U.S.S. PERMIT (SS-178) — war patrol report SS-178_PERMIT_Part2.pdf

— page 129 —
U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON TENTH WAR PATROL

FIRE CONTROL - TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Realizing the weakness of my speed estimate, was attempting to come in for a 60" starboard track to fire the last two fish forward then swing to fire the stern tubes on a still acceptable track.

Raised the periscope when angle on the bow should have been about 40 starboard and saw SENDAI heading directly at us with a hell of a big bone in her teeth at an estimated range of about 2,000 yards. Kept scope us continuously as we swung the necessary 20 degrees toward her (inidentally biting my tongue to keep it from saying "take her down") and fired as cross-hairs steadied beautifully down on her bullnoses. She swung right shortly after firing and estimated to have increased the track to 25 degrees P., when the periscope went under, probably 30" when torpedoes hit.

Tube fired 4 3
Track Angle Target increased from zero to about 30 port by turning.

Gyro Angle Zero 8
Depth Set 8
Power Ht 8
Hit Ht 8
Hit or Miss No (Thank Heavy) 8
Erratic Mk. Torpado Mk. 14-3A 8
Serial No. 39139 Mk. 6-1A
Mk. Exploder Mk. 5-1 8
Serial No. 3822 8
Actuation Set Contact Mk. Warhead Mk. 16 8
Serial No. 5961 8
Explosivo TEX 8
Firing Interval 6 Sec. 8
Type Spread Nono 8
Sea Conditions Light sea 8
Overhaul Activity S/M Base, Pearl.

REMARKS:  None.

- 42 -

— page 130 —
1803 GOT Date Sept. 12, 1943 Lat. 8°30'N Long. 164°40'E (0503 L)
TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Target was the large tanker which was hit with at least three torpedoes in attacks No. 2, and No. 3, and was drifting well down by the stern. Day was just breaking and she looked enormous from ahead, probably because of the "up bubble" she was carrying.

One escort was close by her, pinging, and could be only vaguely made out but was later determined to be the CHIDORI. At least two other escorts were heard pinging to the Northward but could not be made out.

Ship damaged: 1 A0 10,500 tons unidentified class (NOTE: same as damaged in attacks No. 2 and 3).

Damage determined by: Heard both torpedoes hit, and when next seen an hour and forty minutes later the ship was restored to an even for and aft trim but very low in the water, indicating hits forward.

Target draft: 5-45 Course 250° Speed zero Range 4,400

OWN SHIP DATA

Type Attack: Maneuvered for zero track in order to be sure to open up for forward tanks. As range was near extreme for high power, attempted to set fish on low power, but the spindle of #6 tube could not be disengaged on low power setting so rotunred it to high power and fired on at each power. Fortunately we ducked and swung immediately after firing as a torpedo from the CHIDORI passed directly over the conning tower as we reached about 80 feet.

— page 131 —
1943 GCT
(0643 L) Date: 12. 1943
Lat. 8°30'N Long. 164°40'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Target was the large tanker, now having received at least five hits in Attacks No. 2, 3, and 5. The off or of the hits forward on attack #5 was to restore the ship to an even for and aft trim and leave her very low in the water, estimated. froboard 5-10 feet. The CHLORI and two subchasers were soon fairly close to the tanker but apparently still searching near position of our last attack, and one 4 engine patrol plane was soon near the tanker.

Ship Sunk: 1 A0 10,500 tons unidentified class.

— page 132 —
40-45 Course 270 Speed Stopped Range 7,700
    OWN SHIP DATA

Type attack: Maneuvered to get nearly aboard, but was afraid to try to close range. Fired gun successfully for four and aircraft. Knowing how to be severely hit both forward and aft, aimed last torpedo exactly amidships. Set depth at 6 foot to open fire, was opened by thon.

| Type | Depth | Range | Speed |
|------|||-------|
| Tube | 6      | 80 P   |       |
| Track | 60 P   |        |       |
| Gyro | 0      |        |       |
| Depth | 6      |        |       |
| Power | Low   |        |       |
| Hit | Hit   |        |       |
| Erratic | No   |        |       |
| Mk. Torp. | Mk. 14-36 |        |       |
| Serial | 23450 |        |       |
| Mk. Exp. | Mk. 5-1 |        |       |
| Serial | 3232 |        |       |
| Act. | Contact |        |       |
| Mk. Varhead | Mk. 16 |        |       |
| Serial | 1936 |        |       |
| Explosivo | TX |        |       |
| Sea Cond. | Smooth |        |       |
| Overhaul Act. | S/M Base, Pearl. |        |       |

- 45 -

— page 133 —
1. MINE
No mine laying or sweeping operations were observed.

(2) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

(a) AIR: Japanese anti-submarine aircraft seemed in general to be rather ineffective while on general patrol duty, but very efficient when they were making a close search. Although we made normal observations in the presence of aircraft every day off SEA PASS, we were only detected and bombed when we just happened to be in (and were trying like the devil to get out of) an approach position on a small spit-kit freighter. Another witness to this fact is our being detected and bombed while running around the drifting tanker at 100 feet under a fairly choppy surface.

The large patrol planes seemed to carry only three depth bombs, but these were believed to be very heavy.

(b) SURFACE: The same general remarks might be applied to the surface anti-submarine craft encountered. Although at times we evaded at periscope depth with patrol vessels merely passing as close as 1500 yards, never the less after firing or when our presence was other wise disclosed they wore able to close from considerably greater ranges and deliver quite accurate attacks.

It was noted that the attacks seemed to deteriorate in accuracy as they proceeded, and for that reason it is believed difficult for the Japs to re-establish contact once they have lost it. This initial accuracy might indicate that they use markers such as the one described in page 19 of the Narrative to mark the spot of anti-aircraft contact and then use guess work from that point if they are unable to hold contact.

— page 134 —
U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON TENTH WAR PATROL

Although echo-ranging was used extensively in searching and patrolling, they used it very little for the actual attacks. This impression may have been gained, however, from the fact that during attacks the sound gear is usually tuned to about 22-24 Kos, and the volume turned low so that echo ranging might not readily have been heard.

The CHLORI who fired a torpedo at us after attack No. 5 must have been right on the ball as his torpedo passed over head about the same time as our first one hit. That was a new and broadening experience that will be borne in mind when playing with torpedo boats in the future.

By official (Engine Room) count the Japs expended a total of one hundred and two depth charges and bombs, at least one hundred and fifty shells and one torpedo in their brief but enthusiastic "clean-up drive" on the PERMIT.

Tracking by shore radar was suspected on several occasions, but the indications are not positive. Once a search light went on and swept out over the surface when we approached ENUBUJ IS., just before diving in the morning.

The only evasive measures employed were to shoot, swing, and duck when over that looked necessary as it did on every shot this time. When scouts wore far enough away, used a burst of speed to clear the firing point before seeking safety in depth and silent running. By training sound operators to listen under standardized conditions of frequency and gain-sotting, we could get an idea of the relative distance of the scows from us and thus be guided in returning to periscope depth as soon as possible to regain the initiative.

— page 135 —
1. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
MAIN GENERATORS: Shortly after leaving JOHNSTON, #2 main generator began sparking so badly that it was put out of service after inspecting the commutator. The burning of segments speaded evenly around (equal to brush spacing) was found to be at a very advanced state. Further tests were run and the generator reached a dangerous state of sparking at loads as low as 150 K.W. Insulation readings were nearly normal and no other reason than a major winding failure could be advanced. This generator was considered out of commission, and only run periodically at no load to keep the engine in shape.

At the same time #3 main generator was found to be doveloping the same symptomatic burns, but the sparking did not become serious until a load of 650 K.W. on this machine.

Those dofactors are an aggravated occurrence of similar troubles exprienced for some time and never satisfactorily corrected.

BOW PLANES: A short circuit onorgized the shunt coil of the dive contactor, which caused the motor to throw the planes toward dive position with both the control and limited switches effectively shorted out of the circuit. The result was a hard mechanical jam against the mechanical stops at hard dive, which bent the bow plane shaft sufficiently to cause serious leakage through the hull glands. The olutch was kicked out from the control room too late to prevent the jamming but in time to unload the motor and provont its stalling and burning out, since the overload protection was also shorted out. The driving screw was finally backed off by putting two large extension stilssons on the motor pin shaft, and when the tension was thus released the gland leakage stopped and the planos operated normally both in hand and power.

MAIN CONTROL CELL: A contactor in starboard main motor field circuit, actuated by the bus solector switch, was apparently only partially opened and the resulting ar burned the contactor off and sot fire to the adjoining insulation. Fortunately a sparo contactor had been made up by the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, and it was installed after killing the control cell for about a half hour to portit the work.

— page 136 —
1. MAIN ENCRYPTION: HEAD STUDS: A small amount of water was admitted to #3 main engine on starting, which resulted in the breaking of two head studs and the lub oil linkage in #7 unit, these parts; and the cylinder liner, which appeared to be damaged, were replaced.

HULL FITTINGS: On a deep dive on route to the area a leak at the hull fitting on the overboard line from the forward crew's head disclosed the fact that two of the six studs holding this elbow to the hull were broken off. One had been broken for some time and the other nearly broken through. The state of corrosion was such that drill-ing out and re-tapping holes was not considered feasible, so we fitted a short bar and forced it into place to brace the weakond flange. This hold satisfactorily on deep dives and during depth charging at which times it had the loving care and attention of an auxiliary man and several volunteers. Two wore ready to plug the overboard discharge outside the ship; it became necessary, but this would have caused considerable discomfort to the crew.

(L) RADIO: PERMIT'S second message was cleared with much difficulty. 4235 K.C. was the only frequency on which we had any success, and then NPM refused to take the message or to let NPG who had also answered up take it because they WENT ABOUT TO QUIT A WAVE A WAVE OF SOUNDS. After a very exasperating hour of exchanging procedures signals I ordered radio to send the message blind which we did and it was later recopied for. At the time we were only a few miles off K.J.ALEN and were undoubtedly being accurately "dog-foxed" (which didn't matter, as we had also been pretty accurately "dog-charlied" a few hours before), and it was essential to get the transmission completed so we could clear out to the next day's diving position without indicating our intention. There should be some stops taken to expedite the receipt of messages from submarines in enemy waters without long-tending their transmissions unnecessarily.

(M) RADAR: Our S.J. Radar performed up to expectation on this patrol. Low Islands were picked up from 15,000 yards to 25,000 yards and a three ship convoy at 16,000 yards. The only failure encountered was the loss of the range stop and precision sweep after the first attack on a convoy. However, erratic operation was noted at times in that the S.J. would pick up targets at long ranges and then lose contact after the range had been closed several thousand yards.

— page 138 —
1. HEALTH, FOOD, and HABITABILITY:

Health in general was excellent. The only cases treated were heat rash occurring during the protracted periods when the air became very hot and humid due to being rigged for depth charge and silent running. About half the ship's company were so treated. Vitamin pills were taken regularly, and a rotating auxiliary sun-lookout watch got all hands top side at least occasionally while enroute to and from the area.

No restriction was placed on smoking. After explaining the plan and requesting the cooperation of the crew, an experimental policy of free smoking was instituted. The results were most gratifying; in many days of submerged patrols the Commanding Officer has never seen less smoking nor the air better at the end of the day. It seems there is something about the word "The smoking lamp is lighted" that makes a man involuntarily reach for a cigarette whether he wants it or not.

(Q) PERSONNEL:

The performance of duty by all hands was an inspiration to the Commanding Officer. Having served in four ships since the war started, he feels qualified to express the opinion that this crew is among the best in the business.

Organized school of the boat was held for the non-qualified men enroute to and from area, and a good deal of work was done by them on their own initiative in the area. Over half the non-qualified men finished the course and half that number were qualified.

Upon leaving the area the watch bill was re-arranged to train men to fill anticipated vacancies.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FULL USED - GALLONS PER MILE

| Mile | Gallons | Gallons/Mile |
|------|||
| PEARL to JOHNSTON | 735 | 11.099 | 15.1 |
| JOHNSTON to Area | 1115 | 13.055 | 11.7 |
| In Area | 2260 | 19.252 | 8.5 |
| Area to MIDWAY | 1350 | 17.678 | 13.2 |
| MIDWAY to PEARL | 1244 | 18.145 | 14.6 |
| TOTALS | 6704 | 79.459 | 11.8 |

— page 139 —
44/AL6-3
Serial 059
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. PERMIT 10th
Air Patrol Report.

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PERMIT - Report of Tenth War Patrol - Comment:

1. The PERMIT returned to Pearl after a comparatively short but very productive patrol of 32 days with 15 days spent in the patrol area. The expenditure of all torpedoes, with phenomenal results of 14 such planes, was the reason for abandoning the area.

2. By maintaining a close watch on Kwajalein anchorage and using care and excellent judgement in attempting to avoid detection in the presence of many patrol vessels and planes the Commanding Officer was rewarded on the eleventh night when a large ship was sighted headed for Wotje. A night periscope attack was conducted with one hit out of three torpedoes fired. A combination of circumstances including unsatisfactory torpedo tube performance and maneuvers of target prevented a better score on the attack. Target was definitely damaged but proceeded on course for Wotje, and further attempts to attack was frustrated by anti-submarine measures.

3. On the morning of 11 September the PERMIT experienced a fire in the main control cell which turned out to be a blessing in disguise since it influenced the Commanding Officer to proceed to an area where later in the day he was to intercept and deal very effectively with a valuable convoy of three enemy ships. At 1440 L on 11 September PERMIT sighted a convoy of two large freighters and a tanker escorted by five patrol boats and several planes clearing Sea Pass. PERMIT tenaciously ran skillfully maintained contact with this convoy for approximately 40 hours until the last of the three ships was destroyed at 0643 L on 13 September, and in addition took time out during the early morning hours of 13 September to put two torpedoes into a SENDAI class cruiser in a daring down-the-throat periscope attack.

— page 140 —
FC5-4/A16-3
Serial 0250
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND UNDERSEA REPORT to
J.S.S. PERMIT 10th
War Patrol Report.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PERMIT - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded. The tenth war patrol of the PERMIT can be considered one of the outstanding patrols of the war. All contacts were aggressively developed and all attacks extremely well executed. The judgment and tenacity of the commanding officer is considered outstanding.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR congratulates the commanding officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. PERMIT on an outstanding patrol.

T. J. HUFFMAN,
Acting.

Copy to:
CO PERMIT
- Consubdiv 44.

— page 143 —
12-10/116-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01380
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PERMIT Report of
Tenth War Patrol.
COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 265
U.S.S. PERMIT - TENTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PERMIT (SS178) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.
(23 August to 24 September 1943).

1. The tenth war patrol of the PERMIT was the second for the new
   Commanding Officer, but his first in command of the PERMIT. The patrol was
   particularly outstanding in torpedo fire control and performance.

2. The PERMIT, after making an excellent reconnaissance of Kwaijalen,
   patrolled the most likely passes close aboard with patience and tenacity in spite
   of anti-submarine vessels and planes. Then, when the shipping started to move
   out, the PERMIT fired all eighteen torpedoes in three days, obtaining the war's
   highest percentage of hits to date, eighty-nine per cent (sixteen hits).

3. The high light of the patrol was the destruction of a convoy of
   two large freighter-s and a large tanker in twenty-five hours, during which time
   an interferin light cruiser was damaged by two well placed "down the throat"
   greeks. This whole twenty-five hour attack was the epitome of tenacious aggression.

4. This patrol is considered successful for the purpose of Combat
   Insignia Award.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the
   Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this war patrol particularly outstanding
   in aggression and torpedo fire-control. The PERMIT is credited with having
   inflicted the following damage to the enemy:

S. U.S.
1 - Freighter (COSTU MARU class) - 8,592 tons
1 - Freighter (COSTU MARU class) - 8,592 tons
1 - Tanker (unknown class) - 10,500 tons

TOTAL: 27,684 tons

57127
FILMED.

— page 144 —
1- Light Cruiser (SENAI Class) - 5,595 tons
1 - Freighter (YAMAHITO MARU Class) - 6,798 tons

TOTAL: 12,393 tons

PISTHETION:
1. Conspiracy Report)
2. Corinth (5)
3. WNO (5)
4. Citopac (6)
5. Intel. Cen. Pac. (1)
6. Ocean Areas (1)
7. Sarfiorpac (1)
8. (div.Base Flan.Unit) (1)
9. Cinclant (2)
10. Consusblant (8)
11. S/M School, NL (2)
12. Consopac (2)
13. Comsowespac (1)
14. Comsobowespac (2)
15. CTF 72 (2)
16. CTF 16 (1)
17. Censubspac (18)
18. SUBAD, MI (2)
19. ComsubspacSubordcom (2)
20. All Squadron and Div. (2)
21. Commanders, Subspac (2)
22. U.S.S. PERMIT (1)
23. (Endorsements only) (1)
24. All Submarine, Subpac (1).

J. A. WOODRUFF, Jr.,
Flag Secretary.

— page 145 —
70105 FILMED

U.S.S. PERMIT
CONFIDENTIAL
SS178/A16-3
Serial 001-44

From: The Commanding Officer:
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels)

Subject: U.S.S. PERMIT, Report of Eleventh War Patrol.

Enclosures:
(A) Subject Report.
(B) Track charts for subject patrol.

Enclosures (A) and (B) covering the Eleventh War Patrol of this vessel conducted in Western and Central Carolines during the period January 2, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

C. L. BENNETT.
DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.10
BY OP-0289C DATE 3/3/42

DECLASSIFIED

— page 146 —
U.S.S. PERMIT
CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT OF ELEVENTH WAR PATROL
Period: January 2 to March 18, 1944.
Areas: FIFTEEN(NORTH) and Three supplementary areas.
OPERATION ORDER: ComSubPac No. 2-44.
(A) PROLOGUE:
Arrived Sumarine Base, PEARL HARBOR from TENTH WAR PATROL on September 24, 1944. In view of this extent and probable duration of the controlling job (main generators) it was decided to make the ship available for regular yard overhaul at this time. All the work of this overhaul, with the exception re-winding two and balancing all main generator armatures was accomplished by the Submarine Base. In addition to renewing two and re-winding two main generator armatures, major work accomplished included lengthening the conning tower, installing kk. 3 kod. 5 TDC, and SJA radar with PTI. Degaussing gear was removed; not wiped or tempered. Conversion of #7 lain Ballast Tank to Reserve Fuel Tank was started but not completed due to lack of docking visibility. The overhaul was officially completed on December 18, 1943, and four days were allowed for post-repair trials.

Since the previous patrol, Lieutenant R.D. WARD, U.S. Navy, Ensign D.H. DENTON, U.S. Navy(T), and Ensign W.L. POLLOCK, E-V(G), U.S. Naval Reserve, were detahed, and Lieutenant(jg) E.B. JOENSON, U.S. Navy, Ensign L.E. NORLAN, E-V(G), U.S. Naval Reserve, and Ensign A.P. LURPEY, U.S. Navy(T), reported aboard for duty. Thirty-one new men were received in the crew. A seven-day training period was commenced with two days of independent ship exercises which proved invaluable for training the diving sections after the extra ordinarily large turnover of officers and men. Final readiness for sea on 2 January 1944.

(B) NARRATIVE
January 2, 1944
1100 V-W Underway, anroute patrol area via JOHNSTON Island. Met escort, PC1083, at entrance buoys. While still in the channel, started up SJ reder to hold tracking drill with escort. After about ten minutes operation, it went out completely and repairs were commenced at once.

— page 147 —
1245 V-W Reversed course to return to PEARL. SJ casually had been determined beyond capacity of ship's facilities to repair, the symptoms being identical with a failure that had occurred during the training period and could not be diagnosed by the Base but was corrected then by the renewal of certain units. Decision was made to turn back at once in the hope of correcting the trouble and resuming our voyage before dark today.

: 1430 V-W Moored at Submarine Base, PEARL, and Base force commenced repairs on SJ.

: January 3, 1944

: 1238 V-W Underway for patrol erces via JOHNSTON Island, Rendezvoused DARTER and escort PC579 at entrance buoys. Made trip dive along with DARTER in afternoon. At dark escort turned back end PEARL and slowed to twelve knots for four hours to allow DARTER to open out to twenty miles distance.

Engineer and Repair personnel, who had been embarked to complete SJ repairs, won their desperate race to finish their job before sea-sickness finished them; SJ was in operation in time to track DARTER out to 9,000 yards. Performance satisfactory by old standards but not up to expectations for new set.

: January 4, 1944

: Enroute JOHNSTON on four main engines, zig-zagging during daylight. Maintenance of schedule did not permit diving, but fire control problems and emergency drills were held.

: 1142 W Radar contact on plane at 7 miles. This plane was tracked in to less than one mile and out again but was never seen owing to low ceiling. Considering the probable size and altitude of the plane, this performance of SD radar was not considered satisfactory.

: January 5, 1944

: 0930 W Slighted escort PBY. This plane came in on SD radar at seven miles, when its position angle was over 2°.

- 2 -

— page 148 —
1030 W  Simultaneous sight and SJ contact on JOHNSTON Island at 23,400 yards.

Having previously agreed not to enter until DARTER cleared, in view of heavy surging conditions expected inside, closed to within visual signal range to inquire expected time of DARTER's departure, then patrolled North and South in shoal water South of entrance for protection from submarines. This proceedure is not conducive to peace of mind.

: 1420 W  DARTER stood out the channel; commenced maneuvering to pick up the pilot and enter.

: 1458 W  Kored starboard side to the dock at Nevel Air Station, JOHNSTON Island. Received 12,285 gallons fuel oil and 600 gallons lubricating oil.

: 1745 W  Stationed maneuvering watch. While testing out, the belancing rheostat in the shorting of a poorly formed connecting strut caused the ship to be out of the shorting. Repairs were started at once, but before they could be completed it was too dark to attempt passage of the channel. Nevel Air Station personnel were once again found to be extremely cooperative and hospitable.

January 6, 1944 to January 14, 1944 (January 9 dropped. at Inter-National Dote Line)
January 6, 1944
0715 W  Underway for patrol area prior to sunrise.

: 0900 W  Kede trim dive and deep submergence, the first opportunity allowed by our schedule for the latter since the independent operations during the training period. At 250 feet a serious leak existed in hull ventilation exhaust and five new cables in conning tower and control room were pushed in from one-half to four inches. Removal and blanking off of hull vent exhaust trunk had been requested during the overhaul but authorization was received too late to accomplish the work.

Proceeding to area at 80/90 on two main engines, zig-zagging in daylight, maintaining high periscope and radar watches. Kede at least three short training dives each day; exercised crew at battle stations surface and submerged. Seas too rough for battle surface, but simulated same by SUPTECING AND DOWNGAS W/ WY prior to giving guns' crews the starting signal. Gave boarding party instruction and firing practice with small arms and hand grenades. School of the boat was started; the enthusiastic participation by the new men and cooperation by the older hands is most gratifying.

— page 149 —
1914

U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON ELEVENTH WAR PATROL

January 11, 1944

1910 L S.J radar contact on TAONGI ATOLI 5,500 yards 265° true. Since prescribed route lay less than 10 miles North of this atoll, had decided to detour and pass Southward of it because of the submerged reef lying Northwest of the islands and in order to check and tune S.J radar whose reliability was open to question.

2000 L Passed TAONGI abeam to starboard.

January 12, 1944

2030 L Heavy seas and swell having moderated somewhat, slowed to investigate leaking hull exhaust trunk. Found and replaced a stripped bolt in inspection plate; trunk subsequently tight. Sea did not permit sending men under the deck to tighten cable glands.

January 13, 1944

0340 K Interference on S.J radar bearing Northwest (our position 14° 13' N; 162° 40' E), presumably the DACE of whose proximity we had been warned. Put on four engines for two hours to pass ahead; bearing drew aft and disappeared astern. Actual contact was not established.

January 14, 1944

1100 K Cable glands having been set up as much as possible inside pressure hull (still too rough to send a man under the deck) attempted another deep dive. At 200 feet, two of the cables were creeping in so did not go deeper. Will attempt further repairs when seas subside or we can get in the lee of land.

2030 K Entered temporary patrol area North of TRUK.

January 15, 1944

Continued surface patrol to Southwest corner of temporary area where chances seem best for intercepting TRUK - MARIANNAS - EMPIRE traffic passing North of NAKONUTTO.

1730 K Seas having moderated somewhat, broke open deck locker and Ensign A.F. MURPHY, U.S. Navy, undertook to tighten new cable glands in hull and conning tower. Slack was found in several and two or three were apparently only about hand-tight before being covered with bitumastic. Tightening all those stopped the cable-crawling at deep submergence.

— page 150 —
0550 K. Submerged and went deep to test hull and get SBT card. We have yet to find anything but an isothermal to test depth.

Decided upon a modified submerged patrol to achieve maximum coverage with minimum chance of detection while in temporary area; i.e., staying up until sunrise or shortly thereafter to get a look with high periscope in full daylight and surfacing a half hour to an hour before sunset for the same reason. The following reasoning lead to this decision:

(a) Only 35,000 fuel remaining for 28 days in the area (allowing 25,000 for return); this is 1,250 gallons per day and uneventful day's surface patrol requires at least that.

(b) Study of past reports indicates considerable air coverage over convoy routes, and our detection in this wide open area would leave us open to being easily avoided by re-routing.

(c) Maintenance of favorable position in corner of area would require part of each day on Easterly courses and use considerable fuel in maintaining safe diving speed into condition 4-6 seas.

(d) Ship is difficult to handle at periscope depth in these seas, and both diving officers and planesmen need training and practise therein after long lay-off and before entering close-in area.

1324 K. Head three distant explosions; nothing in sight. Presumably, from later reports received, the SEAHORSE poaching on our preserves.

1342 - 1504 K. Eleven distant explosions in pairs and singles; evidently the last half of the first inning in SEAHORSE vs. NIPS.

1705 K. Surfaced and commenced searching to the Southwester, as the best guess on direction of source of the explosions.

January 17 - January 18, 1544

Modified submerged patrol in Southwest corner of area.

— page 152 —
22 January 24, 1944
Kept in mind modified submerged patrol, using economical speeds enroute to and in waiting area. Sent PERMIT first, acknowledging new patrol orders.

January 25, 1944
Entered regular patrol area during the night; 44,000 gallons fuel - en average of 1,000 gallons/day allowing 25,000 for return.

0527 K Submerged five miles Southwest of PISARAS Island, NANONUITO and patrolled southeastward to cover the diverging point of routes mentioned in HADDOCK VII, which looks mighty good from a plot of recent contacts.

1840 K Surfaced and patrolled Westnorthwest at economical speed along track of TRUK - LATITANAS traffic passing South of NANONUITO - also thick with plotted contacts.

January 26, 1944
0315 K Radar contact at nine miles on ULUL Island, NANONUITO.

0545 K Submerged and patrolled in ten mile legs across indicated traffic lane.

1854 K Surfaced and set course on two engines for NORTH PASS, TRUK, to spend remainder of patrol there.

Was rather disappointed to have spent our only two free days in what should have been the most fruitful parts of the area without any contact whatsoever.

January 27, 1944
0525 K Submerged about nine miles North of NORTH PASS. Went deep for SBT card while closing PASS and waiting for daylight to take a look.

0652 K Sighted four motored flying boat - our first visual evidence of Japanese activity. (Air contact #1).

Thereafter one or more planes were sighted almost every observation until midafternoon. Being too numerous to list individually, air and surface patrol contacts near NORTH PASS will be described categorically in appropriate section of this report.

— page 153 —
1311 K Schooner type patrol stood out of channel, swept out a sector North of the PASS to a distance of about seven miles and returned. He was in sight most of afternoon.

: 1840 K Searchlight display commenced (half-hour after sunset?). This proved to be a nightly occurance, involving the sweeping of sky and horizon with many searchlights from several of the islands.

: 1903 K Surfaced. Opened to about 11 miles North of PASS then patrolled route to KWAAALEIN, Radar ranges on TRUK Islands up to 75,000 yards facilitated navigation.

: 1915 K Sighted what appeared to be the green traijectory of a tracer shell rise from the islands and fell into the sea.

January 28, 1944

: 0502 K Submerged 10 miles Northeast of NORTE PASS.

: 1321 K Schooner type patrol boat stood up from Pass and made a sweep about nine miles out. He passed us to Northward about four miles and we proceeded along Northwesterly approaches to the PASS.

: 1500 K Large Catcher type patrol sighted patrolling on Easterly course about eight miles off PASS.

: 1542 K Catcher was about 4,000 yards to Northeastern when upon completing an observation took a final look at him to find his angle on the bow changed from greater than 90° to zero and he was belching a mountainous cloud of black smoke. This one is the grand daddy smoker of the war to date. Went to 100 feet and ran silent normal to his track to open out.

: 1610 K Sound having lost contact, came up for a look to see the cagey Nip lying to less than a thousand yards astern. He obviously had some sort of indication - probably he or a plane saw our periscope. Returned to 100 feet and ran silent for another half hour before next look. Both patrols searched vicinity remainder of afternoon.

: 1850 K Just before surfacing, patrols were in sight on the starboard quarter and astern, and sound contact on another on the port beam. It looked like the old squeeze play.

— page 154 —
1905 K
U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON ELEVENTH WAR PATROL

1905 K
Surfaced to run for it. Smokey was astern at an estimated 4,000 - 5,000 yards and looked big as a house. Was just about to loose confidence in the radar when they made contact at 12,000 yards. His apparent closeness was due to his enormous smoke cloud.

Patrolled at economical speeds along route to KAWAJIMIN.

January 29, 1944

0503 K
Submerged nine miles North of the PASS.

0536 K
Sound contact on light fast screws to Northward moving to west. Too dark to see anything; contact lost before daylight.

0837 K
Schooner type patrol stood out of channel, Eastward about two miles North of Reef, and then appeared to patrol an arc of about seven miles at a distance of 10 miles. Seams, the patrols conform to no pattern as to tracks or times, it would be a bad thing to depend on in any event.

1015 K
Small motor sampan with no mast stood down from North and entered the channel.

1100 K
Photographed TONELIK Island and the next island Eastward from 5,000 yards. No sign of reported radar or mast on the former, though there is a tall isolated palm tree at the Western tip of the wooded portion that might have been mistaken for one. The latter island, however, has a small clump of about four palms in the middle that appear suspicious in that they rise 10 - 15 feet above the uniform height of the rest of the island's trees.

1722 K
Heard four distant explosions in quick succession.

1852 K
Surfaced about nine miles North of PASS. Only one of the Northern reef islands, namely PIS Island, can be contacted on radar at this range and this one was held out to 27,000 yards. Positive evidence of radar in the form of strong and persistent SJ interference was seen for about forty minutes and several searchlights were trained in our direction. The radar interference was very strong and was almost identical with that obtained from another SJ set, indicating nearly the same equipment and pulse rate as our own.

— page 155 —
1852 K (Continued)

Will close and reconnoiter this island at first opportunity, but reported minefields off entrance and tendency of patrols to favor West side make a very close reconnaissance unwise. Bearing of interference continued to coincide with true bearing of PIS Island as latter changed when we opened Eastward.

Blinking lights a degree, or so above the horizon were at first thought to be from planes, but were probably from signal stations on the higher islands. Since we were pretty definitely detected on surfacing and the moon was two hours high, fully expected planes but none were seen.

Petrilled TRUK - KWAAEIN route during the night.

January 30, 1944

0515 K Submerged nine miles North by East from PASS; went deep for SBT card. This has been a daily procedure for two weeks and we have yet to find anything but a straight isothermal; an beginning to think it a waste of time.

0717 K When about five miles North of PASS sighted masts bearing 2910 true, range about 12,000 yards. Started approach, manned battle stations, and commenced closing track; echo ranging heard from two sources.

0735 K Identified target as a large PC boat, similar to PC-1 class but with stick mainmast and taller stack; broke off approach and exchanged roles with same. Schooner type patrol sighted to Southwest end a third source of echo-ranging was heard. Came about and avoided to Northeast as patrols were observed sweeping East end West above PASS. Two float planes were seen assisting in the search.

1008 K Patrols out of sight to westward; resumed closing PASS.

1529 K Sighted schooner type patrol patrolling on zig-zag courses Northward from PASS. On the assumption that he may be going out to heckle us tonight, came to 0450 to surface further East than usual.

2015 K Noted SJ radar interference to Southeastward from 7052' N; 1520' 03' E.); persisted about two hours; probably SHIPJACK.

— page 156 —
0.0
U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON ELEVANTHE MAR PATROL

January 31, 1944

0455 K Submerged about nine miles North of PASS. Patrol led above entrance; usual air and surface patrols sighted.

1912 K Surface, opened to Northwarc, then proceeded at two engine speed to vicinity of PIAANU PASS.

2330 K Then about 20 miles West of PIANU PASS, commenced transmitting serial two.

February 1, 1944

0100 K Transmission completed; set course for NORTH PASS.

0521 K Submerged ten miles North of NORTH PASS. Visibility poor; overcast with many large rain squalls all round; see oily with heavy swells.

0635 K Sighted convoy of two medium freighters and two destroyers clearing NORTH PASS on Northwarc course. Presence of Cachor boat well Eastward of this PASS, strengthened suspicion of probable course for ARSHALLS. Commenced approach; in view of the unusually heavy air coverage and the sight of the sea, crossed north and eastward to close track. Next look showed a near Northwarc course, but as ships were then to the East of this PASS, considered this just a zig. One destroyer was sighted by searchlight in our direction, but nothing in sight to the North. (Contact #3)

0734 K Realized convoy had changed to Northwarc by sea course and came to normal approach. We had been sucked over to Eastward too far, and long range shot in this sea would be torpedoes wasted. Since we were to leave station tonight for life-guard duties, decided to track the convoy, surface and overtake it in time to get in an attack tonight before assuming life-guard station tomorrow.

This confirmed intelligence information that had been noted to the effect that nine fields close to entrance necessitated ships departing NORTH PASS on Northwarc course, but the presence of the Cachor boat patrolling to Eastward and the accelerated activity in the ARSHALLS led me to jump at the wrong conclusion in this case.

— page 157 —
0831 K Convoy had disappeared in rain squalls on base course 3150 true(to pass close Northeast of NALONUTIO) advance 12.5 knots. Heard a series of seven explosions in rapid succession, believed to be a false contact by convoy escorts. Continued opening from NORTH PASS parallelling convoy course.

0915 K Sighted a FUBUKI destroyer (Contact #4) in the edge of rain squall at about 3,500 yards on probable convoy track; later determined him to be patrolling at listening speed (70 RPM). Believed this he escort who had been dropping so worked around to Northeastward of him and continued trailing convoy. Heard another distant explosion at this time.

1020 K Sighted what appeared to be two destroyers with zero angle on bow emerging from rain to south west. As visibility cleared, stick masts were seen to the left of each shape and they were recognized as two YALASIEIR class battleships with large starboard angle on bow and estimated range of 25,000 yards. (Contact No. 5). By coming up to 45 feet the top of the stack could just be seen. Faint smoke in the vicinity indicated other ships in company, but nothing could be seen of them.

It was soon evident that we could not get in, so came to normal approach course to retain contact as long as possible. They passed at least 10 miles.

After six days of no more than patrol activity at NORTH PASS, couldn't help wondering if the two contacts today were the result of our transmission of PIANNU PASS last night.

1122 K Last sight of battleships' tops. Geographical plot had established mean course 2500 true, advance 18.5 knots. Came to Northerly course to open out for surfacing.

1243 K Surfaced about 16 miles North-northwest of NORTH PASS and commenced transmitting contact report.

1255 K Sighted float type observation biplane at about four miles coming toward us; submerged; not bombed. (Air contact #2).

1324 K Surfaced and resumed transmission; visibility very spotty with many scattered rain squalls and low overcast.

1407 K Contact received for; submerged to prepare amplifying report including code on convoy.

— page 158 —
1600 K
    Surfaced and commenced transmission. It had cleared to
    southward and all TRUK islands in plain sight from bridge.
    Fix showed us then only 18 miles from NORTE PASS, so first
    surfacing must have been about 13. Believe this the first
    fix of the war by fangents on TRUK islands from the bridge
    in daylight.

1619 K
    Sighted two engine NELL bomber (air contact #3) banking
    toward us at about five miles. Submerged. As high periscope
    went under he was less than three miles headed directly for
    it, but still no bombs. Cannot understand but are thankful
    for small favors.

1855 K
    Surfaced; proceeded to point for special assignment.

2257 K
    Fixed position by radar contacts on NORTH ATLANTIC.

February 2, 1544

0525 K
    Submerged to obtain trim and head for spot.

0726 K
    Surfaced. Almost complete overcast with heavy clouds
    below. Seas had made up to about condition five, necessitating a station patrol in trough of sea to insure good
    diving course. NORTH ISLANDS in sight through high periscope so commenced patrol. Southward to open to range.

0748 K
    Sighted NELL bomber (air contact #4) coming at us out
    of clouds at about five miles. Submerged. No bombs again.

0945 K
    Surfaced and resumed patrol. Did not use SD this time
    as it has not yet indicated a plane that has ducked us.
    Maintained power training search with SUA.

1015 K
    Sighted float observation plane (air contact #5) about
    four miles abeam and on parallel course. Dived. Seen
    through periscope going down, he gave no evidence of sighting
    us.

1055 K
    Surfaced and resumed patrol.

— page 159 —
1115 K Sighted NELL bomber banking (Air contact #6) toward us at about six miles. Seen through periscope heading at us but again no bombs.

Decided to remain submerged today for following reasons:

(a) Weather conditions made it almost a certainty that our presence would not be required today.

(b) Having been sighted at least twice today and twice yesterday in same locality, believe our persistence now would make it impossible to stay up when we are really needed there, and

(c) Radio log on assigned frequency showed nothing identifiable as of United States origin.

Headed toward NORTH ISLANDS patrolling submerged.

1810 K Sighted NORTH ISLANDS to Northwest.

1350 K Surfaced. Set course 2450 true and proceeded at two engine speed to get maximum change of bearing from TRUK.

2326 K Commenced transitting serial four, partially with intention of persuading Jap planes to re-orient their searching away from our life guard station, toward which spot they are now probably partial.

2345 K Transmission completed; set course for patrol station.

February 3, 1944

0421 K Received word of postponement; set course for NORTH PASS.

0531 K Submerged about 23 miles North-northwest of NORTH PASS and commenced clpsing. Heard several loud but distant explosions in following two hours, probably indicating a harkitz sortie but nothing in sight with high periscope.

0904 K Improving visibility showed larger TRUK islands.

1231 K Islands at NORTH PASS and usual air and surface patrols in sight.

1825 K Properly lighted hospital ship (Contact No. 6) cleared pass on course 330, speed 15 knots. Opened out from track to surface.

— page 160 —
1850 K
    Surface with hospital ship 11,000 yards to Southwest.
    Commenced patrolling at economical speed on route to
    KWAJALBIN.

: 2317 K
    On receipt of orders, set course for life guard station
    on two main engines.

February 4, 1944

: 0540 K
    Submerged on station.

: 0610 K
    Heard one heavy explosion close enough to cause perceptible rush of water in superstructure; nothing in sight.

: 0725 K
    Surfaces. Seas quite rough from East-northeast so
    patrolled at two engine speed in trough of sea on half-hour
    legs, after shifting station but nine miles southward to
    lose sight of NOK-TIN Island. Sky varying from six-tenths
    to completely covered with CI, Cu, end CuNH clouds. SD not
    used, but SJ search maintained in power training.

: 0825 K
    Sighted two planes (air contact #7) at about seven miles
    to Southeast headed west. They were in echelon formation
    and, though unidentifiable, appeared to be large fighters or
    light bombers. Submerged. No indication that we were
    sighted.

: 0900 K
    Surfaced and resumed patrol.

: 0917 K
    Sighted float type Zero fighter, RUFS (air contact #8)
    about five miles to Northward headed nearly toward us.
    Submerged; plane seen throughout periscope while going down
    showed no evidence of having surfaced. This plane was on
    direct route from NOK-TIN to TRUK, which may corroborate
    reported being of planes at former atoll.

: 0954 K
    Surfaced and resumed patrol.

: 1116 K
    Sighted plane appearing to be a large flying boat
    smaller to NAVIS (air contact #9) about 10 - 12 miles to
    Southeast headed toward TRUK. Did not dive as it was headed
    away and was soon lost to sight.

: 1335 K
    Mission assumed completed; submerged and continued
    patrol to Southward toward NOMTE PASS.

— page 161 —
1839 K
    **U.S.S. PHILIP - REPORT ON ELEVENTH WAR PATROL**

    **1839 K**
    **Surfaced. Completely overcast but redder fix showed us 16 miles above NORTH PASS. Commenced economical speed patrol along THUK - KWAJALENI route.**

    **February 5, 1944**

    **0448 K**
    **Submerged about nine miles North of PASS. Decided to dive earlier than usual in order to get squared away and commence observations at daybreak, as our experience of the other day showed sorties may be expected at about that time.**

    **See very rough, making observations end depth control difficult. Tried to work to Eastward in patrolling, so that any approach could probably be made with sea abaft the beam.**

    **0700 K**
    **No patrols in sight from 3 miles due North of PASS. Looks like c quiet day. Only three planes and one schooner type patrol sighted near the PASS during the day.**

    **1851 K**
    **Surfaced about 11 miles North of PASS and patrolled at economical speed on KWAJALENI route.**

    **February 6, 1944**

    **0523 K**
    **Submerged about 10 miles North of PASS and closed same. Usual patrol activities.**

    **1034 K**
    **A WAKEFIELD destroyer observed sinking a sweep at slow speed about four miles North and East of PASS. Fe was not echo-ranging and his screws were not hard at minimum range of 7,000 - 8,000 yards. Two planes sighted over PASS while observing him.**

    **1103 K**
    **Destroyer observed re-enterning channel, and nothing further seen except usual patrol activity.**

    **1840 K**
    **Surfaced and patrolled toward MARSHALS.**

    **2225 K**
    **Radar contact (Contact #7); small pip at 11,000 yards. Since nothing in sight in bright, moonlight turned away to hold range open and lost contact. Then reversed course and ran down bearing until radar interference on this bearing strengthened suspicion that it was SKIPACK - poaching about five miles into our bellwether. Resumed patrol.**

— page 162 —
1944

0422 K Closed Pass a little more then intended end again observed redr interference on bearing of PIS Islend (range 18,000 yards); opened Northwerf and kept redr olser of that bearing.

0521 K Submerged 10 miles North-northeast of Pass end co-encased closing. |.

— page 163 —
0925 K (Continued)

Considering their shallow draft, the heavy seas prevailing, and the probability that they were incipitive of valuable targets to come, did not commence approach on the destroyers but maintained position about seven miles North-northeast of the entrance and continued careful periscope search.

These destroyers held to their Esterly course until well past NORTH PASS, then turned by column movement and entered the ch.men on the coast about South-southwest (again pointing to the possibility of a mine field), closest range .bout 7,000 yards.

When the destroyers had turned to enter the channel it became obvious that they were neither searching nor screening but had just arrived from the West. Consider it likely that they might be returning from a sc.r.eching mission associated by our transmission off PIAAU last night. Patrol activity seems somewhat heavier than usual today but no other traffic through the Pass.

1900 K: Surf.ced and commenced patrolling at economical speed along routes to LASHILLS.

February 5, 1944

0008 K: Received message granting three day extension of patrol and releasing us from close watch on NORTE PASS: set course for the junction of routes at 8 - 15' N., 150 - 45' E.

0550 K: Submerged after making high periscope search in nearly full daylight. Was near desired spot and considered surface patrol inadvisable so close to TAH.

1235 K: Sighted KAVIS flying boat patrolling at low altitude. (Air contact #10)

1846 K: Surfaced. Patrol led traffic lanes to westward with a view to looking into UWL Island anchorage tomorrow, complying with CommSubPec serial four.

February 10, 1944

0208 K: SJ contact (Contact #5) to Southward 9,500 yards. When nothing could be seen at about four miles in bright moonlight, decided it was patrol orft and avoided.

0345 K: SJ contact to Northwest 26,000 yards; finally tracked to a stcndstill enc det.rained to be UWL Island. Weak radar interference in this general direction but bearing uncertain.

- 18 -

— page 164 —
0528 K
: 0809 K
: 1927 K
: 1937 K
: 2009 K
: 2025 K

---

**U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON HEAVYWEIGHT WAR PATROL**

Submerged end closed for reconnaissance of anchorage.

Sighted schooner type patrol boat (Contact #10) patrolling Westward from ULUJ Island.

Examined and photographed ULUJ Island from 1 - 2 miles. Good radar ranges of last night explained by an 80 foot structural steel water tower. It was examined and photographed at 2,200 yards and appeared to be surrounded by a lookout platform and machine gun but no radar unless a very small 5T type antenna. Four or five fair-size tin roofed structures grouped around tower (Lat. 89°4'40"N; Long. 145°39'30"E) indicate some activity here. Only a few Nips shacks were seen at the charted location of the settlement.

Worked around South end to examine Eastern side of island then retired to the south. Started draining fuel from #2 and #3 Fuel Ballast tank vent risers into bilges and pumping to Expansion tank in preservation for converting these tanks to Main Ballast tanks tonight. Considerable fuel was recovered in this process.

Surfaced about 10 miles South of ULUJ and commenced patrolling to South East, continuing preparations for converting tanks.

SJ contact (Contact #11) at 23,000 yards to the South-east, two good sized pipes at this range indicated large ships. Secured preperetions for converting tanks, commenced tracking on two engines and continued battery charges on two as the battery was very low from fighting currents all day.

Targets in sight at 18,000 yards - though full moon was obscured by light overcast - appeared to be two battleships in column. PPI showed aircraft carrier screen of four escorts, on either bow and quarter of the column. Took one engine from charge in effort to hold range open until base course and speed could be established, realizing that such fast targets would leave us out of the picture if we gave in the wrong spot. Keane battle stations submerged.

Range closing fast; put fourth engine on propulsion and both auxiliaries on charge; two screening destroyers now in sight at 10 - 13,000 yards.

We seemed to be just about on the base course of the formation and, though we had insufficient data on targets, dove to escape detection by nearest screen at 5,600 yards. SJ radar interference had been noticed on bearing of targets and was getting stronger.

— page 165 —
2025 K (continued)
Came to firing course and continued approach submerged. As range closed targets could be clearly seen end were identified as two MOGAMI class cruisers. The nearest screen, which passed about four hundred yards ahead of us was a SHIGURE class destroyer.

2044 K Fired four bow tubes at second cruiser in column. Difficulty was encountered in making ready the deck tubes. Swing right end fired #8 tube to hit but it apparently stuck in the tube and had a partial hot run there.

Right after firing looked at near screen who had just passed ahead and had a large starboard engine on the bow. He had commenced smoking very heavily and was turning toward us. Owing to heavy seas stern was had nearly broached and depth control was lost in getting her back under.

Saw a transdous sheet of flame as first torpedo hit in one minute end fifteen seconds. Went deep, turned hard left, and rigged for depth charge.

While going down heard an explosion, pretty definitely that of a torpedo, two minutes twenty seconds after firing last torpedo, which very vigorously broke beam a hit on the port quarter screen although torpedoes were set at 15 feet. This screen was not seen, but judging from the formation which had been quite regular throughout the tracking, it should have been just about in line with the target at firing end the run of 3,500 - 4,000 yards would also correspond to his distance beyond the target as the enemy formation experienced symmetric. This is, of course, just an interesting conjecture and no damage is claimed on such evidence.

2050 K Two destroyers delivered a very short and snappy counter-attack, dropping two patterns of four each and three singles in about three minutes - none very close. They then apparently departed immediately as crews faded out in the direction of the formation within ten minutes. Proceeded with reload forward before coming up.

2155 K Poriscope depth nothing in sight. Pumped down the very considerable pressure in the boat resulting from venting. Negative twice. Targets had obviously cleared the area, but wanted to make certain thorw were no lurking escorts before surfacing as our battery was in no condition to undergo a prolonged attack.

— page 166 —
2006 I: 1. Passed through a very heavy oil streak whose direction corresponded to target's base course. The odor was noticeable for several miles and the fleet that it had persisted over two hours in a rough sea indicated a lot of oil on the water. Our dead reckoning position was not too reliable but it was believed that we were near end a little to the Southeast of the attack, which would indicate that the damaged cruiser was returning to TRUK, 130 miles away. Decided to complete work on tube #8 and get a little more charge in, then return to the slick end follow it toward TRUK at best speed.

February 11, 1944

0001 K: 1. Backed emergency end fired torpedo from #8 tube (see "MAJOR DEFECTS"), then went ahead full speed and cleared the area, returning to pick up oil streak of damaged cruiser at full speed on two main engines.

0018 K: 1. Rader contact (Contact #12) at 24,600 yards to Southwest. Des pretty sure this was the damaged cruiser; commenced tracking on three engines keeping fourth on badly needed battery charge.

0050 K: 1. Target making about 17.5 knots toward TRUK and we were losing true bearing rapidly as we tried to close the range. Than three smaller pips showed up at about the range we had previously gotten on SHIGURE's, was sure this was our cripple, particularly as we experienced the area sort of redder interference at about the same range. Had put all four engines on propulsion a dead blown Ken Ballest tanks dry with floods shut, but still could log only 15.5 knots into the seas while target was tracked at better than 17 knots. It looked like a losing battle, and the situation was particularly disappointing when at about 15,000 yards the target was definitely identified as an aircraft carrier.

0140 K: 1. Determined target making regular zigs of about ten minutes duration on his base course (1100ft) and thirty-five degrees either side of that course. By the time we had closed the range to 11,000 yards, his true bearing had decreased to 2000 true - giving us a 90 angle on the bow for his base course. It looked like now or never, so made

— page 168 —
0157 K (continued)

While glued to the periscope wctching to see whether the destroyer showed signs of hcving contact or w.s going to let us stcy up cnd wctch, was horrified to receive the report that the ship had popped up to 28 fect cnd we were flooding everything in t frntie offort to get bcck down. after a long minute the ship wcs finally gotten under cnd she want down like t rock. When the portisopoe want under, howevor, the destroyer hd not chnged course nor given cny evidence that he hcd soon the PERMIT. Having thus lost the picture there seemed no cternative other than to go deep - which the PERMIT wcs cpparently bound and determined to do anywty - cnd rig for depth chnge in case we were cctented. Ccught the ship cnd leaveled off ct deep submergence.

Sound picked up the destroyer's severs as we were going down. They grew louder on c ncarly constant bcoring for short while, then began to draw off rcidly to the left cnd diminish in intensity. Sorewsh fcded out by cbout six minutes after firing. It w.s evident that the destroyer hcd turned towrd to investigate c supsucted contcrt that he did not confirm cnd than turned bck towrd-his formtion.

0205 K A series of three hecvy explosions hcrd tnturv.ls corresponding to the firing interuys of the first three torpedoes cnd seven minutes forty-five seconds .fter firing them. This correspondcd rur of 8,400 yards which, considcring the range t firing, i6cictcd c 550 strcrd tr.ck instcd of the 900 trcct Intended. Nothing olsc hcrd on sound gocx except mucn dist.nt pinging. Strted up for t look t onee.

0230 K At porisopoe depth; nothing in sight in bright moonlcht. Commenced relo.ding iorw.rg rnd pumping down pressure in prepr.tion for surfcicing.

0306 K Surfaced cnd commenced tr.rssion of contct report vic NMC cnd crcc frequency. Dedided cg.inst pursuit in view of the short tine before dawn and the urgent necessity for getting in our beidly needed rnd twice interrupted b.ttery chcrc. cven ct full power we could not hcve mcde cnough speed into the sog to offer much ch.nce of overtracking in the hour cnd c hslf of darkness rnm.ining, so set course for PULWAT Isl.and.

0532 K Submerged cnd continued towrd PULAP ATOIL.

— page 169 —
0730 K Slighted PULWAT ATOL and made close reconnaissance
down the Western side. No activity. Thought we counted
one island too many, but it turned out to be the two wooded
ends of TALATAN Island separated by a low-lying sandy strand.

: 1520 K Sighted PULWAT Island Lighthouse.

: 1908 K Surfaed and patrolled across chennel between PULWAT
and PULWAT at economical speed.

February 12, 1944

: 0538 K Submerged 8 miles North of PULWAT Island lighthouse
and closed for reconnaissance of island and anchorage in
accordance with ConsubPac seriel four. Set course to pass
midway between the reef and 8-fathom spot four miles off
shore.

: 0849 K At 60 feet depth after an observation, touched the
bottom or a coral head apparently only with sound head and
pit log sword. Decreased depth to fifty feet and reversed
course to the right, away from the shore.

: 0903 K After turning about 140° at slow speed, touched again
very lightly at fifty feet. A careful cut, corroborated
by a stadiometer range of 5,400 yards on t.e.1

— page 170 —
0903 K (continued)
Close aboard to the South of the lighthouse were three radio masts 75 feet high and the roofs of several buildings. No guns were seen, but they may have been missed as the whole point appeared densely wooded with scrub about 15 feet high.

1213 K Sighted masts of two ships (contact #13) to the North; commenced approach. Targets seen to be KEF, freighter similar to MIKAGE MARU and another KEF, freighter of about same medium tonnage, escorted by catcher boat and large PC boat on either bow. NELL two engine bomber (Air contact #11) seen three times during approach.

1252 K Was in good firing position when a wide Southclay zig gave us a 35 port angle on bow. Knew he had to zig back to go through strait, and should have remained to Southward of his mean course, but instead I tried to run across and get a position for a port track on next leg with the result that we were caught dead ahead at about 1,200 yards. Rather than fire two stern tubes at the probable cost of losing contact, ran under port screen and paralleled base course to continue tracking until out of sight. Geographical plot established base course 115° true, advance 7.5 knots.

1745 K Surfaced and put on four main engines for chafed. Owing to 'Vestcarly current in strait, it had turned out to be quite a job to get clear of lookouts on PULWA. Lighthouse. Finally decided to surface when range was opened to 12 miles, as targets base course would have to be altered to bring him to TRUK and it was desirable to regain contact as early as possible. Set interception course on the assumption of a change of base course at dark to head for OTTI. PASS.

2253 K Radar contact 1330 true, range 22,750, almost exactly as predicted. Commending Officer felt very pleased with himself until plot and TDC insisted targets were on a Southwesterly course. (Cont. #14).

2313 K When PPI showed four targets at 20,000 yards was convinced that we had stumbled into another end a juicier convoy, and that I had wasted valuable time in trying to work to Eastward in blind assurance that it was our original targets.

PPI showed three large targets in line of bearing and one large escort astern. Later another escort showed up at extreme range on port bow of convoy and joined up, had apparently been making a wide sweep. The trailing escort was seen to drop back and sweep about six miles astern from quarter to quarter.

— page 171 —
0130 K Had gained position, manned battle stations submerged, cleared the bridge except for the Commanding Officer and was just ready to dive for attack when two successive wide zigs away aroused suspicions. These were confirmed in a change of base course from 230° to 295°; secured from battle stations and resumed maneuvering for position.

: 0318 K Again in position; manned battle stations and submerged to commence approach. Rough sea required a depth of 50 feet for observations and the heavy swell made trim precarious at this depth.

: 0352 K Had opened outer doors and was ready to fire in beautiful position when ship suddenly popped up and Negative had to be flooded to keep from broaching completely. Caught ship at 35 feet but was unable to stop her going down in time to fire as planned.

: 0415 K At periscope depth, after restoring trim, to see convoy with large angle on the bow and after escort, a two stack destroyer, passing about 1,000 yards ahead. Turned to open range in perception for surfacing.

: 0437 K Surfaced and resumed chase; range to trialing destroyer 9,000 yards. Convoy was due to enter straits between PULWAP and PULWAT before we could possibly pull ahead and we could not trail through there by daylight because of observation tower on PULWAT lighthouse, so decided to run South of URANIE BANK and conduct search from the flank based on convoys known time of passing through strait.

: 0740 K Picked up PULWAT lighthouse through morning haze and shortly thereafter by SJ at 13 miles which was minimum range. Would have preferred to give this point wider berth, but uncertainty of dead reckoning in the absence of pitlog made it inadvisable to shave NANILA REEF to closely.

: 0952 Executive Officer and 0.0.D. on bridge simultaneously heard a NANITMA3(ADAL) plane (air contact #12) pulling out of his dive directly from the sun and saw bomb falling to land about 100 yards abreast to port; submerged.

Since we were then in position to cover the Southernmost likely course of the convoy and could not cover the rest until dark anyhow because of GRAYFEATHER BANK, decided to remain submerged until just before sunset.

— page 172 —
1319 K Convoy (Contact #15) showed up within five miles of where we were bombed, - his position indicating advance of 8.2 knots along 2750 true from streits. Manned bttle stetions, but in view of the difficulty of depth control and his heavy protection had decided to track him and attack tonight in order to get in more shots end evoid losing contact.

The three ships were still in line of bearing normal to the base course with a 2-stock tripod mast destroyer on stercord bow, a large PC type on port bow and four escorts octothor end traveler types astern. They were apparently prepared to throw out distant flanking screens as well as to hold down any subs detected for a good long time. A LAVIS flying bost (Air contact #13) was seen over convoy in one observation.

: 1403 K Photographed ships at minimum range of about 6,000 yards. The large tanker definitely identified as NIPPON KAHU and the freighters similar to FOKOKU LHU and G.S.S.N KAHU (peges 263, 43, and 104 ONI 2087).

: 1530 K Convoy out of sight. Tracking showed pit log spoed now 11 knots and base course changed while tracking them to 3150 true, which showed that they were rounding the Southern tip of GRAYFEATHER LANK instead of cutting across it. Continued trailing along their course at standard speed, looking every hell hour, as we desired to reestablish contact and get in an attack before moonrise.

: 1737 K Surfaced to reestablish contact and determine on which side of CONDOR REEF convoy was passing, - new base course needed them directly for it.

: 1740 K On first high periscope sweep sighted group of rests and stacks that checked very closely with convoy but estimated range of 15 miles showed c reduction in speed.

: 1743 K Submerged to covid detection, considerin- that interception before moonrise was now assured. Continued at two-thirds speed in direction of convoy.

: 1837 K Upon making a sweep preserotory to surfacing just after sunset, were astonished to find ourselves under the noses of convoy number three (Contact #16) of the present chase. Another large 4 goal post passenger freighter similar to HOKOKU KAHU and another large tanker similar to GANYU KAHU (pg 262). A KOLI destroyer was on starboard beam between us and convoy and another smaller escort was made out beyond. Commenced tracking and opening range to surface when it was a little darker.

— page 173 —
1837 K (continued)
Hated to abandon second convoy but decided to shift targets again for following reasons:
(a) "Bird in hand...etc."
(b) These ships probably heavily loaded since headed toward TRUK.
(c) This convoy arriving at TRUK tomorrow, whereas other would be available for interception for several days yet.
(d) Had not enough torpedoes to deal with all three large ships of other convoy.

1900 K
Surfaced and commenced maneuvering to gain position on port side, since PPI showed only one escort there and two to sterbored. Had only two and a quarter hours before moon- rise, so in order to gain position for attac* before then decided to place only two auxiliaries on charge and use four mains on propulsion. In view of later developments, this leads the list of things I shall never do again.

1947 K
As we worked up on close on convoy's port quarter, star fix showed us further North then at expected and that the convoy was practically skirting the edge of GRAYPETTERT BARK. Took a cautious single-ping sounding and got five and a half fathoms, so pulled out and worked over to sterbored quarter in a hurry.

It was obvious we would not reach position ahead; heavy seas reduced our speed considerably and indicated we would have plenty of depth control troubles with a night periscope attack, so decided to fire long range shot from outside of two sterbored screens.

It may be noted in passing that this was the second convoy to pass within five miles of the spot since we were bombed on the surface this morning. This seems to indicate that the Japs are great fatalists or else have a very unflattering opinion of us - which opinion moreover was justi-fied by today's results.

2135 K
Koon had risen but was behind heavy clouds and visibility only slightly improved; had attained fair position and when about ready to shoot the targets zigged away, so withdrew to pull ahead again and accept a submerged approach.

— page 174 —
2156 K
U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON ELEVENTH WAR PATROL

2156 K While PERMIT was working up ahead on starboard beam of convoy and about 5,000 yards outside nearest screening destroyer, the whole Southern horizon was sudenly illumined. It appeared that an un-expected distant flanking escort had turned on two horizontal searchlight beams normal to convoys bearing. The purpose of this maneuver was obvious and while clearing the bridge I looked back toward the convoy just in time to see neer destroyer open his light directly on us. Dove inmediately and as expected, heard the destroyer coming in fast on a constant bearing.

220L K First pattern of four depth charges. During next three hours, thirty-three were dropped including five patterns of four each.

Destroyer had overrun us and another with similar sounding screws joined up, so evaded toward GRAYFATHER BARK and attempted to parallel its Southwestern edge by sound bearings. The charges made an awful rocket reverberating from the bank. Found three degree negative gradient at 290 feet which, with proximity of the bank, may have given them trouble in making accurate attacks but did not make them lose contact as they stayed quite close aboard and were heard through the hull passing directly overhead.

Had to close off main induction end exhaust valve drains as water got dangerously high in engine room bilges. Main induction and all six engines were soon completely flooded. Ship became very heavy aft and overall, so that an average of 90-100 r.p.m. was required to hold it with 15 - 18° up angle, and frequent spurts up to 180 r.p.m. were required to arrest sinking. Maximum depth reached was 320 feet. This was the most serious aspect of the situation, since the battery was nearly flat after running at high speed most of the afternoon and getting in only three hours of charge on the auxiliaries.

February 14, 1944

0058 K After screws had faded out for about twenty minutes, came to periscope depth. When making first quick sweep, saw the bow of a ship ahead and very close aboard, realized it was the bow of the PERMIT just in time to catch my heart with my teeth and swallow it again. Could not reduce bubble below about 120° rise with out sinking like a rock, so observation was not satisfactory but nothing was seen. Eased back to 150 feet and started pumping engine room bilges (not enough water in after trim to get a suction at this angle).

— page 175 —
0100 K
Screws started up from fairly close and two depth charges dropped. Went back to our layer in a hurry, only to find that it was gone and the SBT line now straight up and down.

: 0127 K
Screws had faded out again and the battery situation getting no better. Last, so started up again. Drained engines as well as possible, warmed up SJ and made preparations to surface and run for it.

: 0145 K
Periscope observation - nothing in sight in bright moonlight, except our own bow sticking up like the Great Pyramid.

: 0147 K
Surfaced, making SJ sweep as it cleared the water and using both turbo blows to reduce the 3 inches of pressure to a point where we could open the hatch. Right as it was, that moonlit sky looked mighty good to us. Withdrew to Southeast, trenamitting contact report, jemming in a charge, and restor.ng normal conditions in the boat.

Examination of main induction gasket, after it was drained down and opened, showed our real large particles of coral crushed into the gasket. Gasket end set were cleaned off and subsequently held tight at deep submergence.

: 0302 K
Reversed course to dive off PULAWAT strait, which has fully proved its fruitfulness as a hunting ground. Transmitted serial ten to CcnSubPac regarding shortage of fuel as a result of chasing.

: 0541 K
Submerged West of strait, after crowding sunrise to reach the finishing rate on battery charge. The battery had really been close to bottom.

: 1812 K
Sighted Float tyre monoplane (Air contact #14), similar to one that bombed us yesterday, flying in direction of PULWAT.

: 1903 K
Surfaced and set course through the straits to intercept convoy reported leaving TRUK, low lend visible up to twenty miles in bright moonlight.

February 15, 1944.

: 0203 K
Sighted smoke ahead (Contact #17) and made radar contact 1170 true. Felt sure this was our convoy and its early appearance indicated high speed; commenced tracking.

— page 176 —
0240 K
Behavior of convoy during tracking aroused suspicions that it might not be the ships awaited at all, but an advance patrol line. The following factors contributed to this suspicion:
(a) Pit log speed of about 5½ knots;
(b) Extremely open line of bearing, ships estimated 2000 yards apart.
(c) All three smoked heavily and almost incessantly.
(d) No other escorts in sight or on radar at about 9,000 yards.
(e) Rader indicated small ships, ranges very small and unreliable beyond 14,000 yards (we had gotten up to 17,000 on large patrols off NORTH PASS).

: 0305 K
Submerged, deciding to make approach at least for a look at steerboard flank ship, apparently the largest.

: 0355 K
At about 5,000 yards, determined ship to be a very small three island ship resembling a large catcher boat seen off NORTH PASS. Abandoned approach and opened range, convinced that this sweep was paving the way for the real convoy.

: 0424 K
Range opened to about 10,000 yards; surfaced and resumed patrol. Received orders from ConsubPac to start heading South for refueling by CTF 72.

: 0540 K
Submerged 8 miles South southeast of TATAT Island and started patrolling down center of the straits. Had intended bombarding the very tautening target on PULWAT before closing the sea-tight submarine. But on reconsideration it seemed unwise to heat-up such a good hunting spot before it has been exploited more fully.

: 1854 K
Surfaced. Decided to work well Westward near SEIN MATSUYE BANK before transmitting to keep from hatching up vicinity as well as to disguise direction of departure.

February 16, 1944

: 0425 K
Transmitted serial eleven acknorlegging orders and informing ConsubPac of departure from crew; headed South to report to CTF 72 for emergency fueling.

: 0600 K
Submerged. Decided to spend most of day submerged as all hands are exhausted after a very busy last few days, and reactions were noticeably not up to per. Also we are passing across PALAU - TRUK routes, and our transmission this morning would make planes almost a certainty.

— page 177 —
1753 K.  Surfaced.  All hands refreshed from rest and the Shellbacks and Pollywogs are busily engaged with plot and counter-plot.

February 17, 1944

0600 K.  Passed to operational control of CTF 72 and commenced guarding BELCONNEN Skeds.

0715 K.  Sighted unidentified aircraft (Air contact #15) breaking out of a cloud at about three miles.  Submerged.

0904 K.  When making preparations to surface, sighted what appeared to be a gaff rigged sail coming out of sun streak to southward.  Identified as a submarine (Contact #18) and commenced approach pending further identification.

0935 L.  Identity as United States submarine well established; broke off approach and opened range.

0957 L.  When range had opened to about 12,000 yards, fired two identification signals and surfaced.  Closed end spoke U.S.S. DACE, then proceeded enroute.

February 18, 1944

0045 L.  Crossed Equator North of Adrireity Islands at Longitude 146° 30' E.

0825 L.  Submerged.  Planned to spend most of today submerged in order to time arrival at rendezvous for dawn.

1250 L.  Surfaced for fix by sun sights.

1321 L.  Sighted aircraft to Southward (Air context #16) about eight miles closing; submerged.

1830 L.  Surfaced.

February 19, 1944

0530 L.  SJ radar contact to Southward at about 21,000 yards.  Changed bearing very rapidly and then went out without much change in range.  Believe it was a plane.  (Air contact #17).

0630 L.  Picked up two MTE escorts by sight and radar at about 5,000 yards.  In their company, we proceeded zig-zagging at best speed via prescribed route through VITIAZ STRAITS.

— page 178 —
0630 L (continued)

Had at least fifty aircraft contacts of from one to thirty planes of all categories before reaching port. Had been told control of the air was in dispute in this area, but all planes turned out to be friendly. Remained in complete readiness for diving but only on one or two occasions did planes come uncomfortably close. Also sighted numerous barges and MTB's proceeding along close to NEW GUINEA coast, and numerous amphibious craft, merchant ships and anti-submarine craft along the coast in the CAPE CRETIN area.

1424 L
Koored to U.S.S. COUCAL who was at anchor in DREGER HARBOR, near CAPE CRETIN, AUSTRALIAN LANDATED NEW GUINEA. SOPA was Com MTB Rons, SEVENTH FLEET in the LST "PORTUNIS", and several merchant ships and amphibious units were present. Commenced fueling (about 7,000 gallons on board), taking provisions, and loading the three torpedoes brought up for us.

Diver from COUCAL determined that QB shaft and pit log were bent back but no other damage evident from hitting coral head.

2215 L
Air raid alert; secured after eleven minutes.

February 20, 1944

0315 L
Another air raid alert.

0700 L
Underway for trim dive and to check for fuel leaks. Berely able to get ship under with all trimming tanks chock-a-block and Negative nearly flooded. Upon returning, filled #1 Auxiliary tank completely with Artesian well water from the beach via COUCAL, and trimmed for blowing Negative down to normal value with a little room in other trim tanks. Delayed departure to leave escorts at 4e.rk.

1400 L
Underway, escorted by two MTBs, following sense route as on trip down.

2000 L
Released escorts at dark.

2056 L
SJ contact on plane (Air contact #18) which crossed our stern at minimum range of 7,000 yards then opened out. Not seen in pitch black night.

— page 179 —
0400 L  Transmitted our serial thirteen to ComSubPac warning
    BURRFISH about our coral head patch off PULWAT ATOLL.

0705 L  'Submerged to miss the morning air patrols.

1403 L  'Surfaced, proceeding Northward at four engine speed
    to search for reported convoy. 'Vechter very squally and
    rough. Decided to make landfall on KANJET Island since
    there would be no reliable star fix.

2000 L  'Sent serial two to CTF 72, informing him of our
    intention.

2050 L  'Sight and radar contact on ANJET Island at 13,000
    yards. Two small boats carrying lights sighted off shore.

February 22, 1944

0100 L  'Crossed the Equator and commenced search from the
    flank for convoy.

0712 L  'Submerged to get trim at daybreak; shortly thereafter
    heard recognition signal on sound gear but could not reply
    except with fathometer which did not reach him.

0736 L  'Sighted submarine approaching on the surface.
    Identified as friendly, fired recognition signals, and
    surfaced. Exchanged information on convoy search with
    U.S.S. DACE. We had covered courses to the left of reported
    course and did not desire to work further 'west, so left
    search with DACE and set course to regain original track.

1040 L  'Received CTF 72 despatched telling us to knock off
    search and resume track Northward, as we were then doing.

2200 L  'Upon receipt of ComSubPac's proposal for short patrol
    near PALAU enroute to LIDWAY, set course for designated point
    and transmitted affirmative reply via CTF 72.

- 34 -

— page 180 —
1944
U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON ELEVENTH YEAR PATROL

February 23, 1944
0700 L Shifted radio guard to NPM.
1226 L Submerged for trim dive and battle problem.
1355 L Surfaced end proceeded toward new area.

February 24, 1944
0200 K Received orders designating area North of PALAU for additional patrol; altered course to conform with routing given.

0724 K Submerged for trim end to avoid morning air patrols. Outboard exhaust valve of #4 kain engine leaked as though it were not there; secured the drains end took sea pressure on the engine. After surfacing spent about two hours chasing a rein squall in which to hide while sending men on deck to rub in the valve, only to have the squall run away from us at about eighteen knots in the middle of the operation.

February 25, 1944
0300 K Entered new assigned area.

0714 K Submerged. As seas had moderated to excellent periscope weather, decided to reopen submerged to the surface.

February 26, 1944
Submerged shortly after sunrise; surfaced shortly before sunset. After surfacing patrol led on EMPIRE - PALAU routes.

February 27 and February 28, 1944
Surface patrol along PALAU - SAIPAN routes, - trim dive after sunrise. SJ radar beginning to tucker out and no more spare tubes.

February 29, 1944
Started working Northward to patrol Western approaches to SAIPAN. Trim dive in A.M.

— page 181 —
0300 K Abandoned search for convoy and set course to gain
prescribed routing to LIDWAY. Detected weak radar interference to Southeast; probably from SILVERSAIDES hunting
same outfit.

: 0809 K 'Wind and sea building up from Northeast. Made trim
dive, twenty minutes duration. Heeding into this sea
would have made diving impossible within reasonable time,
so decided to run due North today and head East through
the islands tomorrow.

: 0904 K Took a very large and enduring roll, resulting in
considerable wetter through the heth.

: 0912 K Running on eny course from North to East seemed
unsafe; submerged to wait for seas to subside or until
sunset would enable us to head into the sea without
worrying about diving.

: 1434 K Seas having subsided somewhat, surfaced and resumed
Northerly course.

: 2300 K Passed between AGRIHAN and ASUNCION Islands of the
MARIANAS.

: 2300 K March 10, 1944 (March 10 repeated on crossing
International Date Line)

Enroute LIDWAY, making at least one dive daily for
trim and training. Used four engine speed when seas
permitted near WAK and VARBUS to reduce time under air
coverage.

After backing around to the Northwest seas subsided
to about condition 5 on a very long heavy swell until
March 9 when they built up again to mountainous proportions.
With these seas on quarter took several heavy and dangerous
oily prolonged rolls.

— page 182 —
1944 (East Longitude Date)
Experienced SD radar interference intermittently throughout the forenoon (Lat. 27° N 179° E).

March 10, 1944 (West Longitude Date)
Seas still tremendous and dangerous to run before, so steered zig-zag courses of hourly legs with sea broad on either quarter.

0702 Y 3J contact on LIDWAY Island bearing 012° true, range 20,500 yards. Sighted three ships later identified as GREENLETT, ARCHERFIRE and SNAPPER. Realized entry would not be permitted, so joined the LIDWAY Jerry-go-round and tightened our belts.

1836 Y Took station a-term of GREENLETT, ARCHERFIRE and SNAPPER, in that order, for cruising in column with PC 1081 screening.

March 11, 1944
0700 Y Seas moderated considerably; FINBACK joined formation.

1100 Y SARGO joined formation.

1206 Y WHALE and TULLIBEE joined formation.

1210 Y Received orders to line up for entry, channel to be opened about 1300. After milling around for about four hours this did not materialize so re-formed column a-term of GREENLETT.

March 12, 1944
Seas somewhat rougher then yesterday and backed around to the South-southeast.

1030 Y Received orders to stand toward entrance and pick up pilot from tug. This entailed some difficulty in rough seas but fortunately he made it in one jmp.

1145 Y Entered channel, followed by SARGO, after which channel was again closed. Tied up to submarine Pier. Despatch sent off to ComSubPac regarding need for docking to effect repairs to sound gear and pit log.

— page 184 —
0018 K 12-50 1SS 3.5 SW R Friendly Ss, probably TAIGGER, exchanged recognition signals by blinker gun.

PATROL CRAFT IN VICINITY OF NORTH PASS, TRUK. These contacts were too numerous to list individually. There was almost always at least one in sight but never more than three except on occasions of entry or sortie. On one occasion a WAKETAK class destroyer was seen patrolling the entrance, but the usual patrols were atcher type, schooner tyve, FC boats, motor sampen, and one large etccher or nondescript three island freighter. The time and extent of the sweeps made did not conform to any pattern but seemed to favor the NW approaches. Echo ranging was only heard on infrequent occasions when two or more were sweeping simultaneously.

0655 K NORTH PASS, 2 AK 8 zz315° P Convoy leaving TRUK; after being 2 DD 13 k. drawn off to Eastward 1 PC thinking they were heading for LAR-SHILLS, commenced trelling to surface and chase.

0515 K S mi. N. 1 DD 2 vr. P FUJII class DD 0-15-12 2-1-44 of NORTH slow searching at 70 rpm. PASS. on track of convoy or chased of sorting BD.

1020 K 6 mi. N. 2 BB 15 ZZ290° P Two YALASHIRO class 2-1-44 of NORTH plus? 18.5 k. Bu; aninuma range PASS. 24000 yds; faint smoke indicated ships in company but they were not seen; heavy air coverage of area. Tracked until out of sight then sent contact report.

1825 K Clearing 1 AH 9 325° P-SH Properly lighted NORTH 12 k. hospital ship, not PASS. zig-zagging. Appeared to clear NORTH PASS on NE course then turn N.

- 39 -

— page 185 —
2225 K 7-57N Prob: 5.5
p.16 2-6-44 152-15E SS

Nothing seen in bright moonlight and contact soon lost. Believe it was SKIPBACK.

8 0925 K 3 mi. NW 3 DD 5
p. 17 2-8-44 of NORTH
PASS.

9 0208 K 8-15.N Patrol 4.7
p. 18 2-10-44 150-07E craft
ULUL IS.

10 0899 K 4 mi. Patrol 4
p.19 2-10-44 SW of craft
ULUL IS.

11 1937 K 15 mi. 2 CA 11.5
p.19 2-10-44 S. of 4 DD
ULUL IS.

12 0018 K 13 mi. 1 CV 12.3
p.21 2-11-44 SW of 3 DD
ULUL IS.

13 1213 K 10 mi. 2 AK 7
p.25 2-12-44 NNW of 1 PC
PULUWAT
IS. Lt.

- 40 -

R Small pip on SJ noted
? after getting radar interference on that bearing.

R Small pip on SJ noted
? after

— page 187 —
U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON ELEVENTH WAR PATROL

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

Con.No.: TITLE : : INITIAL:COURSE: HOW :
& Pg or: & : POSITION: TYPES: RANGE : & ALT:CONT-: REMARKS
Narrat.: DATE : : (Lt.) : ITUDE : ACTED:

2 1255 K 13 mi. N Float 4 N SD-P Probably sighted
p.12 2-1-44 NORTH PASS, biplane Low (surface, but did not
TRUK VO day) bomb. Dove.

3 1600 K 18 mi. N NELL 5 SD-P Probably sighted
p.13 2-1-44 NORTH PASS Low but no bombs. Dove.

4 0748 K 26 mi.N 2 eng. 5 SSE SD Possibly sighted
p.13 2-2-44 NORTH PASS VB Low but no bombs. Dove.

probably NELL

5 1015 K 22 mi.N Float 5 N SD Probably not
p.13 2-2-44 NORTH biplane sighted. Dove.

PASS. VO

6 1115 K 22 mi.N RUFE 5 S SD-P Surely sighted
p.14 2-2-44 NORTH NELL Low but no bombs. Dove.

PASS.

7 0825 K 25 mi.N 2 unident. W SD Probably not
p.15 2-4-44 NORTH VP or 7 sighted. Dove.

PASS. VSB

8 2-4-44 28 mi.N RUFE 5 S SD-P Probably not
p.15 0917 R NAUTI Low sighted. DAVD.

PASS.

9 1116 K 24 mi.N Large VP S SD Not sighted. Did
p.15 2-4-44 NORTH probably 10-12 Low not dive.

PASS. LAVIS

10 1235 K 8-15N LAVIS 7 SE P ---
p.18 2-9-44 150-45 E VP Low

11 1213 K 10 mi. NNW NELL --- P Screening. Ship
p.25 2-12-44 PULWUT Is. VB contact #13.

12 0952 K 7-27N ADA 0.1 N SD First seen by XO
p.26 2-13-44 148-33E VP Low and 00'0 pulling
out of a dive

from the sun with bomb falling
to land about 100 yards on
port beam before bridge was
cleared. We had probably been sighted by
lookouts on PULWUT Light which had been
passed at 12 m'ses in chasing convoy. Dove.

- 42 -

— page 188 —
1319 K 7-33N 148-20E 13 14 1812 K over 2-14-44 P 6-8 15 0715 K 3-20N 146-25E 16 1321 L 3-00S 148-14 17 0530 L 4-55S 147-10E 18 2056 L 5-15S 147-25E 1. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS NEAR NORTH PASS, TRUK:
Air patrols in the vicinity of NORTH PASS, TRUK, were very heavy, possibly a little more so than those observed off SEA PASS, KAAJALEN last September. They consisted of the most part of float observation planes (JAL) flying very low; though flying boats (JAVIS) and medium bombers (NELL) were also seen quite frequently in this vicinity. On numerous occasions large planes were sighted well down over the lagoon which were probably not on A/S patrol but merely taking part in normal flying operations. As has been noted else where, the greatest frequency of aircraft contacts was between about 0900 and noon local time.

-43-

— page 189 —
2000 YARDS
U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON ELEVENTH WAR PATROL

(H) ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. PERMIT TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 11.

Time: (2044 K Date: Feb. 10, 1944 Lat. 8° 27' N Long. 149° 24' E

TARGET DATA - DANGER INFLICTED

Description: Two MOGALI class heavy cruisers in column 4t about 800 yards [Intervail] screened by four destroyers (one identified as SHIGURE class) at about 2000 yards on the bows and quarters, respectively, of the leading and trailing cruisers. The formation seemed to be maintained fairly consistently in spite of the zig-zagging on a comparatively simple plan. Neither of the cruisers had planes in the actipults. SJ radar noted interference as from similar equipment on the bearing of the cruisers.

Contact was made by radar with two quite large ships at 23,000 yards shortly after surfacing. The cruisers and destroyers were seen in full moonlight from the bridge in 10,000 and 8,600 yards and through the periscope in 2,000 and 400 yards respectively.

Ships Damaged:
One MOGALI class C4, 14,000 tons standard and possibly one unidentified DD, 1,350 tons.

Damage determined by:
Sew tremendous flash as first hit on C4 was heard, though only the tops of the ship were then in sight (depth control had been lost after breeching to 35 feet after firing) and the location of the hit was undetermined. After surfacing returned to vicinity and found a very heavy oil streak that could be smelled for several miles and had persisted over two hours in strong wind and rough sea.

While going deep to evade counter-attack, and some four minutes before this started, an explosion strongly resembling a torpedo explosion was heard. This would have been a run of 3500 - 4000 yards for one of the last three torpedoes, or about 1500 yards beyond the C4's track. Though the port quarter screen was not seen at firing, his bearing would have been just about the same as the target judging from

— page 191 —
U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON ELEVENTH WAR PATROL

Remarks: Believe all torpedoes after the first, which was aimed at the bow; passed astern owing to greater target speed and possibly larger track then the valves used. He had zigged toward shortly before firing and little time was left for checking set-up, though a better range was obtained than had previously been hoped for.

U.S.S. PERMIT TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 11.

Time: (0157 K  (1557 Z Date: Feb. 11, 1944  Long. 145° 36' E.

TARGET DATA - DALAAGE INFLICTED

Description: Target was an aircraft carrier or auxiliary aircraft carrier with three escorts, of which one chased and one on the port quarter were observed to be large two-stack destroyers, and the third well out on the starboard beam was not seen but from its speed and radar pip judged to also be a destroyer. Then seen at 9,000 yards from the surface in bright moonlight with a destroyer partially over-lapping, the carrier was estimated to be at least half again as long as the destroyer, or 550 to 600 feet. Although the stacks and foremast of the destroyer could be plainly seen at this time, the carrier appeared as a rectangular silhouette with no visible projections above a full-length flight deck. As in the case of the previous attack, SJ noted strong radar interference on the bearing of the carrier and so was kept clear of it as much as possible consistent with obtaining necessary ranges. Haking contact by radar at 27,600 yards - our greatest range on a ship target - indicates a large ship, particularly as no upperworks were seen.

Ship damaged: One CV or ACV, class and tonnage unknown.

Damage determined by: Hits were not observed because of the loss of depth control incident to recovering from broaching while observing target submerged after firing on the surface. The conviction of the Commanding Officer that three hits were obtained in the carrier is based upon the following attendant circumstances:

(a) Three heavy explosions were heard throughout the ship at intervals corresponding (within one second) to that of firing the first three torpedoes.

— page 192 —
15-25 ft. Course 075° Speed 17.5 Range 9000

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 12-14 kts. Course 165° Depth surface Angle --

Type Attack: Extreme range, low power shot forced on us by lack of speed to close range without losing too much bearing. Used continuous visual bearings and radar ranges after first few minutes of tracking. Attack fully described in narrative.

— page 193 —
1. Attack No. 2 (Cont'd)
2. Tube fired #4 #3 #2 #1
3. Track --All close to 90° Port--
4. Gyro angle --All on zero, angle setters not engaged--
5. Depth set --All set 15 feet--
6. Power --All Low Power--
7. Hit or kiss *Hit *Hit *Hit
8. Mark Torpedo --All Mark 14-3A--
9. Serial No. 20277 26089 39929 25449
10. Mk. Exploder --All Mark 6-4 --
11. Serial No. 2567 11932 12391 12393
12. Actuation Set (All exploders magnetically inactivated)
13. Mk. Warhead --All Mark 16-1 --
14. Serial No. 11901 11495 11302 3159
15. Explosive --All TPX --
16. Firing Interval 7 sec. 8 sec. 12 sec.
17. Type spread --Natural spread; all at KOT. --
18. Sea condition --Sea condition 5 abeam --
19. Overhaul activity Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor

RELAXKS: * Hits not seen but presumptive based on evidence summarized above.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

The anti-submarine patrols off NORTH PACIFIC did not seem particularly effective and were evaded with little difficulty. They did, however, have a high nuisance value in interfering with patrolling plans and requiring considerable additional observation for keeping track of them.

Air patrols were heavy in the vicinity of TRUK in the day time, but no night flying operations were observed although our location within fifty miles of TRUK was undoubtedly known on several occasions on bright moonlit nights.

- 48 -

— page 194 —
133 foot observation station on PULWAT IS. Light-house proved a definite hindrance to chasing on two occasions. On the latter, we were undoubtedly spotted from this station at about 13 miles in early morning haze and two hours later were boarded by a float fighter plane diving out of the sun - a type that would hardly be employed on routine patrol.

The neatest trick of the week was that resulting in our detection and working-over on February 13th. In this case while we were maneuvering for a firing position on the sterbord's flank of a convoy, whose port flank was protected by skirting close to GRAYFATTER BLAK, a hitherto unsuspected escort - over the horizon on the starboard beam of the convoy - suddenly opened up hori-zontal searchlight beams in both directions normal to his bearing from the convoy. The result was that a considerable sector of the horizon was very effectively illuminated and we must have stood out like a sore thumb to the convoy. It took just about a second for the near escorting destroyer to open up his light directly on us, - - - [acting that the whole thing was done on schedule. It is not believed that we had been detected up to this time. This incident recalls the experience of the EADOCK's (Seventh War Patrol) sighting a searchlight closely in the open sea at half-hourly intervals, apparently from an un-contacted fast escort. "Wonder if this could have been another instance of the same tactics?

Besides the "sleeper" just mentioned, the second convoy chased had an outlying escort who showed up on the redder after an hour or so of tracking at about nine miles on the beam of the convoy and gradually eased in to join up. At about the same time a large destroyer, acting as rear screen on this convoy dropped back about six miles and worked over to broad on each quarter. Then the same convoy was observed next noon they had the destroyer and a large PC type on the bows of the line of bearing formation while about 2,000 yards astern there was an irregular group of four nondescript catcher and trawler types. It is surmised that these extra escorts were in company to provide the roving screens at night as well as to leave a couple behind to keep down any submarines detected or suspected without weakening the convoy escort excessively.

The destroyers conducting the depth charges attack on this vessel on February 13-14 were not particularly efficient but were rather more persistent than usual.

— page 195 —
1. U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON SLEEVEITH WAR PATROL

(J) A.TI-SUB. MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS(CONT'D)

In fact, if they had been just a little more persistent they would have had a running gun fight on their hands. The serious aspect of the situation lay in the extremely heavy condition of the PERMIT - due to flooded main induction, engines, and bilges - requiring excessive speed from a nearly spent battery to hold her up. After quite a lot of retrospection the commanding officer is of the opinion that errors in judgment were made first in engaging with the battery at such a low state of charge (although this risk may some times have to be accepted) and secondly, in not sizing the hull by the horns and rectifying the trim as quickly as possible regardless of the noise made. The latter course of action was considered but rejected because of the over present hope that each charge was the last and our reluctance to exhort the NIPS to persistence by definitely disclosing our presence. The proximity of the bunk seemed to mask our screw noise, even up to 180 rpm.

Our experience in this patrol would indicate that JAP cowboys skirt the bunk's best or TRUM instead of pursuing courses over them as reported in volume II of I.C.P.O.A. 33-43. This in spite of the fact that these banks are extensively surveyed with least depths of about seven fathoms.

The number of escorts averaged 1.8 per ship for three convoys and two task groups sighted with aircraft observed in every case in daylight.

(K) LATOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

1. ENGINE EXHAUST VALVES: The failure of our main end exultingly engine outboard exhaust valves to retain exactly tight without rubbing-in or "ahetttering" (a process requiring three man on deck for 20 to 30 minutes) every day or two is a design defect the night easily have serious consequences. Often the state of the sea renders it extremely hazardous to send men on deck for this operation. On February 13, the necessity for constant use of all six engines while on the surface during the preceding thirty-six hours prevented the valves being chattered in the time and the resulting leaks contributed to the seriousness of the situation during a prolonged depth charge attack. It is urgently recommended that these valves be replaced or modified so as to eliminate the necessity for this procedure or at least to permit its accomplishment from inside the ship.

— page 196 —
1. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (CONT'D)
2. MAIN CONTROL STAND: #1 Main Generator intermittently refuses to go on battery bus while bus selector is in battery position. Fault probably lies in the interlocking table but has not been located to date.
3. BALANCING VERNIER: Mounted on main motors 1-5-3-7 was found to be badly burned; the connecting strip burned in two and the grid opened. As this rheostat is of N.Y.k.l. manufacture and no speres were available, a standard spere was altered to replace it. Difficulty is still encountered in balancing these motor loads in parallel.
4. #1 FUEL OIL PURIFIER: Lower bearing was replaced. Twelve times; suspect misalignment of bowl, which will be checked.
5. PIT LOC (LODEL RB-25): The new pit log (taken from the HARDER) proved to be not unreliable, though fairly accurate when it was working; almost constant repair work was required to keep it available for use. Salt water leakage rusted out the bellows bearings, several sets of pump bearings and ruined one pump motor. This leakage was mitigated by turning out a new spacer piece on the lathe to replace a badly worn one for which no spares were carried. Troubles with the pit log were finally ended once and for all by contact with a coral head on February 10th, since no spare sword arm was carried. After loss of pit log points for speeds obtained under various conditions and directions of sea were plotted in on a speed-r.p.p.m. curve for smooth water, and after a number of points were obtained it was found that speeds could usually be estimated within a half a knot.
6. #8 TORPEDO TUBE (DECK): The torpedo in this tube had a partiel hot run, parted the shear pins and jammed against the outer door. A thorough investigation failed to disclose the cause for this hot run, or even to establish a tangible theory in explanation. Examination on the surface proved the torpedo to constitute a hazard in that it could not be secured in the tube and the exploder may have been partially armed. It was decided to expel the torpedo from the tube and jettison it, which was done. Thereafter the outer door seemed to see satisfactory end the tube kept reasonably dry.

— page 197 —
7. TRIP: A marked decrease in capacity necessitated a thorough overhaul of the trim pump enroute to the area. After overhaul and renewing all valve discs and springs the pump worked so well that air domes were ruptured three times before operators could get accustomed to its renewed efficiency. The trim pump is still very noisy in operation and we are looking forward to getting a new type rotary pump.

8. GYRO COLPASS: South rotor vacuum crops slowly but no serious consequences as yet. The error has been consistently westerly, sometimes as high as five degrees, for some undetermined reason.

9. #2 H.P. AIR COLPESSOR: This compressor gave considerable trouble due to a badly worn 4th stage liner which was renewed. Two complete renewals of 4th stage rings exhausted our supply of spares early in the patrol.

(L) RADIO

Reception of the submarine haiku schedule was found to be weaker than the regular NIP. Fox schedule at all times. In the crew's list of the LAIANAS it was almost impossible to copy heiku on any frequency, the worst times being around 1900 to 2100 GCT. There was considerable interference from U.S. as well as JAP stations. Reception improved considerably East of the LAIANAS.

Encountered considerable difficulty in transmitting from the vicinity of TAUK, most of the transmissions being eventually cleared through Austrelien stations. The difficulty was probably due in part to our low antenna, as the transmitter's output was as good as ever.

Another high frequency receiver is badly needed; this has been authorized but none were available during last overhaul. The temporary shift to CTF 72 on effort was made to continue guarding NIP. As well as the EELS schedules, using our broadcast receiver for the purpose. Owing to limitations of the receiver this was only partially successful.

When a ship is shifted temporarily from one command to another, as in this case - some provision should be made to see that no important general messages are missed.

— page 198 —
1 RADIO (CONT'D)

One of the messages we happened to pick up from NPL while guarding BELS was serial 53 OBOR regarding a change in use of identification signals. These instructions were not included in CTF 72 transmissions while we were guarding them, and the word might have been missed entirely had we not been copying b.t.h skeds at that time.

(K) RADAR

The 3T lived up to all expectations getting land of any appreciable height at 60 and 80,000 yards and all ships except small patrol craft from 16,000 to 30,000 yards.

During our training period fuse PS would blow at unexpected times causing damage to the high voltage rectifier tubes, and even causing a burned out resistor. The cause was not determined as any number of troubles could do this. A new high voltage rectifier was installed and the trouble ceased for several days, however the day we left for patrol the sense thing happened necessitating our return to PLANL. A new main control unit was installed and the trouble has not been encountered since.

SENRY radar interference was picked up several times, the first time from PIS Island in the TRIA ATOL. The interference was similar to that caused by our 10 cm. equipment except that the pulse duration was several times the length of our own pulse from the S.T. Interference was in evidence during the cruiser attack and also the carrier attack. Nothing unusual was noticed about this interference and could very well have been made by our 10 cm. radar.

The SD radar gave exceptional performance in picking up our own planes from 7 to 25 miles but the numerous Jap planes sighted were never seen in the S.D. On one occasion it is believed that we dove for a U.S. plane (Air context No. 16) that the radar also did not pick up, however we cannot be sure of this identification. The SD was used according to staggered intermittent search plans: a "low-visibility plan" in which it was on 15% of the time with off periods averaging 20 seconds; and a "high-visibility plan" in which it was on 8.3% of the time with off periods averaging 55 seconds.

— page 199 —
(N) SOUND GEAR AND COLDITIONS
Sound conditions in the TRUK area varied from excellent to poor. Patrol vessels were heard out to 11,000 yards some days while on others 3 or 4,000 yards was the maximum.

On hitting a coral head submerged the QB shaft was bent backward and forced up into the ship about two inches. This caused ten of the brass bolts securing the lowering mechanism to the saips structure to fell in tension and caused serious leakage around the shaft packing gland. Fortunately there was no serious deformation of the lowering mechanism so that the shaft could be forced back down with a hydraulic jack, the bolts replaced with steel, and the packing gland set-up to restore the pressure-tight integrity of the hull.

The JK was used exclusively on the later part of the patrol due to the fact that the QB was mashed on a coral head off PULUWAT. The JK reinforced exceptionally well but its range is about half the length of the QB. The sonic ring flooded out early in the patrol through the cable connection on the ring.

(0) DENSITY LAYERS

While running submerged patrol, made it a daily practice to go to test depth for SET aird immediately upon diving, although there was never anything found but a straight isothermal except on one occasion. On February 13, off the Southern tip of GUATEMALAN BAY, a 3° negative gradient was found at 240 feet. However after being down for about three hours the temperature was found to have risen to its surface value so that the line was straight going up, forcing a neat hysteresis loop.

— page 200 —
3. Points in Marlin

Health was in general very good. Compulsory use of vitamin pills, the sun-lamp, and a rotating sun-lookout watch gave all hands a chance at their vitamin A. Chief Pharmacist late C.V. THURIAN, did a fine job of taking care of numerous minor complaints and there were few major ones. Probably not more than five or six watches were missed throughout the patrol. There was rather high frequency of dental complaints, however, so that all hands will be given dental examination prior to the next patrol. One case of eye inflammation (in a ship's cook who neither stood the lookout watches nor apparently took his vitamin. pills) was attributed to vitamin deficiency and was cleared up in a week by administering doses of multi-celerin (vitamin A concentrate) three times a day.

The food was adequate, but the menus became a little rugged and certain specific shortages became onerous toward the end of the patrol. This was in spite of the fact that more complicated stores than usual were taken out and a limited amount of replenishments were obtained in DECKER HARBOR. This deficiency is attributed to the fact that there is hardly sufficient storage in this ship - even using After Battery room and all passageway decks - to carry provisions for 78 men for a long patrol, and that after a long series of comparatively short patrols the commissary personnel had lost the knack of buying and stowing to utilize the space with utmost efficiency.

Habitability was excellent, except for the crowded conditions. The air conditioning plants functioned efficiently and the boat was usually quite comfortable below even in equatorial waters.

(PERSONNEL)

The performance of duty by all hands was up to the usual high standards that have come to be expected in this ship. The thirty-one men received since last patrol turned to with a will and the old hands cooperated in assimilating them into the organization, with the result that in most cases they have now become valuable members thereof.

— page 201 —
1. PERSONNEL (CONT'D)
2. The conduct of all hands during the depth charge attack of February 13-14 was in keeping with the best traditions of our service; there was little nervousness displayed although all the experienced men realized the gravity of the situation.
3. The usual organized School of the boat was held except while actually in the area, and the enthusiastic participation of most of the unqualified personnel was very encouraging. In addition, tutoring sessions totalling five or six hours a day were conducted by the second and third officers for our three candidates for the Naval Academy.

(R) MILES STEALED - FUEL USED

| DAYS | MILES | GALLONS | Gals/Kil |
|------|-------|||
| PEARL TO JOHNSTON | 3 | 780 | 11,520 | 14.8 |
| JOHNSTON to area | 8 | 2,257 | 23,250 | 10.1 |
| In TRUK areas | 33 | 3,813 | 38,384 | 10.2 |
| TRUK areas to DREGER HARBOR | 4 | 960 | 11,700 | 12.2 |
| DREGER HARBOR to PALAU area | 5 | 1,490 | 20,300 | 13.7 |
| In PALAU area | 7 | 836 | 12,817 | 15.4 |
| PALAU area to MIDWAY | 11 | 3,050 | 38,520 | 12.6 |
| MIDWAY to PEARL | 6 | 1,307 | 15,400 | 11.7 |
| Totals | 77 | 14,533 | 182,351 | 12.5-Average |

(S) DURATION

| Days | Enroute (breakdown above) | Days | Submerged all day | Days | Submerged part of day | (more than trim dive) |
|------||-------||-------|||
| 37   | 40                        | 19    | 18                  |       |                       |                   |
| 40   | 19                        | 18    |                       |       |                       |                   |

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING (At "idway)

| TORPEDOES | FUEL | PROVISIONS | PERSONNEL |
||------|||
| 12      | 2,200 | 3 days    | 5 days   |

(3. obtained in DREGER HARBOR)

Factor terminating this patrol: Operation Orders, and factors of endurance as noted above.

— page 202 —
U.S.S. PERMIT - REPORT ON ELEVENTH YEAR PATROL

(U) REMARKS

On this patrol a new high was reached in depth control difficulties on attacks. While this can be attributed in part to the fact that most of our attack opportunities occurred in moderate to heavy swells and seas, that does not seem to give the whole explenation. Although the diving officer and planesmen were experienced from previous patrols, it seemed impossible at times for them to anticipate the new and disconcerting caprices of the ship. This was most troublesome on night submerged attacks when, because of our short periscope, a keel depth of 48 to 50 feet is necessary for satisfactory observations with any appreciable sea running. These have always been more or less critical depths in a swell, but seemed more so now. Consider it possible that the increased compressibility of the conning tower, due to its heving been lengthened, may contribute to this instability at shallow depths.

All hands were extremely disappointed that broaching and consequent loss of depth control prevented our observing the results of the carrier attack on February 11th. In this case it is certain that we could have wetted the show from periscope depth and risen surface and met in. The presumption of without interference from the escorts. This presumption of three hits out of four torpedoes at near extreme range seems like a feiry tale and almost too good to be true; but in the final analysis there appears no very good reason why the torpedoes should not have hit as the dte we good and the attack deliberately planned and carefully delivered. Creating that this type of attack is not the best and should not be accepted by choice, there will be times when it is the only alternative to letting a valuable target go by unhealened. It happened by fortunate coincidence that our approach party had discussed this type of attack at some length only a few days before, and had worked out considerable data on its limitations and capabilities.

The necessity for the use of discretion in attacking submarines was brought home in this patrol. Counting rater interference with knowledge of a friendly sub's presence, the PERMIT had nine contacts on six different friendly submarines in enemy waters, and heerd the seventh one attacking and being worked over. Truly it's a small world!

— page 203 —
1300 Y Underway for PEARL, after waiting for entering boats to clear channel.

While enroute continued program to train replacements for anticipated losses. Kade one to three training dives daily and held fire control drills. Kade "hand dives," simulating loss of hydraulic power.

March 17, 1944

0735 W Sighted PBY on Westerly course; exchanged recognition signals.

March 18, 1944

0615 W Picked up escort, PC 1077, and proceeded toward PEARL.

1000 W Tied up at Submarine Base, PEARL HADOR.

— page 207 —
11/tel
FCS-4/416-3
Serial 095
C-0-N-7-I-D-S-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO PERMIT Conf. Libr.
SS178/416-3 serial 001-44
dated March 16, 1944.
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PERMIT, Report of Eleventh War Patrol - Comments on.
1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division FOURT-T.O.
2. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are commended on completing an arduous and successful patrol.
C. E. MOMSEN.

— page 208 —
4 01823
FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(12) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET hch
Serial 0582 4 01823
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
27 March 1944.
F4253
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PERMIT Report of
Eleventh War Patrol.
CONSURGAP PATROL REPORT NO. 292
U.S.S. PERMIT - ELEVENTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PERMIT (SS178) - Report of Eleventh War Patrol.
(2 January to 18 March 1944).
1. The eleventh war patrol of the PERMIT was conducted in the Caroline Islands.
2. The patrol was conducted in the cool, well planned, efficient manner that characterizes an advanced submarine commander.
3. Because of lack of sufficient evidence to support damage to the carrier attacked on 11 February 1944, no credit is given.
4. It is noted that search lights were used by an escort as a possible anti-submarine measure. Two lights were flashed on by the escort in opposite directions on bearings normal to the escort's bearing from the convoy.
5. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.
6. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew for this well planned, determined, and aggressive patrol. The PERMIT is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy.

DANGER
1 - Heavy Cruiser (MCCAM CLASS) - 8,500 tons (Attack No. 1).

J. LOCKWOOD, Jr.
C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.
(Complete Reports)
CominCh (5) ComSubPac (40)
CNO (5) SUBAI, MI (2)
CincPac (1) ComSubPacSubordCom (3)
Intel,Gen,Pac,Ocean Areas (1) All Squadrons and Div
ComServPac (2) ComSubPac, SubPac (2)
(Adv. Base Plan, Unit) (2) ComSubTrainPac (2)
CincLant (2) All Submarines, SubPac (1)
ComSubLant (2)
S/M School, N (2)
ComSocPac (2)
ComSocWesPac (2)
ComSubSocWesPac (2)
CTF 72 (1) E. L. HINES, 2nd, Flag Secretary.
ComNorPac (1)

— page 209 —
5 June 1944
SS178/A16
Serial 003
DECLASSIFIED
U.S.S. PERMIT
From:
The Commending Officer, U.S.S. PERMIT (SS 178).
The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
The Commander Submarine Division 142.
The Commander Submarine Squadron 14.
The Commander Submarines PACIFIC FLEET.
The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject:
U.S.S. PERMIT, Report of War Petrol number TWELVE.
Enclosure:
(A) Subject report.
(B) Track chart covering subject report.
(C) Annex "ABLE" to Enclosure (B).
1. Enclosure (A), covering the twelfth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the TRUK area during the period 23 April 1944, to 5 June 1944, is forwarded herewith.

D. A. SCHERRER.

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED-ART. 045, OPNAVINST 5510.10
P.O. 092C DATE 5/12/44
DECLASSIFIED

— page 210 —
U.S. PERMIT

CONFIDENTIAL

(A) PROLOGUE:

Arrived at U.S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H., from eleventh war patrol on 18 March, 1944. Normal refit was conducted by Submarine Division FORTY-TWO Relief Crew and U.S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor.

The following major items were accomplished during a very satisfactory refit period: Removed hull exhaust ventilation piping topside, reduced bridge silhouette and installed ballistic steel front on bridge structure, replaced trim pump with Gould centrifugal trim pump, overhauled No. 1 and No. 4 main engines, renewed No. 3 main engine muffler, installed IFF radar equipment, installed VHF radio transceiver and GP 7 radio transmitter, installed charging panel for electric torpedoes aft, and converted No. 7 main ballast tank into a fuel ballast tank.

Lieutenant Commander Donald A. SCHERER, U.S. Navy, relieved Lieutenant Commander Carter L. BENNETT, U.S. Navy, as commanding officer.

Received five days of training during which four exercise torpedoes, deck gun and automatic weapons were fired. Took part in a realistic two day coordinated attack exercise in company with USS TUNA and USS PERCH on an inbound friendly convoy.

The sound test disclosed excessive main motor noise level. Conducted tests to determine quietest speeds for evasion submerged.

Loaded stores, Mk. XIV and XXIII torpedoes forward, Mk. XVIII torpedoes aft and fueled to capacity. Departed Pearl Harbor, T.H., on 23 April, 1944.

(B) NARRATIVE:

23 April 1944

1214 (VW) Underway from Pearl Harbor, T.H., with surface escort for patrol in accordance with CombatShipFor 17 Operation Order 141-44. Proceeding to JOHNSTON Island; four engines on propulsion to maintain schedule. Made daily trim dives, held daily tracking drills, exercised at battle stations and emergency drills enroute to area.

— page 211 —
23 April 1944 (Cont'd)
1935 (VW) Released escort.
24 April 1944
1232 (W) Radar aircraft contact, 12 miles.
(Aircraft contact #1). Not sighted.
2005 (W) Radar interference on SJ bearing. 280° T.
2050 (W) Radar interference from two separate sources,
Changed course to pass to southward of probable
friendly convoy and/or USS ARCHERFISH.

25 April 1944
0857 (W) Radar aircraft contact, 21 miles.
(Aircraft contact #2). Sighted friendly PBY.
1035 (W) Radar aircraft contact, 26 miles.
(Aircraft contact #3).
1043 (W) Sighted friendly four engine transport plane
(C-54).
1048 (W) Sighted smell coastal tanker leaving JOHNSTON
Island. (Ship contact #1).
1056 (W) Sighted the tanker's PC type escort.
1102 (W) Radar aircraft contact, 14 miles. (Aircraft
contact #4). Sighted C-54 transport plane.
1145 (W) Sighted JOHNSTON Island, bearing 277° T.,
distance 12.5 miles.
1300 (W) Received channel pilot aboard.
1316 (W) Moored to dock at JOHNSTON Island. Received
12,000 gallons diesel c'1. Fathometer being
repaired by ship's force with technical assistance
from JOHNSTON Naval Air Station.
1724 (WX) Underway.
1745 (WX) Cleared channel. Dropped pilot. Proceeding on
two engines to assigned area.

— page 212 —
26 April 1944
.Compensated magnetic compasses.
2110 (X)  S7 radar interforcno, bearing 3070 T. - probably USS STINGRAY.
27 April 1944
100 (X)  Developed 4d lock in forward group of number 3 eirbunk. Secured the hull stop to this group. Three and e half eirbunks remain in commission.
28 April 1944
Omitted from calendar.
25 - 30 April 1944 - Enroute to petrol area.
1 May 1944
1218 (K)  Reder aircraft contact, 20 miles. (Aircreft contact #5).
1228 (L)  Plane closed to 6 miles, not sighted. Submerged.
1355 (L)  Surfaced.
2 May 1944 - Enroute to patrol area.
3 May 1944
1309 (L)  Sighted friendly PB2Y, "Coronado", bearing 2640 T., distance 13 miles. (Aircreft contact #6). Plane stayed well clear.
1400 (L)  Intercepted message on search frequency concerning downed fighter pilot. Started toward position given, but plotted position showed pilot in restricted area, so continued to assigned area.
4 May 1944
0706 (K)  Sighted plane, distance 4 miles heading toward. (Aircreft contact #7). Identified as "Selly" or "Betty", submerged.
0750 (L)  Surfaced.

— page 213 —
4 Key 1944 (Cont'd)
0816 (K) Sighted "Selly" or "Betty" plane heading toward, distance about 7 miles. (Aircraft contact #3).
1008 (K) Surfcoed.

5 Key 1944
1857 (K) SJ rder contact at 9,000 yards, bearing changing rapidly, evidently a plane. (Aircraft contact #9). Proceeding to assigned petrol station.

6 Key 1944
0123 (K) SJ rder interference to Estsoutheast. Assumed to be USS TANG clearing area. No word on: downed evictors so at

0457 (K) Turned west to petrol north of TRUK.

0509 (K) Submerged.

1832 (K) Surfcoed. Petrolled across traffic lanes into NORTH PASS.

7 Key 1944
0459 (K) Submerged. Petrolled about 6 miles off NORTH PASS.

1859 (K) Surfcoed. Proceeded to assigned station for air strike.

2028 (K) Sighted searchlight from TRUK.

2318 (K) Observed explosions in DUELON-MOEN area.

2338 (K) Observed more explosions.

8 Key 1944
1930 (K) Conducted submerged patrol off NORTH PASS during daytime.

Conducted surface petrol across MARIANAS-TRUK routes into NORTH PASS.

- 4 -

— page 214 —
9 Key 1944
0751 (K) Sighted "Betty" bearing 230° T., distance 4 miles. (Aircraft contact #10). Submerged.
0849 (K) Surfaced.
1044 (K) Sighted "Avis" bearing 250° T., distance 8 miles. (Aircraft contact #11).
1046 (K) Submerged.
1135 (K) Surfaced.
1142 (K) Sighted single engine plane, possibly "Val", bearing 330° T., distance 8 miles. (Aircraft contact #12). Submerged.
1357 (K) Surfaced. Headed for air strike station.
1434 (K) Sighted "Betty" bearing 070°, range 5 miles. (Aircraft contact #13). Submerged.
1646 (K) Surfaced.
2120 (K) Observed searchlights, explosions and AA bursts in central TRUK area.
2130 (K) Observed second bombing run.
2138 (K) SJ radar contact at 8,000 yards with rapid change of bearing (Aircraft contact #14).

10 May 1944
0225 (K) Observed explosions and searchlights from TRUK.
0330 (K) Headed for HORTHLAST PASS.
0450 (K) Headed for air strike sector.
0559 (K) Sighted "Zeke" bearing 290° T., range 4 miles. (Aircraft contact #15). Submerged.
0710 (K) Surfaced.
0731 (K) Rader aircraft co-tact, 25 miles. Closed to 13 miles, then opened range; not sighted. (Aircraft contact #16).

— page 215 —
10 May 1944 (Cont'd)
C337 (K) Radar aircraft contact, 16 miles. (Aircraft contact #17). Closed to 9 miles. Submerged.
0541 (K) Surfaced.
1032 (K) Sighted NAKA Island bearing 1590 T., distance 15 miles.
1119 (K) Radar aircraft contact, 36 miles. (Aircraft contact #18). Large group of planes on radar. Evidently "liberators" bombing TRUK. Closest range to planes, 28 miles.
1126 (K) Observed AA bursts over TRUK. Preceding with retiring search along SOUTH PASS-SATANAHI route. Covered speed range of 17-6 knots, course sector 136-1550 T.
1215 (K) Radar aircraft contact, 20 miles. (Aircraft contact #19).
1224 (K) Sighted "Betty" bearing 0250 T., range 5 miles. (Same as contact #19). Submerged.
1247 (K) Surfaced.
1415 (K) Radar aircraft contact, 10 miles, closing. (Aircraft contact #20). Submerged.
1435 (K) Surfaced.
2145 (K) Secured retiring search and proceeded back toward SOUTH PASS.

11 May 1944
Planned to make submerged reconnaissance of LOSAP and NAKA Islands.
0530 (K) Sighted LOSAP Atoll bearing 0150 T., distance 15 miles.
0534 (K) Changed course to head for reported downed aviators about 330 miles away. Adjusted speed so as to commence search at 0500 on 12 May.
0807 (K) Radar aircraft contact, 0 miles and closing. (Aircraft contact #21). Submerged.

— page 216 —
11 May 1944 (Cont'd)
0630 (K) Surface.
1200 (K) Sighted "Betty" bearing 010° T., distance 8 miles, passing clear. (Alircraft contact #22).
1207 (K) "Betty" disappeared.
1308 (K) Radar aircraft contact, 10 miles and closing. (Alircraft contact #23). Submerged.
1332 (K) Surface. Converted No. 2 Fuel Ballast Tank into a ballast tank.

12 May 1944
0200 (K) Passed through reported position of downed aviators. Proceeding along occupied drift course sounding horn every 5 minutes and sweeping horizon with searchlight every 30 minutes. Considered that use of searchlight was not too risky in these waters.
0500 (K) Secured rectangular spiral search on two engines for best estimated position of aviators after having drifted for 40 hours. Sent ELIT disattach #1 to ConsubPac. Used same horn and light as above after dark.

13 May 1944
0500 (K) Secured search for aviators. Headed back to TRUK on one engine to conserve fuel.
0947 (L) Radar aircraft contact, 14 miles. Sighted "Liberator" bearing 0950 T. (Alircraft contact #24).
0949 (L) Plane turned towards. Submerged.
1025 (K) Surface.
1254 (K) Radar aircraft contact, 10 miles and closing. (Alircraft contact #25). Submerged.
1310 (K) Surface.

14 May 1944
1053 (L) Radar aircraft contact, 20 miles. (Alircraft contact #26). Not sighted.

— page 217 —
14 May 1944 (Cont'd)
1200 (K) Sighted LOSAP Atoll bearing 009° T., 11 miles.
Worked around to eastward to Atoll conducting a retiring
search from the flank for traffic leaving SOUTH PASS
to eastward.

1427 (K) Had simultaneous airstream and submarine contacts.
Sighted "Betty", bearing 000° T., distance 6 miles.
(Aircraft contact #27). "Betty" made no hostile move
and disappeared in the clouds, so turned to investi-
gate "submarine" contact which turned out to be PIS
Island in LOSAP Atoll.

2000 (K) Secured retiring search. Headed toward LOSAP at
slow speed to conserve fuel. Converted #3 Fuel
Ballast Tank into a Main Ballast Tank.

15 May 1944
0440 (K) Sighted LOSAP Atoll bearing 218° T., distance 11
miles.

0508 (K) Conducted submerged reconnaissance of Atoll at
ranges of 1-2 miles. Nothing observed except a few
native huts. There is a causeway or bared reef
between PIS end TAILP Islands, and between LOSAP and
IAOL Islands. A pole marker is located in the
eastern channel into the lagoon.

1846 (K) Surfaced. Heeded for SOUTH PASS for submerged
patrol tomorrow.

2145 (K) Went ahead on 3 engines to search for downed
aviators near PULUWAT Island, 215 miles away.

16 May 1944
0948 (K) Sighted north tip of MANILA REEF. Avoided.

1013 (K) Sighted PULUWAT lighthouse bearing 024° T.,
distance 17 miles.
Commenced search for aviators along most likely
drift line. This looked good because of floating
cocoanuts, oil drum and wood sighted along this
course. These were assumed to have drifted from
PULUWAT. Gradually worked to the northward covering
drift rates of from 0.5 to 2.0 knots.

1257 (K) Rader aircraft contact, 24 miles - 2 pips closed
to 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #28).

— page 218 —
16 July 1944 (Coast'd)
1255 (k) Sub.erged.
1322 (k) Sighted "Libert" through the periscope at 2 miles.
1323 (k) Fire two smoke bombs. "Libert" circled from 2 to 4 miles away. No evidence that he saw smoke bomb. Ante to sneak this plane in case he had any dope on downed evirotors.
1335 (k) Surf.ced. "Libert" dis.apered.
1340 (k) Sighted green gyre and marker bomb in the water about one mile from where we surf.aced.
1555 (k) Co. enced blowing air horn every five minutes. Did not use serrhilight because of close proximity to air strip at PUUAT.

17 July 1944
Continued search for evirotors.
115 (k) Radar irror.it cont.ct, 2 miles. (.irrorit cont.ct /25).
1121 (k) sighted single engine monoplane bearing 2700 T., range 10 miles. sub.erged.
1143 (k) surf.ced.
1355 (k) Sighted Jap rubber life ret partitlly inflated. (Let. 7-14 N.,'Long. 14-07 E.). Recovered reft with following gear; helmet (lost), jacket(lost), leather bellows, automatic pistol with 2 auto.ty clips and holster, clock, speech tin tube, 2 flyin. suits, 2 geirs leather gloves, shorts, riding pants, i.rist. i.c kit, large chart ena. variou.s cell papers. Rift was painted red with white stripes. Very small berracles had just started to form in metal ittings. It appeared that the Kip evirotors had become tired of just drifting and had decided to join honorable ancestors.

2000 (k) Secured search for evirotors. Eoded back to TAU on one engine to conserve fuel. It is strongly felt that these cowmed evirotors landed on PUUAT. Island es they went down only 9 miles east of this island. The general westerly drift would carry that to the island or at least so close.that they could have easily been sighted and rescued by natives or Nips.

— page 220 —
21 May 1944
0509 (K) Submerged for patrol off NORTHEAST PASS.
0928 (K) Sighted "Betty" bearing 045° T., distance 11 miles. (Aircraft contact #33).
1135 (K) Sighted "Zeke" bearing 190° T., range 5 miles. (Aircraft contact #34).
1856 (K) Surfaced.
1947 (K) Observed an unscheduled air strike on TRUK. Somebody is producing explosions over there.

22 May 1944
Shipping is at a general low ebb. In view of recent return of small supply ships apparently from SATAWAN, assumed they might take supplies to OROLIUK. PONAPE next, So decided on patrol of OROLIUK; PONAPE-OTTA traffic lane.
0700 (K) Submerged.
0957 (K) Surfaced.
1031 (K) Sighted "Betty", bearing 246° T., range 4 miles. (Aircraft contact #35). Submerged.
1059 (K) Sighted "Betty", bearing 206° T., range 4 miles. (Aircraft contact #36). The last two contacts may have been on same plane.
1229 (K) Surfaced.
1415 (K) Submerged. Patrolling submerged part time during low contact probability periods in order to conserve fuel.
1834 (K) Surfaced.
1920 (K) Headed for report position of downed "Liberator".
23 May 1944
0500 (K) Passed through given position of downed aviators. Proceeded along most likely drift route at two engine speed.
0812 (K) Sighted masts of two small sampan type motor vessels similar to well decked "drag line fighting boat"

— page 221 —
23 May 1944 (Cont'd)
0812 (K) shown under "Small Fishing Boats" in ONI 208-J (rev).
(Ship contact #4). Range 14 miles, bearing 350° T.,
on easterly course. Made end around run.

1037 (K) Submerged ahead of vessels for close inspection.
The leading vessel of about 100 tons was freshly painted
and apparently in use as a PC. The after vessel was
similar in appearance but larger, about 300 tons, and
appeared to be used as a cargo carrier. Both vessels
mounted small guns of about 1 pounder or 40 millimeter
size with machine guns visible on the bridge of the
smaller vessel.

Decided to work over the larger vessel with our
deck gun utilizing our greater range and speed.

1154 (K) Made battle surface 3,350 yards astern of target.

1156 (K) Took larger vessel under fire with 4 inch deck
gun. Both vessels turned and opened fire. Allowed
range to open until their shells were landing short.
Maneuvered to keep the small vessel from closing our
disengaged side - used 20 millimeter guns to hold
him off.

1231 (K) Ceased firing when deck gun refused to come back
to battery. Two, possibly three, hits were observed.
Cleared scene to westward, which was well for at

1239 (K) Sighted "Pete" bearing 220° T., range 4 miles.
(Aircraft contact #37). Submerged.

1313 (K) Two explosions - comfortably distant.

1329 (K) Two more explosions, evidently bombs.

1548 (K) Surfaced end continued search for aviators in
squally weather.

1625 (K) SJ radar contact, 11,500 yards, bearing changing
rapidly. Not sighted. (Aircraft contact #38).

1850 (K) Commenced sounding air horn every five minutes.

2212 (K) Heeded for SOUTH PASS - KUSAITE traffic route.

— page 222 —
24 May 1944
0906 (K) Sighted SOUTH Island bearing 008° T., 13 miles.
1159 (K) Sighted NAMA Island bearing 060° T., 14 miles.
Commenced patrolling across route to KUSAITE, and later made retiring search in that direction.

25 May 1944
0851 (K) Submerged for trim dive end drills.
1000 (K) Surfaced.
1030 (K) Radar aircraft contact, 24 miles. Not sighted.
1229 (K) Sighted home made rowboat peinted yellow with short outriggers, mast step and short tiller. It was swash and contained nothing except a beiling can, fish, and a firestone (date May 1942) infiltration type lifebelt. The construction looked like the work of en inland seilor.
1300 (K) Sunk oil drum with 20 millimeter fire.
1740 (K) Put four 20 millimeter hits in large drifting mooring buoy.

26 May 1944
0400 (K) Proceeding on 3 engines for patrol off east entrance of OTTA PASS.
0643 (K) Submerged.
1415 (K) Sighted "Betty" bearing 310 T. (Aircraft contact #40).
1416 (K) Sighted Japanese submarine bearing 282° T., range about 5,000 yards. Battle stations. This submarine was similar to I-68 class, Turned to south and tracked submarine for a bow tube shot. Between observations, sound obtained a bearing on the starboard quarter. Looked and there was a submarine only about 3,000 yards away. (Ship contact #5).
1430 (K) Fired two stern tubes at range of about 1,500 yards using target speed of 18 knots. Rapid development of attack indicated higher speed, but couldn't believe it.

— page 223 —
26 May 1944
1430 (K) (Continued)
The seas were fairly rough making observations of a low lying submarine difficult. While firing, suddenly realized that this was another submarine - this one had a large rectangular conning tower and a big hanger aft.

Swung ship for a bow shot and at

1434 (K) Fired bow tubes on a large starboard track at about 2,400 yards range.

1437 (K) Two explosions.

1440 (K) Long, heavy, rumbling explosion. Just prior to firing the bow tubes, sound had reported screws at 170° relative. Now observed the other submarine high telling it to the eastward.

1445 (K) Increased speed and opened land to the eastward in pursuit of remaining submarine.

1531 (K) Sighted unidentified lend plane bearing 084° T., range 4 miles. (Aircraft contact #41).

1845 (K) Surfaced. Pursuing Nip sub on 3 engines.

27 May 1944
0909 (K) Rader aircraft contact, 24 miles. Not sighted. (Aircraft contact #42).

1009 (K) Sighted unidentified plane bearing 045° T., 6 miles. (Aircraft contact #43). Lost plane in rain squall.

1016 (K) Rader aircraft contact, 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #44). Sighted "Betty" bearing 120° T. Submerged.

1122 (K) Surfaced. Heading beck toward TRUK.

1330 (K) Transmitted PERMIT second dispatch.

28 May 1944
0448 (K) Headed for MOGAMI BANK on 2 engines passing south of TRUK.

- 14 -

— page 224 —
28 May 1944 (Cont'd)
0802 (K) Sighted "Betty" bearing 320° T., 8 miles. (Aircraft contact #45). Submerged.
0835 (K) Surfaed.
0955 (K) Sighted "Ventura" bearing 185° T., range 10 miles, passing clear. (Aircraft contact #46). Plene passed into cloud.
0956 (K) Radar aircraft contact, 7 miles. "Ventura" sighted heading toward. Submerged.
0958 (K) Tremendous explosion overhead while passing 115 feet. Considerable minor damage: drain line to compensating line in forward room carried away dousing the sound gear, pit log, etc., with oil and water, lost power on bow planes; full voltage ground on after battery; pit log out; much broken glass; leaks in high pressure air manifold. Other items kept showing up as time went by.

Someone elicited numerous appreciative chuckles when he bemoaned the passing of the good old days when Jcp fighter protection from TRUK would have prevented this incident.

PERMIT position Latitude 06-45N, longitude 151-52E, 23 miles south of OTTA PASS.
1127 (K) Surfaed. Went ahead on 3 engines to make up for lost time. Discovered bridge gyro repeater, searchlight, and sixlights shattered, forward antenna carried away, after starboard antenna post bent end later carried away completely. Both periscopes thoroughly bespeckled.
2112 (K) Sighted PULAP Island bearing 295° T., 10 miles. SJ redder adjusted until it picked up island.

29 May 1944
0254 (K) Sighted distant searchlight bearing 060° T. Changed course toward.
0325 (K) SJ radar contact, 075° T., at 18,400 yards. (Ship contact #6). Commenced tracking a convoy of many pips on southerly course. Bombing had put TBT's out of order, but TDC had checked satisfactorily on repeated test problems.
0408 (K) Sighted smoke of convoy.

— page 225 —
29 May 1944 (Cont'd)
0412 (K) Slighted ships of convoy. Raised in on sterboard bow of convoy.
0415 (K) Started firing bow end deck tubes at 1,200 yards, 80 starboard track, depth set 6 feet. Nearest escort 900 yards. Dewn was just beginning to break in the east, but we had dark background. Our camouflage is 0.K.
0436 (K) Swung left for stern tube shot. Near escort turned toward, but when explosions started in the midst of the convoy he desisted. Leading ship in convoy turned on green masthead light, another turned on a red masthead-light, and a third turned on a multicolored masthead light.
0437 (K) Fired stern tubes and put on a burst of speed as at toward.
0445 (K) Final explosion. Escort losing the race. Reloaded forward, but it is getting too light for on-the-surface attack. The explosion times showed that we missed our first target at 1,200 yards, but hit one at 3,800 yards range. F'ur other fish exploded at 6,000 - 6,700 yards run which could have been end of run or contact explosions on far column of ships. Later observations showed this convoy to be composed of about a dozen ships of 1500 to 3000 tons each and 4 or 5 escorts. Misses are attributed to possible 1 kmt speed error and small size and shallow draft of targets.
0504 (K) Sighted ship bearing 0530 T., range 11,000 yards. (Ship contact #7). Closed to investigate. Contact proved to be "sleeper" patrol well astern of convoy. Opened out.
0600 (K) Submerged for trim.
0736 (K) Surfaced. Trailing convoy, as it is impossible to make end around while convoy is between NAKONUTRO and MOGAMI BANKS. Sent out contact report on aircraft search frequency. Could get no receipt although the usual transmitter fiddling and tuning was heard periodically. Finally sent it blind 3 times on main frequency end first harmonic. A few "Liberators" could surely raise havoc in that convoy.

— page 226 —
29 Key 1944 (Cont'd)
0816 (K) Sighted "Liberator" bearing 300° T., 10 miles.
0818 (K) Range is closing, so submerged.
0856 (K) Surfaoed.
1056 (K) Radar aircraft contact, 24 miles. Not sighted.
1121 (K) Reder aircraft contact, 10 miles closing.
1153 (K) Surtaced.
1247 (K) Sighted smoke of convoy, 165° T.
1253 (K) Radar aircraft contact, 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #50). Submerged.
1330 (K) Surfaoed.
1331 (K) Rader aircraft contact, 19 miles. (Aircraft contact #51).
1333 (K) Sighted ULUL Island, bearing 094° T.
(Aircraft contact #52), and "Deve" bearing 145° T., range 6 miles (aircraft contact #53). Submerged.
1422 (K) Surfaoed.
1423 (K) Sighted "Zeke" bearing 170° T., range 6 miles.
(Aircraft contact #54). Submerged. Decided to quit this purposing and catch the convoy after dark.
1832 (K) Surfaoed. Started search for convoy covering routes to NORTH, PIAANU, and SOUTH PASSES. 3d radar omitted a couple feeble pips on rain squalls and then quit cold - too many bombs. Night dark and squally. Stopped to listen for "pings" every half hour.

30 May 1944

By 0330 had not located convoy, so decided PIAANU PASS was most likely destinction and headed there to be in position for a morning submerged attack.

— page 227 —
30 May 1944 (Cont'd)
0409 (K) Slight convoy bearing 170° T., distance about 3 miles. Visibility very poor - squally. Slowed to listen and heard screws and echo ranging. His position plotted on projected track from his last known position to PIAANU PASS. With the SS reder out of order and only 4 torpedoes left, decided a submerged attack at daylight was in order. So opened out end took position 5 miles ahead of the convoy a few miles off PIAANU.

0538 (K) Could hear convoy approaching in low visibility, so submerged end-closed, scund bearing.

0557 (K) Slight ship bearing 223° T., angle on bow 50 port. Took normal approach course at standerd speed. Could not close convoy. The cacey Nips had aimed for PIAANU and at the last minute turned off for OTTA PASS.

0700 (K) Closes range 10,000 yards - opened out for attempt at an end around if poor visibility holds.

0746 (K) Surfaced. Proceeding on 4 engines, 2 auxiliaries on charge in a heavy rain storm. The only chance for an attack lies with the weather. If the rain continues we may be able to out co'mers-and get into position before the convoy enters SOUTH or OTTA PASS.

0816 (K) Slighted ship dimly through the rain bearing 113° T., range about 5 miles. Not using SD radar which might be DF'd.

0850 (K) About 5 miles abeam of rear ships now. May get a shot at last ships if luck and weather hold.

0859 (K) Rain lightning, sighted TOL Island bearing 036° T. Convoy fairly distinct - looks doubtful.

0901 (K) Sighted "Pete" or "Dave" bearing north, range 3 miles. (Aircraft contact #55). This settles things. Plane turned towards. Submerged. Executive Officer counted sixteen ships and escorts before we dove. The following types of ship were ncted: 1 POLOZU MARU, pp 271, ONI 208-J(revised); 2 AMAKAZU MARUS, pp 270 libd.; 1 IKOMAZAN MARU, pp 234 libd. All were of this size or smaller.

1000 (K) Sighted "Pete" bearing 050° T., range 4 miles. (Aircraft contact #56). Visibility is now good. Proceeding at 80 rpm for position off KUOP Atoll in case some of this convoy breaks off for SATAWAN.

— page 228 —
30 May 1944 (Cont'd)
1007 (K) Sighted "Betty" bearing 021° T., range 4 miles.
(Aircraft contact #57). Plane dropped object, possibly
a marker. Went to 120 feet. Several light popping
noises were heard through the hull - might be some
type of sono bomb so changed course to open reef.

1107 (K) First of 23 distant heavy explosions. Echo ringing
and distant screws heard. Hope it is our planes
working over the convoy, but expect it is an embarras-
sion depth charge barrage. It is well that there are
no really close antisub vessels for with 6 exhaust
valves pouring a steady stream into the engine room,
it is necessary to pump the bilges every half hour.

1123 (K) Last explosion.

1840 (K) Surfaced.

31 May 1944
0046 (K) Sighted red light from one of TRUK islands.

0100 (K) Transmitted PERMIT third dispatch.

0514 (K) Submerged for patrol off KUOP Atoll to intercept
any traffic to SATAWAN.

1847 (K) Surfaced. Proceeding to air strike station.

2023 (K) SEARCHLIGHT beam sighted from TRUK.

2058 (K) Bombing attack started - one lovely explosion.

1 June 1944
0137 (K) Explosions on TRUK.

0150 (K) SJ radar contact bearing 221° T., 3,000 yards.
(Ship contact #8). Assumed to be small patrol and
evaded.

0235 (K) Transmitted PERMIT fourth dispatch.

0615 (K) Proceeding on 3 engines to search OTTA PASS-
SATAWAN traffic lane.

0720 (K) Sighted 2 unidentified fighter planes bearing 325,
range 4 miles. (Aircraft contact #58). Submerged.

0809 (K) Surfaced.

- 19 -

— page 229 —
1 June 1944 (Cont'd)
0818 (K) Sighted "Val" bearing.270° T., range 5 miles.
(Aircraft contact #59).

0900 (K) Surfaced.

1059 (K) Sighted "Betty" flying low in heavy rain squall.
(Aircraft contact #60). Submerged. Too far behind
now, secured search.

1515 (K) Surfaced. Headed for MAJURO with not too much
fuel left.

1844 (K) SJ radar contact, 0730 T., at 4,000 yards.
Turned away, slowed and listened on QB. Bright moon
light, nothing seen or heard - ren around contact.
position and proceeded on our way.

2 June 1944
0705 (K) Sighted "Liberator", bearing 200° T., range 11
miles. (Aircraft contact #61). Plane, made a move
toward. Submerged.

0827 (K) Surfaced.

1040 (K) Entered southern seafy lane enroute MAJURO.

1205 (K) Sighted "Liberator" bearing 340° T., range 4 miles.
(Aircraft contact #62). Submerged.

1230 (K) Surfaced.

3 June 1944
1226 (L) Mede trim dive end held drills.

1317 (L) Surfaced.

1434 (L) Sighted KUSAIE Island bearing 151° T., distance
40 miles.

— page 230 —
4 June 1944
1453 (L) Rendezvoused with escort vessel U.S.S. CASSIN(DD372).
2025 (L) Sighted flashing red light bearing 180° T.
2030 (L) Radar contact on PC 548 bearing 193° T., range 10,650 yards.

5 June 1944
0925 (L) Entrance buoys, NAJUTO ATOLL, abeam. Entered lagoon.
1015 (L) Moored alongside U.S.S. BUSHNELL in NAJUTO LAGOON.

— page 233 —
1:1232(W): 19-50N : 12 mi.: R
: 4/24/14: 164-05N: 12 mi.: R
2:0857(W): 17-25N: Cata- : 21 mi.: R
:4/25/14: 169-05W: 1ine : 26 mi.: R
3:1035(W): 17-07W: C-54 : 26 mi.: R
:4/25/14: 169-09W: : 14 mi.: R
4:1102(W): 17-10N : C-54 : 14 mi.: R
:4/25/14: 169-12W: : 20 mi.: R
5:1210(W): 16-55N : 20 mi.: R
:5/1/55: 167-53E: : 7 mi.: 130 SD
6:1309(L): 14-00N : Coronado: 13 mi.: 160 SD
:5/3/46: 158-20E: : 4 mi.: R
7:0702(K): 11-00N : Sally : 4 mi.: 240 SD
:5/3/46: 152-18E: or Betty: : 7 mi.: 130 SD
8:0361(K): 10-55N : Sally : 7 mi.: 130 SD
:5/3/46: 151-18E: or Betty: : 5 mi.: R
9:1337(K): 8-52N : Betty : 5 mi.: N SD
:5/0/44: 151-15E: : 4 mi.: R
10:0731(K): 8-13N : Betty : 4 mi.: SE SD
:5/0/44: 151-08E: : 8 mi.: SE SD
11:1044(K): 8-15N : MAVIS : 8 mi.: SE SD
:5/0/44: 151-08E: : 16 mi.: SE SD
12:1121(K): 8-10N : Val? : 16 mi.: SE SD
:5/0/44: 151-08E: : 5 mi.: N SD
13:1044(K): 8-14N : Betty : 5 mi.: N SD
:5/0/44: 151-15E: : 4 mi.: R
14:2105(K): 7-34N : Zeke : 4 mi.: E SD
:5/10/44: 152-25E: : 28 mi.: R
15:1031(K): 7-35N : : 28 mi.: R
:5/0/44: 152-29E: : 16 mi.: R
16:1071(K): 7-25N : : 16 mi.: R
:3/10/44: 152-37E: : 36 mi.: R
17:1015(K): 6-50N : Betty : 20 mi.: NW : R
:5/10/44: 152-24E: : 10 mi.: R
20:1115(K): 6-25N : : 10 mi.: R
:5/10/44: 152-35E: : 9 mi.: R
21:0807(K): 6-10N : : 9 mi.: R
:5/11/44: 152-20E: : 24

— page 233 —
1:1232(W): 19-50N : 12 mi.: R
: 4/24/14: 164-05N: 12 mi.: R
2:0857(W): 17-25N: Cata- : 21 mi.: R
:4/25/14: 169-05W: 1ine : 26 mi.: R
3:1035(W): 17-07W: C-54 : 26 mi.: R
:4/25/14: 169-09W: : 14 mi.: R
4:1102(W): 17-10N : C-54 : 14 mi.: R
:4/25/14: 169-12W: : 20 mi.: R
5:1210(W): 16-55N : 20 mi.: R
:5/1/55: 167-53E: : 7 mi.: 130 SD
6:1309(L): 14-00N : Coronado: 13 mi.: 160 SD
:5/3/46: 158-20E: : 4 mi.: R
7:0702(K): 11-00N : Sally : 4 mi.: 240 SD
:5/3/46: 152-18E: or Betty: : 7 mi.: 130 SD
8:0361(K): 10-55N : Sally : 7 mi.: 130 SD
:5/3/46: 151-18E: or Betty: : 5 mi.: R
9:1337(K): 8-52N : Betty : 5 mi.: N SD
:5/0/44: 151-15E: : 4 mi.: R
10:0731(K): 8-13N : Betty : 4 mi.: SE SD
:5/0/44: 151-08E: : 8 mi.: SE SD
11:1044(K): 8-15N : MAVIS : 8 mi.: SE SD
:5/0/44: 151-08E: : 16 mi.: SE SD
12:1121(K): 8-10N : Val? : 16 mi.: SE SD
:5/3/44: 151-08E: : 5 mi.: N SD
13:1044(K): 8-14N : Betty : 5 mi.: N SD
:5/0/44: 151-15E: : 4 mi.: R
14:2105(K): 7-34N : Zeke : 4 mi.: E SD
:5/10/44: 152-25E: : 28 mi.: R
15:1031(K): 7-35N : : 28 mi.: R
:5/0/44: 152-29E: : 16 mi.: R
16:1071(K): 7-25N : : 16 mi.: R
:3/10/44: 152-37E: : 36 mi.: R
17:1015(K): 6-50N : Betty : 20 mi.: NW : R
:5/10/44: 152-24E: : 10 mi.: R
20:1115(K): 6-25N : : 10 mi.: R
:5/10/44: 152-35E: : 9 mi.: R
21:0807(K): 6-10N : : 9 mi.: R
:5/11/44: 152-20E: : 24

— page 235 —
Time : Lat. :  Initial:Course: How
No.:  Date :  Long. :  Types :  Range :&Speed:Contacted:  Remarks
42 : 0909(K):  7-03N  :  24 mi.:  :  R  :
: 5/27/44: 154-12E:  :  :  :  :  :
43 : 1009(K): 7-06N  :  6 mi.:  NW  :  SD  :
: 5/27/44: 153-59E:  :  :  :  :  :
44 : 1016(K): 7-06N  :  Betty  :  12 mi.:  S  :  R  :
: 5/27/44: 153-59E:  :  :  :  :  :
45 : 0802(K): 6-52N  :  Betty  :  8 mi.:  W  :  SD  :
: 5/28/44: 152-10E:  :  :  :  :  :
46 : 0955(K): 6-45N  :  Ventura :  10 mi.:  E  :  SD  :
: 5/28/44: 151-52E:  :  :  :  :  :
47 : 0816(K): 9-05N  :  Libera- :  10 mi.:  N  :  SD  :
: 5/29/44: 149-00E:  tor  :  :  :  :  :
48 : 1056(K): 8-55N  :  :  24 mi.:  :  R  :
: 5/29/44: 149-09E:  :  :  :  :  :
49 : 1121(K): 8-50N  :  :  10 mi.:  :  R  :
: 5/29/44: 149-14E:  :  :  :  :  :
50 : 1253(K): 8-40N  :  :  10 mi.:  :  R  :
: 5/29/44: 149-20E:  :  :  :  :  :
51 : 1331(K): 8-38N  :  19 mi.:  :  R  :
: 5/29/44: 149-22E:  :  :  :  :  :
52 : 1336(K): 8-37N  :  6 mi.:  :  SD  :
: 5/29/44: 149-22E:  :  :  :  :  :
53 : 1336(K): 8-37N  :  Single  :  6 mi.:  NR  :  SD  :
: 5/29/44: 149-22E:
54 : 1123(K): 8-30N  :  Zeke  :  8 mi.:  N  :  SD  :
: 5/29/44: 149-25E:  :  :  :  :  :
55 : 0901(K): 7-07N  :  Pete or :  3 mi.:  W  :  SD  :
: 5/30/44: 151-26E:  :  :  :  :  :
56 : 1000(K): 7-05N  :  Pete  :  4 mi.:  S  :  P  :
: 5/30/44: 151-27E:  :  :  :  :  :
57 : 1007(K): 7-05N  :  Betty  :  4 mi.:  Var. :  P  :
: 5/30/44: 151-27E:  :  :  :  :  :
58 : 0720(K): 7-04N  :  Two  :  4 mi.:  SE  :  SD  :
: 6/1/44: 152-54E:  :  :  :  :  :
59 : 0818(K): 6-53N  :  Veal  :  5 mi.:  NNW  :  SD  :
: 6/1/44: 152-59E:  :  :  :  :  :
60 : 1059(K): 6-35N  :  Betty  :  3 mi.:  N  :  SD  :
: 6/1/44: 153-08E:  :  :  :  :  :
61 : 0705(K): 5-20N  :  Libera- :  11 mi.:  N  :  SD  :
: 6/2/44: 156-30E:

— page 235 —
Time : Lat. :  Initial:Course: How
No.:  Date :  Long. :  Types :  Range :&Speed:Contacted:  Remarks
42 : 0909(K):  7-03N  :  24 mi.:  :  R  :
: 5/27/44: 154-12E:  :  :  :  :  :
43 : 1009(K): 7-06N  :  6 mi.:  NW  :  SD  :
: 5/27/44: 153-59E:  :  :  :  :  :
44 : 1016(K): 7-06N  :  Betty  :  12 mi.:  S  :  R  :
: 5/27/44: 153-59E:  :  :  :  :  :
45 : 0802(K): 6-52N  :  Betty  :  8 mi.:  W  :  SD  :
: 5/28/44: 152-10E:  :  :  :  :  :
46 : 0955(K): 6-45N  :  Ventura :  10 mi.:  E  :  SD  :
: 5/28/44: 151-52E:  :  :  :  :  :
47 : 0816(K): 9-05N  :  Libera- :  10 mi.:  N  :  SD  :
: 5/29/44: 149-00E:  tor  :  :  :  :  :
48 : 1056(K): 8-55N  :  :  24 mi.:  :  R  :
: 5/29/44: 149-09E:  :  :  :  :  :
49 : 1121(K): 8-50N  :  :  10 mi.:  :  R  :
: 5/29/44: 149-14E:  :  :  :  :  :
50 : 1253(K): 8-40N  :  :  10 mi.:  :  R  :
: 5/29/44: 149-20E:  :  :  :  :  :
51 : 1331(K): 8-38N  :  19 mi.:  :  R  :
: 5/29/44: 149-22E:  :  :  :  :  :
52 : 1336(K): 8-37N  :  6 mi.:  :  SD  :
: 5/29/44: 149-22E:  :  :  :  :  :
53 : 1336(K): 8-37N  :  Single  :  6 mi.:  NR  :  SD  :
: 5/29/44: 149-22E:
54 : 1123(K): 8-30N  :  Zeke  :  8 mi.:  N  :  SD  :
: 5/29/44: 149-25E:  :  :  :  :  :
55 : 0901(K): 7-07N  :  Pete or :  3 mi.:  W  :  SD  :
: 5/30/44: 151-26E:  :  :  :  :  :
56 : 1000(K): 7-05N  :  Pete  :  4 mi.:  S  :  P  :
: 5/30/44: 151-27E:  :  :  :  :  :
57 : 1007(K): 7-05N  :  Betty  :  4 mi.:  Var. :  P  :
: 5/30/44: 151-27E:  :  :  :  :  :
58 : 0720(K): 7-04N  :  Two  :  4 mi.:  SE  :  SD  :
: 6/1/44: 152-54E:  :  :  :  :  :
59 : 0818(K): 6-53N  :  Veal  :  5 mi.:  NNW  :  SD  :
: 6/1/44: 152-59E:  :  :  :  :  :
60 : 1059(K): 6-35N  :  Betty  :  3 mi.:  N  :  SD  :
: 6/1/44: 153-08E:  :  :  :  :  :
61 : 0705(K): 5-20N  :  Libera- :  11 mi.:  N  :  SD  :
: 6/2/44: 156-30E:

— page 236 —
1. U.S.S. PERIT TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1A & 1B PATROL NO. 12
Time: 1430 (K) Date: May 26, 1944 Lat. 7-05N Long. 1520E
TARGET DATA - DANGER ATTACK ATTACKED
DESCRIPTION: Cne I-68 class submarine and one I-9(or I-1) class submarine with hangar art. Controst was made by sound and by sighting through the periscope. Visibility was good, seas were from-the east and moderate.

SHIPS SINK: One I-9(or I-1) class submarine with hangar art.

DAY/ACT:
DISTRICTED: Heard Tined Hit - 2 minutes and 17 seconds. About 2½ minutes later there ensued a long, heavy, rumbling explosion. This submarine not seen or heard again.

TARGET DRAFT: 15 ft. Course: 090 Speed: 16. Range: 1500(A): 2400(3).

*CMT SHIP DATA

Speed: 2 Course: 180.2A 070 Depth: 53 ft. Angle: 0

FIRST CRITICAL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK: Submerged, periscope attack; use the TDC angle solver, gyros in automatic, and spread introduced by shifting the point of aim with the periscope. Used a spread of 1/2 the target length between torpedoes.

Fired two I"r. XVIII torpedoes from after tubes and immediately swung to bring bow tubes to bear on an 150 starboard track. No hits with stern tube salvo, so, 1 minutes later fired four torpedo spread from bow tubes.

The rapidity with which the attack developed gave little time for tracking. Target speed used was 13 knots, whereas later reconstruction showed actual target speed to be around 16 knots. Consequently all torpedoes except the last bow shot missed ahead. The weakness of the attack was that the target and allowed another attack.

- 27 -

— page 236 —
1. U.S.S. PERIT TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1A & 1B PATROL NO. 12
Time: 1430 (K) Date: May 26, 1944 Lat. 7-05N Long. 1520E
TARGET DATA - DANGER ATTACK ATTACKED
DESCRIPTION: Cne I-68 class submarine and one I-9(or I-1) class submarine with hangar art. Controst was made by sound and by sighting through the periscope. Visibility was good, seas were from-the east and moderate.

SHIPS SINK: One I-9(or I-1) class submarine with hangar art.

DAY/ACT:
DISTRICTED: Heard Tined Hit - 2 minutes and 17 seconds. About 2½ minutes later there ensued a long, heavy, rumbling explosion. This submarine not seen or heard again.

TARGET DRAFT: 15 ft. Course: 090 Speed: 16. Range: 1500(A): 2400(3).

*CMT SHIP DATA

Speed: 2 Course: 180.2 A 070 Depth: 53 ft. Angle: 0

FIRST CRITICAL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK: Submerged, periscope attack; use the TDC angle solver, gyros in automatic, and spread introduced by shifting the point of aim with the periscope. Used a spread of the left target length between torpedoes.

Fired two I"r. XVIII torpedoes from after tubes and immediately swung to bring bow tubes to bear on an 150 starboard track. No hits with stern tube salvo, so, ¼ minutes later fired four torpedo spread from bow tubes.

The rapidity with which the attack developed gave little time for tracking. Target speed used was 13 knots, whereas later reconstruction showed actual target speed to be around 16 knots. Consequently all torpedoes except the last bow shot missed ahead. The weakness Mk. XVIII's did not alert the target and allowed another attack.

— page 237 —
1. USS PERMIT TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2A,B,C PATROL NO. 12
Time: 0425(K) Date: May 29, 1944 Lat. 9°N Long. 149°E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION: About a twelve ship convoy with four or five escorts in an elliptical cruising disposition with the Long Axis normal to the line of advance. Following types of ships were noted: 1 FOLOZU MARU pp271 ONI 208-J(rev); 2 A/KAAZU MARUS pp270 ibid and+1 IKOMAZAN MARU pp234 ibid. The convoy was contacted by SF radar after sighting the flash of a searchlight on the horizon. The night was dark with scattered rain squalls.

SHIPS SUNK: Unknown.

SHIPS DAMAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK: One 2-3,000 ton AK.

— page 237 —
1. USS PERMIT TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2A,B,C PATROL NO. 12
Time: 0425(K) Date: May 29, 1944 Lat. 9°N Long. 149°E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION: About a twelve ship convoy with four or five escorts in an elliptical cruising disposition with the Long Axis normal to the line of advance. Following types of ships were noted: 1 FOLOZU MARU pp271 ONI 208-J(rev); 2 A/KAAZU MARUS pp270 ibid and+1 IKOMAZAN MARU pp234 ibid. The convoy was contacted by SF radar after sighting the flash of a searchlight on the horizon. The night was dark with scattered rain squalls.

SHIPS SUNK: Unknown.

SHIPS DAMAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK: One 2-3,000 ton AK.

— page 238 —
1. CONFIDENTIAL
DANGER DETERMINED: One timed hit at 3,800 yards.
TARGET DRAFT: 10' COURSE 150 SPEED 3.2 RANGE: 1200(A)(B); 2200(C).
OWN SHIP DATA
SPEED: 5 kts. COURSE: 060 DEPTH: Surface ANGLE: 00
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
TYPE ATTACK: Night surface attack using radar ranges and radar and bridge pelorus bearings. Fired with TDC using radar ranges with continuous pelorus bearings given orally; a divergent standard (4-3-2-1) spread was introduced by means of the torpedo offset dials at the TDC. Gyros were in automatic.

Only a brief tracking period was possible because of imminent dawn. The approach was made from the convoy's starboard bow. A zig away to 150° T., placed us in a nice position at 1200 yards range, 90 starboard track on the starboard column of ships. An escort was 900 yards end closing on our port; then a fired bow-tubes with about a 10 left gyro. Fired deck tubes by watching generated gyro angle while swinging ship slowly to the left - fired on TDC generated gyros of 359 and 001 giving a 2 degree divergent spread.

Swing left to bring stem tubes to bear. As there were no immediate hits and as escort headed our way, set after torpedoes (Mk. XVIII's) at 4 feet depth. Escort was evidently confused by torpedo explosions in middle and for columns of convoy, so fired stern tubes, target in convoy at a range of 2200 yards accepting a 19 right gyro.

Rader had so many ships in line toward the last that ranging was extremely difficult. The convoy covered a span of about 5000 yards in the direction of the line of fire. The officer giving pelorus bearings had three other ships besides the selected target in his binocular field while firing. Timing the torpedo explosions gave one definite hit at 3800 yards torpedo run with 4 more explosions at runs of 6000, 6300 and 6700 yards which could be end of run explosions or hits in the far flank of the convoy. One final and heavy explosion was heard 8 minutes after firing the last Mk. XVIII torpedo from Aft.

Failure to register more short range hits is attributed to the small size and shallow draft of the targets, a speed error of 3/4 knot, and possible small course errors.

— page 238 —
1. CONFIDENTIAL
DANGER DETERMINED: One timed hit at 3,800 yards.
TARGET DRAFT: 10' COURSE 150 SPEED 3.2 RANGE: 1200(A)(B); 2200(C).
OWN SHIP DATA
SPEED: 5 kts. COURSE: 060 DEPTH: Surface ANGLE: 00
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
TYPE ATTACK: Night surface attack using radar ranges and radar and bridge pelorus bearings. Fired with TDC using radar ranges with continuous pelorus bearings given orally; a divergent standard (4-3-2-1) spread was introduced by means of the torpedo offset dials at the TDC. Gyros were in automatic.

Only a brief tracking period was possible because of imminent dawn. The approach was made from the convoy's starboard bow. A zig away to 150° T., placed us in a nice position at 1200 yards range, 90 starboard track on the starboard column of ships. An escort was 900 yards end closing on our port; then a fired bow-tubes with about a 10 left gyro. Fired deck tubes by watching generated gyro angle while swinging ship slowly to the left - fired on TDC generated gyros of 359 and 001 giving a 2 degree divergent spread.

Swing left to bring stem tubes to bear. As there were no immediate hits and as escort headed our way, set after torpedoes (Mk. XVIII's) at 4 feet depth. Escort was evidently confused by torpedo explosions in middle and for columns of convoy, so fired stern tubes, target in convoy at a range of 2200 yards accepting a 19 right gyro.

Rader had so many ships in line toward the last that ranging was extremely difficult. The convoy covered a span of about 5000 yards in the direction of the line of fire. The officer giving pelorus bearings had three other ships besides the selected target in his binocular field while firing. Timing the torpedo explosions gave one definite hit at 3800 yards torpedo run with 4 more explosions at runs of 6000, 6300 and 6700 yards which could be end of run explosions or hits in the far flank of the convoy. One final and heavy explosion was heard 8 minutes after firing the last Mk. XVIII torpedo from Aft.

Failure to register more short range hits is attributed to the small size and shallow draft of the targets, a speed error of 3/4 knot, and possible small course errors.

— page 239 —
29 May 1944, L. 9N - L. 149E.

TYPE ATTACK: NIGHT SURFACE - Radar.

Attack No. 2A 2A 2A 2A
Tubes Fired #4 #3 #2 #1
Track Angle 78S 78S 78S 78S
Gyro Angle 12L 12L 12L 12L
Depth Set 6 6 6 6
Power High High High High
Hit or Miss ? Miss ? ? ?
Erratic No No No No
Mk. Torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 23 23
Serial No. 26713 23537 41243 41264
Mk. Exploder 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial No. 8340 17828 17289 10775
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual - - - -
Mk. Warhead 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
Serial No. 11866 10532 12860 1261
Explosive TPX TPX TPX TPX
Firing Interval 9 sec. 8 sec. 7 sec.
Type Spread 2D DIVERGENT WITH TDC.
Sea Conditions MODERATE - Force 2.
Overhaul Activity Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

Attack No. 2B 2B 2C 2C
Tubes Fired #8 #7 #6 #5
Track Angle 86S 84S 109S 109S
Gyro Angle Zero Zero 19R 19R
Depth Set 8 8 4 4
Power High High High
Hit or Miss Miss Miss Miss
Erratic No No No No
Mk. Torpedo 14 14-1A 18 18
Serial No. 14329 17376 54235 53857
Mk. Exploder 6-4 6-4 4-7 4-7
Serial No. 8827 11533
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual - Contact - - -
Mk. Warhead 16-1 16-1 18 18
Serial No. 2933 4973
Explosive TNT TNT TPX TPX
Firing Interval 6 sec. 15 sec.
Type Spread 2D Div. with TDC 2D Divergent
Sea Conditions MODERATE - Force 2
Overhaul Activity Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

- 30 -

— page 239 —
29 May 1944, L. 9N - L. 149E.

TYPE ATTACK: NIGHT SURFACE - Radar.

Attack No. 2A 2A 2A 2A
Tubes Fired #4 #3 #2 #1
Track Angle 78S 78S 78S 78S
Gyro Angle 12L 12L 12L 12L
Depth Set 6 6 6 6
Power High High High High
Hit or Miss ? Miss ? ? ?
Erratic No No No No
Mk. Torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 23 23
Serial No. 26713 23537 41243 41264
Mk. Exploder 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial No. 8340 17828 17289 10775
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual - - - -
Mk. Warhead 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
Serial No. 11866 10532 12860 1261
Explosive TPX TPX TPX TPX
Firing Interval 9 sec. 8 sec. 7 sec.
Type Spread 2D DIVERGENT WITH TDC.
Sea Conditions MODERATE - Force 2.
Overhaul Activity Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

Attack No. 2B 2B 2C 2C
Tubes Fired #8 #7 #6 #5
Track Angle 86S 84S 109S 109S
Gyro Angle Zero Zero 19R 19R
Depth Set 8 8 4 4
Power High High High
Hit or Miss Miss Miss Miss
Erratic No No No No
Mk. Torpedo 14 14-1A 18 18
Serial No. 14329 17376 54235 53857
Mk. Exploder 6-4 6-4 4-7 4-7
Serial No. 8827 11533
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual - Contact - - -
Mk. Warhead 16-1 16-1 18 18
Serial No. 2933 4973
Explosive TNT TNT TPX TPX
Firing Interval 6 sec. 15 sec.
Type Spread 2D Div. with TDC 2D Divergent
Sea Conditions MODERATE - Force 2
Overhaul Activity Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

- 30 -

— page 240 —
1154(K) 23. 1944 7-00N 150+20E
TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
SUNK: None.
DAMAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK:
One sampan type motor vessel similar to well decked "dragline fishing boat" shown under "Small Fishing Boats" in ONI 208-J(rev.)(300 tons).

DAMAGE T PERMITTED BY:
Two, possibly three 4" hits observed.

DETAILS OF ACTION
Masts of this two ship convoy sighted through high periscope while on surface conducting search for downed aviators. Made end around, submerged, looked over targets. Surface 3350 yards ast-ern of largest ship (300 tons) and opened fire with 4". Both ships opened fire with several one pounder or 40mm. rapid firing guns, so opened range beyond their effective range. Used our 20 min's to keep targets from closing. Average range 5000 yards. 4" fire not very effective due to range and size of target. 20mm. fire served only to scare off smaller vessel. Ammunition expended:
(1) 4"/50 cal. - 77 HC, 18 Common.
(2) 20 mm. - 333 tracer, 667 plain.

— page 240 —
1154(K) 23. 1944 7-00N 150+20E
TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
SUNK: None.
DAMAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK:
One sampan type motor vessel similar to well decked "dragline fishing boat" shown under "Small Fishing Boats" in ONI 208-J(rev.)(300 tons).

DAMAGE T PERMITTED BY:
Two, possibly three 4" hits observed.

DETAILS OF ACTION
Masts of this two ship convoy sighted through high periscope while on surface conducting search for downed aviators. Made end around, submerged, looked over targets. Surface 3350 yards ast-ern of largest ship (300 tons) and opened fire with 4". Both ships opened fire with several one pounder or 40mm. rapid firing guns, so opened range beyond their effective range. Used our 20 min's to keep targets from closing. Average range 5000 yards. 4" fire not very effective due to range and size of target. 20mm. fire served only to scare off smaller vessel. Ammunition expended:
(1) 4"/50 cal. - 77 HC, 18 Common.
(2) 20 mm. - 333 tracer, 667 plain.

— page 241 —
1. MINES
No mining or minesweeping activities were observed.

: (J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND VASATION TACTICS

The most effective anti-submarine measures encountered were from U.S. planes. The "Vontura" bombing on 28 May was well executed - almost too well executed. This "Vontura" trick of apparently staying on a non-hostile course until he got in a cloud, and then whipping into a power glide was very disconcerting to say the least.

The "Pote" type plane encountered on 23 May dropped light bombs apparently just to dissuade any further gun attacks on his "split kit" friends.

Plentiful air coverage repeatedly forced us down while we were trailing convoys during the daytime. A "sleepor" patrol boat was encountered ten miles astern of the convoy on 28 May. He very efficiently blocked an end around run as the western flank of the convoy was protected by MOGAMI BANK. Convoy air coverage was heavy and through - even in heavy rain squalls.

Aircraft on two occasions apparently dropped several "sono-bombs" - or some special contraption that made a very light double-clicking explosion.

The depth charge barrage on 30 May, while directed against us, was primarily an embarrassing barrage intended to protect the exposed flank of the convoy.

Only one anti-submarine surface patrol was encountered at night in the vicinity of TRUK.

Air coverage was unusually heavy on the last day in the area following a lengthy radio transmission.

Evasion tactics from aircraft consisted of putting a layer of water overhead, changing course radically and clearing the diving point at 3-4 knots.

— page 241 —
1. MINES
No mining or minesweeping activities were observed.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND VASATION TACTICS

The most effective anti-submarine measures encountered were from U.S. planes. The "Vontura" bombing on 28 May was well executed - almost too well executed. This "Vontura" strike of apparently staying on a non-hostile course until he got in a cloud, and then whipping into a power glide was very disconcerting to say the least.

The "Pote" type plane encountered on 23 May dropped light bombs apparently just to dissuade any further gun attacks on his "split kit" friends.

Plentiful air coverage repeatedly forced us down while we were trailing convoys during the daytime. A "sleepor" patrol boat was encountered ten miles astern of the convoy on 28 May. He very efficiently blocked an end around run as the western flank of the convoy was protected by MOGAMI BANK. Convoy air coverage was heavy and through - even in heavy rain squalls.

Aircraft on two occasions apparently dropped several "sono-bombs" - or some special contraption that made a very light double-clicking explosion.

The depth charge barrage on 30 May, while directed against us, was primarily an embarrassing barrage intended to protect the exposed flank of the convoy.

Only one anti-submarine surface patrol was encountered at night in the vicinity of TRUK.

Air coverage was unusually heavy on the last day in the area following a lengthy radio transmission.

Evasion tactics from aircraft consisted of putting a layer of water overhead, changing course radically and clearing the diving point at 3-4 knots.

— page 242 —
1. AIR leaks. On April 30 during an air charge it was noted that the pressure in the banks was dropping. By isolating the banks the leak was determined to be in the 4 forward flasks of #3 bank. These flasks were isolated and allowed to bleed down, putting 4 flasks cut of 38 out of commission.

2. BOW PLANES. The bow plane casualty was in the form of a full voltage ground on the positive side of the line, This ground was found to be on the Bow Plane Rigging In-Out Indicator. Trouble had been experienced with this indicator, as hydraulic oil leaked on it from the gear box overhead. The bow planes had also developed a "floating" ground which was on the negative side of the line. The ground on the top of the in-out indicator was cleaned and the reading raised to 800,000 ohms. But when the planes were tested, the full voltage ground was still on the gang-switch in the in-out indicator. This switch was open on both sides of the line and no reading could be obtained. As the reading on the fiber block on the in-out indicator was still low (800,000), it was decided to pull the indicator and re-insulate it. The fiber block was found to be oil-sacked, but after cleaning and glyph-tol- ing it the reading was raised to 6 Megs. The ground on the gang-switch was also cleared and this remedied the situation with the exception of the floating ground. This ground was later found on the R2 lead in the bow plane tilting panel. The cause of the trouble was insulation breakdown due to oil on the fiber block. A new block and a little oil control should do away with this source of trouble.

3. AIR CONDITIONING SUPPLY PANEL. The casualty was in the form of a short circuit across the bakelite fuse block for No. 2 Air conditioning in the Pump Room. Deterioration of the bakelite block, due to age, was probably the cause of the breakdown. This block was of 1" thickness. A new block of 3/4" bakelite was made and has been satisfactory so far. This block should be replaced with one of 1" material.

4. GALLEY RANGE. This trouble was an open lead between the switch for the lower oven unit on #2 Range and the connection block at the range. This lead was replaced by a temporary lead. This open circuit must have been due to faulty installation as the galley range wiring was all new installation as per last refit. The wiring between the switch and connection block should be renewed.

— page 242 —
1. AIR leaks. On April 30 during an air charge it was noted that the pressure in the banks was dropping. By isolating the banks the leak was determined to be in the 4 forward flasks of #3 bank. These flasks were isolated and allowed to bleed down, putting 4 flasks cut of 38 out of commission.

2. BOW PLANES. The bow plane casualty was in the form of a full voltage ground on the positive side of the line, This ground was found to be on the Bow Plane Rigging In-Out Indicator. Trouble had been experienced with this indicator, as hydraulic oil leaked on it from the gear box overhead. The bow planes had also developed a "floating" ground which was on the negative side of the line. The ground on the top of the in-out indicator was cleaned and the reading raised to 800,000 ohms. But when the planes were tested, the full voltage ground was still on the gang-switch in the in-out indicator. This switch was open on both sides of the line and no reading could be obtained. As the reading on the fiber block on the in-out indicator was still low (800,000), it was decided to pull the indicator and re-insulate it. The fiber block was found to be oil-sacked, but after cleaning and glyph-tol- ing it the reading was raised to 6 Megs. The ground on the gang-switch was also cleared and this remedied the situation with the exception of the floating ground. This ground was later found on the R2 lead in the bow plane tilting panel. The cause of the trouble was insulation breakdown due to oil on the fiber block. A new block and a little oil control should do away with this source of trouble.

3. AIR CONDITIONING SUPPLY PANEL. The casualty was in the form of a short circuit across the bakelite fuse block for No. 2 Air conditioning in the Pump Room. Deterioration of the bakelite block, due to age, was probably the cause of the breakdown. This block was of 1" thickness. A new block of 3/4" bakelite was made and has been satisfactory so far. This block should be replaced with one of 1" material.

4. GALLEY RANGE. This trouble was an open lead between the switch for the lower oven unit on #2 Range and the connection block at the range. This lead was replaced by a temporary lead. This open circuit must have been due to faulty installation as the galley range wiring was all new installation as per last refit. The wiring between the switch and connection block should be renewed.

— page 243 —
5. FUEL OIL PURIFIER PANEL #1. This trouble was a short circuit. This coil is in the final accelerating contactor. This coil was burned up due to constant voltage applied to it. The accelerating contactor failed to go in due to a faulty setting. This contactor was reset and the lockout coil renewed, and no further trouble has been experienced.

6. #1 EVAPORATOR HEATERS. Three of the four heater units on #1 still were grounded, from 180 volts to full voltage. When the legging was taken off, it was found that there was a leak all around the gasket between the coils and upper tenk of the evaps. All the heater elements were good so the plugs were replaced and the leads re-insulated. This will remedy the situation, if the gasket holds. The bolts on the gasket flanges were tightened.

7. PIT LOG. Operatior has been fairly satisfactory. The log developed a knot and a half high speed error, due to improper setting of contacts. This could be caused by the contact arm slipping on the bellows arm. The contact arm does not assume the central position when the pressure is equalized on both sides of the bellows. Instead it makes on the lower cotector when at rest, which speeds the pump motor up. The only change made in the contact setting was to lower each contact four notches so that the contact arm would have its required distance to operate. Operation was consistent with a 1.5 knot error.

8. MARK VI GYRO. The master compass has operated very satisfactory but has about a 1° westerly error, which was present upon installation. At varying latitudes and speeds this error has held. On May 24 the filament circuit on No.1 Thyatron tube burned out and upon replacing both tubes the follow up panel has worked satisfactory.

The Conning Tower repeater 36 speed selsyn resumed its old trouble of legging and jumping. It was replaced with a selsyn without a dampener, (only one avellable) which works very well except when cutting in, when care has to be taken to prevent motoring.

The glass in bridge repeater was shattered which flooded out the entire bridge repeater. The unit was taken down and washed with fresh water, but will have to be completely overhauled and all windings beked or possibly rewound. A new supply cable must be installed.

— page 243 —
5. FUEL OIL PURIFIER PANEL #1. This trouble was a short circuit. This coil is in the final accelerating contactor. This coil was burned up due to constant voltage applied to it. The accelerating contactor failed to go in due to a faulty setting. This contactor was reset and the lockout coil renewed, and no further trouble has been experienced.

6. #1 EVAPORATOR HEATERS. Three of the four heater units on #1 still were grounded, from 180 volts to full voltage. When the legging was taken off, it was found that there was a leak all around the gasket between the coils and upper tenk of the evaps. All the heater elements were good so the plugs were replaced and the leads re-insulated. This will remedy the situation, if the gasket holds. The bolts on the gasket flanges were tightened.

7. PIT LOG. Operatior has been fairly satisfactory. The log developed a knot and a half high speed error, due to improper setting of contacts. This could be caused by the contact arm slipping on the bellows arm. The contact arm does not assume the central position when the pressure is equalized on both sides of the bellows. Instead it makes on the lower cotector when at rest, which speeds the pump motor up. The only change made in the contact setting was to lower each contact four notches so that the contact arm would have its required distance to operate. Operation was consistent with a 1.5 knot error.

8. MARK VI GYRO. The master compass has operated very satisfactory but has about a 1° westerly error, which was present upon installation. At varying latitudes and speeds this error has held. On May 24 the filament circuit on No.1 Thyatron tube burned out and upon replacing both tubes the follow up panel has worked satisfactory.

The Conning Tower repeater 36 speed selsyn resumed its old trouble of legging and jumping. It was replaced with a selsyn without a dampener, (only one avellable) which works very well except when cutting in, when care has to be taken to prevent motoring.

The glass in bridge repeater was shattered which flooded out the entire bridge repeater. The unit was taken down and washed with fresh water, but will have to be completely overhauled and all windings beked or possibly rewound. A new supply cable must be installed.

— page 244 —
9. COLLISION ALARM. Collision alarm kept grounding out through the bridge contact meker, due to a bad seating of valve on the handle. It was impossible to get this to hold. A new cable and contact meker will have to be installed.

10. RUNNING LIGHT CIRCUITS. Both running light circuits are flooded. Now cable will have to be run.

11. LIGHTING VOLTAGE REGULATOR. At the first of the patrol this regulator began to operate erratically losing control of generator voltage, especially on battery charge. This unit works very well at times, holding the voltage for as long as 8 hours at a time and then losing control, letting the generator potential meter, the tubes, batteries, generator potentiometer, 100,000 biasing resistor have all been renewed, all connections checked, and continuity and ground readings taken. This regulator has the same action on both lighting motor generators.

12. MAIN POWER. On May 28th after the Ventura bombing it was found that #2, #2 and #8 main motors had developed a new noise - much different than usual. A close inspection showed #2 armature with a wobbly rotation and a very regular banging sound. All rigging should be given close check for alignment, the tube oil seal to have developed a lube oil leak, through the tube oil seal. It also has a chattering noise, #8 also has a very irregular noise - mostly a bumping chatter.

13. GAGES. The lube oil pressure gages on the reduction gears were also found to have been knocked out of calibration. One glass was broken. The pressure gages on the maneuvering Room panel were also knocked out of calibration and leak internally. Pressure gages for circulating water have been found to read incorrectly.

14. No. 3 MAIN GENERATOR. No. 3 main generator developed a bad habit of not coming to the "Battery Bus" position without an unusual amount of pressure being applied - this fault is believed to be in the adjustment of the inter-locking table.

15. ENGINE EXHAUST VALVES. Leaky engine exhaust valves remain a major military defeat.

16. TET REPEATER. The TET system was knocked out of alignment by the Ventura bombing. Ship's force was unable to affect repairs. Proper shock mounting for the conning tower repeater is expected to help prevent this from reoccurring.

— page 244 —
9. COLLISION ALARM. Collision alarm kept grounding out through the bridge contact meker, due to a bad seating of valve on the handle. It was impossible to get this to hold. A new cable and contact meker will have to be installed.

10. RUNNING LIGHT CIRCUITS. Both running light circuits are flooded. Now cable will have to be run.

11. LIGHTING VOLTAGE REGULATOR. At the first of the patrol this regulator began to operate erratically losing control of generator voltage, especially on battery charge. This unit works very well at times, holding the voltage for as long as 8 hours at a time and then losing control, letting the generator potential meter, the tubes, batteries, generator potentiometer, 100,000 biasing resistor have all been renewed, all connections checked, and continuity and ground readings taken. This regulator has the same action on both lighting motor generators.

12. MAIN POWER. On May 28th after the Ventura bombing it was found that #2, #2 and #8 main motors had developed a new noise - much different than usual. A close inspection showed #2 armature with a wobbly rotation and a very regular banging sound. All rigging should be given close check for alignment, the tube oil seal to have developed a lube oil leak, through the tube oil seal. It also has a chattering noise, #8 also has a very irregular noise - mostly a bumping chatter.

13. GAGES. The lube oil pressure gages on the reduction gears were also found to have been knocked out of calibration. One glass was broken. The pressure gages on the maneuvering Room panel were also knocked out of calibration and leak internally. Pressure gages for circulating water have been found to read incorrectly.

14. No. 3 MAIN GENERATOR. No. 3 main generator developed a bad habit of not coming to the "Battery Bus" position without an unusual amount of pressure being applied - this fault is believed to be in the adjustment of the inter-locking table.

15. ENGINE EXHAUST VALVES. Leaky engine exhaust valves remain a major military defeat.

16. TET REPEATER. The TET system was knocked out of alignment by the Ventura bombing. Ship's force was unable to affect repairs. Proper shock mounting for the conning tower repeater is expected to help prevent this from reoccurring.

— page 245 —
1. RADIO
- Radio-reception and transmission was normal.
- Reception of NEM Hieku was much better than on the last patrol. The best frequency for receiving was 6380 kcs., and for transmission 8470 kcs.

Four transmissions were made in area with little difficulty. Two of the transmissions were cleared through Australia to VHZ and VHM and two through NEM. A contact report was sent blind to the search planes. Difficulty was encountered in clearing transmission on May 30. The first transmission was tried at 1900 GCT with no success. This may have been due to rein and electrical storms, as the message was cleared with no trouble five hours later. Our TEL transmitter has a tendency to waver off frequency.

(2) RADAR
- Again the performance of the S.J. was gratifying even though ranges on Truk were somewhat less than obtained on the previous patrol. Some troubles were encountered near the end of the patrol. The most serious one of these came after the first attack on the convoy. After two days of checking and testing an unk's without success, it was noticed that there was an area between the high voltage leads to the modulation network. Separating these leads eliminated the trouble. The only other difficulty was due to a broken porcelain terminal in the high voltage rectifier.

- The S.D. was surprising in its excellence performance through out most of the patrol. Planes were picked up from 6 to 36 miles. This increase in efficiency is believed to be due to the new type of antenna head, Condenser C-101 burned out on leaving the area and no speres were on board.

(3) SOUND GEAR AND CONDITIONS
- The QB sheft freezes at depths of 200 feet and more. Both the QB and JX sound gear went out of operation with the bombing of May 23 but came back before the trouble could be located. During local operations prior to leaving patrol the QB driver signal could not be heard by our escort. With the present gear it is impossible to echo rchge or communicate. Pearl Harbor sound men were unable to remedy this trouble. It was their opinion that a new driver and possibly a new head was needed. The present gear is a military hazard because of the lack of communication while submerged.

- 36 -

— page 245 —
1. RADIO
- Radio-reception and transmission was normal.
- Reception of NEM Hieku was much better than on the last patrol. The best frequency for receiving was 6380 kcs., and for transmission 8470 kcs.

Four transmissions were made in area with little difficulty. Two of the transmissions were cleared through Australia to VHZ and VHM and two through NEM. A contact report was sent blind to the search planes. Difficulty was encountered in clearing transmission on May 30. The first transmission was tried at 1900 GCT with no success. This may have been due to rein and electrical storms, as the message was cleared with no trouble five hours later. Our TEL transmitter has a tendency to waver off frequency.

(2) RADAR
- Again the performance of the S.J. was gratifying even though ranges on Truk were somewhat less than obtained on the previous patrol. Some troubles were encountered near the end of the patrol. The most serious one of these came after the first attack on the convoy. After two days of checking and testing an unk's without success, it was noticed that there was an air gap between the high voltage leads to the modulation network. Separating these leads eliminated the trouble. The only other difficulty was due to a broken porcelain terminal in the high voltage rectifier.

- The S.D. was surprising in its excellence performance through out most of the patrol. Planes were picked up from 6 to 36 miles. This increase in efficiency is believed to be due to the new type of antenna head, Condenser C-101 burned out on leaving the area and no speres were on board.

(3) SOUND GEAR AND CONDITIONS
- The QB sheft freezes at depths of 200 feet and more. Both the QB and JX sound gear went out of operation with the bombing of May 23 but came back before the trouble could be located. During local operations prior to leaving patrol the QB driver signal could not be heard by our escort. With the present gear it is impossible to echo rchge or communicate. Pearl Harbor sound men were unable to remedy this trouble. It was their opinion that a new driver and possibly a new head was needed. The present gear is a military hazard because of the lack of communication while submerged.

— page 246 —
1. SOUND GEAR AND CONDITION (Corrected)
   - Sound conditions were excellent around Truk.
   - Screws were heard up to 9,000 yards.

: (O) DENSITY LAYERS
   - All deep dives except one indicated isothermal water to '260 feet. The exception was a 10 positive gradient at 80 feet twenty miles east of LOSAP Atoll.

: (P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY
   - The health of the officers and crew was very good.
   - The following cases were treated:
     - Tonsillitis - 1
     - Fracture, simple, left ring finger - 1
     - Fungus infection - 3
     - Sprained wrist - 2
     - Pleurisy - 1
     - Furuncle - 2
     - Gastritis - 1
     - Hemorrhoid, external - 1
   - The food was plentiful, varied, and well prepared.
   - The habitability was normal throughout the boat.
   - Only eleven-cell dry drive-was-moder.

: (Q) PERSONNEL
   - The performance of officers and crew was eminently satisfactory.
   - Schools of the boat and in rating were continued throughout the patrol. The response was gratifying as usual. Watches were shifted and qualification exams were given enroute from the area.
   - The inevitable effects of a month of considerable surface operation under either actual or immediately potential air coverage adjacent to enemy bases was beginning to manifest itself at the end of the patrol-the dives were getting faster day by day.

— page 246 —
1. SOUND GEAR AND CONDITION (Corrected)
   - Sound conditions were excellent around Truk.
   - Screws were heard up to 9,000 yards.

: (O) DENSITY LAYERS
   - All deep dives except one indicated isothermal water to '260 feet. The exception was a 10 positive gradient at 80 feet twenty miles east of LOSAP Atoll.

: (P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY
   - The health of the officers and crew was very good.
   - The following cases were treated:
     - Tonsillitis - 1
     - Fracture, simple, left ring finger - 1
     - Fungus infection - 3
     - Sprained wrist - 2
     - Pleurisy - 1
     - Furuncle - 2
     - Gastritis - 1
     - Hemorrhoid, external - 1
   - The food was plentiful, varied, and well prepared.
   - The habitability was normal throughout the boat.
   - Only eleven-cell dry drive-was-moder.

: (Q) PERSONNEL
   - The performance of officers and crew was eminently satisfactory.
   - Schools of the boat and in rating were continued throughout the patrol. The response was gratifying as usual. Watches were shifted and qualification exams were given enroute from the area.
   - The inevitable effects of a month of considerable surface operation under either actual or immediately potential air coverage adjacent to enemy bases was beginning to manifest itself at the end of the patrol-the dives were getting faster day by day.

— page 248 —
3. Air Activity - Except when shipping was near, Japanese air activity was generally surprisingly limited. Air traffic was regularly encountered on the TRUK-SATAWAN end TRUK-GUAM lines. There are regular early morning air searches in the northeast and southeast sectors from TRUK.

4. Life guard duty - This will be subject to separate correspondence except to issue a reminder that our own aircraft are potentially, and sometimes actually, more dangerous than the Nips.

5. Material - (a) This vessel urgently needs new sonar equipment if for no other purpose then submerged communication. What a sensation it would be to have our own ship's work us over sometime and not be able to say a word.

(b) The high submerged noise level of the main motors is a distinct military liability.

(c) The exhaust valves fill the engine room bilges regularly as usual. There is no satisfactory solution to this problem except the installation of the new submerged flapper type valves. This could be accomplished during a refit period provided the necessary plans and material were assembled prior to the beginning of the refit.

6. Mark XVIII torpedoes. Depth set was 4 feet on the attack on the small vessel convoy north of MOGAMI BANK. The torpedoes were fired into a force 3 sea with no prematures.

7. General - The dark gray-black camouflage applied by Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor was most satisfactory.

— page 248 —
3. Air Activity - Except when shipping was near, Japanese air activity was generally surprisingly limited. Air traffic was regularly encountered on the TRUK-SATAWAN end TRUK-GUAM lines. There are regular early morning air searches in the northeast and southeast sectors from TRUK.

4. Life guard duty - This will be subject to separate correspondence except to issue a reminder that our own aircraft are potentially, and sometimes actually, more dangerous than the Nips.

5. Material - (a) This vessel urgently needs new sonar equipment if for no other purpose then submerged communication. What a sensation it would be to have our own ship's work us over sometime and not be able to say a word.

(b) The high submerged noise level of the main motors is a distinct military liability.

(c) The exhaust valves fill the engine room bilges regularly as usual. There is no satisfactory solution to this problem except the installation of the new submerged flapper type valves. This could be accomplished during a refit period provided the necessary plans and material were assembled prior to the beginning of the refit.

6. Mark XVIII torpedoes. Depth set was 4 feet on the attack on the small vessel convoy north of MOGAMI BANK. The torpedoes were fired into a force 3 sea with no prematures.

7. General - The dark gray-black camouflage applied by Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor was most satisfactory.

— page 249 —
1/2/42/1-3/FB142 SUB-KLINE DIVISION 142
Serial 028
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
7 June 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL:
FIRST NEDDERS ENT to
U.S.S. PERMIT'S Twelfth
War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division 142.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Via: The Commander submarine Squadron Fourteen.

Subject: U.S.S. PERMIT - Report of Twelfth War Patrol;
Comments on:

1. The twelfth war patrol of the PERMIT was the first for the new commanding officer as soon. The patrol was conducted in the TRUK area and lasted for forty-three days of which twenty-nine days were spent in the assigned area. Lifeguard duties were performed during eight of the twenty-nine days. Patrol was terminated one day early due to low fuel. PERMIT was hampered by many plane contacts in the area and was attacked by one of our Ventura planes while patrolling within the bombing restricted zone. The bomb exploded as she was passing 115 feet and caused considerable minor damage throughout the ship. There were six contacts with enemy vessels three of which were torpedo targets. Four torpedo attacks and one gun attack were delivered.

2. Number 1 - This was a day submerged attack. During patrol off OTLF. Pass a submarine similar to the 1-68 class was sighted at range 9,000 yards. While heading for attack position sound picked up a target which was sighted to the second submarine at range 3,000 yards. Approaching was sighted to the second target identified as similar to I-1 (or I-9) class with plane ranging at range 1,500 yards two and 15 torpedoes from the stern tubes were fired on 1140 track. Both missed probably due to error in speed estimate.

Number 15 - Fortuitously the torpedoes fired in above attack were 1-8 and did not alert the target. Ship was swung for bow tube and at range 2,400 yards 4 1/2 hour 14's were fired on 1500 track. Armed of half target length between torpedoes was applied by shifting point of aim. One explosion was timed at 2'17" after firing. Loss of depth control prevented periscope observation immediately following the explosion. About 2 minutes after torpedo explosion, a long, heavy rumbling explosion was heard. Then periscope observation was again possible the only taking in sight was the 1-68 class submarine departing rapidly to the eastward.

— page 249 —
1/2/42/1-3/FB142 SUB-KLINE DIVISION 142
Serial 028
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
7 June 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL:
FIRST NEDDERS ENT to
U.S.S. PERMIT'S Twelfth
War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division 142.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Via: The Commander submarine Squadron Fourteen.

Subject: U.S.S. PERMIT - Report of Twelfth War Patrol;
Comments on:

1. The twelfth war patrol of the PERMIT was the first for the new commanding officer as soon. The patrol was conducted in the TRUK area and lasted for forty-three days of which twenty-nine days were spent in the assigned area. Lifeguard duties were performed during eight of the twenty-nine days. Patrol was terminated one day early due to low fuel. PERMIT was hampered by many plane contacts in the area and was attacked by one of our Ventura planes while patrolling within the bombing restricted zone. The bomb exploded as she was passing 115 feet and caused considerable minor damage throughout the ship. There were six contacts with enemy vessels three of which were torpedo targets. Four torpedo attacks and one gun attack were delivered.

2. Number 1 - This was a day submerged attack. During patrol off OTLF. Pass a submarine similar to the 1-68 class was sighted at range 9,000 yards. While heading for attack position sound picked up a target which was sighted to the second submarine at range 3,000 yards. Approaching was sighted to the second target identified as similar to I-1 (or I-9) class with plane ranging at range 1,500 yards two and 15 torpedoes from the stern tubes were fired on 1140 track. Both missed probably due to error in speed estimate.

Number 15 - Fortuitously the torpedoes fired in above attack were 1-8 and did not alert the target. Ship was swung for bow tube and at range 2,400 yards 4 1/2 hour 14's were fired on 1500 track. Armed of half target length between torpedoes was applied by shifting point of aim. One explosion was timed at 2'17" after firing. Loss of depth control prevented periscope observation immediately following the explosion. About 2 minutes after torpedo explosion, a long, heavy rumbling explosion was heard. Then periscope observation was again possible the only taking in sight was the 1-68 class submarine departing rapidly to the eastward.

— page 250 —
5-142/16-1/FH142 SUB. R.I.S. DIVISION 142
Serial 028
CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST ADDRESSMENT to
U.S.S. FRUIT'S TWELFTH
War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. FRUIT - Report of Twelfth War Patrol;
Comments on:

Number 2, B - This was a night surface attack on a convoy of about 12 small ships - 14-5 escorts. Contact was made by radar and convoy tracked for about 45 minutes. Position had been gained on sternboard bow when left zig-placed 25RMT in good firing position. Four torpedoes from bow tubes followed by two from the deck tubes were fired at sternboard flank of convoy range 1,200 yards. One hit was tried for a run of 3,300 yards.

Number 20 - Aft an escort at range of 900 yards ship was swung to bring stern tubes to bear and torpedoes set for 4 feet in case escort needed for FRUIT. Escort apparently was confused by explosions, so the torpedoes were fired at sternboard flank of convoy range 2,200 yards. To this, 1,200 yards of torpedoes were fired at sternboard flank of convoy range 2,200 yards. It is encouraged to now test our torpedoes as effective, but it is believed in this case it was considerably aided by very poor lookouts on the escort.

Number 3 - This was a gun attack on two small craft of about 300 tons and 100 tons respectively. Both mounted small guns. A battle surface was made from stern and fire opened on the large vessel with the 4" gun at range 3,350 yards. Range was opened to keep 300 tons from enemy shore. The 20mm guns were used against the smaller vessel to prevent airships from coming on the disengaged side. After extending 95 rounds of 4" gun failed to return to battery and action was broken off. Two or possibly three hits were observed.

3. MATERIALS:
The FRUIT returned from patrol in fair material condition. There are a great many work items to be accomplished during the current period. It is expected that all damages and defects noted in sub-paragraph (k) will be corrected during a normal refit period. Refit will be accomplished by the BUNSALL.

— page 250 —
5-142/16-1/FH142 SUB. R.I.S. DIVISION 142
Serial 028
CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST ADDRESSMENT to
U.S.S. FRUIT'S TWELFTH
War Patrol.
Subject: U.S.S. FRUIT - Report of Twelfth War Patrol;
Comments on:

Number 2, B - This was a night surface attack on a convoy of about 12 small ships - 14-5 escorts. Contact was made by radar and convoy tracked for about 45 minutes. Position had been gained on sternboard bow when left zig-placed 25RMT in good firing position. Four torpedoes from bow tubes followed by two from the deck tubes were fired at sternboard flank of convoy range 1,200 yards across track 80°. One hit was sighted for a run of 3,300 yards.

Number 20 - This was a gun attack on two small ships was swung to bring stern tubes to bear and torpedoes set for 4 feet in case escort needed for FRUIT. Assort apparently was pushed by explosions, so the torpedoes were fired at sternboard range 2,200 yards. To this, lasses on the above attacks are attributed to probable control errors and small size and shallow draft of targets. It is encouraged to now test our o-mouflage is effective, but it is believed in this case it was considerably aided by very poor lookouts on the escort.

Number 3 - This was a gun attack on two small ships. A battle surface was made from sternboard range 3,350 yards. Range was the large vessel with the 4" gun at range 3,350 yards. Range was opened to keep ships from enemy shore. The 20mm guns were used against the smaller vessel to prevent airships from coming on the disengaged side. After extending 95 rounds of 4" gun failed to return to battery and action was broken off. Two or possibly three hits were observed.

3. MATERIALS:
The FRUIT returned from patrol in fair material condition. There are a great many work items to be accomplished during the current period. It is expected that all damages and defects noted in sub-paragraph (k) will be corrected during a normal refit period. Refit will be accomplished by the BUNSALL.

- 2 -

— page 252 —
5-14/A16-3
Serial 059.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ADDRESS TO
U.S.S. PERMIT'S Twelfth
War Patrol.
From:
To:
Subject:
1. Forwarded, concurred, in the remarks of the
Commander Submarine Division One hundred Forty-Two.
2. The Captain, officers and crew of PERMIT are
congratulated on the dance they have done this enemy.

J. B. LOSTTAFF.
Copy to:
Consubdiv 142
CO PERMIT.

— page 252 —
5-14/A16-3
Serial 059.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ADDRESS TO
U.S.S. PERMIT'S Twelfth
War Patrol.
From:
To:
Subject:
1. Forwarded, concurred, in the remarks of the
Commander Submarine Division One hundred Forty-Two.
2. The Captain, officers and crew of PERMIT are
congratulated on the dance they have done this enemy.

Copy to:
Consubdiv 142
CO PERMIT.

— page 253 —
10/16-3(15)/(16)
Serial 01229

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PERMIT Report of
Twelfth War Patrol.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 453.
U.S.S. PERMIT - TWELFTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via.: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PERMIT (SS178) - Report of Twelfth War Patrol.
(23 April to 5 June 1944).

1. The twelfth war patrol of the PERMIT was conducted in the Truk Area, and was the first for the new Commanding Officer, as such.

2. All attacks made were aggressively conducted. The attack on the Japanese submarine of the I-9 class was of note. The Commanding Officer's quick action in shifting from the smaller Japanese submarine present and firing at the larger is commendable. The advantages of the Mark 18 are seen in the first attack on the I-9 class submarine which resulted in misses but did not alert the enemy and allowed the PERMIT to make a subsequent successful attack.

3. The unfortunate bombing of the PERMIT by a friendly plane has been made the subject of separate correspondence.

4. This patrol is designated as "Successful" for Combat Insignia Award.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew for this aggressive and successful war patrol. The PERMIT is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

SUNK
1 - Submarine (I-9 class) - 2,200 tons (Attack No. 1B).

— page 253 —
10/16-3(15)/(16)
Serial 01229

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PERMIT Report of
Twelfth War Patrol.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 453.
U.S.S. PERMIT - TWELFTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via.: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PERMIT (SS178) - Report of Twelfth War Patrol.
(23 April to 5 June 1944).

1. The twelfth war patrol of the PERMIT was conducted in the Truk Area, and was the first for the new Commanding Officer, as such.

2. All attacks made were aggressively conducted. The attack on the Japanese submarine of the I-9 class was of note. The Commanding Officer's quick action in shifting from the smaller Japanese submarine present and firing at the larger is commendable. The advantages of the Mark 18 are seen in the first attack on the I-9 class submarine which resulted in misses but did not alert the enemy and allowed the PERMIT to make a subsequent successful attack.

3. The unfortunate bombing of the PERMIT by a friendly plane has been made the subject of separate correspondence.

4. This patrol is designated as "Successful" for Combat Insignia Award.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew for this aggressive and successful war patrol. The PERMIT is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

SUNK
1 - Submarine (I-9 class) - 2,200 tons (Attack No. 1B).

— page 254 —
1- FREIGHTER (class unknown)
1- ARMED TRAWLER
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
D-A-M-A-C-E-D
2,000 tons (Attack No. 2B)
300 tons (Gun Attack No. 1)
2,300
4,500 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
CominCh (7)
CNO (5)
CinCpac (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean Areas (1)
ComServPac (1)
CinClant (2)
ComSubsLant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
ComSoPac (2)
ComSoViesPac (1)
ComSubSoViesPac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
ComNorPac (1)
ComSubPac (40)
SUEAD, MI (2)
ComSubSpaSubOrdCom (3)
All Squadron and Division Commanders, SubSpa (2)
ComSubTrainPac (2)
All Submarines, SubSpa (1)

E. V. TITTLE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 254 —
1- FREIGHTER (class unknown)
1- ARMED TRAWLER
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
D-A-M-A-C-E-D
2,000 tons (Attack No. 2B)
300 tons (Gun Attack No. 1)
2,300
4,500 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
CominCh (7)
CNO (5)
CinCpac (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean Areas (1)
ComServPac (1)
CinClant (2)
ComSubsLant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
ComSoPac (2)
ComSoViesPac (1)
ComSubSoViesPac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
ComNorPac (1)
ComSubPac (40)
SUEAD, MI (2)
ComSubSpaSubOrdCom (3)
All Squadron and Division Commanders, SubSpa (2)
ComSubTrainPac (2)
All Submarines, SubSpa (1)

E. V. TITTLE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 255 —
13 August 1944.

From: The Commander, U.S.S. PEARL (SS 178).
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Task Force SEVENTY TWO.
       (2) The Commander SEVENTY FLAG.

Subject: U.S.S. PEARL, Report of "Far Patrol Number THIRTEEN."

Enclosures: (A) Subject report.
       (B) Track chart covering VOLEAI area.
       (C) Track chart covering YAP area.

1. Enclosure (A), cover the thirteenth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the "VOLAI" area during the period 29 June 1944, to 13 August 1944, is forwarded herewith.

D. A. SCHERER.
DECLASSIFIED
BY: [Signature]
DATE: [Date]

DECLASSIFIED
D. A. SCHERER.
DECLASSIFIED
BY: [Signature]
DATE: [Date]

— page 255 —
13 August 1944.

From: The Commander, U.S.S. PEARL (SS 178).
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Task Force SEVENTY TWO.
       (2) The Commander SEVENTY FLAG.

Subject: U.S.S. PEARL, Report of "Far Patrol Number THIRTEEN."

Enclosures: (A) Subject report.
       (B) Track chart covering VOLEAI area.
       (C) Track chart covering YAP area.

1. Enclosure (A), cover the thirteenth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the "VOLAI" area during the period 29 June 1944, to 13 August 1944, is forwarded herewith.

D. A. SCHERER.
DECLASSIFIED
BY: [Signature]
DATE: [Date]

DECLASSIFIED
D. A. SCHERER.
DECLASSIFIED
BY: [Signature]
DATE: [Date]

— page 256 —
U.S.S. PERMIT - THIRTEENTH WAR PATROL, Report of.

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived KAJURO ATOLI from "Welfth war petrol on 5 June, 1944. Assigned to Submarine Division 142, alongside U.S.S. BUSHNELL for regular refit.

The following major material items were accomplished: overhauled #2 and #3 main engines; overhauled brush rigging on #2 and #6 main motors; installed interior voice communication system; cleaned and overhauled both periscopes; straightened and realigned 3J radar mast; overhauled and adjusted 3B sonar equipment so that echo-ranging and submicrosecond communication were possible for the first time in six months; overhauled both high pressure air compressors; repaired split in #6 fuel ballast tank vent riser.

Excessive clercnco in bow planc bearings and misalignment of #1 periscope bearings were not corrected because of limited tender facilities. These items can be satisfactorily postponed until c. April Hrobrr refit. Not sound tested or decremed.

The refit was most satisfactory, and the coooperation received from both the rofficers and the torpedo crew and the torpedo crew was outstanding. Recuperation facilities on LYRIA Id., were excellent. Two officers and four torpedo officers and one torpedo officer were discharged and like number received.

23 June - Post repair trials.

24 - 26 June - Three drylight training periods during which three exercise torpedoes were fired and one bottle surface firing was conducted.

27 - 28 June - Loaded stores, torpedoes, ammunition and fuel to capacity.

29 June - Deported for patrol.

— page 256 —
U.S.S. PERMIT - THIRTEENTH WAR PATROL, Report of.

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived KAJURO ATOLI from "Welfth war petrol on 5 June, 1944. Assigned to Submarine Division 142, alongside U.S.S. BUSHNELL for regular refit.

The following major material items were accomplished: overhauled #2 and #3 main engines; overhauled brush rigging on #2 and #6 main motors; installed interior voice communication system; cleaned and overhauled both periscopes; straightened and realigned 3J radar mast; overhauled and adjusted 3B sonar equipment so that echo-ranging and submicrosecond communication were possible for the first time in six months; overhauled both high pressure air compressors; repaired split in #6 fuel ballast tank vent riser.

Excessive clercnco in bow planc bearings and misalignment of #1 periscope bearings were not corrected because of limited tender facilities. These items can be satisfactorily postponed until c. April Hrobrr refit. Not sound tested or decremed.

The refit was most satisfactory, and the coooperation received from both the rofficers and the torpedo crew and the torpedo crew was outstanding. Recuperation facilities on LYRIA Id., were excellent. Two officers and four torpedo officers and one torpedo officer were discharged and like number received.

23 June - Post repair trials.

24 - 26 June - Three drylight training periods during which three exercise torpedoes were fired and one bottle surface firing was conducted.

27 - 28 June - Loaded stores, torpedoes, ammunition and fuel to capacity.

29 June - Deported for patrol.

— page 257 —
29 June

1300 (L) Undertow for Thirteenth War Patrol in accordance with CombatForce' 17 Operation Order No. 223-44.

1416 (L) Cleared channel, NAURO ATOLL, escorted by U.S.S. CAPTIVATE (Alt. 156).

1500 (L) Submerged for trim and a check on oil and air leaks. Escort reported heavy oil slick. Port stern tube packing gland developed excessive leak at deep submergence. Unable to rectify oil leak so returned to MAJURO.

1913 (L) Koord alongside U.S.S. BUSHNELL. Replaced two packing rings in port stern tube. Made complete check of fuel system and put additional water seal in after fuel ballast tanks during battery charge.

30 June

0650 (L) Undertow for check on oil leaks in lagoon.

0702 (L) Anchored in loc of NYRA Id. and made stationery dive to 27 foot keel depth to inspect for oil and air leaks. Found split in cftcr bulkhead of bow buoyancy tank. No oil leaks.

0810 (L) Surf.accd. Returned alongside U.S.S. BUSHNELL. Added up bow buoyancy tank split.

1032 (L) Undertow again for patrol.

1156 (L) Cleared channel, NAURO ATOLL, proceeding on two engines toward southern scftoy loca escort by U.S.S. CAPTIVATE. Zig-zagging constant helm, 30 degrcos, during daylight and moonlight.

1 July

0420 (L) Relcrsed escort. Set course 263° T.

0842 (L) Submergcd. Hold emergency drills.

1004 (L) Surf.accd.

— page 257 —
29 June

1300 (L) Undertow for Thirteenth War Patrol in accordance with CombatForce' 17 Operation Order No. 223-44.

1416 (L) Cleared channel, NAURO ATOLL, escorted by U.S.S. CAPTIVATE (Alt. 156).

1500 (L) Submerged for trim and a check on oil and air leaks. Escort reported heavy oil slick. Port stern tube packing gland developed excessive leak at deep submergence. Unable to rectify oil leak so returned to MAJURO.

1913 (L) Koord alongside U.S.S. BUSHNELL. Replaced two packing rings in port stern tube. Made complete check of fuel system and put additional water seal in after fuel ballast tanks during battery charge.

30 June

0650 (L) Undertow for check on oil leaks in lagoon.

0702 (L) Anchored in loc of NYRA Id. and made stationery dive to 27 foot keel depth to inspect for oil and air leaks. Found split in cftcr bulkhead of bow buoyancy tank. No oil leaks.

0810 (L) Surf.accd. Returned alongside U.S.S. BUSHNELL. Added up bow buoyancy tank split.

1032 (L) Undertow again for patrol.

1156 (L) Cleared channel, NAURO ATOLL, proceeding on two engines toward southern scftoy loca escort by U.S.S. CAPTIVATE. Zig-zagging constant helm, 30 degrcos, during daylight and moonlight.

1 July

0420 (L) Relcrsed escort. Set course 263° T.

0842 (L) Submergcd. Hold emergency drills.

1004 (L) Surf.accd.

— page 258 —
1 July (Cont'd)
1305 (L) Hold b.r.tlc surface on infl.tod, dampond matross cov.r. Firod 6 rounds of 4 inch for spotting practico. Deflated target with 20 mm and .50 caliber batteries.

1356 (L) Resumed course to the area. Hereafter held daily trim dives and fire control drills. WOOD, George Arthur, 551-54-77, Mothlc, U.S.N., placed on binnacle list.

3 July
1030 (L) Set course 261° T. Pharmacist hate tentatively diagnosed WOOD's illness as scarlet fever. Isolated patient in captain's stateroom.

4 July
Condition of patient not changed so decided to verify diagnosis.

0915 (K) Commenced transmitting PERMIT serial one.

1005 (K) Sighted "Pete" type float plane bearing south, range about 6 milcs (Aireraft Contact #1). Submerged. "Pete" probably came from SATAVAN.

1049 (K) Surfaced.

2100 (K) No word from SubPec doctors, so decided to try and intercept U.S.S. STINGRAY, who is returning from patrol, and ask STINGRAY to take patient for further transfer for medical treatment.

2221 (K) Weak SJ radar interforcnce, bearing 283° T.

2256 (K) SJ radar contact, bearing 2500 T, range 8,500 yards, (Ship contact #1), and then sighted U.S.S. STINGRAY coming out of c. rcin squill. Closed cnd oxehnged recognition signals cnd c.lls. STINGRAY promptly consented to t.ck our pt.ctint. Commc.ned mcnu.covering to trcnscfr pt.ctint vir. our rubbr b.ot.

7 July
0010 (K) Received information that trcnscfor was unno.ocssry, so rcc.llcd our bvt. t. to cxecutive officer got whct dope the STINGRAY could aff.ur and the f.resh SOu clf poppcd up our pt.ctint so tho b.ot trip wcs not altogcthor in vcin.

— page 258 —
1 July (Cont'd)
1305 (L) Hold b.r.tlc surface on infl.tod, dampond matross cov.r. Firod 6 rounds of 4 inch for spotting practico. Deflated target with 20 mm and .50 caliber batteries.

1356 (L) Resumed course to the area. Hereafter held daily trim dives and fire control drills. WOOD, George Arthur, 551-54-77, Mothlc, U.S.N., placed on binnacle list.

3 July
1030 (L) Set course 261° T. Pharmacist hate tentatively diagnosed WOOD's illness as scarlet fever. Isolated patient in captain's stateroom.

4 July
Condition of patient not changed so decided to verify diagnosis.

0915 (K) Commenced transmitting PERMIT serial one.

1005 (K) Sighted "Pete" type float plane bearing south, range about 6 milcs (Aireraft Contact #1). Submerged. "Pete" probably came from SATAVAN.

1049 (K) Surfaced.

2100 (K) No word from SubPec doctors, so decided to try and intercept U.S.S. STINGRAY, who is returning from patrol, and ask STINGRAY to take patient for further transfer for medical treatment.

2221 (K) Weak SJ radar interfornce, bearing 283° T.

2256 (K) SJ radar contact, bearing 2500 T, range 8,500 yards, (Ship contact #1), and then sighted U.S.S. STINGRAY coming out of c. rcin squall. Closed cnd oxehnged recognition signals cnd c.lls. STINGRAY promptly consented to t.ko our pt.ctint. Commenced manouvering to trcnscfr pt.ctint vir. our rubber boot.

7 July
0010 (K) Received information that trcnscfor was unnoocssary, so rcc.llcd our bvt. t. to cxecutive officer got what dope the STINGRAY could siffur and the fcrsh SOu clf poppcd up our pt.ctint so tho boot trip wcs not altogcthor in vcin.

— page 259 —
5 July (Cont'd)
0030 (K) Boat returned. Lying to while electricians repair damaged wiring in control cage resulting from flash over in /1 main generator field rheostat. (Sound gear manned and ready to answer bells on the battery on about 5 seconds notice.)
0346 (K) Hiring repaired. Proceeding on 2 engines to assigned area.
1135 (K) Held 20 mm. end 50 caliber gun practice on a floating oil drum.
1905 (K) SJ radar contact, bearing 2490 T., range 4,400 yards. Turned away and promptly lost target. Nothing in sight with goal visibility, so resumed course.
1930 (K) Entered assigned area.
2023 (K) Set course west to patrol along PALAU-TRUK shipping route. At night using the auxiliary engines at a speed of 7 1/2 knots and zigging during moonlight, otherwise used a speed of 5 knots in order to conserve fuel.
2045 (K) Hacked north while pumping #3 and #4 engine sump because of dilution with fuel oil.
2208 (K) Proceeding to life guard station off WOLFAI Id., on two engines.

6 July
0425 (K) Sighted a minesweeping gear float: about 12 feet long with tail vancs, painted grov with a rod stripo athwcrtship undcrneath. Sank it with 50 caliber fire after the B.A.R. failed to do more than chip the paint. Floct hc do moss or bcrnclos. (Lct. 7-07N, Long. 146-23 E.)
0430 (K) Light explosion in torpedo tubo #6. White smoke c.mc out of vcut. Tube cool, no prcssure in tubo, so opcncd tubo door. White acrid smoke in the tubo, but cftorbody of 1k. 18 torpedo cold. Inspected torpedo and found #6 hcnd hole plcto gaskct mcltcd out, numrous cell tops blown off bolls, after cnd of battery compartment w.r.m. Thorc w.s no fire so opcncd cell hand hole pl.tcs to vcntilcto torpedo.
0607 (K) Firc broke out in-torpcdo btctory oomcrrtmcnt. CO2 would only extinguish it tomporarily. Smoke w.s hcvy na crid. Donnd roscuo breathing appcrctus and lorcda torpedo in the tubo.

— page 259 —
5 July (Cont'd)
0030 (K) Boat returned. Lying to while electricians repair damaged wiring in control cage resulting from flash over in /1 main generator field rheostat. (Sound gear manned and ready to answer bells on the battery on about 5 seconds notice.)
0346 (K) Hiring repaired. Proceeding on 2 engines to assigned area.
1135 (K) Held 20 mm. end 50 caliber gun practice on a floating oil drum.
1905 (K) SJ radar contact, bearing 2490 T., range 4,400 yards. Turned away and promptly lost target. Nothing in sight with goal visibility, so resumed course.
1930 (K) Entered assigned area.
2023 (K) Set course west to patrol along PALAU-TRUK shipping route. At night using the auxiliary engines at a speed of 7 1/2 knots and zigging during moonlight, otherwise used a speed of 5 knots in order to conserve fuel.
2045 (K) Hacked north while pumping #3 and #4 engine sump because of dilution with fuel oil.
2208 (K) Proceeding to life guard station off WOLFAI Id., on two engines.

6 July
0425 (K) Sighted a minesweeping gear float: about 12 feet long with tail vancs, painted grov with a rod stripo athwcrtship undcrneath. Sank it with 50 caliber fire after the B.A.R. failed to do more than chip the paint. Floct hc do moss or bcrnclos. (Lct. 7-07N, Long. 146-23 E.)
0430 (K) Light explosion in torpedo tubo #6. White smoke c.mc out of vcut. Tube cool, no prcssure in tubo, so opcncd tubo door. White acrid smoke in the tubo, but cftorbody of 1k. 18 torpedo cold. Inspected torpedo and found #6 hcnd hole plcto gaskct mcltcd out, numrous cell tops blown off bolls, after cnd of battery compartment w.r.m. Thorc w.s no fire so opcncd cell hand hole pl.tcs to vcntilcto torpedo.
0607 (K) Firc broke out in-torpcdo btctory oomcrrtmcnt. CO2 would only extinguish it tomporarily. Smoke w.s hcvy na crid. Donnd roscuo breathing appcrctus and lorcda torpedo in the tubo.

— page 260 —
6 July (Cont'd)
0631 (K) Surveyed one Mk. 18 torpedo to sea.
0950 (K) Sighted heavily constructed row boat awash. Nothing in it. (Lat. 7-09 N, Long. 145-14 E.)
1225 (K) Sighted ITALIK Id., bearing 304° T., range 13 miles. Opened out on course south.
1246 (K) Submerged to check for oil leaks. We were leaving a heavy slick. Various experiments during the next two days indicated a leak in the compensating water riser in expansion tank. Secured using expansion tank for bilge water, pumping bilges to sea - better a spot than a slick.
1508 (K) Surfac'd. Patrolling south east of WOLEAI.

7 July
0735 (K) Sighted WOLEAI ATOLL with high periscope. Opened out.
0850 (K) Sighted unidentified large patrol plane bearing 040° T., range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #2). Not detcocted or radar. Submerged.
0922 (K) Surfac'd. Decided to patrol on the surfco west of WOLEAI to cover ULTIMI-WOLEAI, PALAU-WOLEAI and PALAU-TRUK shipping routes. Shipping will be scarce in this area and will be forced to approach from the west because of U.S. occupation of the MARIANAS Id. No area also in lifeguard area.

8 July
1620 (K) Held 20 mm. practice firing at large float consisting of heavy pl.nks lashd over drums. (Lct. 7-44 N, Long. 143-19 E.)

10 July
0437 (K) Sighted WOLEAI ATOLL bearing 075° T., distance 12 miles. Jorked round to southwest of atoll.
0540 (K) Div'd for submerged reconnaissance of WOLEAI. Closed southrn side of atoll. No shipping in thg.

— page 260 —
6 July (Cont'd)
0631 (K) Surveyed one Mk. 18 torpedo to sea.
0950 (K) Sighted heavily constructed row boat awash. Nothing in it. (Lat. 7-09 N, Long. 145-14 E.)
1225 (K) Sighted ITALIK Id., bearing 304° T., range 13 miles. Opened out on course south.
1246 (K) Submerged to check for oil leaks. We were leaving a heavy slick. Various experiments during the next two days indicated a leak in the compensating water riser in expansion tank. Secured using expansion tank for bilge water, pumping bilges to sea - better a spot than a slick.
1508 (K) Surfac'd. Patrolling south east of WOLEAI.

7 July
0735 (K) Sighted WOLEAI ATOLL with high periscope. Opened out.
0850 (K) Sighted unidentified large patrol plane bearing 040° T., range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #2). Not detcocted or radar. Submerged.
0922 (K) Surfac'd. Decided to patrol on the surfco west of WOLEAI to cover ULITHI-WOLEAI, PALAU-WOLEAI and PALAU-TRUK shipping routes. Shipping will be scarce in this area and will be forced to approach from the west because of U.S. occupation of the MARIANAS Id. No area also in lifeguard area.

8 July
1620 (K) Held 20 mm. practice firing at large float consisting of heavy pl.nks lashd over drums. (Lct. 7-44 N, Long. 143-19 E.)

10 July
0437 (K) Sighted WOLEAI ATOLL bearing 075° T., distance 12 miles. Jorked round to southwest of atoll.
0540 (K) Div'd for submerged reconnaissance of WOLEAI. Closed southrn side of atoll. No shipping in thg.

— page 261 —
10 July (Cont'd)
0540 (K) (Cont'd)
I.goon. T'rocs on YOLEN Id. oppcar protty sorcgly from thc doanbins. Littlc cctivity wrs notod. The tolophonc linc connecting thc northorn isl-nds of thc otoll wrs not.d s rport.d by thc SALMON.

1325 (K) Commenced opn out to thc southw.r.d and componstcod Kngnctis comp.sscs.

1940 (K) Surf. cod. P.trollod coross PALAU-TRUK shipping routs.

11 July
1630 (K) Conductcd prctice firing of light wc.pons at flot.ting drum.

12 July
0430 (K) Sightcd EL.TO Id. bcrring 090° T., rngs 14 milos.

0522 (K) Submerg.d for rcconniss.ncc of EL.TO I.T.O.L will which ars bccn r.port.d t.s.c. scriplinc bscil. Gloss obscrvction disclosud no scriplinc facilities. Thc only activity notod was native fishcrnn.paddling outrigger canocs around in ths lagoon. ypnc'd out to northward.

1556 (K) Surf.aced. Patrolld acrosy Y.P and ULITHI to PUL.M.T shipping routs.

2142 (K) Stoppcd. Dctctcd salt water in rcduction gcar lubricating oil sump. Lying to while coolors and tank top warc tostd and lubricating oil was rcncwod.

13 July
0307 (K) Starbordr shaft in commission.

0413 (K) Proccading to lifeguard station on both shafts.

0739 (K) Sightcd OLIM.R.O Id. bearing 191° T., distancs 15 milos.

0823 (K) Sightcd large rod buoy with conical scction mountod on round undr.body similar to scoplano runway markers. (Buoy 10 milos northwost of OLIM.R.O Id.)

— page 261 —
10 July (Cont'd)
0540 (K) (Cont'd)
I.goon. T'rocs on YOLEN Id. oppcar protty sorcgly from thc doanbins. Littlc cctivity wrs notod. The tolophonc linc connecting thc northorn isl-nds of thc otoll wrs not.d s rport.d by thc SALMON.

1325 (K) Commenced opn out to thc southw.r.d and componstcod Kngnctis comp.sscs.

1940 (K) Surf. cod. P.trollod coross PALAU-TRUK shipping routs.

11 July
1630 (K) Conductcd prctice firing of light wc.pons at flot.ting drum.

12 July
0430 (K) Sightcd EL.TO Id. bcrring 090° T., rngs 14 milos.

0522 (K) Submerg.d for rcconniss.ncc of EL.TO I.T.O.L will which ars bccn r.port.d t.s.c. scriplinc bscil. Gloss obscrvction disclosud no scriplinc facilities. Thc only activity notod was native fishcrnn.paddling outrigger canocs around in ths lagoon. ypnc'd out to northward.

1556 (K) Surf.aced. Patrolld acrosy Y.P and ULITHI to PUL.M.T shipping routs.

2142 (K) Stoppcd. Dctctcd salt water in rcduction gcar lubricating oil sump. Lying to while coolors and tank top warc tostd and lubricating oil was rcncwod.

13 July
0307 (K) Starbordr shaft in commission.

0413 (K) Proccading to lifeguard station on both shafts.

0739 (K) Sightcd OLIM.R.O Id. bearing 191° T., distancs 15 milos.

0823 (K) Sightcd large rod buoy with conical scction mountod on round undr.body similar to scoplano runway markers. (Buoy 10 milos northwost of OLIM.R.O Id.)

— page 262 —
13 July (Cont'd)
1330 (K) Rosumod surface patrol across YAP-PULUWAT route.
2235 (K) Sighted bluo flash on the horizon bearing 320° T.
Bcnt on spocd and invostigatod, but nothing contactod.

: 14 July
0711 (K) Sighted-lcargo barrel shaped mooring buoy.
(Lct. 8-10 N, Long. 144-31 E). Hold practico firing
with 50 cclibor and 20 mm. guns.
0744 (K) Rosumod petrol working to southward to petrol
PALIU-TRUK route.
1830 (K) Snk oil drum with 50 cclibor gun.
2242 (K) Sighted glow on horizon boring 150° T.
2250 (K) Sighted rod light on thc cbovo bocring, (Ship
cont.ot #2), which provod to bo a brilliantly lightod
and properly mcrkod hospitnl ship stocring cours
2730T., at 13.5 knots. We made the bost of tho situ-
etion and hod some good tr cking drill.

: 15 July
0040 (K) Lost rdr cr contact on hospital ship at 23,800 yards.
1807 (K) .nother oil drum shot up - we'ro suroly giving tho
flotscmc bcd timo cnwcy.

: 16 July
9708 (K) Sighted L.MOTHRK Id. bearing 2690 T., range 15 milos.
0722 (K) Submerged for reconnaissance of LAMOTHRK ATOLI.
1325 (K) Took pictures of lagoon side of LAMOTHRK Id. from
the north east. Nothing in the lagoon. No evidence of
seaplane facilities (at 3,000 yards). The tips of
three possible antenna poles were visible - also several
huts, a large building (probably trading post) and a
water tank. The top of the water tank, which is level
with the tree tops, may to be used as a lookout platform.
The absence of definite military objectives precluded
bombardment.

— page 262 —
13 July (Cont'd)
1330 (K) Rosumod surface patrol across YAP-PULUWAT route.
2235 (K) Sighted bluo flash on the horizon bearing 320° T.
Bcnt on spocd and invostigatod, but nothing contactod.

: 14 July
0711 (K) Sighted-lcargo barrel shaped mooring buoy.
(Lct. 8-10 N, Long. 144-31 E). Hold practico firing
with 50 cclibor and 20 mm. guns.
0744 (K) Rosumod petrol working to southward to petrol
PALIU-TRUK route.
1830 (K) Snk oil drum with 50 cclibor gun.
2242 (K) Sighted glow on horizon boring 150° T.
2250 (K) Sighted rod light on thc cbovo bocring, (Ship
cont.ot #2), which provod to bo a brilliantly lightod
and properly mcrkod hospitnl ship stocring cours
2730T., at 13.5 knots. We made the bost of tho situ-
etion and hod some good tr cking drill.

: 15 July
0040 (K) Lost rdr cr cont.ct on hospital ship at 23,800 yards.
1807 (K) .nother oil drum shot up - we'ro suroly giving tho
flotscmc bcd timo cnwcy.

: 16 July
9708 (K) Sighted L.MOTHRK Id. bearing 2690 T., range 15 milos.
0722 (K) Submerged for reconnaissance of LAMOTRK ATOLI.
1325 (K) Took pictures of lagoon side of LAMOTRK Id. from
the north east. Nothing in the lagoon. No evidence of
seaplane facilities (at 3,000 yards). The tips of
three possible antenna poles were visible - also several
huts, a large building (probably trading post) and a
water tank. The top of the water tank, which is level
with the tree tops, may to be used as a lookout platform.
The absence of definite military objectives precluded
bombardment.

— page 263 —
16 July (Cont'd)
1930 (K) Surfaced. Rosunacd surfaco patrol across TRUK-PALAU route.

17 July
0705 (K) Proceeded toward WOLAI on two engines for air strike.
1200 (K) Rosunacd surface patrol across southern part of TRUK-PALAU route.

18 July
0829 (K) Held 20 mm gun practice on oil drum.
1138 (K) Sighted "Lavis" type sea plane bracing 0700T, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #3). Submerged.
1214 (K) Surfaced. Acsumod patrol favoring direction of "Mavris" in esc at wcs escorting surface craft.

19 July
0607 (K) No. 1 MAIN GENERATOR out of commission(wiped bearing on commutator and).
1000 (K) On lifeguard station.
1045 (K) Sighted turbo "Libortors"; rcngos varied from 5-16 miles. Kado recognition signal, no reply, Libortors buzzed round briefly. (Aircraft contact #4). SD radar w.s. finally. coxed into giving a couple pips.
1110 (K) Sighted large unidentified two engine monoplane bearing 1200T, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #5.) This aircraft was in sight only a short time.
1240 (K) Held 50 caliber and submachine-gun practice on a large white conical buoy. (Lat. 6-55, Long. 143-34). Patrolling across the PALAU-TRUK route and the western approaches to WOLAI.
1800 (K) Sighted EARIPIK ID., bearing 1940T, range 15 miles.
2000 (K) Converting No. 3 F.B.T. to a ballast tank.
2212 (K) Sct course 280 at two engine spced to shift areas as ordcrd. Elected to pass south of SOROL ATOLL as this would bring us on the YLP air strike route sooner.

— page 263 —
16 July (Cont'd)
1930 (K) Surfaced. Rosunacd surfaco patrol across TRUK-PALAU route.

17 July
0705 (K) Proceeded toward WOLAI on two engines for air strike.
1200 (K) Rosunacd surface patrol across southern part of TRUK-PALAU route.

18 July
0829 (K) Held 20 mm gun practice on oil drum.
1138 (K) Sighted "Lavis" type sea plane bracing 0700T, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #3). Submerged.
1214 (K) Surfaced. Acsumod patrol favoring direction of "Mavris" in esc at wcs escorting surface craft.

19 July
0607 (K) No. 1 MAIN GENERATOR out of commission(wiped bearing on commutator and).
1000 (K) On lifeguard station.
1045 (K) Sighted turbo "Libortors"; rcngos varied from 5-16 miles. Kado recognition signal, no reply, Libortors buzzed round briefly. (Aircraft contact #4). SD radar w.s. finally. coxed into giving a couple pips.
1110 (K) Sighted large unidentified two engine monoplane bearing 1200T, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #5.) This aircraft was in sight only a short time.
1240 (K) Held 50 caliber and submachine-gun practice on a large white conical buoy. (Lat. 6-55, Long. 143-34). Patrolling across the PALAU-TRUK route and the western approaches to WOLAI.
1800 (K) Sighted EARIPIK ID., bearing 1940T, range 15 miles.
2000 (K) Converting No. 3 F.B.T. to a ballast tank.
2212 (K) Sct course 280 at two engine spced to shift areas as ordcrd. Elected to pass south of SOROL ATOLL as this would bring us on the YLP air strike route sooner.

— page 264 —
20 July
1040 (K) Sighted "Betty" type aircraft bearing 0900T, range 4 miles. Low clouds. (Aircraft contact #6). Not detected by radar. Submerged.

1124 (K) Surfaced.

1157 (K) Sighted two "Liberators" bearing 0700 T., range 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #7).

1236 (K) Sighted one "Liberator" bearing 1800T., 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #8).

1239 (K) Sighted one "Liberator" bearing 0070T., 19 miles. (Aircraft contact #9).

1252 (K) Sighted one "Liberator", bearing 0250T., 14 miles. (Aircraft contact #10).

1339 (K) Sighted 14 "Liberators" bearing 2430T., ranges 15-20 miles. (Aircraft contact #11.) SD radar obtained. Ranges of 16-20 miles on this group. Those planes were heading home from a strike on YAP.

21 July
Received word to keep clear of GUAVINA so continued to westward of YAP. It is considered that a coordinated search for this downed aviators would have been useful.

0719 (K) Transmitted PERMIT'S second to ComSubFec.

1255 (K) Number 1 Kc in Goncorotor back in commission. The engine room force did not exscllent job of honing down the journal and rofitting a spcrc.

1845 (K) Sighted "Petc" type pln. nc bcrring 3400T., rcnge 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #12.) Evidently scouting. Submerged.

1939 (K) Surf. cod. Pc.trolling across western approaches to YAP.

2035 (K) Discov.rd open circuit botwcen RAK radio recov.er cnd cntcnnc. lcd in. Repr.ird connection. This accounts for our inrability to int.rcrcpt GUAVINA'S transmission on 450 kcs.

— page 264 —
20 July
1040 (K) Sighted "Betty" type aircraft bearing 0900T, range 4 miles. Low clouds. (Aircraft contact #6). Not detected by radar. Submerged.

1124 (K) Surfaced.

1157 (K) Sighted two "Liberators" bearing 0700 T., range 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #7).

1236 (K) Sighted one "Liberator" bearing 1800T., 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #8).

1239 (K) Sighted one "Liberator" bearing 0070T., 19 miles. (Aircraft contact #9).

1252 (K) Sighted one "Liberator", bearing 0250T., 14 miles. (Aircraft contact #10).

1339 (K) Sighted 14 "Liberators" bearing 2430T., ranges 15-20 miles. (Aircraft contact #11.) SD radar obtained. Ranges of 16-20 miles on this group. Those planes were heading home from a strike on YAP.

21 July
Received word to keep clear of GUAVINA so continued to westward of YAP. It is considered that a coordinated search for this downed aviators would have been useful.

0719 (K) Transmitted PERMIT'S second to ComSubFec.

1255 (K) Number 1 Kc in Goncorot back in commission. The engine room force did not exscllent job of honing down the journal and rofitting a spcrc.

1845 (K) Sighted "Petc" type pln. nc bcrring 3400T., rcnge 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #12.) Evidently scouting. Submerged.

1939 (K) Surf. cod. Pc.trolling across western approaches to YAP.

2035 (K) Discov.rd open circuit between RAK radio receiver and cntcannc. lcd in. Repired connection. This accounts for our inbrility to intcrcpt GUAVINA's transmission on 450 kcs.

— page 265 —
22 July
1730 (K) Sighted 12 unidentified single engine monoplans flying in formation. (Aircraft contact #13) Rngc 12 milos, bcring 270°T. Subcargd. We wcro cppcrcntly undctoctd and watchod thom proccod on towards YAP.

1839 (K) Surfaced.

23 July
Continuing a surface patrol across southwestern approaches to YAP. This covers the PALAU-YAP route and is also close to the "Liberator" strike route to YAP.

0238 (K) Heard aircraft pass. close aboard, not sighted. (Aircraft contact #13.) SD radar not in use.

0250 (K) Observed an explosion on YAP bearing 073°T. Evidently our nocturnal visitor was an unscheduled strike on YAP.

0739 (K) "Sighted "Betty" type plane bearing 130°T., range 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #14.) Subcargd.

0759 (K) Surfaced.

1125 (K) Sighted YAP Id., bearing 034°T., range 25 milos on high periscope.

1127 (K) Sighted "Poto" typo flot plane bearing 135°T., rngc 3 milos in a light rain squall. (Aircraft contact #15.) Subcargd.

1147 (K) Surfaced. SD radar contact reported while at 40 ftct. (Aircraft contact #16.) Went back down only to lcern tht SD cont-ct ws at 30 milos. Thc SD rdcar performance is scist-factory for the first timo this prtrol. Continurl cduistmont hcs gotten it tund for opcrtion on 118 lgos.

1150 (K) Surfaced. SD rad-ct contact 25 milos. (Aircraft cont-ct #17.)

1150-52 (K) Numerous princly rad-ct contacts fr "ibrator" strike on YAP. Ne pl ncs sighted bccuso or rcducod visibility.

1156 (K) A group of explosions and gycsors of wctor bcoring 250°T., rngc about 7,000 yrdrs. Cno of our "libcrtors" cithr misscd thc trgct considcrably or also just jttlisoncd his lod- no oxtrr charge for this addcd attraction!

— page 265 —
22 July
1730 (K) Slighted 12 unidentified single engine monoplans flying in formation. (Aircraft contact #13) Rngc 12 milos, bcring 270°T. Subcargcd. We wcro cppcrcntly undctoctd and watchod thom proccod on towards YAP.

1839 (K) Surfaced.

23 July
Continuing a surface patrol across southwestern approaches to YAP. This covers the PALAU-YAP route and is also close to the "Liberator" strike route to YAP.

0238 (K) Heard aircraft pass. close aboard, not sighted. (Aircraft contact #13.) SD radar not in use.

0250 (K) Observed an explosion on YAP bearing 073°T. Evidently our nocturnal visitor was an unscheduled strike on YAP.

0739 (K) "Sighted "Betty" type plane bearing 130°T., range 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #14.) Subcargcd.

0759 (K) Surfaced.

1125 (K) Sighted YAP Id., bearing 034°T., range 25 milos on high periscopc.

1127 (K) Sighted "Pcto" typo flot plane bearing 135°T., rngc 3 milos in a light rain squall. (Aircraft contact #15.) Subcargcd.

1147 (K) Surfcccd. SD radar contact rcportcd while at 40 fcot. (Aircraft contact #16.) Went back down only to locrn tht SD cont-ct wcs at 30 milos. Thc SD rdcar performance is sctisfactory for the first timo this prtrol. Continurl cduistmont hcs gotten it tund for opcrtion on 118 lgos.

1150 (K) Surfcccd. SD rad-rc contact 25 milos. (Aircraft cont-ct #17.)

1150-52 (K) Numerous ironically rad-rc contacts frc "ibrator" strike on YAP. Ne pl ncs sighted bccuso or rcducod visibility.

1156 (K) A group of explosions and gycsors of wctor bcoring 250°T., rngc about 7,000 yards. Cno of our "libcrtors" cithr misscd thc trgct considcrably or also just jttlisoncd his lod- no oxtrr charge for this addcd attraction!

— page 266 —
0649 (K) Sighted what appeared to be a submarine on the surface bearing 220°T., range.7 miles. (Ship contact #3.) Visibility was spotty because of scattered rain squalls. Then two masts were sighted to the left of the "submarine". SJ radar was out of commission to replace a tube.

: 0650 (K) Turned away on course 040°T., on three engines. The original contact was first identified as a friendly submarine so we turned away to see what it was doing with relation to the masts sighted. With improved visibility the "submarine" turned into a Jap escort vessel similar to our SC class with zero angle on the bow, range steady at 6 miles. The sea was too rough for gun flight so at

: 0700 (K) Submerged and changed course to the northwest at 2/3 speed to open out on the escort's track and cut off the other vessel in case it had its course.

: 0726 (K) Rigged for depth ch reg as the escort started searching our vicinity. Evaded at periscope depth.

: 0737 (K) Two depth charges, comfortably distant, about 1,500 yards. Escort then headed to southwest. No tagged along on the assumption he would return to his charge.

: 0911 (K) Surf. cod. Picked up escort and masts and proceeded on four engines to get between target and YAP.

: 0930 (K) Sighted YAP Ia., bearing 040°T., 22 miles. Closed to within 15 miles of YAP, but considered we would not be sighted because of poor visibility.

: 1032 (K) Sighted target bearing 166°T.

: 1035 (K) Submerged. Commenced approach.

: 1130 (K) Went to battle stations. Target identified as a single well coastal froghopper of about 800 tons similar in appearance to KINATO NARU in the miscellaneous section of ONI 208-J (Revisod). It was a modern looking little engine aft motor ship.

— page 266 —
0649 (K) Sighted what appeared to be a submarine on the surface bearing 220°T., range.7 miles. (Ship contact #3.) Visibility was spotty because of scattered rain squalls. Then two masts were sighted to the left of the "submarine". SJ radar was out of commission to replace a tube.

: 0650 (K) Turned away on course 040°T., on three engines. The original contact was first identified as a friendly submarine so we turned away to see what it was doing with relation to the masts sighted. With improved visibility the "submarine" turned into a Jap escort vessel similar to our SC class with zero angle on the bow, range steady at 6 miles. The sea was too rough for gun flight so at

: 0700 (K) Submerged and changed course to the northwest at 2/3 speed to open out on the escort's track and cut off the other vessel in case it had its course.

: 0726 (K) Rigged for depth ch reg as the escort started searching our vicinity. Evaded at periscope depth.

: 0737 (K) Two depth charges, comfortably distant, about 1,500 yards. Escort then headed to southwest. No tagged along on the assumption he would return to his charge.

: 0911 (K) Surf. cod. Picked up escort and masts and proceeded on four engines to get between target and YAP.

: 0930 (K) Sighted YAP Ia., bearing 040°T., 22 miles. Closed to within 15 miles of YAP, but considered we would not be sighted because of poor visibility.

: 1032 (K) Sighted target bearing 166°T.

: 1035 (K) Submerged. Commenced approach.

: 1130 (K) Went to battle stations. Target identified as a single well coastal froghopper of about 800 tons similar in appearance to KINATO NARU in the miscellaneous section of ONI 208-J (Revisod). It was a modern looking little engine aft motor ship.

— page 267 —
24 July (Cont'd)
1150 (K) Escort answer with lookouts passed about 150 yards abeam. We intended to fire Mark 18 torpedoes at 4 foot depth setting. The condition 3 sea made the use of Mark 18's almost mandatory.

1200 (K) With the practitist set up imaginable, torpedo run 600 yards; a contactor fused in the after gyro regulator and the gyro zero recorder commenced spinning madly. Consorted. The after room couldn't get the gyros back soon enough, so decided to use three bow tubos (Mark 23's) set at 5, 4, and 5 foot depth.

1205 (K) Target processed clps cboard. The forward gyro regulator was capable of "indicating" only so decided not to trust this fancy stuff and shifted to the I. rk VIII angle solver, gyros set on zero.

1215 (K) Fired three bow tubes. Target had been alerted and was searching the escort and fish tilling. Fired first torpedo for 165 starboard track, second for 180 track, and when these had him bracketed, fired third torpedo at his stern shots for 170 track. The first two torpedoes ran well; the one with the 4 foot setting sent up a small plume of spray only once and then settled down. The third torpedo had a good bead on the target which we ducked. While trying to get back to porisopos depth, one torpedo exploded and about 30 seconds later, sound reported light screws coming in fast. Decided we were at an unhealthy depth, so went deep and rigged for depth charges and silent running.

The estimated torpedo run of 2500 yards shock well with the 1 minute 54 seconds time of explosion. Sound did not hear the heavier screws again.

1218-55 (K) The escort rationed out seven more depth charges only two. If which were at 20 yards and deep. We evaded by running at 80 turns at 200 foot, keeping the escort abaft the beam and making good a course into the sea and away from YAP.

1340 (K) The gaged 1.1k all around from 30 feet depth, nothing in sight.

1400 (K) Surface to open out on YAP.

1446 (K) Submerged fr c.related. Bent a gyro spindle in relocating; had to renew it.

1824 (K) Surfaceed. Pr.ceeded to westward of YAP inside of 60 mile circle.

— page 267 —
24 July (Cont'd)
1150 (K) Escort answer with lookouts passed about 150 yards abeam. We intended to fire Mark 18 torpedoes at 4 foot depth setting. The condition 3 sea made the use of Mark 18's almost mandatory.

1200 (K) With the practitist set up imaginable, torpedo run 600 yards; a contactor fused in the after gyro regulator and the gyro zero recorder commenced spinning madly. Consorted. The after room couldn't get the gyros back soon enough, so decided to use three bow tubos (Mark 23's) set at 5, 4, and 5 foot depth.

1205 (K) Target processed clps cboard. The forward gyro regulator was capable of "indicating" only so decided not to trust this fancy stuff and shifted to the I. rk VIII angle solver, gyros set on zero.

1215 (K) Fired three bow tubes. Target had been alerted and was searching the escort and fish tilling. Fired first torpedo for 165 starboard track, second for 180 track, and when these had him bracketed, fired third torpedo at his stern shots for 170 track. The first two torpedoes ran well; the one with the 4 foot setting sent up a small plume of spray only once and then settled down. The third torpedo had a good bead on the target which we ducked. While trying to get back to porisopos depth, one torpedo exploded and about 30 seconds later, sound reported light screws coming in fast. Decided we were at an unhealthy depth, so went deep and rigged for depth charges and silent running.

The estimated torpedo run of 2500 yards shock well with the 1 minute 54 seconds time of explosion. Sound did not hear the heavier screws again.

1218-55 (K) The escort rationed out seven more depth charges only two. If which were at 20 yards and deep. We evaded by running at 80 turns at 200 foot, keeping the escort abaft the beam and making good a course into the sea and away from YAP.

1340 (K) The gaged 1.1k all around from 30 feet depth, nothing in sight.

1400 (K) Surface to open out on YAP.

1446 (K) Submerged fr c. related. Bent a gyro spindle in relocating; had to renew it.

1824 (K) Surfaceed. Pr. seeded t. westward of YAP inside of 60 mile circle.

— page 268 —
26 July

Proceeding to life guard station west of YAP for carrier strike.

0452 (K) Sighted the first of four bright parachute flares near YAP, bearing 0900*, 15 miles.

0544 (K) Sighted YAP Id., bearing 0950, 18 miles. Closed to assigned position at dawn, nobody else here and no word on time of strike. Diving not advisable because of loss of communication, so decided to open out until there is evidence of a strike.

0711 (K) Number 4 main engine out of commission. (Wiped crank bearing on number 9 unit.)

0720 (K) Sighted large flight of aircraft over YAP. Simultaneous SD reader contact at 7 miles. (Aircraft contact #18.) Headed toward YAP.

0721 (K) Explosions started on YAP.

0722 (K) Numerous friendly pips on the SD radar.

0859 (K) Two "Hellas" checked in as our escorts. Communications via VHF radio very satisfactory.

1018 (K) Second wave hit YAP.

1100 (K) "Librators" came over for photographs.

1219 (K) Third attack.

1403 (K) Fourth attack.

1432 (K) Went ahead on three min engines to rescue crew of downed TBF. Reported position just outside of reef on the opposite side of the island. Aviators are reported to be pedaling 80-90 out to sea.

1504 (K) Shore battery (evidently A.A. shells) landed a couple shells about 3,000 yards short. So we took the hint and set.rtod skirting the island at 5 miles. Our escort radioed that there is nothing left to bother us, we can go right in to the beach - received this with mental rosy-tions. Asked escorts to strafe any b.t.torios that intrude with the rescue.

: 1615 (K) Life r ft in sight, bout 2 miles from the entrance to TONTL HARBOR and-1 miles from the roof. Two "Kingfisher" planes chocked in but we're told by our escort not to land - so they procoeded to land near the raft!

- 12 -

— page 268 —
26 July

Proceeding to life guard station west of YAP for carrier strike.

0452 (K) Sighted the first of four bright parachute flares near YAP, bearing 0900*, 15 miles.

0544 (K) Sighted YAP Id., bearing 0950, 18 miles. Closed to assigned position at dawn, nobody else here and no word on time of strike. Diving not advisable because of loss of communication, so decided to open out until there is evidence of a strike.

0711 (K) Number 4 main engine out of commission. (Wiped crank bearing on number 9 unit.)

0720 (K) Sighted large flight of aircraft over YAP. Simultaneous SD reader contact at 7 miles. (Aircraft contact #18.) Headed toward YAP.

0721 (K) Explosions started on YAP.

0722 (K) Numerous friendly pips on the SD radar.

0859 (K) Two "Hellas" checked in as our escorts. Communications via VHF radio very satisfactory.

1018 (K) Second wave hit YAP.

1100 (K) "Librators" came over for photographs.

1219 (K) Third attack.

1403 (K) Fourth attack.

1432 (K) Went ahead on three min engines to rescue crew of downed TBF. Reported position just outside of reef on the opposite side of the island. Aviators are reported to be pedaling 80-90 out to sea.

1504 (K) Shore battery (evidently A.A. shells) landed a couple shells about 3,000 yards short. So we took the hint and set.rtod skirting the island at 5 miles. Our escort radioed that there is nothing left to bother us, we can go right in to the beach - received this with mental rosy-tions. Asked escorts to strafe any b.t.torios that intrude with the rescue.

: 1615 (K) Life r ft in sight, bout 2 miles from the entrance to TONTL HARBOR and-1j miles from the roof. Two "Kingfisher" planes chocked in but we're told by our escort not to land - so they procoeded to land near the raft!

- 12 -

— page 269 —
26 July (Cont'd)
1618 (K) Shore batteries opened fire (estimate it was about 4-inch A.A. fire). Pit shells landed between raft and us, getting closer. We rigged a heaving line on No. 2 periscope and to the true of one shell short 150 yards and one shell alongside at
1621 (K) Submerged .bout 1,500 yards short of raft and proceeded at 45 feet to tow the raft out to sea if necessary. The shore batteries ceased firing.
1630 (K) One "Kingfisher" took off from alongside the raft. Raft is now empty. Reversed course.
1637 (K) Second "Kingfisher" took off. These pilots made an excellent rescue in the face of close shelling by shore batteries.
    It is considered that there was too much wasted talent with both submarine and sea planes plunging in. The aviator directing the rescue should have definite control to insure better coordination.
1647 (K) Surfaced and cleared the vicinity on three engines. No aircraft in sight.
1720 (K) Sighted TBF and Hollcat, bearing 0200T., range 12 miles. Those planes reported no remaining downed aviators. (Aircraft contact #-7.)
2125 (K) Explosions on YAP.

27 July
0450 (K) SJ radar contact on YAP bearing 0900T., 21 miles. Teking life guard station.
0715 (K) Sighted squadron of friendly carrier planes heading for YAP bearing 0700T., 15 miles(Aircraft contact #20). Numerous "Hollidivors", "Hollcats", and TBF's in sight and on radar. We had an escort of two "Hollcats" during the strike.
0805 (K) Sighted plane crash off GORROR POINT. Hocked towards seaco on three engines. Pilot cppcors hurt and is down inside of rccf. The water cppcors too shallow for a "Kingfisher", so broke out rubber boat and made preparations to send a rescue party covered by our gun battery and our straing planes.

— page 270 —
27 July (cont'd)
0908 (K) Stopped to pick up empty life raft - evidently one dropped yesterday.
0916 (K) "Kingfisher" plane (Alircraft contact #21) made a successful landing inside the lagoon. An A.A. gun fired about three shells over the lagoon before our planes silenced it. The "Kingfisher" took off with the downed pilot. We returned to our station.
1119 (K) Sighted the masts of two destroyers bearing 1720T., range 18 miles (Ship contact #4). These two destroyers, USS BOYD and USS BRADFORD, stood by during the remainder of the strike in order to take over any aviators we might rescue.
1500 (K) Our destroyer friends shoved off, the show is over. Proceeded to open out to the westward of YAP.
1630 (K) Stopped to pick up another carrier plane type rubber raft.
1740 (K) Held 20 mm and 50 caliber practice and 4" pointer drill on a large square steel tank.

28 July
0315 (K) Sighted a red glare on the horizon bearing 140T. Changed course to investigate.
0355 - 0410 (K) Occasional radar interference on various bearings - assumed to be friendly planes working over YAP.
0425 (K) Sighted a large fire on eastern part of YAP.
0712 (K) Lost sight of YAP. Decided on a surface patrol in northwest sector of our circular area in order to maintain a radio guard for possible additional strikes.
2145 (K) SJ radar contact on YAP, bearing 190T., range 21 miles.

29 July
0609 (K) Dived for submerged patrol off TONIL HARBOR - the Nips might try to slip something in.
2029 (K) Surfaced.
2350 (K) Chased a phantom light for a while.

— page 271 —
30 July
Surface patrol across the northwest approaches to YAP.

31 July
Air strike scheduled on WOLFAI and we are the only sub near, so proceeded to southwest corner of area in order to reduce run by twelve hours if any planes are forced down.

1102 (K) While surfacing from a trim dive, had friendly S.D. radar contact at 3 miles opening out. (Aircraft contact #22). Plane not sighted in heavy overcast.

2051 (K) Sighted possible red light bearing 290°T. Proceeded to investigate.

2105 (K) SJ radar contact (two nice pips) that disgustingly deconcreted into a resin. squall on course 355, speed 9½.

No. 4 main engine was tested and placed in an "emergency use only" status as an 11 cylinder V type engine.

1 August
1754 (K) Sighted SOROL Id., bracing 310°T., 18 miles.

1905 (K) Departed area for SEADLER. With only three main engines available for cruising, cannot make it in 2½ days, so settle down to two engines. Where possible, shifted personnel on watches for training. Holding numerous training dives, drills and schools daily.

3 August
0500 (K) Shifted to operational control of Commander Task Force.72, task unit designation 72.1.12.

1205 (K) Sighted "Ventura" bearing 005°T., 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #23). "Ventura" went into a cloud bank and at

1206 (K) "Ventura" came out of clouds with zero angle on the bow so submerged to 120 feet. SD contact (friendly) closed from 10 to 9 miles as we went under. Some day maybe we will most a "Ventura" that won't be that way. And us in the safety (?) lane too.

1253 (K) Surfaced. Bridge gyro repactor glass found cracked; removed repactor to prevent further flooding. The last time a "Ventura" bombed us, this repactor was smashed - guess the strain was too much this time.

- 15 -

— page 272 —
2000 (K) Crossed the equator with appropriate ceremonies and resounding thwacks from below.

5 August
0540 (K) Sighted SC 747 bearing 2200T., range 6 miles. (Ship contact #5.) Set course for SEADLER EARBOR, escorted by SC 747.

: 0643 (K) Sighted 2 "Liberators" bearing 180T., 15 miles. (Liberator contact #24.) During the rest of the day, verious "Liberators", "Coronados", "SED's", "Lightenings", "Venturas", etc., were sighted.

0744 (K) Sighted LOS RYAS Ids., bearing 1690T., range 20 miles.

1135 (K) Entered SEADLER EARBOR, PANUS Id.

1200 (K) Lowered alongside U.S.S. BURYALIE. Received enought fuel end lubricating oil for the trip to BRISBANE. Received Consubrban 18 Operation Order, serial 0030, with routing instructions.

1507 (K) Underway for BRISBUE, AUSTRALIA, escorted by NSS 42.

1755 (K) Late trip dive and promptly surfaced to secure leaky airer battery netch.

1758 (K) Resumed trim dive.

1810 (K) Surface. Proceeding on 3 engines along assigned routing.

6 August
0722 (K) SD radar contact 6 miles (Aircraft contact #25). Friendly, not sighted.

: 0732 (K) Sighted TOIOTTA Ia., bearing 1670T.

0948 (K) Sighted mast bearing 132.5T. Exchanged cells with E.I.A.S. BOHUCA(A.S 1252) our escort through VITTAZ STRAIT. (Ship contact #6.)

1116 (K) Sighted friendly Air bearing 0280T., 12 miles. (Ship contact #7.)

1305 (K) SD radar contact, friendly at 5 miles, a transport plane. (Aircraft contact #26.)

— page 273 —
6 August (Cont'd)
1311 (K) Signed two friendly AKS ("Liberties") bearing 1560T, hull down. (Ship contact #8.) Passing through VITIAZ STRAIT numerous friendly aircraft contacts were made.
1430 (K) Sighted friendly AK bearing 1260T., 12 miles. (Ship contact #9.)
1433 (K) Sighted friendly PC and two LCI's, bearing 1550T., 10 miles. (Ship contact #10.)
1545 (K) Sighted friendly PC, bearing 1080T., 8 miles. (Ship contact #11.)
1630 (K) Sighted what appeared to be a friendly CV, bearing 168T, radar range 17,500 yers. (Ship contact #12.)
1553 (K) Released escort, 18-3. SCHUCA.
2242 (K) SC radar contact, bearing 1850T., 18,700 yards. Avoided. (Ship contact #13.)
2345 (K) SC radar contact, bearing 1080T., 12,000 yards. Avoided this eleven ship convoy. (Ship contact #14.)

7 August
0130 (K) Radar interference bearing 1570T. This was assumed to be U.S.S. FLYING

— page 274 —
8 August (Cont'd)
0625 (K) Sighted large friendly AK ("victory" type). Bearing 125°T, 11 miles. Put him abeam to open out on his track. He finally sighted us at 10,500 yards and turned away. Attempted to exchange visual recognition signals, but it was too rough and hazy. (Ship contact #16.)

0725 (K) SJ radar contact on our friend the AK bearing 207°, 11 miles. Not sighted.

0944 (K) Sighted masts of an AK hull down, bearing 231°T. Avoided (Ship contact #17).

2053 (K) SJ radar contact on ROSSEL Id., bearing 232°T., 27½ miles.

The seas have been increasing all day until rpm's for 14 knots is only giving 10 knots made good.

9 August
0600 (K) Took a slug of water down the engine induction. Seas rougher than ever. Slowed to 2 engines. Making good 8 knots.

1449 (K) Seas moderated sufficiently to proceed on 3 engines at 11.5 knots.

1532 (K) No. 1 main engine out of commission because of wiped crank bearing. Slowed to 2 engines.

1817 (K) No. 3 main engine out of commission for bearing inspection. While circulating oil through No. 4 preparatory to starting, the after engine lubricating oil pump was inadvertently pumped to the forward sump. We are now surging forward on No. 2 main engine only. No. 4 engine (11 cylinders) operates satisfactorily on charge.

10 August
0015 (K) No. 3 main engine in commission. Proceeding on two engines.

0140 (K) Sent PEATIT's second to ComTaskFor 72.

0830 (K) No. 1 main engine in commission minus one unit.

— page 275 —
11 August
1401 (K) Submerged. Commenced six hour battery discharge.
1730 (K) Surfaced.
1830 (K) One cell hit low voltage limit. Very poor capacity. Cut to 8 and later 10 hour rates.
1842 (K) Proceeding on the engines.

: 12 August
1414 (K) Submerge for emergency drills.
1504 (K) Surfaced.
2325 (K) Sighted the 100m of TITBLE ISLAND Pt. light bearing 2670T., range 40 miles.

: 13 August
0430 (K) CALOUNDRAHEAD LIGHT bearing 2260T.
0710 (K) Pilot Bechisnle.
1130 (K) Moored at NEW FARF WHAF, BRISBANE.

— page 278 —
7/4/44 : 7/7/44 : 7/18/44 : 7/20/44 : 7/20/44
Date : 1000 K : 0851 K : 1138 K : 1045-3 : 1110-1
Time (Zone) : 4-58N : 7N : 5-43N : 6-55N : 6-55N
Position: Lat. : 152-13.5E : 144-19E : 144-56E : 143-48E : 143-48E
Speed : 13.5 kt : 10 kts. : 10 kts. : 10 kts. : 10 kts.
Course : 000 : 280 : 180 : 271 : 271
Trim : Surf : Surf : Surf : Surf : Surf
Minutes Since Last: : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0
SD Radar Search : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0
Number : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1
Type : Dave, : Unid. : Libera: 2 engine
Pete : Mavis : Mavis : tors, monoplane.
Probable Mission : Pat. : Pat. : Pat. : Strike'WOLFAI
How Contacted : Sight : Sight : #1 Per. : Sight : Sight
Initial Range : 6 mi. : 10 mi. : 10 mi. : 10 mi. : 11 mi.
Elevation Angle : 1° : 8° : 11° : 8° : 8°
Range & Relative : : : : : : :
Bearing of Plane : : : : : : :
When It Detected : : : : : : :
S/M : ? : ? : ? : ? : ?

(State (Beau- : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1
Sea: (fort) : : : : : :
(Direction(Rel) : : : : : :
Visibility (Miles) : 30 : 30 : 30 : 30 : 30
(Height in : : : : : : :
Clouds: Ft. : 1000 : 800 : 1200 : 1200 : 1200
(Percent : : : : : : :
Overcast : : : : : : .4 : .6 : .6
(Bearing(Rel) : Day : Day : Day : Day : Day
Moon: (Angle : : : : : : :
(Percent : : : : : : :
Illum. : : : : : : :

Type of S/M Camouflage on this patrol DARK GREY.

— page 279 —
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
7/20/44 7/20/44 7/20/44 7/20/44 7/20/44 7/20/44 7/21/44
1040 K : 1157 k : 1236 K : 1239 K : 1252 K : 1339 K : 1845 K
7-3N : 7-4N : 7-4N : 7-4N : 7-4N : 7-4N : 7-4N : 10-7N
140-48E : 140-30E : 140-30E : 140-30E : 140-30E : 140-30E : 137-22E
12 kts. : 12 kts. : 12 kts. : 12 kts. : 12 kts. : 12 kts. : 10 kts.
300 : 070 : 070 : 070 : 070 : 070 : 070
Surf. : Surf. : Surf. : Surf. : Surf. : Surf. : Surf.
0 : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0 : 9
1 : 2 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 14 : 1
Betsy : Liberators : Liberator : Liberator : Liberator : Liberator : Pete
Pet : Strike : Strike : Strike : Strike : Strike : Pet.
Sight : at YAP : at YAP : at YAP : at YAP : at YAP : at YAP
Sight : Sight : Sight : Sight : Sight : Sight : Sight
4 mi. : 10 mi. : 10 mi. : 10 mi. : 10 mi. : 10 mi. : 10 mi.
40 : 40 : 40 : 40 : 40 : 40 : 40
1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1
. 075 : 070 : 070 : 070 : 070 : 070 : 070
30 : 30 : 30 : 30 : 30 : 30 : 30
1200 : 1000 : 1000 : 1000 : 1000 : 1000 : 1000
.6 : .6 : .8 : .8 : .8 : .8 : .8
Day : Day : Day : Day : Day : Day : Day
:

— page 280 —
13 14 15 16 17 18 19
7/22/44 7/23/44 7/23/44 7/23/44 7/23/44 7/26/44 7/26/44
1730 K 0739 K 1127-K 1147 K 1200 K All day 1724 K
9-27N 9-11N 8-55N 8-54N 8-53N West of 9-15N YAP
137-44E 137-40E 137-53.5 137-55E 137-56E 138-10E
10 kts. 10 kts. 10 kts. 10 kts. 10 kts. 10 kts. 10 kts.
130 - 120 - 120 - 120 - 120 - 170
Surf. Surf. Surf. Surf. Surf. Surf. Surf.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fighters: Betty Pete Unk. B-24 B-24, SB20, Hellidivers
Pat. Pat. Unk. YAP on YAP
Sight Sight Sight SD SD SD Light & Radar
12 mi. 12 mi. 3 mi. 30 mi. 11 mi.
10 20
2 2 2 2 1 1
30 30 30 30 30 30
800' 600' 700' 7000 1500 1500
1.0 .9 1.0 1.0 .1 .1
day day day day day day day
-24-