U.S.S. DACE (SS-247) — war patrol report SS-247_DACE_Part3.pdf

— page 1 —
1019
Searched bottom at 308. feet. All stop. Guess we will sit here for a while. No temperature gradient. We are thankful for the heavy seas--oil leaks might not be so discernible. Pinging is mostly to the north-west but not too far away. One sound head apparently bont. Abandoned conning tower.

1040
At least one escort has been detailed to look after us. Apparently he is conducting a pinging and listening search sweep and he seems to have contact. He is in no hurry and apparently sure of our position as he has moved up and down our sides and came right over once. Decided to remain on the bottom as he had still failed to drop, however the current began to take charge of us and to carry us bumping and turning on the bottom with accompanying loud scraping, grinding and clanking noises. We were slewed around 900 to the left. Could not understand how we could remain undetected with all this racket going on so decided to get off the bottom at the first opportunity. By

1056
No screws could be heard by JP so we decided to get off the bottom and get going. Commenced blowing Safety and for the next 15 or 20 minutes we made more noise blowing, venting, starting and stopping hydraulic,

-20-

— page 2 —
1115 At 160 feet going up. Trouble opening. Negative flood. Down angle and speed won't hold her down so at about 100 feet opened safety outboard vent and commenced getting control of the boat although she nearly bottomed again. We were just about squared away at 270 feet when JP reported what we had all been expecting---"SCREWS, coming in fast at 1800". We relaxed, however, when we learned the screws were our own.

: 1142 Faint pinging astern.

: 1216 Up to periscope depth for a look. All clear as far as the weather would let us see.

: 1230 Secured from depth charge and silent running. Believe everyone offered at least a silent prayer of thanks. Those bombs and charges were as close as I have ever heard them.

Submerged to 100 feet to pump bilges and survey damage. Managed to rig in JK-9C sound head. JK side ruined--QC side okay. Forward torpedoes exposed to depths as great as 200 feet prior closing doors.

: 1240 Will have to check them all. Bow planes noisy, loud rumble aft--probably stern planes, one shaft has developed an intermittent squeal. Otherwise everything seems all right. I had intended to surface at least by 1400 when I figured I would be far enough from land to get off my contact report to the Group Commander. However, things took longer than I expected, so at

— page 3 —
1555 With only two forward torpedoes ready, surfaced and got off my contact and amplifying reports to the Group Commander, and told him I was diving. Noted superstructure hatch dished in aft.

: 1616 Dove and went to work on the torpedoes again.

: 1929 Changed course to surface and was just about to do so when SJ radar went out of commission for a half an hour.

: 2000 Surfaced. Informed Group Commander the events of the day and of my noisy conditions. He reassigned DACE to FLASHER's position about 40 miles northeast of CAMRANH Bay. Proceeded in that direction against the ever present wind and heavy seas.

: 2016 APR has our 200 MC friend again. Much SJ interference.

: 2120 Radar contact on BECUNA bearing 0780T, range 6,400 yards. Avoided.

: 2312 Radar contact on FLASHER bearing 0960T, range 11,550 yards. Spent the next hour avoiding. Closed to 2,000 yards and we still could not see him.

: 20 December 1944

: Making our way northward in the teeth of the gale--not making much headway. Do not desire to head directly into seas as we would be unable to dive quickly for planes.

: 0730 Passed through debris and by one floating mine.

: 1048 SD contact 22 miles. Turning at full speed with full rudder to get seas astern for diving.

— page 4 —
1052. With plane at 12 miles closing pulled the plug. Plane had closed to 8 miles by the time SD went under. The Japs surely fly in any kind of weather.

: 1205. Surfaced.

: 21 December 1944.

Continued high winds and heavy seas from the north.

: 0459. Radar contact bearing 0730T at 15,640 yards. (Ship contact #11). Stationed tracking party.

: 0530. Enemy on course 3200T, speed about 4 to 6 knots. Target apparently stops every 10 or 15 minutes. Sent Group Commander a contact report.

: 0548. Dawn will be approaching soon so decided to close enemy even though he does appear small. Went to battle stations torpedo and headed in.

: 0615. Closed to 4,600 yards and still couldn't make our more than a small blob in the approaching daylight, so opened target to clear him before it gets too light. It was a good tracking drill.

: 0628. Enemy has turned toward us and speeded up. Guess we are now rendering target services for him. Increased to full speed on 4 main engines and opened range but he is crowding us into the beach and it is getting very light. Informed Group Commander that I was retiring and that contact was a patrol boat.

: 0651. With the, shore and the petrol boat both in sight, the latter 11,000 yards, eastern and

-23-

— page 5 —
0652
Flooded No. 3, main engine on dive.

0707
Pinging astern but nothing in sight due to high seas. Opened coast and target on 1300T.

0750
With pinging faded out astern decided to utilize time below checking No. 3, main engine, and treating the torpedo after bodies which were flooded on the 19th. Check showed No. 3 main engine outboard exhaust valve inoperative --apparently caused by depth charging as we hadn't used this engine since our being attacked. The air chamber of the depth mechanism in one of the pressure exposed torpedoes was found flooded, so we will have to check the other five torpedoes for the same defect. More surface patrol time lost.

1504
Surfaced and headed north with torpedoes checked but No. 3 main engine out of commission.

1804
Radar contact bearing 3560T at 13,190 yards. As we had SU interference on the same bearing we assumed it was one of our subs so pulled clear.

2020
Attempted to put 2 men on deck to fix No. 3 outboard exhaust valve but seas were too rough so decided to get under the lee of HON LON Island for repairs.

22 December 1944

Heavy seas and high winds from the north.

0100
From a position 4 miles south of HON LON, and 5 miles from the mainland headed into seas at slow speed while KERR, 17" 0", CMOMM, USN and FITZGEARLD, L.H., MoMMle, USN went to

-24-

— page 7 —
1546
Dove. Plane apparently target's air cover-age. Maintained a periscope patrol until

: 1924
When we surfaced and started north to our station. Reported results o? chase to Group Commander.

: 2035
Received CIF-71's serial 76 reassigning areas to various submarines. DACE and BECUNA are to share Area C-3. Commander SFTTRR in BECUNA to coordinate.

: 2101
Received orders from Commander STU.R to patrol off of Cape VARELLA. Set course for new station.

: 23 December 1944
No change in weather.

: 0506
Had just reached new station when a FLASHER contact report followed by a BECUNA report on a 5 ship convoy 80 to 90 miles south of us. Was received. Headed south making 20 knots with the seas astern.

: 0725
Passed a floating mine.

: 0830
Having failed to find convoy along estimated course commenced a retiring search to the northeast. Notified Group Commander of my movements and requested latest information. He replied that the ships had made port, so at

: 1018
Headed north once more into the seas.

: 2130
Arrived on station off of Cape VARELLA. Commenced patrolling about 10 miles off the coast.

: 2350
SJ contact 16,000 yards bearing 2100T.

— page 8 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS24:7), Report of War
Patrol Number SIX.

(Ship contact #13). Commenced tracking. Target appears small and making very little speed.

24. December 1944

0033 Secured tracking.

0101 Made radar contact and exchanged calls by SJ with BECUNA.

0623 Dove. Conducting submerged patrol off Cape VAIKILLA. Plan to patrol close to VARELLA in the morning, and drop down to the entrance to VAN FONG Bay in the afternoon in hopes of catching north bound shipping "holling up" for the night.

0800 Sighted native sail boat.

1136 Sighted a bomber by periscope, distance 4 - 6 miles. (Aircraft contact #13).

1203 Sighted native sail boat.

1801 Sighted single-motored plane headed towards us 3 or 4 miles distant. Believe we were undetected but sought the safety of the depths for a few minutes. (Aircraft contact #14).

1918 Surfaced. Weather has finally started to improve a little. Surface patrolling 10 to 12 miles off shore.

25 December 1944

Merry Christmas!

0431 Exchanged recognition signals with BECUNA.

0626 Dove for submerged patrol same as yesterday. Enjoyed Christmas corals on records and a good Christmas dinner.

-27-

— page 9 —
1928
Surfaced. Patrolling about 10 miles east of VARELLA.

26 December 1944

0400 Exchanged SJ recognition signals with ESCUNA.

0628 Dove for usual submerged patrol. Routined all torpedoes.

1303 QB picked up pinging astern which grew in intensity. We are about 4 miles off Cape VARELLA, sky overcast and seas have some white caps with heavy swells from north, visibility lowered due to light rain.

1320 Unable to see target. Pinging very strong.

Went to battle stations submerged.

1330 Sighted mast, bridge, and stack of a ship emitting black smoke--range about 9,000 yards, angle on bow 30° starboard. Can not identify. Came to N/C. No other targets in sight. (Ship contact #14).

1335 Target appears to be a PC boat or small DD or DE with raised forecastle mounting 1 gun, stick foremost just cebft bridge, searchlight platform, tall vertical single stack, small stick mast aft. Tracked him on course 3550° at about 8 knots, and got within about 3,000 yards of him, but believed him too shallow draft and small to hit in these seas, besides maybe something better is astern. Watched him go "over the hill" and closed VARELLA.

1411 Secured from battle stations. Apparently he was just conducting a periodic sweep.

— page 10 —
1928
Surfaced. Patrol from VARELLA northward ten miles off shore.

: 2351
SJ radar contact on BECUNA bearing 0240T, 12,000 yards.

: 1627
Dove for submerged patrol off Cape VARELLA. Visibility poor and unable to maintain periscope patrol in the heavy seas, so commenced clearing coast and at

: 1113
Surfaced.

: 1636
Received BECUNA's message asking if we had seen any mines. Answered that we had seen 3.

: 1707
Received orders from BECUNA to retire to Longitude 1100-30' E. She had sighted ten mines near her position to the north. As the current is still a strong southerly current DACE gladly complied.

: 28 December 1944
Patrolling 40 to 60 miles east of Cape VARELLA.

: 0404
Went to 4 engine speed and commenced closing the coast. Hope we can spot the mines before they spot us.

: 0618
Dove for submerged patrol northeast of VARELLA.

: 1058
Unable to maintain periscope depth on northerly courses due to heavy seas. Am south of VARELLA. Have been fighting a losing battle with 3 to 4 knot current so changed course to 180 to continue the struggle off HON DOI Island and southward.

-29-

— page 11 —
1112
Sighted the masts and stack of a ship bearing 3270T at 8 miles. (Ship contact #15). Commenced tracking.

1114
Sighted a JAKE (Aircraft contact #15) patrolling over and ahead of ship. Visibility not too good with a misty land background and overcast sky. We are about halfway between Cape VAIELLA and HON DOI Island opposite the shallow water indentat ion in the coastline, but in 40 to 60 fathoms of water. As we could not make periscope exposures on northerly courses nor make headway in that direction, I decided to run with enemy and try to make the attack as he passed near HON DOI Island.

1216
Target apparently making 7.5 knots on about 1800T. Cannot see him all the time. Can now see two ships astern of leader in a rough column about 1,000 yards apart. The last one may be an escort. Plan to fire four torpedoes at the first ship and attempt to fire the remaining two at the second ship.

The next hour presented its difficulties with trying to keep track of our position, keeping track of the plane, and track the targets. The problem was made more complex when the stern plane contactors became overheated to the point of melting the insulation, making it necessary to complete the attack with the stern planes in hand power. This constituted a major casualty considering the rough sea conditions, but was ably handled by the diving officer, Lieutenant W.W. PRICE, JR., U.S.N.

1243
Target has apparently slowed to about 5 knots and has an angle on the bow of 50 port. It looks like we may be getting too close to HON DOI so decided to go to 80 feet.

-30-

— page 12 —
1255
On course 2400T with the first target on a 1100 port track, but with a longer range than anticipated due to zig away while we were turning.

1258-49 Commenced firing at the leader (fired 4 torpedoes).

1259-40 Commenced firing at the second ship (fired 2 torpedoes).

1300 As we had six torpedoes fanning out from our large impulse bubble (#6 poppet didn't function), and as I had lost track of the air escort I went deep immediately and evaded on course 1300T, rigging for depth charge and silent running.

1301-55 Loud explosion, followed shortly after by a fainter explosion whose time was not recorded.

1304-17 Explosion.

1304-20 Explosion.

1306-38 Explosion.

1307-13 Explosion.

1307 QB and JP (manned by experienced operators) heard definite breaking up noises in the direction of the targets. This was substantiated by two other operators plus the sound officer. These noises were heard over a period of about twenty minutes. Noises also heard through hull.

-31-

— page 13 —
1312-30 Depth charge undoubtedly dropped by the plane as no screws were heard close by. The charge was close, but not "tooth shaking".

: 1323-10 JP heard noises like oil burning on the surface in addition to breaking up noises. No gradient at 300 feet.

: From the above facts I am positive we sank one of the two targets (Probably the second one), and possibly hit the other. The first target was a medium MFM AK of about 4,000 tons similar in appearance to the OSAKA MARU or CHERIBON MARU (page 132 and 131, ONI 208(3)Rev.). The second one was not very well identified. It may have been used as a tanker, but resembled in appearance the WAKANOURA MARU (Page 138, ONI 208(7)Rev.). It appeared lower in the water than the first target but approximate-ly the same size. The remaining two ships were not identified. One appeared to be an escort. Subsequent checking of data substantiated by navigational data showed that our firing data was excellent and the problem was checking on TDC when we fired.

: 1400 All clear on sound, but have decided to remain down until the stern planes are repaired. Depth control is difficult in the risk of losing control with the air screen they must have above.

: 1530 Stern planes are repaired. (Resistor was burned out.) Came to periscope depth. All clear but visibility poor. Secured from rig for depth charge and silent running and pumped bilges, made reload and checked after torpedoes.

-32-

— page 14 —
1627
Heard and felt a series of six distant explosions that sounded like depth charges. Guess the Japs are working over our area.

: 1927
Surfaced.

: 2120
Received GURNARD's contact report. Perhaps we can get in on this force, so commenced patrolling along enemy's probably track.

: 2320
Weak interference on APR at 153 MC--probably a night plane. The moon is full and bright tonight.

: 2321
EBCUNA sent word that she was going south to a new station. This gives DACE all of Area C-3.

29 December 1944

Patrolling along probable track of a reported contact 20 to 30 miles off shore. APR gets 153 MC (500pps) interference at odd intervals.

: 0304
Weak SJ contact at 16,000 yards. Probably a patrol vessel. Spent the next hour avoiding. There are apparently two small ships.

: 0800
Guess our contact isn't going to develop. Will patrol eastern side of area on surface today and let Cape VARELLA cool off after our attack.

: 1547
Dors for trim and to give reload torpedoes a pressure test. Am glad we did for one of them floated.

: 2008
All torpedoes checked. Surfaced.

— page 15 —
30 December 1944
0545 Weak 198 MC interference on APR.
0629 Dove about 9 miles northeast of VAREILLA and adjusted position 2 to 3 miles northeast of the Cape.
0928 Raised periscope just in time to see a floating mine pass by about 50 yards to port.
1041 Sighted a JAKE patrolling to the northward about 8 miles distant. Assume something is headed south. (Aircraft contact #16).
1058 Plane appeared to be diving at periscope so went to 150 feet.
1105 Periscope depth. Nothing in sight. Heavy swells from north.
1114 JF heard high noise level at 2900T. While searching I saw five big bombers, apparently FRANCES, in addition to our JAKE. Figured we had hit the jackpot if our still invisible convoy had a six plane escort, but apparently the bombers were just flying south for they soon disappeared. (Aircraft contact #17).
1120 JP reported screws on 2800T. We are trying to close the contact.
1200 Targets were identified as three medium size trucks about 500 to 1,000 yards from the beach. (Ship contact #16).
1219 Broke off approach and continued patrolling.
1943 J.F. C. Made night sweep to seaward. Most of the patrol was on the coast at night.

— page 16 —
31 December 1944
0622 Dove in our usual spot northeast of Cape VARELLA.
0956 Sound heard pinging on 2400T. This is probably the force reported in GURNARD's third last night.
1000 Sighted tops of four or five ships standing up the coast from the south bearing 2010T. (Ship contact #17). Commenced tracking. We are on course 3450T, the visibility around the shore and to south is not good. 'Seas have a moderate swell from north with little or no white caps. Current is usual 3 knot southerly current. We are two to three miles off shore a little north of VARELLA.
1005 It now appears that the are two parallel columns of ships. The near ship is a transport at about 12,000 yards, angle on the bow 150 port with an escort on his port bow. It looks as though the outboard column has an escort on its starboard bow. My plan is to get between the two columns and try to fire bow and stern tubes, and keep from closing the shore too much. (Water shoals rapidly near shore.) Targets appear to be on course 0050T with the range to the transport about 9,000 yards.
1008 Leading ship (transport) zigged 300 to his port, angle on the bow is now 15 starboard.
1011 Changed course to 0000T, but as depth control and periscope feather are worse on this course than any other, at
1017 Reversed course coming right to 1800. Two JAKES (Aircraft contact #18) are now in sight

— page 17 —
1022
Periscope depth. Inshore escort is headed over our way. Sound gets screws and pinging on several bearings.

1025
From the looks of things I am just to sea-ward of a column of four DD's or DE's. This was what I thought until now was a second column of big ships. It appears that they had been on a converging course with the inshore column, and that plus the offshore distance I gained on my right turn placed me in this most undesirable position.

1028
Screws of escort that turned towards us have slowed and stopped. I am now about 4,000 yards from the transport. Right full rudder and more speed.

1032
Changed course to 290°T. Escorts commenced passing us one by one all pinging furiously. The closest passed about 300 to 400 yards from us. Can't locate the transport.

1036
Screws of our suspicious escort have started up again.

1038
Have lost sight of transport. Convoy speed is about 12 knots.

1039
Shifted targets to two almost overlapping tankers; angle on the bow about 120° port, range about 3,500 yards. We were getting a set up on these, when at.

1041
I spotted an escort carrier against the land background with a DD or DE in line with it. Angle on the bow about 110° port, range about 4,000 yards. This was the last.

— page 18 —
1045 TDC was shifted to low power. Depth set at 6 feet (in hopes of hitting the escort also).

1048 Trouble getting correct solution light on TDC. (Should have used Mk 8 Angle Solver, but thought we would get a near enough solution on the TDC--time was getting short.)

1050-50 Fired tube #1.

1050-59 Fired tube #3.

1051-09 Fired tube #5.

1052 Commenced changing course to 130°T, and going deep. Rigged for depth charge and silent running.

1101 Depth charge or depth bomb-explosion--not close. Apparently no torpedo hits. No gradient at 300 feet. Much pinging and many screws which remained in evidence until

1202 At which time we came to periscope depth and secured from rig for depth charge and silent running.

1207 Commenced opening coast at 2/3 speed so we can surface, broadcast our contact report to the ROCK which is north of us, and make an:ond around on the target.

1233 While making preparation for surfacing received a depth bomb--not too close. Flame apparently sighted our 2/3 speed periscope feather. Guess we will have to clear this spot prior to surfacing. (Aircraft contact #19).

-37-

— page 19 —
1433
Surfaced. Commenced transmitting contact report.

: 1434
SJ and SD both got a plane at 3 miles closing. (Aircraft contact #20). There may have been two planes according to SJ radar.

: 1435
Dove.

: 1511
One depth charge explosion--not close; probably dropped on our diving point. From the next sequence of events I believe the plane must have dropped a marker float at some previous time and called an escort, for at

: 1512
Heard and felt two depth charges--not close. Went deep and rigged for depth charge.

: 1513
Heard and felt one more depth charge.

: 1515
Heard and felt eight more depth charges.

: 1516
Heard and felt eleven more depth charges. What a barrage! None were too close, but were close enough to jar the boat. Sound heard pinging at 260°T.

: 1627
All clear apparently. No screws are in evidence. The Nip's convoy has too good a start on us now to intercept him. Seas are building up from the north.

: 1920
We were all set to surface when suddenly sound picked up what sounded like air compressors, or some ship's auxiliary machinery dead ahead and quite loud. The noise was rhythmical but too fast for screws. All of our sound talent agreed that it sounded like machinery. The moon isn't up yet and nothing can be seen through the periscope.

— page 20 —
2045
The bearing is drawing southward from about 0900T, but the intensity doesn't diminish. Figuring perhaps it was a "sleeper" patrol boat conducting a listening search we went deep and rigged for silent running. This sound continued to baffle us and remained very loud until about 2020 when it began to diminish slowly in a southerly direction. By

2100. Surfaced. All clear.

2110 SJ radar out of commission for a half an hour.

2200 Cleared contact report of today's force. (DACE's third to CTF-71.) Patrolled off shore.

1 January 1945 (Happy New Year!)

Patrolling on surface.

1014 SD contact 15 miles. (Aircraft contact #21). Closed to 8 miles, so at

1016 Dove.

1054 Surfaced. All clear.

1920 Weak SJ radar interference to the north.

2338 SJ radar out of commission.

2 January 1945

0045 Cleared DACE's fourth to CTF-71 giving a resume of the patrol so far, and giving 3 January as the limit of our endurance if we

— page 21 —
0113
Put on three main engines to reach the 0500 position of a reported contact. This will put us slightly out of our area to the east, but the adjoining area is vacant.

: 0402
SJ is back in commission. Attempted without results to exchange recognition signals with a submarine to the southwest of us. I guess the GURNARD or GUITARRO is searching also.

: 0643
SJ radar commenced flickering on and off.

: 0755
SJ repaired. Seas are building up to real large ones once more.

: 1200
Convoy is seven hours overdue on our estimated 0500 position. Broke off search and headed back to our area.

: 1526
Patrolling on the surface in the southern part of our area headed north.

: 2040
Received CTF-71's serial 41 to the DACE stating that it was desired DACE remain on station another week, and to conserve fuel unless developing contacts, but to advise CTF-71 when we leave the area.
Fuel needs and mileage were recomputed carefully and fuel safety factor cut down. Considering adverse currents, head seas, past engine performance, zig-zagging, etc., I believe 38,000 gallons to be our minimum fuel allowance for reaching SIAPAN. We will stretch out our "velvet fuel" as long as possible.

-40-

— page 22 —
3 January 1945
0625 Dove for submerged patrol between VARELLA and HON DOI. This is the first really good day we have had from a weather and seas point of view. Current is checking at only 2 to 2.5 knots south.

1952 Surfaced. Patrolling 12 miles off shore.

2030 Took advantage of the good weather to grease the topside. Weak APR interference on 193 MC.

2326 Intercepted a "Close Urgent" message from the GUITARRO to the GURNARD. From a previous message we knew her position, and that she was limited to 10 knots with stern planes jammed on hard rise. As we were less than 50 miles from her and figured the GURNARD might be more distant we commenced closing her at 4 engine speed, and sent a message to her asking if we could assist and giving our position. Message was not receipted for.

4 January 1945

Closing GUITARRO at top speed.

0027 Nothing having been heard from the GUITARRO we told the GURNARD that we were closing the GUITARRO giving our HT and asking if he could get there sooner.

0034 Received message from the GUITARRO stating that the GURNARD was assisting her, so at

0040 Reduced speed and resumed patrolling to the northward.

0613 Dove northeast of V.REILLA for our usual submerged patrol. Passed six small sail boats during the morning.

-41-

— page 23 —
1952
Surfaced. Patrolling 10. to 14 miles off shore.

2332
Plane was contacted by SJ and verified by SD at 27,000 yards, bearing 190°T. Faded out rapidly. (aircraft contact #22).

5 January 1945
Patrolling near coast.

0038
SJ contact bearing 3250T at 6,300 yards. Lookouts can see a small blob. avoided.

0615
Dove northeast of VARELLA and closed the coast for submerged patrol. Sighted five small sailboats during the day.

1931
Surfaced. Patrolling 12 miles off shore.

2200
Converted No. 5 R.F.E.T. to watter ballast tank.

2316
Dove to wash oil out of No. 5 M.B.T.

2333
Surfaced.

6 January 1945
Surface patrolling 12 miles off shore.

0621
Dove. Conducted submerged patrol off VARELLA.

1024
Sighted a large unidentified bomber through the periscope. (aircraft contact #23).

1938
Surfaced. Patrolling northward 12 to 15 miles off shore.

-42-

— page 24 —
7 January 1945

Surface patrolling.

0237 Cleared DACE's serial five to CTF-71 reporting that we were departing Area C-3 at 0700 due to fuel shortage and that we had no further contacts.

0630 Crossed northern boundary of Area C-3 enroute SAIPAN.

1325 Dove for trim.

1342 Surfaced.

1745 Received CTF's serial 65 ordering us to pass to operational control of CTF-17 at a certain position at 1200H the eighth, and bidding the DACE a warm farewell and best wishes.

2100 Converted No. 3 R.F.B.T. to a water ballast tank.

2213 Dove to wash oil from No. 3 M.B.T.

2238 Surfaced.

2355 Transmitted DACE's serial one to CTF-17 telling him that we were reporting for duty at 1200H on the eighth and informing him of our proposed route to SAIPAN, our speed of advance, fuel, torpedoes, etc.

8 January 1945

Enroute SAIPAN.

1430 Made trim dive.

1447 Surfaced.

-43-

— page 25 —
1807
Sighted sails of 'two ships about 15,000 yards, bearing 074°T. We are silhouetted against the afterglow of the sunset. Closed at high speed, manned all bridge level guns, and had other gun crews standing by below.

: 1830
Ships appear to be Chinese junks. (We are about 90 miles from the China coast). Continued to close and passed astern of them at 2,500 yards, then turned northward to silhouette them. Put a burst of 20mm across their bow, and they immediately commenced taking in their sails.

: 1847
Closed to within 400 yards and definitely identified them as Chinese junks and deemed them no gun shoot target.

: 1850
Resumed base course and speed.

: 1917
Received ComSubPacFor's welcome message (serial 92 Peter).

9 January 1945

: 0040
Picked up weak SJ interference on 320°T.

: 1205
SD contact 22 miles. (Aircraft contact #24).

: 1212
Lost SD contact at 22 miles.

: 1227
Made landfall on PRATAS Island by SJ at 22,950 yards bearing 313°T. There are two tall radio towers on this island.

: 1711
Received ComSubPacFor's serial 97 Sugar giving important routing instructions, and requesting acknowledgment and weather report.

: 2205
Cleared DACE's serial 2 to ComSubPacFor in answer to the above serial.

— page 26 —
10 January 1945
0558 SD contact 28 miles. Closed a little; then faded out. (aircraft contact #25).
0628 Dove for trim.
0650 Sighted two small single-engine planes through periscope. (aircraft contact #26).
0701 Surfaced.
0712 Land (FORMOSA) on SJ bearing 0600T, at 55 miles.
0950 Dove for SD contact at 8 miles. (aircraft contact #27).
1025 Surfaced.
1047 Dove for plane sighted by lookout and SD at 9 miles. (aircraft contact #28).
1157 Surfaced.
1330 Dove for SD contact 7 miles. (aircraft contact #29).
1400 Surfaced.
1444 SD contact 14 miles closing. (aircraft contact #30).
1445 Dove.
1515 Surfaced.
1518 SD contact 18 miles. (aircraft contact #31).
1521 Dove with plane at 14 miles closing.
1625 Surfaced.

-45-

— page 27 —
1640 SD contact 22 miles. (Aircraft contact #32).
: 1644 Dove with plane 13 miles closing. Decided to remain submerged until sunset.
: 1815 Surfaced.
: 1945 SJ contact on an unidentified object at 5,280 yards bearing 0600T. Avoided.
: 2000 SJ contact on BATAN Island bearing 1030T, 95,000 yards.
: 2105 Received ComSubPacFor's serial 6 Yoke giving us further routing instructions. Picked up various islands near BALINGTANG Channel on schedule.

11 January 1945

: 0050 Completed transit of BALINGTANG Channel and set course southward along the coast of LUZON Island. having rounded BABUYAN Island at ten miles distance to the north and east.
: 0100 Commenced getting SJ radar interference.
: 0225 SJ contact bearing 0400T at 35,000 yards on DIDICAS ROCKS.
: 0247 SJ radar contact on our SJ "interference friend" at 9,950 yards. Tried unsuccessfully several times to challenge and closed to 8,000 yards, but got no response. Believe him to be U.S.S. CROAKER. Lost contact at 10,000 yards.
: 0310 Intermittent SD interference on APR.
: 0618 Dove for trim.
: 0643 Surfaced.

— page 28 —
0822 Dove for SD contact 8 miles. (Aircraft contact #33).
: 0902 Surfaed.
: 0945 SD contact 16 miles. (Aircraft contact #34).
: 0946 Dove with plane at 13 miles closing.
: 1035 Surfaed.
: 1820 No. 2 main generator was put out of commission due to commutator casualty. (See MAJOR DEFECTS). Unable to effect repairs at sea.

12 January 1945

: 0558 Dove for trim.
: 0619 Surfaed.
: 0750 Liberator bomber sighted by lookout bearing 130°T at 10 miles, flying low. (Aircraft contact #35).
: 0752 SJ contact on same plane at 18,000 yards. Watched him pass ahead, close to 4 miles, then disappear at 8 miles. Apparently he never saw us.
: 0804 SJ contact on a plane bearing 2650T at 30,000 yards (a different plane). This one changed bearing rapidly, closed to 28,000 yards, and then faded. (Aircraft contact #36).
: 2125 Received CTG 17.7 despatch 120637 giving us further routing and rendezvous information.

13 January 1945

: 0637 Dove for SD contact at 11 miles which closed to 9 miles. (Aircraft contact #37).

— page 29 —
0702    Surfaced.
: 0830    Completed transmission of DACE's serial 1 to CTG-17.7 giving him our position, speed of advance and time at rendezvous point.
: 0901    SD contact at 19 miles closing very slowly. (Aircraft contact #38).
: 0903    Above plane sighted by lookout and OOD. Apparently a Liberator on patrol. Faded from view and SD at about 17 miles.
: 1042    Large low-flying plane sighted by lookout and J00D. Neither radar could pick it up. Estimated range 18 miles. (Aircraft contact #39).
: 1047    Plane disappeared. It appeared to be a large bomber.
: 1200    Set all clocks ahead one hour to conform to -9 zone time. (ITEM time).
: 1315I    Dove to routine torpedoes.
: 1740I    Surfaced.
: 1859I    Lookout sighted what appeared to be a green flare bearing 0200T, distance about 6,000 yards. As there was no indication of anything on the radar we thought it might be from a downed aviator, so we changed course to 0000T and ran for 3 miles, fired a recognition flare (which brilliantly illuminated us), and turned east.
: 1930I    Broke off search.
: 2142I    Strong interference on iPR at 223mc sweeping every 48 seconds.

-48-

— page 30 —
14 January 1945
11531 SD contact at 19 miles. (Aircraft contact #40).
11581 Plane disappeared from radar screen.
1204I SD contact at 22 miles (possibly same as contact #40). (Aircraft contact #41).
1207I Lost contact at 23 miles.
1950I SJ interference to the north on a westerly course. Attempted unsuccessfully to challenge. Believe this was U.S.S. CHARR.

15 January 1945
0600I Dove far trim.
0613I Surfaced.
0945I SD contact at 21 miles closing. (Aircraft contact #42).
0952I With plane 6 miles am closing, and still being unable to see him we fired a flare and dove.
1015I Surfaced.
1541I SD contact at 32 miles. (Aircraft contact #43).
1546I Plane opened to 34 miles and disappeared.
1600I Set all clocks ahead one hour to conform to -10 zone time (KING time).
1935K Weak 107mc PR interference.
2155K Weak 200mc APR interference.

-49-

— page 31 —
16 January 1945
0020K Arrived at escort rendezvous point.
0032K Contacted escort by SJ. Closed and spoke him. Escort was LCI 677. Proceeded toward S.I.P.I.N.the lights of which were visible to us 70 miles away. From here on many friendly planes were contacted. They will not be individually reported herein.
0407K S.I.P.I.N contacted on SJ bearing 1020T, at 45 miles.
0645K Entered T.N.P.I.G Harbor, S.I.P.I.N Island.
0730K Moored starboard side to U.S.S. SKIPJACK in nest along port side of U.S.S. FULTON. While at S.I.P.I.N accomplished minor repairs and fueled ship. The repairs on No. 2 main generator were deemed too big a job for the tender to accomplish during our short stay, so will proceed to Pearl Harbor, T.H. with it out of commission. The facilities, willingness to help, and courtesy shown us by the tender were greatly appreciated.

17 January 1945
Moored T.N.I.P.I.G Harbor, S.I.P.I.N.
18 January 1945
1000K Underway from S.I.P.I.N enroute Pearl Harbor, T.H., with LCI 1061 as escort.
1256K Sighted N.N.T.H.I.N Island bearing 0100T at about 60 miles.
1450K Dove for trim.
1520K Surfaed.
-50-

— page 32 —
1700K  Releasd escort.
2030K  Sighted SARIGAN Island bearing 0460T at 35 miles.
2200K  Transited passage between SARIGAN and GUGUAN Islands passing the latter 8 miles abeam.
    All during the day and evening many friendly planes and ships were sighted.
    These are not included herein.

19 January 1945
1028K  PEM sighted by quartermaster and picked up on both radars at 14 miles. (Aircraft contact #44).
1320K  Dove for trim.
1331K  Surfaced.
1545K  Unidentified plane sighted at 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #45).

20 January 1945
No remarks.

21 January 1945
1000K  Set clocks ahead one hour to conform to -11 zone time (LOVE time).
1340L  Dove for trim.
1405L  Surfaced.

22 January 1945
No remarks.

— page 33 —
23 January 1945
Reconverted No. 4 R.F.B.T. to a water ballast tank.

1245L Dove for trim and to wash oil from #4 MRT.

1319L Surfaced.

1920L Fired green flare to southward. Search-ed for sixty minutes and fired a flare, but had no results.

1955L Weak SJ interference apparently to southward on opposite course.

24 January 1945
0600L Set all clocks ahead one hour to conform to -12 zone time (MIKE time).

1235M Dove. Conducted six hour battery discharge in preparation for Navy Yard layup. Routined all torpedoes and compensated magnetic compasses.

1728M Surfaced.

1830M Completed battery discharge.

24 January 1945 (West Longitude date)
0705M 25 January 1945 East Longitude time and date crossed 180th meridian into zone plus twelve (YOKE) time, and turned the calendar back one day repeating the 24th of January.

0935Y Dove for trim.

1010Y Surfaced.

— page 34 —
25 January 1945
: 1300Y Set clocks ahead one hour to conform to plus 11 zone time (XRAY time).
: 1517X Dove for trim.
: 1550X Surfaced.
: 26 January 1945
: 1145K Passed two friendly submarines believed to be LUGARTO and HUDDOCK abeam to port.
: 27 January 1945
: 0015X Passed and exchanged recognition signals with POMPRET.
: 0615X Dove for trim.
: 0640X Surfaced.
: 0807X Unidentified aircraft sighted and contacted on SD radar at 23 miles opening. (aircraft contact #46). (From here until end of patrol sighted many friendly planes which will not be individually listed herein.)
: 28 January 1945
: 0130X Sighted KUUAI Island 65 miles to the north.
: 0430X SJ contact on OAHU Island 55 miles bearing 0720T.
: 0435X Contacted our escort, PC 485, and proceeded to port in company.
: 1000X Moored Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

--END OF SIXTH WAR PATROL

-53-

— page 35 —
U.S.S. DACE (PS247), Report of War
:  Patrol Number SIX.

(C) WEATHER
Weather conditions encountered were those expected for the area during the NW monsoon. Heavy seas, continuous rain, overcast skies, and moderate winds predominated. In general, the weather was unsuitable for submarine operations.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
Currents as described in Coast Pilot were encountered. The drift, however, averaged 3.0 knots instead of the normal 1.5 knots, and in some instances a drift as high as 4.0 knots was recorded.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
No new navigational aids were observed. Two radio towers were observed on PRATAS Island. Longitude 200-44°N, Latitude 116°46' E. Loran equipment was carried for the first time, and although the lack of stations did not allow maximum use of the equipment it is felt that this instrument will become invaluable for submarine navigation. A fair fix was obtained 1,400 miles from the station on the NW coast of Australia.

— page 42 —
3900 (at 3300 (firing))

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Torpedo Attack Form)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol #6

Time: 1300H Date: 12/28/44 Lat. 12-39N Long. 109-30E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Four ship convoy in column with approximately 1200 yards between the first and second ships which were identified as medium freighters. The after two ships were not well identified--at least one appeared to be an escort.

Ship: One (1) Medium MMF AK, approximately 4,000 tons, similar in appearance to the WAKANOURA MARU (PP 138, ONI 208(J) Rev.). (EU).

Ship: One (1) Medium MMF AK, approximately 4,000 tons, similar in appearance to the ASA KA or CHERIBON MARU (PP 132 & 131 ONI 208 (J) Rev.). (EU).

Damage: One definite timed torpedo hit and one fainted explosion timed to hit the leader by: (i.e., more distant ship) followed five minutes later by breaking-up noises which could be heard through the ship's hull and which were identified by four expert personnel sound operators and the sound officer at the JP & QB sound stations. These breaking up noises came from the general direction of the second ship, but had a very broad bearing (200 or more) and persisted for about 20 minutes. Noises resembling burning oil were also heard.

Target Draft: 12' Course: 1800T Speed: 5.6 Range: 3900 (at 3300 (firing))

-61-

— page 43 —
3.0 Course: 2400T Depth: 65' Angle: 0(at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: A submerged daylight attack was made at periscope depth using the I.D.C. with periscope ranges and bearings supplied to obtain the firing set-up. A four torpedo salvo was fired at the leaking AK and a two torpedo salvo was fired at the second AK. A divergent spread was introduced into each salvo, and the check bearing method of firing was employed.

-62-

— page 45 —
1. U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report Of War
2. Patrol Number SIX.

: 1. U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 6

: 1. Time: 1055H Date: 12/31/44 Lat. 12-55N Long. 109-29E

: 1. TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

: 1. Description: Escorting Aircraft Carrier which closely resembled the CHITOSE Class CWL.

: 1. Ship(s) Sunk: None.

: 1. Ship(s) Damaged or Probable Sunk: None.

: 1. Target draft: 18' Course: 0000T Speed: 12 Range: 4500 (at firing).

: 1. OWN SHIP DATA

: 1. Speed: 3.0 Course: 3280T Depth: 62' Angle: 0 (at firing).

: 1. FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

: 1. Type Attack: Submerged daylight attack was made at periscope depth on the escorting carrier at long range. Periscope bearings and ranges were used in the TDC to obtain the firing set-up. With only three Mk 14-3A torpedoes in the bow tubes, a three torpedo salvo in low power was fired using the check bearing method, and employing a divergent spread. The torpedoes were fired without a correct solution light on the TDC (caused by 240 sec. torpedo run cutout). The Mk 8 Angle Solver was not employed as it was thought the TDC solution would be near enough to get hits. The torpedoes are believed to have missed the target astern. Torpedo depths were 6 feet because there was a chance to hit a DD near the carrier if the carrier was missed.

-64-

— page 46 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War
:  Patrol Number SIX.

(H) ATTACK DATA (CONT'D)

Tubes Fired #1 #3 #5
Track Angle 132°S 132°S 135°S
Gyro Angle 34° 34° 34°6
Depth Set 6' 6' 6'
Power LOW LOW LOW
Hit or Miss MISS MISS
Erratic No No No
Mark Torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 26432 24222 25114
Mark Explorer 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial No. 26905 1994.9. 26763
Actuation Set CONTACT CONTACT CONTACT
Actuation Actual - - - -
Mark War Head 16-1 16-1 16-1
Serial No. 14713 14671 14683
Explosive TORPEX TORPEX TORPEX
Firing Interval 9" : 10"
Type Spread DIVERGENT
Sea Conditions MODERATE SEA
Overall Activity U.S.S. BURYLIE

Remarks: All torpedoes are believed to have run HSN.

-65-

— page 47 —
1. CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS24-7), Report Of War
Patrol Number SIX.

(I) MINES

In accordance with Commander Task Group 71.1 Operation Order No. 167-44 this vessel laid a field of eleven Mark 12 mines on the arc of a circle between PULIU CANBERI Island and the Indo China coast. All mines were dropped from the after tubes with the ship on the surface, and in a flooded down condition in water of 1 to 12 fathoms. The plant was a difficult one due to pattemsdesired, weather, currents, and close proximity to the shore (about 1,000 yards to the nearest point). During the same day the plant was made two probable mine explosions were heard. Full details concerning the plant are contained in C.O.T.N.S.D.C. Serial 001 of 17 December 1944 addressed to Commander Task Force 71.

During our stay off the Indo China coast this vessel sighted about four spherical horn type mines, and near submarines to the north and south sighted many others. At one point we were ordered to clear the coast due to the close proximity of many floating mines. It is believed that the extremely rough weather encountered caused the mines to break their moorings from fields to the north and the strong current caused them to drift rapidly southward. We possibly sank one mine, but due to rough seas and close proximity to the coast the others could not be sunk. Perhaps the mines became unarmed upon breaking their moorings, but I don't desire to be the one to test them, and operating in these waters particularly at night was rather nerve wracking.

(J) NTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES, IND EVASION TACTICS

Perhaps the Japs are at last waking up to the fact that we use Lombok Straits. D.CR encountered four good sized (and perhaps two other) craft equally spaced and apparently patrolling across the northern entrance to the straits making our transit difficult. I do not believe any of these were radar equipped however, but at least one was a 21 knot ship.

— page 48 —
1. CONFLICTING INFORMATION:
Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War
Patrol Number SIX.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS (CONT'D)

All convoys contacted were surface and air escorted. The surface escorts appeared for the most part to be DE's or small DD's. The planes were invariably JAKES. Regular shipping appeared to hug the coast closely with the escorts to seaward of their convoys.

The Japs still ping blindly telegraphing their presence before they can be sighted. They also still employed the stop and listen search. Once our presence was detected they employed their usual depth charging and search tactics. Apparently they were able to keep a plane or two over the area for sometime after detection, and it is believed that on one occasion our supposed position was marked with a float of some kind and a surface escort sent for.

Judging from our "drubbing" on the 19th of December, I would say that a JAKES can carry four good size depth charges or bombs.

Our evasion tactics invariably consisted of going to about 300 feet (if depth of water permitted), using 65 turns on one shaft and 60 on the other, and running silently in the direction of the current and away from the coast.

No new countermeasures were noted.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

ENGINEERING:

1. Failure of No. 3 main engine outboard exhaust valve to close caused flooding of that engine. Investigation showed that the pin linking the main drive stem with the rocker arm assembly was missing. The pin was replaced with one of the same size from the inboard engine induction flapper operating mechanism. No permanent damage was sustained by the engine or the exhaust valve. Damage was due to depth charging.

2. Misalignment of the drive shaft in the compressor of No. 1 vapor distiller unit caused excessive wear of the bearings, lobes, and timing gears. Compressor

— page 49 —
1. SUBJECT: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War
        Patrol Number SIX.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (CONT'D)

was disassembled and all defective parts renewed from spares.

ELECTRICAL:

Stern Planes - Dynamic breaking resistance open circulated, causing the shunt brake to heat excessively.
Relay coil renewed.

Main Generators - Low readings were obtained on main generators as follows. Upon completion of refit #1 main generator read 6 megs; #2 main generator 400,000 ohms; #3 main generator 500,000 ohms; and #4 main generator 2.5 megs. During the training period readings on #2, 3, and 4 dropped. After #2 main generator was sprayed again, it improved and has remained about 1 meg. #3 main generator dropped to 100,000 ohms, and still is 100,000 ohms although it has been run the same number of hours as the others. #4 main generator has steadily dropped and is now 250,000 ohms.

No. 2 Main Generator - Some of the commutator bars (due to either heat or centrifugal force) lifted. The current feeding through partially lifted brushes to brush holders caused the brush holders to melt. The metal therefrom accumulated between the commutator bars, and caused a short circuit which in turn burned the brushes and caused considerable sparking. Inspection showed burned brushes, melted brush holders, high commutator bars, disintegrated mica and charred commutator. The generator was placed out of commission as the repair work to be done is well beyond the capacity of the ship's force.

(L) RADIO

Reception of BAKERS schedules was good with no interference from the enemy. No serials were missed. During both day and night, 9250 kcs. was the best frequency.

SUB FOX reception was difficult shortly after shifting op-control to CTF-17 due to atmospheric

— page 50 —
161650 (DEC. 1944) 349-291705 (DEC. 1944)
318-171642 " 353-301607 " 18th (couldn't raise) 354-301620 " 322-190915 (DEC. 1944) 355-301704 " 323-191732 " 357-311705 " 324-201730 " 368-011652 (JAN. 1945) 326-211711 " 369-011656 " 327-211723 " 376-021627 " 22nd (couldn't raise) 377-021630 " 329-230922 (DEC. 1944) 381-031640 " 330-240105 " 387-041720 " 331-240900 " 388-041710 " 332-251520 " 391-051615 " 338-261715 " 392-051637 " 341-271655 " 6th (couldn't raise) 342-271630 " 400-071735 (JAN. 1945) 345-281645 " 403-081707 " 346-281637 " 404-081657 " 344-280940 " 405-081728 "

The 9 messages originated were cleared with unusually little trouble, and no interference from the Japs.

-69-

— page 51 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS24J), Report of War
Patrol Number SIX.

Subject: RADAR

The SJ-a radar gave excellent results from the standpoint of ranges, particularly on small targets. The slotted reflector completely eliminated side lobes, and is probably responsible for the increased range on small targets such as sailboats. Except for normal tube failures, the only casualty was the breakdown of the modulation network due to leakage of oil.

The SD radar provided very reliable performance with contacts usually twelve miles or better, and up to thirty miles on aircraft.

The radar detector (APR-SPA) yielded four contacts on enemy radar with data as given in (U).

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions in the area were poor with a high water noise level due to the strong current and shallow water. During evasive tactics on the morning of 19 December the JK side of the JK-QC head was wiped on the bottom. Due to the poor sound conditions and the insensitivity of the remaining QB head the results obtained by sound were below average.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

No density layers were encountered. The areas in which this vessel operated were stormy and current ridden. It is believed these two factors broke up any tendancy to form density layers.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, and HEALTH/BEAUTY

The health of the officers and crew was good. One case of UREHTRITIS, non-specific, was successfully treated with penicillin. Sulfathiazole was used to treat a case of UREHTRITIS of the right knee. Although healthability was good due to the cool outside temperature the heavy weather did much to reduce the comforts within the boat. It was a case of "hanging on" seventy-five percent of the time. Ship is badly in need of fumigation.

Food was well prepared and served. Excellent pastries were greatly appreciated by all hands.

-76-

— page 52 —
1. U.S.S. DACE (SS24-7), Report of War
    Patrol Number SIX.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY (CONTINUED)

The "D and D" brand of Australian orange juice being issued to the SoWesPac boats is unfit for human consumption. The beef issued this vessel for this patrol was below standard. It was impossible to obtain enough tinned flour for patrol needs. While bagged flour was available, it is deemed unfit for submarine patrol use due to lack of proper stowage facilities.

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men on board during patrol - 76
(b) Number of men qualified at start of patrol - 57
(c) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - 66
(d) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol - 6
(e) Number of men advanced in rating during patrol - 2

The performance of duty on the part of the officers and crew during this patrol left nothing to be desired and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Navy. The reaction of all hands on the 19th of December when the ship was severely bombed and depth charged, followed by bottoming in shallow water soon after was excellent. Too much credit cannot be given Lt. Comdr. R.C. BENITEZ, U.S.N., who as Executive Officer and Navigator organized and trained the ship's company exceptionally well, navigated the ship during a difficult mine plant in shallow, current ridden waters, and whose timely advice and suggestions based upon a wealth of experience were most helpful to his Commanding Officer.

Much credit is also due the following officers and men:

    Lt. W.W. PRICE, JR., U.S.N., for his excellent performance as diving officer under stress of attack, and for his many helpful and useful suggestions throughout the patrol.

    Lt. W.J. DORWORTH, JR., U.S.N.R., torpedo officer, for his excellent handling of the mine plant.

— page 53 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War
Patrol Number SIX.

(Q) PERSONNEL (CONT'D)

and his extra and successful efforts in keeping the poor torpedoes which we were issued in working order.
- The team of Lt.(jg) A.A. EEEL, U.S.N.R., Radar Officer, and WRIGHT, C.I., CRT(AA)(T), U.S.N.R., for their valuable services in operating and keeping in operation both radars, their deductions concerning enemy radar signals, and their excellent supervision of Communications.
- FITZGEARLD, L.H., MOMMLC, U.S.N. for his excellent work in successfully accomplishing several difficult engineering repair jobs.
- The five day training period allowed this vessel off Fremantle was excellent, and was considered sufficient to bring to high pitch an all ready well trained ship's company. On patrol "qualification school" was held continuously. All officers received refresher T.D.C. training while six of the watch officers received three to four days of practical work in Navigation.
- The addition of new equipment and consequently the necessity for more watch standers made it necessary to carry 76 men. The above number allows a well balanced watch section.

(R) MILES STHAMED - FUEL USED

Base to area (Fremantle to BARNIER) 1711 mi. 20,710gal.
In area 7,274 mi. 79,443gal.
Area to base (South China Sea to Pearl Harbor) 4,606 mi. 62,648gal.

(S) DURATION

Days enroute to area 8
Days in area 35
Days enroute to base 14
Days submerged 14
Days partially submerged 10
Days at Saipan 2

-72-

— page 55 —
1. Ship or Station U.S.S. D.CE (SS247)
2. Area covered on this mission 9 December to 12 January 1945 South China Sea - Philippines
3. Enemy radar was land based near LOMBOK STRITT.
4. Intercept equipment APR-SPA
5. (a) Frequency 198 mcs, (b) PRF 1050 determined by SPA, (c) Pulse Width 5 micro-seconds determined by SPA, (d) Sketch of Pulse:
   - [Image of sketch]
   (e) Lobe Switching was not used.
   (f) Polarization of enemy signal not determined.
   (g) Sweep rate 1/3 RPM
6. Radar was probably air search because of the frequency and because it had a wide beam width.
7. Radar was detected at 2130H on 8 December about 20 miles south of LOMBOK STRITT and was lost while transitting the strait.

-74-

— page 56 —
1. Ship or Station______, U.S.S. DACE (SS247)______
2. Area covered on this mission: 9 December - 12 January 1945 South China Sea - Philippines.
3. Enemy radar was apparently land-based near the entrance to CIMRAN Bay.
4. Intercept equipment: PR-SP.
5. (a) Frequency 197 mcs.
   (b) PRF 1050 determined by SP.
   (c) Pulse width 12 micro-seconds determined by SP.
   (d) Sketch of pulse:
   [Image of pulse sketch]
6. (e) Lobe switching was not used.
   (f) Polarization was not determined.
   (g) Sweep Rate 1/5 RPM
7. Radar was probably air search because of the frequency and because it had a wide beam width.
8. The radar was picked up on 18 and 19 December just after sunset and just before sunrise from a position about 15 miles east of CIMRAN Bay. It made about six sweeps during a period of one-half hour and then secured. While sweeping, pronounced and numerous side lobes were evident.

— page 57 —
1. Ship or Station: U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
2. Area covered on this mission: 9 December to 12 January 1945 South China Sea - Philippines.
3. Enemy radar was probably shipborne.
4. Intercept equipment: APR-SPA
5. Frequency: 153 mcs.
   (a) PRF was about 500 determined by SPA
   (b) Pulse width was 10 micro-seconds determined by SPA
   (c) Sketch of pulse:
   (e) Lobe switching was not used.
   (f) Polarization of the signal was not determined.
   (g) Sweep rate 1 RPM.
6. Purpose of radar unknown.
7. Radar was picked up out at sea at 2235H on 28 December in position 12°-19'N; 109°-46'E. No other contact was made with the enemy. The radar swept around for about five minutes and secured for fifteen. Contact was maintained for one hour.

— page 58 —
1. Ship or Station______ U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
2. Area covered on this mission 9 December to 12 January 1945 South China Sea - Philippines.
3. Enemy radar was probably airborne.
4. Intercept Equipment APR-SPA
5. (a) Frequency 167 mcs.
   (b) PRF was 500 (doubtful) determined by SPA.
   (c) Pulse width was approximately 10 micro-seconds determined by SPA.
   (d) Sketch of pulse:
   (e) Lobe switching was not used.
   (f) Pol.riza: on not determined.
   (g) Radar was not sweeping.
6. Radar was probably an ASV.
7. This interception, picked up at 2245H on 8 January at 1400-20N; 1130-43E, was very weak and fading irregularly similar to a distant aircraft radar. Because of the weak signal strength the data may be slightly in error.

— page 59 —
1. I do not recommend transit of LOMBOK STRAITS in company with another ship, particularly I do not recommend being behind the leading ship for the following reasons:

(a) Constant watch must be kept on ship ahead thereby diverting radar, OOD's, and lookout's attention.

(b) Evasive maneuvers are hampered and restricted.

(c) Most shots fired are aimed at submarine's wake at night and that leaves 'tail end Charlie' in line of fire if leading ship is fired upon.

(d) Patrols that fall astern of leading ship while chasing him are likely to shift the chase to rear ship with good results.

2. The majority of the torpedoes issued this ship for this patrol were carelessly prepared and carelessly handled in delivery. This carelessness was of such an extent that much trouble was experienced with torpedoes throughout the patrol. A full report on this matter is being submitted to Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN (C.O. DACE's Serial 84).

3. This vessel was unable to obtain either a Nautical Almanac or an Air Almanac for 1945 for use on patrol due to lack of same in Freemantle.

4. From our observations all shipping along the Indo-China coast, except fast warship traffic, traveled only by day, hugged the coast, and was air and surface escorted. No mine sweeping activity was noted. It is believed that VAN FONG Bay is not used as an overnight anchorage.

5. The mortar type recognition flare projector trusted very quickly and became unreliable with too heavy a coating of grease. It is believed that this

— page 60 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS24.7), Report of War
Patrol Number SIX.

(V) REMARKS (CONT'D)

projector should be made of a non-corrosive material or chrome plated.

6. It is believed that there is room for improvement in the method of securing the topside metal superstructure access hatches. The method of spot welding them closed is not satisfactory and is an admission that the designed method of securing these hatches is unsuitable. In our case we had two welded hatches break loose and were forced to spend a considerable time breaking the weld on a third in heavy seas so as to repair an outboard exhaust valve. It is suggested that the hatch rims be rubber gasketed to keep them quiet, and some form of a non-corrosive "C" clamp arrangement be designed to properly secure them.

7. The elevation locks on the 20mm guns are unsatisfactory for submarines. These guns become loose and "flop around" on a dive frequently.

8. The various victrola records and movies now available to submarines are much appreciated, and furnish a much needed diversion on patrol.

— page 62 —
4. The DACE was also unfortunate in an early attack when in a most advantageous firing position and about to fire, an alert escorting plane dropped four close depth bombs near the DACE. A subsequent depth charging caused considerable damage to the DACE and forced her to bottom.

5. The DACE returned from patrol unusually clean and with morale high. The DACE will soon depart for overhaul on the west coast.

6. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FIVE congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and men for the completion of a successful and difficult mine patrol and the damage inflicted on the enemy.

E. W. GREENELL

— page 63 —
1/2/45
Serial: 0103
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS DACE (SS247) Report
of Sixth War Patrol.

"From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. FAGIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FIVE.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew of the U.S.S. DACE upon completion of a very strenuous patrol, and for the resulting damage inflicted upon the enemy.

3. It is recommended that the U.S.S. DACE be credited with the following:

DAMAGED
SUNK
1 - AK(EU), 4,000 tons
1 - AK(EU), 4,000 tons
Total Sunk or Damaged - 8,000 tons.

W. V. O'LEGAN
J.P. C.

— page 64 —
2 02171
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC LEET
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
4 February 1945

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DICE (SS247) - Report of Sixth War Patrol
(2 December, 1944, to 26 January, 1945).

1. The sixth war patrol of the DICE, under the command of Commander O. R. Cole, Jr., U.S. Navy, was conducted in the South China Sea. The DICE in addition to independent offensive patrol and coordinated group patrol conducted a special mission.

2. A separate report has been made of the special mission successfully carried out by the DICE. In addition to this job well done, the DICE with aggressive area coverage made three convoy contacts. Enemy air coverage was always present, and in closing the first convoy for attack the DICE was severely bombed and depth charged. She was forced to bottom in 306 feet of water, and through sheer courage and determination made her escape without major damage. It is estimated that a medium XK was sunk and another damaged as a result of her aggressive attack on the second convoy contact. The long range attack on a Chitose Type CVL in the third convoy contact unfortunately failed.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, commands the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the DICE for this aggressive, successful patrol. The DICE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

SUNK
- 4,000 tons (Attack No. 1)

1 - Medium XK (XU)
- 1 -

— page 69 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

Less than 24 hours before sailing transferred Lieutenant William J. DORNOUTH, JR., DS, USNR (torpedo officer and T.D.C. operator) to the hospital. No trained replacement could be located on the base or in any of the four tenders present. Was informed one would be waiting for us at MIDWAY. Ensign James C. MATHESON, U.S.N. reported aboard for duty on 25 May 1945.

(B) NARRATIVE:

All times are minus ten (KING) unless otherwise stated.

The following is a list of the officers and chief petty officers who were attached to and serving on board the DACE during this war patrol together with the number of previous patrols made.

| NAME, RANK OR RATE | NO. PATROLS MADE |
|||
| Commander O.R. COLE, JR., USN | 5 |
| Lieut. F.J. RUDER, USN | 3 |
| Lieut. M. GODEK, DE, USNR | 4 |
| Lieut. S.F. REID, DE, USNR | 4 |
| Lt. (L.) A.A. EBEL, DE(R), USNR | 6 |
| Lt. (j.g.) H.H. CALDWELL, USN | 3 |
| Lt. (j.g.) P. BANTA, EN(L), USNR | 2 |
| Ensign R.C. LIGHT, E(L), USNR | 1 |
| Ensign J.C. MATHESON, USNR | 0 |

ADF, E., 328 46 26, CTMT(T)(SS), USN | 9 |
FITZGERALD, L.H., 386 06 67, CMO(M)(AA)(SS)(T), USN | 6 |
KERN, JUNIOR, 356 12 52, CMO(M)(AA)(T)(SS), USN | 4 |
MILLESON, C.J., 261 66 95, CRN(PA), USN | 0 |
MORSE, R.W., 266 46 28, OY(T), USN | 6 |
OGLE, P.L., 323 13 71, COLM(M)(AA)(T)(SS), USN | 5 |
PARSONS, E., 279 52 33, OEN(AA)(T)(SS), USN | 6 |
PERCINS, E.R., 272 41 26, CPHM(AA)(T)(SS), USN | 2 |
SMITH, G.O., 291 71 39, CO(M)(AA)(T)(SS), USN | 6 |

-3-

— page 70 —
25 May 1945
1332(V-W) U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Commencing seventh war patrol in company with USS
C.BEZON (SS334)(OTC) and in accordance with Commander
Task Force 17's operation order No. 111-45 of 24 May
1945.

: 14.30(V-W) Set clocks back one half hour to zone plus ten
(WILLIAM) time.

: 26 May 1945 Noon posit: 24-0-49'N, 1610-03'W
Conducted training dives and drills.

: 27 May 1945 Noon posit: 26-37.5'N, 1660-49.5'W
Conducted training dives and drills.

: 1800(W) Set clocks back one hour to zone plus 11 (X-ray)
time.

: 28 May 1945 Noon posit: 28-22'N, 1760-39'W
Conducted training dives and drills.

: 29 May 1945 Noon posit: SubBase, MIDWAY, T.H.

: 0747(X) Sighted MIDWAY Island bearing 250PT, distance
12 miles.

: 0920(X) Moored port side to berth sail six, Submarine
Base, MIDWAY.

: 1000(X) Set all clocks back one hour to plus twelve
(YOKE) time.

Spent the day topping off with fuel, lub. oil,
water and supplies. Made minor repairs and routed
all torpedoes. Held a conference with wolf pack
commander and received his operating procedure orders.

-4-

— page 71 —
29 May 1945 (Cont'd)
We were all very pleased and appreciative of the courtesy and interest shown us by the personnel of the Submarine Base and tenders present.

30-31 May 1945
Noon posit: 280-03'N, 1750-26'W
0810(Y) Underway for patrol area in company with USS C.BEZON. The expected T.D.C. operator did not arrive thereby necessitating a last minute re-shuffle of officers' jobs and battle stations.

0815(Y) Set all clocks back two hours to zone minus ten (KNG) time. (Note: All times are KNG times unless otherwise noted).

1015(31 May 1945)
Crossed International Date line and dropped 30 May from the calendar.

1 June 1945
Noon posit: 290-38'N, 1760-41'E
Conducted training dives and drills.

2 June 1945
Noon posit: 310-12'N, 1710-53'E
Conducted training dives and drills.

3 June 1945
Noon posit: 330-41'N, 1670-29'E
Conducted training dives and drills.

4 June 1945
Noon posit: 360-05'N, 1630-24'E
Conducted training dives and drills.

5 June 1945
Noon posit: 300-23'N, 1580-39'E
Conducted training dives.

-5-

— page 73 —
8 June 1945 (Cont'd)
JIMA.

0330 Doves for submerged patrol parallel to the coast 35 miles south of ATOYA MISAKI, (Daylight comes early and stays late around here.) Can see both sides of KURASHIRI SUIDO.

0715 Light fog set in with varying visibility.

0832 Sighted what appeared to be one large or two small sailing vessels. (Ship contact #1) Commence d clossing. During the next hour we alternately found her and lost her in the mist. She tracked at about 4 knots on 0500T apparently headed thru the straits. Finally made her out to be a large vessel with sails. Determined to shoot it out with her.

0940 Sighted a second ship about 2 miles astern of first one. (Ship contact #1) Believe it to be a sailing vessel but couldn't identify her in the mist.

0943 Battle Surfaced parallel and abeam of first target, range 1,600 yards. (Gun attack #1) Manned all guns to give crews battle experience. Forward 40mm hit target in the bow on first shot. Closed range as we had no return fire. All guns scored numerous hits.

0951 A hit started a large fire on target. Target is sinking. Circled to opposite side of target and put finishing touches on her destruction.

0958 Target destroyed. She was identified as a large 300 ton sea truck similar to sea truck pictured on page 31 of AIC NOR PAC No. 874. Jap flags were painted on the sides of her hull amidship. No survivors noted.

-7-

— page 75 —
9 June 1945
Noon posit: 44-20°N, 146-38°E

0333
SJ contact 3,000 yards. Upon investigation this turned out to be the derelict of the lugger we destroyed yesterday. Only a couple of wobbling masts plus the remains of the deck house were a-bove water. When part of the hull rose above the water due to the swells it appeared as though her back was broken. No sign of life aboard.

0407
Dove on 100 fathom curve south of ATOYA MISAKI for submerged patrol. Visibility fair. Our lugger derelict haunted us like the Flying Dutchman all morning.

1155
Sighted by periscope the stump mast of a second derelict. This was undoubtly the remains of the sea truck we destroyed, but there was not enough above water to identify it.

1439
Surfaced. Visibility has closed in and shows no signs of improving. Surface patrolling south of ATOYA MISAKI.

1700
Departed area and shaped course for next station (2 East) south of YETOFU KAIKYO.

1920
Reversed course. Decided to search in Sea of OKHOTSK. Increased speed to full on 4 main engines. Sent DACE's serial 1 to Wolf Pack Commander informing him of our 2130 position in KURASHIRI SUIDO and telling him that we were searching to the north-east. Transmitted message four times without getting a receipt. Felt that further transmission would give away our track as the Japs were jamming our frequency and were undoubtedly DI-ling us.

Received APOGON's serial 1 to Pack Commander apparently stating that he would have to go through a blind bombing zone to search in the Sea of OKHOTSK and asking for orders. No receipt for her message from Pack Commander. Feel sure APOGON intercepted

— page 76 —
9 June 1945 (Cont'd)
our message. Apparently MANTA and APOGON have just arrived on or near station 2 East to join the pack. Their position uncertain. Am a little anxious about CABEZON as we have not seen, heard from, nor gotten radar contact or interference from her since the morning of 7 June although we should have been anywhere from zero to 40 miles from her for two days.

2220 Completed uneventful transit of KUNASHIRI SUIDO. When in the lee of YETOROFU JIMA the sea became calmer, the mist cleared, and we became brilliantly illuminated by the phosphorescence in the water when only four or five miles from the shore. Commenced searching to the north and northeast at full speed on four main engines.

10 June 1945 Noon posit: 470-25°N, 149°-03'E

Surface searching to the northeast.

0355 Dove for trim.

0402 Surfaced and continued search at full speed.

0620 Sighted by high periscope a large freighter and a much smaller ship, bearing 0370T at about 16,000 yards. (Ship contact #2) Visibility is varying between six and nine miles.

0621 Quartermaster on the bridge reported a sailboat broad on the starboard bow, but upon further investigation it proved to be a large DE or DD type escort. Why he didn't see us I don't know for when we put our stern to him he was 12,600 yards by 35 radar and clearly visible from the bridge level. Our 35 radar performance is terrible. We failed to obtain a pip on this escou which was broadside to us, nor did we get a pip from the other ships.

-10-

— page 77 —
10 June 1945 (Cont'd)
Made the decision not to broadcast contact report to pack for the following reasons:

(a) APOGON (speaking for 'ANNA and herself') had apparently made the decision not to search and had requested orders from CADEZON but received none.

(b) CABEZON unheard from since early 7 June.

(c) Felt sure APOGON at least received our message giving our position and intention.

(d) Japs had jammed circuit and undoubtedly would have been able to clear our message expeditiously the DD-ling of our position would be a dead giveaway to the Japs that we were in contact with this convoy.

(e) Our SJ performance was so poor as to throw out any chances of tracking beyond range of visibility and our SJ didn't quite have enough range for this either.

(f) Escorts were believed radar equipped (APR signals had been received by us) and most likely had radar detectors.

(g) Seas were picking up.

(h) Positions of other submarines in the pack were unknown, and at this time we were 145 miles from station 2E from station 1E, and 85 miles from station 2E where the rest of the pack apparently was. To the best of our knowledge they were not in the search.

(i) We were not in possession of any previous information which the other boats did not have.

We quickly opened the range on the escort and commenced a long end around on the far side of the convoy. Visibility was variable between six and nine miles, and remained so throughout the day. Got an occasional glimpse of the convoy. We figured that they were making 92 knots on course 0450T.

— page 78 —
10 June 1945 (Cont'd)
0844
High periscope sighted a second escort bearing 1140m, range 12,650 yards. This escort was also a large type DE or small DD, and was stationed on the convoy's port bow. We continued our tracking and end around on this escort.

1055
Figured we were 22,000 yards dead ahead of the convoy and on its base course. Do not believe convoy is zigging. Came to course 0450m, slowed to 2/3 speed, pumped bilges and made preparations below.

1130
Slowed to 1/3 speed. Manned sound gear--escorts apparently not pinging.

1234
With one escort just visible dove, reversed course, and commenced approach. Seas were picking up with about eight to twelve foot waves.

1245
Plan if possible to pass inside of port escort and shoot three torpedoes each at the two ships in the convoy, and fire stern tubes at the port escort.

1245
Heard two escorts pinging long scale.

1258
Sighted starboard escort bearing 2140T at about 6,500 yards.

1305
Sighted port escort on our starboard bow, range about 4,000 yards, and convoy dead ahead. The picture is: DACE headed between the two escorts towards the convoy which consists of one (1) medium size freighter of about 5,000 to 6,000 tons (similar to EIHUKU IARU, page 134 ONI 208-J revised) almost equidistant between the two escorts and only slightly behind them. (Escorts are MIKURA-class 'rigates as described on page 7 CincPacCincPOA Bulletin 56-45 of 26 Feb. 1945). The remaining ship is very small and is still

— page 79 —
10 June 1945 (Cont'd)
unidentified. Possibly it is a third escort. It is close astern of the freighter. I believe the convoy is suspicious because the starboard escort has moved up from the starboard quarter to the starboard bow, both escorts are pinging, both are patrolling back and forth on either bow or the convoy, and the convoy is apparently zigging on short legs, or constant helming.

1309
Starboard escort passed 1,200 yards abeam. Shifted setup to port escort. Freighter has a 300 port angle on the bow. Believe I can carry out my original plan of giving the port escort stern tubes and the convoy the bow tubes.

1316
Just about ready to let go with bow tubes at the freighter when she zigged to her left giving a sharp starboard angle on the bow with small fellow slightly on her starboard quarter. Left full rudder. From here in things happened fast, and we had the double problem of continuing the approach and avoiding collision at the same time. Freighter's bow surely looks big in low power. Periscope up continuously. Setup changed to stern tubes. The stern small ship will clear us--(I think and hope). She looks like a very small coastal tanker or barge (similar to the "Small MANU" of the Victor Baker Division) very low in the water, 90 to 100 feet long, 100 tons.

1322-20
Fired tube No. 8 (Torpedo Attack #1A) at 1047 of freighter with 10 right spread, estimated range 500 yards, torpedo depth of 7 feet, angle on the bow 120 starboard. We were set to give her another tube when at

1322-35
Saw, heard, and felt first torpedo hit the freighter at the 1047 sending a cloud of smoke and debris 200 to 300 feet in the air. Shortly there-

-13-

— page 80 —
10 June 1945 (Cont'd.)

after heard a smaller explosion which was probably her boilers as we hit under her stack. Shifted set up to small ship which was past us now having passed too close to us for comfort.

1323-20
Fired tube No. 10 (Torpedo Attack #1B) at MOT of small ship at an estimated 450 yards, 110 starboard angle on the bow, torpedo depth of 7 feet.
This torpedo apparently missed. Freighter has commenced to list. ("Monday morning quarterbacking" makes it appear that we were a hundred yards or so closer than we figured, and the torpedo probably ran under the target. It is hard to see how it could miss at that range. Torpedo run for the first torpedo was 383 yards.) Made a sweep for the escorts and saw that the starboard escort was reversing course to head for us, estimated range about 3,500 yards. Got a quick setup on him and at

1324-35
Fired tube No. 7 (Torpedo Attack #1C) at the starboard escort, estimated range 3,000 yards, angle on the bow 30°starboard. Port escort not sighted.

1325
Commenced going deep and rigging for depth charge. When last seen the freighter was apparently stopped as the small ship was passing it rapidly. Popping and crackling noises were heard from the freighter.

1327-14
Torpedo explosion. From subsequent events this hit was apparently not in either escort, and it is believed that tube No. 7 torpedo hit the freighter. (See special torpedo supplement to this patrol report.) We are at 250 feet going down to 300. Passed through a 40°gradient at about 100 feet. Personnel in the various compartments hear breaking up noises through the hull. Escorts are pinging. JF, JK, and QB all hear loud breaking up noises in the target's direction over a wide band.

— page 81 —
10 June 1945 (Cont'd)
Put same on loud speaker and all hands present, most of whom have heard breaking up noises before, are convinced that the freighter is on her way down. Target's screws were not heard after the first torpedo hit.

1329-29 First depth charge, astern, starboard and above.

1329-44 Second depth charge, astern, starboard and above.

1330-39 Third depth charge, astern, starboard and above.

1331-34 What sounds like gun fire above the popping and crackling of the freighter which can be heard from 1700 to 0900 relative.

1333-24 Fourth depth charge, astern, starboard, above.

Escorts are ping searching.

1353 Escort shifted to short scale, and is apparently coming up from astern. Can not hear screws, but sound conditions for screws have not been good today. Pinging is quite loud.

1356-19 Fired tube No. 9 (Torpedo attack #1D). (See special torpedo supplement to this patrol report.)

1413-09 Head a light explosion near the surface followed in rapid succession by a barrage of nineteen other explosions all of which sounded on or very near the surface. These sounded too light for the usual submerged depth charges. It is possible he was hit and set off some charges on the surface.

1419 A barrage of twelve depth charges. These sounded near the surface but louder than the previous barrage.

-15-

— page 82 —
10 June 1945 (Cont'd)
1425    Still hear breaking up noises from the bearing of the freighter. Pinging still continuous from both escorts. We are evading at 60-90 turns at 300 to 350 feet, fish-tailing, on course about 1800T. This is the only time I have ever "sweated it out" and been very cold at the same time. The Conning Tower is like an ice box.

1430    The pinging from one escort is much fainter and was soon lost. The other one still persists at about the same intensity but seems to remain at the bearing of the attack scene.

1500    Heard pings on two different frequencies from the same escort--one high the other low. Can it be that one escort is alongside the other with both pinging?

1615    Pinging is begining to grow weaker. Started up.

1645    At periscope depth. Visibility about eight miles. All clear. Went back to 100 feet, pumped bilges, made reload aft and checked forward torpedoes, pumped down pressure and got a trim.

1730    Quite a few people in various parts of the ship heard a heavy, distant explosion.

2044    Surfaced. Seas picking up. Returning to scene of attack and resuming search for remnants. Forward T.B.T. and bridge gyro repeater flooded.

2230    Completed search of attack area. No contacts. I guess this is to be expected for the seas are to rough for radar to pick up small objects, and it is too dark to see much if indeed we are in the exact attack locality. Resumed search along convoy's track.

— page 83 —
10 June 1945 (Cont'd)
2300 Took a big sea down the hatch.
2340 Received Wolf Pack Commander's serial 2 ordering us to break off search and take station 3E (KITA URUPU SUIDO).
2400 Broke off search in compliance with orders. Doubted the value of further search anyway due to roughness of seas and their extreme phosphorescence, our short ranged radar, shallow draft and small size of targets, and the fact that they had been thoroughly alerted. Drafted DACE's first to ComSubForPac, ComSubForPacAd Comd. and the Pack Commander giving position, results to date, and intention to take assigned station.
11 June 1945: Noon posit: 470-00'N, 1490-56'E
Attempting to clear message.
0339 Unable to clear radio message. Dove to routine torpedoes and give all hands a much needed rest enroute our new area which we will enter about midnight.
1700 Completed routining torpedoes.
1832 Surfaced. Attempted to clear radio message. Antennae grounded out.
1915 Gave up trying to clear message. Set course for new station.
2024 SJ contact on BURTON TO bearing 1150T, range 50,000 yards.
2225 Weak SJ interference. Was never able to identify it and it disappeared at dawn (about 0330).

-17-

— page 85 —
15 June 1945

| Date       | Time       | Location          | Notes                                                                 |
|||||
| 1200      | 1300       | U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN. |                                                                 |
| 1322      | 1739       | Dov, visibility having again improved. |                                                                 |
| 2036      | 15 June 1945 | Surface. Have grave doubts as to the effective-ness of our SD radar. Have had no pips since arrival MIDWAY although high peaks are numerous in our area. |                                                                 |
| 0010      | 0324       | Noon posit: 460-34'N, 1510-03'E |                                                                 |
| 1030      | 1430       | Surface patrolling in KITA URUPU SUIDO. |                                                                 |
| 1519      | 1730       | Picked up APOGON's SJ radar interference. |                                                                 |
| 2000      | 2023       | Converted No. 4 F.B.T. to a main ballast tank. |                                                                 |
| 2135      | 2135       | Submerged to replace stern plane contactor and flush out No. 4 M.B.T. |                                                                 |
| 2000      | 2135       | Surface. Proceeded towards station patrol line No. 1 for a seaward sweep. |                                                                 |

— page 86 —
15 June 1945 (Cont'd)
2255 Cleared DACE serial one to Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet information the TARKS giving results to date, missing serials, latest NAN notice, report on poor radar performance, and the usual routine data.

16 June 1945 Noon posit: 460-30'N, 154°-04'E

Enroute new patrol station on easterly courses.

0020 Exchanged recognition signals with westbound MANTA.

0022 Could see her phosphorescent wake and bow wave at 7,000 yards. Obtained radar contact at 6,200 yards.

0800 Arrived in position on scouting line. APOGON and CABEZON 15 miles on either side. Commenced advance at the prescribed speed of 10 knots.

0600 Commenced remounting and connecting up forward Mk 9 T.B.T. This proved to be a big job involving block and tackle, meger, etc.

0630 Received APOGON's serial 4 giving position, course and speed. Received for same.

0659 Received APOGON's serial 5 requesting we report our position. Received for same. Compiled by sending our 0900 position at

0920 To APOGON (DACE Serial No. 2).

1015 Received APOGON's serial 6 giving position and "enemy course and speed" and ordering immediate rendezvous. Received for same and headed her way at full speed. Visibility very poor.

-20-

— page 87 —
16 June 1945 (Cont'd)
1217
SJ contact at 8,200 yards on one of our Pack's boats followed shortly after by contact on the other. Played tag with one of the boats for 45 minutes, and although we got close enough to see her wake several times she always managed to elude us in the fog.

1324
Closed and spoke CABEZON. She was invisible at 400 yards most of the time. Her loud hailer was a great help in communications. We were unable to obtain one prior departure, and had a hard time making ourselves heard. Gleamed the following bits of information:

(a) CABEZON was not hearing us by radio and apparently we were not hearing him. Frequency plans checked. We both hear A'OGON well, and she apparently hears us. Mystery is unsolved. Agreed to exchange messages at about 1600.

(b) Checked navigation and scouting line plots. DACE had been in error.

(c) CABEZON was 30 miles from scene of our attack on the 10th. We were sure we were "lone wolfing it". This was a heart-breaker-communication again.

(d) Our receipt for her "Break off search" message of 10 June was never received by her.

(e) A'OGON was not in contact with the enemy.

1342
Broke up rendezvous, proceeded to scouting line station.

1344
APOGON loomed up in fog on opposite course at 500 yards or less.

1555
Sent DACE serial 3 giving position, course and speed to CABEZON three times during next hour or so. No receipt.

-21-

— page 88 —
16 June 1945 (Cont'd)
1630(about) Cane out of fog bank. Visibility unlimited.
1638 Received unaddressed Wolf Pack drill message uncoubled from CAHEZON so receipted to her for same.
1810 Transmitted DACH serial 3 for the fourth time. Included APOGON in address this time. Received APOGON's receipt.
1856 Requested APOGON to relay my message to CAHEZON.
1856 Receipt from CAHEZON. Communications are still far from good.

17 June 1945 Noon posit: 490-33'N, 1570-50'E
Surface patrolling on line No. 1. Visibility fair, sky overcast.
0320 Made dawn trim dive.
0337 Surflaced.
0942 Exchanged SJ recognition signals with APOGON.
1354 SJ contact 18,000 yards. Surface visibility good--sky overcast, noting in sight. TBT in a state of disassembly with 2 additional men topside. Lost pip/momentarily at picked it up again at about 12,000 yards moving in fast.
1355 Dove with plane 6,000 yards. (Plane contact #1) Plane not sighted. This the end of our Mk 9 forward T.B.T. for this run.
1359 At 200 feet--no bombs.
1430 At periscope depth.

— page 89 —
17 June 1945 (Cont'd)
1454 Surfaced. All clear.
1500 Lookout reported 2 planes low on horizon. Not verified, but could have been.
1518 Sighted APOGON by high periscope.
1530 Sent DACE serial 4 two times reporting aircraft.
APOGON only receipted.
1852 Received CABEZON's serial 6 and Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet 170712. The former ordered CABEZON and DACE to search north of and APOGON south of ADAIDO TO for the downed aviators reported by the ConsubForPac message.
1915 Set course for ONEKOTAN SUDO full speed.
1956 Sent DACE serial 5 twice giving position, course and speed. APOGON only receipted.
2015 SJ interference to southward.
2130 SJ contact on CABEZON, at 8,600 yards. Exchanged recognition signals, and she gave us her course and speed. We paralleled her and proceeded independent-ly, but close by her.
2227 Made landfall on SJ radar at about 30,000 yards, bearing 2950T on ONEKOTAN TO.
18 June 1945 Noon posit: 51-01N, 1550-49E
0030 Completed transit of ONEKOTAN KAIKYO and shaped course for ARAIDO TO at full speed. Visibility good.
0130 Dawn is heralding its arrival with a red eastern

— page 90 —
13 June 1945 (Cont'd)
sky brilliantly silhouetting the rugged snow-capped peaks of PARAMUSHIYU TO and adjoining islands.

0236 Sighted friendly submarine by high periscope.

0300 Sighted ARAIDO TO. This is a 7,654 foot, perfect, cone-shaped, snow covered peak--a wonderful landmark, and beautiful sight. Took pictures.

0400 Commenced search for downed aviators. Spent all morning surface searching and covered the 15 mile, 10 mile, and 7 mile circles in sector 0650T to 3050T from ARAIDO TO. Although for short periods the visibility was poor it in general was good to excellent. Seas were calm. We felt awfully conspicuous surface searching so close to the beach, and as events turned out we were undoubtedly sighted.

1100 APR signals on frequency 78.5, PRT 500 sweeping.

1300 Opened to the northwest and west.

1400 Cleared DACE serial 06 to CABEZON reporting position, search sector covered, negative results, and that we were breaking off search.

1446 Received CABEZON's serial 06 ordering us to search to the west. Complied with same. Scenery beautiful, sea calm, visibility phenomenal. Allowed all hands desiring to come topside for a look. Mountains of KAMCHATKA visible to the north.

1529 Dove for trim.

1550 Surfaced.

1615 Sighted a VAL-type plane (Plane contact #2) patrolling over our morning search area. He was about 15 miles away, but plainly visible. Watched him.

— page 91 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

---

**12 June 1945 (Cont'd)**

for quite a while until he disappeared over PARAMUSHIRO TO. No SD contact on him nor on any of the various peaks.

Lookout sighted a ZEKE-type plane at 6 or 7 miles closing rapidly. SD radar is definitely not working.

Dove to 200 feet.

Periscope depth--all clear. Continued further research on SD. Found two broken connections in antenna mast in its base. Believe one connection is broken at the top. Will open same up after dark.

Surfaced. Sun is setting but it is still very light.

Lookout sighted a submarine or small ship (Contact #3) to the east, near PARAMUSHIRO. The OK-ing the chart she was fully 15 or more miles from us. There must be some remarkable refraction in this area. Believed this was APOCOM at this time. She flashed a light at us several times. I am sure we were plainly visible to her as we surfaced broadside to her and were silhouetted in the sunset.

Saw gunfire flashes from this ship. Saw 2 or 3 antiaircraft bursts over her and heard several long delayed explosions. Put our stern to her. During the next 10 or 15 minutes saw several large gunfire flashes from her direction, saw one more AA burst, heard several very heavy explosions, and observed much yellow-green smoke in her direction. It is all very mysterious, and we can only explain it as a light bombing raid plus AA defense fire. Although the flashes looked as if they were met for us we saw no surface splashes. Opened to westward

— page 92 —
13 June 1945 (Cont'd.)

in quest of a quiet spot so we can open up our SD antenna at the top and attempt repairs unmolested.

2133 Received and receipted for CABEZON's serial 09 ordering DACE, and APOGON to act independently in certain areas until 26th. We are to patrol down the KURILE Chain to the southward.

2142 Received APOGON's serial 10 giving contact report to southward. Secured charge and put 4 engines on propulsion to close. Should make it about midnight.

2226 Received CABEZON's serial 11 requesting our position. Was about to transmit same when at

2240 SJ got a contact at 120ft, range 9,600 yards (Ship contact #4). Commenced tracking and re-composing message.

2245 Received CABEZON's serial 12 requesting that we reply to her serial 11.

2258 Cleared DACE pack serial 07 to CABEZON giving position and contact data. Contact tracks at 2200ft, speed 13.

2300 We are on her starboard quarter between her and the moon. Night fairly clear with half moon shining brightly, sea calm. Decided to end around her stern and approach from the dark side for better cover and identification. Shortly thereafter we entered a small fog bank which was quickly left behind, and soon the sky became overcast with a slight horizon haze but good visibility for night attack. Phosphorous in the water is extremely brilliant and most embarrassing. Our SJ will not hold contact at much beyond 9,600 yards.

— page 93 —
18 June 1945 (Cont'd)
2321 Received APOGON's serial 13 stating she was attacking. Her contact is definitely a different one from ours. Believe the night patrol are looking for us.

2330 Target has been steering about 2200T at 12 to 13 knots. We have been "ending around" at full speed.

2331 Target zigged left to 1750T, still at 12 knots. Went to Battle Stations Torpedo.

2346 Heard two or three distant explosions followed a short time later by a very heavy, distant explosion which shook the ship slightly. After this several other distant explosions were heard which sounded like depths charges. Shortly after this APOGON in her serial 14 reported attack completed, and in her 15 reported results as 2 or 3 (hits or ships?). Shortly after this our target slowed to 9 knots, but remained on about 1750T.

19 June 1945 Noon post: 500-42N, 1540-09T

0019 With the target tracking nicely at 9 knots on 1750T, and with DACE 450 on his port bow, range 8,700 yards, changed course to 3000 and headed in at standard speed. The phosphorescence in the water is terrific, so we gradually slowed down until at

0027 We were making but 40 rpm, and showing very little wake or bow wave. Set up checking nicely for about a 90 port track. Quartermaster got a glimpse of the target at about 5,000 yards, but couldn't tell much excepting that it appeared to have a broad angle on the bow. We are manning No. 1 periscope for bearings. Our flooded forward T.B.T. will be missed very much.

— page 94 —
19 June 1945 (Cont'd)
0030 Target zigged to 1400T, speed still 9 knots, range 3,900 yards. Believe this is a normal zig-don't think we have been detected. She is in sight from the bridge but not from No. 1 periscope. Have been giving him not more than 100 silhouette. We can still shoot on about a 50 port track. She looks like a DE or Frigate and is, I guess, looking for us. More tense moments of waiting. Then with the target at about 2,300 yards, 450 port angle on the bow, 550 torpedo track, run of 2,000 yards, at

0034-41 Fired tube No. 3. (Torpedo Attack #2)

0034-53 Fired tube No. 4.

0035-06 Fired tube No. 5.

0035-15 Fired tube No. 6.

0035-30 Right full rudder, all ahead flank: No. 1 periscope hadn't been able to see him, so we fired on radar bearings with 2 torpedoes to hit MOT, 100% spread for 275 foot target. Depth set 4 feet. I am sure he saw us as soon as we fired for our bow lighted up brilliantly due to impulse air and torpedoes disturbing the phosphorous. At the time of firing his angle on the bow as estimated from the bridge checked well with setup. Named after TET.

0036 Target observed to turn towards us. Torpedo wakes are lighted up like main street on a Satur-day night. Torpedoes appear to be running hot, straight and normal without broaching. Our engines are now smoking furiously.

0037 Steadied on 0700T. T.B.T. can't see because of engine smoke. Range 1,600 yards.

0036 Came to 0350T, so T.B.T. could see.

-28-

— page 95 —
19 June 1945 (Cont'd)
0038-48 Fired tube No. 3 down the throat on radar bearings.
0039-01 Fired tube No. 10 down the throat on radar bearings.
0039-01 Target fired a 2 gun salvo of about 4" caliber at us. Control party below thought our torpedoes had hit, but we on the bridge knew better.
0039-01 In anticipation of obtaining pictures of the Nip blowing up, we filmed his first salvo.
0039-20 Fired tube No. 7 down the throat. (See Special Torpedo Supplement report to this patrol report.) We should have waited longer but gun fire is a great "hurry upper" when pointed in your direction.
0039-40 Three more shots from escort. His powder isn't flashess. Saw one splash close off our starboard beam. A couple whistled overhead. Believe our smoking Wintons are spoiling his aim.
0040-00 Dove to 300 feet. Rigged for depth charge. Turned left off track.
0041-40 Fired tube No. 9. (See Special Torpedo Supplement to this patrol report.) Setup for this one is excellent. We are under a 60 temperature layer. All we can do now is hope and hang on. They won't be long in coming. Pinging heard.
0046 Depth charge #1.
0047 Depth charge #2,3,4,5,6,7, and #8.
0048 Depth charge #9,10,11,12,13 and #14.

-29-

— page 96 —
19 June 1945 (Cont'd)
0049 Depth charge #15 and #16.
0050 Depth charge #17 and #18. All were close and shook the ship considerably. They were all apparently slightly aft and above with some to port and some to starboard.

0051-- During this period we attempted to put our stern to our attacker and fishtail away. This proved impossible as she always seemed so close. Screws and pinging could be heard most of the time. She stopped and listened a couple of times. Once she went up our port side close aboard, crossed a head, started down our starboard side then came right over head with screws very audible through the hull. Several times she appeared to be getting good echoes off of us. Once she was getting echoes, shifted to short scale, speeded up, passed right overhead (screws again audible through the hull), and astounded us all be her failure to drop.

0145 All three sound gears heard twice in rapid succession sounds that closely resembled two torpedoes being fired. We hoped that the rest of the pack was helping us out but as it turned out this was wishful thinking. Maybe the Jap fired two fish at us.

0151 Decided to fishtail on course 3150, and clear the scene regardless of where the Jap appears to be. We had planned to fire evasive weapons but our hydraulic gun aft proved disappointing. First there wasn't enough air to shoot it, then we were unable to push PTS out by hand. We didn't desire to be blowing air about the ship so we secured all noisemaker operations.

0212 Depth charge #19 and #20.
0228 Depth charge #21,22,23,24,25, and #26.

— page 97 —
19 June 1945 (Cont'd)
0229 Depth charge #27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35 and #36. These were not so close as the first. Apparently his depth charge racks hold 18 charges total. Believe this follow is a MIKURA class frigate.

0330 Believe we are losing him although his pinging is still strong. Have heard another occasional, very distant pinger.

0430 Pinging very weak. Started up to periscope depth.

0510 Periscope depth. Apparently all clear. Sea flat calm. Visibility good.

0517 Secured from rig for depth charge and silent running.

0525 Secured from battle Stations. Commenced reload and getting squared away below. Survey shows damage due to our scerve depth charging to be slight. (5" ammunition scuttle flooded, minor leak in after loading hatch, searchlight lense shattered, after engine room 200 lb. salvage air check valves slightly damaged, Manoeuvering room Fuel oil vent and compensating water system vent backed off and leaked, #1 main motor fan has a knock (this may be serious and is a source of noise), much cord and paint chips plus scoral light bulbs.)

0600 Sea is a flat calm, visibility good. Decided to conduct a submerged patrol during the day as everyone is tired out from the past two days operations, plus the fact that planes from PARAMUSHIRU will undoubtedly be searching and our SD radar is out of commission. Plan to proceed out to sea and fix the antenna at the top.

2118 Surfaced after 20 hours and 38 minute dive.

— page 98 —
19 June 1945 (Cont'd)
Commenc'd disassembly of SD antenna. Routined torpedoes.

20 June 1945
Noon posit: 49°-21'N, 151°-54'E

Continuing work on SD.

0130 Commenc'd trying to clear DACE second to Com SubForPacAd Comd., ComSubForPac, AID LARIS giving recent attack information and data requested by ComSubForPacAd Comd.'s 161831.

0200 Received CABEZON's serial one to ComSubPacFor info LARKS stating that AOGON sank 2 and possibly 3 MRUS and CABEZON sank the remainder. I guess we picked on the "sleepy escort". Well maybe we kept one escort occupied for the rest of the pack. This accounts for the second distant "pinger" which we heard intermittently during our evasion.

0400 Ceased transmitting after 2 and 1/2 hours of unsuccessful continuous attempts to clear our message. It is long after daylight and we have been unable to reassemble the SD antenna mast. It will be necessary to open the bottom of the mast at the same time the top is opened to effect reasonably. This necessitates rendering the boat non-watertight. Decided to patrol at sea again today and effect repairs after dark tonight when detection and quick dives are unlikely.

0950 Picked up a white cork life ring with Jap characters and metal tag.

2030 AFR signals on frequency 60, pulse rate 500. Sweeping.

2130 Recommended repairs to SD. Converted No. 5 F.B.T. to a water ballast tank.

— page 99 —
20 June 1945 (Cont'd)
2200    Top of SD mast is secured. The boat is watertight again.
2230    Recommended attempts to clear DACE second message to ComSubForFacAd. ComSubForFac and LARKS.
21 June 1945    Noon post: 460-59'N, 1500-50'E
    Surface patrolling enroute XITA URUPU SUIDO area.
0300    Ceased transmitting having attempted unsucessfully for 4½ hours to clear our message.
0320    Dove for trim and to flush out No. 5 M.B.T.
0345    Surfaced.
0540    SD radar is back in commission--supposedly.
1047    Tade landfall on BURTON TO by SJ bearing 2200T, range 50,000 yards. No SD pip on peaks.
1145    APR signals on frequency 62. Sweeping.
1433    While peacefully zigging in plain view of BURTON TO was surprised to see a submarine surface 2,000 yards on our port beam. Put our stern to her until recognized as a U.S. submarine then paralleled her.
1435    Steadied on course 0250. After exchanging signals found her to be the NANT. Ordered her by semaphore to "Close to speck". She was on our starboard quarter at this time. She sent "INT speed", and we sent back "Six". She increased speed and maneuvered to close us to our starboard. When within speaking distance, and after exchanging a few words it was noted she was still converging on an estimated course

-33-

— page 100 —
21 June 1945 (Cont'd)
of 010° at a speed slightly greater than ours. I was about to call over and tell her Commanding Officer that he was getting too close when I noted him turn towards his conning tower hatch and I assumed he had given an order to sheer off to his right--away from DACE. Shortly after this it became apparent to us that collision was imminent. The MANTA was still converging, her bow was about opposite our bridge apparently dropping aft slowly. Applied the general prudential rule at

By putting on right full rudder, all ahead full, and sounding the collision alarm, hoping to pull ahead and throw my stern clear of her bow.

MANTA's bow touched our stern at about frame 90 on the shell plating of No. 6C M.B.T. The blow was a glancing one and did not jar us much. MANTA dropped aft and at

We started back to course 0250 decreased speed to 1/3, and secured from collision. The only visible damage is a 4-inch dent in No. 6C M.B.T. Sent to MANTA by light "No damage x Close to speak x Course 0250, speed 6 x Not so close this time".

Spoke MANTA and asked him what had happened. All hands on the bridge were amazed when her Commanding Officer answered to the effect that he had been dead in the water, and that we had rammed him. Understood him to say that he thought we were closing him, which is hard to believe in view of the order we had sent him by semaphore, his request for our speed, and in view of the fact that we had been steady on course 0250 at 1/3 speed for fifteen minutes while he had maneuvered from about 2,500 yards on our starboard quarter to alongside of us, never once getting his bow much beyond our bridge.

-34-

— page 101 —
21 June 1945 (Cont'd)
From the ensuing conversation I gather that he is carrying out the original schedule as set forth by the Pack Commander.
Told him that we were going to the RETOROPU KATKYO area, and that we might be back up to the KITA RUPUPU SUIDO area on the 23rd or 24th. Also told him that members of the pack were acting independently so far as I knew until the 26th.

1522 Reversed course to proceed on our way. He turned away and dove soon after.

1801-30 Bridge watch was startled by the whine and roar of an airplane engine, and looked up in time to see a VAL-type plane diving at us from 1500 relative. (Aircraft contact #4) Bridge was cleared and at

1502 Dove. (Before all hands had cleared the bridge the plane was seen to pass over us at about 300 feet. Why he didn't strafe or bomb on this run we will never know. SD got no contact so assumed it never was fixed.)

1503 Going to 200 feet in a hurry. Heard strafing followed by one light bomb which was close, but set shallow. No damage.

1503 Periscope depth. All clear, but sky is partly overcast.

1846 Heard three distant depth bombs or charges.

1850 Investigation shows SD radar upper antenna connection broken again. Commenced preliminary work for repair of same.

2052 Heard one or two more depth bombs or charges, still distant but closer than the last ones.

— page 102 —
21 June 1945 (Cont'd)
2201    Surfaced. It never gets really dark up here and today is the longest day of the year.

2230    Commenced opening top of SD antenna. Proceeding towards YETOROFU. KAIKYO about 15 miles off the coast of URUPTU JIMA.

22 June 1945    Moon point: 45°-29'N, 149°-02'E

Proceeding on surface. Moon bright--visibility good.

0200    Found it necessary to open top and bottom of SD mast rendering boat non-watertight again for a short time. Dawn commencing to break.

0315    Dove for submerged patrol in YETOROFU KAIKYO.

Plan to reconnoiter sulphur refinery on the shores of MOYORO WAN at the northeast end of YETOROFU JIMA as a possible bombardment target for complying with ComSubForPac's 16073C. SI and SD radars both out of commission.

0723    Sighted two small luggers about 3 or 4 miles distance going away from us, and well in YETOROFU KAIKYO. (Ship contact #4) After due deliberation decided against gun attack because of their small size, the lack of two out of three of our radars, with the good possibility of being surprised by aircraft with gun crews on deck, and confined waters, and the interruption, if not cancellation of our bombardment plans.

1400--    Made close-up reconnaissance of MOYORO WAN. Can make out only one building. It doesn't check the sulphur plant. No shipping present. Continued to check currents through the day and observe the WAN.

1530

— page 103 —
22 June 1945 (Cont'd)
2135
Surfaced and commenced surface patrolling just south of the Straits. Our SD shows small pips on peaks at 10 miles. This is the first time our SD has functioned since before entering the area some sixteen days ago--weak though it is.

23 June 1945
Noon posit: 450-22N, 1480-57'E
Surfaced patrolling. Light fog in patches set in about dawn. Also APR received what we believed was airborne search radar (frequency 155, P.N.450) which swept for about one hour and half commencing about 0300. (Research shows it could have been either airborne, or a type of shore aircraft warning radar.) SD radar showed no plane pip. Decided to surface patrol until fog blows clear.

0713
SD contacted two planes (Aircraft contact #5 and #6)--one about 10 miles, and the other moving in and out from about 11 to 8 miles. As fog was mostly dissipated and what little there was was clearing fast, decided to dive for submerged patrol off MOROYO WAN.

0715
Dove. During the day we patrolled close in across the mouth of the WAN. Visibility excellent. We still haven't seen our sulphur plant nor any of the other buildings shown on the chart except the one which we thought we observed yesterday. At the northern end of our sweep we observed what was undoubtedly a shore battery located on the side of the mountain in the vicinity of IKOMO ISO. In view of this and in view of the fact that we have never been able to locate our sulphur refinery target, decided to take position about 9,000 yards from the shore of the WAN (i.e. about 4,000 yards from the nearest land) and surface about dusk, lob a few 5 inch shells at the beach in compliance to

— page 104 —
23 June 1945 (Cont'd)
ComSubForPac's 160738, and then head up towards KITA URUPU SUIDO.

1920 Noted fog bank rolling in from the east.

1921 Battle Stations Surface.

1934 Surfaed. The fog beat us by a couple of minutes, so we fired 4 rounds of 5 inch at the beach on navigational range and bearing. All apparently hit the island. I guess the Japs know we are here.

1937 Secured from Battle Surface Station and cleared area.

2030 AFR picked up the same type of radar that we had this morning.

2130 Commenced transmitting DACE second to ComSubFor Pac, ComSubForPacAd Comd., info IARKS. Gave them resume of our activities from our 19 June attack to date and answered ComSubForPac's. 200537 and ComSub ForPacAd Comd's 161631.

2355 After many frequency shifts and much Jap jamming managed to clear message.

24 June 1945 Noon posit: 460-33N, 1510-01E.

Enroute KITA URUPU SUIDO. Weather foggy.

0430 Commenced surface patrolling across the SUIDO.

Weather remained foggy all day.

25 June 1945 Noon posit: 460-41N, 1510-01E.

Surface patrolling across KITA URUPU SUIDO. Weather squally, seas picking up, no fog.

— page 105 —
25 June 1945 (Cont'd)
049
Dove for submerged patrol taking ten minute high periscope looks and ST radar sweeps at 55 feet. Depth control difficult.

2052
Surfaced. Sea rough but weather clear. Patrolling in the Straits.

2330
Fog set in.

26 June 1945
Non posit: 470-12N, 1470-48E

0040
Exchanged calls by SJ radar with TITOSA and told her the Straits were clear of patrols.

0100
Departed KITTA URUPU SUDO enroute station on scouting line in south central part of Sea of OKHOTSK in accordance with the Pack Commander's serial 09.

0315
Received CABEZON's serial 20 ordering the pack to take scouting position on her, course 270°, speed 9, distance 15 miles. Her 0400 (26th) position was given as 470-30N, 1490-40E. Changed course to comply.

0630
Emerged from fog bank. Visibility excellent.

0742
Arrived in scouting line position. Exchanged calls by SJ with APOGON to the northeast.

0817
Cleared DACE serial 09 to CABEZON telling her that we were in position.

0825
Sighted AFOGON on southeasterly course, and exchanged searchlight messages concerning our position and attack data.

1822
Weak APR signals on 97 m.c., 500 pps; also another weak signal on 76 m.c.

-39-

— page 106 —
26 June 1945 (Cont'd)
2250 Received CABEZON's serial 23 telling us to reverse course at midnight, and giving his position which was garbled. We have missed CABEZON's serial 22.
2330 Cleared DACE's serial 10 to CABEZON stating that we would reverse course at midnight, giving him our position, and stating that we had missed his serial 22 and part of his 23.
2400 Reversed course to 0900T.
27 June 1945 Noon posit: 470-16'N, 1470-49'E
Surface patrolling in Sea of OKHOTSK with excellent visibility and a full moon.
0316 Lookout sighted a light bearing 0300T, range about 14 miles. (Ship contact #6) Can see several bright lights through high periscope. Believe ship to be a hospital ship or a Russian. Commenced end around to dive ahead and observe him. Dawn is breaking.
0416 Cleared DACE serial 11 to pack informing pack of contact, and that I was investigating.
0450 With the target steering a steady course of 0300T, along the U.S.S.R. shipping lane at a speed of 10 knots, and apparently a single unscorted large freighter, decided a high speed end around was a useless expenditure of fuel. Slowed and headed towards ship for positive identification.
0512 SJ radar finally crashed through with a measley range of 16,600 yards on the broadside, plainly visible freighter.
0535 Range now 9,500 yards. Ship is definitely a

— page 107 —
27 June 1945 (Cont'd)
properly marked Russian B02-S01 Liberty type ship of 7,176 tons, as shown on page 68 of AIC NORPAC No. 653 Revised. Sheered off an assumed surface patrol.

0659 Ceased transmitting DACE serial 12 to pack after sending it double two times with no receipts. This reported contact as Russian, gave our posit., and the fact that we were abandoning investigation. (Determined later on in the day that CABEZON had received this message.)

0750 Received CABEZON's serial 24 giving us scouting line information.

0620 Received CABEZON's serial 25 to pack giving further data on course changes.

1117 Sighted CABEZON to the north.

1245 Closed CABEZON to signalling distance and exchanged positions and information. Then headed southeast for our scouting line position.

1418 Received CABEZON's serial 26 requesting estimate of fuel needed by DACE for return to base.

1450 Answered above query with DACE's serial 13.

1717 Exchanged SJ signals with CABEZON.

2400 Received course to 2700T.

28 June 1945 Moon posit: 470-04N, 1470-55E

Surf: patrolling on scouting line. Visibility good.

0944 0.0.D., J.0.0.D., QH and lookout sighted two

— page 108 —
28 June 1945 (Cont'd)
large bubbles in quick succession each about 5 yards long by 3 yards wide about 40 yards off the starboard beam. They had the appearance of impulse bubbles or a submarine venting air-ridden tanks. Put stern to it and cleared area to northwest.

11103 Received CABEZONI's serial 27 to reverse course to 0900T at noon.

11115 Bridge personnel plus Commanding Officer and high periscope watch sighted a long, straight, and moving streak in the water about 1,500 to 2,000 yards to the south and parallel to our base course. This was not positively identified as a torpedo wake, but could easily have been. Sound gear could hear nothing.

1200 Reversed course. This takes us back past this morning's scenes of activity, but we are steering to leave them well south of us.

1342 Periscope sighted by lookout close aboard to port. (Ship contact #7) Put stern to and avoided to north and northeast. This sighting was made by the port lookout who said he saw a black tapered object appear once, disappear, then reappear with about two foot exposed, and a slight feather around the base. In view of the fact that our pack had been patrolling in this area for some time sending quite a few radio messages, and in view of the periscope, possible torpedo wake, and bubbles sighted by DACE, I was convinced a submarine was present, so when our evasive action was deemed completed, DACE's serial 14 to the pack was composed reporting possible submarine contacts and requesting a new area.

1520 Raised just about to transmit serial 14 (about) when CABEZONI's serial 20 was received changing

— page 109 —
1557
Transmitted DACE's serial 14. Received immediate receipts from MATTA and APOGON, but none from CABEZON. During the next hour and a quarter message was transmitted double four times including once on the old frequency with no receipts from CABEZON.

1630
Sighted U.S. submarine on horizon bearing 3580T on a westerly course.

1650
Submarine turned towards us and dove. Assumed she was making an approach on us so commenced ending around to eastward, fired emergency recognition flares, and set sound watch for sonic identification.

1717
CABEZON received for DACE serial 14.

1737
U.S. submarine surfaced. DACE fired more flares.

1745
Established SJ communication and identified her as APOGON. Tried to explain our reason for being out of position but was unable to get message through.

1818
Sighted and exchanged calls with MATTA to our starboard.

-43-

— page 110 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Subject:  U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

22 June 1945 (Cont'd)
1235 Transmitted DACE serial 15 to CABEZON request-ing reply to our last message to which she answered affirmative (her serial 29).

1636 Commenced taking station to the west of AFCHON. Signalled her by light that we would be west of her, apologized for causing her to dive, and exchanged navigational positions.

2120 Reported in position to CABEZON (DACE's serial 16).

2222 Received CABEZON's serial 31 requesting our position and a repeat of our 16.

2310 Complied with same in DACE's serial 17. Thus ends a day full of minor incidents.
(Note: After exchanging stores with an inquisitive seal for a full minute at close range about sunset, and noting that there were whales in our vicinity this morning, it is a fifty-fifty chance our Jap submarine suspicions were caused by the activities of these two classes of sea mammals.)

29 June 1945 Noon posit: 500-04'N, 151-06'E

Surface patrolling on scouting line. Visibility good.

0322 Dove for trim.

0334 Surfaced.

0535 Passed a medium sized, heavy metal tank with various pipe appurtenances.

0715 Passed an object identified as a medium sized ice box in good condition.

-44-

— page 111 —
29 June 1945 (Cont'd)
1334 Exchanged SJ calls with APOGON.
2100 Converted No. 3 F.B.T. to a water ballast tank.
30 June 1945 Noon posit: 520-29'N, 1540-20'E
    Surface patrolling on scouting line. Visibility good.
0240 SJ interference on our starboard beam.
0305 Dove for trim and to flush out No. 3 M.E.T.
0327 Surfaced.
0730 Am becoming anxious concerning scouting line courses. Original plan calls for a reverse of course at 0300, yet on the other hand the pack hasn't been following the original plan since 17 June. To further complicate matters we are getting quite far north and nearing KAMCHATKA.
1030 Still no information from the Pack Commander. Decided to reverse course anyway and ask for information.
1031 Cleared DACE serial 16 to CAHENZON giving position, and requesting scouting line information. Determined our wolf pack frequency receiver to be out of commission although the usual static noises were heard continuously. Guess this accounts for the lack of information. Don't know how long it has been defective.
1345 Received CAHENZON's serial 36 ordering DACE to patrol in accordance with Pack Patrol Instructions of 29 May. We can't make our position on the scouting line by 1600 at which time the line breaks up, so set course for our lane in area 4.

— page 112 —
30 June 1945 (Cont'd)
West (ONEKOTAN KAIKYO). Check shows we have missed CABEZON's serials 32, 33, 34, and 35.
(Note: We now have two receivers on the Wopaco frequency and two radiomen on watch at all times.)

1400 Composed DACE's serial 19 to CABEZON informing her of the missing serials, and that DACE would be in Area 4 West about 0100 tomorrow.

1600 Unable to get a receipt for our message although sent double two times.

1645 Land sighted bearing 1200T, distance 73 miles. Identified as ARAIDO TO.

1925 Received APOGON's serial 35 to DACE requesting our position.

2000 Answered APOGON's message with DACE serial 20 and also transmitted DACE serial 19 again to CABEZON. Received receipt for both messages.

2200 SJ contact the southern peaks of PARAHUSHIUB bearing 1500T, about 95,000 yards.

1 July 1945 Noon posit: 490-51°N, 1540-54°E

Enroute Area 4 West. Visibility good.

0130 Commenced patrolling DACE lane off ONEKOTAN KAIKYO.

0324 Passed an unidentified corpse.

0329 Dove for submerged patrol in the straits. Two times during the day fog banks rolled in, and then passed clear. Visibility was for the most part good. Maintained 55 foot SJ radar periscope patrol when in reduced visibility. Sea flat calm.

— page 113 —
1 July 1945 (Cont'd)
1830
Planned to surface as fog had rolled in again, but SJ radar went out of commission at this point. Decided to remain submerged for repairs.

2106
Surface--SJ repairs completed. Between 2230 and 2330 we had the after glow of sunset, fog, excellent visibility, overcast, clear, starlite sky, light rain and moonrise not to mention brilliantly phosphorescent water. Slowed to 100 rpm to reduce phosphorescent illumination.

2 July 1945
Noon posit: 490-55N, 1550-55E
Surface patrolling, visibility poor to excellent. No SJ interference from the rest of the pack but assume other boats are patrolling in their nearby lanes.

0336
Dove at sunrise although it has been light for more than an hour. Commenced submerged patrol of ONEKOTAN TAIKYO. Visibility remained excellent all day. Sea calm. Rounded all torpedoes.

0915
Sighted plane (identified as an ENTRY) (Plane Contact #7) through periscope at an estimated range of 4 miles. Increased depth to 100 feet.

0925
Periscope depth--all clear.

2114
Surfaced.

2220
Transmitted DACE's serial 21 to CANZONI informing her that we were proceeding to Area 3 West (KITA MURFU SULDO), that we would rendezvous in accordance with original patrol instructions, and requested her position.

2243
Received CABIZZO'S serial 41 giving her posit. about 60 miles north of her Area 4 lane.

— page 114 —
3 July 1945 (Cont'd)
2324 Transmitted DACE's serial 22 telling CABEZON that we had missed her serials 33, 39, and 40, requesting a repeat of her latitude, and asking if DACE was operating independently.

2354 Received CABEZON's serial 42 giving same posit. and telling us that we were operating independently until 5 July. We had previously been ordered to carry out original patrol plan. Whereabouts of APOGON and TANTA unknown. Decided to comply with original patrol plan taking DACE's prescribed lane for trip to Area 3 West.

3 July 1945 Noon posit: 490-21'N, 1520-41'E

Proceeding towards KITA URUPU SUIDO at slow surface speeds. Visibility good.

2024 Received CABEZON's serial 43 telling the pack to operate independently until 5 July at which time each submarine was to be in its assigned lane in Area 3 West. Speeded up so as to arrive at this station by early morning 4 July.

4 July 1945 Noon posit: 460-56'N, 1510-08'E

0230 Entered Area 3 West (KITA URUPU SUIDO)and commenced surface patrolling across DACE and CABEZON's lanes. Weather during the day was alternately foggy and clear but in general visibility was not too good.

0403 Dove for trim.

0425 Surfaced and continued surface patrolling.

2200 Received APOGON's serial 40 stating that she was in her lane to the south of us.

— page 115 —
5 July 1945
Noon posit: 460-47°N, 151°-05°E

Surface patrolling in DACE lane on Sea of OKNOTSK side of NITA UNPU SUIDO. Visibility fair to poor all day.

0220
SJ radar interference on 0400T. Assume this to be CABEZON but was unable to establish communications.

0344
Dove for trim.

0403
Surfaced and continued surface patrol.

1035-1100
Received weak sweeping APN signals in 80 megs. and 76 megs.

1340
SJ interference at 2520T, probably APOGON. Believe she tried to contact us but we were unable to establish communications.

2020
Received CABEZON's serials 44 and 45. The former breaking up the pack (giving APOGON charge of APOGON and NITA), and the latter ordering DACE to take station 5 miles on CABEZON's port flank.

2022
Set course for new position.

2120
Cleared DACE serial 23 to pack giving posit., course, speed and PTA.

2123
Received ComSubPac's 051013 ordering DACE and CABEZON to depart area at sunset 7 July.

2218
Received CABEZON's serial 46 telling us to take our time and save fuel.

2330
Completed transit of NITA UNPU SUIDO.

— page 116 —
6 July 1945
Noon posit: 460-15°N, 1580-53°E
Enroute CABEZON's port beam. Visibility poor.
Exchanged recognition signals with CABEZON.
In position on CABEZON's port beam conforming to her courses and speeds.
Dove for trim.
Surfaced. Surface patrolling to seaward.
Received CABEZON's serial 47 giving course and speed data. Weather alternately clear and foggy during the morning, but very clear all afternoon (land 90 miles away was visible).
Rendezvoused with CABEZON and transferred DACE patrol narrative and track charts.

7 July 1945
Noon posit: 440-24°N, 156°-26E
Surface patrolling. Persistent light fog prevails.
Dove for trim.
Surfaced.
Deferred from assigned area in company with U.S.S. CABEZON enroute MIDWAY in accordance with CombSubPac 051013.

8 July 1945
Noon posit: 400-22°N, 1630-17°E
Enroute MIDWAY. Light fog prevails.
Dove for trim.
Surfaced.

— page 117 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Subject:  U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

14:23 Commenced six hour battery discharge.
2019 Completed discharge.
9 July 1945 Noon post: 360-30'N, 1690-10'E
Enroute MIDWAY. Light fog pervails
0030K Set clocks ahead one hour to conform to -11 time (LOW time).
10 July 1945 Noon post: 320-27'N, 1750-20E
Enroute MIDWAY.
04:17 Dove for trim.
0421 Surfaced.
0630L Set all clocks ahead one hour to conform to -12 zone time (MIKE time).
1107M Received ComPask Group 17.5's 092124 giving routing instructions.
1332M Received ComSubPacAd.Comd.'s 100036.
11 - 10 July 1945 Noon post: 280-15.3N, 1780-13.W
Enroute MIDWAY.
0622 Crossed international data line. Changed day to 10 July.
1314 Rendezvoused with airplane escort.
1640 Moored at berth S-9, MIDWAY, T.H.

-51-

— page 119 —
0307 - 1120 K  1.11 Kts   0150
1120 - 1315 K   0 - -
1315 - 1400 K   0.4 Kts   1600

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

LORAN stations were too distant for LORAN navigation in this area.

On June 16, July 6, July 7, July 8, and July 9 while in a fog bank, it was possible to take bubble sextant observations of the sun. This bubble sextant with averaging device (Type AI-5851-1) was used with good results and is highly recommended for navigation in this area.

The high, rugged peaks of this area are an invaluable aid to Radar Navigation during fog and the limited darkness. It was quite possible to patrol a strait on the surface using Radar Navigation without once seeing the surrounding land.

No lighthouses or similar navigational aids were sighted in operation.

(F) CONTACTS

| NO. | DATE  | TIME    | LAT.  | LONG.  | TITUTAL EST. ORG. | HOW COORD. | REMAINS |
|-----|-------||-------|||||
| 1   | 0832  | 1446-20H | Luger | 8,000 | 3 Kts. P      | with gun-  |         |
|     |       |          |        |        |                  | fire        |

— page 120 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
CONTINENTAL
Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

(F) CONTACTS (Cont'd.)
DATE    LAT.    TYPE(S)    RANGE & SPEED    COUNT    RUMORS
NO.   TIME    LONG.    TYPE(S)    RANGE & SPEED    COUNT    RUMORS
3    2001   154-56.5E    Unident.    30,000    out
    MIKURA class    17KT    9 Kts.    R    Attacked-
    Frigate(EU)    9,600    9 Kts.    R    missed; was
     counter a-
     attacked.
4    2240    154-33.4E    (2) small    100T
    6-8 Kts. P
5    0727    149-00E    Luggers    6,000    030T    Look-
     Russian    20,000    9 Kts. out
6    0415    154-44.5E    Frig.    20,000    9 Kts. out
     Russian    9 Kts. out
7    1342    147-48E    Periscope    300

— page 122 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Subject:  U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

(F) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)
Own Ship Data
Speed 2.5 Kts Course 191.5T Depth 65 feet Angle 00 (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack:  Submerged periscope attack on a snap set up
    based on previous tracking information.  Cont-
    inuous periscope bearings and standarder ranges
    were used.

Tubes Fired:
    Track Angle-- 147.5
    Gyro Angle-- 188
    Depth set-- 7 ft.
    Power-- HIGH
    Hit or Miss-- HIT
    Erratic-- NO
    Mark Torpedo-- 14-3A
    Serial No.-- 95130
    Mark Exploder-- 6-5
    Serial No.-- 33612
    Actuation Set-- CONTACT
    Actuation Actual-- CONTACT
    Mark Warhead-- 16-4
    Serial No.-- 20177
    Explosive-- TTPX
    Firing Interval-- -
    Type Spread-- DIVERGENT
    Sea Conditions-- 5
    Overhaul Activity-- S/1 Base, Pearl Harbor

REMARKS:  It was intended to fire two torpedoes at this
    target with a total divergent spread of 20'.
    After the first torpedo was observed to hit
    shifted to the next target before the second
    torpedo was fired.

-56-

— page 123 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
CONTINUED:
Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

(1) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)
(Torpedo Attack Report Form)
U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1B PATROL NUMBER 7
Time: 1323-20 Date: 10 June 1945 Lat: 47-25N Long: 149-04.5E
Target Data--DAMAGE INFLICTED
Description: Same as Torpedo Attack 1A. Target is Small
MARU, V-B type.
Ship(s) sunk: None
Ship(s) damaged: None
or probably sunk
Damage det- None
ermined by:
Target draft: 6 ft. Course: 050T Speed: 9 Kts. Range: 250 yds.
estimated
(at firing)
Own Ship Data
Speed: 2.5 Kts. Course: 183T Depth 65 ft. Angle: 00 (at firing)
Type Attack: Submerged periscope attack on a snap set up
based on previous tracking information. Continuous periscope bearings are
stadiometer ranges were used.

-57-

— page 124 —
1. USS S. S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
   - Number SEVEN.

(1) ATTACH DATA (CONT'D.)

Tubes Fired: 1540
Track Angle-- 2010
Gyro Angle-- 7 ft.
Depth Set-- HIGH
Power-- HIGH
Hit or Miss-- MISS
Br. Rate-- NO
Mark Torpedo-- 14-3A
Serial No.-- 91995
Mark Exploder-- 6-5
Serial No.-- 32926
Actuation Set-- CONTACT
Actuation Actual-- -
Mark Warhead-- 16-4
Serial No.-- 20135
Explosive-- TRK
Firing interval-- -
Type Spread-- -
Sea Conditions-- 5
Overhaul Activity-- S/M Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

REMARKS: Range and size of target were overestimated. Initial
cive of torpedo carried it beyond the target--re-
sulting in a miss.

-50-

— page 125 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol.
Number SEVEN.

(1) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)
(Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2A PATROL NO. SEVEN
Time: 0035 Date: 19 June 1945 Lat: 50-23.9N Long: 154-34E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: One (1) MIKURA class frigate. Contact made by SJ radar at 9,600 yards. Visibility 5,000 yards.

Ship(s) Sunk: None

Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None

Damage determined by: None

Target Draft: 10 feet Course 1400T Speed 9 Kts. Range 2,300 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 4 Kts. Course 288T Depth Surface Angle 00 (at firing)

Type Attack: Night surface attack using SJ radar ranges and bearings.

-59-

— page 127 —
(SS247)
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)
(Torpedo Attack Report Form)
U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NUMBER 2B PATROL NO. 7
Time: 0039 Date: 19 June 1945 Lat: 50-24N Long: 154-34E
Target Data--Damage Inflicted
Description: Same as Torpedo Attack 2A.
Ship(s) sunk: None
Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None
Damage determined by: None
Target Draft 10 ft. Course 090T Speed 14 Kts. Range 1,750 (at firing)

Own Ship Data
Speed 16 Kts. Course 090T Depth Surface Angle 00 (at firing)
Type Attack: Night Surface attack using SJ radar ranges and bearings. "Down the thrust shot".

-61-

— page 128 —
1. U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
   Number SEVEN.

2. ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)
   Tubes Fired--  #8  #10
   Track Angle--  0090P  0060P
   Gyro Angle--  1660-30'  1670-30'
   Depth Set--  4'  4'
   Power--  HIGH  HIGH
   Hit or Miss--  MISS  MISS
   Erratic--  NO  NO
   Lark Torpedo--  14-3A  14-3A
   Serial No.--  66L29  95L41
   Mark Exploder--  6-5  6-5
   Serial No.--  42644  19956
   Actuation Set--  CONTACT  CONTACT
   Actuation Actual--  -  -
   Mark Warhead--  16-4  16-4
   Serial No.--  213L3  1976C
   Explosive--  TPK  TPX
   Firing Interval--  -  13"
   Type Spread--  NOISE  NOISE
   Sea Conditions--  0  0
   Overhaul Activity--  S/M Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

REMARKS: TTP bearings could not be obtained due to smoke from our own engines. Water extremely phos-phorescent.

-62-

— page 130 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

(I) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)
Deflection for 5" gun was given from periscope. Range corrections were passed by SJ radar. The Conning Tower had direct communication with Sightseeker by battle power phones.

Open sights and tracer ammunition enabled both 40mm's to obtain a high percentage of hits.

Five inch and 40mm fire were very effective. The .50 caliber guns had little effect, but were used to give personnel a taste of gun action which may prove valuable in the future. The twin 20mm should prove effective when personnel have gained more experience. Improvement was noted during this action.

(GUN ATTACK REPORT FORM)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - GUN ATTACK NUMBER 2 - PATROL NO. 7

Time: 1934K - Date: 23 June 1945 - Lat: 45-26N - Long: 148-56E

Damage: Undetermined.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Fired four (4) rounds of 5"/25 at the beach in compliance with Consubspac 160738 from a range of 6,000 yards (nearest land 4,000 yards). Shells were aimed at shoreline from navigational slot. Loud explosions at this range seem to indicate shells hit on land. It is unfortunate that a heavy fog bank prevented us from spotting ranges and deflection on the building we had previously observed. Gun fired normally after being immersed in 340F water all day.

(I) MISSES
No mines or mine laying operations were noted with the exception of the two mines sighted and sunk by the U.S.S. CABLEZON while enroute to patrol area in company with DACE.

-64-

— page 131 —
1. U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

(J) ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

No new countermeasures or new tactics were noted. This ship was counterattack on two occasions with depth charges from Jap Frigates, strafed and bombed by a Jap plane, fired at with deck guns of a frigate and probably with two torpedoes from this same ship. On the occasion of being fired upon the Japs manned their guns and got off at least five well aimed shots from guns of about 4" size at night in a very short time. If she fired torpedoes at us they were ineffective at our depth of 300 - 350 feet.

The Jap Frigates used echo ranging with very poor results most of the time, but on occasions they stopped and listened apparently with equally poor results. Good density layers were always present.

Our evasions consisted mostly of silent running at 300 - 350 feet while fish-tailing away on a certain course. Due to mechanical difficulties noise makers were not employed.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

(1) FULL AND MACHINERY:

Electrical - An unexpected dive necessitated by an approaching plane flooded the already opened bridge pelorus, forward T.B.T. and cable putting the equipment out of commission for the remainder of the patrol.

Boat & Stern Planes: After Yard overhaul both bow and stern planes failed to go into power operation without manual aid. The clutch meshed well but solenoid would not pull the clutch into the fully engaged position. Brackets and pins as pos'ive locks were installed which guaranteed power on the planes. Additional troubles were caused.

— page 137 —
U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

| DATE | GCT TIME | LONG. | LAT. | CARD |
|------||-------|------|------|
| 6/6/45 | 1730 | 151-29 | 42-35 | 20 Neg. |
| 6/6/45 | 1700 | 146-50 | 44-16 | 60 Neg. |
| 6/11/45 | 1600 | 149-06 | 47-14 | 50 Neg. |
| 6/11/45 | 1730 | 147-40 | 47-17 | 60 Neg. |
| 6/17/45 | 1700 | 157-41 | 49-51.5 | 90 Neg. |
| 6/18/45 | 0900 | 155-07 | 50-50 | 90 Neg. |
| 6/19/45 | 1721 | 153-23 | 49-45 | 90 Neg. |
| 6/21/45 | 1630 | 149-08 | 46-53 | 80 Neg. |
| 6/30/45 | 1740 | 153-31 | 51-49 | 10 Posit. at 140 feet |
| 7/1/45 | 1530 | 154-28 | 50-09 | 40 Neg. |
| 7/2/45 | 1800 | 155-00 | 50-00 | 40 Neg. |
| 7/4/45 | 1835 | 151-01 | 46-50 | 40 Neg. |
| 7/7/45 | 1825 | 154-23 | 45-56 | 40 Neg. |

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, and HABITABILITY

The state of health of the ship's company was excellent. There were very few coids which was rather the opposite to what could be expected in going from a tropical climate to one of cold, dampness, and fog. There was only one admission to the sick list (a case of cellulitis) for a total of two sick days.

The selection of food we were able to obtain was good and varied, and it was in general well prepared. The baking was outstanding. STEINBERG, C.I., BKL(1)(SS), USNR deserves much credit for this outstanding baking. The newly installed ice cream freezer was used constantly and its products were a well-comed addition to our menu. Soup was served at night during cold weather. Fresh water developed a metallic taste causing slight nausea.

The cold damp weather made parts of the boat uncomfortable at times. This was particularly true of the forward and after torpedo rooms which were not only the coldest compartments but which excelled all the rest in the quantity of dripping condenser. The air conditioning plant was run submerged to reduce

— page 145 —
5-241/A16-3
Serial #: 024

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Report of Seventh War
Patrol Dated 10 July 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Division TWO-FORTY-ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Administration.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

1. The seventh war patrol of the U.S.S. DACE was conducted in the KURILE ISLAND - OKHOTSK SEA Area. The DACE was one or four (4) submarines in a coordinated search and attack group consisting of the CAHEZON, APOGON, IANTA and DACE, with the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. CAHEZON, Commander G. W. LAUTRUU, Jr., U. S. Navy, as Group Commander. This patrol was of forty seven (47) days duration, thirty-one (31) of which were spent in the assigned area. No opportunity was afforded the DACE to engage in coordinated attacks with the rest of the group.

2. Despite thorough area coverage only three (3) worth while torpedo targets were contacted, one (1) of which was a properly marked Russian ship. The other two (2) contacts were developed into attacks. In addition one (1) gun attack was made.

Torpedo Attacks No. 1A and 1B - 10 June 1945.

Initial contact was made in the early morning by the high periscope watch. After a long and around the DACE dove for attack. The contact developed into one (1) medium sized freighter (EIHUKU MARU type), one (1) small coastal tanker or barge, and two (2) MIKURA class frigates. One (1) MK 14-3A torpedo was fired (No. 1A) at the freighter, which was seen to hit at MOT, sending debris 20C to 300 feet in the air. Range 400 yards, track angle 1470 starboard, 80 R. gyro. Target was then shifted and one (1) Mk 14-3A torpedo was fired (No. 1B) at the small tanker, which missed, probably because of the short range. Range 350 yards track angle 1540 starboard, 210 R gyro. The escorts forced the DACE deep before she could observe final results on the freighter, but loud breaking up noises indicated she sank. A depth charging followed.

Torpedo Attack Nos. 2A and 2B - 19 June 1945.

A night surface attack, using radar ranges and bearings. Four (4) Mk 14-3A torpedoes were fired (No 2A) at a MIKURA class frigate. Range 2300 yards, track angle 400 port, 70 - 100 L gyros. At the instant of firing the DACE was apparently sighted as the target turned toward, and all torpedoes missed. The DACE then turned tail to target and commenced retiring. Four (4) minutes later two (2) Mk 14-3A torpedoes were fired "down the throat" at this pursuing frigate. Range 1750 yards, track angle 80 port, 130 L gyro. All torpedoes miss. Close gun-firing then caused the DACE to dive, and she was subjected to rather close depth charging.

— page 146 —
5-241/A16-3
Serial # 024

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Report of Seventh War
Patrol Dated 10 July 1945.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

---

**Gun Attack No. 1 - 8 June 1945.**

A well executed gun attack on a wooden sea truck (300 tons) in company with a wooden lugger (75 - 100 tons), resulted in their destruction, next day derelicts of both targets were sighted - only the masts showing.

Recommended Assessment:

One (1) medium class AK (EU), sunk - 5000 tons.
(Similar to (EHUKU Class).
One (1) wooden sea truck (20), sunk - 300 tons.
One (1) wooden lugger (20), sunk - 100 tons.

3. A diversionary gun firing was conducted on the shores of MOYERO
WAN at the northeast end of YETOROFU JIMA on 23 June 1945, in connection with the operations of HYDEAN'S "HELLCATS".

4. The DACE returned from patrol exceptionally clean - one of the cleancast submarines I have ever observed returning from patrol - and in very good material condition. Her radio and radar difficulties will be thoroughly investigated and defects remedied. Her refit will be accomplished by the U.S.S. ABER
and Submarine Division "Two-Forty-One's Relief Crew in the normal period. Health of the crew was very good and morale high.

5. The Administrative Division Commander congratulates the Commander:
Officer, Officers and crew of the DACE on this aggressive and arduous patrol, and for the damage inflicted upon the enemy.

J. W. BOWLES
Acting.

— page 147 —
11/4d
Cargo of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
13 July 1945.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Report of Seventh War
Patrol, dated 10 July 1945.

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of SEVENTH War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander
   Submarine Division TWO FORTY-ONE.

2. It appears that the communication difficulties and poor
   radar performance experienced by DACE wore caused primarily by un-
   satisfactory material conditions. These will be corrected in a normal
   refit.

3. The cleanliness of DACE upon her return from patrol
   was outstanding.

4. The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR congratulates
   the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of DACE upon the completion
   of another long and arduous patrol and upon the damage inflicted upon
   the enemy.

F. W. FENNO.

— page 148 —
1-10(A)/A16-3(18)
Serial: 01353
Confidential
THIRD ENCLOSURE to
DACS Report of
Seventh War Patrol.

CONSUBSAP RADAR REPORT NO. 825
U.S.S. DACE - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Seventh War Patrol
(25 May to 10 July 1945).

1. The seventh war patrol of the DACE, under the command of Commander O. R. Cole, Jr., U.S. Navy, was conducted in the Kurile Islands and Sea of Okhotsk Areas. The DACE along with the U.S.S. HAUMA (SS299), U.S.S. APOQON (SS308) and the U.S.S. CABEZON (SS334), formed a coordinated attack group with the commanding officer of the CABEZON as group commander.

2. With thorough, aggressive area coverage the DACE made two contacts worthy of torpedoes, both of which were developed into attacks. Out of the first contact, a medium sized freighter was sunk and a Mikura class frigate damaged. The second contact, a Hikaru class frigate, succeeded in avoiding all torpedoes fired by the DACE. The DACE also accounted for two small craft by a well conducted gun attack and made a diversionary gun attack on the shores of Moyoro Jima at the northeast end of Yetorofu Jima during this patrol.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this fifth successive, successful patrol added to the fighting record of the DACE. The DACE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

| ACTION | DAMAGE | TONNAGE |
||||
| 1 - Medium AK (Similar to EIHUKU Type) - (SU) | 4,000 tons | (Attack No. 1 and Separate Report) |
| 1 - AIS (Sea Truck) (EC) | 300 tons | (Gun Attack No. 1) |
| 1 - AIS (Lugger) (EC) | 100 tons | (Gun Attack No. 1) |
| TOTAL SINK | 4,400 tons |

| ACTION | DAMAGE | TONNAGE |
||||
| 1 - PF (HIKURA Class) (EC) | 1,500 tons | (Separate Report) |
| TOTAL SINK & DRAINED | 5,900 tons |

Authentication & Distribution on next page. - 1 - MERRILL COMSTOCK, Deputy.

— page 149 —
712-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial: 01853
CONFIDENTIAL
THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

SUBJECT: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Seventh War Patrol
(25 May to 10 July 1945).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
CHIO (5)
Cincapa (6)
JICPOA (1)
AdICPOA (1)
Conservpac (1)
Cincelant (1)
Consubslant (8)
S/1 School, HI (2)
CO, S/1 Base, PH (1)
Consopac (2)
Consovespac (1)
Consubs?thFlt (Fwd Echelon) (2)
Consubs?thFlt (Rear Echelon) (2)
Commorpac (2)
Consubspac (3)
ConsubspacAdCond (40)
SUEAD, HI (2)
ConsubspacSubordcon (3)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Pacific (2)
Consub?prd?rSellbac (Airmail) (5)
Substreampac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

E. C. HINES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

— page 152 —
1943, Mrs. O. Pomeroy Robinson christened this hull of the DACE and sent her sliding into the waters of the Thames River -- the first submarine to be launched at the Victory Yard.

Three officers and about ten members of the crew of the DACE were present for the launching. Her prospective commanding officer was Lieutenant Commander J.F. Enright, Naval Academy class of 1933. Her Executive Officer was Lieutenant Commander W.G. Holman, Class of 1936. Other officers assigned to the ship were: Lieutenant C.R. Clark, Jr., USN, Engineering Officer; Lieutenant (Junior grade) F.P. Thomas, USNR, Gunnery Officer; Lieutenant (Junior grade) F.P. Thomas, USNR, Engineering Officer; Ensign E.T. Jones, USN, Assistant Engineering Officer; and Ensign C.C. Erhard, USNR, Communications Officer.

On July 23, 1943, Captain W. Foster, of the Electric Boat Company, got the DACE underway and brought her alongside the pier at the U.S. Submarine Base, New London. The officers and crew, dressed in blues waited silently on the dock for their ship. At 1700, that afternoon, they marched aboard. After a brief ceremony the ship was formally handed over to the crew.

The next two weeks were spent in the New London area.

Over fifty per cent of the crew were green hands, fresh from submarine School. Only seventeen men had ever been on a war patrol before. Full advantage had to be taken of this period to organize this outfit into coordinated submarine crew.

On August 9, 1943, the USS DACE went to sea for the first time on a short trip to Newport, Rhode Island. She spent a few days there first torpedoes then returned to New London. Prior to her arrival she made her first deep dive, without incident.

On September 6, 1943, the DACE got underway for Pearl Harbor. She stopped for a few days at the Submarine Base, Colon, Canal Zone, then completed her trip.

On October 3, the USS DACE arrived at Pearl Harbor. For two and a half weeks she went through the tests, drills, and exercises pre-arrived by Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet, to prepare her for war. Finally, on October 20, heavily laden with torpedoes, fuel, ammunition and food, the DACE set sail on War Patrol Number One.

— page 153 —
2- USS DACE

WAR PATROL NUMBER ONE

The USS DACE stopped at Midway from October 24-27 in order to repair one engine. On October 27, she crossed the 180th meridian for the first time. On the 31st, the barometer started dropping. On November 2, it dropped 18 points in seven hours and the DACE encountered her first heavy weather.

On the 4th, she entered her patrol area which was off the coast of the southern-most Japanese island. For several days she patrolled the area submerged in the daytime and surfaced at night.

First contact was made the night of November 7, while on the surface. There seemed to be two large ships and two small ones. The target fired at was similar to the KYAKKO MARU of 6,783 tons. Once hit was felt and lots of black smoke poured out of the targets stack.

The DACE returned for a second attack but this time a large oiler with two escorts loomed up ahead. One of the escorts challenged her. She ignored the challenge and fired more torpedoes -- no results. The Japs flashed search-lights and dropped depth charges but the DACE had cleared the area on the surface.

The patrol continued off the coast of MIKI SAKI. Numerous planes and a few small picket boats were sighted but nothing worth-will.

On November 11, the USS DACE surfaced early in the evening in the bright moonlight. At 2130, a patrol boat was sighted. The DACE turned away and tried to open the range. The patrol boat now was revealed as a destroyer which commenced chasing. When the destroyer had closed the DACE to 6,000 yards, the submarine fired a spread of torpedoes. The Japs did not make the expected final dive so the DACE submerged -- and fast. The Japs rushed over the top and dropped four depth charges -- not close, then continued away at high speed.

Days of routine patrolling went by. Planes were sighted and evaded by diving. Small picket boats were always present, but no worth while targets were sighted.

On November 14, she shifted to the southern part of the area and about midnight sighted HACHIJO JIMA about 40 miles away.

It the break of dawn on the 15th, an aircraft carrier of the SHOKAIU-class, and at least three destroyers passed just outside of the torpedo range. It was impossible to get closer to them while the boat was submerged.

On the 19th, at about 1800, while the ship was submerged a tanker and an escort were sighted. Everything looked good for a submerged escort but the Japs became suspicious and the tanker turned away. The escort located the DACE and attacked. The first depth charge was close, light bulbs broke, cork flew off the bulkheads, and few cables were pushed further into the ship.

— page 154 —
3- USS DACE

Within an hour three more patrol boats joined the fun and tried to relocate the DACE. Fourteen more depth charges were dropped -- none very close. About 2100, the patrol boats gave up and left the vicinity. The DACE surfaced at 2315, found herself alone so she cleared the area.

The DACE remained in her area but out of sight of land on a shipping lane for the next few days. One small ship, possibly a "Q" ship and one CHIDORI were sighted at a distance but no worth -while contacts appeared.

Finally on December 4, the DACE was ordered back to Midway for rest and refit.

The combat insignia was not authorized for this patrol at this time. The Patrol lasted for 53 days.

The refit for the second patrol was started on December 11th while the crew rested on Midway.

On December 28, Lieutenant Commander J.F. Enright, USN, was relieved as Commanding Officer by Lieutenant Commander B.D. Claggett, U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1935. From December 29 through January 4, 1944, the new Commanding Officer trained his crew in an annual Midway, during this time Vice Admiral C.A. Lockwood, Jr., USN, spent a day on the DACE observing the training exercises. January 7, the ship was completely loaded and sent out on her second war patrol.

From January 7 to 18, daily drills and dives were held for training purposes. A few plane contacts were made but the submarine was evidently undetected. On the 15th, the DACE was transferred to the operational command of Task Force 72. On the 18th the DACE entered her assigned area located between the Bismarck Archipelago and the Caroline Islands.

From the 18th to the 26th, the ship patrolled her area on the surface. Once a lot of wreckage and a lifeboat were sighted, and once six Japanese were seen. On the 29th, Polusok Island was sighted about 30 miles away. On the 24th, the area of Manila Reef was patrolled on the Palau-Truk shipping route.

Contact was established the night of the 26th on a large tanker with two escorts. For three hours the group was tracked in order to determine their course and speed. The DACE turned in to attack. Unfortunately, one of the escorts complicated the attack by interposing itself between the sub and the main target. The sub passed successfully behind the escort and fired torpedoes at the tanker. A couple of minutes later two violent explosions shook the sub but no flashes were seen because of rain squall. The target fired two red rockets. Three more explosions were then heard. The DACE turned away with one escort, which appeared to be a destroyer, chasing her. For a long time the destroyer stayed about a mile and a half dead astern then it seemed to give up the chase and left.

— page 156 —
5- USS DACE

After reconnoitering the coast near Hollandia, Netherlands New Guinea, at close range for two days and a night, the DACE closed in on the surface, after dark, March 23rd. During this period the DACE had taken many photographs and made sketches of the coast and surrounding terrain. At 2315, she put off five commandos in a rubber boat - distance to the beach one mile. At 0213 March 24th, she put off two more boats with six commandos.

For the next two days the DACE took pictures of the coast, sighting nothing but a hospital ship and an occasional patrol boat.

Upon completing these missions the ship returned to Seeadler Harbor, Admiralty Islands for fuel arriving midday the 27th. The next day she headed out once more bound for the patrol area. On March 31, she received a two-bomb straddle from a Jap bomber which divided out of the clouds. On April 4th, the DACE sighted an aircraft carrier leaving Davao Gulf but could not close to attack. At 0012 April 6th, the DACE contacted a task force of three Jap cruisers and four destroyers. Two torpedoes were fired at each cruiser at 0042. There were no hits. At 0130 the next morning, the DACE contacted an escorted freighter, but after a prolonged chase, the sub was detected and received three depth charges. She was unable to attack.

The DACE received orders April 10th to meet the deadly damaged USS SCAMP, and escort her home. That evening contact was established and the DACE and the SCAMP commenced their long trek back to the base, arriving at Seeadler Harbor April 16th. On April 19th, the DACE got underway for patrol once again.

During this time the DACE had a very interesting experience. The ship made a routine dive to evade a Jap plane. Due to the excitement of the moment and temporary loss of power the boat nosed gently over to an angle of 52 degrees. Everyone was forced down to the forward bulkhead. The Chief Radioman, J.H. Jemison, USN, slid out of the radio shack, inadvertently grabbed the knocker valve on the high pressure air manifold and blew the main ballast tanks. The Captain ordered all back full. Control was regained just before the boat broached so that she stayed out of sight under the sun: 'ace.

That same day another emergency dive ended up with a 37 degree down angle. It seemed to be the day for steep dives. Everything stayed under control from then on, and the ship regained her normal stability. There was no further excitement until the 26th when a periscope was sighted. This was avoided.

The evening of the 27th, several destroyers were contacted but they got away. On May 2nd, the DACE chased for several hours a large gunboat escorted by two destroyers. Hampered by reduced speed due to a generator casualty, and impending dawn, the DACE fired five torpedoes at the tanker from long range. Unfortunately there were no hits, and close gun fire from the escorts drove the DACE off. One fairly close depth charge was dropped."

That afternoon, after a long and nerve-racking patrol, the DACE headed for home, and arrived at Brisbane, Australia, May 13, 1944.

— page 157 —
6- USS DACE

This patrol was considered successful for purposes of awarding the submarine Combat Insignia. The patrol lasted 59 days.

WAR PATROL NUMBER FOUR

After a 30-day refit, including two weeks leave in Brisbane, Sydney, and environs, the DACE was ready for sea. She headed north on June 15th with a new Executive Office, Lieutenant Commander R.C. Bennetts, USN. Various training exercises were conducted under Commander C.C. Burlingame, USN. She arrived at Seeadler Harbor in the Admiralties June 20th. The next day, the DACE departed for her area and on the way opened the "ACEY DACE" Movie Theater with a showing of "No Time For Love." June 26th, she entered the area and commenced hunting Japs in earnest.

The DACE patrolled submerged close to the Mindanao Coast during the day and on the surface at night. Many contacts were made, all of which either got away or were too small to be worth-while targets. The great number of planes contacted indicated considerable activity in the Java Gulf. Finally on July 9th, the DACE made a submerged attack on a large transport with two escorts. She scored at least three hits, various countermeasures made observation of final results impossible. A total of 43 depth charges were dropped, too close for comfort, but too close enough for severe damage.

On July 16th, the DACE penetrated Sarangani Bay and took periscope photographs. At dawn, July 20 off Fort Lebak, she contacted a well escorted tanker which passed just out of range. Surfacing later that morning the DACE started a long and hazardous chase in full view of the shore. The target was not seen again and the disappointment was intense.

Just after dawn July 26 smoke was seen on the horizon. This contact was chased all day, the DACE being forced to submerge eight times to avoid detection by planes. That night after dark contact was re-established and at 0049, the next morning, the DACE attacked on the surface. Ten torpedoes were fired into a convoy of three ships and six escorts -- one ship was sunk. The DACE was forced to submerge to avoid being rammed. Twenty-six depth charges were dropped.

The afternoon of July 31st, a submerged attack was made on a small unescorted freighter. One hit sank it at once but another torpedo exploded prematurely just outside the ship. It shook the boat and shattered light bulbs and gauge faces. The next morning the last four torpedoes were fired at a medium-sized freighter with escorts. The freighter nimbly dodged all torpedoes while the later hit the DACE to the tune of 10 close depth charges. The "burn." She arrived at Seeadler Harbor, August 6th, and left for Brisbane the next day. The DACE ran through very heavy weather in the Coral Sea, but arrived safely in Brisbane, Australia, on August 12th.

— page 158 —
7- USS DACE

This patrol was successful for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of the patrol was 60 days.

WAR PATROL NUMBER FIVE

Two hectic weeks of renewing acquaintance and visiting in Sydney, Toowoomba, Southport, Coolangatta, Redcliffe and tother areas along the east coast of Australia finally terminated with the announcement that the DACE had received an excellent refit and was ready for her fifth war patrol.

On September 1st, under the command of Commander B.D. Claggett, in company with the USS DAFUER and escorts, the DACE departed from Brisbane. That same evening, while making a trim dive, a submerged object jarred the boat. Next morning an investigation with shallow-water diving apparatus revealed that the sonar head would be inoperative for the rest of the trip. Commander R.H. Crane, USN, training officer came aboard September 4th, and observed all battle and emergency drills for two days. Finally on the 10th, the DACE moored alongside the USS COUCAI at Darwin to replenish food and fuel. After an uneventful transit of Banka Passage the patrol area was reached and the DACE commenced mine sweeping operations. With 20-millimeter gun fire she sank six drifting type mines and exploded one more torpedo type (parts of which became firmly imbedded in the deck, and narrowly missed the Officer of the Deck). Reconnaissance and mine-sweeping assignments terminated on the 27th, when we moored alongside the USS ORION in Mios Qondi Lagoon, Schouten Islands.

An untimely casualty to the master gyro compass forced the DACE into the "Reluctant Dragoon Club" and departure was delayed and reached the assigned area of Palawan Passage and Balabac Strait on October 10. The 13th proved a lucky day when a seven ship convoy of tankers and freighters with two destroyers escorting was sighted. Shortly after midnight on the 14th (after the navigating labored over charts, bearings, soundings, and ranges) the DACE had firmly established her position inside a treacherous area of reefs, shoals and islands and proceeded to attack. While firing (on the surface) one torpedo ran erratic and only expert maneuvering allowed the boat to continue the attack and avoid her own torpedo which propounded and threatened the DACE's existence. Torpedo explosions in the targets alerted the destroyers and the their tracers streaked through the air but no splashes of falling enemy shells were noticed. The DACE cleared the area at full speed to reload. Results of this attack were one 10,000-ton tanker sunk and one 7,500 ton transport sunk. Approaching daylight forced the ship to leave the hazardous area. On the 19th, two nosey, alert, Jap anti-submarine destroyers avoided our torpedoes and promptly retaliated with depth charges. Again shortly after midnight on the 22nd, while exchanging information with the USS DAFUER, the radar contacted high speed enemy ships --definited the non-of-war. In conjunction with the DAFUER, making maximum speed on the surface, set a course to intercept these desirable targets. But the enemy's radical change of course plus the advantage of greater speed permitted him to escape untouched and unseen.

— page 159 —
8- USS DACE

Our orders were to return to the base. However the Skipper had that "funny-feeling in his bones" and requested that the DACE be given permission to extend her time in the "hot spot." The next night (and again minutes after midnight) while talking to the DARTER, a long range radar contact put us in pursuit of the enemy. In this instance a failure in our most vital piece of equipment caused us to lose touch with our future targets. Teamwork on the part of the DARTER and our communication set-up permitted us to continue our chase. Meanwhile the expertly trained technicians worked "like mad" and in a short time had our equipment back in shape. At about 0200, an enemy task force of 12 big and important men-of-war surrounded by fast, cautious "tin-cans" was being plotted and recorded. So the old-Man's hunch had materialized and the DACE and DARTER were making preparations for the big event to take place at dawn.

The DARTER made the first run and did a beautiful job of destroying Jap men-of-war. Shortly thereafter the DACE expertly executed attack at dawn which cost the Japs their biggest heavy cruiser-the MAYA. Of course a destroyer counter attack followed and the noise of torpedoes, the cruiser's magazines exploding, the depth charges, and the sinking ships' breaking up noises were terrific. The same night a crippled heavy cruiser with two torpedoes was trying to seek the safety of a nearby port, but the two subs had overheard the ship's radio chatter, and the planes were made accordingly. Around midnight the DARTER went aground on Bombay Shoal. At 0140 on the 24th, with the DARTER still aground, the attack was broken off so that the DACE could stand by to render any services possible.

When it was recognized that the DARTER couldn't be saved only one all-crater was left - rescue the personnel. Hurriedly the DARTER was transferred in small rubber boats through surf and breakers to the DACE. On the last trip the Commanding Officer of the DARTER came aboard and the final destruction of the unfortunate torpedoes was planned. While this job was being accomplished using torpedoes and guns and enemy plane appeared and dropped a couple of bombs, luckily she selected the DARTER as his target. This interruption was forced on a steady over-crowded sub, she proceeded to Freemantle, Western Australia. These two crews were together in one submarine for two weeks.

This patrol was successful for purposes of "warding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of this patrol was 67 days.

At Freemantle, Western Australia, an excellent refit of normal duration, conducted by the USS EURYALIE, was completed and the DACE was ready for her sixth war patrol. On November 21st, Commander B.D. Claggett (after four patrols as Commanding Officer) was relieved by Commander O.R. Cole, Jr., USN.

— page 160 —
9- USS DACE

December second the DACE in company with the USS BERGALL, her run which took her to Exmouth Gulf, Western Australia, and through Lombok Straits. DACE and BERGALL parted company while DACE doubled back to investigate a radar contact. Then the DACE proceeded along the Singapore -- Hong-Kong trade route with the hopes of intercepting some enemy traffic. This hope wasn't realized, so the DACE continued on to Pulau Gambir. The channel between Pulau Gambir and the mainland was an excellent night refuge for shipping so the DACE was assigned the task of making that spot less desirable. After the many hours the navigator spent in determining the current, depths, reefs, the task of mining this channel was started at 0330 on December 16th, and was completed one hour and fifteen minutes later. Later that afternoon loud explosions were heard but the heavy seas prevented any visual verification of what the DACE thought to be the results of an effectively mined area.

The next assignment was the area off Camranh Bay. Heavy seas and strong wind made for a miserable existence. Submerged patrols were followed by difficult because of the sea conditions. On the 19th, a convoy of five large ships with three escorts was sighted and the attack started. Bad weather was certainly in the enemy's favor. At times the targets could not be seen and again the periscopes would be exposed too much. Depth control was difficult but expertly handled. Just as the first torpedo was to be sent out its way, a series of four depth charges or bombs went off which shook the boat violently, and and carried and sank and# 1.

— page 161 —
10- USS DACE

While running on the surface many floating mines were detected so the lookouts were doubly cautious. On the 28th, another opportunity presents itself --this one resulting in sinking one medium freighter of 4,000 tons. In the days that followed, planes and small ships were contacted but not targets of any size worthy of torpedoes were sighted so our presence remained a secret.

December 31st, a worth,-while periscope contact of two columns of ships was made at 1000. The Captain's plan was to avoid the overlooking across which were shielding the group and to locate himself between the two columns. While trying to keep in close touch with all the ships and still keep our presence unknown the Captain sighted planes -- which served to increase to our already rumoured interference. Intense anti-submarine measures were being employed by the protectors of the Japanese ships so the Skipper had to be extremely careful. Fortunately for the days and unfortunately for the DACE, an escort carrier (which was the target singled out for her attack) was at an escorts range for our torpedoes -- or else sighted and avoided our torpedoes, and consequently got away untouched. A plane dropped a depth bomb but this was off, so no damage was done. At 1235, while making preparations for surfacing another bomb was dropped -- this one also too close. After surfacing at 1435, we set out to run down the enemy targets but a plane, forced us to dive two minutes later and again a depth charge was felt -- but wasn't close either. In the next hour or so more depth charges were dropped -- but fortunately none did any damage.

The next few days were spent in normal patrol and on January 7th, the DACE made preparations for the trip to Saipan. On the 8th, two suspicious vessels which were investigated, proved to be Chinese junks. They were left untouched. On January 17th, the DACE reached Saipan and moored alongside the USS SKIPJACK alongside the USS FULTON. On the 18th, the DACE departed Saipan enroute Pearl Harbor, where she arrived on the twenty-eighth.

The patrol was successful for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of this patrol was 58 days.

On January 28th, 1945, the DACE arrived in Pearl Harbor where she received voyage repairs. She then proceeded to the San Francisco Bay Area for her first Navy Yard overhaul.

From February 8th, until April 25th, the ship underwent a complete and satisfactory overhaul at the Submarine Repair Basin, Bethlehem Steel Company. During this period all personnel and officers were given 30 days leave and were transferred and new men reported aboard. Lieutenant Commander R.C. Benitez, USN, was relieved as Executive Officer and Navigator by Lieutenant F.J. Ruder, USN, on March 12, 1945.

— page 162 —
10- USS DACE

While running on the surface many floating mines were detected so the lookouts were doubly cautious. On the 28th, another opportunity presents itself --this one resulting in sinking one medium freighter of 4,000 tons and damaging one medium freighter of 4,000 tons. In the days that followed, planes and small ships were contacted but not targets of any size worthy of torpedoes were sighted so our presence remained a secret.

December 31st, a worth,-while periscope contact of two columns of ships was made at 1000. The Captain's plan was to avoid the over-closing across which were shielding the group and to locate himself between the two columns. While trying to keep in close touch with all the ships and still keep our presence unknown the Captain sighted planes -- which served to increase to our already numerous interferences. Intense anti-submarine measures were being employed by the protectors of the Japanese ships so the Skipper had to be extremely careful. Fortunately for the Japs and unfortunately for the DACL, an escort carrier (which was the target singled out for her attack) was at an excessive range for our torpedoes -- or else sighted and avoided our torpedoes, and consequently got away untouched. A plane dropped a depth bomb but his aim was off, so no damage was done. At 1235, while making preparations for surfacing another bomb was dropped -- this one also not too close. After surfacing at 1435, we set out to run down the enemy targets but a plane, forced us to dive two minutes later, and again a depth charge was felt -- but wasn't close either. In the next hour or so more depth charges were dropped -- but fortunately none did any damage.

The next few days were spent in normal patrol and on January 7th, the DACL made preparations for the trip to Saipan. On the 8th, two suspicious vessels which were investigated, proved to be Chinese Junkers. They were left untouched. On January 17th, the DACL reached Saipan and moored alongside the USS SKIPJACK alongside the USS FULTON. On the 18th, the DACL departed Saipan enroute Pearl Harbor, where she arrived on the twenty-eighth.

The patrol was successful for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of this patrol was 58 days.

On January 28th, 1945, the DACL arrived in Pearl Harbor where she received voyage repairs. She then proceeded to the San Francisco Bay Area for her first Navy Yard overhaul.

From February 8th, until April 25th, the ship underwent a complete and satisfactory overhaul at the Submarine Repair Basin, Bethlehem Steel Company. During this period all personnel and officers were given 30 days leave and were transferred and new men reported aboard. Lieutenant Commander R.C. Benitez, USN, was relieved as Executive Officer and Navigator by Lieutenant F.J. Ruder, USN, on March 12, 1945.

— page 163 —
11- USS DACE

April 26th, the DACE departed San Francisco enroute Pearl Harbor in company with the USS WHALE.

The two subs arrived Pearl Harbor on May fifth. For six days they under-went a voyage refit then started the training period with Captain C.C. Burlingame, USN, as training officer.

The seventh war patrol started May 25th. Two subs, the DACE and the USS CABEZON, left for the cold waters of the Kuriles Islands.

On the 29th, they laid over at Midway for fuel and supplies.

From April 30th, till June 7th, the two ships, enroute to
starting, conducted training exercises and drills individually and together. The evening of the 7th, they separated and headed in for their patrol stations. The DACE closed the coast that night and dived in Kunashiro (Channel) between the islands of Shikotan and Kunashiri.

Early that morning two sailing vessels were sighted through the periscope. The DACE tracked them with difficulty in the evening. Finally preparations were made afd at 0945, she surfaced in smooth water in a fog with Japanese islands only a few miles on either side of them. At a range of only 1600 yards she opened fire with her five-inch gun and automatic weapons.

The first shot from the forward gun hit the largest sailing vessel in the bow. In a couple of minutes, a five-inch shell which hit and disabled the target. The DACE closed in to 500 yards and made certain the destruction was complete. She then turned her attention to the other ship, sailing vessel.

A small rowboat with one or maybe two survivors was being rowed furiously into the fog towards the nearest beach. The second vessel was completely deserted. In a few minutes it too was reduced to a smouldering wreck.

By this time, the fog had cleared enough so that the nearby shores were visible. The DACE moved away from the scene of the wreckage, then dived.

This was the first time the DACE had ever surfaced and fired her guns at an enemy ship.

The DACE finally left the area on the ninth of June and headed into the Sea of Okhotsk.

The early morning of June 10th, a large freighter and a small tanker were sighted about eight miles ahead. The DACE went ahead full speed in order to run around the ships and get ahead of them. At one time the fog cleared up enough to show a large destroyer escort only six miles away. For a couple of minutes the personnel on the bridge watched this Japanese warship, then the fog obscured her again.

— page 164 —
12- USS DACE

An hour later another escort was seen for a few minutes, then
disappeared. The convoy now consisted of two rather potent escorts,
one freighter, and a small tanker.

At about noon all hands had lunch, then the sub waited dead
ahead of the convoy. In a half hour the first escort came into sight
and the DACE submerged.

Silently the DACE slipped unseen under the water between the
two escorts. The freighter was dead ahead and coming towards her
boks on. The DACE maneuvered out of the way, and with the freighter
only 350 yards away, she fired. Almost instantly the first torpedo
hit the freighter with a tremendous explosion amidships. Quickly
more torpedoes were fired at the smaller tanker but none hit. The
Captain took a quick look at the escorts through the periscope and
discovered one of them coming straight for the submarine. Quickly
another torpedo was fired at this escort, then the DACE dived deep.
Just before the periscope was lowered a quick glance at the freighter
proved that the first torpedo had done its job well. As she dived
to deeper depths the noise of the freighter breaking up on her way
towards the bottom was clearly audible through the hull.

A couple of minutes of silence passed, then four depth charges
shook the boat. Someone remarked: "If you think that was loud wait
until you hear the next ones." The breaking up noises from the
freighter continued. The escort could be heard coming back for
another run. A quick set-up was made and another torpedo was fired.

Shortly afterwards and explosion that sounded like a torpedo hit,
rumbled through the boat, In quick succession 19 more explosions went
off overhead. Five minutes of silence passed. Twelve depth charges
exploded close by and shook the ship slightly.

For the next few hours the DACE silently eased away from the
searching escorts, one of which was probably badly damaged. Finally
late that afternoon after four hours of freezing quiet the DACE
came close to the surface for a periscope look -- all clear. The
heaters were turned on and everyone restored circulation in their
number limbs by stamping their feet and drinking hot coffee.

After dark, the DACE surfaced in very rough seas. She went
back to the scene of the action but could locate no wreckage. She
then headed for the area of Kita Uruppu Channel.

June 11-16, the DACE patrolled back and forth in the channel.
Some days were exceptionally clear and the snow-capped peaks of
Shimizuura Take towered high over her. Other days were foggy and
bleak.

On the 16th, the DACE joined company with the CABEZON, the
USS AFOGON and the USS MANTA. The four subs made a wide patrol
sweep up the eastern side of the KURILES. During this sweep the
first plane for this patrol was contacted -- no bombs.

— page 165 —
13- USS DACE

On the 17th, the pack received orders to search for the crew of a U.S. Army plane which had been forced down near Aradido To. Each sub had to be assigned area and arrived there next day early. The whole day was spent on the surface in a light mist and only five to ten miles away from Aradido to. Most of the time the lofty island was clearly visible.

The aviators could not be found. That afternoon a single Jap plane took off from a nearby air field and searched a while on the other side of the island. He never saw the DACE although she was only 15 miles away. An hour later, another plane appeared only 6 miles away so the DACE dived.

That eve' after she had surfaced the DACE sighted quite a bit of gunfire about 20 miles away but could not find out what it was all about.

On the 18th, the DACE proceeded down the western side of the Kuril's island. Later that night she contacted a single ship. For a couple of hours she tracked and ran around the ship in order to get ahead of it. During this time, several distant underwater explosions were heard. The APOGON had located a convoy and was working it over.

Shortly after midnight the DACE was ahead of her target. It was very dark, but the water was constantly illuminated with phosphorescence. She turned toward her target and waited on the surface in the darkness. Soon the target was close enough and the torpedoes were fired. The water was churned into a brilliant flame by force of the expulsion of the torpedoes. Each torpedo left a brilliant streak in the highly phosphorescent water. The Jap saw them coming and maneuvered so that they passed down both sides of him. By this time, the ships were very close and had materialized into a heavily armed anti submarine MIKURA-class frigate. The DACE rapidly turned away and bent on full power. A cloud of exhaust smoke poured out of her engines and momentarily hid her from view. Twin flashes appeared on the bow of the Jap and two explosions resounded through the air. A faint cheer went up from the crew below -- they thought the Jap had been hit by the DACE's torpedoes. Two shells exploded ahead of the DACE. Another salvo came so close that the whistling of the shells could be heard in the coming tower. One exploded close to the ship. The DACE fired more torpedoes -- no luck. She dived rapidly and deep, and fired yet another torpedo. This was not a case of hitting the target -- it was a case of saving the DACE for V-J Day. The next three minutes were spent hanging on as the sub rocked and was shaken by 18 large and loud depth charges.

— page 166 —
14- USS DACE

The DACE maneuvered and evaded far below the surface while the Jap attempted to relocate her. He dropped 18 more charges which were not too close. A couple of hours later he had wandered so far away from the DACE that she secured from battle stations and allowed everyone to watch to turn in for a well-earned rest. Some slight damage from the depth charging was noticed, but nothing serious -- only the usual broken light bulbs, scattered cork insulations, some small beads broken and some small valves backed off of their seats.

June 20-26, the DACE patrolled in the Sea of Okhotsk.

One day during a heavy overcast, the bridge watch were startled to hear the whine of an approaching airplane. As the sub dived, the last man down the hatch saw the Jap plane roar about 100 feet over-head. A half-minute later the sub was under and bullets were dropping on to the hull as the plane tried to strafe. One small depth bomb went off, but it missed by a wide margin.

Once during this time the DACE dropped a few shells into a sulphur refinery close to the beach at Moyoro Wan, but it was so hazy that no results were observed.

On the 26th, the DACE joined the other members of the wold pack and continued a sweep through the Okhotsk Sea, and along the lower channels of the Kuriles Island chain.

On the 27th, she closed in one morning on a contact and finally recognized her as a Russian Merchant ship -- a lend-lease Liberty type ship.

On the second of July, the subs operated independently and the DACE went to Kita Uruppu channel for patrol.

No contacts were made, so on July 6th, the DACE and CABEZON again joined company and left the area.

The patrol was deemed successful for the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of this patrol was 47 days.

POST - WAR PERIOD

The DACE and CABEZON arrived at Midway on July 25, 1945. For two weeks the relief crew overhauled the ship while the officers and crew enjoyed themselves sunning, fishing and engaging in competitive sports. The DACE and CABEZON engaged in an athletic competition for a plaque to be presented to the winning ship. The DACE now has the plaque as a trophy in her forward battery passageway.

On August 4th, the two subs got underway for another war patrol. They arrived at Saipan on August 13th for voyage repairs.

The ship was all ready to leave on August 15th, 1945, at 1400. At 6am in the morning, Japan agreed to surrender terms, and the patrol was delayed indefinitely.

— page 167 —
15- USS DACE

For two weeks the DACE remained in Saipan. A quarter of the crew and officers were assigned to man any Jap subs which might appear for surrender. They returned to the DACE ten days later without seeing a Jap submarine.

On September 1, 1945, the DACE set sail for Pearl Harbor in company with the USS ORION, USS RAY, USS CREVALLIE and USS ICEFISH.

After an uneventful trip they all arrived in Pearl Harbor on September 10,1945, and waited for the orders which would take them all home for good.

On September 13, 1945, the DACE, MUSKALLUNGE, CREVALLIE, and GATO departed for Panama and home. The DACE was scheduled to return to New London on October 5th. She had made seven war patrols in two years and two months active duty, and sunk or damaged over 73,000 tons of enemy ships.

By Directive dated January 1947, USS DACE (SS 247) was later placed out of commission, in reserve, attached to the U. S. Atlantic Reserve Fleet.

SUMMARY OF PATROL RESULTS

| No. of Patrols | Number and Type of Ships | Tonnage of Ships Sunk | Number and Type of Ships Damaged | Tonnage of Ships Sunk |
||||||
| 1               | 0                        | 0                      | Freighter (EC) KYOKKO MARU type | 6,783                 |
| 2               | 0                        | 0                      | Tanker (EU) | 10,000                |
| 3               | 1-AK (EU)                | 2,000                  | 1 AP (EU) | 10,000                |
| 4               | 1-SMC (EU)                | 1,200                  | 1 AP (EU) | 10,000                |
| 5               | 1-AO (EU)                | 10,000                 | 7,500        | 0                      |
| 6               | 1-CA (ATAGO class)        | 12,500                 | 0          | 0                      |
| 7               | 1-AK                    | 4,000                  | 1 AK        | 4,000                 |
| 7               | 1-AK EIHUKU class (EU)    | 4,000                  | 1 PF (MIKURA) (EC) | 1,500                 |

— page 169 —
10 Oct-6 Nov 1944
NAME: DACE
FROM: CROSS INDEX CARD
SERIAL DATE
SUBJECT Coordinated Attack Group
Reports of movements of two Japanese cruisers in SOUTH CHINA SEA. Combined reconnaissance & attack sank or damaged 65,000 tons including three Japanese cruisers in PALAWAN Passage 23 Oct 44. DACE rescued entire crew of DARTER which grounded on CHINA SEA 24 October 1944 and FILED: War Diary
Separately under DARTER ser 022 of 5 Nov 44

MICROSERIAL NO. ACTION REPORT CPWY FORM 3480-13 (11-55) 8-28883

DATE 16-28 December 1944
FROM CROSS INDEX CARD
SERIAL DATE
SUBJECT Coordinated Attack Group Operations
Chronological report of operations of BECUNA, FLASHER, FOE, DACE and PADNEY under CDR H.D. STUART. Operated in SOUTH CHINA SEA for primary purpose of reporting & attacking enemy forces attempting to interfere with MIDWOOD Lending.
FILED: War Diary
Separately as ORIGINAL under USS BECUNA
as PROTOSTAR under USS BECUNA

MICROSERIAL NO. 110216
ACTION REPORT CPWY FORM 3480-13 (11-55) 8-28883

DATE 16 December 1944
FROM C.O. USS DACE (SS-22/7) (Commander Task Unit 71.1.21)
SERIAL DATE
SUBJECT Report of Special Mission. Narrative report covering laying of field of 11 Dec 12 mines off the coast of FRENCH INDI CHINA during Sixth War Patrol in the South China Sea.
(CONVESPAC: SUB OPS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately as CARBON COPY
DUPLICATE COPY

MICROSERIAL NO. ACTION REPORT CPWY FORM 3480-13 (11-55) 8-28883

— page 170 —
10-19 June 1945
NAME: DACE
FROM: CO - USS DACE(S-247)
SERIAL: OCI
DATE: 10 July 1945
SUBJECT: Torpedo firing reports, Forwarding of
Forwards two form reports of action during SEVENTH WAR
PATROL. Claims one freighter from Mark 26 firing.
(NCRFAC; SUB OPS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately
as Enc. to SUBSPAC ser 00235 of 24 Jul 45

MICROSERIAL NO.: ACTION REPORT
FORM 3480-13 (11-55)

— page 171 —
27 SEP 58
BY AP-0201C DATE/APPROX
SS227/AI6-3
Serial 022
DECLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. DAKTER
(Group Commander of Coordinated Patrol of DAKTER)
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
(1) Commander Submarine Division ONE EIGHTY-ONE.
(2) Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN.
(3) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.

Subject: Report of Coordinated Patrol of U.S. DAKTER and U.S. DAKTER 4th Patrol, DADE 5th Patrol.

References: (a) CTY-71 Opords. 138-44 and 139-44.
(4) Subject Report.
(5) Coordinated Search and Attack Instructions, U.S.S. DAKTER Conf. serial 003 dated 1 Oct. 1944.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the coordinated part of the above two patrols conducted in the South China Sea auring the period 10 October, 1944 to 6 November 1944, is forwarded herewith.

D. H. McCLINTOCK.

— page 175 —
5/22/17/A16-3
Serial 022
CONFIDENTIAL

(C) REMARKS, Cont'd

4. The cooperation and aid in planning renewed by the DACE Commander, Commander B.D. CLAGGETT, USN, were outstanding. In addition this Officer unhesitatingly risked his ship to rescue the entire crew of the DATER.

D. H. McCLINTOCK.

— page 176 —
6-3
: serial 022

CO-TEXT:
From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. DACE.

Subject: Coordinated Search and Attack Instructions.

Reference: (a) CTF-71 OpOrd. 138-44 and 139-44.
(b) CTG 71.4 Tentative Coordinated Search and Attack Doctrine (serial 0399 of 17 July 1944.)

Enclosure: (a) Supplemental Communication Instructions.

1. Proceed independently to area as ordered by reference (a).

2. Upon arrival in area about 9 Oct., 1944, rendezvous at 115-45E, 7-45N. Two hours after sunset. DAKTER will be at this rendezvous each night beginning 9 October until rendezvous is effected.

3. On receipt of information concerning passage of enemy shipping through our area, C.O. DAKTER will specify the search plan to be used. If practicable, a search line will be formed at a position to insure enemy contact two hours after dark. This should minimize effectiveness of air cover.

4. In forming the search line, the point of origin of the line will be the position of the DAKTER; and the direction of the line will be the true bearing from that ship. Distance will normally be 20 miles. Speed of advance normal to line, on surface, will normally be 10 knots. If submerged, speed of advance will be 2.5 knots. If line is stationary, remain within 5 miles of assigned station if on surface; remain on station if submerged.

5. Doctrine for attack is as follows: Use reference (b) as a guide. Submarine "A" making first contact, report same, together with probable

— page 179 —
260 miles 20° means, "From Mike bearing 260° 20 miles."

7. Use CW if voice contact fails, if voice frequency fails, etc. Use SSB if SSB is available, but use GCP 1247/8, Channel 108 for this.

8. Receipt for all voice messages: Make callup short and wait an interval before repeating a callup. If you want a message authenticated use following authenticators:
   - DLRTER
   - DLC3
   - Dave
   - Clag
   - Ernie
   - Dennis
   - Iva
   - Walt
   - Ed
   - Don
   - Bill
   - Benny
   - Matt
   - Sam
   - Gus
   - Earl
   - Phil
   - George

Example: DLC3 wishes to check on DLRTER.

"Betty from Poppy - Clag. - answer:
"Poppy from Betty - Dave"

Use authenticators consecutively from list. If submerged and if practicable listen for 3 minutes with antenna raised at 0800; 1100; 1400; and 1700 How on voice frequency.

-4-

— page 180 —
9. Recognition:
(a) K.I.cht recognition will normally be by radar. If a radar is trained on one sub, she will train her radar on bearing of first radar and attempt to exchange major war vessel recognition signals.
(b) In emergency use major war vessel recognitions by blinker.
(c) D.R.TER radar normally sweeps at 6-8 rpm. D.C. Sea Gull = 4-5 rpm.

10. Special voice signals which may be used when diving are as follows:
   - DOG DOG = DIVING
   - DOG DOG Sea Gull = DIVING for plane.
   - DOG DOG Blitz = DIVING for attack.

11. Use Sugar Dog radar at discretion during daylight. Normally D.R.TER will use it, unless visibility renders early plane detection by lookouts probable.

-5-

— page 181 —
5-18/16-3
Serial 0221
OFFICIAL
FLEET
STEN ENDORSEMENT to
CO US SUBLATTER (SS227)
Conf. 1tr. A16-3 Serial
022 dated 5 November 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: Report of Coordinated Patrol of U.S.S. DARTER (SS227) and U.S.S. DADE (SS247). (DARTER 4th Patrol, DADE 5th Patrol).

1. This coordinated attack group comprised U.S.S. DARTER whose commanding officer was a group commander and U.S.S. DADE. The group covered Palawan Passage and vicinity for a period of fourteen days. Two coordinated attacks were made and each ship made one independent attack as a result of information furnished by the other. The first coordinated attack was delivered on each of two DD's evidently conducting an anti-submarine search in advance of a heavy convoy task force. Both attacks were unsuccessful due primarily to radical maneuvers of the targets. The second was an epic of coordinated attacks. Radar contact was made on a large task force coming up Palawan Passage just after midnight on 23 October. Each submarine took station ahead of a column of enemy ships, submerged before dawn and delivered a periscope attack within fifteen minutes of each other against both columns just at dawn.

2. The DARTER got five hits into an A-26 class C4 and swung for a storm shot and with gyrro angles of 130 to 120 left, fired four torpedoes for three hits in the second cruiser in column, also on A-26, and another hit timed for the third cruiser in column. The DADE got four hits into what was identified as a Kongo class battleship. All evidence points to her sinking.

3. In making a subsequent and around on a crippled A-26, Iping back to the southwest that night, the DARTER ran hard aground and could not be saved. DADE rescued all officers and men, returning them to Frunzantle.

4. This group displayed a marked degree of teamwork, aggressiveness and intelligence. The comments of the group commander are well considered.

5. Communications, both within the pack and with the outside were excellent. The contact reports of the group commander on the morning of 23 October furnished our forces with information of the enemy task force which was invaluable and which contributed in large measure to the success of the second battle of the Philippine Sea.

— page 182 —
5-13/416-3
Serial: 0221
OFFICIAL
Subject: Report of Coordinated Patrol of U.S.S. DARTER (SS227) and U.S.S. DACE (SS247). (DARTER 4th Patrol, DACE 5th Patrol).

6. The Squadron Commander heartily congratulates the group commander, and both ships on an outstanding performance which had far reaching results. Both ships are still deserving of a "WELL DONE".

ELIOT H. BRYANT.

— page 183 —
1/2/24-71/A16-3
UNITED STATES NAVY
12a/1e
CONFIDENTIAL
SERIAL 022, dated 5 November 1944.

RECEIVED 5 FILES
December 1944.

From:
The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES THIRD FLEET.
The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject:
War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
Consisting of U.S.S. DARTER and U.S.S. DAG from
10 October 1944 to 6 November 1944, Comments on.

1. The Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of DARTER and DAG, under the direction of Commander D. H. KOLHITOCK, U.S.N., Commanding Officer DARTER, patrolled in the vicinity of PALAWAN P.S.S.C. from October 8th until the 24th, when DARTER grounded on BONARAY SHOAL.

2. DAG and DARTER made an attack on a convoy during the night of the 13th of October in the very foul waters inside of N. PUELOUS SHOALS, and succeeded in completing one attack which sank a large AO and damaged a large AP.

3. This group executed one of the most successful coordinated attacks on record during the morning of October 23rd, when DARTER sank one O. and damaged another, and DAG sank a third. It was assumed that this Task Force was unlikely to radically alter base course in the restricted waters of PALAWAN P.S.S.C. until after dawn, and therefore both submarines would get in attacks prior to dark. The Task Force came right into the arms of the warning DAG despite the very effective DARTER attack twenty minutes earlier.

4. When DARTER grounded DAG was on hand to assist only one hour and a half after the grounding took place. There was no chance of getting DARTER off, but the fast of saving all of her crew from certain capture by the enemy was of far-reaching importance, and is an example of the type of mutual assistance which is a factor in the high morale of the Submarine Service.

5. The extensive and almost daily use of rendezvous for nearshore conversion is noted. In addition to the time lost, there are two disadvantages of this form of communication: first,

— page 185 —
24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12a/pr
Serial: 01518 December 12, 1944.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L-
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS DARTER Conf. Ltr. A16-3
Serial 022, dated 5 November
1944.
Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
Consisting of U.S.S. DARTER and U.S.S. DACE from
10 October 1944 to 6 November 1944, Comments on.

DISTRIBUTION:
Coastmin:
Vice Cpnav (3) - Direct CTG-71.5 (2)
Vice Cpnav Op-23c (1) - Direct CTG-71.8 (2)
CoastLtTl (1) - CTG-71.9 (2)
Coast2Dflt (1) - ComSubBom-12 (2)
Coast3Dflt (2) - DivComSubBom-12 (1 each)
CoSubLtTl (30) - DivComSubBom-26 (1 each)
CoSub2ndTl (4) - ComSubDiv-162 (1)
CTG-71 (7) - S/M School, N.I. Conn. (2)
CTG-71.3 (2) - SubAd, Mare Island. (2)
CTG-71.4 (2) - S/Ms 7thTl (1)

THIS REPORT WILL BE DROVED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

J. B. MILLER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 187 —
16 December 1944
163

All times are "HON"

received a message from CTF 71, desiring, the
Commanding Officer advise as commander of a co-
ordinated attack group to consist of the USS
HON, and BOUNA. All three ships were at this
time stationed in a patrol line off LUCON, and
HON. Orders were to attack enemy forces which
sighted from KANANDA. The USS HON, with
but little submarine readiness, was ordered to
proceed to this bay. Their locations were from
to me. BOUNA set course 24°0' T., speed 10 knots,
and sent a message to HON to proceed to this
vessel at latitude 13°-51' I., longitude 125°-30' W.
at 0700, 17 December. The USS HON will have to
three en-ships speed to make rendezvous. The USS
was aware that the USS had less than 50,000 cal-
lons remaining.

17 December 1944
0700

reconnoitered with the and passed her patrol in-
structions, by line to the USS.

24

Same with USS.

This plan was conceived to intercept any Orange
Tank force transiting from the area of the
or LUCON while we were in transit, and to
detect any ships departing from the bay after
arrival. All ships were to be stationed on an
arc of 15 miles radius from LUCON.

Story was, which lasted a quarter of a
century, which lasted a quarter of a

— page 188 —
1100
SUBMARINE PATROL REPORT
Group from 16 December 1944 to 20 December 1944.

1100
received 11/10's contact report of Orca & Task Force, including 2 35's, leaving 1st Bat at 0300, course 130°, speed 17 knots. It appeared that they would transit the Enclosure Islands, and remain so through Bataan. The next day they would turn further south, coming to 10°N or 110°E. Decided that chances of our intercepting force by turning south were very poor and continued on course to approach 40°N.

1105
1st December 1944
1050
Because of heavy weather and strong southerly current reported by coast pilot, when about 1 or 2 miles from coast directed group to change course to 040°, speed 5 knots.

2100
Received message from CTF 71 asking Allied aid DAD to task group. Initial stations were assigned by message as follows: 1st, north of line bearing 090° from 10°N. 2nd, 1st, west of Longitude 109°-30' S.; 3rd, 1st

— page 190 —
1:51
- Report of air patrol of No. 2-cruised submarine
- Group from 16 December 1944 to 20 December 1944.

: 2115
- No. reported a floating mine at latitude 100-37° N, longitude 109-23° W.

: 22 December 1944
- 19,000 yards from latitude 11-11° N, longitude 109-30° W, at 0600. Submarine began on this course.

: 0655
- Failed to report radar contact bearing 227, range 19,000 yards from latitude 11-11° N, longitude 109-30° W, at 0600. Submarine began on this course.

: 0714
- Received message on FOB seaplane that submarine had sunk three terns of 5 ship convoy at 0500 at latitude 15-04° W, longitude 109-06° W. She said she had one torpedo left and was headed home.

: 0729
- Submarine reported that contact was one and one escort.

: 0317
- Submarine gave enemy course as 355°. She also reported another escort. Passed course at 22,000 yards from latitude 100-55° W, longitude 109-26° W. She is in sight of Submarine and contact.

: 0953
- No. reported contact, bearing 200°, range 22,000 yards from latitude 100-55° W, longitude 109-26° W. She is in sight of Submarine and contact.

: 1000
- Submarine made sight and radar contact.

Attack or all three ships failed. Heavy seas and very poor visibility was the major cause of the failure. I do not believe the target were ever aware that any submarines were in the vicinity. I do not know the details of the loss and attacks.

Sent word that convoy was approaching.

4

— page 191 —
1730
Report of Far Patrol of Co-ordinated Attack Group from 16 December 1944 to 23 December 1944.

1730
...D.D. reported a radar contact, bearing 190, range 25,000 yards from latitude 11°-07' N, longitude 109°-32' W, sighted headsea toward contact.

1744
...Second frc enemy course and speed.

1753
She replied that her own course was northeast, speed full.

1305
Asked if mission for information.

1-12
...received message from CTF 71 recce/ship sighted, and said she was only two left in pack, and air is 0-3. She said traffic seems to be in contact with enemy, and said station of which was.

1-28
Familiar said she had lost contact. Amys were very large and high speed, possibly warships.

1910
...Familiar said enemy course was 090, sighted 1 knot. She abandoned search. Had sighted to three 03-sec torpedo, which she did.

1947
...D.D. reported the med sighted ship (this earlier convoy) approaching the way, and had been forced down by air cover.

23 December 1944
...Familiar, homeward bound with but one torpedo, reported a 5 ship convoy at latitude 11°-13', longitude 109°-45' W, at 14,000, speed 13 knots. Sighted enemy in direction convoy. Attacked to ask D.D. if she had received report.

0536
...Notalistica communication with D.D. found that not hard to make sense and transit. D.D. listed information (received from F-51, at 0515 and enemy with first information to make.

0536
...D.D.'s unorthodox experience with this convoy is detailed in the above report. Sighted sighted by one destroyer and one YANK 10 battleship. One of the destroyer and one destroyer.

— page 192 —
0939
- 3:30 AM sent contact report to CTF 71, Southard Fleet, and CTF 77. Sent same report to D.C.S.

0954
- D.N. requested new information. Informed her snips had entered harbor.

24-27 December 1944
- Nothing of interest, except that weather made it hard to distinguish between very poor visibility from rain squalls and any with very frequent hard rain

— page 193 —
5-26-16-3
Serial (026)
SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY SIX
Caro of Floct Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
20 January 1945

FIRST SHIP'S NAME TO
GO USS BEAUMARITZ, Cmdr.
SS319/416-3 serial 029
dated 28 December 1944.

From: Com andor Submarine Squadron TWENTY SIX.
To: Com andor-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) Com andor Submarines, SEAWATK FLIGHT.
(2) Com andor SeaWATK FLIGHT.

Subject: Report of War Patrol of Co-ordinated Attack Group from
16-28 December 1944 (USS BEAUMARITZ, FLASHER and HOB).

1. No coordinated attacks were made, although the plan of search
was well conceived. Extraordinarily rough weather during most of the period
seriously interfered with fast surface rebuilts, and deflected several contact
dovetails, which otherwise might have been successful. FLASHER made an
unsuccessful attack on the night of 21 December, sinking three tankers, but at the
time was conducting an independent chase of this previously reported convoy,
and no coordinated attack was developed. One important and valuable contact
with an enemy Task Force was made and reported by BEAUMARITZ.

— page 194 —
264
From: 15 February 1945
To: 15 February 1945
Via: 15 February 1945
Subject: 15 February 1945

The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
Consisting of U.S.S. BEGUNA (SS219), U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249), U.S.S. HOS (SS56), U.S.S. DACE (SS247), and U.S.S. PADDLE (SS268) - Comment on:

The Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of USS FLASHER and ICO was ordered to form off KARLAN Bay on 16 December, 1944, for the primary purpose of reporting and attacking enemy forces which might attempt to interfere with the Allied landings on HINDURO. DACE and PADDLE were ordered to join on 18 December. Commander V. D. SHUR, U.S.S., Commanding Officer of BEGUNA, was the Group Commander during the period 16 to 28 December.

DACE reported the first contact on a large northbound convoy which sailed from KARLAN Bay the morning of 20 December. FLASHER made an unsuccessful attempt to develop the contact.

FLASHER sighted another northbound convoy the next morning. She was unable to close submerged, but finally regained contact early the following morning. 25 December, and sank three tankers in a brilliantly executed night surface attack.

The same morning PADDLE reported having sighted one tanker with one escort. HOS and BEGUNA also soon made contact and started working ahead for a submerged attack. All three submarines made submerged approaches on this target. HOS was the only one to reach a firing position, and her attack was unsuccessful. Heavy seas and poor visibility made all approaches unusually difficult.

That afternoon PADDLE made radar contact in reduced visibility on several large high speed targets heading east. Although never sighted by any of the group, they were assumed to be war ships.

In the early morning of 25 December, FLASHER, homebound with only one torpedo, reported radar contact on a northbound convoy heading for KARLAN BAY. BEGUNA made a submerged

— page 195 —
1945-02-01
Serial: 002
9 February 1945.

SUBJECT: [SUBJECT: USS T-1]
TO: [TO: Rear Admiral H. F. L. Stetson]
FROM: [FROM: Commander, Submarine Force]
TO: [TO: Commander, Submarine Force]
SUBJECT: [SUBJECT: USS T-1]
TO: [TO: Commander, Submarine Force]
SUBJECT

— page 196 —
32247/A16-3
Serial 001
Secret
DECLASSIFIED
From: The Commanding Officer (Commander Task Unit 711.131)
To: The Commander Task Force 71 (Commander Task Group 711.)
Subject: Special Mission - Report of.

Reference: (a) ComTaskGroup 711.1's OpOrd. No. 167-44
   - Of 30 November 1944.
(b) Annex E to above OpOrd.
(c) Annex F to above OpOrd.
(d) CTG 711.1's despatch 100751 of December 1944.

Enclosure: (A) Two copies of overlay of mine plant.

1. In accordance with instructions given in reference (a, (b), and (c), this vessel laid a field of eleven Mark 12 mines off the coast of FRENCH INDICTHINA between PULAU GAMBIER Island and the mainland in the vicinity of latitude 13-36' N and longitude 109-18' E. Enclosure (A) gives the exact location of each mine in the plant.

2. A narrative of the operation is as given below:

It was planned to lay the mines as soon as possible after arrival in the area in accordance with reference (d). This it was hoped would be about 0000 on 16 December, however enemy planes and increasing headwinds and head seas deemed otherwise. By forcing the ship into the seas at three and four engine speeds we managed to arrive seven miles abeam of PULAU GAMBIER Island at about 0230 on the 16th. It had been decided to make our approach from the northeast in order to have the current with us and more sea room in which to make initial approach.

At 0300 the initial phases of the approach were commenced. A strong southerly current of 3 knots was experienced which caused us to break off our first

— page 200 —
13-40W
109-20E

U.S.S. DACE
SIXTH WAR PATROL
MINE PLANT
16 DECEMBER 1944

DESIRED POST OFFICE: 0 ACTUAL POST OFFICE:
B.A. CHART 389

— page 201 —
1945-71/AL6-3/ USS SEABOARD
Serial 0085-3-2(1)

From: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE,
To: The Chief of Naval Operations,
Via: Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: Report of Mineralogy Operation During Sixth War Patrol of U.S.S. DACE.

Reference: (a) C.O. U.S.S. DACE Secret Ltr. SS247/AL6-3 Serial 001 of 17 December 1944.

Enclosure: (A) Reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

Copy to: ELIOT H. BRYANT.
GNO (ADVANCE COPY by AIRMAIL)
COM 7TH FLEET.
C.O. U.S.S. DACE.

30 MARCH 1945
MAR 195
15.0439
2.

— page 202 —
12-10(A)/A16-3/S75
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLIGHT
Serial 000235
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
24 July 1945.

SERGEANT
FRON:
No:
VLA:
Subject:
Report of Firing Mark 27 and Mark 28 Torpedoes During the Seventh War Patrol of the U.S.S. DACE (SS247).

Enclosure:
(A) U.S.S. DACE - Secret Report of Firing Mark 28 Torpedoes, War Patrol No. 7 (CO USS DACE Secret 1tr, File SS247/ A16-3(001), serial none, dated 10 July 1945).
(B) U.S.S. DACE - Top Secret Report of Firing Mark 27 Torpedoes, War Patrol No. 7 (CO USS DACE Top Secret 1tr, File SS247/ A16-3(0001), serial none, dated 10 July 1945).

Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith.

It is estimated that Mark 28 Attack No. 1, enclosure (A), resulted in a hit in the medium AQ previously damaged in Mark 14-3A, Attack No. 1 (see Seventh War Patrol Report).

It is also estimated that the U.S. submarine has rigged up a hit in Mark 27, Attack No. 1, enclosure (B).

The Force Commander congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the DACE for this effective use of new weapons. Damage to the enemy has been credited in the endorsement to the Seventh War Patrol report.

The security classification of enclosure (B) is changed to Secret in accordance with recent instructions from the Bureau of Ordnance.

G. C. CRAWFORD,
Chief of Staff.

DISTINGUISH:
(2)

— page 204 —
5-2/4/75/A16-3
Serial: (0011)
S-B-C-R-E-T
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS D.D. (SS247) Secret
Report of Firing Mark 28
Torpedoes, Pat. No. 7.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. D.D. (SS247) Secret Report of Firing Mark 28 Torpedoes, Patrol Number 7.

1. Forwarded.

2. The remarks that the Mark 28 torpedo fired on the first attack hit the freighter previously damaged and sinking as the result of a torpedo hit from attack 1A are concurred in. Apparently the breaking up noises on this freighter were sufficiently intense to divert this torpedo.

3. The miss on attack Number 2 was probably caused by firing down the throat only nineteen (19) seconds behind the Mark 1A torpedo. This probably resulted in the Mark 28 being required to reverse course in an unreasonably tight turning circle if a hit were to be made.

F. W. FENNO.

— page 206 —
88247/A16-3/(001)
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
10 July 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels).

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Secret Report of Firing Mark 20 Torpedoes, Patrol No. SEVEN.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

O.R. COLE, JR.

— page 207 —
26 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM

U.S.S. DACE (SS24-7) Mark 28 Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol No. 7

Time 1324-35 Date 10 June 1945 Lat. 47-25N Long. 149-04.5E

Sound conditions Poor Depth of water 1000 fathoms

Distance to nearest shore or reef 80 miles Sea condition 5

Was it raining? No Injection 40°F

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Convoy consisting of one (1) Medium AK of about 5000-6000 tons (similar to EIHUKU MARU, page 134, ONI 208-J Rev.), one very small tanker or Sea Truck of the V-B type, with two (2) MIKURA class frigates for escorts. Contact made by high per-sonnel. Visibility 6-9 miles.

Ship(s) sunk: (1) Medium AK, 5000-6000 tons(similar to EIHUKU MARU).

Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None

Damage determined by Torpedo head to hit over sound gear and through hull. Time of run checks well. AK was emitting breaking up noises loud enough to hear through hull. Torpedo passed close to the AK at the time it enabled.

Target draft 12' Course 0500' Speed 9 Kts Range 2,300 yards (at firing)

Target turn count Unknown. Target bearing at firing instant unknown

Give any peculiarities noted in target! sound output None noted.

(Note: The above refers to the escort which was the original target. The AK was stopped at a range of about 500-800 yards, bearing approximately 0250°, and emitting loud breaking up noises.)

— page 208 —
2.5 Kts. Course 1730 Depth 65' Angle 00 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL & TORPEDO DATA

Any indication of acoustic countermeasures being used? Give details. None noted.

Were depth charges being dropped? No

Type attack: Snap setup: on an escort to previously hit freighter, using periscope ranges and bearings. On its course to intercept the target, the torpedo passed close aboard the loudly bracing up freighter shortly after they gyro unlocked. It is believed that it homed on and hit the freighter.

FIREING DATA

(Torpedo) decreasing due to swing Tube fired No. 7. Track angle 3098 towards? Depth 65ft.

Gyro angle 227 Torpedo speed: 2 TDC 32 Kts. Hit or Miss Hit.

Erratic No. Time of torpedo run 2120 Torpedo serial No. 104429.

Mark exploder Unknown. Overhaul activity S/M Base, Pearl Harbor

Description of sound track of run. How long was torpedo tracked? Not tracked.

Were the bearings constant? Unknown

Was torpedo easy to follow? No. Not picked up

CONSENSUS: Prescribed routine for upkeep was followed. Torpedo gave no trouble.

(*Note: Data on this attack is a little confused. It is possible that a port track was used instead of starboard.)

— page 209 —
28 Torpedo Attack Form

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Mark 28 Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 7
Time 0039 Date 19 June 1945 Lat. 50-24N Long. 154-30E
Sound conditions Poor Depth of water 800 fathoms
Distance to nearest shore or reef 20miles Sea condition 0
Was it raining? No Injection 430F

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description One (1) MIKURA class frigate. Contact made by
    SJ Radar at 9,600 yards. Visibility 5,000 yards

Ship sunk None
Ship damaged None
Damage determined by None

Target draft 10' Course 0300T Speed 14 kts Range 2200 yds. (at firing)
Target turn count Unknown Target bearing at firing instant 1700
Give any peculiarities noted in target's sound output None noted.

— page 210 —
28 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM (Cont'd)
OWN SHIP DATA
Speed 18 Kts. Course 0850 Depth Surface Angle 00 (at firing)
FIRE CONTROL & TORPEDO DATA
Any indication of acoustic countermeasures being used? Give details. None noted. Target was firing guns.
Wore depth charges being dropped? No. Commenced 6 min. after firing
Type attack Night surface, down the throat shot using SJ radar ranges and T.B.T. bearings.
FIRE DATA
Tube fired No. 7 Track angle 0070-30°P Depth set
Gyro angle 1670-50° Torpedo speed used in TDC 34 Kts. Hit or Miss
Erratic Not known Time of torpedo run Unknown Torpedo # 104431
Mark exploder Unknown Overhaul activity S/M Base, Pearl Harbor
Description of sound track on run. How long was torpedo tracked? Not tracked.
Were the bearings constant? Unknown. Believed constant as shot was down the throat.
Was torpedo easy to follow? Not followed.
Give details. Unknown
COMMENTS: Prescribed routine for upkeep was followed. Torpedo gave no trouble. It was fired 41 seconds too early due to enemy gunfire. Only 19 seconds had elapsed since the firing of a Mk 14 torpedo down the Bimose track. This probably caused Mk 28 to miss, also drove shortly after firing and depth charges commenced about 6 minutes after firing.

— page 212 —
5-24/57/A16-3
Serial: (0005)
F05-24/57/A16-3
SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
Caro of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
13 July 1945

T-Q-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS DALE (SS247) Top
Secret Report of Firing
Mark 27 Torpedoes, Patrol
No. SS271

From:
To:
Via:

The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
(1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:
U.S.S. DALE (SS247) - Report of Firing MK-27
Torpedoes, War Patrol Number SEVEN.

1.
Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander
Submarine Division TQ FOATY-ONE.

2.
Thoro are slight indications that one of the
frigate escorts subjected to the first attack was damaged. However,
any accurate assessment of damage resulting from MK-27 torpedoes is
extremely difficult whoro there is noro than one target, otho ranging
and depth charging occurring simultaneously.

3.
It is believed that the unit fired on the second
attack missed because of excessive target speed.

4.
The unit returned from patrol by DALE has been
confirmed by the Special "cappons Section, Navy No. 1504, and was
found to be in patrol condition.

F. V. FENNO.

— page 214 —
3524/7/A16-3/(0001)
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
10 July 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer,
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels).

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Top Secret Report of
Firing Meric 27 Torpedoes, Patrol No. SEVEN.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

O.R. COLE, JR.

— page 215 —
27 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM
(MARK 27 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM)
U.S.S. DAGGER (SS247) Mark 27 Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol No. 7
Time 1356-19 Date 10 June 1945 Lat. 47-25N Long. 149-04.5E
Sound conditions Poor Depth of water 1000 fathoms
Distance to nearest shore or roof 80 miles Sea condition 5
Was it raining? No

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description
Convoy consisting of one Medium IX of about 5000-6000 tons (similar to EIHUCI MURU, page 134, ONI 208-J Rev.), one very small tanker or sea truck of the V-B type, with two MIKUR- class frigates for escorts. Contact made by high periscope. Visibility 6 to 9 miles.

Ship sunk
Hono

Ship possibly damaged
One (1) MIKUR- class frigate.

Damage detector
Throo to four minutes before firing, one escort (which upon-look was seen to be headed in our direct on) shifted to short scale and apparently was commencing a run. 16 min. and 50 sec. after firing a light explosion was heard over sound and through the hull. This was followed by a rapid series of nineteen light explosions which were not depth charges and which sounded close to the surface. After this pinging was still heard from both escorts, but one grew weak faster than the other. At 1730 a heavy, distant explosion was heard.

Target draft 10' (estimated) Course Unknown Speed Unknown
Range 500 to 1000 yds (est.) (at firing)

— page 216 —
2.2 kts. Course 230° Depth 300 feet Angle 00 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL & TORPEDO DATA:

Was target aware of submarine's presence? Yes
Was submarine doing depth charged? Not at the moment.
Type attack: Torpedo was fired when the DD motor read a maximum value and pinging was heard all around the dial. Target had shifted to short scale and had commenced a run on D.CE.

Time of firing 1356-19 Tube No. 9
Time of hit 1413-09 Erratic No to best of knowledge.

JP deco belt meter indication at firing Maximum
JP deco belt meter indication 1 minute after firing Maximum
JP deco belt meter indication 2 minutes after firing Maximum
JP Gein. 4.2 Filter Band 6,000 cycles
Mark Torpedo 27 Serial No. 636T
Mark Warhead Unknown Serial No. -
Mark Exploder Unknown Serial No. - -

— page 217 —
MARK 27 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM (Cont'd)
Arming distance met___ Believed to be 200 yards.
Issuing activity___ S/M Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.
COMMENTS::
Upkeep procedure followed the instruction pamphlet exactly. Electrolyte temperature ran about 50° higher on this torpedo than on those in the racks due to the heating effect of the hydrogen burner. This necessitated watering the battery after the torpedo had been aboard two weeks. This torpedo was subject/to 145 psi pressure prior to firing ed

— page 218 —
27 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Mark 27 Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 7

Time: 0042 Date: 19 June 1945 Lat. 50-23N Long. 154-34E

Sound conditions: Poor Depth of water: 800 fathoms

Distance to nearest shore or reef: 20 miles Sea condition: 0

Was it raining? No

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: One (1) MIKURA class frigate. Contact made by
    SJ radar. Visibility 5,000 yards.

Ship sunk: None

ship damaged: None

Damage determined: None

Target depth: 100' Course: 0800 Speed: 14 kts. Range: 1,000 yds
    (at firing)

Target turn count: Unknown Target bearing at firing instant
    unknown, but it was approaching DACE on port quarter

Give any peculiarities noted in target's sound output: One hour
and three minutes after firing sound heard two distinct "whoosh-
ing" sounds which resembled torpedoes being fired.

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 5 kts. Course: 0500 Depth: 250 feet Angle: 10 dive (at
    firing)

— page 219 —
27 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM (Cont'd)

FIRE CONTROL & TORPEDO DATA

Was target aware of submarine's presence? Yes

Was submarine being depth charged? No. Severe depth charging commenced 4min and 20 sec. after firing.

Type Attack Torpedo was fired when it was estimated the target was about 1,000 yards away and closing DACE. Sound was not manned until just before the torpedo was fired.

Time of firing 0041-40 Tube No. 9

Time of hit No hit Erratic No

JP decibel meter indication at firing Maximum (Vented Negative)

JP decibel meter indication 1 minute after firing Maximum

JP decibel meter indication 2 minutes after firing Maximum

JP Gain 4.2 Filter Band 3,000 cycles

Mark torpedo 27E Serial No. 35T

Mark warhead Unknown Serial No. - -

Mark exploder Unknown Serial No. - -

Arming distance set: Followed to be 200 yards.

Issuing activity: Pearl Harbor, T.H.

COMMENTS: Transcribed upper was followed.

— page 220 —

END OF REEL
JOB NO. E-108

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO—NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

— page 221 —
U.S.S. FLORIKAN (ASR9)

Subject: Towing U.S.S. FLIER (Continued).

8. Florikan was then headed upwind and stopped. While the messengers of increasing size were being taken aboard the submarine, this ship swung into the trough of the sea parallel to Flier and drifted to leeward of her. When the end of the 6 inch manila line (the last messenger) had been taken aboard the Flier the two ships had drifted apart by an amount almost equal to the length of the line.

9. With both ships stopped the Florikan drifted to leeward faster than the Flier, but the Flier drifted faster in the direction in which the ships were heading.

10. With both ends of the line being held, and with Florikan rudder hard over toward Flier, it was possible to work Florikan upwind directly ahead of Flier. Then while this ship drifted to leeward and the submarine moved ahead the strain on the line eased and the Flier heaved it in. By repeating this procedure several times the end of the tow cable was almost gotten on board the Flier. It was then necessary for Flier to use both cap-stans in series. Finally the tow cable was gotten aboard and shackled up.

11. This time a 15 fathom shot of 1 inch chain had been substituted for the wire pendant. Again the 1½ inch shackle was considered the weakest point in the tow.

12. As Florikan again went ahead taking a strain on the tow wire, the wire was paid out until, with a speed of 50 R.P.M., at 1400 feet the ships rode the waves as nearly in unison as it was possible to arrange. About 5 hours had been required to again proceed with tow.

13. Before leaving that vicinity, I desire to express my great admiration for the officers and men of the Flier who were engaged in the work on the deck of the Flier. The ship was rolling heavily and occasionally waves swept over the deck but the work continued. One man was seen to be swept overboard but, as they all had on lifejackets and lines, he was quickly hauled back on board. He was not any wetter than he had been before going overboard. Reference to Knights Modern Seamanship indicates that those men accomplished an impossible task.

14. Course was set at 125° T. as the most easterly course (and therefore most comfortable course) that could be steered and yet ensure passing safely to southwestward of Lisianski Reef. Even on that course this ship was rolling her bulwarks under.

15. The gale and very heavy seas continued throughout the day and most of the night. Toward morning (24 January) the wind shifted and decreased and the seas moderated. At daylight speed was increased. Based on 1/6 safety factor rule and considering a 1½ inch shackle as the weakest part, the pull was limited to 20,000 pounds except for occasional surges. This was the criterion

— page 222 —
16. Strong wind and rather rough seas were encountered on 25 January but were not as bad as on 23 January. After that conditions continually improved. Maximum speed attained was 96 R.P.M. (8.8 knots by Flier pit log). Twice speed was reduced and towline shortened to assist Flier in renewing chafing gear.

17. The U.S.S. PC 602 escorted from Midway to Pearl. On the morning of 23 January she stood by close aboard the Flier for lifeguard duty. At 0245 W on 30 January the U.S.S. DIONE reported for duty as additional escort. During daylight of that day air coverage was provided.

18. The only material casualties suffered were to the towing machine. The automatic tensioning device failed due to the time lag between the closing of the payout switch and the actual paying out of the wire. The can roller lever arm dropped over the after side of the can and prevented the can returning to its normal position on completion of the surge. A new can with longer riding surface was made on board. After the new can had been installed no further difficulty was had.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT
FC5-10/S25
Serial 50

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
19 FEB 1944

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

1. **Forwarded.** Although this towing operation conducted by the FLORIKAN is a routine assignment for that type of vessel, it is nevertheless considered that the exceptionally fine seamanship displayed by that Commanding Officer, despite rough seas and adverse conditions, is worthy of special mention.

2. It is recommended that the towing equipment on similar vessels be inspected to assure proper functioning.

Copy to:
CO FLORIKAN.

— page 223 —
5 July 1944

SS250/A16
Serial 027

DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. FLIER.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Commander Submarine Division ONE EIGHTY T.O.
Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.

Subject: U.S.S. FLIER, Report of War Patrol Number One.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart, Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE only.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the first war patrol of this vessel conducted in the area west of the Island of Luzon, P.I. between the coast and longitude 118°30' E and between the latitudes of 12° and 17°N during the period 21 May to 5 July 1944 is forwarded herewith.

J.D. CROWLEY.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C

BY O.P.-092627DATE 5/25/42

83280 FILMED

— page 224 —
U.S.S. FLIER

U.S.S. FLIER * Report of First War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE:

Oct. 18, 1943: Commissioned at New London, Conn., and received thirty days training including contract torpedo trials at Newport, R.I., prior to departure for Pearl Harbor.

Dec. 20: Arrived at Pearl Harbor and received two weeks training in addition to a week for voyage repairs and loading for patrol.

Jan. 12, 1944: Departed on first war patrol with orders to top off fuel at Midway Islands. Ran aground on east side of channel while attempting an inbound transit of Midway Island Channel.

Jan. 22: Pulled off reef and departed for Pearl Harbor in tow of U.S.S. FLORIAN. Received temporary repairs at Navy Yard Pearl Harbor.

Feb. 7: Departed Pearl Harbor for Navy Yard Mare Island.

Feb. 16: Arrived at Mare Island, Calif., for repair of damage received from grounding.

May 8: Arrived Pearl Harbor after undergoing repairs at Navy Yard Mare Island, California. Assigned two days voyage repairs and eight days training including participation in a coordinated attack group against an inbound convoy.

(B) NARRATIVE:

May 21, 1944:
1100 (W) Underway from Pearl Harbor for patrol in accordance with Task Force 17 operation Order No. 171-44, escorted by U.S.S. P.C. 602.

2000 (W) Released escort.

2100 (W) Lade radar contact with an unidentified vessel bearing 3250T at a range of 26,500 yards. (ShipContact No. 1) Connected tracking and closed to investigate. Contact developed into a large merchant type ship with escort and obviously friendly due to location. FLIER had not been notified of probability of making this contact. Sent FLIER Serial one to CO SUBPAC and resumed previous course and speed.

-2-

— page 225 —
U.S.S. FILER
:  Report of "First War Patrol."

May 22
1200(W) Lat. 20-26N Long. 164-04W
Miles Steamed 365 Fuel Consumed 5267 Gals.

May 23
1200(W) Lat. 17-13N Long. 169-16W
Miles Steamed 368 Fuel Consumed 6179 Gals.
Arrived Johnston Island to fuel.
1734(W) Lat. 19-14N Long. 178-10.5W
Miles Steamed 293 Fuel Consumed 3135 Gals.
Crossed international date line and omitted
May 24
1200(X) Lat. 18-55.5N Long. 173-12W
Miles Steamed 267 Fuel Consumed 2377 Gals.

May 25
1200(X) Lat. 19-14N Long. 178-10.5W
Miles Steamed 293 Fuel Consumed 3135 Gals.
1859(X) Crossed international date line and omitted
May 26 from calendar.

May 27
1200(N) Lat. 19-45.5N Long. 176-39W
Miles Steamed 298 Fuel Consumed 3524 Gals.

May 28
1200(N) Lat. 20-13N Long. 171-01.5W
Miles Steamed 321 Fuel Consumed 3540 Gals.

May 29
1200(M) Lat. 20-39.5N Long. 165-40.5W
Miles Steamed 301 Fuel Consumed 3905 Gals.

May 30
1200(L) Lat. 21-15.5N Long. 159-58.5W
Miles Steamed 327 Fuel Consumed 3295 Gals.

May 31
1200(L) Lat. 21-36N Long. 154-34.5W
Miles Steamed 305 Fuel Consumed 3146 Gals.
Sighted plane bearing 1760T at a range of
1204(L) about 10 miles. (Plane Contact No. 1) Dived.
1220(L) Observed plane bearing 0010T at a range
of about 10 miles. Plane was not seen
again so at 1307(L) surfaced and resumed
standard speed.

June 1
1048(L) Sighted plane (Plane Contact No. 2) bearing
1250T at a range of about 10 miles.
Dived.
1200(L) Surfaced and resumed base course and speed
at Lat. 22-05W Long. 149-40E.
Miles Steamed 276 Fuel Consumed 3430 Gals.

— page 226 —
0815(I) Changed course to intercept convoy reported by another submarine, and increased to three engine speed.
: 1100(I) Sighted plane bearing 2660T (Plane Contact No. 3) at a range of about 10 miles. Dived. Plane not again sighted so at 1145(I) surfaced and resumed previous speed.
: 1200(I) Lat. 22-25N Long. 144-35B Miles S.eamed 312 Fuel Consumed 3849 Gals.
: June 3 04:00(K) Reached estimated track of convoy and commenced retiring search of area twenty miles on both sides of track.
: 1200(K) Lat. 22-27.5N Long. 138-07.5E Miles Steamed 410 Fuel Consumed 6735 Gals. i.a.c.e trim dive. Surfaced at 1350(K) and sighted smoke bearing 0080T at an estimated range of 30 miles. (Ship Contact No. 2) Change of bearing and range indicated that target was on a southeasterly course, while convoy we were looking for was on north westerly course. The sea was glassy calm and it was believed that a successful periscope approach during daylight was very improbable. For this reason decided to dive and approach target sufficiently to obtain an estimate of course and speed to aid in making an end around after dark.
: 1539(K) Heard first of a series of 22 distant depth charges. Only smoke of target in sight at this time.
: 1848(K) Sighted unidentified vessel bearing 2220T believed to be either a submarine or escort craft on northerly course at high speed. (Ship Contact No. 3)
: 1918(K) Turned away from target to open range in preparation for surfacing. Sighted smoke bearing 2100T. (Ship Contact No. 4) Original target now bearing 1090T. The second contact was believed to be closer so decided to shift targets for the following reasons:
   (1) Had a more favorable position on second contact.
   (2) Believed original target already under attack because of hearing depth charges from that bearing.

— page 227 —
2021(K) - SURFACED and CONVEYED working ahead on starboard flank of convoy estimated to be on base course 300°T speed 8. Convoy was clearing in sight in bright moonlight, eight columns of smoke being visible. The location of the southbound convoy bearing about 1300T distant about 30 miles was frequently illuminated by gunfire. There was one short display of gunfire from our convoy giving the impression they may have been under attack, possibly from the submarine previously sighted this afternoon. No underwater explosions were heard, however. The convoy was tracking on base course 300°T speed 8 kts. With convoy bearing 165°T distant 18,500 yds. they zigged toward FLEK giving a zero angle on the bow. This was hastily decimated to be a change of base course, associated with the other attack believed to be in progress, so dived to commence radar approach. It now became apparent that base course had not been altered, and range could not be reduced below 7,600 yds. so decided to surface and try again.

June 4, 0053(K) SURFACED with target bearing 2470T at 14,800 yards and commenced end around on starboard flank. 0320(K) MOONSET. 0355(K) Divd and commenced radar approach with target bearing 1150T at 16,000 yds. 0447(K) Target in sight at 2,100 yards so ordered periscope depth. 0501(K) Fired three torpedoes at each of second and third Able Kings in column of three passing ahead. Bwings periscope to get a set up on column passing stern but the nearest was practically on top of us turning away, while two of the escorts close aboard were turning toward. Ordered deep submergence to evade. The first, second, and fourth torpedoes fired were heard to explode, indicating two hits in first target and one in second. On last look around first target was smoking heavily amidships and second had turned away and apparently stopped.

— page 228 —
0634(K) Received last of 34 depth charges, from four escorts.
0658(K) Heard last of: propeller noises from escorts.
0735(K) Lade periscope observation and observed two heavy columns of smoke bearing 0160T.
0747(K) Went deep to reload forward. Escort staying close to scene of attack so continued working way southward in order to clear scene and surface.
1020(K) Surfaced and commenced heading up for scene of attack, with intention of trailing to determine course and speed of convoy. On departure from scene.
1052(K) Observed escort heading toward FLIHK so opened to southward.
1130(K) Commenced trailing again but at 1200(K) sighted escort who is apparently patroling the area of the attack, nothing else in sight. Commenced an end around to westward.
1200(K) Lat. 22-49N Long. 136-41.5E
1640(K) Files steamed 376 Fuel Consumed 4079 Gals.
1657(K) Commenced retiring search curve to north eastward.
June 5
0042(K) Sent FLIHK serial 2 to CSUSUBAC reporting
0617(K) Serial 2 which was reported garbled.
1000(K) Unable to regain contact with convoy so headed for scene of attack.
1027(K) Passed to the Commander of Commander Task Force 71 without signal.
1200(K) Arrived at position of attack and found considerable debris including six lifeboats, from one of which a package of documents was retrieved, several life rafts, and the wooden pilot house overhead from which was retrieved a Sperry Mk 15 gyro repeater.
2028(K) Lat. 20-45N Long. 131-50E
1200(K) Files Steamed 343 Fuel consumed 3439 Gals.

June 6
1200(K) Lat. 20-45N Long. 131-50E
files Steamed 343 Fuel consumed 3439 Gals.

— page 229 —
1200(K) Lat. 19-49N Long. 125-50E
: 0515(I) Miles Steamed 353 Fuel Consumed 3381 Gals.
: 1200(I) Lat. 19-40.5N Long. 121-58.5E
: 1729(I) Miles Steamed 236 Fuel Consumed 2533 Gals.
: 0448(H) Dived with plan of remaining submerged until early afternoon to obtain general idea of air coverage and enemy activity in this area prior to run. ng on surface during daylight.
: 1200(H) Lat. 19-30N Long. 120-12E
: 1344(H) Miles Steamed 115 Fuel Consumed 960 Gals.
: 1452(H) Dived due to evidence of enemy radar shown on SD screen. Signs of enemy radar were cr.stant enough to indicate bearings were being taken on SD transmission.
: 1916(H) Surfaced.
: June 10 Conducted submerged daylight patrol 10 miles west of Calayan Island.
: 1105(H) Plane Contact No. 5. Sighted two unidentified planes 20 miles west of Calayan Island. Flames started. Long. 121-05E
: June 11 Conducted submerged patrol 7 miles west of Cape Bojeador.
: 0117(H) Sighted small patrol boat at lat. 19-01.5N long. 120-43E. Maneuvered to pass clear.
: 0820(H) Sighted first of several land planes being operated over beach. Planes were unidentified but appeared to be similar to type Zelee. One large commercial type plane seen taking off from air strip along beach at lat. 18-12N Long. 120-35E.

-7-

— page 230 —
1200(H)  Let. 18-10N  Long. 120-22.5E
:  June 12  Conducted submerged patrol 10 miles north-
:  west of Cape Bolinano.
: 1200(H)  Lat. 16-26N  Long. 119-40E
:  June 13  Conducted submerged daylight patrol close
:  inshore along west side of Cape Bolinano.
: 1200(H)  Let. 16-02N  Long. 119-37E
: 1305(H)  Sighted smoke bearing 0150T and commenced
:  submerged approach.  (Ship Contact No. 6)
:  Target was evidently keeping close inshore
:  so attempted to get between target and the
:  beach.  The original contact developed into
:  a convoy of about eleven ships and at least
:  six escorts.  The sea was glassy calm which
:  made undetected periscope observations very
:  difficult so the approach was made with short
:  and infrequent periscope observations.
:  Last power on the sternplanes for about
:  three minutes.  Power was temporarily re-
:  gained then lost again.  Planes finally be-
:  gan operating normally at 1429(H) though
:  remained a source for worry.
: 1452(H)  Fired four stern tubes at 9,000-10,000
:  ton tanker, and immediately swung forward
:  to get a set up for the bow tubes.  An Able
:  King was crossing the bow about 50-100 yds.
:  ahead, too close for attack, so shifted to
:  a target in the inboard column about 1200-
:  1300 yds. distant.  Heard two timed hits in
:  tanker followed immediately by a very loud
:  explosion.  Before getting set up on the
:  new target the periscope was ducked because
:  of a misunderstanding of ordered depth to
:  the diving officer.  Continued deep to
:  evade the escorts heard converging from
:  all directions.  Power failed on the stern
:  planes again, and we had a few bad moments
:  as we tried to get the angle of the boat
:  by hand in the thick of a heavy depth charge
:  barrage.  At least six vessels participated
:  in this attack, and dropped 105 depth charges
:  many of which seemed very well directed but
:  set too shallow.

— page 231 —
1515 (H) 1548 (H) 1600 (H) 1948 (H) 030 (H) 0310 (H) 0610 (H) 1150 (H) 1200 (H) 1356 (H) June 15 1200 (H) June 16 1200 (H) June 17

---

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.**

- **1515 (H)** - Heard a loud rumbling, type of explosion from the general direction of the target. Sound reported noises similar to a ship breaking up from the direction of the target intermittently between now and 1800.
- **1600 (H)** - Periscope depth, sighted several columns of smoke bearing 130°T. Commenced recovery.
- **1948 (H)** - Surfaced and proceeded at best speed toward Manila to regain intercept convoy.
- **June 14 0244 (H)** - When approximately 15 miles west of Subic Bay sighted smoke bearing 2150T. Started to close contact and observed air patrol to the east. (Plane Contact No. 7) Slowed to one third speed and turned away from plane until clear, when course and speed to close target were resumed.
- **0310 (H)** - Forced under by plane. Coming in on port beam. Attempted to close convoy submerged but was unable to do so. Dawn prevented further surface running in addition to the presence of a patrol boat which was conducting a supersonic sound search from the east.
- **0610 (H)** - Lost sound contact with patrol boat.
- **1150 (H)** - Sighted undetected aircraft bearing 3100T range two miles, on a westerly course. (Plane Contact No. 8)
- **1200 (H)** - Lat. 14-45N Long. 119-35E. Miles Steamed 161 Fuel Consumed 1662 Gals.
- **1356 (H)** - Sighted light bomber bearing 2350T at a range of 7 miles on a westerly course. (Plane Contact No. 9)
- **June 15** - Conducted submerged daylight patrol 10 miles southwest of Ulong Island proceeding to patrol western entrance to Calavite Pass.
- **1200 (H)** - Lat. 13-26N Long. 120-12E Miles Steamed 124 Fuel Consumed 883 Gals.
- **June 16** - Conducted submerged patrol of western approach to Calavite Pass.
- **1200 (H)** - Lat. 13-20N Long. 120-11E Miles Steamed 94 Fuel Consumed 877 Gals.
- **June 17** - Made submerged transit of Calavite Pass during morning and patrolled Veracruz Island Pass.

— page 232 —
1200(H) Lat. 13-32N Long. 120-25E
: 1934(H) Miles Steamed 126 Fuel Consumed 754 Gals.
: 1600(H) Sighted five medium Abile Kings, one small
: 1940(H) Interesland tanker and two escorts (Ship
: 2043(H) Contact No. 7) bearing 0180T at a range of
: 1940(H) 12,000 yds., as they emerged from a heavy
: 2043(H) rain squall. Commenced submerged approach.
: 1940(H) Targets were hugging the north coast of
: 2043(H) Verde Island Passage on base course about
: 1940(H) 1100T speed 7 kts. Was unable to close
: 1940(H) target while submerged, but estimated
: 1940(H) they could be overtaken about 2100(H) just
: 1940(H) west of Verde Island. Lost contact in wan-
: 1940(H) ing light.
: 1940(H) Surfaced and commenced chasing convoy.
: 1940(H) Arrived two miles west of Verde Island with-
: 1940(H) out having regained contact. It is judged
: 1940(H) they must have gone through Maricaban Pass
: 1940(H) or anchored, as their speed would not have
: 1940(H) permitted them to pass Verde Island before
: 1940(H) our arrival. Visited until 2100 off the
: 1940(H) eastern entrance of Maricaban Pass for them
: 1940(H) to emerge. By this time our presence in
: 1940(H) the vicinity apparently became known, as
: 1940(H) a patrol boat in North Pass was seen signal-
: 1940(H) ing to the shore and was tracked by radar
: 1940(H) to be closing and there were many flashing
: 1940(H) lights on the beaches. It was decided to
: 1940(H) clear this vicinity and investigate Maricaban
: 1940(H) Anchorage where the lookouts thought they
: 1940(H) had sighted ships during our run down the
: 1940(H) passage.
: 1940(H) Closed Maricaban Anchorage and identified
: 1940(H) silhouettes seen there to be rocks.
: 1940(H) Abandoned search and proceeded to Calavite
: 1940(H) Pass.
: 1940(H) June 19 Made submerged patrol 10 miles northwest
: 1940(H) of Cuba Island enroute to patrol northern
: 1940(H) approaches of Manila in accordance with
: 1940(H) new area assignment.

-10-

— page 233 —
1200(H) Lat. 14-08N Long. 119-51E
: Miles Steamed 130 Fuel consumed 1300 Gals.
: Patrol torpedoes to Manila.
: 1200(H) Lat. 14-32N Long. 120-01E
: Miles Steamed 101 Fuel consumed 736 Gals.
: Patrol torpedoes to Manila.
: 2136(H) Set course for new patrol area in accordance
: with dispatch orders.

: June 22
: 0133(H) Sent FLIER serial 1 to CTF 71 reporting
: attack on tanker and acknowledging orders
: to change station. Made submerged day-
: light patrol of AEO East Pass enroute to
: new area.
: 1200(H) Lat. 12-49N Long. 120-33W
: Miles Steamed 138 Fuel consumed 1503 Gals.
: Sighted five columns of smoke bearing 2100T
: at an estimated range of 15 miles. (Ship
: Contact No. 8) Headed for target to observe
: change of bearing. The bearing had not
: changed by 1915(H), visibility through the
: periscope was negligible due to darkness,
: and the target was much closer, with sev-
: eral pingers and light screws being audible.
: It was decided to get off the track and
: make an attack on the surface where it was
: believed that a better opportunity existed
: due to darkness.
: 2025(H) Surfaced and commenced end around port side
: of target bearing 3250T at a range of 12,000
: yds. Target course 3450T and speed nine
: knots. Target was keeping about 4 miles
: off Western shore of Mindora Island.
: 2300(H) Reached a position 450 on port bow of tar-
: got group at a range of 11,000 yards so
: commenced attack.
: 2323(H) Fired three torpedoes at each of first
: and second slips in near column. Both
: vessels were Able Kings, the first be-
: ing quite large and the second medium
: sized. Two torpedoes were seen to hit
: aft on the first target and one seen to
: hit the second target though two were
: heard to hit the second ship. Both ves-
: sels dropped out of formation and headed
: for the beach. Turned away from target
: group after firing and began avoiding
: escorts while working way around port.

— page 235 —
0139(H) 0231(H) 0234(H) 0248(H) 0420(H) 1200(H) 1348(H) 1400(H) 1430(H)

- 0139(H) 0231(H) 0248(H) 0420(H) 1200(H) 1348(H) 1400

— page 236 —
1.447(H) Sighted an unidentified plane bearing 0750T. (Plane Contact No. 10) It had now become apparent that extensive A/S measures were being undertaken in the vicinity of last nights attack. Various pingers were heard from that direction throughout the afternoon as well as smoke from A/S vessels. 1620(H) Sighted destroyer type vessel (Ship Contact No. 9) bearing 2650T headed in direction of FLIER so made stern tubes ready and maneuvered to keep them bearing on target. 1915(H) Target turned away after approaching to 3,400 yards and disappeared in waning light. 1959(H) All clear by a radar search at 40 feet so surfaced and in process made radar contact on target bearing 2160T at 5,600 yards, believed to be same destroyer. Cleared area at best speed and set course for patrol area. 2222(H) Sent FLIER serial 2 to CTF 71 reporting attack. June 24 0207(H) Changed course to return to base

Conducted daylight submerged patrol south-west of Lubang Island. 1200(H) Lat. 13-30N Long. 119-55E Miles Steamed 144 Fuel Consumed 1843 Gals. June 25 Conducted daylight surface patrol in Cuyo East Pass and northern part of Sulu Sea. Ran submerged for about three hours during that part of the day which it was felt that air patrols would most likely be encountered. 1200(H) Lat. 9-56N Long. 120-55E Miles Steamed 221 Fuel Consumed 3662 Gals. June 26 Conducted submerged patrol during daylight while approaching the XSS east of Pearl Bank. 1200(H) Lat. 6-11N Long. 119-53E Miles Steamed 274 Fuel Consumed 3689 Gals. June 27 Made early morning transit of Sibutu Pass. 0325(H) Noticed interference on SJ radar screen caused by another radar. 0354(H) Made radar contact with another vessel bearing 0870T at 8,000 yards. Had previously been warned that the U.S.S. M.I.GO was operating in this area so took course to avoid for the following reasons: 1. Radar interference was near the same

-14-

— page 238 —
1037(H) - Report of First War Patrol.

Conducted daylight surface patrol of the eastern Java Sea w.ile enroute Lombok Strait.
Approached sail boat to investigate cargo and determine if there were any native volunteers among the crew. The sea was rather rough and considerable time was consumed in maneuvering to get the sail boat alongside. In appearance it was quite similar to the numerous sailing craft formerly encountered in Madocra. Strait and was obviously a native fishing boat. One native signified his willingness to accompany us so took him aboard, gave them some food and departed. This native indicated by sign language that there were no Japanese among the crew of five.
1200(H) Lat. 6-06S Long. 116-49E
Kilos Steamed 225 Fuel Consumed 2612 Kals.
1425(H) Raide radar contact with an unidentified plane at a range of 20 miles which began to decrease so dived. (Plane contact No. 12)
1513(H) Plane not sighted so surfaced and resumed previous course and speed.
July 1 Raide early morning transit of Lombok Strait and evaded a patrol boat at either end. (Ship Contacts No. 12 and 13)
Cruised on surface during daylight enroute to base.
1023(H) Sighted and exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. Bolifish. (Ship Contact No. 14)
1200(H) Lat. 11-21S Long. 115-29E
Kilos Steamed 240 Fuel Consumed 4540 Kals.
July 2
1200(H) Lat. 17-07S Long. 113-59E
Kilos Steamed 380 Fuel Consumed 5291 Kals.
July 3
1200(H) Lat. 22-39S Long. 112-39E
Kilos Steamed 356 Fuel Consumed 4686 Kals.
July 4
1200(H) Lat. 28-13S Long. 112-43E
Kilos Steamed 350 Fuel Consumed 5722 Kals.
July 5
1200(H) Proemntle, V.A.
Kilos Steamed 275 Fuel Consumed 3950 Kals.

-16-

— page 240 —
1. Ship Contacts Continued.
Tac: Lat.: : Initials: Est.Course: How : No: Date: Long.: Types: Range & Speed : Cont.: Remarks
7. June 18 13-43N 5 AK's 12000 1100T P While in Verde I Pass, sighted corvoy emerging from rain squall. Unl. to close due to range and large on the bow. Upon facing at night t. tamped to overt. but unable to reg contact.

8. June 22 12-50N 9 ships 30000 3200T P Attacked - Sank oi 1830(H) 120-40E about 10 9 kts. Smoke large AK and two unidentified escorts.

9. June 23 13-09N 1 DD. 6000 1700T P Made contact at d and maneuvered to keep stern tubes in ing since we had i. torpedoes forward. When range was abo 3000 yds. target 2. ged away and dis. parred in darkness.

10. June 27 04-03N 1 119-40E Unidenti- 8000 Unknown SN-R Character of redi fied boil over broke off interfor once indi to be U.S.S. contact atd this was a U. 1.1100 which before Submarine, me. we were due to obtained. ed to avoid.

11. June 30 04-50S 0310(H) 117-35E Unicen-7800 Various SN-R Character of rca. course courses interfor once indi & speeds of this was a U.S. submarine. He broke off contact.

12. July 1 08-19S Patrol 8000 Northerly SN Evaded on the sur 0037(H) 115-58.5E Craft course. face. Believe we slow speed were undetected.

13. July 1 08-31S Patrol 6900 Southerly SN Same as 12. 0126(H) 115-55.5E Craft course slow speed

14. July 1 11-30S Submarine 10000 Northerly SD-P Closed & identifi course as U.S.S. FONEFISH 1031(H) 115-32E 14 kts. exchanged signals.

— page 241 —
1. May 31 21-36N Mevis 10 Mi. 0950T
2. June 1 22-05N Mevis 10 Mi. 0900T
3. June 2 22-24N Mevis 8 Mi. Unknown
4. June 8 19-40.5N Betty 10 Mi. Unknown
5. June 11 18-17.5N Unknown 10 Mi. 0450T
6. June 11 18-12.5N Large 12 Mi. -- Plane
7. June 14 119-22E Unknown 14000 yards
8. June 14 14-50N Unknown 2700T
9. June 14 14-44N Unknown 14000 yards
10. June 23 13-14.3N Unknown 16000 yards
11. June 27 01-50N Unknown 28000 yards
12. June 30 06-17.5S Unknown 40000 yards
13. June 30 06-17.5S Unknown 40000 yards
14. Target Data:
    - U.S.S. FLIER
    - Torpedo Attack No. 1
    - Time: 0501(K)
    - Ditto: 4 June 1944
    - Ltt. 22-55N 136-44E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: Attack made on convoy of 5 Air's with 4 escorts. Initial contact made during daylight - sighted smoke on horizon. Convoy tracked until nightfall. Approach made on surface and at radar depth using radar ranges and bearing. Final attack made at periscope depth. Usine periscope bearings.

Ships sunk: One medium AK (name unknown) 6000 tons.

Ships damaged or Probably sunk: One medium AK (name unknown) 6000 tons.

-19-

— page 242 —
14' Course: 320 Speed: 9 kts. Range: 600 yds.

Own ship data:
Speed 2.6 kts., course 0500, depth 65', angle 00'

Fire Control and Torpedo Data.

Type Attack: Radar approach - final attack by periscope.

| Type | Attack | Target | Type | Target | Type | Target | Type | Target |
|------|||------||------||------||
| Tubes | fired | 1      | 2     | 3       | 4     | 5      | 6     |
| Track | angle | 95P    | 98P   | 100P    | 85P   | 88P    | 92P   |
| Gyro | angle | 350    | 344   | 348     | 000   | 354    | 357   |
| Depth | set   | 10'    | 10'   | 10'     | 10'   | 10'    | 10'   |
| Power | HP    | HP     | HP    | HP     | HP    | HP    | HP    |
| Hit  | Hit   | Hit    | Hit   | Hit    | Hit   | Hit    | Hit   |
| Erratic | No   | No     | No    | No     | No    | No    | No    |
| Mk. torpedo | 23 | 23 | 14-3A | 14-3A | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Serial No. | 41391 | 41118 | 26453 | 40731 | 41006 | 52903 | 6-4 |
| Mk. exl. | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 |
| Serial No. | 12724 | 8461 | 12737 | 11600 | 3127 | 2498 | 6-4 |
| Actuation set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation actual | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Mk. Warhead | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-0 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
| Serial No. | 12383 | 12555 | 2133 | 3102 | 1425 | 13092 | 6-4 |
| Explosives | Tpx. | Tpx. | Tpx. | Tpx. | Tpx. | Tpx. | Tpx. |
| Firing interval | 8 sec. | 8 sec. | 8 sec. | 8 sec. | 8 sec. | 8 sec. | 8 sec. |
| Type spread | Divergent | Divergent | Divergent | Divergent | Divergent | Divergent | Divergent |
| Sea Condition | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Overhaul Activity | Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, T.H. | Remarks: Convoy was not aware of the presence of a submarine until the attack was completed and the torpedoes were fired. | | | | | |

U.S.S. FLIER Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 1
Time: 1452(H) Date: 13 June 1944 Lt. 16-00N Long. 119-41.5E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: Attack made on convoy of 11 ships including AK's and tankers with at least 6 escorts. Initial contact made during daylight - sighted smoke on the horizon through the periscope. Approach and attack made at periscope depth using periscope ranges and bearings throughout.

— page 243 —
U.S.S. FLIER
CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.

Ship probably sunk: 0ne tanker (Huzian war) 9527 tons.

Damage determined by: Heard two timed hits followed by a loud explosion. Twenty minutes later another explosion was heard. Sound then reported hearing noises of a ship breaking up for a period of 30 minutes.

Target draft: 16'  Course 200° Speed 8 kts. Range: 1450 yds.

Own Ship Data.
Speed 4 kts. Course 0900T Depth 65' Angle 00

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Periscope Attack.

Tubes Fired 7 8 9 10
Track angle 095P 095P 096P 098P
Gyro angle 025 023 021 017
Depth set 10' 10' 10' 10'
Power HP HP HP HP
Hit Hit Hit Miss l.i.ss
Erratic No No No No
Lk. torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 40663 26139 40828 22327
Lk. exploder 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial No. 2168 17536 434 8799
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual Contact Contact
Lk. warhead 16-1 16-0 16-1 16-1
Serial No. 3238 2852 3202 12409
Explosives Tpx. Tpx. Tpx. Tpx.
Firing Interval 5 sec. 5 sec. 10 sec.
Type Spread Divergent Spread
Sea Condition 0 0 0
Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Remarks: Convoy was following a radical zig plan with groups apparently zig-zagging independently. Escorts were patrolling stations, echo ranging and listening. Approach was undetected until firing. Strong counter measures were started immediately by at least six escorts.

U.S.S. FLIER  Torpedo Attack No. 3  Patrol No. 1
Time: 2323(H) Date 22 June 1944  Lat. 13-10.5N  Long. 120-27.

-21-

— page 244 —
U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: Convoy of 9 ships with about 10 small escorts. Initial contact made at dusk - sighted smoke on horizon through periscope. Remained submerged while convoy passed close aboard; when convoy had passed well clear, surfaced and made end around run using radar ranges and bearings throughout the approach. TET bearings were used for the final firing bearings, targets being visible through 750 binoculars at about 5,000 yards.

Ships sunk: One large AK [UNIDENTIFIED] 8,000 tons. One medium AK (unidentified) 6,000 tons.
Damage determined by: Observed two hits on first target and one hit on second target. Heard two hits on first target and two hits on second target. Two vessels were seen by radar to drop out of formation and start heading for the beach. Lost radar contact with one of these at 10,000 yards while the other was clearly in sight at 18,000 yards during subsequent attack on convoy. Upon return to attack cripples only one target was visible at 14,000 yards and sound reported loud noises similar to vessel breaking up in general direction of cripple originally lost at 10,000 yards. While attempting to penetrate screen of escorts the remaining radar target suddenly disappeared from view and did not reappear when the range was closed to what should have been 11,000 yards.

Target draft: 24' Course 3400 Speed: 8 3/4 kts. Range: 3100 yds. 20' 3400 8 3/4 kts. 3100 yds.

Own Ship D'ta
Speed 5 kts. Course 0850' Depth Surface Angle 00

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Surface radar attack - TBT firing bearings.

Tubes Fired 1 2 3 4 5 6
Track angle 075P 075P 077P 080P 080P 082P
Gyro angle 000 359 000 000 359 001
Depth Set 12' 12' 12' 12' 12' 12'
Power HP HP HP HP HP HP
Hit Hit Hit Miss Hit Miss
Erratic No No No No No
Jk. torpedo 23 14-3A 23 23 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 49219 36385 41442 41530 25691 26569

-22-

— page 246 —
1. U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.
2. Tubes fired 1 2 3 4
3. Track angle 60P 80P 82P 83P
4. Gyro angle 000 359 000 358
5. Depth set 12' 12' 12' 12'
6. Power HP HP HP HP
7. Hit Hit Hit Hit Miss
8. Erratic No No No No
9. Mk. torpedo 23 14-3A 23 14-3A
10. Serial No. 41556 26567 41618 40328
11. Mk. exploder 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
12. Serial No. 8800 8762 17840 2599
13. Actuation set Contact Contact Contact Contact
14. Actuation actual Contact Contact Contact
15. Mk. Warhead 16-1 16-1 16-0 16-0
16. Serial No. 2363 12563 12042 10929
17. Explosives Tpx. Tpx. Tpx. Tpx.
18. Firing I. tervel 8 sec. 8 sec. 8 sec.
19. Type Spread Divergent Spread
20. Sea condition 1 1 1 1
21. Overhaul Activity: Submarine Bearer Pearl Harbor, T.H.
22. Remarks: Although the convoy was aware of the presence of a submarine as a result of the first attack, this attack was made undetected. Two escorts passed about 1800 yds. on either beam shortly after firing, but did not see us.

(I) Lines. None.

(J) Anti-Submarine Measures and Evasion Tactics.

Convoys in the Manila area are large and heavily escorted with both destroyers and PC boat types being employed as escorts. They use echo ranging both day and night quite ineffectively and there were no indications of radar being used.

Koutine patrols around the Manila area are negligible, however after the attack of June 23rd the area was strongly patrolled by a hunter-killer group consisting of a plane, a destroyer, and several smaller A/S vessels.

A speed of 90 rpm was used at 300 feet to evade A/S attack and seemed to leave most of the depth charges astern.

(K) Major defects and damage.

1. June 2 - Both high pressure air compressor motors were grounded out due to water being blown into them from the bilges by the rapid venting of negative tank, the vent of which leads into the pump room bilges in

— page 247 —
U.S.S. FLIER

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.

The immediate vicinity of the compressors. Both motors were disassembled and thoroughly cleaned and dried out and returned to satisfactory operating condition. Further trouble was prevented by exercising extreme care in venting negative.

2. June 13 - Power was lost on the stern planes temporarily three times at critical moments. The three speed switch installed by the navy yard during overhaul proved to be the source of the trouble. The resistances introduced when operating the motor at medium and low speeds cause a decrease in voltage below the amount necessary for proper operation. The motor was operated at normal speed the remainder of the patrol. It is recommended that the three speed switch be investigated and possibly the resistances reduced.

3. Considerable difficulty was encountered throughout the patrol in maintaining the proper adjustment of the starting panels for the low pressure blowers. This was a repetitive failure in the proper operation of the accelerating contactors and will be investigated more thoroughly during the coming refit period.

(L) Radio.

All serials were received. Much interference was experienced, however none was believed to be due to enemy jamming. Transmissions were completed with little difficulty on the 4235 series. Antenotators were used at all times with prompt acknowledgment.

(M) Radar.

The SJ and SD radar performance was excellent. This is largely attributable to the expert attention given this gear by HOWELL, A.G. RTLc.

Radar interference was noted on the SJ radar four times. In two of these instances friendly submarines were known to be in our vicinity while no enemy forces were known to be near. In the other two instances enemy forces were known to be present, while although a friendly submarine could have been in the vicinity, its presence was not definitely known.

The first of these two instances was at Lat. 13-10N Long. 120-27E on June 22, while we were tracking an enemy convoy with several escorts. However, nothing in their

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actions indicated they were aware of our presence until we attacked the convoy, and then they never definitely located us.

In the second of these instances on June 23 we had been in contact with a destroyer while submerged and just before sunset in Lt. 14-07N long. 120-14E. We lost contact as darkness set in, and in a radar sweep just before surfacing the only thing noticeable on the screen was radar interference from about 2000T. Immediately upon surfacing made radar contact at 6,000 yds. on this bearing with what is believed to have been the same destroyer. Although he was aware of our presence in the area, it is quite apparent that he did not have a radar contact on us after we surfaced.

A search was made with the AN/APR-1 radar detector between 80 and 1000 megacycles once each hour while on the surface in the vicinity of enemy bases. We were fooled at first by indications on 185, 205, 250, 283, 305 and 310 megacycles, but these were apparently from intermediate frequencies on the SD, as they disappeared as soon as that radar was turned off. Although considerable time was spent within fifteen miles of Corregidor and the suspected radar on Lubeang Island, we were surprised to get absolutely no indications of enemy radar at any time. While enroute to base we encountered a friendly submarine and made a search and were able to pick up their SD on about 118 megacycles.

Very definite interference picked up on the SD radar, and at first attributed to enemy radars, was subsequently discovered to be caused by a defect in our own transmitter.

(N) Sound Gear and Sound Conditions.

Sound conditions were uniformly good throughout the patrol. The QC/B gear was much more effective than the JP-1 sound equipment. The JP-was unable to contact anything at a greater range than 3,000 yards.

(O) Density Layers.

In the South China Sea west of the Luzon coast no surface layers were encountered. All gradients

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Were negative with a stop of from two to ten degrees at some point between 100 and 200 feet.

The average periscope depth echo range was between 2000 and 3500 yards with a ping range of about 2000 yards. The assured range varied between 1200 and 1800 yards and was usually at a depth of 250 feet.

It was noted that the negative gradient became sharper as the coast was approached increasing to as much as 8 degrees five miles off shore. Convex sely the negative gradient became as low as 2 degrees some distance from the coast.

(P) Health, Food and Habitability.

The ship's company enjoyed excellent health throughout the patrol with no days being lost due to sickness.

The food was quite good with the ice cream freezer being a very welcome addition.

In general the habitability was good with the possible exception of the forward torpedo room. This space gets little circulation of air and remains hot and uncomfortable in the tropics even while operating on the surface. It is recommended that an additional cooling unit similar to the one in the conning tower be installed in the forward battery with a booster blower to increase the supply of air to the forward torpedo room.

(Q) Personnel.

A large percentage of both officer and enlisted personnel received their first combat experience during this patrol. Their performance of duty was exceptional and reflected the soundness of the underway training programs conducted at New London and Pearl Harbor.

Extensive use of the available training facilities ashore from the time the crew was first formed until the present has paid dividends. In addition, the extended period from commissioning until this patrol together with a small personnel turnover has resulted in more than the average training for a new boat.

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(R) Miles Steamed - Fuel Used.
Pearl Harbor to Area 5888 Mi. 57,000 Gals.
In Area 1750 Mi. 14,000 Gals.
Area to Frenanthe, W.A. 2914 Mi. 42,000 Gals.

(S) Duration.

Days enroute to Area - 19 days.
Days in Area - 14 days.
Days enroute to Base - 11 days.
Days submerged - 19 days.

(T) Factors of Encumance Remaining.

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor
Number Gals. Days Days
4 1500 30 20
Limiting factor this patrol: Effective expenditure of torpedoes.

(U) The two Manila bound convoys that we encountered were proceeding so to arrive off Corregidor at day-light. There is considerable shipping in this vicinity, and it is considered that several boats could be effectively employed in this area simultaneously. Direct VHF voice radio communication would be of considerable assistance.

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