U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS-420) — war patrol report SS-420_TIRANTE.pdf

— page 1 —
START OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: H-108-AR-161-75]
          [HANDWRITTEN: R#1]

1.0
1.1
1.25 1.4

      2.8       2.8
      2.5       2.5
      3.0       2.2
      3.2       2.0
      3.5       1.8
      3.8       1.6
      4.0
      4.2
      4.5
      4.8
      5.0
      5.6

OPERATOR [HANDWRITTEN: Havens]
DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 5-13-75]

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET, START & END
NAVEXOS 3968

— page 2 —
SS420/A16-1
Serial 002
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR. 5200.9
of 27 Sep 58
BY [HANDWRITTEN: 9LC] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 4/28/71]]

25 April 1945

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. TIRANTE.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) The Commander in Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. TIRANTE, Report of War Patrol No. ONE.

Enclosures: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track chart.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the first war patrol of this
vessel, conducted in the EAST CHINA and YELLOW SEAS, is forwarded
herewith.

[SIGNATURE: G. L. Street III]
G. L. STREET, III.

[HANDWRITTEN: FILMED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 121876]

— page 4 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 113,000 gals!]
(3) Stowage for 28 torpedoes: 18 forward, 10 aft. 77 crew's bunks.
(4) Large magazine in control room (1300 rounds 40MM, 120 rounds
    5" etc., part in pressure proof stowages topside); pump room
    under radio room. Air compressors in Forward Engine Room.
(5) ST radar and wind TBT's installed in New London. 2nd 40MM gun
    installed at Pearl, and forward escape trunk rigged as "foxhole"
    to shoot a .50 cal. gun with man standing in hatch. Many top-
    side pressure proof stowages added. Armament now as follows: 1
    5"/25 gun aft, two 40MM on bridge, one forward, one aft; one
    .50 cal. in foxhole, one
    .50, two .30 cal on bridge.
(5) One way "command circuit" from bridge to C.T. supplementing
    7 MC.

B. NARRATIVE

Officers on board
| | Age | Patrols this incl. | Duty | Qual | Battle Sta.
|---|---|---|---|---|---
Lt. Comdr. G. L. STRIET USN | 31 | 10 | CO | Com'd | A.O.
Lt. Comdr. E. L. BELCH USN | 27 | 11 | Exec. Nav. | Com'd | A.O.
Lt. E. G. CAMPBELL USNR | 29 | 8 | Eng. | Subs | D.O.
Lt. E. PEABODY USNR | 25 | 1 | Torp, Gun | Subs | T.D.C.
Lt.(jg) T. C. MARCUSE, USNR | 25 | 1 | Radio, Rad- | - | Radar,
| | | | | Sonar.
Lt.(jg) J. J. DONNELLY USNR | 24 | 1 | Asst. Eng. | - | Plot #1
Lt.(jg) R. E. RICHEY USN | 23 | 1 | Comm. | - | Asst TDC.
Ensign D. R. JONES USN | 31 | 11 | 1st Lt. | Enl. | Plot #2
Ensign W. N. DIETZEN USN | 21 | 1 | Und. Inst. | - | Recog'n.
Ensign W. E. LEDFORD USN | 24 | 8 | Asst Torp. | Enl. | Torp.Rms.
---
Average | 26 | 5.3

CPO's
| | Rate | Age | Patrols this incl.
|---|---|---|---
REMLEY, D. W. | CTM(PA) | 28 | 8
CLARK, A. W. | CEM(PA) | 26 | 9
THOMAS, E. F. | CMOMM(PA) | 29 | 9
FEY, W. H. | COM(T) | 28 | 8
FICKEL, L. F. | CMOMM(T) | 34 | 2
WILLIAMS, C. W. | CPHM(T) | 25 | 5
SNIDER, M. R. | CRM(T) | 25 | 1
MAY, C. A. | CMOMM(T) | 29 | 4
---
Average | 28 | 5.75

CREW (CPO's excluded) Average age 23.25. Average patrols 2.4 (this
included).

-2-

— page 5 —
March 3, 1945
Departed PEARL HARBOR in accordance with ComTaskForce 17 Operation
Order #65-45, enroute to west coast of KYUSHU via SAIPAN to form co-
ordinated attack group with TINOSA and SPADEFISH, with Commanding Officer
TINOSA as group commander.

March 3-15
Enroute SAIPAN, conducting training enroute. Averaging three dives,
one battle problem daily. Studying many patrol reports, and "BUSHIDO"
to get back in trim after a long lay off.

March 11
1450 L Sighted SCABBARDHISH and exchanged pleasantries.

March 12
1108 L Sighted plane too far away to identify. No IFF, no SD
contact. No indications of his sighting us.

March 15
Arrived SAIPAN. Commenced investigation to remove shaft squeal.
Underway on 16th to test preliminary work. Drydocked on March 17th.

March 18
1000 L Ensign W. N. DIETZEN, USN reported for duty.
1306 L Underway. Tested shafts, found no squeal. FULTON did
a well job. Proceeded on patrol under escort.
1420 L Discovered stowaway, DELECTA, J. J., 807 20 15, Slc, USNR,
attached to U.S.S. FULTON.
1630 L Put bow alongside escort (YMS 343) and transferred stowa-
way.

March 18-24
Enroute area NINE, conducting routine training. Slowed SOA from
15 to 11 knots on account of heavy weather.

March 19
0600 L Contacted U.S.S. HADDOCK.

March 22
0715 I Sighted U.S.S. TREPANG.

March 24
0855 I Dived, commenced approach to TOKARA STRAITS.
1608 I Surfaced, intending to transmit weather as per instructions
from ComSubPac and then transit strait.
1615 I Sighted plane. Dived.
1853 I Surfaced. TBL motor generator was sprayed by water from
pump room bilges and negative vent, out of commission. Unable to trans-
mit.
0910 I The Captain took the deck for a few minutes and was reward-
ed by hearing, then sighting, a single engine plane buzzing along almost
over the after capstan. Diving time a little faster than that of a
rock.
2021 I Surfaced. Transited strait without further incident. [HANDWRITTEN: TBL]
motor generator really soaked now from that last dive. Negative vent
as installed is a serious military hazard.

-3-

— page 6 —
Entered ar NINE.

March 25 1200 Posit:31-08N 130-35E (All times item);
0504 Dived five miles off KAIMON DAKE for first day's submerged
patrol. Closed to 3000 yards off the beach.
0830 Sighted converted whale Killer-type patrol boat. See special
report. Many small craft sighted during day.

FIRST ATTACK
SUNK - 3080 Ton AK KIYOTADA Class
Lat 31-08 N Long 130-30 E

1320 Sighted ship. Commenced approach.
1325 Ship identified as torpedo target. Conducted normal sub-
merged approach, used ST in early stages to obtain speed and masthead
height. Completed attack using attack periscope and ping range just
before firing to check set-up.
1330 Identified target as KIYOTADA Class AK.
1341-40 Fired 3 MK 18 torpedoes aft, ping range 1000 yards, gyro
angle 180°, track 90S, depth set two feet, spread to get one hit, using
spread setter design by Comdr. H. J. CASSEDY, USN.
1343 One hit, at MOT. Torpedo run 1M10S. Target disintegrated.
Took picture. Target sank bows first in about one minute.
1344 Two torpedoes hit beach and exploded.
1349-1445 Received two depth charges and two aircraft bombs, all
distant.

FIRST BLOOD FOR TIRANTE!
1953 Surfaced.
2037 Dived on SD contact.
2123 Surfaced. All clear. Desire to remain undetected and dive
up north off ONIKI SAKI in morning to allow this area to cool off a bit.

March 26 1200 Posit 32-08 N 129-55 E.
0220 Dived for a plane.
0239 Surfaced.
0505 Dived 6 miles off O SHIMA, just south of ONIKI SAKI. Not such
a good place. Events proved. Were bothered all day by small craft.
Although we closed to 2000 yards from a group of rocks off shore, two
small tankers, a small AK, and a small hospital ship passed inshore of
the rocks in the late afternoon disclosing the use of a heretofore un-
reported inland passage along the coast.
2000 Surfaced, with a sigh of H.P. air. Intend to come back to
where they'll have to give us a shot tomorrow - sealing off the northern
approach to this inland passage.

March 27 1200 Posit 32-15 N 129-57 E.
0231 Dived for a plane. Flooded main induction (personnel
casualty). Our calculations are correct - it does hold about six tons.
0344 Surfaced.
0450 Dived. Patrolled all day about 3000 yards off ONIKI SAKI.
Bothered somewhat by fishermen working in pairs towing drag nets
between them. A few bad moments as one persistent pair forced us to
150 feet to duck under their net. Glassy sea. Big ships stayed home.

-4-

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1947 Surfaced. SD cut of commission for rest of patrol with cracked
insul tor on top of mast. Loss of the SD Radar keenly felt as our key-
ing it 1 second twice every three minutes had given us reliable warning
of many planes and is very difficult to DF. No change in number of
plane contacts with or without it.
2106 Dived for a plane. Lookouts getting better fast. Moon as
bright as day. Commenced counter measure of completely flooding, down
to 24 feet, 1½ down angle. Advantages (1) Diving time 30 seconds
(average. (2) Smaller radar target and silhouette.
2149 Surfaced.
2325 Dived for a plane.
2400 Surfaced.

March 28 1200 Posit 32-15 N 129-56 E.
Intend to open from coast, transmit weather enroute to FUKE SHIMA,
and then return to ONIKI SAKI.
0009 Dived for a plane.
0129 Surfaced. TBL generator soaked again by negative vent. No
transmission tonight. We repeat, "the location of this piece of equip-
ment in the pump room in line with negative vent is a military hazard."
0425 Dived off ONIKI SAKI. Sighted various patrol and small
craft during morning. Patrolled 2000-4000 yards off ONIKI SAKI.

SECOND ATTACK
SUNK 2700 Ton AK
32-15 N 129-55 E

1205 Sighted smoke, which developed into a small AK, TF, compo-
site superstructure, cruiser stern, plumb bow, heavily laden. Identified
as type "C" For Tare Charlie. about 2700 tons. Executed standard sub-
merged approach from land side, using ST in early stages for target
speed and masthead height determination and complete periscope under
attack periscope with ping range to check set-up just before firing.
Target speed solution slowed from 14 knots to 8 knots during the approach.
The ST definitely gets the credit for this one.
1304-30 Fired three MK 18 torpedoes fwd, ping range 900, gyro
angle 015, track 60 P, depth set six feet. Spread at MOT, bow and stern.
1305-13 One terrific hit at MOT by MK 18-2 torpedo donated by
employees of the WESTINGHOUSE MK 18 Factory, Sharon, Pa. Torpedo run
43s. Target sank instantly. Diving time 30 seconds. Took 3 pictures.
Other two torpedoes were "robbed" as they ran out to sea "hot straight
and normal" and sank. No end of run explosions, in water 50 fathoms
deep.
1324-1453 Evading. Received 8 depth charges. Target was apparent-
ly not escorted, but the area was patrolled by Japanese Special Subma-
rine Chaser #1 and he happened to be near by - also his partner, whom
he promptly called in.
1826 Sighted "Killer" group of three SC boats patrolling area,
pinging sonically every 1½ seconds.
2001 Surfaced.
2045 Dived for a plane, whose exhaust was sighted by lookout.
Suspect this was the same star we dived for last night (sighted by same
lookout).

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2123 Surface. Transmitted weather one day late, also giving
results to date. Then changed course and headed south at high speed
to let this area cool off.

March 29 1200 Posit 31-05 N 129-40 E.
Received message giving life guard station for air strike on KYUSHU
and JAP fleet if it comes out. Luckily we are near the designated po-
sition.
0100 Increased speed to full on four engines. Have time to make
a sweep of coast of KYUSHU from NOMO MISAKI to KADON DAKE before sun-
rise.
0100-0416 Ran down coast 13 miles off shore at 19 knots making
careful radar search, hoping at least to be able to make a contact
report on Jap fleet units, if any were there. Covered estimated speed
of advance 18 to 12 knots. No luck.
0547 On life guard station. Made trim dive.
0615 Surfaced. Flooded down decks awash. Hoisted colors. Day
uneventful. Saw 8 planes during day, IFF response on many more. Stay-
ed up and watched 2 ZEKE go by at 4 miles. Dived once, when two land
based bomber type planes came in zero angle on the bow, no IFF. Enter-
tained ship's company by letting them hear and read our carrier plane
pilots VHF remarks as they blasted KYUSHU.
1845 Secured life guard. Dived twice for planes before 2400.

March 30 1200 Posit 31-07 N 130-36 E.
Enroute to submerged patrol spot off BONO MISAKI.
0305 Radar contact 4300 yards, which developed into a small vessel
on course about 020°T.

FIRST GUN ATTACK
SUNK 100 Ton Lugger
Lat 31-11 N Long 130-04 E.

0352 Decided this fellow was a gun target; so went to Battle
Stations. Surfaced. Ended around to get target silhouetted against bright
moon, then closed him keeping bows on, intending to open fire with the
forward 40MM and 5MM while closing, then swing broadside to polish him
off. Held the PIRATE "Foxhole" in reserve much to their disgust.
0410 Sighted target and identified him as standard Jap lugger.
0428 Commenced firing at 2000 yds. Target fired a burst of .30
cal. tracer which whizzed overhead. Fwd. 40 MM silenced him. Swung
left at 1800 yards range to unmask battery. First 5" shot hit the
target completely through him, and that gun hitting consistently,
demolished the target. The 40MM did not do as well because of poor
pointing, until range decreased to 1000 yards. The after 40 MM part-
ially blinded the 5" crew, and in return the blast hit the 5" trained
well forward almost lifted the after 40 MM crew out of their seats, but
undaunted both crews methodically went to work and cut the lugger to
ribbons.
0447 Ceased firing, came alongside to pick up some prisoners.
Target had practically had her stern shot off, and was burning furiously
amidships and aft. Passed 25 yards away, saw about 10 Japs jump into the
water, so withheld fire to get prisoners. APR picked [HANDWRITTEN: this crucial time]
to report Jap airborne radar coming in. Decided against taking any

-6-

— page 9 —
prisoners with a Jap plane around; also it was early in the patrol; so
departed the scene, leaving the lugger blazing brightly, and sunk till her
gunwales were at the water's edge, and thoroughly demolished.
Changed patrol area to KAI ON DAKI, since the lugger was only about
6 miles off BONO HISAKI.
0535 Dived. Patrolled 300-2000 yards off the beach.
1420 Dense fog. Surfaced 3000 yards off beach for a look around
and a breath of fresh air.
1430 Fog thinned - dived. No activity of any kind. Our carrier
based fighters must have scoured the water front.
1931 Surfaced, heading south to transmit weather, and patrol among
islands south of KYUSHU for night.

March 31 1200 31-12 N 130-08 E.
0518 Dived off BONO HISAKI. Uneventful.
1754 Heard much pinging "around corner" of BONO.
1925 Surfaced, intending to sweep the coast "around the corner"
a bit and maybe catch another lugger - perhaps something bigger.

April 1, 1945 1200 Posit 31-18 N 129-12 E.
Many APR contacts, possibly airborne or submarine. Swung ship
for several, but bearing determination was not satisfactory with our non-
directional antenna.
0214 SJ contact 9000 yds, closing fast. Dived.
0220 Heard much echo-ranging in direction of BONO HISAKI. Decided
to patrol off shore while the area cools down for a day.
0549 Dived. Saw numerous planes flying low, searching the area.
1940 Surfaced. Returning to BONO HISAKI for next day's patrol.

April 2 1200 Posit 31-18 N 130-05 E
Submerged patrol off BONO HISAKI. Sighted various small craft.
1027 Surfaced in a fog - 4000 yards off BONO HISAKI light and
air search radar station for a look around and a breath of fresh air.
Combed the deck for several rattles JP had heard, and found several.
While several men were over the side sawing off a loose side plate, the
fog commenced to thin.
1055 Dived with the lighthouse coming into view.

THIRD ATTACK
MISSED STANDARD JAP LST
Lat 31-15N Long 130-05E

1558 Sighted ship coming out of haze. Battle Stations. First
ST range 3200 yards, speed 16 knots by plot, angle on bow zero.
1600 The target was identified as a standard type, empty, Jap
LST, riding extraordinarily high out of the water with lookouts all over it.
him. Bow out of water for one tenth of his length. JP sound, which had
picked up fishermen all day before they came into sight, had great diffi-
culty in picking up this target even when close. The cause was soon
apparent when his screw appeared to be up in a well.
1602 Intended to fire bow tubes with sharp track, but the set-up
was not good, range too short, dope still not definite. We had time for
only three set-ups by time torpedo run was 500 yards. Changed mind and
let target go by at 200 yards abeam, set up for a deliberate stern shot
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at large track.
1604 Fired three MK 18-2 torpedoes aft, range 1000 yards, track
port 160, gyro an les 210. Torpedo runs from 1300 to 1700 yards, depth
set two feet.
1605 Target saw the usual plumes of spray thrown up by torpedoes
"whale spoutin;" at this shallow depth setting, an made radical maneuvers
to avoid; spinning on his tail like a trained seal. No hits. The set-
up checked perfectly, the TDC generating ST bearings and ran es as the
five was fired, and the Commanding Officer is certain the torpedoes
would have hit if indeed not actually under the target. Noted
much running up and down the decks and belching of smoke on the tar et -
we gave him a few bad moments at least.
1609 Sound reported torpedoes fading out - straight as a die.
1612 Four instant depth charges from the target.
In retrospect it is felt that we should have fired bow tubes, be-
cause the target could hardly have avoided a fish at 500 yards ran e
even on a very sharp track. As it turned out, our stern tube set up
checked exactly with the bow tube set up. Our dope was ri ht, thou h
we needed one more observation to check it. Result, three fish wasted,
five alerts, much, and we are very disappointed. All hands keenly interested.
Our only consolation is some other boat missed an LST also, not so long
ago. On a good set up, he reported his torpedoes apparently ran under.
Apparently their draft empty is exceedingly shallow.

April 3 1200 Posit 32-13 N 129-58 E.
Patrolled about 2000 yards off ONIKI SAKI. Several times small
contact charges exploded on the bottom as two Jap SCS-1 depth-charged a
whale 4000 yards from us. All morning they thrashed around. Suddenly
at 5000 yards si ht of a very small, very rusty en ines-aft collier
ridin alon on his "left hind cheek", with the same two patrol boats
escorting. Bow out of water, 1/4 way aft, screw thrashing, lifeboat
lowered halfway to water. Battle Stations. Started approach. Looks
as thou h he's just been raised off the bottom and is being run through
area as "B.I.T". This outfit has been suspicious all morning but didn't
find us. Let this "pile of rust" go by. Needed a flying torpedo to
hit him, anyway. This was an ideal gun target - except for the patrol
boats ruining the party.

April 4 1200 Posit 32-12 N 129-57 E.
Uneventful patrol off ONIKI SAKI.

April 5 1200 Posit 32-28 N 128-45 E.
Uneventful patrol 2000-3000 yds. of FUKUE SHIMA. Two Jap Special
Submarine Chasers came out of the harbor in the morning and picked
our spot to come right over. They passed through our diving spot where
Jap 10 Cm radar interference from shore had steadied on us. Evaded at
150 feet silent running. Same two returned late in afternoon.

April 6 1200 Posit 34-10 N 127-53 E.
Decided to investigate northern part of area NINE for a chance, now
that we have been assigned it by SI.DEFISH.
Dived off SHORI TO. Saw numerous fishing schooners drag ing nets
astern. Kept busy staying clear all during the day. Decided to try to
capture one and take personnel back to base, since they ought to have

-8-

— page 11 —
information about the suspected anchorage at REISUE KAIWAN.
1918 Surface contact. One of the larger schooners.
1930 Havin trouble coming alongside, and he isn't cooperating.
Fired a 40MM shell through his mainsail. The shell exploded, making
a big hole in the sail. .30 cal. machine gun cut his mainsail halyard
so he lowered his sails in short order.
1940 Boat alongside. We look huge by comparison.
Lieutenant Peabody II (all American, Harvard 1942) and
SPENCE, H. W., GMlc jumped aboard, both armed to the teeth in terrify-
ing fashion. The dignity of the boarding party was considerably shaken when
Lt. PEABODY landed in a pile of fish and skidded across the deck in a tre-
mendous "prat" fall, but their efficiency was unimpaired. With many
hoarse shouts and bursts of tommy gun fire, three thoroughly scared and
whimpering fishermen were taken aboard. One KOREAN successfully hid
by jumping over the side. Found out later he thought we were Japs,
thus putting his day as "draft-dodger", to an end.
SPENCE, having routed the last KOREAN out of a locker in the
cabin where he had hidden, and having picked up a clock and pipe as
souvenirs, reported to Gunnery Officer that the search of the schooner
below decks had been completed. The Gunnery Officer, not to be out-
done, hurriedly looked about for a souvenir for himself before ordering
"Cast off". In the darkness he picked up something and sent it below.
Nothing much was noticed topside, but many curses immediately came
from below decks, and a burly seaman rushed to the bridge, holding his
nose, and hurled "Mr. PEABODY'S souvenir" - to wit: one very dead
squid - over the side. One KOREAN was accidentally slightly wounded
in the left arm when he had to be persuaded by a burst of tommy gun
fire in the water to climb back aboard and join the party.
1958 Cast off schooner. Set course through the passages of the
KOREAN ARCHIPELAGO at full speed, navigating by P.P.I. Passed through
fishing fleet of about 50 schooners. Hoped to route out some of the
shipping our planes have reported hugging the coast here. Navigator
now a qualified SJ operator.

April 7 1200 Posit Lat 34-33 N 125-20 E.
9443 Entered MAIKOTSU SUIDO.
0546 Dived. Experienced currents up to 5 knots, luckily mostly
northerly, which was to our advantage. Conducted submerged patrol in
DAIKOKUSAN GUNTO 2000 yds. from the beach. Heard distant pinging.
Closed it hoping for a convoy.
1652 Sighted two ships, later identified as a CHIDORI and a
PATROL FRIGATE on an anti-submarine sweep. Avoided detection. Minimum
range 7500 yards. Took several pictures of them with simultaneous ST
ranges for Intelligence purposes. Their usual loud pinging on 14.8 Kcs.
was the first thing we picked up.

FOURTH ATTACK
SUNK 2800 Ton Sugar Able Sugar
Lat 34-35 N Long 125-20 E.

1755 Sighted ship proceeding up the island chain. Commenced
approach. Because of increased confidence in the ST periscope, made
ready only two tubes. Executed standard submerged approach.

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— page 12 —
1852 Fired two MK 18-2 torpedoes, depth set 4 feet, range 600,
gyro angle 352, track 120.
1853 Two terrific hits. Target sank instantly. Tried to get
pictures, but target had sunk. Got one of the last three feet of his
bow as it went under.
The target was a brand new TM (modified) Sugar type,
2800 tons, painted olive drab in color. He had a deck cargo of oil
drums and a circular gun platform on bow.
1858 Surfaced 3800 yds. from the beach, broad daylight. Decided
against adding to our prisoner list because of momentarily expected
sunset air patrol and our recent CHIDORI and PF friends; so cleared
the area, heading directly for a small fishing schooner as we did so.
The occupants pitifully attempted to get away, but gave up and hauled
down their sails, whereupon we slowed and passed close aboard. Only
two people could be seen, a man and a woman, huddled pathetically to-
gether in the stern of the tiniest sailboat imaginable. Their relief
and happiness were evident when they realized our intentions were peace-
ful, as we gesticulated violently astern to where the wreckage of the sunk-
en ship was bobbing, around. Two more men jumped out from under the sail
where they had hidden and the little boat sailed joyfully off in search
of loot. Prior to surfacing the debris was examined through the peris-
cope, and only oil drums, bits of wood and two survivors hanging on to
a piece of wreckage could be seen.

April 8 1200 Posit 35-06 N 123-57 E.
0632 Surfaced after trim dive, intending to patrol on the surface
in plotted traffic routes sixty miles west of DAIKOKUSAN TO. Ran decks
awash at slow speed, but wake could be seen several miles astern in
glassy sea.
0732 Sighted plane, two engine bomber, directly in the sun,
headed for us. Dived.
0735 Two bombs. One close explosion, one dud.
0825 Periscope depth for a look. Plane saw us with two feet of
scope exposed, came in and strafed, dropping possibly another dud. Back
to 200 feet, day's patrol ruined by getting spotted.
1025 6 Distant bombs. He must have called in the wolves.
1506 Surfaced.
1535 Sighted plane, a two engine bomber, on horizon. Dived to
periscope depth to keep an eye on him.
1545 Plane passed over the periscope. This lad is good! Went
deep - all of 150' (200' depth of water).
1957 Surfaced. Cleared area. We now feel that staying on the
surface and getting spotted by planes is a poor way to carry out our
mission of inflicting the maximum possible damage on the enemy.

April 9 1200 Posit 36-50 N 123-57 E

FIFTH ATTACK
SUNK 5000 Ton Transport (Attack 6A)
MISSED 4000 Ton Freighter (Attack 6B)
Lat 36-50N Long 123-55E

0920 Heard distant pinging bearing 270°T. Went to 52 ft. raised
SD mast and at 0934 broadcast contact to SPADEFISH. No receipt.

-10-

— page 13 —
0936 Sighted large ships and three escorts. commenced
approach. The sea was glassy, sound conditions phenomenal, depth of
water only 200 feet, [HANDWRITTEN: no gradient] Poor conditions for a submerged
attack, perfect for the opposition. In addition, our ST is operating
at only 75% efficiency due to cracked mica window in wave guide, neces-
sitating a high exposure at close range to get a radar range. However,
we are convinced of its value, and will do whatever is necessary to get
at least two ST ranges. With 8-10 feet of ST out failed to get radar
range even as close as 8000 yds. Shifted to #2 periscope until range
is 5000 when we will try again [HANDWRITTEN: with ST] Mirage makes stadimeter
ranging erratic.
The convoy is zigzagging radically, with one escort on the far
flank, one on the near bow, one on the near quarter, with possibly
more escorts. Ships identified as transport NIKKO MARU (page 31, 208 J),
leading, and freighter RAMB II (page 71, 208 J) in column astern.
Speed dope poor.
1015 Forced to expose four feet of ST periscope to get [HANDWRITTEN: 6200 yard]
radar range. Maybe we are foolish, but intend to get good dope.
Looking down the escorts' throat with that much periscope out on this
mirror smooth day made us feel like Lady Godiva in the market place.
We will be most fortunate to get in undetected today. The assured
echo range is over 3000 yards.
1022 Near escort, a big new frigate passed close aboard, pinging
horribly. We swung into him keeping our bow on him. Not detected.
With our torpedoes set on six feet forward (dry aft) were ready to give
him two if he showed any signs of acting up.
1025 Zig toward, giving NIKKO a starboard 50 angle on the bow,
and RAMB about starboard 40. Had our bow right on them ready for a
zig either way. Set-up looks fine - now have time to wait a bit until
track improves. Turn count on NIKKO of 88 RPM showed 15.5 knots.
1027 Up ST scope for firing bearings. This is necessary to double
check our speed solution of 14 knots and to get a quick set-up on
second ship. Fired 3 Mk 18-2 torpedoes at NIKKO depth set 6 feet,
range 1600 yards, [HANDWRITTEN: gyro angle 051°, track 110 S, spread 200' between]
torpedoes hoping to hit MOT, foremast, mainmast.
While firing saw a two flag hoist go up on the NIKKO. Shifted to
RAMB, saw him to blocking some signal, got a quick set-up, and saw
him start to swing right, decreasing the angle on the bow. Escort on
his starboard quarter is headed our way due to zig so must shoot now
or never, before hits in NIKKO alert the whole convoy.
1029 Fired three MK 18-2 torpedoes at RAMB, depth set 6 feet,
range 1700, [HANDWRITTEN: gyro angle 013, track 55S-20P] Had to set in a different
angle on the bow for each shot. Target surprised us by at least a
150° course change, with hard over rudder. In the process he nicely
combed the spread.
While firing at RAMB, heard and saw three hits in NIKKO. Her decks
were crowded with "slant eyes". The first, spread to hit MOT, hit in
the after well, breaking her in two there and stopping her screws, never
to be heard again. The second spread forward, hit amidships, raising
Cain generally, and she had already sunk to the water's edge when the
third, spread aft, hit under the foremast blowing her bow off. The
force of the first two hits was so terrific that they stopped her dead,
causing the third MK 18, which normally would have missed aft, to hit.

-11-

— page 15 —
. of the mirage in the form of two small "YMS" mine sweeps. Approached
and took pictures of them and their sweep gear over their stems.

April 12, 1945 1200 Posit 32-24 N 124-42 E.
Uneventful submerged patrol on SHANHAI-SAISHO TO route. Sighted
three horn-type floating mines during the day. Had all bridge watch
standers take a good look at them through the scope. Took pictures
of one in H.P. very close aboard.
1930 Surfaced, headed for SHANGHAI at high speed to scout
SHANGHAI-QUELFART line.
2230 Start radar tracking party to investigate two ships
at 38,000 yards, that had initially been picked up by the SJ at the
phenomenal range of 70,000 (estimated). Sent contact report to sub-
marines in area. Loud pings on 14.8 Kcs. and Jap 10 Cm radar interfer-
ence came from our contacts. After two hours of hard work and closing
to investigate, determined our contacts to be two A/S vessels pa-
trolling the traffic route. Sent third and last message to area sub-
marines and exchanged information with TRUTT. on patrol positions for
the next day.

April 13, 1945 1200 Posit 32-40 N 125-14 E
0612 Returning from SHANGHAI sweep at high speed. Sighted dawn
plane and dived for the day. Upon surfacing heard the melancholy news
of the death of our Commander-in-Chief.
Intend to make investigation of a reported anchorage on the north
shore of QUELFART during darkness. Our six MK 14-3A torpedoes left
forward will be ideal for this work.

SEVENTH ATTACK
SUNK AMMUNITION SHIP 8000-10,000 Tons (est) Attack 6A
SUNK FRIGATE MIKURA Class 1500 Tons Attack 6B
SUNK FRIGATE MIKURA Class 1500 Tons Attack 6C
Lat 33-25 N Long 125-50 E

April 14 1200 Posit 32-35 N 125-50 E
0000 Approaching QUELFART ISLAND northwestern side.
0029 Radar contact. Patrol boat. Went to tracking stations
and worked around him. Sighted him at 4500 yards - long and low. No
evidence of radar until we were nearly around, when he turned on his
(Jap 10 Cm). The patrol was evidently suspicious, probably because
we came too close but soon went back to sleep.
Continued working up the anchorage.
0223 Radar contact. Another patrol craft, bigger than the other.
Avoided by going forth in front of the anchorage, had 10 Cm radar, and was pinging on
14.8 Kcs. He also became suspicious, apparently, and headed for our
point of nearest approach to him. However our tactic of heading in-
shore confused him (as we no doubt merged with his land pips) and he
continued routine patrolling.
During the whole of the ensuing action, except while actually
firing torpedoes, this patrol boat was kept on the TDC and both plots.
He was always a mental hazard, and potentially a real one. The only
chart that was of any use was the Jap "Zoomie" chart labelled "Japan
Aviation Chart, Southernmost Portion of CHOSEN (KOREA) No V3-36".
No soundings inside the ten fathom curve in the harbor and approaches

-13-

— page 16 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 10 FATH]
[HANDWRITTEN: (13/4)]
[HANDWRITTEN: 0354]
[HANDWRITTEN: 0310]
[HANDWRITTEN: QUELPART ISLAND]

SCALE
-----
3000 y/s

were shown. Hoped the place wasn't mined and that none of the five shore-
based radars reported on QUELPART were guarding the harbor.
0240 Battle Stations. Approached anchorage from the south along
the ten fathom curve within 1200 yards of the shore line. Took "single
ping" fathometer sounding every 3 to 5 minutes. The smell of cattle
from the beach was strong. Bridge could not see well enough to distin-
guish ships from shore line in the harbor, though a couple of darker
spots in the early morning mist looked promising - as did, indeed, the
presence of two patrolling escort vessels where none had previously
been seen several nights before during night patrol in this area.
0310 Completed investigation this side of the anchorage area 1200
yards away. There may be ships there, but cannot see well enough to
shoot. Started around the small island off the anchorage, staying as
close as possible. The patrol vessel by this time was paralleling us
7000 yards off shore, still not overly suspicious, but annoying. Execu-
tive Officer on bridge could see him now and then.
0330 Having completed circuit of the small island, started in from
northern side, cutting in across the ten fathom curve. At about -
0340 Bridge made out the shapes of ships in the anchorage. Sound
picked up a second "pinger" - this time in the harbor. Still too far,
(4500 yards and not sure of what we saw). Patrol heading this way.
Sounding 11 fathoms. Current setting us on beach. Decided to get in
closer and have this over with. A/A 2/3. (Radar Officer confirmed
sharp pips of ships in anchorage).
0350 Bridge definitely could see ships. For the first time put
targets on TDC, with Zero speed and TBT bearings. With assistance of
TBT and PPI, SJ commenced ranging on largest ship - very difficult to
distinguish from the mass of shore pips, and gave range of 3500 yards.
Sounding 9 fathoms. Still getting set on. Land loomed close aboard
on both sides. Patrol still not overly alerted, passing about 6000
yards away, pinging loudly, outboard of us. Land background our

[HANDWRITTEN: -14-]

— page 17 —
Saving Grace: Seared taking "single ping" fathome readings; if those
ships can get in here; so can we. Both 40 MM guns are all loaded and
ready with gun crews. Since it is too shallow to dive, we will have to
shoot our way out if boxed in.
0355 Exec on TBT picked out three targets, and got on largest.
Backed down and left. Bow toed slightly out to combat the set.
0355-30 Fired one torpedo as a sighting-in shot to dope out
current using TBT bearings, range by SJ 2300 yards, gyro angle 344.30,
track 90. Captain went to the bridge to get in on the fun, up there.
Missed to the right. Torpedo hit beach and exploded, proving there
was no torpedo net.
0359 Fired one torpedo aimed at left edge of the largest target,
to correct for current effect. Wake headed straight for the target.
0359-22 Fired another torpedo aimed same as the previous one -
straight as a die. Exec's keen shooting eye looked right on tonight.
0401-05 A tremendous beautiful explosion. A great mushroom of
white blinding flame shot 2000 feet into the air. Not a sound was
heard for a moment but then a thunderous roar flattened our ears
against our heads. The jackpot, and no mistake! In this shattering
convulsion we had no idea how many hits we had made, but sincerely
believe it was two. In the glare of the fire, TIRANITE stood out, in
her light camouflage, like a snowman in a coal pit. But, more impor-
tant, silhouetted against the flame were two escort vessels, both
instantly obvious as fine new frigates of the MIKURA Class. The Cap-
tain instinctively ordered "Right full rudder, all ahead flank", and as
quickly belayed it. Steadied up to "pick off" the two frigates.
0402 Fired one torpedo at the left hand frigate, using TBT
bearings and TDC ranges.
0402-16 Fired another torpedo at the same target.
0403 Fired last torpedo at the right hand frigate.
0404 Now lets really get out of here!
0404-20 One beautiful hit in the left hand frigate. The ship
literally exploded, her bow and stern rising out of water and the center
disappearing in a sheet of fire. Must have hit her magazines. Very
satisfying to watch, though not the equal of the previous explosion,
of course. Possibly two hits in him.
0404-40 A hit on the other FF also - right amidships! No flame
this time, other than the explosion, but a great cloud of smoke
immediately enveloped her and she disappeared. We jubilantly credit
ourselves with three ships sunk with at least four, probably five,
hits for six fish. Not the slightest doubt about any of the three
ships. Now only one torpedo left aboard. Immediately reloaded it and
[HANDWRITTEN: reset TDC cams for our MK 18.]
The patrolling escort had now increased speed and turned toward
the anchorage. Once more we pulled our trick of slipping undetected
along the shore. As we left the gutted anchorage behind, a third FF
could be seen standing out at slow speed. He did not, however, come
out after us, but stayed, watching the fire. So we just ran down the
coast of QUELPART headed for the open sea. Transmitted results of
attack to submarines in area so they could avoid the certain A/S
measures to come.
The large ship which exploded was, in the Commanding Officer's
mind, unquestionably a heavily laden ammunition ship, or possibly a
tanker loaded with aviation gas. Not much can be said about her type

-15-

— page 18 —
and size, but in the sudden glare of the explosion she appeared to be
a large engines-aft vessel, of from 8000 to 10,000 tons. In the light
of her own fire she was huge.
As we rounded QUELPART'S southwestern tip, the glare from the
anchorage could still be seen above the dark hills, and a heavy smoke
cloud hung like a shroud over the entire western end of the island.
0513 Radar and sight contact with the other patrol, which we had
avoided initially. This time he was alert, we got definite SJ
interference from him - [HANDWRITTEN: 10 CM] [HANDWRITTEN: ar] Too light to evade surfaced,
so dived and evaded submerged. He came over to the spot where we had
dived and dropped a pattern. Many distant depth charges or bombs
were heard and planes were sighted all day. This area will be hot
tonight.
2043 Surfaced, following three aircraft bombs not too far away.
[HANDWRITTEN: Jap airborne radar] fading.
2148 Dived for a plane.
2245 Surfaced, and transmitted message to Force Commander.

April 15 1200 Posit 31-07 N 128-30 E
0145 Dived for a plane.
0228 Surfaced. Received orders to return to Midway for refit.
0655 Sighted DANJO GUNTO, distance 20 miles.
0710 Sighted two periscopes on port bow about 2500 yards away.
Avoided at full speed. Why did the Jap use two periscopes - no answer
for that one. Maybe he was laying a mine field and had no torpedoes.
Periscopes were raised and lowered several times.
0909 Sighted possible mine.
0919 Stayed on surface and watched two heavy bomber type planes
go by, headed for SASEBO, could have been ours.
1000 Dived for two large patrol planes who evidently were not
going by. Our SJ mast is still out of commission. Loss of the SD
is still keenly felt.
1322 While searching continuously with both periscopes just
prior to surfacing, sighted another large patrol plane circling about
5 miles away. Stayed down.
1615 Surfaced.
1737 Sighted heavily barnacled mine. Shot at same for 30 minutes,
with 40 MM, 50 cal. and carbine - unable to sink it. Finally secured.
1832 Another mine.
1840 Another plane. Dived.
2017 Surfaced.
2245 Another plane went by. Did not dive.

April 16, 1945
0123 Passed through NANSEI SHOTO chain.
0537 Dived for a plane.
0705 Surfaced.
0854 Sighted dead Jap soldier. (Very dead). Wearing kapok
life jacket, helmet and leggings. Flooded down and hauled him along-
side to examine pockets for notebooks, papers, etc. for our Intelli-
gence Service, but corpse was decomposing so secured.
1017 IFF response all over the screen. Sighted 2 FBM's headed
for us. Fired one mortar recognition signal followed by another.
FBM's still coming in. Suddenly heard one plane say, "Look at that
-16-

— page 19 —
ship down there! Wonder if it's friendly?" Promptly opened up on
VHF and set him straight. Situation eased.
1043 Another dead Jap soldier similar to first. (Deader).
1647 Sighted three Jap flyers roosting on the float of their
overturned plane. (JAKE) Maneuvered to pick them up. Put our bow
(well flooded down) against the float, but they defiantly straight-
armed it and showed no desire to come aboard. Kept our boarding party
on cigarette deck behind armor plate. The pilot, identified by goggles
and a flight cap, had something hidden in his right hand and suddenly
defiantly threw a lighted aircraft flare aboard, in return for which
Lt-Commander BEACH parted his hair with an accurately placed rifle
shot. Our bridge .30 and .50 cal. machine gunners had to be firmly
told not to shoot. At first, it was thought that the flare might
be some kind of bomb or hand grenade. But this was obviously not so,
and the flare was kicked over the side by the Gunnery Officer. The
pilot kept haranguing his two crewmen. Things at an impasse. Brought
one of our KOREANS topside to persuade them to come aboard.
The three flyers suddenly jumped overboard and swam away from
their wrecked plane; so Lt-Commander BEACH, with a few rifle shots
gained the distinction of sinking a Jap plane single handed. That
left the three Japs with no refuge. The pilot went off one way and the
two enlisted men another. All had kapok lifejackets on. Brought one
of the enlisted men alongside. At first he seemed willing to be res-
cued when yelled at by the KOREAN. Then evidently thought better of
it, screamed "KILL, KILL, KILL" at us, ducked out of his life jacket
and swam away. He was observed to duck his head under water several
times and swallow salt water, until finally he failed to reappear.
One suicide for the Emperor.
Brought the second enlisted man alongside. He was willing to be
rescued after more cajoling by our KOREAN through a megaphone, and
assisted our boarding party in bringing him aboard. Undressed him
completely on deck searching for hidden knives and hand grenades.
No lethal weapons found.
Brought the pilot alongside. He had shed his lifejacket - evi-
dently thinking of suicide. He seemed conscious and in good control
until close aboard, when he appeared to lose consciousness and became
helpless. Lieut. PEABODY and SPENCE, GM1c, dived over the side with
sheath knives and heaving lines tied around them, grabbed the inert
Jap and boosted him aboard over the bow. Undressed him also with same
result. He was still inert when examined below decks by the Chief
Pharmacist's Mate, whose verdict was that the man was shamming. This
is substantiated by the fact that, when startled by the general-
announcing equipment, he jerked upright, then relaxed into insensibility
again. Evidently having been brought aboard while unable to help it,
his honor, or something, had been saved. He apparently had not had the
nerve to carry out his own suicide order.
Incidentally, although nothing of much value other than a notebook
was found in the pockets of the enlisted man, the pilot's pockets
contained a notebook, a visiting card, quite a lot of Japanese money
plus a quantity of rubber prophylactics. It is considered that he is
quite a fellow, if not, indeed, an officer.
Isolated all prisoners after giving them a hot shower and
dungarees.
2200 About - decoded a message addressed to U.S.S. SPADEFISH,
telling him to look for one of our aviators down 200 miles away

-17-

— page 20 —
from us. We had reason to believe that the SPADEFISH was behind us,
since we had had his SJ interference astern two days ago, and had been
running at high speed on the surface since. Accordingly, went to
full speed and headed for the spot. Informed Force Commander and
received prompt affirmative reply.

April 17
Searching all day for downed pilot. Spoke CERO, joined her on
scouting line for several hours, and communicated with GATO, both
also searching. A passing B-29 helped us for a short time by check-
ing position of survivor reported by a plane. No luck. Area thorough-
ly covered. CERO and GATO departed. Contacted DD MANNING, also search-
ing for pilot and told her our search plan. Requested authority from
Force Commander to continue search another day.

April 18
Continued spiral rectangle search all night, firing Very's Star
every hour and blowing whistle every 5 minutes.
0300 L Received orders to discontinue search, so reluctantly
resumed course for MIDWAY.

April 19
0225 L Sighted lights on horizon. Investigated the contact,
which developed into a correctly lighted hospital ship, on course
330°T at 8 knots, evidently headed from CHICHI JIMA RETTO to HONSHU.
Avoided.

April 25 (plus 12 zone time)
Arrived MIDWAY.

-18-

— page 21 —
C. WEATHER
Weather in the EAST CHINA and YELLOW SEAS was as expected for the
time of year. Occasional fog, usually calm, very little rough weather,
overcast about half the time. Temperatures moderate in the southern
part to cold in the northern and YELLOW SEA areas. Frequently the tem-
perature of the water was greater than that of the air. This fact,
combined with the very smooth seas and possibly some unexplained atmos-
pheric condition, may have had something to do with the extraordinary
radar ranges reported in section (U).

D. TIDAL INFORMATION
Nothing to report.

E. NAVIGATION AIDS
Lights on the coast of KYUSHU and islands off shore were out.
The passage through the KOREAN ARCHIPELAGO was lighted, however, although
the lights were dimmed and shielded so as not to be visible to a vessel
further at sea. During the first passage north of (U. LP RT ISL ND,
when no ships were seen, dimmed navigational lights were not. During
the attack on the anchored ships on the northernshore several dim
navigational lights on the northern coast of QUELP RT were seen, in-
dicating that these lights are burned probably at all times, and not
only for the benefit of expected traffic.

It may be said in passing that all inshore navigation was done
with SJ and PPI, with satisfactory results. Fixes were obtained as
often as desired, with bearings and ranges on as many as four or five
points.

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— page 22 —
F. SHIP CONTACTS

NO. Time Lat Type(s) Initial Est. How Remarks
    Date Long.         Range Course Contacted
                         Speed

1. 1320 I 31-08N Small AK 10,000 144°T Periscope Sunk - 1 hit
   Mar 25 130-30E KIYOTADA Class 9½ K

2. 1450 I 32-08N 2 Small AO 10,00 180°T Periscope Inshore-out range
   Mar 26 130-00E 9 K

3. 1713 I 32-09N Hospital Ship 12,000 000°T Periscope Inshore-out range
   Mar 26 130-00E 12 K

4. 1732 I 32-08N Small AK 12,000 000°T Periscope Inshore-out range
   Mar 26 130-00E 14 K

5. 1217 I 32-15N Small AK 14,000 180°T Periscope Sunk - 1 hit
   Mar 28 129-55E "C" FTC Class 8 K

6. 1558 I 31-15N LST-New Aux. 3,500 155°T Periscope Missed
   Apr 2 130-05E Transport 13 K

7. 1652 I 34-37N CHIDORI & 13,000 060°T Periscope Avoided
   Apr 7 125-20E MIKURA PF 9 K

8. 1755 I 34-35N Type TM (mod) 13,000 030°T Periscope Sunk - 2 hits
   Apr 7 125-20E S.A.S. oiler 9.3 K

9. 0925 I 36-50N Convoy - 1AP 20,000 100°T Periscope Sank leading
   Apr 9 123-55E 1 AK, 3 PF 15 K ship (AP)

10. 2237 I 31-41N 2 Anti-Sub 70,000 330-160°T Radar Avoided
    Apr 12 123-36E vessels 9 K

11. 0340 I 33-25N 1 AK 4,800 Anchored Sighted Sank AK, 2 PF
    Apr 14 126-15E 3 PF anchored ~

12. 0710 I 31-42N Submarine 2,500 Submerged Sighted Raised & lowered
    Apr 15 127-44E scope several
    times.

13. 0255 L 29-26N Hospital ship 20,000 330°T Sighted Correctly lighted
    Apr 19 140-35E 8 K

Various patrol craft and fishing boats sighted throughout area, mostly
close inshore.

Contact #9 was by sound. Pinging was first heard, at estimated
range of 25,000 yards. Depth of water - 200 feet. Submarine Speed -
2½ kts. Submarine keel depth - 60 feet. Relative bearing - 270°R.
Types - 1 AP 5,080 tons 15 knots; 1 AK 3,685 tons, 15 knots; 3 PF
1500 tons each, 15 knots. JK type sound equipment made first contact.
QB, JK, and JP were in use at the time. Sound first heard echo ranging
on 14.8 Kcs.

-20-

— page 23 —
G. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

Many aircraft contacts were made, both day and night, and their
alertness has considerably improved over that noted during this Comman-
ding Officer's previous patrols. In order to avoid detection, most
daylight patroling was done submerged. One day was spent life guarding
on the surface, during which eight planes passed within relatively close
range, either friendly or too preoccupied to bother with us. On the 8th
of April we tried surface running and were immediately driven down and
kept down by a very alert patrol plane. On April 15th, leaving the area
with but one torpedo remaining, we ran on the surface within sight of
land hoping to be detected and reported, and thus may in some measure
decrease the pressure on the other subs in the area. Planes were sight-
ed almost daily through the periscope while submerged. In general,
daylight aircraft contacts were at dawn and dusk.

Night radar planes proved a bother because they frequently caused us
to dive, interfering with night search or change of station, and re-
ception of schedules. The radar planes were almost invariably first
picked up on the APR and identified by their characteristic freq/PRF/PW.
It is believed that the Jap gets his first indication of the presence
of the submarine at about "Saturation Six" (saturation SPA pip at gain
setting of six). He then flies a gambit trying to improve his bearing
information by turning down his radar gain. Thus the submarine thinks
the plane is going away when in reality he has been alerted.

Possibly the Jap pilot doesn't realize this to be a by-product of
his radar tactics. At any rate, he suddenly flies overhead, probably
having lost the indication at about 5000 yards distance. About that
time the submarine dives.

Our counter measures were as follows:

(1) On APR plane contact, key the SD and slow down or stop to
reduce wake. Dive at 6 miles range or less. Stay down half an hour,
then try SD again. If all clear, surface. Unfortunately, the SD went
out of commission early in the patrol.
(2) With SD out, on APR contact start a plane sweep with the SJ.
Slow down or stop. Dive if a fast closing contact is made on SJ.
After a few instances of having a plane fly overhead we decided also
to dive on "Saturation Six". Usually surfaced about one hour later, after
an APR or SJ sweep showed all clear.
(3) Proceed well flooded down whenever possible, to reduce radar
target and silhouette.

The purpose of slowing or stopping was, of course, to decrease the
possibilities of being sighted. Experiment has proved that the boat
dives almost as fast, and with equally good control, from a dead stop
as from any other condition. Diving time when dead in the water fully
flooded down averaged 35 seconds to 50 feet (at 6 knots averaged 30
sec.). Our argument for diving on "Saturation Six" on the APR was that
we had no SD, and wished not to be detected. This policy, it is believed,
paid off. We averaged about one night dive per night in the area.

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— page 24 —
Flares sighted at night were possibly released by planes, though
to what purpose cannot be guessed. Altogether 5 flares, all green and
all very bright, were sighted at different times. Some appeared
fairly close, others quite far, but all were over the water and not in
the direction of land. Possibly they were intended as part of a "war
of nerves" on submarines.

-22-

— page 25 —
H.
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420)
Time 1341
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. ONE
Date 3/25/45
Lat. 31-08N Long. 130-30E
PATROL NO. ONE

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description KIYOTADA MARU type, 3,080 ton AK, page 264 of ONI
208J (revised).
Ship Sunk KIYOTADA MARU type, 3,080 ton AK
Damage determined by: Saw, heard one torpedo hit. Saw ship sink.
Target draft 17' 7" Course 144°T Speed 9.5 kts. Range 1000 yds.

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 3 kts. Course 250°T Depth 58 ft. Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type attack Submerged ST periscope attack. Target was on steady
course. Speed solution was exact. A spread covering
400 ft. was used but was not necessary as the MOT shot
was accurate. Wing fish spread to miss.

| | #10 | #9 | #8 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes Fired | 90 S | 90 S | 90 S |
| Track Angle | 176.30 | 184.30 | 182 |
| Gyro Angle | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Depth Set | - | - | - |
| Power | | | |
| Hit or miss | hit | miss | miss |
| Erratic | no | no | no |
| Mk. Torpedo | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial No. | 57583 | 99182 | 99202 |
| Mk. Exploder | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 |
| Serial No. | 9819 | 8027 | 9766 |
| Actuation set | contact | contact | contact |
| Actuation actual | contact | contact | contact |
| Mk. Warhead | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial No. | 4655 | 4681 | 4718 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing interval | - | 8 | 8 |
| Type spread | . MOT | 200' Fwd. | 200' aft. |
| Injection | 65°F | 65°F | 65°F |
| Sea condition | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Overhaul Activity | S.B. F.H. | S.B. F.H. | S.B. F.H. |

Remarks Torpedoes set at such a shallow depth break
the surface of the water every 200 yds. and as
they return to depth give off a spray with their
screws. Speed and course of torpedo is not
affected.

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— page 26 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420)
Time 1304
[HANDWRITTEN: Date 3/28/45]
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. TWO
Lat 32-15N
PATROL NO. ONE
Long 129-55 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description
Type "C" Fox Tare Charlie 2700 Ton AK, page 7
ONI 208J (revised) Supplement 3

Ship Sunk
Type "C" Fox Tare Charlie 2700 Ton AK.

Damage determined by:
Saw, heard one torpedo hit. Saw ship sink.

Target draft 20' 7"
Course 180°T
Speed 8 kts.
Range 900 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 3 kts.
Course 280°T
Depth 58 ft.
Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type attack
Submerged ST periscope attack. Speed exact. Tar-
get on steady course. Wing fish spread to hit, but
MOT shot broke ship in two, ship folded up and
wing shots missed.

| | #6 | #5 | #4 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes fired | 55 | 60 | 63 |
| Track angle | 021 | 017.20 | 010 |
| Gyro angle | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Depth set | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Hit or miss | hit | miss | miss |
| Erratic | no | no | no |
| Mk. Torpedo | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial No. | 58009 | 99155 | 99223 |
| Mk. Exploder | 8-5 | 8-7 | 8-7 |
| Serial No. | 9777 | 11328 | 10656 |
| Actuation set | contact | contact | contact |
| Actuation actual | contact | contact | contact |
| Mk. warhead | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial No. | 4797 | 4919 | 4443 |
| Explosive | TFX | TFX | TFX |
| Firing interval | 0 | 8 | 8 |
| Type spread | MOT | 150' fwd | 150' aft |
| Injection temp. | 62°F | 62°F | 62°F |
| Sea condition | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Overhaul activity | S.B.T.H. | S.B.T.H. | S.B.T.H. |

Remarks
Torpedo #58009 which hit was donated to the Navy
by the workers in the Westinghouse Electric Plant
in Sharon, Pa. This torpedo was carried all the way
from New London by this vessel. At least three ad-
mirals have been photographed with it. With such
high priced christening and guidance this fish couldn't
miss.
Though it sank twice on the range at Newport, when
the chips were down it ran as straight and as true
as a die.

-24-

— page 27 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. THREE PATROL NO. ONE
Time 1604 Date 4/2/45 Lat. 31-15N Long 130-05E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description LST - New Jap Auxiliary Transport, 1500 Tons, page
141 of ONI 222 J.

Ship sunk None. Missed with three torpedoes.

Target draft unknown course 155°T Speed 13 kts. Range 1400 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type attack Submerged, ST periscope. A real surprise attack.
Five minutes after commencing to track, all torpedoes
in the salvo were fired. Unable to obtain a solu-
tion early enough to shoot bow tubes, so shifted to
stern tubes which was an error, as we were left with
a greater torpedo run and a poor track angle. Wing
fish spread to miss.

| | #10 | #9 | #8 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes fired | 170 | 170 | 180 |
| Track angle | 152.30 | 150 | 149.30 |
| Gyro angle | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Depth set | miss | miss | miss |
| Erratic | no | no | no |
| Mk. Torpedo | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial no. | 99146 | 99177 | 99156 |
| Mk. Exploder | 8-5 | 8-7 | 8-5 |
| Serial no. | 8883 | 11376 | 8768 |
| Actuation set | contact | contact | contact |
| Actuation actual | contact | contact | contact |
| Mk. warhead | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial no. | 4642 | 4757 | 4656 |
| Explosive | TFX | TFX | TFX |
| Firing interval | 0 | 8 | 10 |
| Type spread | 0 | 75L | 75R |
| Injection | 62°F | 62°F | 62°F |
| Sea condition | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Overhaul activity | S.B. F.H. | S.B. F.H. | S.B. F.H. |

Remarks Torpedoes behaved similarly to those in attack
#1, bobbing to the surface every 200 yards. Target
saw these wakes and evaded.

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— page 28 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SSA20) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. FOUR PATROL NO. ONE
Time 1852 Date [HANDWRITTEN: 4/7/45] Lat [HANDWRITTEN: 34-35N] Long [HANDWRITTEN: 125-20 E]

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description
Type TM (modified) Sugar Able Sugar 2800 Ton AO
Fainted olive drab in color. Page 13 of ONI 208J
(revised) supplement #3.

Ship Sunk
Type TM (modified) Sugar Able Sugar 2800 ton AO.

Damage determined by: Saw, heard two torpedoes hit. Saw ship sink.

Target draft 20' Course 030°T Speed 9.3 kts. Range 600 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 3 kts. Course 100°T Depth 58' Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA.

Type attack
Submerged ST periscope attack. Target on steady
course, and his speed was exact. Spread to hit on
either side of MOT.

| | #1 | #2 |
|---|---|---|
| Tubes fired | 120 | 123 |
| Track angle | 352 | 349 |
| Gyro angle | 4 | 4 |
| Depth set | 4 | 4 |
| Hit or miss | hit | hit |
| Erratic | no | no |
| Mk. Torpedo | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial No. | 58245 | 99173 |
| Mk. Exploder | 8-5 | 8-5 |
| Serial No. | 9064 | 9866 |
| Actuation set | contact | contact |
| Actuation actual | contact | contact |
| Mk. Warhead | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial No. | 4694 | 4687 |
| Explosive | T1X | T1X |
| Firing interval | - | 10 |
| Type spread | 50' fwd. | 50' aft. |
| Injection temp. | 41° | 41° |
| Sea condition | 1 | 1 |
| Overhaul Activity, | S.B.F.H. | S.B.F.H. |

Remarks
None.

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— page 29 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5A PATROL NO. ONE
Time 1027 Date [HANDWRITTEN: 4/9/45] Lat 36-50N Long 123-55 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description NIKKO MARU, 5,080 ton AF, page 31 GNI 208J (revised)

Ship sunk NIKKO MARU, 5,080 ton AF.

Damage determined by: Saw three torpedoes hit. Saw ship sink.

Target Draft 25' 1/4" Course 100°T Speed 14 kts. Range 1600 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 3 1/2 kts Course 350°T Depth 58' Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type attack Submerged ST periscope. Condition of sea prevented
frequent observations. Targets were zigging radi-
cally. Solution was not exact. As he was proba-
bly making 15 knots. This under estimation re-
sulted in three hits in the target as the first
torpedo stopped the target in its tracks. Wing
fish spread to hit.

| | #6 | #5 | #4 |
| :| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Tubes fired. | 110 | 117 | 118 |
| Track angle | 051 | 058 | 058.40 |
| Gyro angle | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Depth set | hit | hit | hit |
| Hit or miss | no | no | no |
| Erratic | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Mk. Torpedo | 57540 | 58186 | 99188 |
| Serial No. | 8-7 | 8-7 | 8-7 |
| Mk. Exploder | 11145 | 10867 | 15747 |
| Serial No. | contact | contact | contact |
| Actuation set | contact | contact | contact |
| Actuation actual | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Mk. Warhead | 2814 | 4649 | 4698 |
| Serial No. | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Explosive | 0 | 10 | 13 |
| Firing interval | 0 | 200 fwd. | 200 aft. |
| Tube spread | 42°F | 42°F | 42°F |
| Injection temp. | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sea condition | S.B.F.H. | S.B.F.H. | S.B.F.H. |
| Overhaul activity | | | |
| Remarks | None. | | |

-27-

— page 30 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5B PATROL NO. ONE
Time 1029.10 Date 4/9/45 Lat 36-50N Long 123-55 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description RAMB II - 3,635 Ton AK, page 71 of CNI 208J
(revised)

Ship sunk None. Ship saw periscope and avoided torpedoes.

Ship damaged None.

Target Draft 20' Course zigging from 100°-280°T Speed 14 Range 1750

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 4 kts. Course 340°T Depth 58' Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type attack Same as 5A. Target saw periscope when shooting at
first target. He zigged radically and possibly
speeded up. Course and speed were probably never
set correctly in TDC. Although the track angle
changed from starboard to port on TDC, assistant
TDC operator never got the word so that inadver-
tently third shot was spread forward and came
closest to hitting.

| | #3 | #2 | #1 |
| :| :----- | :----- | :----- |
| Tubes Fired | 55 S | 20 S | 15 P |
| Track angle | 013.30 | 010 | 003.10 |
| Gyro angle | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Depth set | miss | miss | miss |
| Hit or miss | no | no | no |
| Erratic | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Mk. Torpedo | 99200 | 99191 | 99168 |
| Serial No. | 8-7 | 8-7 | 8-5 |
| Mk. Exploder | 11365 | 10784 | 9818 |
| Serial No. | contact | contact | contact |
| Actuation set | contact | contact | contact |
| Actuation actual | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Mk. Warhead | 4610 | 4667 | 4612 |
| Serial No. | TFX | TFX | TFX |
| Explosive | 0 | 11 | 8 |
| Firing interval | 0 | 200 R | 200 L |
| Type spread | 42°F | 42°F | 42°F |
| Injection Temp. | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sea condition | S.B.F.H. | S.B.F.H. | S.B.F.H. |
| Overhaul Activity | | | |

Remarks None.

-28-

— page 31 —
U.S.S. TL.NTE (SS420)
Time 0355.30

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6A
Date 4/14/45 ' Lat 33-25N

F.TRCL NO. CNE
Long 126-15 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description Large AK, or AC, engines aft type. Identification uncer-
tain because of low visibility, and fact that target was
almost indistinguishable against shore line. Estimated
at 8 to 10,000 tons, believed loaded with ammunition or
aviation gas. A very valuable target, with a total of 3
escorts, and 2 other vessels patrolling the anchorage.

Ship Sunk Large AK, or AU.

Damage determined by: Saw target blow up.

Target draft 28' (est) Course 280°T Speed 0 Range 2,300 Act. 2300 used.

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 0 Course 178°T Depth surface Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type attack Radar surface. Used TBT for firing bearings. Target
was tracked only by TDC and then only one minute prior
to shooting. This was for 2 reasons. (1) A patrol boat
was lurking off the island and searching for us. Need-
less to say we tracked him. (2) The targets were so close
to shore that radar was unable to pick them up until
shortly before the firing point. However tracking an
anchored target was no problem. Torpedoes were not spread
on the TDC. They were sighted in on the TBT by the
belly calculating Lt-Comdr. BE.CH.

| | #6 | #5 | #4 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes Fired | 90s | 90s | 90s |
| Track angle | 344.30 | 351.35 | 350.35 |
| Gyro angle | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Depth set | hi | hi | hi |
| Hit or miss | miss | hit | hit |
| Erratic | no | no | no |
| Mk. torpedo | 14 3A | 14 3A | 14 3A |
| Serial No. | 26546 | 25939 | 40699 |
| Mk. Exploder | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 |
| Serial No. | 26562 | 27901 | 25776 |
| Actuation set | contact | contact | contact |
| Actuation actual | contact | contact | contact |
| Mk. Warhead | 16-4 | 16-4 | 16-4 |
| Serial No. | 15799 | 27901 | 19770 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing interval | 0 | 210 | 22 |
| Spread | Point of aim | Point of aim | Point of aim |
| Injection temp. | 56°F | 56°F | 56°F |
| Sea condition | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Overhaul Activity | S.B.F.H. | S.B.F.H. | S.B.F.H. |

Remarks Gyro angles matched by Indicator-Regulator. Current set the
first torpedo aimed at 1.T. enough to the right so that it
passed forward. Then current was allowed for on the succeed-
ing shots. The first torpedo exploded on the beach.

-29-

— page 32 —
U.S.S. TILLANTE (S420) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6 B&C PATROL NO. ONE
Time 0402 Date [HANDWRITTEN: 4/14/45] Lat 33-25N Long 126-15E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description 2 MIKURA Class P.F. Seen and identified when sil-
houetted against the exploding ship in attack #6A.

Ship Sunk 2 MIKURA Class P.F.

Damage determined by: Saw two hits in first ship, one in second. Saw
first ship blow up amidships. Saw second ship
hit, with a big explosion and a cloud of smoke,
and commence to sink stern first.

Target Draft unknown Course 280°T Speed 0 Range 2300 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 0 Course 189°T Depth surface Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type attack Same as 6A. Big gyro angles necessitated because
current was setting ship toward shore and bow
had to be kept out.

| | 6B Attack | | 6C Attack |
|---|---|---|---|
| | #3 | #2 | #1 |
| Tubes Fired | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Track angle | 335 | 334.45 | 341 |
| Gyro Angle | 6. | 6 | 6 |
| Depth set | hi | hi | hi |
| Power | hi | hi | hi |
| Hit or miss | hit | hit | hit |
| Erratic | no | no | no |
| Mk. Torpedo | 14 3A | 14 3A | 14 3A |
| Serial No. | 23442 | 64085 | 64048 |
| Mk. Exploder | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 |
| Serial No. | 33066 | 32872 | 17395 |
| Actuation set | contact | contact | contact |
| Actuation actual | contact | contact | contact |
| Mk. Warhead | 16-4 | 16-4 | 16-4 |
| Serial No. | 16127 | 20336 | 15542 |
| Injection temp. | 56°F | 56°F | 56°F |
| Explosive | TIX | TIX | TIX |
| Firing interval | | 16 | 44 |
| Type spread | Point of aim | Point of aim | Point of aim |
| Sea condition | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Overhaul activity | S.B.I.H. | S.B.I.H. | S.B.P.H. |

Remarks None

-30-

— page 33 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) GUN ATTACK NO. ONE P.TRUL No. ONE
Time 0428 Date 3/30/45 Lat 31-11N Long 130-09 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Sunk One Lugger 100 Tons.

Damage determined by: Saw target hit and burning. Came alongside
and saw target had sunk to water's edge.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Tracked lugger from seaward side of BONO MISAKI and up moon from
it until the course and speed were solved. Then crossed in front of
him at 4000 yards range and attacked him in the moon streak on the
starboard bow, opening up with the 20 MM and 40 MM guns at 2000 yards
presenting a 15° angle on the bow. Target answered fire with a .30
cal. machine gun, but ceased from fright more than from accuracy of
our guns.
On second run from lugger's quarter 5"/25 opened up with a hit at
1600 yards. Thereafter it was just a question of filling the lugger
full of holes. 5"/25 hit 50% of the time at 800 yards. Other guns
were very inaccurate.
Ammunition used for this action was excessive, but not when con-
sidering it was our first gun battle. Fire control used was the Dove
White system for the 5"/25 cal., spotting from the bridge for the 40MM.

Rounds expended
5"/25 - 33
40MM - 240
20MM - 10

-31-

— page 34 —
I. MINES

Possible evidence of enemy mine laying activity was encountered
when two periscopes, evidently from the same submarine, were sighted
at 0710 I, April 15. The only explanations of this occurrence are:

(1) Not a submarine. False contact.
(2) One of ours (not logical since our people wouldn't act that
way, and anyway we don't believe any of ours were in this vicinity).
(3) Enemy sub unable to fire torpedoes; hence careless with
periscopes.
Hence, logically, laying mines.
Position: Lat 31-42 N Long 127-44 E.

Six floating spherical shaped mines were encountered. Three on
the SHANGHAI-QUELLART route, position: Lat 32-26N Long 124-40E.
Periscope pictures of one such mine were taken close aboard it.
Three in approximate position, Lat 31-20N Long 128-04E.

J. ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS.

Anti-Submarine Measures.

Nothing radically new was noted except dogged persistence and all
around intensification of A/S measures, using, apparently, every avail-
able resource.

During her 22 days in areas NINE and TWELVE, TINANTE encountered
the following JAPANESE A/S measures:
1. Many night flying radar equipped planes - particularly in area
NINE during full moon period. Almost without exception, radar planes
were on 145-160 M.C. 1000 FREE. A few were sighted at night with no
evidence of radar.
2. Many day search planes - We were forced down consistently and
decisively when we attempted daylight surface patrol in area TWELVE.
One twin engine bomber 60 miles west of MIKIKUSAN T. in area TWELVE
came in out of the sun, forced us down, dropped two bombs (one a dud)
and stayed around to strafe the periscope and drop another apparent
dud (heard splash) one hour later. Then he called in his partners, who
depth charged the spot for several hours afterwards. A simi-
lar search plane, late that same afternoon, flew right over our periscope
after we dived for him when he was sighted broadside to us on the horizon.
3. Land based radar - one possible 10 CM radar on southern coast of
FUKAE SHIMA stayed on us at 5 miles prior to diving in morning.

Many of the usual 140-160 M.C. air search radars were intercepted on
the AIR. Attempted to stay about 10 miles away from them, but when
necessary to close them to reach our dawn diving spot off the coast,
did so with impunity to within 3-5 miles. Also, we completely flooded
down whenever possible and zigzagged by Arma Course Clock to render
detection and tracking by shore based radar more difficult.

4. Floating mines - sighted west of QUELLART ISLAND and in western

-32-

— page 35 —
half of area NINE.
was our only counter-measure. A special mine lookout and SJ plus a straight course
have watertight doors on the latch while these menaces were around. Crew was glad to
5. Four Hunter-Killer groups, radar equipped (three with 10 Cm,
one with 150 M.C. surface search radar.) echo-ranging - operating in
pairs on traffic routes. Plus "pairs" of "Japanese Special Sub Chasers"
#1" sweeping daily on the coastal route off NIKI SAKI and FUKAI SHIMA -
they listened when patrolling, pinged sonically ("clucking" sound every
1½ sec. above JF & SKI bands) when alerted. One pair off NIKI
SAKI depth charged a false contact 4000 yards south of us. Also dropped
several single charges that seemed to explode on the bottom. No ahead
throwing weapons.
6. "Sucker Bait" run through coastal traffic focal point off NIKI
SAKI right after events of paragraph 5 above, consisting of one very
small (about 600 tons) engine aft collier, very rusty, with bow
right mine chain with bow out of water 1/4 of length, screw thrashing
half out of water, lifeboat halfway lowered, with the same two patrol
boats in company. Apparently waiting for us to disclose our position by
shooting at it. Did not bite. No ordinary torpedo could have hit him.
7. "First team" echo ran in, radar equipped (10 Cm) "hunter-Killer"
group" gave us "deliberate depth charging after we sank a transport in area
TWELVE in 200 feet of water.
8. Two A/S vessels, one later identified as a PC-4 class (page 91
(NI 222J) patrolled the approaches to the anchorage off QUELLART ISLAND
in which we sank three ships. Both were 10 Cm equipped. One came
on 14.8 K.C. One was approached to 4500 yards before we identified him,
but his 10 Cm radar did not train on us until we had opened out to about
10,000 yards. However, when we came within 10,000 yards of this same
patrol vessel while clearing the area, he was alerted, apparently picked
us up with his 10 Cm radar or sighted us against the horizon, came over
to our diving position, and dropped a small pattern of depth charges.
While operating close to the harbor, just prior to and during the attack,
the other A/S vessel (harbor patrol) was consistently approached to
5000-8000 yards. That he did not pick us up with his 10 Cm radar is be-
lieved due to our hugging the coast and merging with his shore pips.

J. EVASION TACTICS
Following a daylight submerged attack which resulted in sinking
a transport, a "First Team" depth charging resulted. A/S conditions
were perfect: 200 feet of water, no density layers, phenomenal sound
conditions, class by sea. Initial patterns shortly after firing were
fairly close - mostly above, astern and to starboard. Three light
close bottom except for one charge in each pattern below. Immediately after one early
explosion were heard and registered "low" on SCBT. Ship
was running at 180 feet in 200 feet of water.

Unable to shake him at 140, 100 and 60 RPM (all below cavitation speed).
Two more "pingers" finally showed up and boxed us in on one listening and
pinging occasionally on 17.4 K.C. up ahead, one on either side pinging
every 8 sec. on 14.8 K.C. Decibel meter on JP unfortunately read up against
the top (20 db.) most of the time while boxed, but it was invaluable
when the escorts moved out a bit. Escorts made alternate runs starting
-33-

— page 36 —
from the quarter as indicated by slight speeding up, shifting to short
scale pinging, and constant true bearing. As the run developed, ping-
ing interval gradually decreased to about 1 second. Evasion consisted
of slowly speeding up from 60 RPM to about 100 RPM, sometimes as high
as 140 RPM (cavitation threshold) and observing true bearing of escorts
screws on JK and JF. If true bearing commenced to draw aft, turned toward
with hard over rudder (in emergency steering); if true bearing commenced
to draw forward, turned away sharply. By waiting him out a bit prior
to commencing evasive turn we were able to throw off his lead angle
at the last minute and make his pattern miss astern. During and after
depth charge disturbances we kept high speed on - but the assured
range of 3000 yards or over enabled escorts to maintain contact and stay
with us. Just after one good run and just as another was started, we
fired one NAC beacon set on low frequency band with 3 minutes delay,
plus two false target shells. The NAC beacon failed to operate. No
luck in shaking escorts. When the next good depth charge run developed -
another NAC beacon with the same setting was fired, plus three false
target shells as he came in. The NAC beacon did not function until 7
minutes after shooting it, although set for 3 min. delay. The oncoming
escort, who appeared almost at the dropping point for the best run of
the day - his true bearing remaining constant despite our best efforts -
suddenly shifted his pinging to the NAC beacon and FTS aft of us and did
not drop his pattern. All escorts then congregated around the NAC and
FTS, pinging like mad. The LNTE did not waste time pulling away at 0-60
RPM, running as silently as possible. Although escorts soon fanned
out in what appeared to be a coordinated retiring search curve, using
long scale pinging, they never picked us up again. Many more depth
charges were dropped at intervals on false contacts or just to hold
us down.

When we surfaced after sunset we had several SJ
equipped with Jap 10 Cm radar. After closing them to see if any ships
were with them - evaded on surface at high speed.

A sincere vote of thanks to our smart 1's who developed NAC and
FTS. Also to the men who developed the decibel meter for JF which is
invaluable for evasion, although a 50 decibel meter would be much better
when escorts get in close. The CDI also was of great assistance in
evasion, and should not be discarded.

K. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE.

Ordnance and Gunnery

Torpedo performance on this patrol was outstanding, as a result of:

(1) A beautiful job on the part of the Torpedo Shop, S/M Base,
Pearl Harbor.
(2) The conscientious and highly expert care of the torpedo gang
on this vessel.

Differing from the accustomed procedure, both electric and air
torpedoes were carried forward. Twelve MK 18-2's plus six MK 14 3's
(outboard in the racks) were thus carried. This worked out to everyone's

-34-

— page 37 —
satisfaction, except the Japs, inasmuch as the electr were used for
the daylight submerged approaches, mostly in very smooth seas close
to the beach, and the six air torpedoes were ready for the night attack,
where they are infinitely superior because of (1) higher speed, (2)
longer range.

Mark 18 Torpedoes

Charged weekly except in cold waters when they were charged every
ten days. No trouble was encountered with the MK 18-2 running slow in
cold water. On 9 April, when the NIKKO MARU was sunk with three out of
three MK 18-2's, the injection was 42°. The torpedoes fired had been
charged the day previously.

It is strongly recommended that terminal blocks be attached to all
batteries in MK 18 torpedoes. This immensely cuts down the work in-
volved in routining the torpedoes and, by enabling the cell voltages to
be taken much more easily, ensures against a low cell's interrupting a
torpedo run. Terminal blocks attached by the MK 18 shop in Pearl Harbor
were of invaluable help to us in taking all readings.

Hold down nuts were installed in all the depth setting mechanisms
with complete success as results proved, and full speed reduction was
applied corresponding to depths set. The expected "whale spouting" of
MK 18-2's at very shallow depth settings of two and four feet was noted.
This occurred in smooth sea at intervals of several hundred yards
apart for each torpedo.

MK 14 3A Torpedoes

It is noted that six MK 14-3A torpedoes were fired on the surface
in 54 ft. of water, ship lying to, with a gyro angle in one case as
great as 25° with no detriment to their accuracy.

Gunnery

The sights on the 40 MM gun are still causing trouble. Water tur-
bulence on diving bends the sights out of bore sight. The panoramic
telescopic sight is not bad, but the fact that it must be installed on
the gun just before firing is an inherent weakness. Pressure proof
telescopic sights should be removed from 3 inch and 4 inch guns ashore
and installed on the 40 MM at the earliest opportunity.

The 40 MM guns stood up surprisingly well considering that they
are definitely not a wet type. The automatic loaders were changed
every four days and the guns tested for firing by shooting several
rounds from them. Much greater accuracy and effectiveness was ex-
perienced in shooting these guns single fire than in automatic.

MK I Mod I Projector

A chrome plated LK I Mod I projector was carried on the bridge
structure. Chrome plate is the answer to maintaining it in effective
operating condition at all times. No difficulty was encountered with
it, except that it had to be cleaned once. A heavier coat of chrome
plate is advocated. The high shooting mortar shell is one good
answer to ship to

-35-

— page 38 —
plane recognition and is far superior to MK 10 flares, which blind
bridge personnel with smoke by day and flame by night.

Hull and Machinery

(1) Hydraulic periscope pistons

Twice since the ship has been built one of the rubber seal rings
on the pistons in the periscope hydraulic hoist cylinder has broken.
When this occurs the hoisting speed of the periscope is decreased and
the hydraulic surge tank in the conning tower rapidly fills with oil.
The last time this happened, on patrol, the hydraulic cylinder was dis-
assembled and a new piston seal ring installed - a two hour job.

It is believed that a piston with two seal rings would be advanta-
geous. When it was suggested at the building yard the answer was that
a piston with two rings would be too long and might get jammed in the
cylinder because of whip in the hoisting rod. This may be so; but
inspection of the piston indicates that a new piston of exactly the same
dimensions could be built, grooved for two seal rings. It is recom-
mended that this matter be investigated. The advantages of two rings
are obvious.

(2) Negative tank vent

Negative tank vent discharges on the port side of the pump room
bilges, in the forward end of the compartment. During a dive, all the
bilge water collects in front of negative vent on account of the down
angle, and when the tank is vented the whole pump room is subjected
to a high velocity spray of mixed oil and water. Several starting
panels have been thoroughly soaked and have required constant atten-
tion, but the most serious resulting casualty occurred to the TBL
motor generator set, which happens to be located in a most unfortunte
place.

Much effort has been expended in keeping pump room bilges dry,
and in erecting shields about the TBL motor generator. A permanent
solution requires an arrangement of baffles in negative vent so
that the air stream is directed aft instead of athwartships across
the bottom of the bilges. This will be requested in the ensuing refit.

(3) Shaft Squeal

The starboard shaft developed a squeal before our arrival at SAIPAN.
While there the ship was drydocked, the strut bearings sanded down in
raised spots, and the squeal eliminated. About two thirds of the way
through the patrol the squeal again became audible.

It is now believed that the bearing strips (phenolytic composition)
in the strut bearing are too long, binding on the ends. Then a slight
swelling due to absorption of moisture will cause a bowing of the bearing
strip, reducing clearance in the center, though it may be satisfactory
at both ends.

(4) Bent propeller

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— page 39 —
During the depth charge attack on April 9th while evading at 180
feet in 200 feet of water, the ship struck and scraped along the mud
bottom momentarily. After surfacing, while running at maximum speed,
excessive vibration was noted. Although a silence test was satis-
factory, both screws should be throughly checked for nicked or dis-
torted blades.

L. RADIO

Major Defects

The location of the TBL motor generator in the pump room has
proved unsatisfactory. The motor is always drenched with bilge water
on venting negative, and twice we were unable to transmit because of
this casualty, even after pumping the bilges as far down as possible.
It is requested that the motor generator be installed in the forward
torpedo room during refit. Plans and sketches for this change are
being prepared.

Jamming

Enemy jamming was the same as that reported in previous war patrol
reports. Though we were always able to tune them out, the Japs invaria-
bly tried concentrated jamming of NPM's Authenticator at the end of a
message.

Performance

The RBS installed in PEARL proved highly satisfactory in perform-
ance. Another RBS or an RBL in place of the less useful REH is
recommended for future installations.

The VHF transceiver worked exceptionally well for plane communica-
tions and ship to plane recognition. During training operations in
Pearl the maximum ship-to-ship range obtained was about six miles.

Comment

When calling NPM prior to transmitting, failure to receive authen-
tication from NPM on their "go ahead" leads to uncertainty and doubt
until the message has been sent and receipted for. Why couldn't NPM
send us our signal strength and an authenticator with the first "K"?
If such frequent use of channel 1286 for this purpose would compromise
the system, then the need is great enough to warrant adoption of a
separate authenticator system.

Whenever possible we transmitted immediately upon surfacing to
avoid the midnight rush on NPM. On one of our first transmissions from
the area it took three hours to get a "go ahead", during which time we
were repeatedly told to wait while urgent messages were being sent.
These extended transmissions make any attempt to avoid DF'ing worthless.

M. RADAR

Major Defects

-37-

— page 40 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1]
[HANDWRITTEN: 2]
In installing the ST radar the wave guide and dummy antennae were
reversed. We questioned this at the time, but were assured that the
reversal was standard installation. The set was useless from Panama
to Pearl, where the more savvy boys cut us in on the know. A lot of
work and headaches for inexcusable inefficiency on the part of those
who should have known better.

Damage

Early in the patrol our SD antennae insulator cracked and flooded the
mast. By nightly application of glyptol and bakelite cement we had al-
most stopped the leak when the depth charging on the ninth re-opened
the crack beyond repair. We were unable to use the SD at all, a serious
loss because the SD-5 receiver and our system of keying it twice every
three minutes had proven very successful in training and on the way to
the area.

The same depth charging broke a 755 tube in the TN-2. Pearl had
been unable to furnish spares for any of the radar receiver equipment
except for the SPA. We used the 755 out of the TN-3 which left us with-
out a receiver for the 300 to 1000 bands.

The SPA unit does not receive sufficient ventilation in its location
under the SD receiver. During refit we plan to have a separate venti-
lation duct run to it.

A splintered mica window, accidentally struck by periscope handle
on the wave guide valve extension reduced ST ranges about one-third.

Performance

The SJ's performance was outstanding. A second-return range on
land at 150 miles was obtained and 75-90 miles was average. The phe-
nomenon of surface trapping accounted for ranges on small ships at 35
miles. This is the subject of a separate report contained herein.

ST performance was good. Ring time was maintained at between
2400 and 2700 at all times.

Both SJ and ST required daily tuning. Our success in maintaining
top performance was due mainly to the use of the echo box in tuning the
SJ and the visibility of the SPA for observing echoes while tuning
the ST transmitter. With the OBU and SPA, tuning is greatly simplified
and the gear checked more often as a result.

The SJ was keyed for two sweeps, one fast, one slow, every five
minutes.

N. SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

All sound gear worked consistently well and the few troubles were
minor.

Sound conditions throughout the area were uniformly excellent. JP

-38-

— page 41 —
picked up two small mine-sweeps at 20,000 yards while they were making
only two knots. Pinging was heard on the QB at approximately 30,000
yards. The Japs used 14.2-14.8 Kcs. almost exclusively for super-
sonic pinging. One pinged on 17.8 Kcs.

O. DENSITY LAYERS.

Few layers were encountered in the area, and those negligible.
A bathythermograph card was taken daily, and all card are being sent
to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Hydrographic Office).

P. HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY.

Unexceptional, except in the fact that we carried 10 officers and
81 crew, plus 5 prisoners during the latter half of the patrol. Total
on board, 96. No particular discomfort was experienced.

Q. PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men detached after previous patrol - No previous patrol.
(b) Number of men on board during patrol - 81.
(c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol - 50
(d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - 74
(e) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol - 31

Performance of duty of officers and men was in accordance with the
high standards previously set for them by the Submarine Force. We were
fortunate in having a firm nucleus of experienced hands to season our
green youngsters.

The state of training of the entire ship's company was excellent.
Although the ship was new and the crew as a whole unseasoned, the
Commanding Officer has no hesitancy in stating that he departed on this
war patrol with a more thoroughly trained crew than in any of his pre-
vious nine war patrols.

Credit for this belongs to the ship's officers, many of them them-
selves untried, who worked unceasingly to achieve this result. And a
great share of the credit goes to our three training officers, Captain
D. C. Mac ILLAN at Portsmouth, Commander A. H. TAYLOR at New London,
Captain J. G. JOHNS at Balboa, and Captain Mac ILLAN again at Pearl
Harbor. To them the Commanding Officer wishes to extend his sincere
appreciation for a thankless job conscientiously done.

The large number of men (24) qualified in submarines after their
first patrol is indicative of the high caliber of men turned out by the
Submarine School. It is also a result of heavy emphasis placed upon
"school of the boat" at sea and ashore, since the crew was first assembled
at Portsmouth. Most of the men not yet ready to qualify were received
since leaving the East Coast and missed the Training Command's excellent
"school of the boat" in Portsmouth.

-39-

— page 42 —
R. MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

Pearl to Saipan                 3700 miles          43,300 gals.
Saipan to Area                  1745 miles          20,300 gals.
In area                         4105 miles          37,340 gals.
Area to Midway                  3380 miles          44,600 gals.

Totals                          12930 miles         145,540 gals.

S. DURATION

Days Pearl to Saipan            12
Days Saipan to Area             7
Days in area                    22
Days enroute to Midway          11
Days Submerged                  20
                                ___
Total days patrol               52

T. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes       Fuel            Provisions          Personnel factor

1               9,770 gals      30 days             20 days.

Limiting factor this patrol - expenditure of torpedoes.

-40-

— page 43 —
U. COMMUNICATIONS, R.D.R. AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES
R.DAR COUNTERMEASURES
1. Intercept of Enemy signals.

| Posit of | PRF | PW | Tuning | (all posits N.&E.)
| Date Ship Freq. | CPS | | Unit | Remarks
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3-24 29-55 151 | 500 | 11 | TN-2 | Yaku Shima - land based
|      130-24 | | | | air search.
| 3-24 30-34 143 | 500 | 15 | TN-2 | Land based air search
|      131-16 | | | | sweeping irregularly
| 3-24 29-59 150 | 1000 | 10 | TN-2 | Airborne
|      131-42 | | | |
| 3-25 30-53 145 | 500 | 11 | TN-2 | Land based airsearch.
|      129-52 | | | |
| 3-25 31-05.5 100 | 450 | 80 | TN-2 | Land based air search.
|      130-27.5 | | | |
| 3-25 31-09 150 | 1000 | 5 | TN-2 | Airborne - At 16,000 yds.
|      130-07 | | | | on SJ; saturation was 9
| | | | | closing range resulted in
| | | | | weaker signal. Was evid-
| | | | | ently decreasing output
| | | | | to narrow bearing.
| 3-25 31-33 145 | 500 | 5 | TN-2 | Possibly portable air
|      129-25.7 | | | | search double pulse 5
| | | | | u/sec PW each.
| 3-26 31-33 150 | 500 | 5 | TN-2 | Portable air search.
|      129-25.7 | | | |
| 3-26 31-33 470 | 510 | 3 | TN-3 | Pulse shape: [drawing of a pulse shape]
|      129-25.7 | | | | No more avail-
| | | | | able info.
| 3-26 - 155 | 500 | 10 | TN-2 | S/M or landbased air
| | | | | search.
| 3-28 31-40.7 196 | 1200 | 5 | TN-2 | Possibly mobile air
|      129.8 | | | | search, Shipboard AA
| | | | | search, or AA fire
| | | | | control.
| 3-28 31-40.7 150 | 500 | 7 | TN-2 | Landbased air search
|      129-16.8 | | | | antennae rotating about 1
| | | | | RPM
| 3-28 31-40.7 465 | 500 | 3-5 | TN-3 | No info.
|      129-16.8 | | | |

— page 44 —
Posit of
Date Ship Freq. PRF PW Tuning Remarks
             CPS Unit
3-28 31-40.7 145 500 - TN-2 Land based air search
     129-16.8

3-28 " 155 500 10 TN-2 Possibly land based air
                                        search or S/M

3-29 31-01.8 75 250 30 TN-2 Land based air search.
     129-38.7

3-30 31-19.8 99 300 40 TN-2 Land based air search.
     130-2.4                                Off Satsuma.

3-29 30-4 75 510 60 TN-2 Land based air search.
     129-40.5                                Detected while doing life
                                        guard duty off KYUSHU.

3-30 " 145 500 6-8 TN-2 Land based air search.
                                        Strong signal.

3-30 " 147 1000 5-8 TN-2 Possibly airborne

3-30 30-59.5 72 500 40 TN-2 Land based air search.
     130-27.8                                Pulse shape: [drawing of pulse shape]
                                        Slight change of freq.
                                        Setting resulted in
                                        pulse shape as follows:
                                        [drawing of pulse shape with curved line] possibly lobe
                                        switching.

3-31 30-45.5 99 400 33 TN-3 Land based air search.
     129-57.2                                Pulse shape: [drawing of square pulse shape]

3-31 31-25.2 150 500 14 TN-2 Land based air search
     129-57                                  (sweeping irreg; strong
                                        output) swung ship and
                                        obtained bearing on Bono
                                        Misaki; had previously
                                        observed installations
                                        on Bono Misaki light-
                                        house.

3-31 " 200 500-1000 12 TN-2 Believed to be shipborne.

4-1 31-26 155 500 7-8 TN-2 S/M or land based air
     129-40                                  search.

4-1 " 75 500 44-50 TN-2 Land based air search.
                                        Ragged pulse:
                                        [drawing of ragged pulse shape]

4-1 31-23.8 150 500 13-15 TN-2 Land based air search.
     129-19.1

-42-

— page 45 —
Posit of
Date | Ship | Freq. | PRE | PW | Tuning | Remarks
     |      |       | CPS |    | Unit   |
4-1  | 31-28.5 | 470 | 500 | 3-5 | TN-3 | Possibly airborne. Weak.
     | 129-31.3 |     |     |     |      | Came in and went out
     |          |     |     |     |      | sharply.
4-1  | 31-29.3 | 96  | 400 | 30-40 | TN-2 | Land based air search.
     | 129-36.4 |     |     |       |      |
4-1  | "        | 146 | 1000 | 5-7 | TN-2 | Airborne. Keyed.
4-2  | 31-24    | 197 | 1200 | 10-13 | TN-2 | Possibly mobile air
     | 130-25   |     |     |       |      | search, shipboard AA
     |          |     |     |       |      | search, or AA F.C.
4-2  | Off      | 150 | 1000 | 6   | TN-2 | Airborne. Keyed.
4-2  | Bono     | 146 | 750 | 10  | TN-2 | Possibly air search.
     | Misaki   |     |     |     |      |
4-3  | 32-24.5 | 95  | 350 | 60  | TN-2 | Land based air search.
     | 129-41  |     |     |     |      | Very strong:
     |         |     |     |     |      | [drawing of a pulse shape]
4-3  | "        | 150 | 500 | 12  | TN-2 | Land based air search.
     |          |     |     |     |      | Pulse shape:
     |          |     |     |     |      | [drawing of a pulse shape]
4-4  | 32-14.2 | 152 | 550 | 3   | TN-2 | Land based air search.
     | 129-50.8 |     |     |     |      |
4-5  | 32-18.8 | 148 | 1200 | 10  | TN-2 | Airborne. Pulse shape;
     | 129-4.1 |     |     |     |      | [drawing of a pulse shape]
     |         |     |     |     |      | Radar contact 11000 yds.
4-5  | 32-27.3 | 94  | 800 | 12  | TN-2 | Land based air search.
     | 128-43  |     |     |     |      | Pulse shape:
     |         |     |     |     |      | [drawing of a pulse shape]
4-5  | "        | 76  | 600 | 25-35 | TN-2 | Land based air search.
     |          |     |     |       |      | Pulse shape:
     |          |     |     |       |      | [drawing of a pulse shape]
4-5  | 32-48    | 94  | 800 | 20  | TN-2 | Land based air search.
     | 128-22.9 |     |     |     |      | Pulse shape:
     |          |     |     |     |      | [drawing of a pulse shape]
4-5  | 34-9.2   | 160 | 550 | -   | TN-2 | Land based air search.
     | 127-27.7 |     |     |     |      | Pulse shape:
     |          |     |     |     |      | [drawing of a pulse shape] <- Steady.
4-9  | 34-25    | 155 | 500 | 5   | TN-2 | On Ko To in Daikokusan
     | 125-17   |     |     |     |      | Gunto Group.

-43-

— page 47 —
4. Data on photographs taken.

Roll 1, exposure #1-3 Kaimon Dake, Kyushu.
#5 Jap picket boat.
#6 Kiyotada Maru sunk on March 25th.
#7-8 Sampan.
#9 Steam patrol vessel off Oniki Saki, Kyushu.
#10 Sampan off Oniki Saki.
#11-12 Picket boat off Oniki Saki.
#13-14 Oniki Saki, Kyushu.
#15, 16, 17 Maru sunk on March 28th-MK18-2 torpedo
donated by employees of Westinghouse,
Sharon, Pa.

Roll 2, exposure #1 Sea truck, lugger type.
#2-4 Bono Misaki Lighthouse, southern Kyushu.
Radar installations observed.
#3 Lugger.
#10-23 Fukae Shima, southern coast, Goto Retto
Group. Radar installations observed.

Roll 3, exposure #1-3 Korean fishing schooner.
#4 Lighthouse, southern tip of Shori To.
34-24N 127-48.5E.
#14 Patrol Frigate
#15 Chidori

Roll 4, exposure #1-3 Picket boat or mine sweep, west of
Quelpart Island.
#4-6 Floating mine usual type. 32-31.5N
124-47.6E.

Report of Surface Trapping on SJ and ST Radars.

Ref: (a) CNO conf. ltr. OP-20-F-5-MMS(SC) S67-5, serial 0502820
of 8 January 1945.

The first occasion of surface trapping noted by this vessel
occurred on the night of April 9.
time: 2100 Item.
posit: lat. 36-49 N long. 123-53 E.
wind direction: 200°T. velocity: 3
air temperature: 48°
sea temperature: 43°
barometric pressure: 29.51 state of sea: 1

Two pips were first observed on the ST (X band) radar while
still at periscope depth, antennae height 4½ feet above the surface.
The range on the first 24,000 yds., the second 36,000 yds. On sur-
facing, the SJ (S band) radar, antennae height 23 ft. at the time,
showed bearings to be 090°T and 190° respectively on the same pips.
Radar interference in the SJ screen from the direction of 090°T was
analyzed as friendly and we exchanged recognition signals by radar
keying with the USS SHADEFISH. At the time we could not believe it,
but in the light of subsequent observations it can be assumed that
our range of 24,000 yds. on the 090°T bearing was on a submarine.
Maximum range on a submarine under normal conditions is 16,000.
-45-

— page 48 —
We did not investigate the contact at 190°T but tracked it with radar
ranges and bearings and determined it was moving away.

These pips, and later ones we observed, were of unusual
strength and clarity. Pip height at 36,000 was almost saturation and
it was very easy to (lobe) switch for an accurate bearing.

The second observation of surface trapping was on April
12th.
    time: 0120 Item.
    posit: 31-40 N 123-50 E.
    wind direction: 170°T. velocity: 3
    air temperature: 58°
    sea temperature: 55°
    barometric pressure: 29.40 state of sea: 1
    radar: SJ, antennae height 24 feet.

This pip, having the same unusual characteristics of size and
sharpness as the others, appeared at 70,000 yds, bearing 190°T.
We closed to 40,000 where the pip suddenly decreased rapidly in size and
then disappeared. We did not attempt further to determine the type vessel.

At 2230 Item on the same day, we observed two pips at a distance
of 75,000 yds, on 235°T, and this time we ran down the bearing. Conditions
were approximately the same as given above, except that the sea was
glassy. The pips did not disappear but at 18,000 yards they rapidly
assumed a real size and were analyzed as destroyers or large picket boats.
Lobing was simple from 75,000 to 20,000, and then very difficult as it
would be normally for that range.

It must be emphasized that these pips were not second return
echoes on land nor were they "ghost echoes" due to reflection from one
object to another. We constantly checked for any signs of the above by
varying our pulse rate and swinging ship. The pips tracked on TDC and
plot. The only difference observed between these pips at 75,000 yds. and a
normal pip was the narrow base of the former; height and sharpness were
identical with a pip on a destroyer at 10,000 yds.

That same night, at about 0230 April 13, this vessel exchanged
recognition signals via SJ radar with the U.S.S. SIOT. The SIOT sent us
her position, which was 240 miles from us. Signal strength and reada-
bility were excellent.

During our stay in the Yellow Sea area, from April 6 to 15,
radar ranges on land averaged 80 to 90 miles consistently. One range was
150 miles. (These are second-return on the SJ. Second returns were in-
frequently observed on the ST while surfaced - antennae height 36 ft. -
but we used that radar less often. Another factor in ST vs. SJ per-
formance is that our ST output is 35 kilowatts as compared to the SJ's
50 kilowatts).

During this time the air was dry, the wind velocity between
0-3 knots.

The phenomenon of extraordinary SJ ranges persisted for the
whole time that we were in the vicinity of 32°N 125°E. Maximum range

-46-

— page 49 —
varied from 70,000 yards to 50,000 yards, but we felt al all time
sure of a minimum range of 25 miles during this period. (about 1 week)

COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES

See Paragraph L.

SONAR COUNTERMEASURES

Jap supersonic pinging was almost invariably at 14.2 - 14.8
kcs. In one instance, echo ranging at 17.4 kcs. was noted.

V. COMMENTS

Schedules and Transmissions

The greatest disadvantage to diving frequently at night is
that regular receipt of NIM schedules is seriously interfered with.
During this patrol an unusually large number of serials were missed,
because of our frequently being forced to dive by night radar planes.
It is submitted that diving at night for planes except when in actual
contact with the enemy or when enroute to a definite objective, is
just as logical as diving during daylight for planes. At night one
can surface a little sooner than during daylight, but the arguments
for remaining undetected are equally cogent. As far as night search
is concerned, the enemy has apparently adopted the policy of anchor-
ing at night whenever at all possible, thus reducing submarine
effectiveness at night in practically all areas pertaining to them.
At any rate, a one hour dive need not ever seriously affect the
efficiency of night radar sweeps, but it makes one miss serials
if only run once or twice.

The following suggestions are humbly offered to minimize the
interference in NIM schedules:
(1) Decrease the number of serials by more strict adherence
to the original purpose of serially numbering messages - ie:
ONLY those messages that all subs must have should be serialized.
For example the nightly news letter, as interesting as it is,
need not be serially numbered; yet, since it is serialized,
we must open up if we miss three news letters, and ask for
them. On the other hand, changes in recognition signals are
not serially numbered. The consequences of missing one of
these changes might be very grave, and it is submitted that
they should be serialized.
(2) Decrease the lengths of all messages by a careful choice
of words. Messages involving change of CSI 1270, for instance,
average three times necessary length, and as a matter of fact,
are usually a day late, and consequently entirely unnecessary.
(3) Delete long stereotyped expressions denoting originator,
which use up many groups. Short code names with several al-
ternates could be used, if name of originator is essential.
However, all messages to subs on patrol are from the same
four originators, unless, rarely, they are rebroadcasts of
a message received from a ship on patrol. Except in the last

-47-

— page 50 —
c se, submarines on patrol don't really care who originated the
message.
(4) Make absolutely certain that NFM broadcasts all serials at
least three times during the specified hours. If it can be done
without overloading the transmitting facilities, all serials should
be rebroadcast the next night also. NFM should be monitored to
insure early correction of any error.

World news was received occasionally from NFM on the schedules,
and occasionally proved of interest. This service would be much im-
proved if some discrimination as to what news to send were to be
exercised. In one instance for example, NFM sent the only news of the
day, a lengthy report on some unimportant tennis match between two
unknown players at an obscure resort.

During this patrol, a weather report was transmitted every other
night. In spite of authorized abbreviations, etc. the "overhead" of
each message was about fifty groups. That is to say, every time we
opened up we had to send at least fifty groups before anything else at
all could be said. During 3½ years of war the amount of information
required from submarines on patrol and consequently the length of
transmission has tripled. To decrease the average length of submarine
transmissions without sacrifice in clarity or decrease in information
contained therein, it is suggested that a number code be developed,
similar to the weather code, by which such information can briefly
be transmitted.

SONAR

As stated in paragraph J "Anti-Submarine Measures and Evasion
Tactics", the use of a decibel meter in conjunction with the JI sound
gear was invaluable in estimating the distance of an anti-submarine
vessel and the time at which he started his runs. However, our meter
reads only up to 20 decibels (+6). With large, fast escorts, the
sound level may be over twenty decibels when they are a mile away.
What we need is a meter calibrated from 0 to 50 decibels; with that
information plus bearing changes and turn counts, the submarine would
be able to plot the attacking ship at all times.

A Weston 22196, No. 695 noise level meter might be the answer.
This was on the ship's original allowance list but was crossed off by
Portsmouth supply department.

SD RADAR

Contrary to expectations of all officers on board with patrol
experience, the loss of the SD radar did not in any manner affect
the number of Jap plane contacts. We dived for as many planes
without the SD as with it. It is believed that the enemy cannot, or
does not DF the SD when it is keyed irregularly for very short periods
at a time. When operating close to his coast, it is even probable
that he cannot readily distinguish it from his own many radar sets
of the same or similar frequency. This vessel is fitted with an
SD-5 set, with the persistent screen feature, which makes an
efficient SD watch possible with a 1 second "buzz" every two

-48-

— page 51 —
or three minutes. Doctrine was to "buzz" it twice every three minutes
during daylight, and to buzz it on an AIR contact day or night. After
two years of mistrust of the SD, the Commanding Officer feels that
with these new modifications, the SD-5 is an excellent piece of gear.

CREW

A crew of 81 enlisted men and 10 officers was taken on patrol
which is believed to be an all time high to date. We have 77 crews'
bunks plus 10 officers' bunks (using the wardroom). With a crew of
this size, however, it was possible to stand the following surface
watches: Telephone watches in both torpedo rooms, maneuvering room,
control room, and conning tower. These telephones "paid off" frequent-
ly particularly when diving alarms and IKC failed on a training dive.
Two controllermen in maneuvering room (total of 3 men counting phone
watch). Two operators in radio room. Chief of watch, auxiliaryman,
APR-SD-IFF man, and phone man in control room. Sound man, telephone
man, SJ-high periscope watch stander, helmsman in conning tower. Five
lookouts (six if desired) plus OOD, JOOD, and QM on bridge. Either
8 or 9 good lookouts topside. Our "Eagles" did a marvelous job in
face of intense plane activity day and night. With this number of
officers and lookouts on bridge we could still dive the boat in 30
seconds flooded down.

AREA

No traffic was found underway during darkness in areas Nine
and Twelve, except anti-submarine patrols. Yet there is doubtless
quite a bit of traffic hugging the coast of China in undiveable
water of 10 fathoms or less, swinging up past the Shantung Promontory,
and running down the Korean coast close to the beach. A large area
like Area Twelve could best be covered, it is felt, by two or possibly
three wolf packs. The Japs are probably doing a fairly clever and
consistent job of routing their shipping around our submarines,
aided by every plane sighting, RDF fix on transmitting submarines,
or other type of contact. In these days of few targets, it is possi-
ble that a heavier concentration of boats in the Yellow and East China
Seas would severely restrict the movement of what little merchant
marine the enemy has left. Heavy and persistent air patrol of the
area forces submarines to operate submerged by day. Thus robbed
of surface mobility and increased surface search radius, the sub-
marine becomes a "weapon of opportunity" submerged. More submarines
are thus needed for efficient coverage.

OFFICERS

The Commanding Officer would like to single out each of his
officers for individual recognition for his meritorious service, but
this is manifestly impossible, and he will content himself by men-
tioning the most deserving out of an outstanding group of officers.
Special mention is made of the performance of Lieut. E. G. C. BELL,
Engineer and Diving Officer. In eight war patrols Lieut. C. BELL
proved himself an experienced, fearless, cool, and always highly
capable submarine officer. It is expected that he will be ready
for an Executive Officer's billet for his next patrol. Ensigns

-49-

— page 52 —
D. R. JONES and W. E. LEDFORD, both ex-enlisted men, have contributed
mightily to the successful results of this patrol. As First Lieutenant,
Ens. JONES had much to do with getting us there and getting us back, and
as Plot #2 he was a valuable cog in our attack organization. Ens.
LEDFORD, as Assistant Torpedo Officer was primarily responsible for
the beautiful torpedo performance we realized.

Lieut.(jg) T. C. MARCUSE
The Commanding Officer desires to take this means of publicly
commending Lieut.(jg) T. C. MARCUSE, the Communications, Radar, and
Sound Officer of this vessel. Although he reported aboard fresh
from submarine school and knew next to nothing about radar, radio,
or sound, he applied himself with such diligence to his duties that
he has become an expert in this field. Consequently when it was
impossible to find a regular officer graduate of the radar school,
this officer had so thoroughly fitted himself to be radar officer
that the lack of a school graduate was no detriment to the ship. He
manned the JF sound gear during evasion and counter attack, where
his services were of most outstanding value to the Commanding Officer.
Needless to say, the conduct of Lieut.(jg) MARCUSE under the most
trying conditions was exemplary, and much of the credit for the
results of this patrol deservedly goes to him.

Lieut. E. I. PEABODY II
This officer is one of the most hardworking, keen, and aggressive
personnel has ever been the Commanding Officer's fortune to serve with.
Practically a stranger to the TDC when he was ordered to the TIRANTE,
having served his previous submarine career in R-boats, he is now a TDC
expert, fit to compete with anyone for the title. Part of his success
is due to never-ending study and daily "workouts", the remainder to a
superbly quick analytical mind. As can be seen by perusal of the
Narrative section of this report, Lieut. Peabody distinguished himself
by boarding a Korean schooner and taking three prisoners therefrom,
and by diving over the side and rescuing a Jap aviator who was
apparently waving between dying for the emperor and being rescued.
The qualities exhibited by Lieutenant PEABODY are no doubt the same
which won him the designation of "All American" as well as the
KNUTE ROCKNE award for the "outstanding lineman of the year" at
Harvard in 1941. He is in all respects an outstanding Naval Officer
and many brilliant reports may be expected of him in the future.

Lt-Comdr. Edward L. BEACH, USN, Class of 1939.
The success of this patrol is due in great measure to the un-
tiring efforts of the Executive Officer, Lt-Comdr. Edward L. BEACH,
USN, Class of 1939. This officer has spared no pains in organizing
and training the officers and crew from the building period on. The
results speak for themselves. The Commanding Officer wishes to pay
tribute to this outstanding loyal, capable, smart and aggressive
"right hand" man who was a tower of strength at all times.

Teaming up with the Captain by taking the "Command Call Duty"
during darkness, Lt-Comdr. BEACH did a beautiful job of carrying the
lead during intense radar plane activity & many radar contacts, thus
enabling the Commanding Officer to get much needed rest. He more than
justified the Commanding Officer's great confidence in him.
as bridge officer, manning TBT's on night attack, and as Assistant

-50-

— page 53 —
Approach Officer on submerged attacks, stationed in the vicinity of
the TDC where he could advise the Captain, coordinate ST radar
Sound, Assistant TDC operator, and firing key operator, he fulfilled,
to perfection, the key function in our fire control party.
This officer is considered to be one of the outstanding sub-
marine officers of the war. With eleven war patrols to his credit (ten
of which were in the highly successful TRIGGER), the last five patrols
served in the capacity of Executive Officer and Navigator, it is
strongly recommended that Lt-Comdr. BLECH be given command of a com-
batant fleet submarine as soon as possible.
Only two objections immediately arise. First - the Jap, who
stands to lose more ships as a result. Second - the TIRANTE, who
will miss her superb fighting Exec. more than she cares to admit.

— page 54 —
FB5/322/A16-3
Serial: (02)

SUBMARINE DIVISION THREE TWENTY TWO
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
29 April 1945

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) Report
of First War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division THREE TWENTY TWO.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY TWO.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) - Report of First War Patrol.

1. The first war patrol of the U.S.S. TIRANTE, under the
command of Lieutenant Commander George L. STREET, III, was con-
ducted in the East China and Yellow Seas. The patrol was of fifty-
two days duration, twenty-two of which were spent in the area.
The patrol was terminated by the expenditure of torpedoes. This
was the tenth war patrol of Lieutenant Commander STREET, but his
first in command.

2. The Division Commander considers this to be one of
the outstanding patrols of the war. The TIRANTE penetrated deep
into coastal waters to find suitable targets and she was amply
rewarded for her aggressiveness and sound analysis of enemy ship-
ping routes. Her evasive measures to minimize enemy counter at-
tacks were particularly good.

Torpedo Attack #1 - March 25, 1945. Sunk - 3080 Ton
AK (Kiyotade Class). Using her ST radar to excellent advantage,
the TIRANTE conducted a standard daylight submerged attack on a
single small AK. One MK. 18 hit of three torpedoes fired com-
pletely demolished the target and she was seen to sink in about
one minute.

Torpedo Attack #2 - March 28, 1945. Sunk - One Type
"C" FTC 2700 Ton AK. After an excellent ST approach on a single
unescorted AK. One Mk. 18 torpedo hit of the three Mk. 18's
fired caused the target to sink immediately. The area was being
patroled by two patrol boats who counterattacked TIRANTE with
eight depth charges. The hitting torpedo was the one donated
by the employees of the Westinghouse Electric Plant, Sharon, Pa.

[HANDWRITTEN: α]
-1-

— page 56 —
SUBMARINE DIVISION THREE TWENTY TWO
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Cal.

FB5/322/A16-3

Serial: (02)                                                    29 April 1945

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) Report
of First War Patrol.

— page 58 —
FC5-32/A16-3
Serial: 058
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON THIRTY-TWO

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
4 May 1945.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS TIRANTE (SS420) Report
of First War Patrol Dated
25 April 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY-TWO.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
      (2) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) - Report of First War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine
Division THREE TWENTY-TWO.

2. This first patrol for the U.S.S. TIRANTE will go down in history
as one of the most outstanding patrols of the war and is a superlative example
of aggressiveness, intelligent planning, and expert execution of the primary
functions of a wartime submarine.

3. The torpedo attacks made on April 14th are particularly noteworthy
for the cool calculation, the daring, and the skill, with which they were
conducted.

4. It is recommended that the U.S.S. TIRANTE be credited with damage
to the enemy on her first patrol as follows:

SUNK
1 - AK (Kiyotada Maru Type) (EC) - 3,080 tons (Torpedo Attack No.1)
1 - AK (Type "C" FTC) (EC) - 2,700 tons (Torpedo Attack No.2)
1 - AO (EC) - 2,800 tons (Torpedo Attack No.4)
1 - AP (Nikko Maru) (EC) - 5,080 tons (Torpedo Attack No.5A)
1 - AK (Ramb II) (EC) - 3,685 tons (Torpedo Attack No.5B)
1 - AK or AO(EU) - 10,000 tons (Torpedo Attack No.6A)
1 - PF (Mikura Class) (EC) - 1,500 tons (Torpedo Attack No.6B)
1 - PF (Mikura Class) (EC) - 1,500 tons (Torpedo Attack No.6C)
1 - MIS (Lugger) (EC) - 100 tons (Gun Attack No. 1)
TOTAL - 30,445 tons

5. The Squadron Commander most heartily congratulates the commanding
officer, officers, and crew upon the completion of this aggressive, outstandin,
smartly conducted first patrol, and for the extensive damage inflicted upon
the enemy in expertly conducted attacks on targets sought out close to the
enemy's shoreline.

[SIGNATURE: K. C. Hurd]
K. C. HURD.

— page 59 —
1Q(A) 16-3(18)
Serial 01099
[STAMP: CONFIDENTIAL]

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
TIRANTE Report of
First War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 750
U.S.S. TIRANTE - FIRST WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) - Report of First War Patrol
(3 March to 25 April 1945).

1. The first war patrol of the TIRANTE, under the command of Lieutenant-
Commander G. L. Street, III, U. S. Navy, was conducted in the East China Sea and
Yellow Sea areas. The TIRANTE coordinated her patrol with the TRUTTA, LIONFISH, and
PICUDA, with the commanding officer of the TRUTTA being group commander.

2. The TIRANTE's first patrol is outstanding and adds a glorious chapter
to the nation's history. It is characteristic of the decided aggressiveness,
brilliant planning and intelligent use of all weapons. The torpedo attacks made on
April 14, deep along the enemy shore, at ships in a protected anchorage are
examples of extreme skill, daring, and brilliant judgment.

3. By intelligent area coverage and penetration of the enemy's inner
defenses, the TIRANTE made several worthwhile contacts. In seven attacks she sank
three freighters, one small tanker, one large tanker, and three frigates. In a
gun action she sank a lugger. The TIRANTE captured three prisoners from a schooner
and also two aviation personnel from a downed Jap aircraft.

4. The torpedo donated by the employees of the Westinghouse Electric
Plant in Sharon, Pennsylvania, accounted for the sinking of one freighter.

5. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

6. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the
commanding officer, officers, and crew of the TIRANTE for this outstanding first
patrol. The TIRANTE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon
the enemy during this patrol:

[STAMP: RECEIVED]
[STAMP: NAVY DEPARTMENT]
[STAMP: MAY 22 1945]

[HANDWRITTEN: 2ND Copy]
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
11 May 1945.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

Ga

- 1 -

[HANDWRITTEN: 24]

[STAMP: RECEIVED S-C FILES]
[STAMP: ROOM 2055]
[STAMP: 21 MAY 1945]
[HANDWRITTEN: WHITE 10]
[HANDWRITTEN: Up to]
[HANDWRITTEN: File No. 170165 2104/SS420]
[HANDWRITTEN: Ag. No.]

— page 62 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

SS420/A16
Serial 003
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1G]
[HANDWRITTEN: BY] [SIGNATURE: G.L. Street] [HANDWRITTEN: DATE 6/26/72]
19 July 1945

From : The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. TIRANTE.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) The Commander in Chief, U.S.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420), Report of War Patrol Number Two.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the Second War Patrol of this
vessel, conducted in the East China and Yellow Seas during the period
20 May 1945 to 19 July 1945, is forwarded herewith.

2. During the entire period of this patrol the Commanding
Officer acted as Pack Commander of a Coordinated Search and Attack
Group consisting of the U.S.S. RONQUIL, PADDLE, SEA DEVIL, SEA OWL,
and HADDO, and for part of this period the U.S.S. SEGUNDO, SEA CAT,
BILLFISH, QUEENFISH, TRUTTA, SPOT, THREADFIN and SEA ROBIN. This
report also constitutes the report of the Pack Commander of this group.

[SIGNATURE: G.L. Street]
G. L. STREET, III.

[HANDWRITTEN: FILMED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 136425]

— page 63 —
A. Prologue
Arrived Midway April 25, 1945, from First War Patrol and commenced
refit under Commander Submarine Division 322 and the U.S.S. PELIAS.

Lt. Comdr. Edward L. BEACH was detached and became a FCO and
Commanding Officer of TIRANTE's relief crew. No major alterations
were accomplished: Lt.(jg) Edward J. SKEEHAN reported for duty.

Officers and crew returned from a very pleasant Midway rest period
on May 10th and were very pleased to take over an immaculately clean
ship. Sub-Div 322 did a splendid job and receives our commendation
and gratitude.

Commenced predeparture training on May 11th. Underwent six days
of intensive training under the watchful eyes of Captain D. C. MacMILLAN,
our training officer and Division Commander. Five exercise torpedoes
were fired.

May 18th and 19th were devoted to loading. At this time replaced
single mount 20 MM gun with twin mount 20 MM, on deck forward. Also
obtained new type panoramic sights for both 40 MM guns.

-1-

— page 64 —
B. Narrative

May 20, 1945
1400 (M) Underway from Midway in company with U.S.S. SEA OWL and
U.S.S. PUFFER enroute Saipan in accordance with CTG 17.5 Opord 15-45.
The following officers and chief petty officers on board.

Officers                 Age *Patrols Duty      Qual.    Battle Stations

Lt-Comdr. G. L. Street, USN 31    11     CO       Com'd    A.O.
Lt. E. G. Campbell, USNR    28    9      Exec     Subs     A.A.C., Spot one.
                                         Nav
Lt. E. Peabody, II, USNR    25    2      Torp     Subs     T.D.C.
                                         Gun
Lt.(jg) T.C. Marcuse, USNR. 25    2      Comm     -        Radar, Sound
                                         Radar
                                         Sound
Lt.(jg) J.J. Donnelley, USNR 24    2      Elect    Subs     D.O.
Lt.(jg) R.E. Richey, USN    23    2      Eng      -        Asst.T.D.C.
                                                           5" gun.
Lt.(jg) E. J. Sheehan, USNR 30    1      Asst.lst Subs    Formation Plot,
                                         Lieut.            Fwd. 40MM, Damage
                                                           control.
Ensign D.R. Jones, USN      30    12     1st.Lt.  Subs     Plot #2
Ensign W. N. Dietzen, USN   22    2      Commisy  -        Plot #1, Aft 40MM
Ensign W. E. Ledford, USN   24    9      Asst.    Enl.     Torp. Rooms.
                                         Torp.

*Includes present patrol.

C.P.O.'s                 Rate         Age      *Patrols

Remley, D. W.            CTM(PA)      28       9
Thomas, E. F.            CMOMM(PA)    29       10
Few, W. H.               CQM(T)       28       9
Fickel, L. F.            CMOMM(T)     34       3
Williams, C. W.          CPhM(T)      25       6
Snider, M. R.            CRM(T)       25       2
May, C. A.               CMOMM(T)     29       5
Baker, T. L.             CMOMM(AA)(T) 25       11
Hess, R. H.              CMOMM(AA)(T) 26       8
Ferris, W. R.            CMOMM(AA)(T) 25       10
Freeland, A. E.          CEM(AA)(T)   28       6
Frank, H. E.             CTM(AA)(T)   25       9
Secard, E. L.            CRT(AA)(T)   24       8
Stein, R. O., Jr.        CSM(T)       24       2 (Special
                                                 photographer)

May 20-29
Enroute Saipan conducting daily training exercises and communications
drill with submarines in company.

May 22
Sighted Ventura bomber, bearing 045°T, range 8 miles. Did not close.

May 27
2220 - Passed U.S.S. GATO on opposite course.

-2-

— page 65 —
May 28
     0034 - Sighted U.S. GUITARRO and exchanged recognition signals
     via SJ radar.
     0324 - Sighted numerous B-29's heading toward Japan. Give 'em Hell
     boys!
     0640 - Made rendezvous with escort and set course for Saipan.
     1126 - Moored outboard of U.S.S. SEA DEVIL in nest on starboard
     side of U.S.S. ORION. Commenced voyage repairs.

May 29-31
     Undergoing voyage repairs alongside U.S.S. ORION. Splendid co-
     operation by all tender personnel remedied all troubles including the
     repacking of a bad port stern tube. The cordial hospitality
     of Capt. [UNCLEAR: LENT], USN, CTG 17.7 and his most efficient staff was
     [UNCLEAR: appreciated].

     Upon arrival Saipan, TIRANTE received orders to organize a nine-boat
     patrol pack called "Street's Sweepers" consisting of RONQUIL, SEA DEVIL,
     and PADDLE, called "Texlander's Technicians" and the SEA OWL, HADDO and
     TIRANTE, to be joined later by the SPOT, QUEENFISH and TRUTTA. Held nu-
     merous conferences between the skippers of the first six boats of our
     pack in order to promulgate mutually suitable pack instructions. Comdr.
     C. H. ANDREWS briefed us as ComSubPac's Staff representative and Comdr.
     R. KEFAUVER very courteously flew up from Guam to give us the latest hot
     dope on the area from his recent patrol there in charge of "Russ!s
     Rustlers".

     Areas 9 and 12 were assigned the pack and for the purpose of this
     patrol were divided into nine separate patrol areas. Area nine was divided
     into three separate areas while area twelve was split into six separate
     patrol zones. A rotating patrol system was set up whereby each submarine
     of the pack was assigned one of the nine areas for a period of five days,
     at the end of which time the boats rotated to an adjacent area. Thus
     each boat during the 30 day period in the area would work six different
     sub-areas. The entire patrol zone as divided provided both coastal focal
     points and relatively deep and open water in each sub-area. The division
     was based upon contact information derived from past patrol reports and
     aircraft sightings of enemy shipping and it is believed that each area
     thus set-up contains at least three good hunting spots.

     General pack instructions, including communications procedure, a grid
     system for contact reports, a summary of likely focal points and miscella-
     neous instructions was written up and handed to each Commanding Officer.
     These "Supplementary Patrol Instructions" may be referred to for further
     details on the pack patrol plan. No underway pack training was scheduled
     as none is considered necessary under a rotating area system.

May 31
     1500 - Underway in accordance with CTF 17 OPORD Number 115-45 for
     East China and Yellow Sea Patrol. U.S.S. SEA OWL and HADDO in company
     enroute to area. Departure delayed one hour due to steering casualty.
     (See defects)
     1600 - Set clocks back one hour. All times now Item.
     2020 - Transferred mail via line throwing gun to escort, LCI 1098.
     Tried to transfer stowaway, MURPHY, H.O., F2c, 921 48 73, attached to Sub-
     Div 162, but seas were too rough to permit use of small dinghy in darkness.

                                        -3-

— page 66 —
so decided to be with us. Released escort.

May 31 - June 4
en route assisting
S.L. C.L. and L.A.D.C.
numerous radar and
Sighted many objects
periscopes.
during this period.
ed as doubtful

June 4
0355 - exchange calls and recognition signals by SJ radar with
U.S.S. TILEFISH.

June 5
1200 Posit 29-31N 130-45E.
1423 - Sighted Takano Shima bearing 340°T, distance 15 miles
when visibility suddenly lifted.
1440 - Submerged and commenced transit of Takano Shima Suido.
2015 - Surfaced and completed passage through Kumeji Shoto.
2330 - Sent T.I.M. One to Sweepers giving patrol instructions to
S.T. CAT, TILEFISH, and S.C.U.L.

June 6
1200 Posit 31-13.7N 130-12.3E.
0030 - exchanged recognition signals by SJ radar with U.S.S. PADDLE
and also at
0300 - with U.S.S. PADDLE.
0425-2000 - Conducting submerged patrol 3000 yards off Koro Isaki.
Days sightings totaled three small luggers hugging the coast. Had sound
contact and periscope sighting on a submarine believed to be U.S.S. SFA
C.I. patrol in off Koro Isaki submerged.

June 7
1200 Posit 32-17N 129-57.3E.
0318 - SJ radar contact bearing 155°T, range 7000 yards. Commenced
tracking from ahead and at
0415 - Submerged on target's track five miles off Chiki Saki. Con-
tinued tracking using SJ radar ranges and bearings, but secured the
approach party when target was identified as a S.S.U.L. C.I., too
small for torpedoes. Good drill.
1133 - Sighted small oiler, camouflaged to look like about 1000
by close aboard. Think it was ten hundred tons larger.

June 8
1200 Posit 32-05N 129-35E.
0100 - received important dispatch announcing information,
re "George Levick Street IV", to the Commanding Officer.
passed out orders.

0305-0415 - Observed large fire and many explosions in direction of
Kumamoto. Looks like our "goonies" are getting in some very effective
licks.
0415 - Submerged off Chiki Saki and at
0450 - Sighted two fast approaching motor torpedo boats. Our
special photographer took colored motion pictures of them as they passed
by at close range of about 200 yards. Perhaps it could be a light long film
can use these shots in his submarine movie

-4-

— page 67 —
FIRST ATTACK
SUNK - One 830 ton Type E Cargo Carrier (heavily armed)
MISSED - Two 400 ton Heavily Armed Picket Boats
POSTATT - 32°16.5'N, 129°56'E.

0525 - Sound contact on and sighted ship bearing 179°T, initial
range about 7000 yards. Conducted standard submerged approach using ST
radar all the way. At 5500 yards we had a target group consisting of
four ships in column, all small. Leading the group was a brand new,
brightly camouflaged, heavily armed, MFM, raked 'economy' bow, cruiser
stern, raised 1-2-3, small AK, identified as type E cargo carrier,
followed at 800 yard intervals by three heavily gunned, radar equipped,
picket boats, of about 400 to 500 tons each. At
0550 - Fired three Mk 18-2 torpedoes forward at small cargo carrier,
depth set at two feet, torpedo run 910 yards, gyro angle 005, track 110 S,
spread 50 feet between torpedoes along target's track. Quickly shifted
set-up to second ship in column and fired one Mk 14-3A, set at 4 feet,
at this large sized picket boat. Heard first explosion. Quickly swept
back to first target in time to see flame and debris flying high in the
air from what looked like an MOT hit. Made a quick set-up on 3rd ship,
another picket boat, and let go at him with another Mk 14-3A, set at 4
feet. Observed target to turn away just after we fired.

Second explosion followed immediately. Swung periscope around to
see second hit disintegrate 1st target. Target went down in less than
two minutes, nevertheless Executive Officer and Mk 8 officer obtained
quick looks seeing only a high stern, main mast and rudder quickly going
under. Both picket boats evaded torpedoes directed at them by turning
away, no doubt alerted by their leader going sky high before the torpedoes
intended for them arrived. Considered these to be too small to warrant further expenditure
of torpedoes once they became alerted.

Of note were the three picket boats. They were brand new, painted
battleship gray, manned by naval personnel dressed in whites, flew the
naval ensign, had a large bedspring radar antenna on foremast, and were
heavily armed with two 37 MM guns, one on bow and one amidships plus a
number of other rapid fire weapons aft. When alerted by their formation
leader blowing up, they spun on their tails to reverse course, (causing
their intended torpedoes to miss) went smartly to battle stations and
commenced forming up in close column for the expected gun fight. Our
original intention was to make sure of sinking the escorting, heavily
armed freighter with three torpedoes, then battle surface and polish off
the three "lambs" with our guns. Changed our battle plan when we were
into about a thousand yards and saw the weight of broadside, with gun
crews at battle stations, arrayed against us.

June 9 1200 Posit 32-47N, 129-06E.
0000-0400 - Quite an eventful period for the SJ radar, featuring
aircraft contacts at maximum ranges of 21,000 yards and minimum ranges of
a few hundred yards. Evasive tactics consisted of slowing down and
altering course. It is not believed that these planes knew of our pre-
sence since in each instance only one pass in our direction was made.

-5-

— page 68 —
SJ also showed small saturated pips between 2000-4000 yards on two occasions.
These were avoided at high speed and nothing was sighted. The night was
moonless, but cloudless. A ship of any size could be easily seen at 3000
yards. It is believed that these contacts were either birds, small fishing
craft, floating debris or possibly floating mines. On one occasion sound
reported screws simultaneous with a radar contact at 4000 yards. Whatever
the craft was it certainly must have been very small since the SJ radar
was in perfect operating condition.
0412 - Submerged three miles off Kaba Shima to patrol expected ship-
ping focal point for traffic plying between Fukaye Shima and Nagasaki or
Sasebo. Patrolled 2000 yards off the rocks.
0430-1600 - Sighted numerous small craft featuring miscellaneous
sampans and small luggers. At
1622 - Went to battle stations when a stacks aft ship of an estimated
3000 tons appeared to be standing out of Wakamatsu Seto. Secured the
approach when it became apparent that the angle on the bow was 160 instead
of 20. This ship disappeared in the direction of Takigawara Seto thus
establishing the fact that the narrow passages through the Goto Retto
are being used by small and medium sized vessels.
1710 - Sighted three PBYE floatplanes flying in column and watched
them pass by at about 2 miles distance. Penetrated the bay submerged
looking for anchored targets. None sighted.
2200-2330 - Sighted red glow in general direction of Nagasaki.
Appears to be a fire raging there so suspect our air force boys are at
it again tonight. We owe our zoomies a great deal. They have certainly
pulled the night radar flyers off our necks lately.

June 10 1200 Posit 32-47.5N 129-03.7E
0120 - SJ radar contact on plane at 11,000 yards. Stayed up and
watched it close to 4400 yards with the true bearing drawing aft. Had
APR airborne contact simultaneously so knew it was a Jap. Plane passed
us by and did not return indicating he never had contact on us.
0409 - Submerged between Kaba Shima and Sao Zabi and patrolled 2000
yards off the rocks. Throughout the day had numerous small craft contacts.
At
1605 - Went to battle stations for what at first appeared to be a
fair sized ship at about 4000 yards, but secured the approach at 500 yards
when it turned out to be nothing but a very small, 70 foot, loudly pinging,
Chinese gunboat, camouflaged from the air with green foliage topside and
on masts. Watched it pass by at a range of 200 yards.
1630-1730 - Penetrated approaches to Wakamatsu Seto to a point 800
yards from the beach and 3000 yards from Hebo Shima in order to ascertain
whether or not any ships were anchored in this protected area. Results
negative.
2210 - SJ radar contact bearing 110°T, range 7000 yards. Stationed
the radar tracking party. Picked up APR indication at 156 megacycles,
pulse rate 500, pulse width 4. This corresponds to BATFISH report on
Jap submarine radar. Also have 10 centimeter radar interference on SJ
convinced that our contact is on a Jap sub and are taking position on the
target's track and 8000 yards ahead.
2300 - While we are quite sure that there are not any friendly
submarines in this area every effort is being made to communicate with

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target as a possible friend. SJ radar challenges have been made eight
times. The I.F.F. has been keyed four times and as a last resort we are
attempting to communicate with the target by VHF. Sent message: 'Attacking
submarine in Area 9B, if friendly identify yourself!' This was last sent
at a range of 3000 yards.
2330 - We are now in position ahead of the target and have had
absolutely no response to any of our challenges. The Commanding Officer
was just about to give the order to submerge for a radar depth approach
when at
2337 - The Executive Officer, from his battle station on the bridge,
executed an emergency dive as a long dark shape suddenly emerged from the
mist close aboard to starboard. Two lookouts and the Executive Officer
saw this ship and all three arrived at the same conclusion - that it was
a submarine. Its presence was first revealed by the bow waves and stern
wake it made. The hull was very low in the water and no superstructure
was noticed. It is believed that the angle on the bow was approximately
45° starboard and it is possible that he was making an approach on us
while we were conducting one on his 8000 yard distant friend. After
submergence we immediately came to ST radar depth. Neither the radar
or sound could pick up the target, thus confirming our belief that it was
a submarine and that it too had dived. Ruled out motor torpedo boat as we
should have had sound or ST contact after diving. A few minutes later
at 45 feet we regained SJ radar contact with our original target who was
still buzzing away with both radars and in the total absence of any other
contact decided to go ahead with our original approach plans.

June 11 1200 Posit 32-34N 129-34E

SECOND ATTACK
MISSED - Probable RO type Jap Submarine
POSTATT 32-44N, 129-15E

0017 - With what appeared to be a perfect solution on the TDC at
a target speed of 5.5 knots, turn count 234 RPM, fairly heavy screws and
a course of 260°T for the past thirty minutes, but still unable to see
target with #1 periscope, fired two Mk 18-2 torpedoes at, depth set
two feet, torpedo run 1250 yards, gyro angle 184, track 270, spread 50
feet between torpedoes along target's track. Both missed, cause unknown,
(TDC generated SJ firing bearings) but could be either due to inaccuracy
of SJ radar bearings at such close ranges or fact that target was a
submarine after all but perhaps instead a small, shallow draft, patrol
boat, too small to hit with a torpedo. Turn count, however, checked well
for an RO class submarine at the speed tracked. Torpedoes ran straight and
merged with target screws at proper time.
0024 - Two end of run explosions 10 seconds apart, time six minutes
ten seconds after firing for each. This is beautiful torpedo performance
despite the misses. Target apparently unalerted, continued to track on
steady course at same speed.
0109 - Surfaced. Decided not to end around for another attack since
(1) Do not see how we can do better since solution seemed perfect on
attack just completed. (2) Very doubtful that we can get in position
before target reaches GotoRetto restricted waters, a short distance ahead.
(3) Actual identification of target as worthy of further torpedo expenditure
in doubt and due to very dark night impossible to determine. Keenly disap-
pointed.

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— page 70 —
0130-0400 - For second consecutive night we patrolled across south-
western approaches to Nagasaki penetrating to within 1½ miles of harbor
entrance area. Had been through approximately 230° on P.P.I. most
of the night and feel certain that no target of any size could have es-
caped detection by our splendidly performing SJ radar. Negative results
obtained during these night excursions indicated that practically no
traffic is running at night in this area.
0409 - Submerged 5½ miles due south of Nomo Saki heading due north
intending to patrol 3000 yards off this likely traffic focal point for
the day. Saw a dozen or so lights in the direction of the beach and
believed these to be on land since SJ radar indicated only land in that
direction.
0505 - Lights previously sighted now appear to be ships and their
dark hulls can be made out as dawn begins to break. At first we thought
we had discovered an open Jap anchorage, figuring that perhaps air raids
had driven shipping out of Nagasaki and that they had taken refuge here.
Headed toward this abundance of targets and the closer we got the smaller
they seemed until at
0526 - With daylight breaking discovered that we were in the middle
of a Jap fishing fleet which included some fair sized vessel of perhaps
200 tons. Decided to keep these small craft under surveillance and if
no suitable target presented itself during the day to gun a few of them
at dusk. However, fishing fleet departed after sunrise.
0530-0820 - During this period we acted as traffic cop just 2000
yds. off the point for a seemingly endless chain of trawlers, small sea
trawlers, and miscellaneous small craft. Made a practice approach on two of
these, both heavily camouflaged with foliage topside. This is certainly
"main street" for small coastal traffic which seems to be about all the Nips
are running in this area. Nagasaki Defense Post frowning down on us
from the headland precluded a battle surface until dark.
0823 - Sighted anchored ship in the distance, apparently tied up
to dock alongside colliery at Ha Shima - 7 miles from Nagasaki entrance.
0930 - Have had anchored ship under observation for an hour now.
It appears to be a 2000 or 3000 ton stack aft freighter moored alongside
the colliery dock taking on coal by conveyor. Coast pilot verified
position of colliery on this island. Held war counsel and decided to
go in after this ship, the largest we have seen so far. Targets are too
scarce these days to let any opportunities pass. Observations show a
gratifying lack of patrol craft in this spot and heavy small craft traffic
makes presence of mines unlikely. Plan to make a close in submerged attack,
then surface and clear the area before the patrol boats come out in force.
0952 - Changed course to 045°T, told the crew our intentions, and
headed up "Broadway" passing inside of that accumulation of rocks and
shoals known as Mitsu Se. A ticklish navigational problem, beautifully
handled by our cool, calm navigator, Lt. E. G. CAMPBELL, required fre-
quent periscope observations. Considering the abundance of small craft
traffic, continuously flowing by close aboard on either side, it is most
remarkable that our periscope was not sighted. Took colored motion
pictures on the way in and throughout the approach, attack, first torpedo
hit, and escape. Movie camera snap-on adapter for our ST periscope,
designed and built for us by U.S.S. PELIAS under Lt-Comdr. D. LONG's
expert eye, paid for itself over and over.

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— page 71 —
THIRD ATTACK
SUNK - One Sugar Charlie Love 2300 Tons Stacks Aft.
DESTROYED - About 5000 board feet of docking and Colliery.
POSTATT - 32°37'N, 129°45'E.

Taking a single ping sounding every 5 minutes, maneuvered into
a position 1000 yards from the target. Recognition officer and Commanding
Officer measured target length of 310 feet by periscope bearings and ST
ranges, catalogue raked "economy" bow, mast and booms in well amidships,
kingpost at bridge, stacks aft, economy stern and one shiney 4.7 in. gun
aft with gun crew stationed on it. This gun gave us trouble later. Swung
left to 320°T. to head toward the target, depth of water 17 fathoms, at
1115 - fired one Mk 18-2 torpedo forward, depth set four feet, torpedo
run 1000 yards, gyro angle 357, track 90S, aimed at MOT by periscope
bearing and using ST radar ranges. This was a sighting in shot to test
the accuracy of our observations of the current, a target speed of 1/2
knot having been set into TDC to offset the current as observed.
Mounted movie camera on periscope and started photographing target
five seconds before torpedo was expected to reach its mark. Torpedo hit
exactly on schedule, but about 50 feet forward of the point of aim. A
large geyser of water and debris resulted and when the eruption subsided
we could see a hole was blown in the target's side through which coal
poured into the sea. The blast of the explosion also vented upwards fold-
ing back part of the deck. Two sailors had been observed leaning on the
rail. Blew these poor devils sky-high.
Commenced swinging left and prepared to surface intending to clear
the area at high speed before the arrival of the "national guard". On next
look at the target, however, observed it still afloat, listed to starboard
and down by the bow, but not destroyed. Also saw the Navy gun crew (decked
out in whites) at battle stations, frantically training the 4.7 inch gun
aft skyward - evidently believing the destruction wrought had come from
that quarter. The presence of this menace was a factor not previously
considered in our plans and precluded carrying out, for the moment, our
intentions of surfacing. Immediately steadied up, therefore, on course
318°T, and at
1118 - Fired another Mk 18-2 torpedo forward, depth set four feet,
torpedo run and range 900 yards, gyro angle 004-30, track 100S, aimed
by periscope to hit just ahead of the stack. Intended to complete destruc-
tion of the target and polish off the gun crew with one blow. More
movie coverage. Commenced swinging left again but steadied up when sound
reported torpedo had run true but suddenly stopped, no explosion occurred
for the timed run. It is believed that this torpedo either buried itself
in a mud bank, was caught by possible torpedo net which could have
been rigged from a mooring buoy observed just aft and outboard of the
target, or was a dud. Meanwhile, the Nip gun crew had spotted our SD
antenna, raised preparatory to surfacing after the first hit and were
exploding shells in the water around us. Things at an impasse with much
more opposition than expected.
1120 - Fired a third Mk 18-2 torpedo while on course 285°T, and at a
range and torpedo run of 750 yards, depth set two feet, gyro angle 038,
track 105S, aimed just aft of the MOT to miss whatever had foiled our
second torpedo. This was a bullseye, hitting with a tremendous explosion
right at the point of aim. The damage wrought by this single hit was
truly spectacular. The target was completely obscured for about 30 seconds

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and when the smoke lifted and the debris cleared away, the target was
observed to be listing at least 20° to starboard. In addition, a large
section of the dock was demolished and the conveyor belt rigging, which
had extended out over the docking space, was dangling uselessly from its
supports. The bothersome gun crew were nowhere to be seen although their
gun was still trained on us. Once again our movie camera went into action
(sorry we missed the second torpedo hit - our periscope was sweeping) and
the pictures of this scene should be excellent material for the submarine
movie. Meanwhile we were swinging left with full rudder at 120 turns.
Rigged in the one sound head we had down thinking of that 3½ fathom spot
close by: When finally headed out toward more open water, slowed, took
a quick look around for planes, patrol boats and gun emplacements but could
find nothing larger than a tug with about six barges in tow, plus
other small craft. Decided now or never, so, after an all clear report
on the SD radar at.

1133 - With our target and colliery 1800 yards astern, surfaced
at flank speed on four engines. Expected a 4.7" shot any moment, but
the gun was silenced for good. Never have the engines been on the line
quicker and it is strongly suspected that flank speed turned out to be
a little better than our rated 1100 KW. The Commanding Officer had hardly
reached the bridge when the SD radar reported 'Plane overhead, less
than one mile'!! It just couldn't be!
"Turn on the IFF," suggested Snider, CRM, then stationed on the high
periscope, a remark which considerably relieved the tension, but none of
the urgency of the situation.
Looking hastily around we could see no sign of a plane among the
bright clouds overhead, but we did discover that we were under automatic
gun fire from the beach; this firing was sporadic and inaccurate, a
condition no doubt resulting from our surprise surfacing right under
their noses. About this time the frustration was relieved when our plane
radar contact was identified as land. However, on the visibility side,
it was discovered that our bow planes would not rig in due to high speed
of surfacing. Our mistake, as we always rig in the bow planes prior to
surfacing.
1133 - Rang up all stop, and all hands on bridge take cover behind
armored section thereof, and rigged in the bow planes. Fortunately the
Japs were a little slow in adjusting their shooting eyes and we sustained
no hits. After what seemed an endless period the planes were housed so at
1135 - We again rang up all ahead flank. At this point the navigator
sent up word from the Conning Tower to swing left 170°T, to avoid that
3½ fathom spot shown on the chart as Nakano Sone. This course, for the
three minutes we were compelled to hold to it, headed us directly toward
Nomo Saki, whose defense post on the top of the bluff 300 yds. away was
blazing away at us with automatic fire. Meanwhile, the few small craft
present at the time of surfacing were high-tailing it in all directions
to stay clear of us, punctuating their retreat with bursts of small arms
fire. Special photographer, STMIN, R. O., jr., CSM during the entire
period stood calmly out in the open, on the cigarette deck, grinding away
with his color movie camera. The coolness of this man under fire was
outstanding.
1138 - Having cleared the shoal area we were now able to commence
working our way around Mitsu Se to the westward and open water.
1140 - Came right to 260°T, the normal escape course. From here on

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our sole worry was planes and we had the Captain, OOD, and five look-
outs, the SD radar, the fast sweeping SJ radar, and both periscopes keeping
an alert watch for them. At
1203 - With Nomo Saki disappearing into a welcome surface haze,
submerged, 1/2 hour after surfacing and at a range of eight miles from
the nearest land and nine miles from the area of attack. Changed course
radically to the south to throw the Nips off the scent. We are now well
clear and in open water ten miles short of the 100 fathom curve and we
do not believe the anti-submarine forces which are certain to come out
in force from Nagasaki will find us now. Further running on the surface
now seems unwise since about sufficient time has elapsed for the Nips to
get a few planes into the air and we want to take cover before they can
mark our spot of submergence. Continued clearing the area at four knots,
at two hundred feet. (bottom 240 feet)
1718-1820 - During this period heard a total of about 30 distant
depth charges. Presume they are really working over the
vicinity of our attack. Picked up distant light fast screws on two
occasions but these never approached close enough to cause concern.
2300 - Sent TIRANTE first to ComSubPac and Sweeper reporting results
to date and modifying area assignments for next five days. Due to
departure of BILLFISH and SEA CAT we have but seven boats to cover nine
sub-areas. QUEENFISH, SPOT and TRUTTA are still in the Life Guard League.
2330 - SEGUNDA reported via wolf-pack frequency, having sunk one
large transport in the Yellow Sea. Fine work.
2330 - Worked around two patrol craft equipped with Jap 10 CM radar
apparently headed in the direction of our point of transmission which
may or may not be significant.

June 12 1200 Posit 32-02N, 128-22E.
0100 - Received typhoon warning from NPN. Dope as received indicates
storm center will pass about 150 miles west of us about 36 to 50 hours from
now. We are well within storm's radius of high winds.
0700 - Weather definitely getting worse. Wind and sea kicking up
a bit and visibility variable with rain squalls. Low visibility makes
it impossible to patrol close into the beach as had been intended so de-
cided to spend the day covering the western approaches to the Goto Retto,
surfaced. Only contacts during the day were two momentary indications on
SJ radar, one at 9000 yards, the other at 25,000 yards. These disappeared
almost immediately and after running down the true bearing on four engines
for 45 minutes failed to reveal anything. decided that they
in each instance must have been low flying planes. No IFF or VHF response. Visibility got
progressively worse during the day with almost constant precipitation.
Barometer dropped to a low of 29.00 with wind and seas increasing. All
indications are to the effect that the typhoon warning was to be respected.
Therefore, decided to spend the night in open water to the westward of the
Goto Retto and ride out the typhoon. Also covered shipping routes to Korea.
2300 - Tonight's newsletter reports SEA OWL as having sunk one
TERUTSUKI type DD. Bud HALL chalks one up for the pack.

June 13 1200 Posit 33-20N, 129-08E.
0630 - Seas have moderated and visibility is improving so set course
for the nearest inshore position likely to be a focal point for Nip
shipping. At
1051 - Submerged twelve miles from Iju Shima with two light houses

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— page 74 —
and land clearly in sight 10-12 miles away and visibility good. Patrolled
the balance of daylight hours 3000 yards of Koshiki Shima light. This
previously reported lucrative "Hunting spot" turned out to be a only
contacts during the day were one distant lugger and a small submarine
chaser, hull down and apparently patrolling to the northward of us.

June 14 1200 Posit 33-28N, 129-28E.
0416 - Submerged for days patrol across traffic route northward
from Sasebo and Nagasaki. Covered area between Ikitsuki Shima and Azuchi
Oshima patrolling close inshore, 1000-3000 yards off the rocks to catch
coast huggers. Only worthwhile contact was a small unidentified vessel
bearing 148°T, apparently using Ikitsuki Seto well to the southward of us and
beyond reach.
1727 - Sighted hitherto unreported gun and shield in a revetment facing
northeastward on top of hill on northern point of Ikitsuki Shima. Small low-
lying buildings which could be lookout or fire control posts were observed
at the tops of several hills on the northern part of this island.

June 15 1200 Posit 33-27.5N, 129-24E.
0000 - Had SJ radar interference frequently during night patrol
on surface, northwestward toward Tsushima. Interference always seemed
to come from the direction of the straits and must originate from one of
our boats in the Sea of Japan. Challenged by keying SJ radar but received
no reply.
0425 - Submerged five miles west of Ikitsuki Shima and closed western
shore of this island for day's patrol 3000 yards off the beach.
0531 - Heard one depth charge and pinging bearing 290°T, second
pinger bearing 320°T.
0608 - Sighted two ships with large angles on the bow, later identi-
fied as one MIKURA class frigate and one DE-UN-1 or KAIKOBAN type. Former
had radar antennae on both foremast and mainmast, the one aft being the
large ladder type. These patrol boats were zigzagging and stopping and
starting their screws, apparently conducting a deliberate anti-submarine
sweep of this area and we left them unmolested in the hope that this pre-
saged bigger and higher priority traffic. No such luck was realized. We
had intended patrolling a day or two off the southern Chosen coast but
considered this inadvisable due to widespread aircraft mining activities
there plus jettisoning of mines too close to the most promising patrol
spots. So at
2017 - Surfaced and headed for a new patrol area in the vicinity of
Saishu To.

June 16 1200 Posit 33-26.5N, 127-02E.
0542 - Submerged and spent the day conducting a close inshore sweep
of eastern coast of Saishu To investigating all bays and possible anchorages
for presence of shipping. Looked into reported submarine base on Gyu To
from a range of 2000 yards. No activity whatsoever observed. Took pictures
of coastal features, buildings and radar station, two air search - bedspring
plus one possible ladder type antennae on Jozan To. Sighted several small
fishing boats during the day and by SJ radar at night.
2300 - HADDO and SEA DEVIL reported in with results to date. Former
probably sank a frigate while latter contributed one small stacks aft
freighter to pack's bag. Sent TIRANTE second to pack correcting area
assignments for next patrol period.

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— page 75 —
June 17
1200 Posit 33-05N, 126-19.5E.
0556 - Sighted four small trawlers hugging south Saishu To coast-
line, too close to coast and airfields for battle surface. Continued
submerged sweep of southern and western coastline including investigation
of all possible anchorages. Observed considerable activity at naval and
army air bases on southwestern tip of Saishu To. There was a lot of air
activity here, much more than observed off the western coast of Kyushu.
It is believed that the Japs use airfields on outlying islands such as
Saishu To and Fukayo Shima as a day time refuge for planes normally based
on the main islands. Four "Jacks" and at least four other planes (several
as late as 2030) were observed to be using this field. The "Jacks" took
off at about 1630 and departed eastward and were not seen again. It is
strongly suggested that future air operations pay some attention to these
small outlying air fields since they do provide a refuge for planes
which may be participating in night attacks against our forces on Okinawa
and elsewhere.
2045 - Surfaced and set course for Kokuzan Shoto area where we expect
to spend the next few days patrolling. Made transit close in along south
Korean Coast passing east and north of Shushi Gunto. Sighted numerous
small craft, sailing vessels and fishermen, along north coast of Saishu
To.
2203 - Sighted floating mine. Posit 33-37.5N, 126-26.5E.

June 18
1200 Posit, 34°-47'N, 125°-17'E.
0235 - Exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. RONQUIL by SJ
radar. His area is at least 90 miles away but signal was very strong.
0916 - Sighted two single engined unidentified low flying planes
thru periscope.
2330 - Sent TIRANTE third to Sweepers revising area assignments
to include QUEENFISH now reporting for duty.

June 19
1200 Posit 34°-35N, 125°-18'E.
0104 - SJ radar contact 19,000 yards, bearing 260°T and moving
very rapidly to left. Obviously a plane, so keyed IFF receiving a res-
ponse at 8 miles. Opened up on VHF and exchanged information with friend-
ly patrol plane. He had no contacts to report. Told him survivors of
plane lost previously had been rescued by his own buddies. Received
happy acknowledgement.
1013 - During submerged patrol on traffic lane south of Daikokuzan
To OOD sighted two flying boat type planes, AOB zero and went deep before
identification could be established. Might have been friendly but OOD
did not think so.
2046 - Surfaced and commenced sweep of likely coastal route between
Daikokuzan and west coast of Chosen. Only contacts were two small sailing
craft.

June 20
1200 Posit 34°-20'N, 124°45'E.
0445 - Submerged about 15 miles west of Santai To conducting five
minute sweeps with 12 feet of periscope exposed. Raised SD antennae for
5 minutes every hour to listen in on jack frequency.
1004 - Sighted single engine unidentified plane. He is on time today.
1300 - Surfaced for a good look around and a breath of air for 25
minutes. Submerged again until afternoon Jap A/S patrol passes by.

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— page 76 —
1330 - OOD sighted two planes close aboard and identified them as
PBM Mariners. Immediately raised vertical antenna and tried to commu-
nicate with them by VHF. When this failed to bring a response,
1333 - Surfaced and tried again and again without success on VHF
and voice SAFPLAN. Spent rest of day and the night surfaced patrolling
on a north and south line covering the western approaches to Kokuzan
Shoto, a productive area in the past.

June 21 . 1200 Posit 34°17'N, 125°14'E.
0434 - Submerged two miles off Hen Sho rock expecting to cover
traffic route for island-jumping ships traversing the Kokuzan Shoto.
1340 - Surfaced when decreased visibility reduced periscope coverage.
1403 - Sighted two masted sailing vessel and commenced closing to
investigate.
1413 - Brought Korean fishing boat alongside. No cargo found aboard.
Removed one prisoner, the only occupant of military age. This
man was the result of careless parents, in appearance Japanese, but
apparently his mother was Korean and his father a Japanese. He indicated
Daikokuzan To as his home. Gave this crew bread, cigarettes and canned
goods in return for our prisoner. Too late we found our budding young
commissary officer had given these fishermen sardines as a change in diet!
1602 - Sighted floating mine, usual horned spherical type, posit
37°24'N, 124°43'E. Exploded it with a direct hit by our eagle eyed
forward 40 MM crew, at a range of about 150 yards. Ordered all hands on
topside to take cover. The explosion was very heavy, the nearest frag-
ments falling about 50 feet short of the TIRANTE. Heavy white smoke
hung over the area for several minutes.
2330 - Sent TIRANTE fourth to Sweepers info ComSubPac containing
area revision and special instructions to QUEENFISH, TRUTTA and RONQUIL
in compliance with ComSubPac's 160638 of June. Sub divided old area 12C
and consolidated old areas 12A and B into single area. Change made since
results to date of pack indicate FAIRING ONE air coverage in southern
part of area has driven all traffic northward and revision places an
additional submarine in the northern Yellow Sea. Also made provisions for
TRUTTA and SPOT now joining 'Sweepers'

June 22 . 1200 Posit 38°-08'N, 125°24'E.
0330 - FADDLE reported in with results to date, SPOT and TRUTTA
messages giving ETA's area also received.
0330+ - Swept up Western Korean coast with radar coverage for all
coastal traffic. Had several contacts on small two masted sailing vessels.
Initial radar ranges were under 8000 yards. Speed 1-3 knots.
0450 - Sighted object bearing 095°T. Headed toward to investigate.
Identified as two masted sailing schooner. Manned both 40MM, the twin
20 MM and 5 inch. Despite efforts to get him to haul down his sails and
heave to he kept sailing away, so forcibly lowered his mainsail with
several well placed shells from the forward 40 MM. He promptly hove to.
0530 - Brought schooner alongside and boarding party swarmed aboard.
Thorough search revealed no cargo, papers or charts aboard, only fisher-
men. He was about 30-40 feet long, unarmed and had a crew of about a
dozen wizened men, apparently Koreans. Removed only man of military age as
a prisoner of war. Posit 35°-18N, 125°-43'E. In return gave them some
bread, cigarettes and Spam (good riddance) and received much bowing to
express their thanks. Sighted numerous sailing craft during the next few
hours, closed until identified as harmless fishing boats with one or two masts.

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— page 77 —
0920 - Boarded and searched a three masted fishing schooner. Results
proved him to be only a fisherman and all personnel were Korean. Gave
them several cans of "dessert Mark 2" (peaches).
1025 - Sighted two FBM's, posit 35°45'N, 125°27'E. Communicated
by VHF and planes reported negative results for their day's search.
1910 - Contact 070°T, 11,000 yards. Headed for it on four engines.
Sighted large four-masted sailing junk. Identified this as an Antung
cargo carrying junk per description in a recent ONI Weekly. Description
of 190 Ton cargo carrying junk, boarded and sunk by SPADEFISH on her
3rd War Patrol in this same locality, also fits this vessel. Went to
Stations for Battle Surface in a driving rain.
1929 - Commenced firing at sails to induce occupants to heave to
and lower canvas. Instead most of crew went over the side, so lowered
sights to hull level and commenced ripping the junk apart with 5 inch,
40 MM, 20 MM and .50 cal. ammunition. Destruction wrought was tremendous
but target did not sink. Instead it disintegrated into hundreds of
smaller pieces and one large be-splintered, mastless hulk.
1954 - Ceased firing and maneuvered to come alongside to board and
search. Our boarding party, led by Lt. Peabody and covered by Ensign
Ledford's fire support party on our bow, scrambled over and through the
hulk like hounds after a hare. While searching the full capacious hold
for type of cargo carried, several of the junks crew were spotted
crouched in the shadows. Efforts to grab a prisoner were abruptly broken
off by shouts from the boarding officer that the wreck was sinking and to
get topside. With boarding party safely back on our bow, backed clear a
few yards to await developments. The hulk took a lurch and sunk to
her gunwales. Saw a man jump into the lifeboat at the davit heads on
the stern, so put our well flooded down bow alongside it to capture him.
No luck. In the gathering darkness and heavy rain he escaped us by
plunging over the side. Recalled our dripping wet boarding party and
departed the area, leaving the life boat intact for use by any survivors.
Position of attack 37°54'N, 125°34'E.
0300 - Received QUEENFISH second relative to program for gun actions
in Area 9 Charlie.
0444 - Submerged for days patrol off Daisei Gunto and Chosan Kan.
Sighted numerous fishing boats and three junks during the day; the latter
were similar to our gun target of yesterday. Sorely tempted to battle
surface and polish off several of these but stuck to our plan of waiting
for a steel bottomed ship to come by.
2028 - Sighted another four-masted junk bearing 297°T and fairly
well out from the beach. Went to stations for Battle Surface having
decided to attempt to board this one before destroying it in order to
(1) definitely ascertain that it was carrying enemy cargo and consequently
a definite target of value for submarine action; (2) capture charts and
any other documents it might be carrying; (3) to take its Commanding
Officer prisoner.
2127 - Battle Surfaced and headed for the target with all guns manned
and ready. At
2130 - Fired several warning shots through sail tops and sounded
10 to 15 short blasts on the whistle to induce junk to shorten canvas.
Repeated this tactic several times. One sail was lowered, but occupants
did not risk exposure to finish the job. Carefully maneuvered alongside,
our bow to junks beam, keeping all guns forward ready and having boarding

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party flat on deck forward, well armed, standing by to board. At a range
of about 200 yards, flooded down forward to place our bow and the junks
beam on approximately the same horizontal plane to facilitate boarding,
and continued approaching at about 2 knots.
Our ten man boarding party had been well instructed and primed
by the boarding officer. The grapnels, securing chains, and lines were
ready, tommy guns were in competent hands on the bow to supply coverage
for the men boarding, and the boarding party itself was fully equipped with
.45 cal. pistols, flashlights, whistles, life jackets, knives and hand gre-
nades. Instructions were to (1) secure the junk alongside (2) round up all
personnel aboard and assemble them in the junk's lifeboat carried on its
stern (3) Bring Commanding Officer aboard as prisoner (4) Throughly search
for charts, documents and any and all written material (5) Determine cargo
and other characteristics of this type vessel. Specific duties were alloted
to each member of the boarding party and Lt. PEABODY and Ens. LEDFORD were
placed in charge of the operation. The signal to"clear the decks" preparatory
to diving was one long blast on our whistle.
2149 - Were surprised when a voice several times called out, 'Don't
shoot!!'

2152 - TIRANT's bow barely touched the junk's beam, grappling hook dug
into junk's gunwale firmly securing it alongside. Lines were quickly put
over and men swarmed aboard like Hollywood pirates. The entire boarding
program was carried out without mishap, no opposition was encountered, and
no arms were found aboard. The English-speaking Jap skipper was quickly
brought aboard, followed by a collection of charts and miscellaneous written
material. The prisoner was immediately taken below to be questioned by the
Executive Officer, using the captured charts for reference. Following is
a summary of the information obtained as a result of this questioning:
1. Junk departed Antung June 22nd with a cargo of dried peas carried in
sacks 250 lbs. each, bound for Reisui (South eastern coast of Korea).
An average of 200-300 tons of cargo, mostly food, is carried by each junk
from Manchurian ports principally Antung and Dairen, to ports on Kyushu or
Southern Korea for distribution to the very hungry Empire.
2. Junk was owned by the Reisui Corporation, a branch of the large NYK ship-
ping Company, and consequently Jap controlled. Crew (about a dozen total)
were mostly Korean; skipper was of mixed parentage, mother Korean, father
Japanese. He said all of these junks had a Jap skipper and a nondescript
crew made up of Koreans or Manchurians.
3. Reisui Corporation owns and operates approximately 2000 of these Antung
built junks.
4. This 4-Masted junk was 132 American tons, length 108 feet, named the
"Antung Maru #293", draft 3 meters loaded, 1 meter empty. It was a new type
junk, different from the 250 ton type described in the ONI weekly. Of note
were the heavy masts - so thick that one man could just reach around one of
them. The hull and decking were built of heavy planking two or three inches
thick. The manila rigging and fore and aft canvas sails were well made,
brand new, and efficient. The hold was spacious and covered with three heavy
hatches and tarpaulins. The Captain slept in the wheel house. No sextant
or chronometer was carried. The crew's quarters were below decks forward and
aft and were equipped with a small wood burning galley stove, plus sliding
shelf-type bunks having a grass mat and wooden headrest. Forward was a hand
powered anchor windlass with a large wooden kedge anchor. Across the stern
at two davit heads was swung a 20-foot lifeboat. For mass production model,
this sailing vessel seemed to be exceedingly able and well found.
5. His charts showed courses and traffic routes for junk traffic in the Yellow
Sea and along south Korean Coast. (these proved to be helpful in obtaining
further contacts on similar craft).
16

— page 79 —
In general the junk routes were farther off the beach than expected.
These junks run along rhumb lines laid off between off shore lights
and islands.
6. Questioning concerning steam shipping and mine fields did not
bring forth any pertinent information except that chart showed
the roughly triangular mine field off southwest corner of Chosen.
2229 - Junk's crew departed in lifeboat. Indicated nearest land to
them by pointing our bow at it, plus sign language. Meanwhile TIRANTE
fire brigade had been ordered out and was busy setting the torch, with the
aid of spirits and fuel oil, to our prize. In no time at all the target
was blazing merrily from two of the three holds and the cabin aft.
2233 - Got underway from alongside and stationed the regular sea
detail.
2253 - Observed target to be still burning furiously at a distance
of seven miles.

June 24
1200 Posit 38°13'N, 124°14'E.
0015 - Moored alongside small schooner. Dispatched boarding party
over to search it. Investigation revealed it to be a harmless fishing
boat, so left it unmolested.
0130 - Received RONQUIL first announcing her sinking of one unident-
ified ship in the fog off the Shantung Promontory. Glad to see Tex Lander
make out.
0139 - SJ Radar contact bearing 005°T, range 10,000 yards. A tracking
speed of zero indicated an anchored target or another sailing craft. Went
to 'Stations for Battle Surface' and commenced closing.
0232 - Came alongside another 4-Masted, 132 ton, new Antung type
junk. Sent boarding party and fire brigade aboard in a repeat performance
of procedure followed on "Antung Maru #293." This time we used our prisoner
from the latter as an interpreter to assist in speeding up the action.
Again junk's Commanding Officer, numerous charts, and written material
were removed. Our new prisoner was Japanese, and from Nagoya. We questioned
him with the assistance of our English-speaking Nip, but obtained no new
information of any consequence. The junk's cargo was again dried peas,
its name "Antung Maru #284". At
0254 - With fires blazing forth from two holds and in the cabin struc-
ture, got underway from alongside. Junk's crew were well clear in a life-
boat headed toward the nearest land ten miles to the eastward.
Posit 38°30'N, 124°35'E.
0258 - Shot a few 40 MM shells into the blazing hulk just above the
waterline to provide ventilation for the fires.
0300 - A low lying fog set in reducing visibility to about 100
yards.
0302 - Set course for new target which SJ radar had picked up at 14,
000 yards during first approach, with all guns manned and trained on the SJ
bearing and SJ ranges constantly set on the 5 inch range scale.
closed this target listening for screws over thousand yards. No screws
heard at 1000 yards. TDC reports target is stopped. At 500 yards still
do not know what target is. Issued orders to our gun crews to shoot
on (1) Commanding Officer's order (2) target opening fire on us. At 100
yards the crow's nest lookout reported two mastheads above the fog. At
50 yards suddenly saw the dark shape of another large junk.
0339 - Closed and grappled this vessel. Posit 38°34'N, 124°40'E
This target proved to be a heavy two masted junk about 180 feet long, 250

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tons, old type Antung cargo carrying junk. Alongside us he looked huge.
Identification was confirmed by last two prisoners taken. It was anchored
and there were no personnel aboard. A good haul of excellent Jap charts
and written material was removed. These charts covered a large section
of Japanese home waters. Our English- speaking POW states that this type
junk is no longer being built since it was found to be top-heavy, unmaneu-
verable, and does not carry as much cargo as the lighter 4-masted mass
production type. It is believed that this is the class of cargo carrying
junk described in the ONI weekly. After considerable difficulty due to
being unable to get into the well secured cargo holds, got two fires
started, one in the cabin aft and one in the crew's quarters forward.
0354 - Backed away from alongside junk. Shot a few bursts of 20 MM
into its bow to ventilate forward section. Now had radar contact on at
least three other targets and set course for nearest one. At
0416 - Made out the by now familiar features of the 4-masted type
junk, its masts becoming visible above the fog bank at 100'yards. Posit
38°36'N, 124°40'E.
0423 - Alongside, with boarding and fire parties again performing
what has become routine procedure for disposing of these targets. Per-
sonnel were quickly clear in a lifeboat saluting us with much bowing and
clapping. Apparently they were very pleased to remain alive. Did not
remove any as prisoners since we now have four aboard and segregating
and watching them all is developing into quite a problem. Removed the
usual charts and documents plus two coils of brand new three inch Manila.
Manila was part of the cargo carried on this target, there being coils of
both three and five inch stowed aboard. In addition the usual cargo of
250 lb. sacks of dried peas was carried. Set her afire and at
0437 - Shoved off and headed for next target, anchored about two
miles away and clearly visible with dawn breaking and the fog lifting.
At this time there are three brightly burning victims in sight.
0500 - Noted Jap 10 CM radar interference from the direction of Sei
To lighthouse. Daylight is fast breaking.
0508 - Came alongside another anchored 4-masted, 132 ton, Antung
type junk and proceeded to polish it off via standard procedure. Posit
38°38'N, 124°36'E. The swift current made this landing of the New London
variety. The situation was tense while our boarding and fire parties were
aboard this target due to the possibility of planes arriving to investigate
the scene.
0510 - Junk's crew safely in lifeboat.
0523 - Target burning furiously, boarding party back aboard, so
backed clear. Cargo this time was maize and dried peas. More charts etc.
0525 - Broad daylight is now upon us and reveals no less than four
more targets of this type in sight. Went to 'Stations for Battle Surface'.
It is now too bright to risk sending the boarding party over, the men are
almost exhausted after a hard and full night's work, and aircraft or
patrol craft counter measures are expected since the night's operations
have brought us to within easy visual distance of the lighthouse on Sei
To. Therefore, decided to employ gunfire in disposing of the next junk.
Observed, at this time, that most of remaining junks had full canvas up
and were getting underway. Headed for nearest target about three miles
to the northeastward with all guns manned. Navigator reported junk was
anchored on a 10 fathom shoal and for us to go no closer than necessary.
At
0550 - Commenced firing at about 800 yards with 5 inch and one 40
MM. First shots were purposely aimed high to induce personnel aboard to

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— page 81 —
abandon ship. Four men promptly complied, taking the lifeboat
provided. Lowered gunsights and commenced pulverizing the stout wooden
sides just above and at the waterline. In a very few minutes target was
a mass of various sized holes from cabin to forepeak, deck house riddled,
and at least six five inch and a dozen 40 MM holes right at the waterline.
0611 - Commenced looking around for the next target. Observed that
all other junks in the area were sailing at best speed eastward toward the
shallow delta of the Daido Ko (river). Started after them but secured the
chase when the navigator sent up word that they were inside a six fathom
shoal with a 4 knot current setting us onto it. Many other 6 fathom fingers
were just inshore of this spot.
0613 - With all remaining targets thus unaccessible, commenced clearing
the area at four engine speed. Opened out from the coast to the southwest-
ward, back-tracking along our trail of destruction far enough to examine
close aboard the remains of our last four targets. Inspection of one junk
that had been burning for about 6 hours revealed that fire will do a complete
job, burning down until the rising water quenches it. Nothing but a
smoking hollow dismasted hulk remained of this target.
0758 - Submerged for a day of rest, and continued opening out to the
southwestward.
2020 - Surfaced.

June 25 1200 Posit 37°45'N, 123°46'E.
Conducted surfaced patrol covering likely route of traffic crossing
from Shantung Promontory to Chosen Kan-Daisei Gunto area.
1603 - SJ radar contact bearing 232°T, range 35,000 yards. Sighted
mast through high periscope, with angle on bow apparently zero. Several
minutes later saw what appeared to be the hull of a vessel of some sort
with a small angle on the bow.
1623 - Submerged for approach. Unable, thereafter, to pick up target
either by periscope at 52 feet or SJ radar at 42 feet.
1653 - Surfaced and headed down last true bearing. SJ radar immediate-
ly regained contact. Target now tracked at less than three knots so
commenced closing at four engine speed beginning to suspect we were again
experiencing the phenomenal ranges observed in the Yellow Sea area two
months ago by both the TIRANTE and SPADEFISH.
1753 - 'Battle Stations Surfaced' Closed and boarded a dilapidated,
two masted, Chinese junk, carrying a cargo of salt. Crew were definitely
Chinese so left them unharmed and provided with a donation of cigarettes,
bread, and canned goods. Boarding party had a good look at their Joss
Shrine.
2007 - SJ radar contact bearing 335°T, range 23,000 yards. Changed
course to true bearing of contact.
2127 - Tracked target at a speed of one knot. Believing this to
be anothersailing craft went to 'Stations for Battle Surface' and headed
in to investigate. Sighted target at 1500 yards range. It was a 3-masted
Antung junk, the 132 ton class, modified. While the rigging was different,
the hull structure and compartment arrangement were exactly the same as
the 4-masted type of 132 tons. This craft had apparently been damaged in
a storm, one mast leaning at an angle of about 20° from the upright position.
2147 - Closed, grappled and boarded. Posit 37°53'N, 123°34'E. Removed
charts. Cargo consisted of dried peas and salt. Crew were mostly Manchurian.
After placing all hands in the lifeboat, set fire to the junk in the usual
manner. Withdrew about 100 yards and vented the target with a half dozen

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40 MM shells. The fire burned brightly and was still seen blazing at a
range of 14,000 yards.
2330 - Observed a partial eclipse of the moon starting at 2125 and
ending at 0302.

June 26
0044 - SJ radar contact bearing 063°T, range 13,000 yards. Tracking
indicates a speed of one knot, probably another sailing craft.
0125 - Went to 'Stations for Battle Surface'. Visibility is about
1500 yards with a typical Yellow Sea fog setting in.
0132 - Sighted target thru the mist and identified it as a 4-masted,
cargo carrying junk.
0140 - Brought junk alongside by ramming it well forward with our
bullnose flooded down to the water's edge at a speed of 3½ knots. The
impact punched a sizeable hole in the heavy side strake of the junk and
caused the stern to swing in, the grappling hook quickly securing the
craft alongside. This procedure was an innovation in our technique and
definitely reduced the time required to secure the junk alongside. Also
provided a hole near the junk's waterline to ventilate the fires and
start her sinking with no ammunition expended. Proceeded to board and
set her afire as per standard procedure. Cargo was dried peas; charts
were taken, and according to our English-speaking POW she flew a flag
indicating she was sailing from Dairen. Our POW also volunteered the
information that after word of our two nights of piracy had gotten ashore
by means of the ship wrecked crews, that within about five days few junk
crews could be induced to sail. This appears to be true from preliminary
reports received from the pack.
0153 -Backed clear of target, observing it to be completely aflame,
bow to stern, as we continued our sweep northward. These junk crews cer-
tainly put up a lot of objections to rowing home. POSIT 38°32'N,
124°10'E.
0335 - Radar contact bearing 305°T, range 6900 yards. Stationed
the radar tracking party which quickly arrived at a target speed
solution of zero. Believed this contact to be a small fisherman.
because of close initial radar range. (our average on them has been
7000-8000 yds.). Closed to investigate with only forward 40 MM gun
manned. The fog was very thick at this time. Nothing could be seen at
300 yards. Suddenly, at about 200 yards target suddenly became visible
thru the fog. Was startled to discover ship was sailless. Through a
rift in the fog noted a Jap flag painted on the vessel's hull and a pilot
house aft of amidships. We ghosted by undetected and without firing
a shot. Withdrew to about 1500 yards range and went to 'Stations for
Battle Surface'.
0402 - Started in again, this time with all guns ready. We were
still uncertain as to exactly what type of craft we were closing. Possibly
it was a small patrol boat, anchored awaiting the lifting of the fog.
This time, however, we were ready and at
0415 - Commenced firing at a range of about 150 yards. Our twin
20 MM forward and the fwd 40 MM were the first guns brought to bear on
the target. As the first 20 MM incendiary hit the target it suddenly
burst into flames. Apparently the shot had punctured a gasoline stowage
tank. Our "foxhole" singled out and disabled the machine gun on her stern.
Further broadsides of 40MM and 20MM vented the hull spreading the fire the
entire length of the vessel. No 5 inch shells were necessary. At
0418 - Just three minutes after the first shot had found its mark,

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ceased firing. In the brightness of the high shooting flames we were able
to identify the target as an engines aft lugger, exactly similar to the
85 foot, 90 gross ton type, pictured in I & C Bulletin N.A.C.I. - ONI. No. 74.
Identification verified by single mast forward, life boat on deck and
general structure of hull and deck house aft. POI when called to bridge
identified target as a Jap controlled craft used as "go between" for
fishing vessels and the port of Antung. With target completely engulfed in
flames and hull well ventilated at the waterline, continued surfaced
patrolling to the westward. POSTATT 38°58'N, 124°12'E.

0600-1000 - Made several fog bound approaches on small, one and two
masted sailing craft with all guns ready just in case. Had to close to
within 200 to 300 yards on each one before identification could be
established. Did not molest any of these fishermen. One hard working
fisherman in a dory held up one scrawny fish for sale - not tempted.

June 27 1200 Posit 37°38'N, 122°55'E.
0001 - Surfaced patrolling off Shantung Promontory, shifting
operations to area 12 C.
0030 - Sent TIRANTE second to ComSubPac info Sweepers reporting
additional results and including a brief description of junks which inspec-
tion by boarding have been found to be definitely targets of military va-
lue. Also gave approximate routing of these craft as obtained from cap-
tured charts and prisoners of war.
0443 - Made a trim dive.
0600+ - Surfaced patrolling off Shantung Promontory just out of
visual range of lighthouse. Closed and opened the range to the beach
as the visibility varied throughout the day. Had several fishing boat
contacts which were ignored.

June 28 1200 Posit 38°41'N, 121°10'E
0440 - Submerged for day's patrol two miles off southwest corner
of Kwantung Peninsula to intercept Port Arthur bound traffic.
1150 - Surfaced for a few minutes in a temporary heavy fog to
improve our position and get a breath of fresh air.
1300 - Experienced strong currents sweeping into the shallow Gulf
of Pohai. These increased in velocity as time of high water drew
near reaching a maximum of between 6 and 7 knots. Port Arthur needs
no minefields or A/S vessels - this current off its harbor is enough
by itself to keep submarines busy.
1420 - We were losing ground fast when fog began to set in obscuring
land and preventing accurate positioning. Suddenly the fog lifted
revealing a totally unfamiliar coast plus one small tug inshore. Finally
obtained a position 4000 yards off the rocks at the foot of the lighthouse
and discovered to our surprise that we had made about 5 knots good
backwards - right through the strait into the Gulf of Pohai. The boiling
tide rip off the point reminded us of the Race off New London.
1500 - As suddenly as it had lifted the fog closed in, blotting
out everything. Three minutes later we executed the classic maneuver of
"getting the h--l out of there" on the surface at full speed.
1600 - Patrolled surfaced for remainder of day covering western
approaches to Port Arthur by SJ radar. Made several approaches on
sail boats during remainder of day and night. None were targets of
military value.

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— page 84 —
June 29 1200
Posit 37°33'N, 123°02'E.
0100 - By Wolf Pack frequency sent message to U.S.S. PADDLE and HADDO
containing instructions with regard to ComSubFac's 280722 and 251921.
0300 - Made a trim dive.
0540 - Surfaced and patrolled during the day off Shantung Promontory
in variable visibility. Stayed as close as possible to the lighthouse on
the promontory without risking being sighted by it. Several fishing boat
contacts during daylight hours and almost constantly throughout the night.

June 30 1200 Posit 38°58'N, 122°19'E.
0001 - Made surfaced sweep through Gaichosen Retto in order to tho-
roughly cover likely traffic routes from south and east. Saw nothing larger
than a fishing boat, there being a disconcerting number of those.
0445 - Submerged at convergance of two shipping routes found on cap-
tured chart. Consider this spot, due east of Dairen, an excellent location
for interception of traffic from the south and east. PADDLE should be
covering western approaches to Dairen.
1110 - Visibility restricted by settling fog so surfaced to get
better area coverage. Submerged again at
1230 - When fog lifted.
1715 - Surfaced and headed eastward along established traffic route.
2230 - Received SEA DEVIL message announcing she had rescued ten
downed aviators. Excellent work by Mac McGIVERN in behalf of our FAIRWING
CNE team-mates.

July 1 1200 Posit 38°43'N, 122°12'E.
0030 - Received Wolf Pack frequency message from PADDLE giving her
grid position. Message was garbled but doped out a logical version which
was confirmed at
0105 - When SJ radar contact was made on U.S.S. PADDLE. Closed
for VHF conference discussing plans for tomorrow's patrol across approaches
to Dairen. Gave PADDLE the western and TIRANTE the eastern side of a line
between En To and Dainsanzan To lights.
0400 - Usual morning fog set in so conducted surfaced patrol with SJ
coverage of Dairen Harbor approaches.
0818 - Fog lifted so TIRANTE submerged. Spent remainder of day
2 to 4 miles northeast of En To lighthouse on the route to Dairen. Had
a good view of the lookout and radio stations at the lighthouse. Also
noted their tunnel air raid shelter in the side of the rock.
2048 - Surfaced and headed southward to new patrol area off Shantung
Promontory.
2205 - SJ radar contact, bearing 206°T, range 12,900 yards. Later
identified as U.S.S. PADDLE. Thought we might have caught up to a Nip
sub for a few minutes.

July 2 1200 Posit 37°00'N, 123°11'E.
0200 - Received three most heartening messages from members of the
Pack. SEA DEVIL announced picking up the eleventh and last crew member
of plane downed two days ago. SEA OWL reported destroying a 300 ton
schooner by gunfire and taking two prisoners, one wounded Jap and one
Korean. The big news, however, was the HADDO's excellently conducted fog
bound attack off Chosan Kan in which she sank three and probably four
unidentified MARUS with 7 hits out of 8 torpedoes fired. To make the
performance complete Frank LYNCH and his sharpshooters knocked off one

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— page 85 —
of two pursuing escorts after receiving a full close range broadside
from one of them.
Conducted surfaced patrol off Shantung Promontory.
1653 - Submerged when SD contact initially picked up at 8 miles
closed to 6 miles. No IFF response and unable to make contact on VHF.
Did not see plane.
1706 - Surfaced.

July 3
1200 Posit 37°09'N, 123°10'E.
Surfaced patrolled off Shantung Promontory.
1147 - Sighted 2 single engined planes bearing 270°T, SJ radar
range 15,000 yards. No IFF or VHF response.
1149 - Submerged to avoid being sighted just in case this air
activity signifies a convoy is about to attempt a crossing of the Yellow
Sea.
1307 - Surfaced.

July 4
1200 Posit 36°37'N, 123°42'E.
0030 - Received ComSubPac dispatch ordering THREADFIN and SEA
ROBIN to join SWORDFISH in areas NINE and TWELVE.
0504 - Made a trim dive.
0543 - While making and ST radar periscope sweep preparatory to
surfacing and with visibility reduced to about 500 yards by a thick fog,
obtained contact on a target bearing 160°T, range 4200 yards. No screws
on JP or UK sound.
0545 - Surfaced and commenced tracking target. Plot and TDC both
obtained a speed of 8 knots indicating that this time we did not have
the usual sailboat.
0606 - Radar now has two pips very close together. Both are small
indicating that target is not large. Went to 'Stations for Battle
Surface' and commenced approaching targets on their port quarter. Intend
to look them over carefully from that vantage point before attacking
just in case they turn out to be well armed patrol boats.
0627 - At about 3000 yards sound picked up two sets of screws on
bearing of targets which were still very close together. Screws were
not light and fast like most escort type vessels but relatively slow
and heavy. Readied three torpedo tubes forward on good depth settings
with gyros matched. Fog is still very thick. Cannot see more than 400
yards. Ordered officer on bow as advanced lookout. Lt.(jg) SHEEHAN
donned his tin hat and fighting face and took station forward. At
0632 - He sighted two small engines aft vessels in line abreast
heavily camouflaged with foliage; relative bearing port 20, range about
300 yards, angle on the bow S160. Swung left to "cross their tee" astern
and at
0634 - Commenced firing with all guns, forward group (fwd 40MM,
twin 20MM, "Foxhole" .50 cal. and deck .50 cal.) taking the left hand
target while after group (5 inch, after 40MM and bridge .50 cal.) con-
centrating on the right hand target. These ships were approximately
50 yards apart beam to beam and were now identified as armed picket boats.
Our sudden attack completely surprised them as the initial broad-
sides raked their decks of topside personnel. This eliminated immediately
the possibility of return fire. The targets put on speed however and
commenced the usual radical evasive maneuvers, taking advantage of the
fog. Their frantic efforts met with little success, as our deliberately

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— page 86 —
shooting 'guncrews' stayed right on them and hit them consistently.
The first salvoes of the after group set the right hand picket boat (#1)
afire and the 5 inch holed him along the waterline with several solid
hits in his engine room. Sound reported that his screws had stopped.
This follows fuel tanks suddenly burst into flame and he became a raging
inferno aft, with the flames as high as his mainmast. Leaving him dead
in the water we closed the left hand picket (#2) for the coup de grace
with all of our guns bearing. He was by this time presenting a 180°
angle on the bow and making off at his best speed. As the full weight
of our attack descended upon this hapless victim he, in desperation, ...
turned toward and attempted to ram us. Afutile effort, however, since
our fire raked him fore and aft and soon had the craft ablaze. He stag-
gered off into the fog again with sound reporting his screws still going
as fast as ever. Ran him down and gave him another treatment with all
guns. This stopped him dead and spread the fires throughout his length,
flames extending skyward beyond his mastheads. He was settling and
appeared to be a total loss with many 5 inch and 40 MM shell holes at
the water line as we left him to find his companion ship. Radar led
us back to target #1 which had been badly crippled by our initial broad-
sides. Postatt 37-15'N, 123-19'E.

0650 - Commenced firing at picket boat #1 which was again under-
way with original fire apparently partially under control. Target
immediately swung left and toward in an attempt to ram. Again the weight
of our broadside was too much for the enemy as fires broke out at various
sections of the craft. We later learned from a POW taken from this ship
that a five inch shell penetrated the engine room, killed the chief
engineer, and stopped his engine. Checked fire as the enemy abandoned
ship, some taking to the lifeboat, others plunging over the side. Came
close aboard to target and saw that it was well riddled with shells.
Fires were blazing in the pilot house, engine room, and on the stern.
Noted his 25 MM and 13 MM automatic weapons laid bare of camouflage on
the wreckage of the pilot house. Among some debris spotted six or seven
enemy personnel in the water. Headed toward a group of five of these
men clinging to a piece of wreckage. Came alongside debris, flooded
bow down to decks awash, and quickly brought five dripping wet enemy
crewmen aboard. Stripped and searched them for hidden weapons and called
the Pharmacist's Mate topside to examine them. Discovered three of the
enemy to have well advanced venereal infections while a fourth had a
rash on both legs. Decided to keep the remaining healthy one instead
of all five as had been our original intention. Upon being interrogated
by our English-speaking POW, these Navy men declared they were "just
fishermen". Further questioning later indicated their true character.
Equipped the four infected Japs with large gunney sacks with head and
armholes cut in them for clothes, their original soaking wet apparel
having been thrown over the side when they were first brought aboard.
Commenced looking around for the lifeboat which had been seen to set
out from the picket boat earlier. While searching for this lifeboat
the SJ radar, which had been keeping tabs on the other picket boat, re-
ported that at 1400 yards bearing 265°, the pip had disappeared. Found
lifeboat tied alongside the still burning target. Apparently, the four
or five Japs in it had returned in an effort to extinguish the fires and
salvage the ship. At this time it was noticed that the bow of the picket
boat was almost undamaged. Therefore, decided to bring the TIRANTE
alongside, board, and search the undamaged section for anything of
intelligence value. At

-24-

— page 87 —
0748 - Came alongside picket boat, now bow to bow, and dispatched
boarding party. A clip containing 14 25MM point detonating shells
was found and brought aboard. With slight way on we inadvertently
forced target to swing alongside. While engaged in securing it to
the TIRANTE suddenly noticed two depth charges on the vessels stern.
There was a fire blazing close by and one of the depth charges looked
a bit hot. Immediately recalled the boarding party, who were about to
enter the crew's quarters forward, lowered the four "sacked" Nip
crewman into the lifeboat and backed clear. Withdrew to a range of
150 yards and commenced firing at targets stern with the twin 20MM
to explode the depth charges. Secured after several close bursts failed
to detonate them.
Came to 265°T to run down the last bearing of target #2 to make
sure he had sunk. After running about 1500 yards passed through an
extensive oil slick and a large expanse of debris including oil drums.
Noticed what appeared to be most of a deck house with the by now fami-
liar debris of a sunken vessel clustered around it. Could find no trace
of bulk of target, despite a thorough SJ search of area. (SJ had held
target out to 8000 yards during tracking phase) Feel confident that it
sank. When last seen this boat had been stopped, completely afire from
bow to stern, well-holed at the waterline, and had already lost con-
siderable freeboard. Its pip disappeared at 1400 yards and sound had
heard no screws start up; initial sound contact about 3000 yds. Re-
turned to our last target and with a well placed 5 inch hit blew a large
hole in his bow at the waterline. He was losing freeboard forward when at
0830 - Departed scene of attack and continued surfaced patrol to
the southward.

1000 - With the aid of our English-speaking POW questioned the
latest addition to our brig. The following is a summary of the information
obtained:
1. The two ships destroyed were the KOSHE MARU and the MASHUYE MARU,
complement 17 and 16 Navy men respectively; two officers - the skipper
and chief engineer. Armament of each consisted of 1 25MM and 1 13MM
gun, two depth charges and small arms. We observed two small calibre
machine guns on one of them. Ships were powered by a 4 cylinder NIGATA
make diesel engine, capable of about 7 knots. Had a wireless capable
of receiving only, a slight understatement we believe, as the antennas
were large and efficient looking and no doubt these vessels could trans-
mit. A white anchor signifying Naval duty was painted on either bow.
2. These vessels had journeyed from Shimonoseki, Kyushu, to Tsingtao to
pick up a cargo of oil. Army authorities at the latter port refused to
give them oil but sent them to Shanghai with a cargo of 130 to 140 Japanese
army coats. At Shanghai POW had seen 10 to 14 large ships (that
would be on about June 27 since trip from Shanghai to Tsingtao took them
six days). They returned to Tsingtao on July 2nd anchoring in the outer
harbor. No large ships were seen there but some could have been inside
the harbor. Departed Tsingtao on afternoon of July 3 and were bound
for Jinsen, Korea, for net tending duty of some sort, when TIRANTE inter-
cepted them. Apparently they never did get the cargo of oil they were
after.
3. POW was apparently just a deck hand. He had been inducted for army
training four years ago but was dismissed after six months due to physical
defects. (He seems to be a little off in the head) Jap Navy grabbed him
off a fishing boat six months ago.
4. Identification: These picket boats were very similar to the ARIAKE

-25

— page 88 —
MARU, length 100 feet, gross tonnage 167. P.27 CinCPac CinCFCA Bull. 56-45.
1035 - SJ radar contact bearing 236°T, range 23,000 yards. SD
immediately reported two pips and IFF response. Called planes by VHF
and learned the results of their search thus far were negative. Re-
quested speedy notification should they find anything.

July 5 1200 Posit 36°34'N, 123°02'E.
0030 - Sent TIRANTE third to ComSubPac, SWEEPERS, THREADFIN and
SEA ROBIN setting up 30 mile interval picket line of seven boats along
123°E meridian to intercept traffic believed to be about to attempt
crossing of Yellow Sea. Considered this a most necessary move in view
of three "zoomie" convoy contacts off Shanghai banks which were reported
to be heading northward. Stationed TRUTTA off Chosan Ko to take care
of Port Arthur and Dairen Empire bound traffic. Directed THREADFIN and
SEA ROBIN to relieve PADDLE and RONQUIL upon arriving area and requested
an extension for all SWEEPERS until July 12. Stationed SEA DEVIL in
area NINE for all lifeguard work. Reported to ComSubPac the sinking
of two picket boats by gunfire.
0200 - Received THREADFIN dispatch announcing delay in time of arrival
area NINE.
0500+ - Throughout the day conducted surfaced patrol on picket
line station, as per own instructions.
1300 - Received SEA ROBIN, SEA OWL and THREADFIN dispatches
announcing their respective arrival times on picket line.
2300 - ComSubPac directed SEA OWL to lifeguard station in area NINE.

July 6 1200 Posit 36°35'N, 123°00'E.
Surfaced patrolling on picket line off Shantung Promontory.
0300- Received PADDLE, RONQUIL and SPOT messages containing ETAbles.
picket line. PADDLE also reported gunning six miscellaneous sailing
vessels off Shantung Promontory.
0830 - Received COMFAIRWING ONE report of convoy off Saishu To,
headed west.
2230- ComSubPac message reporting two convoy contacts by FAIRWING
ONE in Saishu To area received.

July 7 1200 Posit 36°33'N, 129°58'E.
Surfaced patrolling on picket line off Shantung Promontory.
0130 - Sent TIRANTE fifth to SWEEPERS, SEA ROBIN and THREADFIN
directing latter two boats plus RONQUIL to intercept convoys reported
by FAIRWING ONE in vicinity of Saishu To. Ordered THREADFIN to coordi-
nate these activities and moved SPOT northward to fill gap in our picket
line.
0145 - Received ComSubPac dispatch directing time of departure
from area for all of SWEEPERS and designating refit bases. By SAFPLAN
THREADFIN requested authority to patrol Shanghai route to intercept
reported convoys. Replied 'Affirmative' and called her attention to
our last serial probably not yet received by her. Later intercepted
her message organizing RONQUIL and SEA ROBIN into an effective search
unit along with herself.
0830 - HADDO requested via SAFPLAN authorization to conduct close
in submerged patrol off Shantung Promontory. Immediately replied in the
affirmative and congratulated her on her 'splendid' performance to date.
1250 - Sighted two PBM patrol planes and talked to them by VHF.
They had no contacts to report.

26

— page 89 —
1345 - Received contact report from HADDO on two escorts and two
freighters off promontory giving course and posit. Received a second
report 30 minutes later indicating convoy had rounded promontory and was
heading westward. On receipt of first information went to 4-engine speed.
Planned to intercept convoy off Kwantung peninsula. From HADDO contact
reports figured SOA of enemy to be eleven thus making it impossible to
intercept them prior to entry into Gulf of Pohai should they continue
westward. Gambled that they might turn north along Miao Island group
with final destination Port Arthur or Dairen. Attempted to raise HADDO
and obtain further information from her concerning convoys movements.
Unsuccessful, she was no doubt submerged.
1427 - SD contact 8 miles. No IFF response and unable to raise on
4 miles.

VHF.
1428 - Submerged when unidentified plane closed to 4 miles.
1443 - Surfaced.
1715 - SD contact 8 miles. No IFF response. We are now north of
search area covered by friendly planes. Submerged.
1745 - Surfaced.
1800 - Transmitted to QUEENFISH, SPOT, and PADDLE notifying them of
our withdrawal from picket line and directing that they each move north
1° of latitude to cover most likely routes across the Yellow Sea.

July 8 1200 Posit 38°42'N, 121°29'E.
0220 - SJ radar contact bearing 230°T, range 12,300 yards. Stationed
radar tracking party. Target appeared to be constant helming on base
course 050°T, speed 8 knots. At
0245 - Target suddenly reversed course. Decided this must be a
patrol boat and was much encouraged by this possibility since the presence
of anti-submarine activity indicated shipping might be coming through.
Set course for a spot midway between Dairen and Port Arthur where we will
patrol submerged close in to the shore. Picked this location rather than
one west of Port Arthur to avoid strong currents found at the latter spot
earlier in the patrol.
0417 - Submerged for days patrol 3000 yards of Shohei To; on route
between Port Arthur and Dairen. Found currents not nearly so heavy here
as they had been farther to the westward. Maximum of about 1½ knots was
encountered.
0837 - OOD sighted EFM of a ship bearing 295°T, and immediately went
to 'Battle Stations Submerged'. Target was closely hugging the coast so
swung right toward the nearest point of land to reduce torpedo run.

FOURTH ATTACK
SUNK 2200 Ton AK
38°48.5'N, 121°28'E

0846 - Sighted second ship ahead of first one as it emerged from land
haze. The leading ship was considerably larger than the original contact
and about 3000 yards ahead. Shifted set up to this new target. ST came
through with a range at 7500 yards. Great work by our conscientious radar
officer, Lt.(jg) MARCUSE, considering the great difficulty in distinguishing
the target from land pips at this range. Measured target length of 240-250'
by ST.

-27-

— page 90 —
0907 - Shooting set-up. We now have a good solution, target course
090°T, speed 8.4 knots. Can see two lookouts in the wings of the bridge
and one sailor climbing the ladder to the bridge.
0908 - Fired three Mk 18-2 torpedoes forward, range 900 yards, gyro
angle 013°T, track 90 S, depth set four feet, spread 2000 along target's
track. Firing intervals were 12 and 10 seconds, set periscope bearings in
TDC, which was generating results before each shot. Attempted to obtain
set-up on second ship, but he was too far away (at least 3000 yds) with a
sharp track.
0908-45 - First torpedo hit first target slightly aft of mainmast with
a terrific explosion stopping his screws. Mounted movie camera on scope
in time to catch color shots of smoke in the air and debris falling.
Movie camera was still grinding away at
0909 - When 2nd torpedo hit under target's stack amidships. Target
rapidly commenced going down stern first. We were surprised at
0909-10 - When our third 'fish' spread 100 feet (and should have
missed) exploded under the foremast. Target sank a few seconds later
as our movie camera ran down. Much wreckage and few survivors were seen
in the water although one lifeboat, amazingly enough, was floating among
the wreckage with a half dozen Japs in it. These sailors must have been
already in the lifeboat and cut away the falls as their ship sank from
under them about 30 seconds after the first hit.
0910 - Looked around for our second ship and discovered it to have
reversed course and to be high-tailing it back toward Port Arthur. Changed
course to the southeast to evacuate area before the patrol boats come out
in force and catch us in this 20 fathom water.
TARGET IDENTIFICATION - See torpedo attack #4.

0928 - Sighted converted yacht-type patrol boat painted grey bearing
167°T, range about 4000 yards, heading for the scene of the attack. Went
to silent running and depth charge stations. Target commenced echo ranging
search (14.8 kcs) of the area. No depth charges received as enemy apparent-
ly never had contact on us. Continued opening out to the southeast at
110 feet with most of TIRANTE under 20° temperature gradient.

2035 - Surfaced.
2245 - Sighted green flare bearing 300°T. Our downed aviators do
not use this color. This is also too far north for our normal search planes.
2300 - Sent TIRANTE fourth to ComSubPac and S T I D E R S designating
meridians to sweep southward upon departing area. Placed SPOT in charge
of boats not departing until twelfth. Reported latest sinking to ComSubPac.
2310 - Received HADDO report of convoy of 1 large and 1 medium tanker
plus two escorts seen west of Port Arthur during submerged patrol of that
area. Decided to delay departure one day to patrol east of Dairen just
in case HADDO convoy passes that way enroute to homeland. HADDO was
granted permission to delay her departure of this vicinity one day to
do more hunting.

July 9 1200 Posit 38°58'N, 122°16'E.
Conducted submerged patrol across eastern approaches to Dairen.
Only contacts were small one and two-masted fishermen.
2345 - SPOT reports destroying two small junks and taking two prisoners.

July 10 1200 Posit 36°00'N, 123°30'E.
Proceeding southward at two engine speed along 123° 30'E meridian.

-28-

— page 91 —
small sailboat contacts.
0145 - Exchanged recognition signals and calls with the U.S.S.
QUEENFISH by SJ radar.
1434 - Sank horn-type floating mine with 20 MM gunfire. Posit 35°30'N,
143°25'E.
1752 - Sank another floating mine, same type, Posit 34°51.1'N,
123°24'E.
1922 - Sighted a 3rd floating mine. 20 MM gun jammed and with dark-
ness descending upon us discontinued efforts to sink it. Posit 34°49'N,
123°24'E. This is the area where those mines are thickest.

July 11
Underway at two engine speed departing area.
0200 - Intercepted SEA ROBIN report announcing she sank one large
PC and one unidentified tanker off Saishu To. Nice going STIMIE.
0810 - Sighted floating mine. Posit 32°35'N, 124°06'E.
1018 - SD contact 4 miles and closed rapidly to 2 miles. Sighted
two engined bomber with sharply tapered wings. Submerged. Had no IFF
or VHF response. Believe plane was either a Jap 'Topsy' or a PV-1
Ventura.
1133 - Surfaced.
1710 - Sighted plane bearing 310°T, range about 12 miles. Submerged
when he ceased circling and headed our way. Plane was definitely Japanese,
probably a 'Francis'. No IFF or VHF reply was received.
1822 - Surfaced.

July 12
Posit 31°02'N, 128°58'E.
Underway on two engines departing patrol area.
0622 - Exchanged calls and recognition signals with U.S.S. TRUTTA
by SJ radar.
1100 - Received PADDLE contact on Jap submarine east of Nansei
Shoto.
2130-2230 - Transmitted Nansei Shoto.
2300 - Received SEA OWL report covering her attack on Jap sub in
vicinity of PADDLE contact earlier in the day.

July 13
Posit 29°07'N, 131°15'E.
0400 - Exchanged calls and recognition signals with U.S.S. SPOT astern
of us. Received information that she intended conducting submerged patrol
in vicinity of reported Nip sub:
0405 - Sent TIRANTE fifth to ComSubPac reporting departure area.
0435 - APR contact, 158 mcgs., 500 PRF, 4 pulse width, weak, but
corresponds to Jap submarine air search radar as reported by the BATFISH.
0508 - APR contact a little stronger. Swung ship in effort to obtain
bearing. Analysis of results indicated source was either north or south
of us. Decided to make trim dive, surface and swing ship again to check
preliminary analysis.
0535 - Submerged. Stbd. side of main control cubicle went out of
commission. (See Major Defects) Remained submerged to make repairs,
balanced at 90' in deep water for about 15 minutes at all stop to completely
deenergize stbd. side of cubicle. Ensign D. R. JONES, section diving officer,
deserves much credit for this performance without benefit of a gradient.
Meanwhile changed course to north and later northeast to search for Nip sub.
Cubicle repairs took until late afternoon.

-29-

— page 92 —
2010 - Surfaced.

July 14-19
Enroute Guam. Radar and sight contact on numerous planes and 'friend-
ly submarines enroute.

July 19
0400 - Rendezvoused with escort.
0800 - Arrived Port Apra Harbor, Guam.

The following is a summary of the results of the Wolf-Pack coordinated
by Commanding Officer, U.S.S. TIRANTE, and known as STREET'S SWEEPERS,
covering the period from 6 June to 12 July, inclusive. This tabulation
includes only the known results at this writing.

HADDO
3 - AK - Sunk.
1 - AK - Probably Sunk.
1 - PF - Probably Sunk.
1 - Escort Vessel (UN) - Sunk.

SPOT
2 - Junks - Destroyed.
2 - Prisoners - Captured.

TRUTTA
16 - Schooners - Destroyed
1 - Tug - Destroyed.

QUEENFISH
1 - Junk - Destroyed.

SEGUNDO
1 - AP - Sunk.

SEA ROBIN
1 - AO (UN) - Sunk.
1 - PC - Sunk.

RONQUIL
1 - AK (UN) - Sunk.

PADDLE
6 - Misc. Sailing Craft -
Destroyed.

SEA DEVIL
1 - AK - Sunk.
11 - Aviators - Rescued.

SEA OWL
1 - DD - Sunk.
1 - Schooner - Destroyed.
6 - Aviators - Rescued.
2 - Prisoners - Captured.

TIRANTE
3 - AK - Sunk.
2 - Picket Boats - Destroyed.
1 - Lugger - Destroyed.
9 - Junks - Destroyed.
5 - Prisoners - Captured.

TOTAL RESULTS
1 - AP - Sunk.
1 - AO - Sunk.
8 - AK - Sunk.
1 - DD - Sunk.
1 - PC - Sunk.
1 - PF - Probably Sunk.
1 - Escort Vessel (UN) - Sunk.
2 - Picket Boats - Destroyed.
1 - Lugger - Destroyed.
12 - Junks Destroyed.
23 - Schooners and Misc. Sailing Craft - Destroyed.
1 - Tug - Destroyed.
17 - Aviators - Rescued.
9 - Prisoners - Captured.

The Pack Commander wishes to express his thanks to the SWEEPERS for
their excellent cooperation and teamwork.

-30-

— page 93 —
C. WEATHER

     Generally speaking the weather in the East China and Yellow Seas
was as expected for the season of the year. In the northern Yellow Sea
heavy fogs covered the area a good 50 per cent of the time. The nights
were often clear but generally the fog would settle down over the seas
commencing an hour before dawn and lasting until ten or eleven hundred
except on those occasions when it persisted all through the day.

     A typhoon warning was received early on the morning of 12 June. An
hour or two later the seas began kicking up, wind velocity increased, and
the barometer dropped to a low of 29.00. Typhoon never reached area
NINE, however, and twenty-four hours later all storm indications had
disappeared.

D. TIDAL INFORMATION

     The heavy tidal currents described in the coast pilot as existing
off Chosan Kan and in the Port Arthur area were found to exist exactly
as described. The seven knot current off the Kwantung peninsula attained
its full force sweeping the submerged TIRANTE along the coastline and
much against her will into the Gulf of Pohai - stern first.

E. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

     No navigational lights were found burning in the East China Sea or
the western Kyushu area. Along the southern Korean Coast the same inshore
lights reported in TIRANTE FIRST WAR PATROL WERE still in use. All
navigational lights in the Port Arthur and Dairen area were burning,
apparently at full strength and rated characteristics.

G. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

     There was a most gratifying lack of enemy air activity in area NINE
and TWELVE during the period of this patrol. On the other hand, frequent
contacts were made with friendly FAIRWING ONE planes. It is regrettable
that plane sub-coordinated attacks were not consummated due to lack of
contacts.

     It is considered that the fine accomplishments of our 'zoomies' has
almost swept the enemy air forces from this area. The exceptions are a
few outlying airfields, one at Saishu To, another at Fukayo Shima, where
more than normal air activity was noted. It is believed that planes nor-
mally based on Kyushu may have taken refuge at these outlying airports to
escape constant attacks of our own air forces.

     Night air activity by the enemy was completely absent in the Yellow
Sea. In the Kyushu coastal area several night APR airborne contacts were
made on enemy planes but it is not believed any of these had contact on
the TIRANTE. Evaded by slowing down to reduce wake and changing course.
Normally we surfaced patrolled well flooded down.

-31

— page 94 —
F. SHIP CONTACTS
No. Time Lat. Type Initial Est. How Remarks
Date Long. Range course & Contacted
Speed

1. 0318 I 32-17N Patrol Boat 7300 020°T SJ Radar Made approach -
   June 7 129-57E 12 K Too small for
   Torpedo.

2. 0450 I 32-16N 2 MTBs 3000 180°T Periscope Avoided.
   June 8 129-54E 20 K.

3. 0525 I 32-16N Small AK 7000 335°T Sound Sank with 2 hits
   " " 8.2 K. out of 3

4. 1622 I 32-48N 3 Picket Boats 5500 335°T Periscope 2 targets avoid-
   June 9 124-00E 8.2 K. ed one torp. ea.

5. 1605 I 32-48N Small AK 8000 290°T Periscope Unable to close.
   June 10 129-04E unk. AOB Port 160.

6. 2210 I 32-44N Small gunboat 4000 270°T Periscope Made approach.
   June 10 129-15E 8 K. Too small for
   Torpedo.

7. 0823 I 32-37N Unknown (be- 7000 260°T SJ Radar Missed with 2
   June 11 129-45E lieve RO sub) 5.5 K. torpedoes.

8. 1555 I 33-22N Small AK 10,500 Moored at Periscope Sank with 2 hits
   June 14 129-26E colliery out of three.

9. 0608 I 33-28N Small AK 9000 Not Periscope Unable to close.
   June 15 129-23E tracked AOB Port 80.

10. 0335 I 38-58N 1 MIKURA PF 9000 120°-180° Periscope Searched our
    June 26 124-12E 1 Unk. (DE) 6 K. area.

11. 0543 I 37-15N Lugger 6900 Anchored SJ Radar Destroyed by
    July 4 123-19E gunfire.

12. 0220 I 38-37N 2-Picket Boats 4200 050°T ST Radar Destroyed by
    July 8 121-06E 7 K. gunfire.

13. 0837 I 38-48.5N Unknown 12,300 Patrolling SJ Radar Patrolling off
    July 8 121-27E (believe Patrol 8 K. Port Arthur.
    boat) Might have been
    HADDO

14. 0846 I 38-48.5N Small AK 12,000 090°T Periscope Target reversed
    July 8 121-28E 8.4 K. course when con-
    tact #14 sank.

15. 0928 I 38-48N Small AK 8000 090°T Periscope Sank with 3
    July 8 121-28E 8.4 K. torpedo hits.

    Patrol Boat 4000 Patrol- Periscope Searched area
    ling. after contact
    #14 sank. An-
    other pinger and
    and float plane
    joined him.

In addition sighted various one and two masted fishing
schooners and 12 cargo carrying, Jap operated, junks in gen-
eral vicinity of Chosan Kan. Destroyed 2 of latter by gun-
fire, and 7 by fire subsequent to boarding.

-32-

— page 95 —
H.
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. ONE PATROL NO. TWO
Time 0550 Date 6/8/45 Lat. 32°16.5'N Long. 129°56'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description Type E, MFM, Cargo Carrier, 830 Ton AK. Three 400 Ton
            Picket Boats - radar equipped; all in column astern of
            Cargo Carrier. Contact was made by periscope. Visi-
            bility 5 miles, overcast.

Ship Sunk Type E, MFM, Cargo Carrier, 830 Ton AK. (EC)

Damage Determined by Saw, heard two torpedo hits. Saw ship sink.

Target Draft 14.8' Course 335°T Speed 8.2 kts Range 900 yds

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 4 Kts. Course 270°T Depth 58 ft. Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Submerged Sᵀ periscope attack. Targets were not zigging.
            Speed solution exact. Torpedoes from No. 3 and 4 tubes
            were fired at MOT of two of the picket boats, but missed
            when picket boats were alerted by torpedo hits on leading
            target and turned away.

|                   | #6      | #5      | #4      | #3      | #2      |
| :| :------ | :------ | :------ | :------ | :------ |
| Tubes Fired       | 120 S   | 120 S   | 120 S   | 110 S   | 90 S    |
| Track Angle       | 0050    | 01020   | 01250   | 35250   | 313     |
| Gyro Angle        | 2       | 2       | 2       | 4*      | 4*      |
| Depth Set         | 27.6    | 27.6    | 27.6    | Hi      | Hi      |
| Power             | Hit     | Miss    | Hit     | Miss    | Miss    |
| Hit or Miss       | No      | No      | No      | No      | No      |
| Erratic           | 18.2    | 18.2    | 18.2    | 14 3A   | 14 3A   |
| Mk. Torpedo       | 57564   | 58090   | 58013   | 63989   | 66474   |
| Serial No.        | 8-7     | 8-7     | 8-7     | 6-5     | 6-5     |
| Mk. Exploder      | 10628   | 10977   | 10721   | 13162   | 25105   |
| Serial No.        | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Set     | Contact | -       | Contact | -       | -       |
| Actuation Actual  | 18-2    | 18-2    | 18-2    | 16-1    | 16-1    |
| Mk. Warhead       | 14850   | 28062   | 3779    | 18045   | 18220   |
| Serial No.        | TFX     | TPX     | TFX     | TPX     | TPX     |
| Explosives        | 0       | 16      | 12      | 39      | 45      |
| Firing Interval   | 1000    | 1000    | 1000    | 1050    | 1000    |
| Torpedo Run       | Mot     | 50' fwd | 50' aft | Mot     | Mot     |
| Type Spread       | 71°F    | 71°F    | 71°F    | -       | -       |
| Injection         | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       |
| Sea Condition     | PELIAS  | PELIAS  | PELIAS  | PELIAS  | PELIAS  |
| Overhaul Activity |         |         |         |         |         |

Remarks: Electrolyte 71°F. Torpedo runs were 80 and 75 seconds
         in length.
         *NOTE: Minimum permissable depth setting on Mk 14-3A
         torpedoes.
         -33-

— page 96 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SSA20) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. TWO PATROL NUMBER TWO.
Time 0017 Date 6/11/45 Lat 32°44'N Long 129°15'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
Description: Probable RO type Jap Submarine. Contact made by SJ radar.
Turn count of 234 RPM, heavy screws. Checked approximately
with speed of 5.5 knots. APR indication at 156 megacycles,
pulse rate 500, pulse width 4, corresponded to BATFISH report
on Jap sub. Definite Jap 10 centimeter radar interference
on SJ bearing of contact. (UN)

Ships sunk or damaged: None
Target Draft Unknown Course 260°T Speed 5.5 kts. Range 1000 yds.
OWN SHIP DATA
Speed 3 kts Course 030°T Depth 44 feet Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
Type Attack: Tracked target for 2½ hours on the surface and 45 minutes
submerged. Target was on steady course and speed. During
closing minutes of approach TDC ranges checked exactly with
generated ranges and TDC generated SJ radar firing bearings.
Fired torpedoes on SJ radar bearings at 44 foot depth. Could
not see target through the periscope at any time.

| | #10 | #9 |
|---|---|---|
| Tubes Fired | | |
| Track Angle | 90 S | 90 S |
| Gyro Angle | 184 | 183^50 |
| Depth Set | 2 | 2 |
| Power | 27.6 | 27.6 |
| Hit or Miss | Miss | Miss |
| Erratic | No | No |
| Mk. Torpedo | 18-2 | 18-1 |
| Serial No. | 57344 | 54538 |
| Mk Exploder | 8-7 | 8-7 |
| Serial No. | 11208: | 10953 |
| Actuation Set | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual | - | - |
| Mk Warhead | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial No. | 4378 | 4508 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval | - | 14 |
| Torpedo Run | 1250 | 1300 |
| Type Spread | 25'F | 25'A |
| Injection 70 | 70°F | 70°F |
| Sea Condition | 1 | 1 |
| Overhaul Activity | PELLAS | PELLAS |

Remarks: Electrolyte 70°F. Heard end of run explosions at 6'10" and 6'24".
Sound tracked both torpedoes running straight and reported torpedoes merging
with target's screws at the proper time. At first opportunity checked align-
ment of SJ with both periscopes and TPT's on a convenient sailboat at about
3000 yards. All bearings checked within 15'.
Reason for misses unknown, but might be due to possible error in SJ bearings
at close ranges, or possibly target was a very small patrol vessel, presenting
too little target for our torpedoes to hit it.

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— page 97 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) TORPEDOE ATTACK NO. THREE PATROL NO TWO
Time 1115 Date [HANDWRITTEN: 6/11/45] Lat 32°37'N Long 129°45'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: One Sugar Charlie Love 23 Tons, Stacks Aft AK, (EC)
moored to colliery dock at Ha Shima. Contact made
by periscope five miles distant. Measured target's length
of 315' by ST ranges and horizontal reticule (EC)

Ship Sunk: One Sugar Charlie Love 2300 Tons, Stacks Aft AK. (EC)
Damaged: One Colliery and docking.
Damage Determined by: Saw, heard torpedo hits. Saw ship settle to the
bottom with a large starboard list.

Target Draft 19.2 ft. Course 040°T Speed 2.5 kts. Range 1000 yds.

OWN SHIP DATA
Speed 2 kts Course 320-285°T Depth 58 ft. Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Submerged ST periscope attack. Although target was
moored, it would not track at less than 1/4 - 1/2 of a
knot as a result of the current. Torpedoes were
fired and spread on periscope bearings.

| | #1 | #2 | #3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes Fired | | | |
| Track Angle | 90 S | 100 S | 105 S |
| Gyro Angle | 357 | 004^30 | 03745 |
| Depth Set | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| Power | 28.2 | 28.3 | 28.8 |
| Hit or miss | Hit | Miss | Hit |
| Erratic | No | No | No |
| Mk. Torpedo | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial No. | 57553 | 57566 | 57536 |
| Mk. Exploder | 8-7 | 8-7 | 8-7 |
| Serial No. | 10678 | 10664 | 11454 |
| Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Act. | Contact | - | Contact |
| Mk. Warhead | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial No. | 4627 | 3779 | 4595 |
| Explosives | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval | - | 135 | 120 |
| Torpedo Run | 1000 | 900 | 720 |
| Type Spread | Mot | At Stack | Just aft of Mot |
| Injection | 71°F | 71°F | 71°F |
| Sea Condition | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Overhaul Act. | PELIAS | PELIAS | PELIAS |

Remarks: Electrolyte 71°F. Times of run for hitting torpedoes
were 70 and 40 seconds respectively. Torpedo fired from
No. 2 tube stopped running at time it should have hit.
It could have hit a mudbank, become fouled in a mooring
cable or possible torpedo net attached to a mooring
buoy close to the point of aim off the vessel's star-
board quarter, or have been a dud exploder.

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— page 98 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. FOUR PATROL NO. TWO.
Date 7/8/45 Lat 38°48.5'N Long 121°28'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: One MFM, raised 1-2-3,-engines amidships, composite super-
structure with deck house on stern, plumb bow, counter stern
AK. By ST periscope ranges and horizontal reticule measured
target's length to be 250'-240'. Sound reported heavy screws
and reciprocating engines. Ship was painted grey and loaded
apparently with coal. Target identified as of the HOZAN
MARU Class, page 151 ONI 208 J (revised), gross tonnage 2556-
1863 (EC). She was in company with another smaller MFM AK
at least 3000 yds. astern which reversed course without pre-
senting a shot.
Ship Sunk: One AK of the HOZAN MARU Class, gross tonnage 2556-1863 (EC).
Damage Determined by: Saw, heard hits. Saw ship sink. Color movies show
last two hits and target going under.
Target Draft 24 ft Course 090°T Speed 8.5 kts. Range 900 yds.

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Submerged ST periscope. Target was following the coastline
and zigged to conform to it. Target tracked poorly as only
two good observations were obtained until the range was 2000
yards. Target probably was making 9 knots. First torpedo
hit aft and stopped target, second hit amidships, third
forward. Target sank stern first, about 30 seconds after
the first hit.

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 3 kts Course 340°T Depth 58 ft. Angle 0 (at firing)

| | #6 | #5 | #4 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes Fired | 90 S | 92 S | 93 S |
| Track Angle | 01320 | 022 | 02345 |
| Gyro Angle | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Depth Set | 28.0 | 28.0 | 28.1 |
| Power | Hit | Hit | Hit |
| Hit or Miss | No | No | No |
| Erratic | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Mk. Torpedo | 57884 | 57721 | 57504 |
| Serial No. | 8-7 | 8-7 | 8-7 |
| Mk. Exploder | 11093 | 10626 | 11197 |
| Serial No. | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Mk. Warhead | 4844 | 4028 | 4149 |
| Serial No. | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Explosive | - | 12 | 10 |
| Firing Interval | 750 | 725 | 700 |
| Torpedo Run | - | 100°F | 100°A |
| Type Spread | 69 | 69 | 69 |
| Injection | PELIAS | PELIAS | PELIAS |
| Overhaul Activity | PELIAS | PELIAS | PELIAS |

Remarks: Electrolyte 60°F. Times of runs were 43, 43, and 44 secs.

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— page 99 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE                               GUN ATTACK NO. ONE                 PATROL NO. TWO
Time 1929. I                                Date 6/22/45       Lat 37°54'N        Long 125°34'E
                                            TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Destroyed 1 ANTUNG Type Junk, 132 Tons (EC).

Damage Determined by:       Saw damage and boarding party reported target com-
                            pletely demolished and sunk to gunwales.

                                            DETAILS OF ACTION

At 1910: Radar reported contact at 11,000 yards. Closed and identified.
Went to 'Battle Stations Surface' and commenced shooting at sails at 1500
yard range with 20 MM, and fwd. 40 MM guns. Instead of lowering their sails
the majority of the crew abandoned ship. Proceeded to demolish junk with
20 MM, 40 MM and 5"/25 cal. guns at range of 800 yards.

Rounds expended:            5"/25 - 43
                            40MM - 336
                            20MM - 420
                            .50 Cal - 500.

U.S.S. TIRANTE                              GUN AND INCENDIARY ATTACKS 2-7     Patrol No. TWO
Times 2152 I                                Dates 23-24 June 1945 Lats. 37°05'N Longs. 125°34'E
      0232 I                                                      38°03'N        124°35'E
      0339 I                                                      38°04'N        124°40'E
      0423 I                                                      38°06'N        124°40'E
      0508 I                                                      38°08'N        124°38'E
      0550 I                                                      38°04'N        124°37'E

                                            TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
Destroyed: 6 ANTUNG Type Junks (EC)         1 - 250 Tons.
                                            5 @ 132 Tons - 660 Tons.
                                            Total:         910 Tons.

Damage Determined by: Saw all junks destroyed or burned to waterline.

                                            DETAILS OF ACTION
All guns were used at different times at ranges up to 1000
yards. 20 MM gun proved most effective incendiary gun. All junks were
brand new. So new that one could still smell the sawdust in them. When
ignited the junks lit off like tinder boxes. Destroyed one by gunfire
alone. Boarded other five, set them afire, and ventilated them as necessary
with 40 MM shells

Rounds expended: 5"/25 - 22 rounds.         Fuel oil - 20 gallons.
                 40 MM - 134 rounds.        Alcohol - 5 gallons.
                 20 MM - 280 rounds.        Spirits - 5 gallons.
                 .50 Cal. - 300 rounds.

                                            -37-

— page 100 —
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) GUN & INCENDIARY ATTACKS 8-9 PATROL NO. TWO
Times 2147 I Dates 25-26 June 1945 Lat 37°53'N Long 123°34'E
0147 I 38°32'N 124°10'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Destroyed - 2 ANTUNG Type Junks (EC)
@ 132 Tons - Total 264 Tons.
Damage Determined by - Junks ablaze from Stem to Stern.

Details of Action
Boarded and set fire to both junks. Vented the first one with 40 MM
shells at 100 yards.
Rounds expended: 40 MM - 6 rounds
Fuel Oil - 3 gallons.
Spirits - 2 quarts.

U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) GUN ATTACK # 10 PATROL NO. TWO
Time 0415 I Date [HANDWRITTEN: 6/26/45] Lat 38°32'N Long 124°10'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Destroyed - 1 LUGGER 90 Tons (EC)
Damage Determined by: Saw Target ablaze from stem to stern.

Details of Action
Used 20 MM and after 40 MM gun at range of 150-300 yards. First 20 MM
hit set him ablaze. Whole action took place in thick fog.
Rounds expended: 40 MM - 46
20 MM - 120

U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) GUN ATTACK #11 PATROL NO. TWO
Time 0634 Date [HANDWRITTEN: 7/4/45] Lat 37°15'N Long 123°19'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Destroyed - 2 Picket Boats 167 Tons - Similar to APIAKE MARU (EC).
Damage Determined by - Saw one ship sink on radar; saw other ablaze and
sunk to water line.

Details of Action
All guns were used in this action. When opening fire fwd. battery
consisting of 2 - .50 cal., fwd. 40MM gun, twin 20MM on one target; and after
battery consisting of aft. 40MM, bridge .50 cal. and 5"/25 cal. on the other
target. Maximum firing range of 500 yards was necessitated by the very poor
visibility. Spotting was done from the periscope and radar and transmitted to
the guns by phone talker on the TDC.
Rounds expended: 5"/25 - 10 rounds.
40 MM - 144 rounds.
20 MM - 400 rounds.
50 cal. - 600 rounds.

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— page 101 —
I. MINES

Floating mines were sightes as follows:
Time-Date           Posit                     Remarks
2203(June 17)       33-37.5N, 126-26.5E       Exploded by 40MM hit.
1602(June 21)       37-24N, 124-43E           Sunk by 20MM hit.
1435(July 10)       35-30N, 123-25E           Sunk by 20MM hit.
1752(July 10)       34-51N, 123-24E           ---
1922(July 10)       34-49N, 123-24E           ---
0810(July 11)       32-35N, 124-06E           ---

All mines were of the usual horned spherical type. While transitting
floating mine area at night, placed lookout, equipped with life jacket and
signal flashlight, on bow. Made constant SJ radar sweeps forward and steered
a steady course. Placed watertight doors on the latch to give the crew an
added feeling of security.

J. ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS.

Nothing new was noted and, compared to our previous patrol in this
area, the A/S measures, particularly night radar plane patrols, were grati-
fyingly light.

During her 37 days in areas NINE and TWELVE, TIRANTE encountered
the following Japanese A/S measures:

    1. One long and low small craft; believed to have been a small sub-
marine, apparently making a night surface approach on us when sighted
at about 700 yards by the Executive Officer and two lookouts while we were
making an approach on his partner, believed also to have been a submarine.
(torpedo attack #2) We ruled out the possibility that he was one of our
PT boat friends (sighted several days earlier in daylight through the
periscope in the same general area) when, after our dive to periscope depth,
neither ST Radar nor sound could pick him up.
    2. APR contact 158/500/4, on believed Jap submarine in area East of
Nansei Shoto (same general locality of PADDLE and SEA OWL sightings the
previous day). Sound this man obtained an approximate bearing of North.
Search efforts were hampered when the stbd. side of our control stand went
out of commission on a trim dive.
    3. A 'hunter Killer' group of two patrol frigat es made a dawn echo
ranging (14.8 kcs) sweep of our patrol area off Azuchi O'Shima.
    4. Encountered miscellaneous patrol craft as follows: (a) Several
Japanese Special Sub Chaser #1 and 2-MTB's off Oniki Saki. (b) 70' long
echo ranging (17 Kcs) Chinese gunboat off Gotto Retto (c) Yacht type echo
ranging (14.8 Kcs) patrol craft east of Port Arthur following successful
torpedo attack #4. Another pinger and a float plane later joined in the hunt.
(d) Two 10 CM Radar equipped patrol craft apparently heading for our trans-
mission spotoff Danjo Gunto.
    5. 6 floating mines were sighted. (see MINES)
    6. 25 day and 3 night enemy planes were contacted in the area. (see
AIRCRAFT) 12 friendly planes were also contacted.

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— page 102 —
K. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE.

Ordnance & Gunnery

A. Torpedoes.

A split nest of MK 14-3A and MK 18 torpedoes was carried forward,
the purpose being that we would be prepared for either a day submerged
or a night surface attack with the best torpedo available for each. Only
once was it necessary to fire more than three torpedoes forward, and then
the shift of cam settings was accomplished without any delay in firing
procedure.
MK 18's provided us with their usual good short run performance.
Routine was strictly adhered to, and no defects were noted. Hold down
nuts were installed and terminal blocks were manufactured and installed
by the U.S.S. PELIAS. The attachment of the terminal blocks on all
batteries is considered a 'must' by this vessel as it greatly decreases
the difficulty in taking accurate battery voltage readings.

B. MK I Mod 1 Projector.

The Mk Mod 1 Projector, chrome plated by the S/M Base, Pearl Harbor
in February, rusted badly as the chrome plating wore off. A constant
routine of cleaning and greasing was adhered to. The high shooting
parachute mortor shell is excellent for plane recognition.

Hull and Machinery

1. Badger Distilling Unit - Heat Exchangers.

Midway through the patrol, the #1 vapor compressor still lost all
feed water. The still was out of commission for 48 hours while the heat
exchanger tubes were being cleaned with the hydrodynamic tube cleaners.
The #2 still was at greatly reduced efficiency for the same reason by
the end of the patrol in spite of minimum use of this plant during this
period.
The condition of these heat exchangers indicates that the tubes
should be cleaned by mechanical means at every routine cleaning. The
acid bath method of cleaning does not properly clean the scale deposits
from the heat exchangers of these Badger type stills.

2. Gyro Compass Repeaters - Jumping of.

The gyro repeaters jumped when the ship swung. We changed 6A6
amplifier tube and the jumping disappeared. Number 2 rectifier tube
burned out. We replaced both rectifier tubes. We had no apparent trouble
until the next day when jumping began again. At this time it was noted
that jumping occurred only when the ship swung to the left. This led
us to believe that the cause of the trouble was poor contact between the
brushes and the rings of the five ringed disk of the follow up head.
We, therefore, cleaned the sliprings and adjusted the spring tension of the
brushes. This, however, had no affect. Presently, the repeaters began
to jump as much as 30 degrees, still, only when swinging to the left.
We noted that jumping was minimized on slow speed submerged turns, so

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— page 103 —
we secured the speed input to the gyro, but this had no effect. We then
found a leaky condenser pack; so we substituted eight individual conden-
sors for the pack and the jumping decreased to two to five degrees. We
then took resistance and voltage readings and found half voltage on
primary side of interstage transformer. We replaced another 6A6 amplifier
tube, but the reading didn't change. Finally we put the sensitivity dial
on 6. This eliminated practically all of the jumping. Previously, we
had run the sensitivity dial over the complete scale without doing any good.

3. Arcing of Main Generator Field Contactors.

Number 3 main generator field contactors arced excessively when
pulling the generators off the motor bus on diving. This arcing fused
the main springs of several contactors, and caused us to twice lose power
on the starboard side. To rectify the trouble we replaced the thyrite
resistor which was in parallel with the generator shunt field and the
contactor tips which were pitted. In order to prevent the arc from
again reaching the contactor spring we mounted a piece of fiberboard
between the two sets of contactors. It might be noted that a piece of
fiberboard had previously been mounted between the contactors, but it
was not quite large enough and was mounted incorrectly.
To repair the damage which resulted from this arcing, it was
necessary to render the entire cubicle inoperative. This had to be
done four times. Twice we balanced submerged on the sharp gradients
happily found in the Yellow Sea. The third and fourth times, however,
we had to balance in the uncooperative Pacific where thermoclines were
not to be found.

4. Perchlorate Content of Main Battery Electrolyte.

The perchlorate content of the electrolyte at the time of the
last refit was 0.005% for the forward battery and 0.010% for the after
battery. The maximum allowable perchlorate content as defined in BuShips
ltr. JH1 (660s-3J0) over S62-4 over EN 28/A2-11 dated 11 August 1943 is
0.012%.
Since the battery was pumped at Pearl Harbor prior to our first
patrol, it is quite probable that by the end of this patrol the maximum
allowable percentage will be exceeded. Since excessive perchlorate lowers
the capacity of the battery, it is desired that the battery be pumped
during the coming refit.

5. Periscopes.

During the last refit special two ring hydraulic pistons were
manufactured for both periscopes and SD radar antenna mast. It was thought
that two rings would be better than one and would permit less leakage
past them. We were soon, however, to be "squared away" on this matter,
because almost immediately it was noted that the surge tank in the Conning
Tower was rapidly filling up each time the scopes or SD antenna was being
used, indicating excess leakage past the rings. Examination revealed
that the rings were being sheared off as if being cut with a knife. No
apparent reason could be found for this but something had to be done as
we were running low on spare rings. So, in desperation we put the old
single ring pistons back in. This was the answer; as no further trouble
was experienced throughout the entire patrol. Our apologies go to Ports-
mouth Navy Yard, whose original design of one ring proved to be best.

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— page 104 —
6. Hydraulic Accumulator.

          During evasion after torpedo attack #4, the hydraulic accumulator
unloaded after the IMOs were secured when the ship was rigged for silent
running. When re-charged the accumulator leaked oil excessively through
the oil packing gland. This leak was stopped the next day by tightening
up on the gland, after the accumulator had been unloaded and the air pre-
sure bled down. Previous attempts were futile. During the last refit in
Midway the same trouble occurred and the leak was stopped after the
accumulator had been disassembled and the packing renewed. It is recommended
that this trouble be throughly investigated as to why the accumulator
leaks after being unloaded. It is also recommended that a stop valve be
installed in the line between the IMO pumps and the accumulator. This would
enable the IMO pumps to supply oil direct to the service manifold in
case of a casualty rendering isolation of the accumulator necessary.

7. Port Stern Tube.

          Enroute to Saipan from Midway the Port stern tube developed an
excessive leak. At Saipan the packing was removed and inspection of the
tube showed the shaft to be scored. New flax packing was installed.
During the patrol at no time was the boat submerged at a depth greater
than 200 feet, and no excessive leaking was encountered. However during
the period enroute to Guam from station it leaked excessively at test
depth. This tube should be repacked during the refit, unless the boat
is drydocked, in which case the shaft should be pulled and the score
removed.

8. Negative Vent.

          The baffle on negative vent, designed by this vessel and installed
by the U.S.S. PELIAS during last refit, has been most satisfactory during
this patrol and has entirely cured our trouble experienced last patrol,
of soaking with spray the TBL motor generator and other pump room electri-
cal equipment whenever we vented negative tank at deep submergence.

9. Steering.

          Upon making preparations for getting underway from Saipan it was
discovered that ship's steering system was inoperative in any position.
Examination revealed that the upper drive shaft, going through the pressure
hull, had been raised about 1/4" causing two Woodruff keys on this shaft,
to interfere with the lower jaw of the upper clutch, just under the emer-
gency handwheel and preventing turning of the shaft. This rendered
steering impossible from Conning Tower or Control Room in either power, hand
or emergency. It was revealed that the grease fitting under the lower
clutch jaw, admitting grease in between the ends of the upper and lower
drive shafts had recently been packed with a power gun. Upon removal of
this fitting, grease under high pressure vented out, allowing the upper
shaft to drop to its normal position and our troubles were over. This
could have been a serious casualty underway, so in order to prevent re-
currence, we permanently removed this grease fitting as it was not con-
sidered necessary for lubrication at this point.

-42-

— page 105 —
L. RADIO
Another RBS will be most welcome. The RBH is of little use.
VHF again proved itself for sub-plane communications and identifica-
tion, but is not the answer for ship to ship communications except for very
close ranges. Inter-pack communications would have been easier had the
boats been equipped with SCR's.

Comment
Communications with planes of FAIRWING ONE varied in effectiveness.
When used, VHF communications were simple and expeditious - individual
pilots were always most cooperative. However, we received few messages
directly from planes on SAFPLAN, though many through Okinawa, and our
two attempts to contact planes on SAFPLAN, were unsuccessful. Okinawa's
nightly summary is a good idea and we looked forward to it, but how much
more effective would be direct communication between a submarine and a
plane with a target in sight. This we never had.
On several occasions when we were maintaining radio silence, planes
were heard to call "any/all submarines" giving no contact or posit but
only "INT K". After an hour of this, one plane went ahead and sent his
contact report blind on a convoy five hundred miles from us. Few subs
will answer up to an "INT K" and we should explain this to our "zoomie"
teammates. However, if they will send their contact with posit, blind,
as per instructions, any sub in the vicinity will open up in nothing flat.
Our last few days in the area, the SAFPLAN frequencies were too
crowded at night to be of any use in inter-pack communications. FAIRWING
ONE rather monopolized the frequency with an uninterrupted flow of life-
guard instructions, sending one message after another in rapid succession
and disregarding circuit discipline by breaking right in on any submarine
operator injudicious enough to try to get a few words in edgewise. On
the night of 7 July, while chasing a convoy we were trying to get important
pack dope to the HADDO and had to wait three hours before the circuit was
clear of lifeguard info. Cannot such messages still go through NPN on
the regular skeds?

M. RADAR
Our SJ radar's outstanding performance is due in great part to
the talent and efforts of Chief Radio Technician E. L. SECARD.
The majority of tube failures were in IF 6ACN's and 6AK5's.
ST performance was better this patrol. Lt. CLARK at Saipan "Squared
it away" for us during voyage repairs there and with daily tuning we were
able to keep it peaked up. The tuning is still much too critical, however.
No trouble encountered with SD other than tube failures, most com-
monly with 2 x 2's. We need SV.

N. SONAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
The QB receiver picked up interference from the radar to such an
extent that the gear was greatly reduced in efficiency. (This condition
was not present until this patrol) During refit we will have the radar

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— page 106 —
cables behind the sound stack shielded with sheet lead.
Sound conditions were good in the East China Sea, poor in the
Yellow Sea where pronounced gradients prevailed.

C. DENSITY LAYERS

Throughout the East China Sea, observations at various points indi-
cate isoballast water from surface to 200 feet. Observations in the Yellow
Sea showed an isothermal surface layer 40-60 feet in depth. Below this
layer there was in all parts of the Yellow Sea a sharp negative gradient
in which the temperature dropped 20-30 degrees in about 60 feet. Below
this the water was isothermal.
On two occasions when it was necessary to secure all propulsion
for repairs it was possible to balance on the negative gradient layer
for a period of an hour with little difficulty.
All SBT cards have been forwarded to the Office of the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations.

P. HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY

The preparation of the food and diversification of menu during
this patrol was exceptionally well managed. A tribute is paid to
FREYMANN, P. A., Bkr 2/c and Ens. W. N. DIETZEN, USN for their excellent
handling of this usually thankless job.
Of particular note was the rationing of fresh fruit and fresh
frozen vegetables making these much coveted commodities last throughout
the patrol.
The TIRANTE carried a crew of 82 men and 10 officers during this
patrol. In addition our population was increased by one stowaway and
five prisoners, making a total of 98 men and officers aboard. On 16-hour
all day dives (necessitated due to the long daylight hours) the CO2 con-
tent in the air reached about 2% resulting occasionally in headaches and
causing slight panting. CO2 absorbent was spread out at various locations
throughout the ship on all these dives and without doubt relieved the
situation to some extent. However, to provide for an efficient watch and
maintenance bill to get the most out of our complex and more numerous
equipment, particularly in the Gunnery, Radio, Radar and Sonar fields,
this vessel desires to maintain our crew at its present strength. We have
bunks for 77 men and 10 officers (using the wardroom). A detail breakdown
of our watch bill was made in our Report of First War Patrol.

Q. PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men detached after previous patrol 8
(b) Number of men on board during patrol 83 (Incl. 1 stow-
(c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol 69 away)
(d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol 76
(e) Number of men making their first patrol 7
Interest in our 'school of the boat' remained at the high level

-44-

— page 107 —
existing during the last patrol. Four men are being recommended for
disqualification in submarines, two at their own request and two others for
inaptitude. Our four unqualified officers have worked long and industriously
at learning the boat and have been given ample opportunity to learn the
required practical factors.

R. MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

Midway to Saipan 2,786.0 miles 31,000 gals.
Saipan to area 1,721.0 miles 20,500 gals.
In area 7,004.5 miles 65,500 gals.
Area to Guam 1,695.8 miles 21,000 gals.

S. DURATION

Days Midway to Saipan 10 Days
Days Saipan to Area 6
Days in Area 37
Days enroute to Guam 7
Days submerged 20
Total days patrol 60 Days

T. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel factor

13 5,500 gals. 20 days 20 days

Limiting factor this patrol - Operations Order.

U. COMMUNICATIONS, RADAR, AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES.

Radar Countermeasures.

1. Intercept of Enemy signals.

(see following pages #46 and #47.)

[HANDWRITTEN: -45-]

— page 108 —
DATE | POSIT OF SHIP | FREQ | PRF CPS | FW | TUNING UNIT | REMARKS
---|---|---|---|---|---|---
6-4 | 29-17 | 160 | 500 | 5&4 | TN-2 | Fixed Air Search - double pulse: [waveform drawing with '5' and '4' above peaks]
    | 134-04.1 | | | | |
6-6 | 30-32 | 150 | 500 | 5&4 | TN-2 | Fixed Air Search - double pulse.
    | 129-35.8 | | | | |
6-6 | " | 97 | 500 | 18 | TN-2 | Air Search - sweeping very slowly.
6-7 | 31-38.5 | 270 | 500 | 10 | TN-2 | Air Search - weak - keyed approximately every 2 mins.
    | 129-37.1 | | | | |
6-7 | " | 96 | 500 | 25 | TN-2 | Air Search.
6-7 | " | 150 | 500 | 9 | TN-2 | Air Search.
6-7 | " | 155 | 500 | 5 | TN-2 | Air Search.
6-7 | " | 185 | 500 | 10 | TN-2 | Air Search.
6-7 | " | 100 | 750 | 10 | TN-2 | Air Search.
6-8 | 32-35.2 | 150 | 1000 | 8 | TN-2 | Air borne - picked up plane on SJ shortly after it was
    | 129-16.8 | | | | | being keyed.
6-9 | 31-56 | 150 | 1000 | 8 | TN-2 | Air borne - picked up plane on SJ.
    | 129-16.8 | | | | |
6-10 | 32-35 | 155 | 500 | 3 | TN-2 | Believed to be S/M radar.
     | 129-36 | | | | |
6-10 | " | 150 | 200 | 7.5 | TN-2 | Air Search
6-10 | " | 96 | 500 | 15 | TN-2 | Air Search - weak - sweeping slowly. [waveform drawing]
6-11 | 32-11 | 155 | 500 | 5 | TN-2 | Doubtful source.
     | 129-29.2 | | | | |
6-12 | 32-55.8 | 70 | 500 | 25 | TN-2 | Air Search.
     | 128-14 | | | | |
6-12 | " | 94 | 750 | 12 | TN-2 | Air Search.
6-13 | 33-32.2 | 94 | 750 | 12 | TN-2 | Air Search.
     | 129-26.2 | | | | |
6-14 | 33-27.5 | 100 | 750 | 12 | TN-2 | Air Search.
     | 129-26.2 | | | | |
6-14 | " | 96 | 750 | 15 | TN-2 | Air Search.
6-14 | " | 102 | 360 | 22 | TN-2 | Picket boat - very weak.
     | | | | | [HANDWRITTEN: -10-] |

— page 109 —
DATE | POSIT OF. | FREQ | PRF | PW | TUNING | REMARKS
     | SHIP      |      | CPS | M  | UNIT   |
-----||------|-----|----||
6-14 | 33-27.5   | 190  | 750 | 12 | TN-2   | Air Search
     | 129-26.2  |      |     |    |        |
6-14 | "         | 100  | 750 | 12 | TN-2   | Air Search
6-14 | "         | 70   | 500 | 25 | TN-2   | Air Search
6-15 | 33-25.8   | 96   | 750 | 15 | TN-2   | Air Search
     | 129-23.3  |      |     |    |        |
6-15 | "         | 100  | 750 | 12 | TN-2   | Air Search
6-15 | "         | 70   | 500 | 25 | TN-2   | Air Search
6-15 | "         | 147  | 500 | 7  | TN-2   | Air Search
6-17 | 33-07.5   | 156  | 500 | 10 | TN-2   | Air Search
     | 126-38.8  |      |     |    |        |
6-18 | 34-47.2   | 150  | 500 | 7  | TN-2   | Air Search - Slow Sweeps
     | 125-17.2  |      |     |    |        |
6-18 | "         | 155  | 500 | 5&4| TN-2   | Air Search - double pulse
6-19 | 34-53.5   | 156  | 500 | 5&4| TN-2   | Air Search [HANDWRITTEN: squiggle]
     | 125-22.4  |      |     |    |        |
6-20 | 34-30.4   | 156  | 500 | 8&3| TN-2   | Air Search
     | 124-44.9  |      |     |    |        |
6-21 | 34-11.1   | 160  | 500 | 7  | TN-2   | Air Search
     | 125-13    |      |     |    |        |
7-4  | 37-13.5   | 110  | 500 | 25 | TN-2   | Air Search - weak
     | 124-18.6  |      |     |    |        |
7-10 | 36-30.5   | 100  | 500 | -  | TN-2   | Air Search - Too weak to
     | 123-21.8  |      |     |    |        | get pulse width.
7-11 | 32-32.8   | 160  | 500 | -  | TN-2   | Air Search - Too weak to
     | 124-06.2  |      |     |    |        | get pulse width. Possible S/M
7-12 | 30-29.5   | 160  | 500 | 5&4| TN-2   | Air Search
     | 120-00    |      |     |    |        |
7-12 | "         | 160  | 500 | 5  | TN-2   | Possible S/M
7-14 | 29-11.9   | 81   | 500 | 30 | TN-2   | Air Search - first contact
     | 134-12.5  |      |     |    |        |

-7-

— page 110 —
2. Jamming.
On 4 July, off the southeast corner of Shantung Peninsula, SD picked
up strong noise jamming. The set is tuned to 114 mcs.

3. Deception.
No deception was used or encountered.

4. Photographs.
The following is a list of a few of the numerous camera shots taken
by STEIN, R. O., CSM, Special Photographer assigned special duty aboard to
get movie shots for the Submarine Movies:
Color Movies:

Mag. No. Footage Subject
2 6 Jap lugger off Bono Misaki.
2 20 Pan of Wakamatsu Shima and adjacent Islands
 of Gotto Rhetto group.
3 5 Two MTB's off Oniki Saki.
3 15 Nomo Saki, beach emplacements, bearing
 043°T,
 3000 yds.
4 42 Approach, first torpedo hit and sinking of
 stacks aft AK coaling at He Shima.
5 22 Retirement from sinking collier. Panorama
 of shoreline off Nomo Saki.
5 4 Two frigates off Azuchi O'Shima - one
 MIKURA Class, one possible KAIKUBARI or UN-
 1, range 5000 yds.
9 20 Panorama of Ikitsuki Shima installations.
9 5 Radar installations at Jo San, off east -
 ern Saishu To.
9 40 Panorama Gyu To, eastern side Saishu To.
10 13 Aircraft hangars and aircraft near beach
 southwest Saishu To. Approx. posit of
 hangars - 33°12.0'N, 126°16.4'E.
23 3 ANTUNG MARU junk, 132 tons, 3 masted,
 fired off Shantung Promontory.
29 12 #2 and #3 torpedo hits and sinking of
 HOZAN MARU class cargo ship.

Also, still shots of same subjects.

Sonar Countermeasures
Most pinging encountered was on 14.2-14.8 Kilocycles.

V. COMMENTS
Boarding and Battle Surface.
Prior to our first patrol run a procedure for Battle Surface and
Boarding was intensively studied, developed and drilled on by this vessel.

-48-

— page 111 —
This patrol afforded ample opportunity for us to utilize this to good
advantage. In the humble belief that other submarines might desire to
draw upon our experience in like manner, as we have benefited, the
Battle Surface and Boarding procedure is herewith outlined.

The boarding party consists of ten men recruited from the
5"/25 gun and below decks ammunition train and is led by the gunnery
officer. It is divided into two groups - the first and second waves. The
second wave (fire support group) covers the first as it boards and also
secures the target against our bow. We attempt to keep only our bow
touching the target in order to have only one point of contact to defend
in case of opposition.

Equipment for each man in the first wave includes (1) a .45
pistol with three clips, (2) three hand grenades, (3) a sheath knife
(4) a flashlight, (5) a lifejacket with whistle. A hatchet is also
carried by one man. This equipment is carried in holsters and pouches
all hanging from a .45 cal. pistol belt. The second wave's equipment
consists of (1) two grappling hooks on chains, so they cannot be cut
adrift by the opposition, (2) a carbine or tommy gun for each man.
(3) flashlights. (4) life jacket and whistle.

When the decision to board has been made the boarding party
assembles near the bow and lies flat for protection against possible
enemy fire. The bow of the submarine is aimed about a quarter length
inside either the bow or stern of the enemy ship, coming in on a 90 track.
Shortly before ramming, (3-4 kts. seem best) the ship is flooded down
forward and as the bullnose penetrates the wooden hull, (putting a size-
able hole in it, thus saving ammunition) grappling hooks are thrown over,
the first wave jumps aboard and the target is captured.

Of the first group going aboard each man has a special task.
If no opposition is encountered, one man immediately searches for charts,
publications and other written material, three men round up the prisoners
and single out the skipper for questioning, and one investigates the
cargo. The Commanding Officer is notified immediately of the cargo,
the nationality of the crew, and any other information that can be garnered.

Should he decide to destroy the ship the crews are herded into
a lifeboat which is lowered by the remarkably quick and effective, though
most unseamanlike and uncomfortable method of hacking through the falls
with a hatchet. This to a background of loud protests, bellows and
anguished cries from the hapless crew, feverishly trying to maintain
their balance in the boat which all but upends in its perilous journey
to the water. Our attempts early in the game to (1) have the junk crew
lower their own lifeboat or (2) have boarding party untangle the maze of
falls and lower the boat away properly met with no success. At the same
time that the crew is being evacuated, fires are set in the hold, crew's
quarters and other compartments, by the second wave of the boarding
party. Fuel oil, spirits, and alcohol are used for this purpose. The
fires set, the order is given to abandon ship and the boarding party
clambers back aboard the submarine, which by this time is partially along-
side, carrying all the loot which might be useful to JICPOA.

-49-

— page 112 —
While backing off from the burning vessel, it is ofttimes
necessary to fire several rounds of 20 MM and 40 MM to the hull to
provide adequate air for the blaze.

Communications

Our thanks to NPN for rebroadcasting promptly our major instruc-
tions and area re-assignments to the nine-boat pack. Average time from
our transmission to re-run on the skeds was about 2½ hours. The advan-
tages of this method are many: (1) One transmission by pack commander,
thus only one Dog Foxing of him. (2) Insures that all boats of the pack
will get the message. (we requested and got NPN to re-run the message
three times to take care of the boats that might be forced down at night)
(3) Rest of the pack do not have to break radio silence to send receipts
or to request repeats of the message. (4) Force Commander is constantly
kept informed of the latest changes in pack dispositions and instructions.
This helped a great deal, for the operations officer, ComSubPac, cooper-
ated one hundred percent with us by directly assigning lifeguard duties
to individual boats of our pack based on the latest pack sub-area
assignments. This saved a great deal of inter-pack SAFFLAN communications
and was much appreciated.

It was gratifying to find that many of our complaints of last
patrol no longer apply. NPN's original authentication helps a great
deal; serially numbered recognition changes relieve worry over the
possible missing of same; and so on. Also NPN's news is a lot more
interesting of late.

The nightly NEWSLETTER is interesting and much appreciated.
In these days of impromptu wolf packs it frequently occurs that the pack
commander does not know the names of some Commanding Officers of the
boats assigned him, due to our SubPac Rosters getting rapidly out of
date while at sea. This presents several difficulties: (1) Seniority
of the boats is in doubt. (2) Embarrassment results in VHF conferences
as one might not be sure who is on the other end. Security dictates
that Commanding Officers' full names not be said in plain language on
VHF. (3) Better teamwork results if the skippers know each other, or
at least know who has each boat in the pack. The SKIPPERS were fortunate
in this respect and excellent cooperation prevailed. It is requested
that the nightly NEWSLETTER note the names of new Commanding Officers
along with the usual departure for patrol item.

Approach Aids.

Mention is made of several devices that have helped us a great
deal. Other submarines might find them useful:
1. The very simple and accurate spread device designed by Comdr.
H. J. CASSIDY, USN, has solved our spread problems. This plastic
device is attached directly to the TDC offset dials and enables
the Asst. TDC Operator to directly apply line offset in feet
between torpedoes with respect to torpedo run. It fits in well
with the very excellent nomograph originated and drawn up by
Comdr. CASSIDY, which gives at a glance the error in target speed
covered to obtain one hit, knowing (a) target length in feet,

-50-

— page 113 —
'(b) range (c) total spread in feet along target's track. We
have had good luck with these two simple devices and humbly
believe that they bring out present Mark 3 T.D.C. spread system
almost to a par with the linear spread system of the new Mark
4 T.D.C., with the welcome addition of being able to quickly
obtain speed error coverage. Plans for Comdr CASSIDY'S
plastic spread device were drawn up from our device by Submarine
Base, Pearl Harbor, in Feb. 1945.
2. To obtain target length during an approach we have had the
pleasure of using the compact, accurate, spread paddle, designed
by Comdr. C. L. BENNETT, USN. This simple instrument is operated
by an enlisted assistant (our photographer and is-was operator)
who stands out of the way near the helmsman. Given (a) ST range,
(b) angle on the bow, (c) target length measured in degrees and
tenths along the ST periscope's horizontal reticule (which is
divided in degrees for both high and low power) he obtains target
length in feet in a matter of seconds. This has helped us a
great deal in determining spread and identifying targets.

Enemy Shipping

During this patrol the TIRANTE spent about half the time sur-
faced patrolling across likely traffic routes and half the time sub-
merged at close inshore positions. The complete lack of shipping contacts
during the daylight surfaced patrolling, particularly across the formerly
productive routes between the Shantung Promontory and the West Korean
Coast, indicated that most traffic is now taking the long route around
closely hugging the coast, one or two miles out, all the way. The
preponderance of SWEEPER contacts close in to the coast substantiates
this contention.

The TIRANTE found the following close-in-shore positions the
most likely to be productive.

A. Area NINE.
1. Off Oniki Saki.
2. Off Nomo Saki.
3. Northeast tip of Kaba Shima.

B. Area TWELVE.
1. Close in to Shantung Promontory.
2. Off Chosan Kan.
3. Midway between Port Arthur and Dairen, 3000 yards from
coast.
4. Along Miaotao Island Group.
5. Across convergence of east-west shipping routes shown
on captured charts, east of Dairen. Approx. posit:
39-02N, 122-30E.

The almost complete absence of night contacts in these areas
further substantiates the already apparent fact that the Japs are running
very little shipping during darkness.

-51-

— page 114 —
Officers

        As on the TIRANTE'S First War Patrol, the performance of what
the Commanding Officer considers to be a particularly outstanding group
of officers was all that could be desired.

        Lt. E. PEABODY II, originator, organizer, and courageous leader
of our bold piratical boarders also again turned in his customary excel-
lent performance and analysis on the TDC. His leadership was an inspira-
tion to the members of the boarding party.

        Lt. (jg) T. C. MARCUSE, SWEEPER'S "staff communicator", capably
handled the trials and problems of inter-pack communications and at the
same time maintained the Radio, Radar, and Sound equipment in a high
state of operating efficiency.

        Lt. (jg) R. E. RICHEY took over the Engineering (Mechanical)
Department, this patrol, and handled it exceedingly well. His ability
and cool courage as battery officer and local control spotting officer
on the 5 inch gun had much to do with the unusual accuracy and effective-
ness of that weapon in our four gun actions.

        Ensign W. E. LEDFORD again maintained our torpedoes in perfect
working order and it is firmly believed that his untiring efforts are
in a large measure responsible for the splendid torpedo performance
recorded on the TIRANTE'S first two War Patrols.

        Lt. (jg) J. J. DONNELLY very capably handled his new jobs of
Electrical and Diving Officer.

        Special commendation is merited by our hard working First Lieut.,
Ensign D. R. JONES. This very capable and well-schooled officer has now
completed twelve War Patrols without the slightest effect upon his
efficiency. While his departure will be sorely felt, it is intended to
give him a much deserved rest, with a strong recommendation for rotation
to state-side duty. It is expected that his billet aboard the TIRANTE
will be filled by our newest officer, Lt. (jg) E. J. SKEHAN, who this
trip has made an excellent initial impression.

        Lieut. Edward G. CAMPBELL (DE) USNR.

        The success of this patrol is due in no small measure to our
loyal, hardworking, smart and aggressive Executive Officer and Navigator,
Lieutenant Edward G. CAMPBELL.

        With nine patrols to his credit, this capable and experienced
officer was of inestimable value to his Commanding Officer. At night,
while on "Command Call Duty" he took the conn and aggressively and
skillfully tracked and closed all night contacts until identified, sparing
no amount of effort to find targets. His judgment in this merited his
Commanding Officer's complete confidence. His navigation was coolly
done under difficult circumstances - notably our approach and retirement
among submerged reefs in the colliery attack.

                                -52-

— page 115 —
Lieut. CAMPBELL ably acted as "Chief of Staff" of the SWEEPERS,
and it was he who bore the brunt of the work of writing up the mutually
satisfactory Supplementary Patrol Instructions, and also the index and
staff work. The Pack Commander could not have asked for a more reliable,
capable, and keenly analytical "right hand" man than this young officer,
whose wise advice and well considered plans contributed no little to the
overall success of the SWEEPERS.

-53-

— page 116 —
FC5-36/A16-3
Serial: 027
DECLASSIFIED

SUBMARINE SQUADRON THIRTY SIX

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
23 July 1945.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) -
Report of War Patrol
Number Two.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Thirty-Six.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Administration.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) - Report of War Patrol
Number Two.

1. The second war patrol of the TIRANTE was conducted
in the East China and Yellow Seas; was of 60 days duration of
which 37 days were spent in the area; 20 days submerged. The
Commanding Officer of the TIRANTE, Lieutenant Commander G.L.
STREET, III, was the wolf pack commander of the "Street's Sweep-
ers" consisting of U.S.S. TIRANTE, RONQUIL, PADDLE, SEA DEVIL,
SEA OWL, and HADDO, and for part of this period the U.S. SEGUN-
DO, SEA CAT, BILLFISH, QUEENFISH, TRUTTA, SPOT, THREADFIN and SEA
ROBIN.

2. The first war patrol of the TIRANTE is considered
to be one of the outstanding patrols of the war. While this
patrol did not yield as much Jap tonnage sunk, it was neverthe-
less as brilliantly conducted and as aggressively pursued as the
first one.

3. On June 8, 1945, sight and sound contact was made
on a group of four small ships; an 830 ton type "E" cargo carrier
similar to the one illustrated on page 1578, O.N.I. Weekly; and
three picket boats. A standard submerged ST approach was con-
ducted; a favorable firing position attained with a 120° S. track;
small gyro; 900 yard range. Three torpedoes were fired at the
cargo carrier; two hits were obtained and the target was seen to
sink in less than two minutes. One torpedo was fired at each of
the leading two picket boats; both missed, probably because they
were alerted by the torpedo explosion on the AK and they maneuv-
ered to avoid. The enemy took no counter action.

4. On June 11, 1945, night radar contact was made on
what was believed to be a submarine. The target was tracked for
2½ hours on the surface and 45 minutes submerged, during which

-1-

— page 119 —
FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18)
Serial 01947
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
TIRANTE Report of
Second War Patrol.

SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
mr
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
2 August 1945.
NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 836
U.S.S. TIRANTE - SECOND WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) - Report of Second War Patrol
(20 May to 19 July 1945).

1. The second war patrol of the TIRANTE, under the command of Lieu-
tenant Commander G. L. Street, U.S. Navy, was conducted in the East China and
Yellow Sea areas. Lieutenant Commander Street also acted as group commander
for the coordinated patrol groups in the area during this patrol consisting of
the TIRANTE, U.S.S. RONQUIL (SS396), U.S.S. PADDLE (SS263), U.S.S. SEA DEVIL
(SS400), U.S.S. SEA OWL (SS405) and U.S.S. HADDO (SS255); and for part of the
period the U.S.S. SEAGUIDO (SS398), U.S.S. SEACAT (SS399), U.S.S. BILLFISH
(SS286), U.S.S. QUEENFISH (SS393), U.S.S. TRUTTA (SS421), U.S.S. SPOT (SS413),
U.S.S. THREADFIN (SS410) and U.S.S. SEA ROBIN (SS407).

2. The TIRANTE on her second war patrol picked up where she left
off in her famous first patrol, and continued by bold aggressiveness and skill
to wreak havoc upon the enemy. In four torpedo and 11 gun attacks, all bril-
liantly executed, she accounted for the destruction of three enemy ships and
12 small craft. Entry into the hazardous waters of Ha Shima Harbor some seven
miles from the entrance to Nagasaki to destroy an enemy collier at the dock,
and retirement amidst the gun fire of numerous small craft in the harbor and
the defense station on the bluff was a particularly outstanding display of
daring and fine ship handling. The team work and coordination of the numerous
submarines in these areas during this patrol also reflects great credit upon
the commanding officer of the TIRANTE and his ship's officers who so ably
assisted him.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the
commanding officer, officers, and crew of the TIRANTE for this outstanding
patrol which is so in keeping with the illustrious record established by the
TIRANTE on her first war patrol. The TIRANTE is credited with having inflicted
the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

- 1 -

[STAMP: EXTRA : ORIGINAL
SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253]

— page 122 —
SS420/A16
Serial 004
DECLASSIFIED

U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR 5200.9]
[STAMP: of 27 Sep 58]
[STAMP: BY [HANDWRITTEN: JSK] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 8-2-66]]

23 August 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. TIRANTE.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) The Commander in Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420), Report of War Patrol Number Three.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A) covers the period between the termination
of the 2nd War Patrol and the TIRANTE's arrival at Midway following the
cessation of hostilities. No track chart is submitted since the TIRANTE
never reached her assigned patrol area.

[SIGNATURE: G. L. Street]
G. L. STREET, III.

[HANDWRITTEN: FILMED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 140250]

— page 123 —
A. Prologue

Arrived Guam July 19, 1945 from 2nd War Patrol and commenced
refit under Commander Submarine Division 362 and the U.S.S. SPERRY.

Ensign D. R. JONES, USN was detached and Ensign A. K. KNEVIL,
USN reported aboard for duty.

Officers and crew returned to the ship following an athletic
rest period at Camp Dealey on August 3. Four days loading and
four days of intensive training followed. No major alterations
were completed during the overhaul period. Four exercise torpedoes
were fired during training.

(2)

— page 124 —
B. NARRATIVE

Aug. 12, 1945
0630 (K) Underway from Guam in accordance with ComSubPac
Opord 194-45 for life guard duty in National league to be follow-
ed by patrol in areas 1, 2, and 3 or 9 and 12. The following
officers and chief petty officers on board:

Officers | Age | Patrols | Duty | Qual | Battle Stations
---|---|---|---|---|---
Lt-Comdr. G. L. Stret, USN | 31 | 11 | CO | Com'd | A.O.
Lt. E. G. Campbell, USNR | 28 | 9 | Exec | Subs | A.A.O.
 | | | Nav | |
Lt. E. Peabody, USNR | 25 | 2 | Torp | Subs | T.D.C.
 | | | Gun | |
Lt. T. G. Marcuse, USNR | 25 | 2 | Comm | Subs | Radar
 | | | Radar | |
 | | | Sound | |
Lt.(jg) J. J. Donnelly, USNR | 24 | 2 | Elect | Subs | D.O.
Lt.(jg) R. E. Richey, USN | 23 | 2 | Eng | Subs | Asst.TDC 5" Gun
Lt.(jg) E. J. Skechan, USNR | 30 | 1 | 1st Lt. | Subs | Plot #2 fwd 40MM
Ens. W. N. Dietzen, USN | 22 | 2 | Commsy | Subs | Plot #1 aft 40MM
Ens. A. K. Keevil, USN | 23 | 0 | Asst. | - | Mk. 8
 | | | Comm. | |
Ens. W. E. Ledford, USN | 24 | 9 | A.Torp | Subs | Torp. Rooms

C.P.O.'s
Remley, D. W. | CTM(PA) | 28 | 9
Thomas, E. F. | CMoMM(PA) | 29 | 10
Few, W. H. | CQM(T) | 28 | 9
Williams, C. W. | CPhM(T) | 25 | 6
Snider, M. R. | CRM(T) | 25 | 2
May, C. A. | CMoMM(T) | 29 | 5
Baker, T. L. | CMoMM(AA)(T) | 25 | 11
Hess, R. H. | CMoMM(AA)(T) | 26 | 8
Freeland, A. E. | CEM(AA)(T) | 28 | 6
Frank, H. E. | CTM(AA)(T) | 25 | 9
Secard, E. L. | CRT(AA)(T) | 24 | 8
Stein, R. O., Jr. | CSM(T) | 24 | 2 (Special
 | | | | Photographer,

1600 Arrived Saipan. Moored in nest on port side USS ORION.
Unloaded torpedo cargo and took aboard full load of torpedoes for
patrol.

Aug. 13
1500 Departed Saipan in company with U.S.S. TILEFISH for War
Patrol. Travelled with TILEFISH for two days, C.O. TILEFISH
coordinated movements.

(2)

— page 125 —
Aug. 16
1600 Received ComSubPac serial 160315 ordering TIRANTE to
Midway. Reversed course and proceeded in accordance with routing
instructions.

Aug. 13 - Aug. 23
Sighted numerous friendly planes and sighted and exchanged
recognition signals with several friendly submarines thoughout
this period.

Aug. 23
1600(M) Arrived Midway, moored port side to, in berth S-2.

C. Weather
No unusual or abnormal conditions of weather were encountered.

D. Tidal Information
No remarks.

E. Navigational Aids
No remarks.

F. Ship Contacts
No contacts were made with enemy shipping. Only contacts were
with friendly submarines.

G. Aircraft Contacts
Contacts with enemy aircraft were nil. Numerous friendly air-
craft contacts in joint zones.

H. Mines
No mines or mining activity encountered.

J. Anti-Submarine Measures & Evasion Tactics
No remarks.

(4)

— page 126 —
K. Major Defects
    The jumping defect reported in the gyro in our 2nd War Patrol
    Report was not completely remedied. Gyro experts both at Guam and
    Saipan spent many hours both in port and underway attempting to
    track down the source of trouble. At times it appeared that the
    jumping was licked but invariable after two or three days it would
    return. The gyro repeaters continue to jump on occasion. Maximum
    jump noticed since last complete check in Saipan has been about 2
    degrees.

L. Radio
    No casualties, no remarks.

M. Radar
    No casualties, no remarks.

N. Sonar Gear and Sound Conditions
    No remarks.

O. Density Layers
    SBT cards were taken on all dives and are being forwarded to
    the office of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

P. Health, Food and Habitability
    No remarks.

Q. Personnel
    (a) Number of men detached after previous patrol           12
    (b) Number of men on board during patrol                   81
    (c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol             70
    (d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol               70
    (e) Number of men making their first patrol                 7

R. Miles Steamed - Fuel Used
    Guam - Midway                               4210 miles     69,000 gals.
    Note: Stopped at Saipan enroute patrol area - never reached
          area before being ordered back to Midway.

(5)

— page 127 —
S. Duration
    Days - Guam - Midway                               13 days
    Total days patrol                                   13 days.
    Days submerged                                      None

T. Factors of Endurance Remaining
    Torpedoes           Fuel            Provisions      Personnel factor
    26                  45,000          70 days         60 days.

    Limiting factor this patrol - termination of hostilities and
    orders to proceed to Midway.

U. Communications, Radar, and Sonar Counter Measures
    No remarks.

V. Comments
    None

                                                        G. L. STREET, III

                                (6)

— page 128 —
Submarine Division THREE TWENTY TWO
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Cal.

FB5/322/A16-3

Serial: 011
DECLASSIFIED

27 August 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) Report
of War Patrol Number THREE.

From: The Commander Submarine Division THREE TWENTY TWO.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY TWO.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420), Report of War Patrol Number THREE.

1. The U.S.S. TIRANTE departed Guam for her third war patrol on
August 12, 1945. Hostilities ceased before she arrived in her area and on
August 16, 1945, she was directed to return to Midway. No enemy ship or
plane contacts were made.

2. On arrival in Midway the TIRANTE was exceptionally clean and
with the exception of the gyro compass, with no material deficiencies.

[SIGNATURE: D.C. MacMILLAN]
D.C. MacMILLAN

— page 129 —
DW

FF12-10(A)/A16-3
Serial: 0115

DECLASSIFIED

SUBMARINE SQUADRON THIRTY-TWO
                                        Care of Fleet Post Office,
                                        San Francisco, California.
                                        31 August 1945

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS/420) Report
of War Patrol Number THREE.

From:        The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY-TWO.
To:          The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:         (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
             (2) The Commander in Chief, United States PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject:     U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) - Report of War Patrol Number THREE.

1.           Forwarded, concurring in first endorsement.

                                        [SIGNATURE: K. C. Hurd]
                                        K. C. HURD.

— page 130 —
FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18)
Serial 02376
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
TIRANTE Report of
Third War Patrol:

[STAMP: RECEIVED S & C FILES]
[HANDWRITTEN: BC Room 705A]
[HANDWRITTEN: 10 OCT 1945]
[HANDWRITTEN: A16-3(23)/Ld.420]
[HANDWRITTEN: 188325]

SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
WT
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
25 Sept. 1945.
NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 914
U.S.S. TIRANTE - THIRD WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) - Report of Third War Patrol.

1. Forwarded to complete the combat record of the U.S.S. TIRANTE,
Lieutenant Commander G. L. Street, III, U.S.Navy, commanding. TIRANTE did
not reach the station assigned for her third war patrol before the cessation
of hostilities.

2. Since no patrol was conducted and no damage was inflicted on
the enemy, the award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is not authorized.

3. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, shares the pride
which the commanding officer, officers and men of the TIRANTE must feel at the
impressive record their ship has made in a brief but meteoric wartime career.

[STAMP: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations]
[STAMP: FLEET MAINTENANCE]
DISTRIBUTION: [STAMP: OCT 12 1945]
(Complete Reports) [STAMP: RECEIVED]
Cominch [STAMP: NAVY DEPARTMENT] (6)
CNO (1)
Cincpac (1)
JICPOA (1)
Conservpac (1)
Cinclant (8)
Consubslant (2)
S/M School, IL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Consopac (2)
Consowespac (1)
Consubs7thFlt (Fwd Echelon) (2)
Consubs7thFlt (Rear Echelon) (2)
Connorpac (1)
Comsubspac (3)
ComsubspacAdCond (20)
SUBAD, MI (2)
[HANDWRITTEN: 131]

G. C. CRAWFORD,
Chief of Staff.

ComsubspacSubordco (3)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Pacific (2)
ConSubOpTraGr(Airmail) (5)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

[SIGNATURE: E. L. Hynes]
E. L. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

— page 131 —
END OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: G-108-AR-161-75]
[HANDWRITTEN: R # 1]

1.0
| 50 | 2.8
| 56 | 3.2
| 63 | 3.6
| 71 | 4.0

1.1

1.25 1.4 1.6

2.5
2.2
2.0
1.8

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
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GOVERNMENT

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MICROFILMED BY
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