U.S.S. BARB (SS-220) — war patrol report SS-220_BARB_Part2.pdf

— page 1 —
U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220)
Nov. 18 (Cont'd)
0820 Going deep. Rigged ship for depth charge.
0822 Two bombs. Not close.
1034 Surfaced.
1035 LRCR.FT CO.T.CT #78. Sighted float plane at 8 miles.
Div'd.
1117 Surfaced.

Nov. 19 Enroute Midway.
1318 LRCR.FT CONT.CT #79. SD contact at 4 miles. Div'd.
Bow planes out of commission. Remained submerged for
electrical repairs.
1736 Surfaced. Repairs completed.

Nov. 20-25
Hurruto Midway. Requested Midway refit upon learning
of work overload at Pearl. We are a logical candidate.

Nov. 25 Added a second Nov. 25th upon crossing internal
date line.
1130(X) Moorcd Midway. Received Midway's customary excellent
welcome.

— page 2 —
1. USS. B.R.B. (SS220)
2. USS. B.R.B. = Report of Tenth War Patrol.
3. (C) W.THER.
4. Weather in general was excellent. Seas were calm north of Fukue Shima; and the northeast monsoon accompanied by a heavy ground swell was encountered south of Quelpart Is (SishuTo). Winds of about 30 knots were occasionally found in this same area, though wind and rainfall were below average expected. Clouds were broken and scattered, and provided for better cover for aircraft than for the submarine. A persistent light surface haze frequently ensued a mild mirage effect.
5. (D) TID.L. L.POR.M.TION.
6. Tido and currents conform generally to tide tables and charts. A set of 1 knot to the north with flood tide was experienced in Lat. 32-15 to 32-20 and Long. 129-00 to 129-40.
7. (E) NAVIGATION L.I.S.
8. The following aids to navigation were observed:
   - Lights:
     - Haku To - Lighted, normal characteristics, Sori (Shori) To - Lighted, normal characteristics, Gyu To - Lighted, normal characteristics, Kyobun To - Lighted, normal characteristics.
     - Koshiki, Kuromo Sc, (northeast entrance to Sasobo) lighted temporarily for entering ships. Characteristics normal.
     - Fog horn on O Shima (southeast of Fukue Shima) - operating, normal characteristics.
   - Quelpart Is. (Sishu To) was determined by celestial fixes, to be 4.5 miles south of its position as charted. (H.O. Chart 5494).
     - Bono Misaki - Lighted, steady white light.
9. (F) SHIP CONT. CTS
   - Time: Lat. : Initial:Est. : Now
   - No.: Date: Long. : Type: Range: Cse. : contact: Comm.:
     - 0245 : 35-23.6 : Large : P:22000 : :
     - 11-10-44129-05.8 : Ikkoku Haru : 105 : Radar : .tttck :1
     - 2255 : 31-39-0 : convoy 18000 yds : .tttack :2,..,3,C
     - 11-11-44:125-36.0 : 1l ships:4 csc.: 195 : Radar :D - :3.
     - 0700 : 34-15.0 : 3 two mast yd : : Gun .tttack
     - 11-14-44 127-54.0 :schoon.rs14000 : 270 : Sight :1,..,3C.
     - 2248 : 32-15.7 : Shokaku :19000 : :
     - 11-15-44 126-33.5:Cl. CV : das.:050 : Radar :tttck :4.
     - 1052 : 51-19.5 : 2 small :15000 : :
     - 11-17-44 150-05.1: K's. 2 Esc. Rd. 140 : Sight :tttack :5.

— page 3 —
105: 22-18,8
1. 11-4 137-46.2
2. 11-5 135-28.8
3. 11-6 132-17.2
4. 11-6 132-05.0
5. 11-6 130-48.8
6. 11-6 130-46.0
7. 11-6 33-22.2
8. 11-9 126-29.3
9. 11-9 122-32.2
10. 11-10 128-28.0
11. 11-11 128-08.0
12. 11-11 0732
13. 11-11 0733
14. 11-11 0831
15. 11-11 0925
16. 11-11 0924
17. 11-11 0930
18. 11-11 0930
19. 11-11 0930
20. 11-11 1011
21. 11-11 1011

: 10 Mi. Sight: Divad.
: 15 Mi. Sight: Sight: Divad.
: 12 Mi. SD: Sight: Divad.
: 31 Mi. SD: Sight: Divad.
: 8 Mi. Sight: 2 planes: Paris.
: 7 Mi. Sight: Divad.
: 4 Mi. Sight: Pariscap.
: 7 Mi. Sight: Divad.
: 10 Mi. Sight: Divad.
: 7 Mi. Sight: Divad.
: 6 Mi. Sight: 2 planes, divad.
: 15 Mi. SD: Hider Depth.
: 5 Mi. SD: " "
: 10 Mi. SD: " "
: 18 Mi. SD: On surface.

- 18 -

— page 6 —
Time : Lat. : : Initial : How : Remarks.
No.: Date : Long. : Type : Range : Contact : Remarks.
: 1021 : 33-06.0 :

— page 8 —
1944, 1st LT. TIGRET D.T. -- D.L.N.GE I.F.L.C.TED
Description: A-Large AK (EU)
B-Medium AK(EU)
C-Medium AK(EU)
Convoy of four escorts and eleven large,medium, and small freighters. No air coverage. Visibility- poor. Contact radar.
Ships Sunk: A-Large AK(EU), B-Medium AK(EU), C-Medium AK(EU).

Damage determined by: Visual and Radar observations.
Target Draft: B-20' Course: B-171 Speed: B-9 Range: B-3240
C-20' C-171 C-9 C-3250
(It firing)

OWI SHIP D.T.
A-9 -085
Speed: B-9 Course: B-083 Depth: Surface. Ingle: ---
G-9 C-090 (It firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO D.T.

Type .ttack: Night surface - radar.
Tubes Fired--No.: 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 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— page 11 —
1944
USS S.S. B.R.B
Time: 2326
TORPEDO TTL.CKS (CONT'D)
TORPEDO TTL.CK NO. 4
PILOT NO. 10
Date: 15 Nov. 1944
Lat: 32-15.7 N
Long: 126-38.5 E
TARGET D.T.T. -- D.M.G. INFLICTED

Description: Aircraft Carrier (Shokaku Class)(EC) Cruising with three or possibly four escorts. Contact - Reder. Visibility - Fair.

Ship Damaged: Aircraft Carrier (Shokaku Class)(EC) - 29,300 tons.

Damage determined by: Visual observation and timed hit.

Target draft: 21' Course: 055 Spced: 19.4 Range: 2680 (..t firing)

ONI SITE D.T.T.

Speed: 8.5 Course: 340 Depth: Surface. Angle: 0

Type .tttack: Night surface radar.

Tubes Fired--No. : 5 : 4 : 3 : 2 : 1 :
*Track .ngle : 131 S : 134 S : 136 S : 133 S : 140 S :
*Gyro .ngle : 025 : 027 : 030 : 032 : 034 :
*Depth Set : 10' : 10' : 10' : 10' : 10' :
*Power : -- : -- : -- : -- : -- :
*Hit or Miss : Hit : Miss : Miss : Miss : Miss :
*Matric-Yos-No : No : No : No : No : No :
*Mark Torpedoes : 18-1 : 18-1 : 18-1 : 18-1 : 13-1 :
*Serial No. : 54438 : 56402 : 55339 : 54443 : 56434 :
*Mark Exploder : 8-5 : 8-5 : 8-5 : 8-5 : 8-5 :
Serial No. : 8962 : 8691 : 8973 : 8745 : 8673 :
*Actuation Set : Contact: Contact : Contact : Contact : Contact :
*Actuation actual : Contact : -- : -- : -- : -- :
*Mark .rhoad : 18-2 : 18-2 : 18-2 : 18-1 : 18-2 :
*Serial No. : 2530 : 2894 : 2776 : 1931 : 2684 :
*Explosive : TX : TPX : TX : TPX : TPX :
Firing Interval : 0s : 10s : 10s : 10s : 10s :
Type Spred : Div. : Div. : Div. : Div. : Div. :
Sea conditions : 5 : 5 : 5 : 5 : 5 :

Overnault activity: U.S.S. BORAD W. GILMORE.
Remarks: Spread computed for 50 yds. between torpedoes along
target. Target zigged away about three minutes after
firing. No speed reduction used.

— page 12 —
1944
U.S.S. B.R.B (SS-220)

H) TORPEDO ATTACKS (CONT'D)

U.S.S. B.R.B
Time: 1213
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5* P.TROL NO. 10.
Date: 17 Nov. 1944. Lat: 31-19.5N Long:130-06.1 E.

TARGET DRAFT: 101
Course: 140
Speed: 6
Range: 1750
(.t firing)

CWI SHIP D.T.T.

Speed: 4
Course: 262
Depth: 65'
Angle: 0°

Type attack: Dey submerged - perciscopo.

Tubos Fired--No. : 9 : 10
*Track angle : 123 S : 116 S
*Gyro angle : 180° : 174°
*Depth Sot : 31 : 31
*Power : -- : --
*Hit or Miss : Miss : Miss
*Erratic-Yos-No : No : No
*Mark Torpedo : 18-1 : 18-1
*Scrial No. : 55636 : 54757
*Mark Exploder : 8-5 : 8-5
Serial No. : 9122 : 9021
*Actuation Set : Contact: Contact
*Actuation Actual: -- : --
*Mark Warhead : 18-2 : 18-2
*Scrial No. : 2722 : 2886
*Explosive : TPX : TPX
Firing Interval : Os : 35s
Type spread : None : None
Sea Conditions : 2 : 2

Overhaul activity: U.S.S. HORRID W. CLIMBERS.
Remarks: Fired once torpedo at each ship. Misses due to fire control error. One half speed reduction used.

— page 19 —
U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220)
U.S.S. B.R.B. - Report of Tenth War Patrol.
(C) DENSITY L.YERS

Iso thermals to 200 feet or deeper was the usual condition encountered on this patrol. No thermal gradients existed in water loss than 200 feet deep. SBT records are tabulated below. The cards are being forwarded to the hydrographic office.

The depths indicated are those of the thermal unit, located 25 feet above the keel.

| Date       | Position | Remarks |
||||
| 26 Oct.    | 07-13 N  | 370° to 200°, gradual curve, to 34° at 350° |
| 29 Oct.    | 15-32 N. | 35° to 200°, gradual curve to 83° at 300° |
| 30 Oct.    | 15-43 N  | 36° to 230°, break to 81° at 240° |
| 6 Nov.     | 32-01 N  | 75° to 260°, break to 71° at 510° |
| 9 Nov.     | 33-25 N  | 72° to 260°, curve to 70° at 230° |
| 0230       | 128-32 E |         |

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HEALTH-BILITY.
Health was excellent throughout the patrol. Food was excellent and the menus varied. Habitability was materially improved by the installation of an additional air-conditioning unit in the wardroom country.

(Q) PERSONNEL

The performance of officers and men, their never-say-die spirit when the enemy temporarily has the upper hand, and their eagerness for attack, continues to be an unending source of inspiration.

(a) Number of men on board during patrol - 75
(b) Number of men qualified at start of patrol - 64
(c) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - 65
(d) Number of men unqualified making their first patrol - 8
(e) Number of men advanced in rating during patrol - 9
(f) Number of men recommended to Squadron for advancement - 7

- 33 -

— page 21 —
U.S.S. B'RB (SS220)
U.S.S. B'RB - report of Tenth War Patrol:
(U) RADAR AND RADIO COUNTER MEASURES:
The 90° angle between the antennas, should overcome the poor
directivity characteristics of a single antenna and insure a good
bearing accuracy. The two coax cables would come down the present
conduit through the pressure hull to a roll shielded SWITCH
(similar to a telephonic switch board double throw switch) permitting a lobbing action on the incoming signal. The ship could then
be slowly swung and the bearing noted which produced two pips of
equal size on the screen.

The following is from the PR log:

| Date       | Our position | Rate | Width | Speed | Rope |
|||------|-------|-------|------|
| 6 Nov.    | 50-01 N.     | 152  | 440   | 25    | none |
| 1900       | 130-24 E     | 147  | 490   | 25    | 1 per 5 min. |
|            | Remarks: Course West, Picked up 152 M, later 147 M; as we passed through channel former faded, then the latter. |
| 7 Nov.    | 31-09 N      | 150  | 450   | 25    | none |
| 0200       | 129-46 E     |      |       |       | 1 per 5 min. |
|            | Remarks: Signal faded in and out as we passed Kusakaki Shima. |
| 8 Nov.    | 52-15 N      | 95   | 660   | 25    | 1 per 5 min. |
| 1900       | 123-50 E     | 94   | 650   | 60    | 1 per 5 min. |
|            | Remarks: 95 M possibly from Donjo Gunto. Other source bore 000°T from our position. 94 M had very poor pulse shape (long trailing edge). |
| 9 Nov.    | 33-40 N      | 74   | 450   | 50    | none |
| 1300       | 123-50 E     |      |       |       | 1 per 5 min. |
|            | Remarks: Possible beacon for northern entrance to Sasebo. |
| Nov. 13   | 33-20 E      | 164  | 500   | 7     | Slow or None |
| 1900       | 127-30 E     |      |       |       | 1 per 5 min. |
|            | Remarks: Double pulse (10 micro-sec apart). True bearing indicated, Maru To as source. |
| 14 Nov.   | 32-50 N      | 75   | 450   | 60    | none |
| 2200       | 126-40 E     |      |       |       | 1 per 5 min. |
|            | Remarks: Possible radio beacon on Maru To. |
| 17 Nov.   | 31-26 N      | 153  | 430   | 25    | Slow and Irregular |
| 0600       | 129-38 E     |      |       |       | 1 per 5 min. |
|            | Remarks: Several possible sources. |

— page 23 —
95 Mic
   660PRF
   25 Mic
   94 Mic
   650 PRF
   60 Micro
   25 Mic

(a) Was the switch used: Rato: How determined:
   - No indications.
   - Polarization of enemy signal: -
   - Swop Rato: 5% min/swop & 3 min/swop.

(b) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, OCL, or L.
   - Apparently a Beacon or a search radar of at least 50° beam width.

(c) Evidence of this conclusion: We were 30,000 and 50,000 yards from any possible source (shore) and the signal was strong 20% or more of the swop (not considering a sector scan)

7. Narrative:
   - Our position 32-15H, 128-50T, course 000°T.
   - The 95 Mic, rectangular pulse seemed to have its source on the bearing 050° - 250°T (possibly Danjo Gunto). The other signal came from 000°T.
   - Occasionally a strong pulsing pulse (similar to a beat note) would be heard at the same PRL.
   - Dial setting. Its pulse rate was 176 per minute.
   - It times the trailing edge of the 94 Mic pulse would change shape (be clipped a little shorter).
   - This would be accompanied by a crackling noise in the PRL earphones.

— page 24 —
25 Nov. 1944    Report No. 3.

1. Ship: U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220).

2. ...rec overcoed on this mission: East China Sea from 6 Nov. to 17 Nov. 1944.

3. ...has enemy radar: Landborne: Yes.

4. Intercept equipment: PRL-1 and SPU-1.

5. (a) Frequency: 74 & 75 Mc. Dial readings: 74 - 75
   (b) PRF: 450 now measured: SPU-1
   (c) Pulse Width: 50-60 Micro Sec How measured: SPU-1
   (d) Sketched Pulses:

   (c) Was lobe switching used: Rate: How determined:
      No indication of lobe switching.
   (f) Polarization of enemy signal:
   (g) Sweep rate: No sweep.

6. (a) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLG, OCL, or IL.
   ...appeared to be a beacon.
   (b) Evidence for this conclusion:

7. ---

8. Narrative:
   One with very irregular pulse rate (500 to 1100) was noted near the northern entrance to Sasabo. The pulse rate would jump at irregular intervals from 500 to 800 or 950, etc. The pulse looked like one with a long, sloping trailing edge, the latter being clipped off abruptly at 55 or 60 micro seconds. ...nother source appeared possibly to be Hara To, a third on Kusakaki Shima, and a fourth was noted when we were at 50-10 in and 150-20.

- 38 -

— page 26 —
1. U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220)
2. U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220)
3. Position when enemy radio signals were observed.
   On area and enroute to and from area.
4. Position of transmitting station.
5. Ship's location.
6. Frequency.
678. Type of

— page 28 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Task Group SEVENTEEN POINT FIVE.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. BARB, Report of Tenth War Patrol.

1. The tenth war patrol of the U.S.S. BARB was conducted in the East China Sea in the area to the westward of KYUSHU and was of thirty days duration, covering the period October 27, 1944 to November 25, 1944. Eleven days were spent in the area. The BARB was a unit of a co-ordinated attack group; the QUENFISH and PICUDA, with the group commander in the QUENFISH, being the other units of the group. The patrol was terminated by the expenditure of all torpedoes.

2. Area coverage on this short and aggressive patrol was excellent and resulted in five contacts, all of which were developed into torpedo or gun attacks. A summary of these attacks follows:

ATTACK NO. 1 - on 10 November a large high speed unescorted AP, AIKOKU MARU class, was intercepted off the northern approaches to SASECO and a moonlight radar-periscope approach and attack resulted in two hits which slowed the target to 2 kts. and gave it a 300' list. The BARB surfaced in pursuit and fired a single torpedo on two separate attacks at short ranges; both missed, one due to erratic run and the other took a jog to the left before settling down. A submerged approach was then made to point blank range and the single torpedo fired scored a hit, finally sinking this valuable ship. Ample opportunity was afforded to identify and witness the sinking of this target in the bright moonlight.

ATTACK NO. 2 - was on an eleven ship convoy with four escorts. A night surface attack with excellent fire control resulted in firing three two-torpedo salvos in two minutes at three targets (one large and two medium AK's) which netted one hit in each target. The BARB then swung and fired two stern tubes at another large AK scoring one hit. The first three targets were sunk and the last damaged.

— page 29 —
1-2-3
: 0128
: C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
: U.S.S. BARB, Report of Tenth War Patrol.

ATTACK NO. 3 - was a submerged periscope attack on the remainder of the same convoy. Three torpedoes were fired at extremely short range at a small AK being overlapped by a medium AK beyond. One hit blew up the small AK and the third torpedo hit the overlapping medium AK. While it is probable that this ship was also sunk, evidence is unfortunately inconclusive.

ATTACK NO. 4 - on a SHOKAKU class CV with three or four escorts was an excellently conducted night surface radar attack. A zig away three minutes after firing caused all but one of a five torpedo spread to miss. This hit slowed the target temporarily. Chase had to be abandoned when it became evident that the damaged CV could not be closed prior to dawn.

ATTACK NO. 5 - was made on two small coastal freighters discovered hugging the coast. The two remaining torpedoes were fired, one at each target. Both missed due to small size of targets and errors in fire control data.

GUN ATTACK NO. 1 - was on three schooners. Divided fire, 40 MM and 4", was employed to sink a pair, and the third schooner was attacked and sunk a half hour later.

3. Numerous plane contacts were made, probably incident to B-29 strikes. Life guard duties were performed on one occasion and a search was conducted for downed aviators. Enemy counter measures were standard and gratifyingly light, probably due in no small part to the B.R.B's aggressive tactics, severe damage inflicted, and smart, evasive tactics. The B.R.B also noted the small bombs or hedge hogs being thrown as previously reported by other returning submarines.

4. The B.R.B returned from patrol in good material condition. All major defects will be corrected with particular attention to the master gyro compass and hydraulic plant. A normal refit is anticipated. This is the B.R.B's fourth patrol since a navy yard overhaul.

— page 30 —
1 AP (AIKOKU MARU class) (EC) 10,500 tons (Attack #1A to D)
1 large AK (EU) 7,500 tons (Attack #2A)
1 medium AK (EU) 4,000 tons (Attack #2B)
1 small AK (EU) 2,000 tons (Attack #3)
3 miscellaneous schooners (EU) 300 tons (Gun Attack #1A-C)
TOTAL 28,300 tons

DAMAGED
1 large AK (EU) 7,500 tons (Attack #2D)
1 medium AK (EU) 4,000 tons (Attack #3)
1 CV (SHOKAKU class) (EC) 29,800 tons (Attack #4)
TOTAL 41,300 tons

TOTAL SUNK AND DAMAGED 69,600 tons

J. C. BROACH.

— page 31 —
1. Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
    Subordinate Command, Navy No. 1504.
2. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
3. (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
4. (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
5. Subject: U.S.S. BARB (SS220) - Report of War Patrol Number TEN.
6. 1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks and recommendations of Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-ONE.
7. 2. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate Command, Navy No. 1504 wishes to add his congratulations to the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. BARB for another very aggressive war patrol.
8. J. M. WILL.

— page 32 —
1944
FF12-10/A16-3(15)
Serial 02764
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
BARB Report of
Tenth War Patrol.

COUSBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 593.
U.S.S. BARB - TENTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. BARB (SS220) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.
(27 October to 25 November 1944).

1. The tenth war patrol of the BARB was conducted in the East China Sea area off the west coast of Kyushu. The BARB was one of three submarines working together in the East China Sea area in adjacent areas for the purpose of cooperative attacks.

2. This was the third successive highly successful war patrol for the BARB. Within eight days the BARB fired all its torpedoes in a series of extremely aggressive torpedo attacks of all types. These excellent attacks resulted in the sinking of five enemy ships, the probable sinking of two more, and the damaging of a large enemy aircraft carrier. In addition the BARB sank three large enemy seagoers by sun fire. The attacks made in the early morning runs of 12 November against a large convoy of eleven ships and four escorts demonstrated in a most brilliant manner how night radar and periscope attacks should be made. When the shooting was over at least four of the enemy ships had been sunk, and two more probably sunk or severely damaged. This convoy was not later on by one of the other submarines of the group.

3. The attack on the large enemy carrier was also well conducted, but more hits on this target were lacking because of the carrier's zig just after firing.

4. Award of the submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of this fine fighting submarine for this third successful successful war patrol. He further congratulates the BARB for having sunk 14 ships, including one aircraft carrier, plus three seaplanes and three schooners, all totalling 108,450 tons; and for damaging four more ships including a large enemy carrier, totalling 46,300 tons. The BARB is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

— page 33 —
1-10/16-3(15)
Serial 02764
Confidential
Third endorsement to
B.R.R. Report of
Tenth War Patrol.
COLSUSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 593.
U.S.S. BARB - TENTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. BARB (SS220) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.
(27 October to 25 November 1944).

SUNK
1 - Large AP (EC) (Alkoku Laru Class) - 10,500 tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Medium AK (EU) - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Medium AK (EU) - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Small AK (EU) - 2,000 tons (Attack No. 3)
1 - Schooner - 300 tons (Attack No. 1A)
1 - Schooner - 300 tons (Attack No. 1B)
1 - Schooner - 300 tons (Attack No. 1C)

TOTAL SUNK 28,900
DAMAGED
1 - CV (Shokoku Class) (EC) - 29,800 tons (Attack No. 4)
1 - Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Medium AK (EU) - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 2)

TOTAL DAMAGED 41,300 tons
TOTAL SUNK AND DAMAGED 70,200 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7) C.A. Lockwood, Jr.
CNO (5)
Cincap (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean Areas (1)
Conservpac (1)
Cincolant (1)
Consubsblant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2) Subtrainpac (2)
CTG 71.9 (2) All submarines, Pacific (1)
Comnorpac (1)
Comsubspac (40) C.O. K. Hynes, 2nd, Flag Secretary.
SUBAD, MI (2)
ComsubspacSubordcom (3) E. L. Hynes, 2nd, Flag Secretary.
All Squadron and Division Commanders, Pacific (2)

— page 35 —
15 February 1945.

U.S.S. BARB (SS220)

File: SS220/A16
Serial: 02

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

DECLASSIFIED

From:
To:
Via:

Subject: U.S.S. BARB - Report of Eleventh War Patrol.

Enclosure:
(A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (Combustible only).
(C) Information submitted to Hydrographic Office concerning EAST CHINA SEA (copy to Combustible only).

1. Enclosure (A) covering the eleventh war patrol of this vessel conducted in the FORMOS STRAITS and EAST CHINA SEA off the east coast of CHINA from SHANGHAI to LAM NIT during the period 15 December 1944 to 15 February 1945, is forwarded herewith.

E. B. FLUCKEY

110014

— page 36 —
19 Dec.
1430(Y) Departed Midway. Commenced training program for officers and men, daily dives and fire conrolparty drills.
Enroute Guam or Saipan.

20 Dec. Omitted.

21 Dec. Crossed international date line.

25 Dec. Sank floating mine with twin 20mm. Expended two magazines. Lat. 15-40.4 N. Long. 155-19.5 E.
Celebrated Christmas with corals and festivities.

27 Dec. Arrived Guam. Received an excellent welcome and voyage repair from Sperry and Sub. Div. 101.

29 Dec. Underway in company with LOOP.RS, QUARTERS, D PIQUA, ComWOLFPack, Commanding Officer QUARTERS.

1 Jan. Celebrated the advent of what we hope is the final year of the war.
0000(I) Received patrol boat contact report from QUARTERS.
0847(I) We will not be able to reach the contact prior to noon.
0958(I) Received message that QUARTERS and PIQUA were commencing gun attack.
1233(I) Sighted small thin column of white smoke.
1243(I) SHIP CONTRACT 1. Lat. 25-09 Long. 155-15. Sighted patrol boat, lying to. Smoke had disappeared.

— page 37 —
1 Jan. (Cont'd)
1305(I) Mamed 4 inch and twin 20mm guns. Requested information from QUARFISH. QUARFISH replied - sink target at discretion. Looked target over. She had been hit in bow by 4 inch shells. Automatic guns had sprayed her with the usual lack of effect. A good sized fire had evidently been started forward and a small fire on her port quarter. These had been brought under control. Her hull was in good shape, no flooding having taken place. Her bridge and engine room were unaffected. No personnel were in evidence. Probably hiding, since fires had been put out. Determined to board. Kept automatic weapons trained on all openings to eliminate any possible opposition.

1313(I) Away boarding party. Boarding party boarded patrol boat. Confiscated sextant, 7x50 German binoculars, compass, barometer, radio transmitter and receiving sets, charts, colors, rifles, professional looking books of uncemented value. Crews quarters were not searched because they were blacked out. Flashlights and crowbar proved to be the two items lacking in our boarding party equipment. Boarding party returned with full bags. Patrol boat had been armed with a machine gun and rifles. Evidently being used as a weather ship. In view of the fact that she may have sent a message requesting assistance prior to QUARFISH and FUGUE attack, decided against sending party back to search for a prisoner. Backed clear. GUT ATTACK. Commenced firing with 4 inch gun at 400 yard range. Fired 15 rounds for 15 hits. One hit hit the off the engine room fuel tanks. This made the midships section a blazing inferno. 8 or 9 Japs came scrambling out from below. The next shot landed in their midst. Took Kodachrome movies. Ceased firing. Secured the guns. Target was sinking. Cleared the area. Target sank.

1349(I) GUT ATTACK. Passed through TORPIA KAIKYO. Encountered AP signals at 142, 148, 158 mcs. Presumed to be shore based covering certain sectors of channel. Decided to run surface patrol through area nine, since we were astern of rest of pack who had submerged.

— page 38 —
1155(I) Received China aircraft report of convoy near DAIJO
: 1420 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #1. Sight and SJ radar contact on NELL
: 1455 at 3 miles in drizzle. Dived.
: 1502 Surtacced.
: 4 Jan. (All times HOW unless otherwise designated).
: 0043 Sighted 2 lighted Junks. 130 miles west of SHANGHAI.
: 0400 Avoided.
: 1105 Succeeded search for convoy in ANA 12. Enroute area
: 1155 Sighted floating mine Lat. 30-48, Long. 125-08.
: 1155 Tried to sink it with 20mm and 50 Cal. Navy hits,
: 1155 broke off horns which erupted in a yellow vapor, but
: 1155 mine refused to sink. Entered area 11A and 3.
: 1155 Area has been divided into three sections of equal
: 1155 latitudes for independent rotating patrol until coordi-
: 1155 dinated search is required. This to take care of the
: 1155 fast traffic anticipated. Commenced patrol in Area
: 1155 GHEN. Taking sounding at half hour intervals for
: 1155 hydrographic office.

5 Jan. 1413
: 1529
: 1618
: 1140
: 1216
: 1514
: 0540
: 0601
: 7 Jan.
: 0540

— page 39 —
7 Jan. (Cont'd)
0746
0805
0829
0843
0845
0900
0902
0905
0907
0941
1027
1031
1059

U.S.S. B.R.R. - Report of Lieutenant W.r Patrol.
7 Jan. (Cont'd)
Ahead of convoy. Contact reports going out every 20 minutes. Picuda will be able to get in: Queenfins probably not.
Submerged 14000 yards ahead of convoy. No. of heavy
base course to get a stable 60 ft trim in the heavy
seas. Necessary to use 2/3 speed at all times.
Commencing approach, nothing in sight. Distant pingings.
Visibility now estimated at 7000 yards.
JP picking up light and heavy screws intermittently.
Using pinging bearings to conduct approach.
Rain squall has reduced visibility to about 4000 yards.
Making continuous poriscope exposure at 50 ft with over
ton feet of scope out half the time. Cutting across convoy
course, screws all over the dial, very loud pingings,
and not a ship in sight.
Swinging priscope wildly. Two sets of heavy screws
crossing ahead, light screws astern and on port and
starboard bows. Visibility is still apparently about
4000 yards.
Haze lifting. Sighted a large tanker broad on starboard
bow, range 850 yards with 150 starboard angle on bow.
Made ready bow tubes. Nearly whole formation is now in
sight. Large freighter is about 100 yards beyond
the tanker. Escorts are five destroyers, two stacks,
with white bands around stacks.
Tubes are ready. Tanker is zigging away. Definitely
a poor shot which would not be worth the value of an
unalerted convoy to the Picuda. Withheld fire. Made
a set up on a destroyer about 1000 yards on port bow.
In easy, provoking shot, but our torpedoes would
never run up sea at 6 feet in this weather.
Commenced taking oariscopes exposures at one minute
intervals. Determined to surface when trailing
destroyer has disappeared for another end around. Chalk
this one off to visibility. I'm amazed that no one
spotted our scope, also that I have now developed
enough self control to resist the temptation to let
three fly at an escort unless conditions are right.
The latter the result of twelve torpedoes I have
wasted in the last three patrols.
Surfaced. Convoy at 12000 yards. Commenced and around
at 10 - 14000 yards depending on the visibility of the
port screen. Base course 110°T.
Two explosions.
Four explosions.
One explosion.

— page 40 —
7 Jan. (Cont'd)
1115 Convoy changed base course to 150°W. Visibility increasing, besttroyers in sight. Secured end around. Impossible to beat them to formosa now that naze has cleared. Leading back to China Coast. Some consolidation in ricuda making the grade.
2128 Assumed coast position of Wolf pack scouting line patrolling along China coast northward searching for a convoy.

8 Jan.
0441 Reversed course and headed southwest along China Coast. Eased in towards coast in event convoy hugged coast. SHIP CONTACT #3. Sighted smoke of convoy towards the coast. Commenced closing. It least five ships. Sent out contact report to pack. Sent out contact report of convoy on southerly heading. Sent out contact report of convoy course 140. Seven or more large ships. Commencing and around on port flank of convoy at 22000 yards. Visibility excellent. Sent out contact report of enemy base course 160, speed 12. The pack is closing. Heard occasional depth char res. Sent out contact report of enemy base course 155, speed 11. Sent out contact report of enemy base course 170, speed 5.5. Sent out contact report of enemy base course 175, speed 9.5. Now have 8 ships. Possibly more, for some are straggling. In position ahead of convoy. We are now in the blind bombing zone. Sent out contact report giving enemy zig plan. Told pack to home on our SJ interference.

1549
Have been ending around at 20 - 23000 yards with funnels and masts of most ships clearly in view from bridge, some of escorts masts tops barely visible. Using periscope for quick bearings, taking angles on bow from bridge and using radar ranges. If we had not been in wolf pack end around would have been made at greater range. However I estimate the situation as follows:
(a) Convoy is evidently heading for TAKU which will allow the pack only the early evening for attack, at best, before getting too deep in blind bombing zone and too close to minefields.

— page 41 —
1612
1616
1618
1620
1621
1655

---

**U.S.S. B.R.B. - Report of Lieutenant Walter Patrol**

(b) Our job is to bring pack into contact as expediently as possible, then make a daylight submerged attack from coastal flank and slow or turn the convoy into the QUENCHISH and PIQUDA.

(c) The above will require an accurate flow of information. This can only be obtained by close in tracking. Figured the ships suitable for this as her old type shears can easily be mistaken for a Chinese Junk if seen by the merchantman (with no facilities for tracking), but not by the escorts.

(d) QUENCHISH and PIQUDA undoubtedly have been navigating by D.N. for past 36 hours whereas C.L., being near coast, has accurate navigation position, so will attempt to bring pack in on our SJ interference. We can not attack until another boat has made contact.

PIQUDA has contact.

Informed pack we were diving to attack straboard flank. We are now well into blind bombing zone.

Submerged. Sea force 5, making attack at 60 feet.

Distant depth charges.

Distant depth charges.

Echo ranging. A plump convoy of 6 it got good sized ships. All better than 6500 tons and many of these coal burners. Ships are in several echelon groups. The leading echelon to port consisting of a L.C.M. M.H.U Class MCFM frighter with a destroyer about 1500 yards ahead. About 500 yards on the starboard quarter of this frighter is a 4 goal postor transport surrounded by 4 split kit escorts. Large M.H.M frighter straggles about 1200 yards astern of the transport. The starboard echelon is about 1000 yards on the starboard quarter of the above echelon. It consists of three brand new large engine aft frigther or tankers, possibly the type 45 M.H.F. Standard A (ModiFied) Cargo Ships shown in the OII weekly of November 22, 1944. Small escort is close on each bow of the leading ship in the starboard echelon. Two escorts are about 5000 yards out on the starboard flank. Between the two echelon and straggling about 3500 yards astern are two more large frigther, probably M.H.M. There seems to be escorts everywhere. All ships are painted grey and are heavily laden.

It would be a snap to get in the center of this outfit. However it is imperative that we bend them to port, and prevent them from heading towards the shallow China Coast. Holding off on starboard bow. Plan to smack the 4 goal postor with the 4 escorts in the port echelon since she is probably the most important ship, then use the other three bow tubes on the leading engines-aft job in the starboard echelon, following through with a stern tube attack on the second engines-aft ship.

— page 43 —
1747 (Cont'd) Secured slowing down tubes.
1748 Maximum relative movement between destroyer and B.R.B.
1749 Nice spot for a down the throat shot, but no torpedoes
1750 forward.
1751 Aggressiveness evaporated. Issued deep submarine
1752 of 140 feet, mud below. Break up noises continuing.
1753 Complicated evasion. No depth charges. Reloaded forward.
1754 Surfaced with breaking up noises still being clearly
1755 heard. No contact.
1756 Hooking down assumed enemy new base course.
1757 Jap radar interferences. This interferences was steady on
1758 us for the better part of the night five hours. Radar
1759 jamming was also encountered.
1760 U.S.N. reported attacking.
1761 J. GUNNISH reported at 20000 yards on convoy. QUANTITATIVE
1762 completed.
1763 PIGUDA reported attacking. Reported 6 ships in convoy.
1764 that it checks, unfortunately, with K.C. H.L.U still afloat.
1765 Gunfire from direction of convoy.
1766 Reported having contact end taking position on starboard
1767 flank.
1768 Explosion.
1769 Two explosions. PIGUDA has probably attacked. We are
1770 now about 8000 yards abeam of last ship. Insignificant
1771 QUANTITATIVE would be cautiously awaiting completion of our
1772 attack so she could get in again, decided to try our
1773 radical new system of continuous attack (see remarks).
1774 Commencing our normal escarpment surface approach on last
1775 ship in the formation from the starboard flank. Mother
1776 ship about 600 yards on his port bow over. R.I.P. The
1777 more ships about 3000 yards ahead. Formation plot in-
1778 diates five escorts around this tail group. One for-
1779 ward, one on his starboard bow, one on starboard beam
1780 and two astern. Since we intend attack from starboard
1781 quarter these will not bother us (we pray).
1782 Night is very dark and visibility poor. Sea state 4.
1783 Radar ranges and T.P. bearings used.
1784 TORPEDO TT.CK #2. Fired tubes 1,2,5 at trailing large
1785 K on a 145 starboard tr.ck, range 2100 yards, gyros
1786 zero, own ship spaced 16.5 knots, torpedoes sounded
1787 like motor torpedo boats 'oing out.
1788 Overlapping ship is a large 10 or 11 head full,
1789 right rudder, swinging out to commence approach on the
1790 next ship up the line.
1791 Two hits observed and timed.
1792 One hit observed and timed in overloading ship. First
1793 ship disappeared from view and radar - sunk. Second ship
1794 was engulfed in a cloud of smoke. Radar reported pip was
1795 half size when ordered to 'sift to new target and
1796 probably sunk. - 9 -

— page 44 —
2032
2033
2054
2055

U.S.S. BARB (SS-220)

CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. BARB - Report of Eleventh War Patrol
6 Jan. (Cont'd)
2018-2024 Explorations probably damaged formation but increased speed. These two ships were in column about 2000 yards apart. Making approach on starboard flank or trailing snip. Formation plot showed 9 escorts within 5000 yds. One about 1000 yds on starboard beam, two close aboard, others scattered with apparent confusion. Having only eased out to 4000 yds beam for a setup this would be quick.

One explosion.
TURBULENT ATTACK. Hired torpedoes 45, on a 12/ starboard track, gyros 1 right, range 1500 yds. Swinging right to ease out and then attack target ahead with stern tubes. Three hits-timed and observed followed by a stupendous, earth shaking eruption. This far surpassed Hollywood and was one of the biggest explosions of the war. The rarefaction following the first pressure wave was great taking. A high vacuum resulted in the boat. Personnel being in the control room said they felt as if they were being sucked up the hatch. Personnel in the Corning Tower, wearing shortened shirts not tucked in at the belt, had their shirts pulled up over their heads. On the bridge as the air was wrenched from my lungs, somehow it formed the words "all ahead flank". The target now resembled a gigantic phosphorous bomb. In the first flash as the torpedoes hit all we could ascertain was that the target had a long superstructure and a funnel and a small, spherical, 15-ton,

— page 45 —
2055
U.S.S. EAKB (SS200)
U.S.S. EAKB - report of Elavonthar patrol.
Jan. (Cont'd)
2055(Cont'd) Good sales talk. Commenced the approach for a stern tube attack on the ship ahead. No pip from our patrolly sunk ship on radar. From this end information from rest of pack hcr classification is now Sunk.
2110
Investigated a pip 10000 yds ahead which turned out to be two fair sized escorts high tailing it by themselves for TAKAO. Probably the destroyer. No other ships ahead.
2125
QUAERFISH requested enemy course and speed. Replied. Evidently she is distant, so recommended approach on the last merchant ship. Notified pack we were attacking single ship. This in view of the fact radar had spotted an escort on her starboard quarter approaching rapidly. This ship should be sunk before she obtained additional protection. One escort on her beam close aboard.
2150
Head of target 2650 yds. Slowed to 1/3 speed. Storn tubes ready. Opening out slowly from the track and waiting a few minutes for target to close range before firing.
2153
Two torpedo explosions on targets starboard quarter. QUERFISH must have attacked. Unaccountably she is the escort we had picked up coming up on the starboard side. Clogs business for we had about 20 seconds to go before firing.
2156
Target stopped. Barb stopped. Would she sink? Range 2500 yds.
2157
Target opened fire with automatic weapons, 40mm and 2cm stictated 3 inch gun in all directions.
2158
Bolcive QUERFISH dived. Target fire is high and erratic. Weird to be lying to, here, listening to the rattle of his 20mm, the poomp-poomp-poomp of his 40mm and the occasional blast from his 3 inch. The gunsmoke has a pungently foul odor which hangs heavy throughout the ship. All fire is tracer. Those are flying thick and fast from port to starboard then from starboard to port, with a 40mm projectile sailing over us now and then. We are protected by the smoke from his guns.
2159
Range 5000 yds. Radar reports no change in target pip. QUERFISH can not attack submerged. All rock 2/3. Intend to back in to 1500 yds to make sure of a two torpedo coup-de-grace.

— page 47 —
0800
U.S.S. BUBE - escort of eleventh war patrol.
10 Jan. (Cont'd)
0200 (Cont'd) Hydrographic office, by separate correspondence,
is being requested to make this island, BUBE Island.
CDC operator in the. doghouse.
0800 Joined the Junk fleet for morning maneuvers.
1615 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #4. Sighted NELL at 9 miles. Div'd.
1655 Surfaced.

11 Jan.
0042
QUARTERFISH reported contact on one ship making 17 kts.
Harded to intercept at maximum speed in providing scares.
0136 Encountered QUARTERFISH instead of enemy. Ship had gone
by. One of our DRs must be out.
0933 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #5. Sighted J.K.K. at 7 miles. Div'd.
1005 Surfaced. Commenced patrolling south along 20 fathom
curve.
1112-1130 Junks around.
1532 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #6. Sighted TSS at 10 miles. Div'd.
1552 Surfaced.

12 Jan.
0800-1100
Surfaced patrolling off 7000dW. Seas stable 5. Visibility
7000 yds in heavy haze. Sky overcast.
0800-1100 Investigated discolored water spot for hydrographic
officer. These are not shallows. Look sounding through
out spot. Believe these spots are due to subterranean
streams. During a dive I.ter at this spot we were
26000 lbs heavy overall.
1500 QUARTERFISH reported radar contact about 30 miles east of us.
However we had her SD interferance bearing 160°T.
...assumed her D.R. was in error and homed on her SJ.
1508 QUARTERFISH div'd.
1520 SHIP CONTACT #4. Radar contact on convoy at 15,400 yds.
Commenced approach. We are well off the track.
1550 At standard speed on 1r ports starboard bow. Near escort
at 6000 yds, not visible in haze. Enemy course 515.
1500 Speed 14.5 kts. We are working ahead.
1532 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #7. Sighted ZEKE carrying one bomb, at
2 miles heading in. Div'd. This Jap doesn't realize he
can't see anything in this poor flying weather.
1535 One bomb. Took normal approach course at high speed.
1544 Aircraft still in sight. Sighted one destroyer crossing
ahead at about 5000 yds.
1600 Whole formation in sight crossing about 6000 yds ahead.
Course 290. Heart breaker. Convoy consists of an unlist
escort carrier with a single funnel aft on starboard side
and four polos along starboard side of flight deck, which
goes all the way to the bow.

— page 48 —
1625
1759
1303
1901

13 Jan.
0800-0900
1150
1203
1205
1230
1522
1422
2200-2530

14 Jan.
0500-0800
0819

15 Jan.
1459
1540
1602

16 Jan.
0030
0110

Surfco p.trolling north of S.M.S. IFLET off 20 fathom curve.
Junks.
HCR.FT CONT.CT #9. Sighted BATTY 10 miles. Divcd.
Surfccd.
HCR.FT CONT.CT #10. Sightcd J.K.B at 6 miles. Divcd.
Surfccd.
HCR.FT CONT.CT #11. Sightcd BATTY at 7 miles. Divcd.
Surfccd.
Junks.

Surfco p.trolling off SWEAT ST.R.S.
Junks.
HCR.FT CONT.CT #12. Sightcd M.VIS at 10 miles. Divcd.
Disassembled faulty torpedo for repairs.
Surfccd.
HCR.FT CONT.CT #13. Sightcd 2 BATTIS at 7 miles. Divcd.
Surfccd.
HCR.FT CONT.CT #14. Sightcd 3 BATTIS at 5 miles. Divcd.
Surfccd. All planes bound for FORMOS.

Surf co p.trolling north of FORMOS covering eastern approaches to FORMOS. ST.R.ITS.
HCR.FT CONT.CT #15. Sightcd RUFB at 3 miles. Divcd.
Plane type indicated, possibility of fleet traffic.
Remained submerged.
Surfccd.

Surfco p.trolling approaches to FORMOS. ST.R.ITS.
Made approach on 1 large Junk.
QUEENFISA reported contact on a single ship with 2 escorts.
over 100 miles away. She can handle it.

— page 49 —
0526
QUARTERFISH
Communicated search for snip which was lost heading for China coast.
- HURRY CONT. CT #16. Sighting briefed by 2 miles. Div.
0739
Surfaced. Commenced using SD at intervals.
0755
HURRY CONT. CT #17. SD radar contact at 26 miles. No dive.
0832
Sighted QUARTERFISH (appearing at 6 miles).
1020
Cruising among large Junk fishing fleet closing coast for night traffic search.
1355-2400
Received word from PICUD. That B.K.B should search for
212C
aviator downed 8 miles off SHUI CHIA (HONKUS.) sometime
on 15 January. 3.5 kt current sets along north of
140 miles away. B.K.B at this time is having sufficient
trouble of her own running down the coast north of
F.M.K.W. H.R.BOR inside the 10 fathom curve. Searching
QUARTERFISH's ship and avoiding Junks.
2359
Secured search for ship. No coast lights. Are burning.
Covered all possible seconds and courses through western
half of area. Assume ship stopped at POODOW or S. IS. INLET.

17 Jan.
Surfaced patrolling sc. reching north of FORMOS. Where current
would have set aviator. Undoubtedly he was picked up by
Japs.
2000
Commenced patrol 6 miles east of H.I.H. ISL ND. Searching
for convoy reportd by China. Air Group. Results negtive.

18 Jan.
Surfaced patrolling 10 miles east of H.I.H. ISL ND.
1000
HURRY CONT. CT #16. Sighted 2 ZEKES at 3 miles. Div.
This planes are flying about 20 feet above the water.
1110
Surfaced.
1249
HURRY CONT. CT #19. Sighted PETS at 5 miles. Div.
This plane is also flying close to surface. Romined
submerged for possible contact.
1657
Surfaced. Sweeping down coast to L.M. YIT CHIA by radar,
Investigated outcr hrbor of L.M. YIT CHIA by radar,
from position along 20 fathom curve. Ships reported by
China Air Group must be anchored in inner bay.

19 Jan.
Surfaced patrolling FORMOSA STR.ITS. PICUD. and ERB
decided to blockade the STR.ITS. B.R.B covering to east,
PICUD to west.
2117
Sighted H.KUSH. KO (FORMOSA) light. Dimmed, shown at infrequent intervals, not visible outside of 6 miles.

- 15 -

— page 50 —
20 Jan.
0003
: 0901
: 1017
: 1030
: 1113
: 1638
: 1758
: 1802
: 21 Jan.
: 0633
: 0858
: 0757
: 0841

---

### SURFACED.
China reported all traffic had holed up. No over, confirmed surface patrol of Formosa Straits.
- **IACR.FT CONT.CT #21.** Sighted PATE at 5 miles. Div.
- **Plane close to water.** Remained submerged for possible traffic.
- **Surfaced.**
- **IACR.FT CQNT.CT #22.** SD contact at 8 miles. Div.
- **Surfaced.** Several Junks around.
- **Sighted mine.** Lat. 25-57.2, Long. 121-18.8.
- **China reported more ships anchored in Ln. YIT.**
- **...also another convoy from around thcrc, apparently going through our area.**
- **Commended searching again.**
- **IACR.FT CONT.CT #25.** Sighted PATE at 7 miles. Div.
- **Surfaced.**
- **Have searched for all aircraft reported ships covering all possible speeds and courses. Since nearly all are reported from Ln. YIT, and we are positive they do not pass TURN.BOUT light, these ships must go by an unknown route.**
- **Study of charts indicates that the passage of these ships could be affected without sighting by pack, if the Japs have dredged the long 1/2 fathom stretch through H.I.T.N Straits.**
- **Requested China air Group obtain information on H.I.T.N STH.TT3.**

---

### SURFACED PATROLLING.
**POHOS.SR.ITS searching for more ships which departed Ln. YIT.**
- **IACR.FT CONT.CT #24.** Sighted PATE at 6 miles. Div.
- **Surfaced.**
- **IACR.FT CONT.CT #25.** Sighted PATE at 7 miles. Div.
- **Surfaced.**

— page 51 —
22 Jan.
: 0656
: 1205
: 1421

Surface patrols generally cover convoy in accordance with plan. Scars have been located to state 3. Skies overcast. Sighted mine. Lat. 27-06, Long. 122-12. Have decided not to sink the drifting mines for they may possibly damage Jap traffic.

Manuvoring among Junk fleet. Crossed 20 fathom curve. SHIP CONTACT #5. Sighted smoke of 3 to 6 ships moving in column along the coast. Closed to 18000 yards for accurate tracking and to determine types. Two ships are large AKS. Lost sight of others shortly. Their course is 225, speed 10 knots, their position, in 3 fathoms, several miles inside the 10 fathom curve. At 10 kts they could not make S.M.S. INLET before 2100. If the overcast remains heavy enough to hide the moon we can tackle them in S.I.O.N CHI. INLET just north of S.M.S. INLET. Sent contact report to PICUD.

Secured tracking. 'SJ radar lost target at 29000 yards. Ended around SEVENTH ST. R.S., TAS. ISL.IDS and PISH. ISL. DS, through Junk fleets, outside of island visibility range.

- 17 -

— page 52 —
22 Jan. (Cont'd).
1820 Dark. Commenced approach to coast south of PISANG ISLANDS and north of SAUSA INLET.
1900 Passed edge of Junk Fleet. Approaching ten fathom curve. Sorry to clear the Junks even though they provide an obstacle race, for we depend upon their routes to keep us clear of minefields.
1915 Quartermaster tugged at my sleeve and confidentially said, "Don't look now, but we just passed a mine 10 yds abeam, to port." Probably garbage.
1926 Picked up a Junk 6000 yds ahead. Joined him in 9 fathoms and commenced patrolling to seaward on his quarter, using him for a mine sweeper.
2100 Still no coast lights burning and no snips. Requested Picuda by radar to patrol off TUNG YUNG ISLAND in event ships had departed coast north of PISANG ISLANDS. Informed her that convoy had not passed our position.
2120 Have now covered route for convoy specs 16-6 Kts. Ships must have anchored. Decided to search coast. Lack of Junks between coast and PISANG ISLANDS may indicate a minefield. Instead of going directly up coast we will ease out around PISANG ISLANDS and close coast north of them.
2257 Picuda reported negative contact.
2326 North of PISANG ISLANDS. Closing coast escorted by Junk fleet, all constant net helming. Visibility is lowering. Cannot see Junks outside of 1000 yards. Coming by PPI.

23 Jan. Conducting inshore surface search for convoy anchorage. Maneuver in constantly to avoid collision with Junks. Present entourage consists of several hundred darkened Junks.
0030 Commenced taking PPI coast contour plots, for plexiglass matching with large scale chart of coast, to search for snips.
0112 Chart plot matching showed an uncharted square northwest of ICOUG LIGHT. Checked this on I-scope which showed saturation pips at 29,800 yds. Radar officer and operator said they were definite snips. Doubt existed, however, for our radar has never before had saturation pips on snips at such a range. Continuing to search up coast towards ICOUG LIGHT.
0157 Iloonsot.
0240 Cleared Junks. None. Ahead. Much proper to have them, or know the reason for their absence.

— page 53 —
1. U.S.S. BARB (SS220)
2. U.S.S. BARB - Report of Elevation War Patrol.
3. 23 Jan. (Continued)
4. 0500 SHIP CONTACT #53. Rounded IMCGC ISLAND and had radar contact on a very large group of anchored ships in the lower reaches of NAKKAR HARBOR. Slowed to take stock of the situation. Fully realize our critical position and the potential dangers involved. Estimate the situation as follows:
   (a) Recent unknown mining in this vicinity is a known fact. Mines could be laid from IMCGC ISLAND to TAH ISLAND. However, a more effective minefield would be from IMCGC ISLAND to PINGFONG the eastern entrance to NAKKAR HARBOR, which would provide a protected anchorage behind it. Since the position of the anchored convoys is too close to this line, assume the latter minefield does not exist. The former though doubtful, must remain a possibility, particularly in view of the absence of Junks.
   (b) Jap radar interceptance is showing up on the J-scope and PPI, sweeping. One escort appears to be patrolling several thousand yards northeast and a second escort to the east of the anchored ships covering the most logical position for entry and attack. A third escort is working close to IMCGC LIGHT apparently more concerned with using his radar to keep himself off the rocks. Visibility is very poor.
   (c) Assumed the closely anchored columns would be heading about 0500H heading into the wind and seas with a current of 1 kt. Plotted the navigational position from which we would attack, making our approach from the southeast. The attack would be made on approximately a 60° track so that our stern tubes would be fired with zero gyros on our selected retirment course.
   (d) Elected to retrieve through an area marked "U.S. FORCED" on our large scale chart which contained sufficient "rocks awash" and "rocks, position doubtful" to make any abortive scouts think twice before risking a chase. This course would also cross the mass of Junks which would be a definite and if real barrier to all pursuit. While retiring radar will only be used sweeping quickly from broad on one bow to broad on the other, all damage must be assessed with out it.
   (e) Countermeasures expected will be searchlights, gunfire, and hot pursuit. Against this we will have a stern tube salvo, 40mm and automatic weapons.
   (f) Inasmuch as our attack position will be 6 miles inside the 10 fathom curve and 19 miles inside the 20 fathom curve, we will require an hours run before being forced down. Consequently our attack must be a complete surprise and the force of our attack must be sufficient to completely throw the enemy off balance. We have four torpedoes forward and eight aft. No time will be available for reload; for a speedy, darting, knife thrust attack will increase the probability of success.

— page 55 —
0525
: 0552
: 0402
: 0402-16
: 0402-26
: 0402-56
: 0402-46

U.S.S. B.R.E. - Report of Eleventh War Patrol.
25 Jan. (Cont'd)
0320
Figure the odds are 10 to 1 in our favor. Men Battle
Stations torpedoes.
0525
Fortunately we have a flexible control party and at this
point we relaxed it. C.O. secured the bridge and took over
the conning tower; target plot was secured and the assistant
approached officer was shifted to PTI; and another officer
plotting officer was shifted to PTI; and another officer
was shifted to the bridge.
Serious-ly considering placing crew in life jackets,
but the atmosphere throughout the boat is electric. The
men are more tense than I've ever seen them. S.v. for an
occasional report of "single ping sounding, a fathoms",
the control room is so quiet the proverbial pin would
have sounded like a depth charge. Discarded the idea of
life jackets as definitely alarmist, with so many hearts
doing flip flops.
Do not consider it advisable in our present precarious
position to send a contact report to the PICUDL. She
could not possibly attack before dawn and get out. Will
send one after the attack when our presence is known.
Range 6000 yds. made ready all tubes. Ships are anchored,
in three columns about 500 yds apart with a few sentries
ships farther inshore. This, frankly, must be the most
beautiful target of the war. Actual measurement of target
length is 4200 yds. Ships are banked three deep. Even
an erratic torpedo can't miss. Radar officer counts twelve
ships on one bearing. Estimate at last 50 ships present.
Our biggest job will be to prevent too many torpedoes
from hitting one ship. For purposes of set up chose one
of the large ships to left of center of the near column
as target. Using PTI bearings,
NORPD 4.1, fired tubes 1,2,5,4 with 150s spread,
track 65 starboard, gyros 30 left, torpedo run 5225 yds,
depth set 6 feet, target speed 15 knots, target course
040PT.
0402-16
0402-26
0402-56
0402-46

— page 57 —
0342
Smoke from the ships hit, on fire, and exploding completely obscured all ships and prevented any further observation. 0406 Gun fire from well astern. Some poor junks getting it. 0438 Some form of navigational light lighted on TMI ISL. 0445 Sent contact report to PICUD. 0511 The Galloping Ghost of the China Coast crossed the 20 fathom curve with a sigh. Never realized how much water that was before. However, like begins at forty (fathoms). 0512 Stopped to 19 kts. 0550 Dawn. Assume the Japs will expect us to submerge, so will stay on the surface. 0633 LIGHT CUT CT 26. SJ radar picked up plane at 7 miles coming in fast. L.C.O.S. privilege to change his mind. Divod. Range closed to 25 miles. 1220 Surface. Notiring to cast. Requested China Air Force obtain information as to damage inflicted in harbor. 1321 Periscope sighted. Manoeuvred clear. Doubtful sighting. 24 Jan. Surface patrolling center of area. 1424 Sighted mine. Lt. 27-01, Long. 122-15. 1519 LIGHT CUT CT 27. Sighted 3 SMTS at 5 miles. Divod. Worked on, hydraulic plant. 1644 Surface. 2225 LIGHT CUT CT 22. SJ contact on plane at 7 miles, closing. Divod. 2245 Surface. 25 Jan. Surface patrolling off S.M.S. ISL. Sea state 6. 23 Jan. Surface patrolling off 100 CHOW. Seas state 7. Received contact report from FIGUD. of 1 sali, unknown escorts, air coverage, sighted at 1200. Commenced search. Secured search. Ship probably went to Lili YIT. 1429 1900

— page 58 —
27 Jan.
    SURFACE PATROLLING FORMS: S.S. STATION 7.
    ...attempted to investigate L.H. YIT after dark, but seas
    piled up and we had enough to do to stay afloat.

28 Jan.
    SURFACE PATROLLING FORMS: S.S. STATION 6.
    Invaded blind bombing zone during afternoon in hopes
    of picking up MOY traffic.
    Investigating L.H. YIT harbor, empty.
    2130 Sighted mine. Lat. 25-03, Long 11-35.
    2254 Sighted mine. Lat. 25-04, Long 11-57.

29 Jan.
    SURFACE PATROLLING FORMS: S.S. STATION 5.
    ...H.C.R. PT CONVOY 29. SJ contact on plane at 5 miles,
    closing. ...lived. Plane closed to 1 miles while sub-
    merging.
    0030 Surpassed.
    0345 China aircraft reported L.H. L.P., 1 escort leaving
    AMOY at 1750 headed northcast. They should be close to
    our position, and should pass through L.H. YIT. Commenced
    search. ...we will be in less than 20 fathoms it is
    imperative to find them and complete our attack prior
    dawn.

0402 PICUD. reported contact with 2 ships and 2 escorts on
    FORMOSI, side of straits, distant 60 miles. Since she has
    10 torpedoes, believe our present search is best gamble.
0450 SHIP CONT. CT #6. SJ contact at 17,500 yds. Commenced
    approach. Convoy consists of 1 large L.H. I medium
    transport in column with 1 escort on starboard flank
    of transport which is leading. Heavy rain. Visibility
    is poor. See in L.H. YIT about state 4. Targets on steady
    course 0600T, speed 7.8 knots. Sent contact report to
    PICUD.

0537 Range to large. LK 1600 yds, Swinging right for stern tube
    shot. TBT bearings inside 3000 yds.

0540-10 TURPEDO TIT.CK #5. Fired tubes 7,8,9, 10 on 113 sterno r.
    track, gyros 2' right, range 2010 yds, torpedoes set
    at 8 feet. Spread coverage 200%.

0543 Convoy no longer visible in rain squalls.
0544-10 One timed hit. Not observed.
0544-35 Second timed hit. Not observed.
    Continued to track target as we opened out. Target main-
   tained steady course 0600T, speed 7.9 kts.
0555 C.O. in Coming tower watching ...scope and PPI when
    target suddenly disappeared from ...scope and PPI at
    3000 yds. Attains time ...P and escort pips wore 4' to right
    of target.

- 25 -

— page 59 —
U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220)
U.S.S. B.R.B. - Report of Eleventh War Patrol.
29 Jan. (Cont'd)
0555(Cont'd) Frankly, assessment of damage in this attack from our stand point can only be classed as unknown. The time
hits were over one minute late which is incomprehensible
unless these torpedoes run very slow up heavy sea. Tracking the target after the attack showed no apparent
damage until the pip disappeared. Seas off the coast
were state 7 and one hour after the attack we were forced
to slow to 8 kts. Can not understand how we could
possibly miss. The approach on a steady course, steady
spread target was the simplest we've ever been offered.
Even my conscience bothered me with the thought that I
was practically jettisoning our last four torpedoes on
such a simple set up, when I could have fired a split
sloop of two torpedoes at the 4K and two at the 4P.
Hit times, however, do not jibe and yet are much too
early for end of run. Analysis is a mystery.
Departing area in heavy seas. Making good 2 kts.
inductions closed.

30 Jan. Surface patrolling enroute Midway, seas state 6,
decreasing.
1108 Sighted mine. Lat. 27-14, Long. 121-47.
1420 Sighted mine. Lat. 25-35, Long. 122-07.

31 Jan. Surface patrolling enroute Midway, seas state 4.
1424 Sighted mine. Lat. 30-10, Long. 125-28.
1630 Sighted mine. Lat. 30-15, Long. 125-35.
2130 Departed area 11, entered area 12.

1 Feb.
0200 Departed area 12, entered area 9.
0546 .Ph signal 96 m.cgs. From D.H.JO CUHTO.
0645 sighted mine. Lat. 31-48, Long. 127-58.
1445 sighted a U.S. Submarine.
1459 Submarine fired identification flre. Range 12000 yds.
1500 ...sweared with a flare. .s colors changed at 1500 we fired
a different color than she had fire. She then disappeared.
2000 Passing through TUKL. STR. IT. .PR contacts at 147,
154, 158, 159 and 160 megacycles. Several at 160
mcg with different characteristics.
2100 SJ interference. Challenged but no answer.
2200 SJ contact on a U.S. Sub to south of us. Unable to
raise on SJ. Probably Underwood's Urehins.

2 Feb.
0025 Exchanged messages with U.S.S. P.R.CHE.

— page 61 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. BARB (SS 220) ELEVENTH WAR PATROL - Comments on...

1. The eleventh War Patrol of the BARB was conducted in the East China Sea off the East Coast of China from Shanghai to Lien Yit. The BARB was one of three submarines forming a coordinated attack group. The Patrol was of 59 days duration.

2. The attacks made on this patrol and the results obtained were most spectacular and outstanding. The Commanding Officer, making his fourth patrol on the BARB as such, displayed great ability and outstanding aggression but also unusual tactical ability. His outstanding courage and aggression were best displayed in his attacks made in the very restricted waters of the China Coast. This patrol which ends a sequence of four highly successful ones for the Commanding Officer indicates that the BARB is one of the finest fighting submarines this war has ever known.

3. The attacks were aggressively conducted, characterised by outstanding skill and tenacity. A summary of these attacks follows:

4. TORPEDO ATTACK No. 1 - 8 January 1945 - A convoy of eight large ships and many escorts were contacted at 1300 and tracked for five hours while the PICUDA was coached on to the targets. The Commanding Officer gallantly adjusted his position so that he could force the convoy away from the coast and toward the other submarines of the group. Finally at 1724, the BARB, making a day periscope attack, fired three torpedoes at a large transport and one minute later fired three more at a large engines-aft freighter. Four hits were obtained; the engines-aft freighter was demolished and the transport was left sinking. In addition another freighter-transport, which happened to be overlapping the tanker, was also hit and set on fire amidships.

— page 62 —
1945-3-8  SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-FOUR

C-re of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
20 February 1945

Subject: U.S.S. BARB (SS 220) SLEVETH "AR PATROL - Comments on...

TORPEDO ATTACK No. 2 - 8 January 1945 - After the attack above the other two submarines of the pack managed to get in attacks also. Then the BARB began another attack on the same convoy. Coming up from the quarter in an outstanding display of tactical command, the BARB fired three torpedoes in a night surface attack on the trailing ship of the convoy which was a large freighter. Two of these torpedoes hit and sank this freighter and the third hit an overlapping tanker whose pip was seen to disappear from the radar screen twenty minutes later.

TCRPEDO ATTACK No. 3 - 8 January 1945 - Twenty-one minutes after attack No. 2 the three remaining bow tubes were fired at a large ammunition ship. This ship followed the usual reaction of the BARB's treatment, absorbing three hits and exploding with a of the largest explosions ever seen by the Commanding Officer. The Intelligence of the target and the tremendous explosion made it ship may have also sunk two escorts which had been close to it and were never seen again, but the Commanding Officer was to the three. The one remaining target of the convoy turned over to the QUANTIFIER for attack. The BARB, however, stayed in the vicinity in order to make sure that this target did not get away. NOTE: - It is of note that only 4-1/2 hours elapsed from the time of the BARB's first attack on the eight-ship convoy until its complete elimination was made.

TORPEDO ATTACK No. 4 - 23 January 1945 - This outstanding one-ship battle will be one of the great stories to come out of this war when it can be told. For over two weeks the BARB had been unable to find any targets in submarine waters. The BARB assuming the roll of a motor torpedo boat, launched an eight-torpedo attack on a large anchored convoy. After running 19 miles in more from the 20-fathom curve. The whole passage was made through unexplored area, dodging junks and patrolling escorts. About thirty ships were estimated in the anchored convoy and three radar escorts were patrolling on its outer edge. The BARB maintained complete tactical command of the situation throughout. Picking the targets such that each torpedo would account for a separate ship, the BARB fired its four remaining bow tubes first and then turned to fire its four stern tubes; eight hits were obtained. A large freighter was observed to settle and sink; another caught fire and

— page 63 —
5-29 January 1945 - A large freighter and a medium transport with one escort were contacted by radar. After obtaining position the last four stern tube torpedoes were fired at the large freighter. Two hits were heard but not seen because of a rain squall. Ten minutes later the target disappeared from the radar screen at a range of 8,800 yards while the initial contact had been 17,500 yards; at the same time the pip of the transport and escort still remained on the screen. Although the Commanding Officer claims no damage on this attack because the timed hits did not agree with the range, the Division Commander feels that this target was at least damaged.

5. In addition to the damage inflicted on the enemy above, the BARB also finished off a 300-ton patrol vessel which had been previously damaged by the QUEENFISH and PICUDA. After a boarding party succeeded in obtaining gear from this vessel, the BARB sank it with 13 rounds of 4-inch ammunition.

6. The BARB returned from patrol in a high state of cleanliness. Morale of this vessel is, of course, high. The BARB is now returning to the West Coast for Navy Yard overhaul.

7. The Commander Submarine Division-44 takes great pleasure in congratulating the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew for this extremely aggressive and highly successful war patrol.

— page 64 —
21 February 1945

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS BARB (SS220) - Report
of Eleventh War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLETT.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLETT.

Subject: U.S.S. BARB (SS220) - Report of Eleventh War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR heartily congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew of the U.S.S. BARB upon completion of one of the most outstanding patrols of the war. The extreme aggressiveness combined with skill and daring, resulted in devastating losses to the enemy. The percentage of hits, around 80%, is evidence of the superb quality of this fighting ship.

3. It is recommended that the BARB be credited with the following:

| SINK | PROBABLY SINK |
|------||
| 1 AP(TU) | 10,000 tons |
| 1 AE(EU) | 7,500 tons |
| 1 AK(EU) | 7,500 tons |
| 1 AK or AO(EU) | 7,500 tons |
| 1 AE(EU) | 7,500 tons |
| 1 AK(EU) | 7,500 tons |
| 1 AE(EU) | 4,000 tons |
| 1 AE(EU) | 7,500 tons |

*1/3 Misc. Patrol boat (EC) 100 tons
59,100 tons

Total Sunk, Probably Sunk, or Damaged - 91,400 tons

* 300 tons patrol vessel with credit for sinking divided among PICU.D., BARB, and QUEENFISH.

J.H. C. G.

— page 65 —
1. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
: 2. The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
: 3. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. BARB (35220) - Report of Eleventh War Patrol (19 December 1944 to 15 February 1945).

1. The eleventh war patrol of the BARB under the command of Commander E. B. Fluckey, U.S. Navy, was conducted in the Formosa Straits and East China Sea off the east coast of China from Shanghai to Tamsui. The BARB, along with the PICUDA and the QEFFIS, furnished a coordinated attack group with the commanding officer of the QEFFIS as the group commander.

2. The same fighting spirit and group cooperation displayed by these three submarines during their last patrol were evident throughout this one. The PACU, continuing her illustrious record, turned in a performance during this patrol which is probably an all-time record. The patrol started by the three submarines sinking a small craft by gunfire. The BARB's next action against the enemy was in the form of three aggressive attacks delivered upon a large convoy on 8 January. The BARB sank four ships and shared honors with the PACU for sinking two enemy ships. The QEFFIS attacked for a large target. On 22-23 January the BARB, displaying the ultimate in skill and daring, penetrated Nankwan Harbor on the China coast to wreak havoc upon a convoy of some thirty ships at anchor. The BARB proceeded some six miles inside the ten-fathom curve, nineteen miles inside the twenty-fathom curve, to fire first her bow tubes, then her stern tubes into this choice group of targets. The target handling of the BARB, both in delivering her attacks and in firing good her evasive, was remarkable accomplished. The BARB had the other contact on 29 January, which resulted in two timed hits. These hits were a little late for a proper time interval for normal running Mark 18 torpedoes, which was probably due to the low temperature existing. This patrol should be studied in detail by submarine personnel. The remark concerning a new method of successive attacks from rear to leading ship in line of end arcund, paragraph (V), are of particular interest to the Commander Training Command, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

— page 66 —
1/3 MIS (Armed Patrol Vessel) (EC) - 1C0 tons (Gun Attack No. 1)
1 Large AP (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 1A)
**1/2 Large AK (KAGA MARU Type) (EC) - 4,650 tons (Attack No. 1A)
1 Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 1B)
1 Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 2)
***1/2 Large AK (Possibly A0) (EU) - 3,750 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 Large AE (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 3)
1 Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 4A)
1 Medium AE (EU) - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 4B)
1 Large AE (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 4B)

TOTAL SUNK - 60,000 tons

DAMAGED

1 Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 4A)
1 UN - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 4A)
1 Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 4B)
1 Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 5)

TOTAL DAMAGED - 26,500 tons

TOTAL SUNK & DAMAGED - 86,500 tons

— page 67 —
1/3 credit to each: B.R.B., PICUD, and QUEENFISH.
**Estimate this same ship hit later by PICUD in attack
N. 2 - 1/2 credit for sinking to each: PICUD and B.R.B.
***Estimate this same ship hit previously by PICUD in attack
No. 2 - 1/2 credit for sinking to each PICUD and B.R.B.

MERRILL COSTOCK,
Chief of Staff.

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[Complete Reports]
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CNO (5)
Cinopac (6)
JICPOA (1)
ADICPOA (1)
Gomservpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Comsubslant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubjowespac (2)
CTG 71.9 (2)
Comnorpac (1)
Comsubspac (3)
Comsubspac/4 (40)
SUB/AD, MI (2)
ComsubspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Pacific (2)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific(1)

E. L. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

— page 72 —
U.S.S. BARB (SS220)
CONFIDENTIAL

(H) U.S.S. BARB (SS220) GUN ATTACK NO. 1, PATROL NO. 11.
Time: 1348.30 I. Date: 1 Jan. 1945 : Lat.25-15 N Long.155-20 E.

Target Data - Damage inflicted
Sunk: 1. (Patrol Vessel, Armed)(IC) 300 tons.
Incidentally attacked and damaged by Queenfish and Picuda).

Details of Action
cleared the ship and fired 15 rounds of 4" H. C. for 10 hits.
Seven of the fuel tank, scattering fuel and
flames. Eight of nine Japs scoured out
of the next round to explode the
threat. The ship was then injured, jumped over the side.
Total: 5. 5

— page 74 —
1. Track angle 698 705 725 765 808 843
: 2. Gyro angle 001 003 005 350 354 558
: 3. Depth set 81 81 81 81 81 81
: 4. Power - - - - -
: 5. Hit or miss ? Hit Hit Hit Hit Miss
: 6. Narrative ? No No No No No
: 7. Mark Torpedo 18-1 18-1 18-1 18-1 18-1 18-1
: 8. Serial No. 55171 56400 55241 56463 55551 55798
: 9. Mark Explorer 8-5 8-5 8-5 8-5 8-5 8-5
: 10. Serial No. 9670 8415 9998 10210 10854 10175
: 11. Curation Set Contact Cont. Cont. Cont. Cont. Cont.
: 12. Curation . . . Cont. Cont. Cont. Cont. Cont.
: 13. Mark Warhead 18-1 18-1 18-1 18-1 18-1 18-1
: 14. Serial No. 3383 2897 2529 2949 2725 2564
: 15. Explosive TPX TPX TPX TPX TPX TPX
: 16. Piring interval Os 10s 10s Os 10s 10s 10s
: 17. Type spread Divergent Div. Div. Div. Div. Div.
: 18. Sea conditions 5 5 5 5 5 5
: 19. Overhaul activity--.Submarine Base, Midway, T.H.

Remarks: Spread from aft forward computed for 50 yds. between torpedoes along target track. Speed reduction used. Made end around at 20-23000 yards. Had zig plan and speed before diving, from visual observation of angle on bow from bridge, high periscope bearings and radar ranges during end around.

- 32 -

— page 75 —
2011-11-01
: 1-8-45
: 24-37.2 N. Long.
: 120-50.5 E.
: T.R.G.T.D.T. - D.M.G.E INFLUENT
: Large .K with large .K or .O overlapping.
: Same convoy as attack 1. Visibility - poor.
: Contact radar 20,000 yards.

SHIPS SUNK:
: Large .K(EU) - 7,500 tons.
: Large .K or .O(EU) - 7,500 tons.

D. THE DETACHMENT BY:
: Large .K or .O hit by first torpedo amidships and second torpedo forward. Large .K or .O hit by third torpedo amidships. Heavy cloud or smoke prevented further observation. Radar pip of primary target (large .K) disappeared immediately. Radar pip of overlapping target (large .K or .O) reduced to half size at range of 800 yards when radar was shifted to target or next attack. Upon completion of attack No. 3, 20 minutes later, there was no radar pip from this target. Queenfish also passed scene of this attack shortly thereafter without finding a target.

Target Draft: 25'. Course: 225'. Speed: 10.3 kts. Range: 2150 (at firing)

OWN SHIP D.T.
Course: 189' Speed: 16.5' Depth: Surface. Angle:

Type attack: Night Surface - Radar and TBT.

Tubes Fired--No. | 1. | 2. | 3.
---|---|---|---
Track .angle | 143S | 145S | 147S
Gyro .angle | 358 | 000 | 002
Depth Set | 81 | 81 | 81
Power | - | - | -
Hit or Miss | Hit | Hit | Hit
Erratic | No | No | No
Mark Torpedo | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1
Serial No. | 54820 | 56419 | 54640
Mark Exploder | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5
Serial No. | 9624 | 7942 | 9919
Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact
Actuation .actual | Contact | Contact | Contact
Mark Warhead | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1
Serial No. | 2891 | 2913 | 2978
Explosive | .PX | .PX | .PX
Firing interval | Os | 10s | 10s
Type spred | Divergent | Div. | Div.
Sea conditions | 3 | 3 | 3
Overhaul activity-- Submarine Base, Midway, T.H.
Remarks: Spread from aft forward computed for 50 yards along target track. Speed reduction used.

— page 76 —
U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220)
U.S.S. B.R.B. - TORPEDO - TT.CK NO. 5. P.TROL NO. 11.
Time: 2054-H. Date: 8 Jan. 1945. Lat.24-01.6in. Long.120-29.5ft.

TARGET DETERRIFIED BY: Target soon to blow up from bridge in a brilliant display and disintegrate. Three hits - art, amidships and forward.

Target Draft: 25' Course: 180 Spced. 11.5 Range: 1590 (at firing)

OWI SHIP D.T.

Course: 134 Spced. 11.4 Depth. Surface. Angle.

Type Attack: Night Surface - Radar and TBT.

Tubes Fired--No. 4. 5. 6.
Track Angle 127S 129S 132S
Cyro Angle 001 004 007
Depth Set 8' 8' 8'
Power - - -
Hit or Miss Hit Hit Hit
Brrratic No No No
Mark Torpedo 18-1 18-1 18-1
Serial No. 56691 55648 54862
Mark Exploder 8-5 8-5 8-5
Serial No. 9635 10359 10354
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual Contact Contact Contact
Mark Warhead 18-1 18-1 18-1
Serial No. 2363 2348 2935
Explosive TPX TPX TPX
Firing Interval Os 10s. 10s. 10s.
Type Spread Divergent Div. Div.
Sea conditions 3 5 3
Overhaul activity: Submarine Ease, Midway, T.H.
Remarks: Spred from eft forward computed for 50 yards along target track. Spced reduction used.

- 34 -

— page 77 —
U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220)
U.S.S. B.R.B.
Time: 0406-H
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4-1
PILOT NO. 11.
Date: 23 Jan. 1965. Ln. 27-04 H. Long.120-27 H.
TARGET D.T.T. - DANGER (INFLICTED)
DESCRIPTION: Convoy contacted in the afternoon plus other convoys at least thirty ships. ...anchor in three main columns 500 yards apart with other scattered ships. Twelve ships on firing bearing. Throarader equipped c'scorts patrolling. No air coverage. Contact - Radar - Full saturation pips at 29,800 yards. Visibility - poor.

SHIPS SUNK: Large AK(EU)(main target) - 7,500 tons.
SHIP PROB.ELY SUNK: Large .K(EU) - 7,500 tons.
SHIP D.HEGED: Unidentified. - 4,000 tons.

D.HEGED DEFENDED BY: Main target in first column hit by torpedoes 2 and 3 timed and observed. Target observed to sink. Unidentified ship in second column hit by torpedo #1 - timed and heard on bridge - not observed since shielded by main target after turn to right.
Largo .K, in third column, hit by torpedo #4 - timed and observed. Shortly thereafter caught on fire. Fire later flared up five or six times then went out in a manner similar to a sinking ship.

Target draft: 25' Course: 040 Speed: 14(tide) Range: 3400 (at firing)

OWN SHIP D.T.T.
Course: 320 Spced: 95 Depth: Surface. .rglo-
Type attack: Night Surface - Radar and TET.

|    | 1.    | 2.    | 3.    | 4.    |
|------|||||
| Track Angle | 66S    | 67S    | 68S    | 69S    |
| Gyro Angle | 327    | 326    | 328    | 329    |
| Depth Set | 61    | 61    | 61    | 61    |
| Power    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Hit or Miss | Hit    | Hit    | Hit    | Hit    |
| Erratic   | No    | No    | No    | No    |
| Torpedo Run | 3765    | 3250    | 3200    | 4225    |
| Mark Torpedo | 18-1    | 18-1    | 18-1    | 18-1    |
| Serial No. | 55869    | 55866    | 54926    | 56832    |
| Mark Exploder | 8-5    | 8-5    | 8-5    | 8-5    |
| Serial No. | 8660    | 611    | 1055    | 9545    |
| Ctuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Ctuation .ctual | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Mark Warhead | 18-1    | 18-1    | 18-1    | 18-1    |
| Serial No. | 1563    | 3444    | 1804    | 2207    |
| Explosive | TPX    | TPX    | TPX    | TPX    |
| Firing interval | 0s    | 10s    | 10s    | 10s    |
| Type Spread | Divergent | Div.    | Div.    | Div.    |
| Sea conditions | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    |
| Overhaul .ctivity: | Submarine Base, Midway, T.T. | Remarks: Torpedoes fired from aft forward. Spread coverage 150%. Speed reduction used. |

- 35 -

— page 78 —
U.S.S. B.R.B (SS220)
U.S.S. B.R.B TORPEDO T.T.C.K NO. 4-B. 2 KILO NO. 11.
Time: 0408-1. Date: 25 Jan. 1945. Lat. 27-04N. Long. 120-27E.
TARGET DRAFT: 5 - DIMENSIONS: 4-4-4.
DESCRIPTION: Same target as attack 4-4-.
SHIPS SINK: Unidentified (U.EU) - 4,000 tons.
Large U.EU - 7,500 tons.
S.A.P. DIMENSIONS: Large A.K (AU) - 1,500 tons.
D.M.G. DETERMINED BY: Unidentified in second column, hit by torpedo #5 - Timed and observed. Whole side of ship blew out in our direction in a manner similar to an U.E. or the magazine of a large warship. Torpedo #6 hit in the first column. Selected to have hit in main target of attack #4- or ship close to this target. Observation not sufficiently accurate enough to claim additional damage. Large U.E., in third column hit by torpedo #7 - timed and observed. Ship blew up with tremendous explosion. Large U.E., in first column ahead of main target of attack 4-4-, hit by torpedo #8 - timed and observed. Ship blocked forth a huge cloud of smoke. This smoke from fires and ships blowing up completely obscured all ships and prevented any further observation of other damage.

Target Draft: 25' Course: 040 Speed: 14(tide) Hanno: 3020 (..t firing)

| Course | Speed | Depth | Surface | Range |
||-------|-------||-------|
| 100    | 9½   |       |         |       |
| 100    | 9½

— page 79 —
0540-H
TORPEDO TACK NO. 5. P.TROL NO. 11.
Date: 29 Jan. 1945. 20-08m. Long.119-59 E.

TARGET DRAFT: 25' Course: 060 Spccd: 7.8 range: 2010 (at firing)

Course: 175 Speed: 8.5 Depth: Surface Angle: -

Type attack: Night Surface - Rader and TBT.

| Tubes Fired | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. |
||----|----|----|-----|
| Track angle | 118S | 121S | 124S | 127S |
| Gyro angle  | 182S | 185S | 188S | 192 |
| Depth Set  | 8'   | 8'   | 8'   | 8'   |
| Power      | -   | -   | -   | Hit-  |
| Hit or Miss | Miss | Miss | Probably | Probably Hit. |
| Erratic   | No  | No  | No  | No  |
| Torpedo Run | 2180 | 2240 | 2320 | 2410 |
| Mark Torpedo | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 |
| Serial No. | 54483 | 56689 | 55651 | 55202 |
| Mark Exploder | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 |
| Serial No. | 9859 | 10069 | 8452 | 9655 |
| Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation actual | - | - | ? | ? |
| Mark Warhead | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 |
| Serial No. | 2270 | 3415 | 2912 | 3603 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPA | TPX | TPX |
| Firing interval | Os | 10s | 10s | 10s |
| Type Spread | Divergent | Div. | Div. | Div. |
| Sea Conditions | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |

Overall activity: Submarine 'Base, Midway, T.H.
Remarks: Target on steady course at steady speed. Spread coverage - 200%. Approach elementary. Speed reduction used.

— page 80 —
18-40 N, Long. 155-18.5 E. - Sunk by Gunfire.
(2) Lat. 30-48 N, Long. 125-07.8 E. - Damaged, horns erupted with yellow vapor.

(3) Lat. 25-57.2 N, Long. 121-18.8 E. - Avoided.
(4) Lat. 27-05.6 N, Long. 122-12 E. -
(5) Lat. 27-01 N, Long. 122-15 E. -
(6) Lat. 25-02.8 N, Long. 119-32.5 E. -
(7) Lat. 25-03 N, Long. 119-37 E. -
(8) Lat. 25-04 N, Long. 119-37 E. -
(9) Lat. 25-35 N, Long. 122-07 E. -
(10) Lat. 27-14 N, Long. 121-47 E. -
(11) Lat. 30-10 N, Long. 125-28 E. -
(12) Lat. 30-15 N, Long. 125-35 E. -
(13) Lat. 31-43 N, Long. 127-58 E. -

— page 88 —
1. Ship or station - U.S.S. B.B. (SS220)
2. Position, bearing and altitude when enemy radio signals were observed. - Entire period in patrol area 1272.

— page 89 —
5 Jan. 1945.
    Report of Lieutenant W.R. Petrol.

(U) RADIO AND DIRECTORATE STATUS: CO.TTD
Date: 5 Jan. 1945.
Frequency: 148 Mc.
PRF: 500
Pulse Width: 10 Micro-sec.
Sweep rate: not sweeping.
Detonation equipment: .PR/SPL.

Narrative: If this set was sweeping, it was a very slow sweep and the beam width was very broad. Otherwise this was a possible beacon. Possible location - either side of TORR. K. IKYO.

Date: 5 Jan. 1945.
Report No. 2.
Enemy radar appeared to be - land based.
Frequency: 158 Mc.
PRF: 500
Pulse width: 15-10 Micro-sec.
Sweep rate: erratic.
Detection equipment: .PR/SPL.

Narrative: This was detected only occasionally and then very weakly, as we entered channel from east TORR. K. IKYO.

— page 90 —
5 Jan. 1945.
Report No. 3.
Enemy radar appeared to be - Land based or air borne.
Frequency - 155 Mc.
RPT - 500
Pulse Width - 15 micro-sec.
Sweep Rate - irregular.
Detection equipment - .PA/SPL.
HALTIVE: This was picked up as we passed S/W of Y.KU SHIL.
It was stronger when we has a plane contact on SJ radar 12 miles dead ahead. Plane (radar-equipped) also reported by submarine ahead.

Date: 8 Jan. 1945.
Report No. 4.
Enemy radar appeared to be - Land based: 24-50 F, 120-50 E.
Frequency - 152 Mc.
PHT - 550
Pulse Width - 8 micro-sec.
Sweep Rate - not sweeping.
Detection equipment - .PA/SPL.
HALTIVE: This was encountered during cttack #2 and #3.
No evidence that we were picked up. Possible beacon.

- 48 -

— page 91 —
8 Jan. 1945.
Harbor No. 5.
24-50 ft.
Sweep rate: 28 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 4.5 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 2.5 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 1.5 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 1 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.5 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.25 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.03125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.015625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0078125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.00390625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.001953125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0009765625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.00048828125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.000244140625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0001220703125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.00006103515625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.000030517578125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0000152587890625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.00000762939453125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.000003814697265625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0000019073486328125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.00000095367431640625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.000000476837158203125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0000002384185791015625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.000000119209349609375 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0000000596046748046875 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.00000002980233740234375 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.000000014901168701171875 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.000000007450584350585 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0000000037252921752925 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0000000018621461378125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.00000000093107315625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.000000000465536625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0000000002327683125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.00000000011638415625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.058192078125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0290960390625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.01454801953125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.07274009765625 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.036370048828125 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.018185029296875 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.090925146484375 micro-sec.
Sweep rate: 0.0

— page 93 —
19 Jan. 1945.
Enemy radar appeared to be on DANJO GUNTO.
Frequency - 96 mc.
PRF - 750'
Pulse width - 10 micro-sec.
Sweep rate - not sweeping.
Detection equipment - APH/SPA.

NARRATIVE: This is the same signal picked up on our tenth patrol when cruising near 32°N, 125°30' E.
Appears to be navigational beacon.

Date: 1 Feb. 1945.
RAPORT NO. 10.

As we passed eastward through TOKARA KAIKYO, numerous frequencies were picked up, noted for a while, then lost. Not being in a position or frame of mind to maneuver the ship and take advantage of the directivity of the APH antenna, it is not known which side of the strait the stations were located, but everything indicated that there were installations on KUCHINA, YAKUBU, YANJ SHIMA, and TANEGA SHIMA.

The following frequencies were noted.
(a) 147 Mc and 144 Mc (too weak to get any data on their characteristics)
(b) 159Mc, PBF 500, Pulse width 7 micro-sec.
(c) 154Mc, PBF 500, Pulse width 5 micro-sec.
(d) 158Mc, PBF 500, Pulse width 4 micro-sec.
(e) 160Mc, 6 stations. One possibly on YANJ SHIMA, 500 PBF, and 6 micro-sec pulse width; and two possibly on TANEGA SHIMA, 550 PBF, 4 and 10 micro-sec each pulses.

The Stations of d and e above had rapid, well defined, sweeps, of apparently narrow beam width.

There was no definite sweeps rate. It times there would be two or more strong sweeps a minute, including simultaneous sweeps of two stations (superposition of wave forms on SPA). Then there would be lapses of five or ten minutes between sweeps. It times, the indication so resembled patrolling air craft that the SD radar was keyed but no contact was made.

— page 95 —
1. U.S.S. BARB (SS220)
2. U.S.S. BARB - Report of a scout on war patrol.
3. (V) PHOTOS: (CUT!)
4. The convoy remained organized, used some zig-zag and increased speed slightly. 21 minutes after the last attack, the second attack was made on the next ship up to the line. 20 minutes after the second attack was made the B.A.B passed the next ship and at 2160 yards Irogoing an attack in deference to the rest of the pack. Thus in less than 15 hours after contact, we found ourselves ahead of the convoy, without making an end around, with all tubes relocated, and with two concentrated attacks under our bolts. Trouble from escorts which were stationed at the flank and out of the way was nil. As we had anticipated, not seeing us, they turned towards the stricken ship to drop depth charges, mentioned course and speed to hold ammunition practice, or, in the case of the exploding, were intent upon saving their own necks. If they had turned out to chase us we had the advantage of a head start on our enterprise course and at full speed before the torpedoes hit.
   - Consequently, to us, the tactics of this attack were ideal in its particular sphere; no end around, the accuracy of concentrated fire, requires only one third of the time normally used, automatic-ally takes care of reload, minimum escort trouble, maximum convoy organization, and best possible position of sub upon completion of first wave of attacks. Obviously it is flexible and easily adaptable to special circumstances.

2. Analysis of Japanese shipping lanes and suggested operations is being forwarded by separate correspondence.

3. It is with regret that the B.A.B detaches herself, temporarily for overhaul, from the LOOPSHIPS under the excellent leadership of Commander C.B. Loughlin. To have had the privilege of fighting alongside such splendid pacifists as the QUINNISI and PIQUA is a source of inspiration and pride to me in the B.A.B. It is hoped that, after our sojourn in the States, the LOOPSIPS may again be formed for a deeper invasion of enemy waters.

— page 97 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division 322.
2. The Commander Submarine Squadron 32.
3. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
4. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. BAR (SS220), Report of Twelfth Tor Patrol.

Enclosure:
(A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (ConsubPec).
(C) Special Report (Separate Cover).

1. Enclosure (A), Covering the Twelfth Tor Patrol of this vessel conducted along the North Coast HOKKAIDO, in ANTA TAI, TAHIKA TAI (PATIENCE) BAY) and East Coast KARAFUTO during the period 8 June 1945 to 2 August 1945 is forwarded herewith.

E. B. FLUCKY.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, CPNAVINST 5510.1C

BY OP-0989C. DATE 5/12/22

DECLASSIFIED

— page 98 —
1. U.S.S. BARB (SS220)
2. U.S.S. BARB = Report of Twelfth War Patrol
3. (A) PROLOGUE
4. On 27 February 1945 arrived Navy Yard, Mare Island from Eleventh War Patrol for yard overhaul. All outstanding important alterations were completed with the exception of JT, FM, TDM, SV, Sound Dome, 15KVA I.C. Motor generators and directional APR for which material was lacking. Schools at Mare Island were excellent and well coordinated. Overhaul was average. On 16 May 1945 departed Navy Yard for Pearl Harbor, Voyage repairs at Pearl Harbor accomplished by SubRon 18 and U.S.S. EURYAL, very cooperative and very good.
5. An underway training period of 3 days was started 28 May 1945, with Captain C.C. BURLINGAME, U.S.N., as training Officer. Eight steam torpedoes were fired. Three days were devoted to special exercises. Training curriculum under ComSubsTrainPac was excellent.
6. Two Officers were transferred and two received. Transferred 15 men.
7. Readiness for sea date 8 June 1945. Installed rocket launcher. Condr. H. HULL cosuggested. Admire his elimination of red tape to procure it.

(B) NARRATIVE

Officers and Chief Petty Officers
Comdr. Eugene B. FLUCKEY, U.S.N.
Lieut. James T. HEBSTER, U.S.N.R.
Lieut. Max C. DUNCAN, I.S.N.
Lieut. William M. TALKER, U.S.N.R.
Lt(jg) David R. TEETERS, U.S.N.R.
Lt(jg) Charles T. HILL, U.S.N.R.
Lt(jg) Thomas M. KING Jr., U.S.N.R.
Lt(jg) Lawrence J. SHEFFIELD, U.S.N.R.
Ensign William (n) MASEK, U.S.N.R.
SAUNDERS, Paul G. CGH, U.S.N.
TADE, Gordon L. CEN, U.S.N.
TILLIAMS, Franklin A. CHOMIN, U.S.N.
GIRHART, Frank W. CREN, U.S.N.
NOLL, Thomas J. CHOLEN, U.S.N.R.

8 June 1945
1400(VT) Departed Pearl Harbor, T.H. enroute MIDAY in accordance with ComSubPacAd Comd Operation Order No. 121-45. Conducting daily dives, Schools, and drills.

9 June 1945
1200(T) Position: Lat. 24-47 N, Long. 161-34 T.

10 June 1945
1200(T) Position: Lat. 26-48 N, Long. 167-26 T.

11 June 1945
1200(X) Position: Lat. 28-26 N, Long. 172-53 T.

12 June 1945
0820(Y) Moored MIDAY. Received MIDAY'S customary excellent welcome and services.

— page 99 —
13 June 1945
0900(Y) Underway for patrol area. consisting of North Coast HOKKAIDO, ANI and TARAINAAN, (Patience Bay) in KARAFUTO.

14 June 1945
Skipped this day. Crossed international date line.

15 June 1945
1200(M) Position: Lat. 29-44 N, Long. 176-23 E.

16 June 1945
1200(L) Position: Lat. 31-38 N, Long. 170-56 E.

17 June 1945
1200(L) Posistion: Lat. 34-35 N, Long. 166-08 E.

18 June 1945
1200(L) Position: Lat. 37-40 N, Long. 161-21 E.

19 June 1945
1200(K) Position: Lat. 41-05 N, Long. 155-06 E.

20 June 1945 (All times KING unless noted otherwise).
1209 Position: Lat. 43-25 N, Long. 149-22 E.
2138 Sighted ETOROFU ISLAND.
2200 Transited KURASHIRI SUIDO.

21 June 1945 Entered Area.
0015 Surface patrolling along northwest coast of KURASHIRI.
0015 CONTACT #1. Radar contact on two small craft at 4800 yards. Closed but unable to see them at 1000 yards clearly enough to determine whether luggers or motor torpedo boats. Decided on dawn gun attack, so took position to westward information. Course 070(T), speed 8 knots.
0230 Closed to 1000 yards awaiting first streaks of dawn.
0300 Hanned battle stations-gun.
0318 Made out targets to be standard 100 ton luggers in early dawn. Range to forward lugger 85 yards broad on sterboard bow. Range to after lugger 1200 yards on starboard beam. 40 mm to take on forward target, 5 inch on after target.
0319 GUN ATTACK #1. Commenced firing. Fired one round of 5 inch r one hit in after target. Fired seven rounds of 40 mm for four hit in forward target. Forward target commenced firing to his starboard with a 37 mm (approximately) gun, only 180 degrees out of phase. Shifted 5 inch to forward lugger and fired 4 rounds for 3 hits. Forward lugger sank. Reverse course to finish off after lugger which was sporadically firing a 37 mm splashing well astern of us. At 800 yards fired 3 rounds of 5 inch for 2 hits and 9 rounds of 40 mm for 6 hits. Target filled with water and settled, a shambles, as not left the area. Did not desire a prisoner from this vicinity, since plan to take prisoners from the KARAFUTO area.
0336 Attacked position: Lat. 44-39 N, Long. 146-43 E.
0426 Secured. headed towards NEMURO KAIKYO.
1150 APR Contact 76/500/7
1150 APR Contact 81/500/40
1155 APR contact 78/500/24

— page 100 —
21 June 1945 (Cont'd)
1200 Position: Lat. 44-32 N, Long. 145-44 E.
1321 Dived for a periscope. Probably a sea. Not a. controlling off SHIRUTOKO ISL.
HOKKAIDO.
1436 Surfaced.
1454 Sighted aircraft HAP at 6 miles. Dived. Are using SD keying at 1 minute intervals in accordance with latest SORG information.
1517 Surfaced.
1520 Sighted aircraft - different plane at 10 miles. Slowed to 2/3 speed.
1522 Div'd.
1533 Surfaced.
1537 Sighted same aircraft patrolling ABASHIRI TAN. Commenced easing out from coast. Not worried about being sighted because we have been asked to raise a rumpus.
1604 Div'd. Aircraft heading towards. SD range 10 miles.
1608 One bomb.
1610 Second bomb. Astern, port, below by indicator. Are at 140 feet.
2010 Surfaced, sun still up. Decided to repay the compliment by making the initial submarine rocket assault tonight on SHARI e. City of about 20,000 population on the North Coast of HOKKAIDO.
2309 Sighted MOTORO ISAKI light, characteristics normal.

22 June 1945

0150 Named battle stations-rockets. Set up rocket launcher and loaded twelve five inch rockets. Set rocket range 5250 yards. Cleared decks.
0233 ROCKET ASSUALT #1. In position 4700 yards off the beach. Visibility-fair. Range to center of top 5250 yards. Depth 20 fathoms.
0234 ROCKETS ATAY!!!
An inspiring sight. C.O. were polaroid goggles at darkest setting for launching to maintain night adaption. All rockets left in 5 seconds and their trail disappeared about 20 feet above the deck. Rockets observed to fall in an arc estimated at 500 yards in diameter in the center of the town. Explosions were seen, heard and felt. No fires were started.
Reversed course and -thrived at high speed as dawn was breaking. Each rocket carries a 9.6 lb. explosive charge and the effect is similar to placing a bomb on a small scale.
0250 APR contact 79/500/7. Shore based air search radar was turned on. Evident-ly the Japs did think they were being bombed.
0400 APR contact 195/1000/32.
0811 Sighted plane at 12 miles. Div'd.
0835 Surfaced.
1045 Sighted KARAFUTO
1200 Position: Lat. 45-53 N, Long. 143-59 E.
1735 APR contact. 153/500/24. Steady. Sung ship but could obtain no definite bearing.
2200 Commenced search of coast line of TARAIRA TAN (PATIENCE BAY).

23JUNE 1945
Surface patrolling along coast of PATIENCE BAY.
0346 CONTACT #2. Sighted Trailer to seaward. Closed.
0413 Man battle stations-guns.

— page 101 —
23 June 1945 (Cont'd).

C423 GUN ATTACK #2. Range 2000 yards. Corroded firing 40 mm at large two decked, two nested diesel wooden trawler similar to 150 ton class in identification manual. This to determine extent of answering fire. First shot over, second short, third a hit. That a beautiful weapon this 40 mm is not the have telescopic sights and sight bar. Once the range is determined, the hit consistently. Expanded 3 more rounds of 40 mm for 3 hits, then checked fire. Seven Japs ran forward. Trawler was still going ahead at 8 knots, so fired 3 rounds of 5 inch for 3 hits at 700 yards to stop it. No answering fire. Called away boarding party. Fired 13 more rounds of 40 mm for 11 hits to quell any opposition from possible machine guns. Unfortunately a fire now broke out below: his decks and quickly spread through his superstructure. This prevented boarding. The Japs, forward, seemed content to be fired, rather than come out of hiding and risk survival in the icy water. Consequently since we now wanted a prisoner and did not want to leave a blazing mark of our presence, determined to sink Trawler by a high speed sweep close aboard in order to wash sufficient water through a large 5 inch hole near the waterline. Opened out, spaced up to 16 knots and swept by about 10 yards off his port beam. Target filled and sunk.

0504 Took aboard one prisoner. Five others volunteered and another committed Hari-Kari by slitting his throat. Left five swimming around in near freezing water hanging on to a few plenks.

0700 After an hours run returned to wreckage to see if the survivors had possibly made a raft. All had joined their ancestors.

1200 Position: Lat. 47-59 N, Long. 142-38 E. Continued coastal sweep on the surface.

24 June 1945

Surface patrolling coast of KARAFUTO - PATIENCE BAY.

0126 Closed SHIKUKA to 5 fathom curve because of bogeys. This being an air boat it is believed some form of radar belloon or decoy exists along shorelines. Definitely no ships were present though pips resorbled ships.

0452 Passed through field of drift ice in northern end of bay.

1200 Position: Lat. 48-34 N, Long. 144-48 E. APR contact 79/750/28.

25 June 1945

Surface patrolling along east coast of KARAFUTO and RUSSIAN SAKHALIN going as far north as UKT. Possibly Japs may be buying oil at UKT.

1200 Position: Lat. 52-12 N, Long. 143-17 E. Toured as far north as Lat. 53-34 N, then turned south swinging tail out from coast and following 100 fathom curve down, which we believe Japs use from P.R.U. ISHIKU. Passed one field of drift ice east of UKT.

26 June 1945

Surfaces patrolling south along SAKHALIN.

1200 Position: Lat. 51-04 N, Long. 144-13 E. CONTACT #3. Through a remarkable atmospheric lens sighted a Convoy at a range later determined to be 40-45,000 yards. With the lens effect, the Convoy appeared to be viewed from about a 5 degree elevation, all ships being on this side of the horizon in miniature with bow waves visible.

— page 102 —
26 June 1945 (Cont'd).

and no parts of the ships sticking up above our normal horizon. There were apparent through-out this sector. Commenced and around.

1720 APR contact 79/500/30.

1776 I.e.s persisting. Sighted aircraft apparently leaving Convoy.

1350 APR contact 75/500/24.

1910 Ahead of Convoy. In view of no darkness tonight - late sunset, long twilight, full noon and after previous days of fog, a sparkling clear, cold day - decided on a submerged attack now.

1920 Submerged. Renge unknown. Hovered, enemy may have us spotted as easily as we have him. Closing at high speed. Convoy consists of 2 medium and 1 small freighter escorted by 1 PD(Torutsuuki), 2 DEI's and 2 PC's. Plane cover has not gone. Probably en route LA PERQUISE from PardusSHIAU. Looks like the Japs are determined to get these through.

2028 ST range 11,000 yards. Angle to it is 1800 zero.

2037 Convoy turned towards beach sharply, giving large port angle on the bow. Commenced approach on far sector, a TERTUSUKI, since we have not been cut out by base course change.

See special report.

2200 Surfaced under a cloudless sky and full noon. Closed coast.

2219 Picked up target group near AMAZA TISAKI will inside 10 fathoms.

2234 One or more escorts, probably 'heat d' - TERTUSUKI gave us several broadsides at 12,000 yards. Cru-fire was seen and heard in and pointed in our direction. No splashes were observed by C.O. or O.O.D. All other had been cleared from the bridge, so are brightly silhouetted by noon. Headed for NETONU TISAKI forty miles south along the coast where we might get in a submerged attack in 15 fathoms.

27 June 1945

0200 Circling off NETONU TISAKI. Convoy evidently anchored at twilight at AKATA TISAKI, and escorts patrolling off anchorage had fired at us.

0749 Contact with Convoy coming down coast deep inside ten fathom curve. Divod and commenced closing coast, see an oily calm.

0810 Surface haze lifted near coast. Visibility excellent.

0822 Two bombs. Close. Just as periscope was being raised for first time in 12 minutes. Evidently our hull is visible against the bottom in such shallow water with a calm sea above us. Raised periscope anywhere to observe formation. TERTUSUKI is leaving formation and giving us a zero angle on the bow at about 7500 yards. Plane overhead. This looks like a nice place to take departure from. Secured attack and cornered evasion.

0825 Two bombs. Close.

0832 Depth charge distant.

0833 Depth charge distant.

0852 Made ready all tubes.

0855 Two depth charges to port. Fairly close.

0900 Twenty six fathoms.

0900 Two depth charges to port and ahead. Depth charge indicator doing a nice job.

0904 Two depth charges to port. Decided to open coast, surface and and around to a point south of KAIHYO TO where we would have 30 to 40 fathoms to attack in.

(6)

— page 103 —
27 June 1945 (Cont'd).

Less than 20 fathoms is evidently too little with a calm sea and an clear plane cover. Undoubtedly he is spotting our silhouette against the sand bottom.

1039 Surfaced, Smoke of target in sight. Plane out ahead. Commenced and around at 30,000 yards.

1143 Div'd for plane. NILSON, R. (n), 671 69 24, R12c received laceration on forehead and nose requiring sutures. While clearing bridge.

1200 Position: Lat. 48-38 N, Long. 145-08 E.

1215 Surfaced, Figured the Convoy would head for ARIO ISAKI so opened out to an estimated 40,000 yards to avoid plane sighting during end around.

1319 Div'd for plane.

1336 Surfaced, Opened out to an estimated 50,000 yards. No contact with Convoy. Headed for position ahead.

1640 APR contact 79/500/30.

1733 Ahead of Convoy's estimated position. Commenced search.

1800 APR contact 78/500/7 and 82/500/10.

1835 APR contact 98/500/24.

1956 Div'd for plane at 8 miles.

2025 Surfaced, Resumed, search.

Search'd coast from ARIO MISAKI to SAKAYEHAMA during night, then patrolled off ARIO MISAKI which Convoy must round.

2307 APR contact 79/500/20.

28 June 1945

Patrolling submerged off ARIO ISAKI.

0024 APR contact. 79/500/20

0338 Div'd for submerged patrol.

0712 Sighted DE -ho commenced patrol about 3,000 yards to seaward of us. Thought he was trying to draw us out so remained close in along coast.

0900 DE shoved off to southward.

0946 Sighted plane patrolling our position.

1200 Position: Lat. 46-48 N, Long. 143-30 E.

2134 Surfaced. Am. sure Convoy has not gone by. Commenced search up the coast of PATIENCE BAY.

29 June 1945

Searching for Convoy close along coast of PATIENCE BAY.

0512 Submerged for patrol along coast north of LOTOARI.

1200 Position: Lat. 48-22 N, Long. 142-45 E. Off KASHIHO.

1217 C.O. raised periscope to find himself looking at the buck teeth of a Jap pilot in a RUFE about 200 yards away. This single pontoon plane was flying about 50 feet off the water. Angle on by 90 port. Sent to 90 feet. Tater is an oily calm. Depth 20 fathoms. Visibility excellent.

1242 Periscope depth.

1245 Sighted some Convoy coming down coast about 1500 yards inside 10 fathom curve with a DE and two PC's patrolling on their beam along the 10 fathom curve. The TERUTSUKI DI is acting as an outer screen about 1500 yards outside the 10 fathom curve. A clever set up with plane patrolling ahead of TERUTSUKI. Named bottle station torpedoes and headed in.

— page 105 —
30 June 1945 (Cont'd)
0925. LPR contact 79/500/10.
0945. LPR contact 50/600/40.
1010. LPR contacts 68/1260/40 and 72/500/40.
1200. S-rung ship but unable to determine direction.
1200. Position: Lat. 49-29 N, Long. 144-39 E.
1715. LPR contact 117/1250/12.

1 July 1945

Surface patrolling off N.H.I.T.A. KISHIKI. Our first'fog in the arc.
1200. Position: Lat. 49-24 N, Long. 144-39 E.
1330. Tested out both rubber boats with four, 200 lbs. plus, Officers in view of anticipated future operations.
2030. Set course for KAIHYO TO for morning bombardment. This island contains a large government operated seal rookery on the eastern side. Buildings and warehouses are located on the "eastern side." To plan to land and take it. A prisoner will be valuable to check' routing and frequency of KAIHYO Convoys.

2 July 1945

Surface patrolling on rout KAIHYO TO.
0500. Sighted KAIHYO TO. Visibility about 10,000 yards. Large stockades of the seal rookery were in evidence on the eastern side. Two b'c'cons, radio antennas and an observation post were on the flat top of the island. Eased ground south of island, on edge of visibility circle, trusting to our camouflage for non detection before the bombardment. Reefs and shoals extend off the island, with the best and most sheltered approach from the west.
0625. Headed in for bombardment. Has a bit surprised to find 20 or more large barracks, warehouses and buildings on the eastern side. Looks like business has expanded beyond our expectations and those of the pilot and others.
0638. Commenced continuous keying of fathometer.
0641. Named b'c'ttle stations-gun. Noticed people medly running around the island. Our presence is known. The 10 fathom curve extends 2000 yards off shore.
0650. Sounding 7 fathoms. Range 1100 yards. Visibility - excellent. Fog has cleared. Skies overcast.
0651. SHORE 30 BELARUS. Commenced firing 40 mm. Simultaneously island personnel opened up on us with machine guns -thick walled across us with-out hitting. Immediately returned their fire with our tin 20 mm, 2-50 calibre and 2-30 calibres, concentrating 40 mm on an exposed 50 calibre mount -thick the enemy had mounted on top of the 50 foot cliff overhanging the buildings on this side, of the island. Opposition ceased. Range 900 yards. Commenced firing 5 inch gun, systematically destroying all buildings. Spotted a 75 mm field piece unmarked on the cliff. Turned the 40 mm gun to on it, and their fourth shot hit it, knocking a shell off - leaving it lying on its side.

— page 106 —
2 July 1945 (Cont'd).
: 0704 Reversed course to remain in close. Sounding 6 fathoms. At range 300 yar stopped and let the guns literally tear the place to pieces. The 40 m destroyer, the observation post, three Sampans close to the beach and on oil dump of about thirty drums. These drums must have contained seal oil, for the automatic fire striking the oil pouring down the beach, gave off large flashes, but never set it on fire. A fire broke out in one of the large buildings near the center of the concentration and quickly spread to other buildings. Heavily a wonderful sight and the ideal submarine bombardment - huge fires burning, sections of building flying up in the air, Sampans destroyed, oil drums tumbled and split, a field piece overturned and a machine gun hanging loose, unattended. Too much praise can not be given the gun crews. The crew emphasized thriftly use of our limited ammunition, almost to the danger point, and not a bullet or shell was wasted. The 5 inch shifted targets methodically, as quickly as previous target was destroyed. The 40 mm, with its new telescopic sights and sight bar, proved its worth as an accurate weapon. The automatic weapons outdid themselves by firing properly in short bursts. To really appreciate this bombardment one must see the results obtained by our photographer.

0724 Cased fire. Opened out to observe results. Secured guns. Island a shambles with fires spreading. Stopped and lay to at 3500 yards to observe results and give the planes a couple of hours to arrive in case a transmission had been sent before we silenced their transmitters. This as a precaution preparatory to our intended landing.

1030 No planes yet. The had heard nothing on 500 kc's so assume bombardment is still a private matter. Flooded down forward and inflated rubber boots. Called away SSMULT FORCE and briefed them. Plan to land on northeast side of island with 40 mm laying a barrage 200 yards ahead of party.

1045 Named battle stations-gun working back in toward beach, heaving the lead to check the fathometer. Stopped 650 yards from beach in 5 fathoms. Looked over by list of island over for possible unknown fortifications. Fires burning rarrily - about 1/3 of buildings having been consumed.

1102 To our amazement C.O. and O.O.D. spotted 4 pillboxes along the top of this barren island protecting this side.

1103 Commenced firing 40 mm at one large pillbox from which an antenna led.

1104 Fire was immediately returned by machine guns and rifles. Opened up with all automatic guns which silenced the opposition. After 18 shots, the 40 mm put one in the slit of the pillbox and blew open port of the front side. Real accuracy gave up our idea of landing as too risky with the results to be obtained other than project No. 3 and withdraw. It about 4000 yards the Japs again opened up with machine guns in a face saving attempt. On losing sight of the island now rechristened LITTLE I'0, fires were still burning.

As an interesting sidelight members of the assault Force had refused offers of 200 to swap with other members of the crew prior to discovery of the pillboxes. Afterwards, the price as best expressed by one of our Commandos - "You can buy no for a nickel".

1200 Position: Lat. 48-24 N, Long. 144-25 E. Set course to investigate town of SHIRITORI.

1640 APR contact 135/1500/12.

— page 107 —
2 July 1945

CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. BARB = Report of Traffic for Patrol 1

2 July 1945 (Cont'd)

1752
Dived. Closed beach until we had only 3 fathoms under keel. SHIRITORI is a greatly enlarged thriving town with numerous factories. Spotted trains shuttling back and forth for future reference.

2126
Surfaced. Set course for SHIKUKA. Our presence in PATIENCE BAY will be a sore subject to the Japs by tomorrow so decided to give SHIKUKA a rocket passage. SHIKUKA is another large town in the northwestern part of PATIENCE BAY which has really grown up. It has many factories and land and seaplane air bases. 10 fathom curve is 5 miles off the beach.

3 July 1945

0100
Sighted range lights of SHIKUKA harbor. Heavy overcast and a light drizzle. Perfect for rocketloading. Set up rocket launcher and checked circuits.

0210
Manned bottle stations-rockets. Loaded 12 rockets. Set rocket range at 5250 yards. Target to be center of town with drift going into factories.

0239
ROCKET ASSAULT #2. In position, 4900 yards off the beach. Sounding 5 ft. Put on polaroid goggles to watch the fun.

0240
ROCKETS AAY!!!

Nothing happened. After a four frantic minutes found a loose connection in the circuit. Backed down and regained firing position.

0247
ROCKETS AAY!!! This time the system worked and the 5 inch rockets went swishing out.

0247-31
Rockets landed with their usual thunder and explosions arongst a mass of buildings. Scrapped for deep water. No fires were started. Lights blinked on and off in town for a few minutes then darkened.

Set course down middle of PATIENCE BAY on route OTOMARI in AITAI. This area will need cooling off. Fog set in with visibility varicbly.

0943
CONTACT #4. Sighted a small coastal freighter (KFK), 1000 tons, coal burner in the haze, on route SHIKUKA, zig zagging. Radar made contact at 13,000 yards. Confirmed and around.

1010
APR contact. 59/500/40.

1200
Position: Lat. 48-24 N, Long. 143-56 E.

1206
Submerged in position ahead, speed and zigzag plan determined.

1227
Angle on bow zero. Two lifeboats are sung out and half lowered. Range 1800 yards. Ant deep.

- See special report.

1249
Surfaced. Picked up a total of 17 charts. All Japs committed Hari-nari. Eliminated as much evidence as possible. International signal flags and colors floating around in tightly wrapped individual bundles were numerous, but heavy swell washed them away when scavenging was attempted. Moral - bring a dip net.

Set course for AITAI and OTOMARI.

4 July 1945

0535
APR contact: 155/500/20. Ssang ship without success.

1200
Position: Lat. 45-48 N, Long. 143-37 E.

1604
CONTACT #5. Sighted Frigate, Divod. Connected approach. Frigate did a figure S in our direction and than opened out, closest range 8000 yards before frigate returned to his patrol down possible nine line which is charted.

1846
Sighted RUSSLIN destroyer which we made a successful approach on, until he was identified by his merchant ship nerking at 3500 yards. A two stacker which had passed east through La PEROUSSE.

— page 108 —
4 July 1945 (Cont'd)

A surprise for us have not expected Russian Non-of-arr. Fortunato that we weren't planning on special weapons for outer doors on bow tubes had been opened before he was identified.

Surfaced. Radar contact on another ship. Used flank speed to get ahead.

Submerged. Corroded approach.

Sighted another RUSSLAR, a Liberty ship heading for L. PERKUSE.

Surfaced 6000 yards from him. Our position between two mine lines without a check on our DR for over 12 hours is not good.

During night searched. Best Coast of ANI A. AN from L. PERKUSE to OTORARI via the 10 fathom curve.

R contact 95/500/40.

5 July 1945

0450 Submerged for day patrol off TAKAHI SE just south of VENOCCHI PT. and north of L. PERKUSE minefields. After close study of this coast and the traffic routes we anticipate particularly the daily train ferries this appears to be the only point where an attack is possible. Here we can get to within 3000 yards of the beach. Unfortunately it is in uneasy position close to the minefields with a maximum of 15 fathoms of water, and the surface is a mirror like calm. The boys are not getting pretty good at diving with a maximum of 2 degree dive angle. could we could encounter some fog.

0703 Sighted a Trailer working close in to the beach.

0820 Another Trailer passing close.

0829 Sighted a Lugger heading towards L. PERKUSE.

0846 Two more Trailers.

0910 CONTACT #6. Sighted a Frigate coming down the Coast outboard of us. sent to full speed commencing approach. Target pinging.

0922 During an observation sighted two train ferries singing down the coast. These were almost invisible against the land background. The leader of these was a beautiful job, more or less of a combination of the SEIHU IARU #2-nd the TUGAR LARU, two steaker, stacks athertish, with three decks of superstructure under a large bridge - estimated tonnage 4000. Close behind it was a medium AK which had been converted to a train ferry, judging from its starboard fantail. Turned around again and commenced approach on train ferry at high speed.

Approach ended up with BARR in the middle. Closest range to after ferry 3400 yards. Frigate 3000 yards outboard of us. Target speed 15 knot both ferries passed within two hundred yards of the rocks. Kicked myself for being drawn out from the coast by the escort.

0953 CONTACT #7. Sighted smoke coming north through L. PERKUSE. Iade out two ships under the smoke heading our way. One is very large resembling a Liberty Ship. Had a good comparison between it and the large train ferry as they passed. The big ship eased out from the coast to let the ferries pass inboard. The small ship identified as a small engines aft coastal AK passed inshore of the ferries. Had a for-berd moments when a large rust patch on the side of the large AK resembled the Red Russian markings - angle on the bow is small. nice picture presented itself of the coastal AK using the Russian to screen it. Could practice all her the howls if we fired fish across the bow of a Russian at Coastal AK.

— page 109 —
1038 Raised the periscope nearly clipping off the pontoons of a Jap seaplane. This plane was a twin floater doing figure eights across the bay of the large A, This is no Russian. Fused out a bit and large. He eased in towards coast.
1047 TORPEDO ATTACK #2A. Fired tubes #4, #5, #6. Track angle 95, strcboard, range 1570 yards, gyros 15 degrees right, speed 11.5 knots, depth set 6 feet. Target in ballast but dreading at least 12 feet. No hits. Sung loft for stern tubes at high speed.
1051 One explosion - torpedo hit beach.
1052 TORPEDO ATTACK #2B. Fired tubes #7 #9. Dropped target speed to 8 knots. Track angle 135 degrees starboard, range 1670, gyros 25, decreases loft, depth 6 feet.
1054 One hit, raised periscope. Target had heavy clouds of white smoke under stack and was listing to starboard. Tops of screws were visible and screws were stopped. Coastal AA was stopped on his port beam, but being in ballast with the bow port of his keel showing, not suitable for torpedoes.
1057 Breaking up noises commenced. Lo-ered scope and hauled rashes for the twenty fathom curve.
1106 Took a final periscope check on target. Three lifeboats were in the water. Ship not listing to port about 10 degrees, her anchor down - evidently the torpedo explosion had anchored her. Breaking up noises continued loud ly, but target did not appear to be settling. Much as I disliked the idea it was imperative to reverse course and deliver the Coup De Grace.
1114 Fade ready tube #1. Could not sight plane, but pinging was heard with an up doppler. Decided to use ST and get some exact data on those Mk12-2 fish. Found our funnel height was off to the extent that target speed was 9 knots. Our first spread should have caught him easily.
1123 Range 1400 yards, Stendby - hold everything target is sagging amidships. Secure tube #1.
1124 Target broke amidship and sank in a "W" for victory witnessed by C.O. and Exoc. Breaking up noises lasted about 5 more minutes.
1130 Having spotted escorts coming in from North and South, dropped down to 80 feet and buried our heads, hopefully.
1136 Distant bomb or depth charge. Pinging no loud.
1200 Position: Lat 46-05 N, Long. 142-19 E.
    i. concentrated sweep was not made of this care. by at least two pairs of escorts, a needed by running east silently, using 100 Rf. than necessary because an undetermined current sets southerly on to the minefield and the bay shores to the North.
2116 Surfaced, Still drylight, but even the escorts spent to be leery of honging around a submarine after dark. Set course for Hikini. ID to cool this off and to give personnel a chance to relax, in spite of the fact that this attack was consummated without any close death charges or bombs, it has affected personnel more than any other. Frankly, it seems to permeate most with an electric, nerve-racking claustrophobic. No one likes it. Believe this is due to shallow water, proximity of minefields and the obvious fact that our fish are not hitting even with the best of set ups.
2133 MR contact 210 i.e.g.

— page 110 —
6 July 1945
: 0030  APR contact, 95/500/40.
: 0545  Variable fog and rain, adjusted courses so that breakers on beach could be
: 0900  APR contact, 79/500/40.
: 1152  Divd end closed SHIMOYUBETSU to 12 fathom curve for observation. Heavy
: 1200  Position: Lat. 46-04 N, Long. 142-20 S.
: 1403  Surfaced.
: 1805  APR contact, 79/250/20.
: 2109  APR Contact, 135/250/20.
: 2330  Set course for ANI. AN to take advantage of foggy weather.

7. July 1945
: 1127  Surface patrolling east of L. FERROUS on route ANI. AN, another deserted
: 1129  US after dawn. Visibility 20,000 yards.
: 1159  CONTACT #8. Sighted a Frigate at 15,000 yards.
: 1200  Divd. Commenced approach. Frigate was patrolling southwest, perhaps
: 1223  coincidentally, from NAKA SHIKETOKO BISAKI along possible nine line.
: 1241  Target reversed course at about 8000 yards and escaped.
: 1253  Position: Lat. 45-45 N, Long. 142-55 E.
: 1255  Surfaced.
: 1359  Surface patrolling on course 7.
: 1700  Obtained fix. Recorrecting our track shows that we were within 500 yards
: 1715  of eastern possible nine line during our approach on the first Frigate of
: 1802  the day.
: 1830  APR contact, 75/500/40.
: 1835  CONTACT #10. Divd. Sighted two Frigates patrolling slowly down the coast
: 1930  out from the position of our attack. Regret they don't join us in thirty
: 2100  fathoms, but they appear to like 20 fathom water.
: 2130  Last sight of Frigates.
: 2160  Surfaced. Sun still up. Looks like the heat is still on. Get course for
: 2100  PATIENCE B.IY.
: 2130  APR contact, 80/750/24.

8 July 1945
: 1200  Surface patrolling along east coast of MARFUTO and PATI. ON B.IY.
: 1205  Position: Lat. 46-56 N, Long. 143-17 E.
: 1625  Haze set in. Visibility 12,000 yards.
: 1833  APR contact, 77/500/28.
: 2030  CONTACT #11. Sighted a lugger making 9 knots heading south along 10 fathom
: 2050  curve. Decided to follow on edge of visibility until light fog thickened,
: 2055  or twilight, for if lugger sights us he can beach himself before we get
: 2055  a shot off.
: 2100  Sunset. Commenced closing. Rased inside the 10 fathom curve.
: 2050  Fathometer showing 2 fathoms beneath keel. Rigged in sound heads.
: 2055  Target evidently heading for SAKIZHII. 2 miles south of us.
: 2055  GUN ATTACK #3. All stop. Range 1100 yards commenced firing 40 mm. Gun crew
: 2055  for 5 inch standing by below decks. Fired 32 rounds for 20 hits.

— page 111 —
8 July 1945(Cont'd).

2058 Lugger destroyed and sinking by the stern. Ceased firing.
2058 Reliable lookout spotted large 2 engine plane rising from field near the
beach. Cleared the decks and went to emergency speed heading for 10 ft. t-
on of deep water, zigzagging wildly. Raised periscope to watch plane.
2101. Reached the 10 fathom curve, but plane had not been picked up again.
These three intervening minutes seemed like hours of. being an ostrich, and
everyone in the control room was urgently beseeching the fathometer to
show us 10 fathoms, I. entirely booted myself a hundred times. For not fightin
the plane off with guns, but my snap decision had been to clear everybody
off to side and close the hatch, so that no second would be rated in gett-
ing the gun crews below when we had sufficient water beneath us to dive.
As a post-mortem the snap decision was correct.
2102. "ith no plane on SD or periscope, decided it was evidently a transport
plane on a routine takeoff which hadn't seen us, so returned to the bridge.
2103 C.O.,O.C.D. (quartermaster and periscope spotted two medium calibre guns
firing at us from SHARKHARK. The opposition had broken out the village
guns and were pumping out shots every five seconds. All were tall stern
in the vicinity of the sinking lugger. Shifted my horseshoe to another
pocket and set course for HURRO KAIKYO on route lifeguard station for
carrier strike.

9 July 1945
0900. APR contact. 74/500/25.
1200. Position: Lat. 46-06 N, Long. 144-54 E.

10 July 1945
0040. APR contact. 79/500/70.
0045. APR contact. 198/1150/24.
0545. APR contact. 198/900/25.
    Surface patrolling along west coast of KURASHIRI in NURU KAIKYO.
    Visibility excellent.
0918. CONTACT #12. Sighted smoke coming up through NURUO STRI. Probably coast-
    al AIS, which would pass close to SHARKYOKO, so corr. arced high speed diesh
    across the straits to obtain close inshore attack position.
1000. Submerged 7 miles off SHARKYOKO with fishing sharks in clear view with-
    out binoculars. .e must accept being sighted by people on shore and trust
    they have no telephone or signal communication to warn approaching ships.
    Continued closing coast at full speed.
1015. I named bettle stations-torpedoes. Corr. corr. ST approach. Targets-two
    Coast AIS (800 tons est.). Snorkey Joos HIFI. No escorts. Course and speed
    steady. One target 2000 yards at 20th of other. Decided to fire for close
    position so KAI8's couldn't rise. Estimated draft of target 3-10 feet. Set
    torpedoes on 3 feet.
1117. .t firing position,range 600 yards, but periscope is ducked.
1118. TORADO ATTACK #3. Fired tubes #1, #2, #3. Range 540 yards, track 145 ster-
    board, gyros 43 degree right, target speed 8 knots. No hits. Torpedoes
    tracked towards target and then were lost. Target paint-lined course and
    speed. Corr. corr. turning left for attack on second target.
1125-30 One torpedo explosion on the beach. ent to 150 feet dead ahead of second
    target. J. unable to pick up series of second target until after it had
    passed overhead.

— page 112 —
10 July 1945 (Cont'd).

1128 Secured from battle stations. Disappointed. Attached targets go over the hill and turn SHIRATOKO ISSAKI on route BASHIRI. Considered a battle surface action; but targets were alerted, armed with 40 mm and I expected the HOKKAIDO Coastal air patrol to arrive momentarily.

1200 Position: Lat. 44-04 N, Long. 146-15 E.

1307 Sighted aircraft which searched area.

1340 Sighted aircraft which searched area.

1636 Surflaced and set course for KUNASHIRI SUIDO.

Of possible interest concerning those Coastal IIs is the fact that both were dragging a rope not astern similar to the type used in the old "Castl recovery on our BB's. At first this was considered a possible anti-submarine drag, until I watched three Scampers work close aboard the AKIs and hook on to the not with a grennel for a free ride.

1808 APC contact. 75/500/50.

2100 APC contact. 80/600/50.

2200 Converted #4 fuel ballast tank.

11 July 1945

Surface patrolling between KUNASHIRI and SHIKOTAN.

0200 Transited KUNASHIRI STRAIT.

0445 APC contact. 79/500/50.

0755 CONTACT 13: Sighted a large diesel Senpan. Visibility excellent. Lanned bettle stations-gun. Since we are 15 miles from air bases on SHIKOTAN, maneuvered into firing position so that guns could fire on a line between SHIKOTAN and KUNASHIRI thus lessening the noise.

0902 GUN ATTACK 4: Commenced firing 40 mm at range of 900 yards. Target spaced 7 knots. Fired 40 rounds of 40 mm for 35 hits. Target stopped, but refused to sink.

0908 Censored firing. Circled and noted a high speed sweep close aboard target, but she stayed afloat.

0927 Fired two rounds of 5 inch at 350 yards. Target opened all seas and sank. Continued patrol.

1200(I) Position: Lat. 44-04 N, Long. 146-19 E.

2200(I) Transited SHIKOTAN STRAIT. Fairly shallow, 15 fathoms. En route life-guard station.

12 July 1945

Surface patrolling SUSHO SHOTO. to KUNASHI, light fog, visibility 10,000 yards. Patrolling with beach visible.

0055(I) APC contact. 79/500/60.

1040(I) APC contact. 153/500/22.

1200(I) Position: Lat. 45-05 N, Long. 145-30 E.

1210-1320(I) APC contact. 153/500/22.

1700(I) APC contact. 102/500/22. Lasted while in this area.

1832-2400(I) APC contact. 152/500/22.

13 July 1945

Surface patrolling on lifeguard station south of KUNASHI. Strike was cancelled, so closed coast for patrol. Low visibility.

1200(I) Position: Lat. 42-39 N, Long. 144-59 E.

— page 113 —
14 July 1945
Surfaced patrolling on lifeguard station.
0000(I) APR contacts. 78/300/60; 102/500/22; 305/500/17 and 206/500/22.
0410(I) Dived. SJ contact at 18,000 yards closing fast.
0516(I) Surfaced. All clear.
0524(I) Fighter Cap 4 planes arrived. Strike commenced. During day large fires were started at KUSHIRO and KUSHISHI which burned all night.
1200(I) Position: Lat. 42-39 N, Long. 14-54 E.
1720(I) Air cap departed.
1910(I) Dived. Plane sighted at 4 miles, flying low, zero angle.
2000(I) Surfaced. Set course for new lifeguard station south of HONUMO. To stay.
Cont. 15 July 1945
Surfaced patrolling on lifeguard station.
0450(I) Fighter Cap of four planes arrived.
Closed the beach to watch the fun. The first wave quickly set the air and knocked out all important targets. Then a search began for scouting to strike. About 50 fighters scoured the area. The spotted a few radio stations which they immediately set ablaze. This section of HONUMO appears very soft. Thought we might join in the sport by a score bombardment, but neither our cover nor ourselves could find anything worth wasting a 40 mm on after scouting along the shore. There were only a few impoverished small villages left. The high point of the strike came when the following VHF conversation was overheard: "ambitious Pilot to Section Leader 'There's a horse, I'm going after him'. Stern Section Leader 'You leave that poor horse alone'."
e noticed 5 or 6 horses grazing in a field. The last of the opposition.
1200(I) Position: Lat. 43-11 N, Long. 145-46 E.
1600(I) Cover departed. Secured from lifeguard. Requested a weeks extension to cover are time we had cobscorbed in lifeguard and en route. Extension granted.
2200(I) Transited SHIKOTAI STRAIT.

16 July 1945
Surfaced patrolling on route ANI AN.
0400 Transited KUSHISHI STRAIT.
1200 Position: Lat. 45-07 N, Long. 145-23 E.
2140 R contact. 95/500/22.
2330 Entered ANI AN.

17 July 1945
Patrolling ANI AN near Li PEROUSE.
0550 Dived north of minefields off CHISHIY. SAI.
0603 Sighted lugger going up coast. Followed by 3 Samoans.
0915 Visibility decreased to 4000 yards.
0922 Surfaced.
1100 CONTACT #14. Sighted SHIUSHU class Frigate 150 degrees true. Small angle on the bow. Range 10,000 yards.
1102 Dived. Commenced approach.
1117 Named bottle stations torpedoes.
1150 Frigate definitely identified as a SHIUSHU Class Frigate. Target has no set zig plane, patrolling at 7 knots with zigs as large as 90 degrees.

— page 114 —
1150(Cont'd) Keisthead height 57 feet - for future reference. At 6000 yards target turned away and headed towards minesfields lazily patrolling. Secured approach.

1200 Position: Lat. 46-03 N, Long. 142-18 E.

1216 Headed back towards our shore position. This approach had drawn us out 3000 yards. Visibility lowering along coast.

1222 CONTACT #15. Sighted another Frigate and small AK hugging the coast. Commenced approach, but closest range obtained was 2700 yards on the Frigate which is too great for our torpedoes. To only have 5 left, their performance so far has been very poor. Consequently they will be expended only on close shots.

1300 Noted the Japs have placed a spar buoy at position where we sank the large AK. This menace to navigation forces traffic out into 13 fathoms of water and accounts for our being able to get as close as we did on our last approach than we had been drawn away out of position by the Frigate.

1449 Sighted lugger hugging the beach.

2005 Sighted lugger hugging the beach.

2138 Surfaced. Set course south to investigate night patrol activity L. FROUSE minefields.

2215 AR contact, 95/450/40. Probably NISHI MOTORO LISAMI.

2221 CONTACT #16. Radar contact, 12,000 yards, 2 Frigates patrolling along minelines. One of these Frigates using 10 Cl radar.

18 July 1945

0145 Radar contact at 17,000 yards. Closed to discover another RUSSLAN.

0331 Radar contact at 20,000 yards. RUSSLAN lights.

0416 CONTACT #17. Sighted one of the minefield Frigates at 17,000 yards.

0425 Dived off VENOCCHI POINT to take a crack at the daily traffic which must pass outside our spar buoy thus allowing us to be off the coast in 20 fathoms.

1000 Our train ferries, which we have pointed for since the start of the patrol failed to appear for the second consecutive day. News broderest stated that the recent fighter strikes on Japan had eliminated 3 train ferries at HAKODATE. Thus our two must have been sent south to replace them.

1047 Our minefield Frigate again put in a distant brief appearance. To be staying out today for some real traffic.

1127 CONTACT #18. Sighted a large AK escorted by the customary SHIUSHU class Frigate coming down the coast. Earned battle stations and commenced approach in a calm sea. Using only attack scope and taking observations on the Frigate only, since we have his minehead height cold. Frigate about 1500 yards broad on port bow of large AK(KFK), passenger superstructure. Decided to fire 2 torpedoes at Frigate and 3 at AK. Set up checking exactly.

Feralleled Frigate to present small target. He is pinging and we have an isotherm.

Took a quick peek as Frigate passed 3-400 yards abreast, staring into the ends of half a dozen binoculars with which their lookouts were spying, noticed Jap 0.0.D. berating one port lookout and ran fiddling around the depth charge racks. Target now on steady course 196 degrees true, speed 12 knots. To complicate matters the elevation handle of the periscope picked this overborne moment to come off, much to my surprise. Couldn't resist exclaiming "See-no hends", however soon returned to the serious business of consummating a one-armed approach.

— page 115 —
1158-25 TORPEDO ATTACK #4A. Fired tubes #4 and #6 at the Frigate. Range 1240 yr track 160 degrees port, gyros 10 degrees right. Sung right and at
: 1159-18 TORPEDO ATTACK #4B. Fired tubes #2, #3, #5 at large AK, Range 1510 yrs, track 120 degrees port, gyros 43 degrees right. All torpedoes set on 4 feet, since we believe torpedoes are running deep.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 46-04 N, Long. 142-29 E.
: 1200-28 One hit in stern of Frigate. This set off his depth charges and blew his stern off in a tremendous explosion. Noticed his rising sun men-of-war flag sinking properly. The bow and quickly assumed a 90 degree rise angle. Took pictures. Formed and of ship sunk until it hit bottom leaving about 20 feet of bow sticking up vertically. This will provide a much better marker than a spar buoy. Sinking witnessed by entire Corning Toro party. There were no survivors.
: 1205 Large AK made a 90 degree turn toward, then 180 degree away, then right 90 degrees to go back up the coast followed by a 180 degree turn to resume course for his original destination. Seems to have a difficult time making up his mind, which would be eased, if he only knew we are out of torpedoes. Unaccountably we missed him.
: 1213 Secured from bottle stations and opened coast.
: 1536 Surface. Visibility 12,000 yards. A norf feel very dangerous with a full forty fathoms of deep water beneath us, and no have a for bitter pills for the other three Frigates in this area, if they care to play on our ground.
: 1545 AF contact. 95/450/40.
: 1601 CONTACT #19. Sighted 2 Frigates astern of us about 11,000 yards in 20 fathoms of water. Their decks and superstructure were completely visible, Roncinaid surfaced, hoping to draw them out. Their angle on the bow: 20 degrees port. Frigates declined the invitation and, apparently on sighting us, crackly changed their angle on the bow to 90 degrees port and made for the ice for the minefield.
: 1743 Sighted a Nibbili ship south of us.
: 1807 Radar contact at 9 miles closing fast. Divod. Oh hell, plane opposition has been a gun, since the fighter surface.
: 2121 CONTACT #20. And at twilight, bright moonlight. Hilo raking SJ sweep, prior to surfacing, made radar contact on 3 Frigates, two together and one several thousand yards away. All searching for us, and equipped with 10 Cradar. Coronaced aero gear, but unable to gain position ahead. Frigates passed at 2000 yards plaining visible in night periscope. Unfortunately we have no shooting fish.
: 2220 Surfaced. Did not consider it good policy to tackle this whole group, with want to have, into the possibility of being held down all night by moonlight. Hope to be able to handle these singly at a later date.
: 2225 AF contact. 95/450/40.
: 2337 Another FUSELI ship contact.

19 July 1945
: 19 July 1945
: Surface artillery FISHING AF. Our plan is to locate a suitable coastal position of the railways, land our SABOTER force and plant a 55 lb. demolition charge under the tracks. Then this charge will be exploded by a train passing over and closing the micro stitch.

— page 116 —
19 July 1945 (Cont'd):
1022  : APR contact, 76/500.
1130  : APR contact, 79/500/60.
1200  : Position: Lat. 47-03 N, Long. 143-44 E.
1837  : Dived end closed coast for observation.
1932  : Sighted the regular northbound train. Located a fairly good position. He had previously located two good landing spots north of SHIRUTAI.
2201  : Surfaced. Bright moonlight and no clouds. Operation off tonight.

20 July 1945:
1200  : Position: Lat. 48-03 N, Long. 143-06 E.
    : Close study of the Japanese Charts of KARAFUTO recovered from the sinking of the coastal AK has revealed more accurate sounding information than our own charts.
1517  : Selected a more suitable position for the sabotage.
1648  : Dived end closed coast for observation.
1947  : Sighted train.
2132  : Surfaced. See eel, but we are fouled up by a perfect lovers night, bright moon. Cloudless.

21 July 1945:
1200  : Surface patrolling diagonally across PATIENCE BAY towards CHIRE, obtaining sounding information of uncharted sections for the Hydrographic Office and praying for clouds.
1200  : Position: Lat. 48-52 N, Long. 143-56 E.
1740  : APR contact, 77/500/40.
1825  : APR contact, 79/750/50.
1920  : APR contact, 74/600/700.
    : Another Iover's night. Patience. One Sampan was sighted moving along the beach.

22 July 1945:
1200  : Surface patrolling easterly across PATIENCE BAY sounding uncharted areas and biding our time.
1200  : Position: Lat. 48-04 N, Long. 144-23 E.
    : Southerly breezes brought a stratus. At last the weather is right. Passeyed word that SABOTAGE will land tonight. After days of patiently waiting and observing, the undercurrent of expected action that ran through the boat made ones spine tingle. Even our prisoner "MILITARY" was swept away with it and asked to be permitted to join the party. Not an escapee he supplied information on dogs and beach patrols than questioned.
    : Briefly the outline of our project is as follows:
GENERAL PLAN:
    To blow up a train at a vital point in the KARAFUTO east coast (20)

— page 117 —
22 July 1945(Cont'd)
railway system. Under overcast submarine to approach, beach on batteries, at slack water, flooded down, until two fathoms of water remained under the keel, as checked by leodsman. Here, approximately 1000 yards offshore, the two rubber boots, 'containing eight men and equipment, would be launched. Navigation in to be by radar. Hoped for landing point to be 800 yards from nearest houses. Upon beaching signalman and guard would remain with boots. Other six men would proceed across highway to track. At suitable position for planting charge the party would divide. One guard proceeding 50 yards up track near the road. Another 50 yards down track end of third 20 yards inland. The remaining three would dig under the tracks, plant the battery and charge, test and adjust the firing circuits, recall the men, make final hoolup and return to the ship. All men carried red flashlights, patches, knives, two "PD" rations, lifejacket, cigarette lighter and pistol. Other equipment in the boats consisted of radar corners, carbines, tonnage guns, hand grenades, HK108 (55 lb.) demolition charge, electrical equipment, home manufactured shovels and pick, signal gun, Very pistol, binoculars, line and wedges. Party should land at 2330 and return prior to 0230. Twilight commences about 0245.

Communications are to be simple:
(1) Alert - 2 Bob White whistles.
(2) Assemble - Hiipoorwill whistles.
(3) Mechanical whistle - emergency dash for the boats.
(4) Two Very stars - are in trouble - lay a barrage in direction indicated.
(5) One Very star from submarine - are in trouble, will return every night.
(6) "U" on blinker gun - party is returning to boat.
(7) One Very star at 15 minute intervals - unable to locate submarine after 30 minutes paddling from beach.

The party to be comprised of the following personnel:
Lieut. Lillian L. HARKER, U.S.N.R., File No. 120037.
SEVER, Francis N., 621 82 53, Si2c, U.S.N.R.
RICHARD, James E., 564 85 40, KoN2c, U.S.N.R.
HARVARD, John (n), 234 39 38, HolNlc, U.S.N.
SAUNDERS, Paul G., 265 72 19, CGH, U.S.N. (Chief of the boat).
HATFIELD, Billy R., 828 15 66, El3c, U.S.N.R.
HELIAD, Laurence ..., 279 79 21, SC1c, U.S.N.
KLINGESMITH, Edward ..., 877 88 49, Th3c, U.S.N.-I.

Trains at this point have varied from 7 to 32 cars. The average train consists of twelve freight cars, three passenger cars, and one mail or baggage car. Though narrow gauge, the engines are large and of the European type rather than the Ochu type.

2145 Trim dive.
2155 Surfaced, flooded down.
2200 Briefed SA2OTER party. Heado in.

The atmosohore is charged with excitement. Rubber boats are being inflated, equipment is being gathered, and last minutes joking is still in progress. The night is perfect with a moderate overcast hiding a 3/4 moon, so that we have just enough light, the sea is calm and the tide is slack.

2230 SJ contact at 4500 yards on two sultkits coming down the coast. Probably luggers or Scampans. Lay to and tracked them across our boat at 5 knots.

— page 118 —
22 July 1945 (Cont'd)
2255: Hail battle stations guns. Reised sound heads. Opened out as spitkits zigged our way.
2318: Losing valuable time with these spitkits. They are by now. Commenced closing beach, wiggling back and forth adjusting position. Planned for lndnarks indefinite.

23 July 1945
0000: SABOTAGE ATTACK #1. In position at last. Two fathoms under the keel. Shore line 950 yards. e can do no better. Launched rubber boats.
0005: As boats shoved off had planned to say something apropos to such an operation as "Synchronize your watches," however all I could think of was "Boys, if you get stuck, head for Siberia 130 miles north - follow the mountain ranges, good luck".
0037: Atched the boats all the way in, and radar easily tracked them by their radar corners. I imagine the Serb is easily sighted from the beach, but, I hope, hard to identify.
0052: Party landed on the beach. Seconds are dragging by. Feel positive that once initial landing is made, unopposed, the rest will go off smoothly. I momentarily expecting shots, flares and a general clamor, but the blackness of the night has engulfed all in a challenging silence.
0132: An unscheduled North bound train coming up the tracks. To lights exert from the firebox, white smoke swirling back. The boys ashore must be in the middle of their job now. Crossed my fingers and held my breath. Imagination running rampant.
0154: Train passing by successfully. Heaved a sigh of relief and shifted that horseshoe around again.
0132: At last, the boats are leaving the beach. Luffled cheers from our side. They are blinking their signal - holding off our answer. Surely they can see us. Their blinking becoming insistent - perhaps they mistake us for a patrol vessel. Gave them a short dash and darkness settled.
0154: Ye Gods! another northbound train coming up the tracks. Broke the silence to yell to the boats "Paddle like the devil". Entirely rested, the boats have spotted the train and the paddles are churning like eggbeaters. The train is getting closer and closer. Any second now. That a moment! Even the boats have stopped to look. Everyone is a stricken with the aspect of any of momentary destruction.
0154: That a thrill! That a beautiful sight! The charge made a much greater explosion than the expected, the engines boilers blew, wreckage flew to hundred feet in the air in a flash of flame and smoke, cars piled up and rolled off the track in a rattling, twisting, mass of wreckage. Cheers!
0151: Keeled the boats aboard and backed clear.
0202: Kicked ahead and hauled out to deep water. A small fire flickered along-side the tracks and, shortly, lights of a car came dashing along the road. Feel more proud and happy over what my lads have done, than I could in sinking a hundred ships. Their stories are priceless. Bear with me - while I give you the highlights briefly as heard over the medicinal libation.
Our navigation, though close for such a coastline, was about 500 yards off to the north. Haze covered the two close peaks the party was to work in on, and the boat compass was erratic. Consequently, when the party landed they found themselves in somebody's backyard, fifty yards from a house. Fortunately no dogs put in an appearance, though dogtracks lit

— page 119 —
23 July 1945 (Cont'd).
0202(Cont'd).

human barefoot prints alongside were noticed on the beach. After a short period of huddled reconnaissance, the main party left the boat guards proceeded cautiously inland skirting the houses. At this point that had appeared to be grass, from our offshore view, turned out to be a nest high bullrushes which crunched and crackled with every move, shrieking out their presence. All shapes took on human forms. About to huddle yards inland they came to the highway. Another huddled reconnaissance. All clear, so Lt. Jalker arose starting a dash across the road and immediately fell head-first into a four foot ditch. Picking himself up, he cautioned the rest to 'natch out for the ditch, then made a dash across the highway and immediately fell headfirst into the ditch on the other side. A hundred yards farther and they arrived at the track, recommitted, and selected their spot. Having noticed a peculiarly shaped object a short way down the tracks, Larkuson, a guard was told to check on it and the guards were sent out. Digging commenced, but soon stopped then someone came running up the track. It was Larkuson, who reported, "Jeepers, that thing is a lookout tower". Then queried as to why he didn't give the alert to warn them of his approach, he replied, "I tried to whistle, but when I saw that tower my mouth dried up". Quiet continuing, he was again sent out. Digging recommenced, but the picks and shovels shattered the night - ith loud ringing sounds. They were laid aside and excavation continued dog fashion. A flickering light was spotted down the tracks. A train? ork ceased. In proper frontier fashion all ears were pinned to the rails. No sound. Turn to again.

Suddenly at an estimated range of 75-100 yards a train loomed up, roaring down upon them. Nearly the entire party made a dive for the nearest foxhole, the four remaining squawked themselves into hiding behind bushes six inches high and two inches wide. The train blared past with the engineer hanging her out of his cab looking each of the party over personally.

Then the initial foxhole crash dive was made, Hatfield, the electrician, landed in such a fashion that both carbon dioxide cartridges attacked to his lifejacket went off. He was sure he was shot, yet soon found that he was merely approaching motorway as his face lost inflate.

The train by, the project hurried along with no untoward occurrence, other than the boy's decreasing the rice. It's clear clearance to the rail well below what had been assigned - just to be sure it would work. Circuits were checked, the charge was hooked up, the digging disguised and then the right filled with whippoorwill. A little difficulty was encountered in launching the boats through the light surf with everyone getting a bit scared. About to thirds of the way back they sighted the train, and thoroughly enjoyed watching the fruits of their effort being explosively slack.

Position: Lt. 48-16 H, Long. 143-41 S.
LRP contact. 99/375/20.
Submerged off SHIRUTU for reconnaissance.
Surfaced. Reconnaissance a failure due to haze.
LRP contact. 74/500/40.

24 July 1945

Surface patrolling off SHIRUTU.
LRP contact.

— page 120 —
24 July 1945(Cont'd):
.0810 Exchanged recognition signals with KINGFISH. Attended to send her a message giving her most of our area but interference faded. Tried VHF and
.1200 Position: Lat. 48-52 N, Long. 143-17 E.
.1210 APR contact. 99/500/30
.1215 APR contact. 68/1000/25.
.1219 Submerged for reconnaissance of coast, from HITIC to SHIRIKI. Close
work with 3 to 4 fathoms below the keel. However, planning a rocket
.2117 attack, it is necessary to locate targets. This is a large factory
.2200 port, one chimney, disappearing in the clouds, measured at better than
.400 feet high. Checked its ST pip and decided to use it in conjunction
.2235 ROCKET ASCALUT #3. In position 5100 yards from high chimney.
.2236 ROCKETS AAY!!! Our first batch of 12-20 sent sinking on their way to the
.2236-05 ROCKETS AAY!!! Our first batch of 12-20 sent sinking on their way to the
.2236-30 First batch landed with their customary heavy explosion.
.2239 ROCKETS AAY!!! Second batch of 8 headed for the factories. Reloaded.
.2239-30 Second batch landed.
.2242 ROCKETS AAY!!! Third batch off for the town.
.2242-30 Third batch landed.
.2244 Secured for battle stations-rockets. Set course for town of KASHIHO,
.2350 Headed south for KASHIHO with fires and explosions increasing.
.2310 Tro. large fires broke out at SHIRIKI followed by muffled explosions.
.2311 Another fire started. Many explosions shooting the flames up into the
.2350 Headed south for KASHIHO with fires and explosions increasing.
.2350 Headed south for KASHIHO with fires and explosions increasing

— page 121 —
25 July 1945(Cont'd).

0449 Very loud rumbling explosion which drove personnel out of their bunk.
0600 A.P.R. contact. 99/375.
0912 CONTACT #21. Sighted mast of Sarpens.
0946 I can bettle stations-guns.
0959 GUAR TITACK #5. Corroced firing 40 min. Range 1400 yards, closing. Fired 20 rounds for 18 hits.
1009 Away boarding party! Led by Lt(jg) KING boarding party boarded, captured one prisoner from the crew and collected three anchors and a steering line.
1024 Boarding party returned. Backed clear.
1030 Fired one round of 5 inch. Hit at waterline. Sarpens sank.
1200 Position: Ltr. 49-09 H, Long. 143-56 E.
1208 CONTACT #22. Sighted mast of Sarpens toward CHAIR out anticipated bombardment target and another Sarpens down the coast. One of prisoners picked up informed us that 15 seaplanes ran based at Lake close inland from CHAIR. Doubt this however, we still ran out of 15 fighters for bombardment.
1226 Named bettle stations-guns.
1233 GUAR TITACK #6. Corroced firing 40 min at Sarpens. Range 1100 yards, closing. Fired 20 rounds for 16 hits.
1234 Fired one round of 5 inch. Hit at waterline. Sarpens sank. Shifted 5 inch to cannibals at CHAIR.
1235 Shore bombardment #2. Corroced firing 5 inch. Range 5700 yards. Fired 43 rounds for 20 hits. No fires. Visually damage consisted of large holes and sections of buildings blown up. Incendiary ammunition is a necessity.
1250 Secured gun stations.
1254 Other Sarpens coring up the coast.
1308 I can bettle stations-guns.
1314 GUAR TITACK #7. Corroced firing 40 min, range 1450 yards, closing. Fired 20 rounds for 15 hits.
1315 Fired one round 5 inch. Artillery hit. Sarpens sank. Secured gun stations.
1334 CONTACT #23. Sighted Sarpens. Sighted 2 more Sarpens. One towing the other. Decided to attack those first, as they were closer to beach. Other was outboard of us.
1350 I named bettle stations-guns.
1355 GUAR TITACK #8. Corroced firing 40 min at towing vessel. Range 900 yards, closing. Fired 13 rounds for 11 hits.
1356 Fired one round 5 inch. Artillery hit. Loading Sarpens sank.
1357 Shifted 5 inch to toward Sarpens. Fired one starboard and three rounds of high capacity. One artillery hit. Target sank. All high capacity nor was expended. A few starballs left.
1410 GUAR TITACK #9. Corroced firing 40 min range 1000 yards, closing. Fired 25 rounds for 21 hits.
1413 Fired two 5 inch starballs set on 10 seconds. Two hits passing on through near waterline. No explosions, though we had considered them a poor possibility. Sarpens sank.
1415 Secured gun stations.
1630 Passed by KALIKO TC for observation of reconstruction work since our bombardment on 2 July. Only to buildings had possibly been patched. The place still in ruins. The fires of loft burning had wiped out half the buildings.
Set course south to depart area via minefields and north coast HOKKAIDO, hoping we might entice a single Frigate out in deep water by use of the Buck Rogers gun and radar balloon.
2340 Heavy fog set in. Our plans failed. Set course for KURASHIMA STRAIT. To still arrive there during daylight. If clear intend to sweep northwest coast of KURASHIMA for cannibals and Sarpens.

— page 122 —
26 July 1945
Surfaced patroling en route KUMASHIRI STRAIT.
APR contact. 79/500/50.
Fog lifted. Visibility excellent. KUMASHIRI chad.
Position: Lat. 44-38 N, Long. 116-38 E.
Being nearly certain there would be no aircraft left in this vicinity and believing the Japs would have no reason for having coastal defenses on the northwest coast of the island, started a surface sweep 2-3000 yprs off shore, using fathometer continuously. Passed several small villages and pipsqueak fishing stations. Anticipate some Sarapans around SHISEIDO, Sighted SHISEIDORO. Locks good. One lumber mill with single tall black stack. Three large main buildings and many smaller houses and shacks. To the right and toward the beach we have a Sarpan building yard with six rectangular, box like cradles, resting on some form of tracks which run down into the water. To the left of the cradles, clear of the waters edge are neat rows of brand new Sampens. A can count twenty six and there are probably more behind them. To the right of the cradles are three more neat rows of Sampens, that we can see, counting seventeen more, with their buildings behind them and lumber piles to the right. Evidently the Sampens are built in the cradles and the cradles run down to the water to launch the Sampens. Then the Sampens are hauled back up on the beach by rollers. All buildings, cradles and Sampens have large fir tree branches scattered over them for convalescence from aircraft.

Hade a sweep by to draw any opposing fire. None encountered.
Shore bombardment 3. Commenced firing 40 mm and 20 mm at 2100 yards range. A lucky hit in an oil tank started a large fire behind the hill which quickly spread and turned the mill into a blazing inferno. This spread among all the Sampens to the left of the cradles and destroyed them completely, during the afternoon.

Throughout the afternoon and evening pepperd crack with 20 mm, 50 Cal. and 30 Cal. guns to prevent any attempt to put fires out. Expanding a total of 157 rounds of 40 mm, 2400 rounds of 20 mm, 1000 rounds of 50 Cal. and 500 rounds of 30 cal. ammunition.

CONTRACT #24. Sighted a Trailer on the horizon. Closed.
GUN ATTACK 10, Range 400 yards. Commenced firing 20 mm, 50 Cal. and 30 Cal. machine guns while passing close aboard. Turned and swept back and forth across his station attempting to sink target with rifle grenades. His hull is very heavy and tough, our rifle grenades for the most part failed to penetrate. This ranged me, for when our bordering party was trained by the larines at idray, this same type grenade had ripped through large timbers and even gone through eight inches of reinforced concrete. Here, only three grenades, out of eight, penetrated. These only made holes one to three inches in diameter. Fired a total of 720 rounds of 20 mm, 1000 rounds of 50 Cal., 1000 rounds 30 Cal. and 15 rifle grenades. Traveler caught fire and stopped.

Selected two prisoners who appeared to be in fair shape.
Returned to lumber mill and building yard.

APR contact 93/500/18.
The fires have gone a good job. All buildings are nearly leveled, but the tall stack standing alone and red hot. Sampens to the left are completely destroyed. A fire has broken out to the right of the cradles in the lumber piles and is spreading towards the remaining seventeen Sampens and cradles. Commenced firing with 20 mm to force personnel back under cover. A few Japs were noticed working with something on the beach. They soon cleared the beach. Then turned the train 20 mm on the remaining Sampens and cradles.

— page 124 —
31 July 1945
POW, Taken near CHIRE, informed us that he had read in the local Japanese newspaper that our train was destroyed by a bomb and that 150 men had been killed.

1200(L) Position: Lat. 33 51.1 N, Long. 168 52.0 E.

1 August 1945

1200 Position: Lat. 31 23.0 N, Long. 173 42.3 E.

2 August 1945

1200 Position: Lat. 29 34.3 N, Long. 177 56.2 S.
Crossed International Date Line.

2 August 1945

1000 Arrived Midway; An excellent Welcome.

— page 125 —
1. NAKA SHIRETOKU, KISAKI - Latitude 46-02 Longitude 143-24
    lighted normal characteristics.
2. HOTOKARI - Latitude 48-16 Longitude 142-38
    lighted normal characteristics.
3. SHIKUKA HAKUCHI - Latitude 49-13 Longitude 143-07
    lighted normal characteristics.
4. OTOKARI HAKUCHI - Latitude 46-39 Longitude 142-45
    lighted normal characteristics.
5. FISHI HATORO KISAKI - Latitude 45-54 Longitude 142-05
    lighted normal characteristics.
6. ATOYA KISAKI - Latitude 44-27 Longitude 146-34
    lighted with period as follows: 60 second light 12 eclipses
    48 sec.

(29)

— page 126 —
0015 44-32.5
21 June 146-15.6 Lugger 2k miles
C-070 S-7 Kts. R
Two 100 ton crane
Luggers, one sunk
one destroyed.

2. 0346 47-33.1
23 June 142-58.5 Trawler 8 miles
C-310 S-8 Kts. Sight
One prisoner.
Three frigates
and five escorts.
T.T.C.K. issued.

3. 1655 50-17.6
26 June 144-15.2 Convoy 15 miles
C-190 S-8 Kts. Sight
and five escorts.
T.T.C.K. issued.

4. 0943 48-20. Small
3 July 144-11 Coast
AK 6 miles
C-340 S-8.1 Sight
Sunk.

5. 1604 45-53
4 July 143-47.1 Frigate miles
C-210
6-210
S-14
C-210
S-9
C-210

— page 128 —
U.S.S. BARE TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1A PATROL NO. 12 TIDE 1320(K)
DATE: 29 June 1945 L.A.T. 48-25 E LONG. 1/2-47 E.
TARGET DATA: DIALOG INELICITED

Description: Target was DD escort of a Convoy off three lieutenants and five escort Convoy had air cover which sighted periscope and directed attack of DD. Contact - periscope, Visibility - excellent.

Ship Sunk: None. Ship damaged: None. Ship Range 960 (at firing)

Target Draft: 10 feet Course 233. Speed 10 knots Range 960 (at firing)

ON SHIP DATA:

Speed 3 knots Course 218 Depth 61 feet Angle 0 (at firing).

Type Attack: ST Periscope.

Tubes Fired: No. No. 8 No. 9

Track angle 45 20 R 5S 19° R
Gyro angle 20° R 6 feet 6 feet
Depth set 6 ft 27.2 Kts. 27.2 Kts.
Power Miss 27.2 Kts. Miss
Hit or miss No 18-2 18-2
Brrratic(Yes/no) 18-2 18-2 99975
Mark torpedo 100255 58116 3-7
Serial No. 8-7 16193 16375
Mark exploder 16643 Contact 16375
Serial No. Contact - -
Inctntion set 18-2 18-2 18-2
Mark marked 6102 6219 6200
Serial No. TFK TFK TFK
Explosive 0 s 10 s 10 s
Firing interval 0 s 0 0 0
Type surfaced 0 U.S.S. BURLE (US-22).
Sea conditions Electrolyte - 48 degrees.
Overall activity Injection - 35 degrees.
Remarks: Target did not maneuver to avoid.

Reason for nissos undetermined.

— page 129 —
1. ATTACK DATE (Cont'd)
U.S.S. BARB TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1B PATROL NO. 12 TIE 1331(T)
DATE 29 June LAT. 48-24 N LONGITUDE 142-47 E.
TARGET DATA: ---DAMAGE INFLICTED
Description: Target same as attack No. 14.
Ship sunk: None.
Ship damaged: None.
Target draft 10 feet Course 012 degrees T. Speed 12 Kts. Range 620 (at firing)
O.N. SHIP DATA
Speed 3.6 Kts. Course 162 degrees T. Depth 61 feet angle 0 (at firing)
Type attack: ST Periscope.
Tubes fired No. 1 No. 2 No. 3
Track angle 10 s 14 s 20 s
Gyro angle 042 045 051
Depth set 6 feet 6 feet 6 feet
Power 27.2 kts. 27.2 kts. 27.2 kts.
Hit or miss Miss Miss
Brrratic(yes/no) No No No
Mark torpedo 13-2 18-2 18-2
Serial No. 99405 100141 100277
Mark exploder 8-7 8-7 8-7
Serial No. 16641 16635 16120
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual - - -
Mark warhead 18-2 18-2 18-2
Serial No. 5206 6283 4990
Explosive TPX TPX TPX
Firing interval 0 s 10 s 10 s
Type spred 1/2 degree R. 0 1/2 degree R.
Sea conditions 0 0 0
Overhaul activity U.S.S. BURLIE (iS-22)
Remarks: Electrolyte - 48 degrees.
Injection - 35 degrees.

Reason for misses undetermined. Target did not maneuver to avoid.

(33)

— page 130 —
U.S.S. BARB  =  Torpedo Attack No. 24    Patrol No. 12  The 1047(K)
DATE  5 July 1945    Lt. 46-04 K.    Longitude 142-14 E.

TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description:  Large AK with plane escort hugging the coast. Contact - Periscope.
Visibility - Good.

Ship Sunk:  None
Ship(s) damaged:  None
Damage determined by:  None

Target draft: 25 feet Course 003  Speed 11.5 kts. Range 1570
(at firing)

O.H. SHIP DATA

Course 260    Speed 2.15 kts. Depth 65 feet angle 0 (at firing)

Type attack:  Periscope.
Tubes fired  No.  4    No.  5    No.  6

Track angle 90 s    95 s    99 s
Gyro angle 015    018°    022°
Depth set 6 feet    6 feet    6 feet
Power 27.6 kts.    27.6 kts.    27.6 kts.
Hit or miss  Miss    Miss    Miss
Erratic(yes/no)  No    No    No
Mark torpedo 18-2    18-2    18-2
Serial No.    58255    58085    10029L
Tark exploder 8-7    8-7    3-7
Serial No.    16524    16570    16699
Actuation set  Contact    Contact    Contact
Actuation actual  -
Mark. 18-2    18-2    18-2
serial No.    6171    6151    5966
Explosive  TPX    TPX    TPX
Firing interval 0 s    10 s    10 s
Type spread 2 degrees L. 0    2 degrees R.
Sea conditions 1    1    1
Overheul activity  U.S.S. BARRYLES (L.S-22)
Remarks:  Injection - 49
Electrolyte Torp. 54
Torpedoes hit 2 each exploded 4n 30s and 4n 45s after
No. 4 was fired.

Two misses due to speed error. One torpedo should have hit, possibly too.

— page 131 —
U.S.S. BARE - Report of Twelfth War Patrol

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd).

U.S.S. BARB    TOFEDO ATTACK NO. 2B    PATROL NO. 12    TITE 1052(K)

DATE 5 July 1945    IAT. 46-04 N    LONG. 142-14 E.

TARGET DATA --- DIALAGE INFLICTED

Description: Same as attack No. 2A

Ship(s) sunk: Large AK (EO)

Damage determined by: Timed hit. Sinking witnessed by Commanding Officer, Executive Officer and TTC Operator.

Target draft 25 feet Course 024 Speed 8 knots Range 1680 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Course 182 Speed 2.2 Depth 65 feet Angle 0 (at firing).

Type attack: Periscope.

Tubes fired No. 7 No. 9 No.

Track angle 133 s 135 s

Gyro angle 153° 157°

Depth set 6 feet 6 feet

Power 27.6 knots 27.6 knots

Hit or miss Miss Hit

Erratic(yes/no) No No

Mark torpedo 18-2 18-2

Serial No. 100013 100055

Mark exploder 8-7 8-7

Serial No. 16791 16553

Actuation set Contact Contact

Actuation actual - Contact

Mark warhead 18-2 18-2

Serial No. 5278 6153

Explosive TPX TPX

Firing interval 0 10 s

Type spread 1 degree L 1 degree R

Overhaul activity U. S. S. JURYALE (AS-22)

Remarks: Injection: 49

Electrolyte Temp: 54

Torpedo run #9 - 2070 yards timed hit

2ml5s

Miss due to speed error.

— page 132 —
U.S.S. BARE = Report of Twelfth War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd).

U.S.S. BARB TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 12 TIME 1118(k)

DATE 10 July 1945 LAT. 44-13 N LONG. 145-23.5 E

TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLECTED

Description: Two coastal AK's hugging coast. 2500 yards between ships. No air cover. Visibility - Excellent. Contact - Smoke (30,000) yards.

Ship sunk: None.
Ship damaged: None.

Target draft 8 feet Course 012 Speed 8 kts. Range 540 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Course 293 SPEED 2.1 Depth 65 feet Angle 0 (at firing)

Type attack: Periscope - Occasional ST range. Check bearing between No. 1 and 2.

Tubes fired No. 1 No. 2 No. 3

Track angle 143 s 145 s 145 s
Gyro angle 042 044 044
Depth set 3 feet 3 feet 3 feet
Power 27.7 kts 27.7 kts 27.7 kts.
Hit or miss Miss Miss Miss
Erratic(Yes/no) No No No
Mark torpedo 18-2 18-2 18-2
Serial No. 99408 100103 100070
Mark Exploder 8-7 8-7 8-7
Serial No. 16623 16363 16847
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual - - -
Mark warhead 18-2 18-2 18-2
Serial No. 6064 6169 6241
Explosive TPX TPX TPX
Firing interval 0 s 18 s 10 s
Type spread 4 degrees R 0 4 degrees L
Sea conditions 0 0 0
Overhaul activity U.S.S. BURY.LIE (AS-22)
Remarks: Injection - 51 Battery Temp - 60

Reason for misses undetermined. Target did not maneuver to avoid.

(36)

— page 133 —
U.S.S. BARB  = Report of Twelfth War Patrol

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd).

U.S.S. BARB  TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4 A. PATROL NO. 12 THE 1158.25(K)

DATE 18 July 1945  LAT. 46-03.8 N LONG. -142-16.2E

TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: A large AK with Frigate escort hugging coast. Frigate abeam 1500 yards to seaward. Contact - Periscope. Visibility good. No air cover.

Ship sunk: SHIHUSHU Class Frigate (EC) 1000 tons.
Damage determined by: Target observed by ten Conning Tower personnel to be perpendicular to the bottom. Photograph obtained.

Target draft 8 feet Course 196 Speed 12 kts. Range 1240
(at firing)

ON SHIP DATA

Course 200 Speed 2 kts. Depth 65 feet Angle 0
(At firing)

Type attack: Periscope, having determined masthead height by ST range.

Tubes fired No. 4 No. 6

Track angle 160 P 164 P
Gyro angle 0152 0102
Depth set 4 feet 4 feet
Power 27.7 kts. 27.7 kts.
Hit or miss Hit Miss
Erratic(yes/no) No No
Mark torpedo 18-2 18-2
Serial No. 99212 58246
Mark exploder 8-7 8-7
Serial No. 16720 16563
Actuation set Contact Contact
Actuation actual Contact -
Mark warhead 18-2 18-2
Serial No. 6321 6164
Explosive TOPPEX TFX
Firing interval 0 10 s
Type spread 1 degree R 1 degree L
Sea conditions 2 2
Overhaul activity U.S.S. JURYALE (AS-22)
Remarks: Injection - 49
Battery Temp. - 60
Torp. run #4 2000
Timed hit #4 - 2 min. 3 Sec.

Reason for miss - Target blew up.

— page 134 —
U.S.S. BARB - Report of Twelfth War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

U.S.S. BARB TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4B PATROL NO. 12 TIME 1159.18(K)
DATE 18 July 1945 LAT. 46-03.8 N. LONG. 142-16.2 E.

TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Same as attack 4A. Fired at large AK.

Ship sunk: None.
Ship damage: None.

Target draft 25 feet Course 200 Speed 12 kts. Range 1510
(at firing)

ON SHIP DATA

Course 214 Speed 2 kts. Depth 65 feet Angle 0
(at firing)

Type attack: Periscope attack. ST information obtained exact target speed.

Tubes fired No. 2 No. 3 No. 5

Track angle 119 P 123P 128P
Gyro angle 047° 043° 039°
Depth set 4 feet 4 feet 4 feet
Power 27.7 kts. 27.7 kts. 27.7 kts.
Hit or miss Miss Miss Miss
Erratic(yes/no) No No No
Mark torpedo 18-2 18-2 18-2
Serial No. 100289 99419 99254
Mark exploder 8-7 8-7 8-7
Serial No. 16717 16926 16571
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual - - -
Mark warhead 18-2 18-2 18-2
Serial No. 6218 6165 6166
Explosive TPX TPX TPX
Firing interval 0 x 10 s 10 s 10 s
Type spread 2 degrees R 0 2 degrees L
Sea conditions 2 2 2
Overhaul activity U.S.S. HURALE (AS-22)
Remarks: Injection - 49
Battery Temp. - 60
Two end of runs - 5 min. 42 sec., 6 min. 2 sec.

No maneuvers for four minutes after firing. Reason for misses undetermined.

— page 135 —
U.S.S. BARB (SS220) GUN ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 12 TIME 0319(K)
Date 21 June 1945 LAT. 44-39 N LONG. 146-42.5 E

TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Two luggers (100 tons each) approximately in column on course 075T, speed 7 knots. Contact radar - 4800 yards, visibility poor.

Sunk: 1 lugger 100 tons
    1 lugger 100 tons

Damage determined by: First lugger observed to sink after 3-5 inch and 4 40 mm hits. Second lugger sank after 3-5 inch and 7-40 mm hits.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Picked up targets at 0015 and kept position aboard until 0230, 45 minutes before dawn. Then closed in on formation and when after lugger was 1200 yards abeam to starboard and the forward lugger 850 yards broad on the starboard bow, opened fire with 5 inch on after target and with 40 mm on forward target. Fired one round 5 inch for one hit and seven rounds 40 mm for four hits. Forward target returned fire but bearing was 180 degrees out. Overhauled forward target and at 1000 yards fired four rounds 5 inch for three hits. Target observed to sink. Reversed course finish off after lugger. At 800 yards fired three rounds 5 inch for two hits and nine rounds 40 mm for six hits. Target sank. Target returned fire, splashes astern, until gun was hit. Target sank. Guns on the targets are believed to have been approximately 37 mm.

U.S.S. BARB (SS220) GUN ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 12 TIME 0423(K)
DATE 23 June 1945 LAT. 47-41 N LONG. 143-06 E
TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Radio equipped diesel. Trawler (150 tons) on northwesterly course, Speed 5 knots. Contact - visual. Visibility - good.

Sunk: 1 Diesel Trawler 150 tons.

Damage determined by: Trawler observed to sink.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Sighted large Trawler at dawn at about 12,000 yards. Closed target and gained radar contact at 8500 yards. When target was 2000 yards broad on the starboard bow, opened fire with 40 mm. First shot over, spotted down. Second shot short, spotted up. Third shot hit. 40 mm hit consistently once the sight bar range was determined. When target was abeam, at 700 yards, fired three rounds 5 inch for 3 hits. Fired a total of 20 rounds 40 mm for 15 hits. Fire broke out below decks and quickly spread to the superstructure. Fuel oil caught fire later and burned until target sunk. Target finally sunk by high speed sweep close aboard which filled hull with water through shell holes. Took one prisoner - six others perished.

— page 136 —
U.S.S. BARB (SS220) GUN ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 12 TIME 2055(K) DATE 8 July 1945 LAT. 27-26.8 N. LONG: 142-46.9 E.

DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Lugger hugging coast in 3½ fathoms of water. Visibility - poor. Contact - Visual.

Sunk: Lugger 75 tons.

Damage determined by: Target destroyed and sinking by the stern when forced to leave the scene by aircraft.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Sighted target in the haze while patrolling 10,000 yards from the beach in a light fog. Forced to trail target until visibility decreased enough to permit closing target without being sighted. Closed target to 1100 yards and opened fire with 40 mm gun. Range to beach 2800 yards. Depth of water 3½ fathoms. Fired 32 rounds 40 mm for 20 hits. Engine knocked out and several hits along waterline. Aircraft sighted over land so turned away with full rudder, emergency speed, and headed for deep water - 10 fathoms, then 1 mile distant. Two Village guns at SAKAYEHAMA, 2½ miles distant, opened up and shoveled out about 30 rounds in record time. No splashes observed. Reached 10 fathoms curve and aircraft had not attacked, so guess he didn't see us.

U.S.S. BARB (SS220) GUN ATTACK NO. 4 PATROL NO. 12 TIME 0902(K) DATE 11 July 1945 LAT. 44-03.2 N LONG. 146-30.0 E.

DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Diesel Sampan (50 tons) enroute home after a successful days work. Visibility - Excellent. Contact - Visual.

Sunk: Diesel Sampan. 50 Tons.

Damage determined by: Target observed to sink.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Sighted mast of target on the horizon and commenced closing for the attack. Target homeward bound at 5 knots. Opened fire with 40 mm at 900 yards. Target poured on coal and increased speed to 7 knots. Fired 40 rounds 40 mm for 35 hits. Target was stopped and in shambles but refused to sink. Secured 40 mm gun and manned 5 inch. Fired two rounds five inch for two hits. Target sunk.

— page 137 —
U.S.S. BARB = Report of Twelfth War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd).

U.S.S. BARB (SS220) GUN ATTACK NO.: 5 PATROL NO. 12 TIDE 0959(K)

Date 25 July 1945 LAT. 49-03.8 N LONG. 143-49.5 E.

TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Target Description: Diesel Sampan on easterly course, speed 5 knots.
Contact - Visual. Visibility - good.

Sunk: 1 Diesel Sampan. 50 tons.
Damage determined by: Sampan observed to sink.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Sighted mast of Sampan on the horizon. Speeded up and closed range at two engine speed. At 1400 yards opened fire with 40 mm and fired 20 rounds for 18 hits. Target stopped. Came alongside target and put over boarding party. Took one prisoner. Hauled out to 500 yards and fired one round of 5 inch. Target sunk.

U.S.S. BARB (SS220) GUN ATTACK NO. 6 PATROL NO. 12 TIDE 1233(K)
DATE 25 July 1945 LAT. 49-06 N. LONG. 144-10 E.

Target description: Diesel Sampan on Southwesterly course, speed 5 knots.
Contact - Visual. Visibility - good.

Sunk: 1 Diesel Sampan. 50 Tons.

Damage determined by: Sampan observed to sink.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Sighted mast of target on horizon and closed range at two engine speed. Target was about 4000 yards off beach. At 1100 yards opened fire with 40 mm and fired 20 rounds for 16 hits. Then fired 1 round 5 inch and target sunk.

— page 138 —
U.S.S. BARB (SS220) GUN ATTACK NO. ___ 7 PATROL NO. 12 TEL. 1314(K)
DATE 25 July 1945 LAT. 49-01 N. LONG. 144-19.2 E.
TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Diesel Sampan on Southern course, speed 5 knots. Contact Visual. Visibility - good.
Sunk: 1 Diesel Sampan. 50 Tons.
Damage determined by: Target observed to sink.

DETAILS OF ACTION

While retiring from Shore Bombardment No. 2, sighted target on horizon. Closed target and at 1450 yards opened fire with 40 mm. Fired 20 rounds 40 mm for 15 hits. Target stopped. Fired one round 5 inch. Target sunk.

U.S.S. BARB (SS220) GUN ATTACK NO. ___ 8 PATROL NO. 12 TEL. 1355(K)
DATE 25 July 1945 LAT. 48-52.2 N. LONG. 144-21.2 E.
TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: One diesel Sampan with another in tow on Northern course, speed 4 knots. Contact - Visual. Visibility - good
Sunk: Two diesel Sampans. 100 tons.
Damage determined by: Targets observed to sink.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Sighted targets on horizon and closed at two engine speed. At 900 yards opened fire on towing vessel with 40 mm. and fired 13 rounds for 11 hits. Fired one round 5 inch. Target sunk. Shifted 5 inch to towed vessel and fired 3 High Capacity and one Starshell for one hit. Target Sunk. Used starshell because all of High Capacity now expended.

— page 139 —
U.S.S. BARB - Report of Twelfth Air Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd).

U.S.S. BARB (SS220) GUN ATTACK NO. 9 - PATROL NO. 12 TIE 1410(K)

DATE 25 July 1945  LAT. 48-52.8 N  LONG. 144-19 E.

TARGET DATA - DANGER INFLICTED

Description: Sighted target before targets of GUN ATTACK NO. 8 but went after two Sampans together first because we were between single target and land and knew he couldn't get away. After sinking two Sampans, turned on original contact and at 1000 yards fired 25 rounds 40 mm for 21 hits. Target stopped. Fired two 5 inch Starshells set on 10 seconds for two hits. Had hoped stars would explode on contact but no luck. Didn't really expect them to explode but they were the only kind of 5 inch we had left. Stars went right through target at waterline. Target sunk.

U.S.S. BARB (SS220) GUN ATTACK NO. 10 - PATROL NO. 12 TIE 1556(K)

DATE 26 July 1945 LAT. 44-20.7 N  LONG. 145-52 E.

TARGET D.T.A. - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Large Diesel Trawler approaching the coast of KUNASHIRI from the direction of HOKKAIDO - Contact - Visual. Visibility - good.

Sunk: 1 Large diesel Trawler. 100 tons.

Damage determined by: Observed target to sink.

DETAILS OF ACTION!

Sighted target while circling off target of shore Embardment No. 3. Closed target and at 400 yards opened up with 20 mm, 50 Cal. and 30 Cal. machine guns. A couple of rounds more of 5 inch sure would come in handy here. Passed target close aboard and fired rifle grenades as well as machine guns. Fired 720 rounds 20 mm, 1000 rounds 50 Cal., 1000 rounds 30 Cal. and 18 rifle grenades. Target burning internally. Target stopped. Took two prisoners. Hauled out and took a short trip to take another look at fires on beach. Fires on Trawler spread until fuel oil tanks caught on fire. Three beautiful explosions. Target completely gutted but refused to sink. No ammunition left large enough to do the job. Final sinking accomplished by ramming.

— page 140 —
U.S.S. BARB (SS220) SHORE BOMBARDMENT NO. 1 PATROL NO. 12 TIME 0651(K) DATE 2 July 1945 L.A.T. 48-30 N. LONG. 144-37.8 E.

TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Island of KAIHYO TO located off the Southeastern tip of PATIENCE BAY. Destroyed twenty warehouses and barracks and three Sampans. Visibility - fair. Damage determined by: Observed all hits by large and small calibre ammunition, leaving island in a shambles with large spreading fires.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Approached the western side of the Island on course 054(T) at 0651 commenced firing 40 mm, 1100 yards range on course 020(T) placing island on our starboard beam. Island returning fire with small calibre weapons, which was immediately returned with our 40 mm, 20 mm and small arms (Opposition ceased). Continued firing small calibre and commenced firing 5 inch. Changed course to 180(T) placing island on our port beam, and continued destruction of all buildings. Fire broke out in a large building in the center of the island quickly spreading to the surrounding buildings. Three Sampans close to shore were also destroyed by 40 mm and small calibre fire. At 0724 ceased fire as all buildings were destroyed and some of them being consumed by fire. Opened range to 3500 yards and observed the effects of our bombardment. At 1103 closed range to 700 yards (5 fathoms) for closer observation and discovered four pill boxes. Opened fire with 40 mm and destroyed one of them. Ceased fire and left the island to its misery. A word of praise is due the 40 mm gun crew for their accuracy of fire. Total ammunition expended: 35 rounds 5 inch, 232 rounds 40 mm, 780 rounds 20 mm and 2100 rounds of 50 & 30 cal.

U.S.S. BARB (SS220) SHORE BOMBARDMENT NO. 2 PATROL NO. 12 TIME 1235(K) DATE 25 July 1945 L.A.T. 49-05 N. LONG. 144-17.5 E.

TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Target was large Canneries in town of CHIRI. Damaged: Large Canneries. Damage determined by: Twenty rounds seen to land in target area. Several large holes in roof of main buildings and smaller buildings immediately surrounding.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Sighted Canneries while making approach on target of GUN ATTACK No. 6. Immediately after Trawler sunk, shifted fire to factory. Target consisted of large building with two tall stacks and accompanying buildings. Average range 5700 yards. Fired a total of 43 rounds 5 inch high capacity.

— page 141 —
35. U.S.S. BARB (SS220) SHORE BOARDER NO. 3 PATROL NO. 12 TLE 1500(K)
DATE 26 July 1945 LAT. 44-20 N LONG 146-01 E.

TARGET DATA --- Damage INFLICTED
Air Camouflaged lumber mill and camp building yards at SHERIDOR on west coast of KUNASHIRI.
Visibility - good.
Damage: 1 Lumber mill.
35 campers (destroyed by fire) to plietely destroyed 700 tons.
Damage determined by: Observed hits by 40 mm and 20 mm ammunition in lumber mill, campers end oil tank. An oil fire started which quickly spread to lumber mill. Campers begin burning leaving the industry in ashes.

DETAILS OF ACTION
Closed range to 2100 yards and opened fire with 40 mm and 20 mm. A lucky hit in an oil storage tank started a large fire behind the lumber mill which quickly spread to the mill and surrounding buildings. Campers and building cradles were destroyed by gun fire which resulted in a large fire some time later. Several large spreading fires were still visible as night settled over the area which reminded one of a large steel company with its characteristic glow. Fired a total of 157 rounds 40 mm, 2400 rounds 20 mm, 1000 rounds 50 cal., and 500 rounds 30 Cal.

U.S.S. BARB (SS220) ROCKET SOAULT NO. 1 P.TROL NO. 12 TLE 0234(K)
DATE 22 June 1945 LAT. 43-54 N. Long. 144-40 E.

TARGET DATA --- Damage INFLICTED
Town of SHARI on the north coast of HOKKAIDO with a population of about 20,000.
Visibility - Fair.
Damage determined by: Observed all rockets to fall and explode approximately in the center of the town. The rockets erupted with a shower of sparks. No fires were observed.

DETAILS OF ACTION
Maneuvered into position 4700 yards off the beach and 5250 yards from the center of town using radar and line of bearing on a distant peak for navigation. Launched 12 KILO 5 inch rockets from KILO rocket launcher which is located on 5 inch gun foundation forward and an is secured trained dead ahead. Reversed course and withdrew at high speed as dawn was breaking. Rockets observed to fall in an area about 500 yards in diameter in the center of town as well as can be estimated. Explosions were seen, heard, and felt.

— page 142 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. BARE = Report of Twelfth War Patrol

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd).

U.S.S. BARF (SS220) RO.KET ASSAULT NO. 2 PATROL NO. 12 TIE 0246.30(K)

DATE 3 July 1945 LAT.49-13.5 N. LONG. 143-07.4 E

TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Town of SHIKUKA located on the east coast of KARAFUTO at the northern tip of PATIENCE BAY with a population of about 20,000.
Visibility - poor.

Damage determined by: Observed all rockets to fall and explode in the center of the town. Damage undetermined. No visible fires.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Maneuvered into position 4930 yards off shore navigating by radar which placed the ship approximately 5250 yards from the center of the town. 0246.30 launched 12 MK 10 5 inch rockets from MK 51 rocket launcher located on the forward 5 inch gun platform. Reversed course and headed for deep water. The rockets exploded in the center of the town but the damage was undeterminable. The explosions brought forth several lights in the town, but they were quickly turned off.

(45A)

— page 143 —
U.S.S. BARB (SS220) ROCKET ASSAULT #3 PATROL NO. 12 TITLE 2236(K)
DATE 24 July 1945  LATE 48-37 N. LONG. 142-51 E.

TARGET DATA --- D.MAGE INFLICTED
Town of SHIRITORI located on the east coast of KARAFUTO.
Visibility - Poor.
Damage determined by: Observed all rockets to fall and explode on the target; namely, on a large factory and in the center of the town. Large, spreading fires were observed accompanied with a series of explosions of an undetermined nature. Returned to target seven hours later. Small and large explosions were heard, although visibility prevented any further observations. Smoke hung throughout the area.

DETAILS OF ACTION
On several occasions observed target area from periscope depth to find any outstanding land marks which would give navigational aid for the night attack. A large factory with a 400 foot chimney gave an excellent land mark for radar navigation.
Laneuvered into position 5250 yards from the first target the large factory, using radar navigation. 2237 launched 12 MK 10 5 inch rockets from the MK51 rocket launcher. 2238 launched 8 more rockets on the same target. Laneuvered the ship to the left using the smokestack as a reference point to gain a firing position on the center of the town. 2242 launched 12 rockets and then changed course to 180(T). Fifteen minutes after rockets hit fires became visible, so reversed course to observe the spreading fires. The factory was burning along with buildings in the center of the town. Explosions were also seen and heard. Visibility was very poor, but the fires were of such a magnitude that the burning structures were visible.
Left this area and proceeded to our second victim. Returned seven hours later approximately 7700 yards off land and heard several series of rapid, small and large explosions followed sometime later by a very large explosion which made the whole ship vibrate. Visibility was too poor to observe what was happening. The odor of burnt wood was heavy in the air.

U.S.S. B.RB (SS220) ROCKET ASSAULT NO. 4 PATROL NO. 12 TIME 0310(K)
DATE 25 July 1945  LATE 48-21 N  LONG. 142-43 E.

TARGET DATA --- D.MAGE INFLICTED
Town of KASHIHO located on the east coast of KARAFUTO.
Visibility - Poor.
Damage determined by: Observed all rockets to fall and explode approximately in the center of the town. No visible fires.
DETAILS OF ACTION
Laneuvered into position 5000 yards off the beach using radar navigation. 0310 launched 12 MK10 5 inch rockets from a MK51 rocket launcher. All rockets hit in the center of the town as best could be estimated with no visible fires resulting from the attack.

— page 144 —
U.S.S. BARB (SS220) SABOTEUR ATTACK NO. 1 FATROL NO. 12 TLE 0147
DATE 22 July 1945 LAT. 47-42.8 LONG. 142-32.6 E.

TARGET DATA --- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Northbound train of 12 freight cars, 3 passenger cars, and one mail car.
Destroyed: 1 Train.

Damage determined by: Observed explosion when charge was set off.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Observed trains running up and down coast during early period of patrol. Decided on operation and selected spot. Waited for calm sea and overcast night. Proceeded to selected spot, 950 yards off the beach, using radar navigation - flooded down and on the batteries. Put ashore Saboteur Party of seven men and Lt. ALKIER in charge. Oighted northbound unscheduled train after party reached the beach. Train passed on unharmed. Party left beach to return to boat after having been ashore an hour. Man party was 300 yards from boat, another train came along; but this one was not so lucky. Engine blew up with terrific explosion and all the cars piled up on top of the wreckage.

A 55 lb. deallotion charge was used as the explosive. This was planted between two ties under the outboard rail. Three dry cell batteries supplied the current for the detonator and a micro switch completed the circuit. The micro switch was placed under the rail in such a manner that the deflection of the rail due to the weight of the train would close it. A test lamp was placed in the circuit for test purposes, which was by-passed when the charge was connected. The dry cells were sealed in a No. 10 can and all connections were taped to prevent moisture from grounding the circuit. Adjustment of micro switch clearance was by means of wedges, on one of which it was mounted. Final clearance as set was less than 1/8 inch.

(I) MINES

No mines were sighted. Frigate patrol was encountered close to the two LA FERROUSE minelines labeled as possible. It may have been coincidence that their patrol partially alerted these lines.

— page 145 —
1. U.S.S. BARBARA
2. Report of Twelfth War Patrol

(J) ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

These were two phases of antisubmarine measures.

The first phase was normal for a shallow water submarine patrol with three different bombings, one gun attack and two depth chargings. Since traffic moved only during daylight, and well inside the ten fathom curve, the escort deployment used, is of particular interest and was very effective. Two DE's and 2 PC's acted as inner screen. A TERUTSUKI DD and plane made up an outer screen. Twice we were spotted, probably by the plane, while attempting to break through this combination, and both times bombed. It is believed that this spotting was due to our hull outline being seen in the shallow water. Both times the DD followed up with depth charging, escorted by the plane. Though armed with long extensive depth charge racks, the DD used only side throwers, the charges from which were set at 50 and 100 feet. A combination of listening and pinging was used by the DD, and his attacks were made at speeds of 10 and 12 knots. This slow speed, as well as the shallow water may account for his failure to use depth charges from his racks.

The depth charge direction indicator proved invaluable as an aid to evasion during all depth chargings and bombings. During our heaviest attack; though acting like a pin ball machine and registering everything including "TILT" it was found to be accurate at ranges outside of 400 yards. These were checked by the C.O. visually through the periscope and ST ranges were obtained on the depth charge gyers.

Primary evasion on the first pass consisted of attack firing two sets of down the throat shots. When these failed and the DD was close to his dropping point, our screws were revved up to full speed for twenty seconds to indicate a speed increase then slowed to 1/3 speed. This must have been successful for the destroyer commenced dropping ahead of us. When DCDI indicated ahead, scope was raised and counter attack commenced (special report). On his second pass the plane had no bombs left, and again we fired a down the throat salvo. These missed and we evaded using the same full speed tactics. The destroyer dropped astern of us. As he swung for a third pass 5 NAC beacons set at 3 minutes were fired at 1 minute intervals, depth changed to 80 feet and silent speed resorted to. No charges were dropped and we were never picked up again. A hold down bomb was dropped later in the afternoon.

In the LA PHOUSE area, four SHIMUSHU class Frigates were used. Three patrolling minefields, one escorting OTOLAHI traffic. When hunting us these paired off. After one was sunk the remaining three hunted together. There was an obvious reluctance on their part to chase or attack us singly. During fog they kept to the ten fathom curve. When alone they hugged the minefields.

While gunning a lugger off SAKAYEHA was were attacked by two coastal defense guns.

While bombarding KAHHYO TO we were attacked by machine gun and rifle fire from the island. The island was defended on its western side by 4 pillboxes, one exposed 50 Cal. machine gun and one 75 mm field piece. The field piece and one pillbox was destroyer. Opposition was silenced after the initial crossfire, by sweeping the island with twin 20 mm, two 50 Cal. and two 30 Cal. automatic guns. Whenever we ceased fire and drew away, the island would again open up with their machine guns.

Two of the luggers encountered counterattacked ineffectively with 37 mm tracer single fire.

— page 146 —
1. U.S.S. BARE = Report of Twelfth War Patrol.
2. (J) ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS (Cont'd).
3. The second phase of antisubmarine measures occurred after the carrier strikes on HOKKAIDO. Only 2 planes were encountered. La FEROCUSE area remained unchanged.
4. No countermeasures resulted from rocket assaults or our train demolition work.
5. In retrospect, our closing experiences, seem to add to the many evidences that the Japs have their backs against the wall.
6. (K) MAJOR DEFECTS.
7. HULL AND MACHINERY:
   1. #1 periscope leaked excessively and it became necessary to repack the lower bearing. The leaks were stopped but the scope turned exceedingly hard. #2 scope would not hold pressure and it was necessary to recharge the scope several times.
   2. The superstructure was noisy at submerged speeds of 2/3 and over, particularly the extension rods to MFT stops in 10# blow lines, and external air salvage connections. These were eliminated by using wooden wedges. A vibrating noise around JP head could not be located.
   3. Lower packing gland starboard side of SD antenna hydraulic piston rod was repacked.
   4. Azimuth head on 'B sound equipment stripped threading on outer casing of the 'B shafting, due to faulty assembly, temporarily repaired.
   5. #4 Outboard exhaust valve gasket - while running the auxiliary generator at 'full load without running #4 main engine, the outboard exhaust valve gasket was burned out due to insufficient cooling water being discharged through the spray rings by the auxiliary generator salt water system.
   6. #4 Main generator - Due to a faulty oil seal ring on the forward bearing, this generator was used for emergency only the last half of patrol.
   7. On #2 Main Engine a six inch crack developed on the inboard side of crankcase, near forward holding down bolt.

ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY:
1. No casualties, misfires or duds for 40 mm gun, 5 inch gun, or rockets.

(L) RADIO
In general, the operation of radio gear was satisfactory. That few casualties to equipment were experienced were promptly and well repaired by the Chief with the help of the Auxiliary force.

TBI-6. ...Seven Transmissions were made in the area - all of them on 8470 kcs. In each case, more than usual difficulty was encountered in establishing contact. Several call-ups were needed to establish communication on the first three of the transmissions listed below on the fourth, no shore station could be reached. It was found that "OF" precedence, used on the first messages, would not be answered and had to be changed to "0". The last several messages were sent with "CI" priority initially and no difficulty was encountered.

— page 147 —
1. RADIO (Cont'd)
2. Message #1 to NPM Received by RDO Pearl.
3. Message #2 to NPN Received by RDO Guam.
4. Message #3 to NPN Received by RDO Guam.
5. Message #4 to NPM Received by RDO Pearl.
6. Message #5 to NPG Received by RDO San Francisco.
7. Message #6 to NPM Received by RDO Pearl.
8. Message #7 to NPM Received by RDO Pearl.

RAL-7...This was installed by the U.S.S. BURY.LIE before the Barb's departure of Pearl Harbor. It was used on 8470 Kcs and, although Jap interference was both strong and invariably exactly tuned to frequency, little difficulty was encountered once contact was established.

RHI-2...Used on the Wolf Pack frequency. Calls were frequently heard and two messages intercepted but reception, due probably to distance only, was very weak.

VHF-624 (A)...When the lifeguard assignment was received, this equipment was turned on for a test and the trans-receiver began to smoke heavily. Inspection showed a combination of casualties the cause of none of which could be determined: Both 5U4G filaments in the rectifier were burned out; The Hamonic Amplifier, VT-203(9003), was shorted; burned out were the Condenser, 206-1, and the resistor, 264; the channel-shifting mechanism was also inoperative.

Repairs were made, using Radar spares since none were supplies for this installation, and tubes, resistors, condenser and equipment tuned to Channel "A" Communication was established with our aircraft and no difficulty experienced thereafter.

RAK-5...This equipment was used to cover the 500 Kcs frequency furing lifeguard duty.

VHF-610(A)...One attempt was made to use this equipment when communication was established with the U.S.S. KINGFISH on SJ radar, but the range (estimated at 60,000 yards) was too great and the effort was wholly unsuccessful.

ANTENNAS...The newly installed "Spot" antennas were entirely satisfactory and none of the expected difficulty in loading them was experienced. The whip antenna was mainly useful in taking Loran fixes en route to and from patrol; it was not used in the area.

JP SOUND....Satisfactory.

— page 148 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. BARP. - Report of Twelfth War Patrol.
(L) RADIO (Cont'd).
'Da-l....Cable trouble developed several times with this equipment and, on one occasion, when it snapped at the stuffing box allowing the ends from the head to fall into the shaft, it appeared that the rest of the patrol would be made without QB sound. An excellent job of repair by the radio Chief and the auxiliary force saved the day however. The azimuth circle and yoke were removed, the cables fished out of the shaft and, after fourteen hours of work, the gear was back in use. The difficulty of the job was greatly increased by the damage caused by faulty re-installation during overhaul when the yoke set-screws were not properly located in the shaft receiving holes. This carelessness resulted in the serious burning of threads both on the yoke and the shaft and was only discovered when repair to the cable was undertaken.
(M) RADAR
SJ......The range indicator was replaced during overhaul, greatly increasing sensitivity. The set suffered no major casualties during the patrol. Operation was highly satisfactory. Second sweep echos, seldom encountered in the past, were frequent enough to be of navigational value. En route from area transmitter blower motor bearing had to be shimmed into the end ball.
ST......Enough can not be said regarding the value of this addition to the fire control equipment. However the beat oscillator was found to be quite unstable(tried several 723 A/B's). This made it hard to keep the unit in tune, and initial ranges several times left much to be desired. On the surface, the ST followed targets out 15% farther than the SJ (probably due to relative antenna heights). A tunable echo box is greatly needed. Optimum tuning conditions were while submerged. To determine the effect of pressure in the boat on the tuning of the Beat Oscillator, the set was tuned to land and while the operator watched the echos an inch of pressure was added to the boat. There was no noticeable change in echo height.
SD......The SD-5 was installed during overhaul. This set demonstrated to the satisfaction of all hands its unreliability. During lifeguard duty it would have a good contact on a plane at fifteen to twenty miles and yet show only occasional contact on a flight of planes at five miles.
IFF......The BN and ABK are now controlled from either SD or SJ. Their operation was entirely satisfactory throughout the patrol. The length of the ABK pulses was used to calibrate the pulse duration scale of the AM/SPA.
(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
Nothing new concerning sound conditions.

— page 149 —
U.S.S. BARB - Report of Twelfth War Patrol

---

### (O) DENSITY LAYERS

Very few dives in this area exceeded 150 feet. At the surface, the water varied from 41 to 49 degrees, and was often isothermal to 80 feet, but invariably between 80 and 140 feet the water temperature would drop 10 to 15 degrees.

The cards recorded will be forwarded to the hydrographic office.

---

### (P) HEALTH FOOD AND HABITABILITY

Health was excellent with no men hours lost. Our "Doc" proved himself a real doctor by patching up wounded prisoners, removing shrapnel, sewing ligaments and muscles, and treating first degree burns.

The Commissary department, ably led, outshone itself and far surpassed previous patrols.

Habitability was good for this area. Only 5 days were passed submerged, during which the ship sweat heavily.

---

### (Q) PERSONNEL

How difficult it is to close this chapter in the Barb. What wordy praise can one give such men as these. Men who, without the information available to the C.O. follow unhesitatingly when in the vicinity of minefields so long as there is the possibility of targets. Men who offer half a years pay for the opportunity to land on Jap land, to blow up a Jap train with a self trained demolition team. Men who flinch not with the fathometer ticking off 2 fathoms beneath the keel. Men who shout that the destroyer is running away after we've thrown every punch we posses and are getting our ears flattered back. Men who will fight to the last bullet and then want to start throwing the empty shell cases. These men are SUBMARINERS.

| Item | Description |
|------||
| (a) | Number of men on board during patrol | 75 |
| (b) | Number of men qualified at start of patrol | 61 |
| (c) | Number of men qualified at end of patrol | 73 |
| (d) | Number of men unqualified making their first patrol | 9 |
| (e) | Number of men advanced in rating during patrol | 8 |
| (f) | Number of men recommended to Squadron for advancement-no vacancy on board. | 5 |

— page 150 —
U.S.S. BARB = Report of Twelfth War Patrol.

| MILES | STEAKED - FUEL USED |
|-------||
| 1376  | 15040            |
| 2160  | 23620            |
| 8043  | 55415            |
| 2000  | 20850            |

| DURATION | 11 days |
|||
| 39 days | 6 days |
| 5 days  | 5 days |

| FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING | 17,000 gals. | Provisions | Personnel |
|||||
| Torpedoes, Rockets, Ammunition, Fuel | 30            | 30          | 30         |

Factor: Limiting factor this patrol - ammunition.

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES:

The following are contacts made by the AN/APR and AN/SPA RUM equipment. TN-2 was found to be calibrated four megacycles above TN-1. Often several contacts appeared in the same vicinity, varying only slightly in frequency, pulse note, or pulse duration. Excessive pulse duration was indicated in many cases, but calibration of the AN/SPA sweep scale with IFF pulses checked correctly. Vicinity of:

42-40 N., 145 E. 305/500/15
206/500/23
102/500/23

These were thought to be harmonies from the same source, but comparison of pulse shapes and the different times of the contacts as well as dissimilar sweep methods tended to discount this. 102/500/23 was strongest when we were nearest KUSHIRO. The others appeared to be in the vicinity of AKKESHI WAN.

153/500/23
This contact was strongest when near 43-10 N, 154-30 E. Possible source NEMURO.
Land based air search type radar, 60-80/500/25-35 was contacted in several localities. Four units of distinctly different characteristics were contacted between 145-00 E., and 146-00 E., 43-10 N.

Vicinity of: 44-30 N., 145-30 E.
78/500/60.
During both passages of SHIKOTAN SUIDO (43-40 N, 146-30 E) the above contact was made. Contact was had on the same type of radar during four passages of KUNASHIRI SUIDO, possible source ATOIVA HISAKI.

— page 151 —
198/900 or 1150/20-25
This contact was had while along the north west coast of KUNASHIRI SHI.
at the same time contact was had on 79/500/20. This latter (possibly
same station) was strong while in ABASHIRI WAN, as was contact on
185/1000/20.
Vicinity: 44-30 N, 143-20 E.
79/500/25 - 79/1000/60 - 135/250/13.
Vicinity: 46-00 N, 142-20 E. (Possibly NISHI NOTORO MISAKI)
95/450-500/25-40 - 159/650/13 - 75/500/25
Vicinity: 45-50 N, 143-30 E. (Possibly NAKA SHIROTOKO MISAKI)
75/500/25
Vicinity: CAPE PATIENCE 49-00 N, 144-40 E.
79/750/18 - 72/500/25' - 117/1250/8 (Had contact for less
than a minute).
Vicinity: 46-50 N to 47-20 N, 143-30 E. (AIRO MISAKI) One sweep per min.
155/500/8-13 - 79/500/13-70 - 82/500/100 - 98/500/15.
Vicinity: 47-30 N, 142-50 E. (SAKAYEHAHA) Had similar contacts at 310 keg.
76/500/10 - 77/500/20
Vicinity: 48-00 N, 143-50 E. I appeared to be four contacts.
.59/500/25 74-79/500-750/40-70
Vicinity: 48-30 N, 142-10 E. (SHIRITORI)
135/1500/8 - 74/500/40 (Irregular fast sweeps)
99/375/ long (had no definite pulse shape. Possibly a beacon)
Vicinity: 48-50 N, 143-14 E.
68/1000/25 - (strong sweep)
95/500/23
Vicinity: 50-00 N, 144-15 E.
79/500/23 (slow, weak sweeps)
75/500/60. (Appeared not to sweep)

— page 152 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. PAPER - Report of Twelfth War patrol.

(U) COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES

No enemy transmissions were intercepted except those used for...... Jamming. CW continuous keying was encountered at all times on 8470 kilocycles with occasional additions of voice. Wolf pack frequencies were consistently straddled by voice jamming. While such jamming was found to be exactly on frequency, it was only partly effective in that no difficulty was experienced once communication was established with the stations called. There were no instances of known enemy deception on this run.

SONAR COUNTERMEASURES

During the duel with the destroyer continuous keying on 17 kilocycles was heard. The Frigates encountered keyed on a frequency below 14 kilocycles.

(V) REMARKS

The torpedo has fulfilled its purpose. It's day, in this war, is passing. It is believed that, in the not too distant future, with the anticipated increase in tempo of air strikes, and the lack of air opposition, that life-guard duties will be taken over, more capably and more efficiently by PT boats. Thus, those of us, not specially equipped for the last good area, must stage-nate and slowly slip into oblivion, or look to a new main battery - rockets. The rocket is not a toy. Its possibilities are tremendous, strategically and tactically, but not beyond comprehension. For the sake of argument let us take only the tactical side with which the skipper is immediately concerned, and consider it in the light of our meagre experience.

For immediate use the material available to us is the same as used on the LCI(G). The rocket concerned is the MK10 Mod. 0, 5 inch, high capacity, spin stabilized, rocket, carrying an explosive charge of 9.6 lbs. This explosive charge is much greater than that of our 5 inch projectile and really packs a wallop. The MK51 launcher used, weighs about 75 lbs. and holds 12 rockets. It is simple and easy to operate with angle settings of 30,35,40 and 45 degrees for ranges of 4500, 4900, 5150, 5250 yards respectively. Deflection or drift varies from 10 miles right for the closest range to 50 miles right for the farthest range. The rocket rises 4300 feet in its trajectory. Accuracy is very good with an impact area of 400 yards diameter. Firing is done electrically from the Conning Tower. Twelve rockets are fired from a single launcher in 4.5 seconds. Maximum time of flight is 30 seconds. Blast consists of a light shower of small sparks and rocket trail disappears about 20 feet above the hull. The reload crew waited in perfect safety alongside the Conning Tower fairwater. Reload was accomplished in less than 2 minutes.

Augmenting this set up, the following is recommended. Carry torpedoes only in the tubes. These to be steam torpedoes, so that afterbody space only is required for routining. Remove all torpedo racks and replace them with rocket stowage bins. In this manner well over 2000 rockets may be carried. One to three tanks of six launchers each to be installed forward. Whether these be permanent or portable is a question for materiel personnel. Permanent pressure proof firing circuit to be installed with deck connections for short portable leads to the launchers. Thus we have a battery firing a salvo of 72 to 216 rockets, depending upon its size. Variations in this are obvious and a matter of experience and need.

— page 153 —
1. U.S.S. BARB = Report of T.G. LIGHT YAR Patrol.
2. (V) RHAKKS (Cont'd.)
3. On the subject of the approach, it is assumed that all submarines now use a plexiglass PPI plot or its equivalent for accurate inshore navigation. Preliminary reconnoiter is desirable. An ST check is made for possible definite pips which may be used in conjunction with TDC for taking the desired attack position. Specific navigation landmarks are noted and plotted for possible TBT - radar - proach. If neither of above can be determined or visibility precludes their use, radar navigation alone may be used if target site is suited to its use. Rocket range is preset by the launcher angle and drift is taken care of by variation of ships head as launchers are lined up with ships head. If greater impact area is desire, launchers may be set at varying angles and ships head swung during firing.

Normally no opposition will be encountered even when attacking targets protected by heavy coastal defenses. Naturally the attack will be conducted under visibility requirements suited for night surface convoy work. The attack itself approaches the insubstantaneous. Only a flash will be apparent to shore observers, yet, if the submarine is noticed in the flash, shore gunsights would have extreme difficulty in getting on the submarine. In very dangerous situations the firing key may be closed and the diving alarm sounded simultaneously, observing results through the periscope.

Fortunately the Japanese set up presents numerous shoreline targets. Many of these are more suited for submarine assault than surface craft bombardment; or can be more effectively handled by a submarine than a minor task force - notably HOKKAIDO, KARAUTU and the KURILE ISLANDS.

Rockets themselves are self selling, simple and easy to operate. They do not require gunsights. Most of our opposition does.

That tremendous advantages we possess - can submarine a submersible task force. Let's make the rocket our final devastating blow against the Jap's with one idea in mind - DESTROY AND FULVERIZE.

RECOMMENDED DESIRABLE FEATURES
(a) High capacity, incendiary rocket.
(b) Increase rocket range to 8000 yards.
(c) Design a more rugged launcher and pressure proof rockets.
(d) Blast deflection into superstructure.
(e) Rockets to be stowed in metal containers in place of boxes. (We removed the boxes, wrapped the rocket motor in travelling, and stowed rocket projectile and motor separately as a precautionary measure. Projectile and motor are easily and quickly assembled prior to use. Ground band was left on motor until rocket recived topside via the scuttle.)
(f) Some method be devised for more facile scuttle handling.
(g) Consideration be given to a stern bank of rocket launchers.

2. AREA

North Coast HOKKAIDO, ANTA AN AND TARAIKA AN (PATIENCE BAY) was requested as an area in an effort to alleviate the crowded submarine situation by opening up a new area. Much of this area had never been investigated by a submarine and no part of it had been touched since 1943, this in the vicinity of LA HEROUSE.

— page 154 —
19 MKL8-2 torpedoes were carried. Only 2 hits were obtained. All were fired and tracked normally to the target. All targets for the MKL8-2 torpedoes were steady course, steady speed. No maneuvers were made by targets to avoid. ST information was used on all attacks except large AK which was sunk. Injection was low. No duds were apparent. Cur firing system was checked after each attack. Ranges were short, tracks and gyros not excessive, and target draft at least twice as great as depth set. Several torpedoes exploded on the beach. Major variation of torpedo speed would not have affected hits in many cases. It is believed torpedoes ran deep, but after through study no basis can be made for this other than elimination of all other possibilities. Conviction is so strong in this belief, that it is not too farfetched a consideration to attribute our two hits to erratic runs, from the normal run of these torpedoes. Albeit, with three very successful past runs using MKL8 torpedoes, our faith is not shaken and we will take them again.

— page 155 —
6 August 1945
FIRST ENCODER TO:
U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220) Report
of Twelfth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division THREE TENTY T.O.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY T.O.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220), Report of Twelfth War Patrol.

1. The twelfth war patrol of the U.S.S. B.R.B. conducted north of Hokkaido and east of Karafuto during the period from June 1945 to 2 August 1945 is an unparalleled example of daring, planning, and originality, resulting in outstanding achievements. The introduction to submarine warfare, with devastating results, of rocket and saboteur attacks, was but a phase of this remarkable patrol.

2. Action resumes follow:

(a) During the first night in the area, radar contact was established on two craft later identified as luggers. Close range gun attacks, delivered at dawn, disposed of both targets in seventeen minutes. This first gun attack demoralized the North of the new 40th sight yoke.

(b) During the night of 22 June 1945 B.R.B. took station 5250 yards from the center of the town of Shari and launched twelve rockets as repayment for two aircraft bombs received that afternoon. No fires were started, but all rockets exploded in the center of the city.

(c) A large wooden trawler, sighted during the early morning of 23 June 1945, was taken under fire from 2000 yards with 5 inch and 40mm to determine amount of resistance. B.R.B. closed and pin point shooting soon had a large hole at the water line and fires raging. With a miserly desire to conserve ammunition, the bow wave, at 10 yards, was next used to despatch this target. Cree prisoner was taken from six volunteers.

(d) Three days later, under freak atmospheric conditions, sight contact was made on a convoy at forty thousand yards. Convoy consisting of three freighters, a DD, 2 DE's and 2 FG's, could not be closed after submergence, but an attack was made on the seawarr escort. This is covered by a special report. After surfacing contact on the convoy was reestablished, but broadsides from twelve thousand yards prevented attack. Tracking continued.

— page 156 —
6 August 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220) Report
of Twelfth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. B.R.B. (SS220), Report of Twelfth War Patrol.

through the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth with B.R.B being only on the receiving end. About room of the twenty-ninth B.R.B was again submerged ahead of the convoy, and in contact. An attack, covered by a special report, was delivered shortly thereafter. At 1320, from a range of 560 yards, three electric torpedoes were fired down the throat, at the DD, for no hits. Unable to go deep, the Commanding Officer had the doubtful pleasure of watching this ship pass almost overhead with side throwers working at the double. Another attack, covered by a special report, was delivered. On his next pass, at 620 yards, three more electrics were fired down the throat for no hits. The Commanding Officer then prudently ordered "deep submachine" of thirty feet while receiving numerous close charges. Five MAC bacons aided escape.

(e) On the morning of 2 July a surface approach was made on the seal rockery at K.H.Y.C. In addition a radio station and twenty barracks buildings and warehouses were observed. Bomb. detent was commenced from 1100 yards and again pin point shooting resulted. All buildings were systematically destroyed while the 10th silenced the opposition and destroyed three sampans. A well planned assault force was called away, but the presence of 4 pill boxes, previously unnoticed, caused a change of plan. One of these was destroyed by a direct 40MM hit in the aperture.

(f) On 3 July a salvo of twelve rockets was fired at SHIKUNA at landed "amongst a mass of buildings", but no fires resulted.

(g) Later that day a small coastal freighter was attacked. This is covered by a special report.

(h) On 5 July, while submerged, two ships were sighted. The larger was thought to be a Russian and the smaller appeared to be taking an attack of it as an unofficial screen. After a.roach was underway the larger was identified as enemy and target was shifted. Three electric torpedoes, fired from 1600 yards on a 95" track, with 15 gyros, resulted in no hits. Ship was swung and two more electrics were fired from the stern tubes for one hit. The ship was stopped. While maneuvering for a third attack the ship was seen to break amidships and sink.

(i) On 6 July a lugger was destroyed by 40MM fire, but the presence of a plane caused the B.R.B to break off action before the target had finally sunk.

— page 158 —
PB5/322/A16-3
Serial: 08
SUBMARINE DIVISION THREET. HITTY T.C.
c/o Fleet Fost Office
San Francisco, Cal.

CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST ENCRYPTION to:
U.S.S. BARR (SS220) Report
of Twelfth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. BARR (SS220), Report of Twelfth War Patrol.

---

3. It is recommended that pressure proof sights with yokes, of make shift design if necessary, be installed on all 40mm guns as quickly as possible. Notching can be added to the Commanding Officer's recommendation regarding rockets except the obvious coordinated bombardment.

4. It is a distinct pleasure to the Administrative Division Commander to be officially associated again with this ship and to congratulate them on this, their fifth successive, outstanding patrol.

— page 159 —
1. The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY-T.O.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. BARB (SS220) - Report of Her Patrol Number Twelve.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the complete remarks of the Commander Submarine Division THIRTY-T.N.O.

2. The twelfth war patrol of the U.S.S. BARB adds another glorious chapter to the history of this submarines wartime operations. This patrol is positively outstanding in all phases due to the expert execution of intelligently conceived planning involving the use of all the usual submarine weapons plus rocket and sabateur attacks.

3. The recommendations of the Commanding Officer and the Commander Submarine Division THREE THIRTY-T.N.O concerning the employment of rockets by submarines deserves serious consideration.

4. It is recommended that the U.S.S. BARB be credited with damage to the enemy on her twelfth war patrol as follows:

| SSN | Ship | Tonnage | Notes |
|-----|------||-------|
| 1   | AK  | 7,500  | (Attack No. 2) |
| 1   | FF  | 1,000  | (Attack No. 4) |
| 2   | MS  | 200    | (Gun attack No. 1) |
| 1   | MS  | 150    | (Gun attack No. 2) |
| 1   | MS  | 50    | (Gun attack No. 4) |
| 1   | MS  | 50    | (Gun attack No. 5) |
| 1   | MS  | 50    | (Gun attack No. 6) |
| 1   | MS  | 50    | (Gun attack No. 7) |
| 2   | MS  | 100    | (Gun attack No. 3) |
| 1   | MS  | 50    | (Gun attack No. 9) |
| 1   | MS  | 100    | (Gun attack No. 10) |

Total - 9,300 tons

— page 160 —
05-32/416-3
SUB: RINE SQUADRON THIRTY-TWO:
Serial: 0197
Care of Fleet Fleet Office,
San Francisco, California,
13 August 1945.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. RARE (SS220) Report of
Twelfth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. RARE (SS220) - Report of War Patrol Number Twelve.

In addition three bombardments of shore installations were conducted resulting in the destruction of 20 war houses, barracks, and 3 sampans, 1 lumber mill, and 35 sampans in building yards. .1. coming factory was damaged. Four rocket assults were made on four separate towns with devastating effects.

5. The commanding officer, officers, and crew of the U.S.S. RARE are most heartily congratulated upon the completion of this outstanding patrol and for their remarkable ability, initiative, and spirit in carrying out such successful attacks on enemy units afloat and his shore installations.

K.C. HURD.

— page 163 —
12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 02164
CONFIDENTIAL:
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
BARE Report of
Twelfth War Patrol.
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 855
U.S.S. BARE - TWELFTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. BARE (SS220) - Report of Twelfth War Patrol
(8 June to 2 August 1945).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
CNO (5)
Gincpac (6)
JICPOA (1)
ADICPOA (1)
Conservpac (1)
Ginclant (1)
Comsubsplant (8)
S/M School, HL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Consopac (2)
Consovespac (1)
Consubs?7thFlt (Fwd Echelon) (2)
Consubs?7thFlt (Rear Echelon) (2)
Comnorpac (1)
Consubspac (3)
ConsubspacAddComd (40)
SUBAD, HL (2)
ConsubspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Pacific (2)
ConsubOptraGr3alboa' (Airmail) (5)
Substrampac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

E. L. HINES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

— page 166 —
1.0 2.8 2.5 1.1 1.8 1.25 1.4 1.6
OPERATOR: A. Frye
DATE: 3-5-81

THIS MICROFILM IS THE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO—NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET – START AND END
NDW-NPPSO-5210/1 (6-78)

— page 168 —
21 Aug-22 Sep 1944
NAME: BARR
DATE: 21 Aug-22 Sep 1944
SERIAL: 009
DATE: 21 Aug-22 Sep 1944
SUBJECT: Coordinated Patrol Report
REPORT OF COORDINATED ATTACK GROUP under Cdr. J.R.S.WINBURNE (EDIS RADIATORS) in COWBOY COASTER area. Sank or damaged 95,850 tons of enemy shipping. On 16 Sep USS BARR & USS QUENFISH rescued 20 Britien & Australian survivors of (OVER)

PILED: War Diary
Separately under TASK GROUP 17.16 no ser of no date

12-17 September 1944
BARR
CROSS INDEX CARD

Rescued POW survivors of Japanese NAKUTO MARU and transported them to SAIPAN putting some aboard USS FULTON.

Separately under FULTON no ser of 30 Sep 44

DATE: 26 June-3 July 1945
NAME: BARR
FROM CO-US BARB(SS-220)
SERIAL: 009
DATE: 26 June-3 July 1945
SUBJECT: Torpedo attacks of USS BARB
Forwards 4 form reports for Mark 28 & Mark 27 attacks on Japanese shipping off Hokkaido, on TWELPTH WAR PATROL. Coastal cargo vessel sunk 3 July with Mark 27 torpedo. (CENPAC;SUB OPS)

PILED: War Diary
Separately
as Enc to SUISPAC ser 00324 of 12 Sep 45

MICROSERIAL NO.
ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 380-13 (10-55)
B-2102

— page 169 —
1. The Commander Task Group 17.16.
To: The Commander in Chief United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Attack Group 17.16 from August 4, 1944 to 3 October 1944.

Reference: (a) War Patrol Report #1, U.S.S. QUENFISH.
       (b) War Patrol Report #7, U.S.S. TUNN.
       (c) War Patrol Report #9, U.S.S. BARB.

SYNOPSIS:

1. Task Group 17.16 consists of Barb, Tunny and Queenfish departed Pearl Harbor at 1530(YY) on 4 August 1944 enroute to convoy college petrol area via Midway. These ships arrived midway in foreseen of 9 August and departed at 0750(YY) on 10 August, overnight delay being necessitated by repair work on Barb bow planes. August 11 was omitted from calendar on crossing International Date Line. On 21 August, arrived in Convoy College end on 23 August entered area WESTERN. On 1 September, Tunny was bombed by aircraft while diving and reported the damage incurred to return to Pearl. On 20 September, in accordance with operation order, Barb and Queenfish departed area DELFTE and departed Convoy College on 22 September en route Saipan to discharge thirty (30) British and Australian Survivors. Arrived Saipan on 25 September, departed on 26 September and arrived Majuro for RAFT on 3 October, 1944.

TRAINING.

1. No opportunity was afforded this group to train on convoys in Pearl area. Enroute midway, therefore, wolf-pack tactics were employed in simulated attacks on Griswold (DE 7) which escorted this group for two days. Excellent results were obtained from this training. In addition, opportunity was afforded to test the communication system and code, and train coding personnel with beneficial results. After detachment of Griswold, individual submarines in turn made runs for the other submarines in the pack. In separate report, suggestions for improved training are being submitted.

— page 171 —
17.16, 8-4 to 10-3-44.

COUNICATIONS (CONT)
5. Barb guarded 4155 Kcs and received China air force traffic. None of these communications could be utilized by the Eradicators to obtain contacts. It is of interest to note that those Army plans search only at night so information transmitted should be evaluated accordingly.

COUNTER ATTACKS
1. Tunny was bombed on 30 August while changing statn (damage, if any, not reported) and again on 1 September with considerable damage. Because of extent of damage, Tunny was ordered to return to Pearl Harbor.

2. Queenfish had sixty enemy aircraft contacts and was bombed on three occasions, one of which was too distant to cause concern. At three separate times, in two localities - one west of Gerardi and one in Bashi Channel, Queenfish was attacked and prompt ship handling circumvented these attacks. Queenfish was depth charged four times and once while still at periscope depth.

3. Barb had seventy three enemy aircraft contacts and was bombed on five occasions, during which fifteen bombs were dropped; in particular, one attack was so close that bomb fragments and tail piece were recovered on deck. While conducting a night surface radar attack on a Chidori, Barb was sighted; the Chidori illuminated the barb with searchlight and simultaneously opened fire with her bow gun. Barb was depth charged on four occasions. Three patterns during a single attack by the two ships of the hunter killer group, acting as "jinge" and "attackor", were laid skillfully and accurately. Barb recorded 141 depth charges laid after her attacks and heard exclusions of at least that many again which were too distant to consider more than annoying. The depth charge attack on 15 September differed from all previous, as the explosions had a deeper note indicating a heavier charge; the submarine seemed to move more as the explosion waves moved away from bursting point, even though Barb was well distant. No sharp click was heard prior to explosion of these heavier charges.

ATTACKS
1. Tunny fired no torpedoes prior to receiving bomb damage and leaving College for Pearl Harbor.

— page 173 —
17.16, 8-4 to 10-3-44

ATTACK (GUNT)

While the convoy continued on its way, several ships (escorts presumably) detached themselves and gathered in vicinity of the cripple; after the loud explosion, pips of this target, which had been detected originally at a radar range of 32000 yards, merged with those of the escort at a radar range of 9000 yards.

3.

(a) Barb made initial detection of only two enemy contacts; one of the sea was the hunter killer group on 13 September and the other was on a drifter type of "Fishing vessel on 4 September. The latter was attacked by 20th and 40th when Barb conducted battle surface after lengthy approach. During the attack, a plane was sighted and Barb submerged only to battle surface later and sink the craft with the four inch gun at close range. For prisoners were taken.

(b) After the attack on the four ship convoy by Quensfinish on 31 August, Barb lost contact with convoy due to forced submergence and headed east in attempt to intercept. Tunnery reported pertinent data on convoy. At dawn, Barb contacted "Jampanito" and an unidentified submarine ran was then forced down by air-craft. Finally she made sight contact with the convoy and when almost in position-to attack, Barb heard torpedoes from another submarine and saw the escort vessel and another ship sink. Then with three torpedoes and two hits, Barb attacked and witnessed the sinking of an unidentified large merchant vessel. This was apparently a ship of recent construction, not shown in identification booklet. The first of these three torpedoes missed the freighter astern and hit a tanker six hundred yards away in the center column. The torpedo was hard as a hit by personnel throughout the Barb and was timed twenty three seconds later than an observed second hit in freighter. Counter-attack and excessive range precluded further attacks then. Barb evaded on westerly courses and about eleven hours later, was in position to make attack number two. Three bow torpedoes were fired at a small freighter escorted by at least two small escort vessels. Three hits were observed and the ship was seen to break up and sink. During the day, numerous contacts had been made on sampans under sail (black and yellow vertically colored stripes) evidently lifeboats with survival.

(c) On 9 September while five miles from the nearest escort and ten miles from the convoy previously attacked by the Quensfinish, Barb was forced down by an escort plane, which caught the submarine up moon. Barb watched three large ships pass by beyond the range of electric torpedoes.

— page 175 —
17-16, 8-4 to 10-3-44. _ RESCUE WORK (CONT)

(a) Queensland had no torpedoes remaining while Barb had three only - one forward and two aft. An'end around would probable / not permit another attack before dawn. The convoy had been twice attacked with escorts alorted and in addition, now had aircraft escorts.

(b) The three biggest plums in this convoy had been plucked and sunk.

(c) Both submersines had travelled over 300 miles at full speed in compliance with orders to recover Aus. Australian and British survivors from a sunken ship and we were still eight hours away from report position.

(d) Unmistakeable signs of foul weather were evident in the increased overcast, dropping barometer, typical typhoon sea swells and high winds. Survivors had been in the water about four days. Other rescue: submarines had reported men in poor physical condition. If we delayed another period of daylight, it was doubtful if we could recover anyone.

2. Based on the information received, with unpredictable currents and no knowledge of location of actual attack, independent searches were made of two areas, both submarines working towards each other. About four hours after commencement of search, after sighting many dead men, live survivor were sighted by Barb and twenty minutes later by Queensland, five miles away. By d.irk, Barb had recovered fourteen and Queensland had eighteen of which number two died. Only cadavers were seen the following day but rescue would be we been almost impossible due to very high seas.

3. The survivors were object, semi-conscious, despondent, partly delirious and helpless specimens of oil coated men. In many cases, they were too weak to slip a noose over their heads and under their arms. Frequently, a submarine would be within twenty yards before they were aware of the presence of succor. Only expert seamanship by the two commanding officers and efficient team work of personnel on topside service, these survivors. The men below who bathed, watered, fed and bedded down the survivors were as patient and careful as though they had been trained as male nurses. How versatile a submarine enlisted man can be!

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

1. To use was made of the helium reader decoy balloons.

2. Barb fired her 40 Ht against the fishing craft on 4 September but jammed after the third shot due to mal-operation. It was cleared and test fired later.

— page 176 —
7.16, 9-4 to 10-3-44.

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT (CONT.)

Quonset fired her 40 mm against a NAVIS which had landed on the surface of the water on 4 September. It is considered that these uses are insufficient to make definite recommendations as to value of these guns; it is recommended, however, that those guns be retained for at least another patrol.

ANTI SUBMARINE MEASURES.

1. During the last ten days in patrol area, it was noted that all aircraft were flying at a much higher level. 'Whore planes had been detected at first at elevations of one to two degrees, they were being picked up at elevations of five degrees or higher.

2. Barb observed from the bridge the bombing of the Tunny and dived immediately thereafter, to periscope depth. The NIP aviators boxed with white float lights to position where Tunny dived and the direction of advance; these lights were seen bobbing on the water for one hour. Later, a green magnesiuia parachute flare was dropped. Similarly, the position of the Barb was marked on one of her for each dive from aircraft during the night, as lights were burning when Barb returned to periscope depth.

3. To explanation can be offered for the unusual aircraft scientifically display and use of flares on 1 September witnessed by Quonset, as it is believed she was too distant from Tunny to have observed the attack.

4. As the patrol progressed, it was evident that convoys were having greater air coverage and convoy lanes were patrolled heavily. There was considerable night flying, particularly during nights when moon was bright. After a night attack on a convoy, planes were prompt in arriving at the scene of attack. Aircraft encountered by Barb apparently homed on the SJ radar until sight contact was made and bombing attack followed. Twice, aircraft was heard and seen at night before bombs were dropped as submarine was diving; had Barb not changed course after submerging, more than minor damage would have resulted.

5. Each convoy was well protected by anti submarine escorts. In only one instance, on 15 September, was a fleet destroyer found as an escort and that convoy had an escort carrier in the formation. In general, Chidori class torpedo boats and P.C.s performed escort work. Convoys employ a tighter formation at night, Zigzag on signal by red blinker light and change position in formation. Then a ship is attacked, the convoy continues on, leaving behind an escort to pick up survivors; when available, a plane hovers overhead.

— page 177 —
1. Three submarines appear to be the best number for a pack. It is believed that there is now sufficient ship movement through Convoy College to warrant rearrangement of areas and assignment of four packs. The wolfpack doctrine is sound and was followed by this pack.

2. On several instances, lack of knowledge of other submarines' calls, frequency and code hampered our movements and dissemination of information. It is believed that greater destruction can be wrought with better dissemination by pack commanders of information known to them. The senior pack commander should be authorized to act as area commander and direct packs to intercept convoy's end coordinate activities in the College.

RESULTS:

1. It is recommended that the following damage to the convoy be credited:

| Damage | Description |
|||
| BARR | SINK |
|        | One unidentified large frogfisher. |
|        | One unidentified small frogfisher. |
|        | One Itukusima large tanker. |
|        | One Otaka escort carrier. |
|        | One fishing vessel - drifter (by gunfire) |
|        | DIALOGUE |
|        | One unidentified medium tanker. |
|        | QUERISTIS SINK |
|        | Two unidentified large tankers. |
|        | Two unidentified large transports. |
|        | One unidentified large frogfisher. |
|        | One unidentified old class destroyer. |

2. All submarines in the group cooperated one hundred percent and the group commander wishes to take this opportunity to express his appreciation to the commanding officers, officers and crew of the Baro, Quenfisih and Tunny for exerting their best efforts during the patrol.

E. R. SWINBURNE.

— page 179 —
1- Large AP (EU)  - 10,000 tons (QUEENFISH Attack No. 3)
: 1- Large AP (EU)  - 10,000 tons (QUEENFISH Attack No. 5)

TOTAL SUNK 90,850 tons

DAMAGE:

1- Medium AO (EU)  - 5,000 tons (BABE Attack No. 1)

TOTAL SUNK AND DAMAGED 95,850 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
ComInCh (7)
QHO (5)
CinOpac (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean Areas (1)
ComServPac (1)
CinClant (1)
ComSubsLant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Subase, P.H. (1)
ComSoPac (2)
ComSoiePac (1)
ComSubSoiePac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
ComNorPac (1)
ComSubsPac (40)
ComSubsPacSubOrdCom (3)
all Squadron and Division Commanders, Pacific (2)
SubTrainPac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

(Compleet Air Wing TWO) (1)
O-in-C, ASWTU, FitAirWingTWO (1)

(Compleet Air Wing TWO) (1)
O-in-C

— page 180 —
15-11/5041
U. S. S. FULTON
75/ntb
P2-5
DECLASSIFIED
FROM:
To:
Via:
Subject:
Reference:
1. The Medical Officers.
2. The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
3. The Commanding Officer.
4. Commander Submarine Squadron 193.
5. Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLIGHT.

Experience of Survivors from a Sunken Japanese Transport Recovered from Life Rafts in the South China Sea, Reports Concerning.

(a) Buoys Form 1tr. No. 38, P3-2/116-3 (014), dated 4-14-42.
(b) Patrol. 1tr. No. 23L-44, dated 4-30-44.

1. On the evening of 15 September 1944, the USS SALTON (38315) and the USS TORNAITO (5833) rescued one hundred and twenty-four men from the waters of the South China Sea. On 17 September 1944, the USS MARINE (5833) recovered an additional thirty-two men. These men, Japanese prisoners of war for two years and seven months, were being transferred from Singapore to the Japanese home islands when their transport was sunk early on the morning of 15 September 1944. Being refused rescue by Japanese men-of-war, they remained in the water, clinging to rafts. Some were nude, but most were clad in shorts and scanty clothing. Some had life belts. They were without other protection from the sun and had no food or water except for a little rain water; a few caught some fish with their hands. The sea, prior to the time they were rescued, was rough enough to threaten their position on the raft. Some of the rafts were crowded, others carried only one or two men. Then space was available, they either lay on their bellies on the rafts or set up, clutching one side with their hands and bracing their feet against the opposite side to maintain their position. Many of their companions died before rescue came. A total of one hundred and fifty-seven men were rescued; seven of these died later. Though a few were sailors, most of them had belonged to either the Australian or English races. By winning in the sea at intervals they had managed, until too weak to continue, to keep their skin wet. Most of them, taken prisoner at the fell of Singapore on 15 February 1942, had been in concentration camps. Prior to their departure from Singapore, this particular group of prisoners had been selected as most physically fit, all having been free of skin diseases and all having diagnostic rectal smears for communicable diseases.

-1-

— page 181 —
2. EXPERIENCE OF SURVIVORS FROM A DUNKIN JAPANESE TRANSPORT RECOVERED FROM LIFE RAFTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. Report Concerning.

2. WILLIAM, P. J., PHIL, TOM, or THE SHALLOW, stated concerning the rescue and subsequent care of these men:
   - "We took on fifty-four men, after they had been in the water for about three days. Some of the crew went over the side and pulled their rafts alongside and we took them as they came. We cut or stripped away all of their clothes and life jackets, then we threw a blanket around them and helped them down the ladders.
   - The physical condition of all was poor. They were very weak, exhausted, malnourished and extremely dehydrated. Four of them, they later died, were unconscious when brought over the sides. I could see no evidence of external injuries on any of them. The Captain gave me eight men, relieved of all duty, who worked with me for the next five days, working eight hours on and eight hours off. We cleared the water from the after-battery room and the after-torpedo room, turning these compartments into regular wards and having a bunk for each man."

3. "First of all, after we had them in their bunks, we gave each man a little water, gradually increasing the amount each time they took a drink. Then, because they were all completely out of sore eyes, we wiped the oil from their eyes. Then I made rounds to find out which ones were in the worst condition. To each of four men who seemed to be having severe pain, I saw a syrette or morphine. Then, after they were fairly comfortable, we started removing the fuel oil from their skin. We pretty soon used up the two cans of mineral oil which I had and the detergent used. Then we got a five gallon can of light hydrulle oil and used that. Next, we gave to each man who could stand, a shower with warm water and soap, and cleaned up their bunks, using extra sheets, blankets and mattress covers as we had them. All of them had sores on their bodies, shallow skin ulcers, for the most part. Then we removed the oil these places looked very angry so we put on a dry dressing. Later, most of these appeared to form a dirty, gray scab over the surface and were infected so we dusted them with sulfanilamide powder. Three of the men had cellulitis, in two cases about the lower and incision and draining was required. The third case involved a finger. It, too, had to be incised and drained. After this we decided to cut everyone's hair. I didn't see any lice! I figured that they had probably been killed by the oil with which their hair was melted."

— page 182 —
15/6
IN REPLY
REFER TO
ASII/ 25-5
DECLASSIFIED:
"After we had the men fairly comfortable and after they had all been given a little food, it was early morning of the sixteenth and most of them fell into an exhausted sleep. They didn't rest well, continually turning and twisting in their sacks. Then they awakened, we fed them concentrated milk, water and hot tea which seemed to quiet them down, their pulse and respiratory rates falling. We turned off the lights and let them sleep it off. After this, they all looked better and were more cheerful. We gave each of them about a cup of milk, one milk-vitamin capsule and ten grains of quinine. That same day we saw them frequently in the morning and water. On the third day, the seventh, they all looked much better. I started them on three meals a day with strong broth, concentrated milk, soup, soft boiled eggs, soft toast, fruit juice and some ice cream. All of them seemed to tolerate the food well, they being no nausea or vomiting. Their bowels began to move freely and they began to vomit almost immediately when they received food and water. No man had a slight diarrhea and I gave him some sulfadiazine."

"All of the men were malnourished, I saw shock-into the deck and carry them down the ladder. Most of them couldn't sit up and had to be put in bunker right away. I'm sure that five of them had malaria because they had chills, fever and had a yellow tinge to their eyes. They were the only ones who had a fever. Because I knew that at some time or another they had all had malaria. I started each one out upon ten grains of quinine that first night; the next two days I gave them twenty grains daily. Following this, they received ten grains a day except for those I thought had malaria and they received fifteen grains. I thought some of the men had a vitamin deficiency. In early morning of the next day, the food was very good. In the morning, the food of the scorpion were particularly thick- and, swollen and often cracked and sore. For these we made scrotal supports. In some cases there was swelling of the head of the penis. The men, at the time they went into the water, said that most of them had had no sores. When I first saw them practically one hundred percent of them had sores over their bodies and a skin rash. Their tongues were often smooth, sore and very dry. I saw no bleeding gums. One man had a very large belly as though he had anestesia. Their feet were not swollen. They were all suffering from sunburn, exposure, shock and exhaustion."

— page 183 —
816
IN REPLY
REFER TO
AS11/
DECLASSIFIED
Subject:
Experience of Survivors from a Sunken Japanese Transport Recovered from Life after the South China Sea Report Concentration

"The four men who we removed unconscious from the water never did come to. They were suffering, I thought, from shock, exposure and perhaps a return of their malaria. They had been on raft. One of them possibly had severe internal injuries from depth charging. I could see no external injuries. I gave them four units of plasma and 200c of glucose and saline (5% dextrose). Three of them died on the second day; the fourth died the night of the incident. If there had been a doctor aboard at the time we recovered them, maybe he could have done something to have saved them. One man complained of pain in his chest. He was very emaciated and had thick and tenacious sputum. I thought maybe he had tuberculosis."

"we cleared all crew members from the after-battery room and from the after-torpedo room; the only crew members allowed to go through to shore were those who had to go through, other than those helping the crew used the officer's head and the after-battery head. The other head we used for the patients. Those men helping me we put into the chief's quarters because we wanted a place where they could sleep when off duty and because we didn't want the rest of the crew exposed to them any more than was necessary. The officers doubled up and the chief's moved into one of the staterooms. The crew used the officer's shower. We used all of our available sheets, blankets and mattress covers. The crew donated their extra salvos, salvos, and other salvos, and the life. We received some blankets and salvos and shirts from the USS CASS (DD370) when she came alongside with us. SCHIP for the USS HOLLAND (AS1). We had plenty of food aboard for the patients. The crew and officers had to subsist, however, on mostly sandwiches because the galley was always so busy. I didn't give any of the sea stimulants other than hot tea which they seemed to appreciate the most. I had all of the medical supplies that I needed; I could have used more twenty-four inch gauze. We had only one urinal duck and it was constantly in use, consequently, we had to use anything else we could find."

3.
"Concerning the rescue and subsequent care of the fourteen men recovered by the USS BARN, DONKEY, William K., while, USS, 372 23 75, said: "I had about two and a half days to get ready for the men. I planned to put them in the crew's quarters, in the after-battery, using the bunks on the starboard side, especially the middle ones. For the patients, we reserved the number two head in the crew's quarters. We had only one

— page 184 —
6/6
IN REPLY
REFER TO
AS11/
DECLASSIFIED
Subject:

Experience of Survivors from A Sunken Japanese Transport Recovered from Life Rafts in the South China Sea. Reports Concerning the Japanese Submarine.

shower in use so it had to be shared with the patients, but it was washed down with acetate solution three times a day. "We covered the mattress with canvas to protect them from oil. Normal saline, plasma, sterile gear, morphine ayrettes and adrenaline was broken out in readiness. The had buckets, soap, mineral oil and alcohol for cleaning them up, plenty of blankets, all the available mattress covers, sheets, clothing and plenty of fruit juices were on hand. I had a dietetic sheet all made out. Then they were brought aboard I was in the receiving position, below, at the ladder in the crew's mess hall where we had two mattresses on the deck. I had picked out six men to help me, but I later had to increase this to twenty because it took from two to three men to care for each patient. After the first night I worked through the day from 0745 until 2400 when one of the boys took over for me.

"The men were very weak when we came upon them for they had been in the water for six days and seven nights. In three instances, the crew went over this side to help them aboard. All of them had to be helped down the ladder; only one of the fourteen could sit up, the rest were so weak that they had to lie down. About eight of them were semi-conscious, the remaining six were in a pretty good mental state. Many of them had multiple skin abrasions on their sides, arms and legs which they said resulted from their uncomfortable position on the raft. Many of these, with the action of the salt water, oil and sun, had become open sores. Most of them had 'prickly heat' which had gone on to 'salt burns', enormous superficial ulcers which were very tender; in one man, they almost covered his entire body. Oneman had a large, deep tropical ulcer on his leg. About eight had edema of the ankles and feet which, in several, pitted with pressure. The secretion of one man was swollen to the size of a large grapefruit which presented a large ulcerated abrasion; the shaft and head of the penis was swollen. Six of the men had penile sores which I thought may have been due to scabies, but I couldn't be sure. Three of them had ring-worm infections around the groin. Most of them had very acute conjunctivitis from the oil. All were extremely dehydrated. Their tongues were swollen, very red, dry and were sore for about four days. Their teeth were generally bad; about three had a mild gingivitis."

— page 185 —
15/12/1944
IN REPLY
REFER TO
U. S. S. FULTON (AS11)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

Subject:
Experience of Survivors from a Sunken Japanese Transport Recovered from the Battle in the South China Sea. Reports Concerning...

"I thought all of them showed evidence of pelarga and some of them seemed to have beri-beri. As a general diagnosis, for all of them, I put down immersion, non-fatal, exposure and malnutrition. Other than for the abrasions mentioned, I could see no other evidence of external injury. Several of them spoke of the under water explosions at the time their ship sank, stating that the force was great enough to cause abdominal pain and to force water through their anal canal. Some said that following this, for a couple of days, they were very sick and vomited many times. 'When we got to the aboard, the first thing I did was to look them over for fractures and injuries. Then, after we got them in their burks, we gave them, to start off with, three tableaspoons of sweetened water, repeating this in small sips at short intervals. We first of all washed their eyes out with boric acid solution, followed by a few drops of mineral oil. We continued to wash their eyes out every three or four hours and instilled yellow oxide of mercury as long as it was necessary. We found that giving them a little brandy in coffee seemed to make them react more easily and to tolerate better the cleaning up. Three men took care of one patient and started to remove the very thick layers of fuel oil from their skins; it took about forty-five minutes to get off the first layer and caused quite a bit of pain. I thought the abrasions were too severe to put fuel oil upon, so we used buckets of warm water and soap. Then, I started to clean up the abrasions, dressing them with sulfa-thiazole powder and gauze. I couldn't see any lice or orabs, but we cut their hair because it was so matted with oil."

"When we first got them, they were very dehydrated. In addition to the sweetened water and coffee, we gave them, in the first twenty-four hours, clipped ice cubes and sips of water at short intervals. Then we gave them water to rinse out their mouths at short intervals because it seemed like their tongues became dry and swollen and stuck to the roofs of their mouths. About 0200 that first night, we had them all squared away, but they didn't get much sleep because of thirst. The second day I started them on fruit juice (pineapple and grapefruit juice), but it seemed to give all of them gas so I discontinued it."

— page 186 —
16
IN REPLY
REFER TO
AS11/
DECLASSIFIED
Subject:

U.S.S. FULTON (AS11)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

Experience of Survivors from a Sunken Japanese Transport Recovered from Life Rafts in the South China Sea. Reports Concerning...

"About noon of the same day, we started them out on soft boiled eggs, crisp toast. In addition they received egg nog and ice cream. After the first twenty-four hours, and after their thirst had been eased, they began to settle down, but it wasn't until the third day that they began to eat well. Some of them had troubles tolerating the soft diet. One man vomited and four had diarrhea which cleared up with bluish and some had indigestion after eating. I've ran into a typhoon with the ship often at a twenty and thirty degree roll and many of the sea were seasick. After the first twenty-four hours, most of them began to vomit and to have bowel movements. Several of the men, after a few days, began to develop little roustules under their skin which cleared up after drainage and rinsing with alcohol. Many developed heat rash. I gave the man with the tropleal ulcer some sulfadiazine by mouth shortly thereafter it came to a head. At the time he was transferred, it was almost completely healed. Practically all of them had a fever that first night or from 99 to 103 degrees. The next day their temperatures were normal with the exception of two men in whom it remained elevated to above 100 degrees and due, I thought, to shock and extreme exposure and dehydration. One of these men had a constant cough, but no sputum. One boy developed a high temperature which came down, in twenty-four hours, after ingestion and drainage of three boils. I kept the fellow with the swollen scrotum in bed, applied ice bags and gave him sulfadiazine by mouth. At the time he was transferred the swelling had largely subsided and he was up and around. Most of the men, by the third and fourth days, were feeling well, looked much better and were up and around. None of the men died."

"As for general treatment, I used AFC capsules and gave them six multi-vitamin capsules daily for three days, cutting it down to four capsules a day thereafter. As far as I could tell, none of these men had malaria. I didn't give any narcotics or plasma or saline. We were short of morphine and were on the verge of collapse. I gave them a half to make them go around. I ran out of sulfadiazine. After the first three or four days, I gave up trying to keep these patients isolated from the crew. They were all exceedingly cooperative, grateful and patient. The crew and officers helped me a great deal and willingly gave their clothing, cigarettes and time."

— page 187 —
315
IN REPLY
REFER TO
AS11/ 0 Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

Experience of survivors from a Surken Japan-
ese Transport Recovered from the Hafta in
the South China Sea. Reports Concerning.--
Concerning the rescue and subsequent care of
the eighteen men recovered by the USS CURRINGTON, DIXON, Harold,
311 46 90, THIEN, USN, stated: "we knew about forty-eight hours
before-hand that we were to search for survivors. Then we found
them some of the crew went over the side and pulled their rafts
alongside. They had been in the water for about six days. One
man didn't answer our shouts; we threw a life preserver, hitting
his foot, but he didn't understand. Then we brought his raft
alongside he was in a state of collapse and was semi-conscious.
A second man was likewise unconscious; two more were semi-conscious
and disoriented and we had to lower them down the ladder. The
remaining fourteen men showed evidence of malnutrition, extreme
fatigue, exposure and immersion; all were in a deplorable physi-
cal condition. All complained of itching and burning of the
skin from the fuel oil and salt water. All had a follower type
of skin rash, as if they were on the ship. There were three of four
men with symmetrical cutaneous sores on the neck, hands and feet with
surrounding areas of tissue atrophy which I thought to be the
cutaneous lesions of pellagra. Two of them had large, deep
indolent tropical ulcers over the body prominences. All had from
mild to severe conjunctivitis. Their throats were red and in
some cases the entire lining of the throat, cheeks and tongue
were reddened. One of their tongues were swollen. Their teeth
were reddened. One of their tongues were swollen

— page 188 —
1. Experience of Survivors from a Sunken Japanese Transport Recovered from Life Hints in the South China Sea, Reports Concerning...

We used warn soap and water to get the fuel oil off and some of our own lubricating oil. The conjuativities I treated with saline irrigations and mild silver protein. The skin rashes were treated with sulfonamid powder and vaseline gauze. The only surclsal treatment necessary was inolision and debridement of the tropical ulcer. One oompalined of a foreign body in the eye which I removed.

The first night most of the men were restless so I gave them ambulatory every night the greater they slept better. Those who had been confused at the time of recovery were generally improved in a few hours. After the first three days most of the men were up and around. Four or five men, two or three days after rescue, developed paraesthesias of the upper extremities. In most cases, they began to have bowel movements twenty-four to forty-eight hours after receiving food. Some of the men wore seaaklor. I think that, on an average, they gained about ten to fifteen pounds in the period of time that they were aboard. There were five of the men who were seriously ill. One of these, the day after rescue, said that he was having malaria and that he had had from thirty to forty bouts of the disease previously. He didn't have a chill, but his temperature was elevated to around 101.6°. I gave him saline irrigation as of quinine 'stint' and repeated the dose four hours later; the next day his temperature was lowered and he was much improved. I continued him on the same dosage of quinine daily. The other men had similar complaints and had temperature elevations; I gave them each a course of quinine. The second man, upon rescue, had a temperature of 104°. He didn't have a diarrhea, but had much nausea in his stool. For the next two to three days he had saline irrigation repeated up, but then it came down by lysis. He complained of constant heart burn. I gave him aluiumin hydroxide and tincture of belladonna with improvement.

Two men died. One of these was unconscious when brought aboard. His axillary temperature was about 104.5°; his pulse was more than 140 and his respirations were about thirty-six per minute. He was cyanotic and dyspneic. The belly was swollen, so deep reflexes could be found and I thought his spleen was palpable. The last forenoon we swollen and bruised, otherwise there was no evidence of external injury. I gave him one-half grain of morphine tartrate immediately and one unit of plasma, followed by 1000 cc. of normal saline and five per cent glucose. He appeared, for a short time, to be improved, the cyanosis and dyspnea lessening, but it returned. The temperature never dropped and he never became concious. He died that first night, about ten hours after he was rescued. I

— page 189 —
15. 1/8/58
U.S. S. FULTON
ASLI/
DECLASSIFIED
Subject:

Experience of Survivors from a Sunken Japanese Transport Recovered from Life Refits in the South China Sea Reports Concerning...

thought the most likely causes were those of shock, exhaustion and exposure. The second man was likewise unconscious when brought aboard. His temperature was about 105°. He was dyspeptic, cyanotic and the abdomen was enlarged. He had, in addition, a severe desquamation of the skin of the hands, neck, and chest. He was apparently in pain. I gave him morphine tartrate, one and one-half units of plasma and five pezcent glucose in saline. For a time he appeared to improve. He vomited twice, something that looked like seaweeds. He died about thirty hours after rescue. It is possible that internal injuries might have contributed toward the death of both of these men for there were under water explosions at the time their ship was sunk. Both men received one-half of the morphine per hour. The next day they were placed in the hospital. The men were sealed and were kept awake by the steam. Moreover, the first night while giving intravenous fluids, it was difficult to keep a steady flow in one outlet, let alone two, with the ship operating at a thirty-five or forty degree roll. The only thing of which I needed more was twenty-four inch gauze."

5. DANGER, M.L., 202 03 68, PHIL, USN, aboard the USS PAMPANITO, had seventy-three men to care for. One man died before arrival, possibly the result of internal injuries. Unfortunately, detailed information concerning the remaining men is not available. Their general condition, on arrival, was similar to that of the other survivors.

6. Upon arrival at SAIPAN, on 20 September 1944, the USS STALION and the USS PAMPANITO tied up alongside the USS TULON (ASLI). On 25 September 1944, the USS BARD and the USS QUENKINS arrived with their survivors. Plans previously made for evacuation of the patients to the U.S.A. 14th CHINHNAI HOSPITAL were carried out without delay. Following the instruction contained in Reference (b), these men were considered to be potentially loose-infected. In view of the history of exposure to all and lack of demonstrable life and because of the military exigency, the submarines were not fumigated. All compartments used by the patients, however, were completely decontaminated, the bulkheads, bunks and decks being washed down with

— page 190 —
11/2-5
DECLASSIFIED
Subject: Experience of Survivors from a Sunken Japanese Transport Recovered from Life Rafts in the South China Sea. Reports Congregating...

A five percent solution of saponified cresol. All blankets were laundered, all mattresses were thoroughly aired after being sprayed with an insecticide fortiified by five percent phenol. New pillows, mattress covers and clean clothing were provided. When it was finally determined that the patients were free of quarantinable diseases, the Fleet Medical Officer was notified by dispatch.

Examination of the rescued men at the time of arrival by the Medical Officers of the USS PULITZER, was of a necessity very brief. All the observations made by WILLIAMS, DICKINSON, and DERRIS were substantiated. It is our opinion that they are to be commended for their resourcefulness and skill in meeting the sudden emergency thrust upon them.

7. Through the courtesy of the U.S.A.I. 14th CHINA HOSPITAL, and particularly from Colonel R.C. WADSWORTH and Captain W.H. MOORHEAD, the following information concerning the survivors was obtained. A carefully taken medical history revealed their average weight loss during their imprisonment had been about sixteen pounds. Ninety-five percent stated that they had had malaria; several had had the cerebral form of this disease. Sixty-seven percent said that they had had recurrent dysentery (bacillary and amoebic); ninety-five percent reported, during their imprisonment, recurrent manifestations of vitamin and nutritional deficiencies of one type or another. Many had been treated by their own doctors (fellow prisoners of war) for beriberi and pellagra. Sixty percent, at one time or another, had had tropical ulcers. At one time, a terrific epidemic of cholera with a high mortality rate (985) had swept through their group. Some of their fellow prisoners died of typhus fever. When moved from one camp to another they were deloused by boiling their clothes and by bathing with soap and water. Soon after their capture they were given innoculations by the Japanese against cholera, plague, typhoid fever and amoebic dysentery. Prior to their departure from Singapore they stated that none of them had had skin rashes or ulcers. Upon hospitalization, all were found to be suffering from malnutrition, exhaustion and exposure. One hundred percent of them showed evidence of vitamin deficiency, varying in degree and extent. In eighty-five percent, pre-tibial pitting could be demonstrated by hyperpigmentation undoubtedly accounted for some of this edema. All of their tongues were smooth, many were sore and fiery red. The gums were swollen and bled easily upon slight trauma. Angular stomatitis was seen frequently. All had some type of skin lesion which varied from severe eczema to minor abrasions and erosion. Five men had

— page 191 —
16
IN REPLY
REFER TO
AS11/
DECLASSIFIED

Subject: Experience of Survivors from a Sunken Japanese Transport Recovered from Life Rafts in the South China Sea. Report. Categorizing.

either searrling of the cornea or acute corneal ulcers, in one instance these were blistered. 'Undoubtedly, exposure to the sun and oil caused blistered development. Ten percent of the sea casualties of a stinking sensation on swimming, the sunburn, perhaps in the nature of an esophagitis associated with dehydration and the swallowing of salt water. Twenty percent had palpable livers; in ten percent the spleen was palpable. Twenty percent of the men recovered by the STATION and the TAMATTO had an acute bronchitic which, they stated, developed within a few hours after their rescue. Out of twenty-nine chest X-rays taken of this group, there was one fractured rib and nine cases of acute bronchopneumonia. There was one case of pulmonary tuberculosis in which acid fast organism were demonstrated in the sputum (LANG, Robert F., rescued by the TAMATTO). There were blood stained sputum sputa. Of one hundred telephonium, five (4%) showed Pseudomonas vibrax. Routine stool cultures on one hundred and fifteen men were positive in eleven instances (10%) for the Flexner bacillus. Of sixty-three stool smears taken, three (5%) were positive for Ascaris, twenty-one (33%) were positive for hookworm. Most of the men had an anemia, generally associated with material parasites and hookworm infestations. During their hospitalization, none of the men had diarrhea; stool cultures for cholera were not made. Of seven skin cultures, Trichophyton was isolated in four instances, Staphylococcus in three cases. All of the men, with treatment and rest, responded very favorably.

A. J. PHILIP
Lieutenant, (MC), U.S.N.R.

T. P. DUPY
Lieutenant, (MC), U.S.N.R.

W. N. FOY
Lieutenant Commander, (MC), U.S.N.R.

Copy to:
Force H.O., Subforaeft.
Fleet M.O., Pacfleet.

-12-

— page 192 —
916
IN REPLY
REFER TO
AS11/72-1

U.S.S. FULTON (AS11)
10/1/44
San Francisco, Calif.
c/o Fleet Post Office
OCT 25 1944

DECLASSIFIED SECRET
FIRST MEMBER: To:

— page 193 —
12-10/7/44
Serial: 00923
DECLASSIFIED:
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
The Chief of the Bureau of Public Health and Surgery.

Subject: Experience of survivors from a submm Japanese Transport
recovered from life rafts in the South China Sea, reports
concerning.

1. Formatted:
   - The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, considers
    that the pharmacist's notes attached to the RADMINTY, QEENFISH, BARD,
    and SALMON, were outstanding in their performance of duty. It was only
    through their knowledge of medicine, combined with painstaking and
    conscientious attention to the surviving Survivors of Far that one hun-
    dred and fifty-two of the one hundred and fifty-seven rescued were
    brought through this ordeal.

2. The following action has been taken in regard to the
pharmacist's notes concerned:

DEERFISH, H. L., PHILIP, U.S.N., U.S.S.R., RADMINTY, recommended to the
Bureau of Naval Personnel for advancement to Rearm. Pharmacist.

PHILLIPS, D. P., PHILIP, U.S.N., U.S.S.R., SALMON, advanced to Chief
Pharmacist's Mate, Acting Appointment.

3. By copy of this endorsement, the Commanding Officer's of
the RADM, and QUENFISH are being requested to make recommendations for
promotion of, or suitable awards to, PHILLIPS, PHILIP, U.S.N., PHILIP, U.S.N.,
and DICK, Harold (m.), PHILIP, U.S.N., respectively.

Copy to:
G. A. LOCKWOOD, Dr.
GO USS RADM
GO USS QEENFISH
GTG 17-7

— page 194 —
2-10-2/16-3/575
SUBSALINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 00324
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Report of Firing Mark 27 and Mark 28 Torpedoes During the Twelfth War Patrol of the U.S.S. BASS (SS220).

Enclosure:
(A) U.S.S. BASS - Secret Report of Firing Mark 28 Torpedoes, War Patrol No. 12 (CO USS BASS Secret Itr. File SS220/16-3, Serial 009 dated 3 August 1945).
(B) U.S.S. BASS - Secret Report of Firing Mark 27 Torpedoes, War Patrol No. 12 (CO USS BASS Secret Itr. File SS220/16-3, Serial 009 dated 3 August 1945).

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith.

2. The Force Commander congratulates the commanding officer, officer, and crew of the BASS for this effective use of the Mark 27 Torpedoes, and reports that the BASS was not similarly fortunate in the use of the Mark 28 Torpedoes.

3. The sinking of a ship by the use of the Mark 27 Torpedoes has been credited in the Force Commander's endorsement of the BASS's twelfth war patrol.

MERRITT, CONNSTOCK,
Deputy.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (2)
CHO (2)
Cinepec (3)
Consubspice (2)
ConsubspiceAddCond (2)
Consubstremipne (2)
Comsubsplant (2)
ComSubs?th?ht (2)
ComSubs?th?ht (2)
All Squadron Commanders (1)
All Division Commanders (1)
BUD (2)
Buships (2)
CO, USS BASS (less Encl.) (1) 91 21 dS

E. L. HINES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

— page 195 —
SS220/AL6-3
Serial:  009
DEGLASSIFIED

From:  The Commanding Officer,
To:  The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
Via:  The Commander Submarine Division THREE TWENTY TWO.
The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY TWO.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. BARB Secret Report of Firing Mark 27 and Mark 28 Torpedoes, Patrol No. 12.

Enclosure:  (A) Subject Reports.
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

E. B. FLUCKEY

— page 196 —
27 TORPEDO "TTACK FORM

U.S.S. B'RB MARK 27 TORPEDO ATTACK No. 1 PATROL No. 12 TIME 1233(K)
DATE 3 July 1945 L.T. 48-25.3 N LONG. 143-54.0 E SOUND CONDITIONS Felt
DEPTH OF WATER 45 fathoms DISTANCE TO NEAREST SHORE & REEF 29 Miles,
WAS IT R/INING? NO SE/ CONDITIONS 1

TARGET D/TA - D/M/CG INFLICTED

Description: Coastal NK on base course 334CT, probably en route SHILUCK et northern tip of 2-TIENIG B/Y. No elr cover. Contact - Reder (13000). Visibility - Pocr.

SHIP SUNC: Coestel /K 1000 Tons.
D/M/CG DETERMINED BY: Timed hit - 1m 34s. Surfaced end observed wreckage. Self-sighted charts.
TARGET DRAFT 10 feet COURSE 334 SPEED 8.1 kts. R/NC 80 yards (et firing).
TARGET TURN COUNT - T/REET BE RING /T FIRE TIGT NT 300 R
CVE NT/COUL/RTIES NOTE IN T/REET'S SOUND OUTPUT HON.

ON SHIP D/TA
SPEED 2 knots COURSE 146 DEPTH 135 feet N/CLE 3 degrees down (et firing).

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO D/TA
W/S T/REET /N/RE OF SUB'S PRESENCE? NO.
W/S SUB/RNL BEING DEPTH CH/RGED? NO.
T/REET/CTK: Picked up target by radar in fog. Tracked target until course, speed, and zig-plen were determined. Submerged 4000 yards ahead of target and started to 150 feet when target was 1900 yards distant. 18° negative gradient prevented reaching 150 feet before good firing position was obtained so fired at 135 feet.

TIME OF FIRING 1233(K) TUBE NO. 10 TIE OF HIT 1234.34(K) ERR/TIG No.
JP DECIBEL HETER INDIC TION 'T F/ERING FULL scale (plus 6).
JP DECIBEL HETER INDIC TION 1 I/INUTE. PTER T/IRING Plus 6.
JP DECIBEL HETER INDIC TION 2 I/INUTES after firing -
JP G/IN 4 FILTER E/ND 6000 CYCLES M/RK TORPEDO 27-0 SERT/L NO. 1170
M/RK N/HE/D - SER/L NO. - I/R EXPLODER -
SERT/L NO. - R/INING DIST/NCE SBT -
ISSUING /CTIVITY Submarine Bese, Petrl Herbor, T.H.

COMMENTS

This torpedo was c.rried in the rack until six days before firing. The torpedo was charged weakly after its receipt on June 7, end water was added to the battery one time. At the time of contact the torpedo was on charge. The charge was secured, the torpedo reloaded into the tube end fired.

— page 197 —
28 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM
U.S.S. B/RB 'MRK 28 TORPEDO ATTACK No. 1 P/TROL No. 12 TIME 2105(K)
D: 26 June 1945 LAT. 49-40 N LONG. 144-23 E.
DECLASSIFIED
SOUND CONDITIONS: Poor DEPTH OF WATER 68 Fathoms DISTANCE TO NEAREST SHORE OR REEF 10 MILES SE CONDITION State I V/S IT R/ING NC.
INJECTION 34.
TARGET DATA - D/M/GE INFLICTED
Description: Convoy of three merchantmen (2 medium 'K's, 1 small 'K') in column approaching coast with 5 scouts (1 DD (TERRUSKUL); 2 DE'; 2 PO's). 2 DE's end 2 PO's 1000 yards to seaward of column. DD 3000 yards to seaward of column. Target was DD. Contact - visual. Visibility - good. Convoy had air cover which left before the attack.

SHIP SINK: None.
SHIP D/M GED: None.

TARGET DRIFT TO 10 feet COURSE 221(T) SPEED 9 knots R/NG 2190 (et fir- ing) T R/GET TURN COUNT 110 RPM T/RGET BE R/NG T FIRING INST/NT 037 R GIVE /NY PECULIARITIES HOSTED IN T R/GET'S SOUND OUTPUT None.

OWN SHIP DATA
SPEED 2.0 knots COURSE 271(T) DEPTH 61 feet /NGLE 0 (et firing). SUBM R/NE COURSE, SPEED, /ND DEPTH CH/NGES None.

FIRE CONTROL /ND TORPEDO DATA
NY INDIC/TIONS OF 'COUNTRY COURSE' SURFERS BEING DROPPED? No.
TYPE ATTACK: ST PERISCOPE.

FIRING DATA
TURB FIRE NO. 4 TR'CK /NGLE 130 P DEPTH SET 80' CYRO /NGLE 013 TORPEDO SPEED USED IN TDC 31.8 Kts. HIT OR MISS MISS ERR/TIC Yes TIME OF TORPEDO RUN - TORPEDO SERI/L No. 104329 M/RK EXPLODER - OVERH/UL /CTIVITY U.S. Submarine Bese, Pearl Harbor, T.H.
DESCRIPTION OF SOUND TR CK OF RUN. HOW LONG V/S TORPEDO TR/CEKD? Screw noise was lowered pitched than that that of Mk-18 torpedo. Torpedo tracked for 33 seconds.
WERE THE BE R/NG CONST NT? No.
V/S TORPEDO E/SY TO FOLLOW? Yes.
GIVE DETAILS: Torpedo was picked up when fired and tracked from OR to 030' R in 33 seconds. Torpedo was almost as easy to follow as Mk-18. Contact was lost suddenly as if a switch was turned off.

COMMENTS
The upkeep and routine for the MK28 torpedoes was carried out with no difficulty. The torpedoes were charged weekly and watering of the batteries was not required before firing. This torpedo was kept loaded in the tube from June 7 until fired on June 26. On June 25, 72 volt ground was found to exist on the negative lead.

— page 199 —
28 TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 12 TIDE 1317(K)
DATE 29 June 1945 L.T. 48-25 N LON. 142-47 E. SOUND CONDITIONS Poor
DISTANCE TO NEAREST SHORE CR REEF 3 miles SEA CONDITION State 0
TAS IT RAINING? No. INJECTION 35. DEPTH OF AFTER 18 Fathoms

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
Description: Same target as MK28 Attack No. 1. Formation the same except only 4 escorts, 1 DE missing. Conroy had air cover which spotted periscope and sent DD to attach when range to DD was 9000 yards. Cont.ct - periscope.
Visibility - Excellent.

SHIP SUNK: None.
SHIP DAMAGED: None.

TARGET DRAFT 10 feet COURSE 161(T) SPEED 10 knots RANGE 1670 (at firing)
TARGET TURN COUNT - TARGET BEHIND AT FIRING INSTANT 194 R
CIVE ANY PECULIARITIES NOTED IN TARGET'S SOUND OUTPUT None.

ON SHIP DATA
SPEED 2.8 Knots COURSE 137(T) DEPTH 61 feet ANGLE 0 (at firing)
SUBMARINE COURSE, SPEED, AND DEPTH CHANGES:
1317,30 - Changed speed to 1/3.
1319 - Right full rudder.
1320 - Fired salvo of 3 IKILIS down the throat
1321 - Changed speed to full.
1321,30 - Changed course to 170 degrees true, changed speed to 1/3.

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
ANY INDICATIONS OF COASTAL TORPEDO USE: No.
TREE DEPTH CHARGES BEING DROPPED? Yes.
1318 - 1 explosion
1319,30 - 1 explosion - possible torpedo explosion.
Torpedo did not hit target.

TYPE ATTACK: ST Periscope.

FIRING DATA
TUBE FIRED NO. 10 TRACK ANGLE 14 P DEPTH SET 80' GYRO ANGLE 190'
TORPEDO SPEED USED IN TDC 30,2 knots HIT CR MISS MISS ERRATIC Yes
TIME OF TORPEDO RUN - TORPEDO SEPTAL NO. 104347 MARK EXPLODER -
OVERHAUL -CIVILITY * Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
DESCRIPTION OF SOUND TRACK OF HUN. HOT LONG WAS TORPEDO TRACKED? Torpedo was
not picked up on the sound gear.
TREE THE BEARINGS CONSTANT? C Unknown.
TAS TORPEDO EASY TO ROLL? Not followed.
CIVE DETAILS: None.

— page 201 —
35
TARGET DATA - DIALAGE INFLICTED
Description: Same target as MK28 torpedo attacks No. 1 & 2 - DD (TERETSUKI). Target was making depth charge attack on ship. Had just passed 200 yards abeam. Target had air cover. Cont.ct - Periscope. Visibility - Excellent.

SHIP SINK: None.
SHIP DANGER: None.

TARGET DRAFT 10 feet COUSSE 178(T) SFED 10 kts.RANGE 800 yards (at firing)
TARGET TURN COUNT - TARGET BE.RING .AT FIRING START 250 .
CIVE ANY FECULIARITIES NOTED IN TARGET'S SOUND CUTUP. None.

ON SHIP DATA
SEED 2.4 ktsCOURSE 174(T) DEF.TH. 61 feet ANGLE 0 (at firing) SUBMARINE COURSE, SFED, AND DEF.TH CHANCES:
1327.30 Left full rudder. All ahead full.
1328 All ahead two thirds.
1329.30 Left rudder. All ahead full.
1330 Left rudder. All ahead full.
1331 Fired salvo of 3 kts at 3 kts. 354
TARGET CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
TURBO SIRED No. 4 TRACK .NGLE 173 S DEH.SET 80' GYRO ANGLE 354
TORPEDO SPEED USED IN TDC 3/4. HIT CR MISS Miss MESS. Yes. TIDE OF TORPEDO RUN - TORPEDO SERIAL NO. 104374. MARK HEADER - CVERH.AUL ACTIVITY - Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
DESCRIPTION OF SCUD TRACK CF RUN. HC LONG .AS TORPEDO TRACKED Torpedo not heard on the sound gear. WERE BEARINGS CONSTANT: Unknown.
AS TORPEDO EASY TC FOLIO? Not followed.
GIVE DETAILS: None.

COMMENTS
This torpedo was kept in the rack from June 7 until June 26 when it was loaded into the tubes. No ground was found in this torpedo as in the MK28's kept loaded in the tubes.

— page 202 —
004221
DECASSIFIED
S-E-O-R-E-T

1st Endorsement to
CommSubPac Secret Ltr.
7/12-10(A)/A16-3/875,
Serial 00324, dated
12 September 1945.

From:
To:
Subject:
1. Forwarded.

G. E. PRAHL
Ass't to Flag Secretary

Copy to:
ComSubPac (1st End. only)

MADE IN U.S.A.

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