U.S.S. POGY (SS-266) — war patrol report SS-266_POGY.pdf

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1943-1945
WWII Patrol File

FORDECK LOSES JANUARY 1943 - JUNE 1945
CONSULT NATIONAL ARCHIVES WHICH HAS
CUSTOMS.

ALL MATERIAL ON THIS REEL IS DECLASSIFIED.

J.A. KOONTZ

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2- USS PGY (SS 266)

The vast of the Central Pacific were not patrolled in haphazard, hit-or-miss fashion. There was the Empire .blockade and the Truk blockade -- submarine concentrations on shipping focal points. Around the Palaus, the Marianas, the Marshalls, and the Gilberts the Submarine Pacific patrols were blocked out as part of a carefully designed pattern.

By July 1943 the sea of Japan was the only area in the Pacific open to enemy shipping, well protected against submarine invasion by geographic and military barriers. The PGY contributed greatly toward forcing Japan to retreat to this small area.

The PGY departed Pearl Harbor on 9 September 1943 for her third war patrol, to be conducted in the Palau area. On the 20th she sighted a five ship convoy. After a two day chase and one unsuccessful attack, two torpedo hits were scored on the largest freighter of the convoy to send 7000 more tons of enemy shipping beneath the waves. No more prey was sighted, and on 20 October 1943, the PGY returned to Pearl Harbor.

On 8 November 1943 Lieutenant Commander R. M. Metcalf, USN, relieved Lieutenant Commander Wales as commanding officer. The ship departed for her patrol area again in the Palau Islands, on 25 November. While still enroute to her assigned area, a large freighter and a submarine tender with an escorting destroyer were sighted on 7 December 1943. In the ensuing attack three torpedoes hit and sank the 6,081 ton submarine tender, and one hit was scored on the freighter. The PGY went deep and sat out an attack of 22 depth charges. She surfaced in the darkness to find the freighter dead in the water with the destroyer circling her. The PGY fired two torpedoes, both smashing hits, and the freighter went under.

On 13 December the PGY picked the plum of this patrol. With two torpedoes she sealed the fate of a 5000 ton transport leaving Palau loaded with troops. The angry escort dropped 27 depth charges during the counter attack, the three close charges caused damage necessitating termination of the patrol. She returned to Midway on 22 December 1943 after only 28 days on patrol.

Formosa, the big island lying at the toe of the Nansai Shoto chain was Japan's second largest colony, and an important source of food for the home Empire. Well aware of the colony's economic status in the Empire, Submarine Pacific Headquarters had marked the Formosa area for special attention. Now, with the war moving westward, Formosa's importance was increasing in the strategic as well as the economic field. The island stood as the main way-station on the Malaya-Netherlands Indies-Philippines trunk line to Japan. Linking the East China and the China Sea, Formosa Strait served as a "protected" waterway for Japanese shipping. The protection was not quite literal, for roaming the southern end of Formosa Strait were U. S. submarines.

On 5 February 1944 this undersea marauder departed Midway on her fifth war patrol for an anti-shipping sweep of this Formosa area. During the morning of the 10th she made contact with a convoy in Bushi Channel off the southern tip of Formosa. Riding herd were three Japanese destroyers. To

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3- USS POGY (SS 266)

Commander Metcalf and his crew this was so much "pogy bait", and they lost no time in maneuvering to attack and fire five torpedoes. The Imperial Navy lost the destroyer MINEKAZE, and the Japanese merchant marine lost the 5,500 ton passenger-cargoman MALTA MARU. Another torpedo hit damaged an additional freighter.

The POGY then headed northward up the east coast of Formosa, and on the 20th of February she caught a convoy on the Tropic of Cancer. Skillful approach and sharp-shooting attack sent two torpedoes slamming into the TAITIN MARU, a freighter of 5,155 tons, and one into the NANYO MARU, a freighter of 3,610 tons; sinking both.

Three days later in Nonsei Shoto waters, the POGY blew the bottom out of another freighter. With a destroyer and four "Marus" to her credit, the POGY hoisted the broom and headed for Pearl Harbor, arriving on 6 March 1944.

On 7 April she departed on her sixth patrol, which was to be conducted in the waters south and east of Japan proper. Just after moonset on the night of 26 April, a Japanese submarine showed its silhouette. The POGY promptly opened fire and the Japanese raider was eliminated from the register.

Continuing her blockade on into May, the POGY attacked and sank a freighter with one torpedo on 5 May. A counter attack of 25 depth charges missed and the POGY went blithely on her way to sink another medium freighter on the 13th. A 20 ton sampan was sunk by gunfire during the afternoon of 16 May, and five of her crew taken prisoner. On the 20th a small trawler was destroyed and on the 29th the POGY arrived back in Pearl Harbor.

She departed Pearl Harbor on 1 June 1944 for a West Coast Navy Yard overhaul, arriving at Hunter's Point, San Francisco, California on the 6th. On 20 June Lieutenant Commander F. G. Molteni, Jr., USN, relieved Lieutenant Commander Metcalf as commanding officer.

Having completed overhaul by 17 September 1944, the POGY departed for Pearl Harbor. After a training period she got underway on 13 October to conduct her seventh war patrol, in the Nansei Shoto and waters south of Japan. No contacts were made during this patrol and the ship returned to Midway on 2 December 1944.

On 27 December the POGY slipped out on her eighth patrol, which was to be conducted in the islands of the Nanpo Shoto. On the 14th an unsuccessful torpedo attack was made on a convoy of three freighters. No other opportunity to attack presented itself during the patrol, and the ship returned to Midway on 11 February 1945. On 22 February Lieutenant Commander J. M. Bowers, USN, relieved Lieutenant Commander P. G. Molteni, Jr., as commanding officer.

On 12 March the POGY was underway for her ninth patrol in the area south of Tokyo Bay. On 19 April, while on lifeguard station, a Liberator on patrol strafed and bombed the POGY by mistake, causing considerable damage. On the 29th she rescued ten Army aviators from a downed B-29, and got underway for Saipan to transfer them. On 6 May she departed Saipan for Pearl Harbor, arriving on 15 May 1945 for refit.

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1st Star/FIRST anti-submarine assessment -- 28 April 1944
1st Star/OKINAWA Gunto Operation
Assault and occupation of Okinawa Gunto -- 21 March - 20 April 1945
1st Star/FIRST Submarine War Patrol -- 15 April - 5 June 1943
1st Star/SECOND Submarine War Patrol -- 26 June - 16 August 1943
1st Star/THIRD Submarine War Patrol -- 9 September - 28 October 1943
1st Star/FOURTH Submarine War Patrol -- 25 November -- 22 December 1943
1st Star/FIFTH Submarine War Patrol -- 15 January - 8 March 1944
1st Star/TENTH Submarine War Patrol -- 2 July - 21 August 1945

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5- USS POGY (ES 66)
For their actions while serving aboard the POGY the following men received awards:

Lieutenant C.I. abder G. H. Wales -- Silver Star and a Gold Star in lieu of a second Silver Star

Lieutenant Commander R. M. Metcalf -- Navy Cross and Gold Star in lieu of a second Navy Cross. Also Legion of Merit.

Lieutenant Reuben Farrior Woodall -- Silver Star

Lieutenant Norman L. Sorenson -- Silver Star

Robert F. Hornberger ETIC -- Bronze Star

Samuel Kenneth Dragett CMMIC -- Bronze Star

Raymond G. Pugsley CMMIC -- Silver Star

The submarine USS POGY was decommissioned and placed in the U. S. Atlantic Reserve Fleet, by Directive of January 1947, and is now berthed at New London, Connecticut.

STATISTICS

OVERALL LENGTH 312 feet

BEAM 27 feet

SPEED 20 knots

DISPLACEMENT 1525 tons

COMPLEMENT 5 officers and 72 men

Compiled: 23 November 1953

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1. FF12-10/A16-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0765
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
June 17, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of First War Patrol.

Enclosure:
(A) Copy of Subject War Patrol Report.
(B) Copy of Comsubdiv 44 Conf. 1tr. FB5-44/A16-3,
Serial 022-B of June 8, 1943.
(C) Copy of Comsubron 4 Conf. 1st. end. FC5-4/
A16-3, Serial 0159 of June 15, 1943.

1. The first war patrol for the POGY was carried out in an aggressive, efficient, and successful manner.

2. The assigned area was well covered, resulting in making fifteen contacts of individual ships or convoys. Of these fifteen contacts, seven aggressive attacks were carried out. Of the seven attacks made, five were successful. The attack on the small destroyer probably resulted in sinking it, but evidence is not conclusive enough to credit it as such.

3. It is of interest to note that the POGY encountered a heavy layer below 250 feet. In this case, the ship had a perfect trim at 300 feet but was forced to pump out four thousand pounds at 250 feet in order to maintain that depth.

4. Another note of interest is the fact the SD radar was able to pick up a 4,000 foot mountain at 90,000 yards and that the SJ picked up the same mountain at 80,000 yards.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this aggressive and successful war patrol. POGY is credited with having inflicted the following damage to the enemy:

| SINK | 1 - Froighter (YANZATO MUR Class) | 6,926 tons |
|------|||
|      | 1 - Froighter (GOSEI MARU Class)     | 1,931 tons |
|      | *2 - Sampans                              | 200 tons   |

*Sunk by gunfire. Total 9,057 tons

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPENWINST 551A.Q. - DECLASSIFIED

SIGNED BY: [Signature]

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPENWINST 551A.Q. - DECLASSIFIED

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1- Destroyer (Glass unknown) - 800 tons
1- Frighther (KISO M.R.U Class) - 4,071 tons
1- Frighther (KEIYO M.R.U Class) - 6,442 tons

TOTAL: 11,313 tons

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
VCNO (5)
Cinepac (5)
Cinelant (2)
Consubsblant (8)
S/M School, M.I. (2)
Consopac (2)
Consowscpce (1)
Consubssowscpce (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Consubspac (10)
SUBU.D, M.I. (2)
Comsubconsubpce (2)
Midway (2)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Subspace (2)
U.S.S. POGY (1)
(COMSUBSP.C Endorsement only)
All Submarines, Subspace (1)

R/C C. LAVIVEN,
Flag Secretary.

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U.S.S. POGY - Report of First War Patrol.

PROLOGUE:
Arrived Pearl from Nantowoc April 5, 1943. Submarine Base accomplished necessary minor repairs; Four day training period. Readiness for sea April 15, 1943.

1. NARRATIVE:
April 15, 1943.
1300 (V) Departed Pearl with PC587 acting as escort.
1600 (V) Made trim dive.
1900 (V) Held SJ radar tracking exercise on escort.
2000 (V) Escort released.

April 16, 1943.
Conducted drills and battle surface each day enroute Midway. Fired 6 rounds 3 inch, 60 rounds 20mm for training.

1455 (V) Sighted PBY plane distance 6 miles.

April 17, 1943.
1228 (V) Sighted PBY plane distance 10 miles.

April 19, 1943.
0830 (Y) Arrived Midway, Received 13,741 gallons fuel. Made minor repairs.
1715 (Y) Departed Midway.

April 20 to 29, 1943.
Enroute Patrol Area. Daily dives and drills.

April 27, 1943.
1310 (J) Sighted smoke-on horizon bearing 305°True. Closed at 18 knots and sighted masts and stack of ship on northwesterly course. Latitude 31-30 N, Longitude 143-57 E - commenced chase at full speed. Target speed was high and he was zigzagging on base course about 335°True. After two hours and a half of full power chasing we had gained very little on him.
1540 (J) Sighted patrol vessel bearing 000°True. He sighted us and headed for us. I reversed course and avoided him at high speed on the surface. Latitude 31-55 N, Longitude 143-40 E. Reluctantly abandoned chase of ship because (1) His high speed made it seem doubtful if we could gain position ahead of him for an attack before next morning when we would be in area. (2) To continue chase would mean gun action with patrol vessel. I did not desire gun action with an armed patrol vessel at this time while enroute to patrol area. (3) Our presence was known and

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0711 (I) Sighted large plane. Dove to 200 feet.
0755 (I) All clear, surfaced. Set course for newly assigned area in accordance with change of orders from CTF 17.

: 0916 (I) Escort headed towards POGY and dropped first barrage of depth charges about 1000 yards. Maneuvered for torpedo shot at escort. More depth charges, escort closing fast. Unable to get good set up on escort, so did not fire.
0850 (I) While ordering deep submergence, took look at target. Target had sunk, leaving surface of water littered with wreckage. Rest of convoy had scattered. Escort dropped more depth charges, none close, total of 15.
0900 (I) Bottomed at 230 feet, unintentionally.
0916 (I) Ahead again, seeking deep water.
1116 (I) One more depth charge. Cleared area to north coast.
1830 (I) Sighted small destroyer or torpedo boat similar to this morning's escort.
1918 (I) Surfaced after dark, all clear.
2240 (I) Radar contact 5000 yards. Battle Stations, commenced tracking.
2339 (I) Fired three torpedoes at small destroyer. Possibly one hit. O.O.D. saw explosion which was also felt and heard on board. Two smaller explosions heard later. Retired at full speed on the surface as radar indicated another ship closing.

-2- ENCLOSURE (A)

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U.S.S. POGY - Report of First War Patrol.

May 2, 1943.

Submerged patrol along Tokyo-Kiska-Attu route.
1815 (I) Sighted sanpan. Made battle surface and destroyed sanpan by gunfire, with 3 inch, 20cm, and .30 and .45 cal. guns. Left sanpan buring brightly and sinking slowly.

May 3, 1943.

Submerged patrol closing coast towards Kinkasan.
Sighted sanpan.
Sighted abandoned life boat, empty.

May 4, 1943.

Closing coast on surface. Sighted many lighted sanpans about 20 miles offshore. Submerged and conducted submerged patrol close to shore, north of Kinkasan.
1345 (I) Sighted northbound freighter and one torpedo boat escort. Attacked and fired 3 torpedoes. Missed. Resumed patrol 5 miles off Kinkasan.

May 5, 1943.

Surfaced patrol between Kinkasan and Shioya Saki. Submerged at day-light off Kinkasan and conducted patrol 3 miles offshore. Navy sanpans sighted during the day.

May 6, 1943.

Surface patrol enroute Kinkasan to Shioya Saki. Submerged patrol off Shioya Saki. Dense fog. Heuded out to sea in afternoon and evening.

May 7, 1943.

Surface patrol closing coast.

May 8, 1943.

Submerged patrol about 10 miles off Shioya Saki.
0624 (I) Sighted southbound convoy of 2 freighters and torpedo boat escort. Started approach.
0821 (I) Abandoned approach, closest range 6000 yards.
0943 (I) Sighted small steamer, southbound similar to a lighthouse tender. Too small for torpedo. Many sampans during the day. Several distant depth charges heard during the day.

May 9, 1943.

Surface patrol at night. Submerged patrol off Shioya Saki in day-light.

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0500 (I) Sighted small patrol vessel.
: 0628 (I) Sighted southbound convoy of 4 freighters, no surface escort, air escort suspected. Commenced approach.
: 0732 (I) Attacked leading ship of inshore column of convoy with 3 torpedoes. One hit. Target slowed but did not stop.
: 0744 (I) Attacked last ship in seaward column with 3 torpedoes. No hits.
: 0745 (I) Aircraft depth bomb exploded very close astern. Ordered deep submergence. Torpedoes in tubes #9 and #10 ran hot and damaged tubes. Gyro compasses out of commission. Considerable minor damage in after torpedo room. Two more depth bombs were received, not close. Several light explosions were heard. Retired to eastward.
: 0844 (I) Nothing in sight. Cleared area to seaward. Reloaded bow tubes. Heard several distant depth charges during day.

May 10, 1943.

: Submerged patrol along Tokyo-ittu-Kiska route.
: 1553 (I) Sighted patrol vessel.
: 1624 (I) Heard distant depth charge.

May 11, 1943.

: 0717 (I) Sighted sanpan. Made battle surface and destroyed with gunfire. Continued Submerged patrol, closing coast.
: 1122 (I) Sighted plane.

May 12, 1943.

: Closing coast. Submerged patrol 3 miles off Kinkasan.
: 0505 (I) Sighted 2 ship convoy, northbound. Impossible to close.
: 0537 (I) Sighted froighter, northbound, probably part of same convoy. Many sampans. Heard several distant depth charges during the morning.
: 1100 (I) Heard distant echo ranging.
: 1119 (I) Sighted patrol vessel.
: 1400 (I) Sighted patrol vessel.

May 13, 1943.

: Submerged patrol off Kinkasan.
: 0409 (I) Sighted destroyer on northerly course. Large angle on bow prevented approach.
: 0816 (I) Sighted 2 ship convoy on southwesterly course. Started approach.
: 0946 (I) Attacked larger ship with 3 torpedoes. One hit. Went to deep submergence to avoid escort closing fast. Light depth charge attack followed. No damage.

-4- ENCLOSURE (A)

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1130 (I) All clear.
1147 (I) Sighted plane. Heard distant depth charge in late afternoon. Opened out to seaward on surface after dark.

May 14, 1943

Surface and submerged patrol.

May 15, 1943

Long Tokyo-Kiska-Attu route.

May 16, 1943

Submerged patrol off Kinkasan.
0504 (I) Sighted 3 ship convoy and escort. Started an rorach. 0627 (I) Abandoned approach, could not close range. 0915 (I) Sighted patrol vessel. Incurved to avoid. Sighted several snamps and two more patrol vessels in close to shore.

May 17, 1943.

Submerged patrol off Kinkasan.
2045 (I) Radar contact at 7000 yards. Connected tracking. Started approach and dived to 40 feet when range decreased to 3500 yards. Did not fire as target was undoubtedly a small patrol vessel. Could not see target through periscope at range of 1800 yards. There has been no traffic offshore but patrol vessels have been sighted offshore on several occasions. I did not want to waste torpedoes on a target I could not see and what I was sure was a small patrol vessel. Visibility was good at the time.

2150 (I) Surfaced and continued patrol, closing coast after completion of battery charge.

May 18, 1943.

Submerged patrol off Kinkasan.
Foor visibility all day.
1025 (I) Sighted patrol vessel.

May 19, 1943.

Submerged patrol offshore.
0335 (I) Heard two distant depth charges. 0510 (I) Sighted patrol vessel.

May 20, 1943.

Submerged patrol off Shioya Saki.
Rain and reduced visibility.

-5-

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1217 (I) Sighted small coastal steamer, not worth a torpedo.
: 21, 22, 23, 1943.
: Patrol led Tokyo-;ttu-Kiska route. I believed that the force was a chance the task force sighted by Swordfish might head this way.
: 22, 1943.
: 0940 (I) Sighted enemy submarine. Started approach. Could not close to firing range.
: 23, 1943.
: 1350 (I) Two distant depth charges.
: 1602 (I) Sighted two patrol vessels.
: 24, 1943.
: Submerged patrol off Kinkasan.
: 045 (I) Sighted two sampans.
: 0600 (I) Fog set in.
: 0835 (I). Heard echo ranging and screws all around until 1200 (I). Visibility less than 500 yards. Ran at 150 feet most of the time and heard screws, through the hull, to right overhead. Visibility improved in the afternoon, still only fair.
: 1503 (I) Sighted patrol vessel.
: 25, 1943.
: Submerged patrol offshore - fog.
: 26, 1943.
: Submerged patrol off Sivoya Saki. Many sampans in sight during the day.

1300 (I) Sighted smoke. Started approach on convoy of two small fire-immers escorted by armed merchantmen.
1356 (I) Fired 3 torpedoes at what appeared to be a tanker but was later identified as small freighter. Heard and saw 2 hits. First hit broke target's back and he started down by the bow. He was sinking with just his stern out of water when I ordered deck submergence to avoid escort closing fast. Escort dropped two depth charges. Not close.
1500 (I) Sighted plane. Cleared area at 150 feet.

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1943

C022 (I) Submerged patrol offshore.
C022 (I) Double full radar contact at 4000 yards, probably sampan. Radar lost contact, almost immediately, and did not regain it.

May 28, 1943

C022 (I) Submerged patrol along Tokyo-Kiska-Attu route.
C022 (I) Sent message to CTF 17 regarding departure from area. Proceeded to NE corner of area.

May 29, 1943

C022 (I) Submerged, approaching exit point.
C022 (I) Set course for Midway.

May 30 to June 5, 1943

C022 (I) Enroute Midway.

June 5, 1943

C022 (I) Rendezvous with air escort.
C022 (I) Moored alongside U.S.S. S'AL at Midway.

2. Weather:
   - **30% of the time, Surface injection temperatures were low - 470 F, and less, except in the Kuroshio, which flows about 70 to 90 miles offshore in this area. There was almost invariably a glassy sea close inshore.**

3. Tidal Information:
   - **Close inshore off Kinkasan, a current of 1/2 to 3/4 of a knot setting 2250T was encountered. This current was strongest near the southern tip of Kinkasan.**

4. Navigational Aids:
   - **Shioya Saki light was burning with listed characteristics, but appeared to be extinguished whenever the Japs had reason to believe we were in the vicinity.**
   - **Shioya Saki lighthouse and the tall stacks at Yotsukura mentioned by the Picketrel in her patrol were good land marks for periscope navigation.**
   - **It is recommended that if information is available, a larger scale chart of this area be prepared.**

- 7 -

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1. 1310(J) April 27  Lat 31-30N 335 18 to 19 Large passenger freighter.
2. 1540(J) April 27  Lat 31-55N 180 15 Patrol vessel.
3. 0936(J) April 29  Lat 35-05N 130 5 Large samoan.
4. 0600(I) May 1  Off Shiroy Sak  Many samoan.
5. 0752(I) May 1  Off Shiroy Sak 180 15 Small destroyer or torpedo boat.
6. 1830(I) May 1  Long 141-30E 325 10 Small destroyer or torpedo boat.
7. 2240(I) May 1  Long 142-08E 325 10 Small destroyer or torpedo boat.
8. 1815(I) May 2  Long 143-40E 325 10 Small destroyer or torpedo boat.
9. 1319(I) May 4  Off Kinikasan 000 10 Medium freighter-l escort.
10. 0624(I) May 8  Off Shiroy Sak 180 9 2 ship convoy-l escort.
11. 0943(I) May 8  Off Shiroy Sak 180 10 Small unidentified vessel.
12. 0500(I) May 9  Off Shiroy Sak 180 10 Patrol vessel.
13. 0628(I) May 9  Off Shiroy Sak 180 8 4 ship convoy-air escort only.
14. 1553(I) May 10  Long 142-53E 000 10 Patrol vessel.
15. 0717(I) May 11  Long 143-12E 000 10 Long 143-12E.
16. 0505(I) May 12  Off Kinikasan 000 9 3 ship convoy.
17. 1119(I) May 12  Off Kinikasan 000 9 3 ship convoy.
18. 0409(I) May 13  Off Kinikasan 330 10 Destroyer.
19. 0816(I) May 13  Off Kinikasan 225 8 2 ship convoy-l escort.
20. 0504(I) May 16  Off Kinikasan 045 8 3 ship convoy-l escort.
21. 0915(I) May 16  Off Kinikasan 180 10 3 patrol vessels.
22. 1025(I) May 18  Off Kinikasan 180 10 Patrol vessel.
23. 0810(I) May 19  Long 142-35E 000 10 Patrol vessel.
24. 1217(I) May 20  Off Shiroy Sak 000 10 Small coastal steamer.
25. 0940(I) May 22  Long 143-07E 045 10 Submarine (I-52?).
26. 1802(I) May 23  Long 142-12E 135 10 2 patrol vessels.
27. 1503(I) May 24  Off Kinikasan 180 10 Patrol vessel.
28. 1300(I) May 26  Off Shiroy Sak 000 12 3 ship convoy.

6. Description of Aircraft Sighted:
   - NO.  TIME  DATE  POSITION  COURSE  ALTITUDE  DESCRIPTION
1. 0710(J) April 28 10 miles 090° 180 1000 Large landplane.
2. 1122(I) May 11  Long 143-05E 090 1500 Unidentified.
3. 1147(I) May 13  South of Kinikasan 090 1500 Unidentified.
4. 1500(I) May 26  Off Shiroy Sak 090 1000 Small landplane.

ENCLOSURE (A)

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7. Summary of Submarine Attacks: (See attached summary sheet)

Attack #1: - Reached position ahead of convoy and tried to get inshore but a zig-placed me dead ahead of the inshore column. Opened out for a stern shot but target got by at close range. Fired, after gyro angles caught up, with a large gyro angle, but with a fairly decent track angle due to another zig towards. Torpedo run was 1000 yards and 40 seconds after firing first torpedo, a tremendous explosion occurred with smoke rising 500 feet in the air. Five minutes later, smoke was still there but target had sunk leaving much wreckage on the water. Maneuvered for a set up on the escort but was forced to go deep when he headed right for us. Target was similar to YAMAZATO MARU 6900 ton page 73, ONI 208-J.

Attack #2: - Attack was conducted by radar only on surface at night. Just before firing, the 0.0.D. sighted outline of target and identified it as a destroyer. Since there were small destroyers and torpedo boats searching the area for us, I believe this to be one of them. At this time radar got two indications on the screen on the same bearing but at different ranges (1000 yards about). Fired three torpedoes with some delay in getting third torpedo out. One minute and thirty-five seconds after firing third torpedo, indicating a hit. Two lesser explosions and this was also heard and felt below, first two torpedoes exploding at the end of their runs. First explosion time checks for a run of 2400 yards. The second radar indication then disappears. This is evidence of one ship damaged and probably sunk. Heard ship.

Attack #3: - This was a very poorly executed attack. Again I was caught ahead of the target and while opening out for a stern shot, the target went by at close range. Fired with a large gyro angle and large track angle. Missed. I should not have fired at all. Wasted three torpedoes. Target was old 3500 ton coal burner with high stack.

Attacks #4 and #5: - Reached position ahead of convoy and between the two columns. Fired three torpedoes at leading ship of inboard column. Thirty seven seconds after firing first torpedo heard explosion as torpedo hit. Time checks for predicted 900 yard run. Personnel below heard two hits but I believe there was only one, as target kept right on going although he slowed down and took a list to port. Swing and fired three torpedoes at last ship in outboard column and upped the speed estimate 15 knots. Set up looked good but all torpedoes missed. I saw the wake of one cross right under target's stern. At this time an aircraft bomb exploded close aboard and we went deep. Target hit was a 4000 ton ship similar to Kiso Maru page 131, ONI 208J.

Attack #6: - This was a long high speed approach resulting in firing on a fairly large track, due to initial distance from track. Fired three torpedoes and sixty-three seconds after firing third torpedo heard one hit. This checks

— page 20 —
7
Time - Use C.C.T.
Date
Lat.)
Location - (Long.)
Number and Type Torpedoes
Fired on Each Attack
Hits
Number Sunk (Tonnage)
Number Damaged or
Probably Sunk (Tonnage)
Type of Target
Range
Type of Attack: Periscope (P)
Surface (S) Night (N) Radar (R)
Estimated Draft of Target
Torpedo Depth Setting
Bow or Stern Shot
Track Angle
Gyro Angle
Estimated Target Speed
Firing Interval
Spread-Amount and Kind
Was Torpedo Performance
Satisfactory?
Remarks: None.

(10-A)

— page 21 —
16:00
U.S.S. POGY - Report of First War Patrol.

with predicted 1600 yard torpedo run. I did not observe damage as escort was very close and headed right for us. Sound lost contact with target almost immediately as we went to deep submergence. Target was 6000 tons similar to Kojo Maru page 76, ONI 208J.

Attack #7: This was an easy approach as targets were not zig-zagging. First ship was a small armed merchantman as escort. Second ship was small freighter. Third ship looked like a tanker until just before firing when he was identified as 2000-ton freighter similar to Gosoi Haru, pago 255, ONI 208J. Fired three torpedoes and saw and heard first two hit. Times of explosions choked for predicted 1300 yard run. First hit broke target's back and he started sinking by the bow. Escort was now headed right for us and very close so went deep.

In all these attacks, except #2, the conditions wore unfavorable for periscope exposures because of glassy seas.

8. Enemy A/S Measures:

All shipping in this area is routed close to shore and passes the two focal points, Shioya Saki and Kinkesan, in escorted convoys about two miles offshore. No shipping other than convoys was sighted. Escorts were old, small destroyers, torpedo boats, or small armed merchantmen. On one occasion air escort was encountered. Convoys usually have only one escort who stays to seaward and on the quarter of the convoy. After an attack, other A/S vessels quickly appear on the scene as well as aircraft which then search the vicinity for about two hours. It is believed that there is a base for patrol vessels in the bay north of Kinkasan.

Numerous patrol vessels were sighted in the area. Those consist of old destroyers, torpedo boats and yacht like vessels with sempan bows and

— page 22 —
1. U.S.S. POGY - Report of First War Patrol.

tall masts with crows nests. The latter are armed with about a 3 in. gun and machin guns, and probably depth charges. Some of the destroyers and torpedo boats have echo ranging equipment and some just listening equipment.

One and probably both of the two saupans attacked had a machine gun mounted on top of the deck house. Both had radio and sent out signals until silenced by our gunfire. In the second case, a plane appeared in the area within an hour.

Depth charge attacks were short. However, the area was usually searched for at least twenty-four hours after an attack. The aircraft bomb on lay 9 landed too close for comfort.

9. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS.

None observed.

10. LLJOR DEFECTS EXPERIENCED.

Hull.

1. Bow plane shafting developed excessive noise in forward battery compartment. Believed to be a universal joint out of alignment.

2. Trim pump is very noisy below periscope depth.

ORDNANCE.

1. Double loading stops on the 20mm guns operate sluggishly and cause guns to jam.

ENGINEERING.

1. Experienced 2 cracked liners, #9 unit, #4 min engine on I-1Y 11, 1943. This is the 3rd casualty on this unit since the commissioning date. A spare head was installed after the 3rd casualty and no further trouble has been seen. A pressure test will be requested for this apparently faulty head upon arrival at Submarine Base. Head on this unit used 637 hours. 2nd liner used 475 hours. 3rd liner used 6 hours.

2. No. 2 coriscope when being lowered and raised made excessive noise. Trouble undetermined but it is believed to be in the lower hoist twist bearing. Hoisting gear and motor should be disassembled for inspection during Refit period.

ENCLOSURE (.)

- 12 -

— page 23 —
3. May 21, 1943, lost power on bow planes. Cause: Broken contact arm on series relay in control panel in forward torpedo room. Replaced contact arm with spare.

4. May 26, 1943 lost power on bow planes. Cause: Contact button on contact arm of accelerating relay sheared off in control panel in forward torpedo room.

5. May 29, 1943 burned out field clutch switch on: "3 generator in main control cubicle. Disassembled and replaced with spares, 2 contact plates, 2 stationary contacts and 1 removable contact. Cause: Presumed to be in operation of clutch when generator was not in use.

6. Pitometer Log - continually cut of commission, principally due to leakage through bellows seal in pump unit. Partially corrected to give fairly accurate results by soldering on a new face for the carbon seal; original one found to be badly pitted. New Pump will be requested during refit period.

7. May 9, 1943, casualty to master compass due to vibration from aircraft bomb breaking both vacuum gages and destroying balance on compass. Rebalanced compass and operated by using rotor armotor instead of vacuum gages.

8. May 9, 1943, casualty to auxiliary gyro - same bomb as above following successful attack on enemy. Loss of mercury and deviation replaced to proper level.

9. April 15, 1943, Fuel Oil pump, No. 1 main engine failed to produce proper fuel oil pressure without using detached pump. Cause: Bronze bushings in fuel oil pump. Refit Base Highway inserted now on No. 2 main engine. Engine fuel oil pressure failed under load. Pump removed and disassembled - broken drive shaft found, caused by seized bushings. Four new bushings, one fuel oil drive shaft and key drawn from sub spares. Refit crew assembled new bushings on new drive shaft with proper clearance. Fuel pump reassembled by ship's force, installed on No. 2 main engine and no further trouble has been experienced.

11. RADIO RECEPTION.

Radio reception was excellent on the eight thousand band during the schedules every night. The low frequency Fox could not be heard in the area. It was picked up returning from area at 1500 E on the surface and not at all submerged.

— page 24 —
U.S.S. POGY - Report of First War Patrol.

No messages were sent or received on 450 IC.

Radio reception was not complete. Consubmarine serial 83 was missed on May 25.
Last message sent NYRU 030336 June.
Last message received NYRU 276 ConsubPac's 051811 June.

12. SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS.

Sound conditions were invariably good in vicinity of Shioya Sakii, and they varied from good to bad near Kinkasan. Upon several occasions, fish noises were heard that resembled a. car. penter at work saving.

Density layers were observed upon numerous occasions between one hundred feet and periscope depth. On May 1, near Shioya Sakii, the trim was good at 300 feet, but the boat was four thousand pounds heavy at 250 feet.

13. HEALTH AND HEALTHBILITY.

The health of the officers and crew was exceptionally good. Only two admissions of Catarrhal fever acute and one case of undiagnosed malaria fever that responded promptly to quinine therapy. Total of sick days was six. There were no injuries.

Habitability was normal. Cooks, mess cooks and mess attendants were allowed to shower daily. The crew was allowed to shower weekly. Trichophytoisis was practically stamped out during this period by local treatment and the use of Cresol on the decks of the showers daily. No known cases aboard at present. The food was good, nourishing, and plentiful. The ultraviolet lamp was not used due to the location at the present being in the forward torpedo room where, when the injection of the water is 50°F. or lower; it was too cold for the men to remove their clothing.

14. HILLS STEAD ENROUTE TO AND FROM STATION.

Pearl to Midway 1274
Midway to Area 2840
In Area 2898
Area to Midway 2178
Total 9190

-14- INCLUSION (.)

— page 25 —
15. FUEL EXPENDED.

Pearl to Midway
Midway to area
In area
Area to Midway
Total
Received 13,741 gallons at Midway.

16. F.CTORS OF ENDURANCE RATING.

Torpedoes
3
Fuel
17,554
Provisions(days)
10
Fresh Water
Indefinite
Personnel (days)
5

17. None

18. REMARKS.

A. Radar

SD-2 The enemy plane, sighted on April 27 at five miles was not picked up on Radar. Several days later, with no adjustments having been made, SD picked up 4000 foot mountain at 45 miles. (80000yds. on SJ).

SJ
SJ radar was out of commission only one night in the area. The trouble was traced to one of the 836 tubes in the H.B. rectifier in which a short appeared only when the tube was normally for several minutes after the turn on, then the 6 amp. fuse in the leads to the 1000 volt circuit of the H.V. would burn out. All blower motors required cleaning after 625 hours of operation as they were causing excessive interference on the screen. At 640 hours, bad focus was traced to excessive voltage across bank of neon lights if receiver-indicator unit. After an all day dive, we have found it necessary to remove condensation from collector rings. A portable electric hot air heater was used for the purpose.

- 15 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 26 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.

Subject: U.S.S. PCGY - Report of First War Patrol - Comments.

1. The First War Patrol of PCGY covered a period of fifty-one days, thirty of which were spent in the patrol area. Patrol was terminated in accordance with provisions of operation order.

2. The first contact was made before PCGY reached her patrol area approximately 250 miles from the coast of Japan, and while this was undoubtedly a valuable target the Commanding Officer's reasons for abandoning the chase are considered sound.

3. PCGY made six daylight periscope attacks against freighters under air or surface escort and one night surface attack against a destroyer. Attacks were conducted aggressively and skillfully showing close attention to detail on the part of the Commanding Officer and the Control Party. Damage was inflicted on the enemy in five of the seven attacks.

4. The sea was smooth during the time the PCGY was in the patrol area which increased the hazard of being sighted, particularly from aircraft. Air and surface escorts were effective in forcing PCGY to deep submergence and thus prevented follow-up of attacks on convoys.

5. Attention is invited to the statement under section 8 of the patrol report that both sampans attacked by the PCGY had radio equipment and sent out signals until silenced by gun fire. In connection with the attacks on the sampans, the Commanding Officer was favorably impressed with the effectiveness of high capacity 3 inch ammunition in setting the sampans on fire.

6. The aircraft bomb which was dropped near the PCGY on May 9 gave the submarine a bad few moments. Both the master and auxiliary gyros were put out of commission and hot runs occurred in numbers 9 and 10 torpedo tubes.

7. At the time of the hot runs in the tubes the outer doors were open, gyro spindles were engaged, guide studs were against stop bolts and tubes were ready to fire. The torpedoes went past the stop bolts, but governors tripped and torpedoes did not leave the tubes. The torpedo in number 10 tube had to be pushed back into the tube by the outer door, putting a strain on

— page 28 —
15/4/46-3
Serial 0159
FC5-4/A16-3
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR
1d
Care of Flot Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
June 15, 1943.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CSD 44 Conf. 1tr. FB5-44/
A16-3, Scri1 022-B of
June 8, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Flot.

Subject: U.S.S. PCG - Report of First War Patrol - Comments.

1. FORTY-FOUR are complete and are concurred in.

2. The Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew on an aggressive and successful patrol.

ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 29 —
1/2
FF12-10/416-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET 1d
Ser: DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
26 August 1943.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
POGY Report of Second
War Patrol dated 8-16-43.

COMSUBSPEC PATROL REPORT NO. 240
U.S.S. POGY - SECOND WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Second War Patrol,
(26 June to 16 August 1943).

Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject war patrol report.
(B) Copy of Comsubdiv 43 Conf. 1st. end. FB5-43/416-3,
Serial (0121) dated 17 August 1943.
(C) Copy of Comsubron 4 Conf. 2nd. end. FC5-4/416-3,
Serial 0218 dated 21 August 1943.

1. The second war patrol of the POGY was spent in the TRUK and MARIANAS Islands areas.

2. Of the five contacts made the POGY was able to carry out attacks on four. All attacks were aggressively carried out. The attack on an important, three ship, escorted convoy was outstanding. Unable to close the convoy in a daytime periscope attack, the POGY surfaced, chased the convoy, and subsequently made a night radar attack, sinking a large seaplane tender.

3. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia award.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this aggressive and successful patrol.

5. The POGY is credited with inflicting the following damage to the enemy:

SUNK
1 - Seaplane Tender (KINUGASA MARU class) - 15,650 tons
DAMAGED
1 - Freighter (class unknown) - 3,000 tons

DECLASSIFIED-AKT. 0445, OPNAVINST 5519.1C
BY O-0496 DATE 11/12
Distribution and authentication on following page
C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.
-1-
DECLASSIFIED

— page 30 —
12/10/46-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01170
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
POGY Report of Second
War Patrol dated 8-16-43.

CJMSUSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 240
U.S.S. POGY - SECOND WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Second War Patrol, (26 June to 16 August 1943).

1. DISTRIBUTION:
   - (1) Encl. Reports
   - (2) Cmdr. Reports
   - (3) Intl. Cen. Pac.
   - (4) Ocean Areas
   - (5) Ser./Corps
   - (6) (Adv. Base Plan.Unit (1)
   - (7) Enclant
   - (8) Corusubiant
   - (9) 3/T School, NL
   - (10) 3/Subspace
   - (11) Cmdr./Subspace
   - (12) 2/1/2
   - (13) 2/T 16
   - (14) Cmdsubspace
   - (15) S/TED, MI
   - (16) Cmdsubspace/Subordcom(2)
   - (17) All Squadron and Div.
   - (18) Commenders, Subspace (2)
   - (19) U.S.S. POGY (1)
   - (20) (Endorsements only)
   - (21) All Submarines, Subspace (1).

R.C. LAVVER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 31 —
1943
Arrived 1idway June 5, 1943 after first war patrol.
Formal refit by Submarine Base, 1idway. Training
period June 22-23, 1943. Not departed nor wiped.
Readiness for sea June 26, 1943.

: 1943
June 26, 1943
1300 (Y) Departed 1idway for patrol area. Daily dives and
drills enroute.

June 27, 1943
Onitted from calendar.

June 29, 1943
Enroute patrol area.

1025 (L) Sighted plane, submerged.

1130 (L) Surfaced.

July 1, 1943
Patrolled submerged east of 'fake Island during the
day. To shipping or planes sighted. Treck still
high on reef.

July 2 to 4, 1943
Enroute patrol area.

July 4, 1943
1500 (K) Entered area.

July 5, 1943
On station, patrolling submerged east of Pulan
Island.

1800 (K) Sighted two ships to westward. Commenced approach.

1815 (K) Sunset.

— page 32 —
1901 (X) In rapidly failing twilight, fired three torpedoes at leading ship and two torpedoes at second ship. One hit (XII) only in first ship.

: 1907 (K) Depth charges and gunfire.

: 2002 (X) Surface in pursuit. Sighted glow of searchlight over horizon astern. Relieved this to be escort rejoining.

: 2115 (X) Radar and sight contact on the two ships at 15000 yards. At this time escort, who had overhauled us Submerged to avoid escort. No depth charges.

: 2300 (K) Surfaced.

July 6-9, 1943

: Surface and submerged patrol between Panonuito and Tall Islands.

July 10, 1943

: Submerged patrol on Espiric - Truk route.

1926 (X) Surfaced. SJ radar out of commission.

2016 (X) Sighted three ships to westward about 12000 yards on southerly course.

2019 (X) Submerged in bright moonlight as destroyer headed toward us. Radar still out. Escort several distant explosions. Destroyer closed to about 5000 yards and then opened out.

2130 (X) Surfaced.

July 11-15, 1943

: Surface and submerged patrol in vicinity of Hurilo Islands.

July 14-15, 1943

: Surface and submerged patrol between East Puy and Gorvin Islands.

July 14, 1943

: 1700 (X) Escort distant echo ranging.

: 1605 (K) Sighted patrol vessel to southeast, distance 15000 yards, on northerly course.

— page 33 —
U.S.S. FOGY - Report of Second War Patrol.

July 15, 1943

1216 (K) Sighted task force of two aircraft carriers, one auxiliary carrier, plus cruisers and destroyers. Unable to close to firing position. Enemy spccd about 25 knots, course south-southeast.

July 16-19, 1943

Surfce and submerged patrol vcst of East Feyu Island.

July 20, 1943

Surfce and submerged patrol southcast of Ulul Island.

1355 (K) Record distant echo ranging.

1438 (K) Sighted convoy of 4 ships and one destroyer escort. Corrwnced approach.

1614 (K) Fired four torpedoes at closest ship in convoy. Iissocd. Target apparently sighted torpedo vacks and successfully encnuvccrd to avoid.

1619 (K) Started evasive tactics at deep surfcrcgncc to avoid depth charge attack. Eight depth charges. None clc.

1900 (K) Surfccd. Radar and sight contact on escort at 5600 yards. Iicnuvccrd at full spccd on surface to avoid.

1942 (K) Sighted flashing light of another escort, apparently signalling. To wcrc bctwccn thcsc two ships. Clcarcd area to northcast.

July 21, 1943

Surfce and submerged patrol north of Fagur Island.

1800 (K) Set course for area 14 south.

July 22-23, 1943

Patrolling Guam-Saipan-Truk route cnroute to area 14 south.

— page 34 —
1943
- Submerged patrol, reconnoitring east coast of Guernsey.
  No signs of building or other activity.

July 25-26, 1943.
- Enroute assigned area, patrolling across Empire-Truk routes.

July 27-30, 1943.
- Surface and submerged patrol, in assigned areas, on Empire-Truk routes.

July 28, 1943.
- 1400 (K) Sighted floating mine, Lat. 14-33N Long. 152-38E.
  Unsuccessfully attempted to sink with 20mm. and rifle fire.

July 31, 1943.
- Surface patrol, to north of assigned area, on Empire-Truk routes.

0418 (K) Radar and sight contact on four shins to northeast, distance 10,000 yards. Started tracking on surface.

0530 (K) With enemy masts just visible on eastern horizon from top of our periscope shears, enemy apparently sighted us at range of 25,000 yards, and challenged with searchlight. Opened out on surface and started and around chase.

1235 (K) Reached position 30,000 yards ahead of convoy.

1321 (K) Submerged on estimated track of convoy.

1843 (K) Sighted smoke of convoy. Coronated approach. Convey apparently changed base course. Unable to close to firing range. Observed three ships with one destroyer escort. Ships were:

(1) KANSAI IARU (XAV) or KITUGASA IARU (XAV)
(2) KAIOCAIA IARU (XAV)
(3) Unidentified 5000 ton coal burning freighter

— page 35 —
1805 (X) Surface in pursuit of convoy.

1900 (X) Sonar contact report.

2120 (K) Radar and sight contact on convoy at 14,000 yards.

2355 (K) In position 4000 yards off the track range 10,000 yards. Submerged to 40 feet and commenced approach.

2350 (K) Went to 55 feet and used generated ranges, sound and maneuver bearings. Visibility good, clear, star-light, no men.

August 1, 1943

0002 (K) Fire four torpedoes. The hits (torpedo) in largest ship. Target scores stopped. Went deep to avoid contact. Gunfire until -

0012 (K) When escort crew moved two depth charges near firing point, then started supersonic search. Series of sharp explosions followed by very loud rumbling heard throughout the ship and lasted over 10 minutes. Noise sounded like an earthquake. This was terminated by a loud but dull, heavy explosion, as target presumably blew up and sank. It is believed that this target sank although slight evidence is lacking. Target was NAVAL SHIP AURU or KATUGAASA AURU.

C053 (K) Report's account stopped but echo ringing continued. Sound very faint. First scores of a motorboat in vicinity of shore.

0150 (K) Started training to use 2nd and went to bridge for 1.5 hours. Range 5,000 yards. Echoes coming, and apparently clicking on survivors. Through 2nd depth, so 2nd deck again.

0208 (K) The surface scores started up. No dropped one depth charge, not close, then echoed out to southward.

0300 (K) Surface the closest individual crew as escort was in 3rd or horizon about 5,000 yards.

0509 (K) Surface, during the forenoon, area was searched by escort raising and several distant depth charges were heard. Remained submerged during day. Patrolled Patrol-Truk routes.

- 5 -

— page 36 —
U.S.S. POGY - Report of Second War Patrol.

August 2, 1943

Surfaced patrol on Epicure-Truk routes.

1200 (K) Set course for Ulul Island.

1305 (K) Sighted floating mine Lat. 12-25N Long. 151-46 E.

2035 (K) Due to post situation set course for Johnston Island. Sent dispatches to Consul.

August 4, 1943

0735 (K) Set course 270° True for position on Epicure-Truk routes.

August 5, 1943

Surfaced and submerged patrol on Epicure-Truk routes.

August 6, 1943

.0020 (K) Set course for Johnston Island. Sent dispatches to Consul.

August 7-14, 1943

Enroute Johnston Island.

August 10, 1943

1134 (L) Radar contact on plane, distance 8 miles. Submerged. Flare not sighted.

1156 (L) Sunken.

August 12, 1943

1030 (Y) Sighted ZBY patrol plane. Exchanged recognition signal.

August 14, 1943

0717 (X) Reported Johnston Island. Received 12,000 gallons fuel.

1050 (X) Underway on route Pearl.

August 16, 1943

: 1000 Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

— page 37 —
1804(K) 7-22  Convoy of 2 18000
July 5 149-SE  Freighters 9 kts.

: 2015(K) 10-34  Convoy of 3 12000
July 10 150-SE  unidentified
ships.

: 1805(K) 8-41  Patrol
July 14 151-:  Jessel
: 1216(K) 8-41  Task Force 12000
July 15 151-33E

: 1433(K) 8-22  Convoy of 4 18000
July 20 149-44E  Freighters
1 DD escort

: 0418(K) 13-56N  Convoy of 3 10000
July 31 152-00E  ships
1 DD escort

: 1443(K) 8-22  Convoy of 4 18000
July 20 149-44E  Freighters
1 DD escort

: 1443(K) 8-22  Convoy of 4 18000
July

— page 38 —
10. TIDE-DATE LATITUDE-LONGITUDE DESCRIPTION:
1. 1025 (L) 25-23E 173-51E
2. 1237 (K) 8-35N 151-14E
3. 1025 (L) 6-42N 151-35E
4. 1237 (K) 8-35N 151-14E
5. 1025 (L) 6-42N 151-35E
6. 1237 (K) 8-35N 151-14E
7. 1025 (L) 6-42N 151-35E
8. 1237 (K) 8-35N 151-14E
9. 1025 (L) 6-42N 151-35E
10. 1237 (K) 8-35N 151-14E

(11) Attack Date:
See report forms.

(I) Lines:
Two floating mines sighted. See narrative.

(J) Anti-Submarine Escuress and Evasion Tactics:
To new counter measures were noted. Convoy were escorted by destroyers which echo renged continuously. On two occasions planes were observed about 60 miles north of Truk before shipping was due to pass through the area.

(K) Major Defects or Damage:
#2 main engine outboard exhaust valves located seriously and often fails to operate by hydraulic power, particularly after a deep dive. Opening and closing by hand several times seems to remedy this difficulty until it is too much to do. The operating gear of this exhaust valve will be disassembled and inspected during the coming refit period.

All five engine outboard exhaust valves leaked seriously at different times. It was necessary to send man on deck on occasions to grind in exhaust valves. This trouble was not experienced on the first war patrol.

- 8 -

— page 39 —
U.S.S. TOBY - Report of Second War Patrol.
SUBMARINE ATTACKS

| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Attack | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Time | 0702 | 0703 | 0619 | 1200 |
| Date | 7-5-13 | 7-5-13 | 7-20-23 | 7-31- |
| Location | (Lat.) | 0702510 | 0702510 | 0802145 | 111216 |
|          | (Long.) | 14903515 | 14903515 | 1492810 | 153352 |
| Number and type | Tor-3. | 2-2. | 3-1. | 3-1. | 3-1. |
| torpedoes fired on each attack | 1-1. | 1-1. | 1-1. | 1-1. | 1-1. |
| Hits | None | None | None | None | None |
| Number sunk (Torpedo) | - | - | - | 15,000 |
| Number damaged or | 5000 | - | - | - |
| Probably sunk (Torpedo) | - | - | - | - |
| Type of Target | Torpedo | Torpedo | Torpedo | Torpedo |
| Range | 1200 yds. | 1500 yds. | 2950 yds. | 2400 yds. |
| Type of Attack: | Periscope(P) | P | P | P | P |
| Surface (S): | 1st (L) | 1st | 1st | 1st | 1st |
| Estimated drift of target | 10ft | 8 ft. | 10 ft. | 10 ft. | 10 ft. |
| Torpedo depth setting | 8 ft. | 8 ft. | 10 ft. | 10 ft. | 10 ft. |
| Bow or Stern shot | 7", 100', 100', 110', 118',

— page 40 —
1. U.S.S. POGY - Report of Second War Patrol.
2. Torpedo Attack Report Sheet
3. Torpedo Attack No. 1
4. Patrol No. 2
5. Time - 1902 LZT
6. Date - 7/5/43
7. Latitude - 07°-25' Long. 149°-3j
8. Target Data - Damage Inflicted
9. Description:
   - Convoy, 2 ships, contact by meriscope, visibility good at first, poor at last.
10. Ship(s) Sunk: - None.
11. Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: - 1 - AP or AK, 3000 tons displacement.
12. Damage Determined by: -
    - Board torpedo hit, saw smoke around target after hit.
13. Target Draft: 18 foot Course 065° Speed 8 kts. Range: 1200 (at firing)
14. Own Ship Data
15. Speed: 4 kts. Course: 200° True Depth: 64 ft. Angle: 13° D. (at firing)
16. Fire Control and Torpedo Data
17. Type attack: -
    - Periscope attack made after sunset. | misses due to errors in estimated enemy course and range caused by poor visibility. Used TDC and periscope for firing.
18. - 10 -

— page 41 —
U.S.S. POGY - Report of Second War Patrol.

| Subject: | Tubes Fired | #1 | #2 | #5 |
|||----|----|----|
| Track Angle | 74°        | 75° | 80° | 334 |
| Gyro Angle | 536        | 550 | 534 | 0 ft. |
| Depth Set | 3 ft.      | 3 ft. | 3 ft. | 0 ft. |
| Power | High      | High | High | High |
| Hit or Miss | Miss     | Hit | Miss | Miss |
| Erectile | No        | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No | 22419     | 22731 | 25475 | 6-1 |
| Mark Exploder | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 |
| Serial No | 6090     | 5731 | 6239 | 16 |
| Actuation set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation actual | None | None | None | None |
| Mark Torpedo | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No | 5752     | 9292 | 4395 | 10 |
| Explosive | TPX      | TNT | TNT | TNT |
| Firing Interval | - | 7" | - | 10" |
| Type Spread | Divers. | Divers. | Divers. | Divers. 4° |
| Sec Conditions | Smooth | Smooth | Smooth | Smooth |
| Overhaul Activity | S/1: Base, Midway Is- land, T.H. | S/1: Base, Midway Is- land, T.H. | S/1: Base, Midway Is- land, T.H. | S/1: Base, Midway Is- land, T.H. |

- 11 -

— page 43 —
U.S.S. POGY - Report of Second War Patrol.

Tubes Fired #4 #5
Track angle 93P 99P
Gyro angle 002 356
Depth set 3 ft. 0 ft.
Power "high High
Kit or miss Miss
Erratic No No
Mark torpedo 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No 23543 23793
Mark exploder 6-1 6-1
Serial No 5045 14787
Actuation set Contact Contact
Actuation actual None None
Mark varhcad 16 16
Serial no 301 6540
Explosive TPX TTT
Firing interval - 8 sec. -
Type spaced Diverg. Diverg. 30
Sea condition Smooth
Overall Activity S/li Base, lid- S/li Base, it- way Island, T.H. way Islands, T.H.

Remarks

- 13 -

— page 44 —
U.S.S. POGY - Report of Second War Patrol.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT

U.S.S. POGY (SS226) Torpedo Attack No. 3 Patrol No. 2

Time: 1619 LZT Date: 7/20/43 Latitude: 08-14'5" Long.1490-420'0"E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Convoy of six (6) ships, four (4) merchantmen and two (2) escorts. Target selected was either an AK or AP of the TAIGE. ARU type (5,600 tons, speed 10-11 kts., length 410', draft 3-24', oil burning).

Ship's Sunk: None.

Ship(s) Damaged or Hired. Probably Sunk:

Damage determined by: None.

Target Draft: 20ft. Course: 075°True Speed: 8kts. Range: 2950 yds. (at firing).

Own Ship Data

Speed: 3.0 kts. Course: 138°True Draft: 64 ft. Angle: 15°(at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Periscope attack made in daytime. Used TDC and periscope for firing. Illnesses probably caused by target sighting torpedo wakes and maneuvering to avoid.

- 14 -

— page 45 —
15 -

Subject: U.S.S. POGY - Report of Second War Patrol

Tubes Fired #1 #2 #3 #4

Track Angle 108P 110P 111P 111P

Gyro Angle 010 009.5 009 009

Depth Set 10 ft. 10 ft. 10 ft. 10 ft

Power High High High High

Hit or Miss Miss Miss Miss

Erratic No No No No

Mark Torpedo 14-3A 14-1A 14-3A 14-3A

Serial No 23521 19844 23649 22541

Mark Exploder 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1

Serial No 6127 5738 6241 14822

Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact

Actuation Actual None None None

Mark 'parched 16 16 16 16

Serial No 964 3870 490 1000

Explosive TPX .TPX TNT TPX

Firing Interval 3" 3" 3" 3"

Type Spread Diverg. 10 Diverg. 10 Diverg. 10 Diverg.

Sea Conditions Scrolls.

Overhaul Activity S/1: Base, S/1: Base, Ilday Isl. way Island, Ilday Isl. - Ilday T.H. T.H. land, T.H. Island, T.H.

Remarks:

— page 46 —
002 LZT Dt: 3/1/43 Letitude: 110-16°5' Long: 1550-34'0"E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:
Convoy, 3 ships and one escort (small destroyer). Target was KAI'SAI or KII'UGASA IARU. Visibility was poor, about 2000-3000 yards. First contact was by "SJ" radar.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: KAI'SAI or KII'UGASA IARU, XAV, 15,000 tons displacement, 460 ft. length. (2600 gross tonnage).

Damage Determined by: Heard two torpedoes hit, then heard ship break up amidst a series of deep, rumbling explosions. These loud noises and explosions lasted for a period of at least 20 minutes and were terminated by a heavy, dull explosion.

Target Draft: 18ft. Course: 155°True Speed: 9 kts. Range: 2400 yar.

Own Ship Data

Speed: 4 kts. Course: 084°True Depth: 55ft. Angle: 1°D (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Approach was made on surface at night using radar. Attack was made at periscope depth using TDC and periscope for firing.

- 16 -

— page 48 —
15:30 UTC, 13 July 1943
Radio: U.S.S. POGY - Report of Second War Patrol.

(1) Radio:
Radio reception was complete with no difficulty. Exceeded in copying API on high frequency. For schedule could seldom be heard on 16.50 in the areas.

NPI was heard submerged with loop depth 20 feet at a maximum distance of 1200 miles with signal strength of one to three depending on ship's heading.

Five transmissions were made outside Pearl 1000 mile circle, all on 8470 KGs. In case case, several stations answered to "LQCI"; and a receipt was obtained without undue delay.

Observations were made after July 9 on 113, 9090, and 125-40 KGs with the following results:

113 KGs. - Occasionally heard 51 at 1000(Z) and 1200(Z). Never heard at 1600(Z).

9090 KGs. - This was best of the three frequencies and could generally be heard 85 at 1000(Z) and 1200(Z) with good readability. At 1000(Z), reception was uncertain. Some days was 85, but as often 80. Interference and static on 90990 was much less than on 113 or 125-40.

125-40 KGs- Occasionally heard 80 at 1000(Z) and 1200(Z) with poor readability and considerable static. Never heard at 1600(Z).

(2) Radar:
The SD picked up its first enemy plane at 8 miles on August 10, 1943. The equipment in the 1000 hours of Operation, and the most common difficulty is failure of one of the 8014-A tubes. This hop once 5 times during approximately 400 hours on this patrol.

The operation of the 5R radar was generally reliable. A new magnetron was installed at 1-day. Only minor troubles occurred. Ranges were fair: 20700 yards - 1-day, 15500 yards - U.S.S. "MURDO," "BURNO," "Rain squalls" up to 2000 yards.

* 18 *

— page 49 —
19

Subject: U.S.S. POGY - Report of Second "Per Patrol.

(1) Sound Gear and Sound Conditions:

The hoist-lower system gave the usual troubles: (1) Excessive leakage of hydraulic oil - with binding in train as an alternative. (2) Rubber insulation ruptured by exposure to oil. Cables will require removal from the project to the jack-boxes. (3) Large holes stones obstructed the under the pressure of ocean atmosphere.

Alteration of sound projectors to permanently lowered type encased in structural and concrete will eliminate all hoist-lower difficulties and make listening practicable at surface speeds.

Sound conditions were excellent in all localities visited. A layer of isothermal water invariably existed down to 200 feet. On July 20 south of Hull Island, echo ranging was heard at a distance of 20 miles and scores at 10000 yards.

(2) Density Factors:

24 Bath thermographs were made in the area to depths of 300 feet or greater. In every instance a definite thermocline or density layer was discovered with the exception of 130 feet, and with isothermal water above. The SST instilled at 1,000 feet has proved extremely valuable.

(3) Health, Food, and Sanitation:

The health of the officers and crew during the entire patrol run was excellent. The sea was so clear that it was possible to sight ships and destroyers at a distance of 100 miles. The weather was good and the sea was calm. The food was good and the officers and men were in excellent health.

-19-

— page 50 —
U.S.S. POSY - Report of Second War Patrol.

Hability was very good throughout the patrol run. The food was of good quality and plentiful. During all day subcargoes the noon meal consisted of sandwiches, salads and cold drinks. Soup was served at 1700, and the main meal cooked and served after surfacing. Slicing conditions were normal, the crews quarters in the after battery compartment being especially cool, well ventilated and quiet. The water was potable and plentiful at all times.

(Q) Personnel:

All personnel, both officers and enlisted, performed their duties in a highly satisfactory manner. Social credit is due to Lieut-Comdr. R. H. Iltcaf, USN., and Lieutenant (jg.) C. Bunting, USNR. For their excellent work in tracking the convoy on August 31, 1943.

(R) Miles Stencod - Fuel Jsod:

Base to area 2096 miles - 27,663 gallons.
In area 4288 miles - 37,760 gallons.
Area to base 3070 miles - 36,658 gallons.
(Received 12,000 gallons at Johnston Is.)

(S) Duration:

Days enroute to area - - - - 3
Days in area - - - - 32
Days enroute to base - - - 14
Days subcargoed - - - 25

(T) Factors of Endurance Remaining:

| Factor | Endurance Remaining |
|||
| Torpedoes | 11                 |
| Fuel       | 7798 (at Johnston) |
| Provisions | 15                 |
| Personnel | 0                  |
| Factor   |                      |
|        | 20-                |

(L) Remarks:

This vessel uses number one auxiliary as a positive tank when going to deep submergence. It is normally kept full and water can be blown out of it through the trim.

— page 51 —
U.S.S. POGY - Report of Second War Patrol.

---

**Manifold very readily by first building up a pressure in the tank to about twenty pounds above sea pressure. This avoids use of the noisy trim pump when it is desired to lighten the trim silently.**

Replacement of the noisy trim pump is an old story now. In addition to this, the following suggested alterations and changes in design are submitted for consideration:

1. Eliminate that portion of the engine air induction which terminates in the maneuvering room. The main control cubicle is so vital an installation that this should be done to avoid any possibility of shorting it out by flooding as has occurred on some boats.

Redesign all induction hull flappers so that they hinge at the forward end. If either the engine air induction or ship's ventilation induction is flooded, on a dive or from heavy seas, the hull flappers as presently installed cannot be closed against a flow of water.

2. Develop an attack radar whose antenna can consist of a small parabolic reflector superimposed on #2 periscope, enabling simultaneous radar ranges and visual bearings during daylight approaches. Such a radar will serve its purpose even if its normal effective range is only 4 to 6 thousand yards.

3. Install on #2 periscope a target bearing trans-nitter with a manually operated cut-in switch which when energized by the approach officer, will transmit relative target bearing to the TDC.

Install in the TDC a target bearing receiver on the relative bearing dial which will receive this value of relative target bearing and instantaneous apply it.

4. Install an antenna threaded high pressure globe valve as an auxiliary inboard vent or blower on negative tank, to enable it to be vented at pressures corresponding to deep submergence without risk of shearing the operating shaft of the present quick opening vent valve.

— page 52 —
5. Increase the size of our vents to decrease the diving time. German submarines are routed to dive in 23 seconds. We should do better than the minimum 45 seconds we do now.

6. Install LIO hydraulic pumps for all hydraulic applications, particularly steering. This pump will also operate as a hydraulic motor. Some merchant vessels now afford use these pumps in their steering installations.

7. Design our fuel ballast tanks so they can be used as normal ballast tanks without sending men on deck for the lengthy job of removing blanks and reconnecting operating gear. This can be done by:

   1. Take the risers strength tested to 198#.

   2. Install two vent stops in each riser (see and store without any bell checks in the valves themselves).

   3. Carry the risers above the vent stops full of sea water. It will then only be necessary to open the vent stops and floods to use those tanks as normal ballast tanks.

8. The whole question of sound gear for submarines should be reexamined. The present installation is unsatisfactory for the full rating reasons:

   1. The drift stops are too weak and continually carry away.

   2. If the ship bottoms, you have no sound gear and the chances are you will wreck one or both projectors.

   3. Installation of echo ranging equipment as differentiated from listening gear on submarines is not justified, by the results that have been obtained from it.

— page 53 —
U.S.S. POGY - Report of Second War Patrol.

(c) Examination of predicted sound range curves prepared by the "toode" olc Oceanographic Institute and the "test Coast Sound School shows that under temperature distribution most usually encountered, the sound beam is deflected downward. Since the projector of a submerged submarine is always below the target, the result is very short or no echo ranges under most conditions.

(b) If a periscope attack radar is developed, we will not need an echo range.

9. It is recommended that sound gear on submarines be limited to the following:

1. A local mounted JX in a strengthened blister or dome similar to the destroyer installations.

2. A topside mounted JX on a fixed shaft (that is, not retractable).

3. Bott installations capable of being locally trained as well as remote controlled, and having auxiliary local receiver amplifiers.

— page 57 —
1. This was a fifty-one day patrol which produced six contacts, half of which developed into attacks. The most attractive contact was a carrier task force but unfortunately attack position could not be attained due to initial range and excessive speed. One contact was a patrol vessel, not a torpedo target. The third contact which did not result in an attack consisted of a three-ship convoy which was sighted in bright moonlight at a time when the SJ radar was out of commission and the destroyer escort must have sighted the submarine almost as soon as the convoy itself was picked up.

2. Attacks #1 and #2 were made one minute apart on the same formation, three torpedoes being fired at the leading ship and two torpedoes at second. Only one hit in first ship was obtained. Inaccurate solution due to poor visibility probably accounts for missile. The range was medium, track angles favorable, and gyro angles were not large (between 20 and 30) but in the failing light the error in estimated course and inaccurate ranges caused five missiles of six shots fired. Contact (radar and sight) was regained but POGY had to dive to avoid escort who came up from astern undetected although occasional all-around radar sweeps had been made.

3. Attack #3 was made at a firing range of 2,950 yards. Avoiding action taken by the target indicated that the torpedo was not sighted in sufficient time to maneuver to avoid. It is noted, however, that a favorable track angle (average 110°) was employed and target's estimated speed was only 8 knots.

4. Attack #4 was quite productive. Two torpedoes hit a 15,000 ton XAV after an elapsed time of nearly twenty minutes.

— page 58 —
4/4
**SUBJ: U.S.S. POGY - Second War Patrol - Comment on.**

hours from initial contact, and the ship, in all probability, sank. The chase and tracking were carried out with skill and determination. After nine hours spent in reaching position ahead of the convoy POGY submerged to commence approach only to find base course had been changed. Undeterred, the commanding officer again surfaced and after a four and one-half hour's run was in position to try again. These efforts were rewarded with a sinking. The commentary remarks about the excellent work of Lieutenant Commander Itcetal and Lieutenant (jg) Bunting in tracking this convoy are noted with satisfaction.

3. **Material:** #2 main engine outboard exhaust valve will be completely disassembled to determine cause for binding. Lucky outboard exhaust valve proved to be a serious handicap. More than grinding in to make tight may be necessary. Though not listed in the report the ship feels considerable concern over the loud rumbling noise made by the rudder during silent running. POGY's main ballast tanks were painted with aluminum enamel by building yard. Preliminary examination by a diver indicates considerable areas are bare and rusted. If all tanks have to be completely repainted it may be impossible to complete refit in the normal period. POGY has large propellers which prevent ship from making designed maximum r.p.m. modified propellers will be fitted. Docking will be required. Six months have passed since last docking.

4. Design Recommendations. The report contains many excellent suggestions for improving new design. Some are being accomplished, some are in the research and experimental stages. Others are not ideas, but all merit consideration. Detailed comments and recommendations will not be included in this endorsement.

5. The commanding officer, officers, and crew are congratulated on the successful patrol and for the damage inflicted on the enemy.

Copy to:
CO., USS POGY.

— page 59 —
FC5-4/A16-3
Serial 0218
CO: FID: TIAL

SECOND EDITOR: To:
USS POGY Conf. Ltr. SS266/A15-3,
Serial 25 of August 16, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Hi, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. POGY - Second War Patrol - Comment on.

1. Forwarded. The comments of Commander Submarine Division Forty-Three are concurred in.

2. The Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew on another successful patrol.

Copy to:
Consubdiv 43
CO I CKY

— page 60 —
1943

Arrived Pearl on August 16, 1943 after second war patrol. Refit by Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, including drydocking in Ard-1. Three day training period. Given flash D degaussing treatment. Readiness for sea on September 9, 1943.

(B) Narrative:

September 9, 1943

1100 (VT) Departed Pearl in company with escort.

1900 (VT) Escort released.

September 11, 1943

0900 (X) Arrived Johnston Island. Received 12,000 gallons fuel.

1200 (X) Departed Johnston for patrol area.

September 11 to 23, 1943

Enroute patrol area. Daily dives and drills for training enroute.

September 13, 1943

Omitted from calendar.

September 15, 1943

1017 (L) Radar contact on plane, 8 miles. Dove, Plane not sighted.

1042 (L) Surfaced.

September 16, 1943

0754 (L) Sighted unidentified plane, 6 miles. Dove.

0822 (L) Surfaced.

0939 (K) Radar contact on plane, 6 miles. Dove. Plane not sighted.

1005 (X) Surfaced.

September 20, 1943

1100 (J) Radar contact on plane, 8 miles. Dove. Plane not sighted.

ENCLOSURE (A)

DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C

BY OP-2328C DATE 6/1/43

DECLASSIFIED

— page 61 —
1127 (J)  Surfaced.
September 21, 1943
1307 (J)  Sighted unidentified plane. Dove. Patrolled Truk-Empire route submerged.
1835 (J)  Surfaced.
2102 (J)  Changed course to head for area.
September 23, 1943
0015 (I)  Radar contact on two ships. Commenced tracking.
0438 (I)  Reached position ahead. Due to moonlight and approaching dawn submerged for attack.
0540 (I)  Fired three torpedoes at second ship; missed. Believe torpedoes ran under target. Target sighted impulse bubble and dropped three depth charges. Remained submerged and decided target was not worth expenditure of more torpedoes or fuel. Target was small freighter 2000 - 3000 tons.
September 24, 1943
Entered area; closed Babslthaups. submerged.
1615 (I)  Sighted patrol vessel, distance 6 miles.
September 25 - 25, 1943
Submerged patrol off Malakal Harbor. A smoky patrol vessel also patrolled outside harbor every day.
September 26, 1943
0810 (I)  Sighted small patrol vessel.
2250 (I)  Radar contact on patrol vessel at 8,000 yards. Avoided.
September 28, 1943
Off Malakal harbor.
0600 (I)  Sighted sampan.
0937 (I)  Sighted line of fishing nets and buoys.
1335 (I)  Sighted convoy standing out of harbor. Convoy consisted of 5 freighters (2 medium, 3 small) and 2 PC boat escorts. Air coverage.

ENCLOSURES (A) -2-

— page 62 —
1403 (I) Started approach. Heavy rain squalls blanked out targets part of the time.

: 1512 (I) Fired 4 torpedoes at largest ship in convoy; missed. Sound reported 4 unusual roaring noises in direction of torpedo wakes about 1 minute after firing. Received 4 aircraft bombs. No damage.

: 1557 (I) Commenced trailing convoy submerged.

: 1615 (I) Sighted 2 engine patrol plane.

: 1847 (I) Surfaced and commenced search for convoy.

September 29, 1943

Searching for convoy.

0513 (I) Made trim dive.

0906 (I) Surfaced.

1042 (I) Sighted smoke. Regained contact with convoy. Started tracking.

2148 (I) Sunkered for night attack. Unable to reach firing position. Convoy was zig-zagging. Could not see through periscope but it was too bright for surface approach. Sea was rough which made depth control at 40 feet difficult.

2246 (I) Surfaced and took position to trail from ahead.

September 30, 1943

0443 (I) In position 15 miles ahead of and on the track of convoy, submerged for dawn attack.

0525 (I) Sighted convoy. Started approach.

0635 (I) Fired 4 torpedoes at largest ship in convoy. One minute after firing, sound reported a roaring noise (1) in direction of torpedo wakes (similar to that of Sept. 28). Right after that escort dropped one depth charge.

0638 (I) Heard two torpedoes hit. Target's screws stopped. Had lost depth control so went deep as escort speeded up and closed rapidly.

0646 (I) Depth charges.

0654 (I) Depth charges: During this time, minor explosions and loud rumblings and cracklings were heard through the hull.

0810 (I) Periscope depth.

ENCLOSURE (A) -3-

— page 63 —
0820 (I) Sighted escort lying to, echo ranging. From 0654 until present time continuus echo ranging but no screws had been heard. Believe target sank; that escort did not drop any more depth charges because he was lying to picking up survivors.

: 0836 (I) Closed escort to 3,000 yards. Nothing else in sight. Heavy rain squall set in.

: 0902 (I) Escort started up and commenced dropping random depth charges about every half hour for the rest of the day.

: 1215 (I) Ship got underway and disappeared in direction of convoy's route. Believe this ship dropped back to receive survivors from escort. Depth charges continued, more and more distant, rest of day.

: 1620 (I) Surfaced and headed along convoy track.

: 1718 (I) Sighted escort who was apparently making a sunset sweep astern. Submerged.

: 1742 (I) Surfaced.

: 2048 (I) Set course for Sorol Island. Sent dispatch report to Consubpac.

October 1, 1943

Patrolling south of Sorol Island.

October 2 - 6, 1943

Patrolling Palau - Jabuul shipping routes.

October 6, 1943

: 1133 (I) Sighted two ships. Started approach on 4 engines on surface, working into position on target's track.

: 1636 (I) In position ahead of target and submerged for attack.

: 1737 (I) Fired 4 torpedoes at medium tanker; missed. Believe torpedoes ran under target. The two tankers were overlapping when we fired.

: 1842 (I) Surfaced.

October 7, 1943

Patrolling off Angaur Island. Sighted smoke of patrol vessel. In morning and afternoon.

ENCLOSURE (A) - - -

— page 64 —
1943

Patrolling off Angaur Island. Sighted two patrol vessels and one plane in afternoon.

October 10, 1943

Patrolling northwest of Sonsorol Island.

0909 (I) Sighted smoke of convoy, five ships and two escorts. Attempted to close.

1200 (I) Unable to close to firing position. Escort in meanwhile had made a contact on something about 5 miles from us and dropped a total of 36 depth charges in three hours.

October 11, 1943

0800 (I) Set course to leave area.

1900 (I) Sent dispatch to Consubapac.

October 12 to 1943

Enroute Johnston Island.

October 14, 1943

Patrolling Truk-Saipan route.

1625 (J) Sighted tanker and destroyer escort. Submerged for approach. After running for over one hour at high speed, could not close to firing range.

October 16, 1943

Patrolling Truk - Empire route.

0616 (J) Sighted convoy of six ships and one escort. Went ahead on surface to gain position ahead.

0935 (J) In position ahead of convoy, submerged for approach. Ran at high speed for one hour and 45 minutes and could not close to firing position. Believe convoy changed base course after we submerged.

ENCLOSURE (A) -5-

— page 65 —
1943

Enroute Johnston Island.

October 20, 1943

1341(K) Radar contact on plane, 10 miles, Dove. Plane not sighted.

1359(K) Surfaced.

1410(K) Sighted unidentified plans, distance 10 miles, Dove.

1447(K) Surfaced.

October 25, 1943

1211(X) Arrived Johnston. Received 14,145 gallons of fuel.

1553(.) Departed Johnston for Pearl.

October 25 to 29, 1943

Enroute Pearl.

October 28, 1943

1100(VII) Arrived Pearl.

— page 67 —
U.S.S. POG - REPORT OF WAR PATROL NUMBER THREE

The many small islands cause the main islands to blend into each other, and the profusion of peaks on all islands cause considera distinction in that they are the highest ones in their vicinity, and can be easily located.

There are numerous small beacons near the entrance to Malakal Passage, but none cut in.

Angaur Island lighthouse is quite prominent: and the lookout station, tall mast with cross tree, is located in center of island and not on the western shore as indicated. The first sighted the lighthouse appears as a mast of a ship.

Nothing on Peleliu Island cuts in and it is believed that it is actually located about two miles farther north than shown on the chart.

(F) Ship Contacts

| TIME | LATITUDE | INTIAL | EST. COURSE | HON- | CON- | TACTED | TARGETS |
|------||||-------|------|||
| NO.  | DATE    | LONGITUDE | TYPES    | RANGE | SPID | TACTED | PRISMS |
| 1.   | 0015(1) | 65-7N    | Small    | 12,000 | 250 | R     | 2 2.5m.

— page 69 —
1) Attack Data:
   - Special forms.
   - Mines:
      - None.
   - Anti-Submarine Measures and Tactics:
      - It is believed that convoys change their base course at dawn, noon and sunset as an anti-submarine measure. The convoys apparently go from point to point but instead of steering a straight line course between any two points, they change base course two or three times between points. Escorts patrol on the flanks and echo range. In close to Palau, air coverage is provided.

2) Major Defects and Damage:
   - Engineering Defects:
      - 1. All engine outboard exhaust valves leaked intermittently. A cut was taken on them during the refit period prior to patrol and they were tight during the training period and the first four days of the patrol.
      - 2. Number 2 main engine outboard exhaust valve would not open by hydraulic power after going to deep submerged. After opening in hand power several times it operated satisfactorily. This defect was continuous during the second patrol, was repaired during the refit period and did not occur as frequently during the third patrol.
      - 3. The brush rigging on the evaporator feed pump motor slipped causing the commutator to overheat and melt out the solder between the armature coils and the commutator bars. As the time of the casualty the time necessary for repairs was unknown, therefore a temporary feed line was installed between a thermometer well on No. 1 main engine salt water cooling line and No. 2 evaporator. This method operated satisfactorily until repairs were completed on the pump motor at which time the temperature line was removed. It is recommended that a permanent standby source of evaporator feed water be installed.
      - 4. While operating the auxiliary engine at 80-90 combination an exhaust valve head on No. 6 unit broke off. It caught under another exhaust valve bending it out of shape and then caught in an intake port thus cracking the liner.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 70 —
113 KC - Unreadable signal usually heard at 1000 (Z) and 1200 (Z). Nothing heard at 1900 (Z).

9090 KC - Not heard at 1000 (Z), reception good at 1200 (Z) and fair at 1500 (Z) with considerable fading at the latter time.

12540 KC - Not heard at 1000 (Z) or 1200 (Z) but occasionally at 1500 (Z) with a fading signal.

(ii) Radar:
The CD-2 picked up numerous planes from 6 to 2 miles. The insulation to ground reading of the mast dropped from 5 to 2 miles in a month to 300,000 ohms. This is attributed to leakage thru the wake assembly at the top which needs replacing. On the return to the trace on the screen became jumpy and one lead up the mast seemed to be repeatedly grounded. An indication appeared at 10 miles with this equipment in this condition.

Operation of the SJ was satisfactory. On or near occasion two ships (largest 2,000 tons) were picked up at 13,700 yards in power train. A patrol vessel of the "Smoky Bear" type was picked up at 10,700 yards and a five ship convoy (largest about 6,000 tons) at 16,000 yards. The "Captain's reading glass" has been rigged for viewing the screen, and it is a definite help in seeing small pipa.

(N) Sound Gear and Sound Conditions:
Both sound head training motors, which are loc. ted in the bilges were flooded with water that overflowed from poppet valve drain tank. Both motors need overheating. Port motor is burnt out and port sound head can be trained only by hand.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 72 —
U.S.S. POGY - REPORT OF WAR PATROL F-12BER THRZE

Lower drift stops continue to carry away at deep submergence. Numerous different types of ball bearings have been used without success.

Sound conditions were good. Screws were generally heard out to five or six thousand yards.

(0) Density Layers:

Density layers west and south of Palau were found on all 15 Bathythemograph observations. Upper limits were between 140 and 260 feet and lower limits were deeper than 300 feet. Later above the layers was invariably isothermal with sea conditions from zero to three.

(P) Health, Food, and Habitability:

The health of the Officers and men during the patrol run was normal. A few sporadic cases of acute catarrhal fever, mild, that were in evidence at the beginning of the run cleared up after approximately ten days acclimatization at sea. There were no injuries.

The food was of excellent quality. The fresh frozen vegetables and fruits were especially desirable and palatable.

Habitability was normal. The water was at all times plentiful and potable. The air conditioning system adequately cooled the boat for proper comfort and rest. One container of Carbon Dioxide absorbent was used to allay a possible high CO2 concentration when a CO2 fire extinguished or was accidentally opened during an all day dive.

(Q) Personnel:

Performance of duty of officers and men was highly satisfactory.

(R) Kiles Steamed - Fuel Used:

Pearl to area: 4098 miles - 45,942 gallons.
In area(s): 2525 miles - 22,164 gallons.
Area to Pearl: 4307 miles - 31,069 gallons.
(Received total of 26,145 gallons fuel in two fuelings at Johnston Island)

(S) Duration:

Days anroute to area--- 14
Days in area - - - - - 18

ENCLOSURE (A) -13-

— page 73 —
17
Days enroute to base - - - - 17
Days submerged - - - - - 13

(T) Factors of Endurance Remaining:
Torpedoes: 9
Fuel Gallons: 6964(ct Johnston)
Provisions: 15
Personnel Factor: 10

Limiting factor this patrol - fuel shortage.

(U) Remarks:
It is recommended that negative tank blow line be made up with silver soldered joints instead of flanged and gasketed as at present. This is the second submarine that the C.O. knows has had a leak develop in the negative tank blow line inside #2 main Ballast tank.

It is also recommended that a standby means of providing feed water to the evaporator be provided by installing a line from the main motor circulating water system to the evaporators. Since this system is always in use when underway on the surface, this could be used as the normal evaporator feed supply with the present pump as a standby.

It is believed that the magnifying glass installed over the SJ radar screen enables the operator to pick up a "pip" at greater ranges than without the glass.

The drift stop rollers on the sound gear are continually breaking. It is recommended that solid steel wheels be substituted for the ball bearings in the drift stops.

This vessel carried a load of 16 Mark 13 torpedoes forward on this patrol. Considerable work was necessary on routine, charging, and, in particular, ventilating these torpedoes. Hot wires did not last as long as expected. On five torpedoes fired, it is suspected that hydrogen explosions occurred during the runs. It is believed that a means should be developed for eliminating hydrogen during the run of the torpedo. This could be done by a hot wire which would burn throughout the torpedo run or by a chemical cartridge (believed to be available at the Naval Research Laboratory, Bellevue).

— page 74 —
U.S.S. POCK - REPORT OF STAR PATROL NUMBER THREE

RESULTS OF BATHYTEROGRAPH OBSERVATIONS

| DATES | TITLE (GCT) | LAT. | LONG. | QUALITY OF DENSITY LAYER | UPPER LIMIT OF LAYER |
|-------||------|-------|||
| Sept.12 | - - - - | 16-29N | 176-10W | Slight | 260' |
| Sept.14 | - - - - | 16-17N | 178-31W | Slight | 230' |
| Sept.17 | 0320 | 14/15N | 162-20E | Slight | 195' |
| Sept.18 | 0300 | 13-30N | 156-30E | Slight | 185' |
| Sept.20 | 0545 | 12-04N | 147-26E | Slight | 250' |
| Sept.22 | 0500 | 10-00N | 141-40E | Good | 130' |
| Sept.22 | 2045 | 8-05N | 138-19E | Excellent | 165' |
| Sept.23 | 2030 | 7-20N | 135-28E | Excellent | 165' |
| Sept.24 | 2015 | 7-18N | 134-58E | Excellent | 210' |
| Sept.25 | 2020 | 7-00N | 134-41E | Very good | 190' |
| Sept.26 | 2030 | 6-08N | 139-08E | Excellent | 175' |
| Sept.30 | 2000 | 7-55N | 148-32E | "try good" | 170' |
| Oct. 3 | 2050 | 6-35N | 141-30E | Excellent | 230' |
| Oct. 6 | 2025 | 5-16N | 136-15E | Very good | 280' |
| Oct. 10 | 2100 | 5-45N | 131-55E | Excellent | 140' |
| Oct. 14 | 1930 | 11-54N | 146-18E | Slight | 130' |
| Oct. 15 | 1933 | 13-30N | 152-00E | Good | 250' |

-15-

— page 75 —
2012 GCT
Date - 9/22/43
Latitude - 08°15'N
Long.138°35'E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:
Cargo vessel, 3,000 tons, one of two ships in a convoy. Contact made by radar, approach made by periscope at dawn. Visibility was poor at first, but got better as it got lighter.

Ship(s) Sunk:
None.

Ship(s) Damaged or
robably sunk:
None.

Damage Determined by:
None.

Target Draft:
16 ft.

Course:
230°T

Speed:
10 kts.

Range:
1210 yds.

On Ship Data
Speed:
44 kts.

Course:
330°T

Depth:
64 ft.

Angle:
13° D.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack:
Normal submarine periscope attack.

— page 76 —
1/1  #2  #3
Tubes Fired...... 89 P  91 P  87 P
Gyro Angle...... 351°  350  353°
Depth Set...... 12 ft.  12 ft.  12 ft.
Power...... -  -  -
Hit or Miss...... Miss  Miss  Miss
Erratic...... ?  ?  ?
Mark Torpedo...... 18  18  18
Serial No...... 53441  53379  53328
Mark Exploder...... 4-2  4-2  4-2
Serial No...... 16247  16225  16357
Actuation Set...... Contact  Contact  Contact
Actuation Actual...... None  None  None
Mark Warhead...... 18  18  18
Serial No...... 315  225  246
Explosive...... TPX  TPX  TPX
Firing interval...... -  8"  -  11"  -
Type Spread...... Longitudinal Spread
Sea Conditions...... Force 0
Overhaul Activity...... S.B.P.H.T.H.  S.B.P.H.T.H.  S.B.P.H.T.H.
Remarks: Believe torpedoes ran under target.

— page 77 —
0310 GCT
Date - 9/23/43
Lat. - 07°-11'-30"N.
Long.134°-36'E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

scription:-
Cargo vessel, TAIBUN MARU type, 6500 tons, one of five cargo vessels in a convoy with two escorts. Contact made by periscope. Visibility poor due to heavy rain.

rip(s) Sunk:-
None.

rip(s) Damaged
Probably Sunk:-
None.

image Determined by:-
None.

target Draft: 18 ft.
Course: 130°T
Speed: 9 kts.
Range: 2290 yds.

Own Ship Data

peed: 3 kts.
Course: 065°T
Depth: 64 ft.
Angle: 13° D

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

type Attack:-
Normal submerged periscope approach.

— page 79 —
215 GCT
Date - 9/29/43
Lat, 06°01' N, Long. 139°03' E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:
Cargo vessel, TAIBUN NARU, 6,581 tons. One of seven ships in a convoy (five cargo vessels and two escorts). Attack made by radar tracking during night and the attack by periscope at dawn. Visibility very hazy at first but grew better as dawn approached.

Ship(s) Sunk:
None.

Ship(s) Probably
None.

Damage Determined by:
The following is believed to be evidence of probable sinking although sight evidence is lacking:

1. Heard two torpedoes hit.
2. Target's screws stopped.
3. Heard minor explosions, rumblings through the hull.
4. Escort made two depth charge runs then lay to, echo ranging, for over two hours, presumably picking up survivors.
5. Smallest ship in convoy dropped back and lay to for about two hours while escort circled him, echo ranging, presumably taking over survivors.
6. No depth charges from right after attack for two hours then depth charges were dropped intermittently for the rest of the day.

Target Draft: 18 ft.
Course: 110°T
Speed: 94 kts.
Range: 2300 yds.

Own Ship Data

Speed: 3 kts.
Course: 150°T
Depth: 64 ft.
Angle: 130° D

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Normal submerged periscope approach.

— page 80 —
1/2
Tubes Fired125 P
Track Angle01A
Depth Set10 ft.
Power-
Hit or MissMiss
ErraticNo
Mark Torpedo13
Serial No53406
Mark Exploder4-2
Serial No16371
Actuation SetContact
Actuation Actual...... None
Mark Harvoad18
Serial No278
Firing Interval...... - 8" - 8" - 8" - 8" -
Type SpreadLongitudinal spread.
Sea ConditionsForce 2
Overall Activity...... S.B.P.H.T.H. S.B.P.H.T.H. S.B.P.H.T.H. S.B.P.H.T.H.
Remarks:
Believe three torpedoes ran normal. Suspect hydrogen explosion on fourth. Sound reported a roaring noise about one minute after firing in direction of torpedoes. Almost immediately thereafter escort dropped one depth charge.

— page 81 —
0337 GCT
Date - 10/6/43
Lat. 05°-03'N, Long. 134°-42'E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:
Tanker, 10,000 tons, one of two ships in a convoy (both tankers). Contact made by periscope while on surface, Visibility good. Attack made by periscope, submerged.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.
Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: None.
Damage Determined by: None.

Target Draft: 10 ft. (bow) Course: 230° Speed: 14 kts. Range: 1700 yds.
18 ft. (stern)

Own Ship Data
Speed: 4 kts. Course: 010° Depth: 65 ft. Angle: 130° D

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: Normal submerged periscope approach.

— page 83 —
5-43/A16-3
Serial (0149)
Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
October 30, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS POGY Conf. Ltr. SS266/A16-3
Serial (028) of October 28, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.

Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of THIRD. - Air Patrol - comments.

1. The POGY departed from her patrol area after eight-teen days on station because of expenditure of fuel. Chases of convoys, one of forty hours duration, resulted in a serious drain on the fuel supply. It is hoped that alteration to main ballast tanks numbers 4A and 4B to convert them to fuel ballast tanks can be accomplished during the current refit to permit longer time on station under conditions prevailing on this patrol.

2. POGY carried sixteen Mark 18 torpedoes and eight Mark 14-3A torpedoes. Eleven Mark 18's were fired with two hits and four Mark 14-3A's with no hits. A complete report on servicing and performance of Mark 18 torpedoes has been submitted to the Force Commander in separate correspondence.

3. Comments on Attacks:

(a) Attack No. 1.
This attack was conducted the day before POGY entered her area on a convoy of two ships, one a freighter of about 2000-3000 tons and the other a smaller ship of about 1000 tons. Three Mark 18 torpedoes were fired against the larger ship from good position with favorable gyro angles and 125% spread. Depth setting was 12 feet. No hits were obtained. There was no evidence of unsatisfactory performance of torpedoes. It is possible that depth setting was too great. The Commanding Officer did not follow up this attack because of the small size of the targets and the prospect of bigger game in the patrol area.

(b) Attack No. 2.
POGY fired four Mark 18 torpedoes from range of 2290 yards at largest ship in a convoy of five ships escorted by two PC boats. Tracks ranged from 143S to 146S and gyro angles were small. Depth setting was 10 feet. Spread was set to cover 150%

— page 84 —
4/A16-3
:rial 0285
: "FID: TIAL
COND ENDORSEMENT to
S POGY Conf. Ltr. SS266/A16-3
rial (028) of October 28, 1943

'oms:
: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
: (2) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

:bject:
U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of THIRD War Patrol comments.

1. Forwarded concurring in the remarks of Commander
marine Division FORTY-THREE.

2. It is noted in attack number two that the track angles
re too large. The range of 2290 yards is in error; this was the
predo run.

:y to:
CSD 43
CO POGY.

J. H. BROWN, Jr.

— page 85 —
3. (b) Cont'd.
of target length. No hits. Sound heard four roaring noises in
direction of torpedoes 1 minute after they were fired, indicating
possible faulty performance of torpedoes.

(c) Attack No. 3.
After a 40-hour chase during which one night attack at
radar depth was attempted, but, because of tracking difficulties,
could not be completed, PGYC conducted a second attack on the
convoy and hit the largest ship with two Mark 18 torpedoes, out
of four fired. Sound heard roaring noise from one torpedo on
this attack. There is good evidence that this target sank. PGYC
was kept down by anti-submarine measures for about eight hours
after the attack and abandoned further pursuit of the convoy.

(d) Attack No. 4.
This attack was conducted against two medium tankers,
unescorted, and not loaded. A favorable attack position was
reached, range 1700 yards, and four Mark 14-3A torpedoes fired
with track of 1355 and small gyro angles. Spread was set to
cover 150% of target length. Torpedoes were aimed at nearer
tanker but ships were overlapping and presented an excellent
target. Depth was set at 10 feet. All torpedoes missed. Since
ships were in the light condition it is probable that torpedoes
ran under the target. Tankers were making 15 knots when attacked
and immediately increased speed after the attack. The Commanding
Officer considered it useless to attempt a chase of these ships
with their high speed and his dwindling fuel supply.

(e) A review of the above attacks indicates that failure
to hit on first and fourth attacks were caused by torpedoes being
set too deep, and failure to hit on second attack was caused by
unsatisfactory torpedo performance.

(f) PGYC had three worthwhile contacts after attacking the
tankers but was unable to gain a firing position on any of them.

4. Attention is invited to the comments in section (J)
of the report in which the Commanding Officer expresses the belief
that Japanese convoys change their base course at dawn, noon and
sunset as an anti-submarine measure.

— page 86 —
5. Comments on Material:
POGY is in very good material condition, and it is expected that refit will be accomplished within the normal period. The leakage of the negative tank blow line into number 2A main ballast tank was a handicap. Recurrence of this casualty will be prevented by relocating the blow line outside the ballast tank or silver soldering the joints in the line as recommended by the Commanding Officer.

J. P. CROMWELL.

cc: CO POGY.

— page 87 —
1- FREIGHTER (TAIUN LUU class) - 6,581 tons

C:\AVEDGE\Fleet\Jtr.
Room 2055
23 NOV 1943
ROUTE TO:

Op File No. (SC)
Doc. No. 100595
Copy No. of

— page 88 —
12-10-16-2(8)(16)
Serial 01593
Confidential
Third Report to
FOGY for
Thrid War Patrol.
Cubus C. R. T. C. R. T. R

— page 89 —
1. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. POGY.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 141.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Subordinate Command, Midway.
       (3) The Commander Submarines Pacific Fleet.
       (4) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. POGY, Report of War Patrol number Four.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
       (B) Track charts (two).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the 4th war patrol of this vessel conducted enroute to and from the Falau Islands during the period November 25 to December 22, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

R. H. METCAIF.

DECLASSIFIED

— page 90 —
1943
U.S.S. POXY - REPORT OF WAR PATROL NUMBER FOUR

(A) PROLOGUE: Arrived Pearl October 28, 1943, after third war patrol. Refit by Submarine Base, PH, TH, including drydocking in ARD-1. Converted LBT 4A and 4B into fuel ballast tanks. November 8, 1943, Lieutenant Commander R. M. BOTCAIF relieved Commander G. H. "ALES as Commanding Officer; Six day training period. Received 4" gun during training period, new radar transmitter day before sailing, Readiness for sea November 25, 1943. Not determined.

(B) FARRATIVE:

November 25, 1943
1255(w) Departed Pearl in company with escort.
1900(w) Released escort.

November 26, 1943
1000(w) Sifted and exchanged reconition signals with B-24.
1355(w) Sifted PBH - apparently not sighted by him.

November 27, 1943
0400(w) Increased speed to 3 engines to maintain schedule. Wind and sea commenced moderating about 1300(w).

November 28, 1943
0545(x) Slowed to 2 engine speed.

November 29, 1943
1018(y) Moored cloncside U.S.S. "BUSINELL, "Hidway. Fueled to capacity.
1557(y) Underway for patrol station.
1645(y) SJ radar out. Returned to hidway.

November 30, 1943
0831(y) Underway for patrol station.

December 1, 1943 - Omitted from calendar.

December 3, 1943
1400(m) Set clocks back to (-) 11 time.

December 4, 1943
0541(1) Fade morning train dive (130 miles from Wake).
0559(1) Surfaced.
0510(1) Lookout sighted unidentified plane. Dove. (Plane contact #1)
0529(1) Surfaced.
0640(1) Lookout sighted unidentified plane. Dove. (Plane contact #2)
0341(1) Surfaced.

— page 91 —
1943
0830(1) Lost all I.C. power (See major defects and damage).
0900(1) Set clocks back to (-) 10 time.
0910(1) Regainst I.C. power.
1930(1) Crossed 1551 nautical miles. Slowed to 1 engine speed.

December 7, 1943
1049(2) Radar contact. No missiles. Dove. Plane not sighted (Flame contact #3).
1110(1) Surface. Powered by sea, flooding control tower and grounding out #2 periscope panel.
1312(1) Periscope shears lookout (JOD) sighted mast of ships bearing 210° T. Went to 4 engine speed to track an enemy out. Frequent rain scuffs, visibility variable. SJ radar missed up target at 15,000 yards, tracked at ranges out to 26,000 yards. New transmitter gives ranges 4-3000 yards greater than old one did. Determined contact to be two large fireguaters and a destroyer, base course 3300T, speed 12. Escort was on starboard bow, so worked into position ahead and slightly to port of convoy track.
1434(1) Dove.
1457(1) Convoy in sight through periscope. Depth control difficult, waves 10-15 feet from trough to crest. Unable to slow below 31 knots during approach. Targets identified as similar to AOBASAM IARU, 956, and RUSABEL IARU, 100, OIH 200J. Escort was not sighted. Commenced approach. Targets were making frequent and radical zigzags, as much as 450 from base course. Just before firing search for favorable sights on both ships and noticed medium sized DD on far side of convoy.
1540-22(1) Fired tubes 1, 2, 3, and 4 at AOBASAM IARU, 110 port track, small gyros, torpedo run 2400 yards. Shifted targets, took quick set up.
1541-08(1) Fired tubes 5 and 6 at RUSABEL IARU, 90 port track, gyros 100 right, torpedo run 130 yards.
1542(1) Went deep, ran 1/2 of full length, depth charge attack. Heard three torpedo hits which checked for time with two in first target, one in second. First hit was a low order detonation, but definitely not a dud.
1544(1) Destroyer dropped first 3 of a series of 22 depth charges. Only one was close and only damage was broken light bulb in bathymetrograph. Found 1° negative gradient at 330 feet, so ran at 350, feeling like an elephant under a cabbage leaf.
1645(1) Escort dropped last depth charge.
1706(1) Periscope depth. By running at 60 feet, saw both ships stopped about 5 miles astern, one with a very pleasant fire aft, the other with a tremendous list. Escort not in sight but pinning madly. Continued to clear area in order to get on surface as soon as possible. Heard unidentified noises through hull and in sound gear for next half hour.

— page 92 —
1942 (Continued)
1724(k) Sunset.
1511(k) Surfaced. Burning ship in sight from bridge, radar range 18,500 yards. Started quick charge, air charge, readjusting trim, etc. Corroded on range around 16,000 yards. Unable to pick up more than one target on radar at any time after surfacing.
2034(k) Commanded surface approach. At about this time target succeeded in extinguishing fire, which at one time enveloped his whole length. Bright moonlight. Picked up destroyer on radar at 13,000 yards. Target was stopped, destroyer circling him.
2058(k) Disembarked. Approach when range to target was 6,000 yards. Too bright. Commanded circling range.
2120(k) Escort called at 12,000 yards. Decided to wait until moon set for next try. Opened out to 15,000 yards and continued to circle target.

December 8, 1943
0230(k) Commenced surface approach from northward.
0245(k) Moonset.
0256(k) Determined we were coming in on about 100 starboard track, and target drifting westward at 1-1/2 knots. Escort still circling at about 9 knots, and pinning continuously. Slowed to 1.5 knot on far side of target. Identified target as ADASAN HARI, down about 10 feet by the storm.
0326(k) Fired tubes 3 and 4, both to hit, on radar ranges and TBT bearings. Torpedo run 1000 yards. Commenced reversing course. Both torpedoes hit, one 30 feet forward of his stern, the other andiships, with tremendous explosions. Target started to sink instantly and was completely submerged by the time we steadied on the new course.
0328(k) Closed area at full speed on all 4 engines, we were not sighted - least range to escort was 3,100 yards. Kept him astern and gradually cleared course to 0900.
0345(k) Lost escort at 14,000 yards, slowed to 2 annas.

It is my belief that the BRISANIE HARI sank sometime between 1706(k) and 1811(k) when we surfaced.

0530(k) Finished transmitting dispatch, c/c to 2430T.
0635(k) Dove.
0747(k) Five loud depth charges astern - nothing in sight.
1239(k) Surfaced, enroute petrol area.
1245(k) Slowed to 1 engine speed.

December 9, 1943
0941(k) Radar contact 10 miles. Dove. (Plane contact #4, not sighted)
1059(k) Surfaced.

— page 93 —
1943
1700(k) Set clocks back to (-) 9 time.
2000(I) Started converting #4 reserve fuel to a ballast tank, elapsed time 1h hours.

December 12, 1943
0600(I) Entered patrol area.
1023(I) Sighted land (Pabellohr I) ahead, distant about 25 miles.
1108(I) Sighted patrol vessel through high seas. Drove, not sighted by him. Commenced closing in a 1.1m submerged.

1819(I) Surrendered.

December 13, 1943
0457(I) Drove, but missed land distant 3 miles. Headed harbor bearing 340°T.
0530(I) Sighted surface in harbor, as from some fighting off.
0632(I) Sighted small seaplane taking off in harbor.
0635(I) Headed for home, 3400T.
0700(I) Scrambled over of two good sized freighter and for best escort standing out of harbor. Commenced approach. Identified leading ship as similar to PANAMA 1470, 1275, 0.0T 20°E. Very lightly loaded, but decks covered with "roves." Not identified other ship. Escort was ahead and in charge of freighter, which were in a loose line of bearing and zigzagging.
0742(I) Fired tubes 7, 8, and 9 at PANAMA 1470, 1275, 0.0T. Escort then under the bridge and ship sag in the middle. Heard second hit seven seconds later as we were going deep. Heard target breaking up and sinking for next hour.
0747(I) Escort dropped first two of 27 depth charges. No damage, found 8° negative gradient at 200 feet, ran silent, keeping escort astern, at 250 - 275 feet.
0914(I) Came to periscope depth, course 000°T. Nothing in sight.
0937(I) Sighted smoke bearing 320°T. Charged course to 1350T, hoping to get a shot at the second ship if he started out again, or at least trail him and be in favorable position for a night attack.
1330(I) Two distant depth charges. Shortly afterward, two PC type patrols came in view, both plunging, running at slow speed, and crisscrossing the area. Smoke was visible all afternoon intermittently, its bearing changing ahead to 250°T when last sighted. Kept stern to whichever patrol scanned closest.
1730(I) Patrol came up from astern, much closer than any had been previously. He was very easy - he apparently (hind sight) picked us up at about 6,000 yards but lost easing in at slow speed to about 3,000, driving us big angles on the bow in each direction while so doing.
1806(I) He headed right for us and poured on the coal. Started deep and rigged for depth charge attack, but too late.

— page 94 —
1302(I) December 13, 1942 (Continued)
1302(I) He let go with a pattern of three that caught us as we passed 150 feet. One was very close on the starboard side, about antiships. Tubes had not yet been ri-reed, and it was impossible to withdraw yro or depth spindles from any tube after the explosion. The next half hour was a very bad one. He dropped no more charges, and we were at 290 feet under a density layer, but he was pining on us and we could hear the echoes bouncing back even if he couldn't. 1930(I) (about) Commenced coming up to periscope depth. (Honorise 1911). 1900(I) Surfaced. Picked up patrol on radar 6000 yards astern. Cleared area to eastward on 4 engines. Lost radar contact at 8600 yards.

Shortly after surfacing, ship took a large starboard list. Investigation isolated #44 ballast tank as the cause. Kan were sent on deck, but due to our low freeboard and seas washing over, could not determine source of the list. Thereafter we were forced to run with both 44 and 45 flooded to the vent. Suspect leaky vent on ruptured riser.

Decision was made to terminate patrol on basis of damage to tubes: No clear reason reported to replace depth and gyro spindles in two tubes only. After reconditioning tubes #3 and #4, the forward light-torque regulator seemed overloaded and slue-ish. On the remaining tubes, it would have been necessary to pre set gyro angle and depth; I therefore considered the ship no longer capable of a successful submerged attack.

December 17, 1943
0025(Ic) Find and head seas abaft. Went to 3 engine speed. 0350(Ic) Sighted Arrian Island at a distance of 45 miles. Closest approach, 15 miles - no evidence of enemy activity, patrols, or planes.

December 18, 1943
0813(Ic) Lookout sighted smoke bearing 306°T. Churned course and ran in that direction at 4 on engine speed for one hour. Nothing further sighted - probably false contact.

December 20, 1943
1930(1) Commenced converting #3 and #5 reserve fuel tanks to ballast tanks. Fire one hour and fifteen minutes. Put low pressure blower on #4 as well and list did not reappear. Apparently we had a vent valve which was not seating properly and which adjusted itself.

— page 95 —
1943
0206(1) Went to 4 engine speed.
2000(1) Wind and sea picking up, both on port quarter.

December 22, 1943 (1st)
Mountainsous waves. After being pooped several times - still running at 4 engi ne speed - blew negative and safety dry. It helped some. Fit log registered everywhere from 16 to 22 knots, depending on whether we were going uphill or downhill.
2400(m) Changed to (-) 12 time.

December 22, 1942 (2nd)
0740(y) Escort planes arrived.
0955(y) Grounded east side of entrance channel. Stopped and drifted clear.
1014(y) Moored to USS BUSHMELL, Midway.
Examination by diver disclosed propellors and rudder undamaged, no damage to hull except paint rubbed off spot 5 feet above keel at frame 93 starboard.

(C) WEATHER
Experienced a following wind and sea all the way from Midway to Palau. From Palau to vicinity of Agrihan I, in the Marianas, had a 20 knot head wind and head sea.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
Just south of Auguruperyu Sho (outer reef east of Palau) experienced a current of 2.5 knots setting 255°T. In general, the closer to the reef, the stronger was the current.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL INFORMATION
The only accurate chart of Palau is H.O. Husc 10,394, rest. #407. Even using this chart, landmarks are difficult to identify. Aitaburai Saki on Makarakaru To (Eil Maik), beacon on URUKUTAABURU To (Urukthapel); radio towers on Kororu To (Koror); were used and cut in well.

No navigational lights were sighted. Could see a white light in Koror Town when we surfaced, December 12th, but it was probably only poor blackout.

— page 96 —
1. 1312(k) 12/7/43 12/13/43 2. 1103(I) 12/12/43 3. 0700(I) 12/13/43 4. 0640(I) 12/5/43 5. 1049(k) 12/7/43 6. 0941(k) 12/9/43 7. 0632(I) 12/13/43
: 2. 130-50N. 152-25E 7-19N 134-53E 1PC 16,000 1AP 14,000 1AK 1PC 14,

— page 97 —
12 feet. Course: 015°T Speed: 12 kts. Range: 2500 yds (at firing)

: 3 kts. Course: 090°T Depth: 65 feet Angle: 0° (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type attack:
Diversion spread was used with TDC and continuous periscope bearings. This attack was followed immediately by Attack No. 2. A total of three hits was obtained on two targets. The first torpedo explosion heard was not as powerful as the following two; and, as the target of Attack No. 1 did not sink, it is believed that one low-order detonation occurred.

— page 98 —
10 ft. 10 ft. 10 ft. 10 ft.

| Tube Fired | Track Angle | Hydrophone | Depth Setting | Power | Hit or Miss | Erratic | Mark Torpedo | Serial Number | Actuation Set | Actual Actuation | Mark Varhead | Serial Number | Explosive | Firing Interval | Type Spread | Sea Conditions | Overhaul Activity |
:---: | :

— page 99 —
1541 LZT
: 12/7/43
: 14-04-24
: 1529-02-25
: Target Data - Damage Inflicted
: Same convoy as Attack No. 1, two large freighters and one escorting destroyer. Target was similar to BRISBANE H.M.U. Contact by sighting. Visibility good to poor.
: Ship(s) Sunk: -
: Ship(s) Damaged or Frobably Sunk: -
: Damage Determined By: -
: Target Draft: 12 ft.
: Course: 0150T
: Speed: 12 kts.
: Range: 1000 yds.
: (at firing)
: Own Ship Data
: Speed: 4 kts.
: Course: 0910T
: Depth: 65 ft.
: Angle: 0°
: (at firing)
: Fire Control and Torpedo Data
: Type Attack: -
: A two torpedo disrupts torpedo wave used with TDC and continuous periscope bearings. This target was on the port quarter of the ship hit in Attack No. 1, and this attack was made immediately following Attack No. 1.

-11-

— page 101 —
0326 LZT
U.S.S. POGY
Time: 12/8/43
Torpedo Attack No. Three
Patrol No. Four
Date: 14-11.2N
Long: 151-41.0E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Freighter damaged by Attack No. 1. Still escorted by destroyer. Attack made after moonest. Visibility normal for a moonless night.

Ship(s) Sunk: AK similar to AOBASAN HAIKU, 8812 gross tons.

Damage determined by: Saw torpedoes hit and saw ship sink.

Target Draft: 20 ft. Course: 280°T Speed: 1 kt. (drifting) Range: 1700 yds

Own Ship Data

Speed: 6 kts. Course: 192°T Depth: Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Attack was made on surface at night after moonest using bearings from the forward TFT and ranges from the SU Radar. Both torpedoes were aimed at IOT.

-13-

— page 102 —
3
Tubes: 3
Track Angle: 938
Gyro Angle: 001°-00
Depth Setting: 10 ft.
Power: High
Hit or Miss: Hit
Erratic: No
Mark Torpedo: 14-3A
Serial Number: 25170
Mark Exploder: 6-1A
Serial Number: 3853
Actuation Set: Contact
Actual Actuation: Contact
Mark Warhead: 16
Serial Number: 11377
Explosive: TPX
Firing Interval: 11"
Type Spread: None
Sea Conditions: Rough sea - heavy swell
Overhaul Activity: SBPHTH
Remarks: -14-

— page 104 —
0741 LZT
: 12/13/43
: 7°-06.9N
: 134°-31.2E

Target Data – Damage Inflicted

Description: Convoy of two freighters, one escort vessel, and air escort proceeding from Lalalac Harbor, Palau to the southward. Sighted smoke first, then the ships. Visibility good.

Ship(s) Sunk: 1AP similar to PANALA TARU, 5270 gross tons.

Damage Determined by: Saw one torpedo hit under ship's bridge, breaking his back. Heard second torpedo hit. Heard noises of ship breaking up and sinking for one hour after firing.

Target Draft: 12 ft. Course: 177°T Speed: 8kts. Range: 1320 yards.

Own Ship Data

Speed: 2 kts. Course: 080°T Depth: 65 ft. Angle: 10° up to zero during firing.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Attack made at periscope depth using continuous periscope bearings during firing, TDC, and a three torpedo, thrce degree divergent spread. Second and third torpedoes hit.

-15-

— page 105 —
4
Tubes Fired#7
Track Angle115P
Gyro Angle162°-00
Depth Set8 ft.
PowerHigh
Hit or MissMiss
ErraticNo
Mark Torpedo14-3A
Serial Number39550
Mark Exploder6-1A
Serial Number3484
Actuation SetContact
Actual Actuation...... None
Mark Warhead16
Serial Number1549
ExplosiveTPX
Piring Interval...... - 10" - 7"
Type SpreadDivergent 3L - 0 - 3R
Sea ConditionsLight swell
Overhaul Activity...... SBPITH
Remarks: Observed one hit, and could see no evidence of smoke along torpedo tracks.

-16-

— page 107 —
1. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Continued)
All outboard engine exhaust valves leaked badly at deep submergence until ground in ship's force.

The bridge to conning tower talk-back system installed by the Submarine Base, Pearl, and which was, I believe, designed originally by the U.S.S. SPRAY, gave perfect communication during the night attack and successfully withstood depth charging.

(1) RADIO
Radio reception and transmission was normal.

In the area reception of NPS Haiku was obtained on 14390 Kcs (daytime only), 9090 Kcs and 4525 Kcs, the latter only occasionally. Interference subcarrier schedules. The 1100 Zebra Shed was almost always blocked. At times 9090 Kcs came in S5 readily extremely low due to a very nasty signal.

Two transmissions were made outside of Pearl 2000 mile circle on 8470 Kcs. In area instance transmission was readily accomplished. Autotranslation was obtained immediately on the record transmission.

The addition of a separate submarine Fax Shed is highly satisfactory. It allows a ready check on all incoming traffic which was lacking in the past.

No submarine serials were missed.

(2) RADAR
The SD was used on both patrol months and nights as well as during daily hit. No trouble was experienced during 20 hours of operation on this patrol.

— page 108 —
1. SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
   - The sound gear never trains properly at deep submergence. The drift stops and the training motor clutches are definite weak points, and should be redesigned.

   Sound conditions were excellent throughout the patrol.

(0) DENSITY LAYERS
   - Sea also (J) above. 50 miles east of Palau, a 12° negative gradient was experienced starting at 175 feet. Just off Nalaka passage, the same gradient was found, starting at about 190 - 200 feet. We found that flooding negative to start us down, and leaving it flooded, gave us a fair trim at 250 feet.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND MAINTENANCE
   - The health of the officers and men during this war patrol was very good.

   One man was turned in on the sick list with Acute Catarrial Fever for a period of three days. There were a few sporadic, mild cases of Catarrial Fever that were treated symptomatically with favorable results and no loss of time.

   There were no injuries.

   Habitability was normal throughout the boat. The food was of good quality and well prepared. The water was plentiful and potable. Food handlers were allowed one shower daily. The rest of the men on shower weekly. This system seems to work quite well, providing ample personal cleanliness without waste.

   The air conditioning and ventilation systems were satisfactory throughout the patrol.

(Q) PERSONNEL
   - All hands conducted themselves in accordance with the best traditions of the Naval Service. I particularly desire to commend the Assistant Approach Officer, Lieutenant W.T. TOS-ALL, Jr., USNR; the TDC Operator, Lieutenant R.D. McENRY, USNR; the plotting officer, Lieutenant R.R. VIGNET, USN; and the diving officer, Lieutenant (jg) V.J. COPPER, jr., USNR for their skillful performance of duty, which is demonstrated by the fact that all attacks resulted in hits.

-19-

— page 109 —
1275 miles
Pearl to Midway
Kidway to Area
In Area
Area to Midway

: 16,562 miles
31,65 miles
321 miles
3217 miles

: 3,308 gal.
50,342 gal.

: 16
2
9
11

: Torpedoes
13
Flo
32,56

: Provisions
45

: Personal
30

This patrol was terminated as a result of depth charge damage to torpedo tubes.

(U) RETAINS

We were fitted with a CUO converter for radar detection for this patrol. We were able to pick up Midway's radar on it at ranges up to 8 miles.

It was used twice during the patrol, once during attack 3, with negative results, and a win on surface 4 miles off the reef at Palau on the night of 12 December, also with negative results.

I am convinced that the enemy had no surface radar in use in either instance.

-20-

— page 113 —
1-12-10/16-3(6)/(16) SURFACE HOME, I.C. IC LIST
Serial 01993
CONTINUED TO:
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PCGY report of
Fourth War Istrl.
CC. SUES. C. I.TROL REPORT IC. 33E
U.S.S. OCY - SCUTT. 1-1. T.U.
From: The Commander submarine force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. OCY (5-12-06) - Report of Fourth War Istrl.
(25 November to 22 December 1943).

1. The fourth war patrol of the OCY was the first to be
commencing Officer, as such. The patrol was conducted in the Pacific.
2. ...recessive in nature, the OCY was successful, the
encruite to the area and just after entering area. Shorty after the
the OCY was subjected to a close depth charging which caused sufficient
to warrant termination of the patrol and return to base.
3. This patrol is considered successful for Combat in Insania.
4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, concurred to the
Commander Officer, officers, and crew for this conservative and successful
The OCY is credited with inflicting the following damage to the enemy:

| DISTRIBUTION: | TOTALS: |
|||
| Complete Reports | 19,507 tons |
| Corvids | 5 |
| CNC | 5 |
| Cinepe | 5 |
| Intel. Cen. Iac. | 1 |
| Ocean. recs | 1 |
| Conserwpe | 1 |
| (Ldr. Ese. Iain.Unit | 1 |
| Cinclnt | 1 |
| Consubalnt | 1 |
| E/ School, NT | 1 |
| Consopac | 1 |
| Consospec | 1 |
| Consubospec | 1 |
| CIF 72 | 1 |
| Comorpac | 1 |

C. 4. LOCATION, Jr.
Consubpe (20)
SUE, II (2)
Consubpe (3)
Consubpe (2)
Consubpe (2)
Consubpe (1)
Consub

— page 114 —
1. Enclosure (A), covering the Fifth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the Formosa Straits, Formosa, and southern islands of the Nansei Shoto during the period from 15 January, 1944 to 8 March, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

R. H. LETCALF.

DECLASSIFIED. 0445, OPM/AVINST 5510.1C

BY OP-0000000 DATE 6/12/44

DECLASSIFIED.

— page 115 —
15 January 1944
1312(y) Underway for patrol area, U.S.S. SKIPJACK also underway.
1400(y) Sighted U.S.S. SILVERBIRDS returning from patrol.

16 January 1944 (omitted)

High winds and head seas were encountered almost continuously while enroute to the area. It was necessary at times to slow to 2/3 speed on one engine, making only 4 - 4.5 knots by pit log, to keep from taking water down the conning tower hatch and inductors.

Kiles steamed on various days are indicated:
17th - 179 21st - 241
18th - 241 22nd - 266
19th - 195 23rd - 252
20th - 145

23 January 1944
1357(k) Slowed to 1 engine speed in accordance with operation order.

25 January 1944
2000(k) Converted #4 reserve fuel tank to ballast tank.

26 January 1944
0940(i) Picked up Kita Iwa Shima on radar, 57,000 yards.
1023(i) Radar indication, 10 miles (plane contact #1). Dove.
1056(i) Surfaced.

27 January 1944
1000(i) Entered standby patrol area.
1514(i) To conserve fuel during eleven days before we could enter area, yet get as much coverage as possible, slowed to about 5.5 knots. Answering bells on the battery, running the auxiliary generator 80-90, and carrying a zero float. Fuel consumption 600-600 gallons per day.

January 27 - February 2, 1944
Patrolled on east or west courses, area between 133° and 137° E longitude, as plot of previous contacts showed this to be best part of area. No contacts.

— page 116 —
1944
1458(i) Commenced submerged reconnaissance of N. Borodino Island and S. Borodino Island. No military installations discernible, no shipping of any sort. Descriptions of both islands in ONI 60 appear to be accurate.

February 4, 1944
0858(i) Commenced submerged reconnaissance of Rasa Island. Took a number of photographs from distances of 1 - 1½ miles. The phosphate plant appears to be quite extensive. There is a large, new building in the center of the island which appears to house a radio station. Halfway up the slope of the island, on the SW side, is a well camouflaged building which is probably an explosives storehouse. This island would be a suitable target for a shore bombardment.

February 5 - 7, 1944
Patrolled on east - west courses in standby patrol area.

February 7, 1944
0300(i) Entered patrol area.
2353(i) Made landfall on Okinawa Jima, changed course to 235, to run along island chain, off shore 10 miles.

February 8, 1944
1215(i) Radar indication, 18 miles (plane contact #2) did not dive.
1350(i) Radar indication, 8 miles. (plane contact #3) Dove.
1435(i) Surfaced, Radar indication, 16 miles. (plane contact #4). Did not dive.
1507(i) Nace landfall on Miyako Jima. SJ radar out. Commenced repairs and tuning.
2014(i) SJ radar back in commission. Resumed patrol.

February 9, 1944
0900(h) Radar indication, 9 miles. (plane contact #5). Dove.
0945(h) Surfaced.
1006(h) Radar indication, 7 miles. (plane contact #6). Dove.
1047(h) Surfaced.
1115(h) Radar indication, 8 miles. (plane contact #7) Dove.
1515(h) Surfaced.
1738(h) Sight contact with smoke bearing 340°T. Radar gave one range of 20,000 yards, then failed completely. We were then 30 miles southeast of Yonakuni Jima. Opened out, as background in our direction was very good.
1757(h) Changed course to 340°T. Radar was back in commission about ten minutes later, and picked up convoy ultimately determined to consist of nine ships of which at least three were escorts. First plot showed convoy to be on base course 290°. Assuming that they would head for Iirun, started and around to the north, but shortly afterward, convoy changed their base course to 240°T, considerably lengthening the approach.

— page 117 —
1944 (continued)
2120(h) Finished charge and put all 4 on propulsion. Unfortunately, there was a full moon, and although it was completely overcast, visibility was still excellent. Decided best chance was to reach the coast of Taiwan ahead of the convoy, in a position to head either north or south, taking advantage of a land background by being between the convoy and the beach. There was a center escort leading the convoy, which prevented going down the middle, two wing escorts who were out so far that they effectively prevented a flank approach, and back far enough to keep us from getting close to the rear ships. Convoy finally changed front, one freighter going off to the north without an escort, while the rest turned south. It was time. We were inside the 100 fathom course and less than two miles from land. Decided to shoot at the lone freighter first, then go back for the convoy.

February 10, 1944
0006(h) Freighter turned toward land, giving us 110 track, 2000 yards range. Just at this time we found out we were being paralleled inshore by a small sampan type patrol, which apparently was attempting to rendezvous with our freighter. We needed a PPI. 0011(h) Fired 3 torpedoes from the bow tubes. Target zigged away 40 degrees just as we fired and they all missed ahead. We were undoubtedly sighted, for he immediately started shooting at us and blinking madly at the escort. Cleared vicinity on 4 engines, and headed south after convoy, as I knew we could not possibly make another approach on the lone freighter and have time to pick up the convoy again. Heard many depth charges astern. 0301(h) In position 6 miles ahead of convoy on their track. Radar plot showed two parallel columns of three ships each, and two wing t escorts. Had determined on a submersed approach but a light mist set in, so headed down on a reverse course on the surface. 0313(h) Sighted leading ship on outboard column at a range of about 3700 yards, small port angle on the bow. Swayed toward him for a bow shot. When the range was down to 2100, discovered he was a MUTSUKI class DD. The forward torpedo room did a nice job of resetting depth on tubes 1 and 2 to 6 feet. 0319(h) Fired tubes 1 and 2 at the DD, torpedo run 1200 yards, both to hit. Shifted targets and at 3, and 5 at the second ship in the outboard column, a large coal burning freighter, similar to the YOKAHARA MARU, p56, ONI 208(J) (revised). The situation now became confused: - 1. I torpedo hit the DD just forward of his bridge and set off his magazines and forward warheads. His bow completely disappeared and a tremendous tongue of flame shot 500 feet in the air. He could feel the heat of it on the bridge, and by its glare we became instantly visible to an admiring multitude of Japanese. 2. #2 torpedo hit the DD aft, and the stern section settled and sank in about 2 minutes.

— page 118 —
3. Two torpedoes hit the second ship in column, and he sank in about a minute.

4. The sound man reported a torpedo running toward us on the port bow. Started swinging in that direction.

5. One torpedo hit a large, modern freighter in the inboard column and he started to settle. Was unable to tell whether or not he sank. He was similar to HONKAI NARU, p.77 ONI 208J (revised).

6. Took a set up on the third ship in the outboard column, another old freighter, who had started to turn away, honing to fire #6 tube.

7. Target changed his mind and turned toward to ram. Went ahead full and turned away, ending up 800 yards, by radar, in front of him. It looked closer. At this point he opened up with his bow gun, about a 4 inch, and such pistols, machine guns, rifles, and shot guns as he had handy. He was also blinking madly on an all-around white truck light, and rolling tremendous depth charges off his stern. The commanding officer was so fascinated by the combined spectacle that he completely forgot the possibility of a down the throat shot until we had opened out too far.

0348(h) Succeeded in shaking off our pursuer, who turned to the south. Knowing that he would be wary, started to return to the scene of the crime to finish off the cripple, but at 0359(h) Sighted a large modern freighter giving us a small port angle on the bow. Before we could get a set up, he too, turned off to the south, forcing us to make another end around. 0450(h) In position ahead of freighter, started approaching with stern tubes bearing.

0512(h) Hoon came out from behind clouds, target apparently sighted us at a range of about 3000 yards and zigged away. Cheered course toward him for a bow shot, but he in turn then headed toward us and started shooting. Changed course away and went to full power with freighter on port quarter shooting at us and dropping depth charges, and an escort on starboard quarter headed our way and flashing a green light at his masthead. During this time, one or the other of the ships fired a white rocket.

0525(h) Having shaken our pursuers, decided to call it a night. One hour remained until sunrise, it was already getting light, and I believed we could expect strong air coverage at daylight which would preclude another end around. We had been at battle stations for twelve hours. Cleared area to northeast on 4 engines.

0611(h) Dove. Spent the day at 100 feet to give all hands a rest, coming to periscope depth hourly.

— page 119 —
10, 1944 (continued)
: 0700(h) - 0723(h) Five tremendous depth charges astern.

During our last encounter, had a total of three ships and one escort on radar, leaving an escort and a freighter unaccounted for but probably back at the scene of the action.

1845(h) Surfaced, commenced transmitting despatch.
2008(h) Completed transmitting, changed course to head for Yonakuni Shima.

February 11, 1944
0556(h) Dove. Conducted submerged patrol 4 - 10 miles south of Yonakuni Shima.
1630(h) Clear of land, heavy overcast in sky. Surfaced, headed for Kusoan To off NE Taiwan.
1853(h) Commenced patrolling NE coast of Taiwan, 10 miles off shore.
2230(h) Picked up small patrol boat at 3500 yards on radar on converging course. Reversed course and opened out.
2312(h) Headed for Hoka Sho. Made contact with another small samoan or patrol. Ran up to north about 30 miles, and at

February 12, 1944
0547(h) Dove, headed south toward Hoka Sho.
1815(h) Surfaced, ran out to eastward and converted #3 fuel ballast tank. Dove twice.
2310(h) Reversed course, heading for point 10 miles north of Hoka Sho.

February 13, 1944
0214(h) 11 miles north of Hoka Sho, came around gradually to head for NW coast of Taiwan. At this time the NE monsoon suddenly started to blow, rapidly reaching force 5. A heavy sea quickly sprang up.
0358(h) Made radar contact broad on starboard bow at 20,000 yards. Went to battle stations and commenced approach. Within a short time it was apparent that target was either drifting or making bare steerageway.
0428(h) Having closed to 8,000 yards target became visible, showing either a very large or a very small angle on bow. Radar picked up an escort patrolling in circles. Headed up to northward to reach a more favorable position.
0455(h) Headed in for attack. The moon was almost full and quite high, but target was directly between moon streak and us. As we headed in, picked up another escort to right of target, and noted intermittent flashing white lights on all 3 vessels, as though they were signalling back and forth. Target appeared to be an old type freighter, with part of its bow gone and masts and stack knocked over or missing. We were coming in on about 130 starboard track.
0517(h) With range of 2250 yards, fired tubes #3 and #4 on surface, own speed 12 knots. Both torpedoes ran erratic. #3 breached with a cloud of steam and spume, and strong odor of hot oil, and the torpedo men reported that #4 sounded as though it hit the shutter as it left the tube. Only one torpedo track was even visible, and it ran off to the right about 10-15 degrees.

— page 120 —
13, 1944 (continued)
Reyersed course and opened out. Heard one blast on whistle as we turned, and the usual gun fire in our direction and random dropping of depth charges commenced.

0556(h) Dove and commenced reload. On returning to periscope depth, target was not in sight, and seas were so heavy that standard speed was necessary to maintain depth control. Decided against heading back for another try. Heard an occasional distant depth charge.

1025-1028(h) Heard a total of 17 distant depth charges.

1822(h) Surfaced.

1937(h) Headed for Tungkien Island off Foochow.

2347(h) Radar contact with patrol. Avoided.

February 14, 1944
0130(h) Radar contact with patrol. Avoided.

0554(h) Dove.

0639(h) Surfaced.

1012(h) Sighted Tungkien Island.

1025(h) Changed course to 180°, dove, heading for Turnabout.

1836(h) Surfaced. Commenced patrolling on north - south courses 10 miles off Turnabout.

February 15, 1944
0603(h) Dove.

0646(h) Surfaced. Low visibility, resumed radar patrol 9-10 miles off Turnabout.

1430(h) Sighted sailing junk close inshore. Avoided.

1925(h) Headed down China coast for Oksu Island.

2307(h) Sighted Oksu Island light, burning with listed characteristics, at an approximate range of 20 miles. Closed to 10 miles.

February 16, 1944
0010(h) Headed east for coast of Taiwan.

0913(h) Radar contact 10 miles (plane contact #8). Dove. Submerged patrol remainder of day, closing coast.

1815(h) Surfaced, headed northeast to round coast of Taiwan. After 4 hours discovered we were barely holding our own against the current.

February 17, 1944
0400(h) Having fixed our position roughly by radar, headed west for Turnabout.

1250(h) Sighted Turnabout, headed south.

1340(h) Sighted two large twin engine bombers flying low under overcast (about 500 feet). (plane contact #9) Dove. Picked them up on SJ radar at 5000 yards as we went down. Apparently not sighted.

1509(h) Surfaced.

1753(h) Sighted Oksu light. Continued to southwestward.

2040(h) Reversed course.

2200(h) Changed course to head for Hoka Sho.

— page 121 —
1944
1346(h) Radar indications (at least 4 planes) distant 9-16 miles. (plane contact #10.) Dove.
1522(h) Surfaced.
1531(h) Radar indication, 8 miles. (plane contact #11) Dove.
1800(h) Surfaced.
2236(h) Rounded Hola Sho at range of 8 miles. Set course for Yonakuni Jima.

During the five days we were in the Formosa straits and off the China coast, we had only strong winds, heavy seas, and a low overcast. A periscope approach would have been impossible, and after our experience of the 13th, I had little confidence in a successful surface attack. Naviga-tion was by radar, with an occasional glimpse of land.

February 19, 1944
0851(h) Dove, 15 miles east of Yonakuni Jima. Conduct submerged patrol and renewed cracked liner #3 main engine.
1823(h) Surfaced. Commenced station patrol on east - west courses off Nakaoukani Jima.

February 20, 1944
0015(h) Radar contact at 20,000 yards bearing 0059T. Contact developed into two good dips, convoy base course 145°, with zig-zags up to 30° to right and left. Target speed about 7 knots. Commenced approach.
0049(h) Radar picked up first one, then two ships on bearing to north widely separated from our immediate objective. These ships re-flected in radar range throughout the approach.
0120(h) Escaped position ahead of convoy. Radar maintain picked up a small escort on his port bow. Rearguard and eight aft, but at six torpedoes left forward distance to track of 3500 yards. Headed in for a bow shot. Leading ship in convoy came in view at about 3000 yards, but I was unable to see second ship. It was a very dark night, no moon, and a heavy overcast.
0129(h) Convoy zigged back toward. Stopped and swung for a sharp track.
0138(h) Fired tubes #3 and #4, no spread, on a 50 starboard track, torpedo run about 1300 yards. Unable to see second target to fire at him.
0139(h) Both torpedoes hit and target started a running dive, which he completed in 52 seconds. Target identified as similar to SINANO NARU, p.161, ONI 208J (revised)
0140(h) Cleared vicinity to southward on 4 engines. Escort, whom we never sighted, commenced dropping depth charges and ran down torpedo tracks toward us. Shortly afterward, much flashing of signal lights from widely separated bearings to the northward occurred, and we lost radar contact with everything but the escort. I believe we came on this convoy just before it made a rendezvous with another and perhaps larger convoy coming down from the north. Again we felt the need of a PPI. Our two ships probably had come from Kirun. In the light of later developments, convoy number two must have reversed course as soon as we fired and rounded at the Yonakuni Jima or Iriomote Jima to the northward. A total of 47 depth charges were dropped in the half hour following the attack.

— page 122 —
20, 1944
0200(h) Started northward, but it took us 20 minutes to get clear of the escort who was patrolling back and forth south of the scene of the attack, and apparently by accident twice heaved us off. Ran at 4 engine speed, first on 040, then on 000, finally on 340 (head. true bearing of searchlights was 020°T).

0335(h) Radar contact, 15,000 yards, bearing 003°. Commenced approach. Target was on base course zero, speed 8, making frequent and radical zigs.

0446(h) With range about 8,000 yards, and POGY slightly forward of targets port beam, he changed his base course 180°. Cursing the day he was born, we reversed course, too, and commenced trying to gain bearing again. By this time it was beginning to get light (sunrise 0518). Fired tubes 3,4, & 5, 110 starboard track, torpedo run 2600 yards, divergent spread. Target zigged toward as we fired and the leading torpedo of the spread hit him in the bow. Target was a medium freighter with flush deck and split superstructure, similar to ADEN LAUR, p.133 ORI 205J (revised), unescorted, and apparently the second ship of our first attack, heading back toward his escort.

0510(h) Changed course to northward, expecting to see target sink. He didn't, but rolling two block busters off his stern and belching out great clouds of black smoke turned off to the south, only slightly down by the bow. Another and around being out of the question, considering our proximity to enemy air bases, cleared area to northeast and at

0600(h) Dove and conducted submerged patrol.

1804(h) Surfaced.

1831(h) Headed back for Yonakuni Jima.

February 21, 1944
0046(h) Two radar indict tions, one at 14000 yards, one at 3000, very near the scene of our last attack. Commenced tracking. Larger ship seemed to be on about 040, making 5-6 knots, smaller one two to three thousand yards astern, and echo ranging.

0123(h) Target changed course to 055, still making 5 knots. He was not zigging, so I began strongly to suspect a searching party.

0130(h) Went to 4 engines and started working up ahead of him, keeping a range of 10,000.

0228(h) In position 10,000 yards ahead of target, headed toward him on reverse course at slow speed.

0245(h) With range down to 5,000, reversed course and stopped, keeping stern to him and kicking ahead occasionally at 1/3 to maintain steeraway and get 1000 yards off his track. His screws became audible at 3500 yards, sound reporting that it was a twin-screw vessel. When the range got down to 3000, he turned toward and gave us a zero angle on the bow. Pulled off his track 1000 yards and stopped. Again he gave us a zero angle on the bow. When this performance had been re-pated three times it became apparent that was annoying, and at a least range of 1900 yards I was able to see our adversary, who had a destroyer's high bow and narrow silhouette. It was obvious that he was maintaining an alert listening watch, who three times had reported to him our correct bearing as we kicked ahead at slow speed. Discontinued approach.

— page 123 —
0519(h) Lost target at 17,000 yards.
: 0555(h) Dove, conducted periscope patrol north of Yonakuni Jima.
: 1822(h) Surfaced. Rounded Yonakuni Jima to westward and set course for Nakanokomi Jima.
: 2200(h) Patrolling east - wast courses due west of Nakanokomi Jima.

February 22, 1944

: 0300(h) Headed northeast at 2 engine speed, paralleling island chain.
: 0602(h) Sighted smoke, then the tops of ships bearing 134T, very close inshore to Iriomote Jima, headed on parallel course. Opened out to start on end around. These ships had apparently gotten by us during the night by hugging the shore so closely their radar echoes blended in with land.
: 0616(h) Radar indication, 3 miles. (plane contact #12) Dove.
: 0706(h) Surfaced, went to 4 engines.
: 0748(h) Radar indication, 3 miles (plane contact #13). Dove.
: 0911(h) Sighted tops of a DD or Cidori bearing 1050T, course about 2300T, opened out.
: 0925(h) Radar indication 5 miles (plane contact #14) Dove.
: 0953(h) Surfaced.
: 1145(h) Radar indication 8 miles (plane contact #15). Dove.
: 1617(h) Surfaced, set course for Kume Jima on 2 engines.

February 23, 1944

: 0115(h) Picked up Kume Jima on radar distant about 25 miles.
: 0200(h) Radar pipes bearing 0400T, distant 22,000 yards. Contact developed into convoy on base course south of west. Went to battle stations and commenced approach. Radar ultimately picked up a total of six targets and one escort. Targets were in a loose formation of two groups of three, with the escort leading the southern group. Worked around to north of convoy's track.
: 0347(h) Stopped and waited for targets to come by firing bearing. Convoy speed was 9-10 knots, frequent and radical zigzags. Kicked ahead at 1/3 speed from time to time to maintain st. coverage and adjust position. Targets came in sight at about 5000 yards.
: 0406(h) Fired #7 and #3 at leading ship, 70 starboard track torpedo run 1800 yards, both to hit. Fired #9 and #10 at second ship, divergent spread, 40 starboard track, torpedo run 1600 yards. (ships were in loose line of bearing, and when we fired first target was on port quarter, second target on starboard quarter.)
The commanding officer having been too greedy, all torpedoes missed their targets. However, one torpedo, after a run of approximately 3300 yards, was seen and heard to hit a large freighter in the second and southern group of ships, starting a small fire which was visible at ranges up to about 10,000 yards.

— page 124 —
1944 (continued)
049(h) Turned away, clearing area on 4 engines. Escort dropped 4 depth charges. Our group of ships, evidently assuming we were working on the other group, continued serenely on their way at their original speed and making normal zigzags.
0417(h) Having opened out to 6000 yards with no sign of pursuit, started working up forward of beam on our original targets.
0418(h) Seven depth charges astern.
0430(h) Target obligingly zigged toward. Reversed course and stopped.
0430(h) With 90 starboard track, torpedo run 2600 yards, fired tubes #7,8,9, #10 at a large modern frigatier of about 2000 tons, similar to GOSYU NARU, p.76 ONI 208J (revised), divergent spread. #8 & #9 were soon and heard to hit with normal explosion. Opened out on 4 engines.
0442(h) 5 depth charges astern, and two red rockets.
0449(h) Target was observed to sink with bow or stern vertical, pip disappearing from the radar screen at a range of about 9600 yards. Having only one torpedo left forward, continued to clear area.
0455(h) Heard 3 depth charges astern.
0523(h) Dove, commenced submerged patrol at periscope depth.
0621(h) Heard ringing on bearings from 150°T to 180°T.
0643(h) Sighted low flying twin engine bomber to south. (plane contact #16)
6704(h) Sighted smoke bearing 173°T.
0735(h) Depth charge.
0800(h) Sighted large 4 engine seaplane (NAVIS) to south. (plane contact 17)
0842(h) Sighted similar plane on same bearing. (plane contact #19).
0847(h) From 0800 to 1130 heard a total of 37 very loud depth charges. No ships in sight. Smoke was visible throughout the morning.
1233(h) Sighted smoke to south. Heard total of 22 depth charges during afternoon.
1821(h) Surfaced, commenced transmitting: despatch.
1930(h) NPAI receipted on F Sked. Changed course to head for area exit point at 2 engine speed.
2330(h) SJ radar contact at 16:00 yards. Tracked him at 5 knots on a steady course, so concluded he was a DD and maneuvered to avoid.

February 24, 1944
0530(h) Navigator got his first celestial observations in 15 days.
2000(h) Converted #5 fuel ballast tank.
2304(h) Went to battle stations for gun bombardment of phosphate plant on Rasa Island.
2350(h) Opened fire, radar range 2500 yards. The results were very disappointing. There was a heavy overcast, and the pointer and trainer could not see the island through their telescopes. Made two runs firing a total of 53 rounds of 4" H.C. and 10 rounds of 4" common, at ranges of 1900 to 2500 yards. There was no return fire, and we were unable to start any fires ashore, so the results are problematical. By the law of averages, we should have gotten a few hits. The so-called fleshless powder is neither flashless nor uniform in its intensity. Also fired 4 drums of 20 Mi.

-10-

— page 125 —
25, 1944.
0039(H) Ceased firing, opened out to south, and resumed course for Midway.

February 26, 1944.
1512(I) Dove.
1845(I) Surfaced, noticed radar interference on SJ which persisted about an hour - True bearing about north.

February 27, 1944.
0230(I) Sighted small lighted saman almost dead ahead. Maneuvered to avoid.

0250(I) Picked up HAHA JIMA on radar bearing 045T, 57,000 yards.
0638(K) Just before sunrise, sighted mast of patrol craft, zero angle on bow, bearing 045° relative. As he had us pinned, with land 20 miles astern, at
0639(K) Dove and put our stern to him. He went by at about 4 - 6000 yards, a killer type patrol boat.
0815(K) All clear, surfaced and resumed course for Midway.
1058(K) Radar indication, 6 miles. (Hlane contact #20.) Dove.
1101(K) Small bomb or depth charge, not close. 3 more small bombs in next 2 hours, none close.
1301(K) At periscope depth, sighted twin float biplane back astern, circling. (Plan cr atact #21.) Went back to deep submergence.
1734(K) One distant explosion.
1845(K) Three distant explosions.
1857(K) Surfaced and resumed course for Midway. Remained of trip was uneventful.

March 4, 1944.
2248(m) SJ radar interference broad on starboard bow. Timed at 5 second intervals, corresponding to a 12 RPM PPI sweep.

March 4, 1944.
0815(y) Sighted escort planes.
1011(y) Moored to S/H pier, Midway, T.H.

Received 25,713 gallons diesel oil and one torpedo.
1631(y) Underway for Pearl.

— page 128 —
17:45(h) : 23-53N : 3 DD : 20,000 : 240° : SD : This one came along : Feb. 9 : 122-48E : 6 AK : yards : 11 knots :

— page 130 —
U.S.S. POGY
Time:  0011 LZT

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. ONE
Date:  2/10/44  Lat.: 23°-44N  Long.: 121°-38E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description - Sight contact made with convoy of six freighters and three escorting destroyers just at dusk. The target for Attack No. 1 had left the convoy and was unescorted at the time the attack was made. A full moon was covered with a heavy overcast. Visibility varied from good to fair.

Ship(s) Sunk - None.

Ship(s) Damaged - None.

Target Draft:  Medium sized Course: 320°  Speed: 11 kts.  Range: 2500 yards.  (at firing)

Om Ship Data

Speed:  11 kts.  Course:  040°  Depth:  Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:  The attack was made on the surface at night using TBT bearings and RADAR ranges. A divergent spread was used to cover 100% of target length. Prior to firing, it was necessary to follow a course more to the right than desirable to avoid running afoul of patrol which was paralleling our course 2000/4° the port beam. Target changed course 40° away, just as we fired, probably having sighted us. All torpedoes missed ahead.

-16-

— page 131 —
U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - WAR PATROL NUMBER FIVE
Attack No. 1

Tubes Fired#3    #4    #5
Track Angle110P   110P   112P
Gyro Angle348    349    349
Depth Setting...... 10 ft.   10 ft.   10 ft.
PowerHigh    High    High
Hit or MissMiss    Miss    Miss
ErraticNo    No    No
Mark Torpedo14-3A    14-3A    14-3A
Serial Number...... 22380    39235    39595
Mark Exploder...... 6-1    6-1    6-1
Serial Number...... 7260    6734    10483
Actuation Set...... Contact    Contact    Contact
Actual Actuation.... None    None    None
Mark Warhead...... 16    16    16
Serial Number...... 11265    11016    1166
ExplosiveTPX    TPX    TPX
Firing Interval...... - 9"    - 8"    -
Type SpreadDivergent    LSL - 0 - 1HR
Sea Conditions...... Calm
Overhaul Activity.... HOLLAND    HOLLAND    S/M Base, Hidway, T.H.

Remarks: The target turned away at the moment of firing causing the torpedoes to miss ahead.

-17-

— page 132 —
0319 LZT
: 2/10/44
: PATROL NUMBER FIVE
: Long.: 121-30E
: 23-125N
: 23-125N
: 121-30E
: 2/10/44
: PATROL NUMBER FIVE
: Long.: 121-30E
: 23-125N
: 23-125N
: 121

— page 133 —
1
Tubes Fired#1
Track Angle87P
Cyro Angle331
Depth Setting...... 6 ft.
PowerHigh
Hit or MissHit
ErraticNo
Mark Torpedo...... 14-3A
Serial Number...... 39159
Mark Exploder...... 6-1
Serial Number...... 1913
Actuation Set...... Contact
Mark Warhead...... 16
Serial Number...... 10094
ExplosiveTPX
Firing Interval...... - 9" - 32"
Type SpreadNone
Sea Conditions...... Calm
Overhaul Activity.. HOLLAND
Remarks:
Torpedoes #1 and #2 both hit the destroyer. Two torpedoes of the second salvo hit the freighter at which they were aimed and sank him. The third torpedo of this salvo hit and damaged the second ship in the adjacent column, after a run of about 2200 yards.

-19-

— page 134 —
0517 LZT
: 3
: 25-46N
: 121-43E
: 2 knots
: 5,000 tons
: 2 knots
: 2250 (at firing)
: 12 knots
: 2620T
: 12 knots

— page 135 —
3
Tubes Fired
Track Angle
Cyro Angle
Depth Set
Power
Hit or Miss
Erratic
Mark Torpedo
Serial Number
Mark Exploder
Serial Number
Actuation Set
Actuation Actual.....
Mark Warhead
Serial Number
Explosive
Firing Interval.....
Type Spread
Sea Conditions.....
Overhaul Activity..

: 3
#3 130S
000 002
10 ft. 10 ft.
High High
Miss Miss
Yes Yes
14-3A 14-3A
25953 23975
6-1A 6-1A
6455 7581
Contact Contact
None None
16 16
11363 10038
TPX TPX
- 8" -
None

Heavy cross sea.

S/BH: S/BH
S/BH:

— page 136 —
U.S.S. POGY
Time:  0133 LZT
Torpedo Attack No. 4
Date:  2/20/44
Patrol No. 5
Lat.: 24°-12N
Long.: 123°-19.5E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description - SJ Radar contact at 19,500 yards proved to be two ships and one escort zig-zagging with about 15 minute. legs, not more than 30° from base course of 145°T. The night was extremely dark with the sky overcast.

Ship(s) Sunk - One AK similar to SINANO IARU - 6254 tons - (GNI 208J(revised p.161)

Ship(s) Damaged - None

Damage Determined by - Saw target sink 52 seconds after first torpedo hit.

Target Draft: 20 ft. Course: 145° Speed: 7 knots Range: 1430 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed: 3 knots Course: 012° Depth: Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack - Attack was made using SJ Radar ranges and TBT bearings. Because of the short range and excellent solution, no spread was used. Both torpedoes hit.

-22-

— page 137 —
4
Tubes Fired
Track Angle
Gyro Angle
Depth Set
Power
Hit or Miss
Erratic
Mark Torpedo
Serial Number
Mark Exploder
Serial Number
Actuation Set
Actuation Actual
Mark Warhead
Serial Number
Explosive
Firing Interval.....
Type Spread
Sea Conditions
Overhaul Activity....

# Attack No. 4

| Tubes Fired | Track Angle | Gyro Angle | Depth Set | Power | Hit or Miss | Erratic | Mark Torpedo | Serial Number | Mark Exploder | Serial Number | Actuation Set | Actuation Actual | Mark Warhead | Serial Number | Explosive | Firing Interval | Type Spread | Sea Conditions | Overhaul Activity | 4/3         | 478         | 001         | 8 ft.     | High   | Hit         | No       | 14-3A       | 22890          | 6-1A           | 5325          | Contact        | 16           | 10009        | TPX            | -             | None          | Light swell from the north | HOLLAND        | FUSHNELL |

Remarks: Both torpedoes hit and the target sank completely in less than a minute.

-23-

— page 138 —
0508 LZT
: 2/20/44
: 24°-28N
: 123°-31E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description - After Attack No. 4, there was much flashing of lights to the northward. Contact was made at 0335 after running northwest. The ship was unescorted and was zig-zagging either to a constant helm plan or with extremely short legs. At 0445, when we had gained position ahead of target's beam, target reversed course. Visibility was fair - dark night with overcast sky.

Ship(s) Sunk - None
Ship(s) Damaged - One AK similar to ADEN MARU - 5824 tons (ONI 208J(revised) p.189)
Damage determined by - Saw and heard torpedo hit. Target did not sink while within radar range.
Target Draft: 25 ft. Course: 210° Speed: 83 knots Range: 2450 (at firing)

Own Shin Data
Speed: 7 knots Course: 133° Depth: Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack - Attack was made using SJ Radar ranges and TBT bearings. A large track and long firing range was accepted because time was short until dawn. Visibility at the time of firing was increasing with the coining daylight. A divergent spread was employed. The time of the torpedo run indicated that the first torpedo, which was angled ahead, hit. Tracking during torpedo run indicated a zig toward.

-24-

— page 139 —
ATTACK NO. 5

Tubes Fired#3 #4 #5

Track Angle116S 118S 118S

Gyro Angle016 014 012

Depth Set8 ft. 8 ft. 8 ft.

PowerHigh High High

Hit or MissHit Miss Miss

ErraticNo No No

Mark Torpedo...... 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A

Serial Number...... 26028 25943 23303

Actuation Set...... Contact Contact Contact

Actuation Actual... Contact None None

Mark Warhead...... 16 16 16

Serial Number...... 10350 1230 350

ExplosiveTPX TPX TPX

Firing Interval.... - 8" - 8" -

Type Spread...... Divergent spread 1½ R - O - 1½L

Sea Conditions..... Light Swell

Overhaul Activity.. SEPHTH GRIFFIN HOLLAND

Remarks: One good substantial hit failed to sink the target.

-25-

— page 140 —
U.S.S. FOGY (SS266)
Time:  0406 LZT

Torpedo Attack No. 6
Date:  2/23/44
Lat:  26-22N
Long:  126-15.5E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description - SJ Radar contact at 20000 yards proved to be a convoy consisting of two groups of three ships each with a smaller vessel generally between the two groups. The convoy was on base course 250T, zig-zagging on legs, of from five to thirteen minutes. Maximum amount of the base course was 350. The ships fired at in attack No. 6 were in the leading group. The ship that was hit was in the trailing group. The night was dark with a light overcast, but visibility was good.

Ship(s) Sunk - None.

Ship(s) Damaged - One ship of about 6000 tons, probably an A/K, type unknown.

Damage determined by - Saw and heard torpedo hit. Target stopped, and several minutes after the torpedo hit, the target was observed to be on fire.

Target Draft: Unknown. Course: 2640T Speed: 9 1/4 knots. Range: About 1900 yds. to each of targets at which torpedoes were aimed.

Own Ship Data

Speed:  3 knots. Course: 3100T Depth: Surface.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type attack - Convoy was tracked for an hour and a half before firing. Targets zigged in succession about 3 minutes before firing and both appeared to be steady on the new course. TBT bearings, SJ Radar ranges, and an angle on the bow estimated from the bridge and checked by three quick bearings and ranges were used. The set-up on the second target continued to check after firing.

— page 141 —
6
Tubes Fired #7 #8 #9 #10
Track Angle #7 6GS 3GS 3T#
Gyro Angle #201 200# 1.66 165#
Depth Setting......  #8 ft. #8 ft. #8 ft.
Power High High High
Hit or Miss(One hit and three misses).
Erratic No No No No
Mark Torpedo......  #14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial Number......  #23815 24551 40084 23669
Mark Exploder......  #6-1A 6-1A 6-1A 6-1A
Serial Number......  #76 54 7747 6C43 7622
Actuation Set......  Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual....  (The one hit was contact).
Mark Varhead......  #16 16 16 16
Serial Number......  #1468 1254 10046 1014
Explosive TPX TPX TPX TPX
Firing Interval....  - 6" - 29" - 6" -
Type spread......  None None Divergent Divergent
Sea Conditions......  Light Swell 20 Right 1% Left
Overhaul Activity..  HOLLAND BUSHNELL BUSHNELL HOLLAND

Remarks: Tubes #7 and #8 wore fired at one ship. Tubes #9 and #10 wore fired at another ship. All four torpedoes missed but one of them hit a third ship after a run of about 3500 yards. The commanding officer cannot account for the misses from tubes #7 and #8. Misses from #9 and #10 were mostly probably due to the sharp track and too great a spread.

— page 142 —
U.S.S. POGY (SS266)
Time:  0438 LZT   Date:  2/23/44
Torpedo Attack No. 7
Lat:  26-22N
Patrol No. 5
Long:  126-12E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description -
Same convoy as Attack No. 6. Ships in the leading group which had been fired at apparently thought the attack had come from the rear because a ship in the trailing group had been hit. The leading group continued zig-zagging without changing base course. The ship sunk was one of the two fire units in Attack No. 6. Visibility same as Attack No. 6.

Ship(s) Sunk -
One AK similar to Gosyo Karu (ONI 208J - revised) - p. 78).

Ship(s) Damaged -
None.

Damage determined by - Saw and heard torpedoes hit. Saw ship sink.

Target Draft:  26 ft.  Course:  2450T  Speed: 9 1/4 kts.  Range: 2750 yds.  (at firing).

Own Ship Data
Speed:  5 knots.  Course:  3160T  Depth:  Surface.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack -
Attack was made using TBT bearings and SJ Radar ranges. 4 torpedoes were fired using a divergent spread applied at the T.D.C.

-28-

— page 143 —
7
Tubes Fired#7 #8 #9 #10
Track Angle375 90S 88S 89S
Gyro Angle200 197 199 198
Depth Setting...... 8 Ft. 8 ft. 8 ft. 3 ft.
PowerHigh High High High
Hit or MissMiss Hit Hit Miss
ErraticNo No No No
Mark Torpedo14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial Number40029 24154 40003 25974
Actuation SetContact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual...... None Contact Contact None
Mark Warhead16 16 16 16
Serial Number5869 6192 10130 1147
ExplosiveTPX TPX TPX TPX
Piring Interval...... - 8" - 9" - 8"
Type SpreadDivergent 3R - 3L - 1R - 1L
Sea ConditionsLight Swell
Overhaul Activity...... S/M Base S/M Base S/M Base, SBPHTH
    Midway Is.T.H. Midway Is- Midway Is-
    lands, T.H. lands, T.H.

Remarks: Target was seen to sink and pip disappeared from radar screen about eleven minutes after firing.

— page 144 —
1. MINE
Range lights on the MV tip of Taiwan led the commanding officer to suspect a minefield between there and Kirun. No other information.

(J) ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS.

The convoy of contact #1, 9 February was well escorted, and as described in the narrative, the escorts were so stationed that an attack was extremely difficult. The convoy commander very properly had his most valuable ships in the inshore column. Preighter which sighted us in this encounter invariably lost no time in opening fire and turning toward to ram.

All convoy escorts, as far as could be ascertained, were echo-ranging on frequencies from 17 to 17.5Kcs.

Contact #5, 21 February, was a trap. The destroyer was not cho-ranging, but patrolling at very slow speeds in company with a smaller vessel who was echo-ranging, was maintaining a very efficient listening watch. We had made an attack in the same area 24 hours before.

There is a very strong daylight air patrol along the Nansei Shoto, principally on the China Sea side, where all convoys seemed to be.

An intensive air and surface antisubmarine hunt was carried out for us on 23 February, after our last attack. Fortunately, we were some miles to the northward.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE.

1. Starboard rain motor cooler circulating water pump motor developed a grounded armature coil which burned through. Repaired and reinsulated by ship's force.

2. #1 Periscope was repacked by Submarine Base, Iidway with some substance, allegedly torpedo tail packing compound, containing grit. Rough weather prevented pulling periscope prior to departure on patrol. Constant use of this periscope for 50 days has lapped the periscope in to some extent, but it must be pulled and all bearings cleaned during refit.

3. The pitometer log suffered covery conceivable casualty and has been kept in intermittent operation only through the expenditure of some hundreds of man hours.

4. Both #1 and #2 evaporators which had been completely overhauled by the Submarine Base, Iidway during the last refit, were found to have serious compressor misalignment after a few hours operation. This misalignment resulted in scored impellors and blower casings, and was most serious in #1 evaporator. Both compressors had to be completely disassembled and proper clearances obtained, and it was necessary to renew the impellors, gear train, wearing rings, oil seals, and steam seals of #1 unit. The Commanding Officer, Submarine Base, Iidway, has been requested to take appropriate disciplinary action by separate correspondence.

-30-

— page 145 —
5. All main engine outboard exhaust valves had to be ground in by ship's force at one time or another during the patrol, due to excessive leakage while submerged.

6. On surfacing 16 February, the upper conning tower hatch gasket fell out of its groove. The spare gasket was cemented in place by ship's force, but it proved to have a soft spot which gives us a salt water shower each time we pass 43 feet diving or surfacing.

7. This vessel has had continued difficulty with the SJ radar motor generator set and control unit, which the commanding officer believes is primarily due to grounds resulting from its location in the lower flat of the forward engine room, where it gets part of the salt water that occasionally pours down the main induction. The usual symptoms are frequency instability and a sudden drop in output voltage. It is recommended that it be relocated elsewhere, possibly in the space formerly occupied by one of the degaussing motor generator sets.

8. A piston seizure in #2 unit of the auxiliary engine occurred on 6 February after 315 engine hours since overhaul. The spare liner and piston were installed by ship's force, but while using the engine to put in a quick charge during the chase of the night of 9 February, load was built up too soon and a cracked liner and scuffed piston resulted. Since this is the second patrol on which exhaustion of spares has put this engine out of commission midway in the patrol, it is recommended that the board spares be increased to two spare liners and two spare pistons.

The auxiliary generator is of definite value, particularly when saving fuel is necessary, but it is underpowered. It should be replaced with a 400 Kt set to enable it to carry the auxiliary load and charge the battery at the finishing rate.

9. This vessel is equipped with General Motors 24B main engines, aluminum pistons and chrome liners. Aside from being rated slightly high, making it difficult to develop full power even when just overhauled, these engines are satisfactory, possessing the greatest advantage that all usual casualties are susceptible to quick repair.

However, the experience of this vessel, after five war patrols, has shown conclusively that these engines must be given a major overhaul after 1000 engine hours instead of after 1500 hours as recommended by the manufacturer. Beyond a thousand hours, exhaust valve leakage develops, causing high temperatures which make it impossible to get even 80-90 out of the engine, let alone full power. The only remedy is overhaul of the worst units. In addition, ring sticking, breaking and sticking exhaust valves, and failure of the wrist pin needle bearings are common casualties after the 1000 hour point is reached.

It is possible that lowered standards of quality control by the manufacturer, in all the ports concerned, as well as lack of experience of overhauling personnel, may be contributing factors to this condition. Irregardless of this, the condition exists and was fully demonstrated on this patrol, on which a series of such casualties and lowered efficiency occurred to #2 and #3 main engines, which now have 1390 and 1116 hours, respectively, since overhaul.

— page 146 —
(L) RADIO:

Radio reception and transmission was normal.

Reception of NFI Haiku was obtained on 14390, 9090, 6380, and 4525 KCs. 6380 KCs is by far the best frequency and is the only frequency which can be heard at all distances from Pearl. A continuous broadcast on this frequency is desired. 9090 KCs is of almost no use because of interference by numerous Japanese stations using the same or nearly the same frequency. Interference on all frequencies was considered normal.

Three transmissions were made in the area with no difficulty.

No submarine serials were missed.

(M) RADAR:

The SD was keyed 5 seconds out of every minute on bright moonlight nights. No indications appeared at night. The SD was very reliable during 300 hours of operation on this patrol. Enemy planes were picked up at ranges out to and including 22 miles. The aerial bomb received on 27 February was the first this vessel has taken in 5 patrols. The plane was small, was picked up at 8 miles, but unlimited visibility let him see us before we could get down.

SJ radar performance was good most of the time. Several minor difficulties appeared at critical periods of operation. If tube failures appeared to be greater than normal. The crystal current was hard to control for a time due to poor contact in the chuck assembly. This trouble was repaired once it was located. The SJD motor generator gave poor performance during much of the patrol. It became necessary to take power from the IC system when the motor generator could not be successfully kept in operation. Land indications were picked up at over 70,000 yards. Rain squalls were tracked out to 35,000 yards. Large ships were picked up and showed a good indication at 18,000 yards and almost disappeared at 20,000 yards. Difficulties was experienced in picking up small patrol craft even inside of 3000 yards and they usually faded at about 8,000 yards. In general, maximum ranges on this patrol on merchant vessels were 20 to 25% less than on the 4th patrol, indicating that the returning job done on 8 February was not wholly satisfactory.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS:

The WA motor generator unit has developed noise and vibration, presumably due to misalignment, on each of the last three patrols. It is realigned during each raft, and must be done again this time.

Sound conditions were generally excellent in all parts of the patrol area where contacts were made.

-32-

— page 147 —
0) DENSITY LAYERS

No density layers were noted in the patrol area. All deep dives showed isothermal water to 300 ft.

A three degree negative gradient was noted at 120 feet, 40 miles east of Haha Jima in the Bonins, on 27 February.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY:

The health of the officers and men during the war patrol was very good.

There were a few sporadic, mild cases of Catarrhal Fever that were treated symptomatically with no loss of time.

There were no injuries.

Habitability was normal throughout the boat. The food was of good quality and well prepared. The water was plentiful and potable. The water system provides ample water for good personal cleanliness.

The air conditioning and ventilation systems were satisfactory.

(Q) PERSONNEL:

The performance of duty of all officers and men during our attacks was in accordance with the best traditions of the naval service. Three officers and eleven men have made all five war patrols.

The commanding officer is concerned with the quality of replacement personnel.

1. A great many service school graduates and sons men who have been rated in relief crews cannot hold down their jobs until they have made a patrol or two.

2. We are getting too many dull-cryed seamen and firemen, who cannot be pushed up into petty officer ratings and who have difficulty even in qualifying in submarines. The commanding officer suggests that a minimum general classification test standard be established for all new submarine personnel, together with a psychological examination for mental alertness.

(R) HILES STEAD - PUEL USD

Midway to area, 2655 miles, 32,385 gallons.
In area 4785 miles, 38,046 gallons.
Area to Midway, 2894 miles, 37,782 gallons.
Midway to Pearl, 1294 miles, 17,396 gallons.

— page 148 —
1. The commanding officer is well satisfied with the present camouflage painting for night attacks, considering it in every way superior to black.

2. Before departure on this patrol, stop valves were installed in the hydraulic sup lly and return lines to #5 FBT vent. This enabled conversion of #3 FBT independently of #5, and is considered desirable for all submarines.

3. The commanding officer believes that the optimum fire control system for submarines should include the following:

   (a) High powered SJ radar and PPI scope in the conning tower, with a PPI repeater on the bridge, if such a repeater can have red illumination.

   (b) A red illuminated gyro repeater near the forward and after TBT positions.

   (c) A night periscope with built in radar antenna.

   (d) A TDC switch position key per section having 30000 yard range scales.

   (e) Forward and after TBT's which are actually precision instruments, either with built in pressure proof telescope or a means of quickly mounting a previously bore-sighted pair of binoculars.

   (f) A dead reckoning tracer in the conning tower for the plotter.

   (g) A larger and more accurate target bearing receiver in the conning tower for TBT bearings.

   (h) A means of setting into the TDC automatically and instantaneously the correct value of relative bearing from either the periscope or the TBT, to be carried and utilized by the commanding officer just prior to and during firing. Such a system will:

     1. Ensure accurate firing bearings.
     2. Solve the spread problem.
     3. Simplify the problems presented by double or triple set-ups and split salvos.

   (i) An adequate talk-back system between TBT's and conning tower. (solved on this vessel)

-34-

— page 149 —
4. New type TDC lighting was installed during last refit. It is definitely unsatisfactory for a night surface approach and a day periscope approach, as the dials of the TDC are almost invisible unless additional external light is thrown on them. The commanding officer has never made a night periscope approach and does not feel qualified to comment on its desirability in this connection. On each of the seven night surface approaches made on this patrol, it was necessary to use a shaded red bulb above the TDC in addition to the newly installed circuit, making a net reduction of zero in the amount of light in the conning tower, and the face of the TDC was still not satisfactorily visible.

Moored alongside pier at Pearl, 1151, 8 March 1944.

— page 151 —
5-43/A16-3
Serial (021)
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. FOGY, Report of Tar Patrol Number FIVE, Comments on.

ATTACK NO. 4 - 20 FEBRUARY

Cn a very dark night, two ships with one escort of 1,430 yards. Both hit and the ship (JIMAO LARU Class) sank in 52 seconds.

ATTACK NO. 5 - 20 FEBRUARY

Three torpedoes fired at cn unescorted... (ADEN LARU Class) at a range of 2,450 yards, resulted in one hit. Target did not sink while within radar range. Approaching dawn prevented further attack.

ATTACK NO. 6 - 23 FEBRUARY

Two torpedoes were fired at each of two ships of a convoy. All missed on targets at which fired but one hit another ship (AK) at a run of about 3,500 yards. Misses on one target are unaccounted for, while sharp track and too much spread probably caused misses on other target. The target which was hit was observed to be on fire but was not seen to sink.

ATTACK NO. 7 - 23 February

At 2A, similar to GOJO LARU in the same convoy as ATTACK NO. 6, was hit with two of four torpedoes fired at a range of 2,750 yards. It sank about eleven minutes later.

: 3. FOGY was exceptionally clean and well kept on return from patrol. Necessary repairs and alterations for which material and time are available will be made by the submarine Base.

- 2 -

— page 153 —
11/jak
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
13 March 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS PGY Comf. Ltr.
SS266/A16-3.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
    (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PGY, Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.

2. The PGY has completed five successful patrols since reporting to the Fleet in April 1943. The first "fresh water" submarine has sunk 13 ships for 73,000 tons and damaged 4 ships for 14,313 tons in just eleven months. She has cruised over 50,000 miles on war patrol and returned from the fifth needing very little overhaul. The performance of the ship reflects great credit on the builders, the officers and crew, and primarily on Lieutenant Commander Hietcalf. The present Commanding Officer put the ship in commission as executive officer, organized the crew and fire control party, and has maintained the PGY's high efficiency for its enviable war service.

3. The excellence of the fire control party in obtaining 50% hits at average ranges of over 2000 yards is deserving of special mention.

C. E. MOMSEN.

— page 154 —
1-10/416-3(15)/(12) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET mr
Serial 0512
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
POGY Report of
Fifth War Patrol.
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 387
U.S.S. POGY - FIFTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
(15 January to 8 March 1944).
1. The fifth war patrol of the POGY was conducted in the East China Sea.
2. This patrol was conducted in the brilliant aggressive manner that characterized this Commanding Officer's previous patrol. All attacks were well conducted and severe damage was inflicted upon the enemy.
3. The Commanding Officer's remarks regarding improvement of fire control equipment are noted. Many of the suggestions made are being incorporated in fire control systems of new construction submarines and in operating submarines when undergoing Navy Yard overhaul.
4. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.
5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this most aggressive and very successful war patrol. The POGY is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

| S U N K | DAMAGED | TOTAL |
|||-------|
| 1 - Destroyer (MUTSUKI Class) | - | 1,445 tons (Attack No.2) |
| 1 - Freighter (Similar YOKOHAMA MARU) | - | 6,143 tons (Attack No.2) |
| 1 - Freighter (Similar SINOYA MARU) | - | 6,254 tons (Attack No.4) |
| 1 - Freighter (Similar GOSYO MARU) | - | 8,592 tons (Attack No.7) |
|         | TOTAL | 22,434 tons |

| DAMAGED | TOTAL |
||-------|
| 1 - Freighter (Similar HOKKA MARU) | - | 8,360 tons (Attack No.2) |
| 1 - Freighter (Similar ADEN MARU) | - | 5,824 tons (Attack No.5) |
| 1 - Freighter (Class unknown) | - | 6,000 tons (Attack No.6) |
|         | TOTAL | 20,184 tons |

Distribution and authentication on following page.
C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

— page 155 —
15 January to 8 March 1944.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
CNO (5)
Cinopac (6)
Ittcl. Cen. Pac. Ocean Areas (1)
Conservpac (1)
(Adv. Base Plan. Unit) (1)
Cinolant (2)
Comsubsplant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
Comnorpac (1)
Comsubs: ac (40)
SUBD, MI (2)
Co:subspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Division Commanders, Subspac (2)
Comsubstrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Subspac (1)

E. L. HYNES, II,
Flag Secretary.

— page 156 —
1-10/16-3(16) SUBLIE FORD, R.OFFIC FLIGHT
Serial 0105
CERTIFICATE
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PC67 (SS266) - Mont of Fifth Rat Patrol.
Reference: (a) ConSubPac third end. FF12-10/16-3(15)/(12) serial 0512 of 16 March 1944.

1. In reference (a) U.S.S. PC67 was credited with certain damage to the enemy including: "a fire in the after part of the after part

— page 159 —
1955(i) Radar contact bearing 34°7, 14,400 yards. Put all 4 generators on propulsion, commenced approach.
: 2012(i) With range to target opening, went ahead full on all four. Own speed 19 knots. (a flat calm sea).
: 2038(i) Blow safety and negative dry. Own speed 19.6 knots at 282 RPM, 1100K from all four generators.
: 2236(i) Discontinued chase. Target speed was 20 knots, zigzagging. After 2½ hours, had closed the range 1000 yards and lost eight degrees in bearing. Target base course 040. From size of radar pip, zigzag plan, and target speed, judged him to be a light cruiser or large destroyer. Sent contact report on 450 and to NPM. NPM rebroadcast it about 15 minutes later on the Haiku Fox.
: 2238(i) c/c to 2290T.

: 0955(i) c/c 3100T. Doubtful smoke contact.
: 1118(i) c/c 3250T.
: 1205(i) Radar contact, 9 miles (plane contact #4.) Dove. Rounded torpedoes.
: 1430(i) Surfaced on course 0900T.

: 0800(i) c/c to 2700T.
: 0917(i) Radar contact, 24 miles (plane contact #5). Dove. Rounded torpedoes.
: 1118(i) Surfaced.

: 1100(i) Radar contact 12 miles (plane contact #5). Dove.
: 1256(i) Raised SD mast. Radar contact 14 miles (plane contact #7). Remained submerged. Rounded torpedoes.
: 1425(i) Surfaced.
: 2118(i) Picked up high land on Kyushu on radar, 60,000 yards.
: 2135(i) c/c to 0200T to head for Toi Saki.

: 1933(i) Surfaced 7 miles SE of Toi Saki.
: 1940(i) Plane contact at 10,000 yards on SJ radar. (plane contact #8) Dove.
: 2032(i) Raised SD mast. Radar contact 8 miles (plane contact #9).
: 2111(i) Surfaced.
: 2144(i) Radar contact 9 miles, closing to 7. (plane contact #10) Dove.
: 2224(i) Surfaced. No further plane contacts. At about the same time a bright, fixed light in the vicinity of Hi Saki was turned out. I am convinced that there is an air field in the near vicinity and that we were the victims of some student aviators getting in their night flying time. My first assumption of radar search planes was not borne out by the succeeding events.

-2-

— page 160 —
1511(i) Conducted submerged patrol on north-south courses 4 miles off-shore between Toei Saiki and O Shima. No ship contacts except numerous small sampans close inshore.
: 1531(i) Sighted 4 fighter planes (TONY) flying low on course 225°T, through periscope bearing about 300°T. (plane contact #11)
: 1906(i) Surfaced on course 090°T. Ran out on two engines to the 160° line from the Bungo Suido, then up toward the Bungo. Light rain and poor visibility.
: 1925(i) Ran through picket line - SJ contacts on both beams.

: 0144(i) Closing Bungo Suido.
: 0607(i) Dove 10 miles east of Fuka Shima on course 270°T. Medium sized trawler or patrol boat crossed astern about 6,000 yards range, making about 12 knots, headed south.
: 0747(i) c/c to 180°T, patrolling along 60 fathoms curve.
: 0825(i) Large sampan crossed stern, 4,000 yards, course west.
: 1003(i) Sighted two bombers (NELL) bearing 080°T on course 200°T (plane contact #12).
: 1301(i) c/c to 0000T.
: 1949(i) Surfaced on course 110°T.
: 2102(i) With Okino Shima bearing 070°, distant 15,000 yards, c/c to 270°T.
: 2121(i) Radar contact bearing 240°T, distant 13,000 yards. Went to 3 engine speed and commenced approach.
: 2139(i) Went to full speed.
: 2143(i) Went to full speed on all four. Target was making 17 knots, zigzagging on only two courses, 105°T and 150°T, but with legs of 3 to 9 minutes. After going to 4 engines had about one knot on him which we used to gain bearing. Did not desire to attack, until after moonset at 0002. From size of pip judged him to be a submarine or torpedo boat.

: 0018(i) Commenced closing for attack.
: 0026(i) Made ready tubes 3,4,5, and 6, as target had not been sighted and we might have to fire on radar bearings. Set torpedo depths on 6 feet, as I was still not sure what type of target we had.
: 0034(i) Fired four torpedoes, divergent spread, Target almost got by before I was able to pick him up and get TBT bearings. Gyro angles were large, but tracks were good - 90° to 120° port. Firing range about 1300 yards, torpedo run 2000. Identified target as a large submarine, class unknown.
: 0036(i) Second torpedo fired hit with much flame and smoke. Target disappeared from radar screen in about 40 seconds.
: 0039(i) Heard four or five loud explosions. May have been torpedoes exploding at end of run, or internal explosions in target. The last explosion was particularly violent and occurred about two minutes after the others.

— page 161 —
0042(i) Ran back down torpedo tracks. Sighted an an ran through a very large oil slick. No survivors in sight. Oil slick had a strong aromatic odor, smelling much like the new 100 octane aromatic aviation gasoline. There are two possible explanations: -
1. The Japs use an aromatic diesel fuel.
2. This particular submarine was carrying aviation gasoline to an outlying base.
0119(i) c/c to 320°T to head back to the Bungo Suido.
0418(i) With Okino Shima bearing 320°T, distant 10 miles, dove on course 290°T.
0800(i) Four miles from Okino Shima, sighted possible radar screen on hill just bchindlighthouse. Took periscope pictures.
2032(i) Surfaced. Bright moonlight and no overcast, so ran down on course 140°T to put in charge.

April 30, 1944
0441(i) Dove on course 305°T, closing Fuka Saima submerged. Sighted patrol vessel to northward during morning.
1928(i) Surfaced. Ran to south for an hour, then west to close coast of Kyushu south of Fuka Shima.
2030(i) Radar contact inshore, 10,500 yards. Commenced approach. Target on course 195°T, speed 7.
2205(i) In position and ready to fire, range 1900 yards, identified target as a trawler of about 300 tons. Let him go by, then cleared area for new patrol station.

May 1, 1944
0451(i) Dove. At daylight, found we were in themiddle of a fishing fleet, never more than 3,000 yards from one vessel or another.
1529(i) All clear, surfaced.
1624(i) Radar contact, 6 miles (plane contact #13). Dove.
1716(i) Surfaced.
1815(i) Involuntary dive - chief of the watch thought he heard diving alarm and opened vents. ODD cleared bridge when vents opened.
1952(i) Radar contact with small patrol vessel. Avoided.
2100(i) Converted #3 F.B.T. to a ballast tank. Made two dives.

May 2, 1944
1141(i) Surface patrol in area.
1217(i) Radar contact 14 miles (plane contact #14). Dove. Rounded torpedoes.
1342(i) Surfaced.

May 3, 1944
0937(i) Surface patrol in area.
1231(i) Radar contact, 14 miles (plane contact #15). Dove. Rounded torpedoes.
1700(i) ODD sighted submarine on horizon bearing 120°T, angle on bow 70 port. Put stern to him, and was unable then to pick him up again even with the high periscope. Apparently we were sighted by him and he dove. Ran up to the north, and at darkness closed his last known position, but made no further contact.
2308(i) c/c to head for the Kii Suido.

— page 162 —
4, 1944
0414(i) Dove with Ichiyo: Saki light bearing 005°T, distant about 12 miles.
Closed coast submerged.
0544(i) Sighted PC type patrol vessel patrolling back and forth close
inshore.
0610(i) Many sailing sampans in sight on all bearings.
0803(i) Sighted steamer heading down the coast. Commenced approach.
Unable to use speed as we were completely surrounded by sampans,
some very close. Hoped target would come by within range, but
he passed about 3100 yards ahead of us. He was an old MPM freighter,
about 4,000 tons, with cut-down masts and a high stack. On his
starboard quarter was what appeared to be an escort - a rather
large engines aft trawler, in silhouette resembling a coastal
tanker.
0900(i) Secured from battle stations, headed down coast on 100 fathom
curve.
0941(i) Patrol yacht passed us on opposite course, inshore.
1000(i) Small coastal tanker, about 250 tons, and PC boat passed inshore
on parallel course.
1045(i) Coastal tanker, about 1500 tons and PC boat passed inshore on
opposite course. Not sighted until they were by, due to heavy
rain.
1245(i) c/c to clear coast.
1403(i) Distant echo ranging, nothing in sight.
1913(i) Surfaced. Heavy rain and strong southeast wind.
2254(i) Commenced radar patrol parallel to coast between Ichiyo Saki and
Shiono Iisaki, range 15,000 yards. No contacts.

May 5, 1944
0418(i) Dove 10,000 yards from Ichiyo Saki, closed coast to 50 fathom
curve. Rain and a very low overcast, heavy seas.
0537(i) Two small freighters appeared very close aboard headed up coast.
Started approach, but second periscope observation showed initial
set-up greatly in error, and targets rapidly going by firing bear-
ing. Decided not to fire. One was identified as Azusa Maru type,
p.108 ONI 208J(Rev.), 1370 tons. The other was about the same
size.
0550(i) Continued down coast following 100 fathom curve.
0744(i) Sighted first of many sampans headed out for a days fishing.
0820(i) Overcast beginning to lift. Sighted torpedo boat to north and
heading down coast.
0930(i) Sighted two medium freighters headed down coast close inshore.
Torpedo boat patrolling on quarter, PC boat also on quarter and
further off shore. Commenced approach. Initial range to freighters
about 3,800 yards.
0955(i) Fired 1, 2, and 3 at rear ship, similar to HAMBURG LARU, p.218
ONI 208J(rev.), divergent spread, torpedo run 2700 yards.
Broached to 59 feet with the periscope up, so went deep and rigged
for depth charge attack.

— page 163 —
0957(i) Heard torpedo hit with loud explosion. Sound man sure it was second torpedo. Target's screws stopped and not heard again, although he continued to hear screws of leading ship. Torpedo run indicated I had underestimated masthead height and our speed solution was too low.

1001(i) First depth charge. Total of eight in first attack, Depth Charge Position Indicator function nicely. We were at 310 feet and 4 of the first eight went off below us, but to starboard and astern. No echo ranging, and we were beneath an 80 gradient. Ran at 80 RPM on course 180. Loud crackling and popping sounds on true bearing of target, which continued for about 20 minutes. Believe he sank.

1013(i) Five depth charges, close but all above us.

1020(i) One depth charge ahead and above.

1024-1033(i) Eight depth charges ahead and to starboard. Last four below us.

1037(i) Escort screws getting fainter.

1117(i) Three depth charges quite far astern.

1226(i) Periscope depth. Sighted two float biplanes well astern (plane contact #16). Heard distant depth charges occasionally throughout afternoon.

1930(i) Surfaced, headed for Muroto Zaki. Bright moonlight, but somewhat to our surprise, no plane contacts.

2205(i) Radar contact with patrol vessel. Avoided.

May 6, 1944

0300(i) Navigator took sights and discovered we had been bucking a 3 knot current. C/c to head for Shiono Misaki.

0441(i) Dove, conducted submerged patrol.

1008(i) Sighted float biplane over Shiono Misaki (plane contact #17).

1027(i) Sighted All or torpedo boat patrolling on east-west courses two miles south of Shiono Misaki.

1148(i) Sighted patrol yacht.

1334(i) Motor Torpedo Boat close aboard with zero angle on bow. Vent deep, started clearing vicinity of land.

1500(i) Lost patrol craft on sound, periscope depth, nothing in sight.

1929(i) Surfaced.

May 7, 1944

Surface patrol in area.

May 8, 1944

0513(i) Surface patrol in area.

0614(i) Radar contact, 6 miles (plane contact #18). Dove.

1146(i) Radar contact, 21 miles (plane contact #19). Dove. Rounded torpedoes.

1436(i) Surfaced.

— page 164 —
1944
Closing Kantori Zaki
0410(i) Dove.
0449(i) Sighted trawler type patrol off shore headed down coast.
0452(i) Several sampans in sight.
0458(i) Small coastal freighter, and a large tug with five wooden vessels with tall masts in tow sighted close inshore headed up coast.
0502(i) Sighted trawler type patrol inshore headed up coast. These vessels have lines that somewhat resemble our LST's or a coastal tanker, but are definitely patrol craft. Took periscope pictures.
0536(i) Sighted very small coastal freighter inshore headed down coast.
0653(i) Sighted trawler type patrol heading up coast.
0700(i) Sighted medium sized AK on the rocks south of Kantori Zaki.
0707(i) Sighted AK or torpedo boat heading up coast, constant helm zigzag.
0730(i) Sighted very small freighter of about 700 tons headed down coast.
0734(i) Sighted patrol yacht close inshore headed up coast.
0805(i) Sighted engines aft freighter or small tanker headed down coast.
0810(i) Went to battle stations, commenced approach.
0816(i) Went to standard speed, turning to close track.
0822(i) One aircraft bomb. Had not made a periscope observation for six minutes, and at that time target was closest ship and he was about 6,000 yards. Started deep and rigged for depth charge attack. (plane contact 20).
0826(i) Another bomb, much closer, above and to port. Clearing coast at 80 RPM.
0848(i) Screws and ringing on starboard quarter, screws on port quarter.
1002(i) Screws faded out. Distant pinging. Started easing up to periscope depth.
1044(i) Periscope depth. One trawler type patrol in sight about 4 miles to south, and headed back inshore. Continued clearing coast. There was almost a flat calm sea; I had been running at 65 feet, although on account of a low overcast, did not believe we would encounter air cover. I believe the plane that bombed us sighted the turbulence from our high speed turn.
1916(i) Surfaced.

May 10, 1944
Closing coast on surface under a low overcast.
1025(i) Dove, conducted submerged patrol.
1914(i) Surfaced, headed toward Daio Zaki.

May 11, 1944
Closing shoal spot south of Daio Zaki under a low overcast.
0533(i) Dove.
0809(i) 600 yards off shoal, being set toward it. C/c to 120.
0820(i) Sounding 25 fathoms, went to standard speed to get clear. Could see breakers about 3/4 mile away.

— page 165 —
0913(i) Slowed to 1/3, conducted submerged patrol. No shipping or patrol vessels sighted.
: 1917(i) Surfaced, headed for spot just west of Omai Zaki where 100 fathom curve comes close to shore.
: 2132(i) Upon came up behind an overcast. Visibility fair.
: 2208(i) 7000 yards offshore, c/c to 270 to patrol along coast.
: 2215(i) Radar contact bearing 280°T, 22,000 yards. Started tracking.
: 2234(i) Went to battle stations and commenced approach. Target on about 090°T, making 12 knots. Sighted smoke at 11,000 yards, target at 9,000. Target was a large passenger freighter, old style about 8,000 tons.
: 2309(i) Picked up two escorts on radar and by sight. One on target's starboard bow, one on his starboard quarter. Decided to get between him and land and fire a stern tube shot, since we had eight torpedoes left aft and nine forward. The last decision was put undoing. Target was zigzagging, with legs of from 3 to 10 minutes.
: 2332(i) Target on 070, angle on bow zero, range 5400.
: 2338(i) Target on 110, range 4,000, coming on nicely.
: 2342(i) Target zigged right to 130, evidently believing he was too close inshore. We were then in 15 fathoms, 500 yards from a shoal ourselves.
: 2344(i) With target going by; fired four torpedoes, range 3900 yards. Assistant TDC operator put in excessive spread and all missed. Went to full power and headed parallel to coast on course 260.
: 2347(i) Trailing escort fired green rocket.
: 2349(i) Trailing escort fired red rocket and headed toward. Two depth charges. He apparently could not see us against the land background, for the range, after closing to 4200 yards, commenced opening, and he seemed to be patrolling some distance astern of target, who kept on going.

May 12, 1944
0004(i) Picked up another patrol vessel on starboard bow, headed toward, range 7000. C/c to 180 to get away from land, escorts, and shallow water.
0047(i) Clear of both escorts. Decided another attack was not feasible:
   1. Target now had a 9 mile lead on us.
   2. We lacked 3/4 hours charge for a full battery.
   3. It would take 2 1/2 hours to catch up with target and 3 1/2 to reach attack position. By this time he would be well past Iro Saki.
   4. Dawn would break at about 0345.
0052(i) Slowed to 2 engines.
0415(i) Charge completed, dove. Conducted submerged patrol.
1915(i) Surfaced.
1924(i) Radar contact, 2200 yards, closing to 1500. Dove.
1946(i) Surfaced. More close radar contacts, continuing for several hours. Eventually decided they might be objects floating in the water as we went right over some of them without being able to see anything. A flat, calm sea.

— page 166 —
1944
Had intended to dive between Omai Zaki and Iro Zaki, but at about 0300 discovered we had not picked up the anticipated set to the east. 0/2 to 0450T.
0459(1) Radar contact, 12 miles (plane contact #21) Dove.
0808(1) Aircraft bomb large; long distance away. During the next eighty minutes, heard 6 more of these. Nothing in sight.
1400(1) In position midway between Omai Zaki and Iro Zaki, patrolling N-S line.
1844(1) Sighted small coastal freighter and escort to north, crossing our stern.
1934(1) Surfaced. Lights of many sampans in sight to west of us.
1936(1) Radar contact with ship, bearing 2450T, 21,000 yards, started tracking.
1938(1) Picked up coastal freighter on radar astern at 14,000 yards. Previously sighted through poriscope at 1844(1).
1955(1) Went to battle stations and commenced approach. Visibility fair - still some light in the west and a clear sky. Target sighted at about seven thousand yards - medium freighter, unescorted, making 10-11 knots on courses from 080 to 110. Worked down to the south for a bow shot on a starboard track. Picked up 2 small patrol vessels 3 miles NE of the target at 8,000 yards, just before firing.
2039(1) With torpedo run down to 1600 yards target began flashing small white lights toward us. Pired 3 torpedoes immediately, divergent spread, depth six feet as I had anticipated a possible Q-ship due to no escorts. Torpedoes went out on about an 80 track.
2040(1) The two wing torpedoes in the spread hit him in the bow and stern. The first torpedo fired, aimed at the MOT, was soon to run erratic and pass astern of the target. A fraction of a second after the second torpedo hit, the entire target was enveloped in a tremendous shock of flame. He obviously had a load of gasoline, for he continued to burn furiously, and several times during the next hour, additional tanks must have ignited for pillars of flame and smoke would rise to great height, then die down slightly.
2041(1) Went to full power and commenced clearing area. It was as if it had as day in the vicinity of the target, the patrols picked up on the radar wore headed toward the scene and the target was about six miles from Iro Zaki. Target last. soon low in the water, listed to starboard, and blazing furiously. Burning gasoline had spread over an area for a considerable distance around him.
2050(1) Headed south to patrol west of the Nanpo Shoto.

May 14, 1944
0419(1) Dove. Engine air induction flooded by failure of outboard valve to close in power (see remarks on material). Surfaced, commenced draining induction to bilges.
0624(1) Engine air induction and bilges dry, dove.
0653(1) Surfaced, commenced surface patrol.
During the night ran to the northward between Inamba Shima and Mikura Shima.

— page 167 —
15, 1944
0410(i) Dove.
1026(i) Sighted one NAVIS through periscope, bearing 270°T, distant 2 miles, course 180°T. (plane contact #22)
1214(i) Sighted one NAVIS through periscope. (plane contact #23)
1911(i) Surfaced, rounded Zeni Su and headed up northeast along the Izu Shima, offshore about 10,000 yards.
2224(i) Radar indication bearing 089°T, 23,000 yards. Started tracking. Discovered we were tracking a rock just west of Kozu Shima. Resumed former course.

May 16, 1944
0051(i) Passed between To Shima and O Shima, 7000 yards south of the latter. No contacts.
0130(i) Headed south toward Miyake Shima.
0402(i) Dove.
0900(i) Sighted float biplane through periscope, rather close, (plane contact #24). Sent deep.
1007(i) Fer-rose depth.
1651(i) Rail: a low visibility, surfaced.
1652(i) Sighted sound 4000 yards on starboard beam. Called 20 MM and made a run over to bridge.
1708(i) Opened fire. No return fire, and after about 10 minutes we had a stopped head in the water, but unable to start a fire with it. 20 KMs.
1725(i) Enemy's and fired 13 rounds, most of which were hits. Sampan, which was about 20 tons, quickly disintegrated and sank. Much to our surprise, discovered several survivors in the water.
1740(i) Maneuvering a deck up survivors. There were six, but one was wounded and disappeared before we could get him. The other five seemed quite pleased to come aboard. One greeted us with "San Diego, California" as he came on deck, which was almost the total extent of his English, but we eventually elicited the information that he had spent 3 years on a San Diego tuna clipper a long time ago.
1839(i) Headed north to make landfall on Nojima Zaki.
2318(i) 13,000 yards from Nojima Zaki, c/c to west.

May 17, 1944
0010(i) Radar contact 314°T, 14,400 yards. Started tracking.
0014(i) Target, a single ship with two escorts, was on course 150°T. Commenced approach.
0025(i) Target course 110°T.
0030(i) Target course 090°T.
0036(i) Target course 070°T.
0042(i) Target course 050°T.
0045(i) Target course 030°T.
0048(i) Target course 000°T. We were now six miles astern of the target and he was six miles from snout water and a nine field, headed into Tokyo Kaiwan. Discontinued approach.
0409(i) Dove for submerged patrol between O Shima and Miyake Shima.
1902(i) Surfaced. During the night closed O'Shima and Nojima Saki. No contacts.

— page 168 —
1944
0222(i) C/o to 1200T.
0407(i) Dove.
0437(i) Surfaced, commenced closing Miyake Shima for surface patrol on southerly course 10 miles east of Miyake, Mikura, and Hachijo Shima. Low overcast, visibility fair.
0639(i) Sighted one EMILY through high periscope. (plane contact #25) Dove.
0733(i) Surfaced.
0756(i) Radar indication, 9 miles (plane contact #26). Dove.
0924(i) Sighted one NAVIS on course south (plane contact #27).
1227(i) Surfaced.
1453(i) Radar contact, 7 miles. (plane contact #28). Dove.
1926(i) Surfaced. Sent despatch to Consubcap on results to date.

: 1944
1055(i) Radar indications, at least 3 planes, 22 miles. (plane contact #29)
1058(i) Indications closed to 6 miles. Dove.
1232(i) Surfaced.
2130(i) Converted #5 PST to ballast tanks. Dove twice.

: 1944
0427(i) Sighted small trawler of about 40 tons 10 miles SW of Sumisu Shima. Named all guns and closed him on 4 engines.
0507(i) Opened fire with 4" and 20 Mi. Target had machine gun on deck house but did not use it, also at least three radio antennas. First drum of 20 Mi started a good fire, and about 10 4" hits put him almost completely under. He sank quite suddenly about 10 minutes after we ceased firing, leaving almost a dozen survivors in the water.
0610(i) As we were running through the oil and wreckage, looking for anything of value, one enterprising Jap managed to hitch a ride on the bow. He then crawled inside bow buoyancy tank through a flooding opening. Not desiring to have him drown there, dislodged him with a blast of high pressure air.
0623(i) Headed south to patrol between Sumisu Shima and Tori Shima.
0829(i) Radar indication, 23 miles (plane contact #30). Did not dive.
0900(i) Radar indication, 4 miles. (plane contact #31) Dove.
1017(i) Surfaced.
1024(i) Lookout sighted NAVIS or EMILY, distant about 6 miles. (plane contact #32) Dove.
1210(i) Surfaced, c/c to 0350T.
1925(i) Departed area for Midway.
During the first 1500 miles of the return trip, to within 650 miles of Midway, we had almost continuous fog and light rain. Occasionally the overcast would lift slightly or thin for a few minutes enough to let the navigator get a sun line.

: 1944
0642(y) Exchanged recognition signals with air escort.
0732(y) Ran over an uncharted bank just west of Noro Bank. Least sounding 38 fathoms. Hydrographic Office will be requested to name it POGY BANK.
1034(y) Moored to U.S.S. GAR, S/M pier, Midway T.H. Fueled.
1540(y) Underway for Pearl.
1822(y) Air escort returned to Midway.

: 1944
0712(i) Sighted escort, PC 519. Proceeded to Pearl in company.
1252(i) Moored starboard side 4 pier, S/M Base, Pearl Harbor.

-1-

— page 169 —
1. In the area there was frequently an overcast and it was often rough, particularly when the wind shifted to the southwest.

Prevailing wind was from the southeast, force 2-4.

Heavy rain was encountered in the Bungo Suido.

Light fog, rain, and zero ceiling frequently occurred during the latter part of the patrol.

On several occasions a light surface haze was present at night with a cloudless sky.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION:
Average force of the Kuroshio was 2 knots, setting 0300T.

Currents inshore were variable and influenced by wind and tide.

Just south of Shiono Misaki a current of 4 knots was encountered setting 0900T.

Very strong variable currents were encountered near the O Shima south of the Sagami Nada. On the morning of 16 May, experienced a current of 6 knots setting 3300T along its western edge, and a current of 6 knots setting 1300T along its eastern edge.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:
A fixed white light visible 32 miles was observed on Hi Saki near Ariake Van on the nights of 25 and 26 April, extinguished at about 2300 each date. Since night flying planes were encountered up until that time, it is probable that this is an aircraft beacon which is secured when all planes have landed.

Omai, Saki and Kake Zuka lights were burning with listed characteristics.

Mikonioto Shima light has altered characteristics. It is now fixed white, visible 14 miles.

All other navigational lights were burning with normal characteristics but reduced power, being visible in general at about 1/2 to 2/3 charted distances.

No navigational light shown on the charts seemed to have been extinguished.

-12-

— page 173 —
U.S.S. POGY
Time:  0034 LZT
Torpedo Attack No. 1
Date:  4-29-44
Lat:  32-07N
Patrol No. 6
Long.:  1330-03E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description - SJ Radar contact was made at 13,000 yards with a single ship leaving the Bungo Suido. This proved to be a submarine on base course 125T zig-zagging according to a simple plan. The target employed only two courses. It remained on 150FT from three to eight minutes then changed to course 105FT for a similar period of time. This plan did not vary during the three hours the target was tracked. The attack was made after moonset. The sky was clear with a light surface haze. Target not seen until just before firing.

Ship(s) Sunk - One Submarine - class unknown - about 1800 tons.

Damage determined by - Saw one torpedo hit - indication disappeared from radar screen in forty seconds. Only a large oil slick remained where the target had been.

Target draft - 171
Course 105FT
Speed 17 kts.
Range 1300 yds. (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 41 kts.
Course 230FT
Depth Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack - Attack was made on the surface at night using SJ Radar ranges and bearings supplemented by TBT bearings at firing point.

— page 174 —
1
Tubes Fired#6
Track Angle99P
Gyro Angle313
Depth Set6 ft.
PowerHigh
Hit or MissMiss
SpasticNo
Lark Torpedo23
Serial Number52954
Actuation Set...... Contact
Actuation Actual.. None
Lark 'arhead16
Serial Number11233
ExplosiveTPX
Firing Interval...... - 8"
Type SpreadDivergent 3L - 1L - 1R - 3R
Sea Conditions...... Choppy
Overhaul Activity... SEPHTH
Remarks - None

: 1
#5
104P
309
6 ft.
High
Hit
No
14-3A
25758
Contact
Contact
None
16
11039
TPX
- 8"
3L - 1L - 1R - 3R
SBPHTH
SBPHTH
SBPHTH
SBPHTH
-17-

— page 175 —
0955 LZT
Torpedo Attack No. 2
Date: - 5 May, 1944
Lat: - 33°-31N
Long: 135°-28E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:
The were patrolling off Ichiyo Saki in the midst of a fleet of fishing sampans. Sky was overcast and visibility was poor. A rough sea with difficult depth control. Further decreased visibility. A sub-chaser was sighted, then what appeared to be a destroyer. An approach was started on the latter vessel when two AKI's were picked up at a range of 3800 yards. The escort was subsequently identified as a mine layer.

Ship(s) Probably Sunk - One AK similar to HALIBURG MARU, P. 213 in ONI 208J (revised) 5220 tons.

Damage determined by - Heard one torpedo explosion at the anticipated time. Depth charge counter attack did not start till 6 minutes after the torpedo explosion. Target screens stopped when torpedo hit amt were not heard again. Loud cracking noises from last true bearing of target heard for twenty (20) minutes.

Target Draft: 18 ft.
Course: 120°T
Speed: 8 kts.
Range: 2600 yds.
(at firing).

Own Ship Data

Speed: 2kts.
Course: 054°T
Depth: 65 ft.
Angle: 30° Down at firing.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: -
The attack was made at periscope depth. A divergent spread was employed, and continuous bearings from periscope were introduced into the TDC during firing.

-18-

— page 176 —
1. Torpedo Attack No. 2

Tubes Fired #1  #2  #3

Track Angle 96S  96S  100S

Gyro Angle 344  346  345

Depth Set 8 ft.  8 ft.  8 ft.

Power High  High  High

Hit or MissMiss  Hit  Miss

Erratic No  No  No

Mark Torpedo14-34 14-34 14-34

Serial Number40421  39971  22159

Mark Exploder6-4  6-4  6-4

Serial Number8541  8502  17579

Actuation SetContact  Contact  Contact

Actuation Actual...... None  Contact  None

Mark Harhead16-1  16-1  16-1

Serial Number1343  9459  5526

ExplosiveTPX  TPX  TPX

Firing Interval......  - 8 "  -  9"

Type SpreadDivergent  0 - 2R - 2L

Sea Conditions...... Rough

Overhaul activity...... SBPHTK  SBPHTK  SBPHTK

RemarksThe torpedo run to the target at the moment of firing was actually greater than that shown by the TDC by about 300 yards. Thus the right wing torpedo hit the target instead of the one with zero spread. Approach officer underestimated mast-head height, which resulted in range and speed solutions being too low.

-19-

— page 177 —
5-11-44
Torpedo Attack No. 3
Lat.: 34-36.5N
Long.: 138-0LE
Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:
Contact was made on the SJ radar at 22,000 yards. The target was a passenger-cargo type vessel of about 8000 tons, coal burning. It was proceeding eastward, close inshore, toward Omai Saki, zig-zagging with five minutes' legs at 12 knots. There were two escorts to seaward of the target on the starboard bow and quarter. The moon was three days past full. The sky was overcast, but the target was picked up at 10,000 yards with 7 x 50 binoculars.

Damage:
None, ••••!

Target draft: 20 ft.
Course 130°T
Speed: 11½ kts.
Range 3900 yds.
(at firing).

Own Ship Data
Speed: ½ kts.
Course: 0200T
Depth: Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack -
The attack was made on the surface at night using SJ Radar ranges and TET bearings. Target speed was accurate, and the target had completed a 250 zig- right to course 130°T immediately before. The first torpedo was fired. Target course remained 1300° during the time that the torpedoes were running. A four torpedo divergent spread was used.

-20-

— page 178 —
10 19 18 17

Track Angle119P 118P 120P 116P

Gyro Angle173 174 169 174

Depth Set8 ft. 8 ft. 8 ft. 8 ft.

PowerHigh High High High

Hit or MissMiss Miss Miss

ErraticNo No No No

Mark Torpedo...... 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A

Serial Number...... 23206 22382 26374 39986

Mark Exploder...... 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4

Serial Number...... 171 8360 13233 17583

Actuation Set...... Contact Contact Contact Contact

Actuation Actual... None None None None

Mark Warhead...... 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1

Serial Number...... 13234 9461 12725 12616

ExplosiveTPX TPX TPX TPX

Firing Interval.... - 8" - 8" - 8" -

Type Spread...... Divergent 1L - 1R - 3L - 3R

Sea Conditions...... Slight swell from southwest.

Overhaul Activity.. SBPTHH SEPHTH SEPHTH SEPHTH

Remarks * The missos were caused by a combination of excessive torpedo run, torpedo dispersion, and a control error. At the moment of firing, the Assistant TDC Operator set double the spread ordered by the commanding officer. This gave a theoretical torpedo spacing of 380 feet between torpedoes instead of 190 feet as planned. On acceptance runs for torpedoes fired from tubes #10 and #9, the dispersion at 4500 yards was 67 feet left and 40 feet right respectively. Presumably, the torpedoes behaved in the same manner on this firing or at least one hit would have been obtained.

— page 179 —
1944
Torpedo Attack Report Sheet

U.S.S. POGY
Time: 2039 LZT
Torpedo Attack No. 4
Date: May 13, 1944
Lat.: 34°-31'N
Lat.: 34°-31'N
Long.: 138°-33'E
Long.: 138°-33'E

Target data - Damage Inflicted

Description - On surfacing, the target was nicked up on the SJ radar at 22,000 yards. The target was headed eastward across the entrance to Suruga'yan. It looked suspicious in that no escort was present, and the target was zigzagging a mere 10° either side of its base course. The weather was clear with no moon, and visibility was fair. Target flashed lights in our direction and was fired. Immediately before he could change course or speed.

Ship(s) Sunk - One AK - 5800 tons - Similar to Lexico Maru - Page 173
...ONI 203J(rev.)

Damage Determined by - Saw and heard one torpedo hit with little apparent damage. Six seconds later sound reported another hit; and the target simultaneously burst into a mass of flame from the foremast aft, lighting up the sea for miles around. It is believed that this vessel was carrying gasoline; because the fire immediately spread several ship lengths astern as the target slowed to a stop, then spread several hundred yards all around it. No left the target in the midst of a vast pool of flame after witnessing from 1400 yards, the formation of a group of Japs who found temporary refuge on the fo'c'stle.

Target Draft: 15 ft.
Course: 092°T
Speed: 9 3/4 kts.
Range: 1770 yards.
(at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed: 3½ kts.
Course: 334°T
Depth: Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack - The attack was made on the surface at night using SJ Radar ranges and T3T bearings. A divergent spread was set at the TDC.

-22-

— page 181 —
1700 LZT (Opened fire) Date: May 16, 1944  Let.: 33-56N  Long.: 1390-50E
1736 LZT (Target sank)

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Sunk - One fishing sampan - about 20 tons - Kaiku Maru owned by a 50 year old fisherman from Hachijo Jima. Crew of ten. Diesel power. Length 22 meters. Bound from Hachijo Jima to Yokohama with a full load of iced fish. 7 hours out of Hachijo and 13 hours from Yokohama at time of attack.

Damage determined by - Saw target sink. Picked up five survivors one of whom gave the following account:

Details of Action

It was at first thought that this target could be sunk with 20 mm. fire. 960 rounds of 20 mm. were fired, 1950 rounds of .30 cal., and 200 rounds of .45 cal. at ranges of from 1500 to 500 yards. No fire was started and little apparent damage resulted. The following 20 mm. casulltics were experienced: bent face plate; sheared off cotter pin on the "safe-fire" switch; and a HBT bullet lodged in the barrel three inches forward of the breech and of the rifling. Although this bullet was firmly seated, it was finally dislodged by the barrel clearing tool after a considerable amount of force was applied from the muzzle end. The target sank readily after 2 rounds of 4" common and 10 rounds of 4" high capacity were fired from 500 yards. Each hit did severe damage.

— page 183 —
1. MINES
No information except of a negative character. We were inside the 100 fathom curve on several occasions in several different places.

(J) ANTISUBMARINE TASURES AND EVASION TACTICS
After our attack on 5 May, went to 310 feet underneath a 8" layer that started at 150 feet. Ran at full speed with radical change of course until first depth charges went off, then slowed to 2/3 (80 RPM). Escorts used no echo ranging. Depth charge position indicator showed eight of 25 depth charges exploded below us. First attack delivered six minutes after firing. Second attack, delivered 13 minutes later, shook us up badly but did little damage. Continuing to run on a steady course at 2/3 speed, we soon left escorts astern and they never regained contact.

After being bombed on 9 May, went to deep submergence and started clearing coast at 2/3 speed. There were at least two patrol craft searching, one echo ranging, but neither made contact.

There was no evidence whatever of night flying search planes during the 30 days we spent in the area, either radar equipped or otherwise.

(K) HAZARD DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
1. The control room soft patch leaked considerably at the outset of the patrol, but the leak steadily diminished to a slight drip.
2. Numerous small electrical casualties - grounds, broken contact fingers, open coils, etc., occurred frequently during the training period and the first two weeks of the patrol.
3. Great difficulty in getting proper battery voltage on charge, and excessive gassing, eventually caused us to check our voltmeters against a Weston portable, and led to the discovery that they had been calibrated without regard for voltage drop in the leads and connections.
4. Midway in the patrol the vent valve gasket to #AA ballast tank came completely out. Investigation disclosed that it had improper taper and had been installed upside down.
5. Depth charging on 5 May caused no serious casualty at the time, but 3 days later it was discovered that the 75% motor field interlock on the starboard main motor starter lower was inoperative. Investigation disclosed that the rollers on the interlock arm and the corresponding latch were sprung 3/16" out of alignment with the starter lower in the off position, leaving the starboard motor without interlock protection. No damage resulted and the interlock was repaired by ship's force.
6. The depth charge position indicator functionality perfectly. It is recommended for installation in all submarines. The only thing lacking is a range scale and a relative bearing indicator, which are both understood to be in the process of development.

-26-

— page 184 —
7. During the refit following the fifth patrol, two main engines wore completely overhauled and the hods pulled and valves ground on the other two. As a result, and for the first time on any war patrol that this ship has made, we were able to get 1100 K.W. (Full power) out of all generators at any time. Additionally, there was an almost complete absence of minor casualties. The Commanding Officer strongly recommends that this procedure be made standard practice for every submarine with General Motors engines during overfleet.

8. On our morning trim dive on 14 May, the hull opening indicator light bore showed a green light on the ship's ventilation induction, but the engine air induction lights showed neither green nor red. The valve was put in hand and closed, but not before the induction was almost completely flooded. After surfacing, the exhaust was re-annotated and it was found that if the hydraulic operation: lower was jammed hard to the right as it was pulled toward the operator, the ship's ventilation outboard valve would sometimes always close but the engine air induction outboard valve would sometimes only move a short distance. Possible recurrence of this casualty has been prevented by slightly altering the mechanical stop against which the hydraulic operating lever is pulled, to make it impossible to jam this lever and get excessive throw of the hydraulic valve itself.

9. The auxiliary engine, General Motors model 8-268, was given a complete overhaul following the 5th patrol. During this overhaul new type exhaust valves, #10 drg #N9779, and valve knocks, pe #13 were installed. The new valves have one groove in the stem and one land on the knocker, the old assembly had three grooves and land; there was no other apparent difference.

23.2 engine hours after overhaul, excessive noise developed. Inspection disclosed that the valve stem cap, pe #12, was riding on the valve spring seat, pe #14, apparently because the new knocks were slightly smaller in diameter than the old type. This allowed the valve stem and knocker assembly to ride too low in the valve spring seat. Valves in #1 and #3 units, which had begun to deform, were replaced with spares of the old type valves in other units shimmed up.

31.6 engine hours after overhaul, the engine again had to be shut down. Inspection disclosed that the knockers on #4 unit had carried away, scarring the cylinder walls, and cracking the piston and cylinder heads. Valves in #6 unit were again riding on the seat, those in #2, 3, 5, and 7 units had insufficient clearance.

In view of the smaller diameter of the new type valve knockers, it is suspected that the new valve and knocker assembly requires an altered valve spring seat.

10. At 0400 May 28, a heavy knock developed in #2 main engine and it was shut down shortly afterward. Inspection disclosed that the upper half of #9 connecting rod bearing had failed completely. Rotation of the shaft had first forced out the bearing metal then ground through the bearing shell into the connecting rod itself. #9 journal was very badly scored, to a maximum depth of .115" and a width of .073", and the center ridge was cut down .022". The adjacent crank webs each showed temper marks indicating that the entire journal had been at a rod heat.

It will be necessary to renew the crankshaft on this engine.

The commanding officer believes that failure of personnel to shut down this engine when indications of faulty operation first developed transformed a minor material failure into a major casualty.

— page 185 —
1. RADIO RECEPTION: 2. TRANSMISSION WAS OK. RECEPTION OF NPM Heiki was obtained on 14390, 9090, 6380 and 4525 Kcs. No unusual or prolonged interference was encountered.

The NMC1 RAL receiver failed during one of the Submarine Schedules due to a broken connection. Reception was continued by taking the incoming signal from the sea-net stage RF amplification in the DQ receiver and feeding this signal into the RBO. The note for a reliable standby receiver to cover the higher frequencies is considered uncertain.

(2) RADAR
The SD was keyed once every minute while in the patrol area. No loss in efficiency was encountered due to this practice. The SD continues to be extremely reliable. Late indications were obtained all the way out to the center of the sweep. Plane indications ranged from 4 to 25 miles.

The SD was excellent performance throughout the patrol. Some trouble was still encountered with the motor generator set. The motor commutator was badly, brake and shifter were brushes, and eventually grounded out the motor and the generator was successfully started down in place and satisfactorily operated. Ranges obtained this patrol were excellent. Late indications out to the center of the sweep, and on enemy submarine was picked up at 13,000 yards, a merchant ship with a 14-inch background was picked up at 23,000 yards, and small scarpans were picked up at ranges up to 8,000 yards. Off Onai Saki merchant indications appeared on the radar screen. These indications looked like light rain squalls but there was no rain, and it was also possible to lose on these phantoms. They first appeared during the early part of the evening, and were encountered at all ranges at different times for the next six hours.

Nothing was ever picked up on the OOO converter.

(3) SCUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
The starboard sound shaft filled with hydraulic oil early in the patrol. The hydraulic packing glans were removed in this shaft during the last refit and it is believed that they were improperly replaced. The sound gear port to satisfactorily in spite of this condition.

Sound centric was never generally in a running condition. Echo ranging could not be heard unless the keying vessel was relatively close. All Japanese echo ranging were encountered once to be on 17 kcs. Echo ranging could never be heard on the JP sound gear, regardless of the frequency in the supersonic range to which it was tuned.

-28-

— page 186 —
0) DENSITY LAYERS
Marked density layers were encountered on the four occasions that we went deep close inshore off south coast of Honshu, the temperature decreasing from about 65° on the surface to about 56° at 300 feet with one or two sharp breaks. The only other bathythcmograph card made showed isothermal water north of Tori Shima on April 20, down to 290 feet where a slight break occurred.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY
The health of the officers and men during this war patrol was very good.

There were a few sporadic, mild cases of Caterhall Fevor that were treated symptomatically with no loss of time. There was one case of Chronic Appendicitis which was treated with Sulfadiazine Therapy.

There were no injuries to the crew. Five Japanese prisoners were taken aboard from a fishing boat who suffering from minor lacerations and shrapnel wounds.

Habitability was normal throughout the boat. The food was of good quality and well procured. The water was plentiful and potable. The water system provides ample water for good personal cleanliness.

(Q) PERSONNEL
The conduct of all officers and men was in accordance with the best traditions of the naval service.

As the submarine service expands and its personnel is diluted, a serious situation is beginning to develop in the torpedoman ratings - none of our replacement torpedoman's must have a practical knowledge of torpedoes when they come aboard, and they have no opportunity to learn during a war patrol. It is recommended that the following measures be taken:
1. Start a program of exchanging ship personnel and submarine personnel.
2. Require that relief crew torpedoman who have had no ship experience get a course of instruction in the ship before they are ordered aboard.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED
Pearl to Midway 1310 miles 15,522 gallons
Midway to Arron 2251 miles 27,222 gallons
In Arron 4824 miles 40,500 gallons
Arron to Midway 2283 miles 35,800 gallons
Midway to Pearl 1364 miles 17,295 gallons

— page 187 —
10
Pearl to Area
In Area
Area to Pearl
Days submerged

: 12
30
10
17

: 20
49,771

: 10
Personnel

: 10
Torpedoes
Fuel
Provisions
Personnel
10
49,771
20
10

: 10
Torpedoes
Fuel
Provisions
Personnel
10
49,771
20

— page 188 —
1-3/16-3
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial (041)
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
USS POGY's Conf. 1tr.
SS266/A16-3
From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY THREE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. POGY, Report of SIXTH War Patrol.

1. The SIXTH war patrol of the U.S.S. POGY was of fifty-two days' duration of which thirty days were spent in the assigned area. Of seventeen contacts made, nine were not successful, four were in contact, three could not be closed, and three were not successful. All attacks were executed with the standard attacks and skill as in previous patrols of this nature.

ATTACK NO. 2 - MAY 5, 1944

This was a daylight submerged attack on two medium-sized AKS. Of three torpedoes fired at the larger AK one hit was heard, and although further observations could not be made the screws of the target were heard to stop and were not heard again. Loud crackling and popping sounds were heard in direction of target for twenty minutes.

— page 189 —
1. U.S.S. POGY, Report of SIXTH War Patrol.

ATTACK NO. 3 - MAY 11, 1944.

This was the only unsuccessful attack and was another night surface attack against an old large passenger freighter. A misjudgment of the enemy's intentions ended up in an excessive range which, with large spread used, undoubtedly accounts for the misses.

ATTACK NO. 4 - MAY 13, 1944.

This was also a night surface attack. Three torpedoes were fired at a medium sized AK at 1,600 yards, resulting in two hits. These hits evidently ignited a load of gasoline which set the ship and surrounding area to blazing furiously. The ship was undoubtedly destroyed.

ATTACKS NOS. 5 & 6 - MAY 16 & MAY 20, 1944.

The 5th were well-executed gun attacks on two sam-pans, resulting in sinking of both. Five survivors were rescued from the first one. The use of high-pressure air is most novel.

3. It is interesting to note that eight of twenty-five depth charges exploded below 310 feet. As more data of this nature become available, improved evasion measures will result.

4. A Navy Yard Overhaul will be given the USS POGY.

5. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are

- 2 -

— page 190 —
1. SUBM-: RINE DIVISION FORTY THREE
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial ( 041 )
Subject: U.S.S. POGY, REPORT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL.

CONGRATULATED on inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK

1. Submarine1,800 tons (Attack #1)
1. AK (Siniler HAMBURG M.R.U.) 5,220 tons (Attack #2)
1. AK (Siniler MEXICO M.R.U.) 5,800 tons (Attack #4)
1. Sampan40 tons
1. Sampan20 tons

Total12,880 tons.

D. C. WHITE.

— page 192 —
FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(16)
Serial 01144
Confidential
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
POGY Report of
Sixth War Patrol.
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 441
U.S.S. POGY - SIXTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.
(7 April to 29 May 1944).
1. The sixth war patrol of the POGY was conducted in waters south and east of Japan.
2. Area coverage was excellent and three out of four torpedo attacks made were successful. In addition, two excellent gun attacks were made and five prisoners picked up.
3. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.
4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this aggressive and sixth successive, successful war patrol. The POGY is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

SUNK
1 - Submarine (class unknown) - 1,800 tons (Attack No. 1).
1 - Freighter (HAMBURG MARU class) - 5,220 tons (Attack No. 2).
1 - Freighter (MEXICO MARU class) - 5,800 tons (Attack No. 4).
1 - Sampan - 20 tons (Gun Attack No. 1).
1 - Sampan - 40 tons (Gun Attack No. 2).

TOTAL - 12,880 tons

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

Distribution and authentication on following page.

— page 194 —
SS266/A16-3
Serial 052

U.S.S. FOGY (SS266)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

DECLASSIFIED A.I
2 December 1944.

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. POGY (SS266).
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Via: Official Channels.

Subject: U.S.S. POGY - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (ConsubSpaC only)

1. Enclosure (A), covering the seventh war patrol of this vessel, conducted in the Nansei Shoto and waters south of Japan during the period from 13 October 1944 to 2 December 1944, is forwarded herewith.

P. G. MOLTENI JR.

DECLASSIFIED ART. C445, OPNAVINST 5510.C
B/OP-3/6/C DATE 6/11/72

F. G. MOLTENI JR.
DECLASSIFIED

— page 195 —
C-Q-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

(A) Prologue.

Arrived Pearl Harbor, T.H., 29 May 1944 from sixth war patrol. On 1 June 1944 completed voyage repairs and departed Pearl Harbor for Naval Drydocks, Hunter's Point, San Francisco, California. On 3 June 1944 arrived Hunter's Point and commenced Navy Yard Overhaul. On 20 June 1944 Lt. Comdr. P. G. NOLTEN JR., USN, relieved Lt. Comdr. R. N. METCALF, USN, as commanding officer.

On Friday, 15 September completed an excellent overhaul. On 17 September departed Hunter's Point for Pearl Harbor, at a speed of 11 knots, which allowed time for training the crew and testing machinery. Much benefit was gained during this period, but it is believed that much more could have been accomplished had the trip been made in company with another boat.

On 25 September 1944 arrived at Pearl Harbor, T.H., and started four day voyage repairs. On 30 September started eight day intensive training period, from which much benefit was gained by all hands.

(B) Narrative.

October 13, 1944.

1430 VW Pursuant to ComTaskFor SEVENTEEN OPORD 347-44, departed Pearl Harbor, T.H., in company with U.S.S. SARGO.

October 13 to 17.

Enroute Pearl to Midway conducting training with U.S.S. SARGO.

October 17.

0900 (Y) Arrived Midway and accomplished minor voyage repairs.

October 18.

0800 Departed Midway in company with U.S.S. SARGO for patrol area.

October 19-20.

Skipped October 19.

October 20-25.

Enroute Midway - Area conducting dives for trim and training. 0430 (L) Exchanged recognition signals by S.J. radar with U.S.S. SNAPPER. 23rd

— page 196 —
0722 (K) Sighted U.S.S. SKATE. Exchanged recognition by S.J. radar.
25th

October 26.

0607 (K) Dove for trim and training.
1030 (K) Surfaced.
1214 (K) SD contact 18 miles - submerged.
1527 (K) Surfaced.
1630 Set all clocks ahead to Zone -9.
2100 (I) Entered area.
All times ITZM unless otherwise specified.

October 27.

0100 Set course for CHI CHI JIMA.
0511 Dove.
0930 Sighted land ahead distant about 30 miles - CHI CHI JIMA.
1735 Surfaced.
1755 Indications on A.P.R. of CHI CHI JIMA radar - very strong, 102 M.O.
2240 (L) Set course to round to north of BONINS and conduct search to the westward, in accordance with ComSubsPac orders.

October 28.

0000 Underway on two engines conducting sweep to westward.
1642 Dove for trim.
1703 Surfaced.

October 29.

0430 Changed course to 090° T.
1053 SD contact 15 miles. Dove.
1145 1.0. system out of commission for overhaul. Steering magnetic compass.
1412 Shifted steering.to gyro.
1416 Surfaced.
1820 Converted No. 4 to a ballast tank.
1905 Dove to wash out No. 4.
1920 Surfaced.
2300 Changed course to 270° T.
2326 S.J. radar interference 283° T.
2340 At a range of 9000 yards sighted a submarine - moon high, calm sea.
2350 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with U.S.S. PILOTFISH.

— page 197 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

October 30.
1430 Dove for trim.
1510 Surfaced.
1750 Changed course to 120° T to return to area.
2050 Received orders to proceed to a new area.
2059 Changed course to 270° T.
2235 Sent POGY No. 1 acknowledging receipt of orders.

October 31.
0905 Sighted plane to north distant 8 miles on easterly course.
0905 Dove.
1207 Surfaced.
1913 Radar interference bearing 176° T. All characteristics of friendly submarine. Believed to be U.S.S. SAURY.
1930 Interference disappeared.

November 1.
0300 Arrived in area. Changed course to 230° T.
0602 Dove.
1300 Sighted land - AMAMI O SHIMA - bearing 305° T, distant 30 miles.
1314 Changed course to 270° T.
1712 Changed course to 090° T.
1825 Surfaced.
1845 A.P.R. indication, 80 M.C.
2000 Reversed course to 270° T, patrolling an east and west line about 30 miles to south of KIKAI JIMA.
2240 S.J. contact 9000 yards, 283° T. Tracked five vessels on course 330° T, speed 8 knots. Believed these to be large Sampans. Considered it too early in the patrol to use torpedoes on vessels this small, so avoided being sighted. We had moon rising behind us.
2328 Resumed patrolling on east and west line.

November 2.
0200 Headed in toward AMAMI O SHIMA.
0553 Doves.
0715 Changed course to 000° T.
1758 Changed course to 130° T.
1810 Surfaced.

November 3.
0000 Changed course to 270° T.
0600 Dove on course 270° T.

— page 198 —
0900  Changed course to 040° T.
1600  Changed course to 090° T.
1833  Surfaced.
2048  Sighted four Sampans bearing 125° T.
2054  Radar contact 130° T, 9000 yards. These Sampans were on a northwesterly course.  Avoided being sighted.  Moon very bright.

November 4.

0030  Changed course to 270° T.
0300  Changed course to 330° T.
0600  Submerged, conducted patrol south of pass between AMAMI O
1630  Changed course to 135° T.
1826  Surfaced.
1835  A.P.R. indication, 80 mi. C.  Probably from KIKAI.
2200  Changed course to 090° T.
2300  Changed course to 266° T.

November 5.

0400  A.P.R. indication, 152 N. C.  Probably from TOKUNO SHIMA.
0600  Submerged, conducted submerged patrol southeast of TOKUNO SHIMA.
1200  Changed course to 035° T.
1400  Changed course to 090° T.
1825  Surfaced.
2300  Changed course to 180° T.
2330  Entered next area.

November 6.

0608  Submerged, conducted patrol off east coast of OKINAWA JIMA.
1828  Surfaced.
1914  A.P.R. indication, 102 N. C.  Probably shore based at OKINAWA.

November 7.

0558  Submerged, conducting submerged patrol off entrance to NAKAGUSUKI TAN.
1840  Surfaced.

November 8.

0609  Submerged, to conduct patrol between YORON JIMA and OKINOYAMA JIMA.
1247  Sighted two Sampans.  Lat. 27° 10' N, Long. 128° 33' E, on southerly course.
1828  Surfaced.

— page 199 —
0611 Submerged for patrol off YORON JIMA.
1823 Surfaced.

November 10.

0604 Submerged for patrol southeast of OKINOYERABU JIMA.
1817 Surfaced.
2200 Set course to pass between OKINAYERABU and YORON.
2330 Entered next area.

November 11.

0003 S.J. radar interference, 279° T. Probably U.S.S. KINGFISH.
0607 Submerged to patrol southwest of IHEYA RETTO.
1200 Sea becoming very rough. Depth control extremely difficult.
1400 At 100 feet and rolling twelve degrees.
1818 Surfaced in typhoon. Wind over 60 knots.
1900 Heading up into storm, making steerage way. Having trouble getting in battery charge due to heavy battery grounds. These grounds were evidently due to the heavy rolling. Maximum roll noted was 57 degrees, witnessed by the control room watch.

November 12.

0244 Changed course to 230° T.
0626 Submerged to get away from the storm and to clean up the battery grounds.
1325 Took first look and found conditions improving. Resumed periscope patrol.
1811 Surfaced and obtained star fix that showed us 20 miles to west of the D.R. Set course to return to IHEYA RETTO.

November 13.

0609 Submerged. Patrolling northwest of IHEYA.
1832 Surfaced.

November 14.

0606 Submerged for patrol southwest of IYE SHIMA.
1830 Surfaced.

November 15.

0602 Submerged north of IHEYA RETTO. Patrolling between

— page 200 —
1203 Sighted float plane.
1400 Heard distant explosion.
1402 Heard distant explosion.
1404 Heard distant explosion.
1419 Changed course to 270° T to have a look in the direction of the explosions.
1438 Sighted two fighters.
1829 Surfaced.
1832 S.J. interference 079° T. Exchanged recognition and calls with U.S.S. S.S. 1400.
2330 Crossed into next area.

November 16.

0604 Submerged southwest of TORNI SHIM.
1827 Surfaced. Sea quite rough. Headed into it.

November 17.

0245 Set course for TOKUNO SHIM. Sea calming.
0605 Submerged, conducted patrol northwest of TOKUNO SHIM.
1139 Sighted 14, BETTY's bearing 205° T on northerly course.
1829 Surfaced.
1836 A.P.R. indication, 160 M.C. Probably TOKUNO SHIM.

November 18.

0559 Submerged, conducted patrol west of TOKUNO SHIM.
1828 Surfaced.
2030 Brief S.J. indication, 224° T, about 21,000 yards. Headed for it for 20 minutes but was unable to pick it up again.

November 19.

0559 Submerged and conducted patrol southeast of SHIMI O SHIM.
1832 Surfaced.

November 20.

0608 Submerged about 10 miles northwest of TORI SHIM. Conducted submerged patrol north of TORI SHIM.
1830 Surfaced and set course for new area.

November 21.

0030 Entered new area.
0105 Set course for TOKUNO SHIM.

— page 201 —
0604 Submerged northwest of YOKOTE SHIMA.
1828 Surfaced. Sea rough. Headed into it.
2240 Received ComSubsPac orders to change station. Cut course to pass between AKUSEKI JIMA and TOKARA SHIMA.
2302 Standard on two engines.

November 22.

0021 Put three engines on propulsion.
0110 Put four engines on propulsion.
0250 Passed between AKUSEKI and TOKARA.
0616 Hanned S.D. Probably a mistake.
0827 Entered new area. Dove about 20 miles south of TANEKA SHIMA, to patrol southeast of TOKARA ZAKI light.
1517 First of five distant explosions heard at five minute intervals.
1816 Surfaced.
1821 S.J. contact, 9000 yards, closing. Keyed S.D. and had a 4 mile contact. Moon was bright and visibility excellent.
1822 Submerged with contact closing.
1855 Raised S.D. mast and keyed once. All clear. Secured S.D. Surfaced.
1856 Surfaced.
1914 Sighted navigational light or aircraft beacon on TANEKA SHIMA.
1950 S.J. contact, 6000 yards, 071° T. Keyed S.D. once, had 4 mile contact opening. Lost S.D. contact at 7 miles. Lost S.J. contact at about 8000 yards. Another aircraft.
2014 S.J. contact, 16,700 yards, 182° T. .P.R. indication weak at 310 M.C.
2017 Lost S.J. contact, 250° T, range 18,300 yards.
2059 S.J. contact, 160° T, 12,000 yards, at 6000 yards, and at 2100 Dove. Noted .P.R. indication, 75 M.C.
2140 Surfaced, took quick S.D. look. All clear.
2145 S.J. contact, 100°T, 8000 yards. Bearing remained steady, so at
2146 with range about 5500, dove. Before S.J. was secured, range was 2000 yards and plane was passing ahead. Noted 75 M.C. indication on .P.R., but not very strong.
2247 Moon set. Surfaced and did not use S.D. prior to surfacing.
2335 Weak .P.R. on 75 M.C. Soon disappeared.

November 23.

0609 Submerged.
1827 Surfaced.
2000 Received ComSubsPac message regarding routing and refit at Midway.
2127 Picked up radar interference, 345° T. Believed to be U.S.S. KINGFISH. Indication drew slowly to the eastward, as if the source were on a southeasterly course.

— page 202 —
0615 Submerged, set course 160°T for southern boundary of area.
1315 Surfaced and departed area; set course for midway.

November 25.
0115 Sent POGY Serial No. 2.
2310 SJ Radar contact on SOFA GAN. Closed to make sure it was SOFU GAN, then set course to get back on line.

November 26.
0550 Made thirty minute trim dive.
2030 Converted No. 3 and No. 5 Fuel Ballast to ballast tanks.

November 27.
0016(K) Radar contact 012°T, 6900 yards; also radar interference. Challenged this contact and after several minutes received the same challenge from him. Believe it to be U.S.S. SEADEWILL. Position, 29-19 N, 145-56 E.
0621(K) Trim Dive.
0645(K) Surfaced.

November 28.
0553(K) Made trim dive.
1113(K) Sighted a submarine, position, Iat. 29-57 N, Long. 153-37 E. Identified as U.S.S. HALIB.
1130(K) Started equalizing charge, to be followed by a test discharge.
2040(K) Completed equalizer.
2230(K) Started six hour discharge.

November 29.
0455 Completed discharge.

November 30 - December 2.
Narrow Area to Iday.
Repeated 2 December.

December 2.
Arrived Midway.

— page 203 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

(C) Weather.
Weather encountered was normal for this time of year and was, in general, good except for the typhoon encountered on 11 and 12 November. The center of this typhoon was to the east of us and passed very close to the NANSEI SHOTO. The worst weather was encountered on the night of 11 November, with very rough seas and winds in excess of 60 knots from NE and NNE.

(D) Tidal Information.
In Area 8, the KUROSHIO was encountered, setting northeast with a drift of from 1 to 2 knots. Between the NANSEI SHOTO and NANFO SHOTO, in the vicinity of latitude 30° north, a northerly set of about 1/2 knot was encountered. Elsewhere in the area, currents were variable and seldom exceeded 1/2 knot. Arcuate to and from area, currents were in accordance with those indicated on pilot charts.

(E) Navigational Aids.
No navigational lights were sighted. In the NANSEI SHOTO, good cuts may be obtained on peaks and tangents and by radar.

(F) Ship Contacts.
| No. | Date | Time | Lat. | Type | Init. Range | Course Speed | How Contacted | Remarks |
|-----|------|------|------|------|||||
| 1   | 0722(K)| 29-54N| SS  | 12,000| YDS. EAST  | 3D           |             |          |
| 2   | 2340(I)| 27-45N| SS, USS| 9,000| YDS. EAST | R Interference on SN |          |          |
| 3   | 2300(I)| 27-50N| 5 large| 8,000| YDS. 330°| R & SN    | Avoided     |          |
|     | 129-54E| 123-54E| Sampans|      |            |             |             |          |
| 4   | 2048(I)| 27-39N| 4 Sampans| 9,000| YDS. 330°| SN & R    | Avoided     |          |
|     | 129-45E|      |      |      |            |             |             |          |
| 5   | 1247(I)| 27-10N| 2 Sampens| 6,000| YDS. 190°| P          |          |
|     | 128-33E|      |      |      |            |             |             |          |
| 6   | 1832(I)| 27-20N| SS  | 13,000| YDS.  | R          |          |
|     | 128-10E| 128-10E| USS SARG|      |            |             |             |          |

— page 206 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

(L) Radio.

Radio reception was good to excellent throughout patrol. No serials were missed. Two transmissions were made without difficulty. There were no material casualties. Two opportunities to stand life-guard duty were missed, due to late receipt of information on aircraft missions. After receiving the despatches upon surfacing at night, it was found that the despatches were transmitted shortly after submerging in the morning and only a few hours prior to the aircraft mission.

The following frequency plan was used:

All times are GCT.

| Time | Frequency |
|------||
| 0000 to 0400 | 4515 and 6045 Kcs. |
| 0400 to 0800 | 9515 and 13655 Kcs. |
| 0800 to 1200 | 9515, 13655, and 16730 Kcs. |
| 1200 to 1600 | 9515, 13655, and 16730 Kcs. |
| 1600 to 2000 | 6045 and 4515 Kcs. |

Intermittent JAP interference on both frequencies. Heaviest jamming on 6045 Kcs.

Excessive fading and weak signals on all frequencies around 0500' (daybreak)

Signal varied in strength. Loud echoes usually cleared up in one-half hour to one hour.

9515 - fair reception. 13655 and 16730 - fair to good reception.

6045 - fair reception. 4515 - very good signal with periodic weak jamming and both intentional and unintentional CT note.

— page 207 —
2000 to 2400 same as 1600 to 2000 same as 1600 to 2000.

During earlier part of patrol encountered excessive Jap jamming on 6045 Kcs. Second half of patrol enemy jamming shifted to 4515 Kcs.

In compliance with ComSubPac directive, it is reported that reception on 9090 Kcs. was good to excellent.

(14) Radar.

APR-SPA Indications:

| Date | Position | Freq. | PRF | Antenna Rotation | Pulse Width | Remarks |
|------||-------|-----||||
| 10-27 | 142-51E 26-55N | 102   | 500 | 1/2 RPM        | 15          | Main pulse was accompanied by two smaller ones on one side only. Gain - 8, pulse - saturation. 32 miles from CHICHI JIMA. |
| 10-27 | 26-55N 143-01E | 102.5 | 750 | Irreg.        | 40          | Just after surfacing the above signal (15 miles width) disappeared. This signal was present during rest of night. The 15 pulse width signal came in again before daylight. |
| 11-1  | 64,000 yds. bearing 320°T to KANAI O SHIMA | 80.7 | 495 | Steady        | 20-25       | This pulse seemed to be steady. Every 10 seconds it would increase and decrease slightly. |
| 11-3  | 22 miles east of TOKUNA SHIMA | 160  | 500 | 1 RPM         | 10-13       | Gain - 9, pulse - 1/2 inch. Believed to be land based radar. |
| 11-4  | Off KIKAI JIMA | 80   |     |                |             | Believed to be land based radar. |

— page 208 —
11-5 22 mi. east of TOKUNA SHIMA
    PRF 500
    Antenna Rotation 12
    Pulse Width Remarks
    Gain - 8, pulse - saturation, Believed to be land based radar.

: 11-6 26-34 N 128-28 E
    PRF 490
    I/4 - 1/2 40-45 RPM
    Gain - 9, pulse 1/2 inch high.

: 11-6 26-18 N 128-33 E
    PRF 750
    I/2 - 1/12
    Gain - 9, pulse - saturation.
    Again we found that the enemy switches from one pulse width to a longer one. This one came on about one hour after surfacing and the one above disappeared. There seemed to be one saturation pulse for two smaller ones.

: 11-6 26-48 N 128-33 E
    RPM 500
    I RPM 12
    Gain - 10, pulse - 1/2 inch. Seemed to be farther away than other frequencies received this date.

: 11-17 27-34 N 127-32 E
    RPM 160
   3
    Detected for a period of only four minutes. Possible source is aircraft. Gain - 10, pulse - saturation. No indication on SD. SJ was not keyed. Radar seemed to be keying at irregular intervals.

: 11-22 30-22 N 131-25 E
    TANEGA SHIMA
    RPM 100
   11
    Believed to be land based radar. At times it appeared as though he would key his radar. The signal would cut off very sharply.

— page 210 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. POCI (SS266) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

(M) Radar (ccnt'd).

The performance of the SD was excellent. Although seldom used in the area, it picked up planes at satisfactory ranges.

SJ ranges on land and U.S. Submarines were normal. Ranges were also obtained on the small craft sighted at night.

(N) Sound Gear and Sound Conditions.

Sound conditions were normal for the areas in which we operated. Due to lack of contacts, there were no opportunities to obtain bearings or ranges on enemy ships.

The training motor gearing on the JK-QC equipment is noisy and will be repaired during refit.

The JP equipment was manned while submerged and utilized to check the noise level of own ship's equipment.

(O) Density Layers.

Bathytemograph Observations:

| Card | Time (GMT) | Date  | Position | Isother-nal to | Temp. F. | Avg. Grad-ient to | Temp. F. |
|------||-------||||||
| 1    | 2100      | 10-25 | 29-14 N   | 185 ft.       | 81      | 325 ft.          | 71      |
| 2    | 1000      | 10-29 | 27-48 N   | 150 ft.       | 81      |                  |         |
| 3    | 0100      | 10-31 | 27-30 N   | 158 ft.       | 79      |                  |         |
| 4    | 2100      | 10-31 | 27-45 N   | 185 ft.       | 80      | 317 ft.          | 73      |
| 5    | 2100      | 11-1  | 27-30 N   | 245 ft.       | 80      | 310 ft.          | 74      |
| 6    | 2100      | 11-5  | 26-46 N   | 185 ft.       | 82      | 312 ft.          | 77      |

— page 211 —
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Subject:  U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

(0) Density Layers (cont'd):
Bathymetrograph Observations (cont'd):

| Card | Time (GCT) | Date | Position | Isother-nal to | Temp. F. | Neg. Grad-ient to | Temp. F. |
|------||------||||||
| 7    | 2100      | 11-7  | 27-00 N   | 145 ft.      | 81      | 305 ft.          | 80      |
| 8    | 2100      | 11-12 | 27-10 N   | 265 ft.      | 79      | 325 ft.          | 75      |
| 9    | 2115      | 11-15 | 27-41 N   | 307 ft.      | 78      |                  |         |
| 10   | 2125      | 11-19 | 28-02 N   | 305 ft.      | 76      | 325 ft.          | 75      |
| 11   | 2130      | 11-20 | 28-56 N   | 265 ft.      | 77      | 318 ft.          | 76      |
| 12   | 2255      | 11-22 | 30-06 N   | 220 ft.      | 78      | 305 ft.          | 72      |

All cards are being forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations.

(P) Health, Food, and Habitability.

Health was excellent. Except for a few minor colds, no sickness was experienced.

Food was excellent and was well prepared. Fresh lettuce was served three weeks after leaving Midway.

Habitability was good. The addition of a booster blower in the ventilation supply line in the control room helped keep the forward battery cooler. However, the forward battery became warm during charges and had the weather been warmer, might have become very hot. It is believed that an air conditioning unit should be installed in the forward battery to remedy the situation.

— page 212 —
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Subject:  U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

(Q) Personnel.

The performance of duty of all hands was highly satisfactory. The new men received from the relief crew at Hunter's Point all are well on the way to becoming good submariners. The quality of seamen and firemen turned out by the Submarine School during the past few months appears to be very high.

It is recommended that the complement of gunner's mates be increased. Practically all submarines carry two or three gunner's mates, and now that advancement in this rate can be made only to fill vacancies in complement, the situation is arising where there are many second and third class who are fully qualified for advancement but for whom no vacancy exists.

It is also recommended that some provision be made for advancement of fully qualified men to C.P.O. in those ratings where there is no complement for chief at present.

No. of men on board

— page 214 —
C-Q-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

(V) Remarks (cont'd).

Mark 18 Torpedo Report (cont'd):

and was jumped out by sawing through the cell connectors. This removed all of the ground and no further trouble was encountered with this torpedo.

Upon withdrawing the torpedo (serial No. 56917) from No. 6 tube for the fourth refresher charge, it was found to have a full voltage ground. After a long search the ground was located in the after body section of the torpedo. A loop in the copper air ventilating line was found to be free to move about, and it had come to rest against a naked charging lead from the battery charging socket. The ventilating line was secured clear of the charging socket and this eliminated the ground.

It was not necessary to add water to any of the batteries. Only one hydrogen burning wire burned out, and that only after 600 hours of operation.

The first casualty was assumed to be a minor hydrogen explosion. No reason for it could be found. However, after the casualty, all torpedoes in tubes were ventilated every 24 hours.

A weekly charging routine was followed during the patrol. Charging procedure in the after torpedo room was to charge one torpedo in a tube and one in a rack at the same time. Half of the torpedoes were charged the first day of the week and half the fourth day. In the forward room, one torpedo in a tube and the reloads for that tube were charged each day for six days. This ship had belly holding straps modified and installed at Pearl Harbor so that torpedoes could be charged by withdrawing the torpedo only about halfway out of the tube. This method was very satisfactory.

Submerged Patrols:

Submerged patrols were made during the daylight because evidence seemed to point to the DFing of the SD radar by the enemy, and it was felt that to remain undetected, submerged operating is almost necessary during daylight hours. It is intended to station two additional lookouts during the next patrol, and to try more surface operating. Remaining undetected certainly is of no value unless, by so remaining, contacts are made.

— page 215 —
1. The seventh war patrol of the U.S. Navy was of 30 days duration, 9 days being conducted in the assigned area in the Nansel outpost.

2. No enemy ships larger than semis were contacted.

3. The commanding officer, officers and crew are congratulated on the completion of this patrol. It is regretted that no opportunity was given to new commanding officer and his command to attend.

U. F. THURSTON.

— page 216 —
A16-3
:  Serial (C211)
:  A16-3
:  C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
:  SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
:  CO, USS POGY Conf. 1tr.
:  SS266/A16-3 Serial 052
:  of 2 December 1944.

From:  Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate
:  Command, Navy Ho. 1504.
To:  Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
    (2) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Far Patrol Number Seven.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division TWO HUNDRED FORTY-ONE.

2. The overheating of the battery on charge will be thoroughly investigated during the refit period. The battery delivers full capacity and has no low cells which could account for the overheating.

3. It appears that the refit will be of normal duration.

G. C. CRAWFORD.

— page 217 —
13 DEC 1944
Serial 02809
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO
FOGY Report of
Seventh War Patrol.
COLLUSBPAC PATROL REPORT 10. 608.
U.S.S. FOGY - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. FOGY (SS266) - Report of Seventh War Patrol (13 October to 2 December 1944).

1. The overall war patrol of the FOGY was conducted in the area around the Issei Shoal. This was the first war patrol for the new commander, Officer 8th Submarine Force.

2. The area covered was good throughout, but the patrol, however, was not a success. Undoubtedly due to the fact that the air strikes in and around this area created a shortage of such targets.

3. Award of the submarine Combat Insignia Award for this patrol is not authorized.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean areas (1)
Conservpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Consusblant (8)
S/L School, IL (2)
CO, S/L base, PH (1)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsovespac (2)
CIG 71.9 (2)
Commorpac (1)
Consuspac (20)
STAD, IL (2)
ConsuspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Division Commanders, Pacific (2)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)
C. L. HYNNS, 2nd, Flo. Secretary.

— page 218 —
1. Enclosure (A), covering the Eighth war patrol of this vessel, conducted in areas of the NAMPO SHOTO during the period 27 December 1944 to 1 February 1945, is forwarded herewith.

P. G. KOLHIT JR.

DECLASSIFIED-MRT. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.IC

BY: [Signature] DATE: [Date]

DECLASSIFIED

— page 220 —
6 January 1945 (Cont'd)
of fuel oil into the pump room bilges. Delayed dive and started
investigation. No. 4 ballast tank was discovered to be causing
this trouble. Reversed course and put men on deck to insert
blanks in the 10 lb. blow to No. 4. After two attempts, the
blanks were made to hold. All is well except that after con-
vorting No. 4 we will not be able to use the 10 lb. blow on
it. Neither the check nor the quick closing valve will hold,
so we must leave the blank flange in.
1700(1) Received message to proceed to Life Guard Station for the 2th;
410 miles to go, about 10 knots needed. Able to make three to
eight.

7 January 1945
Proceeding at best speed possible under weather conditions.

8 January 1945
0030(K) While making 150 turns, shipped a heavy sea down the hatch and
nearly lost lookouts. Slowed to 90 turns. Seas are tremendous
and coming from about 300° T; the course we want to make is
227° T.
1032(1) SD contact 8 miles (Plans contact No. 1)(31-10 N, 145-00.3 D).
Dove. Time of dive was 3 minutes and 45 seconds. Remained
submerged because speed was almost as good submerged as on the
surface, and all hands need a little rest. Still 166 miles
to go to life guard station, and 5 1/2 hours in which to do it.
1720(1) Surface, weather much improved and continuing to get better.
1830(1) Received information that strike delayed one day; we can make
our station now.

9 January 1945
1000(K) Arrived on station, commenced patrolling in vicinity of point
assigned. Weather overcast, raining, and sea calm.
1523(1) SD contact 14 miles (Plans contact No. 2).
1611(1) SD contact 12 miles (Plans contact No. 3), closed to 4 miles.
Contacts continuously until 1645. Again one closed to 4 miles.
Due to the low clouds and rain, no planes were either seen or
heard. "We used the I.N.P. and found that the planes were using
theirs. Our B' was hard to trigger off almost continuously.
1615(1) Received a message indicating that a plane was down 240 miles
to the west of us. Will wait for instructions before going
after him.
1650(1) Received a message from a plane that he was passing over us.
"Had no SD contact at this time.
2030(1) Converted No. 4 to a ballast tank. Can't use 10 lb. blow on it.

- 2 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 221 —
10 January 1945

| Time | Event                                                                 |
|------||
| 0600 | Made a quick dive. Seas and wind still calm, with a heavy overcast and rain. |
| 0850 | Surfaced. Wind and sea making up from the Northeast. Looks like a rough time again. Set course 230 to put wind and sea astern so that diving time will not be too long. "aiting for instructions from 17.7. |
| 1310 | Received orders to proceed to 30 N, 141 E, to search the area. Set course 200, speed 30/90 on two engines. |
| 1340 | Received orders to intercept a convoy, or if this is not possible to observe CHICHI JIMA harbor, SEADRAGON to do the same. Continued course and speed to pass through search area. Too far behind convoy to intercept. |
| 2000 | Passed through assigned search area, set course 180° T. Navigation position doubtful, due to lack of reliable sight. |
| 2033 | SJ contact, 134° T, 7700 yards (Snip contact No. 1)(29-50 N, 140-55 W). Launched 20 N. |
| 2130 | Set course 180° T. |
| 2322 | SJ contact, 200° T, 6400 yards (Snip contact No. 2)(29-24 N, 140-59 E). This developed into about five Sampans. |
| 0038 | Other ships in water overhead. Nothing in sight. |
| 0605 | Heard several distant explosions like depth charges or bombs. |
| 1155 | Surfaced. |
| 1735 | Sighted NISHIMO SHIMA through high periscope. Continued south to obtain radar fire. |
| 1752 | Obtained radar fire. Set course north, speed ten knots. |
| 2030 | Two flares or lights sighted by O.O.D. to westward. Set course 260 and went to 14 knots to investigate. |
| 2058 | Searched this area: no further signs of light. |
| 2100 | Received orders to patrol in areas 14 QY and PYTER. |
| 2111 | Set course 000. |
| 2313 | SJ contact, 348° T, 12,200 yards (Snip contact No. 3)(29-05 N, 140-57 E). Single pip. |
|  | Launched tracking party and started to track. Target was pinging, zigging radically |

- 3 -
- 3 -

— page 222 —
11 January 1945 (Cont'd)
and making about 12 knots on base course of about 160° T.
At a range of 7000 yards, with an angle on the bow of about
40 starboard, target gave us a zero angle and speeded up to
16.5 knots. 'Sent to four engine speed and range opened
slowly. 'Changed course slowly to west to get off his track.
He chased us for about ten minutes, then suddenly gave us a
160° starboard angle and disappeared over the hill. At about
3000 yards we could see him, and he appeared to be a patrol
craft, a little larger than a P.C. How he picked us up is not
known. There was no indication of radar.

12 January 1945
Lost target on radar screen at 16,000 yards. Secured
tracking party, set course north.

Plan to patrol today East and west, covering the north westerly
a-proaches to CHIC I JIMA. This appears to be the best position
in these two areas.

1745
Radar interference, bearing 075° T. Believed to be SHI DR.CM.
Position: 28-35 N, 141-15 S.

13 January 1945
S. angered.
Surfaced.
Changed course to 039° T, and speed to standard on two engines.
SD contact, 27 miles (Plane contact No. 4). Last contact
almost immediately. Position, 28-07 N, 139-47 T.
SJ contact, 060° T, 12,000 yards (Ship contact No. 4).
position, 29-24 N, 140-52 E. Developed into three small
fears, the largest about 1500 tons cr. less, and two small
P.C. type escorts, on base course 350° T, speed 6.5 knots.
Tanned battle stations in the conning tower and commenced
tracking and end around run up their port flank. The escorts
appeared to patrol on the beans of the target group. Noted
interference on the radar on several occasions during tracking;
it was very weak, but appeared to come from the port escort.

14 January 1945
Sent to battle stations.
Port escort must have had a doubtful pip on us, because no
pulled out about 5,000 yards on the target group port bow
and closed us to about 5,000 yards.
After leaving escort behind, worked over to starboard bow
of target group.
Fifth angle on the bow about 35 starboard, changed course to
215° T and headed for target group.

- 4 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 223 —
14 January 1945 (Cont'd)
At range 7,000 yards, slowed and made ready all torpedo tubes, depth setting, 6 feet.
Picked up escort stationed about 3,000 yards, bearing a little forward of starboard beam of target group. Not such a good position for us. Plan to come in at stern of him and fire on about 120° starboard track angle.
With target group overlapping and using center of it as X.C.T., commenced firing six bow tubes, gyro angles 019 to 026, torpedo run of 3500 yards, track angle 135 starboard, spread 12, 11, 3R. 3L, 5R, 5°. All miss. Believe they ran under. Position, 29-41 N, 140-44 E.
Starboard escort now on our starboard beam, range 1850 yards: turned hard right and showed two red lights in a vertical row. We came hard left, all ahead flank.
Secured from battle stations. Believe that to try again on these small, probably empty ships would be a waste of torpedoes. Set course for life guard station.
Tost target group on 3d at 19,000 yards.
Sent POGY 2 to ComSubPac.
Submerged.
Sighted through periscope a PWT type pl-ne (Flame contact No. 5), position, 29-18 N, 139-50 E.
Surfaced. Set course for life guard station. He have no information on when to expect the planes over us.
Arrived on station.
SD contact, 16 miles, closed to 9 miles (Flame contact No. 6), position, 29-01 N, 138-59 E.
Received a message reporting a plane down at position 33-00 N, 141-50 E. This must have been in error from information later received.
Start of continuous SD indications, two of which closed to 4 miles. Sighted glimpses of large planes twice through holes in the overcast. They were on course about 170° T (Flame contact No. 7), position, 28-18 N. 139-05.5 E.
Tried for 45 minutes to send out an urgent message informing ComTasGroup 17.7 about the message concerning the downed plane. Finally gave it up, circuits too busy.

15 January 1945
Weather, which had been almost nice for 36 hours, started making up again.
Received message to see reach position 31-28 N, 139-40 E. Set course for this position at standard speed 30/90 on two engines. Distance to go 150 miles; want to make it before dark. Information already is 18 hours old.
Upon naming APR had a saturation indication on 155° E, PRF of 400, pulse width of 5, and antenna rotation of 50 seconds that was regular at first, but which later varied considerably. Position, 30-40 N, 139-59 E. The position was determined from

— page 224 —
15 January 1945 (Cont'd)
a fix the following morning. It is possible that this radar was on TORI SHIMA. It was lost during the night and picked up again when we were close to TORI. Mill check later if we have an opportunity.
Bridge personnel sighted a large green flare or rocket. DR position 30-50 N, 139-38 E. Searched the area and decided to return at dawn to this spot.

16 January 1945

0345 APR indication 155 legs.
0600 Searching in area of flare.
0619 Much to our surprise, sighted TORI SHIMA bearing 178° T, 43,000 yards. The S.J. picked it up after the automatic frequency control switch was turned on. The had been set thirty miles to the eastward.
0620 Set course to search area to the eastward of SUMISU SHIMA. It is believed that if any fliers are down, the wind and sea would have carried them to the east.
0854 SD contact, 6 miles. Dove. Contact closed to 3 1/2 miles before SD mast went under (Plane contact No. 8), position 31-12 N, 140-21 E.
1526 Surfaced. Wind and sea building up from about 290.
1538 Sighted SUISU SHIMA, bearing 278° T, distance 18 miles. Each indication on APR at 160 miles, sweeping. Probably from AQSA SHIMA, which is about 40 miles away.
1800 SJ interference, which has all characteristics of being friendly, bearing 110° T. Continued during most of the night. Position, 31-36 N, 140-23 E.
2200 Received orders to patrol between 28 and 30 north. Heading into sea on course 270° T. Wind is high and seas continue to build up. We are trying to work to the westward of SUMISU SHIMA, then head south to our area.

17 January 1945

0400 Changed course to 220° T. The can now clear SUISU SHIMA. Submerged. Plan to stay submerge and get a little rest from the weather.
1631 Scund co-tact sounds like carpenters at work.
1645 Took a look at 55 feet with periscope and found nothing in sight. Visibility was not great, due to high seas.
1730 Surfaced.
1918 Friendly two interference on S, bearing 047° T, position 30-44 N, 31-22 B. This may be RING T.
2100 Received orders to proceed to lifeguard station.
2109 Charged course to head for lifeguard station.

- 6 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 225 —
18 January 1945

0530 Received information of delay in strike.
1000 Arrived on station.
1200 Sighted a sailing Sampan (Ship contact No. 5), position 28-40 N, 138-01 E. SJ could pick nim up at 12,600 yards. Too rough to use the deck gun.
1211 SD contact, 9 miles. Looks like this may be a picket boat teamed with an aircraft. Suomergen and gave up the idea of tracking the boat. Contact closed to 5 1/2 miles. (Plane contact No. 9). Position, 23-40 N, 138-01 E.

A few moments prior to picking up the Sampan, one lookout sighted what he believed to be a periscope, and on the same general bearing as the Sampan.

1730 Surfaced.

19 January 1945

"Ind dropping off and sea calming.

1313 SD contact, 11 miles. (Plane contact No. 10) Position, 29-03 N, 138-07 E. This is possibly a lone 5-29 returning siort of fuel. No. IFF on him.
1315 Plane not sighted, had closed to 7 miles. Suomergen.
1430 Surfaced.
1445 Sighted object in water through high periscope. Closed to investigate. Proved to be a mine. Position, 29-00 N, 138-01 E. Tanned 50 caliber, Thompson sub-marine gun, AR, and Springfield and commenced shooting.
1453 SD contact, 20 miles (Plane contact No. 11). Position, 29-00 N, 138-01 E. cleared top side of shooting party. Plane closed to 17 miles, then opened.
1500 Resumed shooting at mine, but without much success.
1520 SD contact, 30 miles. (Plane contact No. 12). Position, 29-00 N, 138-01 E. Cleared top side of shooting party.
1553 Resumed shooting at mine.
1605 SD contact, 16 miles. (Plane contact No. 13). Position, 29-00 N, 138-00 E. Cleared topside of shooting party.
1607 Several E-29's passed overhead.
1620 SD all clear, so settled down to serious shooting at mine. It was bobbing badly and we were rolling heavily, but we didn't want to leave it floating on our point.
1631 Closed to about 150 yards. Mines was noted to be making a brownish yellow smoke. Smoking rapidly increased in violence and volume.
1635 Mine exploded. Ammunition expended: 1125 rounds of 50 cal., 170 rounds of 30 cal., 100 rounds of 30 cal. carbine, and 50 rounds of 45 cal.
1943 Set course to eastward.

- 7 -

[EDITORIAL (A)]

— page 226 —
20 January 1945

1003 SD contact, 20 miles. (Plane contact No. 14). Position, 27-48 N, 140-18 E.
1004 'With plane at 17 miles and closing rapidly, submerged.
1738 Surfaced. Started patrolling east and west line, to the northwest of CHICHI.
2217 APR indication, 103 Mgs. Looks to be land based. Position, 27-46 N, 141-26 E.

21 January 1945

0442 Received orders to form a wolf pack with RONQUISH and SHIPFISH (STRENGTH probably not arrived yet). Received orders to rendezvous with RONQUISH. Headed for rendezvous at 23 N, 142 E. Sent message to RONQUISH to patrol east and west along list. 30 N. POG would patrol same along 27-30 N.
1415 Received lifeguard station. Set course for it.
2200 Started patrolling east and west in vicinity of lifeguard station.

22 January 1945

0430 Received new lifeguard station and information that strike was delayed 24 hours.
0606 Submerged.
1129 Surfaced.
2200 Received new lifeguard station 155 miles to westward, 15 hours to make it. Wind and seas building up rapidly from the west. East speed 8 knots.

22 January 1945

0036 Sent POG 4 to 17.7 explaining that we would probably be delayed.
0818 Sighted SHI IOU, 3240 T, 19 miles.
1037 3D contact, 3 miles. (Plane contact No. 15) Position, 31-09 N, 139-52 E.
1043 Plane closed to 6 miles. No IFF.
1044 Submerged.
1103 Bom, not too far off. We was late, but there is no doubt now about this identity.
1343 Surfaced. Low overcast, wind about 15 knots, seas heavy from 3000 N. "we are 50 miles from station, but we can at least listen for the dope.
1253 Sighted small plane, 0400 T, five miles, heading toward us. (Plane contact No. 15) Position, 31-06 N, 139-44 E.
1355 Bomb - fairly close. Decided to remain submerged. This place seems well covered by aircraft.
1433 Another bomb, 3-5 miles away.
1754 Surfaced. Set course for lifeguard station.
2130 Arrived lifeguard station.

- 8 -

— page 227 —
24 January 1945

0407 Received message to form wolf pack. Set course for rendezvous.
0613 Submerged.
1000 Surfaced.
1159 No. 2 air compressor back in commission after having been out for nearly a week.
1415 Submerged.
1746 Surfaced in very heavy seas and strong wind.
1758 Exchanged recognition signals by SJ with BURFISH.
2100 Patrolling eastward along latitude 31 N in wolf pack with RONQUIL 40 miles to east of us, and BURFISH 20 miles to east of us.
2143 AFR indication, 153 legs. This must be TORI SHIMA, as it checks with previous results in this vicinity. Position, 31-00 N, 140-09 J.
2235 Picked up TORI SHIMA, bearing 189°, T, 22 1/2 miles.

25 January 1945

0409 On information received from RONQUIL contact, changed course to 180° T, and increased speed to 14 knots. Intend to come to 150° T at 0800, and hope to intercept at about noon.
0600 Information from RONQUIL indicates targets very small.
0730 Received instructions to patrol 5 miles east and west of 30-00 N, 141-18 E.
0922 SD contact, 14 miles, closing. (Aircraft contact No. 17)
Position, 30-03 N, 141-15 E.
0923 Submerged. Cather deteriorating.
1736 Surfaced. Continued patrol on assigned point.
1942 SJ contact, 031° T, 4900 yards. (Ship contact No. 6).
Position, 29-52 N, 141-13 E. Small Sampan or patrol boat on course 350° T, speed 2 knots. Too rough for shooting.
Tracked target.
2006 Secured tracking.
2337 On orders from BURFISH set course 347° T and standard speed 80/90 on one engine. Weather beginning to moderate.

26 January 1945

0430 Received orders to discontinue wolf pack and proceed to lifeguard station.
0611 Submerged.
1730 Surfaced.
2000 Received orders to proceed to new lifeguard station.

27 January 1945

0557 Submerged.
1231 Surfaced.
1404 SD contact, 4 miles, no IFF. (Aircraft contact No. 13)
Position, 32-55 N, 141-38 E. Submerged. At 27 feet received friendly IFF from contact. Believe to be DIMSO.

- 9 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 228 —
27 January 1945 (Cont'd)
1451 "ent to 50 feet for SD sweep. Contacts at 12 to 20 miles. (Flare contact 10. 19) Position, 32-51 N, 141-33 E. Believed planes friendly; so surfaced. SD contact, 30 miles. (Flare contact No. 20) Position, 32-52 N, 141-40 E. This contact was showing distress IFF. We were receiving several messages from the same plane indicating that he was down in positions about 120 miles farther south with each message. Believe that this distress IFF was the plane, and that he finally went down at about 29-20 North.
1617 Set course for possible position of downed plane. Increased speed to 14 knots.
1830 Commenced searching the area for downed planes.

28 January 1945
0545 Received orders to patrol area 4 BAKER. Set course to pass north of SUISUI.
1630 Signed SUISUI SUIMA, bearing 233° T, distance 22 miles.

29 January 1945
0610 Submerged.
1752 Surfaced.

30 January 1945
0607 Submerged for patrol south of ZENI SU.
1142 Sighted twin-engine bomber through periscope. (Flare contact No. 21) Position, 33-23 N, 139-05 E.
1753 Surfaced.
2247 "ent to standard speed on three engines. Set course 077.

31 January 1945
0045 SJ contact on INA SA SUIM. Changed course to 090° T.
0252 Changed course to 260° T, and sped to standar on two engines.
0612 Submerged.
1755 Surfaced.

1 February 1945
0230 Received orders to life guard station. Set course 270° T.
0614 Submerged.
1732 Surfaced.

2 February 1945
0617 Submerged.
1238 Surfaced for strike.
1400 Received message calling off strike. Ordered to patrol in area 5 BAKER.

- 10 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 229 —
2 February 1945

0623 Submerged.
1733 Surfaced.
2100 Received orders that strike was on for the 4th.

4 February 1945

0627 Submerged.
1254 Surfaced for strike.
1319 SD contact, 26 miles. (Plane contact No. 22) Dumbos. Position, 31-24N, 136-31N. "exchanged various messages with them throughout the afternoon.
1351 Slighted 3-29 tearing 270°, distant 7 miles. (Plane contact No. 23) Position, 31-20N, 136-35N.
1614 SD contact, 3 miles - nothing in sight, no TFF. Also picked up on SD. (Plane contact No. 24) Position, 31-11N, 136-42N. This may have been a damage friendly plane flying low.
1615 Submerged - plane closed to 1-1/2 miles.
1658 Surfaced.
1530 Received message from TRADPT indicating that a plane was down 100 miles from us. "he had this message, but so badly garbled as to be unrecognizable. Plane had sent the message for 30 minutes, so decided to search area where we were forced down on the chance that he was limping along.
2000 Conducting search of area.

5 February 1945

0600 Received message that all planes returned safely except one who ditched near home plate.
0606 Set course for Midway.
1303 SD contact, 12 miles, closing. (Plane contact No. 25) Position, 30-51N, 138-18N. Submerged.
1610 Surfaced.

6 February 1945

0500 Departed area, set course for Midway.
1400 Get clocks to -10 (X) time.

7 February 1945

0610(T) Submerged for trim.
0645(X) Surfaced.

- 11 - ENCOURAGE (A)

— page 230 —
8-10 February 1945
Enroute Midway.
11 February 1945
0940(L) Exchanged recognition with POMPON. Proceeded in company with her.
11 February 1945
Repeated 11 February.
0900(Y) Arrived Midway.

— page 231 —
1. 102033 29-50 N 140-56 B
2. 102322 29-24 N 140-59 E
3. 112319 28-05 N 140-57 B
4. 132304 29-24 N 140-52 B
5. 181200 28-40 N 138-01 E
6. 251942 29-52 N 141-13 B

: 1. Sampan 7700 yds. Stopped
2. Sampan 6400 yds. 140 2 kts.
3. 12,200 yds. 150 13 kts.
4. 12,000 yds. 350 7 kts.
5. Sailing Sampan 12,000 yds. 045 3 kts.
6. Patrol Boat or Sampan 4900 yds. 350 3 kts.

- 12 -
- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 232 —
071032K 31-10N 8 miles R Submerged
: 091529 32-01N 3-29 12 miles South R
: 091611K 32-00N 12 miles South R Planes on radar for 30 minutes
: 1315061 23-07N 27 miles R No action
: 140806 29-18N Pete 6 miles SE P
: 141551 29-01N 3-29 (?) 16 miles 150 R No action
: 141653 13-58N 16 miles 160 R & 3D Continuous contacts for 45 min.
: 160854 31-12N 6 miles R Submerged
: 181211 2-40N 9 miles R Submerged
: 191513 29-03 11 miles R Submerged
: 191453 29-00N 3-29 20 miles 160 R
: 191520 29-00N 3-29 30 miles 160 R & 3D Attached then
: 191605 29-00N 3-29 16 miles 160 R & 3D Attached then
: 201003 27-43N 20 miles R Submerged at 17 miles
: 231037 31-09N 8 miles R Submerged; received 1 bomb
: 231353 31-03N 5 miles 230 SD & R Submerged; received 2 bombs
: 250922 31-03 14 miles R Submerged
: 261404 32-58N 4 miles R Submerged; received TFT at 30 ft.
: 261451 32-59N 12 miles South R Contact at 50 feet; surfaced

- 13 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 233 —
20 261529 32-32N 141-40B
: 21 301142 33-23N 132-05B
: 22 041319 31-24N 136-31B
: 23 041351 31-20N 136-35B
: 24 041614 31-11N 136-48B
: 25 051303 30-51N 138-18B

: 30 miles
: 26 miles
: 7 miles
: 3 miles
: 12 miles

: 160

— page 234 —
ATTA2K DATA (Cont'd)
:  ATTA2K NO. 1
:  Tubes Fired #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6
:  Track Angle 110 S 110 S 110 S 110 S 110 S 110 S
:  Gyro Angle 019.2 020.1 027.6 022.5 035 026
:  Depth Set 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft.
:  Power High High High High High High
:  Hit or Miss Miss Miss Miss Miss Miss
:  Erratic No No No No No No
:  Mark Torp. 23 14-3A 14-3A 23 23 14-3A
:  Serial No. 26840 25308 24490 46118 61816 25314
:  Mark Exploder 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
:  Serial No. 26219 25932 14240 25115 25707 25050
:  Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
:  Actuation No No No No No No
:  Actual
:  Mark Parched 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
:  Serial No. 17696 17097 17673 14227 34215 14411
:  Explosive Torpex Torpex Torpex Torpex Torpex Torpex
:  Firing Inter- 3 sec. 3 sec. 3 sec. 3 sec. 3 sec.
:  val
:  Type Spread Divergent Div. Div. Div. Div. Div.
:  Sea Condition 3 3 3 3 3 3
:  Overhaul 3 3 3 3 3 3
:  Activity
:  Remarks Torpedoes ran under target.

- 15 - ENCLOSURE (..)

— page 239 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division T.O. FORTY ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY FOUR.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Administration.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. FORTY (SS266) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

1. The eighth war patrol of the U.S.S. FORTY was of 47 days duration, in which 20 days were spent in Nampo Shoto area patrolling and on station for life guard duties. FORTY was a member of a wolf pack with RONQUIL and BURPISH for six days while in this area.

2. Six ship contacts were made. All contacts were sampans or patrol boats with the exception of:
   - Contact # 3. A ship "A little larger than a PO", was picked up by radar at night, range 12200 yards. This ship was tracked for 25 minutes when it then headed for an chased the POY at 16.5 knots, for about 10 minutes. POY changed course slowly to rest to get off his track, when suddenly the enemy "changed to 1600 starboard angle and disappeared over the hill".
   - Contact # 4. A night radar contact was made of three small Tars (1500 tons or less) and two small PC escorts. Part of the time the radar showed seven pips. Fired six torpedoes at overlapping target group, range 3250 yards, track angle 135, depth set 6 feet. No hits were obtained, torpedoes may have run under because of small size of targets.

3. Due to the increase of radio traffic and the necessity to guard more radia circuits, it is believed the recommendations made by the Commanding Officer, that the allowance of radionen be increased to six and that an additional radio receiver be installed has much merit.

4. It is believed that a spare hull ventilation supply blorer fan need not be carried aboard ship as recommended by the Commanding Officer.

5. An inspection of the battery showed that it did not need recharging but that the bracing of the outer rors should be tightened. This will be accomplished during this refit. No suitable air condition unit is available for installation forward of the booster blower. This is a desirable alteration, but not an urgent one.

6. The Commander Submarine Division Two-Forty-One congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers, and crew of the U.S.S. POY upon the completion of this strenuous patrol.

— page 240 —
16-3
Serial: (040)
Confidential

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS POGY (SS266) Report
of EIGHTH War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Administration.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of EIGHTH War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander
   Submarine Division TWO FORTY ONE.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR regrets
   that POGY's efforts were not rewarded with more targets worthy of
   torpedoes.

G. C. CRAWFORD,

— page 241 —
12-10(a)/16-3(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0345
Confidential
THIRD INDORSEMENT to
POGY Report of
Lighting War Patrol.
COIISUBSPEC. P.TROL REPORT 10. 678
U.S.S. POGY - EIGHTY-THIR P.TROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Vic: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Eighth War Patrol
(27 December 1944 to 11 February 1945).

1. The eighth war patrol of the POGY, under the command of Lieutenant Commander P. G. Moltoni, Jr., U.S. Navy, was conducted in the Nanpo Shoto area. A good portion of the patrol was devoted to lifeguard duties.

2. Bad weather prevailed throughout this patrol, and contacts were scarce and limited to small ships. The one attack made on three small Harus failed, probably due to the shallow draft of the targets. Despite thorough and determined area coverage no opportunity to effect rescue of downed aviators was afforded the POGY.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is not authorized.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Conincher (7)
C10 (5)
Cinepae (6)
JICPOA (1)
JdICPOA (1)
Consorvpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Consubsblant (8)
S/ii School, NL (2)
CO, S/ii Base, PH (1)
Consopac (2)
Consowospac (1)
Consubsowospac (2)
CTG 71.9 (2)
Comcorpac (1)
Consubspac (3)
Consubspac/d (20)
SUBD, MI (2)
ConsubspacSubordcon (3)
.11 Squadron and Div. Commanders, Pacific (2)
Eubstrainpac (2)
.11 Submarines, Pacific (1)

FILMED

E. L. HYNOS, 2nd, Flag Secretary.

EXTRA - ORIGINAL
SORG. MICRO
PHOTO LAB. OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 242 —
1/2/1945
SS266/16-3
Serial 02

U.S.S. POGY (SS266)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
15 May 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Official Channels.

Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of War Patrol Number NINE.

Enclosures: (1) Subject report.
(5) Track Chart (ComSubPac Only).

1. Enclosure (1), covering the NINTH war patrol of this vessel, conducted in the area south of TOKYO BAY during the period 12 March 1945 to 15 May 1945, is forwarded herewith.

T.M. BOERS.

DECLASSIFIED
DECL

— page 243 —
1400(Y) Departed Midway enroute area in accordance with ComSubPac operation order No. 53-45.

1720(Y) Submerged.

1758(Y) Surfaced.

-1-

— page 244 —
1945

Dropped this day upon crossing International Date Line.

: 1945

Proceeding to area, conducting training enroute. Weather rough at times, but managed to stay at two engine speed most of the way. Zigzagging by course clock.

: 1945

Noon Position: Lat. 29-16 N Long. 177-16 E.

: 1945

Enroute Area.

: 1945

Noon Position: Lat. 30-23 N Long. 172-29 E.

: 1945

Enroute area.

: 1945

Noon Position: Lat. 31-27 N Long. 166-26 E.

: 1945

Enroute area.

: 1945

Noon Position: Lat. 32-15 N Long. 161-36 E.

: 1945

Enroute area.

: 1945

Noon Position: Lat. 32-45 N Long. 155-53 E.

: 1945

Enroute area.

: 1945

SD contact 6 miles, closing. Submerged.

: 1945

Surfaced.

: 1945

Interference on the APR at 637 mc. Determined to be our own SJ radar.

: 1945

Noon Position: Lat. 32-43 N Long. 151-20 E.

: 1945

March 20, 1945

: 1945

Submerged for trim and training.

: 1945

— page 245 —
2024. 1945 (Cont'd)
: 0927(K) Fire in the Maneuvering Room.
: 0928(K) Fire under control. Both main motor reverser switches on the starboard side appeared to be badly burned, so secured starboard shaft and went ahead on port shaft only (see Major Defects). Best estimate of the cause of the fire seemed to be that something had fallen down in the cubicle and shorted No. 1 main motor reverser, which in turn had burned No. 3 reverser along-side it. Immediate and thorough examination of cubicle and motor room found nothing which could have caused this. Both reversers were removed and found to be badly burned, but no other damage to cubicle was apparent. Since we did not have the material to rebuild both these reversers and since no spares were carried, at
: 1821(K) Sent PGY First to ComSubPacAd, info ComSubPac, giving details of casualty. Combined this information with a weather report we were scheduled to send this date.
: 2028(K) Received ComSubPac's 200948 telling us to head for designated position.
: 2035(K) Changed course to 145°T.
: 2107(K) By this time electricians had salvaged best parts of both reversers and by the addition of some bakelite in the proper places had built a reverser switch which they wanted to try out. Disconnected No. 1 main motor electrically, installed home made reverser in place for No. 3 motor, and found that it worked. Found we could run starboard shaft at 170 rpm, although how long our reverser would hold out nobody knew.

Noon Position: Lat. 33-01N Long. 148-27E.

March 21, 1945
: 0205(K) Received ComSubPac's 201151 telling us to proceed to SAIPAN for repairs.
: 0543(K) Submerged. Minimum speed we could make on the starboard shaft submerged was 145 rpm.
: 0631(K) Surfaced.
: 0827(K) Sent PGY Second to CTG 17.7 giving our predicted positions and speed of advance to SAIPAN.
: 1434(K) Sighted floating mine, covered with moss and with typical horns showing. Expended 120 rounds of 20 Mk., 150 rounds 50 cal., and some rifle bullets trying to sink it. No luck. Disgustedly

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 246 —
1945 (Cont'd)
continued on our way, as we were passing through an air-surface zone and had to stay on schedule.
Noon Position: Lat. 30-13 N Long. 149-00 E.
March 22, 1945
0537(K) Submerged.
0620(K) 'Surfaced.
1103(K) Received CTG 17.7's 220535 changing our rendezvous. Just a small change.
Noon Position: Lat. 26-06 N Long. 149-08 E.
March 23, 1945
1108(K) SD contact 8 miles. No IFF response. Then range had closed to 5 miles, submerged. One lookout said he had sighted a large plane just as the diving alarm sounded, but that he didn't have time to identify it. Sky about 75 per cent cloudy.
1134(K) Surfaced. Although the weather was nice, the sea was fairly rough and we had all we could do to maintain our eleven knots speed of advance. 'e were making about 11.8 knots by pit log.
Noon Position: Lat. 22-01 N Long. 148-55 E.
March 24, 1945
0740(K) Submerged on SD contact of 4 miles, no IFF. This contact had closed slowly from 16 miles and although I don't think he saw us, felt it better to dive since the sky was cloudy and I didn't want him to pop out suddenly.
0802(K) Surfaced.
0925(K) SD contact 18 miles, with IFF.
1001(K) Sighted PBY, distance about 7 miles.
1523(K) SD contact 14 miles, with IFF. Soon lost contact.
1810(K) Test fired 40 M. gun. Test satisfactory.
2003(K) SD contact 12 miles, closing, with IFF.
2005(K) Picked up plane on SJ at 5 miles. During the rest of the night and next morning we had numerous plane contacts, all friendly. The night was very clear with a full moon and some of the planes

- 4 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 247 —
1945 (Cont'd)
were sighted.
Noon Position: Lat. 17-47 N Long. 178-41 E.
March 25, 1945
0014(K) SJ contact on SARIGAN ISLAND, distance 60,000 yards, bearing 254°T.
0038(K) SJ contact on ANATAHAN ISLAND, distance 75,000 yards, bearing 232°T.
0123(K) Sighted SARIGAN ISLAND. Passed between SARIGAN and ANATAHAN on way to rendezvous.
0712(K) Sighted escort, ICI-1062. Effected rendezvous and continued toward SAIPAN.
1439(K) Moored alongside U.S.S. FULTON, outboard of SPOT in SAIPAN HARBOR. Commenced necessary repairs.

March 26, 1945
at SAIPAN repairing main motor reversers, hull supply blower, and other miscellaneous items. Squadron EIGHT and the FULTON were very cooperative and it was a pleasure to receive such fine service. HOE and STERLETT stood in later in the day and moored alongside.

March 27, 1945
1600(K) Received ConSubPac's 260341 changing our patrol area and also our length of patrol.
1645(K) Underway in company with STERLETT, HOE, and SPOT, escorted by ICI-1062.
2100(K) HOE, STERLETT, and escort left us. SPOT and POGY continued on together.

March 28, 1945
0600(K) Submerged.
0625(K) Surfaced. Sighted numerous friendly planes curing the day.
1630(K) Set clocks back one hour to Zone -9 time. All times are now ITE unless marked otherwise.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 249 —
1945 (Cont'd)
0550 O.O.D. sighted two small ships through. periscope bearing 30°T and 40°T (Ship Contact No. 1, Gun Attack No. 1)(Lat. 30-35.15 N Long. 138-04 E). Changed course to. head for them, and as it grew light saw that they were two picket vessels of the usual trawler type. They were fairly large however; estimated length about 140 feet. They were stopped, but would kick ahead every so often for short periods. The only armament visible was a machine gun forward of the bridge on each one. Maneuvered to the westward to place them in line and at

0724 Surfaced with range to nearest picket 6,000 yards and commenced firing 5"25 deck gun. As soon as we surfaced, both targets immediately turned towards and speeded up to 10 knots. Both targets began returning the fire at once with 3 inch, 20 or 37 M.I., and machine gun fire. We could not see the 3 inch guns, but from the flashes knew they were located amidships in both vessels. While waiting to spot our second salvo, observed a 3 inch shell to hit the water 75 feet on our port bow. The machine gun fire from the enemy made it look like it was raining on the water, but all shots were about 1000 yards short. The 20 M.I. or 37 M.I. shells were flying all around us, making funny little popping sounds as they passed overhead. After observing several more close 3 inch salvos, turned away, put targets on our port quarter, and opened range to 6400 yards. Although we had several near misses, we did not hit the target at this extreme range. We were on in range but kept straddling the target in deflection. At 6400 yards was very surprised to see numerous three inch shells land over on our starboard side, while the smaller stuff was still buzzing around overhead. Since the enemy could keep us out at a range at which we couldn't hit, broke off engagement and opened out to the north. Expended 19 rounds 5 inch ammunition.

0813 Submerged.

1701 Surfaced.

1741 Received ComSubPac's 010242 moving our lifeguard station 100 miles east. Went to 3 engine speed.

Noon Position: Lat. 30-53 N Long. 138-00 E.

April 2, 1945

0025 SJ contact on SUISU SHIA, 32,000 yards, 025°T.

0250 Established voice contact with 3-29 and soon thereafter sighted him. We were now on lifeguard station.

0530 B-29 departed, raid completed, no report of ditches.

- 7 - ENCLOSURES (A)

— page 250 —
0616
    Submerged and headed westward. We had orders to be on same station for another raid 3-4 April, so the farthest we could go and still be back on time was a run up to HACHIJO for a look-see. Felt certain there would not be very much traffic running down to CHICHI JIMA.

: 1854
    Surfaced and headed for HACHIJO SHIDA.

: 2056
    Received orders to search our area for 3 missing B-29s. Changed course to the east and commenced search.

: 2056
    Noon Position: Lat. 31-41 N Long. 140-24 E.

: 2056
    April 3, 1945
    On surface in vicinity of lifeguard station searching for 3-29s.

: 2056
    Noon Position: Lat. 31-41 N Long. 141-41 E.

: 2056
    April 4, 1945
    . 0030 Observed first of B-29s headed north.
    . 0230 B-29s returned, headed south.
    . 0530 B-29 assigned us for lifeguard services departed; no report of ditching.
    . 0552 Submerged and headed north. Planned to run up to our area if possible before being recalled for more lifeguard duty. "Altered batteries while submerged.
    . 1240 Surfaced and headed for HACHIJO SHIDA.
    . 1415 Sighted large empty life raft, overturned. No markings; unsinkable type.
    . 2001 Radar contact on HACHIJO SHIDA 253T, 58,000 yards.
    . 2058 Interference on the SJ bearing about 020T. Probably the SADOG, but could not exchange recognition signals although we repeatedly tried the rest of the night.

: 2058
    Noon Position: Lat. 32-16 N Long. 140-53 E.

: 2058
    April 5, 1945
    Had to slow to 5 knots as the sea had picked up considerably. Since we could not make our area, planned to patrol between HACHIJO and HIKURA SHIDA tomorrow.

: 2058
    ENCLOSURE (..)

— page 251 —
0342
: 0351
: 0353
: 0901
: 0914
: 0917
: 0920
: 0922
: 0928
: 0929
: 0938
: 1002
: 1002

---

**April 5, 1945 (Cont'd)**

Submerged halfway between HACHIJO-SHIMA and MIKURA SHIMA. Seas very rough. As soon as we were submerged decoded message telling us to search vicinity to the southeast for B-29 reported down. Changed course to 121°T and ran at 100 feet, coming up every so often for a look. Depth control very difficult at 2/3 speed and even at 60 feet we couldn't see much over the large waves.

JK picked up screws at 181°T. Got a turn count of 100 rpm while we were coming up to 60 feet, and the sound of the screws was very similar to that of a small freighter. (Ship Contact No. 2, Attack No. 1) (Lat. 33-29.15N Long. 139-58.30E)

C.O. had a hazy look over mountainous waves and saw a DE distant about 4000 yards, angle on bow 5° port. Manned battle stations. We were in the trough of the sea, which was the only course on which we could even attempt to hold our depth at 2/3 speed. Target speed tracked at 10 knots.

Target zigged left, giving us about a 45° starboard angle on the bow. Made ready the stern tubes, depth 6 feet. At this time the target became alerted and commenced pinging. He stopped his screws and then started them again. He zigged away again and stopped. He then speeded up to about 140 rpm. At

Fired three torpedoes from the stern tubes, range 1750, 130 starboard track, gyros 20° right. Gave him a speed of 5 knots, as he had just started his screws. No hits, although sound tracked all torpedoes running normal to the target. Believe torpedoes ran under the target.

Target changed course to the right and headed our way, pinging on short scale. Started to ease down to 200 feet.

Depth charge. Ordered 300 feet, rig for depth charge and silent running.

Depth charge, not close.

Depth charge, not close.

Depth charge, not close.

Evaded by keeping stern to target and running at 80 rpm.

Came up to 100 feet, no sound contact on target. He had opened to the westward, pinging continuously. Secured from depth charge and silent running and reloaded aft. Torpedo in No. 10 tube had flooded. (See Major Defects). Although the C.O. did not get a chance to positively identify the target because of the very rough sea, it appeared to be a DE or large escort

---

**ENCIOSURE (A)**

— page 252 —
1917
: 2020
: 2216
: 1440
: 1900
: 2118
: 2312
: 0340
: 0458

: April 5, 1945 (Cont'd)
: 1917
: 2020
: 2216
: 1440
: 1900
: 2118
: 2312
: 0340
: 0458

: April 7, 1945
: 0307
: 0340
: 0458

: April 6, 1945
: 0422
: 1440
: 1900
: 2312
: 0340
: 0458

: April 7, 1945
: 0307
: 0340
: 0458

: April

— page 253 —
1945 (Cont'd)
0924. Sighted first of numerous superforts heading north.
1030. On lifeguard station with sight and VHF contact with our cover plane. Slowed to 2/3 speed.
1656. Sighted SUB:ISU SHIMA, 2230, distance 30 miles. This island looks remarkably like a ship from this direction.
2204. Headed northwest to patrol off HACHIJO SHIMA.
    Noon Position: Lat. 32-00 N Long. 140-02 E.
April 8, 1945
0424. Submerged southeast of HACHIJO SHIMA and commenced closing island.
1900. Surfaced and found we hadn't made much distance during day. Headed north. Planned to investigate HACHIJO tomorrow from close in.
2130. No. 1 H.P. air compressor back in commission.
    Noon Position: Lat. 32-30 N Long. 140-16 E.
April 9, 1945
0050. Converted No. 4 FST.
0128. Submerged to flush out No. 4 FST.
0145. Surfaced.
0409. Submerged 12 miles northeast of HACHIJO SHIMA and commenced closing it.
0519. Heard pinging from direction of land. Nothing in sight.
0630. Sighted small fishing vessel bearing 3250T, distant about 4 miles (Ship Contact No. 3)(Lat. 33-16 N Long. 139-53 E).
1300. Sighted three more fishing vessels, all headed north. (Ship Contact No. 4)(Lat. 33-16 N Long. 139-39 E).
1314. Heard pinging from the north.
1320. Sighted petrol boat that was doing the pinging at 0450T. (Ship Contact No. 5)(Lat. 33-16.5N Long. 139-37). He was over the horizon but looked like he might be the same fellow we fired at a few days ago. He was patrolling slowly.

- 11 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 254 —
14:17 Saw our patrol boat blinking his searchlight and soon thereafter heard another pinger to the northward of us. Visibility excellent.

: 14:31 Sighted two snips bearing 014°T over the horizon (Ship Contact No. 6) (Torpedo Attack No. 2) (Lat. 32-31 N Long. 139-23 a). As they drew closer made them out to be a small tanker with a PC escort ahead pinging. The tanker was very small and resembled one of our yard oilers. His bow and stern were so high that at a distance he looked like two distinct ships. He appeared to be riding high, but why an empty tanker should be going to HACHIJO is not understood. He may have been a self-compensating gasoline tanker, which would account for his high freeboard. Both tanker and escort were zigging radically, making 8 knots. Commenced approach.

: 14:46 While making ready the forward tubes, the boat got extremely light forward and broached 4000 yards from the escort. Flooded negative and speeded up and finally got back down. Raised periscope fully expecting to see escort charging down on us, but he evidently hadn't observed our little difficulty.

: 14:51 Speeded up. Target had now been on a left zig for about 10 minutes and if he didn't zig back soon, we wouldn't get a shot.

: 14:59 Target zigged to his right, presenting a 60° starboard angle on the bow at a range of 3600 yards. The setup had been checking nicely all along, so decided to fire as soon as the torpedo run was 2500 yards.

: 15:02 Raised periscope for final steady bearing and could not see the target. "Look a quick sweep around and could not even see land, which had been plainly in sight all day. A rain squall had come out of nowhere to hide our target just when we needed a good bearing. While waiting for squall to pass got set up to fire by sound, but found we didn't have to change the TDC setup at all, as the solution was checking perfectly with sound.

: 15:05 Since the target was still obscured and the setup not getting any better, fired tubes 1, 2, 3, and 4 from the solution on the TD, range 2250, average track 95 S, average gyro 33° R, depth set 6 feet, divergent spread. No hits. after firing, boat got heavy and started down. Since we couldn't see anyway, planed down to 200 feet. Several depth charges immediately followed, but they were not too close. Went on down to 300 feet. Port sound head began to leak around the hull flange and continued to do so in spite of our efforts to tighten down on the bolts. Believe a whole new gasket is needed. The water that entered did not bother us until the boat took an up angle and then both sound training motors were wetted. (see Major Defects).

— page 255 —
1550
Back at periscope depth, nothing in sight but pinging still audible. From the direction of the pinging, believe target went around HACHIJO to the west and anchored in YAYUME HARBOR. Planned to nose around there tonight and see if our radar could pick him out. Both sound head training motors out of commission.

: 1903
Surfaced and headed west.

: 2124
Changed course to 040°T and went to standard speed.

: Noon Position: Lat. 33-16 N Long. 139-43 E.

: April 10, 1945
Began to get radar indications from HIYAKE SHIMA. All of these islands in this area had several radars, but our operators got so they could recognize most of them. No attempt has been made in this narrative to record every APN indication received, as there was hardly a time when we didn't have an indication of some sort from the many radars in this vicinity. Elsewhere in this report is recorded, to the best of our knowledge, the radars encountered in this area and their characteristics.

: 0300
Slowed to 2/3 speed and commenced patrolling on an east-west line.

: 0423
Submerged 15 miles north of HIYAKE SHIMA, patrolling eastern approaches to TOKYO BAY.

: 1900
Surfaced in mountainous seas. Took several large waves over before we were blown up, but quick closing of the upper conning tower hatch prevented any water from entering the boat. Set course 160°T, speed 80 rpm. He had another lifeguard station for the 12th, but if this weather kept up we wouldn't be able to make it.

: Noon Position: Lat. 34-20 N Long. 139-44 E.

: April 11, 1945
Submerged in very heavy seas and headed south. Depth control was impossible at periscope depth so ran at 120 feet and made periodic attempts during the day to take looks. Ship rolled badly even at 120 feet.

: 0407
Surfaced with sea somewhat quieter.

: 1950
Received new lifeguard assignment so headed northeast. Managed to make two engine speed on this course.

: Noon Position: Lat. 33-31 N Long. 143-03 E.

: - 13 -

: ENTOISURE (A)

— page 256 —
0015
While ship was rolling badly a lookout coming off watch
: accidently bumped against the gyro panel in the control room
and moved the knob on the latitude correction from 30° to
zero. Knob was reset but this was enough to make the gyro os-
cillate 100° each side of the correct heading. Steered by
magnetic and started auxiliary gyro. Master gyro settled out
at 0426. An unique casualty to say the least.

0624
Sighted a floating mine of the usual spherical horned type.

0642
Exploded mine with ten rounds from the forward 20 MH. It
made a very loud noise.

0956
Sighted first of B-29s heading north. During morning sighted
more B-29s and made contact with our cover plane.

1330
Sighted last of friendly planes and cover plane departed. No
report of ditches.

1938
Headed for HACHIJO SHIMA on course 215°T. He had another life-
guard station on the 13th but hoped to get over towards the
traffic lanes (such as they were) in the meantime. This life-
guard duty didn't leave us much time to get in close to hunt
for any shipping. The bad weather we had made it all we could
do to get from one station to another on time.

Noon Position: Lat. 34-27 N Long. 141-05 E.

April 13, 1945

0339
Radar interference on the SJ bearing 265°T. 'Undoubtedly the
S.A.DOG, but could not exchange recognition signals, although
we tried.

0421
Submerged. 'We now had the starboard sound head training motor
repaired, using undamaged coils from the port motor. Did not
use the lathe motor on the port head since it was an open motor
and would have been flooded the first time we went deep. Were
now training the port head by hand and securing it completely
when we went deep.

1905
Surfaced.

2330
On lifeguard station. Sighted first of many planes headed north.
Shortly thereafter saw planes returning from the raid.

Noon Position: Lat. 33-38 N Long. 140-53 E.

April 14, 1945

0155
Sighted a flash on the horizon at 135°T that night have been a

- 14 -

— page 257 —
1945 (Cont'd)
plane ditching. Headed for it. Nothing sighted.
1128 Changed course to 347°T and speeded up, heading for position of possible ditching reported by ComSubFac.
1530 At reported position. Commenced search.
Noon Position: Let. 32-22 N Long. 141-25 E.
April 15, 1945
0412 Submerged on lifeguard station.
0817 Sighted a B-29. Must have been a search plane, as no B-29 raid was scheduled.
1131 Surfaced on station for fighter plane strike.
1300 Sighted one of four B-29s assigned to search area for possible survivors.
1523 SD contact 6 mils with no IFF. It was probable a B-29, but we couldn't see it, so at
1527 Submerged.
1800 Sighted AOCA SHIMA bearing 255°T.
1805 Surfaced and headed for lifeguard station. Received word that fighter plane strike had been delayed 24 hours.
2114 Sighted first of a great many B-29s that were to pass over us during the night. We were on our lifeguard station.
Noon Position: Lat. 32-21 N Long. 140-15 E.
April 16, 1945
0052 Sighted a bright flash on horizon bearing 045°T. Headed for it at standard speed. A little later sighted a low flying 5-29 with his landing lights on, evidently searching. Soon after heard a plane say over the radio that he had one motor out of commission but that he was continuing on to base. No report of ditching. Believe the flash we saw was a jettisoned bomb, since it was instantaneous.
0203 Changed speed to flank and course to 109°T, proceeding to position of reported survivors in raft reported by ComSubFac's 151431. Fighter strike for this day had been cancelled.
0600 In position of reported survivors. Commenced search plan at

— page 258 —
1945 (Cont'd)
full speed.

1027
Lade sight and VHF contact with B-29 assigned to help us in search.

1057
Sighted life raft. Stopped to investigate. Raft was the usual surface ship type and had A-11 painted on its side. All equipment in it was intact and it is believed that this was the raft reported as containing survivors. The various cans, etc., in the raft would have the appearance of people from a distance. Salvaged the medical equipment, which was in perfect shape, having been in a sealed container. All equipment was marked with the U.S. Navy's markings. Raft had evidently been adrift for quite some time from the number of barnacles on it.

1935
Abandonee search as both we and the plane had covered a large area carefully with no results. Headed for HACHIJO SHIMA, since we had no lifeguard mission pending.

Noon Position: Lat. 31-42 N Long. 141-17 E.

April 17, 1945

0416
Submerged 12 miles east of HACHIJO SHIMA and commenced closing for a look in the harbor. Visibility during the day was hazy and not too good.

1758
Heard echo ranging bearing 020°T. From the changes in subsequent bearings, decided this was the same fellow we have found here before patrolling. Nothing in sight. Bearing began pulling to the west and at

1915
Heard light fast screws from direction of pinning. Screws faded out to the southeast and soon afterwards the pinging stopped. Selisve he had gone home for the night.

1928
Fire in bow plane clutch solenoid. (see Major Defects). Fire was immediately extinguished and the bow planes were still operative in power.

2007
Surfaced 12 miles north of HACHIJO SHIMA. Since we had received no lifeguard assignment, decided to dash up to STIJIMA and to patrol for the next day. The STIJIMA was on the east side of the island chain, so we wouldn't be in his way.

Noon Position: Lat. 33-12 N Long. 133-51 E.

- 16 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 259 —
0415 Submerged 15 miles south of a line from IRO SAKI to OMAI SAKI. During the day worked up to a position off IRO SAKI, but although the sea was calm, a surface haze made the visibility none too good. This was the first time we had really been in our area since the start of the patrol. The current here was 2 knots towards 055°T, and we had to steer 290°T at 2 knots in order to make good a northerly course.

1913 Surfaced 15 miles southwest of IRO SAKI. Headed for new life-guards station southeast of AOGASHIYA.

: 0504 Sighted AOGASHIYA bearing 130°T, distance 20 miles.

: 0545 Submerged when lookout reported a small plane, flying low. Sky is very overcast. No SD indication.

: 0620 Surfaced.

: 0800 Changed course to 090°T, passing 15 miles south of AOGASHIYA.

: 1000 On station for fighter strike.

: 1115 Sighted numerous F-51s in company with a B-29 headed south.

: 1130 Sighted more F-51s and a B-29 headed south.

: 1146 A plane using the call "Cyclone Able" called us on VHF and said he had a fighter plane he might have to bring in to us. He asked us if we could see him and we replied in the negative. Since we had just seen some planes pass overhead, told him we were probably north of him.

: 1154 Sighted a plane that looked like a Liberator approaching low. "He circled us slowly, during which time he was positively identified as a Liberator with two tails. His insignia was clearly visible to the 0... and everybody else at a range of 1/2 mile. Attempted to raise him on VHF, thinking he was either Cyclone Able or our cover plane that was due in 6 minutes.

: 1157

— page 260 —
1505
Surfaced and found following damage topside: Bridge repeater smashed by bullets: aft TET grounded out; rudder angle indicator inoperative; 3/4 inch hole through SD mast shear, but SD scmmed to be operating satisfactorily; VHF and APT pipes punctured in several places by bullets; 3/4 inch hole in antenna trunk; port antenna partly shot away; lifeline aft shot away: numerous holes in the vicinity of bridge and periscope shears, some with 30 caliber bullets still sticking in them. From the size of the holes, found it appeared that the plane had 30 cal., 50 cal., and 20 MM., and obtained a goodly number of hits from each. Since our transmitter was out of commission and would require considerable time to repair, rushed repairs on the VHF so we would have some means of communication. Put wooden plugs in the antenna trunk and the APR and VHF piping.

2140
Received ComSubFacts's 191238 requesting lifeguard information, but couldn't reply because of no transmitter. Planned to contact either SEADOG or a cover plane as soon as possible to inform them of our inability to transmit.

Noon Position: Lat. 32-17 N Long. 140-14 E.

April 20, 1945

0425
Submerged southeast of HACHIJO SHIDA. Seas had built up considerably and we had to spend most of the day at 100 feet. In the afternoon, seas moderated enough to allow us to run at periscope depth. Sky overcast.

1910
Surfaced and headed to patrol in position between LIKURA and HACHIJO.

2325
Exchanged recognition signals via SJ with the SADOG. Asked her to inform ComSubPac that our transmitter was out. Also told her that we had been bombed by a friendly plane with no major damage. SADOG said she would inform ComSubPac.

For the first time this vessel tried the procedure for exchanging recognition signals outlined in ComSubTrainPac Information. Cutletin No. 2 of February 1945. The C.O. feels that all subs should investigate this method, for we certainly found it "the neatest trick of the week." By using earphones also, we were able to send and receive the messages at radio transmission speed.

- 18 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 262 —
215
Sighted CERO and exchanged recognition signals with her (Ship Contact No. 8) (Lat. 32-02 N Long. 141-59.30 S). While closing CERO completed repairs to our transmitter and tested it. Informed CERO that we would transmit to ConsubPac instead of her, since our transmitter was now repaired. CERO said she would via heaving line. Also tested our VHF with her; result satisfactory. The had a jury rig on the VHF consisting of a cable lead to the conning tower hatch from the antenna topside. Then a lead from below was brought up through the conning tower and connected to the topside cable in such a manner that it could be quickly broken should a dive become necessary. Planned to use this only when actually on lifeguard station in communication with planes.

1119 Submerged for SD contact, 4 miles. This one had IPF, but it was completely overcast and we didn't see him.

1137 Surfaced. Antenna trunk flooded.

1334 Submerged along with CERO or SD contact, 3 miles.

1406 Surfaced. Antenna trunk flooded again. Since it would take several hours to dry out the trunk sufficiently to transmit, would on her way to her patrol station. CERO departed to the provided to be satisfactory. We plugged the hole by pounding lead in it heated by a blowtorch, and covering the patch with Copaltite.

Noon Position: Lat. 32-01 N Long. 142-11 E.

April 24, 1945

1050 Submerged for SD contact, 6 miles. Antenna trunk dry. The ship was very overcast and we were diving on SD contacts whether they had IPF or not.

1159 Surfaced.

2100 Found port 5 inch ready locker flooded as the result of a bullet hole in it. Jettisoned the ammunition in it.

2200 Heeded for new lifeguard station.

2302 Sent POGY Fourth to ConsubPac giving details of bombing by friendly plane.

2340 No. 2 air compressor back in commission. This crew could fix anything.

Noon Position: Lat. 31-56 N Long. 142-14 E.

- 20 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 263 —
1945

0105 Received change of orders and headed southwest to search area west of SUMISU SHIMA for downed B-29s.

0453 Sighted SUMISU SHIMA. Passed 6 miles north of it and commenced search.

1900 Search completed: nothing sighted. Headed southwest for life-guard station.

Noon Position: Lat. 31-27 N Long. 138-57 E.

April 26, 1945

0617 Had first of numerous friendly indications on the SD.

Noon Position: Lat. 29-27 N Long. 139-09 E.

April 27, 1945

0601 Submerged on SD contact, 2 miles. Sky very overcast.

0640 Surfaced.

1015 Sighted our cover plane.

1256 Cover plane departed.

Noon Position: Lat. 29-20 N Long. 135-58 E.

April 28, 1945

0557 Had first of many friendly indications on the SD.

1020 Received word of Superfort ditching 30 miles away. Went to flank speed and headed for spot. Our cover plane had hot appeared, although we had radio contact with him.

1215 It now became evident that the position given for the ditching was in error, since there was a plane over the survivors and we had nothing in sight. Several other planes were also vainly trying to find the reported position. Began searching area at high speed.

1304 Made contact with the ATUE's cover plane and he said he would search area also. He finally located some survivors just before dark, so we headed for the position he gave us.

1915 At reported position. Commenced search, firing green flares every 15 minutes. Continued throughout the night.

Noon Position: Lat. 28-52 N Long. 136-08 E.

- 21 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 264 —
0345  Sighted first of numerous B-29s passing north.
: 1037  Sighted submarine on the surface bearing 311°T, distance 10 miles. (Ship Contact No. 9) (Lat. 28-43 N Long. 136-22 E). Exchanged recognition signals and information via SJ with U.S.S. TRUTTA.
: 1138  Received report of ditching, so headed for it. ATULE and SPOT also heading for same position, but we were much closer, so notified them we would make the search.
: 1302  Sighted a B-29 and a PBY circling low over the water. Made radio contact and was informed they were over numerous life rafts. Closed and made preparations for receiving aviation personnel.
: 1340  Took aboard first of ten survivors from BAKER 29 No. 840.
: 1445  Took aboard last remaining survivor. All survivors in good condition.

Following men were brought aboard:

| NAME | RANK | SER. NO. |
|------|------||
| BROWN, Eugene Louis | 1st Lt., USA. | 0-423507 |
| MERRON, Alvin Jr. | 2nd Lt., USA. | 0-327814 |
| KLEIN, Eugene "alter | 2nd Lt., USA. | 0-869144 |
| BOLTZ, Mark LeRoy | 2nd Lt., USA. | 0-2060664 |
| PENDERGAST, Howard Edward | S/Sgt., USA. | 31370739 |
| SHOEMAKER, Leason David Jr. | Sgt., USA. | 32979784 |
| PAULE, Marvin William | Sgt., USA. | 35229691 |
| MARCUM, Bige | Sgt., USA. | 35204337 |
| SMITH, Peyton Enoch | Sgt., USA. | 34921933 |
| WILSON, Francis Edward | Cpl., USA. | 12198390 |

The only missing man from this crew was 2nd Lt. "William SUMY", the navigator, whose parachute the other men said failed to open.

1725  Sighted floating mine of usual spherical type. Sank it with one drum of 20 EM. It did not explode on sinking.
1847  SJ interference bearing 337°T. Exchanged recognition signals with the ATUJE.

Noon Position: Lat. 28-39 N Long. 136-16 E.

— page 265 —
1945

0438 Submerged for trim.

0555 Surfaced.

0615 Sighted floating mine of usual spherical type. Sank it with a drum of 20 MM. This one did not explode either, but smoked a little before it sank.

0825 Signed a B-29.

1035 Sighted a B-29. This one was our cover plane for the day's lifeguard duty.

Noon Position: Lat. 29-25 N Long. 136-00 E.

May 1, 1945

0448 Submerged. Had no lifeguard duty for this day. Patrolled at 55 feet with a continuous periscope watch.

1554 Surfaced.

2220 Headed for SAIPAN as per despatch orders from ComSubPac.

Noon Position: Lat. 29-42 N Long. 135-41 E.

May 2, 1945

Enroute SAIPAN.

Noon Position: Lat. 26-20 N Long. 137-44 E.

May 3, 1945

0658 Sighted a U.S. sub through high periscope (Ship Contact No. 10) (Lat. 21-38 N Long. 137-29.45 E). Exchanged calls with U.S.S. RAY.

0710 Closed RAY and transferred our ECM via RAY's rubber boat as per instructions from ComSubPac.

0752 Exchange completed: enroute SAIPAN at four engine speed. Sighted several 3-29s during the day.

Noon Position: Lat. 20-34 N Long. 137-43 E.

- 23 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 266 —
1945

0100 Set clocks ahead to Zone -10 time.

1250(K) Exchanged signals with SHAD.

1312(K) Exchanged signals with SPIKEFISH.

1430(K) Test fired 5 inch gun and 40 M.T. gun. Test satisfactory.

1522(K) Submerged for trim.

1535(K) Surfaced.

Noon Position: Lat. 16-24 N Long. 141-00 E.

May 5, 1945

0605(K) Sighted escort. Proceeded to SAIPAN.

1248(K) '00ored to port side of U.S.S. ORION at SAIPAN HABOR. Transferred aviators, fueled, and replaced RSH receiver, which was beyond repair. The care and consideration given us by the ORION was very gratifying. They gave us overnight laundry service, opened their ship's service and barber shop for us, gave us some movies, and even offered to pay us. It is indeed a pleasure to tie up alongside such a tender.

May 6, 1945

1000(K) Underway from alongside ORION enroute PEARL HARBOR.

1447(K) Escort departed. Submerged for trim.

1513(K) Surfaced.

May 7, 1945

0852(K) Submerged for SD contact, 5 miles, closing, no IFF.

0925(K) Surfaced.

Noon Position: Lat. 17-28 N Long. 148-33 E.

- 24 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 267 —
1945

May 8, 1945

Noon Position: 13-50 N Long. 154-23 E.

May 9, 1945

Noon Position: 19-38 N Long. 160-29 E.

May 10, 1945

Noon Position: 20-23 N Long. 166-57 E.

May 11, 1945

Noon Position: 20-56 N Long. 173-28 E.

May 12, 1945

0125(M) Exchanged calls via SJ with CAPITAIN.

1255(M) Sighted U.S. submarine through high periscope; probably FITTING FISH.

1445(M) Submerged for trim.

1519(M) Surfaced.

2400(M) Changed from Zone -12 to Zone +12 time; date remains 12 May 1945.

Noon Position: 20-50 N Long. 179-49 E.

May 12, 1945

Noon Position: 20-42 N Long. 168-31 W.

May 14, 1945

1115(W) Sighted U.S. submarine.

1135(W) Exchanged calls with STEELHEAD.

Noon Position: 20-47 N Long. 162-47 W.

May 15, 1945

0530(W) Sighted escort: proceeded to PEARL HARBOR.

1030(VW) Moored at U.S. Submarine Base, PEARL HARBOR, T.H.

- 25 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 268 —
0550 30-35.15N 138-04E  Two 8000  Stopped  Periscope  Gun  Attack  No. 1
1 0550 30-35.15N 138-04E  Two 8000  Stopped  Periscope  Gun  Attack  No. 1
2 0851 33-29.15N 139-59.30E  DE or 4000  JX  Sound  No. 1
3 0630 33-16N 139-53E  Small 8000  Periscope  Vessel
4 1300 33-16N 139-39E 3 Small 000°T  Periscope  Vessels
5 1320 33-16.15N 139-37E  Same as  Periscope  No. 2

- 26 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 269 —
1. 1431 32-31N 1 FC 230°T 8 kts. 2. 1115 32-44N ISM (New 1600 160°T 11 kts. 3. 0815 32-02N Submarine 20,000 yds. 4. 1037 28-43N Submarine 20,000 yds. 5. 0653 21-38N Submarine 20,000 yds. 6. 3 May 137-29,45E

(C) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS
The scarcity of aircraft contacts in this hitherto heavily patrolled area was surprising, to say the least. Only one sighting of enemy aircraft was made, and this contact is considered doubtful, since only one lookout saw it and no SD indication was present. No night flying radar equipped enemy planes were encountered during the entire patrol. Since our own planes did not always use their IFF, it can be safely assumed that some of the SD contacts that we submerged for were friendly planes.

- 27 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 270 —
0903(I) Date: 5 April 1945 Lat. 33-29.15 N Long. 139-58.30 E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: DE or Frigate of the MTKURA class. About 250 feet long with a single stack and a gun mount forward. Snip was painted grey and looked new.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: None.

Identification: EU.

Damage Determined by: No damage.

Target Draft 6 feet. Course 010°T. Speed 5 knots. Range 1750 yds. (at firing).

Own Ship Data

Speed 3.5 kts. Course 121°T. Depth 60 ft. Angle (at firing) 0°.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Submerged Periscope.

Tubes Fired: #7 #8 #9

Track Angle: 132 S 134 S 132 S

Gyro Angle: 199 (19R) 203 (23R) 199.5 (19.5R)

Depth Set: 6 feet 6 feet 6 feet

Power: --
Hit or Miss Miss Miss

Erratic (Yes or No) No No No

Mark Torpedo 13-2 13-2 18-1

Serial No. 57717 57575 56771

Mark Exploder 8-5 8-5 8-5

- 28 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 271 —
9/8/1943
Torpedo Attack No. 1, Fire Control and Torpedo Data (Cont'd)

| Serial No. | #7 | #8 | #9 |
||----|----|----|
|           | 8328 | 8479 | 7993 |
| Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual | None | None | None |
| Mk. 'Harhead | 1b-2 | 18-2 | 13-2 |
| Serial No. | 3633 | 1459 | 1330 |
| Explosive | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex |
| Firing Interval | 0 sec. | 27 sec. | 14 sec. |
| Type Spread | 0 | 2 Right | 2 Left |
| Sea Conditions | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Overhaul Activity | S/A: Base | S/A: Base | S/A: Base |
|           | 1/2way | 1/2way | 1/2way |

Notes:
- Sea very rough; fired down trough. Reasons for misses unknown.

U.S.S. PGY (SS266) TOPEDO LT.TT.NC. 2 PATROL NO. 9

Time: 1431(I) Date: 9 April 1945 Lat. 32-31 N Long. 139-28 E

Target Data - Parry's Lifted

Description: Small tanker or engine-saft freighter, resubmiting YOG. Target was light and riding high in the water.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: None.

Identification: EU.

Damage Determined by: No damage.

Target Draft 6 feet. Course 230°T. Speed 6 kts. Range 2250 yds. (at firing).

ENCLOSURE (i)

— page 272 —
1. ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)
Torpedo Attack No. 2 (Cont'd):

Own Ship Data
Speed 3.25 kts. Course 131°T. Depth 63 ft. Angle 1° Down (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack
Tubes Fired
Track Angle
Gyro Angle
Depth Set
Power
Hit or Miss
Erratic (Yes or No)
Mark Torpedo
Serial No.
Mark Exploder
Serial No.
.ctuation Set
Actuation Actual
Mark 'Varhead
Serial No.
Explosive
Firing Interval
Type Spread
Sea Conditions
Overhaul .ctivity
S/M Base
Midway
S/M Base
Midway
S/M Base
Midway
S/M Base
Midway

| Type Attack | Submerged Periscope, Day. |
|||
| #1         | #2                           |
| 96 S       | 96 S                         |
| 32 Right   | 33 Right                      |
| 6 feet     | 6 feet                        |
| Miss       | Miss                          |
| No         | No                             |
| 15-1       | 18-1                           |
| 54288      | 54495                         |
| 8-5        | 8-5                             |
| 9780       | 10131                          |
| Contact   | Contact                       |
| None      | None                           |
| 18-2       | 18-2                           |
| 3559       | 3857                           |
| Torpex     | Torpex                         |
| 0 sec.     | 10 sec.                         |
| 1/2° R    | 1-1/2° R                       |
| 2         | 2                               |
| S/M Base   | Midway                        |
| S/M Base   | Midway                        |
| S/M Base   | Midway                        |
| S/M Base   | Midway                        |
| ENCLOSURE (): | ENCLOSURE ():               |

- 30 -
-

— page 273 —
5/25 only.
: 6000 yards.
: Range - radar spotted on high periscope with a continuous set-up kept on the TDC. Gun range direct from TDC.
: Deflection - Spotted at the gun.

(I) MINES

Four floating mines were encountered. Three of these were destroyed by gunfire. Only one exploded, the other two sinking after being hit several times.

— page 274 —
1. ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

No new antisubmarine measures were encountered. The PC that was escorting the small tanker in attack No. 2 pinged continuously, but never made contact. The DE in attack No. 1 alternately pinged and listened, and after dipping a few "face saving" charges seemed only too glad to let us alone. The LSH contacts: April 22 was unescorted. All in all, antisubmarine measures were weak and ineffective. It was interesting to note also that the depth charges dropped did not have the customary "click" before the explosion, while the explosions themselves appeared to be much lighter than those previously experienced by ship's personnel.

The DE or frigate encountered in attack No. 1 had a turn count of 100 rpm for a speed of 10 knots.

(K) JAPOR DEFEATS AND DAMAGE

Starboard Main Motor Reverser Switches

On March 20, 1945, an electrical casualty in the cubicle resulted in both starboard main motor reverser switches being badly burned, and temporary loss of power on the starboard shaft. The damage was sustained shortly after surfacing, when speed was increased from ahead one-third to ahead standard following the turbo blow-up. Simultaneous with the increase in load, the senior controllerman noticed substantial arcing in the after lower portion of the cubicle, and immediately both sides of the control board were cleared. 'Coping to locate the source of arcing, he again attempted to bring up the load, and this time the arcing at the reversers was so severe that insulation continued to burn and smoke after he had again cleared the board, necessitating the use of a fire extinguisher. Examination revealed that both reverser switches were burned beyond immediate use, so proceeding with power on only the port shaft, work was begun to salvage the best parts of both switches so that at least one reverser could be put into commission. Within eight hours, one reverser was considered servicable, though only temporarily so, and by electrically disconnecting No. 1 main motor at the links and inserting the rebuilt reverser in the armature circuit of No. 3 main motor, we again had a limited range of power on the starboard shaft. The cause of this failure is not known, but lacking evidence to the contrary, it seems logical to assume that it was caused by some piece of metal scrap or tool dropping across either one or both switches, shorting them out. Though a thorough search was made for the tool or other conductor which may have caused the short, none was found.

— page 275 —
1945, while running submerged and in the process of making ready to surface, an electrical fire broke out in the solenoid-operated clutch in the bow plane tilting shafting which released the clutch, thereby causing loss of power for the operation of the bow planes. The bow planes were immediately shifted to hand operation, and the fire at the solenoid was promptly snuffed out with a fire extinguisher. Since this solenoid merely operates a mechanical clutch, it was electrically disconnected and the hand-operating lever of the clutch was secured in the power position with an easily detachable loop of twine, again restoring power to the planes. Lacking a spare solenoid, and since the loss of this means of operating the clutch was not important, it was decided not to attempt a repair underway. It was considered a normal material failure, and in keeping with the many little electrical grievances we have experienced with our bow plane tilting system.

No. 1 Air Compressor

On April 5, 1945, while attempting to start an air charge with No. 1 H.F. air compressor, the electric motor kicked out and failed to run. Investigation revealed that salt water leaking into the motor through a motor vent opening improperly fastened had completely grounded out a field coil which, when starting current was applied, burnt out beyond further use. The source of salt water was traced to a leaky packing on the circulating water pump of the compressor, which sprayed salt water into the motor vent.

The motor was disassembled, and a spare field coil was bolted in place. To do this, it was necessary to remove the top motor housing and block up the armature, because the on-board spare field was not form pressed and would not slip into place. Since this is quite a job underway, it is suggested that spare fields be heated and form pressed for ready use.

No. 2 Air Compressor

During patrol on April 22, 1945, and while in use, the third stage inter-cooler coil of the port H.F. air compressor (No. 2) developed small pin-hole leaks, allowing air in the coils to leak into the cooler.

The holes in the coil were caused by the breaking away from the coil of the lengthwise wedging strip. Holes appeared

— page 276 —
2 Air Compressor (Cont'd)
No. 2 Air Compressor (Cont'd)
where the strip was welded to the coil. Vibration of the coil apparently caused the strip to come loose from the coil; however, why this should occur in this cooler alone has not been determined. Vibration in the cooler had been noted before and the strip had been welded to the coil before when this same casualty occurred without holes appearing in the coil.

Repair to the cooler was made by silver soldering the holes and replacing the metal wedging strips with wooden ones. This repair served sufficiently for the remainder of the patrol and the compressor functioned properly without any leaks or knocks in the third stage inter-cooler.

Radio and Radar
The extraordinary air of the strafing gunner resulted in the severing of the small trunks (1" piping) which house the antennas for VHF and APRA-SPA. The trunks were consequently flooded, and the water pressure forced through the shear valves in the radio shack, thereby flooding the TSJ, transmitter, A&H receiver, and the power unit for frequency meter. The flooding was arrested after about five minutes, although the hull flanges on one of the shear valves continued to leak for several hours.

Salt water damage of the TRL was corrected after three days of cleaning and checking. The R&H beat-oscillator circuit was beyond repair, so that receiver could no longer be used. The frequency meter power p.c.k was quickly put back in commission. The FR-SPA was left out of commission for lack of an antenna cable. For the VHF a temporary antenna lead through the conning tower hatches was rigged up so that this equipment was usable on subsequent lifeguard assignments.

The radio antenna trunk was punctured by a projectile, resulting in a flooded trunk several times before a temporary job of hole-plugging was successful. Several attempts were made to clean up the grounds on the antenna, but they could never be made to read above zero.

It is hoped that this vessel will be provided with a system of SPOT type antennas during the next refit. The TRL should have a complete overhaul to correct all possible damage done by the salt water. The most obvious defect in it at present is the heater circuit, but others are very likely.

— page 277 —
1945, while at submerged battle stations, the hull flange on the port sound shaft sprung a bad leak around several studs. Sufficient water came in to flood both training motors when the boat assumed an up angle. The motors were not stopped in time to prevent serious electrical damage.

By putting the armature of one motor with the field of the other it was possible to salvage one operable motor from the casualty. It was placed in operation on the starboard shaft. The port head was trained by hand and secured completely at deep submergence.

Torpedo Casualties

During torpedo attack No. 1, No. 10 torpedo tube was made ready, but was not fired. The tube outer door was open for approximately 15 minutes at periscope depth. Upon blowing down the tube one hour later and pulling the torpedo (Serial No. 57145), it was found that water had entered the torpedo through the ventilating plug, flooding the forward and after battery compartments, and the after body about 1/3 full. The rubber gasket of the plug had been badly cut and did not seal the opening properly. The torpedo was drained, dried out, and cleaned up. The cells of the battery were carefully cleaned with soda water and dried out thoroughly. Individual cell voltages were taken on all cells and no cell reading was lower than 2 volts. Upon checking specific gravities, No. 2 pilot cell was found to have dropped 15 points below the average of the other two pilot cells, which was 1.265. In the following two days, this pilot cell dropped only 2 points from 1.250 to 1.248. Charge was put in at the end of the time. Average specific gravity of pilot cells was 1.255 at the beginning, and 1.270 at the end. Initial open circuit voltage was 150. Final open circuit voltage was 163.

: full ground was found in the motor circuit. The after-body was pulled and the motor found completely dry with no ground in either the armature or field circuits. The ground was isolated in the main cable connecting the battery and motor, which had got wet by the flooding. This cable was pulled, washed with fresh water, baked out, dried, and the ground completely eliminated. The cable was reinstalled.

— page 278 —
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Cont'd)
Torpedo Casualties (Cont'd)
It was considered that this torpedo was in condition to be fired. On the subsequent charges the battery voltages and gravities acted normal in every respect.
In making a routine tightness test of torpedoes received aboard by flooding tubes at periscope depth for 15 minutes, torpedo serial No. 57126 was found to have a leaking gyro housing compartment. The afterbody was pulled and the gyro housing gasket was found so badly installed that tightening up on the holding down nuts had cut the gasket in two places. The gasket was renewed.

Gunnery Casualties
Following a strafing attack, the safety latch operating rod on the breech of the 5"/25 was found to be snapped completely in two by a ricochetting .50 caliber slug which hit the heavy section of the breech mass lower down. The rod was removed and a new one machined and installed.
Following a strafing attack, the after TBT was found to be completely grounded out somewhere between the transmitter and the hull packing gland. Close examination of the cable showed a small piece of the copper jacket of a .50 caliber slug deeply imbedded in the cable. No spare cable was carried, so the after TBT was out of commission for the balance of the patrol.
After several all-day submergences shortly after arriving on station, the left barrel of the binocular on the after TBT flooded out completely. Previous trouble with this binocular fogging is believed to indicate that it never was completely watertight.

(L) RADIO
Reception was generally good on this patrol, Sub Fox having been received without serious mishap. The broadcast on 9090 kcs.

— page 279 —
1. RADIO (Cont'd)
was sometimes disconcerting, due to what sounded like a faulty transmitter keying relay. The signal itself, however, was always good.

Seven messages were transmitted during the patrol. Six of them were sent in exceptionally brief working times.

The casualties to the radio gear resulted in several inconveniences, notably the TEL being out of commission for four days, the VHF having to be operated with a jury-rig antenna, and RER receiver being out of commission for the remainder of the patrol.

Lifeguard communications were satisfactory most of the time. The 4475 circuit was usually clear; however, some jamming and considerable extraneous transmissions cluttered it up at times.

(2) RADAR
The SJ and SD both performed satisfactorily. There were no casualties to these units and maintenance was good. The RER was also satisfactory, but its use was discontinued after its antenna cable was shot away. The SD was used while on the surface in daylight and was keyed. There was no indication of its being DF'd.

(3) SONAR, ETHER AND SOUND CONDITIONS
With the exception of the casualty to the sound head training motors, the sound gear performed well. No unusual sound conditions were experienced.

(4) DENSITY LAYERS
No density layers were encountered down to 300 feet. The bathymetrograph was out of commission after April 19 because it had a bullet hole through it.

(5) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HYGIENE
Health, food, and habitability were all excellent. There were no sick days. Food was varied and well prepared, the ice cream machine and the mechanical cow being very popular with the crew.

(6) PERSONNEL
(a) No. of men detached after previous patrol . . . . . . . 17
(b) No. of men on board during patrol 77
(c) No. of men qualified at start of patrol . . . . . . . 56
(d) No. of men qualified at end of patrol . . . . . . . 66
(e) No. of unqualified men making their last patrol . . . 11

Performance of officers and crew was in keeping with the high standards of the submarine service.

- 37 - ENCLOSURE (4)

— page 280 —
1. MIDWAY to SAIPAN 3397 miles 41,056 gals.
: 2. SAIPAN to Area 1468 miles 19,682 gals.
: 3. In Area

— page 281 —
1. CONFIDENTIAL
(U) COMMUNICATIONS, RADAR, AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES
APR Contacts:

| Date       | Location | Probable Source | Freq. | PRF | Ant. Rot. | P'  |
||||-------|-----||-----|
| 1 April   | 31-05 N   | HACHIJO SHIMA | 153   | 450 | 1 rpm     | 8   |
| 2 April   | 31-39 N   | HACHIJO SHIMA | 80    | 250 | Steady   | 40  |
| 3 April   | 31-59 N   | AOG. SHIMA or | 157   | 350 | 1 rpm    | 5   |
| 4 April   | 33-04 N   | HACHIJO SHIMA | 107 * | 900 | 50 sec. | 14  |
| 5 April   | 33-41 N   | MITURA SHIMA or | 161   | 450 | Erratic  | 9   |
| 5 April   | 33-50 N   | MITURA SHIMA | 107   | 500 | 1/2 rpm | 30  |
| 6 April   | 32-49 N   | INAME SHIMA or | 80    | 400 | Steady   | 40  |
| 9 April   | 33-27 N   | MITURA SHIMA | 165   | 500 | Unknown | 6   |

* This pulse shape had normal front, but its end tapered off on weak signals.

(V) REMARKS

1. Since the seven submarine picket sweep last October, Jap
picket vessels have been stationed in pairs and have mounted heavier
guns. For a submarine to stay out at 6-7 thousand yards and attempt
to sink them with her deck gun is unprofitable and usually dangerous.
To shorten the range to insure more hits just increases the danger
to a point where the risk involved is not worth the damage inflicted.

— page 282 —
1. The Commanding Officer believes that the way to attack these vessels is with torpedoes at a close range, since they are very often stopped and easy to close submerged. This the CERO ably demonstrated shortly after our attack when she sank what is believed to be one of the same pickets we attacked with a Mk. 15 torpedo set at 2 feet.

2. The Commanding Officer feels that the area in and around TOKYO BAY contains enough shipping to warrant the use of a submarine or submarines there unharmed by lifeguard duty. "Ye found it impossible to conduct a thorough offensive patrol in this area and still perform our lifeguard duties. This was proven by the fact that we could only obtain one full day in area FURNACE during the entire patrol. There were no indications of any shipping south of HACHIJO: all traffic either went east or west hugging the coast of the mainland, or went directly south to HACHIJO. passing close along the eastern side of the island chain. Traffic only runs during the daytime. Since the majority of the lifeguard stations are outlying, it is very difficult for a submarine to reach a favorable position to intercept shipping and still be back for the next day's lifeguarding. It is felt that a spot about ten miles south of the eastern edge of HACHIJO. SHIMA is the best position to find targets in this area. Such traffic that runs usually passes this spot at 10 or 11 o'clock in the morning.

3. For a lifeguard submarine to have a radio compass similar to those carried by 3-29s would be a definite advantage. Twice we had radio contact with planes over survivors and could not find them because of faulty position reports. With a radio compass we could have obtained a quick and accurate bearing and run right over to them.

4. From our aviator friends we learned that planes returning from strikes on Japan rely almost entirely on their radio compasses for navigation. Hence, while they know they are heading directly for TO YAMA, or S.I.P.N, they do not necessarily know exactly how far away they are. Therefore, a lifeguard submarine who receives a report of ditching in terms of a range and bearing from either TOY or S.I.P.N should give more weight to the accuracy of the bearing than the range.

— page 283 —
1-1-1/16-3
Serial: 014
C-O-N-F-I-D-Z-N-T-I-I-L
FIRST TIDORSENT TO
USS PCGY Report of
1iath War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division ONE HUNDRED FORTY ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOURTEEN.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET, Administration.
(3) The Commander in Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PCGY (SS266) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.

1. The Ninth War Patrol of the PCGY under the command of Lieutenant Commander John E. Bevers, U.S. Navy, the first for the commanding officer as such, was conducted in the areas south of the Empire. This patrol was of sixty-four (64) days duration of which thirty-one (31) days were spent in the area.

2. A fire in the main motor-reverser switches on 20 March 1945 caused the PCGY to return to Saipan. After a splendid repair job by the FULTON and Squadron Eight, she again departed for patrol on 27 March 1945.

3. Good area coverage resulted in three contacts worthy of torpedo fire. Two of these were attacked but the third, a LSI contacted on the morning of 22 April 1945 in rough seas, was out of firing range before a tube could be made ready for firing.

A summary of attacks follows:

Attack Number One
(a) On the morning of 5 April 1945, while running submerged in rough seas, PCGY made sound contact on what appeared to be a DE or a large escort vessel. Target was sighted at 4000 yards and tracked at ten knots. Then tubes were made ready target appeared to be alerted but with a range of 1750 yards, 130° starboard track and gyros at 20° right, three MK 18-2 torpedoes set at six feet were fired. Sound tracked all torpedoes running but no hits were made and it is believed that they ran under the target. Further attacks were thwarted by a counter-attack, consisting of four depth charges, which drove the PCGY deep. Upon surfacing course was taken to search for a B-29 which had previously been reported down.

Attack Number Two
(b) During the early afternoon of 9 April 1945, while cruising submerged, a small tanker with one escort was sighted. Target was closed but when range was 2500 yards the ship was lost in a rain squall. As problem was checking perfectly by sound, with a range of 2250 yards, track 95° starbo:rd, gyros 33° R, four MK 18-1 torpedoes with a six feet depth setting were fired. All missed, and when PCGY came to periscope level after depth charging resulting from the attack visual contact had been lost.

— page 284 —
1/1/45
Serial: 014
C-O-N-F-I-D-J-N-T-I-A-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT TO
USS PGY Report of
Ninth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. PGY (SS266) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.

---

In addition to the vessels attacked with torpedoes, two picket PGY battles surfaced and opened fire on them with the 5/25 deck gun at a range of 6000 yards. Fire was returned with 3 inch, 20 or 37 mm and machine guns at the range closed. The ability of the picket boats to obtain near misses at a range of 6400 yards when the PGY was still unable to obtain near misses at a range of officer to consider it expedient to break off the engagement, which he did. Nineteen rounds of five inch ammunition were expended.

Three floating mines were sunk.

4. In addition to the offensive patrol, eighteen days were spent on lifeguard duty and on 29 April 1945, the PGY had the pleasure of rescuing ten aviators from a downed B-29.

5. On 19 April 1945, while engaged in lifeguard duties, the submarine was bombed and strafed by a plane which was identified at a range of 4 mile by the commanding officer and the entire bridge watch as a LIBERATOR. Prior to the bombing the PGY, believing the plane to be friendly, had tried to contact it on VHF but with no success. The resultant damage was extensive and, while it was eventually repaired after a fashion, the need for some iron clad identification procedure between planes on strikes and assisting submarines was again emphasized. In heavy contrast is the enthusiasm of the PGY over the efficacy of the procedure for submarines when exchanging recognition signals as outlined in ComSubTranPac's Information Bulletin No. 2 of February 1945.

6. The officers and crew of the PGY displayed great resourcefulness and professional ability in repairing casualties and damage caused by the bombing and strafing. By reminding on station under most adverse conditions they were finally able to effect the rescue of the aviators.

7. PGY returned from patrol in an excellent state of cleanliness but the material condition was only fair. Needed repairs and alterations can be completed by Squadron 14 in the normal twenty-one (21) day period allotted.

8. The Division Commander takes pleasure in congratulating the commanding officer, officers and crew of the PGY upon the completion of this long, arduous patrol under most disadvantageous circumstances. While it is regretted that the torpedo attacks were not successful, the rescue of ten army aviators made their patrol well worth while.

— page 285 —
055
Serial: 055
Confidential
SECOND ADDRESSMENT to
USS POGY Report of
Ninth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOURTEEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Administrative Command.
       (2) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. POGY (35266) - report of Ninth War Patrol;
            Comments on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division One Hundred Forty One.

2. The Commanding Officer, officers and men are congratulated upon the completion of a long patrol under trying conditions and for the rescue of ten Army aviators. It is hoped that the POGY will have better hunting on her next patrol.

Copy to:
Consubdiv 141
CO USS POGY

— page 286 —
11/12/1945
Serial 01195
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD EDITORS: ENTRY TO FOGY Report of Ninth War Patrol.
CO. SUBSPAC FATHOL REPORT NO. 763
U.S.S. FOGY - NINTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. FOGY (SS266) - Report of Ninth War Patrol (12 March to 15 May 1945).

1. The ninth war patrol of the FOGY, under the command of Lieutenant Commander J. L. Bowers, U.S. Navy, was conducted in the areas near Tokyo Bay. Lifeguard services were rendered in addition to offensive patrol.

2. This well conducted patrol under adverse weather conditions resulted in few contacts. Two torpedo attacks proved unsuccessful. On the first, torpedoes probably ran under the shallow draft target in heavy seas. On the other attack, sound bearings had to be used because of a rain squall at the point of firing, and torpedoes missed probably due to a zig or shallow draft of the target. A gun attack was attempted on two picket boats, but action was broken off due to the return fire and wild maneuvers of the targets. The FOGY had the privilege of rescuing ten Army aviators from a ditched superfortress. Unfortunately, the FOGY was bombed by one of our Liberators. Damage was received, but repaired expeditiously by the ship's force.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the FOGY for the completion of this successful patrol.

W.L.RRILL COL. STOCK.

Distribution & Authentication
next page.

— page 287 —
12 March to 15 May 1945.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
| Name | Date | Location | Type | Notes |
|------|------||------|-------|
| Cominch | 7 | S/School, NL | (7) | (8) |
| CNO | 5 | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Cincpac | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| JICPOA | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| AdICFOA | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Conservpac | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Cinclant | 8 | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Consusblant | 2 | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| S/School, NL | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| CO, S/M Base, PH | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Consopac | 2 | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Consoswespac | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Consubsowespac | 2 | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| CTC 71.5 | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Commorpac | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Consubspac | 3 | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| ConsubspacAdComd | 40 | (40) | (41) | (42) |
| SUBD, LI | 2 | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| ConsubspacSubordcom | 3 | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| All Squadron and Div. | 2 | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Commanders, Pacific | 2 | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Substrainpac | 2 | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| All Submarines, Pacific(1) | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| E. L. HYNES, 2nd, | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Flag Secretary. | 1 | (1) | (2) | (3) |

E. L. HYNES, 2nd, Flag Secretary.

— page 288 —
140255 FILMED

End transcription:

U.S.S. FOGY (SS266)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
21 August 1945.

To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels).

Subject: U.S.S. FOGY (SS266), Report of War Patrol No. TEN.
Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (ConSubFasc only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the TENTH war patrol of this vessel, conducted in the JAPAN SEA during the period 2 July to 21 August 1945, is forwarded herewith.

J. M. BOWERS.

DECLASSIFIED ART. CD-45, ORD/NAVIST 5510.10C

BY OPC-OVC-CC- DATE

DECLASSIFIED

— page 289 —
1945, 15 May 1945. Commenced re: SubDiv 141 and USNBL. On 27 May 1945, refit was transferred to SubDiv 102 and Suinarine Base.

Installed X, ID, AF-5, S-5, ST periscope, DODI, whip type antenna system, twin 20 ft. forward, and moved port sound head to a topside mount.

Following officers detached: Lt. Comdr. Mich.rd T. PARR, USN, Lieut. Lloyd F. CHRISTOPHERSON, USNR; Lieut. Paul K. HEDLEY, USN, and Lt.(jg) James H. WILLIAMS, USNR.

Following officers reported aboard for duty: Lieut. Norman T. SCROGGIN, USN; Ensign Bradley A. CARMAN, USNR; Lt.(jg) John J. REED Jr., USNR; Ensign Lloyd G. CROSS, USNR, and Lieut. Reuben P. "CODAL," USN.

Given 5 days' training.

Fired 5 torpedoes for special TDI exercise with SENNET. Conducted one battle surface firing.

Ready for sea 2 July.

(B) NARRATIVE

| Name | Rank or date | No. Patrols (incl. this patrol) |
|------|||
| BONNES, John M. | Lt. Comdr. | 5 |
| O'DALL, Reuben F. | Lieut. | 8 |
| SOLIS, Herman L. | Lieut. | 7 |
| PEARSON, Claude H. | Lt. (jg) | 4 |
| REED, John J. Jr. | Lt.(jg) | 1 |
| FALCON, Ben D. | Ensign | 3 |
| GRIMES, William M. | Ensign | 2 |
| ROST, Albert S. | Ensign | 2 |
| CALLAHAN, Bradley A. | Ensign | 2 |
| CROSS, Lloyd T. | Ensign | 7 |
| COUSIN, Howard E. | CTN | 1 |
| DODSON, Melvin T. | CDGM | 5 |
| FLOYD, William T. | CDT | 7 |
| PUGLISKY, Raymond F. | CDLHT | 9 |

-1-

— page 290 —
1539(K) Underway from SPEEDY in company with SENNET for 10th war patrol in accordance with Combat Practice Order No. 161-45. Escorted by FC-872.

1910(K) Released escort.

2341(K) Exchanged recognition signals with P.R.GO.

July 18, 1945

0345(K) ATULE joined up and ATULE, SENNET, and POXY proceeded in company.

1117(K) Submerged for trim.

— page 291 —
1129(K)  Submerged.
: 1553(K)  Submerged.
: 1600(K)  Submerged.
: 1320(K)  Submerged.
: 1332(K)  Submerged.
: 1400(K)  Sat clocks back to Zone -9 time.  All times from now on are Item unless marked otherwise.
: 1400(K)  Sat clocks back to Zone -9 time.

— page 292 —
0155 Sighted "that appeared to be a B-32H headed towards us, distance 5 miles. No IFF, so at
: 0218 Submerged.
: 0901 Surface.
: 1347 Sighted AUSSEKI ISLAND and decided to transit the NUBEI SHOTO by passing south of AUSSEKI on the surface. Went to three-cruise speed.
: 1625 Transit completed: slowed to two-engine speed.
: 1850 Sighted two Jap float planes in the distance going south down the island chain.
: 1924 Sighted another float plane crossing ahead, flying low. Submerged.
: 2045 Surface.
: 2045 Noon Position: Lat. 29-16 N. Long. 130-10 E.

July 24, 1945

: 0130 SD contact 17 miles, no IFF; slowly faded out.
: 0443 SD contact 19 miles, no IFF; slowly faded out.
: 0600 Sighted DAJUO CHUTO bearing 012°F, dist. no about 30 miles.
: 1045 Sighted floating mine.
: 1245 SD contact 13 miles with IFF.
: 1249 Sighted what appeared to be two B-32's. Fired a recognition rocket and they scored clear.
: 1340 Sighted floating mine.
: 1905 Sighted floating mine.
: 2100 Interference on the SJ from 219°T. Believed this to be the SHIPMENT. Tried to challenge, but no luck. Noticed that the interference disappeared periodically, indicating that no was either laying his SJ or using his ST in between snipers by the SJ.

2325

— page 293 —
0001  Jul 24, 1945 (Cont'd)
2348  SJ interference again, from 21:30 T.
: 0002  No Position:  Lat. 32-00 N.  Long. 127-26 E.

0003  Jul 25, 1945
0004  Interference finally stopped on us, whereupon the range opened
0005  quickly to 13,000 yards and we lost contact. 'Y guess is that
0006  the SETIET was using her ST for close sweeps, and that when
0007  she picked us up she checked the bearing on her SJ and avoided
0008  us. (If course, this may have been a Jap, but it looked very
0009  much like our own SJ rad. r. Tried to get him on the AP
0010  also, but had no success.

0011  SD contact 2 miles, closing, with IFF. Contact came in to one
0012  mile and then opened out without ever being seen.

0013  Follow-up system on master gyro failed, due to tube failure.

0014  Master gyro back in commission.

0015  From this time until 2031 July 25, 1945, the movements of this
0016  vessel are the subject of a special report.

0017  On the surface, proceeding northeastward in the JAPAN Sea.

0018  Sighted survivors in the water. Although our orders were to
0019  remain undetected for 200 miles, thought these survivors
0020  might be our own aviators, so stopped to investigate. Found
0021  two men and one woman sitting on a section of a ship's deck
0022  with a hatch on it. . . . although they had a little out to us when
0023  we first passed them. They now seemed to sense the T we weren't
0024  friendly and just sat huddled together with their backs to us.
0025  One man tried to hide behind the hatch coming as if he expected
0026  to be shot at minute. They had no food or water. Decided not
0027  to take them aboard since they were over. Only unwilling and
0028  did not want to send a man across 30 feet of submarine decking
0029  to get them. Did not believe they could survive much longer
0030  and the current would take them the entire length of the JAPAN
0031  Sea before they reached land. Did not believe our position

- 5 -

— page 294 —
1945 (Cont'd)
could be compromised by these people.

2210 SJ contact 095T, 3400 yards. Could see him in the bright moonlight: a fisherman (Snip Contact No. 2)

— page 295 —
1945 (Cont'd)
a full moon was due to rise at 2103. Sea glassy. SJ and ST would not operate properly, so as it got dark, kept closing the general position of the target. Finally made him out in the fading light, and at

1954 Got an ST range of 19,900 yards. SJ then came to life and gave a tremendous pip at 19,750 yards. Commenced tracking. Target tracked at 8 knots on base course 150°, constant holding 20° either side. Unscorctd.

2044 In position for attack on starboard bow of target. ... light surface haze made attack conditions excellent.

2055 Fired 4 torpedoes from the bow tubes, torpedo run 1200 yards, 9095 track, near zero gyros, divergent spread, depth set 6 foot. First two torpedoes hit amidships and target sank in 1 minute 29 seconds. Got a good look at him at 750 yards and he appeared to be similar to the ZHU-BU, ONI 203-J, although he looked much larger. He had a well deck forward and aft, single high set amidships, two masts, and composite superstructure amidships. He looked at least 400 feet long. He was old and big. Estimated tonnage between 7 and 8 thousand.

2100 Two end of run explosions for a computed run of 4500 yards.

2111 Secured from battle stations and headed north. Decided to run across the NIGL-SISSHN R.SHIN routes tomorrow and see if we could find any more big ones. Reloaded forward.

Noon Position: | 7-28 N. | 133-40.5 E.
---

July 23, 1945

0413 Submerged.

1256 Surface. Turned high periscope and SJ radar and commenced surface patrol. Sea glassy with occasional surface haze.

Noon Position: | 7-28 N. | 133-40.5 E.
---

July 23, 1945

0413 Submerged.

1050 Surface. Commenced patrolling on a course which headed us for the north tip of S.DO ISLAND.

— page 296 —
2130 SJ contact on SUD ISLAND 31,000 yards, be ring 1460T.
: Noon Position: Lat. 39-07.5 N. Long. 135-35 S.

: 0340 Submerged and headed in towards HIG.T.T. Visibility poor with much surface haze.

: 1632 Sighted 40 SHIN. bearing 0710T.

: 2011 Surfaced. Ran for an hour at standard speed towards HIG.T.T., then ran west to cover all approaches to this port.

: Noon Position: Lat. 35-21 N. Long. 135-43 S.

: 0317 July 31, 1945

: 0027 SJ contact 3450T, 55,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 10, attack No. 2). This was a single pip. no smoke up very plainly on the R1 screen also. Delivered we were experiencing some sort of a r.p. phenomenon, but headed for pip at flank speed and commenced tr. cling.

: 0158 Sighted smoke from target, which at this time was at 15,000 yards. No. had never lost the pip, no had him plotted on course east, speed is 5 knots. Don't worry bright out sky overcast and visibility poor with much surface haze. Decided on a surface attack from the north, so maneuvered accordingly.

: 0258 Sighted target, a small tanker with a single m. st forward. Came in for a 1100 port tr.ck and at

: 0309 Fire 4 torpedoes from the bow tubes, tor. de run 2075, 1250 port tr.ck, gyros near zero, depth set 6 ft. divergent across. Target blew whistle just after we fired and turned towards. No hits. Went and flank and st. tr.ck to get up ahead for another try, although it was getting light fast. Reloaded forward.

: 0347 Submerged 7000 yards from target as it was then quite light. Target turned 90° to the south and we were then out of position. Close proximity to lead m. st and round unadviseable. In analyzing this att. at it was first thought that the target had successfully avoided the torpedoes and that fact may be, but upon checking gyro angles later it was found that the angles recorded by the forward room were

- 8 -

CIRCULARS (..)

— page 297 —
7/31/45 (Cont'd)
: from 007° to 002°, when they should have been 357° to 352°. Ran complete tests on the TDC and gyro regulators, but could not find anything wrong as all tests showed the equipment to be operating perfectly. Finally resumed that the man in the forward room had copied the bearings down ten degrees off. This assumption proved to be in error, which we found out later, much to our regret. After this attack was all over, believed a submarine attack in the moonlight would have been better.

0730 Sighted fishing vessel (Ship Contact No. 11).

1305 Sighted smoke on the horizon bearing 249°T (Ship Contact No. 12).

1345 Sighted top of ship headed north. It was an RMF with a high stack, angle on bow was 90° S, so planned to surface later and and around away from land.

1716 Surfaced with smoke out of sight for about a half hour. Headed north.

1723 SJ contact on our target at 55,000 yards. This radar performance was amazing. Target tracked at 3 knots, headed for FUMKIT. N.

1732 SJ picked up two more ships near the target but on opposite course (Ship Contact No. 13).

1325 Target on course FUMKIT. N. SJ so recovered course and set track tracking after two snips. They were quite close to the beach and within 5 knots, about 3000 yards apart. Figured it would be a risk enough to make an attack just after the target passed the island of TOBI SHII.

2017 Our position was 15,000 yards northeast of TOBI SHII. This targets 9,000 yards to the east of us. To be a last radar contact on this two at 39,000 yards, but the two were out of range of the radar and required contact at 16,000 yards. The two targets were quite close to TOBI SHII. They changed course to the right to 020°T, and in perfect formation set track up the coast again. This fact, coupled with the fact that we wouldn't see them at 9,000 yards, seemed to indicate they were patrol vessels on a sweep. However sound head, but could not hear pinings. Secured tracking and headed south for NOTO PENINSULA.

2125 Lost contact on patrol vessels at 20,000 yards.

Moon Position: Lat. 39-10.5 N. Long. 139-00 E.

— page 298 —
0125 Sent POGY second to ComSubPac.
: 0353 Submar. d.
: 1312 Surf. cod to run around N070 PANIPSJ. on the surface.
: 1710 Sighted HXKUR. SHIH. lighthouse bearing 230°T, SJ range 24,000 yards.
: 1731 S.1.3

— page 299 —
0342, 1445 (Cont'd)
- 0407 - Submerged on target's track about 17,000 yards ahead. It was then beginning to get light.
- 0425 - Slightly east of target, near zero angle on the bow. ST range 14,300 yards. Sea fl. 58° with medium surface. Target was zigging on base course 105°.
- 0512 - 11st for a 90°P tr.ck with a torpedo run of 1000 yards when it was noticed that the correct solution light had gone out on the TDC. 1.00° at the gyro angles showed that they were obviously too far to the right and would all miss stern. Quickly h.d the forward torpedo run rest all gyros on zero and swung left to gain the firing bearing, which was 013° from the table we kept for just such an emergency. 1. look at the target showed it going by at 100 yards with a 90° track. Target was dis.ntific. 5 one of the now standard Jap 10,000 ton tankers, having now and.5 nice. 1. target as could be asked for. The Commander's Iier sincerely hopes that he will never have to go through this experience again.
- 0523 - First 4 torpedoes from the bow tubes, depth set 5 feet, torpedo run 1100 yards, 102°F track. Gyros were on zero and points of aim were a quarter ship length outside and inside bow and stern. Target must have sighted the periscope in the glass so because he blew his whistle and started a turn to the right. Japs were frantically running about on deck. Sound reached first three torpedoes as passing ahead of target, but below the fourth was a hit with a low or over explosion, since all we heard was a very slight thud. Target was completely obliterated by a huge mass of dirt, brown smoke, this in addition to the black smoke pouring out of his stack and trailing stern.

For subsequent details, see special secret report submitted by this vessel.

0533 - Target apparently tossed over a couple of depth charges. He had now completed the rescue course and seemed to be lying to about 3500 yards distant on course 270°. 1. out ahead full not needed torpedo hit, but to soon get underway again and gave us 102° time to get to the. 1.

— page 300 —
1945 (Cont'd)

... an investigation of the TDC showed that the Germans on the forward gyr angle indicate toros were sticking (see Major Defects). This meant that while the TDC was actually solving the problem correctly and could pass all the tests, the gyro indicators were slow to come to the proper position. 20-sequently, as long as the gyros were changing slowly, the correct solution lit hit would be on, but when the gyros were chaning rapidly the sticky dampens prevents the indicators from catching up. In our c.se, as long as our bow was pointed towards the target during most of the approach the gyros changed but little and we had a correct solution. Ho over as soon as we turned to come to a firing course, the resultant change in the gyro angles was too rapid and no longer had a correct solution. This w.s obviously the same thing that happened on our previous attack and caused all our torpedoes to go out 10° to the right of the correct bearing. Have repairs to the TDC.

0757 Surfaced and headed for last true bearing of target. Visibility poor due to surface haze.

024 SJ contact on target 1400T, 15,000 yards. Target not in sight. Commanded one around to the eastward.

1000 In position 16,000 yards. Head of target, which now tracked on a steady course of 130°T at 6 knots. Sighted target through haze, and at

1006 Submerged for attack. ... heavy fog bank soon settled upon us, reducing the visibility to about 1500 yards.

1045 TDC showed target should be 4500 yards away, although we had no 5T contact and could see nothing. Had to go the tubes in case he should suddenly come out of the fog.

1110 Fog bank passed over and target was sighted null down about 15,000 yards to the west of where he should be, on same base course. So he evidently changed course 90° for an hour just after we dove. ...another heartbreak. It seemed as if I'd fuck was a.dimest us for sure. It appears that the target was headed for either K.M.Z. or T.S.T. If he went to K.M.Z., on about 30 miles away, we couldn't get him, but if he continues on to T.S.T.U.G., we had a chance. Commence circling to find out.

1330 Target was obscured to. on gyro course 90° to the right the same trick that there was off earlier in the day. It now appears that he was on to sea course 150°T, which meant he definitely wasn't going to K.M.Z.

- 12 - ENCLOSURE (...)

— page 301 —
1500
    Aircraft and commenced and sound. Although we couldn't see land through the haze, a radar fix showed us about 20 miles west of KANATA.

: 1605
    SJ contact on target be-rins 136T, 31,000 yards. This showed him about to enter the port of MINN., and it looked as if he was going to elude us after all.

: 1610
    Sighted Jap float plane about ten miles away in the direction of the target headed towards us.

: 1615
    Submerged, and headed west.

: 1706
    Received aerial bomb: how close it was hard to say with the existing sound conditions.

: 1709
    Another bomb. Went to 90 feet and stayed there until sunset.

: 2024
    Surfaced and headed out to patrol routes from STURG to KOREA. With those phenomenal radar ranges we could cover a stretch 60 miles wide.

    Noon Position: 25.37-06 N. Long. 136-03 E.

August 3, 1945

: 0404
    Submerged. Sea had become quite rough. This was the first time since we had been in the area that we had had anything but smooth seas.

: 1420
    Surfaced and began patrolling a northeast-southwest line on the surface.

    Noon Position: 25.37-19 N. Long. 134-01.5 E.

August 4, 1945

: 0409
    Submerged.

: 1050
    Surfaced.

    Noon Position: 25.37-02 N. Long. 137-50 E.

- 13 -

    ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 302 —
0342 4t a point a few miles south of where the contact had plotted in. Figured that if it had been a ship he would either be going east or northeast, so charged course to 090°T.

: 0300 3hanged course to north.

: 0315 SJ contact 15,800 yards at 089°T. Commenced tracking. Target tracked on course 085°T at 7.5 knots. Starte and around to the north, planning to dive on target's track and make a submerged approach. Maximum range we could get the target at was 17,000 yards.

: 0436 Sighted target dimly through the haze, but couldn't make out what he was.

: 0543 Submerged on target's track and headed for him. Target still tracked on 090°T at 7.5 knots. Used ST until range was 3700 yards, then came left for a stern shot and at.

: 0656 Fired 2 torpedoes from the stern tubes, 90°S track, 950 yards generated torpedo run, near zero gyros, depth set 6 feet, no spread. Kept periscope down until hit was hard. First hit sounded like escaping air: second hit was good and solid.

: 0657 Raised periscope. Saw target with smoke clearing from andiships. He was a medium tanker with a mast forward, two catwalks, and a set of goalposts aft of andiships. He was listing to starboard and turning in a tight circle to the left. Crew began abandoning ship.

: 0705 Target observed to sink after rolling completely over on its starboard side. About 15 to 20 survivors in the water, clinging to debris, and in a lifeboat. Took motion pictures of target sinking and of survivors. Aloaded aft.

: 2009 Surface. Bear patrolrolling northwest of SAD ISLAND as this seemed to be the way to contact the worthwhile targets.

Noon Position:  Lat. 39-50 N.  Long. 135-34 E.

— page 303 —
6, 1945

Spent the day on the surface patrolling from OGA HANTO to SADO ISLAND. Sighted two floating mines during the day, the first we had seen in this area.

Noon Position: Tatt. 39-23 N. Long. 139-11 E.

August 7, 1945

0732
Submerged 12 miles northwest of OGA HANTO and began closing point for in close patrol. Upon surfacing fog made visibility poor. Poor visibility plus the fact that we couldn't hear anything on the sonar near in these waters were the reasons we had chosen to spend most of our time on the surface, relying on the far reaching radar. While we were submerged, a ship would have to run right over us for us to have a chance to get him.

0658
Sighted two of our 70 hunter-killer group to the south heading north (Ship Contact No. 17). Soon thereafter picked up their pinning on 17.4 kms. Since their direction of movement would carry them right over us, rigged for silent running and headed on 3000m. They passed quite close and continued on up the coast. Sent to 90 feet as they passed, which put us under a 130 negative gradient. To never did near their course, which gives an idea of how poor the sound conditions are in this area. With the large negative gradients present, believe an anti-submarine vessel is wasting its time echo-ranging in these waters.

0949
Lost pinning.

1057
Lost sight of P's.

1902
Surfaced and began north for our lifeguard station 30 miles west of Tatt. 15. Killed.

2208
SJ carried C-47, 17,700 tons (Ship Contact No. 15). Commenced tracking. To was still not at target as target was not very large, but with the material radar performance we had been having it was near to estimate. Target tracked on course 0800T at 8 knots. Night very dark and overcast.

Noon Position: Tatt. 40-07 E. Long. 139-25 E.

August 8, 1945

0005
In position, 4000 yards on starboard bow of target. Could not see target. As range closed, target was still not visible, so

-15-

— page 305 —
1345 (Cont'd)
: 132 Sighted masts of a ship coming up the coast (Ship Contact No. 21, attack No. 5). Angle on the bow was zero, the appearance of a high goal post forward made it look as if this might be a fair target. Commenced approach.

1215 As target turned to round SHILOH IN ISL.IT it was seen that he was only a very small submarine-art coastal freighter, with a goal post forward and a stick mast aft. It was riding very high in the water and could not have been over 500 tons. However, since this was our last day in the area, at

1226 Fired remaining 4 torpedoes forward, range 1000 yards, 90°P track, depth set 6 feet, divergent spread, range 20° left. Sound tracked all torpedoes and they obviously ran under the target. Target's course 090°; speed 6 knots. All torpedoes exploded against the high coastline 2000 yards away, sending great gyysors of water into the air. Target turned 90° to the left and we watched him frantically trying to build up more speed. Since our presence there was no disclosed, opened the coast to the northwest.

2020 Surfaced.

Noon Position: Lat. 43-23 N. Long. 140-36 E.

: 1345 Submerged. During the night we had received orders to extend our patrol two days.

1911 Surfaced.

2230 Ship's dog missed dock after an illness of seven days. Briefed at

Noon Position: Lat. 44-23 N. Long. 139-26 E.

: 1345 Sent POY fourth.

0336 Submerged.

1845 Surfaced.

Noon Position: Lat. 44-02.5 N. Long. 139-22 S.

: 1345 Sent POY fourth.

0336 Submerged.

1845 Surfaced.

Noon Position: Lat. 44-02.5 N. Long. 139-22 S.

— page 306 —
1945

Changed course to the southeast. Had decided to spend one more day in close to the beach in an effort to use up our last two torpedoes. As somewhat doubtful about one of these torpedoes, as it had had two hydrogen explosions (see Major Defects).

0510
Submerged 15 miles northwest of O'KUTU ISSAKI and began closing point for patrol about 4 miles off beach. Sighted several fishing scuppers during the day, and a float type plane was flying around most of the afternoon, but no shipping was seen. Visibility was good and we could not have missed anything during the coast. Fock some pictures of the coastline.

2003
Surface and headed northwest.

: 43-52 F. Long. 141-14 E.

August 14, 1945

0355
Submerged.

1702
Surface.

From this time until 2350 August 14, 1945, the movements of this vessel are the subject of a special report.

August 15, 1945

0000
"Independently of the surface in the Sub. CO OKHOTSK proceeding eastward."

1958
Commence course of ETC NEW ZEALAND.

2200
Completing east of strait. Set course for INDIA.

Noon for station: East. 45-40.5 M. Long. 146-42 E.

August 16 to 20, 1945

Enroute INDIAY.

August 21, 1945

0930(Y) Arrived INDIAY.

- 18 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 309 —
17 0353 I 40-02.0N 2 POs 6000 yds. Patrolling on northerly course
: 7 Aug. 139-35.0E

: 13 2203 I 41-13.0N 1 Trawler 13,700 yds. 0750 ft. SJ
: 7 Aug. 13-55.0E

: 19 0906 I 43-24.0" 1 small 3000 yds. 0900 ft. Periscope
: 10 Aug. 140-36.0E coastal freighter

: 20 1011 I 43-22.0N 1 Trawler 8000 yds. 0900 ft. Periscope
: 10 Aug. 140-33.0E

: 21 1132 I 43-24.0" 1 500 ton 10,000 yds. 0900 ft. Periscope See attack No. 5
: 10 Aug. 140-32.0E freighter (engines aft)

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

Only three planes were sighted in the area, all three being float type planes of old vintage. Three float planes were also sighted in the vicinity of the NANSBI SHOTO enroute to the area.

- 21 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 311 —
20:55 I. Date: 27 Jul 1945. Lat: 37-00 N. Long: 134-02 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:
Sighted smoke on the horizon while submerged. Could not close submerged, so surfaced and made one round. Ship was a large U.S. freighter roesembling the ZUNSHI KUN, although it appeared to be somewhat larger. ...attack was made shortly before mooring when a surface haze made visibility about 1500 yards.

Ship(s) Sunk:
One large freighter (EU).

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk:
None.

Damage Determined by:
Saw two torpedoes hit and saw ship sink in 1 minute, 29 seconds.

Target Drift: 15 ft. Course: 130°T. Speed: 8 kts. Range: 1250 yds. (at firing).

Own Ship Data

Speed: 6.5 kts. Course: 035°T. Depth: Surface. Angle: 0 (at firing).

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type ...attack:
Surface radar, night. Picked target up or radar at 19,900 yards. Tracked for about an hour. Target was constant helm striking, slow.

- 22 -

[CLOSURE (.)]

— page 312 —
1. (Cont'd)
2. Torpedo Attack No. 1 (Cont'd)
3. Tubes Fired
4. Track angle
5. Gyro angle
6. Depth set
7. Power
8. Hit or Miss
9. Erratic
10. Mark Torpedo
11. Serial No.
12. Mark Exploder
13. Serial No.
14. Actuation Set
15. Actuation actual
16. Mark Varhed
17. Serial No.
18. Explosive
19. Firing Interval
20. Type Spread
21. Sea Conditions
22. Overhaul activity
23. "PODER"
24. Remarks:
25. Temperature of electrolytic 55°C. Injection 74°C. Depth set 6 ft. Torpedoes spread to cover 324 ft. of target length. No. 3 hit 78 seconds after firing, torpedo run 1250 y-rd. No. 4 hit 81 seconds after firing, torpedo run 1200 y-rd. No. 3 and No. 4 hit target, which stopped and settled rapidly by the stern. No. 5 was spread 3° ahead and missed ahead. No. 6 was spread 3° aft and missed astern; it probably ran over as target's stern was under a few seconds after first torpedo hit.

- 23 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 313 —
3.5" FOG (SS256). Torpedo attack No. 2. Patrol No. 10.

Time: 0309 I. Date: 31 July 1945. Lat: 38-47 N. Long: 138-30.5 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Initial contact was made by radar at 55,000 yards. Made end around in moonlight although surface haze made visibility poor. Target was a small tanker with a single stick mast forward. Target sighted submarine just after firing and turned towards to avoid.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: None.

Damage Determined by: No damage.

Target Draft: 20 ft. Course: 080°T. Speed: 3 kts. Range: 2000 yds. (at firing).

Own Ship Data

Speed: 10 kts. Course: 137°T. Depth: Surface. Angle: 0 (at firing).

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type attack: Night surface radar using SJ ranges and TBT bearings.

- 24 -

ENCLOSURE (4)

— page 316 —
1. USS POGY (SS266)
   - **Target Data - Damage Inflicted**
   - **Description:**
     - Initial contact made by radar at 50,000 yards.
     - Target was new standard 10,000 ton tanker.
     - Tracked by radar on base course 105°T, speed 7.5 kts., and submerged on target's track for daylight periscope approach. Visibility about 12,000 yards.
   - **Ship(s) Sunk:**
     - None.
   - **Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk:**
     - One large tanker (EC).
   - **Damage Determined by:**
     - Heard fourth torpedo hit, saw large cloud of brown smoke coming out of his port side and target turned completely around and slowed, never tracking at more than 6 knots thereafter. Heard only three end of run explosions.
   - **Target Draft:**
     - 20 ft.
     - Course: 070°T.
     - Speed: 7.5 kts.
     - Range: 1050 yds.
     - (at firing).

Crew Ship Data

- **Speed: 3.5 kts.**
- **Course: 142°T.**
- **Depth: 60 ft.**
- **Angle: 0 (at firing).**

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

- **Type .ttack:**
  - Submerged periscope - ST ranges. Forward angle solver of TDC stock and gyro angles would not generate properly: no correct solution light (see Fire Control Casualties). Used firing bearing from T-4 angle solver, 013°, and used a longitudinal spread on t.rcgt 500 ft. long; first torpedo 1/4 ship's length ahead, second torpedo at bow, third torpedo at quarter, fourth torpedo 1/4 ship's length astern. Only fourth torpedo hit.

- **ENCLOSURE (..):**

— page 317 —
3 (Cont'd)
: 1
: 2
: 5
: 6
: 102 P
: 102 P
: 102 P
: 0
: 0
: 0
: 8 ft.
: 8 ft.
: 8 ft.
: High
: High
: High
: High
: Miss
: Miss
: Miss
: Hit
: No
: No
: No
: 18-2
: 18-2
: 18-2
: 18-2
: 100491
: 100614
: 100029
: 100440
: 16006
: 16001
: 16043
: 16698
: Contact
: Contact
: Contact
: Contact
: End of Run
: End of Run
: End of Run
: Contact
: 13-2
: 18-2
: 18-2
: 18-2
: 31130
: 4113
: 4511
: 5711
: Torpex
: Torpex
: Torpex
: Torpex
: 10 sec.
: 20 sec.
: 30 sec.
: Outside Bow
: Inside Bow
: Inside Bow
: Inside Bow
: Outside Bow
: 1
: 1
: 1
: Fulton
: Fulton
: Fulton
: Fulton
: 28.6
: 28.6
: 28.6
: 28.6
: Temperature electrolyte 75°.
: Injection 74°.
: Reason for first three torpedoes missing: used ion titanid spread and target turned away.

- 27 -

ENSURE (A)

— page 320 —
3.5 kts. Course: 180°T. Depth: 60 ft. Angle: 0 (at firing).

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Submerged periscope attack. No ST or sound ranges. First periscope range 400 yards.

-30-

— page 322 —
1. MINES
No mining activity was observed. Several floating mines were observed in the JAPAN SEA, which were of the usual spherical horned type.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS
The only anti-submarine measures encountered were the PC boats which patrolled in pairs and threes. They conducted sweeps up and down the coast from TSUGARU STRAIT to TSURUGÅ, using echo-ranging.

(K) MAJOR DEFEATS AND DETACHMENT
Hull and Machinery

Engineering and Electrical Casualties
There were no major defects or casualties in the engineering department. The only defect encountered in the electrical department was the continued loss of I.C. power due to the fact that the I.C. motor generators were overloaded. It is recommended that new 15 kva units be installed to replace the present single 3 kva and two 10 kva units as soon as possible.

Ordnance and Gunnery

Torpedo Casualties
Two hydrogen explosions occurred in torpedo serial No. 100791 (Mark 13-2) under the following circumstances: Torpedo was carried in tube No. 10 for two weeks and ventilated every 48 hours; equipped with new hard-Isonard hydrogen burner (the burning circuit was given 48 hour current, ground, and continuity tests each time torpedo was ventilated). At the end of this period, torpedo was withdrawn from tube and placed in rack. First explosion occurred one week after torpedo had been charged, while in rack. Battery compartment ventilation handle plate was off at the time. Hydrogen accumulation was in afterbody and explosion occurred in afterbody blowing forward bulkhead of afterbody into battery compartment. Cause of hydrogen accumulation was a ruptured rubber ventilation exhaust line running through afterbody. Battery was not damaged, nor

- 32 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 323 —
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

Ordnance and Gunnery

Torpedo Casualties (Cont'd)

was motor, wiring, gyro, or depth and steering engines. All these were carefully checked. Only damage was accidentally bulked ruptured and broken ventilation line. Torpedo was cleaned up and charged. Individual cell volts, etc. and gravities were taken both before and after this charge. Battery was normal in every respect. Thereafter, not only were two battery handhole plates left off, but also the afterbody handhole plate, since ruptured bulked left further possibility of hydrogen accumulation in that compartment.

The second hydrogen explosion occurred one week later, 15 minutes after weekly freshening charge had been secured. Sixty of 72 vent cell caps blew off. Two handhole plates were off as well as afterbody handhole plates which were not removed. Torpedo was thoroughly checked again and everything was all right. Decided to carry torpedo in rack, to fire it if the opportunity appeared, making the load just before firing and only after ventilating torpedo. Torpedo was not charged again. Cool weather kept the gravity high for balance of the patrol.

Fire Control Casualties

During attack No. 2, the forward angle solver of the TDC (ark 3, Mod. 5) was observed to be generating more slowly than ordinary during the final phase of the attack after gyros forward were matched. Correct solution light came on at last minute, so fired 4 torpedoes. The gyros should have been 357, 355, 353, and 352. The man on the gyro angle indicator regulator recorded the gyros as 007, 005, 003, and 002. It appeared that the man forward had made a mistake and read his gyros 100 off. This appeared almost certain when the recorded data was put in the TDC and the correct gyros (above noted) determined. Regular angle solver tests drawn at Pearl Harbor were put on the forward angle solver and they checked, each set-up being well within the allowable error designated on the

- 33 - ENGLISH (A)

— page 325 —
1. RADAR
2. SJ-a
3. Performance throughout the patrol was good. Abnormal ranges of 60,000 to 80,000 yards on PC's and small craft were obtained. The target would track in to 35,000 yards, fade, reappear at 25,000 yards. This was all evidently due to favorable atmos- pheric conditions.

Equipment failures:
1. Modulation Network. Bad oil leak after several long periods of operation; replaced.
2. Plate resistor on plate 5 of V4 went out; replaced.
3. Replaced 504G.
4. Replaced VR tubes in Regulated Rectifier to eliminate high voltages.
5. Scorrel IF tubes replaced.
6. Bad cable from Crystal Filter to meter.
7. Main Power Switch burned out. This was replaced at Guam before departing on patrol.
8. HV keying switch is bad.

3D-5
Operation: normal with no failures. SD-5 has proven a vast improvement over former SD.

ST
Very good ranges and performance. Seven feet of scope - 18,000 yards on small tanker; two feet of scope - 5000 yards on medium tanker. Results are due in large part to a constant daily tuning routine by RT in charge, using the procedure recommended at Fersl.

Equipment failures: Cno TR tube.

IPF
Normal. Replaced 15E in N. X101-2 in B3 junction box does not always make contact. Slammed to poor construction of relay.

APR-1 AND APR-5
Operation normal. Failure of 4124 caused intermittent grounds.

- 35 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 326 —
(N) SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions were very poor. All attacks were conducted without benefit of sound gear because we couldn't hear the target until the range was about 2500 yards. Echo-ranging from the PC boats was not audible over 7500 yards range. These sound conditions seemed to prevail in the entire area.

JP was out of commission, due to a flooded cable, after August 4.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

1. Large negative gradients were encountered throughout the area, making it necessary to flood in about 10,000 pounds to get from 60 to 90 feet. The layer was usually encountered at 65-75 feet and was on the average about 12°.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HEALTHABILITY

Health, food, and habitability were good.

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men detached after previous patrol 23

(b) Number of men on board during patrol 79

(c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol . . . . . . . 62

(d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol . . . . . . . 72

(e) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol . . . 13

The performance of all hands was in keeping with the highest standards of the Naval Service. The POGY left on this patrol with five new officers, including a new executive officer and new third officer. The executive officer, LT. R. F. WOODARD, was reported aboard only two days before the ship left on patrol, but he took over immediately and was of inestimable aid to the Commanding Officer. The third officer, LT. N. L. SORENSEN, was reported aboard about 2 weeks before the ship left on patrol and also performed most satisfactorily.

- 36 - ENTOISURE (L)

— page 327 —
PERSONNEL (Cont'd)
It is indeed a privilege and a pleasure to command a submarine manned by officers and men of the calibre found in the U.S. Submarine Service, and any officer who has so commanded knows that this is not just a flowery statement, but the truth.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

Pearl to Guam . . . . . . 4030 miles . . . 52,804 gals.
Quan to Area . . . . . . 2531 miles . . . 26,754 gals.
In Area . . . . . . . 3520 miles . . . 22,551 gals.
Area to Midway . . . . 2467 miles . . . 35,870 gals.

(S) DURATION

Days Enroute to Area . . . . 22
Days in Area . . . . . . . 20
Days Enroute to Midway . . . . 8
Days Submerged . . . . . . 13

(T) FACTORS OF DURATION RETAINING

| Factor | Fuel (Gals.) | Provisions (days) | Personal Factor (days) |
|||||
| 2      | 22,000       | 30              | 20                 |

Initiating factor this patrol: Operation Orders.

- 37 -

EXPLOSURE (A)

— page 328 —
1. Chart of APR contacts:

| Date | Position | Freq. | PRF | Int. Pot. | F/T | Remarks |
|------||-------|-----||-----||
| 26 July | 134 | 270 | Sweeping | 5 | Land based. |
| 26 July | 36-08 N  | 160 | 500 | Sweeping | 5(?) | Had indication for very short period, so F/T is uncertain |
| 30 July | 33-32 N  | 79  | 500 | Sweeping | 30 | This was thought to come from the east side of S/D0 |
| 30 July | 33-32 N  | 101 | 750 | Sweeping | 7 | Came from S/D0 |
| 1 August | 38-12 N  | 95  | 1000 | Sweeping | 8 | Came in strong enough to get accurate readings; lard based |
| 2 August | 37-39 N  | 165 | 500 | Sweeping | 4 | Came in to saturation with gain at 7 on receiver. Had wide beam width. NOTO POINT. |
| 9 August | 43-24 N  | 223 | 1300 | Sweeping | -- | Could have been incorrect. |

2. No radar interference was encountered while in area.

Communication: Countermeasures

1. No signal was intercepted.

2. Jamming occurred as follows:

   - 1100 GMT, 20 July on frequency 13655 and 9050 (24° N - 139° E.)
   - 0930 GMT, 6 August on frequency 13655 and 9050 (39° N - 138° E.)

- 38 - ENCOUNTER (4)

— page 329 —
1939 GCT, 7 August on frequency 13655 and 9050 (420 N - 1390 E.)
: 1849 GCT, 13 August on frequency 3050 (440 N - 1410 E.)
: No jamming was effective enough to prevent copying at any time.

Sonar Countermeasures
No countermeasures were encountered.
All echo-ranging encountered from patrol craft was on 17.4 kcs.

REPORTS
None.

— page 331 —
1. USS S-26 (SS266) - Report of Tenth War Patrol
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. POGY (SS266) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division ONE TWENTY-ONE.

2. The U.S.S. POGY on this patrol became a member of that brave group of our submarines who have penetrated into the Japan Sea and conducted offensive patrol operations therein. The Squadron Commander compliments the officers and men of the POGY on that fine achievement and the splendid courage they displayed in its accomplishment.

3. The phenomenal radar ranges obtained and the extremely poor sound conditions due to the consistently large negative gradient make the Japan Sea at this season an ideal hunting ground for submarines.

4. It is recommended that the POGY be credited with the following damage inflicted on the enemy:

SUNK
1 Large AK (EU) (Similar to ZINBU MARU, ONI 208-J) - 7500 tons (Torp. Attack #1)
1 Medium Tanker (EU) - 5000 tons (Torp. Attack #4)
Total Sunk 12500 tons

DAMAGED
1 Large Tanker (EC) - 10000 tons (Torp. Attack #3)

Total Sunk and Damaged 22500 tons

5. The Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and men of the POGY upon this successful aggressive patrol and the damage inflicted upon the enemy.

C. W. WILKINS.

— page 332 —
712-1C(a)/16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC ISLAND

Serial 02390
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
26 Sept. 1945.

THIRD ENCOUNTER TO
PONY Report of
Tenth War Patrol

CONFUSED TO: 371
U.S.S. FORT WILSON
U.S.S

— page 333 —
12-10(1)/US-3(18) SUBMARINE REPORT, P. CIFIC HART
Serial: 06390
Confidential
TECHNICAL
T-1D ADDRESSED TO
FOGY Report of
Tenth Mv Patrol.
CONSUS-2C PT-100 REPORT NO. 371
J.S.S. POCY - PT-100 REPORT NO. 371
Subject: U.S.S. POCY (55256) - Report of Tenth War Patrol
(2 July to 21 August 1945).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cinchich (7)
CINCO (5)
Cincapic (6)
JIGGY (1)
Conservapac (1)
Cincident (1)
Consubstant (8)
C/S School, IL (2)
CO. S/S Base, ZE (1)
Consomec (2)
Consovapac (1)
Consubst/7th LT (Fwd Echelon) (2)
Consubst/7th LT (Rear Echelon) (2)
Consorpac (1)
Consubspac (5)
Consubspac/Con (40)
SUD, HI (2)
Consubspac/Subord/Con (3)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Pacific (2)
Consub/Op/Dr. (5)
Substr/pace (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

E. L. HIRS, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.