U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS-223) — war patrol report SS-223_BONEFISH_Part1.pdf

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This MICROFILM IS THE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO—NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

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35S Section
Office of Public Information
Navy Department

HISTORY OF U.S.S. BONNEIS (SS 223)

Nearly 300,000 tons of enemy shipping were either sunk or damaged by the U.S.S. BONNEIS (SS 223) before she was lost a few months prior to the end of the war. The submarine has been credited with sinking 154,700 tons and damaging 42,000.

FIRST WAR PATROL

The BONNEIS arrived at Brisbane from New London, Connecticut on August 30, 1943. Following two days of training in Moreton Bay, she departed Darwin on 16 September 1943 for patrol area. The patrol was conducted in the central part of the South China Sea.

The BONNEIS was credited with sinking 43,206 tons of Japanese shipping, including two Japanese APs of 9,000 tons each. In addition she damaged 6,000 tons.

The first war patrol covered a period of 44 days, of which 29 were spent in the patrol area. On this first patrol there were on board 44 totally inoperable men in the crew.

The patrol was terminated on October 21, 1943.

Commander:
"the Commanding Officer of the BONNEIS during this patrol was T.F. Hogan.

SECOND WAR PATROL

The second war patrol of the BONNEIS was conducted in the Borneo-Celebes area from November 22 to December 19, 1943.

On this patrol the BONNEIS was credited with destroying 18,581 tons of enemy shipping, including an Akikaze destroyer, and the damaging of an additional 1,000 tons.

The BONNEIS had been assigned to patrol the central part of the South China Sea, and after extending 15 torpedoes enroute, she was ton directed to patrol in the Sandak-Kan-Tarakan area.

The destruction of the destroyer escort in a night surface attack on December 1st was called "particularly noteworthy" by the Commander of Task Force 71, with which BONNEIS was serving at that time.

Jan 1st alone sunk included 18,000 ton AK; 17,000 ton AK; and 1 DD of 1,215 tons.

In the December 1st action, the BONNEIS sighted a convoy consisting of three ships with two escorts on the morning of December 1. She tracked the convoy all that day but had no opportunity to attack until 21:00. She fired six torpedoes and heard one hit on the large AK as a result of torpedo #6. The AK commenced sinking on an even keel. She observed and heard one hit on the AK (#6 torpedo). The large AK was seen to sink directly after this, disembarking on an almost even keel. The Jan 1st destroyer was hit and a large amount of oil of

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2110 those on board heard and felt a terrific explosion that shook the boat worse than a close depth charge. It is believed that this was the destroyer's magazine. The explosion was accompanied by quite a fire-works display. At this time radar lost contact with all but two ships. The destroyer meanwhile had disappeared when the smoke had cleared.

THIRD U.S. PATROL

The BONEFISH's Commanding Officer on this patrol was Commander T.W. Hogan, USN.

The third war patrol of this vessel was conducted in the South China Sea and Okinawan Strait and covered the period January 12, 1944 to March 15, 1944.

As on her two previous patrols, the BONEFISH through aggressiveness and determination again inflicted telling damage on the enemy. The increasing tendency on the part of the enemy to anchor important convoys in sheltered or protected bays along the Indo-China Coast during darkness greatly reduced the opportunities for night attacks in that area.

The BONEFISH on this patrol was credited with sinking 23,272 tons of Japanese shipping. Also on this patrol she damaged 15,000 tons.

During this 63-day patrol, the BONEFISH made two attacks on larger than normal and well protected convoys. These attacks were successful in that on the first one three timed hits heard indicating two hits on an AO and one hit on an AK, and the second attack four hits were heard on an AO. It was unfortunate that loss of depth control on the first attack prevented firing more torpedoes.

Strong escort vessels and plane counter action prevented further pursuit of either of the convoy. The anti-submarine protection given these convoys, at the daylight attacks, by means of plane and surface vessel ordnination, is evidently becoming more effective, which may require greater use of night attacks, both surface and submerged.

The Australian boat issued to the BONEFISH was the best available in this area at the time of her departure. It was nutritious and in good condition but it is known to be tougher and more stringy than average U.S. beef.

The weather encountered in the South China Sea area was unusually bad for this time of year. For approximately 25% of the time spent in the area visibility was reduced to 3 to 4 miles by fog or rain and the sea was considered too rough for firing torpedoes. The heavy seas did not prevent our firing at any possible attacks but it did make depth control difficult while submerged and limited the radius of our operations on the surface.

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1944, the BONEFISH was conducting in the Celebes Sea -- Sulu Sea area during the period April 15 to May 30, 1944. Her Commanding Officer still was Commander T. W. Hogan, USN.

In the usual hard-hitting manner, the BONEFISH scored heavily against the enemy for the fourth consecutive time.

The ingenious reconnaissance by BONEFISH on the night of 17 May was called particularly commendable by the Commander Submarines, 7th Fleet, R.W. Christie. Tawibay Area was sent by radar and information gained thereby was later substantiated by visual observations. On this patrol the BONEFISH was credited with inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

- Japanese ships sunk totaled 30,401 tons, including 2 x 4,000 tons each; 18,000 ton AP; and 110,000 ton AO.

- Japanese shipping damaged totaled 1500 tons.

With the execution of minor bomb damage the BONEFISH returned in very good material condition.

On this patrol the Commanding Officer reported that he noticed no detailed improvement in the skill of the Japanese anti-submarine group but that he did observe many more of them than had been the case in the past.

A near miss was scored on the BONEFISH by a plane on May 4, while the BONEFISH was trying to get in for an attack. Unfortunately the Japs also happened to be in the right spot at the right minute to sight the BONEFISH.

Weather was good on this patrol with but few exceptions. Light winds, calm seas, and daytime surface haze over the water made observations through periscope distorted by a mirage effect, complicating daylight approaches.

While tracking a convoy in the Sulu Sea on May 3, 1944, the BONEFISH was the target for two Japs aerial bombs. There were at least two Japs planes in the sector furnishing air coverage for the convoy. One aerial depth bomb exploded very close aboard, giving the boat a violent shaking. The explosion caused minor damage, and there was another bomb explosion but this time well above the BONEFISH.

The 10,000 ton AO (tanker) which was sunk on 14 May 1944 was sent of a convoy sighted consisting of three tankers escorted by three destroyers. The convoy was sighted while the BONEFISH was submerged in the northern entrance to Sibu Passag, awaiting daylight for a reconnaissance patrol off Tawibay Bay.

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5

SIXTH WAR PATROL

The sixth war patrol of this vessel was conducted in the Sibuyan Sea and the South China Sea west of Luzon and covered the period 5 September to 8 November 1944.

During part of this patrol the BONEFISH formed a coordinated attack group with the USS FLASHER (SS 249) and the USS LAPON (SS 250).

Excellent area coverage was maintained and many valuable contacts were made. Among anti-submarine measures were intense but the BONEFISH was able to deliver four aggressive attacks and inflict severe damage upon the enemy. The BONEFISH also had the great pleasure of rescuing two downed friendly aviators during a period of life-guard duty.

On this patrol the BONEFISH was credited with sinking a total of 24,000 tons of Japanese shipping. This included two large Jan officers of 10,000 tons each.

Jaynonse ships damaged on the patrol totaled 8,000 tons and included two medium AKs of 4,000 tons each.

This patrol was characterized by the amazing number of enemy vessels encountered, by many enemy plane contacts, by four successful attacks and by the rescue of two aviators. The total of enemy ships encountered were sixty-eight. Forty-five of these ships were worthwhile targets.

The first attack occurred on September 27th. The enemy consisted of one large tanker with two escorts traveling at a speed of 10 knots. A night surface radar attack was made and four torpedoes fired for one hit. The BONEFISH evaded the escorts on the surface. The tanker was not observed to sink but dismounted from the radar screen at 13,450 yards.

This attack, like all of the other four, occurred in the South China Sea west of Luzon. It is one of the 10,000 ton tankers with which the BONEFISH was credited as sinking.

SIXTH WAR PATROL

The seventh war patrol of this vessel was conducted in the northeastern part of the East China Sea and lower Tsushima Straits and covered the period from 6 April to 7 May 1945.

Despite thorough area coverage few contacts were made, all of these being small of anti-submarine vessels. One attack was made, but was not successful probably due to shallow draft and radical maneuvers of the target. In addition to offensive patrols, life-guard services were rendered. Two Jaynonse aviators were captured during this life-guard duty when the enemy plane was shot down by one of our PTBs. The BONEFISH also successfully accomplished a special mission on this patrol.

During the patrol the BONEFISH was a member of a coordinated attack group (Commanding Officer SEASHORE Group Commander). It was a short patrol of 31 days, 21 days being spent in the assigned area and 15 were spent submerged.

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7- BONEFISH

The BONEFISH received the Navy Unit Commendation for her action on her first, third, fourth, fifth and sixth war patrols. The citation read: "For outstanding heroism in action during the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth War Patrols in enemy waters, the U.S.S. BONEFISH boldly penetrated the Pacific. Harassed continually and several times bombed by watchful and aggressive enemy aircraft, the U.S.S. BONEFISH boldly penetrated the most forward combat areas to effect wide coverage of her assigned sectors and strike fiercely at important Japanese surface targets. Consistently ready for combat under the superb handling of her gallant officers and men, she defied heavy escort screens; she developed her contacts with determined aggressiveness and launched gunfire and torpedo attacks despite the severe hostile countermeasures to sink or damage many ships vital to the enemy's continued persecution of her war. In addition to her valiant combat achievements, the BONEFISH rendered splendid lifeboat services during air strikes against hostile territory, effecting the rescue of two friendly pilots. Her outstanding record of success under the hazards and difficulties of prolonged patrols reflects the highest credit upon the BONEFISH, her courageous, fighting ship's company and the United States Naval Service."

She earned the following medals and awards during her period of service in World War II:

NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION - 15 September - 21 October 1943; 1st War Patrol; 12 January - 15 March 1944; 3rd War Patrol; 15 April - 30 May 1944; 4th War Patrol; 25 June - 13 August 1944; 5th War Patrol; 5 November 1944; 6th War Patrol.

AMERICAN AREA CAMPAIGN MEDAL
ASIATIC-PACIFIC AREA COMPLAIN MEDAL
1 star/First War Patrol - 15 September - 21 October 1943; 1st War Patrol; 1st War Patrol - 22 November - 19 December 1943; 1st War Patrol - 15 March 1944; 1st War Patrol - 25 June - 13 August 1944; 1st War Patrol - 25

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U.S.S. BONFISH
SS223/A16
(SS 223)
C/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.
October 21, 1943.

C-O-DECLASSIFIED-A-L-
From: The Commanding Officer,
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels).

Subject: U.S.S. BONFISH, Report of War Patrol
number one.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the first war patrol of this vessel conducted in the South China Sea during the period September 15, 1943 to October 21, 1943; is forwarded herewith.

T. W. HOGAN.
T. W. HOGAN.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.10C
W.O.P-0293C DATE 5/24/42

FILM FID
63042

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1. 0540
Ltr. SS223/A16 (018) of October 21, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

(A) PROLOGUE.

Arrived Brisbane from New London, Connecticut August 30, 1943. Sent crew on two days leave by sections and following work was accomplished: modified T.B.T., modified T.P. circuit micro-switch cable to three hatches, modified lub oil system, removed bridge rudder angle indicator, installed deck plate stiffeners, installed ground lead ground lead to all auxiliary motors, exchanged 24 torpedoes, received 30 additional rounds 4" ammunition, and accomplished miscellaneous out post trip repairs. Were wiped and sound tested.

Deported Brisbane September 6, 1943 with Commander Submarine EIGHTY Two onboard for two days training in Moreton Bay and off Moreton Island. Following training was accomplished:

1. Fired 10 rounds 4" 50 caliber common at TCCD target.
2. Fired 240 rounds 20 mm. target at TSS target.
3. Miscellaneous Day, Night and Radar reports.
4. Received 2 depth charges at 400 yards from H.M.A.S. GLADSTONE.

Deported Brisbane area on September 8, via route prescribed inside Barrier Reef, Grarton Passage and Torres Strait for Darwin.

Arrived Darwin September 15, where reported to Commander Submarine Division One Sixty Two and received orders for Patrol. Received 29924 gallons Diesel Fuel and 5500 gallons fresh water. Had minor leak to 4" 50 caliber ready ammunition locker repaired. While in Darwin, got underway and anchored in Bay for Air Raid Alert.

Deported Darwin 0745, September 16, 1943 for exercises with H.M.A.S. J234 and Planes. Commander Submarine Division One Sixty Two - Officer in charge of practices. Completed exercises and departed entrance swept channel 1300, September 16, 1943 for Patrol Area.

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2030 (I) Lost contact astern.
The sailboats sighted during the day were only fishermen.

Sunday, September 19, 1943.

0607 (I) Submerged for a trim.
0657 (I) Surfaced and continued towards area.
1030 (I) Held fire control drills.
1200 (I) Position Latitude 00-04 N., Longitude 125-15 E.

Monday, September 20, 1943.

0458 (I) Sighted large vessel bearing 3450 T range about 15000 yards, angle on bow 1750 port. Stopped and started tracking with SJ Radar. Target zigging to right and left of base course 2450 T speed about 17 knots. Commenced end round run to position ahead at full speed, tracking target. Target commenced closing range at high speed and with angle on bow of zero at

0521 (I) Made quick dive to avoid detection. Target dropped one depth charge and turned directly away. Range 12,000 yards.

0545 (I) Lost sight of target.

0550 (I) Surfaced and started chasing target at 20 knots or course 2450 T.

0644 (I) Changed to course 2600 T.

0659 (I) Sighted target bearing 3200 T still making high speeds zigging about base course 2450 T. Commenced tracking by high periscope observations at 20,000 yards, trying to gain a position ahead. Target was determined to be an unescorted Navy ship. HARD tanker of about 10,000 tons. Varying speed between 18 - 20 knots. We had increased true bearing by 530 and gained a position forward of his beam, had determined his zig plan and had closed to 6,000 yards of his base course track with a 550 starboard angle on the bow, estimated range 20,000 yards when at

1035 (I) Sighted masts of smaller vessel dead ahead, range about 8,000 yards, made quick dive to avoid detection and turned to course 2700 T to close target track, hoping to get him on his next loop to the left. At

1105 (I) Sighted target continuing his same zig plan, base course 2450 T. Commenced approach. At about

1135 (I) When target was supposed to zig toward, for an angle on the bow of 15 port, range 6,000 yards, took observation and found target with 1700 starboard angle on the bow at range of 6,300 yards. This was not in his zig plan and the only reason I can advance for this turn away is that the heller vessel which was on our north beam then

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1158 (I)
1200 (I) Lost target from sight.
1200 (I) Surfaced and started chase. Set all clocks to zone -8 time.
1115 (H) Sent BONEFISH serial 1.
1123 (H) Sighted three small vessels ahead on both bows.
1124 (H) Sighted target bearing 263° T range 18,000 yards, Angle on the bow 180°.
1125 (H) Made quick dive to avoid what was thought to be a motor Torpedo Boat escorting tanker.
1146 (H) Lost sight of target.
1211 (H) Surfaced and commenced chase, several smaller craft were sighted but the target was never found again.
1400 (H) Abandoned chase and set course for Sibutu Passage.

Tuesday, September 21, 1943.

Made passage Sibutu Strait before daylight.

1030 (H) Held fire control drill.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 06-30.4 N, Longitude 119-06.2 E.
1500 (H) Submerged for a trim.
1535 (H) Surfaced and continued towards area.

Wednesday, September 22, 1943.

0300 (H) Entered Balabac Strait and at
0544 (H) Hailed dive for days submerged patrol at western entrance to Balabac Strait. This was done after receiving of BILLFISH serial 1 and 2, not knowing when she would clear area. This appeared a good place to make a contact while awaiting BILLFISH's action.
1030 (H) Held fire control drills.
1830 (H) Surfaced and proceeded towards Patrol Area.

Thursday, Sept 23, 1943.

0556 (H) Submerged for a trim.
0616 (H) Surfaced and proceeded towards area.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 06-37.9 N, Longitude 113-40 E.
1511 (H) Hailed dive for training.
1519 (H) Surfaced and immediately submerged for training.
1522 (H) Held battle surface, manned 4" gun only. Cleared the deck and at
1530 (H) Submerged for training.
1537 (H) Surfaced and secured from drills. Proceeding toward area.

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1 0540
Friday, 1 October 24, 1943.

Oblt: (I) Submerged for a trial.
Oblt: (II) Surfaced and proceeded to ards area.
Oblt: (III) Position Latitude 08-08.5 N., Longitude 111-03.2 E.

Saturday, 2 October 25, 1943.

Oblt: (I) Sound picked up light high speed screws bearing 126° distance estimated at five (5) miles.
Oblt: (II) Scrapped out.
Oblt: (III) Sighted convoy bearing 297°T, range 12,000 yards on northerly course. Convoy consisted of one anti-submarine vessel escort, with convoy arranged in two lines of three (3) each. This line was about 1200 yards ahead of convoy. The escort was escorted by a single stack, 2 deck transport. The western line consisted of 2 large tankers, distance between ships about 600 yards, between lines about 1200 yards, and patrolled about 2500 yards ahead of convoy. Opened range to eastward and commenced tracking by use of high precision radio.

Oblt: (I) Went to full power to end round convoy, having determined his base course to be 040°T, speed 12 knots.
Oblt: (II) Had worked around convoy and was almost in position when nets were sighted bearing 305°T, range 12000 yards. A high periscope look revealed this to be a U.S. submarine, presumed to be a British U.S. vessel. He was to for for signalling to give his the dope on the convoy.

Oblt: (III) Another mast was reported bearing 035°T, range 12,000 yards and was made out to be another U.S. submarine of the BO-71 class, gave him convoy code 0947.

Oblt: (IV) In position, convoy bearing 221°T, range 20,000 yards. Made quick dive. Went to battle stations commenced approach.

Oblt: (V) It became evident that convoy was not zigging the base course as previously determined but had changed from 040° to 055° or 060°T. Endeavored to close track but closest range was 3,300 yards.

Oblt: (VI) Convoy passed. Posit. Lat. 09-43.1 N., long. 111-54.1 N. Surfaced with convoy tows in sight, commenced chase at full power.

Oblt: (VII) Sighted large plume of smoke and heard several explosions in vicinity of convoy. Convoy scattered in all directions. Black smoke and

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1321 (H) Commanded chase on tanker, single, and double stack transports which had turned to 0450 T and were making off at about 15 knots.
: 1736 (H) Had jicked out a large tanker (8-9000-tons) as a target and was getting ahead about 20,000 yards when obs. ved about six salvos of large caliber (about 4" or 5") gun fire from her directed towards the south. Having obtained a position ahead of target, base course 0150 T, speed 15 knots, and determined base zig plan, made quick dive and started approach.
: 1846 (H) Target was found to have an escort, too dark to determine exact type.
: 1918-38 Fired 7 tube.
: 1918-49 Fired 8 tube.
: 1919-00 Fired 9 tube.
: 1919-10 Fired 10 tube.
: 1920-00 First hit observed and heard. Target scores stopped. Hit right under bridge structure.
: 1920-09 Second hit observed and heard. Hit aft of bridge. Third hit heard.
: 1922 (H) Immediately after first hit target was seen to open up with large caliber gun aft and machine guns all around the horizon, a regular fire works display. Escort came around the targets bow and headed towards us, so went deep.
: 1924-40 (H) First depth charge - not close.
: 1925-01 (H) Second depth charge - not close.
: 1925-10 (H) Third depth charge - not close.
: 1926 (H) While going deep and for a considerable time after war, the groaning and cracking sounds attendant with a ship breaking up and sinking were heard in the direction of the target. Target scores stopped here not heard again. An convinced target search.
: 1928-20 (H) Fourth depth charges - far away aft.
: 1928-25 (H) Fifth depth charge - far away aft.
: 1928-30 (H) Sixth depth charge - far away aft.
: 1945 (H) All this time the escort was tracked by sound on our starboard quarter. All charges were at least 1,000 yards away.
: 2109 (H) Noted. A very nice negative gradient was found at 250 feet, which we were under. I can't think the escort ever heard us.
: 2109 (H) Escorts scores faded out.
: 2109 (H) Heard two distant underwater explosions.

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1. 0540
2. 2112 (H) Heard four evenly spaced explosions very far away. We hoped it was the BILLFISH getting in on a ship as the explosions did not sound like depth charges.
3. 2122 (H) Two distant explosions.
4. 2204 (H) Surfaced. Nothing in sight and no Radar contact.

Sunday, September 26, 1943.

0610 (H) Submerged for a trim.
0650 (H) Surfaced, patrolling at slow speed.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 09-25.1 N, Longitude 111-22.8 E.
1245 (H) Heard a distant explosion. It sounded somewhat like a bomb or depth charge.

Monday, September 27, 1943.

0208 (H) Sighted smoke bearing 2770 T, range about 16,000 yards. Position Latitude 10-40 N, Longitude 110-07 E. Dark but clear night, rain squalls ground horizon. Turned toward smoke and coached radar on.
0219 (H) Radar picked up two or more targets bearing 2740 T, range 13,600 yards.
0221 (H) Went to Battle Stations for tracking and changed course to keep pace with target and stay within Radar range. Determined base course to be 1900 T, zigging at 4 minute intervals 30 to 40 degrees either side, speed 9 knots. At 14,000 yards Radar picked up three targets.
0400 (H) Target changed base course to 2060 T. Two ships or Convoy smoking heavily at intervals.
0410 (H) Went ahead full power to gain position ahead before daylight.
0419 (H) Radar distinguished four ships in Convoy.
0431 (H) Radar distinguished five ships in Convoy at 15,000 yards range.
0540 (H) With Convoy bearing 0250 T, range 15,000 yards and in sight through periscope with dawn just beginning to break made quick dive and commenced approach.
0547 (H) Picked up Convoy in periscope bearing 0310 T, range 11,000 yards. Convoy in three columns (one - two - one). Chose leading ship of center column for target, as it was a big one.
0551 (H) Nicked for silent running and depth charge attack. Sea glassy and perfectly smooth.
0634 (H) Target zigged left so came to course for stern tube shot on main target hoping to get bow tubes on right flank ship later. At torpedo run of 2100 yards, 800 starboard track.
06-37-50 - 06-38-00 - 06-38-09 - 06-38-08 - 06-38-09 -

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1 0540
1210 (H) Started up to take a look but at 200 feet picked up light screws ahead. Had screws intermittently on sound until 1555 when came to periscope depth to take a look and sighted twin float type plane circling dead astern, distance about 6,000 yards. At
1605 (H) Went deep again and changed course. At
1620 (H) Heard four explosions - seemed to be bombs. Heard three explosions - seemed to be bombs. Not too close. Stayed deep.
1649 (H) Sound picked up screws bearing 350° relative. Screws were heard intermittently from then to
1800 (H) Came to periscope depth for look around, sighted three small patrol type vessels bearing 2170 T, even ly spaced on line of bearing, heading on opposite course about 6,000 yards range - they had been with us all day. At
1915 (H) Surfaced and opened range fast. Do not think I was sighted.
2307 (H) Sent BOMBER Serial #2.

Tuesday, September 28, 1943.

0000 (H) Enroute Cape Varella.
0608 (H) Submerged for a trial.
0627 (H) Surfaced.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 13-14.2 N., Longitude 111-39.0 E.
1527 (H) Submerged to check and stop leaks which developed yesterday while deep.
1809 (H) Surfaced.

Wednesday, September 29, 1943.

0000 (H) Patrolling off Cape Varella.
0445 (H) Radar contact 2200 T, range 5400 yards, on small patrol craft.
0452 (H) Sound picked up screws of patrol craft, maneuvered to avoid being sighted.
0512 (H) Lost vessel, range 6,500 yards.
0536 (H) Submerged to conduct patrol off Cape Varella.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 12-43 N., Longitude 109-40 E.
1335 (H) Sighted army type "Zero" fighter bearing 195° T, two miles.
1610 (H) Surfaced.
    - ...submerged off Varella found a 3 knot southerly current against which we made no headway.

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0615 (H) Submerged for a trim.
: 0630 (H) Surfaced and proceeded on surface.
: 1200 (H) Position Latitude 13-58.6 N., Longitude 111-21.9 E.
: During the day found a 1.5 knot westerly current.

Friday, October 1, 1943.

: 0605 (H) Submerged for a trim.
: 0622 (H) Surfaced.
: 1200 (H) Position Latitude 11-06.8 N., Longitude 110-35 E.

Saturday, October 2, 1943.

: 0620 (H) Submerged for a trim.
: 0634 (H) Surfaced.
: 1200 (H) Position Latitude 09-45.2 N., Longitude 109-29.2 E.

Sunday, October 3, 1943.

: 0000 (H) Enroute Cape Paddan, Visibility about 1/2 mile, hard driving rain.
: 0527 (H) Radar contact at 13,000 yards bearing 053° T. Went to Battle Stations for Tracking. Position Latitude 10-46 W., Longitude 109-12.5 E.
: 0545 (H) Plot obtained a course of 168° T, speed 8 knots.
: 0546 (H) Ahead 16 knots on three engines for end round run. Almost daylight, rain clearing up, visibility still poor; Convoy determined to be zigging from 220° T to 120° T.
: 0604 (H) With Convoy bearing 055° T, range 8,000 yards, and in sight from the bridge, submerged for the approach. It was getting light too fast to attempt to open the range further, and in addition, due to weather and unknown currents our own position was doubtful. It appeared the Convoy was heading for the northern passage between Cecil De Mer Island and our own minefields and we did not wish to blunder into that.
: 0630 (H) Convoy had come back to his left and now got by at too great a range to fire although we had been making high submerged speed to close track. Apparently they had sighted Cecil De Mer Island through the rain shortly after we submerged and came sharp left to pass to southeastward of it. We did not sight this land until ships were well past.

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1 0540
The Convoy consisted of two small AK's and three AO's in three lanes. One AK (M(over Kingpost) K.F.K.M. /over Kingpost/), two decks, cruiser stern, and one AO (M.L.F. - about 1000 - 1500 tons) were in the western lane. One AO (M.K.M.F. - about 9,000 tons) was in the center lane followed by another small tanker similar to the one in the western lane. In the eastern lane was one AK (M.F.K.M.) with two decks, cruiser stern. The nearest ship was one small tanker in the western lane, but as the range was over 4,500 yards decided not to fire as the ship was not worth giving our position away at that time.

Sighted two escort vessels joining the Convoy. These formed column ahead.

Sighted 1265 T. Identified as Paulo Cecir De Her Island. Convoy had passed out of sight in rain just to southward of Island.

Position Latitude 10-33 N., Longitude 109-03 W. Sighted again two miles away bearing 260° T. Found we had been set due west onto Ccair De Her Island.

Surfaced and headed for Cape Padaran.

Monday, October 4, 1943.

0607 (H) Submerged for a trim.
0656 (H) Surfaced.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 12-03 N., Longitude 109-51.1 E. Weather becoming very bad, heavy rain continuing with visibility 1 - 2 miles, moderate swells and wind from the north.

Tuesday, October 5, 1943.

0628 (H) Submerged for a trim.
0640 (H) Surfaced.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 10-40 N., Longitude 109-24 E. Submerged to avoid detection from the land as the weather cleared suddenly off Cape Padaran. Surfaced. While submerged found a 4.5 knot current setting 2000 T. Rain continuing, winds increasing.

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0000 (H)
ing steadily, moderate sea, swells increasing, wind from northeast.
: 0300 (H) Radar contact bearing 0400 T, range 13,800 yards. Position Latitude 11-46 N, Longitude 109-23 E. Went to five knots and headed towards target.
: 0315 (H) Having determined target to be on northerly course in close to coast, went to 15 knots and commenced tracking target by Radar. Visibility poor - rain with low lying clouds.
: 0333 (H) Went to full speed to end around target. Target on base course 0000 T, not zig-zagging, making nine and one half knots. Visibility getting worse. We are about five miles off the beach. It is a 4.5 knot current setting against us and on to the beach.
: 0424 (H) Radar identified three targets, Sighted light and land on port beam, estimated range five miles.
: 0556 (H) Sighted light and land on port beam, estimated range five miles.
: 0609 (H) With leading ship bearing 161° T, range 11,000 yards and dawn just breaking, submerged for attack. Went to Battle Stations Submerged. Sea - moderate swells, no white caps or wind. At this time we were about three miles from the beach although we did not realize it.
: 0624 (H) Identified targets as three AKS in triangular formation. Leading ship similar to Page 130 ONI 208 J, both flank ships similar to Page 103 ONI 208 J. All heavily loaded.
: 0703 (H) Targets changed to course 0380 T by simultaneous ship movement. Was about in a position to fire but accepted new set up and decided to fire four torpedoes at left flank ship with 1900 yard range and 90 port track.
: 0706-30 Fired #1 tube.
: 0706-41 Fired #2 tube.
: 0706-52 Fired #3 tube. Checked fire, decided to fire last three torpedoes at leading ship with 2700 yards range and 95 port track. Immediately obtained set up on leading target and at
: 0707-50 Fired #4 tube.
: 0707-51 Saw hit on first target under mainmast.
: 0707-55 Saw #4 torpedo breach twice - erratic until.
: 0708-00 Fired #5 tube.
: 0708-14 Fired #6 tube.
: 0710-05 Saw hit on second target amidships.

— page 22 —
1 0540
: 0711 (H) Observed second target stop and take port 11st.
: 0714 (H) First target stopped and turned to 1800 angle
: 0716 (H) on the bow. Heavy down angle by the stern
: 0717 (H) almost awash.
: 0719 (H) Right flank ship heading across with 50' starboard
: 0720 (H) angle on the bow and at 2,000 yards turned to
: 0721 (H) ward us as if to ram. Started deep, encountered
: 0722 (H) heavy negative gradient at 150 feet.
: 0723 (H) At 150 feet - one (1) depth charge - close.
: 0724 (H) Vent to 300 feet. Screws of attacking ship vary
: 0725 (H) loud - close aboard.
: 0726 (H) Changed to course 1150 T.
: 0727 (H) One (1) depth charge - close.
: 0728 (H) Evaded - and put screws astern.
: 0729 (H) Started to periscope depth.
: 0730 (H) Periscope observation showed smoke in direction
: 0731 (H) of target and visibility decreasing by more rain.
: 0732 (H) Found by cut on beach (suddenly visible) that we
: 0733 (H) had been set in towards the beach and had started
: 0734 (H) deep in 34 fathoms of water and ran out to 53
: 0735 (H) fathoms while going deep. The cut-rent had set
: 0736 (H) us south at about 5 knots.
: 0737 (H) Surfaced, came to course 0000 T at 15 knots to
: 0738 (H) investigate targets. Rain and sea increasing
: 0739 (H) land not in sight.
: 0740 (H) Went to full speed.
: 0741 (H) Slowed and swung left to avoid wreckage of what
: 0742 (H) appeared to be part of a small boat and other
: 0743 (H) debris.
: 0744 (H) Sighted small coasting vessel (about 40 tons)
: 0745 (H) close in to the beach. Sea picking up in
: 0746 (H) vicinity of Cape Varella. Vessel immediately
: 0747 (H) lost to sight as rain closed in again.
: 0748 (H) Position Latitude 12-48 N., Longitude 112-41 S.
: 0749 (H) Sea having picked up with enormous swells and a
: 0750 (H) 60 - 70 knot wind,slowed to 10 knots. Visibility
: 0751 (H) had increased several times to about 10 miles,
: 0752 (H) no targets in sight. I am satisfied that both
: 0753 (H) targets sunk while we were at deep submergence.
: 0754 (H) Heavily loaded as they were they could not live
: 0755 (H) in a sea like this with a torpedo in each of them.
: 0756 (H) Sound conditions were very bad - it was very
: 0757 (H) difficult to pick up the screws of the attacking
: 0758 (H) vessel which was very close.
: 0759 (H) No vessels in sight - as seas have picked up so
: 0760 (H) much and cannot fire torpedoes set course 0900 T,
: 0761 (H) to intercept reported southbound vessel.

Thursday, October 7, 1943.

0000 (H) Seas much smoother, wind decreasing to about 10 knots.

— page 23 —
1034 (H) Sighted a vessel bearing 1150 T, range 20,000 yards appeared to be unescorted rather large merchantman. Position Latitude 12-36 N., Longitude 112-24 E.
: 1034 (H) Went to Battle Station for tracking, and full speed. Determined target to be on a base course of 0300 T to 0500 T, speed 9 knots. Sky clear, horizon hazy, moderate sea - no chop. Started another end round run.
: 1200 (H) Position Latitude 12-48.4 N., Longitude 112-41 E. This target is steering the worst zig zags encountered to date. He is zigging his base course of 0450 T, at 35 minute intervals, then zigging each of those legs between 0800 T and 0100 T, and then zigging 100 to 150 on those legs. In order to be in an attack position, we tracked him by high periscope and determined his zig plan until Submerged with target bearing 2250 T, range 22,000 yards. Went to Battle Stations Submerged, and commenced approach.
: 1556 (H) Target in sight bearing 2100 T. Found a marked negative gradient at 60 feet which made depth control difficult. At
: 1803 (H) After tracking target in, came to course 1370 with 900 port stack, range 1,400 yards and at
: 1811-08 Position Latitude 13-15 N., Longitude 113-12 E. Fired #1 tube.
: 1811-21 No.1 premature very close and jarring. Saw target had started zig to left, obtained new set up and at -
: 1811-31 Fired #2 tube.
: 1811-41 Fired #3 tube.
: 1811-54 Fired #4 tube.
: 1812-03 Saw #2 torpedo pass at 40 ft the target, #3, #4, and #5 appeared to pass under the target, #6 passed astern. No explosions. We had completely bracketed the target with five torpedoes. Target was heavily loaded out not as large as at first supposed, it now being identified as the #WINO HARU' type, loaded draft of 20 feet. Torpedo depth setting of 10 and 15 feet was used. Saw torpedo explode beyond target. Saw torpedo explode beyond target.
: 1812-50 Observed men on stern of target throwing depth charges over the stern. Target turning to right. Depth charge - far away - observed.
: 1814-59 Saw torpedo explode beyond target. Saw torpedo explode beyond target.
: 1815-25 Depth charge - far away - observed.
: 1815-30 Depth charge - far away - observed.
: 1816 (H) Depth charge - far away - observed.
: 1817 (H) Depth charge - far away - observed.
: 1821 (H) Depth charge - far away - observed.

— page 24 —
1824 (H) Came to course 000°T and completed reload. 1 0540 1
: 1830 (H) Target lost from sight.
: 1847 (H) Surface and commenced steering, retiring search course for target to engage it with deck gun - visibility poor - rain.

Friday, October 8, 1943.

: 0200 (H) Gave up search - target must have had more than 10 knots to get away as it did.
: 0610 (H) Submerged for a trim.
: 0702 (H) Surfaced.
: 1200 (H) Position Latitude 12-40 N, Longitude 113-40 E.
: 2100 (H) Sent BOUTIQUE. Serial 3.

Saturday, October 9, 1943.

: 0606 (H) Submerged for a trim.
: 0648 (H) Surfaced.
: 1200 (H) Position Latitude 14-02 N, Longitude 111-07 E.

Sunday, October 10, 1943.

: 0614 (H) Submerged for a trim.
: 0632 (H) Surfaced.
: 0819 (H) Sighted plane to eastward, range five miles, no leader contact, elevation about 30, submerged to 150 feet.
: 0925 (H) Surfaced on course 1660T, no contacts on Radar.
: 1043 (H) Sighted mast and stacks of large two stack bearing 2000T, range 12 miles. Smoke sighted to right and left of steamer. Position attitude 14-32 N, Longitude 110-18.2 E.
: 1051 (H) Target change of bearing to northwest. Changed to 0300T to open range, went to Battle Stations for tracking, and began opening range to get ahead of target at 15 knots. Tracking by light periscope.
: 1105 (H) Determined by T.D.C. and pilot, targets base course as 0050T, zigging 30 to right and left. Decided to bring target to 1850T bearing, at 13 miles and watch in from shore. In view of the plane contact this morning, I think he must have had air coverage.
: 1146 (H) In position - decided to submerge and eliminate the possibility of detection by aircraft.
: 1148 (H) Submerged and went to Battle Stations.
: 1200 (H) Position Latitude 14-44 N, Longitude 110-14.1 E.

— page 25 —
1208 (H) Slight smoke bearing 1860 T.
: 1240 (H) Target bearing 1750, angle on bow 40 port, range 20,000 yards. Commented approach.
: 1253 (H) Ridget for silent running and depth charge.
: 1310 (H) Convoy consists of five ships. One large HORAI type transport painted grey, with two AK's with goal post masts and two with stick masts all between 3500 and 4000 tons each. Chose HORAI transport for target. The AK's were disposed one on each beam and one on each bow. It looked at first as if the AK towards me had a lot of lookouts around the bridge but it later turned out that these were troops of some kind - masses of them.
: 1342 (H) JP and B sound checked, turn counts for transport at 60 r.p.m., AK (nearest) at 102 r.p.m.
: 1401 (H) Target zigged right, to course 020° and one AK came directly between me and the target. When AK was just to left and this side of target at -
: 1402-08 Fired A tube.
: 1402-19 Fired A tube.
: 1402-29 Fired A tube.
: 1402-38 Fired A tube - our last torpedo.
: 1404 (H) Observed target blowing whistle franticly. Target started turning to right slowly.
: 1404-30 Observed and heard A torpedo hit under forward of AK.
: 1404-36 Observed and heard A torpedo hit under mainmast of AK.
: 1404-57 Observed and heard A torpedo hit just forward of mainmast on two stack transport.
: 1405-07 Observed and heard A torpedo hit between mainmast and stern of transport. From this point on I am afraid there was too much to be seen in the periscope to describe. The AK was literally blown apart and around to the right. A gun was firing from the stern and she was sinking fairly evenly and very rapidly. The transport started down by the stern with a little port list, on fire aft and settling rapidly. We took several pictures. These were the first targets we had had an opportunity to see go down and they were good ones too. Had been keeping an eye on the other AK on this side and at -
: 1409 (H) Observed it drop one depth charge and start turning towards me, so very reluctantly took one last look at two stack transport now with stern under, fire blazing in after part of superstructure, and sinking fast, AK had disappeared already, we went to 250 feet.
: 1412 to 1414 Three depth charges - very close. Loud explosions, cracking and groaning noises on a broad bearing in the direction of the rocks. Could be heard through the hull. Two depth charges close. Began evasive tactics.

— page 26 —
1419 to 1429 (H)
    Eleven depth charges - three or which were very close.
    Heavy explosion at a distance - similar to boiler explosion.
    One depth charge - close. Attacking AK seemed to hang on to us very well. Must have good sound gear. He would stop his screws and listen awhile and then come in on a constant bearing and let go.
    Traveled to 1520 (H)
    Twelve depth charges at some distance. We hit a very nice negative gradient at 150 feet which helped out.
    Lost screws.
    Lost 526 to 1601 (H)
    Nine depth charges at some distance. Either dropped by AK at a distance to keep us down and away from the rest of the Convoy while picking up survivors, (good he did not know that we were out of torpedoes) or dropped from planes, as we heard no screws.
    Came to periscope depth at D.R. position 2.5 miles from point of attack. Nothing in sight. Went to normal cruising conditions, and at Spilcoat the main brace for the crew - most of whom had just received their worst depth charging and biggest thrill when the results of the attack was announced from the periscope.
    Surfaced and sent BONEFISH Serial 4, set course to clear area and head for home.

Monday, October 11, 1943.

0620 (H) Submerged for a trim.
0631 (H) Surfaced and proceeded on two engines.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 10-07.9 N., Longitude 110-50.5 W.
1335 (H) Submerged in order to renew broken fitting on steering hydraulic system. (another E.B. Co. high pressure system with low pressure fitting).
1355 (H) Completed work, surfaced and continued on two engines.

Tuesday, October 12, 1943.

0240 (H) Took departure from assigned patrol area.
0609 (H) Submerged for a trim.
0618 (H) Surfaced and proceeded on two engines.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 06-38.8 N., Longitude 113-27.5 W.

Wednesday, October 13, 1943.

0347 (H) Sighted what appeared to be signalling by flashing light from Comiran Island, northern entrance Balabac Strait, continued course and speed.

— page 27 —
1 0540
: 0619 (H) Submerged for a trim.
: 0635 (H) Surfaced and proceeded on two engines.
: 0834 (H) Sighted three aircraft bearing 1200 T submerged
: and went deep.
: 0856 (H) Surfaced.
: 0858 (H) Sighted one more aircraft bearing 1500 T. Submerged
: and went deep.
: 0920 (H) Surfaced. All clear. Proceeded on two engines.
: 1200 (H) Position Latitude 07-28 N., Longitude 118-46.5 E.
: 1535 (H) Sighted small sail boat bearing 1220 T, range
: 1615 (H) 20,000 yards. Headed towards to investigate.
: Crew consisted of seven men of doubtful nationality. The
: who offered no resistance. One of them could speak
: English. One was Chinese, one man Iroro, and the
: remainder a mixture of Iroro and chinese. The cargo
: consisted of 66 bags of Corpa, a total of about
: 10,000 lbs. Had them rip sacks open and throw
: Corpa overboard, then towed boat for several miles
: in order that they couldn't salvage what remained
: of the cargo. As the boat and men were infested with
: vermin, it did not bring any of them aboard.
: The English speaking crew member stated they were
: proceeding from Cagayan Sulu Island to Jolo to sell
: the Corpa. He stated no Japanese are or ever have
: been on Cagayan Sulu. He could give no information
: on Balabac or Tawitawi.

Thursday, October 14, 1943.

0155 (H) Sighted a U.S. Submarine on a parallel and opposite
: course range about 5,000 yards, bearing 1560 T.
: Submerged for a trim.
: 0548 (H) Surfaced and proceeded on two engines.
: 0557 (H) Position Latitude 01-26 N., Longitude 119-24 E.
: 1200 (H) Stepped and picked up an abandoned duck boat of
: excellent workmanship.
: 1732 (H) Sighted a two master schooner, of about 10 tons,
: bearing 1720 T, range 16,000 yards. Altered course
: to investigate.
: 1803 (H) Commenced firing with 20 mm. battery at a range of
: about 1000 yards. Fired first burst over the boat
: whereupon the seven crew members jumped overboard.
: Proceeded to sink it with 20 mm. battery, then
: approached to plant Iolotov Cocktails. Position
: Latitude 00-10 N., Longitude 119-15 E.
: Sailboat sank while setting it afire. The boat was
: of sufficient size to carry considerable Japanese
: cargo and could also conveniently be used for
: submarine spotting in these waters.

— page 28 —
0733 (H) Submerged for a trim.
0747 (H) Sunfaced and proceeded on two engines.
1106 (H) Picked up aircraft on SD Radar at 15 miles.
1107 (H) Plane at 9 miles on Radar, submerged and went
    deep. Plane not sighted.
1136 (H) Sunfaced. All clear. Proceeded on two engines.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 04-22.2 S., Longitude 117-51 E.
2045 (H) Head on all four main engines in order to make
    it through Lombok Strait before daylight.

Saturday, October 16, 1943.

0357 (H) Entered Lombok Strait.
0440 (H) Sighted a patrol vessel bearing 175° T, range
    about 6,000 yards.
0449 (H) Picked up patrol vessel on Sf Radar, range
    5500 yards. Altered course to right to avoid
    detection and get by him.
0505 (H) Patrol vessel opened fire with machine guns
    (appeared to be about 37 mm. in size) when
    abaft our beam. His aim was bad as bursts were
    off in deflection.
0508 (H) Another burst from patrol vessel. A little closer.
0510 (H) Another burst from patrol vessel. The bursts
    were short. Expended about 150 rounds. Patrol
    boat ceased firing.
0545 (H) Departed Lombok Strait.
0806 (H) Submerged for a trim.
0823 (H) Sunfaced and proceeded on two engines.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 10-24.25 Longitude 115-17.1 E.
1425 (H) Placed master gyro compass out of commission
    due to low vacuum in two rotors, steering by
    auxiliary gyro.
2030 (H) Master gyro placed back in commission.

Sunday, October 17, 1943.

0608 (H) Submerged for a trim.
0616 (H) Sunfaced and proceeded on one engine.
1200 (H) Position Latitude 14-51.5 S., Longitude 114-11 E.
1440 (H) Sent BONEFISH Serial 5.
2100 (H) Commenced a six hour battery discharge on the
    surface.

— page 29 —
1 0540
CONFIDENTIAL
(C) WEATHER.
Excellent weather was encountered throughout the patrol in the South China Sea with the exception of one day of very high seas and high winds. This storm was encountered the afternoon of October 6th off Cape Varella and after running east for about 100 miles found very calm seas and a slight wind. It had rained the previous four days but that did not prevent making two contacts.

(D) TID, INFORMATION.
The currents encountered in the South China Sea were in most cases unpredictable. Generally the set north of Cape Varella was to the southeastward with a 1.5 knot drift, and to the southwest below Cape Padaran. The currents generally followed the prevailing wind and changed as frequently. It was not unusual to get set to the north at 1 knot in the morning, to the west at noon to southward at 2 knots by nightfall.
A current of 4.5 knots was found setting about 2000 T right off Cape Varella on October 6.
A current of 3 knots setting about 2300 T was found just to westward of Poulo Coeiro De Mer Island during the latter part of September.
The force of the current generally decreased when going east from the coast.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.
No navigational lights were found burning during the entire patrol.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS.
| No. | Time | Lat. | Types | Initial Range | Estimated Course & Speed | Remarks |
|-----|------|------|||||
| 1.  | 04:40 | -03.3 | Sail-  | 5000 yds     | 1800 T               | Served |
|     | 18/4/43| 12:32 | Boat  |               | 8 kts.                | Noted |
| 2.  | 09:40 | -37.5 | Sail-  | 10000 yds    | 2300 T               | Served |
|     | 18/4/43| 12:50 | Boat  |               | 4 kts.                | Noted |
| 3.  | 12:31 | -24.5 | Sail-  | 10000 yds    | 2100 T               | Served |
|     | 18/4/43| 12:45 | Boat  |               | 4 kts.                | Noted |
| 4.  | 20:10 | -24.5 | Boat  | 150 ft      | 4850 yds             | Served |
|     | 18/4/43| 12:50 | Boat  |               | 10 kts.               | Noted |
| 5.  | 04:58 | -14.5 | SC Boat| 15000 yds    | 3500 T               | Noted |
|     | 18/4/43| 12:40 | Boat  |               | 18 kts.               | Noted |
| 6.  | 12:23 | 2-30N | 2 SC  | 15000 yds    | 0400 T               | Served |
|     | 18/4/43| 12:40 | Boat  |               | 5 kts.                | Noted |
| 7.  | 13:30 | -30N | 1 SC  | 14000 yds    | 1500 T               | Served |

— page 30 —
0303 (H) Secured the battery discharge and went ahead on two engines.
: 1200 (H) Position Latitude 19-35 S., Longitude 113-04 E.
: 1520 (H) Si lited aircraft identified as Catalina di. c. since about 15 miles.

Thursday, October 19, 1943.

0000 (H) Scored crankshaft #4 Main Engine. Engine placed out of commission.
: 0632 (H) Submerged for a trim.
: 0649 (H) Surfaced and went ahead on two engines.
: 1200 (H) Position Latitude 24-36.0 S., Longitude 112-33 E.
: 1430 (H) Sext Benefish Serial 6.

Wednesday, October 20, 1943.

0627 (H) Submerged for a trim.
: 0633 (H) Surfaced and proceeded on two engines.
: 1020 (H) Submerged for a deep dive to test for leaks.
: 1126 (H) Surface and proceeded on two engines.
: 1200 (H) Position Latitude 29-44 S., Longitude 113-26 S.
: 1728 (H) Picked up aircraft on SD Radar at 8 miles.
: 1729 (H) Aircraft identified as Catalina. Approved and exchanged recognition signals.
: 2253 (H) Sighted loom of Rottnest Light ahead.

Thursday, October 21, 1943.

0400 (H) Received with escort-entered swept channel, Gc. e Roads, Fremantle, Western Australia.

— page 32 —
1. ATTACK DATA.
    (H) ATTACK DATA.
    TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM:
    U.S.S. BONNIFISH TORPEDO ATTACK NO. ONE PATROL NO. ONE
    Time: 1943 (H) Date: 9-25-43 Lat. 11-05 N. Long. 112-24 E
    Target Data: - Damage Inflicted

Description: The ship attacked was in company with one single stack AP and one double stack AP, formation roughly column, each ship zigging independently of the other, all three fleeing from burning ship just sunk by BOWFIN. The target was selected as it was a large tenkera previously identified as of the OMOROSAN MARU class during the morning chase, and was the leading ship in the present formation. No escort was visible during the attendant day light end around chase - depth charges were heard in vicinity of burning ship so assumed escort was well behind.

The Convoy had been originally sighted by a lookout just at day break.

The sea was calm, no white caps, visibility was excellent, the sky was clear. Tracking was done by use of high persistence.

When the target bearing was the reverse of the base course, range about 20,000 yards, we turned towards the ship, slowed until mast's came into sight from the bridge, then submerged for the approach. It was fast approaching sight but figured we would have another chance on the surface at night if missed him in this attempt. The target continued his base course of 0150 T, making 4 minute zigs until the firing position was reached. Up until just prior to firing no escort had been seen, and the other two ships had not been seen for quite some time. It may be the BILLFISH had polished them off before reaching our position.

Ship Sunk:
(a) Number: One.
(b) Type: Large A.O. (M(over K) KMFM (over K).
(c) Tonnage: 9205.
(d) Name: OMOROSAN MARU class.

Damage determined by:
Saw two hits, one under bridge and one after bridge. Heard the third hit while locking for escort. Six minutes after the third torpedo hit, heard a series of loud groaning and cracking noises in the direction of the target such as a ship makes while sinking. Could not hear target screws any time after torpedo hits.

— page 33 —
1 0540
Target draft: 2ft Course: 110° T Speed: 14 knots
Range: 1400 yers at firing

Own Ship Data
Speed: 2 knots Course: 340° T Depth: 62° Angle: 0° at firing

Type Attack:
Attack was by periscope submerged. The sea was calm and the night was clear and dark with no moon. Ranges were under estimated during first stages of submerged approach. Angle on bow could be fairly accurate determined due to construction of target with stack aft.

Targets speed had been determined by plot during the afternoons chase and used in the firing set up on the T.D.C.

The stern tubes were used, firing commencing as soon as we had steadied on 340° T, a course for a 1300 port track after a target zig towards us to 110° T. Target bearing was set into the T.D.C. before each shot as the periscope was hard to see in visibility then existing. An eight second firing interval was intended.

Firing Data was as follows:

| Tube | Depth Set | Zone Time | Track | Range | Gyro Angle | Target Bearing | Torpedo Run | Spread |
|-------|||-------|-------|||||
| #7    | 6'       | 15-18-36 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #8    | 6'       | 15-18-38 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #9    | 6'       | 15-18-39 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #10   | 6'       | 15-18-40 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #11   | 6'       | 15-18-41 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #12   | 6'       | 15-18-42 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #13   | 6'       | 15-18-43 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #14   | 6'       | 15-18-44 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #15   | 6'       | 15-18-45 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #16   | 6'       | 15-18-46 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #17   | 6'       | 15-18-47 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #18   | 6'       | 15-18-48 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #19   | 6'       | 15-18-49 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #20   | 6'       | 15-18-50 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #21   | 6'       | 15-18-51 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #22   | 6'       | 15-18-52 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #23   | 6'       | 15-18-53 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |
| #24   | 6'       | 15-18-54 | 12'   | 1400  | 180        | 196          | 193        | 19-19-00 |

Torpedo Hits were as follows:

| Tube | Hit | Hit | Hit | Miss (Astern) |
|-------|-----|-----|-----||
| #7   | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #8   | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #9   | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #10  | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #11  | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #12  | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #13  | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #14  | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #15  | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #16  | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #17  | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #18  | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #19  | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |
| #20  | 18  | 8   | 9   | 10            |

— page 34 —
0.630 (H) Date: 9-27-43 Lat: 10-13.4 N. Long: 109-45 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: A Convoy was sighted from the bridge at 0625 (H) and plowed up by Radar at 0249 (H) at range of 13,600 yards. At and around chase ensued lasting until sunrise allowing the approach and attack to be made submerged by periscope in day light. Visibility while dark was good, although the night was dark and there were a few rain squalls around the horizon. At daylight the sea was calm and glassy and made use of the periscope and high speeds difficult.

No change in the zig-zag was noted at day light. The base course had been zigged twice during the chase that night.

The speed was determined by plot and used for the attack as it continued to check in the T.D.C. The T.D.C. and plot combined were used for tracking, ranges and bearings being obtained from the Radar assisted by visual bearings from the bridge T.B.T.

The Convoy consisted of four ships, escorted by three small anti-submarine vessels similar to our PC boats.

The Convoy made changes up to 25' right and left of base course every four minutes along the current base course.

The peace time steamer route from Hongkong to Singapore was being followed during this interval. During the chase the DRAI position was frequently plotted with the targets position determined by Radar and found a great -id in determining the overall track of the Convoy and any possible large changes in base course.

Ships Sunk: Not seen.

Ships Damaged or Probably sunk:
(a) Number: Two.
(b) Type: (a) One large AP, three deck (12M) single stick masts, no kingposts. Painted Gray.
(b) One large AK, single stack, single stick masts, no kingposts, flush deck, one deck broken airstruc-ture amidships.
(c) Tonnage: (a) 8506 tons.
(b) 5863 tons.

— page 35 —
21' Course: 185° T Speed: 6.5 knots.
: 28° Range: 3630 at firing.
: 5000 at firing.

Own Ship Data:
Speed: 3 knots Course: 260° T Depth: 63' Angle: 0° (at firing)

— page 36 —
1. Typewritten text:
   - "Fire Control and Torpedo Data"
   - "Type Attack:"
   - "The attack was by periscope submerged by day. The sun rose just prior to reaching an attack position, the sky was clear and the sea was glassy and smooth. This was one of the periscope very difficult. During the torpedo approach plot continued to check the target courses and speeds and that speed was used in the

— page 37 —
1 0540
TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. BONAPTHS    TORPEDO ATTACK NO. THREE PATROL NO. ONE

Time: 0700 (H) Date: 10-6-43 1at. 12-21 N.  Long. 109-24 E.

Target Data - Image Inflicted

Description: Made Radar contract at range of 13,800 yards while in rain squall, visib. itv 1 - 2 miles. During entire end round run it was raining steadily and ships were not seen until after submerging. The tracking was done entirely by Radar.

The Convoy was proceeding north along the coast, close inshore, steering a steady course. No zig was noticed at any time although just prior to firing the Convoy turned away from the coast 300, probably having sighted Cue Varella. During this time we had been set into coast by a southwesterly current, and at time of submerging for the approach were only about three mil. of the beach.

The Convoy consisted of three ships, all single funnel AIS in a triangular formation. The left flank ship was picked as the target as it was the largest. No descorts were seen.

At the time of firing the sea was smooth with no whitecaps, moderate swells, and a light steady rain which made periscope observations difficult. Within two hours wind had reached 50 to 60 knots and heavy swells.

Ships Sunk:

(a) Number: Two.
(b) Type: (a) One single stack AK, MIM(Masts mounted on goal posts) well deck, composite, cruiser stern (flank vessel in convoy).
(b) One single stack AK, MIM (single stick masts) well deck, composite, counter stern. (leading vessel in convoy).
(c) Tonage: (a) 3944 tons. 7 4 4 4
(b) 3500 tons.
(d) Name: (a) HUSLINU TARU class.
(b) BANDONG MARU class.

Damage determined by: Star and heard one hit on each target. The first target stopped, and took a heavy down angle by the stern with her deck almost awash after being hit under the mainmast. The second target took a port list and stopped after being hit amidships. Did not hear their screws after going deep to avoid being rammed by third ship of convoy. Arrestsurfacing two hours later.

— page 38 —
221 Course: (a) 040° T Speed:(a) 9.5
(b) 24° (b) 040° T (b) 9.5

Range: (c) 2100 yards at firing.
(b) 3500 yards at firing.

Own Ship Data

Speed: 4 knots Course: 112° T Depth: 63° Angle: 0°
(AT firing)

Type Attack: The attack was made by periscope submerged.
The Convoy was steering a steady course close, inshore so a large circle was made around to the left in order to steady on our firing course on a port track, inshore of the Convoy. Just prior to firing the Convoy apparently sighted land and turned away about 30°, A quick set up was obtained and it was intended to fire four torpedoes at the left flank ship. After commencing fire it was seen that the leading ship of the Convoy was in a beautiful position, so only three torpedoes were fired at the first ship and then three at the leading ship. The spread used on the first target was therefore not centered on the M.O.T. Number for torpedo made an erratic run.

Firing Data was as follows

On course was 112° T, speed 4 knots, targets course 036° T, speed 9.5 knots, on an 85 port track for the first target and a 100 port track for the second target for the bow tubes. At the time of firing the picture was as follows:

-29-

— page 40 —
20° Course: 079° to 050° T. Speed 9.5 knots.
Range: 1880 (at time of firing).

Own Ship Data:
Speed: 4 knots.
Course: 137° T Depth 60° Angle: 2° down (at firing).

Fire Control and Torpedo Data:
Type Attack: The attack was made by periscope submerged. A marked negative temperature gradient started at 60 feet, which made depth control very difficult. At one stage of the approach it was necessary to speed up and turn and it was found very difficult to break through the layer, in order to go deeper and avoid a slice while turning. The first torpedo was fired as usual at 21/2° spread (3 3/4 left) as the range was about 1900 yards and torpedo track 120° port. The target then zigged left giving a 90° port track and a new estimate of range placed it over 2000 yards, so a 2° spread was used with the remaining three torpedoes.

The last two torpedoes were fired in order to make certain the target was hit for as much as exploded prematurely it was not known what would happen to the other three. A 10 left and 1 right spread was used for torpedoes #5 and #6.

#2 torpedo was seen to pass ahead of the target, #3, #4 and #5 appeared to pass under the target and #6 passed astern. Two of the torpedoes were seen and heard to explode at the end of their run, one beyond the target and the other astern and beyond the target.

The swells were not high enough to cause erratic torpedo performance and #4 and #5 torpedoes positively passed under the target as their wakes were clearly seen.

Firing Data was as follows:

| Course | Speed | Range | Depth | Zone | Time | Range | Depth | Zone | Time |
||-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 1    | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 1    | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 2    | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 2    | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 3    | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 3    | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 4    | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 4    | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 5    | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 5    | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 6    | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 6    | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 7    | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 7    | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 8    | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 8    | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 9    | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 9    | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 10   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 10   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 11   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 11   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 12   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 12   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 13   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 13   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 14   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 14   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 15   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 15   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 16   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 16   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 17   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 17   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 18   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 18   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 19   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 19   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 20   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 20   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 21   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 21   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 22   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 22   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 23   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 23   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 24   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 24   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 25   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 25   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 26   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 26   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 27   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 27   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 28   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 28   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 29   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 29   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 30   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 30   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 31   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 31   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 32   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 32   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 33   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 33   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 34   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 34   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 35   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 35   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 36   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 36   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 37   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 37   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 38   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 38   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 39   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 39   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 40   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 40   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 41   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 41   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 42   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 42   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 43   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 43   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 44   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 44   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 45   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 45   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 46   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 46   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 47   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 47   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 48   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 48   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 49   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 49   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 50   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 50   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 51   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 51   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 52   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 52   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 53   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 53   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 54   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 54   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 55   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 55   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 56   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 56   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 57   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 57   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 58   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 58   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 59   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 59   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 60   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 60   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 61   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 61   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 62   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 62   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 63   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 63   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 64   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 64   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 65   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 65   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 66   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 66   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 67   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 67   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 68   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 68   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 69   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 69   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 70   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 70   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 71   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 71   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 72   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 72   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 73   | 1811-03| 1880  | 120° | 73   | 1811-03|
| 20°   | 9.5  | 1880  | 120° | 74

— page 41 —
1. CONFINEMENTAL
Tube: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6
Target Bearing - 17 R 16 R 15 R 15 R 13 R 12 R
Torpedo Run - 2000 1900 1870 1840 1810 1780
Spread Used - 3 3/4 L 1 1/2 L 1 1/2 R 1 1/2 R

There were no torpedo hits.

Premature explosion - 1811-21.
End of run - one torpedo - 1814-59.
End of run - one torpedo - 1815-25.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. BONEFISH TORPEDO ATTACK NO FIVE PATROL NO. One

Time: 1400 (H) Date: 10-10-43 Lat. 14-44 N. Long. 110-19.2 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflitected

Description: A convoy was sighted by the high periscope watch, rail, over 25,000 yards. The Convoy was proceeding on a northerly course so as to pass to westward of the Paracel Islands and reefs. At the time of sighting we were on the route and about at the 1100 position of a reported south bound twenty six ship Convoy.

The sea was smooth, just a suspicion of white caps, the sky clear and visibility unlimited.

The only ship in sight until the attack position was reached after submerging was a large two stack transport, although smoke could be seen from the other ships. Tracking was done by the high periscope while running on the surface until the Convoy was placed on the reverse bearing of their track. This was the first convoy we didn't have to run all the way around, we were almost ahead of them upon first sighting.

Not much time was spent tracking to determine the Convoys exact base course as we had previously sighted one aircraft and believed air coverage was being attempted. However enough data was gathered in the one hour run to enable us to reach the firing position.

The Convoy consisted of five ships and was made up as follows. One large two stack transport (pickled as target) with two 3500 - 4000 ton single funnel AK's on each bow and similar AK's on each quarter. No escorts were present although from the accuracy of the subsequent depth charging the starboard hand and possibly the other three AK's were equipped with sound gear and acting as escorts.

— page 42 —
1. The Convoy was steering a base course of 005° T and zig. 25° either side of this base course on 4. minute l.c.s. There is reason to believe the base course was zig. c.d. to the right at about 1200 (H), shortly after we submerged for the approach.

Ship: Sunk:
(a) Number: Two.
(b) Type: (a) One large two stack, single stick mast, three deck transport, (HTA) with high racked funnels and masts.
(b) One medium, well deck, composite, cruiser stern AK, with masts mounted on gbal posts (HTM).
(c) Tonnage: (a) 9192 tons.
(b) 3500 to 4000 tons.
(d) Name: (a) Similar to HORAT LIARU type AP.
(b) Could not identify but had the same type and arrangement of masts and funnel as the ILLUSTIA MAHU class AK, except did not appear to be as large. It had a cruiser stern.

Damage determined by: Saw two torpedoes hit each ship, observed but one ship (large AP) still afloat just before going to deep submergence, and it was settling rapidly with its stern under and a fire blazing the after superstructure. Six minutes later heard you loud crackling and groaning in direction of target. No ships were seen after surfacing 2 1/2 miles from the attack position later in the afternoon.

Target: (a) 28' Course: 020° T Speed: 9 knots.
(b) 22' 020° T 9 knots.

Range: (a) 3100 (at firing).
(b) 3800 (at firing).

Own Ship Data
Speed: 4 knots Course: 090° T Depth: 63° Angle: 2° down (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type attack: The attack was made by periscope submerged in daylight. Absence of whitecaps and smooth sea made observations difficult.
The target speed was determined during the surface chase, and after submerging continued to check on the T.D.C. and plot. No speed changes were noticed. A turn count of 60 r.p.m. was obtained for the AP and 102 r.p.m. for the wing AK, for a speed of 9 knots.

— page 46 —
1. CONFIRM
Torpedo Attack # 3.
Tube Pitch - No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 No. 5 No. 6
Track Angle - 85 P 86 P 88 P 98 P 100 P 102 P
Gyro Angle - 031 029-30 028 019 018 017
Depth Set - 12' 18' 12' 18' 12' 18'
Power - High High High High High High
Hit or Miss - *Miss Hit *Miss Miss Hit *Miss
Erratic - No No No Yes No No
Mark Torpedo - 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No - 24770 24603 23788 22943 23814 23845
Mark Exploder - 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1
Serial No - 4847 11950 11960 5887 5869 12601
Actuation Set - M M M M M M
Actuation Actual - - - - - -
Mark Warhead - 16 16 16 16 16 16
Serial No. - 2113 1963 1720 3845 1956 1806
Explosive - TPX TPX TPX TPX TPX TPX
Firing Interval - - - 11 Sec.11 Sec.10 Sec.14 Sec.14 Sec.
Type Speed - 30 L 10L 10R 10L 10R 10R
Sea Conditions - Light Swells, Rain Squalls.
Overhaul Activity - U.S.S. FULTON (All Six)
Torpedo fired from tube 4 ran erratic. It was seen to breach twice on run, running hot and straight. Cause unknown.
* Miss due to spread.

- 37 -

— page 47 —
1 Torpedo Attack # 4.
Tube Fired - No 1  No. 2  No. 3  No. 4  No. 5  No. 6
Track Angle - 120 P 86 P 83 P 87 P 93 P 88 P
Gyro Angle - 002 004 005 006-30 000-30 002-00
Depth Set - 10' 15' 10' 15' 10' 15'
Power - High  High  High  High  High  High
Hit or Miss -  *  Miss  Miss  Miss  Miss  Miss  Miss
Erratic -  *  Yes  #No  **  Yes  #Yes  #No  #No
Mark Torpedo - 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No - 20064 23773 20094 23427 22535 20073
Mark Exploder - 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1
Serial No - 6827 4411 6317 6814 4719 14771
Actuation Set - M  M  M  M  M  M
Actuation Actual - M  M  M  M  M  M
Mark Warhead - 16 16 16 16 16 16
Serial No. - 688 10496 1940 634 2453 9556
Explosive - TXT  TXT  TXT  TXT  TXT  TXT
Firing In - --- 23Sec.10Sec.13Sec. 98Sec.10Sec.
Type Spread - 3 3/4'L 1'L 1'R 3'R 1'L 1'R
Sea Conditions - Moderate Sea ---
Overhaul Activity - U.S.S. FULTON (All SIX)

* Torpedo exploded prematurely after 13 second run.
# Torpedo exploded at end of run. 2 went ahead, 3 went under target.
** Torpedo appeared to have hit but failed to explode.
### Torpedo wake not sighted. Miss or Dud.

— page 48 —
CONFIDENTIAL

Torpedo Attack # 5.

Tube Fired: No. 1  No. 2  No. 3  No. 4
Track Angle - 108° 109° 110° 110° 110°
Gyro Angle - 001-30 001-30 001-15 000-30
Depth Set - 12' 12' 12' 12' 12'
Power - High  High  High  High  High
Hit on Miss - Hit  Hit  Hit  Hit  Hit
Eortality - No  No  No  No  No
Mark Torpedo - 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No - 23811 24540 24520 24546
Mark Warhead - 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1
Serial No - 11951 5771 11963 17585
Actuation Set - M  M  M  M  M
Actuation Actual - C  C  C  C  C
Mark Warhead - 16 16 16 16 16
Serial No - 10426 1937 1666 2104
Explosive - TPX  TPX  TPX  TPX  TPX
Firing Interval - -- 11 Sec. 10 Sec. 9 Sec.
Type Spread - 1/20° L 1/40° L 1/40° R 1/20° R
Sea Conditions - Moderate, Light Chop. Few white caps.
Overlap 1 Activity - U.S.S. Fulton (All four).

- 39 -

— page 49 —
1803 Date: 10-14-43 Lat. 0-10 N. Long. 119-15 E.
Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Ship's Sunk:
Two master schooner, 10 ton displacement.
Damage determined by:
Saw boat sink.

Details of Action
Guns Used - Two 20 mm. A.A. Guns.
Rounds fired - 300 rounds of 20 mm. ammunition in proportion 2 H.E.I. to 1 H.E.T.
Average range - 900 yards.
Control of fire - Fired in bursts of 5 or 6 rounds per burst using tracer control of aim. The first bursts were fired over target. Later bursts raked deck and hull at and above water line.
Effectiveness of fire - Incendiary shells burned holes through wooden hull about four inches in diameter but failed to set hull on fire. Shells exploded on contact with hull, ripping planking loose and allowing boat to flood. Schooner sank fifteen minutes after opening fire.
Erratic Performances - Experienced three misfires which considerably slowed the rate of fire.

— page 50 —
1. MINES.
No minelaying operations or mine sweeping operations observed.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND WAVES TACTICS.

The counter measures employed by the enemy seemed to follow their usual methods. Radical zig-zagging was employed even at low speeds with the base course zigged at intervals of from 30 to 60 minutes. Interchange was made between the two equipped with a very good listening gear and an unlimited supply of depth charges. The AK attacked unsuccessfully on October 8 was not equipped with a depth charge thrower but men were observed to heave 200 to 300 pounds charges over the stern. All vessels were observed to have guns of from 3" to 4". The tinker sunk on the night of September 25 was observed to lie a large caliber gun and a machine gun (tracers) all round the horizon after being hit. Three Convoys were sighted without apparent escorts, probably depending on the equipment carried by the vessels themselves. The Convoy attacked on September 25 and 27 had one S.C. boat and three apparently converted yachts or fishing boats, escorts respectively. Two escorts were seen to join the Convoy sighted October 3rd in the vicinity of Pouto. The De Mer Island. The Convoy attacked on October 10th apparently had a very inefficient air escort.

Our evasion tactics consisted of putting the attacking vessel astern and going below the negative temperature gradient which was consistently encountered starting usually at 150 feet.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGES.

The boat suffered no material damage during this patrol. Only two machinery derangements occurred. On September 3, 1943, the exhaust valve stems were found broken in one unit of the 300 K.W. Auxiliary Engine with resultant scorring of the cylinder head. This same casualty had occurred twice previously, once on September 26 and again on September 28.(See addenda on page 44.)

It was not possible to place the engine in commission a third time due to lack of spare exhaust valves. At the time of each casualty the engine was operating at 170 K.W. The cause has not been ascertained.

As already described in BONNISH Restricted Letter SS223/S6 3 Serial 155 of 4 September 1943 to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, over speeding of the Auxiliary Motors (at high voltages on the finishing rate) has once again a major problem.

The net result was that the yardplant and the air compressors had to be secured during every charge, and

— page 51 —
0540
The steering motor, which could not be secured, became
increasingly noisy throughout the patrol.
The main engines became a problem on every contact
with the heavy smoking. When the Convoy was sighted
at daybreak on 25 September, the main engines had to be
stopped and the range opened on the battery to avoid
being sighted because of smoke. Again on 7 October the
engines were secured during the final stages of tracking
the target because of too much smoke. Our first passage
which could have been seen for miles.
This is a problem we have diligently worked on
and occasionally are successful in working up to speed
without smoke, but it can not always be done.

(L) RADIO.

Reception during daylight hours was, at times,
nearly impossible in the area. The 9,000 kcs band
gave the best reception, however on this frequency
interference was picked up from a Japanese Station,
NHC 1.35. On the 4,000 kcs band no satisfactory
reception was experienced. The 12,000 kcs band gave
fair reception for short periods of time, and then seemed
to fade out.
No difficulty was experienced clearing outgoing
messages.
VXJO sent their call at too long intervals during
off periods to check receiver tuning.
The last serial received was number 56.

(M) RADAR.

The general performance of the radar equipment
throughout this entire patrol was highly satisfactory.
Several casualties occurred in both the 3S and the 5S.
The troubles found and corrections necessary are
described as follows: In the 3S we lost all grass. This
was caused by a grounded lead inside plug PGI1 at the
converter unit. Replacing insulation brought back normal
operation. The 3S sweep moved to the right. Replacing
lamps 1P3 and 1P4 corrected this condition. Gradually our
background noise and interference increased until it was
abnormally high. This interference was caused by a
thruster blower motor. The 3S receiver required constant
tuning due to a variation in oscillator frequency. A
faulty oscillator tube heater in the converter unit was
found. Poor focus in the 5S was corrected by replacing
the 6V60, blanking tube. Variation of sweep intensity
caused our sweep to disappear at times. The Cathode Ray
Tube we replaced.

— page 52 —
CONFIDENTIAL

Reliable ranges on both radars were obtained. On the SJ with a 10,000 ton tanker as target - 14,000 yards, a 4,000 ton freighter - 10,000 yards, land - 10,000 yards, 150 patrol vessel - 4,800 yards, a rain squall - 3,000 yards, and a sail boat - 2,000 yards. With the SD echoes from a high peak - 28 miles, and planes - 18 miles.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

The sound gear as a whole, operated fairly satisfactorily insofar as material is concerned. One casualty of importance occurred. The power leads to the JK-3C sound head were broken near the local bearing indicator. The reason for this casualty being the clutch locking nut on the power train being improperly secured resulting in a ratchet effect to allow train of the head in one direction only.

The J Sonico gear is a valuable instrument in detection but poor for accurate bearings. Difficulty was encountered in deep submergence in training this instrument due to apparent binding of shaft in upper bearing.

Sound conditions as a whole were poor. Density layers were present throughout the area and this may have caused the poor sound conditions. Reception appeared less favorable in the morning when density layers were shallow and distinct. During periods of bad sound conditions the J Sonico sound gear seemed to give the best results.

121-00 E., in the Sulu Sea the JK and QB could not hear a large tanker at 6000 yards. The JP picked it up at 7000 yards. October 6, off Cape Varella during an early morning contact with a marked negative gradient at 150 feet, and a 204 foot depth of water, neither QB or JK could hear scores of three vessels even at a range of 2000 yards. JP heard screws weakly at 5000 yards.

On October 7, in Latitude 12-52 N., Longitude 113-20 E., with a marked negative gradient at 60 feet, sound never did hear an AK's screws although range closed to 2500 yards.

On October 10 in Latitude 14-32 N., Longitude 110-18 E., all three sound heads picked up the targets screws at 12000 yards. Echo ranging was heard on 16 KC by the QB head. As no escorts were present in the Convoy one of the AK's must have been equipped with echo ranging gear.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS.

A no. ative gradient was encountered throughout the patrol. At no time was it necessary to pump water out when going deep. In the early morning and with a calm sea, the slope of the gradient was invariably in the form of a flat curve.

Where a shallow layer existed it was found that sound conditions were not as good as when the layer was deeper.

— page 53 —
1 0540
Density layer.
Date    Lat.    Long.    Depth    Temp.    Amount
    Of Layer    Gradient    Plo.    Pl

— page 55 —
10540
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN
Serial 039
CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST ENDORSEMENT TO
USS BONEFISH SS223/
16 serial (018) of
October 21, 1943.

From: [Signature]
To: [Signature]
Via: [Signature]

Subject: U.S. BONEFISH - Report of 1st War Patrol
Comment on:

1. The BONEFISH's first war patrol covered a period of 44 days of which 29 were spent in the patrol area or north of the IWAY BARRIER. It was characterized by intelligent aggressiveness and outstandingly fine torpedo control which combination resulted in a satisfactory performance in the most critical of circumstances.

2. The emphasized use by the enemy of AK's as A/S ships is noted with interest, especially so as their manual production of depth charges appears to have produced a marked effect. The material condition of the BONEFISH is in excellent, the exceptions being thoroughly covered in the report.

3. The material condition of the BONEFISH is in excellent, the exceptions being thoroughly covered in the report.

4. As might be expected after turning in such a stellar performance on their initial venture, the morale of the officers and crew of the BONEFISH is of the highest order.

5. The Squadron Commander takes pleasure in saying "WELL DONE BONEFISH".

J. H. Haines.

— page 56 —
1. Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
: 2. Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
: 3. Commander SEVENTY-FIFTEEN.

Subject: U.S. BOMBERFISH First War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The first war patrol of the USS BOMBERFISH was conducted in the Central Pacific on the south China Sea. All contacts were excellent, the line teamwork of capable officers and crew resulted in great damage to the enemy.

2. Twenty-four (24) Mk 14-34 torpedoes were expended on four spread losses (16,7%) resulted; five torpedoes missed on 6 controls, 2 torpedoes were damaged and one torpedo was expended. Explodes were activated magnetically with ORADAT 1600, part 1, applied.

3. Information received from other sources established that the actual sinking of the ATAG was in the BOMBERFISH Second Torpedo Attack.

4. The difficulties experienced with auxiliary motors due to high voltage is being connected on in separate correspond- ence.

5. This patrol is considered "successful" for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia.

6. The Task Force Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew on this outstandingly successful patrol in which the following damage was inflicted upon the enemy.

— page 57 —
22-71/AL6-3
UNITED STATES NAVY
12-1cs
Serial 0911
19 November 1943
IDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH First War Patrol - Comment on:

SUNK
1. AO (OUTROSAN HARD type) 9205 tons
1. AP (KASTINA HARD type) 9908 tons
1. AP (HORATI HARD type) 9192 tons
1. AK (BILDOENG HARD type) 4003 tons
1. AK's (KUSIMU HARD type) 7888 tons
+ 1 Two-masted schooner 10 tons

40,206 tons

DAMAGED
1. AK (BORNE HARD type) 5864 tons
+ By gunfire.

R. W. CRISTIE.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (2) - Via Com7thFlt
Vice Opnav (1) - Via Com7thFlt
Vice Opnav
Op-23c (1)
Com1stFlt (1)
Com2ndFlt (1)
Com3rdFlt (1)
Com7thFlt (1)
Consubs1stFlt (2)
Consubs2ndFlt (4)
Comtaskfor-72 (2)
Comsubron-16 (1)
Divcoms Ron-16 (1)
Each S/M W.A. (1) - NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN

B. L. CARR,
Comdr., U.S.N.,
Flag Secretary.

— page 58 —
29DEC1943
UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3 (P-3/JPD)
Serial: 02571

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS BONEFISH First War
Patrol Report SS223/A16
(018) of 21 Oct. 1943.

From:
To:
Subject:
Subject:
1. Forwarded.

O.P. Pindall
O.L. LIVDALL
BY DIRECTION

Copy to:
VICNO.

FILMED
1944 JAN 7 21 24

RECEIVED
U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF

FILMED
1944 JAN 7 21 24

RECEIVED
U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF

— page 60 —
64582 FILMED
SS223/A16
Serial (025)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.
19 December 1943.

From: The Commanding Officer,
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels).

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH, Report of War Patrol Number Two.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the second war patrol of this vessel conducted in the Borneo - Celebes Area during the period November 22, 1943 to December 19, 1943; is forwarded herewith.

T. V. HOGAN.

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASS

— page 62 —
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 9-21.5 S., Longitude 115-54 E.
1250 (H) Submerged to await darkness in order to transit
    Lombok Strait.
1915 (H) Surfaced.
2051 (H) Entered Lombok Strait.
2216 (H) Sighted a small patrol boat bearing 266° T, radar
    range 2900 yards. Not detected.
2242 (H) Entered Flores Sea.

Monday, November 29, 1943.

0525 (H) Slighted smoke on horizon bearing 068° T, about
    25000 yards. Position - Latitude 06-34 S., Longitude
    116-47.7 E.
0526 (H) Battle Stations for Tracking. Target identified as
    large AK similar to NOZIMA (Janes - page 326, 1941).
    See was accompanied by one escort similar to SO 53
    type. Both ships were making heavy black smoke.
0656 (H) Submerged for the attack with the target bearing
    090° T, range about 25,000 yards. Went to Battle
    Stations Submerged, and commenced approach.
0716 (H) Sound picked up echo ranging at a range of about
    16,000 yards.
0757 (H) Obtained a screw count of 132 RPM by JP Sound and a
    speed of 8 knots by Plot and TDC.
0817 (H) In position Latitude 06-22 S., Longitude 116-35 E.
    With the target on course 267° T, range 2,500 yards,
    speed 8 knots, own ship on 0300 T, torpedo track
    60 port, 30 right gyro for the bow tubes at
    08-17-55 Fired #1 tube.
08-18-05 Fired #2 tube.
08-18-13 Fired #3 tube.
08-19-25 One torpedo hit heard and seen amidships.
08-19-32 One torpedo hit heard and seen under midmast.
    The targets screws stopped as she took a list and
    settled immediately by the stern.
    One aircraft - appeared to be a type MARY
    was seen stowed on the forward well deck.
0822 (H) The targets stern was seen to be under with the bow
    rising at about a 30° angle. The escort put on
    speed and headed towards so at
0823 (H) Went to deep submergence. Received one depth charge -
    distant. Sound could hear typical ship breaking up
    noises in direction of target.
0823-45 Two depth charges. Negative temperature gradient
    found beginning at 250 feet. Went to 350 and

— page 63 —
0826 to 0827 (H) Five depth charges - very close.
: 0829 (H) Two depth charges - close.
: 0837 (H) From this time on continued to hear escorts screw and echo ranging.
: 0845 (H) Explosion or depth charge heard by sound.
: 0853 (H) Explosion or depth charge heard by sound.
: 0917 (H) Noise of sinking ship faded out, nothing heard but echo ranging.
: 1004 (H) Came to periscope.depth. Escort seen bearing 300° T, (direction last saw target) range about 4,000 yards. He is echo ranging with long scale all around with occasional hand keying.
: 1126 (H) Can still see escorts smoke over the hill.
: 1200 (E) Position - Latitude 06-28.4 S., Longitude 116-36.5 E.
: 1451 (H) By periscope sighted a type PIPE airplane bearing 279° T, course about 050° T, range about five miles.
: 1545 (H) Went to 125 feet.
: 1746 (H) Escorts echo ranging faded out.
: 2030 (H) Surface and proceeded northward toward Makassar Straits. Escorts smoke could still be seen over the horizon astern.

Tuesday, November 30, 1943.

0030 (H) Sighted what appeared to be patrol craft bearing 300° T, range about 6,000 yards. Radar could not pick up target. Not detected.
0523 (H) Submerged off Cape William to avoid detection during day. Several sailboats seen in the distance.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 03-42 S., Longitude 118-14 E.
1204 and 1620 (H) Sighted two more sailboats. They were wandering back and forth near Cape William.
1847 (H) Surfaced and proceeded towards area.
2010 (H) Radar contact dead ahead range 5,000 yards. Maneuvered to avoid, and increased speed to pass well clear. When range closed to 3,000 yards could make out a long low craft similar to a PC boat. During the time we were in Radar contact we noticed interference as from another Radar. Do not believe we were detected. TDC solution showed patrol boat headed on about course 290° T, speed 3 knots.

Wednesday, December 1, 1943.

0155 (H) Radar contact on what appeared to be two patrol boats, range 4,700 yards bearing 287° T. Not detected.
0830 (H) Crossed equator at Longitude 119-13 E.
0940 (H) At position - Latitude 00-22 N., Longitude 119-24 E. sighted a Convoy consisting of three ships with two escorts. The ships were subsequently identified as

— page 64 —
1030 (H) Plot and TDC obtained a speed of 10 knots, Navigational Plot showed a speed of 10 knots made good over the ground.
: 1034 (H) Sighted one aircraft (appeared to be a type DAVE) flying very low over the Convoy so at 1135.
: 1135 (H) Submerged to avoid detection.
: 1136 (H) Surfaced to resume chase.
: 1137 (H) Sighted DAVE again so submerged.
: 1138 (H) DAVE is still in sight circling over Convoy.
: 1139 (H) Position - Latitude 00-29.5 N., Longitude 119-28 E.
: 1140 (H) Surfaced and resumed chase.
: 1141 (H) Sighted the U.S.S. BOMB, While exchanging information to the DAVE, sighted our friend DAVE and submerged.
: 1142 (H) Picked up smoke and mast of Convoy right at expected position.
: 1143 (H) Sighted DAVE coming out of clouds over Convoy, submerged to avoid detection.
: 1144 (H) Went to Battle Station, Will attempt to get in attack as aircraft enters us from gunline a more favorable position on the surface.
: 1145 (H) JP Sound picked up, 5 rows at 10,000 yards range.
: 1146 (H) JP picked up, 10,000 yards range.
: 1147 (H) Observed signal line by flashing light directed towards Convoy from the Eastern shore of Don Bay. They sent "ARAT" for a while then repeated "105 B dash 46 dash 106 Fox" several times.
: 1148 (H) Convoy zigged away, secured from Battle Stations.
: 1149 (H) Surfaced and resumed chase.
: 1150 (H) Picked up Convoy by Rader, range 16,000 yards.
: 1151 (H) Found Radar interference again - assume DD has Radar. Decided to fire bow tubes at escort DD and largest AK (LONDON IARU) then get one other with stern tubes. LONDON IARU is leading ship of loose column with DD on his port beam and TUBARIN on his port bow. We will come in on their port side as the moon is astern of us and they are close inshore.
: 1152 (H) Own Radar can distinguish all except TUBARIN line-layer. Radar interference very strong at 10,000 yards.
: 1153 (H) In Position - Latitude 01-31 N., Longitude 120-51 E. With target on course 060° T, speed 10 knots, range 1,400 yards, own course 117° T, speed 10 knots, torpedo track 124° port for the bow tubes,

— page 65 —
21-00-55  and torpedo run about 1,600 yards.  At
21-00-04  Fired #1 tube.
21-01-16  Fired #2 tube.
21-01-20  Fired #3 tube.
21-01-20  Premature (#2 torpedo).  Shifted to the large
    AK, and with a range of 3,500 yards, speed and
    course the same, at
21-01-25  Fired #4 torpedo.
21-01-30  Premature (#3 torpedo).
21-01-40  Fired #5 tube.
21-01-48  Fired #6 tube.
    Went ahead full with right full rudder and turned
    to new course 274° T, for a stern tube set up.  At
21-01-58  Observed and heard one hit on the DD (#1 torpedo).
21-02-02  Premature (#5 torpedo).
21-03-53  Heard one hit on the large AK (#4 torpedo).
21-03-53  Observed and heard one hit on the large AK (#6
    torpedo).
    The AK commenced sinking on an even keel.  At
    the time only one hit on the AK was certain so
    after steadying on the new course of 274° T, it
    was decided to make sure of her with the after
    tubes as she was a big one.  At
21-04-30  Fired #7 tube.
21-04-34  Fired #8 tube.
21-04-42  Fired #9 tube.
21-04-52  Fired #10 tube.
    Noticed Minelayer escort had headed towards us so
    went ahead maximum speed to escape on surface.
21-05-56  Heard one hit on the Destroyer which had swung
    around and was almost in line with the AK (#7
    torpedo).
21-06-45  Observed and heard one hit on the AK (#8 torpedo).
    The large AK was observed to sink directly after
    this, disappearing on almost an even keel.  The
    Destroyer was hidden in a huge dense cloud of
    smoke.
21-10-00  Heard and felt a terrific explosion that shook the
    boat worse than a close depth charge.  It is be-
    lieved this was the Destroyer magazines.  The
    explosion was accompanied by quite a fireworks
    display.  At this time Radar lost contact with all
    but two ships and the Radar interference ceased.
21.111 (H)  Redefining two ships range now 10,000 yards by
    Radar.
21.116 (H)  Heard light explosion by sound.
21.120 (H)  Slowed to two engines and commenced reload forward
    and aft.
21.121 (H)  Radar lost contact on the two ships at 14,850 yards.

— page 66 —
2237 (H) Submerged for a trim having completed reload and check of torpedoes.
: 2301 (H) Surfaced and set course to intercept re-mainder of Convoy.
Thursday, December 2, 1943.
: 0010 (H) Passed through scene of action, nothing seen.
: 0027 (H) Radar picked up a contact dead ahead, range 900 yards. Turned with full rudder to avoid and passed about 300 yards from a group of four lifeboats or life rafts crowded with survivors who fired on us with small arms as we went by.
: 0044 (H) Sound picked up echo ranging and Radar obtained contact at about 4000 yards. Decided it must be Minelayer escort so continued on search.
: 0240 (H) Radar picked up remainder of Convoy bearing 1160 T, range 12,550 yards in towards the coast. Commenced tracking to gain position ahead for attack.
: 0430 (H) Convoy determined to consist of the KAISYO MARU, and KISO LAKU. Chose the KAISYO MARU as target and at With dawn breaking submerged for the attack and went to Battle Stations. Commenced approach.
: 0526 (H) JP Sound picked up screws, range about 10,000 yards.
: 0604 (H) In Position - Latitude 01-27 N., Longitude 122-03 E. Obtained set up for stern tubes, target on course 1230 T, speed 92 knots, range 1400 yards, own course 019 T, speed 3 knots, 110 port torpedo track an 1500 yard torpedo run.
: 0604-59 Fired #7 tube.
: 06-05-08 Fired #8 tube.
: 06-05-19 Fired #9 tube.
: 06-05-32 Fired #10 tube.
: 06-05-48 Premature explosion (#8 torpedo). Observed #7 and #9 torpedoes make erratic run and miss. Heard torpedo explosion. Believe this was torpedo exploding in targets wake as it had made a sharp curve to the right and was headed to pass astern.
: 06-10-25 #9 torpedo exploded end of run.
: 06-10-30 #10 torpedo exploded end of run. Both tubes turned away so could not get in for bow shot.

— page 67 —
0610 (H)  DI Escort seen over the hill, making high speed rejoining formation.
: 0955 (H)  Completed routing torpedoes forward, surfaced and resumed chase. No aircraft sighted so far this morning.
: 1125 (H)  Sighted one aircraft bearing 274° T, about 15 miles. He soon disappeared in clouds.
: 1200 (H)  Position - Latitude 01-35 N., Longitude 122-40 E.
: 1305 (H)  Picked up aircraft on Radar. Submerged to avoid detection.
: 1320 (H)  Surfaced and resumed chase.
: 1753 (H)  Sighted a U.S. Submarine to seaward on an opposite course at a range of about four (4) miles.
: 1900 (H)  Gave up search, set a course for Sibutu Passage. Convoy must have gone into one of the numerous coves along this coast.
: 2022 (H)  Radar contact at 6,000 yards, bearing 225° T. Radar interference noticed. Believe he was a patrol boat with Radar.
: 2142 (H)  Sent BONEFISH Serial One.

Friday, December 3, 1943.

Enroute Sibutu Passage.

: 1200 (H)  Position - Latitude 03-54 N., Longitude 120-47.5 E.
: 2318 (H)  Commenced transit Sibutu Passage.

Saturday, December 4, 1943.

Enroute Sandakan, Borneo.

: 1140 (H)  Arrived Sandakan, Borneo, submerged and patrolled entrance Sandakan Harbor outside 20 fathom curve.
: 1200 (H)  Position - Latitude 05-59.2 N., Longitude 118-34 E.
: 1835 (H)  Surfaced.

Sunday, December 5, 1943.

: 0507 (H)  Submerged for periscope patrol off Sandakan Harbor.
: 1200 (H)  Position - Latitude 06-01.5 N., Longitude 118-24 E.
: 1835 (H)  Surfaced.

Monday, December 6, 1943.

: 0515 (H)  Submerged for periscope patrol off Sandakan Harbor.
: 1200 (H)  Position - Latitude 06-01.8 N., Longitude 118-19.8 E.
: 1744 (H)  Surfaced and left area for Tarakan via Alice Channel.

— page 68 —
0205 (H) Entered Alice Channel.
: 0400 (H) Departed Alice Channel, set course for Tarakan along coast.
: 0541 (H) Sighted smoke bearing 094° T, commenced tracking to gain position ahead.
: 0736 (H) Identified contact as Ex-Phillipine LEGAZPI, Marineship SHIPS 1942 - Diagram 1199, LA NAVIERA, PILIPINA INC.). Secured from Battle Stations as it is not worth a torpedo, and did not want to dislose our presence by engaging in a surface gun action.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 03-37.6 N., Longitude 118-39.5 E.
: 1434 (H) Struck a submerged log. Investigation of damage disclosed Pit Loc. Rodmoter was bent although the instrument continues to operate satisfactorily. A new vibration indicates a possible bent blade on the starboard propeller.
: 1817 (H) Signed Iateratoea and Pandjoeng Islands ahead, distance 15 miles.
: 1922 (H) Commenced surface patrol on a line 300° T and 120° T between coast and Maratoea Island.

Wednesday, December 8, 1943.

Continued patrol as before.

: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 02-40.2 N., Longitude 118-09.5 E.

Thursday, December 9, 1943.

: Patrolling as before.

: 0834 (H) Plane contact at eight miles on SD Radar.
: 0850 (H) Submerged to avoid detection.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 01-48.5 N., Longitude 118-44.9 E.
: 2255 (H) Orr Cape Mangkalahat patrolling on east-west line. Noticed interference on the SD Radar, slight interference on the SJ Radar.

Friday, December 10, 1943.

: 0600 (H) Underway for Ligitan Passage.
: 1104 (H) Noticed interference on SD Radar. Possibly from Tarakan.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 02-55 N., Longitude 119-00 E.
: 1818 (H) Arrived off Ligitan Islet.

— page 69 —
1942 (H) Sighted a small vessel lying to just to the South-easterward of Ligitan Islet, apparently over on the edge of the reef. On heading that way to investigate him the small vessel put on a burst of speed and placed himself in the shadow of Ligitan Islet. Could not approach him any closer due to the reef. The vessel had the lines of an SC boat or PT boat but refused to come out in the open. His actions indicated possible mine laying, operations to the Southeastward of the reef.

2129 (H) Began to get radar interference on SJ Radar. Believe it is from small vessel above.

2305 (H) Headed west parallel to coast and lost sight of small vessel astern. Lost Radar interference.

Saturday, December 11, 1943.

Patrolling to the westward of Sipadan Island in Ligitan Group.

1140 (H) Sighted a small vessel subsequently identified as the LECAZFI (Jones Merchant Ships 1942, diagram #1199) bearing 2870 T, range 16,000 yards on a course of about 060° T. It is the same vessel sighted the morning of December 7, 1943.

1148 (H) Went to stations for Battle Surface, 4" deck gun only. Commenced tracking on surface.

1206 (H) SJ Radar picked up target range 10,300 yards. Found Radar interference on targets bearing.

1211 (H) With a range of 9,050 yards target sighted us and turned away. Turned towards and commenced chase, closing range slowly.

1220-45 (H) With the range 6,000 yards by SJ Radar, target ten degrees on port bow and heading away, opened fire with 4" deck gun firing high capacity ammunition.

1226-10 (H) Target opened fire on us with one 3" and what appeared to be two 20 mm. His splashes were falling short.

1238-35 (H) Ceased firing as gun would not return to battery. Expended 57 rounds 4" H.C. Seven hits, one probable, and three near misses observed. Target continued zigging with no decrease in speed.

1242-45 (H) Fired one more round, gun again would not return to battery. Total ammunition expended, 58 rounds 4" H.C.

1244 (H) Secured from battle stations, set course for Tarakan. Target lost to sight. When last seen was still making high speed heading for the beach with upper decks on fire.

1337 (H) Sighted one aircraft (type DAVE) astern, range about eight miles. Submerged to avoid detection.

— page 70 —
1734 (H) 2242 (H) 0815 (H) 0854 (H) 0953 (H) 1006-55 (H) 1007-03 (H) 1007-11 (H) 1010 (H) 1010-40 (H) 1010-52 (H) 1011-03 (H) 1012-04 (H) 1012-35 (H) 1016 (H) 1019-50 (H) 1020 (H) 1025 (H) 1045 (H)

SIGNATURE:
- [Signature: name if legible]

SURVEYED:
- [Surveyed: date and location]

TARGET:
- [Target: name if legible]

TARGETED:
- [Target: name if legible

— page 71 —
1120 (H) Submarine Chaser passed at a range of about 1,500 yards.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 02-33 N., Longitude 118-18.3 E.
: 1230 (H) Submarine Chaser out of sight.
: 1244 (H) Surfaced and set a course for Makassar Strait.
: 1250 (H) Sighted a mast of another patrol vessel bearing 120-30 T, range about 20,000 yards, coming from the same direction as the first patrol boat. Went ahead on four main engines in order to pass him well clear.
: 1336 (H) Lost sight of patrol vessel astern.
: 2031 (H) Entered Makassar Strait.

Monday, December 13, 1943.

0020 (H) Crossed the Equator at Longitude 119-00 E.
0937 (H) Commenced getting radar interference on SD Radar (60 miles from Cape William).
1115 (H) Passed Cape William abeam to port distance 15 miles.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 2-44 S., Longitude 118-30 E.
1622 (H) Sighted a large native two-masted schooner on the port bow on a crossing course.
1725 (H) Closed schooner and ordered him to heave to for inspection - the crew consisted of a dozen assorted natives apparently all Malays. Took several photos and allowed schooner to proceed, as it evidently had no cargo.

Tuesday, December 14, 1943.

0719 (H) Contact on the SD Radar at 8 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.
0821 (H) Surfaced.
0845 (H) Sighted Bali Peak distance 60 miles.
0954 (H) Contact on SD Radar at 22 miles.
1005 (H) Lost contact at 16 miles.
1100 (H) Sighted a ZKKE bearing 2870 T, distance 7 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.
1359 (H) Sighted Nusa Besar Island distance 45 miles.
1906 (H) Surfaced and commenced transit Lombok Strait.
2125 (H) Picked up two contacts on SD Radar - one at 4 miles and one at 2 miles closing rapidly. Simultaneously sighted exhaust flares of one, or more planes that were approaching from the westward along the Southern Coast of Bali flying very low. The planes turned before reaching us and proceeded north through Lombok Strait making an estimated 250 knots.
2136 (H) Radar lost contact at 12 miles. Took departure from Lombok Strait.

— page 73 —
2216 North Small 2900 R & Avoided
11/28/43 Entrance Craft SN
Lombok St.
2. 0800 6-24.05 S Convoy 25000 270- 3D Attack
11/29/43 116-28 E 8 kts #1
3. 1230 5-47 S Sail 6000 SD Avoided
11/30/43 117-02 E Boat
4. 0521 3-50 S Sail 8000 SD Avoided
11/30/43 117-55 E Boat
5. 1620 3-42 S Sail 8000 SD Avoided
11/30/43 118-14 E Boat
6. 2110 3-07 S Patrol 5000 270 R Avoided
11/30/43 118-30 E Boat
7. 0155 3-05 S 2 Small 4700 SN Avoided
12/1/43 118-30 E Boats
8. 0940 0-21-9 N Convoy 25000 350 SD Attack
12/1/43 119-26 E 10 kts #2
9. 1400 0-30 N U.S.S. 16000 SD Exchange
12/1/43 119-27 E BOWFIN S/Sails
10. 0030 1-33 N 4 Life 900 R & Avoided
12/2/43 120-57 E Boats SN
11. 0044 1-33 N Convoy 9500 080 Sound Attack
12/2/43 120-47 E 9 kts. #3
12. 1403 1-35 N Sail 1 Avoided
12/2/43 123-21 E Boat
13. 1535 1-35 N Sail 1 Avoided
12/2/43 123-21 E Boat
14. 1753 1-10 N Submarine 8000 095 SD Avoided
12/2/32 123-50 S 15 kts
15. 2015 1-24 N Patrol 6000 SN Avoided
12/2/43 123-38 E Boat
16. 0335 6-00.5 N Sail 12000 010 P Avoided
12/5/43 118-21 E Boat

— page 74 —
17. 0553 4-04 N Mine 18000 300 SD Observed
12/7/43 118-49 E Layer 15 kts.
700 ton

18. 0926 4-04 N Snaill SD Avoided
12/7/43 118-49 E Craft

19. 1943 4-03 N Patrol 1000 SN Avoided
12/10/43 118-51 E Craft

20. 1140 4-02 N Mine 16000 020 SD Gun
12/11/43 118-22 E Layer Attach
# 1

21. 0815 2-30 N 1 AK 20000 290 SD Attack
12/12/43 118-18.2E 8 kts.

22. 1045 2-30 N Patrol 6000 345 P Avoided
12/12/43 118-18.2E Craft

23. 1230 02-33 N Patrol 20000 SD Avoided
12/12/43 118-19.8E Boat

24. 1418 02-10.5N Snaill SD Avoided
12/12/43 118-25.5E Boat

25. 2020 01-09 N Snaill 5000 P Avoided
12/12/43 119-19E Boats

26. 0144 00-43 S Small 10000 SN Avoided
12/13/43 119-0 E Craft

27. 0442 06-57 S Small 5000 SN Avoided
12/14/43 116-30E Craft

28. 0706 07-17 S Snail 20000 SD Avoided
12/14/43 116-19E Boats

* 30. 1622 04-06.8S 2 Nasted 10000 SD Investigated
12/13/43 117-56 E Schooner

— page 75 —
1300 29-43 S Catalina 15 330 T R Exchanged Signals
: 11/23/43 113-32 E 150 Kts. R Avoided
: 1141 24-45 S Unident. 10 150 T R
: 11/24/43 112-33E 150 Kts. R Exchanged Signals
: 1728 21-0.5S SOC 8 080 T R Exchanged Signals
: 11/24/43 114-11E 150 Kts. R Divded
: 0621 14-32 S Unident. 8 R Divded
: 11/27/43 115-03E
: 0647 14-33 S Unident. 240 T SD Divded
: 11/27/43 115-04E 100 Kts
: 1451 06-25 S PETE 023 T P Divded
: 11/27/43 116-36.5E
: 1034 00-35 N DAVE Circling Low Over Convoy P Divded
: 12/1/43 119-26.2E
: 1433 00-40 N DAVE 15 225 T SD
: 12/1/43 119-30 E 150 Kts.
: 1558 00-54 N DAVE 10 SD Divded
: 12/1/43 120-00E
: 1125 01-34.6N Unident. 15 135 T SD Divded
: 12/2/43 123-32.5E
: 1304 01-41 N Unident 7 R Divded
: 12/2/43 122-49E
: 1337 03-44.4N DAVE 20 SD Divded
: 12/1/43 116-26.5S
: 0719 07-17.2S Unident. 8 R Divded
: 12/1/43 116-19 E
: 0954 07-18 S Unident. 22 R No Action.
: 12/1/43 116-18E
: 1100 08-10 S ZEKE 7 200 T SD Divded
: 12/1/43 115-59E 150 Kts.
: 2125 12/14/43 Strait 090 T R No Action.
: 12/14/43 Strait 250 Kts.

*The Commanding Officer wishes to call attention to the large increase in plane activity in the vicinity of Rakassar Strait and Celebes Sea*.

— page 76 —
CONFIDENIAL

(H) ATTACK DATA:

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM:

U.S.S. BONEFISH
TORPEDO ATTACK NO ONE
PATROL NO. TWO

Time: 0820 (H)  Date: 11-29-43  Lat. 6-22 S. Long. 116-35 Z.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target attacked was steaming in company with one escort, a small vessel similar to Jap SC 53, a route that would take them just north of the Kanegano Islands and to Surebaya or Betavia. They were sighted at dawn by the bridge lookouts. Both ships were making heavy dark smoke.

Althought it had been raining steadily, it cleared at sunrise giving unlimited visibility allowing the target to be tracked for a period with the high periscope in order to determine course, speed and zig plan.

Ship Sunk:

(a) Number: One.
(b) Type: Similar to NOZIMA (Naval Auxiliary).
(Page 326, James 1941).
(c) Tonnage: 8215 tons.

Damage determined by:

Saw and heard two torpedoes hit, one amidships and the second beneath the mainmast. The ship settled immediately by the stern and when last seen her stern was under with the bow rising into the air at about a 300 angle. Propeller noises ceased after the hits, and typical ship breaking up noises were heard by sound after going to deep submergence to evade depth change attack.

Target draft: 24' Course 267° T. Speed: 8 knots.
Range: 2615 yards at firing.

Own Ship Data

Speed: 3 knots Course: 030° T. Depth: 62° Angle: 1-10° D.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:

The attack was made by periscope submerged, the target was first tracked on the surface by high periscope and the speed determined by plot and TDC. The most likely base course was determined by navigational Plot and TDC so that when the submerged approach commenced only one course change was necessary to reach the firing position.

— page 77 —
4-3-2-1 spread doctrine was used, the spread
    set into the angle solver by the offset dial. As
    the bow tubes were fired on a port track, the spread was
    set from left to right in order to keep the gyro angle
    small.

Tubes Fired - No. 1    No. 2    No. 3    No. 4
Zone Time - 0817-55   0818-05   0818-13   0818-23
Range - 2615    2565    2500    2480
Torpedo Run - 2320   2280    2250    2220
Target Bearing - 012-30   011-30    011-15    010-30
Track Angle - 52 P    53 P    54 P    54 P
Gyro Angle - 003-30   004-00    005-20    006-20
Depth Set - 12'    12'    12'    12'
Power - High    High    High    High
Hit or Miss - Hit    Hit    Miss    Miss
Erratic - No    No    No    No
Mark Torpedo - 14-3 A   14-3 A   14-3 A   14-3 A
Serial Number - 24748   23720   23726   24760
Mark Exploder - 6-1    6-1    6-1    6-1
Serial Number - 6497   6345    6539    6529
Actuation Set - Mag.    Mag.    Mag.    Mag.
Actuation Actual - Contact Contact
Mark Varipeed - 16    16    16    16
Serial Number - 1585   3679    336    3637
Explosive - TPX    TPX    TPX    TPX
Firing Interval - ---    10 Sec.    8 Sec.    10 Sec.
Type Spread - 24°L    3/4°L    3/4°R    2°R
Sea Conditions - Sea smooth, glassy, calm.
Overhaul Activity - Navy 135 (Subiaco) all four torpedoes.
Miss Due to - ---    ---    Control Spread
    Error

— page 78 —
10 knots Course: 1170T (bow tubes) Depth: On Surface.
2740T (stern tubes)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: The attack was made on the surface at night using the TBT for bearings and the SJ Radar for ranges.

— page 79 —
The target speed was determined by Plot and TDC after a period of tracking by Radar.
:  The attack was made from the port beam as the column was close inshore and the moon was astern.
:  It was originally intended to fire three torpedoes at the DD, three at the AK with the bow tubes; then turn and fire four at the next ship in column.
:  However, after experiencing three premature hits in the first six torpedoes fired, the large AK was again chosen as target for the stern tubes in order to make sure of him.
:  A 4-3-2-1 spread doctrine was used, the spread being set by use of the offset dial on the data computer. As a port track was fired the torpedoes were spread from left to right, divided equally each side of zero offset.

| Tube | No. 1 | No. 2 | No. 3 | No. 4 | No. 5 |
|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Zone | 2100-55 | 21-01-04 | 2101-14 | 2101-25 | 2101-40 |
| Range | 1425 | 1400 | 1370 | 3425 | 3360 |
| Torpedo | 1575 | Pre. | Pre. | 3700 | Pre. |
| Target | 013 | 011 | 009 | 018-30 | 017-30 |
| Track | 123 | 359-40 | 359 | 358-30 | 005-30 |
| Gyro | 12' | 12' | 12' | 12' | 12' |
| Depth | 12' | 12' | 12' | 12' | 12' |
| Power | High | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or Miss | Hit DD | Pre. | Pre. | Hit AK | Pre. |
| Erratic | No | -- | -- | No | -- |
| Mark Torpedo | 14-3 A | 14-3 A | 14-3 A | 14-3 A | 14-3 A |
| Serial Numbers | 22960 | 22329 | 23769 | 24266 | 22568 |
| Mark Exploder | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 |
| Serial Number | 6502 | 6504 | 6353 | 6526 | 6506 |
| Activation Set | Mag. | Mag. | Mag. | Mag. | Mag. |
| Actuation Actual | Mag. | Pre. | Pre. | Contact | Pre. |
| Mark Wherhead | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial Number | 1528 | 1442 | 5964 | 6067 | 1036 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval | 9 Sec. | 10 Sec. | 11 Sec. | 15 Sec. | 10 Sec. |
| Type Spread | 10' | 10' | 10' | 10' | 10' |
| Sea Conditions | Sea smooth, glassy, calm. | Sea smooth, glassy, calm. | Sea smooth, glassy, calm. | Sea smooth, glassy, calm. | Sea smooth, glassy, calm. |
| Overhaul Activity | Navy 137 (Subiaco). All five torpedoes. | Navy 137 (Subiaco). All five torpedoes. | Navy 137 (Subiaco). All five torpedoes. | Navy 137 (Subiaco). All five torpedoes. | Navy 137 (Subiaco). All five torpedoes. |
| Miss due to: | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

— page 80 —
20

Torpedo Attack #2 (Cont.)

Tube Fired - No. 6  No. 7  No. 8  No. 9  No. 10
Zone Time - 2101-48 2104-30 2104-36 2104-44 2104-52
Range - 3325  3450  3480  3525  3550
Torpedo Run - 3675  2150  3250   ---  ---
Target Bearing - 016° 181° 181° 181° 180°
Track Angle - 006° 176° 176° 176° 176°
Gyro Angle - 12° 12° 12° 12° 12°
Depth Set - High  High  High  High  High
Hit or Miss - Hit AK  Hit DD  Hit AK  Miss  Miss
Erratic - No  No  No  No  No
Mark Torpedo - 14-3 A 14-3 A 14-3 A 14-3 A 14-3 A
Serial Number - 24214  24011  23884  23910  22967
Mark Exploder - 6-1  6-1  6-1  6-1  6-1
Serial Number - 6535  6532  6520  6503  6528
Actuation Set - Mag.  Mag.  Mag.  Mag.  Mag.
Actuation
  Actual - Contact Mag.  Contact  Miss  Miss
Mark Varied - 16  16  16  16  16
Serial Number - 1519  965  9111  2315  1502
Explosive - TPX  TPX  TPX  TPX  TPX
Firing Interval - 8 Sec.  ---  6 Sec.  8 Sec.  8 Sec.
Type Sixed - 10° 10° 10° 10° 10°
Sea Conditions - Sea smooth, glassy, calm.
Overhaul Activity - Navy 137 (Subicco). All five torpedoes.
Miss Due to - ---  ---  Control  Spread
  Error

— page 82 —
CONFIDENTIAL

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FOR: U.S.S. BONNEISCH

TORPEDO ATTACK NO THREE PATROL NO TWO

Time: 0505 (H) Date: 12-2-43 Lat. 1-27 N. Long. 122-03 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted:

Description: This was a continuation of attack number two. The Convoy now consisted of the two remaining ships - KAISTO MARU and KISO MARU - plus the minelayer escort. The Convoy was contacted during the night and an end round run made in order to reach a position ahead for a submerged attack at daylight. Visibility was excellent, the sea smooth with no white caps. The KAISYO MARU (Page 197, ONI 208 J) was chosen as target.

Ships sunk or Damaged:
None.

Target Draft: 24' Course 1230 T Speed: 92 knots

Range: 1500 yards at time of firing.

Own Ship Data

Speed: 3 knots Course: 090T Depth: 62' Angle: 10 down to 20 up

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: The attack was made by periscope submerged. The first and third torpedoes made erratic runs, the second was a premature explosion and the fourth was a spread miss astern. Although the spread was applied from left to right, the first torpedo made a sharp curve to the right to pass astern (By stop watch time it apparently exploded in the targets wake), and the third ended with a sharp curve to the left to pass ahead of the target. The fourth was not seen but is presumed to have made a normal run and pass astern.

— page 83 —
3. CONFIDENTIAL

Torpedo Attack #3.

Tubes Fired - No. 7  No. 8  No. 9  No. 10

Zone Time - 0604-59  0605-08  0605-19  0605-32

Range - 1500  1520  1550  1590

Torpedo Run - 1500  1550  1600  1640

Target Bearing - 184-40  182-30  180-40  178-10

Track Angle - 110 F  112 P  115 P  118 F

Gyro Angle - 169  169-15  169-50  170-00

Depth Set - 12'  12'  12'  12'

Power - High  High  High  High

Hit or Miss - Miss  Miss  Miss  Miss

Erratic - Yes  Pre.  Yes  No

Mark Torpedo - 14-3 A  14-3 A  14-3 A  14-3 A

Serial Number - 24046  24269  41692  22545

Mark Exploder - 6-1  6-1  6-1  6-1

Serial Number - 18014  6536  6159  17639

Actuation Set - Mag.  Mag.  Mag.  Mag.

Actuation Actual - --  --  --  --

Mark Warhead - 16  16  16  16

Serial Number - 1498  1945  1520  1540

Explosive - TPX  TPX  TPX  TPX

Firing Interval - 9 Sec.  11 Sec.  13 Sec.

Type Spread - 3 3/4' L  1 1/2' L  1 1/2' R  3 3/4' R

Sea Conditions - Sea smooth, glassy, calm.

Overhaul Activity - Navy 137 (Subiaco).

Miss Due To - Erratic  Pre.  Erratic  Spread.

— page 84 —
1006 (H)  Date: 12-12-42  Lat. 02-32.8 N., Long. 114-15 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:
The ship attacked was steaming, singly evidently bound for Tarakan. It was first sighted as it passed the Northern tip of Maratoea Island on a base course of about 295 or 300° T.

The visibility was excellent with only a few scattered clouds in the sky. The ship was sighted by the bridge lookout.

The target was identified as similar to the TATAN MARU (Page 132 ONI 208 J) of 3,670 tons. She was very lightly loaded and steering a zig of 100° to 150° to a side on 5 minute legs.

Ships: Sunk or Damaged:
None.

Target Draft: 81 to 101° Course: (1) 330° T Speed: (1) 9 kts. (2) 355° T (2) 7 kts.

Ranges: (1) 3,200 yards. (2) 3,100 yards.

Own Ship Data
Speed: 3 kts. Course: 060° T Depth: 62°
Angle: 10° U - 0 - 10° D.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:
The attack was made by periscope submerged. Targets course and speed were obtained during the period of surface tracking by Plot and TDC and checked by Plot during the approach. Three torpedoes were fired initially, but after sound reported one a

— page 87 —
U.S.S. BONEFISH
GUN ATTACK NO ONE
PATROL NO. TWO
Date: 12-11-43
Lat. 4-02.6 N. Long. 118-22.0 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Ship's Damaged:
Number: One.
Type: Small inter Island Steamer converted to Minelayer.
Tonage: 700 tons.
Name: Similar to LEGAZPI.
Identity Established: Photograph and diagram #1199 in James Merchant Ships - 1942.

Damage Determined By:
Observed seven hits of 4" high capacity in upper decks and on probable hit. In addition there were several near misses. The target caught fire after the first hit and when last seen the fire was still burning topside. The counter fire by the target's 3" gun was silenced after the 4th hit although 20 m.m. fire continued.

Details of Action

Type of Gun Used:
4"/50 caliber, Mark 9, Mod. 16 deck gun.

Type Ammunition and Number of Rounds Fired:
Expended 54 rounds 4" H.C. plus four rounds thrown overboard when the deck was cleared - a total of 58 rounds. These shells were fitted with point detonating fuzes.

Effectiveness of Fire:
The first hit set the target on fire and after the second hit it was completely enveloped in smoke for a period. As each hit was made pieces of ship and shell could be seen spraying the water on each side. The target continued to zig and did not decrease speed at any time.

Average Range:
Average hitting gun range was 5,000 yards.
Average Radar range was 5,125 yards.

Fire Control:
The SJ Radar was used for ranges and each shot was spotted on deflection and range. Much better results can be obtained by spotting through the high periscope.

— page 89 —
1. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE.
2. exist.
3. Five major defects previously reported still
4. exist.
5. The first - overspeeding and overheating of vital
6. auxiliary machinery because of high voltage during a battery
7. charge - is considered the most important and is mentioned
8. again as an item that should be corrected at the first oppor-
9. tunity.
10. Trouble is still experienced with the TBT system
11. of commission although the forward one was usable during most
12. of the patrol.
13. The auxiliary generator lubricating oil cooler
14. has not sufficient capacity to keep the lubricating oil return
15. temperature below the maximum allowable when operating in
16. tropical waters. An arbitrary limit of 200 kw has been set
17. by this vessel for this engine in order that the lubricating
18. oil return temperature will not rise above 1700.
19. The cracks previously reported in the stellite
20. seat of the auxiliary engine outboard exhaust valve have
21. opened up and the valve now leaks while submerged.
22. Knocking of master vent operating gear. This is
23. a design defect and appears to be getting worse as the plus
24. in the bell-crank and linkage mechanism wear. The following
25. master vents are affected-#1 & 2, #4, #6, #7. Main Ballast Tanks,
26. and Safety Tanks. The knocking noise when operating the vents
27. submerged has increased appreciably within the last few months.
28. New items are: The 4" gun failed to return to
29. battery during the gun action on December 11, 1943, making it
30. necessary to break off the action. In addition an examination
31. of the gun after firing showed the liner had elongated 1/4"w
32. making it impossible to replace the muzzle Tompion. 54 rounds
33. were fired.
34. The Pit Log rodmeter was bent when a submerged
35. log was struck in the Celebes Sea. The instrument continued
36. to operate satisfactorily but the rodmeter can not be rigged
37. in.
38. It is possible one blade of the starboard
39. propeller is bent also as there has been increased vibration
40. at higher speeds since striking the log and fragments of
41. chewed up wood appeared on the surface aft after the collision.

— page 90 —
1. RADIO.
It is suspected that the Kingsley Receiver, installed in Brisbane, regenerates a signal when in use. No other unusual conditions or casualties occurred. The last serial received was number 62.

: RADAR.
Nothing to report.

: SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.
Nothing to report.

: DENSITY LAYERS.
No unusual density layers were encountered.

: HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY.
In general the health of the crew was excellent. Food was good and well prepared and habitability was good due to extensive surface operations.

: PERSONNEL.
The officers and men performed their duties in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval Service. In general the inexperienced personnel obtained from the Relief Crew were conscientious and willing to learn, however several misfits were found who had been advanced too rapidly and could not perform the duties commensurate with their rating.

: MILES STEAMED - FULL USED.
Freight to Area 1689 miles, 13,790 gallons. In Area 2,623 miles, 37,959 gallons. Area to Fremantle 1613 miles, 19,702 gallons.

: DURATION.
Days enroute to area - six (6) days. Days in area - sixteen (16) days. Days enroute to base - five (5) days. Days submerged - five (5) days.

: FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING.
| Corpoedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel |
||------|||
| None       | 22,536 | 40 days    | Unlimited  |

Limiting Factor of this patrol: Torpedoes.

— page 91 —
(U) REMARKS:
(a) No enemy mine sweeping observed.
(b) No enemy degaussing of ships observed.
(c) Enemy Radars:
Radar interference observed on SD and SJ Radars as various times. Following are specific times:
1. November 30, 1943 - Lombok Strait. Apparently from Patrol Craft.
2. December 1, 1943 - From one of a five ship Convoy. Not noticed after DD was sunk.
3. December 2, 1943 - Off Northern Celebes coast while in SJ Radar contact with small craft at 6,000 yards range.
4. December 10, 1943 - From small vessel of Ligitan Islet.
5. Each time when within 50 miles of Tarakan interference on SD Radar.

— page 92 —
3-01047
Serial #: 0132
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO BONEST SEAL
Patrol SS223/A16 Ser.
(025) dated 19 Dec. 1943.

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship,
28 December 1943.

The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
(1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

U.S.S. BONEFISH - Report of Second War Patrol.
Comments on:

1. The second war patrol of the U.S.S. BONEFISH, conducted in the BONEFISH area, was of the shortest duration of 27 days; due to expenditure of torpedoes.

2. This patrol was conducted in the same out-standing manner as the first BONEFISH patrol. Four aggressive torpedo attacks were made, for a score of seven hits, four premature and thirteen misses, with indications of misses being due to erratic torpedo performances.

3. The material condition of the BONEFISH is most gratifying, required repairs being practically neglible.

4. Commander Submarine Squadron Sixteen takes pleasure in congratulating the Commanding Officer, officers and crew on their second successful patrol.

J. M. Haines.

— page 93 —
12-January, 1944.
4 January, 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. BONEFISH Report of
2nd War Patrol (SS223)
A16-3 Serial 025 of
19 December, 1943.

From: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
To: Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH - Report of Second War Patrol -
Comments on.

1. The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron
SIXTEEN are concurred in.

2. The BONEFISH had been assigned to patrol the
central part of the SOUTH CHINA SEA. In her characteristically
aggressive manner, she developed contacts and expended eighteen
torpedoes enroute, and was then directed to patrol in the SAIDA-
KAN - TARAKAN Area.

3. The destruction of the destroyer escort in the
night surface attack on 1 December, is particularly noteworthy.

4. The patrol is considered successful for purpose of
award of the Submarine Combat Insignia, and the Task Force Com-
mander congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew
of the BONEFISH on inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK
1 AK (NOZIMA TYPE) - - - - - 8,215 Tons.
1 AK (LONDON MARU TYPE) - - - 7,191 "
1 DD (AKIKAZE CLASS) - - - - 1,215 "

Total 16,621 Tons.

-1-

12 JAN 1944
COMMANDER SOUTHWEST
BATTLE FLEET

2 01047

— page 94 —
12-bt
Serial 010
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-I
SECOND ENTRUSTMENT to
U.S.S. BONEFISH Report of
2nd War Patrol (SS223)
A16-3 Serial 025 of
19 December, 1943.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH - Report of Second War Patrol - Comments on:
DAMAGED
+ 1 ON (LEGASPI TYPE) - 700 Tons.
+ By gunfire.

R. W. CHRISTIE.

DISTRIBUTION:
Coalition (2) - Via Com7thFlt
Vice Opnav (1) - Via Com7thFlt
Vice Opnav
Op-23c (1)
Com1stFlt (1)
Com2ndFlt (1)
Com3rdFlt (1)
Com7thFlt (1)
Comsubs1stFlt (2)
Comsubs2ndFlt (4)
Comtaskfor-72 (2) CTF-71 (4)
Comsubron-16 (1)
Divoroms Ron-16 (1)
Each S/L W.A. (1) - NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN

B. L. CARR,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Flag Secretary.

— page 95 —
21 JAN 1944
A16-3(F-3/roj)
Serial: 0129
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. BONEFISH Report of
2nd War Patrol (SS223)

From: Commander SEVENTH FLEET
To: Commander in Chief United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH - Report of SECOND War Patrol, Comments on.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Seventh Fleet congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew of the BONEFISH on the destruction of 16,621 tons of enemy shipping, including an Akikaze destroyer, and the damaging of an additional 700 tons.

T. C. KINKAID.

Copy to:
CO USS BONEFISH
ComSubron-16
CTF-71
TCNO

50 2T 30 NW 25

— page 97 —
223/AL6
SS 223
Serial (03)
Care of Fleet Post office,
San Francisco, Calif.
15 March 1944

From:
The Commanding Officer.
To:
The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:
(official Channels).

Subject:
U.S.S. BONEFISH, Report of War Patrol
Number Three.

Enclosure:
(A) Subject Report.

1. Subject report, covering the third war patrol of this vessel conducted in the South China Sea and Makassar Strait areas during the period January 12, 1944 to March 15, 1944; is forwarded herewith.

T. W. HOGAN
T. W. HOGAN
DECLASSIFIED

— page 98 —
1943, arrived in Fremantle, Western Australia, December 19, 1943, completing this vessel's Second War Patrol. Sent officers and crew on two weeks recreational leave and commenced refit by U.S.S. PELIAS and Relief Crew Personnel.

The following work was accomplished during refit:

1. Complete overhaul of 4"/50 caliber deck gun.
2. Routine overhaul of #3 Main Engine, replacing needle wrist pin bearings with bronze bushings.
3. Overhauled and made operative TBT System, shifting bridge transmitters from fore and aft positions to port and starboard positions.
4. Painted ship - gray on vertical surfaces, black on horizontal surfaces.

Ship's Officers and Crew returned from leave January 3, 1944. Completed loading.

January 4 - 11, 1944, engaged in training exercises in the operating areas off Fremantle, Western Australia.

— page 99 —
1300 (H) Underway from Fremantle, Western Australia, enroute to operating area for training exercises.
: 2236 (H) Completed training exercises. Took departure from operating area and set course for Emsworth Gulf, Western Australia.
: Thursday, January 13, 1944 - Friday, January 14, 1944.
: Enroute Emsworth Gulf, making training dives, instructing and training new officers and men, holding fire control drills.
: Saturday, January 15, 1944.
: 0915 (H) Moored alongside fueling barge in Emsworth Gulf, Western Australia. Commenced fueling ship.
: 1534 (H) Completed fueling ship. Underway, setting course for Patrol Area. This delay of 6 hours and 19 minutes for taking approximately 11,700 gallons of fuel was due to improper hose fittings on barge, inability of barge crew to operate fuel pump on barge which finally was operated by submarine personnel. The entire fueling operation was disgustingly slow and inefficient.

Sunday, January 16, 1944.
: Underway, enroute Lombok Strait.
: 0424 (H) Noted interference on S7 Radar. Unable to determine source of interference. (Passed Southbound Cabrilla about this time).
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 17-48 S., Longitude 114-43.2 E.
: 1245 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar, range 16 miles, closing.
: 1248 (H) Dived to avoid detection. Unable to pick up plane through periscope.
: 1305 (H) Surfaced.
: Monday, January 17, 1944.
: Underway enroute Lombok Strait.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 12 - 37 S., Longitude 115 - 15 E.
: 1550 (H) Sighted plane, distance 7 miles. Dived to avoid detection.

— page 100 —
1609 (H)  Surfaced. Plane not in sight.
Tuesday, January 18, 1944.
Underway enroute Lombok Strait.
0452 (H)  Made landfall on Lombok.
0528 (H)  Submerged to approach Lombok undetected, making very little headway against a 2-3 knot variable current setting away from the Strait.
1200 (H)  Position - Latitude 08-50 S., Longitude 115-44 E.
1953 (H)  Surfaced with crew at battle stations.
2032 (H)  Commenced transit of Lombok Strait.
2113 (H)  Sighted glow of several lights appearing to be illumination possibly for construction work in the vicinity of Labuan Treseig Bay, Lombok Island.
2238 (H)  Completed uneventful transit of the Strait. In passage saw the usual number of lights and small fires on Bali. Secured from Battle Stations. Set course for position of first day's patrol in Flores Sea.

Wednesday, January 19, 1944.
Underway, enroute to position for patrol. Three days were assigned this vessel for submerged patrolling north of Lombok'Strait in search of an enemy submarine used as an A/S vessel. It was decided that the most profitable patrol station for the enemy submarine would be on the route between Lombok Strait and Cape William and covering the East - West traffic lines. The three points chosen for our patrol were on the Lombok Strait - Cape William lane south of the Kangean Islands, north of the Kangean Islands and east of the Lima Islands.
0524 (H)  Made landfall on Sikka Island.
0549 (H)  Submerged for patrol.
1200 (H)  Position - Latitude 07-12 S., Longitude 116-18 E.
1732 (H)  Sighted small native sailboat.
1930 (H)  Surfaced.

Thursday, January 20, 1944.
: 0548 (H)  Submerged for patrol.
1200 (H)  Position - Latitude 06-17.5 S., Longitude 116-40.5 E.
1842 (H)  Surfaced.

— page 102 —
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 01-39 S., Longitude 117-15 E.
: 1328 (H) With three men on deck checking fuel connections for possible leaks, sighted plane bearing 338° T, distance 10 miles. Deok was cleared in qualifying time for the Penn Relays. Submerged to avoid detection.
: 1402 (H) Surfaced.
: 1602 (H) SD Radar contact on plane at 14 miles.
: 1610 (H) Sighted plane bearing 285° T, distance 7 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.
: 1705 (H) Surfaced.
: 2233 (H) SJ Radar contact on land (Cape Mangkalihat) at 30 miles.
: 2342 (H) Passed Birah Birahan Island abeam to port. Passed within Radar range of several small sailboats throughout night. Avoided.

Sunday, January 23, 1944.

0130 (H) Passed Capo Mangkalihat abeam to port.
0629 (H) Several small sailboats in sight.
0734 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar, 11 miles.
0734-30 (H) Plane closed to 9 miles, not sighted - submerged to avoid detection.
0738-30 (H) One depth bomb. Not close.
0746-30 (H) One depth bomb. Just above us but a light charge. As the plane apparently contacted us at 11 or more miles, he probably was warned of our presence by one of the "innocent fishermen" in the small boats we sighted earlier in the morning.
0945 (H) Sighted our aerial companion through periscope. Bearing 1900 T - range 4 miles. He appeared to be engaged in searching for us. Identified as small, float type monoplane (Rufe).
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 2-03 N., Longitude 119-31.5 E.
1518 (H) Surfaced.
1552 (H) Sighted plane, distance 8 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.
1637 (H) Surfaced.

— page 103 —
0140 (H) Made landfall on Marottea Island.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 03-57 N., Longitude 119-32 E.
: 1430 (H) Made landfall on Bangao Peak.
: 1510 (H) Submerged at entrance to Sibutu Passage awaiting
: 1813 (H) Surigao Strait.
: 2040 (H) Entered Sibutu Passage.
: 2236 (H) Completed transit of Sibutu Passage. Set course
: for Balabao Strait.

Tuesday, January 25, 1944.

Underway, enroute Balabao Strait.

1200 (H) Position - Latitude 07-09 N., Longitude 118-56.6 E.

Wednesday, January 26, 1944.

Underway, enroute Balabao Strait.

0002 (H) Made landfall on Balabao.
0153 (H) Entered Selabao Strait.
0210 (H) Sighted bright light in Dalaawan Bay, Balabao.
0312 (H) Completed transit of Balabao Strait. Entered South
    China Sea. Set course for assigned patrol area.
0925 (H) Passed through center of hugh oil slick. Position -
    Latitude 7-25 N., Longitude 115-50 E. Oil appeared
    to be heavy fuel oil and covered area of about 30
    miles in diameter
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 7-28.5 N., Longitude 115-36.1 E.

Thursday, January 27, 1944.

Underway, enroute patrol area.

1200 (H) Position - Latitude 08-08 N., Longitude 111-41 E.

Friday, January 28, 1944.

Underway, enroute patrol area.

0030 (H) Entered patrol area, set course for Cape Paderan.

— page 104 —
0820 (H) Made landfall on Ccair de Mar Island.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-50.1 N., Longitude 109-15.2 E.
: 1459 (H) False plane contact on SD Radar. (Land Pip). Submerged.
: 1517 (H) Surfaced.
: 1645 (H) Sighted Cape Paderan Light. With a focal point 5 miles southeast of Ccair de Mar and limiting bearing lines of 0000 T and 0200 T from this point, commenced a surface patrol of included sector from Ccair de Mar to northern limit of assigned area (off Kamranh Bay).

Saturday, January 29, 1944.

Noted: No steady bright white lights on hillside four miles north of Cape Paderan. Possibly used as navigational lights as they remained burning throughout the night and could be seen for a distance of twenty miles.

1123 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar. Submerged to avoid detection.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 11-34.5 N., Longitude 109-36.7 E.
1251 (H) Surfaced.

Sunday, January 30, 1944.

1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-53.8 N., Longitude 109-15.2 E.

Monday, January 31, 1944.

1200 (H) Position - Latitude 11-20 N., Longitude 109-20 E.
1351 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar, eight miles. Submerged to avoid detection. Plane not sighted from bridge.
1407 (H) Sighted periscope. Distance two miles, circling after. He either saw us or our wake on the surface. Plane identified as a Rufe.
1758 (H) Surface. Set course for north-west corner of area off Kamranh Bay.

Tuesday, February 1, 1944.

0627 (H) Made landfall on Isles des Pecheurs.
0640 (H) Submerged to conduct submerged patrol off entrance to Kamranh Bay.

1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-53.6 N., Longitude 109-35.5 E.
1912 (H) Surfaced. Only vessels sighted during the day were numerous small sailboats appearing to be engaged in fishing. No activity was noted in or about Kamranh. En route southeast corner of the area.

— page 105 —
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 09-55 N., Longitude 110-08 E.
Thursday, February 3, 1944.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-44.5 N., Longitude 109-37.2 E.
Arrived off Fanrang Bay, sighted several small boats appearing to be engaged in fishing.
Friday, February 4, 1944.
0632 (H) Submerged to conduct patrol in close to beach during daylight hours.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 11-32 N., Longitude 109-14.5 E.
Innumerable small fishing sailboats in sight throughout the day, as many as 26 boats in sight at one time.
1946 (H) Surfaced. Headed for patrol station off Isles de Poheours.
1950 (H) Sighted what seemed to be flashes from A.A. guns in Kamranh.
2000 (H) Sighted flashing white signal light of plane over Kamranh Bay. Cut in SD Radar and made contact on 3 planes. All three appeared to be circling around Kamranh Bay. They sent us a report to be on the alert. They seemed to be sighted at 1,500 feet and then sent "N" several times while coming in for a landing. Evidently the A.A. gunner in Kamranh had a firing practice run tonight.
2120 (H) Sighted a navigational light at Latitude 11-54.3 N., Longitude 109-05.5 E. Characteristics: Steady white, visibility 20 miles.

Saturday, February 5, 1944.
0736 (H) Submerged for days patrol.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 12-02 N., Longitude 109-25.8 E.
1933 (H) Surfaced.

Sunday, February 6, 1944.
0651 (H) Submerged for days patrol.
0840 (H) Sighted masts of two motor-sampan type vessels proceeding up the coast from Kamranh Bay close inshore. Visibility low with intermittent rain squalls. Position Latitude 12-01.8 N., Longitude 109-24.6 E. Commenced closing range for investigation.

— page 106 —
0853 (H) Sighted masts of two vessels astern of sampans (bearing 2300 T, range 10,000 yards). Decided this may be north-bound convoy. Went to battle stations. Continued closing range.
: 0905 (H) Sighted Jute type plane near sampans now all identified as catcher type PC boats (See sketch). This must be A/S sweep, possibly ahead of a convoy coming up from the south. Headed toward Isles des Pecheurs astern of vessels at high speed in hopes of interception.
: 1005 (H) Nothing in sight to southward. A/S vessels milling around just north of Isles des Pecheurs conducting south search. Sound hears echo-ranging to northward of them but nothing in sight. Heavy rain squall around Mul Dungba.
: 1010 (H) Sighted large AP coming out of rain squall bearing 3200 T, distance 16,000 yards, on course 1850 T. Continued closing islands to head him off.
: 1037 (H) Convoy in sight now. It consists of two groups of ships (Composition and disposition shown on Sketch "A"). First group has one large AP, three medium AR's and three SC's. Two leading AR's are carrying landing charges on deck. The second group consists of one huge AO, one small AO, three medium AR's and four PC's. The AO is so large he looks like a carrier, dwarfing the ships around him. Trailing the last group is an Assakee Class Destroyer. One Jute type plane circles over Convoy. Our little friends sighted earlier this morning are included in the list of PC's. The convoy is going inside of Isles des Pecheurs so changed course to intercept them as they come but between Hon Nai Island and point Honnai (mainland). Running deep at high speed between looks. Rigged ship for depth charge.
: 1053 (H) Leading AP in sight heading around Hon Nai on course 1500 T. We won't be able to get in on him. Picked the large AO as primary target. The AO now identified as 19,400 tons Tonan Maru (Page 280, ONI 208 J). Double stacks, flush deck, and bridge well forward makes identification positive.
: 1107 (H) In firing position standing by to shoot, when formation zigged away (a change of course we rather expected).
: 1112-31(H)With large AO bearing 2450 T, distance 3,500 yards, our position - Latitude 11-59.1 N., Longitude 109-20.5 E., fired spread of 4 torpedoes from bow tubes at target.
: 1113-20(H)With trailing AK bearing 2470 T, range 3,000 yards, fired spread of 2 torpedoes from bow tubes at this

— page 107 —
1114 (H) Commander swinging left for stern tube shot as we lost depth control and ducked paraloope. Nearest PC about 1,500 yards, turning towards us. Tube poppet valves closed sluggishly allowing 9 tons of water to flood into the Forward Torpedo Room.

1115 (H) Heard series of three explosions. They are hits but can't see.

1118 (H) Continuing to descend with PC closing range by sound so gave up hopes of stern tube shot and started deep. Rigged for silent running. Explosions heard check for at least two hits on large A0 and one on AK. The AK identified as the Seian Maru, 3,712 tons (Page 128 ONI 208 J).

1122 (H) Two depth charges - light weight but close. There are three of them pinging on us. Commenced evasive maneuvers.

1134 (H) Two depth charges very heavy ones but not so close. Must be the DD.

1151 (H) Heard explosion - distant, not a depth charge. There are three A/S vessels near us. Two go at slow speeds, one pinging and one listening - while the third carries the ball, coming in pinging fast. This shallow restricted water affords us only one exit. The boys up above aren't doping that out very well. All this time pinging was heard on bearing of targets.

1200 (H) Position - Latitude 11-58.3 N, Longitude 109-22 E.

1210 (H) Heard dull explosions and crackling noises over sound gear from direction of target on firing.

1218 (H) Started up for look. Pattern of three depth charges - fairly close. Started back deep. Explosion from direction of targets. Not a depth charge. Still have pinging on bearing of target and ship breaking-up noises.

1230 (H) Six depth charges - fairly close but scattered. Three appeared to be in a pattern and three at random probably from Rufe.

1239 (H) Completed reload and check of torpedoes. Two of the A/S vessels are still with us and two are pinging in the vicinity of targets at point of firing. Still hear crackling noises on that bearing.

— page 108 —
1400 (H) Started up for a look. The A/S vessels have worked about 5-6000 yards off from us.
: 1411 (H) Sighted large column of smoke from targets position on firings. Looks like r-l smoke from ship on fire. Sighted a Rufe headed for periscope, range 31 miles. Headed deep. Believe the AK sank at about 1210(H), and that the tanker was badly damaged and on fire, possibly sank.
: 1540 (H) The A/S vessels were coached on by the plane but they have worked off again. Started up for a look.
: 1552 (H) Sighted a Rufe as he sighted the periscope and banked for it. Range one mile. Headed deep. A/S vessels were again conined on by the plane and are again loaing the trail. Glad their sound gear is not as effective as their pilot's eyes.
: 1910 (H) Sound lost all targets. All clear through periscope.
: 1929 (H) Surfaced.
: 1930 (H) Surfaced.
: 1935 (H) Sighted a large plane from bridge. Range about 6 miles. He was headed towards us and showing a bright white light apparently as a signal. O.O.D. saw plane drop what appeared to be a flare as he cleared the bridge. Submerged. Bright moonlight night.
: 1948 (H) Surfaced. All clear.
: 2012 (H) Sighted vessels signaling bearing 020° T, distance 6 miles. Avoided. An inspection of boat showed following damage:
    1. Sound training motors out of commission (flooded).
    2. SD Radar out of commission.
    3. Grounds in various electrical circuits the most serious being in the IC System. (Lost all IC power not long after surfacing).
    4. Pit log out of commission.
    5. Minor damage to hull fittings. Headed toward eastern side of area to avoid the energetic A/S search and to effect repairs.

Monday, February 7, 1944.

0711 (H) Submerged to complete repairs to sound gear, IC System, and SD Radar.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-35.5 N., Longitude 110-01.5 E.
: 1430 (H) Completed all repairs.
: 1435 (H) Surfaced.
: 1652 (H) Sighted a Zeke from bridge, distance 9 miles, headed for us. Submerged.
: 1726 (H) Surfaced.

— page 109 —
1924 (H) Sent BONEFISH Serial No One.
Tuesday, February 8, 1944.
0803 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar, six miles, not sighted from bridge. Submerged.
0944 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar, eighteen miles, closed range alowly, then opened and faded out. Plane not sighted.
1115 (H) Made landfall on: Ceoir de Mer, closed to 8 miles then headed toward patrol station off Kamranh Bay.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-34.0 N., Longitude 109-08.5 E.
1325 (H) Sighted wooden rectangular life raft in good condition painted white with letters "M.S. ASSOSAN MARU - MITSUI LINE" painted clearly on top. From clean, moss-free surface would estimate it had not been in the water for more than a few days. This raft could have floated from our point of firing on the sixth to this point with the earliest wind and current. Unfortunately I do not believe the ASSOSAN is one of the targets fired at.
2201 (H) Made landfall on Cape Paderan. Headed up the coast, 10 miles off the beach.

Wednesday, February 9, 1944.
0635 (H) Plane exhaust fire sighted, distance 4 miles. Submerged 4 miles off entrance to Kamranh Bay and headed down the coast for submerged patrol about 5 miles off beach.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-30.8 N., Longitude 109-12.2 E.
1255 (H) Sound hears echo-ranging bearing 3300 T. Visibility low, foggy with frequent rain squalls. Sea heavy. Sighted convoy bearing 3510 T, distance 5 miles composed of one large AF, one large AK, four medium AK's and one large AO escorted by one Sigure Class ID and five small escort vessels appearing to be converted yachts. The formation (disposition shown on sketch "B") had one column of the larger ships in two general groups, the AF leading the first group and the AO second in the following group. The escorts were ahead, astern and along port side of the column. The DD was well out to seaward and toward the rear of the formation. He continually zigged in and out echo-ranging. Went to Battle Stations. Commenced closing coast at high speed to intercept convoy. They appeared to be hugging coast at about 2 - 2 1/2 miles off. When entire

— page 110 —
1303 (H) Sighted Rufe type plane over convoy.
: 1309 (H) Identified tanker as the most valuable vessel in convoy and used him as target for approach.
: (Similar to Nissin Maru, Page 279, ONI 208 J - 17,500 tons, except has only one stack).
: 1310 (H) Rigged for depth charge.
: 1320 (H) Made all torpedo tubes ready for firing. Am hoping for a bow shot with zero gyro angle, 100 port track, but position of destroyer is such that he will probably force us to fire early. Sea very choppy.
: 1326 (H) DD hears us - undoubtedly that knocking trim pump - and appears to see the periscope. He is on our starboard beam headed for us with a bone in his teeth, pinging fast, range 1,500 yards. It is shoot now or never.

: 1327-11 (H) With AO bearing 297° T, range 3,000 yards, fired a spread of five torpedoes at the AO. Number six tube could not be fired either electrically or manually. DD observed coming in fast. Headed as deep as we could go in the shallow water, rigged for silent running, commenced evasive maneuvers and stood by for a working over. We got it.
: 1328 (H) Heard a series of four definite torpedo explosions corresponding to torpedo runs for tubes #2,3,4 and 5.
: 1331 (H) First depth charge - close.
: 1333 (H) A salvo of four depth charges - astern but closer.
: 1334 (H) Louder but definitely not funnier.
: 1335 (H) Can now hear four vessels frantically echo-ranging on and about us. We are leaving high-speed knuckles astern of us to keep them distracted as we head for deep water.
: 1336 (H) Fifteen attacks, 29 depth charges with one to four dropped per attack. The Nips are really mad this time.
: 1336 (H) Grounded by the stern in 40 feet of water. We were off right away with no damage. Sound head apparently did not touch and is undamaged.

— page 111 —
1405 (H) Attack - one charge dropped - astern.
: 1407 (H) Attack - one charge dropped - astern but still uncomfortably close.
: 1413 (H) Attack - one charge.
: 1415 (H) Rufe adds his bit with a bomb astern. He must see the mud we have kicked up.
: 1437 (H) Commenced reload forward and check of after torpedoes.
: 1453 (H) Dull explosions, crackling, and normal ship-sinking noises heard from direction of target reach the peak in intensity, gradually subsiding until at.
: 1529 (H) Only faint water noise heard on this bearing. Feel positive ship sank at about 1430 (H).
: 1611 (H) Echo-ranging still heard astern but distant. Secured from silent running, depth charge and battle stations. This vessel weathered its worst depth charging to date like a veteran. Any weaknesses in construction would have been all too apparent. There were none. A total of forty-three depth charges were counted plus a few assorted aerial bombs.
: 1921 (H) Surfaced. All clear.

Thursday, February 10, 1944.

Underway, conducting patrol in assigned area. Seas too rough for a torpedo attack.

0658 (H) Submerged.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-18 N., Longitude 110-07 E.
1712 (H) Surfaced.
1735 (H) Sent BONEFISH Serial No Two.

Friday, February 11, 1944.

Underway, conducting patrol in assigned area. Seas too rough for a torpedo attack.

0705 (H) Submerged for patrol.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-33.5 N., Longitude 110-06.5 E.
1815 (H) Surfaced. Enroute patrol station off Isles des Pocheurs.

— page 112 —
0240 (H) Made landfall on Isles des Pocheurs.
: 0523 (H) Submerged for patrol in close to shore off Isles des Pocheurs.
: 0915 (H) Sound reports echo ranging bearing 215° T. Commenced closing the coast.
: 0940 (H) Sighted convoy bearing 2480 T, headed north hugging coast about two miles off the beach. Convoy consists of one small AK and one medium AK escorted by one Asakaza Class DD and two catcher type patrol boats. For disposition of convoy see sketch "C". Position - Latitude 12-03 N., Longitude 109-23.8 E. Continued closing beach although interception looks extremely doubtful.
: 0948 (H) Sighted two Rufe type float planes circling low over convoy.
: 1018 (H) Convoy passed in between Hon Nai Island and Honnai Point, range 10,000 yards, angle on bow 105° starboard, speed 9½ knots. Cave up the chase.
: 1046 (H) One Rufe, sweeping to seaward of convoy, passed about 3 miles away flying about 50 feet over the water. He looks just like his picture! Convoy passed out of sight around Nui Rauchtran, taking the point very close aboard.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 12-00 N., Longitude 109-21 E. Sighted small AK hugging coast about ½ mile off the beach headed northward. Estimated displacement 300 tons. Too small to attack with torpedoes and not worth risk of surfacing for gun attack. Position - Latitude 11-55.7 N., Longitude 109-19.4 E. Surfaced.

Sunday, February 13, 1944.

Underway, conducting patrol in assigned area.

0636 (H) Submerged for patrol in close to shore just north of entrance to Kamranh Bay.
0830 (H) Sighted small AK (100 tons) headed northward hugging coast about ½ mile off shore. Too small to attack with torpedoes and not worth risk of surface engagement with gun. See sketch "D".
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 11-57 N., Longitude 109-19.2 E. Surfaced.

— page 113 —
0617 (H) Submerged for days patrol in close to coast of Phanrang Bay.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 11-34.7 N., Longitude 109-05.2 E.
: 2132 (H) Sighted AA searchlight in Phanrang Settlement.
    Location - Latitude 11-34.5 N., Longitude 109-00 E.
    The light appeared to be engaged in drill.

Tuesday, February 15, 1944.

: 0553 (H) Submerged for days patrol in close to coast of Capo Padoran.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 11-22.5 N., Longitude 109-06 E.
: 1923 (H) Surface.

Wednesday, February 16, 1944.

: 0042 (H) Stations for Battle Surface.
: 0118 (H) Having closed to 3,500 yards from Cape Padoran Light with target clearly in sight in the moonlight, commenced firing at radio station with the deck gun using H.C. shells fitted with point - detonating fuses.
: 0122 (H) Fire returned from hilltop above Cape Padoran Light by two light caliber machine guns, the shells falling in water about 1,000 yards short.
: 0123 (H) One hit on radio station observed. Four hits in near vicinity.
: 0125 (H) Ceased firing having expended 12 rounds of 4"/50 caliber ammunition. Headed seaward at four engine speed. The results of the firing were very dis-appointing. Firing was slow and erratic. A casualty to the foot-firing mechanism forced firing by lanyard which, together with the fairly large roll of the ship, gave a range pattern of 50 on the hillside. Some damage was done to the radio station by the one hit and several close misses.
: 0129 (H) Secured from battle stations. Set course for patrol station off Richmond Bank.
: 0657 (H) Submerged to avoid expected A/S plane search.
: 1055 (H) Surface.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-18 N., Longitude 110-03 E.

Thursday, February 17, 1944.

Underway, conducting patrol in assigned area. High wind, heavy seas, and low visibility.

— page 114 —
0202 (H) Commenced patrolling on east-west line northwest of Riffleman Bank.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 08-52' N., Longitude 111-05' E.
Friday, February 18, 1944.
Underway, conducting patrol in assigned area. High wind, heavy seas, and low visibility.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 09-26' N., Longitude 110-54' E.
Saturday, February 19, 1944.
Underway, conducting patrol in assigned area. High wind, heavy seas, and low visibility.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-08.5' N., Longitude 110-28' E.
Sunday, February 20, 1944.
Underway, conducting patrol in assigned area. Wind, sea, and visibility unchanged. Frequent rain squalls.
: 0942 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar. Submerged to avoid detection.
: 1007 (H) Surface. All clear.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-51.5' N., Longitude 111-00' E.
Monday, February 21, 1944.
Underway, conducting patrol in assigned area. Wind and sea abating. Visibility still low with frequent rain squalls.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-30.5' N., Longitude 110-51.3' E.
Tuesday, February 22, 1944.
Underway, conducting patrol in assigned area. Weather clear.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 11-10' N., Longitude 111-41' E.
2052 (H) Sent BONEFISH Serial Three.

— page 115 —
0617 (H) Made landfall on Tizard Reef.
0730 (H) Entered Dangerous Ground.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 09-57.3 N., Longitude 115-12.9 E.

2337 (H) Set course for Macassar Strait via Balabac and Sibutu Passage.
2400 (H) Received instructions for 5 day extension of patrol in Sibutu Passage to Lombok Strait area.

Thursday, February 24, 1944.

Underway, enroute Makassar Strait.

0800 (H) Left Dangerous Ground and entered Palawan Passage.
0924 (H) Made landfall on Palawan Island.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 8-18.8 N., Longitude 116-38 E.
2035 (H) Entered Balabac Strait.
2327 (H) Completed uneventful transit of Balabac Strait. Set course for Sibutu Passage.

Friday, February 25, 1944.

Underway, conducting patrol enroute through Sulu Sea.

0723 (H) Made landfall on Bancoran Island.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 07-30 N., Longitude 119-51.5 E.

Saturday, February 26, 1944.

Underway, conducting patrol enroute through Sulu Sea.

0140 (H) Entered Sibutu Passage.
0334 (H) Completed transit of Sibutu Passage and entered Celebes Sea. Set course for patrol station off North Watoher Island.
0831 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar - 17 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.
0848 (H) Surfaced. All clear.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 03-33 N., Longitude 120-46.5 E.

— page 116 —
0530 (H) Made landfall on North Watcher Island.
0538 (H) Sighted small vessel occupying approximate position we've chosen for patrol station just north of the island.
0548 (H) Vessel identified as small catcher type patrol craft. He appears to be stopped. Sound reports he is choo- ranging. Continued to close to see what he will do.
0605 (H) Visibility increased now with coming sunrise showing patrol craft alone and not escorting. As he is in too close to beach to safely attack with a land blanked SD Radar, swung out to seaward and commenced running to clear him into a chase. Apparently honorable ancestors decided time not right for becoming honorable hero. He won't chase.
0703 (H) Plane contact on the SD Radar - 12 miles. Submerged.
0809 (H) Surfaced. All clear.
0910 (H) Through high periscope sighted what appeared to be a submarine on the surface in vicinity of position where we sighted patrol craft earlier.
0915 (H) Vessel appearing to be a submarine seemed to submerge. This might be the RASHER. If it was not the RASHER, identification through the periscope at the range was not positive enough to make any conclusions as to its actions. Set course for Balikpapan via Mangkalhati route.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 00-36 N., Longitude 119-56 E. Plane contact on SD Radar - 12 miles - as Rufe sighted from bridge flying low headed toward us. Submerged.
1603 (H) Surfaced. All clear.
1702 (H) Sighted Zeke from bridge - 12 miles - abeam on a parallel course flying low. Submerged.
1809 (H) Surfaced. All clear.
1905 (H) Crossed equator.
2250 (H) Exchanged signals with RASHER via voice modulation circuit.

Monday, February 28, 1944.

Underway, conducting patrol through Makassar Strait.

0521 (H) Sighted searchlight display in Balikpapan.

— page 117 —
0840 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar - 20 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.
0853 (H) Surfaced. All clear.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 3-23 S., Longitude 116-31 E.
1355 (H) Passed Cape William abeam to port. Low visibility with intermittent rain squalls.
1415 (H) Sighted Rufe - 10 miles. No Radar contact.
1437 (H) Submerged. All clear.
1609 (H) Sighted Zeke - 7 miles - flying in the clouds. Again no Radar contact. Submerged to avoid detection and to check SD Radar.
1842 (H) Surfaced. All clear.

Tuesday, February 29, 1944.

Underway, patrolling enroute to station off Kapopasang Light.

0615 (H) Sighted Kapopasang Light.
0621 (H) Submerged for patrol in close to light.
0925 (H) Sighted catcher type patrol craft headed southward.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 4-34 S., Longitude 118-49 E.
1836 (H) Surfaced. Enroute De Bril Bank.

Wednesday, March 1, 1944.

0242 (H) Landfall on De Bril Bank light.
0530 (H) Submerged for patrol off P.V. Dayang Dayangan light, approaches to Makassar City.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 5-29.5 S., Longitude 118-43.6 E.
1229 (H) Surfaced.
1249 (H) Sighted Rufe - 14 miles. Submerged.
1324 (H) Surfaced. All clear.
1742 (H) Set course for Saleier Pass.

Thursday, March 2, 1944.

Underway, conducting patrol in Flores Sea enroute Saleier Pass.

0304 (H) Landfall on Saleier Island.
0530 (H) Submerged for patrol in Saleier Pass.

— page 118 —
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 5-43.5 S., Longitude 120-23.2 E.
: Several sailboats - native presumably - in sight
: throughout the day.
: 1828 (H) Surface. Enroute Lombok Strait.

Friday, March 3, 1944.

Underway, conducting patrol through Flores Sea
enroute Lombok Strait.

: 1109 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar - 14 miles. Submerged.
: 1128 (H) Surfaced. All clear.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 06-51.9 S., Longitude 117-20.9 E.
: 1704 (H) Landfall on Lombok Island.
: 2220 (H) Sighted a small vessel in close ashore north of
: Lombok Island headed westward. Closed range to
: investigate.
: 2242 (H) Range 5,500 yards. Identified vessel as a patrol
: craft about the size of a large PC or small DE and
: sighted an accompanying motor boat. Swung to the
: northwestward to open the range and avoid detection.
: Vessels seemed to be patrolling the northern entrance
: to Lombok, starting and stopping, making about six
: knots good. No echo ranging could be heard.
: 2337 (H) Sighted three small vessels to eastward headed
: us, closing the range slowly. They looked like
: motor boats. Sighted still another boat join the
: first patrol vessel sighted. Swung to southwestward
: at slow speed to ease in between the two groups,
: maintaining visual contact to avoid any unpleasant
: surprises and awaiting the setting of the all-too
: bright moon for the dash through Lombok Strait.
: The prospects for a peaceful trip through are be-
: ginning to look a bit dim.

Saturday, March 4, 1944.

0043 (H) Headed in to Lombok Strait. Patrol vessels still in
: sight, one group on either quarter.
: 0300 (H) Completed transit of Lombok Strait, entered Indian
: Ocean, and set course for Emouth Gulf.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 12-07.9 S., Longitude 114-52.2 E.

Sunday, March 5 - Monday, March 6, 1944.

Underway, enroute Emouth Gulf.

— page 119 —
1000 (H) Sent Bonerfish Serial No. 4.
: 1200 (H) Position-Latitude 16-33 S., Longitude 113-42.4 E.
: Monday, March 6, 1944.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 19-35.6 S., Longitude 113-01.8 E.
: Tuesday, March 7, 1944.
: 0047 (H) Landfall on Northwest Cap. Western Australia.
: 0709 (H) Moored alongside fuel bar, Exmouth Gulf, commenced fueling.
: 1000 (H) Completed fueling, tank aboard 11,776 gallons fuel and limited amount of provisions available.
: 1011 (H) Underway, enroute Fremantle, Western Australia.
: 1156 (H) Sent Bonerfish Serial No. 5.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 21-50 S., Longitude 114-12.8 E.
: Wednesday, March 8, 1944.
: 0445 (H) Received ComTaskFor 71, Serial 55, reversed course, enroute Exmouth Gulf.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 22-11.5 S., Longitude 113-26.3 E.
: 1721 (H) Moored alongside fuel barge Exmouth Gulf, Western Australia, commenced fueling ship.
: Thursday, March 9, 1944.
: 0742 (H) Completed fueling ship to capacity receiving 75,462 gallons fuel, took aboard a small amount of provisions (the fresh meat was most welcome) and got underway enroute patrol station: Latitude 22-00 S., Longitude 109-00 E.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 22-45.3 S., Longitude 113-37.4 E.
: 1517 (H) Exchanged recognition signals with friendly PBY.
: Friday, March 10, 1944.
: 0315 (H) Arrived at assigned station and commenced patrolling on an East - West line at two engine speed.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 21-59.3 S., Longitude 108-49.7 E.
: Saturday, March 11, 1944.
: 0925 (H) Exchanged recognition signals with friendly PBY.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 23-03 S., Longitude 109-45.7 E.
: Sunday, March 12, 1944.
: 0109 (H) Received ComTaskFor 71 Serial 75 directing return to port. Enroute Fremantle, Western Australia.
: 0815 (H) Sent Bonerfish Serial No. 6.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 18-41.4 S., Longitude 110-33 E.
: 1700 (H) Sent Bonerfish Serial No. 7.
: Monday, March 13, 1944.
: 1200 (H) Underway enroute Fremantle, Western Australia.
: Arrived Fremantle, Western Australia, completed.

— page 120 —
51 Type.
DD ASAKAZU CLASS.
PC's See Sketch Above.

For composition of Convoy see reverse side of this sheet.

SKETCH "A" CONVOY
ATTACKED 1112(H)
February 6,1944.

— page 125 —
1. 0613 1/22/24 02-40 S 118-07 E 2. 0840 2/6/44 12-01.8 N 109-24.6E 3. 1010 2/6/44 12-00.5 N 109-23.3E 4. 1255 2/9/44 11-30.6 N 109-12 E 5. 0940 2/12/44 12-03 N 109-23.8E 6. 1532 2/12/44 11-55.7 N 109-29.4 E 7. 0830 2/13/44 11-57.2 N 109-20.5 E 8. 0548 2/27/44 0-57 N 119-41 E 9. 0925 2/29/44 04-36 S 118-50 E 10. 2220 3/3/44 8-00 S 116-00 E 11. 2337 3/3/44 8 - 06 S 116-00 E

ACTION TAKEN - No 1 - Sank; No. 2 - Closed; No. 3 Attacked; No. 4 - Attacked; No. 5 - Closed unable to attack; No. 6 - too small to attack; No. 7 - Too small to attack; No. 8 - Avoided; No. 9 - Avoided; No. 10 - Investigated, then avoided; No. 11 - Avoided.

— page 126 —
1/22/44 21-48 S  OB-20 7 110° T  R
1. 1225 12/1/44 29-32 S  PBY 7 314° T  SD
2. 0624 1/15/44 21-48 S  OB-20 7 110° T  R
3. 1720 1/15/44 21-48 S  OB-20 1 002° T  R
4. 1721 1/15/44 21-48 S  OB-20 7 182° T  SD
5. 1245 1/16/44 17-40 S  Unident. 16 --  R
6. 1550 1/17/44 12-01 S  " 7 187° T  SD
7. 1328 1/22/44 00-53.7 S  DAVE 10 220° T  SD
8. 1602 1/22/44 00-49 S.  Unident. 14 --  R
9. 1610 1/22/44 00-49 S  Reconn. 7 1400 T  SD
10. 0734 1/23/44 01-46 N  Unident. 9 --  R
11. 1552 1/23/44 02-16 N  Unident 8 180° T  SD
12. 1123 1/29/44 11-33 N  Unident 14 --  R
13. 1351 1/31/44 11-20 N  ROPE 8 --  R
14. 2000 2/4/44 11-38 N  Unident. 14 345° T  SN
15. 0905 2/6/44 12-01.8 N  ROPE 12 --  P
16. 1935 2/6/44 11-43 N  Unident. 10 010° T  SN
17. 1652 2/7/44 10-37 N  ZEKE 9 073° T  SD
18. 1652 2/7/44 10-37 N  ZEKE 9 073° T  SD

— page 127 —
19.1045 2/8/44 10-35 N 109-47 E
: 20.0695 2/9/44 10-41.5 N 109-18.0 E
: 21.1300 2/9/44 10-31.0 N 109-10.0 E
: 22.0948 2/12/44 12-03.2 N 109-23.7 E
: 23.1027 2/12/44 12-03.2 N 109-23.7 E
: 24.0942 2/20/44 10-47 N 110-50 E
: 25.0831-2/26/44 04-03.8 N 119-44.1 E
: 26.0703 2/27/44 00-50 N 119-32 E
: 27.1419 2/27/44 00-26 N 118-38 E
: 28.1702 2/27/44 00-17 N 118-31 E
: 29.0840 2/28/44 02-11 S 117-43 E
: 30.1415 2/23/44 02-39.5 S 118-27.7 E
: 31.1609 2/28/44 03-04 S 118-30 E
: 32.1249 3/1/44 5-30 S 118-40 E
: 33.1109 3/3/44 06-49.5 S 117-24.2 E

ACTION TAKEN: - No. 1 - Stood by flare; No. 2 - Stood by flare;
No. 3 - Stood by flare; No. 4 - Stood by flare; No. 5 - Dived;
No. 6 - Dived; No. 7 - Dived; No. 8 - Stood by to dive; No. 9 -
Dived; No. 10 - Dived; No. 11 - Dived; No. 12 - Dived; No. 13 -
Dived; No. 14 - Dived; No. 15 - No action; No. 16 - Dived;
No. 17 - Dived; No. 18 - Dived; No. 19 - No action; No. 20 -
action; No. 21 - No action; No. 22 - No action; No. 23 - No
action; No. 24 - Dived; No. 25 - Dived; No. 26 - Dived;
No. 27 - Dived; No. 28 - Dived; No. 29 - Dived; No. 30 -
Dived; No. 31 - Dived; No. 32 - Dived; No. 33 - Dived.

— page 128 —
6. CONFIDENTIAL

(H) ATTACK DATA.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. BONEFISH TORPEDO ATTACK NO. One PATROL NO. Three

Time: 1108(H) Date 2/6/44 Lat. 11-59.1 N. Long. 109-20.5 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Visibility low. Frequent rain squalls. Sea calm. Sighted convoy through periscope as the ships came out of a rain squall at 10,000 yards. The ships were hugging the coast at about two and one half miles, making only normal navigational changes of course. The convoy consisted of two compact groups. The first group was made up of - one large AP, three medium AK's escorted by three SC's. Landing barges were seen on the decks of two of the AK's. The second group consisted of one very large AO, one small AO, and three medium AK's, escorted by four catcher type PC's. Trailing the convoy at about 2,000 yards was an Asakaze Class destroyer. Hovering over the convoy was one Rufe type plane flying very low. A sketch of this convoy is included in this report as Sketch "A". A rough drawing of the small AO is also shown on sketch "A". This type vessel could not be found in any identification book. The ships all seemed to be fairly new and in good condition.

As the convoy was not zig-zagging and we were at a considerable distance off the track on sighting, the approach amounted to merely closing the coast as quickly as possible to get within firing range of the second group as the convoy emerged from between the Isles des Pecheurs and Point Honnaï (mainland).

In the attack, four bow tubes were fired at the large AO and two bow tubes were fired at the medium AK on the port quarter of the AO. It was intended to fire the four stern tubes into this target group but quick A/S measures coupled with temporary loss of depth control prevented further firing.

Ships Sunk:
(a) Number: One.
(b) Type: AK SENAN MARU (Page 128, ONI 208 J).
(c) Tonnage: 3,712 tons.

— page 129 —
20 knots Course: 2230 T Depth: 63' Angle: 0-10' D.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data.

Type Attack: The attack was made while submerged using periscope observation for information for approach and firing. Sound: QO, JK; and JP - was used for tracking escort movements and checking run of torpedoes.

- 28 -

— page 130 —
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Zone Time 1112-31 1112-43 1111-53 1113-01 1113-20 1113-30
Range 3500 3500 3500 3500 3000 3000
Torpedo Run 3750 3750 3750 3800 3200 3200
Target Bearing 2450 2440 2440 2430 2470 2470
Track Angle 118°P 119°P 120°P 120°P 117°P 118°P
Gyro Angle 012°30' 012°30' 012°30' 013°00' 015°00' 016°
Depth Set 10' 10' 10' 10' 10' 10'
Power High High High High High High
Hit or Miss Hit Hit Hit
Erratic HSN HSN HSN HSN HSN HSN
Mark Torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial Number 39394 24061 24443 24785 24602 25237
Mark Exploder 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial Number 6515 6427 7661 7031 7028 7006
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact.
Actuation Actual -- Contact Contact -- Contact

— page 131 —
6, 1944.
: CONFIDENTIAL
: Composition of Convoy attacked 1112(H) on February
: 6, 1944.

| Number | Type | Approx. Size | Remarks |
|-------|------|||
| 1     | AP  | Large      | First Sighted |
| 2     | AK  | Medium     | Carrying Landing Barges Same |
| 3     | AK  | Medium     |         |
| 4     | AK  | Medium     |         |
| 5     | AK  | Medium     |         |
| 6     | AK  | Medium     | Second Target |
| 7     | AK  | Medium     |         |
| 8     | AO  | Large      | First Target 2 Stacks Aft. See Sketch "A" |
| 9     | AO  | Small      |         |

— page 132 —
1. U.S.S. BONEFISH, TORPEDO ATTACK NO TWO PATROL NO THREE
Time: 1237(H) Date: 2/9/44 Lat. 11-30.4N. Long. 109-09.7 E.

Target: Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Sea rough. Visibility low with frequent rain squalls. Sighted convoy through the periscope while submerged, bearing 351° T, distance 5 miles. The convoy again was composed of two target groups. A large AP led the first group followed by two medium AK's. A large AO was second in the trailing group. One large AK was ahead of the AO and two medium AK's followed it. For disposition see sketch "B". The ships were formed in column and scattered a steady course conforming to the coast line, about two miles off the beach. Five converted yacht type escorts formed a screen around the larger ships. One Sliger class destroyer covered the rear and seaward side of the column. It zigged continuously, echo ranging steadily, and proved to be of first team caliber. The convoy presented a generally poor condition in contrast to the one attacked on February 6, 1944. The AO was identified as the NISSIN MARU, being almost a twin sister of the TORAN NARU except it had only a single stack aft, and did not have the raised platform between the islands. As the AO was the most valuable vessel in the convoy, it was chosen as the target for attack. One Rufe type plane provided air coverage.

The approach amounted to closing the coast to decrease the firing range as much as possible. The destroyer was in such a position that it was necessary to place the submarine dead ahead of him in order to obtain a favorable firing position on the tanker. After reaching this position and standing by to shoot, held fire with gyro angles decreasing until it was obvious that the destroyer had detected us. Destroyer was about 1,500 yards range. It was intended to fire six bow tubes at the tanker but tube #6 failed to fire either electrically or by hand.

Ships Sunk:
(a) Number: One.
(b) Type: NISSIN NARU (Page 279 ONI 208 J), converted as AO.
(c) Tonnage: 17,500 tons.

Damage Determined By: Four definite torpedo hits were heard.
(a) Tube 2 at 1329-06, fired at 1327-19; (b) Tube 3 at 1329-13, fired at 1327-26; (c) Tube 4 at 1329, fired at 1327-39; (d) Tube 5 at 1329-34, fired at 1327-47;

— page 134 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Tube Fired #1 #2 #3 #4 #5
Zone Time 1327-11 1327-19 1327-26 1327-39 1327-47
Range 3,000 2,990 2,980 2,970 2,960
Torpedo Run 3025 3025 3025 3025 3025
Target Bearing 297° 296°30' 296° 295° 294°30'
Track Angle 100° 100° 101° 102° 103°
Gyro Angle 024°30' 024°30' 024°15' 023°45' 023°30'
Depth Set 10' 10' 10' 10' 10'
Power High High High High High
Hit. or Miss Hit Hit Hit Hit
Erratic HSN HSN HSN HSN HSN
Mark Torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial Number 24409 25369 24425 25523 24982
Mark Explorer 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial Number 10217 6482 7001 6371 6901
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual Miss Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
Mark Werhead 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
Serial Number 5822 3775 1618 10172 5938
Explosive TPX TPX TPX TPX TPX
Type Spread 10L 10L 10L 10L 10L
See Cond.1.cor.5 Heavy Seas - visibility low - Rain Squalls
Crew: 1 Activity U.S.S. PELIAS (all torpedoes)
Miss due to Spread - - - - -

— page 135 —
9, 1944. - See Sketch "B".

| Number | Type | Size | Remarks |
|-------|------|------||
| 1     | AP  | Large | 2 Decks - M-F-M |
| 2     | AK  | Medium | LONDON MARU Type |
| 3     | AK  | Medium | Same |
| 4     | AK  | Large | K-F-K |
| 5     | AO  | Large | NISSIN I-ARU - 17,500 Tons, Single Stack Art. M-F-M |
| 6     | AK  | Medium | LONDON MARU Type |
| 7     | AK  | Medium | LONDON MARU Type |
| 8     | DD  | Small | SIGURE Class |
| 9     | E    | Assorted | Converted Yachts Kto. |

— page 137 —
U.S.S. BONEFISH
GUN ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. BONEFISH  GUN ATTACK No. TWO  PATROL No. THREE.

Time: 0117 (H)  Date: 2/16/44  Lat. 11-22 N, Long. 109-01 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflated

Ships Damaged:  Number:  Land Target.
Type:  Target was radio station Cape
    Paderan, French Indo China.
Identity Established:  Reconnaissance made
    for several days previous to firing.

Damage Determined By:  Witnessed one hit on radio station and
    several near misses.

Type of Guns Used:  4"/50 caliber, deck gun.

- Type Ammunition and Number of Rounds Fired:  High Capacity,
    Mar. 28-6 Fuse - 12 rounds fired.

Effectiveness of Fire:  Very poor with only one hit observed,
    and few hits in target area.

Average Range:  Average hitting gun range was 4,700 yards.
    Average Radar range was 3,900 yards.

Fire Control:  Control of fire was through a spotting officer
    on the bridge.  Initial setup was obtained from Radar
    range.  "Telling range 4,000 - scale 105; second round 5,000
    Fatal hit: target round 4,700 - 107.  No further changes.
    This firing was not effective.  Heavy swells caused considerable
    roll to the ship.

- 34 -

— page 138 —
1) MINES.
No enemy minelaying, minesweeping or degaussing operations were observed.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND VASION TACTICS.

It was noted that on February 6, 1944, escort craft (4) came up the coast from the south making a normal search and joined a convoy in the vicinity of Isle Des Pêcheurs. The enemy are employing Rufe and Zekes for air coverage, planes flying ahead of and circling convoy at from 100 to 500 feet altitude. Air patrols precede convoys by at least one day. Convoy are using routes very close in to coast, do not zig zag but steam a course roughly conforming to coast. A destroyer of the A team follows the convoy and a little to seaward. Echo ranging is very strong and a system of searching is used.

Depth charge attacks are carried out by two or more escorts. which get on each quarter, one listening and the other pinging, coming in on a constant bearing and then throwing from one to four charges at varying depths. The plane escort assists. Other escorts remain in vicinity of damaged ships pinging their hearts out. The counter attacks are persistent and thorough. Personally I think the caliber of anti-submarine vessels in the South China Sea has shown a decided improvement. The DD on February 9th obtained contact at about 2,000 yards by echo ranging. The extensive air coverage now being used combined with close inshore routes makes it necessary to conduct a patrol submerged in fairly shallow water.

Evasion tactics employed to date has been to put the A/S vessel(s) astern and keep them there running as silently as possible. This would not work on February 6th and 9th. High speed turns were employed to give knuckles of churned water for echo ranging targets for the A/S vessels. These proved successful.

— page 139 —
1. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGES.
   No new defects were noted. The major defects listed herewith have been commented upon previously. They remain unchanged and no less burdensome for their familiarity.
   (a) Overspeeding of the Auxiliary Motors during battery charges.
   (b) Heavy smoking of the main engines.
   (c) Noisy operation of the reciprocating type trim pump.

This vessel grounded while submerged and engaged in evasive tactics on February 9, 1944. Although no evident damage was done it is felt that the possibility of the presence of some unknown damage plus the fouled condition of bottom and sea valves makes a drydocking during the coming refit advisable.

(L) RADIO.
   No major defects or damage was experienced. The only noteworthy item in regard to radio communication was the extreme distance at which the voice modulation inter-communications system between boats could be heard.

On February 27, 1944, this vessel was called via the voice modulation circuit by the U.S.S. RASHER. It is believed that the two boats were separated by several hundred miles at the time. Signals could be heard clearly. On March 3, 1944, signals between the RATON, PUFFER and RASHER could be heard clearly. This vessel was in Lombok Strait, the PUFFER and RATON were in the South China Sea, and the RASHER was probably in the Celebes Sea.

The incident of the exchange of signals with the U.S.S. RASHER points out the necessity for extreme caution in the use of the voice modulation system. The BONEFISH was patrolling off the approaches to BALKAPAPEN with the RASHER gave our call. Believing the RASHER had contact information, we answered the call. A two-way radio discussion lasting for about fifteen minutes ensued which eventually gained nothing but a test of signal strength and a warning to the Nips that we were about. Tactically, a rendezvous between boats operating in the same or adjacent areas is in-valuable. It is not believed however that radio should be used blindly for this purpose where the two boats are not in actual visual contact with each other.

— page 140 —
1. RADAR.
No major defects or damage was experienced with the SJ-1 Radar. Its consistently excellent performance on this patrol proved its reliability as shown on the first two patrols of this vessel. Landfalls were normally made on peaks at 25 - 30 miles and on low flat islands, trees, or rocks at 5 - 10 miles depending upon the height of the target.

In reduced visibility this vessel was able to pilot through restricted waters safely using only radar ranges and bearings.

The general performance of the SD-Radar was good. In clear weather the radar normally detected planes at ranges of other 14 or 20 miles. During damp weather or light rains excessive arcing of the antenna made plane detection unreliable. During a light rain on the afternoon of February 28, 1944, on two occasions a plane was sighted from the bridge with no radar contact.

A weather proof type SD Radar antenna is urgently needed.

Excessive failure of the SD Radar tube 8014-A experienced on this patrol indicates that an increase of the present spare tube allowance from 100 to 300 percent is a military necessity.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

No abnormal sound conditions were observed.

On February 6, 1944, the forward torpedo room bilge was partially flooded, grounding out both sound training motors. In attempting to effect repairs it was evident that spare field coils for all motors should be carried aboard.

The JP-1 sound equipment again proved its unreliability. Its sound detection is good, but the present type shafting and training mechanism installed is unsatisfactory. The equipment has been out of commission since February 9, 1944, due to grounding out through the shafting.

(Q) DENSITY LAYERS.

None observed.

— page 141 —
CONFIDENTIAL

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY.

Health - Generally good - Some cases of light food poisoning.

Food - In general well-prepared. Only four meals of very tough fowl were available. Tinned ham and fresh pork were palatable. The beef, which was issued to this vessel for this patrol was disagreeable. Various methods of preparation were tried with the only success of being able to pierce the gravy with a fork. Even after the beef was passed several times through a meat grinder to make hamburger steaks or meat loaf, it was so stringy and tough that only about 20% of it was consumed by the hardier souls with regard to the taste and cost. An enormous amount of condiments were used to cover the flavor and odor of the beef and lamb chops. Extensive use of beef was made to render the beef stock for soups which were enjoyed by all hands and was very nourishing. It is considered that a more thorough, system of inspection, and more careful examination by quality, be employed by those having charge of supplying frozen meats to submarines on patrol. The limited storage space available makes it necessary that every piece of meat be usable in some manner.

Chief Machinist's Mate, U.S. Navy, Chief Auxiliaryman of the vessel did excellent work in experimenting and perfecting a scheme for volume of ventilation vs volume of refrigerant for air conditioning which kept the boat comfortable at all times in a hot and sultry climate.

(Q) PERSONNEL.

Officers: For the first time this vessel carried a total of 8 officers on patrol. This proved to be invaluable in that it released the Executive Officer and Navigator from watch standing and allowed him to have closer supervision over the training of both officers and men.

Enlisted men: This vessel has a total of 32 of the original commissioning crew of 69 men aboard for its third patrol. It is considered that, as the number of experienced submarine men for replacements from the relief crew is small, a reduction of 17 experienced men would be too drastic a cut in the crew and that the overall replacement or relief for other reasons of 100% of the original crew will have to take place over a period of 5 patrols rather than the 4 (25% each patrol) patrols as originally intended.

— page 142 —
4.2
CONFIDEN TIAL

(R) NILES STRAUSS & FUEL USED.

Fremantle to Area 1738 miles, 18,472 gallons.
In Area 6,661.2 miles, 55,048 gallons.
Area to Fremantle 2,896.8 miles, 45,738 gallons.

(S) DURATION.

Days enroute to area - 6 days.
Days in area - 45 days.
Days enroute to base - 12 days.
Days submerged - 18 days.

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE RETAINING.

Torpedoes    Fuel     Provisions  Personnel Factor
13    68,313 gal.   20 days   30 days

(U) REMARKS.

Factor determining length of patrol - orders.

- 39 -

— page 143 —
21APR 1944
: FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
: BONEFISH report of
: Third War Patrol.
: From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
: To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
: Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Third War Patrol.
: 1. Forwarded.

O. L. LIVDAHL,
By direction.

— page 145 —
1- XAO (NISSEN LARU TYPE) - - - - 17,500 Tons
1- AK (SEIAN MARU TYPE) - - - - 3,712 Tons
+1 - Sailboat

— page 146 —
72-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12-bit

Serial 0318

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 11 April 1944

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS BONEFISH Conf. Ltr.
Δ16-3 Serial 0168 dated
23 March, 1944. Report
of 3rd War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Third War Patrol - Comment on.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (3) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav (2) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav Op-23c (1)
Com1stFlt (1)
Com2ndFlt (1)
Com3rdFlt (1)
Com7thFlt (1)
Consubs 1stFlt (4)
Consubs 2ndFlt (4)
ComTaskFor-1 (2)
ComSubfor-12 (1)
ComSubRon-12 (1)
DivCons Ron-12 (1)
DivCons Ron-16 (1)
S/M School N.L. Conn. (2)
Each S/M W.A. (1) - NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN.

F. F. STRAUB, Jr.
Flag Secretary.

— page 148 —
1. U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS 223)
: Care of Fleet Post Office,
: San Francisco, Calif.
: May 30, 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels).

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH, Report of War Patrol Number Four.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the fourth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the Celebes Sea - Sulu Sea Area during the period April 15, 1944, to May 30, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

T. W. HOGAN.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY CDR-692099 DATE 3/24/42

DECLASSIFIED

— page 150 —
1944
April 13 - 15, 1944.
Underway on fourth war patrol enroute Exmouth Gulf, Western Australia, in company with U.S.S. CHANTICLEER. Conducting various training exercises using the CHANTICLEER as the target for night and day approaches.

Sunday, April 16, 1944.
Underway as before. Sugar Jig Radar range unit and Talk-back communication system out of commission.

0100 (H) Sent Bonifish Serial No One requesting needed spares be sent to Exmouth Gulf.
0223 (H) Anchored in Exmouth Gulf.
0713 (H) Moored alongside the oil barge and commenced fueling ship.
1215 (H) Completed fueling ship, having received 17,000 gallons fuel.
1819 (H) Completed repairs and test to S J Radar.
Underway enroute patrol area via Ombai Strait, and Sibu Passagero. Continuing work on Talk-Back System.

April 17 - 19, 1944.
Underway enroute patrol area via Ombai Strait, holding daily diving and fire control drills.

Thursday, April 20, 1944.
Underway enroute patrol area via Ombai Strait.

0540 (H) Submerged in the narrows of Ombai Strait.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 8-46 S., Longitude 124-16 E.
1810 (H) Surface, proceeding through the Strait.
1900 (H) Received orders changing our patrol area to the Colobes Sea, West of 125-30 East Longitude and our routing via Banda Sea and Molukka Passage.

2300 (H) Completed transit of Ombai Strait, entered Banda Sea, and set course for Molukka Passage keeping to the west of Boeroe Island. No enemy activity of any nature was seen in the Sawoe Sea - Ombai Strait area. No plane or ship contacts were made. #3 and #4 main engine muffler exhaust elbows commenced leaking exhaust gas and sparks, causing us to leave a disconcerting roar and flame.

— page 152 —
1703 (H) Surfaced.

Monday, April 24, 1944.

0152 (H) Commenced patrol in Sarangani Strait.
0453 (H) Submerged, patrolling about five miles off Tinaca Point.
1040 (H) Sighted smoke bearing 063° T, drawing slowly to the right, came to the normal approach course.
1050 (H) Sighted masts of vessel under smoke bearing 066° T, range about 15,000 yards. Battles Stations.
1118 (H) Identified target as an AK similar to the ARGUN MARU (Page 247, ONI 208-J, rovised). Target is being led by a Chidori type escort and is encircled by six small vessels. All the small ones look exactly alike and appear to be small mine layers or mine sweeps. Target angle on the bow is 5 starboard. It looks like he is headed for the middle of the Strait which puts us in a good firing position. He is not zig-zagging. Speed 7 knots. I can not understand the presence of all these escorts. They appear to be running at slow speed, listening. They are not one-to-one-ranging.
1123 (H) Target changed course to pass Tinaca Point close aboard. That maneuver put us well outside shooting range. Commenced closing track to the northward hoping he would start zig-zagging and zig over this way.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 5-31.5 N., Longitude 125-16.5E. Target got by, hugging the coast, not more than a quarter of a mile off the beach, headed westward, closest range 5,500 yards. I decided that rather than take a long range shot with its low chance of hitting, I would trail and attack tonight. A close inspection of the group showed that the six small vessels were probably minelayers or minesweeps. They carried depth charges but no fixed guns. The AK was probably the tender for the group. With the Chidori and the AK removed from the problem with our torpedoes, the minelayers would make good gun targets. A night surface attack seemed to afford the best opportunity for doing the most damage to them.
1216 (H) Sighted smoke bearing 082° T.
1221 (H) Sighted masts of three vessels headed for the Strait from Davao Gulf. Commenced closing Tinaca Point to intercept.
1301 (H) Identified targets as three sea trucks of about 200 tons displacement, heavily laden, carrying a large amount of dock cargo. Broke off approach. All too small for torpedo attack. I decided they

— page 153 —
1304 (H) would make secondary gun targets tonight.
: 1818 (H) Secured from battle stations.
: 2100 (H) Surfaced. Commenced pursuit of targets, following the coastline to the westward at six miles off the beach. Going ahead at three engine speed, charging on the fourth plus the Auxiliary Engine. Passed the three sea trucks. They are steaming at 7 knots, 5 miles off the beach. I planned on coming back to them after attacking the first target group.
: 2130 (H) Completed the battery charge. Going ahead at four engine speed.
: 2330 (H) By plot we should be within radar range of target now. Continued following coast.

Tuesday, April 25, 1944

0140 (H) As we have not contacted the target and are now halfway up the coast of Moro Gulf, I decided the target either went into a cove and anchored over night or headed across the Gulf for Basilan Strait. Headed for intercept point on targets estimated track for Basilan Strait.
: 0412 (H) Arrived on target's estimated track at his estimated position. Slowed to one engine and headed toward Basilan Strait.
: 0620 (H) Arrived thirty-five miles off Basilan Island - estimated minimum limit outside of SD Radar detection range - and commenced surface patrol north and south across target's estimated track. Plane contact on SD Radar.
: 0847 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar.
: 0848 (H) SD Radar lost contact.
: 1000 (H) Two plane contacts on SD Radar.
: 1004 (H) One plane closing fast. Submerged to avoid detection.
: 1042 (H) Surfaced.
: 1049 (H) Sighted Basilan Island.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 6-48.5 N., Longitude 123-39 E. Sighted a DAVE at 14 miles leaving long trail of black exhaust smoke.
: 1548 (H) Plane headed to close us. Dived to avoid detection.
: 1629 (H) Surfaced.
: 1635 (H) As I believed that target could not get by us into Basilan Strait unsighted, I felt that he must have put in to some small port along the south coast of Mindanao. Headed back toward Sarangani Strait at two engine speed, searching along Mindanao coast; I tried to six miles off the beach, hoping I would pick him up.

— page 154 —
2255 (H) SJ Radar contact on two small targets, range 5,000 yards. Commenced tracking. No moon. Visibility very low. Targets not sighted. Targets plotted course 2700 T, speed 8 knots. Shifted to battery and commenced closing the range. 2315 (H) Closed range to 2,800 yards. Still could not see targets but could hear high speed gasoline engine exhaust. Believe they were two small sampans on patrol. As visibility was too low to see them, it was too low to shoot them, and at 2323 (H) Headed toward Sarangani Strait at two engine speed.

Wednesday, April 26, 1944.

: 0428 (H) Submerged for patrol in Sarangani Strait. Sighted a DAVE apparently patrolling in the east entrance to the Strait. Position - Latitude 5-30.8 N., Longitude 125-22 E. 1200 (H) Sighted masts of a vessel bearing 3360 T, range 15,000 yards, headed for the Strait. Battle Stations. Commenced closing estimated track. We had trouble maintaining station in the Strait due to a strong current setting us southwest. Target headed to pass Tineao Point close aboard. Commenced closing the north coast of the Strait at full speed bucking a two knot current. Target has two SC escorts with him, both patrolling outboard of him, one on the bow and one on the quarter. They are the same type as the five sighted and identified as minesweeps or minelayers on the 24th. 1506 (H) Target got by. Range 8,500 yards. Angle on the bow 110 starboard. Running very close to the beach. Decided I would trail and attack tonight. Target identified as an AK, the MYOGI MARU (Page 208 ONI 208-J revised). She was very heavily laden with a large amount of deck cargo. She burned coal and smoked profusely. Sighted another SC rounding the point, coming down from Davao Gulf. This vessel joined the target, froming up as an additional screen. He was about the size of one of our FC's. Target passed out of sight around Bukio Point, heading for Davao. 1540 (H) Sighted a patrol vessel similar to minesweeps previously mentioned in vicinity of Sarangani Island heading for Davao. 1642 (H) Sighted a small sampan to the west headed for Sarangani Strait. He looked like a ferry boat. This Strait is a busy cross road.

— page 155 —
1833 (H) Surfaced in pursuit of the AK; at three engine speed, charging on the fourth, and following along Mindanao coast toward Davao about five to six miles off the beach. Estimated time of contact - 2100. Commenced warning up radio transmitter to tell the U.S.S. PARGO we were chasing in his area if we contacted him. Passed the patrol vessel sighted at 1642. He was running about three miles off the beach. Radar contact on the target bearing 34.8° T, 10,000 yards. Battle stations. Commenced tracking and working up on his starboard bow. Target group consists of the AK and three escorts. They are making 8 knots, steering a straight course conforming to the coast line, about three miles off the beach. One escort is about 500 yards ahead of the AK and two escorts about 350 yards astern, one on either quarter.

COAST

SC
AK
SC
SS
SKETCH "A"

The night was dark and hazy. No moon. Against the land background the targets could not be seen. Radar P.P.I. gave a very clear picture of the group, however the SJ Radar was used exclusively for all tracking and approach data including firing bearings. The target was not seen from the bridge until it was illuminated by the torpedo explosions.

— page 156 —
2207 (H) Radar contact bearing 000° T, range 10,400 yards, range closing rapidly; very heavy SJ Radar interference of same frequency as our own on that bearing. Believe this must be the U.S.S. PARGO. Commenced calling him on voice modulation frequency to tell him we were going in for an attack. I was afraid he might have contacted our target and I did not want two of us at the firing point at the same time.

2211 (H) Came hard left and started in at full speed. We are about 15 degrees ahead of target's beam. Slowed to open the outer doors on the forward tubes and check the PARGO's actions. Shifted to the battery to eliminate our flaming exhausts. The PARGO started drawing right and opening the range rapidly. She did not answer our calls (I presumed her transmitter was not warmed up) but she apparently saw the picture and decided to pull clear of the shooting. I thanked her for the bottom of my heart. Went ahead full.

2225 (H) Slowed to fire: Making 8 knots, target at range 3,800 yards, TDC and plot-checking perfectly, track angle 95 starboard, zero gyro angles, using modified 4-3-2-1 spread. Fired tube #3. Fired tube #4. Fired tube #5. Fired tube #6. Went ahead full and started swinging left to clear trailing escort on my side. Stood by tubes #1 and #2 in case of prematures with torpedoes fired.

2229-10 (H) Fired tube #3. Fired tube #4. Fired tube #5. Fired tube #6. Went ahead full and started swinging left to clear trailing escort on my side. Stood by tubes #1 and #2 in case of prematures with torpedoes fired.

2231 (H) Steadied up heading south and slowed to observe results of firing. Sound reported a torpedo hit, this hit was not observed and was not heard throughout the boat. It is believed that this was torpedo from tube #6 hitting an escort. as one disappeared from the P.P.I. screen at this time at 3,500 yards range and was not seen again (the trailing starboard escort).

2231-45 (H) One torpedo hit on the target. Heard and observed. (Tube #1). Hit amidahips. One torpedo hit on the target. Heard and observed. (Tube #5). Hit aft.

2231-55 (H) One torpedo hit on the target. Heard and observed. (Tube #1). Hit amidahips. One torpedo hit on the target. Heard and observed. (Tube #5). Hit aft.

2232-05 (H) One torpedo hit on the target. Heard and observed. (Tube #1). Hit amidahips. One torpedo hit on the target. Heard and observed. (Tube #5). Hit aft.

— page 157 —
2233 (H) Second officer manned PPI and observed target
disappear from PPI screen, range of 4,000 yards,
at
2235 (H) Leaving only two escorts who now started dropping
depth charges at random.
2237 (H) Checked the radar, picking up the PARGO bearing
0800 T, range 16,000 yards, and checked scene of
firing showing the two escorts milling about
point where AK sank. Went ahead full on four
engines. Commenced reload. Headed for Sarangani
Strait to clear the PARGO area and return to our
own.
2248 (H) Could still hear depth charges being dropped
astern. Slowed to two engines and commenced a
battery charge.

Thursday, April 27, 1944.

0200 (H) Entered Sarangani Strait and commenced patrolling.
0414 (H) Submerged 5,000 yards off Tinaca Point Light for
days patrol. Encountered the same heavy set to
the southwest.
0518 (H) Sighted a small vessel, possibly a patrol boat,
bearing 320° T, headed for the Strait.
0536 (H) Sighted a large vessel bearing 3180 T, range
16,000 yards, headed for the Strait. Battle
Stations. Commenced closing the track.
0550 (H) Target was seen to be headed to pass Tinaca Point
close aboard and observed that we wore being set
away from the point by the current. Target had
the now familiar type minesweep escort stationed
on his outboard bow. Headed to reach a firing
position before the target zigged away on rounding
the point.

— page 158 —
0600 (H) Identified the target as the HEITO MARU (Page 89 ONI 208-J revised) 4,468 tons displacement. The vessel was heavily loaded aft and lightly loaded forward, causing her to run with her stern well down, and her bow almost out of the water.
: 0607 (H) Did not quite make it due to target's high speed - 13 knots. He rounded point and presented a 100 starboard angle on the bow, range, 3,600 yards.
: 0608 (H) As I felt it would be impossible to trail this target into Davao Gulf today, I decided that his potential value to the enemy made the risk of firing with a 3,800 yard torpedo run a worthy gamble. Using a modified 4-3-2-1 spread, at
: 0608-44
: 0608-53
: 0609-01
: 0609-09
: 0610 (H) First torpedo fired ran erratic and headed for the escort smoking heavily. The star three ran straight. Escort turned and headed around for us at high speed.
: 0611 (H) Target was seen to start swinging out away from the boats, the wakes of three torpedoes looked like they would hit on about a ninety starboard track. With the escort presenting a zero angle on the bow coming in fast, I decided to seek safety in our bomb shelter so ordered down emergency.
: 0611-31 One solid torpedo hit heard throughout the boat. I could not see as the periscope was just ducking.
: 0611-47 One torpedo hit heard throughout the boat. Sound reported targets screws stopped and were not heard again.
: 0615 (H) Loud hissing noise heard through the hull for several minutes. It sounded like escaping high pressure air.
: 0618 (H) Escort is working up our starboard side. He is going slow now, apparently listening. No echo ranging was heard. Commenced evasive maneuvers. As he did not come in wildly dropping depth charges in the usual manner, I was afraid for awhile that he might be an expert at this game of hide and seek.
: 0622 (H) Breaking up noises could be heard through the hull. They sounded loud and close but sound reported they came from astern, in the direction of the target on firing. These noises consisted of sizzling and cracking, escaping air,

— page 159 —
0624 (H) Escort worked up on our starboard side, than came across fast, dropping two heavy depth charges astern of us. They appeared to be set deep.
: 0629 (H) Escort repeated the maneuver, dropping only one charge but close. He appeared to be good with his sound but he could not get the lead angle figured out. He was not echo ranging.
: 0630 (H) A group of air craft bombs exploded at some distance away. This false contact by the plane was in our favor as the escort worked off from us and dropped no more depth charges.
: 0700 (H) Commenced reload.
: 0845 (H) Completed reload and checked the two torpedoes in tubes #5 and #6. Started up for a look. Can still hear escort astern of us but not close. Sighted escort in Sarangani Strait apparently still searching so we continued heading on out.
: 0855 (H) Position - Latitude 5-24.9 N., Longitude 125-03.7 E. Surfaced and headed south patrolling along the west side of the Sangi Islands covering the Palau Makassar route.

Friday, April 28, 1944.

: 0554 (H) Reversed course and headed back north toward Mindanao.
: 0745 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar. Plane did not close.
: 0755 (H) Plane opened range and faded out on radar.
: 1116 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar. Nine miles coming in.
: 1145 (H) Submerged.
: 1155 (H) Surfaced.
: 1200 (H) Sighted small sampan or patrol craft. Avoided.
: 1600 (H) Position - Latitude 4-04 N., Longitude 129-38 E. Commenced a retiring search curve over possible routes for Balikipapon and Torakan at two engine speeds.
: 2240 (H) Plane contact on SJ Radar. Range 2,300 yards. Closing fast. Visibility very low. Plane not sighted. Submerged.
: 2258 (H) Surfaced. All clear.

— page 160 —
0232 (H) Arrived five miles off Milbuk, Mindanao, P.I. and commenced patrolling 4 - 5 miles off the coast line.
: 0436 (H) Submerged three miles off I int Maguling for days patrol.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 6-0' N., Longitude 124-18 E. Surfaced. Commenced surface patrol 5 to 14 miles off the coast across the estimated Davao - Basilan Strait traffic route.

: 0432 (H) Submerged for patrol three miles off Point Maguling.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 6-04 N., Longitude 124-19 E. Sighted a Sally type plane flying low over the water.
: 1807 (H) Surfaced. Headed for Sarangani Strait, running about six miles off the coast.
: 1958 (H) Heard echo ranging dead ahead. Slowed and coached the SJ Radar on.
: 2003 (H) SJ Radar contact bearing 100° T. Range 15,400 yards. Range closing, Changed course to west at slow speed and commenced tracking.
: 2016 (H) Sighted two unidentified ships from the bridge. SJ Radar reported two and possibly three targets, all about the same size, range 14,700 yards. Increased speed to 14 knots.
: 2030 (H) Targets base course determined to be 295° T. Speed 12.5 knots. We were in a good tracking position almost ahead of the targets, being about ten degrees on their port bow. The visibility was all in their favor, however. We were silhouetted in the path of a half moon while they were enveloped in a very hazy back ground. I decided to maintain this position as we were passing through intermittent rain squalls accompanied by heavy flashes of lightning which would illuminate us regardless of our position. By holding a position ahead I retained the initiative. Continued tracking awaiting the most favorable weather conditions. Targets proved worthy of torpedoes. Plot, TDC and Navigational fixes all checked showing target on 2950-T, steering a steady course, speed 12.5 knots, accurate to Basilian Strait. Had no trouble staying in contact with target group as sound could give accurate bearings on their echo-ranging even when radar was not available.

— page 161 —
0011 (H)
Range 12,400 yards. Targets sighted us, turned to starboard and opened fire. Fall of shot could be heard but not sighted. Range commenced to open rapidly. About four salvoes were fired. The ships appeared to have no trouble seeing and identifying the submarine. They were never clearly in sight to us. I thought they were small but as they turned away there appeared to be two of them. One looked very long, the other smaller. From their low speed and heavy echo-ranging, I felt that they were probably A/S vessels on a submarine search, but from their visual appearance I thought they could possibly be large naval vessels. With this possibility in mind I was determined to hold on to them until I could positively identify them. In the light of later events I am certain that I actually saw three vessels. Two of them apparently were close together and as they turned away these two appeared as one large ship. Radar and sound lost targets. Went ahead at four engine speed to regain contact. Moonset. Sound regained contact (note, at 4 engine speed). Radar regained contact - 16,800 yards. Targets ran about 10 miles to the north then came back to the original base course, zig-zagging on short legs. Continued tracking from ahead waiting for the visibility to steady down, either dark enough for a night surface attack or light enough for a periscope attack. Visibility still varying as before. Decided to wait for daylight submerged approach. We should have enough sea room as our TAASail on St. 0539 (H) Target's masts in sight in high periscope bearing 1150 T, sound in contact with echo-ranging on that bearing. Submerged for approach on target's base course line extended. Target group clearly identified as three sub-chasers engaged in an anti-submarine search (See sketch "C"). They were formed on an extended line of bearing, sweeping by simultaneous ship movement about twenty degrees on each side of the base course. As we were on the base course line, it was clear that they would pass over us. The hunter became the quarry, so at

— page 162 —
0628 (H) Ordered deep submergence and rigged for depth charge and silent running.

: 55'

: 120'

: 55'

: 120'

— page 163 —
0700 (H) Sub-chasers passed over us, two to starboard, one to port. Three distinct gradients successfully blanked out their sound and we were undetected.
: 0756 (H) Periscope depth. A/S vessels out of sight. I decided to remain on this track as I felt the A/S sweep we had been accompanying for the past twelve hours might be ahead of some shipping.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 06-38.9 N., Longitude 122-47.9E. Surfaced. Set course for the southern portion of the Colobes Sea to cover traffic routes from Halmhøre and Falu to Balikpapen.
: 2200 (H) Received CTF 71 Orders directing BONEFISH to go to Sulu Sea for Patrol. Continued on present course which he headed us off Sibtu Passage.

Tuesday, May 2, 1944.

1032 (H) Closing plane contact on SD Radar. Submerged.
1103 (H) Surfaced.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 4-24 N., Longitude 121-38 E. Closing plane contact on SD Radar. Submerged.
1350 (H) Surfaced.
1428 (H) Made landfall on Bongao Peak bearing 322° T, distance 21 miles.
2135 (H) Entered the narrows of Sibtu Passage. I had first intended to await moonset before attempting transit but as later developments made a quick entry into the Sulu Sea imperative, I decided to risk the passage in the all too bright moonlight.
2250 (H) Sighted three small patrol craft in the passage just off the north-eastern end of Sibtu Island. Range 9,000 yards. Started swinging right to ease around to the eastward of them.
2255 (H) Sighted a small craft bearing 037° T headed for us. Radar range 3,000 yards. Swang hard right to clear him.
2257 (H) He opened up with a small caliber machine gun. Went ahead flank and presented to him a wiggling 180. He looked suspiciously like a PT Boat.
2305 (H) Range 2,300 yards.
3J Radar made a quick sweep and reported us completely surrounded. One contact proved not to be on debris! - a small craft dead ahead. Range 2,050 yards. Swang hard right to clear him. Headed on back toward the Colobes Sea end of the passage. Range on all vessels encouragingly opening. No casualties incurred from the gunfire. I believe the last vessel sighted was a spotter. We did not contact him on the

— page 164 —
2318 (H)  Slow down to one engine speed. None of the vessels seemed to be chasing us. Bodied to wait for moon-set before I tried it again.

Wednesday, May 3, 1944.

0050 (H)  Reversed course and headed back in to Sibutu Passage.
0210 (H)  Moon-set.
0230 (H)  Sighted three patrol craft on a line of bearing across the center of Sibutu Passage, about one thousand yards between boats. Swung left, hoping to get by them on the westward side of the passage, and headed toward Sibutu Hill.
0250 (H)  Three more vessels sighted in the line, extending the block all the way to the west side of the Channel.
0251 (H)  I concluded there was just one part of the passage they hadn't stopped up and submerged to pass under them.
0800 (H)  Completed passage of Sibutu and entered Subu Sea. I do not know how near we passed to the vessels as they could not be seen in the darkness through the periscope. A 2.5 knot current setting north speeded our transit.
1200 (H)  Position - Latitude 5-22.6 N., Longitude 119-39.3E.
1302 (H)  Surfaced and headed to pass between Pearl Bank and Doc Can Island at two engine speed. Charging on two engines.
1426 (H)  Shifted to three engine speed.
1427 (H)  Sighted two patrol craft ahead in the center of the channel off Pearl Bank Light.
1429 (H)  As it was clear that I could not make the passage unobserved - which I particularly wanted to do - submerged to pass the patrol craft.
1738 (H)  Completed passage of the channel passing within 5,000 yards of the patrol boats, apparently unobserved. The two vessels looked like docked over motor launches. They held station in the very center of the channel, kicking ahead just enough to balance the current. They were not aero-ranging.
1815 (H)  Surfaced and headed for a position on the east-west traffic lane through the Subu Sea at two engine speed, charging on the other engines.
2240 (H)  Arrived on the lane and headed north-west at one engine speed.

— page 165 —
0145 (H) Reversed course and commenced a rottling search along the traffic lane to the south-east at two engine speed.
: 0430 (H) Commenced patrolling on a line, normal to the traffic lane.
: 0625 (H) Sighted a RUFE. Range 10 miles. Submerged to periscope depth.
: 0642 (H) Plane passed out of sight from the periscope.
: 0707 (H) Surfaced.
: 0710 (H) Sighted three columns of smoke bearing 298° T.
: 0714 (H) Headed toward to close.
: 0717 (H) Plane contact on the SD Radar. Ten miles, closing.
: 0720 (H) Sighted a RUFE, flying low over the water, range about six miles. He was headed about ninety degrees from our true bearing. Sighted the smoke on the horizon through the periscope. The smoke covered about fifteen degrees and there were at least three distinct columns. I decided the smoke came from an east bound convoy. Came to the normal approach course and commenced closing the track.
: 0720 (H) An aerial depth bomb exploded very close aboard, giving the boat a violent sinking. Ordered down emergency. Rigged for depth charge.
: 0725 (H) Another bomb exploded - well above us. Levelled off at 250 feet and chocked boat for damage. I decided the bombing occurred as follows. There were at least two planes in my sector furnishing air coverage for the convoy, flying on a 10-15 mile circle ahead. I sighted one of those planes at 0625 (H) and dived to avoid it. I made radar contact on one at 0714 (H) and dived to avoid him, but he either saw me while diving or my submerging wake and closed. When I ran the periscope up at 0717 (H), I sighted a plane about six miles away. The one I did not see must have been directly overhead. This plane dropped a heavy aerial bomb at 0720 (H). From the damage sustained to the bridge superstructure the force of explosion appeared to come from above, aft, and to port of the Conning Tower. An inspection of the boat disclosed the following damage:
   1. Radio Antenna Trunk flooded.
   2. Both periscopes dirty with internal paint chippings and out of collimation. Number two out of action. Number one usable with an effort.
   3. Main hydraulic plant out of commission.

— page 166 —
0810 (H)
Light fast screws and echo-ranging reported by sound. Rigged for silent running.
0821 (H)
Screws and echo-ranging closing. There appeared to be two A/S vessels making a sound search in the vicinity of the scene of the bombing.
0823 (H)
Depth charging commenced.
0830 (H)
Depth charging completed. About twenty-five were dropped. All were comfortably far astern of us. A string of eleven were dropped at one time. The explosions occurred so near together they were difficult to count.
1000 (H)
A/S vessels ceased their sound search and departed to the East. Plot showed the convoy now inside of Pangataran Island. Gave up hope of interception.
1010 (H)
Started up for a look.
1024 (H)
No smoke in sight. Sighted a RUFE, six miles, flying low over the water. I decided to remain submerged to let this area cool off.
1200 (H)
Position - Latitude 6-59 N., Longitude 120-20 E.
1754 (H)
Surfaced. Set course for patrol station off the coast of Zamboanga. An inspection of top-side revealed the following damage:
1. Searchlight demolished. Pieces of the casting were strewn all over the topside.
2. Bridge repeater glass cover shattered. Repeater flooded.
3. Bridge Talk-baok speaker out of commission.
4. Bridge superstruoture plating pulled away from frames and plating badly warped.
5. Several minor fittings broken loose or shattered.
6. A tribute to the SRU designed (BARR type) TBT's - They both worked and appeared to be unharmed, the only equipment that was damaged was the radio.

— page 167 —
2245 (H) Made radar landfall on peaks of Zamboanga - 45 miles. Continued closing coast.

Friday, May 5, 1944.

: 0515 (H) Submerged. Patrolling three miles off the coast of Zamboanga between Point Alimapya and Point Limasum, to cover the northern approach to Basilan Strait.

: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 7-10.2 N., Longitude 121-51.2 E. Surface. Commenced patrolling about seven miles off the coast. Between Dulunguin Point and Batorampon Point.

Saturday, May 6, 1944.

: 0203 (H) SJ Radar contact on two small targets in close to the coast. Closed to investigate. Two targets in sight. Identified as two SC's Avoided.

: 0427 (H) Submerged. Patrolling same as May 5th.

: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 7-10 N., Longitude 121-50 E. Surface. Patrolling north about seven miles off the coast.

Sunday, May 7, 1944.

: 0426 (H) Received FLASHER message regarding a southbound Maru enroute to Basilan Strait. I decided my present patrol station best point for interception.

: 0848 (H) Submerged. Patrolling on a line bearing 270° T from point Batorampon, 3 to 4 miles off the point.

: 0848 (H) Sighted smoke bearing 024° T. Sound reported echo-ranging bearing 140° T. Sighted two vessels, hull down, bearing 146° T. Battle stations submerged. First smoke sighted now bears 022° T. Sea glassy calm. Atmosphere hazy. Intermittent rain squalls.

: 1142 (H) Identified vessels bearing 146° T as two SC's headed north running about one half mile off the coast. Sighted masts bearing 054° T. (MFM). Position - Latitude 7-08 N., Longitude 121-49 E. Identified Southbound group as one Maru with two escorts. Am in good attack position. Decided the Northbound SC's are additional escorts. The one periscope in commission gives me only a hazy outline of the vessels - range 5,500 yards.

— page 168 —
1223 (H) A dry run. Southbound group consisted of one small tug and one 100 ton cargo carrier (see sketch D) accompanied by one SC. Northbound SC's continue on northward. Broke off approach. Range - 3,500 yards.

Sketch of Cargo Vessel Sighted May 7, 1944

Estimated displacement 100 tons.

SKETCH "D"

1235 (H) Sighted masts of a large vessel bearing 3580 T, headed South, running well off the coast. Came to the normal approach course and increased speed to close the track. Another dry run. Range to target -3,500 yards. Identified it as a large hospital ship (8,000 tons). Broke off approach. Took photographs. The 'ship' was properly marked but very dirty in appearance. Secured from battle stations. Closed coast to original patrol station. 1315 (H) Sighted smoke bearing 1570 T. Made out a hazy mast, funnel, mast under smoke bearing 1580 T. Target looked large. Battle stations submerged. Angle on the bow almost zero. Range - 10,000 yards. 1355 (H) The third dry run. Identified target as a very small tug (MFM very high). Secured from battle stations. Broke off approach. Range 3,500 yards. 1431 (H) Sighted sailboat bearing 2800 T. The Nips are apparently holding a small boat regatta in this area today.

— page 169 —
1520 (H) Sighted smoke bearing 150° T. Closed to investigate.

1544 (H) Vessel in sight bearing 150° T. Identified as another small tug headed north along the coast. This vessel first presented the appearance of a large ship as it came over the horizon, but it gradually diminished in size as it came nearer. At 3,500 yards it was properly identified. The series of approaches today made on small boats can be attributed primarily to the damaged periscope's poor vision coupled with the glassy sea and surface haze.

1610 (H) Sound reported echo-ranging on 0450 T.

1655 (H) Sighted masts of vessel bearing 0470 T. Estimated range 10,000 yards. Angle on the bow 5 starboard. Battle stations submerged. Headed in for a 50 starboard track. Rigged for depth charge. I decided to try for a stern tube shot if possible in order to even up remaining torpedoes.

1725 (H) Identified the target group as consisting of one large AP (similar to Abasan Maru, ONI 208-J, 8,812 tons), one small unidentified AK, three SC's, and one Chidori. Formation shown on sketch "E". The large AP was heavily loaded. Its decks appeared covered with troops and cargo, but this could not be clearly identified. It was down by the bow which gave me the impression that it had been damaged. The small AK was too far astern to identify and may have been another escort. The formation was steering a steady course, speed 8 knots, paralleling the coast headed toward Basilan Strait. I was 450 yards off the track, range 4,000 yards, so swung left for a seventy port track with the stern tubes. I expected target to swing about thirty degrees left after rounding point Batorampon.

1726 (H) Outboard SC passed close aboard. Target zigged left after rounding Point Batorampon, presenting a 100° starboard track. The Chidori pulled astern of the target and started up his port side as shown in sketch "E".

1732 (H) Chidori just ahead of bow of the target. Range to target 2,500 yards, 100° starboard track, using a modified 1/3-2-1 spread.

— page 171 —
1738 (H) Depth charging commenced as we passed 250 feet on the way down.
: 1750 (H) Depth charging completed. Total of 20 dropped. The depth charges were heavy ones, set deep. None were dangerously close. Two A/S vessels still with us.
: 1755 (H) Series of breaking up noises heard through the hull - like falling timber coupled with gurgling, pops and sizzles, etc. Sound reported it from the direction of target at point of firing. I feel certain that the AP fired at was hit by three torpedoes and sank at about 1755 (H).
: 1800 (H) Two A/S vessels milling around above us, exchanging.
: 1814 (H) The two A/S vessels do not seem to be able to hear us. Commenced reload aft.
: 1930 (H) Echo-ranging working off at stern. Sound reported he lost sore now noises. Headed up for a look.
: 1945 (H) 40 feet. All clear by SJ Radar.
: 1946 (H) Surfaced. Sighted searchlight being played over the water at the point of firing. SJ Radar could not pick up any targets at this range - 16,000 yards. I believe the lights were being used by the escorts in looking for survivors. Headed west to open on the coast and send my serial number two, concerning results of attacks today and the heavy patrol activity encountered around Sibutu. Secured attempting to transmit the message. Interference, jamming and probable loss of power in previously flooded antenna trunk made transmission impossible.
: 2152 (H) Headed north for patrol station off Dumaran Island.
: 2300 (H) Received message concerning the FLASHER attack on a MARU this morning. As position and course check with the AP sunk this afternoon, I assumed it to be the same vessel. The speed checked that used on the TDC for the attack - 8 knots. The small vessels seen today headed north were probably going to his assistance and were his escorts for our attack.

Monday, May 8, 1944.

0029 (H) Succeeded in transmitting BONEFISH Serial Number Two.
0645 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar. Six miles. Submerged.
0725 (H) Surfaced.
0842 (H) Sighted possible small power patrol boat close inshore off Cavili Island. Avoided.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 9-50 N., Longitude 120-35 E.
1330 (H) Arrived on patrol line south-east of Dumaran Island.

— page 172 —
2342 (H) Sighted small vessel bearing 220° T, range 10,000 yards. Closed to investigate.

Tuesday, May 9, 1944.

0030 (H) Small vessel proved to be a 30 ton sailboat. Brought it alongside to check identity of crew. One pidgin-english speaking member of the crew was brought aboard for interrogation while the sailboat was being inspected. This personality divulged the following information.

a. The boat was from Cogyan Island carrying a cargo of lumber [consisting of about 8 knoty, crooked logs - worktles] enroute to Taytay (Palawan) where the lumber would be sold and thence on to Panay to buy rice.

b. The crew consisted of a mixed group of Filipino natives including two ex-Filipino soldiers.

c. There are no permanent Jap patrols in this general area.

d. Jap shipping uses a route through "the channel" (Between Duman Island and Delangonem Island).

e. A convoy of nine ships plus escorts passed through "the channel" headed North on May 7,1944.

f. The only Jap troops stationed in this area are distributed:

Puerto Princesa - 500 Army.
Coran Island - 300 Army.
Taytay - 40 Army.

g. Forty ex-Filipino soldiers have joined the 40 Jap troops at Taytay and are quartered with them.

h. Food is very scarce in this area.

i. He would like to have some food, clothes, cigarettes and liquor. A regular beggar. Returned the native to his boat with food and cigarettes. Continued on patrol line.

1141 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar. Eight miles. Submerged. Heavy interference noted on SD Radar at time of contact.

1200 (H) Position - Latitude 10-12 N., Longitude 120-09 E. Surfaced.

1214 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar. 10 miles. Submerged. Same radar interference noted.

1552 (H) Same radar interference noted.

1638 (H) Surfaced.

1834 (H) Sighted a large single wing sea plane bearing 3200 T, range 15 miles. Course north.

1835 (H) Plane changed course towards us. Submerged.

1900 (H) Surfaced.

— page 173 —
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 9-18 N., Longitude 120-19 E.
1600 (H) Altered course to shift patrol line to western entrance of Mindanao Sea.

Thursday, May 11, 1944.

0230 (H) SJ Radar contact bearing 196° T, range 19,700 yards. Battle Stations for Tracking. Slowed to five knots to get change of bearing.
0242 (H) Estimated target course 060° T. Speed 15 knots. Ahead at four engine speed to gain position ahead.
0250 (H) SJ Radar reported two targets. Range 15,000 yards. Two vessels in sight from the bridge. One identified as a small destroyer, the other possibly a small cruiser.
0300 (H) TDC, Plot, and navigational track showed targets on base course 0550 T, speed 15 knots, zigging 30 degrees to the left and right of the base course 14 minute legs, enroute Mindanao Sea.
0403 (H) In position. Targets bearing 135° T. Range 16,500 yards. Submerged for attack. Battle Stations Submerged.
0422 (H) Both targets in sight through the periscope. Both with small angle on the bow. Near one looked large. Angle on the bow of near one - 5° port. Started swinging left for a stern tube shot at him. Targets were not echo-ranging. Made ready all tubes.
0441 (H) Targets zigged away, presenting 85 port angle on the bow and clear silhouettes. Large target identified as the ITUKUSIMA minelayer. The escort identified as a TIDORI class torpedo boat. Steadied on course 301° T, for a zero gyro angle stern tube shot on the ITUKUSIMA. Range - 2000 yards. Using a modified 4-3-2-1 spread at fired tube #7.
0443-33 (H) Fired tube #7.
0443-43 (H) Fired tube #8.
0443-52 (H) Fired tube #9.
0444-01 (H) Fired tube #10.
0448 (H) All torpedoes were electric.
Check of TDC setup showed a bad control error in target course set, sufficient to cause a miss. Started to swing right to fire bow tubes. Target zigged away presenting a 165 port angle on the bow, range 3,500 yards.
0450 (H) TIDORI commenced dropping depth charges. Target now outside of torpedo range. The escort evidently sighted a torpedo breach or heard an end-of-run explosion, but he did not appear to be able to dope out where the torpedoes came from and did not close us.

— page 174 —
0530 (H) Target passed out of sight. Decided it impossible to pursue target further into Mindanao Sea. Decided our present position in the entrance to Mindanao Sea a good place for intercepting traffic so continued patrolling.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 8-48 N., Longitude 122-55.5 E. Surfaced.
1838 (H) Friday, May 12, 1944.

0452 (H) Submerged.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 8-48 N., Longitude 123-00 E. Surfaced.
1850 (H) Received orders from ComTaskFor 71 ordering this vessel to reconnoiter TAWI Tawi Bay. Set course for Sibutu Passage at three engine speed, patrolling about 10 miles off the coast of Zamboanga enroute.

Saturday, May 13, 1944.

0233 (H) Sighted several small vessels close in to the coast. Slowed to investigate.
0300 (H) Identified the group as six small sea-trucks or patrol craft headed north running about one mile off the coast. Changed course to avoid and continued on toward Sibutu Passage at four engine speed.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 6-34 N., Longitude 120-12 E. Landfall on Doc Can Island.
1355 (H) Submerged to transit channel between Pearl Bank and Doc Can Island unobserved.
1453 (H) Surfaced. Continued on toward Sibutu Passage. In view of numerous patrols encountered in Sibutu Passage during the transit of May 2, 1944, I decided to enter the passage and to submerge in position for reconnoitering Tawi Tawi Bay before moonrise. I believed that the heavy northerly set of the current would prevent me from approaching the passage submerged from the north in daylight and that I could not enter the passage unobserved on the surface after moonrise.
2141 (H) SJ Radar contact on small vessel bearing 111° T, range 6,400 yards. Slowed to investigate. Identified vessel as a small SC patrolling on east-west course across the northern entrance to the channel. Eased around him to the West. Arrived in position for reconnoitering patrol off Tawi Tawi Bay. Submerged.
2200 (H) Moonrise. Determined current to set north - 3 knots. Want ahead 2/3 speed to hold station. Visibility good.

— page 175 —
0254 (H) Slighted a convoy of three tankers escorted by three destroyers bearing 2810 T, headed for Sibutu Passage, range 7,000 yards. Battle Stations Submerged. Commenced closing the track on the normal approach course.
: 0300 (H) Made out the formation as shown on sketch "J". Identified the last tanker in column as the GENYO MARU (Page 277 ONI 208-J revised), the largest ship in the group, and decided to attack it. Made ready the bow tubes. The two leading tankers were similar to the NIFPON MARU (Page 208, ONI 208-J revised).

SKETCH "J"

- 27 -

— page 176 —
0305 (H) The near escort, a HIBIKI Class DD, passed very close aboard ahead of me. His high speed must have blanked his sound gear as he did not detect me although I was making high speed to close the track.
: 0310 (H) The formation zigged, placing me in a favorable firing position. From the size of the target's bow wave I gave TDC a speed estimate of 14 knots. With the tanker bearing 2170 T, range 3,000 yards, 130 port track, using a modified 4-3-2-1 spread, at
: 0311-30 Fired tube #1.
: 0311-38 Fired tube #2.
: 0311-46 Fired tube #3.
: 0311-54 Fired tube #4.
: 0312-02 Fired tube #5.
: 0312-02 Attempted to fire tube #6 but it could not be fired together electrically or manually.
: 0313-40 Heard one torpedo hit. Did not see explosion.
: 0313-48 Heard and saw one torpedo hit under the bridge sending up a huge column of smoke and flame.
: 0313-55 Heard and saw one torpedo hit under the stack, knocking his whole stern off.
: 0316 (H) Target now completely enveloped in smoke and flame. Swing periscope to near destroyer and saw him swinging toward me, not too close, but his bow wave was big. Ordered down emergency.
: 0317 (H) First depth charge as we passed 200 feet on the way down. A heavy one. Commenced heading out of the passage to the Northward, taking advantage of the current. Two destroyers continued dropping depth charges, all astern of us, but they worked Northward also. They would stop and listen then speed up and drop one or two charges. They were not echo ranging.
: 0324 (H) Minor explosions and breaking up noises heard through the hull.
: 0338 (H) A tremendous underwater explosion, shaking the boat considerably. I believe this must have been the tanker, or what was left of it, blowing up. Sound heard no more noise coming from the direction of the target after this explosion.
: 0339 (H) The last depth charge. Twenty were dropped in all. One destroyer commenced echo-ranging astern of us. He was the only one heard after this time. He appeared to commence a systematic sound search of the area, working to the northward. I wanted to get back to the passage so I commenced working to the eastward of him. Commenced reload. I now had three torpedoes left forward. None aft. Completed reload and check of torpedoes. Destroyer still astern of me. Started up for a

— page 177 —
0552 (H) Look.
Destroyer must have heard me as he speeded up and commenced closing the range. Won't back deep.
0638 (H) Destroyer worked off further astern again. Started up for a look.
0710 (H) Periscope depth. Sighted a RUFE flying low over the water astern of me. Back to 100 feet to avoid detection.
0724 (H) Aerial bomb exploded astern. Decided to remain deep until the vigor of the A/S search could. I felt that if I was detected again I would not be able to work back into Sibutu Passage today for reconnoitering in accordance with my orders. Continued on Eastward to work around the A/S patrol. I hoped the current would shift and set me back in the passage. Running at 100 feet between looks.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 5-35 N., Longitude 119-48 E. Sound reported light fast screws bearing 010° T. Decided this was reinforcement for the AS search-ing party but started up for look. Sound reported three sets of fast screws, one overhead. Bearing changing very rapidly. Held my depth to let the one above me pass over.
1212 (H) First set of screws passed but another set picked up bearing 010° T; sound reported all screws light and fast. Sound reported heavy screws close aboard bearing 060° T, getting nearer. Decided this was not an A/S search and started up to see. Sound reported heavy screws overhead. They could be heard through the hull. Held depth at 100 feet to 1-2 ship pass over.
1257 (H) Periscope depth. Sighted Jap Task Force, part of which had just passed over me, bearing 160° T, range about four miles, headed away, no targets within firing range. Task Force consisted of:
   Three Battleships.
   One Carrier.
   Three Heavy Cruisers
   One Light Cruiser
A destroyer screen ahead. Formation shown on Sketch "C". Estimated speed at 17 knots.
1330 (H) Task Force passed out of sight headed toward Sibutu Passage. Continued heading toward Sibutu but Navigational fixes showed we were making no headway against the current and that it had set me about twenty five miles north-east of the passage.

— page 179 —
1851 (H) Surfaced (after 20 hours 27 minutes submerged). Set course for Sibutu Passage. Commenced battery charge on two engines. Decided to attempt to transit Sibutu on the surface and send message concerning the task force sighted today from the Celebes Sea. In making this decision, I took into consideration:
1. Based on experience of the past, the radio message could not be sent out until after midnight due to local interference conditions.
2. With luck, I might make the trip through the passage unobserved before midnight (time of morning).
3. I could reconnoiter Tawi Tawi Bay tomorrow from the South of Celebes Sea side, but I could not from the northern side due to adverse current as shown by today's experience.
SJ-Radar contact on vessel bearing 200° T, range 12,000 yards, achieved and changed course to the left to pass to the eastward of him.
Range closing showing vessel off an eastward course I changed course to the west to pass to the other side of him.
Bighted the vessel from the bridge. Identified it as a destroyer or long PC Boat patrolling on East and West courses across the north entrance to Sibutu Passage.
A survey of the situation showed me I would not be able to work around the destroyer in time to complete the trip through Sibutu before moonrise. This left me with the alternative of reversing course, running into the Sulu Sea to send the message concerning the task force, or continuing on with a good possibility of being forced down preventing me from sending the message. I decided on the first course in view of the importance of my information. I felt that I had the information which was desired and that an attempt to transit Sibutu Passage would delay its transmission too long for it to be of any value.
Set course for Doc Can Island channel at three engine speed.
SJ Radar contact bearing 051° T, range 7,000 yards. Changed course to 000° T, shifted to four engines. Range closed to 3,000 yards, made out two SC's from the bridge, headed to close me, but they were now back on the quarter. Went ahead flank.
Crossed ahead of them and range commenced to open. Lost radar contact on SC's. Range 12,000 yards.

— page 180 —
0019 (H) Entered Doc Can Island channel. Commenced sending BONKISH Serial Three concerning sighting task force, attacking tanker and inability to re-connote Tawi Tawi Bay.
: 0045 (H) Left Doc Can Island channel and set course for a patrol station north of Doc Can Island channel, awaiting further orders from CTF - 71.
: 0347 (H) Arrived on patrol line.
: 0853 (H) 3D Radar contact on plane. Range 22 miles.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 6-39 N., Longitude 119-50 E.
: 2300 (H) Received orders to patrol off Tawi Tawi Bay when transit of Sibutu deemed feasible.

Tuesday, May 16, 1944.

: 0857 (H) Sighted DAVE type plane flying very low, range 10 miles. Submerged.
: 1144 (H) Surface.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 6-35 N., Longitude 119-43 E.
: 1300 (H) Set course for Doc Can Island channel, timing arrival for beginning of darkness.
: 1349 (H) Sighted DAVE type plane, flying low, range 14 miles.
: 1350 (H) DAVE changed course toward us. Submerged.
: 1426 (H) Surface.
: 1910 (H) Entered Doc Can Island channel at 4 engine speed.
: 1930 (H) Completed transit and set course for Sibutu Passage.
: 2214 (H) Entered Sibutu Passage keeping well to the westward side of the channel.
: 2215 (H) Sighted medium size patrol vessel in eastern side of the passage, off Sanga Sanga Island.
: 2256 (H) S1-Radar contact on two small vessels, range 13,400 yards, two miles off shore on westward side of the passage. Changed course toward the center of the channel and commenced tracking.
: 2305 (H) Plot showed the two vessels stopped. Set course to pass 12nm about 8,000 yards abeam.
: 2310 (H) Made radar search of Tawi Tawi Bay as we passed at 2nm off the radar. The two vessels commenced signalling toward a light on Sibutu Hill. One of the vessels could be seen from the bridge and was identified as a PC. Went ahead on four engines.
: 2313 (H) S1 Radar contact on a vessel three miles off Sibutu Island, range 10,300 yards, bearing 200° T. This one was about two miles south of the first two contacted.

— page 181 —
2316 (H) The single vessel commenced signalling toward Sibutu Hill.
: 2319 (H) Changed course further left as the single commenced closing fast. Range 7,400 yards. I could make him out from the bridge. He looked about the size of one of our DE's.
: 2321 (H) SJ Radar contact dead ahead; range 2,500 yards, just as I sighted two high speed motor boats there, angle on the bow 5 port. Gave hard right rudder.
: 2322 (H) The two small ones passed 1400 yards abeam, swinging out away from me.
: 2324 (H) Steadied-up with the two astern of me and they did likewise, angle on the bow 160 port. The range opened quickly and contact was lost at 4,500 yards. The large vessel continued to close the range but drew right in bearing. I changed course further right to let him cross my stern, thinking he probably did not see me.
: 2329 (H) The maneuver worked, the range commenced opening until contact was lost at 17,000 yards. His speed plotted at 20 knots.
: 2343 (H) Completed transit of Sibutu Passage and commenced a large circle back to the north and east to return off Tawi Tawi Bay for reconnaissance. Sighted signal light on the southern end of Sibutu Island.

Wednesday, May 17, 1944.

0400 (H) Arrived at position for reconnaissance off TijTijTij Island Reefs. I first planned on making a reconnaissance of Tawi Tawi Bay from Sibutu Passage. On arriving in the passage, the heavy nocturnal patrol activity encountered indicated that I would have to accomplish this submerged in daylight. In order to make a rough survey of the Bay while on the surface, I decided to run in close aboard the TijTijTij Reefs at the southeastern end of the Bay and scan the Bay by radar in hopes of learning if there were any large vessels in the harbor and if there were, gaining a picture of the anchorage disposition. The plan proved highly successful. On arriving off the Reefs, the first sweep by radar showed that several large ships were in the Bay. An accurate track was plotted on a large scale chart, and as we proceeded along parallel to the reefs, the radar contacts on the vessels in the harbor were plotted on the chart. Accurate range lines were obtained but bearings were only rough due to the ships being so close together.

— page 182 —
0425 (H) Completed radar study of Bay and submerged awat- ing daylight.
: 0649 (H) Completed reconnaissance of Tawil Tawil Bay by periscope.
: 0802 (H) Completed reconnaissance and commenced patrolling the southeast approach to the Bay.
: 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 4-43.5 N., Longitude 119-57.2 E.
: 1817 (H) Surfaced.
: 1905 (H) Commenced sending BONEFISH Serial Four reporting presence of the Task Force.
: 1920 (H) Completed transmission and pulled out to the southwest to observe accuracy of Jap R.D.F. equipment. It proved to be in good working order.
: 2218 (H) Signs of activity. Sighted searchlight signalling in: Tawil Bay.
: 2311 (H) S7 radar contact on vessel in Sibutu Passage, range 18,750 yards. Commenced tracking.
: 2322 (H) Sighted several lights signalling on or near Sibutu Island.
: 2340 (H) Vessel contacted by radar tracked speed zero. Avoided.

Thursday, May 18, 1944.

0155 (H) S7 radar contact on two vessels off Manuk Manuk Island, range 20,200 yards. Closed to investigate and commenced tracking.
0214 (H) Four vessels in the group by radar; tracked on course 3450 T, speed 15 knots, headed in to entrance to Tawil Tawil Bay. From type of radar contact they appeared to be two destroyers and two PC's. They came from our approximate position two PC's.
0220 (H) Vessels tracked in to the harbor. Sound reported echo-ranging bearing 0800 T.
0226 (H) Sound reported two vessels echo-ranging bearing 0900 T, loud and fairly close. As radar could not contact vessels, I decided they were small and I headed west to avoid.

— page 183 —
0237 (H) Sound reported a third yessel echo-ranging bearing 0500 T.
0245 (H) Sighted signal light bearing 3570 T.
0247 (H) SZ Radar contact, bearings 3570 T, range 15,000 yards. Commenced tracking. Could not see vessel from the bridge.
0250 (H) Plot showed target making high speed toward me. Headed away and went ahead full.
0255 (H) Range 12,000. Shifted to Flank speed on four engines.
0258 (H) Range still closing. Sighted the vessel from the bridge; identified as a large PC. With no speed faster than flank, no torpedoes in the stern tubes, target angle on the bow zero, 3 A/S vessels on my port hand and reefs on my starboard, I decided to seek safety in depth so submerged. Sound reported high speed across close aboard. Then reported they stopped. Sound did not regain contact.
0404 (H) Sound reported weak echo-ranging bearing 1380 T. Surfaced.
0405 (H) Sound reported three vessels echo-ranging bearing 1000 T. As nothing in sight and no radar contact on that bearing, I decided they were small; avoided. Submerged at southern entrance to Sibutu Passage for patrol.
1053 (H) Sighted three land based bombers, range 8 miles.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 4-07 N., Longitude 119-44.5 E.
1302 (H) Sighted AMIGIRI Class destroyer bearing 3270 T, range 12,000 yards, angle on the bow 60 starboard. Commenced approach.
1305 (H) DD changed course, heading into Sibutu Passage through channel east of Simunul Island; nearest range 10,000 yards.
1324 (H) DD passed out of sight. Broke off approach.
1850 (H) Surfaced at 5
1900 (H) Sighted three signal searchlights turned on simultaneously and trained in my direction, bearing 3100 T, range about 5 miles. Radar had no contact on that bearing.
1905 (H) From movement of the lights, it was obvious that they were on vessels maneuvering at fairly close range. With no radar contact I was sure that they were small and probably part of the A/S search. That started last night after my radio transmission. Commenced working around to the east of the group to get back off Tawi Tawi Bay at four engine speed.

Friday, May 19, 1944.

0358 (H) Submerged off Tijitij Island.

— page 184 —
0745 (H) Commenced reconnaissance of Tawi Tawi Bay by periscope.
: 0910 (H) Completed reconnaissance observations having checked identification and anchorage positions. No changes were noted except appeared to be several more destroyers than there were before and one tanker was observed with a nest of destroyers alongside apparently in the process of fueling. All ships were smoking but none appeared to be moving. Commenced patrolling southeastern approaches to the Bay.
: 1009 (H) Heard three distant explosions sounding like aerial bombs.
: 1018 (H) Sighted a convoy of two tankers and three destroyers, bearing 2320 T, range 16,000 yards. They came from the southwest and were headed for Tawi Tawi Bay. Commenced approach although it looked as though I was too far to the east of them to get in for an attack.
: 1025 (H) Heard depth charge explosion and noted near destroyer dropping single charges as shown in sketch "H".

DROPPED CHARGE
SKETCH "H"

— page 185 —
1026 (H) Identified group as thst attacked on the night of May 7th. The two tankers were the NIPPON MARU type, (Page 208, ONI 208-3 revised). and the destroyers were of the HIBIKI class. Convoy passed out of sight in channel east of Simunul Island, nearest range 10,000 yards. Broke off approach. 1148 (H) Observed much heavy smoke in Tawi Tawi Bay but no ship movement. 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 4-45.8 N., Longitude 120-09.5 E. 1701 (H) Sighted RUFE flying low - range about 3 miles. 1846 (H) Surfaced. Patrolling southeastern approaches to Tawi Tawi Bay. Saturday, May 20, 1944. 000 (H) Received orders: to continue the patrol of this area until sunset 21st of May. 0453 (H) Submerged for petrol off southeastern entrance to Tawi Tawi Bay. 0702 (H) Sighted a RUFE type plane range 8 miles, flying low over the water. 0730 (H) Sighted RUFE again, range 5 miles, evidently making a sul search of this area. As conditions are ideal for the plane - clear visibility, flat calm with just enough surface ripple to break the glare, commenced running at 150 feet between looks. Sighted a ZEKE, range one to two miles, diving down my throat. Headed down fast waiting for the bomb that did not come. I guess the pilot decided it was a fish after all. Continued running at 150 feet between looks. 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 4-41 N., Longitude 120-05 E. 1852 (H) Surfaced. Patrolling northeast and southwest across approaches to Tawi Tawi Bay. Sunday, May 21, 1944. 0325 (H) Submerged in position for reconnaissance of Tawi Tawi Bay in close to TijTiTiji Reef. 0540 (H) Task Force in Tawi Tawi Bay in sight. 0640 (H) Completed reconnaissance of the Bay. Task Force present together with two tankers and many minor or unidentified vessels. The Carrier could not be positively identified. Commenced patrolling to south and east. 1200 (H) Position - Latitude 4-48 N., Longitude 120-07 E. 1829 (H) Surfaced. Set course for Bangka Pass enroute to Fremantle, Western Australia. 2032 (H) Sent BONEFISH Serial Five reporting presence of Task Force in Tawi Tawi Bay and our clearing of the area.

— page 186 —
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 2-50 N., Longitude 125-10 E.
2025 (H) Completed transit of Bangka Passage. Set course for Ombia Strait.

Tuesday, May 23, 1944.

0636 (H) Crossed equator at Longitude 126-12 E.
0950 (H) Plane contact on SD radar. Submerged.
1136 (H) Surfaced.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 0-43 S., Longitude 126-38 E.
1407 (H) Plane contact on SD Radar. Submerged.
1728 (H) Surfaced. Noted weak radar interference on SD radar throughout the day indicating some form of radar on Halmahera.

Wednesday, May 24, 1944.

0635 (H) Plane contact on SD radar. Submerged.
0701 (H) Surfaced.
0826 (H) Plane contact on SD radar.
0831 (H) Sighted SALLY type plane. Submerged.
0902 (H) Surfaced.
1200 (H) Position - Latitude 5-10 S., Longitude 125-19 E.
2300 (H) Entered OMBAI Strait.

Thursday, May 25, 1944.

0350 (H) Received following plain language message addressed for action to all U.S. Naval Vessels, Priority: "What has God wrought". As no code meaning to this message could be found aboard it was decided that the message meant one of the following:

1. A national calamity had occurred.
2. Hitler was dead.
3. Prohibition was back in effect.

0427 (H) Received message explaining despatch received at 0350 (H) sent in commemoration of the centennial of the telegraph. Entire crew were vastly relieved. Position - Latitude 9-42 S., Longitude 122-30 E.
1200 (H) Entered Indian-Ocean. Set course for Fremantle, Western Australia.

1735 (H) Entered Indian-Ocean. Set course for Fremantle, Western Australia.

Friday, May 26 - Tuesday, May 29, 1944.

Underway, enroute Fremantle, Western Australia.

Wednesday, May 30, 1944.

1000 (H) Arrived Fremantle, Western Australia, completing this vessel's fourth war patrol.

— page 191 —
1. 0746 4/22/44 01-01 S. Unident. 18 R
2. 0851 4/22/44 00-54 S. Unident. 20 R
3. 1728 4/22/44 00-41.8 N. 2 ZEKES. 12 SD
4. 0706 4/24/44 03-22 N. Unident. 9 R
5. 0726 4/24/44 125-01 E. Unident. 6 R
6. 0847 4/25/44 125-05.5 N. Unident. 19 R
7. 1000 4/25/44 06-38 N. Two 26 R
8. 1545 4/25/44 123-05 E. Unident. 14 R
9. 0950 4/26/44 125-19 E. Unident. 10 T P
10. 0745 4/28/44 123-05 E. Unident. 32 R
11. 1117 4/28/44 04-01.3 N. Unident. 9 R
12. 2240 4/28/44 05-33 N. Unident. 1 330 T R
13. 1541 4/30/44 124-11.2 E. Unident. 6 130 T P
14. 1031 5/2/44 04-24 N. Unident. 14 R
15. 1350 5/2/44 121-53 E. Unident. 12 R
16. 0625 5/4/44 121-24 E. Unident. 6 SD
17. 1033 5/4/44 120-20 E. Unident. 8 270 T P
18. 0645 5/8/44 120-08 E. Unident. 6 R
19. 1141 5/9/44 10-12 N. Unident. 8 R
20. 1552 5/9/44 120-09 E. Unident. 10 R
21. 1834 5/9/44 120-05.3 E. Unident. 15 170 T SN
22. 0710 5/14/44 120-29.5 E. Unident. 8 P
23. 0853 5/15/44 119-37 E. Unident. 22 R
24. 0857 5/16/44 120-00 E. DAVE 10 690 T SD
25. 1349 5/16/44 119-55 E. DAVE 18 SD

— page 192 —
1053 5/18/44 04-05 N. 3 Unident 8 2700 T P
: 1701 5/19/44 04-54 N. HUFE 3 3000 T P
: 0702 5/20/44 04-40 N. HUFE 8 3500 T P
: 0916 5/20/44 04-41 N. ZIEGE 2 2700 T P
: 0950 5/23/44 00-41 S. Unident. 10 -- R
: 126-30 E.

ACTUATION TAKEN: No. 1 - Div'd; No. 2 - Div'd; No. 3 - Div'd;
No. 4 - Div'd; No. 5 - Div'd; No. 6 - No action; No. 7 -
Div'd; No. 8 - Div'd; No. 9 - No action; No. 10 - No action;
No. 11 - Div'd; No. 12 - Div'd; No. 13 - Div'd; No. 14 -
Div'd; No. 15 - Div'd; No. 16 - Div'd; No. 17 - Down to
100 feet; No. 18 - Div'd; No. 19 - Div'd; No. 20 - Div'd;
No. 21 - Div'd; No. 22 - Down to 150 feet; No. 23 - No
action; No. 24 - Div'd; No. 25 - Div'd; No. 26 - No action;
No. 27 - Went deep; No 28 - 150 feet; No. 29 - 150 feet;
No. 30 - Div'd.

— page 193 —
45 -

**TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM**

U.S.S. BONEFISH TORPEDO ATTACK NO. One PATROL NO. Four.

Time: 2230 (H) Date: 4/26/44 Lat. 6°-12' N.Long. 125° 47' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Target, accompanied by three escorts, was sighted in Sarangani Strait and got by outside of firing range. Target was identified and was presumed to be enroute to Davao. At sunset the submarine surfaced and gave chase, contacting the target group by radar at 2108 (H). The target was tracked until 2211 (H) at which time the submarine commenced a firing approach.

Ships sunk:
(a) Number: One.
(b) Type: AK - MYOGI MARU - Page 208, ONI 208 J (Rev.).
(c) Tonnage: 4,124 tons.

Damage Determined By: Saw and heard two torpedo hits. Target was seen to disappear from the radar PPI screen at 4,000 yards range while two escort vessels at approximately the same range remained clearly in view.

Target Draft: 24' Course: 002° T Speed: 8 knots.

Range: 2,700 yards.

Own Ship Data

Speed: 8 knots. Course: 278° T. Depth: Surface.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Surface - Radar. Course and speed of the target was determined by Plot, TDC and Navigational track. Due to extremely low visibility, radar (SJ and PPI) was used exclusively for tracking and firing data. The target was not seen from the bridge until illuminated by torpedo explosions. The firing approach was started from 10 degrees forward of the target's starboard beam, range 8,000 yards. The approach was made at full speed on the battery keeping the bow on the target. Before firing, speed was decreased to 8 knots, and course altered to give a zero gyro angle with the bow tubes.

— page 194 —
CONFIDENTIAL

The modified 4-3-2-1 spread was used, spread from bow to stern.
Sound reported hearing a torpedo hit at 2231-45 (H).
The fire-hit observed-on-the-target had heard through-out the boat was at 2231-55 (H). At about 2232-00 (H), radar reported the trailing starboard escort disappeared from the radar screen and was not seen again, range 3,500 yards. The target and two escorts were in view on the screen at that time. Shortly thereafter the target's ship departed in size, disappearing all together at 2235 (H). Range 4,000 yards.
A post firing analysis showed that the torpedo fired from tube #6 missed the target astern due to spread.
Using the interval between time of firing of this tube and time of first reported hit, the torpedo run corresponds to the range to the trailing starboard escort.
It is believed that this escort, a minesweeper or mine-layer of about 500 tons displacement, was hit by the torpedo from tube #6 and sank almost immediately.

— page 195 —
CONFIDENTIAL

TORPEDO ATTACK DATA FORM

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. One

| Tube Fired | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
||----|----|----|----|
| Zone Time | 2229:10 | 2229:20 | 2229:28 | 2229:37 |
| Range     | 3800 | 3730 | 3700 | 3650 |
| Torpedo Run | 3770 | 3720 | 3700 | 3640 |
| Target Bearing | 267 | 267-30 | 268 | 268-30 |
| Track Angle | 94° S | 95° S | 95° S | 96° S |
| Gyro Angle | 359 | 0 | 358 | 358-40 |
| Depth Set | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' |
| Power     | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or Miss | Miss | Hit | Hit | *Miss |
| Ertie.   | --- | --- | --- | --- |

Mark Torpedo. Mk 23 Mk 23 Mk 23 Mk 23

Serial Number. 26913 33778 46136 46126

Mark Explorer. Mk6-4 Mk6-4 Mk6-4 Mk6-4

Serial Number. 12307 8577 6995 7675

Actuation Set. Contact Contact Contact Contact

Actuation Actual. --- Contact Contact ---

Mark Warhead. Mk16-1 Mk16-1 Mk16-1 Mk16-1

Serial Number. 11046 11577 9756 12152

Explosive. TPX TPX TPX TPX

Type Spread. 3/40 R 1/2 R 1/2 L 3/40 L

Sea Conditions. Calm Calm Calm Calm

Overhaul Activity. U.S.S. ORION (all)

Miss due to. Spread --- --- *Spread

* A probable accidental hit on an escort.

Remarks: All torpedoes ran, hot, straight and normal.

— page 196 —
1. TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM
U.S.S. BONEFISH  TORPEDO ATTACK NO. TWO  PATROL NO. FOUR
Time: 0630 (H) Date: 4/27/44 Lat. 5°-33' N. Long.125°-21' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Sighted target at 0536 (H) range 16,000 yards, heading for Sarangani Strait where submarine was patrolling submerged. Target was steaming a straight course, conforming to the coastline. It was escorted by one small minesweep stationed on the target's starboard bow.

Ships Sunk:
(a) Number: 0no.
(b) Type: AK - Similar to HEIITO MARU (range 39 ONI - 208-J revised).
(c) Tonnage: 14,168 tons.

Damage Determined By: Three torpedo hits were heard which checked with time of torpedo runs for tubes #2, #3 and #4. Sound heard target's screws stop at the time torpedoes hit and they were not heard again. Typical breaking up noises were heard by sound coming from the direction of the target when hit for about one hour. Loud breaking up noises together with secondary explosions were heard through the hull for about twenty minutes after the target was hit. On returning to periscope depth at 0855 (H), the escort was seen searching the area at the scene of the sinking but the target was not in sight.

Target Draft: 15' Course: 0850 T Speed: 13 kts.
Range: 3,800 yards.

Own Ship Data
Speed: 3 kts. Course: 0100 T. Depth: 63' Angle: 00
Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Submerged - Periscope. As the target was running parallel to the coastline, his movements could be predicted in advance. It was seen that it would round Tinaca Point close aboard, zigging away from my position. I therefore commenced closing the point as quickly as possible, intending to fire at the target before it reached the turn. Due to target's high speed and an adverse current, the target rounded the Point before I reached the desired firing position, forcing me to accept a long torpedo run. Periscope ranges and bearings were used for tracking by plot and TDC as well as for firing data. A modified 4-3-2-1 spread was used, spreading the torpedoes from the bow toward the stern.

— page 197 —
1 2 3 4
: 0608:43 0608:53 0609:01 0609:09
: 3850 3840 3830 3820
: 4040 4020 4020 4030
: 357° 358° 359° 0°
: 108° S 108.5°S 110°S 110°S
: 06° 06° 04° 03°10'
: 6' 6' 6' 6'
: High High --- ---
: Miss Hit .Hit .Hit .Hit
: Yes No No .No
: Mk14-3A Mk14-3A Mk23 Mk23
: 23861 26825 41324 46131
: Mk6-4 Mk6-4 Mk6-4 Mk6-4
: 12230 8720 8712 8804
: Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
: Contact Contact Contact Contact
: Mk16-1 Mk16-1 Mk16-1 Mk16-1
: 2947 11493 12572 11126
: TPX TPX TPX TPX
: 13°R 3/4°R 3/4°R 13°L
: Calm Calm Calm Calm
: U.S.S. ORION (A11)
: **
: ** Seemed to make ciroual run, smoking heavily.

— page 198 —
25' Course: 190° T Speed: 8 knots.
Range: 2,500 yards.

Own Ship Data:
Speed: 3 knots Course: 300° T Depth: 63' Angle: 0°
Type Attack: Periscope - Submerged. Target's speed was 8 knots.

— page 199 —
CONFIDENTIAL

determined by tracking by Plot and TDC using periscope
ranges, bearings and estimated angle on the bow.
Target's course set by estimated angle on the bow
and checked on navigational chart as paralleling the
coast line.

It was expected that the target would zig away
after passing Batorampon Point and before reaching
the firing point. The submarine was maneuvered into
a position 450 yards off the track at a range of
4,000 yards and on a course for a 70 starboard track
with the stern tubes. The target zigged away as was
expected giving a 2,500 yard stern tube shot with a
100 starboard track angle.

The presence of the three escorts complicated the
approach particularly the radically maneuvering Chidori.
Sound, JK, QB and JP was used to track the escorts and
to track the torpedoes when fired.

— page 200 —
7 8 9 10
: 1732:56 1733:06 1733:17 1733:26
: 2744 2744 2744 2744
: 2630 2630 2640 2650
: 104030 105045 1070 108010
: 850 S 860 S 870 S 900 S
: 177030 1780 178050 1800
: 6' 6' 6' 6'
: High High High High
: Hit Hit Hit Miss
: No No No No
: Mk 23 Mk 23 Mk14-3A Mk14-3A
: 46164 26910 26620 24784
: Mk 6-4 Mk 6-4 Mk 6-4 Mk 6-4
: 8722 11318 8696 8695
: Contact Contact Contact Contact
: Contact Contact Contact ---
: Mk 16 Mk 16-1 Mk 16-1 Mk 16-1
: 5826 12123 2018 10895
: TPX TPX TPX TPX
: 10 R 10 R 10 L 10 L
: 1 1 1 1
: U.S.S. ORION (A11).
:
:
: Torpedo performance - hot, straight and normal.

**Explanation:**
- The text is a torpedo performance report for a submarine.
- The report includes various technical details such as torpedo types, ranges, times, and coordinates.
- The text is organized in a tabular format with columns for torpedo number, date, time, and other relevant data.
- The report includes annotations and corrections made by the operator.
- The report is marked as confidential and should be treated as such.

— page 201 —
5/16/44 Lat. 8° 48' N. Long. 123°-0'E.
Target Data - Damage Reported

Description: Target was contacted at 0230 (H) by SJ radar, range 19,700 yards, while the submarine was patrolling off the western entrance to the Mindanao Sea. Target was tracked by Plot, TDC and Navigational track using radar ranges and bearings. There was one escort, a Tidori Class Torpedo Boat, stationed on the targets starboard bow.

A standard end-around run was made, tracking the target enroute to a position ahead, range 16,500 yards, on the base course track extended. The target was zig-zagging on 14 minute legs, 30 degrees on either side of base course.

Ship Fired At But Missed:
(a) Number: One.
(b) Type: ITUKISTIMA (Minelayer).
(c) Tonnage: 1970 tons.

Damage Determined By: Missed due to Control Error.

Target Drift: 10' Course: 060° T Speed: 15 knots.

Range: 2,000 yards.

Own Ship Data

Speed: 3 knots Course: 300° T Depth: 63' Angle: 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Periscope - Submerged. Target's speed was determined by radar tracking on the surface while gaining a position ahead for a submerged attack.

Targets course was determined by estimate of angle on the bow by periscope observation.

Targets course was determined by estimate of angle on the bow by periscope observation.

Four electric torpedoes were fired at the target, all missing astern. A reconstruction of the firing showed that a control error was made on firing in the

— page 203 —
CONFIDENTIAL

TORPEDO ATTACK DATA FORM

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. Four

Tube Fired. 7 8 9 10

Zone Time. 0443:33 0443:43 0443:51 0444:00

Range. 2000 2015 2022 2044

Torpedo Run. 2210 2270 2310 2400

Target Bearing. 141°30' 138°30' 137°15' 134°24'

Track Angle. 119° P 119° P 120° P 120° P

Gyro Angle. 180°30' 180°30' 180° 180°

Depth Set. 6' 6' 6' 6'

Power.

Hit or Miss. Miss Miss Miss Miss

Erratic. No No No No

Mark Torpedo. Mk 18 Mk 18 Mk 18 Mk 18

Serial Number. 53870 53930 54170 54023

Mark Explorer. Mk 4-2 Mk 4-2 Mk 4-2 Mk 4-2

Serial Number.

Actuation Set. Contact Contact Contact Contact

Actuation Actual.

Mark Warhead. Mk 18 Mk 18 Mk 18 Mk 18

Serial Number. W 232 W 968 70 83

Explosive. TPX TPX TPX TPX

Type Spread. 1°0 L 1°0 L 1°0 R 1°0 R

Sea Conditions. 3 3 3 3

Overhaul Activity. Submarine Repair Unit Fremantle, W.A.

Miss Due to. Control Error (All).

Remarks: Target prior moment of firing changed course to 0500 T while TDC value was on 0800 T. Torpedoes were fired with gyro angles from 180°30' to 180° which caused miss astern. Torpedoes apparently ran normal.

— page 204 —
0.000 YARDS.

Target Data - Damage Inflated

Description: The convoy was sighted at 0254 (H) while the submarine was submerged in the northern entrance
to Sibu. Passage awaiting daylight for a reconnais-
sance patrol off Tawi Tawi Bayi. The convoy con-
sisted of three tankers escorted by three
destroyers. The last tanker in column was the
largest and was chosen as the target for attack by
torpedoes. The two leading tankers were identified
as the NIPPON MARU type (Page 208, ONI 208 J Revls-
ed), The destroyers were of the HIBIKI Class.

It was seen that the convoy was heading for
the entrance to Sibu. The passage and that it would
pass within firing range.

A normal submerged approach was made, using
periscope ranges and bearings for a quick track-
ing check of target's speed and zig plan. The
formation was zigging 50 degrees to the right and
left of the base course on 6 minutes legs.

Ships Sunk:
(a) Number: One.
(b) Type: TANKER - GENYO MARU (Page 277 ONI 208-J Revlsed).
(c) Tonnage: 10,020 tons.

Damage Determined By: Three torpedo hits were heard
two of which were seen. The last explosion, a hit
under the stack blew the entire stern off. Two
minutes after the first hit the target was a mass
of smoke and flame. Normal ship: breaking up
noises were heard until a terrific underwater
explosion was felt 25 minutes after the first hit,
indicating that the tanker exploded.

Target Draft: 15' Course: 150° T Speed: 14 knots.

Range: 2,000 yards.

— page 205 —
2.5 knots Course: 209° T Depth: 63' Angle: 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Periscope - Submerged. The shortness of the approach allowed little chance for an accurate check of speed. Based on the size of the bow wave, 14 knots was used on the TDC. This was probably low causing the last two torpedoes fired to miss astern.

A modified 4-3-2-1 spread was used, spreading the torpedoes from bow toward the stern.

Tube #6 could not be fired either electrically or by hand. It is believed that the failure to fire was caused by low pressure on the 200# air system. The casualty is being studied by the ship with view toward devising preventive measures.

— page 206 —
1 2 3 4 5
Tube Fired: 1 2 3 4 5
Zone Time: 0311:30 0311:38 0311:46 0311:54 0312:02
Range: 3070 3082 3095 3108 3122
Torpedo Run: 3640 3660 3700 3730 3780
Target Bearing: 217°20' 216°20' 215°15' 214°24' 213°24'
Track Angle: 112° P 112° P 114° P 115° P 116° P
Gyro Angle: 349 349 348-30 351 353
Depth Set: 6' 6' 6' 6' 6'
Power: High High High High High
Hit or Miss: Hit Hit Hit Miss Miss
Erratic: No No No No No
Mark Torpedo: Mk 23 Mk 23 Mk 23 Mk 23 Mk 23
Serial Number: 41311 41301 46125 33868 46155
Mark Exploder: 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial Number: 8706 6545 8783 11559 11300
Aotuation Set: Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
Aotuation Actual: Contact Contact Contact Contact ---
Mark Warhead: Mk16-1 Mk16-1 Mk16-1 Mk16-1 Mk16-1
Serial Number: 3306 12184 11831 13587 1345
Explosive: TPX TPX TPX TPX TPX
Type Spread: 3° L 1½L 1/2° L 1/2° R 1½R
Sea Conditions: 0 0 0 0 0
Overhaul Activity: U.S.S. ORION.
Miss Due to: Spread Spread
Remarks: Time of tracking very short, periscope observations difficult due to lighting conditions.
Torpedoes ran hot, straight and normal. #6 tube did not fire, stopbolt failed to lift.

— page 207 —
1944, to my mind can best be described as just "one of those things" and can be expected periodically when the submarine is trying to get in for an attack. I do not believe the plane had any special submarine detection gear. He unfortunately happened to be at the right spot at the right minute to sight me. I do believe, however, that the planes are carrying a considerably heavier charge now than they were at the first part of the war.

No particular difficulty was experienced in evading detection by the A/S vessels after the torpedo attacks, once they started dropping depth charges. It was noted however on two occasions after attacks that a systematic sound search of the area was made, using the firing point as the origin and developing a sweeping line moving in the direction of the submarine's most logical course. Speed of advance about three to four knots.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGES.

No new major defects were noted. The major defects listed herewith have been commented upon previously in various correspondence dating back to the acceptance trails of this vessel:

(a) Overspeeding of the Auxiliary Motors during battery charges.
(b) Heavy smoking of the main engines (General Motors 24A-A). This defect was magnified by the development of holes in the outboard muffler exhaust elbows to #3 and #4 main engines during the trip to the area. These two engines were so noisy and gave off such a display of sparks and flame that they were used only in emergencies during the patrol.
(c) Noisy operation of the reciprocating type trim pump.

— page 208 —
CONFIDENTIAL

This vessel received moderate damage as a result of a near miss by an aerial bomb on May 4, 1944.

The following damage could not be repaired by ship's force and remains uncorrected:

(a) Both periscopes. Out of collimation. Dirty internal paint chippings. Leak.
(b) Searchlight and bridge gyro repeater W.T. covered demolished.
(c) Bridge superstructure plating pulled away from frames and plating warped.
(d) Possible damage to #2 fresh water tank causing salt water seepage.

(L) RADIO.

No major defeats or damage was experienced. Reception during the patrol, as a whole, was very poor. This was due mainly to Jap interference, both CW and MCW. Reception was extremely poor in the vicinity of Davao Gulf and Sarangani Straits and frequently VIXO could not be received.

Although the recommended frequencies were used, communications could not be established direct with VIXO for transmission of serials #3, #4, and #5. These were relayed by VEM and NPG.

(M) RADAR.

Trouble was experienced with the range unit of the SJA radar while underway for patrol area. Fortunately, we had only been underway two days when the trouble occurred and were able to send a despatch requesting a replacement range unit by air shipment, to Emuorth Gulf. Though not definitely established, the trouble is believed to have been due to a defective transmitting crystal or lead thereto in the range tank. On May 23,1944, 6 hours of operation were lost while hunting for a defective condenser, C-22B, in the transmitter-receiver unit.

Despite the above trouble, performance of the newly installed SJA-equipment was superior to that of the replaced model SJ-equipment, which was considered excellent. Ranges in excess of 100,000 yards were obtained on land targets on several occasions while ranges of 10,000 to 15,000 yards were obtained on small escort vessels. PPI unit did not prove as useful as expected for convoy attacks, but was of great assistance to navigation, especially in restricted waters. The fault is not in the PPI unit, rather it is due to the design of the presently

— page 209 —
CONFIDENTIAL

installed antenna which causes excessive side-lobes to be radiated with a consequent distortion of the true picture and misrepresentation on the PPI screen. Reduction of I.F. gain only partially corrects this fault. We are anxiously looking forward to a new design antenna reportedly in production now.

The general performance of the SD-2 radar was good. Ranges obtained were 10-18 miles on planes and 26 miles, 32 miles, and 36 miles on various land targets. At one time a plane was picked up at 32 miles.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

Numerous gradients encountered during the patrol apparently effectively shielded us from detection by the sound gear of the Japs. On one occasion while at 300 feet, three small patrol craft passing directly overhead and pinging constantly, failed to detect us through three density layers. While on the surface pinging was detected at 19,000 yards and submerged, screws were heard at 10,000 yards.

The JK and QB sound equipment out-performed the JP-1 gear, which is definitely not up to par.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS.

No unusual density layers were encountered.

— page 210 —
6. CONFIDENTIAL

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY.

Health: In general good - one case of Pyelonephritis.
Food: Very good - much improvement over the last patrol.
Habitability - good.

(Q) PERSONNEL.

This vessel is at long last reaping dividends due to policy of rotating personnel. Enough experienced men are being returned from rest periods to offset the inexperience of new men.

Both officers and crew performed their duties in an excellent manner.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED.

| Miles | Gallons |
|------||
| 1699.4| 21,709 |
| 6,442.5| 65,349 |
| 2,050.2| 25,107 |

(S) DURATION.

Days to Area - 7.
Days in Area - 35.
Days from Area to Freemantle - 5.
Days submerged - 21.

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING.

Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel Factor
Three | 9,100 gal. | 30 days | 30 days
Limiting Factor this Patrol.

(U) REMARKS. | Orders.

A post firing analysis of the attack on the loaded transport off Zamboanga on May 7, 1944, brings out an interesting point in regard to Japanese observance of the rules of 1907 Geneva Convention applying to hospital ships. The transport was sighted by this vessel at 1655 (H). The transports course, speed and damaged condition shocked with information learned later, indicated...

— page 212 —
FC5-16/416-3
Serial # 0319
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN
C-0-NF-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-I
U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship,
3 June 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS BONEFISH Conf.
1tr. SS223/A16 Serial
06 dated May 30, 1944,
Report of 4th War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN,
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Fourth War Patrol -
Comment on.

1. The fourth patrol of the U.S.S. BONEFISH was conducted in the CELEBRES SEA - SULA SEA area during the period 15 April 1944 to 30 May 1944. The patrol was of forty-seven days duration with thirty-five days being spent north of the Barrier.

2. This patrol is the fourth outstanding patrol for the BONEFISH. It was conducted aggressively, with clear and concise thinking, in the face of heavy enemy counter-measures, both planes and numerous patrol craft. Area coverage was excellent and five torpedo attacks were made, four of them being successful.

ATTACK NO. 1 - Contact was made by periscope submerged on one AK attained by three escorts. When proper firing range could not be obtained the Commanding Officer surfaced after sunset, gave chase and attacked the target obtaining two hits. There is a possibility that one of the escorts was hit accidentally by one of the torpedoes of the spread.

ATTACK NO. 2 - A submerged periscope attack on one AK escorted by a small minesweep resulting in three torpedo hits. Commanding Officer was forced to fire at a long range (3800 yards) due to adverse currents and a change of course of the target which was following the coastlines.

ATTACK NO. 3 - A daylight submerged attack on a large AP escorted by three PC's, one CHIDORI and one unidentified ship. Three torpedoes were heard to hit but results were not observed due to enemy counter-measures.

ATTACK NO. 4 - This attack on a minelayer escorted by a CHIDORI missed due to a control error.

— page 213 —
5-16/AL6-3
(Es)
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship,
3 June 1944.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Fourth War Patrol - Comment on.

ATTACK NO. 5 - A submerged attack in bright moonlight resulted in two hits soon, three heard, on a large tanker, one of a convoy of three with three destroyer escorts.

Besides the torpedo attacks the BONEFISH accomplished a reconnaissance mission obtaining valuable information.

3, The BONEFISH returned in very good material condition with the exception of minor bomb damage and will be refitted in the normal time. The lack of satisfactory replacement trim pumps continues to embarrass submarine in this operating area. This ship together with seven others in this area have chrome liners with aluminum pistons and smoke badly. It is strongly recommended that immediate steps be taken to provide material to accomplish Ship 147-K. Further study should be made of radio transmission and reception in the patrol areas for the purpose of evolving frequency-time combinations which will insure good reception. The Submarine Repair Unit, Fremantle, W.A., is to be congratulated on the excellent performance of the S.R.U. designed (Barr type) TET's.

4. The BONEFISH returned to port after a very active patrol with high morale, excellent health and an exceptional state of cleanliness.

5. The Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew for maintaining the high standard set in previous patrols and for further important damage inflicted upon the enemy.

H. H. McLEAN.

— page 214 —
12/PRT 7 0574
Serial 0561
G-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
3RD ENDORSEMENT to: USS BONEFISH
Conf. Ltr. A16, Serial 06, dated 30
May, 1944. Report of 4th War Patrol.
From: The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Fourth War Patrol
- Comment on:
   The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron
   concerned in.
2. In the usual hard hitting manner, BONEFISH scored
   heavily against the enemy for the fourth consecutive time. This
   consistently fine performance reflects great credit on the
   Commanding Officer.
3. The remarks in the second endorsement relative to
   the delay in receiving trim pumps and proper oil control rings for
   main engines are concurred in. Could centrifugal pumps are re-
   ported to be enroute by air and should be available for the next
   refit.
4. The ingenious reconnaissance by BONEFISH on the night
   of 17 May, is particularly commendable. TART TAVT BAY area was
   swept by radar and information gained thereby was later
   substantiated by visual observation.
5. This patrol is designated as successful for purpose
   of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.
6. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding
   Officer, Officers, and Crew of BONEFISH for inflicting the
   following damage on the enemy:

| SINK | TONNS | TONS |

— page 215 —
7 0574
UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Al6-3(F-3/roj)
Serial: 0/6S/

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS BONEFISH conf. ltr.
Al6, Serial 06, dated
30 May 1944, Report of
Fourth War Patrol.

From: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Fourth
War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commanding Officer, Officers, and Men of
the U.S.S. BONEFISH are congratulated for conducting a
successful war patrol during which 27,424 tons of enemy
shipping were sunk.

Copy to:
ComSubs7thFl1t
ComSubRon-16
CO U.S.S.BONEFISH

H. W. GRAF,
Chief of Staff.

— page 216 —
18 March 1946

REASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE BY SUBMARINES

Reference: (a) ComSubPac 1tr. FF12-10/L11(1) of 21 February 1946.

USS BONEFISH (SS223) 4th War Patrol
Date of Attack: 14 May 1944
Position: Off TAWI TAIWAI BAY, P.I.

DNI lists and Japanese verification
state that as a result of BONEFISH's attack on an AO, the trailing ship in a convoy, the DD INAZUMA of 1800 tons was sunk. This sinking was a result of one hit heard by BONEFISH but not observed. Two hits were seen and heard in the AO and BONEFISH was credited with her sinking. Credit for sinking the DD should be added to BONEFISH's tally. Commanding Officer, Comdr. T. W. Hogan, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:
ComSubLant
SubSchool New London
CO SS-223
Op-23E
Op-414C3

— page 218 —
13 August 1944.
SS223/A16-3
Serial 014

DECLASSIFIED
From: The Commander, Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Vic: (Official Channels).

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS 223) - Report of War
P.T.R. Number Five.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the fifth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the Columbus Sea. Not in the Sulu Sea. Covering the period 25 June to 13 August is a war record herewith.

L. L. EDGE.

DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.C
BY OP-0932E DATE 12/12/44

89754 FILMED

— page 219 —
1944, arrived FRENCH-NTLE, V.A., from Fourth War Patrol. Refit conducted by first relief crew of Submarine Division 162 and U.S.S. ORION. Drydocked in marine railway, 8 - 10 June. Bridge cut down to TRIGGER Type. Overhauled #3 and #4 Main Engines and Auxiliary Generator Engine. Refit completed, 13 June 1944.

On 13 June 1944, Commander T. HOGAN, USN, was relieved by Lieutenant Commander L. L. EDGE, USN, as Commanding Officer.

On 14 June 1944, ship was degaussed by flashing method, and sound tested.

From 16 June to 22 June, 1944, carried out post-refit deep dive, tests, and training, including coordinated night surface training runs.

On 23 and 24 June 1944, completed loading and readiness for sea.

— page 220 —
1315
Departed FRENATILE, for fifth war patrol, in accord_nce with Commander Task Force Seventy-one Point One Secret Operation Order No. 81-44, of 21 June 1944.
Hocad6 for Exercise Area ABLE for final day and night training runs with H.M.A.S. HORSEMAN cs target.
2230 Completed training runs, and parted company with HORSEMAN.
Departed exercise area, ans set course for EXMOUTH GULF, W. ...

26 - 27 June 1944

Noon Position: 26th L.t. 30° 27' S
Long. 114° 08'15" E.
27th Lat. 26° 05'15" S
Long. 112° 21' E.

Abrute XMOUTH GULF, ... A, vi bombing restricted on l.one, conducting daily tricning drives, drills, and fire control exercises.
2102 26 June 1944: Interference on SJ Radar, followed half hour later by contact, bearing 074°(T), range 5750 yards. M.uneuvered to prevent range closing rapidly, and exchanged visu.l.recognition signals with a Blue submarine. Tried to exchange calls, but the range and heavy seas prevented it.

28 June 1944.

Noon Position: L.t. & Long. EXMOUTH GULF.
1023 Moored to fuel b.reg, EXMOUTH GULF, W. ... , and commenced rueling.
1725 Received 12,000 gallons fuel oil, topped off fresh provisions, and departed EXMOUTH GULF, enroute to assigned patrol area.
1847 Fired four rounds of 4-inch common ammunition, plus 20 mm. guns, at beachhead hulk near VLMING. H.M.D., simulating battle surf.ce.

— page 221 —
29 - 30 June 1944.
Noon Position: 29th Lct. 190° 09' S.
Long. 113° 15' E.
30th Lct. 140° 54' S.
Long. 114° 49' E.

Enroute from XMOUTH GULF, via LONBOK STRI, via Bembing Restricted Lnc, conducting daily training dives, drills, and fire control exercises.

2010 29 June: Interference on SJ Radar screen.
No contact.

1110 30 June: Expended four (4) rounds of 4-inch common ammunition, and fired all light caliber guns in battle surface drill.

0800 0.0.D. sighted unidentified, high-wing monoplane, possibly KAVIS type (Plane Contact No. 1), distance estimated 15 miles, low. Position about 290 miles, bearing 145°(T) from SOMRABAJA. Submerged.

1013 Surfaced, after conducting daily submerged drills and training.

1021 Sighted a U.S. submarine. Altorod course to close, and exchanged visual calls with southbound FLIER. Obtained information that she had contacted and easily evaded only two small patrols, one at each entrance to LOMBOK STRAIT on her transit of the proceeding night.

1400 Submerged to kill time until sunset. Practiced balancing on density layer at 250 feet.

1827 Surfaced and set course for moonlight approach to LOMBOK STRAIT.

2 July 1944.
Noon Position: Lct. 80° 09' S.
Long. 116° 01' E.

0214 Mocnset.
0302 Commenced transit of LOMBOK STRAIT at full power. During transit, contacted by SJ Radar and then indistinctly sighted three unidentified, fired small craft, (Ship Contacts No. 1,2, and 3), the first near southern entrance and to eastward of center, and the other two near northern entrance, one to west, one to east of center. Contact ranges were 5500, 6100,

— page 222 —
0515
Complicated transit of strait.
While still debating whether to continue on surface at high speed to clear vicinity of LOMBOK or to dive and take a day off in which to conduct submerged patrol close ashore to northern shore of LOMBOK ISLAND, covering trip to SOERABAYA (via LOMBOK and BALI STRATTS), at sighted unidentified vessel against early morning light. Range indeterminate; no radar contact.
(Ship Contact #4). Submerged, and decided in favor of submerged patrol. Headed for unident. Identified undent as small two-masted schooner. Decided to close to investigate.
Took periscope pictures, for practice, of sail-boat. Identified crew as small, brown-skinned natives, not Japs.
Commenced closing LOMBOK coast from northwest, making periscope observations every 15 minutes from 62 feet, and running at 90 feet in between, due to very calm and smooth sea.
Sighted small sailboat at 112°(T), range approx. 6000 yards.
Sighted another small sailboat, at 157°(T), range approx. 6000 yards, and small object beyond which locked, possibly, like a mast. (Ship Cont. at #5). Turned toward, and increased speed to 5 knots. Mast appeared to belong to some type of small steamer, hull down, because at 5.0k tcp was now showing; at this time also sighted what seemed to be another object with mast which could also be a small steamer. The appeared at 5k tcp pass each other on opposite courses.
Further observation, while closing, showed them both to be drawing to scattered and remaining at same distance from each other. Began to suspect they were all one ship, stack aft, with only superstructure showing; see came to normal approach course, at 5 knots, to close.

— page 223 —
1224 Sighted two sailboats on port bow.
: 1246 'Finally made cut cur "AO" to bc two small sea
trucks, running to eastward paralleling beach
about 3 miles from it. The range had closed
only slowly using five knots speed on a normal
approach; so gave up chase, and stood dead on
course 060°(T) about 6 miles from coast.
Remined at 4 knot speed in between periods
observations, however, hoping to be able to
surf. So at about sunset, and find cur two
sea trucks within sight, and, perhaps, bc
able to run in during twilight and knock them
off with the 4-inch.
: 1829 Surf. ced during twilight, with throo s.li brats
in sight, but no sign of cur quarry. We had good
dark background flown all directions except
from the beach, but at
: 1839 hoacced to close LOBBOK coast to investigate. It
dark objects closer in.
: 1845 With radar range to beach 6000 yards, and objects
very close in and still unidentified, headed
back out to northeast, and decided to run
to northern coasts of the barrier islands along
the eastern traffic approach lane to SEGARABA'A,
and south of the PATERNOSTER ISLANDS, until
necessary to cut northward past LAK.SSAR
Using 3 engine speed.

3 July 1944
: 0049 Noon Position: Lat. 60° 25.1' S.
: 0049 Long. 119° 15.4' E.
: 0049 Radar contact on starboard bow, range 7000
yards. Closed to investigate, and, at 4100
yards made out sailboat in misty moonlight.
Continued on way.
: 0826 Sighted BONAWJA ISLAND, bearing 333°(T),
distance 16 miles.
: 1006 Contact at 14 miles on SD Radar (Plane Contact
No. 2).
: 1007 Plane radar pip faded out; not sighted.
: 1243 Contact at 18 miles on SD Radar (Plane Contact
No. 3). Faded out in minute; not sighted.
: 1250 Sighted large object coming up over horizon,
on port bow. Turned away and stopped. Range
not decreasing rapidly; so at
: 1255 Turned toward and closed.
: 1315 Object identified as DE BRILL BANK Lighthouse,
which had been sighted long before land itself
was visible. Unusual pogada-like construction

— page 224 —
1435
fooled us.
Sighted object on horizon bearing 325°(T). Headed for it, to investigate.
1432 Passed close aboard large abandoned raft made of bamboo, use undetermined. Resumed course and spood.
1505 Sighted small, odd looking sailboat, and changed course to investigate.
1528 Passed close aboard native outrigger sailboat with about seven rather scared native fishormen, the boat riding to dragnets over the bow. No Japs.
Resumed course and spood.
1612 Sighted BANKILLUANG ISLAND by poriscoope.
1628 Sighted three small sailboats similar to earlier one, and close to base course; so again closed to investigate.
1704 Passed close aboard content of the three sailboats, Results same as before.
2345 Contacted CAPTAIN LINDAR by SJ RAGAR, distance 85,000 yards.

4 July 1944
Noon Position: Lat. 01° 26.5' S, Long. 118° 00.9' W.
Went to 4-engino spood to pass CAPTAIN LINDAR - CAPTAIN LINDAR.
0400 With CAPTAIN WILLIAM nearly aboard, changed course to head for BALLISTA.
0507 Reduced spood, well clear of CAPTAIN WILLIAM.
0625 -ltered course slightly to investigate a light whosc sails gleamed white in early morning sun.
0639 Passed close aboard still smaller outrigger with bright yellow paint and four br-wn natives fishing.
1008 Sighted larger, two-masted sailboat, and changed course to investigate.
1020 This looked like a possible gun target; sc went to battle surface st tics, with gun arrows standing by below.
1033 Ship's I.C. MG tripped out just as we began to maneuver for close approach to sailboat, and we narrowly veered running target down, as rudder angle indicator, gyro repeater, engine annunciators, talk-back and IMC went out together. Order and stand-by systems quickly effective however; so we only soared cursclvos as well as the occupants of the sailboat.
1037 I.C. MG back in commission.
1043 With 20 mm. guns manned, we circled sailboat, which had doused sail and w.s lying to. She locked harmless.

— page 225 —
1051
at close quarters, with only brown-skinned crew showing. The sky was mainly overcast sc, ct
Brought best alongside and sent one-officer board-
ing party over. This boat was a two-masted, schooner rigged, carrying, in addition to the
fore and main s.lls., jib and two stays.sls, and
two topsails; she was of an estimated 20 tons
displacement. Her complement consisted of eight
men, two women, and one baby (preminently dis-
played, 3o e-butt 8 months). They wore all brown
skinned, and hailed as best we could make cut
from MARASSAR; no English spoken. She carried
no cargo other than own food and water, and
a few boxes of Japanese cigarettes made at
SORABATA. A check disclosed considerable
in the form of Japanese-issue guilders, and a
ledger indicating that the boat had called at
M.K.CARR, SORABATA, BATAVIA, and T.R.K.N.
Upon our close approach, the crew had not hidden,
but lowered sail without any show of force on
our parts and willingly helped bring the boat
alongside by tending lines. They appeared
friendly in every way. Wished we had something
to leave them as a parting gift, but could think
of nothing we could spare, whereas we wore off-
ord both cigarettes and money!
Cast off from sailboat, and proceeded to close
B.L.I.K.P.N.
Reached focal point for north-south B.L.I.K.P.N.
traffic lane, and changed course to follow this
lane to northward.
Sighted float-type plane from bridge, estimated
range 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 4); submerged.
Surfaced, all clear.
Sighted two-masted sailboat by periscope; turned
to close.
Brought sailboat alongside. This one was
identical to other, but crew was all male, and
three looked like Japanese. Again, boarding
party was sent over for search, but three
sailors were brought on board for closer in-
vestigation. No finally took their vehemently
expressed word that they were Chinese, since
all oriental critics board were of Chinese
make. Again the attitude was generally friendly,
although no English was spoken. They seemed to
call B.L.I home, but had, like the earlier boat,
been to ports of practically all the N.E.I.

— page 226 —
1930
2125
2242
2307
2311
2315
2323
2330
5 Jul 1944
NOCN Position: Lat. 00° 41' N.
Long. 119° 54' E.
Changed course from south side of M.NGKALIHAT to head for NORTH ATCHER.
Sighted NORTH ATCHER, distance 19 miles.

-8-

— page 228 —
1625
Beacon clearing the area at four engines spaced in a direction b.c. toward NORTH WATCHER. Target was already a flaming hulk, and low in water, but not sunk.

1631
Contact on SD Radar, range 6 miles, moving in. Submerged. (Plane Contact No. 5).

1807
Surface; all appeared clear, except smoke from our still burning target.

1809
Contact on SD Radar, range 2 miles. Submerged. Be on the suspect "pl.ne" was NORTH WATCHER, since we had closed it considerably since diving at 1631.

1825
Sky still covered with low overcast, and nothing but coast of CHILDREN, nearby NORTH WATCHER, and smoke from our target visible.

1838
Surface; be on clearing arc to northward.

1910
Smoke from target no longer visible.

2150
Alter cord course to westward to head for traffic lane north of CPE MINGLE. Felt that our presence in NORTH WATCHER was might have been publicized by the small but spectacular landing lasting fire, and that consequently it might be more profitable to shift operations to now spot.

2300
Interference on SJ Radar screen, as from a U.S. submarine, bearing 021 (T).

2320
Radar interference fixed out, on bearing 070°(T).

2340
Contact CPE MINGLE. HLT by SJ Radar, distance 30 miles. Sighted from bridge for minutes later.

6 July 1944
Noon Position: 1. 02° 41' N.
Long. 118° 16' E.

0047
Changed course to northward to head for patrol spot NW of MARTON. I.S.N.D.

0050
Sighted M.T.H. ISLAND, distant 20 miles. With the glass sea, bright moonlight, and high visibility conditions existing, the horizon was almost nonexistent, and ranges and sizes of objects sighted were extremely difficult to judge. Thought for a short while this island was a DD or patrol vessel much closer, and on a parallel course with speed almost equal to our own.

— page 229 —
0339  Ch.nced course to NW, to pass about ten miles from M.O.R.S. REPORT - nd M.R.TOTE. ISL.ND.
0801  Changed course to 2600(T) heading for patrol line.
0908  Contact on SD Radar, range 9 miles, moving in slowly; submerged. (Fl.no Cont.ot. Nc. 6).
1021  Surf.ced, after completing daily b.t.tle problem; all clear.
1106  Commenced surf.ce p.t.rcl on a 5-mile line, 0400 - 2200(T), from P.NDJ.NG ISL.ND, center of line distance about 12.5 miles, covering northern entrance to channel between PANDJANG and MARATOUSA ISLANDS.
1114  Contact on SD Radar, range 7 miles; submerged.
1246  (Fl.no Contact No. 7).
1930  Surfaced; all clear. Resumed surface patrol.
7 July 1944
Nc.n Positi:n:  Lat. 02C 51.4' N.
L.nc. 118C 13' E.
0639  Submerged for daily trim dive and battle problem, conducting periscope patrol while down.
0955  Surfaced, and resumed surface patrol.
1003  Sighted, by periscope, a small two-rasted, single-stacked starcar, hull down, bearing 2350(T), range about 10 miles. (Ship contact No. 8).
1010  Determined course to be Nw heading for TARAKAN.
1014  Began end-around at 4-on-line speed.
Sighted another smaller vessel bearing 2750(T).
(Ship Contact Nc. 9). This fellow had only one mast and looked like a possible patrol corf with a small angle on bow headed toward channel who had been guarding; so we continued to open to NE to avoid. Apparently not sighted.
1101  Reained periscope contact with target after locating it for a short while, during avoiding action.
1109  Sighted another vessel from high lockcut, bearing 2850(T), and also closing fast toward our channel. This one, through periscope, locked definitely like SC type patrol vessel; so we maneuvered to put him sharp on quarter, to avoid.
1219  Again we were not apparently sighted, and resumed end-around on original target after getting clear of the patrol vessel.
1219  Monotony contact on SD Radar, range 37 miles; probably land.
1243  On target's base course ahead; turned toward reduced speed.

— page 230 —
1246
Sighted float-type plane dead ahead with a 70° angle on bow, range about 12 miles and approximately over target. (Flame Contact No. 8). Submerged.
1249 Battle Statics submerged.
1257 Sighted target by periscope, angle on bow very small. Water very smooth. Going to 80 feet between observations.
1330 The closer he came, the smaller the target appeared. Target course, 340°(T); speed 8 knots.
1338 Target developed into small wooden vessel, superstructure aft, estimated tonnage, 200 tons; Jap flag painted on each bow. Doodled he could not be worth more than one torpedo; so, at first sight, he was not considered an evidenc of any guns.
1345 Went to 80 feet at full speed preparatory to battle surf. Target on port beam, range 600 yards.
1352 Sound reported target bearing was suddenly behind TDC generated by the torpedo. Tried to get out of range, but before we could, torpedo was seen to be steady; so, we became afraid he was not an innocent as he appeared and hit the torpedo and darted out of range. The torpedo was then in the air and dropped. To be on safe side, down on course to 300 feet.
1406 Nothing had happened; the sound bearing finally had drawn ahead; so came up for look. Tried to get the torpedo to the surface, but it was too close. Object lost.

— page 231 —
1418 The eighth hit, this time in his after superstructure, finally caused him to burst into flame. He immediately lost all way, and the crew began to appear in the water stern.

: 1420 Checked fire, with range at 800 yards, but bearing too far aft and angle on bow still small. Maneuvered for favorable position for finishing him off.

: 1423 Resumed fire, t 600 yards range, into his sternboard side.

: 1245 Checked firing, after expending 21 rounds of 4" H.C. and 288 rounds of 20 mm. ammunition. By this time, target was burning furiously, stem to stern, was down about four feet, and was dead in water, emitting heavy clouds of black smoke, again like an oil fire, even though it took eight hits of 4" H.C. to start him burning. Took pictures, and began observing scene, because of earlier plan sighting, and of that smoke smoke undoubtedly be soon in TARAKAN. Scoured topside, and from b.t.tle stations; clearing to eastward toward deeper water.

: 1538 Changed course to 1600(T), to head for our previous patrol station off RANDYAN ISLAND. Had first thought it might be wise again to shift the location of operations, this time to the traffic lane between TARAKAN and SIBUTU, because of the advertisement had just created again. However, the two patrol craft we had avoided during the morning's pursuit, intrigued us with the possibility that they wore going down to meet a TARAKAN bound convoy, so we decided to return for another night and day. Changed course to 1100(T) to investigate object looking like sailboat.

: 1553 Object identified as floating palm tree debris. During the past four days, we had sighted so much debris in the smooth water, such that range and size were difficult to estimate, that we had become almost "adobris happy", actually going out of our way to close nearly a score of times. Resumed course 1600(T).

: 1604 Sighted RANDY, NG and MARTON, ISLANDS, distant 21 and 26 miles respectively. Changed course to head directly for old patrol line.

— page 232 —
1815 Smoke from our target still visible 27 miles away.
: 1903 Commenced surface patrol of old 5 mile patrol line, 220° - 0400(T), off PANDJANG ISLAND.

: 8 July 1944 Noon Position: Lat. 25 56.7' N. Long. 118° 06.5' E.

: 0143 Sighted small unidentified vessel, estimated range, 16,000 yards. Began closing.
: 0205 SJ Radar picked up the vessel at range of 9050 yards.
: 0212 Target identified as sailboat similar to those stopped and boarded in MAKASSAR STRAIT. Resumed patrol.
: 0735 Sighted smoke and two masts of a ship (Ship Contact No. 10) headed southward from behind PANDJANG ISLAND, followed in the next few minutes by sightings of three more sets of masts with smoke, and two single masts (Ship Contacts No. 11 through 15). Apparently our hunch yesterday concerning the two patrol vessels was bearing fruit. We were surprised by the southerly course, however, since the chart indicated no channel between PANDJANG and the BORNEO coast. We headed SE, since it appeared that we would have to intercept them at the southern entrance to the channel between CAPE MANGKALIHAT and MOEARAS REEF.
: 0750 Leading targets were seen to have passed behind DERAWAN ISLAND and then to turn toward us, and finally, to turn still more heading up toward TARAKAN. We then realized that the convoy must have anchored overnight in the shelter of the reefs, and behind PANDJANG ISLAND, at about Lat. 20 18.4' N., Long. 118° 10.3' E., and was making a scuttle through the small channel immediately to the south of DERAWAN ISLAND, probably after having been joined by some or all of the escort vessels. This change of convoy course to the NW made an end-arcund lock like duck scup, bringing aircraft interference, and we expected to intercept it about one third of the way to TARAKAN. Began end-arcund to northward.
: 0813 Contact on SD Radar, range 5 miles. Submerged to 200 feet. (Plane Contact No. 9).

— page 233 —
0846
Surfaced, and continued full power end-around. It became clear that the convoy course was considerably closer inshore than that of our small target of yesterday, because we had lost contact while submerged.

0925 Regained periscope contact with smoke and masts. Started by contact on nine sets of masts about 20° on port bow which came into periscope view-almost simultaneously. (Ship Contacts Nos. 16 through 24.)

0956 Raided toward us; so we turned southward, although I had to turn to the left to avoid the smoke. We decided that these fellows were small, possible patrol craft, and had better be avoided; so we gradually turned out to the eastward although range closed to where the tops of their superstructures were plainly visible from the bridge. We had visions of an armada of patrol craft being sent to look for us, because of yesterday's activities, their being guided by a possible plane sighting this morning.

As we were beginning to feel clear, however, with nine friends showing no signs of having seen us, at two contacts appeared on the SD Radar simultaneously, at ranges of 12- and 14 miles, and moved in. Submerged. (Pilco Contact 101.)

1025 Back to periscope depth, with our nine interlopers coming closer but with large angles on the bow. As long as we were already submerged, decided to close these little fellows to see exactly what they were.

1051 The nine were identified as all one of a kind: small motor-driven wooden "luggers" of about 150 tons each, with two masts, an after superstructure.

1104 Came to 50 feet, and sighted smoke and some masts of our original convoy bearing 2360(T), which meant that, due to all our delays, the convoy had gained about 300 true bearing on us.

1115 Surfaced, in sight of, but astern of, the nine sea-trucks, and continued full power end-around on convoy. Sighted steamer and small escort on port bow (Ship Contacts Nos. 25 and 26), again headed SW. Again turned to eastward to avoid, while we decided whether this new contact should be developed and attacked in stead of our first convoy. Addition looks by periscope into-ted that this new one was a torpedo-t. I got but he seemed to be small, something under 2000 tons, whereas our convoy had been originally

— page 235 —
1342
UNYO MARU (p. 269, O.N.I. 208-J) with an SC type escort leading. Rengo 5850 yards, bearing 2570(T).
Considered low-power short, but decided to let first target pass since closest range was 4500 yards with 1200(S) angle on bow. At least two more good targets were coming up, who would probably be alerted to avoid us by a miss, as well as... hit, on this first one due to the smooth water. These latter targets could now be soon be firing 2260(T) still hull down.
With targets coming on nicely, on steady course, and landing escort must in sight, scund picked up f.st light scrows bearing 0400(T).
Small wooden vessel similar to yesterday's target was sighted coming up on starboard quarter, but apparently not aware of our presence. This follow never got very far away during the onusuing attacks, and we were never sure that he was not going to pick up the scope during observations of the target group and give us away. (Ship Contact No. 27).
The water should rather quickly in this vicinity; so took single-ping sounding to reassure ourselves. 55 fathoms. This was done in spite of t.regt proximity, because there had been no echo nor knocking by escorts so far, and it was hoped that they might be using sonic listening equipment only, or at least have supersonic gear tuned to frequency different from our sounding head.
Leading oncoming target at 8250 yards, bearing 1580(T). Targets were in column and both targets appeared to be small to medium AKs, similar to TOSHI MARU (2000 tons, P. 151, O.N.I. 208-J), each with two goal-posts separated by amidships superstructure and stack. One SC type escort leading, with a larger unidentified type more like a PY on the starboard quarter of the second target and another SC on its port quarter, at distances of about 1000 yards.
With target range 3800 yards, began swinging to bring stern tubes to bear for about 1000(S) track, in order to take advantage of our MK XVIII torpedo aft and thus perhaps be able to swing for bow tube shot on second target before our location could be discovered.
Fired all tubes aft, six-foot depth setting, 10-second firing interval, at leading target with 1100(S) track, zero gyros, range 2200 yards, and set-up choosing beautifully by both TDC and

— page 236 —
1438
plot. Immediately began swinging right, to bring bow tubes to bear on second target.
Sound reported torpedoes apparently running
straight and normal and headed a little ahead
of target screws. Nc wakes or bubbles had been
observed by periscope.
Sound reported torpedo noise mingling with
target screw noise. Waiting expectantly, if
not patiently.
Nothing happened, except that target and escort
were observed continuing merrily on their way,
not appearing to realize, even in a smooth sea,
that four torpedoes had at least been in their
near vicinity. Anyhow, we were glad, even in
missing, that the fish had been MK XVIII's,
because our next attack was still unsuspected.
6. Fired tubes #1,2,3, and 5 with six-foot
depth settings, 8 second intervals, at second
target, with 1100(s) tr.ck, about 300(R) gyros,
and range of 2400 yards. The gyro setting
came forward field to match just before firing,
but were immediately matched. A kept matched
by hand, using phone to check indications and
setting. After firing, started swinging left
toward escort and target's starboard quarter and
also toward deeper water.
Sound reported escort screws speeding up and
getting closer. Raised scope and looked straight
down torpedo w.ks at target, and also at escort
who was just crossing w.ks with about 400 (S)
angle on bow, swinging right, toward us. Decided
it was time to go deep.
Dist.ant-sounding explosion. Do not know what
this was, but do not believe it could have been
a hit in our target.
At 200 feet, barely in negative gradient, and
using 2/3 speed swinging to 1100(T). Difficult
to go any deeper, apparently due to beginning
of steep negative gradient. Light screws at
3300(T), and at 3520(T), fairly close. Expected
depth charges did not materialize.
Begin working up to periscope depth for a look.
While trying to get up the last five feet for a
look, screws at 0000(T) remaining on steady bearing
ing. No sound reported then getting quite close;
so lost nerve and headed for 250 feet, to get
well inside of it.
1514. Went ahead at 5 knots speed to clear vicinity of
escorts.

— page 237 —
1529 It developed by new that we could not get any deeper than 250 feet even by flooding in 5000 pounds, plus reactive. Bow and stern planes had no effect at 5 knots; so finally decided that we were either on top of a negative gradient, such as ice, or wore on bottom, churning away, but getting nowhere, in spite of the fact that both sub heads, as well as JP, wore able to train and pick up screws merrily, and the pit log was still out of commission and rigged in. No one on board ever felt any kind of fear as if grounding. 55-ft. thres sounding a little earlier had evidently been in grave error or else we had been over a sub-sea hole at that time. Blowing negative with 200-pound air and pumping from caustic, by finally lifted us off, and we resumed course for deeper water to southward. Two sets of high speed, light screws had been audible all the while by sound, working around in different directions, but aerially drawing farther away. Sound reported three "ping" to NE of us, in the general direction of the screws which had become very faint. 1628 At periscope depth, could barely see top of mast of two escorts to NE of us; with no apparent idea as to where we were. 1639 Surface, and could see the superstructures of the escorts by periscope, but felt we could cut run them with the head set up to hold; so got going to SE. They saw us, and headed to intercept ahead, but never really had a chance. We naturally felt pretty disheartened by our performance. The luck which had been with us right up to the time of firing, enabling us to get into fairly decent attack position on two of the convoy in spite of interruptions and minor casualties, had deserted us at the last minute. Eight torpedoes came, and nothing except two worthwhile but escaped targets to show for it. We have done our best since to explain this miss, especially on the first target, but all recorded and remembered data has checked later just as perfectly as before firing. It was a dream set-up with targets, steady course and good. The torpedoes all ran straight and normal as far as we could tell. The 30°(R) gyres of the second attack may have been a bit excessive, particularly if ranges had been a little cut, but in the last quick periscope

— page 238 —
1753
With P.NDJ.NG ISLND a. in sight, sighted small unidentified vessel coming out of cur familiar channel between M.R.TOE. and P.NDJ.NG ISLNDS. Turned to cl. sc.

Range closed to 8500 yards. The vessel soonaced to be a small coastal or inter-island steamer, of about 300 tons. In the tethering dusk and at this range we could not tell whether she mounted any guns or not, but she had course and speed on course parallel and opposite to ours, such that we would pass about 1000 yards abeam of each other if we hold on. We were already in plain sight of each other. After our failure with the big target carrier in the afternoon, we were fooling near enough by this time to bite any Japs on sight; so continued to close.

1818 Battle stations, surf.ce; gun crews standing by below.

1824 t. range of 2400 yards, turned away and reversed course to parallel targets. Getting closer, but still not in sun visible on target.

1828 Commenced firing 4" deck gun, range 3100 yards. Boyed effective range of 20 nm. and 30-caliber, so held these crews below, but standing by. First shot under; second over, third and fourth to right. Target began turning away and toward shallow water of reefs; no answer fire. Fifth and sixth shots were hits, but target still under full control and not burning. Turned toward for chase and to close range. Range 2900, closing. With target slowed by several more hits, but still under control, checked fire to close and gain firing position.

1835 With range at 1100 yards, resumed fire on port quarter of target, still closing. First hit started her burning.

— page 239 —
1842 Passed within 600 yards of target pumping hit after hit, seeing many of them go completely through and out the other side. Target had developed into another wooden vessel, although considerably larger than any of our other gun targets, and was now burning famously, but not like the others had with their oil. She finally stopped, with upper works all aflame and fire shining through the gaping holes in her hull. A few survivors were seen to be in the water hanging on to lines trailing astern. The two lifeboats had not been launched. With reefs N5 of PANDJANG only 1500 yards away chocked fire to reverse course for return run. Resumed fire at 800 yards. Second hit finally touched off a chase of oil, and she really began to smoke and blaze in billows, every whit as spectacularly as her two predecessors - more so, in fact, since it was now fairly dark. We felt pretty conspicuous from our show by this time; so after a few more parting hits, one from the stern, which pierced her hull from stern to stem and set off an additional big oil fire, we, at Ceased firing, and set course at good speed for our patrol spot off CHILDREN. 2l rounds of 14" H.C. and 12 rounds of common expended for 17 hits. Several explosions sending flame up to six or seven times height of target were seen as we were leaving target far astrcn, and glow was visible until obscured by MARATOA ISLAND, when we finally turned SE beyond it. Again we failed to "sink" a wooden vessel, but knew that each of the three was completely destroyed in so far as future use to -nyonc, including the Japs, is concerned, and in all three cases, oil cargoes were destroyed. Hope the Japs were annoyed, even though we had missed the two torpedo targets.

9 July 1944
Noon Position: Lat. 40 02.5' N.
Long. 1180 46.2' E.
1006 Contact on SD Raa.r, rango 8 miles, sky overcast; sc did not dive. Pip f.dod back out. (Plane contact No. 11). Came in at 14 miles range, but also faded again.

— page 240 —
1012. Sighted LIGHTNING GROUP of Islands' and reefs; bearing 2900(W). - - -
1045 Sighted two small masts and smoke over horizon, by periscope, bearing 0170(T). (Ship Contact. No. 28). Began closing.
1055 Sighted float plane from bridge, bearing 1700(T), t about 8 miles; angle on bow about 700(S). Submerged to 1ct him go by. (Plane Contact No. 12).
1133 Surf ced, with masts no longer in sight, and headed northward.
1141 Picked up masts, gain by periscope bearing 0220(T); headed NW to intercept.
1200 Evidently had misjudged target course, because he had disappeared by the time of this observation; by periscope. Now guessed he must have been headed toward LIEKE CHANNEL instead of to south of LIGHTNING REBELS; so we also headed for LIEKE CHANNEL entrance.
1250 Rgained cont.ct, with masts be.ring 3400(T); changed course to northward parallel reefs.
1325 Could see cont.ct pretty well by now. He appeared to be a small patrol vessel of some type, painted gray, but was well over in water of about 10 fathoms and beyond gun range, apparently patrolling a bit aimlessly to the NW of NIMR, NIMR, NIMR. He may have been either laying mines in this area or perhaps sweeping a channel through LIGHTNING CHANNEL. We, however, hoped to transit SUBTUTU P.S.S.GE in the two hours of darkness between sunset and moonrise so decided that his position and small size would make any further time spent playing with him a waste. Set course for SUBTUTU, covering route from there to T.R.K.N.
1450 Sighted and then maneuvered to close object which locked like possible mine adrift, bearing 1140(T); range about 4 miles.
1508 Passed close aboard rusty can buoy, adrift in position: Lat. 40 14.3'N. Long. 1190 19.1'E. Sighted SUBTUTU HILL, bearing 0020(T), distance 30 miles.
1604 Began approach to SUBTUTU P.S.S.GE from SSB. Radar interference on SJ Radar bearing 1650(T); suspected it to be L.PON, also preparing to transit the pass tonight.
1910 Commenced transit of SUBTUTU P.S.S.GE at full power. The radar interference at stern followed us through, indicating that the trailing sub chose a course near SUBTUTU ISL.N, while we kept at middle.

— page 241 —
2014: Completed uneventful transit of the pass, and reduced speed; set course for PEARL BANK.
: 2245: Sighted islands of PEARL BANK.
: 2305: Entered channel between PEARL BANK and DOC CAN ISLAND.
: 2340: Completed transit of channel, on northerly course.

10 June 1944:
: Noon Position: Lat 70 11.7' N.
: Long. 120° 05.5' E.
: 0200: Changed course to 0600(T) to follow possible traffic lane between SIBUTU FASS and ZAMOANGA.
: 0510: Sighted small unidentified vessel in early morning twilight. Began closing cautiously, waiting for increasing light to aid identification; bearing 0150(T). (Ship Contact No. 29).
: 0519: Sighted JOLO ISLAND.
: 0519: Contact identified as fishing trawler, approx. 50 tons, with Jap flag painted on sides of deck house. Range 5000 yards. Stations for battle, surface.
: 0535: Sampan appeared to be unarmed, and all of crew except one brave.soul (Jap) had taken refuge below, but it degenerated and course and speed. Fired a 20 mm. burst across his bow to make him stop - which he did.
: 0605: Circled target, trying to make, by gestures and shouting, the lone individual understand that he and crew were to take to their boat, if they knew what was good for them. Our war was not with the fisherman individually, but felt the same as the Sampan flaunting his Nip colors had to be destroyed. Either he wouldn't underst.and, or they didn't know what was good for them, because they made no moves toward abandoning ship. Getting nowhere with our humanitarian efforts; so finally commenced firing with 20 mm. guns only, trying to set him on fire. Racked sampan about 20 minutes at mean range of 300 yards, but in spite of holing him innumberable times and splintering his deck house. It, it neither burned or sank, nor did crew come out. The 20's were proving entirely inefficient; so, at
: 0615: Fired two rounds of 4" common, one through superstructure, which fired him and one through hull, which didn't help him. The fire scrap rapidly, eventually getting into his fuel; he began setting slowly. Ceased firing.

— page 242 —
0700
Departed scene, with target still burning with a nice column of smoke, gutted, and cwssh. There
my have been a dozen survivors. Wether had begun to quench fire to some extent.
0710 Contact on SD Radar, range 12 miles. (Plane Contact No. 13). Our burning sampan was no doubt afra
ing the plane's attention, and, since we still were not too far away, we submerged.
0830 Surfaced and proceeded on 0600(T).
0831 Contact on SD Radar, range 16 miles, followed by sighting flot plane from bridge. (Plane Contact No. 14). Watched him while he circled above our late target, and closed to 1 miles. He kept circling, however, and finally drew beyond radar or sight contact to SE. S.specet he was a regular morning patrol from JOIC, looking in to see what the smoke was about.
1150 Sighted MINDANAO, bearing 1000(T), about 50 miles away.
1544 Changed course to CO40(T), headed for GUIMARAS STRAIT.

11 July 1944
Noon Position: Lat. 90 52.5' N.
Long. 121° 51.4' E.
0104 Sighted small object in the moonlight, but no radar contact. Began closing with circumspoct, and the 20 mm. guns manned.
0140 Radar picked up target, now believed to be small sailboat, at 4000 yards range.
0205 Brought small, single-masted Filipino sailboat, with crew of four Moros, alongside. They had pipors purporting to be a "Travel Permit", written in English, issued by the Chief of Police at the town of BARINAN, in the SW Province, Commonwealth of the Philippines, allowing a trip of 31 days for the purpose of taking a small cargo of "Racp" to P.N.Y. They appeared harmless and genuine; so we shoved off after exchanging a few cig rockets, canned goods and a little rice for two native straw hats (complete with bugs).
0730 Contacts on the SD Radar, at 5 and 6 miles. Submerged a bit hurriedly. Conducted the usual drills and fire control practice while down. (Plane Contact No. 15).
0917 Surfaced.
1136 Sighted P.N.Y., at 0200(T), distance 22 miles. Changed course for P.N.Y. GULF.

— page 243 —
1409 Lookout sighted float plane, bearing 0180(T), range about 20 miles, (Plane Contact No. 16), with about 900(P) angle on bow. He was over PANAY at time of sighting, just under a low bank of clouds; he flew on out to sea keeping approximately the same range from us as he passed from our port bow, astern, to cur. starrboard quarter. When on our port beam he turned toward us, and at

: 1451 Contact on SD Radar, closing at17 miles. Feeling that it mi.ht have been chance, and that he may not yet have seen us, we submerged with rather still at 16 miles. Tried to hold contact with periscope by stopping at 65 feet, but we inadvertently ducked; so went on to 100 feet to be on the safe side.

: 1558 Surfaced, all clear, and continued into mouth of PANAY GULF.

: 1622 Began surface patrol in entrance to PANAY GULF, on 8 mile line 0.00 - 2200(T), about 16 miles NW from SOJOTON POINT, NEGROS.

: 1930 Began to close GUIMARAS ISLAND, for closer-in sight surface patrol.

: 2210 Contact on SJ Radar, bearing 0790(T), range 4400 yards. (Ship Contacts No. 30 and 31). Let range close to 3800 yards, when, at

: 2214 Sound reported light screws on the contact bearing, making about 200 rpm. Turned away, just as we could make out from the bridge two small vessels on the contact bearings. Tracked contacts at speed of 5 knots, course 2750, headed out of GUIMARAS STRAIT. Both vessels seemed to be small, definitely not torpedo size, and may have been either patrol craft or small cargo vessels such as our gun targets of the CHINESE S.S. - Decided to track until moonrise, for possible identification, but was anxious not to be drawn very far off our patrol station, where we had hopes of bigger game.

: 2254 SJ Radar out of commission.

: 2326 Moonrise.

: 12 July 1944.
    Noon Position: Lat; 100 27' N.
    Long. 1210 40' E.

: 0030 Manouvered to put vessels in path of rising moon, but identification still impossible because of their small angle on bow when on that bearing. Swung out to southward to a position abcm of them. From this position they agreed to be

— page 245 —
0140  Depth charge, nct close.
: 0140 - 30  Second depth charge, not so far away.
: 0140 - Originally thought they were astern, from our new playmate, but the evidence of sheared screws and bulged bulkhead of the head in the forward room indicated that they were ahead; possibly the little fellow who had fired his machinegun at us cut across our bow when we won't down. Decided the control room boys were right after all; went deep and began clearing the area at knots. The fellow astern was the most persistent tracker, apparently listening only, however. To say we felt chagrined and sheepish over the evening's exploit is putting it mildly. Among other things, we were at least lucky, and glad, that no candidates for the Purple Heart resulted.
: 0222  Screws seemed far enough away for a look; so started up.
: 0226  Two more depth charges, but definitely farther away. Since nothing particularly to be claimed from coming up until far enough away to surface, stayed down.
: 0322  Sound heard first echo range, bearing northward, but screws had faded out.
: 0342  Surface and headed out of PANAY GULF, with a night's surface patrol spoiled by a mixture of over-confidence and indiscretion. Decided not to return to patrol spot because our presence was more than suspected and the SJ Radar was still out of commission.
: 0404  Gyro repeater system out of commission.
: 0457  SD Radar out of commission, upon attempt to warp for dawn use.
: 0530  Submerged, until CD Radar could be repaired, since we had seen apparent A/S aircraft patrol yesterday... and felt we might be sought for today. Surface, with SD Radar in commission, and using the auxiliary gyro compass. Discovered search-light lens was shattered; dismounted searchlight and stowed it below.
: 0858  (P.I.no Contact No. 17).
: 0910  Compass reporters back in commission. Headed up EAST GUYO PASS for dry surf co patrol.
: 1737  Sighted MANQUIN ISLAND bearing 0150(T); reversed course to southward.
: 1808  Bogen closing west coast of PANAY for close-in search during d.rkness.

— page 246 —
2326 Changed course for patrol across route from SIBUTU PASS to WEST CUYO PASS.

13 July 1944.
Noon Position: Lat. 100 13.5' N.
Long. 1210 54.0' E.
Sighted two sailboats on port bow, on course to intercept our base course.
Passed close aboard smaller boat, with Filipino crew; no English spoken, but sign language indicated that other boat contained an english speaking member.
Sighted float plane from bridge, bearing north, range about 20 miles. (Plane Contact No. 12). Watch ed him disappear to NE.
Brought two-masted sailboat alongside. Crew consisted of, according to papers produced, twelve unarmed enlisted men of the Philippine Army (USAFFE), "assigned to the boat pool of the northern sector," with Sgt. B. CAYANAN in charge, and able to speak a little English. The two boats were endeavoring to carry much needed supplies, mainly food, to CAGAYAN ISLANDS, for an army group there. The boats had left PALAWAN near SIR J. BROOKE. POINT in an effort to reach CAGAYAN with a strong SE monsoon, but had missed the islands and were now about 35 miles to NW.
They felt it impossible to beat against the wind, and were then trying to return to PALAWAN in the vicinity of DUMARAN ISLAND.
Sgt. CAYANAN told us Jap traffic was frequently seen to pass between DUMARAN ISLAND and C. MERRI ISLAND five miles to the east. According to him, the only Jap garrison on port on the east coast of PALAWAN was at PUERTO PRINCES. (Lt. 90 44' N. Long. 1180 44' E.), with none in the vicinity of DUMARAN, where his own headquarters are located. We replenished their exhausted water supply, gave them a little food, cigarettes, and nine hand grenades, and parted good friends. Wished we had time to tow them to CAGAYAN.
Sighted D.L.NG.NEM ISLAND, distance 36 miles.
Commenced surface patrol on an east-west line, across direct route from SIBUTU PASSAGE to CUYO WEST PASS.

14 July 1944.
Noon Position: Lat. 100 03.8' N.
Long. 1220 24.5' E.
Headed back for PANAY GULF for submerged patrol.

— page 247 —
0145 Interference on SJ Radar, followed by coded keying: "AA v MCGREG", bearing 201°(T). The keying was readily observed, and certainly served to identify the HOE; sorry we could not respond in kind. Held our course and speed; no direct contact.
0716 Sighted NEGROS ISLAND.
0749 Contact on SD Radar, range 13 miles. Submerged to avoid detection. (Plane Contact No. 19).
0836 Surfaced.
0957 Began closing SOJOTON POINT, NEGROS at 4-engine speed, under cover of low overcoast and intermittent rain squalls.
1034 Submerged for patrol, 3 miles off SOJOTON POINT.
1826 Surfaced, and paralleled coast of NEGROS to southward, five miles off shore, covering possible traffic route from ZAMBOANGA to VIS.YAN SEA, via GUIMARAS STRIT.
2200 Changed course to NNE.

15 July 1944.
Noon Position: Lat. 10° 14.4' N.
Long. 120° 05' E.
Changed course to westward to head for patrol near DUMARAN ISLAND.
0937 Sighted C.I.N.D.G.N ISLAND, distance 38 miles.
1113 Sighted P.I.N.N ISLAND, distance 44 miles.
1251 Commenced surface patrol along a seven mile line, 070° - 250°(T), 10 miles south of DUMARAN ISLAND.
1815 Shifted surface patrol to spot 1500 yards south of C.I.N.D.R ISLAND.
2125 -apparent slight radar interference on SJ Radar, from 2170 to 2260(T).
2143 Interference faded out.

16 July 1944.
Noon Position: Lat. 10° 18.3' N.
Long. 119° 56.6' E.
0010 Began to patrol to SE of C.I.N.D.R ISLAND.
0500 -approaching yesterday's patrol spot south of DUMARAN ISLAND.
0612 Sighted mast cover horizon, bearing 020°(T).
0618 Target true bearing drawing left; sc changed course to westward to intercept.
0630 Target seen to pass between COTAD and EANBOY ISLANDS and DUMARAN ISLAND. Went to full power on interception course while target was masked by these two islands. He was evidently small and

— page 248 —
0710  running in shallow water.
: 0853  Made battle surface, on wooden vessel (similar to gun target off TARA.KAN of 7 july), bearing about 0750 (rel), range 3450 yards.
: 0854  Commenced firing 4" deck gun. Straddled him in range and deflection several times, but no hits; gun sights sadly in need of bore sighting. Target turned away, and opened.
: 0857  Checked fire to close range.
: 0901  Resumed fire with 4" gun. Began to hit; target slowed.
: 0905  Target set on fire, range 3600 yards. Shooting slowly and deliberately.
: 0915  Checked fire to close range.
: 0920  Resumed fire, range 2625 yards, closing. Target was now in water under 10 fathoms; so our nearest approach was about 1900 yards, 1000 yards from our intervening reef.
: 0926  Coasted fire with all but 4 rounds of 4" ammunition expended and began clearing area, back toward deeper water. Target was now dead in water, burning furiously through the topside, with survivors in water. -gained all but 6 inches of height, and several explosions were seen as we retired, the flames shooting as high as five or six times the mast height. Smoke from the target was seen throughout the remainder of the day.
: 1015  Slowed, resuming surface patrol.
: 1020  Sighted two-engine, mid-wing, bomber-type plane coming in from over PALAWAN ISLAND; range 11 miles by SD Radar (Plane Contact No. 20). Submerged, and watched him with periscope. He turned and headed for our late target and circled it, until Plane disappeared back over PALAWAN, on bearing 2900(T). We had thought at first that he was beginning a retiring search spiral, since it appeared probable that our target had called for aid by radio when we began our attack, but this did not develop, as he never approached us closer than 9 or 10 miles. Surface and resumed surface patrol.
: 1139  Sighted two small craft close inshore, headed SW in direction of smoke.
: 1315  Contact on SD Radar, range 11 miles. (Plane Contact No. 21). Moved out to 12 miles, and then a second contact appeared at 10 miles. (Plane contact No. 22).

-30-

— page 249 —
1414 Plane contacts moved in to 8 and 10 miles; sighted one plane from bridge, same as one of the morning. Submerged.
: 1528 Surfaced, and resumed surface patrol.
: 1535 Contact on SD Radar, closed from 15 to 12 miles rapidly; not sighted (Plane Contact No. 23). Submerged, and decided in favor of submerged patrol for remainder of day.
: 1645 Surfaced. Felt that all the aircraft interest might presage imminent usage of this route by something more important, so decided to patrol vicinity on surface during the night and to patrol the DUMARAN - CAMBARI passage the next day.

17 July 1944.
: Noon Position: Lat. 100° 31.2' N, Long. 120° 02.9' E.
: 0525 Submerged, for patrol between COTAD and CAMBARI ISLANDS, off DUMARAN. Sighted several small sailboats during the day.
: 1854 Surfaced, and set course to northward, through WEST CUYO PASS.
: 2340 Contact on SJ Radar, bearing 1650(T), range 17,500 yards. (Ship Contact No. 33). Began closing and tracking. Determined target on steady course of 3450(T), speed 10 knots.
: 2357 Changed course to parallel target while continuing to track.

18 July 1944.
: Noon Position: Lat 110° 17.1' N, Long. 120° 27.1' W.
: 0004 Began easing back and in on target in hopes of seeing him for identification. The night was very dark and completely overcast, with rain squalls all about, and a sea unusually choppy for this region.
: 0027 Target course now 2950(T), steady, and speed 9 knots.
: 0119 Battle stations. Closed to 3600 yards; still impossible to see target against an inky cloud background. Began to shift our position from his starboard bow to his port side to give ourselves the darker background. Sound made a 180 rpm. turn count.

— page 250 —
0155
Closed to 2900 yards on port side of target; still not visible. If we only had had a convoy of good, big targets, we could have slaughtered them this night. We could not be sure whether this one was a worthwhile torpedo target or not, but he was headed for shallow water at western edge of the pass with only about a half hour to go. The contact range indicated more than a sailboat, but just how much more, we could hardly guess. Anyhow, at, Turned in for attack, with 700(P) angle on the bow, range 3100 yards.

: 0240
Fired three bow tubes at target, sight unseen, using radar bearings and ranges. Range 1300 yards, 1300(P) track. The first and third torpedoes were seen to run erratic taking bad angles, but at Saw and heard one hit in direction of target, followed by several minor explosions and flashes. Dimmights seen to be moving about the target. Radar pip began to grow smaller.

: 0246
Target pip on SJ Radar disappeared. Began closing to investigate.

: 0300
At last loc. tion of target, with considerable wooden wreckage in evidence about us with a smell of fuel oil and burnt powder. The night was still pitch black and raining a bit; so with aid of flashlights we tried to see survivors or wreckage to help us identify target. Passed close to several survivors in water and exchanged shouts, but upon trying to maneuver ship to pick them up, lost sight of, and could not relocate them. Gave up after spending over an hour, and picking up only a Jap sailor's hat, a suit of white coveralls, and a small wooden box containing three small handbooks printed in Japanese, and hauling one small capsized lifeboat alongside (too heavy to pick up and no name).

: 0424
Clearing area on easterly course.

: 0530
Reversed course, to return to scene of crime for daylight investigation. Still protected by heavy overcast and surrounded by rain squalls.

: 0612
Wreckage of small nature sighted all around us. Mostly lumber and countless large bamboo poles, with many straw mattresses scattered about. Picked up orange tear-drop shaped buoy, with the thought it might be part of minesweeping gear. Headed up-wind from first debris sighted, and finally sighted oil slick. Closed to find four or five capsized and wrecked lifeboats, and about 25 Jap survivors clinging to various bits of floating wreckage.

— page 251 —
0735 Picked up Jap survivor who was too weak and near exhaustion, to swim from us, on approach, as did most of them. It turned out that he could almost speak and read a little English. The target had been a new 2000 ton cargo ship, with a crew of 32, and carrying a load of lumber from NEGROS to MANILA for ship and boat building. She also carried 124 naval ratings and 6 naval officers for transport. No estimated that about 40 of the latter survived until morning, but we only saw about 25 in all, including those of the crew. Our prisoner had been the bowswain. Our unsighted target could have been worse. 0752 Began clearing scene, ret. ining our one prisoner. 0853 Rosumed course up WEST CUYO PASS, heading for southeastern approaches, to MINDORO STRAIT. 2015 Commenced patrolling on east-west line, 8 miles south of AMBULONG ISLAND, covering SE approaches to EAST APO PASS of MINDORO STRAIT.

19 July 1944
Noon Position: Lat. 110 56.2' N.
Long. 120 57.9' E.
Contact: No. 24.
1055 Cont. on SD Radar, r.m.e 15 miles. (Pkne squalls all day, and using SJ Radar as well as SD.
2001 Headed for patrol of TABLAS STRAIT and eastern approaches to VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.

20 July 1944
Noon Position: Lat. 120 52.2' N.
Long. 121 52.4' E.
0830 Submerged in TABLAS STRAIT for patrol in vicinity of M. ESTRE DE CAMPO ISLAND.
1854 Surfaced, and proceeded to northern end of TABLAS STRAIT for surface patrol off BANTIGUI POINT, LUZON.
2242 Contact on SJ Radar, bearing 3500(T), range 10,650 yards, Began tracking; determined speed as 4 knots, on easterly course.
2322 Identified contact as sailboat at 4900 yards. Continued toward patrol position.
2323 Apparent radar interference on SJ Radar, but very weak. Considered possibility of a Jap shore

— page 252 —
21 July 1944
Noon Position: Lat. 130 41' N.
Long. 1210 34,5' E.
Submerged for patrol of BALTIC POINT, and chwrt route from MON-AG P-AS to VERDE ISL-ND P-AS,GE, in accordance with dope given us by our J-pp prisoner.
Sighted 2-engine bomber-type plane, bearing 2200 (T), range about 5 miles, course northward. (Plane Contact No. 25).
Surfaced and proceeded to night patrol area, half way between MARINDUQUE ISLAND and entrance to VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE. Avoided two small radar contacts during night.

22 July 1944
Noon Position: Lat. 130 30.2' N.
Long 1210 14' E.
Changed course to westward, closing entrance to VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE for submerged patrol in entrance.
Submerged four miles to eastward of station in entrance because of daylight; continued approach to station submerged.
Sound picked up three sets of echo ranging signals, centered about 1800(T). Difficult to tell which way bearings were drawing, but continued closing entrance to pass, on normal approach course.
Sighted mast bearing 1860(T) and another mast and stack at 1930(T). Soon followed by sighting three more mast-stack combinations and four more single masts all bearing between 1850(T) and 2010(T), headed for the pass. (Ship Contacts Nos. 34 - 42). From our position on chart and theirs, they were already effectively by us, but hoping for a lucky zig, at
...not to 250 feet and 7 knots speed, for fifteen minutes to see if we could come near holding bearing.
Back to periscope depth. Our periscopes were at this time acting up more than at any time so far on the patrol. The 1.4" scope has never had its

— page 254 —
1918
Began drying scopes. Sighted several sailboats during day.
Surfaced, in entrance and headed back out for night patrol area. Again made a couple of small radar contacts, presumed to be sailboats, and avoided.

23 July 1944.
Noon Position: Lat. 13° 33.6' N.
Long 121° 11' E.
0300
Began closing entrance to pass in order to be on station by diving time.
Submerged, at outer end of patrol line in entrance to VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.
Sound picked up screws, followed by OOD sighting large AK similar to GOSYO MARU, (p. 79, O.N.I., 208-1), followed by two escorts, one on each quarter, not echo-ranging. (Ship Contacts No. 43,44, and 45). The escorts appeared to be HIBIKI-type DD's. The bearing was already 0100(T), (0600 rel.), range 7500 yards, with target course about 280°(T), speed about 14 knots. All three vessels were close enough so that their hulls were plainly visible. The OOD had not seen them on his earlier ton-minute observation probably because of their land background, and due to the fact he was temporarily exposing only about two or three feet of periscope in an effort not unduly to attract the attention of a nearby sailboat by using too much scope. At least a dozen sailboats at various ranges and bearings had been around us all morning and stayed so, apparently fishing for some of the fish of which sound gave plenty of evidence. If only we could be sure all were Filipinos!
Again we went deep and ran at high speed, this time for twenty minutes, but even as we did so, sound showed us a bearing pulling ahead at a hopeless rate. This time, we were well up inside the entrance to the pass, although favoring the southern side because of yesterday's experience. This ship had evidently come in along the route pointed out to us by our prisoner, from MOMFOG PASS, and thus fooled us again. Two boats could effectively cover this entrance, but, so far, one was having his difficulties. Both convoys used the route north of VERDE ISLAND when in the passage itself, however. Saw the last of our big AK going over the hill, Decided to head right up into the passage between VERDE ISLAND and LUZON, until necessary to begin clearing for the evening, in order to lock the barn door.

— page 255 —
1314 Sighted small motor tr.wlcr, ce ing through pass from c.stw.r.d. He eventually made the round of three sailboats who had been fishing in our vicinity since mid-morning, and, himself, runned in sight. Tow.r.d dusk, he took the thrcg scaiboots, who had become bcc.lmed, in tow, and them off in the direction of CALAP.N, MINDORO. This made us glad we had not shown ourselves promiscuously to the sailboats in this vicinity, since their affiliation with a power boat had a strong Japancso flwr.

1910 Surf.ced, nd headed out of entrance to c. night patrol st ticn six miles closer to cntr.nco for the proceeding night.

1951 On night patrol st.tion, covering eastern entrance to VERDE ISLAND P.S.S.GE. Made the usual couple of small r.dar cont.cts during the night, and .v.cidod.

24 July 1944
Noon Position: L.t. 13C 33.5' N.
Long. 1210 10.6' E.

0305 Commenced return to day submerged patrol st.tion in the p.css.

0445 Submerged in VERDE ISLAND P.S.S.GE for d.y patrol in ch.nnel between VERDE ISLAND and LUZON. Our "usual" morning convoy failed to show this time, but the sailboat fisherman wore about their business, as before.

1916 Surfaced, and headed for night patrol station off entrance same as preceeding night.

2038 Patrolling on station. Made three sailboat radar contacts during the night; tracked, and avoided.

25 July 1944
Noon Position: Lat. 130 33.5' N.
Long. 1210 10.6' E.

0300 Proceeding back into passage.

0440 Submerged for day patrol in eastern VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.

1109 Sighted small steam trawler, bearing 2940(T), range about 7000 yards, on easterly course at 9 knots. (Ship Contact No. 46). He was about same size as our second and fifth gun targets, with superstructure, mst and st.ck aft, but apparently with a steel hull.

1134 Trawler out of sight to eastward.

1915 Surf.ced, and headed for usual night patrol crec. Patrolling on station.

— page 256 —
26 July 1944
: No Position: Lat. 130 34.6' N.
: Long. 121 09.5' E.

: 0250
: Proceeding back into passage.
: Submerged for day patrol in eastern VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.
: Sighted five small wooden trawlers like our second and fifth gun targets, proceeding to eastward from out of passage, (Ship Contacts No. 47 - 51), followed soon by three smaller motor launches painted green and mounting at least one gun about the size of 20-mm. Two of the trawlers seemed to drop or pick up something for about a half hour about 3000 yards on our beam, presumably fish lines or nets, although no markers were ever seen, before proceeding to eastward. The three green patrols locked as if they might have been riding herd on the trawlers.
: Sighted FIVE type plane bearing 0890(T), range about 10 miles. Disappeared behind hills to north of passage. (Plane Contact No. 26).
: While searching for our FIVE's reappearance, sighted small unidentified biplane, stunting over the land to northward of us; at first thought he was FIVE but never could make out flat; so decided he was different one. (Plane Contact No. 27).
: Sighted large unidentified plane bearing 0780(T), distance about 12 miles. (Plane Contact No. 28). Watched him also disappear behind northern hills, but could never tell much about him except that he seemed to be a single-wing flying boat.
: Sighted ROPE type plane bearing 2150(T), range about 10 miles, and watched him cross pass and disappear into hills of MINDORO to southward. (Plane Contact No. 29).
: Surfaced, and began departure from area.

: 2050
: Contact by SJ Radar on sailboat, range 8800 y rads; passed at 4000 yards about the starboard. Headed south through TABLAS STRATT.
: Decided not to send BONNEFISH Serial ONE, until following night in order not to jeopardize CABILLI's chances of loss working this area undetected. The eastern end of, with approaches to, VERDE ISLAND P.S.S.GE is believed to be a very good area for picking up enemy traffic, but its small and confined

— page 257 —
27 July 1944.
NCCN Position: Lt. 100 07' N.
Long. 1210 43.3' E.
Contact on SJ Radar, on SILON ISL.ND, distance 10.5 miles.
Headed down LST CUYO F.S.S.
Sighted PETE type plane bearing 1120(T), range about 20 miles, over coast of P.N.Y. headed northward. (Plane Contact No. 30).
Plane disappeared on bearing 0510(T), flying very low over land; may have landed.
Contact on SD Radar, range 8 miles; moving in slowly. Submerged. (Plane Contact No. 31).
Surf. 0530.
Sighted small single-masted sailboat, bearing 2320(T); changed course to investigate.
Brought small Filipino sailboat alongside. Son vessel occupied, two. The speed broken English. Home port was JOLO. Carrying small cargo of light M.nil. rope. Had been to C.G.Y.N ISL.NDS as host two could make out. They stated that JOLO has 2200 Japs, but no ships normally stay there. Scid that a month ago a large number of Jap warships were at TAWI TAWI, this being the last time they were there. They professed to dislike the Japs saying they were often slapped and otherwise struck by them, but to like Americans very much! Said no rice is available and clothes of any sort are virtually unobtainable (as the rags, in which all of our native contacts to date have been garbled, have amply indicated).
Parted company with sailboat after leaving them a few cigarettes and small amount of rice.

— page 258 —
2105 Commenced transmission of BONEFISH Serial ONE to ComTaskFor 71.
: 2120 Message sent and receipted for; cleared spot at high speed for two hours, heading for tomorrow's patrol spot off CORONADO POINT, MINDANAO.

: 28 July 1944
: Noon Position: Lat. 7° 19.5' N.
: Long. 122° 11.2' E.

: 0100 Contact on SJ Radar, on three unidentified small craft close together, range 6600 yards. Maneuvered to avoid, and tracked on average course 240°(T), speed 7 knots; nothing heard by sound but wind was very light for sailboats to make that much speed. Weak flashing lights seen in direction of recent disappearance of the triple contact; possibly signals to each other.
: 0345 Contact on SJ Radar, again on an unidentified small craft, range 5000 yards, between us and coast. Tracked at speed 4 knots, course 030°(T). Avoided. Submerged for daylight patrol three miles off CORONADO POINT, MINDANAO. While down, modified SJ Radar to permit keying.

: 1858 Surf.ced, nd set course to westwd.rd, heading for TUBBATHA. REEFS.

: 29 July 1944.
: Noon Position. Lat. 8° 32'N.
: Long. 120° 46.3'S.
: 0555 Sighted SOUTH ISLET Lighthouse, TUBBATHA. REEFS, bearing 310°(T), dist.nce 18 miles.
: 0841 Sighted NORTH ISLET, TUBBATHA. REEFS, bearing 331°(T).
: 1018 Sighted m.sts. and st.ck of 1.arge ship, by periscope (Ship Contact No. 52); identified as tanker, bearing 0760(T), range about 13 miles.
: 1020 Changed course to parcoll and went to 4-engine speed to track and to maneuver to position ahead. First escort sighted. -apparently eastern or on quarter of target (Ship Contact No. 53). Turned toward target. Had tracked target now for nearly four hours, while pulling ahead and staying at ranges such that the high lockout could not come more than m.sts. nd st.ck tcp. TDC solution gave spced about 13.5 knots with regular zigs every fly minutes but irregular amounts of course change each.

— page 260 —
1509
At 300 feet with our pel comifin, constant bearing,
short scale keying; noted we were in a nice tempcra-
ture gradient.
: 1509 - 30 Friend above went back to long scale keying
and slowed. He passed about over us, while we
waited.
: 1516 Nothing happened, and pinging became a little fainter.
: 1518 Escort holding his key down; then stopped to listen;
faint echo ranging in background to south indicated
that rest of target group had continued on to south-
ward.
: 1524 Scerws fadd out.
: 1528 All echo drawing away to southward; bogan working
up to periscope depth.
: 1548 All clear at periscope depth; target and escorts
out of sight.
: 1550 At 50 feet, sighted vessel looking like our escort,
but .t long range and to northward of us, .nd headed
back our way with small angle on bow. Began pulling
away from his tr.ck, a.g.in thinking in terms of
shooting him if he could be identified as DD.
: 1603 The escort from the north changed course and showed
himself to be a U.S. submarine.
: 1608 Surf.ood abcut 4 miles from submarine, and closed.
: 1612 Exchanged visual calls by light with CABRILLA, who
was looking for our lato contacts; also exchanged
information.
: 1642 Completed arrangements with CABRILLA for coordinate.ted
search, base course 1950(T), speed 16 knots, dist.no
15 miles, using SJ R.rad for communications with
difficulty. Time awasting, but due to radical zig
of base course we could not bc sure whether target
was headed direct for SIBUTU PASSAGE, or vice some
indirect route such as the DOC C.N. PEARL B.NK
Channel. Believed we would, together, be covering
a thirty-mile lane, so chose the direct, medi.n course.
Still no contacts and believed that by 2200 we would
be somewhat chead of target group; so sent message
to CABRILLA. suggesting independent search after that
time, since it would be obvious they had followed
different routing. Our 15-mile distance had been
close to the r.g.ged edge of efficient communications
by SJ R.rad.
: 2115 Turned to c.stward, parting company with C.BRILLI.,
who sent mess.c that she was returning to northw.rd.
Radar communication lost,
: 2140 Cont.ot on SJ Radr, bearing 0530(T), range 22,150

— page 261 —
2217
y: 2217
rds: 2217
Made out target from bridge, bright moonlight;
visibility obviously excellent. Turned to
parallel and track.
2256 SJ Radar showed group dispositions to be unchanged
with the 5-minutes zigs still in effect. Navi-
gational plot indicated they were headed for DOC
CAN - PEARL BANK Channel, at about 15 knots.
Wanted to wait until after monsoon for a surface
attack, since the escort sound operators had
already given evidence of leaning toward pro-
ficiency, but it seemed that they would be in
the DOC CAN Channel about that time. Finally
decided to run ahead and transit the channel
ahead of them and attack just as they came through.

30 July 1944

Noon Position. Lat. 7° 30.9' N.
Long. 121° 03.9' E.

0023 Moon sank low behind heavy clouds, and black
darkness blanketed the sea. We were expecting
momentarily to pick up either PEARL BANK or
DOC CAN ISLAND, but the unexpected early arrival
of darkness, made us revise our plan to one of
immediate attack.
0026 Slowed and began hauling off target's track for
attack position while they closed. Battle stations.
0029 Sound picked up echo ranging by all escorts
at range of about 15,000 yards. One again had
key down for a few seconds, possibly trying to
pick up DOC CAN.
0053 Headed in, planning to fire under stern of near
bom escort with about 1000 (S) track. Using radar
bearings and ranges.
0103 Near escort passed within 2100 yards of us with-
out sighting us, although he was plainly visible
to us.
0108 - 9. Fired tubes No. 6,5,3,2, and 1 at tanker, range
3500 yards, 1100 (S) track, 6 feet depth settings,
8 second firing intervals, offset spread aft-
forward for 120% coverage, average gyros zero;
own speed 9 knots. Used radar bearings through-
out because TDC's had been erratic lately, and
radar had already demonstrated its ability in
the sinking of the 2000 ton freighter.
Turned right with full rudder and full power upon
completion of firing to avoid the quarter escort,

— page 262 —
0111
Of whom we were again almost dead ahead,
Four beautiful hits seen, heard, felt, and timed,
With two equally forceful internal explosions like-
wise recorded. The first hit was right in the stern
and must have put rudder, screws and/or engines out
of commission immediately; the remaining three hits
were spaced in succession almost equally long the
length of his hull. Near perfect torpedo performance
if ever we had seen it!
Almost as soon as the explosions ceased, the target
was seen to be down by the stern. The escorts started
ed milling around a bit, closing the target, obviously
not knowing from where the attack had been launched.
Opened to 4000 yards on nearest escort and slowed to
observe proceedings. Target pip on radar screen had
been growing steadily smaller and was now smaller
than that of any of the three escorts. Stern of
target could no longer be seen from bridge, but bow
appeared to be completely out of water.
Escorts began signalling to each other or to what
was left of the target. We considered moving back
in and trying our luck on the destroyer, while all
escorts seemed to be nearly stopped in the vicinity
of the target, but, since we had remaining only enough
torpedoes for one more good attack on a convoy (four
forward and four aft), and we were not sure that he
was even a destroyer, decided against it.
Explosion, as if from depth charge.
Another depth charge; felt sorry for any survivors
in water!
Target no longer visible either from bridge, or as
a radar pip, although three escorts still seen both
ways.
One of escorts began closing in our direction at
about 15 knots, range 8300 yards. Began beating a
retreat.
Four more depth charges; they sounded much better
up stairs there than below!
Range on escort began opening rapidly. Believe he
thought he had a submerged contact, and made a run
on it, never actually seeing us at all.
Lost all contacts by radar, last range -bout 12,000
yards.
Changed course to northward clearing the area at 2-
engine speed. Discovered the target off one Mk.
XVIII torpedo had flooded partially, grounding motor
loads.
Changed course to NE, heading in direction of
TINDANAO.

— page 263 —
1337 Reversed course to head for possible traffic lane north of SIBUTU and TAWI TAWI.
: 1901 Contact on SD Radar, range 12 miles, just as we were about to secure it for night. (Plane Cont.ct No. 32).
: 1902 Plane picked up by SJ Radar, range 20,100 yards, bearing 1960(T).
: 1905 Contact lost by SJ Radar, range 22,000 yards, bearing 1940(T).
: 1906 Contact lost by SD Radar at 12 miles. It was so unusual, as far as we had yet observed, to have a plane flying about this late in the day (evening twilight was over at about 1830), we decided to continue keying the SD Radar for a while, as during the day.
: 2003 Contact on SD Radar, range 1 mile! (Plane Contact No. 33). No warning otherwise. We had been having almost continuous trouble recently with what we believed was internally caused interference on this radar, so at first we thought this might possibly be another form of that, but it appeared too strong and steady. Decided to dive, but had to clear two men out of forward superstructure who had been greasing the bow planes by moonlight. Changed course rapidly while waiting. At this point, the SJ Radar picked up a small contact at range of 1550 yards, and reported the bearing practically steady, the range fluctuating in and out a bit - thus further confusing the issue, bec.use this was similar to numbersless contacts made in the past on birds or groups of birds. But the SD has never been known to do this.
: 2004 One Year L.tor: Submerged - to 250 feet to any phosphorescent glow of our screws.
: 2007 - 30 Depth bomb! Not too close, just convincing.
: 2008 - 30 Second depth bomb, a little farther away, after sound reported hearing the splash about 30 seconds earlier. Wish we knew for sure that they carry only two of those things!
: 2145 Up to 45 feet; cut in both radars. Both showed very strong and definite radar interference. Cont.ct on SJ Radar, bearing 1720(T), range 2200 yards; fairly strong pip, apparently at center bearing of SJ Radar interference. Felt this possibly could be a U.S. submarine coincidentally in the vicinity, but our mood at the moment was not much in favor of staying up long enough to

— page 265 —
0630
0739
0900
1035
1252
1654
1730

1 August 1944
No position. Lat, 080 28.9' N.
Long. 1220 18.3' E.
0747
1046
Sighted MIND.NAO, distance 45 miles.
Contact on SD Radar, range 21 miles; f. dead out
at 26 miles. (Plane Contact No. 37).
Sighted numerous s.liboats during the day but
did not pass close.
Commenced surf.ce patrol about 20 miles cfr
SIND.NC.N BLY, Z.MBOANG. PENINSUL.

2 August 1944
Ncqn Position. Lat. 80 32' N.
Long. 1230 04' E.
0505
1045
1050
Submerged, for patrol 23 miles off BL.NC. POINT,
MIND.NAO (Lat 80 30' N. Long. 1230 03' E).
Sighted unidentified plane bearing 0620(T), range
about 20 miles, 1.ter identified as a small
monoplane with non-retr.ctible landing gear
(Plane Cont.ct No. 38).
Sighted two more planes in same direction, one a
"Pete" and the other a "Nate". Changed course to
close BLANCA POINT. (Plane Contacts No. 39 and
40).

— page 266 —
1125 Sighted smoke, bearing 070°(T).
: 1130 Sighted one set of masts, bearing 073°(T). (Ship Contact No. 56). The three planes were patrolling above these masts.
: 1140 Nearest plane circled within about 3 miles of us: went to 90 feet to close track of ship, which was following coast at about 2 miles off, at same time hoping planes would pass over and beyond us during this while.
: 1210 Back at periscope depth. Three vessels now visible, one large, three small. (Ship Contacts No. 57, 58, and 59), Large one an unloaded tanker, with zero angle on bow. Began pulling off track at slow speed for short tube shot. Battle stations submerged.
: 1226 Sighted two more ships, one a medium-to-large freighter far back on starboard quarter of our tanker, and another small unident asteron of the tanker (Ship Contacts No. 60 and 61). At least two of the small ships looked like very small cargo ships, but none were orthodox escort types, although their disposition around the tanker indicated they were escorts.
: 1255 - 18 Commenced firing tubes No. 7, 9, and 10 (No. 8 out of commission) at tankers; range 1780 yards, 73°(S) track, 6 feet depth setting, zero average gyros, 150% spread aft-forward; target course 250°(T), speed 6.5 knots.
: 1256 Began swinging to left for bow tube set-up on either the tanker again or the oncoming freighter on the tanker's quarter.
: 1257 Loud explosion. This explosion came a little sooner than was expected for a hit, corresponding to a torpedo run of 1650 yards, and was very loud. However, it did not have the sound of a depth charge or depth bomb. The G.O. was looking at the freighter with the periscope at the time of the explosion, attempting to get a set-up on it, and did not observe whether it was a hit on the target or not. The explosion was so loud, however that our first reaction was that it was a bomb dropped by one of the planes. During the approach and attack, it had been impossible to keep track of the three planes, and they were ignored except for the usual precautions of limiting periscope exposures as to number and length, and submerged speed. Occasionally one had been sighted incidentally over the convoy's far side, so that we knew they were still around. Being a bit bomb conscious from our experiences of two nights earlier, we went deep - and regretted ever afterwards.

— page 267 —
1313
not staying up long enough for one more look at the target. At least if it were a bomb, the feeling was that it was over a quarter of a mile away, and no damage was caused.
No other explosions or depth charges were dropped, although sound heard screws on various bearings between 0850(T) and 1200(T), for some time thereafter, as if possibly hunting for us, but also as if possibly passing by and clearing area.
Sound reported "crackling" noise from direction of target, 1100 - 1150(T).
Back to periscope depth. Masts and stacks of several of the target group soon at about 1950(T), but unidentifiable against land background.
Two planes seen still patrolling over the target group.
Surfaced to begin end-around; all clear by periscope.
Sighted two of the escort planes from bridge, in the direction of convoys disappearance, ranges about 20 miles.
Contact on SD Radar, range 10 miles.
Range closed to eight miles; plane still not sighted, with sky partially overcast. Submerged.
Surfaced, and re-commenced end-around, to east and south, along ZUMBOANGA PENINSULA coast.
Contact on SD Radar, range 15 miles; moved in to 11 miles and then moved out. Evidently the air cover still was there, although it was dark except for bright moon behind clouds.
Momentary contact on SD Radar, bearing 1760(T), range 22,400 yards, believed to be the plane.
Lost contact on SD Radar at 15 miles.
Contact on SD Radar, range 16 miles; faded out two minutes later.
Short contact on SD Radar again, range 11 miles.
Another weak SD Radar contact, range 19 miles.

3 August 1944
NCCN Position. Lat 70 24' N.
Long. 1210 44' E.
Turned northward, paralleling coast 5 miles away, after getting no shore water in. Approaches to BASILAN STRAIT. Believed we were ahead of convoy, although the air cover kept us too far out to get in contact by radar. Moon getting low, but still bright. Flooded down.
Sighted convoy bearing 0660(T), closer in to coast.

— page 268 —
0339 F: int screws by sound. Turned off SD Radar because proximity to land made it only a source of annoyance and worry.
: 0343 Two contacts by SJ Radar on the convoy, range 9075 yards. Turned to parallel and track.
: 0410 Moon is down behind low thick clouds.
: 0422 Radar able to pick out 5 distinct ships, with largest one being fourth in an approximate column. Turned in for attack at low speed, using radar ranges and bearings. Targets indistinguishable from black land background from bridge. Had to avoid an escort which worked out of position on starboard bow of target; nearest range about 2500 yards. Our own background was a dark cloud gray with no distinct horizon.
: 0431 able to see tanker target from bridge; using TBT only to check radar bearings.
: 0459 22 Commenced firing tubes No. 1, 2, 3, and 4 at tanker, range 3500 yards, 1200 track, 10 right average gyro angle, 6 feet depth setting, 120% spread from aft forward; target course 2200(T), speed 6 knots. Began turning away at high speed and blowing up with low pressure blowers, on completion.
: 0441 30 C.O. saw very small flash followed by large white geyser of water rise up a little inside of target's bow to a height of about twice that of the bow. No explosion heard.
: 0443 Signal light on target, or escort nearly in line with it, began blinking in our direction, but not readable.
: 0444 Keyed SD Radar; contact at 1 mile. Nothing known to be that close; so submerged. Range to target had already opened to about 6000 yards.
: 0454 25 Distant explosion as if torpedo hitting beach, or bottom.
: 0458 Depth charge; long range.
: 0500 Depth charge, still far away.
: 0540 All screw noises faded out. Settled down to all-day submergence at 150 feet, clearing vicinity to NW.
: 1704 Surfaced, all clear; began clearing coast at high speed.
: 1836 Changed course to northward to move out of probable night patrol plane area.
: 2050 Began transmitting BONEFISE Serial TWO to CTF 71. Message sent and receipted for. Headed westward at

— page 269 —
4 August 1944.
Noon Position. Lat. 60 55' N.
Long. 119 49.6' E.
0220 Changed course to southward, heading for PEARL BANK.
0921 Submerged to flush out No. 3 and 5 fuel ballast tanks after conversion to METS.
0954 Surfaced.
1023 Contact on SD Radar, range 31 miles; faded out.
1136 Contact on SD Radar, range 32 miles; faded out at 33 miles, 3 minutes later.
1338 Sighted considerable floating wreckage, including many oil drums, two large capsized lifeboats in otherwise good condition, splintered wooden beams, and one life ring. Maneuvered to pass close aboard both lifeboats; and to pick up life ring. Life ring painted red and white, and marked with Japanese characters only. This wreckage was -bout 30 miles to northward of position of tanker sinking of July 30; light winds blowing from south.
1525 Resumed course toward PEARL BANK.
1913 Sighted DOC CAN ISLAND, range about 10 miles. Commenced transit of SIEBUTU PASSAGE at full power, with full moon overhead.

5 August 1944.
Noon Position. Lat 20 54.6' N.
Long 119 37.7' E.
0010 Completed uneventful transit; setting course for MAKASAK STRAIT.
1310 Sighted NW coast of CHILBEES, distance about 35 miles.
1411 Cont. at on SD Radar range 14 miles, followed by sighting from bridge as it was passing ahead from starboard to port. (Plinco Contact No. 42).
1412 Identified as "Pcto".
1412 Pl.no. docv. nd turned toward us when about dec. 4th. submerged with range at 12 miles.
1505 Surf.ocd.
1817 Sighted s.libot, range about 7 miles. Maneuvered to prevent passing tcc close aboard in twilight.
2005 Crossed equator.

6 August 1944.
Noon Position. Lat. 30 31' S.
Long. 117 37' E.
0420 Passed C.P.E. HILLAM abeam, distance about 25 miles.

— page 270 —
0928 miles.
0928 Contact on SD Radar, range 27 miles; faded out at 20 miles. (Plane Contact No. 43).
1101 Sighted small ship, bearing 2580(T), range about 8 miles; appeared to be similar to our wooden gun targets: single mast, superstructure aft. Maneuvered to avoid at 5 miles range, since he was zigging on an intersecting course. (Ship Contact No. 62).
1345 Sighted LHA LSANDS, distance about 11 miles.
1345 Contact on SD Radar, range 40 miles. (Plane Contact No. 44).
1400 Plane contact faded out at 40 miles.
1420 Heated for LOMBOK STRAIT. Made several small sail-boat contacts during the night.

7 August 1944.
Noon Position. Lat. 8° 42.5' S.
Long. 115° 42.2' E.
0102 Contact by SJ Radar on LOMBOK LSAND, distance 95,000 yards.
0150 Land contact on SD Radar at 36 miles.
0420 Between this time and 0500 made contact by SJ Radar and then by sight on five sailboats, all he'd crossed our path to extrovert.
Maneuvered to avoid, and finally passed between them, in order to be at entrance to LOMBOK STRAIT by dawn.
0558 Submerged in northern entrance to LOMBOK STRAIT, during morning twilight. Periscope observations every 15 minutes. Soon became evident a two-knot current was helping us southward. Tried going to 150 feet, but current seemed stronger - periscope depth.
1210 Two thirds through strait. Sighted patrol boat, unidentified class. (Ship Contact No. 63).
1215 CHIDORI Class torpedo boat sighted (Ship Contact No. 64) patrolling with first boat across strait between NUSA BSAS ISLAND and LOMBOK. They seemed to be in a loose line with the CHIDORI to Southward.
1239 B.t.tle st.tions submerged. Thought we might have a chance to use our repircd, and last, MK. XVIII torpedo on the CHIDORI.
1300 Already past small patrol, as they moved over to eastern extremity of their patrol line, and started back.
1307 CHIDORI headed back with 100(S) angle on bow, at 14 knots. Looked like a collision set-up; so plundown to 300 feet to pass under, hoping to get shot as he e.g.in turn to eastward. Both boats were

— page 271 —
1316
Unidentified screws passed astern, but other
indeterminate noise heard on port bow.

: 1322
Started up.

: 1336
At periscope depth. The CHIDORI h.d. gone by
all right and had started back, but we had opened
the track too much for a shot with a single
torpedo.

: 1338
Began changing course to northward to re-close
track of CHIDORI for his next pass across.

: 1430
Became apparent the vessels were not coming
back across. They seemed to be now patrolling in
a north-south direction over near the eastern
side of the strait.

: 1436
Changed course to NE to close, but our two-knot
southerly current would not let us make much headway to north, even at 2/3 speed.

: 1447
CHIDORI coming back southward on what looked like
a shooting set-up if only he came far enough.

: 1518
Steady on firing course, with No. 9 tube ready,
for a 90°(5) track, 1200 yards from track; range
1400 yards, bearing coming on fast.

: 1520
Sound bearings showed change of target course.
A look showed he had turned and headed away,
evidently at the southern end of his line.

: 1525
Changed course back to northward while draining
tube to inspect torpedo. It became evident on the
target's next change to the southward that he was
working to westward across channel, according
fashion, with legs generally north and south.

: 1545
Next leg toward us put his southern extremity to
NW of us and at a greater range than before. Made
No. 9 tube ready again, but did not come very close
to firing set-up again.

: 1545
Decided to secure attempts at firing on the CHIDORI
considering the time already spent trying to gain
successful position, and feeling also increased
doubt as to the effectiveness of the repairs to
our line torpedo now that it had already been
flooded once.

: 1547
Received report that on second flooding of the tube
the torpedo afterbody had flooded! Headed out of
strait.

: 1845
Surfaced 18 miles south of strait in evening twilight.

— page 272 —
1854
Contact on SJ Radar combined with radar interference, bearing 040° (T), range 2700 yards. Believed to be friendly submarine, but could receive no reply by our recognition signal, or attempted exchange of call signs by SJ Radar keying. He appeared interested while we were transmitting. Range was opening rapidly; we finally sent short mess-ge, blind, about what we had seen in the strit.

8 August 1944.
Non Position. L.t. 120° 53' S.
Long. 115° 00' E.

0053
Agn in radar interference on SJ Radar, bearing 1900 (T).
Exch.ngcd recognition signals, calls, and information messages with north bound FILER, by SJ Radar keying.
Sighted FILER -t 6000 y rds r.ngge, -t passed -bout 600 yards fr.m her; bew w&ke was by fr the most outstanding visibility feature.
Lost radar contact on FILER -t 12,700 yards.
Radar interference f.dod cut.
Submerged for drills and training.
Surfaced.
Submerged for training.
Surfaced.
Commenced transmission of BONEFISH Serial THREE.
Transmission completed; message receipted for.

9 - 12 August 1944.
Non Positions:

9 August: Lat. 17° 36.5' S.
Long. 113° 53.6' E.

10 August: Lat. 21° 55.8' S.
Long. 112° 49.6' E.

11 August: Lat. 25° 20.8' S.
Long. 112° 12.3' E.

12 August: Lat.
Long.

Conducting daily training dives and drills, enroute to FREMANTLE, W.A.

13 August 1944.
Arrived FREMANTLE, W.A.

— page 275 —
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— page 277 —
6. Return ONLY the transcribed text - NO commentary, explanations, or meta-text

| Date: | Time: | Name: | Date

— page 282 —
U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS 223) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1-A
Time 1435(H) Date; July 8, 1944 Patrol No. 5.
Lat. 30° 07' N. Long. 117° 24' E.

Target Data - Damage inflicted

Description: Sighted convoy at 0735(H) while conducting a surface patrol off O.N.DJ.N.G ISLAND. Convoy consisted of three J.K's plus 4 escorts and appeared to be headed eastward through DERL.N CH.NNEL from overnight anchorage enroute to T.R.K.N. Commenced an end-around run to obtain a position ahead for attack. The convoy was curved at speed 7.5 knots, hugging the'10 fathom curve at speed 7.5 knots.

The end-around was complicated and lengthened by a plane contact, range 5 miles, at 0813, the appearance of a group of nine small vessels ahead at 0956, two closing plane contacts at 1007, and finally the appearance of a small steamer with escort at 1130. These contacts forced us to dive twice and to do considerable maneuvering to avoid being sighted. Position for attack was finally gained at 1351, about five miles from entrance to T.R.K.N at which time we dived for the approach.

Calm sea. Clear visibility. The convoy was disposed in a rough column parallel to the coast and steering a steady course. The loading J.K plus one escort was well ahead of the other and got by outside of firing range. The loading J.K in the second group was chosen as the first target for torpedo fire.

Ships attacked but not damaged.

(a) Number: One (E.C.)
(b) Type: J.K, similar to TOSEI M.RU (page 151)
(c) Tonnage: 2,433

Damage Determined By: All torpedoes missed. C.use not determined.

Target Draft: Loaded 24' Light 86", Course 3550(T), Speed 7 knots, R.ng 2250 y.rds.

Own Ship Data Speed 2.5 knots, Course 110°(T), Depth 62', Angle 00.

— page 283 —
CONFIDENTIAL

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type attack: Submerged - Periscope.

The target for the first attack was the leading AK of two in column. Periscope data was used for tracking by TDC, and by plot. (Two separate plots were run. One on standard graph paper using own ship D.R. position and the other on a large scale chart using navigational fixes where obtainable.)

Four MK. 18 torpedoes were fired from the stern tubes using a torpedo spool of 29 knots and recommended TDC settings for zero gyro angles.

All torpedoes missed. It is not known whether torpedoes missed ahead, astern, or ran deep as sound reported the torpedoes running straight and normal and tr.cked them to the target. A chock of firing data and gyro angles set on the tubes did not indicate any control error.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1-B. P.TROL NO. 5.

Time 1445(H). Dato: 8 July 1944. Lat. 30° 07' N. Long. 117° 54' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target for this attack was the next AK in column astern of the vessel not attacked at 1435.

Ships attacked but not Damaged:

(a) Number: One (E.C.)
(b) Type: AK. Similar to TOSEI MARU, (page 151, O.N.I. 208-J).
(c) Tonnage: 2,433.

Damage Determined By: All torpedoes missed. Cause undetermined.

Target: Draft, loaded 24', light 8'0", Course 005°(T), Speed 8 knots. Range 2870 yards.

Own Ship Data: Speed 3.0 knots. Course 285°(T). Depth 62'.

Angle 06°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type attack: Submerged - Periscope.

— page 285 —
1018(H) 29 July 1944. Lat. 6° 03' N. Long. 119° 54' E.
Target Data - Damage Inflicted.

Description: Sighted the target group initially at 1018(H) 29 July while conducting a surface patrol off TUBB.T.H. REES. Tracked the group and made an unsuccessful submergence approach at 1500(H) in which the submarine was detected by the escorts and held down until contact on the target was lost. At 1600(H), surfaced and commenced search, regaining contact at 2210(H), radar range 22,150 yards. The target group was composed of one large tanker with two Chidori type torpedo boats, one on either bow about 1500 yards from the tanker, and one trailing destroyer that zigged his position from dead astern to broad on either quarter of the tanker. About 1500 yards from it. The group was zigging at 5 minutes interval with irregular course changes and zigging the base course but once on the surface. Commenced a surface approach at 0053(H) after more had set and the target had reached a position just north of the target.

— page 286 —
CONFIDENTIAL

PARL B.N.K. Visibility f.ir to pocr. Sea calm.

Ships Sunk: (a) Number: One (E.C.)
    (b) AO (Similar to KOUYO: MARU, p.&c
    277 0.N.I. 208-J rev.).
    (c) Tonnage: 10,020.

Damage Determined By: Four torpedo hits were seen, heard
felt and timed. Explosions were equally spaced starting
at stern and working forward.
Target was seen from the bridge and checked by SJ Radar
to stop and settle in the water finally sinking at 0121
(H), ten minutes after first hit. At the time of sinking
the submarine was about 4,500 yards from the target and
had it in sight from the bridge and on the radar screen.

Target: Draft light 11'. Course 150°(T). Speed 15.5 kts.
Range 3,200 yards.

Own Ship Data: Speed 9 knots. Course 100°(T). Depth -
surface. Angle - .

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type .ttack: Night Surface - Radar.

The approach was commenced from 12,000 yards, 30 degrees
on the starboard bow of the target, heading bow on at
the t.nker, speed 10 knots. The relatively slow speed
used to reduce our bow wave and to cut a channel
r.dar shock of the escort disposition and target zig
on the way in. During the approach it was necessary to
parallel the target's track for a short time to let the
leading starboard escort get by, range 2100 yards, then
cut in sharply .stern of him for firing.
Upon completion of firing, went .head full and swung cut
and away from the trailing escort, putting him on the
starboard quarter as we retired.
The SJ Radar was invaluable for the .approach, furnishing
tr.eking data on the tanker, firing bearings and constant
range and bearing chocks on the two near escorts.

TORPEDO .TTACK NO. 4. P.TROL NO. 5.

Time: 1250(H). Date: 2 August 1944. Lat. 80 33' N.
    Long. 123°00' E.

— page 287 —
1. TARGET DATA - Damage Inflicted
Description: Sighted convoy while conducting a submerged patrol off BLANCA POINT, MINDAÑAO, P.I. Visibility clear, moderate chop to sea.
Convoy consisted of one large tanker, one medium freighter and four small vessels appearing to be miscellaneous converted escort types. Ships were disposed with tanker leading in a rough column ahead of the freighter and with the small-ers in a rough semi-circle, ahead, outboard, and astern of the tanker. The convoy was steering a steady course conforming to the coastline about three miles off the beach.
Three planes furnished air coverage, circling at random over and about the convoy.

Ship's Data:
(a) Number: One (E.C.)
(b) Type: Tanker (similar to SYOYO MARU, page 286 O.N.I. 208-J, rev.).
(c) Tonnage: 7,499.

Damage Determined By: It is believed that one hit was obtained (first torpedo fired).
One minute and thirty-eight seconds after first torpedo was fired one loud explosion was heard and felt in the boat. The commanding officer was getting a set-up on a trailing AK at the time and did not have the first target in sight. A firing range of 2100 yards had been used on the TDC and thus the explosion occurred before the hits were expected. It was thought that a plane had bombed the periscope.
A recapitulation of the attack indicates that the lack of counter measures by the escorts shows the submarine had not known the location of the submarine and therefore makes it unlikely that the submarine was detected and bombed by a plane. It is believed that the target was actually closer at the time of firing than first estimated and that the explosion had was a torpedo hit.
Sound reported only two torpedos running, indicating the second torpedo fired was a cold shot.

Target: Draft, Light 8' 6". Course 2400(T). Speed 6.5 knots. Range 1750 yards.

Own Ship Data:
Speed 2.5 knots. Course 3100(T). Depth 62 feet. Angle 0°

— page 290 —
1-B
Torpedo Attack Detc, Attack 1-A (cont.)
Tubc Fired 7 8 9 10
Ltrk Trpcdo 18 18 18 18
Serial Number 53760 53752 53763 53570
Mark Exploder 4-2 4-2 4-2 4-2
Serial Number 2-16179 2-16970 2-17140 2-16407
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual - - - -
Mark Warhead 18 18 18 18
Serial Number 89W 80W 1108W 492W
Explosive TPX TPX TPX TPX
Type Spread 2 1/4 L 3/4 L 3/4 R 2 1/4 R
Sea Conditions Calm
Overhaul -activity SRU, Fremantle, W. A.
Miss Due to - Not known.
Remarks: Torpedoes appeared to run hot and straight.
No control error could be determined.

Torpedo Attack No. 1-B
Tubes Fired 1 2 3 5
Zone Time 14-45-30 14-45-39 14-45-51 14146-03
Range 2870 2885 2900 2915
Torpedo Run 3200 3250 3280 3300
Target Bearing 025-30R 026-00R 027-00R 028-00R
Track Angle 1350S 1360S 1370S 1370S
Gyro Angle 034-00 035-00 -37-00 -38-00

— page 292 —
1. Torpedo Attack Data, Torpedo Attack No. 2. (Cont.)
: Tubes Fired 4 - 5 6
: Range 1300 1280 1250
: Torpedo Run 1480 1450 1400
: Target Bearing 005-30 004-00 002-00
: Track Angle 130°P 132°P 134°P
: Gyro Angle 357-30 354-30 350-00
: Depth Set 6 feet 6 feet 6 feet
: Power High High High
: Hit or Miss Miss Hit Miss
: Erratic Yes No Yes
: Mark Torpedo 23-0 14-3A 14-3A
: Serial Number 26906 40301 22638
: Mark Exploder 6-5 6-5 6-5
: Serial Number 8171 14183 17148
: Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact
: Actuation Actual - Contact -
: Mark War head 16-1 15-0' 16-1
: Serial Number 13727 1022 7587
: Explosive TPX TNT TPX
: Type Spread 2R 0 2L
: Sea Conditions: Choppy
: Overhaul Activity: U.S.S. ORION.
: Miss Due to Erratic Hit Erratic

Remarks: Torpedoes from tubes 4 and 6 were seen to run erratic, taking large left gyro angles. Cause not known.

— page 293 —
1
Torpedo Attack No. 3.
Tube Fired 6 5 3 .2 1
Zone Time 01-08-48 01-08-58 01-09-08 01-09-17 01-09-26
Range 3,230 3,220 3,215 3,210 3,200
Torpedo Run 4,000 4,040 4,050 4,070 4,090
Target Bearing 349-30 350-00 350-30 352-00 353-00
Track angle 135 S 135 S 136 S 137 S 138 S
Gyro angle 004-30 005-30 006-30 009-00 010-00
Depth Set 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft.
Power High High High High
Hit or Miss Hit Hit Hit Miss
Br. tactic No No No No No
Mark Torpedo 14-3- 14-3- 23-0 14-3- 23-0
Serial Number 26327 40383 41374 40094 46132
Mark Exploder 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial Number 14161 14021 354 189 7333
.actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
.actuation .actual Con. Contact Contact Contact
Mark warhead 15-0 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
Serial Number 3866 13680 13746 13719 11288
Explosive TNT TPX TPX TPX TPX
Type Spread 2L 1L 0 1R 2R
Sec. Conditions Calm.

Overhaul activity - U.S.S. ORION
Miss due to - - - - spread
Remarks: Torpedoes spread from aft forward.

— page 294 —
7 9 10
Zone Time: 12-55-18 12-55-31 12-55-45
Range: 1780 1765 1750
Torpedo Run: 1600 1600 1600
Target Bearing: 171-00 172-30 174-30
Track Angle: 125 S 135 S 1355 S
Gyro Angle: 179-30 184-30 189-30
Depth Set: 4 feet 4 feet 4 feet
Power: - - -
Hit or Miss: Hit Miss Miss
Erratic: No Yes Cold No
Mark Torpedo: 18 18 18
Serial Number: 53650 754114 54051
Mark Explorer: 4-2 4-2 4-2
Serial Number: 2-16727 2-16985 2-16902
Actuation Set: Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual: Contact - -
Mark Warhead: 18 18 18
Serial Number: 260W 378W 85W
Explosive: TPX TPX TPX
Type Spread: 3L 0 3R

Sea Conditions: Slight Chop
Overhaul Activity: SRU, Fremantle W...
Miss due to - Not known.
Remarks: Second torpedo could not be heard to run and is believed to have been a cold shot.

— page 295 —
1
Torpedo attack No 5.
Tube Fired 1 2 3 4
Zone Time 04-39-22 4-39-31 4-39-39 4-39-49
Range 3,350 3,310 3,280 3,250
Torpedo Run 3,600 3,580 3,540 3,500
Target Bearing 352-00 352-30 352-30 353-00
Track angle 120S 122S 123S 123R
Gyro angle 000-30 001-00 001-30 003-00
Depth Set 6 feet 6 feet 6 feet 6 feet
Power High High - -
Hit or Miss Hit Miss Miss Miss
Irritation No No No No
Mark Torpedo 14-3- 14-3- 23 23
Serial Number 32371 40602 26916 33763
Mark Exploder 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial Number 17122 17099 14043 7569
.actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact
.actuation .actual Contact - - -
Mark Warhead 15-0 15-0 16-1 16-1
Serial Number 2161 2158 13712 13684
Explosive TNT TNT TPX TPX
Type Spread 1 1R 1 1R 1 1R

Sea Conditions Calm
Overhaul .activity U.S.S. ORION
Miss Duc to - Probably error in target speed.

— page 296 —
U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS 223)  GUN TT.T.CK No. 1  Patrol No. 5.
Time: 1620(H)  Date:  5 July 1944.  Lat 0° 41.2' N.
    Long 119° 51' E.
Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Ships Destroyed  Number:  One
    Type:  Lugger, wooden, diesel
    supply craft.
    Tonnage:  100 tons.
    Name:  Not known.

Identity established:  Observation from bridge.  (similar to photo in ONL weekly).

Damage Determined by:  Observed first shot from 4" gun fired at target to hit, setting target on fire.  Four more hits were scored with the 4" gun, causing the vessel to settle and burn furiously.  When last seen the vessel was afire from stem to stern with smoke and flames biling up for a hundred feet above it.  The vessel apparently was located with oil or gasoline.

Details of action

Type of Guns used:  4"/50 cal. deck gun.  Two 30 cal. m. chinchaguns.  One 20 mm. Mk II.
Type ammunition and Number of Rounds fired:  6 rounds 4"/50 cal. H.C., 7 rounds 20 mm. HEI & HET.  500 rounds 30 cal. B & T.

Effectiveness of Fire:  The 30 cal. m. chinchaguns were used to spray target for anti-personnel fire.  They proved reliable and effective.  The 20 mm. guns continued their long record of unreliability.  The 4"/50 H.C., fire was excellent, the first hit setting the target clear.

Average Range:  Average hitting gun range was 700 yards.
Average Radar range was 700 yards.

Fire Control:  The fire control system used by this vessel during this and subsequent gun attacks is run from the conning tower.  It consists principally of the fire control officer who received continuous radar ranges from the SJ Radar and range and deflection spots from the spotter who runs the periscope.  Under some conditions the radar operator can observe the fall of shot in which case he calls out the range error to the spotter who uses the r.d. radar's data for the spots.  The fire control officer

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1415(H) Date: 7 July 1944. Lat. 20 40' N. Long. 1180 22.2' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Ships Destroyed: Number: 1
Type: 1
Lugger: 1
Wooden, diesel supply craft.
Tonnage: 200 tons.
Name: 1
Not known.

Identify Established: Visually from bridge. (Similar to photo in ONI.)

Damage Determined By: Observed eighteen hits with 4" gun causing target to stop, settle in water, and to burn furiously. The vessel was apparently loaded with oil which caught afire. When last seen the vessel was completely aflame. Black smoke could be seen from its fire when twenty miles away. Floating wreckage, including many oil drums, was sighted in the target's position on the day following the attack.

Details of Action

Type of Guns Used: One 4"/50 c.l. deck gun, one 20 mm. MK.II.

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CONFIDIAL
Type:  Ammunition and Number of Rounds Fired:
29 rounds of 4"/50 cal. H.C.
99 rounds of 20 mm. HEI ' HET.
Effectiveness of Fire:  The 4" gunfire was as effective on this attack as on the first, setting the target fire on the eighth hit. The 20 mm. gunfire had little effect until the range was closed under 1000 yards.
-varage Range:  Average hitting gun range was 1600 yards.
-varage Radar range was 1500 yards.

Fire Control:  Normal fire control system was used until the range was closed to 600 yards at which time spot was shifted to the bridge.

Erratic Performance:  Both 30 cal. machinoguns jammed in the initial loading. The after 20 mm. gun failed to open fire and the forward 20 mm. gun jammed on the ninetieth round. Both casu. lities similar to that experienced during the first gun attack.

GUN ATTACK NO. 3.  P.TROL NO. 5.

Time:  1830 (H)  Date:  8 July 1944  Lat. 20 41' N.
    Long. 118 09' E.

Target Data- Damage Inflicted

Ships Destroyed:  Number:  One.
    Type:  Wooden hull, coastal steamer.
    Tonnage:  300 tons.
    Name:  Not known.

Identity Established:  Observed from bridge.

Damage Determined By:  Observed seventeen four inch hits in the target. The tenth hit set the target afire. The vessel stopped, out of control, and commenced to settle. When last seen the target was low in the water, gutted, and burning brightly from bow to stern with oil fed flames.

Type of Guns Used:  One 4"/50 cal. deck gun.

Type Ammunition and number of Rounds Fired:

24 rounds 4"/50 H.C.
12 rounds 4"/50 Common.

Effectiveness of Fire:  The first few hits appeared to do only superficial damage. The tenth hit was a death blow, however, apparently putting her propulsive machinery out of commission and setting her afire.

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0605(H) Date: 10 July 1944. Lat 70° 10' N. Long 119° 12' E.
Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Ships Destroyed: Number: One
Type: Diesel powered fishing sampan.
Tonnage: 50.
Name: Not known.
Identity: Established. Observed from the bridge.

Damage Determined By: Two 4"/50 cal. hits set the target afire. Observed the target became ablaze from bow to stern and settle in the water. Left it as nothing more than burning wreckage.

Details of action

Type of Guns Used: One 4"/50 cal. gun, two 20 mm. Mk. II.

Type ammunition and Number of Rounds Fired:
2 rounds 4"/50 cal. common.
358 rounds 20 mm. Mk. I & Mk. II.

Effectiveness of Fire: The twenty millimeter fire obtained many hits but did little damage. The 4"/50 is credited with its destruction.

Average Range: Average hitting gun range was 300 yards.
Average Radar range was 1800 yards.

Fire Control: Directed from the bridge.

Erratic Performance: None.