U.S.S. FLIER (SS-250) — war patrol report SS-250_FLIER.pdf

— page 3 —
1. The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron TEN.

Subject: Towing U.S.S. FLIER.

1. This ship towed U.S.S. FLIER from Midway to Pearl Harbor, receiving tow from harbor tug at 1545 Y on 22 January 1944 off Midway channel entrance, and turning tow over to harbor tug at 1437 W on 30 January 1944 inside the net in Pearl Harbor.

2. In taking FLIER in tow it was discovered that the large shackle used on the end of the 2 inch tow wire would not pass through the bullnose of the submarine. It is also doubtful whether the eye in the end of the tow wire would pass through the bullnose. For that reason a 1 inch wire pendant was shackled to the tow wire and, through the bullnose, was shackled to the towing bridle which had previously been rigged on the submarine. It was considered that the weakest point in the towing arrangement was the 1 inch shackle between the towing bridle and the wire pendant.

3. At the time of starting, the sea was calm with a light breeze blowing. Speed was gradually increased to 36 R.P.M. which gave a speed of 8 knots by FLIER pit log. This speed was maintained during the night.

4. During the night the wind and sea picked up and considerable chafing of the wire in the bullnose resulted. At 0613 XT the wire pendant parted. Despite the strong wind (Force 9) and the rough sea (Condition 8) the crew of the FLIER unshackled the broken wire and led a messenger through the bullnose while the tow cable was reeled in aboard this ship and preparations made to again take FLIER in tow.

5. Diesel oil was pumped overboard but had no noticeable effect on the waves. In lying to, the ship drifted to leeward faster than the oil spread.

6. An attempt was made to float a light buoyed messenger to FLIER but was unsuccessful because of the relative speeds of drift of the two ships and the buoyed line. It was not desired to tow the messenger across either end of the submarine because that would have required unduly endangering the personnel on the submarine who would have had to get it aboard.

7. This ship was then taken past the submarine, as close as considered safe, on the same course. When directly upwind, two unsuccessful attempts were made to pass a messenger with a line. throwing gun. Both times the end of the line fell within ten feet of the submarine. Another pass was made and the line gotten aboard the FLIER by means of the line throwing gun.

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8.  Towing U.S.S. FLIER (Continued).

8.  Florikan was then headed upwind and stopped. While the messengers of increasing size were being taken aboard the submarine, this ship swung into the trough of the sea parallel to Flier and drifted to leeward of her. When the end of the 6 inch manila line (the last messenger) had been taken aboard the Flier the two ships had drifted apart by an amount almost equal to the length of the line.

9.  With both ships stopped the Florikan drifted to leeward faster than the Flier, but the Flier drifted faster in the direction in which the ships were heading.

10.  With both ends of the line being held, and with Florikan rudder hard over toward Flier, it was possible to work Florikan upwind directly ahead of Flier. Then while this ship drifted to leeward and the submarine moved ahead the strain on the line eased and the Flier heaved it in. By repeating this procedure several times the end of the tow cable was almost gotten on board the Flier. It was then necessary for Flier to use both caps-stans in series. Finally the tow cable was gotten aboard and shackled up.

11.  This time a 15 fathom shot of 1 inch chain had been substituted for the wire pendant. Again the 1½ inch shackle was considered the weakest point in the tow.

12.  As Florikan again went ahead taking a strain on the tow wire, the wire was paid out until, with a speed of 50 R.P.M., at 1400 feet the ships rode the waves as nearly in unison as it was possible to arrange. About 5 hours had been required to again proceed with tow.

13.  Before leaving that vicinity, I desire to express my great admiration for the officers and men of the Flier who were engaged in the work on the deck of the Flier. The ship was rolling heavily and occasionally waves swept over the deck but the work continued. One man was seen to be swept overboard but, as they all had on lifejackets and lines, he was quickly hauled back on board. He was not any wetter than he had been before going overboard. Reference to Knights Modern Seamanship indicates that those men accomplished an impossible task.

14.  Course was set at 125° T. as the most easterly course (and therefore most comfortable course) that could be steered and yet ensure passing safely to southwestward of Lisianski Reef. Even on that course this ship was rolling her bulwarks under.

15.  The gale and very heavy seas continued throughout the day and most of the night. Toward morning (24 January) the wind shifted and decreased and the seas moderated. At daylight speed was increased. Based on 1/6 safety factor rule and considering a 1½ inch shackle as the weakest part, the pull was limited to 20,000 pounds except for occasional surges. This was the criterion

— page 5 —
19 FEB 1944
SUBJECT: Towing U.S.S. FLIER (Continued)
COMMANDER: FEB 19 1944
PACIFIC FLEET

used for speed for the remainder of the trip.

16. Strong wind and rather rough seas were encountered on 25 January but were not as bad as on 23 January. After that conditions continually improved. Maximum speed attained was 96 R.P.M. (3.8 knots by Flier pit log). Twice speed was reduced and towline shortened to assist Flier in renewing chafing gear.

17. The U.S.S. PC 602 escorted from Midway to Pearl. On the morning of 23 January she stood by close aboard the Flier for lifeguard duty. At 0245 W on 30 January the U.S.S. DIONNE reported for duty as additional escort. During daylight of that day air coverage was provided.

18. The only material casualties suffered were to the towing machine. The automatic tensioning device failed due to the time lag between the closing of the payout switch and the actual paying out of the wire. The cam roller lever arm dropped over the after side of the cam and prevented the cam returning to its normal position on completion of the surge. A new cam with longer riding surface was made on board. After the new cam had been installed no further difficulty was had.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT
FC5-10/S25
Serial 50
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
19 FEB 1944

1. Forwarded. Although this towing operation conducted by the FLORIKAN is a routine assignment for that type of vessel, it is nevertheless considered that the exceptionally fine seamanship displayed by that Commanding Officer, despite rough seas and adverse conditions, is worthy of special mention.

2. It is recommended that the towing equipment on similar vessels be inspected to assure proper functioning.

Copy to:
CO FLORIKAN.
C. F. ERCK.

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5 July 1944

DECLASSIFIED
From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. FILER.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Commander Submarine Division OIE EIGHTY T.O.
Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.

Subject: U.S.S. FILER, Report of War Patrol Number One.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart, Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE only.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the first war patrol of this vessel conducted in the area west of the Island of Luzon, P.I. between the coast and longitude 118°30' E and between the latitudes of 12° and 17°N during the period 21 May to 5 July 1944 is forwarded herewith.

2. DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C

BY O.P.-0923Z DATE 5/25/42

83280 FILMED

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U.S.S. FLIER

U.S.S. FLIER * Report of First War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE:

Oct. 18, 1943: Commissioned at New London, Conn., and received thirty days' training including contract torpedo trials at Newport, R.I., prior to departure for Pearl Harbor.

Dec. 20: Arrived at Pearl Harbor and received two weeks' training in accident to a week for voyage repairs and loading for patrol.

Jan. 12, 1944: Departed on first war patrol with orders to top off fuel at Midway Islands. Ran aground on east side of channel while attempting an inbound transit of Midway Island Channel.

Jan. 22: Pulled off reef and departed for Pearl Harbor in tow of U.S.S. FLORIAN. Received temporary repairs at Navy Yard Pearl Harbor.

Feb. 7: Departed Pearl Harbor for Navy Yard Mare Island.

Feb. 16: Arrived Mare Island, Calif., for repair of damage received from grounding.

May 6: Arrived Pearl Harbor after undergoing repairs at Navy Yard Mare Island, California. Assigned two days' voyage repairs and eight days' training including participation in a coordinated attack group against an inbound convoy.

(B) NARRATIVE:

May 21, 1944:
1100 (W) Underway from Pearl Harbor for patrol in accordance with Task Force 17 operation order No. 171-44, escorted by U.S.S. P.C. 602.

2000 (W) Released escort.

2100 (W) Lade radar contact with an unidentified vessel bearing 3250T at a range of 26,500 yards. (Ship's Contact No. 1) Commenced tracking and closed to investigate. Contact developed into a large merchant type ship with escort and obviously friendly due to location. FLIER had not been notified of probability of making this contact. Sent FLIER Serial one to CU.SUBPAC and resumed previous course and speed.

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20-26N Long. 164-04W
Miles Steamed 365 Fuel Consumed 5267 Gals.

: 17-13N Long. 169-16W
Miles Steamed 368 Fuel Consumed 6179 Gals.
Arrived Johnston Island to fuel.
Departed Johnston Island and set course
for patrol area. Commenced daily fire
control drills, school of the boat for
unqualified men, and several divers daily
for training.

: 18-55.5N Long. 173-12W
Miles Steamed 267 Fuel Consumed 2377 Gals.

: 19-14N Long. 178-10.5W
Miles Steamed 293 Fuel Consumed 3135 Gals.
Crossed international date line and omitted
May 26 from calendar.

: 19-45.5N Long. 176-39W
Miles Steamed 298 Fuel Consumed 3524 Gals.

: 20-13N Long. 171-01.5W
Miles Steamed 321 Fuel Consumed 3540 Gals.

: 20-39.5N Long. 165-40.5W
Miles Steamed 301 Fuel Consumed 3905 Gals.

: 21-15.5N Long. 159-58.5W
Miles Steamed 327 Fuel Consumed 3295 Gals.

: 21-36N Long 154-34.5W
Miles Steamed 305 Fuel Consumed 3146 Gals.
Sighted plane bearing 1760T at a range of
about 10 miles. (Plane Contact No. 1) Dived.
Observed plane bearing 0010T at a range
of about 10 miles. Plane was not seen
again so at 1307(L) surfaced and resumed
standard speed.

: 22-05W Long. 149-40W
Miles Steamed 276 Fuel Consumed 3430 Gals.

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0815(L) Changed course to intercept convoy report-ed by another submarine, and increased to three engine speed.
: 1100(L) Sighted plane bearing 2660T (Plane Contact No. 3) at a range of about 10 miles. Dived. Plane not again sighted so at 1145(L) sur-faced and resumed previous speed.
: 1200(L) Lat. 22-25N Long. 144-35E Miles 5, eamed 312 Fuel Consumed 3649 Gals.
: 0400(K) Reached estimated track of convoy and com- menced retiring search of area twenty miles on both sides of track.
: 1200(K) Lat. 22-27.5H Long. 136-07.5E Miles Steamed 410 Fuel Consumed 6735 Gals.
: 1308(K) Late trim dive. Surfaceed at 1350(1) and sighted smoke bearing 0060T at an estimat-ed range of 30 miles. (Ship Contact No. 2) Change of bearing and range indicated that target was on a southeasterly course, while convoy we were looking for was on north westerly course. The sea was glassy calm and it was believed that a successful periscope approach during daylight was very improbable. For this reason decided to dive and approach target sufficiently to obtain an estimate of course and speed to aid in making an end around after dark.
: 1539(K) Heard first of a series of 22 distant depth charges. Only smoke of target in sight at this time.
: 1848(K) Sighted unidentified vessel bearing 2220T believed to be either a submarine or escort craft on northerly course at high speed. (Ship Contact No. 3)
: 1918(K) Turned away from target to open range in preparation for surfacing. Sighted smoke bearing 2100T. (Ship Contact No. 4) Original target now bearing 1090T. The second contact was believed to be closer so decided to shift target for the following reasons:
   (1) Had a more favorable position on second contact.
   (2) Believed original target already under attack because of hearing depth charges from that bearing.

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2021(K)  Surfaced and connected working ahead on starboard flank of convoy estimated to be on base course 3000 yards ahead.  Unvoy was clearly in sight in bright moonlight, eight columns of smoke being visible.  The location of the southbound convoy, bearing about 1300 distant about 30 miles was frequently illuminated by gunfire.  There was one short display of gunfire from our convoy giving the impression they may have been under attack, possibly from the submarine previously sighted this afternoon.  No underwater explosions were heard, however,  The convoy was tracking on base course 3000 speed 8 kts.  With convoy bearing 1650 distant 18,500 yds.  They zigged toward FLEET giving a zero angle on the bow.  This was hastily determined to be a change of base course, associated with the other attack believed to be in progress, so dived to commence radar approach.  It now became apparent that base course had not been altered, and range could not be reduced below 7,600 yds. so decided to surface and try again.

June 4:
0053(K)  Surfaced with target bearing 2470 at 14,800 yards and commenced end around on starboard flank.

0320(K)  Monost.
0355(K)  Dived and commenced radar approach with target bearing 1150 at 16,000 yds.  Target in sight at 2,100 yards so ordered periscope depth.

0501(K)  Dived three torpedoes at each of second and third Able Kings in column of three p.s.s.  In ahead.  Swung periscope to get a set up on column passing stern but the nearest was practically on top of us turning away, while two of the escorts close aboard were turning toward.  Ordered deep submergence to evade.  The first, second, and fourth torpedoes fired were heard to explode, indicating two hits in first target and one in second.  On last look around first target was smoking heavily amidships and second had turned away and apparently stopped.

-5-

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0634(K) Received last of 34 depth charges, from four escorts.
: 0658(K) Heard last of propeller noises from escorts.
: 0735(K) Fade periscope observation and observed two heavy columns of smoke bearing 0160T.
: 0747(K) Went deep to reload forward. Escort staying close to scene of attack so continued working way southward in order to clear scene and surface.
: 1020(K) Surfaced and commenced heading up for scene of attack, with intention of trailing to determine course and speed of convoy on departure from scene.
: 1052(K) Observed escort heading toward FLIER so opened to southward.
: 1130(K) Commenced trailing again but at 1200(K) sighted escort who is apparently patroling the area of the attack, nothing else in sight. Commenced an end around to westward.
: 1200(K) Lat. 22-49N Long. 136-41.5E
: 1640(K) Files steamed 376 Fuel consumed 4079 Gals.
: 1657(K) Commenced retiring search curve to north eastward.
: 1675(K) Sent FLIER serial 2 to SUBPAC reporting attack.

June 5
: 0042(K) Sent FLIER serial 3 to SUBPAC to clarify serial 2 which was reported garbled.
: 0617(K) Unable to regain contact with convoy so headed for scene of attack.
: 1000(K) Passed to the Command of Commander Task Force 71 without signal.
: 1027(K) Arrived at position of attack and found considerable debris including six lifeboats, from one of which a package of documents was retrieved, several life rafts, and the wooden pilot house overhead from which was retrieved a Sperry Mk 15 gyro repeater.
: 1200(K) Lat. 22-38N Long. 136-36E
: 2028(K) Files steamed 290 Fuel consumed 4079 Gals.
: 2028(K) Sent FLIER serial 4 to SUBPAC reporting inability to regain contact, and observed results.

June 6
: 1200(K) Lat. 20-45N Long. 131-50E
: 1200(K) Files Steamed 343 Fuel consumed 3439 Gals.

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1200(K) Lat. 19-49N Long. 125-50E
: 1200(H) Miles Steamed 353 Fuel Consumed 3381 Gals.
: 1200(H) Dived and commenced submerged transit of
: 1200(H) Balintang Strait.
: 1200(H) Sighted type Betty plane over Babuyan Island.
: 1200(H) (Plane Contact No. 4)
: 1200(H) Lat. 19-40.5N Long. 121-58.5E
: 1200(H) Miles Steamed 236 Fuel Consumed 2533 Gals.
: 1200(H) Sighted and embarked a ship bearing 3020T
: 1200(H) at an estimated range of 18,000 yds. (Ship
: 1200(H) Contact No. 5) Attempted to close but aban-
: 1200(H) doned chase with target bearing 3360T at
: 1200(H) 1820(I). This ship was on northerly course
: 1200(H) making approximately 18 knots, apparently
: 1200(H) unescorted.
: 1200(H) Surfaced and continued toward station.
: 1200(H) June 9
: 1200(H) Dived with plan of remaining submerged un-
: 1200(H) til early afternoon to obtain general idea
: 1200(H) of air coverage and enemy activity in this
: 1200(H) area prior to run. Neg on surface during
: 1200(H) daylight.
: 1200(H) Lat. 19-30N Long. 120-12E
: 1200(H) Miles Steamed 115 Fuel Consumed 960 Gals.
: 1200(H) Surfaced and proceeded toward area at 17 kts.
: 1200(H) Dived due to evidence of enemy radar shown
: 1200(H) on SD screen. Signs of enemy radar were
: 1200(H) constant enough to indicate bearings were
: 1200(H) being taken on SD transmission.
: 1200(H) 1916(H) Surfaced.
: 1200(H) June 10 Conducted submerged daylight patrol 10
: 1200(H) miles west of Calgary Island.
: 1200(H) 1105(H) Plane Contact No. 5. Sighted two un-
: 1200(H) identified planes 20 miles west of Calgary
: 1200(H) Island. Planes steering various courses.
: 1200(H) Lat. 19-16N Long. 121-05E
: 1200(H) Miles Steamed 152 Fuel Consumed 1108 Gals.
: 1200(H) June 11 Conducted submerged patrol 7 miles west of
: 1200(H) Cape Bojeador.
: 1200(H) Sighted small patrol boat at lat. 19-01.5N
: 1200(H) Long. 120-43E. Maneuvered to pass clear.
: 1200(H) Sighted first of several land planes being
: 1200(H) operated over beach. Planes were unidenti-
: 1200(H) fied but appeared to be similar to type Zelee.
: 1200(H) One large commercial type plane seen taking
: 1200(H) off from air strip along beach at lat. 18-12N
: 1200(H) Long. 120-35E.

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1200(H)  Lt. 18-10N  Long. 120-22.5E
: 1200(H)  Liles Steamed 174  Fuel Consumed 2270 Gals.
: 1200(H)  Conducted submerged patrol 10 miles north-west of Cape Bolinao.
: 1200(H)  Lat. 16-26N  Long. 119-40E
: 1200(H)  Liles Steamed 178  Fuel Consumed 2033 Gals.
: 1200(H)  Conducted submerged daylight patrol close inshore along west side of Cape Bolinao.
: 1200(H)  Lat. 16-02N  Long. 119-37E
: 1305(H)  Sighted smoke bearing 0159T and commented submerged approach. (Ship Contact No. 6)
: 1305(H)  Target was evidently keeping close inshore so attempted to get between target and the beach. The original contact developed into a convoy of about eleven ships and at least six escorts. The sea was glassy calm which made undetected periscope observations very difficult so the approach was made with short and infrequent periscope observations.
: 1416(H)  Lost power on the sternplanes for about three minutes. Power was temporarily regained then lost again. Planes finally began operating normally at 1429(H) though remained a source for worry.
: 1452(H)  Fired four stern tubes at 9,000-10,000 ton tanker, and immediately swung forward to get a set up for the bow tubes. An Able King was crossing the bow about 50-100 yds. ahead, too close for attack, so shifted to a target in the inboard column about 1200-1300 yds. distant. Heard two timed hits in tanker followed immediately by a very loud explosion. Before getting set up on the new target the periscope was ducked because of a misunderstanding of ordered depth to the diving officer. Continued deep to evade the escorts heard converging from all directions. Power failed on the stern planes again, and we had a few bad moments as we tried to get the angle of the boat by hand in the thick of a heavy depth charge barrage. At least six vessels participated in this attack, and dropped 105 depth charges many of which seemed very well directed but set too shallow.

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1515 (H) 1800 (H) 0310 (H) 0600 (H) 1200 (H) 1356 (H) 1200 (H) 1200 (H) June 16 1200 (H) June 17

- **CONFIDENTIAL**
- **U.S.S. FLIER**
- **Report of First War Patrol.**

**Heard a loud rumbling type of explosion from the general direction of the target. Sound reported noises similar to a ship breaking up from the direction of the target intermittently between now and 1600.**
- **Periscope depth, sighted several columns of smoke bearing 1300T. Commenced reload.**
- **Surfaced and proceeded at best speed toward Manila to again intercept convoy.**
- **When approximately 15 miles west of Subic Bay sighted smoke bearing 2150T. Started to close contact and observed air patrol to the east. (Plane Contact No. 7) Slowed to one third speed and turned away from plane until clear, when course and speed to close target were resumed.**
- **Forced under by plane. Coming in on port beam. Attempted to close convoy submerged but was unable to do so. Dawn prevented further surface running in addition to the presence of a patrol boat which was conducting a supersonic sound search from the east.**
- **Lost sound contact with patrol boat. Sighted unidentified aircraft bearing 3100T range two miles, on a westerly course. (Plane Contact No. 8)**
- **Lat. 14-45N Long. 119-35E**
- **Liles Steamed 161 Fuel Consumed 1662 Gals.**
- **Sighted light bomber bearing 2350T at a range of 7 miles on a westerly course. (Plane Contact No. 9)**
- **Conducted submerged daylight patrol 10 miles southwest of Lubang Island proceeding to patrol western entrance to Calavite Pass.**
- **Lat. 13-26N Long. 120-12E Miles steamed 124 Fuel Consumed 883 Gals.**
- **Conducted submerged patrol of western approach to Calavite Pass.**
- **Lat. 13-20N Long. 120-11E Miles Steamed 94 Fuel Consumed 877 Gals.**
- **Made submerged transit of Calavite Pass during morning and patrols. Ver. Island Pass.**

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— page 15 —
1200(H) lat. 13-32N Long. 120-25E
: 1934(H) Surflaced in Verde Island Passage and made
: 1200(H) Transmit to patrol
: 1600(H) target
: 1940(H) Surflaced and commenced
: 2043(H) Arrived two miles west of Verde Island with
: 2232(H) Closed Maricaban Anchorage and identified
: 2318(H) Abandoned search and proceeded to Calavite
: June 19 1lade: submerged patrol 10 miles northwest
: of Cabra Island enroute to patrol northern
: approaches of Manila in accordance with
: new area assignment.

— page 16 —
1200(H)  Lat. 14-06N Long. 119-51E
:  June 20  'Patrolled northern approaches to Manila.
: 1200(H)  Lat. 14-32N Long. 120-01E
:  June 21  Patroled northern approaches to Manila.
: 1200(H)  Lat. 14-24N Long. 120-03E
:  June 22  Set course for new patrol area in accordance
:  with dispatch orders.

: 2136(H)  Sent FLIER serial 1 to CTF 71 reporting
:  attack on tanker and acknowledging orders
:  to change station. Made submerged day-
:  light patrol of AFO East Pass enroute to
:  new area.

: 1200(H)  Lat. 12-49N Long. 120-33E
:  June 23  Niles Steamed 138 Fuel 8onsumed 1503 Gals.
: 1830(H)  Sighted five columns of smoke bearing 2100T
:  at an estimated range of 15 miles. (Ship
:  Contact No. 8) Headed for target to observe
:  change of bearing. The bearing had not
:  changed by 1915(H), visibility through the
:  periscope was negligible due to darkness,
:  and the target was much closer, with sev-
:  eral pingers and light screws being audible.
:  It was decided to get off the track and
:  make an attack on the surface where it was
:  believed that a better opportunity existed
:  due to darkness.

: 2025(H)  Surfaced and commenced and around port side
:  of target bearing 3250T at a range of 12,000
:  yds. Target course 3450T and speed nine
:  knots. Target was keeping about 4 miles
:  off Western shore of Mindora Island.

: 2300(H)  Reached a position of 1500 port bow of tar-
:  get group at a range of 11,000 yards so
:  commenced attack.

: 2323(H)  Fired three torpedoes at each of first
:  and second ships in near column. Both
:  vessels were Able Kings, the first be-
:  ing quite large and the second medium
:  sized. Two torpedoes were seen to hit
:  aft on the first target and one seen to
:  hit the second target though two were
:  heard to hit the second ship. Both ves-
:  sels dropped out of formation and headed
:  for the beach. Turned away from target
:  group after firing and began avoiding
:  escorts while working way around port

-11-

— page 18 —
0139(H)  - 0231(H)  - 0234(H)  - 0246(H)  - 1200(H)  - 1348(H)  - 1400(H)  - 1430(H)

---

### Transcription:

**U.S.S. FLIER**

**U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.**

sequently occupied without contacting a cripple, which further confirmed my belief that the target of the second attack had sunk.

Sound reported distinct noise of a ship breaking up bearing 0700T which was then the bearing of the only cripple still in sight by radar. It is believed that this noise emanated from the cripple originally lost on the radar after the first attack, and now in process of sinking.

Since a clear path through the exoorts to the target could not be found it was decided to attempt running between two of them, one being a pinger bearing 0000T and the other a radar contact bearing 0900T at 4,500yds. Cannot course 0400T while making 15 knots.

When the target was 14,000 yds. away and three miles from the beach the pip suddenly disappeared from the radar screen. U to this point it had come in very clearly at range in excess of 18,000 yards so was presumed to have sunk. Further closed the areas but pip did not reappear at what would have been a range of 11,000 yds.

Commenced working way to westward of attack area to clear exoorts prior to daylight. There was not sufficient time to overtake convoy which had previously disa,>eard at a range of 24,000 yards just off Cape Calavite.

Attempted to make dispatch report of contact to aid U.S.S. AUG in gaining attack position, but found there was not sufficient time prior to daylight.

Divided and turned back toward attack area with the intention of arriving there late in the afternoon for a daylight inspection.

Lati 13-13.5N Long. 120-175E

Miles Steamed 140 Fuel consumed 1546 Gals.

Heard first of intermittent pinging bearing 0190T. Commenced working lay south end east to approach attack area from the south. Sighted smoke bearing 0020T believed to be from an A/S vessel.

Contacted another pinger bearing 0820T and subsequently sighted smoke on that bearing.

— page 19 —
1/47(H) Sighted an unidentified plane bearing 0750T. (Plane Contact No. 10) It had now become apparent that extensive A/S measures were being undertaken in the vicinity of last nights attack. Various pingers were heard from that direction throughout the afternoon as well as smoke from A/S vessels. Sighted destroyer type vessel (Ship Contact No. 9) bearing 0250T headed in direction of FLIER so made stern tubes ready and maneuvered to keep them bearing on target. Target turned away after approaching to 3,400 yards and disappeared in waning light. All clear by a radar search at 40 feet so surfaced and in process made radar contact on target bearing 2160T at 5,600 yards, believed to be some destroyer. Cleared area at best speed and set course for patrol area. Sent FLIER serial 2 to CTF 71 reporting attack. June 24 0207(H) Changed course to return to base. June 25 1200(H) Conducted daylight submerged patrol in Cuyo East Pass and northern part of Sulu Sea. Ran submerged for about three hours during the part of the day where it was felt that air patrol would most likely be encountered. Lt. 9-50N long. 120-55E. June 26 1200(H) Kills Steamed 221 Fuel Consumed 3682 Gals. Conducted submerged patrol during daylight while approaching the XSS east of Pearl Bank. June 27 1200(H) Lt. 6-11N long. 119-53E Kills Steamed 274 Fuel Consumed 3689 Gals. June 27 Made early morning transit of Sibu to Pass. Noticed interference on SJ radar screen caused by another radar. 0354(H) Made radar contact with another vessel bearing 0870T at 6,000 yards. Had previously been warned that the U.S.S. LIIGO was operating in this area so took course to avoid for the following reasons: 1. Radar interference was near the same

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— page 20 —
1200(H) Lat. 3-02N Long. 119-55E
: 1657(H) Latitude radar contact with an unidentified plane at fourteen miles range and decreasing so dived to evade. (Plane Contact No. 11)
: 1652(H) Plane not sighted so surfaced and proceeded to patrol eastern shore of Makassar Strait on surface during darkness and submerged during daylight.
: June 26 Continued patrol of Makassar Strait and conducted submerged daylight patrol close inshore.
: 1200(H) Lat. 00-13.5N Long. 119-28E
: June 29 Pilots steamed 223 Fuel Consumed 1812 Gals.
: 1200(H) Lat. 2-44S Long. 118-36E
: June 30 Pilots steamed 186 Fuel Consumed 1634 Gals.
: 0220(H) Noticed radar interference with another radar believed to be in the general vicinity of 2100T which was the course of the FLEK.
: 0310(H) Made actual radar contact with another vessel bearing 2380T at a range of 7,500 yards. Launched battle stations, stopped and turned to keep stern tubes bearing. Radar operator was certain this was one of our submarine because of similarity of frequency and pulse rate as evident from interference, together with range at which actual contact was made. No had not been informed of likelihood of encountering another submarine, but from subsequent information it is concluded that this contact must have been U.S.S. ROYALO. Knego opened rapidly and target was tracked on westerly course at seventeen knots until contact was lost. Resumed course and speed and radar interference worked around to northeastward and faded out stern. (Ship Contact No. 11)

-15-

— page 21 —
1037(H) Conducted daylight surface patrol of the eastern Java Sea w.ile enroute Lombok Strait.
: 1200(H) Lat. 6-06S Long. 116-49E
: 1425(H) Kilos Steamed 225 Fuel Consumed 2612 Gals.
: 1513(H) Plane not sighted so surfaced and resumed previous course and speed.
: July 1 Late early morning transit of Lombok Strait and evaded a patrol boat at either end.
: (Ship Contacts No 12 and 13)
: 1023(H) Cruised on surface during daylight enroute to base.
: 1200(H) Sighted and exorciged recognition signals with U.S.S. BellAFISH. (Ship Contact No 14)
: 1200(H) Lat. 11-21S Long. 115-29E
: 1200(H) Kilos Steamed 240 Fuel Consumed 4540 Gals.
: July 2
: 1200(H) Lat. 17-07SS Long. 113-59E
: 1200(H) Kilos Steamed 380 Fuel Consumed 5291 Gals.
: July 3
: 1200(H) Lat. 22-39S Long. 112-39E
: 1200(H) Kilos Steamed 356 Fuel Consumed 4686 Gals.
: July 4
: 1200(H) Lat. 28-13S Long. 112-43E
: 1200(H) Kilos Steamed 350 Fuel Consumed 5722 Gals.
: July 5
: 1200(H) Frornentle, V.A.
: 1200(H) Kilos Steamed 275 Fuel Consumed 3950 Gals.

-16-

— page 22 —
1. U.S.S. FLIER
CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.

(C) Weather.
The weather was uniformly good throughout the patrol with moderate warm breezes and clear days and nights. In the eastern part of the South China Sea there were occasional rain squalls and periods of reduced visibility but not to the extent expected during this season of the southwest monsoon.

(D) Tidal Information.
No unusual currents were encountered.

(E) Navigational Aids.
No lighted aids to navigation were encountered. The radar is invaluable for purposes of navigation when in restricted waters were accurate fixes may be obtained by radar tangents and ranges of blind objects.

(F) Ship Contacts.
Time: Lat.: : Intitl.: Est.: Course: How :
No: Dte: : Long.: Types : Range : & Speed : Cont.: Remarks
1. May 21 20-54N AK 26500 0950T SN-R Tracked and closed
2100(W) 160-21W 11 kts Identified friend
2. June 3 22-25N Smoke 50000 1500T SD Approached and
1350(K) 138-48E from Smoke tracked and then
convoy broke off to attack
of about No. 4.
8 ships
3. June 3 22-25N Unidbn-10000 Northorly P No action taken -
1848(K) 138-48E tified course & thought to be U.S.
high speed Submarine
4. June 3 22-22N 5 Alt's 40000 3200T P Attacked - Sank
1908(K) 138-49E 4 Unicontified 9 kts. Smoke one medium Aik,
escorts damaged one medium
AK.
5. June 8 19-52N Large 30000 0000T P Unable to close
1729(I) 121-50L AK or 18 kts. Smoke due to speed and
LAP large angle on the
bow.
6. June 13 15-58N 11 AK's 30000 1750T P Probably sank tank
1305(H) 119-38E and 9 kts. Smoke similar to Huizish
Tankers, near (9,527 Tons)
at last with two hits. Un-
6 escorts able to observe
results because of
strong A/S near surface

-17-

— page 23 —
U.S.S. FLIER

U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.

(F) Ship Contacts Continued.

Time :Let. : :Initial:Best.Course:How : :Notes:Date:Long.:Types:Range:& Speed : :Cont.:Remarks

7. June 18 13-43N 5 AK's 12000 1100T P While in Vorde I Pass. sighted cover. yon emerging from rain squall. Unk. to close due to range and large on the bow. Upon facing at night a. tempted to overtake but unable to reg contact.

8. June 22 12-50N 9 ships 30000 3200T P Attacked - Sank 0. 1830(H) 120-40E about 10 9 kts. Smoke large AK and two unidentifed medium AI's.

9. June 23 13-09N 1 DD. 2.8000 1700T P Made contact at day and maneuvered to keep stern tubes ing since we had in torpedoes forward. When range was abo 3000 yds. target gled away and disap. pearred in darkness

10. June 27 04-03N Unidenti- 8000 Unknown SN-R Character of reda 0354(H) 119-40E fied belicved broke off interference indica to be U.S.S. contact ated this vcas a U. HINGO which before Submarine, renouve we were due to obtained. cd to avoid.

11. June 30 04-50S Unicen-7800 Various SN-R Character of raa 0310(H) 117-35E tified courses interference indica & speeds on this was a U.S. Submarine. He broke off contact.

12. July 1 08-19S Patrol 8000 Northcly SN Evaded on the sur 0037(H) 115-58.5E Graft course face. Believe we slow speed were undetected.

13. July 1 08-31S Patrol 6900 Southcly SN Same as 12. 0126(H) 115-55.5E Graft course slow speed

14. July 1 11-30S Submarine 10000 Northcly SD-P Closed & Identifi 1031(H) 115-32E 14 kts. course as U.S.S. FONEFISH exchanged signals.

-18-

— page 24 —
1. May 31 21-36N Mevis 10 Mi. 0950T SD 150 feet.
2. June 1 22-05N Mavis 10 Mi. 0900T SD 150 feet.
3. June 2 22-24N Mavis 8 Mi. Unknown SD 150 feet.
4. June 8 19-40.5N Betty 10 Mi. Unknown P 150 feet.
5. June 11 18-17.5N Unknown 10 Mi. 0450T P 150 feet.
6. June 11 18-12.5N Large 12 Mi. -- P 150 feet.
7. June 14 119-22E Unknown 14000 2600T SN Aircraft coverage for convoy wew a approaching.
8. June 14 14-45N Unknown 4000 2700T P 150 feet.
9. June 14 14-44N Unknown 14000 2700T P 150 feet.
10. June 23 13-14.3N Unknown16000 Various P A/S patrol.
11. June 27 01-50N Unknown 28000 Unknown R Made quick dive to 150 feet.
12. June 30 06-17.5S Unknown 40000 Unknown R Made quick dive to 150 feet.

(H) Attack Data:
U.S.S. FLIER Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol No. 1
Time: 0501(K) Date: 4 June 1944 Lat. 22-55N L= 136-44E

Target Data - Damage Inflated
Description: Attack made on convoy of 5 Aik's with 4 escorts. Initial contact made during daylight - sighted smoke on horizon. Convoy tracked until nightfall. Approach made on surface and at radar depth using radar ranges and bearing. Final attack made at periscope depth. Usine periscope bearings.

Ships sunk: One medium AK (name unknown) 6000 tons.

Ships damaged or Probably Sunk: One medium AK (name unknown) 6000 tons.

-19-

— page 25 —
U.S.S. FLIER _Report of First War Patrol_

Danger determined by: Hard three-timed hits, two hits in the first salvo of three torpedoes fired at the first target and one hit in the second salvo of three torpedoes fired at the second target.
Observed first target stopped and smoking badly and second target stopped.
The following day upon return to the scene of the attack much debris was sighted.

Target draft: 14' Course: 320 degrees: 9 kts. Range: 600 yds.

Own ship data:
Speed 2.6 kts., course 0500, depth 65', angle 00'

Fire Control and Torpedo Data.

Type Attack: Radar approach - final attack by periscope.

Tubes fired 1 2 3 4 5 6
Track angle 95P 98P 100P 85P 88P 92P
Gyro angle 350 344 348 000 354 357
Depth set 10' 10' 10' 10' 10' 10'
Power HP HP HP HP HP HP
Hit Hit Hit Miss Hit Miss Miss
Erratic No No No No No No
Mk. torpedo 23 23 14-3A 14-3A 23 23
Serial No. 41391 41118 26453 40731 41006 52903
Lk. ex. loader 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial No. 12724 8461 12737 11600 3127 2498
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
Mk. Warhead 16-1 16-1 16-0 16-1 16-1 16-1
Serial No. 12363 12555 2133 3102 1425 13092
Explosives Tpx. Tpx. Tpx. Tpx. Tpx. Tpx.
Firing interval -- 8 sec. 8 sec. 40 sec. 8 sec. 8 sec.
Tpx. spread Divergent Spread Divergent Spread
Sea Condition 0 0 0 0 0 0
Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Remarks: Convoy was not aware of the presence of a submarine until the attack was completed and the torpedoes were fired.

U.S.S. FLIER _Torpedo Attack No. 2_ Patrol No. 1
Time: 1452(H) Date: 13 June 1944 Lt. 16-00N Long. 119-41.5E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: Attack made on convoy of 11 ships including AK's and tankers with at least 6 escorts. Initial contact made during daylight - sighted smoke on the horizon through the periscope. Approach and attack made at periscope depth using periscope ranges and bearings throughout.

-20-

— page 26 —
U.S.S. FLIER
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

Ship probably sunk: One tanker (Huzisan Maru) 9527 tons.

Damage determined by: Heard two timed hits followed by a loud explosion. Twenty minutes later another explosion was heard. Sound then reported hearing noises of a ship breaking up for a period of 30 minutes.

Target draft: 16' Course 2000 Speed 8 kts. Range: 1450 yds.

Own Ship Data:
Speed 4 kts. Course 0900' Depth 65' Angle 00

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Periscope Attack.

Tubes Fired 7 8 9 10
Track angle 095P 095P 096P 098P
Gyro angle 025 023 021 017
Depth set 10' 10' 10' 10'
Power HP HP HP HP
Hit Hit Hit Miss Miss
Erratic No No No No
Lk. torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 40663 26139 40828 22327
Lk. exploder 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial No. 2168 17536 434 8799
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual Contact Contact ---
Lk. warhead 16-1 16-0 16-1 16-1
Serial No. 3238 2852 3202 12409
Explosives Tpx. Tpx. Tpx. Tpx.
Firing Interval 5 sec. 5 sec. 10 sec.
Type Spread Divergent Spread
Sea Condition 0 0 0 0
Overhead Activity: Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Remarks: Cargo was following a radical zig plan with groups apparently zig-zagging independently. Escorts were patrolling stations, echo ranging and listening. Approach was undetected until firing. Strang counter measures were started immediately by at least six escorts.

U.S.S. FLIER Torpedo Attack No. 3 Patrol No. 1
Time: 2323(H) Date 22 June 1944 Lat. 13-10.5N Long. 120-27.

-21-

— page 27 —
U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.

Target Data - Engine Inflicted
Description: Convoy of 9 ships with about 10 small escorts. Initial contact made at dusk - sighted smoke on horizon through periscope. Remained submerged while convoy passed close aboard; when convoy had passed well clear, surfaced and made and around run using radar ranges and bearings throughout the approach. TBT bearings were used for the final firing bearings, targets being visible through 7X50 binoculars at about 5,000 yards.

Ships sunk: One large AK [Unidentified] 8,000 tons. One medium AK (unidentified) 6,000 tons.
Damage determined by: Observed two hits on first target and one hit on second target. Hard two hits on first target and two hits on second target. Two vessels were seen by radar to drop out of formation and start heading for the beach. Lost radar contact with one of these at 10,000 yards while the other was clearly in sight at 18,000 yards during subsequent attack on convoy. Upon return to attack cripples only one target was visible at 14,000 yards and sound report-ed loud noises similar to vessel breaking up in general direction of cripple originally lost at 10,000 yards. While attempting to penetrate screen of escorts the remaining radar target suddenly disappeared from view and did not reappear when the range was closed to what should have been 11,000 yards.

Target draft: 24' Course 3400 Speed: 8 3/4 kts. Range: 3100 yds. 20' 3400 8 3/4 kts. 3100 yds.

Own Ship D'ta
Speed 5 kts. Our se 0850T Depth surface Angle 00

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Surface radar attack - TBT firing bearings.

Tubes Fired 1 2 3 4 5 6
Track angle 075P 075P 077P 080P 080P 082P
Gyro angle 000 359 000 000 359 001
Depth Set 12' 12' 12' 12' 12' 12'
Power HP HP HP HP HP HP
Hit Hit Hit Hit Hit Miss
Erotic No No No No No
K. torpedo 23 14-3A 23 23 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 49219 36385 41442 41530 25691 26569

-22-

— page 28 —
6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial No. 11593 8764 11590 439 2345 2301
Actuation set Contact ContactContactContactContactContactContact
Actuation actual Contact ContactContactContactContactContact
Rk. Varhead 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-0 16-1 16-1
Serial No. 9390 12559 11974 9646 3135 3105
Explosives Tpx. Tpx. Tpx. Tpx. Tpx. Tpx.
Firing Interval -- & sec. &sec. 15 sec.8 sec. 6 sec.
Type Spread Divergent Spread Divergent Spread
Sea Condition 1 1 1 1 1
Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Remarks: Convoy was unaware of the presence of a submarine
until the actual hits but were following a regular zig zag
plan 200 either side of the base course.
An impulse pressure of 300 lbs. was used.

U.S.S. FLIER Torpedo Attack No. 4 Patrol No. 1
Time: 0023(H) Date: 23 June 1944 Lat. 13-13N Long. 120-00.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: Same convoy as in Attack No. 3. As second end
around approach was being made the convoy was required
to change base course in our direction for navigational
reasons. Radar contact was maintained throughout the
period between Attack No. 3 and Attack No. 4. Radar
ranges and bearings were used throughout the attack -
TBT bearings were used as final firing bearings.

Ship Sunk: One medium A: (unidentified) 6,000 tons.

Damage determined by: Bridge personnel observed two
hits though three were heard. Ship began smoking badly
and was settling by the stern as other vessels of the
formation passed around it. This target did not emerge
from the target group as seen by the radar and it is
believed to have sunk before last ship of formation had
passed.

Target draft: 20' Course 2950T Speed; 8 3/4 kts. Range: 3000 yc

Own Ship Data
Speed 9 kts. course 0350T Depth Surface Angle 00

Fire Control and Lopredo Lata

Type Attack: Surface Radar Attack - TBT firing bearings.

— page 29 —
1 2 3 4
Track angle 60P 80P 82P 83P
Gyro angle 000 359 000 358
Depth Set 12' 12' 12' 12'
Power HP HP HP HP
Hit Hit Hit Hit
Erratic No No No No
Mk. torpedo 23 14-3A 23 14-3A
Serial No. 41556 26567 41618 40328
Mk. exploder 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial No. 8800 8762 17840 2599
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual Contact Contact Contact ---
Mk. Warhead 16-1 16-1 16-0 16-0
Serial No. 2363 12563 12042 10929
Explosives Tpx. Tpx. Tpx. Tpx.
Firing I tervel 8 sec. 8 sec. 8 sec.
Type Spread Divergent Spread
Sea condition 1 1 1 1
Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Remarks: Although the convoy was aware of the presence of a submarine as a result of the first attack, this attack was made undetected. Two escorts passed about 1800 yds. on either beam shortly after firing, but did not see us.

(I) Mines. None.

(J) Anti-Submarine Measures and Evasion Tactics.

Convoys in the Manila area are large and heavily escorted with both destroyers and PC boat types being employed as escorts. They use echo ranging both day and night quite ineffectively and there were no indications of radar being used.

Routine patrols around the Manila area are negligible, however after the attack of June 23rd the area was strongly patrolled by a hunter-killer group consisting of a plane, a destroyer, and several smaller A/S vessels.

A speed of 90 rpm was used at 300 feet to evade A/S attack and seemed to leave most of the depth charges astern.

(K) Major defects and Damage.

1. June 2 - Both high pressure air compressor motors were grounded out due to water being blown into them from the bilges by the rapid venting of negative tank, the vent of which leads into the pump room bilges in

— page 30 —
U.S.S. FLIER

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First Patrol.

The immediate vicinity of the compressors. Both motors were disassembled and thoroughly cleaned and dried out and returned to satisfactory operating condition. Further trouble was prevented by exercising extreme care in venting negative.

2. June 13 - Power was lost on the stern planes temporarily three times at critical moments. The three speed switch installed by the navy yard during overhaul proved to be the source of the trouble. The resistances introduced when operating the motor at medium and low speeds cause a decrease in voltage below the amount necessary for proper operation. The motor was operated at normal speed the remainder of the patrol. It is recommended that the three speed switch be investigated and possibly the resistances reduced.

3. Considerable difficulty was encountered through-out the patrol in maintaining the proper adjustment of the starting panels for the low pressure blowers. This was a repetitive failure in the proper operation of the accelerating contactors and will be investigated more thoroughly during the coming refit period.

(L) Radio.

All serials were received. Much interference was experienced, however none was believed to be due to enemy jamming. Transmissions were completed with little difficulty on the 4235 series. Antenaticators were used at all times with prompt acknowledgment.

(M) Radar.

The SJ and SD radar performance was excellent. This is largely attributable to the expert attention given this gear by HOWELL, A.G. RTLc.

Radar interference was noted on the SJ radar four times. In two of these instances friendly submarines were known to be in our vicinity while no enemy forces were known to be near. In the other two instances enemy forces were known to be present, while although a friendly submarine could have been in the vicinity, its presence was not definitely known.

The first of these two instances was at Lat. 13-10N Long. 120-27E on June 22, while we were tracking an enemy convoy with several escorts. However, nothing in their

— page 31 —
U.S.S. FILTER - Report of First War Patrol.

actions indicated they were aware of our presence until we attacked the convoy, and then they never definitely located us.

In the second of these instances on June 23 the had been in contact with a destroyer while submerged and just before sunset in Lat. 14-07N long. 120-14E. We lost contact as darkness set in, and in a radar sweep just before surfacing the only thing noticeable on the screen was radar interference from about 2000T. Immediately upon surfacing made radar contact at 6,000 yds. on this bearing with what is believed to have been the same destroyer. Although he was aware of our presence in the area, it is quite apparent that he did not have a radar contact on us after we surfaced.

A search was made with the AN/APR-1 radar detector between 80 and 1000 megacycles once each hour while on the surface in the vicinity of enemy bases. We were fooled at first by indications of 185, 205, 250, 283, 305 and 310 megacycles, but these were apparently from intermediate frequencies on the SD, as they disappeared as soon as that radar was turned off. Although considerable time was spent within fifteen miles of Corregidor and the suspected radar on Lubang Island, we were surprised to get absolutely no indications of enemy radar at any time. While enroute to base we encountered a friendly submarine and made a search and were able to pick up their SD on about 118 megacycles.

Very definite interference picked up on the SD radar, and at first attributed to enemy radars, was subsequently discovered to be caused by a defect in our own transmitter.

(II) Sound Gear and Sound Conditions.

Sound conditions were uniformly good throughout the patrol. The QC/B gear was much more effective than the JP-1 sound equipment. The JP1was unable to contact anything at a greater range than 3,000 yards.

(0) Density Layers.

In the South China Sea west of the Luzon coast no surface layers were encountered. All gradients

— page 32 —
U.S.S. FLIER

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.

Were negative with a step of from two to ten degrees at some point between 100 and 200feet.

The average periscope depth echo range was between 2000 and 3500 yards with a ping range of about 2000 yards. The assured range varied between 1200 and 1800 yards and was usually at a depth of 250 feet.

It was noted that the negative gradient became sharper as the coast was approached increasing to as much as 8 degrees five miles off shore. Convexly the negative gradient became as low as 2 degrees some distance from the coast.

(P) Health, Food and Habitability.

The ship's company enjoyed excellent health throughout the patrol with no days being lost due to sickness.

The food was quite good with the ice cream freezer being a very welcome addition.

In general the habitability was good with the possible exception of the forward torpedo room. This space gets little circulation of air and remains hot and uncomfortable in the tropics even while operating on the surface. It is recommended that an additional cooling unit similar to the one in the conning tower be installed in the forward battery with a booster blower to increase the supply of air to the forward torpedo room.

(Q) Personnel.

A large percentage of both officer and enlisted personnel received their first combat experience during this patrol. Their performance of duty was exceptional and reflected the soundness of the underway training programs conducted at New London and Pearl Harbor.

Extensive use of the available training facilities ashore from the time the crew was first formed until the present has paid dividends. In addition, the extended period from commissioning until this patrol together with a small personnel turnover has resulted in more than the average training for a new boat.

-27-

— page 33 —
U.S.S. FLIER
CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.

(R) Miles Steamed - Fuel Used.
Pearl Harbor to Area 5888 Mi. 57,000 Gals.
In Area 1750 Mi. 14,000 Gals.
Area to Frenantie, W.A. 2914 Mi. 42,000 Gals.

(S) Duration.

Days enroute to Area - 19 days.
Days in Area - 14 days.
Days enroute to Base - 11 days.
Days submerged - 19 days.

(T) Factors of Encurance Remaining.

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor
Number Gals. Days Days
4 1500 30 20

Limiting factor this patrol: Effective expenditure of torpedoes.

(U) The two Manila bound convoys that we encountered were proceeding so to arrive off Corregidor at day-light. There is considerable shipping in this vicinity, and it is considered that several boats could be effectively employed in this area simultaneously. Direct VHF voice radio communication would be of considerable assistance.

-28-

— page 34 —
02278
: 8
: U.S.S. FLIER (SS250) - Report of First War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The first war patrol of the U.S.S. FLIER during the period 21 May to 5 July 1944 was conducted in an area west of LUZON, P.I.. It covered a period of forty-four days of which fourteen days were spent in the area.

2. Four attacks were made on enemy ships during this aggressive patrol. Twelve hits were observed or heard out of the twenty torpedoes fired.

ATTACK NO. 1 - A night submerged attack following a long chase on a convoy of five AKs with four escorts. Three torpedoes fired at each of two AKs resulted in two hits heard on the first and one hit heard on the second. Good evidence of one AK having been sunk was obtained later.

ATTACK NO. 2 - In a glassy sea made a daylight periscope attack on a convoy of eleven ships with at least six escorts. Four torpedoes were fired at an AO. Two timed hits followed by a heavy explosion and breaking up noises were heard. Escort counterattacks and airplane coverage prevented further attacks on this convoy.

ATTACK NO. 3 and 4 - Night surface attacks on the same convoy of nine enemy ships and about ten escorts. Attack No. 3 was made with three torpedoes fired at each of two AKs at 3,100 yards. Two hits were observed on the first AK and one hit was observed and one heard on the second AK. Both targets disappeared from the radar screen. Following another end around, attack No. 4 was made with four torpedoes on an AK at 3,000 yards. Two hits were seen and one was heard. Escorts prevented more torpedoes being fired. The target was seen settling by the stern.

3. Material condition of FLIER is excellent. The negative tank vent line will be baffled to prevent flooding of air compressor motors.

— page 35 —
4. Particularly noteworthy are comments contained in paragraph (M) regarding the apparent lack of indications of enemy use of radar in this area and also the false indications registered in the detector when operating own SJ radar. It is noted that SJ radar interference was observed on four occasions. Experiments on keying the SJ radar circuit are being conducted. It is hoped that this will provide a practical means of establishing friendly identity in such cases.

5. The health and morale of the crew on return from this patrol was excellent.

6. The Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew on the serious damage inflicted on the enemy during the first patrol of this ship.

H. H. McLEAN

— page 36 —
12a/ms
Serial: 0718
18 July 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS FLIER Conf. Ltr. A16-3
Serial 027, dated 5 July,
1944. Report of First
War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. FLIER (SS250) - Report of First War Patrol.
Comment on:

1. The First Patrol of the USS FLIER was conducted in the area west of LUZON, P.I. The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN are concurred in.

2. FLIER, by excellent area coverage, effectively exploited traffic focal points in the vicinity of MANILA. Against large, heavily escorted convoys, and in spite of intense countermeasures, FLIER successfully completed four aggressive and skillful attacks, obtaining twelve hits in six enemy ships from twenty torpedoes fired. These results on a first patrol indicate a well-trained ship, ready and eager to seek out and destroy the enemy.

3. The Force Commander notes that FLIER made extensive use of all available training facilities from the time the crew was first formed. This fine patrol fully demonstrates the value of that training. The FLIER is to be especially complimented upon maintaining both fighting efficiency and indomitable spirit in spite of a disheartening set-back suffered soon after commissioning.

4. This patrol is designated "successful" for purposes of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

5. The Force Commander takes great pleasure in congratulating the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew on this excellent first patrol in which the following damage was inflicted upon the enemy:

SUNK

1 - AK (MEDIUM - EU) - - - - 4,000 Tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - AK (MEDIUM - EU) - - - - 4,000 Tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - AK (MEDIUM - EU) - - - - 4,000 Tons (Attack No. 3)
1 - AK (LARGE - EU) - - - - 7,500 Tons (Attack No. 4)
Total - 19,500 Tons.

— page 37 —
12a/ms 8 02278
Serial: 0718
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. FLIER (SS250) - Report of First War Patrol - Comment on:
DAMAGED
1 - AO (HUZISAN MARU Class - EC) - 9,500 Tons (Attack No.2)
1 - AK (MEDIUM - EU) - 4,000 Tons (Attack No.3)
Total - 13,500 Tons.
Grand Total 33,000 Tons.

6. The damage inflicted in Attack No. 1 (2 Medium A/S Sunk - 8000 Tons) was accomplished in waters under the Operation Control of the Commander Submarines, PACIFIC FLEET, who is requested to credit it accordingly.

R. W. CHRISTIE.
ORIGINAL COPY

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominchi (3) - (Direct)
Vice Opncv (2) - (Direct)
Vice Opncv Op23c (1)
ComlstFlt (1)
Com2ndFlt (1)
Com3rdFlt (1)
Com7thFlt (2)
Comsubs1stFlt (4)
Comsubs2ndFlt (4)
CTF-71 (4)
CTF-72 (2)
CSS-12 (1)
CSS-16 (1)
DivComRons-12 (1)
DivComRons-16 (1)
S/M School N.L. Comm. (2)
E:ch S/M W.A. (1) - NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN

P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
Flag Secretary.

— page 38 —
9 AUG 1944
Al6-3(F-3/roj)
Serial: 9-05
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L-
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS FLIER conf. 1tr.
Al6-3, Serial 027 of
5 July 1944. Report
of First War Patrol.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. FLIER (SS250) - Report of First War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

2. Commander Seventh Fleet congratulates the
Commanding Officer, Officers, and Men of the U.S.S. FLIER
on the successful completion of their First War Patrol.
This fine patrol, during which 19,500 tons of enemy ship-
ping were sunk and 13,500 tons damaged, reflects the
effect of intensive training prior arrival combat area.

H. W. GRAP
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
ComSubs7th
ComSubRon-16
CO U.S.S. FLIER

— page 39 —
1944 - Rounded BANCORAN ISLAND to the northeast on the surface at a minimum range of 19 miles and at 1500 to 1600 feet. The route was to converge and then run down the recommended steamer route approaching NASUBATA CHANNEL. At 1800 made landfall on BALABAC ISLAND and obtained a fix using bearings of peaks on BALABAC and PALAWAN ISLANDS. (No evening stars were obtained because of a complete overcast.) The fix showed the vessel to be on the steamer route about 50 miles from BALABAC ISLAND. The route intended to be followed through BALABAC STRAIT was that recommended by the U.S.S. CREVALE and given in annex to the Operation Order. At 1800 commenced taking intermittent soundings to establish crossing the 100 fathom curve, and continued taking them thereafter. All soundings checked with the chart. At 1930 made radar contact on BALABAC ISLAND and shortly thereafter on BUGSUK ISLAND. At 2100 made radar contact on COMIRAN ISLAND at 16,000 yards range. At 2130 sighted COMIRAN ISLAND, and about this time made radar contact with ROUGHTON ISLAND. Speed had been reduced to five knots while the landfall on COMIRAN and ROUGHTON ISLANDS was being made, but when the position of the vessel relative to these points had been verified speed was increased to seventeen knots.

At 2200 with COMIRAN ISLAND bearing 190 T distance about 6,700 yards there was a terrific explosion estimated to have been on the starboard side abreast of the forward battery. Oil, water, and debris deluged the bridge. There was a tremendous venting off of air through the conning tower hatch and the vessel sank in about twenty or thirty seconds while still making about 15 knots through the water.

It is my opinion that a mine was in contact with the hull just below the waterline at the time of the explosion, since there was no tendency to lift the ship, and it is further my opinion that the hull was clearly holed and not that the vessel's back was broken.

— page 40 —
12/Bt
TOP SECRET
NARRATIVE: of Second War Patrol of U.S.S. FLIER.
(All Times LOW and Approximate)

The following personnel were seen by various of the survivors to be in the water after the vessel had sunk:

GROWLEY, John D., #70079, Comdr., USNR.
LIDDELL, Jr., James W., #85674, Lt. D-V(G), USNR.
JACOBSON, Alvin E., #313246, Ens. D-V(G), USNR.
HOWELL, Arthur G., 647 88 45, CRT, USNR.
TREMAINE, Donald P., 375 93 43, FCR2c, USN.
MILLER, Wesley B., 882 95 54, MOMM3c, USNR V-6.
RUSSO, James D., 705 22 98, QM3c, USNR V-6.
BAUMGART, Earl R., 305 92 74, MOMM3c, USNR V-6
KNAPP, Paul, #12351, Lt., USN.
CASEY, John E., #123674, Lt., USN.
REYNOLDS, William L., #105645, Lt.(jg), USNR.
MAYER, Phillip Stanley, #270779, Ens., E-V(g), USNR.
HUDSON, Edgar Walker, 295 24 90, CMOHM(AA), USN.
POPE, Charles DeWitt, 261 88 13, CGM(AA)
MADEO, Gerald Francesco, 642 94 60, F2c, USNR.

The word was passed for all survivors to gather together but Lt. Reynolds, Hudson, and Pope did not re-appear. Ens. Mayer was being assisted by Howell but after about 20 minutes he was unconscious and had to be abandoned. Shortly thereafter Lt. Knapp became separated from the party and was not again seen nor heard.

The sky was completely overcast and no land was visible except occasionally during flashes of lightning. It was my first impulse to swim towards COMIAN ISLAND, but after considering the chance of falling into Japanese hands there, it was decided to try to make one of the coral reefs to the northwestward. The occasional flashes of lightning and some breaks in the cloud cover to the southward permitted us to orientate ourselves at intervals, but much of the time in between we were probably swimming in circles.

After moonrise at 0300 it became easier to remain orientated. All this time Lt. Casey had been unable to see and had been guided in his swimming by various members of the party. At nearly 0400 he apparently became exhausted and went under. It was about this

— page 41 —
12/Bt
TOP SECRET
NARRATIVE: of Second War Patrol of U.S.S. FLIER.
(All Times How and Approximate)

time that land became visible ahead and thereafter our efforts were directed toward it.

Madoe now began to fall behind the group but because of the strong currents it was apparent that the only hope for anyone lay in swimming at best speed, and he was therefore told to do the best he could toward the land. He was not seen nor heard after 0500. After daylight the seas began to pick up making swimming more difficult and the party began to separate, all having the objective clearly in sight. By 1330 five of the group, Lt. Liddell, Ens. Jacobson, Howell, Baumgart, and myself, had reached a floating palm tree about two miles from MANTANGULE ISLAND, and swam with this aided by the current to the reef off the south coast near the eastern end of that island. Upon coming ashore at 1530 this group was met by Russo who had swum the entire distance. At 1700 Tremaine was found on the eastern end of the island by Lt. Liddell. A lean-to was constructed and the night was spent on the sandy portion of the beach.

The spot at which we landed and spent the first two nights commanded a view of the vicinity of the wreck. At no time was any activity noted. A plane which passed overhead at 1500 did not deviate from its course toward BALABAC.

August 15, 1944 - The Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer made an inspection of the east coast of the island to search for food and water and to formulate a plan for reaching the most likely spot where friendly natives could be found. It was decided to construct a raft and proceed via BYAN and GABUNG ISLANDS to BUGSUK ISLAND with PALAWAN ISLAND as the ultimate objective. The search for food and water resulted in one drifted cocoanut which was divided among all hands. At 1700 Miller appeared in camp from the western end of the island where he had landed at about sunset August 14, 1944, and reported he had found nothing at that end. At 1800 a large geyser of water was seen on the general bearing of FLIER followed by the sound of a distant explosion, the source and reason for the explosion is unknown. The vicinity had been observed throughout the day and at no time was any activity noted, and again a plane passed over in the afternoon without deviating from its course.

— page 42 —
1944 - In the forenoon the party moved to the eastern end of the island and gathered drifted pieces of bamboo which were lashed together with vines into a raft about seven by four feet. Two paddles were constructed of bamboo. At 1500 shoved off for BYAN ISLAND and landed on the northwest point of that island just after sunset. The night was spent there.

August 17, 1944 - At 1600, near low water slack, made our way with the raft across a coral reef to GABUNG ISLAND landing on the southwest point at sunset and spent the night there.

August 18, 1944 - We worked our way east along the south coast of GABUNG ISLAND searching for food and getting into position for the trip to BUGSUK ISLAND. One edible drifted cocoanut was found and divided among all hands. Immediately upon rounding the southeast point of GABUNG ISLAND a group of buildings was visible on BUGSUK ISLAND. At 1400 shoved off for BUGSUK ISLAND and landed and left the raft on APO ISLAND at 1700. The buildings were cautiously approached on foot but no sign of life was apparent. The buildings apparently had been evacuated for sometime, and had subsequently been looted. There was an excellent grove of cocoanut trees here and a cistern from which all hands drank. The night was spent in the house.

August 19, 1944 - Shortly after sunrise two native boys appeared, one of whom could speak English reasonably well, and he told us that if we would accompany him he could provide us with food and water. He also warned us not to drink the water in the cistern as it had been poisoned. However, no ill effects were subsequently noted. He guided us to a building apparently an old school house, about a mile inland, and here we were met by Mr. Pedro Sarmiento, leader of the BOLO Battalion of BUGSUK ISLAND, together with three soldiers armed with rifles and six men armed with blow guns and bolos. We were told by Mr. Sarmiento that he had a small sailboat (classed as a 'compt) available, and that his orders were to return any Americans found to Brooke's Point, PALAWAN. He also said that a landing party of Japanese was expected soon at the spot on which we had landed, and that he was anxious to get us clear of that vicinity. We ate a meal of fish and rice and started out immediately in the direction of the BUGSUK River, this was our first meal since leaving the FLIER.

— page 43 —
1944 - We completed the trip to the boat, and about 1600 departed for the guerilla outpost at CAPE BULIUYAN, PALAWAN, where we arrived about midnight.

August 21, 1944 - We were met at CAPE BULIUYAN by Sargeant Pascual de la Cruz (PA), U.S.A.F.F.E. who relieved Mr. Sarmiento of responsibility for our safe conduct. Sargeant de la Cruz then told me the information he had concerning the loss of the ROBAIO. We remained in the Army Barracks here until we departed for BROOKE'S POINT in the same comit at about noon. Before departure I requested Mr. Sarmiento to make a search of the islands in the vicinity of BALABAC STRAIT for any other survivors of ROBAIO or FLIER, and he assured me he would do this. The wind was not favorable so we anchored in the evening in the TUBA River.

August 22, 1944 - Underway at 1100 for Brooke's Point arriving there early the following morning. Near sunset a Japanese Launch was sighted on the horizon and was evaded by dousing sail and rowing into the beach.

August 23, 1944 - Upon arrival at Brooke's Point we were escorted to the home of Captain N.B. Mayor, Infantry (PA) (USAFFE) Acting Commanding Officer of Sector D of the Sixth Military District. Also at this point there was found a U.S. Army Coast Watcher Unit who put their communication facilities at our disposal. Submitted report to COMTASKFOR SEVENTY-ONE and then we were offered transport to an evacuation point about 5 miles inland. Here we received medical treatment using the facilities of the coast watchers and were afforded the best available food and lodging by Mr. T.H. Edwards, an American Citizen in business at Brook's Point before the war and now in evacuation.

— page 44 —
1944 - Received instructions from Commander Seventh Fleet to arrange details for rendezvous and evacuation.

August 27, 1944 - Conferred with Captain Mayor regarding the availability of transportation and cooperation of his forces in the evacuation plan.

August 28, 1944 - Submitted plan for rendezvous to Commander Seventh Fleet.

August 29, 1944 - Received Commander Seventh Fleet's approval of rendezvous plans and notification that REDFIN would be there on the 30th and again on the 31st if necessary.

August 30, 1944 - At 1330 a small Maru anchored near rendezvous and remained there. The security signal was not displayed because of his presence, but by 2000 the evacuees were all embarked in two small boats, one equipped with an outboard motor and voice radio equipment and towing the other. It was decided to attempt to establish radio contact with REDFIN before moving to seaward of the Maru, but attempts made between 2000 and 2200 were unsuccessful. It was then decided to head out to the southeastward, well clear of the Maru, and to again attempt radio or visual communications being careful to keep the light concealed from the Maru. At 2330 established radio communications with REDFIN but because of weak signal strength had to use CW instead of voice. At 0050 August 31, sighted REDFIN and reported aboard to the Commanding Officer at 0103.

F. M. Murphy
JOHN D. CROWLEY,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding Officer,
U.S.S. FLIER (SS250).

— page 46 —
1. LIER, commanded by Cdr. J. D. Crowley, left Fremantle, Western Australia on 2 August 1944 to conduct her second war patrol. Her area was east of Saigon, French Indo-China, and she was to pass through Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, the Celebes Sea, Sibutu Passage and the Sulu Sea in proceeding to her station. By evening of 13 August she had come through the Sulu Sea and was transiting Balabac Strait, south of Palawan, P. I. when, at 2200, disaster struck. Suddenly a terrific explosion, estimated to have been forward on the starboard side, shook the ship.

Several of the men on the bridge were injured, and the Commanding Officer was thrown to the after part of the bridge, where he regained his senses a moment later. Oil, water and debris deluged the bridge. There was a strong smell of fuel, a terrific venting of air through the conning tower hatch, and the sounds of flooding and of screaming men below. Lt. Liddell, the Executive Officer, had stepped below the hatch to speak to Cdr. Crowley; he was blown through it, and men poured out behind him. Within 20 or 30 seconds FLIER sank while still making 15 knots through the water. The Commanding Officer's opinion is that the explosion was caused by contact with a mine.

Those men who survived have stated that the following men were seen in the water after the ship went down: Crowley, J. D., Cdr.; Liddell, J. W., Jr., Lt.; Jacobson, A. E., Ens.; Howell, A. G., CRT; Tremaine, D. P., FCR3C; Miller, W. B., MoMM3C; Russo, J. D., QM3C; Baumgart, E.R., MoMM3C; Knapp, P., Lt.; Casey, J. E., Lt.; Reynolds, W. L., Lt. (jg); Mayer, P. S., Ens.; Pope, C. D., CGM; Madeo, G. F., F2c. Lt. (jg) Reynolds was wounded, as was Hudson, and when the word was passed for all survivors to gather together, they and Pope did

J. D. Crowley

— page 50 —
5510.1 U.S.S. REDFIN (SS272)
DATE: 15 JUN 53
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander Task Group SEVENTY-ONE POINT ONE.

Subject: Special Mission - Rescue of 8 Survivors from the U.S.S. FLIER and 9 other persons marooned at Sir John Brockes Point on Falawn Island.

1. About 2100 on 23 August while patrolling west of Falawn Island received instructions to proceed immediately to the Sulu Sea in the vicinity of Lat. 8-40N - Long.118-15E. I reported that I would arrive there at dawn on 28 August. I actually arrived there about noon 27 August. During the evening of 27 August I received instructions to patrol Central Sulu Sea awaiting further instructions for a Special Mission. 28 August was spent on the surface south of Tubbataha Reefs. At 0030 on 29 August received instructions to be at Lat.8-47N - Long.117-55E at sunset 30 August. I was at this time about 50 miles southeast of Tubbataha Reefs. The distance was too great for me to cover during darkness so returned and kept sight contact with Tubbataha Reefs during the day. At 1900 took departure and headed directly for Tagalino Island.

2. During the evening of 29 August received instructions to rendezvous with friendly boat party at 2000 on 30 August at Lat.8-47N - Long.117-55E. There I would pick up Commander John D. Crowley, U.S.N. and seven other survivors from the U.S.S. Flier. I was also authorized to evacuate a British Missionary, his wife and their two children. The security signal was to be three white lights in a vertical row shown from Brookes Point Lighthouse, which would mean the coast was clear for twenty miles each side. Code names were provided for the submarine, the Boat Party, the Rendezvous Point and for Brookes Point. Voice radio communication was to be on 4000 Kcs. The radio communication and the fact that we had a geographical reference points are the two factors that contributed most to the success of this rendezvous. I was also directed to give the Coast Watcher Party any arms and ammunition that I could spare. The receipt of these orders was acknowledged by the Redfin. Later instructions said that if unsuccessful the 30th that I should try the 31st and if still unsuccessful to report the fact.

3. There follows a chronological order of events up through the rescue and subsequent retirement from the coast.

0017 Made radar contact on Tagalino Island and commenced patrolling east of island.
0330 Commenced closing the coast of Falawn Island heading for Brookes Point and the rendezvous point.

— page 52 —
3/4" = 1' = 12''

U.S. S. REDFIN (SS272)
% Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

SS272/A16
Serial 001

SECRET
Subject: Special Mission - Rescue of 8 Survivors from the U.S.S. FLIER and 9 other persons marooned at Sir John Brookes Point on Palawan Island.

---

### 31 August 1944

0037 Found out that boat party was in a spot 5 miles 135 T from Brookes Point and they were in two small boats one equipped with an outboard motor.

0043 Sighted boats at range 5700 yards.

0053 Boat party sighted Redfin range 3000. Secured radio.

0100 Boat passed close aboard and I recognized the voice of Commander John D. Crowley, U.S.N.

0103 Flooded down and received two very crowded boats alongside.

Received the following passengers on board:
1. Comdr. John D. Crowley, #70079, U.S.N., Comdg. USS Flier.
2. Lieut. James W. Liddle, Jr., #85674, U.S.N., R.N., R

— page 53 —
33272/A16
Serial 0011
TOP-SECRET
Subject: Special Mission - Rescue of 8 Survivors from the U.S.S. FLIER and 9 other persons marooned at Sir John Brookes Point on Palawan Island.

Amunition:
- 45 cal. - 3000 rounds.
- 30 cal. - 20000 rounds.
- 30 cal. (carbin) 2800 rounds.

Writing paper; pencils; typewriter ribbons.

Three (3) bags of medical supplies, including all sulpha tablets and powder, atabrine and quinine.

Commissary supplies; flour, yeast, coffee, canned fruits, and vegetables.

Miscellaneous items:
- 200 cartons of cigarettes
- Playing cards
- Diesel oil
- Sulphuric acid
- Radio tubes
- Toilet paper
- Soap

I was quite surprised to see two members of the Coast Watcher Group which I had landed at Ramos Island on 8 June 1944 come on board with the boats crews and later to find out that all the radio equipment used by the boat party had been brought in on the Redfin.

0145 Made arrangements with Coast Watchers to capture any members of the Sea Truck who reach shore as I intended to shell it on my way out. They seem very elated over the prospects.

0151 Both boats very heavily loaded cleared the ship.

(4)

— page 55 —
1. U.S. S. REDFIN (SS272)
   : % Fleet Post Office
   : San Francisco, Calif.
   : 4 September 1944.

Special Mission - Rescue of 8 Survivors from the U.S.S. FLIER and 9 other persons marooned at Sir John Brookes Point on Palawan Island.

WATKINS, Charles O.

Watkins is a 3lo, U.S. Navy. He was a member of the ground forces of Fat Wing 10 stationed at OLYMPOCO. This station was evacuated early and he remained in the Manila area ending up with the Naval Coast Defense Battalion at Mariveles under the command of Commander Bridget, U.S.N. In March he was transferred to Fort Hughes in Manila Bay where he was surrendered to the Japs on May 6, 1942. After three days he was put on CORRECTED: OR, 10 trying days were spent there. Next stop was BILIBID PRISON, MANILA, then on to another prison camp in northern LUZON. From this camp he was forced to march, along with 1500 other prisoners, a distance of 20 kilometers in 8 hours to BINABAONG concentration camp. With 350 prisoners he was loaded on a freighter and sent to PUERTA PRINCESA camp on PALAWAN. On 12 August 1942 he escaped with Joel Paul Little, ordinance man third class, U.S. Navy who is now on PANAY. Watkins met Wigfield and Marquez in northern PALAWAN and shared their experiences arriving at Brookes Point in December 1943.

GARRETSON, Henry C.

Carreston is an American citizen who came to the Philippines in 1920 as a civil engineer for the Philippine Government. In 1930 he went in business for himself as a contractor and engineer at CEBU. The first month of the war he worked as a demolition engineer and also as a censor for the Army. He participated in the salvage work on the SS PANAY and helped in retrieving 400,000 rounds of .30 cal. ammunition; 5 three inch guns; 22 machine guns; 50 B.A.R.'s; 2,000 three inch shells, and much miscellaneous gear. When this work was abandoned he retreated to the mountains. In September 1942 he started south to obtain aid for our Guerrilla Forces on Panay and Negros. He got as far as Brookes Point, Palawan where he was taken ill with malaria. He remained in this vicinity aiding in the organization of the Philippine Constabulary force until evacuated.

KERSON, Vans Taivo

Kerson, age 44, is a citizen of the republic of Finland. He has traveled around the world and has been employed as a seaman, diver, engineer, and can easily be called a soldier of fortune. He was employed by the National Government of China for five years.

— page 58 —
1. Investigation of the circumstances connected with the loss of the U.S.S. Rotab and the loss of the U.S.S. Flier.

INDEX
| Page |
|------|
| 1    | Organization of the investigation. |
| 2    | Introduction of defendant. |
| 3    | Introduction of counsel for defendant. |
| 4    | Commanding officer's narrative read. |
| 5    | Adjournments. |
| 6    | Introduction of interested party. |
| 7    | Introduction of counsel for interested party. |
| 8    | Investigation finished. |

TESTIMONY
| Name of witness | : | Investigator | : | Interested Party |
|| :-: | | :-: | |
| J.D. Crowley, | : | 1,2,3,8,37,35 | : | 35,36 |
| cdr, usn | : | | | |
| Surviving officers | : | 3 | : | |
| and men of Flier | : | | | |
| R.W. Christie, | : | 1,2,4,5,6,7,9, | : | 142,43 |
| r.adm., usn | : | 10,11,12 | : | |
| J. W. Liddell, Jr, | : | 20,21,22 | : | 22 |
| lt, usnr | : | | | |
| A.B. Jacobson, | : | 14 | : | |
| ens, usnr | : | | | |
| A.C. Howell, | : | 17,18 | : | 17 |
| crt, usnr | : | | | |
| D.P. Tremaine, | : | 19 | : | |
| frcr2, usn | : | | | |
| W.B. Miller, | : | 15 | : | |
| mommc, usnr | : | | | |
| J.D. Russo, | : | 19 | : | |
| qmc, usnr | : | | | |
| F.R. Beaumart, | : | 16 | : | |
| mommc, usnr | : | | | |
| H.H. McLean, | : | 25,26,28 | : | 26,27,28 |
| cart, usnr | : | | | |
| M.J. Tichenor | : | 29,30,31,33,34 | : | 30,31,32 |
| cart, usn | : | | | |
| J.L.P. McCallum, | : | 24 | : | 24,25 |
| lt cdr, usn | : | | | |
| W.H. Kimbrough, | : | 23 | : | |
| lt, usnr | : | | | |
| G.W. Patterson, | : | 38,39 | : | |
| cart, usnr | : | | | |
| M.W. Shea, | : | 40,41 | : | |
| lt cdr, usn | : | | | |
| W.A. Kent, | : | 41,42 | : | |
| cdr, usn | : | | | |
| W.K. Laughen, | : | 20 | : | |
| lt cdr, usn | : | | | |

— page 59 —
1. Commencing officer's narrative. 2. Operation Order Number 100-44. 3. Operation Order Number 80-44. 4. Reckoning letter of U.S.S. Flier. 5. Reassured condition of U.S.S. Flier. 6. Reassured condition of U.S.S. Kobelio. 7.

— page 60 —
1. Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
To: Rear Admiral Freeland A. Daubin, U.S. Navy.

Subject: Investigation into loss of U.S.S. RABALO and U.S.S. FLIER.

1. Under authority of 5 U.S. Code 93 you are hereby detailed to investigate the circumstances connected with the loss of the U.S.S. RABALO and the loss of the U.S.S. FLIER.

2. In accordance with the provisions of the statute above mentioned, you are given authority to administer an oath to any witness attending to testify or depose during the course of the investigation.

3. You will make a thorough investigation into all the circumstances connected with the loss of the U.S.S. RABALO and the loss of the U.S.S. FLIER, and upon the completion of the investigation you will make a complete report to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, via the Commander, Seventh Fleet, of the facts which you deem to be established. You will further give your opinion as to whether any offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred.

4. Your attention is particularly invited to the applicable portions of section 725 and to section 734, Naval Courts and Boards.

5. The Commander, Seventh Fleet, is hereby directed to afford you such facilities as may be necessary to the proper conduct of the investigation and to furnish the necessary clerical assistance.

6. The classification of TOP SECRET is hereby assigned to all proceedings and reports incident to the investigation herein ordered.

E. J. KING,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
and
Chief of Naval Operations

— page 61 —
1. That the U.S.S. Flier, in accordance with Task Force Seventy-One Operation Order Number 100-44, "Exhibit 1", departed Fremantle 2 August 1944 to proceed to war areas stopping at Exmouth Gulf for fuel and thence proceeding via Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, Sibutu Passage and Balabac Strait.

2. That prior to departure, the Operation Order and the annexes thereto were explained to the commanding officer by the Operations Officer, his assistant, and the Intelligence Officer, and that he was thoroughly briefed by these officers, and finally by Commander Task Force Seventy-One, and was given all available information concerning the enemy and enemy minefields.

3. That the Operation Order, with the annexes, issued to Flier, contained all available information.

4. That the organization of the Operations Office of Commander Task Force Seventy-One, and the method of briefing commanding officers of submarines is exceedingly thorough and excellent in all respects.

5. That prior to departure from Fremantle, Flier had had a normal refit, had been ranged to determine her degaussed condition, and materially, was ready for patrol in all respects.

6. That the Flier, after her refit, had been given the customary training in approaches and fire control under the supervision of Captain George W. Patterson, Junior, U.S. Navy. Her crew consisted of eight officers and seventy-seven enlisted men, total of eighty-five. The commanding officer, Commander J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, was an experienced submarine commander. The other officers and enlisted personnel were well trained and qualified in all respects to take a submarine on war patrol.

7. That in working up the reekoning of the U.S.S. Flier, none of the ship's records or charts were available, having been lost with the ship. All information pertaining to fixes, and times, are approximate only, having been supplied by the commanding officer, the navigator, and other ship's personnel from memory.

8. That on 13 August the Flier passed Bancoran Island to port on course 270° True, and at 1540 intercepted the steamer route through Balabac Strait, Nasubat Channel, and changed course to 254° True to follow this route. A slight northerly set was noted and 256° True was steered to follow this steamer route.

9. That the Flier's Operation Order in paragraph (ix) (3) stated: "Stay clear of readily mineable waters in the vicinity of the Sulu Archipelago and Balabac Strait. Use deepest water routes in transitting Sibutu, Balabac, or Mindoro Straits".

10. That the phrase, "deepest water routes", was explained by the Operations Officer to mean the Nasubat Channel, as this is the deepest water route through Balabac Strait.

— page 62 —
11. That forty transits of Balabac Strait have been made and those of recent dates are as follows:

10 February 1944---Crevalle
13 February 1944---Tinosa
17 February 1944---Puffer
18 February 1944---Ray
24 February 1944---Blueth
25 February 1944---Bonefish
26 March 1944---Blueth
19 April 1944---Crevalle
22 April 1944---Kotalo
8 May 1944---Crevalle
10 July 1944---Lapon

12. That in the intelligence annex to the Operation Order, and with the Operation Plan, all available information concerning Japanese mines and mining operations were given. This information has been studied by the investigating officer, but cannot be made a part of this record on account of its classification. The deep water route through Balabac Strait, Nasubata Channel, was considered the safest; and the Crevalle's Track in her transit through Nasubata Channel on 8 May was given. This track is shown on U.S.C. & G.S.C. Chart Number 4326, enclosure (C) to "Exhibit 3". There is also shown on this chart the track of the Lapon which transitted Nasubata Channel on 10 June 1944. The track of the Lapon was not available to the Operations Officer until 24 August 1944, which date was subsequent to the sailing of the Filer.

13. That on the night of 13 August 1944, the Filer had all underway stations fully manned. The watch was alert. No ships or planes were sighted by the lookouts. The commanding officer was at the con on the bridge, and the navigator was in the conning tower. The proper charts were in use. The course through Nasubata Channel had been plotted on the chart, also the course of the Crevalle through the channel. The Coast Pilot and Tide Tables had been studied. Radar bearings and soundings were being taken at frequent intervals and were being plotted. Listening gear was manned. Nothing was heard. Speed was seventeen knots, four engines, auxiliary engine carrying the auxiliary load, with a zero float on the battery.

14. That on the night of 13 August 1944, during the transit of the Filer through Nasubata Channel, the sky was overcast, there was no moon, visibility was about eight thousand yards, practically no wind, and the sea was calm. A slight set to the northward, indicating a current of less than a knot, had been noted by the navigator in his approach to the channel.

15. That a terrestrial fix at 1800 on landmarks on Palawan and Balabac Island was obtained. Last position was determined by radar ranges. Last sounding was forty-one fathoms. This last position is shown at 2200 on U.S.C. & G.S. Chart Number 4326, enclosure (C) to "Exhibit 3".

16. That Filer's fix at 2200, just prior to the explosion and her sinking was about eight hundred yards to the southward of the Crevalle's Track, which track lay in water of over one hundred fathoms. This fix was also about eight hundred yards

— page 63 —
17. That, navigationally, the course being followed by the Flier through Nausbate Channel was a safe track. Insofar as danger from Japanese minefields was concerned, the Flier's Track was between the track used by the Creville on 8 May 1944 and that used by the Leapon on 10 June 1944.

18. That shortly after 2200 there was a terrific explosion from an outboard source, apparently on the starboard side, and the Flier took a down angle by the bow and sank within a matter of seconds. This position is latitude 70-58'-30" South, longitude 1170-13'-40" East.

19. That after the Flier sank, fifteen of the ship's company were accounted for in the water:

- Commander John D. Crowley, U.S. Navy.
- Lieutenant James W. Liddell, junior, U.S. Naval Reserve.
- Ensign Alvin E. Jacobson, U.S. Naval Reserve.
- Lieutenant J. E. Casey, U.S. Navy.
- Lieutenant Paul Knapp, U.S. Navy.
- Lieutenant (junior grade) W. I. Reynolds, U.S. Naval Reserve.
- Ensign Phillip S. Mayer, U.S. Naval Reserve.
- Howell, A. G., CMT, U.S. Naval Reserve.
- Tremaine, D. P., FCR2c, U.S. Navy.
- Miller, W. B., MCM3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.
- Russo, J. D., CM3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.
- Baumgart, E. A., MCM3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.
- Hudson, H. W., CMOM, U.S. Navy.
- Pope, C. D., CGM, U.S. Navy.
- Madoo, G. F., F2c, U.S. Naval Reserve.

20. That during the night of 13 - 14 August, while attempting to make their way to land, the following disappeared and are believed lost:

- Lieutenant Paul Knapp, U.S. Navy.
- Lieutenant J. E. Casey, U.S. Navy.
- Lieutenant (junior grade) W. I. Reynolds, U.S. Naval Reserve.
- Ensign Phillip S. Mayer, U.S. Naval Reserve.
- Hudson, H. W., CMOM, U.S. Navy.
- Pope, C. D., CGM, U.S. Navy.
- Madoo, G. F. F2c, U.S. Naval Reserve.

21. That, on 14 August at about 1530, and various times thereafter on the same afternoon, the eight survivors reached shore on the eastern end of Mantangule Island, a distance of about fifteen miles from the spot where the Flier sank. All of them had been in the water for a period of over seventeen hours. On 23 August the survivors finally arrived at Brooke's Point and, through a coast watcher's unit, made radio contact with the Commander Task Force Seventy-One and were picked up by the U.S.S. Redfin on 31 August 1944.

— page 64 —
22. That at Cape Bulikuyan on Jelawan Island Commander Crowley encountered Sergeant Pasqual de la Cruz, Philippine Army, U.S.A.F.T.E., who had just returned from a reconnaissance trip to Balabac Island and he gave Commander Crowley information concerning the Robalo.

: 23. That the explosion which sank the Flier came from an underwater outside source. It did not come from an enemy surface vessel, or plane, since none were sighted or heard. The ship was rocked by the force of the explosion and there was a great rush of air from the conning tower followed by debris, a geyser of water, and a strong smell of oil.

: 24. It cannot be stated whether the Flier was sunk by an enemy mine or torpedo. Giving credence to intelligence reports that enemy minefields had been laid north of Makassar Island, and the fact that the Flier was in mineable waters—about forty-one fathoms—when the explosion occurred, and finally the fact that the survivors were in the water in the near vicinity until late afternoon of the next day, and saw no enemy at the time of the explosion, or enemy searchers later in the area, much weight must be given to the opinion that it was a mine, anchored or drifting, and that the sinking of the Flier, at this time, was unknown to the enemy. As for a torpedo sinking the Flier, this is discounted since the bridge watch or the S.O. radar picked up nothing, and the enemy submarine, if surfaced, would have had to have been within a few thousand yards of the Flier.

: 25. That, according to all available intelligence information, the Japanese use only contact mines. Minefields laid in areas subject to rough seas or currents will not normally endure for periods longer than six months. Japanese mines have been found adrift in the vicinity of the Sulu Archipelago.

: 26. That the U.S.S. Robalo, in accordance with Task Force Seventy-One Operation Order Number 80-44, "Exhibit 2", departed Fremantle 22 June 1944 to patrol the South China Sea and approaches to the Gulf of Siam south of latitude 90 North and west of longitude 125 East. This was changed on 16 July 1944 to the area west of longitude 108 East until Ray's departure from the area. Robalo was directed to fuel at Exmouth Gulf, thence proceed via Lonbok Strait, Makassar Strait, Sibutu Passage, Balabac Strait, and South of Dangerous Ground.

: 27. That, prior to departure, the Operation Order and the annexes were explained to the commanding officer by the Operations Officer, his assistant, and the Intelligence Officer, and that he was thoroughly briefed by these officers, and finally by Commander Task Force Seventy-One, and was given all available information concerning the enemy and enemy minefields.

: 28. That, prior to departure from Fremantle, Robalo had had a normal refit, had been ranged to determine her degaussing condition, and materially was ready for patrol in all respects.

: 29. That the Robalo, after her refit, had been given the customary training in approaches and fire control under the supervision of Commander Willis A. Lent, U.S. Navy. Her crew

— page 65 —
30. That Robalo's Operation order, in paragraph (x) (4) stated, "Stay clear of readily amenable waters in the vicinity of the Sulu Archipelago and Balabac Strait. Use deepest water routes in transitting Sibutu Passage or Balabac Strait", and that in the intelligence annex, the route followed by the Crevalle through Balabac Strait--Nasubata Channel--was given.

31. That Fact Number 11 applies to the transitting of Nasubata Channel in the case of the Robalo.

32. That on 2 July 1944 Robalo reported her 0800 How position as 30-29 North and 1190-26 East, and that she had sighted one enemy battleship and two destroyer escorts which had gotten by her.

33. That this position reported by Robalo is her last known position.

34. That from this position at 0800 How, 2 July, she could have transited Balabac Strait--Nasubata Channel--the night of 3 - 4 July 1944.

35. That on 11 August 1944, and thereafter, unsuccessful attempts were made to communicate with the Robalo.

36. That it cannot be stated how the Robalo was lost. After reporting the enemy battleship and two destroyer escorts on 2 July, she may have been DF'd and sunk by enemy surface forces or planes. There are well formed rumors that survivors from the Robalo were taken by the enemy on Balabac Island. The Robalo could have transited Balabac Strait--Nasubata Channel--on the night of 3 - 4 July, and could have been sunk by a mine while transitting this channel.

37. That, referring to paragraph 22 of the Finding of Facts, Sergeant Pasqual de la Cruz gave the following information which, while not factual, is the best obtainable:

(a) Robalo sank on 3 July 1944 as the result of an explosion in the forward battery compartment.
(b) The reported position of the Robalo was forty miles west of Balabac Island.
(c) There were four survivors of the Robalo who were found by the Japanese on Comiran Island and taken prisoner.
(d) Of the four prisoners, one was the commanding officer, one was Ensign Samuel L. Tucker, U.S. Naval Reserve, and one was Martin, Wallace K., signalman third class, U.S. Naval Reserve, and the identity of the fourth was not known.
(e) The commanding officer and the unidentified prisoner were shot, either deliberately or while trying to escape.

— page 66 —
1. Ensign S. I. Tucker and "quartermaster" Martin survived and are war prisoners at Puerto Princess, Palawan.
(g) Sergeant de la Cruz also told Commander Crowley that the Robalo had deported Fort Marwin on a date late in June, a fact which he had no means of knowing, unless he had learned this from the Japanese or from the survivors of the Robalo. This gives credence to his story, as does also the fact that he had the names of two of the crew, namely, Ensign Tucker and "quartermaster" Martin.

OPTION:
1. That the Operation Orders for the U.S.S. Flier and for the U.S.S. Robalo, prepared by Commander Task Force Seventy-One, contained complete directives and information for the routing of the submarines to their respective patrol areas.
2. That from all available intelligence information the routing of these submarines through Balaac Strait—Nasubata Channel—was the safest route.
3. That in the loss of the U.S.S. Flier and the U.S.S. Robalo, no blame was incurred by the interested party, Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy, Commander Task Force Seventy-One, or any member of his staff.
4. That in the loss of the U.S.S. Flier, no blame was incurred by the defendant, Commander J. L. Crowley, U.S. Navy, the commanding officer, or any member of the Flier's crew.
5. That in the loss of the U.S.S. Robalo, there is no evidence of any blame that can be ascribed to the commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Manning M. Kimmel, U.S. Navy, or to any member of the crew of the U.S.S. Robalo.
6. That the loss of the U.S.S. Flier, while transiting Nasubata Channel, must be ascribed to the hazards of war.
7. That the loss of the U.S.S. Robalo, in a position unknown, must be ascribed to the hazards of war.

— page 67 —
1. The investigation began at 1405.
2. The investigating officer, Rear Admiral Freeland A. Daubin, U.S. Navy, administered the prescribed oath to Cecil Ireland McCormick, chief yeoman, U.S. Navy, the reporter, who took seat as such.
3. The investigating officer read the order directing him to make the investigation and which is hereto prefixed.
4. The investigating officer announced that the investigation would be conducted with closed doors.
5. A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:
   - Exclaimed by the investigating officer:
     - "I, [NAME], state your name, rank, and present station."
     - "John D. Crowley, Commander, U.S. Navy, at present attached to the staff of Commander Task Force Seventy-One."
     - "I have been detailed to investigate the circumstances connected with the loss of the U.S.S. Hobalo and the U.S.S. Flier. Here you the Commanding Officer of the United States ship Flier when she was lost."
     - "I was,"
     - "The investigating officer informed the witness that he would be a defendant in this case and that the evidence before the investigation might, since admitted under oath, be used at any time against him and that he had the right for counsel."
     - "The defendant requested that Commander Charles H. Andrews, U.S. Navy, act as his counsel. Commander Andrews took seat as counsel for the defendant."
     - "The investigating officer appointed Lieutenant Commander Willard R. Laughon, U.S. Navy, to work up the reckoning of the U.S.S. Flier from what available information there was from the time she sailed from Fremantle, Western Australia, until she was lost."
     - "A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:"
     - "Exclaimed by the investigating officer:"
       - "I, [NAME], state your name, rank, and present station."

-1-

— page 68 —
1. R. W. Christie, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Commander
   2. U.S. Navy, Commander Task Force Seventy-One.
   3. Here the pilot and the radio operating under your
   4. They were.
   5. Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy, informed the investigating officer that he had an interest in the subject matter of
   6. The investigation officer informed the pilot that the radio operator at the time they were lost. He requested that he be allowed to be
   7. The pilot requested the course of the investigation, examine witnesses, and introduce new matter pertinent to the investigation in the same manner as a defendant.
   8. The request of Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy, was
   9. The investigating officer informed the interested party that the evidence before the investigation might, since admitted under oath, be used at any time against him and that he had the right for counsel.
  10. The interested party requested that Captain George W. Patterson, U.S. Navy, act as his counsel. Captain Patterson took seat as counsel for the interested party.
   11. Commander J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, defendant, was recalled as a witness by the investigating officer, and was informed of his privilege not to testify, if he so desired. The defendant waived this privilege and was then advised that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.
   12. Examined by the investigating officer:
   13. 1. Commander Crowley, you have the narrative of the loss of the filer?
   14. A. Yes, sir, I have the narrative. Here it is.
   15. The copy of the commanding officer's narrative was submitted to the defendant and to the interested party, and by the investigation officer offered in evidence. There being no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit A".
   16. The following surviving officers and members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier were assembled and duly sworn and the narrative of the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Flier of the disaster was read to them by the commanding officer in the presence of the investigating officer and the interested party:
   17. Lieutenant James W. Liddell, junior, U.S. Naval Reserve.
   18. Ensign Alvin E. Jacobson, U.S. Naval Reserve.
   19. Arthur C. Howell, CRT, U.S. Naval Reserve.
   20. Donald P. Tremaine, PGR2c, U.S. Navy.
   21. Wesley B. Miller, HOM3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.
   22. James D. Russo, M3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.
   23. Earl R. Baumgart, HOM3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.

— page 69 —
2. Is the narrative just read to the court a true statement of the loss of the United States ship Flier?

A. Yes, sir.

3. Have you any complaint to make against any of the surviving officers and crew of the said ship on that occasion?

A. No, sir.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and resumed his status as a defendant.

Examination of the surviving officers and members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Have you any objection to make in regard to the narrative just read to the court, or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the loss of the United States ship Flier?

None of the surviving officers and members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier had any objection to the narrative in its present form or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the loss of the U.S.S. Flier.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine these surviving members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine these surviving members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier.

The investigating officer informed the surviving members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier that they were privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which they thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out in the commanding officer's narrative.

The surviving members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier stated they had nothing further to say.

The surviving members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier were duly warned and withdrew.

— page 70 —
1. Admiral, did you issue and sign the Operation Order for the U.S.S. Flier?
2. A. I did. Here it is, Operation Order 100-44 of 31 July 1944.
Operation Order Number 100-44 was submitted to the defendant and to the court and by the investigating officer offered in evidence. There being no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit 1".
3. 2. Did you also issue and sign the Operation Order for the Robalo?
A. I did. Here it is, Operation Order 80-44 of 20 June 1944.
Operation Order Number 80-44 was submitted to the court and by the investigating officer offered in evidence. There being no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit 2".
3. 3. Can you state what date the Flier and what date the Robalo sailed?
A. The Flier departed Fremantle at 1500 How August 2, 1944. Robalo departed Fremantle June 22, 1944.
4. 4. On what date do you assume that the Robalo was lost?
A. A message was received from U.S.S. Robalo by the Headquarters of Commander Task Force Seventy-one on 2 July. In that message she reported her position as follows: At 0800 How latitude 03-29 N., longitude 119-26 E. In that message she reported the information that one enemy battleship, two destroyer escorts and an aircraft carrier had gotten by her. No further information has been received from the Robalo despite our repeated attempts to establish communication. For three successive days beginning 11 August Robalo was asked to report her position. No answer has been received. The Robalo should normally have returned to Fremantle on or about 14 August.
5. 5. Is it your assumption that she was lost soon after the 2nd of July, the date she last reported her position?
A. I estimate that the Robalo met with a disaster sometime shortly after her radio transmission on the 2nd of July.

— page 71 —
3. In the Operation Order for the Flier, how was she routed to her area--by what channels?

A. Flier was directed to depart [Xenarth] and proceed to [Xenarth Gulf via Bombing Restriction Lane]. Thence proceed via [Lombok Strait, Lakassar Strait, Sibutu Passage and Belabe Strait to patrol Areas 301 and 302 in accordance with the schedule given in detail in the Operation Order. She was further directed to start passage at dark on the 11th of September and to proceed to [Xenarth via Mindoro Strait, Sibutu Passage, Lakassar Strait and Lombok Strait. She was further directed to stay clear of readily mineable waters in the vicinity of the Sulu Archipelago and Balabac Strait and to use deepest water routes in transiting Sibutu, Balabac or Mindoro Strait. She was further authorized to return via [Karinata Strait, Java Sea and Lombok Strait, if deemed more feasible and in such case to advise the Commander Task Group Seventy-One point One.

7. A. Admiral, has it been your practice when a submarine sails, after you have approved and signed the Operation Order, to personally brief the commanding officer? If so, will you tell in general how you brief them?

A. It is my general custom to interview the commanding officer just before his departure in order to discuss the proposed patrol and to emphasize certain features of importance on methods and policies and in connection with the existing tactical situation. I always make a point of insuring that the commanding officer is satisfied with the material condition of his ship after the refit and that he is satisfied with the officer and enlisted personnel assigned to the ship and with the state of training. It has been my practice to emphasize the risk of enemy submarines from the time of departure and during the return passage south of the carrier because of the natural let down in vigilance with transiting these relatively peaceful waters. During this briefing, there is usually a free discussion of such things as the use of the 3D radar, torpedo depth settings, the advisability of gun actions and such matters.

8. Q. In the case of the Robelo and Flier, did you follow your usual practice and brief the commanding officer of each of these ships?

A. I did.

9. Q. You stated that the route for the Flier was through [Balabac Strait]. Have you made it a practice to route submarines through that Strait?

A. Submarines are routed to various patrol areas with the following considerations in mind: (a) shortest distance and time to area; (b) separation of submarines; (c) diversification of routes; (d) enemy opposition; (e) phases of the moon; (f) exploitation of traffic en route. We endeavor to insure that no one route becomes a "Beaten Path". If two or more depart at about the same time, we choose the routes to separate them in time and place to avoid the consequence of petrol vessels or planes being alerted by an attack, a sighting or a DF fix. Submarines are operated in groups only in open sea areas. Since I took command

— page 72 —
10 February 1944---Greville
: 13 February 1944---Tinosa
: 17 February 1944---uffer
: 18 February 1944---Ray
: 24 February 1944---Luefish
: 25 February 1944---Bonefish
: 19 April 1944---Greville
: 22 April 1944---Robelo
: 8 May 1944---Greville
: 10 July 1944---Lapon

On 7 June 1944, Redfin executed a special mission taking her well into shallow water in North Balabac Strait. In the Intelligence Annex to the respective Operation Orders given Robelo and Filer there is to be found the following: "Mines and underwater obstructions have apparently been laid in Balabac Strait north of Mangsee Island". Subsequent to the completion of the above operations, the U.S.A. Greville transitted Balabac Strait using the following route: initial point (05-02.5N, 117-20.0E), then course 840 distance 7.5 miles to (07-58.0N, 117-11.2E), then course 824 distance 8.35 miles to (07-58.0N, 117-11.2E), then course 824,50 distance 5.50 miles to (07-50.5N, 117-07.0E), then course 184.00 distance 5.25 miles to (07-45.25N, 117-00.0E), then course 2300 to clear Strait. Robelo was routed to the Anambas Islands via Balabac instead of Karimata to have him available in the Makassar-Celebes Sea area in support of the Noemfoor Island operation. Filer was routed to French Indo China for the following reasons: (a) Karimata was congested at the time with the Greville and Lapon southbound and the Ray northbound; (b) probability of better hunting against the enemy in Makassar Strait at that time; (c) to separate Muskolung and Filer who left port on the same date for mutual training. One was routed through Balabac

— page 73 —
10. Q. Was the Flier given all the information regarding enemy mines that you had available?

A. Yes.

11. Q. Will you please state what relative enemy hazards exist insofar as submarine operations are concerned?

A. I consider the greatest danger from the enemy to our submarines to be, in order of importance: (1) submarine torpedoes; (2) depth charges; (3) aircraft bombs; (4) mines, either drifting or in a field; (5) nets and other obstructions.

12. Q. In your opinion, how was the Robalo lost?

A. Intense enemy activity in Makassar Strait in early July leads me to believe that the Robalo may have been successfully hunted down by enemy anti-submarine aircraft and surface vessels shortly after his radio transmission, but as it has been rumored that survivors from the Robalo have been taken by the enemy in the sea, then it seems likely to me that the Robalo was destroyed in some of the chemical shells of Balabac Strait and possibly by contact with a mine, either anchored or drifting. There has been a very considerable amount of evidence about drifting mines particularly in the vicinity of Balabac and the Balu Archipelago.

13. Q. You heard the narrative concerning the loss of the Flier. In your opinion, how was the Flier lost?

A. It seems to me that the evidence indicates that the Flier was destroyed by an explosion from outside, either a torpedo, an anchored mine or a drifting mine.

14. Q. Have you any other information at this time that is pertinent in regard to the loss of the Robalo and the Flier?

A. We have always been faced with the possibility that the enemy would succeed in closing to us some of the various passages in the HBI and Philippine area. We have always realized that he would make every attempt within his power to prevent the United States submarines proceeding from the bases which he knew existed in Australia to the areas where they could intercept his traffic. Such opposition we thought could take the form of Sono-Buoy, radar detection devices both ashore and in ships and airplanes, patrol vessels of all types, aircraft, mines, nets and cables. We have considered that Soenda, Alas, Balabac, Alice Channel, Karimete, Surigao, San Bernardino and Basilan were mineable, and Lombok, Sibutu, Mindoro, Balabac and Makassar were heavily patrolled by surface vessels. Sibutu, Mindoro, Makassar and Molukka were heavily patrolled by planes intermittently. Due to the depth of water, current and width, we have considered Omba, Lombok, Timor Sea, Mindoro, Makassar,

— page 77 —
9. Was the chart in use the largest scale chart of the channel and island?

A. Yes, sir. U.S.C. & G.S. chart number 4326 was being used to navigate the vessel.

10. Q. Was that chart corrected up to date?

A. Yes, sir, to the best of my knowledge.

11. Q. Had you and the navigator studied the Sailing Directions?

A. Yes, sir.

12. Q. What was the depth of the water in the approximate position where the Filer sunk?

A. The soundings prior to the very last one before the disaster were running between sixty-five and ninety fathoms. The last sounding obtained was forty-one fathoms. Immediately upon getting this sounding, I called the navigator under the hatch to discuss a course change to bring us into deeper water. I interrupted this discussion to call for another sounding to verify the last one received. It was at this time that the explosion occurred.

13. Q. Were you steering by gyro compass?

A. Yes, sir, we were steering by the master gyro, checking with the auxiliary gyro and the armored vehicle type magnetic compass.

14. Q. What was the error of the master gyro?

A. I don't remember exactly but throughout the entire trip the error of the master gyro was essentially zero. The auxiliary gyro was also checked continuously within about one degree of the master.

15. Q. When was the last azimuth taken?

A. I would like to refer to the navigator for that. I believe it was the foresoon of the day of the disaster.

16. Q. Do you know whether or not you had been sighted by any enemy vessels or planes prior to entering the Straits?

A. We ran on the surface throughout the entire day of 13 August. A continuous periscope watch in addition to the regularly assigned lookouts was maintained, and no surface craft were sighted by us. I consider it highly improbable that we could have been sighted by a surface craft under these circumstances without our seeing him. No aircraft were sighted although at about 1400 we had an SD radar contact at eighteen.

— page 78 —
17. At the time of the sinking of the vessel and during the long period the survivors were in the water, and during and until the time you contacted friendly forces, have you anything to say regarding the conduct of the surviving officers and men?

A. The time of the actual sinking was so short that I was unable to make any observations during this period. After the survivors were in the water and throughout the entire period until we were picked up by friendly forces, the sound advice accorded me and the superb qualities of leadership exhibited by Lieutenant Liddell constituted an inspiration to all hands. The conduct of Ensign Jacobson, Howell and Russo as exemplary. The conduct of the remaining survivors was satisfactory throughout.

Cross-examined by the interested party:

18. You are a submarine captain of long experience, do you consider that an enemy submarine could have fired torpedoes at Filer without being detected either before or after firing?

A. I have implicit trust in the ability of our 87 radar equipment, and the operator stationed at the time of our transitting Helabac, to pick up a target the size of a surfaced submarine, with the possible exception of a midget submarine, at a minimum range of six thousand yards. Unless the enemy has more effective night periscopes than we have, I consider a submerged attack impracticable in the visibility conditions existing. No radar contact except land targets was made. Nothing except land was sighted and throughout the period we remained in the water, several hours of which I feel were in close vicinity of the sinking, nothing was sighted. For these reasons it is my opinion that it is highly improbable that an attack was launched from a submarine.

19. Evidence indicates that Rasubata Channel can be traversed with the least depth of one hundred fathoms for a width of one mile. Why was the Filer in a lesser depth?

A. The problems facing the commanding officer of a submarine in transitting a channel of this sort are as follows: (1) the problem of safe navigation; (2) the problem of maintaining sea room in event of a contact with a surface patrol; (3) the problem of passive measures such as anchored or floating mines, in the case of Rasubata Channel, Roughton Island to north has extensive reefs extending on the channel side of the island. A combination of the navigational problem together with that of maintaining sea room in case of contact with a surface patrol craft indicated to me the advisability of running as far south as possible in good water. It was my intention not to get into

— page 80 —
1. The investigation began at 9:40.

Present:
Rear Admiral Freeland A. Dembitz, U.S. Navy, the investigating officer;
Cecil Leiland McCormick, chief yeoman, U.S. Navy, reporter;
The defendant, Commander J. P. Crowley, U.S. Navy, and his counsel;
The interested party, Rear Admiral K. W. Christie, U.S. Navy, and his counsel.

The record of proceedings of the first day of the investigation was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the investigation were present.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:
1. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. Alvin E. Jacobson, Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve, stationed on the U.S.S. Flier.
2. What was your station on the night of 13 August?
A. At nine o'clock I went on watch as JOD, stationed on the after cigarette deck. At the same time, the other JOD was there so I was on the starboard side of the cigarette deck. That was my station until I was swimming.
3. Before you went on watch, had you accustomed your eyes to the duties of a night lookout?
A. Yes, sir, for thirty-five minutes.
4. What, approximately, was the visibility at the time you were on watch?
A. The visibility was fairly good. You could see as far as the land. It was cloudy. As far as I remember it was good.
5. Did you sight any ship or any suspicious object in the water during the time you were on watch?
A. No, sir. I sighted nothing except land.
6. What do you think was the cause of the loss of the Flier?
A. I believe it was a mine that hit the starboard side around the officer's country somewhere below the surface.
The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

— page 81 —
1. The parties to the investigation desired further to examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. State your name, rate, and present station.

A. Wesley Bruce Hiller, motor machinist's mate third class, U.S.N.R. I don't know what my present station is.

2. On the night of 13 August what was your station on the Flier?

A. Forward port lookout.

3. Before you went on watch had your eyes been night adapted?

A. Yes, sir.

4. For how long a time?

A. For about twenty minutes.

5. What was the visibility conditions?

A. Well, I could see land at eight thousand yards but it was very poor. The sky was overcast. No stars out. It was cloudy and dark.

6. During the time that you were on watch did you see any ship or any suspicious object in the water?

A. No, sir, I saw nothing in the water. I could see a light on the beach. There was a lighthouse there but nothing in the water.

Cross-examined by the defendant:

7. Was it a light or a lighthouse you saw?

A. I couldn't say. It was very dim. It was where the lighthouse was and I imagine it was a lighthouse.

— page 82 —
1. The parties to the investigation desired further to examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous question.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. State your name, rate, and present station.

A. Earl Raymond Baumgart, motor machinist's mate: third class, attached to the U.S.S. Flier.

2. On the night of 13 August, what were your duties on the Flier?

A. After starboard lookout.

3. Before going on watch had your eyes been night adapted?

A. Yes, sir.

4. How long?

A. For a half hour.

5. What was the visibility?

A. It was very overcast. It wasn't too visible.

6. Could you see land?

A. Yes, sir, I could with binoculars.

7. During the time you were on watch did you at any time see any ship or suspicious object in the water?

A. No, sir, none at all.

8. Did you see any light ashore?

A. No, sir, I did not see any light.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine this witness.

— page 83 —
1. The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-inquiry.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. State your name, rate, and present station.

A. A. G. Howell, chief radio technician, U.S. Naval Reserve, U.S.S. Flier.

2. On the night of 13 August, before the Flier was lost, what was your station?

A. I was operating the radar for navigational purposes.

3. How long had you been operating it?

A. I believe an hour or more. I couldn't tell the exact hour. When we began to get in reach of the islands and needed navigation.

4. What contacts did you make?

A. We had contact with the lighthouse on the port. We had reefs or small islands on the starboard. We had Balabac ahead. We had small island on the port bow just beginning to come in. On the starboard side, quite a distance away, we had land coming in. That is all I can recall.

5. Had you made any ship contacts?

A. We had made no ship contacts.

6. Did you give all this radar information to the navigator?

A. The information was continuously going to the navigator and to the bridge.

7. Was the radar operating efficiently?

A. The radar was operating as good as it has ever worked and it was in very good condition.

Cross-examined by the interested party:

8. During the time you were operating the radar before the

— page 84 —
10. You had obtained a bearing and range of the large ship on the port bow?

A. If you mean the lighthouse, yes. I believe we were going 2540 True and it was about 280° relative just forward of the port beam at a range of five to seven thousand yards as near as I can recall.

Cross-examined by the defendant:

11. You had relatively close land on both sides, do you recall which was closer?

A. Yes, sir, on the starboard side it was about two thousand yards closer.

12. When the close radar contacts were first made, how were they verified as being land contacts?

A. From the general conporation and also checking with the navigator. I gave bearings on three or four different places and gave the tangents. With the tangents we gave and some sounding, we located where we were. We were exactly where we should be according to radar.

13. Do you recall furnishing information to the radar tracking party to check the speed of any of these contacts?

A. Yes, sir. As I recall there was one you wanted specifically checked on and the radar tracking party said it had no speed. It was the lighthouse we were checking on.

14. Do you recall the last radar range?

A. It was between five and seven thousand yards. I believe it was between fourteen and eighteen thousand to the land dead ahead of us.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to further examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

— page 85 —
1. The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was advised that the oath previously taken by him was still binding, and declared as follows:

1. Q. State your name, rate, and present station.

A. James D. Russo, quartermaster third class, U.S. Naval Reserve, attached to the U.S.S. Flier.

2. Q. What were your duties aboard the U.S.S. Flier on the night of 13 August?

A. I was recording the cuts they were making on the various landfalls by the radar. I was in the conning tower.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine this witness.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine this witness.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The

— page 86 —
1. The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous question.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The investigating officer, the reporter, the defendant and his counsel, and the interested party and his counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the trial were present.

Lieutenant Commander Hilgard, laughon, U.S. Navy, the officer appointed by the investigating officer to work up the reckoning, submitted to the court and by the investigating officer offered in evidence a letter and charts showing the position of the U.S.S. Filer from 1500, 13 August 1944, until the time she was lost, the accuracy of which he took an oath. There being no objection it was so received and marked "Exhibit 3". The investigating officer read the letter to the court.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out.

The witness stated that he had nothing to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was advised that the oath previously taken by him was still binding, and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. J. W. Liddell, junior, lieutenant, D-V(O), U.S. Naval Reserve, U.S.S. Filer.

2. On 13 August what fixes did you obtain from 1500 on and by what means?

A. Terrestrial on the peaks of Palawan Island at approximately

— page 87 —
1800. Made a landfall on the peaks of Balabac Island just prior to sunset and obtained another fix at this time. At 1930 made radar contact with Balabac Island and commenced getting radar fixes using Palawan and Balabac Islands at approximately ten minute intervals. As Nasubata Channel was approached and just when the other islands began to come in on radar fixes were obtained at shorter intervals.

5. Did your fixes show any set?

A. The fixes indicated a slight set to the northward. However, it was practically negligible.

4. What was your compass error?

A. An azimuth obtained late in the afternoon indicated the compass error to be .2 west.

5. How did soundings check with fix.5 by the fathometer?

A. The soundings verified the position of fixes.

6. Did you have the Crevalle Track which was mentioned in your Operation Order laid down on your chart?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Were you endeavoring to follow this track?

A. During the early part of the passage it was intended to stay a little south of the track to further clear rough water. From a point off Comiran Island it was intended to follow the track of the Crevalle.

8. How far out?

A. I would say about one and one-half miles.

9. Were you endeavoring to stay outside the one hundred fathom curve?

A. During the early stages of the approach of Nasubata Channel the track laid down took the vessel inside of the one hundred fathom curve.

10. At what time were you inside the one hundred fathom curve as you remember?

A. I would say we crossed the one hundred fathom curve at about 1830.

11. It is noted from the chart that you were south of the Crevalle Track and the Crevalle Track through the channel lay in water one hundred fathoms or over. At what time did you intend to meet the Crevalle Track and follow that track through the channel?

A. When the Flier was north of Comiran Island.

— page 88 —
12. How often were you taking soundings?
A. Nearly continuously.
13. How often were you taking radar bearings on the islands?
A. We obtained radar fixes at a maximum of five minute intervals.
14. How often were you plotting the ship's position?
A. I kept a continual plot of the position of the ship.
15. Did you previously lay down a track through the channel?
A. Yes, sir.
16. Had you consulted the Coast Pilot, Philippine Islands, Part II, regarding the passage through the channel?
A. Yes, sir.
17. Did you obtain all information from the Coast Pilot regarding tides and currents?
A. The information regarding currents is very limited.
18. Previous to the time the ship was sunk, how had your fixes checked with your course as laid down on the chart?
A. The fixes showed the ship to be slightly north of the course.
19. How far north?
A. Maximum of a mile.
20. When a sounding of forty-one fathoms was obtained, what action did the commanding officer take?
A. I discussed with him the desirability of changing course to the right where there was deeper water. In the midst of this discussion the vessel sank.
Cross-examined by the interested party:
21. What instructions were given you by the captain relative to the navigational track through Nausbata Channel?
A. The captain and I had previously looked at the chart showing the track of the Crevalle and had decided to follow this track with the exception of clearing Roughton Reef by a distance of about three miles.
Reexamined by the investigating officer:

— page 89 —
22. Q. After the sinking of the Flier and during the long time the survivors were endeavoring to reach land, have you any comments to make regarding the difficulties of the personnel and their behavior, commendable or otherwise?

A. I think the conduct of all was commendable without exception.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. W. H. Kimbrough, Lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve, attached to Commander Task Force Seventy-One Staff.

2. Q. In your capacity as Intelligence Officer on the Staff of Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet have you been furnished information from Commander Seventh Fleet regarding enemy mining activities in the various island channels?

A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. Do you keep a complete and up to date file of this information?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. Do you give this information to the Operations Officer and the Assistant Operations Officer on Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet Staff?

A. Yes, sir.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine this witness.

— page 90 —
1. The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous question.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was now having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Lieutenant Commander J. L. P. McCallum, U.S. Navy, Torpedo and Gunnery Officer, Staff, Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet.

2. Q. In your capacity as Gunnery and Torpedo Officer, have you obtained information concerning Japanese mines?

A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. Will you please tell us what you know regarding the depth of water in which they are planted and characteristics as to their type, whether or not they have ever gotten adrift and been picked up by Allies and any other information you have concerning Japanese mines?

A. Japanese have only moored contact mines within the knowledge of our intelligence. No magnetic mines are known to be used by the Japanese. Contact mines used by them are in general similar to U.S. contact mines. No known Japanese mines are in use that are not directly affected by the dip of any currents that may exist in localities where they may be laid. I have no direct knowledge of the depths in which Japanese mines have been laid, but the Dip Tabulation for U.S. mines indicates that fields laid in depths over fifty fathoms in any locality where an appreciable current may be expected is of such a degree that the mines would not be expected to contact a ship when currents are in excess of one and one-quarter knots. I have received intelligence indicating that the Japanese mines have been found adrift in the vicinity of the Sulu Archipelago and Bebado Straits. Kinfeilds laid in any areas subject to rough seas or to currents of the order of one to two knots will not normally endure for periods of over six months. By that I mean that a high percentage of the mines will be cast adrift. I base this statement on the experience of the Allies in connection with the North Sea field.

Cross-examined by the interested party:

— page 91 —
4. Q. Have you available data to give the estimated dip of a mine anchored in one hundred fathoms of water set to eight feet depth at low water slack when subject to a current of one and one-half knots?

A. Yes, sir, it is sixty feet.

5. Q. Anchored mines usually contain a device rendering them inoperative when on the surface. Do you know anything regarding the reliability of such devices?

A. Yes, sir. Most contact mines are fitted with a hydrostat intended to render the mine inactive should the mine be cast adrift. The dependability of this device as shown with extensive use is such that it cannot be used in minefields moored near the surface. In addition, the spring of the hydrostat is of such construction that if a mine rises to the surface after submergence at deep depth there is no assurance that the mine will become disarmed.

6. Q. From your Dip Table, what is the dip indicated for mines planted in forty-one fathoms of water to a set depth of eight feet when exposed to a current with a strength of one and one-half knots?

A. Twenty-six feet.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous question.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Heber Hampton McLean, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commander Submarine Squadron Sixteen.

2. Q. What was your station on or about 20 June 1944?

A. On 20 June 1944, in addition to my duty as Commander Submarine Squadron Sixteen and Commander Task Group Seventy-One

— page 93 —
10. Q. What important considerations determined the routing of the Robelot?

A. At that time the Flasher, Crevolle, and Angler were operating for group operations in the South China Sea which had been vacant for some time. They were routed via Lombok and Karimata Strait, and it was so timed that they would transit Karimata Strait on successive days. The Robelot was sent via Kelassar and Sibutu to be available to support Southwest Pacific Force operations in Noemfoor which was scheduled in the latter part of June. For this reason and in order to diversify routing of submarines through the islands, the Robelot was routed through Sibutu and Balabac Strait.

LL. Q. In the light of all information then available to you, did you select the routing with any reservation as to the risk of enemy opposition? In other words, did you consider the route reasonably safe?

A. I considered this route as safe and possibly safer than the one via Karimata.

LL. Q. What enemy opposition do you consider existed in Lombok Strait?

A. Patrols would likely be encountered and possibly aircraft. I consider that the death of water and current would preclude the effectiveness of any mines.

LL. Q. What are the risks to be met in traversing Karimata Strait?

A. There is a long stretch of comparatively shallow, readily mineable, water. As I remember there is some two hundred miles of water around fifteen to eighteen fathoms. If a submarine was detected in that stretch an aircraft anti-submarine group would make it very dangerous for a submarine. There is also the possibility of surface patrol and aircraft.

LL. Q. What are the principal risks in transitting Sibutu Passage?

A. Enemy surface and air patrols.

LL. Q. What are the principal risks in transitting Balabac and Nasubat Channel?

A. Nasubatac Passage could be covered by surface and air patrols. We had previous indications of mining in that area.

— page 94 —
1. Investigation was made as to the probable effectiveness of such mines and it was considered in the deep water of this passage, with the probable currents existing, that moored mines would not be effective. The Grevaille had made a westbound and eastbound passage of this Strait just prior to the departure of the Robalo and had reported no indications of mines.

   1.6. A. Would you, then, consider this routing to be reasonably safe under the conditions of warfare?

    A. Yes, sir.

   1.7. C. Did the Commanding Officer of the Robalo express or imply any dissatisfaction with any phase of his order?

    A. No, sir.

   1.8. Q. In your experience as Operations Officer, do you know of any instance on the part of any commanding officer to hesitate to accept the dangers incident to the patrol operations upon which he was ordered?

    A. No, sir.

   1.9. Q. When were you relieved as Operations Officer?

    A. On the 8th of June Captain Tichenor relieved me as Operations Officer. Three days later he departed for the East Coast to attend a conference, and I again took over the job until my own departure for the East Coast on the 8th of July.

    None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine this witness.

    The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relative to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-ing.

    The witness stated:

    I would like to state that on Kimmel's previous patrol his ship suffered severe damage from an aircraft bomb and that despite this damage, which would have influenced a less determined commanding officer to return to port, he continued on patrol. At the time he departed on his subsequent patrol, I felt that he was fired with a strong determination to go out and get them.

    The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

    A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the

— page 95 —
1. State your name, rank and present station.
2. Murray Jones Tichenor, Captain, U.S. Navy, Operations Officer, Staff, Commander Task Force Seventy One.
3. When did you assume the duties as Operations Officer of Task Force Seventy-One?
4. 1 September 1943.
5. Were you Operations Officer when the Flier departed on 2 August?
6. Yes, sir.
7. I show you an Operation Order. Can you identify it as the Operation Order that was prepared for the Flier prior to her departure on 2 August?
8. Yes, that is a true copy of the Operation Order.
9. State briefly the routing of the Flier?
10. Flier departed Fremantle 2 August to proceed to the South China Sea, routed via Exmouth Gulf, Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, Sibutu Passage and Balbac Strait.
11. Did you and your assistants prepare the Operation Order for the Flier?
12. Yes, sir.
13. Please state fully, but concisely as possible, the method used in preparing Operation Orders and explain the briefing of the commanding officers.
14. Future planning of patrols is done by myself and Commander Jensen on a preliminary basis and then, almost invariably, I discuss them with the Commander Task Force. After this the individual Operation Order for the submarine is written in the rough form by Commander Jensen. This rough draft of the Operation Order is thoroughly checked over by myself and changes made as considered necessary in discussion with Jensen. It is then presented to the Chief of Staff who likewise may make alterations or changes. In the majority of cases the rough draft is taken to the Commander Task Force for his preliminary approval. The orders are then written in the smooth and submitted through the same channels as in the rough for signature by the Task Force Commander. During this period the commander officer of the submarine generally has visited the operations office several times. He is told the area in which he is going to patrol, is interviewed by Commander Jensen, and generally myself, and then by the Intelligence Officer on subjects pertaining to his patrol, principally in respect to

— page 97 —
1. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.1. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.2. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.3. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.4. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.5. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.6. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.7. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.8. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.9. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.10. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.11. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.12. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.13. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.14. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.15. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.16. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.17. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.18. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.19. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.20. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.21. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.22. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.23. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.24. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.25. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.26. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.27. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.28. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.29. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.30. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.31. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.32. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.33. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.34. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.35. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.36. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.37. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.38. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.39. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.40. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.41. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.42. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.43. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.44. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.45. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.46. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.47. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.48. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.49. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.50. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.51. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.52. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.53. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.54. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.55. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.56. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.57. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.58. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.59. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.60. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.61. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.62. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.63. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.64. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.65. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.66. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.67. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.68. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.69. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.70. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.71. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.72. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.73. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.74. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.75. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.76. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.77. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.78. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.79. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.80. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.81. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.82. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.83. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.84. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.85. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.86. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.87. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.88. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.89. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.90. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.91. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.92. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.93. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.94. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.95. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.96. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.97. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.98. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 1.99. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
   - 2. From the position where we believed Flier to be at the time we had the information, I consider that it would have been necessary for the Flier to transmit the information and the submarine to have been in a position to do so.

13. Is the passage of the submarine of the Seventh Fleet to the operating area opposite by enemy anti-submarine measures and if so what is the nature of them?

A. I consider that submarines approaching operating areas are opposed by every anti-submarine measure that the enemy is able to bring against them; namely, aircraft, patrol vessels, submarines, radar, mines, reports of sightings by vessels, mining, underwater sound devices; in fact, every anti-submarine measure known.

14. Do you consider that the routing selected for the Flier constituted undue risks to the submarine?

A. I do not consider that the routing of the Flier had any more risk attached to it than the routing of any other submarine through the operating areas.

15. When you briefed the commanding officer of the Flier did he express any objection to the Operation Order?

A. To the best of my knowledge he did not.

Reexamined by the investigating officer:

16. Please state what was the last information received from the Robalo.

A. The last information received from Robalo was a despatch

— page 98 —
1020 local time on the morning of 2 July, from a position in the western part of Celebes Sea, which reported that she had sighted a task force, consisting of one battleship and two destroyers, that she had been unable to close. Position, course and speed were reported.

17. Q. What attempts were made to get in touch with the Robelo by radio and on what dates?

A. No attempts were made to get in touch with Robelo until it was considered that she was on her return trip to Fremantle and was in such a position that she should be receiving her despatched report of time of arrival. Robelo was expected to return to Fremantle from patrol on or about 14 August. Not having heard from her on 11 August, we requested her to give us her position and estimated time of arrival Fremantle. This message was sent out on normal submarine schedules for a period of three successive days. No reply was received.

18. Q. Have you any opinion as to what might have happened to the Robelo?

A. At the time Robelo was overdue, I was of the opinion that she had met with misfortune after her radio communication to us reporting the contact of the Task Force, and probable as a result of that contact. Since that time I have received information which indicates otherwise.

19. Q. I show you U.S.C. & C.S. Chart Number 4306. It has been prepared by Lieutenant Commander R. R. Leachon, U.S. Navy, showing the tracks of the Flier through Masubate Channel. On this chart also is the track of the Grevalle through this channel which was given in the Ultra Secret annex to the Flier Operation Order. Also on this chart is the Lapon Track when she went through this channel on 10 July. When did the track followed by the Lapon come into your possession?

A. After the Lapon returned from patrol.

20. Q. Did you have this information prior to the time the Flier sailed?

A. No, sir. This was received about 24 August.

21. Q. Will you state to the court the navigational instructions given in the Lapon Operation Order relative to transitting the Sulu Archipelago and Balabac Strait?

A. The Lapon, in her Operation Order, was instructed to "stay clear of readily mineable waters in the vicinity of the Sulu Archipelago and Balabac Strait. Use deepest water routes in transitting Sibutu, Mindoro and Balabac Straits".

22. Q. It is noted that the same phraseology "deepest water routes in transitting Sibutu, Balabac and Mindoro Straits" is also used in the Flier Operation Order. Will you please amplify this phrase?

A. By use of the phrase "deepest water routes" of the

— page 100 —
27. From last reported position, could Robalo have reached Balabac Strait by the night of 3 July?

A. Yes, sir.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine the witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

At his own request the defendant, Commander John D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, took the stand to testify, was advised that the oath previously taken by him was still binding, and declared as follows:

Remained by the defendant:

1. What is your estimate of the maximum draft of the Flier just prior to the sinking?

A. The vessel was in diving trim. All ballast tanks dry. I believe that the draft is seventeen feet, ten inches.

2. In previous testimony you gave three considerations of a submarine commander officer in transitting passages between islands in enemy controlled waters. These are: (1) possibility of contact with enemy mines; (2) presence of enemy anti-submarine vessels; and (3) navigation dangers. Which of these did you consider primary in this particular instance?

A. I considered that safe navigation together with the maintenance of sea room in the event of contact with an A/S vessel combined as the consideration of primary importance. I considered the possibility of enemy mines secondary to these others.

3. In your experiences of making passage through various channels, during this war as submarine commander officer, where the navigational aids are unlighted and not well known, have you found that the unpredictable currents, in spite of all the information available, make it necessary to give sufficient sea room to avoid grounding in darkness on poorly charted reefs?

A. In my experience in these waters, which had been limited to one previous patrol, I found the information very sketchy and undependable. I believe the safest method is to allow as much sea room as possible and observe current as it appears on

— page 101 —
1. What was the primary method used in obtaining fixes?
   - Radar plot.
   - Soundings were used for verification.

2. Did you consider the sea room between the Crevalle Track and the reefs of Koughton Island sufficient with to warrant taking your ship more to the north than to the south?
   - The Crevalle Track is north of the central axis of the navigatable water. Based on considerations of keeping maximum sea room, a track south of the Crevalle Track is indicated.

3. Do you think the explosion on the Flier was from a battery?
   - No. I believe the explosion was from an external source. At the time of the explosion I had four main engines on propulsion and the auxiliary engine carrying the auxiliary load with a zero float on the battery. I consider from the fact the battery was not being charged that very little probability of a battery explosion existed.

4. In your narrative you expressed the statement the explosion was on the starboard side. Did you feel any movement of the Flier to port at that time?
   - I recall very definitely a side-ways whip back and forth.

5. Please state exactly where you were and what your actions were from the time of the explosion until you went into the water.
   - I was standing in the center of the forward end of the bridge at the time of the explosion. The aggregate of my impressions fixed the source of the explosion as forward on the starboard side near the waterline. I was aware of the start of a column of water in the air and the next thing I knew I was holding on to the rail near the after TBT on the port side. I immediately upon regaining my faculties ran forward to sound the collision alarm which is on the starboard side just above the conning tower hatch. The impressions that I received at this time are as follows: there was a very strong smell of fuel oil, the conning tower was dark, there was a strong blast of air venting out the conning tower hatch, there was noise of flooding and screams emanating from below, personnel were coming out of the conning tower hatch. At the time I reached the forward port of the bridge the bridge deck was starting under. The vessel apparently had a down angle of about the same amount that is taken on a normal dive. My next impression was that of being projected through the water at a great forward speed, and as the bridge went under I was washed out through the after end. I never saw nor felt any trace of the vessel after this.

Cross-examined by the interested party:
   - Did you have the track of the Crevalle laid out on your

— page 103 —
3rd Day

Ending Quarters of the
Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet,
Saturday, 16 September 1944.

The investigation began at 9:30 a.m.

Present:
Rear Admiral Freeland A. Daubin, U.S. Navy, the investigating officer;
Cecil Leland McCormack, chief yeoman, U.S. Navy, reporter;
The defendant, Commander J. L. Crowley, U.S. Navy, and his counsel;
The interested party, Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy, and his counsel.

The record of proceedings of the second day of the investigation was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the investigation were present.

The refit commanding officer of the U.S.S. Flier not being present in the area, at his own request the defendant, Commander J. L. Crowley, U.S. Navy, took the stand to testify, was advised that the oath previously taken by him was still binding, and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Please state how long the Flier was under refit prior to her departure on 2 August and her general material condition at the end of the refit.

A. The Flier was refitted by the relief crew of Submarine Division One Sixty-one and the tender forces of the U.S.S. Orion during the period July 5, 1944, to July 19, 1944. The regularly assigned commanding officer relieved the refit command officer on July 19, 1944. Subsequent to that date the vessel was sound tested, satisfactorily completed a dive to test depth and satisfactorily completed all machinery tests. The first sound test was not satisfactory because of excessive water noises emanating from the starboard screw. The vessel was docked on July 26 to investigate the cause for this situation and during docking the starboard tailshaft was replaced with a spare. Both propellers were replaced by spares recently checked for pitch and the starboard strut bearings were pulled and brought to standard clearance. Subsequent to undocking on July 31, the vessel was again given an underway sound test and was pronounced satisfactory. I personally listened to the sound test and concur with that decision. Flier was ranged to determine her degaassing condition on July 5, 1944. The results of the observation of that ranging are in this letter.

The letter was submitted to the investigating officer and to the court and by the witness offered in evidence. There being no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit 4".

The witness continued:

— page 104 —
1. It is my opinion that Flier was in all respects ready for sea when she departed Fremantle on 2 August 1944 for second war patrol.

2. What was the general condition of the battery and the battery ventilation system at the end of the refit?

A. The condition of the battery was excellent and the battery ventilation was satisfactory in all respects. Regular charging procedure was followed and hydrogen readings were always well within the allowed limits.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. George Warren Patterson, Junior, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commander Submarine Division One sixty-one.

2. Were you the training officer for the Flier prior to her departure on last patrol?

A. I was.

3. Will you please state in your opinion the efficiency of the officers and crew of the U.S.S. Flier?

A. In my opinion the efficiency of the officers and crew of the U.S.S. Flier was excellent. My personal observation of the operations of the Flier underway during the normal training period convinces me that the state of training of both the fire control and ship control parties of the U.S.S. Flier was excellent. Commander J. B. Crowley, U.S. Navy, a graduate of the submarine school at New London, Connecticut, was qualified to command submarines. He had made five war patrols in command of the S-28 operating in the Aleutians area. He had made one war patrol in command of the U.S.S. Flier. He was a graduate of the PCQ school at New London, Connecticut. He had on 1 August 1944 had command of the Flier for a period of eight months. The executive officer, Lieutenant J. W. Liddell,

— page 105 —
1944, Naval Reserve, was qualified in submarines. He has been recommended for qualification in command. He first entered the submarine service during the summer of 1941 as an officer on board the U.S.S. Snapper. He was engineering officer on board the U.S.S. Flier at the time of commissioning and has served on board the Flier for a period of eight months. Lieutenant P. Knapp, U.S. Navy, the engineering officer of the Flier, was a graduate of the submarine school and the Naval Academy, class of 1942. He has been recommended for qualification in submarines and had been recommended

— page 106 —
1. State your name, rank, and present station.
2. A. Maurice William Shea, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Raton.
3. 2. Were you the refit commanding officer of the kobelo prior to her departure on her last patrol?
   A. Yes, sir.
4. 3. Please state how long the kobelo was under refit and her general material condition prior to her departure on last patrol.
   A. The kobelo was under refit for a period of fourteen days and after that she operated, under went a post refit prior to going on patrol which total time was approximately twenty-three days. The post refit was divided between operations and repairing minor repairs upon return to port.
5. 4. At the time of her departure, was she in all respects ready for sea insofar as material condition was concerned?
   A. Yes, sir.
6. 5. Had she received the customary refit?
   A. Yes, sir.
7. 6. Was the commanding officer satisfied as to material condition?
   A. Yes, sir.
8. 7. Had she been sound tested?
   A. Not during my tour as relief commanding officer of the kobelo.
9. 8. Do you know in your knowledge whether or not she did receive a sound test prior to her departure?
   A. Yes, sir, she did as it is customary to sound test all boats prior to patrol.
10. 9. Had she been ranged to determine degaussing condition?
    A. Yes, sir. Kobelo was ranged on 30 May 1944 and her degaussed condition is contained in this letter.

— page 107 —
1. The letter was submitted to the investigating officer and to the court and by the witness offered in evidence. There being no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit 5".

10. Q. What was the general efficiency condition of the battery and battery ventilation system of the Robelo?

A. Excellent, sir.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Commander Willis A. Lent, U.S. Navy, Commander Submarine Division One Twenty-One.

2. Were you training officer for the Robelo prior to her departure on her last patrol?

A. Yes, sir, I was.

3. In your opinion what was the general efficiency of the officers and crew prior to her departure?

A. From a training standpoint both the officers and the crew compared favorably with the other submarines I have trained in this area. The commanding officer had had the experience of one patrol in command of the Robelo prior to this training period, and had made at least five patrols on other fleet submarines in the Pacific as second or third officer. The executive officer, Lieutenant Commander C. W. Fell, U.S. Naval Reserve, had completed two patrols as executive officer of the Robelo which was his only experience in the Pacific. Both the third officer and the fourth officer, Lieutenant Commander H. E. Carter, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant R. J. Proseus, U.S. Navy, had been on the Robelo from fitting out on, and I consider them very capable submarine officers. There was one other officer, Lieutenant (junior grade) H. F. McKnight, junior, U.S. Naval Reserve, who had been on the boat since commissioning. The

— page 108 —
1. In your opinion was the Robalo well trained and ready to go on patrol?

A. Yes, sir. I reported to the training officer after firing torpedoes that in my opinion the Robalo was ready to proceed on patrol.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The investigation then at 12:10 p.m., took a recess until 1:45 p.m., at which time it reconvened.

Present:
The investigating officer, the reporter, the defendant, and his counsel, and the interested party and his counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the trial were present.

At his own request, the interested party, Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy, took the stand, was advised that the oath previously taken by him was still binding, and declared as follows:

Examined by the interested party:

1. Do you as Commander Task Group Seventy-One point One and signer of Operation Order 100-44 consider that the orders in paragraph (x) (3), "Use deepest water routes in transitting Situtu, Falabac or Mindoro Strilts" left any discretion to the

— page 109 —
1. Information regarding the likelihood of mines to be encountered by the [Liner] was given in various manners: (1) the general information from well before the war to the date of the Operation Plan was contained in an annex so marked; (2) other information, Ultra Secret in nature, was given in an annex to the Operation Order; (3) in the Operation Order itself was given the paragraph quoted, (x) (3). In the annex to the Operation Order the track of the Crevalle which had made several safe passages through Balabac Strait was given as information. The term "use deepest water routes, etc.," in (x) (3) of the Operation Order was a direct order. The information regarding the Crevalle Track was specifically made information in that form to differentiate it from an order. It is, however, pertinent to state in general the operational policy of this command is to tell the submarine commanding officer what to do but not how to do it. Instructions to use deepest water routes was given for the specific reason that we considered that mines could not be effectively planted in that deepest route through Balabac which is Nasubata Channel. Since this would appear to be crux of the question, I will amplify the general operation policy further to say that it can readily understand that the commanding officer may have had many good reasons for not following precisely the track of the Crevalle, but that he must have realized that the safest route was the deepest water route insofar as the mine menace was concerned.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous question- ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, withdrew and resumed his seat as an interested party.

Neither the investigating officer, the defendant, nor the interested party to the investigation desired any more witness.

Commander J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, defendant, submitted a written statement, which statement was read and is appended.

Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy, interested party, submitted a written statement, which statement was read and is appended.

The investigation was finished, all parties thereto with-drawing.

— page 110 —
1. I wish to state that upon Flier's departure for Second War Patrol I consider that she was in excellent material condition, and that the personnel situation both as to the general background of experience and state of training was entirely satisfactory to me.

2. During the night of 12 - 13 August 1944, I received information from the Task Force Commander as to the course, speed, and position of the remnants of a convoy previously attacked by a carrier off Cape Calavite. Flier's position at the time of receipt of this information was such that by employment of surface running throughout daylight on 13 August 1944, I could transit Balabac early that evening and still be in position to intercept the convoy twenty five miles west of Balabac Island at 0230 14 August 1944. In the absence of specific instructions prohibiting transit of Balabac Strait, I would have done so in pursuit of this convoy even if I were not originally so routed. It was, therefore, in a spirit of eager anticipation of early contact with the enemy that we approached Balabac Strait and with absolutely no feeling of apprehension as to special hazards that might lurk there.

In my approach to Nasubata Channel I believe that the route employed was sound in that it was favorable to safe navigation, despite the probability of unpredictable currents, and that it was also favorable to evasion of enemy patrol craft. In addition, it was designed to put the vessel in deep water in the narrow part of the channel between Conran Island and Roughton Island.

The primary means employed for determining the position of the vessel was the radar plot and this was reported as checking perfectly. Single ping sounding were taken at frequent intervals to verify the plot, and I required a report from the navigator after each sounding as to how well it agreed with the chart. All soundings were in agreement except the last one of forty one fathoms which was less than expected and I immediately conferred with the navigator relative to a course change to put us into deeper water. At the same time, the possibility for error in reading a single ping sounding was recognized and another was ordered for verification. It was at this time that the explosion occurred.

The state of the tide, about midway between low and high water, would indicate that the strength of flood could be expected. Flier was definitely set to the northward prior to sinking and every indication is that the survivors were set first to the northwestward by the flood tide and then to the northwestward by the ebb tide, being then in such position as

— page 111 —
1. The submarine was on a routine patrol in the North Balabac Strait and surrounding areas. This appears to substantiate the existence of a strong current at the time of the sinking, and expert testimony has been introduced which shows that if the depth of the water were forty one fathoms and the velocity of the current were one point five knots, a moored mine would dip to about twenty six feet below the surface. This is well below the keel depth of a fleet submarine.

The nature of the explosion was such as to impress upon me the opinion that it was near the surface. I did not observe any tendency to lift the boat although I did feel a sharp sidewise jar. Nothing that I observed gave me the impression that the vessel was hogging or sagging which result would almost certainly accompany severe damage to the keel. It appears probable then that the vessel may have struck a floating mine.

I do not feel that Flier was at any time subjected to any risk over and above that which must be willingly accepted by submarine personnel operating in wartime through these passes in which the enemy is exerting every means at his disposal to deny us passage. I respectfully submit my past war record of five patrols in command of a C-class submarine in the Aleutians and one patrol in command of Flier as a background of experience upon which the foregoing conclusions are based.

I deeply regret the loss of a fine ship together with seventy eight fine shipmates and friends. The other survivors join me in paying this final tribute to them.

Very respectfully,

JOHN D. CROWLEY,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Flier.

— page 113 —
10 April 1944, when we were directed to attack enemy destroyers when possible, that twenty enemy destroyers have been sunk. The month of August 1944 is our greatest month with 370,500 gross tons sunk and 104,100 damaged. Preliminary reports indicate that September will be even more successful. Percentage of torpedo hits for the last eleven months has been 40.1. The following submarines of this force have received the Presidential Unit Citation: Trout, Cudgeon, Bowfin, Greenling, Guardfish, Wahoo. Action is pending in the case of Harder and Bonefish.

This damage has not been effected without loss. In Task Force Seventy-one during my command the following submarines have failed to return from patrol: Grenadier, Greyling, Cisco, Capelin.

In the final analysis, the burden of enemy pressure lies on the shoulders of the captains of these fine submarines. They are selected after many eliminations with the greatest of care. The Commanding Officer of the FTL, Commander Crowley, has made five war patrols as Commanding Officer of the FTL. He has been recommended for the award of the Navy Cross for his success achieved on his first war patrol in the FTL. He has been recommended to command a division.

The Commanding Officer of the Robalo, Lieutenant Commander Kimmel, was an officer long experienced in submarines. His first patrol in the Robalo was most fearlessly and aggressively conducted. Near the beginning of his patrol his ship was severely damaged by the enemy, but in spite of that he continued on patrol. I consider Commander Crowley and Lieutenant Commander Kimmel to be officers of the highest type, professionally competent, experienced and possessing qualities of leadership and character that are exemplary.

The burden of responsibility in directing the operations of these submarines is a very heavy one. I feel the loss of so many splendid young men in the Robalo and Filer very personally. It is small comfort to feel that the planning and direction of the operations of these vessels has been done to the very best of our ability.

R. W. CHRISTIE,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet and
Commander Task Force Seventy-one.

— page 114 —
1500 August 2, 1944 - Departed Fremantle, W.A. for Second War Patrol and made an uneventful passage in accordance with routing, passing East of FARL BANK into the SULU SEA at 0300 August 13, 1944.

August 13, 1944 - Rounded BANCORAN ISLAND to the northeast on the surface at a minimum range of 19 miles and at 1500 took departure from BANCORAN ISLAND to converge and then run down the recommended steamer route approaching NABUBAZA ISLAND. At 1800 made landfall on BABAAC ISLAND and obtained a fix using bearings of peaks on BABAAC and PALAWAN ISLANDS. (No evening stars were obtained because of a complete overcast.) The fix showed the vessel to be on the steamer route about 50 miles from BABAAC ISLAND. The route intended to be followed through BABAAC ISLAND was then recommended by the U.S.S. CRANE-VALLIS and given an annex to the Operation order. At 1800 commenced taking intermittent soundings to establish crossing time 100 fathoms curve, and continued taking them thereafter. All soundings checked with the chart. At 1930 made radar contact on BABAAC ISLAND and shortly thereafter on BUGSUK ISLAND. At 2100 made radar contact on CUMIAN ISLAND at 16,000 yards range. At 2130 sighted CUMIAN ISLAND, and about this time made radar contact with ROUGIN ISLAND. Speed had been reduced to five knots while the landfall on CUMIAN and ROUGIN ISLANDS was being made, but when the position of the vessel relative to these points had been verified speed was increased to seventeen knots.

At 2200 with CUMIAN ISLAND bearing 190 I distance about 6,700 yards there was a terrific explosion estimated to have been on the starboard side abreast of the forward battery. Oil, water, and debris delayed the ordnance. There was a tremendous venting off of air through the conning tower hatch and the vessel sank in about twenty or thirty seconds while still making about 15 knots through the water.

It is my opinion that a mine was in contact with the hull just below the waterline at the time of the explosion, since there was no tendency to lift the ship, and it is further my opinion that the hull was clearly holed and not that the vessel's back was broken.

The following personnel were seen by various of the survivors to be in the water after the vessel had sunk:

CROWLEY, John D., # 70079, Comdr., USN.
LIDDELL, Jr., James W., # 85674, Lt. D-V(C), USNA.
HOWELL, Arthur C., # 333246, Ens. D-V(C), USNA.
THEMALBE, Donald R., 375 93 43, FRA2C, USN.
MILLER, Wesley B., 882 95 54, MOM3C, USNA V-6.
RUSSO, James D., 705 22 98, QM3C, USNA V-6.

— page 116 —
1944 - At 1600, near low water slack, made our way with the raft across a corral reef to GABUN ISLAND landing on the southwest point at sunset and spent the night there.

August 16, 1944 - We worked our way east along the south coast of GABUN ISLAND searching for food and getting into position for the trip to JUSUK ISLAND. One edible drifted cocoanut was found and divided among all hands. Immediately upon rounding the southeast point of GABUN ISLAND, a group of buildings was visible on JUSUK ISLAND. At 1400 moved off for JUSUK ISLAND and landed and left the raft on ARU ISLAND at 1700. The buildings were cautiously approached on foot but no sign of life was apparent. The building apparently had been evacuated for sometime, and had subsequently been looted. There was an excellent grove of cocoanut trees here and a cistern from which all hands drank. The night was spent in the house.

August 19, 1944 - Shortly after sunrise two native boys appeared, one of whom could speak English reasonably well, and he told us that if we would accompany him he could provide us with food and water. He also warned us not to drink the water in the cistern as it had been poisoned. However, no ill effects were subsequently noted. He guided us to a building apparently on old school house, about a mile inland, and here we were met by Mr. Pedro Sarmiento, leader of the South Battalion of GUSUK ISLAND, together with three soldiers armed with rifles and six men armed with blow guns and bolos. He were told by Mr. Sarmiento that he had a small sailboat (classed as a copilot) available, and that his orders were to return any Americans found to brooke's front, PALABAN. He also said that a landing party of Japanese was expected soon at the spot on which we had landed, and that he was anxious to get us clear of that vicinity. We

— page 117 —
1944 - We completed the trip to the boat, and about 1600 departed for the guerrilla outpost at CARB BULLHUA, PALAWAN, where we arrived about midnight.

August 21, 1944 - We were met at CARB BULLHUA by Sergeant Pascual de la Cruz (PA), U.S.ARMY, who relieved R. Sarmiento of responsibility for our safe conduct. Sergeant de la Cruz then told me the information he had concerning the loss of the ROADILO. We remained in the army barracks here until we departed for BROOKS' POINT in the same copilot at about noon. Before departure I requested R. Sarmiento to make a search of the islands in the vicinity of BALABAC SRAIT for any other survivors of ROADILO or FILIH, and he assured me he would do this. The wind was not favorable so we anchored in the evening in the TUBARIVER.

August 22, 1944 - Underway at 1100 for BROOKS' POINT arriving there early the following morning. Near sunset a Japanese launch was sighted on the horizon and was evaded by dousing sail and rowing into the beach.

August 23, 1944 - Upon arrival at BROOKS' POINT we were escorted to the home of Captain M.D. Mayor, Infantry (PA) (USARF) Acting Commanding Officer of Sector D of the Sixth Military District. Also at this point there was found a U.S. Army Coast Watcher Unit who put their communication facilities at our disposal. Submitted report to COMRASSKOR SNIPIT-ONE and then we were offered transportation to an evacuation point about 7 miles inland. Here we received medical treatment using the facilities of the coast watchers and were afforded the best available food and lodging by R.T.H. Edwards, an American citizen in business at Brooke's point before the war and now in evacuation.

August 26, 1944 - Received instructions from Commander, Seventh Fleet, to arrange details for rendezvous and evacuation.

August 27, 1944 - Conferred with Captain Mayor regarding the availability of transportation and cooperation of his forces in the evacuation plan.

August 28, 1944 - Submitted plan for rendezvous to Commander, Seventh Fleet.

August 29, 1944 - Received Commander, Seventh Fleet's approval of rendezvous plans and notification that ABRIR would

— page 119 —
12/gr.
TASK FORCE SEVENTY-ONE,
TASK GROUP SEVENTY-ONE POINT ONE,
U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223), FLAGSHIP.

PERTH, WEST AUSTRALIA.
31 July, 1944. 1635 HOUR.

TASK ORGANIZATION:
(a) U.S.S. FLIER
(Task Unit 71.1.8)

1. (a) Enemy information found in Task Group 71.1 Operation Plan Number 1-43, of 1 September, 1943.

(b) Latest intelligence information and prospective moves-ments own forces contained in Annex "ASLE" to this Operation Order.

(c) Principal Japanese Shipping Routes as contained in Annex "CHARLIE" to this Operation Order. These indicate general routes only.

2. This unit will wage unrestricted submarine warfare against the enemy in order to destroy enemy shipping and to deny the enemy use of vital traffic lanes.

3. (a) FLIER

(1) DESTROY ENEMY SHIPS.

(2) When directed about 2 August, 1944, depart PREMANTLE and proceed to EXHAUST GULF via Bombing Restriction Lane. There fuel to capacity.

(3) Thence proceed via LOMBOK STRAIT, MAKASSAR STRAIT, ISHUTU PASSAGE, and BALABAC STRAIT to patrol areas 201 and 202 in accordance with following schedule:

AREA 201 - Weeks commencing 7 August, 21 August and 4 September, 1944.

AREA 202 - Weeks commencing 14 August and 28 August, 1944.

Change patrol areas each Sunday.

— page 120 —
12/gr.
TASK GROUP SEVENTY-ONE
TASK GROUP SEVENTY-ONE POINT ONE,
U.S.S. BONAPTSH (SS223), FLAGSHIP.

FRRTH, WEST AUSTRALIA.
31 July, 1944. 1635 HON.

(4) At dark on 11 September, 1944, start return to
PERMANENTLY via LINDORO STRAIT, SIBIUU PASSAGE,
MAKASSAR STRAIT, and LOMBOK STRAIT. Stop at
EXMOUTH GULF only if fuel is required.

(x) (1) Exploit traffic lanes and focal points enroute to
and from areas.

(2) Be prepared to provide pertinent information to
and conduct coordinated attacks with submarines
in adjacent areas.

(3) Stay clear of readily mineable waters in the
vicinity of the SULU ARCHIPELAGO and BALABAC
STRAIT. Use deepest water routes in transitting
SIBIUU, BALABAC, or MINDORO STRAIT.

(4) In carrying out paragraph 3(a) (4) above, you
are authorized to return via KARIMATA STRAIT,
JAVA SEA and LOMBOK STRAIT if deemed more
feasible. In such case advise the Task Group
Commander prior to departure from your assigned
area.

4. Logistic support available at KMOUTH GULF, DARWIN, and
FREMANTLE.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex "ARL" to
Task Group 71.1 Operation Plan Number 1-43, and
Annex "BAKER" to this Operation Order.

(b) Commander Task Group 71.1 in U.S. Naval Headquarters,
PERTH, WEST AUSTRALIA.

R. W. CHRISTIE,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Task Group SEVENTY-ONE Point ONE.

ANNEXES & DISTRIBUTION
(See page 3) - 2 -

— page 121 —
12/6/1944
TASK FORCE SEVENTY-ONE,
TASK GROUP SEVENTY-ONE POINT ONE,
U.S.S. BONEFISH (35223), FLAGSHIP.

PERTH, WEST AUSTRALIA.
31 July, 1944. 1635 HOURS.

ANNEXES:
"ABLE" - Latest Intelligence Information.
"B.KER" - Special Communication Instructions.
"CHARLIE" - Pamphlet "Principal Japanese Shipping Routes."
"DOC" - Entrance Instructions for DARWIN, AUSTRALIA, and SEADLER HARBOR, MANUS ISLANDS.
"EASY" - Effective Submarine Safety Lanes and Operating Areas.

DISTRIBUTION:
CSS-12 (Without Annexes).
CSS-16 (Without Annexes).
File

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:
M. F. DESIGN,
Commander, U. S. Navy.

— page 123 —
16 July 1944.

OUTGOING

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:
M. T. JENSEN,
Commander, U. S. Navy.

ORIGINATING OFFICER: 12

T.O.D. HOW TRANSMITTED: SYSTEM: 108-5

ORIGINATOR ACTION INFORMATION

CTF-71 T6-71.1

DATE AND TIME GROUP 00 01 05 06 11 12 13 15 16 20 64 70 86 90 95

160729

PRECEDENCE: CODING: TYPING: DATE:

ROUTINE

OUTGOING

16 July 1944.

— page 124 —
12/gs
TASK FORCE SEVENTY-ONE,
TASK GROUP SEVENTY-ONE POINT ONE,
U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223), FLAGSHIP.

PENTH, WEST AUSTRALIA.
20 June, 1944. 1620 HOUR.

1. (a) Enemy information found in Task Group 71.1 Operation Plan Number 1-43, of 1 September, 1943.
   (b) Latest intelligence information and prospective movements own forces contained in Annex "ABLH" to this Operation Order.
   (c) Principal Japanese Shipping Routes as contained in Annex "CHARLIE" to this Operation Order. These indicate general routes only.

2. This unit will wage unrestricted submarine warfare against the enemy in order to destroy enemy shipping and to deny the enemy use of vital traffic lanes.

3. (a) ROSALO
   (1) DESTROY ENEMY SHIPS.
   (2) When directed, about 22 June, 1944, depart FRANKFORT for EXMOUTH GULF via the Bombing Restriction Lane; there fuel to capacity.
   (3) Thence proceed via LOBOK STRAIT, MAKASSAR STRAIT, SISUTU PASSAGE, BALABAC STRAIT, and SOUTH OF DANGEROUS GROUND to patrol the SOUTH CHINA SEA and approach- es to the GULF of SIAI South of latitude 9° North and West of longitude 112° East, paying particular attention to SINGAPORE - SAIGON, SINGAPORE - MANILA, and SINGAPORE - EMPIRE traffic routes.

(4) At dark on 2 August, 1944, depart area for return to FRANKFORT via BALABAC STRAIT, SISUTU PASSAGE, MAKASSAR STRAIT, and LOMBOK STRAIT. Stop at EXMOUTH GULF only if fuel is required.

— page 125 —
12/9/48
TASK FORCE SEVENTY-ONE,
TASK GROUP SEVENTY-ONE POINT ONE,
U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223), FLAGSHIP.

PENTH, WEST AUSTRALIA.
20 June, 1944. 1620 HOURS.

(x) (1) Exploit traffic lanes and focal points enroute to and from areas.

(2) After exhausting own possibilities for attack provide pertinent information to and cooperate with submarines in adjacent areas.

(3) In carrying out paragraph 3(a)(4) above you are authorized to return via KARIMATA STRAIT, JAVA SEA, and LOMBOK STRAIT if deemed more feasible. In such case advise the Task Force Commander.

(4) Stay clear of readily mineable waters in the vicinity of the SULU ARCHIPELAGO and BALABAC STRAIT. Use deepest water routes in transitting SIBUTU PASSAGE or BALABAC STRAIT.

4. Logistic support available at EMOUTH GULF, DARWIN, and FRENCH TERRITORIES.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex "ABLER" to Task Group 71.1 Operation Plan Number 1-43, and Annex "BAKER" to this Operation Order.

(b) Commander Task Group 71.1 in U.S. Naval Headquarters, PERTH, WEST AUSTRALIA.

R. W. CHRISTIE,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Task Group SEVENTY-ONE point ONE.

ANEXES
"ABLER"
"BAKER"
"CHARLIE"
"DOC"
"EASY"

- Latest Intelligence Information.
- Special Communication Instructions.
- Pamphlet "Priniepal Japanese Shipping Routes."
- Entrance Instructions for DARWIN, AUSTRALIA, and SEABLOW HARBOR, KANUS ISLANDS.
- Effective Submarine Safety Lanes and Operating Areas.

DISTRIBUTION:
CSS-12 - (Without Annexes).
CSS-16 - (Without Annexes).

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:
M. J. JENSEN,
Commander, U. S. Navy.

— page 126 —
5 July, 1944.

C-C-N-F-I-D-R-N-T-I-A-L

From: Commander Service Force, Subordinate Command, SEVENTH FLIGHT.
To: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
Subj: Degaussed Condition of Submarines.

1. The following tabulation gives the degaussed condition of the USS FLIER which ranged 5 July, 1944:
   - Safest present zone of operation: 70N.
   - Minimum present safe depth below keel at 70N: 42 feet.
   - Minimum present safe depth below keel at 80N: 43 feet.
   - Worst present heading: North.
   - Best present heading: North.
   - Minimum safe depth below keel at 80N if degaussed: 42 feet.
   - Worst headings if degaussed: North & South.
   - Best headings if degaussed: East & West.

Remarks: This submarine does not require degaussing.

/s/ R. E. LAWRANCE.

Certified to be a true copy:

P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

cc: CTG 71.3
CO USS FLIER.

— page 127 —
381-6 Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif. 3/mr.
Serial: 0233

30 May, 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-B-N-T-I-A-L

From: Commander Service Force, Subordinate Command, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.

Subj: Degaussed Condition of Submarines.

1. The following tabulation gives the degaussed condition of the USS ROBAIO and the USS BONEFISH which ranged 30 May, 1944.

(A) USS ROBAIO: -

Safest present zone of operation. 80N.
Minimum present safe depth below keel at 80N 89ft.
Worst present headings North & South
Best present headings East & West.

Remarks: Degaussing could not improve the condition of this submarine.

(B) USS BONEFISH: -

Safest present zone of operation. 80N.
Minimum present safe depth below keel at 80N 52ft.
Worst present heading North
Best present heading South
Minimum safe depth below keel at 80N if degaussed 07 ft.
Worst headings if degaussed North & South
Best headings if degaussed East & West.

Remarks: This submarine requires degaussing by Flash D.

/s/ R. E. LAWRANCE.

Certified to be a true copy:

P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

CC: CTG71.5

— page 128 —
23 September 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: Investigation into the loss of the U.S.S. ROBAILO and the U.S.S. FLIER.

This is an investigation convened by COMINCH to inquire into the circumstances connected with the loss of the U.S.S. ROBAILO and the U.S.S. FLIER.

The U.S.S. ROBAILO departed Fremantle 22 June 1944, and last reported her position at 0800, 2 July as 03-29N, 119-26E, stating in addition that an enemy force of 1 B.B, 2 BE, and 1 CV had gotten by her. No further information has been received.

The U.S.S. FLIER departed Fremantle 2 August. On the night of 13 August, the FLIER was making transit through Nasubata Channel. Last sounding was 41 fathoms. Shortly after 2200 there was a terrific explosion, and FLIER sank within a matter of seconds. No enemy surface or air units had been sighted, and there was no evidence of an enemy SS being in the vicinity while survivors were in the water.

Eight survivors including the commanding officer, reached land on 14 August and made contact with a coast watcher's unit. The commanding officer of the FLIER was given information at this time that the ROBAILO sank on 3 July as a result of an explosion in the forward battery compartment, that four survivors including the commanding officer, were made prisoners by the Japanese, and that two of these, including the commanding officer, were shot either deliberately, or while trying to escape.

The record is in the proper form, and the findings and opinion are in accordance with the evidence.

COMINCH directs that the record be forwarded via Commander Seventh Fleet, but since COMINCH is the convening authority, Commander Seventh Fleet, being in a lower echelon, is in no sense a reviewing authority. He merely comments on the record and adds any information that may help the convening authority to evaluate the investigation. His action is not one of "approval" but one of "concurrence".

If F-2 has any additional evidence which would throw light on the loss of these two ships, such should be appended to the suggested endorsement as an enclosure and the endorsement and enclosures attached and bound in front of the first page of the record.

A suggested endorsement is attached.

"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"

— page 129 —
23 September 1944

Commander Seventh Fleet has carefully evaluated the attached record of investigation and concurs (or does not concur *) in the findings of fact and opinion of the investigating officer.

T. C. KINKAID,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander Seventh Fleet.

* (In case of non-concurrence add "in the following instances etc.").

"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"

— page 130 —
1.0 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.25 1.4 1.6

This microfilm is the property of the United States Government

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO—NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

D-62264