U.S.S. FLASHER (SS-249) — war patrol report SS-249_FLASHER.pdf

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SS249/A16-37A9
Serial 03

From:  The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. FLASHER.
To:  The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron 16.
       (2) The Commander Task Group 71.1

Subject:  U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249), Report of War Patrol
Number 1.

Enclosure:  (A) Subject report.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the first war patrol of this vessel conducted in the Manila, P.I., area during the period 6 January, 1944 to 29 February, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

R. T. WHITAKER.

68681 FILMED
3 02607

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1. PROLOGUE:
Arrived Pearl Harbor from Canal Zone on 15 December 1943 and after four days refit commenced fifteen day training period. Completed training on 2 January 1944. Sound tested and depermed on 3 January 1944.

(B) NARRATIVE:
January 6, 1944
1314 (V-W) Departed Pearl for Midway.
1836 (V-W) Escort departed.

January 7, 8, 9, 1944
Enroute Midway, conducting training exercises enroute.

January 10, 1944
1021 (Y) Arrived Midway. Made temporary repairs to deck forward and fueled to capacity.
1634 (Y) Underway; departed Midway for patrol under Combat Group 17-1.
1930 (Y) Discovered that we had a TMC from Division 44 relief crew aboard as stowaway. Put him to work.

January 11, 12, 1944
Proceeding to patrol area making two engine speed (200 RPM). Encountering heavy swells from the Northwest.
1200 (Y) Changed time to 1200 (M) and date to 12 January 1944 on crossing the 180th Meridian.

January 13, 1944
0900 (M) Conducted practice battle surface using target we obtained at Midway. Fired 6 rounds from 4 inch and 60 rounds from 20 MM. Have been attempting to average 13.5 knots but check on fuel shows us to be using 13.5 gallons to the mile in this sea so will attempt to average 12 knots until we have better weather.

January 14, 1944
1000 (M) Changed to minus eleven zone time.

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1. NARRATIVE (Cont'd):
January 15, 1944
Great circle track would pass Marcus 30 miles to North. Decided to change track to pass 80 miles to North of Marcus in the hope that we can get by without being run down by planes. New track will allow us to come no nearer than about 120 miles during daylight.

January 16, 1944
1300 (N) Within about 250 miles of Marcus all day and at dark we were about 150 miles away. No planes as yet. Changed to minus 10 zone time. Seas increased from the West today and tonight it required two engines to make good eleven knots. Will be forced to slow to one engine speed to save fuel if these seas keep up.

January 17, 1944
0100 (K) Changed to one engine speed as seas became pretty rough and we started taking considerable water down coming toward hatch. Will be forced to'cease time at one engine speed for some time in order to have any fuel left for maintaining station and for possible end around plays.

January 18, 1944
Seas have calmed down and there is no wind, only a slight swell. Still making one engine speed.

0655 (K) Sighted smoke (Ship Contact No.1) bearing 1700T. distance about 30,000 yards. Changed course to close smoke, and went ahead standard. On approaching closer smoke appears to come from ship on easterly course.

0704 (K) Sighted patrol bomber (Plane Contact No. 1) circling ship at about 15 miles from us. This plane appeared to be searching from about 7 miles ahead of ship to about 3 miles astern of ship. Changed course to east to keep from closing and to prevent plane from sighting us. At this point trailing appears rather hopeless if he has air coverage, we are only about 250 miles from Marcus, so it is possible he may have it all day. Decided to continue on present course, trailing ship in the hope that this plane is just the morning patrol from Marcus and that he will depart when he assures himself that no subs are around. Believe our gray paint prevented him from sighting us.

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0805 (K) Plane departed in easterly direction. Decided to get ahead of ship and dive for daylight approach. Commenced end around at three engine speed. Determined base course of ship to be about 095°T. Speed 11 knots.

1105 (K) Submerged about 15 miles ahead of ship and commenced approach.

1140 (K) Sighted masts of freighter. Found him to be zigging radically with about 400 to 500 zigs every five minutes. At seven thousand yards picked up SC type escort (Ship Contact No. 2) on his starboard bow. Decided to make attack from port side.

1231 (K) All set up for stern shot at about 800 yard run when I took a look and target had zigged toward and left me with ten degree starboard angle on bow, crossing track at about 800 yard range. Had to go ahead full to try to get across and ship apparently saw wake and turned away.

1234 (K) Slowed down to take look as I thought we might still fire with 180° track. Just got periscope up when escort dropped depth charge at about 500 yards on port beam. Took look at target but saw no hope of firing as freighter had pulled clear.

1236 (K) Went deep to 300 feet, ng gradient.

1243 (K) One more depth charge, far away.

1306 (K) Back at periscope depth. Escort seen to be rejoining ship who is at about 12,000 yards bearing 130°T. Will surface when he is about 30,000 yards and make another end around.

1441 (K) Surfaced on course 080°T. and commenced end around. Had no trouble tracking because of his heavy smoke. It now appears that there are two vessels smoking. Believe he may have picked up another escort from Marcus (Ship Contact No. 3).

1815 (K) Commenced closing target at 19 knots. It now appears that he has changed base course to about 130°T. and is still using a radial zig plan.

1842 (K) Battle stations, commenced approach, radar range 14,850 yards. Radar picked up two escorts at 8,000 yards, one on each bow of target and about 1500 yards from track. Took station 6,000 yards from target on his port bow and waited for favorable opportunity to attack.

1930 (K) Port escort had dropped well aft and target zigged toward. Headed in for seventy port track at 10 knots.

1936 (K) Fired 4 torpedoes from bow tubes with torpedo run about 2,450 yards, track about 70° port, target speed 10.5 knots. At this time we were about 20° on the port bow of the port escort at range of about 3°.

-3-

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2300 yards, Commenced turning left with full rudder after firing; went ahead flank (18 knots).
1937-30 (K): Observed hit about midway between stack and stern. Sparks flew about. 200 feet into the air and target began to settle rapidly by the stern. Fifteen seconds after first torpedo hit, another hit was heard but not observed as we were busy with escorts.
1938 (K): Port escort astern, range 2200 yards.
1941 (K): Escorts dropped first of about ten depth charges. This was nice as it showed that they thought we were submerged. We opened out to 5500 yards and circled toward other side of target to be sure he sank.
2202 (K): Observed target sink, and at same time he disappeared from radar screen. Commenced clearing area at four engine speed. Escorts still droppin' depths.
2115 (K): Went to course 270°T. at two engine speed, heading for area.

January 19, 1944
Heading for area conducting training enroute.
0645 (K) Slowed to one engine speed.

January 20, 1944
0630 (K) Made dive and removed torpedo from Number 7 tube as this torpedo had completely flooded its after body and gyro pot when it was made ready submerged on January 18, 1944. Replaced torpedo with one from racks and decided to save this doubtful torpedo until last. Worked it over and it now appears all right. Had considerable difficulty handling torpedoes while shifting them as we have no spare racks and the boat was rolling about 5° to a side at 100 ft.

January 21, 1944
Heading for area conducting training enroute.
1900 (K) Changed to minus 9 zone time.

January 22, 1944
Conducting training enroute to station.
1307 (K) Forward starboard lookout sighted periscope. Avoided. Did not report as felt that sighting was not positive.

January 23, 1944
Conducting training enroute to station.

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(B) NARRATIVE (Cont'd):
January 24, 1944
1400 (I) Changed to minus 8 zone time.
January 25, 1944
0659 (H) Sighted Balintang Island bearing 230°T. after 48 hours without a fix. Had expected to be south of the island but found we were about 20 miles to the northeast of D.R. Decided to pass to north of Balintang and as the weather was bad to try and get through the passage on the surface in order to get on shipping lanes by night.
1010 (H) Visibility suddenly increased and we sighted two sail boats (Ship Contact No. 4) bearing 0170T. at about 12,000 yards. Submerged. Decided to start submerged running during daylight.
1814 (H) Surfaced. Proceeding at 2 engine speed until we get on probable traffic lane from Manila to Empire. Now through channel and on probable traffic lane. Changed course to pass about 10 miles off northeast tip of Luzon.

January 26, 1944
0550 (H) Submerged.
1831 (H) Surfaced. Continued at one engine speed heading for area.
2104 (H) Radar contact bearing 2220T. range 10,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 5). Turned beam to contact and commenced tracking. Soon decided that contact was a small target, probably a patrol boat, as he seems to have no definite course in mind. Attempted to close at two engine speed but found that we could not as target was apparently avoiding. The night is dark and we have not closed nearer than 9,000 yards so we have not been sighted I am sure. We are still in area to north of our own so decided our contact might be a friendly sub who believed we are a patrol boat as he is using over fifteen knots avoiding.
2230 (H) Discontinued chase.

January 27, 1944
0130 (H) Entered area. Decided to continue down coast on probable traffic lane.
0552 (H) Submerged.

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1825 (H)  Surfaced. Steaming down probable traffic lane from Manila about 10 miles off coast at 5 knot speed.

January 28, 1944

0148 (H)  Abeam of Hermana Mayor about 8 miles off beach. Sighted signalling on beach in vicinity of Hermana Mayor several times during night.

0542 (H)  Submerged. Still heading down coast toward probable traffic focal point north of Subic Bay.

1740 (H)  Sighted small boat bearing 187°T. (Ship Contact No. 6). Avoided to westward.

1846 (H)  Surfaced. Decided to patrol course 220°T. and reverse during night across probable traffic routes north of traffic focal point.

January 29, 1944

0431 (H)  Sighted lights of ship bearing 040°T. at quite some distance. Closed at 10 knots and obtained radar contact at 20,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 7).

0446 (H)  Identified ship as Japanese Hospital ship of 9,000 - 10,000 tons with all the proper lights making 12 - 14 knots for Manila. He is on track about 10 miles off coast. Sure hated to let this one go as I don't believe in hospital ships and, at any rate, unescorted ships are rare these days.

0536 (H)  Submerged. Same patrol routine as before.

1841 (H)  Surfaced. Continued patrol.

2149 (H)  Radar contact bearing 135°T. at 9,000 yards range (Ship Contact No. 8). Commenced tracking. He is in toward beach so it is impossible to see him but feel he is small and probably a patrol boat. Decided I would have to make sure though so at:

2220 (H)  Commenced end around at 17 knots to get ahead and in toward land from him.

2309 (H)  With target on course 340°T. speed 9 knots had reached position about 50 degrees on his port bow when he reversed course apparently reaching end of his patrol line. Decided I would trail him to see where he went so formed one eight with him as guide.

January 30, 1944

0047 (H)  Our guide now reached the southern end of his lane and reversed course. We let him go by and continued on down coast to a point about 13 miles northwest of Capones Island where we will patrol across traffic lanes for the next few days.

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0536 (H) Submerged. Continued patrol across probable traffic lanes on course 045T. and reverse. Sighted numerous small sail boats in near beach during day.
: 1417 (H) Sighted, masts at 002T. Went to battle stations and commenced approach. (Ship Contact No. 9).
: 1435 (H) Identified target as small two masted vessel of about 150 tons. Probably a native vessel or perhaps a patrol boat.
: 1617 (H) Sighted ship bearing 135T. distance about 13,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 10). Went to battle stations and commenced approach.
: 1645 (H) With target on course 335T. speed 11 - 12 knots and with range of about 11,000 yards, identified it as 8,000 - 9,000 ton hospital ship. Secured from battle stations. Probably the same ship as we sighted before on his way to Manila. This one was hard to take as we were in a beautiful position for attack.
: 1653 (H) Took pictures of hospital ship at 4,000 yard range and resumed patrol.
: 1841 (H) Surfaced and continued patrol as before.

January 31, 1944

: 0120 (H) Radar contact bearing 123T. range 8,400 yards (Ship Contact No. 11). Identified target as small patrol vessel and avoided. Continued patrol.
: 0547 (H) Submerged and continued patrol as before. The water has been like a mill pond ever since we have been here. Sure would like a few white oaps.
: 1844 (H) Surfaced. Continued surface patrol as before.

February 1, 1944

: 0531 (H) Submerged and continued patrol as before.
: 1815 (H) On making preparations to surface, found the SJ radar to be out.
: 1838 (H) Surfaced; continued surface patrol as before.
: 1920 (H) SJ radar back in commission.
I consider this position just north of Subic Bay to be approximately a 2400 position for traffic leaving Manila. Since we have been on this route a week now without contacts, will remain here until midnight and then start for Cape Calavite.

February 2, 1944

Since I am going to Cape Calavite we might as well run a modified retiring search curve until dawn and try to pick up traffic on various routes from Manila.

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0000 (H) Making ten knots on course 250°T. on retiring search curve to northwest of Manila.
: 0541 (H) No luck during night. Submerged and headed southeast toward Cape Calavite. After submerging was forced to go to 125 feet secure all high pressure air on the boat and grind in safety tank blow.
: 0730 (H) Back at periscope depth.
: 1739 (H) Sighted sampan bearing 283°T. distance about 6,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 12). I would sink this one with gunfire except that he is probably a native boat and not Japanese.
: 1841 (H) Surfaced, headed for Cape Calavite at 10 knots.

February 3, 1944

: 0200 (H) Arrived off probable traffic lanes about 15 miles southwest of Cape Calavite. Commenced to patrol this area.
: 0535 (H) Submerged. Headed for a point 5 miles to west of Cape Calavite light. This seems to be a good daylight point to patrol as, from here, we can attack traffic rounding Cape Calavite in either direction.
: 0800 (H) Arrived at above point, commenced to patrol in north south direction. Found the current to set about 350°T. at about 12 knots during day. Sighted three small sailboats during day. They appear to have been fishing.
: 1850 (H) Surfaced and stood out to patrol traffic lanes at point about 12 miles southwest of Cape Calavite.

February 4, 1944

: 0528 (H) Submerged and stood in to point five miles west of Cape Calavite light. Will patrol the same as yesterday. Sighted several small sails during day one of which has been right off Calavite light all day.
: 1847 (H) Surfaced and resumed patrol about 10 miles southwest of Calavite light. With us in this position I don't see how shipping headed from Calavite Pass to either Palaman Passage or Mindoro Strait could get by without being picked up.

February 5, 1944

: 0529 (H) Submerged. Resumed patrol 8,000 - 10,000 yards west of Cape Calavite light. Our patrol here finally amounted to something when at:
: 1745 (H) Sighted smoke bearing 069°T. (Ship Contact No. 13). The position of this smoke indicates that he is about a mile off Cape Calavite and is hugging the coast.

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1809 (H) Went to battle stations. Although we closed the Cape to about 4,000 yards we could not sight target against the black land. Started to open out from land and scoured from battle stations.
: 1906 (H) Surfaced with a bright moon. Ship not in sight.
: 1915 (H) Sighted ship as he came out from land south of Cape Calavite bearing 105T. distant 12,000 yards. We were about 120° on his starboard bow so commenced end around at three engine speed using the other engine on charge. At this point we had about 40 miles of good water before reaching Apo Island reef so commenced making full power on the three engines (18 knots).
: 2017 (H) Almost ran over small sampan. Passed him 1,000 yards to starboard. We didn't change course or speed and neither did he.
: 2057 (H) Arrived ahead of target (his base course 145T. range 12,000 yards). Submerged, went to battle stations and commenced approach. Decided to fire attern tubes if possible (Ship Contact No. 14).
: 2122 (H) Sighted 3 large sampans with target and to his starboard. Had already committed myself to a starboard track by turning off in this direction so did not change my plans.
: 2136 (H) With torpedo run about 1500 yards fired four torpedoes from stern tubes using periscope spread of target length between torpedoes. After one minute and five seconds torpedo run the first torpedo hit target about 3/4 way aft. Twenty-five seconds later another hit amidship. Both were observed. Target's stern seemed to blow up when hit, and he began to sink immediately. Second hit broke him in two, and three minutes later he was out of sight, his bow disappearing in a vertical dive. Usual breaking up noises were heard.
: 2141 (H) Two loud explosions separated by about 15 seconds. These were probably our other two torpedoes exploding at end of run but could possibly have been depth charges.
: 2151 (H) The three sampans didn't seem to be chasing us so decided to change them and went to stations for battle surface.
: 2159 (H) Battle surfaced, and headed for sampans who were now 4,000 yards away, and headed for beach under forced draft.
: 2212 (H) Opened fire with 4" gun at range of about 1500 yards. Fired 15 rounds of four inch and sank one sampan and damaged another with a hit which did not explode, when at:

-9-

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2220 (H) Found we were getting dangerously near shoal water so reluctantly abandoned chase and secured guns. Both 20 MM failed me in this attack. Had they worked, we could have sunk all three during this time. Target was a maru of about 4,000 similar to Mitakasen Maru. The sampans were steam sampans and appeared large. They were probably of about 40 tons each. Headed back to patrol traffic lane between Cape Calavite and Palamas Passage.

February 6, 1944

- 0531 (H) Submerged. Decided to patrol today 4 - 5 miles west of Cape Calavite light again.
- 1541 (H) Sighted floatplane (Plane Contant No. 2) at a distance of about 5 miles. He seemed to be making search of area for submarines. Watched him through periscope until he disappeared. Continued patrol at periscope depth.
- 1845 (H) Surfaced. Continued to patrol traffic lanes about 10 miles southwest of Cape Calavite.

February 7, 1944

- 0542 (H) Submerged. Continued patrol at periscope depth as before. Sighted various sail boats during day.
- 1848 (H) Surfaced. Continued surface patrol as before.

February 8, 1944

- 0201 (H) Changed course to 313°T. and speed to 10 knots. Decided to patrol area west of Manila in hopes of a convoy coming out in that direction.
- 0534 (H) Submerged about 20 miles northwest of Cabra Island. Conducting patrol at periscope depth.
- 1841 (H) Surfaced. Patrolling traffic lanes west of Manila Harbor.

February 9, 1944

- 0541 (H) Submerged. Heading in for point north of Simo Bank. Conducting patrol at periscope depth in this vicinity.
- 1543 (H) Sighted low wing, single engine monoplane at distance of about 6 miles heading toward Manila (Plane Contact No. 3).
- 1621 (H) Sighted float plane (Rufe type) making search of area. Watched him until he left (Plane Contact No. 4).
- 1844 (H) Surfaced and commenced patrolling traffic lanes northwest of Manila off Subic Bay.

-10-

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2243 (H) Radar contact bearing 330°T. distance 14,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 15). Commenced tracking. Found course to be 050°T., speed 9 knots. Commenced end around to get ahead but found ourselves to be too close to ahoal water. Slowed down and commenced trailing as by this time target appeared to be a patrolling destroyer (Bright Moonlight).

2340 (H) Target came about and headed on course about 230°T. with range 12,000 yards we turned 180° and put our tail to him. He sighted us and gave us a zero angle on bow and started closing the range.

February 10, 1944

We ran with him until range closed to 10,000 yards when, thinking him to be a destroyer, and desiring to make an attack at:

0018 (H) Submerged, and headed toward. He kept coming until range decreased to about 3,000 yards. By this time it was evident that he was a patrol boat too small to shoot at. He appeared to be something like a converted yacht.

0031 (H) He dropped two depth charges. We remained at periscope depth in order to be in better position to avoid.

0032 (H) Three more depth charges.

0057 (H) He gave up and left area.

0141 (H) Surfaced and resumed patrol.

0323 (H) Radar contact 14,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 16). Identified to be same patrol vessel. He sighted us again at 12,000 yards and headed our way at about 14 knots. Not wishing to dive again we avoided at 18 knots.

0403 (H) Lost contact, resumed patrol, moving south about 20 miles.

0541 (H) Submerged, heading in to patrol about 12 - 18 miles west of Corregidor.

0630 (H) Sighted float plane bearing 020°T. distance 7 miles (Plane Contact No. 5).

0653 (H) Sighted float plane 025°T. distance 8 miles (Plane Contact No. 6).

0658 (H) Sighted another float plane bearing 015°T. distance 4 miles (Plane Contact No. 7).

0912 (H) Sighted float plane bearing 097°T. distance about 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 8).

1229 (H) Sighted fleet plane bearing 05°T. distance 7 miles (Plane Contact No. 9).

1838 (H) Surfaced. Patrolling traffic lanes west of Manila as before.

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2050 (H) Radar contact bearing 301°T. distance 14,000 yards. He turned toward at 12,000 yards and appeared to speed up. Identified him to be same patrol boat as last night (Ship Contact No. 17). Avoided at high speed.

February 11, 1944

0540 (H) Submerged, patrolling traffic lanes about 60 miles northwest of Manila.
1843 (H) Surfaced. Headed down general traffic lanes toward Manila.
2345 (H) Radar contact ahead range 9,860 yards (Ship Contact No. 18). Identified contact as small patrol boat about size of SC. Avoided at high speed. He did not sight us.

February 12, 1944

Decided to leave this area and head back to Cape Calavite as our presence here is known, and as it is difficult to patrol in close in the moonlight with these small boats around. Headed south at 10 knots.
0335 (H) Sighted patrol boat bearing 155°T. (Ship Contact No. 19). Picked him up by radar after sighting at 9,100 yards. Avoided at high speed.
0523 (H) Submerged. Headed south toward Cape Calavite.
1843 (H) Surfaced, heading toward traffic lanes off Cape Calavite.

February 13, 1944

0210 (H) Arrived off Cape Calavite. Will patrol here tonight and in the early morning head for Calavite Pass. Intend to go through the Pass today and investigate the western entrance to Verde Island Passage.
0537 (H) Submerged in western entrance to Calavite Pass and headed through. Found current to be negligible. Sighted several sail boats in pass, but had no difficulty avoiding them.
1200 (H) Golo Island light at Eastern end of pass abeam. Headed for Cape Santiago. It appears nice and peaceful in here and there are nice white oaps. Nice weather for a periscope attack. Sighted several sail boats during day.
1847 (H) Surfaced and pulled out into the center of this place about 5 miles off Mindoro Coast. Considered it necessary to remove ourselves from traffic lanes until we had finished charge as this place is rela-

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2146 (H) Radar contact bearing 070°T. range 19,350 yards (Ship Contact No. 21). It was apparent immediately that this was a radar large ship just rounding Macariban Island, coming out of Verde Island Passage. We are now caught out of position as the target already has about 55° port angle on bow, and we only have about ten miles in which to get ahead. Got ready on four engines and commenced approach at maximum speed heading up toward Cape Santiago.

: 0318 (H) We are still churning along with target now at range of about 14,500 yards with about 7,500 yards to track and Cape Santiago getting awfully large. We were trying to make up our minds to dive at this point as the moon is very bright when we sighted a patrol boat bearing 340° relative at 8,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 22). This decided things, and we submerged and commenced closing track at high speed. This patrol boat had small angle on bow, and we just hoped we hadn't been sighted and kept going. Our course now heads us for Cape Santiago and the Navigator is worried plenty about running aground.

: 0335 (H) Sighted target through periscope. He is a fairly large freighter of about 7,000 tons and has a PC boat escort on his port bow. Angle on bow about zero, range about 7,000 yards. Headed toward target. Commenced pulling off track for stern shot when target zigged 30° to left. Reversed course and headed in for a bow shot. We are now within about 2,000 yards of Cape Santiago.

: 0358 (H) Fired four torpedoes from bow tubes, spread by periscope at about 8 second intervals. One minute and fourteen seconds later one torpedo hit target between bridge and stack. This hit appeared to break his back as both end raised and his middle began to settle. We began to watch target sink with one eye and the escort with the other. Our depth control wasn't the best at this point, the periscope was ducked, and we couldn't get back up without speed. As escort, when last seen, had a small angle on bow and was making high speed, we were forced to go deep.

: 0405 (H) Three depth charges, fairly close.

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0412 (H) Target scores stopped just after torpedo hit. At this point we could hear the loudest breaking up noises I have ever heard. It sounded as if he were right alongside, and I was a little worried as to whether we were too close. We feel that target sank at this time. Commenced avoiding heading in general direction of Calavite Pass. Two more depth charges, not very close.

0554 (H) Could hear scores of two patrol boats astern, but they didn't appear close. Came up for look and saw two patrol craft at about 4,000 yards on starboard quarter. No signs of ship.

0604 (H) One patrol craft bearing about 0200T. with zero angle on bow at about 3,000 yards. Observed him send our numeral eight with yard arm blinker. Wonder what this means to a Jap. Went down to 150 feet.

0630 (E) Patrol boat having passed astern, came up to periscope depth for a fix so we could get through Calavite Pass. Got the fix and at the same time sighted three patrol craft astern at about 4,000 - 6000 yards. Also sighted convoy of three large merchantmen with minesweeper escort heading in from Calavite Pass (Ship Contact No. 23). This appeared a bit ironical as we had waited for days outside and had seen nothing, and now we are rigged for silent running and trying to sneak out when here they come in. It was apparent that the first two ships were beyond range, but the last one was behind position with about a 600 starboard angle on bow at about 9,000 yards. Abandoned all idea of silent running and commenced approach at high speed. We only had two torpedoes loaded forward due to previous attack, so ordered forward room to reload two tubes as fast as possible. We never slowed below 4 knots during this approach and only took one look. We finally reached a point with generated torpedo run 4,000 yards with about a 97 starboard track. I was watching the torpedo run dial, and it stopped decreasing at this point, so felt it was now time to fire. The forward room had done an excellent job of reloading, and four tubes were ready.

0648 (H) Fired four torpedoes forward, spread by periscope with about three fourths ship's length between torpedoes. Two minutes and twenty five seconds later one hit just abaft bridge. Fifteen seconds later another hit well aft. This target is estimated, I believe, conservatively at 9,000 tons.

0653 (E) Still at periscope depth watching target as escort is still far away and the water is choppy. He

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0412 (H) Target screws stopped just after torpedo hit. At this point we could hear the loudest breaking up noises I have ever heard. It sounded as if he were right alongside, and I was a little worried as to whether we were too close. We feel that target sank at this time. Commenced avoiding heading in general direction of Calavite Pass. Two more depth charges, not very close.

0554 (H) Could hear sorews of two patrol boats astern, but they didn't appear close. Came up for look and saw two patrol craft at about 4,000 yards on starboard quarter. No signs of ship.

0604 (H) One patrol craft bearing about 0200T. with zero angle on bow at about 3,000 yards. Observed him send our numeral eight with yard arm blinker. Wonder what this means to a Jap. Went down to 150 feet.

0630 (H) Patrol boat having passed astern, came up to peri-scope depth for a fix so we could get through Calavite Pass. Got the fix and at the same time sighted three patrol craft at about 4,000 - 6000 yards. Also sighted convoy of three large merchantmen with minesweeper escort heading in from Calavite Pass (Ship Contact No. 23). This appeared a bit ironical as we had waited for days outside and had seen nothing, and now we are rigged for silent running and trying to sneak out when here they come in. It was apparent that the first two ships were beyond range, but the last one was behind position with about a 600 starboard angle on bow at about 9,000 yards. Abandoned all idea of silent running and commenced approach at high speed. We only had two torpedoes loaded forward due to previous attack, so ordered forward room to reload two tubes as fast as possible. We never slowed below 4 knots during this approach and only took one look. We finally reached a point with generated torpedo run 4,000 yards with about a 97' starboard track. I was watching the torpedo run dial, and it stopped decreasing at this point, so felt it was now time to fire. The forward room had done an excellent job of reloading, and four tubes were ready.

0648 (H) Fired four torpedoes forward, spread by periscope with about three fourths ship's length between torpedoes. Two minutes and twenty five seconds later one hit just abaft bridge. Fifteen seconds later another hit well aft. This target is estimated, I believe, conservatively at 9,000 tons.

0653 (H) Still at periscope depth watching target as escort is still far away and the water is choppy. He

— page 18 —
(B) NARRATIVE (Cont'd):

appeared well on the way to sinking. He is well down with a good list and his whole upper works including the bridge are blazing merrily. He's apparently had gasoline on deck as these flares could hardly come from a normal ship's fire. We were enjoying the sight immensely with a play by play description when two aircraft bombs or depth charges landed pretty close and shook us up a bit. They did no damage except open valves and break a few light bulbs, knock cork around, and force us to go down to 275 feet, thus preventing us from seeing target sink. Commenced avoiding on a southerly course headed for Calavite Pass.

0706 (H) The escort commenced dropping depth charges and was soon joined by one or more other patrol boats. During the next forty minutes a total of thirty-nine charges were dropped none of which were extremely close.

0711 (H) Heard crackling noises which were probably caused by target sinking. At no time after second torpedo hit were the screws of the target heard.

0815 (H) Can no longer hear screws of patrol boats.

0824 (H) Changed course to 260°T. heading for Calavite Pass on D.R., having obtained a fix just after firing.

0902 (E) Water in forward bilges flooded out both sound training motors. JP still giving good results though, and we shifted to hand training on JK.

0930 (H) Came to periscope depth and got fix with Golo Island light abeam to starboard and us in the center of the Pass heading out. The navigator had done an excellent job. Went down to 150 feet to avoid being picked up by planes.

0943 (H) Fast screws. This fellow went right on by passing almost overhead, and then when he got about 1,000-2,000 yards ahead he reversed course and steamed by again without pausing, his screws soon facing out.

1300 (H) Cleared western entrance to Calavite Pass. Headed out to patrol traffic lane from Calavite to Palawan Passage.

1416 (H) Sighted land-plane (Plane Contact No. 10) bearing 350°T. distant about 4 miles. He was apparently covering Calavite Pass waiting for us to come out.

1809 (H) Heard two distant explosions, apparently aircraft bombs.

1848 (H) Surfaced. Patrolling traffic lanes from Calavite to Palawan Passage. Remainder of day uneventful.

February 15, 1944

0540 (H) Submerged. Headed for patrol station off Cape Calavite.

(20)

— page 19 —
1545 (H) Sighted ship bearing 112°T. distance 12,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 24). Went to normal approach course.
1557 (H) Identified target as PC boat. Discontinued approach and resumed patrol.
1843 (H) Surfaced. Patrolling as before off Cape Calavite.
2354 (H) Commenced standing down traffic lane through Mindoro Strait, heading down toward southern end of area at 2/3 speed.

February 16, 1944

0528 (H) Submerged south of Cuyo West Pass. Decided to linger here one day in view of reported ship movement through this area. Passed the day off Calusa Island and to the northwest of Cagayan Island.
1856 (H) Surfaced, patrolling probable traffic lane west of Calusa Island.

February 18, 1944

0530 (H) Submerged about 20 miles northwest of Calusa Island.
0827 (H) Sighted ship bearing 052°T. (Ship Contact No. 25). Commenced approach. Target appears to be on course 215°T. speed 13.5 knots.
0846 (H) Identified target as friendly submarine, probably the COD. Commenced moving off track. Submarine passed about 2,000 yards away.
1300 (H) Surfaced. Decided to run remainder of day on surface in order to be in good position north of Pearl Bank tomorrow morning.
1644 (H) Sighted single engine bi-plane bearing 210°T. distance 12 miles (Plane Contact No. 11). Submerged. Don't believe we were sighted.
1730 (H) Surfaced, continued running on surface.
1903 (H) Commenced noticing SJ radar interference on our SJ.
1912 (H) Radar contact bearing 221°T. range 7,350 yards (Ship Contact No. 26). It is obvious that this contact is on same ship we has an SJ Radar. Believe it to be the COD as he appears to be headed for Sibutu. Avoided.
2135 (H) Radar contact bearing 265°T. range 9,600 yards.

— page 20 —
(B) NARRATIVE (Cont'd):

Radar interference heavy on this bearing. He appeared to be tracking us with his bearing drawing aft slowly and range closing slowly. He got in to 7,000 yards and then opened out rapidly. We lost contact with him in a rain aqual at 9,150 yards. Believe this also the COD, and we experienced radar interference from him the rest of the night.

February 19, 1944

0533 (H) Submerged about 15 miles north of Laparan Island. Heading toward pass between Laparan Island and Pearl Bank.

1630 (H) Passed Pearl Bank Light abeam to starboard, continued on through pass submerged.

1842 (H) Surfaoed. Proceeding south at 15 knots.

1921 (H) Radar contact bearing 180°T. at range of 5,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 27). Determined this contact to be small boat. Probably a fisherman or small patrol boat. Avoided.

February 20, 1944

0530 (H) Submerged.

1837 (H) Surfaoed.

February 21, 1944

0032 (H) Entered Makassar Strait.

0531 (H) Submerged.

1843 (H) Surfaoed. Very bad weather with heavy rain. Visibility poor. Proceeding down west coast of Celebes at two engine speed using radar to find out way along.

February 22, 1944

0245 (H) Radar indicates we passed Cape William abeam, Submerged. Stood in toward Cape Mendar to obtain land fix. Visibility still poor.

1150 (H) Obtained fix on Cape Mendar.

1847 (H) Surfaoed, heading south at two engine speed.

2009 (H) SJ Radar contact bearing 180°T. distance 8,600 yards (Ship Contact No. 28). Identified as small boat and avoided.

February 23, 1944

0134 (H) SJ Radar contact bearing 110° relative, range 7,000 yards (Plane Contact No. 12). This contact had steady bearing and rate of change of range indicated.

— page 21 —
0136 (H) Submerged.
: 0220 (H) Surfaced with both SJ and SD manned.
: 0235 (H) SD radar contacts at 9 and 14 miles (Plane Contact No. 13 and 14). These planes played around for ten minutes without getting closer and then went out of range.
: 0547 (H) Submerged.
: 1851 (H) Surfaced, heading toward Lombok Strait at two engine speed.

February 24, 1944

: 0115 (H) SD picked up land at 55 miles.
: 0138 (H) SJ picked up land at 70,000 yards. In spite of not having had fix for 24 hours, headed for Lombok using radar.
: 0547 (H) Submerged in North entrance to Lombok Strait and commenced transit submerged.
: 1700 (H) Completed transit of Lombok Strait submerged.
: 1909 (H) Surfaced, headed south at two engine speed.
: 1955 (H) Radar contact bearing 1400T. range 7,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 29). Identified this contact as friendly submarine headed north and avoided. Could tell by our SJ that he was also using an SJ radar.

February 25, 1944

We are about 160 miles south of Barrier so decided to try surface running today.

February 26 - 28, 1944

Proceeding from the Barrier to Fremantle, Australia, running on the surface, averaging fourteen knots.

February 29, 1944

0646 (H) Met escort at rendezvous.
0857 (H) Moored in Fremantle Harbor, Fremantle, Western Australia.

— page 23 —
1. Sampan - 40 Tons - Identity established by sight during torpedo attack and during gun engagement.
2. Damaged: 1 Sampan - 40 Tons - Identity established by sight during torpedo attack and during gun engagement.
3. Damage determined by: Observing hits on two targets and noting one to disappear.

Details of Action:

This gun action took place under fairly good visibility conditions with the moon high overhead. The average range during firing was about 1500 yards. One 4"/50 cal. gun-and two 20 M/M guns were used in the action. Fifteen rounds of high capacity 4"/50 cal. ammunition with point detonating fuses and 20 rounds of 20 M/M ammunition (2 dummies, 12 H.E.T., and 6 H.E.I.T.) were used during the action. Gun pointing was only fair in spite of sinking one sampan and damaging another. Radar in conjunction with the T.D.C., were used for fire control.

The forward 20 M/M gun failed to fire after 19 rounds and the after 20 M/M gun, after the first round. Both failures were due to sluggish trigger mechanisms.

(I) MINES.

No comment(s).

-27-

3 02607

— page 24 —
1. Leaky safety tank blow valve - Secured all air to the ship except that from the 200# compressor while submerged and ground in this valve to stop leak.
   - This is considered to be a major defect since the vessel is put in a dangerous situation unnecessarily by having to secure all air to the ship except a small volume from the 200# compressor when grinding in any valve on the high pressure air distribution manifold.
   - It is recommended that some provision be made to permit blowing of main ballast tanks when grinding in a valve on the high pressure air distributing manifold.

2. Contact lever for #175 plugging relay, Allowance List 563, page 39, line'13, Cutler Hammer Drawing No: 624-263 broke once in the bow plane tilting controller panel and twice in the stern plane controller panel. These contactor arms also hung up on several occasions, breaking the supply circuit to the bow and stern planes. Believe the trouble is in the manufacturing of these contactor arms, the groove at the fulcrum point of the contact lever being stamped too deep and the cam being too long.

3. The Pitometer Lug in this vessel requires constant attention to keep it in operation. Especially at slow speeds submerged the readings are unreliable. The trouble may be entirely due to a sticky motor on pump. The tender will be requested to free these up and to make a thorough check of the whole unit.

— page 25 —
1. RADIO:
1. Reception.
A. HAIKU Fox Schedule (6-20 January 1944)
(a) Frequencies used for reception.
    FREQUENCY    DATES    REMARKS
    (1) 16.68 KC    6-15 Jan.    Used day and night. Good only
    in daytime - too much fading
    out at night.
    (2) 4525 KC    Seldom useable due to static
    and jamming. Despite increase
    in power 16 Jan., signal
    strength was not improved.
    (3) 9090 KC    15-18 Jan.    Used to some extent for night
    reception. Experienced some
    fading. Used to some extent
    for day reception.
    (4) 14,390 KC   16-20 Jan.    Used almost exclusively for
    night reception. S3 signals.
    (5) 17,370 KC    No signals heard at any time.
(b) Interference encountered.
    The usual quota of weather static was encountered.
    One cause of static in the 4000 KC band was determined
    to be the SJ Radar; efforts to eliminate this interference
    were unsuccessful. Some fading was caused by
    water grounding antennas during rough weather. Specific
    types of interference are noted below.

(1) FREQUENCY    DATE    TIME    POSITION    REMARKS
    (1) 16.60 KC    14 Jan. 18002    Series of "WY" heard pre-
    venting reception of: HK NR
    77.
(2) 9090 KC    16 Jan. 16022 25055'N    The following transmission
    155026'E    was heard which prevented
    copying the 1600 GCT Sched-
    ules.
    "43456
    SFU SFU ...... VF
    SFU VVVVV SFU SFU ......
    AAA SFU SFU ...... TT SFU
    SFU AEAZ ARCVT SFU SFU ......
    ." At this time heavy stat-
    ic blotted out all other
    HAIKU frequencies.

-29-
3 02607 30

— page 26 —
1. RADIO (Cont'd):
    Jamming consisted mostly of "W's" over-riding the HAIKU frequencies, particularly 4525 KC, starting in with the 1100 GCT Schedule and reaching a peak during the 1600 GCT Schedule.
    At 0900 GCT, 21 January 1944, at posit 25026'N, 139032'E, radio guard was shifted to the BAKERS FOX, Radio Perth.

(c) Serial missed.
    The only serial missed was 40G of January 1944.

B. BAKERS Fox Schedule (21 January - 29 February 1944).

(a) Frequencies used for reception.

Radio reception on this schedule was much improved over the HAIKU Fox. 9250 KC was received up to 14 February with an S3 strength. With the introduction of the new transmitters and antenna system, the signal strength was four. Some fading was experienced during the 1700Z and 1800Z schedules on this frequency. 4370 KC was never used due to the SJ Radar interference. The signal strength on the 12,630 KC frequency was two.

(b) Interference encountered.

The only interference experienced on the 9250 KC frequency was a station with a signal strength of five sending on a frequency of 9245 KC. This station was heard every night while in the area repeatedly sending "DE PICTOK". He was never heard transmitting any traffic.

(c) Serial missed. None.

2. Transmissions.

| DATE  | TIME  | POSIT | CALLED | STA. | STATION | FREQ | NO OF GROUPS | TOTAL TIME | TRANS MITTED |
|-------|-------|-------||------||------||||
| 1/11/44 | 0927Z | 2759'N | NQO   | NQN  | 4235    | 36   | 48         | 37 Min.     |              |
| 1/18/44 | 1312Z | 23040'N | NQO   | NWZ  | 8470    | 48   | 48         | 48 Min.     |              |
| 1/24/44 | 1743Z | 10023'S | VHXW  | VIXW | 8470    | 128  | 27 Min.     |              |              |

— page 27 —
1. RADIO (Cont'd):
3. Casualties,
   None.

(a) RADAR.
1. SJ Radar.
In general the SJ Radar equipment operated satisfactorily. Total number of hours operation was 650.

A. Casualties:
(a) Three quarters of an hour operation lost when the Type 836 rectifier tubes in the high voltage rectifier burned out. Tube was replaced.
(b) On one occasion, the "grass" was low with maximum Gain setting. The tubes in the intermediate amplifier on the Range Indicator Unit were interchanged to increase the amount of grass. The sensitivity of the equipment appeared to increase after this had been accomplished.
(c) The antenna mast continued to leak around the packing gland upon deep submergence. The flax packing used by the contractor had been found quite unsatisfactory and had been replaced at Pearl Harbor by Superseal graphite type packing. No opportunity to take up on the packing presented itself prior departure for patrol. Due to the necessity of returning the equipment after the lower wave guide assembly is removed to permit taking up on the packing gland, it was decided to suffer the leakage and consequent temporary loss of the Lobe Switching feature until the contacts and contact rings could be cleaned and dried.
(d) The Regulated Rectifier voltmeter Multiplier Coils again failed due to the heat generated by the rectifier units.

B. Interference.
The only interference noted on the equipment was experienced the night of 18 February 1944, before, during, and after Ship Contact #26. The interference was of the usual type caused by another SJ Radar operating nearby. Position at the time interference was first noted was 6°49.4'N., 120°20.5'E.

-31-

3 02607 32

— page 28 —
2670 Foot Peak
(a) AK (9000 Tons)
(b) Patrol Boat (150 Tons)
(c) Land (21 Ft. Hgt.)
(d) Airplane

2. SD Radar.

The SD Radar was operated continuously during daylight surface cruising, and during the nights of 22 through 24 February. Plane contacts were made at ranges up to 23 miles. The 12,000 foot peak on Lombok Island was picked up on this equipment at 55 miles. Total number hours of operation was 335.

A. Casualties.

The equipment operated satisfactorily during the entire patrol as far as could be ascertained.

B. Interference.

(a) The diagram is an attempt to show one of the two types of interference experienced.

The screen sweeps into saturation with an underlying pattern as shown by the dotted line. This dotted line was a bright spot on the sweep itself, lowering as the sweep came in to a closer represented range. Sweep from right to left in uneven intervals. This type of inter-

-32-

(37)

— page 29 —
21 Jan. 1944 0835(K) 22-25N 10 Minutes 13936'E
(1) 22 Jan. 1944 1430(I) 21005'N 25 Minutes 13355'E
(3) 18 Feb. 1944 1302(H) 9046'N 5 Minutes 12039'E

It is suspected that this disturbance is caused locally, but its cause was not determined. It will be noted however, that interference (2) occurred one hour twenty three minutes after the reported periscope sighting on 22 January, and that interference (3) occurred when a friendly submarine was known to be in the near vicinity.

(b) At 0825(I), 22 January, at 21025'N - 13503'E, the below diagramed disturbance was noted on the screen.

The effect consisted of large noise splotches causing varying vertical displacement of the extra trace. The pattern resembled the noted underlying pattern of the interference described in paragraph (1) above. Noticeable was the fact that only the displaced trace had the noise and not both traces, as would be the case in double pulsing. The disturbance was constant for approximately ten minutes.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

1. Sound Gear.

A. Performance.

Both supersonic and sonic equipments performed creditably throughout the patrol. It is felt that the necessity for re-magnetizing the JP_sound head following depth charge and other shocks somewhat reduces the effectiveness of this gear during evasive tactics.

— page 30 —
1. Sound Gear and Sound Conditions.

B. Casualties.

After the second attack on 14 February, both QB and JK training motors were put out of commission by water in the Torpedo Room Bilges when the ship took a decided up angle. Salt water corroded the windings of the armatures and field coils to such an extent that repair was impossible, although the motors were submerged no more than three minutes.

This casualty was a major blow to our efforts of evading after the attack, as it was necessary to resort to hand training and the consequent inefficiency of operation of the equipment. It was on this occasion that the JP equipment became in its own right an intergral part of our sound gear.

After two days of attempting to repair the motors, a 3/4 H.P. Westinghouse 220 Volt D.C. motor, used ordinarily in conjunction with a portable bilge pump, was jury rigged. With a small portable blower to keep this motor cool, the use of power training on the QB sound projector was enjoyed the remainder of the patrol.

: As no method of removing water from these bilges exists except by using the drain or trim pumps, it is strongly recommended that either the training motors be relocated somewhere on the bulkhead or overhead in the Torpedo Room or that moisture or waterproof motors be used in the present bilge location.

2. Sound Conditions.

Sound conditions in this area were found to be good. Little exact data was obtained, but reliable ranges of five to six thousand yards on the supersonic gear, and three to four thousand yards (eight to nine thousand with ship running silent) on the sonic equipment were usual for medium and fast screws. The response of the JP equipment in shallow water was notably improved over that in deep water.

(0) DENSITY LAYERS:

It was the policy of this vessel to submerge to a sufficient depth in each of the areas patrolled to determine the presence of any density layers. The follow-

— page 31 —
(0) DENSITY LAYERS (Cont'd):
ing information is submitted:-
DATE    TIME    DEPTH    DEPTH    TEMPERATURE
    GCT    POSIT    (F.S.)    GRADIENT    GRADIENT PER
    100 FT. DEG. F.

15 Jan.  0600  25°41'N   2455    210    2.5 NEG.
    161°30'E

18 Jan.  0105  24°51'N   3050    210    2.0 NEG.
    150°26'E

26 Jan.  2155  16°17'N   760    150    14.3 NEG.
    119°35'E

30 Jan.  0930  15°00'N   2180    165    8.2 NEG.

14 Feb.  1918  13°44.5'N   110    170    8.2 NEG.
    120°43'E

14 Feb.  1045  13°32'N   1914    130    4.6 NEG.
    120°06'E

18 Feb.  0845   9°01'N    917    0    1.9 NEG.
    120°28'E

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY:

1. In general the health of the crew was excellent.

There was one case of subperiosteal abscess. - On 28 January the patient was admitted to the sick list as a bed patient when swelling, inflammation, and tenderness occurred in the lower tubial region of his right leg. The leg was elevated on a pillow and hot magnesium sulfate wet dressings applied to the affected area. One sulfathiazole gram every four hours was given, but this was discontinued after two days when the patient's temperature began to oscillate between 101 and 103. The swelling gradually subsided, but the redness and tenderness was still present. Wet dressings were discontinued and ichtyol dressing applied. The patient's temperature was now 100 and steady. The swelling reappeared on the seventh day, and the same treatment was started again. A few days later the red area on the lower tibia showed some fluctuation. Tuis was lanced and a thin purulent discharge drained out. The incision kept open for drainage with a sterile vaseline gauze and the wet dressing continued. The patient showed some im-

— page 32 —
U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249)

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY (Cont'd):

provement, his temperature dropped to normal, and the swelling and tenderness diminished. The patient was taken off the sick list only one day when swelling and fluctuation reoccurred. A needle was then inserted, and two cc's of the same thin purulent discharge operated. Hot magnesium sulfate wet dressing were reapplied and drainage soon started from the previous incision. The patient's temperature has since then been normal, the swelling down, and the incision has been draining freely.

Upon arrival in port the man will be transferred to the tender for xray and treatment.

2. Our cooks and baker did fine work in preparing the food. Meals were served at the regular times with hot soup and crackers available at midnight. This midnight snack became more and more popular as the patrol progressed.

3. Habitability throughout the patrol was 4.0

(Q) PERSONNEL:

The performance of all personnel, both officers and enlisted men, was very gratifying.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED.

| Item | Quantity | Description |
|------|||
| Pearl to Midway | 1185 miles | 16223 gals. |
| Midway to Area | 3890 miles | 41075 gals. |
| In Area | 2121 miles | 12700 gals. |
| Area to Freemantle | 3144 miles | 38025 gals. |
| | 10,340 miles | 108,023 gals. |

(S) DURATION:

| Duration | Description |
|||
| Days enroute to Area | 20. |
| Days in Area | 21. |
| Days enroute to Base | 13. |
| Days submerged | 30. |

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING:

| Factor | Description |
|||
| Torpedoes Number | 8 |
| Fuel Gals. | 2200 |
| Provisions Days | 40 |
| Personnel Factor Days | 15 |

Limiting factor this patrol - terms of operation order.

— page 33 —
1 March 1944.
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER - Report of First War Patrol - comment on.

1. The first war patrol of the FLASHER covered a period of fifty-five days from PEARL HARBOR to FRAMATILE, AUSTRALIA, patrolling MANILA, P.I. Area enroute. Twenty-one days were spent in assigned area.

2. Twenty-nine ship contacts were made, but only four contacts were worthy of torpedoes. All four attacks were conducted in an extremely determined and aggressive manner, and the ships were either sunk or damaged. The attacks were well planned, radical zigs by the enemy were ably countered, and the FLASHER was maneuvered into the most favorable firing position under the circumstances. Countermeasures by the enemy appear weaker than usually encountered.

3. The FLASHER will be refitted in the normal time. The cleanliness of the ship and the state of morale are excellent.

4. The Squadron Commander takes great pleasure in congratulating the Commanding Officer, Officers, and crew, on a very successful and aggressive first patrol.

J. H. Haines.

(4)

— page 34 —
20 March 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT:
U.S.S. FLASHER Conf.
Ltr.A16-3 Serial 0125
of 1 Mar.1944, Report
of FIRST War Patrol

From: Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: Commander in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER - Report of First War Patrol Comment on.

1. The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN are concurred in.

2. The determination of the Commanding Officer to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy is well illustrated by the aggressive attack on 14 February in VERDE ISLAND PASS less than a mile from CAPE SANTIAGO which resulted in the sinking a 7,000 ton freighter. While still being sought by the sunken freighter's escorts he successfully attacked a second convoy that was standing in from CALAVITE PASSAGE and sank a 9,000 ton freighter loaded with oil.

3. The unsatisfactory performance of the sound equipment following the attack on 14 February is noted. It is recommended that the Bureau of Ships undertake a study of the location of the sound equipment training motors with a view to relocating them or providing water tight motors. The value of sound equipment for both attack and evasion purposes cannot be too strongly stressed. It is considered necessary that a high degree of reliability of this equipment be insured.

4. This patrol is considered successful for the purpose of award of Submarine Combat Insignia.

5. The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew on the completion of this successful and aggressive patrol. The FLASHER is credited with inflicting the following damage to the enemy:

FILMED

— page 35 —
16/ms
20 March 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. FLASHER Conf.
Ltr.A16-3 Serial 0125
of 1 Mar.1944, Report
of FIRST War Patrol

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER - Report of First War Patrol
Comment on:

SUNK
*FREIGHTER (UNIDENTIFIED)

— page 36 —
35249/AL-3/49
serial 09

From: 35249/AL-3/49
To: 35249/AL-3/49
Via: 35249/AL-3/49

Subject: 35249/AL-3/49
Enclosure: 35249/AL-3/49

1. Enclosure (a) covering the second war patrol of this vessel conducted in the Cape Varella area during the period 4 April 1944 to 26 May 1944, is forwarded herewith.

R. T. MITCHELL

7 01433

— page 37 —
1944

Returned from first war patrol on February 29, 1944 and after running the magnetic range, commenced refit alongside U.S.S. HULAS at Fremantle, WA. Refit and training were completed on March 31, 1944, but two additional dockings were required to remedy a squeal in the port shaft; and departure was delayed until April 4, 1944.

(B) NARRATIVE:

April 4, 1944

1655 Underway, standing out of Fremantle Harbor.
1635 Took departure on Rottnest Island Light. Conducting surface and submerged training exercises.
Enroute to Fremantle Gulf.

April 5, 1944

Enroute Fremantle Gulf conducting surface and submerged training.

April 7, 1944

0950 Moored alongside fuel barge in Fremantle Gulf. Received 11,700 gallons fuel.
1350 Underway, leaving Fremantle Gulf.
1014 Fired five rounds four inch off entrance to Fremantle Gulf. Headed for Lombok Strait.

April 8, 1944

Enroute Lombok Strait on surface, conducting surface and submerged training.

April 10, 1944

0535 Submerged thirty miles south of Lombok Strait.
1846 Surfaced, heading for Lombok Strait.
2100 Concluded transit of Lombok Strait, having sighted only one sail boat during transit.

April 11, 1944

Enroute Patrol Area, running on surface.

7 01433

-1-

— page 39 —
0730 Reached traffic focal point 30 miles off coast of Mindanao. Changed course to head up toward west coast of Fanay.

: 0823 Sighted ship by periscope bearing 0380 true. Believed to be sailboat (Ship Contact No. 2). Decided to close and investigate so went to four engine speed.

: 0923 Came alongside native boat about 40 feet long with rectangular sail, and the word TOY written on the stern. This boat was found to contain seven scared floors and about 20 sacks of Soy Beans which they stated they had obtained at Tawi Tawi and were taking back to Mindanao for food. They seemed to be very much afraid of our 20 ft guns which were pointed at them, but were unable to speak English until encouraged by a warning shot from a .45 pistol at which point their English improved rapidly. Gave them four or five packages of cigarettes, which they were most thankful for, and departed good friends.

: 2000 Commenced passing up west coast of Fanay at about 20 miles off land.

April 16, 1944

: 0500 Submerged about 6 miles southwest of Ambulong Island off west coast of Mindoro. Decided to remain submerged during day because of nearness of land.

: 1844 Surflaced about 20 miles east of Apo Island. Heading for area at two engine speed.

April 17, 1944

: 2200 Reached eastern edge of area. Decided to conduct surface patrol in eastern part of area before heading for Cape Varella. Will patrol at eight knots during day and at 6 knots at night to save fuel.

April 18, 1944

: 0600 Headed for a point at Latitude 130 - 50'N, Longitude 114 - 05'E. Consider this to be a good area for surface patrol. Will spend the next four days in this vicinity.

— page 40 —
1. NARRATIVE (Cont'd).
2. April 19, 20, 1944
   - Conducting surface patrol as above. Diving for one hour every other day for trim.
3. April 21, 1944
   - Conducting surface patrol as before.
   - 1347 Submerged for trim dive.
   - 1445 Surfaced.
   - Decided to conduct surface patrol in the vicinity of Latitude 150 - 37°N, Longitude 115° - 45°E for a few days as this seems to be a probable intersection of traffic routes. Headed for above point.
4. April 22, 1944
   - Conducting surface patrol as before.
   - 1900 Decided we have wasted enough time in this area. Headed for Cape Varella at one eye-line speed, conducting surface patrol en route.
5. April 24, 1944
   - Heading for Cape Varella, conducting surface patrol en route.
   - 1401 Submerged for trim. Bow planes have been giving us much trouble failing periodically to operate when rise is put on planes. Decided to remain submerged and make complete investigation.
   - 1619 Trouble with bow planes located and repaired. (See casualty report). Surfaced and headed for Cape Varella as before.
6. April 25, 1944
   - 0602 SD contact & miles (Plane Contact No. 4).
   - 0607 Plane dropped one depth charge or large bomb. Not close.

— page 41 —
0720  - 2ossible distant ringing.
0726  - Sighted smoke bearing 2370T. (Ship' Contact No. 3).  Believed ships to be on northerly course.  Changed course to 310T. to close.
0742  - Sighted low wing monoplane (Flane Contact No. 5) bearing 020T. distance about 4,000 yards and headed toward us.  Went to 100 feet.
0805  - At periscope depth.  Discovered smoke and changed bearing to about 2280T. indicating ships on easterly course.  Changed to intercept.
0625  - Attempted to surface.  Went to 40 feet and put SD out only to get plane contact at 2 miles (FlaneContact No. 6).  Went to 130 feet expecting bomb but none came.
0842  - Back at periscope depth.
0903  - Started up to 40 feet preparatory to surfacing.  Sighted plane bearing 1510T. distance about 8 miles (Flane Contact No. 7).  Went back down to periscope depth.
0920  - Surface on course 1500T.  Sighted convoy periscope bearing 1970T. with two low wing monoplanes searching above them.  Decided to stay on surface and track from about 15 miles if possible.  With two planes and masts of ships in sight, traced on easterly course until 1010 when one plane headed for us and started coming in fast.
1010  - Submerged with SD radar range of 10 miles.  Went to 130 feet.
1039  - At periscope depth.  No ships or planes in sight.
1052  - Came up to 40 feet and put SD radar mast up preparatory to surfacing.  Flane contact 2 miles closing.  Went down to 120 feet.
1111  - At periscope depth.
1119  - Sighted 2 planes bearing 1300T. distance 7 miles headed in our direction.  Went to 90 feet.
1132  - At periscope depth.
1137  - Sighted plane bearing 1490, at about 5,000 yards.  Went to 90 feet.
1201  - Sound heard light screws.

— page 42 —
1206 Sighted gunboat tyre escort vessel at 3,000 yards, angle on bow 110° starboard. This escort apparently sent by planes to keep us down. His course is about 330° T. indicating that bearing of convoy was about 150° T. when he left it. His speed is about 20 knots. Decided from this that convoy is probably still on easterly course. Decided to remain at periscope depth and watch this fellow. He passed us and with range about 7,000 yards slowed down and commenced pinings.

1240 Escort passed out of sight bearing 3070T. 1337 Surfaced on course 105°T. with gunboat in sight by periscope, a stern at about 30,000 yards. Decided to try to regain contact with convoy. Our best hope indicates they are headed to eastward and it seems likely that they will cut back to northeast later this afternoon or tonight. Commenced search to eastward at 17 knots.

1627. SD contact 14 miles closing rapidly. Submerged.

1724 Surfaced. Continued search at 17 knots. 2330 It now seems that Japs have out-guessed us as all efforts to regain contact have failed. Decided to continue search up to daylight position between Macclesfield Bank and Bombay Reef feeling that they are headed in this direction.

April 26, 1944

Conducting search as before.

0700 Decided we had missed this convoy. Headed back toward Cape Varella. Regret missing this convoy, but their excellent plane coverage was too much for us. Type and number of planes indicated that they may have had an escort carrier with them. All the planes I saw looked much like our TBF and they were very fast.

April 27, 1944

Headed for Cape Varella conducting surface patrol enroute at one engine speed.

— page 43 —
1417 Sighted land bearing 2690T.
: 1455 Heve decided to conduct submerged patrol in the Varella area for next few days. An now 50 miles off land and do not wish to be detected at this point so will dive for the rest of the day. Submerged.
: 1927 Surface. Headed for Cape Varella at one engine speed.
: 2355 Reached position ten miles east of Hon Doi Island. Commenced patroling north and south parallel to coast at this point. It is our intention while here to patrol ten miles of coast during night and three miles of submerged during daylight. By conducting this type of patrol we believe we will be in a position to discover and attack any ship that nugs coast either by day or night.

April 20, 1944

: 0542 Submerged and moved in to a position three miles off Hon Doi. Sighted several sailing junks and fishing vessels during day. Investigated one junk from 700 yards submerged. He did not appear to be located. Believe was fishing, but he may have been a spotter.
: 1933 Surfaced ten miles off Hon Doi. Commenced patrolling parallel to coast at this point.

April 29, 1944

: 0536 Submerged and moved in to three miles off Hon Doi. Sighted many small sail boats during day, as many as 25 being in sight at one time.
: 1936 Surfaced. Commenced patrol ten miles off Hon Doi.
: 2012 3J radar contact bearing 2600T. range 15, 300 yards (Ship Contact No. 4). This appears to be ship hugging coast on northerly course. Changed course to north and commenced tracking. There is a half moon and the visibility is good except for scattered rain squalls. It is not possible to see ship though, because of his nearness to coast.

— page 44 —
2100 CLOSED in to 14,000 yards and found that there are two distinct targets. Tracking shows course to be 350°T, speed 7.5 knots. They are not zig zagging. Decided we would have to get ahead and make a submerged attack. Decided to dive about seven miles north of Cape Varella in about 40 fathoms of water. Commenced and around at two engine speed charging on two engines.

2230 REACHED a point ahead of targets at range of 14,000 yards. Submerged and headed toward.

2245 CAME up to radar depth and obtained range of 8,000 yards. Set-up checks nicely with target course 350°T, speed 7.5 knots.

2253 CAME up to radar depth and got range of 5,600 yards. Went to periscope depth and started pulling off track to eastward. Decided to get about 1800 yards off track and come around for bow shot in order to have six tubes available for three fish at each target. By this time could make out two medium ships in rough column. Could not see any escort. This seemed too good to be true but could never find an escort. Sound conditions here are poor due to temperature gradients. Leading ship appeared to be freighter of about 4,500 tons with engines aft. Second ship was much larger freighter of about 6,000 tons. Heeded in for 90° starboard track on leading ship.

2317 FIRED three torpedoes at leading ship and immediately shifted to second ship, firing three at him. All torpedoes spread by periscope. One minute and five seconds after firing first torpedo observed hit just aft of NOT on leading ship. The second ship exploded with a tremendous flash and disappeared almost immediately. Believe this ship was loaded with ammunition.

2321 HAD just shifted to first ship when first of three depth charges went off. Sound had reported fast screws bearing 020° relative during firing but did not stop firing to look since periscope had seen no escort. Third depth charge landed very close so went to 200 feet going ahead standard and turning rapidly. Escort's screws drew aft rapidly and faded out in direction of position where second ship had sunk.

— page 45 —
2325 Heard distant explosion.
: 2333 Back at periscope depth. Escort appeared to be searching vicinity of sinking of second ship. Leading ship with one hit was dead in water and well down.

April 30, 1944

0000 First ship still afloat. Decided he would need another hit so commenced approach for stern stern.

0011 Made ready two tubes a fit.
0015 With estimated range of 1500 - 2000 yards and with gyro on 180° and on steady course fired one torpedo aimed at center of target. Had checkle to see that target bearing was steady so felt that we couldn't miss, but we did. Target now appeared to be on way sinking so decided to reload forward and wait until moonest at 0055 to surface and then finish him off if still afloat.

0040 Target sank.
0056 Surface. Nothing but land and escort at 2600 yards on radar. Cleared area to eastward at three engine speed charging on one engine. Decided to patrol center of our area on surface for next few days in vicinity of previous contact.

0536 Submerged for trim.
0618 Surface. Will patrol for the day on the surface about 120 miles off Cape Varella at one engine speed.

May 1, 1944

Conducting surface patrol about 120 miles off Cape Varella.

May 2, 1944

Conducting surface patrol as before.
0900 Commenced heading for eastern part of area having decided to patrol traffic lanes to northwest of Dangerous Grounds.

-9-

— page 46 —
0524
Heading for eastern edge of area as before.
Sighted smoke bearing 230°T. (Ship Contact No. 5).
At this time visibility in the direction of the contact was poor while we were in the east against the sunrise with not a cloud in our part of the sky. The sea was perfectly calm with practically no wind

— page 47 —
1120 TARGET NOW IDENTIFIED AS VERY LARGE FREIGHTER OF ABOUT 10,000 OR MORE TONS AND IS UNESCORTED. HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ZIGGING BUT EXPECT HIM TO START AT ANY TIME.
1134 AN NOW ABOUT 400 YARDS OFF TRACK ON PORT BOW OF TARGET AT RANGE OF ABOUT 5,000 YARDS. DESIRE TO FIRE STERN TUBES SO HEADED OUT FOR 500 PORT TRACK.
1149 FIRED FOUR TUBES AFT SPREAD BY PERISCOPE. LOWERED PERISCOPE KICKED AHEAD AND STARTED TURNING RAPIDLY TO RIGHT TO BRING THE BOW TUBES TO BEAR.
1150-45 AFTER TORPEDO RUN OF 1700 YARDS, TWO KILOT'S HIT HIM WELL FORWARD. THEY SEEMED TO HAVE LITTLE EFFECT EXCEPT TO LOWER HIS BOW A FEW FEET AND CAUSE HIM TO INCREASE SPEED. FELT WE HAD TO STOP HIM BECAUSE IF ALLOWED TO GET AWAY THIS TIME HE COULD POSSIBLY GET AIR SUPPORT BEFORE WE COULD MAKE ANOTHER END AROUND.
1154 WITH HIT FIRING AT PERISCOPE WITH SEVERAL GUNS OF FOUR OR FIVE INCH, FIRED FOUR TORPEDOES FORWARD WITH LARGE GYRO ANGLE, TRACK ABOUT 1100 PORT. AS SOON AS HE SAW THESE KILOT'S FISH COMING HE MADE RAPID TURN TO RIGHT AND THEY ALL PASSED DOWN HIS PORT SIDE WITHOUT HITTING. HE KEPT ON TURNING RIGHT THOUGH AND SOON PRESENTED A 1200 STARBOARD TRACK WITH TORPEDO RUN OF ABOUT 2400 YARDS.
1159-30 FIRED REMAINING TWO TORPEDOES FORWARD SPREAD WIDELY BY PERISCOPE. ONE OF THESE WAS SEEN TO RUN ERRATICALLY.
1201 TORPEDO HIT WITHIN ABOUT FIVE FEET OF STERN OF TARGET. THIS STOPPED TARGET DEAD IN THE WATER AND WE HAD TO RELAX EVEN THOUGH HE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE SINKING.
1202 COMMENCED RELOAD FORWARD.
1211 TARGET DID NOT APPEAR TO BE SINKING RAPIDLY SO FIRED ANOTHER TORPEDO AT HIT FROM FORWARD. ALLOWED ONE KNOT SPEED. THIS WAS TOO MUCH BECAUSE AT:
1212-30 TORPEDO HIT FORWARD CUTTING OFF ABOUT FIFTY FEET OF HIS BOW AND TAKING WITH IT HIS FORWARD GUN AND GUN CREW WHO WERE STILL FIRING

— page 48 —
1218 Target now had about 100 down angle but did not appear to be sinking fast so fired one more torpedo from forward at 1500 yards. This torpedo circled out about 30° to the right then commenced turning left and finally hit the target in the bow. This finished him and he began to sink rapidly. The crew were already abandoning ship at this time.

: 1221 Target sank in vertical dive bow first. Four boatloads of about 100 survivors commenced rowing away. Much wreckage was left on the surface. Headed north to clear area a few thousand yards before surfacing. Commenced reload at.

: 1401 Surfaced. Returned to scene of sinking to see if we could identify the ship. Ficked up one life ring (without name) one bale of raw rubber, and a sample of Manila fiber. There were several hundred bales of rubber (both white and black) and boxes of Manila fiber on the surface. Found one sign in the wreckage with the German words RAUCHEN VERBOTEN printed on it. Took many pictures of wreckage and then cleared area to eastward. Also found one hog (very fat) of about 150 lbs. floating in wreckage. Having been able to get no fresh pork in Australia for patrol, it was a big temptation, but thought of butchering aboard a sub caused us to restrain ourselves.

: 1434 Headed for eastern edge of area.

: 1600 Commenced patrol of traffic lanes along east-ern edge of area at one engine speed.

May 4, 1944

Conducting surface patrol as before.

: 0300 Received orders to come home. Set course for Mindoro Strait.

May 5, 1944

Heading for Mindoro Strait at two engine speed.

-12-

— page 49 —
0510 Submerged about 15 miles northeast of Apo Island. Heading down coast of Mindoro.
1658 Surfaced. Headed for Sulu Sea at two engine speed.

May 6, 1944

1305 Submerged about 15 miles south of Queen of Seas Shoal. Decided to run submerged remainder of day in this vicinity in hopes of sighting traffic coming down Filipino coast and cutting across toward Basilan Strait.
1655 Sighted smoke bearing 3450T. On coming up to 60 feet found smoke to be coming from one ship at a great distance, but sighted masts of another bearing 3500T. Went to battle stations and commenced approach (Ship Contacts No.s 6 & 7).
1719 Made out target to be large, four goal post freighter with minesweeper escort. Target found to be zig zagging radically about base course 1600T., speed about 13 knots. Decided to attempt stern shot as we have three torpedoes aft and only two forward.
1743 Fired three torpedoes aft with about 950 starboard track torpedo run about 1600 yards spread by periscope. Escort well up ahead. About one minute after firing, target was observed to be firing at torpedoes with several four or five inch guns. Frou where the splashes landed it appeared that all torpedoes passed astern. Freighter decks appeared to be filled with people. Believe we used too low speed, but find it hard to believe he could be making fifteen knots.
1751 Freighter dropped two depth charges. Torpedoes exploded at end of run. Escort remained in vicinity pinging while freighter cleared area to eastward.
1757 Escort headed toward fairly close. Went to 150 feet.
1806 Back at 64 feet. Saw escort rejoining target to eastward.

7 01433

— page 50 —
1815
Sighted large hospital ship similar to ASH I H.NU coming up on same track freighter had passed over. We passed about 2,000 yards away headed on course 160°T. speed about 13 knots.

1828
Target sending signals probably to escort, but it looks more as if he is sending to Hospital Ship.

1847
Surfaced with SJ radar out of commission. Target bearing 100°T. range about 20,000 yards. Commenced closing at four engine speed.

1858
Saw much gunfire in direction of target.

1902
Sighted ship dead ahead at about 10,000 yards apparently escort searching to rear of target. Reversed course and avoided.

1907
Escort no longer in sight. Reversed course and started closing again.

1908
SJ Radar back in commission. Flicked up target bearing 1270T. range 25,000 yards. Hospital ship bearing 1540T. range 20,000 yards. Target appears to be on base course about 180°T. Commenced end around to starboard. Target found to be zig-zig radically and making about 15 knots.

2100
Target changed base course to 110°T. leaving us astern, all of our running having gained us nothing. Decided to make end around to his port side. Commenced doing so keeping range at 20,000 - 22,000 yards and making 80% on four engines.

2314
Had almost reached port beam of target when we sighted Calusa Island bearing about 1350 true, range 19,570 yards. It now became plain that target intended to pass Calusa close aboard end to the south. This would leave us to north of it. Decided to pass to north of Calusa and then cut down between Calusa and Cagayan Island.

2330
Was just about to head down between islands when we sighted small ship, apparently the escort, between the islands. This forced us to back-track and pass to west of Calusa losing all the ground we had gained.

-14-

— page 53 —
0517 Submerged about 10 miles north of Laparan Island.
: 1000 Commenced transit passage between Laparan Island and Pearl Bank submerged.
: 1330 Transit completed, headed for Sibuitu Passage.
: 1028 Surfaed, headed for Sibuitu at three engine speed.
: 2300 Cleared Sibuitu Passage; headed for Banka Passage.

May 9, 1944

: Headed for Banka Passage at three engine speed.
: Sighted fishing boat or small patrol boat bearing 120°T. in Banka Passage. (Ship Contact No. 8). Avoided at four engine speed.
: Transit of Banka Passage completed, headed down Molucca Passage.

May 10, 1944

: Headed south in Molucca Passage at three engine speed. Disdained to attempt transit of Molucca on surface.
: SD radar contact, range 11 miles. Submerged (Plane Contact No. 8).
: Surfaced, resumed three engine speed.
: Changed course to pass to west of Boeroe Island. Decided not to go through Manila because of bright moonlight and since we will have plenty of time to make our desired rendezvous.
: Sighted small vessel close to Boeroe Island (Ship Contact No. 9). Avoided.

May 11, 1944

: Headed south to pass through Barrier between Sernata and Babar Islands.
: Slowed to two engine speed.

May 12, 1944

: Enroute Fort Darwin at two engine speed.

-17-

7 01433

— page 54 —
0230 Indications of presence of plane on SJ radar.
Set watch on SD radar.
0301 SD radar contact at 17 miles (Plane Contaot
No. 9).
0305 Contact moved in to 10 miles; submerged.
0322 Surfaced with contact at 15 miles on SD.
0335 Submerged when contact had moved in to 3
miles.
0355 Surfaced.
0415 SD radar contact at 12 miles. Also picked
this plane up on SJ at 12,000 yards.
0418 Contact moved in to 4 miles; submerged.
0438 Surfaced. Running at 2 engine speed. The
above plane contacts took place from 15 to
30 miles south of the eastern end of Serrnata
Island.
0927 Since we do not need to run on surface to
make rendezvous on time, decided to submerge
for remainder of day. Submerged.
1656 Surfaced. Running at 15 knots.

May 13, 1944

0500 Sighted escort.
0700 Moored to dock at Port Darwin.
1630 Underway for Eastern Java Sea having taken
aboard 12 torpedoes and eighty thousand
gailons fuel. Decided to proceed at three
engine speed.

May 14, 1944

0458 Submerged for trim.
0543 Surfaced, making three engine speed.
0921 Sighted submarine which we believe to have
been USS bearing 0720T. range about
20,000 yards.
1250 Sighted plane bearing 0100T. at range of
about 15 miles (Plane Contact No. 10).
Submerged.
1342 Surfaced.
1645 Passed Serrnata Island 20 miles abeam to port.
Headed west through Flores Sea.

May 15, 1944

Proceeding through Flores Sea at 17 knots.

— page 55 —
0326 Changad course to head for traffic lanes off Makassar City.
: 1051 Desire to remain undetected. Submerged about 30 miles southeast of De Bril Bank.
: 1825 Surfaced ten miles south of De Bril Bank. Set course to head for traffic lanes northwest of Makassar City.

May 17, 1944

: 0130 Commenced surfacing patrol at ten miles west of Kapoposang Light. Sighted several small fishing vessels during the night.
: 0526 Submerged. Commenced submerged patrol 12 miles southwest of Kapoposang Light. Believe that any traffic making the northern approach to Makassar City will make a landfall on this light.
: 1236 Sighted seaplane bearing 285°T. distance about 15 miles (Plane Contact No. 11). Believe he may be air coverage for some ship entering Makassar City. Feel that base course of ship entering Makassar City would be about 120°T. Since this contact is to south of this bearing believe we may be to north of this track. Changed course to 190°T.
: 1248 Sighted smoke bearing 279°T (Ship Contact No. 10). Commenced closing track to south at 2/3 speed.
: 1305 Sighted masts of snip bearing 279°T.
: 1315 Slowed to take look. It is raining very hard and have lost sight of target. Continued closing to south as we still appear to be north of target track.
: 1328 Sighted plane in heavy rain very close.
: 1338 Heard light sorews and pinging bearing 275°T. Still raining hard. Cannot see target.
: 1345 Sighted target bearing 259°T. at estimated range of about 3,000 yards. Could just make

— page 56 —
1352 Target zigged away and gave us a 1100 port angle on bow. Unable to get range but estimate it at about 2500 yards. We were forced to make up our minds immediately whether to fire or not. Decided that I had to take a chance on this important target, so with estimated range of 3,000 yards and estimated speed of 14 knots fired six torpedoes spread very wide by periscope. Hoped to get at least one hit, but they all missed. Went to 100 feet.
1358 Plane dropped bomb. Not close.
1400 Escort getting close, Went to 200 feet.
1405 Escort shifted to short scale and headed on firing run.
1407 Escort passed directly overhead with us kicking ahead at about 5 knots and turning.
1407-10 Depth charges started going off. Five depth charges all very close but apparently astern.
1408 Continued to avoid keeping escort astern. Found out that pit log will not house.
'1513 At periscope depth. Sighted mine sweeper type escort astern at about 4,000 yards. Went to 150 feet.
1539 At periscope depth. Noting in sight.
1828 Surfaced. Headed for Eastern Java Sea at 15 knots.

May 18, 1944

0620 Sighted submarine bearing 265°T. range about 18,000 yards. Identified this as a friendly sub so kept closing and exchanged calls.
0820 3D contact at 15 miles (Plane Contact No. 12).
1001 Surfaced. Commenced patrol of East Java Sea at 10 knots. Heading for traffic lanes off Surabaya, Java. Sighted many sail boats during day.

-20-

— page 57 —
0306 SJ radar contact bearing 31°0T. range 17,550 yards (Ship Contact No. 11).
Commenced tracking and found target to be on steady course 065°0T. at 7.5 knots. Commenced end around at 19 knots.
0514 Arrived 13,500 yards ahead of target and on his track. Slowed to targets speed and changed course to 065°0T. in order to get a more accurate speed check. Target speed checks nicely at 7.5 knots, course at 065°0T.
0537 Submerged at beginning of morning twilight 13,350 yards ahead of target. Headed for target.
0553 Sighted target by periscope at 8,500 yards. Appears to be small freighter of about 2,000 tons with stack aft. He looks high in the water so set torpedo depth at six feet.
0606 Target still on straight course. Headed out for stern tube shot - 90° starboard track.
0622 Fired three torpedoes from stern tubes torpedo run about 1200 yards.
0623 Felt sure we couldn't miss this one, but we did. He kept on steady course for one minute and fifteen seconds after firing and then gave us a 160° angle on bow. I feel sure these torpedoes passed under target. Watched torpedoes by periscope and tracked them with sound gear and everything indicates that torpedoes ran deep.
0706 Surfaced and headed toward eastern part of Java Strait at two engine speed. Sighted many sail boats.
1349 SD radar contact at 12 miles (Plane Contact No. 13). Submerged.
1625 Surfaced. Heading for eastern part of Java Sea at 15 knots.
1915 Received orders: to return. Commenced making 17 knots.
2226 SJ radar contact bearing 082°0T. range 13,200 yards. Identified this as friendly sub. Avoided. (Snip)
2301 SJ radar contact bearing 081°0T. range 9,950 yards (Ship Contact No. 13). Identified as small vessel, probably fishing boat. Avoided.

-21- 7 01433

— page 58 —
0736 Submerged about 15 miles north of entrance to Lombok Strait.
: 1230 Commenced transit of Lombok Strait submerged.
: 1840 Surfaced about five miles north of southern entrance to Lombok Strait.
: 1910 Clear of Lombok Strait. Proceeding on surface to Fremantle, Australia.

May 21 & 22, 1944
Enroute Fremantle as before.

May 23, 1944
Enroute Fremantle, Australia.
1010 Received orders to proceed to rendezvous with ANGLER. Changed course to 3470T. and speed to 18 knots.

May 24, 1944
Enroute to rendezvous with ANGLER.
1547 Sighted mast bearings 3360T, distance about 30,000 yards, closed and identified contact as CHILDS, ANGLER, and CRAVALLI.
1607 Joined their company and neared on course 1460T. speed to 10 knots.
1905 Received orders to return.
Left formation.

May 25, 26, 27, 1944
Enroute Fremantle, Australia.

May 26, 1944
0645 Changed course to head in to Fremantle. Harpoon conforming to swept channel.

0810 Entered Fremantle Harbor:

-22-

— page 61 —
1944 I.C. Motor Generator overload. On 6 April, 1944 it was discovered that the supply leads to #2 I.C. M-G set were overheated. The SJ-a, SD, R-dars and normal load were being supplied at that time. Made tests with the following results:

| Generator | Load | Motor Voltage | Motor Current |
||------|||
| No load  | 113-V|               | 11.5 amps    |
| Normal load | 113-V|               | 33.5 amps    |
| SJ-a Radar and normal load | 113-V|               | 51.0 amps    |
| SJ-a, SD Radars and normal | 113-V|               | 56.5 amps    |

Tests on #2 I.C M-G set gave the same results. This motor is rated at 7 H.P. (cont), 1800 R.F.M., 115-V, 53 amps.

Rewired I.C switchboard according to sketch below to permit the SJ-a load to be carried on either I.C M-G set with or without normal load. When both Radars are in operation this vessel now runs two I.C M-G sets, carrying the SJ-a load on one and the normal I.C. and SD load on the other.

This SW. disconnected from A.C. bus. SJ radar load will not register on A.C. ammeter.

SJ Radar.

No.1
I.C.
M.G.

A.C. Bus
I.C. Board

No. 2
I.C.M.G.

7 01433

— page 62 —
1. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
Engineering - Electrical (Cont'd)
To reduce heating of I.C. M-G motor supply leads placed SJ-a Radar load on SJ M-G set. The latter generator furnished the required load voltage for the radar for only a maximum of four hours. It was therefore necessary to again supply the SJ-a Radar with power from the I.C. M-G set.

The General Electric SJ M-G set has the following characteristics. The motor is a 115 - 345-V-DC, 3 H.P., 3600 R.P.M. machine. The alternator is a 115-V-AC, 60 cycle machine rated to deliver 1.35 K.W. at 13 amps. The set will not deliver the power continuously required by the SJ-a Radar. For this reason it is recommended that this M-G set be used to supply power for the SD Radar, thereby reducing power requirements of the I.C. M-G sets.

On 7 April, 1944, in trying to start #1 I.C. M-G set discovered that cut-out switches to controller panels for #1 and #2 I.C. M-G sets had become so over-heated that the insulation had broken down. The consequent arcing rendered the switches useless, necessitating wiring the supply direct to the panel as no spare switches were available. Believe this casualty was caused by the above described overload.

2. The Cutler-Hammer Controller Panels for the bow and stern plane tilting motors are still unreliable. It has been necessary to station a watch on these panels during Battle Stations to ensure having power on the planes. Defects this patrol as follows. On 10 April, 1944 and 14 April, 1944 the contactor arm for the #175 relay in the stern plane panel hung-up causing power to be lost on the stern planes. The same casualty was experienced during an approach on 29 April, 1944. This indicates that although this new arm does not break it is too long and too rough. On 24 April, 1944 the Bow Planes would not go to rise. Found that the #117 rise contactor fell out too far making the air gap so great that the coil would not pull the contactor in. On dismantling

— page 64 —
1. The following defects were noted in torpedoes issued to this vessel:

(a) Torpedo #26559 (overnauled by U.S.S. PELIAS) had leaky exhaust valves which were sealed improperly and which caused the afterbody to flood.

(b) Torpedo #26769 (overnauled by U.S.S. PELIAS), torpedo #33755 (overnauled by U.S.S. ORION), and torpedo #23100 (overnauled by U.S.S. ORION), had gyro setting mechanisms which allowed the side setting sockets on the torpedoes to be turned without actually setting any angle on the gyro pot.

(c) Torpedo #39597 (overnauled by U.S.S. PELIAS) and torpedo #33753 (overnauled by U.S.S. ORION), ran erratic - causes unknown.

(d) Torpedo #22771 (overnauled by U.S.Submarine Base, Midway Island, T.H.), had a depth engine which caused sluggish operation of the horizontal rudders and, in addition, had a gasket missing from the seat for turbine hand hole plate. The afterbody of this torpedo was completely flooded due to the failure to install this gasket.

All torpedoes listed under items (a) and (b) ran not straight and normal, but most certainly would have been erratic and not the de-fects been noted during routine aboard ship. The torpedo listed under item (d) was not fired. This is a total of at least 7 out of 32 steam torpedoes which would have run erratic and they been fired as issued to the vessel.

2. Although provided with leads for carrying two mark 16 torpedoes simultaneously in the after room, the charging panel begins to smoke excessively when a load of more than 7 amps is put on it. This condition limits the charging rate to 3 amps per torpedo, which is below the recommended starting rate and increases unnecessarily the length of time to charge.

The Mark 18 torpedo hydrogen eliminators are not adequate for handling hydrogen generated when the torpedo is in the tube. After six hours with the hydrogen burners turned on continuously with a load 4.75 amps, a torpedo was withdrawn and a 5% hydrogen mixture was found in the battery compartment. In order to keep the hydrogen

— page 65 —
1. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE.

/Ordnance.

content down, the torpedoes, thereafter, when in the tube were ventilated every four hours. This practice is not desirable since it causes an excessive amount of battery water to be evaporated and an increased number of grounds.

(L) RADIO.

1. Reception.

(A) Reception of the BAKERS schedule was in general difficult while in the China Sea area. Heavy Jap interference in the form of VTS and random transmissions prevented copying the 1200 and 1300 GCT schedules. Best reception was obtained on 9250 KCS. between 1500 and 1800 GCT. In transit to and from the patrol area, and in the Java Sea, reception was satisfactory.

(B) Serials missed: Number 75 of April, 1944.

2. Transmissions.

| DATE | TIME | POSIT | CALL | DELIV. | MSG | CALL | COMM | SHI- | NO | TOTAL |
|------|------|-------|------|-------|-----|------|------|------|----|-------|
| (1) | 5/3/44 | 0647 | 13033' | VIXO | 12705 | 16940 | 12705 | 1330 | 61 | 13 Min |
| (2) | 5/7/44 | 17102 | 9030' | VIXO | 12705 | 8470 | 1800 | 46 | 51 Min |
| (3) | 5/7/44 | 00157 | 838' | VIXO | 8470 | 8470 | 3150 | 46 | 40 Min |
| (4) | 5/10/44 | 13252 | 2058' | VIXO | 12705 | 8470 | 2190 | 64 | 30 Min |
| (5) | 5/17/44 | 11232 | 4047' | VIXO | 8470 | 8470 | 3200 | 56 | 17 Min |
| (6) | 5/18/44 | 23182 | 5005' | VIXO | 8470 | 8470 | 1150 | 42 | 6 Min |
| (7) | 5/22/44 | 02362 | 18041' | VIXO | 8470 | 8470 | 1890 | 48 | 11 Min |

3. Casualties. None other than several receiver vacuum tubes worn out from age.

-39-

— page 66 —
1. SJ-a Radar. Total hours operation - 745

During the last refit PPI was installed by the U.S.S. PELLAS radar force.
At the same time, the ship's force installed a rheostat in the antenna training motor armature circuit to permit control of speed of rotation of the antenna. Such control was felt to be desirable for two reasons: One, slow speed search would be possible, and two, at slower speeds of train, there would be less wear on the moving parts of the training system. The rheostat used was a 103 cm High Pressure Air Compressor Motor field control rheostat of Cutler-Hammer manufacture. It is mounted on the cover of the SJ Radar junction box directly above the Transmitter-Receiver, and is easily reached by the operator. Heat developed is by no means excessive. The following table gives the speeds obtained at three different auxiliary power (battery) voltages.

| Speed Rotation in RPM |
||
| No Resistance Full Resistance |
| 260 (Normal)          | 15  | 7  |
| 293                   | 17  | 8  |
| 350                   | 20  | 10 |

A. Casualties.

(a) See Major Defects - Engineering - Electrical section for the discussion of SJ Radar power supply difficulties. If, as recommended, the SJ Radar M-G set is rewired to supply power for the SD Radar, the danger of the casualty described in paragraph (b) below will be greatly reduced, as there would then be no necessity for shifting the SJ Radar load to a single I.C. M-G set to prevent overloading the latter.

(b) On 7 May, the PPI unit failed after 509 hours operation due to a snorted primary winding of the oil-filled power transformer T-1, Navy Type 30987. This transformer being a tender spares, no replacement was

— page 67 —
U.S.S. FLASHER (SS2)

available until arrival at Darwin, May 13th. In the early mornings of May 16, the sweep on the PPI was suddenly lost. Because it was not desirable to secure the radar at the time, no attempt at repairs was made. Approximately three hours later, the sweep reappeared, and PPI then operated normally. Shortly after this, the PPI again failed, this time due to the short-ing of the primary winding of the re-placment transformer T-1, which had been obtained at Darwin. The failure occured while the normal I.C. power load was being shifted from No. 1 to No. 2 I.C. M-G, to leave No. 1 M-G supplying the SJ radar load alone. As the normal load was shifted, the No. 1 generator voltage was seen to rise to 139 volts. It was undoubtedly this rise in voltage which caused the transformer failure.

(c) Trouble was experienced with intermittent high High Voltage Rectifier Current. A loose wire lead from condenser C-17, D-150960 Transmitter -Receiver, resulted in occasional loss of grid drive to the type 807 bias generator. C-17 was replaced from spares.

B. Interference.

The only interference encountered was generated by the SJ Radar of two passing friendly submarines.

2. SD-4 Radar. Total hours operation - 650.

Performance was satisfactory. Plane contacts were made at ranges up to 21 miles, while land was picked up at 55 miles on several occasions.

A. Casualties. None.

B. Interference.

On 18 and 19 May, while in the eastern part of the Java Sea, continued inter-

-41- 7 01433

— page 68 —
1. SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.
1. Sound Gear.
   A. Performance.
   B. Casualties.
   (a) The equipment gave poor performance during the first part of the patrol. If the gear had been idle for more than four or five hours and was then put into operation, during the first ten or fifteen minutes of operation very little sound could be heard even when maximum gain was used. After this initial period, the equipment would suddenly produce normal and satisfactory reception.
   The cause of this difficulty was found to be a defective type 6D6 vacuum tube in the intermediate frequency amplifier section of the 3D Receiver-Amplifier. The grid cap of this tube was slightly loose, but not sufficiently so to give bad test results or consistently poor performance. Tube was replaced from spares.
   (b) The 3D Training Motor, rebuilt during the last refit, has very poor commutation. It is believed that the field coils or armature are electrically unbalanced, as excessive sparking cannot be eliminated by setting the brushes.

— page 69 —
7 01433

U.S.S. Flounder (224)

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

2. Sound conditions.

Sound conditions were only fair in the China Sea area. The background consisted mainly of a loud buzzing noise. The maximum range at which target screws were heard was 4,000 yards, the average range of detection being about 3,500 yards. These ranges applied to both sonic and supersonic equipment. In the Sulu and Java Seas, conditions were greatly improved, high background noise, except during rain squalls, being non-existent.

(0) DENSITY LAYERS.

| DATE | TIME | GOT | POSIT | DEPTH (FMS) | DEPTH AT HIGH GRADIENT STARTED (FT.) | TEMPERATURE GRADIENT STARTED (F.) | DEPTH IN DEG. F. |
|------|------|-----|-------|||||
| 8 Apr | 0130 | 19015'S | 113019'E | 560 | 15 | 12.0 | 13.3 | 13

— page 71 —
33,183 gal. 30 days 14 days.
Limiting Factor this Patrol - Dispatch Orders.

(U) RATINGS.

In general material difficulties were few. It is relieved that this was largely due to a good refit last time in.

The lack of good meats is still felt very keenly on patrol. The beef was poor, and we had no frozen chicken and no pork. It is strongly recommended that this condition be remedied as soon as possible.

Torpedo performance on this patrol was poor. Four torpedo after bodies flooded when they were tested in the tubes and would have been crratic had they been fired in this condition. Two torpedoes were observed to run erratic. It is further believed that the negative results of the attack on a large AK on six May were caused by poor torpedo performance. Subsequent data indicated that a speed error of 1.5 - 2.0 knots was made in this attack while a spread coverage of 3.5 knots was used. The target was observed during the torpedo run and did not avoid. It is therefore difficult to see how all three torpedoes missed.

— page 72 —
1. The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE, San Francisco, California, 3 June 1944.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS240) Report of Second War Patrol, comment on.

1. Patrol occupied a period of 55 days of which 38 were spent north of the barrier. After firing all torpedoes, fuel and 12 additional torpedoes were obtained at DARWIN on the 40th day of the patrol.

2. The same splendid aggressiveness that characterized the first patrol of this ship again paid dividends. The area coverage was excellent and FLASHER made contact with six enemy groups meriting torpedo fire. Attacks resulted in every case except one, where the persistent efforts of the captain were thwarted by enemy air activity.

(a) Attack No. 1: Moonlight submerged attacks on two freighter in column. Tracked by radar at 7.5 knots on steady course and attained excellent firing position at range 1000 - 1625 yards and track angles of 60° to 100°. Three hits were obtained for seven torpedoes fired and both ships were seen to sink.

(b) Attack No. 2: A series of daylight submerged attacks after a surface end around. The first salvo of Mark 18 torpedoes slopped the ship with two hits. The target avoided the second salvo of Mark 18's but FLASHER stayed with him and obtained three more hits. Excellent pictures of the sinking were obtained.

(c) Attacks Nos. 3 - 4: Daylight submerged approach resulted in three misses from a range of 1850 yards and track angles of 750 - 810°, due to error in estimate of target speed. FLASHER surfaced and ran around target (which was escorted) and succeeded in getting one hit with his last two torpedoes, slowing the target to five knots and listing him considerably.

— page 73 —
1. ATTACK No. 5: (After getting additional torpedoes at DARWIN). Daylight submerged approach on large escorted seaplane tender in heavy rainfall off MAKASSAR City. Ship was entering harbor and FLASHER was forced to resort to a snap shot at 3000 yards with little or no approach data. Six torpedoes were fired but all missed, due no doubt to excessive range and inaccurate firing data.

(c) ATTACK No. 6: Excellent firing position attained on small freighter of about 2000 tons and a submerged periscope attack actuated, firing three torpedoes from 1300 yards with tracks of 910 - 940. Target was light in the water and the torpedoes, set at six feet, apparently ran under the target. Firing data had been well established.

3. Two torpedoes ran erratic and seven others would have done so had not the ship discovered serious defects which are thoroughly described in the report. This emphasizes the need for increased alertness in the supervision of torpedo overhauls.

4. FLASHER returned in good material condition and will be refitted in the normal time. A switch will be installed during current refit so that the SD radar power may be obtained from the SJ motor-generator. The primary of the high voltage transformer in the PPI will be fused at approximately 20% overload to prevent the primary burning out due to sudden voltage fluctuations. A locally manufactured rheostat to give speed control of the SJ antenna training from 14 to 1 RPM is being installed on all boats of this squadron. The deficiencies in torpedo charging and hydrogen elimination will be corrected.

5. The morale of officers and crew is outstanding and they are congratulated for inflicting severe damage on the enemy.

[Signature: GRIGGS]

— page 74 —
6278
FE24-71(A16-3) UNITED STATES NAVY 11 1/2/gr.
Canal 1, 2002
19 June 1944

SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO:
USS FLASHER Conf. Ltr.
A16-3, Serial 09, dated
28 May, 1944. Report
of Second War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Second War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The remarks of Commander Submarine Squadron
TWELVE are concurred in.

2. The Force Commander notes with approval the
persistence of FLASHER during the chase of a convoy on 25
April. There is strong evidence that the enemy is escorting
important convoys with escort carriers in addition to the
surface escorts, and it is very likely that such escort was
with the convoy contacted 25 April.

3. This patrol is designated as "successful" for
purpose of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

4. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding
Officer, Officers, and Crew of FLASHER on their continued
success and for the following damage inflicted upon the enemy:

SUN:
1 - AI. (SUNG GLANG - 2C) (Identified from VICHY RADIO
Passes) -- 1,065 Tons (1st Attack).
1 - AI. (UI) -- 4,000 Tons (1st Attack).
1 - AI. (EU) -- 7,500 Tons (2nd Attack).
Total -- 12,565 Tons

DALAGED
1 - LARGE AI (EU) -- 7,500 Tons (4th Attack).

Grand Total -- 20,065 Tons

R. W. CHRISTIE.
P#71
DISTRIBUTION & AUTHENTICATION
(see next page)
ORIGINAL COPY
-1- 7 01433

— page 75 —
9:33
Reg. No. 7 01433
Serial No. 0/742

Al6-3(F-3/roj)
Serial: 0/742

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. FLASHER Conf. ltr.
Al6-3, Serial 09, dated
28 May, 1944. Report
of Second War Patrol.

From: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Second
War Patrol.

1. The Commanding Officer, Officers, and Men
of the U.S.S. FLASHER are congratulated for having con-
ducted a successful war patrol.

C E. VAN HOOK,
Deputy.

Copy to:
CO U.S.S. FLASHER

— page 76 —
9 C4090

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
Enclosures:

1. Enclosures (A), (B), and (C) cover the third war patrol of this vessel conducted in the South China Sea Area during the period 19 June, 1944 to 7 August, 1944 are forwarded herewith.

R.T. HILBER.

9 C4090

— page 78 —
1. PROLOGUE:
Returned to Fremantle, W.A., from Second War Patrol on May 23, 1944 and after running the Magnetic Range, commenced refit, S.R.U. (Navy 137) accomplishing the refit. Number Four Main Ballast Tank was converted to a Fuel Ballast Tank during the refit. The refit was completed and the snips force returned to the ship on June 10, 1944. Commenced training on June 11, 1944 and completed Sound Test that date. Departed for Patrol in South China Sea on June 19, 1944.

(B) NARRATIVE:
June 19, 1944
1700 Departed Fremantle, W.A., for Third War Patrol.
1900 Commenced making night runs on HMAS NUBBO.
2125 Night runs completed, released DUBBO. Enroute Exmouth Gulf conducting surface and submerged training.

June 20, 1944
0829 Sighted and spoke to friendly sub: (Ship Contact No. 1).

June 21, 1944
1741 Enroute Exmouth Gulf.
1741 Sighted and spoke to friendly sub. (Ship Contact No. 2).

June 22, 1944
0915 Moored alongside Fuel Barge in Exmouth Gulf. Found that we had failed to fuel our new No. 4 fuel ballast tank to capacity in Fremantle so required 28,679 gallons.
1000 Transferred SPENCER, M.G., Jr. EMIC, No. 262 22 66, USN, to Navy 81, with a case of acute appendicitis. This appeared to be a serious attack of appendicitis and it was considered that an immediate operation was required. The Commanding Officer, Navy 81, found that a minimum of six hours would be required to get a hospital plane, and it was also unfortunate that the Navy 81 doctor was away in the country at this time. However, the Commanding Officer, Navy 81, with the

— page 79 —
0632 Lookout sighted plane at about 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 2). Submerged.
0712 Surfaced. Sighted several sail boats during day.
2000 Commenced transit of Karimata Strait at 3 engine speed.

June 28, 1944

0500 Transit of Karimata Strait completed, slowed to 2 engine speed.
0652 Sighted plane at about 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 3). Submerged.
0802 Surfaced.
1327 SD Radar Contact at 21 miles (Plane Contact No. 4).
1330 Submerged when plane had closed to 12 miles.
1436 Surfaced.
1812 Sighted smoke bearing 311°T. (Ship Contact No. 5). Commenced closing at four engine speed.
1920 Sighted mast bearing 300°T. and much smoke in this direction indicating a large convoy. Change in bearings of smoke and change of range indicates convoy headed for Singapore on course of about 295°T.
1953 Radar Contact on last ship of convoy bearing 303°T. range 19,500 yards. Commenced end around to starboard as we would have the best water in this direction.
2100 Found that convoy had about 13 large ships with several small ones believed to be escorts. Ships appeared to be in four groups with about three merchantmen in each group, and with an escort on each side of each group. It was evident that we would have to attack in water of not more than 25 fathoms. It also appeared that we could only make one attack as the convoy was close to really shallow water to the northwest and we felt sure they would seek the protection of this shallow water after the first attack. The Commanding Officer was reluctant to make a submarine moonlight attack in this depth of water. It was also considered that a surface attack offered the best opportunity of doing the most damage to the enemy. We also hoped we would be able to evade on the surface.

— page 80 —
2209
after our attack and thereby avoid a lot of trouble for ourselves. We therefore decided to wait for moonest at 0055.
Arrived on desired station about 400 on the starboard bow of leading group of convoy at range of 17,000 yards. Decided to remain here until moonest. Convoy base course checks at 2950T. Speed 9.75 knots. The leading group of three ships contained two of the largest ships in the convoy. We therefore decided to attack these two large ships.

June 29, 1944

0052 Heavy clouds covered moon which was about to set anyway. Went to battle stations and commenced approach for attack. Picked up escort on starboard bow of leading ship at range of 7,500 yards. Continued to keep bow pointed at escort. With range of 4,000 yards on escort, and with him directly ahead, he gave us a zero angle on bow. Since convoy has also zigged toward, did not feel that he had seen us, but felt we had to get out from in front of him so changed course to left with full rudder and put him on our starboard quarter. Kept him in this position until range started to open at 3,000 yards. At this time convoy had zigged away and we had an angle on the bow of about 650 starboard on the leading ship, range about 5,500 yards. Came right with full rudder and headed in for 900 starboard track. This course would pass us about 2,000 yards astern of escort. Had just headed in when we picked up another escort on port bow at 4,500 yards. Felt we could complete attack before he could worry us. With gyro angles about zero and torpedo run to leading ship about 3,500 yards the first and second ships were almost overlapping, with the second ship about 700 yards closer than the leading ship.
From this position fired three torpedoes at leading ship with 10 offset and immediately fired three at second ship with 10 offset. On completion of firing commenced reversing course to right with full rudder and at flank speed. Had hoped to fire stern tubes at third ship but this did not develop as he had fallen too far astern. Two minutes and twenty five seconds

— page 82 —
1. NARRATIVE (Cont'd).
2. June 30, 1944.
3. 0600 We were about 45 miles west of Natuna Island, heading up probable traffic lanes northeast of Singapore.
4. July 1, 1944.
5. 0745 Entered Area. Standing up toward center of area to patrol Saigon - Manila and Singapore - Empire routes until the third at which time CREVALLIE will probably arrive. Have ordered CREVALLIE to patrol area east of Longitude 110°E until dark the eleventh. FLASHER will cover coast until that time when CREVALLIE will relieve FLASHER and FLASHER will patrol Saigon to Takao routes in the vicinity of 120°N and west of 111° - 30°E. It is expected that ANGLER will arrive completing our Wolf Pack on about 13 July. Have ordered ANGLER to patrol Singapore - Empire and Saigon - Manila routes east of 111° - 30°E and in the vicinity of 120°N on arrival.
6. July 2, 1944.
7. Conducting surface patrol as before.
8. 1004 Submerged for trim.
9. 1026 Surfaced. Conducting surface patrol at 14 knots.
10. July 3, 1944.
11. Heading for station off Hon Doi at 14 knots.
12. 1437 Sighted two large metal drums with metal beams between them. These were quite large and heavy drums and considering them a menace in our area, decided to try to sink them. Expanded three drums of 20 MM ammunition and obtained many hits. Large holes were blown in both drums, and although they were still afloat when we left, I believe they probably sank.
13. 2340 Arrived in Cape Varella Area. Decided to maintain night surface patrol 14,000 - 15,000 yards off Hon Doi and to conduct day submerged patrol 4,000 yards off Hon Doi. It is believed that this type of patrol will insure contact with any coastwise traffic worthy of torpedoes.

— page 83 —
0528  Submerged and moved in to day submerged station. Sighted many sail boats during day. At times we have as many as 15 all around us. Surfaced and moved out to night patrol station. One sail boat seems to stay in an area about 15,000 - 25,000 yards off Hon Doi. We play tag with him most of the night to keep from being sighted.

July 5, 1944

0535  Submerged for day patrol.
0920  Sighted small south bound coastal freighter of about 800 tons (Ship Contact No. 6). Do not feel justified in disclosing my position here by attacks on this kind of target.
1141  Sighted small coastal freighter of about 700 tons. He was headed south at 7.5 knots (Ship Contact No. 7).
1336  Sighted small trawler of about 200 tons headed south (Ship Contact No. 8).
1943  Surfaced and moved out to night patrol station.

July 6, 1944

0525  Submerged for day patrol.
1455  Sighted small south bound coastal freighter of about 700 tons (Ship Contact No. 9).
1600  Sighted small coastal freighter of 400 tons south bound (Ship Contact No. 10).
1710  Sighted small south bound coastal freighter of about 600 tons (Ship Contact No. 11).
1937  Surfaced and moved out to night patrol station.

July 7, 1944

0533  Submerged for day patrol.
0611  Sighted two small coastal freighters of about 500 tons each, both headed south (Ship Contact No. 12).
0644  Sighted small north bound coastal freighter of about 700 tons (Ship Contact No. 13). Many sail boats in sight in this area at all times.
1937  Surfaced and moved out to night patrol station.

— page 84 —
2030 SJ Radar Contact bearing 229°T. range 14,300 yards (Ship Contact No. 14). This ship was close to Hon Doi and was seen to be headed north. Commenced tracking. Moen is about full, but it is overcast and raining. Will have to make surface attack.
2055 Picked up escort on starboard beam of target. This escort was very active and never maintained any fixed station for long.
2201 SJ Radar Contact bearing 000°T. range 6,500 yards (Ship Contact No. 15). Believed this to be sail boat but it was raining hard and he was dead ahead so was forced to avoid. This put me back on beam of target at 13,000 yards. Target has Cape Varella abeam to port about 2500 yards.
2315 Arrived at point about 6500 yards ahead of target and about 1000 yards off his track to starboard. As we have eight torpedoes aft and ten forward, decided to fire aft. Slowed to let target overtake us. Still raining although it is fairly bright, Feel we can get away with night attack all right.
2329 Set tubes aft on four feet just in case target is shallow draft. We know nothing about him at this time as we haven't seen him.
2340 Sighted target at 4350 yds with about 100 starboard angle on bow. Commenced working around for stern shot, keeping stern to target. Target appears to be medium freighter of about 4,000 - 5,000 tons. Wish that tubes were on six feet, but will not change them now.
2354 Fired four torpedoes aft with 20 divergent spread. Target course 345°T. speed 9.6 knots, traok 750 starboard, torpedo run 2100 yards. Escort at this time was well back on starboard quarter of target and heard to hit target almost under the foremast. Another was seen and heard to hit midway between MOT and stern. This one threw up a cloud of sparks. With escort astern at about 2700 yards, commenced heading out slowly watching for target to sink.
2357 Escort commenced racing about wildly trying to find us. Am sure he never saw us.
2400 Target was seen to sink and at the same time disappeared from radar at range of 3,000 yards. Commenced clearing area.

— page 85 —
0003 Esport commenced dropping depth charges, a total of 10 depth charges being dropped.
: 0022 Lost escort on SJ radar. Commenced heading back to patrol station off Hon Doi.
: 0536 Submerged for day patrol 4,000 yards off Hon Doi.
: 0920 Sighted float type monoplane bearing 173°T. range about 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 5).
: 1232 Heard distant explosion.
: 1241 Heard two distant explosions.
: 1436 Heard distant explosion.
: 1450 Sighted float type monoplane bearing 176°T. range about 12 miles. He appears to be patrolling in that vicinity (Plane Contact No. 6).
: 1510 Sighted another plane in vicinity of first plane. Both 'seem to be searching same area (Plane Contact No. 7).
: 1700 Sighted two low wing monoplanes bearing 176°T. distance about 12 miles (Plane Contact No. 8). They appear to be conducting a very intensive search in this area.
: 1724 Heard two distant explosions.
: 1750 Heard one instant explosion.
: 1821 Heard distant explosion.
: 1825 Heard distant explosion.
: 1835 Heard distant explosion. Planes still seem to be searching area to south. Thought for a while that they might be air cover for a convoy, but don't believe so now as we have remained at periscope depth and have seen no smoke. It would be impossible for traffic close to the coast to get by us as we are only 4,500 yards off shore.
: 1908 Heard two distant explosions.
: 1946 Surfaced and stood out to night patrol station we are still worried at night by sail boats and for the last two nights have had a three masted junk in our area. I still don't think they are anti-submarine vessels though.

July 9, 1944

: 0535 Submerged for day patrol.
: 0643 Sighted plane bearing 185°T. distance 12 miles. (Plane Contact No. 9).
: 0718 Sighted plane bearing 137°T. distance 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 10). They seem to be working the same area over again today.
: 0940 Heard three distant explosions.
: 1037 Heard three more explosions.

— page 86 —
1102 Sighted two "Ida" type planes at four miles closing rapidly (Plane Contact No. 11), went to 90 feet while they passed over and then came back up to periscope depth.
1152 Heard two distant explosions.
1942 Surfaced and stood out to night patrol area.

July 10, 1944

0535 Submerged for day patrol.
0735 Sighted 2 engines medium bomber bearing 2160T. distance 8 miles (Plane Contact No. 12). This plane was flying at about 4,000 feet and passed out of sight on course about 0400T.
0927 Sighted twin float mono-plane bearing 2200T. distance about 5 miles (Plane Contact No. 13). This plane passed about a mile off and went out of sight at about 0931. There has been no small coastal traffic since our attack a few nights ago.
1943 Surfaced and stood out to night patrol station.

July 11, 1944

0517 Submerged for day patrol.
0946 Sighted three northbound coastal vessels bearing 2200T. distance 10,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 16). These were very small vessels of about 150 - 350 tons each.
1519 Sighted twin float monoplane bearing 1610T. distance 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 14).
1528 Plane went out of sight.
1943 Surfaced. Headed out for surface patrol about 90 miles off shore. CREVALLES is due to take inshore patrol to night.

July 12, 1944

0228 Arrived on station about 90 miles off coast. Commenced surface patrol of this area.
0913 SD Radar Contact 22 miles (Plane Contact No. 15). This contact finally went out of sight at 36 miles. Am not positive that this was plane contact, but it looked good. At times there seemed to be two planes. I list this as a plane contact as we make it a rule to always believe the SD radar.

July 13, 1944

0701 Sighted smoke bearing 2300T (Ship Contact No.

— page 87 —
17. Smoke appeared to be well over horizon so headed to:ard smoke at 15 knots, keeping good lookout both from high lookout platform and with periscope.

: 0714 Sighted two masts and hull of ship from bridge at radar range of 19,000 yards. This was the first time we realized that the visibility was reduced. I felt we might be sighted this close but we were in a brilliant morning sun from him, so reversed course and started opening out. Sent Contact report to ANGLE. Did not attempt to contact CREV.LLLE as I knew he was submerged in close to coast. At this point only one ship was visible but could see smoke from another ship. It appears that we have a convoy of two ships. Escorts not in sight. Convoy course appears to be about 0400T.

: 0740 Lost contact so headed back slowly toward convoy. It appears now that an end around will be difficult because of haze. When we have radar contact we are within sight of them and the moment we lose radar contact we also lose sight contact.

: 0754 Regained contact with ship bearing about 2400T. This appears to be an escort. Headed away from him and commenced tracking.

: 0801 Heard several loud explosions.

: 0837 Escort headed for us and started closing range. We went ahead at four engine speed and started opening out from him. Our plan at this point was to lose him and circle around end regain contact with convoy.

: 0911 Had started sending ANGLE last known position of convoy when lookout sighted plane over escort and closing us rapidly (Plane Contact No. 16). Submerged and changed course 80° to left.

: 0916 Plane dropped one bomb which was not very close.

: 0930 At periscope depth. Sighted minelayer type escort with zero angle on bow, range about 9,000 yards. Continued on course trying to get out from ahead of him.

: 0941 Looked at escort again. Found angle on bow still zero, range about 2,500 yards. Went to 150 feet. He is using long scale pinging. He passed just about overhead still making about 15 knots.

: 1000 Back at periscope depth. Sighted escort bearing 0330T. still on same course and at same

— page 88 —
1019  Lost sight of escort.
: 1057  Surfaced. SD Radar Contact at 7 and 8 miles. Submerged. (Plane Contact No. 17).
: 1151  Surfaced. Trying to regain contact at four engine speed.
: 1223  SD Radar Contact 12 miles closing (Plane Contact No. 18). 'Submerged.
: 1232  Sighted plane by periscope bearing 315°T. He is apparently making wide search of area and appears to be twin float, low wing monoplane.
: 1257  Surfaced.
: 1304  Sighted plane (Plane Contact No. 19).
: 1305  Submerged when plane closed to 10 miles by SD.Radar.
: 1342  Surfaced.
: 1343  Sent ANGLER dope on last known position of convoy and told him that we believed convoy was on northeasterly course.
Ordered ANGLER to search sector from 030 - 090 and told him we would search sector from 350 - 030. Commenced search of our sector at four engine speed.
: 2032  Felt that convoy would either go between Macclesfield Bank and the Paracels or to the southeast of Macclesfield Bank. Not having regained contact by this time, ordered ANGLER to search for convoy to southeast of Macclesfield Bank until 1200 tomorrow and told him we would cover probable courses to northward. Did not order CREVALLES to take part in search as he would have just surfaced off Varella and would be well out of the picture.

July 14, 1944

: 1135  Could not regain contact. Ordered ANGLER to conduct patrol in vicinity of traffic focal point "DOG", and told him that we will conduct patrol in vicinity of Lati-tude 130°N, Longitude 114°E.
: 1200  Headed for new patrol station.

July 15, 1944

: 0800  Arrived on station. Commenced surface patrol at one engine speed.

— page 89 —
(B)  NARRATIVE (Cont'd).

July 16, 1944

0934  SD Radar Contact 30 miles.
0938  Lost contact at 33 miles.  Don't know whether this was plane or not.

July 17, 1944

0935  SD Contact 30 miles.
0940  Lost contact at 29 miles.  This may be a plane flying high but it looks strange.
1436  Submerged for trim.
1515  Surfaced.

July 18, 1944

The weather has become very rough and it is entirely overcast.  There is a strong wind from the southwest.  The visibility is poor.
2032  Asked CREVALLIE if she had had any success off Varella.
2052  CREVALLIE replied in the negative.
2315  Sent the boss a message expressing doubt as to whether traffic in near warranted the continued employment of three submarines.  It appears to me that we aren't having much luck and I feel that maybe there are better areas.

July 19, 1944

Weather still rough with high wind from southwest.  Sky still overcast with poor visibility.
1046  Sighted ship as it came out of poor visibility by bearing 0500T. range about 15,000 yards.  The Officer of the Dock (Ensign Hamlin) used very sound judgement and sounded the diving alarm immediately thereby preventing us from being sighted (Ship Contact No. 18).
1058  Identified contact as KUMA Class Cruiser escorted by one destroyer on his port bow.  Angle on bow of cruiser is zero.  Commenced approach.  Set torpedo depth 12 feet.
1103  Target zigged 30 degrees to right.  Headed in for bow shot.  Target making 185 RPM.
1106  Estimated him at 18 knots.
Target gave us about a seven degree port angle on the bow with us headed across his track.  Went ahead full and came right for stern shot.  His range now about 2,500 yards.  It is going to be close as to whether we get around and squared away in time.

— page 90 —
1110 COMMENCED firing stern tubes on track of about 120° port. Didn't mean to let him get this far by but we were too slow. Fired four torpedoes with about 1400 yard torpedo runs, about 300 left gyro angle, with estimated speed 17 knots. Spread by periscope. Was forced to "take her down" at this point as destroyer escort was on our port beam at about 500 yards with a zero angle on the bow. Don't think he saw us but he sure looks mean. Heard one torpedo hit followed about ten seconds later by another one. 1114 Destroyer started dropping depth charges, all pretty close. 1118 Destroyer dropped last of 15 depth charges in initial attack. Spent the next hour and twenty minutes trying to outguess the escort. He always appeared to be fairly close but apparently didn't have good contact as no further charges were dropped during this period. 1240 At periscope depth. Sighted cruiser dead in water bearing 2070T, range about 6,500 yards. Destroyer is patrolling up and down this side of him. Cruiser is down by the stern and has a good port list. He has considerable yellow smoke coming up aft and his mainmast has disappeared. Commenced approach for bow tube shot. 1318 It appears now that cruiser may have a slight bit of headway, so set him up for three knots. He could not possibly be making more speed as we have been making only four knots and have been closing him nicely with a 1200 port angle on the bow. 1326 Had intended to close in to about 1500 yards but at this point with range to cruiser of 3200 yards, and with destroyer headed for us at about 2,000 yards, decided to go ahead and fire. Fired for bow tubes spread by periscope with half a target length between torpedoes. With this set-up I didn't see how we could miss, but we did. Spread should have taken care of at least a 3 knot speed error. 1327 Went deep as destroyer continued to close rapidly. The sea was very rough by this time and it is possible that these torpedoes, set at ten feet, did not perform properly. 1335 Destroyer commenced dropping depth charges none of which were very close. 1345 Destroyer dropped last of thirteen depth

— page 91 —
1548
Periscope depth. Sighted cruiser bearing 1350T, range about 9,000 yards. Also saw destroyer in vicinity of cruiser. Cruiser is apparently still dead in water. Commenced another approach. It now became necessary to reload forward as we only had torpedoes left in tubes Nos. 1 and 2 and they had been flooded so long that I didn't trust them. Depth control was too uncertain at periscope depth due to rough seas, so was forced to run at 150 feet during reload. This was bad as I could not look. The reload was complicated by the fact that two of my four remaining torpedoes were lined up for tubes Nos. 1 and 2 which were already loaded. We were forced to move these torpedoes down to tubes Nos. 5 and 6 by chain fall. This process took an awful long time as we were trying to keep to a minimum of noise.

1608 From now until 1630 heard what appeared to be much gunfire in direction of cruiser. Also heard two heavy explosions that we could not identify.

1651 Sighted destroyer bearing 139°T. range about 7,000 yards. Cruiser not in sight. This is about the position cruiser was last sighted. Continued to close last known position of cruiser. Destroyer remained in this vicinity.

1744 Destroyer took departure on course about 245°T at high speed.

1756 Watched destroyer disappear bearing 253°T. on course about 245°W which would head him for Saigon. By this time we were in vicinity of last known position of cruiser. Sighted some floating debris including oil cans and drums. It is possible that cruiser might have sunk or that destroyer might have sunk him. Also realize that he may have gotten underway and that destroyer might have been left behind to worry us. With this in mind decided to conduct search for him after surfacing.

1907 Surfaced. Sent ANGLER a message and told him to search for cruiser in sector 240 - 270 from last known position. Also told him we would search to south of course 2400T. Also told CREVALLIE to assume cruiser headed for Saigon and to take course to intercept.

— page 92 —
0000
July 20, 1944
Heavy seas and still no sign of cruiser.
0046 Told ANGLER to take patrol station Latitude 120° - 38'N, Longitude 115° - 06'E. FLASHER headed for position Latitude 120° - 33'N - 115° - 25'E.
0914 Ordered ANGLER to patrol station Latitude 130° - 43'N, Longitude 115° - 43'E. Also told him we would take station 20 miles to east of him.
1037 Ordered CREVALE to take patrol station Latitude 130° - 51'N, Longitude 115° - 24'E. This puts CREVALE, ANGLER, and FLASHER on line of bearing 117°T. with 20 miles between boats. Patrol speed 10 knots with one hour legs.
1838 Moved search line 33 miles bearing 29°T. from present stations. Consider this gives better coverage for probable southbound convoys.

July 21, 1944
1108 Told ANGLER and CREVALE that FLASHER was taking new posit ion Latitude 12° - 36'N, Longitude 114° - 56'E. Ordered ANGLER and CREVALE to form line of bearing 325°T. interval 40 miles on above posit ion of FLASHER. Patrol speed ten knots, two hour legs. Headed for new position which covers Saigon - Manila, Saigon - Empire, and Singapore - Empire traffic routes.
1983 Received orders to change to an area north of Manila between Latitude 140° - 15'N and Latitude 160° - 30'N. Came to new course 040°T. and headed for new area. Sent message to ANGLER and CREVALE forming new search line with FLASHER in position Latitude 160° - 20'N, Longitude 119° - 16'E and with ANGLER and CREVALE at intervals of 20 miles bearing 270°T. from me. This puts FLASHER about 30 miles off beach and I believe will give good coverage for Manila traffic provided we can conduct surface patrol.

July 22, 1944
0931 Submerged for trim.
1014 Surfaced.
2315 Sent ANGLER message to cover coast in the vicinity of Latitude 160° - 26'N, Longitude

— page 93 —
119° - 54°E during daylight tomorrow.

July 23, 1944

2000 ANGLER reported nothing sighted along coast and that sea was returning to search line.

July 24, 1944

0746 SD Radar Contact 10 miles, closing. Submerged (Plane Contact No. 20).
0907 Surfaced.
1031 SD Radar Contact 9 miles, submerged (Plane Contact No. 21). It is entirely overcast and the visibility is very poor. Haven't had a good fix in a week.
1136 Surfaced.
1258 SD Radar Contact 7 miles. Submerged (Plane Contact No. 22).
1416 Surfaced.
1500 Sent ANGLER and CREVALLES message to form search line bearings 252°T. from me in posit Latitude 15° - 03.5'N, Longitude 117° - 11°E interval 11 miles. Also order submerged patrol during daylight tomorrow.
1840 Rendezvoused with ANGLER at Latitude 16° - 15'N, Longitude 116° - 49'E. and exchanged two SJ Radar vacuum tubes. After transfer proceeded to stations for tomorrow's patrol. SJ radar out of commission.

July 25, 1944

0555 Received contact report from ANGLER reporting 10 ship convoy on course about 310°T. Set course to intercept.
0700 Sighted smoke bearing 216°T. distance about 15 miles. (Ship Contact No. 19). Sent contact report to ANGLER and CREVALLES. Commenced tracking and commenced pulling ahead of convoy.
0722 ANGLER told us that base course of convoy was 335°T. speed 8. This checked with us except that convoy speed seemed a little faster.
0752 Received message that ANGLER was diving.
0755 Sighted Large flying boat bearing 060°T. distance 10 miles and headed toward us. (Plane Contact No. 23). Sent aircraft plain language contact report while diving. This put us in a bad spot about 20,000 yards off convoy track. Decided to head in on normal

— page 94 —
0841
Took look and sighted smoke and tops of snips. We are holding bearings pretty well and believe we can get in if battery holds out.
0857 Went to battle stations.
0915 Counted 14 large snips in convoy plus a large number of good escorts ranging from destroyers down to PC boats. At this time it looked as if we might get in for a shot on an end ship. Convoy was arranged in two columns of about five snips each with a third column of what appeared to be the most important snips in the center. The center column was seen to contain two or three large tankers and an escort carrier bringing up the rear. Could see a few planes on his deck but he had none in the air.
0926 Sighted escort close with small angle on bow. Went heading in. It seemed that every time I took a look from now on I had an escort close aboard.
0949 Decided I would have to take a look although one escort appeared close aboard bearing about 230° relative. Raised periscope just in time to watch escort pass over after torpedo room. While we were frantically getting periscope out of sight the after torpedo room reported fast screws passing over. This upset our plans as we felt we might have seen sighted. Has forced to go to 100 feet so we would have a little start on him if he started dropping them. At this point I couldn't tell anything from sound. There were screws and pinning in all directions.
0956 Made observation and found a destroyer about 400 yards away out with large angle on bow. Found that convoy had changed base course without our knowing it due to our high speed running to get in. He now found that the whole convoy had passed over us. Could have fired long range shot at this point with about 120 track out as we only had six torpedoes and as a fighter and CHV-111 still had not attacked, decided to wait and make another end around. Commenced tracking convoy submerged. His patrol plane is still with him. Course now about 010°T, speed about 10 knots.

— page 95 —
1156
Surfaced and commenced trailing.
1155
Visibility closed in and we lost sight of convoy. Decided it would be impossible to make end around in this weather. Decided to trail.
1156
CRIVILLI reported she was ahead and commenced attack. Our 3rd radar being back in operation, decided to close in slowly hoping to get radar contact.
1157
Heard two loud explosions followed by many more. Decided CRIVILLI was made attack and is getting worried over. Sound believes best bearing is now 330° relative. Can now hear loud pinging in this direction. Commenced closing at high speed as I believed convoy would now alter base course and felt we had to see them if we were to regain contact.
1158
Sighted smoke and masts of convoy bearing 031°T. distance about 14 miles. Changed course to head for them. Angle on bow about 150°.
1159
Sighted escort bearing 330°T. at range of about 14,000 yards with about zero angle on bow. Suberged. Don't think he sighted us as visibility was poor, but did not want to get sighted at this point. After diving found that there were two escorts apparently searching for CRIVILLI. Put our stern toward them and commenced opening out.
1160
Escorts no longer sighted but can still hear their pings. Surfaced.
1161
Sighted escort astern. Submerged to keep from being sighted. Continued opening out.
1162
It commenced raining very hard. Took advantage of reduced visibility and surfaced. Put on four engines and opened out from escorts. Sent our best dope to ANGLER.
1163
Decided we were well clear so changed course to head for convoy.
1164
Sighted escort bearing 290°T. He appears to also be joining convoy. The visibility was poor in our direction, so turned our tail toward him and soon lost him. Still trying to regain contact at four engine speed.
1165
Told ANGLER that CRIVILLI and escort were about 30 miles behind convoy. It appears that FLASHER will have to regain contact as ANGLER and CRIVILLI appear to be pretty well out of the picture.

— page 96 —
2048 was afraid we had lost contact for good, but at this point we picked up bearing 060° T. range 22,000 yards. Sent Contact report to CRUZAL and ANGLE and commenced tracking and working toward port bow of convoy. I felt that I had to wait to attack until one of the other boats got contact, especially in view of the fact that I only had six torpedoes. Sent contact report giving enemy course 020°T. speed of advance 11 knots. He seems to be making 12 knots through water. We are just fooling around, tracking and changing batteries. Sent contact report giving enemy course 005°T. speed of advance 11 knots.

July 26, 1944

0005 Sent another contact report.
0105 Sent another contact report giving enemy course as 030°T. speed of advance 11 knots.
0130 Convoy apparently stopped zigzagging. Visibility poor with many rain squalls.
0140 ANGLE reported contact. Sent message that we were commencing attack and started in. We are now 10,000 yards from leading ship in port column and about 4,000 yards off his track.
0201 It now seems that we will have to fire at about a 60° track and even so we will be close to two escorts.
0209 Changed course to 150°T. and headed in for 60° port track at 10 knots.
0211 With torpedo run about 3,000 yards, and with one escort on port bow at 2,500 yards and with one on starboard bow at 2,000 yards commenced firing forward. Fired three torpedoes at second ship in column and then shifted and fired three at third ship. Used 10 divergent spread. Went ahead flank and commenced turning left with full rudder. The range to the escort to starboard now is 1600 yards and he has about 20° starboard angle on bow. This puts us inside of him. Came to course 030° true, this being the convoy base course. We are now in good position to act as an additional escort, out feel that I cannot get out until we pull ahead a little. One minute and fifty eight seconds after firing first torpedo, observed and heard first hit just forward of center of first target. This was followed by a second hit well aft on first target. About 10 seconds later a torpedo was seen to hit the sc-

— page 97 —
0214
FLASER (SS249)

COND TARGET JUST AFT OF THE CENTER.
We were feeling pretty good as we had hit both our targets and especially as the range on the escort astern had opened to 1900 yards and we had as yet not been detected. At this point however, our feeling of security came to an abrupt end when the whole scene was lighted up as bright as daylight by the explosion of a tanker in the center column. One of our torpedoes which had missed the second target hit this large tanker about 1/2 miles away. The ocean was covered full of ships and we were in an uncomfortable position. We cleared the bridge immediately and started down. By the time we hit fifty feet we could hear shells landing all around where we had been. We felt that we must have been seen and went to three numbered feet turning at high speed, and expecting an immediate depth charge attack. Although many high speed scores passed over us, and although escorts were pinging in our vicinity for a long time, it appears that they still thought we were on the surface as they dropped no depth charges. We were giving out a tremendous cloud of smoke when we submerged, and I believe that they were firing at our smoke thinking that we were still on the surface. We took a southerly course to clear the vicinity in order to surface and trail. With much pinging and fast scores near in the vicinity of damaged ships, came to a scope depth. Periscope observation showed tanker bearing 0430T, range about 8,000 yards still burning brightly and low in the water. This appears to be very large tanker, but it is almost completely covered by flames. Two escorts were so far in the vicinity of the tanker but somewhat to the left of it. Continued to open out. Came to radar depth and picked up escort at 4500 yards, bearing 0490 true, range closing. Went back to periscope depth. Hard two distant explosions. Believe this is ANGER manning attack. Came to radar depth. Picked up escort at 6,000 yards astern. It is still pretty light from burning tanker but believe we can surface. Surfaced. Picked up two escorts astern at about 7,000 yards and also another contact

-21-

— page 98 —
10° to left of tanker at 15,000 yards. Kept opening out tracking other contact. Found him to be dead in the water.
0445 Tried to contact ANGLER and CRIVALE to give them dope on damaged ship, but they did not answer. Decided to remain in vicinity and dive at daybreak to close damaged ship and tanker to see what happened to the and in hopes of trailings. Submerged and headed for damaged ships with tanker still burning brightly.
0525 At periscope depth. Large damaged ship in sight, but tanker cannot be sighted, nor can any fire or smoke from it be seen. Feel sure it has sunk. Continued to close damaged ship. There are two escorts in the vicinity of this ship. He is dead in water and they are searching all around him.
0700 Our large, damaged freighter appeared to get up steam and get underway about this time. He stood off on northerly course at about five knots. Continued to close last position of tanker, but he was not to be found. | positive he sank.
0932 Commenced opening out to south.
1027 Heard two explosions followed by two more and then at intervals until 1050 by many more explosions.
1030 Saw high, wide cloud of smoke on last bearing of our target. Feel sure one of the other boats got mine.
1037 Sighted plane in vicinity of smoke on last bearing of freighter (Plane Contact No. 24). This freighter was a very large, four goal post type of about 8,500 tons. He had a good list and was well down by the stern. He was a MIKHAIL type of about 475 feet in length. He is identified as the Assoran Maru type. Our second target was seen quite plainly in the light of the burning tanker prior to diving. He was a medium looking vessel of the MIKHAIL type of about 500 feet length. He had a Raked bow and a cruiser stern. He is identified as the Hirokawa Maru type of 6,872 tons.
1227 Surfaced.
1232 Sighted plane bearing 3400T. distance 16 miles. (Plane Contact No.25). He closed to 12 miles then went out of sight. Decided to head for barn as ANGLER and CRIVALE are still down and we have no more torpedoes. Also feel it would be impossible to regain contact with convoy at this late time.
1915 ANGLER reported two hits on large mercantman.
1950 Told the other two what we had accomplished and also that we are needed for barn. Told Valker on CRIVALE to take charge of Wolf Pack.

— page 100 —
1333 Sighted float plane bearing 1500T. distance about 10 miles. Submerged (Plane Contact No. 28).
: 1432 Surfaced.

July 29, 1944

: 0711 3D Radar Contact 13 miles (Plane Contact No. 29). Submerged 15 miles north of passage between Laparan and Pearl Bank. Decided to run submerged for remainder of day.
: 1550 Completed transit of passage between Laparan Island and Pearl Bank.
: 1844 Surfaced. Headed for Sibutu Passage at 16 knots.
: 2300 Completed transit of Sibutu Passage. Slowed to two engine speed.

July 30, 1944

: 1021 Sighted plane bearing 190T. distance about 12 miles (Plane Contact No. 30). Submerged.
: 1116 Surfaced.
: 1340 Sighted small patrol boat bearing 230T. distance about 18,000 yards (Snip Contact No. 20). Avoided on surface.
: 1500 Entered Makassar Strait.

-24-

— page 101 —
1944

July 31, 1944

0457 SJ Radar Contact bearing 2350T. range 9,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 21). This appeared to be a patrol boat. We awaited on surface.

0547 Submerged about 12 miles off Cape Williams.

1715 Surfaced about 25 miles southwest of Cape Mandar. We have had a current of about two miles with us today.

2129 Signed three low flying planes approaching from about 0700T (plane Contact No. 31). Submerged. Moonlight very bright and good visibility.

2200 Surfaced. Continued at two engines speed.

August 1, 1944

0945 Signed Sekala Island bearing 2510T. distance about 12 miles.

1348 Slighted large flying boat bearing 1750T. distance about 18 miles (Plane Contact No. 32). Submerged about 30 miles north of Loomok Island. Will remain submerged the rest of the day.

1847 Surfaced.

2015 Commenced transit of Loomok Strait at three engines speed.

2109 Sighted small patrol boat bearing 1900T. range 9500 yards (Ship Contact No. 22). Avoided on surface and continued transit.

2220 Completed transit, heading for Fremantle, W.A.

August 2-6, 1944

Enroute Fremantle, W.A.

August 7, 1944

0745 Entered swept channel.

0820 Completed running magnetic range.

0900 Moored in Fremantle harbor, Fremantle, W.A.

— page 104 —
0211 (H)
Date: 26 July 1944
Patrol No. 3
Lat. 18°01' N
Long. 117°56' E

TARGET DATA - DANGER INFLICTED:

Description:
The convoy consisted of 14 large ships with about an equal number of escorts ranging from destroyers down to FC boats. The formation was in three columns with 5 merchantmen in each of the wings columns and two or three tankers plus an escort carrier in the center column. The second and third ships of the port column and the 1st tanker in the center column were torpedoed.

Ship's Sunk:
One large modern type 40 (E) of about 500 feet in length and 10,000 gross tons.

Ship's damaged or probably sunk:
(a) One large AK (EC) of the WFRK type similar in outline to the SOSAI NARU, ONI 206-J (REV), page 64, 3,612 gross tons.

(b) One AK (EC) of the WFRK type similar in outline to the WFRK type 73, 6,853 gross tons.

Damage determined by:
(a) Saw 40 ourst into flames and burn brilliantly for 3 hours with a large column of smoke after being hit with one torpedo. Submerged at dawn and closed the burning tanker only to find one of the damaged AK's and two escorts left in the vicinity.

(b) Saw and felt two torpedoes hit the SOSAI NARU Type AK. She was then dead in the water for about 4 hours with a good list and down by the stern. She finally got some way on and in company with two escorts headed slowly off to the northeast. Believe the CREW. LIE sank her later in the morning.

(c) Saw and felt one torpedo hit the WFRK NARU Type AK. This ship was not observed again after the attack.

-37-

— page 105 —
1. USS FLASH (SS249)
2. Torpedo Attack No. 4
3. Patrol No. 3
4. Time: 0211 (H)
5. Date: 26 July 1944
6. Target Draft: (1) 30' Course: 030° Speed: 12 Range: (1) 3000 YC
7. (2) 29' (2) 3000 " (3) 27' (3) 4000 "

Type Attack: Surface
Radar - T.B.T.

Tubes Fired: 3: 4: 5: 6: 1: 2
Track Angle: 70°P: 69°P: 67°P: 52°P: 51°P: 53°P
Gyro Angle: 34°S: 34°S: 35°S: 30°S: 30°S: 30°S
Depth Set: 8: 8: 8: 8: 8: 8
Power: HIGH: HIGH: HIGH: HIGH: HIGH: HIGH
Hit or Miss: HIT: HIT: HIT: HIT: MISS
Erratic: NO: NO: NO: NO: NO: NO
Mark Torpedo: 14-3A: 14-3A: 14-3A: 14-3A: 23: 23
Serial No.: 26555: 26733: 26097: 26493: 41655: 49288
MkR Explorer: 6: 6: 6: 6: 6: 6
Serial No.: 14354: 7545: 14343: 14357: 12642: 7952
Attuation Set: CONTACT: CONTACT: CONTACT: CONTACT: CONTACT: CONTACT
Attuation Actual: CONTACT

— page 107 —
1944, while trying to start the auxiliary engine it was found that the outboard exhaust valve would open only about once inch either in hand or power. It is believed that operating gear in the superstructure is jammed. Upon arrival in port a thorough investigation will be made of the topside operating gear.

(L) RADIO.

1. Reception.

(...) Radio reception on this patrol was normally good except during certain periods listed below:

1. Interference by an enemy station was first noticed on July 1, and was heard.

— page 108 —
1. RADIO.
'daily until about July 29. This inter-Terence began regularly about 1945 & and ceased about 2000 Z.

2. There was intermittent jamming by enemy stations each day on patrol station periscope during the times when numbers were being sent.

Best results in reception were obtained on 12.650 KOS at about 0800 Z. The only night frequency that could be copied was 9,250 KOS. 4,370 KOS could not be heard. On station. On July 22, we started using 4,150 KOS. as the daytime frequency. Reception became possible at about 2300 Z each day and was copied until about 0800 Z when intermittent reception and fading was encountered. The signal strength on this frequency was 5 until about 0740 Z. There was no evidence of jamming or interference.

(3) All serials were received during the patrol.

(4) The R/T circuit was used numerous times during the patrol. The frequency employed was 2850 KOS. Communications were established on one occasion as a distance of 180 miles. Another time a message was intercepted at 600 miles. Normal communications could be established in a few minutes, and it was not necessary to repeat. During the attack on July 25 and 26, atmospheric conditions made reception very difficult.

2. Transmissions.

| DATE | TIME | ST. | MSG | C. | UP | COMM | SEPT | NO. | TOT. | TOTAL |
|------|------|-----|-----|----|----|------|-------|------|-------||
| 30   | JUNE | 1640| 10940E | VIXO | VIXO | 8470 | 8470 | 031 | 69 | 15 Min. |
| 18   | July | 1532| 12037N | VIXO | VIXO | 8470 | 8470 | 160 | 48 | 16 Min. |
| 19   | July | 1158| 12042N | VIXO | VIXO | 12705 | 8470 | 200 | 55 | 21 Min. |
| 6    | July | 1457| 16900N | VIXO | VIXO | 8470 | 8470 | 170 | 77 | 12 Min. |

3. Casualties. There were no casualties.

— page 109 —
1. SJ-a Radar. Total hours operation this patrol - 685.

The performance of the SJ-a radar was normal although we felt that the ranges obtained were slightly less than those on previous patrols. The radar was out of commission for a period of 24 hours, the cause is discussed under casualties. Reliable ranges and bearings were obtained at 18,500 yards on a 5,000 ton M.R.U. and at 24,000 yards on an unidentified M.R.U.

2. Casualties.

On July 24th the transmitter broke down with a loss of pulsings. It was thought that the 5D21 modulator tune was defective as its plate glowed red and the tube had the appearance of being gaseous. Replacement of this tune from the spares and with a tube retained from the M.R.U. now the same results. It was then found that condenser coil in the transmitter unit was shorted. This was replaced from the spares and normal operation resulted.

High humidity conditions of prolonged silent running rendered the 6,000 volt supply in the PPI unit inoperative until a few minutes after surfacing. There was no damage involved, as T1 in that unit has its primary circuit fused to 1/2 amp. through the spare fuse clips supplied in the unit during the last refit. This proved its worth during the patrol.

B. Interference.

There was no interference encountered other than that caused by friendly submarines.

2. SD-4 Radar. Total hours operation this patrol - 502.

The performance of the SD radar was satisfactory. During the last refit the power supply circuit was altered so that the SJ-a M-G set could furnish power to the 4 transmitters receiver. A start-step switch was installed in the radio room to operate the SJ-a M-G supply lead from the SJ-a M-G was led to one side of a double pole-double throw switch also located in the radio room. The other side of

— page 112 —
(R)  NILES STANARD - FUEL USED.

Fremantle to Area 3140 mi. 38837 gals.
In Area 5658 mi. 45217 gals.
Area to Fremantle 3355 mi. 36190 gals.
12153 mi. 120,244 gals.

(5) DURATION.

Days enroute to Area 12
Days in Area 26
Days enroute to base 12
Days submerged 12
Days north of the barrier 37
Total days on Patrol 50

(T) FAVORITES OF ENTERPRISE REMARKS.

Torpedoes  Fusil  Provisions  Personnel factor

0  5,007 gals.  40 days  14 days

Limiting Factor this Patrol - Expenditure of Torpedoes.

(U) REMARKS.

In Wolf Pack operations, it is imperative that all submarines engaged make every effort to keep in contact with the enemy. On the night of July 25, the FLASH regained contact at about 2100 and was then forced to remain inactive for a period of almost five hours until at least one other submarine had contact. It is realized that enemy action may possibly prevent submarines from remaining in contact during daylight. However, when darkness comes all submarines should use maximum speed to close up. It is believed that even battery charging should remain in secondary until contact is regained. In this connection, it is pointed out that the auxiliary engine can be used to good advantage for charging while seeking to regain contact. After contact is regained, each Commander Officer is then free to take whatever time he considers absolutely necessary for charging his batteries before he attacks. During this time he can at least

-45-

— page 114 —
1. First Endorsement to U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249)
Report of Third War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Third War Patrol.

1. The Third War Patrol of FLASHER was conducted in the South China Sea Area and was of 50 days' duration. The area was aggressively covered and four successful torpedo attacks were carried out.

2. The first attack was made on the surface at night on two large ships of a 13 ship convoy under heavy escort to SHIGAPORE. One ship was seen to sink with three hits and the second disappeared about 10 minutes after receiving two hits.

3. The second attack off HON DOI resulted in the sinking of a medium AK escorted by a rather feeble AA.

4. The third attack in daylight submerged gave two hits on a KUHA class cruiser which stopped the cruiser, caused a heavy list and drag, started a fire, and completely unstepped the mainmast. In spite of counter attacks by the escorting destroyer, FLASHER was maneuvered to bring the bow tubes to bear and fired four torpedoes, unfortunately without result, before taking up evasive tactics to shore off the destroyer.

5. The last attack on a large convoy with air and surface escort was skillfully carried out over a period of 24 hours and resulted in the sinking of one A0, the probable sinking of one AK, and damage to a second AK.

6. FLASHER returned in excellent material condition and state of cleanliness, which reflects much credit on all hands. Refit will be accomplished in the normal period. The continued unsatisfactory performance of under-water lora is a source of embarrassment to submarines and will continue to be until some substitute is furnished or a better supply of replacement parts becomes available.

9 04090

— page 115 —
10 August 1944

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249)
Report of Third War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Third War Patrol.

7. The judgment of the Commanding Officer in the execution of his duties as Commander of the Coordinated Attack Group is considered excellent.

8. The Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew are congratulated for again having conducted an excellent and most aggressive patrol which resulted in inflicting severe and important damage on the enemy.

J.H. HADDEN,
Acting.

— page 116 —
0947
UNITED STATES NAVY
Serial: 0947
AUG 30 1944

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS FLASHER Contr. Lt.
A16-3/A9 Serial 015.
date 7 August, 1944.
Report of Third War
Patrol.

From:
To:
Via:
Subject:
U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Third War Patrol.

1. The Third War Patrol of the U.S.S. FLASHER was concerned with shipping wreckage in the South China Sea. Strong blows against Japanese VARELLA, and CAFE BOLINAO. A Light Cruiser of the KUMA Class was sunk North of DANGEROUS GROUND.

2. In her characteristically resolute and determined fashion FLASHER skillfully and aggressively attacked the enemy at every opportunity. The cordon of escorting surrounding two exceptionally well protected convoys was penetrated and hits obtained on all ships attacked. An excellent fire control organization is indicated.

3. The night surface attack on the SINGAPORE bound convoy is particularly noteworthy since it was conducted in water of about twenty-six fathoms sixty miles from the entrance to SINGAPORE STRAIT.

4. The decision of the Commanding Officer to delay his night attack on the convoy off CAPE BOLINAO until other boats were in contact, and the frequent contact reports enabled CREVALLES to locate the convoy and sink three large AKs just before dawn.

5. The Commanding Officer distinguished himself by his competent tactical command of the Coordinated Group consisting of FLASHER, CREVALLES and ANGLE. Seventy nine threshed six hundred tons of enemy merchant shipping and a Light Cruiser were sunk by this attack group.

6. The ASOSAN MARU which was damaged in attack No. 4, was sunk a few hours later by CREVALLES. The gross tonnage, 8,800 tons,

— page 117 —
0 9200.
FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12a/gr.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS FLASHER Conf. Ltr.
A16-3/A9 Serial 013,
dated 7 August, 1944.
Report of Third War
Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Third War Patrol - Comment on.

is being divided evenly between FLASHER and CREVALLES.

7. This patrol is designated as "successful" for purpose of award of Submarine Combat Insignia.

8. The Force Commander takes the greatest pleasure in heartily congratulating FLASHER Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew, on this outstanding patrol, in which the following heavy damage was inflicted on the enemy:

| Sunk | Sunk |
|------|------|
| 1-AR | (Similar HEIAN MARU-EU) - 10,000 Tons (Attack No. 1) |
| 1-AK | (Large - EU) - 7,500 Tons (Attack No. 1) |
| 1-AK | (Medium - EU) - 4,000 Tons (Attack No. 2) |
| 1-CL | (KUMIA Class - EC) - 5,100 Tons (Attack No. 3) |
| *1-AK | (ASOSAN MARU Class - EC) - 4,400 Tons (Attack No. 4) |
| 1-AO | (Large - EU) - 10,000 Tons (Attack No. 4) |
| 1-AK | (KIROKAWA Class - EC) - 6,900 Tons (Attack No. 4) |

TOTAL - 47,900 Tons

*Half credit shared with CREVALLES.

P. F. STRAUB, JR.,
Flag Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (3) (Direct) CTF-72 (2)
Vice Opnav (2) (Direct) GSS-12 (1)
Vice Opnav Cp-23c (1) GSS-16 (1)
Com1stFlt (1) GSS-18 (1)
Com2ndFlt (1) DivComsSubRon-12 (1)
Com3rdFlt (1) DivComsSubRon-16 (1)
Com7thFlt (2) DivComsSubRon-18 (1)
ComSubs1stFlt (30) S/M School N.L.Conn. (2)
ComSubs2ndFlt (4) SubAd, Mare Island (2)
CTF-71 (4) S/M's 7THFLT (1)

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

— page 118 —
9 04090
UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Al6-3(F-3/roj)
Serial: 095-47

23SEP 1944

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
USS FLASHER Conf. ltr.
Al6-3/A9, Serial013,
dated 7 August, 1944.
Report of Third War
Patrol.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Third
War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

2. Commander Seventh Fleet is deeply gratified
by the agressive character and masterly execution of
U.S.S. FLASHER's Third War Patrol.

3. The Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew
are congratulated for the accomplishment of an eminently
successful mission.

JIM JACOBS
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
ComSubs7thFl1
ComSubRon-12
CO, U.S.S. FLASHER

— page 120 —
35249).

(A) PROLOGUE.

Returned from Third War Patrol on August 7, 1944 and after running magnetic range, commenced refit in Fremantle, WA. Refit was completed on August 21, 1944 and regular underway training was commenced on August 22, 1944. The ship was sound tested and the starboard shaft was found to be noisy. The propeller on this shaft was changed and the trouble was remedied. The ship was tested for cavitation noises, curves were drawn up, and the ship was furnished with copies for use during evasive action. Training was completed on August 20th and final loading was completed on August 29th.

(B) INEVITABLE.

The following officers and chief petty officers are attached to this vessel on its Fourth War Patrol:

| NAME          | RANK OR RAILF   | PROVISION NUMBER |
||||
| A. T. MILLER     | LT. U. D. R.     | 9                |
| F. T. GLENNON     | Lieut.           | 6                |
| G. F. COFFIN      | Lieut.           | 7                |
| T. A. BURKE, JR. | Lieut.           | 2                |
| T. R. McCANTS, JR. | Lieut.           | 3                |
| F. B. HARRISON, JR. | Ens.           | 1                |
| J. G. HALLIN      | Ens.           | 2                |
| J. B. ATALISON, JR. | Ens.           | 0                |
| BAKER, ROERT A.   | CRL (AA) (T)    | 3                |
| BUCK, SPIVA L.    | CHOL (AA)        | 6                |
| CRAY, Harold S.   | CI (FA)          | 6                |
| CYPHER, Victor H. | CHL (FA)        | 6                |
| FRANCE, William J. | CTL (AA)        | 7                |
| STRAUSS, Francis O. | CRT (AA) (T)    | 3                |

August 30

1714 Underway for Fourth War Patrol.
2200 Took departure on northwest Island Light.
Proceedings to Exmouth Gulf.

August 31 - September 1

Enroute Exmouth Gulf conducting surface and submerged training.

— page 121 —
0913 MOORED port side to fuel darge in Exmouth Gulf. Took aboard 9,354 gallons fuel.
: 1422 Underway, leaving Exmouth Gulf and heading for Look Strait.
: 1522 Fired thirteen rounds of four inch at wreck off Vlaming head.

September 3 - 4

: Enroute London Strait, conducting surface and submerged training.

September 5

: 0549 Submerged 15 miles south of entrance to London Strait.
: 1045 Surfaced, still 15 miles south of entrance, naviing had a 2 knot current against us all day.
: 1948 Commenced transit of London Strait at four enine speed.
: 2200 Completed transit and slowed to two engine speed. No patrol in London this time. Sighted several sailboats during night.

September 6

: 0535 Submerged with SD radar contact 10 miles closing. (Plane Contact No. 1).
: 0955 Surfaced. Headed for lower end of Lakassar Strait at 2 engine speed.

September 7

: 0535 Soused about 12 miles off land, about midway between Cape Handar and Cape William, with the intention of running submerged today.
: 0908 He nave made no headway against a strong current, so surfaced 12 miles from land to try our luck on the surface.
: 0930 Sighted patrol plane bearing 130°T, distance 15 miles. (Plane Contact No. 2). Did not close so we did not dive.
: 0937 Sighted another patrol plane bearing 345°T, distance 10 miles and closing. (Plane Contact No. 3). Soused.
: 1230 Surfaced. Still about 12 miles from land.
: 1415 Cape William about to starboard. Sighted several sail boats during day.

— page 122 —
0545 Passed north latitude about to starboard at range of about 25 miles.
0951 SD radar contact, range 11 miles. (Flame Contact No. 4). Surfaced.
1052 Surfaced.
1129 SD radar contact, range 12 miles. (Flame Contact No. 5). Surfaced.
1236 Surfaced.

September 9

0330 Commenced transit of Subutu Passage at three en- line speeds.
0500 Transit completed.
0515 Surfaced about 10 miles north of Subutu Passage. Headed for passage between Laparan Island and Pearl Bank.
1038 Surfaced about 20 miles south of Pearl Bank.
2030 Completed transit of passage between Laparan Island and Pearl Bank. Headed toward south-west tip of Panay.

September 10

0816 Sighted plane at, about 10 miles distance. (Plane Contact No. 5). Submerged.
0939 Surfaced.
1316 Sighted three planes bearing 020°T., distance 20 miles. (Plane Contact No. 7). Did not dive as planes did not close. They were flying at about 14,000 feet and appeared to be headed for Davao.
1535 Decided to send today and tomorrow patrol-linq traffic lanes from Basilan Strait to West Coast of Panay. Submerged as we desired not to be detected.
1612 Surfaced. Headed for West Coast of Negros for radar fix as it is overcast.
2130 Obtained land fix and headed back for traffic lane.

September 11

0523 Submerged.
1314 Sighted three planes bearing 0490T., distance 10 miles. (Plane Contact No. 8). These planes were flying very low, out were in formation. Their course was about 180°.

-3-

— page 123 —
1639
sighted ship bearing 146°T., range 16,000 yards. (Ship Contact No. 1). Went to battle stations and commenced approach. Single on own about 25 port. It appears that we will get in easily. Do not understand lack of escorts or air coverage.
1650 Target identified as a large hospital ship of about 8,000 tons. Discontinued attack.
1630 Surfaced, headed north for deep water along west Coast of Panay.

September 12

0015 Signed lights of Hospital Ship bearing 358°T.
0055 SJ radar contact bearing 075°T., range 10,000 yards. Identified as friendly submarine. (Ship Contact No. 2). He had evidently investigated hospital ship also.
0232 Slowed to 2/3 to last hospital ship open out.
0510 Submerged 10 miles off Southwest tip of Panay.
1231 Sighted plane bearing 121°T., distance four miles. (Plane Contact No. 9). Plane appeared to be fighter and was headed north.
1331 Sighted two motorized bomber bearings 096°T., range 5 miles. (Plane Contact No. 10). This plane appeared to be circling over beach and at times would completely disappear. Close observation revealed that he was making landings on a strip behind the trees in the vicinity of San Jose. Watched him make a total of about five landings.
1555 Sighted formation of 12 medium bombers flying north over the Coast of Panay. (Plane Contact No. 11). They circled in the vicinity of San Jose and finally they all landed on our newly discovered landing strip.
1630 Surfaced. Headed for Mindoro Strait.

September 13

0333 Completed transit of Mindoro Strait. Headed out to sea. Thought we would try it on the surface today.
0625 SD radar contact 10 miles. Submerged 20 miles off Cape Calavite. (Plane Contact No. 12). Decided to remain submerged.
1842 Surfaced. Headed for area at two engine speed.

— page 124 —
1916 SJ radar contact bearing 2300T., range 11,500 yards. (Ship Contact No. 3). Identified as friendly submarine.
1930 Received message directing us to cover approaches to Manila, with reconnaissance our primary mission. Heard EADOC tell HANB to cover route from Manila north of Cabra Island. Decided that we should cover northern approaches to Manila, so took station about 15 miles from coast just off Subic Bay. Feel that we will sight from this point any task force entering Manila from north.
2030 Arrived in area off Manila, P.I.

September 14

0515 Submerged.
0659 Sighted patrol boat bearing 0140T., range about 10,000 yards. (Ship Contact No. 4). He was headed down coast and passed well clear.
0636 Sighted float plane bearing 0320T., distance about 15 miles. (Plane Contact No. 13). He passed out of sight on northwesterly course.
1144 Sighted two motored bomber bearing 1530T., range 15 miles. (Plane Contact No. 14). He was flying at about 1500 feet and passed within about four miles headed up the coast of Luzon.
1843 Surfaced. HANB is scheduled to leave station tonight and as the route north of Cabra Island is considered very important, decided to cover it instead of our present position. Headed for point 12 miles north of northern end of Cabra Island.
2230 Commenced patroling new station north of Cabra Island.

September 15

0512 Submerged.
1015 Sighted fighter plane bearing 2250T., range 6 miles. (Plane Contact No. 15). He was on an easterly course and disappeared in the clouds almost immediately.
1624 Surfaced.

September 16

0514 Submerged.
1627 Surfaced.

— page 125 —
0155
Submerged for patrol about 12 miles north of Cura Island.
: 1632
Surfaced.
: 2347
Decided to patrol across traffic lane bearing 2000, from Dorellor. Headed for this new position at 10 knots.

: 0906
Sighted mast of ship operating 2750T., range about 20,000 yards. (Ship Contact No. 5).
: 0913
Said sighted our fleet plane over ship. Had believed the mast might only be a patrol vessel until this time, but now feel sure it is a convoy.
: 0917
Went to battle stations. Knowing this convoy is headed for Manila, we can tell from his true bearing that we are about on his base course, so our problem is fairly simple. The sea is rough, so feel sure we will not be sighted by planes.
: 0926
Target identified at large number with four destroyer escorts. He appears to be a very new ship and looks very modern. He has two destroyers at a range of 1500 - 2000 yards, one escorting about 600 on each bow. The other two destroyers are well out at a range of 3000 - 4000 yards from him and possibly a little nearer on the bow. They are all joining and if their equipment is good, we will have trouble getting through. Sound conditions are excellent. He picked up screws on the convoy at about 14,000 yards by JT.
: 0929
Target sighted toward islands. We headed for him.
: 0938
Target sighted 300 to his left, giving us 200 starboard angle on bow at 6,000 yards.
: 0942
Range 4,350 yards. Target appears to be covered with people. Believe he is a loaded transport. He seems to have hundreds of people around his rails, possibly acting as periscope lookouts.

— page 126 —
0945 Coming right with full rudder at 2/3 speed, heading in for 900 track. Target has zig-zag away living us 700 starboard angle on bow. The near starboard escort is very close to us on our starboard bow. Probably as close as three hundred yards, but his angle on the bow is about 700 starboard. Had intended to fire six torpedoes, but cannot get number three true ready. (See note under Casualties).

0947-20 Still swinging right. Commenced firing forward with about 15' right gyro, about 900 starboard track, torpedoes run about 2750 yards. Fired torpedoes at about 6 second intervals. Spread torpedoes by periscope. First torpedo aimed just about 10T, second just forward 10T. Third about 1/2 mile. A ship's length ahead of bow, fourth half a mile. Length astern, and fifth at 10T. Nope to get at least three hits used target speed 11 knots. Due to nearness of escort and due to the fact that the plane was close aboard, decide to go deep. Headed for 300 feet turning left at standard speed.

0949 Heard first torpedo hit followed at 7 seconds intervals by two more hits and then after 15 seconds of the fourth hit.

0950 Near escort has passed astern, but now have outer screen coming in fast from dead ahead. Shifted rudder to full right to try to get off his track.

0953 He didn't manage it. He passed overhead, going down our side length, and dropped four beautiful mess. These charges were close and really shook the boat running many light buoys and chain cutter minor damage. He were at 325 feet at time and I believe they were above us. One needed avoiding at 2/3 speed with destroyers milling around and pinging all over the place. Headed out on westerly course.

1000 Explosion near. Not close. Near many sounds characteristic of ship sinking, bearing 100T, by sound. This would be in the correct direction.

1010-30 Heard another explosion. Destroyers are pinging astern but don't appear to be trying too to find us.

-7-

— page 129 —
0646 Sighted above plane which turned out to be flylike boat.
0711 SD contact at 20 miles. (Plane Contact No. 23).
0725 Lost contact at 24 miles. Plane not sighted.
1510 SD contact at 13 miles. (Plane Contact No. 24).
1520 Lost contact at 14 miles. Plane not sighted.
2000 In PO. reported sinking a tanker at 0400 and statea she mad lost contact with convoy. Commence ca conducting patrol off Cape Bolin-ao. Will patrol lo,000 yards off quiring the day.

September 23
0523 Submerged.
1635 surfaced.

September 24
0515 Submerged off Cape Bolinao.
1626 Suriaced.

September 25
0508 Submerged.
1009 Sighted plane bearing 264°T., distance 15 miles. (Plane Contact No. 25).
1021 Lost sight of plane.
1030 Sighted several very small coastal freighter neahed up coast very close to land. They varied in size from about 100 tons to about 500 tons. Did not attack. (Ship Contact No. 9). From 1030 to 1130 about 17 of these small vessels passed.
1030 Suriaced. Still conducting patrol off Bolinao.
2207 Ordered in PC: to patrol special area Charlie 52. Flashed to patrol Charlie 45. This covers traffic north and south to the west of scaroorouin Snoals. Flashed and LPO 20 miles apart.
2230 Commenced heading for new area at 14 knots.

September 26
0654 Sighted InPO bearings 2150T., range about 16000 yards. (ship Contact No. 10). InPO appears to be just about on station. He will pass her to get to our station.

— page 130 —
0900 Arrived on station. Commenced surface patrol at 10 knots, one hour legs.
1907 Submerged to waist out number four main ballast tank after converting it.
1927 Surfaced. Received message telling me to continue our activity to Area east of Isle. From now until October 9, 1944. As we just arrived here today, it would be a complete waste of many miles steaming and two days time if we left now. Decided to remain here until 1200 tomorrow. Directed LAFOR to move to Latitude 150 - 40N. Include 119 - 10E. at 1200 tomorrow. Told him we would patrol 30 miles to west of him.
2217 Made rendezvous with LAFOR so he could tune his ST transmitter. Found our SJ is not working too well, but it's the best we can do with the antenna mast as it is.
2300 Returned to station.

September 27

0532 Sighted two ships bearing 325T. These appeared to be two battleships with about 300 port angle on the bow. Put stern to them and went ahead on four engines trying to open out to make an end around. Was afraid we would be sighted in early morning light. (Ship Contact No. 11).
0540 Sighted smoke bearing 170T. This made it evident that we could not make and around on battleships. There was no time to encode a message to the LAFOR, so sent them a plain language message of sighting ships and submerged.
0555 Unable to sight battleships, but sighted smoke bearing 1690T. (Ship Contact No. 12).
0559 Believe we are well to the west of this convoy's track as his base course here should be about 0150T. Came to normal approach course and commenced closing track.
0628 Still closing track. Identified contact as 6 - 10 ship convoy arranged in two columns with several escorts, including at least two destroyers. Commenced making approach on passenger vessel which is leading ship of near column. He appears to be a medium AP of the NIM type. He has at least three passenger decks and an awful lot of superstructure.

-12-

— page 131 —
0646 One tanker appears to be in center of formation and two more tankers in far column. We cannot get to them.
: 0721 With angle on bow about 35° port and range about 350 yards, came left for fifty port track. Hoped to nola on long enough to swing left for larger track later, but port leading destroyer is on our starboard beam fairly close with about a 20° port angle on bow.
: 0723-30 Target range 3,000 yards. No change in course. Destroyer has now given us a zero angle on the bow, range 1000 - 1500 yards. Feel we must either fire now or probably lose all opportunity of doing so. Decide to fire only four torpedoes as other snips of column are about in line and at greater range.
: 0725-30 Continue ed firing forward. Target speed 7 knots, track 500 port, torpedo run about 2400 yards. Fired four torpedoes at seven second intervals spread 5 snips length between tracks. Spread by periscope.
: 0725-30 With destroyer on our starboard beam with zero angle on bow and range about 1,000 yards, decided to go deep. Thought of firing four stern tubes at him but did not have time to turn for down the throat shot. Went to 330 feet. One minute and thirty-seven seconds after firing, heard one mit. Forty-four seconds later heard another definite mit. The first hit checked well for the third torpedo which was spread well forward, and later events indicated that our speed estimate was low. The second mit does not check in time for a hit on the transport as time between hits was 44 seconds and firing time was only 22 seconds. There was another ship astern of our target however, and at somewhat greater range, but with a small angle on the bow. The time for the second hit checks well for a hit by the first or second torpedo on this target or on a target in the far column. The torpedo was tracking this convoy on the surface, later reported seeing one ship explode and also said that she saw a flash with white smoke another ship.
: 0723 The first of 15 fairly close depth charges went off.

— page 132 —
0729-25 T.ree. fairly close. charges.
0734. Commenced hearing very loud. creaking up noises in. direction of. first target. These noises were heard throughout the ship and were the loudest the. commanding officer has heard in ten war patrols.
0739. Seven more depth charges, not close. avoiding to. southeast.
0806. Commenced coming up slowly as escorts seem to. be not too close.
0844. Periscope observation shows two escorts bearing 0340T., range about 8,000 yards. These fellows appear to be looking for survivors. headed away from them to get clear and surface.
0943. Escorts apparently have picked up all. hands as they commenced dropping single depth charges, apparently to keep us down. They dropped about 10 between now and the time we surfaced at 1102.
1042. Lost sight of escorts. Still hear their pinings.
1101. Heard distant depth charges.
1102. Surfaced. Hands of two escorts still in sight by periscope on surface. Opened out at full speed.
1130. Lost contact with escorts. Commenced searching for convoy on original base. Course as we have no idea which way they went. making 10 knots on four engines.
1544. We should be ahead of convoy now, but have not sighted them. Headed over toward Lingayen Gulf to intercept them if they changed course that way. Also feel they may head in and anchor over-night.
1610. Received message from LPO indicating convoy headed for beacon at 1200 today. We changed course to head for entrance to Lingayen Gulf in the hope of intercepting them. LPO reports sinking large tanker and large freighter.
2340. Sighted low flying aircraft crossing bow from starboard to port. (Plane Contact No. 26). Manned SD and found him to be 6 miles away.
2343. Lost contact at 8 miles.

September 28

0023. We are now 10 miles off Cape Bolinao and still no convoy. Changed course to 2500T. to head out on their probable course.

— page 133 —
15-15

---

### Submarine Patrol Report

**USS LAURETUS (Cont'd).**

**0145** Got message from L.P.O. saying she had been forced down by plane - probably the one we saw. Sighted lights of properly marked hospital ship bearing 275°T. and on northerly course. (Snip Contact No. 13). Let him go.

**0408** It appears that we have lost convoy for good. Headed for new patrol station about 60 miles off Coast. L.P.O. is 30 miles to east of us and thirty miles off coast.

**0523** Sighted small patrol vessel bearing 260°T., range about 22,000 yards. (Ship Contact No. 14). Avoided.

**0635** SD radar contact 11 miles. (Plane Contact No. 27).

**0637** Sighted float plane. Submerged with plane at 9 miles. He didn't sight us.

**0651** Sighted above plane by periscope and watched him go out of sight to the westward.

**0802** Surfaced.

**0939** Sighted smoke bearing 064°T. Headed to close smoke. (ship Contact No. 15). Could not contact L.P.O.

**0957** Sighted mast bearings 063°T. Commenced tracking.

**1035** Found target to be headed on base course toward us at speed of 13 knots. Submerged and commenced approach.

**1040** Hear pinging from only one snip.

**1106** Identified target as AS vessel. Continued approach.

**1124** Target came in to 10,000 yards and then gave us a 90° port angle on bow. He was a CHIDORI. CHIDORI headed north. Could never close nearer than 10,000 yards.

**1155** Lost sight of target. Can still see smoke. He looks like he might be burning coal from the way he smokes. Decided to stay down and work torpedoes.

**1441** Still hear pinging of CHIDORI. He appears to be searching area very thoroughly.

**1645** Lost pinging. Finished working torpedoes.

**1718** Surfaced.

**1820** Ordered L.P.O. and FLASHER to move north forty miles due to air and patrol activity this area.

---

**September 29**

**1619** SD contact 9 miles. Submerged. (Plane Contact No. 28).

**1720** Surfaced.

— page 136 —
052
Avoided. (Ship Contact No. 16).
Submerged about 10 miles off coast, just north of Palaui Point.
0532 Heard pinging baring about 036°T.
0540 Sighted CHIDRI type torpedo boat bearing 040°T, range about 12,000 yards. (Ship Contact No. 17).
0600 Sighted smoke bearing 036°T. (Ship Contact No. 16). This appears to be a convoy coming out of Santa Cruz harbor.
0611 Sighted two planes bearing 022°T., distance about 12 miles. (Plane Contact No. 31). They appeared to be screaming above convoy.
0615 Convoy appears to be heading north. Guess we are out of luck.
0645 More ships are standing out of Santa Cruz Harbor.
0701 This convoy is headed our way. (Ship Contact No. 19). Battle stations.
0713 Convoy appears to be composed of about 6 - 10 ships in two columns of 4 - 5 ships each. There are many escorts and they have two planes above them. The sea is absolutely smooth. Not even a ripple on it. This will probably be fun. Commenced going to 60 feet between looks.
0730 Range now about 6,000 yards. We appear to be about on base course.
0745 Make ready all tubes. Ranges now 4500 yards. It appears that we may be able to fire three torpedoes each at two leading ships in starboard column. Angle on bow of leading ship in this column now about 400 starboard.
0748 Range now 3000 yards, angle on bow about 450 starboard. Three escorts are on starboard. Beam of convoy. We are dead ahead of them. Planes close aboard above convoy.
0750 Track now about 600 starboard, torpedo run 2200 yards. Commenced firing forward as I was afraid we would be sighted if we waited any longer. Fired three torpedoes at leading ship with 20 divergent spread, and then fired three at second ship. Started deep immediately after firing as both planes were fairly close and our position should be well marked in this water. Heard one torpedo hit on

-18-

— page 137 —
1. First target one minute and thirty-five seconds after firing followed by two hits on second target at correct intervals.
2. Escorts started dropping depth charges, some fairly close and some far away. From now until 0615 about 35 depth charges were dropped. The ocean appears full of escorts and they are all pinning. Believe they are getting in each others' way.
3. Sound reported definite sinking noises in the direction of target. These were also heard by the commanding officer and are believed to have been from the second target.
4. Escorts now appear to be interested in something in the general direction of the attack. There is much pinings but none very close. Started up for look.
5. Made serious observation. Saw damaged ship with his bow well up in the air bearing 1230T., range about 5,000 yards. One other unidentified ship and a CHUDRI are standing by him.
6. Damaged ship sank with a loud explosion and with a cloud of white smoke above him. This is believed to have been the first target. Two float planes are searching the area.
7. The unidentified ship appears to be lying to and looks as if he may be down by the stern. He may be damaged. Commenced closing him at 2/3 speed to polish him off.
8. Two power boats flying the Japanese merchant flag are in the vicinity of the sinking ship. As we get closer there seems to be some doubt as to whether this so called damaged ship is even a merchant ship. He has a gun forward and looks now like a hybrid escort. He also appears to be pinning.
9. All doubt was cleared up when our damaged ship suddenly whirled around to port and dropped four depth charges. Commenced clearing area to seaward as only two escort vessels and two planes remain in this vicinity.

-19-

— page 138 —
1053 WATCHED two more CHIDORI torpedo boats join the search group. These seem to smoke very heavily.
1145 Escorts and planes still in sight searching, but they seem to think we went north. At least they haven't searched in our direction yet.
1305 Lost sight of escorts and plane. Still hear pinging.
1341 Sighted plane again, but he is far away. No longer near pinging.
1622 Surfaced. Will remain out from coast tonight and head in tomorrow morning to be in close for daylight patrol.

October 5

Decided to patrol tomorrow just south of Her-mana mayor in order to intercept any traffic coming out of Santa Cruz harbor.
0512 Submerged. Thought we were about 10 miles west of Hermana mayor out later found we were about five miles further south.
0513 Heard pinging, hearing 030T.
0541 Sighted CHIDORI bearing 0840T., range about 12,000 yards. (Snip Contact No. 20).
0550 Sighted smoke bearing 030T., range about 25,000 yards. Appears to be convoy coming out of Santa Cruz. (Snip Contact No. 21). He will be in excellent position for attack if they head south.
0600 CHIDORI headed for us and closed in to 4,000 yards before turning south.
0615 Convoy headed north after coming out. He will be unable to attack, but LT.POL. and BOMFISH should be in good position.
0630 CHIDORI disappeared on bearing 1350T.
0642 Sighted 2 float planes bearing 080T., distance about 4 miles, on opposite course. (Plane Contact No. 32). One appears headed north toward convoy. The other is searching this area.
0700 Sighted masts of 5 ships bearing 0440T., range about 15,000 yards. Angle on bow 300 starboard. (Snip Contact No. 22). Commenced closing only to find that they are small engines-aft coastal type vessels not worth torpedoes.

— page 140 —
0557 Sighted bomber in direction of convoy. Flare contact No. 47. This was the first of seven planes sighted covering this convoy. There were five medium bombers and two float planes. The float planes seemed to fly fairly high while the bombers usually were within 100 - 200 feet of the water. As it was very smooth, this forces us to be very careful and go deep between observations.

: 0530 Range now 12,000 yards, angle on bow 20° starboard. We seem to be pretty well ahead of convoy now. - numerous planes are making it difficult though, and on this observation large doubles were noted coming up from forward. There is no time to check for origin of these doubles. Decided they were probably from bow buoyancy so closed bow buoyancy vent. We have only stern tubes so will attempt to get directly ahead and keep stern pointed at convoy during latter stages of approach.

: 0703 With planes all around made observation and found that convoy had given us a 25° port angle on bow. As stern is pointed toward them and as torpedo run is only about 1700 yards felt this was a favorable opportunity. This was further indicated as several of the targets were overlapping. We hadn't been sighted now and it seemed probable that we would be at any time, so decided to fire.

: 0704 Commenced firing stern tubes with 300 port track, torpedo run about 1700 yards. Used one degree divergent spread. Started deep after firing as planes were all around. Expected to get at least one hit but were disappointed as all torpedoes missed. Delivered they saw traces and avoided.

: 0710 Served and pinning from escorts all around but not a single bomb or depth charge. Don't understand it, but guess they decided to let us alone as we hadn't damaged them.

: 0606 Periscope observation showed convoy well past in the distance and many planes still screaming our vicinity.

— page 141 —
1117 Have sighted planes on every periscope
    observation.
1400 Plans no longer in sight. Feel that
    undue concern over planes caused us to
    miss this convoy. Had we held fire for
    a few minutes we could probably have gotten
    into firing position from which we could
    readily be missed. The commanding officer
    had felt from the beginning of the approach
    that he would probably be sighted, and he
    was so relieved to get into what he con-
    sidered to be an acceptable firing position
    1623 surfaced.
1900 Still cannot contact BONFISH so sent a
    message to the Boss telling him so. Feel
    that when my message comes back on the
    Schedule BONFISH will contact us.
2330 Got message from BONFISH saying that she
    had failed in attack on fifth and that she
    also chased another hospital ship. LAFOR
    suggested moving out a couple of days to
    let area cool off, so ordered pack to move
    out to former station off coast.

October 7
. . .
Moving out to station off coast.
0700 Arrived on station.

October 8
Patroling station as before.
1050 Sighted overturned life boat. Deoris in
    this area indicates that some ship has been
    sunk near here.
1900 Wolf Pack have been ordered to maintain in-
    shore patrol as before, commencing tomorrow
    morning. Headed for station off Palaui
    Point.

October 9
0504 Submerged off Palaui Point.
0537 Sighted mast and smoke bearing 2450T. Com-
    menced closing at high speed. (Snip Con-
    tact no. 24).
0811 Identified contact as two very small coast-
    al freighter not worth torpedoes.

— page 143 —
3503
With ships in sight by eye was forced to dive to prevent being sighted. Sounded and went to 6 feet making high speed submerged. Closing as rapidly as possible, but it looks hopeless.
0520 Made observation. Convoy consists of eight ships with three escorts. The sea is very calm. Targets nearing 350T, range 11,000 yards. Angle on bow now 650 starboard. Continued to sighted closing at high speed.
0600 We are getting very close to shallow water. Naviator says we have about two miles before we are due to run aground.
0610 Range now 6,000 yards. Angle on bow about 900 starboard. Three of the ships are overlapping. If we had more than 2,000 feet, we would fire low power shot. As it is, we have three 1,000 ton ships. Sighted two float planes over convoy. (Plane Contact No. 52).
0622 Convoy zigged away. Continued to close 100-1000 yards.
0635 We have traveled more than 100 miles southward. We should have already run aground on a fair fathom bank. Reversed course to 2000 and decided to give up. They are already in shallow water. We don't even have a contact of main. An end around due to the water.
1205 Surfaced and made for southern end of area.
1800 Departed area.
2055 S1 contact with friendly submarine bearing 3490T, range 5,500 yards. (Ship Contact No. 26).
2100. Lost contact.
2300 Sounded transit of 4000 last pass.

October 12

0249 Passed soundings. Island about 20 port, distance 0,250 yards.
0253 S1 contact bearing 165T, range 16,250 yards. Commenced tracking. (Ship Contact No. 29).
0320 Targets are on close course about 2300T, speed 6 knots. There are about 3 ships in convoy. This course takes targets into shallow water north of Cuyo Islands. ...cannot make end around without running through much shallow water with many banks of from 3 - 10 fathoms. Do not consider it.

-25-

— page 145 —
1420 Submerged with plane at 9 miles.
1448 Surfaced.
1455 Sighted friendly submarine bearing 1940T. (Ship Contact No. 31).
1505 Exchanged calls with RADM. Also told him about patrol boat to northward.

October 12

0033 Passed through narrows south of Cape William. Sighted several sailboats during day.
1436 Sighted friendly submarine bearing 1000T., range about 10,000 yards. (Ship Contact No. 34).
2100 Commenced transit of Londo Strait.
2120 30 radar contact bearing 1970T., range 6,500 yards. (Ship Contact No. 33). Identified as small patrol boat and avoided.
2300 Completed transit of Londo Strait.

October 16

0554 Sighted submarine bearing 0990T., range about 15,000 yards. Later identified as RADM. (Ship Contact No. 34). She is also needed south.

October 17 - 19

Maroute Fremantle, WA.

October 20

0630 Moored in Fremantle Harbor.

— page 147 —
1944
Torpedo Attack No. 1
Patrol No. 4
Date: 18 September, 1944
Lat. 34.11.5'N.
Long. 120.02 E.

Description:
One very modern, new looking ship, believed to be an .K used as Transport as it was very crowded with People topside. This ship is estimated to be a seven to eight thousand ton vessel with composite superstructure, M(K)F(K)M, flush deck, cruiser stern, and raked bow. It appeared to be diesel propelled. His escorts were four destroyers and one float plane. Two of the destroyers were at 1500 - 2000 yards, one bearing 600 on each bow of the target, the other two were well out at 3000 - 4000 yards and a little sharper on the bow. Visibility conditions during the attack were excellent.

Ships Sunk:
One Large .K (EU).

Ships damaged or probably sunk:
None.

Damage determined by:
Four timed hits identified as 1, 2, 3, and 5 torpedo explosions. Characteristic breaking up noises were heard fourteen minutes after firing. Upon return to periscope depth the target was not visible and the actions of the escorts indicated that they were recovering survivors (aided by float plane as spotter).

Target Draft:
22'
Course: 048°T.
Speed: 11
Range: 2500

OWN SHIP D.T.T.:

Speed: 2.7
Course: 305 to 322
Depth: 65'
Angle: 1°D.

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO D.T.T.:

Type .ttack:
Submerged Periscope. The target was picked up at long range through the periscope. .900 track was intended but, due to a zig away, the actual track was 100° S. Fired five torpedoes with a divergent spread by periscope.

— page 148 —
0724 H
Date: 27 September 1944.
TARGET D.T.: D.M.GE INFLICTED:

Description:
Convoy consisted of eight to ten ships arranged in two columns with a number of escorts (at least two of which were destroyers). The target selected for this attack was the leading ship of the near column: a medium-sized type, having an exceptionally lot of superstructure with at least three passenger decks. ...snip in the center of the formation was identified as a tanker, and there appeared to be two tankers in the far column. The visibility was good; the sea, smooth with slight swells.

Ship's Sunk: One Medium (FIU).

Snip's damaged or probably sunk: One M.RU (UN).

Damage determined by: Two timed hits, the first at one minute and thirty-seven seconds after firing and the second, forty-four seconds later. The first checks for a hit on the target by the third torpedo which was spread well forward, later events indicated that speed estimate was low. The time of the second explosion checks well for a hit by the first or second torpedo either on an unknown M.RU, observed on firing to be astern of the target and at somewhat greater range, or on a ship in the far column. Characteristic breaking up noises were heard throughout the ship ten minutes after firing. The L.PON later reported that she observed one ship explode and saw a flash and white smoke from another ship. The times of her observations check closely with those of the explosions heard by this ship.

Target Draft: 20' Course: 338° Speed: 7.0 Range: 2400

OWN SHIP D.T.:

Speed: 3.1 Course: 110° Depth: 64' Angle: 10°.

FIRE CONTROL (UND TORPEDO D.T.):

Type .ttack: Submerged Periscope. Convoy was picked up by smoke on horizon just prior to diving. ...accepted a 500 track because of the closeness of a DD escort with a zero angle on the bow. Fired four torpedoes, divergent spread by periscope with one half ships length between torpedoes.

-48-

— page 149 —
20' Course: 150° Speed: 8.5 Range: 2400

OWN SHIP DATA:

Speed: 3.2 Course: 050° Depth: 65° Angle: 1/2°D.

FIRST CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA:

Type attack: Submerged Periscope. Convoy was picked up by ping-ing heard on sound while patrolling submerged. Made approach running at 60 feet between observations because of smooth sea. Six torpedoes were fired at two targets, three at each. Torpedoes were spread by off-set using a 20 divergent spread.

-50-

— page 150 —
1944
Date: 6 October 1944.
Lat. 15°31'N.
Long. 119°46'E.

Description:
Large convoy formed in two columns with seven or eight escorts. There were seven planes (five medium bombers and two float planes) flying air coverage. The sea was very smooth. The target was a medium in the starboard column. One large P was observed in the lead of the port column but could not be closed for attack. The ships were so spread that several in the starboard column were overlapping at the time of firing.

Ship's Sunk: none.

Ship's damaged or probably sunk: none.

Damage determined by: -

Target Draft: 22' Course: 210° Speed: 9 Range: 2000

Ship's Draft: -

Speed: 3.0 Course: 205° Depth: 64' Angle: 1/2°D.

Type Attack:
Submerged Periscope. Due to heavy air coverage and very smooth sea, observations were short. Ran at 60 feet between observations. A small track was accepted and four torpedoes fired from the stern tubes. Torpedoes were spread by off-set using 10 divergent spread.

-52-

— page 157 —
0) DENSITY LAYERS.

| Date | Time | Depth | Depth at | Temperature |
|------|------|-------|||
|      | GOT  | Posit | (Fus.)  | Gradient    |
|      |      |       |           | Started (Ft.)|
|      |      |       |           | in Degrees F. |
| 9/16/44 | 0140 | 14014'  | 1090     | 200         |
|      |      |       |           | 4.0 deg.   |
| 9/26/44 | 2340 | 15041'  | 2265     | 210         |
|      |      |       |           | 7.0 deg.   |
| 10/4/44 | 0030 | 15025'  | 150      | 60          |
|      |      |       |           | 3.7 deg.   |
| 10/5/44 | 2330 | 15032'  | 1300     | 100         |
|      |      |       |           | 3.9 deg.   |

(F) INCLIT, FOOD, AND INSULIT.

The health of the crew was excellent in spite of spending much of the patrol submerged. Only the usual minor ailments were experienced and they were treated by the pharmacist's mate with little difficulty.

The cooks and baker did a splendid job. They were handicapped by mediocre quality of meat, but the variety showed a vast improvement over that furnished for previous patrols.

In spite of much time spent submerged, the habit of ability was excellent. Pleasant weather encountered during the patrol helped improve living conditions.

(G) PERSONNEL.

The performance of all personnel, both officers and enlisted men, was again gratifying.

(a) Number of men on board during patrol - 76
(b) Number of men qualified at start of patrol - 47
(c) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - 50
(d) Number of men advanced in rating during patrol - 7

(R) MISS STRAIGHT - FULL USED.

Base to area | 1850 miles | 19,684 gals.
In area | 8075 miles | 75,910 gals.
Area to base | 1510 miles | 25,912 gals.

— page 158 —
5 4,374 gal. 40 days 14 days.
Limiting factor of this patrol: provisions or operations order.

(U) RIDDLE AND DREAD OUTFLOW.
NO comments.

(V) 1S... 1S...:
(a) No minesweeping activities observed.
(b) Dive - aerial traffic under the west coast of Luzon.
(c) During the past two patrols torpedoes has been excellent. This is evident at partially to the east and at the 10:00 hour. The 10:00 hour is in routine practice and details to the 10:00 hour.

— page 159 —
1. The Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
       (2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of War Patrol Number 4.

1. During this patrol the commanding officer acted as group commander of a coordinated search and attack group comprising FLASHER and LAPON from 20 September 1944 until 11 October 1944 with BONEFISH joining the group on 30 September.

2. The patrol area, west of Manila was at all times under heavy air coverage (57 plane contacts), surface patrols were active, all convoys heavily escorted, and sea conditions glassy smooth. FLASHER overcame these obstacles in characteristic fashion. All four attacks were submerged attacks indicating excellent use of periscope. All torpedoes were Mark 14A or Mark 23.

3. Attack No. 1 on 18 September was made against a large single ship, probably being used as a transport, escorted by four destroyers. Five torpedoes were fired from good position, range 2750 yards, small gyro angles, torpedoes spread by periscope. The destroyers prevented staying up to witness results but two timed hits were made. All indications are that the ship was sunk.

Attack No. 2 on 27 September was made on a convoy encountered in early morning while attempting to make an end around on two battleships previously encountered on the surface. Contact with the battleships was lost and attack conducted against a medium transport and an over-lapping AK in the convoy. Four torpedoes were fired. Escorts again prevented witnessing results but two timed hits were heard, one in each ship, and LAPON observed one ship explode and another hit. Firing range 2400, torpedoes spread by periscope, 50° track, small gyro angles.

Attack No. 3 on 4 October was made on a convoy standing out of Santa Cruz Harbor, Luzon, sighted early in the morning just after diving. Three torpedoes were fired at the leading ship and three at the second ship in column, both ships being medium AKIs. One timed hit in the first ship, two in the second. Again FLASHER was forced deep without being able to see the results. On this, as on the first two attacks, the

— page 160 —
05-13/416-3
SUBMARINE SQUADRON EIGHTEEN
Caro of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California,
23 October 1944

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of "Air Patrol Number 4."

Oscars made depth charge attacks. One minute after return to periscope depth, FLASHER saw one crippled ship blow up and sink. Spread was accomplished by offset, small gyro angles, range 2400 yards.

Attack No. 4 on 6 October was made on a large convoy with seven or eight surface escorts and seven plane escorts. A medium AK was target; four torpedoes fired on a 33° track from range of 2000 yards. A spread was used which should have ensured coverage of 600 feet at that range, but all torpedoes missed. The sharp track necessitated by proximity of escort, or possible evasive action by target probably account for those misses.

The F1 ASHER returned from patrol in good material condition. She will be given a normal refit by EURYLIE and OKE EIGHTY-TWO - 2 relief crew. The state of cleanliness was excellent. Proper inspection procedure during refit should prevent recurrence of crankcase explosion experienced on 9 September. All mufflers, tail pipes and cleaves will be renovated. The present auxiliary compass is not designed for continuous operation and if it is to stand up it must be used only when necessary. The hydrogen detector should be removed but as replacement is not available, it will be repaired. A dam will be installed in the forward torpedo room to prevent bilge water grounding out the sound training motors. All other material defects will be corrected during refit.

The commanding officer's recommendation that two copies of CSP 1247 be issued each submarine is concurred in.

On this fourth patrol the commanding officer displayed the same sound judgment, aggressiveness and careful planning which have character- ized his previous patrols. He, his officers and crew are to be congratulated on another fine patrol. The high state of training and morale are reflected in the heavy damage inflicted on the enemy.

ELIOT H. BRYANT

— page 161 —
7 November 1944.
11 04060

---

**FLASHER Conf. Ltr.**
Al - 3/A9 Serial 021, dated 20 October 1944. Report of Fourth War Patrol.

---

**FLASHER's Fourth War Patrol was conducted in the SOUTH CHINA SEA off the West Coast of LUZON. The Commanding Officer, Commander R. T. WHITAKER, U.S.N., was the Group Commander of a Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of FLASHER, LAPON, and BONEFISH. His able direction of this Group left nothing to be desired.**

---

**FLASHER turned in her usual fine performance in spite of the fact that air and surface anti-submarine opposition was much stronger than that usually encountered. Smooth sea conditions increased the hazards on all attacks, but did not prevent this experienced and capable Commanding Officer from reaching good attack positions and sinking ships.**

---

**It is regretted that lifeguard duties prevented FLASHER from joining in a coordinated attack on a convoy reported by LAPON, particularly since there was no call for services during the two days spent in performing this special assignment.**

---

**Submarines departing on patrol are being given two copies of CSP 1247.**

---

**The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is honored for this patrol.**

---

**The Force Commander takes pleasure in congratulating FLASHER's Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew on another fine patrol, and notes with pride that in four consecutive successful patrols this outstanding submarine has sunk seventeen cargo ships and one Light Cruiser for 109,900 tons, and damaged two cargo ships for 11,500 tons. FLASHER is credited with inflicting the following heavy damage on the enemy in a well planned and splendidly executed patrol:**

---

**EXTRA: ORIGINAL**
SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB. OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 163 —
24 NOV 1944
To: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Fourth War Patrol - Comment on.

1. Forwarded.
2. The Commander Seventh Fleet congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew of the U.S.S. FLASHER for the completion of a highly successful patrol during which 25,000 tons of shipping was destroyed and 4,000 tons damaged.

J.H. LONG
By direction.

— page 164 —
U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249), Care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California, 2 January, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. FLASHER. The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Via: Official Channels.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249), Report of War Patrol Number 5.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the fifth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the Saratov Bay Area of the South China Sea during the period 15 November, 1944 to 2 January, 1945 is forwarded herewith.

G. W. GRIDER.

— page 165 —
1944, from Fourth War Patrol on 20 October, conducted by HURVALE and Division 182 relief crew. The following major items of work were accomplished during reit: New electronic equipment installed as follows: I.F.F., V.H.F., A.F.R., Loran. Two main engines were overhauled. Two new propellers installed to eliminate "sinking shafts". The upper pintle bearing on the r.d.der was found to have excessive clearance but no corrective action was taken at this time.

On 31 October, 1944 the Commanding Officer, Commander G. W. GRIDD, U.S.N., was relieved by Commander Refit was completed on 3 November. Underway training began on 5 November and consisted of six day's training underway with one convoy exercise and the firing of two exercises torpedoes. Training was completed on 12 November and final loading, on 13 November.

(NARRATIVE)

The following officers and chief petty officers are attached to this ship on her fifth war patrol:

| NAME | RANK | PRIVICUS NUMBER |
|------|------||
| G. W. GRIDD | RATN | 7 |
| F. T. GLIM.CN | LIEUT. | 7 |
| G. F. GOFFIN | LIEUT. | 7 |
| T. A. BURKE, JR. | LIEUT. | 8 |
| T. R. McCANTS | LIEUT. | 3 |
| F. B. HARRIS, JR. | LIEUT. | 4 |
| J. C. HALLIN | LT (jg.) | 2 |
| J. S. ATLANSON | LT (jg.) | 3 |
| BUCK, Spiva L. | ENS. | 1 |
| CAREY, Harold S. | CMOM (AA) | 7 |
| OTHERS, Victor M. | CV (PA) | 7 |
| DE BOIS, Frank J. | CGM (PA) | 7 |
| PARCE, William J. | CHOM (AA) (T) | 4 |
| SILLMAN, Francis O. | CTM (AA) | 8 |
|          | CRT (AA) (T) | 4 |

— page 166 —
15 - 22 November

Unventril. Proceeding Darwin onauting track- in grills, submerged and surface approaches, and tests of the new electronic equipment with H.M.A.F.I.L. At 0900 on the 21st, spoke the H.M.A.F.I.L. (J244), heading west. Rendezvoused with (J041) and proceeded to Darwin. Hovered outboard of B.C.M.L. and H.M.A.F.I.L. alongside U.S.S. C.H.A.M.L. at 1027, 22 November. Received 33,573 gallons of fuel oil, 590 gallons of lubricating oil, 4200 gallons of fresh water. Directed repairs to SJ radar training gear, returned the VFR, touched up the paint, bored the crew.

At 1655, 22 November, underway with out escort enroute to patrol area off northwest coast of Luzon. Cur route is east of Tidor, through the Banda and Tidor seas, passing between the Tiger Islands and Salieier Islands thence to Makassar Strait, Sibutu Pass and Indoro Strait. He are first boat out and are to rendezvous with H.M.A.F.I.L. the second night in the area. Spoke the J246 while proceedings out of swept channel.

23 November

Plane Contact No.1
At 0437 made radar contact with corvette in flight of medium bombers from Darwin. Sighted one at sixteen miles. Several more showed on SD screen.

...t 1043 lookout reported some aboard. Dived. Surfaced fifteen minutes later directly under the guns of a large frigate bird. (Bird Contact number 1). Bow buoyancy went will not close.

Plane Contact No.2
At 1528 began receiving IFF signals at a range of 35 miles. Closed in to five miles before we sighted him in a cloudless sky; a silver Liberator, very hard to see. Drove him off with recognition signals and emergency flares.

— page 168 —
5) NARRATIVE (Cont'd).

Flame Contact No. 5:
At 1456 dived for trial and training. TDC still out of commission. Fut pressure test on all torpedoes in tubes. Found one leaky torpedo. Surfaced at 1700. Transited Sioux Pass. At 2043 sent message requesting TDC spares from a southern boat.

20 November

At 0041 when ten miles north of Pearl Bank made Sd contact with U.S.S. H.M.S.

— page 169 —
1935 000 and look out sighted two enine bomber flying low and headed at us. Dived. Surfaced at 1423. At 1013 made 3D contact and later sighted three planes, they passed 21 miles ahead, flying high.

Exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. GUNNER by SJ in 40 last Pass at 2158.

30 November

Plane Contact No.11

At 0144 in Lindor Strait made SJ contact on plane at 13,000 yards. We put our tail to his and he passed 6,000 yards away, flying over and on opposite course. Could be plainly seen at 10,000 yards in the bright monolith.

Cleared Mindoro Strait about 0400 and headed for rendezvous established by ComVolfPak; 120 miles to the westward. Stopped all day without event. Dived in the evening to flush out number 4. At 2PM. Auxiliary engine muffler seems to have a hole in it.

Arrived at rendezvous at 1958 and circled until 2102. Apparently H.M.S. H.M.S. is still bound up. Set course to the eastward to look for a convoy reported by plane to be in Palawan Pass; thought we might get him if he headed north from there.

1 December

Convoy didn't appear; at 1030 started return to rendezvous. Fell in with H.M.S. H.M.S. enroute and she assigned a patrol station for tomorrow. Proceeded toward it.

2 December

Patrolled assigned station all day. At 1753 headed for rendezvous point assigned by ComVolfPak in western part of area 46.

3 December

Rendezvoused with H.M.S. H.M.S. and BSCUN at 0700. H.M.S. passed over supplementary patrol instructions, assigned FLASH to north end of patrol lines in 46 on longitude 117° east, H.M.S. H.M.S. at Latitude 120° 55' north. FLASH twenty miles north during

— page 171 —
1st Lt. J. H. H. (Gont'd).
Attack No. 2.
At 0916 fired first stern tube. Gyro angle 233, torpedo run 1900, track angle 60 port, estimated speed 10 knots. After firing first one, the scope went under and wouldn't come back out. The assist at DC operator was instructed to fire three more, spreading by offset. Consequently, the second torpedo was fired seventeen seconds after the first without a spread.

The scope then came back out. The target was turning toward; an I.E. on the bow 30 port and growing smaller. Choked fire.

Turned attention to destroyer for killer shot. He was dead in the water with his stern almost under and very close; he had drifted around to about a 130 degree port track now. Took sweep around and saw another destroyer or patrol boat to boiling down on us at about 500 - 1000 yards. Went deep.

As we were going deep, heard two timed hits on tanker. Apparently he was making more than ten knots and his maneuver showed him down just enough to let him out on both in the tail. Verily, we smell of the rose.

At 0925 the depth on rises started; about sixteen in all, mostly close. At 0931 near screws throw in the hull. Executive officer: "If he drops now, they're gonna be close." At 0932, four depth on rises. They were.

We were under a good negative gradient which started at 250 feet. We retired to the south and west, gradually pulling away from the searchers.

At 1053 we were back at periscope depth. To the north we saw: a. The tanker on fire in his engine room aft and settling by the stern. b. An AS/SAIO class destroyer standing by, about 500 yards nearer and a little off to the left of the tanker. c. Two escort vessels and the net tender making sweeps around the tanker. Range to the destroyer was 7500 yards.

Started a reload. At 1136 turned around and headed in to attack the destroyer and finish off the tanker. The plan is to fire three at each, depth set six feet. At 1205 reload completed. Then the range to the destroyer was 4400 yards another rain squall closed in and visibility was reduced to zero.

— page 176 —
3) TRAFFIC (Cont'd).

Noted our planes make two strikes on Subic Bay. Lots of planes and flak over the islands; no one pay-ing much attention to us. Could hear conversation of VHF: "Tra-sport in subic Bay, lets get him", etc.

Plane Contact No.25:
At 1001, when at a point bearing 240(T) 16 miles from Corrigidor, we were crossed under by a plane that was in from seaward. We were on station, so remained submerged and patrolled east and west in the light of the 100 fathom curve.

Plane Contact No.20:
At 2047 made SJ contact on 2 planes bear-ing 054, 30,000 yards. They seemed to be searching the area where we submerged this morning. Lost the planes after about 15 minutes. The APL indicated a 100 miles radar in the area which gradually grew stronger. At 2150, SJ contact at 14,000 yards, closing. He gave us an indication to 3000 yards.

Twenty minutes later the SD was raised and the planes were still there at six and eight miles. Based deck down to periscope depth.

Plane Contact No.27:
At 2235 all clear; surfaced with the SD in operation. Two minutes later we had contact at 17 miles, closing. At 2237, dive when range had closed to three miles. Decided to give them a hour to go away.

Surfaced at 2345 with the SD in operation.

15 December

Plane Contact No.20:
At 0025, they came back and we went down when they closed to 3 miles. Their radar is 150 miles. Decided to give them another hour and to quit using the SD. The night is very dark.

Surfaced at 0130. The new best getting interference on the ST from Cabra Island and strong indications on the AF at 530 miles. Thought Cabra might be the steel pigeon and decided to open out to 20 miles. Made a couple of distant ST contacts on planes while doing so.

-12-

— page 178 —
15.00
USS. PIASER (SS249).

3) NARATIVE (Cont'd).

Several plane contacts during day. Crashed down by six fighters at 0756. Surface at 0815.

At 1604 set course for Camaran Bay, French Indochina as part of coordinated attack group with BOUA (CIC) and HCE, as directed by CHI 71.

At 1746 sighted HAMMISTI against sunset to the westward; neid course. As we approached, it grew clearer and she could no longer be clearly seen; received no recognition signals. At 1807, at range around her. She then started chasing, FLIGHT. It was necessary to pound full speed into the sea in order to open the range. Communicate with HAMMISTI by radio and found that it was inassid he who was chasing us. Sent him our greetings.

Set course to rendezvous with BOUA and HCE, having received orders from BOUA in the meantime.

17 December

Rendezvoused with BOUA at 0615. She passed over Opor. Proceeded toward Camaran Bay on scouting line with BOUA and HCE.

Plane Contact No. 39
At 1107, momentarily SD contact at 11 miles. At 1110, sighted plane at range of two miles; a Liberator. Exchanged recognition. He showed no IFF.

At 1300 received MIMOS excellent contact report on enemy forces leaving Camaran Bay.

Seas are very heavy from the north.

13 December

Proceeding toward Camaran Bay.

12 December

Plane Contact No. 42
Three plane contacts during day. Wind force seven from north. Forty foot waves. No sights for two days.

Picked up land on the SJ at 1347. Believed land to be Non Ion Island.

— page 180 —
35. ATLANTIC (Cont'd).

at 1031 headed east to open out from the beach.

Surfaced at 1204; sent contact report to pack; headed north in pursuit at three-engine speed. Heavy seas prohibited faster speed. We were making about 12½ knots through the water and fighting a three-knot current. Instigated convoy speed at 8½ knots through the water.

FLASHER stayed about twenty miles offshore until dark, then closed to seven miles. Received permission from BOUNA to chase; no other ships in pursuit. Expected to regain contact at about 2200.

It 2043 tracked four side locks from the beach for a few minutes.

22 December

After 2200 our spirits began to droop.

The weather began to improve as we moved northward. It was fairly calm by 0500.

We had decided to reverse course at 0100. At that time the navigator noticed that Tortue Island was underway. This turned out to be our convoy. It developed into five large tankers, three smaller escorts and a destroyer. Speed eleven knots, not zigzagging.

Commenced training and working ahead on their starboard, forward side. It took us until 0400 to get ahead of the convoy. All the time we were working ahead of the destroyer remained exactly between us and the nearest ship. Occasionally he would turn on his radar and create very heavy interference on our S.O. Disquieting.

The other three escorts were distributed along the forward side of the convoy. The formation was very tight with less than 500 yards between tankers. They were not zigging, but appeared to shift from column to line of bearing from time to time. Attack from the forward side appeared impracticable.

Decided to try an attack from the land side. Convoy was twelve miles off the beach and about fifteen miles south of the pass between Cape Batangan and Kulao Rui Island. FLASHER was 10,000 yards, 300 on the port bow of the leading ship; ships in column. As we moved into this position, the destroyer stayed between us and convoy until he was dead ahead of leading ship. He then began to drop aft on the starboard side of convoy. -h-h-h-h-n!

— page 182 —
23 December

Ship Contact No. 8
At 0325, when 48 miles bearing 135° from Cam-
ranh Bay, made SJ contact on a northbound convoy
of three ships and two escorts. Sent contact
report at 0400 to RECUNA, DACE, HOR and FADDLE on
Wolf Pack frequency. Tracked them until 0500;
course 355, speed 13. Could not see them at
6000 yards. Sent another contact report at 0500,
then broke off and resumed course to southward.

At 2100, exchanged calls with U.S.S. GURNARD, north-
bound.

24 December

At 0901 sighted a drifting mine. Attempted to sink
with 20mm fire. Scored two nits out mine did not sink
or explode.

25 December

Crossed equator at 0930. Picked up BARBERO'S SJ
interference at 1930, she was overtaking us very slowly.
Exchanged calls at 2145; she passed aboard about midnight.

— page 183 —
26 December

Exploded a drifting mine at 1418. Sank another at 1450.

Just after sinking second mine, at 1453 sighted through the periscope what appeared to be a submarine bearing 072 (T); submerged to avoid being sighted. Tried until 1556 to close range, but never saw more than a single tall stack with no masts. May have been a small trawler or the shears of an American submarine; there was considerable mirage effect on the horizon. Surface at 1556.

27 December

Set course to pass west of Kangean Islands, between Goa Goa and Kangean Island. Sighted about twenty sailboats during day.

At 0537 exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. BLUEGILL, northbound.

At 0830, gave carton of Chesterfields and loaf of bread to the first sailboat that passed close aboard. Grew of friendly natives.

At 1142, just after passing between Goa Goa and Karang Takat Reef made SD contact on plane at nine miles, closing. Dived.

Surfaced at 1229.

Plane Contact No.43
At 1615 sighted a RUFE at a range of about 15 miles coming from direction of Soerabaja enroute Lombok Strait. Submerged to periscope depth and watched him pass. He made several dips and circles in vicinity of the northwest point of Bali and finally disappeared over the Strait at 1655. He was painted black a float plane.

Surfaced at 1659. At 1729 sighted him returning. Submerged and watched him pass by headed for Soerabaja. We were then thirty miles from the entrance to Lombok Strait. Decided to remain submerged until sunset.

Surfaced at 1835 and set course for the Strait.

— page 184 —
1. NARRATIVE (Cont'd).
2. Ship Contact No.9.
3. At 1909 while some twilight remained and with a full moon, sighted a patrol boat against the background of Bali, bearing 2030 (T), range 6 miles, angle on the bow zero. Picked him up on SJ at same time.
4. Went to flank speed and put nim broad on the starboard quarter. Estimated his top speed to be about fifteen knots. He was about the size of a PC boat. Intended to work to the south of him and continue through the Strait. He cooperated by always giving us a zero angle on the bow. Had he attempted to head us off he could have succeeded.
5. By 1930, when the range had closed to 4860 yards he opened fire with two automatic guns of about 20mm caliber. His speed was 17 knots. Sent lookouts and OOD below. At this time we were on course 130 (T) and headed for Lombok Island.
6. He continued to shoot at us during the remainder of the chase. His shells landed astern, ahead, and on both sides, but never hit us. The shells did not seem large enough to cause serious materiel damage.
7. From time to time he would turn on his searchlight and send a short signal in the direction of Bali. It appeared to be "6T".
8. We continued to make small course changes to the right. Finally, by 1950, we were on 190 (T) headed for the middle of the Strait with the escort almost astern and the range opening. Minimum range was 4500 yards.
9. By 2020 the range was 7050 yards, most of his shots were falling astern and the situation was improving.
10. Ship Contact No.10.
11. At that time, sighted another patrol boat sharp on our starboard bow at a range of about five miles. Submerged.
12. Went to 300 feet, got off our track to the westward, rigged for depth charge attack, and waited. We were almost in the center of the northern entrance to the Strait. There was a sharp negative gradient beginning at 250 feet.
13. We could hear shells hitting the water for about five minutes after the dive. He then slowed and commenced echo-ranging. We ran 1½ miles to the west and then resumed our course through the Strait. The other patrol boat was pinging to the south.

— page 185 —
1. NARRATIVE (Cont'd).

They never contacted us and did not drop depth charges. Apparently they thought we would try to escape to the northward. By 2100 both searchers were north of us. Came to porisope depth at 2150 and could barely see one patrol boat moving away slowly to the north.

Navistaticon fixes showed a 1½ knot current against us. We had about 25 miles to go to clear the Strait.

At 2320 surfaced with the patrol boats out of sight though still pinging. Proceeded through the Strait without further incident. We gave this southwest cape of Lombok a wide berth, passing 4 miles east of Nusa Besar and seven miles from Lombok.

28 December

We were clear of Lombok Strait at 0055 and very glad to feel the Indian Ocean swells under the keel. At 0430 sent our Serial Six to CTF 71 describing speed and gun range of patrol boats, current and the method we used in clearing the SW cape.

Transit of Lombok Strait can be made very difficult by two patrol boats during bright moonlight. We were sighted against a clear background before we either sighted or radar-contacted the patrol boat, which was against a land background.

29-30 December

Uneventful. Exchanged calls with U.S.S. FARDHEAD and U.S.S. BESUGO at 0610 and 0748 respectively on the 29th.

At 2101, 30 December, moored alongside YO 10 at Exmouth Gulf.

31 December

Underway at 0202, 31 December, having received 22,800 gallons of diesel fuel oil.

At 0855, exchanged calls with U.S.S. COUGAL, northbound. Observed radar interference on the SJ to the southeast all night. Could not communicate.

1 January, 1945

No. 3 main engine out of commission at 1014. (See major defects).

— page 186 —
2 January 1945
Conducted sound tests and ran degaussing range.
At 1115 moored starboard side in nest alongside
U.S.S. BURYAT.

-22-

— page 188 —
1. ATLANTIC DATA:
   - TORPEDO ATTACK No. 1
   - Patrol No. 5
   - Date: 4 December, 1944
   - Lat. 13°12.5'N.
   - Long. 116°37.0'W.

2. DESCRIPTION:
   - Co. voyage consisted of one large 40 escorted by two destroyers, a net tender, and two patrol boats.
   - The tanker was identified as the THIYO HURU, CVT 205-J (Korvised), page 270.
   - The destroyers were of the AUGUSTO class, ONI 41-42, Japanese Naval Vessels.
   - Visibility was bad during the approach, and it was not until just prior to firing at a DD that the tanker was sighted.

3. SHIPS SINK: one.

4. SHIPS PROBABLY SINK: One DD AUGUSTO Class. (30).

5. Damage determined by:
   - Two timed explosions check in for first two torpedoes. Observed spray rising around his engine room as second explosion was near; second hit was between after stack and amidships.
   - Target began to smoke heavily and, when last seen, had a "st" in his stern almost under.

6. Target Draught: 9' Course: 316° Speed: 15 Range: 1650

7. OWN SHIP DATA:
   - Speed: 3.3 Course: 150° Depth: 64° Angle: 10° D.

8. TYPE ATTACK:
   - Submerged periscope. Target group was sighted by periscope at 2c, 700 yards, on westerly course at approximately 15 knots.
   - After diving, ran squalls to gether with large swells.
   - Made observations difficult.
   - Close DD as target; fired four torpedoes, dverent spread by periscope with first and fourth amidships.
   - Second amidships aimed one quarter of the ship's length ahead and astern.

*Identified at range of 300 yards on the surface at night

-26-

— page 189 —
0918 H
Date: 4 December, 1944
Lat. 13°12.5'N.
Long. 116°37.0'E.

TARGET DATA - DATAFILE: TARGET DATA

SUSPECTED DESTINATION: Large AO, sighted during attack No. 1.

DISTANCE: None.

LOSS DAMAGE: Large AO, identified as TETOY TARU, CRL 200-J (Revised) Page 276. (NO).

Target DRAFT: 31' Course: 317°T. Speed: 10 Range: 1900

OIL SHIP DATA:

Speed: 4.7 Course: (1) 195° Depth: 64 Angle: 12°D. (2) 200°

FIRST CONTROL AND CONTROL DATA:

TARGET ATTACK: Submerged periscope. Quick set-up, stern tube shot following attack No. 1. Intended firing four torpedoes but checked fire after two upon observing target's turn to starboard. Both torpedoes were fired to hit, thus first by periscope, the second by generated bearing (periscope under). Believe under-estimate of speed by TDC caused hit as target was slowed down by maneuvering.

-30-

— page 190 —
1251 H
Date: 4 December, 1944
Lat. 13°12.5'N.
Long. 116°37.0'W.

TARGET D.T.T. - D.I.G. FLIGHT
SERIATION: 0 of attack No. 2 and 3 to Class DD.
UPS SUN: AASS10 Class DD. (EU)
UPS DAMAGE or probably sunk: None.
MAGY DETERMINED BY: Four hits, tilted and knocked off torpedoes, zero angle on bow after firing. Hears breaking up noise on sound. Upon return to periscope depth, observed other escorts and ourring tanker but no destroyers.

GET DRAFT: 9 Course: 060° Speed: 0 Range: 2050

ON SIGHT DATA:
SEA: 2.7 Course: 019° Depth: 63° Angle: 30°.

FIRST CONTROL ID TORPEDO D.T.T.

PE ATTACK: Submerged periscope. Planned attack on DD and damaged AC, firing three torpedoes at each. Unable to pick up tanker due to rain squall so decided to fire four at the DD. Fired four torpedoes, divergent spread by periscope. During firing saw bow of tanker, rejecting beyond stern of DD. Fired 5 and at him, aiming close under destroyer's stern. Believed both torpedoes stopped in DD as times of explosions close on DD.

— page 191 —
3.3. FLASHER
Time: 1:21.3H
Date: 4 December 1944
TARGET D.T.A. - D.D. 1st LT JOHN
Description: Large No. of attacks No. 2 and No. 3.
Hips Sunk: TATYC 1st U, ONI 206-J (Revised) page 276 (DC).
Nips damaged or probably sunk: None.
Ammunition: Observed torpedo hit ship in after well, saw ship break in two and sink.

Target Draft: 31' Course: 310' Speed: 0 Range: 600
CWMP D.T.: 9
Course: 041 Depth: Surface

— page 192 —
22 December 1944
Lat. 15°04.0'N
Long. 109°06.5'E

TARGET DATA - DATABASE INFORMATION:
Convoy consisted of five large tankers escorted by one destroyer and three patrol boats. The ships were first observed while patrolling submerged on the 21st. Long chase and three hours tracking, receded mi.ht surface attack.

NIPS Sunk: Two large tankers (EU).

NIPS Damaged or Probably Sunk: None.

Image of the damaged tanker is not provided.

Target Draft: 30' Course: 3460 Speed: 11 Range: 2200

QUANTITY DATA:
Course: 071° Depth: Surface Angle: -

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA:
Night surface radar attack. End around was made from the starboard side, crossing ahead of convoy at fifteen thousand yards. Ships one and two were onsen as targets, planning to fire forward, three torpedoes at each. When the angle on the bow increased to 30° port, turned toward and slowed down. The ships were proceeding in column on course 346° at 11 knots, not zigzagging. One escort was ahead and on the port bow of the leading ship. The destroyer and two other escorts were on the starboard (seaward) flank of the column, the destroyer being farther out than the other two. Waited until the angle on the bow increased to 90° port and the range decreased to 2400 yards, then started shooting. Spread by offset (0, 2R, 2L). TBT bearings and radar ranges were used during firing.

— page 193 —
ATTACK DATA.
:  Torpedo Attack No. 6
:  Patrol No. 5
:  Date: 22 December 1944.
:  Lat. 15°04'.0 N
:  Long. 109°06'.5 E

TARGET DATA - DANGER ATTACK:
:  Third ship (AO) in convoy of attack number 5.
:  One large tanker (EU).
:  One damaged or probably sunk: None.
:  Observed one hit; heard two explosions,
:  times checking with data. This ship burned
:  for quite awhile, then exploded and sank
:  like its predecessors.

ARGENT DRAFT: 30' Course: 34° Speed: 11 Range: 1900

CHI-SHIP DATA:
:  Course: (9) 176° (7) 179° Depth: Surface
:  (10) 177° (6) 220° Angle: -

FIRST CONTROL ATTACK DATA:
:  Night surface radar attack. Stern shot, four torpedoes, following attack No. 5. Swung right with full rudder at flank speed upon completion of forward firing. Fired torpedoes spread by offset (1L, 1R, 3R, 3L) as soon as setup was obtained on TDC.

|:  | :  | :  | :  | :  |
|:  |

— page 194 —
1. MINE LAYING OPERATIONS were observed.

Three floating mines were noted at the following positions: (a) Lat. 50°15', Long. 107°15'E; (b) Lat. 50°15', Long. 111°15'E; (c) Lat. 50°15', Long. 111°15'E. All three were moored mines which had broken away from their moorings and were covered with sea growth. The first one could not be sunk or exploded although hit with 20 ft shells. The second was exploded and the third sunk by 20 ft guns.

(J) AMT-SURFAREN HEARTS AND EVASION TACTICS.

The anti-submarine measures during the attacks of December 4, 1944 were very heavy. The tactics of the escort vessels were to run down the torpedo track, drop a pattern of charges and then to commence screening with echo-ranging since they never did appear to have sufficient strength. This type of searching was ineffective. On both attacks there was a negative temperature gradient at 250 feet.

Normal evasive tactics were to deep, keep the stern toward the escort, and make 70 R/T.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS.

Engineering.

While trying to start the Auxiliary engine on 30 November, 1944 found that the outboard exhaust valve could not be opened. Inspection of the exhaust board operating gear showed the following defects: (Refer to the following pages for details.)

- The valve could not be opened.
- The exhaust valve could not be opened

— page 195 —
1944 #3 Main Engine had to be cut out due to excessive exhaust temperatures. The injector and running gear was inspected. Found no trouble yet the unit still ran with an exhaust temperature of 975°F. The unit was again cut out. Since that time #3, #7 and #8 units had to be cut out for the same reason. It is believed that the cause of these high exhaust temperatures in the above mentioned units is poor exhaust valves. Also on this same engine at 300 engines hours while replacing a cracked piston it was necessary to renew the exhaust valves of that unit. It is desired that a more careful and thorough overhaul be given this engine during the coming refit.

-38a-

— page 196 —
35. FLASER (SS249).

(1) MAJOR DEFECTS (Cont'd).

Torpedo & Gunnery:

(a) Upon daily routine check on 26 November, it was discovered that the relative target bearing failed to generate. Thorough examination revealed that the trouble was in the towed-up motor (Type B7P21, Ord. Dr. No. 198746, Piece #1). This motor was removed and own course motor substituted for it temporarily. The bearing generated normally, defined by the new motor. Efforts to repair the motor were unsuccessful. Sent dispatch and received replacement from U.S.A. HARDWARE; installed and ran check problems. TDC was operating normally. No further trouble was experienced during the patrol.

It is believed that the trouble was in the armature of the original motor. There are at least three motors of this same type in the TDC. It would seem advisable to include in the spares board a spare armature or, even better, a spare motor of this type.

(b) All twenty-three torpedoes fired appeared to run hot, straight and normal. Of these 15 were hits for an average of 65%.

Upon routine tests of torpedoes for water tightness, two were flooded due to missing casks. These torpedoes were treated in accordance with the normal routine for a flooded torpedo and apparently ran satisfactorily.

Considerable trouble was experienced this run with the gyro clamp Piece No. 3506 slipping about the shaft of the side setting wheel. During routine of torpedo No. 33678 on 22 November, the gyro pot was discovered on 27th. Instead of zero. This gyro was operated and checked on zero prior to loading on 12 November. On attempting to tighten the clamp, the screw sheared. This wheel and clamp were replaced by those from the other side. The torpedo was checked again on 27 November, and the gyro pot was on zero. It appeared to run true when fired on 4 December.

Similar trouble was experienced with torpedoes No. 65790 and No. 49457.

— page 198 —
35. FLASHER (SS249), 1

(1) RADIO DEFECTS (Cont'd).

(c) Air Condition, Equipment. Despite the observance of various operational practices promulgated by the Bureau of Ships, The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, and The Commander Submarine Squadron Four, the equipment as installed on this vessel will not keep the forward part of the ship in a completely habitable condition. This defect was apparent on this patrol even though in-jection temperature was lower than usual in this locality and battery charges were less frequent.

The necessity for the installation of the following devices cannot be emphasized too strongly:

(a) Additional one or two ton cooling coils and a booster supply ventilation fan in line in Control Room.

(b) Sheet metal restrictions in the cooling coil boxes to prevent air from flowing through the void spaces at the top and bottom of the coil boxes.

(c) Main engine detached fresh water recirculating pumps.

(1) RADIO.

Radio reception of the Baker schedule during the patrol was only fair. No serials were missed out on several occasions messages were delayed by poor reception.

On the Manila side of the South China Sea the best frequency to use in the day, for an about 0100 GMT until 1000 GMT, was 12,630. 9250 KCS proved to be the best frequency to use. Attempts to use 12,630 KCS during the day were only fairly successful. A heavy wave note zero beat at this frequency was noted. VIXO would fade out about 1000 GMT until about 2200 GMT. From 0000 GMT until around 0600

— page 199 —
1. RADIO (Cont'd).
2. GOT VIXO was very weak and copying difficult. Very good results were obtained on the Wolf Pack frequencies. The frequencies used were 2880 KCS and those as designated in VOPaoo 2. CW was used the entire time and proved more reliable than voice usage during previous patrols.

For transmissions 8470 KCS proved to be the most efficient frequency. On one occasion we were unable to establish communication with VIXO on this frequency. This was believed due to adverse weather conditions and interference from other stations. At that time we shifted to 12,705 KCS and immediately established communications.

On three occasions in the operating area our transmissions were rescripted for on the Baker's schedule and on one occasion our call-up was answered. This is an invaluable help to submarines as heavy interference is always encountered on the working frequencies.

| Time & Date | Posit | Sta. Call- ed | Msg. Del. To | Freq. | Ships Cour- se | No Sent | Total Trans- mission time Minutes |
||-------|||-------||||
| 0245      | 1426.5| VIXO        | VHAI         | 6470  | 040            | 28      | 17                          |
| 11/20     | 122912.3| VIXO        | VHAI         | 8470  | 020            | 81      | 25                          |
| 1202      | 1530.3| VIXO        | VIXO         | 12705 | 080            | 64      | 45                          |
| 11/27     | 139.3| VIXO        | VIXO         | 6470  | 335            | 45      | 12                          |
| 1445      | 138.2| VIXO        | VIXO         | 8470  | 290            | 60      | 12                          |
| 12/13     | 118.2| VIXO        | VIXO         | 8470  | 177            | 44      | 20                          |
| 2130      | 1452.1| VIXO        | VIXO         | 8470  | 200            | 35      | 29                          |
| 12/14     | 119.3| VIXO        | VIXO         | 8470  | 200            | 35      | 29                          |
| 2200      | 1455.1| VIXO        | VIXO         | 8470  | 200            | 35      | 29                          |
| 12/21     | 109.2| VIXO        | VIXO         | 8470  | 200            | 35      | 29                          |
| 0920      | 120.3| VIXO        | VIXO         | 8470  | 200            | 35      | 29                          |
| 12/28     | 115.3| VIXO        | VIXO         | 8470  | 200            | 35      | 29                          |
| 0259      | 220.1| VIXO        | VIXO         | 8470  | 200            | 35      | 29                          |
| 12/31     | 113.3| VIXO        | VIXO         | 8470  | 200            | 35      | 29                          |

— page 200 —
1. SJ-1 Radar. Total hours of operation - 845.

The performance of the SJ-1 radar was excellent throughout the patrol. No major operational difficulties were ever experienced. The equipment withstood the shock of heavy depth charging on two occasions. No major vacuum tube failures, and only a few small tube failures, were experienced.

A noted improvement in ranges over previous patrols was due largely to the replacement of the lower feeder unit waveguide casting during the last refit. U.S. Army, B-24 bombers, were placed up at ranges up to 52,000 yards; a large tanker of about 10,000 tons, at 27,000 yards; an enemy destroyer was killed out to 23,000 yards; and second sweep land echoes were noted at approximate 150,000 yards.

The SJ-1 radar was used for recognition and communication with friendly submarines on various occasions, but the newly installed pulse amplifier was found to be too critical in adjustment for practical use. The sensitivity setting changed during the other boat's transmission to such an extent that it was impossible to receive solid copy. The need for amplification is recognized, but a more stable circuit is necessary.

The upper gavel assembly for the SJ-1 training was found to have excessive play during the first few days of patrol. This assembly was taken apart and the gears shimmed up to take out the play. The small gear unit assembly drive for the PPI flexible cable is very noisy and this assembly is to be replaced during the next refit. The SJ-1 training mast has excessive vibration during high speeds and rough seas. It is believed that realignment of middle bearing and installation of another bearing about 4 feet below the middle bearing during the next refit will reduce this vibration.

Interference.

Interference from other than friendly forces was noted on the SJ radar screen. This occurred during a four-hour approach on an escorted convoy on the morning of 22 December, 1944 in position Latitude 14°04'N, Longitude 109°06'E. The interference was encountered four times during the four-hour approach for periods of about 2 minutes on each occasion. At these times the enemy convoy was 10,000 yards distant.

— page 202 —
1. SCUND (Cont'd).
2. screw noises or pinging until the range was 6,000 to 7,000 yards. The sea was very rough and there were numerous rain squalls in the vicinity. Once contact was established on pinging, it was followed out to about 12,000 yards.
3. There were no operational difficulties noted with either the sonic or supersonic equipment. No ping ranges were attempted.

| Time & Date | Posit | Depth Fath-oms | Depth Gradient Started Feet | Total Gradistn Observed (UT) |
||-------||||
| 1300       | 17025'N | 3020           | 110                        | 3 NMC                     |
| 1/19       | 11649'E | 2230           | 240                        | 2 NMC                     |
| 806        | 13005'N | 2230           | 240                        | 2 NMC                     |
| 2/3        | 11704'E | 2200           | 220                        | 4 NMC                     |
| 749        | 13014.7'N | 2200           | 220                        | 4 NMC                     |
| 2/4        | 11639.5'E | 2500           | 150                        | 5 NMC                     |
| 217        | 13028'N | 2500           | 150                        | 5 NMC                     |
| 2/10       | 11759'E | 1640           | 200                        | 3 NMC                     |
| 311        | 14017'N | 1640           | 200                        | 3 NMC                     |
| 2/13       | 11944.8'E | 60            | 140                        | 4 NMC                     |
| 455        | 1208.5'N | 60            | 140                        | 4 NMC                     |
| 2/19       | 11017.5'E | 60            | 140                        | 4 NMC                     |

(F) HEALTH, FOOD, AND FABRITABILITY.

The health of the crew was excellent. One case of appendicitis was treated with sulfa and the application of ice packs on the abdomen. The patient responded very well to this treatment and gradually recovered from appendicitis. However, he developed a case of violent headaches shortly afterwards. These, it is believed, were caused by a combination of appendicitis, an old head injury, heavy seas, and depth charges.

-45-

— page 205 —
1. Date of intercept: 12/14/44 Time (Z): 1234
2. Location of ship: 14°08'N 120°08'E.
3. Type intercepted radar: Probable land-based.
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 2.
5. Freq: 180 PPH: 150 PW: 3
6. Narrative:

We had radar contact with aircraft when this AFR contact was present.

Contact No. 4

1. Date of intercept: 12/14/44 Time (Z): 1300
2. Location of ship: 14°09'N 119°58'E.
3. Type intercepted radar: Unknown.
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 3.
5. Freq: 530 PPH: ? PW: -5
6. Narrative:

This contact was noted during the same period that we had intercept contact numbers 2 and 3. This one and contact Number 3 were of the same character except that a higher FRF was noted by audio means.

Contact No. 5

1. Date of intercept: 12/14/44 Time (Z): 1545.
2. Location of ship: 14°10'N 120°00'E.
3. Type intercepted radar: Probable land-based.
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 2.
5. Freq: 152 PPH: 1000 PW: 8-10
6. Narrative:

The radar seemed to be sweeping slowly with a sweep rate of about a minute.

Contact No. 6

1. Date of intercept: 12/14/44 Time (Z): 1600
2. Location of ship: 14°10'N 120°00'E.
3. Type intercepted radar: Unknown
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 2.
5. Freq: 160 PPH: 400 PW: 10
6. Narrative:

This contact gave a double image on the pulse analyzer screen. Each image had a pulse width of 5 micro-seconds.

— page 206 —
1. Date of intercept: 12/14/44 Time (Z): 1750
2. Location of ship: 14°10'N 125°00'E.
3. Type intercepted radar: Unknown.
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 3.
5. Freq: 530 PPI: 3.
6. Narrative:

This contact had a fluttering note and we believed this to have been a spar-gap modulated radar. The radar did not appear to be sweeping.

Contact No. 8

1. Date of intercept: 12/15/44 Time (Z): 1900
2. Location of ship: 14°13'N 119°55'E.
3. Type intercepted radar: Probable airborne.
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 2.
5. Freq: 150 PPI: 500 FW 5.
6. -

Contact No. 9

1. Date of intercept: 12/16/44 Time (Z): 1345
2. Location of ship: 15°N 116°E.
3. Type intercepted radar: Probable airborne.
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 2.
5. Freq: 220 PPI: 250 FW: 3.
6. Narrative:

This was a very strong contact but was intermittent. It did not give the characteristics of a sweeping type radar.

Contact No. 10

1. Date of intercept: 12/17/44 Time (Z): 1545
2. Location of ship: 13°10'N 113°41'E.
3. Type intercepted radar: Probable airborne.
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 2.
5. Freq: 115 PPI: 250 FW: 5-7.
6. -

Contact No. 11

1. Date of intercept: 12/19/44 Time (Z): 0600
2. Location of ship: 12°41'N 110°28'E.
3. Type intercepted radar: Unknown.
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 2.
5. Freq: 154 PPI: 1100 FW: 10.
6. Narrative:

Strong contact sweeping slowly believed to have been land-based.

— page 207 —
12/13/44 Time (Z): 0805
: 12°03' N 109°51' E.
: Unknown.
: APR-1 band 2.
: 235 PRF: 250 PW: 3
: NARRATIVE:

This was an intermittent contact of unstable character.

Contact No. 13

1. Date of intercept: 12/13/44 Time (Z): 1955.
2. Location of ship: 1304.8°N 109°40.5°E.
3. Type intercepted radar: unknown.
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 2.
5. Freq: 200 PRF: 1000 PW: 10
6. Narrative: Very strong contact but intermittent.

Contact No. 15

1. Date of intercept: 12/23/44 Time (Z): 1300
2. Location of ship: 8°9.2'N 108°43'E.
3. Type intercepted radar: Unknown.
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 2.
5. Freq: 238 PRF: 500 PW: 1
6. Narrative:

Intermittent contact very strong when our SJ was secured. Soon after making contact we passed a friendly submarine. The contact was lost a short time later.

Contact No. 16

1. Date of intercept: 12/26/44 Time (Z): 2100
2. Location of ship: 5°49'3" 114°29'E.
3. Type intercepted radar: Believed to be SJ radar.
4. Type intercepted equipment: APR-1 band 2.
5. Freq: 235 PRF: 1280 PW: 1
6. Narrative:

Friendly submarine was in the vicinity when we had this contact. After sub had cleared us the contact was lost. When we were close to land we also had same type contact. We believed this due to the SJ radar signal being reflected off the land end picked up by the APR antenna.

— page 208 —
(a) No comment.

(b) No definite trends were noted as regards traffic routes and foci points.

(c) The excellent camouflage (haze gray) saved this vessel from counter-measures after the attack on 22 December, 1944. Although only 3200 yards from an enemy destroyer and with the whole area illuminated by 31 fires, the FLASHER was not detected.

4 01688

-51-

— page 209 —
1. The Commander Submarine Squadron Eighteen, San Francisco, California, 3 January 1945.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.
(2) The Commander Seventh Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

1. The fifth war patrol of the FLASHER was conducted in the SOUTH CHINA SEA, in areas west of LUZON and adjacent to the FRENCH INDO-CHINA COAST. FLASHER participated in two wolf packs, one with HAWKHILL and EDGINA, the other composed of HOL, EAGLE, DACE and PADDLE.

2. This patrol was of 49 days duration, 34 of which were spent in the assigned areas. It is significant that only one full day was spent submerged. This resulted in excellent area coverage and presented the advantage of FLASHER being in the right place at the right time for the subsequent attacks which took place.

3. Attack No. 1. Acting on a contact report received from HAWKHILL on 4 December the FLASHER was able to develop the first attack upon a DD which was part of a convoy composed of an AO, a net tender and several smaller escorts. Four torpedoes were fired at the DD from a range of 1650 yards on approximately 90° track angles to obtain two hits in the vicinity of the engine room spaces.

Attack No. 2. Immediately after disposing of the DD the FLASHER then brought the stern tubes to bear and two torpedoes were fired at the AO from 1900 yards on about 65° track angles both of which hit and caused it to catch fire. At this time the escorts took charge and FLASHER was subjected to a very thorough depth charging.

Attack No. 3. Upon regaining periscope depth FLASHER again took the initiative and closed the convoy to attack what appeared to be another DD and the damaged AO which presented themselves as overlapping. A total of six torpedoes were fired from about 2000 yards on 120° track angles with four of them aimed at the DD and two aimed at the AO. Four hits were noted in the DD while the AO did not appear to be affected. Again FLASHER was given a very thorough working over which she successfully rode out and evaded.

Attack No. 4. Undaunted by counterattacks FLASHER surfaced in the late afternoon and observed the AO to be still burning and in an awash condition. At dark the submarine closed in for the kill and fired

— page 210 —
5-13/416-3
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FIGHTER
Cnr. of Float Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
3 January 1945.

FIRST INDORSEMENT to
USS FLASHER (SS249) -
Report of Fifth War
Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

---

**Attach No. 5.** On the morning of 21 December FLASHER contacted a convoy of five U.S. cruisers and three patrol craft which she chased and tracked until the early morning of 22 December. Taking advantage of the lackadaisical tactics of the DD escort the FLASHER attacked from the surface the two leading U.S. ships of the column with three torpedoes each from the two tubes at a range of 2200 yards on 1150 track angles. Two hits were obtained on each ship which set them afire and caused them to blow up.

**Attach No. 6.** This was the second phase of the preceding attack when FLASHER came about rapidly and fired four torpedoes from the stern tubes at the third U.S. ship of the column from 1900 yards range on 1300 track angles to obtain two hits. After burning for some time it too blew up and disappeared. The engagement was broken off after a short period of evasion with the DD which apparently never sighted the submarine.

4. With the exception of number three main engine the material condition was very good. She will be given a normal refit by U.S.S. BURYALE and Submarine Division 132 Roller Crew.

5. Cleanliness of the ship upon return from patrol was exceptional. The morale of the crew is very high.

6. The Squadron Commander extends his heartiest congratulations to the Commanding Officer, officers and crew upon the results of this highly effective patrol and for adding to the already illustrious record of the FLASHER. Since there was so much incendiary activity on the part of the enemy, it might be called the "Flashing Action" patrol.

C.C. BURLINGAME
Acting.

— page 211 —
14/pi
24 January 1945.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT:
USS FLASHER (cat. Ltr. A16-3 Serial 07, 1945, report of Fifth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS-249) - Report of Fifth War Patrol - Commanded on

1. The Fifth War Patrol of the FLASHER was conducted in the areas west of HAWAIʻI, and off the coast of INDIO CHINA, as a member of a coordinated search and attack group consisting of FLASHER, HAWKBILL, and BEGUINA under the tactical command of Captain E. H. BRYANT, U.S.N., in HAWKBILL.

2. The first series of attacks occurred on 4 December and were characterized by skill and determination. At 0745 a contact report from HAWKBILL indicated that FLASHER was on the path of a westbound convoy, and at 0749 four sets of masts were sighted through the rain squalls. At 0844, after tracking from ahead, FLASHER dived to conduct a submerged approach in the very spotty visibility still prevailing. At 0915 she fired four torpedoes at an ASASHIO CLASS DD which had appeared rudely cut off the mist at ranges 2,000 yards. Immediately after observing two hits on the DD, a four torpedo set-up was fired at a large tanker in the formation. Two hits in this target were bearing after driving down by a close, and close, escort vessel. FLASHER was depth-charged but returned to the attack and fired four more torpedoes at the DD at 1251. This counter attack was described as "a very thorough working over with many king-sized explosions very close ahead". Back at periscope depth at 1410 FLASHER observed that the DD had sunk, and that the tanker, burning from end to end, was a total loss. However, FLASHER had to administer the coup de grace at 1821 with one torpedo, range 600 yards.

3. The second series of attacks, which resulted in even more damage to the enemy, took place on 21 December. At 1008, while patrolling submerged off HON DOI, INDO-CHINA, FLASHER observed a convoy pass out of torpedo range, northbound along the coast. At 1204 she surfaced and commenced the chase. At 0100 the next morning, coming at the surface and during the next three hours FLASHER completely outmaneuvered the four escorts and succeeded in delivering a surface

— page 212 —
1606
FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 14/pr
24 January 1945.

SECOND INSTRUMENT TO:
USS FLASHER (SSP49) - Report of Fifth War Patrol - Combat O.I.

---

**Attack which produced six hits from ten torpedoes fired, and sank three loaded tankers.**

4. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is authorized for this patrol.

5. Commander GRIDER, his officers and Crew are congratulated upon this excellent patrol which has added the following assessed damage to the FLASHER's impressive total:

| SINK | GRAND TOTAL | 41,700 Tons |
|------|||
|      |             |              |

| DISTRIBUTION: | ORIGINAL COPY. |
|||
| Ccainch        | (3) Direct    | CTG-71.5     | (2) |
| Vice Opnav     | (2) Direct    | CTG-71.8     | (2) |
| Vice Opnav Op-230 | (1) | CTG-71.9     | (2) |
| Com2stFlt      | (1)           | DivComSubRon-12 | (1 each) |
| Com2ndFlt      | (1)           | DivComSubRon-18 | (1 each) |
| Com7thFlt      | (2)           | DivComSubRon-26 | (1 each) |
| ComSub1stFlt   | (30)          | S/M School, N.L. Conn. | (2) |
| ComSub2ndFlt   | (4)           | Comat, NYD Puget Sound | (1) |
| CTF-71          | (7)           | SubHd, Mare Island | (2) |
| CTG-71.3        | (2)           | S/Ms 7thFlt     | (1) |

---

**SUNK**

**JAMES FIRE.**

**DISTRIBUTION:**
Ccainch (3) Direct CTG-71.5 (2)
Vice Opnav (2) Direct CTG-71.8 (2)
Vice Opnav Op-230 (1) CTG-71.9 (2)
Com2stFlt (1) DivComSubRon-12 (1 each)
Com2ndFlt (1) DivComSubRon-18 (1 each)
Com7thFlt (2) DivComSubRon-26 (1 each)
ComSub1stFlt (30) S/M School, N.L. Conn. (2)
ComSub2ndFlt (4) Comat, NYD Puget Sound (1)
CTF-71 (7) SubHd, Mare Island (2)
CTG-71.3 (2) S/Ms 7thFlt (1)

---

**THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATER.**

---

**Flag Secretary.**

- B. MILLER,
- B. MILLER,
- Flag Secretary.

---

**-2 0168S**

— page 213 —
01634
R.S. No. 4
USS FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
1. Forwarded.
2. The Commander Seventh Fleet takes great satisfaction in congratulating the FLASHER on this excellent patrol.
J.G. KINKAID
T. C. KINKAID

Copy to:
ComSubRon 18
ComSubs, 7thFlt
USS FLASHER (SS249)

[Handwritten annotation: "Forwarded"]
[Handwritten annotation: "Copy to: ComSubRon 18 ComSubs, 7thFlt USS FLASHER (SS249)"]

[Handwritten annotation: "Chef's log"]
[Handwritten annotation: "R.T. Jones"]

— page 214 —
SS249/416-3/9
Serial:  013
From:    The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. FLASHER.
To:    The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Vfa:    Official Channels.
Subject:  U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249), Report of War
    Patrol Number Six.

Enclosures:
(A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (ComSubPao. Only).

1. Enclosure (A) covering the Sixth War Patrol of this vessel conducted in the Hainan Island and Indo-China areas of the China Sea during the period 27 January to 13 April 1945, is forwarded herewith.

2. During the period from 9 to 28 January 1945, the Commanding Officer acted as Pack Commander of a Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of the U.S.S. FLASHER and the U.S.S. B.S.H.W. This report also constitutes the report of the Pack Commander of that group.

G.W. GRIDDER

— page 215 —
35249

(A) : PROLOGUE.

Arrived Fremantle, W.A. from Fifth War Patrol on 2 January 1945. Refitted by U.S.S. EURYALE and Division 182 Relief Crew. Commander George Laird, U.S.N., was relief crew Commanding Officer.

The following major items were accomplished during the refit:

Main engines Nos. 3 and 4 were overhauled. Lower pressure-proof hatches were installed in crew's mess, after engine room, and after torpedo room.
A DRT (Monroe Odograph M-1) was installed in the conning tower.
The SJ antenna was replaced with a slotted type.
Stiffeners were welded to the outer hull in #2 and 3 auxiliary tanks and in safety tank. The ship was dry-docked and the bottom scraped and repainted.

The refit was completed on 17 January. Sound tests were conducted on the 18th. Five days of training followed during which three torpedoes were fired.

During refit Lieutenant F.F. Coffin, USNR, was detached and Ensign R. R. Harnar, USNR, reported aboard.

(B) NARRATIVE.

The following officers and chief petty officers are attached to this ship on her Sixth War Patrol:

| RANK OR RATE | PREVIOUS NUMBER WAR PATROL |
|||
| G. W. GRIDER, | Comdr. 6 |
| P. T. GLENNON, | Lt.Cdr. 8 |
| T. A. BURKE, Jr. | Lieut. 4 |
| T. R. McG. NTS, | Lieut. 5 |
| F. B. HARRISON, Jr. | Lt(jg) 3 |
| J. C. HAMLIN, | Lt(jg) 4 |
| J. E. ATKINSON, | Ensign 2 |
| R. R. HARNAR, | Ensign 0 |
| BUCK, Spiva L. | CHOM(AA) 8 |
| CAREY, Harold S. | CY(PA) 8 |
| CYPHERD, Victor M. | CEM(PA) 6 |
| DE BOIS, Frank S. | CNOM(AA)(T) 5 |

— page 217 —
31 January - 1 February 1945

Enroute Lombok Strait holding daily training dives and battle surfaces. The 20mms could not be made to perform properly. Frequent prolonged stoppages whose cause could not be determined undermined Commanding Officer's confidence in these particular guns.

The pit log has been reading low at submerged speeds.

2 February 1945

...it 1300 master Gyro out of commission for four hours due to low vacuum in rotor.

...it 1727, dived 18 miles south of Lombok Strait to await darkness. Surfaced at 1927 and transited the Strait at four-engine speed without incident. The transit was completed at 2230 just as the moon rose.

...it 2305 sighted a patrol boat bearing 070° (Shipcon No. 2). She was lying to about eight miles north of the Strait. We passed her at 9,000 yards without disturbing her.

FLASHER passed north of the Kangean Islands and set course for Karimata Strait.

3 February 1945

...it 1010 sighted and exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. BRIM.

...it 1120 made 3D contact on a Betty bomber (...iron No. 1); sighted him at nineteen miles and dived at seven. Watched him proceed eastward and surfaced at 1140 when he was out of sight through the periscope.

...it 1610 sighted and later exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. BLUEGILL.

4 February 1945

Sank two floating mines during the day. (See section I). Went to three-engine speed at 1433 in order to transit Karimata Strait during darkness.

— page 218 —
5 February 1945

Completed transit of Karimata Strait at 0525. At 0820 sighted large two-masted sailboat to the northeast (Shipoon No. 3). As we could not attack in vicinity of Karimata Strait, we avoided detection.

Trim dive at 1319. Remained submerged until 1540 in order to adjust pit log.

During night received orders to proceed to Area between Hainan and Cape Tourane for patrol with U.S.S. BASHWA. FLASHER OTC.

6 February 1945

At 0840 sighted a plane bearing 005° at a distance of about 15 miles. He did not close. (Aircon No. 2).

At 1315 lookout and O.O.D. sighted a bomber with zero angle on the bow, range about eight miles. Dived to 100 feet. (Aircon No. 3).

At 1317 four aerial bombs exploded, not very close. Surfaced at 1517.

During the night we checked the operation of the SD on North Natocna Island. It appeared to be operating properly.

7 February 1945

At 1044 sighted bomber coming in from ten miles. Dived and received three aerial bombs, not very close. (Aircon No. 4).

Surfaced at 1148.

During night sent FLASHER Serial two requesting rendezvous with BASHWA at 2200 on the ninth at southern limit of area.

Dived at dark to flush out No. 4 FBT.

8 February 1945

At 2110 exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. HAKE.

9 February 1945

Had SJ interference from two sources to the westward during the morning. We are proceeding up the Indo China coast, about sixty miles off shore. Weather is overcast with force five wind and frequent rain.

— page 219 —
11/14/45, made SD contact at 14 miles, friendly IFF. Contact closed to three miles and then opened without being sighted. Could not raise him on VHF or contact him on SJ. (Aircon No. 5). At 2120, rendezvoused with U.S.S. BISHW and passed over operation order for coordinated search and attack group. We will patrol the Rainan-Cape Touraine traffic lanes, midway between the two places, distance between subs about thirty miles. As this area has been clear of subs for some time and because it is believed that most of the traffic will pass us at night, we are going to run submerged during daylight in order to keep our presence unsuspected. At 2135, set course for patrol station on western end of scouting line.

10 February 1945

Dived at 0643. At 1305 sighted patrol bomber to the westward on southerly course, distant about 15 miles. (Aircon No. 6). At 1400, sighted same plane heading north. (Aircon No. 7). During afternoon routine torpedoes and swung ship to compensate magnetic compass. Surfaced for three minutes at 1641 to air out boat.

11 February 1945

Dived at 0649. No fix for four days. Made three minute surface in the afternoon.

12 February 1945

Dived at 0646. Surfaced at 1904. At 2210, received orders from CTF 71 to go after task force sighted by T.W.T.LUS and BL.CK-FIN heading north off the Indo China coast. Sent orders to the B.S.H.W to be on scouting line at Latitude 16:30, Longitude 111:00 at 1200 tomorrow; course 180, speed 10, distance between submarines 20 miles. This should cause us to intercept the task force about 2000 tomorrow night. At 2333, FLASHER headed south for a land fix on Caps Touraine.

— page 220 —
0232, having obtained an accurate fix on
Culao Cham Island, set course for position on
FLASHER-BASHAM scouting line. Seas are quite
heavy.

Believe BERGILL, BLOER, GUITARRO scouting
line will form to the south of us. Our line
will get the last crack at the task force if
it gets past all the other subs.

During the night and morning received con-
tact reports from FLUNDER and BLACKFIN which
indicated that the task force was making greater
speed than was first believed. Our scouting
line should now intercept at about 1500.

Received CTM 71 Serial 65 directing all hands
to be prepared to render life guard assistance
on the 15th and 14th. ...t 1000 ordered FLASHER
and BASHAM to shift to lifeguard frequency,
4475 k.s.

...t 1010 BASHAM reported herself on the scouting
line.

...t 1130 arrived on scouting line, made trim
dive at 1400 kt/T reading.

Surfaced at 1200 and started south at 10 knots.
(BLUE was forced down by a plane at 1153 as
late torpedo).

The original plan had been to attack after
dark to air air cover while getting into
position. During the morning the visibility
had been so poor that it was decided to accept
a day attack...about noon, however, the visi-
bility began to improve and it was decided to
revert to the original plan of a night attack.
...t 1130 was issued an order to proceed
full to raise BASHAM. ...assumed she had been
forcibly lost and remained north.

...t 1200 placing up SJ interference
bearings...assumed it was BASHAM although
we could not trace the radio.

...t 1230 was issued from BASHAM for-
port with the new son forced down by a plane
at 1130.

...t 1240 message to BASHAM instruct-
ing it to turn steering line at Lat. 16-45,
course 40° 30', passed at 1400, and to shift
back to the first target frequency. ...assumed BASHAM
would coast with the scouting line before dark.

...t 1400 was over forced under by a plane for
twenty minutes (Jargon No. 8).

— page 221 —
15:25, intercepted BLOWER message that she had attacked with one hit in BB and one in CA. She did not give task force position in this message. (At 1530 the task force came out of a rain-squall 12 miles from BASHAW. Sighting was mutual. Enemy opened fire with main battery and launched a plane. BASHAW dived but was unable to close. She surfaced at 1715 with enemy still in sight and sent contact report. (This information is from an SJ message the BASHAW sent us later. It is not known whether or not she had contact prior to the mutual sighting.))

At 1600, received a contact report on the Baker seaball's while placed the task force at 16 N at 1200. It true, we should sight them soon. At 1632, sighted plane from bridge at six miles. Dived and turned right through periscope until he disappeared. Hurried at 1638. (Aircon No. 9). At 1700, received BASHAW'S contact report giving enemy's 715 position. Our position was almost an hour of task force. Went to flank speed and course 045 it intercept. We could make 15 knots into the sea, taking over much water. At 1800, contact at 10 miles. Did not close. (Aircon No. 10). At 1823, began getting SJ interference bearing 124. Delivered it was BASHAW and that she was in contact with enemy. At 1837, 20 miles, friendly IFF. Retained contact until 1848. Called on VHF, no answer. Friendly scope? (Aircon No. 11). At 1900, exchanged recognition signals with BASHAW. He believed she had contact. At 1915, BASHAW sent message by SJ reporting the 6V hits at 1720 with the 4 miles behind the 4V. At 1940, being curious that we were behind enemy, we broke off the chase. The enemy was still outrun us on the surface and at 2000, the 4V came at him. Our line might not be at attack except for the unfortunate 4V. At 2020, the visibility on the BASHAW was never exceeded five miles. Decided to spend tomorrow in northeast corner of sub patrol areas to be available for life-guard duty tomorrow.

— page 222 —
14 February 1945

...at 0245, made SJ contact with plane at 4900 yards astern. Dived at 1700 yards. Surfaced 10 minutes later. (B/SHLW contacted a plane at midnight). (Aircon No. 12).
No calls for assistance during the day.
3D contact, 7 miles at 1150. Did not close. (Aircon No. 13).
...at 1700, started return to area.
During evening received message directing FLSHER and B/SHLW to patrol off east coast of Hainan Island.

15 February 1945

Set course for Tai Chow island, ordered B/SHLW to patrol 20-30 miles off shore. Dived at 0635 and patrolled off the island. Surfaced at 1909.

16 February 1945

Dived at 0635 and surfaced at 1915. Moved pack north to Sifa Point during night. The soundings around this point are meager and it looks like anybody's first choice for an anti-submarine minefield. Two days off Tai Chow have convinced us that the shipping must pass inshore of that island.

17 February 1945

Dived at 0627, six miles east of Sifa Point. B/SHLW on surface twenty miles to the east.
...at 1059, heard pinging bearing 312. Visibility through periscope about 3 miles. Came to course 290 to close Sifa Point. From then until 1130 pinging drew to left. We closed to 4 miles of Sifa without sighting targets.
Lost pinging at 1130. (Shipcon No. 4).
...it would be impossible to get in ahead of this target during daylight and as it would be in Yulinkan Bay by dark, decided to open out from beach, surface, and conduct a sweep up the coast tonight.
Surfaced at 1702, 9,000 yards from B/SHLW. Ordered her to take position 10 miles off Sifa Point and start on course 030 at 1630, speed 10. FLSHER 20 miles to eastward.
Proceeded northward up the east coast of Hainan.

-8-

— page 223 —
16 February 1945

...t 0200, changed scouting front to course 065 on Formosa-Tonkon Point route. ...t 0900, headed back for Sifa Point.
...t 1058, SD contact 22 miles, friendly IFF. 100% overcast. Picked up by SJ at 4 miles. Passed at 2 miles headed west. Not sighted. Followed out to 46 miles on SD then he closed again. ...t 1126 he passed over at 1900 yards without being sighted. (.ircon No. 14). We called on VHF without success during the entire time.
...t 1145, SD contact 10 miles, friendly IFF, closing. Dived when range was 7 miles. (.ircon No. 15). Surfaced at 1241.
...t 1425, SD contact 20 miles. No IFF. Dived at range of 7 miles. (.ircon No. 16). Surfaced at 1454.

19 February 1945

Ordered a patrol line whose center was 40 miles off Tonkon Point. P.A.NITO had reported good hunting in this area.
SD contact at 1116. Visibility poor. Dived at 3 miles. (.ircon No. 17). Surfaced at 1129.
...t 1131, SD contact. Dived at 2 miles. (.ircon No. 18). Feel this plane was friendly, but he showed no IFF and would not answer VHF. Surfaced at 1143 with contact at 19 miles going away.
...t 1415, SD contact 9 miles; did not close. (.ircon No. 19).
...t 1458 sank a floating mine with 20mm gunfire. (See section I).
...t 1627, SD contact 30 miles; no IFF. (.ircon No. 20). Called him on VHF and by voice on 4475 kcs; turned on the JFK. No response. We have radiated with everything but cosmic rays in an effort to establish communications with these planes. If the visibility ever improves, we may be able to communicate visually.
...t 1628, changed course to arrive off Sifa Point by midnight.

20 February 1945

B.S.H.M. spent day submerged off Sifa Point.
...t 1825, SD contact 16 miles. SJ contact at same time. Thought we had a convoy with air cover. Dived when range closed to 10 miles to avoid detection. Surfaced at 1901 and chased for an hour without results. (.ircon No. 21). SJ contact was on plane.

— page 224 —
1. NARRATIVE (Cont'd).
   - About 2300 sent message to B.S.H.W to form scouting line athwart the Hainan Strait-Hong Kong traffic route about fifty miles from the strait and to arrive by 1600 on 21st. Proceeded to new position.

21 February 1945
   - At 1400 arrived on station and started patrolling. Visibility about four miles.
   - Sent contact report to B.S.H.W. Tracked target on 220. Lost sight and radar contact at 10,700 yards.
   - At 1626, SJ and sight contact with B.S.H.W ahead of us. Sent her message by SJ telling situation, that targets were "DBS or smaller" and that we were diving; to investigate and attack.
   - At 1636, headed on generated true bearing of targets and dive.
   - At 1739, long after the generated range and passed zero, made preparations to surface.
   - At 1743, sighted two sea trucks with zero angle on bow. Let them pass. Did not surface because we wanted to coordinate the gun attack with B.S.H.W. There would be enough moonlight for a gun attack.
   - At 1859 surfaced and headed after targets. Crew B.S.H.W. the information by SJ. Picked up targets at 1918. It was now raining and visibility appeared too poor for a good gun attack.
   - Discussed it with B.S.H.W by SJ. She expressed a desire to shoot two torpedoes at them. Told them to go ahead.
   - Tracked B.S.H.W as she made her approach. At 2045 one sea truck disintegrated.
   - B.S.H.W reported missing one and suggested a gun attack. Told him to wait for us; we closed.
   - At about 2126 B.S.H.W opened fire with 20mm and 40mm. Her deck gun would not fire.
   - At 2126 FL.S.H.W opened fire at about 1500 yard range. No return fire. Continued to fire spasmodically until 2154 at average ranges of 500 yards. Visibility prevented accurate shooting at greater ranges.
   - At 2154 after firing 26 rounds of 4" for about ten hits, plus many smaller caliber hits from both ships, the target capsized.

— page 226 —
5. FLASHER (SS249)

(B) NARRATIVE (Cont'd):

24 February 1945.

Chased down for ten minutes by SJ contacted plans at 0308. Dived at four miles (air con No. 24).

Visibility had improved during the day. Got first glimpses of the sun since entering the area.

Made six aircraft contacts during day. (air con No. 25-30). Chased under at 1058 by six twin-engine bombers. Apparently the clear weather has brought out all the Japs.

During evening received HOS'S contact report of a convoy headed for Yulinkan Bay. We could not intercept before they reached the coast. Decided to intercept the evening of the 25th off Hainan. Moved scouting line to a point that will cover both the Hainan Strait and Tonkon Point routes to the Empire.

25 February 1945

Chased under three times by planes during day. (air con No. 31-33). The contact at 1133 was on seven twin engines bombers that we watched fly right over us; we were submerged. None of these planes showed any evidence of radar.

...t 1700, heard two distant explosions through hull. Believed at the time that it was the B.S.H.L.W. getting bombed.

...t 1731, SD contact 22 miles. Did not close. (air con No. 34). This confirmed our belief.

...t 1807 picked up B.S.H.L.W.SJ interference.

...t 1931 B.S.H.L.W. reported by SJ that she was in contact with a small K with GHIDORI escort, that she had missed the GHIDORI that afternoon with four torpedoes, and that her transmitter was temporarily out of commission.

Went to full speed to intercept. B.S.H.L.W. gave target course 180, speed nine. We should be on target's port bow.

...t 2035 B.S.H.L.W. reported by SJ that she was submerging for the attack. Full moon made surface attack impracticable although sky was overcast.

...t 2045 established SJ contact with targets. Worked into position 8,000 yards ahead and awaited results of B.S.H.L.W.S attack. Target took large zig to his right soon after B.S.H.L.W.S SJ interference disappeared. (Ship con No. 6).

...t 2138 when it became evident that B.S.H.L.W. had missed, and when about five miles north of North Tava Island, submerged to radar depth. Went to

— page 227 —
1. NARRATIVE (Cont'd).
2. periscope depth when range to escort was 4,000 yards. CHIDORI was about 2,000 yards ahead of target.
3. It 2148 heard two loud explosions. Must have been random depth charges dropped by escort as it seemed a little late for B.S.H.I.'S end of run explosions.
4. Swung for stern shot when it appeared that we were dead ahead of target.
5. It 2200, with generated range 700 yards, took a ping range: "Possible echo 900 yards". Set in 800 yards on TDQ.
6. It 2201 with gyro angles very near 180 and with a generated range of 900 yards, fired three stern tubes at the K, spread by periscope.
7. Minute and a half later when it was evident that we had missed, started preparing for a bow shot. Had already started the swing.
8. Two minutes and twenty seconds after firing stern tubes, heard one hit. Swung periscope on target, could see him enveloped in smoke. Observed second hit which caused a brisk explosion aboard. Observed third hit which left nothing but a puff of smoke where the target had been.
9. We had a range error of 1300 yards and witnessed the great advantage of small gyro angles for night shots. How they all happened to hit is unexplained.
10. The CHIDORI returned to the scene of his late convoy for a brief moment then began an ineffective search, finally disappearing to the south. We had him in sight for about an hour and could still hear distant pinging when we surfaced.
11. FL.S.H.I. reloaded and surfaced at 2335. Informed B.S.H.I. of results and gave a scouting line for tomorrow, centered at Latitude 20-30, Longitude 112-35. Did not deem it feasible to pursue the CHIDORI amongst the islands and shoals of the Hainan coast. There was still a chance of intercepting the HOE'S contact.

26 February 1945

It 0245 made SJ contact with plane at 10,500 yards. He buzzed around until 0914 when he finally got on the beam and started in. Dived when range closed to 6,000 yards. Last SJ range 1,000 yards. (Lircon No. 35). No PR indication. Surfaced at 0321.
It 0953 sighted large plane to westward, headed south. Did not close. (Lircon No. 36).
Two friendly planes or SD at 1135. Did not close to less than 11 miles. Did not answer VHF. (Lircon No.37).

— page 228 —
27 February 1945

...t 0701, while headd... 20 miles off coast, sighted two ships on hazy horizon. Sent contact report to B.S.H.W. (Shipcon No. 7). ...fter some time of dashing away because they looked close and then dashing in when we lost contact, B.S.H.W reported that they were two sea trucks. She must have had a better horizon than we did. Went to battle stations and closed the range. They proved to be two luggers of a boat fifty tons each. One had a dummy gun on the deck house which he never manned. ...t 0907, opened fire with 20mm and 4" at a range of about 2,000 yards. Closed range to 400 as action progressed and targets appeared unarmed. Targets stayed fairly close together and circled. B.S.H.W arrived on scene and joined in about 0930; her 4" was back in commission. Fire 4" rounds of 4", 260 rounds of 20mm, 250 rounds of 1" at 1,000 yards. One 1" exploded, the other was left burning from one to six and listing with holes below the waterline. Two still afloat. Finally went alongside and threw three hand grenades into hull, but she was still afloat when last seen. We did not fire more 4" because we were down to 11 rounds and it was obvious that he was completely destroyed. During the action, sighted a sail on the horizon. Did not attack. Broke off at 1000. B.S.H.W opened fire again on remaining target at 1025 and may have sunk it. Two aircraft contacts during morning and early afternoon that did not close. (Lircons No.38-39). ...t 1752, SD contact at 19 miles. Sighted at 6 miles. ...1iberator. IFF began to show at 3 miles.

-14-

— page 230 —
2 March 1945

Dived at 0621.
At 0957 sighted a Liberator. (Aircon No. 45).
At 1338 sighted a Liberator passing close aboard. (Aircon No. 46). Surfaced at 1339 to communicate with plane. Could not establish VHF contact, but he told us by blinker that he would search to the south and report any contacts.
FLASHER headed south at full speed.
An hour later received a contact report from our plane on a BETTY bomber headed in our direction. This report came on the area frequency. The BETTY was never contacted. Too bad it couldn't have been a convoy. Also too bad we were never able to establish a working agreement with any of our planes while we were in the area.
At 1945 reversed course.

3 March 1945

At 0100 set course for point MAXI.
At 0200, sent despatch to CTF 71 giving new time of arrival.
At 0800, entered safety lane.
Sighted several Liberators during the day.

4 March 1945

At 0530, rendezvoused with U.S.S. DAY (DE 225) and set course for Subic Bay.
At 0950, moored alongside the tanker ESSO PORTLAND in Subic Bay and commenced fueling.
At 1557, completed fueling and at 1635 moored in most alongside U.S.S. GRIFFIN.

4 - 7 March 1945

During this period the following items were accomplished:
Hull repainted.
Loose frames in superstructure were rewelded. This was the cause of the thumping noise we had experienced.
Removed negative tank flood valve, renewed gaskets, and replaced flood valve.
Renewed VHF.
Flushed out one fresh water evaporator.

— page 231 —
8 March 1945

Uncleary at 0700 in company with U.S.S. THATCHER (DD514), escort. Released escort at 1130 and proceeded westward through the joint zone.

Sighted many friendly planes during the day.

9 March 1945

Cleared safety lane at 0830 and set course for Cape Varella to join BLUEBACK Pack in that vicinity.

Sighted two friendly aircraft during the day. (Aircons No. 47 and 48).

Dived at 1601 to take sound level reading on port shaft. Surfaed at 1640.

Tested 20mms at 1850.

At 2300 received orders from Pack Commander to patrol 60 miles east of Varella tomorrow, and to rendezvous when practicable.

10 March 1945

At 0812, sighted U.S.S. BLACKFIN 45 miles east of Varella. Exchanged information, then proceeded to our assigned station.

At 1630, set course for BLUEBACK'S station in order to rendezvous at dusk.

At 1830, sighted BLUEBACK. Went close aboard and received operation order. There are to be five stations, spaced at 2, 17, 30, 45, and 60 miles east of Varella. Stations are numbered 1 through 5 from west to east. BLUEBACK to keep station 3, the other four subs to rotate daily.

-17-

— page 232 —
11 March 1945

Patrolled seven miles off Varella during the night. Moved in to two miles before dawn. Dived to escape detection at 0601 when we sighted a sailing boat between ourselves and land. During the day at least 50 sailboats passed us. All were headed south. Most of them were two-masters of about 30 foot length. Number 1 engine out of commission with leaky gasket on lube oil cooler. Surfaced at 1950 and moved out to seven miles. At 2049, SJ contact on BERG.IL. Exchanged calls and info with her. At 2100, headed east for station five. At 2312, exchanged calls with BLUEBLOK and picked her up on SJ at 7600 yards. Lost SJ contact with her at 2335, bearing 346. At 2354, SJ operator reported a possible plane contact bearing 296 (T), 17,000 yards. At 2355, sighted firing on the horizon bearing 321 (T). There were two sources, each firing what looked like two 20mm and one larger gun. Headed for the firing at three-engine speed. (No. 1 engine still out of commission). At 2357, SJ contact on two small ships bearing 321 (T), range 12,600 yards. (Shipcon No. 8).

12 March 1945

At about 0000, began hearing depth charges. Estimate of the situation: The BLUEBLOK was attacked while on the surface by a two-ship hunter-killer group. She may have mistaken them for friendly submarines. (FLASHER had SJ interference from three friendly sources at the time.) They opened fire, forced her under and depth charged her. Our initial contact on the "plane" must have been on these ships with an erroneous bearing. The depth charging lasted only a few minutes, then ceased and the hunter-killer group began a search of the area. FLASHER kept clear. They appeared to be smaller than DES. At 0050, sent contact report to pack warning them of presence of group. At 0050 the two ships departed on course 190, speed 13. FLASHER resumed

— page 233 —
13 March 1945

Dived at 1555 for sound level test of port
screw. Noise level is up one DB.
Surfaced at 1614.
...t 1645, PR contact at 107 mgcs. Continued
intermittently until 1730.
...t 1724, received report from BLUEB. CK that
she had an IRP contact at 70 mgcs.
...t 1748, received orders from Pack Commander
to shift immediately to station 2. Went to full
speed and headed west.
...t 1604, sighted BLUEB. CK in station 4.
...t 1924, exchanged calls with SE. ROBIN. She
was seeking BLUEB. CK for a rendezvous to deliver
mail. Directed her to BLUEB. CK.
...t 2025, exchanged calls with H. W. K. BILL.
...t 2335, exchanged calls with BERG. L.

14 March 1945

...t 0954, sighted twelve B-25s headed south.
Could not raise on VHF. (Iron No. 51).

~19~

— page 234 —
35. FLASHER (SS249)

(B) NARRATIVE (Cont'd).

It 1320, sighted our Liberator search plane. Talked to him on VHF. He said there were four ships, all beached and apparently destroyed near Qui Nohn Bay. (Aircon No. 52). This was our first successful communication with a plane. It 1705, sighted a mast to the westward. Investigation identified it as a small sail boat. It 2100, set course for station 1, off Varella. During evening received word of a plane sighting of a nine ship convoy south of Saigon. Also received word from Pack Commander that there were enemy submarines 200 miles to the north and that submerged patrols for all stations were authorized.

15 March 1945

Patrolled during night five miles off Varella. It 0404, SJ contact at 3300 yards, moving very slowly. Thinking it might be an aviator that had been reported down in the area, we closed. It turned out to be a small southbound sailboat. We were sighted and the helmsman of the sailboat held a loft a burning faggot to make sure we saw him. Retired. It 0557, submerged two miles east of Varella. During the day at least 200 sailboats passed us heading south. It one time there were 57 in sight. It 1733, sighted a small lugger which came up from the south, hugging the coast; reversed course when abeam of the lighthouse, and retired into Vung Ro Bay. He may have been some sort of a tender for this tremendous fleet of sail boats. (Shipcon 9).

Surfaced at 1922. The waters to the south of Pape Varella were alive with small bobbing lights, presumably from anchored sail boats. It 2100, set course for station 5, exchanging calls with the BERG.II and H.M.BILL during the night. Received amplifying report from Pack Commander on the enemy submarines. The BRILL had sighted a torpedo 200 miles to the north. Pack Commander repeated that we were authorized to patrol submerged at discretion. Stations 2 and 4 were moved 15 miles south. BERG.II reported that she had picked up lost aviator.

— page 235 —
16 March 1945

At 1000, SD contact 12 miles. Sighted two B-25s. We had been to id that they were making a shipping strike. (Aircon No. 53).

At 1108, friendly SD contact at 6 miles. Passed at 3 miles without being sighted. (Aircon No. 54).

At 1143, AFR contact 176 mgos, a BN free-curoy. Called on VHF and a P-38 answered. This was another shipping strike. Picked up on SD at 30 miles. (Aircon No. 55).

At 2100, proceeded to station four.

17 March 1945

At 1556 sighted our search Liberator. Could not raise him on VHF. (Aircon No. 56).

18 March 1945

Patrolled station two, fifteen miles east of Varella. Cruised all day at two-en, line speed and zig-zagged fifty degrees either side of base course.

...at 0949, our search Liberator went by. Could not raise him on VHF. (Aircon No. 57).

At 1043, the pack engaged in a search drill when Pack Commander mistook plane's position report for a contact report. Headed southeast at full speed.

At 1055, AFR contact at 158 mgos which continued throughout the day. Appeared to be land-based.

At 1200, mistake was discovered and we were ordered to return to station.

At 2100, shifted to station 1.

19 March 1945

Dived at 0600, two miles east of Varella, Sighted about ten sailboats during the day.

At 1417, sighted small sea truck heading north close to the beach. (Shipcon No. 10).

Surfaced at 1924.

At 2100, set course for station 5.

20 March 1945

At 0714, SD contact 14 miles. Did not close. (Aircon No. 58).

— page 236 —
21 March 1945

During night, Pack Commander E. H. Handy, in the
of pack, placing three subs, at points two miles
off the coast, our station to be ten miles south-
east of Varelta.

At 0728, sighted BUBBAK patroling on surface
about ten miles east of Varelta.

At 0815, on station. Remained at two-engine
speed and steered very erratic courses because of
enemy submarine menace.

At 0954, SJ contact on two planes to the south
at 32,000 yards. From then until 1138 we were in
continuous contact and communications with friend-
ly planes. Thoro was a striking force of B-25s

-22-

— page 238 —
23 March 1945

At 0100, Pack Commander ordered pack to move north to a line off Pulo Gambir. Our station two miles east of the island. Proceeded.

Dived at 0547.

Sighted numerous southbound sailboats during the day.

Surfaced at 1931.

At 2100, proceeded to station five.

24 March 1945

At 0430, received orders from HAWKIII to proceed with her to a point at Lat. 12°05'N, Long. 109°35'E. With HAWKIII thirteen miles further west to assist search planes in rescue of crew of downed B-25. Set course south at full speed.

At 1010, sighted EBY to the west. (Aircon No. 67).

At 1103, sighted two B-25's searching for aviators. (Aircon No. 68).

Communicated with HAWKIII; she reported results of air search negative.

At 1112 sighted HAWKIII to the westward. She headed for us. At 1135, communicated with her on the VHF from 1000 yards.

As we had orders to report to CTF 17 the following evening, we departed to the northeast. HAWKIII, bound for Fremantle, departed to the south.

At 2200, sent departure message to CTF 71.

25 March 1945

At 0716, exploded a floating moored-type mine with rifle fire.

At 1219, SD contact 28 miles; did not close. (Aircon No. 69).

At 2000 sent message to CTF 17 reporting and requesting routing instructions.

— page 239 —
26 March 1945

At 0840, SD contact 18 miles. Did not close. (Aircon No. 70).
At 0854, SD contact 20 miles. Talked to "OBOE XRAY" on VHF. Not sighted. (Aircon No. 71).
At 2236, SJ contact on plane at 24,000 yards. Friendly IFF. Turned on AK. (Aircon No. 72). This plane was apparently suspicious of us; circling us many times and closing in as close as three miles. At 2320, plane dropped a flare about two miles abeam that might have been an illumination flare or a recoo signal. By this time we were suspicious of him. Could not raise him on VHF.
At 2339, when he had once more closed to 3 miles, we fired a recoo grenade. This seemed to satisfy him and he went away.

27 March 1945

At 0150, exchanged recoo signals by SJ with friendly submarine.
At 0315, SD contact at 28 miles. Did not close. (Aircon No. 73). Four more aircraft during day. (Airsons Nos. 74-77).
At 2330, entered Pacific Ocean through Balintang Channel.

28 March 1945

At 0825, SJ contact at 18 miles. Did not close. (Aircon No. 78).
At 1015, sighted U.S.S. PIRINHA. ahead. During the next twenty four hours overtook the PIRINHA. SJ: OWL, bearing 115; all headed through the safety lane to Saigon, as we were.
At 1232, sighted a floating moored-type mine which we exploded with rifle fire at 1345. The PIRINHA saw the explosion and headed to our assistance. Told him on area frequency that we had sunk a mine. The SE. GUL reported sinking one at almost the same instant.
At 1912, exchanged recoo signals with the SE. OWL, bearing 115.
At 2357, SJ contact on SE. OWL, bearing 110, range 9,700 yards.

-25-

— page 240 —
22 March 1945

The following times are ITEM:
...t 0100, received message from SEU. CWL on zone frequency reporting her SJ contact on us and asking us to identify ourselves; we complied. Range was 7,000 yards at this time.
...t 0615, exchanged recce signals with U.S.S. PUFFER. Closed range on her and exchanged info on the VHF; then pulled ahead.
...t 0727 a Liberator flew over us headed south. (Lircon No. 79).
...t 1515, began picking up PR contacts on 200, 225 and 425 ngs, which gradually grew stronger. Had characteristics of friendly radar.
...t 1654, picked up interference on SJ, bearing 152. Believe this was SG interference.
...t 1659, SJ contact bearing 167, range 16,7000 yards. Changed course to 045 to keep from closing. Ship was tracked on course 330 at 16 knots. (Ship con No. 11).
...t 1929 lost SJ contact to the westward. Noted new set of interference to south. We now had four PR contacts, all at saturation.
...t 1950, SJ contact bearing 196, range 14,000 yards. Turned away and went to full speed. (Ship con No. 12). This ship chased us for about 45 minutes, gradually closing the range. ...t 2016, when the range had closed to 11,000 yards, flashed the second identification signal at him. He answered with the first challenge and we replied properly. He then asked for our call, which we gave. He responded with his cell, which we could not read. He then departed to the northwest; we resumed course.
...t 2034, another SJ contact to the south; two ships bearing 106, range 13,600 yards. They hold their course and we passed clear without being challenged. (Chircon No. 13).

30 March 1945

Continued to have PR contacts until 0815.
...t 1207, sighted and exchanged signals with U.S.S. SNOOK on opposite course.
...fina and seas have been increasing during the past two days. Sunt message to CTF 17.7 delaying our arrival on day to 2 .mril.

-26-

— page 244 —
4" / 50 cal. 20 MM 30 Cal. MG
USS. FLASHER (SS249)
Patrol No. 6
Date: 21 February 1945
Lat. 20° 23'N
Long. 111° 31'E

TARGET D.T.T. - D.M.GE INFLICTED:
Sunk: One sea truck, 150 tons, identified by survivor (POW). (EQ).

Damaged or probably sunk: None.

Damage determined by: Observed 10 or 12 hits and target's disappearance from the radar screen. -approached within 25 yards of sinking target to take prisoner. Target was keel up with cargo floating all around. Survivors were on the target and in the surrounding water.

DET. ITS C. ACTION:
During the action the following guns were fired with ammunition expended as noted:

4"/50 cal. 20 MM 30 Cal. MG
H.G. - 24
Common - 2
- 90
- 175

The average firing range was 1000 yards. Several runs were made, firing as the target came into range, first to port then to starboard. Target speed was 4 or 5 knots. This ship followed the U.S.S. B.S.H.W in on several runs then maneuvered independently when it was apparent that the B.S.H.W/S4-inch gun was not functioning. Radar ranges were used with spotting from the gun. The target did not return fire. No erratic performances were noted at the four inch; the 20MM performance was poor due to malfunctioning of both guns (see Major Defects). It is estimated that ten to twelve 4-inch hits were made.

The U.S.S. B.S.H.W was also firing on this target and shares credit for its destruction.

— page 245 —
0911(H)  Date: 27 February 1945 Lat. 19° 20'N Long. 111° 18'E

TARGET DATA - DETECTED INFLICTED:

Sunk: Two luggers, 50 tons, of the Victor .ble Division, Small Japanese Ships Identification (EG).

Damaged or probably sunk: None.

Damage determined by: Both targets broke into flame when hit, the bridge or deck house burning first. One target finally capsized and, when last seen, only the bow was above surface. The other target was approached and hand grenades thrown aboard. It was burning throughout its length when last observed.

DETECTED ACTION:

During the attack the following guns were fired with ammunition expended as noted:

| Range | Type    | Caliber | Weight | Range | Type    | Caliber | Weight |
|-------||||-------||||
| 4"    | 50 cal.  | -       | -      | 28    | 16       | -       | 360    |
| 20    | MM      | -       | -      | 360   | 250      | -       | 250    |

Targets were approached to approximately 2000 yards before opening fire. ...this range they were close together and fire was divided between the two. Both were on fire within five minutes. ...verage firing range was 1000 yards. Targets became rattled and did little maneuvering after the first hits; they did not return fire. Radar ranges were used with spotting from the gun. Performance of the 4" gun was good with about 50 percent hits. 20 MM performance was again poor due to malfunctioning of the guns (See Major Defects).

The U.S.S. BASHAN was also firing upon these targets and shares credit for their destruction.

— page 246 —
1. MINES.
2. No minelaying operations were noted.
3. Floating mines were observed in the following locations and disposed of as indicated:
   - Date: 2/4/45, Lat: 2/4/45, Long: 2/4/45, Disposition: 2/4/45,

— page 247 —
20 MM Machine Guns.

Enroute station test firing of the 20 MM guns revealed frequent cases of failure to fire. The failure was common to all guns and careful inspection failed to give any indication as to the cause. The symptoms were somewhat similar to those given in the instruction book for a free trigger casualty. At times the gun would fire a short burst - then upon attempt to resume fire there would be a "click" - the bolt and block assembly would not go forward and the gun would remain in the cocked position. The application of slight tension with the cocking lanyard would free the gun and, without pulling the trigger, the bolt and block assembly would go forward to the uncocked position.

During voyage repairs at Subic Bay the U.S.S. GRIFFIN inspected the guns and reported having had similar trouble on previous occasions with other guns. They attributed the cause to a worn trigger hook and renewed this part in all guns.

Although helping to some extent, this did not entirely eliminate the trouble. The same condition described above still exists.

— page 248 —
20 MM Machine Guns.

Enroute station test firing of the 20 MM guns revealed frequent cases of failure to fire. The failure was common to all guns and careful inspection failed to give any indication as to the cause. The symptoms were somewhat similar to those given in the instruction book for a free trigger casualty. At times the gun would fire a short burst - then upon attempt to resume fire there would be a "click" - the bolt and block assembly would not go forward and the gun would remain in the cocked position. The application of slight tension with the cocking lanyard would free the gun and, without pulling the trigger, the bolt and block assembly would go forward to the uncocked position.

During voyage repairs at Subic Bay the U.S.S. GRIFFIN inspected the guns and reported having had similar trouble on previous occasions with other guns. They attributed the cause to a worn trigger hook and renewed this part in all guns.

Although helping to some extent, this did not entirely eliminate the trouble. The same condition described above still exists.

— page 252 —
35. FLASHER (SS249)

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS (Cont'd).

The blower consisted of about a 1/20 H.P. electric motor and fan salvaged from an electric fan: its capacity was so small that it could not increase the volume of air supplied forward by as much as 5%.

...although the air conditioning plant on this vessel is in good operating condition, ventilation in the Forward Torpedo Room and Forward Battery Compartment continues to be unsatisfactory. Installation of additional cooling coils and a booster blower of sufficient capacity in the Control Room should improve conditions. It is also recommended that larger air-conditioning compressor motors be installed, as that the compressors can be operated at somewhere near their rated speed of 650 R.P.H., instead of at 330 R.P.H., the present maximum speed.

-44-

— page 253 —
1. RADIO.
(1). Reception.
The reception on all circuits during the patrol was satisfactory. However, interference from enemy stations on the fox frequencies at times completely blanked out VIXO'S signal especially if this signal was weak (this was usually the case during the afternoon). Frequency 12.630 Kcs, was used most of the time to copy the sub schedule. Frequency 9,250 Kcs, was used when the schedule on the above frequency could not be copied.

All Wolf Paok Frequencies were received satisfactorily. CW method was the primary means of clearing traffic and was found to be superior to voice. Aircraft - boat reception on this circuit was satisfactory but there was an excessive amount of plain language which would be of considerable value to the enemy if it were intercepted.

The lifeguard frequency, 4,475 Kcs, was used several times and proved to be entirely satisfactory for plane - boat and boat - boat communications.

During the patrol four serials were not received on the sub fox schedule. It is believed, that these would not have been missed if more reruns of the submarine traffic were made. The periods during the day when VIXO just sends her call could be utilized by sending the previous day's sub fox schedule.

(2). Transmission.
Ten messages were cleared on the ship to shore frequencies. Considerable trouble was encountered in establishing communications. The call up was answered on the frequency called only five times. Usually the call up and receipt were effected on the fox frequency. This was due to the week signal of the station answering and interference from other stations. On one occasion the message was sent by the "TT" method. It was received and placed on the schedule. In sending a message to NPN it was necessary to have the base ship at Subic relay it to NPN.

— page 254 —
1. RADIC (Cont'd)
2. Frequency 8,470 Kos.was used to transmit messages at night and frequency 12,705 Kos.
3. Trans. Freq. No. Posit Time Date Sta. Kos. Signal Strength
4. 21°30'S 1740 1/30/45 VHAL 12,705 5
5. 00°10'N 1513 2/7/45 VXG 8,470 5
6. 20°12'N 111°32'E 1613 2/25/45 VXG 8,470 0
7. 18°10'N 2053 2/28/45 VXG 6,470 0
8. 14°42'N 1655 3/2/45 VXG 8,470 0
9. 13°12'N 1001 3/20/45 VXG 8,470 0
10. 14°07'N 1430 3/24/45 VXG 8,470 0
11. 18°14'N 1230 3/25/45 Z44N 8,470 5
12. 19°47'N 1915 3/26/45 NHN 8,470 5
13. 20°45'N 1540 3/28/45 NDP4 4,155 5

(3). VHF and other Electronic Equipment.

During the first part of the patrol the operation of the VHF was unsatisfactory. Neither planes nor boats could be contacted at any range even when known to be on the same frequency. At Subic the antenna was shortened, steel bolts on the antenna insulator were replaced by brass, and a new VHF was installed. Operation for the remainder of the patrol was satisfactory and planes could be worked out to ranges of 30 to 35 miles.

— page 255 —
1. RADIO (Cont'd).
The AFR was operated continuously in the patrol area. In addition to its normal use, this equipment was used to tell if the AEK was being properly triggered, if the BN was transmitting, and if the VHF was putting out. (See Section U for enemy radar interceptions).

The BN was kept in a stand-by condition the greater part of the time, but keyed only on contact. Its operation was satisfactory and total casualties were three 15-E oscillator tubes.

One AEK unit appeared to be keying intermittently when triggered. It was replaced by the spare which triggered itself. The original unit was then reinstalled even though the signal it put out appeared weak and erratic. The AEK was turned on only when visual or radar contact was made on a friendly plane.

The Loran operated satisfactorily from an electronic point of view although most of the patrol was made in areas not adequately covered by the network. At one time, fifteen stations were picked up on the receiver although few of them could be identified.

(1) RADAR.
(1). SJ Radar.

The SJ was operated almost continuously in the area. This was necessary because of the poor visibility conditions which prevailed. The efficiency was conserved to drop at times when it had been run for three days continuously; this was probably caused by heat. The radar was out of commission only once for a short period of time. This was due to a condenser, C22B, in the transmitter being shorted.

The ranges obtained were a little below normal on all contacts. An average range on a submarine was 10,000 yards and on aircraft, which were mostly B-24's and B-25's, about 15,000 to 30,000 yards depending on the altitude.

— page 257 —
(GOT)    DEPTH OF    DEPTH GRADIENT    TOTAL GRADIENT
Date    TIME    POSITION    WATER (Fm)    STARTED (Ft)    OBSERVED (°F)
2/7/45  0244   7°08'N    800    20    6    Neg.
2/10/45 0846  17°6.8N    100    120    4    Neg.
2/19/45 0609  16°46'N    60    140    4    Neg.
2/22/45 2200  20°40'.5N    57    120    4    Neg.
2/23/45 1908  19°45'N    65    100    4    Neg.
3/22/45 0847  12°32'N    70    20    4    Neg.
3/22/45 2147  13°35'N    65    10    5    Neg.
3/24/45 0819  12°58'N    1300    40    3    Neg.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY.

The health of the crew was excellent. Only the usual minor ailments appeared and the Chief Pharmacist's Mate handled them with little difficulty.

The food was well prepared and the quality was good. The meals showed a vast improvement over those issued on the last run.

The habitability was good in spite of disagreeable weather experienced off the Hainan Coast. The large number of days spent on the surface helped to improve living conditions.

(Q) PERSONNEL.

(a) Number of men on board during patrol - 78
(b) Number of men qualified at start of patrol - 54
(c) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - 65
(d) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol - 15
(e) Number of men advanced in rating during patrol - 12

— page 258 —
1998 Mi. 26,835 Gal.
In Area (Part 1) 6697 Mi. 71,319 Gal.
Area to Subic Bay 410 Mi. 5,822 Gal.
Subic Bay to Area 403 Mi. 5,445 Gal.
In Area (Part 2) 4374 Mi. 60,928 Gal.
Area to Pearl Harbor 5233 Mi. 77,226 Gal.

(D) DURATION:
Days enroute to Area - 6
Days in Area (Part 1) - 29
Days enroute to Subic Bay - 1
Days at Subic Bay - 4
Days enroute to Area - 1
Days in Area (Part 2) - 19
Days enroute to Pearl Harbor - 17
Days submerged - 10

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING:
Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel

25 24,430 gal. 14 days 7 days

Limiting factor this patrol - dispatch orders.

(U) INTERCEPTION OF ENEMY RADAR TRANSMISSIONS:
| Date | Freq. (Mhz) | Freq. (Mhz) | RCM LOG: | Tuning Unit | Remarks |
|------||||||
| Feb.4 | 50 15'15" | 148         | 375      | 2.5       | TN2 Antenna rotating very slowly and regularly. Signal was weak and usual pulse shaped. Had signal 5 sec. out of every 30 sec. |
| Feb.7 | 80 28'12" | 128         | 4.5       |            | TN2 Good signal strength. Appeared to be sweeping irregularly. Usual pulse shape noted. |

— page 260 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FCTF-FCUR.
Te: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS 249) SIXTH WAR PATROL - Comments on.

1. The Sixth War Patrol of the U.S.S. FLASHER was conducted in the Hainan Island and Indo-China Areas of the China Sea. The patrol was made under the operational command of Commander Tasi. Force 71 and was of 77 days' duration, broken only by a four-day stop at Subic Bay. For part of the Patrol the FLASHER and the U.S.S. BASHAW formed a coordinated attack group, with the Commander of the FLASHER in command.

2. Area coverage was most complete and thorough. The Indo-China Coast line was kept under close surveillance during much of the patrol. In spite of the thorough area coverage, however, only one target was contacted worthy of torpedo fire and this was sunk. Other smaller targets were attacked by gun fire.

3. The one torpedo target and the gun targets were successfully attacked. On the night of 25 February, 1245, the FLASHER obtained a good firing position in spite of bright moon light and was able to carry out a submerged radar periscope attack on a small AK escorted by a CHIDORI. Three Mark 18 torpedoes were fired and in spite of a large range error, three hits blew up and sank the freighter. The gun attacks were made in coordination with the BAHAN. On the night of 21 February 1945 both submarines attacked a large sea truck carrying Japanese soldiers and Chinese conscripts and succeeded in sinking this vessel with their guns. The FLASHER took a total two Chinese prisoners. In the morning of 27 February 1245, both submarines attacked two Japanese lurgers and after a 2.0-1.0 battle both lurgers were sunk.

— page 261 —
4. The usual number of mines were contacted and the FLASHER sank or exploded six of them. The FLASHER also conducted life guard duty.

5. The FLASHER returned from this patrol in an extremely clean condition. The materiel condition of the FLASHER, however, is only fair and she will proceed to the San Francisco Area for a modernization overhaul.

6. The Commander Submarine Division 44 congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew for this extremely well conducted, long, and arduous patrol, and for inflicting damage upon the enemy.

— page 262 —
19 April 1945
: SECIND ENDORSEMENT to
: USS FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.
: From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
: To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
: Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET. Administration.
: (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. FACIFIC FLEET.
: Subject: U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.
: 1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.
: 2. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. FLASHER upon completion of a long and arduous patrol and the damage inflicted upon the enemy.
: 3. It is recommended that the FLASHER be credited with the following:
: SINK
: 1 - AK(FU), 2,000 tons (Torpedo Attack #1)
: - MISC. Sea Truck (EC), 75 tons (Gun Attack #1)
: - MISC. Lugger-1 (EC), 25 tons (Gun Attack #2)
: - MISC.(Lugger-1)(EC), 25 tons (Gun Attack #2)
: Total Sunk 2,125 tons
: *150-ton sea truck and two 50-ton luggers, with credit for sinking divided between FLASHER and BASHAW.
: W. V. O'REGAN.

— page 263 —
5 N 0491
Cnr of Float Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
23 April 1945.
NOTES: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTERING
P.TROL. ACK...

SUBJECT: U.S.S. FL.SSER (SS24/9) - Report of Sixth War Patrol
(27 January to 13 April 1945).

1. The sixth war patrol of the FL.SSER, under the command of Commander G.W. GRIDER, U.S. Navy, was conducted in the
Hainan Island and Indo-China areas. During the period from 9 to 26 February 1945 the commanding officer acted as group commander of
a coordinated attack group consisting of the U.S.S. FL.SSER and
U.S.S. B.SS.W (SS241). During this patrol the FL.SSER had the
pleasure of entering Subic Bay for fuel and repairs, thus extending
her patrol endurance.

2. With excellent crew coverage, the FL.SSER attacked the
only contact worthy of torpedo fire and sank one small merchantman.
She added to her score by sinking two luggers and one sea truck by
gun fire. It was unfortunate that the fast enemy task force was
able to get by the scouting line of which FL.SSER was a unit.

3. ...ward of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol
is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
congratulates this commanding officer, officers, and crew of the
FL.SSER for this successful patrol for this valiant ship. During this time
sixth successful patrol for this valiant ship, the FL.SSER has sunk twenty-four ships for a total tonnage of
153,607 tons and damaged two ships for a total tonnage of 11,500
tons. The FL.SSER is credited with having inflicted the following
damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

SUNK

1 - Small K (EU) - 2,000 tons (attack No. 1)
*1 - Son Truck (IC) - 75 tons (gun attack No. 1)
*2 - Luggers (IC) - 50 tons (gun attack No. 2)

FOT L SUNK - 2,125 tons#

EXTRA: ORIGINAL
SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 264 —
12-10(..)15-3(18) SUB. AIR FORCE, PACIFIC LITT N1

C-rc of Flot Post Office,
S-n Francisco, California,
23 April 1945.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DISTROYD RIGOR TO
ENTERING TROOP.

*150-ton sea truck and two 50-ton luggers with credit for sinking
divided between USS and USS.

NOTE: Since the above damage was done in areas under the operation
1 control of Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE, no is requested to
assume credit accordingly.

MERRITT CO. STOCK.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complet. Reports)
Cominch (7) Conargo (1)
CIO (5) Conuebaspe (3)
Cinepe (5) Conusbapeedom (40)
JICIO. (1) JUB D, II (2)
...CIC.O. (1) ConusbapeSubordcom (3)
Conaservpe (1) ...11 Squadron and Div.
Cinclant (1) Commanders, Pacific (2)
Consublant (8) Substrinpe (2)
S/S School, NL (2) ...11 Submarines, Pacific(1)
CO, S/L Baco, -H (1)
Conaspe (2)
Conasw.sprc (1) E. L. HINTS, 2nd,
Conusbawasprc (2) Flag Secretary.
CTC 71.9 (2)

— page 265 —
3.0
: END OF REEL
: JOB NO. NRS 419
: THIS MICROFILM IS
: THE PROPERTY OF
: THE UNITED STATES
: GOVERNMENT
: MICROFILMED BY
: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
: PRNC-NRMC-4 (REV. 4-52)