U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS-232) — war patrol report SS-232_HALIBUT.pdf

— page 1 —
7-08
: AR-183-78
: HalbT (55-232)
: OPERATOR
: [Handwritten: [Name]]
: DATE 10-16-78

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET - START AND END
NDW-NPPSO-5210/1 (6-78)

— page 5 —
3,362 tons, (42-13N; 142-16E). That same evening she fired four torpedoes at a destroyer for unobserved results and on 8 September, damaged a Spanish
with her deck guns. She returned to Pearl Harbor on 16 September 1943.

HALIBUT departed Pearl Harbor 10 October 1943 for her seventh war patrol. She made an unsuccessful attack on a convoy 31 October and was
held down for most of the day by two torpedo boats. On 2 November she
regained contact with units of the same convoy northwest of Truk and
pressed home an attack to sink EHIB MAHU, 4,653 tons, (29-16N; 134-48E).
When her torpedoes missed a second freighter, she surfaced for a second
try and was forced down by high explosive shells from the enemy. The
continued tracking the target and broke off the chase after two more
unsuccessful attacks. On 5 November she made a torpedo attack for heavy
damage to escort carrier JUNYO in Bungo Channel. Three destroyers held
her down for four hours but she escaped without damage and returned to
Pearl Harbor on 17 November 1943.

On her eighth war patrol, HALIBUT formed a coordinated attack group
with HADDOCK and TULLIBEE. She departed Pearl Harbor 14 December 1943
enroute to the Marianas Islands. On 14 January she made an unsuccessful
attack on a destroyer and was forced down by the enemy who dropped 20
depth charges within fifteen minutes. She then conducted submerged patrol
in the enemy harbors of Guam and Saipan. On 23 January a long range torpedo
attack on an aircraft carrier anchored in Garapan Anchorage was frustrated
by bombs from an enemy patrol plane, followed by depth charge attack by an
enemy destroyer. HALIBUT returned to Midway on 2 February 1944.

During post repair trials 20 rearmoury 1944, a leak was discovered
necessitating dry-dock at Pearl Harbor until 21 March when HALIBUT sailed
for the Nansei Shoto area on her ninth war patrol. On 12 April she shifted
to the east of Okinawa and attacked from inshore, scoring one hit amidships
to sink passenger cargo TAICHI MAHU, 3,213 tons, (23-07N; 129-01E). On
6 April she fired six torpedoes to scatter a convoy, then closed on one
vessel which had become separated from the escorts. She fired three
torpedoes to sink GENBU MAHU, 1,672 tons, (27-20N; 128-15E), then shifted
her attack and fired four torpedoes to sink coastal minelayer KANOME, 450
tons, (27-37N; 126-11E). HALIBUT evaded counter-attack by two patrol craft
and a patrol bomber during which some ninety depth charges were dropped.
On 29 April she bombarded two warplanes and other buildings on the north-
eastern shore of Kume Chima. On 3 May she made a surface gun attack on the
last two of a group of motor sampans, exploding one and leaving the other
ablaze. During this action, three of her men were wounded by machine gun
fire of the enemy and fragments of the exploding sampan. Due to the
critical condition of the wounded men, she departed her patrol area and
returned to Pearl Harbor on 15 May 1944. Pro days later she sailed for
general overhaul at San Francisco, returning to Pearl Harbor, 20 September
1944.

— page 6 —
1st Lt. Halibut (USS 232)
For her tenth war patrol, HALIBUT formed a coordinated attack group with HADDOCK and TUNA. She departed Pearl Harbor on 8 October 1944 and during the Battle for Leyte Gulf (25 October), sank destroyer AKITUKI, 2,700 tons, off Cape Engano (20-29N, 126-36E). On 31 October she rejoined the other submarines to form a scouting line off the west coast of Formosa.

On 14 November 1944, HALIBUT attacked a convoy in Luzon Strait, firing four torpedoes on the largest freighter. About six minutes later she was counter-attacked, apparently by planes equipped with "jikitanchiki", the Japanese version of the magnetic airborne detector. These planes flew so low over the water that they were heard by the men in HALIBUT. After dropping bombs, the aircraft left markers and called in the convoy's surface escorts who delivered a short but severe depth charges run and for some unknown reason at the time the convoy was attacked. One close explosion severely damaged the port side of the conning tower as HALIBUT went deep. This was quickly followed by three or four more explosions. In the forward torpedo room, the skids with their torpedoes jumped up one foot, all deck plates were dislodged, and the pressure hull and tank tops were wrinkled and numerous bolts sheared. When she surfaced it was found that a depth charge had exploded on or very close to the "gun mount (forward). The breech cover was smashed and punctured, and the chamber pushed to port. Her men made temporary repairs and she limped into Japan for emergency repairs on 19 November.

She arrived at Pearl Harbor 1 December 1944 and on 4 December, Lieutenant Commander Ignatius J. Galinstin was relieved by Lieutenant Commander G. F. Gugliotta, U.S.N. For heroic service as commanding officer of HALIBUT, Lieutenant Commander Galinstin was awarded the Navy Cross, the Silver Star Medal and two Gold Stars in lieu of the second and third Silver Star Medal.

HALIBUT departed Pearl Harbor 5 December and arrived at San Francisco on 12 December 1944. She underwent battle damage repairs in the Hunter's Point Naval Shipyard, departing 16 February 1945 for Portsmouth, New Hampshire. On 11 March she arrived at the Portsmouth Navy Yard where damage was found to be too extensive to justify the necessary overhaul. She was placed out of commission on 10 July 1945 and remained in modified reserve status for disposal. Her name was stricken from the Navy list 8 May 1946 and she was sold on 10 January 1947 to the Quaker Shipyard and Machinery Company of Camden, New Jersey.

HALIBUT received 7 battle stars and other awards for the following operations:

1. Star/CUBMARINE WAR PATROL - PACIFIC: 22 Nov 1942 - 15 Jan 1943
2. Star/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL - PACIFIC: 8 Feb 1943 - 30 Mar 1943
3. Star/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL - PACIFIC: 10 Jun 1943 - 26 Jul 1943

— page 7 —
1. STAR/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL - PACIFIC: 20 Aug 1943 - 16 Sep 1943
: 1. STAR/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL - PACIFIC: 10 Oct 1943 - 17 Nov 1943
: 1. STAR/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL - PACIFIC: 21 Mar 1944 - 15 May 1944
: 1. STAR/LEYTE OPERATION: 10 Oct 1944 - 1 Dec 1944
NAVY UNIT COORDINATION: 8 Oct 1944 - 1 Dec 1944
PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION BADGE: 10 Oct 1944 - 1 Dec 1944

COMMANDING OFFICERS
LCDR P. H. Ross, U.S.N.
LCDR J. J. Galantin, U.S.N.
LCDR G. F. Guglietta, U.S.N.
LCDR A. C. Benitez, U.S.N.
LT J. G. Galligan, Jr., U.S.N.
LT F. W. Meyers, U.S.N.

ORIGINAL STATISTICE
LENGTH OVERALL: 311'8"
EXTREME BEAM: 27'4"
STANDARD DISPLACEMENT:
Tons: 1,526
Mean Draft: 15'3"
SUBMERGED DISPLACEMENT:
Tons: 2410
DESIGN SPEED:
Surface: 20.25
Submerged: 8.75
DESIGN DEPTH: 300'
DESIGN COMPLEMENT:
Officer: 6
Enlisted: 54
ARMAMENT:
Torpedo Tubes: (10) 21"
Secondary: (1) 3"/50
(2) .50 cal.
(2) .30 cal.

TORPEDOES:
24

5 Compiled and stenciled
4 Nov 1958 (ks)

— page 8 —
1/5/47
FF12-10/A16-3(5) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01236
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
October 26, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
COUSUBAC PATROL REPORT NO. 79.
U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - REPORT OF FIRST AR
TATATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of First Air Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of CombatGroup 8.5 conf. 1tr. TG8.5/AL6-3 Serial 029 of September 26, 1942.
(B) Consubron TNT conf. 1tr. TG5-10/A16-3 (FB5-101) Serial 042 no date.
(C) Copy of Subject Report.

1. Serious damage to our own forces might easily have resulted from the situation existing on the night of 21-22 September in which the HALIBUT contacted a force of friendly vessels without previous information of their presence. Submarine operational commanders must make every effort to keep submarines informed of friendly vessels in their vicinities if catastrophic results are to be avoided.

2. In considering the wisdom of maintaining daylight surface patrols in enemy controlled waters, Commanding Officers must remember that although the use of radar may prevent a surprise plane attack it does not prevent the enemy from detecting the submarine's presence and routing possible targets clear of the area.

3. The loss of a man overboard on the night of 23 August is regretted. While this's organization and diving procedure should be designed to prevent such an occurrence the possibility of such losses do exist when operating under pressure. However, from the brief comment submitted by the report the conclusion is reached that this Commanding Officer has no adequate check to determine when all hands are below.

DISTRIBUTION
(350ft-42)
List III: SS
Special:
Pl(5), Bt3(5), A1, Consublant (2)
Consubscwespac (2)

R. H. SCHLISHTOV 12/1942
R. A. S. LEBRIDE
Flag Secretary.

43841

— page 10 —
12 August
1120(7) Radar target 16 miles, not sighted.

15 August
1150(7) Received COA: RADAR, 8.5 degrees, 152030, assigning patrol area.

1415(7) Radar target 7 miles.

1416(7) Sighted DTG, did not challenge.

1600(7) Entered assigned patrol area, conducting surface patrol.

16 August
0600(7) Deported patrol area.

0830(7) Hooded Dutch Harbor.

18 August
1215(7) Deported Dutch Harbor for assigned patrol area in accordance with COA. 8.5 Operation Order 7-1/2 of 16 August 1942, current hull ship drills, fire control drills and training drives. Radar again functioning very well, picking up high points of land and aerial targets. Picked up targets on Nader and later sighted PBY at distances 8, 6 and 7 miles. Challenged recognition signals with last plane. Sighted two fighters engaged in tactics, did not challenge.

19 August
0714(7) Sighted PBY flying very low - not picked up on Radar - plane did not challenge.

1245(7) Radar target 12 miles - sighted PBY did not challenge.

20 August
1500(7) Entered assigned patrol area. ATU and surface closing island.

21 August
0531(7) Dove to approach ATU submerged.

0800(7) Had closed to 4000 yards from beach, investigating Chichagof Harbor for alarms of enemy activity. Took and sighted convoy. To signs of enemy activity detected.

1132(7) Had opened island to five miles and decided to surface for surface patrol.

- 2 -

— page 12 —
23 August (continued)
0509(Y) This man was the starboard lookout. 'Then bridge was cleared, there were five people on the bridge, port, starboard and after lookouts, Captain and 0.0.0. No one missed it. But failing to clear the bridge prior to diving. No reason can be advanced for his failing to get below unless he slipped and fell over the side.

0510(Y) Continued to close range and changed course to parallel route. TUT to LORAN. Selected to take submarine-god patrol of harbor, we would catch merchantmen when he put to sea.

0659(Y) Sighted two patrol vessels or small destroyers, range 3900 yards, angle on bow 950 starboard, bearing 1610 relative. Vessels in line of bearing approximately one mile apart. Scattered on line directly to forward of Chiefton Harbor, ATU Sound made contact on scows. Vessels were single-stack, low ships, similar to TOI0ZUR0 Class destroyers.

0700(Y) Vessel nearest MAIBUT dropped two depth charges. ZIG-god for depth charge attack, stayed at periscope depth. Sighted twin float bilge, scuttleway-bomber type 97, headed directly toward ship.

0706(Y) Plane changed course and headed for artillery vessels. Single depth charge. Portrolling vessels sustaining to seaward.

0730(Y) Artillery vessels reversed course and headed for Chiefton Harbor. Plane not sighted.

0838(Y) Scoured from depth charge attack. Continued patrol of line towards LORAN. Depth charge

— page 13 —
23 August (continued)

1942(Y) Surfaced and cleared area to northward at 10 knots. Decided to patrol Cape "Franciscan" tomorrow. Delivered patrol vessels returned to Hawaii while plane kept us down. Delivered route of aircrahnation is as follows: On days of poor visibility, they run about 15 to 20 miles out and hope to sight tons of mountains on ATTU. On days of good visibility, they pick up MARINELLI and keep close inshore. In any case patrol vessels rendezvous with them about twenty miles from Holtz Bay near coast of ATTU.

24 August to 28 August - Submerged patrol by day, surface patrol by night of great circle course from Japan to ATTU and northern coast of ATTU.

28 August 2100(Y) Departed ATTU--for KISKA--and-- in accordance with CONTRACTS 6.5 secret despatch 260005 of August.

29 August to 2 September - Submerged patrol by day of KISKA--and--. Surface patrol by night. Particular attention being paid to track Sirius Point to Tulagi Island and Sirius Point to Scoula Island. Only two days of high visibility.

2 September 2045(Y) Sighted searchlights on KISKA. These lights were sweeping the bay to secure for a period of about an hour. These lights both are and will be type.

3 September to 8 September - Daily submerged patrol of area to prevent any movement of enemy forces going undetected in accordance with CONTRACTS 5.5 secret despatch 030800 of September.

8 September 0400-2000(Y) Submerged patrol of approaches to KISKA Harbor and Northward Reef in accordance with CONTRACTS 5.5 secret despatch 070040 of September.

2000-2400(Y) Surface patrol of Admiral-Kiska line. Anticipating movement of forces reported by CONTRACTS 8.

— page 14 —
U.S.S. [SUBJECT] (J-232) from 07 May 1942 to 01 May 1942

2 September 0000-2200(Y) [SUBJECT] surface patrol of USS [SUBJECT] Island-Lisbon line. First day of surface running since arrival in area.

2200(Y) [SUBJECT] [SUB

— page 15 —
15 September to 17 September - Submerged patrol by day along:
Seichai Islands to intercept any traffic from Holtz to Kiska or Kiska to Holtz as result of Army's activities at Kiska.

20 September:
2000(Y) Left station for Dutch in accordance with CONTRACTOR
3.5 secret despatch 130935.

21 September:
2250(X) Sighted formation of unidentified vessels bearing 0309 (T)
range 4000 yards, course 2700(T), speed 15 knots.
2300(X) Formation identified as three cruisers screened by four destroyers. Changed course to close and investigate.
No friendly forces known to be in area. Have not been sighted by formation.
2305(X) Closed formation by chance of course and going ahead
full on four main generators.
2310(X) Sent contact report, ULTIMATE SUMMARY.
2315(X) Formation changed course to 1000(T).
2335(X) Fell in attern of formation, trailing undetected.
Formation speed 16 knots, course 1000(T). It battle
stations, ready to attack, depending upon positive
identification.

22 September:
0010(X) Tiddler cruiser challenged this vessel. Range 4000 yards.
Exchanged recognition signals; broke off trailing
approach, secured battle stations, resumed course to
Dutch. 'e trailed this formation for one hour and
twenty minutes undetected. Could very easily have had
a sure attack on last cruiser in formation and probably
would have been able to deliver simultaneous attack on
second and third cruiser that had been enemy. This
vessel had no information that 'o'ight encounter our
own forces'encounter Dutch from patrol area.
1025(Y) Sighted PX, altitude 1500 feet, course 3000, range 6
miles. Lat. 53-36-00N, Long 173-56-00E.

23 September:
0913(T) Arrived Dutch Harbor, Unalaska.

-7-

— page 16 —
1. U.S.S. MILITARY - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.

2. The weather accounted in the area as generally favorable for this area. - Indicates generally north-east bracing to northwest with clear weather. The barometric rose and fall in an unpredictable manner, rising or falling as such as line during an all day seascape. Highs are usually limited by the characteristic visibility of this area. - Slight wind, for a short time followed by quick closing mist, fog or rain, for a short period, then another period of excellent visibility. In-shore near Ittu strong ground swell are experienced at 100 feet. Normal swells are about 5 to 6 feet, causing difficult rescue observations. There are a number of days on a wind, with glassy seas and low swells, this condition is retained the day of our first contact, August 23rd, and was very unfavorable for gasoline or-posure, and it is believed affected the screening plane in spotting us. Average air temperature 45°, average water temperature 53°.

3. ITTU IT

— page 18 —
6. DESCRIPTION OF AIRCRAFT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.

Date: Aug. 9
Position: : 22-05-15M
Type: : PBY
Course: : 3300
Altitude: : 5000
Time: : 1725

Aug. 9
: 22-05-18M
: PBY
: 1500
: 3000
: 1731

Aug. 9
: 22-05-20M
: PBY
: 0405
: 3000
: 1733

Aug. 10
: 26-00-00N
: PBY
: 3450
: 3000
: 0755

Aug. 10
: 26-41-00N
: PBY
: 1710
: 1500
: 1435

Aug. 11
: 29-58-00N
: PBY
: 1710
: 4000
: 0958

Aug. 15
: 53-02-00N
: PBY
: 0405
: 1500
: 1415

Aug. 19
: 53-53-45N
: PBY
: 2850
: 2000
: 0714

Aug. 19
: 53-49-00N
: PBY
: 0150
: 2000
: 1245

Aug. 21
: 53-10-00N
: Single float
: : 1500
: 1500

Aug. 23
: 53-08-06N
: Single float
: : 1000
: 0710

Sept. 22
: 53-05-00N
: Single float
: : 1000
: 1000

Sept. 22
: 53-36-00N
: Single float
: : 1500
: 1025

Aug. 23
: 53-36-00N
: Single float
: : 1500
: 1025

— page 19 —
7. SUBJECT: U.S.S. ILIUBUT - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL

8. SUBJECT: ENEMY OF METALS - JAPANESE TRAFFIC IS ROUTED CLOSE INCHES WHENCE POSSIBLE. THIS CONTENTION IS BORN OUT BY ALL THE OBSERVATIONS BY THIS CONVENTION. COASTAL TRAFFIC IS PATROLLED BY DESTROYERS OR SMALL PETROL VESSELS EQUIPPED WITH VARIABLE PITCH SUPERSONIC AND SONIC GEAR. THE ROUTE ALONG ATTACHED TO THE TRAFFIC IS NOT TRAFFIC, WHICH IS ALL TRAFFIC IN THIS AREA, IS SECURED.

During clear weather incoming ships from Japan attempt to close Cape Wrangell about midnight of day of arrival, run down the coast close in-shore, are met off Red Head about dawn by patrolling or escorting vessels and escorted to Holtz Bay where they unload or remain for short period of not unloading. Departing Haltz Bay in time to arrive Buldir Island about midnight of day of arrival at Kiska. Pass Buldir Island to Norway, Kiska, arriving Vega Point about 0700 morning of arrival Kiska - Arribor.

During thick weather incoming vessels from Japan attempt to reach point about 10 miles north of Cape Wrangell, then set course for Red Head where they rendezvous with escort.

Enemy merchantmen are moved with guns of about 4" caliber.

Approach on 23 August was terminated with enemy opening fire with gun and running into harbor when we had to dive.

Depth charge attack 23 August was not persistent and indicated that DD's or patrolling craft may misname depth charges when SS is known to be in area, also that patrolling plane(s) drop nuisance bombs. A total of three depth charges from DD's and 2 bombs or depth charges from plane over period of ten (10) hours.

On September 9 while proceeding full speed to new area, this vessel was illuminated with searchlight from aboard the boat, range unknown, type of vessel unknown, Visibility at this time 500 yards, light fog. Our ship stood a large bright phosphorescence and went to 250 foot, and scores hours, no depth charge dropped - attack not pressed home. From later reports it is believed that this attack was delivered by one of two screening vessels sighted later in the morning by S-32.

-11- ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 20 —
8. (continued).

All depth charge attacks made on this vessel indicated that charges were being dropped astern and at a lesser depth than the ship. This verified in attack on 23 August as DD's or patrolling vessels were watched through periscope as depth charges were dropped. Arrival of plane caused discontinuance of this procedure.

From sound of depth charges it is believed that charges dropped were small ones.

Pinging search

Encounters of this vessel with enemy A/S patrols indicated that enemy vessels use supersonic equipment ranging in KGs from 18-24 and on one occasion below 14 KGs. Search appears to be of a very perfunctory nature and not particularly good. At no time was the H.LIBUT particularly embarrassed by persistent, close search. It appears that enemy A/S vessels depend more on sonic than supersonic equipment.

9. MAJOR DEFECTS EXPERIENCED.

CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR

No. 2 periscope vibrates so badly that it is almost impossible to take a range and bearing with it. This matter has been the subject of correspondence since the acceptance trials of this vessel. It is definitely bad bearings as the entire periscope vibrates now, and this is the third periscope that has been tried in present bearings. Above four knots the entire periscope snears vibrate. This is a serious military hazard and causes the ship the utmost concern.

Main Ballast tank group blows on high pressure manifold leak very badly necessitating scouring those valves during dive to prevent air pockets collecting in main ballast tanks.

#1 air bank located in forward battery well has a leak. This is an old dofot roccurring. Prior to Goparturo Porri, Submarine Base reported this leak but working of line during patrol, caused leak to reopen.

Trim pump is excessively noisy and precludes any use when in vicinity of enemy vessels equipped with sound gear.

-12- MICLOSURE (C)

— page 21 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of First War Patrol

ENGINEERING (ELECTRICAL)

No major defects experienced.

When the ship rolls as much as 25° to 30° as was frequently the case in this area, innumerable gunnery problems were encountered. These were caused by electrolytic seeping through the sealing compound around the cell tops. This necessitated many man hours being expended in washing down jars to remove grounds. Time was not available for remedying this defect prior to start of patrol.

NAVIGATION

The torpedo log is entirely unsatisfactory. Submerged its speed varies from 0 to speed being, made. It entails constant maintenance in order to remain operative. This instrument has been source of trouble since installation. It is strongly recommended that an entire new unit be installed. Performance is absolutely unpredictable.

10. RADIO RECEPTION

Radio reception was complete with exception of COLTASKGNOUT 8.5 secret despatch between "Angoon" and "Corlett". Evidence of Japanese interference nightly on circuit. Last serial sent HALIBUT "Comet", last serial received COLTASKGNOUT 8.5

11. SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions in both patrol areas were noticeably poor. Maximum range by sound 3900 yards. These sound conditions were probably caused by the abnormally large number of volcanic noises. These were always present. Off Atut time were similar to "olouking" and "rumbling". Off Kiska each morning at 0630 sound picked up a rhythmic noise sounding exactly like a piledriver. This in addition to regular noises, possibly those were from Kiska Harbor.

At odd intervals, these noises resounded light high speed srows causing "sound" to report a contact, causing undue hopes to be raised.

Any vessel in these waters should not be surprised at any noises emanating from the sound gear.

-13- ENGLISH (C)

— page 22 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of First Patrol.

Off Kiska at intervals of about every two hours definite
rushing noises were heard through the hull and saip felt to rock,
but no indication was picked up on sound gear, and nothing was
in sight at any time. It is believed that this is volcanic
action in this area.

It was noticed that as the saip increased distance from the
islands the unusual water noises subsided and finally disappeared entirely.

12. HEALTH OF THE SUBMARINE:
The health and morale of the crew were excellent during
the entire patrol. There were no illnesses except minor complaints of no consequence. Vitamin tablets were issued in accordance with current instructions. The food was good, well cooked
and varied. We were fortunate in having on board one COSTA and
two cooks. Thus one cook was available for baking, and it is
strongly recommended that all boats of this class carry three
cooks. The foreign arrangements with highly desirable if not
a necessity. In addition these cooks stood look-out watches
(4 hours per day).

The boat was comfortable throughout the entire period of
operations. The air conditioningsystem was used daily to prevent sweating and CO2 absorption was spread daily at beginning of dive. One-half of can being used each day. This benefit
gained by this procedure cannot be praised too highly.

13. MILES STEAMED:
9,012.7 miles. Miles submerged - 1,126.9
Miles surface - 7,885.8

14. FUEL OIL EXPENDED:
72,406 gallons.

15. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE RATING:
TORPEDOES FUEL PROVISIONS
24 No. 40,042 S.I. 21 days. Unlimited 10 days.

-14- ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 23 —
16. FLOTOR CLUSING. ENDING OF PTROI.

Patrol was terminated upon orders of COMT. SCHROFF 8.5

17. REMARKS

Red lights were used for night illumination from air lock door forward. Dark and light red bulbs being used. About two-thirds of the patrol had been in the dark. "Christmas Tree" in the Control Room was destroyed. The effect of the red bulbs to a large extent. Lieutenant W.P. SCHROFF, U.S. Navy ensign officer and Chief Electrician's mate A.D. H.BELIC, U.S.N., devised a resistance valve that inserted in series with the PT-7R circuit communicated through a spare switch on the I.C. board. This marked the end of the patrol. The indicator board was installed in the control room. It is believed that this alteration should be included in every such circuit on this and subsequent classes of boats. A marked reduction in the eye strain on personnel in the control room was found by a report and the dark adaptability of the lookouts later improved.

The following information concerning lights sighted or suspected on the various islands, is submitted:

Lights are located near Kiska Harbor, those lights are of the type as well as built type.

No light or structure sighted on Buldir, but track of traffic past this island both at night and during the day indicates the possibility of such a light.

A very definite man made structure is located on top of the mountain on the island of Island of the Saroshi group. It is believed that this structure may house a navigational light of some kind. The light was not seen but is believed present. The structure is plainly evident from sea.

Lights were noticed on Kresta Point, Attu Island. It is believed that this light is used to communicate with patrol vessels, and also to serve as a landfall for vessels coming from Japan.

-15-

— page 24 —
16- ENGLISH SUBJECT: U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of First war Patrol.

In lieu of equalizing charges, a one-hour overcharge was put in every five days.

Time on station - 31 days.
Fuel used on station - 39,906 gallons.
Miles on station - 5,252.0 miles (4,134.3 surfaces)
Fuel (gal/mile) on station - 7,60 gallons per mile.
Fuel (gal/day) on station - 1,288 gallons per day.
AVG. S.O. at start of charge - 1,187.
AVG. duration of charge - 4.77 hours.
Total miles steamed - 9,012.7

— page 26 —
705-10/A16-3 (F05-101)
Serial 042

DECLARATION OF WAR:
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten, The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: U.S.S. MILITARY (32332), First "Air Patrol - Corrientes on.

Reference: (a) CO MILITARY Conf 35-232/16-3 Serial 015 of September 23, 1942.

1. Commander Submarine Squadron Ten concerns in this report are in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the first paragraph by Commander Task Group Light Point Five.

2. It is noted that the MILITARY was not informed of the presence of our own forces accounted on the night of 21 - 22 September, which were traced for a period of one hour and twenty minutes before they were identified as friendly. The Navy had been so identified it is conceivable that one or more of these cruisers would have been lost or seriously damaged due to the lack of information of our forces operating in this area.

3. The excessive vibration of 12 periscope experienced will be remedied at the next refit by the MILITARY.

4. The beneficial effects of the use of CO, absorbent daily at the beginning of all day submarine period is noted. Further use of it is recommended by submarines on patrol.

DECLASSIFIED BY:

— page 27 —
44 24/1

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
November 11, 1942.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. H.L.I.BUT (SS 232) - Report of Second War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) ComTaskGroup 8.5 conf. 1tr. T38.5/AL6-3
    Serial 039 of October 24, 1942.
    (B) Copy of Subject Report.

1. Though lacking ir. results because of relatively little enemy activity, the Commander Officer displayed commendable aggressiveness on this patrol which should bear fruit when more productive areas are assigned on future missions.

2. The description of the maneuvers employed by the "Q" ship encountered on October 11, 1942, should be of value to all Commanding Officers encountering a vessel of this nature.

R. H. ENGLISH.

DISTRIBUTION:
(350M-42)
List III: SSs.
Special:
Pl(5), EN? (5), ZI (5),
Consub (2),
Consubsoe (2).

E. R. S. LINDBUILD,
Flag Secretary.

— page 28 —
1. From: The Commander Task Group Light Point Five (Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One).
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Second War Patrol.
1. Forwarded.
2. ---
3. ---
4. The commendable aggressiveness demonstrated on this patrol, as on the prior one, is certain to pay dividends in the end.
5. Due to the immediate departure of the HALIBUT for FEAR HARBOR no attempt has been made to investigate the cause of or to remedy the difficulty experienced in attempting to withdraw the torpedo in number 6 tube.
6. ---

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 29 —
1. U.S.S. HILLDUT - Report of Second Patrol.
: 2. PERIOD 1942 - OCTOBER 23, 1942.
: 3. North of Alaska and Kiska and.
: 4. Commanded Task Group C-5 Operation Order 19-42 of October 2, 1942.

1. HULLDUT - In accordance with Commander Submarine Patrol Fleet, Confidential Letter No. 6-42, the following report of the U.S.S. HILLDUT's Second Air Patrol is submitted:

2 October
17:00 (UT)
Departed Dutch Harbor aircraft patrol area. Heavy seas and head winds. Could not run at 3 engine speed.

3 October
Trip dive.

4 October
1055 (UT)
Intercepted contact report of cargo vessel. Increased speed to 19.5 knots. Changed course to northeast intercept point.

1113 (UT)
Received message indicating change of course. Scuttles sea ice indicating expected interception of enemy.

1320 (UT)
Received message giving new position of transport bearing 330 distant 110 miles from Kiska. Continued course sea ice.

1324 (UT)
Shooting planes directed back this vessel in forward of closest approaches of enemy.

1500 (UT)
Radio direction finder beeps. No change in heading. Radio critical 1050 or 1300 position. All but one contact.

1510 (UT)
Sighted enemy bomber B-24 headed from one enemy base. Enemy reported 2900 (T) at 1:30. Enemy aircraft 1.5 miles distant. No indication of enemy.

1543 (UT)
Sighted 2nd PT returning to base. Enemy from bearing 300° (T). Still indicating no cross or intercept course.

1550 (UT)
Sighted enemy aircraft 1.5 miles distant. No indication of enemy.

-1-

— page 31 —
U.S.S. "ILLIOT" - Report of Second Patrol.

5 October (continued)
0821(Y) Plane sent out contact report of this vessel.
0823(Y) Plane started report.
0830(Y) Sent position report.
0833(Y) Plane exited if he was circling us.
0835(Y) Replied in the affirmative. Plane reported. Continued surface patrol.

7 October
0700(Y) Made trim dive.
1304(Y) Sighted three B-24's bearing 2600(T) distant 15 miles on course 1900(T).

8-9 October - Surface patrol with trim dive daily.

10 October - Surface patrol with trim dive daily.
0840(Y) Sighted 1 B-24, 53-52-30(N) Long 175-16-00(E), alti-tude 1500 feet, distant 10 miles, on course 2700(T).

11 October
0555(Y) Sighted 6 B-24, 54-45-30(N) - Recharged recognition signals.
0940(Y) Intercepted contact report of enemy freighter.
0947(Y) Increased speed to 19 knots.
1007(Y) Changed course to 2400(T). Sighted bomb burst from plane heading ship.
1142(Y) Attached to a small craft. Sighted 2 miles ahead of freighter.
1120(Y) Freighter continually changing course to left. In-possible to turn position 8 miles ahead. Freighter spotted 13.5 knots.
1337(Y) Decided to close freighter for surface attack. Patrol plane leaving ship.
1400(Y) Freighter changed course toward us, flying 150 aircraft/sec. Freighter changed course toward us, flying 150 aircraft

— page 32 —
1428-32(Y)  Loud explosion. DUBL. Build 500 yards check of this vessel. Target not visible due to spray until just before firing second torpedo. Frighten openc fire from concealed deck gun, using high explosive shells. All missiles, overs no shots.

: 1428-50(Y)  Fired second torpedo. TNT set up clock accurately. 1428-55(Y)  Energy torpedo passed down port side distant 10 yards from side.

: 1429(Y)  Manuvoroc to evac possibilities of more torpedoes and to bring stern tubes to bar. Frighten light-in water. Deliver second torpedoes passed directly under target.

: 1438(Y)  Fired after tube. This torpedo a 1k 2V. Single on bow 10P6port, range 1500 yards - gyro angle 20feet. Fired another torpedo fire after tubes. Miss 1k 2V. All torpedoes fired at. initial depth setting. Frighten screws breaking water.

: 1440(Y)  Frighten continued to close range firing high explosive shells. Increased speed to full, but retention. Firmly believe that torpedoes are running under target and not exploding. Decide to continue firing. Have fired four torpedoes, three missed. As to the first torpedo; the following is submitted: Torpedo exploded 32 seconds after firing. Fifty seconds after firing an enemy torpedo passed close aboard to port.

: 2000(Y)  Sent H.M.S. "DALY" LONDON.

: 2059(Y)  Received Cocksack pump C.5, Cdr LONDON.

12-13 October - Submerged patrol during cycle 1 of Kiska-Sagua. Surface patrol during night.

- 4 -

— page 33 —
14 October 1100(Y) 1300(Y) 14-15 October 1100(Y) 1500(Y) 1515(Y) 1530(Y) 1545(Y) 1830(Y) 2100(Y) 2110(Y) 2300(Y)

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

**Subject:** U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Second Patrol.

**14 October 1100(Y)**
**Intense air bombing Kiska. Reticles took place for an hour on one-half.**
**Sinkie sighted over Kiska harbor. Probably result of army bombing.**

**14-15 October**
**Submerged patrol during daylight. Surprise patrol during night. Listening on periscope antenna ten minutes each hour on the hour for aircraft contacts.**

**16 October 1100(Y)**
**Stretched submarine patrol off Kiska. Intercept patrol report from searching plane giving location of enemy forces southwest of Kiska. Received plane report that he was trailing a C-47.**
**Stretched plane report to radio. Hard explosion through hull. Nothing in sight. Did not listen.**
**Stretched plane report to radio. Hard loud explosion through hull. Did not observe listening period. Potentially in sight. Minor explosions heard on port side. Sound of air was not in it is expected that straffing would sound like.**
**Sinkie two B-261s he detected direct toward ship. Started down, hard similar explosions as before.**
**He is loud explosive, closely resembling light bomb close aboard. Explosions follow by rushing of water. All quiet nothing in sight. For action of ship five miles north of Seul. Island.**
**Surfaced.**
**Received C-47s, 3, 5, 15,

— page 34 —
17 October
0100(Y) Start: 10 nautical miles, altitude 1500 on course 270°(T) in Lst 53-26-00(N) Long 17-10-00(3).

18, 19, 20, 21 October - Surface patrol of area with tri-civ daily.

21 October
1500(Y) Depart: patrol area for Dutch in accordance with Coastguard 8.5 "Lay Point".

22 October
1023(W) Sighted P3Y bearing 180°(T) distance 14 miles, alt-take 1000 ft., on e.stirly course in Lst 33-42-20N, Long 173-40-30N.

1240(W) Sighted P3Y bearing 350°(T) on course 050°(T) distant 6 miles, altitude 500 feet in Lst 53-45-00N, Long 172-54-00N.

23 October
0800(W) Arrived Dutch.

— page 36 —
6. ALERT SIGNED:
NO. Date: Disposition: Type: Description: Captain: Position: Tango
1. 00ct.4: 7 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1000 T: L.C. 53-40-00N: 1310(1)
2. 00ct.4: 7 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 0900 T: 1543(2)
3. 00ct.4: 4 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1000 T: 179-56-00C: 1320(1)
4. 00ct.4: 5 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 1555(1)
5. 00ct.5: 10 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00B: 0755(7)
6. 00ct.6: 10 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 176-18-00C: 0310(1)
7. 00ct.7: 15 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 176-32-30C: 1304(7)
8. 00ct.10: 10 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 176-32-30C: 0340(7)
9. 00ct.11: 10 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 035(7)
10. 00ct.11: 10 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
11. 00ct.11: 10 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
12. 00ct.14: 10 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
13. 00ct.16: 10 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
14. 00ct.17: 10 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
15. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
16. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
17. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
18. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
19. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
20. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
21. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
22. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
23. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
24. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
25. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
26. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
27. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
28. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
29. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
30. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
31. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
32. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
33. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
34. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
35. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
36. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
37. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
38. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
39. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
40. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
41. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
42. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
43. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
44. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
45. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
46. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
47. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
48. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
49. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
50. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
51. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
52. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
53. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
54. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
55. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
56. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
57. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
58. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
59. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
60. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
61. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
62. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
63. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
64. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
65. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
66. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
67. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
68. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
69. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
70. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
71. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
72. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
73. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
74. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
75. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
76. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
77. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
78. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
79. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
80. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
81. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
82. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
83. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
84. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
85. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
86. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
87. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
88. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
89. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
90. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32-00C: 1100(7)
91. 00ct.22: 14 mi. : B-24: 1200 T: 1500: 1200 T: 175-32

— page 37 —
7. JULY OF ATTACKS.

At 0925(Y) October 11 received report from patrol plane of locating enemy cargo-vessel. Changed course to intercept. Sighted enemy planes and sank. 1045(Y) sighted freighter on horizon. Sighting positions considerably in error or there are two ships out here. Changed course to close freighter sighted. Changed course to get sight miles ahead of enemy for submarine attack. 1200 ran into rain s'uall. Decided to close enemy on estimated eastbound bearing. 1220 ran squall lifted. Enemy distant 6 to 7 miles. Escaped periscope course. Sailed 2 miles from enemy. Enemy sighted 3 miles. Enemy sighted

— page 38 —
10 - EXCLUSIVE (3)

Subject: U.S.S. KALIBUT - Report of Second War Patrol.

8. BIRTH 3/12/1943.

2-ship as described above used 3" deck gun and torpedoes, and maneuvered to avoid.

9. MAJOR DEFECTS EXPERIENCED.

CONTINUATION AND REPAIR

Third stage cooler in steel decked hull's pressure air compressor developed leak in coil where supporting strap is brass welded across coil.

This leak may have been caused by a faulty weld or by corrosive action. Coil replaced with spare.

Third stage suction valve in starboard air compressor broke in two and was replaced with spare.

One or more main ballast tank sea checks, in 10% blow lines, leak allowing sea water to back up in lines to manifold.

12. Periscope vibrates so badly that it is almost impossible to take a range and bearing with it. This matter has been the subject of correspondence since the acceptance trials of this vessel. It is definitely bad bearings as the entire periscope vibrates now, and this is the third periscope that has been tried in present bearings. Above four knots the entire periscope shears vibrate. This is a serious military hazard and causes the ship the utmost concern.

EXCLUSIVE

To major engineering difficulty was experienced throughout patrol.

Recurrent battery grounds were, however, still in evidence.

GUNTRY

Torpedo in number 6 torpedo tube cannot be hit down. Torpedo will move for 12 in tube but will not move aft. This condition discovered October 11, 1942 after pre-cruising tubes for surface firing. A tube was used in the attempt to remove torpedo, but of no avail. Reason for this casualty has not yet been determined.

— page 41 —
10. (continued).

The idea of coordinating patrol planes and submarine activity is showed great promise and if properly worked out, should result in exactly increased destruction of enemy shipping.

Reception of low frequency for schedule was excellent during daytime, and the high frequency receiver was utilized for aircraft circuits. At night it was frequently necessary to shift to high frequency for schedules, low frequency not being readable.

Daily at 1700 GMT (0500Z) the noise level completely bleached out low frequency for transmission. This twilight effect also covered the high frequency band with the exception of the highest frequency. From 0630-0900 GMT reception was uniformly poor due to twilight effect. This seemed to extend over all bands.

11. SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions were normal for this area and no density layers experienced.

12. HEALTH AND WEATHER.

Health conditions were not as good as on the last patrol. The following disorders and injuries being treated during the patrol:
- Dizziness and vertigo: 2
- Gastro-enteritis, acute: 1
- Cataracts, acute: 1
- Common cold: 2
- Sinusitis, acute: 1
- Constipation: 5
- Lymphedema: 2
- Laceration: 2

13. TELESCOPE VIEW.

Telescope to station -- 500.3
Telescope from station -- 500.8
Telescope on station -- 4040.5

- 12 - INCLOSURE (B)

— page 42 —
14. FUEL OIL EXPENDED.
    57,000 gallons.

15. FACTORS OF DEDUCE REMAINING.
    TORPEDOES 20 37,000 gallons
    PROVISIONS 25 days
    FRESH WATER 30 days
    PROVISIONS 30 days

16. FACTOR CAUSING DEDUCE OF PATROL.
    Patrol ordered ended by CONTAMINATE GROUP 0.5 THAY POINT.

17. REMARKS.
    This patrol was unique in that the majority of the patrol was spent on the surface using patrol planes as scouts. The weather was perfect for this type of operations, and radius of activity of this vessel was unusually increased. While no damage was inflicted on the enemy by this vessel, the lost opportunities, due to poor communications, indicate the great possibilities of this type of operations.

It is believed that once the pilots' new the submarines problems, and what information is desired, this type of operation will be increasingly successful in this area.

The need for a gun forward was never more clearly demonstrated than in the attack on 11 October. The 3-ship land gun aft and it would have been possible for this vessel to trail at 1000 yards and shell continuously. "With the gun aft, this procedure was impossible.

During the four day subsequent patrol of Niska and Segula two peculiar structures were noticed on Segula Island. It is possible that they are of volcanic origin but they appear to be range-finder located in low swamps. These are located, one on the western slope of Segula nearest Niska Harbor, and the other on the eastern slope behind Segula point. It is believed that photographs might show whether these structures are manmade or volcanic.

The following day a structure was seen by the parisense officer, located on the right tangent of Sirius Point, which looked like a radio ship with two masts. This ship is well concealed and blends into the background very nicely.

- 13 - EMICLATURE (B)

— page 43 —
17. TUNNELS (Continued)
Tide on station - 16 days.
Fuel used on station - 4,455 gallons.
Tides on station - 4,945.5 miles (Jurassic 4,756.7)
(Tidal datum 1920)
Fuel (gal/alk) on station - 9.79.
Tidal (gal/day) on station - 2,700.
Average J.S. at start of charge - 1160.
Average duration of charge - 5.4 hours.
Total miles stenciled - 6,126.6.

- 14 - HIDLOSSURE (2)

— page 44 —
12-10/16-3(5)/ SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET.
(12)
Caro of Fleet-Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
January 21, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
(COMBINED COMMANDER'S REPORT NO. 123
U.S.S. HALTUR - WAR SHIP)
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HALTUR (SS232) - Report of Third War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Consubidiv 101 conf. 1tr 116-3 of Tunnery 19, 1943, and copy of Subject War Patrol.

1. The third war patrol of the HALTUR was exceeded in length and was more than thoroughly covered and the 3rd radar was used well and was an important factor in the preliminary results.

2. Fine hits out of 19 torpedoes, or 47.4% hits, set an example for all submarine commander officers to follow.

3. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, is in general agreement with the opinion expressed in paragraph 4 of Commander Submarine Division 101 basic letter, concerning the amount of spread to be used. This figure of three-quarters of a target length between adjacent torpedoes, at the target track, is given as a general thumb-rule and subject to occasional exceptions.

4. The Commanding Officer and all hands on the HALTUR are heartily concentrated on a job well done.

5. The HALTUR is credited with having inflicted the following damage:

| SINK | | |
|------|--|--|
| 1    | - | Passenger-freighter | 10,000 tons |
| 1    | - | Freighter | 7,000 tons |
| 1    | - | Freighter | 6,780 tons |
| 1    | - | Freighter | 6,500 tons |
| Total: | 30,280 tons |

DAMAGED

| 1 | Passenger-freighter | 8,000 tons |
|--|||

While it seems probable that this ship was sunk, it is assessed as damaged because of lack of sufficient observations.

-1-

— page 45 —
12-10/A16-3(5)/ SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FILET
(12)

Serial 082

CONFIDENTIAL

COLLIER PATROL REPORT NO. 123
U.S.S. HALLIUT - THIRD WAR PERIOD.

'Subject: U.S.S. HALLIUT (SS232) - Report of Third War Patrol.

J. H. BROWN, U.S. Acting.

DISTRIBUTION:
(11-43)
List III, SS
Special:
PL(5), EN3(5), ZL(5)
Consubstant (2), X3(1),
Consubscowscbance (2),
Subschool, N.L. (2).

J. A. WOODRUFF, Acting Flag Secretary.

— page 46 —
1. USS. HILBURT - Report of Third 'ar Patrol
Period from Nov 22, 1942 to Jan 15, 1943.

2. Commanded by Lt. Cmdr. J. W. Smith, USNR, RCN
Ordered to proceed to the patrol area at 1:00 p.m. on Nov 22, 1942.

3. Arrived Pearl Harbor on October 31, 1942 from Second War Patrol. Commenced refit on November 1, 1942 by Submarine Base Commander and Subron Torpedo Officer. Dredged in
2602-663

— page 47 —
1315(X)  U.S.S. H.L.PUT - REPORT OF THIRD PT.MOL (Cont'd)
: 1315(X)  November 26, 1942
: 1015(X)  Follow up motor on gyro heated up excessively. Installed spare which acted similarly. Unable to determine cause of trouble. Out out follow up system and steered by magnetic compass.
: 1315(X)  SDR radar out of commission.
: 1015(X)  Notified O.C. SUBSTATION and COLT. SGN 7.5 or expected arrival at thirty mile circle at 0600(Y), November 27, 1942 - one day behind schedule.

: 1015(X)  November 27, 1942
: 1015(X)  Contacted escort to I.D.A.Y.
: 1015(X)  Record Submarine Base, 3D radar, and installation of blower inpuLler. Washed, receiving 14,066 gallons.

: 1015(X)  November 28, 1942
: 1015(X)  Transferred Basim T. Dicks, USN to Submarine Base, I.D.A.Y. This officer, who reported aboard just prior to our departure from R.N.L, was found to suffer from chronic seasickness which completely incapacitated him for duty during the passage to I.D.A.Y.
: 1015(X)  Deported I.D.A.Y. on account of seasickness.
: 1015(X)  Gyro apparently operating satisfactorily.
: 1015(X)  Gyro following up motor on overhanging. Decided to return to I.D.A.Y.
: 1015(X)  Recorded at Submarine Base. Gyro electricians from Base commenced checking gyro. Unable to determine reason for overheating of motor and installed Submarine Base spare in order not to detain us further.

: 1015(X)  November 29, 1942
: 1015(X)  Received COLT SGN 7 degasth relative to entry of freighter into our area on December 6, 1942.
: 1015(X)  Deported MIDAY in company with escort.
: 1015(X)  Passed H.D.DOCK crewmate I.D.A.Y. Escort departed to accompany P.DOCK.
: 1015(X)  Sighted BY on escorting course, distance 10 miles.
: 1015(X)  Sighted BY and exchanged recognition signals.
: 1015(X)  Crossed International Beta Line and changed date to December 1, 1942.

: 1015(X)  December 1-4, 1942
: 1015(X)  Uncomfortable. Made daily training drives. "Gather good and seas fairly calm. Zigzagged during daylight. Made good 300 miles per day. On evening of December 4, S.J. radar out out of commission. Unable to locate source of trouble.

: 1015(X)  (A)

— page 48 —
1.3.3. SUBJECT: U.S.S. LIBBY - REPORT OF THE 2ND STERNAL (Cont'd)

December 5, 1942
- Gather story. 'Find and scan rising and barometer dropping.
- After twenty-four hours of trouble shooting, the cause of the 3rd radar failure was traced to a defective coaxial cable. Rader can be made to operate by flexing this cable when radar goes out.
- Took shot of water down hull induction, stripping nine blades on supply blower I-picllcr. .ind and seas high and wind direction continually shifting.

December 6, 1942
- Weather still very stormy with heavy seas and wind of 40 knot velocity.
- Repaired blower implorer by straightening and reinstalling eight of the stripped blades. Blower ran smoothly at reduced speed and was sufficient for ventilation purposes.

December 7, 1942
- Interdicted area at 400 30' N and headed for coast at southern edge of area. 'ind and sea had abated by this time.
- Dived and continued to close coast.
- Surfaced. Still about twenty miles from coast. Ran north and south charging batteries before closing coast further. Sighted lights of seven sampans and several lights on beach. 3rd radar operating intermittently.

December 8, 1942
- Made simultaneous visual and radar contact, broad on starboard bow, range 600 yards. Changed course to bring bearing on quarter to track with radar. 'mile change course, radar lost contact and target disappeared in dark clouds on horizon. Jearched for target until 0130 but unable to regain contact.
- Sighted contact just astern of 3rd contact. 3rd contact was not identifiable. 3rd contact was

— page 50 —
1400(K)
Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Third War Patrol.
December 9, 1942 (continued)
hugs shore line very closely along this portion of the coast, and takes arc difficult to pick up against the mountains background. (Contact #5).
After abandoning attack, closed coast to about three and a half miles.
Sighted large freighter (Contact #6) proceeding up the coast, range about 14,000 yards, altitude about 20,000 feet, speed about 8 knots. It appeared to be about 10,000 tons, slightly loaded. This was apparently the one we had been fishing for. It was a close to the beach and as after sunset and raining or snowing along the coast, was very difficult to see. Although insufficient daylight existed for a submarine approach it was still too light to surface. Decided to head north, parallel to the coast. Put initial set up on TDC and when we surfaced at the freighter should have been 4000 yards on our port beam. Unable to establish sight or radar contact and as sound had not picked up target before we surfaced, he may have put into one of the coves or small harbors along this portion of the coast. Continued northward up the coast, searching for the freighter but could not regain contact.
Decided to run northward along the coast for 12 miles to get ahead of the freighter. It was not too difficult to get on the coast, and when we were sure we were on the coast, reverse course in attempt to intercept the freighter. Sighted numerous ships, all little more than a few hundred yards distant.
2257(K)
Made radar contact on starboard 55ft, range 6000 yards. Commenced tracking target and found it to be on south-early course.
2306(K)
Retreated course and continued to track target.
2325(K)
Determined target to be 1400(T), speed 10 knots. Target to be bearing 180 degrees to port, speed 10 knots. Target was very dark; it had crossed the coast. Radar was working nicely and could now pick up four targets, two large and two small with the two large ships apparently in column and the two small ones closer on the flank of the convoy.
December 10, 1942
0004(K)
Reached position, 6000 yards, 60° on starboard bow of leading target. The light was very dark; it had crossed the coast and was working nicely and could now pick up four targets, two large and two small with the two large ships apparently in column and the two small ones closer on the flank of the convoy.
-5-
ANNOTATION: (A)

— page 51 —
0000(K) U.S.S. HALIBUR - Report of Third Patrol.
December 10, 1942 (continued)
Sample abaft our port beam between us and target and was afraid for a minute. We would interfere with approach.
0006(K) Came loft to course at 903 track. Planned to fire three bow tubes at leading large target and then shift to second ship and fire the three remaining bow tubes.
0015(K) Sighted ship on port bow. Appeared to be a large transport but was not the target which the radar indicated to be the leading large target ship upon which we were making our approach. Continued to close track on leading target.
0017(K) Sighted leading ship which was another transport larger than first one sighted.
0019(K) Sighted two escort vessels, one forward of port beam and the other ahead on the convoy. Port beam and on the other side of the convoy. Forward not apparent as two AP's in line of bearing with two AABs. Continued on in larger distance transports which was 3/4 for side of convoy from us.
0021(K) Fired 2" diver sent spread fire tubes 1/2", 1/4", and 1/8" at loading transport, range 2000 yards. One magnetic hit, midships on transport. Bar burst of flame followed by smoke and debris and whole-mind shock of ship scored to lift into the air. Several minutes later it could be seen that the transport was sinking. Its stern was not visible and the bow was pointing into the air at an angle of 20°.
0022(K) After firing, it was seen that the position of the near destroyer, which was about to port, distance about 1500 yards, made it impossible for us to swing left to bring remaining bombs to bear on the second transport. Surge right and saw that by making a large turn we could fire at stern shot at this target, however. Hade re-dy tubes 9 and 10.
0025(K) Steadied on new firing course and fired a 1 1/2" di-vergent spread fire tubes 9 and 10, range 1500 yards, at second transport. Two magnetic hits.
0026(K) Destroyer on far side of convoy was seen to turn in our direction, radar range, 1700 yards, bearing 250° relative. Desert on aircraft side turned toward convoy, heading across our stern, radar range, 1500 yards. He did not observe the effect of the hits on the second transport as we were more concerned with the maneuvers of the destroyer and avoiding them. The 3J radar initiated contact with the two destroyers and gave continuous range and bearings which assisted greatly in choosing direction courses. The ranges to the destroyers increased rapidly and it is believed that we were never seen.
-6- MICLOSUN (A)

— page 52 —
U.S.S. MILIUT - Report of Third Patrol

December 10, 1942 (Continued)
0030(K) Heard first of clevcn explosions, six of which sounded like depth charges and the remainder like underwater explosions in ships hit. It this time we could see bursts of flame rising into cir from the two transports.

0055(K) Changed course to 090°(T), deciding to clear vicinity and spend next several days of southeast coast of HOKKI.DO.

0105(K) Heard two distant underwater explosions. Although we were approximately ten miles from the scene of the action, the explosions were of sufficient intensity to be both felt and heard.

Poor visibility made positive identification of the targets in the above attack difficult. From what could be seen the following description is submitted. Both ships were 'assigned type ships probably constructed to naval auxiliary transports. The first ship attacked appeared to be larger of the two, tonnage estimated at 10,000 tons. It was a composite superstructure type with three decks and one medium straight funnel cylinders, similar to the BUENOS AIRES KARU. The second ship was a similar type but a little smaller, about 8000 tons, of the same general appearance as the TAKUTAHO KARU. It is believed that the tonnage estimate of the two ships is conservative in as much as the larger of the two filled 3/4's of the field of 7500 binoculars at a range of 1200 yards and the freeboard of both vessels was very large.

0610(K) Divd and checked north. Seas were rough and ran at 100 feet, current not stationary off KOKI.DO. Boat was extremely difficult to hold when we came to periscope depth for observations and we broached several times. Number two periscope was better. Had rigged heater at bottom of periscope well which seemed to help climate some of the moisture. Performance of SJ radar during previous evening was encouraging as it did not go out once. Had taped defective coaxial cable to stiffen it and this seems to have temporarily carried the effect.

1616(K) Surfaced. Seas calmer and temperature considerably higher. Continued northward to make landfall on ERIMO S.KI LIGHT. Shortly after surfacing, St. Elmo's fire appeared to top of periscopes and radar mast, lighting top of boat considerably. Now of no way to eliminate this. It appeared several times during the patrol.

- 7 -

EICLOSEUNE (A)

— page 53 —
1. U.S.S. YALIBUT - REPORT OF THIRD WAR STATION (COSTUD)

December 11, 1942
0320(K) SIGHTED ARRIO 3-KI LIGHT, distances 21 miles. Light was of normal brilliance exhibited clear-cut tactics.

0610(K) Submerged about 15 miles off coast in steamer lane between HUSH-RO and ENROL SAIL. Sighted lights of several ships just before diving.

0500(K) Sighted or had sound contacts with twelve seamen during the day. Several of us struck off course to maneuver to avoid. Sea was extremely flat and had to use extreme caution with paracope exposures to keep from being seen.

1821(K) Surface and not course for ENTER DARK, planning to dive in outer steamer lane. Sighted four seamen during the night.

December 12, 1942
0616(K) Submerged. Mind and sea had increased during the night and had retarded proper progress so that we were approximately 40 miles off the coast. Continued to course.

1530(K) Sighted six seamen during the day.

1930(K) Surface. Headed seaward to put new light in magnetic compasses. Handed on to lock for cause of bailing noise in superstructure. Found noise was caused by section of athwartships bulkhead which had broken loose and was banging on the ship rolled. Launched loose section to prevent it from moving.

2214(K) Made radar contact broad on port beam, range 7500 yards. (Contact 5). Target was apparently on northerly course. Changed course to parallel target's course, bringing target bearing on starboard bow and commenced tracking. Determined target's course to be 0270, speed 12.5 knots. Passed target aboard, range 5400 yards and made first sight contact. Visibility was extremely poor due to low clouds and snow and about all that could be determined was that target was a large, coal burning vessel. . . . as we went ahead, gaining bearing, sight contact was lost at about 6000 yards.

2342(K) Came to course for 90° track. Had sight contact immediately from 4000 yards to firing point.

2355(K) First I 1/2 divergent agreed from tubes 3. 4, and 5 at range of 1250 yards. Target torpedoes at target. Flashes of all three hits were plainly discerned on the bridge and by their light target was identified as a three island freighter of approximately 7000 tons similar to the LISBOA LUN. Three minutes later heard loud explosion and saw larger instantaneous glow of light around freighter. Immediately following this:

--8-- EXCLUSIVE (A)

— page 54 —
1942 (continued)
explosion, freighter's bow was seen pointing into the air at an angle of about 45°. Fire was observed breaking out in midship section as it sank.

December 12, 1942
Fleet very loud explosion from freighter. It was of sufficient intensity to shake the whole ship although range to the target was about 2000 yards. Freighter no longer visible. Radar operator reported that he had lost contact at 2100 yards. There were no survivors.

0003(1) Retired to eastward, clearing the vicinity to complete battery charge.

0045(1) Sighted lighted sentry. Encountered to avoid.

0052(1) Submerged. Another port, low overcast, sloshed and snow, heavy seas. Closed coast.

1120(1) Surfaced. High wind and seas slowed speed of advance to 4 knots.

December 14, 1942.
0539(K) Submerged. Continued toward coast. The effect of the heavy seas encountered was being felt in the material condition of the boat. Several sections of superstructure plating were loose and banging. After trim gained about 2500 lbs a day from sea. Bow buoyancy went would not leave at times, believed due to misalignment of operating gear shifting. Number two portside still foggy particularly in the morning after first during. The higher water temperature caused to clear up the water after we had been down for about three hours.

0120(K) Surfaced. Retreated more shipping lane, 15-20 miles off the coast. Sighted three sunken Curing night.

December 15, 1942.
0000(1) Dived about 15 miles off shore and headed for coast.

1101(1) Sighted small vessel under sail and at anchor, headed northward close to the beach. It was very small to the escort vessel at about 10 knots. (Contact 29) to be the size one fifth two ships rigged. (Contact 29) Sighted small freighter. Report 500 tons, very close to the beach, headed southwest. Believe it was out of NDA. (Contact 143).

1130(1) Surfaced. Sea was calm, and noon, now in first quarter, was very bright. Headed north to keep stern to moon but ran into line of lifeboat sampan to seaward of us and was forced to anchor near to the westward to keep our distance from the line. The sampans were about a mile from us.

-9-

— page 55 —
15, 1942. (continued)
mile apart and scanned to remain along the hundred fathom curve.
Reached northern end of line of sampans when we were off SAME KAIU and headed east to get outside the line and open the distance to the beach.
Headed north, planning to spend several days in vicinity of SHIRITA SAKI.

December 16, 1942.
0540(K) Sighted SHIRITA SAKI LINE, distance 18 miles. The light was of normal brilliancy but with altered characteristics.
0523(K) Submerged fifteen miles southeast of SHIRITA SAKI and headed toward coast.
1100(K) Changed course to north.
1230(K) Sighted smoke to southward, close to the coast.
1340(K) Sighted stack of a ship to northward. (Contact 1/1).
1415(K) Ship to northward identified as a freighter with destroyer escort, apparently heading down the coast.
They were still hull down and it was difficult to estimate an angle on them.
1525(K) Smoke previously sighted to southward proved to be from a freighter northward bound (Contact 1/2).
1420(K) Got first good look at southbound freighter. It was a corvette of about 5000 tons displacement. Angle on the bow was 30° port and we were too far off the track to make an attack.
1429(K) Changed course to 180° to head for northbound target.
1435(K) Sighted two more freighters (contacts 13 and 14), northbound, eastern of one sighted at 1425.
1453(K) Northbound freighters were strung out about three thousand yards apart and four miles off the beach. Southbound freighter had meanwhile passed on down the coast and the destroyer escort could not be seen. Beleaguered was still to northward of us waiting for northbound convoy.
1455(K) Decided to make attack on last freighter in column as it appeared to be the largest and most likely to offer the beach. Distance between freighters prevented making an attack on more than one of them.
1510(K) Commenced approach, coasting in on course for 90° starboard track.
1510(K) Fired 1 1/2" [c]ivergent spread from tubes 1, 2 and 3, range 1800 yards. Two torpedoes hit target. Three minutes later freighter obscured down by the bow and sinking. Now was under water to bridge and crew was above water. The ship was a coal burning freighter with flush deck and split superstructure, of a type similar to the SWITCH. (6700 tons). Still could not see destroyer.

-10- DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED BY:

— page 57 —
1912 (continued)
1812(K) surfaced and headed for SHITTY JACK, planning to over-
    act south of the light along the coast.
1923(K) Sighted darkened ship, five degrees on the port bow,
    range 7200 yards, angle on the bow, 50° port. Course
    070°(T). Cocked radar on bearing, (contact J15).
1928(K) Paralleled target's course and corrected tracking with
    radar.
1940(K) Sighted coast of HOKKAIDO on port bow. As we were
    inshore of the target changed course to take position
    on target's starboard bow and to scuttle off the tar-
    get, now identified as a 3000 ton freighter, lightly
    loaded.
1947(K) Target changed course to left, and increased speed to
    12 knots. We changed course to close target.
1955(K) Freighter staid on course 030°. Delivered her last
    US and was making for one of the ports on the south-
    west coast of HOKKAIDO. Diffused moonlight through
    a high overcast made visibility good at this point.
    We changed course to parallel and overtake him.
2022(K) Freighter evidently saw that we were cutting off his
    retreat to the coast and changed course to 2850 to
    put us astern. He again headed towards him and com-
    manced overtaking at 18 knots.
2113(K) Gained position on starboard quarter of freighter,
    range 3000 yards and decided to fire a long range
    shot before he changed course again. Condition of
    the sea prevented use of the deck gun forward. Visi-
    bility prevented attainment of favorable attack posi-
    tion ahead.
2114(K) Fired tubes 5 and 6 at freighter, range 2700 yards
    with 140° starboard track and zero cross angles. Re-
    mained on firing course and at
2117(K) when torpedoes should have struck target, his bearing
    was zero relative. Identical solutions of target's
    course and speed were obtained by TDC and radar plot.
    Torpedo performance as indicated by tracks appeared
    normal. Target did not maneuver to avoid. It is
    believed that torpedoes passed close aboard or under-
    neath target. The freighter was very lightly loaded
    and sea conditions made setting depth at less than
    10 feet practical.
2120(K) Decided to abandon attack. Freighter was not of suffi-
    cient size to warrant further expenditure of torpedoes.
    Headed for southern end of area.

- 12 -

— page 58 —
20, 1942
Subj: 5039(K) Submerged. Sea was rough and we remained in offshore
steamer lane during day.
Lc18(K) Surface. Moonlight was very bright and was now begin-
ning to restrict our movements, making it difficult to
get in close to the beach for the morning dives and
almost prohibiting a successful night surface attack.
The southern part of the area between 3400 and
3400 was in fact in a state of
very doubtful visibility in attempting to close
the coast. Decided to try inshore between 3400 and
and 3400 as far as possible had been sighted there.
Wind and sea abated during night.

December 21, 1942
0534(K) Submerged ten miles off shore and closed coast.
Lc19(K) Sighted small freighter proceeding southward close to
the beach. It was too small to attack. (Contact 16).
1530(K) Sighted the small motor schooner twice previously
sighted. It was headed southeast, inshore on us with
one sail rigged. (Contact 17).
1540(K) Sighted small tug or coastal minesweeper standing up
the coast. Commenced approach but broke it off when
small size of vessel was determined. (Contact 18).
1630(K) Sighted twin fleet rcoo missiles not on 3 miles
SANK, distance 10 miles.
1639(K) Surface.

December 22, 1942
0519(K) Divd and commenced closing coast in vicinity of 3000 I
SAKI. Had gotten a considerable southcoastward set
during night and we were about fifteen miles from the
beach when we submerged.
0630(K) Lade sound contact on starboard quarter. We were still
closing coast on course 2900(T).
0631(K) Sighted the sound contact. "Yes only able to see top
of superstructure but it appeared to be a patrol
vessel or small destroyer. (Contact 19).
0639(K) Sighted freighter carrying from rain squall to south-
ward of us. Sound pilot said up its screws at about the
same time. Range was 6000 yards, on the bow,
300 starboard. Commenced approach. (Contact 20).
0655(T) Pired a 1 1/2" diverging spread from tubes 1, 2, and 3,
One torpedo hit target.
0655(K) Lade periscope sweep to locate patrol escort. Unable
to see it but sighted a second ship crossing from rain
to southward, distance about 5000 yards. (Contact 21).

- 13 -

— page 60 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF THIRD ARTICL (Cont'd)

December 22, 1942 (continued)
LIGHT (K) Surface and continued underway. Decided to return from area and search several days on the Atlantic track to obtain a little rest and report numerous minor defects. In addition, the extremely bright light of the now full moon made surface cruising near the beach hazardous. On this night, the sky became cloudless as the moon rose and visibility practically unlimited.

December 23-24, 1942
Patrolled Atlantic track. Uncomfortable. After surfacing on December 24, received COLT 7 days at depth directly on to keep close observation of TORPEDO STRAITS and to take contact reports to COLT. Reportedly, received a visit from a U.S. Navy officer.

December 25-26, 1942
Patrolled off Cape Hatteras. Took a 3-inch shell and sighted a ship on the evening of December 27. Sent a report to the Navy. Visibility narrowly lost.

December 30, 1942
0330 (K) Sighted ship (contact 22) on sternboard. Scored on converging course, ran 500 yards. Picked up on radar at 6000 yards, airfield its course and commenced tracking. Sighted contact radio visibility good.

0350 (K) Determined target's course to be 2000 (T), speed 8 knots and identified it as a small cruiser, fairly well located. It was the only two torpedoes remaining for-ward decided to gain position ahead for stern shot making submarine radar approach. In position, 5000 yards ahead of target and turned away off his track. Submarines to bear. Conducted a torpedo using torpedo bearings and radar ranges. TDC checked target's course and speed. Fired a 10' diver's periscope from tubes 8, 9, and 10 at range of 1700 yards, 900 track, depth set at 10 feet. All torpedoes raised. Torpedo performance appeared normal and TDC set up checked for five minutes after firing. Target's draft estimated at 15'.

0560 (K) Fired explosion of one torpedo at end of its run. Rained submerged and continued patrol off STORM STRAT.

— page 61 —
1943
Unventful. Attrolled off TIGER SEA IN.
'Nothing sighted.

January 4, 1943
0503(K) Submerged southwest of 3.7I end headed for point
of departure from area.
1615(H) Surfaced.
2200(E) Deployed area enroute to IDAY.

January 5, 1943
Unventful. Leather good and seas calm.

January 7, 1943
1500(L) Commenced a trace hour battery test discharge which was
secured at the end of two hours when cell #55 failed.
Two other cells were abnormally low.

January 8, 1943
Unventful.

January 10, 1943
Arrived IDAY. Informed by CCCT 7.5 that we
would refit 2.2L

— page 63 —
00050K 8 Doc : Unidentified
: 00050K 8 Doc : Small freighter, 1000: 39-45W
: 00050K 8 Doc : Small freighter, 1000: 35: 8
: 00050K 8 Doc : Small freighter, 100

— page 64 —
5. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY SIGHTED.

Contact: Attack: Time and date: Description: Position: Course: Speed: Remarks:
No.: No.: of sighting:
14: 4: 1435K 16 Dec: Freighter, 600T, 41-10H:

— page 65 —
6. DESCRIPTION OF AIRCRAFT SIGHTED

| Contact | Time and Date: | Type | Position | Course: | Altitude |
|||------||||
| 1       | 14:00 23 Nov  | B-24 | 24-18N    | 090     | 1500 ft  |
| 2       | 14:35 29 Nov  | Navy PBY | 28-35N    | 110     | 2000 ft  |
| 3       | 15:15 29 Nov  | Navy PBY | 28-38N    | 070     | 1000 ft  |
| 4       | 16:30 21 Dec  | Japanese twin float reconnaissance plane | 41-25N | 090 | 2000 ft |
| 5       | 10:22 14 Jan  | Navy PBY | 21-50N    | 090     | 1000 ft |
| 6       | 14:43 14 Jan  | Navy PBY | 21-38N    | 090     | 1000 ft |
| 7       | 15:50 14 Jan  | Navy PBY | 21-35N    | 100     | 1000 ft |

In addition, numerous planes of various types were sighted in immediate vicinities of PEAPL and PTYAY.

— page 67 —
46 : 47
Date: 12/22/42 : 12/30/42 : 12/22/42
Location (Lat, Long): 40-55N, 141-47E
Torpedoes fired on each attack: 3
Hits: 1
Number sunk: 1
(Tonnage): 6,500
Number damaged or probably sunk: -
Type of target: AK
Range 1500 yards or less: -
Range more than 1500 yards: -
Periscope depth: 1800
Surface depth: 1700
Deep submergence: -
Estimated draft: 12ft
Torpedo depth setting: 10ft
Echo or stern shot: 10ft
Track angle: 90°
Gyro angle: 0°
Estimated target speed: 10 kts
Firing interval: 8 secs
Spread - Amount and kind: 12°
Divergent: Divergent

- 22 -

— page 68 —
7. SUMMARY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS-- REMARKS.

Attack #1
The one hit on the transport was a magnetic explosion. Failure of other two torpedoes to hit may have been due to heavy yawing at time of firing or failure of magnetic exploders to function. Believer control data was correct as target had been tracked for over an hour before gaining firing position.

Attack #2
Decision to fire stern tubes on this attack was made on the spur of the moment after completion of attack #1. Tubes were made ready, radar range and bearing of new target were cranked into TDC and torpedoes were fired four minutes after firing the bow tubes. Both of these hits were also magnetic.

Attack #3
Freighter sank within four minutes of being hit. Radar tracking had again given exact course and speed and made possible complete destruction of freighter with no survivors.

Attack #4
Believe speed was overestimated causing one torpedo to miss ahead of target. Other two torpedoes hit in forward part of ship. Freighter sank rapidly and underwater cracking noises and explosions were heard for about ten minutes after the attack.

Attack #5
Target was a small freighter, lightly loaded. We were seen before firing and target turned away from us twice. Finally fired long range shot. Believe torpedoes passed close aboard or underneath freighter.

Attack #6
Underestimation of speed believed responsible for failure of two torpedoes to hit. The one hit was a magnetic explosion. Ship was a new coal burning freighter of about 6500 tons. Seven minutes after hit only stack and masts were visible.

Attack #7
Bright moonlight and good visibility made submerged attack necessary. Submerged after gaining position 6000 yards ahead and turned away from track, firing stern tubes. Control data checked perfectly and only explanation of misses is failure of magnetic exploders.

7. - 23 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 69 —
8. ENEMY ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES.

Few enemy anti-submarine measures were encountered. Although numerous sampans were sighted, there was no indication that any of them were engaged in anti-submarine work.

Shipping was routed close to the coast and ships of a convoy were spaced about two miles apart, making an attack on more than one ship difficult. It is believed that escorts accompany southbound coastal shipping to about 15 miles south of SULUYA SAKI and meet northbound traffic at this same point.

Japanese listening gear appeared to be very efficient, echo ranging less so.

Anti-submarine vessels have a noiseless speed of method of muffling their screws. In the depth charge attack on December 16, 1942, no screws were heard for six minutes before fairly close depth charges were dropped.

The evidence of regular plane patrols of the area was observed.

MINIMIZING.

None.

10. MAJOR DEFECTS EXPLAINED.

HULL
1. Hull Ventilation Supply Blower.
Upon two occasions during the patrol the hull ventilation supply blower impeller was damaged. Enroute from PEARL to MIDWAY the impeller was completely stripped, probably when a weakened blade carried away. Impeller was renewed at MIDWAY. Several days before entering the area water was taken down hull induction, stripping nine blades from the impeller. Those were straightened and reinstalled with silver solder. Blower was operated at three-quarters speed during remainder of patrol.

2. No. 2 Periscope.
No. 2 periscope was frequently foggy and difficult to use for about three hours after diving in the morning. Fogginess was more pronounced and lasted longer when air temperature was low. A heater was rigged in the periscope well and turned on each night. This appeared to eliminate some of the moisture and foginess. During the coming refit period, periscope should be cleaned and dried out thoroughly.

- 24 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 70 —
10. MAJOR DEFECTS ENTERED (Cont'd).

A. HULL (Cont'd.)
3. After Trim Tank.
   - After two weeks in the area, after trim developed a leak of about 200 pounds an hour at periscope depth.
   - The rate of leakage increased as the patrol progressed.
   - .t deep submergence, however, leak apparently stopped, hence it is believed that water is entering either through main hole gasket or a stuffing gland.

4. Main Ballast and Group Blow Valves.
   - Despite grinding in during the last refit period the main ballast blow valves still leak and it was necessary to operate with group blow valves closed during the entire patrol. Forward group blow valve also leaks as evidenced by the chattering of the forward group check valves as the boat was planed up just prior to surfacing.

5. Bow Buoyancy Vent Valve.
   - During the latter half of the patrol, bow buoyancy valve frequently could not be closed when cruising submerged, although it could always be opened. Valve was operated hourly when cruising on the surface and usually left in the open position when submerged. Fail-ure believed due either to warping of tank plating or misalignment of operating shafting.

6. Superstructure.
   - Upon two occasions during the patrol it was necessary to sustain or remove portions of the superstructure which had come loose and were hanging when cruising submerged.

7. Leakage around SJ Radar Mast.
   - On the second deep submergence during the patrol, excessive leakage developed around the SJ Radar Mast probably due to ruptured gasket.

8. Lowering of Sound Heads.
   - Sound heads cannot be lowered when running silent with the hydraulic plant secured. A hand pump for accomplishing this should be provided.

9. Hydraulic System.
   - The hydraulic plant has given unsatisfactory performance during this patrol and requires a complete overhaul and correction of the following defects:

- 25 - ENGLISH (A)

— page 73 —
10. NAVY PATROL REPORT (Cont'd).

A. PATROL
5. (cont'd)
A battery test discharge at the three hour rate was conducted enroute to "THAY" upon completion of the patrol. It was necessary to secure the discharge at the end of two hours due to failure of cell #35 forward. Two other cells, #42 forward, and #105 aft were abnormally low. Jars should be replaced with limited rubber and above low cells examined and either treated or removed. Battery as a whole needs cycling and a test discharge.

6. SJ Radar.
The SJ radar failure just before entering the area was traced to defective coaxial cables, evidently damaged by abnormal banding inside the transmitter. Radar could be made to operate by fluxing and taping the defective cables whenever the trouble occurred and satisfactory performance would then be obtained until the movement or vibration of the ship jarred them again. It is recommended that a complete set of spare cables be included in spare parts carried on board.

The high resistance heater coil in the range unit heater burned out. Cause of failure believed due to tarnishing of heater circuit from 115 volt AC. Supply as called for in manufacturer's instructions. Transmitter blower motor shows excessive bearing wear. The self-lubricating bearings do not seem to be obtaining sufficient lubrication, possibly due to excessive heat in the transmitter unit. It is recommended that bearings be modified to permit external lubrication.

7. SD Radar.
SD Radar failure enroute Pearl Harbor to "Hawaii" was found due to an internal short in the electrovoltic condenser in the high voltage line. Condenser was removed in "Hawaii". Upon leaving "Hawaii", radar again failed. Shifts force traced trouble to grounding of a bare lead in the high voltage line indicating an uninsulated armature.

"While on patrol the inquirers holding the shoes on the radar mast were cracked when the mast was raised to its upper limit inadvertently with high battery voltage on the hoisting motor. Since our radar position of the mast is about two feet below the upper limit, recommend upper limit switch be lowered a foot.

- 28 -

— page 75 —
15. TULM - 14,000 gallons
Fuel expended: 21,427
Fuel expended en route: 21,170
Fuel expended en route: 12,500
Fuel expended en route: 91,577

16. POSTED ON TURKISH ISLANDS.

Torpedoes: 5
Fuel: 23,000 gallons (upon arrival TURKISH ISLANDS)
Provisions: 15 days (upon arrival TURKISH ISLANDS)
Fresh water: Unlisted
Personal: 5 days

17. TURKISH ISLANDS

Patrol was terminated in accordance with the operation order.

18. IDENTICAL.

The 35 radar was of invaluable assistance in the conduct of the patrol. Without it, the contacts on the flights of December 9 and 12 would never have been made and it was effectively used in the other two nights attacked. The feasibility of a submarine radar against the British Isles was well illustrated in the attack on the morning of December 30.

An official contract organization for night surface radar operations has been developed and the following description may be of value to beats just obtaining 35 radar.

Code naming Officer comes and from bridge, assisted by Officer of the Dock (Diving Officer), executive Officer takes station in Corbridge Tower, supervising the diving party, and coordinates in- formation to the diving officer. Communication officer and radar technician run radar. Gannery officer and firecontrolman on TDC and sixth officer runs pilot.

Rear contracts were made at ranges of 6000-3600 yards. Radar operators were usually able to distinguish between large and small targets although small targets usually located or with high noise are not radar target than they actually were. The overall occasions radar picked up samples, taking contact at about 2800 yards and maintaining it to 4000 yards.

- 30 - 1. CLOSURE (..)

— page 76 —
18. KRIEGS (Cont'd).

Winter clothing provided is inadequate for winter operations in northern areas. Trousers and wash clothes suffered partial,
cautery from cold hands and feet and absent of clothing worn was bulky and cumbersome. Waterproof fleece lined footwear and gloves
and one piece fleece lined coveralls are recommended.

Boats operating in the northern areas in January and February will probably experience considerable difficulty with ice forming over substructure lighting holes, particularly on
steel cock aft.

The torpedo misses on attacks, 5 and 7 are attributed to failure of magnetic exploders.

Prior to receipt of instructions directing us keep close observation of TORPEDO STRIKE, the commanding officer had planned to spend several days carrying out intensive to IBURU WAT
covering ship ing routes to steel cutters at MUKIMI and MINORI
and turn return south of IBURU for another attack on
coastal shipping.

- 31 - EMIGRATE (1)

— page 77 —
A16-3
COMBINED SUBMARINE DIVISION 101
Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
January 19, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Division 101.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of Third War Patrol.

1. HALIBUT third war patrol extended from November 22, 1942 to January 15, 1943. Of the 54 day period 28 days were spent in the patrol area and 2 days at sea.

2. Two day attacks and five night attacks were made, resulting in 9 hits with 10 torpedoes, 47.4%, an excellent performance. The two attacks on December 9-10, and the attack on December 12 were splendid night surface attacks using radar and evasion on the surface, accomplished in low visibility. The night attack on December 30 was made at a depth of 40 feet, using radar ranges and employing periscope bearings. Without the 3rd radar the three ships sunk on the nights of December 9 and 12 would never have been contacted.

3. The expenditure of two torpedoes against the 3000 ton freighter on December 19 with large range and track angle did not appear warranted. Concerning the commanding Officer's remarks on this attack it should be remembered that a 3000 ton freighter is always "worth sinking" provided the chances of hitting seem sufficient to the Commanding Officer to warrant firing.

4. It is noted that, on the seven attacks, the total torpedo spread used covered the following approximate percentage of the target length: (1) 87%, (21 23%, (3) 45%, (4) 64%, (5) 42%, (6) 65%, (7) 53%. The above are considered inadequate. Where three torpedoes are fired, the total spread should normally cover about one and one half target lengths. Where two torpedoes are fired the spread should cover about 75% of the target length. The general rule is to seperate adjacent torpedoes by 75% of target length. Adherence to this spread policy becomes more important, giving better chances of hitting, in view of the early provocative use of the heavy torpedo heads and in view of recent improved torpedo performance. It should be noted that one hit sank each of two relatively large ships on this patrol. It is true that radar is giving more accurate target data, but only more it is felt certain that the submarine and the torpedo tracks will be undetected and that target data is correct it is believed that the above stated spread coverage can be narrowed somewhat.

-1-

— page 78 —
16-3
CONTAINER SURVEY DIVISION 101
Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
January 19, 1943.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of Third War Patrol.

5. Only one enemy plane was sighted in the patrol area.

6. The use of an eight-second firing interval, low gyro angles, and, with one exception (attack number 5), of excellent track angles, is noted with pleasure. Those factors greatly increase the hits.

7. The Division Commander congratulates HALIBUT on an excellent patrol.

T. G. MARTIN.

Copy to:
CO HALIBUT
Consubron 10

-2-

— page 79 —
1/2 ton
Serial No. 15
From: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet
Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.
Enclosure: (a) Copy of Subject War Patrol Report.
    (b) Copy of Consulbrn 10 Conf. 1tr. P65-10/AL-3 Serial 045
    dated March 21, 1943.
    (c) Copy of Consuldiv 10l Conf. 1tr. P65-10/AL-3
    Serial 021 dated March 21, 1943.

1. The fourth war patrol of the U.S.S. HALIBUT exhibited once again the aggressive characteristics of its previous patrols. All of the HALIBUT attacks were made at night in a most aggressive manner; one under enemy gunfire from what was probably an auxiliary cruiser and another against a four-ship convoy under escort. All attacks resulted in inflicting damage on the enemy.

2. Once again the HALIBUT used its Radar very effectively in executing its attacks in spite of numerous material failures.

3. The engineering performance of the HALIBUT on this patrol is considered sufficiently outstanding to make a comment thereon. The HALIBUT cruised 11,150 miles using 90,655 gallons of fuel oil.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commander Officers, Officers and Crew on this very aggressive and successful war patrol during which they inflicted the following damage on the enemy:

SINK

1. Freighter (SX-21) MAHU Class) --- 5,624 tons
2. Freighter (HULL) MAHU Class) --- 2,486 tons
TOTAL SINK --- 15,110 tons

DAMAGED

1. Freighter (Undistributed) --- 5,000 tons
2. Freighter (Undistributed) --- 5,000 tons
3. Freighter (Undistributed) --- 5,000 tons
TOTAL DAMAGED 15,000 tons

- 1 -

— page 81 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232)  WW
CONFIDENTIAL
U. S. S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF FOURTH WAR PATROL
PERIOD FROM - 8 FEBRUARY 1943 to 30 MARCH 1943
OPERATION ORDER - COMMANDER TASK FORCE SEVEN
OPERATION ORDER NO. 21-43.

PROLOGUE:-
Arrived at Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, from
third-war patrol on January 15th. Commenced refit on January
16th, using base repair force and relief crew from Subron Four.
Repaired leak in after trim; adjusted bow buoyancy vent; treated
low cells in main storage battery to remove electrolyte impuri-
ties and restore capacity; dried out periscope; and installed
I.M.O. main hydraulic pump. Completed refit January 31. Con-
ducted sound tests and ship was deemed on February 1-2. Train-
ing period February 3-5. Ready for sea February 8th.

1. NARRATIVE: -
February 8, 1943
1300(VT) Departed Pearl Harbor with U.S.S. PC-585 as escort.
1833(VT) Made trim dive.
2000(VT) Escort departed for Pearl.

February 9, 1943
1443(VT) Exchanged recognition signals with Navy PBY
patrol plane.

February 10-11, 1943
Uneventful, conducted training dives, instruction
and drills daily enroute to MIDWAY.

February 12, 1943
0627(Y) Contacted plane escort to MID AV.
1105(Y) Moored at the Submarine Base, Midway. Submarine
Base personnel and ship's force performed minor
repairs. Equalized main storage battery. Received
14,500 gallons of fuel.

February 13, 1943
0902(Y) Departed Midway for Wake Island.
1429(Y) Sighted two Navy PBY patrol planes returning to
MIDWAY.

February 13-15, 1943
Uneventful, training dives, instruction and drills.

-1- ENGLISH (A)

— page 82 —
1943
U. S. S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF NORTHWEST ATLANTIC

February 16, 1943
1241(M) Sighted periscope (Contact #1) 1500 yards abeam to starboard. Turned to bring stern tubes to bear and submerged. Sound could not pick up the target. Sounded and continued enroute to WAKE ISLAND.

February 17, 1943
1311(L) Entered area. Radar made landfall on WAKE ISLAND. Commenced surface patrol to southward and eastward of WAKE.

February 18, 1943
0010(L) Sighted WAKE ISLAND six miles to westward. The entire island was blacked out. Sighted twelve searchlights sweeping sky over WAKE and WILKES ISLANDS. These lights were arc type lights apparently evenly spaced along the shore line. One light was observed sending the international code signal "Option". All lights but one were trained directly overhead. One searched to seaward.

0522(L) Submerged, closing WAKE ISLAND. Sighted small patrol vessel of approximately 300 tons anchored in the south channel, between WILKES ISLANDS (contact #2). Continued closing WAKE. From a point two miles offshore details of both WAKE and WILKES ISLANDS were plainly visible. A large number of buildings and barracks have been erected on both islands. There are five high radio towers on the southeast corner of WAKE, and three large cranes were observed at work on this island. A signal station mounted on a four legged skeleton frame work is located at the observation spot marked on the chart to the northwestward of the south channel. Two pentagonal concrete structures similar to gas cans are located a few hundred yards northwestward of this observation spot on WILKES ISLAND. A tall water tower on PEALE ISLAND is painted aluminum and is clearly visible well to seaward. Two dredges were observed at work on the lagoon side of south channel. No vessels other than the small guardship, and no planes were observed.

1203(L) Deported WAKE for TRUK.

-2- ENCLOSURE (L)

— page 83 —
1943 (continued)
19U8(L)    Surfaced.  Sheer pins on bow plane rigging in
    mechanism carried away.  Hooks to and replaced pins.
2015(L)    Continued enroute TRUK.

February 19, 1943
0800(L)    Changed course to conduct surface patrol along the
    estimated Empire-Kwajalein track.

February 20, 1943
0615(L)    Commenced search along Empire-Kwajalein track.
0920(L)    Sighted ship (Contant #3) through high periscope,
    15 miles ahead to scrounboard.  Commenced tracking.
0929(L)    Increased speed and changed course to attack attack
    position ahead.  Identified ship as unescorted
    frigate.
1000(L)    Target appeared to be zigzagging using large changes
    in course.  Visibility was excellent making it
    necessary for us to keep at long range to avoid
    being sighted.  Decided to continue tracking during
    day and close to attack after dark.
1400(L)    Track shows vessel apparently enroute from Kwajalein
    to Saipan or Guam.
1935(L)    Closed to continue tracking with radar.  Visibility
    excellent in full moonlight.
2024(L)    Estimated target base course to be 2730(T) at 11
    knots.  Target still zigzagging in moonlight.  Sub-
    marined to 40 feet in position 11,000 yards ahead of
    him and commenced approach using radar range and
    periscope bearings.  Target plainly visible through
    both periscopes appeared to be a 5600 ton frigate
    similar to the SOUTHWEST (ONI 208J page 15), intact
    draft.
2028(L)    Cans to attack course using bow tubes.
2043(L)    Target zigged.  Cans to course for 900 track using
    stern tubes.  Went to 52 feet and secured radar.
2059(L)    Fired a 20 divecrest spread from tubes 7, 8, and 9,
    set at 10 feet.  Range 1600 yards.
2100(L)    Heard three explosions and observed all three torpedoes hit.  These were "Torpex" heads; explosions
    were not very loud and no flashes were seen.
2101(L)    Target listed about 700 to port and sinking fast.
2102(L)    Target sank, no survivors.
2103(L)    Surfaced and set course for TRUK.

-3-    ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 84 —
1943
0000(K) Decided to try searching at anchor point along the Kwajelein-Saipan track.
0800(L) Started search.
1600(L) Decided last nights target was unaccompanied, abandoned search and set course for TRUK.

February 22, 1943
1500-1600(K) Noted signals on SD radar indicative of another radar making sweeps at intervals of seven minutes. At one time signals remained constant for a period of five minutes. The distance to TRUK was 250 miles, Number three near engine out of commission due to failure of locking plate in vertical drive gear.

1600(K) February 23, 1943
0500(K) Commenced submerged patrol along the Empire-Truk lane between latitudes 10° and 11° north. Uneventful.
1845(K) Surfaced patrolling south toward TRUK.
1930(K) Entered area.

February 24, 1943
0513(K) Commenced submerged patrol across the Kwajelein-Truk track at latitude 9° north.
1850(K) Surfaced patrolling eastern end of area. Uneventful.
1900(K) #3 main engine back in commission running satisfactorily on parts filed out of a wrench handle.

February 25, 1943
0510(K) Commenced submerged patrol closing TRUK along Empire-Kwajelein-Truk traffic lanes.
1900(K) Surfaced.

February 26, 1943
0500(K) Commenced submerged patrol eastward of the Hall Islands.
1849(K) Surfaced patrolling northward, Uneventful.

February 27, 1943
0500(K) Commenced submerged patrol north of MURILLO ISLANDS. Uneventful.
1919(K) Surfaced. Decided to try passage between ONON and HALL ISLANDS, across the SIFAN-TRUK track.

February 28, 1943
Uneventful. Patrolling between ONON and HALL ISLANDS.

-4- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 85 —
1943
0200(K)
0500(K)
1900(K)
1942(K)
March 2, 1943
0034(K)
0415(K)
0500(K)
1910(K)
2000(K)
March 3, 1943
1442(K)
1955(K)
2000(K)
2046(K)
2055(K)
2300(K)
2325(K)
2333(K)
2337(K)

---

**CONTINUED**

U. S. S. HALLIUT - REPORT OF FOURTH AR PATROL

Commenced night search along the track toward TRUK. Abandoned search. Commenced submerged patrol, closing THUK along the estimated traffic lane. Surfaced petrollining north between the ONON and HALL ISLAND groups. Sighted glow of powerful searchlight sweeping the seas beyond the horizon. It is believed that this light is located atop one of the islands in Truk atoll.

Sighted lighted manfishing 30 miles northeast of PISARAS ISLAND in the ONON group (Contact/4). Sighted searchlight apparently located on PISARAS ISLAND. This light may be a navigational aid turned on at brief intervals to guide shipping past the ONON ISLANDS. Commenced submerged patrol northwest of the ONON ISLANDS along the Saipan-Truk track. Uncomfortable. Surfaced and set course for PIAU. Deported across. Set course for a point on the eastmost Emprise-Baian-Pulaward Island track.

Commenced surface patrol to northwest of along estimated track to Saipan and the Emprise. Sighted two vessels distant 14,000 yards, abeam to port. Reversed course and commenced tracking. Identified ships on 9500 ton passenger-frigighter similar to Nainia near ONON 2087, page 98) and one flush deck diesel freighter of about 7500 tons. Both ships appeared to be zigzagging eastward. Radar was unable to obtain contact. Continued tracking using TRK and estimated range and angle on the bow. Decided to attack larger of the two ships first. Radar obtained intermittent ranges at about 5000 yards. Estimated course 0850(T), speed 10 knots. Came to course for a 90 starboard track using bow tubes. Checked range with radar. Using TRT bearing fired a 20 diverging spread of four torpedoes at the larger target. Torpedoes set for a depth of 20 feet. The first set to run ahead, the center two to hit, and the fourth to run astern. Range 2000 yards.

---

**ENCLOSURE (A)**

— page 86 —
1943 (continued)
2339(K) Observed two torpedoes hit the larger freighter, one boonstth the bridge and one aft. The second vessel swung away and disappeared behind the target. Closed to attack second freighter. Second vessel reappeared about 100 yards from the target, rapidly, angle on the bow 100 yards. He sent a rapid signal similar to "Zero Nagat Qucon" in the direction of the torpedoed ship and opened fire on the ship with two guns of about 5" caliber and several machine guns. Swung away to dodge shots from torpedoes and starboard quarter and stern. His firing was good but he apparently underestimated our speed. Deadlocked this vessel might have been an auxiliary cruiser in view of volume and accuracy of his gunfire and his smart tactics. While retiring observing first vessel burning amidships. Visibility decreasing due to rain squalls. Decided to circle to northward and eastward and close to attack from the north northeast. Heard very loud explosion behind the torpedoes. Boilers.

March 4, 1943
0103(K) Plotted our position and the position of the action and commenced closing to attack the second vessel. Sighted both vessels at a range of about 6000 yards. Visibility improved. The torpedoed freighter was on its beam ends and going down by the stern, no superstructure was visible. Small lights flickering on the water indicated that the crew had abandoned ship. Second vessel was picking up survivors from torpedoed passengers—freighter. He was opened fire again with two ships sighted and machine guns. Shots were on in their deck guns and machine guns. Shots were on in deflection but short. Swung away returning to northward. The freighter was sailing away to the northward. The torpedo was plainly visible each time we closed. Radar unable to pick up the target, impossible to attack sub-marged. Lost target in rain squalls. Radar still inoperative. Decided to run to the southward and continue search at dawn. Made train dive. Surfaced. Recovered course and commenced search. Decided to patrol along estimated track to Saipan and the Empire for one more day before leaving for Palau.

0106(K) Lost target in rain squalls. Radar still inoperative. Decided to run to the southward and continue search at dawn. Made train dive. Surfaced. Recovered course and commenced search. Decided to patrol along estimated track to Saipan and the Empire for one more day before leaving for Palau.

0120(K) Lost target in rain squalls. Radar still inoperative. Decided to run to the southward and continue search at dawn. Made train dive. Surfaced. Recovered course and commenced search. Decided to patrol along estimated track to Saipan and the Empire for one more day before leaving for Palau.

0516(K) Made train dive. Surfaced. Recovered course and commenced search. Decided to patrol along estimated track to Saipan and the Empire for one more day before leaving for Palau.

0533(K) Made train dive. Surfaced. Recovered course and commenced search. Decided to patrol along estimated track to Saipan and the Empire for one more day before leaving for Palau.

0700(K) Recovered course and commenced search. Decided to patrol along estimated track to Saipan and the Empire for one more day before leaving for Palau.

0800(K) Made train dive. Surfaced. Recovered course and commenced search. Decided to patrol along estimated track to Saipan and the Empire for one more day before leaving for Palau.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 87 —
1943 (continued)
C901(K)    Submerged undetected plane distant eight miles
    course from eastern at an altitude of 4000 feet.
    Submerged 2nd course for Palau.
1530-1635(K)    Re. 1st flight distant expectations in groups of
    three, similar to depth charge patterns.

March 5, 1943
Uncountful enroute to Palau.

March 6, 1943
1900(I)    Entered area.

March 7, 1943
0514(I)    Submerged closing Palau.
0611(I)    Heard echo ranging on starboard quarter, frequency
    17 kcs.
0622(I)    Sighted small freighter (2000T) (Contact #6), at
    about 16,000 yards bearing 145° relative. This
    ship not exceptionaly high masts with basket type
    lookout platforms and was believed to be on A/S
    patrol, patrolling eastern entrances to Palau on
    approximate course 240°(T), speed 10 knots.
0740(I)    Unable to close range. Continued toward Palau.
1923(I)    Surfaced patrolling to southwestward along the
    chain of islands.

March 8, 1943
0505(I)    Submerged, closing Angaur Island from the south.
0925(I)    Sighted unanticipated plane flying over Angaur
    Island.
0950(I)    Heard echo ranging on 16 kcs.
1000(I)    Sighted distant attack. Turned to close target.
1121(I)    Shocks disorganized to Northward. Unable to close
    for patrolling eastward. Continued patrolling
1932(I)    Surfaced. Pooled to patrol off Palau.

March 9, 1943
0500(I)    Submerged patrolling northwest of Togglu Mungui.
1535(I)    Sighted smoke of vessel to southwest, range about 10
    miles. Contact 7).
1558(I)    Identified ship as two stack passing freighter
    of 900 tons, on course 315° (T), speed 11 knots,
    distant 9 miles.

-7- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 88 —
1943 (continued)
1700(I) Range too great for submerged attack. Decided to track him out of sight and overhaul him after dark, Ship was unscorched and not zigzagging.
1919(I) Surfaced and set course to intercept target at about 2300.
2200(I) Sighted red light 150 on port bow, distance about 10 miles.
2351(I) Identified ship as enemy hospital ship similar to Sashi near (OHI 2087, page 13). He was showing a cross of red lights on each funnel and a large lighted cross on the after deck and side, in addition to normal running lights. Exercised radar tracking party. Examined vessel at 4000 yards, accepted him as hospital ship and broke off pursuit, Decided to return ran his track.

March 10, 1943
0500(I) Submerged patrolling western port of area.
1925(I) Surfaced closing PLU to patrol off Toggi Mungui in vicinity of yesterday's contact.

March 11, 1943
0503(I) Submerged closing PLU.
1200(I) Patrolling to southward across Toggi Mungui channel.
1219(I) Hour two ships echo-ranging on long scale bearing 2550 relative.
1230(I) Sighted convoy bearing 2460 relative, angle on the bow 250 port. Range 12,000 yards. (Contact #8).
1245(I) Convey composed of four frigates of about 5000 tons accompanied by two escorts. Frigates were in groups of two across on each other. Vessels in each group were in range of each other. Sighted one destroyer escort on the far side of the formation in the van. Could hear but could not see second escort.
1300(I) Sighted MHJIN type 97 (Adm) twin float reconnaissance scorpion cruising above the formation at about 500 feet.

-8- ENCLOSURE (4)

— page 89 —
1301(I) Lost depth control.
1306(I) Escorts have shifted echo ranging scale and one began hand keying to check contact.
1326(I) Made the forward tubes ready. Still had difficulty controlling depth. Sound could not pick up the target screws. Each time periscope was raised one escort keyed a long ping.
1327(I) Turned to come in for a ninety track, raised periscope and at.
1328(I) Heard exceptionally loud explosions close aboard. Believe plane sighted us and dropped a charge just below us and forward. Rigged for depth charge and dived to 300 feet. Heard escorts screws as they speeded up. First charge broke lights and gauges, knocked cork loose, blew brush rigging off battery blowers, lifted numerous auxiliary motor overload trips, and put sound gear and pit log out of commission.
1331- Escorts delivered well placed attacks close aboard. They used patterns and varied depth settings. A total of ten charges were dropped all of them very close some above and some below us. Returning to southwestward. Convoy is apparently enroute Falau to Formosa or Phillipines along same track as last nights contact. Decided to intercept after dark.
1600(I) Changed course to westward.
1850(I) While coming to periscope depth. Heard five distant depth charge explosions astern. Believe one escort remained to keep us down. Boat was light at 300 feet and heavy at 150 feet due to marked density layers.
1917(I) Surfaced. Set course to intercept convoy in early morning.

March 12, 1943
014(I) Radar contact eight miles off starboard bow. Commenced tracking.
0144(I) Radar lobe switching grounded out during depth charging. Ranges accurate but bearings erratic at short range.
0300(I) Convoy now consisted of four ships and one escort in approximately the same formation as they were earlier in the day. Escort was patrolling on the far side aft. Decided to attack leading two targets first following up with attack on the near target after group. Convoy was on course 317°(T), speed 8 knots.
0328(I) Turned to course for 90° port track using bow tubes. As range decreased radar bearings became more erratic. Hoped to obtain TBT bearing to check set up.

- 9 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 90 —
1943, (continued)
0328(I) Visibility very poor. Heavy rain squalls. At 2200 yards still could not see targets. Decided to use available radar bearings and increased spread to 3.
0343(I) Fired three degree divergent spread from tubes 3,4, and 5 at closest target. Course 317°(T), speed 8, range 2200 yards.
0344(I) Radar shifted to leading target bearing 342° relative, range 2600 yards. Using same set up fired three degree divergent spread from tubes #6, 1 and 2. All torpedoes in both spreads set for 15 feet.
0345(I) Heard first of three torpedo explosions from the first two salvos followed by two secondary explosions. Still could not see targets in squall. Believe the last torpedo of first salvo and two torpedoes in second salvo hit.
0346(I) Steadied on course for 90° port track on closest target of second group using stern tubes. Able to see target and use TBT bearings. Decreased spread to 2°.
0347(I) Fired 2° divergent spread from tubes 7,8, and 9 at closest target of second group. Range 3000 yards.
0349(I) Sav. and hard two torpedoes hit the target. Sav. escort turning in our direction and observed red flares being fired from both target groups. Radar range on escort apparently decreasing. Retired to southwesterward to reload tubes. Believe three freighters of the convoy "overlay damaged, possibly two sunk.
0515(I) Submerged at dawn patrolling western end of area to complete inspection of boat for depth charge damage.
1929(I) Surfaced. Decided to patrol to southward to intercept shipping rounding Anguar Island.

March 13, 1943.
0500(I) Submerged closing Anguar Island. Uncomfortable.
1929(I) Surfaced.

March 14, 1943.
0500(I) Submerged patrolling to northward on east side of islands.
1930(I) Surfaced enroute to Guam.

March 15, 1943.
0115(I) Departed area.

- 10 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 91 —
1943, U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Fourth War Patrol

March 15-16, 1943:
- Unexcelled, spent one day submerged across estimated 1,000-1,500 fathoms. Recorded THALER's report but estimated fuel on board would only allow us two days in Guam area.

March 17, 1943:
- Entered area.
- Submerged closing Guam.
- Sighted Guam.
- Surface. Decided in view of short time remaining, to patrol northward along the west coast of Guam, pass south of Rota and conduct submerged patrol in the morning across estimated convoy track from Saipan to Truk.

March 18, 1943:
- Submerged patrolling across traffic lanes from Saipan to Truk.
- Surface. Decided that fuel remaining would not permit us to remain longer. Set course to clear area for MIDWAY.
- Sighted small unidentified vessel. Commenced tracking. Visibility excellent in bright moonlight.
- In position 10,500 yards ahead of target. Identification doubtful but judged from his size and small beam that he was some sort of patrol on course 320°(T) at speed 9 knots. Target sighted us and opened fire with deck gun at range 10,500 yards, firing a total of three rounds, all wide. Decided target was a patrol yacht. Maneuvered out of range and set course for MIDWAY. Target maintained speed but changed course in an unsuccessful endeavor to head us off.

March 19, 1943:
- Departed area for MIDWAY.

March 20-25, 1943:
- Unexcelled.

- 11 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 92 —
1943. U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

March 26, 1943.
0546(H) Rendezvoused with air and surface escorts.
0928(H) Hooded at Submarine Base, Midway. Received 28,600 gallons of fuel.

1000(Y) Donated Midway for Pearl in accordance with Consubmarine Service.

1105(X) Surface escort departed.

1230(Y) Air escort departed.

March 30, 1943.
0530(W) Rendezvoused with escort for Pearl.
1913(W) Hooded at Submarine Base, Pearl to undergo overhaul.

- 12 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 93 —
1. U.S.S. HILTUT - Report of Fourth War Patrol.
2. BATTERY.
3. Clear skys and calm seas were experienced all the way from Wake to Truk. In the Truk area the weather was uniformly clear with unlimited visibility. The prevailing winds were from the northeast, force 3. Seas were calm with occasional days when the surface was glassy with long low swells. Scattered rain squalls were encountered particularly during the night.
4. Enroute from Truk to Palau, fleet calms prevailed. The weather was clear with intermittent rain squalls in the late afternoon and at night.
5. In the Palau area, days were clear and calm. During the night the sky was generally overcast with frequent heavy rain squalls.
6. TIDAL INFORMATION.
7. Tidal currents in general conformed to those depicted on the pilot chart with one marked exception: South of Anguar Island in the Palau group a strong easterly set of 1.5 knots was experienced as far east as longitude 139°E and as far north as 70°30' North. This was experienced only in the southern part of the area. To northward a normal northerly set was encountered.
8. NAVIGATION AID.
9. The water tower on Peale Island of the 'lake Group is plainly visible well to seaward of 'lake. The charted observation spot on Nikles Island is marked by a signal tower supported by a four legged skeleton framework.
10. No other navigation aids were sighted.
11. Good fixes were obtainable using ordinary sextant to obtain star sights whenever moon was up.

- 13 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 94 —
1. 1241(H)Feb 16: Submarine Periscope 22-34N : Not definite.
: 2. 1127(L)Feb 18: Patrol Vessel (30CT) 19-17N : Anchored off south channel Wake Is.
: 3. 092C(L)Feb 20: Freighter similar to 14-33N : 270- : 3 hits - sunk
: 4. 0034(K)Mar 2: Small fishing sampan 16-15N : 302 : 11
: 5. 1955(K)Mar 3: Passenger Freighter 10-18N : Showed two white lights.
: 6. 0622(I)Mar 7: Small freighter (200CT) 7-17N : High stack and two exceptionally
: 7. 1535(I) Mar 9: Hospital Ship - Asahi 7-58N : Well lighted in accordance with
: 8. 3,4,5: 1245(I) Mar 11: Convoy of 4-5000(T) 7-52N : 317 : 8 : Believe on route Togai Mungu
: 9. 2016(K) Mar 18: Patrol Yacht (500T) 14-04N : Apparently on route to Saipan

— page 95 —
1. 1241(H)Feb 16: Submarine Periscope 22-34N : Not definite.
: 2. 1127(L)Feb 18: Patrol Vessel (30CT) 19-17H : Anchored off south channel Wake Is.
: 3. 092C(L)Feb 20: Freighter similar to 14-33N : 3 hits - sunk
: 4. 0034(K)Mar 2: Small fishing samp 8-52N : Showed two white lights.
: 5. 1955(K)Mar 3: Passenger Freighter 110-18H : Passenger freighter 2 hits - sunk.
: 6. 0622(I)Mar 7: Small freighter (200CT) 7-17N : High stack and two exceptionally high masses equipped with lookout platforms. This vessel was a corvair, ranging on 16 kcs. Believed to be a USN ship.
: 7. 1535(I)Mar 9: Hospital Ship - Ascari 7-58N : Well limited in accordance with international conventions.
: 8. 3,4,5: 1245(I)Mar 11: Convoy of 4-500(T) 7-52N : 317 : 8: Believed enroute Togo! Mungu to Formosa or Phillipines. 5 hits - 1 reconnaissance plane : 3 Aik's damaged, 2 Aik's possibly sunk.
: 9. 2016(K)Mar 18: Patrol Yacht (500T) 14-04N : Apparently enroute to Saipan : 9.5 : 1.6-3AE: 320 : 9.5 : 1.6-3

— page 96 —
6. DESCRIPTION OF AIRCRAFT SIGHTED.

Contact: Time and date: Description Position: Course: Altitude
No. of sighting

1. 1443(V) Feb 9 Navy BY
2. 1429(Y) Feb 13 Navy BY's (two in company)
3. 0901(X) Mar 4 Enemy seaplane (type unknown)
4. 0925(I) Mar 8 Enemy seaplane (range too great for Positive identification).
5. 1300(I) Mar 11 Enemy twin float seaplane, NAKATA type 97 ("ADAM")

In addition numerous plinths of various types were sighted in the vicinity of IDWAY and PEARL.

— page 97 —
7. SUBMARY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS.

| Attack | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 | #5 |
|-------|----|----|----|----|----|
| Date  | Feb. 20 | March 12 | March 12 | March 12 | March 12 |
| (Lat.) | 15-09N | 10-22N | 9-19N | 9-19N | 9-19N |
| Location (Long.) | 159-30E | 145-21E | 132-50E | 132-50E | 132-50E |
| Torpedoes fired | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| on each attack | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Hits | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Number Sunk (Torpedoes) | 5500 | 2500 | 5000 | 5000 | 5000 |
| Number damaged or probably sunk | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Type of Target | FREIGHTER | PASSENGER | FREIGHTER | FREIGHTER | FREIGHTER |
| Range (Yards) | 1600 | 2000 | 2220 | 2600 | 3000 |
| Periscope depth | 52ft | 20ft | 20ft | 20ft | 20ft |
| Surface night | 10ft | 25ft | 20ft | 20ft | 20ft |
| Estimated draft target | 10ft | 20ft | 15ft | 15ft | 15ft |
| Torpedo depth setting | 10ft | 20ft | 15ft | 15ft | 15ft |
| Bow or Stern Shot | Stern | Bow | Bow | Stern | Stern |
| Track angle | 90° | 90° | 100° | 115° | 100° |
| Gyro angle | 0° | 3° | 10° | 25° | 10° |
| Estimated target speed | 11 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Firing interval | 8 sec | 8 sec | 8 sec | 8 sec | 8 sec |
| Spread - Amount and kind | 20L-00-0 | 20R-00-0 | 30L-00-0 | 30L-00-0 | 20L-00-0 |
| | 2°R | 2°L | 3°R | 3°R | 2°R |

REMARKS:
1. Attack #1 - Tracked target on surface for ten hours during daylight using high periscope at maximum range. Closed after dark and continued tracking with SJ radar. Target was zigzagging radially in light of full moon. Submerged 11,000 yards ahead of target and found him clearly visible in both periscopes. Closed to 4,000 yards using SJ ranges and periscope bearings. Went to 52 feet at this range and completed attack using #1 periscope. Fired three torpedoes and obtained three hits in Sycon Iaru type freighter of 5500 tons at a range of 1600 yards. Watched vessel sink two minutes after torpedoes hit.

- 16 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 98 —
7. CUT AND SPLIT ATTACKS (CONTINUED)

Attack #2 - Sighted two vessels shortly after dark and commenced tracking prior to conducting night surface approach. Found S1 radar unable to obtain ranges over 5000 yards and only occasional ranges inside of this. Estimated range and used TBT bearing. Conducted surface approach and fired four torpedoes at larger of two ships, a passenger-freighter off about 9500 tons similar to Manila Iaru, ONI 208J, page 98. Obtained two hits. Attack on the second vessel, believed to be an auxiliary cruiser, was beaten off by gunfire. Radar could not pick up target and submerged attack was impossible. Eventually lost target in rein squall. Then last seen torpedoed ship was on its beam ends, with no superstructure visible, and going down by the stern. Crew had abandoned ship and were being picked up by the second vessel.

Attacks #3, #4 and #5 - Attacks three, four and five were made on a four ship convoy at night in extremely low visibility. Submerged attack earlier in the day had been frustrated by a heavy depth charge attack delivered by convoy plane and surface escorts. Surfaced after dark and overmoulded targets. Made contact on S1 radar and tracked convoy to obtain course and speed. Ships were not zigzagging and TDC set up and plot checked course and speed accurately over a period of two hours. Visibility was exceptional by poor. Sky overcast with frequent rain squalls. As we closed to attack leading ships it was found that radar ranges were accurate but bearings erratic due to damage sustained in the afternoon encounter. Targets were still invisible at 2200 yards. Fired three degree divergent spread at each of the two leading targets, ranges 2200 and 2600 yards. Shortly thereafter heard three torpedo explosions and two secondary explosions. Believe one torpedo of first salvo and two torpedoes of second salvo hit two unidentified freighters of about 5000 tons. Times of explosions corresponded approximately to estimated torpedo runs. As we swung to bring stern tubes to bear on second group, squalls lifted enabling us to use TBT bearings. Fired two degree divergent spread at closest ship in second group. Range 3000 yards. Saw and heard two torpedoes hit unidentified freighter of about 5000 tons. Both groups fired red flares after torpedoes hit. Believe three vessels severely damaged, possibly two sunk.

8. ENTRY A/S MEASURES.

The unescorted freighter sunk on February 20th (Contact #3) was zigzagging day and night using 30 to 70 degree changes in course.

- 17 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 99 —
8. ENEMY A/S MEASURES (CONTINUED)

On the morning following the night attack of March 3, an air patrol was sent out from the direction of Truk. He dropped several charges late in the day at the scene of the sinking.

Vessel encountered March 3 (Contact #5) used tracer with heavy calibre machine guns, for night firing.

In the Palau area strong A/S measures were encountered. The convoy attacked on March 11-12 was protected by two surface escorts and one reconnaissance plane. The surface escorts employed echo-ranging on 16-17 kcs searching for long scale as they patrolled. Each one used a signal of slightly different pitch. They used irregular hand keyline to check their contacts and then shifted to a shorter scale. At intervals they keyed a "long ping" believed to be a contact signal. Plane initiated attack by dropping a charge directly on us at periscope depth. Escorts screws were then heard speeding up as they closed in. Just before dropping charges echo-ranging ceased. Changes were dropped in patterns with varied depth settings. All were exceptionally close and this attack, though short, was by far the heaviest and best coordinated attack to which this vessel has been subjected. A total of eleven charges were dropped by plane and escorts. Following the attack one escort stayed with the convoy and the other remained in the area finally dropping six more charges late in the day, probably before returning to port.

In addition to these measures one air patrol was sighted over Angaur Island and one vessel (Contact #6) believed to be a 2000 tons, had a high stack and bridge and was approximately

— page 100 —
10. LAZARO DEFECTS (CONTINUED)

Construction and Repair

(1) (Continued) gear. The trouble is probably due to a bent hinge pin or to strained ball and socket joints.

(2) The stern plane tilting-captain clutch overheats and rattles so badly that it has been found necessary to lash it in place. Shock-mounting and silencing of this gear is considered of utmost importance.

(3) The trim and drain pumps now vibrate so badly that the vibration is transmitted to the hull itself. Both pumps develop a loud air hammer at deep submerged. These pumps require shock-mounting and modification of the air domes during the coming refit.

(4) The noise level of all auxiliary machinery has become noticeably higher and has shown a marked increase since depth charging. It is considered imperative that shock-mounting of auxiliary machinery be completed during the coming refit period. This work has been deferred on previous occasions either because of lack of material or time.

(5) Abnormal vibration when the rudder is put over indicates excessive clearances in the lignum vitae rudder stock bearings.

(6) Foreign material has been knocked loose and has lodged on one of the lenses of number one periscope.

Engineering (Machinery)

(1) Number 3 main engine was out of commission for three days after the vertical drive gear locking plate sheared.

(2) The treatment administered to the main storage battery during the last refit period lasted 10 days at the end of which it was necessary to jump out 4 cells. Throughout the patrol difficulty has been experienced with high grounds. Dielectric test reveals 86 bad jars. A five hour battery discharge conducted while returning to base showed a total battery capacity of 90.29% and 15 low cells. Again it is recommended that screw insert jars be replaced with laminated rubber and low cells be replaced with spare elements.

(3) Numerous auxiliary motors and panels have wooden blocks in place of rubber shock mounting. During depth charging, brush rigging was jarred off two battery vent blowers and many overload trips were operated. It is considered essential that all such electrical equipment be shockmounted along with auxiliary machinery.

- 19 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 101 —
10
SUBJECT: U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

10
MAJOR DEFECTS (CONTINUED)

Radio and Sound
(1) The 5J Radar gave poor results on two attacks. Following attack #2 it was found that the dipole in the base of the circular wave guide was displaced causing severe attenuation resulting in a maximum range of 350C yards and no bearings. During depth charging on 11 March the lobe switching motor was grounded out and bearings were poor and at times impossible during attacks #3, 4, and 5. Both of these defects have been remedied by ship's force.
(2) Both sound heads were knocked out of commission during depth charge attack on March 11. XR shaft bearings have been jarred out of alignment and as head is trained a loud noise is picked up in the receiver which effectively drowns out all other noise. After overhaul by ship's force it is now possible to pick up our own screws on the XB head. However, the head still shows a partial ground. Docking to repair both heads is considered necessary since it is probable that either or both heads are collapsed.

11. RADIO RECEPTION.

Radio reception was excellent throughout the patrol.

Last serial sent: 23IC00
Last serial received: 41

In the Truk area signals were noted on the SD radar indicative of another radar making sweeps at intervals of seven minutes.

SD radar was not used in Truk and Falau areas to avoid possibility of detection and tracking by shore based radar.

Material condition of loop antenna prevented our testing effectiveness of new NH low frequency FOX schedule submerged.

12. SOUND CONDITIONS.

Sound conditions were uniformly poor throughout the patrol. Great difficulty was experienced picking up vessels screws.

A marked density layer was encountered off Toagel Mungui passage Falau. The lower was located between 150 and 200 feet and showed a temperature gradient of 30F.

- 20 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 102 —
12. SOUND CONDITIONS (CONTINUED).
Sound gear was put out of commission by depth charge attack on March 11.

13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY.
The habitability of the ship was in general very good. Air-conditioning and ventilation provided adequate despite high temperature.

The health of the crew was in general excellent during the patrol and morale high. However, it was found that personnel tired more easily on this patrol than on the three previous runs. This may have been caused by higher temperatures encountered, or by the fact that many have completed their fourth patrol, or more probably by a combination of both.

14. MILES STAMPED ENROUTE TO AID PRO. STATION.
Miles steamed enroute station 4,399.4
Miles steamed between areas 2,982.4
Miles steamed returning to Midway 2,856.2
Miles steamed in areas 2,152.4
TOTAL MILES STAMPED 13,740.9

15. FUEL EXPENDED.
Fuel expended enroute Pearl to Midway 13,865 gallons
Fuel expended enroute Midway to Station 27,725 do
Fuel expended in areas 22,350 do
Fuel expended enroute Station to Midway 17,890 do
Fuel expended enroute Midway to Pearl 22,700 do
TOTAL FUEL EXPENDED 49,820 do
124,350 do

16. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE RATING.
Torpedoes 8
Fuel 2,300 gallons (upon arrival MIDAY)
Provisions (days) 20 (upon arrival MIDAY)
Fresh water 10
Personnel (days) Unlimited
10

- 21 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 103 —
17. PICTOR OF ENDURANCE GAUSING TERMINATION OF PATROL.
- Shortage of diesel fuel terminated this patrol.
- RECHARGE.

(1) Attack number one provided an excellent opportunity to observe the effect of the new torpedo explosive. The destructive effect was great lifting the entire center section of the target and blowing the funnel and bridge completely off. However, there was no flash and comparatively little noise.

(2) The poor material performance of the radar on attacks #2, 3, 4, and 5 was felt keenly, under very low visibility conditions and it is felt that had it been functioning properly, considerably more damage might have resulted from these attacks.

(3) Shipping in the Palau area is apparently still using Tootagil Mungui Passage enroute to Formosa-the Philippines and the Empire. Ships encountered had a separately cleared in the morning on courses 315 to 320(T).

(4) Torpedo performance was uniformly excellent.

(5) It is suggested and highly recommended that some type of official award be given the outstanding lookout on each patrol. It is considered that the Army and Navy Medal would be an appropriate award. At present this vessel grades its lookout and awards a cash prize donated by the ship's officers. This has greatly improved the performance of all lookouts.

(6) It is also suggested that patrols be required to qualify in submarines before being advanced in rating. The current pay schedule provides that the pay grade of a submarine officer is one-half that of a lieutenant. It has been noted that the pay grade of a submarine officer is one-half that of a lieutenant

— page 104 —
5-10/11-6-3
Serial 0.5
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HAITIAN (SS-232) - Comments on Fourth War Patrol.

Reference: (a) CO HAITIAN 1st Lt 232/16-3 Serial 05.

1. The fourth war patrol of the HAITIAN was of 52 days duration, of which 29 days were spent patrolling in the area assigned.

2. Sixteen torpedoes were fired on 5 separate targets and 62.5% hit their marks. This is an exceptionally high percentage. Specially noteworthy is the all attacks were in the attack, most of them during the night, and on only one attack was the 5rd radar performance entirely reliable during the approach.

3. No premature torpedo explosions were observed. This should be encouraged news to those who are now making every effort to reduce and eliminate this phase of erratic torpedo performance.

4. It is noted that the target on which torpedoes were used sank within two minutes. This speaks well for the operator's constructive power of torpedoes as compared with the enemy through the conclusion and flash were lost.

5. The HAITIAN will receive a regular overhaul at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, prior to resuming patrol operations.

6. Unfortunately, insufficient evidence of sinking in attacks 3, 4, and 5 precludes credit for sinkings in the case of those vessels. The squadron Commander can't be responsible for the damage inflicted on all personnel of the HAITIAN on an ex-cellerant patrol in which the following is added to their record of accomplishments:

Sunk --- 15,100 Tons.
Damaged --- 15,000 Tons.

[END OF TRANSCRIPT]

[END OF DOCUMENT]

— page 105 —
PB5-101/A16-3
Serial: 021
Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
March 31, 1943.

Subject:  U.S. HAIRIFT - Fourth "Air Patrol - Comments on.

February 8 to March 30, 1943. "Kitchen of the fifties was spent in the patrol areas.

2. Five attacks were completed, one of them hit a patrol boat, two at night on surface by radar alone, and two at night by bridge patrol. Radar played an important role in each attack. Ten hits were made out of sixteen torpedoes fired for the excellent score of 62.5%. As on the last patrol, this vessel used favorable track angles, low zero angles, and short firing intervals. In addition, torpedoes were effectively employed. The shift from a planned 40 to a 60 spread coverage at the last minute on attacks Nos. 3 and 4, because targets were invisible and radar bearings uncertain, was an excellent example of flexibility in spread coverage to meet existing conditions.

3. Alterations to trials and drain pumps and installation of laminated jars will be completed during Vard overhaul at Pearl Harbor beginning 1 April, 1943.

4. Concomitant pararaphs 18(5) and 18(6):

(a) The idea of an award for the outstanding lookout has merits but the Navy and "errino Cora" deal is awarded essentially for heroism. It is believed that, aside from letters of commendation from higher authority, suitable means for recognition for excellence are already provided each Commander (Fleet).

(b) Recent instructions require that any man who fails to qualify in submarines after six months on board or two patrols be returned to surface ships.

5. The Division Commander adds his heart's content to the Commander's officer, officers and crew for another aggressive, ablv conducted patrol resulting in much added damage to the enemy.

[Signature]

— page 106 —
5/1/43
DATE: 6-6-43
SS232/A16-3
Serial (013)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
July 28, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OFFICIALS 5510.10
BY 5/1/43
DATE: 6-6-43
SS232/A16-3
Serial (013)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
July 28, 1943.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT, Report of War Patrol Number Five.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track Charts for subject report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the fifth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the TRUK and GUAM areas during the period June 10, 1943 to July 28, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

P, H. ROSS.

— page 107 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Fifth War Patrol
:  PERIOD FROM - JUNE 10, 1943 to July 28 1943

A. PROLOGUE:
Arrived at Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H., from Fourth War Patrol on March 30, 1943. Commenced regular Navy Yard overhaul at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor on April 1. Installed laminated rubber jars in both batteries. Cut down superstructure. Replaced three inch gun with 4"/50 cal.gun. Installed two additional .20mm guns, and mounts for 2 air cooled .50 cal. machine guns. Moved #1 periscope to conning tower. Replaced #3 main motor armature. Removed all degaussing coils and equipment. Installed conning tower air conditioning system. Installed RBO system. Installed baththeromograph. In drydock, May 2 to May 15. Completed overhaul May 25. Conducted sound tests and departed on May 27. Training period May 31 - June 3. June 4 - 8, conducted underway tests to correct unbalanced condition and excessive sparking in #3 main motor. Ready for sea June 10.

B. HARRAT IVE:
June 10, 1943.
1100(W)  Dopard torpedo PEARL HARBOR with U.S. PCS86 as escort.
1520(W)  Forced to slow from 17 to 10 knots due to excessive temperature of starboard main motor air coolers. Air coolers not obtaining sufficient circulating water.
1615(W)  Trouble determined to be in faulty operation of lub oil cooler by-pass valve which was restricting discharge of circulating water from air coolers. It was found, however, that by placing the valve in a partially closed position sufficient water circulation could be obtained to make 17 knots.
1906(W)  Made trim dive.
1955(W)  Escort departed.

June 11, 1943.
0641(W)  Made trim dive.
1500(W)  SD Radar out of commission. Tube Y-211 (type 6V6) in sweep circuit burned out. This was second tube of this type replaced since leaving PEARL. Renowned tube, expending last spare. Checked all circuits to determine quaso of tube failures. All circuits normal.
1637(W)  Sent despatch to Consubspac requesting that spare tubes and a lub oil cooler by-pass valve be flown to JOHNSTON ISLAND.

June 12, 1943.
0230(W)  ECM out of commission. Printer unit not operating properly.
0706(W)  Contacted air escort to JOHNSTON ISLAND.
1110(W)  Moored to dock, JOHNSTON ISLAND. Obtained 9,030 gallons fuel oil and 900 gallons fresh water.
1430(W)  Unable to determine ECM trouble so sent dispatch to Consubspac requesting that another ECM be included with items being sent.
1630(W)  Effected repairs to ECM. Maintain ship's force found that main motor circulating water trouble was due to improper installation of by-pass valve and corrected same. Six spare 6V6 tubes wore obtained from JOHNSTON ISLAND so at.
1730(X)  Departed JOHNSTON ISLAND on route across.
1930(X)  Reported completion of repairs and departure for area to Consubspac.

-1-
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 109 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Fifth War Patrol

deep but not so close. After this attack he left us and stood off in the direction of the freighter, dropping single charges intermittent-ly as he went and pinging a few times. During the next two hours, sixteen more charges were dropped, progressively farther away. During this attack the roller boarding in one locking down device of the J/K/Q sound gear broke. The head was held in place by the remaining locking device and could still be trained.

0900(K) At periscope depth. Nothing in sight.

1058(K) Sighted single float reconnaissance plane.

1912(K) Surface. Decided to spend a day or so in southern part of the area to try to get the SJ in an operating condition and to make other minor repairs necessitated by depth charging and leaks during deep sub-maritime.

June 24, 1943.

0442(K) Submerged, heading east along southern edge of area. No contacts. Spent the day checking over the SJ and making other repairs and adjustments. Since departure on patrol, personnel have had to work over-time correcting the numerous minor defects which are bound to arise after an extensive navy yard overhaul.

1913(K) Surface. Headed northeast to pass south of LOSAP ISLAND and get an TRUK-POMPER track.

June 25, 1943.

0135(K) Sighted patrol vessel (PC type)(Contact #6) on starboard bow, range 8000 yards. Turned away and increased speed to full. No evidently saw us as we turned away and headed for us, gaining slowly.

0155(K) Patrol boat fired a shot and illuminated us. We dived when we was 4000 yards astern and still gaining. Went to 300 feet.

0159(K) Depth charge attack commenced. Thirteen charges dropped not too close. He never made sound contact with us and shortly after completing his attack he stood off to the northward. We headed south. After reaching 300 feet the bearing of the remaining bearing from the J/K/Q probe. This was replaced by the remaining bearing from the J/K/Q probe, so the latter could not longer be trained. The increased pressure against the locking devices at deep submarges was cracking and breaking the outer races on the bearings.

0310(K) Hard distant pinging ahead of us. Changed course to the northwest and later swung around to the northeast. Hoorf faint pinging for the next five hours. Twelve distant depth charges were dropped.

0700(K) Another bearing on QB sound. Last ball bearing race on QB sound. Listened by swinging ship. Unable to hear anything so decided to start the hydraulic system to raise QB head and install now bearings found in engineering spares. (See paragraph N - Sound Gear and Sound Conditions).

1135(K) At periscope depth. Nothing in sight.

1912(K) Surface. Continued toward eastern edge of area.

June 26, 27, 1943.

Uncomfortable. Continued submerged patrol in eastern part of area, still working on repairs, chiefly the SJ radar. After surfacing on the 27th the radar appeared to be operating normally but we had nothing to test it on. Decided that its importance warranted spending ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 111 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Fifth War Patrol
:  to the eastward. Had originally planned interoception between TARANG
:  REEF and CONDOR BANK but now saw that we would have to make our
:  attack to the eastward of CONDOR BANK and before the convoy reached
:  the vicinity of GRAY FEATHER BANK. Was not sure of our position as
:  a heavy overcast had prevented obtaining morning star sights.
: 0730(K) Got a sun line which gave us a fair check on our longitude and at
: 0830(K) Changed course to the northeast again to close the track.
:  Obtained occasional bearings on the smoke which seemed to indicate
:  that the convoy was heading for the safety of the shoal water around
:  CONDOR BANK.
: 0954(K) Submerged when estimated distance to track was five miles.
: 1000(K) Turned north to further close track but after an hour it became apparent
:  that either the convoy had been further north than we had calculated
:  or else it had reached CONDOR BANK and headed to the northeastward
:  for GRAY FEATHER BANK. Could not see this ship but the smoke was
:  keeping the convoy well located for us. Changed to normal approach
:  course.
: 1130(K) Sighted stacks and masts of the two ships as they passed north of us at
:  a range of 14,000 yards.
: 1220(K) Reluctantly abandoned chase and turned south.
: 1530(K) Had grosser fire in gallery which was put out in short order by a CO, ex-
:  tinguished continued to leak after being scoured and the boat had
:  become smoked up considerably as after taking a good look around sur-
:  faced to air out.
: 1500(K) Had just decided to stay on the surface when the SD radar reported a plan
:  at 1 1/2 miles. Dived without seeing anything and stayed down until
:  dark. An uncertain as to the actual existence of this plane as SD
:  radar performance had been erratic and it had lately shown consider-
:  able interference and distortion. However, several experienced radar
:  operators saw the pip and said that it looked like a plane.
: 1938(K) Surfaced and headed west.
: 2230(K) Sent despatch to 'Conusbuscap reporting the convoy.

July 6, 1943.
: 0503(K) Made trim dive.
: 0516(K) Surfaced and changed course to north to head for our new area.
: 0534(K) Sighted SATANAL ISLAND bearing 0657, distance 12 miles. Changed course
:  to give it a little more clearance.
: 0828(K) Sighted WEST FAYU ISLAND bearing 3537, distance 15 miles.
: 0830(K) Sighted a plane emerging from cloud bank ahead at low altitude, distance
:  about 10 miles. Dived. Plane was not identified as to type. We may
:  have been seen as we passed SATANAL ISLAND, SD radar did not pick up
:  this plane.
: 1923(K) Surfaced.
: 2347(K) Sighted unidentified ship (Contact #9) on starboard bow, bearing 090°T,
:  estimated range 4000 yards. A low haze obscured the horizon making
:  visibility very poor and it was impossible to tell anything about
:  the vessel except that it was not very large. Not having any radar
:  and since HING O was passing through this area decided that wisest
:  course in the low visibility was one of avoidance and turned to put
:  the ship on our quarter until it disappeared.

-5- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 112 —
1556(K) 1938(K) 2500(K)
July 7, 1943.
Unmanned on surface heading for now area.
Within 150 miles of QUAM, Submerged.
Surface.
Changed course to 110° to comply with latest orders from Consubspac.

July 8, 1943.
Unmanned on surface heading for now area.
Within 150 miles of QUAM, Submerged.
Surface.
Changed course to 110° to comply with latest orders from Consubspac.

July 10, 1943.
Submerged.
Sighted two large ships on starboard bow (Contact #10). Range 7000 yards, angle on the bow 20° or more. Light from a half-full moon with an overcast sky made visibility fairly good for a submerged approach. Commenced approach. Formation zigged to the right putting us in a favorable attack position. Identified leading ship as a converted carrier, second ship as auxiliary cruiser. Sound picked up scores of one escorting destroyer on our starboard beam. Range and angle on the bow was difficult to estimate but got a quick set-up on the carrier.

2026(K) Last depth control. Bolstered to 1000 knots. No wind. No motion. Making tubes ready. When control was regained a few minutes later the carrier had gotten by a favorable firing bearing. Shifted target to the auxiliary cruiser and at.

2032(K) Fired six torpedoes at the cruiser. Three hits. Saw the first torpedo hit, raising a large column of smoke and debris from the vicinity of the bridge. Hard but did not see the other two torpedoes hit as was looking for the escort. Made storm tubes ready for possible shot at the escort who had turned in the direction of the cruiser and was crossing our stern. Took another look at the cruiser. It was stopped, down by the stern and red flares were being fired. The carrier was signalling to the cruiser with blinker tube.

2035(K) Heard a series of about six explosions which sounded like internal explosions in the cruiser.

2039(K) Sound reported the noise of a torpedo on our port quarter. Checked the bearing and saw it coincided with the bearing of the destroyer. Went deep. It could have been one of our torpedoes running on the starboard side. Did not hear the torpedoes again after we started deep. A few minutes later, the sound ran reported that all he could hear was one set of heavy screws astern. Those slowed down until they were almost stopped and then speeded up again.

2114(K) Four depth charges, not close.

ENDORSEMENT (A)

— page 113 —
1943, U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Fifth War Patrol

July 10, 1943 (continued):
2114(K) The sounds of the depth charges dropped on this attack were different from any previously heard by this vessel. Three distinct noises were heard for each charge. First, there was a low muffled explosion which was followed about two seconds later by the customary click. Four to five seconds after the click, the loud explosion and water noises were heard.
2120(K) Destroyer commenced searching for us using echo ranging on 18 kcs.
2125(K) Four more depth charges.
2145(K) Pinging became fainter and finally faded out or stopped.
2345(K) Surfaced.

July 11, 1943.
Uneventful. Conducted submerged patrol northwest of TRUK. Majority of crew were still feeling effects of food poisoning.

July 13, 1943.
Surface patrol northwest of TRUK.

July 14, 1943.
Conducted submerged patrol. Upon surfacing, headed north towards now area. The crew was back in normal health with the exception of two men who were still unable to keep any food down.

July 15, 1943.
0445(K) Submerged, conducting patrol across area.
1940(K) Surfaced.
2100(K) Entered area.

July 16, 1943.
0035(K) Sighted ROTA bearing 340°, distance 33 miles.
0105(K) Sighted GUAM, bearing 265°, distance 25 miles.
0450(K) Submerged, turned south, heading for PORT AFRA.
1210(K) Sighted small patrol vessel, patrolling outside of PORT AFRA (Contact #11).
1215(K) Sighted two large freighters in PORT AFRA (Contact #12).
1938(K) Surfaced. Patrolled EMPIRE-GUAM track during night.

July 17, 1943.
0459(K) Submerged, heading for PORT AFRA. Weather stormy, frequent rain squalls and low visibility.
1144(K) Sighted GUAM when visibility increased between rain squalls. Continued to close PORT AFRA but was unable to get a good look into harbor because of visibility conditions.
1845(K) Surfaced.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 114 —
1943, U.S.S. HULBUR - Report of Fifth War patrol

July 18, 1943:
0502(K) Submerged. Weather still stormy.
0935(K) Within sight of FORT APRA. The two frigates were still there. Those may have been the same two freighters which the TUNNY reported upon leaving this area. Took bearing from different positions to determine their location and found them to be practically on the reef in the far northeast corner of the harbor. Their continued presence in FORT APRA may indicate that they are damaged ships which have been beached.
1941(K) Surfaced. Turned south planning to pass around south end of GUAM and then head for our departure point.

July 19, 20, 1943:
Uneventful. Conducted submerged patrol south and east of GUAM.

July 21, 1943:
0459(K) Submerged.
1800(K) Departed area on route MIDWAY.
1930(K) Surfaced.

July 22, 24, 1943:
Uneventful.

July 25, 1943:
1223(L) Sighted land based reconnaissance bomber (MITSUBISHI 97) emerging from cloud bank to north at low altitude, distance 4 miles. Dived. Our positions was 115 miles north of WAKE.
1640(L) Surfaced.

July 26, 1943:
0405(L) Made trim dive.

July 27, 1943:
0518(M) Made trim dive.
0759(M) Sighted 9 B-24's passing on opposite course, altitude 3000 feet.
1048(M) Sighted PEF on opposite course, altitude 1500 feet. Exchanged room-matic signals.
1527(M) Sighted unidentified plane, distance 12 miles. Plane did not close sufficiently for identification.
1600-1629(M) Sighted four B-24's on parallel course.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 115 —
1943. Made trim dive.
1435(M) Sighted periscope on port beam, bearing 3060T distance 1500 yards. Swung right to put periscope astern and increased speed to full.

1440(M) Sighted PBY bearing 3250T, distance 10 miles.
1510(M) Resumed base course. Sent contact report on periscope to Comsubspac and Midway.
2359(M) Changed time to 12 zone time.

July 28, 1943.
0600(Y) Contacted air escort to MIDWAY.
0808(Y) Moored alongside U.S.S. SHERRY.

C. NEATHER.

The weather in the TRUK area was exceptionally good. Seas were flat and visibility excellent. Occasional rain squalls were encountered, particularly during the night. In the vicinity of GUAM, the weather was very equally and seas were rough with a considerable ground swell.

D. TIDAL INFORMATION.

In the waters north of TRUK a set of a half knot to the westward was experienced while south of TRUK it was the same amount to the eastward. The current along the west coast of GUAM sets a half knot to the southwest.

N. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

No lighted navigational aids were sighted. The light-houses on POINT RITIDIAN and CROTE POINT and the aero beacon were useful in navigating inshore at GUAM.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 116 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
F. SHIP CONTACTS.

| No. | Time and Latitude: | Date | Longitude: | Type(s) | Initial:Course | How: | Contacted: | Remarks |
|-----||------||||------|||
| 1.  | 17:04(K)         | 8-07N | Destroyer  | 12,000  | 3000T       | P   |           |           |
|     | June 20 151-29E |       |           |         | 20 kts      |      |           |         |
| 2.  | 20:43(K)         | 8-02N | Freighter with one | 12,000  | 290T       |      |           |         |
|     | June 20 151-02E |       | destroyer escort | 13 kts    | SN         |      |           |         |
| 3.  | 23:46(K)         | 8-09N | Destroyer or patrol | 12,000  | 270T       |      |           |         |
|     | June 20 150-33E |       | vessel      | 5 kts     | SN         |      |           |         |
| 4.  | 23:51(K)         | 8-04N | Destroyer or patrol | 12,000  | 270T       |      |           |         |
|     | June 20 150-36E |       | vessel      | 5 kts     | SN         |      |           |         |
| 5.  | 03:14(K)         | 6-30N | Freighter with des- | 12,000  | 045T       |      | We were sighted |         |
|     | June 23 150-08E |       | trover escort | 10 kts    | SN         |      | after commencing | approach and depth |         |
| 6.  | 01:35(K)         | 5-57N | Patrol vessel | 8,000  | 3300T      |      | Depth charged by |         |
|     | June 25 152-55E |       |           | Unknow | SN         |      | this patrol |         |
| 7.  | 02:02(K)         | 5-16N | Sound contact High | 8,000  | Unknown  |      | Not sighted |         |
|     | July 2 151-52E |       | spored screws | 4,000  | 1100T      |      | Later sighted at |         |
| 8.  | 21:00(K)         | 8-06N | Two freighters | 9Kts    | SN         |      | 1130(K) July 5. |         |
|     | July 4 146-13E |       |           |         |              |      | Last. 7-37N; Long. | 1148-26E. |         |
| 9.  | 23:47(K)         | 9-07N | Unidentified | 4,000  | Unknown  |      | Believed to be a |         |
|     | July 6 147-10E |       |           |         |              |      | small patrol ves- | sel. |         |
| 10. | 20:07(K)         | 10-37N | One XCV, one XCL, | 7,000  | 1900T      | P   | Fired 6 torpedoes |         |
|     | July 10 150-45E |       | and 2 DD's. | 17 kts    | (Night)  |      | at XCL(AIKOKU MARU | cless) - 3 hits |         |
| 11. | 12:10(K)         | 13-28N | Small patrol vessel | 9,000  | Various  |      | Patrolling off |         |
|     | July 16 144-37E |       |           | 8 kts    | P         |      | PORT APRA. |         |
| 12. | 12:15(K)         | 13-27N | Two large freighters | 4,000  | -        |      | In PORT APRA. |         |
|     | July 16 144-39E |       |           | 1,500  | Unknown  |      |              |         |
| 13. | 14:35(M)         | 26-49N | Periscope | 4,000  | Unknown  |      |              |         |
|     | July 28 179-44E |       |           | 1,500  | Unknown  |      |              |         |

— page 118 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

H. ATTACK DATA.

U.S.S. HALIBUT TORPEDO ATTACK NO.1 FATRQL NO. 5

Time 2032(K) Date July 10, 1943. Lat. 10-37N Long. 150-45E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:
Task Force consisting of one converted carrier, one auxiliary cruiser (AIKOKU NARU class) and probably two escorting destroyers. Contact was made by periscope sighting two hours after sunset. Visibility through periscope, 7000 yards. The auxiliary cruiser was attacked and three torpedo hits were obtained.

Ship's Sunk: None.

Ship's Damaged or probably Sunk: Auxiliary cruiser (AIKOKU NARU-class), gross tonnage: 10,500.

Damage detected: Saw one torpedo hit, heard two others. Large column of smoke and debris seen in vicinity of bridge when torpedo hit. Ship stopped and and down by stern.

Target draft 29 feet Course 190 Speed 17 kts Range 1500

Gun Ship Data

Speed 4 kts Course 310 Depth 65 feet Angle Zero

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type attack: Night periscope attack using Torpedo Data Computer. Fired 4.4" torpedo at 1000 yards. Torpedo gyro angles at range of 1500 yards. Torpedo course and range estimates very rough due to visibility conditions. Kept periscope raised throughout the attack and got check bearings between torpedoes as the TDC bearings were not agreeing very well.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 119 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF FIFTH WAR PATROL

H. ATTACK DATA (CONTINUED).

Tubes fired #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6
Track angle 106P 110P 116P 123P 127P 132P
Gyro angle 46L 47L 59L 57L 71L 65L
Dopth sot 20' 20' 20' 20' 20' 20'
Power High High High High High High
Hit or Miss Miss Miss Hit Hit Hit Miss
Erratic No No No No No No
Mark Tor-
podo 14-3 14-3 14-3 14-3 14-3 14-3
Serial No. 23672 23737 22973 23019 23262 23271
Actuation
Sot Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation
Actual --- --- Contact Contact Contact ---
Mark War-
hood 16 16 16 16 16 15
Serial No. 5984 815 9775 6143 729 235
Explosive Torpex Torpex Torpex Torpex Torpex TNT (Tor-
pox octenador)
Firing In-
tional 8 sec. 8 sec. 8 sec. 8 sec. 8 sec. 8 sec.
Type Spread
(Interogent) 1H 1H 4L 4R 6L 6R
Sos Condi-
tions Calm
Overhaul
Activity U.S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, TH USS STERRY
Remarks- None.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 120 —
14 - ENCLOSURE (2)

1. U.S.S. H.LIBUT - Report of Fifth Patrol

I. MINES.

No similarity operations were observed.

J. ANTI-SUBMARINE TASSURE AND SWASON TACTICS.

The area around TRUK is well patrolled by destroyers and other anti-submarine vessels. In two instances we were deeply charged after having been sighted on the surface at night.

On June 23 we dove and changed course when the destroyer was about 4000 yards away, headed toward us at high speed. We delivered his attack immediately on our estimated subcoincidence position, dropping ten chares which were fairly close. With out slowing down he made another pass a few minutes later, dropping four more, set deep but not so close. He then stood off in the direction of the freighter he had been escorting. During the next two hours, sixteen more chares were dropped, apparently for nuisance value. They were all distant. Point pinging was heard once for about fifty minutes.

The patrol vessel which sighted us on the night of June 25 delivered a similar attack, dropping thirteen chares without slowing to rest a sound contact. This may have been all his chares as he stood off to the northward at high speed shortly after making his attack. To us no time used echo or range, but an hour afterwards we heard distant pinning to the south. This continued for the next five hours and twelve distant depth charges were dropped.

After our attack on the auxiliary cruiser one destroyer remained behind to deliver the depth charges attack. Near the end of the day we dropped a thousand depth charges and then proceeded to the next one. The next depth charge was dropped and after a few minutes we were in the vicinity of the enemy. The depth charges were dropped and the enemy was in the vicinity of the

— page 121 —
1. U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF FIFTH WAR PATROL

K. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE.

HULL
(1) Trim and drain pumps: Both the trim and the drain pumps were fitted with air domes during the navy yard overhaul. This modification did little to eliminate the pounding of the pumps at depths greater than 100 feet. The trim pump in particular was very noisy. Difficulty was experienced in obtaining a good suction with either pump when at deep submergence.

(2) Air conditioning and refrigeration: Numerous leaks in refrigeration and air conditioning piping made necessary the excessive expenditure of five flasks of freon during the patrol.

(3) Hydraulic systems: Hydraulic leaks, especially in the stern planes and steering gear systems, depleted a 65 gallon hydraulic oil supply by the end of the patrol.

(4) High Pressure Air Compressors: Early in the patrol, the third and fourth stages valves in both high pressure air compressors required grinding repeatedly to eliminate leaks caused by the scoring of the valves and valve seats by particles of dirt and carbon. The coil strap or the coil support of the third stage intercoolers vibrates against the coil causing a persistent metallic knock and chafing the coil walls. This coil has twice been renewed.

(5) Stern Planes - Capstan Clutch: The clutch rollers of the stern planes-capstan clutch overhaul, rattles, and chip the clutch flanges. The entire assembly requires realignment.

(6) No. 2 Periscope: When No. 2 periscope was lowered on the bottom bearing in rigging for depth charges attack on June 25, one of the training handles was jarred from the upright position against the periscope so that the end of the handle rested against the side of the periscope well. When the periscope was later raised, this end caught under a lip in the side of the well and the lower portion of the periscope was forced about four inches out of line. The periscope was immediately lowered and it returned to normal alignment. Using a long hook, the handle was replaced in the upright position and the periscope raised. No damage had been done to the optical system, but the periscope soon lost all its gas and the standard hand wheel had been bent so that it turned stiffly.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 122 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF FIFTH WAR PATROL

K. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (CONTINUED).

ENGINEERING:
(1) Lub-oil cooler by-pass valves: Upon departure from PEARL, excessive temperatures of the starboard main motor circuit, lating water and cooling system air prevented maintenance of the vessel from being in a state of complete stoppage. This was caused by faulty operation of the lubricating oil cooler by-pass valve which was restricting discharge of circulating water from the oil coolers. It was found that by setting this valve in a mid-position, sufficient cooling water could be obtained to make required speed. At JOHNSTON ISLAND, inspection showed that the valve body had been installed improperly. Proper installation by ship's force corrected the defect.

(2) Pitoneter Log: Throughout the patrol, the pitoneter log was sluggish and sometimes erratic, particularly at submerged speeds. This has been characteristic of the system since installation. It is believed that the causes of the trouble are in the pump unit and the control unit although both these units have been overhauled at the end of each patrol and the control unit at least once during each patrol. Spare parts have become depleted and to date have been irreplaceable.

TORPEDO AND GUNTRY:
Numerous defects were discovered in the torpedoes when checked by ship's force. Among the more important were:
(1) Torpedo No. 2579 - Loose stuffing box nuts on rudder rods in aft-orboy bulkhead. Loose vertical rudder yoke pins.
(2) Torpedoes No. 23263, 23019 - Packing gland on the stop valve follower improperly packed.
(3) Torpedo No. 23040 - Chipped glass in depth setting gearing.
(4) Torpedoes No. 23044, 23260 - Control valve bracket nuts slackened off.
(5) Torpedo No. 22770 - Gyro pot 1 1/2" off center.
(6) Torpedo No. 23276 - Seals nut found in combustion pot.
(7) Torpedo No. 23272, 23261 - Leaky starting pistons.

RADIO AND SOUND:
(1) 35' and 35' Radars - (See paragraph M - Radar).
(2) Sound Gear - (See paragraph N - Sound Gear and Sound Conditions).

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 123 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF FIFTH YEAR PATROL

L. RADIO.

Communications were generally satisfactory throughout the patrol. Radio reception was good and no sordidness was noted. Contradable time was spent in trying to decode three strip cipher messages. These had been improperly encoded and were later corrected. Some difficulty was experienced in clearing traffic to NEI on one occasion, the message being relayed via BRISBANE. The four and eight thousand bands were jammed from about 1000 to 1200 ZEBRA.

Frequency tests conducted by Radio Oahu were observed in accordance with Consubspac Serial 200Y with the following results: NEM was heard only on 9090 KCS. Reception was excellent on this frequency. Signal strength and readability were five, there were no atmospherics and slight interference from one to three stations did not affect reception.

Attempts to copy NEM on the submerged loop were unsuccessful.

There were no radio material defects.

M. RADAR.

SJ RADAR

The SJ radar was out of commission during the entire patrol. It was apparently functioning properly upon our departure from JOHNSTON ISLAND, but at no time thereafter was it able to pick up a target. This radar has not operated satisfactorily from the time it was installed. It was hoped that a complete overhaul by the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor prior to this patrol would remedy the defects, but such was not the case.

Following is a chronological record of SJ radar performance during this patrol.

June 17: Loss of IF gain. Gain was brought back by replacing tubes in receiver indicator.

June 19: Range indicator would not return to zero. Renewed broken cord in range tank.

June 20: Radar failed to pick up two targets at 8000 yards. The following day took oscillograms of all circuits to determine cause of failure. All circuits checked satisfactorily except triangular #5 on V-1 and terminal #1 on V-2. These tubes are in the swept circuit however which appeared to be working properly.

June 21: The trace moved to the right of the screen. Took voltage and resistance readings and found trouble to be the bank of regulators lamps, LPL-1P4. Renewed LP4 which remedied this trouble, but there was no outgoing pulse. Renewed tube 72A(V-2) and the pulse reappeared about 6000 yards cut from the zero point. Replacement of the trigger tube (V-9) remedied this defect.

— page 124 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF FIFTH WAR PATROL

M. RADAR (CONTINUED).

June 24: Radar failed to pick up destroyer at 4000 yards. Later that day changed oscillator-converters, took oscillograms, voltage and resistance readings and made every test prescribed in the instruction book without finding anything wrong.

June 25: Radar again failed to pick up a target at 4000 yards. Decided oscillator converter was out of tune as nothing else appeared to be out of order. Using a tuning box obtained from Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor attempt-ed to tune for maximum spread of outgoing pulse. Tube V-101 and R-110 shorted out during this operation and was replaced.

June 29: Closed an island, 60 to 70 feet in height, to a range of about 7000 yards and attempted to tune the spare oscillator converter. After working for two hours without success abandoned the attempt and resigned ourselves to the necessity of conducting the remainder of the patrol without an S.J radar.

SD RADAR
The SD radar gave unsatisfactory performance throughout the patrol, requiring excessive replacement of tubes and other spares. It was continually going out of commission when it was not needed and could not be depended on at any time.

Following is the record of SD radar performance.

June 10: A shortened sweep appeared on the screen; Replaced a meter of tube V-211 corrected the trouble.

June 11: Shortened sweep reappeared. Replaced a meter of V-211 tube again rectified defect. Checked all circuits to determine reason for tube failures. All circuits checked normal.

June 20: Equipment lost sensitivity. Replaced a meter of 1st RF tube restored sensitivity.

June 23: Trace disappeared. Found that condenser C-255 was arcing and that resistance R-274 was burned out. (This condenser and resistor have caused trouble on previous patrols). Replaced the above parts with spares.

July 5: When SD started to double pulse found that resistors R-101 and R-103 had burned out. Replaced R-101, but had no spare R-103. Substituted a .5 neoprene resistor for the proper 1 megohm valve of R-103. This allowed only limited operation of the radar for the remainder of the patrol.

-15- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 125 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF FIFTH WAR PATROL

N. SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

During the navy yard overhaul, a new type of locking down device was installed on both sound equipments in accordance with BuShips ltr SS238/38(515) of Sept. 24, 1942. This modification as accomplished by Navy Yard Patrol Officer was unsatisfactory. During the first deep submergence after arrival in patrol area, the outer race of one of the ball bearings of the locking down device for the J/K/Qc sound gear was broken by the increased pressure on the bearing. Two days later, when again forced deep, the same casualty occurred to one of the bearings of the Qb equipment. As no spares had been provided, this broken bearing was replaced with the one good bearing remaining on the J/K/Qc equipment, putting this latter cut of commission. Several hours later this bearing also broke and the QB was trained using only one locking device until it too failed, making training impossible. Four bearings of a slightly different type, but of sturdier construction, were finally found and engineering spares. These were installed and permitted satisfactory operation of the both sound equipments. No other bearings of proper size were on board as two brass rollers were manufactured and used on the J/K/Qc gear in order to retain two of the ball bearings as spares for the QB. These rollers introduced a slight noise in the J/K/Qc when trained but were otherwise satisfactorily satisfactory. After the above casualties occurred both sound heads developed a ncisiness when trained which is believed to originate in the shaft bearings. Fragments of the broken locking device bearings may have been removed from the shaft securing the bearings. The QB shaft has also developed a vibration at 4 knots.

Sound conditions in the area were average.

O. DENSITY LAYERS.

Density layers were noted on the three occasions as it was necessary to go to deep submergence. The first two times (41-1- Lat. 6°30'N, Long. 150°10'E; 42-1- Lat. 6°00'N, Long. 152°50'E) it was necessary to increase speed and pump out to climb through a layer at 280 feet. On the third occasion (Lat. 10°37'N, Long. 150°45'E) the bath was lighter at 300 feet than at periscope depth. The bath through the shaft was used in every dive but no marked temperature gradients were noted. The bath through the shaft

— page 127 —
U.S.S. HALLIBUT - REPORT OF FIFTH WAVE PATROL

Q. PERSONNEL.

The conduct and performance of duty of both officer and enlisted personnel were of the highest order.

Twenty now men wore taken to sea on this patrol, of those, only three were qualified in submarines and only five had made previous war patrols. Despite their general lack of experience they soon found their places in the ship's organization and quickly adapted themselves to war patrol routine.

The Commanding Officer desires to take this opportunity to thank all personnel for their assistance and cooperation in the conduct of the patrol.

R. MILES STEAD - FUEL USED.

| Fuel | Provision | Personnel Factor |
|------|||
| 18   | 5200 gal  | 5 days         |
|      |           | 10 days        |

Patrol was terminated in accordance with the operation order.

U. Remarks.

The complete failure of the SJ radar throughout the patrol was a great disappointment and its absence was keenly felt on numerous occasions. The performance of this SJ has been erratic and generally unsatisfactory on the three patrols made since its installation. It is recommended that it be replaced with another radar during the coming refit.

Air conditioning water was used for washing throughout the patrol. Expenditure of this water did not equal distillation and the excess would overflow the collecting tubins in the submarine and drain into the sanitary tank. Capacity of #2 sanitary tank is only 275 gallons and with the additional air conditioning water draining into it, it would be completely filled several hours before time to surface. To avoid the necessity of blowing the tank while submerged, it is recommended that a connection be installed between #2 sanitary tank and the drain line. This will permit the pumping of the sanitary tank to the expansion tank when necessary.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 128 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

1. HALIBUT Fifth War Patrol extended for forty eight days, thirty one days being spent in patrol areas in the Carolines and Marianas.

2. It is believed that too much time (twenty nine days) was spent in submerged patrol, considering the areas and other factors.

3. Contacts and attack:
   (a) The experience with contact No. 5 on 23 June again emphasises the importance of remaining unsighted. Rather than close the range and be sighted, the submarine should remain at invisible range while gaining attack position ahead at full speed.
   (b) Contact No. 8 might have been attacked on the surface considering the very dark, rainy night. On the following afternoon, rather than abandon chase, trailing and an end-around followed by attack from ahead appears sound against this 9-knot convoy.
   (c) The loss of depth control on the one attack made was most unfortunate in that it prevented firing at the carrier. The order to make ready the tubes was given rather late; this was combined with personnel errors in hurriedly preparing all tubes. (It this time nearly all the crew were handicapped by the sickness from food poisoning.) Although the carrier got by, it's escorting converted cruiser was given a salvo of six torpedoes and received three hits, at least two of which were Torpax.

4. The Division Commander does not concur with the Commanding Officer's remark (paragraph U) that the 3rd radar has been generally unsatisfactory on the three patrols since installation. On the other two patrols six ships (40,000 tons) sunk or damaged would not have been contacted except for radar. On eight successful night attacks (55,000 tons) radar was largely responsible for the results; on two of these the targets were never seen or heard prior to firing. The 5th was also used on two unsuccessful attacks. Investigation of the poor radar performance of this patrol leads to the conclusion that the primary cause is insufficient experience in practical troubleshooting, on the part of the technician.

— page 129 —
1 XCL (AIKOKU NARU CLASS) 10,500 tons.

END OF REPORT

FCS-10/A16-3
Serial 0110
SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO
CO HALIBUT Conf. 1tr.
SS232/Pl6-3, serial 013,
dated July 26, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

1. The HALIBUT conducted her Fifth War Patrol in areas where contacts are not numerous but most of them valuable targets. Only one torpedo attack was delivered. Three hits were scored on an XCL.

2. The remark under section N of the patrol report that the S3 radar has not functioned properly since installation is not borne out by the glowing account of its successful operation in HALIBUT Report of Third War Patrol, nor is it borne out in HALIBUT Report of Fourth War Patrol. On this patrol it was used successfully on 4 out of 5 attacks. On the other attack, ranging was poor. On all attacks bearings were erratic at close range, which is to be expected with large targets.

3. Reports from other submarines contacting the same convoy after the HALIBUT attack may definitely indicate whether the XCL hit by three torpedoes sunk or not. Until such information is available it is recommended that the HALIBUT be credited with the following damage to the enemy:

DAVAGAD (C)
1 XCL (AIKOKU NARU CLASS) 10,500 tons.

— page 130 —
1-10/416-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01056
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
CO HALIBU1 Conf. 1tr.
SS232/A16-3, serial 013,
dated July 28, 1943.
CONSURSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 230
U.S.S. HALIBU - FIFTH W.R PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HALIBU (SS232) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject war patrol report.
    (B) Copy of Consubdiv 101 Conf. 1st. end. FB5-101/416-3,
    serial 055 dated 29 July 1943.
    (C) Copy of Consubron 10 Conf. 2nd. end. FC5-10/416-3,
    serial 0110 dated 2 august 1943.

1. The fifth war patrol of the HALIBU was spent around Truk and in the Marianas.

2. It is regretted that the HALIBU did not have the full use of its SJ radar during the patrol. Seven of the contacts were at night and could have been developed much better had the radar been functioning.

3. The one attack was aggressively carried out and the auxiliary cruiser hit was undoubtedly seriously damaged and may have sunk eventually.

4. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia award.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for inflicting the following damage upon the enemy:

DAUGHTER
1 - Auxiliary Cruiser (LIKOKU MARU class) - 10,500 tons

C. L. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

Distribution and authentication on following page.
-1-

— page 131 —
12/10/46-3(5)/16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01056
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
August 8, 1943.

THIRD ENTRY:
CO HALIBUT Conf. 1tr.
SS232/416-3, serial 013,
dated July 28, 1943.

CONDENSED PATCH REPORT NO. 230
U.S.S. HALIBUT - FIFTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch, VCNO (5 ea); Cincpac (6);
Cinclant, S/M School NL, Comsoapac,
Comsubsoapsec, CTF 72, SUED MI,
ComsubspsecSubordCom, all Squad. &
Div. Comdr. (2 ea); Serforpac (Ldv.
Ease Plan,Unit), Comsoapsec, CTF 16,
HALIBUT (1 ea); Comsubsblent (8);
Comsubsapc (12);
All SS Subspac (loss enclosures) (1).

R. C. LAWVER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 133 —
35-12N/16-3
SERIAL 043
CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT:
HALIBUT CONF. 1st, SS232/16-3
Serial (016) of 16 September 1943.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of Sixth War Patrol - Comments on.

6. It is felt that the officers and men of this HALIBUT are to be congratulated for a fine patrol under their new Commanding Officer and that the torpedo performance improves this ship will better her already fine record.

7. It is recommended that the HALIBUT be credited with having inflicted the following damage on the enemy:

| SINK | TONNS |
|------|-------|
| 1 AK (ITALY NARU type) | 6,000 tons |
| 1 AK (NAGANO NARU type) | 3,624 tons |
| TOTAL | 9,824 tons |

DAMAGE
1 DD (class unknown) | 1,000 tons
1 Sampan | 150 tons

TOTAL | 1,150 tons

R. E. PEACHER.

R. E. PEACHER.

— page 134 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U. S. S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL

PERIOD FROM: 20 AUGUST 1943 to 16 SEPTEMBER 1943.

AREA: COMATASKFOR 17 OPERATION ORDER NO. 162-43.

A. PROLOGUE.

Arrived MIDWAY on 28 July 1943 from FIFTH WAR PATROL. A corded alongside SPEAKY and commenced refit by SPEAKY and SUBDIV 101 Relief Crew. Made deep dive off MIDWAY on 30 July to determine cause of defects in trim and drain pumps and sound gear. Completed refit on 11 August. Major work accomplished included renewal of JK/QC sound head, complete overhaul of SJ and SD radars, and repairs to trim and drain pumps. 12 August, Lieutenant Commander I. J. Galantin, U.S. Navy, relieved Commander P. H. Ross, U.S. Navy, as commanding officer. Training period 15-17 August. Ready for sea on 20 August.

B. NARRATIVE.

20 August 1943
1300(Y) Departed MIDWAY in company with SARAVEN. Air escorts furnished to thirty mile circle.
1753(Y) Made trim dive. Parted company with SARAVEN.
2400(Y) Changed date to 22 August.

22-27 August 1943
Uneventful. Made daily training dives and conducted drills, including one battle surface firing, enroute area.

28 August 1943
0305(K) Entered area. Headed for the coast at the southern boundary.
0310(K) Made radar contact with two darkened sampans, range 2900 yards. Spent the next hour dodging these and three others that appeared close to our track. The latter three showed lights.
0429(K) Submerged.
Only contacts during the day were three more sampans.
2012(K) Surfaced. Continued towards coast.

29 August 1943
0427(K) Submerged 9 miles off NODA VAN. Closed coast to four miles and commenced patrolling north-south line off KURO SAKI.
0749(K) Contact #1. Sighted loaded northbound freighter, estimated tonnage 4000 (similar to p.131 of ONI208-J), close to the coast, range 10,000 yards, angle on the bow, 350 starboard. Commenced approach, coming to normal approach course. On the second look saw SHIGURE class destroyer about a mile to seaward and on the starboard bow of the freighter. It was soon apparent that we could not close.

— page 135 —
29 August 1943 (continued)
suffiiently for a good shot at the freighter, but might get one at the destroyer.
Attagk #1. Fired three bow tubes at the destroyer, small angle shots on a 1200' track, range 1900 yards, depth set at six feet. Saw torpedo tracks pass under target. No hits. Destroyer did not appear to maneuver for about two minutes after firing and then turned sharply away, dropping one depth charge as he did so. The destroyer circled to the left and stood over in our direction, continuing to drop depth charges. He passed down our port side at 700 yards range as we continued swinging right and after making several short turns while searching for us, headed back across our stern giving us an opportunity to use our stern tubes. This destroyer had a very smart, well kept appearance, and it soon developed that his tactics were equal to his looks. Any lookouts were visible at rails and on bridge. Attack #2. Fired three stern tubes at the destroyer on a 1100' starboard track, range 1000 yards, depths set at 6 feet. Again he did not appear to maneuver but no hits were obtained. He remained at periscope depth watching him search for us and drop intermittent depth charges.
Believe our periscope was finally sighted as he turned and stood toward us, zero angle on the bow. We went deep.
Pattern of four depth charges shook us up considerably. The QS sound gear went dead, cork was knocked loose, and lights were put out. He had rigged in the J/K/Q head upon going deep to prevent damaging both heads if we should hit bottom. Didn't want to risk starting hydraulic plant to lower the J/K/Q so we were deprived of all listening ability.
Heard the destroyer's screws through the hull as he rumbled over us. The five charges that followed again jarred us around a bit. Counted a total of 43 depth charges.
Started the hydraulic plant and lowered the J/K/Q head. All was quiet so vented the pressure off negative tank and started up to take a look. Upon reaching 120 feet heard echo-ranging approaching from the southward so eased back down to 300 feet to seek the shelter of a marked density layer. He probably heard us venting negative and headed down the bearing. He evaded by keeping our stern to him. Although he did not get very close to us he was exceedingly persistent. At 1230 intermittent pinging of a little different note was heard, disclosing the presence of an assistant who apparently spent most of his time listening.

— page 136 —
29 August 1943 (continued)
1305(K) Lost contact with the echo-ranging but decided to stay deep to make certain we had shaken our pursuers. During the afternoon, several distant explosions which sounded like bombs were heard.
1740(K) At periscope depth. Nothing in sight. Surfaced. Headed north to try our luck around the entrance to IBURI WAN.

30 August 1943
0421(K) Summarged 18 miles east of SAI SAKI.
0603(K) Contact 2. Sighted column of three freighters to the northward, range 15,000 yards, large angle on the bow. Came to normal approach course but was unable to close. Abandoned chase after an hour and a half, and continued closing SAI SAKI. This convoy was evidently headed from HUDOAN towards ETHO SAKI.
1145(K) Contact 3. Sighted smoke bearing 1940(T). On the next look made out the mast of a freighter. Change of bearing indicated that he was headed across TUGARU STATTS for SAI SAKI. Again we were unable to close and watched him round SAI SAKI close in and pass up the northeast coast of the peninsula. Realized we could do no good until we got closer to the beach. Sea was flat so ran at 100 feet to make a little speed while closing. Took looks every half hour. Sighted what appeared to be a fair-sized sampan off SAI SAKI.
1410(K) Contact 4. Attack 3. Sighted smaller sampan ahead crossing our bow to starboard. Immediately afterward saw a freighter headed toward us, 50 starboard angle on the bow, range 5000 yards. On the next look he had turned away paralleling the coast, giving us a 600 port angle. 'e came left to increase the track and attempt to close.
1425(K) Saw another freighter astern of the first one. Shifted targets and continued approach on him.
1432(K) Fired three bow shots at the second freighter, range 1000 yards, 1100 port track, depths set at 8 feet.
1433(K) Saw the freighter took his lights and a few seconds later one torpedo hit just forward of the bridge in the hold space throwing a large cloud of water and debris three hundred feet into the air. This freighter was a medium sized well deck coal burner similar to the NAGANO HATU (3824 tons) Page 134 of ONI 208-7).
1434(K) Sound reported fast screw approaching on the port bow. Took a last look at the freighter who was settling rapidly on an even keel and then looked for the fast screws. Saw the so-called sampan sighted an hour earlier heading for us, range about 1000 yards. 'ent to deep submergence and headed to seaward.

— page 137 —
30 August 1943 (continued)
1436(K) Heard the crackling noises characteristic of a ship breaking up.
1438(K) The patrol boat commenced dropping his charges, letting them go one at a time and at several minutes intervals. In addition to the charges, a number of minor explosions, swishing sounds and crackling noises could be heard through the hull for the next ten minutes. These came from the direction of the target and could be nothing but the noises of the ship breaking up.

The screws of two patrol boats were heard intermittently for the next two hours. The smaller sampan sighted before firing may have been the second one. During this period, 24 depth charges were dropped, one every three or four minutes, none of them very far away, but smaller charges than those administered by the destroyer yester-day.

1651(K) Lost contact with the patrols. Last of charges was dropped.
1930(K) At periscope depth. Nothing in sight.
2012(K) Surfaced. Headed east for 3410 and at three engine speed.
2030(K) Sighted beams of two sweeping searchlights in direction of SHIRIYA SAKI.
2102(K) Slowed to two engine speed to put two generators on charge.
2135(K) Contact 25. -adar contact bearing 1700 relative, range 13,000 yards. -ive minutes later the range had closed over a thousand yards so shifted one engine from charge to propulsion and changed speed to 18 knots. -adar could now make out two targets, about 600 yards apart. -range continued to close so put on four engines and built up to full power. Visibility was poor due to a haze along the horizon and could not see the contacts. Made small course changes attempting to work out to seaward and at same time keep enemy as nearly astern as possible. As the range continued to close and the bearing remained constant, our only conclusion could be that a couple of radar equipped destroyers were hot on our trail. Their speed checked at about 24 knots.
2209(K) Submerged when range had decreased to 7000 yards. Still nothing had been seen. -ajor planes would not rig out. (See Paragraph K - Major Defects). Started deep but hit a density layer at 250 feet which bounced us back up to 220. -inally got down to 300 feet. -ound could hear the screws approaching. -e turned left to the northward and the bearing of the screws started to draw across our stern. Sound lost contact when they were due south of us. To our surprise, nothing more was heard. Guessed that they had stopped and were listening for 15.

— page 138 —
30 August 1943 (continued)
2300(K) Got the bow planes rigged out and vented negative. Still nothing heard so started up. Came to radar depth and made several good sweeps around. No contacts. Surfaced. Nothing in sight and still no radar contacts. This latest contact may have been a coincidence although the persistent counter-measures of the past two days led us to believe the destroyers were sent out to search for us. If they had radar it was not very efficient in that it apparently did not detect our dive and failed to regain contact when we surfaced.
2340(K) Headed southeast to take a day off for a much needed rest and to effect minor repairs.

31 August 1943
0429(K) Submerged. Spent the day at 150 feet, taking occasional looks. Got the QB sound gear in commission again and cleared up numerous other minor defects. No air or oil leaks could be detected.
2017(K) Surfaced and headed north for ANCHOR.

1 September 1943
0424(K) Submerged 11 miles south of ANCHOR. ...encountered thick fog shortly after diving which limited visibility to about 1000 yards. Farther east-west line.
1220(K) Fog lifted. Commenced closing coast.
1530(K) Contact of. ...Sighted masts of a freighter off entrance to ANCHOR. Came to normal approach course. The freighter was proceeding westward close inshore. Saw that we could not reach him during daylight so parallel his course and commenced tracking, planning to chase him down after dark. Determined his speed to be 9 knots and identified him as 4500 ton freighter similar to the PALAO MARU (Page 82 of ONI 208-1).
1700(K) Ran into a number of sampans standing in and out of KUSHIRO. These hampered our periscope observations and we lost contact with the freighter.
2017(K) Surfaced and commenced chase on course 2400(T). By making 18 knots we could overtake him by 2400 whether he followed the shore line or headed directly for RIMO SAKI. Had not made contact. As radar had been working exceptionally well and all probable routes of this target were well covered believe he must have put into KUSHIRO for the night.

2 September 1943
0020(K) Radar contact with sampan. Avoided.
0030(K) After final careful radar search of coast changed course to 1500(T) to work around RIMO SAKI.
0240(K) Radar contact with sampan. Avoided.

— page 139 —
2015(K)  Submerged.  Headed for coast on the western side of
    RIMO SAKI.
    Patrol led northwest of RIMO SAKI.
: 2015(K)  Surfaced.  Headed westward planning to spend the next
    day in TSUCARU STRAITS.
: 2250(K)  Aiding wind and sea gave indications of heavy weather.
    Decided to abandon our plan to enter TSUCARU STRAITS
    and headed southeast to ride out the storm.

: 3 September 1943
: 0455(K)  Submerged.  Headed north toward RIMO SAKI.  Heavy seas
    and poor visibility throughout day.
: 2013(K)  Surfaced.  Ind and seas had abated somewhat and having
    made a landfall on RIMO SAKI shortly before surfacing
    decided to head for TSUCARU STRAITS again.

: 4 September 1943
: 0439(K)  Submerged.  Had planned to dive about 10 miles of SAN
    SAKI and patrol southwest across the strait.  Found that
    the current had been stronger than estimated and our
    position was too far out to permit getting well into
    TSUCARU STRAITS.  Closed SANKI and patrolled close
    inshore off the point.  Seas were heavy, depth control
    was difficult, and visibility very poor.  No contacts.
: 2010(K)  Surfaced.  After clearing the strait headed south to spend
    the next day south of SHIRA SAKI.

: 5 September 1943
: 0415(K)  Radar contact on small boat at range of 3000 yards.  Fog
    limited visibility to about 1000 yards.  Tracked him
    and found he was headed north.  This course seemed to
    indicate he might be an advance escort for a convoy as
    the fishing sampans are usually headed east or west.
    Closed coast to ten miles.
: 0441(K)  Contact of.  Attacks, and 5.  Radar contact at range of
    12000 yards.  Commenced tracking and found that contact
    consisted of three ships, headed up the coast 5 miles in-
    shore of us.
: 0500(K)  It was beginning to get light and fog showed signs of
    lifting.  e were 8000 yards from the track and still
    had some distance to gain for an attack position.
: 0510(K)  Came to a course for 1050 starboard track.
: 0511(K)  Lighted sampan type patrol boat about 3000 yards away.
    He sighted us for he was flashing a light at us, but
    he possibly did not recognize us as we were inshore of
    him where the fog was thickest.
: 0513(K)  Submerged to radar depth.

— page 140 —
5 September 1943 (continued)
0523(K) It was now quite light but still foggy. Went to periscope depth. Unable to see the targets but could hear them on sound. Generated range and sound bearings indicated that the two leading targets were getting by, but we still had an opportunity for a shot at the last ship. Sound bearings showed that the target was coming on the firing bearing although he could still not be seen.
0534(K) A freighter suddenly materialized out of the fog, range about 700 yards, angle on the bow, 1000 starboard.
0535(K) Fired three bow tubes on a 1300 starboard track, range 650 yards, depths set at 10 feet, 80 divergent spread. Matched the torpedo tracks run right to him but nothing happened. Radar tracking, sound bearings, and short range all pointed to an excellent set-up, but while waiting for the explosion on this shot "that couldn't miss", saw he was fairly high in the water. The torpedoes passed under. Had three other tubes ready so set depths at 8 feet and at
0536(K) Fired three more bow tubes. Range was now 950 yards and these torpedoes were fired on a 1450 starboard track, using a 20 divergent spread. Again no hits.
0537(K) The fog suddenly lifted and we got our first good look at the convoy. Saw three unescorted freighters, starting to zig radically. The first two were small, about two thousand tons, but our target was a fair sized ship, similar to the SANKO MARU (page 102 of ONI 208-J).
0542(K) Heard one explosion. May have been a depth charge or torpedo exploding at end of run.
0555(K) Fog set in again. Our hunting in this spot was undoubtedly ruined for the day and anti-submarine measures would probably be forthcoming so headed to seaward.
2002(K) Surfaced. Patrols shipping lane between TSUGARU STRAIT and KUMO SAKI during first part of the night.

6 September 1943
0100(K) Headed north to patrol coast of HONKAIDO between MURORAN and SAIKI SAKI. Distribution of torpedoes was now four forward and five aft.
0414(K) Contact 8, Attacks 16 and 17. Radar contact at 9000 yards. Commenced tracking and found that the target was paralleling the shore line on course 3000(T) at 10 knots. Maneuvered for a position ahead favorable for firing stern shots. At a range of 5000 yards, radar operators thought there was a small escort with the target. Crossed target's track to what was believed to be unescorted side. Radar then gave indication that escort was now on this side. Recorded the track and overran desired position permitting the target to cross our stern 2000 yards away. Although it was getting light, foggy weather reduced visibility and target was very faintly seen at range of 3000 yards.

-7-

— page 141 —
6 September 1943 (continued)
0455(K) Increased speed to get ahead of the target again, still hoping to gain a position for firing stern tube shots.
0536(K) Visibility improved and we were sighted at a range of 520 yards as evidenced by the target's signalling to us. Submerged and continued approach for a bow tube shot. Target was now plainly visible through the periscope and was made out to be a 6000 ton freighter of the same general type as the ITALY IARU (page 179 of ONI 208-J), heavily loaded, including deck cargo. No escorts could be seen.
0552(K) Fired two bow tubes at range of 3330 yards, 1150 starboard track, depths set at 10 feet.
0554(K) Saw a very small splash of water under the target's stack and sound reported two light explosions. Nothing was heard through the hull. Interval for torpedo run was correct but there was no visible damage to the freighter. Freighter appeared to maneuver, swinging toward us. Took a look around for escorts but there was none in sight. Another look at the target showed him with an 800 port angle on the bow and closer.
0601(K) Fired our last two bow shots at a range of 2200 yards, 1050 port track, depths 10 feet. After firing saw the freighter swing away and no hits were obtained.
0607(K) Heard our last fired torpedoes explode at the end of run.
0608(K) Saw that the freighter was settling by the stern and realized that our first torpedoes had hit him. His screws were still turning over but he had slowed down considerably. Headed for him at high speed, and, making brief periscopes exposures, saw him settling aft with a port list. The character of the hits on this target seemed to indicate that torpedoes ran considerably deeper than the 10 feet set. The splash of water and the intensity of the explosions were minor compared to those of the hit in Attack #3, where the torpedo was set at the same depth. Fortunately, the target had a very deep draft.
0640(K) Sound reported a disturbance on the target's bearing which sounded like a ship sinking. By the time we had slowed from six knots and raised the periscope it was all over. The only thing in sight was the bottom of his keel and it soon disappeared.
0642(K) Saw two boatloads of survivors where the freighter went down. Turned south to clear the vicinity. In connection with this attack, we regret the needless expenditure of two torpedoes and the lost opportunity to use after torpedoes rather than forward ones. The phantom escorts which gave us concern were apparently minor lobes of the main target. They were very realistic pips at 3500 yards, however, and plotted in likely escort positions.

— page 142 —
6 September 1943 (continued)
2013(K)  surfaced.  With five torpedoes left - all aft, decided to concentrate on radar contacts where we would have a chance to choose our position. Ten miles off any coast in the area looks promising for night contacts.  Headed southwest to work the shores of HONSHU.
2110(K)  Radar contact bearing 2850(T), range 9500 yards and closing fast.  Turned to put the target on the quarter and increased speed to 18 knots.  Range continued to close.  Tracked target and when at
- 2116(K)  It became visible at range of 5600 yards submerged to radar depth.  Slighted the target, at 3000 yards, went to periscope depth and turned to a course for stern shots on a 900 starboard track.  TDC indicated that we had an excellent solution with target on course 1120(T) at 21 knots.  Target was seen to be a destroyer, but its class could not be identified.
2125(K)  Fired four stern shots at range of 2000 yards, 950 starboard track, depths set at 6 feet.
- 2126(K)  At predicted time of hitting, the set up was still checking perfectly on the TDC and both sound heads tracked torpedoes to the target.  No explosions were heard in the conning tower, but main below reported a dull thud similar to the sound of this morning's hits and felt a slight tremor.  Unfortunately this information did not reach the conning tower promptly, and at
2129(K)  When sound operators reported a whistling noise like a torpedo approaching, went deep.  This was either one of our torpedoes running erratic, or one hot, straight, and normal, "Made in Japan."  While going deep sounded reported screws were what I saw, and bearing drawing in reverse direction.  During venting of negative tank lost target for 30 seconds.  Thereafter, heard nothing specific except disturbance in the last known direction of the target.  Decided to stay down until after noon set.
2131(K)  Heard explosions of two of our torpedoes at the end of their run.
2300(K)  Came to radar depth.  Nothing in sight and no radar contact.
2309(K)  Surfaced amid spectacular phosphorescence and, having only one torpedo (still in racks aft) and a low battery, proceeded to clear vicinity by steering evasive courses to the southward.
2315(K)  Radio heard weak (strength 2) Japanese transmissions on 450 kcs., which continued intermittently for 25 minutes.  Unable to get RDF bearings.  Believe that above evidence is conclusive of at least damaging this destroyer.  Absence of counter-measures other than a possible torpedo cannot be explained otherwise, his maneuvers indicating that he was aware of our attack.

— page 143 —
7 September 1943
0125(K) Changed course to the eastward, to depart area enroute MIDWAY. Had several radar contacts with sampans prior to diving.
456(K) Submerged.
1751(K) Surfaced.
2150(K) Departed area.
2345(K) Sighted lighted sampan, range about 6000 yards. Closed through rain squalls and opened fire with 4", 20mm, and 50 cal., at range of 900 yards. Just before firing, the sampen saw or heard us for he dimmed his lights and immediately after the first several shots he commenced transmitting on 450 kcs. About three minutes later transmissions ceased abruptly, and did not occur again although several other stations were heard intermittently throughout the attack.
The sampan fired a few rounds of small arms at the beginning of the attack but after the first five minutes no signs of life were apparent.

8 September 1943
0120(K) Ceased firing on the sampan having expended 29 rounds of 4" amd 1230 rounds of minor caliber ammunition without being able to set him on fire or sink him. He was a well battered hulk by the time we finished however. This sampan was a typical fishing boat of about 150 tons. He was well lighted when first seen and he had a net out several hundred yards away which was supported by two lighted buoys. The efficiency of our attack was lowered considerably by the poor visibility and the blinding effect of our semi-flashless ammunition.
0122(K) Cleared vicinity on four main generators. Had radar contact with several other sampans during night.

9-11 September 1943
Anroute MIDWAY. Uneventful.

12 September 1943
0000(Y) Rendezvoused with POLLACK and air escort on thirty mile circle.
0910(Y) Moored MIDWAY.
1500(Y) Underway enroute PSARI in company with POLLACK.
1830(Y) Parted company with POLLACK.

13-15 September 1943
Uneventful.

-10-

— page 144 —
16 September 1943
0345(W) Sighted POLLACK and exchanged recognition signals.
0600(W) Rendezvoused with escort, P0599.
0951(W) Moored Submarine Base, Pearl.

C. WEATHER.

The weather enroute to and from station and while in the area was generally very good. One storm lasting two days was encountered in the area but seas were normally very flat and sometimes glassy. Fog close to the coasts of HONSHU and southern HOKKAIDO hampered periscope patrol but was a decided advantage in the development of night radar contacts. Temperature was moderate during the entire time in the area.

D. TIDAL INFORMATION.

The currents in the area corresponded to those shown on the local charts and described in the coast pilot. An easterly set was predominante, particularly off TSUGAKU ISLANDS.

E. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

No navigational lights were sighted. Mountain peaks identified by pictures in the Japan Pilot were used extensively in piloting off HOKKAIDO and in the southern part of the area. The SJ radar was invaluable when operating inshore during foggy nights.

F. SHIP CONTACTS.

See table on page 12.

G. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS.

No enemy aircraft were sighted.

Only friendly planes sighted were in the immediate vicinity of PEARL and MIDWAY.

-11-

— page 146 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL

H. ATTACK DATA.

U.S.S. HALIBUT
Time: 0813(K)
Date: 29 Aug. 1943
Target Data - Damage Inflated
Description: SHIGURE class destroyer which was escorting a 4000 ton freighter. Contact was made by periscope sighting. Visibility against a coastal background was 12,000 yards.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.
Ship(s) Damaged or probably sunk: None.

Damage determined by: None.

Target Draft: 91 Course: 001° Speed: 13 3/4 Range: 1900

Own Ship Data
Speed: 4 Course: 300 Depth: 65° Angle: 00

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: This was a periscope attack using the torpedo data computer for fire control. A 21/2 divergent spread and a 6 second firing interval were used.

Tubes fired: No. 1 No. 2 No. 3
Track angle: 120S 122S 124S
Gyro angle: 358 002 006°
Depth set: 6' 6' 6'
Power: High High High
Hit or Miss Miss Miss
Evasive: No* No* No*
Mark Torpedo: 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No.: 23732 23054 23823
Actuation Set: Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual: None None None
Mark Markhead: 16 16 16
Serial No.: 1151 9619 1159
Explosive: Torpex Torpex Torpex
Firing interval: 6 secs. 6 secs. 6 secs.
Type spread: Divergent Divergent Divergent
Sea conditions: Calm sea with light swells.
Overall activity: SPERRY SPERRY SPERRY

Remarks: * Probably ran deep, as tracks were seen to run under target.

-13-

— page 147 —
U.S.S. HALLIBUT (continued).
H. ATTACK DATA (continued).
U.S.S. HALLIBUT
Time: 0837(K)    Date: 29 Aug. 1943    Lat. 40-03N    Long 142-01E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: SHIGURE class destroyer which was escorting a 4000 ton freighter. Contact was made by periscope sighting. Visibility against coastal background was 12,000 yards.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.
Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None.
Damage determined by: None.

Target draft: 91'    Course: 036    Speed: 131    Range: 1000

Speed: 4    Course: 104    Depth: 65'    Angle: 09'

Pine Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: Periscope attack using the torpedo data computer for fire control. A 30 divergent spread and 6 second firing interval were used.

Tubes fired: No. 7    No. 8    No. 9
Track angle: 108S    111S    113S
Gyro angle: 225    225    226
Depth set: 61'    61'    61'
Power: High    High    High
Hit or miss: Miss    Miss    Miss
Efficacy: No*    No*    No*
Mark Torpedo: 14-3A    14-3A    14-3A
Serial No. 23089    20180    41978
Actuation Set: Contact    Contact    Contact
Actuation Actual: None    16    16    16
Mark Aftread: 16    3945    5313
Serial No. 9680    6 secs.    6 secs.    6 secs.
Explosive: Torpex    6 secs.    6 secs.    6 secs.
Firing interval: 6 secs.    6 secs.    6 secs.
Type spread: Divergent    6 secs.    6 secs.    6 secs.
Sea conditions: Swells    6 secs.    6 secs.    6 secs.
Overhaul activity: SPERRY    6 secs.    6 secs.    6 secs.

Remarks: *Torpedoes may have run deep.

-14-

— page 148 —
C-O-I-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL

H. ATTACK DATA (continued)

U.S.S. HALIBUT
Time 1432(K) Date 30 Aug. 1943 Lat. 41-53N Long. 141-10E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: Two loaded medium sized well deck freighters. Two sampan type escorts patrolling coast in vicinity. Contact was made by periscope sighting. Visibility good.

Ship(s) Sunk: One freighter similar to the N.GANO AARU, 3824 tons (page 134 of ONI 208-J).

Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None.
Damage determined by: One torpedo hit observed in the hold space just forward of the bridge. Large column of water and debris rose 300 feet in air. Freighter observed settling one minute later. Cracking noises and minor explosions heard for ten minutes after the hit.

Target draft 20' Course 155 Speed 84 Range 1230

Own Ship Date
Speed 3 Course 245 Depth 65' Angle 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: Periscope attack using the torpedo data computer for fire control. A divergent spread of 2° between torpedoes was used.

Tubes fired No. 1 No. 2 No. 3
Track angle 104.5 107S 110S
Gyro angle 34.5 34.5 33.6
Depth set 8' 8' 8'
Power High High High
Hit or miss Hit Miss Miss
Articulation No No No
Mark Torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 23693 23653 23242
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual Contact None None None
Mark 'Arhead 16 16 16
Serial No. 1568 9688 2606
Explosive Torpex Torpex Torpex
Firing Interval 8 secs. 8 secs. 8 secs.
Type Spread Divergent Divergent Divergent
Sea Conditions Calm Calm Calm
Overhaul Activity SPARRY SPARRY SFARRY

Remarks None.

— page 150 —
C-O-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL

H. ATTACK DATA (continued).

U.S.S. HALIBUT TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4 PATROL NO. 6
Time 0535(K) Date 5 Sept. 1943 Lat. 41-20N Long. 141-33E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: Convoy consisting of two small freighters and one 5000 ton freighter similar to the SANKO HARI (page 102 of ONI 208J).
Radar contact in low visibility.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.
Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None.
Damage determined by: None.

Target Draft 10' Course 022 Speed 10.5 Range 650 yards

Own Ship Data
Speed 3 knots Course 330 Depth 65' Angle 09

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: Periscope attack on the 5000 ton freighter following radar contact and tracking. The target was sighted at a range of 750 yards through heavy early morning fog. Torpedo date computer employed for fire control. Used an eight second firing interval and an eight degree divergent spread.

Tubes fired No. 1 No. 3
Track angle 1288 1385
Gyro angle 009 005 001
Depth set 10' 10' 10'
Power High High High
Hit or miss Miss Miss
Bratic No* No* No*
Mark Torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 23044 23310 23707
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual None None None
Mark Harhead 16 16 16
Serial No. 1584 5765 2534
Explosive Torpex Torpex Torpex
Piring Interval 8 secs. 8 secs. 8 secs.
Type spread Divergent Divergent Divergent
Sea Conditions Calm Calm Calm
Overhaul Activity SFERRY SFERRY SFERRY

Remarks: *At least one torpedo passed unlemneth the target. Torpedoes may have run deep.

-16-

— page 152 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL

H. ATTACK DATA (continued).

U.S.S. HALIBUT    TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6    PATROL NO. 6
Time 0552(K)    Date 6 Sept. 1943    Lat. 42-13N    Long. 142-16E
    Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description:  Heavily loaded 6000 ton freighter of same class as
    ITALY MRHU (page 179 of ONI 208-J). Unescorted.
    Radar contact in low visibility.

Ship(s) Sunk: One 6000 ton freighter.
Ship(s) Damaged
or probably sunk: None.
Damage determined by: Saw freighter sink.

Target Draft 25' Course 3000 Speed 9.5 knots Range 3330 yds

Speed 4 kts Course 2350 Depth 65' Angle 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: Periscope attack after radar contact and tracking. Used
    torpedo data computer for fire control. Fired two torpedoes with an eight second firing interval and 1/20
    divergent spread.

Tubes fired: No. 5 No. 6
Track angle 115S 116S
Gyro angle 359 000
Depth set 10' 10'
Power High High
Hit or lass Hit Hit
Scratch No* No*
Mark Torpedo 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 22539 23332
Actuation Set Contact Contact
Actuation Actual Contact Contact
Mark Harhead 16 16
Serial No. 9913 1470
Explosive Torpex Torpex
Firing interval 8 sec.
Type spread Divergent Divergent
Sea Conditions Calm Calm
Overhaul activity SFERRY SPERRY

Remarks: *Very small splash of water observed and low intensity of explosion indicated that torpedoes ran deeper than ten foot depth set.

-18-

— page 153 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SIXTH AIR PATROL

H. ATTACK DATA (continued)

U.S.S. HALIBUT
Time: 0601(K)
Date: 6 Sept. 1943
Lat: 42-13N
Long: 142-16E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: Heavily laded 6000 ton freighter of same class as ITALY
ARU (page 179 of ONI 208-J). Unescorted. Radar contact
in low visibility.

Ship(s) sunk: This ship was sunk, but "TARES" of "REALITY" of this attack.
Ship(s) damaged
or probably sunk: None.
Damage determined by: None for this attack.

Target Draft: 25' Course 130° Speed 9.5 kts Range 2200 yds

Own Ship Data
Speed: 4 kts Course: 230° Depth: 65° Angle: 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: Periscope attack after radar contact and tracking. This
attack was made after previous attack did not appear to
be sinking the target. Torpedo data computer used for
fire control. Fired two torpedoes with an eight second firing
interval and a 2° divergent spread.

Tubes fired: No. 3 No. 4
Track angle: 102° 105°P
Gyro angle: 336° 337°
Depth set: 10° 10°
Power: High High
Hit or miss: Miss Miss
Erratic: No No
Mark Torpedo: 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 23615 24000
Actuation Set: Contact Contact
Actuation Actual: Miss Miss
Mark Variable: 16 16
Serial No. 2624 2594
Explosive: Torpex Torpex
Firing interval: 8 sec.
Type spread: Divergent Divergent
Sea conditions: Calm Calm
Overhaul activity: SPERRY SPERRY

Remarks: Failure to obtain hits was due to target's maneuvers after
having been hit in previous attack.

-19-

— page 154 —
0-N-F-I-D-B-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL

H. ATTACK DATA (continued).

U.S.S. HALIBUT
Time: 2125(K) Date: 6 Sept. 1943
Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Destroyer, class unknown. Radar contact at 9000 yards.
Target sighted from bridge at 5600 yards.

Ship(s) sunk: None.
Ship(s) damaged:
or probably sunk: One Destroyer - Class unknown.
Damage determined by: Heard dull thud and felt tremor which were similar
to effects of other torpedo hits observed. Maneuvers and actions
of destroyer after firing indicated he had been hit.

Target draft: 9' Course: 115 Speed: 21.5 Range: 2000 yards

| Speed | 3 kts. | Course | 2050 | Depth | 65' | Angle | 0° |
|-------|||------|-------|-----|-------|----|

— page 155 —
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL
H. ATTACK DATA (continued)

U.S.S. HALIBUT GUN ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 6
Time 0010 (K) Date 8 Sept. 1943 Lat. 50-51N Long 145-38E

Target Data - Damage Inflated

Sunk: None.

Damaged or
probably sunk: One 150 ton fishing sampan.

Damage determined by: After firing on sampan for approximately one hour, went close aboard and observed the sampan to be in a badly battered condition.

Details of Action

Sighted lighted sampan and, closing to 900 yards, opened fire with 4", 20mm, and 50 cal. guns. Fire was maintained intermittently for an hour and ten minutes at an average range of 750 yards, without being able to set the sampan afire or sink it. Fire was not particularly effective due to low visibility, blinding effect of the 4" semi-flashless powder, and the penetrability of the wooden target. Local control with radar ranges was used for the 4" and tracer control was employed for the 20mm and 50 cal. The following ammunition was expended:

29 rounds 4"/50 cal. SPDF
480 rounds 20mm High explosive
480 rounds 50 cal. incendiary and Armor piercing
50 rounds .45 cal. ball
220 rounds .30 cal. ball

— page 157 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-8-N-T-I-A-L

U.S. 3. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SLITH "AR PATROL

J. ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND VASIVE TACTICS (continued).

Believe the destroyer fired a torpedo down our torpedo tracks as sound reported one heading our way, whereupon we went deep and were unable to determine the extent of the damage inflicted. No depth charges were dropped.

On both of the above occasions our position was between TSUGARU STRAIT and SHIMO SAKI. Since the destroyers apparently did not have radar, believe that we were tracked by shore based radar after surfacing. The destroyers were probably standing by close to our estimated surfacing position, and after our course and speed had been determined, were dispatched to intercept. These tactics might well have been disastrous for us in the low visibility had our radar not been working efficiently. At no time did our radar indicate interference from another radar.

No air patrols or air escorts were seen.

The numerous sampans contacted at the area arrival and departure points and the rapidity with which radio transmissions commenced at the time of the gun attack may be indicative of the fact that sampans are located at these points to do their fishing in order that submarine arrivals and departures may be observed and promptly reported.

K. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE.

(A) HULL.

1. Bow Planes. During the depth charge of 30 August, the bow planes could not be tilted in hand power. Investigation showed that the shaft which drives the rigging out interlock in the hand and emergency line had sheared, leaving the interlock in the closed position, and preventing tilting by hand. The interlock was disengaged for the remainder of the patrol.

The new bow plane limit switch installed has too fine a setting. Surface speeds caused the planes to creep off zero while rigged in and the limit switch prevented rigging out when planes were as little as a half degree off zero. It is suggested that a mechanical stop be installed inboard of the bow planes so that they will be tight against the stop when rigged in at zero degrees tilt.

-23-

— page 158 —
0-0-N-R-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U. S. S. HALLIBUT - REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL

K. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (continued).

(B) ENGINEERING.

1. Pitometer Log. Despite a complete overhaul by tender r6- perif force during last refit, the pitometer log was erratic and unreliable throughout the patrol, and required constant attention, adjustment, and repair by ship's force. Then pump unit developed a pronounced grinding noise it was found that the pump and drive motor were out of alignment, and there was no end play of the impeller shaft with respect to the rotary seal bellows. This latter indicated an improper seal which was found to be the case, allowing the bearings to flood and become corroded. After bearings had been re-newed and pump reassembled this unit operated satisfactorily.

When the control unit became erratic, it was found that the mechanical and electrical settings were in error, particularly the setting of the contact arm with respect to the magnets, settings were made as nearly correct as possible, and operation of the unit was improved, although a percentage adjustment of -4 was necessary to compensate for high readings.

The master speed indicator became erratic after about ten days of operation. Inspection revealed that the follow-up contact assembly, the follow-up contacts, and the white top limit micro switch were dirty. The contact assembly was cleaned, two contact screws were replaced, and the micro switch renewed. Since these repairs the performance of the unit has been satisfactory.

2. LMC System. Leakage through the cables from the bridge speaker unit into the LMC stack caused grounds and shorts in the unit. The system was entirely out of commission for several days of the patrol and was finally made operative for passing the word only by cutting out the signal generator.

3. Nupture of the bridge speaker and subsequent leakage into the LMC unit has occurred on almost every patrol. A pressure proof speaker which will stand deep submergency pressure is essential to prevent recurrence of the casualty.

— page 159 —
0-N-F-I-D-B-N-T-I-A-L

U. S. S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL

K. MAJOR DEPOTS AND DAGGS (continued)
(B) ENGINEERING.
2. LMC System (continued).

In connection with interior communications, the bridge-coming tower-control room communication system on this vessel is unsatisfactory. It is recommended that a separate system be installed for these three stations, removing the bridge speaker and induction coupling microphone from the LMC system. The secondary system should include a speaker and microphone at each of the three stations on the system.

L. RADIO.

Radio reception was satisfactory throughout the patrol, and complete with the exception of serial G-ORGE which was not received.

Communication with NPM was easily established on 8470 Kcs on 7 September 1943.

No submerged reception was possible.

There were no major radio material defects.

Japanese transmissions on 450 Kcs were heard on two occasions, once after our night attack on the enemy destroyer and once after commencing our gun attack on the sampan.

M. RADAR.

Performance of both the 3D radars was uniformly excellent. Normal ranges obtained on the 3D were: destroyers and freighters, 10,000-13,000 yards; sampans, 3000 yards; land, 30,000-38,000 yards. With the 3D, mountain peaks were picked up at 30 miles and planes in vicinity of LADY at 14 miles.

The following defects which occurred were quickly rectified by the technician:

SJ Radar
(1) Intermittent loss of "grass". Trouble was traced to a faulty coaxial cable between the range indicator and the transmitter.
(2) A 115 volt ground developed in power supply, caused by the leads to the loding motor becoming wet during deep submergence.

— page 160 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U. S. S. HALIBUT REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL

M. RADAR (continued).
SJ Radar (continued)
(3) Excessive noise level on the screen was found to be caused by noisy blower motor. Overhaul of motor and replacement of broken brush spring eliminated trouble.
(4) Main and expanded sweeps went out. Renewal of broken lead on the coupling condenser at the grid of VI restored normal operation.
(5) The cord in the crystal tank parted and was replaced with spare.

SD Radar
(1) Excessive jitter on the trace was found due to arcing at the ground terminal of the high voltage condenser. Bonding with copper wire removed the arc and the jitter.

N. SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

During the depth charge attack on 29 August, the QB lost sensitivity. Replacement of a tube in the receiver partially rectified the trouble but the projector also appears to have lost sensitivity. The reading to ground has dropped from infinity to 20 megs.

Both sound shafts have been a source of noise when trained ever since the navy yard overhaul. This is believed due to improper alignment of shafts and training mechanisms.

Sound conditions in the area were average. Marked density layers probably hampered enemy echo-ranging.

O. DENSITY LAYERS.

Marked density layers were encountered in all parts of the area. A negative gradient usually occurred between 75 and 90 feet, making the boat much heavier at periscope depth than at 100 feet. The temperature drop was sometimes as much as 20°. On the several occasions it was necessary to go to deep submergence, the gradients continued to decrease until 200 feet was reached. The exception to the above was after a storm when no gradient was noted in submerging to 200 feet east of TSUGARU ST.LAIT.

Information contained in the hydrographic Office bulletin "Late Summer Hydrographic Conditions in the Japanese Area" was confirmed by this vessel's observations.

— page 161 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-B-N-T-I-A-L

U. S. S. HALLIUT - REPORT OF JIXTH MAR PATROL

P. HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY.

The health of the crew was excellent throughout the patrol. One man suffered a ruptured ear drum during the gun attack. Vitamin pills and the sun lamp were used.

The food was varied and well prepared.

Habitability of the boat was very good.

Q. PERSONNEL.

The devotion to duty, steadiness, and enthusiasm of the officers and crew were particularly gratifying to the commanding officer on his first patrol in command. Without detracting from an appreciation of continued excellent performance of duty by many others, the following may be cited in particular:

Lieutenant Commander C. A. Butler, U.S. Navy, for excellent coordination of the torpedo control party and especially for radar approach tactics.

Lieutenant (junior grade) John J. Hinchey, U.S. Navy, for excellent depth control, several times without the use of bow planes, during two sustained depth charge attacks.

Design maxwell such, U.S. Navy, for prompt discovery of and remedial action for damage sustained during depth charging.

WALLAY, A. C., r618-34-82, 4T2C V-6, U.S.N.A., for extremely conscientious and thorough maintenance of the radar equipment. His quick and sure repair of defects made it possible to detect pursuing destroyers on two occasions, and to initiate three attacks.

R. MILIS STEAD - FULL USED.

MIDWAY to AREA2250 miles - 22,235 gals.
In AREA1655 miles - 14,540 gals.
AREA to MIDWAY2100 miles - 33,500 gals.
MIDWAY to PARL1374.4 miles - 21,030 gals.

S. DURATION.

Days enroute MIDWAY to AREA7
Days in AREA11
Days enroute MIDWAY6
Days enroute MIDWAY to PARL4
Days submerged11

-27-

— page 162 —
U. S. S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL.
:  T. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING.
: Torpedoes 1 23,220 gal(s)(arrival 40 days 40 days)
: Fuel MIDWAY)
: Limiting factor this patrol: Torpedoes.
: U. REMARKS.
: None.

-28-

— page 163 —
35-12N/A16-3
Serial 043
CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT:
To: The Commander Submarine Division ONE THIRTY ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TRAVEL.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of Sixth War Patrol - Comments on:

1. The sixth war patrol of the U.S.S. HALIBUT lasted for a period of 26 days and was the first for the present Commanding Officer. Only the relatively short period of 16 days in the area was required to organize all but one torpedo which shows a fine workmanship determination to get things done and get them done as quickly as possible.

2. The HALIBUT developed a five excellent contacts which she was able to attack. These included 2 destroyers and 3 AKS at which 23 torpedoes were fired for three sub hits and one probable for an average of approximately 17.4%. This is below average but it is noted that the commanding Officer firmly believes quite a few torpedoes either went under the target or failed to explode on contact. That this is a distinct possibility is borne out by the fact that out of the five torpedoes that were soon or heard to hit the side of the target only one got any indication of being a high order explosion.

3. In analyzing the sonar attacks made, the attack was in all cases was good, the range was excessive for best results in three cases and the gyro angle was greater than that considered desirable in three cases. It is therefore a possibility that unfavorable position accounted for some failures but a far more distinct and probable reason is poor torpedo performance.

4. The health and morale of the crew seemed excellent and the material condition was good. Rofit will be accomplished by the GRIFFIN in the normal period.

- 1 -

— page 164 —
FC5-12/A16-3
Serial 067
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENCRYPTED TO
CO HALIBUT Coaf. 1tr
SS232/A16-3 Serial 016
of 16 September 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, I.af.1. Fleet.
(2) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Sixth Patrol.

1. Analysis of torpedo performance, based on subject report and interview, reveals that of the twenty-three torpedoes fired only one torpedo hit for a normal explosion and three others hit as duds. Further, that four torpedoes were positively tracked to the enemy ships and went under the targets and, in addition, two more possibly ran deep. Of the remaining ten torpedoes that were fired, the tracks were not observed either due to (1) sunlight conditions, (2) poor visibility conditions, or (3) loss of track due to results obtained from a normal explosion of one torpedo that hit; this precludes stating that there might have been more probable deep ones.

2. The summation of damage made by the Commander Submarine Division 121 is concurred in.

3. The Squadron Commander notes with pleasure the aggressiveness with which the Commanding Officer conducted his first war patrol as Commanding Officer. This is especially true of the first and second attacks that were developed from the first contact. It is regretted that these two attacks did not result in a sinking especially since the first three torpedoes fired were tracked right under the enemy destroyer fired on.

4. Congratulations are offered to the Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew of the HALIBUT for damage inflicted on the enemy.

J. B. GRIGGS.

— page 165 —
35-12N/AL6-3
Serial 043
CONDITIONAL

FIRST INDORSEMENT:
LIEUT. CONFIRMED, SS232/AL6-3
Serial (016) of 16 September 1943.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of Sixth War Patrol - Comments on...

6. It is not the officer's duty to make a fine patrol under the conditions of the moment, but to have a good record of the patrol.

7. It is recommended that the HALIBUT be credited with having inflicted the following damage on the enemy:

| Damage | Type | Tonnage |
||------||
| 1 AK (ITALIAN TANK TYPE) | 6,000 tons | 3,624 tons |
| 1 AK (MEXICAN TANK TYPE) | 9,824 tons |         |
| TORPEDO |         |         |
| DANGER |         |         |
| 1 DD (class unknown) | 1,000 tons |         |
| 1 Sarpan |         | 150 tons |
| TORPEDO |         |         |
| TOTAL |         | 1,150 tons |

R. N. FRANCIS.

R. N. FRANCIS.

— page 166 —
1-12-10/A16-3(5)/(16)
Serial 01337
Confidential
Third Endorsement to
Halibut Report of
Sixth War Patrol.

COLDSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 260
U.S.S. HALIBUT - SIXTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of Sixth War Patrol, (20 August to 16 September 1943).

1. The HALIBUT's sixth war patrol was the first for the new Commanding Officer.

2. The patrol was conducted in an area numerous with contacts. This patrol averaged slightly less than one contact per day.

3. All attacks were developed in an aggressive manner. The SJ radar was used advantageously in the fogs for which this crew is noted.

4. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Jusignia award.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this successful patrol. The HALIBUT is credited with inflicting the following damage to the enemy:

SUNK
1 - Freighter (NAGARO NARU class) - 3,824 tons
1 - Freighter (ITALY NARU class) - 5,859 tons

TOTAL: 9,683 tons

Damaged
1 - Destroyer (unknown class) - 1,000 tons
1 - Saugen - 150 tons

TOTAL: 1,150 tons

* Damaged by gunfire - probably sunk.

C. A. LOCKOOD, Jr.

— page 168 —
153 CONV
SS232/A16-3
U. S. S. HALIBUT
Serial (018)
DELOSSHIELD-MAT. 0415, CHIVASVET 5310.10
BY C-0-N-T-T-D-B-N-T-F-A-L
From: The Commanding Officer,
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 101.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron TNI.
(3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(4) The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track chart for subject patrol.
1. Enclosures (A) and (3), covering the Seventh War Patrol of this vessel during the period 10 October 1943 to 17 November 1943, are forwarded herewith.
I. GALANTIN.
( )

— page 169 —
0-N-F-I-D-B-N-T-I-A-L
U. S. S. HAIJIBUT - REPORT OF SEVENTH WAR PATROL
PERIOD FROM: 10 OCTOBER 1943 TO 17 NOVEMBER 1943.
COMTASKFOR 17 OPERATION ORDER NO. 229-43

A. PROLOGUE:
Arrived PARL 16 September from SIXTH WAR PATROL. Scored alongside GRIPPI on 17 September and commenced refit by GRIFFIN and SUBDIV 121 Relief Crew. Dry-docked 26-26 September. Oil sound gear pulled and realigned; No. 3 20mm gun rose-moved and Mark 10 mounts installed for other 20mm guns. New lookout platforms installed and silhouette further reduced. Completed refit on 30 September. Post repair trial, sound test and deperating, on 3 October. Training period, including experimental torpedo firing of HACHOLAS, 5 - 8 October. Both period scopes damaged in collision with destroyer escort on 8 October. Ferriscopes removed by submarine base, Pearl Harbor, 6-9 October. Ready for sea, 10 October.

B. HARRATIVES:
10 October 1943
1300(VT) Departed PARL escorted by P3584, with Commander Fred J. Beltz, USN (Ret), (Bushies), as passenger to HIDAL.
1501(VT) Made trim dive.
1900(VT) Farted company with escort.

11-13 October 1943
Uneventful. Made daily trim dives and conducted drills.

14 October 1943
0555(Y) Rendezvoused with air escort.
0620(Y) Scored in nest alongside SPARRY. Fueled, receiving 14,036 gallons. SPARRY made voyage repairs including replacement of oil motor-generator (See paragraph K, JACOB DEPOTS AND DAMS).

1716(Y) Underway enroute area.

16-16 October 1943
Uneventful. Made daily trim dives.

19 October 1943
0552(L) Made trim dive.
1345(L) Sighted plane tentatively identified as twin engine medium bomber (similar to NELL). Dived and remained submerged for two hours. Our position at this time was 600 miles, bearing 0350(T) from LANCUS.

1550(L) Surfaced.

20-21 October 1943
Uneventful.

22 October 1943
0601(K) Made trim dive.
1940(K) Made radar contact, range 6500 yards. Closed range to 6000 yards with-out sighting the contact although visibility was good. Concluded that target was sanpan or other small craft and maneuvered to avoid.

— page 170 —
23 October 1943
0335(K) Radar target at range of 5600 yards. Range and bearing changed rapidly and we lost contact at 9000 yards. Although not sighted, believe this was a night-flying plane. SJ radar had picked up friendly planes in the vicinity of 1DDAY and this target was similar to those.
0615(K) Sighted plane overhead at high altitude. Dived and remained submerged for rest of the day to routine torpedoes. Our position at time of this contact was 225 miles, bearing 2009(T) from TOKIO.
1835(I) Surfaced.
24 October 1943
0551(I) Submerged.
1840(I) Surfaced.
2230(I) Entered area.

25 October 1943
0544(I) submerged. Petrolied entrance to JUNKO SUDO, twenty miles south of OKINO SHIA. Only contact was one sailing sampan.
1847(I) Surfaced. Flamed to spend tomorrow off TOI ISAHI.
1850(I) Sighted OKINO SULA LIFT, bearing 3569(T), distance 21 miles, showing normal characteristics.
2216(I) Made radar contact, bearing 2659(T), distance 37,000 yards. Two very small pips, about 5000 yards apart could be seen at this range. Changed course to 2659(T), and commenced closing the contact. Then pips did not increase in size appreciably and tracking showed that targets were stationary because suspicious of the contact, but closed range to 4800 yards. Despite good visibility nothing could be seen. Believe pips were due to an atmospheric condition (see paragraph 1, RADAR). Changed course to the southward to search along coast toward TOI ISAHI.

26 October 1943
0537(I) Submerged 6 miles east of O SHIA and commenced closing coast.
0700(I) Sighted first of numerous sailing sampans which hampered our movements and observations throughout the morning as we worked our way north along the coast. These sampans were small boats with low freeboard and either two or three rectangular sails. All appeared to be fishing and at no time were any scores heard. As many as forty were sometimes in sight.
1644(I) Surfaced. Patrols traffic line, ten to forty miles off shore during night.

27 October 1943
0522(I) Dived 15 miles southeast of HI SAKI. Closed the coast to 4 miles and petrolied across the entrance to ATAKAI. Sighted two motor sampans heading towards ATAKAI. After nearing the entrance however, they turned and proceeded up the coast. These appeared to be small fishing boats but each had a JAPANESE flag painted on the bow.
1503(I) Sighted another motor sampan heading toward the coast.
1851(I) Surfaced. Patrols north and south between TOI ISAHI and TANDA SHIA on possibility of intercepting the three transports reported by BAB.

— page 172 —
29 October 1943 (continued)
0620(I) The escort continued the search, alternately pinging and listening, but no more charges were dropped. The freighter evidently remained in the vicinity as two sets of scows were heard intermittently.
0705(I) The PC boat abandoned thehunt and withdrew to the northwest.
0832(I) Came to periscope depth. Nothing in sight. Patrolled at periscope depth.
Amplifying this frustrated attack, decided that we had been heard by the escort just before we dove although it rings was still about 6000 yds. Aven though we knew where to look we were unable to sight him. The escort then crossed the bow of the target to our side, showing the orange warning light to the freighter. The first after was of about 4000 tons displaced, similar to, but not, the HAICOZAKI HARI (page 121 of OIN 206-1).
1854(1) Surfaced with lights of four sunpans in sight.

30 October 1943
0502(I) Divvied, 15 miles south of OKINO SHIA. Closed the island, and then proceeded eastward close along the coast.
0956(I) Contact No. 2. Sighted patrol boat of about 500 tons. He had a clipper bow, short stack and two masts with a flying flyer from the foremast. He was proceeding westward at slow speed. Answered to avoid. Several fishing sunpans were sighted during the morning and towards evening encountered a large portion of the fishing fleet returning home.
1854(I) Surfaced with lights of four sunpans in sight.

31 October 1943
Hoping to sight smoke or masts remained on surface about forty miles off shore until;
0638(I) and then submerged and conducted high periscope patrol.
1610(I) Contact No. 3. Sighted smoke bearing 246°(T). Came to the normal approach course and maintained sight contact until dark. During this time we closed the range slightly and were able to recognize that smoke came from several ships.
1854(I) Upon coming to radar depth prior to surfacing found that our contact was a group of about ten ships, now only seven to ten miles away.
1645(I) Surfaced and commenced tracking convoy, at 20,000 yds while making an end-around run. The convoy was zigzagging on a base course of 120°(T) at a speed of 6 knots.
2200(I) Commenced setting indications of another radar in the vicinity whenever our SJ was trained ahead. The convoy was 20,000 yards on our starboard beam at this time.
2247(I) Contact No. 4. Sighted radar contact by degrees on the starboard bow, range 8000 yards. Changed course to the left to avoid and slowly approached the range, meanwhile tracking this target. He was making frequent knots, first on a northerly course and later westerly, around to the east and finally to the south toward the convoy. As we followed this ship with the SJ we continued to get very pronounced indications of another radar. (See paragraph II - 1645A).
2330(I) Lost contact with target at 15,000 yards just as it was about to join up with the convoy. Continued tracking and drawing ahead of the convoy. Having definitely determined the convoy's course and speed, made the following estimate of the situation and decided upon a plan of attack. It was a startling night, with smooth sea, and visibility on the surface was good, but it was dark enough so that periscope visibility would be very limited. It would be impossible to make an undetected surface radar depth approach. Decided to dive ahead of the convoy early in the morning and make a dawn attack.

— page 173 —
1. 1 November 1943
0501(1) Attack No. 1. Submerged to radar depth in a position twelve miles ahead on the convoy's track and turned toward the targets. Shortly before diving, the convoy had apparently gone to the right hand leg of their zig plane.

0530(1) Radar bearings indicated that the convoy was holding their right hand leg longer than usual. Came to normal approach course and went to periscope depth.

0557(1) The smoke and tops of the ships were now in sight and when bearings still indicated no zig back to the left, realized that a dawn change of course had been made which left us a considerable distance from the track. Went ahead at standard speed.

0559(1) Had just worked up to six knots when a series of short pings followed by a long note was heard in the convoy's direction. Range to the nearest escort was about 10,000 yards. From this time on, one escort ranged continuously.

0620(1) Not our first good look at the convoy, and counted the smoke and masts of seven freighters. The ships were in three roughly parallel columns, with the largest ship, which looked like the AUGUSTINE, 7600 tons, in the center, leading the middle column. Two escorts were seen at this time, and later during their hunt for us were identified as OTORI torpedo boats. One was bearing toward 20° relative from the center of the formation and the other bearing about 300° relative, each distant about 2000 yards from the convoy. Two other small vessels of yacht or patrol boat appearance are believed to have been additional escorts on the quarters of the formation. Aside from the AUGUSTINE ARU type, all ships appeared to be of about 3500 tons gross. That at first seemed to be a tanker, in the column nearest us, proved to be an engine-aft type, smaller to the AUGUSTINE ARU, 3060 gross tons. Unable to get close enough for good high speed shots, decided to fire three low speed shots at the largest ship, the several overlapping targets diving a good chance of a hit.

0652(1) Fired three low speed shots from two tubes, estimated range 6500 yards on a 109° port track, depths set at 10 feet.

0700(1) No explosions were heard but saw the small freighter that was leading the near column sound his whistle and turn slowly away, standard Japt procedure when about to be hit.

0703(1) Heard two explosions, probably two of our torpedoes as they sank at end of run. All the ships in the convoy had now turned away and were smoking heavily. Saw a large column of steam issuing from the freighter that had blown his whistle. Finally believe one torpedo hit was obtained in this 3500 ton ship. Previous experience has proved that long range torpedoes were heard to explode at end of run. Attached convoy running away from us but unable to follow any specific target in the wake of smoke and shifting masts.

0705(1) Four depth charges were dropped.

0733(1) Saw two of the escorts standing in our direction, one of them pinging. Added at periscope depth and they came no nearer than 3000 yards. Both were OTORI-type torpedo boats. The pin,er remained within five miles of us the better part of the day, while the other apparently searched further fields and was only seen once again, in the early part of the afternoon.

— page 174 —
1. November 1943 (continued)
1000(I) Saw the smoke of the convoy for the last time, bearing 200°(T).
1032(I) Three distant depth charges. The only torpedo boat in sight was about three miles away.
1056(I) Sighted a single engine light bomber land plane, flying low in the vicinity of the torpedo boat.
1216(I) Saw the same plane for the second time.
1500(I) Lost all contact with the escorts. Continued southward, planning to overtake the convoy during the night.
1615(I) Surfaced.
1855(I) Sent contact report to COATSAILPORT SERVICE. Unable to get a receipt for the report after 30 minutes of transmission, changed padding of message, shifted operators, and an hour later succeeded in giving it to VHIN. Upon completion of the transmission changed course to 170°(T) on the first leg of a search plane. Although the convoy had fled to the southwest, the ship was not able to contact the convoy.
2107(I) Contact No. 5. Made radar contact, range 12,500 yards, bearing 2490°(T). Aneuvored to avoid. This contact was steering various escorting ships. Our transmission may have been D/F led and one of the torpedo boats sent back to investigate, or this may have been the GRAYBACK. Again, radar interference was present when this contact was made. After avoiding and losing the contact changed course to 190°(T) continuing the search plane.

2. November 1943
0325(I) Contact No. 6. Made radar contact on two ships, range 30,000 yards, bearing 2100°(T). Connected tracking and overtaking.
0420(I) Contact No. 7. Then about 2am of contact No. 6, made another radar contact on two more ships, 25,000 yards ahead. Since it was apparent that the convoy had split up, decided to go after the leading pair first, giving us a better chance at the others afterwards. By sweeping around and we could intercept short-range aircraft. While doing this, we had three distant explosions and saw a faint glow of light to the westward. It was apparent that an immovable wolfpack was in action.
0723(I) Attack No. 2. With the tops of the stars in sight through the high periscope, submerged and commenced approach. The two ships, both frigates, were in a line of bearing, about 2500 yards apart, zigging radically with short legs on a base course of about 170°(T), possibly a constant helm zig.
0641(I) Fired three bow tubes at the loading and larger freighter, range 1000 yards on a 400 starboard track, depth 15 feet.
0642(I) Saw and heard two hits, one under the mainmast and the other under the bridge. After being hit, the freighter swung around toward us and in maneuvering to avoid being rammed we lost our position for firing on the second freighter.
0644(I) Having cleared the damaged freighter, maneuvered for a shot on the other one who now turned away about thirty degrees.
0650(I) The damaged freighter who had been listing sharply to starboard, sank. This was a 3500 ton ship similar to the BIHUKU KARU (page 135 of ORI 208-J). A close range picture may serve to better identify her.
0651(I) Attack No. 3. Fired three bow tubes at the second freighter, range 3000 yards, on a 1280 starboard track. No hits. Misses believed due to unfavorable firing position and inaccurate data.

— page 175 —
2 November 1943 (continued)
0900(I) After this unsuccessful attack, followed the freighter who was still zigging rapidly, now on a northerly course, hoping he would turn south again.

0935(I) The target was now 7000 yards away, still on his northerly course. Hot having seen any guns on deck, decided to surface and close for a second attack. See were too rough for a gun attack.

0945(I) Surfaced. Discovered that the freighter was armed when a high explosive shell, probably a four inch, landed a thousand yards short out "on" in deflection.

0946(I) Submerged. Two more shots, both shorts, splashed five hundred to a thousand yards before we got down.

0950(I) The freighter now ceased zigzagging and ran straight on course 330°(T). We followed along, keeping him located by his smoke until 1130 when we lost him.

1215(I) Contact No. 8. Sighted the freighter's smoke again and a few minutes later saw that he had been joined by two other ships, whose tops were now visible. The group was proceeding to the eastward and appeared to consist of two small freighters and one non-smoker, probably an escort. He came to the normal approach course.

1235(I) Lost sight of the target group again. Turned and headed on the last bearing.

1300(I) Sighted a puff of smoke whose bearing indicated the group had turned back to westward.

1351(I) Surfaced to chase down our targets.

1425(I) Using radar and the high periscope regained contact and commenced tracking at a range of 26,000 yards.

1503(I) Had just started an end-around run when we sighted a twin-engine medium bomber over the target group. Submerged and headed towards targets.

1759(I) Surfaced and commenced search plan.

1631(I) Contact No. 9. Made radar contact bearing 2550(T), range 23,000 yards. The seas were picking up and overcast skies and occasional rain gave us a black night ideal for a surface radar approach. He target at first appeared to consist of only two ships but as we closed the range noted another small pip in company. Decided that this was the same group of ships, the smaller pip being the escort.

1930(I) Tracking showed the targets zigging 250 to the right and left of base course 180°(T) at a speed of 7 1/2 knots.

2130(I) Norked ahead of the target group, continuing to track until completing the better charge. Since we could choose our own position for this attack, decided it would be a good opportunity to use our stern tubes. As indicated by the radar, the three ships were in a rough line of bearing, two to three thousand yards apart, with what we judged to be the escort on the port quarter. Decided to make our first attack on the leading ship who was on the right hand side of the convoy. The size of radar pipes indicated this to be the smaller freighter.

2255(I) Sighted the target for the first time at a range of 2500 yards. The night was so dark that none of its features could be recognized; however were able to get several TBT bearings which were used as firing bearings.

2259(I) Attack No. 4. Fired three stern tube shots at a range of 2200 yards on a 700 port track, depths set at eight feet. No hits.

— page 176 —
2 November 1943 (continued)
2300 (I) after firing went ahead on all four main generators and changed course to the right paralleling the target's course. As we continued to track the target while retiring discovered that it had speeded up and was closing the range. At one time the target was so close that the radar ping merged with the outgoing pulse. However, it was so black and rainy that neither party sighted the outer. It was evident we had fired on the escort, helping account for the misses. Turned to put our pursuer directly astern and as we built up to full power, slowly began to draw away. . . . then we had opened the range sufficiently commenced working around the right flank of the convoy taking a position astern to see what the next move of our targets would be.

3 November 1943
0054 (I) then 10,000 yards astern of the convoy resumed tracking and found that the course and speed was the same but that the formation had altered so. . . . The ship which we had attacked was now about four miles to the eastward of the other two who were only a thousand yards apart and almost in column. In following our retirement he had been drawn away from the other two ships and having lost contact with them seemed unable to rejoin the formation in the darkness of the night.

0145 (I) Commenced overtaking our targets again, this time planning to attack the leading and larger one of the two ships in column. The seas were becoming rougher and a steady rain now made visibility lower than ever.

0407 (I) Sighted our target at a range of 1600 yards just before gaining position for another stern tube attack. The target was merely a dark shape even at this close range but it looked larger than the escort previously attacked. Angles on the bow and bearings checked with the TXO.

0408 (I) Attack No. 5. Fired three stern tubes using TXT bearings at a range of 1300 yards on a 750 starboard track, depths set at 10 feet. Again no hits were obtained. This was a deliberate, carefully checked attack, and believe our data was absolutely correct. Our only explanation for misses is erratic depth performance of torpedoes due to the rough seas and swells. One torpedo was heard to explode after a run of 3 1/2 minutes, probably caused by bracching. The other two exploded normally at end of run.

0411 (I) After firing, turned and retired to the northward, proceeding to search for bigger game.

0520 (I) Submerged.
1144 (I) surfaced to get a sun line, having had no fix or line of position for two days.

1305 (I) Submerged.
1816 (I) Surfaced. Patrolled north and south during the night. Seas were still rough and weather stormy.

4 November 1943
0520 (I) to contact, although within 5 miles of desired position. Changed course to the north to return to our area at high speed.

1200 (I) Sighted a drifting life boat. Investigation proved it to be empty with the exception of several oars and a brown tarpulin or sail. No identifying inscriptions were visible. Also sighted the body of a dead Jap dressed in white coveralls and a life jacket, floating several hundred yards from the boat.

— page 177 —
4 November 1943 (continued)
1655(1) Made radar contact at 18,000 yards, with the range closing fast. Turned away and increased speed to full. The rapid change of range and bearings soon indicated our contact was a night-flying plane. Sighted it from the bridge at 10,000 yards and followed it as it closed to 7000 yards and then started opening. The white light it was carrying could be seen out to eight miles once we were on it. We spent the next half hour trying to keep out of the way of the plane as it patrolled the vicinity. The night was clear with a quarter moon, but the sea was quite choppy and probably helped prevent the discovery of our presence.

1932(1) Lost contact with the plane and continued northward.

5 November 1943
0400(1) Contact No. 10. Attack No. 6. Made radar contact at a range of 28,000 yards. Radar indicated a formation of four or five ships at this range. Commenced tracking, and found the target to be on a steady course of 3000° (T) at a speed of 19 knots. We were about 5 miles off the track so came to a normal approach course and T.

0532(1) Submerged to radar depth, 14,000 yards ahead of the nearest ship and turned toward the formation.

0518(1) Went to periscope depth as it was just beginning to get light and the range to the loading ship was 10,000 yards. The formation had now zigged 200 to the right of this course.

0525(1) Was able to see all of the four larger ships in the formation. The leading one was a TON class cruiser and slightly on his port quarter, 4000 yards astern was a carrier. Two other large ships were in column two to three thousand yards broad on the port quarter of the carrier. No destroyers could yet be seen.

0533(1) The cruiser passed down our port side about a thousand yards away. The formation now appeared to have come back to the base course, giving us a small starboard angle on the bow on the carrier. Planned to fire six torpedoes at the carrier on a sharp track if we didn't get another zig. Although we had not gotten a range since going to periscope depth, this set-up on the DC was checking perfectly and having had an accurate initial range and good speed check, believed we had a correct solution.

0537(1) Saw the target zig to the left giving us an estimated 300 starboard angle on the bow. We were right to a course for a 500 starboard track. In making the course change we moved forward about 100 yards to the right of the carrier. The periscope bearing and advanced 150 on the gunner's deck bearing and the commanding officer called the angle on the bow 600 starboard where we got a range of 450. We angled on the bow and bearing were cranked in, TDC open for lowered the range from 3000 to 2500 and after getting a final check bearing, at.

0539(1) Fired 6 bow tubes at the carrier on a 1150 starboard track, gyros started at 300 yards, actual range 1200 yards, depths set at 10 feet.

0540(1) Heard and saw one hit. Believing this was the first torpedo fired and all others passed astern due to range error and large gyro angles. After firing swung left to turn stern tubes to bear. While turning, watched the carrier. Our one hit had been off and had apparently disabled his steering gear and slowed him down, and he was slowly swinging our way.

— page 178 —
1. U.S.S. HALIBUT - REGAT OF SEVENTH MAR FATTROL
2. 4 November 1943 (continued)
3. 0543(I) Attack No. 7. Fired our two remaining torpedoes at the carrier, range 2200 yards, on a 125° starboard track, depths set ten feet.
4. 0544(I) Commenced reloading our remaining torpedoes forward.
5. 0545(I) Heard two hits while looking at the other ships in the formation. The cruiser and the other two large ships, believed to be battleships, were opening the range rapidly, and the other ship in sight was a destroyer who must have previously been at the stern of the carrier. The carrier was still circling slowly to the right without much way on.
6. 0546-49(I) Heard eight or ten explosions, some sounding like depth charges and others like torpedoes at end of run.
7. 0554(I) The carrier had now swung around and was beginning to dive as a part of the turn. The carrier had a slight port list, and was down by the stern some 5 to 6 degrees.
8. 0556(I) Attempted to fire this tube at the carrier, range 1500 yards, 105° port track. The torpedoes were not ejected but ran in the tube until the governor took effect. (See paragraph K, NAVY DEPOT AD ADM. 0602(I) The destroyer was now standing toward the carrier and in so doing would pass close abo.rd us. with torpedoes remaining decided to go deep without using negative cofere our periscope was sighted in the brigantine morning light. Heard a destroyer rumble over us as we passed 60 feet.

The carrier damaged in this attack had a silhouette exactly like the SHOKAIU class, including the four small sticks masts, two on either side of the flight deck aft, appearing in the drawing on page 25 of ONI-14. It is realized that this may have been a converted carrier, but the fact remains that it had the same profile as the SHOKAIU. It was quite light when we got our last look and the enemy gun sponons amidships could be clearly seen, as could three or four and green camouflaged planes, secured to the flight deck on the port quarter. At this time it was seen that the two other large ships were definitely battleships, one of the NAGAO class and one other, class uncertain.
9. 0604(I) Commenced evasive tactics at 350 feet, a temperature gradient existing at 300 feet. Could hear two destroyers searching for us, sometimes echo ringing, sometimes listening, never very far away.
10. 0632(I) Heard a loud rumbling explosion, which, although fairly distant, was of considerable intensity.
11. 0641(I) Two depth charges were dropped and fifteen minutes later, another single charge exploded. The two destroyers had now been joined by a third and all three stayed right with us for the next four hours. Several times they made good contacts, shifted their echo-ranging to a short scale and started a run. Each time, however, they seemed to lose us and the expected barrage of charges did not come. Three times one of the seacraft ships passed over close enough for the white of the turbines and across to be heard through the hull. In all, only thirteen charges were dropped during the morning and these came one or two at a time, fairly close, but above us.
12. 1100(I) Had concentrated on working our way to the eastward taking advantage of the current, and had gradually dropped our pursuers astern. One could be heard pinging occasionally but he was quite distant.

— page 179 —
5 November 1943 (continued)
1305(I) Lost contact with the pinings.
1332(I) Heard six very distant explosions, probably depth charges.
1511(I) Came to periscope depth, nothing in sight.
1637(I) Surfaced. Departed for HAY.

6 - 12 November 1943.
- 13 November 1943.
- 14-16 November 1943.
- 17 November 1943

— page 182 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-K-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SEVENTH PATROL

H. ATTACK DATA

Torpedo Attack Report Form

U.S.S. HALIBUT
Time: 0652(1) Date: 1 November 1943
Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Convoy consisting of one medium-sized freighter (similar AMAGISAN
ARU, 7600 tons), six small freighters, averaging about 3500 tons,
and four escorts, two of whom were CGUL torpedo boats. Contact had
been made by sighting smoke the previous afternoon. Tracked with radar
during the night and made submerged attack on largest freighter shortly
after dawn.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.
Ship(s) Damaged or probably sunk: One 3500 ton freighter, type undetermined.
This was not the ship upon which the attack was made.
Damage determined by: Freighter sounded his whistle and swung slowly away. A
few minutes later a large volume of steam was seen issuing from this
freighter.

Target draft: 20' Course: 160°(T) Speed: 7.4 kts Range: 5450 yds

Own Ship Data

Speed: 4 kts Course: 230°(T) Depth: 62' Angle: 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: This was a long range periscope attack made shortly after dawn.
Low speed shots were fired using the TDC and racks, a correction to
target's speed just prior to firing. A 1/4" divergent spread and eight
second firing interval were used.

Tubes fired #1 #2 #3
Track angle 109°(F) 109°(F) 109°(F)
Gyro angle 23°(R) 23°(R) 23°(R)
Depth set 10' 10' 10'
Power Low Low Low
Hit or Miss Miss Miss
Articulation No No No
Lark torpedo 1k-3A 1k-3A 1k-3A
Serial No. 39578 21588 39370
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual -- -- -- Contact
Lark warhead 15 15 16
Serial No. 3762 5985 5799
Explosive Torpex Torpex Torpex
Firing interval -- 8 secs 8 secs
Type spread Divergent Divergent Divergent
Sea conditions Calm Calm Calm
Cverhaul activity U.S. Summarine Base, Pearl Harbor.

Remarks: - Illess were due to control errors and the long torpedo run to the
target. The freighter believed hit was between us and the larger ship
aimed at and his bow was just overlapping the stern of the larger one.

-14-

— page 183 —
0-0-N-P-I-D-2-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SEVENTH MAR PATTROL

TRKFSDO ATN: 2
Date: 2 November 1943
Target Data: Damaged
Length: 134-48E

Description: Two small freighter, one similar to CHUKU MARU, 3500 tons.
Unescorted. These ships were part of convoy attacked on 1 November 1943. Contact was made by radar at range of 25,000 yards. Ships tracked throughout night, and attacked in morning. Visibility was excellent at time of attack.

Ship(s): Sunk: Freighter similar to CHUKU MARU, 3500 tons (page 135 of OIN 206-1).

Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None.

Damage determined by: Ship was seen to sink.

Target draft: 20' Course: 175°(T) Speed: 7.9 kts Range: 1040 yds.

Speed: 2 kts
Course: 040°(T)
Depth: 65'
Angle: 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type attack: Periscope attack using TDC. Fired a 3/4° divergent spread at 1000 yards range.

Tubes fired #4 #5 #6
Track angle 40°(S) 42°(S) 44°(S)
Gyro angle 10°(L) 9°(L) 9°(L)
Depth set 10' 10' 10'
Power High High High
Hit or Miss Miss Hit Hit
Articulation No No No
Mark torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 39/71 24/51 25/85
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual 16 16 16
Mark warhead 1663 2526 1107
Serial No. 1663 2526 1107
Explosive Torpex Torpex Torpex
Firing interval 5 secs 8 secs
Type spread Divergent Divergent Divergent
Sea conditions Chopey
Over-all activity U.S. Submarine Base, Fearl Harbor.

Remarks: First torpedo missed ahead. Second torpedo hit under the bridge and third under the mainmast. The freighter sank eight minutes later.

-15-

— page 184 —
0-N-F-I-D-0-N-P-I-A-L

U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SEVENTH AIR FATALITY

TRIPOD ATTACHMENT NO. 3
Time: 0651(1) Date: 2 November 1943
Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Three thousand ton freighter which was accompanying the ship sunk in Attack No. 2. Contacted by radar at 25,000 yards, tracked through night and attacked in morning. Visibility was excellent.
Ship(s) sunk: None.
Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None.
Damage determined by: ---

Target draft: 20' Course: 140°(T) Speed: 6.5 kts Range: 3070 yds

Own ship Data
Speed: 4 kts Course: 090°(T) Depth: 64' Angle: 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: Ferriscope attack using TDC. fired a 2' divergent spread with an eight second firing interval.

Tubes fired
Track angle 12°(S) 12°(S) 12°(S)
Gyro angle 3°(L) 2°(L) 1°(L)
Depth set 10' 10' 10'
Power High High High
Hit or miss Miss Miss
Articulation No No No
Mark torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 25723 25611 41732
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual None None None
Mark warhead 15 15 15
Serial No. 3680 1469 1779
Explosive Torpex Torpex Torpex
Firing interval 8 secs. 6 secs.
Type spread Divergent
Sea conditions Choppy
Overhaul activity U.S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor.

Remarks: 1. Tubes are believed due to long firing range, and unfavorable firing position.

-16-

— page 185 —
2259(I)  Date: 2 November 1943  Lat: 25-01N  Long: 133-53E
Target data: 1st 150°(T)  Speed: 7.6 kts  Range: 2200

---

**Own Ship Data**

| Speed: 2 kts | Course: 060°(T) | Depth: 4°(L) | Surface: 4°(L) |
|||||
| Fire Control and Torpedo Data |

Type attack: Night surface radar attack using TOC. TOC used to obtain firing bearings. "Tired a 1 1/2" divergent spread with an eight second firing interval.

---

**Tubes fired**

| Tubes fired | #7 | #6 | #9 |
||----|----|----|
| Track angle  | 70°(F) | 71°(F) | 71°(F) |
| Gyro angle  | 1°(L) | 2°(L) | 4°(L) |
| Depth set  | 6'  | 6'  | 6'  |
| Power      | High | High | High |
| Hit or miss | Miss | Miss | Miss |
| Arratic   | No  | No  | No  |
| Mark torpedo | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No. | 25360 | 25704 | 25677 |
| Actuation set | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation actual | None | None | None |
| Mark warhead | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No. | 1072 | 1705 | 5977 |
| Explosive | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex |
| Firing interval | -- | 6 secs. | 6 secs. |
| Type spread | Divergent | Divergent | Divergent |
| Sea conditions | Rough | Rough | Rough |
| Overhaul activity | U.S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. | U.S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. | U.S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. |

Remarks: After firing, it was discovered that ship fired on was an escort which had not been recognized in the blackness of the night. Misses believed due to probable shallow draft of this type of target.

---

-17-

— page 186 —
3 November 1943
Target Data: Damage Inflicted

Description: Two small freighter's accompanied by one escort. This was the same group attacked five hours earlier. The larger of the two freighter was fired on in this second attack. Contact was made by radar at range of 23,000 yards. Visibility was very low at time of attack due to overcast and rainy night.

Ship(s) sunk: None.
Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None.
Damage determined by: ---

Target draft: 20' Course: 160°(T) Speed: 6.4 kts Range: 1330 yds

Crew ship data:
Speed: 2 kts Course: 250°(T) Depth: Surface Angle: 0°

Type Attack: Night surface radar attack using TDC. TAT used for firing bearings. Fired at 25° divergent spread.

Tubes fired #8 #9 #10
Track angle 74°(S) 74°(S) 75°(S)
Gyro angle 58°(R) 58°(R) 58°(R)
Depth set 10' 10' 10'
Power High High High
Hit or miss Miss Miss
Brrratic No No No
Hark torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 39576 25392 25402
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual None None None
Hark warhead 15 16 16
Serial No. 2125 1864 1832
Explosive Torpex Torpex Torpex
Firing interval 6 secs. 6 secs.
Type spread Divergent
Occ conditions Rough with heavy swells
Vernual activity U.S. Submarine 3-seat, Pearl Harbor.

Remarks: - Discusses believed due to heavy swells. Set-up on TDC was checking well at time of firing. One torpedo probably broached as it was heard to explode before reaching end of run.

-18-

— page 188 —
0543(1)  Date: 5 November 1943  Lat: 32-19N  Long: 132-56E
    Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Task force consists of one RCN class cruiser, two battleships (one RCN class), one carrier rescuing S.S. Clark class, and several destroyers. Contact made by radar at 22,000 yards. Carrier damaged in Attack No. 6 was attacked. Visibility fair in early morning light.

Ship(s) sunk: -
Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: One carrier with silhouette like that of S.S. Clark.

Damage determined by:
- Head: Hard two hits. Tarpedo run correct for estimated firing range and time between hits checked with firing interval. Then last observed, carrier was listed to port and down by the stern by 5 to 8 degrees. A loud rumbling explosion was heard forty-seven minutes after these hits.

Target draft: 201 Course: 320°(T) Speed: 11.5 Range: 2200 yds

Own Ship Data
Speed: 4 kts Course: 064°(T) Depth: 64' Angle: 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: Ferriscope attack using TDC. A 3° divergent spread and twelve second firing interval were used.

| Type | Attack | Depth | Range | Speed |
|------||-------|-------|-------|
| Tube | fired  | #7    | #6    | 127°(S) |
| Track | angle  | 126°(S) | 127°(S) | 4°(R) |
| Gyro | angle  | 1°(L)  | 10°(R) | 10° |
| Depth | set   | 10°   | 10°   | 10° |
| Power | High  | High  | High  | High |
| Hit or | Miss  | Hit   | Hit   | Hit |
| erratic | No    | No    | No    | No  |
| Mark torpedo | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| serial No. | 25731 | 25623 | 25623 | 25623 |
| Actuation set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Attack actuation | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Mark warhead | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No. 3677 | 1515 | 1515 | 1515 | 1515 |
| Explosive | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex |
| Firing interval | - | - | - | - |
| Type spread | Divergent | Divergent | Divergent | Divergent |
| Set conditions | Steady | Steady | Steady | Steady |
| Overall activity | U.S. submarine base, Pearl Harbor. | U.S. submarine base, Pearl Harbor. | U.S. submarine base, Pearl Harbor. | U.S. submarine base, Pearl Harbor. |

Remarks: - None.

-20-

— page 191 —
35-12N-125-45E
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SEVENTH AIR PATROL

K. JUNIOR DIRECTORS AND ADMISSIONS (CONTINUED):
(C) GUMMORY (continued)

Five minutes after firing, normally with the rest of the tube next, No. 4 tube was reloaded, lapulles air built up to 300 pounds and tube made ready to fire. The tube was fired electrically from the conning tower but the torpedo was not fully ejected. Lapulles air pressure, mostly 4 seconds, at which time the governor functioned. Then the tube was ordered secured it was found that the muzzle door would not close completely, indicating that the torpedo fire inches of the head was protruded from the tube. The torpedo could not be brought back into the tube because the stop bolt had dropped behind the after end of the guide stud. Upon determining this, the lapulles stop valve was closed, air was led off the firing valve, the shutter bar interlock was removed from the tube, and the interlock disconnected. The lapulles was raised. A line was secured to the stop rod, and pulled back, thus raising the stop bolt and allowing the torpedo to be pushed back into the tube by closing the muzzle door.

This misfire was due to lack of sufficient lapulles air. Since the lapulles tank was charged to 300 lbs/sq.in., it is believed that the fault was in the firing valve. Upon disassembly of this valve, a slight amount of rust flakes from the lapulles tank was found. This may have caused the firing valve to lift improperly, resulting in partial lapulles. The firing valve had been closed firmly for 5 seconds.

The torpedo involved was exposed to 350° sea pressure during the depth charging. Only apparent damage to the torpedo were flooded by pot, after body, and explosive mechanism.

L. RADAR:

Radio reception was satisfactory and complete on normal NAVFOX frequencies but difficulty was experienced in carrying the new NAVFOX schedules. While in the area, 9090 kcs, could be received until 1500 (Z) when it faded out. The fourteen and seventeen thousand and bnds were too weak to copy. The 4525 frequency was not inaccurately transmitted after we left the area but accurate. It may be in strong and clear although interference was bad.

There were no major radio material defects.

M. RADAR:

SJ RADAR

Just prior to departure on patrol, one of the new high powered SJ radar transmitters was installed in this vessel, with this transmitter, the performance of the SJ was much beyond expectation and almost beyond belief.

First indications of its superiority came when HDJAY was picked up at 45,000 yards. In the area, average sized targets were contacted at 30,000 to 35,000 yards and landed at the end of the scale, about 90,000 yards. The SJ proved more valuable than the SD in picking up planes, locating a plane at night at 16,000 yards.

-23-

— page 193 —
0-N-P-I-D-E-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SEVENTH AIR PATROL

M. RADAR (CONTINUED)

SD RADAR

Operation of the SD radar was generally unsatisfactory during the patrol. On several occasions it failed to stick up planes well within its range.

The following casualties occurred and were rectified:

(a) Failure of the insulation in the filament corona shield caused the sweep tube 6V6 to burn out and weaned both 60A tubes in the transmitter.

(b) A loose dipole on the mast caused interference on the screen.

Interference at present existing on the screen is believed due to an audible arcing in the transmitter unit. Ship's force has been unable to determine the exact source or location of this arcing.

N. SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

Sound conditions were generally very good in the BUMBO SUIDO area. Screws were picked up at ranges of six thousand yards and echo-ranging at over fifteen thousand yards. Subterranean disturbances and fish noises were heard when in the vicinity of the coast.

Despite realignment during the last refit, the S sound gear is still noisy when trained. Most of the vibration appears to be at the top of the dry-draulic piston. Vibration increases when an at deep submarine incidence indicates that compression of the hull increases misalignment. Vibration of destroyers on 5 Nov-ember was accomplished only after training of the S head was discontinued.

The JX sound gear also has a marked chatter in the upper bearings. The training gear for this gear developed a squeak during the depth charging on 5 November.

Condensation from the container tower air conditioning unit flooded out the S sound receiver. This has been a regular occurrence on the last three patrols. It is planned to relocate the air conditioning unit during the forth-coming refit.

O. DAISY LAYERS.

No marked temperature gradients were experienced while in the area. On going to deep submergence on 5 November (21000 4 November, 1943) in latitude 32°19'N, longitude 132°56'E a gradual temperature drop from 77°F at periscope depth to 71°F at 300 feet was noted. A slight layer was encountered at 290 feet where three degrees of the temperature drop occurred.

The new iso-ballast cards were used in the SBT, and were useful, but this vessel's compressibility is less than the 2000 lbs/100' figure on which the cards are based.

-25-

— page 195 —
0-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U, S. S. HALIBUT - REPORT OF SEVENTH WAR PATROL

U, REMARKS.

Although the digest of previous patrols list the type and location of contacts, they do not indicate the time of day and direction of travel. Were such information included, it would be possible, in these coastal areas, to deduce the usual hour of taking departure or arrival at prominent headlands, and save several days of fruitless patrolling.

When using the TBT during even a moderate sea, both hands are required to keep the binoculars steadied on the target and training smoothly. This means that an additional man is needed to operate the buzzer, whenever the TBT operator calls "MARK". Until a more suitable TBT is developed, it is believed this handicap can be overcome by modifying the buzzer control key mounting so that it can be operated by pressure of the operator's wrists or forearms. This system will be designed and installed during the forthcoming refit.

— page 196 —
1. Commander Submarine Division 102.
  To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
  Via: (1) Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
  (2) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
  (3) Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT - Seventh War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The HALIBUT's seventh War Patrol covered a period of thirty seven days, twelve of which were spent in the assigned area south of Bungo Suido. The patrol was terminated due to exsencditure of all but one torpedo. The single remaining torpedo had been rendered defective by a tube failure and excessive deep submergence.

2. During her short stay in the area, HALIBUT had numerous contacts on worthwhile targets. Contacts were aggressively developed in the face of opposition.

Attack No.1 on a seven ship convoy with four escorts was delivered with low-speed torpedoes at a range of 6450 yards shortly after dawn. Eight radar tracking preceded this attack during which base course and speed were determined. In these cases it is almost mandatory that tracking be continued for some time after the convoy was detected. The usual dawn or pre-dawn change of base course which has been proven to be a substantial wind change of course. This, the commanding officer failed to do and as a result was forced to change course. In this case, the convoy was slow speed, 7.4 knots, and was heading toward the open sea. It, therefore, is believed that torpedo-fire should have been withheld and an end-around made as soon as conditions warranted.

Evidence of damage resulting from this attack is not convincing.

Attack No.2 was excellent in all respects. It was delivered at close range during daylight against a difficult target and resulted in the sinking of the Hikaru Maru.

Attack No.3 was unsuccessful for the reasons set forth by the commanding officer, namely; long range (3000 yards) and poor position. In addition this target was fully alert due to the sinking of the Hikaru Maru only ten minutes before.

— page 198 —
1. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
2. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
3. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
4. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
5. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
6. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
7. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
8. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
9. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
10. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
11. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
12. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
13. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
14. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
15. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
16. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
17. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
18. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
19. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
20. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
21. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
22. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
23. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
24. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
25. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
26. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
27. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
28. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
29. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
30. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
31. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
32. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
33. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
34. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
35. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
36. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
37. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
38. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
39. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
40. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
41. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
42. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
43. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
44. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
45. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
46. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
47. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
48. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
49. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
50. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
51. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
52. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
53. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
54. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
55. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
56. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
57. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
58. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
59. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
60. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
61. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
62. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
63. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
64. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
65. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
66. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
67. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
68. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
69. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
70. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
71. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
72. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
73. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
74. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
75. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
76. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
77. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
78. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
79. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
80. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
81. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
82. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
83. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
84. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
85. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
86. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
87. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
88. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
89. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
90. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
91. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
92. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
93. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
94. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
95. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
96. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
97. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
98. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
99. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
100. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
101. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
102. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
103. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
104. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
105. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
106. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
107. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
108. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
109. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
110. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
111. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
112. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
113. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
114. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
115. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
116. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
117. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
118. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
119. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
120. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
121. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
122. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
123. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
124. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
125. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
126. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
127. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
128. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
129. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
130. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
131. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
132. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
133. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
134. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
135. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
136. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1/1/1943 - 1/1/1943
137. USS LUBITZ (LST 101) - 1

— page 199 —
1-10/16-3(8)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET mr
Serial 01723
CONFIDENTIAL
THIS ENDORSEMENT TO
HALIBUT Report of
Seventh War Patrol.
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 302
U.S.S. HALIBUT - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
(10 October to 7 November, 1943).
1. The Seventh War Patrol of the HALIBUT was conducted
in an Empire Area.
2. All attacks were aggressively made but the ranges in
general were excessive.
3. The exceptional performance of the new SJ highpower
Radar is most encouraging.
4. This patrol is considered successful for the Combat
Insignia award.
5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, con-
gratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for having
inflicted the following damage on the enemy:
SUNK
1 - Froighter (Eihuhu Maru Class) - 3,520 tons.
DAMAGE
1 - Carrier (Shokaku Class) - 15,000 tons.
C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

Distribution and authentication
on following page.

FILMED
8037a -1-

— page 202 —
15-17 December 1943.
Arrived Pearl Harbor 17 November 1943 from Seventh "War Patrol. Hooded alongside SPE-1Y and commenced refit by JERMY installation of PR1, replacement of No. 2 periscope, realignment of sound gear, and treatment of low battery cells. No deepering or sound test. Refit completed on 1 December. Made post repair trial on 4 December. Training period, 6-8 December. Conducted convoy training exercise with TULLIBEE and HADDOCK, 9-10 December. Ready for sea, 14 December.

B. NARRATIVE:
14 December 1943.
1328 (VW) Departed Pearl in company with HADDO, TULLIBEE, HADDOCK and with 3C escort.

1614 (VW) Made trim dive.

1630 (VW) Surfaced.

1930 (VW) Escort parted company and HADDO drew ahead. TULLIBEE, HADDOCK, and HALLUST proceeded in column formation. Conducted radio communication tests and training with other submarines in formation during the evening.

15-17 December 1943.
Enroute Midway. Made daily training dives and held drills for fire control party. Conducted coordinated search and attack exercises with TULLIBEE and HADDOCK as directed by Task Group Commander. Seas rough and took considerable water down conning tower hatch on several occasions.

18 December 1943.
0923 (Y) Rendezvoused with air escort on Midway thirty mile circle.

— page 203 —
19 December 1943 (Continued).
1151(Y) Arrived 1liday. Received 15,395 gallons fuel and 1300 gallons fresh water. BUSHNELL made voyage repairs.

19 December 1943.
0842(Y) Departed Midway under air escort in company with TULLIEB and HADDOCK. After clearing channel formed column, distance 15 miles, HALLBUT third in column. Seas still rough.

1539(Y) Made trim dive.

1623(Y) Surfaced.

2400(Y) Changed time to -12 zone time and changed date to 21 December 1943.

21 December 1943.
Wind and seas increased in intensity. During day made seven knots good while making turns for twelve.

1444(M) Made trim dive. Exorcised approach party.

1536(M) Surfaced.

2130(M) Slowed to 9 knots. In the heavy head sea the ship was pitching heavily causing screws to break water and race. Carried zero float, making good five knots in wind and seas that reached force 9. Lowest barometer 29.34.

22 December 1943.
0557(M) Made trim dive.

0620(M) Surfaced. No abatement of storm. Made six knots good throughout day.

2200(M) Made radar contact at range of 4800 yards, bearing 0560T. Unable to sight the contact but from indications of another radar in vicinity and short range of contact, identified as friendly submarine, probably HADDO, who left Midway one hour behind us. The range gradually opened until contact was lost at 10,600 yards.

"Ind and seas had diminished slightly and were shifting around to the north, enabling us to make 11 knots throughout night.

— page 205 —
0-0-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. HALLIUT (SS232) - Report of Eighth "Air Patrol.
27 December 1943. (Continued)
Message was recopied for after fourth transmission.

28 December 1943.
0540(K) Had triplicate
0600(K) Entered assigned area.
0630(K) Surfaced.
1320(K) Aircraft Contact No. 2. Target on 3D radar, range 14 miles and closing. Submerged. Did not sight plane and do not believe we were sighted.
1407(K) Surfaced.
1410(K) Sighted FARALION DE PAJALOS bearing 2170T, distance 32 miles.

29 December 1943.
0134(K) Made radar contact, bearing 1920T, range 12,500 yards. Radar interference indicated presence of friendly submarine so closed and made sight contact with TULLIBEE. Received orders from Group Commander to patrol to eastward of TULLIBEE and rendezvous at dawn for further instructions.
0545(K) Made triplicate.
0555(K) Surfaced.
0640(K) Closed TULLIBEE and received mail via line throwing gun.
0730(K) Proceeded to initial station for surface patrol.
0734(K) Sighted HADDOCK bearing 2450T, range 6 miles.
0830(K) On station, commenced patrol on course 2700T, speed of advance, 9 knots. HALLIUT on north-eastern end of scouting line bearing 045-2250, scouting distance, 15 miles.

30 December 1943.
0515(K) Changed course to 0750T and commenced search plan to eastward at 16 knots, in accordance with signals from Group Commander. Able to make only 13 knots good, heading into force 7 seas.

1421(K) Aircraft Contact No. 3. Radar contact, 6 miles. Submerged and went to 300 feet to obtain SBT card.

— page 206 —
31 December 1943 (Continued).
1502(K)  Surface.

2310(K)  Discontinued search plan on order from Task Group Commander. Set course for morning rendezvous.

31 December 1943.
0725(K)  Rendezvoused with TULLIBEE and exchanged mail.

0740(K)  Proceeded to station on scouting line.

1502(K)  Ship Contact No. 1.  Sighted smoke bearing 0900T and a low minutes later saw target's masts.  Closed range until stacks and upper works were visible in high periscope and was then able to identify as the hospital ship TAKAGO I ATU.  She was painted white with a large red cross on each stack, was unescorted and did not appear to be zigzagging, so rejoined the scouting line, transmitting contact report to Group Commander.

1 January 1944.
0636(K)  Made trim dive.

0729(K)  Surfaced.

1410(K)  Rendezvoused with TULLIBEE to receive mail.

1445(K)  Proceeded to position for tomorrow's patrol, in accordance with orders just received.  HALLIUTS station on northeastern end of 0200-2000 scouting line; scouting distance, 6 miles.

2 January 1944.
0901(K)  Dived in assigned position and commenced submerged patrol on course 1100T.

0926(K)  Ship Contact No. 2.  Sighted a Japanese I Class submarine, painted black, with what looked like a white 0-3" painted on the conning tower.  Range was about 7000 yards, angle on this bow, 900 starboard.  Turned toward and went ahead full but was unable to close the range although the target zigged in our direction once, probably when the TULLIBEE fired.

0944(K)  Heard four explosions.  Since there was no damage to the submarine, assumed these were four TULLIBEE torpedoes, exploding at end of run.  Decided to

— page 207 —
2 January 1944 (Continued).
surface as soon as possible for following reasons:
(1) By so doing would be able to get ahead of
   target by midnight if he maintained his 152
   knot speed or slowed.

(2) Advantages of surface patrol are obvious.

(3) Air search of this immediate vicinity was
   now very probable.

(4) Even though we were sighted on surface days
   would be no wiser - they already knew one
   submarine was in this area.

1017(K) With enemy sub out of sight for 15 minutes, surfaced
   and commenced chase.

1825(K) Received message from TULLIBEE calling for morning
   rendezvous.

1853(K) Transmitted our position and informed Group
   Commander we were chasing the target.

1940(K) Received message changing rendezvous to the evening
   of the third.

3 January 1944.
0010(K) Not having made contact, slowed to one engine speed
   and patrolled along estimated course of the target.

0637(K) Submerged.

0834(K) Surfaced. Abandoned search and turned south, head-
   ing for evening rendezvous.

1800(K) Rendezvoused with HADDOCK and TULLIBEE.

1900(K) Commanding Officer went aboard TULLIBEE via her
   rubber boat for classification of planes with Group
   Commander and Commanding Officer of HADDOCK.

2315(K) Commanding Officer returned aboard. Set course
   for patrol station on scouting line bearing 0750T,
   distance 16 miles from TULLIBEE.

4 January 1944.
0644(K) Made trim dive.

0735(K) Surfaced. Continued surface patrol west of Marianas.

— page 208 —
5 January 1944.
0645(K) Made trim dive.

0730(K) Surfaced.

1820(K) Landed with TULLIBEE and after receiving new
    radar plan, proceeded to assigned station. During
    the right pass through Marianas Chain, 15 miles
    south of Asuncion Island.

6 January 1944.
0710(K) Dive for submerged patrol, cast of Marianas.

1805(K) Surfaced.

1900(K) Returned with TULLIBEE and received further
    patrol instructions.

7 January 1944.
0640(K) Anchored.

1601(K) Ship Contact No. 3. Sighted top of a warship,
    bearing 0350T, range 20,000 yards, angle on the
    bow estimated at 50° starboard. Closed range on
    normal approach course and identified the contact
    as a heavy cruiser, either the ATAGO or TAIGO,
    escorted by two destroyers, who were patrolling
    on either flank. The cruiser was zigzagging
    radically on a base course of about 160°T, speed,
    20 knots. "As unable to close sufficiently for
    even a long range shot (nearest range 10,000
    yards) and at

1704(K) Cruiser passed out of sight to southeast.

1735(K) Surfaced and proceeded northward.

2030(K) Rendezvoused with TULLIBEE, informed Group
    Commander of our contact and received instructions
    for following day's patrol.

2100(K) Set course for patrol station.

8 January 1944.
Uneventful. Continued surface patrol east of
    Marianas.

9 January 1944.
0627(K) Made trim dive.

— page 209 —
0-0-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. H.LIBUT (33232) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.
9 January 1944 (Continued).
0724(K) Surfaced.

1309(K) Aircraft Contact No. 4, Radar contact, 28 miles.
    Plane did not close and pip disappeared at 32 miles.

2000(K) Rendezvoused with TULLIS and after receiving new
    patrol orders proceeded to station on northeastern
    end of 0530-2330 scouting line; scouting distance
    20 miles.

10 January 1944.
0644(K) Div'd and conducted submerged patrol on course
    1430.

1802(K) Surfaced. Continued search plan ordered on 1430T,
    speed, 11 knots.

11 January 1944.
0007(K) Transmitting course to 2310 on receipt of
    message from Task Group Commander.

0048(K) Received orders to proceed to next position and at
    0930(T) to form a scouting line, course 2700T,
    see to 1000. HALT on eastern end of line
    bearing 0700-2500.

0615(K) Made trim dive.

0631(K) Surfaced.

1531(K) Sighted a floating mine in latitude 115-36' N,
    longitude 1450-09' E. It was spherical, about
    40" in diameter, with several 8" horns and was
    partially covered with barnacles and fouling as
    though it had been in the water for a considerable
    period. Sank this mine with 200mm gunfire
    and then rescued our position of eastern end of
    the submarine, 15 miles.

1737(K) Ship Center For. St. Elizabeth tops of a warship
    through the periscope, bearing 1200T, range
    34,000 yards. Sent contact report to HULBET
    and HABOCH. Cut in on radar and commenced
    track. On target at 18 knots, using periscope
    bearing and radar ranges. Range closed to
    30,000 yards while we were working up to speed
    and at that range, enough of the bridge structure
    was visible through the high periscope to identify

— page 211 —
12 January 1944.
0300(K) Rendezvoused with TULLIBEE and received scouting plan. Jet course for station on scouting lines.

0417(K) Sighted and exchanged recognition signals with HADDOCK.

0626(K) Made trim dive.

0658(K) Surfaced.

0708(K) Sighted drifting mine. Latitude 11-20N, longitude 142-59E.

13 January 1944.
0643(K) Made trim dive.

0717(K) Surfaced.

1635(K) Sighted DAUGHTER ISLAND bearing 1420T, distance 13 miles.

1900(K) Rendezvoused with TULLIBEE and HADOCK. Commanding Officer went aboard TULLIBEE for conference with Group Commander, and Commander of Officer of HADOCK. The discussion included patrol plans for the ensuing several days and the fuel problem. The TULLIBEE had 41,000 gallons remaining while the TULLIBEE and HADOCK, both with 14 ballast tank conversion, each had approximately 20,000 gallons more. In order to equalize the fuel remaining and keep the HADOCK in the "oilpark" it was decided that each of the others, two boats should transfer 7,000 gallons to the TULLIBEE, if possible. Since the seas were calm with only a slight swell, conditions seemed favorable for the first attempt. After the Commander of the TULLIBEE returned aboard processed with TULLIBEE to the lee of EWRIFIK ISLAND, twenty miles to the east. After two unsuccessful attempts to bring the boats safely alongside the project was abandoned for the night in order to reach patrol stations for the following day.

14 January 1944.
0639(K) Made trim dive.

— page 212 —
0-0-N-N'-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. HALIBUT (35232) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.
14 January 1944 (Continued).
0706(K)  Surface.

0800(K)  On station on southeastern end of scouting line bearing 162°-34'2", scouting distance, 15 miles, course 252°T, speed 10 knots.

1339(K)  Ship Contact No. 5. Attack No. 1. sighted tops
or a destroyer bearing 020°T, range 20,000 yards,
large angle on the bow. Turned away to avoid
being sighted and transmitted contact report
giving target's true bearing.

1341(K)  Range was closing and enemy heading our way.
Transmitted amplifying report. Ten miles is
distance to target. Diving end at

1342(K)  Submerged and connected approach. The target
was zig line on a base course of about 180°T,
piercing intermittently.

1407(K)  The destroyer, now identified as of the ASHIO
class, changed course 90° to the right. Assum-
ing this was a large zig, turned toward target
awaiting his next line. Even minutes later he
had not made any radical changes of course so
connected column. Left for a 50 knot on a 100°
port track.

1416(K)  Fired four bow torpedoes on a 135° port track at
a range of 1500 yards. Depths were set at
6 feet.

1417(K)  Heard three torpedo explosions, occurring 0:35,
1:00 and 1:40 minutes respectively after firing
this first torpedo. Since the torpedo was
1800 yards the first two explosions were obvious-
ly premature and as there was no apparent damage
to the destroyer, concluded that the third one
was likewise. Immediately after the first
explosion, the destroyer evaded by maneuvering
radically. He could not stop the charges
and soon turned back searching for us. Remained
at periscope depth at a favorable
shot but when destroyer approached us at

1424(K)  Went to deep submergence.
The destroyer dropped twenty charges over a
period of fifteen minutes and then confirmed her-

— page 213 —
0-0-J-P-I-D-S-K-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.
14 January 1944 (Continued).
self to listening. Found an excellent density
layer at 340' and evaded by keeping our stern
towards him. His screws finally faded out, and
we commenced venting the pressure of negative
tank. The destroyer immediately started echo
ranging, coming back in our direction. He did
not regain contact however and we evaded success-
fully until we tried venting again. Although
his pinning sounded very faint and distant, he
apparently heard the noise and headed toward us
once more. He still did not make contact, but
dropped two charges, not close.

1800(K) When the echo ranging faded out again, vented the
pressure of negative tank and came to periscope
depth.

1838(K) Sighted the destroyer returning again, range,
10,000 yards. Decided against trying another
attack in the bed light and evaded at periscope
depth as long as we could see him. As darkness
closed in, lost sight of him at about 4000 yards.

2050(K) Came to radar depth, and seeing all was clear,
surfaced. (Note: Since we had been unable to
pump down the 4" pressure in the boat, in order
to prevent injury to personnel or damage to
upper conning tower hatch, closed lower conning
tower hatch before surfacing. After surfacing,
left lower hatch closed till turbo-allow had
removed most of the pressure. This took about
2 minutes).

The failure to obtain results in this attack
was due to premature explosions or three of the
four torpedoes fired. Although the firing set
up was not particularly good in that it was
necessary to use large guns on a large track,
the spread was very sufficient to cover a fair
range of control cruisers and motor torpedo
maneuvers.

Cause of the premature is believed due to
the large gyros in combination with the six foot
depth setting. The sea was calm. At all
slight swell and sound not in the causad torpedoes
to break. Sound reported all torpedoes running
in the direction of the target.

2125(K) Received message from TULLIBEE giving her position.

— page 214 —
15 January 1944 (Continued).
2154(K) Transcribed following message to TULIBB and HADOCK, have surfaced, what is the dope? Have lost contact with enemy destroyer. My position is 5-50N, 143-104T.

2310(K) Received message from TULIBB to form a scouting line at 0100(K) on line 1 bearing 3420T, course 072T, speed 5. Proceeded to position on the line.

1023(K) Plane Contact No. 5, sighted unidentified plane, there is miles. Numbered. Do not believe we were sighted.

1120(K) Surface.

2230(K) Received signal from TULIBB to reform the scout-in line and desensitize a new point of origin. Proceeded north to form the line.

2348(K) Made radar contact bearing 0060T, range 17,000 yards. Radar interference indicated presence of friendly submarines. Closed range and examined and recognized the position. Closed to hailing distance and stayed. Experienced with the conditions and the operation of TULIBB. Was unknown.

16 January 1944.
0510(K) Made train dive.

0650(K) Surface.

1000(K) Received message from TULIBB designating rendezvous for dusk.

1900(K) Rendezvoused with TULIBB and HADOCK and received instructions for patrol. Heavy overcast continued.

— page 215 —
16 January 1944 (Continued).
2100(K) made radar landfall on IPALIS LAND and took departure for patrol station.

17 January 1944.
0605(K) made trim dive.

0633(K) surfaced.

0820(K) sighted FARULIP ISLAND, bearing 3520T, distance 13 miles.

1900(K) Rendezvoused with TULLIBE and HADLOCK and received mail. Informed Group Commander of our fuel status which would permit three days further operations with the wolfpack provided no high speed running was involved. By conducting submerged patrol independently would be able to remain on station a week. In view of this proposed that HALIBUT conduct submerged patrol in vicinity of enemy harbors for remainder of time in area. Upon receiving an affirmative, set course for CU.

18 January 1944.
0632(K) made trim dive.

0703(K) surfaced. Continued surface patrol enroute GUAH.

19 January 1944.
0755(K) submerged fifteen miles west of POATARA, GUAH in low visibility and commenced closing the harbor.

1037(K) sighted large freighter in ARA. Believe this to be the same ship which has several times been reported as being aground in this harbor. No other activity was noted. Intermittent showers made reconnaissance difficult.

1920(K) surfaced. Patrol d to northwest of GUAH during night.

20 January 1944.
0649(K) Submerged fifteen miles west of POATARA and commenced closing harbor.

1005(K) The large freighter was still in the harbor. Shores installations and landmarks were as described in previous patrol reports.

— page 216 —
20 January 1944. (Continued).
1914(K) Sun laced anchor hoisted to conduct patrol off S.A.I.
21 January 1944.
0653(K) Dived twenty miles east of JAPAN and conducted submerged patrol toward TURAFH LAGOON.
0750(K) Plane Contact No. 6. sighted twin engine patrol plane, distance 3 miles, on westerly course.
1157(I) Ship Contact No. 6. sighted destroyer patrolling off TURAFH LAGOON. During the next hour sighted a second destroyer and three patrol boats to the north. Tilted port side of the destroyer type. Tilt

— page 217 —
1914 (K)  JURFACED.
2005 (K)  Transmitted contact report to Combatant on the
cruiser. Upon completion it remains silent
proceeded toward ROTA to send the following day
there. Foul would then permit returning to
SAIL for another day patrol.

22 January 1944.
0619 (K)  Submerged first-class northwest of ATA.
Approached the island and conducted a close
reconnaissance of ATA. BAY and 30th LAGH
BAY. No activity was noted. There is a new,
red brick factory on the northeast shore of
JOYATA BAY. The sugar mill near the town
of ATA has been poorly camouflaged at the present
and red paint and appeared to be in use. Lookout towers were visible on the highest peaks,
and there is probably a fortification on TAIRINGOT.

1915 (K)  JURFACED.
23 January 1944.
0608 (K)  Submerged first-class west of ATA.
0930 (K)  As we closed the harbor, sighted inshore patrol
vessels similar to those observed here two days
ago. Throughout the day, two destroyers and
four patrol boats were seen conducting patrol
around CAIRO ATA. ATA and the entrance to
TAIRINGOT.

1032 (K)  Heard five explosions which, although not close,
were not as far distant as any of the surface
patrols. Concluded the view dropped by a plane
and went to 100 feet.

1037 (K)  Had just started up to periscope depth then sound
reported fast, severe, getting closer approaching
from direction of previously observed destroyer.
Went to 300 feet.

1102 (K)  When no further counter-measures developed, came
to periscope depth and continued toward the harbor.

— page 218 —
1135(K) Ship Contact No. 9, sighted aircraft carrier
    moored on anchored in Channel at 10:00 a.m. The
    patrol was situated to the east of Oran, class CVN
    as seen in CNI 41-46. Several planes were on
    deck and at the range attained no damage was
    apparent.
    After cutting in the carrier's position
    from the port line, the patrol was to be
    closing sea. It was still the patrol's
    objective. The ship was to escort with escort
    while evading destroyers and patrol boats. A
    systematic patrol was being maintained covering
    all approaches to the carrier at ranges from
    30 to 6 miles. By approaching from
    northward believed to be 30 miles, the
    at 10:00 a.m. The patrol was to be
    at 10:00

— page 219 —
0-0-N-N-I-D-B-N-T-I-A-I
U.S.S. HILIP (3232) = Report of light air Patrol.
23 January 1944 (Continued).
1925(1) surface. In view of the fuel remaining decided to spend the following day patrolling northeastward towards area departure point. During the night sent contact reports to OoOsubSca and the others of the wolfpack.

24 January 1944.
0615(1) Dived. Conducted submerged patrol east of MARIANAS.

1850(1) Surface.

25 January 1944.
0300(1) Departed area in accordance with provisions of operation order.

0546(1) Made trim dive.

0606(1) Surface.

26-31 January 1944.
...moves area to IDL/IY. Made morning and evening dives and conducted drills and air reconnaissance. Shifted watch stations to provide training for inexperienced men in preparation for next patrol. Weather excellent and seas calm.

31 January 1944.
0357(Y) Made 3rd radar contact, range 20,000 yards. Attempted to track but when actions of target indicated it was probably a plane cut in SD which verified this. Sent contact report and was informed planes were friendly.

1 February 1944.
0700(Y) Rendezvoused with air escort.

0800(Y) Arrived off IDL/IY, weather and channel conditions prevented entry. Remained underway overnight to east of IDL/IY.

2 February 1944.
0930(Y) Hovered submarine Base, IDL/IY.

C. TACTICAL:
- Weather enroute to station was stormy with heavy head seas and prevailing overcast. In the land area, seas were normally choppy with a moderate swell. Visibility during both day and night was excellent. While operating west of TUK was were calm and frequent rain scudls were encountered.

D. TIDAL TIDE:
- In the TUK chain a westward current of about three-quarters of a knot prevailed. East of TUK an easterly set, drift .5 knot was experienced. No strong or unusual currents were noted.

— page 224 —
0-0-N-P-I-D-3-N-T-I-S-I

U.S.S. HULIUT (32312) - Report of Flight 1st Patrol.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data (Control 1).

Sea conditions: Calm with slight swell.

Overall Activity: [FREQUENCY]

Remarks:
Three premature torpedo explosions occurred 0:35, 1:00, and 1:40 minutes after firing the first torpedo. The fourth torpedo missed the target. These prematures are attributed to the combination of shallow depth settings and large gyro angles employed which probably caused torpedoes to break. The slight swell existing at the time of firing should not have caused erratic depth performance. None of the premature explosions were seen although the Commanding Officer was looking through the periscope in the target direction at the time of all explosions.

- 23 -

— page 230 —
5. The enemy heavily screened the damaged aircraft carrier in the anchorage off Saipan. The patrols and air cover effectively prevented the HALIBUT getting in for even a long range attack. The combination of air and surface patrols has been found very effective by our own forces in the Atlantic, so it is not surprising to find it equally effective for the Japanese.

6. Except for the main storage battery, the HALIBUT is in good material condition and will be refitted in the normal period. Determined efforts will be made to reduce the battery grounds. The weakness of the ST patrols is still apparent. It is believed that suitable repairs can be made.

7. The Commanding officer, officers and crew are congratulated on a well conducted patrol and it is regretted that their efforts were not more fruitful in damage to the enemy.

Copy to:
CO, HALIBUT.

— page 231 —
16-3
Serial 027
CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO
USS HALIBUT REPORT of
Fightin' War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Subordinates Commander.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT - Report of Fightin' War Patrol.

1. HALIBUT is eighth war patrol was aggressively
conducted, even though results were disappointing. Enemy
battleship's evasive maneuvers effectively prevented attack, and
aircraft bombing and depth charging, frustrated HALIBUT's attempts
to get into firing range on damaged carrier in CAI'AN.

2. The Commanding Officer did not see any evidence,
on this surface of the three structure explosions. This may
indicate faulty depth performance, resulting in explosion at
or along depth. Inspection of torpedo tube depth setting
mechanism has failed to reveal any defect when may have caused
faulty depth performance.

Copy to:
Consubdiv-61
USS HALIBUT

— page 233 —
3232/AL-3
Serial: 011
C-C--T-T-D--J-T-L-L
From: The Commanding Officer, U.S. ATLANTIC
To: The Commander-in-Chief, USSTAS PATROL
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division PATROL
       (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron PATROL
       (3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific
       (4) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC
Subject: U.S. ATLANTIC (SS 232) - Rep. to Ninth War Patrol.
Enclosures: (a) subject report.
       (3) Track Chart.

1. Enclosures (..) and (..), covering the ninth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the NEAR EASTERN area during the period 21 March to 19 May 1944 is forwarded herewith.

I/ V. G. L. T. T.

— page 234 —
21 March 1944

1300(VT) Departed P.M. enroute I.W.A., escorted by PC 980.

1530(VT) Conducted test of newly installed I.W.A. with I. I

— page 235 —
35 March 1944 (Continued)
0830(T)  Record at submarine list, HUD.  Submarine
    base and division on deck voyage repairs.
    Received 15,800 gallons diesel oil.  On
    advice of submarine base medical officer,
    transfered to one who had developed ell-
    ments enroute.  Obtains replacesents.  (See
    paragraph F.  HUD.)

1633(T)  Underway for assigned area.

2400(T)  Changes data to 27 March 1944.

27-July 1944.

"Uneventful.  Weather is clear and seas calm.
Had training, lives twice daily and conducted
drills for air crew party.

1 April 1944.

0035(T)  JACK 1.  Look out Officer-of-the-Week
Position  sighted a plane carrying a "wings running light
26-4th  passing overhead.  Surprised.  Our position at
152-31st  this time was 67 miles north of 12403.  We
    not in operation, visibility good with half-
    moon.

0108(T)  surfaced.

1635(T)  Made training dive.

1925(T)  surfaced.

2 April 1944.

0245(T)  Completed conversion of 4 x 2 E fuel ballast
    tank to a -ain ballast.  It loo miles steaed,
    at 15 knots, on this test, 1960.

0310(T)  submerged to flush out tank.

0322(T)  surfaced.

- 2 -

— page 236 —
3 April 1944.
0606(1)  Race trie live.
0706(1)  Surfaced.
4 april 1944.
0535(1)  Made trie live.
0577(1)  Surfaced.
0700(1)  Interst valtine, ersta.
2000(1)  Lower to one-third speed on one engine and sent on in subsequent to a just like in 44 went very slow in 1943 not been setting trie live since conversion to 0 nights ago. 1nned sound gear and proc. 1ed 6000 moon.

2030(1)  [MISSION] 1. 1ade radar contact, bearing 399°  Position 26-40N  when first observed but with a minute increase to saturation.  This 1s 1n

— page 237 —
0-0-N-7-I-D-7-7-I-A-L
U.S.S. EULIST (as 232) - Report of Int. War Patrol.

4 April 1944 (Continued).

was made. 6 probably sign.1d each other simultaneously whenever you turn away. If he has maintained his original large angle on this bow he would never been easily visible through the periscope.

2.3.3(I) surfaced.

2 April 1944.

In view of shifting station to a probably more profitable point on, at

0525(I) dived to conduct submerged patrol, thus avoiding use of an anchor change of being sighted.

1234(I) ARRIVED 2. sighted twin engines patrol boat. 2-02-135-34E

1859(I) surfaced.

6-7 April 1944.

Failing to make contact, resumed surface patrol of at the area.

8 April 1944.

0445(I) entered assigned area.

0537(I) Dived and conducted patrol east of China.

1905(I) surfaced.

9 April 1944.

0633(I) undetected. located rest area of China.

1936(I) surfaced.

— page 238 —
10 April 1944

0540(I) DVSd and coul.snosed passage through 1-3-1
    ACIO SHI. Ostrern Yt. C. JI... and CII. CYHr.3U
    JI.A.

0630(I) 3I1C3C2. 2. 3I1C3C2.

— page 240 —
0130(I)  Identified this new contact as southbound firefighter with three small escorts, one on each port quarter.  A were inshore of them and would be unable to pass undetected.  Decided to attack scouting if a satisfactory position could be reached in the quickly ceveloping situation, then surface as soon as possible and overtake the other ships.

0135(I)  Submerged to radar 6.5ft at 9200 yards range and came on deck approximately 2200hrs, 2.5in. 2.50miles from the surface. 2

— page 241 —
12 April 1944 (Continued):

02:43(I) Sound has lost contact. It covers and echo ranging was weak and as stern. started to radar depth.

0306(I) Nothing visible through periscope and no radar targets.

0307(I) Surface. sighted and radar contact on one escort, range 900 yards. sent ahead at full power and rapidly opened range. as we drew away lists could be seen near scene of action indicating recovery of survivors or perhaps taking of damaged ship in tow. There is a good chance that this heavily loaded ship sank from the hit in its machinery space. Decided not to return for further investigation but to continue in straitening earlier contact before dawn. Continuous no threat. ward along coast of 3 miles.

0414(I) 23:07 6. made radar contact on starboard bow, range 6000 yards. sighted a small patrol vessel. Turned away and after losing contact worked about 1000 yards to offshore course. as it became light, opened out for a short maintenance surface patrol searching for convoy.

0733(I) 11:30 3. Target on we read at 16 miles. It closed to 12 miles and then opened.

0810(I) 28:50 4. Target on 20 miles. at 18 miles.

0832(I) 6 were not in a position closed or on convoy, on the estimated track, able to cover it's probable courses as it took departure from the northern tip of 3 miles. 1th instant it's plane contacts at ranges between 12 and 18 miles, closed and commenced submerged patrol.

- 8 -

— page 243 —
1944-1945

0532(I) Dived and conducted submerged patrol off pass between ANTI-SLAVE and CHINA. 1944.

1947(I) surfaced. Patrols to westward during night.

13 April 1944.

0600(I) Commenced daylight surface patrol 100 miles west of KULING.

0834(I) USS 6. 3D radar contact, range 20 miles. Remained on surface as plane did not close. 12-01-45 12

— page 244 —
18 April 1944.

0537(I) : undamaged end continued patrol of channel.

1953(T) : un-faced. Patrol led to starboard of island chain, ten miles off shore.

19 April 1944.

0524(I) : undamaged end commenced passage of channel between YC and JI. and continued.

1000(I) : HPOO 12. shifted smoke and masts of freighter. Commenced a road but nearest range attack as was 5000 yards. Ship was identified as a small coastal freighter of not over 100 tons. He was headed for the south coast of OICY, JI, unescorted, making 10 knots on a steady course. Followed him northward in hopes that he might put in to the small harbor on CGCJ.

1600(I) : made a careful examination of CGCJ from two miles off shore. The freighter was not there so he presumably continued the eastern coast.

1953(I) : surfaced. Roosed a steamer so sent several days on surface patrolling, the traffic routes fifty to a hundred miles off the coast.

20 April 1944.

Conducted daily surface patrol. Miles overcast, visibility good.

1114(I) : 1. 35. 2. radar contact, range 12 miles. Ranges did not close so remained on surface.

1200(I) : 1. 35. 2. radar contact, range 10 miles. Closing. Dived. Range 12. closed to 5 miles before radar was secured as 35 went under.

1637(I) : surfaced.

- 11 -

— page 245 —
21 April 1944.

Conducts daylight surface patrol, heavy overcast and intermittent rain into the visibility. Used 3 radar, 2 periscope and 2 wares and up and ready to act in, but not keying.

0712(I) ATC 10. Contact on 2 radar, 10,000 yards. Range opens rapidly and target is identified as a plane.

1025(I) ATC 11. Contact on 3 radar, 21,700 yards. Turned towards and attacked to close but lost contact. This was also determined to be a plane.

1218(I) ATC 12. 3 radar contact, range 24,000 yards. Rapidly changing range and bearing indicates an attacking plane.

1547(I) ATC 13. 1.

— page 247 —
26 April 1944 (Continued).

side of the U.S. A-20T chain and patrolled southward between I-19, J-11, and T-20, J-11A.

27 April 1944.

0049(I) TRACK 14. radar co. tact on several ships, range 12,000 yards. Composed tracking and determined that the target was proceeding north and close to eastern shore of I-19. Radar indicated a convoy of three ships in column with five or six escorts, one of which was about four t-lous. My yards in the van of the convoy.

Tracks "mile" orking to a position of more open water. The night was overcast and dark and it "as particularly very to the westward, so encountered to attack I-19 targets; port flank. Observations for a surface attack would have been ideal. The I-19 was a brilliant psychological success.

0258(I) Found targets were not zigging, course 077°, speed 8. Turned to a position course. At 6000 yards, several fire gunners, smoking heavily were visible fire. The bridge, . . . electric as our first target the steadily largest ship, last in column.

0327(I) ATLANTIC 2. Fired 4,3, 2, 3, 3, range 3000 yards, small gyro eels on a 600 port track. CRI-1 in. Intentionally was to obtain a firing range of 2500 yards but an escort "as bearlings" on our starboard beam, to thousand yards at a. Seized accurate target data. V-1

— page 248 —
27 April 1944 (continued).

0330(I) Commanding Officer saw the flash of one torpedo hit from the direction of the convoy. Line of torpedo run checked for hit from TACCP 3. Shortly thereafter the convoy commenced sounding whistle.

0332(I) Rear frigate exploded. The sea continued for the next eleven minutes as the scouts explored a good portion of the clear water. While returning to view the flashes, the frigate sent an instruction to the destroyer to attack. The failure to follow the instructions was the cause of the frigate's collision with the convoy course, speed, and TACCP. The frigate was not positive identification of the destroyer. The frigate was not possible in existence. Visibility was poor. The frigate was not in sight of the convoy course. The frigate was not in

— page 250 —
27 april 1944 (continued).

0533(I)  : 1st led a torpedo boat on 8th destroyer, bearing 2300T, range 12,000 rds, at 5:00 on the sea, with 2d 2

— page 251 —
0927(I)  U.S.S. [NAME OF SUBMARINE] (US 232) - Report of [DATE OF REPORT]
27 April 1944 (Continued).

0927(I)  [NAME OF SUBMARINE] 16.  [NAME OF SUBMARINE] about to turn deck to the
position  [NAME OF SUBMARINE] mineslayer to finish his oil, sound reported
27-38N  scores to the south.  [NAME OF SUBMARINE]  [NAME OF SUBMARINE] are sighted the
125-07L  meets and steers on enemy torpedo boat standing in our direction, range 500 yards.

0930(I)  [NAME OF SUBMARINE]  [NAME OF SUBMARINE] explosion.

0933(I)  [NAME OF SUBMARINE]  [NAME OF SUBMARINE]  [NAME OF SUBMARINE] oil incident.  [NAME OF SUBMARINE] of these
have been aircraft bombs.

0938(I)  [NAME OF SUBMARINE]  [NAME OF SUBMARINE] 15.  [NAME OF SUBMARINE] attack the engine patrol to bear
Position  [NAME OF SUBMARINE] over the patrol boat.

27-35N
125-07S

0940(I)  [NAME OF SUBMARINE]  [NAME OF

— page 252 —
27 April 1944 (Continued).

1323(I)  lost sight of the line and patrols no continued to expend depth charges until close before dark, at t.tel of 9. charges being dropped.

2000(I)  surfaced. 6. made gottem about thirty miles out of our area in making our escape. needed south-ward to return.

26 April 1944.

0533(I)  submerged.

1942(I)  surfaced.

2010(I)  noted interference on J radar, bearig 2300T. which appeared to go into a dense area. since we were in the northern part of our area and the nearest submarine to the south of us, the S.R.L. was, should we ever be in a less easily miles away, decided to head in the direction of the possible it that the S.R.L. was closing a convoy into our area.

29 April 1944.

0030(I)  Radar interference. No clear secure strategy but no contact had been made. Changed course to the southeast to make landfall on HNL. 3. HNL.

0201(I)  lads radar identified on HNL. range 32 miles. Interference on J was still very strong.

0343(I)  A. FDR 18. 4. radar contact bearig 2660T, position 20-28N. The submarine later reported. Tracked target on counter 0730T, speed 7 knots, zigzagging in shot legs. 30.

— page 256 —
3 May 1944.
0510(1) Submerged craft of CRITICAL INTEREST patrol ed eastward.

1307(1) Position 27-30I. 128-43S. 1328(1) surface, the decision being to attack traiI- in, sea-ens, but after silence, the, and verify their use as cargo carriers.

2049(1) Iade leader contact at 10,000 yards or a number of small ships. This looks like our sea-ens fleet. Closed.

2120(1) Position 27-08N. 126-22S. 2140(1) GUARDING 2. Commenced firing 20mm and .50 cal. at the two traiI- in, sea-ens, and 1200 yards. Subject to the closest sea-ens turned partially toward us. Obtained several 20mm hits on the first sea-ens, starting a small fire, and later the closest one was doing heavily hit by a well as by 20mm and .50 cal. Although one was seen running, the enemy's machine gun, soon fired our opening fire the 2nd and 4th loaded. We're hit by a burst of enemy fire and met their way below in spite of painful rounds. Continued attack without further return fire till target exploded vioIe. By the a bill of fire and very strong order of gun powder. Numerous fragments struck the hull, the pieces of metal wounding a lookout in the hip. Three

— page 258 —
3 May 1944.
over the catapult. No internal damage suffered.

(c) 1944, Joseph J. LITZ, 2nd Lieutenant, 244 83 03, 1013JC, V-6, U.S.N., battle lookout, was struck in right hip by a piece of flying metal as the target exploded.

In view of the nature of the C.I.'s and L.I.D.'s wounds, left area 24 hours early, setting course for I.D. at best speed.

4 May 1944.

0600(I) Departed area.

1945(I) Sent message to Jonsubpac reporting departure from area an request that a doctor board an outbound submarine at 7:00 for transfer to us. It this point it is believed that I.D. has a puncture in stine and operation might be necessary.

3 May 1944.

1937(I) 20th Oct 24. I. rode radar contact, range 9000 yards and, Visibility was still fair but target could not be seen. Runs away and lost contact at 11,500 yards. Radar intercepts on the target bearing and our position in submarine operating area indicate the probable direction of a friendly submarine although intercepts are confirmed by usual ship types.

9 May 1944.

1100(I) Rendezvous with 2nd and Lt(jg) U. S. N. (MC), USN transferred to this I.D. by rubber boat.

- 25 -

— page 259 —
11 Jan 1944.
052(7)    sighted H.MAY escort planes.
0925(7)    roared at submarine fire, H.MAY.  After
examination of wounded men, met local officers
decided that satisfactory rescue was per-
mitted.  Crew of 2nd and 3rd flotilla
H.MAY.

1537(7)    Underway for A.M.A.L.

15 May 1944.
1130(7W)    roared at submarine base, A.M.A.L. 30A.

C.  MECHANISM:
The weather in the area was generally good. Temperature was moderate and seas were generally flat but with surf which was not very high. The periscope was in use. Sky was cloudy and conditions were generally good. The weather was generally good

— page 265 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-T-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS 232) - Report of 'Inth'ar Patrol.

E. ATTACK DATA:
Time: 0200(I) Date: 12 April 1944 Lat. 2°-7'N Long.129-01s

Target Data - Damage Inflicted:
Description: Single frigate, similar to ATU-1, 790 tons, 84, 2, 25-0, escorted by three 50-tyres patrol boats. Contact was made by sighting, at night, range 15,000 yards. Visibility was excellent with a near full moon.

Ship(s) sunk: -
Ship(s) damaged: Freighter 'Sillier' to ATU-1, 790 tons. or probably sunk.

Damaged: Deterred. Observed one torpedo hit amidships.

Target Draft: 25' Course 220PT Speed 9 kts. Range 2700 yds.

CWN Ship Data:
Speed: 3 kts. Course 3000T Depth 60' Alt 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data:
Type Attack: After sighting, had ahead on surface, tracked by radar, heading toward target at slow speed. At 5200 yards range, submerged to radar depth and at 3000 yards were to periscope depth. Fire three torpedoes, using 150 cds, a divergent spread of 1/2L, 0/2, 1/2L.

- 32 -

— page 267 —
0-0-N-T-D-1-D-1-T-1-1-1-1
U.S.S. FLIGHT (32) - Report of Miss. Patrol.

H. ATTACK DATA (Continued):
U.S.S. FLIGHT TORPEDO NO. 2 FLIGHT 9
Date: 27 April 1944
Lat. 27-12N Long. 123-135

Description: Convoy of three frigate carriers with five or six escorts. Got to sea at 2 radar at range of 12,000 yards. Any of us over-cose with noon and night was dark all-tough brilliant guns nose-conce in water caused a slightly visible wake. Ship fired at in this attack was last in the column of frigate. See see-sawed to the largest of the convoy.

Ship(s) Sunk: None

Ship(s) Damaged or Torpedo sunk: None

Target Draft: 25' Course: 037 Speed: 6 kts. Range: 3000 yds.

CVR Data
Speed: 5 kts. Course: 145° Depth: 3,000 ft.

Fire Control: Fired to psdo Data

Type Attack: After making radar contact, traced cord over and course 23.5°S, at this sea's time to a position clear of surrounding islands and on the deck side. Conducted a broad attack on surface, using radar ranges and bearings un-till target was visible and then shifted to IBT bearings. Fired a divergent spread of 3/40, 00, 3/40°USN, 100°TNT firing bearings.

- 34 -

— page 273 —
1944-12-27 10:00:00
Date: 27 -April 1944
Lat: 37-37N
Long: 128-11E

Target Data:
- Depth: 64'
- Course: 0100T
- Speed: 10 knots
- Range: 900 yds.

Own ship Data:
- Speed: 3 knots
- Course: 1000T
- Depth: 64'
- Range: 900 yds.

-40-

— page 276 —
1. L.I. 120 (G. 232) - Report of. initial patrol.

Target Data - Damage Inflated

```
Date: 3 May 1944
Latitude: 27-08N
Longitude: 123-22E
```

Damage or Probably sunk

Damage Determined By

(a) Sapan sunken.
- After being hit he vily by 4", 20mm and .30 cal. gunfire, Sapan exploded violently with a large blast of flames and a very strong odor of gunpowder.

(b) Sapan damaged.
- Numerous 20mm hits started a small fire in this sea pen. The fire was later apparently brought under control and extinguished.

Details of attack

...after making radar contact on a fleet of 18 cars, Sapan sighted earlier in the day, closed an open fire on the two trailing sea pens. At 4", 20mm and .30 cal. a range of 1200 yards. ...as the range closed, the fire on 11 guns became excessively difficult. ...followed by a 20mm hit on the exception of one. ...30 cal. machine gun which failed after firing several rounds, the gun was quickly brought to a stop. ...the Sapan's firing was extremely erratic: 1 round 4"/30 cal. cannon; 2 rounds 4"/30 cal. 120mm; 200 rounds .30 cal.

- 43 -

— page 288 —
5-44/16-3
SERIAL 040
C.O.-N-T-I-D-Z-N-T-I-J-I
Subject: U.S.S. HILIBUT HINTH War Patrol - encounters on

(b) Attack No. 2. This was a night surface attack on a convoy of three ships in column with five or six escorts, the one in the van lo ding the convoy at c distance of four hundred yards. The night was soundless and dark with overcast sky; brilliant phosphorescence in the water prevented high speed movement. Convoy was tracked from contact at six miles; targets, snaking to v.l.y., were visible at three miles. Convoy was on course 037° true, not sighted, speed 8 knots. The at was selected as last ship in column, unidentified, estimated 5000 tons, the largest and probably most important in the convoy. Those torpedoes were fired from two tubes, divergent spread, six foot depth coating, an 60 port track at radar range of 3000 yards. No apparent reason is evident for the failure of those torpedoes to hit, as the data reported gave an steady at depth of 500 yards. The torpedoes were not successful in making contact with the convoy, and the torpedoes were not successful in making contact with the convoy,

— page 289 —
5-44/416-3
Serial 040
C.O.-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT Ninth War Patrol - comments on, attacked previously or had arrived on the scene as a result of the attacks, I respective of submarine maneuvers, a small angle on to bow was presented with range closed to 1500 yards, when enemy ship changed course 25° to the left. It is possible that enemy sound personnel lost the submarine at this point as previously his pinging had been loud and clear. If four torpedoes from the stern tubes, divergent spread and small angles, to hits resulted, from the damage observed through periscope, the early sink: g offoct and creaking up noises heard, it is believed the target sank.

Recommended damage assessment

SUNK 1 CM TSUBAME Glass 570 tons

4. Gun attacks

(a) Gun Attack No. 1, A night shore bombardment on two large warehouses on the northern shore of KUME SHIMA, Fifty-three rounds of 4" ammunition were expended; five hits were observed in warehouses and others in adjoining structures. In addition to the damage caused by smoke, fire and bursting shells, there must have been considerable loss of "flaco" and sense of security.

(b) Gun Attack No. 2, Indicative of the scarcity of shipbottom for coastal freight movements was the coney of oighteen large motor sampans sighted on May third. Appearances belied their vocation as fishoman; their machine gun armament, the enormous explosion of one sampan and resultant strong odor of gunpowder indicate their probably use as ammunition carriers. One 250 ton sampan was sunk and one damaged to a small extent; three submarine men were wounded but are now recovering.

5. A depth charge indicator was used aboard gously. This equipment provides valuable information and it is hoped that such devices will soon be available for all submarines.

6. Keying the SJ radar causes a heavy voltage urge to be placed upon magnetron tubes which has a damaging offoct and reduce the 1st to and efficiency of the tubes. A keying offoct can be obtained to operating the wave guide handle and controlling the antenna output without materially varying the voltage on the magnetron tube.

— page 290 —
7. The HALIBUT has proceeded to Hunter's Point for overhaul and
accomplishment of outstanding alterations.

8. The health and morale of the HALIBUT was excellent, Congratulations
are extended to the CLain, C.Ph.M., U.S.N., for his successful ministering to the
wounded personnel.

9. The commanding officer, officers and crew are complimented on
the completion of another successful patrol resulting in sinking 12,873 tons
and damaging 5250 tons of enemy shipping.

E. R. SWINBURNE,
Acting.

E. R. SWINBURNE,
Acting.

— page 291 —
11/jak
FC5-4/A15-3
Serial 0206
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
26 May 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-Z-N-T-I-L-L
SECOND ENCRYPTION:
USS TALISTA (H) "Air Patrol Report.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC ISLET.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC ISLET.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT Ninth "Air Patrol - Corrents on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division FOUR.

2. Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and men for another aggressive and well-conducted patrol.

— page 292 —
1. The ninth war patrol of the HALIBUT was conducted in the NANSEN SHOTO area.

2. In patrolling close to the Island chain, the HALIBUT contacted much enemy shipping, and was thus able to carry out five individual torpedo attacks, inflicting severe damage upon the enemy. All attacks were well planned and aggressively conducted. It is of interest that the HALIBUT was able to make a single convoy. It is realized that these convoys are normally protected by at least one escort whose gun power is stronger than that of our submarines, but an attack as made by the HALIBUT on the rear of the convoy will do much to discourage this type of enemy trans- portation. The HALIBUT attacked the sampan convoy after a good estimate of the situation, and when sure that the heavily gunned port was well a.ead.

3. In addition to making successful torpedo and gun attacks on shipping, the HALIBUT conducted a successful bombardment of shorehouses and buildings on Kume Shimia.

4. It is interesting to note that the depth-charge recorder recently installed was helpful and of value to the HALIBUT. Use of the SJ radar for plane detection by the HALIBUT was most important, and such practice is encouraged in all our submarines in order to obtain data on enemy patterns.

5. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Engineering Award.

6. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the HALIBUT for this aggressive and successful war patrol. The BUT is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

54

-1-

— page 294 —
1-10/15-18(18)  SUBMARINE PATROL  REPORT  IN

Serial: 085  Crew of Patrol Officer, 1st Engineer, California, 1 Feb. 1945.

Reference:  (n) Consubmarine Patrol, 35-12N-125-45E (15) (15) serial 01656 of 29 July 1945.

1. Reference (n) credits the USS, USS, USS with certain changes to the crew including the changing of an unidentified freighter in an attack on 0121 12 April 1944.

2. Reliable intelligence, subsequently received, identifies the ship attacked on this occasion as the USS,

— page 296 —
55232/416-3
Serial: 024

C- DECLASSIFIED: A-1

From: The Commander Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division POINT SIX.
    (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
    (3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
    (4) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U. S. FLIGHT (33232) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
    (b) Track Chart.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B), covering the tenth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the Luzon Strait area during the period 8 October 1944 to 1 December 1944 is forwarded herewith.

I. J. CLINTON.

DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, CONWAY INSTITUTE 55110.0
BY OCP 02699 C DATE 5/30/17 DECLASSIFIED

— page 297 —
2-2-N-F-I-D-Z-N-T-I-Z-I
U. S. S. KLI3UT (53232) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

PROLOGUE:
Arrived FRALI 1944 15 May 1944 from Ninth War Patrol and departed 17 May for San Francisco Bay. Crew for overhaul, arrived 15th October 1944. Conducted Company Submarine depot repair. Arrived 24 May 1944 and commenced major overhaul. Accomplished all outstanding items including: 1.

— page 298 —
9-18 October 1944 (Continued).

using SD antenna. (See pr graphs I and K, radio and radar). Made rendezvous with HUDDOCK on 16 October to exchange information; and again at entrance to SIREN eastern safety lane on occasion of HUDDOCK and TUN. Sighting enemy submarine.

19 October 1944.

0300(K) Passed between SIREN and HUDDOCK Islands enroute rendezvous.

0700(K) Made rendezvous with HUDDOCK, TUN., and escort TGN 9. Proceeded to SIREN.

0940(K) SHIICON 1. Sighted periscope, close record to port, maneuvered to evade, and sent contact report.

1305(K) Moored to TONIGHT alongside HOLLYDI in TUN. HROB. Received aerial wireless and prompt, efficient service by HOLLYDI officers and men. Took on 43,000 gallons diesel fuel oil. Major work item consisted of repairs to 3T radar which had been open ting very poorly for last few days.

21 October 1944.

Heraxfter, all times to ITM (9-9).

1443 Left SIREN for patrol area in company with HUDDOCK, TUN., and escort TGN 9.

1930 Left column formation and proceeded to designated station in line of bearing north to course, interval, 10 miles.

22-23 October 1944.

Huroute patrol area, conducted training divs.

24 October 1944.

0800 AIRCON #2. Sighted very large unidentified southbound plane. Did not dive.

1105 AIRCON #3. Sighted large unidentified plane. Did not dive.

- 2 -

— page 299 —
24 October 1944 (Continued).

1730 Interrogated convoy colloges safety line.

1737 Sighted submarine, believed to be HUDDOCK, bearing 240°T, distance about 16,000 yards.

1835 Snell pip on SJ radar bearing 260°T, range 2250. Turned away and commenced tracking; pip showed intermittently and finally disappeared.

1854 Sighted two lights about a mile apart flashing on and off at about 30 seconds intervals. Lights appeared to be at about 6,000 yards range but 50 could not pick up any target on this bearing. The lights were first flashing around 6 seconds before the following possibilities: (1) The lights could be from survivors in a raft or boat, although lights seemed brighter than any they would be likely to have. (2) That the radar contact just before was on a periscope and that the lights might be a trap for an enemy sub or mine who might also be to investigate. Increased to pl.rec lights up noon and at.

1932 Divd to investigate submerged. Handed toward lights but could hear nothing on sound and could not pick up lights even with much periscope.

2033 Surf accd, nothing in sight, and set course up safety line.

25 October 1944.

0832 Received group corr nser's order to patrol safety line at 125°-00' (2), and went ahead to best speed to reach station.

1226 Received orders changing station. Reversed course at full speed.

1340 Heard several distant explosions through hull.

1630 Reached station in safety line at 126°-30' (2) and commenced patrolling at 12 knots on southerly course. Named VHF, and about 1700 contacted herring convoys stations of our dive bomber pilots who were in contact.

— page 300 —
25 October 1944 (Continued)

with enemy forces apparently close by. Roped to get sufficient information to enable us to close. The flight or squadron leader could be clearly heard describing the contact as a Japs battlecruiser with two cruisers near her, and said that another group of enemy ships was in sight to the westward. The calls of two of the planes in this flight were "Manoo 99" and "Manoo 13". While the air group continued to break in by "T" to get their position, when one impatient and eager birdman said, "Let's get going and get this over with". The answer was, "I will make my attack in one minute", and soon thereafter a plane could be heard going into a port dive, followed by the word, "There goes your Buri", to the moment the remaining officer was called to the bridge to smoke in sight, but other personnel enjoyed the surprise attack on the Japanese. The attack on the Japanese was not a surprise. The Japanese were not expecting it. The Japanese were

— page 301 —
25 October 1944. (Continued)

1743
Dived for approach. The decision to dive at this time was made because of a previous experience this vessel had with a Jap battleship. On that occasion, radar tracking resulted in detection of the enemy by its S2 radar interference, or by a possible radar jig, and the target evaded successfully.

Tracking showed the wave 15,000 yards to starboard of the target, but by using much spaced ranges to keep ahead of the target. To smoke or damage was evident on the target, but its speed of 15 knots, by turn count, indicated probable damage from the air attack. As the range closed, detected the other smaller ships, bearing about 60 and 300 relative from the large ship believed to be a battleship, distant about 3000 yards. While the light was still good, only the large ship's radar could be seen, making positive identification difficult. It was getting dark quickly, and by the time the target presented a fairly large range on the bow at a moderate range, the visibility was poor (sunset 18:14). The commander's officer was sure by the height and straightness of the Japanese ships, the accuracy ships were seen dimly and briefly. The one to the battleship's starboard was apparently a light cruiser of the YAMATO class, while the one to port was a destroyer. During the approach, the destroyer began to smoke heavily. At

1842
Gained attack position about 5,000 yards ahead of target, 400 yards off his track to port. The smaller ships would pass well clear on either side. Attached firing 6 bow tubes on a small track, then swinging right for stern shots, when the starboard screen was seen to signal by yardarm blinker. The target then made its first substantial zig, changing course to the right. This gave us a chance for a much better track, but increased the torpedo run greatly, and it was necessary to fire almost at once, as the target would soon be going away. The destroyer was up almost continuously in the rapidly falling light, it is possible that it was detected by radar, but she being practically flat.

— page 302 —
25 October 1944 (Continued)

The large last minute zig zag curve the best opportunity for identification of this target. The light was poor, and own ship was being swung while introducing final attack date, but it cannot be definitely stated that this ship was not one of the heavy cruisers of which pictures are available in OIN 41-42, its cargo being too strategic, too high, and only one straight stack was seen, firmly close to the foremast. As this ship was not, but the of its length to view, no means was good, but the commanding officer lied this to the officer, and concentrated would make a stick rather difficult to see, in the above on getting accurate ends and bearings. For the above visual evidence the decision was made that this ship was probably the U.S. vessel, but in view of not seeing a mainmast, the I5w was also a possible, little idea exists that this was the U.S. for which little identification date is available other than OIN 222-J's statement that it may be either a 2 or CDR.

1843-36

Started firing for radar tubes; small curve angles, about 95 port turrets, 3,400 yard center deck range, 6 torpedoes spaced for 1000s overage, depth at 20'. The importance of keeping the torpedoes open at full 5 seconds had been so well stressed in training that the torpedo men not only swallowed the bubble but a bit of the ocean for good measure and we became nervous for radar. With the last look, the destroyer was seen with a zero angle bearing 70 relative. Unable to see, it

1845-30

Sent deep, It is believed I erred in not firing the storm tubes on sound as we went deep. All along the bow sat-up was excellent the four star's sets, even on an unfavorable trace, could well have been fired in view of the importance of the target. Destroyer passed close astern. Tracked torpedoes to target.

-5-

— page 303 —
25 October 1944 (Continued)
1847-50 First torpedo explosion.
48-08 Second torpedo explosion.
-53 Third torpedo explosion.
49-30 Fourth torpedo explosion.
50-10 Fifth torpedo explosion.
1850-37 Locker to explosion.
50-44 Locker to explosion.
51-44 Very loud triple explosion followed by prolonged heavy reverberations. Did not hear any explosions that were definitely depth charges.

1853-1925 Heard any explosions of lighter intensity and sounds still in the vicinity of the submarine. Heard for sources of noise, while cooking to periscope depth. Only two sets of sources were audible all this time, and these clusters intermittently stopped and started, spaced up and slowed, moving back and forth in a series indicating picking up survivors.

1945 ...t periscope depth, nothing visible.

1950 Surfaced. Sighted distant blinker lights ahead in direction of enemy's track. Sighted large target on last sound bearing of target misses. Coasting Officer and lookout described this as a very large target, no superstructure visible, strongly resolute line hull with small silhouette. I announced to close target with small silhouette.

1951 Intercept on this object, range 12,300 yards, strong pip with broad base, unlikes cur scm before.

1952 Men below decks reported explosion.

1954 Target faded from radar screen and simultaneously disappeared from view. Visibility very good in light or bright half moon. Set course 030°T at full speed to

— page 304 —
25 October 1944 (Continued)

close ship that had been signalling. Many gunfire flashes could be seen over the horizon to southwest, but thought it better to try to overtake the late battleship's escorts (whose speed at this of attack was only 13 knots) than to get _fixed up in an all-out naval battle. The wave chief of the 4th carrier force, in direct contact with the Japanese, and it was clear that failed to _actuallize could always drop back on the other enemy units...so we _sensed to the north, star shells or flares over the horizon illuminated by the scene of the engage. But the south...assisted through strong odors of gunpowder (magazine explosion!?)."

2200 Received TUNL. contact report. 'With very indefinite data of own to co on, can no press_ets of _regaining contact, decided to try for TUNL's contact. Headed to intercept at full speed.

2252 SHOCK 3. Radar contact bearing 3060, range 32,000 yds. Contact tracking.

2253 Sent contact report to FADDOCK and SUL. Scan sighted two very large ships, probably battleships, then one smaller, but radar indicated that of 5 ships, 2 large, 3 smaller. Continued tracking and found that through initial easy course was 2000, that kept warding around to left (east) until base course of zero, speed 19 was reached. By successively zigzag away to keep us astern, they succeeded in pulling slowly away.

2345 Sent amplifying contact report.

2400 Sent same contact to JULIO, LT, CDR, XO.

26 October 1944.

0030 Sent amplifying report.

0108 Lost contact, last range 32,000 yds. Targets on course 000, speed 20.

0130 Sent poor contact report to subs patrolling to north.

0245 Sent FLEET Serial 1 to CC XO reporting newest

— page 305 —
0-0-N-T-I-D-T-N-4-I-4-L
U. S. S. F. L. I. D. U. (USS232) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

Contact and last evening's attack.

Continued chase all night and until reaching Latitude 23°00' N, Longitude 126°30' W.

0613
Nade trie dive.

0657
Surfaced. Returning to station in safety lane. During the day passed about a hundred boxes and miscellaneous wreckage. Recovered one of the boxes and found it to be a tin-lined cedar ammunition box for a small caliber shells, about 37 m., with naval markings on the box.

2133
Received group commander's order concerning overcast through safety lane.

27 October 1944.

0627
Dived.

1348
Surfaced.

1851
Sighted submarine just surfaced, bearing 2850T, distant 6,500 yards. Acknowledged recognition signals on 3T.

1900
3T radar locked up and ISLAD, bearing 2500T, distant 73,000 yards.

1910
Set course to pass through LUGN STARTER between BALTIMORE and BALTIMORE.

28 October 1944.

0030
Issued 3D-1D LUGN to starboard, distant 15 miles.

0800
Afloat 4. Sighted Jap BATTY bearing 300 relative distance about 5 miles, on fire. Dived, watching torpedoes as we went down, saw Jap adjust his good. However, the bomb went over, it

0801
Exploding close enough to shake the boat but causing no damage. 3D was not in use but as our engines had smoked badly just before, believe that this attacked the Jap and let him take a favorable position unnoticed by us.

— page 307 —
31 October 1944 (Continued)

0640 Sent enemy course and speed to F-10OO and TUN. Opened out and examined and around.

0815 ALCOR 6. Sighted plane crossing eastern. Divded to avoid being sighted.

0846 Surface and resued and around. . .t full speed, we gained very slowly.

0934 Sighted submarine bearing 0579T. Identified as TUN. Discharged calls with 3T. TUN. was directed by OTC to continue search for convoy while . . .DOOR would try to close our contact.

1150 Sighted F-10OO to northeast trying to close our contact.

1212 F-10OO reported unable to close the target, that she would search for the convoy, and directed us to chase at discretion. Since we were gaining on the target decided to continue.

1305 Received F-10OO report of smoke about far to the southwest.

1330 Informed F-10OO and TUN. we were chasing independently. We are still gaining on the target's search and flank and hope to get ahead in attack position before he can put . . .TUN. between us.

Throughout the day continued and around, using 3T at intervals of 3 to 10 minutes and getting in occasional glimpses of the target through the horizon. The size of this ship can be judged by the fact that radar ranges up to 32,000 yards could be obtained, but a single ship of some second rate of the target all day. She caused to be a very large nearly 1,000 miles away. Her zig plan on base course Q20T, speed 16, was accurately determined.

1510 Radar contact on F-10OO, bearing 030T, distant 36,000 yards. We will be able to stay between it and the target as we start to close the target.

1715 "With everything shining up nicely, closest are of the target at range 2,000 yards, the target turned away radically, settling on course 250°. Followed around.

- 10 -

— page 310 —
6 November 1944 (Continued)

0410 Radar picked up second search target. First target was sighted close enough to be identified as a 10 or 30.

0424 Targets tracked on base course 325° at 15 knots.

0429 Working ahead of targets on port flank to dive ahead for dawn attack when radar went out of co. mission. Targets not in sight, but continued trying to get ahead on targets! Base course in the hope that we could still then at dawn and then take on attack.

0600 Found that radar will require a new solution network. Have no sea.

0632 Contact not regained, dived for sub-escaped patrol, 25 miles west; or T.L.C.

0918 SIRCC (?) . I. sound contact on echo ranging and searches bearing north.

0924 Sighted type of three ships bearing 021° - 029°, approx. at range 13,000 yards. Started closing at high speed.

0929 Can now make out convoy consisting of 3 ships - aft freights (or possibly radar sight tankers) and 1 sounding register. Two torpedo boats or small destroyer escorts could be seen and heard plainly, while at least one other could be heard. Convoy base course 230°, speed 9 knots. Can see normal approach course at high speed.

1002 Unable to close track. Convoy slowly drawing ahead. Can see convoy base course to keep a.oke in sight.

1053 SIRCC (?) . I. picked up screen. Soon sighted two more ships - aft freights, 15,000 yards. These ships are apparently trying to join the formation sighted earlier.

1115 Targets on base course 260° at 10 knots. Tops of escort sighted. Least range attained, 7,500 yards.

1124 Changed course to head for one of the targets who had now reversed course.

- 13 -

— page 311 —
6 November 1944 (Continued)

1136 Lost contact. Target probably heading back to T.T.U., resumed convoy back course, and decided to surface as end around run. If we wait until dark to surface we will probably be unable to regain contact without the radar. In spite of our priority to T.T.U., we can stay up long enough to get a contact report to the wolfpack south of us.

1327 Surfaced.

1330 Transmitted convoy contact reports to wolfpack 12, wolfpack 16 and BL.GHISH (not received for).

1355 LACK of sighted F.P. 'Rufe' on parallel course, distant 7 miles.

1402 Dived when plane headed directly toward us.

1825 Surfaced, made best speed along convoy's track, hoping they do not have radar, and that we can make sight contact during the night. Not transmitted contact report.

1930 Transmitted request to all boats in vicinity for spare part necessary to put radar in commission.

2100 E.D.D.C.H. said she could furnish the part. Set course for rendezvous. Radar rigged to pick up 2 torpedoes.

7 November 1944.

0209 SH.I.CoH.8. Sighted patrol vessel dead ahead, range about 8,000 yards. Provided and sent report to L.D.D.C.K. requesting change in rendezvous.

0440 Made rendezvous with E.D.D.C.H. It was very dark, being unable to see her at 1500 yards, but she coasted us on by VHF. Received 3F-a modification network via line and sent over one fit log below in exchange. The air very grateful for E.D.D.C.H's pro-pt and generous assistance. Made plan to continue joint daylight s roh.for convoy.

0537 : .sided to station on scout line, course 225°, speed 17.

— page 312 —
7 November 1944 (Continued)
1101 ALMOST 10. Sighted 3 bombers dead astern. They will pass directly overhead, on a course taken this. to FALAFIR. Dived.

1146 Surfaced.

1230 Received group commander's order to continue search at discretion.

1300 SJ radar back in commission (See paragraph 1).

1412 Having covered convoy's most probable route with no result, dived.

1855 Surfaced.

2320 Received group commander's order concerning new patrol stations. Set course for new area.

8 November 1944.

0656 Dived.

1902 Surfaced. Set course for submerged patrol at dawn about 20 miles south of 30-00 in Babel Channel.

9 November 1944.

0158 Radar contact on FORESA, 90,000 yards.

0649 Dived. Seas becoming increasingly heavy each 5 depth control difficult.

1545 SHIPOC 79. Sighted 3 hitled hospital ship AUKA. Heavy seas prevented sighting until skip was within 5,000 yards. She was properly marked, not zigzag, proceeded in on southerly course at about 14 knots.

1612 Heard two distant explosions.

1855 Surfaced. Took considerable water down the hatch. Wind and barometer indicate we are on the edge of a typhoon. Set westerly course to try to clear storm. Much rain and heavy low clouds.

— page 313 —
0-0-N-T-I-D-N-A-I-A-L
U. S. HULL (SS232) - Report of Tenth Tar Patrol.

10 November 1944.

Wind had shifted about 900° during the night indicating that we were getting clearer of the storm.

0705
Dived and reversed course to head back toward Luzon, making depth control possible only with seas abeam.

1117
AIRCON mill. Sighted 4° FUR'F' flying low about 4 miles off. This is not good flying weather.

1906
Surfaced. Continued heading east. Storm continues.

11 November 1944.

0657
Dived for submerged patrol.

1245
Surfaced to get sun line.

1251
Dived.

1650
Surfaced. Obtained sun line. Wind and seas have moderated slightly.

1654
Dived.

1907
Surfaced.

2253
Radar contact on land, believed to be B-24 LAND, range 70,000 yards. Jet course to northwest to patrol along B-24 LAND.

12 November 1944.

0640
Sighted ITSAYAT ISLAND bearing 095°.

0648
Dived for submerged patrol off west coast of ITSAYAT ISLAND.

1911
Surfaced.

13 November 1944.

0645
Dived for submerged patrol. Intended to make passage to westward between ITSAYAT and B-24 IL-104 and get look at ASHORE AIRCRAFT. However, strong current.

- 16 -

— page 314 —
13 November 1944 (Continued)
and tide rises made this impossible, sweeping us toward
ICOC ISLAND. Unable to take headway in desired
direction after 3 hours, and after abandoning for 3
minutes, patrolled to northward along coast of
islands.

1922
Surfaced. A scootered west of BUN ISLAND to probable
convoy route.

14 November 1944:
0335
AIRCK 12. 3J contact at 16,000 yards. Intercepted
to avoid.

0455
AIRCK 13. 3J contact at 16,000 yards. Sighted
exhaust flames of twin-engined plane. Followed plane
back and forth by sight and radar at various ranges.
Plane radar interference on radar screen. Son plane settled
on our starboard quarter and started in, at
0503
Dived with range 6,500 yards.

0537
Surfaced.

0551
AIRCK 14. 3J and sight contact, range about
14,000 yards. Intercepted, and lost contact at 0617.

0647
Dived to patrol along estimated traffic route.

1146
SHIRCON 10. Sound heard pinning bracing 154T.
Nothing in sight, but speeded up, heading for
contact, and at

1222
Sighted tops of northbound convoy. Started closing
at high speed.

1232
Can now make out only very large and two smaller
freighters and three 40 foot escorts.

1244
Fourth freighter seen. Convoy consists of one large
modern freighter, 2 medium freighter, and one small
engineer-craft ship. Escorts in sight are three class
IC-13 boats and one other small escort. These are all
on our side of the convoy and there are 4 other
escorts on the far side. Chose the large freighter
as target. It is zigzag at about four minute.

- 17 -

— page 315 —
1319-40 to 1324-10
Interviews. Continued approach at high speed. Laugh, pinging.

1324-10
One explosion heard in forward torpedo room and conning tower. Did not see explosion but the fire in the far column is now making black smoke and dropping. The intervet was in correct for a fit in this ship. Swinging for steam tubes shots. Escorts have not found us yet. Over 2,000 yards away with large angle on bow.

1324-34
Sound reported another torpedo explosion.

1326(about) Hard strange, loud, fast, buzzing noise. See paragraph J.

1327-45
Heavy explosion to port. Tent deep.

1328
Heavy explosion.

1331
Three heavy explosions, close. At 325 feet.

1348
One close depth charge, damaging conning tower, secured coming toward. Two escorts heard, one pinging on either quarter.

1350
Several close depth charges, very loud, shaking the boat violently, and pushing us down to 420 feet. These came so nearly together it was not possible to count them accurately, but believe two patterns of four were dropped. Much minor damage was evident, everything loose was dislocated, and both guns knocked out. All damage is listed under rear, right A, but the following are the more interesting events:

The forward torpedo room was particularly near hit. The side, with their torpedoes, jumped one foot up, damaging the torpedoes, all deck plats were dislocated, and all personnel were thrown into the bilge, one man

- 18 -

— page 317 —
15 November 1944.

0230 Informed by INTELDO that message to CO.SUBA.C had been received by FAD.

0636 Made trim dive.

0723 Surfaced.

1110 ...1001/15. Sighted JAP AIR on opposite course, range but 6 miles. Slowed to reduced speed. Surprised by torpedo hit out.

1114 RUM disappeared in direction of CO.SUBA.

1310 Received visual message from INTELDO informing us that she had been damaged to standby until FLEET REACHES SUBA.C. ...INTELDO will handle all communications.

1320 Sighted westbound submarine to the north, believed to be ...SUBA.C. During next two hours sighted and spoke to JAP CO and SUBA.C also westbound.

1545 Sighted another westbound submarine, believed to be SUBA.C.

16 November 1944.

0725 Sighted object resembling mine. Announced to close, and sank with 20 men alive. Close examination showed this to be a large spherical buoy with several pad eyes.

17 November 1944.

0532 Made trim dive.

0557 Surfaced.

18 November 1944.

1420 ...1001/16. Sighted S-24. Acknowledged recognition signals.

19 November 1944.

0630 Contacted escort, 101126.

1147 'Hovered starboard side to INTELDO alongside U.S.S. PULITZER at 12-00 P.M., 3.11.44.

- 20 -

— page 318 —
19 November 1944 (Continued)

U. S. S. FULFOW accomplished repairs to 1st lot, 3rd radar and other work designed necessary for trip to ZULU. Unable to pump forward battery well dry. Exchanged 3D radar casts with FITADO to give her one that can be repaired by FULFOW. Last received in exchange is best and cannot be raised. Received 42,500 gallons diesel fuel oil.

22 November 1944.

0915 Departed SAIPAN enroute PAUL KAROL, in company with U. S. S. SURPRISE and escorted by 2C 51.

1606 Escort left formation.

1915 Passed between SARIC and ANTARES.

23-30 November 1944.

Enroute PAUL KAROL.

1 December 1944.

0915 (W) Made rendezvous with BATTISH, ROTOR and escort PC 603. Proceeded to PAUL HARBOR entrance.

1402 (W) Moored at Submarine Base, PEARL HARBOR.

— page 323 —
11. 1117(I) 21-03 N 10 Nov. 119-02N
: 12. 0335(I) 21-10 N 14 Nov. 121-35N
: 13. 0455(I) 21-05 N 14 Nov. 121-36N
: 14. 0351(I) 21-02 N 14 Nov. 121-34N
: 15. 1110(I) 20-57 N 15 Nov. 123-54E
: 16. 1420(I) 17-05 N 12 Nov. 141-41E

: 6,000 yards
: 16,000 yards
: 12,000 yards
: 10,000 yards
: 16,000 yards
: 310°

— page 326 —
0-0-N-T-I-D-Z-N-T-I-Z-I

U. 3. 3. ELIET (53232) - Report of Tenth Patrol.

H. ATTACK DATE (Continued)

U. 3. 3. ELIET TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 - ATTACK NO. 10
Time 1320(T) Date: 14 Nov. 44 Lat.: 20-56 N. Long.: 121-33 E

Target Data - Damage Inflated

Description: Largest ship of 4 in convoy (KURSU I...U type) overclipped by a medium MPU freighter.

Ship(s) sunk: None

Identification: JU

Ships damaged or probably sunk: 1

Tonnage: 4,000

Damage determined by: TIED two explosions at proper intervals for hit in further ship (medium I) which was seen to drop catcher and smoke much.

Target Draft: 22' Course:015 Speed: 8

Range (at firing) 3430 Gyro range: 343, 342, 341, 342

CW SIX DET

Speed: 4 Course: 270 Depth: 63 .miles: 0°

Type Attack: Day periscope. Convey was screened by three 70 foots and one small escort. Target was largest freighter of four. At tide or firing, target was overlapped by another ship of the convoy about 500 yards further away on same course. Due to fairly long range targets zigged away during torpedo run. Tied 2 hits in further ship. Torpedoes fired with 100% coverage.

- 29 -

— page 328 —
1342 fathoms, sec slight swell, few with 6 caps). It is not
believed that this device or devices was one or our torpedoes
running erratic for it is too improbable to suppose that six
minutes after first it would seek us out, pass over us
several times, and then choose to explode close aboard. Neither
would its turning circle permit it to pass overhead more than.

- 31 -

— page 330 —
1259 (H) Broached and made out the tops of 2 large 4 foot 2 smaller tops of 2 smaller ships.

1305 (H) Sighted three miles screening the convoy (if Contact 10). These three planes were flying in a continuous circle ahead of and over the convoy and were in sight until the convoy passed out of sight.

1326 (H) Sighted a Junk covering the starboard beam of the convoy (if Contact 11).

1336 (H) Sighted an old type land based bi-plane similar to SUSU class covering the starboard beam with the Junk (if Contact 12).

Our closest range to this convoy was about 12 miles. Course of convoy estimated at 300°T, speed 10 knots. We could not close submerged and the Junk covered the convoy for an hour and ran for a second contact report. By dusk this convoy will be well up the west coast of India. Broke off the approach. This was heartbreaker. So far we have expended a lot of oil chasing warships and this, our first slow speed convoy, could not be closed for attack.

However, this convoy should have passed almost over the Junk's position.

1506 (H) Heard piping and sighted the tops of a ship wellastern of the convoy, range about 10 miles. Probably this is the escort which had been dropped the depth charges heard at 1230.

1546 (H) Sighted a Frances or Selby type boat which was covering the starboard quarter of the convoy. (if Contact 13). It passed about 2 miles away.

This was undoubtedly the heaviest convoy we have observed over a convoy to date. The planes out to chase were sighted at 12 miles. The convoy was covering 20 to 30 miles ahead on the bows of the convoy, in inner screen covering the L.E. side. The ships which were in the convoy were passing and crossing at the quarter to prevent and around runs.

- 33 -

— page 339 —
0-0-N-R-I-D-N-T-I-L
U. S. S. HILIBU (53232) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

I. RADIO (Continued).

by heavy deep diving, all frequencies radiated between 2000 Z and 2200 Z. Sirens were in use, on 12705 Kc. The first of four transmitters from the area, on October 25, took 20 minutes on 2470 Kc. The second, a daily transmission on 16940 Kc., went through to 11 in a record breaking 15 minutes, October 26. The third took between 11572 and 15302 October 28, to clear. In 16 and 17, were worked without success, due to a lack of interference and the urgent message. The first took out a message, on 18, on the secondary frequency on 2690 Kc. The HILIBU's fourth transmission, on November 7, on 8470 Kc., took an hour and a half after communication had been established with ZUL, Australia. There was strong interference from other U. S. stations trying to work this frequency.

Circuit discipline should be enforced on ship-slo-rise frequencies. Indiscriminate tuning and failures to cease transmissions was a shore station gives all stations a chance (stop transmitting) double shore station if it is not a message. The HILIBU was continually trying to send a priority dispatch, on or off, by a ship.

Perhaps a new set of ship-slo-rise frequencies should be established for submarines. The boats now have to speak excessively in the clear or message, very often only a few miles from the ship. It is also recommended that a single code be provided for use when reporting contacts, composition, course, speed, fuel and torpedoes on hand, etc., in the interest of shortening transmissions.

With use of only once in the area at short range, (it worked best when we were too close to use the message.) Tests ensure that HILIBU showed it to be good only for a possible range of 6,000 yards between submarines. However, flyers attacking the battleship were not to be cleared clearly on the 25 miles. To use of the 30 distance was made, estimated range of 25 miles. To use of the 30 distance was made

— page 340 —
0341(1) on 31 October on aircraft contact report, transmitted by CHUGARING was received. LIRUT was in good position to intercept the contact, but enroute, ship contact 4 was made.

At 0342(1) on 6 November report of southbound shipping in southern FOX CO. STATIONS was received. LIRUT patrolled off TALO that day and made ship contacts 6 and 7.

- 43 -

— page 342 —
0-0-N-T-I-D-Z-N-T-I-1
U. S. S. LELET (SS232) - Report of Tenth War Control.

IV. SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CRITICALS (Continued).

phones are very poor. There were no other material defects in either sound equipment.

A single ping rang, at 4,400 yards, was attempted on the battleship target, with no results. There was no other chance to try echo-ranging. Frequencies were shifted every 3-4 minutes while listening on the JIC or XE gear, covering a range from 14 to 30 kcs. All JAP pingings heard was on 16-18 kcs.

O. DENSITY LEVELS.

No marked density layers were noted in the USS or XE gear. At 1800 on 25 October 1944, Lt. 20-35 N, Long. 125-30 N, a gradual negative gradient of 4 degrees was observed between 200 feet and 300 feet.

R. HEAVY, FOC, and HEAVY-SHIFT.

General health of the crew was good, there being no cases of serious illness or injury. A few minor irregularities and a back sprain resulted from the depth charge attack on 14 November. The latter injury seemed serious at first, but rest and massage cleared it up.

Food and habitability were good. The movie projector carried on patrol for the first time was greatly appreciated by all hands. The 5,000 square feet, full length feature pictures were shown several times, the program was varied with excellent short subjects produced by ship's welfare in Honolulu.

Q. LENGTH.

For those in the 5th for this performance of duty by all officers in the 5th, it is a source of great pride to the commanding officer. We were with him who so completely carried the heaviest of

— page 344 —
35. S. H. LIGHT (353232) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

S. DURATION

Days enroute PLAN to S. I. N. 10
Days at S. I. N. 4 2
*Days enroute S. I. N. to P. A. R. 3
Days sub.erred 17
Days enroute S. I. P. A. R. 10
Days at S. I. P. N. 4 3
Days enroute S. I. P. A. R. 10

* Included one day for attack (ship contact 3).

T. FACTORS OF DESTRUCTION AT S. I. N. SAT. 1.

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor

14 (4) unserviceable 40,000 gals. 30 days 15 days

Limits factor this patrol - death charge damage.

U. RADIO & ADULT CONTACT PERSONS.

Repeated and often effective radio messages encountered on this submarine "fox" frequencies or 6045 and 5915 kcs. These are coincident with the seaplanes and were then exactly on frequency. They were employed with beagle jamming and continuous unadulterated. They reached each on two occasions.

At 1505 Zebra 3 Fox, 144 a Jap was heard on the wolfpack frequency using Japanese code, and only keying was heard to other times on all wolfpack frequencies.

The AP-AP radar detector proved useful only after use "radar" produced by this ship's verification, and other submarines. It had been identified. A signal on 250 kcs. for our own 57, which was observed only when the low voltage was turned on and the high voltage turned off, produced a number of "plane radar" contacts. A search of deterring be ring from the AP-AP is needed before it can do a real job.

It is believed that the Japs have used a certain accurately deterring direction of our 57 radar interferance. The large auxiliary who evaded us seemed to know our bearing correctly, as did the task force that evaded us on the night of 25 October. This was often at such great ranges that it seemed unlikely they could be getting a jmp on us. Likewise, off the southeast tip of Okinawa, at ranges as great as 40,000 yards, land ceased racers would stop their sweep and steady on our bearing for a while.

- 47 -

— page 345 —
3.8. ULTIMATE (3.8.232) - Report of Tenth Torpedo Patrol.

U. RADIO & RADAR CONTROLLING (Continued)

Radar encountered, eliminating spurious responses, is tributed below:

| Date | Position | Frequency | Int. |

— page 350 —
11/jfs
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

FC5-4/A16-3
Serial: 0592
8 December 1944.

SUBJECT: FIRST ENCOUNTER TO USS HALIBUT (SS232) REPORT OF TENTH WAR Patrol.

Subject:
U.S.S. HALIBUT (SS232) - Report of TENTH WAR Patrol.

1. Following a major overhaul by Bethlehem Steel Co. at San Francisco, California, the U.S.S. HALIBUT went through a training period at Pearl Harbor, and departed for her TENTH WAR patrol on 8 October 1944. The U.S.S. HALIBUT was a unit of a coordinated attack group consisting of the U.S.S. TUNNA, U.S.S. HALIBUT, with Commander J. P. ROACH, U.S.S. on the U.S.S. HALIBUT, and USS TENTH WAR, with Commander TENTH WAR, on the U.S.S. HALIBUT. The TENTH WAR patrol was the first of a series of four days' duration, with seventeen days spent in the area south of Formosa, and was terminated by heavy damage to the U.S.S. HALIBUT, resulting from a very severe depth charging.

2. Ten ship contacts were made, two of which were developed into attacks. Other ship contacts could not be closed, in spite of determined attempts by the U.S.S. HALIBUT. Summary of attacks follows:

Attack No. 1
A periscope attack commenced in the late afternoon against an enemy task force just previously attacked by aircraft. The U.S.S. HALIBUT had the pleasure of listening in on the radio communications among the aviators who were engaged in the attack. In the fading light the enemy task force was made out to consist of (1) either a battleship, a battle cruiser, or a heavy cruiser, and (2) a light cruiser, and (3) a destroyer. About one-half hour after sunset the attack on the largest ship was commenced, and

— page 351 —
12 December 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT TO USS HALIBUT (SS232) Report of Tenth War Patrol (Cont'd.)

six mark 18 torpedoes from bow tubes were fired on a very favorable track with small gyro angles. With the sea being flat, and in order to avoid any possibility of an impulse bubble, poppets were held open for a full five seconds, causing the U.S.S. HALIBUT to become heavy forward. The U.S.S. HALIBUT then went deep, but tracked the torpedoes to the target for five timed hits. Those hits were followed by a very loud triple-explosion. Only two sets of screws heard after this. About an hour later the U.S.S. HALIBUT returned to periscope depth, and, with nothing in sight, surfaced and sighted what was described as a "large mound," believed to be the target capsized. The radar pip at 12,300 yards was strong, with a broad base--unlike any seen before. Shortly thereafter below decks personnel heard an explosion, the target faded from visibility and from the radar screen.

Attack No. 2: A daylight periscope attack against a convoy consisting of one large AK, two medium AKs, one small engines--aft ship, escorted by three patrol craft of PC-13 type. Four Mark 18 torpedoes from bow tubes were fired at the large AK with a medium AK overlapping. All torpedoes missed the primary target, but two timed hits were heard in the overlapping medium AK. Then followed exceedingly severe counter measures, during which the U.S.S. HALIBUT was very badly damaged, necessitating her return to port.

3. The U.S.S. HALIBUT will be sent to the West Coast for overhaul and repair.

4. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR heartily congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. HALIBUT on this aggressively conducted patrol, and on the skill manifested by all hands in bringing home their ship despite the heavy battle damage.

-2-

— page 352 —
12 December 1944.
Serial: 0532
CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS HALIBUT (SS292) Report
of Tenth War Patrol (Cont'd.)
It is recommended that the U.S.S. HALIBUT
be credited with the following:
SUNK
(1 - BB
Either (1 - CB or
(1 - CA
1 - AK(EU), 4,000 tons
Total sunk or Damaged, 4,000 tons plus 1, capital man-of-war.
) J. Z. C. C.
W. V. O'REGAN

— page 353 —
12-1-1944
Serial: 02793
Confidential
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
HALIBUT Report of
Tenth Mar Patrol.

COLUSBASC PATROL REPORT NO. 601.
U.S.S. HALIBUT - TENTH MAR PATROL.

From: The Commander submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALIBUT (0232) - Report of Tenth Mar Patrol.

The tenth mar patrol of the HALIBUT was conducted in the areas between Luzon and Formosa. The HALIBUT was on of three submarines forming a coordinated attack group.

On 25 October the HALIBUT contacted part of the re-treating Japanese task force from the second Philippines Sea Battle. Just prior to attack the HALIBUT met our naval vessels making attack on two separate groups of target ships in the same vicinity. One group consisted of a heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and one destroyer; however, aviators reported that there was probably a battleship or at least a new type heavy cruiser in this latter group. It is believed that the heavy cruiser was mistaken for a battleship by the aviators. The HALIBUT made a very excellent approach on what he believed to be an enemy battleship and obtained five good hits which undoubtedly sank this craft. The damage to the HALIBUT was subsequently seen by three of our submarines, it is believed that the HALIBUT sank a heavy cruiser, possibly a new type class.

On 14 November the HALIBUT attacked a large ship in a convoy of four and obtained two hits. The heavy cruiser was sunk so close that it was not possible to get the ship under way.

— page 354 —
1- Heavy Cruiser (HU) - 10,000 tons (attached to: 1)
1- Medium Frigate (MU) - 4,000 tons (attached to: 2)
TOTAL SUM AND DIMENSIONS - 14,000 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete reports)
Cominch (7)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
Intel.Ccn.Pac.Ocean Arcas (1)
Conscrvpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Consubslant (6)
S/M. School, IL (2)
CO, 3/1h Base, 2H (1)
Consopac (1)
Comsowcspac (1)
Comsubsowcspac (1)
CTG 71.9 (2)
Comcorpac (1)
Comsubspac (1)
SUBAD, 1H (2)
ComsubspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Division (1)
Comsancers, Pacific (2)
Substrainpac (2)
All submarines, Pacific (1)

E. L. HYNES, 2nd, Flag Secretary.

— page 355 —
1-10/18-6(18)  SUBMITTED FOR OFFICER, 1st 085
    Corr of Fleet Post Office,
    San Francisco, California,
    1 lab. 1946.

From:  The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To:  The Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Via:  The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. "ELEPHANT" (SS-203) - Report of 11th War Patrol.

Reference:  (n) Grandeur this third end, 11/10/18-3(15)/(18) serial 01656 of 39 Apr 1946.

1. Reference (n) credits the U.S.S. "ELEPHANT" with certain changes to the original including the changing of an unidentified freighter in an attack on 0131 12 April 1946.

2. Reliable intelligence, subsequently received, identifies the ship attacked on this occasion as the "ELEPHANT" of 3,213 tons and states that this vessel was sunk as a result of "ELEPHANT's torpedo attack.

3. According to reference (n) is modified as follows:

   (n) Strike out all of paragraph 6 after the word "enemy" and substitute the following:

   SUBMITTED TO:
   1 - AC (TACOM NAVY)    3,213 tons
   1 - AC (Submarine Patrol Class)    4,000 tons
   1 - Combat Patrol or (SUBNAV Class)    570 tons
   1 - Corro. Sperm     250 tons
    TOTAL SURF    6,000 tons

   Reference:
   1 - AC (Class unknown)    5,000 tons
    TOTAL DETACHED    5,000 tons

TOTAL SURF & DETACHED    18,000 tons

RECEIVED SC FILE
Room 3055
18 FEB 1946
Doc. No. 196541
Copy No. 4/3

Dist. Sub. Administration
on text memo.

Frank T. Tuttle,
Chief of Staff.

— page 357 —
7-108
: AR-183-28

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO—NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION