U.S.S. THRESHER (SS-200) — war patrol report SS-200_THRESHER.pdf

— page 1 —
1.0
: 1.1
: 1.25
: 1.4
: 1.6

: 2.5
: 2.8
: 2.2
: 2.0
: 1.8
: 1.6
: 1.4
: 1.2
: 1.0

: 2.5
: 2.8
: 2.2

— page 4 —
15-16 October 1942
CROSS INDEX CARD

THRESHER

Laid field of 32 mines an Gulf of Siam during FIFTH WAR PATROL.

Separately under SUBS, SOMESPAC: ser 000167 of 29 Dec 42

: 25-20 December 1942
FROM CO - USS THRESHER(SS-200)
SERIAL 002
DATE 10 January 1943
SUBJECT SUBMARINE ACTION REPORTS, Forwarding of

Forwards two torpedo firing reports for SIXTH WAR PATROL.
Claims two freighters and one transport sunk, in JAVA
Sea area.
(SOMESPAC: SUB OPS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately as ORIGINAL

MICROGRIDIAL NO. ACTION REPORT 000167 from 30-12-13 (11-35)

— page 5 —
14 Feb-2 March 1943 NAME THRESHER
DATE THRESHER (SS-200)
SERIAL DATE
SUBMARINE ACTION
5 torpedo-turning reports for SEVENTH WAR PATROL. Claims three tankers and one transport sunk in JAVA Sea area.

(SOWESPAC: SUB OPS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately as ORIGINAL

| MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT | DATE | NAME | THRESHER | SERIAL | DATE | SUBJECT | SPECIAL MISSION |
|||------|------|

Report (to CTG 71.1) of abortive attempt to evacuate a party from Ceram Island on EIGHTH WAR PATROL. No contact made with party.
(SOWESPAC: SUB OPS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately as CARBON COPY

| MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT | DATE | NAME | THRESHER | SERIAL | DATE | SUBJECT | SPECIAL MISSION |
|||------|------|

Report (to SUBPAC) of contact with Allied Intelligence party on Negros Island in the Philippines during NINTH WAR PATROL. Personnel and supplies provided and intellig- gence material picked up. (SOWESPAC: SUB OPS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately as ORIGINAL; as CARBON COPY

| MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT | DATE | NAME | THRESHER | SERIAL | DATE | SUBJECT | SPECIAL MISSION |
|||------|------|

— page 7 —
16 March-18 April 1945 NAME THRESHER
FROM CROSS INDEX CARD SERIAL DATE

Coordinated Attack Group under Cdr.C.L.Bennett
(DENNETT'S BLAZERS II) in SOUTH CHINA SEA.

PILED: War Diary
Separately under TASK GROUP 17.14 no ser of 24 Apr 45

MICROSERIAL NO. ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3840-13 (10-55)

— page 8 —
352007E-3
Serial C-142
DESCENDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division SLETY-ONE.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron SIX.

Subject: Attack on THRESHER (SS200) by U. S. Patrol Plane on February 24, 1942.

1. Enroute Pearl Harbor on February 24, 1942.
   this vessel was attacked by a U. S. Patrol Plane. The events of the day were as follows:

   At 0906 (plus 11) the sound operator picked up
   ahead suspicious noises sounding like a supersonic
   ranging device in automatic fast ranging. An
   enemy submarine had been previously reported to
   THRESHER in this general vicinity. Prior to the
   assumed contact the THRESHER had been zig zagging
   on base course of 088T. At the time of the contact
   the Officer-of-the-Beck immediately changed course
   to 2100T to clear the area. At 0926 (plus 11)
   course was changed to 180T and at 0931 a PBY plane
   was sighted on the port beam on a Westerly course.
   As the plane was sighted at a great distance the
   Commanding Officer believing he had not been sighted
   ordered a dive. At 0951 (plus 11) surfaced and con-
   tinued to run on southeasterly course working around
   point of contact. At 1130 (plus 11) again changed
   changed course to 180T suspecting another contact.
   At 1135 (plus 11) sighted a PBY plane due north on
   an easterly course, and as soon as plane was sighted
   it turned towards THRESHER. Visibility in the general
   direction was not good and the plane was believed
   close, so a dive was ordered to 100 feet. There did
   not seem time enough to fire a recognition signal as
   any mistake would have placed THRESHER in a bad pos-
   ition. At 1140 (plus 11) three explosions were heard,
   none close enough to shake the vessel. At this time
   our position was 532 miles, 266T., from Barbers
   Point. At 1215 (plus 11) surfaced and continued
   towards Pearl Harbor on base course. At 1250 (plus 11)

— page 9 —
SS200/16-3
Serial C-142
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: Attack on THRESHER by U. S. Patrol
Plane on February 24, 1942.

sighted a PBY plane to the south and dove again. At 1330 (plus 11) surfaced and continued towards Pearl Harbor without incident. The attack was reported to the Commander-in-Chief and the Commander Submarines, Pacific, as a second means of establishing our identity and position over the regular information concerning U. S. Forces in the vicinity of OAHU.

W. L. ANDERSON
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
C.O. THRESHER Serial
C-142 of 2-27-42.
From: The Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-ONE.
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIX.

1. Forwarded.

SECOND INDORSEMENT to
C.O. THRESHER Serial
C-142 of 2-27-42.
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIX.
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

1. Forwarded.

A. R. McCANN.

— page 10 —
0228
Serial 0228
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
THRESHER Conf. 1st SS200/
A16-3 Serial C-142 of
February 27, 1942.

From: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Attack on THRESHER (SS200) by U.S. Patrol Plane
on February 24, 1942.

1. Forwarded.

Copy to:
Comptwin 2 (Complete)

— page 11 —
4th Endorsement
on CO THRUST SS200/
AL-3 Serial G-142 of
27 February 1942.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

Subject: Attack on THRUST (SS200) by U. S. Patrol Plane
on February 24, 1942.

1. Forwarded.

2. With return of papers please furnish a statement
from the pilot concerned in this case in order that the
entire matter may be reviewed.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

— page 12 —
6 MAR 1942
PATROL WING TWO
P.W.2/AL6-3/ 0230
SUBJECT: ATTACK ON THRESHER (SS200) by U.S. Patrol Plane on February 24, 1942.

Reference: (a) CPW-2 2nd end. AL6-3/0224 or March 2, 1942.

1. RETURNED.

2. The statement requested in the fourth endorsement hereof was forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet by reference (a).

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

— page 14 —
3. Attacks made.

1523, July 6. In latitude 08°35'-30" north, longitude 170°57' east, in daylight submerged attack, fired spread of two torpedoes at a 5,000 ton tanker under escort of two patrol craft. Observed one torpedo hit near stern; dense clouds of smoke, and heard an alert explosion. Enemy patrol craft, and patrol by aircraft counterattacked with depth charges. One hit.

0840, July 9. In latitude 8°43'-00 north, longitude 167°33'-00 east, in daylight submerged attack, fired spread of two torpedoes at passenger freighter similar to 5000 ton. Observed two hits followed by internal explosion. Submarine subjected to severe depth charge attack. Two hits.

1023, July 20. In latitude 07°00 north, longitude 151°41' east, in daylight submerged attack, fired spread of three torpedoes at 5,000 ton freighter. Torpedoes may not have armed due to insufficient range. No hits.

1452, August 4. In latitude 03°45' south, longitude 128°02 east in daylight submerged attack, fired a spread of two torpedoes at a 3,000 ton passenger freighter similar to 5000 ton. Ship delivered depth charge attack against submarine - and may have been a -ship. No hits.

— page 15 —
1. U.S. SARGOS (SS188) Flagship
: U.S.S. SPARTAN - June 26, 1942 - August 17, 1942

1. SPARTAN was directed to locate and destroy enemy combatants, supply and transport shipping in the SOUTH CHINA SEA, route to and from station was via LORETO and LACONA SHUTTLE, CIRUNA PASSAGE, and south of BAGNOLO GROUND.

2. Navy ships sighted.

0042, July 2. In latitude 70-54' south, longitude 116-06' east three submarine chasers on southerly course apparently engaged in search. One hour and a half later sighted single vessel of similar type and at 0315 the same vessel or similar vessel. No attack made.

0004, July 5. In latitude 00-50' south, longitude 116-56' east at distance of about 6 miles, a passenger type ship on southerly course at speed of about 15 knots. Unable to close range or to identify ship.

0004, July 6. In latitude 00-05' north, longitude 116-36' east outline of small destroyer or patrol ship on course about 1500 true. No attack made.

1455, July 8. In latitude 00-26' north, longitude 116-42' east a small patrol ship about 500 tons, and 175-200 feet in length on northerly course. Lost sight of this vessel in red star area and at 1730 sighted the same or similar ship, at range of 5000 yards. Ship had one gun mount forward and tripod mast. No attack made.

1812, July 26. In latitude 11-33' north, longitude 109-34' east, at distance of 9 miles, a 5300 ton freighter, identical with Arima and, on southwesterly course. Made attack.

2015, July 27. In latitude 11-41' north, longitude 111-05' east, at range of 8000 yards, a 12000 ton passenger-cargo ship, similar to Arima and in red star area, zigzagging on southerly courses. Proceeded on surface to position when and made attack.

— page 16 —
115
R.S. No. 7-01615
SS200/A16-3
TERRASHER

DIGITAL 0195

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Action Reports, forwarding of.

Enclosure: (A) Four (4) "U.S. Submarine Action Report".

1. Four "U.S. Submarine Action Reports" covering the Fourth War Patrol of this vessel are enclosed herewith.

Z. Miller
U.S. Submarine Force
[signature]

[Date] 10 06

— page 17 —
1525 (-11 ZT)    Location: Latitude 08-36-00N
    Longitude 171-00-00E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) ATTACK FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT - IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Fair, occasional brief showers.
SEA CONDITIONS: Sea Force 2 from Northwest.
SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable): Excellent. Listening up to 6,000 yds.
TYPE OF OPERATIONS: Offensive attack on all enemy shipping during War Patrol.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Conduct of unrestricted submarine warfare.

FORCES ENGAGED: OWN
- (Name and Type) ENEMY Tanker 5000 tons, various small patrol craft and aircraft (not seen though attacked by same).
TYPE OF ATTACK (Own Enemy): scratch one) Submerged Daylight Approach at periscope using periscope and TDC.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION: ATTACKED TANKER enterin channel to HALCYAP ATOLL. Tired 2 stern shots. First torpedo track not seen. Second hit aft.

WEAPONS EMPLOYED:
Own: TORPEDOES (TWO)
Enemy: DEEP CHARGES
AMMUNITION EXPENDED: 2 Torpedoes

EVASIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED:
Own: SILENT WATCH; DEEP STORMING
Enemy: TORPEDOING.

— page 18 —
1100 feet
Firing range: 64 feet
Strait: curved shot(s)
Type spread: horizontal and vertical
Attack: (unchecked)
(checked) (after firing)
Detected: (unchecked)
(checked) (after firing)
RESULTS: (Certain) Hit aft under engine spaces. Ship stopped and lay to about Two miles offshore with considerable smoke over after part of ship.
Estimated: Beachd ship or caused damage resulting in Slow sinking.

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP: [NONE]

BRIEF REMARKS: A/S measures by aircraft, when a return to determine definitely results of attack was attempted, caused lack of definite information. Operation orders called for departure from this area at this time also.

— page 19 —
11.5
R.S. No. 9-01615
U.S.S. THRESHER
Date: July 9, 1942
Time: 0342 (1:12T)
Location: Latitude 08-43-00N
Longitude 167-33-00E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) ATTACK FIRST – THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT – IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Fair
SEA CONDITIONS: Glassy calm; force 0.
SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable): Excellent.
TYPE OF OPERATIONS: Reconnaissance and attack on all enemy shipping.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Conduct of unrestricted submarine warfare.

FORCES ENGAGED: OWN NONE

(Name and Type) ENEMY PASSENGER FREIGHTER (6,000 tons), various patrol craft, aircraft.

TYPE OF ATTACK (Own Enemy – scratch one) Submerged daylight approach at periscope depth.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Attacked freighter off southern tip KWA ALMIN ISLAND. Tired 2 stern shots. Both hit. Ship seen to blow up. Severe A/S measure followed attack including aircraft bombs, surface depth charges WEAPONS EMPLOYED: and the use of grapnel and magnetic sweep.

Own TORPEDOES
Enemy DIRT CHARGE, BOLTS.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED 2 Torpedoes

EVASIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED: Own Silent running, deep submergence.

Enemy ATTACKING.

— page 20 —
1300 yds.
Firing range
Keep 04 feet
Straight torpedo shot(s)
Type splash
Attack: torpedo
(check) (opposed by air screen ghosted)
Detected: torpedo
(check) (after firing)
(undetected)

RESULTS: (Certain) ____ blew up ship instantly sinking it.
(Estimated) ____

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP: Air leak in H.R. Flasks in #5 M.B.T. Partially flooded
Antenna Trunk.

BRIEF REMARKS: A/S measures were the severest yet encountered by this vessel. The buzzing note such as put out by old time "spark gap" radio transmitters was heard throughout the hull occasionally indicated a magnetic sweep. The use of the heavy crampon in an effort to catch our screws on the boat was also encountered for the first time at depth of 300 feet. It is interesting to note that at least two depth charges were claimed to strike the superstructure deck by personnel aft before detonation and while the subsequent shake-up was severe no damage was apparently suffered by this vessel.

— page 21 —
1942
U.S. SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT
U.S. Submarine Force
Time: 1023
Location: [Location: 07-07N, Longitude: 125-45E]
INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) ATTACK FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT - IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Overcast, Squally, Warm
SEA CONDITIONS: Choppy, Moderate Shell, Sea Force 2 from 12
SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable): Poor, Around 1500 yds max. range.
TYPE OF OPERATIONS: Offensive attack on all enemy shipping.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Conduct of unrestricted submarine warfare.

FORCES ENGAGED: OWN NONE
(Name and Type) ENEMY: ENEMY (5,000 tons), small Patrol Craft.

TYPE OF ATTACK (Own: Enemy - scratch one): Periscope torpedo attack submerged.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Attacked ENEMY headland for OTTAPASS to TRUK ATOL.
Fired 3 bow shots. Believe all 3 passed under target. No detonations.
No hits.
WEAPONS EMPLOYED:
Own: TORPEDOES (3)
Enemy: DEEP CHARGES
AMMUNITION EXPENDED: 3 Torpedoes.

EVASIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED:
Own: Silent Running; deep submergence.
Enemy: TORPEDOES.

— page 22 —
400 yds. (est.)
Firing range 64 feet
Keel depth 64 feet
Stratified shot(s)
Type spread
Torpedoes set at 24' and 29'.
Attack: (check) (opposed by air screen, XXXX)
Detected: (check) (after firing)
(checked)
RESULTS: (Certain) NONE

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP: NONE

BRIEF REMARKS: Fast firing checkup of data indicated that an estimated error in range undoubtedly prevented hits inasmuch as the run of torpedoes was less than that required for arming of the magnetic feature. Bad judgment indicated on part of control personnel even though TDC range was 750 yds. A/S measures were from aircraft depth charges close aboard and 5 distant charges soon after firing.

— page 23 —
15-01-00
Reg. No. 9-01.6/5
R.S. No. 9-01.6/5

U.S. SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT

U.S.S. [Ship's name]

Location: Latitude 35-12N, Longitude 125-45E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) ATTACK FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT - IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Overcast, hazy toward land.
SEA CONDITIONS: Slightly choppy.
SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable): Poor.
TYPE OF OPERATIONS: UNSTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: DESTRUCTION OF HEROIC VESSEL.
FORCES ENGAGED: OWN NOTE.

(Name and Type) ENEMY BELIEVED to be a U.S. SUBMARINE (2500 tons) coming out of ANCHOR BAY at close range. Received by draft of vessel. Two torpedoes went deep under target. Did not detonate. Ship turned WEAPONS EMPLOYED: and conducted heavy retaliatory depth charge attack. Own TORPEDOES. Enemy DEEP CHARGES.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED: Two Torpedoes.

EVASIVE-TACTICS EMPLOYED: Own Deep submergence; silent running. Enemy NOTE.

— page 24 —
FOR TORPEDO ATTACK (on):
Firing range 700 yds.
(check)
Periscope
(see and TDC
Sound
Sound and TDC

Attack: unopposed:
(check) (opposed by air screen, close screen
Detected: submarine firing
(check) (after firing
undetected

RESULTS: (Certain) NOTE
_

— page 25 —
237
IN REPLY
REFER TO
SS200/AL6-3
Serial 208
U.S.S. THRESHER
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
November 12, 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander Task Force FIFTY-ONE.

Subject: Action Reports.

Enclosure: (A) Three (3) "Submarine Action Reports".

1. Three Action Reports covering the FIFTH WAR PATROL of this vessel are enclosed herewith.

J. J. MICHIGAN

— page 26 —
1825
Location: Latitude 0h 20.0 S
Longitude 118-54.5 E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) ATTACK FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT - IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Clear
SEA CONDITIONS: Calm
SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable): Excellent
TYPE OF OPERATIONS: Unrestricted Submarine Warfare.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Enemy TANKER singly

FORCES ENGAGED: OWN Self singly

(Name and Type) ENEMY TWO-ISLAND Tanker (small)

TYPE OF ATTACK (Own Enemy - scratch one): Surface Gun-fire from 3-inch deck gun.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Enemy was just getting clear of reef on which he had grounded during the night. Surfaced at sunset and fired 26 rounds of ammunition. Enemy left sinking and on fire.

WEAPONS EMPLOYED:
Own: 3-inch deck gun (3-inch 50 cal. AA)
Enemy None

AMMUNITION EXPENDED: 26 rounds 3-inch 50 cal. common.

EVASIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED:
Own: None
Enemy None

— page 27 —
FOR TORPEDO ATTACK (Own):
:  Tiring Range
:  Keel depth
:  Straight curved shot(s)
:  Type spread
:  Attack: (unopposed)
:  (check) (opposed by air screen close screen)
:  Detected: (prior to firing)
:  (check) (after firing)
:  (undetected)

RESULTS: (Certain) Vessel clear of reef; low in water apparently sinking, large internal fire burning.

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP None

BRIEF REMARKS Evidences of effort to free target from reef were observed during the day as streams of water poured from bow and stern; pumps could be heard on sound search; large bow anchor cable lead out apparently for keeling purposes.

— page 28 —
2205
U. S. SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT

Location: Latitude: 35-09 N
Longitude: 119-34 E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) ATTACK FIRST – THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT – IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Generally clear, bright moonlight from eastward.

SEA CONDITIONS: Smooth

SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable): Good

TYPE OF OPERATIONS: Unrestricted Submarine Warfare.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Enemy Vessel singly.

FORCES ENGAGED: Self, Single

(Name and Type) ENEMY: Large Patrol Boat.

TYPE OF ATTACK (Own: Torpedo – serrate one): Submerged approach at periscope depth

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Sighted distant object. Closed in to see more distinct-ly and also to put enemy vessel up moon from this vessel. Dove end conducted submerged approach with target in moonlight. Fired one torpedo. Did not hit.

WEAPONS EMPLOYED:
Own: Torpedo
Enemy: None

AMMUNITION EXPENDED: 1 Torpedo

EVASIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED:
Own: None
Enemy: None

— page 29 —
1050 yds.
Firing range

Type Spread: None

Attack: (unopposed)
(check) (opposed by at least one torpedo)

Detected: (check) (detected)

RESULTS: (Certain) None

Estimated) None

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP: None

BRIEF REMARKS: Heard loud detention about five minutes after firing. Inasmuch as target did not change course or speed when torpedo was seen to run under, it was believed that the explosion was the torpedo detonating at end of run upon striking the bottom. The target was constantly in view in bright moonlight and dropped no depth charges. He ran away at high speed after the explosion was heard this apparently being his first indication of the attack.

— page 30 —
1942

U.S. SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT

U.S. SUBMARINE

Time: 1942

Location: Latitude 7°36'8" N
Longitude 116°15' E

(a) ATTACK FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT - IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Generally clear, heavy horizon
SEA CONDITIONS: Flat calm
SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable): Excellent
TYPE OF OPERATIONS: Unrestricted Submarine Warfare

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Two FRIGHTERS in convoy

FORCES ENGAGED: OWN: Self, Sincerely

(Name and Type) ENEMY: 3 FRIGHTERS escorted by one MURMILID third
frother far astern and still hull down at time of attack.

TYPE OF ATTACK (Own Enemy): scratch one Submerged approach periscope depth.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Sitched up in van of two frothers in echelon astern; distance between 1,000 yds. Made attack at evening twilight submerged and fired two torpedoes from stern tubes, range about 3,000 yds., one torpedo at each ship. Believa both vessels sunk.

WEAPONS EMPLOYED:
Own: Torpedoes
Enemy: Depth Charges

AMMUNITION EXPENDED: 2 Torpedoes

EVASIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED:
Own: Deep Submergence - Silent Running.
Enemy: None.

— page 31 —
6,000 tons respectively.

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP: None

BRIEF REMARKS: Observed convoying DD head directly for firing point after firing so went to deep submergence before torpedoes reach target. Run of torpedoes about 2 minutes. Heard definite distant detonations of torpedoes intermingled with secondary explosion. 2 Depth charges were dropped not very close aboard. Sound operators had excellent conditions. Heard heavy screws of firehaters up to detonation time and then were heard no more. Destroyer screws heard distinctly in his brief search after attack. Surfaced about 70 minutes later. Nothing in sight though bright noon gave good visibility on clear night. Did not use more torpedoes as only had two in stern neat and data was checking accurately on TDC throughout approach and attack.

— page 33 —
1. First line planted:
   - Point of origin: Latitude 12°47'-37" N., Longitude 100°44'-25" E.
   - Length of line - 4600 yards.
   - Direction of line - 044.° T.

2. Second line planted:
   - Point of origin: Latitude 12°50'-37" N., Longitude 100°45'-25" E.
   - Length of line - 5900 yards.
   - Direction of line - 276.° T.

NOTE: The average depth of water for these two lines is about 12.5 fathoms, with an average of 12 fathoms per mile along the other line.

— page 35 —
0-7-16, 1942. STOP
ZONE TIME  WATCH TIME  FW'D  AFT  COURSE  NO.
02-25.5  1/4-23  #9  X  280  21
02-28  16-48  X  280  22
02-32  20-58  #3  X  280  23
02-35  23-21  X  280  24
02-38.5  27-23  #2  X  280  25
02-41.5  00-15  X  280  26
02-45  03-29  #3  X  230  27
02-48  07-02  #2  X  295  28
02-52  10-19  #3  X  295  29
02-55  13-31  X  295  30
02-58.5  16-43  #4  X  295  31
03-02  20-15  #3  X  290  32

— page 37 —
14 OCT 42 - CULP OF GUNN

Serial 00677

December 19, 1942.

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: The Commander Southwest Pacific Force.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. FLIGHT.

Subject: Details of Mine plant made by U.S.S. THRESHER.

Reference: (a) Conowesapacfor deapatch 130622 of November.

1. The details of THRESHER's mine plant are as follows:

(a) Planted two (2) lines, each of sixteen (16) mines evenly spaced.

(b) The first line bearing 044 degrees true from Latitude 12-47-37" North, Longitude 100-44-25" East, length of line 4,600 yards.

(c) Second line bearing 276 degrees true from Latitude 12-50-37" North, Longitude 100-45-25" East, length 5,900 yards.

J. CARY JONES,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
Cinepac

— page 39 —
1 01544

U. S. SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT

Date: December 25, 1941

Location: Latitude 38°1' S

Longitude 112°44' E

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a) **Attack First.** Then collect data for this report.
   (a) Do not "gun deck" this report—if data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy enter a dash in space for which no data is available.
   (c) Draw a circle around the appropriate entry in this report wherever suitable.

---

Weather Conditions: Overcast

Sea Conditions: Calm

Sound Conditions (if applicable): Fair

Type of Operations: Unrestricted submarine warfare on enemy shipping.

---

Specific Objective: Enemy convoy.

---

Forces Engaged: Own

---

Self, singly.

---

(Name and Type) Enemy Several large freighters in convoy; 2 escorting destroyers; verious small craft as A/S vessels.

---

Type of Attack (Own / Escort - seratch one): Submerged torpedo attack.

---

Brief Description: Enemy convoy departed Surabaya, Java keeping in channel to avoid minefield. Began to disperse at outer buoy (about 20 miles out) when attack was made. Attacked first three ships in column.

---

Weapons Employed:
   - Own Torpedoes
   - Enemy Bombs: depth charges,
   - Ammunition Extender: 5 torpedoes.

---

Evasive Tactics Employed:
   - Own Running when enemy DD's ran; silent running; moderately deep submergence.
   - Enemy None.

— page 40 —
For Torpedo Attack (Own):
Firing range: 20-30
Keldepth: 65 feet.
Periscope

Type spread 2° on 1st & 2nd targets
Attack: (unspoiled)
(check) (opposed by air screen/close screen (both))
Detected: (check) (after firing)
undetected

RESULTS: (Certain) ___ One 7000 ton freighter sinking.
___ One 6000 ton freighter damaged.

(Estimated) ___ One 6000 ton freighter mentioned as damaged
probably sunk.

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP ___ None

BRIEF REMARKS: The destroyer and small craft screen coupled with
possible detection by two escorting Zero's overhead made observations
before attack very difficult. Aircraft spotted this ship immediately
after firing but not before one quick look revealed results certain
and estimated given above.

— page 41 —
1 01514
U. S. SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT
U.S. THRESH
Time: 0258 (-8 2T)
Location: Latitude 4°45' S
Longitude 113°54' E

INSTRUCTIONS:
a) Attack First: Then collect data for this report.
b) In space for which no data is available.
c) Draw a circle around the appropriate entry in this report wherever suitable.

Weather Conditions: Pale moon, slight overcast, frequent squalls.
Sea Conditions: Moderate
Sound Conditions (if applicable): Good
Type of Operations: Unrestricted submarine warfare on enemy shipping.
Specific Objective: Enemy transport (possibly combination transport and plane ferry).
Forces Engaged: Own
Self, singly.
(Name and Type) Enemy 10,000 ton triple-docked, flat-topped, single-stacked transport.
Type of Attack (Own / Enemy scratch one): Surface torpedo attack followed by deck gun fire.
Brief Description: Slight smoke of vessel while submerged 3 hours before sunset. Could not close submerged. Surfaced and gave chase. Twice got in torpedoes. Torpedo attack and fired first 3 torpedoes, secondly 2 torpedoes. No explosions. Trailed target until moonrise. After 11 hour chase sank target by gunfire and 1 non-exploding torpedo to hasten sinking.
Weapons Employed:
Own Torpedoes; 5-inch shells from deck gun.
Enemy Machine gun fire.
Ammunition Expended: 6 torpedoes; 85 5-inch shells.

Evasive Tactics Employed:
Own None
Enemy High speed; attempted ramming of this vessel.

— page 43 —
3 01502
U. S. SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT
Date: 14 February 1943
Location: latitude 35-12N, longitude 125-45E
Longitude: 105-46.7E

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Do not "Gun 'I' check" this report — If data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy enter a dash in space for which no data is available.
2. Draw a circle around the appropriate entry in this report wherever suitable.

Weather conditions: Slightly overcast. Excellent horizontal visibility.
Sea conditions: Heavy chop.
Sound conditions (if applicable): Fair.
Type of operations: Unrestricted submarine warfare.
Specific objective: Japanese submarine.
Forces engaged: Own Self, singly.
(Name and Type) Enemy Submarine of I-65 class.
Type of Attack (Own/Intercepted - scratch one): Submerged approach at periscope depth using torpedoes.
Brief Description: Sighted Japanese submarine near steering straight course transiting SOMITA STRAIT to the northward. Made attack submerged and fired 3 torpedoes from bow tubes at 2200 yards range. No explosions resulted.
Weapons Employed:
Own Torpedoes
Enemy None
Ammunition Expended 3 torpedoes.
Evasive Tactics Employed:
Own None
Enemy Turned away, fired deck gun and withdrew on surface.

— page 44 —
2200 yards
Firing range: 65 feet
Knots: 65
Straight shot(s): 10 R, 11R, 12R, 20R
Type spread: 1: 10, 11: 10, 12: 10, 20: 10
Attack: (unopposed X)
(check) Exposing: torpedo tubes, depth charges, etc.
Detected: torpedo tubes, depth charges, etc.
(check) (after firing X)
(undetected)

RESULTS: (Certain) None

(Estimated) One DUD hit on target heard on sound gear.
Apparently did not badly damage target as he withdrew on surface.

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP: None

BRIEF REMARKS: Considered an ideal set-up. All firecontrol data checked perfectly. Positive identification of vessel as a submarine of the 1-65 class aided in such information as meshhead height and length. This command can only feel the there is some deficiency in the functioning of the warhead or exploders as only three positive detonations have been heard out of the last 14 torpedoes fired by this vessel. This belief confirmed by positive data hit on target during previous war petrol and 3 positive data hits on derelict during present petrol. The firecontrol party on this vessel have been operating successfully together since shortly after the beginning of the war. Used all large warheads (Mk XVI).

LIEUT. Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding

— page 45 —
21 February 1943
Date: 21 February 1943
Location: 1190-13° E
Longitude: 1190-13° E

INSTRUCTIONS:
a) **Attack First** - Then collect data for this report.
b) Do not "run deck" this report - if data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy enter a dash in space for which no data is available.
c) Draw a circle around the appropriate entry in this report wherever suitable.

Weather Conditions: Slight overcast.
Sea Conditions: Cloudy.
Sound Conditions (if applicable): Clear.
Type of Operations: Unrestricted submarine war fare against enemy ships.

Specific Objective: Japanese convoy of three large transports escorted by destroyer and "killers" type corvettes.

Forces Engaged: Own
Self, singly.

(Name and Type) Enemy 12,000-ton transport, 17,000-ton transport; 7,000-ton transport (two not identified); 1 "killers" type corvette disguised as "frighters".

Type of Attack (Own / Enemy search one): Submerged, approx. 4-5 parabolas, depth.

Brief Description: Sighted enemy while on surface standing eastward. Commander swept to 2-3 head. Submerged and attacked two ships (7,000 tons, 12,000 tons) in south-eastern column of square formation. Distanced 2 hits on each vessel. Later observed both being abandoned.

Weapons Employed:
Own: Torpedoes.
Enemy: Length charges, guns.

Ammunition Expend: 5 torpedoes.

Evasive Tactics Employed:
Own: Silent running.
Enemy: 4-5-2

— page 46 —
1500 and 2200
Firing range
Ked depth
Straight/survived shot(s)
Type spread
Attack:
(checked)
Detected:
(checked)
RESULTS:
(Estimated)
DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP:
None.

BRIEF REMARKS:
After firing observed hits on first vessel, 12,000 ton transport. Later saw both ships being abandoned and troops being transferred to the third ship of the convoy. Lists on both vessels.

H. J. Jullien
Lieut. Comdr. U.S. Navy, Commanding.

— page 49 —
3 01502
U. S. SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT
S.S. SUBMARINE
Time: 1314 (ET - 8)
Location: Latitude 35-12N, Longitude 125-45E

INSTRUCTIONS:
a) Attack First: Then collect data for this report.
   - In space for which no data is available.
   - Draw a circle around the appropriate entry in this report wherever suitable.

Weather Conditions: Overcast, Squally.
Sea Conditions: Choppy.
Sound Conditions (if applicable): Fair.
Type of Operations: Unrestricted submarine warfare.
Specific Objective: Abandoned, drifting 7000 ton transport hit by this vessel on previous day.
Forces Engaged: Own
    - 6th
    - (Name and Type) Enemy 7000 ton abandoned transport.
Type of Attack (Own / Enemy): Search (one) submerged approach at periscope depth.
Brief Description: After returning to scene of previous day's attack in early morning, discovered abandoned ship. Sank with torpedoes after firing 3 positive duds.
Weapons Employed:
    - Own: Torpedoes.
    - Enemy: None.
Ammunition Expended: 4 torpedoes.
Evasive Tactics Employed:
    - Own: None.
    - Enemy: None.

— page 50 —
1. Firing range
2. Keel depth: 64 feet
3. Straight/curved shot(s)
4. Type spread: 1000
5. Attack: (unproposed)
6. Detected: (proposed/firing)
7. RESULT: (Certain) [SANK 7000 ton transport]
8. (Estimated) [None]
9. DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP: [None]
10. BRIEF REMARKS: [Listed 3 single torpedoes two of which were seen and heard to hit the target. The third apparently ran deep under the target. All were duds. No explosions. All were large warheads (mk XVII). South torpedo (mk XVII) warhead blew up ship which sank 3 minutes later. On previous patrol one post typhus was also on AVI warhead.]

[Signature]
[Name]
[Title]
[Commander]

[Signature]
[Name]
[Title]
[Commander]

— page 51 —
3 01502
CONFIDENTIAL
U. S. SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT
Time 1445 (CT - 24)
Location Latitude 39-20' 6.5
Longitude 1179-171.5
INSTRUCTIONS:
a) Attack First: Then collect data for this report.
   - In space for which no data is available:
   (c) Draw a circle around the appropriate entry in this report wherever suitable.

Weather Conditions: Fair
Sea Conditions: Clear
Sound Conditions (if applicable): Good
Type of Operations: Enter the type of operation (e.g., patrol, attack, etc.)

Specific Objective: Tanker and frigate.

Forces Engaged: Own
Self, singly.

(Name and Type) Enemy Tanker - freighter.

Type of Attack (Own / Torpedoes: Submerged torpedoes).

Brief Description: Electric smoke and enemy at long range, maneuvered on surface to position ahead. Submerged and fired 4 torpedoes at first ship, hit him, sank him. Dived one torpedo. Last one on board) at 2nd ship, missed.

Weapons Employed:
Own: Torpedoes
Enemy: Torpedoes
Ammunition Expended: 5 torpedoes

Evasive Tactics Employed:
Own: None
Enemy: Turned away.

— page 52 —
For Torpedo Attack (Own):
Firing range 2300, 3900 yards.
Ked depth 64 feet.
Type Attack (check)
Periscope and TDC
Sound
Sound and TDC

Type spread: Long tudinals
Attack: (unopposed)
(checked) (opposed by surface torpedo attack)
Detected: (checked) (air firing conducted)
RESULTS: (Certain) Sunk 7,000 ton tanker.
(Estimated) None.

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP: None.

BRIEF REMARKS: Had one observed but hit on first target... finally sank him with shot in stern at 170° & angle or the bow.

[Signature]
Lieut. Comdr. U.S. Navy, Commanding.

— page 54 —
1 MAY 1943
Time: (TAT -9)
0443
Dived off NUSA LAUT ISLAND and proceeded submerged to rendezvous.
1200
ROST: LAT 3-27' S; LONG 123-52' E.
1630
Heavy rain set in over the area.
1825
Surfaced in the rain while still light. Stationed off-fier lookouts. No land could be seen at this time
though position by DR from navigational fixes taken
about two hours before was believed good. The visibility after darkness had set in was :very poor so made
three-mile crisis-cross run through the rendezvous.
2015
Sighted light to northward toward CERAM shore so ran
slowly in that direction. Made challenge at intervals.
2030
No reply and light disappeared at intervals.
2035
Sighted other lights on CERAM shore and believed first
light sighted was on the beach.
2102
Turned and ran slowly southward through the rendezvous,
briefly flashing blinker gun through northern area of
horizon after completing the turn.
2338
Commenced running six-mile square around rendezvous by
dead'reckoning inasmuch as no landmarks could be identified on the CERAM shore. The islands of SAPARUA and
NUSA LAUT were completely obscured by continuous rain.
Commenced withdrawal from the area.

— page 55 —
5 MAY 1943
Time (AT -9)
0542 DIVED off NUSA LAUT and headed for rendezvous submerged.
1200 POST: LAT 3-27' S; LONG 125-52' E.
Sighted several saillines throughout the day.
Weather remained excellent.
1910 Surflaced at rendezvous and stationed officer lookout.
Commenced running three-mile crisis-crosses through
that position. Only one sailline vessel was visible
before surfacing. It was near NUSA LAUT apparently
heading for that ISLAND. Innumerable seach-lights on
SAPORA and NUSA LAUT were brilliantly visible as
lookout for any approaching or occasionally flashing
light.
2136 Commenced running six-mile square around rendezvous at
slow speed. No contacts made.
2348 Stooped to southward and commenced withdrawal from area.
Excellent visibility prevailed throughout night. No
noon.

On 11 May, 1943 reported "no contact" to Force Commander.

CONTENTS:
The poor visibility on May 1st prevents a statement that
the other party was not in the area. He was not, however, at
the rendezvous.

Appreciating the difficulties of navigation from a small
sailboat, we wished to insure that there was no possibility that
the other party was in the area but had not found us before we
abandoned the search. Accordingly, when he did not appear at rendezvous in the good visibility of May 5th, we closed each of the coasts
bounding the area in succession to a distance such that the
native fires on the beaches were well within our horizon. A
small boat between this ship and the shore would then have appeared inside our horizon. It is reported with regret that
the other party was not in the area on the night of 5 May.

— page 56 —
5-2/23
File: FC5-6/A16-3
(11/Mo)
Serial: 93-55
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIX
SECRET
Care of Fleet Post Office,
the FRANÇAISCO, California,
May 24, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIX.
To: The Commander TASK FORCE SEVENTY-ONE.
Subject: Report of Special Mission.

1. Forwarded.

A. R. McCANN.

— page 57 —
11-85
U. S. NAVAL FORCES
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Serial 2004
June 6, 1943.
SECRET
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO THRESHER SECRET 1tr.
SS200/A16-3 Serial 016
of May 24, 1943.
From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
To: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
Subject: Report of Special Mission.
Reference: (a) Com7th Fleet despatch 220839 of April 1943.
1. Forwarded.
2. Commander Task Force SEVENTY-CNE considers that the THRESHER covered the rendezvous area very thoroughly and had the party been anywhere in the vicinity on either 1 or 5 May contact would have been made.

A. R. McCANN.

— page 58 —
25/jch
Serial: 0065
S-E-C-R-E-T
FOURTH ENDORSEMENT to
SS200/A16-3 Serial 016
of May 24, 1943.
From: The Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.
Subject: Report of Special Mission.
1. Forwarded for information. Return of all
papers is requested.

J. CARY JONES,
Deputy Commander.

5th Ind.
G-2 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, AFO 500, 16 June, 1943.
To: The Commander Seventh Fleet.
Papers returned as requested.

Van S. Merle-Smith,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Act. A.C. of S., G-2.

— page 59 —
9WP 3
Serial: # 023
DECLASSIFIED
S-STRATFORD T

From: The Commanding officer.
To: The Commander Submarines, PACIFIC FILET.
Subject: Report of Special Mission.
Enclosure: (A) Special Mission Report.
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

HARRY HOLL.
[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten text: "HARRY HOLL."]

[Handwritten text: "9WP 3 Serial: # 023"]

— page 60 —
1. Approaching west coast of NEGRCS in very bad visibility.
   Surface radar picked up land dead ahead at about 45,000 yards range.
: 2. Dove about six miles off shore. Finally identified land and fixed position. From a southwesterly approach CAIMON POINT locks much like an island until within about 2 miles when the low land between it and the mainland begins to appear.
: 3. Sighted tops of destroyer coming up from the southeast parallelizing the coast about 3 miles off shore. THRESHER was then about 3000 yards off the beach. Circled away from destroyer.
: 4. Destroyer disappeared to the northwest.
: 5. Destroyer reappeared in about same position where last seen and lay to off CAIMON POINT.
: 6. Destroyer disappeared once more to the northwest and was not again seen. Reconnoitered all bays and beaches north and south of CAIMON POINT as thoroughly as possible in the variable visibility prevailing.
: 7. POSIT: Lat 9°-34.1'N; Long 122°-23.7'E.
: 8. Sighted sailboat close to beach just north of CAIMON POINT. Sailboat followed the CAIMON shore line and turned into the small bay south of the point. The Commando Lieutenant looked at this boat through the periscope and agreed that it was the most likely sort of "barge" to be encountered here and that there was little or no fishing in this spot.
: 9. Started closing CAIMON POINT preparatory to surfacing. We had decided that the destroyer's presence indicated that though the dams might be suspicious they were not in control of the beach here, otherwise they would have avoided any suggestion of fore-knowledge in order to trap the submarine. We asked the Commando Lieutenant if he still wanted to carry out the original plan in spite of indications of possible compromise. He laughed and said, "On yes - I must".

— page 61 —
1943 (Cont'd.)
Time (21-8)

1859
Surfaced about 3000 yards due west of CANTON POINT and headed in on the motors trimmed down with deck nearly awash. Pale quarter moon eastern with slight haze overhead.

1912
Sighted sailboat standing out from CANTON POINT. Pointed this out to the Commando Lieutenant and decided with him that he should make directly for the sailboat.

1916
Put over one-man rubber boat. The Lieutenant headed for the sailboat. Maneuvered to keep rubber boat between sailboat and THRESHER until receipt of identification signal from the Lieutenant.

1930
Received the "all's well" signal from the sailboat and twisted around to be headed out to sea while the sailboat approached. Another sailboat with dark sails was now seen coming out from CANTON POINT astern of the first. First sailboat alongside. Commenced transfer of gear from forward torpedo room.

2000
First sailboat departed for the east. This one had large outriggers and small capacity.

2015
Second and larger sailing vessel capable of carrying 15 tons came alongside. Resumed transfer of gear.

The Commando Major previously landed by the USS GUDGEON had come aboard from the first sailboat. He had been as suspicious as we until he picked up our Lieutenant, for in addition to the Destroyer a Zero plane had been overhead most of the day.

The Major had men stationed up and down the beach on the other side of the extreme tangents to north and south. On the approach of any ships they would warn us by signal lights.

The guerrilla leader said that there were about 7000 Jap soldiers back in the hills and that skirmishes were frequent. Their greatest needs were ammunition and medical supplies so we gave them everything we could in these lines (see list below).

The question of cigarettes and magazines came up. The Commanding Officer was somewhat in a quandry about such items. We were delighted to give everything we had to these men who are doing a fine job at the daily risks of their lives; at the same time the Commanding Officer was anxious to avoid any move which might compromise either the men ashore or the means of supplying them. In the end it was left to the discretion of the Commando Major who accepted all the articles with great relish. All the cigar-

— page 62 —
1943 (Cont'd.)
Time (ZT-8)

ettes, matches, soap, razor blades, candy, etc. were voluntary contributions from the crew of the THRESHER and attest their admiration for the Commandos and the work they are doing.

A suitcase full of intelligence documents was brought aboard and will be forwarded via the proper channels.

A simple recognition challenge and reply would have eased tension on both sides. A signal of this sort for future meetings was arranged with the Commando Major. It will be transmitted orally via the Intelligence Officer at our destination.

2023 Finished loading second sailboat. All Commandos left the THRESHER. Mission completed.

2038 Underway clearing the area at four-engine speed.

2045 Received ComSubs 7th Fleet's Serial Nine.

List of additional items furnished commandos:

(1) Medical supplies (especially quinine and sulpha drugs.
(2) 4 Colt pistols; spare pistol clips; belts for same; spare Tommy gun clips; 25 hand grenades; 3 cases of .30 ammunition.
(3) 150 cartons of cigarettes, matches, soap, toothpaste, razor blades, magazines.
(4) Food as follows:

| Item          | Weight | Item          | Weight |
|||||
| Milk, pwd.     | 50 lbs.| Sardines, can| 63 lbs.|
| Butter, tinned | 12 lbs.| Luncheon Meat, can| 35 lbs.|
| Luncheon Meat | 75 lbs.| Ham, canned   | 60 lbs.|
| Jam, tinned    | 48 lbs.| Cheese       | 25 lbs.|
| Crabmeat       | 33 lbs.| Lobster      | 38 lbs.|
| Tomatoes      | 74 lbs.| Coffee      | 100 lbs.|
| Corned Beef Hash | 125 lbs.| Bouillon Cubes| 2 lbs.|
| Rice          | 200 lbs.| Salmon      | 48 lbs.|
| Sugar         | 100 lbs.| Evap. Milk   | 87 lbs.|
| Potatoes, (dehyd) | 80 lbs.| Spaghetti  | 30 lbs.|
| Salt & Pepper | 2 lbs. |           |        |

(3)

— page 63 —
1st ENDORSEMENT to THRESHER secret ltr.
SS200/A16-3 Serial 023 of 30 July 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
Via: (1) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander South West Pacific Force.

Subject: Special Mission Report.

1. Forwarded.

SECRET

2nd

Commanding Officer, Task Force (32)?
Commanding Officer, Task Force (32)?
1. 1st Endorsement.

K. Mermer

P. V. MERCH, By direction.

— page 64 —
001010
SECRET
SECRET
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. THRESHER Secret
Ltr. 58200/416-3, Serial
023, of 30 July, 1943.

From: The Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: The Commander Task Force Seventy-One.

Subject: Special Mission Report.

1. Forwarded.

Copy to:
CINC, SWPA.

H. W. GRAF,
Chief of Staff.

— page 65 —
SS200/A16-3/00
Serial: 028

DECLASSIFIED
U. S. S. THRESHER.
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.

From: Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS.
Via: The Commander Submarines, PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Submarine Reconnaissance of NOMOI ISLANDS, Conducted by USS THRESHER, April 5-18, 1944.

Enclosure:
(A) Notes on Submarine Photographic Reconnaissance of NOMOI ISLANDS.
(B) Annotated Advance Copy H.O. chart 12027.
(C) Tracing of Aerial photograph of SATAWAN ISLAND.
(D) Log books.

1. Enclosures (A)-(D) are forwarded herewith. The movie and still photograph negatives will be delivered direct to the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas.

2. It will be noted that the log book, containing the true bearings, ranges, times and comments, also includes the reconnaissance of OROLUK ATLANTIS.

D.C. MacMILLAN.

— page 66 —
SECRET
: U.S.S. THRESHER conducted a photographic reconnaissance of the NOMOI ISLANDS during the period April 5, 1944 - 1945.

All areas indicated in the submarine reconnaissance request were covered photographically, and visual reconnaissance was made. Motion pictures were taken of the entrances to each lagoon, which should show the existing surf conditions.

SOUND CONDITIONS and DENSITY LAYERS

No density layers or temperature gradients were found to depths of 300 feet. Sound conditions were good.

TIDAL INFORMATION

Zone times (-10 Z.D.) of high water in the area on the days of the reconnaissance are as follows:

| Date       | Time (UTC) | Depth (ft) | Notes |
||||-------|
| APRIL 6, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 7, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 3, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 9, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 10, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 11, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 12, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 13, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 14, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 15, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 16, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 17, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |
| APRIL 18, 1944 | 1340      | 1200       |       |

- 1 -

— page 69 —
1944, fifteen minutes prior to an air strike from the SOLOMON, a Japanese airplane of unidentified type was seen 5 miles north of SATAWAN ISLAND. It turned toward this vessel's periscope. During the previous two days' strikes the THRESHER had surfaced in close proximity to ONECP ISLAND and TA ISLAND and was undoubtedly seen from the shore.

— page 73 —
1944. There are no land marks on this island. It is heavily wooded and apparently inhabited.

Several natives and boats were seen on or near the south side of the island. Trees grow proatically to the water's edge on all but the south side, where a sand beach extends about 200 feet from the trees. The surf was quiet on the reef.

PARANG ISLAND was reconnoitered from west, north, and east on April 5 and 8, 1944. There were no signs of habitation on this island, which is heavily wooded. There is a shallow sandy beach on the north and east sides. The surf northeast of the island was very heavy.

The islands along the east side of ETAL ATOLL are apparently uninhabited, are heavily wooded, have little beach, and are set well back from the reef, which is steep with moderate surf.

ETAL ISLAND is the c^ntr of population of the atoll. Two houses were observed on the south coast of the island. Along the shore line runs a stone seawall, about 5' - 8' high, from the earth or stone jetty to the west tip of the island. The west end of the island as charted is actually separated from the main body of the island by a sand spit. In the vicinity of the houses what appear to be breakwaters run out into the water.

— page 75 —
1944, weather was partially overcast, and photographs were made at ranges of 500 to 1100 yards.

The only habitation observed was on LUKUNOR ISLAND and ONEOP ISLAND, except for one native house located on the western end of SOPUNOR ISLAND, and one on PIASA ISLAND. A group of about ten natives was seen fishing on the reef west of SOFUNOR ISLAND.

LUKUNOR ISLAND was observed to be the center of habitation, with a fair sized native village located on the lagoon shore. A seawall runs parallel to the beach west of the village along the lagoon shore line. A native hut is located at the northern tip of LUKUNOR ISLAND. On the eastern side of the island were seen enclosures elevated in the trees which might be lookout posts. A house behind one of these posts appears to be sand-bagged. A sand bag enclosure close to the beach may be the site of a gun emplacement.

ONEOPS ISLAND presented a very well kept appearance with underground cleared. A few huts were seen, and a seawall runs the length of the southern side of the island.

— page 77 —
000/3/00/ (06) COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
Serial: 00563
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
MAY 10 1944

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO U.S.S. THRESHER Ltr.
SS200/16-3/00, Serial
028 of May 2, 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Areas.

Subject: Submarine Reconnaissance of NOMOI ISLANDS, Conducted by U.S.S. THRESHER, April 5-18, 1944.

1. Forwarded. The Commanding Officer U.S.S. THRESHER delivered enclosures (E) to (D), inclusive, of the basic letter, to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas.

C.H. LOGWOOD, Jr.

— page 78 —
146(1-40) Series 1/2 26 SEP 1943

DECLASSIFIED
U. S. S. THRESHER.
Fleet Post Office.

2 May 1944.

From: Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS.
Via: The Commander Submarines, PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Submarine Reconnaissance of OROLUK ATOLL, Conducted by USS THRESHER, April 11, 1944.

Enclosure: (A) Notes on Photographic Reconnaissance of OROLUK ATOLL and OROLUK LAGOON.
(B) Annotated Advance Copy H.O. chart 12028.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith.
The movie film and still photograph negatives will be delivered direct to the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas.
The "log book" giving the range, true bearing, time and comments on each photograph is being forwarded as an enclosure to this vessel's report on the reconnaissance of NOMOI ATOLL.

D.G. MacMILLAN.

— page 79 —
1944
File:
U.S. SUBMARINE
U.S.S. FORT OLIVE
San Francisco, Calif.

NOTES ON PHOTOGRAPH RECONNAISSANCE OF OROLUK ISLAND AND OROLUK LAGOON

Weather - Observed on only one (1) day (April 11, 1944).

Generally clear and fair. Cloud cover 10% - 20% consisting of cirrocumulus and alto-cumulus clouds. In the vicinity of OROLUK to the southward and southwest on the preceding and succeeding nights the weather was fair and clear. At morning and evening twilight a hazy overcast formed and cleared in about an hour.

Wind was from N.E., force 2-3, with moderate sea and slight swell from N.E.

Tide --- Low water at 1000 local zone time (-10 E.D.).
High water at 1625 local zone time (-10 E.D.).
Moon full - Spring tides.

Sound conditions were good. No density layers or temperature gradients were found to a depth of 300 feet.

Movie films 4-30(included) and still rolls #61-70 (inclusive) have OROLUK ISLAND and LAGOON as their subject. The attached chart shows the ship's location during exposure of each movie and still film. Movie film was divided approximately equally between color and black and white. Still film was exposed while running submerged in close vicinity of OROLUK ISLAND. Movies, with two (2) exceptions, were exposed using the periscope while running on the surface. Movie reel #22 and half of #23 were exposed submerged near OROLUK ISLAND. Surface speeds varied from 8 to 12 knots, and distances from the reef varied from 500 yards to 2,000 yards.

DESCRIPTION OF OROLUK LAGOON

Throughout its periphery the reef presents much the same appearance. It is very accurately charted on the enclosed Japanese chart. There are only two (2) land areas of sufficient extent to note.

— page 81 —
35N, Long. 155°-20'.5E annaears
deeen and naviagable.by small ships. Cne hour after low tide
a surface disturbance was noted in the naas, and a pronounced
tide riw was observed 1,000 yards northwest of the entrance.
Entry by a ship as large as a destroyer would annaear to be
difficult exceot at slack water. The north reef is the same
in aneaerance as the others, i.e., flnt, awash at low tide,
and with scattered large rocks.

The western side of the reef is broken by at least
five (5) clear entrances. Cne, however, at Lat. 7°-31'.4N,
Long. 155°-11'.7E is obstruc tado by a shoal within the leaoon.
The northern of the two naases at Lat. 7°-29'N, Long. 155°-
13'.5E is wartially obstruc ted by a oronnent shoal within the
laaoon. PICTUREPASS did not annaear usable. None of the
western entrances is sufficiently well marked for safe navi-
gation by other than small boats. Cnf the northwest side of
CRCLUK ISLAND breakers annaeard about 200 yards closer to the
island than the limits of the reef as charted on the enclosed
Japanese chart.

CRCLUK ISLAND AND ANCHORAGE

The island is heavily wooded, although the vegetation
is not as dense as was noted in the NOCITLANDS. The trees
were arnoxinately equaliy divided between nains and another,
unident ified, type. No habitation was observed exceot at the
southarn extremity of the island. The seaward beaches are
steen, narrow and rocky wth a sandy stretch on the extreme
north enl of the island. An observation tower of slightly
greater than tree height was observed at the location charted.
In the vicin itity of the tower were noted angular shadows which
could not be identified. They annaeard man-made rather than
natural.

In the anchorage a small vessel was observed to be
aground and awash to about deck level. The deckhouse, masts
and antennae annaeard serviceable and were visible at a range
of five (5) miles. The wreckage of a twin-angled airplane
lies on the reef about 300 yards south of the island. The

— page 82 —
SECRET
Serial:  SECRET
U. S. S. THRESHER.

(cont'd).

locations of both the vessel and plane are shown on the chart.

At 1115, April 11, 1944, a liberator type bomber was observed to bomb the island and the beached 75 ton vessel. No hits on the vessel were observed. No AA fire was observed on the island. Half an hour after the bombing, smoke was observed rising from the center of the island. Several burned trees were visible on the southwest side of the island.

This vessel bombarded with 5"/51 caliber high-caneacity ammunition the beach area in the vicinity of the observation tower. Thirty (30) rounds were expended, most of which were observed to land on the beach and in the trees just to the north of the beach. The line of fire was on true bearings from 0300T to 0450T. Ranges were from 5,000 yards to 10,000 yards. Results were not observed at close range. A small amount of smoke was seen rising from the area fired upon. There was no return fire.

— page 83 —
38-4-44
FF12-10/A16-3/00/(06) COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
Serial: 00562
SECRET
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO U.S.S. THRESHER Ltr.
SS200/A16-3/00, Serial
027, of May 2, 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Pacific
Ocean Areas.

Subject: Submarine Reconnaissance of OTOLUK ATOLI, Conducted by U.S.S.
THRESHER, April 11, 1944.

1. Forwarded. The Commanding Officer U.S.S. THRESHER delivered
enclosure (B) of the basic letter to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean
Areas with the movie film end still photographic negatives.

[Signature: LOCKWOOD, Jr.]

— page 84 —
45-42/A16-3
Serial: 058
From: The Commander Task Group 17.16 (ComSubDiv 42).
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(2) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Attack Group 17.16 from 14 June 1944 to 1 August 1944.

References:
(a) Report of War Patrol No. 8, USS GUARDFISH.
(b) Report of War Patrol No. 13, USS THRESHER.
(c) Report of War Patrol No. 1, USS PIRANHA.
(d) Report of War Patrol No. 4, USS APOGON.

Enclosures:
(A) Group Commander's Report of War Patrol.
(B) Operations enroute Midway.
(C) Operating Doctrine in Area.
(D) Communication Plan.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the subject war patrol is herewith submitted. This task group reported on the vicinity of the eastern and western entrances and along the coast of Northern Luzon. References (a), (b), (c), and (d) cover in detail the activities of the individual submarines.

2. The Group Commander's Narrative covers the attacks made by all submarines and their relationship to the Coordinated Attack, as well as comments on operating and communication procedures.

W. V. O'REGON.

— page 85 —
14 June 1944
The U.S.S. GUADFISH with Group Commander aboard departed Pearl in company with the U.S.S. TRESHER and U.S.S. PIRANHA in accordance with Contaskforce SEVENTEEN Operation Order No. 204-44 dated 13 June 1944.

14 June 1944
to
18 June 1944
Enroute lldway. Exercised in group tactics and communications.

18 June 1944
Arrived lldway. Repinished fuel and fresh water.

1500(Y) Departed lldway.

0417(L) Rendezvous with U.S.S. APOGON.

0445(L) Passed patrol instructions to U.S.S. APOGON via line and empty 4" shell container.

0446(L) Set course for area.

27 June 1944
Instructions had been received to search for Awned aviator for one full daylight period northwest of the Mariannas.

— page 86 —
0530(K) COMMANDER'S REPORT OF WAR PATROL (CONT'D)

0530(K) Commenced search.

1935(K) Completed search. Numbered us all drums wore sighted during the day. The APOGON sighted three rafts with survivors aboard. Upon closing raft it was ascertained that they wore Jap. The Group Commander received this information when the APOGON closed to within visual signalling distance of the GUARDFISH. Since the rafts at this time wore about ten miles astern, it was decided to continue and complete the search plan for our own enemy.

2 July 1944 Arrived on station.

11 July 1944 Received contact report from THRESHER. This contact report was received by all submarines. At this time all submarines were on the surface and were proceeding from area 38 to area 27, a distance of approximately ninety miles to the southward. The submarines were roughly in an east-west line of bearing fifteen miles apart, center of boats from east to west, PIR.N.H.A., GUARDFISH, APOGON, THRESHER. The convoy consisted of nine large ships "isposed in three columns with about five escorts, on course 1750T, speed 12-14 knots. The convoy, when contacted, was bearing 2750T, distance 12 miles from THRESHER.

2255(I) GUARDFISH made contact, bearing 1950T, distance 15 miles.

2314(I) APOGON made contact bearing 2730T, distance 15 miles. The PIR.N.H.A. was well to the northward and did not make contact until 0450(I).

The attack doctrine at this time was working beautifully. The situation resolved itself into this: The THRESHER was trailing astern and reporting movements of convoy. The APOGON was working up the starboard flank and the GUARDFISH the port flank. The PIR.N.H.A. was kept informed of the convoy's movements and was closing from the northwest at four engine space.

0025(I) The THRESHER commenced working up starboard flank of convoy to be in position to start attack after the two flankers had finished.

- 2 - ENCLOSURE (I)

— page 87 —
0207(I) The APOGON had attained a position ten miles ahead and was directed to attack. Owing to the bright moon it was necessary to conduct a submerged radar approach.

: 0225(I) APOGON dove for attack.

: 0304(I) The APOGON fired six torpedoes, three at a large passenger freighter and three at two overlapping AK's. Three torpedo explosions were heard spaced 8 to 10 seconds apart. Shortly after firing, a destroyer was observed to pass 400 yards ahead of the submarine at high speed. Swinging the periscope back to the convoy, it was seen that a large AK of the center column had headed directly for the periscope and was then less than 400 yards away. On going deep the APOGON was rammed by this ship, and suffered serious damage to her periscope shears which necessitated return to base. Damage assessment: AK - 7500 tons, AK - 4000 tons, damaged.

: 0331(I) The GUARDFISH had attained a position nine miles ahead of the convoy and dove for attack. A radical change of course by the convoy, while the GUARDFISH was passing between the two ahead escorts, frustrated this attack and prevented her from closing to less than 3800 yards despite the fact that she remained at radar depth and was using maximum speed.

: 0405(I) THRESHER started working up starboard flank to gain attack position.

: 0415(I) THRESHER driven off on surface by flank escort.

: 0450(I) PIRANHA made contact.

: 0505(I) THRESHER again driven off to the northwest by flank escort.

: 0512(I) The GUARDFISH secured from its approach and surfaced about 5 miles astern of the convoy.

: 0547(I) PIRANHA in position 10 miles ahead of convoy dove for dawn attack.

: 0613(I) Air cover appeared over the convoy. At this time the situation appeared as follows to the Task Group Commander:

- 3 -
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 88 —
15 July 1944
The Group now enlisting 5 three submarines in line of bearing east-west, interval between submarines twenty miles, course 0437, w.s. ongagc in a sonroh for a report only. The carrier of submarines from

ENCLOSURE (1)

— page 89 —
16 July 1944
0353(I) Received contract report of enemy convoy in position 20-08N, 120-17E, from P.I.N.H., who at this time was approximately 110 miles to the eastward. GUADELOUPE and THURSDAY changed course to intercept, proceeding at four engine speed.

0944(I) P.I.N.H. fired 3 torpedoes at a large U.S. ship three at a large U.S. ship, which was spotted in three columns with 3 torpedoes. Convoy was disabled in three

— page 90 —
1900(I) THRESHER driven down by plane and last contact.
: 1928(I) PIR.NH. first receipt of THRESHER contact report.
: 1950(I) PIR.NH. first receipt of GU.RDFISH contact report.
: 2050(I) THRESHER and PIR.NH. receive latest information of GU.RDFISH ten ship convoy which was about 40 miles to the southward of THRESHER on course 195, speed 8.
: 2400(I) THRESHER again made contact with her original convoy of four ships and two escorts.

GENERAL SITUATION. T 2230(I)

The Group Commander's estimate of the situation at 2230(I) was this: The GU.RDFISH was about 15-20 miles from the convoy headed south in an excellent position for attack. The THRESHER having lost contact with her convoy was some forty miles to the northwest heading due south to range in contact with her own convoy or to return up with the GU.RDFISH. The PIR.NH. was at an indefinite, but uncertain, position. The GU.RDFISH was now in a strong and very dangerous position. Because of the strong and varying currents in this vicinity, two to three knots, and the unpredictability of getting good navigational fixes in the presence of the convoy, the Group Commander reasoned that all reported positions of TITAN were in the vicinity of the convoy. The GU.RDFISH was now in a strong and very dangerous position. The GU.RDFISH was now in a

— page 91 —
0045(I)  Leading AK disappeared from screen, DD escort stopped.

: 0048(I)  Second AK disappeared from screen.

: 0050(I)  DD pip disappeared. Damage assessment:
   Sunk: 1 AK 7,500 tons, 1 AK 7,500 tons, 1 DD 1,300 tons.

: 0218(I)  The formation now consisted of a DD leading one AK and one AO. Fired 2 bow torpedoes at DD, 3 bow torpedoes at AK and 3 stern torpedoes at AO. Six hits were made. Commenced reload, opened to 10,000 yards and tracked targets.

: 0344(I)  With the DD escort now trailing and hugging the stern of the trailing AO. Pired 2 bow torpedoes at AK, 2 bow torpedoes at AO and, 1 bow torpedo and 1 stern torpedo at escort.

: 0346(I)  Two hits on AK which sank immediately.

: 0359(I)  The pip from the escort disappeared from the screen at 10,000 yards when previously he could be tracked at 18,000 yards. During the retirement several explosions were noted on the escort and two rather heavy ones just before disappearing from screen. In this thrilling night action the THRESHER had accomplished the destruction of an entire convoy consisting of 4 large ships and two destroyers for a total of 35,200 tons.

GURDFISH NIGHT ACTION 16-17 JULY

: 2342(I)  16 July.  Envoy of ten ships disposed in two columns, one led by a large tanker, other by a large AK with escorts on either bow and quarter. Fired six bow torpedoes at loading 5 ships which were overlapping. All torpedoes spread within target area. Six hits.

: 2345(I)  The tanker was probably loaded with gas because it blew up immediately, sending huge flames about a thousand feet skyward. The large AK commenced to burn aft and later blew up. The third ship in line, ar. AK, broke in two and sank. The fourth ship in column went down bow first. The entire scene was lighted up bright as day by the explosions and the burning ship. The remainder of the convoy scattered.

-7- ENCLOSURE (A.)

— page 92 —
0006(I) 17 July. Commenced tracking one large ship whose escort was dropping depth charges on the far side of the target.

: 0042(I) Fire 3 storm torpedoes. Two hits.

: 0045(I) The target took a heavy list to starboard and disappeared from sight and radar screen.

: 0136(I) Commenced tracking a now target zigging radically over four or five minutes.

: 0257(I) Fire two storm torpedoes. Both missed ahead as target zigged towards.

: 0303(I) Swung bow around to target and fire two torpedoes. Two hits. Proximity of escort and a rising moon caused GUARDFISH to head out fast. The target started to settle by the stern but continued ahead at three knots. The target disappeared from the radar screen at 13,000 yards, while the escort was still seen. Everyone in the control party showed signs of excessive fatigue after six hours at Battle Statistics under constant tension. The Commander ordered the escort to clear the area at high speed. In this night action the GUARDFISH had sunk 6 ships: 1 AC, 10,000 tons; 1 AK, 7,400 tons; 1 AK 5,800 tons; 1 AK 6,500 tons; 1 AK 5,600 tons; 1 AK 7,500, for a total of 42,300 tons.

: 0405(I) Received THRESHER's report of night action in which she expended all of her torpedoes. The Group Commander directed her to return home.

: 0545(I) The GUARDFISH made contact with the FIRNEL, bearing 320T.

: 1800(I) 18 July. The GUARDFISH on submerged patrol, with the FIRNEL about 25 miles to the eastward, sighted a naval convoy to the northwestward on course 250T, speed 15 knots, distance six miles. The seas were running heavy and it became necessary to expose about ten foot of periscope to obtain intermittent looks at the target. The number of ships and escorts was not determined, but the following were known: two aircraft carriers (type unknown), two large tankers, one large transport similar to HOKOKU MLRU, one naval auxiliary identified as the "AYATOSAN MARU". It would have been impossible to close this convoy had it maintained its course and speed. Several zigs in the direction of the submarine caused one flank to pass right over the GUARDFISH.

-8- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 93 —
1822(I) Fired three bow torpedoes at naval auxiliary. Swung periscope around for setup on large tanker.

: 1823(I) Heard two hits, one of which was seen through periscope just abaft superstructure.

: 1824(I) Tanker headed for periscope at 800 yards range. Took final look at naval auxiliary which had about thirty degrees port list and had main decks awash as submarine went deep to avoid ramming.

: 1837(I) Breaking up noises and a muffled explosion were heard.

: 1910(I) Depth charging over but escorts still pinging. Escaped up to periscope depth. One DD soon circling in vicinity of attack acting as if rescuing survivors.

: 2038(I) Surfaced. Very heavy seas running, rendering chase impossible.

: 0532(I) 19 July. The GUARDFISH on surface patrol with PINANHA bearing approximately east, distance 15 miles. Mde radar contact with convoy berring 235T, distance 11 miles on course 350T, speed 75 knots. The convoy consisted of three large and three medium AK's. Contact report was sent out to PINANHA as the GUARDFISH endeavored to get in attack position ahead before awwn.

: 0610(I) The coming of dawn caused the GUARDFISH to dive before having reached an attack position ahead.

: 0639(I) The convoy changed base course to 050T, placing the GUARDFISH in a good position ahead. Rain squalls interfered considerably with the approach because of reduced visibility.

: 0743(I) Finding it necessary to duck under an escort to close the range, sufficient delay was occasioned to permit the original target tracked to pass good firing point. Setup shifted to another target coming up. At this time two ships in different columns were overlapping at range of 1,000 yards and 2500 yards, respectively. Fired four torpedoes. Two hits soon on near target which broke in half immediately. One timed hit on far target. All hands heard a torpedo pass overhead and in the near vicinity of the manoeuvring room. This presumably was one of our own on an erratic run. Went deep immediately to avoid.

-9- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 94 —
20 July
GUADELOUPE departed area for Midway.

25 July
FLEET: departed area for Majuro.

C - CONTINUING TRENDS

1. The priority areas of our unit's employment were:
   - Torpedo training
   - Tor

— page 95 —
2. The special two-letter submarine code used on this War Patrol provided a rapid and reasonably accurate method for sending tactical signals. The use of the code is conducive to brevity and invariably results in a clear understanding of the message received.

3. Some confusion existed on two occasions when messages from another pack were received on our operating frequency. This can be avoided in the future by definite assignment of two or more frequencies to each pack. Although the operating frequencies of our group were being used by other agencies, no difficulties were encountered in reception. Jamming or interference by the enemy was not noticeable. The reason for the failure of the PIR.NH, on one occasion, to receive a change of course signal is not known. Four hours later the PIR.NH opened up and transmitted a contact report right on frequency. In view of the extensive damage inflicted on the enemy as a direct result of this contact report, the single failure of communications during the entire patrol on this occasion can only be attributed to a Divine Providence, commonly referred to as the "JJ" factor.

D - REMARKS

1. The excellent teamwork manifested by the pack in its attack on the convoy on the night of 11-12 July convincingly demonstrated the soundness of the attack doctrine. In approximately four hours the convoy was nicely boxed and the first submarine with heading in for the attack. Unfortunately the only submarine to remain in contact with the convoy could not broadcast this vital information because of serious battle damage it had sustained.

2. It is noted that the APOGON as a result of three torpedo hits was credited with damage to a 4000 ton AK. It is considered that this estimate of damage is extremely conservative. This convoy was soon personally by the Group Commander just prior to dawn and under a bright moon at a distance of five miles. All vessels in the convoy were large AK's and had been tracked at speeds varying between eleven and thirteen knots. Three torpedo explosions spaced about ten seconds apart were heard by the GU.RDFISH, which was then about nine miles ahead of the convoy, followed shortly thereafter by a series of depth charge explosions. It seems probable that one AK received those hits and it is very doubtful that any vessel of this type could survive such damage.

-11- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 96 —
3. In the night actions of 16-17 July one very important factor stands out and that is: the exocollant results obtained by a pack, eno boat of which had become separated from the other two by a distance of approximately 110 miles. The PIRANHA, who was the contacting submarine, sank eno ship during a day attack and thereafter was held down by air and depth charging which caused her to close contact. The other two boats, THRESHER and GUARDPISH, were eno 110 miles away at the time of contact, yet were able to close and sink two of the enemy ships. The whole operation was not intended and was caused by a failure of communications; notwithstanding, exocollant results were obtained. Area coverage by individual boats of a pack and the "on the spot" formation of packs with submarines operating singly should be made to subject of careful study by the Training Command. It would be extremely desirable to have all submarines going in individual patrols prepared to participate in pack tactics, with communication procedures and succession of command clearly defined. There then, would be no need for a rendezvous and packs of two or more boats could be built up around the contacting submarine at the scene of the enemy.

4. It is believed that packs of four, five, or even six boats can act as a tactical unit even though spread over greater distances. At the present time many of the convoyers are sufficiently close to shore to receive air cover during the daylight periods. After completion of a day attack a submarine will surely be held down and the contact invariably lost. The larger number of boats in the pack will insure contact being maintained until the enemy is totally destroyed or cause it to seek refuge in port. In this connection, it is suggested that Training Command originate problems on the game board, using latitude and longitude positions for both submarines and convoy and conduct all communications by key, using the regular operators attached to the submarines for this purpose.

5. The success obtained on this patrol is entirely due to the exocollant teamwork manifested by all of the Commanding Officers. The APOGON showed a fine aggressiveness and skill in getting ahead of the first enemy to be contacted and delivering the first attack. It is regretted that the battle damage sustained on this attack caused her to be ordered THRESHER was a direct result of the PIRANHA's original contact report. During the day period prior to the night action on this convoy the PIRANHA performed her mission in a very

— page 97 —
6. In the recommendation of awards to the various Commanding Officers it is recommended that due consideration be given to a submarine's contribution to the effectiveness of other submarines actually accomplishing the sinkings.

E - DAMAGE TO THE ENEMY

S-U-N-K

| DATE | TIME (I) | BY | N.ME | TYPE | TONNAGE |
|------||----|------|------||
| 12   | July    | 0656| PIRANHA| 1 AK | (ASAHASAN MARIU CLASS) | 8,700 |
| 16   | July    | 0944| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (EIVO MARIU) | 8,700 |
| 16   | July    | 2342| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (Large Tanker) | 10,000 |
| 16   | July    | 2342| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (AKAGI MARIU CLASS) | 7,400 |
| 16   | July    | 2342| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (ADEN MARIU CLASS) | 5,600 |
| 16   | July    | 2342| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (ADEN MARIU CLASS) | 5,600 |
| 17   | July    | 0030| THRESHER| 1 AK | (Class Unknown) | 7,500 |
| 17   | July    | 0030| THRESHER| 1 AK | (Class Unknown) | 7,500 |
| 17   | July    | 0042| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (ADEN MARIU CLASS) | 5,800 |
| 17   | July    | 0042| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (ATAGO MARIU CLASS) | 7,500 |
| 17   | July    | 0324| THRESHER| 1 AK | (Class Unknown) | 7,500 |
| 17   | July    | 0324| THRESHER| 1 AK | (Large Tanker) | 10,000 |
| 17   | July    | 0324| THRESHER| 1 AK | (Class Unknown) | 10,000 |
| 18   | July    | 1622| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (Naval Aux. (AYTOSAN MARIU) | 8,600 |
| 19   | July    | 0743| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (HOLISAN MARIU) | 6,100 |
| 19   | July    | 0743| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (Total Sunk - - - | 110,700 |

D.-M-A-G-E-D

| DATE | TIME (I) | BY | N.ME | TYPE | TONNAGE |
|------||----|------|------||
| 12   | July    | 0301| APOGON| 1 AK | (Class Unknown) | 4,000 |
| 12   | July    | 0301| APOGON| 1 AK | (Class Unknown) | 7,500 |
| 19   | July    | 0743| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (Class Unknown) | 4,000 |
| 19   | July    | 0743| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (Total Damaged - - - | 15,500 |
| 19   | July    | 0743| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (Total Sunk - - - | 110,700 |
| 19   | July    | 0743| GUARDFISH| 1 AK | (GRAND TOTAL | 126,200 |

W. V. O'REGAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commander Task Group 17.16.

-13- ENGLISH (A)

— page 98 —
9 03822  F42.53, 1
Serial 01986
CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Patrol Report of Seventh
Coordinated Attack Group.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: [Blank]

1. The Seventh Coordinated Attack Group consisted of the U.S.S. GUARDfISH (SS217), the U.S.S. THRESHER (SS200), the U.S.S. PI-RAHA (SS389), and the U.S.S. APOGON (SS308) with Captain W. V. O'Regan, U.S. Navy, in the GUARDfISH as Group Commander. Details of the individual submarine's activities are contained in the GUARDfISH's eighth, the THRESHER's 13th, the PIRANHA's first, and the APOGON's fourth war patrol reports. The excellent team work manifested by the entire crew during attack, was rammed by a large AK and suffered serious damage to her periscope shears, which necessitated return to base. The GUARDfISH sank six ships in one convoy within a period of three and a half hours, and later accounted for a large Naval auxiliary and damage to a medium freighter. The THRESHER within a period of three hours sank an entire convoy of six ships. The PIRANHA accounted for a large AK and a large AO in addition to contributing directly to the success of the GUARDfISH and THRESHER as a result of passing on timely contact reports.

2. The well considered remarks of the Group Commander, particularly paragraphs 3 and 4, will receive careful consideration and study.

3. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. congratulates the Commander Task Group 17,16, the commanding officers, officers, and crews of the GUARDfISH, THRESHER, PIRANHA and APOGON for this outstanding patrol which resulted in the following severe damage to the enemy:

SUNK

1 - AK (ASASHIN NARU Type) (EC) - 8,700 tons (PIRANHA Attack No. 1)
1 - Large AO (EIYO NARU Type) (EC) - 8,700 tons (PIRANHA Attack No. 2)
1 - Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (THRESHER Attack No.1)
1 - Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (THRESHER Attack No.1)
1 - DD (EU) - 1,300 tons (THRESHER Attack No.1)

SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 100 —
12/6/44 (15) (16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01986
Confidential
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Patrol Report of Seventh
Coordinated Attack Group.
Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Attack Group 17.16.
(14 June to 1 August 1944).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
CINCO (5)
Cinepac (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean Areas (1)
Conservypac (1)
Cincelant (1)
Comsubsplant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Consopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
Commorpac (1)
Comsubapac (40)
SUB.D, MI (2)
ComsubapacSubordocom (3)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Pacific (2)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)
ComPlectiDrivingT/O (1)
O-in-C,S/TU,FltAir/IngT/O (1)

E. I. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

— page 101 —
120554 FILMED
U.S.S. S.S. O.I (SS405)
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

24 April 1945.

From: Commander Task Group Seventeen Point Fourteen
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Official Channels.
Subject: Report of Coordinated Air Patrol of TASI. GROUP SEVEN. NITE IN POINT FOURTEEN.

Reference: (a) USS S.S. C.I., Report of Second Air Patrol.
(b) USS FILM.H., " " Fourth " "
(c) USS PUFF.N., " " Seventh " "
(d) USS TRANSHER " " Fifteenth Air Patrol.
(e) USS P.F.NITO " " Fifth Air Patrol.

1. The Air Patrol of Coordinated attack Group SEVENTEEN POINT FOURTEEN, extended from February 11, 1945 to April 21, 1945. The Group was attached to the Group from March 16 to March 24, 1945 and from April 6 to April 11, 1945. The P.F.NITO was attached to the G-coup from April 6 to April 16.

2. The nature of the patrol and operation order preclude the usual preliminary planning and preparation of directives. However since all commanding officers had had previous experience in coordinated attack groups this did not prove a serious handicap and orations were planned and directed by usual patrol communications channels with no difficulty.

3. This report makes no reference of being a complete report of the activities of the Group, and is designed only to supplement references (a) to (c) and outline the directives under which the patrol was conducted.

C.L. BURNETT.

— page 102 —
1. PROLOGUE:
   - CommSapCo Operation Order #43-45 of 10 February 1945 formed a Coordinated attack group to be known as BUNKER STALKERS, consisting of the SEA OWL (SS4305), FLAKHA (SS389) and PUFFER (SS268) with task unit designations 17.14.1, 17.14.2, and 17.14.3 respectively. Commanding Officer SEA OWL was designated C.T.G. 17.14. All units of the group were refitting at GUIL with RPS dates of February 9-11. Advantage was taken of an opportunity to hold the first session in the new Convoy College at Camp Dealay, followed by a conference of C.O.'s and communications personnel in which it was determined that all of the group's eye-to-eye on the principles of group operations. Since the operation order directed the group to proceed to CONVOY COLVILLE and conduct offensive patrol in accordance with despatched instructions to be furnished" the usual detailed advance planning was not considered feasible.

(B) NARRATIVE:

1. February:
   - 1500 I: Underway from APRA HARBOR, GUIL, rendezvoused with DRUM (SS228) and escort U.S.S. ROE (DD418) at chemical entrance, and set course for local operating area 8-3.

   - 1720 I: SEA OWL left formation to conduct gun practice on target towed by GREENLEAF while remaining on group patrol led to Northward. This delay proved ill-advised as it led to our becoming involved with a surface task force and entering safety line well behind our schedule. It would have been preferable to have had the ship involved proceed ahead to conduct practice and then join up with group on schedule.

   - 2153 Entered safety line some three hours behind submarine notice. Escort turned back and DRUM pulled ahead to maintain 15 knots speed of advance. FLAKHA was assigned lane 12 miles to starboard and PUFFER to port of axis along which SEA OWL was proceeding at thirteen knots speed of advance en route to area. Concentrated daily for radar tracking and communications.

   - Sent SEA OWL serial one informing C.T.G. 17.7 of our positions - barely within our submarine notice - and cruising disposition. Also warned other boats to remain on or ahead of schedule in view of possible confusion of submarine notice.

February 14:
   - 1435 I: After radar tracking exercise, PUFFER reported appendicitis case on board. Directed her to arrange through C.T.G. 17.7 for rendezvous with RICHERFISH to affect transfer, and detached her from frantation to effect this.

— page 104 —
1546
Smoke disappeared into BASCO, B.TAN IS. Nothing sighted at estimated range 14 miles. Notified HOBSTERS and BLAZERS.

: 1915
Received PIRANHA report of chasing smoke toward TAKAO, PUFFER also got this. Since no further reports assume contact could not be developed.

: 20 February
SEA OIL evaded two torpedoes shortly after surfacing in BASHI CHANNEL, and sighted about ten feet of the periscope of the firing submarine while pulling clear at flank speed. Sent contact to BLAZERS and HOBSTERS but could raise no one until after dark.

: 1930
Rotated station. Ordered PIRANHA to search BASHI CHANNEL, PUFFER to assist SEA OIL in search for our submarine contact in case he retired to TAKAO on surfacing, since sooth had risen to state six or higher. Also directed BLAZERS to patrol submerged during daylight in BASHI CHANNEL. For this search specified that a lone target should not be attacked without commission.

: 21 February
PIRANHA and PUFFER searched without success for downed airmen as per CSF despatches; SEA OIL had missed the despatch but was tid'd down by life-guard assignment and could not have assisted in search.

: 23 February
PIRANHA, PUFFER, and THRESHER assisted by several planes conducted unsuccessful search in heavy seas for downed aviator.

: 2300
PUFFER had probable A.PR and radar contact which disappeared at 7500 yards between them, presumably an enemy submarine that dived.

: 24 February
Shifted stations as per patrol plan, - PIRANHA now BLAZER lifeguard.

: 25 February
Made combined report on unsuccessful searches and of our inability to communicate with planes, possibly due in part to the overloading of lifeguard frequency with routine administrative and operational traffic.

— page 105 —
26 February

0320 Received CSP despatch reporting aviator down about 3 miles South of RANAU, "drifting South". Since our patrol in this region has shown a strong and consistent set to NNS, SEA OWL, searched along that drift line, ordering PUFFR to search South. Decided LOBSTERS offer of assistance in this search since they could not make it in daylight today and by tomorrow search was considered futile.

1730 SEA OWL heard plane "FLYING TIP" report on 4/75 that he was abandoning search and returning to base. Unable to raise him on that frequency and no other intorsto's indicated that he was searching this vicinity. Apparently they have instructions to answer up only, to know calls.

27 February

0330 PUFFER reported results of search negative and was ordered to patrol according to plan.

0900 FLYING SEAN sank a sailing vessel, suspected of being anti-submarine or aircraft picket off RUKYU SHO while observing an air raid by friendly planes on the nearby coast of FORLOS. One prisoner was taken.

1900 Received CSP serial nine nine moving LOBSTERS West and giving BLAZERS all of LUZON STU.ITS.

Requested permission from LOBSTERS to use LEG JOINT East of 199° longi-tude in order to enable BLAZER lifeguard to cover full sector assigned and avail himself of the lee afforded by FORLOS against the heavy seas out of the Northeast.

28 February

1730 Sent serial three to CSP reporting weather and results of searches, and a restrictive report of our difficulties in communicating with planes.

Sent new patrol plan to BLAZERS for rotating stations between BALTINGING CHANNEL, lifeguard, and B.GII CHANNEL.

Received warning of possible contact with CHUB and a flight of CHINA B-291's. Named 4475, but had no contact with either.

1 March

2112 Received CSP serial 13 ordering PUFFER to continue on present lifeguard station and SEA OWL and FLYING TIP to proceed to Northern LEG JOINT at 115° East for special job.

Ordered BLAZERS to acknowledge new orders, which they did, and set course for now station. -lr

— page 107 —
6 March
2240
Received CSF despatch clarifying lifeguard duties and giving us first specific jobs. PUFFER fired a harassing salvo of three torpedoes at an unidentified small radar contact that pursued and fired torpedoes at her.

7 March
1900
Received CSF serial thirty-seven further amplifying our instructions and authorizing patrol within twelve hours run of our spot in absence of specific instructi. This was a big help as the ocean was rapidly becoming full of grouos in those little night hols as the ocean was rapidly becoming full of grouos in those little

— page 108 —
2205
Received orders for lifeguard duties tomorrow. FIRANHA entered blind bombing zone to attack two patrol craft, possibly CHIDORIS. Shortly after missing with ten torpedoes and while gaining position for another attack he was knocked by friendly plane which apparently did not molest his two erstwhile targets.

12 March

2300
FIRANHA suggested search for reported contact near HAINAN, but considered this too far from our ordered positions as well as being in the MONSTERS' area.

Asked FIRANHA and FUFFER their fuel situation and their reaction to requesting a five day extension with some improvement in prospects for shooting torpedoes. Received favorable replies from both.

13 March

1400
SEA CML held VHF conference with FIRANHA.

1350
Received despatch from Number One MONSTER reporting a heartbreaking frustrated attack on TAUTAU LERU, and generously offering to change area allocation and in general giving us a free hand to "roach" at will. Thanked him.

Sent FUFFER orders to rendezvous with SEA CML near her spot for VHF conference.

2247
Received CSF despatch regarding survivors in rubber boat near CHINA CO.ST. Cancelled rendezvous with FUFFER and sent orders for a search along 25 fathom curve.

14 March

0100
Sent SEA CML seventh, requesting five day extension.

Received lifeguard orders for today.

0130
Intercepted CSI' despatch giving FIRANHA fighter cover and assistance in further search for life raft.

0648
SEA CML sighted and made a submerged approach on a vessel which was identified at 5000 yards as BLUE LARU, Ail-13, properly marked and on a straight course.

1900
Received CSF despatch deferring final answer on extension request.

— page 109 —
2300
Received lifeguard orders for tomorrow.

15 March
Intercepted PIRINIs serial three, reporting negative results but excellent pieces cooperation in liferaft search. The latter pounds an encouraging note for which we have been waiting and favorably hoping.

1915
PIRANHA reported a floating mine at 22-15 N; 116 - 57 E.

1930
Received GSF serial 77 T ordering SH-3D and PETO to relieve BLIZZERS of lifeguard duties and granting a five day extension to BLIZZERS who were to pick up THRESHER and patrol Western LSD JOINT as a four boat pack.

(a) Assumption that 25-fathom restriction still applies, reduces considerably the available petrol area in Northern and Northwestern parts.

(b) We can expect the "plaque of junks" to be at least as bad as in HONG KONG vicinity.

(c) Analysis of aircraft contacts for past month shows the principal routes are through HANNAM CHANNEL, thence hugging CHINA coast, and cutting across from Southern end of HANNAM to HONG KONG. On the latter route, practically all contacts were North bound, most of them at night and high speed.

4. Narrow and varying fuel margins of BLIZZERS would preclude coordinated surface patrol day and night. Presence of junks would probably hamper day-surface patrol, but small size of area would make concentration for scouting line each night to cover probable high speed routes.

Accordingly a patrol plan was issued, setting up four sub-areas for day tide independent patrol, viz: (a) South of 19-30 N; (b) 19-30 N to 20-00 N; (c) North of 20-00 N and East of 112-00 E. A standard scouting line was ordered to originate with stations at fifteen mile intervals bearing 125° true from initial point 20-25 N; 111-55 E, and to advance ten knots on course 215° T from 2000 H. Each night, corresponding to area assignment, and likewise break away each morning in time to reach next day's diving point at best practicable speed, all boats striving to maintain line at least from 2300 to 0300 H. Since eight days were left, assignments were to be rotated every other night.

— page 110 —
16 March
BLIZZARS departed lifeguard stations at sunset and set course for now area, running before state six seas.

17 March
2300 Held VHF conference with THRUSHER to obtain information on area, as she had been patrolling those waters for some two weeks.

18 March
Received CSF despatch forwarding CHIEFC's message in appreciation of lifeguard efforts of BLIZZARS and SES. 10.CHEER. Those kind words were doubly appreciated in view of the feelings of frustration and futility growing out of our initial difficulties in communications and cooperation.

Received CSF serial 90 ordering BLIZZARS to hold on to their RICH's but opening up quite considerable now horizons between the 25-fathom and 20-fathom curves. This relaxation of restrictions permits patrol practically anywhere outside the blind-bombing zone. In consequence of this change, authorized boats in two Northern sub-areas to forego the nightly scouting line for independent patrol in areas, warning them again to keep clear of blind bombing zones.

20 March
1900 Received CSF despatch concerning aircraft mining activities in our area; warned all boats - particularly FIRE-NIH who was in that vicinity. Also directed all boats to originate own departure message and start for home when they reached minimum fuel allowance.

2223 SE. OWL had first of three brief encounters with small but fast craft - probably LTB - 12 miles E-SE of MIDDLE CHANNEL, H.I.N.N. Sent out warning to all boats, but unable to raise FIRE-NIH, until she opened up later and reported she had been bombed by friendly plane at a point 14 miles inside submarine patrol zone.

21 March
Sent message to FIRE-NIH, and PUFFER requesting their reaction to a group bombardment on FIRE-SS. radio station or on B.F.T.N. 18. Received enthusiastic replies and sent SE. OWL ci.ith to CSF requesting authority to bombard those targets, since we were not sure of their present status or desirability as targets. Also reported FIRE-NIH's being bombed.

2300 Received CSF despatch giving lifeguard orders.

— page 111 —
22 March

0330
23 March
1230
2240
2330
2040
1000
25 March
0100
1100

RECEIVED cancellation of lifeguard orders.

FINAHE reports having learned by voice communication with search plane of two JAP CLIs in LING SUI (or "LEONG SOI, - which chart do you read?) BAY and that he was proceeding to investigate. Told him to go ahead and keep us informed as SEA OWL fuel would not permit such a run unless necessary in case contact made. This contact later received on fox sked, and PUFFER also reported investigating it.

SEA OWL intercepted CHUBs report of having just investigated LING SUI with no contacts, and sent this info to PIR.NHA and PUFFER.

Received CSI serial two two sugar ordering BLAZERS to depart area and proceed via SAIPAN to MIDWAY for refit.

FINAHE reported search of LING SUI showed cruisers had gone, and that her low limit of fuel was reached. SEA OWL has 27000, PINAHE 29000, and PUFFER 33000.

Upon departing area, bombardment had still not been authorized but as FINAES was practically on our track SEA OWL set course to stop by for reconnaissance anyhow. BLAZERS released THRESHER and departed area into heavy head seas that made us start counting up our fuel by the cup-full.

Received LIGHTY dispatch asking if we had fired upon rockets; sent negative reply giving our position and speed of advance toward him.

Received CSI serial twenty-eight, authorizing bombardment of FATA'S and suggesting radio station as best target. Callo for position, course and speed from roat of BLAZERS and found they could not make it before daylight of 26th so SEA OWL pushed on to make preparatory reconnaissance tomorrow.

Sent out preliminary operation plan to BLAZERS to avoid necessity of opening up near target. Assigned code names to reference points on chart and to possible targets to enhance VHF security; stressed importance of station-keeping to avoid danger from premature; and scheduled a rendezvous 15 miles West of target at 0300 H tomorrow to disseminate final plans.

SEA OWL made radar and sight contact on FATA'S ISLAND, and submerged for a close reconnaissance. Sighted an unidentified plane, probably HELL, over the island while retiring.

— page 112 —
2100
Received THRESHER despatch asking for dope on FRITAS for possible continuation of bombardment by MOBSTERS.

26 March

0300
BLIZZERS rendezvoused as scheduled 15 miles West of FRITAS for VHF conference to pass final plans for bombardment. During this conference a Jap radar-equipped 4-marine flying boat flew over very low and within 2000 yards of all three boats. S.A. OWL and PUPPER dived, but FRITAS thought plane was a friendly FRITAS and stayed up - thereby probably saving the day by making the Jap think we were harmless fishermen.

Upon completion of conference, formed column and proceeded to the specified approach line for bombardment of radio installations on FRITAS IS. Description of bombardment appears in reference patrol reports, that of the SE. OWL containing the Group Commander's estimate of total damage inflicted by the group.

0630
Completed bombardment and dispersed according to plan to proceed independently to SITIN for fuel. The only resistance encountered was aircraft which was contacted by SE. OWL and forced PUPPER down during retirement.

1230
Sent message to THRESHER diving dope on FRITAS and suggesting that BISCO, BITAN, might be a more satisfactory target due to difficulty of spotting and observing results on FRITAS.

Sont message to BLIZZERS telling them to proceed independently because of low fuel unless otherwise directed and to continue to guard WFO,CO until further orders, SE. OWL to guard OWL frequency for whole pack.

Sont message to TIGRONE, who was to pass us close aboard en route to our recent area, suggesting a rendezvous for VHF conference on area; received affirmative reply.

2200
Since SE. OWL needed a partial day submorgod to make schedule add up right, requested permission from BLOCKFISH to patrol off BISCO, BITAN IS., and offered services in reconnaissance to MOBSTERS who were planning to bombard this town on 28th. affirmative replies from both.

2300
Sent departure message to C.T.G. 17-7 info CST, requesting permission for BLIZERS to proceed independently due to low fuel, giving SE. OWL's routing, and reporting bombardment.

27 March

1930
SE. OWL sent report of reconnaissance to THRESHER.

— page 113 —
2030
Received CSB despatch authorizing BLIZZERS proceed independently to SAITAN.

22 March
1315 I
SEA OIL exploded floating mine, at 20 - 45 N; 125 - 30 E, and sent word to other boats in DIXIE. Learned in replies that FLASHER and PUPPER had likewise exploded mines on some latitude and within 16 minutes of same longitude.

This seemed like too much of a concentration to be a coincidence, especially when found so far from known mine fields that their source is a matter of conjecture. Therefore sent S. CYL. TENTH reporting those sinkings to CSB and CT.G. 17.7.

Directed BLIZZERS to shift from WATACK to CHILI frequency.

Received despatch from CT.G. 17.7 directing BLIZZERS to joint rendezvous. Received warning of typhoon which did not fully materialize.

2 April
0600 K
BLIZZERS effected joint rendezvous with FLASHER and IETO, and proceeded in company to TAHITI. HUBBARD to moor alongside FULTON and receive sufficient fuel and provisions for voyage to LIDAY.

3 April
1600 K
BLIZZERS departed SAITAN for MIDWAY in company with FLASHER, FLASHER, and IETO who pulled off as their routing diverged from ours.

2040 K
Observed a large explosion practically in the middle of our very open disposition and an unidentified plane was heard on WIFI to say it was a jettsicened bomb. Sent this deep to the boats by radio and was very relieved to get receipts from all.

In reply to inquiry from CT.G. 17.7 sent despatch reporting all boats present and explaining why escort was released prior to reaching safety lane.

6 April
Received CSB despatch authorizing BLIZZERS to conduct short patrol in the vicinity of W.E. while on route LIDAY. Joined by THERSHER and PAUL. IETO as well as #4 and #5.

-12-

— page 114 —
10 April
SE. CPL patrolling off NKE, sighted a sampan type patrol craft close to the island. This craft was sighted every day but was never sufficiently clear of shore batteries to warrant attack on him.

16 April
SE. CPL made 3E contact 6 miles Northwest of NKE on what was at first presumed to be the patrol craft, but was later identified as an enemy submarine when it dived during SE. CPL's surface air reach.

On the assumption that this submarine would contact - or had contacted - the island and would return to the Enviror, called in all BLENES for attack patrol blocking probable rotational routes and SE. CPL commenced a close watch on the anchorage at NKE (See SE. CPL track chart).

17 April
SE. CPL again contacted enemy submarine rounding LACKY IONT cl-see aboard and heading up for the anchorage. Again the enemy frustrated SE. CPL's attack by diving.

18 April
SE. CPL sunk enemy sub after contacting him third time anchored about five hundred yards off the boat landing. One torpedo of a depth and diver sent spread hit the submarine aft and it sunk storm first. The other two torpedoes did not explode and are presumed to have been steered by a torpedo not which was later seen.

The submarine was a very large one with no deck gun and is tentatively identified as an I-54 Class supply submarine (YUSEN). SE. CPL remained in the vicinity for an hour watching a landing barge and ex-USN motor launch pick up some seventy or eighty survivors, but was prevented from surfacing by the shore batteries on NKE. Although certainly detected by the rescue craft, SE. CPL encountered no anti-submarine measures whatsoever, and it seems very probable that the patrol craft soon daily horeto-fire had been alongside the submarine and was sunk with it.

After pulling clear out of gun range, SE. CPL surfaced and reported sinking to remainder of pack and to CUSUB. As all boats were probably getting pretty low on food and the probability of more targets in the immediate future was practically nil, all boats were ordered to discontinue patrol and proceed to their refit bases. IEDL-bound Thresham and RUSNITO were released from pack and a rendezvous was ordered for the original BLENES in order to proceed to IDAY in early.

-13-

— page 116 —
6. The intelligent and cheerful spirit of the perorati manifest by the
    TUPPER and T.I.N.H. through the patrol and by the THRESHER and F.I.NITO while
    they were attached was superb and made the Gr. up Commander's Task an easy and a
    pleasant one. It was a sure proof of keen dispassion that no opportunity was
    offered for carrying this corperati to its supreme test in a coordinated attack.
    With the bachian-up of the Grup made it possible for the SEA O.L. to hunt down
    and successfully attack the submarine one-untoreed off T.I.S., that type of "coordin-
    ted attack" offers little in the way of compensation to the boats that had to sit
    out in left field and wear a crew in the open ocean.

ESTABLISH OF D.L.G. TELEMETRY:

Sunk:

Three-masted Fishing Junk (I.S)(I.T.N.H.) 50 tons
Submarine, I-54 Class (SU) (SA O.L.) 2000 tons

Damaged:

Radio Station on I.T.A.S ISLAND (SEA O.L., F.I.N.H., TUPPER)
Large motorboat off F.I.T.S. (I.S)(TUPPER) ? tons

-15-

— page 117 —
1. SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO FORTY ONE
Serial # 016
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CTG 17, 14 (CO, USS SEA
ONL) Conf. Report of
Coordinated War Patrol of
Task Group 17, 14, SS405/
A16-3 dated 24 April 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Division TWO-FORTY-ONE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Administration.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of Coordinated War Patrol of TASK GROUP
SEVENTEEN POINT FOURTEEN.

1. Forwarded.

D. F. VILLIAMSON.

— page 118 —
15/4/45
FCS-24/A16-3
SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR
11/dn
Serial: 084
Caro of Float Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
27 April 1945.

SECOND ENQUIRY TO
CTD 17.14 (CO, USS 3E.
O.N.) Conf. Report of
Coordinated Air Patrol of
Task Group 17.14, SS405/
A16-3 dated 24 April 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Administration,
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of Coordinated Air Patrol of TASK GROUP
SEVENTEEN POINT FOURTEEN.

1. Forwarded.

2. The remarks of the Commander Task Group SEVENTEEN POINT
FOURTEEN regarding lifeguard communications and the need for a more rigidly
enforced doctrine for friendly planes flying over submarines in patrol zones
are concurred in.

3. The coordination of this group was well planned and
sufficiently flexible to take care of the numerous changes and problems
which arose. The use of EOM for propaganda of plans is believed to be far
superior to using NOPAC and avoids corresponding the effective NOPAC
unnecessarily.

4. The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR concurred in the
group commander's estimate of the damage inflicted by the group and joins
him in his regrets that an opportunity was not afforded those "heads up"
submarines to conduct a coordinated attack against a worthy enemy target.

F. T. FENNO.