U.S.S. SCULPIN (SS-191) — war patrol report SS-191_SCULPIN.pdf

— page 1 —
7-108
AR-86-99
55-191; Scripps
OPERATOR
DATE April 99

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET - START AND END
NDW-NPPSO-5210/1 (6-78)

— page 5 —
125 feet, so the submarine broached and was again detected. She immediately submerged and the destroyer attacked with a pattern of 18 depth charges. There was considerable damage, including temporary loss of depth control. As a result, Scelpin ran beyond safe depth so that many knots developed in the hull. So much water entered that the submarine was forced to run at a high speed to maintain depth. This made tracking easy for the Japanese sonar. A second depth charge attack knocked out Scelpin's sonar, leaving her blind.

The submarine's commanding officer, Comdr. Fred Conway, decided to surface and give the crew of the doomed vessel a chance for survival. With her decks still awash, Scelpin's gunners manned the deck guns but were no match for the destroyer's machine battery. A shell hit the conning tower and killed the bridge watch team, including Comdr. Conway, and flying frigate Lt. John Killeen. The crew of the destroyer's officer of the day, Comdr. John M. Noyes, was killed. The destroy

— page 6 —
5-089
DECLASSIFIED DATE: 25 JANUARY 1942
DECLASSIFIED BY: U.S.S. SULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO
26 January 1942

SUBJECT: SUBMARINE REPORT

1. In accordance with existing instructions, subject report and Radio log for our patrol must be forwarded herewith.

FILMED
(4) 40204

— page 7 —
88391/416-3
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO
23 January 1942.

U.S.S. SCULPIN
Seriel (02)

REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
PERIOD FROM 1700, BEGINNING 4, 1941 TO 0730, JANUARY 22, 1942.

AREA: East Coast Philippines, including Luan Bay and Bataan
Channel, Cebuanas and Makassar Straits to Borneo
via Nadiar Sound.

ZONE THIS KEPT: NUDU 6

— page 8 —
1. U.S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

PART "A" of Serial (30) - Report of First Per- toral - U.S.S. SCULPIN.

December 3, 1941: Pursuant to verb 1 orders, rendered with U.S.SULPIN, the destroyer and two destroyer patrols (at 17:00, at 17:30, at 17:45, at 18:00, at 18:30, at 19:00, at 19:30, at 20:00, at 20:30, at 21:00, at 21:30, at 22:00, at 22:30, at 23:00, at 23:30, at 24:00, at 24:30, at 25:00, at 25:30, at 26:00, at 26:30, at 27:00, at 27:30, at 28:00, at 28:30, at 29:00, at 29:30, at 30:00, at 30:30, at 31:00, at 31:30, at 32:00, at 32:30, at 33:00, at 33:30, at 34:00, at 34:30, at 35:00, at 35:30, at 36:00, at 36:30, at 37:00, at 37:30, at 38:00, at 38:30, at 39:00, at 39:30, at 40:00, at 40:30, at 41:00, at 41:30, at 42:00, at 42:30, at 43:00, at 43:30, at 44:00, at 44:30, at 45:00, at 45:30, at 46:00, at 46:30, at 47:00, at 47:30, at 48:00, at 48:30, at 49:00, at 49:30, at 50:00, at 50:30, at 51:00, at 51:30, at 52:00, at 52:30, at 53:00, at 53:30, at 54:00, at 54:30, at 55:00, at 55:30, at 56:00, at 56:30, at 57:00, at 57:30, at 58:00, at 58:30, at 59:00, at 59:30, at 60:00, at 60:30, at 61:00, at 61:30, at 62:00, at 62:30, at 63:00, at 63:30, at 64:00, at 64:30, at 65:00, at 65:30, at 66:00, at 66:30, at 67:00, at 67:30, at 68:00, at 68:30, at 69:00, at 69:30, at 70:00, at 70:30, at 71:00, at 71:30, at 72:00, at 72:30, at 73:00, at 73:30, at 74:00, at 74:30, at 75:00, at 75:30, at 76:00, at 76:30, at 77:00, at 77:30, at 78:00, at 78:30, at 79:00, at 79:30, at 80:00, at 80:30, at 81:00, at 81:30, at 82:00, at 82:30, at 83:00, at 83:30, at 84:00, at 84:30, at 85:00, at 85:30, at 86:00, at 86:30, at 87:00, at 87:30, at 88:00, at 88:30, at 89:00, at 89:30, at 90:00, at 90:30, at 91:00, at 91:30, at 92:00, at 92:30, at 93:00, at 93:30, at 94:00, at 94:30, at 95:00, at 95:30, at 96:00, at 96:30, at 97:00, at 97:30, at 98:00, at 98:30, at 99:00, at 99:30, at 100:00, at 100:30, at 101:00, at 101:30, at 102:00, at 102:30, at 103:00, at 103:30, at 104:00, at 104:30, at 105:00, at 105:30, at 106:00, at 106:30, at 107:00, at 107:30, at 108:00, at 108:30, at 109:00, at 109:30, at 110:00, at 110:30, at 111:00, at 111:30, at 112:00, at 112:30, at 113:00, at 113:30, at 114:00, at 114:30, at 115:00, at 115:30, at 116:00, at 116:30, at 117:00, at 117:30, at 118:00, at 118:30, at 119:00, at 119:30, at 120:00, at 120:30, at 121:00, at 121:30, at 122:00, at 122:30, at 123:00, at 123:30, at 124:00, at 124:30, at 125:00, at 125:30, at 126:00, at 126:30, at 127:00, at 127:30, at 128:00, at 128:30, at 129:00, at 129:30, at 130:00, at 130:30, at 131:00, at 131:30, at 132:00, at 132:30, at 133:00, at 133:30, at 134:00, at 134:30, at 135:00, at 135:30, at 136:00, at 136:30, at 137:00, at 137:30, at 138:00, at 138:30, at 139:00, at 139:30, at 140:00, at 140:30, at 141:00, at 141:30, at 142:00, at 142:30, at 143:00, at 143:30, at 144:00, at 144:30, at 145:00, at 145:30, at 146:00, at 146:30, at 147:00, at 147:30, at 148:00, at 148:30, at 149:00, at 149:30, at 150:00, at 150:30, at 151:00, at 151:30, at 152:00, at 152:30, at 153:00, at 153:30, at 154:00, at 154:30, at 155:00, at 155:30, at 156:00, at 156:30, at 157:00, at 157:30, at 158:00, at 158:30, at 159:00, at 159:30, at 160:00, at 160:30, at 161:00, at 161:30, at 162:00, at 162:30, at 163:00, at 163:30, at 164:00, at 164:30, at 165:00, at 165:30, at 166:00, at 166:30, at 167:00, at 167:30, at 168:00, at 168:30, at 169:00, at 169:30, at 170:00, at 170:30, at 171:00, at 171:30, at 172:00, at 172:30, at 173:00, at 173:30, at 174:00, at 174:30, at 175:00, at 175:30, at 176:00, at 176:30, at 177:00, at 177:30, at 178:00, at 178:30, at 179:00, at 179:30, at 180:00, at 180:30, at 181:00, at 181:30, at 182:00, at 182:30, at 183:00, at 183:30, at 184:00, at 184:30, at 185:00, at 185:30, at 186:00, at 186:30, at 187:00, at 187:30, at 188:00, at 188:30, at 189:00, at 189:30, at 190:00, at 190:30, at 191:00, at 191:30, at 192:00, at 192:30, at 193:00, at 193:30, at 194:00, at 194:30, at 195:00, at 195:30, at 196:00, at 196:30, at 197:00, at 197:30, at 198:00, at 198:30, at 199:00, at 199:30, at 200:00, at 200:30, at 201:00, at 201:30, at 202:00, at 202:30, at 203:00, at 203:30, at 204:00, at 204:30, at 205:00, at 205:30, at 206:00, at 206:30, at 207:00, at 207:30, at 208:00, at 208:30, at 209:00, at 209:30, at 210:00, at 210:30, at 211:00, at 211:30, at 212:00, at 212:30, at 213:00, at 213:30, at 214:00, at 214:30, at 215:00, at 215:30, at 216:00, at 216:30, at 217:00, at 217:30, at 218:00, at 218:30, at 219:00, at 219:30, at 220:00, at 220:30, at 221:00, at 221:30, at 222:00, at 222:30, at 223:00, at 223:30, at 224:00, at 224:30, at 225:00, at 225:30, at 226:00, at 226:30, at 227:00, at 227:30, at 228:00, at 228:30, at 229:00, at 229:30, at 230:00, at 230:30, at 231:00, at 231:30, at 232:00, at 232:30, at 233:00, at 233:30, at 234:00, at 234:30, at 235:00, at 235:30, at 236:00, at 236:30, at 237:00, at 237:30, at 238:00, at 238:30, at 239:00, at 239:30, at 240:00, at 240:30, at 241:00, at 241:30, at 242:00, at 242:30, at 243:00, at 243:30, at 244:00, at 244:30, at 245:00, at 245:30, at 246:00, at 246:30, at 247:00, at 247:30, at 248:00, at 248:30, at 249:00, at 249:30, at 250:00, at 250:30, at 251:00, at 251:30, at 252:00, at 252:30, at 253:00, at 253:30, at 254:00, at 254:30, at 255:00, at 255:30, at 256:00, at 256:30, at 257:00, at 257:30, at 258:00, at 258:30, at 259:00, at 259:30, at 260:00, at 260:30, at 261:00, at 261:30, at 262:00, at 262:30, at 263:00, at 263:30, at 264:00, at 264:30, at 265:00, at 265:30, at 266:00, at 266:30, at 267:00, at 267:30, at 268:00, at 268:30, at 269:00, at 269:30, at 270:00, at 270:30, at 271:00, at 271:30, at 272:00, at 272:30, at 273:00, at 273:30, at 274:00, at 274:30, at 275:00, at 275:30, at 276:00, at 276:30, at 277:00, at 277:30, at 278:00, at 278:30, at 279:00, at 279:30, at 280:00, at 280:30, at 281:00, at 281:30, at 282:00, at 282:30, at 283:00, at 283:30, at 284:00, at 284:30, at 285:00, at 285:30, at 286:00, at 286:30, at 287:00, at 287:30, at 288:00, at 288:30, at 289:00, at 289:30, at 290:00, at 290:30, at 291:00, at 291:30, at 292:00, at 292:30, at 293:00, at 293:30, at 294:00, at 294:30, at 295:00, at 295:30, at 296:00, at 296:30, at 297:00, at 297:30, at 298:00, at 298:30, at 299:00, at 299:30, at 300:00, at 300:30, at 301:00, at 301:30, at 302:00, at 302:30, at 303:00, at 303:30, at 304:00, at 304:30, at 305:00, at 305:30, at 306:00, at 306:30, at 307:00, at 307:30, at 308:00, at 308:30, at 309:00, at 309:30, at 310:00, at 310:30, at 311:00, at 311:30, at 312:00, at 312:30, at 313:00, at 313:30, at 314:00, at 314:30, at 315:00, at 315:30, at 316:00, at 316:30, at 317:00, at 317:30, at 318:00, at 318:30, at 319:00, at 319:30, at 320:00, at 320:30, at 321:00, at 321:30, at 322:00, at 322:30, at 323:00, at 323:30, at 324:00, at 324:30, at 325:00, at 325:30, at 326:00, at 326:30, at 327:00, at 327:30, at 328:00, at 328:30, at 329:00, at 329:30, at 330:00, at 330:30, at 331:00, at 331:30, at 332:00, at 332:30, at 333:00, at 333:30, at 334:00, at 334:30, at 335:00, at 335:30, at 336:00, at 336:30, at 337:00, at 337:30, at 338:00, at 338:30, at 339:00, at 339:30, at 340:00, at 340:30, at 341:00, at 341:30, at 342:00, at 342:30, at 343:00, at 343:30, at 344:00, at 344:30, at 345:00, at 345:30, at 346:00, at 346:30, at 347:00, at 347:30, at 348:00, at 348:30, at 349:00, at 349:30, at 350:00, at 350:30, at

— page 9 —
U.S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

PAGE 1 of 1
PASS "A" of Serial (00) - Report of First War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN

December 31, 1941: (Continued) executed, decided to maintain stationery patrol in present position until arrival of torpedo destroyer. Navy radio notified at 25 feet until enemy, torpedo destroyer torped

— page 13 —
U.S.S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

PART "A" to Serial (09) - Report of First War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN.

January 13, 1942: At 0730 located ship, 1,397 west to battle stations and commenced movement. At 0745 located the submarine and 1,395 located the submarine. At 0755 located the submarine and 1

— page 19 —
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

U.S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

PART 9° of Ser1 (09) - Report of First War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN.

TRAVELING DATA

SIGHT AT 1:00 JANUARY 1942 AT 1106 GMT SURIGAO STRAIT

1. 4 torpedoes fired (f1927, f1928, f1929, f1930, f1931) de the set 10 feet, high speed, first two on 30°G, second two on 45°G gyro.

2. Night surprise attack, on surface, sighted target at 1100 about 2° on starboard bow, single on the bow, our source about 180°E, speed 1.5 knots, depth charge carried generally to 100° depth, heading for target.

3. Point of aim, bow, target 8 knots, 1°E.

4. Track 1108 to 1408.

5. Target course 290°T, speed 12 knots.

6. Longitudinal spread, 4 second firing interval.

7. Two hits plus, (1st, 2nd and possibly 3rd) observed. First was 55 seconds after firing, second was 55 seconds.

8. Results unknown.

There seemed to be such a long time after firing with no burst that we reset gyros and fired again, the first burst coming just after the second two were out.

— page 20 —
1. On the night of January 2-3, in the westerly bearing 65°W, 1,000 yards from the U.S.S. SULPHUR, 1,000 yards from the U.S

— page 22 —
1. U.S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO
PART "A" to Berth (02) - Report of First War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN.

Hour Underway: 4:30
Surface: Engines
Submerged: Batteries
Total: 1095.1

Miles Underway: 565.4
Surface: Engines
Submerged: Batteries
Total: 1111.6
Total Kts. Generated: 139.130
Total A.D. Arrived: 139.130
Total A.D. Arrived: 131.6
Fuel used: 4,365

— page 25 —
3 March 1942.
IN REPLY
REFER TO:
U.S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO
3 March 1942.

SAGI/116-7
DECLASSIFIED
Series (04)
From:
The Commanding Officer,
Commander Submarines, U.S. Asiatic Fleet.

Subject:
Ver Patrol Report.

1. In accordance with existing instructions, subject
report and Radio Log for our patrol report are forwarded herewith.

Signed:
[Signature]
[Date]

— page 26 —
88191/A16-3
: 2-C-L-E-I-D-E-L-E-I-A-L
: Serial (04)
: U.S.S. SULPHUR
: REPORT OF SECOND MAR PATROL
: PERIOD FROM 1305, JANUARY 30, 1942 to 0546, February 28, 1942.
: AREAS: Approaches to Kendert; Kendert to Greyhound Straits;
: Greyhound Straits to Kem.
: ZONE TIME HRS: MINUS 7 H

— page 29 —
1/2/1

IN REPLY
REFER TO:

U.S.S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

PART "A" to Serial (01) - Report of Second War Patrol - USS SCULPIN

February 1942 (contd):
   1. What were in column with but circled or skipped?
   2. What were not identified but were quite large, one of them impressed me as being a Hobo class carrier; however it was too late to shift target and be spared of the enemy's torpedo firing position.
   3. At 2341 fired two torpedoes from two boats. Explosions heard at 25 and 32 seconds after firing first torpedo. Officer of the deck observed one explosion and the second one was a 2nd torpedo. Dived and preserved to receive counter attack and died at 2nd torpedo.
   4. February 1942: Nothing being heard, and reload completed, surfaced and commenced efforts to regain contact. By 2nd of 1st enemy ships sighted two ships, presumed to be from the group fired at with apparently had scattered, at 2nd torpedo (5000 - 7000 yards) but lost them before gaining firing range. At 2nd torpedo, 2nd torpedo fired for contact report. At 2nd torpedo, 2

— page 32 —
17 February 1942 (courtesy): Herd torpedoes running and braced emergency. White water penetrated under her counter during torpedo run. Dove and almost immediately took a string of five very close darts, three charges, missed effect; being about 150 feet. At 23:36, second striking, three charges, missed effect; Keel det. 23:36 feet. Destroyer energetically continued search. Damage resulting from this attack was partly due to the damage to the torpedo tubes and an injury to the torpedo control. It is not clear whether the torpedo tubes were destroyed. The torpedo tubes were not damaged. The torped

— page 34 —
0 0

IN REPLY
REFER TO:
U. S. S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

[Date] [Name] [Location]

I. NOTES:
In the Floe Sea the west monsoon was blowing strongly and steadily, velocity about 10 knots. Gentle breezes were experienced in Jaluit, Faroe, Jaluit Sea, Jaluit Sea, Timor Sea, and Indian Ocean.

II. WEATHER:
Squally, overcast weather, accompanied by severe lightning storms, was experienced for several days. In the vicinity of Novi Is., the weather was a moderate swell. Other weather was characterized by excellent weather; clear days and nights with exceptionally good visibility; moderate temperature; seas flat calm.

III. DATA:
No opportunity presented for collection of tidal data.

IV. CURRENTS:
The following average currents were observed:

| Location | Set | Drift |
||-----|-------|
| Central Flares Sea | 0700(n) | 2.0 Kts |
| Western Flares Sea | 0450(t) | 1.8 Kts |
| West I Sea | 0060(t) | 1.0 Kts. |
| Gunung Api (Banda Sea) | 1800(m) | 0.8 Kts |
| Minor Sea | 0000(m) | 1.0 Kts. |
| Off NW Coast Australia | 0450(t) | 0.6 Kts. |

10
11/26

— page 35 —
0.55 SCULPIN
N. 35
DIVE 5-12
TRACK CHART
435 FEB. 1942

MANN
DIVE 5-12
ATMOS
SINK DESTROYER
WOMANI

11/27

— page 45 —
0 0

IN REPLY
REFER TO:

U. S. S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

G-G-H-I-J-K-L-M-N-O-P-Q-R-S-T-U-V-W-X-Y-Z
Tank UTH to Serial (04) - Report of Second War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN
PROSPECTION OF ALL NAVY AIRCRAFT SIGHTED

Date: 2/22/42 0806 99-24S 126-42 VP
Time: 2250
Location: Low 300-400
Test: Color silver, two engines in wing, snorkel, floats not retracted, step in fuselage, no 'distinguishing' remarks.

1137

— page 48 —
1942 SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO
FART 13" (Continued)

ATTACK OF 17 FEBRUARY 1942 AT ABOUT 0600 JUST NORTH OF 3. BATHOUND START

1. Two torpedoes from aft.
2. T.D.C. 45 minute run, on 3500 ton supply.
3. Middle of target was point of aim.
4. Track 95 3
5. Enemy course 2050, speed 6 knots (actually 9 by T.D.C.).
   Own course 2900m, speed 3 knots. range 2200 (by T.D.C.).
   (actually 3000). Depth set 10, speed high. Gyro set 180.75 (75 R)
6. Firing bearing 174.25
7. Divergent spread of 10 (3 torpedoes spread 1st 10L, 2nd 0, 3rd 10 R)
8. No hits. Missed astern. After analysis of the approach it is believed that the target was missing 9 knots. Ranges were very poor due to approach being made before sun up and target being poorly defined. Also, we had fish aft but none to spare forward, and in making an approach for a stern shot we allowed the range to open too much. Furthermore a divergent 3 torpedo spread was set but only the first two torpedoes were fired. Had the last (leading the target) torpedo been fired we may have gotten a hit.

ATTACK OF 17 FEBRUARY 1942 ABOUT 2315 HALFWAY BETWEEN G.BAYHOUND AND WYOMING

1. Two torpedoes from forward.
2. Night surface attack on large D.D.
3. Point of aim bow and middle.
4. Track angle 105 P.

— page 49 —
0-N-F-I-D-3-N-T-I-A-L
PART 193 (Cont'd)
ATTACK OF 17 FEBRUARY 1942 ABOUT 7 2315 HALFMAY BIRTHDAY
GRAYHOUND AND WIGON (Cont'd).

5. Enemy course 1250m, speed 12 knots.
   Own course 2150m, speed 4 knots. Range estimated 800 yds.
   Depth set 10 feet, speed high. Gyro set 3450 (15°L).
   Firing bearing 000.

6. Longitudinal spread.
   No hits. Torpedoes were seen to run ahead of target apparently
   due to target backing emergency at sighting us; just prior
   to firing, and maybe an over guess on speed.

8. Resulted in the most thorough depth charging so far experienced.

ATTACK OF 25 FEBRUARY 1942 ABOUT 1630 LMT 13-54S LONG 119-09W

1. One torpedo from forward (our last)
2. T.D.C. snap set-up on large submarine.
3. Point of aim H.O.T.
4. Track 110 F.
5. Enemy course 178°, speed 12 knots. Own quorse 2550T, speed
   3 knots. Range 2500 yards, run 2700 yards. Depth set 10,
   speed high - Gyro set 358.25 (1.75°). Firing bearing 014.

6. Aimed to hit.
7. No hit. Submarine sighted torpedo wake and turned with
   torpedo causing a very close miss ahead.
8. Submarine showed 180° angle on the bow and left at high speed.

— page 52 —
U. S. S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

PART "J" to Serial (04) - Report of Second War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN

Hours Underway:

Surface - Engines 289.1
Surface - Battery 0.6
Submerged - 402.1

Total 691.8

Miles Underway:

Surface - Engines 4047.1
Surface - Battery 3.4
Submerged 924.5

Total 4975.0

Number of charges 30

Total K.W. generated 81,173

Total A.H. charged 119,385

Total cycles 19.8

Number of dives 30

Fresh water received None

Fresh water made 13,984 Gal. per man per day 6.85

Fresh Water used 12,302 " " " " 6.03

Battery water made 735 Gallons per day 24.5

Battery water used 1,453 " " 48.4

Fuel used: Charging 7,504

Propulsion 34,999 Gallons per mile 8.7

— page 53 —
41193 FILMED

IN REPLY
REFER TO:

U.S.S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

S8191/A16-3
27 April 1942

SERIAL (8-1)

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: Commander Submarine, U.S. Asiatic Fleet.

Subject: War Patrol Report.

1. In accordance with existing instructions, subject report for war patrol period is forwarded herewith.

[Handwritten text: "Have a nice trip"]

[Handwritten text: "Good luck"]

[

— page 54 —
27 April 1942

CONFIDENTIAL
Serial (S-1)

U.S.S. SCULPIN.
REPORT OF THIRD WAR PATROL
PERIOD FROM 13 MARCH 1942 to 27 APRIL 1942
AREA:  MOLUKKA SEA
ZONE TIME KEPT:  MINUS EIGHT.

— page 55 —
15 March 1942: In compliance with written orders (GSAF Patrol Order of 13 March 1942) directing this ship to operate against the enemy on west coast of Mindanao, south of Surigao Straits and various points enroute, got underway from Fremantle, Australia, at 1745 and proceeded as requisite clearing harbor and outer approaches. At 1937 completed sortie and set course 3260T, proceeding at economical speed.

14 March 1942: Since orders do not indicate urgency in arrival on station but do indicate a long patrol decided to continue at economical speed and to submerge during daylight - the letter primarily to relieve strain on officer and men.

Submerged at 0557, proceeded at 125 feet, listening patrol. No contacts.

15 March 1942: Submerged at 0556, cruised at 125 feet, listening. No contacts. Surfaced at 1912.

16 March 1942: Submerged at 0559, cruised at 125 feet, listening. No contacts. Surfaced at 1912.

The last batch of fuel oil received from Holland is very dirty. When using it centrifuges must be cleaned once a week instead of daily, purloasting the oil cleaned every fifteen minutes instead of every week and, worst of all, engines smoke excessively at normal operating loads. Have two tanks of clean oil which are being held in reserve.

17 March 1942: Submerged at 0541, cruised at 125 feet, listening. No contacts. Surfaced at 1923.

Described GSAP 171125, Serial 77, directing SOUPLIN to proceed direct to Stirling by arriving prior 24th if possible. Proceeded at best speed. Can make it in not half up.

18 March 1942: Submerged at 0553, cruised at 125 feet, listening. No contacts. Surfaced at 1912.

19 March 1942: Submerged at 0548, cruised at 125 feet, listening. No contacts. Surfaced at 1855.

Very troubled cross sea tonights. Ship laboring and very wet. At 2240 took considerable amount of water down conning tower hatch grounding out torpedo air compressor, low pressure blower and hydraulic motor controller panels. Forced to slow to ten knots.

20 March 1942: Completed repairs to grounded units at about 0200. Submerged at 0542, cruised at 125 feet, listening. No contacts. Surfaced at 1847.

21 March 1942: Submerged at 0539, cruised at 125 feet, listening. No contacts. Surfaced at 1848.

Described GSAP 211000, Serial 83, directing SOUPLIN to spend time allotted keeping in Stirling Bay area.

— page 56 —
22 March 1942: Made landfall, Swase Island, bearing 030°T, distance 10 miles. Submerged at 0533, patrolled at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1540.

At 2040 suffered a piston seizure on number four main engine - the first that this ship has ever experienced. Lay it to dirty fuel oil. See Part I.

23 March 1942: At 0123 established a doubtful sight contact, the visibility being very tricky, which failed to develop. Submerged at 0455. A riding turn on the drum tinkled and badly stranded one hoisting cable, number two periscope. Fortunately the break was near the bitter end so by shortening the cable about nine feet and reseating the lug, the periscope was made usable but cannot be fully housed by about seven feet. Patrolled at 140 feet until repairs to periscope hoisting gear were completed, thereafter at 125 feet, making observations at irregular intervals. No contacts. Surfaced at 1540.

Decorated OSAF 251023, Serial 84, announcing probable presence major unit enemy fleet in Staring Bay area.

24 March 1942: At 0345 completed periscope search of Ombai Strait. Submerged at 0432, patrolled at 125 feet making periscope exposures at irregular intervals. No contacts. Surfaced at 1540.

Decorated OSAF 241400, Serial 85, stating that carriers may not arrive Staring Bay prior twenty-sixth.

25 March 1942: Violent rain storm with visibility nil, submerged at 0120 and conducted listening patrol at 100 feet. At 0538, the visibility being fair, surfaced.

Submerged at 0456; patrolled at 100 feet until sunrise, thereafter at periscope depth, covering the south eastern approaches to Staring Bay. No contacts. Surfaced at 1534.

At 2052, while exercising firing valves, number four torpedo tube was fired accidentally with outer door closed and interlocks broken, resulting in loss of torpedo, and jamming outer door open (see Part I). Shored up inner door and reinforced it with wire straps.

26 March 1942: Submerged at 0439, patrolled at periscope depth covering Eastern approaches to Staring Bay. No contacts. Surfaced at 1550.

Decorated OSAF 261144, Serial 90, directing SWOLFEN to patrol Staring Bay approaches south of Greyhound Strait until further orders.

At 2235 sighted smoke and commenced maneuvering for position. At 2331 ship in sight and, it being bright moonlight with excellent visibility, submerged and continued approach submerged. At 2359 fired three torpedoes from forward tubes at cargo or auxiliary ship. Missed, see Part G for firing data and analysis. Commenced reload.

27 March 1942: At 0043, having completed reload, surfaced and proceeded

— page 58 —
30 March 1942 (cont'd): Stopped down toward Runduna Island for this purpose.
    Decirited CSAT 291032 announcing probability of enemy movement on
    Dervin from Kendari Base, among others, in next few days. On this basis
    decided to concentrate patrol on southern approaches.
    At 2139 commenced striking four torpedoes below, and completed this
    operation at 2345.
    31 March 1942: Submerged at 0425, patrolled southeastern approach to
    Sterling Bay area at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1344.
    1 April 1942: Sighted smoke to northward at 0000, commenced maneuvering
    for position. Took great pains to establish enemy course and speed and to
    gain position right ahead before submerging. Submerged at 0217, it being
    brilliant moonlight with excellent visibility, and continued approach. At
    0310 fired three torpedoes from formed tubes at 0300. Torpedoes
    observed to run not, straight and apparently normal for 50 seconds when
    periscope went under. It seemed impossible that they could miss yet no
    explosions were heard, no hits were observed and target was heard to con-
    tinue to run without pause. At 0311 target was observed to have changed
    course to westward toward Wovon Island. Surfaced at 0730. It would have
    been impossible to gain position ahead of enemy for a second attack before
    enemy fetched Sterling Bay and, if the truth must be told, the Commanding
    Officer was so completely demoralized and disheartened by repeated misses
    that he had little stomach for further action until an analysis could be
    made, the finger put on the deficiency of deficiencies responsible, and
    corrective action taken.
    Submerged at 0432, patrolled eastern approaches to Sterling Bay at
    periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1345.
    Completed analysis of all torpedo firings this patrol, copy of analysis
    and notation of remedial action taken included in part G.
    2 April 1942: Submerged at 0427, patrolled southern entrance of Greyhound
    Straits at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1340.
    3 April 1942: Submerged at 0433, patrolled Greyhound Strait - Sterling Bay
    Line at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1347.
    4 April 1942: Submerged at 0431, patrolled eastern approach to Sterling Bay
    area at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1344.
    5 April 1942: Submerged at 0450, patrolled southeastern approach to Sterling
    Bay area at periscope depth.
    At 1455 sighted masts of steamer to south westward, apparently standing
    toward Buton Straits. Unable to close.
    No further contacts. Surfaced at 1530.
    6 April 1942: Submerged at 0410, patrolled southeastern approach to Sterling
    Bay area at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1530.
    7 April 1942: Submerged at 0430, patrolled south eastern approach to
    Sterling Bay area at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1530.

4 -

— page 60 —
1. 1942: Submerged at 0456, retr0lled southern entrance to Greyhound Strait at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1853.
: 2. 1942: Submerged at 0427, retr0lled southern entrance to Greyhound Strait as periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1851.
: 3. Decided to shift patrol to the Selabanka Strait - Peleng Strait line on the subs0sition that enemy is routing traffic via these straits, Wooni Strait and Buton Strait to avoid entirely the central Nolukka Sea.
: 4. Proceeded accordingly.
: 5. 1942: Submerged at 0433, retr0lled the Cape Nederburgh - Thames Reef line at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1855.
: 6. 1942: Submerged at 0431, retr0lled the Cape Nederburgh - Thames Reef line at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1852.
: 7. At 2035 decrypted CASF 161056 (Serial 37) directing units briefly to proceed to Freemantle via east of Timor. Proceeded as requisite adusting speed so that eastern approaches to Sterling Bay were would be covered during submergence tomorrow. Dispersed by 161701 reporting results of patrol and enemy activity in area and included the gratuitous information that 8/3/41 could maintain patrol station for another week.
: 8. 1942: Submerged at 0433, retr0lled eastern approaches to Sterling Bay area at periscope depth.
: 9. At 0834 sighted masts of ship on easterly course to northwest. Proceeded to close track. At 0832 herd echo ranging on approximate bearing of ship. At 0831 was able to identify ship as a large tanker and could see the topmasts of one escorting destroyer. At 0835 was abaft the tanker's beam, minimum range 3,000-10,000 yards; only one escort discovered which, since only the upper works could be seen, was not well identified but appeared to be a very small single stack destroyer.
: 10. No further contacts. Surfaced at 1829 and immediately dispatched by 170145 reporting contact with tanker. This ship was unable to obtain CSS 11613 before commencement of present patrol hence was unable to use CASF correct call unless I waited until a dispatch from him, originating this date, was received. Such delay might well mean that SWORDFISH, commonly with CASF 161513 (serial 36), would be in a position from which it would be impossible to intercept tanker before she was informed of its presence. Consequently addressed this dispatch to CASF, using yesterday's call, and to NERK with "SWORDFISH" note in the body.
: 11. Set course to pass to eastward of Weter and Timor, proceeded at moderate speed hoping to receive instructions to remain on station.
: 12. 1942: Submerged at 0452, cruised at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1853.
: 13. Instructions to remain on station not having been received, proceeded at best cruising speed.

— page 61 —
19 April 1942: Submerged at 0540, cruised at periscope depth. No contact. Surprised at 1430. 20 April 1942: At 0428 and again at 0432, in latitude 10-558, longitude 124-022, saw flares to northwest. Presumed to be dropped by aircraft since there was neither the flash or sound of gunfire. These flares burst at fairly high altitude, descended very slowly, burned for a minute or more with a brilliant yellowish light. They were at a considerable distance from the ship, estimated to be not less than 15,000 - 20,000 yards. Nevertheless with aircraft in the vicinity decided it would be the better part of valor to refrain from holding back the dawn. Submerged at 0445, cruised at periscope depth. No contact. Surprised at 1758. 21 April 1942: Submerged at 0536, cruised at periscope depth. No contact. Surprised at 1758. 22 April 1942: Submerged at 0550, cruised at periscope depth. No contact. Surprised at 1800. 23 April 1942: Decided to extend surface running period as necessary to insure arrival at rendezvous on April 27th. Submerged at 0800, cruised at periscope depth. No contact. Surprised at 1611. Discontinued my 230901 announcing estimated time of arrival rendezvous as two hours prior dawn on April 27th. 24 April 1942: Reminded on surface. No contact. 25 April 1942: Continued on surface. No contact. 26 April 1942: Continued on surface. At 1446 sighted plane to southward, on easterly course. Distance and indifferen visibility, overcast with low flying nimble clouds, prevented accurate identification but it is believed that this was a patrol type plane, and from its position and course it was presumed to be friendly. No other contacts. At 2300 sighted loom of Rotneist Island light. 27 April 1942: At 0330 established contact with U.S.S. ISABEL and in company with her stood into Freemantle harbor thus concluding third war patrol.

— page 62 —
88191/A16-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

U.S.S. SCULPIN
PARTS (B), (C) AND (D) of Serial 5-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN.

I - Winds:
During the early part of the patrol in Kolukka and Bande Sea changeable winds of moderate strength were experienced. By the end of the patrol the east monsoon had become fairly well established. Off Western Australia strong southerly winds were encountered.

II - The passage north along the coast of Australia was characterized by scudily, overcast weather, with large swells from the southwest. The Kolukka Sea was generally clear, with good visibility, calm seas and moderate temperature; however, several overcast days were experienced, due probably to the shift of the monsoon from west to east. It was noted that the land breeze across the Celebes generally brought overcast weather, while the southerly and easterly winds brought clear weather. Heavy swells from the south were encountered while running down the western coast of Australia.

III - No tidal data was obtained.

IV - The following average currents were observed:

| LOCATION | SET | DRIFT |
||-----|-------|
| Peleng Strait | 3150(T) | 1.0 kts. |
| Kolukka Sea | 0000(T) | 0.6 kts. |
| Timor Sea | 2700(T) | 1.9 kts. |
| Off Northwest Australia | 2700(T) | 0.7 kts. |
| Off West Coast Australia | 0000(T) | 0.4 kts. |

— page 63 —
10°S
USS SCOLPIN
GENERAL TRACK
32 DE WAVE PATROL
13 MARCH - 27 APRIL

PROCEEDING TO LAT 20°S
LONG 112°E, THERE
TO FERMENTATE,
PASSING THROUGH
BOMBING RESISTANT
LANE

PROCEEDING FROM FRONTIER
TO PATROL STATION

AUSTRALIA

11

— page 64 —
124° 2° 5. GRIFFIN STRAIT
: FIRE AT MERRIMACK
: SUBMERGED 26.4
: DIVED 26.4
: DIVED 27.4
: DIVED 27.4
: DIVED 26

— page 69 —
1. USS S. S. SCULPIN
: SS191/A16-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

CONFIDENTIAL
PART (E) of Serial 8-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN.

DESCRIPTION OF ALL ENEMY WAR, INFORMANT SHIPS OR OTHER CRAFT SIGHTED
Time Position Day, Time, Long, Time, Course, Speed, Remarks
Date (7-1) Lat Long Time Tonnage Course Speed Remarks
3-20-42 2359 3-288 124-20M HERO 600 050 10K Slight
clipper bow, long well deck forward, 2 sempan boats forward, 1 stack,
two sempan boats aft, short well deck aft, high straight bridge.
3-28-42 0144 2-328 124-43S SS 1500 Ship
disempered in mist, countercurrents.
3-24-42 1613 2-321 104-40M HERO 600 000 10K Unable
to close - only masts and upper works visible. One stack.
3-28-42 1643 2-308 123-52S AT 7500 030 12K ASAKA KARU TYPE
400 ft long, high bridge saddle, 1 stack, 2masts, straight bow, heavily
3-28-42 1643 2-308 123-52S DD 1500 030 12K loaded.
4-1-42 0310 48 1245 1200 2000 10K Single
stack, small island, two stick masts, straight bow.
4-5-42 1455 4-053 123-30S 1200 2000 10K South

— page 71 —
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

ATTACH OF 27 MARCH 1942

1. Koonlight periscope attack, 27 March 1942.
2. Used T.D.C., generated bearing, fired 3 torpedoes.
3. Target was usually ship of about 4000 tons.
4. Track angle 92°.
5. Generated range 3700 yards - run 3800: Approach officer estimate of firing range, 2000 yards.
6. Gyro 002.5 (2.5GR) Target course 1050, speed 10.
7. Firing bearing 0150 relative, angle on bow 80°.
8. Point of aim was 100°.
9. Depth set to 10 feet, speed high.
10. Used T.D.C., generated bearing, fired 3 torpedoes.
11. Target was usually ship of about 4500 tons.
12. Track angle 105°.
13. Range 1350, run 1375.
14. Gyro 338.5 (21.5OL) Own course 1240T, speed 12.
15. Target course 0280T, speed 12.
16. Firing bearing 355.5 Rel, angle on bow 89°.
17. Point of aim was NOT.
18. Depth set to 10 feet, speed high.
19. Used divergent spread of 20° applied to the generated gyro angle so that one torpedo went down the generated gyro angle and the other two went 20° and 10°.
20. Could not observe results as escort turned for counter action but two hits were heard at 55 seconds and 55 seconds after first torpedo was fired.

— page 72 —
1. Hoonlight periscope attack, 1 April 1942.
2. Used T.D.C., generated bearings, fired 3 torpedoes.
3. Target was sunnily vessel of about 5000 tons.
4. Track angle 105°.
5. Range 1000, run 1000.
6. Gyro 3° (10°L) Own course 310° speed 3.
   Target course 255°, speed 10.
   Firing bearing 002, angle on bow 93°.
   Point of aim was 30°.

7. Depth set 10 feet, speed high.
8. Used divergent spread of 30° applied to the generated gyro angle so that one torpedo went down the generated gyro angle and the other two went 5° R and L of the generated gyro angle.
9. No results observed. From all point firing date target should have been hit at least twice. Torpedo run observed for fifty seconds, hot, straight and apparently normal. Complete analysis follows.

ANALYSIS OF ATTACKS

(A) FACTS.
27 March 1942: Target was placed on by moonlight, smoke only being seen at first. As soon as direction of change in bearing was established came to normal approach course and proceeded at high speed to close track, slowing occasionally to observe direction and rate of bearing change. When target came in sight, dove and continued the approach submerged. Approach and attack were perfectly simple - continued on normal approach course at fairly high speed until the track angle approached 900, then swung to firing course for a virtual straight shot. Fired three torpedoes from forward tubes, firing was previously tabulated; only direction, range, approach officer's estimate of firing range, 2000 yards. Torpedo were heard to run hot and were observed to run hot, straight and apparently normal. Sometime after firing, exact time not noted, target turned away. Attempted to gain position ahead for a dawn attack without success. However, target was observed at dawn and was then on a course of 055°R, and a speed somewhat higher than the 10 knots used was indicated.

Torpedoes fired on this attack last received routine check on March 24th.

— page 73 —
1. U.S. S. SCULPIN
: 2. SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

PART 1 of 2
Report of Third Ver Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN.

ANALYSIS OF ATTACKS (Cont'd)

28 March 1942: Since it cannot be definitely said that this attack was successful it is included in the analysis.

Target was nicked up with small angle on the bow. Approach was not complicated. Escort, which was not easy, was not easy. Was avoided without difficulty. Destroyer's propeller turned over counted at 120 RPM. In turning to the firing course started giving a little late making it necessary to accept a somewhat broader track than had been planned and a small gyro angle, 21.50. Approach of after's estimates agree with the data developed at T.D.C., previously tabulated.

Fired three torpedoes from forward tubes which were heard to run hot, were sighted but not followed. Two explosions were heard, but were not heard by the commanding officer (Possible explanation - his attention was focused on preparing for torpedo room including sound (possible explanation - noise incident to preparing for reload and rise in air pressure from firing, it being routine to completely seal this room as for collision at general quarters since the casualty to number four tube). On the other hand, personnel especially detailed to record the elapsed time between firing and explosion (gunnery officer and gunner's mate) as well as various other members of the crew are quite sure that explosions were heard. One man who was lying with his head against a torpedo in the after torpedo room racks announced that we were being depth-charged! Sorens of the target were not heard after firing. The escort vessel was tracked across SOUTHERN's stern, fairly close aboard, where they were lost and not heard again. Forty-eight minutes after firing made periscope observation and found nothing in sight.

Torpedoes fired on this attack last received routine check on Kerch 27th.

1 April 1942: Smoke from target was nicked up in brilliant moonlight. Maneuvered for two and a quarter hours to be as certain as possible of gaining a position right ahead before submerging. With this position gained, submerged and continued approach. Approach was perfectly simple. The target course as developed by observation and T.D.C. agreed closely with that anticipated. Turn count varying between 90 and 96 rpm was obtained. Estimates of approach officer and assistant approach officer agree with date developed by T.D.C., previously tabulated. Fired three torpedoes from forward tubes which were heard to run hot, and for fifty seconds were observed to run hot, straight and apparently normal. At fifty seconds after firing target appeared hopelessly bracketed,

— page 75 —
5 - 23

U.S.S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO
CONFIDENTIAL

PART "G" of Serial S-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN

(D) CONCLUSIONS.
From the above it may be concluded that:
(a) In the first attack the error in enemy course, probable error in enemy speed, and uncertain range might well have combined to cause a miss.
(b) The second attack and third attack should have been successful.
(c) All torpedoes ran hot and straight.
(d) Most probable causes of failure of third and possible failure of second attacks are:
   1. Exloder mechanism failed to function properly.
   2. Torpedoes ran deep.

(E) ACTION TO BE TAKEN.
1. Immediately,
   (a) Redouble efforts to close range before firing.
   (b) Carefully examine all remaining torpedoes; check all adjustments placing particular emphasis on warheads and depth mechanisms.
   (c) Reduce depth setting for all except armored targets to six feet.
2. On arrival at base:
   (a) Have torpedo repair officer check our routine of preperation and maintenance, again emphasizing warheads and depth mechanisms.
   (b) Examine tubes for evidence of torpedoes striking and thus being thrown off depth. Fire dummies if warranted.

— page 76 —
4-0017
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF FISHERIES
U.S. COAST & GEODETIC
AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT OF MARCH 27
Assumed Torpedo Length 980 feet
Upper Figure Torpedo Run 1200 yards
Lower Figure Torpedo Run 3700 yards

| Track Angle | 90 | 100 | 110 | 120 | 130 | 140 | 150 |
||----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 90        |    |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 100       |    |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 110       |    |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 120       |    |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 130       |    |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 140       |    |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 150       |    |     |     |     |     |     |     |

24

— page 78 —
1/1/41
IN REPLY
REFER TO:

U. S. S. SCULPIN
SS191/A15-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

CONFIDENTIAL
PA-1 (H) of Ser1-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN.
ENERGY AITI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID
NONE

26

— page 80 —
0

IN REPLY
REFER TO:

U. S. S. SCULPIN
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO
S-E-C-R-E-T

PART (1) of Serial 8-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN

CASUALTY NUMBER ONE - ENGINEERING (cont'd)

PISTON SEIZURE #3 MAIN ENGINE, #2 UNIT:
Following measurements were recorded upon installation of new
parts after casualty:

| LINE | RING | GAP (Corrected to 8.500) |
|------|------||
| F & A | THW. | #1 0.050 |
| 8.4995 | 8.500 | #2 0.034 |
| 8.5005 | 8.500 | #3 0.041 |
| 8.500 | 8.500 | #4 0.034 |
| 8.5005 | 8.500 | #5 0.037 |
| 8.500 | 8.500 | #6 0.028 |
| 8.5005 | 8.500 | #7 0.033 |

— page 81 —
88191/A16-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO
CONFIDENTIAL

Part (I) of Serial 8-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SULPIN.

CASUALTY NUMBER TWO - TORPEDO DEPARTMENT

# 4 TORPEDO TUBE:
At 2055, 25 March 1942, having helped make No. 2 torpedo tube ready to fire an inboard slug, ULNER, J.A., TM2c, USN, unlocked the interlock flag on No. 4 tube and fired that tube by hand with full impulse pressure of 400 pounds and both inner and outer doors locked closed.

The torpedo forced the outer door and shutter open and made a straight run. Apparently the tube functioned properly, gyro spindle dis- engaging and stop bolt lifting. Attempt was made to turn the outer door operating shaft to the fully open position and then close the door but the shaft became jammed, so no further attempt was made for fear of springing shaft because jammed, so no further attempt was made to open the door. The side about midnight and assured that the torpedo tube was empty and the outer door and shutter fully open, just as if they had been made so from inside. No damage to door or shutter could be seen.

It is believed that the worm or gear in the door operating gear box, just above the door, outside the skin, has been stripped or broken. This is shown on G & R drawing 85668 and is similar to the arrangement shown on plate 12 of P. 956.

Proper supervision was not being exercised over the operation of firing the inboard slugs. The leading torpedoman, DOWELL, W.E., TM1c, USN, had turned his back and was directing his attention to the after part of the torpedo room when the tube was fired.

The inner door was shored up using angle irons, bars, wire rope, and chain falls to make it as secure as possible.

The extent of the damage cannot be determined until divers investigate further.

— page 82 —
88191/A16-3
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

U. S. S. SCULPIN
Pert (I) of Serial S-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN.

CASUALTY NUMBER THREE - ENGINEERING

BROKEN AND MISSING RINGS #4 MAIN ENGINE, #9 UNIT:
    At 2100, April 9, 1942 while underway with #3 and #4 main engines on propulsion, #9 unit injector, #4 main engine ceased firing. Took pressure card with "Primax" pressure indicator and found running NEF on the unit to be 200 lbs. less than NEP of adjacent units.
    At 2100 started engine and removed head and piston, finding the following: Third compressor ring missing, first and second compression rings broken but no pieces missing, two small pieces of third compression ring imbedded in top of piston. Several nicks were found in third piston ring groove and in top of piston. No scoring of the liner was found.
    Cleaned piston of carbon, dressed down nicks with a fine file, inspected piston pin needle bearing, renewed all compression rings and reinstalled.
    At 0130, April 10, 1942 engine was placed back in commission.

Total engine hours lost overall: 2746.8
Total engine hours at casualty: 3503.5
Engine hours since overhaul: 755.7

At last overhaul the following readings were recorded:

LOWER
F & A 8.513
8.512 8.513
8.507 8.511
8.505 8.507
8.503 8.505

RING GEPS (Corrected to 8.500)

#1  .061 New Ring
#2  .060 New Ring
#3  .074
#4  .064
#5  .059
#6  .070
#7  - 4 -

— page 83 —
58191/A16-3
U.S. SCULPIN
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

CONFIDENTIAL
Part (I) of Serial 8-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN.

CASUALTY NUMBER THREE - ENGINEERING (cont'd)
BROKEN AND MISSING RINGS #4 MAIN ENGINE, #9 UNIT:

| Top of Pin | At Crown |
|||
| F & A      | 8.473   |
|            | 8.472   |
|            | 8.459   |
|            | 8.459   |

At time of casualty the following readings were recorded:

| LINER | ATF | Ring Decs (Corrected to 8.500) |
|-------|-----||
| 8.518 | 8.518 | #1  .051 New Ring |
| 8.513 | 8.513 | #2  .062 New Ring |
| 8.511 | 8.511 | #3  .063 New Ring |
| 8.508 | 8.508 | #4  .061 New Ring |
| 8.505 | 8.505 | #5  .061 New Ring |
|       |     | #6  .059 |
|       |     | #7  .070 |

— page 84 —
58191/A16-3
CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. SCULPIN
Part (I) of Serial S-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN.

CASUALTY NUMBER FOUR - ELECTRICAL

NUMBER TWO AUXILIARY GENERATOR FLOODED:
While submerged at 0800, April 13, 1942 took about a 3/4 degree down angle. Bilge water from after portions of after engine rooms, especially from pockets in bilge under main motors, ran to forward end of after engine room causing the water level to rise to the height of the shaft of number two auxiliary engine generator, water passing around the shaft into the generator casing.

On level keel, height of water in bilges was about one inch below floor plates. Water was leaking into bilge from drain between inboard and outboard exhaust valves of number one engine. Considerable trouble with leakage of outboard valve has been experienced throughout patrol.

After pumping of bilges removed generator end bell finding about four inches of water in generator casing. Drained generator casing and washed down thoroughly with battery water. After drying with fans, the fields were energized and a megger reading of 10,000 ohms obtained, on the fields after heating. This reading could not be relied further and dropped off slowly to zero. Armature resistance came up to 10,000 ohms with heating but dropped off to zero.

Washed armature and fields a second time with battery water and removed brush rigging. Resistance of both fields and armature remained zero.

— page 85 —
1. The enemy appears to dislike the practice of piloting during darkness. His ships have been observed to habitually make landfalls and to commence passage of narrow waters during daylight, usually at dawn. In consequence this ship has adopted the policy of patrolling close to entrances or headlands during the day, and roaming treacherous shoals at night.

2. The enemy uses a profound number of lookouts. In addition to those on the bridge and aloft he usually has lookouts - obviously anti-submarine - posted at intervals along the deck rails. Lookouts are generally, but not always, equipped with binoculars.

3. All enemy ships observed in passage have been proceeding at slow smoke considerably.

4. Those ships which have been observed to maneuver to avoid torpedoes have invariably turned away leading to the conclusion that a fairly sharp return is a broad track should be selected for medium or long range shots.

5. Enemy echo ranging is immensely noisy but does not appear to be particularly efficient. This ship has never been detected by sound alone, nor has it been difficult to evade following an attack or sight contact. To develop a doubtful contact enemy sometimes holds his key down.

6. It appears that "Y" guns are used by some destroyers in laying a depth charge pattern. The tendency seems to be to favor shallow depth settings.

B. MATERIAL:
1. The ship is beginning to show the strain of sending seventy-four percent of the time underway and steaming 26,400 miles in the past six months, during which time she has had the assistance of tender or dock yard for a total of twelve days. The incidence of miner casualties, particularly electrical, is readily increasing. Upkeep and cleanliness are suffering in spite of the fact that on patrol three hours daily, unless in action, are devoted to ship's work by all hands.

2. Experience to date leads the Commanding Officer to submit the following recommendations for consideration:
   (a) Portable deck over boat storage: These sections serve no useful purpose on patrol but do complicate striking torpedoes below from deck storage tubes and launching the boat. It is recommended that submarines proceeding on war mission be authorized to leave them at the base.

— page 86 —
0
IN REPLY
REFER TO

U. S. S. SCULPIN
SS191/A16-3
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

---

**Port (J) of Serial S-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN**

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**B. MATERIAL (Cont'd)**

(b) **Boat:** The difficulty involved in making the present ship's boat ready to run, its limited capacity and miserable performance in any kind of sea, we may detract considerably from its usefulness. It is suggested that a pulling boat of a type that has demonstrated its sea experience (say a dory or wheelboat) would be much better suited to our present needs.

(c) **Intertressee:** When the squadron left Pearl Harbor, sponge rubber mettresses had been requisitioned to fill new allowance. War petrol experience has demonstrated the increased desirability of obtaining this type of mattress.

(d) **Distant tracker:** This instrument is never used. The space occupied by it in the over-crowded condition is never necessary to place them on the cellent use as an orderly storage for officers' gear.

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**O. PERSONNEL:**

1. **The physical end, to a greater extent, the psychological well-being of the men is deteriorating, and accelerated rate. Beneficiaries are sleeplessness, chronic headaches, general lassitude, loss of appetite, marked decrease in mental alertness, emotional instability, and increasing nervousness. Two key men (one of them was in charge of the operation that wrecked number four torpedo tube) so nearly approached complete nervous and physical collapse that it was necessary to place them on the sick list, relieved of all duties. Any radical change in the ship's course or speed, particularly in light, would cause a noticeable tension to develop. As noted elsewhere in this report two serious casualties resulted from what, in normal times, could only be called sheer stupidity. There were many other less disastrous indications of this inability to think clearly and to concentrate, for instance, competent, experienced helmsmen would get far off their course trying to move the compass card to the lubbers line. The slightest physical ailment would affect the men out of all proportion and it was therefore necessary to make rather free use of a dexterity.

2. The conditions described are a source of grave concern to the Commanding Officer. He earnestly recommends that:

(a) This ship be granted sufficient time in port for the crew to be completely rested and recuperated.

(b) In the future schedule the rest period for the crew to commence after the ship is completely repaired, refitted, replenished and ready for service. It is impossible for a conscientious man, and the irresponsible cannot be permitted, to relax while the ship requires attention.

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- 2 -

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34

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SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

PARC (J) of Serial S-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SUBLIPIN

D. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN INSTALLATION & OPERATION OF RADAR (Cont'd):
not aware of this difficulty, he could very easily damage the
insulators and contact switches.

6. The only operational difficulty encountered is the in-experience
of Reddomen when tapping more current to Oscillator tubes to compensate
for deterioration of tubes as they are used.

E. CRITICAL DATA:
Kills Underway:
    Surface, engines 6,773.7 Kills
    Surface, battery 2,000
    Submerged 1,118.5
    Submerged 563.5
    Submerged 7,895.5 Kills
    Submerged 1070.1 Kills

KW. HR. Generated Kills 113,756 Auxiliary 2,628 KW.
KW. HR. Charged 97,162 KW.HR.
AMP. HR. Charged 16A,612 Battery Cycles 27.30
Total Cycles now in battery 357.44

Fuel used generating KW. HR.
    Kills 10,466
    Auxiliary 229
    Fuel used propulsion 59,350
    Total fuel used 70,055

Overall gillons per surface mile 8.76
Overall gillons per KW. HR. Kills 0.092
Overall gillons per KW. HR. Auxiliary 0.087

Gellons fresh water used 21,578 Gell.
Gellons fresh water made 15,468 Gell.
Average daily consumption per man 6.94 Gell.
Average daily loss per man 1.97 Gell.
Gellons Battery water used 2,566 Gell.
Gellons Battery water made 2,402 Gell.
Average daily consumption 57 Gell/day

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SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY TWO
SEVENTEEN

PART (J) of Serial 8-1 - Report of Third War Patrol - U.S.S. SULPIN

E. CRUISING DATA (Cont'd)

WHILE ON STATION NAROH 26, 1942 - APRIL 17, 1942

Arrived on station with 5500 gallons.
Gellone fresh water used 8621 gal.
Gellone fresh water made 6036 gal.
Average daily consumption per man 5,143 gal.
Average daily loss per man 1.62 gal.

Gellone battery water used 1551 Gal.
Gellone battery water made 1560 Gal.
Average daily consumption 67.4 Gal/day

Average daily fuel consumption 1078 Gal.

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Part (1) of Serial S-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol U.S.S. SCULPIN

6 June 1942: Sighted three more 1-mill sail; at 0125 bearing 3310 T (305° relative), at 0145 bearing 1210 T (095° relative) and 0215 bearing 300° T (274° relative). Submerged at 0528 and proceeded at periscope depth. No contact. Surfaced at 1821.

At 1725: Sighted 1-mill sail at 1520 T (112° relative). At 1924: At 0250 observed a white pyrotechnic, probably a rocket, fired from the CELEBES 1-1

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8-E-C-R-E-T

Part (1) of Serial 5-2 Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN

At 0027 Destroyer attacked with six charges which missed stern. Steedled on approximate course 100° T and maintained constant speed of one third on one shaft, all auxiliary machinery scoured. At 0130 heard four faint explosions. At 0150 two explosions near conisderably nearer but still not uncomfortably close. On the 1st two attacks no scores or casualties were heard leading to the supposition that the destroyer being charged about blindly, using Y gun to keep 'equilibrum' and give AK opportunity to escape.

At 0345 nothing further having developed and the moon being up, commenced planing up to periscope depth with out increasing speed. At 0419 made periscope observation and found nothing in sight. Surfaced at 0532.

Submerged at 0500 proceeded at 125 feet coming up to periscope depth for observation at irregular intervals.

At 1650 sighted two meshed gaff topsail schooner bearing hering 2850 T and roll-tive on northerly course close inshore under TQ, MANGIA-LIHAT. This craft being considerably larger than sails heretofore sighted probably fifty tons-buoy - and certainly not motive built or rig decided to attack it on surfacing at dusk. However at 1735 it entered the blight north of the light and anchored.

At 1740 sighted upper works of men of war bearing 0400 T and relatively, commenced approach. At 1755 enemy was tentatively identified as a CQ, but no silhouettes on hand fits it, on southerly course, marking high speed (turn count - 275 rpm), passing outside torpedo range. Considered the possibility of giving chase but decoded that chance of success was very small in view of enemy speed coupled with the fact that it could not devote less than one minute engine to the charge, the battery being nearer exhausted after the short charge last night and subsequent events.

Stood off on course for SIBUTU PASSAGE at 1802. Surfaced at 1810.

10 June 1942: Submerged at 0517, proceeded at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1835.

At 2056 entered SIBUTU PASSAGE. Completed transit of passage at 2203 and set course to pass between PEARL BANK and DOC CAN ISLAND.

11 June 1942: At 0235, being closer of PEARL BANK set course for BANORAN ISLAND.

Submerged at 0508, proceeded at' periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1830.

12 June 1942: At 0300 being closer of BANORAN ISLAND by dead reconnaissance (weather heavily overcast for last twenty four hours) set course for BALABAC STRAIT.

Overcast, unable to obtain fix at dawn. Submerged at 0515, proceeded at periscope depth. No contacts.

The weather having cleared somewhat, surfaced at 1353 for an sight and submerged at 1357. Again at 1703 surfaced for an sight and submerged at 1710.

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Surfaced at 1540.
At 2225 commenced passage of BALABAC STRAIT entering via north channel.
13 June 1942: At 0207 completed passage of BALABAC STRAIT and set course to pass south of the dangerous ground.
Submerged at 0526 and patrolled at periscope depth.
At 1535 sighted smoke bearing 0500 T (1500 relative) and commenced approach. At 1531 enemy proved to be AK on south westerly course. At 1553 made out two additional ships, AOs, in company with but some five miles astern of the first ship. At 1619 fired three torpedoes at leading ship, hewed and observed one hit. Enemy immediately opened en ineffective fire, slowed momentarily then turned away and ascended. Submerged at 1619 and proceeded to be badly damaged. Communed enemy on following ships, at 1635 was detected the sea being perfectly calm and glassy - and vigorously attacked by gunfire from both ships. The heading ship of this section attempted to ram while the second turned away. Went deep to avoid.
At 1702 periscope observed enemy showing ships headed away. Set course to overtake and struck during darkness.
Surfaced at 1631 and gave chase, all ships being in sight. Contact was lost in increasing darkness, but was gained later on one ship, bearing, about 2300 T (3500 relative). Commenced approach to attack on a northerly course to take advantage of existing light conditions. The ship being attacked was later identified as an AK; no sign of the AOs at this time.
On this attack I forced enemy trying to get in close for a certain kill. In addition enemy must have been keeping an excellent lookout. At any rate at 2245 when I was in firing position enemy opened a brisk and disconcertingly accurate fire, and commenced radical maneuvers. Submerged to get clear.
On this dive, which somewhat precluded, two torpedoes forward flooded. Reloaded these three and commenced overhauling the torpedoes. Located the AOs to the northward by sound. At 2337 surfaced and gave chase.
At 2345 sighted AOs bearing about 2900 T (3500 relative) and commenced approach.
14 June 1942: At 0150 fired four torpedoes from forward tubes at last tanker in column. Observed one, possibly two hits. Turned away to avoid contact but none developing, reversed course at 0202 to overtake.
At this point, having but two serviceable torpedoes forward, deadened to gain position ahead for a dawn attack by which time overhault of the torpedoes flooded at 2245 would be complete giving me a full g-livo forward and aft. Set course and speed as requisite. In passing enemy noted sounded tanker still afloat and making heavy smoke. The cargo ship was not sighted; when last seen it was somewhat to the south of the tankers.
At 0514, early dawn, heavy smoke was in sight bearing 0850 T

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1916-3
S-8-C-R-E-T
Part (1) of Serial 3-2 Report of Forth War Patrol-U.S.S. SCULPIN

(190° relative) but no ships structure could be seen. At 0538 submerged to periscope depth. At 0605 sighted tops of two ships, bearing 1050° (186° relative) on south westerly course, proceeded to intercept. For a while it appeared that these ships would pass out of torpedo range by reason of a change of course to their left since last contact. However at about 0650 they were observed to make a radical zig to their right, placing them on a westerly course and making an attack possible.

At 0721 went to bottom stations and proceeded to attack. By this time enemy had been identified as two tankers, cargo ship no longer in company. They were in a line of bearing, about 150° port, with the wounded ship on the disengaged flank making very heavy weather. She was wallowing badly, had a decided port list, and had lowered her botes to the rail. Proceeded to cross leading enemy track to be in position to attack either or both.

At 0732 observed that the leading ship had stopped and that there was much activity on the deck of the wounded ship which was closing the londer. Hope that an abandon ship was in progress were quickly dashed. Enemy formed close column with injured ship leading and proceeded on westerly course. To avoid long torpedo run reversed course away from enemy and at 0755 fired three torpedoes from bow tubes at the last ship in column. Torpedo wakes were sighted, causing the enemy and aircraft to withdraw. Torpedo wake passing close under her stern, the other two up her port side. Both enemy ships opened fire at high speed away on westerly course. On this attack on old familiar casualty occurred, namely a poppet valve gasket corroded away, seven tons of water flooding into the after torpedo room before it was found to be secured reeling in a brief loss of control. It will be a great relief when the anti- orloid alteration providing a position retention for this gasket is accomplished.

The events of the last fourteen hours emphasize the fact that the enemy maintains an alert lookout, by day and by night, attacks and counter attacks vigorously, and takes prompt and effective action. Out of five attempt attacks, two were broken up, one was nullified and all except one were followed by lively counter action designed to discourage further attacks. The weather throughout the action was fair, no calm and clear, with detached clouds. The night was dark, no moon, but with sufficient starlight to provide good visibility, with tactics of surface attack.

At 0801 secured from bttle stations and proceeded at deep submergence conducting sound patrol, making periscope exposures at odd intervals. No further contacts; surfaced at 1847. 15 June 1942: Submerged at 0540, patrolled at periscope depth.

At 0815 condition of sea and rp tides in the vicinity of Riffomen Bank made depth control impossible at reasonable speeds. Went to deep submergence and conducted listening patrol, making

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Part (f) of Ser1-1 S-2 Report of Forth War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN

periscope exposures at irregular intervals. No contacts; surfaced at 1855.
16 June 1942: Submerged at 0555, patrolled northwest of LADD REEF, AT PERISCOPE DEPTH. No contacts. Surfaced at 1902.
17 June 1942: Submerged at 0550 patrolled northeast of PULO GEORGE. No contacts. Surfaced at 1912.
Deceased to shift patrol to Cape VARELIA area. Set course accordingly.
18 June 1942: Submerged at 0512, patrolled off Cape VARELIA at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1927.
A 2230 sighted smoke bearing 2639 (110° relative) and coming on. At this time had only one torpedo passing, one torpedo

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Part (A) of Serial S-2 Report of Fourth War Patrol U.S.S. SCULPIN

No counter action h-ving developed reversed course to deliver the coup de grace if necessary. Enemy appeared to get wry on and stood toward the island at the south of the entrance to VANPONG BAY probably with the intention of berthing. Did not relish following her into water too shallow for diving so held back awaiting developments.

At 0231 all lights on enemy were abruptly extinguished and she was lost to sight. Retired to eastward at high speed.

This ship was very careless in the matter of showing lights. An several occasions, one of them just before firing, lights were so blatantly displayed that some apprehension was felt that Southland had been discovered and was being challenged. However the signalmen could make nothing of suspected signals, and the ship certainly made no attempt to avoid it, so it was probably nothing but the flickering of a cremeless signal light.

Was not thoroughly unhurried at the distribution of torpedoes (five at, none forward) and torpedoes to shift three from the after to the forward room when, and if, the visibility permits.

Submerged at 0516; patrolled off shore east of VANPONG BAY at deep submergence, listening, making periscope observations at irregular intervals. No contacts. Surfaced at 1913 and set course for PULO CEJIR DE NER.

At 1942; Submerged at 0507, patrolled at periscope depth off CAPE PADARAN. No contacts. Surfaced at 1915.

At 1942; Submerged at 0542 patrolled at periscope depth on CAPE PADARAN - PULO CEJIR DE NER line. No contacts. Surfaced at 1921.

The visibility being the best so far experienced and the sea fairly calm decided to get about the business of redistributing torpedoes. Commenced this job at 2055 and completed it at 2257 having shifted three torpedoes from the after to the forward torpedo room.

At 1942; Submerged at 0512, patrolled at periscope depth north of PULO CEJIR DE NER. No contacts. Surfaced at 1919.

At 1940 sighted smoke to south-east, surfaced at 1919, and resumed periscope depth. Commenced periscope depth at 2026 at being bright moonlight, could make out three ships in column hull down on westerly course, tentatively identified as two AP or AK and one Ao. At 2036 was illuminated by an illumination flare, close aboard on starboard quarter (away from moon). Submerged to 100 feet and changed course 250 towards flare. At 2114, no netted having developed, came to periscope depth for observation. At 2122 sighted second flare, more distant than the first, through periscope. At 2130 surfaced and commenced ashore. Enemy ships had cleared PULO CEJIR DE NER to northward.

At 2245, decided that I could not overtake, attack and retire before dawn; broke off chase and headed for deep water.

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Part (1) of Serial S-2 Report of Fourth War Petrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN

23June 1942: Submerged at 0515, Petrolleed east northeast of PUO
OCTOBER 1942 at serviceable depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1920.
At 1952 sighted airplane flare about two miles to southeast.
Since this flare was down moon and some distance, and since no attack followed illumination last night, cleared the bridge of lookouts
preparatory to diving but did not actually submerge. At 1958 nothing further having developed resumed surface cruising status.
24 June 1942: Submerged at 0515, petrolleed east northeast of PUO
OCTOBER 1942 at serviceable depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1925.
25 June 1942: Submerged at 0515, petrolleed east northeast of PUO
OCTOBER 1942 at serviceable depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1921.
At 2057 observed airplane flare close board on starboard beam.
Triageatory followed by flare indicated that plane was on opposite
course. Stood by to dive but nothing further developing resumed normal surface at 2100. Reflected unnerwillingly that the follow;
this seems to be a innocous or a butterfly, probably deprived me of
a chance on the twenty second.
Since it now reports tight my presence is well known in this
area, and in view of the information contained in USSMP 251945 (ser-
ial 69) concerning activity in the vicinity of CAPE SAINT JAMES, doc-
lated to eight at stations on CAPE PARANI area. Set course south at
26 Jun 1942: At 0025 sighted and sighted 3300 relative) on
southly course and commenced minucuvling for position for submor-
ged attack, it being but not too torpedoes from stern tubes at
tinuous approach. At 0300 fired two torpedos from stern tubes at
combination AK - AP, about 4000 tons and missed, probable reason
error in estimated speed.
At 0217 surfaced intending to give chase. Tergct had changed
course and was making for small water south of CAPE PARANI. A
small destroyer was in sight coming out from PARANG BAY apparently
crashed in search. This existed in light conditions being in any forward,
commenced version tactics on surface. At 0239 a second small det-
rover stood out from CAPE PARANI at light speed and interposed be-
tween small and target without any chance to gain the shelter
of CAPE PARANI. Gave up hope of another attack.
Submerged 0525 and retralled CAPE PARANI PUO SEER DE MER
line at periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1520.
Decided to shift patrol to CAPE VARELIA aree tonight and to-
morrow, then make a greeen up the coast. Proceeded as requisite.
27 June 1942: Submerged at 0525 and retralled CAPE VARELIA at
periscope depth. No contacts. Surfaced at 1947.
Proceeded up the coast according to plan.
North of XUANDZI SAX commenced to encounter native small craft,
principally sails but including two motor swimmers.

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Part (3) of Serial 3-2 - Report of Fourth 'For Patrol - U.S.S. SOUL-FIR

Current information as follows:

| Location | Set | Drift |
||-----|------|
| Indian Ocean, just South of Lombok (early June) | 1,100 | 0.9 kts. |
| Sulu Sea | 1,100 | 0.7 kts. |
| South China Sea (western part) | 0,950 | 1.0 kts. |
| (South of Darn, eroue Ground) | 0,950 | 0.7 kts. |
| Indian Ocean NW of Austerli- | 300 | .7 kts. |

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Part (4) of Serial 8-2 - Report of Fourth Yr Patrol - U.S.S. SCUL-FIR
Noting unusual noted.

-14-

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Part (5) of Serial 8-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULL-PIN

| DATE  | TINE | POSITION | COURSE | SPEED | DESCRIPTION |
|-------|------|||-------||
| 6/8/42 | 1655 | 1-25 N 119-15 E | 200  | 9    | Merchant ship 'bout 5000 tons. Two mrsts(80 ft.) single stack, Length 500 ft. |
| 6/8/42 | 1655 | 1-25 N 119-15 E | 200  | 9    | Destroyer, HURSTUKI of similar clnse. |
| 6/9/42 | 1740 | 01-03 N 119-11 E | 180  | 20   | Kino layer of destroyer Two superimposed mounts formed. None aft. Single, stack 8 - type bow. Orme aft - Length 350 ft. Masthead lit. 80 ft. Could not close because of trgct's high speed and great distance to track. Range at sighting - 10,000 yds. |
| 6/13/42 | 1435 | 07-05-30 E | 235  | 10   | Merchant ship 4000 tons. Single stack - Two stlck mrsts 80 ft. high. Length - 400 ft. |
| 6/13/42 | 1553 | 115-02-30 E 07-06-30 N | 235  | 10   | Trinker, 5000 tons, Sump son Pearl and mast for- word, bridge lower thrn strck. One stack aft. Drizzle print on slides? Masthead lit. - 80 ft. Length - 500 ft. |
| 6/13/42 | 1553 | 07-06-30 N 115-02-30 E | 235  | 10   | Trinker, same as tanker desceibed 'above. |
| 6/18/42 | 2230 | 12-45 N 109-43 E | 180  | 13   | Merchant ship 'bout 7000 tons. Resembling RAIKUC KARU. |
| 6/18/42 | 2300 | 12-45 N 109-35 E | 000  | 10   | Fully lighted and may hrvv been - small hosp- ital ship. Vrs attack- ing motor ship at time this one sighted. |
| 6/22/42 | 1922 | 109-24 E 10-44 E | 270  | 10   | 1 large tanker, one mar- ciant ship and an unid- antified ship unabl- mck out detills. Rngc at sighting smoke - 15 mllos. 'Millo closing to On surfacing, trgctes had |

- 15 -

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Part (5) of Sortie 1 S-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN

DATE  TIME  POSITION  COURSE  DESCRIPTION
5/25/42 0025  11-22-30 N  210  10  single streak, 450 ft. long.
6/26/42 0220  109-11 E  ---  10  Small destroyer - unable
     to out dottils.
     Avoided him on the surface.
     Snoe as above.

5/26/42 0239  109-11 E  090  20  Large tanker roscmbling
     TAO HARU (147).

7/7/42 1240 119-12-30 E  010  10  AK - AP, combination. 2
     stiek meste with cargo.
     Bridge -nd supor dock 1/3
     length of ship (olippor bow).
     Longtih - 450 ft.
     About 5000 tons. Nnst ht. -
    100 ft.

7/7/42 1240 119-12-30 E  010  10 1 DD, OKINO, SHINA type

NOTE: In both instances where accounted targets were encountered,
the screen consisted of single destroyer, disposed directly ahead of the target of target column, -t n distance of
2000 - 3000 yds. and proceeding steadily on course and at
speed of convoy.

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Part (6) of Serial 8-2 - Report of Fourth Ypr Patrol - U.S.S. SCULLIN
On 7 Juno ct 0640, sighted pl-no 20 mile north of Cape Will-
irm, Pl-no was 500 type, ship broad seprlno.

-17-

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Part (7) of Serial S-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. SCUL-PIN.

Attack of 3 June 1942 at 23:24.
1. Made in Molukka Sea, south of Tog. M. Manhlihat.
2. Target was r 1,300 ton DD and 5,000 ton Supply ship.
3. Fired 3 torpedoes at DL and one at supply ship.
4. Firing interval about 6 seconds.
5. Estimated firing range 2500 yds.
6. Point of aim was N.O.T.
7. Own course 095°T Target course 215°T
   Own speed 6 knots Target speed 10knots
   Angle on the bow 608.
8. Track angle 735, gyro angle 139°.
9. Torpedo depth set 8 ft., speed high.
10. Was a night surface attack. Set a gyro angle, used ship as director, fired as DD crossed bow, swung ship 5° left and fired #4 as supply ship crossed bow.
11. Sound heard not, straight runs.
12. Applied at 2° speed at the torpedo tubes so that #1 torpedo at 2° speed at the torpedo tubes.
13. Firing interval about 6 seconds.
14. Generated T.D.C. range 750 yds.
15. Point of aim was K.O.T.
16. Own course 155°T Target course 235
   Own speed 3 Kts. Target speed 10 Kts.
17. Angle on the bow 88°T, bearing 172.5°.
18. Track angle 100°, Gyro angle 21°L (stern tubes).
19. Torpedo depth set 8 ft., speed high.
20. Was a submerged periscope at track using and firing on T.D.C. generated bearing, checked by periscope.
21. Sound reported not, straight shots.
22. Applied at 2° speed at the torpedo tubes so that #1 torpedo at 2° speed at the torpedo tubes.
23. Heerd one, possibly two, hits forty-five seconds after firing.
24. Periscope observation immediately after explosions indicated hit.
25.

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Part (7) of Serial S-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. SGUL-PIN.

Attack of 14 June at 0150.
1. Made south of Dangerous Ground, near Falawan Passage.
2. Was an 8,000 ton tanker.
3. Fired 4 torpedoes.
4. Firing interval was about 6 seconds.
5. Estimated range 2500 yds.
6. Point of aim was M.O.T.
7. Own course 0000T.
   - Target course 2400T.
   - Target speed 12 kts.
   - Angle on the bow 60P.
   - Track angle 75P.
   - Gyro angle 15P.
8. Torpedo depth set 8 ft., speed high.
9. Was a night surface attack. Set a gyro angle, used ship as director, fired as tanker crossed the vow.
10. Sound heard hot, straight runs.
11. Applied 2 spread at tubes so that #1 torpedo went out on gyro angle 17L, #2 on 15L, #3 on 15L, and #4 on 11L.
12. Sew at least one hit. Explosion 120 seconds after firing. Used too large a spread for the range.

Attack of 14 June at 0700.
1. Made south of Dangerous Ground, near Falawan Passage.
2. Was an 8,000 ton tanker.
3. Fired 3 torpedoes.
4. Firing interval about 5 seconds.
5. Generated 2T.D.C.
6. Point of aim M.O.T.
7. Own course 3500T.
   - Target course 2700T.
   - Target speed 10 kts.
   - Angle on the bow 92P.
   - Tracking angle 30P.
8. Torpedo depth set 8 ft., speed high.
9. Submerged, periscope attack, using and firing on T.D.C. general ated bearing.
10. Sound heard hot, straight runs.
11. Fired all shots to hit the M.O.T.
12. Missed. Target turned away, observed two torpedoes ran up his port side one closer under his stern.

1. South of Cape Varelle, close inshore.
2. Target was a large supply ship. (7000 tons)
3. Fired one torpedo.
4. Range estimated 2000, actually nearer 3500.
5. Point of aim was M.O.T.
6. Own course 2770T.
   - Target course 1800T.
   - Target speed 13 kts.
   - Angle on bow 83P.
   - Bearing 0000.

-18-

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Part (7) of Serial B-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. SOUL-PIN.

Track angle 99°, Gyro 16°.
8. Torpedo depth set 8 ft., speed high.
9. Night surface attack. Just a gyro angle, used ship as director, fired as target crossed bow, run.
10. Sound heard hat, sufficient run.
11. Time to explosion was 2.5 minutes. The target blew up at 150 seconds. Leave range error due to the fact that target was against land background throughout the approach and until the last few minutes of the attack, making estimates pretty difficult. She was generally described by one lookout as "a blob that is blacker than black a gelatin a black background".
Attack of 26 June at 0130.
1. South Cmarnah Bay entrance.
2. Target was a 4,000 ton supply ship.
3. Fired 2 torpedoes from stern tubes.
4. Firing interval about 10 seconds.
5. Generated T.D.C. range 1425 yards.
6. Point of aim was N.O.T.
7. Own course 290°.
8. Target speed 3.5 kts.
Angle on the bow 575, 615 Bearing 157, 161.
Track angle 728 (both shots) Gyro angle 8L (both shots).
9. Was a night periscope attack using end firing on T.D.C. generated bearings.
10. Sound heard hot, straight runs.
11. Both shots fired to hit the K.O.T.
12. Missed; could not follow torpedo tracks to the target but believe miss was ahead. Reduced estimated target speed from 11 knots to 10 knots shortly before firing. Her actual speed must have been nearer 7 knots.
NOTE: After the torpedo tubes were made ready it was found to be impossible to shift #1 torpedo to high speed, so this one was fired in low speed and #2 in high speed. It so happened that the gyro angles were the same for both shots.

Attack of 7 July at 1345.
1. In Sibu Pas near northwest of Tevita Island.
2. Target was a 10,000 ton tanker.
3. Fired 3 torpedoes.
4. Firing interval about 5 seconds.
5. Firing range 3350 (TDC), Approx. Officers estimate was 2500 yds.
6. Point of aim was K.O.T.
7. Own course 100°.
8. Target speed 3 kts.
9. Angle on the bow 79°.
10. Track angle 91°.
11. Gyro angle 0.5L.
12.

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88191/A16-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
Part (7) of Serial S-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. SOUL-PIN

8. Torpedo depth set 10 ft., exposed high.
9. Yea n daylight, submerged; attack using nf firing on T.D.C.
   - gunrotod bearings, checked by torpedo.
10. Sound hard hot, straight runs.
11. Applied n second at the tubes so that #1 run 2' right, #2
    was on the gyro angle, #3 run 1' left.
12. Herd one hit. Time to explosion was 92 seconds.

— page 112 —
55191/A16-3
B-E-C-R-E-T
Part (8) of Serial S-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULPIN

Enemy A/S Resources

1. Single Destroyer escorts were encountered on two attacks. In each case the destroyer was disposed directly ahead of the target at a distance of 2000 - 3000 yds, stemming steadily on course and at a speed of 60 knots.

2. On the night attack the destroyer avoided torpedoes, then ran down the torpedo tracks at high speed, lurked overhead and listened for a period of 53 minutes, during which time Saulpin was either stopped or proceeding to 2/3 ahead. At the end of 53 minutes on speed, he increased to 2/3 ahead and reloaded command. At 65 minutes DD commenced depth charge attack, releasing a barrage pattern. At 125 minutes a faint explosion overboard was heard at 145 minutes 2 more, much closer. DD remained in vicinity for about another hour, occasionally ringing but mostly lurking at dead slow speed. No tactical or depth sound on steady course.

3. On the night attack the destroyer was conducting routine supersonic search, evidently using a moving boom with torpedo but not frequent pinging. On sighting or hearing torpedoes (about 1 minute after firing) DD gave tactical signal and turned toward us. Went to door submachine and proceded slowly and silently away on steady course. DD did not remain in vicinity, but evidently escorted wounded ships from the scene. Pinging was heard 2 hours after the attack, and about an hour later a destroyer was sighted on bearing on which the original DD faded out. He was proceeding to high speed toward the scene of the attack, but soon passed out of sight.

4. Two "lurkers" were encountered in the vicinity of Cape Pied-arrin, on surfacing after the submarine's motion light attack of 26 June. One was patrolling out from Fairbank Bay; the other proceeded at high speed from under the ice of Cape Pied-arrin, apparently searching for Saulpin. Both were small destroyers. We avoided on the surface for full speed on steady course away from the scene.

5. While proceeding on the surface, "attacking to close 3 ship convoy, near Pulo Coir de Mar, was a 2036 by an air-plane fire, "groped close" by radar on side away from moon (it was bright moonlight night).

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S-E-C-R-E-T
Part (5) of Serial S-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULL-PIN

The flare, which was green colored, burned for several seconds in a
nearly vertical, downward trajectory. Broke off attack and submerged. At 2122 sighted second flare, through the periscope. After surfacing at 2130 to give chase, no further indications of the plane's presence were noted.

On the last and 3rd night following this encounter with the pl-nc, and while prowling in the same vicinity, was again illuminated by similar fires, but remained on the surface.

Since no attacks developed after the flares were dropped the following possibilities are drawn:

(a) Enemy was aware of our presence in the vicinity but could not
accurately spot us and used the flares to attempt to bluff us into
diving in for of imminent attack.

(b) Enemy was unaware of our presence. The flares were recognition or landing signals made to station on Pulo Coori do Mor.

— page 114 —
35191/A16-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
Part (9) of Serial 8-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. SCULL-PIN

1. On the first dive on 28 May it was discovered that the flood valve on negative tank could not be opened or closed manually or by power. Although impossible to determine the exact cause of the trouble, it is apparently in the valve operating linkage inside of the tank. Negative tank was kept flooded throughout the remainder of the patrol.

2. During the third week - look developed in the port main bell-ast tank group. This became progressively worse until a list of five degrees would develop in twenty minutes while riding the vents. For the first three weeks after the discovery the list was taken off with the low pressure blowers; then, more and more the list was taken off with the list of the time and made it necessary to start running with the floods closed on #2 and 3 main bell tanks.

This notice was sent out for the rest of the patrol. The leak is apparently due to a hole in the tank top or vent pipe.

3. On July 1 the high pressure air line between the #1 separator and the high pressure manifold developed a leak making both air compressors inoperative. Temporary repairs were made by the ship's force, recurring about ten hours. On July 12 excessive wear on the 4th stage liner out the #1 compressor out of commission.

The chrome had worn from an alloyed 0.008% to approximately 0.050%. Reports could not be made by the ship's force due to lack of necessary parts.

4. Number three main engine governor.

At 0325 on June 26, 1942 number three main engine stopped. The engine started overloading prior to the time and was pulled clear from propulsion when additional motor current would not produce load and engine started to slow down. Two attempts were made to restart the engine at which time it would run normally under no load for about one minute, then slow to stop. Inspected governor and found load limit rod, load limit rod model bearing and collar to be burned. Turned over ports and placed # three engine on propulsion at 1945, after surfacing. Load limit rod was badly scored at full load position causing it to stick in that position and thus shut fuel off the engine.

Number Two Krin Engine - Number 6 Unit - Cracked liner.

Upon surfacing at 1827 on 8 July 1942 started #2 and noted error spray from #6 unit. After engine had commenced firing and running at 400 RPM the fresh water pressure was noted fluctuating badly.

- 23 -

— page 115 —
88191/A16-3
S-2-0-R-2-2
Part (9) of Serial S-2 - Report of Fourth "or Patrol - U.S.S. SQUADRON
FISH

Secured on line and opened #3 unit. Found liner to be cracked with
a very sharp crack extending from the -ir ports to point about
one inch below the top edge of the liner. This was in exorim-
t-1 cannon - ylved liner installed in accordance with Burney of
Ship's instructions. Rearr'd liner not re-consolidated unit. Fistin
and all rings in way and condition. No rings actuat. Engine
was ylced on charge t 2250.

— page 116 —
88191/A16-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
Part (10) of Serial S-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. EUL-PIN

1. The recent establishment of a directional transmitting antennae at Perth, a decided improvement in reception has been noted. All excellent two serials were received without difficulty. No serials were missed after the new antennae was installed.

2. In Halsey's Strait several heavy density layers were encountered, at depths ranging from 35 to 170 feet. On one occasion, while evading a destroyer, a stop trim was maintained for 38 minutes.

3. From a quarter-strike, the habit of the ship is becoming progressively worse, originally because since the start of the war, no facilities have been available for furnishing the ship to extortimante cookroaches, or for renovating the mattress. These conditions have become so serious that the G.O. feels that:

   (a) The ship must be furnished during the coming lay-in, using an improvised method if standard furnishing service is not available.

   (b) The mattress must be removed to replace the cookroaches, and the ship must be furnished with a new mattress. (The problem of keeping the mattress clean is a complicated by the fact that 90% of the crew must use "hot" bunks - 36 bunks are available for 62 men).

4. Portable and Battery Motor Endurance.

The endurance of this ship in both portable and battery motor has in the past not been too limiting factor for the propulsion, however on previous patrols, great concern has been expressed in attempting to keep the daily loss of both down to a minimum. This reduction in the daily loss has been overcome by running at unnecesarily high speeds while on station to gain high exhaust temperature on the latest two engines with resulting high fuel expenditures; by using stringent measures to reduce the consumption of portable motor to the minimum of a quarter of the daily consumption of battery motor, this last measure resulting in a high battery temperature and reducing the heat capacity of the ship.

The limitations of the Kilkenny Strait lie in the fact that the ship is not a reliable boat, and the ship is

— page 118 —
55191/A16-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
Pert (10) of Serial S-2 - Report of Fourth War Patrol - U.S.S. SCUL-PIN

CRUISING DATA
HILLS UNDERWAY
SURFACE: ENGINES
SURFACE BATTERY
SUBERGED
TOTAL
HOURS UNDERWAY
SURFACE, ENGINES
SURFACE, BATTERY
SUBERGED
TOTAL
KW.HR. GENERATED MTS 132, 208 Auxiliary 1,135
KW.HR. CHARGED 112,820
AMPERES HOURS CHARGED 192,174 Battery cycles 31.9
TOTAL CYCLES NOW IN BATTERY 397.61

FUEL USED GENERATING KW.HR.
KALIS 12,150 Gel.
AUXILIARY 90 Gel.
FUEL USED FOR PROPULSION 69,600 Gel.
TOTAL FUEL USED 81,870 Gel.

FUEL ON HAND AT END OF P.TROL 8,000 Gel.

OVERALL GALLONS PER SURFACE KIL 6,720
OVERALL GALLONS PER H.H.R. KIL 092
OVERALL GALLONS PER K.W.HR. AUXILIARY .087

TOTAL LUBRICATING OIL USED ON P.TROL 1840 Gel.
OVERALL GALLONS PER ENGINE KIL 232
LUBRICATION OIL ON HAND AT END OF P.TROL 4960 Gel

GALLONS FRESH WATER USED 26,086
GALLONS FRESH WATER MADE 19,042

AVERAGE DAILY CONSUMPTION PER KAN 7.25 Gel.
AVERAGE DAILY LOSS PER KAN 1.95 Gel.

GALLONS BATTERY WATER USED 3126.
GALLONS BATTERY WATER MADE 3126.

AVERAGE DAILY CONSUMPTION: 62.6 Gel.

HOURS KILINSIGHT STILL IS USE 208.2

- 27 -

— page 119 —
8-01827
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U.S. FLEET
RECEIVED
SGT. A. L. LINDSEY, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
316-3/Scr. (S-CC492 Aug 31
SGT. S. S. SAGO (6180) P. Lechir
C. L. C

— page 122 —
1630 on 16 August 1942 got underway in compliance with Coast-Task-Group 51.1 secret operation order 46-42 which directs this ship to proceed to Brisbane, Queensland, via south of Australia and Tasmania, and report to CoastTaskFor 42 for duty. At 0830, 21 August in Long. 138°30'E. reported to CTF 42 by dispatch in accordance with orders.

At 0935, 26 August moored at New Perth, Australia, Queensland, commenced replenishing and necessary repairs. Officially main motors, on which resistance has dropped to dangerous level, and torpedo tubes 7 and 8 from which rollers have been lost. Announced readiness for sea date 2 September.

On 1 September all repairs completed, ship ready for sea.

2 September:
0836 underway for 3/3-42 which directs this ship to operate offensive operation order 33-42 (Normandy and British Islands, off Cape Crete, through Vitiuz Strait, north of New Britain, returning through Saint Georges Channel.

In the vicinity of point 1x1 compensated standard compass, swung ship for residual deviation and conducted test dive. Proceeded to sea.

At 1753 cleared Hamilton Patches, proceeded as requisite con- forming to swept channel.

At 1952 arrived at point Van and set course for point Bud.

3 September:
At 0210 sighted darkened ship bearing 025°T on southwesterly course, proceeded to investigate. At 0247, being in position to attack, ordered ship to heave to and identify herself. Was much embarrassed by lack of merchant ship recognition signals. However, satisfied myself that merchant ship was friendly and released her. Stoed of? on course.

At 0357 at point Bud, set course to pass eastward of Cato Island, Nreck and Kenn Reefs.

At 0447 sighted Task Force 44, bearing 060°T on southwesterly course; exchanged recognition signals.

At 0957 submerged; held battle problem and emergency drills. On his dive noted faulty operation of stern planes (see Part H). Sur- aced at 1030.

At 1200 position Lat. 24°16'S, Long. 155°46'E.

No further contacts.

3 September:
At 0951 number four main motor failed (see Part H). Investigation indicates it to be beyond repair by ship's force, consequently

— page 123 —
3-5-C-R-E-T
reversed course to return to base informing CTF 42 by my 040001 of conditions and my actions.

Position at 1200 Lat. 19°52'S., Long. 156°31'W.

At 1850, it being dark, stopped, lay to for more thorough examination of damage to number four main motor. By my 041100 informed CTF 42 of details of damage, repairs required and estimated time of arrival at point Bud. at 1909 proceeded at 13 knots.

No contacts.

5 September:
Sighted U.3.S. STURGEON on northerly course; exchanged recognition signals.

At 1200 position Lat. 24°15'S., Long. 155°30'E.

At 1834 at point Bud not course for point Yun.

No further contacts.

6 September:
At 0234 at point Yun proceeded as requisite conforming to swept channel.

At 0510 exchanged recognition signals with Caloundra Head and received permission to enter. Proceeded as requisites.

At 0957 moored alongside U.3.S. TULA at New Farm Wharf, Brisbane, Queensland, and commenced repairs. Ship considered to be still in patrol status, no liberty to be granted, shift work as necessary to expedite repairs.

7 September:
Continued emergency repairs.

8 September:
Continued emergency repairs.

At 1345 repairs to motor being complete, tested it and found it to be in satisfactory operating condition.

At 1537 got underway in compliance with CTF 42 operation order S 33-42 modified to omit patrol off Normandy and Kirivina Islands, substituting therefor patrol within 30 miles of Lat. 7°30'S., Long. 151°45'E. until directed to comply with balance of orders.

At 1741 number four main motor tripped with no apparent damage. Commenced thorough examination of it. There being no change in resistance or continuity since getting underway, cut it in again at 2008 (see Part H for details)

— page 124 —
0
At 2035 cleared Hamilton Patches and proceeded as requisite conforming to sweet channel.

At 2243 at point 7, set course for point 8ud.

No contacts.

9 September:
At 0548 at point 8ud; set course to pass eastward of Cato Island, Wreck and Kenn Reefs.

At 1030 submerged for battle problem and drills. Surfaced at 1114.

At 1200 position Lat. 24°46'3", Long. 155°33' east.

No contacts.

10 September:
At 0546 set course for Lat. 10°30'S., Long. 156°30'E.

At 1200 in position Lat. 19°24'S., Long 150°25'E.

At 1257 submerged for battle problem and drills. Surfaced at 1330.

No contacts.

11 September:
At 0634 lost power on number four main engine (see Part H). Decided to submerge until repairs are completed. Submerged at 0640, patrolled at periscope depth.

At 1200 in position Lat. 14°44'3", Long. 156°32'E.

Surfaced at 1344. Repairs to number four main engine not satisfactory. However since tomorrow I will be in latitude when, according to general directive, daylight submergence is compulsory and since contact with enemy and consequent demand for maximum speed for purpose of chase seems unlikely before then, decided to postpone further repairs until that time.

No contacts.

12 September:
Submerged at 0450, patrolled at periscope depth.

At 1200 position Lat. 10°57'S., Long. 156°30'E.

During the afternoon swung ship for residual deviation. At the same time attempted to establish relative bearing on which BELLS could be received on loop antenna, but found reception nil on all headings. Held fire control drill. Completed repairs to number four main engine.

Surfaced at 1744.

— page 125 —
2155, in Lat. 10°00'S., Long 156°30'E., set course for assigned patrol area.
No contacts.

13 September:
    Submerged at 0453, patrolled at periscope depth.
    At 0811 increased depth to 100 feet, stopped both shafts, ballanced, to obtain resistance readings of all main motors (see Part H).
    At 0823 went ahead and returned to periscope depth, continuing normal patrol.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 9°06'S., Long. 154°55'E.
    Surfaced at 1753.
    No contacts.

14 September:
    At 0446 submerged in assigned patrol area. Patrolled at periscope depth along the Cape Orford - Kitsune Island line.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 7°34'S., Long 151°45'E.
    Surfaced at 1759.
    No contacts.

15 September:
    Submerged at 0508. For the first time in forty-eight hours got a fairly good fix which indicated an astonishing westerly current (see Part D). Patrolled at periscope depth on northeasterly course.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 7°41'S., Long. 151°31'E.
    Surfaced at 1806.
    No contacts.

16 September:
    Submerged at 0518; patrolled at periscope depth across the Cape Orford - Kitsune Island line.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 7°12'S., Long 151°09'E.
    Surfaced at 1805.
    No contacts.

17 September:
    Submerged at 0510; patrolled across Cape Orford - Kirivine Island line at periscope depth. Obtained resistance readings all main motors; cleaned number three which was dangerously low (see Part H).
    At 1200 in position Lat. 7°38'S., Long. 151°58'E.
    Surfaced at 1805.
    No contacts.
    The night is very foul, fresh breeze from the southeast creates nasty chap that continually sprays the bridge on southerly courses.
    It may be necessary to change the periscope lookouts; overcast, visibility very poor and quite tricky; frequent rain squalls. Conditions decidedly at propitious for a land fall on a shoal and poorly charted area.
    I'll move south but will not attempt to approach Kirivine Island until weather improves.
    No contacts.

-5-

— page 126 —
18 September:
    Submerged at 0452; patrol led at periscope depth across Cape Orford - Kirriwina Island line.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 7°16'3", Long. 151°44'E.
    Surfaced at 1801.
    No contacts.

: 19 September:
    Submerged at 0457; patrol led at periscope depth across Cape Orford - Kirriwina Island line.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 7°03'8", Long. 152°25'E.
    Surfaced at 1805.
    At about 2000 weather cleared somewhat and was able to get a firf fix; the first in some fifty hours.
    No contacts.

: 20 September:
    Submerged at 0523; patrol led at periscope depth northeast of Kirriwina Island.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 8°11'5", Long. 151°45'E.
    Surfaced at 1806. Decripted CTF 42 dispatched 201231 (serial 49) which directs this ship to proceed at sunset tomorrow to investigate Thilenius Harbor and Montagu Harbor, returning to position assigned in original orders by daylight twenty-fifth.

: 21 September:
    Submerged at 0511; patrol led in eastern part of assigned area at periscope depth.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 7°15'8", Long. 152°11'E.
    At 1700 exercised crew at general quarters, held battle problem and emergency drills. Surfaced at 1804. Set course for Thilenius Harbor.
    Dispatched ny 210915 to CTF 42 admitting wholly negative results to date.
    No contacts.

: 22 September:
    Submerged at 0506 five miles south of the southernmost island of the group which surrounds Thilenius Harbor. Since the Coast Pilot indicated that all deep water passages to the harbor are from the eastward, decided to investigate that side first. Proceeded accordingly.
    It is exceedingly dirituit to survey Thilenius Harbor from seaward. The principal islands encompassing it are fai rly lofty, upward of a hundred feet, and numerous islets not shown on the best chart available clutter up the passages. In addition a heavy mist appears to be a permanent characteristic of this littoral. No shipping or shore works were observed; however, in view of the conditions noted above, it is decidedly possible that both were present but were concealed from seaward observation.
    At 0938, having approached the coast as closely as appeared prudent considering the very sketchy chart available, reversed course and stood clear to southward.

— page 127 —
3-7-C-R-R-T

At 1200 in position Lct. 6'22'13., Long. 150'17'E.
At 1511 sighted the masts of a ship bearing 275'T, range about 18,000, on southerly course. Continued operations but was unable to close to less than 13,000 yards; this was lost to sight bearing 22' T still on southerly course. This ship was hull down at all times, however from the appearance of her upperworks, a segment of stacks, and spearing of masts she could be identified as a destroyer of the HIBIKI class with reasonable certainty.

It was an unpleasant surprise to discover this destroyer clearing Thilenius Harbor by the western approaches where, according to the Coast Pilot, the channels are all shoal and unsuitable for any but shallow draft shipping. The enemy, it seems, shows a singular lack of confidence in that publication. Decided to investigate the western approaches tomorrow.

Surfaced at 1812.
No further contacts.

23 September:
Submerged at 0505 and proceeded to reconnoiter Thilenius Harbor from westward. As before could see little or nothing of the inner harbor but did observe a group of buildings, which appeared to be military in character, on the extreme western end of the southernmost major island (unnamed on past charts). It consisted of several small buildings, or possibly tents, in a close group and one, considerably larger and somewhat detached to the westward, before which was a flag pole. Colors were not shown. No shipping could be seen.

At 0634 reversed course and stood clear to southward.
At 1200 in position Lct. 6'35'13., Long. 150'17'E.
Surfaced at 1813.
Deripted CTF 42 230801 (aerial 55) which directs this ship to proceed at sunset tomorrow via. Vitiica Strait to the north or New Britain according to operation orders.

No contacts.

24 September:
Submerged southeast of entrance to Kontogur Harbor at 0457. At 1520, when light was sufficient for observation, stood across entrance on westerly course. About two or three miles east of the entrance, at a collection of buildings similar to that discovered at Thilenius Harbor yesterday; viz, many small buildings closely grouped and one larger building somewhat detached but in this case without a flag staff.

In spite of mist and rain was able to observe all parts of Kontogur Harbor except the extreme southeastern part close inshore beyond the headland. Saw no shipping in the harbor or at Vahsel anchorage.

At 1200 in position Lct. 6'11'13., Long. 151'03'E.
At 1308 stood clear to the southwest.
Surfaced at 1808.
No contacts.

— page 128 —
25 September:
    - Submerged at 0500, and patrolled at periscope depth.
    - At 1200 in position Lat. 6°41'8", Long. 148°38'E.
    - Surfaced at 1815, obtained an excellent star-fix and set course to make land fall on Telitit, Point, New Guinea, before commencing passage of Vitiaz Strait. At 2105, having made anti-pitch-laid land fall, commenced passage of Vitiaz Strait setting course to pass west of Tolokwa Island.
    - No contacts.

26 September:
    - At 0145 completed passage of Vitiaz Strait, commenced rounding Tolokwa Island.
    - At 0513 submerged and patrolled at periscope depth.
    - At 1200 in position Lat. 4°58'S, Long. 148°24'E.
    - Surfaced at 1814. Proceeded as requisite to pass east of Witu Islands.
    - No contacts.

27 September:
    - Submerged at 0450; patrolled at periscope depth.
    - At 1200 position Lat. 4°14'S, Long. 149°53'E.
    - Surfaced at 1816.
    - No contacts.

28 September:
    - At 0008 made land fall on Caye Lambert, New Britain.
    - Submerged at 0442 and patrolled at periscope depth.
    - At 0640 sighted ship bearing 021°T (291°Rel) on westerly course, speed about 18 knots, range about 20,000 yards. Unable to close range below 15,000 yards. From experience of her upperworks this ship was the sea plane tender CLIFTONA.
    - At 0738 sighted masts of ship, bearing 290°T (200°Rel) on south-easterly course, range about 19,000 yards, speed about 12 knots.
    - Commenced approach.
    - At 0752 went to bottom stations. Target is large tanker, similar to OMIROSAIL, escorted by one anti-submarine ship of a type I have never seen before, zig-zagging wickly.
    - At 0826 fired four torpedoes from stern tubes at tanker, observed two hits; one on port quarter, other on port beam just about bridge island. Heard two, possibly three explosions.
    - At 0827 went to deep submergence and prepared to receive counter-attack. At 0830 first striking depth charges missed fraterstern. At about the same time heard explosions which had the characteristic sound of airplane bombs. This case as something of a surprise, no air screen or patrolling aircraft having been sighted.
    - At 0844 at least two ships were engaged in search. At 0848 took a very close string of depth charges. Apparently one a/3 ship min.landed contact and co.chad the other on. Excellent team work, resulting in a very neat straddle, much damage resulted (see Part II), ship momentarily lost main power and commenced making water in numerous places.

— page 130 —
2 October:
    Submerged at 0547; patrold the Cape Stephens - Cape Queen
    Charlotte line at periscope depth.
    At 0640 heard scree 3 and, on making periscope observation, discovered a medium sized transport similar in appearance to JINZITU HAN, escorted by one destroyer of the HUNSUL-UC class, bearing 325°T (280°R) on easterly course, range about 12,000 yards, speed about 14 knots. Commenced approach, went to battle stations. At 0710 heard a series of explosions and at one made a periscope observation. The transport had turned away about 75° and was standing off to the northeastward; the destroyer was interposed between SCULPIN and the transports, the range being about 5000 yards, and was busily engaged in making a depth charge attack. Observed him make two additional runs, dropping about four charges on each, after which he followed the transport at high speed. Utterly unable to explain this mysterious conduct. At no time did the destroyer echo range; it seems incredible that he, while making about 14 knots, could have heard the SCULPIN, which was proceeding at moderate speed. (100 shaft rpm), at a range of about 6000 yards. The sea was flat calm, but the periscope had been used sparingly and it was not necessary to expose more than eighteen inches of tube to get an excellent observation, so the possibility of its being sighted appears remote. On the whole it seems most probable that I had the misfortune to encounter a nervous convoy which, in the tension of the dawn alert, took fright at and attacked a school of fish.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 3°08'51", Long 150°29'E.
    Surfaced at 1917.
    At 1957 heard and sighted single a/S ship to southward on northwesterly course, range about 5000 yards - appeared to be the same type as that which escorted the tanker attacked on 28 September. These ships are extremely hard to see; having very little freeboard and practically no upworks. They are well this side of the horizon as viewed from SCULPIN's bridge before they are sighted. Avoided on the surface.
    At 2020 saw the reelection of somewhat extensive illumination to the northward - apparently in the vicinity of the straits between New Ireland and New Hanover.
    No further contacts.

-10-

— page 131 —
3 CRET
4 October:
   - At 0035 met a doubtful sound contact, scores, bearing 165°T (165°Hel) which failed to develope. Probably false.
   - Submerged at 0540; patroloid the Cape Stephens - Portland Island line at periscope depth.
   - At 1200 in position Lat. 3°29'3.0", Long. 150°45'12".
   - Surfaced at 1909.
   - Decided to shift patrol to southern line for a few days. Proceeded accordingly.
   - No contacts.

5 October:
   - Submerged at 0358; patroloid Lat. 4°00'3", east of Long. 150°E.
   - At 1200 in position Lat. 4°00'3", Long. 150°18'E.
   - Surfaced at 1916.
   - At 2022 sighted what appeared to be a periscope flare bearing from a submarine north. This flare was quite distant and was released from a great height, the glow of it being obscured beyond the horizon for an appreciable time after the flare itself had dipped.
   - At 2035 another flare sighted on the same bearing.
   - No contacts.

6 October:
   - Submerged at 0548; continued to patrol eastward along Lat. 4°5.
   - At 1200 in position Lat. 3°50'3", Long. 150°54'E.
   - Surfaced at 1919.
   - At 2035 sighted a periscope flares bearing north, similar in all respects to those sighted last night.
   - No contacts.

7 October:
   - Submerged at 0559 and patroloid eastward along Lat. 4°5. At 1200 in position Lat. 3°40'3", Long. 151°29'E.
   - At 1232 identified target to a destroyer of the HANSHAKU class, a combination AC-AP, about 10,000 tons, in column in that officer's direction, about 14 knots. At 1303 went to battle stations and commenced attack.
   - Was sorely tempted to have a shot at the destroyer with about 250 yards torpedo run. However, prudent patroloid over personal ammo, he held on to attack the last ship of column, the transport, from a range of about 1200 yards. At 1200 fired four torpedoes from bow tubes at the selected target. As a result of firing lost about six feet keel depth consequently housed periscopes. After reeling depth and commencing at 1320:55 heard three explosions. At a badly 1322 made periscope exposures and discovered the target to be badly hit and obviously in sinking condition, the submarine was not deep. At 1325 turned away and the destroyer to be turning toward. Went deep and prepared to receive counter action which commenced at about 1323 and lasted until 1435. In view of the started hull in the forward torpedo room and the precarious condition of the conning tower.

— page 132 —
5-7-C-R-T
O
door, was grateful that this counter attack was neither prosecuted
with vigor nor very accurate.
At 1723, reports from sound having been negative for about an
hour and the sun being low enough to make detection from the air un-
likely, made periscope exposure and found nothing in sight.
Surfaced at 1913.
Further contact.

8 October:
Submerged at 0602; patrolled across Cape Stephens - Portland
Island line at periscope depth.
At 0917 sighted smoke bearing 225°T, bearing decreasing. Com-
menced approach. At 0930 contacted developed as convoy of two cargo
ships and one escort on easterly course, speed estimated to be 11
knots. Continued approach but unable to close range to less
than about 20,000 yards. At 1015 last sight of convoy on bearing
140°T.
At 1200 in position Lat. 3°16'S., Long. 149°24'E.
Surfaced at 1916.
At 2100 heard and sighted patrolling anti-submarine craft;
heard two, possibly three, in addition to the one sighted. These
ships appeared to be disposed in line and to be patrolling on an
easterly course. No large ships in company. Avoided on surface.
No further contacts.

9 October:
Submerged at 0551, patrolled along the Cape Stephens - Portland
Island line at periscope depth.
At 1200 in position Lat. 3°27'S., Long. 149°41'E.
Surfaced at 1918.
No contacts.

10 October:
Submerged at 0543; patrolled across the Cape Stephens - Port-
land Island line at periscope depth.
At 0950 sighted a submarine, Commenced approach. At 0957
heard two series of three explosions each, very distant.
At 1030 was in position Lat. 3°33'S., Long 149°47'T. hence
should have sighted the convoy which CTF 42 100731 (serial 79)
places in Lat. 3°33' long. 149°55' at this time. However, nothing
of it was seen since the smoke then under investigation emanated
from it, in which case any estimate of its course was entirely wrong.
At 1200 in position Lat. 3°30'S., Long. 149°58'E.
At 1212, having failed to develop the smoke into a definite
contact, alerted course to patrol eastward along the traffic lane.
Surfaced at 1914.
At 2000 sighted parachute flare bearing 035°T at same distance
but closer than those seen on the nights of October 5th and 6th.
Additional single flares seen on same bearing at 2015, 2030 and
2044. Crossing the lines of bearing of these flares with those pre-
viously sighted indicates that the illumination is centered about
the waters between New Hanover and New Ireland causing us to hope

-12-

— page 133 —
3-E-C-R-E-T
that Kavien is receiving attention from our air force.
No further contacts.

11 October:
    Submerged at 0542; patrolled the Cape Stephens - Cape Batsh line at periscope depth.
    At 1149 sighted subjicion of smoke bearing 353°T but was unable to develop into definite contact.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 3°19'S, Long. 149°41'E.
    No further contacts.

12 October:
    Submerged at 0554; patrolled along Lat. 4° at periscope depth.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 4°11'S, Long 150°49'E.
    Surface at 1908.
    Described CTF 42 dispatch 120526 (serial 87) making all area available to SCULPIN and directing that she not transit St.
    George's Channel but depart area from the southeastern corner at sunset of seventeenth.
    No contacts.

13 October:
    At 0050 heard series of underwater explosions and shortly thereafter heard light, high speed screws to the southwest. From that time until 0130 was engaged in a lively game of hide and seek with an enemy that was never sighted - the visibility being atrocious. It was from the small anti-submarine boats that kept the enemy growing dull in this vicinity. Contact definitely lost at 1130.
    At 0433 noted an extensive and pleasingly rosy glow, highlighted by brilliant flashes, bearing about 110°T - the direction of Rahelu. Obviously large fires and explosions which persisted until lost in the dawn.
    Submerged at 0559 and patrolled or' Beining Peninsula at periscope depth.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 3°5°N, Long 151°23'E.
    Surface at 1914.
    Decided to take advantage of the fact that ray area has been extended by moving to the northward and operating west of New Hanover or a couple of days in an attempt to locate the assembly area for a raffic inbound for Raheul. Proceeded accordingly.
    No contacts.

4 October:
    Described CTF 42 dispatch 131310 (serial 91) which contains the information that a supply ship from Raheul is expected to arrive at avion at noon today. Altered course to intercept.
    At 0527 sighted large darkened ship. Commenced approach. Tarted developed into a destroyer (type not determined), a large AK and small AK in column in that order, on northwesterly course, speed first estimated at 11 knots but subsequent events indicate that this estimate was much too high. Selected the larger AK as target and

— page 134 —
3-E-C-R-E-T

commenced attack. At 0538 fired four torpedoes from bow tubes at selected target, all missed ahead. Reversed course to attempt a stern shot at the second AK but was prevented by destroyer commencing search. With the aid of a convenient rain squall had no difficulty in evading on the surface but was unable to gain position for a dawn shot.

At 0603 submerged. Destroyer dropped a few depth charges but none of them were close. At 0620 came to periscope depth and found nothing in sight. Patrolled the Cape Stephens - Portland Island line at periscope depth.

At 1200 in position Lt. 3'16'18, Long. 14°4'9"E.

At 1616 sighted two columns of smoke bearing 332' and 345'T. Commenced approach. Target developed into an AK and AO in column in that order on easterly course, speed about 10 knots, least range about 18,000 yards. No escort seen.

At 1752 sighted more smoke bearing 335'T, bearing increasing. Commenced approach but was unable to raise ships, of which there appeared to be at least three.

At 1919 surfaced and commenced chase. The target almost checked me by making a radical change of course to the southward at sunset. Fortunately, for the first time in memory there was fair visibility making it possible to maintain contact.

At about 2030 enemy was in plain sight, consisted of a convoy of three large ships, escorts stations and commenced attack; selected the tanker, the last ship in column, as target. At 2146 sighted a destroyer astern of the tanker, patrolling his station, an unpleasant sight. At 2155, the rear guard destroyer being on a sweep to the disengaged side of the convoy, fired four torpedoes from bow tubes at the tanker. Observed two ships. Turned away from target and retied at speed. Destroyer and at least one other ship, probably another destroyer, commenced vigorous but confused counter action. Teard several depth charge explosions, and at least two ships gave chase and opened fire using caimon, which exploded on striking the surface, and either shipwrecked or was damaged. At 2200 the target was a massive formation, no star shells. When last seen the target was a mass of smoke from amidships forward but no flames could be seen.

At 2255 all signs of the chase were lost. However, mindful of the difficulty of sighting enemy destroyers and A/S craft when and on and also because visibility had deteriorated somewhat with noon-set, decided to continue to retire at high speed for another hour.

No further contacts.

15 October:

At 0005 reduced speed sufficiently to permit placing two generator engines on battery charge, commenced charging air banks. Took stock of the situation which seems to me as follows: (a) Storage battery and air banks low as result of two attacks and an all day submerged patrol since last change. (b) An now separated from enemy by at least fifty miles, more if he speeded up after the attack. (c) Since I cannot devote less than one engine to the charge my advantage in speed is not more than five knots, less if the enemy has increased speed. (d) Enemy has undoubtedly altered course and probably

— page 136 —
3-2-C-2-T-T

plane in the outer well deck and an impressive stock of depth charges on tie poop, flying the man-of-war flag. For want of a better classification put him down as an 4/3 cruiser. He was zigzagging wonderfully but his base course appeared to be about north, speed about 8 knots. At 1407 went to battle stations and commenced attack. At 1430 fired three torpedoes from stern tubes, small parallax, at the target. Observed one torpedo explode in his wake very close under his counter, another to hit just forward of his bridge. Easy did not appear to be too badly hurt, certainly he was still full of fright. He promptly went with his torpedo and one well deck gun and at 1434 got way on and commenced an approach down the torpedo tracks. Proceeded to get any last torpedo ready and at 1438 fired it at the target as he crossed astern. This torpedo had been a consistent bad actor, on every occasion of its being made ready (except when on the surface) it had flooded in spite of repeated overhaul, consequently did not remain in service for the observer its performance but launched at 1555 when a possible erratic run. At about 1439 heard a single heavy explosion but even if this was a hit it did not stop the enemy. His screws could still be heard as could the burst of shells, and iron 1441 to 1443 he dropped a few depth charges, none close. Then after the sound of his screws receded, fading out on bearing 120°T at 1512. Out of respect to enemy planes remained deep until 1555 when a periscope observation showed nothing in sight except a heavy smoke cloud bearing 90°truc, bearing decreased, very slowly until it was lost to sight at 1806, bearing 06°T. During this period my course was 118°T. Surface at 1852 and made a short exploratory trip to the north-easterward without regaining contact, which is not particularly indicative since heavy and frequent rain squalls severely limited visibility. Since the enemy had no doubt as to my position at this time and thinking it probable that CDR 142 was counting on SUMPTLY for offensive action in the Guadalcanal theatre, dispatched my 180008 announcement that all torpedoes were expended, now the at Cape Vikenara and results of patrol. Shortly thereafter received CDR 142 dispatch 180951 (serial 59) routing this ship home via north of Buka. Reversed course and proceeded as requisition. No further contacts.

19 October:
Weather very black, visibility nil, with frequent and violent rain squalls. Forced to slow to listening speed. Submerged at 3522, proceeded at 125 feet, listening. At 1200 in position Lat. 5°06' S., long. 155°55'E. Made the mistake of rereading my orders for returning to base and became doubtful as to whether I was to keep clear of area DOG north of Buka. Surfaced at 1854. Dispatched my 190915 announcing my intentions of crossing area DOG at Lat. 4°50'S. Shortly thereafter received CDR 142 dispatch 191123 (Serial 3) approving this and delivering a well merited rebuke for excessive use of radio. No contacts.

— page 137 —
20 October:
    Submerged at 0530; proceeded at 125 feet listening.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 06°00'S, Long. 154°00'E.
    At 2210 sighted darkened ship bearing 160°T, range about 8000 yards, on northwestly course, zigzagging. Avoided on the surface.
    No further contacts.

: 21 October:
    Submerged at 0536 and proceeded at 125 feet, listening. Torpedo Officer back to duty.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 11-38-00, Long. 156-10-00.
    Surfaced at 1827. Dispatched my 220715 announcing ETA at point Bud.
    No contacts.

: 23 October:
    Decided to continue on surface.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 20°49'S, Long. 155°34'E.
    No contacts.

: 24 October:
    Continued on surface.
    At 0911 in Lat. 24°38'S, Long 154°44'E. sighted a yellow life ring and, on the chance that it might be of value to intelligence, picked it up.
    At 1200 in position Lat. 25°02'S, Long. 154°47'S.
    At 1355 passed through very large oil slick in Lat. 25°18'S, Long. 154°49'S.
    At 1500 submerged and conducted three hour battery discharge. Inspected the ship.
    At 1755 being at point Bud set course for point Van.
    Completed battery discharge at 1926 and at 1842 surfaced.
    No contacts.

: 26 October:
    At 0030 sighted and exchanged recognition signals with friend.
    By force consisting of two cruisers and three destroyers.
    At 0100, being at point Van proceeded as requisite to confirm to sweet channel.
    At 0430 exchanged recognition signals with received permission to enter from above. Head and stood into port.
    -17-

— page 138 —
3-E-C-R-E-T
3erial (3-5)
PART B - TAMPER.

Coral Sea
Lat. 7-30, Long. 151-45
Vitiag Strait
West of .ew Ireland
East of New Ireland
East of Bougainville

- Generally fair; moderate swell; good visibility; 35 wind, force 4.
- Generally overcast; visibility terrible; sea generally calm to moderate; light rains.
- Wind and sea force 6 from south-east.
- Generally overcast; flat calm to moderate wind and sea; squally; visibility terrible.
- Partly overcast; excellent visibility; moderate wind and sea.
- Overcast; squally.

— page 140 —
3-E-C-R-E-T
Serial (35) U.S.S. SULPIN (35191)
REPORT OF PATROL
PART D - NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:
Nothing unusual noted.

— page 141 —
9-28-42: La. 6-30 S: 275 T: 13,000: HTJMT type destroyer.
1517 : Lo.150-17S: 15 kts.: er.
(Too far to attack)

: 9-28-42: La. 3-46S: 021T: 12-15 : 15,000 : .V. - CHYODA type
0640 : Lo.151-37S: knots. : Seaplane carrier, No
escorts visible.
: 9-28-42: La. 3-47S: 290T: 12,000 : Tanker est. 550-600
0738 : Lo.151-39S: 12 kts.: : 14,000 : rt. long. Similar to
(Fired 4 torpedoes, witnessed 2 hits : CHUROSH MIRU (S36)
before going deep.) Upon coming to : exeprting "goal post"
periscope depth after attack, sighted : for small
engine land bomber, non retractable landing : single high telescope
gear, flying low, distance 4 miles. : mast. Escorted by sub
vessel.
: 10-2-42 : La. 3-17S: 330T: 10,000 : Transport similar HITTA
0710 : Lo.150-20S: : 20,000 : MURT (91) clipper bow,
: 10,000 :

— page 142 —
3-E-C-R-E-T
PART E - SHIPPING AND AIR CONTROL:

DATE & TIME: 10-7-42
: ENTRY: COURTS &:
THIRD: POSITION: BEARING: SPEED: RANGE: DESCRIPTION:
: ESCORT: DD HATSUMAR:
10-7-42: La. 3-513: 200'T: 105'T: 23,000: type. 1st transport
: 1145: 23E. 1st: 14 kts.: 14: 1st:

— page 143 —
3-T-C-R-B-T
PART E - SHIPPING AND PATROL:

DATE & TIME: 10-14-42:30 S, Long: 34.5° T; 105° T; 25,000
LAT: 3-10° N, LONG: 35° T; 105° T;

— page 144 —
3-E-C-R-E-T
Serial (8-5)
REPORT OF PTF: 1st PTN
PART F - DETAILS OF ACTION.

Monday, 26 September at 0620.

CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION:
In spite of the fact that enemy was zigzagging widely it quickly became apparent that the submarine was not in a position to be able to escape. The enemy was closing on the submarine and the submarine was in a position to escape. The submarine was

— page 145 —
7 October at 1324.

CONTROL OF THE TASK:
During the entire time that he was in sight enemy maintained steady course and speed, consequently there were no greater problems involved in closing the track and selecting the most desirable target. During the next eight hours he sped on the normal bearing slightly, consequently the rate of change of bearing was 1% per minute.

— page 146 —
14 October at 0550.

: COMMAND OF THIS UNIT: 22ND,OH:
   - Enemy was sighted sharp on the starboard bow with a moderately broad port angle on the bow. Letter a second, smaller, X was sighted in column with and astern of the target and finally just before firing the escort was discovered leading the process.
   - Maneuvered to close the track keeping a proximately and on to selected target to gain a position range about 1500 yards, target angles about 285°, fired with the target bearing zero relative and the torpedoes angled left to take care of advance.

1. Position: 1st of New Hanover, 1st, 1-14 3, Long, 150-01 E.
2. Target was large at in convoy.
3. Fired 4 torpedoes from forward.
4. Was a surface, high attack.
5. Target course 297, speed 11.
6. Own course 047, speed 3.
7. Firing bearing 000, Gyro angle 14°.
8. Range on bow 70°.
9. Track angle 6°.
10. Range 2000, run 1900.
11. Depth set at 8 feet, torpedoes to run at 19 feet, speed high.
12. Used longitudinal speed of 5 seconds, commenced firing at target bow.
13. Target did not maneuver to avoid.
14. Sound tracked target from 6000 yards.
15. Missed ahead undoubtedly about to cross or in estimating enemy speed, which was probably nearer eight times above knots.
16. Also failed to use enough speed. Torpedoes were aimed at bow, forward, stack and main mast. Considering that date for a light surface attack is at best cautious, speed should have covered at least the length of the target.
17. Like a relative in jail this attack makes a painful subject for discussion.

— page 147 —
3-E-C-12-T PART F - DETAILS OF ACTION.
Serial (3-5)

14 October at 2200.

CONDITION OF RECEIPT:
The ship was sighted in the afternoon while on submerged patrol, then on surface, stern to the right and firing position submerged so decided to chase and attack on the surface during darkness. Started working boat plot.

The ship was a radiological charge of course to southwesterly. The ship was not very heavy but the ship was not very heavy. The ship was not very heavy.

— page 148 —
3-F-C-R-E-T
PART F - DETAILS OF ACTION.

Serial (3-5)

16 October at 1420.

CONDUCT OF JSTUD. CHI:
This approach was complicated by the fact that all torpedoes were in the after tubes; the wide zigzag, plumbed followed by the enemy was an added annoyance. Instead this base course to the
about north, consequently approached to gain a position north of
main, thereafter closed his current tracks at something less than
normal course to be in position to quickly swing to a firing course
for a small parallax shot.

With the target bearing about 080°, range about 1800 yards,
he was observed to complete a 2-2 to his right. Swing left to
reduce the type course and fired a five-bore track was reached.
One hit was observed out enemy's net incorporated. He commenced a counter attack down the torpedo tracks, placing him in position for me to attack with my left torpedo on a virtual straight
shot as he crossed eastern.

1. Position: northeast of Buka Island. Lat. 9-31 S., Long. 156-05 E.
2. Target was a special type A/3 vessel.
3. Fired 4 torpedoes.
4. Missed a day, periscope and TDC attack.
5. First torpedoes fired as follows:
   - Torpedo course 171°T. Speed 8 knots.
   - On course 171°T. Speed 3 knots.
   - Firing bearing 11°. Gyro angle 116 (L o2).
   - Angle on the bow 92 S.
   - Track angle 98 S.
   - Range 1900.
   - Last torpedo fired using:
     - Torpedo course 101°T. Speed 11 knots.
     - On course 171°T. Speed 3 knots.
     - Firing bearing 164°. Gyro angle 174°.
     - Angle on the bow 54 S.
   - Track angle 64 S.
   - Range 1600.
6. Depth set 8 feet, torpedoes to run at 12 feet. Speed high.
7. Used divergent spread of 2° on first three torpedoes.
8. Believe target maneuvered to avoid last shot.
9. Time to explosions was 7-5 seconds.
10. Sound tracked target from 900 yards.
11. Observed the first torpedo to explode in enemy were not more
    than twenty-five feet about his counter - the first time I
    have ever seen this happening. The second torpedo hit just
    over his bridge indicating that the third missed ahead.
    It appears that the speed achieved was considerably wider
    than that intended.
    Performance of the fourth torpedo not observed, however
    a single heavy explosion was heard about one minute after it
    was fired.

— page 149 —
18 October, Continued.

1. Heavy column of smoke, presumably emanating from the target, was under observer. On about an hour and a half to about three hours and a half after the attacks during which time its change in bearing (from 050°T to 060°T) was very slow.

12. Consider the enemy injured by one, possibly two, hits.

— page 151 —
3-E-C-R-E-T PART G - NAVY ANTI-SURFACE MASSES.

Serial (3-5)

slowed to screening speed. Escort commenced a supersonic super sonic search to the northwestward, about this time it became obvious that a second 3/3 ship had arrived on the scene and was searching to the southward.

About twenty minutes after the counter attack commenced it appeared that the ship to the northwest had established a good contact but instead of attacking himself he must have touched his friend on. At any rate the letter made a perfect attack in every thing but depth setting, crossing SQUARE from starboard quarter to port bow.

Under cover of this attack on an OCCURS to the southward at high speed then slowed as indicated. The objective with the counter attack was to prevent the counter attack from being detected and considerable noise being made incident to necessary repairs and stops to protect the ship from further damage.

Enemy appeared to form a scouting line on north-easterly course. Penetrated this on a genetically southeasterly course by keeling the two ships on approximately equal relative bearings on either bow.

From this counter attack a reliable if not full report was learned. He teetofore, as it happened, all attacks on escorts were getting more and more difficult. The enemy was now in a position to attack the ships

— page 152 —
3-7-C-R-3-T
Serial (3-5)

first string of de-th charges might be uncomfortably close.

7 October:
Following a successful attack on an enemy transport observed the escort, a large destroyer, to be trailing for counter attack, went to deep submarine to work. It was not in any particular hurry, the destroyer being at least 150 yards away. Consequently was most unpleasantly surprised when, at a keel depth of about 75 feet, a single heavy explosion occurred fairly close astern. During the attack and attack a very loose load of debris landed far aft for air screens with negative results. However there is no other way to explain this explosion except as an air dropped depth charges were a serious threat to the enemy. In fact I do not believe that the counter attack ships ever established contact although they were, on occasions, quite close to 30L.T.I.

Salient features of this counter action were:

(a) The escorting destroyer was early reinforced by at least one other 1/3 craft.
(b) On three separate occasions late in the action, no screens being audible, single very heavy explosions were heard, none very close, indicating that air support was present then it not sooner.
(c) Only in the last few minutes that sound contact was made with the search did enemy ships come railing.
(d) In lieu of 'pinging' he seemed to employ some means of causing a rapid series of rapid explosions which sounded for all the world like a heavy object being dropped along the hull of the ship. When first heard these explosions some contact action: it was quite obvious that the thought 'terrapi' flashed into everyone's mind (not excepting the Commanding Officer's) since the enemy was almost directly overhead, his serious being clearly audible without benefit of listening gear.

14 October:
Following an unsuccessful night surface attack on the leading ship of a two ship convoy the escorting destroyer commenced a search and counter attack in which inter contact seemed to be the keynote. The destroyer either never found the torpedo tracks or made no attempt to follow them down. I believe that the torpedoes, with ACI device removed, exploded at the end of their run and the inter attack had developed from.

— page 153 —
3-5
Serial (3-5)

ly at random. Had no difficulty retiring on the surface using a convenient rain squall for cover.

14 October:
Following a successful night surface attack on the last ship of a three ship convoy, course south, counter-attack promptly developed. At the time torpedoes were fired one escorting destroyer was known to be on the port, distance, quarter of the selected target and the presence of another, robustly ahead, was suspected. Immediately after firing SCULPTI turned and retired at high speed to the northwest.

The following description must be taken with a liberal grain of salt, darkness and the rapidity of the action made accurate observation impossible. Some ship toward the head of the column opened fire, the bursts being well on the port quarter of SCULPTI, meanwhile the destroyer mentioned above had crossed over at high speed, passing, the end of the column, and at about this time he dropped a string of depth charges. Apparently he found himself in his friends line or fire because he reversed course still at high speed and took up a position between SCULPTI and the wounded ship and seemed to slow or stop, undoubtedly waiting for order to be restored.

By this time I had all ends on the line and was retiring at maximum speed. Also the picture had become clear as events stabilized. The category of fire, i.e., depth charges, probably sound, and commenced chase opening fire, with time pressed projectiles, which was quite accurate in truth but consistently short. I was just about to dive when I realized that he was not using his obvious speed advantage indicating that he had not seen but was dead, on sound to maintain contact. This would make us even, or maybe give me a small advantage, on the question of speed so remained on the surface, gradually, gradually, down from the surface, gradually, gradually, down to lose contact. When last seen, by a little less, he was port bound on to SCULPTI, range about 10, 000 yards apparently stopped, probably trying to regain sound contact.

15 October:
A particularly successful submerged attack was made on an unescorted auxiliary cruiser. He promptly opened fire with two guns apparently using the impulse double click as point of aim. The projectiles he used exploded on striking the surface of the water making quite a burst. However I do not see how they could harm a submarine submarine since their penetration below the surface, if any, must have been a matter of a very few feet.

After a few minutes the enemy got way on and started an approach down the torpedo tracks living at an opportunity to fire.

— page 155 —
3-E-C-R-E-T
Serial (3-5)
REPORT OF FIFTH WAR PATROL

PART I - MATERIAL DEFECTS.

While underway with three main engines on propulsion on September 11, 1942, fresh water pressure on number four main engine began to fluctuate indicating a cracked liner. Took compassions of all units and cut each unit out individually; the foremast did not reveal any abnormally low pressures nor did it lie latitudinally to the ship. The fluctuations on any unit being cut out. Secured the engine due to abnormal overheating and so up by air with the indicator cock open. No moisture out of any of the units. Number five unit having the lowest conversion on the engine and the cutting out of number five injector having seemingly to have reduced the pressure fluctu- tion a slight amount, opened the valve. Five units and resumed lines. No visible crack. Upon conversion of repairs run on number four main engine until diving the next day, the pressure fluctu- tion had been present. Out-tilted engine temporarily ceased by keeping vent on fresh water system open preventing system from becoming in sound. Upon securing engine on jetties, 12, 1942, saw it again by air with the indicator cock open and turned off. The engine was in a sixteen unit. Cased this unit up and found a large crack in the line extending from the top of the line to the air ports. Instead of a liner with the 1.00 number five unit and engine function properly re-lined of 1.00.

The following damage was sustained and "incidents" occurred during the death charge attack on September 28, 1942:

FORWARD TORPEDO ROOM:
(a) Took in a small amount of water through plugs in pressure hull that fill holes previously occupied by leads to mine cable cutters.

FORWARD BATTLE COMPARTMENT:
(a) The sea pressure gauge line in the officers head carried away at keel depth of 270 feet. Compartment started flooding from sea, fortunately little or no water getting down in battery well before a d.c.a.d. could be constructed around battery hatch with bedding, clothes, etc. no chlorine. A bucket brigade was formed and baled water out of after end of compartment to the pump room bilges via the drain in the crew's head. (water accumulated to a depth of 12 inches in after end of compartment.) The drain finally plugged, so water was dumped into dry stores room to a depth of approximately eight inches. About one and a half hours later the gauge line was finally plugged, after several attempts, with a wooden stopper. This stopper was replaced with a pipe plug after surfacing in the evening.

— page 156 —
1-2-C-R-E-T
Serial (3-5)

(a) Continued:
The alteration to remove these guage lines to a position inboard of the sea V.J.ves was partially completed in dry dock at Sorel, France. Limited time in dock there prevented full completion of the alteration.

(b) Inboard layer to battery exhaust ventilation jarrce open sufficiently to show a red light on the "carriers tree".

(c) Throne in officer's inboard lower from its connection to flushing line exhaust. A continuous seperae for remainder of patrol, keeping here deck and forward battery water way wet.

JOURNAL ROOT:
(a) Graze gun air connection jarred open.
(b) Flooding of dry store room dissolved all but one hundred pounds of sugar on board.

UP ROOT:
(a) Drain pump discharage valves to sea jarrce open.
(b) High water in pump room bilges cooled with large up angle on boat located out restricating compressor motor. Injected at 200 pounds of exhaust into motor room which has a)roximately the same characteristics and substituted it to our restricating motor. This motor functioned satisfactorily throughout the whole patrol.
(c) Drain pump starting resistor flooded out by bucket brigade dumping water in crew's head and water sloshing down side of pressure hull. Has been out with fresh water and overhulled. This causes considerable inconvenience when trying to get rid of the charge through the boat after securing from depth charges attack. Trim pump used to pump bilges, sanitary tanks, etc.
(d) Radio transmitter grounded out.

ORIGIN TORPEDO:
(a) Incline meter broken.
(b) Depth gauge glass smashed and needle knocked off the pin.
(c) Steam tight lit hit fixture broken. (This was "shock mounted" in accordance with existing instructions.)
(d) One blower broken.
(e) One locator knocked off bulkhead.
(f) Number two periscope "raise-lower" switch shorted out by water leaking around seismoope.
(g) Azimuth light (noon) on number two periscoope broken.
(h) Gauge glass on hydraulic repair raising tank snapped about half way between securing valves, allowing about twenty gallons of hydraulic oil to run into bilges.

— page 157 —
9-Z-C-R-Z-T
PART H - HATEL LIEUTENANT.

Serial (3-5)

(i) The knife edge on the conning tower door cut through the gasket for a distance of about ten inches and the gasket was pushed in by pressure for a distance of three to four inches on either side of the cut through portion. The cut through portion was on the inboard side of the door, i.e. the side away from the hinges. Since this coast charging the door has remained shut and has taken a pressure of 250 feet, the deck is without excessive leakage.

(j) The object prism of number two was jarred at one point where the remaining fringes look the prism to the tilting mechanism.

(k) The forward starboard corner of the conning tower superstructure just above the main deck was displayed outboard and the paint locker door blown open.

AFTER BATTERY:

(a) Inboard vent to safety tank on port side jarras open and a mitting water to compartment from sea. Vent closed by hand immediately and water mopped up off of deck. Very little or no water got into battery well.

(b) After battery developed a 190 volt ground during the attack. This was reduced to 40 volts by thoroughly cleaning the cell tops.

(c) Due to the casualty to the reinforcement plant and considerable trouble trying to get the air conditioning plant cross connected to the refrigeration system, the temperature in the ice box could soon rise to 50°F. This resulted in the loss of 500 pounds of boned beef and all yeast on board.

(d) Inboard flapper to battery exhaust ventilation jarred open sufficiently to show a red light on the Christmas tree!

'ORWARD ENGINE 2000:

(a) Jarred open fuel oil suction valve from collecting tank; sea pressure lifted relief valve on fuel system flooding bilges with fuel to a depth of about four inches before trouble could be located and suction valve closed.

(b) Jarred open all sea valves from one to two turns.

(c) Jarred open air inlet valve to 200 pound reducer lifting relief valve.

(d) Spun outboard exhaust valve hand wheels on number 1 and 2 angles to the natural position. Valves did not open or leak.

(e) Fuel oil filling valve jarred open.

(f) Foot of the lockers and fuse boxes popped open.

(g) Fuel oil standby pump discharge valve to number one auxiliary engine jarred open.

(h) Three gauges on main engine evaporators were broken.

(i) The Kleinschmitt still was badly shaken up due to whip of its foundation. No welds were cracked but the present

— page 158 —
3-P-C-R-T-T
Serial (J-5)

PART H - MATERIAL DESIGNS.

foundation is considered too flimsy for the vessel to get the still in the lower
still. It will be a relief to get the still in the lower
flats on a solid foundation.

(J) The powerplant cannot arm insulator in the governor control
cabinet of number one generator engine was broken ground-
ing the center arm to its spindle and giving a zero ground
on number one generator armature circuit. Manufactured a
new insulator and installed.

(K) Zero setting lever guide pin on pyrometer meters of for-
ward engines are jarred out of their guide slots causing
pyrometers to give erratic readings until trouble could
be located.

MANEUVERING ROOM:

(e) On first close depth charges the depth charge switch was
jammed from "on" to "off" position. Second close charge
jammed overload relays open and lost main power. Controll-
ernment reset overloads and went ahead at desired speed,
total elapsed time power was lost, about ten seconds.
Auxiliary power was not lost. This switch has a ratchet
to hold it in the "on" position, evidently the panel
jumped out of its notch to allow the handle to swing to
the "off" position. The switch is a standard heavy type
pancake switch which will be replaced with the approved
Portsmouth Navy Yard to you, you receipt.

FTER ENGINE ROOM:

(a) Number one main motor circulating water gauge ruptured.
(b) Liquid level gauge to number four main engine evaporator
broken.
(c) Metal lamp shade blown off overhead.
(d) Opened number three sanitary tank outboard vents about 1½
turns allowing tank to partially fill from sea before vents
were closed.
(e) Number four main engine sea suction strainer vent valve
opened two turns.
(f) Port reduction gear cooler started bad leak around studs
and gaskets to cooler hand hole plates. Starboard cooler
springs a small leak in the same place. No salt water in
tube oil system.
(g) Bonnet of hull valve to flushing line in head sprung a
leak that was repaired during the attack.
(h) Same as item (k) for forward engine room applied to all
after engines.
(i) Five main engine evaporator gauges were broken.

GENERAL:

(a) Numerous lighting fixtures and bulbs throughout the boat
were broken.

— page 160 —
3-E-C-R-E-T
PART H - NATURAL DEFECTS.

Serial (S-5)

the motors out to remove carbon dust to bring the insulator readings to one neogohm. Since the start of the war this condition has become increasingly aggravated. The motors have not been overhauled since installation, a period of about four years.

Upon completion of last war patrol the installation readings were as low as 100,000 ohms. Thorough cleaning by air brought the readings temporarily up to above one neogohm on all motors. Upon arrival in Fremantle from Albany, Western Australia, the reading on number three and four ran motors were 250,000 ohms and 300,000 ohms respectively. Number one and two motors read 400,000 ohms and 500,000 ohms respectively. All motors were cleaned by blowing at this time, August 9, 1942. Upon arrival at Brisbane from Fremantle number three motor read 50,000 ohms and the remainder of the motors above 300,000 ohms.

During the stay in Brisbane all motors were thoroughly cleaned and the coolers on number three and four main motors were removed and tested hydra-tatically to 105 p.s.i. Upon departure from Brisbane the following readings were recorded:

| M.M. No. | ARMAMENT | SINKERS FILTER | SHUNT FIELD |
|||||
| 1       | 1 meg     | 14 meg         | 15 meg      |
| 2       | 1 meg     | 14 meg         | 15 meg      |
| 3       | 1 meg     | 7 meg          | 15 meg      |
| 4       | 1 meg     | 7 meg          | 15 meg      |

At 0951 on September 4, 1942, number four main motor flashed with a load of 600 amps and 320 volts on it. The motor was immediately pulled clear and no load was placed upon it until arrival in Brisbane. Very little could be seen through the hand holes until the ship was stopped at 1741 when an examination of the motor was made through the hand holes with the armature stopped. Preliminary examination showed numerous jettison of the brush rigging, had been turned, the positive bus flexible lead to the brush rigging was turned, copper splattered about the motor casing and the commutator was jettisoned. The connection to the copper bus was jettisoned and found to be dry and in good condition. The connection block inside of the motor could not be seen through the hand hole plates. Insulation readings on all circuits of this motor were zero at this time.

Upon arrival at Brisbane on September 6, 1942, removed and bell upper half and brush rigging from number four motor and found that the flash over had been between the positive and negative terminals of the series field at the connecting block, melting all buses on the block and the series field buses leading across the casing to the series field. Copper was scattered on the inside of the casing.

— page 162 —
3-E-C-R-3-2
Serial (3-5)

Recorded the following readings on the remainder of the motors after they had cooled off:

| M.M. No. | ARMATURE | SENSITIVITY FIELD | SHUNT FIELD |
|||||
| 1       | 300,000  | 5 meg           | 10 meg      |
| 2       | 400,000  | 2 meg           | 10 meg      |
| 4       | 200,000  | 600,000 ohms   | 1.5 meg     |

The following readings were recorded on September 29, 1942:

| M.M. No. | ARMATURE | SENSITIVITY FIELD | SHUNT FIELD |
|||||
| 1       | 350,000  | 5 meg           | 15 meg      |
| 2       | 500,000  | 6 meg           | 15 meg      |
| 3       | 300,000  | 2 meg           | 15 meg      |
| 4       | 200,000  | 800,000 ohms   | 15 meg      |

On October 10, 1942 the following readings were recorded:

| M.M. No. | ARMATURE | SENSITIVITY FIELD | SHUNT FIELD |
|||||
| 1       | 250,000  | 3 meg           | 15 meg      |
| 2       | 400,000  | 6 meg           | 12 meg      |
| 3       | 90,000   | 2.5 meg        | 12 meg      |
| 4       | 200,000  | 900,000 ohms   | 3.5 meg     |

Cleaned number three motor and recorded the following readings:
- 1st reading: 1 meg; series Field 3; 3 meg; shunt Field 12 meg.

October 20, 1942 readings were:

| M.M. No. | ARMATURE | SENSITIVITY FIELD | SHUNT FIELD |
|||||
| 1       | 350,000  | 3 meg           | 15 meg      |
| 2       | 400,000  | 3.5 meg        | 12 meg      |
| 3       | 800,000  | 1.5 meg        | 15 meg      |
| 4       | 200,000  | 200,000 ohms   | 2 meg       |

The readings of the armature circuit are low due to the poor insulation and trapping of carbon dust behind the risers of the motor. This condition can be corrected only by removal of the armature, reinsulation, varnishing and bulking. Blowing out the pace behind the risers brings the insulation readings up temporarily. It can be seen from the above readings that the group over the carbon dust increases with time, the time interval on patrol being about twenty days before the readings arrive at a extremely

— page 164 —
0
SECRET
Serial (S-5)
REPORT OF FIFTH MAR PATROL

PART I - FOOD AND HABITABILITY.

The U.3.3. PELIAS, recently arrived from the States, supplied this ship with boned beef, fresh frozen foods and a wide variety of canned fruit and fruit juices which considerably improved the crew's diet. The food was good until the refrigeration system broke down on 28 September, thereby spoiling everything in the ice box.

Habitability was, as usual, excellent.

— page 167 —
3-3-C-R-E-T
Serial (S-5)

entirely due to Lieutenant HARDENHILL's industry and devotion to duty that there is no reason to believe that any of the torpedoes ran other than hot, straight and normal and largely due to his skill as TDC operator that twelve of the attacks resulted in destruction of or injury to enemy ships.

Ernest S. BALDWIN, 393 06 41, Gdef(ss), USN - for the skill, ingenuity and determination which he displayed, under the direction of Lieutenant HARDENHILL, in successfully plugging a serious leak through the pressure hull of the ship which was then at approximately 275 feet keel depth and being actively hunted by the enemy.

— page 168 —
1. Days duration of patrol - 48 days.
2. Number of days submerged - 42 days.
3. Total miles steamed surfaced and submerged by R.P.M.
   (a) Surface 7458.9
   (b) Submerged 1135.6
   Total 8595.5
4. Gallons fuel oil used - 72,230.
5. % of capacity fuel oil used - 80.3 %.
6. Gallons lubricating oil used - 4,010.
7. % of capacity lub. oil used - 54.5 %.
8. Gallons potable water used - 20,782.
9. Gallons battery w.ter used - 3,400.
10. Factor limiting patrol duration - Fuel.

— page 169 —
5-5/A16-3/01/JW
Serial (0097)
S-E-C-R-E-T
From: The Commander Task Force FORTY TWO.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: The Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area.
Subject: U.S.S. SCULPIN - Report of Fifth War Patrol - September 2, 1942 to October 26, 1942.
Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
1. Enclosure (A) is "overwaded herewith.
2. This patrol of the U.S.S. SCULPIN in enemy waters around NEW IRELAND ISLAND, BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO and BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND, SOLOMONS ISLANDS, is characteristic of the outstanding war record of this vessel. Two tankers and a transport were believed to be sunk and a large anti-submarine vessel severely damaged and probably sunk. Gross tonnages were 9200, 10200, 9200 and 4000 tons respectively.
3. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander L. H. Chappell, U.S. Navy, already the holder of a Navy Cross, has been recommended for a Gold Star in lieu of a second Navy Cross for these actions against the enemy. The splendid performance of the ship's officers and crew is noted. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. SCULPIN has been directed to see that recognition of their performance of duty is made a part of each officer's and man's record.
4. The material condition of the SCULPIN, particularly the main motors, is such as to require a navy yard overhaul. The SCULPIN is scheduled for a navy yard overhaul after her next patrol.
5. This report is well written and contains much valuable information for future patrols in this area.

R. W. CHRISTIE,
Copy to:
Vice O'Day
Cinepac, Cinelant, Comsoapacfor,
Comsubspac, Comsubsblant, Comsubsouwspacfor,
USS SCULPIN file - (1 each)
Each S/M of TP-42 - (1) (NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN).
TP-42 Patrol Summaries file and War Diary (1 each)
Comsubron 2; Comsubdiv 22 - (1 each).

— page 170 —
14 JUL 1982
A/16-3/ss
FF12-15(42)/A16-3
Ser1 0028
S-E-C-E-T
From: The Commander Task Force FORTY-TWO,
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLIGHT,
Vice: The Commander U.S. Naval Forces, SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC AREA.
Subject: U.S.S. SOULFISH Fifth War Patrol - additional
comment.
Reference: (c) CTF 42 Istr. WOS-5-/16-3/01/Jw (0097)
d-ted Nov. 3, 1942.

1. It has been determined that the ship reported
as "wildcried sunk" as a result of three torpedo hits in
the 151-231 E., USS, was not FUL
in latitude 35-51' S., longitude 151-231 E., was not FUL
NARU class of 9,200 tons at 4,730 tons.
2. The NARU sank thirty-five minutes
after the attack.

JAMES FIRE.

— page 171 —
016-3
Serial 00106

A16-3
Serial 00106

February 9, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST THOROUGHLY TO:
CTP-42 Secret 1tr. A16-3
Serial 0028 of 2-5-43.

From: The Commander Southw est Pacific Force.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. SOUTHWEST FILTHWAR PATROL - additional comment.

1. Forwarded.

J. CLARY JONES,
Chief of Staff.

— page 172 —
1/2-10/A16-3(5)/ SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET  (12)  Care of Fleet Post Office,  San Francisco, California,  January 19, 1943.

Serial: 075

COURTESY OF:  U.S.S. SCULPIN (SS191) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of Subject War Patrol.

1. The Sixth War Patrol of SCULPIN (November 18, 1942, to January 8, 1943) occupied 51 days, 34 of which were spent in patrol areas.

2. Of several feasible contacts, one culminated in torpedo attack. Two hits were made out of four torpedoes fired.

3. It is not known what use the enemy was making of the three gas-lighted buoys encountered on December 17.

4. The failure of the torpedo to leave the tube on December 19 seems likely to be due to faulty firing valve action or to not holding firing key closed long enough. Firing valves must be cleaned and tested at each refit. Firing keys must be held "hard closed" for at least four seconds.

5. SCULPIN is credited with the following damage to the enemy:

DAMAGED

FILMED: 1 Tanker

— page 173 —
12/10/A16-3(5)/ SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET  Gt
(12)
Serial 075
CONFIDENTIAL
CONSUMBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 121
U.S.S. SCULPIN - SIXTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. SCULPIN (SS191) - Report of Sixth
War Patrol.

DISTRIBUTION
(IM-4-3)
List III: SS.
Special:
PL(5), EN3(5), ZI(5),
Consub(2), X3(1),
Consub(2), X3

— page 174 —
3-1
Serial (3-1)
U.S.S. SCULPIN (33191)
REPORT OF SOUTH WART PATROL
Commencing November 18, 1942 at Brisbane, Q., Australia.
Ending January 8, 1943 at Pearl Harbor, T.H.

AREA, PATROLLED: South Coast of New Britain west of longitude 151-15 E, northern approaches to Vitie Strait and vicinity of Truk Islands, south of line extending 315 deg. T from Taulap Pass and latitude 7-15 N, east of the reef.

CONTENTS:
Part A - - - - Narrative
Part B - - - - Weather
Part C - - - - Tidal Information
Part D - - - - Navigational Aids
Part E - - - - Shipping and Air Patrols
Part F - - - - Details of Action
Part G - - - - Enemy Anti-Submarine Measures
Part H - - - - Material Defects Experienced
Part I - - - - Food and Inability
Part J - - - - General Comments

-1-

— page 177 —
24 November 1942:
Deorified OTW 42 dispatched 230245 (serial 53A) which warns me to keep north or latitude of Cape Crettin to avoid fouling Swordfish. No contacts.

24 November 1942:
Submerged at 0534, patrolled south coast of New Britain at periscope depth.
At 1135 sighted plane on southerly course; either land based bomber with retractable landing gear or flying boat. Range too great for accurate identification.
Position at 1200 Lat. 7-32 S, Long. 152-07 E.
Surface at 1907. Deorified CTY 42 dispatched 240715 (serial 64) which announces that I'll pass to the command of CTY 7 at zero hours GMT, 28 November, in vicinity of Lat. 0 deg., Long. 149 E.
No further contacts.

25 November 1942:
At 0018 sighted what a.peaceful to be a flare burning on the surface bearings 050 deg. T. Bright moonlight with good visibility in that quarter but no ships were in sight; concluded that it was dropped from a plane and accordingly took cover in a convenient rain squall.
Deorified CTY 42 dispatched 241057 (serial 97A) directing me to disregard his serial 64 and to take up a station patrol 15 miles north of Tolokiva Island, commencing at daylight 26 November, until further orders. Proceeded as requisite.
Deorified V-43 dispatched 241215 (serial 65) cautioning me to keep west of area away when proceeding northward.
Submerged at 0538 and patrolled the south coast of New Britain at periscope depth.
At 1200 in position Lat. 6-37 S, Long. 149-21 E.
Surface at 1923.
At 2330 made land fall on Cape Crettin and commenced passage of Vitiez Strait.

26 November 1942:
...at 0600 submerged and patrolled assigned station at periscope depth.
Position at 1200, Lat. 05-04 S, Long. 147-25 E.
Surface at 1934.
No contacts.

27 November 1942:
...at 0505 sighted object in water which might be a small boat, commenced approach and at 0544 an unpatrolled assigned station at periscope depth.

-4-

— page 178 —
28 November 1942:
Submerged at 0551, patrolled assigned station at periscope depth.
Position at 1200 Lat. 5-05 S, Long. 147-32 E.
At 1746 held battle problem and emergency drills.
Surfaced at 1940.

Submerged at 0545 and proceeded at periscope depth.
Position at 1200 Lat. 4-42 S, Long. 149-39 E.
Surfaced at 1927. 3st course to arrive at Long. 148 deg. E as early as possible without anterior area easy.
No contacts.

30 November 1942:
Submerged at 0558 and proceeded at periscope depth.
Position at 1200 Lat. 2-10 S, Long. 148-40 E.
Surfaced at 1929.

No contacts.

1 December 1942:
Submerged at 0623 and proceeded at periscope depth.
At 1100, being in the vicinity of 1st 0 deg., Long. 149 deg., considered myself as now being under the command of CTF 7.
At 1200 in position Lat. 0-30 N, 148-58 E. Set clocks back one hour to zone -10 time.
Surfaced at 1807.
No contacts.

2 December 1942:
At 0043, immediately after monitor, sighted a small darkened ship bearing 123 deg. T. on southerly course, range about 5000 yards.
Commenced approach, but at 0105, before firing position was gained, enemy sighted me, altered his course to eastward to put me astern and increased speed. Enemy was fairly speedy, was able to distance me in a stern chase and at 0110 lost contact. Assuming that he would eventually attempt to return to his original course, about 190 deg. T., I altered course to southeast and continued at best speed. At 0150 regained contact, enemy again on southerly course, commenced approach, was again sighted at about 6000 yards range.

— page 180 —
6 December 1942:
At about 2000 commenced trying to raise 1942 to ask for repeat of missing serials without success. Radio Brisbane opened up and said he would take our message, accordingly gave it. to him that he had not obtain receipt but since communication had been signals. Did not obtain and since I did not like to further jeopardize my position, assumed that he had gotten it and shut down. Cleared the area, moving to the eastward.

7 December 1942:
At 0500 made land fall on Peran Island bearing 025 deg. T., distance 20 miles.

-7-

— page 181 —
1. SUBMERGED at 0506 and patrolled the vicinity of Cotta Pass at periscope depth.
2. At 0545 sighted smoke and masts of ship bearing 246 deg. T, bearing increasing. Commenced approach. At 0610 sighted what appeared to be the conning tower of a submarine wearing 027 deg. T, which would place him in the pass or possibly inside the reef. He was immediately lost to sight and not seen again. At 0645 sighted the masts of a ship bearing 027 deg. T, bearing decreasing, indicating that he was standing out of the pass. Commenced approach on the last mentioned ship, it being obvious by now that the ship to the westward was now inside the reef, having entered by a pass to the westward, probably Ulifuraro. At 0710 the ship being approached was recognized as a somewhat nondescript airfart, in appearance much like a medium sized tuna boat, armed, carrying depth charges and flying the merchant flag. He was making rudder course changes and sometimes stopping. (Suggesting that the ship was still on the way to the south. Looked as if he might be running a little farther from something good. At about this time sighted smoke to the northward, bearing decreasing. This plotted in as a ship inside the reef on a westerly course standing over 1000 yards. At 0725 he cleared the reef by a pass to the westward and then stood off on a southerly course. Ship's structure was never raised but his masts were seen briefly after he cleared the atoll. At 0730 sighted float type, sin, lie engine, observation bilane bearing 170 deg. T, on westerly course, range about 4000 yards.
3. At 1325 sighted ship bearing 115 deg. T, on northerly course, range about 1000 yards, later identified as a small patrol boat, probably the one sighted earlier this morning.
4. At 1452 sighted masts of small ship bearing 185 deg. T, on easterly course, range about 1500 yards. Shortly thereafter he reversed course and drew clear to the westward. While range was too great to say definitely, he appeared to be a patrol vessel similar to but slightly larger than the one previously sighted.
5. Surfaced at 1806.
6. No further contacts.

8 December 1942:

At 0245 sighted darkened ship bearing 255 deg. T, on northerly course, range about 6000 yards, bearing increasing. Commenced approach. At 0304 it became apparent that range was rapidly increasing. Continued chase at best speed. Lost sight of target at 0310. Continued chase until dawn without regaining contact.
Submerged at 0504 and patrolled southern approaches to Cotta Pass at periscope depth.
Position at 1200, Lat. 06-12 N, Long 151-23 E.
Surfaced at 1801.
Having received no reply to my "Q" signal requesting repeat of missing serials, at 2330 dispatched my 081026 (serial sail) making same request. As before, was unable to raise MPI so gave it to radio Brisbane who had volunteered to act as relay.

— page 182 —
10 December 1942:
- Submerged at 0504 and patrolled assigned stations at periscope depth.
- At 0610 heard two distant explosions.
- At noon in position Lat. 05-57 N, Long. 151-35 E.
- Surfaced at 1805. Assuming that promised target had gotten no commenced a search toward Truk.

No contacts.

11 December 1942:
- Submerged at 0512, patrolled southern approaches to Cotta Pass at periscope depth. Position doubtful, not having had a good fix since morning of December 9.
- At 0540, with nothing in sight, was unexpectedly attacked by depth charges having the characteristic sound of those dropped by aircraft, fairly close. Went to 140 feet, rigged for depth charge attack and altered course. At 0605, not having been again attacked, secured from depth charge and at 0650 resumed course and periscope patrol.
- At 0845 sighted float type, single engine, observation biplane bearing 000 deg. T, distance about two miles.
- Position at noon, Lat. 07-00 N, Long. 151-40 E.
- At 1542 sighted smoke bearing 083 deg. T, bearing slowly decreasing. Commenced approach. At 1600 target identified as a small fishing boat being utilized as an anti-submarine patrol. Not a torpedo target but continued the approach for practice.
- Surfaced at 1805. Still heavily overcast.
- At 1815 sighted the beam of a powerful searchlight to the northeastward which swept the horizon several times. From its bearing and estimated distance, judged it to be on a ship, or on one of islands, within the reef.

-9-

— page 183 —
12 December 1942:
    - "No further contacts."
    - "12 December 1942:"
    - "At 0036 having failed to regain contact, and being in the close vicinity of Pulusk Island and surrounding reefs, with the ships position very much in doubt, gave up chase and stood clear to the eastward."
    - "At 0309 and patrolled at periscope depth."
    - "Position at 1200, Lat 6-29 N, Long. 149-59 E."
    - "Surfaced at 1809."
    - "Es for the next few days and return to this vicinity towards the middle of the week."
    - "No contacts."
    - "14 December 1942:"
    - "Submerged at 0319. Patrolled southwestern approaches to Truk at periscope depth."
    - "Position at 1200, Lat. 6-32 N, Long. 151-10 W."
    - "Surfaced at 1807."
    - "At 1807 sighted 100m of searchlight to northwest, very distant."
    - "No contacts."
    - "15 December 1942:"
    - "Submerged at 0507, patrolled southern approaches to Truk at periscope depth."
    - "At 0851 sighted a flying boat bearing 045 deg. T."

- "10"

— page 184 —
100 feet until 0915 when resumed periscope patrol.
Position at 1200, Lat. 6-29 N, Long. 152-06 E.
Surfaced at 1808.
No contacts.

16 December 1942:
Submerged at 0509 and patrolled southern approaches to Truk at periscope depth.
Position at 1200, Lat. 6-26 N, Long. 152-09 E.
Surfaced at 1807.
At 1845 sighted beam of searchlight bearing 310 deg. T, quite distant.
No contacts.

17 December 1942:
Submerged at 0515 and patrolled southwestern approaches to Truk at periscope depth.
At 1130 sighted mast of ship, bearing 100 deg. T, bearing increasing, range about 24,000 yards. Commenced approach. At 1136 identified the target as a torpedo. The buoy was 3 or 4 miles. The

— page 185 —
1. CONFIRMATION:
   - Suggestion on aircraft carrier, and at least three escorts on north-easterly course at high speed. At 0040, when range was about 15,000 yards, two of the escorts were observed to head directly for SCULPIN. Turned away and attempted to evade on the surface. For a few minutes thought I might get away, especially when one of the enemy was seen, and heard, making a tenth charge attack. However almost immediately thereafter the other ill-illuminated SCULPIN perfectly with a very powerful searchlight and both opened fire at a range of about 6000 yards. Submerged and from 0057 to 0102 underwent depth charge attack with new very accurate or close, followed by a long supersonic search. Lost sound contact at 0156.

At 0252 came to periscope depth and found nothing in sight. However several rain squalls were in the vicinity, so remained submerged until they had cleared up. Surfaced at 0348.

Submerged at 0510 and patrolled southwest on a proaches to Truk. Presuming that enemy shipping will be routed clear of this vicinity today and that I will be certain to receive considerable attention from enemy air patrols, decided to conduct a listening patrol.

Position at 1200, Lat. 6-27N, Long. 150-00 E. Surfaced at 1817. Since my presence was well advertised here, decided to move to eastward. At 1920 dispatched my 180731 (serial Unit) reporting events of this morning.

At 2222 sighted darkened ship bearing 270 deg. T, on north-easterly course, range about 12,000 yards. Commenced maneuvering to gain position for submerged attack.

19 December 1942:

At 0024 sighted destroyer bearing 340 deg. T, on southwesterly course, range about 8,000 yards, obviously making rendezvous with ship being approached. The first indication of the presence of this destroyer was a puff of smoke bearing about 000 deg. T. He was subsequently observed to make smoke briefly at intervals, suggesting that enemy uses this means of establishing contact during darkness with good visibility.

At 0030, being in favorable position, submerged and continued the approach. At 0101 went to battle stations and commenced attack. At 0121 fired four torpedoes from bow tubes at large bridge island type tanker. Torpedo in number four tube failed to eject properly and started a hot run in the tube. It was necessary to fire it at second time when it ejected, but was not heard to run.

At about 0123 observed two hits on the tanker, one just about under his bridge island, the other on his starboard quarter. It is believed that the latter caused flooding of his machinery spaces. Certainly his screws stopped and were not again heard.

Immediately after the torpedoes hit, the destroyer turned to counter attack. Lost sight of him completely as he came end on so at about 0127 went deep and rigged for depth charge attack, which developed at 0129 as one inaccurately placed string of seven eigh depth charges followed by a supersonic and listening search.

— page 186 —
20 December 1942:
At 0345 passed through what appeared to be a very pronounced ship's wake. Jebbered it without result but decided to send the day patrolling his victim and search toward Truk during daylight. Jebbered at 0511 and patrolled south of Truk at periscope depth.

Position at 1200, Lat. 05-21 N, Long. 151-51 E.
At 2200 deorited CTF 7 dispatch 192214 (Serial Love) warning me that TRITON would cross my home bound track in Lat. 10 N, Long. 160 E, exact date unknown.

21 December 1942:
At 0450 sighted beam of searchlight bearing 005 deg. T, quite distant.
At 0503 Jebbered and at 10-15E southern approaches to Truk at periscope depth.
At 1145 sighted mast or ship bearing 000 deg. T, on southerly course, range about 14,000 yards. Commenced approach.
At 1200 in position Lat. 00-04 N, Long. 151-22 E.
At 1200 target identified at 12-00 N, Long. 151-22 E. Properly listed and marked as a hostile ship, proceeding independently on steady course, and as far as could be determined completely unarmed. Did not attack but continued approach to obtain photographs.
Surfaced at 1816.
No other contacts.

22 December 1942:
Jebbered at 0514, patrolled southern approaches to Truk at periscope depth.
Position at 1200, Lat. 5-26 N, 151-33 E.
Surfaced at 1820.
No contacts.

— page 187 —
23 December 1942:
   - Submerged at 0505, patrol led southern approaches to Truk at periscopes depth.
   - Position at 1200, Lat. 5-22 N, Long. 151-00 E.
   - Surfaced at 1615.

24 December 1942:
   - Submerged at 0506, patrol led southern approaches to Truk at periscopes depth.
   - Position at 1200, Lat. 5-22 N, Long. 151-00 E.
   - Surfaced at 1615.

25 December 1942:
   - Submerged at 0453, patrol led southwestern approaches to Truk at periscopes depth.
   - Position at 1200, Lat. 6-45 N, Long. 151-00 E.
   - At 1439 sighted ship bearing 075 deg. T, on southern course, range about 10,000 yards. Commenced approach, ...at 1440 determined target to be a sea not distant, and one that is single engine scouting plane, zigzagging. ...at 1450 a periscope observation showed the target to be very close aboard and much ahead of the generated bearing by reason of a radical right zig. ...than an attempt was made to match pointers and fire, the gyro setting motor stalled. (See Part H). ...made a desperate effort to bring the torpedoes to bear by swinging the ship in conjunction with heavy external fire. ...but could not keep up with the very rapid rate of change of bearing so, to try steam hunkition, this target got away. Determined to chase in during darkness. Jet courses accordingly.

26 December 1942:
   ...at 0300, being ahead of enemy's plotted position, commenced a search cru. across his mobile courses.
   - Decribed CTF 7 dispatched 441637 (Serial Prep). Cheers for DRNU!
   ...at 0515, full dawn, having failed to regain contact, submerged and patrol led southwesten approaches to Truk at periscopes depth.
   - Position at 1200, Lat. 4-35 N, Long. 145-38 E.
   - Surfaced at 1817.
   - At 2235 deciphered CTF dispatched 252258 (Serial Negat) containing the information that an enemy submarine was in PDed in Lat. 10-45 N, Long. 159-30 E. on beachway 25.
   ...at 2250 stopped to clear a section of side plating which had partially carried away.
   - No contacts.

— page 188 —
27 December 1942:
...t 0040 dearipted CTY dispatch 252018 (Serial Inter) contain-
ing procedure to be followed when in the vicinity or outlying is-
land bases.
Submitted at 0519 and patrolled southeastern approaches to
Truk at periscope depth.
at noon in Lat. 0-23 N, Long. 152-33 E.
Surfaced at 1732.
No contacts.

28 December 1942:
Submitted at 0540 and proceeded at periscope depth.
Position at 1200, Lat. 09-45 N, Long. 157-01 E.
Surfaced at 1728.
No contacts.

30 December 1942:
Proceeded on surface.
at 1200 in position Lat. 12-53 N, Long. 158-31 E.
No contacts.

31 December 1942:
Proceeded on surface.
at 0000 set clocks elapsed one hour to zone -11 time.
Position at 1200, Lat 14-52 N, Long. 163-45 E.
Dispatched by 310597 (Serial Love) informing CTY 7 of my
scheduled on this home bound trip and informing him that I was with-
out information on hull slips and recognition signals to be used
after midnight, 2nd.
No contacts.

1 January 1943:
The condition of the sea being such as to preclude an adequate,
efficient lookout and the main motors requiring attention making it
necessary to stop the shafts (see part II) submerged at 0655 and
proceeded at 0830 at depth except when work on motors required
balancing when went to 100 feet.
Position at 1200, Lat. 15-40-30 N, Long. 166-26 E.
Surfaced at 1637.

— page 190 —
5 January 1943

Proceeded on surface.
At 0240 decipted CTF 7 dispatch 050226 (Serial Love) directing that submarines at sea making radio transmissions include position to nearest degree at the time of first transmission.
Position at 1200, Lat. 19-07 W, Long. 171-15 W.
No contacts.

6 January 1943:

At 0212 decipted CTF 7 dispatch 060947 (serial Prep) confirming rendezvous requested in my 310907.
At 0430 set clocks ahead one hour to zone plus 11 time.
At 1100 sighted patrol plane (PBY) bearing about 200 deg. T on northeasterly course and at 1105 exchanged recognition signals.
Until asked to get clear this plane showed disconcerting propensity to linger in my immediate vicinity. In view of the fact that four large depth charges were plainly visible under his wings this seemed almost like bad taste.
Position at 1200, Lat. 19-34 W, Long. 167-01 W.
At 1300 commenced battery discharge at the six hour rate and completed it at 2044.
No further contacts.

7 January 1943:

Proceeded on surface.
At 0303 sighted patrol plane (PBY) bearing about 060 deg. T on southwesterly course, range about 8000 yards. At 0437 exchanged recognition signals.
At 1200 in position Lat. 19-38 W, Long. 107-02 W.
At 1505 made Radar plane contact and shortly the surface sighted patrol plane (PBY) bearing 300 deg. T on northeasterly course, range about 16,000 yards. Received recognition signals.
No further contacts.

8 January 1943:

At 0300 sighted searchlight display bearing 040 deg. T.
At 0454 sighted darkened ship bearing 125 deg. T on southeasterly course, range about 8000 yards. At 0457 exchanged recognition signals and discovered her to be LITCHFIELD. Proceeded into Pearl Harbor under escort of LITCHFIELD.

— page 192 —
1. Lat. 7-30-00 S.
   Long. 151-30-00 E.

2. Vitiaz Strait

3. S.W. of Truk *
   South of Truk *

4. Between Truk and Pearl Harbor

* Consistent average of 23 days observation.

— page 194 —
12-2-42 : 1-45-00 N : 123 T: 8000: Enemy: Undoubtedly fired off about 3-4000
0043 : 14-9-45-00 E: : 190 Z: tons, high poop and stack
: Own: aft- high bow and probable
: 023 T: gun mount fwd-spacious well
: amidships but no rest visible
: ble-probably carried radar
: or exceptionally good load
: outs.
: DD; probable ALSHHO type
: 1222 : 150-04-00 E: : 210 T : tripod foremast, forestack
: and aftermast only parts
: : visible. Assisting DD was
: : flying boat-similar to PBY
: : in appearance-at great
: distance.

12-6-42 : 06-23-00 N : 255 T: 7000: Enemy : Two HATORI class cruisers
0531 : 151-26-45 E: : 020 T : in column at speed of about
: : 090 T : 12 knots. Could not close.

12-6-42 : 06-42-00 N : 228 T:15000: Enemy : While engaged in attack on
0659 : 151-27-15 E: : 020 T : CL, sighted masts of two
: : 000 T : SHIPS. One A0, one AT.
: : 000 T : Shifted attack to leading
: : ship; an AT very similar to
: : HOKUYO MARU app. 6000 tons.
: : 200 T : Sighted ship small tanker app.
0714 : 355 T: 10000: Enemy : Sighted DD of MINEKAGE class
: : 200 T : approaching at high speed.

12-7-42 : 06-56-00 N : 246 T:10000: Enemy : Sighted tops of masts and
0545 : 151-44-30 E: : 000 T : smoke of ship moving to
: : 000 T : north. Ship was never
: : 350 T : visible.

12-7-42 : 06-56-00 N : 027 T: 8000: Own : Sighted what appeared to be
0613 : 151-44-30 E: : 350 T : looming tower of sub. was
: : moving away; shortly lost to
: : sight.

— page 196 —
12-11-42 :06-48-00 N :083 T:10000:Enemy :"Tuna Boat" patrol vessel.
1608 :151-33-00 E: :200 T: Approx. 175 ft long of 400
:

— page 197 —
PART E (CONTINUED)
CONFIDENTIAL
APP. ZN.
DATE & TIME POSITION ING. YDG. COURSE DESCRIPTION
12-18-42 :05-15-00 N :270 T:10000:ENemy :Sighted large tanker, simi-
2222 :150-18-00 E: :055 T: :lor to TATETARA MARU, with
: :own :gun mount on bow.
: :160 T:
12-19-42 :06-01-00 N :340 T:12000:ENemy :Sighted DD coming to
0024 :150-31-00 E: :220 T: :rendezvous with tanker.
: :own :
: :333 T:
12-21-42 :06-04-00 N :005 T:12000:ENemy :Sighted ship which was later
1144 :151-18-00 E: :155 T: :identified as the TATETARA
: :own :MARU military hospital ship.
: :210 T: :Painted white and properly
: :marked with green band and
: :red cross on side and stacks.

12-25-42 :07-01-00 N :075 T:18000:ENemy :Sighted ship with DD escort-
1434 :151-18-00 E: :210 T: :later identified as very
: :own :smaller to TITOBUNA MARU
: :315 T: :all respects. Was escort
: :by DD or KURATA class.
: :ship was steering a very
: :pronounced zigzag course.

— page 198 —
2222 December 15, bearing 270 deg. T, range about 12,000 yards, on northeasterly course, maneuvered to gain position ahead of enemy and near his track maintaining this range at t.t. with would just permit sight contact. Surface approach was unattended when escort destroyer was sighted obviously making rendezvous and in a position favorable for sighting 30UNLTR. Submerged at 0030 and continued the approach on normal approach course, traveling by sound. At 0101 picked up enemy, a large tanker, turned, periscope, came to 70 deg. track and commenced attack. Could not see escort but could hear him pinching industriously so left the torpedoes set to run at 8 feet. At 0111 sighted destroyer almost out firing bearing but too far away for a good shot. Came to 90 deg. track and increased speed to get a better firing position on tanker. At 0121 fired four torpedoes from bow tubes at tanker.

1. In Lat. 6-06 1, Long. 150-29-30 E.
2. Target was large bunker.
3. Fired four torpedoes on a predetermined periscope bearing in broad sight.
4. Target course 055 deg. T, speed 12 knots. Own course 325 deg. T, speed 3 knots. Firing bearing 341 Gyro angle 0.
5. Range on the bow 71 S.
6. Range 3300, run 3000.
7. Longitudinal spread fired just ahead of bow, just ahead of midships, just aft of midships, and at stern.
8. Target did not maneuver to avoid.
9. Time to explosions was just over two minutes. . .occur at time not obtained.
10. Sound conditions excellent. Tracked target screen "pinging" from about 14,000 yards.
11. Two hits observed and heard, one starboard midships and one on starboard quarter.
12. Consider the enemy received structural damage tantamount to destruction and probably sank. His screws stopped and were not heard again.

— page 199 —
1. General Observations.

Surface anti-submarine patrols were neither extensive nor effective. Small patrol vessels, comparatively adapted fishing boats, were the only type seen and their activity was limited; none even seen forward and carried a single stow of depth charges in racks at. They had little to combat. To limit the number of depth charges stopped to listen to the sound of the sound

— page 207 —
3. Communications.

The kindest comment that can be made on communications is that they were not good. Three dispatches were missed; CTF 7 dispatched 010312 of December as a result of an error in deciphering the call signs coupled with the fact that the external indicator was not recognized, this ship not holding a list of indicators and being familiar with only HMND, FETH and JUNO as indicators for the crypto systems held; CTF 7 dispatched 030920 of December as a result either of the call being enyphered improperly or if a second error on SCHUTT's part in using OCP 1312 series and OCP 1311 A-2 to be definitively determined after return to port; a third unidentified message - but prior to CTF dispatch 032323 of December an unknown reason. Difficulty was experienced in establishing communication with CTF 7 to transmit any signal in December and my dispatch 081026 of December. In both cases radio Brisbane's offer to relay was accepted. CTF 7's dispatches 082015, 082106, 100446, 110610, 140105, 170815, 191845, 250037, 250106, 251945, 312536 and 312358 of December and 050214, 052250, 060212, 060212, 062150 and 070111 of January addressed to Task Force Seven, were inipted in a system not held by this ship. Rest that one or the might have continued inoperative concerning the transmission of any 310907 of December and made that dispatch unnecessarily long.

Some small confusion in the matter of maintaining a consecutive check of list because much of the traffic was multiple address. It is suggested that a change to each task unit a category, such as girls' names, breeds of dogs, names of rivers, cities, etc., from which all serial key cards pertaining to it will be selected might clarify the situation.

4. Health.

Generally speaking health of the crew was good. Injuries consisted of one second degree burn and one electrical burn involving the eyes. More serious illnesses included two cases each of urethritis, carbuncle and cataract. CTF, and six cases of rather severe unclassified intestinal disorder. The latter resolved food poisoning to some degree but for the fact that the cases were consequently over a period of several days rather than simultaneous.

There was a further increase in the minor ailments that are always with us such as coughs and colds, particularly early in the patrol, constipation, ear aches and headaches.

In this connection it is the opinion (admittedly of the rankest lay variety) of the Commanding Officer that the crew of this ship is beginning to suffer from the cumulative strain of the last thirteen months. Seventy-five percent of the officers and about 60 percent of the men, including all key men, have served continuously on this ship since the commencement of hostilities. Another fifteen per-

— page 211 —
1518 Y Underway. Air escort in company until dark.
: 2400 Y Set clocks ahead twenty-four hours.
: 1:30 to June 5 (incl.): Enroute. Exercised daily at battle rate drills, radar tracking or battle surface.
: June 6: 0230 K Entered area. Patrol located across KISKA route during daylight. No contacts.
: 2245 K Decirited Consubpae dispatch 060347 (serial 12F; ultra) and at.
: 2300 K Proceeded as requisite at best speed.
: June 7: 0020 K Made radar contact with small ship bearing 2500T, range about 4000 yards, and at most simultaneously sighted flashing light on that bearing. In view of special instructions avoided.
: 0633 K Sighted small patrol or fishing boat bearing 2200T, range about 12000 yards. Avoided.
: 1002 K Sighted small patrol or fishing boat bearing 2400T, range about 9000 yards. Avoided.
: 1030 K Time not being pressing and the visibility being such that surprise encounters at close range were not impossible, submerged and proceeded at periscope depth.
: 1900 K Surfaced.
: June 8: 0533 K Submerged in approximate position 3130N, 142010E.

— page 212 —
1205 K  Surfaced for observation of sun.
: 1300 K  Submerged.
: 1620 K  Surfaced for observation of sun.
: 1524 K  Submerged.
: 2035 K  Sunraced and patrolled on courses 060° and reverse, length of legs eight miles, center at Lat. 31°30'N, Long. 142°10'E.

June 9:
0000 K  Sighted two carriers escorted by one large ship, apparently a cruiser, bearing about 190T. Almost simultaneously made radar contact at range of 11,500 yards. Continued approach.

0016 K  Fixed four torpedoes from forward tubes, torpedo run 7550 yards.

00130 K  One submarine torpedo explosion, close abr. 6m. (6yrs) missed answering for stern shot.

0024 K  Heard two distant underwater explosions and cut about 1/2 mile from the observed much blinker signaling in the target group. Sent contact report.

0025 K  Unable to gain position for stern shot, commenced chase. Sight contact lost.

0032 K  Radar contact lost, range 14,300 yards, only two ships visible.

0034 K  Possible radar contact to westward which failed to develop.

0130 K  Not having regained contact and in view of events of 0024, 0032 and 0034, decided to back track searching for cripple. Proceeded accordingly but with negative results.

0451 K  Anticipating opposition, air and surface, submerged and patrolled at periscope depth, along the line between Lat. 28°N, Long. 144°20'E and Lat. 32°45'N, Long. 141°03.

— page 214 —
0.415 K
Submerged and patrolled off KINKASAN at periscope depth.

: 1839 K
Sighted a convoy of five ships; viz one medium sized AP/AK, one small AO, two small AK's and one escort on southherly course bearing 0300T, range about 9000 yards. Commenced approach.

: 1919 K
PIfed four torpedoes from stern tubes at largest ship, the AP/AK. Firing interval eight seconds. Commenced swinging for bow shot at small AO.

: 1919:40K
Heard and observed one premature torpedo explosion close aboard. Great exotement on the target which commenced to swing toward. Other ships, except escort, turned away. Escort increased speed slightly and commenced closing target.

: 1920:20K
While observing tho escort, heard one explosion and, shifting periscope to the target, observed one hit somewhat forward of amidships.

: 1922 K
The escort, apparently having picked up the torpedo tracks, commenced an approach down thom.

: 1925 K
The escort being about 500 yards away with zero angle on the bow, went to 250 feet and rigged for depth charge. Until this time tho target continued to swing in a tight circle to his right.

: 1930 to 1934 K
Subjected to a very deliberate counter attack, five depth charges being dropped at one minute intervals. None very close. No damage.

: 1959 K
Made periscope observation; nothing in sight.

: 2043 K
Surfaced and commenced pursuit of convoy.

June 15:
: 0440 K
Not having regained contact, submerged and patrolled indicted enemy track off SHIYOY S.KI.

: 2034 K
Surfaced having sighted nothing all day. Decided to patrol this vicinity at slow spad during darkness to intercept traffic rounding SHIYOY S.KI.

— page 215 —
U.S.S. SCULPIN

CONFIDENTIAL

June 16:
0445 K Submerged and patrolled KINKISAN - SHIYO. SAKI line at periscope depth. Distant underwater explosions were heard at frequent intervals from mid-day on.

2032 K Surfaced having sighted nothing. Act course for KINKISAN.

2200 K Mede doubtful radar contact which failed to develop.

June 17:
0330 K Detected picture of another radar on SJ screen.

0430 K Dawn well advanced but the visibility being not more than 500 yards by reason of dense fog decided to remain on the surface to conduct radar patrol.

0600 K Visibility rapidly increasing.

0610 K Visibility about 15,000 yards to westward, less to seaward. Submerged and patrolled off KINKISAN at periscope depth.

0640 K Mede doubtful sound contact, light screws, bearing 2350T, which failed to develop.

0840 K Sighted two sampan type patrol boats bearing 1100T, range 6000 yards. -widowed.

1600 to 1615 K Heard echo ranging to westward. Nothing sighted; visibility very spotty, varying rapidly from 1000 yards or less to about 8000 yards.

2014 K Surfaced. Feeling that the enemy, by means of radar, had detected my presence in this area, decided to move south.

2150 K Mede radar contact bearing 1350T, range 5200 yards. Commenced tracking. It developed that the target was very small, probably a patrol boat or fishing sampan, not worth a torpedo. The conditions of visibility (about 1000 yards and variable, overcast, very dark) and the geographical location made a gun action inadvisable. Continued tracking for practice.

2317 K Broke off tracking. The target was on course 1350T, speed

— page 216 —
5. U.S.S. SCULPIN

CONTINUED:
1. Five knots, not zigzagging. No could his screws be heard at a range of 1000 yards.

June 15:
2. 0436 K Submerged and patrolled across the KINKAISHI - SEIKOYA SAKI line at periscope depth.

3. 0545 K Passed a buoy carrying a net about six feet high on which a black flag was stranded.

4. 1746 K Gyro compass follow up system failed.

5. 2040 K Surface having sighted no ship, at this point decided to move to the eastward and patrol the KIKA route while repairing the gyro compass and, before again closing the coast, to communicate with Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, to inform of the progress of the patrol to dates, particularly the disavowing torpedo performance. Proceeded as requisite.

June 19:
6. 0128 K Sighted darkened ship bearing 210°T, range about 3000 yards, on western course. Continued approach.

7. 0156 K Radar in contact with the target at a range of 6700 yards, failed to fire. Fired a 5" shell target.

8. 0219 K Submerged and continued the approach.

9. 0314 K Target in plain sight at about 1000 yards was discovered to be one of the sanan type patrol boats so common in this area. Too small for a torpedo, but not too strong to be taken by gun action. Doodled to open the range to southeast to take full advantage of visibility (noon setting, first dawn shortly due to the northeast), surface and ran all guns. Then approach hit from eastward other ships of the sea, they observed during daylight had, other than weather guns, only one small gun forward - and overwhole hit with maximum volume of fire from the entire battery before he could bring his gun to bear.

10. 0325 K Surface and went to gun action stations. Continued approach.

— page 217 —
0345 K
: Commanded firing at a range of 800 yards, target angle 150, Commanded hitting at about the third or fourth salvo, action proceeded according to plan. Enemy replied only with small arms which were shortly silenced. Slowed and circled enemy at 100 to 400 yards range, maintaining fire.

: 0403 K
: Enemy dead in the water and apparently sinking; his deck house was a mass of flames and it could be seen, through shell holes, that a satisfactory internal fire was underway. Broke off. action and stood to eastward at best speed to cl-air area.

: 0445 K
: Gro comes back in conjunction. Very gratifying in view of the fact that none of the electrical's mates attached are qualified gyro compass repair men.

: 0506 K
: Submerged and patrolled across the KISKi route at periscope depth.

: 1524 K
: Sighted fishing scrapyard bearing 120 T, range about 5000 yards, on westerly course. Commanded approach.

: 1620 K
: Heavy could be made out to be a scrapyard, about 75 tons, area, ostensibly, with machine guns forward and on the bridges house and a train mount small cutter gun or noop on aft. at this time he was about to enter a dense fog bank. Out of range for his impressive armament decided to wait until he was enveloped in fog then carry on the action in a series of quick run bys coming by radar, thus preserving the element of surprise.

: 1625 K
: The target being obscured by fog, surfaced and went to gun action stations. Commanded approach.

: 1640 K
: Commanded firing, range 400 yards, target angle 225°. Action proceeded as planned, a total of three masses being made. After the first pass almost lost the target, radar being damaged by the shock of gunfire. Fortunately the damaged was intermittent in nature and contact was regained and held.

: 1730 K
: There being no opposition from the target which was in flames from the bridge house aft and amidships deck to bow rapidly to take of the forward machine gun which had not been used - indeed the cover had not

— page 218 —
1747 K
been removed - in the action. Ceased firing and closed.

: 1747 K
Lay alongside and boarded the enemy. Tound two Japanese, armed with Japanese army rifles, in the forecastle. They were shot. One other survivor in the water refused to accept assistance. The machine gun forward and the twin mount aft turned out to be "quakers". The machine gun on the bridge house was genuine - explosion of the ammunition in its magazine and ready locker considerably enlivened the proceedings at this point - but it was inaccessibile because of the fire. For same reason the log, other ship's papers and radio set could not be secured. Name painted on the enemy's boat was IBARAKIKEN DAICHU MIYASHIMA KAN.

: 1755 K
Cast off and backed clear leaving the enemy in flames and about half submerged. Took from him two rifles and one wooden machine gun. Cleared the area to the north-castward.

: June 20:
0500 K
Submerged and patrolled across the KISKA route at periscope depth. No contacts.

: 1937 K
Surfaced.

: 2130 to 2230 K
Tried unsuccessfully to establish communication with any naval shore station in order to clear traffic to Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. Finally sent the message blind on 4234 and 3470 kilocycles. Sat course for KINKASAN.

: June 21:
0435 K
Submerged and patrolled at periscope depth off shore closing KINKASAN. No contacts.

: 2020 K
Surfaced.

: June 22:
0015 K
Noted that the radar on KINKASAN is again in operation.

: 0512 K
Submerged and patrolled across the traffic lane off KINKASAN.

— page 219 —
1000 K Sighted smoke bearing 2610T, bearing increasing. Co reasoned approach.

1047 K Target is three AK's in column on northerly course, zig-zagging. Firing range promises to be excessive but, in view of the scarcity of targets, decided to attack the last ship if an otherwise satisfactory solution of the torpedo control problem is obtained.

1100 K Fired four torpedoes from bow tubes at the selected target. Firing interval twelve seconds, checked the set up by 'cerisaioge observer' from between s. cots.

1100:50 K Heard no observed a pre-attack explosion, close aboard. Thus warned, the target had no difficulty avoiding the remaining three torpedoes.

1102 to 1136 K The enemy formation broke up, each ship maneuvered independently and radioless. The closest ship - the target - opened an ineffective fire from a 20mm gun turned to be about five inches. All 2"all" retirad toward S.S. "AHA".

1332 to 1415 K Heard echo ranging to westward. The searching ship was now sighted.

2040 K Surfaced. "As now thoroughly discovered by the totally unsatisfactory performance of torpedoes. Decided to again try to establish communication with Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, and obtain authority to investigate this influence feature of the remaining sixth exploders. Accordingly, proceeded to the southeastward. Sent contact report.

2225 to 2310 K Attentated to raise any naval station station without success.

2330 K Acain commenced trying to establish communication with any naval shore station.

Fune_23:

0032 K Being unable to establish communication and feeling that my position was sufficiently well-protected, ceased transmitting an. stood convoy towards S. ICYSA SAIK.

- 11 -

— page 220 —
20.36 K
- Submerged and closed SICYA SIKI, feeling at this point that it would be useless to take further attacks unless something were done to arrest the present high rate of recurrence explosions and further, since the enemy must try this time be a plly aware of my replacement and doubtfully less anti-submarine units waiting to come so as soon as I commence transmittal, decided to activate an influence feature of the remaining exploders. Commenced this job and completed it during the forenoon.

20.45 K
- Surfaced having sighted nothing all day. SICYA SIKI light was observed to be burning with normal characteristics. On the assumption that this indicated that causative traffic was antisub, decided to remain with in radar range of the coast north of the light tonight. Proceeded accordingly.

June 24:
- 04.20 K
- Submerged and patrolled off SICYA SIKI at periscope depth.

- 05.55 K
- SICYA sank two patrol boat bearing 201CT, range about 6000 yards steering various courses but gradually recvin. to the westward. Avoided.

- 20.55 K
- Surfaced, no other ship in having been sighted. Remained within radar range of the coast during the night.

June 25:
- 04.15 K
- Submerged and patrolled off SICYA SIKI at periscope depth.

- 05.00 K
- SICYA sank bearing 309CT, bearing decreasing. Remained approach.

- 06.30 K
- Snake proved to be from three AIC's on southerly course, unibivalve close in to the beach.

- 07.00 K
- Targets east, least amore about 7000 years; broke off the approach. This encounter indicates that the Japanese, not illoically, were the risk of grounding to theft of submarine opposition. Fudging from the boat chart available these ships were not out side the 6th fathom curve and to successfully attack them it would be necessary to fire in about fifteen fathoms of water. An unpleasant prospect and a dubious one since no exact information as to how deep is the "initial deep dive" of the 3k. AIV -

— page 221 —
3A torpedoes is at hand.

0957 T: 3A torpedoes are in the water.

1635 K: 3A torpedoes are in the water.

— page 222 —
1947 K
For a brief interval, such smoke from the target, apparently emanating from his after hatch. He averstantly still has some way on and is trying to rejoin the formation.

: 1956 K
Ship's being lost to sight in the growing twilight and against the land background. Then last seen first and turned ships was proceeding on northward course, not zigzagging. Target apparently had abandoned efforts to keep up and was again closing the beach.

: 2102 K
Surfaced. No radar contact that could be distinguished from the beach. Decided to proceed to KINKJAN to intercept. Proceeded as requisite.

June 26:
: 0315 K
Ship-tied KINKJAN bearing 295°T, range 34,000 yards. Had made as wide a sweep as time would permit to the eastward to approach and on an time present as small a target as possible to any radar which has been pictured on our screen for about two hours.

: 0332 K
Doubtful radar contact 020°T, range 20,400 yards which failed to develop.

: 0408 K
Sub-merged at patrols off KINKJAN at periscope depth. Visibility very spotty.

: 0644 K
Picked up scrawls on sound bearing 045°T, made periscope exposure and saw a destroyer emerge from the fog, on southwesterly course, range 2300 yards, angles on. Now zero. He was irrationally afterward lost to sight when the fog closed in thick and not soon again. "I think the data and airships sound conditions did not feel justified in a sound sound although he undoubtedly crossed my storm, close aboard.

: 0712 K
Picked up score noises on sound, judged to be two heavy sets and one light set bearing 230°T, on oratorially course. Attested range 4000 yards. Coincided sound approach but remained at periscope depth hours to get a sight of enemy before firing, the visibility being reduced but extremely visible.

: 0720 K
Has forced to re-deep when an enemy ship suddenly appeared very close aboard to port and crossing from port to starboard. I hesitate to estimate the range to

— page 223 —
0935 K
Hearc and sea a destroyer, bearing 2150T, on northerly course at high speed. Attornped, unsuccessfully, to gain position for stern shot.

0938 K
Visibility much improved. The destroyer can now to the northward at high speed.

0946 K
Visibility unlit. The destroyer can be soon away, only patrol ing in south east of ASIU 3.IIIA, working to the south very close in slo. Slight one enemy torpedo boat bearing 150T, range 5000 yards, lying to or making bero stronger. A second sniper type was standing out north of Kitu. 3.3A, bearing 2800T, range about 6000 yards, slow speed.

1002 K
The destroyer, now bearing 2500T, range about 4500 yards, cor. once also raising. True bearings of the two patrol boats had not arrived by changed but they had both closed SQUIPIR; ranges between 3500 and 4500 yards.

1015 K
Definite indications that the destroyer is getting an echo.

1017 K
The patrol boat to the southsouthward has gotten way on and is 8ms on, range about 2500 yards. The echo to the southsouthward is not close. The destroyer to the southwest has closed to about 3000 yards and is nearly down on; SQUIPIN is very fine on his port bow. All indications are that SQUIPIR's presence is known, or pretty well suspected, and that the close and specific hunt is developing. Accordingly at

1021 K
Charnod course to scatter to or sent stern and small target to echo ranging, silenced ship and went deep. Found a magnificent transport guns version at boat on hundred and twenty feet.

1023 K
The hunt being very close, rigged for depth charge attack.

1038 K
The hunt is still disconcertingly close; the destroyer appears to be getting oceasil not echoes but is uncertain.

— page 225 —
1230 X: Stitched canvas two petrol boat bearing 1250T, range about 3000 yards on south-wastorily course.
: 2043 Y: Surfaced.
June 23:
: 0424 Y: Submerged and commenced to close KIKJAH.
: 0443 to 0900 Y: Stitched a total of five small snorchs, apparently all innocently onerated in fishing.
: 0940 K: Stitched smoke bearing 1510T, bearing decreasing. Cor- neared approach.
: 1010 Y: Conduct developed into a loose convoy of three small and two large A/C's escorted by one small escort v.s.sol on northerly course. Selected one of the large A/C's as target.
: 1057 K: Fired four torpedoes from the after tubes at the se- lected target. All missed, probably three since the target was observed to reverse his course during the tor- pedo run. Xeomet for the target and set all ships on a zigzagging and collared the vicinity to the north- ward. The target continued to maneuver radically until the escort closed him when they, in close company, stood off to northward.
: 1210 Y: He red oar remains an orderly starboard port, probably the escort 'nervous' not a. board- ing 0450T, on southerly course, range about 900 yards. No remained in sight and sound, conduction a thorough search, until at
: 1400 X: No was lost to southwastorward.
: 2103 K: Surfaced and set course for IDYAY.
June 22 to July 4 (total):
: 2400 K: Set clocks back twenty four hours to zone plus twelve time.

— page 228 —
6-18-45 0545 37-30-30N 141-52E. 120°T  Headway 1 large seapen type patrol boat.
6-19-43 0400 142-50-30T. 300°T  Headway 1 small seapen.
6-28-43 1100 38-19N 141-38E. 010°T 8 kts. 3 medium sized AK, similar to TONS HATU.
6-24-45 0600 37-00N Var to 4 kts. 1 small patrol boat, similar to U.S. EC boat.
6-25-43 0650 37-03N 141-03E. 165°T 12 kts. 3 medium AK.
6-25-43 1000 36-59N 141-04E. Var to 5 kts. 1 small seapen patrol or fisherman.
6-25-43 1600 37-02N 141-08E. 018°T 9 kts. 3 medium AK, similar to CRITERION MATU and KASACISAI HATU.
6-25-43 1710 37-01-30N 141-02E. 016°T 8 kts. 3 medium sized AK.
6-26-43 0645 36-17N 141-40E. 225°T 22 kts. 1 DD, type unknown.
6-26-43 0720 36-16N 141-38-30E. 010°T 8 to 3 AK heard, onto of which 10 kts. was seen very close aboard.
6-26-43 0930 36-19N 141-39-30E. 010°T 22 kts. DD, type unknown.
6-26-43 1004 33-19N 141-39E. Var. 5 kts. 1 small patrol boat, similar to U.S. EC boat, and 2 seapen type patrol boats.
6-26-43 1400 36-26N 141-35E. Var. 2 medium sized AK similar to ISIKAI MATU; 1 small AK similar to TONS HATU; 1 DD, VASATAT type.
6-27-43 1230 37-34-30N 142-38E. Var. 8 kts. 1 medium sized seapen.
6-28-43 0450 33-42-30N 141-40-30E. 010°T 5 kts. 1 very small seapen.

-20-

— page 229 —
6-28-43 0732 38-40-30N 1800T 6 kts. 2 very small sampans.
6-28-43 0900 38-35-30N 0000T 5 kts. 2 very small sampens.
6-28-43 1100 38-34N 0450T 6 kts. 3 small AK; 2 medium AK similar to TURCAYA MAJU; 1 small escort similar to U.S. PC boat.

PART VI - AIRCRAFT SIGNED

CONDUCT OF THE APPROACHES:

Attack No. 1.

This was very nearly a snap shot. The enemy was first sighted on approximately the firing bearing for a ninety sterboard track. Swing to a course for a one hundred ten degree track, straight shot, and went ahead at best speed. For about ten minutes enemy was tracked, principally by radar. When the torpedo problem appeared to be satisfactorily solved fired on generated bearing, low power.

Attack No. 2.

A short approach, the enemy appearing suddenly out of the fog at medium range. He was zigzagging on very short legs. Solution of the torpedo control problem not the best so decided to fire a four torpedo spread. Fired on periscope bearing, long-itudinal spread.

-21-

— page 233 —
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

| Attack | Time | Use G.C.T. | Date | 091400 | 140829 | 220100 | 250815 | 280100 |
||------||------||||||
|        | (Lat.) | 31-30N    | 38-26N | 38-19N | 37-02N | 38-34N |        |        |
|        | (Long.) | 143-10E  | 141-45E | 141-38E | 141-02E | 141-42E |        |        |
|        | Number and Type Torp. | Fired on Each Attack | 4:14-3A | 4:14-3A | 4:14-3A | 4:14-3A | 4:14-3A | 4:14-3A |
|        | Hits | 7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|        | No. Sunk (Tonnage) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|        | Number Demagcd or Probably Sunk (Tonnage) | 7 | 4500 | 0 | 2500 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|        | Type of Target | CV | AK | AK | AK | AK | AK | AK |
|        | Range | 7000 | 2000 | 4000 | 1600 | 2800 |        |        |
|        | Type of Attack: | Periscope (P) | Surface (S) Night (N) | N R | P | P | P | P | P | P |
|        | Radar (R) | Estimated Draft of Target | 25 | 18 | 18 | 12 | 12 |        |        |
|        | Torpedo Depth Setting | 20 | 20 | 20 | 10 | 8 |        |        |
|        | Bow or Stern Shot | Bow | Stern | Bow | Stern | Bow | Stern | Bow |
|        | Track angle | 120S | 95S | 112S | 62S | 134P |        |        |
|        | Gyro Angle | 10R | 0 | 8R | 10R | 69R |        |        |
|        | Estimated Target Speed | 19 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 8 |        |        |
|        | Ring Interval | 8 sec. | 8 sec. | 12 sec. | 12 sec. | 8 sec. |        |        |
|        | Spread - Amount and | 1 Div. | Long. | 1 Div. | 1 Div. | 1 Div. |        |        |
|        | Kink | Was Torpedo Performance Satisfactory? | No * | No * | No * | No * | No * |        |        |
|        | Remarks: | *1 | First shot premature 20 seconds after firing. | *2 & *3 | Fourth shot premature 15 seconds after firing. | *4 & *5 | Magnetic exploders inactivated. |        |

— page 236 —
1953-04-01
Serial 053
CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO SOUIPIN Conf. 1tr
SS3191/A16-3 ser 09
of July 4, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
    Subordinate Command, Midway.
    (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
    (3) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SCULPIN - Seventh War Patrol.

1. SCULPIN seventh war patrol was conducted from 24 May to 4 July 1943. 23 days being spent in the patrol area. Expenditure of all torpedoes torpedinated the patrol.

2. Performance of torpedoes and percentage of hits were disappointing. Three per cent torpedoes and two positive hits resulting from 20 torpedoes.

3. Torpedo Attacks:

(a) June 9: Long range. (7850 yard run) made hits difficult to obtain on this valuable task force. The range could not be closed as preciously further. Radar and pelorus firing bearings were used. There was one premature in 4 shots at low speed setting. Two explosions and each bomber signal flag occurred about 8 minutes after firing. The commanding Officer states that this time of 8 minutes is only very approximate. There is therefore slight evidence of 2 hits.

(b) June 14: One hit and one premature observed from 4 shots, using Mk 8 angle solver and longitudinal spread. TD was not used because it was not checking well - partly occasioned by a zig plen using very short logs.

(c) June 22: One premature and no hits from 4 shots at excessive range. The premature warned the target.

(d) June 25: One definite hit observed from 4 shots. The air read used should have produced one or two hits.

(e) June 28: Four torpedoes missed. Necessity for swinging for stern shots, plus a zig, away, produced a bad gyro angle, long range, and poor track.

-1- ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 237 —
5-101/A16-3
Serial: 053
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. SCULPIN - Seventh War Patrol.

(f) General: Proper spreads were used; it is questionable whether torpedoes should have been fired on third and fifth attacks; three torpedoes on fourth attack appear sufficient; considering the fact that the last four attacks were made on enemy of three or more freighters, every effort should be made to fire at multiple targets wherever possible.

4. Gun Attacks: 65 rounds of 3" were fired at first sampan; 48 rounds at second one.

5. The dummy machine gun found on the sampan are worthy of note but cannot be taken for granted.

6. Lack of night contacts indicates that shipping in this area may seek shelter after dark.

7. The radio transmitter will be thoroughly checked. There is good reason to believe it was operating properly when radio contacts could not be made.

8. SCULPIN is receiving a 10 day refit.

-2- ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 238 —
1. Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
    A16 SUBCONTRACT CO, NAVY NO. 1504.

Serial 018

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND REPORT TO
CO SUBLIFT, 1st, 35191/ A16-3 Serial 09 of July 4, 1943.

From: Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SULPHUR - Seventh War Patrol - Comments on.

1. The seventh war patrol of the U.S.S. SULPHUR extended over a period of 40 days, twenty-two of them being in the area.

2. An interesting feature of the patrol was the recovery of the dummy machine gun from the destroyed sampan. This may be common practice among Japanese fishing and patrolling sampans.

3. It is noted that shipping passes so close to shore and between islands, whenever possible, so that the submarine attack is difficult and often hazardous. The practicability of mining the areas close inshore and the channels between these islands should be investigated.

4. It is noted that the SULPHUR experienced difficulty in raising NIX. Similar difficulties have been reported by a number of submarines. The result is excessive time of transmission due to the transmitting of "WYSS" and unnecessary checking of call signs, authenticators, etc., and in some cases complete failure.

5. It is recommended that the following damage to the enemy be credited to the SULPHUR.

SUNK
1. Saran Type Patrol Boat Tonnage unknown.
1. Saran 75 tons.

DAAGED
1. AK (type not known) 4,500 tons.
1. AK (type not known) 4,500 tons.
Total 9,000 tons.

INCLUSION (C).

— page 239 —
35-12N-46-3(5)/(15) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET 1d

Serial C918
CONFIDENTIAL
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 210
U.S.S. SCULPIN - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. SCULPIN (SS191) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of Subject War Patrol Report.
(B) Copy of Consubdiv 101 Conf. 1st. end. FB5-101/Δ16-3,
Serial 053 of July 5, 1943.
(C) Copy of Consubspace Conf. 2nd. end. Δ16-3, Serial 018
of July 5, 1943.

1. The seventh war patrol of the SCULPIN was the first after an extensive new year overhaul.
2. It is unfortunate that the SCULPIN was unable to close the carrier group contacted in order to fire at close range. The long range, plus a premature which advertised the firing of torpedoes, eliminated chances of hitting.
3. It is noted that there were many days of apparently indiscriminate bombing carried on in the SCULPIN's area. This seems to be a general form of anti-submarine warfare carried out by the Japanese of late in many of the areas surrounding the Empire. Such practice indicates that the exact location of our submarines is unknown and can be considered as nuisance bombing only.
4. Indications of radar on Nikkanan are again evident from the SCULPIN's report. It is gratifying to note that good use of the bathythormograph was made by the SCULPIN. The SCULPIN is credited with having inflicted damage upon the enemy.

| REM 2955 | SINK |
||------|
| 5 AUG 1943 | 1 - Samoan type patrol boat - 50 tons 75 tons |
|         | 1 - Samoan |
|         | TOTAL: 125 tons |
| Op File No. (SC) | DOC. No. 8962 | DIMAGED |
| Copy No. | - Freighter (unknown class) - 4,500 tons |
|         | - Freighter (unknown class) - 4,500 tons |
|         | TOTAL: 9,000 tons |

Distribution and authentication on following page - 1 - C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

— page 240 —
11-10/16-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET 1d
Serial 0918
CONFIDENTIAL
CONSUS/PLATO REPORT NO. 210
U.S.S. SCULPIN - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. SCULPIN (S391) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
VCNO (5)
Cinopec (5)
Serforpec (5)
.adv. Bree Flan. Unit (1)
Cincllant (2)
Consublant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comemopsc (2)
Comemospsec (2)
CTP 7 (2)
CTP 16 (1)
Consubspac (10)
SUSAY, MI (2)
Comadbcomsubpec (2)
Mickey (2)
.11 Squadron and Div.
Comanders, Subspec (2)
U.S.S. SCULPIN (1)
(CONSUESF.C Endorsement only)
.11 Submarines, Subspec (1)

H.C. LAWER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 241 —
351/416-3
Serial: 014
Date: 17, 1943
Subject: DECKASSHED-1
DECLASSIFIED: 0445, GONNAVIG
BY: 00 94A
DATE: 17, 1943
Period: 1943 JULY 25, 1943 TO SEPTEMBER 17, 1943
Area: 1000' E. 25' N. 25' W.

— page 243 —
1/1/43-3
Serial: 014
Date: 1/1/43
Subject: 1/1/43-3
Subject: 1/1/43-3

1/1/43-3
1215 Y
...signed at 1/1/43
...signed

— page 248 —
1903 B
- Subj: Sunked off ATLANTIC east coast, 20 miles off coast, 2,000 yards
- 2129 B: Sighted small ship to the south east, British ship, 2,000 yards
- 2214 B: Distant that was 20 miles away, 2,000 yards
- 2258 B: Sunked off coast, 20 miles east of the patrol area, 2,000 yards
- 2305 B: It sank, partially submerged, 20 miles east of the patrol area, 2,000 yards
- 2308 B: Depth charge attack on enemy, 20 miles east of the patrol area, 2,000 yards
- 0231 B: Lost sight of them, 20 miles east of the patrol area, 2,000 yards
- 0445 B: Disappeared at patrol area, 20 miles east of the patrol area, 2,000 yards

- -8-

— page 250 —
1052 1
Sounder action continued. Chit and eel notched. Lighter
than usual and a few sparsely set on sill. Depth.

1121 1 1
Sounder struck out, cutting but no lost close, made periscope
sops and the air closed the con. Vox 1-3. Depth. Chisel
to the hull and set a line. Course 30. 15-3. 15-3. 15-3.
Tion to second shot to 1-10 to succeed.

1055 1 1
Sounder and notched to 1-10. 15-3.

— page 260 —
1. 133 0004 0245 0133
Date: 24-51 25-47-30 24-44 25-15-30
Location: 122-11-30 1120-06-30 1123-37 124-51-15
No. of Type Tubes: 1 1 1 1 1
Tubes: 1 0 0 0 0
2. Sunk (bombed): 4500 0 0 0
Type of Target: 1000 1200 1700 1500
Size of Target: 30 75 75 75
Scope (2), surface (3): (2) (2) (2) (2)
Tunnel (4), submerged (5): 10 150 (6) 355 0 (2)
Tunnel (7): 7.0 10 10 10
Tunnel (8): 10 10 10 10
Tunnel (9): 50 50 50 50
Bread: 50 50 50 50
Bread: 50 50 50 50
As Order of: 50 50 50 50
Bread

— page 261 —
1. 133 : 2. 004 : 0245 : 0133
Date : 1. 1. 17 : 2. 21 : 3. 15-15-30
Location : 24-51 N : 25-47-30 : 24-44 N : 25-15-30
No. of Type Not Seagoes : 1 TNT : 2 Dpx : 1 Dpx : 1 Dpx : 1 Dpx
Dired on each attack : 2 Dpx : 1 Dpx : 1 Dpx : 1 Dpx

Date : 1. 0. 0. 0. 0
No. Sunk (Complee) : 4500. 0. 0. 0. 0
Type of Attack : 1000 : 1200 : 1. 70 : 1500
Scope (2), surface (3) : (2) : (2) : (2) : (2)
Attack (4), depth (5) : 15 TNT : 12 TNT : 12 TNT : 12 TNT : 12 TNT
Nipple depth setting : 50 TNT : 50 TNT : 50 TNT : 50 TNT : 50 TNT
Bore at stern not : 30 : 75 : 75 : 75 : 75
Tack : 10 : 10 : 10 : 10 : 10
Trial rate : 10 : 10 : 10 : 10 : 10
Striated Target : 7.6 TNT : 10 TNT : 10 TNT : 10 TNT : 10 TNT
First Alert : 10 sec : 10 sec : 10 sec : 10 sec : 10 sec
Bread : 50 rad : 50 rad : 25 rad : 50 rad : 50 rad
As ordered : 1167.

— page 269 —
35191/-16-3
Serial 014
Subject: TROUT ON TROUT
AV - WALL CARRIER
Total
Gallons G/t G/D
Airplane area 24,950 5.84
Fire area 24,310 7.35 740
Airplane load 31,320 10.48
Remaining on board 8,885

VII - PROTOCOL OF TROUT
Naval vessels engaged in co-operative with detection order.

VIII - NAVIGATION
There was a surprise, despite of enemy activity. The tide was little trouble on the initial crossing and the ship's radio signals that the enemy is making use of the continental railroad system.

Most of the enemy ships encountered the ship, all of which, the only possible exception, were the 5.31 class. The 5.31 class was the most capable of the 5.31

— page 271 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division TWENTY-TWO.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWO.

Subject: Report of Sight War Petrol - forwarding of.

1. This is the U.S.S. SCULPIN eighth war petrol.
The Commanding Officer has had command for all patrols. The
CERTIFICATE: spent 55 days at sea off which 31 days were in area.

2. This vessel made twelve ship contacts, of which
only four contacts were suitable targets and could be deployed.
The SCULPIN was made on a combination AP/AK
similar to KISO MARU. Three torpedoes were fired, one hit,
one missed, and apparently one was a dud. Target was sunk.
The second attack was on a small AK. Four torpedoes were
fired, with approximately zero gyro. Only one torpedo ran
and it either missed or was a dud. Those torpedoes were fired
in 90 feet of water. The depth of the water plus the torpedo
impulses pressure might be the determining factors causing the
loss of this three torpedoes that were not heard nor observed
after firing. The third attack was made on loading escort, a
small well armed merchantman, of a convoy consisting of about
30 small craft of various types. Three torpedoes were fired
resulting in three misses or duds. The character, disposition,
the maneuvers and attempts of the convoy indicates that
the enemy is taking definite steps to cut down shipping losses.
The fourth attack was made on an AK. Three torpedoes were
fired which were heard and observed to run hot, straight, and
normal. It lasted one was a dud, the other might have missed.
The Commanding Officer observed water disturbances along the
side of the target which clearly indicated a hit. A small
smount of water was found in the exploded from torpedoes on SCULPIN were found when they were examined in Midway.
This flooding might have been the reason for the apparent duds.
Attention is invited to part VIII pages 21, 22, and 23 concerning enemy anti-submarine measures, and part XVIII, pages
27 and 28 under remarks.

— page 273 —
60/rg
FC5-2/A16-3
Serial (0123)
C-Q-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
29 September, 1943.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
CO SQUIPLIN Conf. Ltr. SS191/A16-3;
Serial 014, dated 17 Sept., 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWO.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. SQUIPLIN - Report of Eighth War Patrol, Comments on.

1. The Commanding Officer, officers and men of the SQUIPLIN are deserving of high praise for their conduct of the eighth war patrol and the eighth under the command of the present Commanding Officer.

2. It is regrettable that when personnel performs so creditably that there should be any question about the performance of material. Of thirteen torpedoes fired, there is some reason to suspect that three did not run hot, straight, and normal and that on one of three unsuccessful attacks a torpedo hit and failed to explode. It is not considered that the facts justify a wholesale condemnation of torpedo performance.

3. The SQUIPLIN should be credited with sinking one (1) AK of 4,000 tons.

P. E. PENDLETON.

— page 274 —
1d
FF12-10/A16-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01360
CONFIDENTIAL:
THIRD INDORSEMENT to
SOULFISH Report of
Eighth War Patrol.
CONSUSBFAC PATROL REPORT NO. 263
U.S.S. SOULFISH - EIGHTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: The SOULFISH's eighth war patrol was also the eighth patrol for the Commanding Officer.
1. The SOULFISH's eighth war patrol was also the eighth patrol for the Commanding Officer.
2. The few worthwhile contacts that were made were aggressively attacked. More damage to the enemy would probably have been inflicted if torpedoes had been better.
3. Conveys of small craft protected by well armed larger craft will probably be encountered more often as Japan's Merchant Marine dwindles. Steps are being taken to develop more effective defensive measures against these nuisance craft which are too small and difficult to hit or waste torpedoes on but have sufficient gun power to make it inadvisable for a submarine to engage them with the gun.
4. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia award.
5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for inflicting the following damage to the enemy.

SUNK
1 - Cargo-Passenger Vessel (class unknown) - 4,500 tons

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

Distribution and authentication on following page
-1-

— page 276 —
2

THE STORY OF THE LAST ENGAGEMENT OF THE USS SOUPII
AS SUBMITTED TO CAPTAIN HENRY L. (OP23C)
ON 1 OCTOBER, 1945.

On the night of November 18th we had tracked a large convoy for some eight hours—at dawn we dove and went in to make a submerged attack. Just as we were in a position to shoot, the convoy (consisting of one freighter, five destroyers and one light cruiser) either spotted us or zigged normally. At any rate, they turned directly on us and came over us. The Captain ordered me to "take her down," thus using a new tactic, which made no noise. I halted this outfit heard the Sculpin or were alerted, for the whole convoy speeded up. However, they did not drop any depth charges at this time. We stayed deep for an hour and at 0730 Captain Cromwell and Commander Connaway decided that because of the large escort this Harr was very important and we say to after it. Therefore, he ordered us to surface, which we did. However, we evidently did not take a good enough look for the Japan had left a "sleeper" (a large flotilla leader destroyer) which was about 6,000 yards from us when we surfaced. We got the submarine down again by the time he came over to drop his first string. The damage received by the first depth charges was not unusual but disconcerting. An exhaust valve in the after engine room was ruptured and we started taking water in aft. Several sea valves were jarred off their seats and could not be made tight.

After about an hour or at 0830, he came over again, this time directly over us and dropped eighteen charges. The hands of the depth gauges fell off in front of my face. The pressure gauge near the diving station commenced flooding and there was other minor damage about the ship. The weather conditions were perfect for a destroyer, sound and echoranging highly effective. There was a strait line on the Bathymetrograph down to 300 feet; our evasion tactics were not to useless on that day.

At 0930 he came over again and dropped another string. This added more airships and depth charges to the submarine under control, in spite of the large up angle (13 degrees) of the submarine under weight in the boat. By now it was taking 100 or 110 turns at or more and much weight in the boat. The surface disturbance we shook the destroyer for over half an hour. At this time we decided to pump bilges and another depth charge. Captain Connaway neither the drain nor the trim pump would take suction. Captain Connaway then had me relieved from the diving station so that I could inspect and report damage throughout the boat. Upon inspection I found the after engine room flooded to such an extent that I believed it unsafe to attempt to place a bubble in a 8-1/2. (which would have failed the trim considerably) because the floor of water forward might short sea water. We decided to bail the water forward to another compartment until we could trim the ship without endanger- ing main motors.

While we were running up a bucket brigade the temporary diving officer broached the ship. However, no one could be blamed for this as the depth gauge was stuck at 170 feet, and, as I mentioned before, the pressure gauges

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3

killed Lt. Defrees on the gun.

At this time, I considered it unwise to wait longer for
squatting operations because the next shell might damage the hydraulics
system, thus making it impossible to operate the vents.

I ordered "Warrant Officer" and when answered ordered "Abandon
Ship". I waited one minute by the clock before ordering "Mills Joseph
Cabrunas, 1600ft (who had gallantly elected to remain with me and man a station
not normally hit) to open the vents. Before ordering Cabrunas to "open the
vent", I informed Capt. Cramwell, who was in the Control room, of my in-
tentions. He told me to go ahead, but he could not come with us for he
was afraid the information he possessed might be injurious to his shipmates
at sea if the Japanese made him reveal it by torture.

As I left the Corning Tower door water was coming waist deep
over the sill, and I am certain no one left the ship after me. I last saw
Cabrunas going up the corning tower hatch. He either became fouled in
wrecks or was killed by machine gun fire.

I collected the men in the water into one group. Those of us
who were strong swimmers aided the wounded and weak swimmers.

The destroyer picked up a man 1500 and took us into Truk
Atoll. There were all survivors at this point (3 officers and 38 men). After
ten days of alternate beating with clubs and questioning at Truk we were
divided into two groups and embarked on two aircraft carriers for passage to
Japan.

On Dec. 2nd the U.S.S. Saifish sank one of the carriers and
as a result we lost 2 officers and 18 men. George Joseph NOEL/C was the
sole American survivor. One Officer and 20 men arrived at Uruma, the secret
intimidator and interrogation camp of the Japanese Navy.

It is also my opinion that the following named officers and
men displayed outstanding valor and perseverance in the face of overwhelming odds.

Captain John Cramwell, USN, for refusing personal safety to protest
his shipmates and countrymen still engaged in war and operating at sea.

Lt. Nelson John Allen, USN, for his courage, leadership and
devotion to duty.

Lt. Joseph Defrees, USN, for his courage, leadership, and
devotion to duty. It was his gun crew that held the destroyer at bay during
scuttling and abandoning operations.

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1917
SCULPIN (SS 191)

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**Capt. John P. Cromwell**
**Wolf Pech Commander**

and other orders a few days later, no answer came from her. On 30 December SCULPIN was reported as press-med list.

Meanwhile, long before tension mounted at the bases concerning her, SCULPIN was meeting her test. The story presented here is reconstructed from statements made by members of her crew recovered from enemy prison camps since the close of the war.

On the night of 18 November, SCULPIN made a radar contact on a fast convoy, and made an en- ar