U.S.S. SARGO (SS-188) — war patrol report SS-188_SARGO_Part2.pdf

— page 1 —
35163/AL6-3
Serial 015

U.S.S. SARGO
-SSIC-
Cere of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
16 September, 1945.

DEGLASSIFIED:
From: The Commanding Officer,
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SARGO, Eighth War Patrol Report.

Enclosure: (A) Eighth War Patrol Report of U.S.S. SARGO.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. S. CARLICK.

FILMED
52131

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1. CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. SARGO - SS188-G
U.S.S. SARGO - Report of Eighth War Patrol. (Period from August 1 to September 15, 1943) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet Operation Order No. 149-45.

PROLOGUE
Arrived Submarine Base, MIDWAY ISLANDS, July 9, 1943, after Seventh War Patrol. Ship was refitted by Relief Crew of Submarine Division Forty-Four and Submarine Base, assisted by Ship's Force.
During July 26-28 conducted training exercises off MIDWAY as directed by CSD-44.
During refit period detached the following officers to New Construction: LieutComdr. J.D. FULP, Jr., U.S.N. and Lieut. L.A. LAFAUNTE, Jr., U.S.N., and received the following for duty: Lieut. O.H. FAYNE, U.S.N., Ens. F.N. COOPER, U.S.N. and ENS. T.N. BAKER, U.S.N.R.
Ready for Sea August 1, 1943.

(1) NARRATIVE
August 1 1000Y: Departed MIDWAY for PATROL under Air Escort.
Crossed the International Date Line.

Aug. 3-5 Uneventful cruising to Southwest enroute to Area 15N at two engine speed. Making daily trim and training dives and exercising at Battle Stations, Battle Problems, and miscellaneous drills.

Aug. 6 Ran subcargoed until Sunset, north of WAKE, 2224(L) No. 3 Main motor leads shorted by main power cable metal guard falling down on cables. 3 Main motor and the Starboard Starting Controller out of commission. Subsequent electrical fire quickly extinguished. About this time the Auxiliary Generator field coil was flooded placing generator out of commission. Small scrap of wood in bilge suction valve allowed sufficient water to enter generator when ship was pitching.

Aug. 7-8 Cruising as before, conducting miscellaneous training. Completed repairs to 3 Main motor and Starting Controller placing them again in commission, but will avoid high voltage on 3 Main motor whose resistance readings low.

Aug. 9 0830(L): Gyro compass out of commission due to vacuum failure. Shifted steering to Auxiliary Gyro which is very satisfactory. Master Gyro repaired by 1700(L). 1529(L): O.O.D. and lookouts reported sighting periscope, maneuvered to avoid since there is possibility

— page 3 —
1. CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. SARG0
-SS186-

August 9 Cont.: of friendly submarines in this vicinity.
Experiencing many bad air leaks during training dives,
finally had to out out one half of #2 Air Bank for
balance of Patrol.

August 10 0459(K): Submerged and patrolled to Southwestern,
entering Area 15 N at Lat. 10°N., Long. 15°-20°E.
Spent morning fighting air leaks which give us a
marked wake in the glassy sea. Got situation in
hand, but some reappeared later in patrol.

August 11: Submerged patrol across pass between NAMONUITO and
EAST FAYU IS. Having plotted most TRUK Area contacts
in this vicinity, have decided to spend several days
here.
0725(K) Sighted 2 engine landbased bomber, MITSUBISHI
97,patrolling low over water.
1850(K) Surfaced and repaired C.T. hatch, and cleared
ground on #5 Main motor during night.

August 12: Submerged patrol in approximately same areas yesterday,
day, running on port, shift only until ground on #5
Motor was finally cleared.

August 13: Patrolled pass between NAMONUITO and 2. FAYU IS.
favoring Western side. Nothing sighted.

August 14: Patrolled to southward along same well-reported TRUK
traffic lane. Nothing sighted; will cover this lane
once more day and then work to south and westward,
since it seems very likely that traffic has been
diverted to south of NAMONUITO IS.

August 15: Patrolled to Southward of pass between HALL and
2. FAYU IS. (Sighting searchlights on TRUK nearly
each morning about 0500(K).
0912(K) Sighted Twin float Reconnaissance plane
Type 97, NAKAMURA 93, patrolling low over water.
Nothing else sighted.
1845(K) Surfaced and followed old traffic lane east
of NAMONUITO to N9 corner of area, planning to run
part of tomorrow surface working around south of
NAMONUITO. This will give us an excellent final
check on this lane and an initial check on the probable w.stward approach while running surface.

August 16: Running on Surface passing around NAMONUITO IS. until
1100(K) then connecting submerged patrol off ULU I.
Nothing sighted.

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17: Submerged Patrol South of NAGNUTIO IS. group on southwesterly courses.
    1034(?) Sighted Twin Float Reconnaissance plane, Type 97 NAGATINA 95, circling over ULU I. (ULU I. has prominent village and Lookout tower on SW side.)
    1851(K) Surfaced and patrolled east and west during night twenty miles south of NAGNUTIO IS. group.

August 18: Submerged patrol West of TRUK and south of NAGNUTIO IS. Sea today was flattest and glassiest yet seen, visibility excellent. Nothing sighted.

August 19: Submerged patrol again N.W. of E. PAYU I. on courses north and south. Nothing sighted. Taking position during night a little to southward of that covered on August 16.

August 20: 0000(K) Sighted what later was determined to be small AK (4500-5000 tons) with escort ahead, bearing 252°T. distance 11,000 yards, and commenced tracking and taking position ahead using first two engines and then four engines.

0020(K) made out patrol well to right of others, but moving on same southeasterly course, group apparently heading for North Pass.

0150(K) then in position ahead of AK to complete approach submerged in bright moonlight, target changed base course to about 070° and patrol was lost to view.

0215(K) again reached position ahead and slowed, when gunfire from second patrol (or escort) was seen simultaneously with its being sighted again. Three shots were fired at us from range of about 7500 yards, probably more as a signal to the AK, which at once turned away to South. (N.D.R had picked up only the AK at 10,500 yards range.)

0217(K) ran a rotating, course north, west, south, and then easterly hoping to shake the independent patrol and again make contact with AK which we expected would soon be back on course for TRUK North Pass.

0350(K) when on course for TRUK North Pass, bearing to southeast and commenced closing.

0451(K) Determined that this vessel was patrol and alone at range of about 700 yards, it then turned toward us and closed range. Turned away and ran until 0458(K) on north and dove.

0503(K) Sound heard its screws on starboard quarter, turned NW and ran silent.

0650(K) All quiet, made periscope observation sighting twin float Reconnaissance plane circling near point of our dive.

Patrolled to Westward - nothing further sighted.

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0515(K) Dov and patrolled off Bank until 1840(K) when we surfaced and proceeded to Area 14(S).

August 21: Submerged patrol south of NANQUITO Is, and east of HITCHFIELD Bank on North and South line, covering route evidently taken by yesterday's contact. This approach to TRUK is apparently the only one being used. Moved in closer to TRUK during the night.

August 22: Submerged patrol on same line as yesterday only closer to NORTH PASS. 0515(K) Sighted Twin Float Reconnaissance Plane 97 NAKATNA 93 flying to northward low over the water. 1840(K) Surfaced headed East at 1940(K) Sighted Searchlights on TRUK.

August 23: 0515(K) Sighted small patrol vessel bearing to southward, took short jog to northward and then continued to eastward undetected. Submerged Patrol 1840(K) Surfaced off N.S. Pass. Not sighted.

August 24: 0515(K) Dov and patrolled off Bank until 1840(K) when we surfaced and proceeded to Area 14(S).

August 25: 0515(K) Dov and patrolled off Bank until 1840(K) when we surfaced and proceeded to Area 14(S).

August 26: Proceeding on surface toward Area 14(S) except for trim dive at dawn, 1805(K) Sighted ship bearing 336°T, range 11000-12000 yards; later determined to be a submarine on South Easterly course. Turned away but when it continued to close range, dove and commenced periscope- Radar approach, bearing in mind, however, the possibility of his being friendly, when last seen at some 9000-10,000 yards, believe he had mast forward but this could have been RADAR mast. Continued approach hoping to beat the rapidly approaching darkness, and make out a legitimate target. Sub was not seen again nor did Radar pick him up. However, from 1919(K) until 1945(K) Sound tracked his screws ("and

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2000. (Don't.) what sounded like his ice machine!). Apparent-ly our sub had dived about the same time we did. 2005(K) Surfaced and continued to N.W. toward Area 14(S); no further contact. Entered S.E. corner at midnight.

August 27: 52d(K) Dove and proceeded submerged to N.W. to patrol off SAIPAN.

August 28: 04d(K) Commenced getting cuts on SAIPAN-TENIAN Is. 5th. Sighted steady white light on northern end of TENIAN I. Patrol led submerged off SAIPAN Channel, working in about five miles from shore. Sighted groups of twin engine bombers (MITSUBISHI 96) at various times during the day. (See "AIRCAPT SIG:TED). 1553(K) Sighted small patrol craft or fishing boat on easterly courses under power. It later raised a sail and stood toward SAIPAN. 1902(K) Surfaced and stood clear to N.E. to send radio message requested by Consubrao on results to date.

August 29: 0110(K) Sent message to Consubrao reporting results to date, and headed westward on four engines to reach position N.W. of SAIPAN Harbor before dawn. 0515(K) Dove and patrolled to South and Southwest across traffic lane to TRUK, (as established by plotting old contacts). 1900(K) Surfaced and cruised to S.W. and back during night to position of SAIPAN again.

August 30: Submerged patrol N.W. of SAIPAN Harbor. 0558(K) Sighted smoke bearing 310°T and connected approach on ship like HUSITAI (Page 102 CNI 20CJ) escorted by TSUBASHI type mine-layer astern. 0645 1/2Fired four torpedo divergent spread from stern tubes. Went deep and commenced evasive tactics, 0649(K) Target screw stopped and not heard again, heard heavy bubbling, crackling noise from direction of target. 0651(K) Two distant explosions from aft.

0651(K) Escort making runs in on us - 1 Depth Charge fairly close. 0652(K) Two depth charges, further away (over 500 yds.). 0655(K) One depth charge; further away (about 1000 yds.). 0656(K) One depth charge. 0700(K) One aerial bomb (was shallow, closer, and pushed our stern down violently). Ran silent until noon, losing escort about 0900(K). 1240(K) Sound picked up screws of escort and probably a DD, one coming up on each quarter, taking turns stopping to listen, coming within about 2500 yards. Ran silent again until evening.

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CONFIDENTIAL
:  U.S.S. SARGO
:  -SS18-

August 30 (Cont.) 1914(K) Sur2eced and worked around SAIPAN and to Southward for a day off APRA Harbor. (Working on grounded field coils of 91 Air Compressor, Pump Room partially flooded prior depth charge attack due to difficulty in getting Pit Log gate valve closed) (See DEFECTS).

August 31: Submerged Patrol S.B. of SAIPAN C.ANNELL, but proceeded to guard GUAR.
(1) Just prior to periscope observation Sound
   - High speed screws.
   - Sighted searching patrol vessel bearing 315°T.
   - About 5000 yards, on various courses (See
   - Changed course to east and avoided patrol which
   - Just stopped to listen.
   - (2) Lost Patrol. Nothing further sighted. (This
   - Vessel being practically on our spot the first thing
   - in the morning, suggested effective Rader tracking of
   - our run during the night, by Radars on SAIPAN and
   - TENANT.)
1903(K) Surfaced and proceeded toward GUAR, passing between ROTA and GUAR to take station N.W. of APRA.

September 1: Submerged patrol off GUAR. Visibility hazy today, reduced also by more frequent rain squalls.
Reviewed estimates on remaining fuel and requirements again today, deciding to depart Area on September 3, at which time we will have fuel for run to JOHNSTON plus our 10% reserve. (Hevc previously reported possibility of e-rlly deperture.)
1905(K) Surfaced and ran back up to station off SAIPAN Harbor.

September 2: Submerged patrol off SAIPAN Harbor, on track of August 30 contest, and working toward SAIPAN (140°-320° line)
1615(K) Sighted mast of ship (like TAHCAN MARU (Page 153, ONI 23CJ), and commenced approach. Soon found that we were about his beam, so trailed him until dark as he worked to northward. From his movements and appearance at nearest daylight range (10,500), judged him to be a <ship or patrol of some sort. His stubiness was accentuated by high gun platforms forward and aft and his light draft. Followed him and made night approach on him after sur2ecing with the thought that we might get a break at a favorable e-ticket or he might lead us to something bigger.
1905(K) Surfaced on course north.
2015(K) Picked up target again by his smoke, bearing 306°T, and commenced working around his bow to the N.W.

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2040(K) When estimated range was 10,000, Radar made contact with range 5500, target on our port beam. (Our range estimate had been greatly in error because of his heavy smoke obscuring or distorting his hull in the dark.)
2043(K) Target evidently turned toward since Radar ranges decreased. Target challenged us with bluish blinker making charcters like IEA. (He either has Radar or excellent night lookouts).
2044(K) With Radar range 5000 yards, target fired three shells in our direction; only one splash was seen, some 600 yards on our port bow. Turned to northward and evaded ship at high speed, soon losing contact. (Had Radio listen over frequency range of receiver, and he picked up at 2120 (K) on 6450 kcs signals from a transmitter close aboard, first tuning, then 3 letter calls, and then a text of numerals. Radioan was able to copy very little of this.)
2110(K) Changed course to eastward and went south of NATHAN I.

September 3: South of NATHAN I, proceeding to S.E. 0538(K) Submerged.
1835(K) Surfaced and departed Area for PEARL.

September 4: Proceeding to Eastward enroute PEARL on two engines, weaving during daylight. Steering by magnetic compass during return trip. (Faster Gyro follow-up system and auxiliary gyro both out of commission)

September 8: 0520(L) Submerged and patrolled across know traffic lane south of WAKI, while routing torpedoes forward and aft. Nothing sighted.
1352(K) Surfaced and continued as before.

September 9: Enroute to PEARL as before.

September 10-11: Enroute PEARL as before.
0800(?) (11th) Crossed International Date Line.
1430(Y) (10th) Sent Serial THRE to ComSubPac, reporting positions within PEARL thousand mile circle.

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15-14: Enroute PEARL as before.
September 15: 0500 arrived at rendezvous.
0522 Sighted escort bearing 080°T., and SEAWOLF bearing 220°T.
Proceeded at 14 knots to PEARL HARBOR, sighting numerous friendly aircraft and surface craft enroute.

— page 10 —
1. CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. SARGO
-SS188-

(2) WEATHER

While north of TRUK, Area Fifteen North, the Sea was for the most part smooth and often glassy. There was nearly always a large percentage of scattered clouds - with occasional brief rain squalls during the night. Our period on station was one of bright moonlight giving nearly maximum night visibility at all times.

While in vicinity of GUAN and SAIPAN, Area Fourteen South, the sea was occasionally smooth, but there was usually a slight chop. Cloud concentrations were greater and rain squalls more frequent and heavier. Visibility during day was in general excellent, but occasionally marred by a bright haze. At night, having no moon and frequent squalls, visibility conditions were only fair.

(3) TIDAL INFORMATION

In Area Fifteen North the current was north by west and slightly more than one half a knot.

In Area Fourteen South the current was northwest by west and about three quarters of a knot strong. In the vicinity of SAIPAN Channel the current reached a velocity of about one and one half knots.

(4) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

No navigational aids were sighted. No additional information on navigation can be added to that already furnished by boats that have previously covered these areas.

— page 11 —
1/8/19/43 11-52N : Reported by Lookouts and
: 1529(L) 154-32E : PERISCOPE :C.O.D. but not a positive
: contact
: 2/8/20/43 3-00N : Basterly :AK (5000) :Night contact - no details
: 0000(K) 150-52E : 9 :TONS Est.)
: made out
: 3/8/20/43 3-00N : Basterly :Escort :Night contact - no details
: 0015(K) 150-52E : 9 : :about size of SC or type.
: 4/8/20/43 3-00N : Basterly :Patrol :Night contact - appeared
: 0020(K) 150-52E : Var. :slightly larger than above
: :escort
: 5/8/20/43 07-55N : Var. :Patrol :Believe to be same contact
: 0419(K) 151-04E : Var. :as (4).
: 6/8/23/43 08-00N : ? :Patrol :Possibly a Subchaser -
: 0200(K) 152-25E : :Night contact.
: 7/8/26/43 12-16N : Basterly :Submarine :Only conning tower and mast
: 1905(K) 147-24E : ? :seen; Made unsuccessful ap-
: :proach to identify.
: 8/8/26/43 15-02N : Var. :Small Patrol :Small single masted open
: 1535(K) 145-53E : Var. :or Fishing boat, motor and sails.
: :Graft.
: 9/8/30/43 15-18N : 1140-T : (AK) 5000 tons HUSHL MARK, Coal
: 0558(K) 145-32E : 11 :Burner, loaded, Guns fwd.
: :and aft. War Color.
: 10/8/30/43 15-18N : 1140-T :Escorting :Like TSUBAUM CLASS Mine-
: 0630(K) 145-32E : 11 :Mine layer
: 11/8/31/43 14-37N : Var :Patrol :See Sketch. Two flared
: 0752(K) 1146-00B : Var :300 Tons(Est)steaks
: 12/8/43 15-54N :North:ly 1305 Tons
: 1615(K) 145-29E : 10 :C-Ship :Clerking over ULUL IS.
: :Patrol
: : : :High in Water. Guns fwd and
: : : :raft.

(6) AIRCRAFT SIGHTED

DATE
NO:TIME POSITION TYPE REMARKS
: 1/8/11/43 9-03N : 8 Eng. land Based Bomber:Patrolling low over
: 0725(K) 151-09E : 1:ITSUBISHI 97 :water
: 2/8/15/43 15-49N : Twin Float Reconnaissance:Patrolling low over
: 0912(K) 151-27E : Type 97 NAKAJIMA 93 :water
: 3/8/17/43 15-35N : Same as (2) above :Circling over ULUL IS.
: 1034(K) 1449-37E :
: 4/8/20/43 7-55N : Same as (2) above :Circling point of our div
: 0630(K) 150-58E : :following contact with
: : : :patrol vessel.
: 5/8/22/43 7-50N : Same as (2) above :Flying to northward low
: 0915(K) 150-29E : :over water.
: 6/8/28/43 15-05N :Three-Twin Eng. land :In close formation
: 0820(K) 145-52E : based bombers. MITSUBISHI:
: : : :OTORI 96

— page 14 —
7) SUMMARY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS (Cont't.)

AUGUST 30, 1943

Picked up target at 0558(K) by his smoke and commenced approach with initial range 12,500 yards, bearing 293°T. Target was like HUSMII YARU and loaded (Page 102 ONI 208 J), 5" guns(?) on platforms forward and aft, painted dark war-color. Escort was TSUBAME Type mine-lcyer blowing directly astern some 700 yards. Their base course (approaching SAIPAN Harbor) was about 140°T.

Sound picked up screws when range was about 7500 yards, getting turn count of 120 RPM when range was 5700 yards. Approach was made with periscope, speed pilot, and ATDC controlling the firing. Near end of approach, zig placed us on target track so opened track by turning to 040° bringing stern tubes to bear and putting us in direction of sun. Target used zigs up to 50° but last zig was only 20° left giving a good track and gyro angle but poor range. The 2° divergent spread was applied to insure one hit. Final check bearings to TDC being on, commenced firing stern tubes at 06-45-30, 8 second intervals range 3400, track 90° port, 0646-00 turned to right and started deep.

Sound heard torpedoes run-ing and covering target until 06-47-00 when he shifted for a minute to escort, since other sound head (JK) trains with great difficulty below 125 feet. While going to 175 feet depth there was a great deal of noise in ship from rush of water into pump room from pit log hull opening until gate valve could be closed. 06-49-00 Ship quiet, sound reported targets screws had stopped; they were not picked up again, but a loud bubbling-crackling noise was heard bearing 160-170° Relative, the estimated bearing of target. 06-51-00 heard two fairly distant explosions aft, believed from target since it was still early to expect first charge from escort, and almost immediately after these escort was heard on about 235°R, coming in with 250 RPM.

— page 15 —
10. TORPEDO DEFECTS

1. On August 6th the armature and field coil cable shield on the after end of 3/3 main motor short circuited and grounded these cables by rubbing, during vibration, against the insulation until final break down of the insulation. This resulted in a fire at the cables and a surge of current which welded one silver copper contact of the reverser lever in the ahead position. Voyage repairs were undertaken when operations permitted, placing the motor and reverser lever back in commission within 26 hours. Further repairs will be necessary during the next refit.

2. On August 6th the auxiliary generator was flooded. A small piece of wood lodged under the bilge suction valve in the after auxiliary flats in the after engine room. When venting the fuel oil tanks, the bilge suction was subject to sea pressure so that the bilge flooded enough before the cause was discovered to flood the auxiliary g-nerator. By washing and drying the reading on the field coils and armature was coming up to satisfactory figures when the situation was further aggravated beyond repair by further flooding with lub oil. The generator bearing leaked oil into the generator casing. It has been found that the armature vibrates abnormally to the extent that the fan hits the housing. There is a maladjustment in the coupling and the definite cause of which cannot be ascertained at sea. This vibration loosened the seal of the armature bearing allowing this oil to pass into the generator housing.

3. On August 6th the master gyro began losing vacuum in the north rotor. The cause was found to lie in a bad bearing. On replacing this bearing the gyro was again placed in service. On August 31st the follower-up system of the master gyro failed. The follower-up motor was found to be burned up and as yet the cause is unknown.

On September 6th the auxiliary gyro was put out of commission when one of the balance nuts fell off. The cause is believed to be vibration. Since we are unable to balance the gyro at sea, it remains out of commission.

4. A reoccurrence of an unbalanced condition of the main motors similar to the trouble found on leaving the Navy Yard after overhaul, was experienced and will have to be thoroughly gone into during refit. During parallel operation it is difficult to equalize the load and also 1 main motor sparks excessively.

5. The torpedo (1k XIV-6a) loaded in No. 2 tube upon departure for petrol showed a progressive tendency to become distorted along its longitudinal axis. The left side of the warhead and the right side of the air flask. For a distance of about four feet, scraped the tube to such an extent that the time this torpedo had been withdrawn for routine treatment.

— page 16 —
10.  MAJOR DEFECTS (Cont'd.)

third time, the torpedo could not be reloaded into the tube. Since this torpedo (#23306) had apparently been assembled correct-ly, it will require shop tests to determine the cause of its misalignment.

6. #2 Air Bank. By observation with periscope and inspection of gauges it was noted that #2 Air Bank was leaking while on station.

Since this bank is located in #2 main ballast tank it was impossible to effect repairs. The leaks were traced to the after group of 3 bottles in 2E ballast tank. The group was bled down and cut out. The leaks are probably reoccurances of old leaks caused by d.pth charge attack on last patrol.

Bow Buoyancy Blow Valve. Due to a faulty seat, this valve leaked during the entire patrol. Two attempts to recut the seat while on station failed to relieve the trouble, because of untrue cutting tools. To prevent excessive bubbles while submerged the hull stop valve in forwerd torpedo room was closed.

#2 Periscope Cables. The after cable of #2 periscope showed excessive wear due to uneven tension on the forwerd and after cables and both cables were renewed on station.

7. #3 Forward Flood Valve. This flood valve failed to open on our departure from Midway. The fault probably lies in the operating linkage. To overcome this fault the corresponding valve in 3D ballast was kept closed.

8. The JK Sound head is very difficult to train at depths below 100 feet, becoming useless at 200 feet. There is either a shaft misalignment or training gear misalignment, or both.

9. #2 Air Compressor Panel and field coils flooded on August 30, when pump room was partially flooded thru pit log see chest, but was repaired within five days. Flooding was partially due to personnel, but pit log gate valve operating shaft is at present somewhat inaccessible. A long handwheel extension rod will be obtained.

11. RADIO RECEPTION

Radio reception was in general good throughout the patrol. During the latter part of patrol the E.C.M. became faulty in operation causing large parts of many messages to be garbled. The serials missed No. 40 in August and Nos. 27, 31 and 36 in September are evidently garbled messages received on the corresponding dates.

— page 17 —
11. RADIO RECEPTION (don't.)

NPA sometimes faded appreciably during early morning hours. We had no difficulty on the three occasions that transmissions were made to NPA.

No traffic was heard on 450 Kzs.

Very little Jap radio interference was heard, and that was on the 4235 Kzs band. On one instance, September 2, 1943, transmission was heard that very evidently came from a nearby Japanese ship on 6450 Kzs. This was on the occasion of our evading a Q-ship which had sighted us.

Last Serial Received was 43 KING

Last Serial Sent was SARGO No. THREE.

12. SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions north of TRUK were fair to good as judged from task graded noises, ability to hear rsf noises etc. The scores of a p-r-t-o-l vessel were heard at not greater than 4000 yarcs range.

Conditions of SAITAN and GUAC were better from the point of view of back ground and ranges obtained on ships. On one occasion scores were first picked up about 7500 yards.

No ptercis or escorts encountered used pinging.

Battythermograph cards in TRUK Aree were invariably straight lines down to greatest depth taken (260 feet). In SAITAN area, cards were straight lines down to about 175 feet when rather pronounced layer could be found.

13. HEARING AND HABITABILITY

Besides a bad siege of colds that made the rounds, only minor routine complaints were encountered.

14. ITEMS STAMPS

| Item | Quantity | Price |
|------||-------|
| NDAV to Operating Area | 21,940 | 2,555 |
| Between Areas | 27,314 | 35,518 |
| On Stations | 63,327 | 63,327 |
| Last Operating Area to Pearl Harbor | 27,314 | 35,518 |
| Total | 63,327 | 63,327 |

15. FUEL SYSTEM

| Item | Quantity | Price |
|------||-------|
| FUEL TO OPERATING AREA | 21,940 | 2,555 |
| Between Areas | 27,314 | 35,518 |
| On Stations | 63,327 | 63,327 |
| Last Operating Area to Pearl Harbor | 27,314 | 35,518 |
| Total | 63,327 | 63,327 |

16. FACTORS OF EMIGRATION RE-INNING

| Item | Quantity | Price |
|------||-------|
| Torpedoes | 3673 | 1 days |
| Provisions | 1 days | 25 days |

17. FACTOR CAUSING TERMINATION OF PATROL

Fuel.

— page 18 —
18. REMAINS

RADAR (SD)
The performance of the S.J. Radar during this patrol was good at the start but poor toward the end due to a gradual decrease in output accomplished by a loss in effective range. Maximum range obtained during the latter half of the patrol was as follows:
    (a) Ship (500' tons) 10,500 yards
    (b) (1800 tons) 6,000 yards
    (c) (1800 tons) 22,000 yards
Several parts of the S.J. Radar were sighted at night, the nearest coming to within two yards, but none were contacted by radar.
    During the engagement as assembly has been noticed on several occasions and was not a factor contributing to the weakness of the radar, a possible cause for this action could be the mistuning of the set, a condition which could not be satisfactorily remedied because of the absence of targets and the scarcity of waves on which to tune. An echo box would have been of great assistance in clearing this and other such conditions, and it is hoped that the S.J. Radar will be available for use on the next patrol.
    It is possible to attribute the loss of a more sensitive radar two of our fruitless cases might have led to attacks.
    Reports on the S.J. Sonar installation of tubes, mainly in the LT, suggest, and one likely tube in the converter unit, and one thyratron. In addition, when the thyratron blower became defective to a greater extent than could be repaired on patrol, the thermostat control on the T.R. cooling fan was intentionally short-circuited to allow the fan to operate continuously in order that the thyratron would not overheat.

RADAR (SD)
The performance of the SD Radar was good, though no contacts were made on enemy planes. On one occasion at the start of the patrol the set picked up a PSY at 5 miles and later on in the patrol a ship passed a PSY at 5 miles and 10 miles (This same island was picked up by the SD at the same time and range).
    Interference was noted at various times but was mostly internal. It has been noted that internal interference increased considerably when the set was operated at more than 5 miles.
    On one or two occasions interference which may have been external was noted. One occasion was August 26th, when visible contact was made with a ship which possibly was one of our own subs. An interference pattern observed at this time moved first in one direction and then another across the screen, indicating a pulsing rate very nearly equal to our own.
    One defect experienced with the SD was a leaky mast which resulted in a lowering of the antenna resistance, particularly after an all-day dive. In order to remedy this condition the mast was packed at the top with grease. The difficulty was thereby overcome but the present correction is only temporary and must be permanently repaired while in port.

— page 19 —
18. REMARKS

RADAR (SD)
The performance of the S.J. Radar during this patrol was good at this start but poor toward the end due to a gradual decrease in output accompanied by a loss in effective range. Maximum range obtained during the latter half of the patrol were as follows:

| Range (miles) | 10,500 yards |
|||
| 10,000         | 6,000 yards   |
| 5,000          | 2,000 yards   |

Several parts of the report were sighted at night, the nearest coming to within 500 yards, but none were contacted by radar.

During the American assembly has been noticed on several occasions and was not much a factor contributing to the weakness of the S.J. Radar. A possible cause for this acting could be mistuning of the set, a condition which could not be satisfactorily remedied because of the absence of targets and the scarcity of waves on which to tune. In order to work well, the beam of great assistance in clearing this and other such conditions, and it is hoped that the S.J. Radar will be able for use on the next patrol.

It is possible that with the A-7 a more sensitive radar two of our fruitless waves might have led to attacks. Reports on the S.J. consisted of a normal replacement of tubes, mainly in the I.F. stages, and one K.O. fully tube in the converter unit, and one thatrator. In addition, when the thyratron blower became defective to a greater extent than could be repaired on patrol, the thermostat control on the T.R. cooling fan was intentionally short-circuited to allow the fan to operate continuously in order that the thyratron would not overheat.

RADAR (SD)
The performance of the SD Radar was good, though no contacts were made on enemy planes. On one occasion at this start of the patrol the set picked up a FSY at 5 miles and later on in the patrol a pip fired a high island was visible at 10 miles (This same island was picked up by the S.J. at the same time and range).

Interference was noted at various times but was mostly internal. It has been noted that internal interference increased considerably when the set was operated at more than 5 miles.

On one or two occasions interference which may have been external was noted. One occasion was August 26th, when visible contact was made with a ship which possibly was one of our own subs. An interference pattern observed at this time moved first in one direction and then another across the screen, indicating a pulsing rate very nearly equal to our own.

One defect experienced with the SD was a leaky mast which resulted in a lowering of the antenna resistance, particularly after an all-day dive. In order to remedy this condition the mast was packed at the top with grease. The difficulty was thereby overcome but the present correction is only temporary and must be permanently repaired while in port.

— page 21 —
11/rg
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.

20 September 1943.

From: Commander Submarine Squadron TWO.
To: Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: C.S.S. SAIGO - Report of Eighth War Patrol - Comments on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division TWENTY-ONE.

C. B. HORSEN.

— page 24 —
011315
Serial: 01315
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
19 September 1943.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SARGO Report of Eighth War Patrol.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SARGO (SS188) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.
(1 August to 15 September 1943).

1. The eighth war patrol of the SARGO was made north of TRUK and in the Marianas Islands.

2. Only four contacts would have been made if more daytime surface patroling had been resorted to and if the entrances to the important bases had been closely patrolled.

3. This patrol is not considered successful for Combat Insignia award.

4. Evidence is insufficient to credit the SARGO with inflicting any damage to the enemy.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
VONO (5)
Cinepac (6)
Intel. Cen. Pac. (6)
Ocean Areas (1)
Serforpac (1)
(Adv.Pase Plan,Unit (1)
Cinclant (2)
Consubslant (3)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespec (1)
Comsubsowespec (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Comsubpec (18)

56137

— page 26 —
15 October 1943
U.S.S. SARGO - Report of Ninth War Patrol. (Period from October 15 to December 1, 1943. Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet Operations Officer No. 236-43.

(A) PROLOGUE
Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, September 15, 1943, at the conclusion of the eighth war patrol and commenced three weeks' refit. Ship was refitted by Submarine Division 21. Report crew and U.S.S. HOLLAND, assisted by ship's force. Docked for cleaning and painting outtop and again to repair damaged screw. September 24, 1943, Lieut. Comdr. P. W. Gernett, U.S. Navy, relieved Comdr. E. S. Oramick, U.S. Navy, as commanding officer. October 8-12 conducted training exercises in accordance with orders of Commander Submarine Division 21. October 14, 1942, Ens. T. W. Barret, T.S.N.R., was hospitalized and retained on board U.S.S. HOLLAND.

(B) NARRATIVE
15 October 1350(W) Underway from Pearl in accordance with operation order, in company with S.O. 890. 1500(W) Submerged for trim and incst:ination depth charging. 1900(W) Released escort, proceeding independently.

16-16 October Held daily training dives and fire-control drills enroute. On afternoon dive on 17th, flooded both engine-rooms partially (See K).

19 October 0700(X) Rendezvous with escort plenies from Midway. 0910(T) Moored alongside dock, Midway. Received fuel and minor repairs. Filled safety tank with fuel. 1545(T) Underway from Midway for patrol area. Held daily dives for trim and training.

20 October 0100(T) Set clocks to (-11), changed date to 21 October. 1320(L) Exchanged recognition with U.S. patrol plane. (Aircraft Contact #1)

— page 27 —
22 October
1231(L) Sighted plane, evidently friendly, but submerged in error, instead of exchanging recognition.
(Aircraft Contact #2) L 27°17'N, Lo 17°45'E.

25 October
0729(L) Submerged on radar contact 7 miles. Plane dropped two light bombs at distance. (Aircraft Contact #3) L 26°45'N, Lo 15°00'E.

0829(L) Surfaced, Submerged upon sighting two planes flying low, distance 8-10 miles. Planes did not sight SARGO.
1020(L) (Aircraft Contact #4) L 26°40'N, Lo 15°42'E.

1149(L) Surfaced.

26-27 October
Proceeding on surface. Daily training dives and drills.

28 October
1116(K) Submerged on plane radar contact at 12 miles. Not sighted. (Aircraft Contact #5) L 14°15'N, Lo 14°30'E.

1204(K) Surfaced.
1218(K) Sighted MINAMI IO SKIYA distant 50 miles.
2021(K) MINAMI IO SHIYA on both radars at 17 miles.
2350(K) Received dispatch concerning convoy reported by FLYING FISH. Increased speed and set intercepting course.

30 October
0500(K) Commenced search covering speeds for convoy of from 10-8,5 knots and for six wide course coverage as possible during daylight. Continued for 8 end 7.5 knots during night end all next day, with no success. Then commenced surface patroling across Arctic lanes between 1n latitudes 15°32' and 17°32', while awaiting ere 11 QAT to be vacated.
L 21°34'N, Lo 14°26'E.

1 November
Continued surface petrol. Encountering heavy seas from 045°T.

3 November
Heavy seas continuing. Operation at periscope depth is impossible at slow speed.

0000(K) Still encountering heavy head seas.

- 2 -

— page 28 —
5 November
: Heavy seas have subsided.

6 November
0932(K) Sighted SUNFISH and exchanged recognition. Closed SUNFISH and communicated with light.
L 23° 58'N, Lo 134° 38'E.
1000(K) Parted company, resumed patrolling.

7 November
Continuing to hold daily training dives, fire-control and tracking exercises, while surface patrolling across traffic lanes.

8 November
0410(I) Received dispatch concerning convoy being trailed by TAUTIQ. Set intercepting course for dawn tomorrow.

9 November
0530(I) Finally with a long guess, extracted enough information from a bedly garbled dispatch to see that we were out of position for interception. Convoy's night course 340°T, day course 000°T. Convoy had changed base course, so set course at maximum speed for intercept.
1123(I) Sighted smoke of convoy at distance of about 15 miles. (Ship Contact #1) L 21°38'N, Lo 131°19'E.
1200(I) Submerged to 250 feet for temperature readings with convoy bearing 130°T, distant approximately 11 miles, and commenced approach. Water temperature isothermal to 250 feet, with excellent sound conditions. Sound hears screws at 15,000 yds.
1229(I) Ships are in line of bearing with tanker in middle, smaller froighter to left, larger passenger freighter to right with FIBUKI class destroyer patrolling ahead and pinging, making about 120 r.p.m. All ships in light draft condition.
1314(I) Two zigs to the right placed SARG0 outside of large froighter in unfavorable position, so shifted target to tanker which was treiling somewhat, and waited for zig towards.

— page 29 —
9 November (cont'd)
1318(I) Fired four bow torpedoes at tanker, 8 foot setting, using white light spreed from 1/4 length ahead to 1/4 length astern. (Attack #1) L 21°36'N, Lo 151°19'E.
1319(I) Two hits in stern of tanker with much destruction to after end. Tanker stopped and well down by stern, swinging towards us. Much confusion in convoy, with far freighter changed course to right, near freighter changing course to left, and destroyer with at least fifty men in white set port rail as lookouts, turning towards, but about 2700 yds, every.
1321-35(I) Fired three stern torpedoes, 8 foot setting, white light method, at left hand sink which had turned broadside to us at range of 2000 yds, approximately. Target turned sharply away during firing. No hits. Used speed 10 kts., should have been 8 kts. due to his slowing from twisting and turning. (Attack #2)
1322-40(I) Tanker abandoning ship, after aft, stopped, boats in water.
1322-35(I) Three embarrassing depth charges from destroyer and gun fire from tanker, which mounted heavy machine guns for and aft.
1322-50(I) Fired one stern torpedo, 8 foot setting, at center of tanker. Missed. This probably passed under bow which was very high in water. (Attack #3)
1324-15(I) Went deep and rigged for depth charge. Destroyer listening only, no pinging.
1329(I) One depth charge at distance.
1334(I) Two charges fairly close.
1335(I) One charge at distance. Destroyer started pinging, with short periods of listening, until he left us.
1339(I) Two charges at distance.
1352(I) Two charges quite close which caused minor damage; broken light fixtures; air leaks in 200 lb. system, leaking hull flanges in engine rooms, several electrical cables pushed in. Destroyer passed overhead.
1406(I) One charge not close.
1500(I) Destroyer pinging but from direction of tanker, evidently picking up survivors.
1603(I) At periscope depth, sighted tanker afloat, down by stern, distant 8000 yds. Commenced closing target at standard speed, submerged.
1712(I) Surfaced 400 yds. from target, fired 10 rounds of 3" A.P. and 63 rounds of 3" H.C. with about 65 hits, venting all tanks. (Gun Attack #1)

— page 30 —
9 November (cont'd)
1736(I) Target sunk. An inspiring sight with the setting sun as background. Pictures taken. Inspected three empty lifeboats and much debris in vicinity, and then gave chase to convoy at maximum speed, course 555T.

1913(I) Sighted green flare at 2 miles. Nothing else sighted.

10 November
0232(I) Sighted smoke ahead, which developed into convoy. Commenced end around for position ahead at dawn, tracking by radar. A night attack was considered inadvisable due to approaching dawn, very bright moonlight, and much phosphorescence. The surface is glassy so will try to take advantage of sun. Radar was able to range on passenger freighter to 20,000 yds.

0538(I) Submerged ahead for approach from direction of sun. At sunrise convoy changed base course 25° to left from 005T to 340T and passed at nearest range of 4000 yards on near ship. This was reverse of previous day's base course changes, and thus fooled us. I 2400N, Lo 121°49T.

0815(I) Surfaced and gave chase, target smoke in sight bearing 333T, distant about 25,000 yards. During end around, had great difficulty maintaining contact due to rain squalls and low visibility, which would suddenly lift. Unable to close to radar range due to chance of being sighted when visibility lifted. In afternoon lost sight of convoy for over two hours, during which time he changed base course from 340T to 030T.

1526(I) Submerged ahead of target on new base course; commenced approach. Smaller target is to last, passenger freighter to right in line ahead, and destroyer weaving ahead and pitching. Our target is passenger freighter, Targets are zigging every five to twelve minutes.

1722(I) Destroyer passed also aboard to starboard at range of about 500 yds., plunging all the while. We are ahead and between columns.

1733(I) A zig to left by targets puts us in position for attack on smaller freighter, so shifted to this target.

— page 31 —
10 November (cont'd)
1755(I) In feeding light of day, fired four bow tubes by white light spread, depth setting 6 feet, torpedo run 1150 yds., average gyro angle 50 right, for an average track of 115 starboard, with passenger freighter bow to bow targets stern and approximately 1000 yds. Seawater torpedoes running but evidently without enough lead. All missed astern. This condition confirmed a suspicion from Attack 1 that something was amiss with the fire-control. In each case we had used speeds on the high side and torpedoes had passed astern under an otherwise favorable set-up. Will investigate this further before firing anymore torpedoes. (See X) (Attack 4)
1736(I) L 5°22,5°N, L 100°50°T.
1739(I) Destroyer is heading for us at high speed. Went to deep submarine and rigged for depth charge. Series of five depth charges at a distance then destroyer listening, stopping and starting.
1745(I) Two depth charges somewhat closer. The second charge was probably a big one for it was accompanied by a prolonged concussion wave and sustained swishing through superstructure. This was an echo-ranging attack. Sound conditions today are again excellent with isothermal conditions to 300 feet. Our only defense is silent running and weaving to keep tall to, at depth of about 290 feet. (See J)
1829(I) Destroyer has given up an 18 rejoinning convoy.
1913(I) Periscope depth - all clear.
1930(I) Surfaced. Gave chase to convoy using retiring search curve to cover various courses.
2300(I) Re-established contact with convoy at radar range of 10,000 yards, bearing 289°T. Commenced working around to ahead, maintaining radar contact and tracking.
Night surface attack is impractical due to excellent visibility (full moon), and a submerged night attack is not warranted due to my lack of faith at present in fire-control. Thus I'll try another day attack.

11 November
0220(I) Observed flashes and heard gunfire in direction of convoy. Though he no doubt suspected our presence,

— page 32 —
11 November (cont'd)
0220(I) I do not believe the destroyer sighted us or actually fired in our direction. Range was about 10,000 yds.
0248(I) More gunfire flashes seen. Range now 15,000 yds. Possible splashes seen by lookouts on starboard quarter.
1030(I) Submerged with targets! tops in sight, range about 16,000, commenced approach.
1109(I) Investigation shows that e leg of up to 4 degrees is being introduced in T.D.C. (Mk I) and this per-haps explains misses estern in previous firings. Therefore have decided to fire using bow as M.O.T. and white light spread from there.
1115(I) Target is passenger freighter with ships erred as in previous attack. We are dard shced of our target.
1115(I) Target zigs 45° to his left placing us between columns.
1126(I) Zig tow rads. We are still on large freighter's stercord bow, and destroyer will pass almost over us.
1134(I) Destroyer passes down port side at cstimtcd range of 300 yards. We silenced ship for this one.
1136(I) Target has again zigged to his left and we are in a nice position, still between columns.
1137-18(I) Commenced firing from bow tubes, 6 foot setting, white light spread, point of aim bow, torpedo run 50 yds., with average gyro of 16° right for an average track of 18 starboard. Saw two hits in passenger freighter, one under stern, one under number four hold, much smoke above decks, ship is stopped and well down by stern. (Attack #5) Ship was similar to CHIGGO MARTU, p. 164 in O.N.I. 20B. I had just trained on other target which was coming up astern, and about to get set-up for a stern shot when he blew his whistle and started to turn away, indicating that he had sighted us or our torpedoes. I 2736'N, Lo 130°38'12.
1140(I) Destroyer is coming tow-rdrs us now so went to deep submergence.
1142(I) Two depth charges at distance.
1142-30(I) One depth charge, still not close. Destroyer is pinging, stopping to listen, then ahead very fast.

— page 33 —
11 November (cont'd)
1142-30(I) Sound reports crackling noises in direction of (cont'd) target and eight distinct popping sounds. These latter were heard distinctly throughout the ship. These are the sounds associated with a sinking ship and it is firmly believed that the passenger freighter sunk. Destroyer still closes aboard and sticking on us.
1238(I) One depth charge at distance. Destroyer still pinging, getting frequent echoes, but still confused. Sound conditions are excellent, with isothermal gradient to 300 feet.
1253(I) Destroyer passed directly over us from astern, turned and came back from ahead and passed over us again. He must be out of depth charges, otherwise he would surely never dropped on those two beautiful runs. Destroyer spent next two hours pinging, stopping and starting, but always in true bearing of sinking. He was probably picking up survivors.
1450(I) Last pinging from destroyer. Noise level is high, indicating rain.
1605(I) At periscope depth and nothing sighted except float type observation plane, circling in vicinity of sinking. (Aircraft Contact #6) This plane was evidently from AMARI O SHIMA.
1820(I) Remained submerged until dusk. Surfaed. Sent SARGO Serial One reporting success to date, and as we could not estimate enemy course within even 70°, and next day's positions would put us in unfavorable positions for search due to vicinity of land, decided to set course to intercept another previously reported convoy.

12. November
0555(I) In position for interception of reported convoy, commenced patrol. L 28°15'N, Lo 132°44'E.
0930(I) From this time for the next six hours and in all directions over an area of at least ten by twenty miles, sighted all manner of debris consisting of timbers, crates, bores, boxes, dead bodies. A total of six bodies were seen. All were clothed in dungarees and life-jackets. From decomposition it is estimated that they had been in water perhaps ten days.

— page 34 —
12 November (cont'd)
0940(I) Picked up a sample wooden chest, one of many that were to be sighted, and we were very disappointed and chagrined to find that it contained an evil smelling food resembling noodles.
1100(I) Lookout sighted periscope on port bow distant approximately two miles. Avoided at full speed. The lookout, who is our most reliable, had the periscope in sight for about three minutes, though it was not seen by O.O.D. or Captain. It is not known whether this was friend or enemy, but since it was on convoy's track, it was possibly friend searching same as we. (Ship Contact #2)
1130(I) Sighted what appeared to be tops of a submarine ahead.
1155(I) Submerged end commenced closing.
1400(I) Finally sighted the same mast for which we had dived and continued to close.
1426(I) Mast developed into small boat, with sail rigged but not set.
1500(I) Closed to take periscope pictures of what we thought was an unoccupied Klinker type lifeboat, with sail surfing, flying, when a well clothed Jep in soldier's uniform set up.
1520(I) Counted total, 26, five soldier's lying in boat, Marking on boat 1-2, in white figures on gray hull.
1604(I) Surfaced and closed and went alongside. Five soldiers in boat were in generally weakened condition from exposure and lack of food and water. Upon our approach one of the occupants went over the side when he saw our Tommy guns pointing, and he later drowned. His shipmates completely ignored him and he never opened his mouth asking for assistance. Two soldiers were brought aboard, one of which we had selected as the most intelligent for our prisoner, the other for searching. As sea was rough it was not practicable to search all of them nor to enter their boat. Put one soldier back in boat, gave them water, food, and cigarettes, and shoved off.
1800(I) Concluded search for convoy end set course to enter Area Eleven CAST.

14 November
0100(I) Entered area.

— page 35 —
14 November (cont'd)
0100(I) Received information thet Areas Eleven GAST and
(cont'd) Eleven DOG are open to us. Set course to enter
Eleven DOG, proceed through EASHI CHANNEL, up west
coast of FORUGOA to intercept convoy proceeding
from China to TAKAO.

15 November
0000(H) Encountered storm which was destined to remain with
us for the next nine days, reaching full gale pro-
portions et times, end reducing our military value
to zero for periscopes. Navigation was done on fetcho-
meter with exception of two radar fixes, three
periscopes cuts, and ones combined beering and radar
position.

16 November
1554(H) Proceeding on surface as before.
Entered EASHI CHANNEL.

17 November
0130(H) Sighted southwest corner of FORUGOA in vicinity of
GAKAN BI. Light not sighted.
0507(H) Sighted lights of several sampers or small patrol
boats about ten to fifteen miles off shore to north-
west of GAKAN BI. Did not investigate further than
to determine the they were small boats due to
approaching dawn and desire to remain undetected.
Submerged for patrol covering southern approach-
es to TAKAO in vicinity of RYUKYU SHO. Visibility
was very poor in direction of land, consisting of
heavy haze and rain. Closing the beach, on fathom-
meter soundings.
1145(H) Sighted two sampers, apparently fishing.
1300(H) Visibility temporarily improved, giving us short
look at land, distant approximately 2 miles, and
a much needed fix. Observed village of BORYO and
nothing of military interest noted. We were close
enough to see a truck proceeding up a hill road.
1340(H) Raining again, and visibility closed in again, so
set course to open beach in direction of RYUKYU SHO.
1600(H) Sighted another sampen.
1805(H) Surfaced with RYUKYU SHO in sight distant 14 miles.
Set course to pass to westward of this island.

— page 36 —
17 November (cont'd)
1816(H) Observed searchlight drills on RYUKYU SHO.
2040(H) First of several radar contacts at ranges of about 3000-4000 yards on small patrol boats or sampans. These continued throughout night in area about ten miles west of RYUKYU SHO, indicating a patrol line running approximately parallel to coast.

18 November
0100(H) The weather is rapidly worsening with seas and wind building up, steering various courses, covering approaches to TAKAO. Wind and sea have a reduced gale proportions and it now would be impossible to fire torpedoes with any success. L 22°41'N, Lo 120°00'E.
0550(H) Submerged, patrolling at 130 feet. It is impossible to maintain periscope depth. Broached on two occasions while taking periscope observations, Surfaced with storm unheeded. I had planned on proceeding through PESADORES CHANNEL tonight in order to intercept another reported convoy, but due to uncertainty of position, and having reached fuel limit, reluctantly decided to head south again and out of area. Sent SARGO Serial Two.

19 November
0300(H) Sighted and closed to 3000 yds. a properly lighted hospital ship on course 340°T. (Ship Contact #3) L 21°33'N, Lo 119°55'E.
0740(H) Submerged on plane radar contact which closed to 6 miles. (Plane Contact #7) L 21°20'N, Lo 120°20'E. Do not believe plane sighted us, though due to heavy seas it took us an excessive time to dive. Plane was not sighted.
0900(H) Surfaced.
0920(H) Plane radar contact at 15 miles which disappeared at 17 miles. (Plane Contact #6)
0940(H) L 21°19'N, Lo 120°24'E. Plane radar contact at 6 miles, closed to 3 miles. (Plane Contact #9) L 21°17'N, Lo 120°25'E. Submerged. Activities of this plane indicated possible radar either in plane or beach in vicinity of GARAN BI, distant 30 miles approximately, or possibly the so called "Gambit", but with radar. Visibility was poor, and wind and sea still of gale force. Since our surface speed had been reduced to

— page 37 —
19 November (cont'd)
0940(H) five knots, decided to remain submerged. This
(cont'd) plane was a surprise under these weather conditions.
1715(H) Surfaced, proceeding toward end through BASHI
GHANNEL, on soundings. Heavy seas and wind continuing.

20 November
0225(H) Reder contacts end fix obtained on B.K.TAN ISLANDS.

21-22 November
Proceeding at one engine speed, storm still at gale force.

23 November
1800(H) Weather has finally abated.

24 November
1528(T) Port propeller struck submerged object, bending one blade end restricting speed on port sheet to 100 r.p.m. due to excessive vibration. Engineer Officer went over side to inspect damage.
L 23-24N, Lo 15-16E.

25-26 November
Proceeding on surface at one engine speed on starboard sheet.
0212(T) Sighted MINAMI TO SHIMA at about 35 miles.
0944(T) Submerged on plane radar contact at 6 miles. This plane probably from CHICHI JIMA, distant about 180 miles. Plane not sighted. (Aireraft Contact #10)
L 24-12N, Lo 14-15E.
1035(T) Surfaced.
1131(T) Plane radar contact at 17 miles which opened out to 18 miles and was lost. (Aireraft Contact #11)
L 24-15N, Lo 14-15E.
1145(T) Sighted small boat, estimated length 75 feet, possibly small patrol boat, through high periscope, range 7 miles approximately, on westerly course.
L 10-12N, Lo 14-15E.
1305(T) (Ship Contact #4) L 24-12N, Lo 14-15E.
Submerged upon sighting two twin engine bombers coming out of clouds, than heading for us at approximately 6 miles. (Aireraft Contact #12)
L 24-24N, Lo 14-15E.
1532(T) Surfaced.

— page 38 —
27 November - 2 December
Proceeding on surface enroute Midway, holding daily dives for trim and training.
0700(J) Interference on SD radar.
0745(J) Sighted sub marine ahead on surface; submerged. This was most probably ASPRO. Tops of submarine just sighted in periscope, then disappeared.
0632(J) L 28°08'N, Lo 167°28'E.
Surfaced. Proceeding on surface. Interference on radar.

4 December
2400(M) Crossed International Dateline and
0000(Y) Changed date to 4 December.
0710(Y) Sighted and exchanged recognition with escort plane out of Midway.
0805(Y) Sighted Midway, distant 18 miles.
0945(Y) Received pilot aboard, proceeding up channel.
1026(Y) Moored at Submarine Base, Midway. Received fuel and stores.
1320(Y) Underway Midway enroute Pearl.

5-7 December
Proceeding on surface.

8 December
0745(X) Sighted B-24 and exchanged recognition.
(Aircraft Contact #13) L 21°10'N, Lo 162°25'W.
1655(X) Sighted B-24 distant 10 miles. Not sighted by plane.
(Aircraft Contact #14) L 21°08'N, Lo 160°51'W.

9 December
0625(W) Sighted escort vessel, YN3 364, and exchanged recognition signals.
Proceeding to Pearl Harbor.
0900(W) Set clocks ahead to + 9 1/2 zone time.
1230(W) Moored submarine base, Pearl Harbor.

— page 39 —
U.S.S. SARGO
CONFIDENTIAL

(C) WEATHER

From Pearl Harbor to the patrol area the weather was generally good. The seas were light with the exception of two days in the northeast corner of the waiting area when they were sufficiently heavy to make periscope observations at slow speed almost impossible.

The day we entered our area the sky became overcast and the wind and sea began making up. By the night of the third day, on the west side of TATWAN, the conditions had reached whole gale proportions and remained so for the next four days. By the tenth day when we left the area the wind and sea had lessened but it was not until five days after that, the sky became clear and the wind and sea became light.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

On the way to and from the area the set and drift of the current were as expected from the current chart. Off the southwestern tip of TATWAN where no information on currents was available, a strong southerly set was experienced. Over a period of five days, while a whole gale blew from the northeast, the set averaged 1.2 knots towards 21°T.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

Although we passed well within visual distance of GARAN BI on the night of November 16-17, 1943, it was not observed. Since visibility was not particularly good, the light might have been burning with reduced characteristics.

A light is about time position of the TAKAO light was burning with a steady white light. It could not be determined absolutely whether or not this was TAKAO light but it is believed that it was.

The TASHI CHANNEL was navigated under adverse conditions on two occasions. Since all dangers to navigation are to northward it is probably better to use the southern portion of the channel. This proved helpful in the case of the eastward passage when we had had no fix for five days and our position was extremely doubtful since radar picked up the high peaks of BATAIN ISLANDS before they could be seen and before we were in any danger.

— page 40 —
1.1123:21'38" :1-A0 :25000: 000 :sighted:Destroy: of FIHUKI
: (T) :151'19":2-AK :yds. :9 kts: smoke :class, :large oiler
: 9 : :1-DD :

— page 42 —
10,094:24'12" unknown : 6 : R : Did not sight plane.
: (I) : 142°19': miles: : CHICHI JIMA 180 miles.
: 26 :

— page 43 —
U.S.S. SARGO
-:  SSIS188-
-:  CONFIDENTIAL
-:  (H)  ATTACK DATA
-:  U.S.S. SARGO  TRIPEDO ATTACK NO. 1  PATROL NO. 9
-:  Time 1318  Date  Nov. 9, 1943  Lat. 21-38 N  Long. 131-19 E

Target Data
-:  Damage Inflicted
Description: Target was center ship of three ship convoy steaming in a line of bearing, on zigzag course. Small freighter was to the left, larger passenger freighter to right, with FUSUKI class destroyer petroling ahead and pinging, making about 120 r.p.m. All ships were in light draft condition. Two zigs to the right placed SARGO outside of large freighter in unfavorable position, so shifted target to tanker, which was trailing some-what, and waited for zig towards, At 1318, fired four torpedoes at tanker.
Contact had been made at 1122, when smoke of convoy was sighted at distance of about 13 miles, while SARGO was on surface, steering course to intercept.
Ship Sunk: (See "Report of Gun Attack" for sinking of ship listed here as date 1318.)
Ship Damaged: One oiler of 10,000 tons not similar to any tankers shown in O.N.I. 208-7.
Damage Determined by: Saw torpedoes hit and ship burst into flame.
Target Draft 10 ft. Course 344° Speed 10 Range 1400 yds. (at firing)
Own Ship Data
Speed 3.5 Course 080 Depth 66 ft. Angle 0° (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: After making end-around-run on surface, keeping smoke of convoy in sight through high periscope and high lookout between the periscopes, submerged and made periscope attack. Used white light spread and fired four torpedoes spread from 1/4 length ahead to 1/4 length astern. Had impression at the time that torpedoes were running aft of points of aim. This was later confirmed in other attacks and was determined to be a ver- isble lag of from 1 1/2 to 4 1/2 degrees in T.D.C. solution. (Fire Control defeats are being made the subject of a seperate letter.)

— page 45 —
U.S.S. SARGO
-: -SS-188-
CONFIDENTIAL

(H) ATTACK DATA (cont'd)

U.S.S. SARGO TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 9
Time 1321-38 Date Nov. 9, 1943. Lat. 21-38 N Long. 151-19 E

Target Data -- Damage Inflicted

Description: This is a continuation of attacks made after initial contact described in Attack #1. The two freighters changed course when tanker was hit. The passenger freighter changed course to left. SARGO turned to right and brought stern tubes to bear. The target was broadside to SARGO at about 2000 yds. range, but during the firing it turned sharply away. The destroyer turned towards SARGO at range of about 2700 yds. At 1321 fired 3 torpedoes at passenger freighter.

Ship Sunk: None.

Ship Damaged: None.

Damage Determined: --
Target Draft 10 Course 307 Speed 10 Range 2000 yds. (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 35 Course 180 Depth 66 Angle 0 (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: After making end-round-run on surface, keeping smoke of convoy in sight through high periscope and high look-out between periscopes, submerged and made Attack No. 1. After firing bow next at tanker in Attack No. 1, turned end fired 3 torpedoes from after next at passenger freighter. Used white light spread, firing first and second torpedoes at center of target and third one at bow. Intended to fire fourth torpedo but saw target was turning away. Torpedoes passed astern of target due to the turning of target, lag in T.D.C. solutions (see Remarks), and failure to decrease target speed to allow for its deceleration in the turn.

-- 20--

— page 47 —
U.S.S. SARGO
-: -35188-
CONFIDENTIAL

(H) ATTACK DATA (cont'd)

U.S.S. SARGO  TRIPEDO ATTACK NO. 3  PATROL NO. 9.
Time 1323-56  Date  Nov. 9, 1943  Lat. 21-38 N  Long. 151-19 E

Target Data  --  Damage Inflated

Description: This is a continuation of attack made after the initial contact described in "Attack No. 1. After firing three stern torpedoes at passenger freighter in Attack No. 2 and noting that it was turning to an unfavorable track, decided to fire remaining torpedo aft at tanker w.ich had been stopped in Attack #1. At 1323 fired tube #8 at bow of tanker.

Ship Sunk:  None.

Ship Damaged:  None.

Damage Determined by:  --

Target Draft 10 ft.  Course 344°  Speed  0  Range  1000 yds.  (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 3.5  Course 130  Depth 66  Angle 0  (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:  This was a submerged periscope attack. The point of aim was 1/4 length inside bow of tanker. Torpedo missed, probably passing under the bow which was very high in water.

Tubes Fired  #9  Actuator Actual  --
Track Angle  50°  Mark Verified  16
Gyro Angle  207  Serial No.  1034
Depth Set  8 ft.  Explosive  TXE
Power  High  Firing Interval  --
Hit or Miss  Miss  Type Spread  --
Eretic (Yes or No)  No  Sea Conditions  Calm
Mark Torpedo  14-3A  Overhaul Activity  Sub Base,
Serial No.  22615  Fearl Harbor
Mark Exploder  5-1A  Remarks:  None
Serial No.  7112
Actuation Set  Contact
(Magnetic feature deactivated)

-- 22 --

— page 48 —
U.S.S. SARCO
-: -SSL68-
CONFIDENTIAL

(H) ATTACK DATA (cont'd)

U.S.S. SARCO TRIPEDO ATTACK NO. 4 PATROL NO. 9
Time 1755 Date Nov. 10, 1943 Lat. 25-22.5 N Long. 130-50 E

Target Data -- Damage Inflated

Description: Target was a small freighter, the left hand one of two ships remaining in convoy attacked Nov. 9, 1943. Larger passenger freighter was to right, and the escort destroyer was ahead, weaving and pinging. Destroyer passed close aboard to starboard at range of about 500 yds. SARGO was ahead and between columns. A zig to left by targets put SARGO in position for attack on smaller freighter. At 1745 fired four torpedoes forward at small freighter.

Contact was made at 0232, when smoke of convoy was sighted, while SARGO was on surface, steering course to intercept.

Ship Sunk: None.

Ship Damaged: None.

Damage Determined by: --

Target Draft 10 Course 345 Speed 10 Range 1100 yds. (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 3.6 Course 230 Depth 66 ft. Angle 0 (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: This attack was a submerged periscope attack. Used white light speed and fired four bow torpedoes spread from 1/4 length ahead to 1/4 length astern. Saw torpedoes running but apparently without enough lead. All torpedoes missed astern. (See Remarks)

— page 49 —
U.S.S. SARGO
: -SS188-

CONFIDENTIAL

(H) ATTACK DATA (cont'd)

| ATTACK DATA | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 |
||----|----|----|----|
| Tubes Fired | 117 S | 117 S | 115 S | 116 S |
| Track Angle | 047°45' | 51°50' | 50°50' | 52°50' |
| Gyro Angle | 6 ft. | 6 ft. | 6 ft. | 6 ft. |
| Depth Set | High | High | High | High |
| Power | Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss |
| Hit or Miss | No | No | No | No |
| Erratic (Yes or No) | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Mark Torpedo | 25617 | 24440 | 25414 |
| Serial No. | 3-6A | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A |
| Mark Explorer | 5743 | 12868 | 12397 | 12215 |
| Serial No. | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Set | (Magnetic features deactivated on all torpedoes) | | | |
| Actuation Actual | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Mark Warhead | 2533 | 9676 | 11539 | 2491 |
| Serial No. | TXP | TXP | TXP | TXP |
| Explosive | 9 sec | 7 sec | 8 sec | 8 sec |
| Firing Interval | | | | |
| Type Spread | Divergent | | | |
| Sea Conditions | Calm | | | |
| Overhaul Activity | Sub 3 case, Pearl Harbor, T.H. | | | |
| Remarks: | It was after this attack, when target data was accurately known from previous attacks on the convoy, and when all torpedoes still missed, that a comprehensive series of comparisons were made between T.D.C. solutions and Mk. 6 angle solver solutions for many different firing set-ups. These comparisons disclosed the excessive variable lag in T.D.C. solutions previously noted in the report of Attack #2. | | | |

— page 52 —
U.S.S. SARGO
-:  SS1186-
CONFIDENTIAL

(H) ATTACK DATA (cont'd)

U.S.S. SARGO GUN ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 9
Time 1712 Date Nov. 9, 1943 Lat. 21-38 N Long. 131-19 E

Target Data -- Damage Inflicted

Sunk: One oiler of 10,000 tons, not similar to any tankers in O.N.I. 208-J.

Damaged or Probably Sunk: None.

Damage Determined by: Saw ship sink at 1736 (took photographs).

Details of Action

Target had previously been damaged and stopped by SARGO torpedo attack at 1318. After receiving depth charge attack, again sighted target through periscope at 1603, distance about 8000 yds., down by the round (CDR) surface at 1712 surfaced 400 yds. from target and fired 10 rounds of 3" armor piercing and 63 rounds of 3" high capacity point detonating projectiles from 3"/50 cal. deck gun. (Point detonating projectiles were set on delay.) At 1736 the target sank, stern first.

Fire was opened with ammunition from the two topside ready lockers (6 rounds of A.P. and 16 rounds of H.C.), and continued with ammunition passed up through the Conning Tower. It was found that the armor piercing projectiles passed entirely through the tanker and into the water on the far side. For this reason, H.C. ammunition was used to inflict greater damage to the ship's tanks.

Total hits: 65 (estimated).

(I) MINS
No rank rks.

— page 54 —
1943, on a routine training dive, enroute Midway, the diving alarms failed to sound from the mess hall aft, due to a short-circuit which blew fuses in the after circuit. In control room the dive progressed in a routine manner until the exhaust valves of running engines #1,3,4, failed to change to closed. Main induction was ordered closed and all main bellast blown. A 6 1/2" vacuum was pulled in boat before engines were shut down.

The first indication of a dive to the engine rooms was the entrance of a solid stream of water in each induction. The engines were immediately shut down and main induction flapper closed.

The main induction was completely flooded, and hull supply line was partially flooded. The forward engine room bilges were filled to the lower flat deck plates. In after engine room, water sprayed into the cubicle and onto the lighting motor generator causing temporary grounds. No permanent damage resulted.

On 27 November, 1943, No. 1 main engines was started and ran backwards, until stopped almost immediately. This ruptured the tube oil suction line between the pump and the check valve in the sump. A patch was soldered over the rupture. As precaution to prevent recurrence, air start timing was retarded 6 degrees.

On 24 November, 1943, while running at standard speed the port propeller struck an unobserved submerged object. Inspection was made by Engineer Officer by swimming down to the propeller, and one blade was bent for five inches, at angle of 50 degrees. Maximum speed without excessive thumping and vibration was hereafter limited to 110 rpm, on port. All load was placed on starboard shaft, and the port allowed to revolve idle.

No. 2 periscope continued to vibrate excessively at speeds greater than one-third. This is caused principally by shaking of SJ radar head and shaft through force of water and lost motion in gearing of shaft. This condition on this ship is accentuated by the SJ head mounting being offset from centerline and bracketed to periscope shears. A suggested remedy would be the design of some type locking device which, operated from below, would rigidly secure the shaft when not in use. This periscope will require readjustment this refit (See M also).

— page 57 —
1. U.S.S. SARGO
    -SS188-

CONFIDENTIAL

(L) RADIO

Radio reception was very good prior to 1 November when the shift to HAIKU broadcast was made. Signal strength on the new circuit, during the submarine schedules, was very low and much interference, due mostly to jamming, was encountered. This made it necessary to resort to the Fox schedule for our traffic. After the submarine schedules, as about 1700 G.C.T., the signal strength improved and jamming decreased. On Nov. 6th a message of great importance to SARGO was received but was hardly decipherable even after copying three times.

During the letter part of the patrol, from middle of November on, the HAIKU circuit was much better. All regular schedules were received on 4525 KOS, which is now quite satisfactory except for occasional jamming. 9080 KOS, is satisfactorily during the day, but fades at night. The low frequency band, except in rare cases, is unreadable.

Transmissions to N.P.M. were made on 8470 KOS, and no difficulties were encountered, in spite of abnormally heavy seas.

The following message was received on 500 KOS, on 17 Nov. at 22°30'N, 120°03'E.

... V AAA 28176 8565T 248999 AAA 27T43 T AAA YOFO *****
RPT **** 28176 8565T 248999 17T4 3T YOPO ** DBT ** VA

NY * TNI * DE JWA JWA JWA JWA JWA 138 AS
MASS MASS **** AAA 281 76 8565T 248999 AAA 270430 AAA
YOPO ** RPT *** VA

The O in YOPO had 4 dashes in it. The * denotes characters which have no equivalent in our code. The characters were all run together and not spaced as they are here.

Last Serial received: SEVEN LOVE
Last Serial sent: SARGO THRUE

— page 61 —
U.S.S. SARGO
    -SS186-

CONFIDENTIAL

(PERSONNEL)

In spite of a concentrated effort on the part of all officers and a comprehensive schooling program, the percentage of unqualified men on board continues to increase. Already the personnel situation has become critical and unless the rate of turnover is reduced it will not be long before the ship's efficiency is dangerously impaired. The number of men capable of handling all emergencies quickly and intelligently is small. In view of this it is recommended that potential submarine men in relief crews be given as much instruction as possible.

All men of the steamfleet should have instruction in standing lookout watches, instructions & plenemsen on the submarine training device, and night lookout school. This will greatly facilitate a submarine receiving a large number of green men.

The men received from Comsubdiv 21 relief crew are good material and give promises of becoming useful submarine men.

The standard Navy issue type rifles, which are continuously proved unsatisfactory for submarine use. They become stinky in storage, are not wholly water repellent, become less so with age, and wear out rapidly in use. A sufficient number cannot be carried for a single patrol if much bad weather is encountered. A plastic raincoat such as Koroseal or Pilofilm is suggested for trial.

— page 64 —
FBS-44/AI6-3
Serial (055)
CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST PHOTOGRAPH TO
USS J/ROG Report of
Ninth War Patrol

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.

Subject: U.S.S. SARGO Ninth War Patrol - comments on.

1. Forwarded.

2. The ninth war patrol was the first for Lieutenant Commander J. Gernett as commander officer. It was extended over a period of fifty-five days of which twenty-four were spent in the area.

3. There were four ship contacts of which only one was worthy of development. The second ship contact on a submarine is doubtful. The attacks made on the ship contact on a submarine is doubtful

— page 65 —
4. The DFing of the SD probably by plane as well as by shore station as covered in sections J and M should be carefully considered. The operators on the S/RGO keyed the SD.

5. The material condition of the S/RGO on arrival was very good. A Mark III T.D.C. and an extended conning tower are to be installed during this refit period. All repairs and defects will be remedied by the HOLLAND.

6. The health and morale of the crew are excellent.

7. The SARGO operations were terminated by orders.

8. The commanding officer, officers and crew of the S/RGO are to be congratulated on their successful war patrol and inflicting the following damage on the enemy.

1 AK (s:sil:lar to CHIGAGO MAPU) SUIK TOTAL 10,000 tons
1 AK (s:sil:lar to CHIGAGO MAPU) SUIK TOTAL 20,000 tons

L. M. MAIR.

— page 66 —
FC5-4/A16-3
Serial 0341
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS SARGO Report of
Ninth War Patrol.
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. SARGO Ninth War Patrol - Comments on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander
   Submarine Division FORTY FOUR.

2. The Commanding Officer's comments on the unsuitability of issue raincoats are heartily concurred in. The procurement of a desirable type of submarine foul weather clothing for tropical and semi-tropical waters is being referred to the Squadron Supply Officer for investigation and report.

3. The excellent performance of torpedo exploders and 3" H.C. ammunition is heartening. The SARGO's gun crew are commended for "E" gunnery with 90% hits which provided adequate venting of the 40's ballast tanks.

4. The Squadron Commander commends the spirit and performance of duty of the Engineering Officer, Lieut. V. R. Bailey, U.S.N.R., in going overseas in enemy controlled waters to determine the extent of damage to the port propellor.

5. The Squadron Commander takes pleasure in congratulating the new Commanding Officer, officers and men on an aggressive patrol, successfully concluded in spite of an unreliable T.D.C. and a bent propeller.

C. B. ALDRICH,
acting.

— page 67 —
1/0177...

FF12-10/A16-3(6)/(16)  SUMMARIZE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET 1d

Serial 01925

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SARG0 Report of
Ninth War Patrol.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED

CONSUSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 225
U.S.S. SARG0 - NINTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SARG0 (S5188) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.
(15 October to 9 December 1943).

1. The ninth war patrol of the SARG0 was the first for the new
   Commanding Officer, as such. The patrol was conducted in an area around
   Formosa.

2. Five aggressive torpedo attacks were conducted, two of which
   were successful. The faulty operation of the torpedo dete computer was, un-
   doubtedly, responsible for misses on three of the attacks.

3. A lengthy siege of severe weather while in area cut down the
   area coverage considerably and undoubtedly caused the lack of tracers noted.

4. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia award.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, conrtributes the
   Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this expressive and successful patrol.
   The SARG0 is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

SUNK by torpedoes and gunfire.

J. H. BRICK, Jr.,
Acting.

Distribution and authentication
on following page.

62130 FILMED

1 - Tanker (class unknown) - 10,000 tons *
1 - Freighter (CHICAGO NSU class) - 5,866 tons

TOTAL: 15,866 tons

* Sunk by torpedoes and gunfire.

J. H. BRICK, Jr.,
Acting.

— page 68 —
12
FF12-10/A16-3(8)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01925
CONTINENTAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SARG Report of
Ninth War Petrol.
CONSURSP.C PATROL REPORT NO. 325
U.S.S. SARG - NINTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. SARG (SS168) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.
(15 October to 9 December 1943).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
(5)
(5)
(6)
(6)
(1)

— page 70 —
U.S.S. SARGO - RE2CORT OF TENNIS WAR PATROL

(A) PROLOGUE:

Arrived PEARL on 9 December, 1943, after ninth war patrol. Refit was performed by U.S.S. HOLLAND and Submarine Base, during which coming tower was enlarged, Mark III T.D.C. and JP sound gear were installed, main ballast tanks 3A and 3B were converted into fuel ballast tanks, SD-3, SJ radars and P.P.I. unit installed. Drydocked in No. 1 Drydock, P.H.T.H. for repairs to damaged propeller. Detached three officers, received three officers. Four day trining period. Not departed. Readiness for sea 26 January, 1944.

(B) NARRATIVE:

26 Jan. 1944
1300(W) Departed PEARL under escort, and in company with HOE until 1705, at which time change course enroute MILWA, proceeding independantly.

27-30 Jan. Normal cruising, training dives, and general drills.

0933(Y) Moored at N.O.B. pier, MILWA. Received fuel, and minor repairs. Unable to depart as channel was obstructed.

1300(Y) Departed MILWA under air escort, in company with HOE. At 1530 parted company, proceeding to area via prescribed routing. Held daily dives for training enroute.

1425(L) Lat. 22-42.3N Long. 169-46E sighted floating spherical mines. This mine, about 2ft feet in diameter, had a large cone-shaped plate on top, and several smaller bolted plates, and was heavily corroded with barnacles. Sank mine with Lewis machine gun.

1358(K) Plane contact at 20 miles which closed to 15 miles, then was lost at 22 miles. Plane not sighted. Did not submerge. Distance from SAIPAN - 315 miles. (Plane Contact #1) Lat. 14-59N, Long. 151-17Z.

0940(K) Submerged on plane contact at 15 miles, not sighted. (aircraft Contact #2) Lat. 13-00N, Long. 14-28E.

9 Feb. 1004(K) Surface.

1105(K) Several plane contacts at 25 miles, as if large formation. (Aircraft Contact #3)

1108(K) Submerged when range closed to 15 miles. Lat 12-52N, Long. 14-70SE. At radar depth, another contact at 15 miles which closed to 5 miles then opened out and was lost at 23 miles. Not sighted by planes. (Aircraft Contact #4) Lat. 12-43N, Long. 14-40Z.

1143(K) Surface.

1334(K) Contact on plane at 25 miles. While tracking this plane, another plane was sighted by lookout distant about 8 miles, not located in our direction. Submerged. (Aircraft Contacts #5 and #6)

— page 71 —
1355(K) 9 Feb.
Surfaced. It is believed that all of those plane contacts were planes in transit as we were directly on SAIPAN - RYUK line. Lat. 12-43N, Long. 145-41E.

000(K) 10 ab.
Changed course to pass south of PAIS IS, upon receipt of orders.

0300(I) 12 Feb.
Entered area. Proceeding for submerged patrol off ALHAMAL HARBOR.

0504(I) 6:35(I) BEBEIHUAP IS, on radar. Heavy rain, visibility poor. Submerged, commenced closing HALAHAL and BOBY, and patrol 5-7 miles off entrance.

1635(I) Surfaced. Nothing sighted of interest.

0610(I) Submerged off HALAHAL HARBOR, patrolling 5-7 miles off. Encountered many motor fishing sampans through hour. The day, no ship in sight. Decided that tomorrow we would patrol on surface about 60 miles off, crossing the PALAU - YEA - HABULR routes. Have been patrolling those at night. We are pleased by schools of fish which seemed to follow us, with gulls following us into this fish, and fishing sampans and trawlers following gulls, thus the fishing boats were with us continually.

1645(I) Surfaced. Sighted either fleas of lightning or searchlight through clouds, in direction of ALGUM IS, for next two hours. Proceeding for patrol across PALAU - YEA route.

0550(I) Submerged for 6 hours, 6-23N, Long. 135-13E.

0735(I) Surfaced, commenced patrolling PALAU - YEA route, covering east end west passes. Lat. 6-23N, Long. 135-13E. Radar contact at 7000 yds., small patrol vessel on course 100, speed eight. This was being followed at 6000 yds. by another patrol craft, possibly SC type, on same course at same speed. Decided that they may be deep for some time coming out, so stood on along reverse course for an hour. Having sighted nothing, then decided that they were sea, out to meet convoy coming in, so reversed course and at Lat. 6-22N, Long. 134-5E (Ship Contact #1)

0200(I) Regained contact on smaller boat, then on larger one, reached same course and speed, and took three and gave course about 5 miles until

0557(I) with damn breaking, submerged to take a look at just what we had and to await development, and

— page 72 —
0100(I) Set course at full speed for position east of RIGULI ACOLL for 16 Feb., 1013(1) Interception, Submerged on plane contact at 10 miles, (aircraft contact #7) 1043(1) Surfaced, 1000(1) Commenced search which continued all night and next day. 0811(1) Submerged upon sighting large seaplane distant about six miles, 17 Feb., (Aircraft contact #8) 0923(1) Surfaced, continued search, 8-59N, Long, 136-26N, 0933(1) Submerged upon sighting same plane, (Aircraft Contact #9) 1500(1) Decided to remain submerged and continue search 1530(1) Sighted two columns of smoke to northeast, to: sent to battle stations and normal approach at standard speed, Lt., 6-56N, Long, 136-21E, 1530(1) Sighted tops of several ships, and heard "racing from several directions, continued closing and maximum speed, This convoy consisted of five ships and four escorts. The three large ships were in line of bearing, not within 1000 yards of the escorts, and a very large naval anchorage, intersected about 1000 yards of the flank at about 1500 yards in another line of bearing, by two small freighters, one of which was "engines aft." About this contact were four escorts; a trawler or corvette two ahead and two abreast, a HATSUHATA destroyer on starboard flank, an 80 type on port flank, and a trawler or corvette two abreast. The destroyer and the 50 were pinging. (Ship Contact #2) The whole outfit was zigzagging simultaneously approximately 30 degrees on either side of base course, and passed at nearest range of 800 yards, speed 9 knots. Secured from approach and at course to follow, tracking. 1630(1) 1836(1) Surfaced, and commenced change at full speed, with smoke on sight. 1853(1) Contact on radar at 25,000 yds. Tracking showed convoy to be zigging between 2000 and 3000, on base course about 2600, speed 9 knots. The night was moonless, cloudless, and very clear with bright starlight. The large ships were in sight at about 12,000 yards, to a point on port bow of tanker which was still on port flank. The position of this tanker in a flank position, rather than in the center seemed strange, until in light of later events, it became evident that the two large vessels were not in contact. Changed course and headed in to fire at about 70-00 port track. At this time the port flank (SC) was in sight and about 1000 yards on port quarter of tanker. 2125(1) Fire four torpedoes forward at average torpedo run of 2100 yards, all missed. One torpedo ran erratic, taking 450 left gyro. Analysis indicates that one should have hit, turned away and commenced reload, There was some activity by escorts on far side who were firing and dropping depth charges, particularly when torpedoes were plowed at and of run, but the formation in general continued intact. (Attack #1)

— page 75 —
23 Feb.
11:15 (I)
11:28
13:05 (I)
18:05 (I)
05:36 (I)
24 Feb.
09:58 (I)
10:02 (I)
10:52 (I)
11:00 (I)
11:36 (I)
18:50 (I)
25 Feb.
06:59 (I)
07:22 (I)
10:33 (I)
15:00 (I)
26 Feb.
09:38 (I)
09:56 (I)
11:18 (I)
14:47 (I)
15:12 (I)
16:19 (I)
17:22 (I)

Proceeding on surface.
Submerged for plane contact at 13.5 miles.
Surfaced. (Aircraft Contact #11) Lt, 6-31L, Long. 135-23L.
Submerged for plane sighted by J.O.O.D. and near range of 4 miles on radar. 'e may have been sighted. (Aircraft Contact #12) Lt. 6-32L, Long. 132-50L.
Surfaced, resumed search:

Submerged at convoy's main position and proceeded along his course to TONGEI MUNGUI. This position was 6 miles off ANNUAL IS, Sighted convoy about 14000 yards ahead, proceeding toward pass, One CHIYOSE class seaplane tender, one unidentified ship, two destroyers, and two float type low-wing planes. It is not believed that radar on ANNUAL IS, spotted us in at dawn, and convoy was routed well out to sea, around us. (Ship Contact #7)
Lt. 7-08M, Long. 134-03S. (Aircraft Contact #13)
Sighted to destroyers coming slowly along a sloal, listening and searching for us. (Ship Contact #8)
Vent deep and commenced evasions. They had us patchy well out in for today. Destroyers passed at about 1500 yds. and proceeded up our former track toward previously sighted convoy.
All clear, resumed submerged patrol.

Surface patrol to westward of PALAU awaiting a reported convoy.
Lt. 6-20M, Long. 133-00E.
Submerged for plane contact closing in from 30 mi. (Aircraft Contact #14)
Surfaced, continued patrol.
Submerged for repair work on engines.
Surfaced, resumed patrol.

Patrolling lanes to northwest of PALAU.
Submerged for plane contact at 14 miles. (Aircraft Contact #15)
Lt. 6-12M, Long. 133-20E.
Surfaced.
Submerged on plane contact at 10 miles. (Aircraft Contact #16) Lt. 6-12M, Long. 133-21L.
While manning SD, prior to surfacing, made contact contact at 3 miles. (Aircraft Contact #17) As I did not believe that we had been sighted and were about 65 miles off BAEIAN-LUP, conjectured that convoy was near at hand, so remained until 2:00 at which point we were in contact.

Surfaced.
Sighted smoke, commenced approach on surface, tracking and positioning ahead. (Ship Contact #9) Lt. 6-09M, Long. 133-38L.
Submerged, continued approach. Target proceeded along a normal zigzag plan, smoking, but otherwise looking like a warship. At range of about 10,000 yards, a redicel zig to his left of 110° gave us a broadside view, and we thought we had a KAIORI class light cruiser, though the smoking was peculiar.
Target zigged towards us, and we discovered that we had a CHIIDORI bearing down on us at about 4000 yards. Commenced evasion at 300 feet, where we found a slight layer. For the next hour and a half.

— page 78 —
26 Jan to 12 March 44

The weather was in cheerful ex-cellent. The sea varied from a small chop to medium swells, winds generally light to brisk, etc partly cloudy to overcast, frequent rain squalls of short curcation, and air temperature from warm to hot (102 F avore,o).

II. THE PRODUCTION:

Currents were continually experienced in all parts of Arca 10, with drifts of 1 to 1.5 knots, and sets varying from 1m, when 100 mi., west of PALAU, through North upon closer approach, to NE when within 50 mi. of the island, with sets onto the beach within 20 miles of the most shore. On the east side of PALAU the set was 1/2 for 100 miles off shore. However, it is believed that the currents at the north and south ends of the islands are variable, possibly influenced considerably by tides, some SE currents were experienced when SALVO was NE of PALAU, and NE currents were experienced south of ANGUIL ISLAND, both of the 1/2 level being contrary to previous reports.

III. NAVIGATION AID:

The tower previously reported atop the peak at the north end of BAHIMIAP ISLAND is a conspicuous landmark as far as 20 miles off shore. The radio towers on MORO ISLAND are also conspicuous than anything off the east entrance to NAKALI ISLAND. Other aids have directly been fully described either in patrol reports or in the secret sailing discussions furnished by Comdr.

— page 79 —
1,232(1) 6-22N (1) 00cm 7K00 11/19T: R Patrol boats stood out from trawlers: 134-59B; 6am 6u; 10: trawlers: 1,234-59B; 6am 6

— page 83 —
4/5
CONFIDENTIAL
(AVACK NO. 1 continued)

Remarks:
Fourth torpedo took about a 45° left turn as it left the tube and was not seen or heard of again.
Analysis indicates that #3 torpedo should have hit. Several torpedoes were heard to explode at end of run.

U.S.S. SARGO
TIME: 2159
Date: 17 Feb. 1544
Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Same as in Attack #1

Ship Sunk: One (1) Freighter, MCR, 7000 tons.

Ship Damaged or Probably Sunk: One (1) naval tanker, 14,000, SHIRENOKA, O.N.I. 14, p. 140.

Damage Determined by: (1) Sar and heard two hits in freighter, saw explosion which blew 500 feet in air. SAR and heard one hit in stern, just forward of funnel. In 1.5kts of explosion in (1) above, saw tanker well down by stern. Tanker remained stopped, and either sunk or was towed into port.

Target draft: 201 (est) Course: 295 S: 95 Range: 2100 (ave.)
(att firing)

On Ship Data

Speed: 13 Course: 010 Depth: SUBMACH Angle: -- (et firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Radar surface. Course and speed of target accurately known.
Fired than target and another ship the enemy's aircraft in line with gyros approximately 60° using a 3° direction s.r.e.d. #1 hit extended target in stern; #3 and #4 passed ahead and hit ship in line and about 700 yards beyond.
Used T.B.T. bearings, radar ranges.

Tubos Fired: #1 #2 #3 #4
Track Angle 102 F 102P 102P 102 F
Gyro Angle 006 3/4 004 3/4 003 001 3/4
Depth Set 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft.
Power High High High High
Hit or Miss Hit Miss Hit Hit
(From: Ship) (From: Ship)
Erratic No No No No
Mark Torpado 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 26141 35342 26115 39136

(2/1) -14-

— page 84 —
6 mod 4
Serial No: 1375
Actuation Set
Actuation Actual
Mark Farhood
Serial No.
Explosive
Firing Interval
Type Spread
Sea Conditions:
Overhull Activity:
Remarks:
6 mod 4
6 mod

— page 85 —
1/3

| Ship Name | Date | Time | Course | Speed | Range |
||------|------||-------|-------|
| USS SUGKO | 22/4/1 | 25 Feb. 1944 | 1st. 6-57 N | Long. 137-52 Z |
| USS SUGKO | 22/4/1 | 25 Feb. 1944 | 1st. 6-57 N | Long. 137-52 Z |

Description: Heavily laden MHI freighter, 425(plus) feet long, 7000 tons (cst) in convoy with two medium-sized ships of unclear mission type, and two escorts of uncertain mission type. Ships armed in UWM formation, this ship had a 300-400 ton escort on either beam at approximately 1000 yards, 30-40% on either side of base course, enroute PFLAT, contact was made by S. Hitting smoke in high periscope surface patrol, just before sunrise, and developed by radar. Visibility approximately 3000 yards, with heavy rain.

Ships Sunk: None

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: None

Damage Determined by: One DID hit heard throughout boat at proper time. No damage resulted.

Target Draft: 23' (cst) Course: 120° Speed: 10 Range: 2100 (at firing)

-11-

— page 86 —
4,6
Speed: 4,6
Course: 190
Depth: SURFACE
Angle: ---
(act firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Radar surface, using T.B.T. bearings and radar ranges.
Positioned for a 70° port track, with target course and speed accurately known. Torpedoes were fired with left gyros, thus giving poorer tracks than intended. One dual hit was obtained.

Tubes Fired: #5, #6, #7, #8
Track Angle: 525° 47', 545° 52', 555° 59', 665° 63'
Gyro Angle: 157, 162, 169, 173
Depth Set: 8 ft., 8 ft., 6 ft., 6 ft.
Power: Elect, Elect, Elect, Elect
Hit or Miss: Miss, No, No, No
Erratic: No, No, No, No
Mark Torpedo: 18, 19, 18, 16
Serial No., 53653, 53712, 53043, 53706
Mark Exploder: 4 - 2, 4 - 2, 4 - 2, 4 - 2
Serial No., 16309, 16428N, 16633, 16256
Actuation Actual: Contact, Contact, Contact, Contact
Mark Warhead: 18, 16, 16, 16
Serial No., 817, 600N, 573, 456
Explosive: TPX, TPX, TPX, TPX
Firing Interval: 8 sec., 6 sec., 6 sec., 4 sec.
Type Spread: 4, 1,

— page 87 —
ATTACK NO. 5 (continued)

Damage Determined by: Heard one low order explosion, saw and heard one high order explosion directly under bridge, setting bridge afire. Ship was stopped and was also rved to remain stopped for next five hours, until SARGO departed.

Target Draft: 23' (est) Course: 160 Spced: 10 Range: 1700 (at firing)

Qvm Ship Data

Speed: 0 Course: 068 Depth: SUNDOC Angle: -- (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Radar surface, using T.B.T. bo-rings and radar ranges. Course and speed of target accurately known.

Tubes Fired: #5 #6 #7 #8
Treck Angle 82 P 84 P 65 P 66 P
Gyro Angle 190 106# 182# 179#
Depth Set 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft.
Power Elect. Elect. Elect. Elect.
Hit or Miss Miss Hit Hit Miss
Erratic No No No No
Mark Torpedo 18 18 18 18
Serial No. 53640 53592 53666 53769
Mark Explorer 4 - 2 4 - 2 4 - 2
Serial No. 16447 16419 16542 16440
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual 18 Contact Contact 16 16 16
Mark Warhead 157 618 476 516
Serial No. TXT TXT TXT TXT
Firing Interval 3 sec. 3 sec. 3 sec. 3 sec.
Type Spread 3 R 1 R 1 L 3 L
Sea Conditions: Moderate
Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Remarks: None

— page 88 —
1/2/1944
June 15th 26th-12th 1944
One spherical floating mine was encountered enroute to area. It was heavily encrusted with barnacles, and no horns or other appendages were noted. It was sunk by .30 caliber machine gun.

(J) A/S MEASURES AND EVASION FACTORS:

Very efficient anti-submarine measures continued in vicinity of PALAU. Thorough air coverage is given to all major shipping within daily hit steaming distance of the port. Daily patrols appear to recommit to approaches out at least 150 miles. On the several occasions then we may have been sighted by these planes, no bombs were dropped. All planes contacts were made during mornings or very early afternoon. There were no contacts after 1400.

One convoy of three large and two small ships was escorted by one destroyer, two trawlers or corvettes, and an SS, They were steered close, on each flank, and trailing. Another two destroyers and two planes. Another of three ships had two escorts of unknown type. On night attacks on two of these convoys, escorts appeared to be not too alert, and not too crosswise. On three instances when torpedoes exploded at end of run, escorts seemed to assume that submarine was in direction of explosions and therefore took explosions to fire their guns and drop charges.

One torpedo shot struck, apparently fired depth charges from "Y" gun on stern.

In one surface attack, 50 type escort, blinded signal light at us from range of 1500 yards, while we were coming in for firing, but took no further action, as we continued in, fired and struck.

Ruses observed near, heavily smoking sea, along way, follow at 6000 yards by SS type patrol boat. The combination stood out along PALAU. While late for 150 miles from reurned. We followed escorting them to join convoy, whereas they may have simply load us closer.

Radar on ANCHOR IS. spotted us on morning, dive, and to destroyers appeared soon thereafter, thoroughly searching our track.

A CHIDORI torpedo boat, probably directed by a plane, sailed heavily to atrract our advent and pull us toward him, and then when he had us nicely boxed in, attacked. This occurred 60 miles offshore.

The great paint appears highly efficient amontlage. On five night attacks, with lighting conditions from medium br. hr. no moonlit, through bright clear starlight, to medium blackness, we were able to close to within 2000-1500 yards without being sighted, and at times while presenting full length silhouette.

It is not understood why escorts were unable to detect us on listening gear during and after attacks on surface, when we were running full on for engines.

— page 89 —
21 February, the recirculating valve in the hull ventilation
stuck in the closed or exhaust position. Operating gear is free up to the
valve. Section of ventilation piping will be opened during refit for inspec-
tion of valve. Submerged we recirculate through the louvers.

We continue to have considerable difficulty in trying to maintain
a balanced load on #2 and #4 main motors. Part of the trouble is in the motors
themselves and is believed to be in the commutating field coils. The remainder
of the trouble is caused by play in the clutch gears and sheathing of the field
rheostats and will require disassembly during the coming refit. The work on
the motors shall have to wait for the next overhaul.

Small fluctuations in the lighting motor generator voltage have
always occurred with normal operation and large fluctuations up to about 6
volts has occurred whenever the load on the battery has been constant from
change in speed, etc. These characteristics although not entirely satisfactory
were not considered unsatisfactory until the SJ Reder commenced getting its
power from the L.G.M.S. These surges are excess for efficient operation of
the SJ Radar. More efficient or sensitive voltage regulators are very much
desired.

On March 9th number 2 Main Engine was stopped because of a knock-
ing noise in #3 unit followed by loss of lub oil pressure and a loud clank. On
inspection the following defects and causes were found:

(a) The cross-head nut was loose.
(b) The tit on the locking device was broken off and shovled
signs of having broken an old crack or flaw.
(c) The division cover was cracked.
(d) The tension bolt with a nut off one end was in the crank
case loading like a pretzel. Collector pin was not found.
(e) The con rod bearing was wiped.

Number 4 Main Engine clutch thrust bearing continues to leak oil
despite attempts to remedy this defect during each of the last three refits.

All main engines show signs of ring wear. Two pistons were re-
placed on #2 M.E., because of broken rings and lost habbit butts. The rings
were renewed on one unit of #1 M.E. The gold seals are comming to come out
of a few rings on all main engines. Each engine has had about 1000 hours since
last ringing.

One tube on #2 main generator surface air cooler commenced to leak
and so was plugged on each end with tapered plugs turned out on the lathe.

Great difficulty was experienced in obtaining adequate ventilation
for the batteries and the compartments, especially during battery changes, with
the exhaust ventilation blower rotating in reverse direction. Habitability and
ventilation were greatly improved by simply switching the blower motor leads to
make the blower rotate as originally designed.

Both oil and steam seals of #1 and 2 stills failed at 361 and 461
hours respectively. Both compressors were overhauled during the last refit.

— page 90 —
1. RADIO:
   - In general radio reception was satisfactory. Nightly schedules were received on either 4525 or 9090. Daytime reception on 14390 only. Nothing was heard on 450 or the new HAUK frequency 6360.
   - On 15 February the 1100 schedule was blamed out by Jap interference. This occurred on 4525.
   - On 29 February a transmission was made upon leaving the area. An immediate response was received from HL (Australian Station). It is believed that this was probably some Jap. Although he used correct procedure signals, his object seemed to be to keep us on the air. Upon completion of the transmission, he requested a repeat of certain groups. When these were sent, he requested a repeat of different groups. At this point the transmission was secured. In addition the message was not relayed to NPH.
   - On 1 March a transmission was made with no difficulty. ConsubPac Serial 17 was not received.
   - Last serial sent: 1st serial received: SUKMO Scri1 3 ConsubPac Scri1 2X
   - RADAR:
     - SJ This was the first patrol with new high power transmitter and PPI unit. Ranges were the best cover obtained by this ship: PAI AU ISLAND 50,000 yds.
     - Tanfer, 15,000 tons 25,000 yds.
     - Freighter, 6,000 tons 21,000 yds.
     - Destroyer 16,000 yds.
     - Smaller Escorts 6,000 - 12,000 yds.
     - PPI was helpful in determining of two convoy formations. Most important use was searching for escorts during attacks.
     - Regular with was maintained on the PPI at night and during periods of low visibility. Since contacts appeared simultaneously on PPI and A-scope, PPI with was stood because it was found to be less tiring.
     - Distant rain squalls were sometimes intermittent for contacts on PPI, but an inspection on A-scope quickly revealed true nature of contact.
     - The "Range Circle" control on the PPI unit was used for training now and standing SJ with. A sharp turn of the knob gives a simulated contact, which the radar track is trained to report at first sight giving bearing and estimated range. This training resulted in a more alert attack and earlier reports of actual contacts.
     - An antenna spool of 5 rpm was used constantly and found satisfactory. However, an antenna spool of 2 rpm would probably be better for searching and would have the advantage that a watch could be spooled on the A-scope when the PPI is out of order. A close watch cannot be kept on the A-scope at greater speeds than 2 rpm.
     - It is noted that this small range counter of the range unit is not easily read. Also a true bearing indicator would facilitate plotting.
     - No serious troubles were experienced. The high voltage rectifier in PPI unit was not well insulated at socket. This was remedied by adding a 1/6 inch neoprene gasket between the tube socket and ground.
     - The motor generator could not provide power required by the converted SJ. This was rectified by taking part of the power from the 115 volt A.C. lighting circuit.

(2)

— page 91 —
(M) RADAR: (cont'd)
SD-3 This was the first patrol with SD-3. Ranges were generally double those of previous patrols.
Best range was 35 miles and closest was 2.5 miles, contacted while preparing to surface. Average range 15 miles.
There are some indications that the enemy is using direction finders on our SD. On February 9 SD had two contacts at 25 miles, one closing in rapidly, forcing SARO down. On preparing to surface some minutes later, SD showed a contact at 15 miles which rapidly closed to 6 miles. The aircraft remained at approximately 6 miles for over ten minutes, indicating: the aircraft was circling, possibly trying to locate source of buzzing. Similar operations occurred on 19 and 25 February.
On February 20 SD failed to pick up close plane contact observed by lookout. Transmitter's tubes were changed and two days later plane contact was observed at 23 miles.
The SD watch was stood on an instrument base, the car being turned on from 3 to 5 seconds every 45 to 60 seconds. This system gave overall test results and, of course, minimized the possibility of detection by the enemy.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS:
Sounds conditions were good in general.
First convoy contact was picked up echo ranging at approximately 20,000 yards. In general enemy echo ranging was picked up from 15,000 to 16,000 yards. Screws were picked up from 10,000 to 12,000 yards but no continuous bearings until 6000 to 7000 yards.
No sound ranges were taken.
This was the first patrol for this equipment. The results were erratic. Screws were on two occasions picked up at great ranges than the JX. However, the JP would often lose the screens at medium rate for varying periods of time up to about five minutes.
Normal submerged running procedures a very high noise level on this gear and makes interpretation of sounds difficult. Results should improve with experience of personnel.
In general operators could tell when any auxiliary machinery was started up at silent running, although they had difficulty whenever our screens were making more than 60 rpm.
It is desired to obtain a set of recordings of the various sounds that may be expected on the JP. These recordings would greatly facilitate the training of operators.

— page 96 —
P55-61/A16-3
Serial No. 054
CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. SARGO Report
of Tenth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division Sixty-one.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
    Subordinate Command, Navy No. 1504.
    (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
    (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U. S. S. SARGO - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

The vicinity of PALAU was the assigned area for the SARGO's Tenth War Patrol. Eighteen of the forty-five days on patrol were spent in the area. The patrol was terminated when all torpedoes had been expended.

2. Area coverage was excellent. Submerged patrol was resorted to while spending daylight periods close to the islands, but a slightly greater proportion of the time was spent at greater distances from the enemy base where patrol could be maintained on the surface. The latter was the more effective and this appears to be generally true. About one-third of the contacts with suitable torpedo targets close off port result in a single attack. Although contacts are less frequent, contacts on the sea lanes usually result in two or more attacks and usually against less opposition. This is an observation and not an argument to employ submarines only on the sea lanes. The enemy should be kept war-ridden and alerted everywhere.

3. Four contacts were made with suitable torpedo targets and two of these contacts resulted in attacks. Of the other two a small convoy passed out of range near port, and a group of two alerted searchers destroyed was evaded. Attack No. 1 - In the late afternoon a convoy of five ships and four escorts passed out of range. A chase put SARGO in good position for a night surface attack at 2,100 yards. Four torpedoes were fired but all missed. On was erratic. One should have hit. The end of our torpedo explosions alerted the convoy but SARGO was well clear of the sporadic gunfire and depth charges, and was not sighted. Attack No. 2 - The second attack on the above convoy 30 minutes later was nearly frustrated by an escort blinking at SARGO, range 1,500 yards. Attack was continued and four torpedoes were fired.

— page 97 —
5-61/A16-3
Serial No. 054
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBMARINE DIVISION SIXTY-ONE
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
March 14, 1944.

Subject: U. S. S. SARGO - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

pedoes were fired one minute later with three large ships approximately in line. One hit aft stopped the near tanker. A hit on the middle freighter caused the ship to disintegrate with a terrific explosion. SARGO was not detected. Attack No. 3 - A large freighter was attempting to escape unescorted after attack No. 2. After a two hour chase four torpedoes were fired at range of 1,700 yards. This spread was too great for the existing conditions and torpedoes passed ahead and astern. With torpedoes only aft SARGO intended to sink the crippled tanker but could not relocate it. Attack No. 4 - An early evening contact with a convoy of three medium size ships with two escorts was made. After obtaining position she had SARGO fired four torpedoes on tracks of 47 to 63 degrees at range of 2,100 yards with 5 degrees spread. One did hit and was destroyed. This spread was too large under the existing conditions. Attack No. 5 - Less than an hour after attack No. 4 a second night surface attack was made on the same convoy at 1,700 yards range. This resulted in one good explosion and one low order explosion. The freighter was stopped and a fire started amid-ships, but it was still afloat five and one-half hours later. All attacks were very aggressively made and carried to good firing range. Torpedo performance was below average. Coupled with the control errors the ultimate results were not as good as expected from the aggressiveness of the attacks.

In this and other recent patrol reports it is apparent that the ratio of escorts to ships in convoy is being increased, and all convoys have air escorts during daylight when within reasonable range of their air bases. As JAPANESE lines of communication are shortened by less of advance bases the anti-submarine efforts will probably increase because we have no adequate armament to reduce the number of their escort vessels.

The material condition of the SARGO is satisfactory, but there are numerous items to be accomplished during this refit to make the ship ready for next patrol. The refit will take seventeen days. It is believed that it would be advantageous to overhaul the SARGO after next patrol as extensive engine overhaul will be required at that time. Five war patrols will have been completed since last major overhaul.

— page 98 —
6. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are congratulated on a very aggressive patrol, during which the following damage was inflicted:

SUNK

1 - Freighter (Unidentified) 7000 tons

DAYAGED

1 - Naval Tanker (SEIRETOKA) 14,000 tons
1 - Freighter (Unidentified) 7000 tons

Copy to:
C.O. USS SARGO

(6)

— page 99 —
AL6-3  COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET (Mc)  SUBORDINATE COMMAND, NAVY NO. 1504
Serial 052  Care of Fleet Post Office,  San Francisco, California,  15 March 1944.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to  U.S.S. SARGON Report of  Tenth War Patrol.
From:  The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,  Subordinate Command, Navy No. 1504.
To:  The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
    (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject:  U.S.S. SARGON - Report of Tenth War Patrol.
1.  Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander  Submarine Division SIXTY-ONE.  Excessive spreads employed in  attacks No. 1 and No. 4 resulted in misses which otherwise should  have paid greater dividends in enemy damage for the aggressiveness  displayed by the SARGON.
2.  It is to be noted that a starboard instead of port  track was used in Attacks No. 4 and the track angles as listed in  the analysis are in error.  These should read 47, 52, 59 and 63 in  that order.
3.  The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,  Subordinate Command, Navy No. 1504 adds his congratulations to  the Commanding Officer, officers and crew upon the completion of  this aggressive and damaging patrol to the enemy.

C. D. EDMONDS,
(3)

— page 100 —
01230
Serial 0542
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SARGO Report of
Tenth War Patrol.
CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 321
U.S.S. SARGO - TENTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. SARGO (SS188) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.
(26 January to 12 March 1944).

1. The tenth war patrol of the SARGO was conducted in the Pelau Area.
2. The patrol was well conducted and area coverage was excellent. Attacks were well planned and aggressively made.
3. It is noted that the ratio of escorts to ships in a convoy is steadily on the increase. It is expected that in the near future we will have adequate armament to combat the escort menace.
4. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.
5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew on this aggressive patrol and is offering the following damage upon the enemy:

S-E-N-K
1 - Freighter (class unknown) - 7,000 tons (Attack No. 2)
D-A-N-A-E-D
1 - Naval Tanker (SHIRETOKA class) - 14,000 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Freighter (class unknown) - 7,000 tons (Attack No. 5)
TOTAL - 21,000 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5) CTF 72 (2)
CNO (5) Comorpac (1)
Cincpac (6) Comsubspace (40)
Intel.Cen.Fac.Ocean Areas(1) SUBAD, MI (2)
Comservpac (3)
(adv.Base Plan,Unit) (1) All Squadron and Div.
Cinclant (2) Commanders, Subspace (2)
Comsubsblant (8) Comsubstripe (2)
S/M School, NL (2) All Submarines, Subspace (1)
Comscpac (2) (1)
Comsowespace (1) (2)
Comsubscoespace (2) E. L. HYNES, 2nd, Flag Secretary.

— page 101 —
11-10/15-1(12)
Serial 061
CONFIRMED
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. San Juan (SS-205) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

Reference: (c) Commander third cnt. STI-10/16-3(15)/12 serial 0522 of 21 March 1944.

1. Reference (a) credits the U.S.S. San Juan with certain 2 more to the war patrol (class unknown, estimated 7,000 tons) on 29 February 1944.

2. Reliable intelligence, subsequently received, identifies the class as a 5.5-inch torpedo (in average 1.5 tons) of San Juan's attack.

3. ...according to reference (b) is correct as follows:

(a) In average 5 strikes out all effort the word "heavy" and substitute "torpedo".

SUBMARINE PATROL REPORT

1. - 11 (class unknown) 7,000 tons (attack)
1. - 11 (U.S.S. San Juan) 5,270 tons (estimated 12,275 tons)
12,270 tons

Return to: Room 45
ROUTINE NO.: C3

11,000 tons
12,000 tons

11,000 tons
12,000

— page 104 —
7 April, 1944. Operation Order No. 117-44.
1520(Y) Left Midway with air escort until sunset.
1655(Y) Submerged for trim, surfacod, and set course 277° T, at two engine speed.
Enroute to area held daily dives and drills, and fired all guns.

8 April Omitted from calendar, crossed date line.

13 April Master gyro out of commission. (See K)
2000(L) Radar contacts on two objects 5000 yards ahead. Visibility very low due to completely black night. Closed to about 1000 yards with objects not in sight in glasses, but contact maintained and plotted stopped. Believe this to have been two sampans but due to visibility it was impracticable to engage. Our position was at 31-58N Long 156-24E. (Ship Contact #1)

16 April Submerged on aircraft contact, not sighted.
1247(I) (Aircraft Contact #1) Lat 30-41N Long 142-33E
1330(I) Surface.
2057(I) Radar Contact on TORI SHIMA at 35 miles.
Remained stopped for greater part of night while making repairs to No. 3 M.E. exhaust valve, which came completely off operating gear. (See K)

17 April Submerged on aircraft radar contact.
1129(I) (Aircraft Contact #2) Lat 30-19N Long 138-14E
1244(I) Surface.
Stopped again tonight completing repairs to No. 3 exhaust valve.

18 April As we are passing through area 64, which is otherwise unoccupied, submerged for routining of all torpedoes, and repairs to SD mast cables which had parted, and master gyro which is still out. (See K)
2045(I) Entered area 8, Lat 30-33N Long 133-15E

19 April Entered area 7, and proceeded to position for patrol off mouth of BUNKO SUDO.
0452(I) Submerged with position in doubt due to overcast and variable currents. Lat 32-05N Long 132-43E
1940(I) Surfaced off east coast of KYUSHU, with following lights in view: TOGAKI HANA, and Factory mentioned in JIGPO Bull. 38-44; closed coast for thorough radar search. Visibility in direction of coast has been very poor due to surface haze. (See E)

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— page 105 —
19 April (continued)
2001(1) The first of three visual aircraft contacts. This was a large plane, giving impression of flying-boat, with at least four lights. He crossed ahead at about 3 miles. (Aircraft Contact #3) Let 31-59N Long 132-04E
2003(1) Another aircraft with lights, 'crossed ahead, range 4 miles. (Aircraft Contact #4)
2020(1) Another aircraft with lights, range 4 miles. (Aircraft Contact #5)
We are embarrassingly lighted by brilliant phosphorescence, which would make sighting simple for aircraft. We would stop to reduce this effect.
2303(1) Changed course to patrol traffic lane between ASHIZURI SAKI past TOI HISAKI into OSUMI KAIKYO during the night.
2330(1) Master gyro failed again, for third time.
20 April
04.56(1) Suttered, patrolling off SHIMANOURA TAN.
1502(1) Sighted tops of two sails of possible junk to westward on course away. Attempted unsuccessfully to close.
1942(1) (Ship Contact #2) Last 32-36 Long 132-06E
Surfaced, between SHIMANOURA and MISAKI, with several lights in sight.
1957(1) Radar contact at 8000 yards which soon disappeared, leading to belief that it was another plane.
(Aircraft contact #6) Let 32-31N Long 132-04E
Variable currents are making submerged navigation difficult. (See D)
Patrolled for night across 160° T line from BUNGO SUIDO, and proceeding for patrol off ASHIZURI SAKI tomorrow.

21 April
0505(1) Suttered, closing ASHIZURI SAKI, patrolled on 100 fathom curve to eastward. During day sighted murrous fishing sampans and fish nets. Lines of nets were marked with slender poles, carrying small colored pennants.
1938(1) Surfaced, patrolled around SAKI - ASHIZURI SAKI line until time to enter area 6B. Stopped to tune SJ on nearby land. Master gyro is now in commission.
Sighted light of sampen, passed at about 3000 yards.

22 April
0451(1) Entered area 6B.
1550(1) Suttered and patrolled in N.W. corner of area 6B.
Let 31-57N Long 133-15E
Sighted two aircraft, one a twin float plane, the other a flying boat, painted red. The red plane soon disapared but the twin float circled for next two hours at range of about 3-4 miles on bearing toward ASHIZURI SAKI. As these planes were not escorting any ships, and our presence was not known, it is possible that they were conducting some type of exercise. (Aircraft Contacts No. 7 & No. 8) Let 32-07N Long 133-17E
Surfaced. Stopped while charging and fixing position. Much phosphorescence.

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— page 106 —
22 April (continued)
: 20/6(1) J.O.O.D. sighted plane close aboard without lights, altitude 1500 feet. Plane possibly sighted SAIGO, for he turned on his lights and passed on to eastward. (Aircraft Contact No. 9) Cannot explain why he should turn-on his lights when practically alongside, then do nothing more about it. It was a moonless night but ship was clearly lighted by bright phosphorescence. Seas were flat calm, with low swells. On several occasions SJ radar would make contacts out as far as 3000 yds. and track in, only to have them disappear. This was baffling until analyzed as those swells. Let 32-1/4 Long 133-1/2 Radar interference to southward, probably friend.

: 23 April
: 04/58(1) Submerged, patrolling across 1600 line out of BUIGO SUIDO, in area 6B. Let 31-16 Long 133-50E

: 24 April
: 04/50(1) Submerged, patrolling eastern part of area. Surface, sky overcast, position in doubt. Set course to north to enter area 6 and patrol in vicinity of NUROTO SAKI. Storm is developing with heavy rain and seas making up.

: 25 April
: 04/47(1) Submerged in high seas and rain on 100 fathom curve south of NUROTO SAKI. Depth control is very difficult and then only at high speed. Visibility poor. Visibility fair, sighted two open-mast towers and low building on high ground about 1/4 mile north of NUROTO SAKI LINE. The high light is prenant near the top of steep rise from sea to high ground near end of cape. (See E)

: 25 April
: 1954(1) Surface with seas still rough. Radar fix soars to confirm statement in JIGPOA built, 38-44, that O SHINA is misplotted. (See E)

: 26 April
: 04/27(1) Submerged, closing southwest coast of HONSHU to patrol the ICHIYE SAKI - SHIONO ISAKI route. Sighted minesweeper on course S.E., close inshore. (Ship Contact #3) Let 33-30N Long 135-26E

: 07/16(1) Sighted Sampan patrol beaching 0.5°, about on 100 fathom curve. Sighted convoy passing TONTO SAKI on course about 130°, hugging the beach. Scow shoppy with many white cape, and setting onto the beach. Range was about 13,000 yars with visibility poor due to morning haze and land background. Convoy later made out to consist of five ships in a ragged two column formation, led by a SHIGUNE destroyer and with at least one aircraft escort. There were at least three surface escorts of which two have intimate knowledge, in the light of later events, but they were not sighted. With the exception of our selected target, which was a medium KMFI freighter in the seacward column,

— page 107 —
0720(I) (Continued) all ships were non-descript freighters. All ships were zigging slightly or changing course to conform with shoreline. 0502(I) Fired four torpedoes forward, 90° track, range 1600 yards, 0° gyro, using constant bearing spread, 8 foot depth setting. (Attack #1) Spread covered length of target. At firing there was another ship beyond and approximately in line. 0802-45(I) First torpedo explosion, a good solid one. Then three more torpedo explosions spaced at about firing interval, the last one timed and recorded at 1 min, 44 secs. Through error, gyro setters were not energized forward, and all torpedoes went out with 0° gyro. The first explosion is unexplained. It may possibly have hit a small escort which, with the sea existing, was unseen. The last three hits were in our target. Searched for additional escorts immediately after firing, but could locate only the destroyer. Commenced evasion at 270 feet and opening out from beneath. We were very close, with land back-ground practically filling the glass, and a strong current setting on the beach. 0808(I) Counter-attack begins, which was to last for four hours, with total of 64 charges. Sound reports breaking up noises on bearing of target. Forward and after rooms distinctly hear breaking up noises through the hull. It is firmly believed that our target sunk, and it is hoped that the first torpedo not something. Three A/S vessels got together and they were excellent, as we had only one direction to go, and that was to seaward, they knew our location well. No pinging was used the entire time. With one A/S vessel on each of our beams and one eastern, they took turns crossing over. Although sound conditions were poor for listening, it is not known that they actually heard us, but instead systematically plastered our limited three-aboutts. Nos. 23, 24, and 26, the very close ones, brought the paint and cork down, shattered light bulbs and one radio transmitter tub, started air and water leaks, temporarily knocked out the gyro follow-up, and flooded the bridge speaker. After about 2 1/2 hours it is believed that the surface ships ran out of charges, and planes continued random dropping. 1240(I) Last explosion. Continued to open out on beach against current. We have a moon tonight and the planes will probably be out. 1936(I) Surfaced, 15 miles offshore. Surface patrolling across KII SUDO. Planes were expected but none were sighted. 27 April 0452(I) Submerged off ASHIZURI BAKI, patrolling with current along lane to HURIOO SAKI. Seas glassy calm, slight haze, partial overcast. 0750(I) Sighting fishing buoys and fishing boats.

— page 108 —
27 April (Continued)
1750(1) Sighted and tracked fishing or patrol boat on course southwest.
1915(1) Surfaced, again much phosphorescence. Entered Area 6B.

: 28 April
0454(1) Submerged. Reduced visibility, rain. Patrolling in northern tip of Area 6B. Repairing master gyro, which is losing vacuum.
1915(1) Surfaced. Closed HONSHI coast, and patrolled along 100 fathom curve in KUMANO NADA between KANTOKI ZAKI and KUKI SAKI. Sighted MIKI SAKI LIGHT. (See E)

: 29 April
0030(1) Sighted and closed light patrol boat or fishing; boat 15 miles S.E. of KANTOKI SAKI. Light was extinguished as approached. It was not picked up on SJ, nor sighted, Lt 33-29N Long 136-11E
0428(1) Radar contact, 14,000 yds. Turned toward and cleared at high speed, commenced tracking. It was just beginning to become light.
0432(1) Sighted destroyer with stearboard 60 angle on bow. Due to daylight we were forced to submerge. Commenced approach, went to normal approach, Sea is choppy, visibility excellent. Range 10,500 yds. (Ship Contact #5) Destroyer turned towards us in 20° increments until angle on the bow zero. Attempted to cross ahead for storm shot, but he continued to proceed for us. Destroyer identified as 'AKA- Long 136-15E
0445(1) Still practically on the destroyer's track, at range 600 yards fired two Mk 18's from aft with about 60° loft gyro, torpedo run of 500 yards, 5 foot depth setting. Crossed firing as the set up was poor and deteriorat ing fast.
No hits. Destroyer passed close by down starboard side, with screws heard through hull. We fully expected a charge as he passed. He then circled us.
0451(1) Two explosions which were probably torpedoes at end of run.
0452(1) Destroyer serves spooked up and opened out until lost. Sound condition was poor.
In going over this attack-up, the following seas likely. We were picked up by shore based radar while patrolling during the night near KATSUORA 'NAH. He may have had radar or radar D.F., for he seemed to change toward us when we trained our radar on him at initial contact, Or he may have been running a search curve and we managed to get caught in the light. I do not believe that we were sighted. As he was making 15 knots, he did not detect us on sound until we fired, and realizing that he had been fired upon, lost heart and cleared out.
Continued patrolling, hoping that he might have been beating bushes for something coming through.
Surfaced, Patrolling in bright moonlight.

: 30 April
0415(1) Submerged.
1915(1) Surfaced. Lt 32-34N Long 137-00E

— page 109 —
1 May : Entered a sea.
: 0425(I) Contact on radar 18,000 yards ahead. At the time we were about ten miles off, closing the beach for patrol between KANTORI SAIKI and MIKI SAIKI. Target was tracked on course S.W., about 5,000 yards off the shore. Closed at high speed, until (Contact #6)
: 0430(I) Submerged due to daylight. Sea glassy calm.
: 0500(I) Sighted tops of above contact, later identified as small MFM, composite superstructure, coastal freighter, speed estimated at 8 knots, which passed at near range of 12,000 yards.
: 0511(I) Sighted smoke, turned toward. This developed into transfer standing out to sea. Then continued closing beach.
: 0658(I) For the next two hours passed through a maze of fishing sampans, just off 100 fathoms curve.
: 0715(I) Sighted several columns of smoke to S.W., went to battle stations and headed in toward beach. (Contact #8)
: 0920(I) Identified convoy as five ships, zigzagging at about 8 knots. Two of these developed into escorts, one a converted yacht and the other resembling a corvette. As targets were small, it was impossible to distinguish escorts from targets until range of about 8000 yards.
: 1035(I) Heard echo-ranging start up toward beach. Sighted TAKATAKAR destroyer and small naval tanker on course south in close to and between SAIKO and the beach. (Contact #9)
: 1035(I) We were now in beautiful position, dead ahead of convoy, between columns, on their base course of 030°, when, at range of 6, but 6000 yards, to our amazement the convoy dispersed, and possibly lay to, each with a different angle on bow, and one target whose tops could just be seen, well astern. The second escort then continued northward, then headed toward the beach.
: 1035(I) The seas were absolutely calm, without a ripple and poris-cope observations were made with caution.
: 1035(I) This escort, the PY, was joined by two sanpen patrols, and proceeded northward close to the beach. Then each of the ships in single file at intervals of about 2000 yards, proceeded toward the beach, and then along it. The third ship was a medium tanker, the only worthwhile target. We attempted to continue the approach on him, but he passed at nearest range of 4500 yards, at the time it was thought that there was another target waiting to follow the tanker, but this later turned into the stern escort, who remained behind until all his charges had been horded through, when commenced echo-ranging and proceeded northward. Finally sighted twin-flot reconnaissance plane close aboard and gliding in toward us. Went to 110 foot, opened out, (aircraft Contact #11)
: 1035(I) Those were the most confusing maneuvers that have been experienced. Everything leads to the belief that the convoy

— page 110 —
1035(I) (continued) stopped to wait the destroyer and his charge to pass through or behind a mine-field at this particular point, and then they passed through in single file.

This analysis is reached subsequent to the approach as the only logical explanation. The thought of a mine-field did not effect our approach. At the time of the dispersal, we were actually heading away from the beach in order to improve our position, which at that time was between the inshore columns.

Conditions were decidedly unfavorable for an undetected approach, due to existing calm, but there were no indications that we were detected. Any one of the many sunpans or the plane may have sighted us, but no 1/3 section was taken. This, and the radical action of the convoy, lead to the belief of the existence of a possible mine field. (See I)

Surfaced in light fog, off NIKI, Saki. Seas dead calm. Noting interference on SJ radar.

Patrolling during the night along OKAI SAIK - SHIONO NISAKI line. If this calm continues we will patrol this line tomorrow. If it blows up somewhat will petrol close in to westward of OMAI SAIK.

2 May
0215(I) Radar contact at 3000 yards. Contact soon disappeared. This may have been a submarine or a swell. To experienced this condition earlier in patrol on a calm night.

0424(I) Submerged with seas flat calm, overcast, on the OKAI SAIK - SHIONO NISAKI line. Lt 34-07th Long 137-25E

1109(I) Heard first of about eight distant depth charges. Sighted nasts and two sails of sailing sampan. During the day we sighted numerous oil drums and debris, (including a ship's boat)

1916(I) Surfaced off DAIO SAIK, in bright moonlight.

1547(I) 0.0.D, sighted ship and immediately thereafter radar contact at 13,000 yards. Connected tracking. (Ship Contact #10)

1953(I) Ship turned towards vicinity angle on bow of zero. Submerged to radar depth and commenced approach. Ship speed 18 knots, zigging 20° Inconsonants, always away. Range 10,500 yards.

2015(I) Ship vaguely identified in periscope as small destroyer or CHIDORI, passed at near range of 5100 yards. This was very disappointing for it looked as if we had the draw on him.

This may have been the same patrol which we attacked a few mornings ago. Shortly after we trained the SJ on him and commenced tracking, he zigged directly for us as verified by sight from bridge and ply plot. After diving to radar depth there was a blind period when his range closed from 10,000 to 6,500 yards. Tracking submerged was done almost entirely with radar in power sweep. It is possible that this patrol has a radar detector which gives him a bearing if we are accommodating enough to keep it trained on him. In this case he lost up

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— page 111 —
2015(1) (continued) when we dove and resound his zigging. The similar case occurred with the northing patrol. He turned towards us and was able to come down our bearing. It may be that our presence was not known in either case, but similarity in manoeuvors shortly after we established radar contact in each case, leads to suspicions, Surfacod, rapid pursuit, but destroyer quickly pulled out of radar range.

3 May 0430(1) Submerged in calm seas, on 100 fathom curve west of OHAI SAKI, proceeding to point 18 miles west of OHAI SAKI where the 100 fathom curve is only 3 miles off, and which spot has been productive of many contacts. Lat 34-33N, Long 137-46E. During the day, a light fog or surface haze developed which seriously limited visibility. Although large scuppers or patrols were with us continuously through the day, they could fade out of sight at about 2500 yards. Although beach was in sight at diving it faded out and was not seen again. The fathometer was invaluable in maintaining position. Surfacod off OHAI SAKI, preco.dod southwest attempting interception of reported convoys.

4 May Running retiring search covering various courses of reported convoy.

5 May Still searching. Sand rough, heavy rains. Submerged, End-rod area 4B, Position in doubt. Patrolling across YOKYO south-east lanes heading toward IZU SHOYO. Visibility improved during the day and seas have calmed. Surfacod 30 miles west by north of NAGIHUO SHIMA. Closed HACHIJO then headed north until in vicinity of INABEA SHIMA, and patrolled between INABEA and ZOHI SU until dawn. This has been reported as a likely spot for shipping which leaves SAGAMI NADA at sunset for the southwest. The noon is full and sky cloudless.

6 May Submerged off INABEA SHIMA, closed it and took pictures from 3000 yards. No activity, a barren rock. Patrolling across to westward of MIKURA SHIMA. No activity either or surface. Surfacod ten miles south of MIKURA SHIMA. Sighted two planes flying formation, with lights on. They passed two miles aboard and continued in direction of INABEA. (Aircraft Contact #12) As this area is scheduled to remain empty after tonight, I have decided to give routes passing INABEA to east and west another try tonight, and enter our next area during tomorrow's dive. The presence of the planes may mean that something is coming through.

-9-

— page 112 —
7 May
0040(1) Fire in main control cubicle. Lost all power. For the next one hour and one half, we lay to in full moon, with no motor propulsion, while repairs were made to field leads and panels to main motors, which had burned. This was a trying period, enhanced by the thoughts of the night patrol planes, and the 0,0,D, reporting a plane with two horizontal great lights, moving in our direction. Fortunately we were able to recon- vert those lights to stars. (See K)
0205(1) Jury rigged field leads installed. Resumed patrol.
0419(1) Submerged, southwest of HIKURA, patrolling into area 4, Seas are choppy, with a surface haze restricting periscope visi- bility.
1914(1) Surfaced. Full noon rising, sky cloudless. Conditions are unfavorable for close in patrol at night, so patrolled to eastward, across warship lanes, then reversed and closed HIKURA - MIKAKE group.

8 May
0421(1) Submerged off MIKURA, commenced patrolling 8 miles off, between MIKAKE and MIKURA. It is again hazy and these islands could barely be discerned. Cano to 40 feet for search on SJ, prior to surfacing. Contact two planes 3000 yards ahead, which we tracked on P.P.I, as they passed directly overhead and were lost at 4500 yards astern. (Aircraft Contact #13)
1917(1) Surfaced.
1946(1) Sighted flashing light to seaward. Closed in direction of light, but it soon disappeared. This was probably a patrol boat.

9 May
0157(1) We were heading toward HACHIJO SHIMA for submerged patrol when at Contact at 10,000 yards, dead ahead. This developed into severe crash. The SJ radar performance was decidedly inferior for the first time since its installation. Normally we could expect to pick up ships of this size at 20,000 yards. Con- nected tracking and end around at full speed. This is actual- ly a convoy of two medium freighters, two small freighters, and five escorts, four of which were 50 type and one trailer or gunboat. The small escorts were never contacted on radar even at range of 5000 yards.
Base course of convoy was 100 T, speed 7 1/2 knots. It soon became apparent that we would find ourselves unable to get into position for attack until just about dawn, with the consequent expectation of a radical zig at that time. Due to the certainty of air escort from nearby HACHIJO after dawn, it was impracticable to open out for an attack later in the day. Gambling that this zig would be towards about 170° T, at dive in position about 1500 yards off track in direction of expected zig, and 10,000 yards ahead, approach was continued.

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— page 113 —
9 May
0400(1) (Continued) at radar depth until range 5000 yards. It is now daylight, and we are dead ahead. Targets changed course from 160° to 090° at dawn. This puts us directly in path of two starboard escorts and in position for long range shot with large tracks at best. No guessed wrong on the zig.

The first escort, a small gunboat with forecastle gun and high square platform above and aft of bridge, mounting another small gun, passed within 300 yards. This platform had about eight lookouts in white uniforms and three more more on the forecastle. A look after the gunboat passed showed that our target had changed course to right, angle on bow was now 90°, range 2000 yards. The other ships had not changed.

We are directly ahead of this second escort, SC type, and very close.

Fired four torpedoes from aft with 2" T.P.O. spread, torpedo run 2100 yards, 0° gyros, 8 ft, setting. All missed, and exploded at end of run. The only explanation is that we fired on a knuckle, the target was steady before and during firing, with everything checking beautifully.

This second escort passed directly overhead, with screws heard through hull, to remain at periscope depth hoping for another shot but escorts became very busy when torpedoes were running and soon they exploded at end of run.

Became a long range torpedo at 2000 yards. Escort was closing from 2000 yards. Scouting for torpedoes. Escort was closing from

— page 114 —
12 May
0019(1) Underway, proceeding to position of reported convoy.
    Searching for convoy, running retiring search for maximum
    course coverage.
    Interference on both radars, which is undoubtedly a friend
    engaged in search.

: 13 May
0131(1) Continuing search.
    Radar contact at 40,000 yards. Cannoned tracking and closing
    at full speed. As this is greatest range for ship contact, we
    thought imminently of carrier or battleship. Shortly after
    establishing course and speed, contact disappeared. This pheno-
    cannot range on a submarine is undoubtedly due to peculiar atmo-
    phoric conditions described in Section M.
0155(1) Contact reestablished at 16,000 yards, with interference from some
    bearing. Now we believe it is friendly submarine, probably SEA-
    DRAGON. At range of about 9500 yards sighted target, which at
    range of about 7500 yards was identified as submarine. There is
    a hazy full moon shining through overcast. At range of about
    5500 yards, the submarine was seen to dive apparently to radar
    depth at contact was mistaken on radar. We maneuvered to nadir-
    ten the range, and sent recognition on QC, but received no reply.
    Target may have fired smoke berth as we sighted black smoke cloud
    in his direction. (Ship Contact #12)
0230(1) Target surfaced, attempted to send recognition with blinker run
    without contact.
    Had not search for convoy until
    0430(1) when it ended for tomorrow's noon position of reported convoy.
    0700(1) Submarines convoy's noon position.
    1325(1) Sighted a sunken approach on which later developed into U.S.
    submarine. Notified as SEA DRAGON, at range of 5000 yards sub-
    marine periscope course and pass out of sight. (Ship Contact #13)
1556(1) Surface patrol.
2200(1) Entered sea.

: 14 May Surface patrolling.

: 15 May Surface patrolling.

: 16 May Surface patrolling in area 44 in vicinity of TORI SHIMA,
1900(1) Departed across on route MIDWAY. We are encountering storm with
    heavy rains and medium seas from eastward.

: 22 May
0930 Arrived MIDWAY, moored outboard U.S.S. BANG, alongside U.S.S.
    PROTESIS. Received fuel, minor voyage repairs, provisions,
1600 Unloading armouro PEARL.

: 25 May
1419(X) Sighted and exchanged recognition with U.S.S. S-35.

: 26 May
0600 Sighted, exchanged recognition with escort.
    Forenoon Moored at PEARL.

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— page 115 —
60° to 70°, with the average for the patrol being about 65°.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION:

Currents in all Enclosures show the strong influence of the KURSHIO, but close to land they are also affected by tides and the contour of the coast line. Currents were always present, the set being generally easterly, drifts between 1 and 2 knots, but no rule could be depended upon entirely.

Currents near the IZU SHOTO islands were especially tricky, and slight or radar contact with land was maintained at all times. Japan Pilot, Vol. II, 4th Ed., 1940, pp. 608, offers good information on currents in these waters.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:

On April 25, two open-cast towers and a low building were sighted on high ground about 1/4 mile north of MUROTO SAKI LIGHT. Position of masts and house indicate it is a radio station at about 35°14'45"N, Long 134°10'48"E. MUROTO SAKI LIGHT is a good landmark, at least from the east side of the cape, from which position it is seen as a prominent tower near the top of a steep rise from the sea to high ground at the end of the cape.

Upon surfacing near MUROTO SAKI and while running across KII SUDO this might (Apr. 25), radar bearings on 6 SHIMA (Lat 33-37, 7N, Long 134-30,0E) seemed to confirm the statement in JIQPOA Bull, No. 38-44 that this island should be plotted about 2 miles eastward of its location on chart H.O. 5317.

Lights sighted were as follows:

At 1955(1), April 19, sighted two lights on east coast of KYUSHU: (a) steady white, apparently from direction of factory mentioned in JIQPOA Bull, No. 38-44 (on coast at about 32-00N), and (b) occulting white light (on 3 sec., off 5 sec.) apparently from TOSAKI HANA LIGHT.

At 2239 on same date, sighted three lights: (a) Same as (a) above; (b) below to be the 20 mile light on point (Lat 32-25N, Long 131-41E) south of MI SAKI, and (c) from direction of red sampen reported in JIQPOA Bull, No. 38-44 at lat 38-55N, Long 131-45E, which may have been from TODORO LIGHT (Lat 32-31N, Long 131-41E) Fl, R, 1 rod, 2 white, with period of 23 seconds (0 sec., rod flash) 11 sec., white flash 17 sec., white flash; 23 sec., rod, etc.), but if this was TODORO, then from ship's position, it is believed

— page 119 —
1. TIE: 1. LAT: 1. TIME, REST, GCS, HON: CON- 2. DA: TE: LONG, TYPE(S): RANGE & SPEED TACTIC: REMAINS: 2. 1247(1) 30-4IN unknown 13 -- R Not sighted. 16 Apr 142-33E. 2. 1129(1) 30-19N unknown 12 -- R Not sighted. 17 Apr 138-14E. 3. 2001(1) Sighted from bridge at 4. 203(1) 31-59N unknown 3 West S night, All planes were at 5. 2020(1) 132-04E about 1500 ft, and lighted. 19 Apr #3 gave impression of lance flying boat. 6. 1957(1) 32-31N unknown 4 -- R SJ radar at night; not 20 Apr 132-04E sighted. 7. 1550(1) 32-07A twin 6 -- P Planos circled at range 8. 22 Apr 133-17E nonoplano & flying boat. 4 miles for two hours. 9. 2046(2) 32-14N unknown 1 SW S Sighted from bridge. When 22 Apr 133-17E plane was close aboard ho turned on lights; alti- tude 1500 feet. 10. 0736(1) 33-27M float 6 -- P Escorting convoy, after 26 Apr 135-24E type our attack, this plane roccommis probably bombed us. -sance 11. 1135(1) 33-46N twin 2 -- P Escort for convoy. 1 May 136-11E float roccommis -sance 12. 1938(1) 33-38N unknown 3 270° S Sighted shortly after 6 May 139-33E 2 planes 100 kts surfacing. Burning lights. Did not sight sub. 13. 1914(1) 34-12N unknown 1# 270° R Picked up in SJ radar, 8 May 140-04E 2 planes during sweep prior to surfacing. Tracked and passed directly over sub- marine 14. 1340(1) 31-42N ENTRY 3 000 P Sighted in periscopo, 10 May 140-34E Did not sight us.

— page 120 —
ATTACK DATA:
H)    U.S.S. SARGO    TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1    PAYROL NO. 11
TIME 0802(T)    DATE 26 April    LAT 33-30N    LONG 135-27E

Target Data: Damage Inflicted

Description:
Target was largest ship in convoy of five ships, one SHIGURE destroyer, several smaller exoorts. All other ships in convoy were small coastal steamers, none over 2000.tons. Snoke of convoy was sighted through periscope:proceeding along coast of NOISHU near ICHIYE SAII. Ships were in rough double column, destroyer leading, inner column not over one mile from beach. Convoy was zigzagging or changing course to conform with beach. Sea was heavy chop with strong breeze blowing onto land, light haze due to wind drift, sky.clear with broken clouds, current of 2 knots setting onto beach.

Ship(s) Sunk:
Target was MFM composite superstructure, medium stack, forward mast with yardarm, raked bow, counter stern, three is-land camouflaged with dazzle, white and dark gray, 5000 tons, freighter. Forward and after walls appeared to be rigged like tanker with exhaust, piping, etc. Possibly carrying oil in bulk.

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk:
Damage Determined by: Heard throo (3) timed torpedo explosions, sound reported ship brooking up noise on proper bearing of target. Forward and after torpedo rooms both report breaking up noises through the hull. First torpedo fired exploded at 45 secs. What it hit is unknown. Analysis clearly shows that #2,3,4, were timed to hit our target.

Target Draft 20 est. Course 105. Spced 9 Range 1600 (at firing)

On Ship Date

Spced 45. Course 020 Depth 64 Angle 1D (At firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:
Approach consisted of closing the beach rapidly, after sighting at range of about 12,000 yards. The destroyer passed at too great range for a successful shot. Fired four Mk. XIV's forward, 8 foot depth setting, 0° gyros, torpedo run 1500 yards, 95 starboard track, using constant bearing spread. Gyro settors forward were not energized and thus all torpedoes went out with 0° gyros, and the spread was ineffective.

— page 121 —
1. ATTACK DATA (Continued)
(H) ATTACK DATA (Continued)
(Types of Attack #1, continued)
Tubes: Fire
Truck Angle
Gyro Angle
Depth Set
Power
Hit or Miss
Energetic
Mark torpedo
Serial No.
Mark Exploder
Serial No.
Actuation Set
Actuation Actual
Mark Warhead
Serial No.
Explosive
Firing Interval
Type Spread
Sea Conditions
Overhaul Activity
Remarks

#1
95 S
0
8
High
Hit*
No
14-3A
26229
-6-4
12393
Contact
Contact
16
2286
Torpex
12
Longitudinal
Four
Submarine Base, Midway
Torpedoes were fired as if using constant bearing spread.
Actually gyro scutters forward were not charged and all torpedoes were fired with 0° gyro, #2/3/4, produced
timed hits in our targets.
* #1 exploded at 45 seconds. It is not known what this
torpedo hit.

U.S.S. SARGON
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2
PATROL NO. 11
Tinc 0445(1)
Date 29 April
LAT. 33-04N
LONG. 136-17E
Target Data: Dangers Inflicted
Description: Single WAKATAKE or similar type destroyer sighted simultaneously with radar contact in early dawn. After establishing radar contact target sighted towards us in 20° increments.

Ship(s) Sunk: None
Ship(s) Damaged: None
Damage Determined by: --
Target Draft 816" Course 275 Spood 15 Range 600 (at firing)
Own Ship Data
Spood 43 Course 295 Depth 65 Angle 0° (at firing)

19

— page 122 —
ATTACK DATA (Continued)
(Attack No. 2, continued)
Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Commenced approach on surface, tracking by radar, using T.B.T. bearings and angles on bow. Forced to dive by daylight, continued approach from periscope. Target ran a zig of 20° zigs always to his right. We were attempting to get off track for a storm tube 90° starboard track, when at range of about 800 yards tar,ct zigged to his right c.nin, giving us a 10° angle on port bow. -sleeptod set up and fired two torpedoes (Mk 18) aft with 5 foot depth setting. Both missed, probably due to underrunning target, but possibly due to range error effect on large gyro shots.

|    |    |    |    |
|------|------|------|------|
| Tubes | Fired | #5 | #6 |
| Track | Angle | 22° | 37° P |
| Gyro | Angle | 135 | 122 |
| Depth | Sct | 5 | 5 |
| Power | -- | -- | -- |
| Hit or | Miss | Miss | Miss |
| Erratic | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Serial No. | 53578 | 53515 | 53515 |
| Mark Exploder | 1-7 | 1-7 | 1-7 |
| Serial No. | 16153 | 16308 | 16308 |
| Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual | -- | -- | -- |
| Mark Warhead | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Serial No. | 550 | 199 | 199 |
| Explosive | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex |
| Firing Interval | 9 sec. | -- | -- |
| Type Spread | No spread (both fired at MOT) | -- | -- |
| Sea Conditions | Three (No small, moderate sea) | -- | -- |
| Overhaul Activity | Submarine Base, Midway | -- | -- |
| Remarks | Firing was done from an unfavorable position caused by target change of course at close range. As the draft of target was approximately 8 ft., underrunning of torpedoes is not likely cause.

U.S.S. SARGO
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2
PATROL NO. 11
Tine 0440(1)
Date 9 May
LAT. 33-13N
LONG. 140-3A
Target Data: Damage Inflicted

Description: Target was HMN, composite superstructure froighter, raked bow, counter storm, well dock, coal burner, of about 3000 tons. Convoy of four small froighters, five escorts, 4 SC type, one gunboat or PY type, one ahcad, two on each side.

20

— page 123 —
2000 (Continued)
(H) ATTACK DATA (Continued)
(Attack No. 3, continued)
Ship(s) Sunk: none
Ship(s) Damaged: none
Dense Determined by: Heard all torpedoes explode at end of run.
Target Draft 201 Course 146 Speed 7 Range 2000 (At firing)
Speed 2.5 Course 250 Depth 65 Angle 1D (At firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Contacted convoy on radar at 10,000 yards about 2 1/2 hours before dawn. Tracked and ran and around, was just able to get ahead and in position by dawn. Base course of convoy during this period 140°, Anticipated a dawn zig toward 170°, so dived at daylit, hit, 10,000 yards ahead and 1500 yards off track on side toward anticipated zig. Instead convoy zigged 50° to left to 090° at dawn when range was about 6000 yards. This put us in path of two starboard escorts and in position for poor long range shot. A look after first escort passed showed that our target had zigged to right (giving 90° starboard angle on bow, range 2000 yards. Fired four Mk 18, with 0° gyro, using 2° divergent spread, 8 ft. depth setting. All missed.

|    | #5    | #6    | #7    | #8    |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes Fired | 98 S   | 99 S   | 100 S | 102 S |
| Track Angle | 19° L  | 29° L  | 19° L | 5° R  |
| Gyro Angle | 8    | 8    | 8    | 8    |
| Depth Sct |    |    |    |    |
| Power    |    |    |    |    |
| Hit or Miss | Miss  | Miss  | Miss | Miss |
| Erratic   | No    | No    | No   | No   |
| Mark Torpedo | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Serial No. | 53637 | 54103 | 53640 | 53954 |
| Mark Exploder | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Serial No. | 16445 | 16141 | 16615 | 16180 |
| Jetation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Jetation Set |    |    |    |    |
| Mark Warhead | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Serial No. | 352 | 629 | 646 | 714 |
| Explosive | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex |
| Firing Interval | 11 | 13 | 12 | 12 |
| Type Spread | 2° Divergent | Swalls | Swalls | Swalls |
| Sea Conditions | Swalls | Swalls | Swalls | Swalls |
| Overhaul activity | Submarine Base, Midway | | | |
| Remarks: | Reason for mission is not known. As speed of target was accurately known from two hours radar tracking, and course at firing was accurately estimated from a 90° angle on bow, the most likely cause is that target changed course during run of torpedoes. Due to proximity of escorts it was impractical to observe target during this period, analysis shows at least two hits, Torpedoes exploded at end of run.

21

— page 124 —
1. MINE: The existence of a possible minefield is suspected off KATTAFU HANA (Lat 33-53,7N, Long 136-09E)(South coast of HONSHU, H.O, Chari No.5679). This belief was established after observing the manoeuvers of a convoy and its escorts. This convoy stood up the coast well offshore, about on the 100 fathom curve, until reaching a position about three miles from above position. It then lay to, waited for a destroyer and a tender to pass on course south and inshore of it, then proceeded by three escorts, it headed in toward the beach, then northward along the beach in single file.

(2) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND VESSEL TACTICS:
Nothing new was noted in anti-submarine measures. All shipping sighted was heavily escorted, with a sorted typos, mostly the SC class. Night flying planes were encountered near BUNGO SUIDO and in Area 4. With one exception, they were lighted and consequently not very of-factory. In all cases, those planes were sighted within an hour after sur-facing.

Daylight plane escort for convoys seems to be general. The almost complete absence of echo-ranging is of interest. On several occasions when our previous work in low but our location was unknown, and when sound contact had either not been established or had been lost, echo-ranging still was not used. There were no indications that an echo-ranging frequency beyond our detective range was used.

In the one depth-charging sustained, the A/S vessels were general-ous in the number of charges dropped (64). Some of those may have been from planes.

To encounters with small destroyers or torpedo boats indicated possible radar or radar detector.

SD radar was not used in the inshore areas. A method of trimming the ship in going to deep submarine, as used very successfully by the Diving Officer of this vessel, is mentioned as of interest. A pressure of 75 lbs. is carried in #2 or #3 auxiliary. When carried deep, the calculated amount of water (from bathy, card) is quit-ely and quickly blown to sea by opening sea valve before sea pressure reaches 75 lbs. This eliminates the necessity of using the noisy trim pump on the way down.

— page 125 —
1. Major Defects and Damage:
   - The following defects and damage were experienced with the engines. The results of any individual casualty were not very severe but they indicate that the natural condition of the engineering plant is reaching a critical stage.
   - #1 Main Engine
      a. The salt water circulating pump suction line developed a small leak and was temporarily patched.
      b. Prior to departure on patrol the after generator cooler developed a leak in one tube. The tube was plugged.
   - #2 Main Engine
      a. Renovated stuffer in #2 unit because of blow by through broken rings.
      b. The division cover in #3 unit was not centered properly so that the dowel pins were not in place, and the rotator rings were touching and scoring the rod. The piston end division cover rings were replaced. This scoring did not show up until the second 100 hour inspection. The division cover was improperly installed during the last refit.
      c. The bolts came out of the split lock ring of the piston in #5 unit, carrying away the babbit bush, rings and one horizontal land in an exhaust port. It was impossible to determine whether or not those bolts had been properly wired.
      d. The upper super-charger shaft was found to be advanced 25° ahead of that specified by the timing diagram. In resetting the timing that rotating rings of the ball bearing for the lighter gear of chain drive were found to be broken and some pieces had fallen down through the gear tr.i.n. The ball bearing was replaced and the timing reset.
      e. The after generator cooler developed a leak, was disassembled and plugged. This is the third such casualty, each in a different section of the coolers in the last three months, and indicates the necessity of extensive work on those generator coolers.
   - #3 Main Engine
      a. A leak amounting to one quart of fresh water per hour, developed in the upper conter exhaust header. Because of the difficulty in getting the tube to the exhaust, the leak was not been repaired and the engine has been operated sparingly.
   - #4 Main Engine
      a. During the training period of last refit a leak developed in the inboard exhaust valve jacket. The valve was taken down, disassembled, and the hole was covered with silver solder. The jacket was very badly pitted. It is believed that there is a recurrence of this casualty, as a small stream of salt water again flows out of the exhaust space drain.
   - Auxiliary Engine
      a. On April 5, 1944, during the training period at the end of the last refit, hub oil circulation was lost. The hub oil pump was found to be worn excessively and was replaced.
      b. On April 25, 1944, fresh water circulation was lost. It was found that the siphon drive shaft on the pump became so worn that it was able to slip inside of the driver gear and thus the pump did not retest. The pump was replaced by a spare and normal operation was resumed.

— page 126 —
2. The following casualties were experienced in the Electrical Department:

Main Motors:
a. While running on the surface in the car-a and during a battery charge, a fire broke out in the Control Cubicle at the port motor field switch resulting in the loss of power on that side. It is believed that oxidation at the terminal made a high resistance connection causing sufficient heat to start the fire. The backlite board was so carbonized that it was necessary to bypass the switch with new cables. Normal power was resumed within two hours.
b. The brush contact on #1 Main Motor rheostat was opened due to a faulty brush. The commutator was burned slightly but by cleaning the commutator and removing the brush the casualty was quickly corrected.
c. On May 17, 1944 while returning from the area power was lost on the port Main Motors. Inspection revealed the following conditions existing in #2 Main Motor:
   i. All brushes badly burned with pigtails completely detached.
   ii. Many small pieces of molten metal at the commutator and.
   iii. B.dly pitted and burned brush holders.
   iv. Corr. motor carbonized up and slightly burned and scorod.
   v. Burns in windings at certain points.
   The motor was put out of commission for the remainder of the patrol because of lack of brush holders springs, etc. to accomplish repairs. The cause of this casualty has been traced back to the field switch casualty under "a," When the field was lost on the port motors as a result of the fire, a large surge of current unaccountably passed through the motor causing the majority of the damage. The circuit finally opened as a result of continued use. This motor will require considerable attention during the coming stay in port.

Interior (curvature):
a. What occurred in the car-a fire broke out in the starboard forward lifeboat panel located in the pump room. The fire stopped itself when a 100 amp fuse blew at the main switch in the Maneuvering Space. It was caused by noisiture working the dialectric strength between the busses to such an extent that it short circuited. The insides of a similar but unused panel in the Forward Battery were inserted in place of the burned one and normal lighting was resumed.
b. The constant frequency unit was secured because when in use it affected the gyro follow-up mechanism. The source of this trouble was not located.
c. #2 Lighting Motor Generator commenced vibrating excessively. The after bracing was renewed but this vibration was only temporarily reduced. It is believed that the armature is out of balance so that the generator has been placed in a condition of "for emergency use only".
d. The revolution indicators continue to be very unsatisfactory. They require constant surveying and solution is more than one in commission at a time.

— page 127 —
3. Leak in Negative Tank from No. 1 F.O. Tank.
   - A leak developed between negative tank and No. 1 F.O. tank through the manhole. On the SARGO negative tank is located within No. 1 F.O. tank. The leak was first noticed when fuel oil fumes were repeatedly obtained from negative tank inboard vent upon vomiting pressure off negative, after the fuel in No. 1 F.O. tank had been consumed and replaced with compensating water, the pressure and water level in negative tank were both observed to rise at deep submergence.
   - On one occasion, running at deep submergence for nine hours, approximately 8000 lbs. of water flooded into negative tank from No. 1 F.O. tank, necessitating frequent use of trim pump to maintain depth. It is probable that removing the gasket on the manhole cover with a "hospreme" gasket will result in satisfactory seal between the two tanks.
   - This leak created a high noise background in sound gear.

4. For Plane Rigging Out Mechanism:
   - The rigging in gear for the bow planes did not operate satisfactorily throughout the patrol, after an all day dive the bow planes were very sluggish in rigging in. The motor acted as though it were operating under heavy load. During the rigging in operation, the tilting stock was observed to move slightly forward and aft in a series of jerks. Tests for centering of planes before rigging gave no improvement.
   - In general, after the planes had been rigged in, rigging them out and in again two or three times resulted in normal operation. Apparently the binding, if such was the case, was corrected by the initial rigging in operation and thereafter the bow plane gear was properly aligned.
   - The complete gear topside and below was cleaned and greased. Performance was still not dependable and confirmed suspicions as to misalignment of gears. During next rofit the entire bow plane rigging out gear in superstructure and forward torpedo room should be disassembled and parts thoroughly checked for wear, corrosion, and crystallisation.

5. For Submersible Planes - Excessive Noise:
   - Bow and stern plane shafting were excessive noisy throughout the patrol. Indications of excessive wear on shaft bearings and universal joints were noted. Clutch and gear mechanism in Control Room were constant source of noise. Little improvement was noted in operation after thoroughly greasing.

6. Hull Defects:
   - Prior to departure on patrol two cracks in bow buoyancy tank were found and welded up. Superstructure aft of engine exhaust mufflers was observed to be ripping apart and was spot welded together. A leak in the header box developed, allowing sea water to enter main engine air induction and spray the cubicle. The above hull defects indicate a deterioration of superstructure.

— page 128 —
7. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Continued)

(K) Major Defects and Damage (Continued)

7. Mk. 7, Mod. 1, Arma (Master) Gyro Compass:
   This compass was out-of commission six times during this patrol. Since the follow-up system of the compass feeds own ship's course into TDC, it is used to obtain accurate true bearings for fire control plotting, and as-tuates the steering repeaters, the repeated breakdown of the compass as-sumed the proportions of a major casualty.

   On April 13, 1944, the south rotor of the compass lost vacuum to the point of unsafe operation, and was secured after the ltk. 9, Mod. 2, Arma Auxiliary Compass had settled on the meridian (Plus or minus two degrees). Steering was shifted to the Control Room. The gasket on the south rotor was replaced, the rotor rosealed, and a vacuum of 25 in. obtained with the hand pump provided.

   The compass operated properly for five days, during which time the south rotor slowly lost vacuum until it revoaled a low of 16 in. The rotor current was 2.5 amps. The vacuum on the master was removed while the rotors were hot, the compass restarted, and the vacuum again dropped within a very few hours.

   The compass was secured and the clement removed and the rotor case sealed with gasket cement. In replacing the splitter into the sensitive clement, the center contact pin on the stalk was broken. It was replaced by a common sealing needle, which was introduced through the small brass adapter plate by driving the needle through a cage of soap to support the needle against banding, and then tapping the plate with a small hammer on the needle until the needle passed through the plate, making a firm seal in the plate. The vacuum was removed and the compass reassembled and started at 1200, April 19. At 2300, when ship's course was observed to be in error, the master gyro was checked and found to be tilted off the meridian. The vacuum in the rotors was satisfactory, but it was found that there was a broken rotor lead be-tween the clement and the rotor.

   This lead was repaired, and the compass was started, but would not settle on the meridian. A general check was made according to the Arma ltk. 7 ltd. 1 instruction book (Pages 63 & 64). All itacs checked except number 11, the check of the damping cut out circuit. The ball in the valve could not be heard when the circuit was energized. The damping tanks were removed and the valve checked. There were several small piles of firing matter clogged around the valve, thus limiting greatly the flow of oil from one tank to another and also causing the valve to stick. This trouble was re-claimed and the tanks replaced and the compass reassembled and started.

   This time the sensitive clement was out of balance. The clement was balanced by the addition of small strips of lead. The balance was made with the clement in the binnacle with the oscillator bowl running. This cut down on the skin effect of the mercury. The compass was reassembled and started and this time it found and held the meridian.

   It is believed the sensitive clement was originally out of balance, and that due to the improper functioning of the damping system, this unbal-ance was not apparent until the oil line was cleared and the oil allowed to flow freely. The unbalance then became evident. The addition of the lead weights restored the balance, and the compass operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the patrol.

— page 129 —
8. No, 3 Main Engine Exhaust Valve.
On April 16th, number 3 main engine exhaust valve failed to show a green light upon scouring the engine. While opening and closing the valve in attempting to get a groom light, the operating gear jammed in the half open position. During the night the exhaust valve was removed, revealing the cause; the exhaust valve disc was completely detached from the operating gear. All four nuts had hooked off the 5/8" studs in the disc, and the cotter key in the pin shaft was sheared. All parts were found to be in the bottom of the chamber with the exception of the lock washers. It is believed that there were no lock washers on the studs when last assembled during refit, October, 1943, and the valve was removed from the engine. Since

— page 130 —
1. RADIO:
   - Reception in the area off HONSHU was in general fair. All schedules copied were solid. Best schedule frequency was 9090 kcs, and occasionally 4525 kcs. In the daytime 14 390 kcs was generally used. Jap jamming of the schedules was negligible. Nothing was heard on 450 kcs.
   - Considerable difficulty was encountered on our first transmission 9 May. Jap interference and a large amount of traffic caused a delay of approximately 90 minutes. VHF finally answered our call and the message was quickly cleared on 8470 kcs. NTM receipted for the message two hours later.
   - Only defect noted was a broken power amplifier tube in the TBL incurred during depth charge attack.
   - No consumptac serials were missed.

(ii) RADAR:
   - The SD radar was used on intermittent operation going to and from the area. On station it was kept in a standby position, but only keyed upon suspected plane contacts. Ranges of only two contacts made were 12 and 13 miles.
   - During heavy rain, arcing from the antenna to mast overloaded the transmitter tubes and caused sweep deflection and interference. A radar was covered by a plane radar of the frequency the transmitter was found to be unstable at the higher frequencies. Much difficulty was encountered on returning to the original frequency due to tube damage caused by the unstable operation at the higher frequency.

Once again the S/S proved itself invaluable both in tracking targets and navigation. In general performance was good and all ranges were normal and satisfactory except as noted below.
   - On the night of 13 May a strong contact at 40,000 yards was made on one of our submarines. In closing the range the contact was lost at 30,000 yards and not regained until 16,000. We closed to 6000 yards before positive identification was established and then pulled clear. Contact was lost at 9000 yards. Our only explanation is abnormal atmospheric conditions. The barometer stood at 30.05, dry bulb temperature 72°, wet bulb 70°, and temperature of water at surface 69°. The sky was completely overcast. The sea was calm with no ripples or swells.
   - On 2 May secondary pips were obtained at 110 miles on land contacts. Rotation of the pulse rate control on the transmitter causes secondary pips to change position rapidly. This method was used for identification of these pips. Atmospheric conditions were similar to those of 13 May.
   - While surfacing on the night of 8 May, while at radar depth of 40 feet, S/S made contact with two aircraft at 3000 yards and tracked them out to 10,000 yards.
   - Operational difficulties were few and none were serious. S/S

— page 131 —
1. RADAR (Continued)
was out of commission less than one hour out of more than 700 hours of operation. Poor ranges were obtained on a convoy the night of 9 May. The magnetron, which had nearly 1000 hours of operation, was changed and ranges returned to normal at next contact. The PPI drive cable broke at the key. This is the second cable so damaged, it is caused by a sharp bend in the cable made necessary because of gear box arrangement. The displacement sweep during lobing operations became blurred and multiple, making lobing difficult and inaccurate. This condition was caused by low insulation read-ing on the lowest ring to ground of the footer assembly. This was correc-ted and normal lobing was again possible.

Low antenna spccds of 2 and 4 r.p.m. were used for normal search. On surfacing and contacts under 15,000 yards, a speed of 8 r.p.m. was used until it was determined not to be aircraft. 10 r.p.m. was used when studying convoy formations.

(2) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS:

In general sound conditions in the area off HONSHU were fair. to very poor. Scorers were heard from 2000 - 7000 yards, but usually about 3500. An excessive amount of fish noises were heard.

The JP gear gives forth occasional periods of excellence, but generally is not reliable. Results can be expected to improve with more experience in operation. The sound recordings for this gear helped conside-rably in training operators. It is believed that raising the sound had another two feet off the deck would be a desired improvement.

The port sound had been developed a groaning noise which is bo-livered to be worn bearings. The starboard head had training gear makes excessive noise and should be removed.

It is noted that only occasional single pings were heard even when our presence was known. Because of our proximity to shore, it is be-lieved that the Japanese pings were sounding rather than echo ranging. Thus the Jap is either echo ranging on a frequency we are unable to hear or he is relying entirely on listening gear.

During the retirant from our first attack a leak from number one fuel oil to negative caused a high noise level. This sounded very much like high speed screws and caused concern until the cause was located.

(3) DENSITY LAYERS:

Of the twenty-two cards taken on deep dives, 13.5% indicated a negative gradient above 100 feet. They were found, in general, close to the 100 fathom curve. 31.8% of the cards indicated a negative gradient be-low 100 feet and those were found in general to be near the middle of the Kuroshio and away from the beach. 54.7% of the cards showed no gradient at all and were scattered throughout the area. Only cards showing a grad-ent are listed.

— page 132 —
0) DENSITY LAYERS (Continued)

Iso-ballast cards were very beneficial in helping to quickly adjust the trim when making a deep dive.

| DATE | LAT-LONG SURFACE | 100 ft. | 200 ft. | 250 ft. | 300 ft. | DIRECT CONDITION | WIND | SEA |
|------|||||||------|-----|
| 4-17-44 | 30-34.11 | 66° | 68° | 67.5° | 67° | 66.5° | NE-3 | Calm |
| 4-18-44 | 32-00N | 68 | 66 | 65.9 | 65 | 64.5 | SE-4 | Swells |
| 4-19-44 | 32-09N | 66 | 66.5 | 65 | 64.5 | 64.2 | MW-4 | Choppy |
| 4-20-44 | 32-10N | 68 | 68 | 67.9 | 66.2 | 66 | NW-4 | Swells |
| 4-21-44 | 32-50N | 66.5 | 65.2 | 64 | 63 | 62.5 | W-4 | Choppy |
| 4-24-44 | 33-02N | 67.8 | 67.5 | 67 | 66.2 | 64 | NE-4 | Choppy |
| 4-26-44 | 32-58N | 66 | 63.5 | 62.2 | 60.5 | SW-2 | Calm |
| 4-29-44 | 32-34N | 69 | 69 | 66 | 65.5 | SW-3 | Swell |
| 5-1-44 | 34-03N | 59 | 60.1 | 58.8 | 57.5 | NW-1 | Calm |
| 5-2-44 | 34-21N | 59 | 59 | 57.5 | 57 | 56.2 | SE-1 | Calm |
| 5-3-44 | 34-21N | 59 | 59 | 57.5 | 57 | 56.2 | SE-1 | Calm |

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, HABITABILITY:

The health of the crew was very good despite 26 days of submerged running. There were a few minor colds and one case of cellulitis resulting from a cut on the lower leg. The swelling subsided within a day due to heat treatments and soaking in magnesium sulphate solution. One racer of the crew suffered contusions of the hip end elbow when a wave knocked him through the conning tower superstructure door while he was mounting the forward, 20 mm, gun. He was able to resume his duties in three days.

The food was very good and excellently prepared. A minimum of fried foods were consumed due to sunburned cooking. Baking was done daily and was excellent.

We averaged about 14 1/2 hours of submerged running a day, and the air at the end of the day was a little stale giving cause for a few headaches.

— page 133 —
6 01758
CONFIDENTIAL

(Q) PERSONNEL:
The following excerpts from the personal statistics column of the ship's newspaper, The Daily Torpedo, may be of interest:

The average age of the Sargo crew is 23 years, 15 months.

The average Sargo Sei1or has served TWO years, TEN months, in the Navy.

There are SIX non on board who have less than a year in the Navy.

There are TWELVE non on board with more than FOUR years Naval Service.

There are only FOUR non with more than EIGHT years total Naval Service.

The SARG0 herself is FIVE years old, and there are only NINE non on board who were in the Navy when the SARG0 went into commission.

There are NO non now on board who were on board when the SARG0 was commissioned.

The average SARG0 sailor has made 3,75 War Patrols.

Before this War Patrol, 90% of the crew averaged 2,17 War Patrols each.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED:
Mileage to Area 2609 mi. 29087 gals.
In Area 3773 mi. 41016 gals.
Area to Midway 2143 mi. 32072 gals.
Midway to Pearl 1230 mi. 23400 gals.

TOTAL (Pitlochry miles) 2755 mi. 125575 gals.

(S) DURATION:
Days enroute to Area 9
Days in Area 30
Days enroute Midway 6 1/2
Days enroute Pearl 10
Days Submerged 27

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING:
TORPEDOES  Fuel  Provisions  Personnel Factor
    Gas.  Days  Days
    10  7825  15  10

LIMITING FACTOR THIS PATROL -- OPERATION ORDER.

— page 134 —
1. Mark 18 Torpedoes
Although the Mk. 18 torpedoes received from Midway by this vessel were not in as good condition as those received from Pearl Harbor, their performance was apparently satisfactory.
While at Midway one torpedo began a hot run in the after torpedo room when the stop valve was cracked during routining. The cause was found to be the starting valve, which was cracked open. The after propeller shaft sheared off before the stop valve could again be closed. No other damage was found by the ship's force, and the torpedo was replaced by Submarine Base Torpedo Shop, Midway.
These torpedoes had previously been carried on "Car Patrol by NATUTLUS. Grounds were found by NATUTLUS and there were still grounds in the torpedo batteries when they were received aboard the SAIJO. Grounds increased due to condensation in the battery compartments while the torpedoes were in the racks, but decreased to less than 20 volts or disappeared while the torpedoes were in the tubes and being heated by the hydrogen burners.
All Mk. 18 torpedoes fired exploded at end of run.

2. The engineering, electrical, and material condition of this ship after five war patrols, is such as to require major overhaul prior to another patrol. Number 2 main motor requires removal and reconditioning as a result of a serious flash-over. This motor is out of commission.

— page 137 —
11/jak
FC5-4/A16-3
Serial: 0213
Fleet Post Cffice,
San Francisco, Calif.,
31 Yay 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT:
U.S.S. SARCO Report of
Leventh "Car Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FCUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SARCO Eleventh "Car Patrol - Comments on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division FCUR.

2. The four and one-half pages of major d.fects, only one nare of which pertains to U.C.R. engine casualties, show the effects of eleven patrols. A good Navy Yard overfull will reduce the number of defects for the next one or two patrols, then the one of the submarines and its machinery will be in to show again.

3. The Commander Submarine Squadron FCUR congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew on an aggressive patrol resulting in damage to the enemy.

C. B. MOYSEN.

— page 138 —
01758 F4253 (5)
Serial 01095
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
2 June 1944

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SARGOS Report of
Eleventh War Patrol.

CONSUSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 435.
U.S.S. SARGOS - ELEVENTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SARGOS (SS188) - Report of Eleventh War Patrol.
(7 April to 26 May 1944)

1. The eleventh war patrol of the SARGOS was conducted in areas south of the Japanese mainland.

2. The coastline was closely patrolled which enabled the SARGOS to make many contacts worthy of torpedo fire. Of these contacts three aggressive attacks were made resulting in inflicting damage to the enemy.

3. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

S U H K
1 - Freighter (class unknown) - 5,000 tons (Attack No.1) *
*Credit for sinking this freighter is given from the evidence herein plus the fact that the same convoy was contacted the next day by the BEADRAGON which reported one freighter less in the convoy.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Cor. note reports)
C. L. 1. 1. (7)
C. 1. 1. (5)
C. 1. 1. (6)
C. 1. 1. (1)
C. 1. 1. (2)
C. 1. 1. (1)
C. 1. 1. (2)
C. 1. 1. (

— page 140 —
6 June - 17 September, Major items accomplished: installation four "Winton" trim pump, converted 3A & 3B into full ballast, solenoid clutches in bow bridge to trigger type, rearranged #1 periscope in conning tower, modified sonar system 7 MC - 1 MC radar officers' quarters, installed bttle anti-air, eight days training, with radionet for receiving four days voyage reports.

Officers Detached

| Officer | Name | Rank | Date |
||------|------|------|
| Lt. | C. H. Payne, U.S.N. | Lt. | 0. H. Payne, U.S.N. |
| Lt. | R. B. Bailey, U.S.N.R. | Lt. | R. B. Bailey, U.S.N.R. |
| Lt. | R. B. Hicks, U.S.N.R. | Lt. | R. B. Hicks, U.S.N.R. |
| Ens. | R. E. Slater, U.S.N.R. | Ensign | R. E. Slater, U.S.N.R. |

Officer Report

| Officer | Name | Rank | Date |
||------|------|------|
| Lt. | G. C. Cook, U.S.N.R. | Lt. | R. F. Reilly, U.S.N.R. |
| Lt. | R. F. Reilly, U.S.N.R. | Lt. | R. F. Reilly, U.S.N.R. |
| Lt. | R. F. Reilly, U.S.N.R. | Lt. | R. F. Reilly, U.S.N.R. |
| Ensign | J. E. Sutton, U.S.N.R. | Ensign | J. E. Sutton, U.S.N.R. |

— page 141 —
12 Oct 1944
1355 (ww) Underway from Sultmarine Base, Pearl Harbor, in company with U.S.S. FOCY, escorted by PC 728, in accordance with C.T.P. Seventeen Operations Order #346-44.

14-16 October
Enroute Midway. Held drills, battle problems, fired all guns, joint exercises with POGY.

17 October
0923 (Y) Moored Midway. Received 14,150 gal. fuel, fresh provisions and voyage repairs. Departure delayed by repairs to master gyro.

18 October
0743 (Y) Underway for area with air escort.

19 October collected

20-25 October
Enroute to area at two engine speed, holding daily dives, drills, and battle problems.

25 October
1540 (L) Radar and sight contact on large plane, possibly four engines, but otherwise unidentified.
Submerged, Not sighted. (Plane Contact #1) Let 30-05, Long 150-02R Surface.
While lying to, greasing topside, radar made contact at 12,000 yds. (Ship contact #1). Commenced closing and tracking two targets, piloting stopped about 300 yards apart. The moon was three-quarters shining dimly through overcast. Maneuvered to 700 yards at targets down moon, and opened with all guns. Fire from 5 gun (lost at first) was obscured by smoke from small area and poor visibility, and was not effective. Many hits were made by 20 mm. and 50 cal. on both targets and a small fire was started on one, but soon was extinguished. Targets were identified as XAI minelayers (0,1,1, 1A-1A2) of 200-300 tons. Enemy opened fire with two machine guns and one larger gun, possibly 3" and soon had two range. As both targets headed away, presenting no target to 5" gun, and machine gun bullets were splattering off the superstructure, broke off action. One bullet cut lifeline, another plowed into deck, both in vicinity of forward 20 mm. Those are those same pickets or outposts seen frequenting in this vicinity. Let 30-00Y, Long 150-02R.

27 October
0210 (I) Entered area.
0557 (I) Submerged northwest of HUIUO SHIDA.
1835 (I) Surfaced. Closed HUIUO SHIDA.

28 October
0019 (I) Received orders and commenced high speed search to westward.

— page 142 —
28 October (cont'd)
1300(1) Slight ship, tops of which scrambled destroyer, closing. Turned away at 16g knots in an effort to track, but as range continued to close, was forced to submerge. SJ radar shoot strong interference, 1337(1) Submerged, with angle on bow 20°, range 16,000 approximately. Commenced approach. Target was not again sighted, in spite of searches from 40 feet. Lat 29-211, Long 136-17E. 1445(1) Surfaced, commenced search, no contact. (Ship Contact #2) 1553(1) Submerged upon sighting aircraft identified as "UZI", not sighted. (Aircraft Contact #2) Lat 29-339, Long 136-49E.

29 October
0655(1) Sighted, exchanged recognition on S7, and closed PILOTFISH. 1630(1) Sighted spherical floating mine, closed and hit it many times with Tommy Guns without effect. Finally a hit from B.A.R. exploded it. (Soc I) Lat 29-34N, Long 135-07E. Mine was about 36" in diameter, with about six short horns, and flotated very high in water (approx. 40s out of water).

30 October
0937(1) Patrolling along track of reported ship. 1725(1) Surfaced, to insure against sighting by aircraft. 2000(1) Received orders for change in course, and was passed on. 2213(1) Transmitted action: 1/2, (Sargo Serial #1)

31 October-1 November
Enroute nor area.

1 November
1826(1) Contact on SJ at 20,000 yards. Target decerned to be plane on course SW. (Aircraft Contact #3) 2035(1) Another plane contact on SJ at 10,000 yards. Range closed to 5000 yards. (Aircraft Contact #4) Lat 29-33E, Long 132-12E.

2037(1) Submerged. 2117(1) Surfaced.

2 November
0140(1) Plane contact on SJ, range 15,000 yards (Aircraft Contact #5). It definitely looked as if something important was moving in the vicinity but nothing developed further. Lat 29-30E, Long 131-48E. 0300(1) Entered nor area. Lat 29-15E, Long 131-30E. 0558(1) Submerged in light rain and overcast, position somewhat in doubt. 0950(1) Surfaced in rain and heavy overcast. Fixed position by radar on YAKU SHILA. 1150(1) Surfaced than visibility improved, patrolling BUMBO SUDO shipping route. 1756(1) Surfaced in heavy rain, with wind and seas making up. Patrolled during night twenty miles eastward of island chain.

3 November
Weather has improved with seas calming.

- 3 -

— page 143 —
3 November (cont'd)
0555(I) Submerged patrolling to eastward of AUSSEKI and SUHAOSE SILMA.
1817(I) Surfaced with bright full moon, Patrolled across shipping lanes.

4. November
0600(I) Submerged to eastward of SUHAOSE closing island.
0945(I) Slight smoke bearing 3311, went to battle stations and normal approach at stan.and sped (Ship Contact #3). Target was identified from tops and superstructure as MSH, coal burner, of approximately 3000 tons, and tracked on course 235T, speed 9-10 knots. Target passed close in to SUHAOSE at near range of 12,000 ycrs, no escort vessels sighted.
1100(I) Broke off approach, after over an hour's closing at standard speed. A strong opposing current had precluded our closing SUHAOSE as planned, otherwise we would have been on this ship's track.
Lat 25-33N, Long 125-56E.
1352(I) Sighted tops of small ship with small angle on bow, commenced approach. Then range closed sufficiently ship was seen to be too small for torpedo. Target identified as 200-300 ton diesel cruiser as listed in O.H.I. 41-42, still small gun mounted on bow. Took sighted at 3000 yards and broke off approach. (Ship Contact #4)
1817(I) Surfaced, patrolled across lanes in bright full moon.

5. November
0325(I) It was planned to patrol off AHIA SILMA today, but after yesterday's activities decided to try another day around SUHAOSE-AHAHO SILMA.
Aircraft contact on 5I at 20,000 ycrs. (Aircraft Contact #6)
Lat 29-47N, Long 130-25N.
0558(I) Range opened and was immediately lost.
0921(I) Submerged eastward of MAHAHO SILMA and closed to 5 miles. Sighted a small gunboat at range of 8000 yards. Tracked at about 11 knots on course 2300. Closed to about 4500 yards. This type is not listed in manuals, but looked like a converted yacht, with small gun forward, depth charges, and flying naval onscin.
1105(I) (Ship Contact #5) Lat 29-45N, Long 130-01N.
L.O.D. sighted by Ive lent bad planks, probably BERYES, in formation, altitude 3000 approximately, on course south, range 6 miles. (Aircraft Contact #7) Lat 25-42N, Long 125-57E.
1819(I) Surfaced. Patrolling eastward across shipping lanes with very bright moon.

6. November
0210(I) Aircraft Contact at 25,000 yards. Range rounded constant, then contact was lost. (Aircraft Contact #6) Lat 28-35N, Long 130-50E.
0630(I) Entered next area. "I'll attempt surface patrol today.
0619(I) Submerged, about 60 miles east of AHIA SILMA.
0620(I) Surfaced. It is a cloudless, glassy calm day.
0837(I) Submerged on lookout's sighting plane of unidentified type at 5-6 miles, probably not sighted by plane. (Aircraft Contact #9)
0920(I) Surfaced, high periscope patrol, along offshore Empire-Philippines lane.

- 4 -

— page 144 —
6 November (cont'd)
1200(1) Submerged upon sighting ten or more planes of unidentified type in formation on course west, range 7 miles approx. "we were not sighted. (Aircraft Contact #10) Lat 27-44N, Long 130-47E.
L427(1) Surfaced.
L435(1) Submerged for a seagull.
L450(1) Surfaced.
L450(1) Submerged after converting #3A & 3B to bellcast tanks.
2011(1) Surfaced. Commenced closing TONUA SHIMA.

7 November
0547(1) Submerged to eastward and closed TONUA SHIMA.
1832(1) Surfaced.

8 November
0555(1) Submerged, patrolling 100 fathoms curve along southeast coast of AWAII O SHIMA. Investigated ISU 'AI and GASIMA HAIKO. No activity noted.

9 November
0558(1) Submerged and patrolled line between OKINOJIRAPU and TONUA SHIMA.
1822(1) Surfaced.

10 November
0607(1) Submerged. Will patrol on surface today to eastward of AWAII O SHIMA. Sky is overcast but visibility on surface is unlimited.
1320(1) Surfaced. Encountering moderate northerly gale.
1525(1) With repairs completed, surfaced with several corvettes on radar at 12,000 yards. (Ship Contact #6) 12-03J, Long 13-05M.
It is a black night with moderate to heavy sea, continual rain. Commenced tracking and and around. Four targets on radar, course 0207, spred 12 knots, in a 'm formation with two targets approximately abreast in lead, and two more, one on each flank, astern. The two astern were 4000 yards apart; There was little distinction in size of ships but two flankers appeared to be larger. There are at least two Japanese 10 cm, radar giving strong interference and which are unmistakably on us, but the oners are talking no action. After two hours tracking and getting into position ahead and on starboard bow of formation, while waiting and hoping for change, in weather which would permit a submerged approach, decided to take advantage of a particularly heavy rain squall and attack right flank ship. Changed course for 60 starboard track, range 11,000 yards, and closed at 15,7 knots. The set-up is checking perfectly all the way. Thick radar is pl-ig on us still, but they are taking no action. With range of 2000 yds, on spred 7 kts, fired four torpedoes forward, depth setting 4 feet, ten second firing interval, using radar ranges and bearings. Range at fourth torpedo 1830 yards. Tracks 60 to 90, gyros 0 to 10° R.

2206(1)

— page 145 —
10 November (cont'd) -
No hits, but four end-of-run explosions from 5 to 9 minutes. Sunk
loft for stern tubes, but withhold fire due to poor track and evi-
denco of small target based upon not sighting at near range of 1650
yards.

Opened out, continued tracking and positioning for damn attack
submerged. Radar interference continues, with little doubt but
that they have us on their screen. I still cannot understand why
they steam merrily along, unless they like the position we are now
keeping, 12,000 yards ahead. Anticipating a darn zig to northward,
will submerge off the track in that direction at 16,000 yards
ahead. It is still black and raining lightly. We now have only
two pipes. Perhaps the other two are astern of these and cut off our
range.

11 November
0545(1) Submerged, commenced approach. Sound reports long scale automatic
pinging.

0607(1) Two escorts in sight, aqel on 1w 15p port, in approximate column,
still on course 020, speed unchanged. No other ships in sight,
These escorts were accurately identified as new type patrol frigates
similar to sketch on page 20 of U.S. Fleet Anti-Submarine Bulletin,
July, 1944.

0620(1) Frigates are about at 3000 yards, and after exchanging signals via
masthead light, reversed course away and proceeded back along re-
verse of base course, still echo-ranging, and frequently signalling
with light.

0652(1) Ships out of sight, sound still has ringing. Continued elong true
bearing, and remained submerged to continue repairs to S.O.

1452(1) With repairs completed, surfaced. Sky is three-quarters overcast,
broken cumulus clouds, sea rough.

1618(1) Contact on S.O at 20,000 yards, sighted four at a through
high periscope, in line of bearing, distance between 400 yards.

1628(1) Submerged with range 16,000. Ships identified as four patrol fri-
gates similar to this morning's targets. No other ships in sight,
but are evidently conducting anti-submarine sweep. Avoided.
These frigates were not escorting any ships, and were not echo-
ranging. (Ship Contact #) 1st 25-26N, Long 131-42E.

1728(1) Surfaced. Noting radar interference on 1450N.

1741(1) Monotony contact at 28,000 yards. (Aircraft Contact #12)
1st 29-03N, Long 131-28E.

In attempting to make sense out of the preceding twenty-four
hours activity, the following are considered as likely: Aircraft
sighted us and directed searching team to us. Last night's contact
consisted of either four P.P's or two P.P's towing two dummy radar
targets. The possibility of dummy radar targets is based on the
peculiar formation, the fact that we fired at the larger ship with
perfect fire-control data, which when checked shows no reason for
misses, with shallow enough setting (4 feet), and the fact that at
1650 yards target was still not sighted. Our attack was made under
cover of a rain squall and it seems to have been undetected, al-
though their radars were on us. When we submerged at dawn for

— page 146 —
11 November (cont'd)
another approach, the frigates had our range accurately for they searched to our exact vicinity before turning.
The following afternoon we were on the surface for about one hour and a half when the four frigates, obviously in a search formation, appeared on our track. The Inter indiections of a radar equipped plane leads to the belief that we were spotted by this plane, who directed the frigates to us.

The seas are building up and weather is worsening. We are returning to assigned area.

12 November
0130(1) Friendly radar interference, probably BILLFISH.
0530(1) Took heavy sea down coming tower hatch and inductions, causing following damage: both radar, bow planes, gyro follow-up, auxiliary gyro, D.R.T., 1 NO and 7 NO circuits, circulating water pump motor to stills, out of conversation, and a small electric fire in Forward Engine Room. (See K)

We are maintaining steering-ary into seas, which are now force 7-8, visibility 100 yards, attempting to repair damage enough to insure a safe dive.

All hands have done an excellent job in controlling and repairing damage done by this sea.

Submerged to 150 foot, in mountainous seas, to continue repairs.
Surfaced, storm and seas have chocked successfully.

13 November
0247(1) Radar interference, probably PILOTFISH.
0618(1) Sunroof, overcast sky, ro-centered on area.
1212(1) Surfaced, for sun line as sun broke through overcast.
1230(1) Sunroof, visibility conditions unfavorable for surface running, with radar aircraft about.
1805(1) Surfaced. Commenced closing OKINAWA JIMA.

14 November
0610(1) Sunroofed off YORON JIMA, patrolling line between YORON JIMA and OKINAWA.
1235(1) Sighted five scuppers. (Context #8)
1818(1) Surfaced. Patrolling across shipping lanes.

15 November
0546(1) Sunroofed between YORON JIMA and OKINAWA.
0840(1) Sighted diesel transfer type patrol boat, equipped with antenna, and forked bow similar to mine tender. He was conducting listening search at 4-5 knots, stopping to listen every ten minutes. Evaded with nearest range 2500 yards. (Contact #9)
1403(1) Five distant depth charges hoard through boat.
1614(1) Sighted VAL type aircraft. (Aircraft Contact #13) Let 27-19N, Long 128-12E.
Entered now area.

— page 147 —
15 November (cont'd)
1833(1)  Surfaced. Radar interference. Exchanged recognition on and information with POGY.

: 16 November
0602(1)  Submerged north of KUME SHIMA. Seas are again building up and we are rolling heavily down to 90 feet.

1812(1)  Surfaced in force 5 seas, patrolling into sea.

: 17 November
0515(1)  Submerged, patrolling open sea lanes. Again overcast makes surface patrol unsatisfactory.

1818(1)  Surfaced.

: 18 November
0552(1)  Submerged between YORON and HIEYA RYTO.
0730(1)  Sighted distant smoke, which was light. I do not believe this was a ship of any size. Trocked on course away, unable close.

1440(1)  Sighted RUPE type aircraft, range 4-5 miles. (Airref.ft Contact #14)
1827(1)  Lt 27-11H, Long 128-17E. Surfaced.

: 19 November
Submerged patrolling between AGUMI SHIMA and IYE SHIMA. Lighthouse on IYE SHIMA not in operation.

: 20 November
1654(1)  Submerged patrolling between YORON and OKINOYARU.
Sighted seven small fishing trawlers heading for YORON. Three of them had a sail rigged.

: 21 November
Entered north area and patrolled in western part. Hooded northmost gale with seas rough.

: 22 November
0610(1)  Submerged between TOKUNA and AAMI SHIMA with weak shore based early warning radar interference. Investigated weather enroute to GUMI KAIKYO and vicinity of lighthouse on SOTSUKO ZAKI.
1825(1)  Surfaced off the lighthouse with sea not burning. Very strong radar interference on 156 north. Opened to westward and south Soriac island chain has been nil, and because of the activity of mines and anti-submarine craft encountered to the eastward of the chain, I feel that the Jeju may be moving sea shipping offshore. Therefore I have requested permission to patrol in that vicinity.

: 22 November
0558(1)  Submerged, patrolling across line between TOKUNA and OKINOYARU.
0914(1)  Ran into fishing fleet of twenty-one sampans and trawlers on line between the islands. Nine of them were under sail, all in a generally southerly course.

1213(1)  Sighted another lone sampan under sail.
1816(1)  Surfaced to eastward of chain. Received permission for extension.

— page 148 —
24 November
Patrolled on surface in area ABIAZE which is unoccupied.
At sunset, in accordance with orders, departed area and commenced
surface patrol in CLOSET.
2205(I) Crenk-case explosion in #2 M.E., which set rags and paintwork afire.
Boat filled with heavy smoke, necessitating abandoning forward room.
Personnel equipped with smoke masks entered and fire was extinguished. No personnel casualties. (see K)

25, 26, 27 November
Patrolled on surface between longitude 130° and 132° E.
1742(I) Departed area in accordance with orders.

28 November - 7 December
Enroute area to Majuro, holding daily dives for trim, and daily drills.

3 December
2306(I) Contact with friendly submarine outbound. Exchanged recognition
via radar. Lat 21-21N, Long 166-13E.

6 December
1800(I) Contact on friendly surface ship - eastbound. Lat 10-25N, Long.
170-30E.

7 December
0932(I) Made rendezvous with U.S.S. RAISEY, who acted as escort.
Afternoon arrived MAJURO, moored alongside U.S.S. H.H. GILMORE.

— page 150 —
1. TIDAL INFORMATION (Continued)
(D) TIDAL INFORMATION (Continued)
islands the currents averaged between 0.5 and 1.0 knots, but the direction of set was unreliable. And in a few cases the current was nil. Enclosed is a chart showing current direction arrows and the set for 24 hour periods in the areas surrounding Hansei Shoto.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
Positions were easily fixed once within radar range of the islands of Nansei Shoto. The various peaks plotted in well by radar at night and by actual periscope bearings during the day. YIKU SHIMA was picked up by radar at a range of 120,000 yards and was very helpful establishing fixes when entering the area from the Eastward during foul weather. Soundings were taken instantaneously with radar bearings and ranges at frequent intervals on a line severing 090°(r) between 30 and 75 miles from SUWANOSE SHIMA. These soundings did not compare with those shown on the chart indicating that soundings obtained in this area are not to be relied upon for navigational purposes.

LIGHTBULBS:
TIE SHIMA Light and SOTSUKO ZAKI Light were observed to be not lighted from a distance of 12,000 miles on deck nights with a clear atmosphere. It is believed that neither of these two lighthouses are in operation unless they are showing a limiting light with the endloader greatly cut down.

— page 152 —
1. 2036(1) 29-53 (2) patrol boats 13,000 0 R Attacked with gunfire, Picket boats.
2. 1330(1) 29-21 20,000 030 SD Div'd for approach and target not again sighted. Target was radar equipped.
3. 0945(1) 29-35 15,000 230 Slight through periscope, unable to close for attack. No escorts sighted. Ship passed 6nm east of island chain.
4. 1352(1) 29-34 10,000 230 SD Did not attack as ship was too small (200-300 tons). Took picture.
5. 0922(1) 29-35 20,000 230 SD Avoided.
6. 1923(1) 26-03 13,000 020 R Attacked and missed with 4 torps. Targets not sighted until following day. Two patrol frigates conducted uncrewed searches.
7. 1618(1) 29-26 20,000 000 R Four PF's in line abreast conducting sweep, evidently searching for us, Avoided.
8. 1214(1) 27-09 6,000 035 SD Sighted through periscope. Apparent enemy aircraft. Stand- and type, apparently unarmed.
9. 0840(1) 27-12 7,000 220 SD Sighted through periscope. Patrol boat would stop periodically and listen. Avoided at range 2500 yds. Depth charge explosions heard later in day.
10. 1654(1) 27-19 12,000 190 SD Steam crawlers 150 tons, 2 masts, aux. sail, Enroute YORON JIMA.
11. 1120(1) 27-36 9,000 8 SD Fishing fleet.
12. 1120(1) 27-36 7 Fishing fleet.
205. 1120(1) 27-36 4-

— page 155 —
ATTACK DATA
U.S.S. SARGO, TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 (cont'd)
    OCN Ship Date
Speed 7    Course 281° T    Depth surface  Angle 2R to 11R
    (at firing)
    Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Torpedo were picked up by radar at 12,000 yards upon surfacing on a dark, rainy night, sea conditions 3-4 from north. Four torpedoes were tracked on apparently straight course 020°, speed 12 knots, in a 1° formation, with two targets abreast at the vortex and two targets, one on each flank, attern approximately 2000 yards. Range between two after targets indicated their targets 1000 yards. The pipes of two after targets indicated that they were somewhat larger than the leaders. Two of the ships were radar equipped (10 c.n.), which gave very strong interference on our S2 equipment.

After tracking for two and one-half hours, activating improved visibility that night, panik submerged approach in view of his radar activity, decided to take advantage of a particularly heavy rain squall and attack, hoping to be blanketed by rain from his radar detection. From a position 11,000 yards and forward of his nearby 2000 yards, on the starboard flank ship, our approach apparently undetected as target continued on course and speed.

Depth was set at 4 feet, in consideration of the existing sea conditions. However, it is now reported that 0 ft. setting was not used. With cm speed 7 knots, range from 2000 yards to 1830 yards, fired four torpedoes, using radar bearings, 1° spread between torpedoes, for track 84-93 starboard, gyros 3° to 10° right. Swing for stern tubes with near range 1600 yards, but had little due to poor tracks, and felt that target had not been sighted, indicating possibility of very small target.

| Tubes Fired | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 |
||----|----|----|----|
| Track Angle | 845 | 885 | 895 | 935 |
| Gyro Angle | 0024.51 R | 006° R | 006° R | 011° 30' R |
| Depth Set | 4' | 4' | 4' | 4' |
| Hit or Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss |
| Erratic | No | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 |
| Serial No. | 55956 | 57061 | 56043 | 56472 |
| Mark Exploder | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 |
| Serial No. | 9755 | 10110 | 9204 | 10398 |
| Actuation Set | Cont | Cont | Cont | Cont |
| Mark Warhead | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial No. | 1354 | 4003 | 4091 | 3964 |
| Explosive Torpex | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex |
| Firing Interval | 10 sec | 7 sec | 10 sec | 10 sec |
| Type Spread | 1/2L | 1/2R | 1 1/2L | 1 1/2R |
| Sea Conditions | From N, Condition 3-4 | | | |
| Overhaul Activity: | Sub Base, P.H.T.H. | | | |

- 15 -

— page 156 —
1. ATTACK DATA (cont'd)
(H) U.S.S. SARGO, TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 (cont'd)
Fire Control and Torpedo Data (cont'd)

Remarks:
Analysis of complete data gathered before, during, and after firing, indicated that at least two torpedoes should hit. This was as planned in spread. Misses are due either to too deep firing setting (four(4') feet for a target which if it was a patrol fire, gate has a listed draft of 11-12 feet), or to the fact, once evidence of which exists, that we fired on a radar decoy turret, towed by a patrol frigate, and three at eight (8) minutes.

All torpedoes exploded at end of run, one at five (5) minutes and three at eight (8) minutes.

— page 157 —
1. On 29 October at 29-31.5 N, 138-14 E, destroyed a floating mine by small arms fire,
2. This was the standard Japanese contact mine encountered on previous patrols: approximately 36 inches in diameter with six or eight short, stubby horns, and a small padeye on top. The mine projected about forty percent above the surface and was sighted in a calm sea at 4000 yards. Many hits on the shell with .45 caliber bullets failed to explode this mine. Finally a hit with .30 caliber rifle set it off. We were about 75 yards off when mine exploded.

(J)  AMT-S/M MEASURES AND VESSEL OPERATIONS

Active aircraft patrol was encountered in vicinity of HANSEI SHOJO, with concentration heaviest to eastward of the chain. There were indications of co-operation between aircraft and surface anti-ubmarine craft on two days when we were dogged by four patrol frigates. Aircraft and surface craft were equipped with radar. There is some evidence that we fired on a possible radar decoy target towed by patrol frigates which were radar equipped (10 C.H.). All shipping in HANSEI SHOJO encountered during this patrol was sampans and small crawlers enroute between islands. Surface JS patrol was in to the islands was surprisingly light to remain on-existont. When possible we attempted to remain outside of 12 miles from east-ual or reported shore-based radar installations, while on the surface.

(K)  MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

Electrical:
As a result of a heavy sea taken down the, induction and conning tower hatch, numerous items of electrical equipment were temporarily grounded out, among which the more important were the auxiliary gyro, gyro follow-up system, and the bow planes tilt and rigging controller in the control room. No other major defects or casualties were experienced.

Engineering:
1. Considerable trouble was encountered with cylinder liners in that six liners w.r.o found to be cracked and leaking water at various times.
   (a) Operation of the engines previous to these casualties was normal. No overheating of the units was observed at any time.
   (b) Due to previous reports of submarines with this type engines it was believed that the engines were being cooled too rapidly by the use of the recirculating system after shutting down. This policy was not practiced.
   (c) It was noticed in all occasions but one that the cylinder liners were cracking near the top of the liner, making the leak readily detected.
   (d) Spares for these replacements were not adequate, causing the ship to return to port with one engine out of commission. It is recommended that the allowance list be adjusted to allow eight (6) cylinder liners instead of four.

— page 158 —
2. No. 2 main engine suffered a crank case explosion removing two (2) crank case inspection covers and forcing flame over the engine room, which set afire rags.

(a) There were no personnel casualties.

(b) Upon inspection it was found that No. 16 cylinder was cracked and leaking water near the intake ports, the piston was cracked in several places, the piston wrist pin was sheared and all the metal wiped from the wrist pin crushing. A complete inspection was made and no other damage was observed. No. 16 unit was replaced and operation of the engine was found to be normal.

(c) It is believed that the cracked and leaking liner caused the piston to seize, thereby shearing the wrist pin and cracking the piston.

(d) It is recommended that "up to 2,000 pounds of water be added to the crank case to help prevent future casualties of this nature."

3. Considerable trouble was also experienced with cylinder head bolts shearing at the engine housing. A total of eleven studs sheared.

(a) After "Engine Run In" at recent Navy Yard overhaul the yard force took down on each individual head bolt to manufacture's prescribed torque wrench gauge pressure of six hundred and fifty (650) pounds as requested by factory representatives. After experiencing this trouble each head bolt must be buckled or an equal amount of the prescribed pressure and the trouble was relieved temporarily.

(b) Allowable spares for these castings were available.

(c) Future one hundred hour routine inspections shall include checking those studs.

4. Upon starting No. 3 main engine it was discovered that overflying air pressure was lost. Upon inspection it was found that the cylinder (on top) ring in forward end of blower drive shaft was missing. Through inspection of blower drive shaft was found to be in good condition. Engine drive shaft and replaced retainer ring. Operation of engine normal.

(a) No trace of missing rotator ring was found in engine. It is believed that it was never installed.

(L) RADIO

Reception on station in both the Bonin Islands and the Hansei Shoto group was average. No enemy jamming or interference was noted.

The following frequency plan was used to copy the HAI KI submarine fox schedule solid for twenty-four hour period: During darkness 4515 kcs, and 6045 kcs.; in the early morning until late afternoon 9050 kcs.; and in the late afternoon 13655 kcs. were copied. 16750 kcs. was used during daylight in preference to 13655 kcs. which was inconsistent.

Until the adoption of 9090 kcs. a null period was experienced in the early morning and this frequency proved far superior to the previous 9515 kcs.

Serial One was transmitted on 8470 kcs., having tried without

— page 159 —
1. RADIO (Cont'd)
success to contact NIM or any relaying station on 4235 kcs. Difficulties were experienced on 8470 kcs, and message was finally relayed through NIM. Serial Two was transmitted on 4155 kcs. after unsuccessful attempts on 4235 and 8470 kcs. Communication was established readily with NIM who had reception difficulties; the message finally being relayed by NIM. This transmission was expeditiously completed on an almost traffic free circuit while ship-shore frequencies were congested. It is suggested that this be employed as an alternate method of transmission utilizing the services of relatively near advance base tenders. Throughout ship-shore frequencies very poor circuit discipline was noted; e.g., tuning transmitter while a message is being sent, breaking in with call without listening, thereby interrupting transmission.

No ComSubPac Sorials were missed.

(M) RADAR
1. SJ RADAR
Performance was excellent early in the patrol. Sarges - fly maximum ranges were:
   - U.S.S. POXY: 15,000 yards
   - Midway tonner: 35,000
   - Island of Makoto: 35,000
   - (507) foot
   - (507) foot
   (The unusual range on the POXY - 19,000 yards - may have been due to weather conditions. A later maximum on the POXY was 13,000)

Then the following casualties occurred in quick succession:
   (a) Loss of sensitivity, ragged pips from sea return, and a faint setting for receiver tuning (manual). The magnetron was double - 2.5% and was replaced. Tube hours, 300.

   (b) The rectangular waveguide was damaged while removed for inspection. Standing wave ratio has been considerably increased. A new waveguide will be required at refit.

   (c) Gasket in the hub and dipole assembly (antenna feeder unit) was ground to small pieces by friction with the lower stationer unit. Most of these fell into the lower unit.

   In replacing the lower unit after cleaning it was found that the weight and slight misfit of the rectangular waveguide at the unit were throwing the other end of the assembly up against the hub and gasket. It is necessary to place a wooden wedge between the lower stationer unit and the lower and gear assembly housing. The new stabilizing springs do not have enough tension to hold off the lower unit in a balanced position.

   (d) Best oscillator (7265) could not be tuned to magnetron frequency for returning. New 7265 was installed and operated normally.

— page 161 —
1. RADAR (Cont'd)
2. SD RADAR

The SD Radar was operated intermittently on entering and leaving area; and left in a standby condition while on station, to be manned briefly if the presence of aircraft was indicated by SJ radar or SPR.
Only casualty to the SD was a grounded lead to filament transformer in the transmitter.
The addition of a pre-amplifier has not resulted in any noticeable increase in contact ranges.
Antennas resistance readings have been much better than patrol as a result of a coating of Koroscal added Pearl Harbor base, Shoo to shoo reading has remained above 10 megohms the entire patrol.

Operation of the IFF equipment (near own bases) has been satisfactory. It is unfortunate that the SD must be operating in order to keep the BI, The BI would be of greater use and value if operated in conjunction with the SJ radar rather than the SD.

(3) SOUND

Sound conditions on station were only fair as an average. JP-1 performance was satisfactory with ranges up to 9000 yards. Better results were obtained with the JP-1 than the supermarine gear; the sonie outranging the JK-9Q almost every time.
Improved performance of the JP-1 is attributed to an intensive training program of personnel and the raising of the sound head to the increased distance above the deck. The JK and JP-1 were named continuously while outranged.

(4) DENSITY LAYERS

Between 28° N and 3° N Latitude and 170° E to 140° E Longitude, density layers were observed daily (1451 to 1901); negative gradients "live to ten degrees. In the area north of the Bonin Islands density layers were perineated (1901 to 2351); negative gradients of three and four degrees (one gradient of eight degrees). In the same area negative gradients were found to four degrees observed with a sea force less than 4; negative gradients to four degrees (2151 to 2501); two successive gradients were observed at 125 feet completing a gradual four degree temperature drop at 260 feet; with sea force greater than 3 isothermal conditions were generally observed. Twenty-two eared have been forwarded.

— page 162 —
1
Sound Contact No. 1
Date 5 Nov.
Time (zone) 1400 ( 2000
Water Depth (fathoms) 900
Submarine Latitude 29-45 N
Longitude 130-01 E
Sp d 3
Keel Depth 601
Target Gunboat
Type Target Yacht type
Tonnage 200-300
Speed (est) 10
Type Sound Equip. JP-1, JP-3
What did sound first pick up Light series
In Freq. Band (Kcs) Sonic
Initial Range (yds) 5000
Maximum Range (yds) 5000
Time Contact Lost 1425
Range Contact Lost 5000
JP-1, JP-3
Automatic Pinging
Light series
24-18
18,000
20,000
0655
18,000
JP-1
Sonic
7000
7000
1515
7000
7000
- 22 -

— page 163 —
1. No work days were lost during the entire run for medical reasons. Only the usual number of colds and minor cuts and bruises occurred.

2. Habitability, very good. On all day dives one can of CO2 absorbent was spread out in the forward and after torpedo rooms. This measure was a great help, and there were practically none of the usual dull headaches experienced on all-day dives.

3. In general, the food was excellent and well prepared. More and greater variety of fresh frozen foods, especially fruits, would be a welcome addition to the menu. The new ice cream machine was a great success.

(Q) PERSONNEL:
(a) Number of men aboard during patrol 76
(b) Number of men qualified at start of patrol 48
(c) Number of men qualified at end of patrol 55
(d) Number of unqualified men making first patrol 22
(e) Number of men advanced in rating 13

It was necessary to lose eight qualified men after our arrival at Pearl Harbor from Mare Island prior to this patrol. This was subsequent to personnel adjustments made during [JAY YEL] overhaul. These men were replaced by inexperienced men, and in most cases they have shown much interest in learning the boat. A thirty day training schedule was started when we left [MAINE] which covered all the systems and subjects aboard necessary in order to qualify. Each day two classes on the same subject were held for all unqualified men by an officer or leading petty officer. Qualification questionnaires were issued for all unqualified men to fill out. These questionnaires contained 225 questions on all compartments and systems. Following the 30 day school ten submarine training films were shown. These films were an aid in teaching and proved to be both educational and enjoyable to the men.

Of the twenty-two men making their first patrol, all but two give every indication of making good submarine men. Six of them were exceptionally good and learned the boat so well that they qualified this run.

— page 166 —
27 October, 1944

1. U.S.S. SARGO.
2. Area: Bonin Islands 27 to 30 Oct. 1944
3. Installation: Probably airborne.
4. Intercept Equipment: APR-1
5. (a) Frq. 290 ncs, Dial 23,0
   (b) PRF possibly 300 by catatactic of weak signal.
   (c) Pulse width: 5 u sec by SFA
   (d) No sketch was made by operator. Weak signal of short duration.
   (e) Lobe switching: No.
   (f) Polarization: Unknown.
   (g) Sweep rate: Unknown.
6. (a) Probably airborne for surface search.
   (b) Distance from land, 125 miles.
7. This is classed as a "possible" interception, as it was not confirmed. Operator saw the pulse only twice and heard a faint note. Each interception was of 3 second duration.
Time: 0240
Location: Lt, 29-00 N, Long. 13-12 E.

— page 167 —
1 November, 1944

1. U.S.S. SARGO.
2. Area: HANSEI SHOTO
   1. Nov. to 24 Nov.
3. Installation: Definitely airborne.
4. Intercept equipment: APR-1
5. (a) Freq. 1/8 no, Dial 13,5
    (b) PRF 1000 by SPA notor
    (c) Pulse width: 7 u sec by SPA
    (d) Sketch pulse:

   (e) Lobe switching: unknown
   (f) Polarization: unknown
   (g) Scope ratio: unknown

6. (a) Airborne for surface source.
   (b) Reason for conclusion: Aircraft was closing at 200 knots or more at constant relative bearing.

7. Very weak interception at 1732, 1 Nov. Too weak for SPA and SPS.
Position: Lt, 29-22N; Long. 133-1/2E. Aircraft contact on S7 rev. at 15,000 yards about one hour later. Did not close.
Second aircraft contact on S7 radar at 2035, about 15,000 yards, closing rapidly on relative bearing 020. As we subcargoed, ARI operator, who was sweeping elsewhere on the band, returned to the 150 ne. band and detected a signal of moderate strength which was lost as the antenna went under.

— page 169 —
1. U.S.S. SARGO.
2. Area: NANSEN SHOTO From 1 Nov. to 24 Nov.
3. Installation: Probably aircraft.
4. Intercept equipment: APR-1
5. (a) Freq. 142 mc. Dial 12.9
   (b) PRF 1000 by SPA neter
   (c) Pulse width: 5 to 7 u sec
   (d) Pulse shape:

   (e) Lobe switching: unknown
   (f) Polarization: unknown
   (g) Sweep rate: unknown
6. (a) Airborne for surface search.
   (b) SJ radar contacted aircraft 6 minutes later.
7. Weak interoception at 1735 on 11 Nov. 1944. Lt. 29-15 Hq. Long 121-43 E. Four enemy ships were in the vicinity. SJ contact at 25,000 yards, tearing off the ship's lines later - did not close and was believed to be an aircraft as ships were known to be out of range at another bearing.

— page 170 —
22 November, 1944

1. U.S.S. SARGO.
2. Area: HANSEI SHOTO From 1 Nov. to 24 Nov.
3. Installation: Land
4. Intercept equipment: APR-1
5. (a) Freq. 157 nsec. Dial 1.4, 5
   (b) PRF 500 by SPA meter
   (c) Pulse width: 12 u sec by SPA analysis
   (d) Pulse shape:
    [Graphic: waveform plot]
    Sharp edges; nearly flat at top right, gain down.

(c) Lobe switching: No evidence
(f) Polarization: unknown
(g) Sweep rate: Timed at three minutes per revolution.

6. (a) Land based for air or surface search; high power.
7. First interception at 0558 on this date, just before surfacing.
   Location: 28-03 N, Long 128-47 E. Moderate strength.
   Second interception upon surfacing at 1623 same date.
   Location: 28-09 N, Long 128-44 E.
   Strong and sweeping, Strong glide lobes at 60 to 50 degrees from a very broad main lobe. Weaker as we left ABALAH O SHIHI, on course 270.
   Installation was not sighted during submerged patrol. It must be near the lighthouse on SOTSUKO ZAKI.

— page 172 —
5-222/AL-3
Serial: (041)
COMPLETE
FIRST INDORSEMENT to
CRNO Report of Twelfth War Patrol.
From: The Commander Submarine Division TO HUNDRED TWENTY TWO.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY TWO.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SARGO (SSL68) - Report of Twelfth War Patrol.

1. The S.S. ROGO commenced this Twelfth War Patrol from PANAMA, following a west coast overnourall. Many major alterations were accomplished during that period, one being the installation of four "Vinton 278A" main engines. Six new officers reported for duty subsequent to the last was patrol, the Executive Officer reporting during the training period.

2. This patrol was conducted in the S.S. ROGO in TSLMS and in the SHOTO areas, a three day ordnance training at a total of 52 days on station, 10 of which were surface patroling. The 3D radar was used separately, which probably contributed to the relatively few plane contacts, although some contacts definitely had radar equipment since interference was not evident on both APR and 3D equipments. (Arrest, pipas at 25,000 yards with 3D radar is above average.)

3. A study of the track chart shows good area coverage, but contact was unfortunately few. Aircraft to the north of the patrol area were developed into two picket boats, lying-to. They were brought under fire at 700 yards, but the pointer and transmitter on the 5" gun were unreliable with hits due to smoke interference from small caliber firing, poor visibility with an overcast moon, and temporary blindness from gun flashes. The 25 mm. and 50 caliber guns caused some minor damage, particularly since sporadic fires were noted in one of the targets. In the exchange of gunfire, a few hits were made in the vicinity of the 20 mm. gun forward of the S.S. ROGO's coming to by enemy machine gun fire, with no injury to personnel.

4. That may have been a radar example destroyer was sighted while surface patrolling during daylight 26 October. Although tracking at 10 1/2 knots the S.S. ROGO was forced to dive with a range of 16,000 yards and decreasing, before being able to definitely determine the target's track. Contact was not retained on submerging, and could not be reestablished upon surfacing one hour and eight minutes later. Seven days later a medium sized freighter was sighted close inshore to SHOTO, while, but could not be closed to firing range.

— page 175 —
05-22/A16-3
Serial: 093
CO: FIDEN
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS SALVO Report of
Twelfth Year Patrol.

From: Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-TWO
To:
Via:
Subject: U.S.S. SALVO (SS-189) - Report on Twelfth Year Patrol.
Forward, concurring in the remarks included in the first
2. It is reported that the excellent trawler was not rewarded by worthwhile contacts.
3. A study of the performance of SALVO on enemy sea lanes directed
on the part of squadron, Division, and Radar Engineer Officers, to
conclusions resulting will be disclaimed.
4. It is recommended that SALVO be credited with the following:
DA: ACRED (Cum attack hit. 1)
2 XMH (conv. trawler) (3) - - - Total 500 tons.

Copy to:
Consubdiv 222
CO: SALVO
W.J. SUITO,

— page 177 —
35 December 1944.

U.S.S. SARGON (S6168) - Report of Twelfth War Patrol.
(13 October to 7 December 1944).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete reports) (7)
Confined (5)
Canoes (1)
Cargo (1)
C

— page 181 —
8 Dec 41-22 Feb 42 NAME SARGO
FROM: Commanding Officer USS SARGO(SS-118)
SERIAL DATE 1 September 1944
SUBJECT NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE ORIENT
Statement (to ONI) of operations under command of Asiatic Fleet. FIRST WAR PATROL was off French-Indo-China and in Makassar Strait and SECOND WAR PATROL was an ammunition resupply & personnel evacuation run to Mindanao.

FILED: War Diary
Separately as ORIGINAL; as CARBON COPY

(SOMESPAC:STATISTIC DEFENSE: P.I.; MINOR ACTIONS)
MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT | FORM 3940-13 (11-55)
G20432

DATE 5-22 February 1942 NAME SARGO
FROM CROSS INDEX CARD
SERIAL DATE
SUBJECT Submarine relief activities, Philippines
But took one million rounds 20 caliber ammunition to various PI ports from Sourabaya & brought out 24 Army enlisted personnel on return.

FILED: War Diary
Separately under 75 51 ser 001A of 15 May 42

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT | FORM 3940-13 (10-55)
B-21013

DATE 8 Jun-3 Aug 1942 NAME SARGO
FROM CO - USS SARGO
SERIAL DATE 7 August 1942
SUBJECT Supplementary War Patrol Report
Report of sightings and attacks during patrol off Indo-China coast.

(SOMESPAC: CUB OPS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately
as Enc. to TG 51.1 ser S-0026 of 7 Aug 42

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT | FORM 3940-13 (11-55)
B28682

— page 182 —
23-25 September 1942
FROM C- USS SARGOSS-18
SUBJECT: SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT
Three dives reports of torpedo firings on FIFTH WIZ PATROL. Claims one cargo ship sunk in South China Sea.

(SCMESPAC: SUC OPS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately AS ORIGINAL

DATE: 31 December 1942
FROM C.O. USS SARGOS
SERIAL DATE: 31 December 1942
SUBJECT: ACTION BY U.S. SUBMARINE
1 Form Report of action in Lat. 02.39 S, Long. 149.59 E, during 6th War Patrol (30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43). Claims 1 Tanker damaged.

(SPAC: U.S. Submarine Actions)
FILED: War Diary
Separately AS ORIGINAL
As Enc. to SubPac, ser 0133, of 31 Jan 43;

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT | DATE | TIME | LOCATION | DESCRIPTION
---|---|---|---|---
A | 1 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 2 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 3 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 4 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 5 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 6 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 7 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 8 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 9 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 10 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 11 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 12 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 13 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 14 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 15 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 16 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 17 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 18 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 19 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 20 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 21 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 22 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 23 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 24 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 25 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 26 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 27 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 28 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 29 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 30 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 31 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 32 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 33 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 34 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 35 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 36 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 37 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 38 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 39 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 40 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 41 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 42 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 43 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 44 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 45 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 46 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 47 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 48 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 49 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 50 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 51 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 52 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 53 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 54 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 55 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 56 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 57 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 58 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 59 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 60 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 61 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 62 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 63 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 64 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 65 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 66 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 67 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 68 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 69 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 70 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 71 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 72 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 73 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 74 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 75 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 76 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 77 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 78 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 79 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 80 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 81 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 82 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 83 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 84 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 85 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 86 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 87 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 88 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 89 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims 1 Tanker damaged.
A | 90 | 31 | 1942 | 02.39 S, 149.59 E, 30 Nov 42 - 21 Jan 43 | Claims

— page 183 —
S3188/AI-03
DECLASSIFIED
U.S.S.S. SARGO
-SS188-
S3188/AI-03
DECLASSIFIED
U.S.S.S. SARGO
-SS188-
September 1, 1944

From:  The Commanding Officer,
To:  Director of Naval Intelligence.

Reference:  Information concerning Asiatic Fleet and 1941-42 naval
    campaign in Orient in ship's files.

1. The following statement of DUELL, Hollis George GH (AA),
   311 41 64, USN, who was the yeoman serving this command at the time concerned
    in Reference (a), is hereby submitted as the best available compliance with
    Reference (a). DUELL is now attached to ComSubDiv 44 (Flag).

"Prior to sailing from Manila on the first war patrol, a letter was
submitted by the SARGO to SubAEF giving the condition of the SARGO as to
the amount of supplies on board. This letter I believe was burned in Manila
with SubAEF files. SubAEF was aboard the HOLLAND at the time. Flag files
from HOLLAND were moved ashore, and were burned about January 10, 1942.

"The war patrol report was the only correspondence pertaining to the
war that was written up by the SARGO. All other correspondence was routine
reports, of which a number were lost in the mail and since have been dupli-
cated.

"The first war patrol report consisted of about 76 pages, the original
and six copies were typed up. T.D. JACOBS, Lt. Cdr., USN, Comdg. Off.,
delivered the original and six copies personally to ComSubAEF, who then
was on the beach in Sourabaja, Java. ComSubAEF, I believe, was Captain
Fife. In talking with ComSubAEF yeoman, Earl Lancaster, CY, now a ship's
clerk stationed in Australia, I learned that confidential and secret
correspondence was burned after it had reached an amount unsafe to keep on
hand. The first war patrol report was classified as Secret. It is de-
finitely known that the CO SARGO did not keep a copy for the ship's files.

"The second war patrol consisted of an ammunition run to Mindanao with
approximately one million rounds of small calibre. This was arranged with
SubAEF and an Army Major by the name of Ford. The war patrol consisted of
a month's duration. The ammunition was taken to Parang and delivered to
Major Ford, some enlisted army personnel and natives. On return trip ap-
proximately 33 enlisted aviation ground crew (Army) were evacuated to
Sourabaja. A war patrol report was typed up. No action with the enemy had
taken place, nothing sighted. I do not know whether this report was de-
livered or not as SubAEF (office force) had left Sourabaja to catch the
HOLLAND which was on the other side of JAVA.

-L-

— page 184 —
1944 SEP 11 AM 10 40
SS188/410-3
September 1, 1944
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Information concerning Asiatic Fleet and 1941-42 naval campaign in Orient in ship's files.

"SARGO remained only four days at Sourabja, then proceeding to Perth, Australia, with approximately 33 enlisted personnel and 6 officers of China's Flag. No war patrol report was made on this run. No enemy action.

"Commanding Officer T. D. JACOBS, Lieut-Comdr., USN
Executive Officer J. D. FULP, Lieut-Comdr., USN now commanding officer of the USS SEGUNDO
Torp & Gun Off C. D. RHYMES, Jr."

P.W. GARNETT

— page 185 —
1942, U.S.S. SARGO (SS188) Flagship
May 15, 1942,
Commander Task Force FIFTY-ON,
Commander Southwest Pacific Force,
Submarine Relief Activities - Philippine Area,
Reference: (a) COMSOWESPACFOR despatch 140922.

1. Following is a summary of submarine relief expeditions dispatched to the Philippines from the beginning of the war to the time of the surrender of Corregidor:
   (a) 16 January - 7 February. SEAWOLF enroute Darwin to Corregidor taking in thirty-seven tons, 30 caliber ammunition and returned to Sourbayne bringing out submarine spare parts, sixteen torpedoes and twenty-five passengers all Army and Navy air corps pilots. SEAWOLF was at Corregidor 27-28 January.

   (b) 14 February. SEAWOLF stopped at Corregidor enroute from patrol off Indo-China Coast and received 23 torpedoes, 30,000 gallons diesel, 3,000 lbs. radio equipment, 4,000 lb. submarine spares, and nineteen members of Naval Radio Intelligence Unit including two officers plus one army and two naval officers and brought them to Sourbayne. THOU from Pearl Harbor arrived Corregidor about this same time with 3" AA, ammunition for USAFE and was given sufficient fuel to make a war patrol on her return trip to the eastward. She evacuated an unknown quantity of specific securities, and passengers.

   (c) 14 February. SOWEFISH then on patrol off Surigao was dispatched to Corregidor where she arrived 19 February. She filled to capacity with 13 torpedoes and evacuated Presidio and party of 9 to San Jose, Panay, landing them on 22 February. She then returned to Corregidor, embarked Mr. SAYNE and party totaling eleven, plus five Navy enlisted men and brought them to Fremantle, WA., arriving 9 March.

— page 186 —
1942.
May 15, 1942.

Subject: Submarine Relief Activities - Philippine Area.

(a) 22 February. SARGO engaged in carrying one million rounds, 30 caliber ammunition to Parang, Polloc Harbor, Indanao, from Sourabaya and bringing out twenty-four army enlisted personnel to the same place.

(e) 28 February. PMRT on patrol north of Java was sent to Corregidor to be at the service of General MCARTUN, Acting on Java precluded sending A.A. ammunition with this submarine. March 13 she was standing by at Taganayan Island in connection with evacuation of General MCARTUN. Arrived Corregidor 15 March, transferred most of her service allowance of ammunition, received three torpedoes and a total of 10 naval officers and 41 navy enlisted men mostly radio intelligence and motor torpedo boat personnel, arriving from Manila 7 April.

(f) 21 March SARAGON, enroute to patrol station off Indo-China, was ordered to Cebu to ferry radios to Corregidor. Arrived Cebu April 3 and landed 34 tons food plus 1,000 gallons diesel and 600 gallons lubricating oil. To make this load possible landed 12 torpedoes and 250 rounds 3" ammunition on deck at Cebu. Arrived Corregidor April 8 and was taken inside the minefield to unload food and fuel to the U.S.S. PIGON. After 36 minutes alongside the SARAGON departed by orders of CONSULTING with 3 officers and 18 enlisted men of radio intelligence plus 1 army Colonel - total 22, plus publications and limited amount radio intelligence equipment. About seven tons of food were unloaded and a very small amount of fuel was transferred. SARAGON was kept off entrance of 48 hours expecting to unload remainder. On April 10 CONSULTING reported that further unloading of SARAGON was not desired. Proceeded to Fremantle arriving April 26, and discharged passengers and food.

(g) On 21 March SMARTER on patrol off Devao was ordered to ferry radios from Cebu to Corregidor. (Arrived Cebu April 4) landed on Cebu dock 4 torpedoes and 250 rounds.

— page 191 —
11 01:02:00
U. S. SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT
11. S.S. SHARKO
Time: 10:08 HYDRO
Location: Latitude: 10-00N
Longitude: 109-00E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(1) ATTACK FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(2) DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT - IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH POSSIBLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(3) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHETHER SUITABLE.

WITHIN CONDITIONS Overcast, Visibility good with slight haze.

IN CONDITIONS Good with white caps.

V.PL OF OPERATIONS Submarine patrol.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE Penny shipping.

FORCES ENGAGED: OWN
U. S. SHARKO

(Name and Type) ENEMY Medium Cargo ship.

TYPE OF ATTACK (Own/Enemy - scratch one)

TYPE OF ATTACK (Own/Enemy - scratch

— page 192 —
100 yards
Firing range: 100 yards
KEEP DEPTH: 0 feet
Straight ahead shot(s)
Type spread: divergent
Attack: (unopposed)
(Check) (unopposed)
Detected: (after firing)
(Check) (

— page 193 —
331
Date: September 25, 1942
Location: [latitude, longitude, depth]
INSTRUCTIONS:
1. ATTACK FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
2. DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT - IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED, PLEASE PROBABLY ACQUIRE A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
3. DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHERE IT IS SUITABLE.

WITHIN CONDITIONS: Clear, bright, visibility unlimited.

CONDITIONS: Choppy with white caps, no swells.

CONDITIONS (if applicable): Good

TYPE OF OPERATIONS: Submarine patrol

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Enemy combatant and cargo shipping

FORCES ENGAGED: OWN
USS SARGO

(Name and Type) ENEMY 7000-ton motor cargo ship

TYPE OF ATTACK (OWN, EXTRADESCRIPTION, SCRATCH ONE)

TYPE OF ATTACK (OWN, EXTRADESCRIPTION, SCRATCH ONE)

SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION: Attacked with 3 torpedoes, two hits. Completed sinking with a number of torpedoes, after firing three additional torpedoes which failed to sink ship.

WEAPONS EMPLOYED:
Own - Torpedoes, 3" gun.
Enemy - - - -

AMMUNITION EXPENDED: 6 Torpedoes, 48" gun.

EVASIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED:
Own - - -
Enemy - - -

— page 194 —
FOR TORPEDO ATTACK (Own):
    Firing range 1500 yards
    Keel depth 64 ft.
    Straight /Cargo shot(s)
    Type spread  Divergent
    Attack: (unopposed)
    (check) [X]

— page 196 —
000 yards
Keen depth
Straight/curved shot (50°)
Type spread
Attack: (unopposed) (opposed by air screen/close screen)
Detected: (prior to firing (after firing (undetected)
Result: (Certain) (Estimated) (That tanker sank)
Damage to own ship
Lookout (s) or special equipment detector operator(s):
(Name) (Rate) (ServiceNo.)
made initial contact by
(sound) (radar), (SMSD), (MAD), (Sight)
Brief Remarks

Copy to: [COA: copy to]
[Signature: signature here]

— page 197 —
108
AM-95-81
LEO MAKON

END OF REEL
JOB NO. E108
AM-95-81
LEO MAKON

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
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MICROFILM SECTION