U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS-231) — war patrol report SS-231_HADDOCK.pdf

— page 3 —
1. USS HADDOCK (SS 231) was built by the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Her keel was laid 31 March 1941 and she was launched 20 October 1941 under the sponsorship of Mrs. William Henry Allen, wife of Rear Admiral A11 en, USN. The ship was placed in commission on 14 March 1942 under the command of Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. Taylor, USN.

HADDOCK remained at Portsmouth for fitting out until 16 May 1942 and after test firing of torpedoes on the range at Newport, Rhode Island, arrived at New London on 20 May for training operations in local areas. She sailed for the Pacific on 19 June and arrived at Pearl Harbor on 16 July 1942. She departed for her first war patrol on 28 July, being the first submarine to go on war patrol equipped with search radar. The device enabled her to "see in the dark" and could indicate the enemy's vessel's bearing, range and category. Night still clocked the hunting submarine but no longer provided a cover for enemy shipping. This period was conducted in the vicinity of the Bonin Islands and the East China Sea.

On 12 August 1942 HADDOCK made a surface attack for one hit on a freighter which promptly named stern guns and kept going while correcting a 20-degree list. HADDOCK trailed at full speed on the surface until the advent of a dark moonless night when she brought her search radar into play and closed for a second attack. Two timed explosions were heard as the enemy opened with stern guns and gave a frantic whistle. HADDOCK found no trace of the target when she surfaced but official confirmation of a sinking could not be made. While off Amami O'Shima the night of 13 August she sank an unidentified transport of estimated 400 tons. Survivors were observed to take to boats as the target sank (26-07H; 121-29S). In the Formosa Straits before daybreak of 26 August she missed target with four stern shots but swung hard and brought her bow tubes to bear for a hit which sank cargo ship TEENSHUN MARU (2,251 tons) by the stern (27-05H, 121-23S). After patrol off Okinawa, HADDOCK returned to Midway for re-fit on 19 September 1942.

HADDOCK's second war patrol was conducted in the Yellow Sea of Japan. She departed Midway on 11 October 1942. Three stern shots missed a large freighter on 31 October and the enemy stood off undamaged before HADDOCK could obtain another set-up. About midnight she commenced "kick-and-seek" with the moon, trailing two freighters and destroyer escort during the bright periods and closing in as the moon went behind a cloud. This chase became a losing game as the moon rose high and the clouds dispersed, causing

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1942-1943
USS HADDOCK (SS 231)

the attack to be abandoned. On 3 November HADDOCK scored a hit amidship of cargo vessel TEKKAI MARU (1925 tons) who broke in two in a tremendous explosion and sank within four minutes (32-02N; 126-15E). On 6 November she was forced to break off attack on a freighter, by a destroyer and search plane. Off Kakyō To Light on 8 November, she was forced down by an enemy patrol plane who dropped two bombs and held HADDOCK down while another freighter escaped. After moment of 11 November she blew the stern off cargo ship VENTICE MARU (6571 tons) and the enemy went under the sea in fifteen minutes (35-36N; 123-14E). On the night of 13 November she made one hit and struck off at 2500 yards to watch the test of the Loud explosions were heard at the enemy put a lifeboat in the water and sent SOG signals by flashing light. As HADDOCK prepared to finish off the enemy, a gun flash came from dead astern and she cleared the vicinity. She expended the last of her torpedoes on 16 November, observing a hit amidships of a large empty tanker. But when the explosion cleared there was no apparent damage except the tanker slowed, commenced to circle, and opened with stern guns. HADDOCK had small chance of damaging the large tanker with gunfire and on 17 November, to the heavy odds in a gun duel, cleared the area. She returned to Pearl Harbor on 4 December 1942.

On her third war patrol, HADDOCK departed Pearl Harbor on 28 December 1942 and entered her assigned area on 11 January 1943, running submerged across the Southern Islands in the Tokyo traffic lanes. She closed two destroyers on 16 January, but was detected by the lead destroyer who headed directly for HADDOCK at full speed. Within the next half-hour fifteen depth charges were dropped but exploded at shallow depth for no damage to HADDOCK. When she surfaced to clear the area, she found herself surrounded by 24 lighted craft evenly spaced around the compass and converging on a common center -- HADDOCK. As she swung hard to get through an opening at 20 knots, another vessel, thought to be a destroyer was contacted on a converging course. She passed some 4000 yards astern of this vessel, a fast merchantman who sighted HADDOCK and zigged away at high speed. Having spent a very uncomfortable three hours HADDOCK pulled away from the trap. On 17 January she pressed home an attack to blow up and sink an unidentified freighter of estimated 4000 tons. Radical maneuvers of two other freighters prevented further attacks.

On 19 January 1943 HADDOCK intercepted six freighters in double column. She gained attack position on the last ship in the offshore column for two hits (34-13N; 136-59E) "and the target sank in seven minutes." She was forced down by a patrol plane who dropped two bombs, spotting HADDOCK for the escorts which converged for seven hours of counter-attack. On 26 January she was again forced down by a patrol plane and evaded 18 depth charges while four freighters made for the safety of shores. Very heavy seas and driving rains hampered the remainder of the patrol and HADDOCK was unable to close the few contacts made while riding out the storms. She returned to Midway on 17 February 1943. Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. Taylor was relieved by Lieutenant Commander Roy M. Davenport on 5 March 1943.

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1943 HADDOCK departed Midway on 11 March 1943, enroute to conduct her fourth war patrol. She reversed course for rendezvous with a patrol plane on 14 March when one of her crew developed acute appendicitis, making transfer of the patient at sea on the following morning. On 3 April while off Palau, she pressed home an attack on a corvette in company with a transport. Torpedoes apparently ran under the corvette and did not explode. Other torpedoes blew sections of the bow off passenger-cargo ARIMA MARU (7389 tons), followed by explosions amidships and aft. The enemy became a raging inferno as she took an immediate list and went down by the bow (1A-26N; 135-00E). The corvette came down HADDOCK's torpedo track and within the next hour had dropped 24 depth charges, many of which exploded directly overhead. The conning tower was abandoned when the chart desk broke loose from the bulkhead and part of the starboard side came in about four inches. When HADDOCK surfaced it was found that the port side of her conning tower had also given way. Damage to her search radar training system was temporarily repaired by the next day. A few hours after the counter-attack HADDOCK heard a special Tokyo news flash: "Today, April Third, at Imperial Japanese naval vessel of the corvette type sank an American submarine while escorting a large convoy through Japanese mandate islands." Interesting, but fortunately not true. The main damage to HADDOCK's conning tower occurred after the last depth charge. HADDOCK patroled off the harbor of Saipan to report carrier movements there, and returned to Pearl Harbor for repairs on 19 April 1943.

On 30 June 1943 HADDOCK departed Pearl Harbor for her fifth war patrol which was conducted in waters to the east of Palau Island and in the Caroline Islands Group. North of Palau on 21 July she intercepted four transports under escort of two destroyers and escaped detection upon approach despite the many observations made to obtain a se-up on the maneuvering targets while "underneath the nose" of the escorts. With one of the escorts only 700 yards astern, she sent two bow shots towards one transport, then at ten second intervals, fired one torpedo at each of the three other transports. The first target received two hits and became a mass of smoke. Two others were observed in the same condition but no flames were visible. Two more hits were made on the first target as it drifted off to the right. One of the escorts came down HADDOCK's torpedo tracks and thirty depth charges were heard to explode within the next hour. Only one group of five charges exploded near HADDOCK who escaped damage. In this attack she received credit for sinking transport SAIPAN MARU, 5533 tons, (16-18N; 134-09'E).

On the morning of 21 July 1943 HADDOCK intercepted two unescorted modern tankers and observed two hits on one of the enemy. Two internal explosions followed but the ships steamed east in formation at ten knots. She decided to trail the tankers until after nightfall when she was detected upon first approach by searchlights and gunfire. In a second try her torpedoes ran under the targets which again forced HADDOCK to break off by use of searchlights and gunfire. In a third attack, six

— page 7 —
1944 HADDOCK sighted "two loaded tankers" with destroyer escort and tracked at extreme range to avoid detection. The moon set shortly after midnight and she closed to fire three torpedoes at each of the "tankers", then swung for four stern shots at the escort. In this attack one hit was reported observed on one "tanker" with low order explosions heard in both targets. In a second attack she fired four torpedoes at overlapping "tankers" while the enemy escorts remained astern. Three hits were reported observed on the near "tanker" with an explosion that ignited the entire ship. A hit was also reported observed on the second "tanker" and both ships were believed to have been sunk at the time. Records available after the war confirm heavy damage to "transport HOYO MARU (8691 tons) near the vicinity of these attacks but did not indicate a sinking. Out of torpedoes, HADDOCK returned to Pearl Harbor on 15 November 1943, having spent nine days in her assigned patrol area. On 1 December 1943, Lieutenant Commander Roy M. Davenport was relieved by Commander John F. Roach, USN.

During her eight war patrol which was conducted in waters of the Marianas and Caroline Islands, HADDOCK formed a coordinated attack group with submarines TULLIREE and HALIBUR. She departed Pearl Harbor on 14 December and made rendezvous with the other submarines on 17 December 1943. About noon on 19 January 1944 she gained ahead for attack "on a carrier which was in company with a smaller carrier, a cruiser and several destroyers. She fired six torpedoes for two hits on the larger carrier then dived to escape, finding herself between the two carriers with a destroyer on their port flank. Three charges exploded fairly close when a string of eight depth charges were laid astern of HADDOCK who was held down for about six hours before making her escape. She had inflicted heavy damage to escort carrier UNYO (15,000 tons). HADDOCK returned to Pearl Harbor on 5 February 1944.

HADDOCK departed Pearl Harbor on 10 March 1944 to conduct her ninth war patrol off the Mansei Shoto Islands. On 29 March she broke off an attack approach when the target was identified as a hospital ship. On 24 April she torpedoed and sank a small escort vessel which had been guarding a fleet of sampans. As she made rendezvous with TUNA on 3 May, a small enemy vessel was sighted and blasted from the sea by TUNA. Two prisoners were rescued from the sea by HADDOCK who also received two other rescued by TUNA. The prisoners were put under guard in the after torpedo room. HADDOCK called at Midway on 6 May and returned to Pearl Harbor on 10 May 1944. Two days later she sailed for the Unit. States and arrived at San Francisco on 19 May for overhaul in the Hunter's Point Navy Yard. She departed 14 September and returned to Pearl Harbor on 22 September 1944.

During her tenth war patrol HADDOCK formed a coordinating attack group with HALIBUR and TUNA with Commander Roach in HADDOCK as group commander. She departed Pearl Harbor on 8 October to a scouting line south of Formosa.

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24 June for uneventful lifeguard station off Marcus Island, then put into Saipan Harbor on 25 July for fuel. The next day she sailed to perform lifeguard patrol in the Central Nanpo Shots Area. When a patrol plane reported sighting of a survivor in a liferaft on 31 July, HADDOCK sped to the scene and rescued an Army pilot who had been in the water since the evening of the 28th. She was at Midway (15-18 August) and returned to Pearl Harbor on 22 August 1945.

On 7 September 1945, HADDOCK departed Pearl Harbor for the east coast of the United States. She made transit of the Panama Canal on 24 September and arrived at Tompkinsville, New York, 30 September 1945. She visited Philadelphia (25-30 October) then steamed for New London where she remained until 11 December 1945. The next day she entered the Navy Yard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, for overhaul. On 29 March 1946 she returned to New London under tow of USS CHAIN (ARS 20). On 20 April she was placed in commission in reserve and on 23 April, Lieutenant Commander A. R. Strow was relieved by Commander R. W. Alexander, USN. HADDOCK remained at New London, Connecticut, and was placed out of commission in reserve on 12 February 1947. In August 1948 she was assigned service as a reserve training vessel under the Sixth Naval District and continued in this duty until placed out of service at New London during May 1952. She was again assigned service for reserve training during June 1956, basing her operations from Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

HADDOCK was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for her second, fifth, sixth and seventh war patrols. In addition she served eleven battle stars for operations listed below:

1. Star/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL-PACIFIC: 28 Jul - 19 Sep 1942
2. Star/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL-PACIFIC: 11 Oct - 4 Dec 1942
3. Star/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL-PACIFIC: 28 Dec 1942 - 17 Feb 1943
4. Star/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL-PACIFIC: 11 Mar - 19 Apr 1943
5. Star/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL-PACIFIC: 30 Jun - 10 Aug 1943
6. Star/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL-PACIFIC: 2 Sep - 28 Sep 1943
7. Star/SUBMARINE WAR PATROL-PACIFIC: 14 Dec 1943 - 5 Feb 1944
8. Star/LEVITE OPERATION: Leyte Landings: 10 Oct - 29 Nov 1944
9. Star/INO JIMA OPERATION: Assault and Occupation of Iwo Jima: 15 Feb - 5 Mar 1945
10. Star/OKINAWA GUNTO OPERATION: Assault and Occupation of Okinawa Gunto: 24 Apr - 24 May 1945
11. Star/THIRD FLEET OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN: 25 Jul - 8 Aug 1945

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311'8"
: 27'4"
: 1526
: 15'3"
: 2410
: 20.25
: 6
: 54
: 300'
: (10)
: (1) 3'/50
: (2) -50 Cal.
: (2) .30 Cal.
: 24

Compiled and Stenciled
? Jan 1959 (ks)

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10/16/43 (5) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01130
Care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California,
September 30, 1942
CONSUBAC PATROL REPORT NO. 74
U.S.S. HADDOCK - FIRST WAR PATROL
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of First War Patrol.
Enclosure: (a) [Comsubron' 10 Conf. 1tr. FC5-10/A16-3 (FB5-101), Serial 030 of September 23, 1942.
(b) [Comsubdiv 102 Conf. 1tr. FB5-102/A16-3(2), Serial 015 of September 23, 1942.
(c) Copy of subject war patrol.

1. This was a very satisfactory patrol. The area was covered in a thorough manner. The commanding officer demonstrated possibilities of use of radar in tracking the enemy during the night on August 26. It is considered that he employed facilities available very intelligently.

2. After an excellent follow up on August 12, when a SOYO MARU type freighter was damaged by one torpedo hit at 1237, the commanding officer failed to confirm a sinking as the result of his 2100 night attack because of diving for cover from gunfire and remaining submerged for "some time" before a periscope observation could be obtained. Explosions of two torpedoes were heard on the way down, and nothing could be found on the surface after a two hour search by sight and radar. However, the damaged ship may have cruised a distance beyond vision or radar in the interval, and the sound of the explosions is not conclusive, even though it is believed the freighter was sunk. Submergence to seventy-five feet for a short interval with the submarine's course set for the general vicinity of the damaged ship's position would have provided safety from gunfire and more conclusive evidence of destruction or an opportunity for a further follow up.

3. On attack No. 1, torpedo probably ran too deep to actuate the exploder. In addition, the target may have been of wood construction. Mark 15 torpedoes are reported by the Bureau of Ordnance not to run as deep as Mark 14 torpedoes. Despite the torpedo's failure to explode the commanding officer's decision to fire at a 1000 ton trawler is considered sound.

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FF12-10/A16-3(5)  SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET  Hs
Serial 01130
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
September 30, 1942.

COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 74
U.S.S. HADDOCK - FIRST WAR PATROL

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of First War Patrol.

4. The commanding officer, officers, and crew of the HADDOCK are congratulated upon a well conducted patrol and their successful damage to the enemy.

5. The HADDOCK is credited with the following damage:

SUNK

1. Freighter - 3,469 tons
1. Freighter - 6,332 tons
1. Freighter - 0,335 tons
Total ...21,156 tons

R. H. ENGLISH.

DISTRIBUTION:
(210M-42)
List I, Case 2:
Pl(5), SSs
Special:
EN3(5), Consubjant(2),
Comubssowcspac(2),
Cominch(5).

E. R. S. LIBUINE,
Flag Secretary.

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1. NARRATIVE.
July 28, 0900 (VW). Underway from Submarine Base, Pearl, enroute Midway, escorted by U.S.S. WARD.
1500 (VW) WARD dropped three depth charges about 500 yards abeam, for indoctrination.
2000 (VW) WARD returned to base.
August 1, 0635 (Y) Arrived MIDWAY. Fueled and provisioned to capacity. Received CTF 7's Secret dispatch 302354 changing standard patrol areas and routing points.
1400 (Y) Discovered five cracks in After Trim Tank caused by strain on propeller guard struts. Necessary repairs delayed departure until:-
August 2, 1302 (Y) Underway from Midway enroute Patrol area. Air escort to 30-mile circle from Midway. On surface except for daily training dives. Zig zagging during daylight.
CROSSED INTERNATIONAL DATE LINE.
August 4, 0239 (M) Received CTF 7's Confidential dispatch 022301 re running depth of torpedoes.
August 5, 0900 (L) Entered Wake 500-mile circle.
1046 (L) Received CTF 7's Confidential dispatch 042045 containing additional information re running depth of torpedoes.
August 7, 2100 (M) Entered Marcus 300-mile circle.
August 10, 0500 {K} Entered Bonin 300-mile circle.

- 1 -
ENCLOSURE (C)

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U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of First War Patrol.

August 11, 1648 (I)
Attack #1 -- 1000-Ton Trawler -- Missed.
Lat. 29-00 N, Long. 138-30 E, sighted ship on starboard bow. Dove and made attack. Identified as 1000-ton Trawler.

1744 (I)
Fired one torpedo; Missed. Not worth another.
1754 (I)
Two bombs or depth charges dropped. Went to 200 feet, suspecting plane from Bonin had spotted HADDOCK during attack. No more dropped. No damage. 1836 Sunset; surfaced shortly after.

August 12, 1200 (I)
Attack #2 -- 9000-Ton Freighter -- Damaged.
Enroute on surface, Lat. 28-30 N, Long. 133-10 E. Sighted ship on port bow -- closed on surface. 1237 dove and made attack. Fired three torpedoes -- one hit. Target took 20 degree port list but did not slow appreciably. Stern gun promptly manned which kept HADDOCK periscope under constant fire until range opened to about 3000 yards. List was gradually corrected. Target identified as similar to GOYOMARU.

1431 (I)
Surfaced and trailed at full speed, keeping smoke and tops in view. Target making heavy black smoke and no longer zigging. Speed plotted at 14-15 knots.

August 12, 2100 (I)
Attack #3 -- Same target as #2 -- sunk.
Lat. 29-45 N, Long. 132-45 E, dark, moonless night -- closed to 1300 yards on surface and fired two torpedoes -- two hits. Immediately after first torpedo was fired target blew whistle and started turn to starboard. After firing second torpedo, dove for cover from stern gun (while closing the range observed several small white lights flicker in vicinity of stern gun). Explosions of both torpedoes heard (loud) on way down, timed at 70 and 78 seconds after firing (torpedo run 1750 yards). Sound never heard screws again after explosions. Diving officer had taken boat to 200 feet so it was some time before a periscope observation was obtained. Nothing could be seen through periscope. Surfaced and spent next two hours searching vicinity of attack by sight and SJ RADAR. Nothing contacted. There is no doubt in the Commanding Officer's mind that the ship sank, although it was not observed to do so.

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U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of First War Patrol.

August 13, 0441 (I): Snorkered. Serviced torpedoes.

1229 (I): Surfaced.

1625 (I): Entered Area.

1735 (I): Lat. 27-59 N, Long. 130-59 E, (89 miles from AMAMI O SHIMA). RADAR reported plane, distance 4 miles. Dove: without sighting plane. This was first and only time HADDOCK had been forced down since departure. Two bombs exploded (close) while passing 140 feet. No damage.

1918 (I): Heard screws bearing 020° relative; slow, then fast; then stopped. Came to periscope depth -- nothing sighted.

August 14, 0412 (I): SJ RADAR picked up TOKUNO SHIMA bearing 291°(T), distance 16 miles. Submerged and commenced passage between TOKUNO SHIMA and OKINOYERABU JIMA. Surfaced with TORI SHIMA bearing 057.5°(T), distance 8 miles.

August 15, 2045 (I): Dove at dawn and commended submerged patrol, course west.

August 16, 2133 (H): Lat. 27-58-00° N, Long. 123-40-00E, changed course to 228°(T) to patrol down Nagasaki -- Kirun Trade Routes.

August 18, 2215 (H): Received CTF 7's priority dispatch 180231 informing HADDOCK of passage of freighter through area. Part of message missing resulting in insufficient information to act on.

2341 (H): CTF 7's 180231 received again exactly as before with same part missing.

August 19, 1327 (H): Lat. 26-11-00° N, Long. 121-28-00E, sighted Formosa bearing 179°(T).

2321 (H): Twenty hundred position showed HADDOCK on Southern Boundary of Area. Changed course to 090°(T) -- patrolling to eastward.

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U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of First War Patrol.

August 20,
0248 (H) Lat. 26-03-00 N, Long. 121-57-00 E, sighted HOKA SHO light bearing 164°(T), distance 28 miles. Several lighted sampans sighted during night.
2120 (H) Received CTF 7's 191841, correction to 180231 regarding freighter. Missing portion of message still missing. This appears inexcusable and will be made the subject of a separate report.

August 22,
0430 (H) Vicinity of HOKA SHO light has proved barren. Decided to work to westward to vicinity of TUNGYUNG TAO light. Sighted large sampan engaged in fishing. Decided against gun attack in order not to disclose HADDOCK's presence. This proved a happy decision in view of -- Attack #4 -- 7000-Ton Freighter -- Sunk.
Lat. 26-07-00 N, 121-29-00 E, sighted heavily loaded freighter, identified as similar to SHINNA MARU, Made attack. 1240 fired four torpedoes -- two hits followed by terrific internal explosions and fire in after part of ship. Survivors took to boats -- target sank from sight in 12 minutes with bow pointing skyward. Pictures taken.

August 24,
0250 (H) Sighted TUNGYUNG TAO light bearing 240°(T) distance 20 miles.

August 26,
0145 (H) Attack #5 -- 10,000 Ton Freighter -- sunk.
Lat. 26-27-30 N, Long. 121-23-00 E, SJ RADAR reported contact, distance 12,000 yards bearing 0670 relative. Full moon and cloudless sky made undetected surface attack impossible. Plotted enemy course and speed -- went to full speed and set course to gain position ahead for early morning submerged attack. Kept continuous contact with target on RADAR until -- 0440 (H) daybreak, submerged on target's track.
0520 (H) Target sighted for first time, identified as 10,000 ton freighter similar to AFRICA MARU class. Made attack. Fired four torpedoes from stern tubes -- all missed. Swung hard and fired two torpedoes from bow tubes -- 1 hit. Target settled slowly to stern -- no fire or explosions -- crew took to boats -- sank from sight in 30 minutes with bow point skyward.
Lat. 27-05-00 N, Long. 121-23-00 E, pictures taken.

August 27, Sea too rough for periscope observations -- remained

- 4 -

ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 17 —
1. U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of First War Patrol.
2. August 28, at 100 feet. Efforts to overhaul badly flooded torpedo unsuccessful. Serviceable torpedoes remaining - 4 forward, 3 aft; total 7.
3. August 29, Sea abated. Resumed patrol at periscope depth. Closed TUNGYUNG TAO light during day. Patrolled well inside its visibility arc during night.
4. August 30, Patrolling close in to TUNGYUNG TAO light. After surfacing started working to eastward - vicinity of TUNGYUNG TAO unproductive.
5. August 31, After surfacing at night sea was smooth enough to investigate "bumping" noise which had been getting progressively worse during past five days. Determined to be shutter on #1 torpedo tube, which rumbles with the motion of the ship, ending each roll with a "clump". #1 tube has no torpedo in it so will not affect firing but may prove very embarrassing if Jap DD or patrol boat gets on top of HADDOCK.
6. September 1, Suspicious of "Fishing Trawler" of about 500 tons in vicinity since last night -- two high stick masts with radio antennae, very tall stack admiships and large box structure aft which seems to serve no apparent purpose -- burns bright white lights at night appears to fish for awhile, then runs on east-west course.
7. September 2, Patrolling north of HOKA SHO.
8. September 3, Patrolling between HOKA SHO and SENTO SHOSHO.
9. September 4, 0856 (H) Heard explosion -- not very close -- (0900) second explosion -- closer -- went deep.
10. 0935 (H) Returned to periscope depth -- sighted patrol plane circling close aboard at about 100 feet altitude -- after torpedo room reported hearing another explosion -- returned to 150 feet.
11. 1100 (H) Periscope depth -- all clear.
12. 1930 (H) After surfacing ran till dawn at 10 knots, course east, to take up patrol in Japan Stream.

— page 18 —
1. Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of First War Patrol.
2. September 5, 7, -Patrolling Japan Stream west of OKINAWA JIMA.
3. September 6, 7, -After surfacing at night set course to clear China Sea for eastern sector of area, passing south of OKINAWA TIMA. Sighted several small lighted sampans west of KUME SHIMA.
4. September 8, 2007 (I) Received CTF 7's 071911 re NATORI's scheduled overhaul at SASEBO.
5. Sept. 8, 9, Sept. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 to 18 miles. Surfaced.
6. Sept. 12, 1800 (I) Entered 8min 300 mile circle.
7. Sept. 13, 0829 (I) Lat. 29-16-00 N., Long. 141-19-00 E., Plan on radar -- 16 to 18 miles. - dove without sighting.
8. Sept. 14, 0925 (K) Lat. 29-28-30 N., Long. 146-31-00 E., Plane on radar - 3 miles -- dove without sighting.
9. Sept. 15, 1200 (K) Entered Marcus 300 mile circle.
10. Sept. 17, 1700 (L) Entered Wake 500 mile circle.
11. Sept. 19, 1330 (T) Recovered with report.
12. Sept. 1513 (Y) Arrived Midway.

2. WEATHER:
Weather was excellent. Although August and September are "Typhoon Season" no storms were experienced. Submerged patrol was maintained at periscope depth (with five minutes between exposures) the entire time in area except for a total of two and one-half days of rough seas. Judging from the amount

— page 20 —
6. DESCRIPTION OF AIRCRAFT SIGHTED:

Date   Time   Position Course   Altitude   Description
7-28  :1600(W) :22-21N :310°(T) :2000 ft. :U.S. Navy Patrol.
    : 159-17W:
7-29  :0658(W) :24-00N :305°(T) :1500 ft. :U.S. Army Bomber.
    : 163-19W:
7-30  :1042(X) :25-35N :290°(T) :1500 ft. :U.S. Navy Patrol.
    : 167-30W:
8-1   :0500(Y) :28-13N :290°(T) :1000 ft. :3 U.S. Army
    :177-22W :
8-13  :1735(I) :27-59N :--- :

— page 21 —
1) : (2) : (3) : (4) : (5) : (6)
Attack : 1 : 2# : 3# : 4 : 5# : 5#
Date : 8-11 : 8-12 : 8-12 : 8-22 : 8-26 : 8-26
Location : 29-06N : 28-28N : 29-38N : 26-07N : 27-05N : 27-05N
: 138-27E : 133-13E : 132-53E : 121-29E : 121-23E : 121-23E
Torpedoes:
Fired : 1 : 3 : 2 : 4 : 4 : 2
Hits : 0 : 1 : 2 : 2 : 0 : 1
Number : : 9000-Ton:7000-Ton: : 10,000-Ton
sunk : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0
Number : : 9000-Ton:
Damaged : : : : : : :
Type of : 1000-ton:9000-ton:9000-ton:7000-ton:10,000-ton:10,000-T
Target :Trawler :Freighter.freighter:frft. :Frt. :Freighter
Range : 1100 : 750 : 1300 : 1700 :1180 : 1700
:
Periscope:
Depth : yes : yes : yes : yes : yes
Surface : : : : : : :
Night : : : : : : :
Est.Draft: 10 ft : 15 ft. : 15 ft. : 16ft : 20 ft. : 20 ft.
Depth Set: 12 ft : 10 ft. : 10 ft. : 10 ft. : 10 ft. : 10 ft.
Bow or : : : : : : :
Stern Shot:Stern : Bow : Bow : Bow : Stern : Bow
Track angle:90°P : 70°P : 180° : 90°P : 90°S : 115°S
Gyro Angle:10°L. : 10°R. : 100° : 10°R. : 13°R. : 35°L.
Est.Target: : : : : : :
Speed : 10 kts. : 12 kts : 12 kts. : 10 kts. : 8 kts. : 8 kts.
Firing Int: -- : 8 sec. : 8 sac. : 9 sac. : 10 sec. : 10 sec.
Spread : -- : 4°div. : 1°div. : 3°div. : 3°div. : 2° div.

# Attacks 2 & 3 were successive attacks on same ship.

# Column 5 shows data for stern shots and column 6 shows data for bow shots fired during attack #5.

- 9 -

ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 22 —
1000 Ton Trawler.

When the target was identified as a 1000 ton Trawler I decided to spare one torpedo to "start the ball rolling" and put all hands in the proper frame of mind -- a poor decision. The set-up was an elementary one in every respect. Target on steady course at slow speed. Frequent observations were taken so that prior to firing I was confident all data: course, speed, and range, in the T.D.C. was correct. A 90° track was used, straight stern shot, and range closed to 1100 yards. During the 30 seconds just before firing a series of bearings were taken and checked on. Only 2 seconds elapsed between final bearing and firing torpedo. After firing I observed no wake by means of the smoke which was plainly visible. The wake (smoke) passed under the stern of the target. The target was approximately 290 feet long and the torpedo set for 12 feet (Mark XV). Therefore the torpedo must have passed under the ship. Nothing happened. I am unable to account for this unless:

(a) The torpedo ran deep.
(b) The Trawler had insufficient metal in her hull to actuate the exploder.
(c) The exploder was faulty.

Needless to say, the morale effect was exactly opposite to that hoped for. One torpedo wasted.

Attack No. 2: -- 9000 Ton Freighter.
Attack No. 3:

This ship was "either a naval auxiliary or else had an exceptionally well trained crew and alert watch. This was evidenced by (a) the correction of the list and standing on after being hit.(b) the speed with which the stern gun was manned and (c) the accuracy of fire. The "zing" of the shells ricocheting near the periscope was plainly audible through the hull to all those in the conning tower.

Also, as mentioned in the narrative, a few seconds after the first torpedo was fired in the night attack, the HADDOCK was sighted, whistle sounded and the rudder put hard right. This last action, turning, was of course a fatal error as the HADDOCK was firing on a 180° track.

— page 23 —
7000 Ton Freighter

As in the case of attack No. 1, the torpedo wakes (smoke) were again plainly visible throughout the run. This excessive smoke is obviously a great help to any fast manoeuvrable target such as a destroyer or cruiser in taking avoiding action and steps should be taken to eliminate it or reduce it as much as possible.

Attack No. 5 -- 10,000 Ton Freighter.

This ship was obviously a naval auxiliary. She was painted dark gray and her crew wore clean white uniforms. Five (5) life boats were manned and clear of the ship a few minutes after being hit. The boats formed column under oars until the ship sank, then hoisted sail and headed west.

The failure of the four (4) stern shots to hit can not be explained except for the possibility that an incorrect final bearing was inadvertently put into the T.D.C.

8. ENEMY A/S MEASURES:

No escorts or patrol craft were encountered. The only A/S action was from planes as stated in the narrative.

9. MAJOR DEFECTS:

A. ORDNANCE:

(a) Gyro Setting Indicator Regulator.

On August 26, 1942, while holding drill on gyro setting indicator regulators, the unit in the after torpedo room failed to slew properly. When thrown to the slew position, the machine would automatically slew 40 to 60 degrees in one direction, step, and then slew 40 to 60 degrees in the other direction. Contacts were inspected and cleaned and an examination was conducted insofar as possible without disassembling the unit. During this examination the machine became inoperative in the automatic position as well as in the slew position. The indicating feature continued to operate. Because of the lack of an experienced fire controlman and because torpedoes remained in the after tubes, decision was made to use hand metering rather than to disassemble the machine and risk making the indicating feature inoperative also.

— page 24 —
1. Target Bearing Transmitter.
2. Torpedo No. 18173 (Mk 14-1) flooded in the tube. This leak escaped detection until an internal pressure was applied to the afterbody. The forward bulkhead of the afterbody showed severe leakage around its seat. The bulkhead, turbines, etc., were removed; seat and gasket inspected. No defects visible. All parts replaced and bulkhead studs very carefully set up. The leak continued. It is evident that the forward bulkhead is warped. This torpedo was overhauled at N.T.S., Newport, boxed and shipped to New London; assembled, given preliminary and final adjustments and delivered to this vessel by Submarine Base, New London.

B. C & R
(a) Bow Planes
On September 10th, the two large bronze shear pins (located in superstructure) on outboard shaft of bow plane rigging gear sheared upon surfacing at night. The bow planes could not be rigged in until pins were replaced; which was accomplished the same night. This is the fourth set of those pins which have been sheared.

(b) Torpedo Tube Shutter.
On August 26th, a rumbling noise was heard developing from vicinity of No. 1 torpedo tube. This noise became progressively louder, and on night of August 31 calm seas allowed an officer to go on deck to more closely investigate noise. Noise definitely decreased when shutter of No. 1 tube was open. Shutter and outer door was therefore left open when submerged for rest of patrol.

- 12 - ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 25 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of First War Patrol.

B. C & R.

(a) Air Leaks.

Soon after arriving on station it was noted through periscope that bubbles consistently formed in forward group of main ballast tanks and occasionally formed in middle and after group ballast tanks. After three hours submerged when tanks were vented boat would become from 500 to 2000 pounds heavier. This leaking was traced partly to leaky forward group valve on 600 pound mainfold. To minimize leaking the main ballast tank distribution valves on high pressure manifold were kept closed as well as group valves. All valves on 600 pound, high pressure and 200 pound manifolds should be chocked and reground as necessary. All air bottle connections should be checked for leaks.

(d) Periscopes.

After about three weeks of patrol the use of the attack (No. 2) periscope was hampered by fogging. This fogging occurred to a lesser degree in No. 1 periscope.

(c) Fresh Water Tanks.

During the last three weeks of patrol ship's fresh water developed a brownish color and a disagreeable taste. Fresh water tanks should be cleaned, scraped and coated with cement before next patrol.

(f) Pressure Hull -- Propeller Guard Struts.

On September 18th, three cracks varying in length from four to fourteen inches were found in the skin of ship, starboard side, in after torpedo room where forward propeller guard strut is welded to ship's side; at the corresponding place on the port side several cracks were also discovered. The salt encrusted on cracks and the rust stains beneath the cracks indicated that they were at least several days old. At time of discovery ship was on surface and no water was coming through cracks; however that afternoon cracks were observed while ship was at 80 feet; a small trickle of water was leaking through port cracks.

- 13 - INCLOSURE (C)

— page 26 —
14 - DECLASSIFIED

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of First War Patrol.

Just prior to leaving Midway at start of this patrol, three cracks in sides of after trim tank were discovered at points where propeller guard struts were welded to ship. These cracks were welded and null was strengthened at these points with brackets and strengthening pieces. The limited time available prevented FULTON from strengthening all points where struts were welded to pressure hull.

Cracks must be welded and pressure hull strengthened with brackets and backing pieces at all points where struts join ship's sides.

C. ENGINEERING:

(a) Crank Bearing.

On August 6th, a knock was heard in No. 1 Main Engine. Investigation showed that the bearing metal had crumbled away in No. 4 upper crank bearing. This bearing was replaced from spares and engine was operating satisfactorily again after being out of commission for fourteen hours.

(b) Air Conditioning.

On August 8th, No. 1.ir Conditioning Unit lost charge of. From gas. Investigation disclosed a bad leak in the return line from the after cooler unit. This required removal of. Considerable lagging and silver soldering of the leak. The leak was caused by a poor solder joint on a sleeve union.

(c) Air Starting Bottle.

On return trip the head on port air starting bottle for main engines carried away. Investigation showed that the sweated joint between the head and bottle broke. This caused loss of starting air to engines. . . .s there are no stop valves in lines to the bottles it was necessary to cut and blank off the line to the affected bottle.

-14- DECLASSIFIED (C)

— page 27 —
15 - ENCLOSURE (C)

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

**Subject:** U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of First War Patrol.

**D. COMMUNICATIONS:**

(a) **DQ Antennae.**

The DQ antennae leaks around the flange through the pressure hull. The lower shaft is salted and the leads from the loop grounded. Ship's force has made several attempts to take up on this flange but without success. It will be necessary to remove the flange from the pressure hull and reseat it.

(b) **S.J. Radar.**

Upon surfacing September 11th, noticed that SJ Radar produced no echoes from waves even though sea quite rough. Checked as thoroughly as possible with test equipment on board -- found nothing wrong. While submerged on September 12th, changed number of tubes and other parts. Obtained wave echoes upon surfacing that night. Exact cause of trouble not known.

---

**10. RADIO RECEPTION:**

Reception was good on 26.1, 8230, and 16-460 kcs. except just before and during sunrise or sunset. Even then it was possible to copy 8230 kcs. However, whenever sunrise occurred at about 1900 GCT (when NPM discontinues 8230 kcs.) there was about an hour when the schedule could not be copies. 12,345 kcs. was not heard during the patrol. 53 to 55 interference from a Japanese station close to 8230 kcs. was heard nightly from 1000 to 1130 GCT. Another Japanese station was noticed close to 450 kcs occasionally -- usually for about five minutes or the hour. Time ticks were received from NPG (San Francisco) on 12,540 kcs. at 1455 GCT and from JSC (Japanese) at 1155 GCT. None could be received from NPM.

When 650 miles west of Midway, tried to raise NPM on 8470 kcs., then 16,940 kcs., than 4235 kcs., without success. Called NPS on 4265 kcs.; no answer. Called NPS and left on 12795 kcs., both answered immediately and reported HADDOCK's signal strength five. Message ignored through NPS.

Last Message received -- Dainty, 071911.
Last Message Sent -- Heinous, 180011.
No message was sent or received on 450 kcs.

— page 28 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of First War Patrol.

11. COULD CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS:

Sound conditions in the patrol area were in no way unusual. In depth of less than 30 fathoms very little could be heard over the background noise. In deeper water (50 fathoms) the equipment could be operated with almost maximum gain without too much static. No density layers were observed.

12. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY:

Health was very good throughout the patrol. One case of yellow jaundice, one infected cut on leg and two finger tips cut off were all successfully treated by the Pharmacist's Mate (one finger tip was his). The Quartermaster sustained a possible fracture of the arm on the return trip which will require further diagnosis upon arrival.

Vitamin capsules were taken regularly by all hands until the supply was exhausted. It is recommended that the allowance be increased to 4000 per patrol.

With the exception of the three days when one air conditioning unit was out of commission the boat was very comfortable. CO2 absorbent and fresh air from ship's banks were used almost daily while in the area.

Meals were served at the normal times. Lunch was served at noon and dinner in the evening. This routine proved very satisfactory.

The diet was varied and the food well prepared. The cooks baked bread, cake and pies every night of the patrol. A cook's striker would greatly ease the work load in the galley. The absence of frozen foods was keenly felt. The HADDOCK was able to procure but once item of frozen food (peas) at Pearl and none at Midway. This was a great disappointment in view of all the correspondance during the past year regarding the desirability, benefits, etc., of supplying submarines on icing patrols with frozen foods.

13. MILES STEAMED:

To Station: 4471 On station: 2270 From Station: 3011

14. FUEL OIL EXPENDED:

97,000 gallons

- 16 - ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 29 —
15. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING:
Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions(days) | Fresh water | Personnel(days)
8 | 6,000 | 11 | 600 gal. | 7

16. FACTOR OF ENDURANCE CAUSING BED OF PATROL:
(a) Provisions of operation order.
(b) Fuel.

17. REMARKS:
S.J. RADAR:

As the H.DDOCK is the first submarine to go on patrol equipped with an SJ Radar the following remarks are submitted as possible help to others who have been or are being similarly equipped.

The SJ was manned during hours of darkness on the surface throughout entire patrol. Continuous sweeping was maintained. Three operators (2 RM and 1 FC) stood 1 hour watches -- 1 on -- 2 off. One hour seems to be about the limit for an efficient watch due to eyestrain and concentration required. In this connection most of the Radar operators (both SJ and SD) on board have found that wearing green goggles eases eyestrain while watching the screen.

The equipment gave very good performance. Nine of the ten times that it went out of commission the fault was quickly remedied by the CRM. One failure however, required about twenty hours to correct. It is considered essential that all submarines with SJ Radar have a thoroughly competent radar material man on board. The H.DDOCK is fortunate in having such a man who is a Radar School Graduate and spends many hours "nursing" the SJ to insure peak performance. Although casualties were few the equipment required daily adjustment and careful checking.

Prior to surfacing each night the boat was planed up to forty feet (SJ seven foot above water) and held at that depth while two complete sweeps were made in hand power. This requires about four minutes. When SJ reported "all clear" the surface alarm was sounded. It is important to continue searching while

— page 30 —
U.S.S. H.DDOCK - Report of First War Patrol.

During the approach and attack on the night of August 12th and while tracking the target during the night of August 25th, the SJ gave continuous ranges and bearings for the T.D.C. In the first instance radar contact was made at 13,600 yards and in the second at 12,200 yards. During night attack two SJ operators are used -- once to train and read bearings, the other to read ranges.

The lack of a good means of two-way communication between the Commanding Officer on the bridge and the control party and SJ operators in the conning tower was keenly felt during night attacks. It is hoped that prior to the next patrol one of the following will be installed: Pressure-proof speaker and throat microphone or bridge voice tube into the conning tower with outlets at the steering station and T.D.C.

Small sampans as close as 2000 yards could not be picked up even when radar was coached on the exact bearing by the O.O.D.

Opportunities to use the SJ for navigation during the patrol were very limited. Ranges and bearings were obtained as follows:

| Range | TUNNYUNG TAO | TUNNYUNG SHIMA | TUNNYUNG TAO | TUNNYUNG SHIMA |
|-------|||||
| 500   | 500 ft. high  | 500 ft. high  | 500 ft. high  | 500 ft. high  |
| 10 miles | 10 miles      | 10 miles      | 10 miles      | 10 miles      |
| 16 miles | 16 miles     | 16 miles     | 16 miles     | 16 miles     |

Impulse Pressures:

For all firings except the surface attack, impulse of 300 lbs./sq.in. was used for the after tubes and 350 lbs./sq.in. was used for the forward tubes. In all cases ejection was satisfactory and all torpedoes ran hot and straight.

- 18 -

ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 32 —
FC5-10/A16-3
(FB5-101)    SUBMARINE SQUADRON TEN    on
Serial 030    Care of Fleet Post Office;
    San Francisco, California,
    September 23, 1942.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION:
From:    The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To:    The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject:    U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231), First War Patrol -
    Comments on.

Reference:    (a) CO HADDOCK Conf 1tr SS231/A16-3 Serial 046
    of Sept. 19, 1942.

1. The HADDOCK's first war patrol lasted 53 days,
   of which 29 days were spent in the assigned area. The patrol
   was terminated in accordance with the operation order.

2. The HADDOCK's first war patrol was aggressively
   conducted. Only seven contacts were made with enemy vessels
   and all three of the only worthwhile enemy vessels were sunk.
   The tenacity of the Commanding Officer in two of the attacks
   is highly commendable.

3. The Commanding Officer's discussion concerned-
   ing the SJ Radar are highly appropriate and informative. It
   is further noted that the HADDOCK is the first submarine to
   go on patrol with it, and the intelligent use of this instru-
   ment proved its worth.

4. The Commanding Officer, officers, and crew are
   to be congratulated on a well-conducted, aggressive and fruit-
   ful war patrol.

5. The HADDOCK is undergoing refit at Midway.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 33 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division ONE HUNDRED TWO, The Commander Submarines, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - First War Patrol - Comment on.

Reference: (a) C.O. HADDOCK Conf. 1tr. SS231/A16-3, Serial 046 of September 19, 1942.

1. The outstanding feature of the Haddock's first war patrol is that every target of value sighted was sent to the bottom. To accomplish this excellent performance, an aggressive "follow-up" was necessary in two of the three attacks. In the first case an eight and one half hour intelligently conducted surface-chase resulted in what is considered to be the certain sinking of a ship previously damaged. In the second case an unsuccessful stern-tube attack was followed by a quick and accurate maneuver to bring the bow tubes to bear with desired effect. In this attack it is noteworthy that the Commanding Officer withold his fire with the bow.tubes until the torpedo gyro angle had been reduced to 350. This forebearance, under stress, but for which he was richly rewarded is commendable. Furthermore, it shows a proper appreciation of the tactical limitations of the Mark XIV torpedo.

2. The employment of the SJ radar which assisted in bringing two of the three attacks to successful conclusion is of great interest. The Commanding Officer's thorough discussion of the radar in paragraph 17 is timely since it is the first submarine service test of this instrument. Except for the remark regarding the constant "nursing" of the equipment by a Radar School graduate, it is encouraging.

3. MATERIAL

Haddock's refit will be accomplished by the Fulton at Midway. The Commanding Officer's decision to leave the partly inoperative after torpedo gyro setting indicator regulator for the tender to repair due to the lack of an experienced fire controlman on board is concurred in reluctantly. This condition of having untrained personnel on patrol is one with which all submarines will be confronted until such time as a pool of properly trained men can be built up in the relief crews. In the meantime, good luck and sensible decisions of this sort will play their part.

— page 34 —
83671
DECLASSIFIED
FF12-10/A16-3(?), SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01/24
RECEIVED SC FILES
Roon: FS055
Jan 2 1943
DECLASSIFIED
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Second War Patrol.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of Division Engineer, Subdiv 42
    Conf 1tr FB5-42/A16-3/Serial 080 of
    December 10, 1942.
    (B) Copy of subject war patrol.

1. The second war patrol of the U.S.S. HADDOCK was marked by good judgment in developing attacks and in reaching favorable firing positions. Although the percentage of hits was low (20.8%), damage inflicted upon the enemy reached a gratifying total.

2. The attacks can be divided into two groups, i.e., the first four in which a total of 12 torpedoes were fired resulting in only one hit, and the second four attacks in which one hit was scored on each of four targets. In the condition under which the last four attacks were conducted, and considering the spreads employed, the percentage of hits was all that could be reasonably expected. The purpose of employing a spread is to cover errors in estimate of target course and speed or maneuvers of the target to avoid. If all torpedoes of a spread were to hit in all cases, then it might be assumed that improper spreads were employed. Considering that the number of hits obtained on the last four attacks was normal, it is impossible to blame the very low number of hits on the first four attacks, and the low over all hit percentage on erratic torpedo performance.

3. It is regretted that, because all torpedoes had been expended, the HADDOCK was unable to deliver the mortal blow to the 10,000 ton tanker which lay at her mercy for more than one hour.

— page 36 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK -- Report of Second Patrol.
Period from October 11, 1942 to December 4, 1942.
Operation Order 92-42.

Arrived Midway on September 19, 1942 from First Patrol. Commenced refit on September 20, 1942, by Submarines Base personnel assisted by FULTON repair forces. Completed refit on October 9, 1942. Readiness for sea on October 11, 1942. Not departed nor wiped; no training period.

1. NARRATIVE:
October 11, 0602 (Y) Underway from Midway enroute patrol area. Air and surface escort to 30-mile circle. On surface except for daily training dives.

1215 (Y) Flane on radar -- 8 miles -- dove. Surfaced.

CROSSED INTERNATIONAL DATE-LINE.

October 19, 1200 (K) Entered Bonin 300-mile circle.

1330 (I) Sighted plane on port bow -- 10 miles -- dove -- held fire control drills. Surfaced.

1541 (I) Shaved bow plane pins on surfacing from training dive. Spare installed during night.

1910 (I) Shaved bow plane pins on surfacing from training dive. Spare installed during night.

October 20, 1648 (I) Sighted TORI SHIMA bearing 258° (T), distance 30 miles.

October 21, 1600 (I) During depth charge attack drill blew negative tank gasket.

October 22, 1630 (I) Sighted 3 planes on port bow -- 7 miles -- dove. Held drills submerged. Surfaced.

1900 (I)

— page 37 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK -- Report of Second War Patrol.

October 23, 0220 (I) Sighted YAKU SHIMA bearing 300°(T), distance 15 miles.
0400 (I) Dove and commenced passage through TOKARA KAIKYO (COUNTRY STRAIT).
1645 (I) Entered area.
1911 (I) Surfaced with KUSAKAI SHIMA bearing 317°(T), distance 35 miles. Set course for vicinity of ME SHIMA light. (DANJO GUNTO).
2100 (I) Sighted KUSAKAI SHIMA light bearing 350°(T), distant 20 miles.
2100(I) Received CTF-71's secret 222049 assigning HADDOCK additional area for entire patrol.
October 24, 1923 (I) Sheared another pair of bow plane pins upon surfacing. Spares installed during night.
October 25, Patrolling vicinity of ME SHIMA.
October 26, Patrolling vicinity of O SHIMA.
1905 (I) Surfaced and patrolled to westward between CSE SAI light and TOKI SHIMA.
1925 (I) Sighted O SHIMA light bearing 350°(T), distant 12 miles.
October 27, 0555 (I) Shortly after diving at morning twilight, sound picked up fast screws moving up port side close aboard. No details could be observed through periscope but inistinct silhouette indicated patrol craft. Turn count and change of bearing showed speed of about 20 knots.
1630 (I) Sighted smoke bearing 330°(T). Changed course and speed but unable to close range. Plotted probable course and trailed until dark.

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 38 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK -- Report of Second War Patrol.

October 27, (Cont'd).
1900 (I) Surfaced -- went to 4-engine speed on course to intercept. Target should have been overtaken by 2215. No contact by 2300 so reversed course and stood back to northward.

October 28, Patrolling vicinity of OSE SAKI light.

1923 (I) Sighted OSE SAKI light bearing 075°(T), distant 18 miles.

2145 (I) Received CTF-7's 262125 re: running depth of torpedoes.

October 29, 0710 (I) Sighted trawler of about 300 tons bearing 105°(T).

1900 (I) After surfacing, set course for vicinity of SAISHU TO. Sighted a total of 12 sampans during night.

October 30, 0220 (I) SD Radar picked up SAISHU TO, distance 30 miles. 0240 (I) Sighted island on starboard bow.

October 30, 31, Patrolling vicinity of MARO TO light.

October 31, 0845 (I) Attack No. 1 - 6000 Ton Freighter -- Miss. with MARA TO light bearing 3190°(T), distant 7 miles, sighted ship bearing 0670°(T), distance 7 miles. Made attack, 0924 (I) Fired 3 torpedoes from stern tubes. Target made radical turn left and successfully evaded all torpedoes -- dropped one depth charge -- swung hard right and stood off, undamaged, before bow tubes could be brought to bear. (See particulars of attack).

2115 (I) With about 12 lighted sampans in sight SJ radar reported contact -- range 4200 yards bearing 3550°(R). No sampan was on this bearing. Range closing rapidly -- changed course, went to full speed. Radar lost contact at 5000 yards.

- 3 -

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 40 —
1. U.S.S. HANCOCK
- Report of Second 'ar Patrol.
- Reluctance, the attack abandoned as hopeless under the circumstances. The shins were freighter's of about 6000 to 8000 tons and an old type DD.

This was particularly hard to take after the unsuccessful attack in the mornin'.

My estimate of the situation at the time, and decisions reached were as follows:

1. Night surface attack -- explained above.

2. Night submerged attack -- on the assumption that a successful one could be made against a zig-zagging target, I had to discard this as my battery was low and there remained only 3½ hours before morning twilight.
Reason for low battery at this time of the night: After mornin' attack on freighter I ran at 2/3 speed (3.5 knots) instead of dead slow for 6 hours, in order to surface well to the south of the scene of attack. Battery had been watered during the afternoon.
The encounter with the patrol boats at 2115 and 2145 had caused charge to be secured to give full speed. After an hour on four engines, speed was changed to three engines and charge resumed on one engine. As a result, the battery was less than half charged at 2345 when these shins were sighted.

3. Gain position ahead for mornin' submerged attack -- plotted position and remaining night's run which showed that with best speed available (3 engines) and comolition the battery charge enroute (1 engine), gunrock could not reach position ahead of target by daylight.

November 1-4, Patrollon the Trade Poutcs leading to the Formosa Straits.

— page 41 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK -- Report of Second Var Patrol.

November 1,
2125 (I)
With five or six lighted samplers within a radius of 2 miles, SJ Radar picked up patrol boat, range 4200 yards. Went to flank speed to clear. Sighted second patrol boat on starboard quarter. (See comments under A/S measures).

2209 (I)
Lat. 31-47 N., Long. 126-00 E., sighted brightly lighted ship on starboard bow. As range decreased identified as hospital ship with illuminated red cross. Probably headed for Nagasaki.

November 3,
0210 (I)
Attack No. 2 -- 10,052 Ton Tanker -- Sunk.
Lat. 32-02 N., Long. 125-15 E., 3rd Radar reported contact, distance 9050 yards bearing 350°(R). HADDOCK between target and half moon one hour high. Went to full speed and crossed track ahead of target to place target in moon. Observed target was large tanker fully loaded on course 218°(T). Closed to 1700 yards and fired 3 torpedoes -- one hit"amidships followed by terrific explosion. Tanker broke in two and sank in 4 minutes. Identified as similar to TOA MARU. (See particulars of attack).

Cleared vicinity of attack to southward at high speed during remaining 2½ hours before daylight.

0853 (I)
Heard distant explosions.

Sighted approximately 20 lighted samplers during night.

November 4,
0756 (I)
Sighted 2 small fishing trawlers.

1525 (I)
Sighted 2 small fishing trawlers.

November 5,
Patrolling vicinity of TORI SHIMA.

Patrolling northward to vicinity of YOKUNO to light -- sighted 18 lighted samplers during night.

-6-

ENCLOSURE (4)

— page 43 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK -- Report of Second Paratrol.

November 8, 0514 (I)
(Cont'd)

and changed course to close but the change in bearing and range soon slowed it was a hopeless chase. Smoke of three more ships came into sight making a total of seven. Continued at high speed for an hour in case they should change course but they stood steadily on. The closest the HADDOCK was able to get was to see their tops and smoke. Convoy course plotted on about 110°(T), which would be the course for an incoming convoy from Darien after rounding KAKYO TO and heading for the pass north of SAISHU TO. Had we been a few miles to the north we would have had our long awaited chance.

Heading north to close KAKYO TO light.

1303 (I)
attack No. 4 -- 6500 Ton Freighter -- Miss. 9 miles, sighted ship on westerly course headed for the light. Closed to attack. 1327 (I) Fired 3 torpedoes from stern tubes. All missed. Target's speed (15 knots) and change of course prevented favorable follow up with bow tubes. (See Particulars of attack).

1626 (I)
Plane dropped bomb -- not very close.

1650 (I)
Plane dropped second bomb -- same range as first.

1943 (I)
Upon surfacing, rounded KAKYO TO light, headed north and commenced patrolling the trade route to and from Darien.

November 11, 1931 (I)
attack No. 5 -- 7000 Ton Freighter -- Surk. Lat. 35-34 N., Long. 123-59 E., leveled off at 40 feet just prior to surfacing, making routine sweep with SJ Radar. Radar made contact -- bearing 170°(R) -- range 1800 yards. (Sound had previously reported all clear -- evidently failing to recognize screws through sound of HADDOCK's screws on this bearing). Sent to 100 feet, slowed, and tracked ship by sound until satis-fied it was clear. Returned to 40 feet and tracked ship by Radar. When range reached 5000 yards

- 8 -

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 44 —
1931 (I)
(Cont'd).

November 11, 1931 (I)
(Cont'd).

surface and went to 4 engines to gain
position for attack after monsoon. 2007
Monsoon. Clear starlit night, excellent
visibility. Target plotted on course 288°(r),
speed 10 knots. 2115 Fired 4 torpedoes on
800 track -- range 1900 yards. One hit --
aft -- which blew the stern off. Target did
not catch fire but settled rapidly and
commenced sending S.O.S. to H.D.DOCK by small
flashing light. No distress signal heard
by radio. Bow pointed skyward and ship went
under 15 minutes after being hit. Target
identified as freighter similar to LORDS
I.R.U.

2100 (I) Received CTF-7's secret 102320. Position -
in Yellow Sea, 110 miles northwest of HAYO
TO. Although results obtained to date have
been disappointing, area has not been un-
productive. Fuel on hand is not sufficient
to make 775 mile trip to ALOY. Therefore
decided not to investigate ALOY locality.

November 12, 1942, Patrolling northward along the trade routes,
heading for the SHIMANO FROGMOUTH.

November 13, Dove 50 miles southeast of SHIMANO
FROM CTF-7 and decided against proceeding
further north due to proximity of
several shoal spots (lack of silt and
strong variable currents make position very
doubtful). Reversed course.

-9- HISTORIC "B"

HISTORIC "B"

— page 45 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of Second War Patrol.

November 13, 2135 (I)
Attack No. 6 -- 6989 Torr Reighter -- Sunk,
Attack No. 7 -- Unidentified Tanker -- Damaged,
Lat. 36-01.5 N., Long. 125-56.2 E., 50 Radar reported contact -- ranger 13,000 yards. Closed to attack. 2208 Fired 3 torpedoes at 1450 yards -- 1 hit -- loud explosion. Target steered to settle -- did not catch fire. Target sending S.O.S. and signalling by flashing light. Put lifeboat in water which also kept flashing a signal lamp. 2230 While lying off at 2500 yards watching target sink (target not two-thirds under water), ordered Radar to make a complete sweep. Radar immediately reported contact -- range 4200 yards. Sent ahead flank speed and obtained set-up on new target. S.Vung to attack. Closed to 1400 yards -- fired 3 torpedoes -- 1 hit -- only small flash visible from bridge when torpedo hit and muffled explosion heard below decks. Target did not catch fire but slowed to three knots and after several minutes changed course 600 to the left, then reversed course to the right. By this time HADDOCK had slowed to 2/3 speed while I considered the advisability of going in again to finish his off with our two remaining torpedoes (stern tubes) when once was a gun flash dead astern. This came from the far side of the target, 100 to the right of target's bearing and from an estimated range of 6000 yards. Trained Radar on bearing of gun flash but could not get a contact. This indicated no large ship on this bearing. The did not preclude the presence of a DD or patrol boat, as the seas, which had been steadily increasing during the two attacks, had now reached a state of "rough". Under such conditions, experience has shown that the S.O.S. can not be counted on to get a "pip" from smaller ships at this range. Therefore assumed gun was fired from escort and decided these was no time to maneuver for stern shot. Cleared vicinity at full speed.

The first target was identified as a freighter similar to the L.E.A. U.S. and the second target as a very large tanker. (See particulars of attack).

-10-

— page 46 —
1650 (I)
Just prior to diving at dawn SJ radar reported contact on starboard bow -- range 13,000 yards. Insufficient time remaining before daybreak to get in surface attack or get ahead for daylight submerged attack. Bearings obtained indicated SHANGHAI as destination.

Attack No. 8 -- 10,000 Ton Tanker -- Damaged. Lat. 31-52 N., Long. 126-14.5 E., sighted large tanker on starboard beam. Closed to attack. Attempted to cross target's track as only remaining torpedoes were two in stern tubes. Tanker making 14 knots -- unable to get across -- swung stern for 900 track -- fired last 2 torpedoes at 1300 yards range -- 1 hit just forward of amidships. "When explosion cleared no damage was apparent except target slowed and started to circle. Target did not catch fire or take a list. About 3 minutes after observing the torpedo hit, observed (and heard) another explosion well aft. Expected to see his stern blown apart when explosion cleared but instead he still showed no above-water damage. Fired stern gun at periscope. Rigged out port and starboard lifeboats but did not put them in the water. Target continued to circle until dark -- (1 hour - 15 minutes) steadying for about 5 minutes every 40-50 degrees. During this time HADOCK remained at 3000 yards continually observing target. Set-up in TDC kept checking target speed at 2 knots. As it became dark target steadied on course 0480(T), (original course had been 0580(T), and slowly stood off -- no fire or list but by now settled about 3 feet by the stern. Target identified as similar to KOKUYO MARU and was empty.

Considering (a) the small chance of damaging a large empty tanker with gunfire and (b) the heavy odds against the HADOCK in a gun duel, I decided to clean the vicinity at 6 knots.

— page 47 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK -- Report of Second War Patrol.

November 16, 1650 (I)
(Cont'd)
Upon surfacing an hour later no contact by radar or sight was made. Set course to clear area -- all torpedoes expended.

November 18, 0515 (I)
Cleared area two days ahead of final date.

November 20, 1300 (I)
Entered Bonin 300 mile circle.

November 29, 0655 (M)
Upon surfacing from pre-dawn dive sheared third set of bow plane pins. Changed course to put sea on quarter and replaced pins.

1326 (M)
Exchanged recognition signals with U.S. Navy BY.

CROSSED INTERNATIONAL DATE LINE.

November 29, 0700 (Y)
Rendezvous with air escort.

1015 (Y)
Rendezvous with surface escort, SC 502.

1258 (Y)
Arrived Midway. Transferred BRO N, Glenn C., Sea2e., V-6, U.S.N.R. to U.S. Naval Air Station Dispensary, Midway, for treatment, (acute appendicitis).

1715 (Y)
Completed fueling.

November 30, 1040 (Y)
Underway with air and surface escort, SC 502, to 30-mile circle, enroute Pearl.

— page 48 —
1. NARRATIVE:
December 4, 0615 (VW) Rendezvous with U.S.S. LITCHFIELD.
1200 (VW) Arrived PEARL.

2. WEATHER:
(a) Enroute station: Very good except for three days of rough weather.
(b) On station: very good except for a total of four days when it was too rough to maintain patrol at periscope depth. Very little rain.
(c) Enroute Midway: headed into heavy seas for seven days -- all hands very tired upon arrival Midway.
(d) Enroute Pearl: seas abated.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION:
Currents in this area were in accordance with the pilot and were variable and unpredictable. Currents were tidal and drifts of as high as 6.5 to 8 miles in 24 hours were the rule and as high as 16 miles in the Yellow Sea the exception.

When passing through COLNETT STRAIT enroute to the area an average set of 150°(T), and a drift of 1.1 knots were experienced during the day. The maximum set and drift being 190°(T), 2 knots, at a point bearing 060°(T), distance 9 miles from HIRA SE.

On the return trip through COLNETT STRAIT an average set of 140°(T) and a drift of 1.8 knots as found. At a point bearing 155°(T), distance 25 miles from YAKI SHIMA, the effect of the Japanese Current was strongly and quickly felt, setting 040°(T), with a drift of 1.5 knots. Daylight passage of this strait is recommended.

- 13 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 49 —
4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:
Most lights in this area were burning and all lights showed their normal characteristics. The following lights were sighted at the times indicated:

KUSAKAKI SHIMA October 23 and November 17.
GAJA SHIMA November 17.
O SHIMA (GOTO GROUP) October 24.
OSE SAKI (GOTO GROUP) October 26 and 28.
MARA TO October 30, 31 and November 7.
KYOBUN TO (SAN TO) November 6.
KAKYO TO November 8 and 9.
DAIKOKUZAN (KOI TO) November 9.
ME SHIMA (DANJO GROUP) Not burning.

5. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY VESSELS SIGHTED:

| Date | Time | Position | Course | Speed | Description |
|------|------|||-------||
| 10-27 | 0555(I) | 32-24 N 127-42E | -- | 20 kts. | Patrol vessel. |
| 10-29 | 0710(I) | 32-44 N 127-43 E | 2470(T) | 12 kts. | 6000 ton Freighter. |
| 10-31 | 0845(I) | 33-01N 126-22 E | 2470(T) | 12 kts. | 6000 ton Freighter. |
| 10-31 | 2115(I) | 32-47 N 126-43 E | -- | -- | Patrol Vessel. |
| 10-31 | 2145(I) | 32-45 N 126-47 E | -- | -- | Patrol Vessel. |
| 10-31 | 2352(I) | 32-15 N 126-55 E | 0500(T) | 12 kts. | Two 6000 to 8000 Ton Ftrts. and old type DD. |
| 11-1 | 2125(I) | 32-02 N 126-05 E | -- | -- | Two patrol vessels. |
| 11-1 | 2209(I) | 31-47 N 126-00 E | Est. 0400(T) | 12 kts. | Hospital ship. |
| 11-3 | 0210(I) | 32-02 N 126-15 E | 2180(T) | 9 kts. | 10,052 Ton Tanker (load-ed similar to TCA MARU. |
| 11-4 | 0756(I) | 31-11 N 126-35 E | -- | -- | Two small fishing trawlers. |
| 11-4 | 1525(I) | 31-24 N 126-49 E | -- | -- | Two small fishing trawlers. |

— page 50 —
5. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY VESSELS SIGHTED (Cont'd):

Date    Time    Position   Course   Speed    Description
11-6   1330(I)  33-46 N  2650(T)  7 kts.  5000 Ton Freighter.
    127-28 E
11-6   1540(I)  33-46 N   ---    DD.
    127-20 E
11-8   0420(I)  33-54 N  0500(T)   ---    DD.
    125-11 E
11-8   0615(I)  33-50 N  1100(T)   ---    Smoke of 7 ships.
    125-11 E
11-8   1303(I)  33-56 N  2250(T)  15 kts.  6500 Ton Freighter.
    125-06 E
11-11 1931(I)  35-36 N  2880(T)  10 kts.  7000 Ton Freighter
    123-44 E    similar to LYONS MARU,
    Photo No. 390.
11-13 2135(I)  36-01N  2900(T)  7 kts.  6989 Ton Freighter
    125-56.2E.    similar to LIMA MARU.
    Photo No. 112.
11-13 2230(I)  36-01 N  1140(T)  8 kts.   Large unidentified
    125-57 E    Tanker (empty).
11-16 0510(I)  32-15N  2500(T)  10 kts.  Radar only.
    125-54 E
11-16 1640(I)  31-52 N  0580(T)  14 kts. 10,000 Ton Tanker (empty).
    126-14 E    Similar to KOKUYO
    MARU, Photo No. 377.
Throughout Area --    Numerous Saipans.

6. Description of Aircraft Sighted:

Date    Time    Position   Course   Altitude    Description
10-11 1215(Y)  28-09 N   ---    ---    Radar contact.
    179-30 W
10-11 1406(Y)  28-09N   ---   1500 ft. Patrol Plane
    179-44 W
10-19 1330(I)  30-31N  0900(T)  1000 ft.  Mitsubishi heavy
    146-04 E    bomber 97.
10-22 1630(I)  30-17 N  0800(T)  1000 ft. 3 planes.
    133-12 E    (unidentified).
11-6   1550(I)  33-46 N  3200(T)  1200 ft. 1 medium size
    127-28 E    plane.
11-29 1325(M)  28-07 N  0900(T)  1500 ft. USN PBY.
    179-24 E

- 15 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 51 —
7. SUM ARY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS:

| Attack | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
||-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Date  | 10-31| 11-3| 11-6| 11-8|
| Location | 33-01| N 32-02| N 33-46| N 33-57|
| Torpedoes | 126-22| E 126-13| E 127-28| E 125-06|
| Hits   | 3   | 3   | 3   | 3   |
| Number Sunk | 10,052| ---| ---| ---|
| Number Damaged | ---| ---| ---| ---|
| Type of Target | 6000 Ton Freighter | 10,052 Ton Tanker | 5000 Ton Freighter | 6500 Ton Freighter |
| Range | 1410 | 1755 | 1270 | 1685 |
| Periscope Depth | Yes | ---| Yes | Yes |
| Surface Night | ---| ---| ---| ---|
| Est. Draft Target | 15 ft. | 30 ft. | 12 ft. | 12 ft. |
| Depth Set | 6 ft. | 6 ft. | 6 ft. | 6 ft. |
| Bow or Stern Shot | Stern | Bow | Bow | Stern |
| Track Angle | 90°F. | 86°S. | 90°F. | 108°S. |
| Gyro Angle | 0 | 16 R. | 0 | 17 R. |
| Est. Target Speed | 12 kts. | 9 kts. | 7 kts. | 15 kts. |
| Firing Interval | 8 sec. | 8 sec. | 8 sec. | 8 sec. |
| Spread | 2°div. | 2°div. | 2°div. | 3°div. |

©Attack No. 2 -- Tanker fully loaded; on course 218°(T).

| Attack | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
||-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Date  | 11-11| 11-13| 11-13| 11-16|
| Location | 35-36| N 36-01| N 36-01| N 31-52|
| Torpedoes | 123-44| E 125-56| E 125-57| E 126-14|
| Hits   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 2   |
| Number Sunk | 7000 Ton | 6989 Ton | ---| ---|
| Number Damaged | ---| Unknown | 10,000| ---|
| Type of Target | 7000 Ton | 6989 Ton | Large | 10,000 Ton |
| Range | 1900 | 1450 | 1400 | 1300 |
| Periscope Depth | ---| ---| ---| Yes |
| Surface Night | Yes | Yes | Yes | ---|
| Est. Draft Target | 25 ft. | 25 ft. | 30 ft. | 20 ft. |
| Depth Set | 6 ft. | 6 ft. | 6 ft. | 10 ft. |
| Bow or Stern Shot | Bow | Bow | Bow | Stern |
| Track Angle | 84°P. | 135°P. | 82°P. | 125°P. |
| Gyro Angle | 10°L. | 17°L. | 30L. | 32°L. |
| Est. Target Speed | 10 kts. | 7 kts. | 8 kts. | 14 kts. |
| Firing Interval | 7 sec. | 8 sec. | 7 sec. | 7 sec. |
| Spread | 2°div. | 2°div. | 2°div. | 2°div. |

— page 52 —
# Attack No. 7 -- Tanker, light condition, on course 1140(T).
% Attack No. 8 -- Tanker, light condition, on course 0580(T).

PARTICULARS OF ATTACK:

Attack No. 1 -- 6000 Ton Freighter.

Target sighted with zero angle or bow and not zigging. Pulled out on 90° track for stern shot. Approach elementary and all data checked on -- a perfect set-up. Sea flat calm so periscope was used very sparingly. In spite of this he evidently sighted my periscope when raised for final bearing. Then running time of torpedoes had elapsed and no explosions heard, raised periscope. Target had swung hard left and was heading for HADDOCK. Dropped one depth charge and shifted his rudder right until he presented his stern, then stood off at full speed. In the meantime I had swung to bring bow tubes to bear but by the time I was around to new firing position-target showed 170° track, range 2600 yards. I did not consider this set-up warranted further expenditure of torpedoes sc held fire.

Target (Naval Auxiliary) painted dark gray and approximately 30 of the crew (in clean white uniforms) observed along the sides pointing at the torpedo wakes.

Attack No. 2 -- 10,052 Ton Tanker.

Tanker riding very low in the water -- there was no doubt she was fully loaded. About 3 seconds after tanker was hit the stern gun fired one shot at HADDOCK which would indicate we were sighted as we swung to retire and before the torpedo reached the target. Approximately one minute after explosion Radoman heard target send 4-letter call and one S.O.S. -- then silence. She went down like a rock.

Attack No. 3 -- 5000 Ton Freighter.

This was another elementary set-up, similar to attack No. 1, except bow tubes were fired. Target on steady course, speed 10 knots, all data checking perfectly. Sea calm and after previous experience of being sighted (attack No. 1) periscope was used with particular care. HADDOCK Not sighted prior to firing as observations taken 2 minutes after firing showed target on same course. At this time target sighted either periscope or torpedo tracks and started zigging wildly and headed north toward Fort Hamilton.

- 17 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 53 —
3 -- 5000 Ton freighter. (Cont'd)

Being free to study the target more closely I now observed she was riding so high that her propeller was half out of water. How much water she drew in this condition I do not know. Torpedoes were set at 6 feet to give running depth of 16 feet. I did not keep periscope raised to actually observe torpedo tracks. Although impossible to prove, everything indicates that one or more of these torpedoes ran under the target, but too deep for her light draft.

Sound reported one torpedo running 65° to the left of its correct bearing.

Attack No. 4 -- 6500 Ton Freighter.

Again the same experience as in attack No. 3 except stern tubes were fired. Target zigging but all data checking. Slight chop with white caps -- perfect periscope sea. Then running time of torpedoes had elapsed raised periscope and observed target on same course showing HADDOCK was not sighted. A second observation about 30 seconds later showed target changing course to the north, indicating that by now torpedo tracks or periscope had been sighted. He then opened fire with bow gun on periscope and dropped 3 depth charges which exploded almost simultaneously which might indicate some type of gun. This freighter was also in the light condition and evidently headed for Darian.

Attack No. 5 -- 7000 Ton Freighter.

No comments.

Attack No. 6 -- 6989 Ton Freighter.

Attack No. 7 -- Unidentified Tanker.

These attacks took place on a very dark (black) night and in heavy weather. I was apprehensive of torpedo performance in such heavy seas. Due to the highly phosphorescent water the torpedo tracks showed up in the water like chalk marks on a black board. On the first attack, one track was seen to veer off, cross the other two and was lost to sight. On the second attack, all three appeared to run true.

Both attacks took place within 22 minutes of each other, on ships 2 miles apart at the time of attack, with the ships on opposite courses (290 -- 114). In the opinion of the Commander this appears too much of a coincidence, in addition

— page 54 —
6 & 7 (Cont'd.
to violating all common sense rules of routing two-way traffic to avoid danger of collision. After reviewing the whole set-up, the following explanation is submitted:

1. That the ships were in company on course 290°(T), and under escort.
2. That the SJ Radar failed to discern two targets during the first attack due to the small difference in the bearings of the two ships. In fact it is inherent in the design of the SJ beam that it can not get more than one "pip" on objects separated by less than 80 when they have approximately the same range. This characteristic has been proved in practice on previous occasions.
3. With the extremely low visibility it was impossible for any of these ships to see the HADDOCK.
4. That after the freighter was hit the tanker and escort reversed course with the intention of clearing the vicinity.
5. That the signalling from the freighter would indicate she was not alone. (At the time, this signalling did not indicate to me the presence of other ships as the freighter sunk two nights before kept flashing S.O.S. and no other ships were present at that time).
6. That after the tanker was hit, the escort had opened out on the wrong side to look for the HADDOCK and failing to make a contact fired his gun, to "scare me off", as a last resort.

Identity of second target (attack No. 7) -- During the second attack I did not have an opportunity to study the target at close range through binoculars, although the Executive Officer and Quartermaster did. Their identification is summarized as follows:

1. The ship was very large -- the largest target encountered by the HADDOCK to date. They were very definite about this point.

2. She had the silhouette of an empty tanker but in addition was "built up" forward as well as aft.

3. The only silhouettes which resemble the target as described by the Executive Officer and Quartermaster are those of the NISSHIN MARU and TONAN MARU type tankers.

- 19 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 55 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of Second War Patrol.

Attack No. 6 & 7 (Cont'd)

In the absence of more detailed information concerning the characteristics of the target, the Commanding Officer claims damage to a large unidentified ship -- probably a tanker -- tonnage unknown.

Attack No. 8 -- 10,000 Ton Tanker.

One or possibly two more torpedoes was all that was needed to send this tanker to the bottom, as she was at the mercy of the HADDOCK for more than an hour after being damaged.

8. A/S MEASURES:

In view of the almost identical experiences with patrol boats on two successive nights, October 31 and November 1, the Commanding Officer is of the opinion that it was more than coincidence.

In both instances there were a number of lighted semapans grouped in the vicinity with two unlighted patrol craft present.

The first night, October 31, the contacts, ranges, and bearings were all by radar. The following night the radar range decreased to 2000 yards before the HADDOCK started to pull away and open the range. At this time the quartermaster sighted the patrol boat on the port beam, heading directly for HADDOCK and moving in fast. As we picked up speed and changed course he opened up with a searchlight and commenced signalling. This signalling was soon answered by another darkened ship on our starboard quarter. I ordered the quartermaster to try to pick up the second ship in his binoculars which he succeeded in doing and reported it was similar to the first. He stated that both looked like small DD's or large patrol boats. As we stood off both craft continued to signal to each other but did not attempt to chase the HADDOCK.

I cannot understand why the first boat did not open fire at a range of 2000 yards as soon as he realized his attempt at ramming had proven unsuccessful. One explanation might be that, not knowing the exact range, he was over estimating and was not aware that he was so close.

— page 56 —
8. A/S MEASURES: (Cont'd)

In the opinion of the Commanding Officer the lesson to be learned from the above experiences is to be particularly alert for patrol craft when running through a group of lighted sampans.

9. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY MINE S'KEEPING OPERATIONS:

None.

10. MAJOR DEFECTS:

A. ORDNANCE
(a) Target Bearing Transmitter.
The T.B.T. developed a constantly increasing error so that it could not be used to transmit bearings to the T.D.C. after arrival in the area. The same situation developed during the first patrol. In each case, the error increased to approximately 7 degrees (right) by the end of the time on station.

B. C&R
(a) Bow Planes.
Three times during this patrol, the two large bronze shear pins (located in the superstructure) on outboard shaft of bow plane rigging gear, sheared upon surfacing. The bow planes could not be rigged in until the pins were replaced, which was accomplished, in each case, within thirty minutes after pins had sheared. Further shearing of these pins was avoided by regularly rigging in bow planes before surfacing.

This vessel has sheared seven sets of these pins since being commissioned. In each case shearing has occurred as bow planes were being rigged in. Submarine Base, Midway and Submarine Base, Coco Solo, checked system and each base assured us that we would have no further shearing trouble.

As a result of similar bow plane trouble on the DRUM, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, placed a shear pin in the bow plane rigging shafting located in the forward torpedo room. This pin is located in

— page 57 —
10. MAJOR DEFECTS: Cont'd
    (B) C&R
    (a) Bow Planes cont'd

the flexible coupling just forward of the bow plane rigging electric motor. This easily accessible pin was designed to shear before the outside pins sheared. As originally designed this interior pin served its purpose.

However in tests it was found that shear limit of this pin was below that for which capstan was designed, so the original interior pin was replaced by a stronger pin. As a result of this modification, this interior pin has never sheared.

It is believed that the fundamental fault is a misalignment or excessive clearance in some part of the bow plane system. System should be thoroughly checked and fault remedied.

(b) Feriscopes.

As in the case of the first patrol, after about three weeks, the use of the attack (NO.2) periscope was seriously hampered by fogging. This fogging occurred to a lesser degree in No. 1 periscope.

(c) Negative Tank Gasket.

While holding depth charge attack drill enroute patrol area, negative tank gasket blew out, thus losing the use of negative tank during patrol. A new gasket is required.

(d) Fuel Oil System.

During this patrol and last patrol, fuel oil has been shifting between fuel oil tanks. For example, on one night the soundings showed FBT 3n and 3B to be empty; on next night soundings showed 12,000 gallons of fuel in these tanks. A job order has been entered to regrind all fuel oil transfer valves.

- 22 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 58 —
10. MAJOR DEFECTS:
   - B. C&R
     - (a) Air Leaks.
       - Forward group valve of 600# manifold continued to leak on this patrol, as on last patrol, in spite of fact that both Midway and this ship's force have reground this valve. Air bubbles were vented from forward group tanks each watch. It is recommended that a cut be taken on valve disc.
     - None.
     - D. COMMUNICATIONS.
       - (a) DQ Antennae.
         - The DQ antennae leaks around the flange through the pressure hull. The lower shaft is salted and the leads from the loop grounded - - this makes submerged reception and the taking of radio bearings impossible. Submarine Base, Midway, reseated this flange but the jcb was not successful.
       - (b) JK-QC and QB Sound Heads.
         - Both scund heads make a "clumping" noise each time they are stopped or their direction of rotation is reversed. During periods of silent running this "clumping" noise acts as a distinct signal and is a serious military hazard at the very time when the safety of the ship depends largely on running silent. It is believed that the trouble lies in excess clearance between the guide rails and shoes in the trunks.

11. RADIO RECEPTION:
   - Reception was good on 26.1 kcs. and all of the 4115 kcs. series except just prior to and during sunrise or sunset. Practically continuous S3 to S5 interference from a Japanese

- 23 -

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 59 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK -- Report of Second War Patrol.

11. RADIO RECEPTION: (Cont'd)
station close to 8230 kcs; was heard nightly. Another Japanese station was heard close to 450 kcs. -- usually for about five minutes on the hour.
The distress signal heard on November 3rd was on 400 kcs.
Time ticks were received from NPG (San Francisco) on 9090 kcs. at 1455 GCT and from JJC (Japanese) at 1155 GCT. None could be received from NPM.
No message was sent or received on 450 kcs.
Last Message Received -- HERALD.
Last Message Sent -- ACHE.

12. SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS:
Sound conditions in the patrol area seemed to be a little below normal. Background noise, including the usual sounds, prevented the use of very high gain on the receivers at any time. No density layers were observed.

13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY:
Health in general was good but not on a par with the first patrol. No serious injuries were sustained. In addition to the normal amount of minor ailments to be expected there were nine cases of Impetigo and nine cases of Ringworm. The one serious case of illness was Acute Appendicitis which developed three days after clearing the area. The infection was arrested and temperature kept near normal by the intelligent and conscientious performance of duty on the part of BEGLEY, Jackson Allen Jr., CPhM., USN. The patient, BROWN, Glenn Coleman, 32c., USNR, was transferred to the U.S. Naval Air Station Dispensary upon arrival Midway.
Vitamin capsules were taken regularly by all hands.
The boat was very comfortable during the entire patrol.
Meals were served at normal times. Lunch was served at noon and dinner in the evening. The diet was varied and the food well prepared. The supply of quick frozen vegetables was rationed so as to "Stretch" throughout the patrol and these foods were greatly appreciated.

14. MILES STEAMED:
To Station: 3018. On Station: 2896. From Station: 4059.

15. FUEL OIL EXPENDED:
101,500 gallons.

16. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING:
Torpedoes 0
Fuel 6000 gal. (midway)
Provisions 20 days
Fresh water Unlimited
Personnel 7 days.

17. FACTOR OF ENDURANCE CAUSING END OF PATROL:
Expenditure of torpedoes.

- 24 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 60 —
10. REMARKS:
    TORPEDOES.

The Commanding Officer considers the performance of torpedoes during the HADDOCK's Second War Patrol as unsatisfactory. Of the first 12 torpedoes fired, only 1 hit. This one fortunately accounted for the loaded tanker sunk. Of the second 12 fired, 4 hit, one on each of 4 targets. Checking all data in post analysis indicates the percentage should have been much higher, resulting in considerable more damage to enemy shipping. This was most disappointing to all hands.

(a) Number of attacks

— page 61 —
18. REMARKS:

ROUTING OF TRAFFIC (Cont'd).

Decision was made early in the patrol to investigate thoroughly Area plus the adjoining portions of Area and then proceed north into the Yellow Sea along the DARDANELLI TRADE ROUTE. Hunting proved excellent (8 attacks) although results were less than hoped for. This is the reason the SHANGHAI vicinity was not covered.

S.J. RADAR.

The S.J. Radar again proved itself invaluable in picking up targets at night and during the night attacks. In addition it is credited with getting the HADDOCK out of two U.S. ships with patrol craft on the nights of October 31 and November 1.

As was the case during the first patrol, the S.J. did not get pips off spanners regardless of range, but did get rips from small craft at close range if they had a metal stack.

Again it is desired to emphasize that the S.J. requires care and adjustment by a fully qualified maintenance man.

DOCKING

It is requested that the HADDOCK be placed in drydock during the coming refit period to accomplish the following:

1. Clean bottom -- foul bottom has now decreased spread 2 to 3 knots at all combinations. Elapsed since last docking: 6 months.

2. Inspect both propeller shafts to determine if servicing pit-tings, discovered when HADDOCK was near completion, has progressed. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, did not replace shafts at the time because none were available, but informed Bureau of Ships that shafts should be replaced at first Navy Yard overhaul. Copies of correspondence and pictures of shafts are in HADDOCK files.

3. Eliminate noise of both sound heads (described under "Major Defects").

4. Install negative tank gasket.

-26-

— page 62 —
10. NOTES.

Items requested for Third Patrol.

(a) Washing Machine.

(b) Sun lamp.

PERSONNEL.

The performance of duty of the officers and crew of the HADDOCK was of the highest order and in keeping with the best traditions of the U.S. Naval and Submarine Service.

-27- DECLASSIFIED

— page 63 —
5-42/A16-3/ Serial (080)
: DECLASSIFIED
: From: The Division Engineer, Submarine Division
: To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
: Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
: Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK - Second War Patrol, Report on.
: 1. The following comments on the subject patrol are considered pertinent and worthy of special mention.
: (A) MATERIAL.
: Bow planes. The casualty of having the shear pins break on the bow planes rigging gear as experienced on the HADDOCK three times on this patrol is unquestionably one which can be traced to design as occurring on this class of submarines. Steps are being taken by the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., to study the stresses involved. The general material condition of the HADDOCK is excellent.

— page 64 —
3 01428
FF12-10/A16-3(5)/ SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
(12)

Serial 0286
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
March 3, 1943.

CONSUBAPAC FATTROL REPORT NO. 147.
U.S.S. HADDOCK - THIRD WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Third War Patrol.

Enclosure:
(A) Copy of Subject War Patrol.
(B) Comsubdiv 101 Conf. 1tr FB5-101/A16-3
   Serial 08 of February 24, 1943.
(C) Comsubron 10 Conf. 1tr FC5-10/A16-3(FB5-101)
   Serial 024 of February 24, 1943.

1. In spite of the extremely bad weather which the HADDOCK had for over fifty per cent of the time in the area and also the few contacts encountered, the HADDOCK continued the good work it had done on its two previous patrols.

2. HADDOCK made but two contacts that could be developed and these resulted in successful attacks. Percentage of hits for the HADDOCK continued to be high in that 42.8% was obtained in its two attacks.

3. The recommendations made by the HADDOCK regarding the replacement of the DQ with some type of sound gear has already been taken into consideration. A new sonic sound receiving device is in the process of being manufactured and will soon be installed in the present position of the DQ.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew for another successful war patrol accomplished in spite of severe winter weather. The HADDOCK is credited with having inflicted the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK
1 Tanker

— page 65 —
1/2
FF12-10/A16-3(5)/ SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET (12)
Serial 0280
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
March 3, 1943.
CONSUB PAC PATROL REPORT NO. 147.
U.S.S. HADDOCK - THIRD WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Third War Patrol.

DISTRIBUTION
(1M-43)
List III: SS
Special:
F1(5), EN3(5), Z1(5),
Consub (2), X3(1),
Consubsowespac (2),
Subschool NL (2),
Contaskfor 42 (2),
Consubron 50 (2).

E. R. SWINBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 70 —
2130 (I) - Lat. 34-04 N., long. 137-35.5 E., S.J. Radar made contact at 14,500 yards. Bright moonlight made surface attack out of the question and seas were too rough for night submerged attack. Forced to let target pass. Presence of escort not determined. In the short time spent in the area to date, have sighted two large destroyers and one large ship on the track from TOKYO to SHIROKO MISAKI. In view of this decided to spend the next four or five days patrolling this line in hopes of getting some larger and more important shipping that that which follows the coast. A rubbing and bumping noise has developed in the bow plane tilting mechanism. Investigation indicates the trouble is cut-side the boat.

1630 (I) - Three distant depth charges -- nothing in sight. Five distant depth charges during day -- nothing in sight. With moon about 450 high lookout sighted ship braced on sternboard bow. Coached SJ on bearing -- range 14,200 yards. Bearing changing rapidly. Went to battle stations and full speed. Same lookout sighted DD escort to the right (alced) of target. After solving and checking target spaced as 15 knots, forced to abandon chase since bright moonlight precluded surface attack and target spaced of 16 knots proved not to be MADDOCK from gaining position ahead for periscope attack. Target course (250T.) indicated TOKYO as port of departure.

0644 (I) - Shortly after diving sighted komi class DD bearing 100° (R) on parallel course -- range 6,000 yards. Turn count gave speed of 17-20 knots. Course 050°(I), indicated TOKYO as destination. Attack not possible. DD believed to be last night's escort returning to TOKYO -- having turned her ship over to a new "zone escort".

After surfacing set course to close coast for operations off MIKI SAKI light tomorrow. Beromotor falling rapidly -- wind and sea making up out of the west.

2300 (I) - Making good 2 knots against heavy head seas -- finally charged course to ride cut storm -- unable to close coast until weather improves.

January 31, At 150 feet -- seas too rough to maintain periscope depth. Surfaced in heavy seas. Kept ship headed toward coast -- making good 2 knots.

February 1, At 150 feet due to rough seas. Seas moderated toward evening -- after surfacing proceeded toward coast to patrol off MIKI SAKI light tomorrow. Fog set in -- position doubtful -- continued toward coast. Went DR showed we were within 17 miles of MIKI SAKI light we still had not sighted it (29 mile light). Searchlights obscrved on shore to the left of MIKI SAKI, so used these as a guide and continued to close. Seas becoming smooth.

— page 72 —
1. Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of Third War Patrol.

February 12, 1930 (K)
Surfaced.
1300 (K)
Lat. 34-00 N., Long. 148-30 E., lookout sighted large patrol plane on starboard bow -- 6 miles -- doyle. (Evidently same plane on homeward leg of patrol out of TOKYO).
1430 (K)
Surfaced.
February 17, 0900 (Y)
Arrived Midway.

2. TRAILER:
Enroute area -- As indicated in the narrative, heavy head seas were encountered during a considerable part of the passage; resulting in a loss of three days in arriving on station.

In Area -- Twenty-seven days elapsed between entering and leaving the area. Storms and rough seas prohibited operations during fourteen days and nights of this period -- a little more than 50% lost time.
As stated in the Coast Pilot, a barometer below 29.75 invariably is the precursor of strong weather winds. Most of the strong winds experienced were from the west and northwest, although one storm came from the east, later shifting to south.

Enroute Midway -- Fair, except last two days.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION:
In general currents were in accordance with the information contained in the Pilot and on the monthly Pilot Chart. However, many surprising sets and drifts were experienced which defied anicipation. Wind, seas, and depth all apparently enter into the problem which is best not by expecting any current up to 2 knots in any direction.

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:
KASHINO SAKI -- As listed.
OMAI SAKI -- As listed.
MIKI SAKI -- Not sighted at 17 miles when on the surface.
DAIO SAKI -- Not sighted at 15 miles when on the surface.

Good SJ Radar ranges and bearings were obtained off SUNISU SHIMA (Smith Island) and TORI SHIMA up to 26,000 yards.

- 7 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 74 —
2000 2 or 4 engine bomber
: Single-engine biplane, pontoon, patrolling, low-wing monoplane, double float, patrol.
: Patrol plane.
: Light bomber, patrol.
: 3 planes in "U" formation.
: 2000" : formation.

: 1500" : Patrol plane.
: Patrol plane.
: Twin-engine patrol plane.
: 2000" : plane.

: 7 seaplane.
: Radar - 14 miles.
: Radar - 14 miles.

: 2-engine bomber.

ENGLISH (A)

— page 76 —
1954-01/A16-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION ONE HUNDRED ONE
Serial 08
CONFIDENTIAL
From: Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One,
To: Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK - Third War Patrol - Comments on.

1. HADDOCK Third War Patrol extended from December 28, 1942, to February 17, 1943, a total of fifty-one days. Twenty-seven days were spent in patrol areas.

2. Two attacks were made and three hits were obtained from the seven torpedoes fired.

3. Exceedingly rough seas, which continued for over half the period spent in the area, were a great hindrance to the development of additional contacts.

4. The Division Commander congratulates HADDOCK on adding two more sinkings to her previous toll.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 77 —
5-10/AL6-3
(US-101)
Serial 024
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231); Third War Patrol - Comments on.

Reference: (a) CO HADDOCK Conf 1tr SS231/AL6-3 Ser 02 of Feb. 17, 1943.

1. HADDOCK again turned in a most creditable performance, in spite of very adverse weather conditions which caused her to lose approximately 50% of the time in the area. Although an insufficient number of torpedoes were fired from which definite conclusions can be drawn, nevertheless, 3 hits cut off 7 torpedoes-fired (42.8%) and the resultant sinking of 2 ships, is encouraging in the matter of improved torpedo performance.

2. The anti-submarine measures encountered indicate that this area is patrolled by a very efficient and well-organized group of anti-submarine vessels.

3. The Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer and personnel of HADDOCK on a fine patrol.

— page 78 —
170
U.S.S. HADDOCK - FOURTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

Enclosure:
(A) Copy of Subject War Patrol Report.
(B) Copy of Combusdiv 101 Conf. 1tr. FB-101/A16-3 serial 033 of April 20, 1943.
(C) Copy of Combusdiv 10 Conf. 1tr. FC5-10/A16-3 (FB5-101)serial 060 of April 20, 1943.

1. This, the fourth war patrol of the U.S.S. HADDOCK, was the first for a new commanding officer. The patrol was aggressively carried out and good area coverage was obtained.

2. After spending about eighteen days in the area, of which a good deal of the time was spent in surface patrolling, the HADDOCK was able to carry out a highly successful attack against a large and apparently important target. It is possible that many more contacts could have been made and developed had the HADDOCK not been sighted on the surface on several occasions. Surface patrol in the area is, of course, greatly desired, and makes for most efficient coverage. However, the probability of being sighted, particularly before the first attack is made, must be carefully considered, and the question of surface cruising weighed cautiously with the missions to perform.

3. It is noted that the HADDOCK made a study of the density layers upon arrival in area. From this study it was assumed that such conditions were of a permanent nature, at least for the time the HADDOCK was to be in the area. The HADDOCK later found this supposed fact to be quite to the contrary. Unfortunately, it proved to be to the HADDOCK's disadvantage as an embarrassing trim condition arose during a severe depth charging. Little information is available at this time regarding the characteristics of the density layers, but it is believed that reliable information may be obtained from Oceanographic Institutions. This matter is being investigated. In the meantime it is recommended that submarines in the patrol area may be able to find sufficient information about density layers by making a dive to a proximately 200 feet.

— page 79 —
1. SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0537
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
April 25, 1943.

CONSUBEPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 170
U.S.S. HADDOCK - FOURTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

4. The Commander. Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew of the U.S.S. HADDOCK on this aggressive patrol, during which they inflicted the following damage to the enemy:

SUNK

1. Transport (YASUKUNI MARU class) - 11,930 tons.

DISTRIBUTION:
(LIST)
List TIL, SS.
Special:
FLT. 2N3(5), ZL(5),
Compliant (2), X3(1),
Consubmarine (2),
Subsciool, NL (2),
Contaskfor 72 (2),
Consubron 50 (2),
Consopac (2),
Cinclant (2),
Contaskfor 16 (1).

E. R. SWINBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 80 —
1943 to April 19, 1943.
Operation Order 34-43.

Prologue:
Arrived Midway February 17, 1943, from Third War Patrol. Commenced refit same day by Submarine Base Personnel assisted by Relief Crew Submarine Division Forty-Four. Completed refit on March 3, 1943.

On March 5, 1943, Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. Taylor, U.S.N., was relieved of his duties as Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HADDOCK and Lieutenant Commander Roy M. Davenport, U.S.N., assumed command.

Readiness for sea on March 10, 1943, was delayed one day until March 11, 1943, to permit installation of I.M.O. Pump. Not depermed, nor wiped; no training period, except that ship operated on March 5, 1943, conducting surface and submerged drills without target, and during forenoon of day of departure for patrol conducted four approach runs on U.S.S. REGULUS.

PART I
NARRATIVE:

March 11, 0743 (Y)
Underway with U.S.S. REGULUS and CRYSTAL from Submarine Base, Midway, for training exercises. Conducted four submerged approaches on screened target using periscope and radar.

1400 (Y)
Completed exercises, departed Midway enroute assigned area. Conducted drills submerged, made battle surfaces, fired all guns, and exercised fire-control party while enroute area.

March 13, Crossed International Date Line.

March 14, 1325 (M)
Pharmacist Mate reported a case of acute appendicitis. He was convinced that his diagnosis was correct and recommended transferring the patient to Midway if possible. Being within 410 miles of Midway, the Commanding Officer considered it advisable to transfer the man rather than jeopardize his life and the comfort of the crew. That the Commanding Officer had assisted in an emergency appendectomy recently, as Executive Officer of the SILVERSIDES, undoubtedly influenced his decision in this case.

It was estimated we would not lose more than one day in effecting the transfer, and there was a possibility that we might be able to do it that afternoon.

— page 81 —
1330 (M) Reversed course and requested Midway to have plane meet us that afternoon if possible. Midway said they would not be able to meet us that afternoon, but would have a plane meet us the next morning, and that the PYC 18 (PERIDOT) was underway with doctor aboard to intercept us in case the plane couldn't land.

: 0937 (M) Transfer completed, set course for area.

: 2245 (M) Increased speed to three engines to arrive off WAKE at daylight on seventeenth. This resulted in only one day lost due to transfer of ap. endicitis patient. The additional fuel thus used was considered justified as it gave us an additional day on station in our next area.

: 0455 (L) Arrived off WAKE and found them very much awake indeed for at this moment about fourteen searchlights were turned on and brought to an elevation of about 40 degrees, throwing up a wall of light about the eastern approach to the island in such a way as to illuminate any plane attempting to cross the island. Secured our SJ Radar in case this had given them an indication of our presence. Most likely they were just having a drill. However, when two of the lights were depressed and came dangerously close.

: 0458 (L) We made a quick dive.

During the day patrolled off the south coast of WAKE and TIKES Island. Considerable construction work has been done on the islands, and it looked as if grading was being carried out on both islands. The only activity actually observed was near the boat landing. The number of dredges near this point indicated that an attempt was being made to dredge the channel to the lagoon.

— page 82 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of Fourth Far Patrol.

March 17 (Continued)
0458 (L) The Radar on Peacock Point appeared to be intact, and the battery of either 5" or 6" guns on this point looked formidable. Pictures were taken. No plane activity was observed, and unfortunately no ships were present.

1902 (L) Surfaced, set course for next area.

March 19, 1833 (L) Sighted Large Japanese patrol plane, distance 6 miles; dove to avoid. Radar did not pick this plane up. Apparently we were not sighted.

1925 (L) Surfaced.

March 20, 1711 (K) Entered area. After having made a thorough study of all patrol reports covering this area decided to patrol the direct TRUK-SAIPAN route in the vicinity of Lat. 9-25 N., Long. 150-30 E., as this route showed the greatest percentage of previous contacts. Planned to spend about four days at various points along this route and then, when the moon was more favorable for operations near the enemies' base, to cover the North and Northeast Passes of TRUK.

March 21, 0628 (K) The SD Radar showed indications of another radar, directional type, possibly from TRUK. With the thought that they might be DF-ing our equipment, secured the SD and reversed course.

0744 (K) Dove, commenced submerged patrol. Visibility poor, sky completely overcast -- chance of being spotted by plane too great to warrant surface patrol.

1203 (K) With visibility improved, but with sky 70% overcast surfaced to obtain sight of sun on meridian; no fix for twenty-four hours. Ran on surface to obtain better position for submerged patrol, following data obtained on sun sight.

1313 (K) Dove, upon sighting plane abaft the beam, distance about 8 miles, heading towards the ship at 2,000 feet. Evidently plane did not see us. SD Radar was not in use following experience we had had that morning.

- 3 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 83 —
1900 (K)  Surtaced, patrolled TRUK-SAIPAN route.

2118 (K)  Sighted two ships bearing 090°T., silhouetted in the moon on northerly course. Lat. 9-29 N., Long. 150-22 E. Coached radar on - radar then gave good indication at 16,200 yards. Commenced tracking and went to full speed on four main engines (18.5 knots) to gain position ahead for a submerged attack. The targets could not be identified but believed them to be merchant vessels. Plot showed their base course was 005° T., and that they were zigging from 335° to 035°, and that their speed was 16 knots. With our speed differential of 2.5 knots getting ahead was a tedious job. To avoid being sighted we kept the range outside of 16,000 yards. The radar performed perfectly, giving us good ranges and bearings up to 19,000 yards. It was possible to lobe-switch and obtain accurate bearings at 16,000 yards.

2200 (K)  Sighted third ship of convoy which appeared to be a destroyer. He patrolled from ahead of the first ship to astern of the second.

March 22, 0015 (K)  Simultaneously lost sight and radar contact, just as we gained position 21,000 yards ahead and on the track. Since the angle on the bow was zero, losing contact was not surprising. Lat. 10-16 N., Long. 150-31 E.

0030 (K)  Contact had not been regained; reversed course and headed down target's track at 4-engine speed.

0040 (K)  It was obvious by this time that the convoy had changed course shortly after we gained position ahead. We felt certain they had not seen us and their radar (if any) would have had to be far superior to our SJ to pick us up since the SJ was never able to pick up the destroyer. Tried to determine from the chart where this convoy might be heading so that we could take a course that would place us ahead of them again. The only logical destination was SAIPAN or one of the many points west of there. Having come from the

— page 85 —
1440 (K)    Surface and began chase at full speed on four main engines (16.7 knots).

1632 (K)    Radar gave indication of a plane at eight miles. When at seven miles we spotted two bombers on the port bow, flying at 1,000 feet on opposite course and in close formation. We did not intend to dive unless a plane came inside five miles, so turned away, presenting a smaller target. Kept a close watch so that we could dive immediately should they turn toward us. However, they never came closer than 6 miles and within three or four minutes they were out of sight and we returned to our course. Those planes were flying toward TRUK. Their radar caused a disturbance on our radar screen.

1650 (K)    Sighted destroyer on port bow bearing 275° T., range 11,000 yards, angle on bow 50° port. Lat. 9-30 N., Long. 150-26 E. He was making high speed, and the bearing and range changed rapidly, with distance to track 8,500 yards. The sector from which he came was just clearing, but visibility was rather poor where we were as a light rain was falling. It was easy to see him, and it seemed that it would be easy for him to see us. However, we were unwilling to give up the chase for the cruisers so we turned away, presenting our stern, and headed for a heavy rain squall. The squall didn't envelope us as much as we had hoped, so at to avoid detection which seemed very imminent, dove and came to an attack course in case the destroyer had seen us while diving. Bearing 242° T., range 9,400 yards, angle on bow 75° port, course 138° T.

1701 (K)    Target bearing 220° T., range 11,000 yards, angle on bow 85° port.

1707 (K)    Target bearing 205° T., angle on bow 130° port, range 12,000 yards. The destroyer steamed merrily on his way at 16 knots, never getting closer than 9,000 yards. He had never sighted us.

This area provides a thrill a minute. It is like Times Square and you're apt to see most anything at anytime.

Further chase for the cruisers was futile. The original speed estimate of 16 knots was undoubtedly low as he probably increased speed after recovering his planes. Had we had a satisfactory speed differential, we would have had the ships in sight, or at least a pip on the SJ Rader, by the time we were forced down by the destroyer. Three days previous to this we had gotten SJ ranges up to 19,000 yards on a ship no larger than this type cruiser. It was a great disappointment to be unable to fire at one of those cruisers.

— page 86 —
1848 (K)  Surfaced.

Started sanding contact report. With th Japs jamming the circuits, and shifting frequencies as soon as we did, it took us to a half hours to effect delivery. Retired along return route during transmission.

March 25, 0425 (K)  Sighted darkened ship bearing 005° T., distance about 16,000 yards, angle on the bow 50° starboard. Lat. 9-22-50 N., Long. 150-27-30 E., came to course 140° T., and went ahead full on four engines. Tracked him at 13 knots on course 140° T. Distance to track over 10,000 yards. It was thirty minutes before dawn and a bright moon made the visibility excellent. SJ Fadler was not able to pick up the target which appeared to be a merchant vessel of about 6,000 tons. It seemed obvious that we would be sighted but we were too far off the track to dive. Our only chance was to get further ahead of him and close the track without being seen. The bearing was closing slowly, but the situation looked bad, since we had only a half knot advantage over him.

0448 (K)  Target apparently saw us as he fired a green very star in our direction. We immediately dove, came to the normal approach course and used full speed.

0458 (K)  Angle on bow 90° starboard or more; range about 7,000 yards. Came up to 40 feet but the SJ could not pick up the target which at this time was blinking a white light in our direction. He turned to periscope depth. On the next observation the target had presented his stern to us and was quickly going out of sight. By this time it was quite light and the target no doubt realized that what he had seen was a submarine and he therefore took evasive action. He needn't have done so as we never could get near enough to fire with the high speed he had. On bright moonlight nights it is extremely difficult to get ahead of a high-speed target without being seen. If you are not on, or near, the track, the chances of getting there are very poor.

1205 (K)  Sighted one bomber and two Zoro type sea planes patrolling. Our presence in area was disclosed from this morning's contact. Lat. 9-27 N., Long. 150-34 E.

March 26,  Shifted position to Lat. 9-30 N., Long. 148-45 E., and conducted a high periscope submerged patrol. Plane coverage in the areas about TRUK makes an undetected surface patrol highly improbable.

— page 87 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

March 26, (Cont'd)
2235 (K) Plane contact on radar, distance 5 mils. Did not sight.

March 27, As we had to leave the northwest corner of our area by sunset on the next day, it was not considered advisable to try to reach a position off TRUK proper for patrolling on the twenty-seventh. Since our presence was revealed on the main shipping lane the twenty-fifth it was not advisable to return to that point. There existed the strong possibility that most south-bound traffic from SAIPAN was using a route to the west of NAMONUTO ISLAND, thus leaving the route to the east open for mainly north-bound traffic. Little south-bound traffic was seen on this latter route. In view of the above considerations it was decided to patrol this area for the next two days.

March 28, 1856 (K) Surfaced. Shifted position to vicinity of Lat. 10-43-30N., Long. 146-43-00 E., Planned to conduct a submerged high periscope patrol.

March 29, 0315 (K) SD Radar picked up indication of a directional radar; pip of ordinary size, together with high noise level, moved rapidly across the screen once every few seconds for about fifteen seconds and then disappeared for about six minutes. Picking up their transmitted pulse as we did gave further evidence that the Japanese radar is near our SD frequency. We were 315 miles from TRUK. Lat. 10-04-00 N., Long. 147-23-30 E.

0531 (K) Submerged. High periscope patrol.

0810 (K) Sighted small sampan, distance one mile. No guns, depth charges, or other indications of a war-like character were observed. Not wishing to reveal our position lot him pass unharmed. Lat. 10-52N., Long. 146-38 E.

- 8 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 88 —
2000 (I) Converted No. 3 & 5 F.B.T. to ballast tanks. This will help to conserve our fuel and at the same time give us more speed.

April 1, 0500 (I) Submerged to flush out No. 3 & 5 F.B.T.'s.

0530 (I) Surfaced -- leaving no oil slick.

1330 (I) Sighted NGUU ISLAND bearing 006° T., distance 17 miles. Opened range until island was out of sight.

2040 (I) Entered next area.

— page 89 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

April 2, 0511 (I)
Commenced submerged patrol north of PALAU.

1247 (I)
Went deep to check for density layers. Lat. 8-48-00 N., Long. 134-04-30E. Found layers at 145, 240 and 270 feet of greater density. It was necessary to add 4,000 pounds to obtain a trim for two knots at 300 feet. On returning to the surface it was necessary to pump out 9,000 pounds while running at 3.5 knots to get through the density layers. This checks well with the data that other boats have found in this area.

1848 (I)
Surfaced. Set course to patrol in the vicinity of Lat. 9-20-00N., Long. 133-10-00E.

April 3, 0300 (I)
Shifted patrol to vicinity of Lat. 9-42-00N., Long. 133-45-00E.

0658 (I)
Sighted ship hull down bearing 185°T., distance 19,000 yards on course 310° T. Lat. 9-31-00T., Long. 133-38-30E. The officer-cf-the-deck first reported a convoy, and it did look like one of those were masts sticking up all over the horizon. However, we soon saw that it was just one very large ship. Went ahead full on four engines to gain position ahead. Ran down SD antenna mast to reduce chance of being sighted by target and to keep the lookouts especially alert. Target soon zigged 110° to the right, to 060°T., and then commenced zigging 20 to 30 degrees on each side of the base course. Opened the range to 24,000 yards to make sure we were not sighted, but kept target constantly in sight with periscope. We tracked his speed as 14 knots. After five hours we gained position ahead.

1205 (I)
Submerged, and commenced approach.

1230 (I)
Sighted escort on starboard quarter of target; had thought for awhile we were going to get something free. Took position on starboard bow of target, now identified as large passenger freighter, similar to YASUKUNI MARU, 11,930 tons. It was painted gray and looks as if it had been converted to an auxiliary naval vessel. The escort was now identified as a corvette. Planned to come in for a 90° starboard track, straight bow shot and accept a 70° starboard track with a 200 left gyro angle, on the corvette, firing two torpedoes at the corvette, and four at the target. Made all tubes ready.

— page 90 —
1295 (I)
Depth setting of 8 feet was used for the corvette and 15 feet for the target. Those for the corvette would have been set at less depth but due to the choppy sea we wished to avoid premature, especially since we were firing at the escort first. Had to fire at the escort first to insure any chance of hitting him at all -- catching him flat-footed if we could.

: 1255 (I)
Due to target's maneuvers found we were too close to escort's track, so swung to right for stern tube shot. Kept the TDC set up on the target until just prior to firing, then shifted to the escort, took two set-ups and fired at 1301-45, with the bearing exactly on. If the escort had been patrolling this would have been harder to accomplish. Range 1,400 yards, torpedo track 800 starboard, gyro angle 40 left. Shifted to the target and with a completely new set-up commenced firing at 1302-15, with the bearing checking for each shot. Range 1,590 yards, torpedo track 1000 starboard, gyro angle 20 right. Divergent scored was used to spread the torpedoes 45 yards apart along the target's track. Firing interval of 10 seconds. Lat. 10-26-30N., Long. 135-00-00E. The torpedo fired at the corvette did not explode, but was believed to run under him as it was heard to run straight and normal. The other torpedoes hit the target exactly as they were placed, the first hit in the forward well deck, blowing sections of the bow away; the second hit amidships and possibly ignited gasoline stores for at this moment the entire ship burst into a raging inferno; the third torpedo hit in the well deck aft. The ship immediately took a list to starboard and began to go down by the bow. Its screws stopped immediately and were not heard again. Sound conditions excellent. It is seriously doubted if there were any survivors. This ship sank beyond a doubt. The escort and target were unaware of our presence until after the first torpedo hit. After the third hit the escort started our way.

: 1303-50 (I)
Ordered deep submergence.

: 1305 (I)
With boat passing 250 feet first two depth charges came close and shock us up considerably. The next five found us between 250 and 350 feet. During this time we heard a strange noise on the port side.

— page 91 —
1352 (I) Dropped 8 more, not so close.

1344 (I) Dropped 5 more, which makes a total of twenty-four. These were not close, and it seemed he was tired and wanted to go home. At this time the boat had eased down to feet, and we again tried to get water out of the boat and get it back to 300 feet.

1347 (I) At feet we heard cracking, crunching sounds in the conning tower and saw the chart desk break loose from the bulkhead, cork bulge in and break up, as part of the starboard side came in about 4 inches. Ordered the conning tower abandoned. Experienced some tense moments when we could not close the lower hatch. Distortion of the conning tower had jammed the release latch. All hands commenced breathing again when a few blows with a sledge hammer freed the latch and the hatch was closed. Despite increased speed and additional water blown out, we reached feet before the boat started up to 300 feet.

Needed to say, the density layers encountered this day were not the same as those found the day before. Instead of flooding in 4,000 pounds for a trim at 300 feet, we had to pump out 13,000 pounds.

Manned the emergency sound gear in the forward torpedo room -- nothing heard.

1750 (I) Came to periscope depth. All clear except for enormous clouds of dense black smoke and oil burning on the water where the target sank. We were close enough to see the target had it been still afloat but there was only the burning oil. That the passenger-freighter was carrying so much oil would seem to substantiate the statement in "The O.N.I. Weekly" of Feb. 17, 1943, (Vol. II, No.7, page 448), "...there are some indication that cargo vessels are being altered and used to transport large amounts of fuel in bulk".

-12-

— page 92 —
1750 (I)
(Cont'd)

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK -- Report of Fourth War Patrol.

April 3, 1750 (I)
(Cont'd)

Inspection revealed that the port side of the conning tower had given away as well as the starboard but not quite as much. This accounts for the noise heard on the port side at 1305, during the depth charging. It was the same sound as was heard later when the starboard side gave away.

The plates had come in about 4 inches on each side, over the area between one set of strengthening ribs opposite No. 1 periscope. It is here that I beams to support the bridge structure partially replace the strengthening ribs. There also appears to be a 3/8 inch permanent set in the next section aft on the port side, opposite No. 2 periscope.

The SJ Radar training system was the only equipment damaged, and even this was only a matter of bent shafting and misalignment of gears which was temporarily repaired by the next day.

The commanding officer feels that the underlying cause of this casualty is a defective conning tower. He has experienced far more severe depth charging in the SILVERSIDES, under similar conditions.

2320 (I) SPECIAL TOKYO NEWS FLASH:

TODAY APRIL THIRD AN IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVAL VESSEL OF THE CO-VEETTE TYPE SANK AN AMERICAN SUBMARINE WHILE ESCORTING A LARGE CONVOY THROUGH JAPANESE MANDATE ISLANDS.

Interesting -- but fortunately not true; the main damage to the conning tower occurred after the twenty-fourth and last depth charge.

Because of damage to coming tower decided we could not properly carry out our mission, so left area enroute Midway.

Since Japs believe they sank the HADDOCK will not notify Comsubpac of damage and information on leaving area until tomorrow night.

- 13 - ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 93 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK -- Report of Fourth War Patrol.

April 4, 2106 (I)
Sent despatch concerning damage to conning tower and that we had left area to return to port.

April 5, 2057 (I)
Received instructions to patrol off SAIPAN on seventh if conditions permitted. Set course for SAIPAN.

April 6, 0531 (K)
Entered area.

April 7, 0509 (K)
Submerged patrol off SAIPAN.

0900 (K)
With SAIPAN bearing 0930° T., distance 13 miles, sighted aircraft carrier with destroyer and plane escort bearing 030° T., range 12,000 yards, angle on bow 85° port. Came to normal approach course and attempted to close track at best spced. For a moment, when the carrier zigged 20 degrees to the left and the angle on the bow decreased to about 65 or 70, it looked as if we had a chance. However, it was soon evident that this was his furthermost left zig and a short one at that.

0943 (K)
With the range 20,000 yards, angle on the bow 160° port, estimated target speed 20 knots, reluctantly gave up the chase.

A light haze and a bright low sun made the visibility toward the island very poor and prevented sighting the target earlier. The Executive Officer was the O.O.D. at the time and was making complete and thorough sweeps every five minutes.

Identified this carrier as similar to KAGA (sunk at Midway) but it may have been an auxiliary carrier as there appeared to be a catapult on the port side aft. Pictures were taken.

1155 (K)
Observed two destroyers entering harbor from the north.

- 14 -

ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 94 —
15 - ENCLOSURE (A).

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK -- Report of Fourth War Patrol.

April 7, (Cont'd)
1243 (K) Observed mine layer and two destroyers patrolling off harbor for a distance of 5 miles. Many planes in the air at all times. (Bombers and small observation planes).

1726 (K) Observed two destroyers to leave harbor. Impossible to close for attack.

1909 (K) When ready to surface was close to harbor and caught between two patrol ships. With one vessel heading directly for us went deep until clear at

2048 (K) Surfaced, cleared the harbor at full speed.

2346 (K) Sent contact report of carrier movements.

April 8, 0330 (K) Departed area for Midway.

April 13, 1158 (L) Dove for thirty minutes upon sighting plane simultaneously by sight and radar at 10 miles. Lat. 24-16-45 N., Long. 167-48-30 E.

2230 (L) Sent message giving time of arrival off Midway.

April 14, 0747 (L) SD Radar gave indications of a directional radar, signal moved across screen once every 90 seconds. WAKE bearing 220° T., distance 518 miles. Condition continued for two hours.

1005 (L) Plane on SD Radar at 16 miles; closed to 8 miles and withdrew. Not sighted.

— page 96 —
1. Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One.
To: Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK - Fourth War Patrol - Corroments on.

Reference: (a) CO HADDOCK conf. 1tr. SS231/A16-3 serial 04 of 4-19-43.

1. The Fourth War Patrol of HADDOCK extended from March 11 to April 19, 1943. Eighteen of the total thirty-nine days were spent in patrol areas.

2. The patrol was characterized by contacts with valuable fast ships at regular intervals. With one exception, the enemy employed speeds of 16 to 20 knots. This factor, combined with the relative submarine position at time of contact, prevented additional torpedo attacks. The closest range obtained on the Carrier on 7 April was 7500 yards.

3. Attacks:
   - The attack on the large escorted passenger-frigate on 3 April, including the five-hour surface tracking from ahead, was made with skill. It appears most probable that the torpedo fired at the escort ran under and that the magnetic exploder failed. The other three torpedoes, using similar target data, hit their points of aim. A total spread of only two-thirds of a target length was used because the commanding officer knew that he had tracked the target speed and zigzag almost exactly and because he felt sure that he had not been sighted.

4. It seems probable that one or more depth charges rather than unaided sea pressure darted a section of the mild steel plating of the conning tower, port side, while at a depth of about 300 feet. Similar plating on the starboard side was pushed in by the sea pressure while at 415 feet, but this could have been primarily caused by the previous distortion on the port side. The compressed areas occurred at the points where the circular strengthening rings are cut away into the way of the vertical flatwater supports. At these points the conning tower circular plating has the least support. This may require correction in other similar installations. On January 16, 1943, HADDOCK went to 397 feet during depth charge attacks, without apparent damage, and three days later went to 330 feet.

5. HADDOCK is at Navy Yard, Pearl for repairs to coming tower plating, installation of laminated rubber cell jars, and routine repairs.

6. This is the commanding officer's first patrol in corrad. He, the officers and crew are congratulated on a most intelligent, aggressive patrol, on the kind of courage and ship handling that weathers heavy depth charge attacks, and on destruction of another important enemy vessel.

EMOLOSURE (B)

— page 97 —
1. The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231), Fourth War Patrol - Comments on.

1. The fourth war patrol of the HADDOCK, the first under the present commanding officer, extended for a period of thirty-nine days, of which fifteen days were spent in the areas assigned and two days in adjacent areas.

2. A total of thirteen surface contacts were made during the patrol, most of them on valuable targets. Of particular note is the numerous aircraft contacts made in the area north of TRUK. Submarines on previous patrols in this vicinity have observed very little enemy air activity. In one aircraft contact, the HADDOCK presented its stern to a plane flying at low altitude, thus reducing its silhouette and avoiding detection. The HADDOCK patrol report indicates that many Japanese planes are radar equipped.

3. The HADDOCK's experiences chasing convoys and losing contact, and similar experiences of other submarines on patrol, give strong indications that important shipping is routed from point to point as an anti-submarine measure. Such tactics must be expected in tracking convoys. The HADDOCK spent some time patrolling for shipping west of NAMONJUITO ISLAND. This area is not now included in any patrol area. There is a possibility that shipping to and from TRUK is routed over GRAY FEATHER BANK, McLAUGHLIN BANK, and MOGAMI BANK, where the shallow water is unsuitable for submarine operations. This area should be investigated and if shipping is found, these banks and the approaches to them should be included in a patrol area. The possibility and advisability of mining these shallow banks should also be investigated.

4. The HADDOCK sank to excessive depths during depth charging on April 3 because pumping or blowing ballast was sufficiently noisy to invite close and dangerous depth charging. This has happened so often to our submarines as to call for immediate steps in eliminating this handicap. If no noiseless pump can be provided, the possibility of installing a high-pressure pump similar to those of S-boats and R-boats should be considered.

— page 98 —
5. The Commanding Officer's decision to return an appendicitis case to MIDWAY is concurred in. His decision to leave station because of damage to coming tower is also considered justifiable.

6. Although the evidence of sinking of the passenger-freighter on April 3 is not entirely conclusive, it is considered sufficient to warrant credit for sinking. It is recommended, therefore, that the HADDOCK be credited with the following damage inflicted on the enemy:

SUNK

AP (YASUKUMI MARU)

— page 99 —
SS231/AL6-3
Serial (011)
DECLASSIFIED

From:  To:  Via:

Subject:  U.S.S. HADDOCK, report of "War Patrol
number Five.

Enclosure:  (A) Subject report.
(B) Track Chart (Consubpac)

1. Enclosure (A), covering the fifth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the waters to the east of Palau Island in the Caroline Island Group, during the period June 30, 1943, to August 10, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

Roy M. DAVENPORT.

— page 100 —
1. 1943, Pearl Harbor, T.H.
2. April 19, 1943, from Fourth War Patrol.
3. April 20, 1943, entered Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., and commenced regular overhaul and repair of war damage the following day. June 15, 1943, completed overhaul.

Major alterations: Ballistic protection; removal of conning tower door and flood valve; permanently rigged 3" gun forward; installed a 20mm gun mount forward of bridge and one on main deck aft; installed four (4) 50 caliber gun mounts; replaced battery jars with laminated jars; modified magazine for 4-inch ammunition; installed auxiliary gyro compass; modified DQ loop; and repaired war damage to conning tower.

Readiness for sea on June 26, 1943 was delayed four days until June 30, 1943 to permit installation of a new SJ radar. The HADDOCK was the first submarine to be equipped with SJ. This unit failed during training period. Conducted sound test, deperming not required. Held four day training period; fired six exercise torpedoes.

PART I
June 30
1300 (V7)
July 4
0730 (Y)
1700 (Y)

NARRATIVE:
Underway from Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H. in company with U.S.S. S.M.I.S. and escort. Train dive off Barber's Point. Deceased escort at dark and parted company with S.M.I.S.; set course for Midway via routing assigned. Lade daily training dives, conducted drills submerged, made battle surfaces, and fired all guns.

Loored alongside dock at Midway.

Underway for patrol station along specified routing after fueling and watering. Daily fire control and radar tracking drills were held.

— page 101 —
1900 (I) Surface, set course for Palau. Nothing sighted during the two-day patrol in this area.

: 1900 (I) Entered area at Latitude 110-11'N Longitude 137-07'E. Set course to patrol north of Palau at Latitude 180°N, Longitude 134°E to cover shipping lanes from Empire.

: 1900 (I) Underway on surface.

: 1900 (I) Arrived in area, commenced surface patrol. Four days without a fix. Sea has been rough and sky overcast most of the time.

: 1900 (I) Established our position in longitude by several sun sights.

: 1900 (I) Weather cleared during night; established position by star fix. Sea moderately rough.

: 0815 (I) Sighted tops and smoke of four ship convoy bearing 040°T, on southerly course. Commenced tracking and determined convoy was on course 180°T, making 8 knots. All ships were coal burners with high stacks. Latitude 160-48'N Longitude 134°-00'E.

: 1044 (I) Having gained a position ahead at approximately 18 miles, submerged to 300 feet to check the trim of the boat in this vicinity. Found that the trim at periscope depth was satisfactory at 300 feet and that density layers existed at 200 feet and 240 feet, with the bathothermograph indicating a 1° change in temperature (lower) at 100 feet and a further drop of 20° beginning at 190 feet and tapering off to 250 feet.

- 2 - ENCLOSURE (4)

— page 102 —
1129 (I) Commenced approach. Range 18,000 yards. Ships were in two columns, columns in line and ships in open order. Distance between columns about 600 yards. The ships were given the designation of Nos. 1-2-3-4; 1 and 2 being the west column and 3 and 4 being in the east column. No. 4 was always behind position. The ships were identified as troop transports, and similar to the following: #1 HUSKII MARU (10,800 tons), #2 KASHIMA MARU (9,875 tons); #3 JOHNOR MARU (6,182 tons), and #4 YOSINO MARU (8,990 tons). Troops could be seen on the first three ships.

We found ourselves to be exactly on their track and determined that they were making eight knots, and were making 90° zigs from 135° T to 225° T every eight to ten minutes. At 12,000 yards lost the targets in a heavy tropical rain storm, and picked them up again at about 6,000 yards on course 225° T. We then turned to close the target's track: The ships were so disposed that we could fire at #1, #2, and #3 ships as they were almost overlapping bow and stern, (a position exactly like the SILVERSHIPS experienced on her fourth patrol. This position provided good firing ranges with zero gyro angles and ninety port tracks. When approximately 2,000 yards from #1 target the ships zigged left to 135° T. We started a turn to the right to bring the bow tubes to bear for an identical setup on this side as we had had on the other, but found for the first time an escorting destroyer of the TOMIZUJI Class to the starboard of #2 target. He presented a 100 starboard angle on the bow. We were now in a bed spot, and wished that we were still on the other side of the convoy, however we later discovered another escort of the same type on the port quarter of #4 target. With the targets drawing nearer the firing point, and minutes rushing by like seconds, the escort situation required action. Fortunately the escort took this action and presented a 300 port angle on the bow, and eased around astern of us at about 700 yards. The action of this escort had certainly harrassed the "pitcher", what with keeping track of him and four other targets while trying to gain a favorable firing position, and keep our presence unknown at the same time. Until the escort had gone past us firing was out of the question -- he would have been on us within seconds after we had let a single torpedo go. I don't know how we kept from being sighted with the number of observations we had to take to keep track of these maneuvering targets after this last zig --

— page 103 —
123-31 fired two torpedoes at target 34, range 3,000 yards, gyro 3540, track 1250 starboard, firing interval 11 seconds.

At 1234-17 fired two torpedoes at target 31, range 2,500 yards, gyro angle 0270, track 1580 starboard, firing interval 10 seconds. At 1234-50 fired one torpedo at target 32, range 1,600 yards, gyro angle 0350, track 1660 starboard; and at 1235-10 fired one torpedo at target 33, range 2,400 yards, gyro angle 0120, track 1440 starboard. All torpedoes set at 12 feet.

At 1235-19 while searching heard one torpedo hit. Before periscope was trained on 34 target a second hit was timed 10 seconds later. 34 target was a mass of smoke, but seemed to be riding all right. -mother hit was timed at 1236-02 which would have been on target 32, the nearest of the four. At 1236-17 a hit was observed in the stern of target 31 which caused his stern to immediately drop in the water to where he had about 3 feet free board where before he had had some 25 feet. The second torpedo fired at this ship either missed or was a duck as no explosion was heard. On this and 34 ship the torpedoes were fired at the fore and mainmasts. It is believed the forward torpedo hit. At 1237-00 the last torpedo was heard to explode, a timed hit on 33 target. No. 2 and 3, like 34 were smoking as if they were on

- 4 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 105 —
1415 (I) At periscope depth, both escorts in sight at 8,000 and 9,000 yards. We were surprised to find both escorts still around.

: 1445 (I) One escort disappeared to south. Made reload forward and aft.

: 1530 (I) Second escort disappeared to south.

: 1545 (I) Surfaced, closed a rail squall to the east for security and then headed southwest to pass through the firing point. Just at end of twilight passed through four large oil slicks about 500 feet long. Oil was very heavy and seemed to stand well above the surface of the water. It was now too dark to check carefully for debris. Sea was too rough to permit anyone to go on deck to get a sample of oil.

Although ship #1 was not seen to sink, it is the Commanding Officer's opinion that it did. The first torpedo which hit in the stern gave indications that his rudder and screws were gone. He was almost dead in the water when he was hit by two more torpedoes, one in the bow and one probably near the middle. Then last seen his stern was awash. One hour later unmistakable sounds of a ship breaking up were heard by the Commanding Officer and personnel in the conning tower and torpedo rooms over a period of ten minutes. When passing through the firing point, large oil slicks were discovered.

Shortly after surfacing the weather closed down again, making search difficult and recontact practically impossible. In retrospect, it was fortunate we had fired when we did, even with the unfavorable firing position, because we would never have been able to get in another attack the way the weather turned out. The weather seemed to have cleared just long enough for us to have sighted this convoy and make an attack. All warships were torpex except the two fired at #2 and #3 targets - they had torpex extenders. The explosions were not overly loud.

— page 106 —
2030 (I) Sent out contact report.

: July 22 During the night retired at enemy's estimated speed to be on his daylight position circle.

: 0600 (I) Covered a sector 50-miles wide during the day. Visibility not good, never regained contact.

: 1900 (I) Set course for area at one engine speed, carrying float.

: July 23 Underway on the surface, proceeding to area east of Falau.

: July 24 Underway on surface, proceeding to center of area.

: 0530 (I) Submerged, conducting a high periscope patrol. Was unable to set any closer than 68 miles to URUKIHI-FL Island before diving because of the rigid economy of fuel that is necessary.

: 1847 (I) Surfaced, set course for the area in the vicinity of Latitude 30° North, Longitude 137° East at one engine speed to patrol for east-west traffic.

: July 25 Conducting surface patrol.

: 1502 (I) Sighted plane ("Japanese Flying Boat") distance 12 miles at Latitude 40-43' North, Longitude 136-45' East. Submerged.

: 1520 (I) ...at periscope depth, nothing in sight. Do not believe we were sighted. This was our first plane for the patrol -- we hope it will be the only one.

: 1736 (I) Surfaced.

: 2000 (I) Having emptied #3 and #5 fuel ballast tanks of fuel, rigged the vents for use as ballet tanks.

: 2300 (I) Submerged to flush out fuel ballast tanks.

: 2324 (I) Surfaced.

: July 26 Conducting surface patrol.

— page 107 —
0729 (I) Sighted two modern tankers bearing 1640 T, distance 12 miles on an easterly course. Latitude 20-52' North, Longitude 1370-40' East. Went to four-engine speed to gain position ahead. Sea calm, visibility excellent -- making 19.5 knots. Targets were making radical zigs on base course 0900 T at estimated speed of 14 knots. At one point lost targets for over an hour when they decided to run south for 10 miles.

: 1219 (I) Having gained a position ahead at approximately 21 miles submerged to 300 feet to check the trim of the boat in this vicinity. Found the trim at periscope depth to be satisfactory at 300 feet and that a density layer existed at 200 feet. The temperature dropped one degree, between 30 and 150 feet, two degrees between 150 and 230 feet, and then dropped rapidly lower as it went off the card at 250 feet.

: 1245 (I) At periscope depth, commenced approach, range about 18,000 yards. The ships were in column. They were identified as the GENYO IARU (10,020 tons), and the MISSION IARU (10,526 tons), in position in the order named. Both ships were loaded.

: 1315 (I) Then the range was 5,800 yards, the angle on the bow was 10° starboard. We were only 970 yards off the track. As the targets had been making about 20° zigs at irregular intervals, and we had not figured out their plan, we thought it they zigged at all before firing, it would be to starboard. We therefore turned left to open the track. No escorts were in sight, but we figured they were still hidden by the targets. One would never expect to find two valuable targets like these unscorted.

- 8 -
ENCLOSURE (4)

— page 108 —
1318 (I) Targets unfortunately zigged left. There was not enough time to bring the bow tubes to bear so came to a course for straight stern shots at a range of 3,900 yards, 90° starboard track. We had gotten a good check on their speed at 14 knots and were sure the range was correct or nearly so. The sea was in our favor for numerous white caps had appeared on what had been a calm sea. Under the circumstances it appeared advisable to divide our fire and fire two torpedoes at each target. At 1321-35 fired two torpedoes at the second target, with a 9" range, 950 yards, 1710, track 95° starboard, at 1321-53 fired two torpedoes at the second target, with a 7" second firing interval. Range 4,250 yards, gyro angle 170°, track 920° starboard. Point of aim on each target was the bridge and the mainmast. Torpedoes were set at 15 feet. Neither surface or air escort could be seen. The torpedoes were heard to run hot and straight, and a light smoke stream from the first torpedoes could be seen leading the first target. The targets had not seen our torpedoes and were still steaming on unconcerned.

Heard a torpedo hit at 1324-29 and within a few seconds saw a torpedo hit the second target just forward of his after deck house. No damage could be seen on all target, so both hits must have been on the second target.

Both targets now started to turn to the left and presented a 165° starboard angle on the bow. At 1327-18 and 1327-25 two torpedo explosions were heard at the end of their run.

The second target seemed to be in trouble and dropped well behind the first target. His main deck was now awash. The sea was calm but the wind was blowing up white caps.

We immediately changed course and headed for this target at full speed, but the range opened to 11,000 yards and then remained constant. The first target came back and stood by the damaged ship.

- 9 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 109 —
1334 (I) Heard two internal explosions and it looked as if the ship would surely sink, he was barely afloat.

: 1345 (I) With the range still 11,000 yards targets turned to the right and started off to the east in formation making ten knots. It was hard to see what was keeping this ship afloat -- and here he was steering off at ten knots. These modern tankers can really take it.

: They the torpedoes missed that were fired at 34 target is unknown; the targets hadn't maneuvered and the target data was undoubtedly correct since both torpedoes fired at the second target hit. The only conjecture that can be made is that the torpedoes ran deep. Exploders were inactivated. These targets were drawing better than 25 feet -- their loaded draft is listed at 30 feet. This is the first experience we have had with torpedoes exploding at the end of their run. As we couldn't close for another attack list the targets clear and then at

: 1443 (I) Surfaced, set course to get ahead of the targets while keeping the range opened to about 32,000 yards so that they wouldn't know of our movements. We expected planes to show up any time to force us down.

: 1500 (I) Targets changed course to the north, resulting in our losing them for an hour.

: 1600 (I) Picked up both targets. The target was hit was very low in the water. It was too late to get ahead of them for another daylight attack so the decision was made to trail them for a night attack. One of the disappointing things of the patrol was that our SJ radar was not functioning properly, and our radar personnel wore doing everything in their power to repair it. A report on the SJ radar follows under marginal heading (I:) RADAR.

- 10 - ENCLOSURE (..)

— page 110 —
1620 (I) Targets commenced their regular zig zag plan to the east with base course apparently 090° T.

: 1719 (I) Made quick dive to avoid being sighted when targets got too close.

: 1740 (I) Surfaced, targets were on base course 022° T.

: 1820 (I) As it began to get dark put four engines on the line and increased speed to full (19.5 knots). The sea was now perfectly calm. It was a dark night, and it was extramodly difficult to see the targets -- the radar would have been a great help. "To couldn't tell just how close we were to the targets, and it didn't seem as though we were closing any." "To were afraid that if he should stop we'd charge past him before we could ever stop our headway. It was so dark we couldn't judge the range well, especially looking into the stern of the targets.

: 1950 (I) Rang up stop and made the forward tubes ready for firing when the target bearing started to fall off to the left and it looked as though they were changing course. Number 5 tube outer door could not be opened. The range was closing, but the targets were still very indistinct, estimated range 3,000 yards. Targets were just off the port bow.

: 1951 (I) Our previous concern for the rate of change of range under these conditions of poor visibility without a radar was now justified. The targets now turned to the right and presented a 900 starboard angle on the bow, and the bearing rapidly drew to the right. "He started to swing to the right for a quick shot, but then saw the leading target swing left and at

: 1951-20 He fired two emergency identification signals at us. There had not even been enough time for us to shoot from the "hip", when we were sighted. Firing was now out of the question with the

— page 111 —
1953 (I)
We made a quick dive when the second target turned a searchlight on us. He opened fire as we drove a depth charge. We sustained no damage, but blew a gasket on an outboard engine exhaust valve when it was closed before the engine had stopped running. The inboard valve held and the engine was not flooded.

2030 (I)
Surfaced and closed the targets to the north. It was too dark for a submerged periscope approach without a radar, so we decided to try a surface approach, firing from about 3,000 yards. We began tracking by estimating the range and angle on the bow and using the T.B.T. for bearings.

2138 (I)
With the targets on course 075° T, and making 14.0 knots we took a firing position on the second ship. At 2138-33 fired four torpedoes from the bow tubes at the second target; range 3,000 yards, gyro angle 008°, track 95° starboard. Torpedoes were set at 15 feet. A six second firing interval was used. A divergent spread of one degree was applied to the first and fourth torpedoes, while the second and third were fired at the 11.0 T.

2144-05 (I)
Heard three torpedoes explode at the end of their run (about five minutes thirty seconds). The fourth torpedo was not heard to explode. All torpedoes ran straight and normal, and their tracks could be seen passing beneath the target. The targets did not maneuver until the torpedoes exploded at the end of the run. This is decidedly a bad feature because it gives the submarine's presence away.

— page 112 —
2219 (I)
Radar picked up target at 7,400 yards, began tracking. Target now making 13.5 knots.

: 2244 (I)
When the range was 4,000 yards and we were presenting a zero angle on the bow, the targets opened fire on us. After a half dozen shells had passed close above our heads we dove. They did not use a searchlight. It seemed uncanny that they should have opened up so close to us -- I'm sure they couldn't see us because even they were hard to see.

: 2300 (I)
Surfaced, range 8,600 yards. Commenced tracking again.

: July 27
Tracking. two targets that are as determined to get away as we are to get them.

: 0030 (I)
Targets opened fire and turned on searchlight in the direction of 045° T while we bore 352° T from them at a distance of 9,000 yards. They fired about thirty rounds, turned their searchlight off, and fired ten more. This gave us good proof that they didn't have a radar, and that they had just happened to fire in our direction at 2244 (I). If it was just "trial and error", or "random shooting" -- it was, nevertheless, uncomfortable to have around. Following the shooting we lost target by sight and radar.

: 0114 (I)
Radar contact on target at 8,250 yards. Commenced tracking with the idea of getting ahead for a submerged radar approach. I.oon was to come up at 0130, but the sky was overcast. After midnight the targets started heading in the direction of Falau with their base course 310° T and making 12.5 knots.

— page 113 —
0217 (I)
Having gained a position directly ahead of the target at 9,020 yards dove and began submerged approach. Target was on course 310°T making 12.5 knots. e placed ourselves on course 050°T with the expectation that the target would zig to the right for he had been on 310°T for a long time and was due to change to 330°T. e didn't pick up the target after submerging until 6,000 yards. Target still hadn't changed course so we increased speed to full to get off his track. ...t 4,000 yards picked up targets through /l periscope. ...t this time we went to periscope depth to avoid being seen. Our setup was carefully designed to be beautiful -- sound, periscope, and T.D.C. all agreed. e only had two torpedoes aft, so we planned to fire these at the first target (not yet damaged), then swing to bring the bow tubes to bear on both targets.

At 0240-55 fired two torpedoes on periscope bearings from aft set at 20 feet. ...range 1,950 yards, gyro angle 1710, track 620 starboard, 10 second firing interval. Points of aim were bridge and mainmast. Torpedoes were heard to run by sound. Both torpedoes missed and exploded at the end of run (5 minutes - 20 seconds). At this time both targets maneuvered. Up until this time bearing stayed exactly on. If there ever was an ideal set-up, and a correct one, this was it. e're sure the torpedoes didn't go around or over, so they must have gone under. However, having had such perfect luck with our torpedoes on the convoy, we still wouldn't give up.

After firing the stern tubes, swung hard right to bring the bow tubes to bear. e were on the point of firing with 110° right gyros and a 900 starboard track on the second target when our "friends" the first two torpedoes exploded at the end of their run. This is a decidedly unsatisfactory feature. e continued our swing to reduce the gyro angles to zero, and by the time we got around the second target presented a 160° port.

— page 115 —
1300 (I) Departed area for Midway. Latitude 9°-30' N., Longitude 136°-00' E.

: August 3
: 1350 (L) Sighted large metal drum in water, Latitude 23°-45' N., Longitude 165°-03' E. which was dangerous to navigation. Identified as vapor condensor approximately 5 feet in diameter and 8 feet long. It hadn't been in the water long as no barnacles were seen to be attached to it. Sank with seven rounds of 3 inch after small arms failed to puncture it.

: August 5
: 0840 (M) Sighted PBY, distance two miles by sight and radar, exchanged recognition signals.

: 1140 (M) Sighted PBY, distance four miles by sight and radar. Plane did not close - recognition signals not exchanged.

: August 6
: 1440 (M) Crossed International. Dato Line.

: August 6
: 0700 (Y) Entered Midway and moored alongside U.S.S. SPERRY.

: 1306 (Y) Underway for Pearl in company with U.S.S. SNAFISH. Received fuel oil at Midway for trip to Pearl.

: 1555 (Y) Made trim dive. Surfaced. Parted company with the SNAFISH.

: 1704 (Y) Sighted submarine periscope one point on port bow at 600 yards. Turned towards periscope and went ahead emergency speed on all main engines, making the one remaining torpedo, which was forward, ready. Before we could get his true bearing or head directly for him, he lowered his periscope. No did not fire, but ran directly over him and then zigged frequently, but tried to give him a track of 180° most of the time.

The port lookout had reported a bright object on the port bow. As soon as the officer of the deck looked in this direction he saw the periscope some three feet out of the water. The sun was directly behind us, and it was the reflection of the sun on the window of the periscope that we first saw. He had just completed a 400' left zig some thirty seconds before sighting the submarine. Latitude 27°-40.5' N. Longitude 176°-56' W.

His periscope was never sighted again.

— page 116 —
1720 (Y) Sent out contact report. Seeing the S.S. TISH on the horizon closed it until at

: 1814 (Y) Sent S.S. TISH report of submarine contact by search-light. Speed of our two boats precluded any possible chance of submarine catching up with us.

: August 10 Made rendezvous with S.S. TISH and escort - proceeding to Pearl.

: 1100 (VW) Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

- 17 -

— page 118 —
5-4/A16-3
Serial 0210

DECLASSIFIED
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CSD 43 Conf. Ltr. FB5-43/A16-3
Serial C118 of 12 August, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK - Fifth War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The HADDOCK's Fifth War patrol is a model for aggressiveness and tenacity. If the torpedo performance had measured up to the personnel performance this would have been an outstanding patrol in every respect. The skillful manner in which the attack was executed on the four ship convoy on 21 July and the pursuit and attacks on the two tankers on 26 July reflect great credit on the commanding officer, officers and crew.

2. The cause of failure to make a higher percentage of hits in the attacks on the tankers is unknown, but the average range on these attacks was such that a small error in data would result in misses. The explosion of torpedoes at the end of the run is a serious defect which should be eliminated as soon as possible. Although positive evidence of sinking of the USS HURU is not available, it is probable that she did not survive three torpedo hits and it is recommended that HADDOCK be credited with sinking her. Evidence of damage to three other transports, totaling 25,047 tons, and one tanker of 10,526 tons makes the impressive total of one transport, 10,800 tons, damaged and probably sunk, and four ships totaling 35,573 tons damaged.

3. The Squadron Commander congratulates the commanding officer, officers and crew on a most successful patrol.

Copy to:
Consubdiv 43
CO HADDOCK

— page 119 —
1/2/1943
Serial 01131
DECLASSIFIED
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
H.D.DOCK Report of Fifth
War Patrol dated 8-10-43.

COMSUBSP.C PLTROL REPORT NO. 239
U.S.S. H.D.DOCK - FIFTH W.R.P.TROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. H.D.DOCK (SS231) - Report of Fifth War Patrol, 7/7/43.
(30 June to 10 August 1943).

Enclosure:
(A) Copy of subject war patrol report.
(B) Copy of Comsubdiv 43 Conf. 1tr. FB5-4/3/16-3, Serial 0118 dated 12 August 1943.
(C) Copy of Comsubron 4 Conf. 1st. end. FC5-4/1/16-3, Serial 0210 dated 14 August 1943.

1. The fifth war patrol of the H.D.DOCK was aggressively carried out and much damage to the enemy resulted.

2. The night attack on an enemy convoy when seven hits out of eight torpedoes fired were obtained is outstanding. All four ships of this convoy were hit. This required excellent functioning of the fire control party as all eight torpedoes were fired in one minute and thirty-nine seconds.

3. The extremely aggressive and tenacious running attacks on the two enemy tankers were excellently performed even though the H.D.DOCK didn't succeed in sinking them and was subjected to enemy gunfire several times. Evident lack of radar on the enemy tankers is noted.

4. The practice of using the bathythermograph to make frequent studies of the density layers for both sound and trim conditions is highly approved. In two cases on this patrol, the H.D.DOCK made such a survey just prior to attacks and the advance knowledge of conditions was most advantageous.

5. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia award.

6. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this aggressive and successful war patrol. The H.D.DOCK is credited with inflicting the following damage to the enemy:

SUNK

1 - Transport (HUSIMI M.RU class) - 10,936 tons

— page 120 —
1 - Passenger-Freighter (K.S.IM.RU class) - 9,908 tons
1 - Passenger-Freighter (JOHORE M.RU class) - 6,182 tons
1 - Passenger-Freighter (YCSINO M.RU class) - 8,990 tons
1 - Tanker (NISSYO M.RU class) - 10,526 tons

TOTAL: 35,606 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
VCNC (5)
Cinpec (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.
Ocean areas (1)
Scrforpac
(adv. Base Plan. Unit (1)
Cinclant (2)
Consubslant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsopec (2)
Comsowospac (1)
Comsubsowospac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Comsubspac (12)
SUBAD, MI (2)
Comsubcomsubpac
Midway (2)
All Squadron and Div.
Commenders, Subspace (2)
U.S.S. HADDOCK (1)
(COMSUBSPAC Endorsement only)
All Submarines, Subspace (1).

R.C. LAWVER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 121 —
45-43/A16-3
Serial 0116
DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK - Fifth War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The Commanding Officer, officers, and crew of HADDOCK are congratulated on a superbly conducted patrol which resulted in far beyond those actually obtained. The discrepancy was caused by torpedo failures, the exact nature of which is only a conjecture but the commanding officer's explanation of deep running appears logical. At that, nine out of twenty-three hit for a shade-above-average percentage of thirty-nine. There were six attacks on the different contacts totaling six ships. First contact consisted of four troop transports totaling 35,047 tons, all of which were damaged. In this most skillful attack each of the four ships was hit (one hit twice). The time interval from first torpedo fired to last torpedo hit was three minutes and twenty-nine seconds, or two hundred nine seconds. Damage was inflicted at the rate of 171.5 tons per second. In addition, a follow-up attack cost probably sank one of the previously damaged ships of 5,550 tons. Attacks 3, 4, 5 and 6 were conducted against the same two targets, modern loaded ten thousand ton tansers. Fifteen torpedoes were expended in a dogged effort to prevent these important cargoes from reaching their destination. Two torpedoes hit one of the ships but both ships kept on going in spite of the fact that the damaged one was down by the storm with dock exhaust.

2. The report is well prepared and the attack date and analyses are clearly stated. The practice of frequently going deep to investigate for density layers is an excellent one. It is maintaining continuous periscope watch while on the surface. On two occasions (between 0729 and 1219 and 1500 and 1600, both times July 26) HADDOCK lost contact due to radical energy change of course. Each time contact was regained by heading at high speed down the last known true bearing of the target group. This is considered better than the so-called retiring search curve. Second - guessing himself, the commanding officer now feels that it would have been better to have held

— page 123 —
SS231/A16-3
Serial (015)
RECLASSIFIED
From:  To:  Via:
Subject:  U.S.S. HADDOCK, Report of War Patrol number Six.
Enclosure:  (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (Comsubpac)
1. Enclosure (A), covering the sixth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the waters to the north of the Truk Islands, during the period September 2, 1943, to September 28, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

Boy M. DAVENPORT.

— page 124 —
1943 from Fifth "War Patrol. August 11, 1943 commenced refit by Relief Crew Submarine Division Forty-three. Replaced cracked jar of cell 96 aft; converted No. 1 lub oil tank to a sanitary tank having both heads discharge only into this tank; and entered dry-dock for repairs to #5 torpedo tube shutter. Completed refit on August 23, 1943. Deporting not required. Cold four day training period which included an excellent convoy exercise; fired two exorcise torpedoes. Readiness for sea September 2, 1943.

Part I
NARRATIVE:

Sept 2
1100 (VT) Underway from Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H. in company with escort (PC 597). Set course for Johnston Island. Made trim dive. Released escort at dark. Conducted drills submerged, made battle surface, fired all guns, and exercised fire-control party while enroute area.

Sept 4
0932 (X) Powered starboard side to pier at Johnston Island and received fuel and water.

1252 (X) Underway, set course for assigned area at two engine speed.

Sept 6
1145 (Y) Crossed International Date Line.

Sept 8
1408 (N) Sighted plane identified as a "LILY" Type 99A, on course 270, distance 6 miles. Submerged, apparently undetected.

1435 (N) Surfaced.

Sept 9
1653 (L) Sighted small unidentified plane on course 255° T, distance 8 miles. Submerged, apparently undetected.

1725 (L) Surfaced.

1803 (L) Sighted small unidentified plane on course 250° T, distance 8 miles. Submerged, apparently undetected.

— page 125 —
1844 (L) Surfaced.
Sept 10
0620 (L) Sighted small unidentified plane on course 092° T, distance 6 miles. Submerged, apparently undetected. SD radar was being used approximately five seconds out of every thirty to forty seconds. No interference was noted on radar.
0650 (L) Surfaced.
Sept 12
0540 (K) Submerged. Having reached a point 180 miles from the entrance point of our assigned area decided to submerge to avoid detection before reaching the choice hunting ground which lies on a direct route between Truk and Saipan.
1820 (K) Surfaced.
Sept 13
0500 (K) Entered assigned area - submerged, conducting a high periscope patrol.
1835 (K) Surfaced, set course for Truk - Saipan route.
Sept 14
Patrolling on Truk - Saipan route in vicinity of Latitude 90-11' N., Longitude 150°-39' E.
0450 (K) Submerged, conducting periscope patrol with observation every ten minutes.
1840 (K) Surfaced.
Sept 15
Patrolling on Truk - Saipan route.
0500 (K) Submerged, conducting periscope patrol.
1845 (K) Surfaced.
2030 (K) Sighted a target with escort bearing 166° T, distance 10 miles. Latitude 9°-13' N., Longitude 150°-58' E. (Contact #1). Bright moonlight night - visibility excellent. Turned away and opened the range to avoid being detected. Target was tracked using estimated ranges as it was necessary to stay outside radar range to avoid being sighted. Deter-mined target was on base course of 300° T, making 8.0 knots.

- 2 -

— page 126 —
2310 (K) "With target bearing 120° T, distance 9 miles submerged to make attack. At 10,000 yards the radar was still unable to see the target, so to avoid being sighted went to periscope depth and continued with periscope alone - taking ranges with the stadiometer. The escort that had been with the target when we dove had now disappeared. The target was now identified as a passenger freighter similar to the SARAHING (4,070 tons). We tried for a 60° port track, but just before firing target zigged away presenting an 850 track at 3,000 yards. Rather than wait for a 110 track with a resultant longer torpedo run, fired four (4) torpedoes at 0010-00 (K) from forward with a ten second firing interval and a 10 divergent spread. Torpedoes set at 6 feet. Range 2,990 yards, torpedo run 2,850 yards, track angle 850 port, gyro angle 3550. All torpedoes ran straight and normal. The "white light" method was used with periscope continuously on during firing. Two hits were observed, one in the bow and the other in the stern which threw water to twice the height of the vessel. These explosions were felt all over the boat, but were not heard, so it was assumed they were duds. It is believed that the second and third torpedoes hit. The two misses exploded at the end of their run. Middle of the target was the point of aim."

A fire appeared to break out in the side of the ship aft. No change in trim or draft was immediately apparent, but when the target turned towards us to ram, a slight list to port was noted. The target continued to make the same turn count and now headed directly for us.

"With a new set-up fired two "down-the-throat" shots at 0015-08 (K). Using the "white light" method fired two torpedoes from forward with a 12 second firing interval, set at 6 feet. Range 1,780 yards, torpedo run 1,570 yards, track angle 30 port, gyro angle 3330. Both torpedoes were aimed to hit, and let the natural dispersion take care of the spread. No hits. The first torpedo passed about 25 yards to the right of the target while the second was headed directly for the bow. After 700 yards torpedo run the second torpedo

— page 127 —
0016 (K): With the target still headed for us, we turned to starboard and went deep. Much to our surprise the target dropped a single pattern of 9 depth charges, none of which were too close for comfort. Target came up one side and then the other either searching for us, or trying to keep us down, but we evaded successfully. The first torpedo was heard to explode at the end of its run. The target never stopped to listen, but made the same turn count as during the attack (200 rpm). The gradually increased our speed until we left the target behind.

Found a density layer to exist at 150 feet and 210 feet, and it was necessary to flood in 8,000 pounds to obtain a satisfactory 1/3 trim at 300 feet. The temperature remained constant to 150 feet and then dropped 20°F to 210 feet and further dropped 20°F to 250 feet. Sound conditions were good. Latitude 90-30' N., Longitude 150-36' E.

0220 (K): At periscope depth, nothing in sight.

0230 (K): Surfaced, target not in sight; opened the range to the east.

0331 (K): Submerged when the lookout mistook Jupiter, which had just risen, to be a lighted plane. Lookout insisted it was a plane he had sighted, and as it was near morning twilight we remained submerged.

1845 (K): Surfaced. Set course to patrol in the area twenty miles east of Jurlov Island.

Sept 17: Enroute to new shipping lane.

0105 (K): Sighted single flare which was believed to be a light on Jurlov Island for the aid of ships making a landfall. Soon a series of these lights came on, there being seven in all. Those were at a height of approximately 100 feet and were equally spaced.

— page 128 —
150 feet apart. There were low clouds in that direction so we only saw the glow of the lights. Below these lights a single light would appear about 20 feet above the water and would get closer and closer to us until it had reached a point approximately 7,000 yards away, at which time it would illuminate the water for a few moments and gradually drop into the sea. It had almost a straight trajectory. These couldn't have been landing flood lights on a plane because we would have been able to hear and see the plane as it was extremely bright due to full moon.

We were using our 3D intermittently and we could see on our screen another radar searching. We suspected a radar on Murilo Island had picked us up, so we opened the range quickly. After 20 minutes we saw no further lights, nor did we see any planes. We decided to make a reconnaissance of the island during the day of the eighteenth.

0445 (K) Submerged, patrolled sea lanes to the east of Hall Island.

1840 (K) Surfaced, patrolling same sea lanes as during day.

Sept 18 Closed Murilo Island to conduct reconnaissance during day.

0450 (K) Submerged, closing Murilo Island.

1306 (K) Sighted Murilo Island bearing 21°0 T, distance 9 miles. Unable to close enough to observe this date.

1843 (K) Surfaced, patrolling east of Hall Islands.

Sept 19 Submerged, closing Murilo Island.

0505 (K)

1500 (K) Made a reconnaissance of the Island at 4,000 yards and took pictures. No life was observed and only a small boat landing was seen near the southern end of Murilo. The foliage is very dense and there could be quite an establishment ashore there without it being detected from the water. The surf could be seen breaking over the low reef that extends south of Murilo around to RUO ISLAND.

— page 129 —
1840 (K)  Surfaced, Due to absence of contacts in this area, set course to patrol the shipping lane to the east of PULWAT ISLAND.

: 1655 (K)  'Sent to 300 feet to check the trim of the boat in this vicinity. Found a density layer to exist at 210 feet, and it was necessary to flood in 6,000 pounds to obtain a satisfactory 1/3 trim. The temperature remained almost constant down to 210 feet and then dropped off 4° F between there and 250 feet. Sound conditions were good. Latitude 70-29' N., Longitude 150-22.5' E.

: 1845 (K)  Surfaced, commenced patrol running south and north across shipping lanes.

: 2257 (K)  Radar contact on a large ship bearing 225° T, range 15,000 yards, Latitude 70-36' N., Longitude 150-10' E. (Contact #2). Went to battle stations and commenced tracking. It was a relatively dark night with many clouds, but the moon was just rising. We were on course 180° T and continued to close the target on that course. The target was soon tracked on course 100° T at 9.0 knots - he was steering a steady course. At about 8,000 yards we could begin to make out the outline of the target and could see an escort directly astern of him. He was a destroyer, and was not patrolling. The target was first identified as an aircraft carrier, for we could see no masts, bridge, or stack. It about 5,000 yards it was identified as a tanker. It was not the conventional 10,000 ton tanker we saw so much of on the KIDDOCK's fifth patrol, but this was a tremendously big ship. The bow was slightly raised with a modified well forward and from there the deck ran almost straight back to the stern. The mainmast was amidships. The radar had only one huge "pip" rather than two "pips" which are usually found with the conventional tanker. The target was identified as the TOLAN II-RU Ho. 2 (19,400 tons). It was fully loaded. The target

— page 130 —
2327-56 (K)  Fired six torpedoes from forward with a 1° divergent spread between torpedoes (four to hit), with an 8 second firing interval. Torpedoes were set on 10 feet. Range 3,005 yards, torpedo run 3,220 yards, track angle 121° port, gyro angle 009°

— page 131 —
0305-45 (K) With the target just steadied on a new course fired four torpedoes from aft at the 34 target with a 50 divergent spread and with a 10 second firing interval. Torpedoes set at 10 feet. Range 3,080 yards, torpedo run 2,600 yards, track angle 500 starboard, and gyro angle 1990. All torpedoes ran straight and normal, but just as the last torpedo was fired the target ended an extremely short leg of about two minutes, and all torpedoes missed. Neither the submarine or the torpedoes were sighted, and only when the torpedoes exploded at the end of their run was our presence noted. We were still not sighted.

- 8 -
- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 132 —
0530 (K) Submerged, conducting a high periscope patrol. Sky overcast, heavy rains, visibility very poor. Weather cleared during forenoon.

1114 (K) Sighted smoke over the horizon bearing 350° T. Latitude 80-11' N., Longitude 149-31' E. (Contact #4). Change of bearing indicated the ship was on a westerly course. The position of this ship was such that it could be our convoy of last night. After careful consideration we decided to surface, but first would let the range open, so there would be no chance of being sighted by the convoy.

1140 (K) Surfaced. Now began a "hot pursuit" that took us out of our area, through a wide neutral lane and into another area before we were able to again engage this convoy. It was the same convoy.

We assumed that the convoy would round Ulul Island close aboard, and take a course to Saipan or the Empire. If the convoy did this we could keep well over to the west skirting Hogami Bank, and get ahead of them before sunset.

By the time we were aboard to port it was obvious that they weren't going north, but were going to cross the northern part of Hogami Bank on a base course of 290° T. The targets were not zig zagging. We kept them in sight by the obliging smoke of the fl target, and by means of periscope observations every ten minutes.

— page 133 —
1845 (K) Having gained a position ahead, stationed tracking party. Could barely make out targets from bridge, but could not see on radar. Still too light to close for radar approach.

: 1900 (K) Closed targets and gained radar contact.

It was an extremely dark night. Continued to close targets until range was inside 8,000 yaris to insure good tracking. Targets began zig zagging at sunset.

Targets were in line of bearing, and 1,500 yards apart on course 3400 T, making 10.0 knots. To were on their port bow.

We had four torpedoes remaining forward, and four aft, so we planned to fire the bow tubes at the loading target (which was further away than the second) and then swing the ship to bring the stern tubes to bear on the second target. To then started in for the attack and took a course for a straight bow shot and an approximate 1000 port track. Target bearing transmitter was used for firing bearings.

1931-44 (K) Fired four torpedoes from forward at the No. 1 target with a 10 divergent spread and with a 7 second firing interval. Torpedoes set at 10 foot. Range 3,100 yards, torpedo run 3,090 yards, track angle 970 port, gyro angle 0020. All torpedoes ran straight and normal.

1932-05 (K) Swing hard left at full speed to bring the stern tubes to bear. The target bearing transmitter was quickly shifted to the second target, and by reason of this it was easy for the radar to keep on the correct target during the swing. Slowed to 1/3 speed before firing to prevent the torpedoes from broaching due to the heavy turbulence of the screw currents caused by full speed during the turn. Experienced this trouble on the SILVERSHIPS - the broached torpedo fired prematurely too.

- 10 - [MCLOSURE (A)]

— page 134 —
1933-54 (K) Fired four torpedoes from aft at the No. 2 target with a 10 divergent spread and with a 6 second firing interval. Torpedoes set at 10 feet. Range 1,500 yards, torpedo run 1,500 yards, track angle 1060 port, and gyro angle 1320. All torpedoes ran straight and normal.

1934-00 (K) Two torpedoes had already been fired from aft when the torpedoes from forward began hitting. Three torpedo hits were observed as follows: one forward of center, one in center, and one aft. This target was observed to sink both by sight and radar within a minute. Four torpedo torpedoes must have ripped her to pieces.

The No. 1 target started to go down immediately, but it wasn't until about five minutes after it was first hit that it was observed to sink by sight and radar.

We now opened the range to the west with the intention of clearing Mac Laughlin Bank to the west and then turn north to get clear of our neighbors area as quickly as we could.

Right after the ships went down the two destroyers commenced a terrifying depth charge attack that would have been most unpleasant to be under. We counted over fifty charges within four minutes. They sounded like big ones. We laughed and laughed.

2300 (K) Sent out radio report on our activities, and that we were heading home with all torpedoes expended. Set course for today.

Sept 22 Submerged to rest up for the trip home.
0527 (K)

1834 (K) Surfaced.

Sept 23 Submerged north of all Islands during the day to avoid plane detection.

0516 (K) Surfaced, began running on the surface to Midway.

1514 (K) Surfaced, began running on the surface to Midway.

- 11 - ENCLOSURE (L)

— page 136 —
1st Attack (NIGHT) - 15 - 16 SEPTEMBER) :-
A single escorted AK, attacked at periscope depth in bright moonlight, stadiometer ranges being taken with ease inside of 9000 yards range. Four torpedoes gave two hits, but did not appear to seriously damage the ship. The hits were felt but no heard, yet the Commanding Officer estimates the water column for each hit to have been 60 feet high. A zig away contributed to the range of 3000 yards. Then the AK turned to ram, two more torpedoes, fired on sharp tracks with unfavorable gyros, missed, one of these being a premature.

2nd Attack (20 September) :-
A large A0 with DD escorting astern, neither zig zagging, was attacked on the surface on a fairly dark night 30 minutes after initial radar contact. Three or four hits resulted from a salvo of 6. torpedoes, aimed by bridge T.B.T. A sharp track would give greater protection against sighting than the 1200 track used.

3rd Attack (21 September) :-
A convoy of 2 APs escorted by 2 DDs and zig zagging wildly was contacted by radar two hours after sinking the A0. Four torpedoes fired in a night surface attack, missed due to long range and a zig. Then followed a night chase; a dive after dawn for attack from ahead; a periscope contact several hours later with the targets having circled the submarine; a surface chase into the adjacent patrol area; some excellent planning.

— page 138 —
FC5-10/416-3  COMMANDER SUMARINE S.U.DRON TEN
    Care of Fleet Post Office;
    Serial 0164
    San Francisco, California,
    30 September 1943.

From:  The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To:  The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. H.DDOCK - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

1. The Sixth War Patrol of the H.DDOCK was another aggressive, successful patrol with resulting serious damage to the enemy during only ten days in the assigned area.

2. Attacks were exceptionally well conducted. Controcs were fully developed and tenaciousy retrained until targets were destroyed.

3. The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten takes pleasure in extending a "Well Done" to the Commanding Officer and personnel of the H.DDOCK for conducting this highly successful patrol.

4. It is recommended that the H.DDOCK be credited with inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK

- O (TONN M.RU No. 2) 19,400 tons
- P (H.KOZ.I M.RU TYPE) 10,400 tons
- P (R.KUYO M.RU TYPE) 9,419 tons
- 39,219

Copy to:
Consubdiv 101
CO H.DDOCK

— page 139 —
12-10/A16-3/(8)/(16)
Serial 01409
DECLASSIFIED
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
E.DOCK Report of
Sixth Iar Patrol.

CC. USS PAC. PATROL REPORT NO. 268
U.S.S. HADDOCK - SIXTH IAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Sixth Iar Patrol. (2 September to 28 September 1943).

1. The sixth war patrol of the HADDOCK was brief, aggressive, and extremely successful.

2. Only nine days in area, the HADDOCK made six attacks of which four resulted in severe damage to the enemy. Of particular note was the firing of 18 torpedoes in 20 hours in three separate attacks, with the resultant sinking of 39,219 tons.

3. The functioning of the HADDOCK's fire control party was excellent as exemplified by the seven hits out of eight torpedoes fired on the two transports.

4. Apparently the enemy is aware of the use of radar by U.S. Submarines. This is evident in the "ADOCK" chase of the convoy on September 21, when after noting that the targets were not zigzagging during daylight hours, they commenced to after sundown on an extremely dark night.

5. This patrol is considered successful for the purpose of Combat insignia award.

Room 2855
22 OCT 1943
ROUTE IV: 0 1 - 0 2 - 0
Op File No. (SC) 97420
Dec. No. 20227
Copy No. 20227
PRN. 20227

— page 140 —
1- TANKER (TOHAT, ARU #2 Class) 19,425 tons
1- Transport (HAKOZAKI, ARU Class) 10,400 tons
1- Transport (RAKUYO, ARU Class) 9,419 tons

Total 39,244 tons

DAMAGED

1- Freighter (SAKARANG, ARU Class) 4,013 tons

J. B. CHIGG
Acting.

Distribution and authentication on following page.

-2-

— page 141 —
1/1/1943
FF12-10/416-3/(8)/(16)
Serial 01409

DECLASSIFIED
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
L. M. DOCK Report of
Sixth War Patrol.

CO. SUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 268
U.S.S. HADDOCK - SIXTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Sixth War Patrol. (2 September to 28 September 1943).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
VCNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
Intel. Cen. Pac.
Ocean areas (1)
Servpac Adv. Base Plan.
Unit (1)
Cinclant (2)
Consublant (8)
S/M school (2)
Consospac (2)
Consowespac (1)
Consubcnespac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Consubspac (18)
SUAD, MI (2)
ConsubspacSubordcom (2)
All Squadrons and Div.
Commanders, Subspac
U.S.S. HADDOCK (1)
(Endorsements only:)
...11 Submarines, Subspac(1)

J... L. OODRUFF, Jr.,
Flag Secretary.

— page 142 —
12 0935
SS231/A16-3
Serial (019)
DECLASSIFIED
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
November 15, 1943.

From: The Commanding Officer; U.S.S. LDDOCK.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
The Commander Submarine Squadron TEN.
The Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One.

Subject: U.S.S. LDDOCK, Report of War Patrol
number Seven.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (Consubpac)

1. Enclosure (A), covering the seventh war patrol of this vessel conducted in the waters to the north of the Truk Islands, during the period from October 20, 1943, to November 15, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

Roy M. DAVENPORT.

— page 143 —
12 0935
U.S.S. HADDOCK

(A) PROLOGUE.

Arrived Submarine Base, Midway September 28, 1943 from Sixth War Patrol. September 29, 1943 commenced refit by Relief Crew, Submarine Division One Hundred One and U.S.S. SPRAY. Completed refit on October 11, 1943. Not depermed nor wiped. Held three day training period which provided excellent training; fired three exercise torpedoes and all guns. Readiness for sea was delayed one day until October 20, 1943 for repairs to high pressure air compressor.

PART I NARRATIVE

October 20 0700 (Y) Underway from Submarine Base, Midway for patrol in accordance with Consubpac Operation Order 238-43. Set course for assigned area at two engine speed. Conducted drills submerged, made battle surfaces, fired all guns, and exercised fire-control party enroute to area.

October 22 0200 (M) Crossed International Date Line.

October 23 1143 (M) Radar contact of plane at 28 miles; followed out to 30 miles where range remained practically constant for several minutes and then disappeared. Plane Contact No. 1. 370 miles, bearing 0560 T from Wake.

October 24 0650 (L) Sighted plane identified as similar to Type "97" Flying Boat, on course 090 T, distance 8 miles. Plane Contact No. 2. Submerged, apparently undetected. 118 miles, bearing 0380 T from Wake. Not observed by radar.

0735 (L) Surfaced.

0749 (L) Sighted plane identified as similar to Type "00", Navy Float Plane, on course 1400 T distance 6 miles. Plane Contact No. 3. Submerged, apparently undetected. 118 miles, bearing 0380 T from Wake. Not observed by radar. Radar was operated on 3 - 5 seconds, off 10 - 30 seconds during daylight hours enroute to the area. A watch was maintained on a high periscope at the same time.

0911 (L) Surfaced.

— page 144 —
1344 (L) Radar contact of two planes, one at 7 miles and the other at 30 miles. Did not sight planes. Submerged, apparently undetected. Plane Contact No. 4. 70 miles, bearing 017° T from Wake.

: 1501 (L) Surfaced.

: October 25 Sighted plane similar to Type "99" Flying Boat coming out of a cloud on course 250° T, distance 3 miles. Plane Contact No. 5. Submerged, apparently undetected as there were no repercussions. 210 miles, bearing 251° T from Wake. Not observed by radar.

: 1040 (L) Surfaced.

: October 27 Sight ed searchlight beam bearing 178° T, distance approximately 22 miles. Turned towards light at best speed. Latitude 13°-00' N., Longitude 1560-27' E.

: 0130 (L) Sighted searchlight again bearing 225° T distance about 15 miles. Target appeared to be on a westerly course making high speed, so set course of 250° T to overtake him.

: 0234 (L) Lookout got a brief look at searchlight on estimated bearing of 235° T. 'ith target bearing changing so rapidly to the north, estimated that his course was about 285° T which would take him to Saipan. Came to course 285° T. Searchlight seemed to be from an escort. The light had been turned on every hour on the half hour to identify his position in relation to the ships that probably were with him, but it was not seen again after this. Nothing was seen at daylight, and during the day a search was made which covered target courses between 240° - 300°, and speeds from 11 to 19 knots.

: 0721 (K) Sighted plane similar to Navy reconnaissance 95-biplane (NIKIINO) on course 070° T, distance 5 miles. Plane Contact No. 6. Submerged, apparently undetected. Not observed by radar. 350 miles, bearing 028° T from Truk.

- 2 -
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 145 —
0803 (K) Surfaced.
: 1800 (K) Discontinued search, set course to enter area.
: October 28 Entered area, set course for the Truk - Saipan 0315 (K) shipping route.
: 0555 (K) Submerged, commenced submerged patrol with high periscope exposures along the Truk - Saipan shipping route. Due to the previous air activity that has been seen in this vicinity, it was not considered advisable to conduct a surface patrol.
: 1830 (K) Surfaced, conducted surface patrol along same shipping lane as when submerged.
: October 29 Patroling Truk - Saipan route in vicinity of Latitude 90-06' N., Longitude 150-46' E.
: 0507 (K) Submerged, conducting periscope patrol.
: 1832 (K) Surfaced.
: October 30 Submerged, conducting periscope patrol. Swing ship during day for compensation of magnetic compasses.
: 1830 (K) Surfaced. Set course to patrol in the vicinity of Latitude 80-05' N., Longitude 150-50' E. This position has in the past, and again on this patrol, proved to be a good hunting spot as traffic can be intercepted passing south of NANONUTO and to the east of NANONUTO when it is using North Pass, Piaanu Pass, or any of the passes to the south of Truk. Frequently traffic from the south takes this route when by-passing Truk. The HADDOK takes positions along the shipping lanes leading to and from Truk that will insure mostly night contacts for all slow or medium speed ships, and which will insure sighting fast naval vessels during either day-light or dark. Fortunately, this procedure has worked most satisfactorily and has provided many contacts on three patrols spent in this area.
: October 31 Patrolling in the vicinity of Latitude 80-15' N., Longitude 150-35' E.
: 0500 (K) Submerged, conducting periscope patrol.

- 3 -
- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 146 —
1251 (K) Sighted patrol bomber, Type "99", Navy Flying Boat. Plane Contact No. 7. Distance 7 miles.

: 1830 (K) Surfaced.

November 1: Set course for the vicinity of Latitude 9°-15' N., Longitude 150°-35' E.

: 0500 (K) Submerged, conducting periscope patrol.

: 1719 (K) Surfaced, commenced surface patrol in vicinity of Latitude 9°-15' N., Longitude 150°-35' E.

: 1955 (K) Radar interference from what appeared to be another SJ radar on bearing 300° T. Latitude 9°-19' -30" N., Longitude 150°-29' -30" E. Changed course to intercept.

: 2055 (K) Sighted a two ship convoy. Ship Contact No. 2. The smaller ship appeared to be similar to the SAMARANG MARU (4,070 tons), the ship we were depth charged by on the Haddock's Sixth Patrol near this same position. This vessel appeared to be the escort for a 7,000 ton unidentified transport - coal burner with stack amidships and considerable cabin space.

The bearing of the radar interference indicated that neither of these ships had radar, but that the ship that did have it was to the west and astern of these vessels, and could not be seen by sight nor by regular radar pip.

Je remained well ahead of target while tracking and waited to see what developed from the other supposed friendly submarine. The target group was steering a typically difficult Japanese zig plan which is so often found. It takes more than a zig plan to escape the submarine radar, however.

From time to time would lose radar interference.

: 2213 (K) Heard two explosions that might have been torpedoes exploding at end of run or depth charges. The targets continued their zig plan and there was no evidence of any damage done them. Latitude 9°-07.3' N., Longitude 150°-39.4' E.

— page 147 —
2213 (K) Continued to track ahead. The night was almost too light to permit a surface radar run, but a group of rain clouds were working our way, so we elected to wait for this favorable opportunity to attack.

: 2315 (K) Commenced approach in a heavy rain squall. The smaller ship was on the far side and slightly ahead of the AP. Both ships were to be brought under fire. The targets: course and speed were accurately known.

: 2341-06 (K) Fired five torpedoes from forward at the AP using a firing interval of eight seconds, and a divergent spread of 10 between torpedoes. Depth: set of 8 feet on all torpedoes. Range 3,155 yards, torpedo run 3,100 yards, gyro angle 024°, track angle 91° port.

: 2342-08 (K) Fired one torpedo at the AP. Range 4,020 yards, torpedo run 4,150 yards, gyro angle 008°, track angle 107° port. The T.B.T. was used for bearings and radar for ranges.

Three hits were observed in the AP (fwd, middle, and aft) and one hit was observed in the middle of the AP. The AP sank immediately as witnessed by sight and radar. The AP began immediately to sink and was badly on fire. It was observed to sink by sight and radar within fifteen minutes.

The AP undoubtedly had many passengers aboard as there were many survivors in the water. We closed the scene of firing and saw that nothing remained other than the survivors. It did not appear advisable to attempt to rescue any of these people as we had only arrived in the area a few days before.

November 2: Cleared the area and sent to Comsubpac a report of firing and the proper performance of the torpedoes.

: 0456 (K) Submerged, periscope patrol along Truk - Saipan shipping lane.

: 1742 (K) Went to 300' to check for density layers. No layers were experienced and the trim at periscope depth was satisfactory at 300'. The temperature of the water gradually dropped off one degree between 50' and 250'.

- 5 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 148 —
1837 (K) Surfaced.
: 1850 (K) Sighted three or more large unidentified ships, range about 12 miles. Ship Contact No. 3. Determined ships were going south, so commenced tracking. Estimated course 1650 T., speed 16 knots. Saw targets exchanging signals from time to time.
: 2104 (K) Radar contact 4,500 yards. Ship Contact No. 4. It was first thought that the radar was not working properly and had just picked up the convoy, although the convoy looked to be at least 16,000 yards away. Then radar showed we were closing, we stopped the ship dead in the water. By this time we clearly saw some destroyers heading for us; the near one now showing an angle on the bow of 250 starboard at 2,890 yards. Sound reported pinging and plot gave a course of 3200 T., speed 15 knots.
: 2107 (K) "e turned away immediately with emergency speed and made the stern tubes ready for firing, setting the depth for six feet. Although sighting was imminent, we believed we could deliver an attack before the target could attack us. "e therefore turned to put him astern. The t.arget's least range was 1,350 yards, and whether he saw us, or heard our screws is not known, but when he was on our starboard quarter we saw a man run aft with a light, and on their bridge we saw them blinking to another destroyer. At this time he started turning towards us, but he was too late, for at
: 2111 (K) Fired four torpedoes from aft with a divergent spread of 20 between torpedoes. Range 2,035 yards, torpedo run 1,800 yards, gyro angle 198, track angle 850 starboard. The first torpedo hit the target in the middle and he was observed to sink by sight and radar within thirty seconds.

Another destroyer came racing past the stern of the sinking target at high speed and ran down our torpedo tracks. They must have thought we were submerged, because he then dropped several depth charges and stopped to ping and listen. "e stopped to observe the procedure for a few moments and then went on in an attempt to contact the convoy. This seems to have been a "Killer Group" out looking for us, as it was very near to where we sank the ships last night. The three destroyers were in line of

- 6 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 150 —
10,020 tons; the escort was a des-
troyer of unidentified class. Bright moonlight-
night with clouds. The moon was to set at 0015,
so it was planned to track the target until after
the moon set, and then make a surface attack. It
gave every promise of being a dark night, and it
later proved to be darker than expected.

Then sighted the targets were just abaft our beam,
so we proceeded to track the targets from an ex-
treme range (to avoid being sighted) and drew
ahead. The targets were tracked at 13.5 knots on
base course 2930 T.

2338 (K) Closed to establish radar contact at 14,500 yards.

November 6
0018 (K) Closed targets to bring the range inside 8,000
yards for a final check on tracking. The targets
were in column, open order with the escort ahead.
It was planned to take a position abeam of the
first target and bring all three vessels under
fire by firing three torpedoes at each of the
tankers from forward, and then swing the ship to
bring the stern tubes to bear on the escort. Four
torpedoes were to be fired at the escort with depth
set at 6 feet. Ten feet was set on the torpedoes
forward.

0044 (K) Closed to attack.

0059-48 (K) Fired three torpedoes from forward at the leading
tanker and immediately thereafter fired three tor-
pedoes at the second tanker. A divergent spread
of 150 between torpedoes was used on both targets
with a 5 second firing interval. First target:
Range 3,150 yards, torpedo run 3,390 yards, gyro
angle 0030, track-angle 1120 port. Second target:
Range 3,040 yards, torpedo run 2,940 yards, gyro
angle 0190, track angle 920 port.

0100-17 (K) Swung left to fire the stern tubes. Using T.B.T.
and radar for firing.

0103-06 (K) Fired four torpedoes from aft at the escort. A
divergent spread of 30 was used between torpedoes
with a 5 second firing interval. Range 3,145 yards,
torpedo run 3,940 yards, gyro angle 1470, track
angle 1440 port.

- 8 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 152 —
0225 (K) "With all torpedoes expended after nine days on station left the area and set course for Pearl Harbor.
0549 (K) Submerged to rest up after the nights activities. Conducted periscope patrol.
1610 (K) Surfaced. Began running on the surface enroute to Pearl Harbor.
1910 (K) Sent Haddock's Serial two to Comsubpac reporting results and that we had left area.
November 11 Sent Haddock's Serial three to Comsubpac requesting rendezvous.
November 11 Crossed International Date Line.
0307 (Y)
November 15 Made rendezvous with escort.
0700 (VT)
1030 (VW) Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

- 10 -
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 153 —
12 0935
SUBMARINE DIVISION ONE HUNDRED ONE
FB5-101/A16-3
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
18 November 1943.

FIRST ADDRESS TO
CO HADDOCK conf. 1tr.SS231/
Al6-3 serial 019 of 11-15-43.

From: Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
       (2) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK, Report of War Patrol number SEVJN.

1. HADDOCK Seventh War Patrol lasted 26 days, 9 of which were in the patrol area.

2. The locality chosen by HADDOCK for patrol was across the intersections of several shipping lanes and has produced ample contacts during the last three patrols of this vessel. Other submarines assigned to this area should note the remarks on page 9 of the attached report.

3. Submerged patrolling was employed during daylight because of previous air activity encountered.

4. All attacks were skillfully made on surface at night, using radar ranges and TBT bearings. On two occasions of bright visibility HADDOCK waited for squalls and for the moon to set, before attacking, in order to make possible a surface attack. Firing ranges were rather long but data was accurate and good spreads were used. It is of interest that the submarine evaded on the surface after every attack, despite the presence of escorts (3' destroyers in one case). Counter-attacks were negligible.

Attack No. 1: 5 torpedoes at AP and 1 at AK in a 2 ship convoy, possibly unescorted, sank both with 3 and 1 hits.

Attack No. 2: 4 torpedoes fired with 6 foot depth setting at one of three DDs, sank the DD with 1 hit.

Attack No. 3: 10 torpedoes were fired at a convoy of two escorted tankers, 3' bow tubes at each tanker and the stern tubes at escort. Two low order hits were made on 1 tanker, 1 good and 1 low order hit on the second tanker, and a possible dud on the escort, after reloading the last 4 torpedoes, a final attack was made with the two tankers making reduced speed, and overlapping. One hit sank one, and 3 hits sank the other.

— page 154 —
5. Preliminary investigation indicates that the radar interferences noted on the night of 1 November came from a friendly submarine.

6. The HADDOCK has in 7 patrols sunk 18 ships (156,000 tons) and damaged 7 more (67,000 tons) for a total of 223,000 tons. This is the impressive record of a splendid fighting ship. Lieutenant F. J. Doerfler, D-V(S), U.S.N.R., has been the TDC operator during all 7 patrols and has been a tower of strength to his ship. The Division Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew on another excellent patrol causing heavy damage.

K. G. HANSEL.

Copy: to:
CO HADDOCK.

— page 155 —
12 0935
FC5-10/416-3(5)101 SUBMARINE SQUADRON TAN
Serial 0195
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
20 November 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231), Seventh War Patrol - Comments on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten takes pleasure in extending a "Well Done" to the Commanding Officer, of-ficers, and men of the HADDOCK for the splendid results obtained during the seventh patrol, which added to the results obtained on previous patrols give the HADDOCK a total of 156,000 tons sunk and 66,000 tons damaged. This is one of the most outstanding achievements in the history of our submarine warfare.

3. It is recommended that the HADDOCK be credited with inflicting the following damage:

SUNK

1. AP (Unidentified) 7,000 tons
1. AK (SAMARIAN MARU Class) 4,070 tons
1. DD (ASASHIO Class) 1,500 tons
2. AOS (GENYO MARU Class, 10,020 tons) 20,040 tons

TOTAL 32,610 tons.

Copy to:
Comsubdiv 101,
CO HADDOCK.

— page 156 —
1/2/23
12 0935
R.B.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
(20 October to 15 November 1943).

1. The HADDOCK's seventh war patrol was conducted north of Truk. The patrol was extremely aggressive and successful.

2. Only nine days in area, the HADDOCK fired all its torpedoes in six of them. All attacks were made on the surface at night, using radar effectively. On the night of November 2, while the HADDOCK was tracking a distant convoy, good radar plotting detected three enemy destroyers of a killer group. Expert functioning of the fire control party resulted in the sinking of one of the destroyers. This was an excellent attack.

3. It is noted that the HADDOCK used extreme ranges for firing its torpedoes. This was possible and results were successful because of his well-trained and excellent fire control organisation. It must be remembered, however, that shorter ranges of 1,500 yards and under are considered optimum in order to insure hits and take care of control errors. In addition, shorter ranges will be mandatory when using slower speed and shorter range Mark 18 torpedoes.

4. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia award.

5. In completing the seventh war patrol, the HADDOCK established a new record for tonnage sunk and damaged. The HADDOCK now has sunk 156,314 tons, and damaged 67,139 tons.

6. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew on their aggressive and successful patrol. The HADDOCK is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

FILMED
60376

— page 157 —
1-Transport (unidentified) - 7,000 tons
: 1- Freighter (SUMMARING M.R.U. class) - 4,015 tons
: 1-Destroyer (PRINCESS LASHIO class) - 1,500 tons
: 1-Tanker (GENYO M.R.U. class) - 10,019 tons
: 1-Tanker (GENYO M.R.U. class) - 10,019 tons

TOTAL: 32,553 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports) C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.
Cominch (5)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
Intel. Cen. Pac.
Ocean Areas (1)
Comservpac (1)
(Adv.Base Plan.Unit) (1)
Cinclant (2)
Comsubslant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Comsubspace (20)
SUB.D, MI (2)
ComsubspaceSubordcom (3) NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTERING PATROL AREA.

A. A. WOODRUFF, Jr.
Flag Secretary.

— page 158 —
55231/416-3
Serial (01)
DECLASSIFIED
From: To: Via:
Subject:
Enclosure:

1. Enclosure (A), covering the eighth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the vicinity of the Mariana Islands, and the Caroline Islands, during the period December 14, 1943, to February 5, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

J. I. HAMILTON
J. I. HAMILTON
FILMED

— page 161 —
0652 (K) Plane, sight contact - dive - plane unidentified.
0730 (K) Surface.

: 1400 (K) Entered area. Latitude 21°-00' N., Longitude 143°-10' E.

: 1730 (K) Made rendezvous with TULLIBEE. Closed and received addenda plans and instructions for Task Group 17.14 by line throwing gun. Opened out 15 miles to westward, conducted station patrol during night.

: 0730 (K) Closed TULLIBEE. Informed O.T.O. addenda understood. Deployed to patrol station.

: 0500 (K) On signal from O.T.O. changed course to 075° T., speed 17 knots. Conducted search at high speed all day conforming to signal from O.T.O. Seas very rough, took terrific pounding. Had to slow to 14 knots several times to get ahead of water in engine rooms bilges. Flooded out and grounded both hull ventilation motors.

: 0600 (K) Made rendezvous with TULLIBEE, received additional instructions via line throwing gun, found out about torpedoman's death aboard TULLIBEE from injury received by big wave. Deployed to patrol station.

: 0750 (K) Made trim dive.

: 0810 (K) Surfaced, while pumping up sighted 4 engine sea plane. (Plane contact #2) Dived to 200 feet, apparently unseen.

: 0845 (K) Surfaced.

: 1130 (K) Made rendezvous with TULLIBEE on signal. Received new search instructions via line throwing gun - also traded 1 bottle worcestershire sauce for 1 spare drive belt for ice machine. Deployed to new initial position independently.

- 3 - ENCLOSURE (1)

— page 162 —
0600 (K) Made second rendezvous with TULLIBEE, received change of instructions via line throwing gun.

0700 (K) Dived on station.

0940 (K) Heard 5 or 6 explosions in TULLIBEE's direction - bombs, or torpedoes? Nothing in sight. Latitude 21°-15' N., Longitude 145°-17' E.

1800 (K) Surfaced, proceeding to next rendezvous.

January 3
0500 (K) Dived - conducting submerged patrol; enroute to rendezvous.

1530 (K) Sighted TULLIBEE on surface. Surfaced, proceeded to rendezvous in company with her.

1800 (K) Made rendezvous in company with TULLIBEE, with KILIDUT, after dark commandin' officer trans-fereed to TULLIBEE via rubber boat to discuss situation, make plans for next search, and lash over all troubles. Escaped to regular KILIDUT at sea, weather permitting, night or 9on and so close Tarlanas during search.

2300 (K) Commanding officer returned to LPDOCK - deployed to new search position, took up course and speed according to new operations schedule. Note: Explosions heard previous morning were explained as bombs dropped on TULLIBEE after she unsuccessfully attacked enemy submarines.

January 4
January 5
0910 (K) Dived - plane picked up on 3D radar, range 24 miles. (Flame Contact #3).

0940 (K) Surfaced.

1930 (K) Made rendezvous with KILIDUT and TULLIBEE. Received search instructions from TULLIBEE via line throwing gun. Deployed, proceeding to next

— page 166 —
1620 (K) Came to course 250° T., running back down assumed enemy track. Thought it best to reverse assumed track as there might be a cripple about - reducing speed of convoy - or in any case it looked as good a way to make contact as any.

1743 (K) Lade contact with high periscope on mast over horizon. Bearing 210° T. Came to course 210° T. and commenced closing. At first thought it was a DD - turned away to avoid sighting - sent to TULLIBEE - "Destroyer position 50-34" I., Longitude 142°-46' E." Turned back and closed contact at slow speed figuring on working in to diving position for attack, or to track as case might be. Closed to estimated range of 15,000 yards, where he was identified as a patrol boat escort similar to our PC boats. He was cruising slowly back and forth evidently holding TULLIBEE down. During this time he dropped 3 depth charges - he must have heard us. While trying to decide what to do with him, (whether a torpedo would hit him or not), my problem was solved, he sighted us and came for us. Before we could get turned around the lookouts had him in sight so bent on 17 knots and took off on course 035° T., figured at least to lead him off the TULLIBEE. He hung on in sight until too dark to see; but we evidently outdistanced him at 17 knots.

1830 (K) Came to course 060° T. Started retiring search to southward, as if boat was small potatoes alongside possible convoy in vicinity, besides I didn't believe I could hit him with his shallow draft. "could have had a try at him had I then known there was no convoy.

1851 (K) Sent to TULLIBEE - "Contact was patrol boat - chased me, I am continuing on patrol northeast search."

2155 (K) TULLIBEE sent - "Have lost contact with enemy destroyer position 60-03' N., 143°-58' E.

2207 (K) TULLIBEE sent "232 did you contact convoy?"

2222 (K) HALLIBUT sent "No, attacked destroyer". This was first done we had that no convoy was sighted - slowed down and awaited developments.

— page 168 —
18 January 18 Conducting surface patrol enroute to northward. Made temporary repair 1 main generator so it could be used in emergency.

: 19 January 19 Conducting surface patrol. Sighted task force on high periscope. Latitude 120-49.0' K., Lon-itude 1460-20.8' E. Bearing 1550' T., range estimated 20,000 yards, own course 038° T., speed 9 knots. Task force consisted of two carriers, one cruiser, and several destroyers - probably four. Enemy angle on bow at this time about 700 port.

It should be emphasized that the horizon was fairly hazy at this time, otherwise enemy force would have been picked up at about 30,000 yards. Turned away from true bearing to keep range open - put on 4 engines, ordered contact report sent to TULIP.

Examined targets through periscope. They appeared to be in line of bearing - cruiser leading - followed by a large carrier, followed by a smaller carrier, with DD masts out on flanks. Subsequent attempts to identify ships would indicate that the cruiser was most likely a TURUTUL or YUB-1. There are no pictures which adequately identify the carriers. I would say the large one most closely resembled the SHOKUNU but definitely had no island topside. It did have four radio masts, two on port bow, two on starboard quarter, but had no radar antennas recognizable - had an open work forward under forward flight deck which was supported by stanchions, and looked every bit as big as the new LEXINGTON class. It was probably the LUSU class. There were no planes visible on either carrier.

He had a typical Jap bow, and what looked like gun positions under flight deck, extending down most of the length. The second carrier was definitely smaller, and also without island topside. I did not have a chance to examine him thoroughly either then or later, as I selected the large carrier as a target and went on him. The large carrier quite definitely gave the impression of being wide and beany.

— page 170 —
1800 (K)
: 1900 (H)
: January 20 0100 (K)
: Made rendezvous with TULLIBEE. Told him about the attack and received instructions to cover SIRI. A. of GUAM as HULLOUT was covering SIRI.

- 12 -

— page 171 —
14 January 20
0145 (K)  Shortly after parting from TULLIBEE made radar contact, true bearing 220°, range 15,000 yards. Went to battle stations; turned toward at full speed, got off contact report, and started tracking. ...t range 10,000 yards, target speed 13 knots, he turned to my true bearing and increased speed to 19-20 knots. He could not possibly have seen me then or subsequently.

Turned to run with him, tracking, intending to pull off his track and shoot him as he went by, figuring it was a DD, and I had the bullseye on him with radar and darkness. ...han I started chaning course 300 to pull off his track, however, he came with me each time, closing the range slightly, and always presenting a zero angle on the bow. ...t this time I began to get a suspicion all was not well.

We started off after he originally turned toward me on course 010° True. ...han I saw that I couldn't get off his track, I began to work around to the left, trying to keep the range open. I figured by this time he must have a radar and if he couldn't run me down, he must be too small to shoot with torpedoes, particularly as the sea was fairly rough. I did not want to get forced down, with a crippled carrier in the vicinity I might get, so tried to get away. I came around from 010° T., 100° at a time, until I was on course 1900 T. This chase lasted until after 0400 (K), with us making all ahead minimum. I detail all this to show the absolute impossibility of this being an accident, he had to have a radar. ...he never slowed to listen, it was so dark I had trouble seeing the TULLIBEE at 500 yards, and he changed course almost immediately each time I did. Up until this experience I had been skeptical about the Japs having radar on ships, now I am convinced and I advise it's acceptance and full realization by all hands, so as to guard against it's use both offensively and defensively.

04:30 (K)  Started further search for carrier as it was then too late to close GUAM.

- 13 -  [DICLOSURE (A)](https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/d/dclosure-a.html)

— page 172 —
14 - CRITICAL INSTRUCTIONS

January 20
0600 (K)
Dived - decided to remain submerged as I know the area was hot, and after the day and night's activities neither officers nor crew were in any condition to handle hot situations quickly.

1830 (K)
Surfaced, continued search for carrier.

2100 (K)
Picked up radar interference, headed toward believing it was TULLIBEE.

January 21
0100 (K)
Made contact - tried to get across recognition signals, but due to some mix up could not raise him. Decided to continue search.

0600 (K)
Dived.

0950 (K)
Sound picked up screws bearing 030° relative. Nothing in sight on periscope at 50 feet. Screws moved aft and finally disappeared astern. Must have been enemy submarine as TULLIBEE later stated she was not submerged at that time. Screws had peculiar beat, speeding up now and then, averaging about 70 turns.

1255 (K)
Sighted TULLIBEE on surface. Surfaced and closed him for instructions and any dope he might have on carrier.

1830 (K)
Closed TULLIBEE and spoke him. Received instructions for surface patrol next few days, got dope that TULLIBEE was still covering SHARK.

1900 (K)
Deployed, conducting surface patrol.

January 22
Conducting surface patrol.

January 23
Conducting surface patrol. Found air salvage line to "6B I.B.T. carried away, replaced with blank.

January 24
Conducting submerged patrol, routinizing fish, making adjustments and repairs to engines, working on evaporators.

- 14 - CRITICAL INSTRUCTIONS

— page 173 —
15 - NICHOLSON (A)

January 25
Conducting surface patrol. Made rendezvous - TULLIBEE not there - assumed he had closed S.A.F. in accordance Consubpac Serial 59. Received Serial 61 directing FADDOC return independently. Departed on schedule - sent departure report.

January 26
0710 (K)
Sighted two engine'land plane (Plane Contact 76). Latitude 18°-36' N., Longitude 149°-06' S. Dived unobserved.

0750 (K)
Surface - all clear.

January 31
1125 (L)
Sighted friendly Venturi two engine bomber (Plane Contact 77). Latitude 26°-31' N., Longitude 175°-55' S. Exchanged recognition signals.

1311 (L)
Sighted gase or similar plane to above (Plane Contact 78). Latitude 26°-39.8' N., Longitude 177°-23.1' S.

January 31
Crossed International Date Line - Kept same date as yesterday.

0830 (Y)
Arrived off 'Lidwa Island. 'Has informed channel closed, cruising around within visual signalling distance.

1600 (Y)
Tied up Midway.

February 1
0730 (Y)
Departed Midway enroute Fearl in company with SABAGON.

February 2
0130 (X)
#2 Main Engine out, of commission due to broken piston and liner #8 unit, reason unknown.

February 5
Arrived Fearl Harbor.

— page 176 —
1. Forwarded concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One.
2. The controlled use of the SJ Radar in maintaining contact between ships of a coordinated attack unit is noted. On the other hand, the probability of the enemy's use of radar must be visualized, especially in attacking combatant units.
3. The wake and turbulence created by the carrier was intelligently used by F.D.DOCK in evading the destroyers following her attack on 19 January.
4. It is believed that commanding officers of submarines in hostile waters should not leave their ships to conduct a "conference" with the leader of the coordinated group, except under the gravest emergencies. Instructions should be issued by voice radio, line-throwing gun, visual, a sealed tin can or bottle, or by sending another officer.
5. More consideration should be given to water entering the conning tower hatch, main-induction, and hull-induction. A great man serious electrical difficulties have already occurred to our submarines as a result of such sea-water. Admittedly, owing to the requirements of air patrol and high speeds, numerous casualties of this nature must be accepted. However, whenever the nature of operations permits, commanding officers should take reasonable steps to keep the interior of the submarine as dry as practicable.
6. The F.D.DOCK is to be congratulated upon damage in an important enemy combatant unit, to wit:

1. Converted Aircraft Carrier (TYPE & POINTS UNKNOWN)

C. F. ERICK

— page 177 —
1/1

FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, FACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0330
DECLASSIFIED
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
HADDOCK Report of
Eighth War Patrol.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 361
U.S.S. HADDOCK - EIGHTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.
(14 December 1943 to 5 February 1944).

1. The eighth war patrol of the HADDOCK was conducted in the Marianas-Caroline Islands area. The HADDOCK was one of three submarines forming a coordinated attack group.

2. The patrol was aggressively conducted. Only one contact worthy of torpedoes was made. This was an enemy carrier task force, on which the HADDOCK made an excellent approach and subsequent attack which resulted in damaging one large enemy carrier.

3. The attention of the Commander Training Command, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, is invited to the Commanding Officer's noteworthy comments regarding coordinated attack group operations.

4. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia award.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this aggressive patrol and the outstanding attack on the carrier task force. The HADDOCK is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

DAMAGED

1 - Aircraft Carrier (KASUGAI MARU class) - 22,500 tons (attack #1)

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

Distribution and authentication on following page.

FILMED

— page 179 —
35231/416-3
Serial (04)
DECLASSIFIED
From: Commanding Officer; U.S.S. DOCK.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
Commander Submarine Division CITY THREE.

Subject: U.S.S. EADDOCK, Report of "Patrol number Nine.

Enclosure: (1) Subject Report.
(2) Track Chart (Consubpac)

1. Enclosure (A), covering the ninth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the vicinity of the Nansai Shoto Islands, during the period 1-4 March 1944, to 1-4 July 1944, is forwarded herewith.

76116 FILMED

— page 180 —
1. PROLOGUE.

Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, 1944 from eighth war patrol. February 6, 1944 commenced refit by relief crew Submarine Divisi in 101 and Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. The refit was extended due to necessity for renewing all main generator armature, considerably work being performed on main rotors also. February 29, 1944 completed refit, had four days post repair for trials and sound test, three days of operational training, fired four exercises torpedoes, (including two IX Avill's).

(B) PART I - TRAITIVS.

March 10 Departed Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor for patrol in accordance with Opsubpac operation order 68-44, in company with U.S.S. STINGRAY and escort F.J. 560.

March 11 Held training drills and exercises, made deep submergence test.

-0945 (L) Sighted U.S. Navy patrol plane (Plane Contact 1), exchanged recognition signals.

March 12 Sighted B-24 bomber (Plane Jontac 2), exchanged recognition signals.

Conducted radar tracking drills with U.S.S. STINGRAY in afternoon.

March 13 Very rough, could not hold tracking drill.

March 14 Arrived Midway - remained overnight for repairs on port sound head hoisting gear - had hydraulic oil leak required breaking down and renewal of gaskets.

March 15 Departed Midway enroute patrol area.

March 16 Dropped date - crossed International Date Line.

March 17 Made battle surface - fired all guns - conducted fire control drills.

March 19 Ran into heavy weather, slowed to 1 engine.

— page 181 —
20 'eather still bad, mountainous seas, almost lost C.O.D. over the side, had one lookout hurt. Slowed to 7 knots.

: 21 'eather moderated some - went to two engine speed.

: 22 Plane on radar (Plane Contact #3) - did not avoid detection. Took this opportunity to r utine torpedoes.

: 23 Surfaced.

: 24 Plane on radar - dived to 150 feet. (Plane Contact #4).

: 25 Game to periscope depth - Plane was in sight, distance about 5 miles, circling our diving position. Went back to 150 feet.

: 26 Returned to periscope depth, not in sight.

: 27 Surfaced. Seas making up, wind blowing very hard.

: 28 Passed 30 miles south of Lot's Isle, not sighted. "eather getting steadily worse.

: 29 Heard key clicks on H.F. receiver. Just have been close, but not contact on radar. Wave pips showing out to 3500 yards, could have been sea-saw or patrol boat.

: 30 Dived in mountainous seas and high wind. Decided to stay down and give all hands a much needed rest. Rolled 50 at 100 feet. Looking through periscope every hour, hard work to keep from broaching.

: 31 Surfaced, seas moderating.

: 32 Peculiar weather, almost flat calm after dark. Converted H.F.B.T. to I.B.T. Dived to flush it out.

: 33 Entered first area.

: 34 Conducting surface patrol along Hobe - Falau line.

: 35 Conducting submerged patrol along Bungo Suido - Saipan line. Made deep submergence - no gradient. Weather making up.

[END OF REPORT]

— page 187 —
2150 (I) Made radar contact on Yokote Shima.
: 2300 (I) Started through pass between Yokote Shima and Tokara Shima. Dark and intermittent rain squalls.
: 0048 (I) Made radar contact at 11,300 yards (Latitude 28°-56.5' N., Longitude 129°-27.5' E.), bearing 0450 relative. Put on tracking party, went to b-ttle stations. Target tracked on course 070° (T), speed 1.2 knots, evidently patrolling pass to northward of

— page 189 —
23 April 23
2300 (I) Gained position on his track, range 8,000 yards, pointed stern at him and stopped. As range closed small pips kept appearing around two large pips, evidently the sampans, ranges on them varied from 4,000 to 5,000 yards on picking them up.

Decided to try to sink both escorts with torpedoes and then shoot up sampans. New both ships were pretty small but was determined to attack anyway, as we had nothing to lose. Figured with good depth control of electric fish we might bring it off.

: 24 April 24
0130 (I) With leading target (the smallest one) bearing 200° T., and second target bearing 167° T., fired two torpedoes at second target, range 3,175 yards, torpedo run 2,750 yards, track 550 starboard, range angle 060 left. Shifted to leading target and fired two torpedoes, range 3,550, torpedo run 3,575, at 97° starboard, gyro angle 370 right.

: 133 (I) First torpedo hit, causing tremendous flaming explosion which lighted up the whole ocean. The flames must have gone up at least 500 feet with secondary explosions, probably depth charges. Ruled out at full speed to about 7,000 yards range and stopped to see what happened. Leading target started zipping around wildly dropping depth charges. Second large ship was never picked up again.

On thinking the situation over, felt we could not hit this one with a torpedo with all his wild antics, and if we went in to shoot up the sampans we would have at least a pretty good gun battle with him, in addition to which he might have for edoes aboard. Decided results not worth the risk so at

: 0200 (I) Ruled clear and headed for departure point.

In sure one ship, most probably a small cargo vessel of approximately 1,000 tons was sunk. On reflection it is possible that this sampan left was being used to transport supplies, or else they were going a long way to a fishing ground.

: 25 April 25 In route: 1 day. Received convoy contact report from S.S.S.S., changed course to intercept and search.

- 10 -

— page 190 —
1800 (I) Resumed course for Midway.
: 1800 (I) Enroute Midway.
: 0130 (I) Passed twenty miles south of Lot's Wife.

May 3
1800 (I) Made visual contact with another U.S. submarine bearing 1220 T., range about 25,000 yards. (Latitude 23-08-21 N. Longitude 1650-59.6' E.) Closed and exchanged recognition signals. Closed within hail. No important news received. Submarine was BALAO.

May 4
0558 (I) Made visual contact with what proved to be U.S.S. TUNA. Latitude 21-48.4' N., Longitude 1670-04.8' E. Range about 20,000 yards bearing 3200 T. Closed and exchanged recognition signals.

0805 (I) With TUNA still in sight, sighted small enemy vessel bearing 3260 T., range estimated 15,000 yards, angle on bow 45° Port, course 1900 T. TUNA was approximately on the track, we were considerably off the track. (Latitude 22-02' N., Longitude 1670-01.8' E.) Came around on four engines tracking, maneuvering to keep target just in sight in high periscope, and closing track to get ahead.

0830 (I) TUNA must have made same contact and dived, no longer in sight.

0900 (I) With target angle on bow zero, range about 15,000 yards, dived on his estimated track. Figured TUNA was between us and target but might not get in attck, in which case we would. Could not see how to get to targets track unsighted so as to attack ahead of TUNA, worse luck.

0930 (I) Sighted target through periscope at 55 feet depth, range about 8,000 yards. Target appeared to be running about a 30° constant helm zig and we were right on his track. Made preparations for attack as it seemed the TUNA had not gotten in.

- 11 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 191 —
0940 (L) Having just taken look and run down periscope, heard loud explosion. Ran up periscope and saw enormous cloud of smoke where target had been, TUNA on the surface.

: 0943 (L) Surfaced, running up to close TUNA on four engines, all guns manned.

: There was no sign of target until we closed to about 4,000 yards, when we saw masses of floating wreckage. Secured from battle stations and made preparations to search for survivors.

: Two prisoners hanging on to debris were rescued during those operations by HADDOCK boat. On had to be persuaded with an oar handle, the other was badly wounded in face and neck and gave no trouble. One othr r Jap was sighted, but subsequent attempts to find him proved futile. It is certain he drowned as a very careful search was made.

: Lieutenant G. W. KITTREDGE in charge of the rubber boat, and Lieutenant Commander W. J. GERMERSHAUSEN and Lieut(jg) R. J. WILLIAMS swimming did a servicable and courageous job during recovery operations.

: 1245 (L) Went alongside TUNA to recoive two Jap prisoners. Both Japs were a bit hesitant about the trip, but with a heaving line bent on them we hauled them across with no trouble.

: 1300 (L) Pulled clear of TUNA and headed for Midway.

: Jap prisoners proved very docile after getting below. They were established in after torpedo room under guard. Wounded Jap was worked on thoroughly by Pharmacist's hhts, who sewed up his cuts, one being a neck artery, and administered blood plasma. Other prisoners were free with information which was obtained with help of an

— page 194 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY THREE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
       (3) The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLIGHT.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK, Report of NINTH War Patrol.

1. The NINTH War Patrol of the HADDOCK was of sixty days' duration, twenty-nine of which were spent in the vicinity of the NANSEI SHOTO Islands, the assigned area. Two days in the area and six days of the return voyage were spent on special missions.

2. Properly marked hospital ships were sighted on 29 March and 13 April. On 23 April a fleet of about twelve sampans with two escorts was sighted. On 24 April two torpedoes were fired at each escort, resulting in one hit and the sinking of one escort. This was a night radar attack.

3. Four prisoners (two received from the TUNA and two rescued from sea) were returned on board the HADDOCK from the small cargo vessel which the TUNA sank on 4 May.

4. The HADDOCK will receive a Navy Yard Cverhaul.

5. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are congratulated for the accomplishment of a special mission and for the following damage inflicted to the enemy:

SUNK

1 escort 1,000 tons.

D. C. "HITE.

Copy to:
US$ HADDOCK.

— page 195 —
FC5-4/416-3
Serial:  C193
DECLASSIFIED
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR
USN DDG-1: C.F.Ltr.
SSS-1/416-3, Serial 04,
of 1 July 1944.
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC ISLET.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC ISLET.
Subject: U.S.S. BADDOCK, Report of NINTH air Patrol.
1. Forwarded, concurring in the results of Commander
Submarine Division FORT-TREE.
2. Commander Submarine Squadron CONGRATULATES
the Commanding officer, officers and men for another well-conducted patrol.
C. E. MOMSEN.

— page 196 —
6 0950
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
21 May 1944

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 422
U.S.S. HADDOCK - NINTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.
(10 March to 10 May 1944).

1. The ninth war patrol of the HADDOCK was conducted in the Nansei Shoto Islands Area. The area was well covered and all traffic routes explored carefully.

2. Of the three contacts made worthy of torpedoes, two of them were hospital ships. The other, a 1,000-ton cargo vessel, was attacked and sunk in the early morning hours of 24 April.

3. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

SUNK

1 - Freighter (class unknown) - 1,000 tons (Attack No. 1).

NOSTRUBUTION:
1. Complete Reports
C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

FILMED
(7)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(1)
(2)
(8)
(2)
(2)
(1)
(2

— page 197 —
53231/A9-8

DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer:
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Division, San Francisco, California.
The Commander Submarine Squadron, Pacific Fleet.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (33231) - Report of North Star Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (Consubpaco only)

1. Enclosures (A) and (B), covering the North Star Patrol of this vessel conducted in the area south of Coronado during the period 8 October, 1944 to 10 December, 1944 are forwarded herewith.

J. F. J. O'C.

J. F. J. O'C.

— page 198 —
1. USS Submarine Base, P.E. May 10, 1944 from ninth war patrol. Ordered to overhaul at U.S. Naval Dry-docks, Hunter's Point; arrived there 19, 1944. Received new conning tower and periscope shears, shock mounted control cubicle, these being controlling jobs. Completed overhaul, departed San Francisco September 14, 1944. Arrived submarine Base, 22. Conducted five days training period, fired six torpedoes. Had low resistance readings on main power cables and 240 volt ground on cubicle after four hours full power. It was decided to make patrol anyway and attempt to test for flashovers by high speed running enroute Saipan.

(B) Part I
October 8
1330 (VW)
2100 (VW)
October 9
2200 (VW)
October 10
October 11
October 12
October 15

M.I.R.R.T.I.V.E
Departed Submarine Base, F.H. in company with U.S.S. HALIBUT and U.S.S. TULL as coordinated attack group in accordance with Consubpac Operation Order #543-44. Conducted communication drills during afternoon.

Lookout while attempting to chase sea bird off radar antenna caught hand between antenna and shears, crushing it. Requested man be picked up for medical attention as hand was too badly broken up for Pharmacist's late to set it.

Held training drills and exercises for ship and group as a whole.

Rendezvoused with U.S.S. FLEMING who picked up injured man for transfer to U.S.S. STRAY.

Held training drills and exercises for Pack.

Crossed International Date Line - Skipped Friday 13th! Held usual exercises.

Rendezvoused with FLEIBUT and TULL. Passed over operation orders for approach to Saipan, also for Patrol Area.

— page 199 —
15 October 16
Usual training exercises.

1430 (K) Signed periscope 2 - 4,000 yards on port bow, then just entering Saipan Safety Lane. Latitude 169-05.4', longitude 156°-07'. E. -voided at full speed, informing TUN and F.I.I.SUT. Both TUN and F.I.I.SUT. look like the time, so an positive it was neither of the. Looks like safety lane just might be compromised. Sent contact report.

2330 (K) Fassad U.S.S. SAFNO on opposite course, identified by SJ radar keying.

October 17 (Aircraft contact #1) - Plane on radar, distance 25 miles, identified as friendly by I.F. F. - got scan.

1400 (K) (Aircraft contact #2) - Sighted by lookout, distance 25 miles, picked up by radar at 20 miles, identified as friendly by I.F. F. Plane could not be made out. Looked like C-54.

October 19 Fassad through Mariana Islands chain between Saipan and -nataham Islands. Sighted Saipan at estimated range of 30 miles. Radar distinctly negative, lobe switching no good, range on Saipan 20,000 yards, an 1800 foot peak.

0600 (K) Made rendezvous with escort PING 9 and returned and F.I.I.SUT and F.I.I.SUT.

1200 (K) Entered Saipan Harbor, tied up alongside T.5.3. HOUST.

October 20 Held conference with other commanding officers delivered new additional instructions for patrol. Continuing work on radar, working on 2 min engine which have been smoking heavily. Repeated periscopes; found gas had leaked out of both scopes. Various minor jobs accomplished. U.S.S. HOLMES was very anxious to help and made our stay exceedingly pleasant.

October 21 Underway from alongside U.S.S. HOLMES in company with H.I.I.SUT and TUN. Escort U.S.S. PING 9.

1930 (I) Dismissed escort, started up western safety lane, took up scouting line normal to base course.

October 22 Nothing of interest.

October 23 Passed friendly submarine in safety lane. Attitude 180-52' N., Longitude 139°-30' S. Tried to communicate by radar but no success. Probably -.

- 2 -

— page 201 —
1615 (I) 1625 (I) 2041 (I) 2106 (I) 2118 (I) 2135 (I)

- 1615 (I) - Torpedo cabin again. (..incorrect contact 17) - Sighted one single engine fighter, painted black! Could they be ours? At least that is what lookout says. 10-12-47. Indications. -in on station; have decided to stay down until sunset. Latitude 21°00' I., Honolulu 12°00' I.

- 1625 (I) - Surfaced. -s it grew dark could make out gun flashes and explosions to southward. Evident: a bit battle racing. Believing I was in best position to intercept, called PLIBUT and TUT- in to 15 miles. Should not to go on to this nose until our forces quit, that the submarine could not be in formation from Consubuca this was a far force to be home under air attack, and possibly slowed because of a cripple. Intermittent explosions and flashes until at

- 2041 (I) - Transmodous explosion took place. -most probably some ship illuminated with searchlights, probably searching for survivors. Sent contact report to the USS, Headed for lights on 4 or 5 miles. -replied that he was chasing a 01, TUT- could not be raised.

- 2106 (I) - Made radar contact bearing 14,000 (T), range 20,200 yards. (Ship contact 23). Reversed course to 3200 (T), tracking, went to bottle stations. -Hunt it had him in lay as he tracked with 120 port and 12 port on the bow, spaced 22 knots. There was definitely a dark interference on his bearing. Sent contact report course and speed.

- 2118 (I) - Looked as if on guard zigged to 355° (T), driving to the angle on bow and speeded up to 26 knots; range to time about 14,000. Came right to 0200 (T), turns to close the track, without much luck.

- 2135 (I) - Looked as if target zigged back to left, putting me in firing position, range 9,500 yards, bright moonlight directly behind me, dived to r.d. r. J. -interfered with the enemy. -I was in the dark.

— page 202 —
2158 (I)
Surfaced - got off contact report to Oonskpa for boats further north. Decided to go back to battle scene, in case any cripples were around, not having any other contacts to work on. Headed south at best speed.

: 2330 (I)
Received contact report of 2 ships to northward, from HILIBUT, course 1690 (T), speed 22, maneuvered to intercept although could not believe course. Continued until would have intercepted then had report been correct. Changed course to northward as had another contact report from HILIBUT of 2 large and 2 small ships, course 0600 (T), speed 14, position 210-20° N., 1260-10° E.

: 1330 (I)
Received second contact report from HILIBUT on this contact giving course 0200 (T), speed 20 knots. ...s could not close. Commenced search to westward, hoping some cripple would come through.

: 1400 (I)
Contacted TULI, exchanged recognition signals. Headed back for assigned patrol position. 210-20° N., 1260-00° E. Waiting for information, searching for survivors.

: 1830 (I)
Closed TULI; found he had no contacts.

: 2000 (I)
Sent word to HILIBUT and TULI to carry out modified schedule and enter area.

: 2000 (I)
Received word from HILIBUT that he had made 5 hits in a BB last night, probably sinking same! Our sagging spirits considerably raised. Sent HILIBUT our heartiest congratulations.

: 2000 (I)
Decided could not make passage through straits, assigned

— page 203 —
0620 (I)
October 27
0600 (I)
October 28
0615 (I)
October 29
0625 (I)
1300 (I)
October 30
0630 (I)
1300 (I)
1630 (I)
2330 (I)
October 31
0620 (I)
0625 (I)
0945 (I)

: 0620 (I)
Received additional contact report from LT, 2 clips, course 0000 (T), speed 15. Took course to intercept, sent TULL on to try to contact original convoy.
(..)ircraft contact 99) - Plane sighted dead ahead range 4 miles - closing (Betty). Dived to avoid.

- 6 -

— page 204 —
1030 (I)  Surtaced. Proceeded at best speed. Decided impossible to get ahead of HIJUT contact; changed course to 2350 (T), to go after convoy cont. Informed HIJUT.

: 1130 (I)  Sighted ship on horizon almost dead ahead. Picked him up on SJ - range 28,000 yards. Ship cont-ct w/4; changed course to keep range open and track.

: 1136 (I)  Sighted another ship much closer looked like sub, but might have been masts of escort. Dived to attack in case he was the second enemy ship of HIJUT contact report as we were on his track.

: 1151 (I)  Decided it was friendly sub - surfaced - came right to track. Large transport in sight on high periscope, tracked at 17 knots, course 0650 (T), came on bow about 1200 starboard. See was fairly rough, our best speed was 17 knots. New I could never get ahead on this set-up. Decided there was no use of two sub working on a doubtful when a convoy - so to be had. Sent HIJUT done to pursue at closest, came to course 2350 (T), chasing original cont. reported. I could have got ahead of this one had I only known. From HIJUT cont. reports had decided it was impossible, evidently his positions or ours were considerably in error. Would have continued any way to try, except for convoy we were chasing and done on it seemed good. This was sure a big fat by to lose.

: 1247 (I)  Sighted smoke bearing 2300 (T), about dead ahead.

: 1250 (I)  Sighted ship on high periscope. Ship cont-ct w/4. Range 27,000 yards on SJ. Commenced tracking, sent cont-ct report to TUT and HIJUT. Ship tracked on various courses, speed 14 knots, be course about 2200 (T). Commenced and around, sending cont-ct reports intermittently to other boats; at this time thought we had a good sized convoy, as at least three ships were sighted. I am not sure whether part of this group split off during and around or whether we saw the escorts.

The end around on this fellow was a long tedious process as we only had a 3 knot speed differential and he was zigging all the way from 3050 (T) to 1600 (T). Rept him on the SJ and high periscope most of the time.

: 1900 (I)  As finally on his track and ahead about 22,000 yards. It was then too late for day periscope att-ck. TUT came into contact about this time.

— page 205 —
1938 (I) -: full noon was up before sunset, decided on submerged radar and periscope attack; started in.

2032 (I) -: With range 12,000 yards, target in sight, dive to radar depth. Only three ships were present at this time, one large and two escorts. Seas were breaking over radar, found that it was practically useless, did the best we could with periscope, sound conditions terrible. Target zigged right over us at firing point. Decided not to shoot and make another attempt rather than try to get down the throat set up with large gyros. The target group never knew we were there.

2129 (I) -: Surfaced. Started end around. Contacted TULF who said he was about to attack.

0300 (I) -: Escorts started depth charging. They were not too close but they must have had some indication of their approach. Could Disregard them except went to periscope depth. Could not make out angles on bow through periscope but tracked by bearings as well as we could. Target evidently zigging wildly.

0309-30 (I) -: With not much dope, but conditions not improving, fired 3 torpedoes, down the throat, track miles 28, 29, 48, gyros 76, 77, and 78 right, range 2,100 yards. Used no spread as figured large gyros would spread themselves. This set up is not as bad as it looks considering how poor my dope was, and that range and speed do not enter the solution.

0311-40 (I) -: One explosion, sound tracked torpedo to target. Probable hit. Depth charging started in a moment - went to 250 feet.

0340 (I) -: With scores all clear came to periscope depth.

0355 (I) -: Surfaced. Targets still on radar, range 14,000 yards. Commenced run to get ahead for another attack.

0450 (I) -: Sighted gun flashers, escort probably shooting at TULF. Decided on dawn submarine depth. Chose to attack at 6 knots, had not been too successful. Trached target at 6 knots, slowed from 14. This indicates a hit on last attack.

— page 206 —
0652 (I) Dived 22,000 yards on what was assumed to be target's base course, figured him to pass over helicesfield Bank.

: 0726 (I) Sighted smoke and top of target, coring in sure enough. Started appr oth. He was zigging like a whirling dervish and now had picked up an extra escot acting 3. (20 Soots) He was zigging between 3050 (I), and 1900 (T), with no apparent plans. T'ret traced at 8 knots and we were able to keep ahead of him by high speed running. He was about a 7,000 ton. I, lor in the water. He closely resembled the -retuna -aru - Page 11, ONE 203J (Revised).

: 0826 (I) Had him dead to rights, 700' trace, 500 yards range, angle on bow 450' port, was just getting set to shoot when he zigged toward giving me 150' port angle on bow. This as a bad set up, but I escort was very close aboard, figured now or never so at

: 0830 (I) Fired 1st of 4 1k ZVIII torpedoes. Tr ch an-1e 20 port, gyro 320' H., range 2500 yards, another sharp track. Fired two to hit and spread other two 10 e. ch way.

: 0832-30 (I) Heard I torpedo running erratic crossing ahead evidently circling. Three sound men reported this. Had to go deep. I oh hits. Escorts picked us up somehow, one depth charge went off just overhead as we were passing 150', jarring the ship considerably.

Much activity topside; pinging and listening by all three escorts. This would have been the ideal time for TUN to get in, sure hoped he was in position to get target.

: 1100 (I) All clear, came to periscope depth, nothing in sight. Commenced cleaning up the bot, pumping down pressure, etc.

: 1200 (I) Surfaced. Received message from TUN. That she had lost contact. Being well out of contact, figured that search and end around would allow to get to I-ecclesfield Bank, even if successful. It looked as if this area was full of ships, so issued orders for forming of scoutair line to head back up toward blind bombing boundary and thence to our new area.

— page 207 —
1255 (I) (aircraft contact film) - Filled up plane on 35, 10 miles, closing; closed to avoid. Boarded to start over. 1st time in 1 hour.

— page 208 —
0630 (I)
Started to dive, hydraulic plant not start!
One never knows what will happen next. Finally got
it going and divec. in area Detector, covering southern
passages from Takao to Bujinkan.

: 1900 (I)
Surfaced.

: 0625 (I)
Dived for submerged patrol.

: 1900 (I)
Surfaced. Started to eastern part of area.

: 0133 (I)
Underway to dive on line between Jutte Island and
Takao. (Lircraft cont ct 1/2) - Dip on radar 20,000
yards, sounded battle stations. Fl. closed at 200
knots and passed overhead so quickly we hardly had
what was happening at the time we had strong indications
of tap airborne radar on.

— page 209 —
1020 (I)  Hoor depth charges.
: 1045 (I)  Started up to periscope depth.
: 1112 (I)  Closer depth charges and pinging, bearings drawing off as if escorts were head boat toward Tako.
: 1118 (I)  -t periscope depth, nothing in sight.
: 1136 (I)  Secured from depth charge and battle stations. Believe skip probably sank, escorts rescued survivors during lull between 0950 and 1020, then returned to Tako. Sound heard break up noises but no scows after 1st explosion. During this att-ot found range scale could not be turned-axcept by combined efforts of two men. . . . Had to use it, nevertheless, for r pass. This probably explains noises on last attack as I was in use and range error was not discovered. This salvo my wounded pride a little anvver.

: 1911 (I)  Surf-ood. Received contact report from HULL of convoy sighted during day and news that the U.S was out of commission. Told him could supply necessary part, headed to close him and convoy at maximum speed.

: November 7  Due to HILIBUR getting snarled up with patrol boat and changing rendezvous position, did not make rendezvous until

: 0530 (I)  FLIGHT came alongside; sent over a bar port. Provided to give chase to convoy, although by this time looked pretty hopeless.

: 0625 (I)  Hade trim dive.

: 0635 (I)  Surf-ood, course 225° (T), speed 17 knots.

: 0655 (I)  (L)ircraft contact #14) - Plane on radar distance 8 miles, dived to avoid. Traffic jam in hatch caused commanding officer numerous abrasions of knee and elbow.

: 0800 (I)  Surf-ood; resumed course and speed.

: 1052 (I)  (L)ircraft contact #15) - Plane on radar, distance 10 miles, dived to avoid. Felt chase hopeless as we were so far behind. Clary's outfit had all the information we had and evidently had made no contact. Information was about 24 hours old by this time.

- 12 -

— page 210 —
1230 (I)  Surfaced. Told H.L.HUNT was discontinuing search; search at his own descretion.
: 1245 (I)  Dived.
: 1913 (I)  Surfaced. Heading back to area. Deshuffled areas in Detect, so RADDOCK and H.L.HUNT could work together on similar instance to this again. T.U.L.'s are not productive, gave him the one where we had attacked yesterday.
: 0430 (I)  Had strong ST'interference, presumably RADD, but could not make him answer challenge.
: 0620 (I)  Dived.
: 1900 (I)  Surfaced.
November 9  Dived.
: 0627 (I)  Surfaced - Heavy seas and overcast, no st rs.
November 10 Seas and wind continue to make up. Jumps a bit.
: 0632 (I)  Dived, no fix, running at 100 feet, rolling 60. The first time I ever saw it happen, taking looks every two hours and broaching.
: 1900 (I)  Surfaced in very heavy seas. Still heavy overcast. Becoming a bit worried about position, taking sounding every hour. Sent message to H.L.HUNT and H.L.HUNT reassigning stations in Area Delote.
November 11 -Injustice Day!
: 0240 (I)  Finally shot three weak stars. -In new area. Delete. Weather moderating some but heavy sea still running.
: 0627 (I)  Dived. Running at 80 feet, looks every hour.
: 1900 (I)  Surfaced, clear, seas moderate ting.

- 13 -

— page 211 —
12 Dived. Periscope depth a novelty.
0625 (I)

: 1259 (I) Surfaced. Decided on surface patrol, mi hit pick up something.

: 1930 (I) Decoded contact report on BI and CI. (Construct 120929).
    Headed to intercept at maximum speed.

: 2030 (I) On trck, shifted to 2880 kcs to get any later dope
    from CUNL DL trailing contact. Heard several garbled
    messages from XBUL but repeated attempts to rise
    him on 2880 kcs failed.

: 2100 (I) Commenced independent search along track. Flicked up
    airborne and shipborne radar indications on XBUL,
    but no contact. -- directionally characteristic would
    be a welcome addition to this equipment. --fraid he
    got by me.

: 0430 (I) Received message from unknown origin saying "abandon-
    ing ship, search for survivors", no position given.
    Message not complete. Commenced frantically calling
    Clarey's Crushers, meanwhile raised XBUL and XBUL.

: 0500 (I) Finally got answer from Clarey that none of his boats
    were in trouble, concluded that message was a garbled
    Interpack communication usually goes off pretty good,
    but to raise another peak is a horse. of entirely
    another color.

: 0620 (I) Dived in heavy sea. Running at 80 feet, looks every
    hour.

: 1905 (I) Surfaced.

: November 14 Dived. Conducting submerged patrol.

: 0622 (I)

: 1506 (I) Surfaced. Weather moderate, commences closing island
    chain for new station in Balingting Channel.

: 1610 (I) (aircraft contact #17) - Flange on radar, range 12 miles
    closing. Dived to avoid.

: 1705 (I) Surfaced.

- 14 -

— page 212 —
2028 (I) Reversed course to 2300 (T). Tont to maximum speed. Heard Ramage's Fack forming up, decided to head for them, told Tull to commence search. Repeated attempts failed to raise LILIBUT. Did not have cell signs for Ramage's Fack as they were using "OR-CO #2 cell signs, which we do not have. This led to some confusion on our part. "I got sir separate cell signs but believe only 3 boats were present and each had two cell signs.

: 1030 (I) One boat reported contact with 2 patrol boats, radar equipped. From here on various messages were received one of which gave contact report on 3 unknown ships, and several gave convoy contact. -11 turned out to be the same two patrol boats. One boat started an attack, only to find the contact was patrol boats and broke it off. Heartlike was searching along estimated track from contact reports.

: 0410 (I) Radar contact on friendly submarine, range 8,000 yards. He had SJ interference and traced on 050 (T) speed 15 knots. A message from him giving position identified him but we could not raise him by telephone. Proceeded through position given for 3 unknown ships in contact report. Still no contact. As other 3 boats were to westward, decided to search to eastward.

: 0625 (I) No results, one of Ramages boats reported no contact on southerly search. Decided to dive and see what developed.

: 0745 (I) Sighted PB boat (Ship contact 77). Tont to battle stations. Thought seriously of attempting to sink this fellow, but never got close to 4,000 yards. He was on course 320° (I), speed 15 knots, clear of giving us a large angle on bow an. pinning. Believed he might be sweeping ahead of something, decided to wait it out and see. In view of China flane contact (Consubuca 141653) which was received too late to act on, believe these fellows were engaged in giving us the sucker play. If so they certainly succeeded. Found both perciscopes so badly forged that an attack in the above case would have depended on low power alone. Convenced cycling periscopes. This is only one more instance in a never ending series of periscope fogging. "I'll ask for at least one new one next trip in.

: 1900 (I) Surfaced. Received news from Subpace of LILIBUT's damage and lack of radio. This explains why we were unable to raise him last night.

— page 213 —
0618 (I) Dived, circled; I periscope c.r.a.i.n; 12 us.0l.0s as it cannot be turned.

: 1910 (I) Surfaced. "Find and sea making up.

: 1917 (I) Heavy sea running with strong I... trina. Intended making spray in close to Cape Bojador but now periscope depth could not be maintained.

: 1915 (I) Dived. Running at 80 feet with look every hour.

: 1918 (I) Exchanged recognition signals on 3rd with U.S. periscope.

: 1919 (I) Dived, running at 80 feet, looks every hour.

: 1915 (I) Surfaced.

: 1917 (I) Ship contact 38, radar contact at 5,000 yards. Turned and tracked him on course 2200 (T), speed to 1 knots. Lost him at 10,000 yards, decided he was patrol craft, avoided. Seas were such that a minimum setting of 10 feet would have been necessary on torpedoes.

: 1915 (I) Dived - Seas moderating, running at periscope depth closing, coast.

: 1917 (I) Surfaced.

: 1915 (I) Dived, moving toward Cape Bojador, bearing 100° (T), range 12 miles.

: 1913 (I) (-)ircraft contact 118) - Sighted with tail transport not identified, looked like lockwood.

: 1915 (I) Surfaced. Periscope forcing still as bad as ever. Repeated cycling has little or no effect. Could not obtain definite fix while close to Bojador due to periscope trouble.

- 16 -

— page 214 —
21 November 21: LOVED into area Destroy in accordance with schedule. 'Ind and ses rising steadily, looks like another blow.

0630 (I) Divded, running at 80 feet, looks over hour.

1900 (I) Surfaced. Heavy seas, high winds!

November 22: Divded. Still have high seas and winds. Impossible to hold periscope depth any length of time. Running at 80 feet, looks every hour. Broached to 30 feet on one look, required flooding negative and 15,000 pounds in artillery to get down.

1912 (I) Surfaced. Tried to raise TUR, no luck.

November 23: Divded, weather moderated, running at periscope depth.

0619 (I) Surfaced. Departed area Destroy, accurate out of area in accordance with Operation Order.

November 24: Divded.

1905 (I) Surfaced. Decided to depart through Bashi Channel as area is vacant and offers better possibility of night contacts. Ricked up plane radar on 22-1 several times but no contact.

November 25: Passed YAHU [H] Island aboard to starboard.

0200 (I)

0515 (I) Divded.

1335 (I) Surfaced.

2217 (I) Departed area.

November 26: Received instructions to proceed Pearl via idway. Anroute liday.

November 27: Anroute idway.

November 28: Anroute liday.

1110 (H) Plane on radar, distance 10 miles. Divded to avoid. (Aircraft contact 19).

1203 (H) Surfaced.

— page 215 —
1257 (H)
: 1340 (H)
: 1440 (H)
: 1525 (H)
: 1700 (H)
: 2138 (H)
: 2200 (H)
: 2300 (H)
: 2340 (H)

November 30
0029 (H)
0127 (H)

On coming to radar 3,000 yards, picked up plane on 5th, range 3,000 yards circling our position. Could not see him through periscope which was very dim.

...all clear on radar, surfaced - turned on SD.

Be changed recognition signals with U.S.S. 3-2-4-

— page 217 —
1955-43/A16-3
Serial: (1018)
DE CLASSIFIED
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HADDOCK Conf. Ltr.
SS231/49-3 dated 10 December 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY THREE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLAT.
       (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLAT.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of War Patrol Number Ten - Comments on.

1. The tenth war patrol of the U.S.S. HADDOCK was of sixty two days duration, thirty of which were spent in the assigned area south of Formosa. The Commanding Officer was in command of a group consisting of 4,000, H.I.I.T and TUNI. The area was quite active during this period; the group undoubtedly caused the enemy considerable worry during the Second Battle of the Philippines Sea, especially when the Halibut hit a battleship with five torpedoes. Numerous contacts were made by ships of the group, some of which could not be developed through probable inaccuracy in navigation. Those contacts which could be interpreted by HADDOCK are as follows:

TORPEDO ATTACK #1 - NIGHT - SUBMERGED - 1 NOVEMBER 1944.

A group of ships was sighted by high periscope, in and around required considerable time since targets were tracked at 14 knots. In position ahead at evening twilight, a submerged radar attack was decided on due to bright full moon. A zig toward forced HADDOCK to withhold fire and make another end around. In position ahead again, radar depth was taken, but saw breaking over antenna prevented getting accurate data. When escorts started dropping depth charges HADDOCK went to periscope depth and fired with a down the threat set-up. One hit slowed the target to 8 knots.

TORPEDO ATTACK #2 - DAYLIGHT - SUBMERGED - 1 NOVEMBER 1944.

Another end around on same target placed HADDOCK ahead on base course for a daylight periscope attack. In unfavorable zig forced HADDOCK to fire on a 20° track, gyro angle 32°, range 2,500 yards. No hits were obtained. It was later discovered that periscope range scale was deranged. Inaccurate range probably caused misses.

— page 219 —
15 December 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS HADDOCK (SS231) Report
of Tenth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew of the U.S.S. HADDOCK upon completion of this arduous patrol, and for the damage inflicted upon the enemy.

3. It is recommended that the U.S.S. HADDOCK be credited with the following:

PROBABLY SUNK
1 - AK(EU), 4,000 tons
Total Probably Sunk or Damaged - 11,000 tons.

DAMAGED
1 - AK(EU), 7,000 tons
Total Probably Sunk or Damaged - 11,000 tons.

W. V. O'REGAN.
W. V. O'REGAN.

— page 220 —
12 041
NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.

1. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, United States Fleet, was conducting an operation in the area south of Formosa. The HADDOCK was located in the area of the U.S.S. TUM (SS203), formed a coordinated attack group with the commanding officer of the HADDOCK, Commander J. F. Roach, U.S. Navy, as the group commander.

2. The HADDOCK, despite rough weather and intense enemy anti-submarine measures, maintained excellent area coverage throughout this patrol. The HADDOCK was unfortunate enough to see but be unable to close a crippled enemy task force returning from the Second Battle of the Philippines. Valuable contact reports were made by the HADDOCK. This task force was not one from which the HILIBUT had the good fortune to sink a heavy cruiser. The HADDOCK was not damaged by a faulty periscope during her three determined torpedo attacks which were deserving of more damage to the enemy than was intended.

3. Award of the Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this aggressive patrol. The HADDOCK is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

| Damage | Type | Tonnage | Range | Bearing |
||------||-------||
| 1 - Large AK (ARATAN IARU Type) (EC) | 6,800 tons | Attack No. 1 | 1 |
| 1 - Medium AK (DAIBOSI IARU Type) (EC) | 3,900 tons | Attack No. 3 | 1 |

TOTAL DAMAGED: 10,700 tons

Distribution and authentication on following page.

C. A. LOCIMOD, Jr.

- 1 -

EXTRA: ORIGINAL
SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 221 —
12-10/416-3(15)
Serial 02897
DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
CIO (5)
Cincpac (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ccean areas (1)
Conservpac (1)
Cinclant (8)
Consubsilant (2)
S/1 School, IL (2)
CO, S/1 Base, PH (1)
Consopac (1)
Consowespac (2)
Consubsowespac (2)
CTG 71.9 (1)
Comnorpac (40)
Consubspac (2)
SUBAD, MI (3)
ConsubspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Division Commanders, Pacific (2)
Substratinpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

C. H. HYMES, 2nd, Flag Secretary.

Note: This report will be destroyed if not reported to the Department of the Navy.

— page 222 —
35231/AL5-3
U.S.S. HIDDOCK
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
19 March 1945.

Serial: 06

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HIDDOCK.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 201
       (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 20
       (3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (4) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HIDDOCK, Report of War Patrol Number Eleven.

Inclosures: (A) Subject report.
       (B) Track chart of subject report (CSB only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the Eleventh Air Patrol of this vessel conducted in the Bungo suido area during the period January 24, to March 19, 1945, is forwarded herewith.

V. H. BROCHURE, Jr.

DECLASSIFIED. ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY: [Signature]
DATE: 5-3-46

— page 223 —
5 War Patrols
: 6 War Patrols
: 2 War Patrols
: 2 War Patrols
: 0 War Patrols
: 0 War Patrols
: 0 War Patrols
: 0 War Patrols
: 1 War Patrol

Chief Petty Officers
DIXON, I. H. CGM(PA) 10 War Patrols
HULZING, R. O. CTM(AA) 10 War Patrols
H.C. QUESTION, L. R. CGM(PA) 6 War Patrols

— page 224 —
5 "Var Patrols
MC MANIS, A. G.
CMOMM(AA)
7 "Var Patrols
MICHELL, D.
CMOMM(PA)
8 "Var Patrols

January 24
1330 (VT) Departed. Submarine Bado, P.H. in company with U.S.S. LAGARTO, as part of coordinated attack group 17.13, unit designation 17.13.2, Group Commander, Commander F. D. LATTA, commanding officer, U.S.S. LAGARTO. Enroute Siapan

1900 (VT) Escort P.C. 486 departed.

January 25
0810 (VT) Sighted PB4Y, no exchange of recognition.

1200 (VT) Noon position: Lat. 20-51.2; Long. 162-43.8 W.

January 27
1200 (VT) Noon position: Lat. 20-52.7 N; Long. 173-41.8 W.

January 28
1200 (VT) Noon position: Lat. 20-47.5; Long. 179-23.0 W. Crossed International Date Line, dropped January 29.

January 30
1200 (VT) Noon position: Lat. 20-07 N; Long. 174-58.2 B.

January 31
1200 (VT) Noon position; Lat. 20-58.8 N; Long. 170-29.1 E.

February 1
1200 (LT) Noon position: Lat. 20-12.8 N; Long. 165-20.3 W.

— page 225 —
1200 (L) Noon position: Lat. 19-18.2 N; Long. 159-38.5 E.
: 1200 (K) Fire in after torpedo room - burned out resistors in torpedo charging panel. No casulties other than watery eyes and smoke. Lucky we were not submerged where we couldn't surface.
: 1200 (K) Noon position: Lat. 17-29.2 N; Long. 148-49.5 E.
: 1200 (K) Made rendezvous with escort L.C.I. 677 and proceeded to Saipan.
: 0850 (K) Sighted Saipan Island bearing 143 T distance 54 miles.
: 1342 (K) Moored starboard side to U.S.S. LACARTE in not port-side to U.S.S. FULTON. Voyage repairs commenced by Submarine Division Eighty One Rolfed crew and Repair department U.S.S. FULTON. Major items removed of two cracked cylinder-lift-ers on two main engines and removed of grinding noise in number two periscope.
: February 6 Continuing voyage repairs at Saipan.
: February 7 At Saipan.
: 0830 (K) Commander 'William H. Brockman relieved Commander J. P. Roach as Commanding Officer. The following officers were detached:
    Lt(jg). P. C. TITACHEY
    Lt(jg). E. E. BOSTROM
    The following officers reported aboard for duty:
    Lt(jg). J. F. DOLNOVAN
    Lt(jg). H. RICHARDSON
: 1800 (K) Underway for patrol area in company with U.S.S. LAGARTO, U.S.S. SENNIT, escorted by YMS 426. ... delay of one hour was occasioned by the valve disc separating from its stem on the Ice machine circulating water overboard discharge valve.

— page 226 —
8 February 8

Enroute patrol area conducting fire control, gunnery drills and making training dives which had to be shortened in order for us to reach station in time.

1200 (K) Noon position: Lat. 16-29.4 N; Long. 142-30.3 E.

February 9

Seas and wind increased in intensity during night and continued all day. All three submarines of this pack have had to use three or four engines continuously in order to reach station on time.

1200 (K) Noon position: Lat. 20-47 N; Long. 137-39.8 E.

1300 (K) Set clocks back one hour. Hold drills and made two short dives for training.

February 10

0740 (I) SENT report of plane contact 14 miles. Not picked up by us. Later reported as friendly.

1000 (I) Port lookout sighted submarine poriscope on port beam, not sighted by C.C.D. because he took evasive action immediately.

1200 (I) Noon position: Lat. 26-00.6 N; Long. 137-37 E.

2200 (I) Serviced all guns. Our wish is that by dawn tomorrow the seas will abate. "Ith seas running the way they are it will be practically impossible to use the five inch guns.

February 11

0832 (I) Entered area for diversionary sweep distance between submarines 6,000 yards on line of bearing.

0930 (I) SD plane contact distance 14 miles. No response on I.F.F. closed to nine miles. Later LAGARTO reported this contact friendly. Lookout sighted plane momentarily but lost in overcast weather. Seas continue to be too rough for five inch gunnery.

1200 (I) Noon position: Lat. 30-13.7 N; Long. 139-11.3 E.

1848 (I) Changed course to 000 T on orders of LAGARTO.

1945 (I) Changed course to 080 T searching for reported convoy.

— page 227 —
0300 (I) Discontinued search for convoy and commenced search for anything, even a rowboat would help.

: 1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 30-05.8 N; Long. 139-18.5 E. Seas have calmed somewhat five inch guns could be used. Recommended to LAGARTTO that her searchlight be used tonight in an attempt to draw the Japs to us. She is the center submarine of the formation.

: 1610 (I) SD radar contact 10 miles sighted by lookouts at same time bearing 000 T. Identified as B-29 immediately tried to contact by VHF, 4475 Kcs. and searchlight. Shortly thereafter contact on second B-29 followed by contact on third B-29 which sighted us and came in to 3 miles.

: 1630 (I) Established contact with B-29 by VHF and asked him for any contact reports. Notified that two patrol vessels were sighted by him at 0626 Zobra latitude 30 N, longitude 134-50 E. course 085 T speed six knots. Informed wolf pack commander in LAGARTTO and SANDY.

: 2000 to 2230 (I) Converted #4 fuel ballast tank.

: 2255 (I) Radar contact on two picket vessels range 6,700 yards (Ship contact number one) bearing 285 T, Lat. 30-07.5 N, Long. 136-39.5 E. Opened range commenced tracking and sent contact report to LAGARTTO and SANDY.

: 2258 (I) Battle stations torpedo.

: 2313 (I) Secured from battle stations torpedo, continued to track and found spool to be zero maximum radar range possible 9,500 yards. Stopped and remained at 9,400 yards maintaining contact for pack.

February 13

: 0318 (I) Received word that SANDY had contact and we should form on line of bearing with LAGARTTO. Compiled with-out losing contact on target.

: 0515 (I) Commenced opening out to westward with pack in line of bearing 020 T, distance 4,000 yards.

: 0600 (I) Reversed course and headed in to eastward.

: 0615 (I) Battle stations surface (Attack #1).

— page 228 —
0625 (I) Opened fire on larger of two picket vessels range about 7,400 yards. At least one hit was seen from this range and larger vessel commenced laying smoke screen and and both vessels opened fire on us. ..t this time one Mk 32 shell burst over larger vessel silencing forward gun.

: 0700 (I) Concentrated our fire on smaller of the two vessels and closed range while he kept firing in our direction making many straddles with what appeared to be an automatic weapon larger than a 20 Mk. From a range of 3,700 yards to 2,800 yards many hits were made which set him on fire.

: 0720 (I) Ceased firing having expended 148 rounds of ammunition which exhausted our supply. Headed for our victim which was blazing furiously intending to finish her off with 40 Mk but she sank before we had a chance to man them. During this interval SMITH and LGRTO were finishing off larger vessel and we headed over to assist with 40 Mk. If necessary. However this vessel was well taken care of by the SMITH and LGRTO.

: 0810 (I) Formed line of bearing and commenced search.

: 0942 (I) Lookout sighted plane seven miles distance heading for us. The commanding officer and officer of the deck heard the motor and at

: 0943 (I) dived.

: 1002 (I) Surfaced and notified SMITH and LGRTO who were submerged during our contact that we had been forced to dive by unidentified plane.

: 1131 (I) SD radar contact 6 miles sighted by lookout at 4 miles coming in.

: 1133 (I) Dived to 150 feet.

: 1134 (I) Airplane dropped three depth bombs fairly close.

: 1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 29-57.8 N, Long. 136-15.1 S.

: 1239 (I) Surfaced after having lunch.

: 1249 (I) Plane contact on SJ 7,500 yards coming in.

: 1250 (I) Dived.

: 1345 (I) Surfaced.

— page 229 —
1745 (I) Lookout sighted two picket boats on horizon at a range of about 10,000 yards, at the time visibility was very poor and this lookout is observing of much credit. Coachad 3T radar on and they were picked up at about 7,000 yards bearing 260 T commenced tracking and sent contact report to SENNET and L.G.R.T.O which vessels had not been seen or heard from since our last plane contact. Efforts to raise them on SCR failed and with some missgivings opened up on CV. Eventually they were contacted on SCR.

: 1815 (I) Two picket vessels proved to be dead in the water. Commenced running out and in between ranges 16,000 and 8,000 yards maintaining contact.

: 1900 (I) Determined that our best bet was to attack submerged tonight if other submarines did not show up. ...lorting vessels when in position by use of submerged signal ejector. In case the submarines showed up they should attack with gun fire at dawn alerting enemy and we attack submerged.

: 2330 (I) Picked up radar interference from L.G.R.T.O and he called us giving us about the same plan we already had developed.

February 14

: 0506 (I) Submerged for approach: Determined that if the L.G.R.T.O and SENNET were going to attack from the westward we should come in from the eastward closing to about three hundred yards on bow of target.

: 0629 (I) Fired number ten tube with angle on bow of target 30 degrees port, range 300 yards (attack #2).

: 0653 (I) At periscope depth could see both targets and splashes from submarines guns but no hits. Could not see submarines.

: 0713 (I) Not having seen any more splashes for five minutes, surfaced and joined submarine formation.

: 1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 30-13 N; Long. 136-07 E.

: 1455 (I) Upon receipt of orders from pack commander set course 295 T at two engine speed for patrol area off Bungo Suido.

— page 230 —
2045 (I) Radar contact bearing 260 T range 12,000 yards, commander tracking. To eventually discover radar interference and assured contact was SHIMIZU.

: 0400 (I) Entered patrol area off Bungo Suido. Radar contact on land range 90,000 yards bearing 000 T.

: 0624 (I) Submerged conducting periscope depth patrol.

: 1040 (I) Sighted Okino Shima and southern coast of Shikoku distance about 23 miles. We are patrolling near a line made by contacts of other submarines in this area.

: 1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 32-09.1 N; Long. 132-39 E.

: 1641 (I) Surfaced and soon picked up indication of Jap shore based radar frequency 150 mcs.

: 1915 (I) Fip on 150 mcs. was saturated and would remain trained in our direction for minutes at a time. Could not believe that Japs actually had contacted us but thought they were trained on our interference or were taking direction finder bearings of our SJ signal. Decided to run south away from land for half hour and then secure SJ and rotate JT periscope. It may have been coincidence but pip on JT did not saturate as often and they seemed to have lost us. Upon again turning on SJ the pip eventually became saturated and would remain saturated as long as thirty minutes. Decided to again run south and at about thirty miles we believed he lost us. Additional contacts were made during the evening on the following frequencies: 240 mcs., 73 mcs. (because completely saturated and so remained indicating non-directional characteristics), 153 mcs., 156 mcs. and 170 mcs. "To expected a plane contact at any time but this did not materialize. The SJ was kept warned up as each now pip was discovered on the SJ would be keyed for five seconds.

: 2341 (I) Sighted two navigational lights on Kyushu.

— page 231 —
0610 (I) Radar contact bearing 108 T, distance 15,600 yards good sized pip. Stationed tracking party and maneuvered to open range while retaining contact. Lost contact and headed for true bearing but could not again regain contact. It is considered that this contact must have been a plane.

: 0627 (I) Submerged. "I have not had a star sight for four days in as much as our position is in doubt do not consider it prudent to close the Jap coast until our position is better established.

: 1023 (I) Surfaced to get sun line.

: 1024 (I) Float plane crossed astern so we submerged.

: 1036 (I) Conducted periscope patrol.

: 1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 32-08.2 N; Long. 131-58.4 E.

: 1904 (I) Surfaced.

: 2025 (I) Radar contact on airplane distance 12 miles, saturation of c pip on PR had been continuous for last half hour. Submerged.

: 2040 (I) Surfaced. Enemy radar still in evidence.

: 2400 (I) Picked up SJ interference bearing 120 T undoubtedly LADATO.

The above radar equipped plane was detected by PR on 152 mcs. Saturation of pip invariably occurred at range in excess of those where SD radar could contact. Other contacts during night wore made on 158 mcs., 156 mcs., 81 mcs. and 147 mcs.

February 17

: 0220 (I) 3D radar contact ton miles. 3D was keyed due to saturation on PR. Range was increasing, did not dive.

: 0257 (I) Saturation on PR. Keyed 3D, no contacts.

: 0317 (I) Saturation on PR.

: 0323 (I) Keyed 3D made plane contact 4 miles, submerged.

— page 232 —
0343 (I)  Surfaced. Keyed-SD and had contact on plane distance 14 miles steady, eventually going to 16 miles and fading out.  Saturation on 2F for several minutes keyed SD, contact 6 miles. Submerged.

: 0453 (I)  Surfaced. Signal on 2F still present but not as strong; became weaker and eventually faded out.

: 0615 (I)  Submerged northeast of Toi Iisaki heading south and in order to be in position away from usual station for transmission of weather tonight.

: 1200 (I)  Four position: Lat. 31-30.8°; Long. 131-50°.

: 1857 (I)  Surfaced and immediately had indications of radar on 61 mcs., 158 mcs., 161 mcs., 169 mcs. and 146 and 147 mcs.

: 2030 (I)  Contact on 155 mcs., saturated, came in intermittently keying of SD radar. At this time we were attempting to get off weather report. HIDDCC serial one to Combat Patrol Command.

: 2045 (I)  Plane contact 18 miles, gradually came in until at

: 2105 (I)  He closed to five miles and we submerged.

: 2140 (I)  Surfaced, plane radar on 155 mcs. still in visible contact. Saturation reached then faded. Saturation went-ually became steady and 3D indicated. Plane came in 16 miles.

: 2157 (I)  Submerged with range to plane four miles.

: 2230 (I)  Surfaced with plane r-1car on 156 mcs. in visible. Decoding saturated and then faded. We finally located us and saturation remained. Followed in five 16 miles and at

: 2326 (I)  submerged with plane at four miles.

February 10

: 0000 (I)  Surfaced plane still searching on 156 mcs.

: 0155 (I)  Saturation had been in visible for sometime. SD plane contact 22 miles.

: 0203 (I)  Submerged when he closed to five miles coming in.

— page 233 —
0230 (I) Surfaced and watched his pip on PR become saturated then weak, then strong. He came in to 15 miles several times during next three hours but always headed out again. PR gave an indication that he had a friend helping now. But whereas his pip saturated many times he did not get close enough to make us submerge.

: 0605 (I) Submerged.

: 1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 32-22.1 N; Long. 132-26.3 E.

: 1903 (I) Surfaced with the following PR readings: 155 mcs. and ty 2020 (I) was saturated.

: 1950 (I) Reading at 152 mcs. The plane 155 mcs. seemed to be searching all night.

February 19

: 0050 (I) Signal on 73 mcs.

: 0400 (I) The 155 mcs. stayed saturated for fifteen minutes. Began to notice two aircraft radars whether on separate planes or not cannot be determined.

: 0530 (I) Land based signal 161 mcs. much stronger and pl no 155 mcs. booming and saturated almost continuously.

: 0538 (I) SD contact 11 miles then faded from screen.

: 0552 (I) submerged.

: 1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 32-32.1 N; Long. 132-26.3 E.

: 1852 (I) Surfaced in a rough sea and shortly thereafter picked up our usual PR contacts. It is difficult to determine which are land based and which are airborne. However we were not driven down all night so it can be assumed they were all land based.

February 20

: 0607 (I) Submerged.

: 1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 32-30.8 N; Long. 132-12.4 E.

: 1848 (I) Surfaced. Started picking up signal on 153 mcs. Shortly we picked up two signals on this frequency. One, we are sure is land based, the other aircraft.

— page 234 —
2043 (I) .after contact had been up to saturation and down again, SD had plane contact 12.miles but eventually this faded out. Contacts would become saturated at various times all night.

February 21

0430 (I) Contacts on PR were saturated and SD made contact at 18 and 20 miles. The one at 18 miles closed to 8 miles then started out.

0521 (I) APR contacts saturated 3D picked up two planes one at 10 miles coming in.

0523 (I) Plane had closed to six miles and we submerged. This contact closed to 3 1/2 miles before 3D must want under. "We were up close to the 100 fathom curve in Bungo Suido and are certain that we were picked up by land based radar which aided search planes in finding us.

0950 (I) Sighted plane bearing 278 T, distance about 10 miles. Flying boat type.

1200 (I) Noon position: Lat. 32-25.5 N; Long. 132-08.9 E.

1811 (I) Surfaced in very rough sea visibility low and rain. Headed for our new area which is outer area off Bungo Suido.

2100 (I) Completed transmitting HUDDOCK serial number two.

2130 (I) Entered new area in accordance with pack commander orders.

February 22

0030 (I) 3D radar contact (Contact #3) range 6,100 yards bearing 320 T, no contact on APR. Put contact after opened out to maximum range of about 8,500 yards and commenced tracking. Determined target must be picked boat making four knots. Decided to retain contact until dawn and fire one torpedo from dead ahead after identifying because we are within twenty miles of air surface zone.

0415 (I) Lost contact and ran in to 3,500 yards before regaining contact. Closed to 1,800 yards could see nothing.

0538 (I) Opened out to 6,000 yards where contact was lost and never regained even though we headed on his true bearing and circled position. The weather at this time was very bad little or no visibility, rain squalls showing large pips all around us. Sithor he was lost in those rain squalls or our target was a submarine that dived at 0538 (I). "I think it was a picket boat however. . .it no time did we make APR contact.

— page 235 —
0600 (I) "I closed to 50 miles from land so decided to remain on surface for the day.

1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 31-59 N; Long. 133-00.9 E.

1800 (I) Made trim dive. Upon completion can cancel search for target we lost this morning in case he was a Jap Submarine. Weather has no longer, and has been clear all afternoon, visibility unlimited.

February 23

0619 (I) Made trim dive and at

0633 (I) Surfaced searching with high periscope.

0915 (I) FR high noise signal on 250 mcs. 3D radar contact at 24 miles. Closed to 21 miles and faded out.

1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 31-50 N; Long. 133-04 E.

1805 (I) Made trim dive.

1825 (I) Surfaced.

1035 (I) 3D radar contact 18 miles closed to 14 miles then increased to 24 miles. . . .t first no . . .R contact but eventuallly became saturated on 159 mcs.

1042 (I) FR started showing saturation on about 150 mcs. 3D radar contact 20 miles increased to 24 miles.

1851 (I) Plane had now closed to 13 miles. Indicators there are two planes.

1653 (I) Plane at 11 miles and one at 18 miles.

1906 (I) Submerged when they closed to five miles still closing.

1950 (I) Surfaced . . .FR becoming saturated 3D contact two planes about 16 miles. They operated at various distances from nine miles to 16 miles when one cut his radar off and headed in, other still boating on us.

2020 (I) Submerged when the plane heading in closed to four miles.

2116 (I) Surfaced with . . .FR giving weak signals, 3D clear. I don't understand how I manage to remain on surface all day and have this trouble at night. It is a clear moonlight night like day which might have something to do with it.

February 24

1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 31-41.3 N; Long. 132-50.8 E.

— page 236 —
1525 (I) 3D radar contact at 18 miles closed to 16 miles then opened to 18 miles where he faded from screen.

: 1900 (I) Corroborated sending weather report H-DDCH serial number three. Due to jamming by Japs this mess got as not recognized for until 2035 (I). "Eather is taking a turn for the worse looks like we are due for some bad weather.

: February 25

: 0630 (I) Had intended making an all day dive but visibility is less than 8,000 yards with wind and sea increasing so submerged for trim dive only in as much as we have not dived for close to 36 hours.

: 1200 (I) 1000 position: Lat. 31-41.3 N; Long. 131-41.8 E. Seas have increased until now they are estimated to be thirty to forty feet high, wind velocity about 35 knots. Barometer still falling.

: February 26

: The barometer is now rising, storm seems to have passed, seas still high but it is clear enough night.

: 0600 (I) Submerged for the day about 25 miles from land. To have work to do on our main engines. Seas are still rough making periscope depth control difficult.

: 1200 (I) 1000 position: Lat. 32-41 N; Long. 133-51.2 E. It now becomes apparent that we are much closer to Hurato Zaki than we thought. Soundings indicate we are inside the 100 fathom curve.

: 1815 (I) Surfaced, removed the port cooler. A fix indicates we have been set into S.S.S.S. area and closer to Hurato Zaki. We apparently had a drift of 5 knots set about 060 T today, undoubtedly caused by the storm.

: 2324 (I) ST contact 2,100 yards. I answered to place contact astern, stationed tracking party. It soon became apparent with ranges changing from 1,400 yards to 4,000 yards and true bearing changing rapidly that contact was a bird. Sea was fairly calm at the time and may be the answer to the contacts of one submarine around 3,500 yards which they wrote up in a recent patrol report attributing contacts to PT boat or midget submarine.

— page 237 —
27
0237 (I) SJ radar contact on plane 9 miles closed, keyed SD and plane closed to 5 1/2 miles at
0239 (I) Submerged.
0304 (I) Surfaced.
1200 (I) Noon position: Lat. 31-22.6 N; Long. 132-35 E.
1239 (I) SD contact 8 miles closing submerged.
1315 (I) Surfaced.
1900 (I) Commenced sending HUDOCK serial number four and completed at 1945 (I).

February 28
0507 (I) XR contact at about Jap submarine radar frequency. Commenced circling to try to determine direction.
0623 (I) Deterrined contact was shore based. submerged.
0605 (I) Flamed up to 40 feet for five minutes for good look.
1200 (I) Noon position: Lat. 31-07 N; Long. 132-06 E.
1910 (I) SJ radar contact on plane bearing 226 T range 26,000 yards. Keyed SD plane closed to nine miles then opened to 14 miles where contact was lost. 'He had a saturation pip at 136 ncs. tonight which is a new frequency for this area.
2010 (I) SD contact 8 miles closed to about 6 miles then opened out to 11 miles where at
2023 (I) contact was lost.
2100 (I) Entered close in area off Bungo Suido in accordance with pack commander orders.

March 1
0235 (I) Sighted Okino Shima distance 25,000 yards bearing 340 T. Visibility is almost as good as day.
0600 (I) Submerged.

— page 238 —
1200 (I)  Noon position: Lat. 32-36.6 N; Long. 132-09 W.
: 1830 (I)  Surfaced and shortly had full saturation on LR at 153 ncs. and 155 mcs. These persisted until we were about 50 miles from the coast.
: 0604 (I)  SJ radar contact on plane distance 6 miles. Submerged. Undoubtedly we were detected by shore based radar and plane dispatched to investigate. The sea is rough, sky heavily overcast reducing visibility to about 8,000 yards.
: 0830 (I)  Found starboard cooler leaking, no spares, started trying to repair leaky port cooler.
: 1200 (I)  Moon position: Lat. 32-23.8 N; Long. 132-23.4 E.
: 1300 (I)  Bow buoyancy blow is leaking, secured air manifold and ground it in. Depth control at periscope depth had become increasingly difficult and now became impossible, ran at 100 feet.
: 1745 (I)  Repaired lub oil cooler installed so planed to periscope depth and surfaced in rough seas and low visibility.
: 1850 (I)  Sont HUDDOCK serial five to ConsubFasc. dCond.
: 1860 (I)  Submerged. Seas are still high but weather is clearing.
: 1200 (I)  Moon position: Lat. 32-31.8 N; Long. 132-11.5 E.
: 1445 (I)  Sighted Emily type plans on course 090 T.
: 1458 (I)  Sighted same plane distance about 6 miles on course 330 T.
: 1848 (I)  Surfaced.
: 1915 (I)  Sighted what appeared to be two aircraft beacons bearing 269 T.
: 2125 (I)  Aircraft beacons were secured.

— page 239 —
0610 (I) Submerged off 100 fathom curve northeast of Toi Islaki.
: 1200 (I) Knot position: Lat. 31-20.9 N; Long. 131-37.
: 1647 (I) Surfaced.

: 0454 (I) SJ radar contact 6,000 yards 0.0.D. thought this was airplane and diveo. The contact did not seem like plane to me.
: 0532 (I) Fad gained position ahead angle con bow 10 port, range 4,600 yards. Turned towards him.
: 0533 (I) Submerged to 55 feet. Could see him faintly through ST periscope. ST radar did not immediately pick him up but finally did at range of 3,040 yards. Tracked him in to 2,400 yards on course 250 speed 0.5 knots.
: 0527 (I) Went to 175 feet made one torpedo tube ready. Signed for silent running.
: 0545 (I) Tired. One torpedo from stern tubes (t-total 131 sound bearings indicate target had come on 2/3 zig-zag. However, he passed very close from our port side, we had a bearing of 350 relative follow. Immediately by a bearing of 190 relative. Angles 280 at...
: 0556 (I) Sound reported screws speeding up and getting louder. I landed down to 300 feet.
: 0600 (I) Officer on sound reported noise silencer to a recording he had heard off an acoustic harrier.
: 0614 (I) Explosion heard in torpedo room, forward battery, engine room, coming toward control room. Gunner like noise and screws stopped.
: 0616 (I) Started up to periscope depth.
: 0620 (I) Periscope depth, nothing in sight handed on last true.

— page 240 —
1200 (I)  Noon position: Lat. 32-20.8 N; Long. 132-25.5 m.
: 1840 (I)  Surfaced.
: 1910 (I)  Started sending HUDDOCK serial six, not completed until 2045 (I) due to volumn of traffic.

: 1200 (I)  Noon position: Lat. 32-15 N; Long. 132-18.8 m.
: 1841 (I)  Surfaced heading into mountainous sea and a 50 knot wind. Two exceptionally heavy seas caused green water to go through coming tower hatch and into control room and pu p room before lower hatch could be secured in conning tower. Heavy grounds developed, last one eli. i. ated shortly before midnight.

: 1200 (I)  Noon position: Lat 32-24.5 N; Long. 132-17 m.
: 1845 (I)  Surfaced in fairly rough seas.
: 1944 (I)  SJ radar contact on plane distance 5 miles followed out to 9 miles on 3D.
: 2100 (I)  Entered outer area off Bungo Suido in accordance with "off Pack Commander orders.
: 2310 (I)  Picked up SJ radar interferoce from U.S.S. L.G.NTO bearing 136 T, distance 8,700 yards. again tried to communicate with L.G.NTO. No results.
: 2355 (I)  Stationed radar tracking party and attempted to open range on L.G.NTO.

— page 241 —
0015 (I) Communications established via SCR with L.A. and. Still no luck on 3D radar.
: 0035 (I) Lost contact with L.A. and no good tracking drill.
: 0348 (I) RF had been saturated for sometime at 155 mcs. 3D contact at 9 miles.
: 0351 (I) Submerged after following plane in to 3 1/2 miles. This was dive number 1,000 for L.D. and.
: 0418 (I) Surfaced.
: 0420 (I) SD contact 5 miles followed in to 4 miles then out to 5 miles where he faced from screen.
: 0426 (I) Saturated pip on 155 mcs. and 200 mcs. Each one of these frequencies showed two pips and would become saturated then fade alternately.
: 0452 (I) SD contact on two planes range 8 miles.
: 0455 (I) SJ plane contact 9,000 yards.
: 0458 (I) Submerged. SD contact at 3 1/2 and 4 miles closing.
: 0522 (I) Surfaced and shortly had saturated pips at 155 mcs. and 200 mcs.
: 0526 (I) Flare on 3D 13 miles. They would close then open out then close until at.
: 0556 (I) Submerged with both planes at 3 1/2 miles closing. He intended remaining on surface today, but seas are so rough it has been necessary to use more air than usual blowing up home our air is low and do not desire lower it still further by additional emergency dives. To transit again tonight and we may need all our remaining air.
: 1200 (I) Room position: Lat. 41-48.5 N; Long. 133-02 E. Our bow planes which have been knocking the entire patrol are getting progressively worse. The back can be heard through the hull in the far radar battery and control room.

— page 242 —
1830 (I) Surfaced.
: 1910 (I) Corroded sending H.D.DOCK serial soon to Co. SubFec.-d.Cord.
: 1917 (I) Submerged on sight contact two twin engine bombers. Had very slight indication on FR.
: 1920 (I) Room Position: Lat. 31-48.1 N; Long. 133-28 E.
: 1929 (I) Surfaced. "Ind and seas seem to be increasing.
: 1849 (I) Saturation on FR at 157 ncs. and 205 ncs.
: 1914 (I) SD radar contact on plane at 13 miles, then lost from screen. "Ind has not increased to about 30 knots and seas are heavy.
: 2015 (I) Ventilated inboard and took courses to ride out a severe storm.

March 10

: 1005 (I) SD radar contact 19 miles closed to 18 miles then faded. Seas are still heavy but show signs of abating.
: 1200 (I) Room position: Lat. 30-05.7 N; Long. 132-47 E. Skies have now cleared, barometer rising and winds have decreased from an estimated maximum of 50 knots to 25 knots.
: 1849 (I) Sighted a floating mine close aboard. It was so dark that we would have had to approach too close to it to destroy it.

March 11

: 1200 (I) Room position: Lat. 32-05.7 N; Long. 133-32.2 E.
: 1229 (I) SD radar contact 12 miles.
: 1230 (I) Closed to 10 miles, submerged. Today is a beautiful spring day or actually no swells, for clouds and unlimited visibility. All operator just interfered no that he had a pip at 98 ncs. when plane was picked up.
: 1315 (I) Surfaced.
: 1858 (I) Transmitted H.D.DOCK serial eight to Co. SubFec.-d.Cord.

— page 243 —
12
0940 (I) 3D radar contact 22 miles.
0950 (I) Plane faced out at 24 miles.
0957 (I) SD contact 6 miles, closing. Submerged.
1040 (I) Surface.
1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 32-03.7 i; Long. 133-17.6 E.
: 13
0210 (I) Radar contact on L.G. NO and held tracking drill.
0304 (I) Lost contact with L.G. NO.
0904 (I) 3D contact 22 miles.
0908 (I) Lost contact.
0911 (I) 3D contact 14 miles closing, submerged.
1021 (I) Surface.
1146 (I) Sighted two spherical mines and attempted to destroy them but 2L shells would not penetrate casing and 40 MM would not fire.
1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 31-50.4 i; Long. 132-44.1 E.
1225 (I) Decided to give up trying to explode mines.
1344 (I) SD contact 12 miles, closing. Submerged.
1450 (I) Surface, having utilized ti to training diving officer.
1451 (I) 3D radar contact, closing, submerged.
1527 (I) Surface.
1720 (I)

: 13
was cloudy and it was with much difficulty that we eventually obtained a fix.

-21-

— page 244 —
1251 (I) Did not see him so came to his true bearing.

: 1253 (I) Placed up to 50 feet, could not see him. Could still see L.G. NO.

: 1310 (I) Flamed up to 45 feet and made contact. Could see his conning tower and his anti-aircraft gun. About 10 port. Bearing checked on TDC. Appeared we were correct and he was coming around on his left zigzag which would put us in good position. Range at this time was about 15,000 yards.

: 1312 (I) Flamed down to 47 feet and took another look and he was gone. Came back to 45 feet, still could not see him. Visibility had not changed.

: 1320 (I) Came to 40 feet and still could not see him.

: 1337 (I) Surfaced and still did not have him in sight although we eventually picked up the L.G. NO at 14,000 yards. He find it is more difficult to see friendly submarines at great ranges than Japanese.

: 1400 (I) Corroborated search to westward on orders from L.G. NO, then northward, then southward to latitude 29-00 N. In analysis of all data available to me indicates that the JAP must have submerged between 1311 (I) 1312 (I), because even if he reversed course, he could not have opened range more than 400 to 600 yards, in which case I surely would have seen him when I came back to 45 feet at 1312 (I).

: 1537 (I) Lookout reported sighting periscope shears on horizon. Maneuvered to keep target astern. Disbanded challenges and calls via JT radar with 35-39D (33-39G).

: 1930 (I) L.G. NO departed for refit base and we changed course to eastward, searching.

: 2314 (I) Discontinued searching and sent HUDDOCK serial mine reporting departure from area in accordance with orders.

March 15

: 0230 (I) Received orders to remain north of latitude 25-00 N adjusted course and speed accordingly.

-22-

— page 245 —
0142 (I) Plane contact at 10,000 yards on 5T. Lifted 5D and had contact at 4 miles.

: 0142 (I) Submerged.

: 0200 (I) Surface. 'e were apparently undetected and plane was flying low to be below bad weather.

: 0530 (I) Noticed radar interference which we are sure was LCTO, however they would not answer challenge by radar.

: 0647 (I) Sighted friendly submarine periscope shears in high periscope.

: 0556 (I) Trached what we are sure is friendly submarine.

: 0712 (I) Identified friendly submarine as LCTO via SOA.

: 0728 (I) LCTO reported having contact.

: 0751 (I) LCTO reported contact was undoubtedly Jay submarine. 'ent ahead on 11 main engines and came parallel to LCTO on course 160 true. Visibility today is untilited.

: 0930 (I) LCTO told us if we had more speed, make an end around and attack first. They told us target tracked on course 160 true speed 12.

: 0931 (I) ...ill ahead emergency.

: 0931 (I) Established contact with enemy (Contact 5). 'e have much true bearing to gain before attacking. 'e had to run southeast to maintain contact and gain in bearing.

: 0947 (I) Lost contact when he made large zig to his left.

: 1014 (I) Reestablished contact. 'e are gaining in bearing slowly. ...ill angles on bow have been starboard. Believe his base course is 160 true.

: 1200 (I) Moon position: Lat. 29-47.9; Long. 134-59.9 E.

: 1230 (I) Closed range to about 16,000 yards and had his true bearing 348 T and a port angle on his bow. He is due to start coming left on his zig. Notified LCTO of his bearing and th to we were attacking and submerged to 55 feet.

-23-

— page 246 —
1154 (I) SD plane contact distance 5 miles. Submerged.
: 1200 (I) Ton position: Lat. 28-39.9 N; Long. 137-30.5 E.
: 1314 (I) Surfaced, having spent time training diving officers and securing the auxiliary "2 discherge valve seat to its stem. This has happened many times this patrol and the reason is that the cotter pins have been used apparently throughout the boat. The steel has been attacked by salt water, disintegrates and nut backs off.
: 1320 (I) Sighted friendly submarine on surface and maneuvered to put astern until challenges could be exchanged. Our friendly contact apparently sighted us and submerged because we lost contact with him.
: 1500 (I) Transmitted RADIO serial ten.
: 2053 (I) 3D radar interference bearing 355 T, coming in strong. Tried for 15 minutes to establish communications with no success.
: 2155 (I) 3D radar interference faded out on bearing 000 T.
: March 16
: 1200 (I) Ton position: Lat. 27-24.5 N; Long. 137-33.7 E.
: 1217 (I) 3D radar contact 10 miles, submerged and trained diving officers.
: 1240 (I) Surfaced.
: 1434 (I) Hade training dive.
: 1446 (I) Surfaced.
: 1540 (I) He'd training dive.
: 1557 (I) Surfaced.
: March 17
: 0100 (I) Set all clocks ahead one hour to conform to zone minus ten (King) time.
: 0800 (I) SD radar contact 18 miles, no response on I.F.F.
: 0806 (I) Lost contact.
: 0807 (I) Lanned VHF and could hear two planes talking, voice calls "Godd" and "Goody". Attended to raise

— page 247 —
0607 (K) that, but could get no response.
: 0810 (K) Asked him to turn on their I.F.F.
: 0818 (K) They did not respond by voice but turned on I.F.F. at 11 miles.
: 0825 (K) Sighted a B-29 on a northerly course.
: 1050 (K) Received report of light cruiser. We are 560 miles away and would have to go into air surface zone if we reversed course. This report in just 24 hours too late for us.
: 1145 (K) Lookout sighted plane on starboard beam. Dist. 6 miles, obtained I.F.F. response at 6 miles. Manned VHF and communicated with plane voice call "Bill". Another plane on our port quarter answered to "Porgy". Told us they had nothing for us. Appeared to be F2F2X's.
: 1200 (K) Noon position: Lat. 25-55 N; Long. 107-31 E.
: 19 March
: 1200 (K) Noon position: Lat. 17-32 N; Long 106-40; E.
: 1545 (K) Sighted B-29 on parallel course, 14 miles, answered I.F.F.
: 1620 (K) SD radar contact 12 miles, sighted by loc. out and identified as B-24.
: 1920 (K) Redar interference, exchange calls and greetings with TINCSA. Had interference from SFADFISH but she would not answer SJ.

: 19 March
: 0500 (K) Exchanged signals on SJ with TIRANTE.
: 1145 (K) Made rendezvous with escort.
: 1200 (K) Noon position: Lat. 14000 N; Long. 144-15 E.
: 1215 (K) TIGRONE, SEABORSE and BULLHEAD sighted. I am joining their formation.
: 1600 (K) Arrived Guam for refit.

— page 248 —
1. The weather experienced during this patrol was typical of what is usually found in this area at this time of the year. Namely, long slow swells, wind about six (6) knots, and sea generally from a northwesterly direction, average temperature around 56 degrees, sky practically cloudless during the day but closing in at dawn and dusk with a haze which seems peculiar to this coast. Throo severe storms were encountered that were exceptions to the above. The first was on the 25th of February and the second was during the 6th-7th of march. In both cases, there existed low visibility (under 4000 yards), sky completely overcast, the sea confused with short violent swells. During the first storm, the barometer fell to 29.44 inches, temperature 80 degrees F., and to wind rose to a velocity of 25 knots from a direction of 340 (T). The second storm was the most violent. The barometer fell to 29.50 inches, temperature 80 degrees F., and the wind about 45-50 knots from a direction of 230 (T). About four hours after the storm reached its height, the wind shifted to the right until the wind and sea were 180 degrees to each other. This, needless to say, seemed to increase the apparent violence of the storm. The third storm took place during the night of 9th - 10th of March. The barometer's lowest reading was 29.92 inches, temperature 76 degrees F., wind 30 knots from 300 (T).

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION:
The following tides and currents were noted:
- Locality: 3rd
- Height of wave on surface of point for Dungo Suido (Tide and Current Table)
  - 042 (t) 1.5 kts.
- Tidal conditions:
  - Eastern side of Dungo Suido eight miles east and south of 100 fathom curve.
  - Seven miles due south of Okino Shima, 045 (t) .66-2.0 kt.
  - Sixteen miles due south of .055 (t) 2.0 kts.
  - Ishizuri Sakai.
  - Eight miles due east of Toi Hisaaki 030 (t) 2.0-2.3 kt.
  - Latitude 31-45 N:Latitude 133-00 E. 050 (t) 1.1-1.5 kt.

— page 251 —
1. Torpedo attacks were made subject of special report.
2. U.S.S. D.DOCK CUN. ATTACK NO. ___ 1  P.TROL NO. ___ 11
3. Time: 0615
4. Date: 13 February 1945 Lat. 30-05.9 N Long. 136-31 E
5. TARGET D.T. - D.D.D. ATTACK INFLICTED
6. Sunk: Two picket vessels by the combined gunfire of U.S.S. L.G.R.TO, U.S.S. SHINET and this vessel. One displaced about two hundred tons, the second about three hundred tons.
7. Damaged or None.
8. Probably sunk - DET.ILS OF ACTION

The targets were contacted during the night and determined to be lying to. Contact was maintained during the night. Prior to dawn the pack opened to the westward then started in for the attack to the eastward in line of bearing, distance between submarines four miles. L.G.R.TO, center ship, had ordered us to follow her movements in opening fire. L.G.R.TO opened fire at seven thousand yards and we followed. The targets immediately got underway and zig-zagged radically. The larger of the two started laying a smoke screen around the smaller picket, completely obliterating her from view. "I had opened fire initially on the smaller target but now shifted to the larger. "I believe we made at least one hit on this target which put one of his guns out of commission. At ranges of 7000 yards to 5000 yards - about 100 rounds of ammunition was expended using one of the other targets as point of air. "I had kept the range open because of orders and also because of the accuracy of the fire of the enemy. They are armed to be using something larger than a 20lb, perhaps 37 or 40 lb plus 3 inch guns and several 1.5 inch made str.ddles on us.

"I'm closed the range on the smaller of the two because it appears the L.G.R.TO - D.S.N.T. were chasing the larger one, also the smaller target's fire seemed to be directed only at us. -It an average range of 3000 yards in hits were made on the smaller target. -I had closed fire which evolved her over her entire length. -This still closing fire was shifted to the larger target and several hits were made on her prior to the time that our ammunition was expended. -I am closed to about 400 yards of the small target which was burning furiously and on which

— page 256 —
1. RADIO (CONTINUED)
Using the frequency prediction tables, the HUDOCK was able to establish contact with NPL directly on all weather broadcasts. 6470 kilocycles was by far the best except for the first transmission on February 17, when a lower frequency was indicated by the tables. 4235 was used, and an immediate answer from NPL made it possible to get the message off in twenty minutes with only two groups repeated.

To response worthy of working was received on the secondary series. 8470 continued to be our only safe frequency for handling our outgoing traffic.

It is interesting to note that the Japs had the affrontery to jam their own propaganda program on the 8 l.c. band, with backslapping, on several occasions.

5J communications were highly unsuccessful. All subs soon to be slow to recognize signals on this channel when it is encountered. On 7 March the 5J interference from the L.A. WOO was reported by the radar watch. Continued attempts on the part of the HUDOCK to challenge the L.A. WOO were ignored. It is impossible that the L.A. WOO could have been unaware of, the presence of another radar, since she closed to six thousand yards and maneuvered as though making an approach; Identity was finally established by the use of the 3CR 610, but the importance of recognizing and answering all challenges on the 3J cannot be too strongly emphasized. This means of communication is excellent over ranges of twelve to fourteen miles if intelligently used, as was shown by the conversation between the S.H.H.H and the HUDOCK during the latter's run preceding.

To occasion to use the 'Jolf-pack frequencies for communication arose during this patrol. The 3CR 610 was used with good success to ranges of six to seven miles, outside of which response was not dependable.

The VHF was used once to contact a recce plane on February 10. His cooperation left much to be desired: he was sketchy and abrupt, and what information the HUDOCK could glean from him was obtained by continued direct questioning. Signal strength was good and readability was surprising during the entire conversation, (range of plane at time of fading was about fourteen miles).

(1) RADAR

5D RADAR: 'The 3D radar is still in good material condition after over 41,000 hours of operation. Only normal preventative maintenance was necessary during the run, and only one brief failure (transmitter oscillator tubes replaced and run in) took the equipment off the air. Total time of liability: 45 minutes.

— page 257 —
5J-AD: The total time of operation of the 5J to date is 3400 hours; the last part of the patrol took 1 hour and 35 minutes off the normal operating time of the 5J. The first 1 hour and 5 minutes was the failure of the Main Switch after a heavy overload current as the result of poor frequency and voltage regulation in the IC generator then on service. Temporary repair was accomplished by jumping the switch with a cable until repairs could be made to the switch during the next day's inactive hours for the 5J. The second failure was a defective 22R rectifier in the indicator (20 minutes). The remaining time was used to replace a pair of 5U4G rectifiers in the regulated rectifier.

The 5J was used as a surface search radar during night and periods of reduced visibility in daylight hours. Range response was very good, the LOA-TO showed up to fourteen thousand yards consistently, and land echoes on the higher peaks in the vicinity of Bungo Suido (2000-4000 ft.) showing up to 100-120 thousand yards as second sweep pips. The RFI steerable sweep, installed during the last refit, proved to be priceless in aiding these peaks as an aid to navigation.

Little opportunity existed for the use of IFF equipment. The only casualty to this gear was a grounded field coil on the motor side of the IFF set for this equipment, and as corrected by providing the coil and starter in a gland.

(1) 50-MG G.I. - 1D SOUND EQUIPMENT

Sound conditions throughout the patrol were slightly more average. On both occasions of using the U gear, a clear, strong screw beat was obtained on a small picket vessel at ranges of about one thousand yards. -- None in the sound range curve was easily detected, the estimate range at the time being about seven hundred yards. Full scale deflection on the decibel meter was reached at six hundred fifty yards between thirty and thirty-five seconds later.

— page 259 —
1. Number of non detachable officer previous patrol ---16
   (b) Number of non on board during patrol ---76
   (c) Number of non qualified at start of patrol ---43
   (d) Number of non qualified at end of patrol ---61
   (e) Number of unqualified non making their first patrol ---13

In view of the detachment of the Commander Officer and the number of officers on board, it is felt that the practice of sending prior to sailing, additional training was necessary to the patrol area and in the area. The manner in which the crew and the officers responded to this training is to be commended. The performance of duty of both the officers and enlisted personnel under combat conditions, was most satisfactory.

In regard to the enlisted personnel, it is felt that the practice of sending special ratings, such as ST radar operators and photographers, to the boat on temporary duty for the purpose of making one patrol only, leaves much to be desired. These men can not help but feel that the their status is only temporary and that they are not part of the boat.

(a) 1.

— page 260 —
73 450 65 n/a misaki a.aow
81 450 70-100 n/a vic 32nl32e a.aow
97 500 8 incof. Ocin0 Jima ss
98 500 50 n/a vic 33nl31e a.aow
127 700 4 keyed vic 32nl32e only one contact doubt
137 500 5 slow vic 31nl32e ss
143 500 8 keyed pos a/c ss only one contact
    doubtful
144 400 15 slow vic 31nl32e ss
147 450 10 keyed pos a/c ss only one contact
    doubtful
150 450 5 keyed vic 32nl33e only one contact doubt
152 450 8 2-3 min vic 32nl33e ss
152 1000 8 keyed def a/c ss
153 450 10 slow vic 32nl32e
155 1000 8 keyed irrog. def a/c ss
155 450 5-7 2 min. vic 32nl32e ss definite
155 1000 10 keyed def a/c ss sure thing
155 450 7 slow vic 32nl32e ss possible same
156 1000 12 keyed def a/c possible same
156 400 22 slow Vic 31nl32e ss 15 no gear
158 500 5 slow vic 31nl32e ss
161 500 5-7 slow Vic 32nl32e ss only one contact
    doubtful
169 750 8-10 indef vic 31nl32e ss(?) only one contact
    doubtful
195 1000 2-3 keyed pos a/c ss my b new gear
204 750 15 keyed def a/c ss may b new gear
247 2500 3 indef (?) ss only one contact
    doubtful
252 750 '3 indef (?) ss only one contact
    doubtful

    average pulse
    shape

- 38 -

— page 264 —
15-201/A16-3
SUBMARINE DIVISION T/O HUNDRED ONE
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California
19 March, 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Division T/O HUNDRED ONE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron T/F/V.
      (2) The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
      (3) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK, (SS231) - Report of War Patrol Number Eleven.

1. The eleventh war patrol of the U.S.S. HADDOCK was conducted in the Bungo Suido Area. Commander W. H. DOKKAN, Jr., Commander Submarine Division EIGHTY ONE assumed command of the U.S.S. HADDOCK at Saipan, when an accident prevented Commander J. P. ROACH from continuing the patrol.

2. The HADDOCK, along with the LAGARTI and SUBLET formed a coordinate test attack group with the commanding officer of the LAGARTI as group commander. The patrol was of fifty (50) days duration, of which, thirty-one (31) days were spent on station.

3. Despite the thorough coverage of the assigned area no enemy shipping other than one submarine and small craft were encountered.

4. On the morning of February 13th two picket vessels, one of 250 tons and the other of 300 tons were sunk by the coordinate test surface of the attack group. The attack was aggressively carried out in spite of numerous straddles from enemy gunfire.

5. During the early morning of February 14th, the HADDOCK made a submerged torpedo attack on a picket vessel. One torpedo was fired within missile. No ammunition remained for engaging the enemy with guns.

6. On the morning of March 6th a submerged attack was made on an enemy picket vessel. One torpedo was fired. An explosion was heard twenty-nine (29) minutes after firing but this is not considered to have been the explosion of the torpedo.

7. It is regretted that the contact on the enemy submarine on March 14th could not have been developed into an attack. The Jap submarine avoided this by submerging.

— page 265 —
1954-01/AL-3
SUBJ: T.O. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of War Patrol Eleven

Serial (06)
DECLASSIFIED
Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK, (SS231) - Report of War Patrol Eleven

1. As has been the experience of other submarines lately, the HADDOCK was plagued by night flying radar equipped planes and shore based radar. It is worthy of note, however, that the HADDOCK always verified the PR indication by SD or SJ radar before submerging.

2. The HADDOCK returned in an exceptionally clean condition. There are no major defects which will prevent the completion of her refit in the normal period.

3. The commanding officer, officers and crew of the HADDOCK are congratulated on the completion of a very trying patrol.

E. T. SANDY.

B. T. SANDY.

— page 266 —
FC5-20/A16-3/A9
Serial: 050
DECLASSIFIED
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO HADDOCK Rept. of 11th
War Patrol Serial (06) of
19 March 1945.

From:  The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY.
To:  The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Eleventh War Patrol,
comments on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander
Submarine Division TWO HUNDRED ONE.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY con-
grudulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew of the
HADDOCK on the completion of an arduous patrol, marked by a
regrettable paucity of worth-while contacts.

3. It is recommended that the HADDOCK be credited
with the following damage to the enemy by gunfire:

SUNK
*1/3 MIS. (Picket Boat) (EG) (Gun Attack No. 1) 100 tons
*1/3 MIS. (Picket Boat) (EG) (Gun Attack No. 2) 70 tons

TOTAL SUNK 170 tons

*Note: Above assessment is based on assumption that the
sinking of these picket boats will be credited
equally among LAGARTO, HADDOCK and SENNIT.

L. S. PARKS.

— page 268 —
1-10(A)/A16-3(18)  SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC ISLET  Ca
Serial 0746
DECLASSIFIED
TITLED EDGESHIP TO
HADDOCK REPORT OF
ELEVENTH YAR PATROL.
CO SUBSPACE PATROL REPORT 10. 696
U.S.S. HADDOCK - ELEVENTH YAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Eleventh YAR Patrol
(24 January to 19 March 1945).
DALAGED
1 - JIS. (Picket Boat) (EC) - 300 tons (Attack IC. 2)
TOTAL SUM & DRAFTED - 500 tons
*Credit for sinking these 300 ton jacket boats shared with SENETT
and L.GARTO.
TERRITORY CO STOCK.
DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
COINCH (7)
CHO (5)
CINEPAC (6)
JICPOA (1)
ADICPOA (1)
Conservpac (1)
Cincinnati (1)
Consubsequent (6)
S/1 School, IL (2)
CO, S/1 Base, PH (1)
Conspace (2)
Conservspace (1)
Consubservspace (2)
CTG 71.9 (2)
Comorpac (1)
Consubspace (3)
Consubspace(2) (40)
SUB.D, II (2)
ConsubspaceSuborder (3)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Pacific (2)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)
D. L. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

— page 269 —
5831/15-3
Serial: (07)
DECLASSIFIED

To: The Commanding Officer:
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 122
          (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 12
          (3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
          (4) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: T.S.S. DOCK (SS231) - Report of Tar Patrol
Number Twelve.

Disclosures: (1) Subject Report.
          (2) Track Chart. (GunsFasc only).

1. Disclose (1), covering the twelfth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the northern Pacific to 30 October and 10 November during the period 18 April to 29 May 1945. Is forwarded herewith.

a. A. S. 10/1.

-1-

— page 270 —
58231/416-3
DECLASSIFIED

SS231/416-3
U.S.S. RADDOCK (SS231)
Twelfth Patrol.

(1) PROLOGUE

... arrived Apr. 1, 1945, completing
Eleventh Tar Patrol. An excellent refit was performed by
PROTUS and SubDiv 201 relief crews. Installed "DU" direction
finder. TD: alteration to "B sound gear accomplished. Commander: Lt. BLOCH, Jr., U. S. Navy, was relieved by the
present commanding officer. Lieutenant Commander G. J. KITTRIDGE,
U. S. Navy, was transferred to SubDiv 201. Ensign L. J. HIGHL,
U.S.N.R. reported aboard for duty.

Conducted an eight day underway training period. Ready for
sea 16 April 1945.

(2) TRAITIVE

16 April 1945.

1500(K) Underway from alongside PROTUS enroute Twelfth Tar
Patrol.
The following officers and chief petty officers
were aboard:

(3) (FREQUENTLY MISCHIEFS)

LIEUT.-COLOR. R. S. STROY
LIEUT. R. S. TROUDE
LT (jg) G. J. BECKER
LT (jg) J. F. DOLOVICH
LT (jg) D. L. DILLS
LT (jg) H. RICHARDSON
LT (jg) C. L. HALL
LT (jg) C. T. ALL
LT (jg) E. T. BERGQUIST
Design L. T. AGILL

R. O. HULZIG, CTN.
... G. L. CHRIS, CLOIM.
L. A. LOUGOSTON, CHEM.
D. HOGGEL, GOLI.
L. R. HOGGEL, CAT.
L. C. CHILDS, CT.

11 6 7 9 0 2

-2-

— page 271 —
55231/16-3 U.S.S. DODOCK (SS231) Trelith Fatrol.

DECLASSIFIED.

1900(K) Released escort.

19 april 1945.

Enroute area on surface. Conducted daily training dives and drills.

1030(T) Sighted U. S. submarine bearing 302 T. Exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. OCTFISH. (Contact ifl).

1200(T) Lat. 16-12 T. Long. 140-43 E.

20 april 1945.

1200(T) Lat. 19-39 T. Long. 137-43 E.

21 april 1945.

1200(T) Lat. 24-42 T. Long. 137-45 E.

1615(T) Set clocks back one hour to zone minus nine time. Thereafter all times will be "Item" unless otherwise indicated.

22 april 1945.

1200 Lat. 29-16 T. Long. 136-51 E.

1810 Visibility decreased sharply so manned SU radar. Shortly afterwards had radar interference bearing 205 T. After analyzing it, it appeared to be coming from a Jap 10 Oft set, so at

1822 Headed for source of interference. Secured the SU and tracked using the SU receiver to obtain approximate bearings on the interference. Took occasional sweeps with ST.

1915 There are now three sets of interference. One set now bears 190 T, one 205 T, and the third at 215 T. Headed for the one at 215.

1957 It now seems that we may be the one that is being tracked

— page 272 —
22 April 1945. (cont't)

2025
- Have a strong signal at 125 T and three weaker signals at 220 T. Headed for the one at 125 at 18 knots.

2054
- Lost interference at 125 T. For the next hour it made no difference in which direction we went or what speed we used, the interference maintained a steady bearing of 220 T. As thoroughly confused when at

2159
- Had radar contact bearing 354 T, range 9500 yards. Stationed tracking party. Began getting SJ interference there and at (Contact #2).

2225
- Exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. SHROSE. Secured tracking party and resumed work on the suspected Jap interference.

2255
- Lost contact with interference bearing 260 T.

2345
- Radar contact bearing 275 T, range 12,000 yards. (Contact #3). Thought this was, at last, our playmate, but at

2350
- Exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. SHROX. Decided then that we were on the Great American highway and since SHROX came from the direction of our last bearing of the interference that if anything were there he should have seen it. So headed north to get above 30 r.

23 April 1945.

Fatrolling on surface.

0229
- Plane contact at 5 miles. Obtained IFF response and made visual identification, so was a bit surprised when he dropped two flares on us. 'Tith the flares burning merzill', turned on searchlight and exchanged recognition signals with Navy PBY-2. Evidently this satisfied him for he then left.

0516
- Sighted floating mine. Attempted to sink it with small arms. Hit the nine several times, but at

0552
- Line was still afloat so abandoned it. Spent remainder of day in vicinity of last night's interference contacts, but never regained contact.

— page 273 —
23 april 1945. (con't)
Lat. 29-59 N. Long. 135-34 E.
Made Trim Dive.
Surfaced. Discovered that #8 upper piston on #1 lain
Engine was cracked. Upon removing piston found that
the quill bearings for the wrist pin had worked loose.
Had no spares so turned out a brass bushing on lathe.
Engine will be out of commission for about 15 hours.
Received lifeguard assignment at 32N, 139 E. Proceeding
toward station at best possible speed.
24 april 1945.
Proceeding on surface to lifeguard station.
Flare contact on SU at 11,000 yards. Flare closed to
3000 yards slowing no IFF. Dove.
Gale to 50 feet. Took sweep with ST and manned SD.
All clear.
Surfaced. At 30 feet had plane contact on SD and SU at
4 miles. Dove.
After coming to 50 feet and repeating radar sweeps,
surfaced.
Radar contact again at 6 miles. Thought I could try to
stay up for we are going to need all the time we can get
to reach station on time.
"Ten plane closed to 3 miles changed my mind and dove.
Decided that we would actually save time by remaining
submerged long enough for the plane to loose contact
and depart.
Surfaced. Proceeding toward station.
Segan getting planes on SD.
Made contact with air cover.
Lat. 32-07 I. Long. 138-57 E.

— page 274 —
24 april 1945. (cont't).

1217 Air cover reported nothing down in our vicinity. Since the only plane we had heard reported down was within 50 miles of USS's station released cover. Decided to head down island chain.

1335 Received instructions to search in vicinity of 33-25 N., 138-30 E. Headed for that position at best speed.

1550 Raised USS's air cover on VHF and asked him to search for survivors in the vicinity of 33-25 N., 138-30 E.

1603 Plane reported he was unable to conduct search but had passed over the requested position and had seen nothing.

1840 Arrived at position and headed in the direction of drift in an attempt to get ahead of survivors.

2000 Head of greatest possible drift. Began a retiring search to westward.

25 April 1945.

Conducting surface search for survivors.

0130 Received instructions to proceed to vicinity of 32-35 N., 138-45 E. to search. Headed for this spot.

0600 Began a box search at assigned station.

1152 Established contact with search plane with VHF. Asked for information on survivors. Plane had seen nothing.

1200 Lat. 33-28 N. Long. 138-34 E.

1447 Search plane reported having sighted nothing in this vicinity.

1630 Search plane departed. No results.

2300 Proceeding to vicinity 31-45N., 139-05E., to resume search.

26 april 1945.

Patrolling on surface.

0234 Ordered to proceed northward to assist USS in search for survivors in the vicinity of 33-30 N., 138-30 E.

— page 275 —
20 April 1945. (cont't).
: 1200 Lat. 33-24 N. Long. 138-37 E.
: 2100 After securing search proceeded between HACHIJO SHI and HIKURA SHI to eastern side of NAMPO SHOT.

: 27 April 1945.
: 0521 Div'd to conduct submerged patrol.
: 1200 Lat. 34-21 N. Long. 140-00 E.
: 1840 Surfaced.
: 28 April 1945.
: 0444 Div'd to conduct submerged patrol.
: 1200 Lat. 33-11 N. Long. 140-03 E.
: 1650 Surfaced. Proceeding toward 32 N., 139-30 E., for tomorrow's strike.
: 2058 Flane bearing 130 T, range 14,000 yards. Dove.
: 2130 Surfaced.
: 2155 Flane bearing 130 T, range 13,800 yards. Dove.
: 2255 Came to 45 feet for SU sweep. Contact bearing 135 T, range 2500 yards. Down to 60 feet, nothing in sight.
: 2314 Surfaced.
: 29 April 1945.
: Proceeding on surface to lifeguard station.
: 0916 Flane on radar 5 miles, no IFF. Submerged.

— page 276 —
55231/15-3
U.S.S. EDDOCK (SS231)
Twelfth Patrol.

29 April 1945. (cont't).

0951
Surfaced. Do not know what happened to today's strike. ...d thought we missed the detailed information while submerged last night. ...a call from LASHER just before diving asking for the dope. ...will remain on station until noon just in case the strike occurs.

1200
Lat. 31-56 N. Long. 139-29 E.

2230
Proceeding toward lifeguard station at Lat. 34-25 N., Long. 135-55 E., on 4 engines.

30 April 1945.

Proceeding on surface to lifeguard station.

0610
Sighted submarine bearing 032 T, range 18,000 yards. Identified through high periscope as friendly. (Contact #4).

0849
Arrived on station. Submerged.

0934
Sighted B-29 through periscope.

0957
Surfaced.

1000
Established contact with air cover.

1100
High periscope sighted that appeared to be three (3) sub class bearing 120 T, range about 10,000 yards. (Contact #5). Requested cover to investigate. ...further cover attacked ...d loft the SC's, to coin a phrase, burning fiarcell. The whole affair was readily soon through the periscope and from the bridge, and was quite a show. Feel that we should perhaps claim 1/3 or 1/2 credit as fighter director.

1140
Air cover reported no work for us and deported. Submerged.

1200
Lat. 34-22 N. Long. 138-50 E.

1920
Surfaced.

2343
Radar contact bearing 030 T, range 24,600 yards. (Contact #6).

— page 277 —
30 April 1945. (cont't).

2350 Identified contact as a properly marked hospital ship on course 246 T, speed 15. It was heard to watch such a nice target go by, occasionally since not two hours ago we heard of one of our hospital ships being bombed at CKIATA. Held tracking drill.

1. 1 May 1945.

Patrolling on surface.

0045 Lost contact on hospital ship at 29,000 yards.

0518 Submerged.

1200 Lat. 34-15 N. Long. 126-35 E.

1836 Surface into seas that have been getting worse all day.

2115 Headed for vicinity DAIO SAI. Will try to intercept 2 frigates reported in that area.

2122 Radar contact bearing 164 T, range 8000 yards. (Contact #7). Investigation showed contact to be a small picket boat. Avoided.

2. 2 May 1945.

Patrolling on surface on route DAIO SAI. Weather is still deteriorating.

0407 Submerged.

1200 Lat. 34-05, N. Long 136-48 E.

1939 Surface. "Weather improving rapidly."

3. 3 May 1945.

Patrolling on surface.

0600 Sighted two picket boats in close to the beach bearing 350 T. (Contact #6).

0601 Submerged.

— page 278 —
1945. (cont't)
1200    Lat. 34-32 N.    Long. 137-58 E.
1232    Sighted our first enemy plane.
1400    Sighted tops of a ship bearing 303 T, 40B 70 starboard.
    Ship appeared to be about 1/2 mile off the beach. There
    were two planes over this ship so thought it must be a
    worthwhile target. (Contact #9).
1505    Lost contact with target. Triod for next hour to regain
    contact, but never succeeded. It may be that he headed
    up into the OTN river.
1943    Surfaced.
4 July 1945.
    Patrolling on surface.
0610    Submerged.
1130    FUJIYAMA came out of the mist to give us an excellent
    land mark.
1200    Lat. 34-31 N.    Long. 138-29 E.
1249    Sighted ship bearing 305 T, range about 15,000 yards.
    (Contact #10). 'Has never able to close this any
    closer than 11,000 yards and at
1258    'Attached him go over the hill in SURGUE. [LATER:]
1452    Sighted ship bearing 262 T. (Contact #11).
1507    Fired 3 stern tubes with torpedo run of 1300 yards.
    Used 16 1/2 knots for his speed, but an now convinced it
    was nearer to 20.
1510    One explosion. Took a look and saw our target going
    away at best speed.
1540    Sighted ship bearing 087 T, 40B zero. (Contact #12).
    Raided for target. This looks like the same ship we
    had for the last shot.

-10-

— page 279 —
4 July 1945. (cont't)

1558
Pirate 3 bow tubes down the throat. 'Hilo firing the third torpedo saw the second one take to the air like a scillfish. Turned off the track and started deep.

1605
One loud explosion. Continued to hear targets scores for about 30 seconds and then lost them. ...after losing the screws, began hearing a loud squeak on the sound gear that sounded very much like one of our No. 6 boats.

1629
Periscope depth. Sighted what may have been target on about 080 T, range about 15,000 yards going away.

5 July 1945.

Patrolling on surface.

0445
Submerged.

1200
Lat. 33-45 N. Long. 139-22 E.

1942
Surfaced.

2140
Received instructions for lifeguard duty at 33-30 T., 139 E. at 0100 in the morning.

6 July 1945.

Patrolling on surface.

0116
Established contact with air cover.

0246
Air cover departed. It was too late to head for entrance to SURG. 'H' for submerged patrol so decided to run surface patrol on outer approaches to TOKYO.

1054
Sighted two engine bomber headed toward us at 5 miles. Submerged.

1200
Lat. 34-01 E. Long. 138-18 E.

1224
Surfaced.

7 July 1945.

Patrolling on surface.

— page 280 —
7 May 1945. (cont't)
046 Submerged.
0530 Sighted two trawlers bearing 025 T, range 12,000 yards on
    opposite and parallel course. (Contact #13).
0615 Sighted ship bearing 134 T, range 15,000 yards. At first
    this looked like a submarine, but later turned out to be
    a sub chaser. Could not close range sufficiently for a
    Mark 27 shot. (Contact #14).
1200 Lat. 34-36 N. Long. 138-36 E.
1942 Surfaced.
2020 Proceeding to lifeguard station at 34-30 T., 140-00 E.
6 May 1945.
Patrolling on surface.
0804 Arrived at lifeguard station. Submerged.
1145 Surfaced.
1154 Established contact with air cover.
1200 Lat. 34-28 N. Long. 140-10 E.
1204
1230- Became rendezvous point for returning P-51's. 97 fighters
    rendezvoused over us with 6 B-29's and headed for home.
1235 Cover reported no work lost us and departed. Began closing
    coast of HONSHU.
1503 Submerged.
1845 Surfaced.
9 May 1945.
Patrolling on surface.
0516 Submerged.
0615 Sighted ship bearing 008 T, range 8,000 yards.
    (Contact #15).

— page 281 —
2.1.1945. (cont'd)
: 0515(cont'd)
: 0845 Sighted smoke bearing 35° T. 'Yes never able to see source.
: 0926 Sighted traveler bearing 312 T. (Contact /16). ...seas were too heavy for
: 1200 Let. 34-38 N. Long. 139-49 E.
: 1915 Surfaced.
: 2005 Sighted flashing light bearing 340 T. Later identified
: 10. May 1945.
: Patrolling on surface.
: 0420 Submerged.
: 1150 Sighted 3-24 heading into TOKYO BAY. There were 2 air
: bursts above and behind him and a fighter over the bursts.
: anticipated a good fight, but bomber returned and noth-
: ing happened.
: 1200 Lat. 34-41 N. Long. 139-44 E.
: 1943 Surfaced.
: 2000 Japanese began a searchlight display with a battery of
: 12 searchlights. These lights were behind the coast
: extending from TOYAMA. SALT was located
: concentration being around TOYAMA. This display lasted
: for nearly an hour, but the lights were trained too
: orratically to have been tracking anything.

-13-

— page 282 —
11 May 1945.
Patrolling on surface.

0428 Submerged.

1200 Lat. 34-35 N. Long. 139-37 E.

1935 Surfaced.

12 May 1945.
Patrolling on surface.

0433 Submerged.

1200 Lat. 34-38 N. Long. 139-55 E.

1234 Sighted single engine plane, range about 6 miles. Submerged. Since seas have been running down the past hour decided to remain submerged until sunset.

1837 Surfaced.

13 May 1945.
Patrolling on surface.

0541 Submerged.

1200 Lat. 34-08 N. Long. 139-52 E.

1835 Surfaced. Proceeding to assigned lifeguard station at 34-30 N., 137-35 E.

2035 Radar contact bearing 085 T, range 18,000 yards. Turned to investigate. Lost contact after 5 minutes and never regained it.

2310 Interference on SJ. Identified as coming from another SJ radar. This was close to FIPAPIS's night lifeguard station so attempted to exchange recognition signals, to luck.

— page 283 —
55231/-16-3 U.S.S. LIDDOCK (SS231) Twelfth Patrol.

14 May 1945.

On surface enroute lifeguard station.

0030 Began hearing FIREFISH's Dumbo on VHF.

0052 Flare on SJ at 13,000 yards. Obtained no IFF response. Flare opened out to 18,000 yards, but at

0102 Flare closed to 8000 yards. Submerged.

0120 Surfaced.

0520 Arrived at lifeguard station. Submerged.

0735 Sighted B-29.

0813 Surfaced. Established communications with air cover.

1055 Air cover reported no planes down in our vicinity and departed.

1200 Lat. 34-22 N. Long. 137-49 E.

1600 Sighted plane bearing 070 T, distance 8 miles. Submerged.

1851 Surfaced. Seas are on oily calm and there is a thick haze around the horizon. As it grew dark began slowing down to reduce the bow wave. At six knots the bow wave kicked up almost enough phosphorescence to read a book by.

1925 Sighted a dim flashing light bearing 275 T. Thought this might be some downed aviators who had seen our bow wave and drove trying to attract our attention, so nodded toward light.

1946 Close enough to light to see that it was off the water, but could not see anything under light. Range was estimated to be 2-4000 yards but could pick nothing up on radar. Thought the light might be attached to a Gibson Girl's antenna but decided to haul off and think things over.

1950 Steadied on 180 T and light went out.

2000 Decided that maybe it was aviators after all so headed back toward spot where light was last seen, still making 6 knots.

— page 284 —
15 May 1945. (cont'd)
2025 Backed emergency to let first torpedo pass 10 feet in front of bow, went ahead emergency to comb the wakes of the next three, and at
2032 In a lull in the firing: dovo to 100 foot. . . . after having secured the wits out of everyone in the conning tower on numerous occasions, the TDI, in our hour of need, failed miserably for it registered nothing. . . . it the time we dove we had picked up nothing on radar. . . . after diving never had anything on sound, and the PR, for almost the first time this patrol, had no signal.
2210 Surfaced on 4 engines and departed general vicinity.
2345 Slowed to 1 engine and began converting #4 main ballast tank.
15 May 1945.
Patrolling on surface.
0219 Submerged to wash out #4 IBT.
0231 Surfaced.
0445 Submerged to celebrate VE day and to give all hands a chance to get some much needed sleep.
1200 Lat. 33-54 N. Long. 137-25 E.
1825 Surfaced.
16 May 1945.
Patrolling on surface.
1116 Plane on radar, closed to 8.5 miles. Submerged.
1200 Lat. 34-08 N. Long. 137-47 E.
1820 Surfaced. Proceeding toward lifeguard station after getting first fix in 54 hours.

— page 285 —
17 May 1945.

Patrolling on surface.

0224 Established contact with air cover after some difficulty. "To were using GOT date and plane was using local date for calls. For the next hour and a half sighted numerous southbound bombers. "To could see flashes from MGOY. area, but, contrary to the news, fires were not visible 150 miles at sea.

0405 Cover reported no planes down and departed. Headed toward IRO SIKI, to run submerged patrol.

0420 ...air cover told us to stand by for possible job as more planes were over target.

0451 Cover departed. No planes down. In beginning to think we are a good luck outfit. This is the fourth raid in a row over us that has lost no planes.

0538 Submerged.

1200 Lat. 34-14 N. Long. 138-31 E.

1859 Surfaced into heavy seas and high winds. I wish the B-29's would come over more often for only on those days have we had any decent weather.

16 May 1945.

Patrolling on surface.

1010 Plane on radar at 8 miles closing. Submerged. Decided to remain submerged and let the weather wear itself down.

1200 Lat. 34-00 N. Long. 139-51 E.

1555 Surfaced.

19 May 1945.

Patrolling on surface.

0407 Submerged.

1056 Surfaced. Established communications with air cover.

— page 286 —
12 May 1945. (cont'd)
1200  |  Lt. 34-28 N.  |  Long. 138-59 E.
1243  |  -ir cover reported no planes down in our vicinity and departed.  |  submerged.
1902  |  Surfaced.
20 May 1945.
    |

— page 287 —
5231/16-3
DECASSIFIED

23 Jan 1945. (cont't)

0358 Surfaced.

1200 Lat. 32-25 N. Long. 140-24 E.

24 Jan 1945.

Rattrolling on surface east of 10C SHL.

0035 Established contact with air cover. Flares stayed with us only a few minutes and then we were never able to regain radio or radar contact with him although we could hear him talking to ZU2RBCK and other planes. Radio checks with FIREFLY and other planes gave a 5 x 5 check.

0700 FIREFLY's Dumbo told us nothing down in our area and for us to secure.

0744 SD contact at 8 miles. Submerged.

0054 Surfaced.

0948 SD contact at 6 miles. Submerged.

1110 Surfaced. Sighted B-29. Plane identified self as cover for fighter sweep.

1200 Lat. 32-31 N. Long. 140-30 E.

1335 Plane reported nothing down in our area and departed.

1400 Headed for Midway in accordance with CombusSfac dispatch.

1759 Sighted EILT bearing 055 T. Submerged.

1644 Surfaced.

25 May 1945.

1200(K) Lat. 32-21 N. Long. 145-55 E.

26 May 1945.

1200(K) Lat. 31-55 N. Long. 154-17 E.

— page 288 —
27 May 1945.
1010(L) Exploded Moating mine.
1200(L) Lat. 30-53 E. Long. 161-26 E.
: 20 May 1945.
1200(L) Lat. 29-07 E. Long. 168-48 E.
: 29 May 1945.
1200(L) Lat. 28-39 E. Long. 176-24 E.
: 29 May 1945.
0926(Y) [H] [H

— page 289 —
3531/16-3
DECLASSIFIED

U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231)
Twelfth Patrol.

(0) LETTER.

Weather was as to be expected for this time of year. Considerable cloudiness and heavy seas were encountered.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION.

Tides and currents were as given in Sailing Lists and on charts -- as modified by winds.

(2) VIGILANT. IDS.

TOJET. SLII light was burning. It showed normal characteristics and also war time characteristics change as listed in H. O. Pub. 731.

-21-

— page 290 —
35231/16-3
U.S.S. HADDOCK (85231)
Twelfth Patrol.

(F) SIX CONTACTS.

No: Time :Lat. :Course:Row
:Date :Long. :Types :Range :Speed :Cont: Remarks

1 1020(K) 16-01.4 N 120 High
4/19 141-00.2 E SS 18,000 12 P USS IOEFIS

2 2159 29-32.8 N 090 USS
4/22 135-13.2 E SS 9,100 12 SJ SHORSE

3 2345 29-42.2 N 090
4/22 135-11.0 E SS 13,000 -  SJ USS SEAFOX

4 0610 33-48.5 N 180 High
4/30 138-39.7 E SS 18,000 15 P USS RASHER

5 1100 34-25.6 N 270 Sunky by
4/30 138-54.2 E SC (3) 9,000 8 P -ir Cover

6 2343 34-04.0 N 246 Properly in
4/30 138-05.2 E AH 24,600 15 SJ Hospital S.

7 2122 33-48.8 N 015 Identified
5/1 138-27.7 E PC 8,000 6 SJ as Picket V

8 0600 34-19.0 N 270
5/3 137-47.8 E SC 15,000 1 Lk. 2 SC's

9 1400 34-33.6 N 695 Unable to
5/3 137-55.5 E Unknown 18,000 8 F close

10 1249 34-31.9 N 070 Unable to
5/4 138-29.8 E IM 15,000 11 F close

11 1452 34-35.2 N 090
5/4 138-33.9 E PF 5,000 20 P .attacked

12 1540 34-34.1 N 260
5/4 138-36.0 E PF 10,000 20 P .attacked

13 0630 34-33.8 N 165 2
5/7 138-32.1 E Trawler 12,000 -  P Trawlers

14 0815 34-42.1 N 270 Unable to
5/7 138-34.0 E SC 15,000 11 P close

15 0615 34-29.5 N 170 Identified
5/9 139-40.8 IPD 8,000 22 P as IPD

16 0926 34-33.7 N 205
5/9 139-44.2 E Trawler_22_4,400 9 P Trawler

— page 293 —
35231/16-3
DECLASSIFIED
U.S.S. EDDOCK (35231)
Twelfth Patrol.

(1) --TT.CK D.T.
U.S.S. EDDOCK TORPEDO TT.CK NO. 2 (cont't).

T.T.E. TT.CK:
Down the throat shot with a torpedo run of about 800 yards. Second torpedo broached and ran erratic. Believe target saw torpedo and was able to turn away in time to. excuse misses.

TUBES FIRED
12-08

— page 297 —
52317.16-3
DECLASSIFIED
(1) SOUR GEAR. 3DUD CONDITIONS.

Material condition of the sound gear during this patrol was most disappointing. Several overhauls of the shafts during consecutive refits have failed to stop hydraulic oil leaks.

The TDI installation on this vessel has proven to be little more than a "florale-buster". Sensitivity of the here-to-forescellent B-head has been materially reduced by high-loss collector rings, and a marked increase of background noise during training is apparent.

Although routed daily, the training gear on the B shaft has become extremely noisy.

The JF suffered from reduction of sensitivity due to deterioration of the hydrophone. This condition is aggravated by a broken cable shield. Power training is greatly needed on this gear, since continuous watches are stood during routine dives. The JF would be highly appreciated.

Sound conditions encountered in the vicinity of southeastern CONSUL and LTO were average and normal.

(0) DENSITY LIVERS.

Only the following two small negative gradients were encountered during entire time in the area:

| TIME | DATE | LOCATION | GRID REFERENCE |
|------|------|||
| 0500GT | 5/4/45 | Lat. 34-33.0 N, Long. 138-30.0 E | 20 negative between 140 feet and 160 feet. |
| 0300GT | 5/13/45 | Lat. 34-52.9 N, Long. 140-27.1 E | 10 negative between 120 feet and 160 feet. |

Bathymetrograph cards are being forwarded in accord with instructions.

(F) 1/2" RATE, FOOD AND RADIOGRAPHERS.

No comment.

— page 298 —
15 and 5
: 9801
: 20
: 20

**U.S.S. EDDOCK (SS231)**
**Trelfth Patrol**

| (a) | 12. |
|-----|-----|
| (b) | 76  |
| (c) | 57  |
| (d) | 9   |
| (e) | 8   |

The performance of duty of all hands left nothing to be desired. The officers and men were as enthusiastic the last day on station as they were the first day.

| (R) | 12. |
|-----|-----|
| Guan to area | 1235 miles |
| In area | 5810 miles |
| Area to library | 55061 miles |
| | 32017 miles |

| (S) | 5 |
|-----|--|
| Days enroute to area | 32 |
| Days in area | 6 |
| Days enroute to LIBRARY | 18 |

| (T) | 5 |
|-----|--|
| Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel Fact: |
| 15 and 5 | 9801 | 20 | 20 |

**RATING FACTOR: 15**

**RATING FACTOR: 5**

**RATING FACTOR: 20**

**RATING FACTOR:

— page 300 —
35331/16-3 U.S.S. LDDOCK (SS231) Preflth Patrol.

| TIME | PRF | TP | PT | ROT | POSITION | KIMBINS |
|-----|-----|----|----|------|||
| 73  | 450| 45| Very slow | Lat. 33-34 E | 102  | 500  | 16 | Very slow | do |
| 102 | 450| 55| Very slow | Lat. 33-37 E | 92   | 1000 | 8  | 30 sec. | do |
| 155 | 450| 3 | 2 min. | Lat. 33-37 E | 80   | 500  | 65 | Steady | do |
| 105 | 1000| 8 | Slow | Lat. 32-51 E | 157  | 750  | 8  | Keyed | do |
| 103 | 750| 12| Steady | Lat. 32-51 E | 110  | 450  | 12 | do | do |
| 109 | 1500| 12| slow sweep | Lat. 34-04 E | 103  | 500  | 12 | do | do |
| 106 | 450| 45| do | Lat. 34-04 E | 157  | 450  | 10 | do | do |
| 150 | 500| 12| do | Lat. 34-04 E | 107  | 500  | 12 | do | do |
| 106 | 350| 25| do | Lat. 34-56 E | 105  | 500  | 25 | do | do |
| 73  | 1000| 25| do | Lat. 33-44 E | 120  | 500  | 20 | do | do |
| 82  | 500| 65| Steady | Lat. 33-44 E | 100  | 500  | 10 | Slow | do |
| 100 | 500| 10| do | Lat. 33-44 E | 157  | 500  | 10 | do | do |
| 157 | 500| 10| do | Lat. 33-44 E | 194  | 1000 | 5 | do | do |

-32-

— page 303 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division C. L. A. T. T.O.
: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Submarine Force, Commander Submarine Squadron 5, Pacific Fleet, Commander Submarine Force, Commander Submarine Squadron 5

— page 305 —
FC5-12/A16-3
Serial 0109
DECLASSIFIED
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS HADDOCK - Report of
of Twelfth War Patrol.

From:  The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
To:  The Commander In Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander In Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Twelfth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division One Twenty-Two.

2. On 30 May the HADDOCK conducted a test battery discharge to the low voltage limit at the six hour rate and then continued the discharge to the low voltage limit at the ten hour rate. The test was successfully completed and a capacity of exactly 100% was obtained. This battery has now completed 468.5 cycles. It is probable that renewal will be required at next regular overhaul.

3. The Commander Submarine Squadron Twelve congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. HADDOCK upon the completion of her well conducted twelfth war patrol.

C. V. TILKINS.

— page 306 —
011570
Serial 01464
DECLASSIFIED
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
HADDOCK Report of
Twelfth War Patrol.

COUSUESPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 780
U.S.S. HADDOCK - TWELFTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Twelfth War Patrol (18 April to 29 May 1945).

1. The twelfth war patrol of the HADDOCK, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander A. R. Strow, U.S. Navy, was conducted off the south coast of Honshu and in the vicinity of Nampo Shoto Islands. In addition to conducting offensive patrols, the HADDOCK performed lifeguard duties.

2. Area coverage was thorough, but suitable torpedo targets were few. Four torpedoes were fired at the HADDOCK on a dark night, all of which were evaded by good seamanship. The TDN failed to function in this particular instance; however, it should be pointed out that this instrument is merely an additional aid or adjunct to provide protection against torpedo attack. Like any other piece of mechanical equipment, it is subject to derangement, and implicit faith in its continued performance cannot replace sound evasive tactics.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is not authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, crew, and officers of the HADDOCK on the completion of this long and arduous patrol; and hopes that they may find better hunting on future patrols.

E. E. YEOUIS.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Corinich (7)
CIO (5)
Cincpac (6)
JICPOA (1)
ADICPOA (1)
Conservpac (1)
Cinclant (1)

(Cant't next page)

— page 307 —
12-10(1)/A16-3(18)  SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01464
Confidential
THIS REPORT WILL BE DISPOSED PRIOR TO ENTERING PUBLIC AFFAIRS.
COMMUNICATIONS, PATROL REPORT NO. 780
U.S.S. HADDOCK - TWELFTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Twelfth War Patrol
(18 April to 29 May 1945).

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd):
(Complete Reports)
Consulistant (8)
S/1: School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Consopac (2)
Consowespac (1)
Consubs7thflt (Fwd Echelon) (2)
Consubs7thflt (Rear Echelon) (2)
Consupac (1)
Consubspac (3)
ConsubspacdCond. (20)
S/1, NL (2)
ConsubspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Pacific (2)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

W. S. LANGLEY,
List. Flag Secretary.

— page 308 —
15 August 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer:
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 141
       (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 14
       (3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (4) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: T.S.S. DDOCK (53231) - Report of "Air Patrol Number THAIMON."

Enclosure: (1) Subject Report.
       (2) Track Chart, (ConsubSpaC only).

1. Enclosure (1), covering the thirteenth war patrol of this vessel conducted off U.S.S. ISLAND and in the Central Pacific area during the period 24 June 1945 to 15 August 1945 is forwarded herewith.

PROFESSIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICER
0455, OPPOSITION 5510.10
BY 911 DATE 5 3-44

[Signature]
Lt. R. SHOT.

— page 309 —
24 June 1945.

1600(Y) Underway from Submarine Base dock, enroute Thirteenth "ar Patrol in accordance with ConSubSrac OpOrd p135-45. Started the patrol off with a bang for just as we turned into the channel the master compass went out and we were very thankful that we had a range to steer by. Compass began to settle down again about 3 miles south of the entrance.

— page 310 —
24 June 1945. (Cont.)
2359(Y) Set clocks ahead 24 hours to zone (-12) time and skipped the date 25 June.

26 June 1945.
Conducted training dives and drills daily enroute station.

1200(I) Lat. 27-23 K. Long. 178-16 E.

27 June 1945.
1200(I) Lat. 26-56 K. Long. 172-43 E.

28 June 1945.
1200(L) Lat. 26-11 K. Long. 167-04 E.

29 June 1945.
1200(I) Lat. 25-23 K. Long. 161-30 E.

30 June 1945.
1200(K) Lat. 24-33 K. Long. 154-43 E.

All times hereafter King unless otherwise noted.

1 July 1945.
Patrolling on surface off USS ISLAND.
0440 Signed 2 S-24's enroute ISLAND.
0510 Plane reported no work for us.
1200 Lat. 24-26 K. Long. 153-39 E.

2 July 1945.
Patrolling on surface off USS ISLAND.
0512 Morning bombers reported no work for us.
0520 Submerged to close ISLAND for closer investigation.

— page 312 —
35231/16-3 U.S.S. HADDOCK (35231) Thirteenth U.S.N.

6 July 1945.

Patrolling on surface off HADDOCK ISLAND.

1140 Bombs on island.

1200 Lat. 24-31 N. Long. 154-07 E.

1301 Bombs on island. Tried to raise planes on radio after each run but not with no success. -sure no casualties since we could hear them and they never tried to raise us.

7 July 1945.

Patrolling on surface off HADDOCK ISLAND.

0930 B-29's over island.

1200 Lat. 27-07 N. Long. 153-49 E.

2000 Converted #4 main ballast tank.

2109 Submerged to wash out #4 I.B.T.

2116 Surfaced.

8 July 1945.

Patrolling on surface off HADDOCK ISLAND.

1027 Planes came in against strong opposition - three bursts for four bombing runs.

1140 Single plane bombed the island. This is about to become confusing - we never know from one day to the next when or if to expect these planes over the target.

1200 Lat. 24-05 N. Long. 153-56 E.

9 July 1945.

Patrolling on surface off HADDOCK ISLAND.

0641 0930 B-29's over island. Heard delayed action bombs going off for the next 4 hours.

1200 Lat. 24-13 N. Long. 153-47 E.

— page 313 —
33231/416-3 U.S.S. ADMOCK (33231) Thirteenth Patrol.

: 10 July 1945.

: Patrolling on surface off USS ISLAND.

: 1200 Lat. 24-10 N. Long. 153-58 E.

: 1204 Sighted search plane over Icarus.

: 11 July 1945.

: Patrolling on surface off USS ISLAND.

: 1200 Lat. 24-09 N. Long. 153-56 E.

: 1230 Sighted daily search plane.

: 13 July 1945.

: Patrolling on surface off USS ISLAND.

: 1200 Lat. 24-07 N. Long. 153-48 E.

: 1302 Sighted two search planes. After notice a conversation on VHF, one plane proceeded to bring out the mail next Wednesday.

: 14 July 1945.

: Patrolling on surface off USS ISLAND.

: 1200 Lat. 24-34 N. Long. 154-14 E.

: 1255 9 B-29's bombed the island.

: 1638 Sighted friendly patrol plane.

: 15 July 1945.

: Patrolling on surface off USS ISLAND.

: 1200 Lat. 24-24 N. Long. 153-51 E.

— page 314 —
15 July 1945. (Cont’l).
1250 Patrol plane over 35-12N for one hour.
16 July 1945.
1200 Patroling on surface off 35-12N.
1215 Delayed 35-12N over us and 35-12N.
1220 Lat. 2N-30 N. Long. 153-51 N.
1215 Plane reported he was the only plane due over the island so as he left we departed station for 35-12N in accordance with despatch orders.
1422 Attempted to sink mine with .50 cal. and small arms

— page 315 —
55231/16-3
: .S.S. S.D.00 (S3231)
: Intercept Patrol.

20 July 1945.
: Enroute SIRIUS.
: Lend-2voused with 50-995 and proceeded into 21-... I.
: I.

— page 316 —
23 July 1945. (Cont').
2120 "Rear signal on APR, 108/450/10-14. Could not identify beyond possible U.S. SC set. A directional APR set would have been of assistance here.

24 July 1945.
Enroute station in company with BILO.
1200 Lat. 26-50 N. Long. 139-34 E.
1653 Sighted 4 ships bearing 300 (t), distance 10 miles. Appeared to be a tanker and 3 destroyers. Decided they were friendly. (Ship Contact #4).

25 July 1945.
Enroute station in company with BILO.
0650 Arrived on station.
1030 Parted company with BILO.
1200 Lat. 31-26 N. Long. 139-27 E.
1555 Heeded for lifeguard station.

26 July 1945.
Patrolling on surface on lifeguard station.
0100 Established contact with air cover.
0348 Air cover departed. To work for us.
1200 Lat. 30-05 N. Long. 140-50 E.

27 July 1945.
Patrolling on station off TORI SH...
1200 Lat. 30-35 N. Long. 140-52 E.
2007 Interference on 3D bearing 270 (t). Could not exchange recognition signals and calls.

— page 317 —
55231/416-3 U.S.S. RADDOCK (SS231) Thirteenth Patrol.

20 July 1945.

Patrolling on station north of TCK SIA.

Lat. 31-27 N. Long. 140-28 E.

Contacted our air cover that was due over us at 0930 this morning. Although we had him in sight a couple of times and on the radar at will, we could not vector him in to where he could find us.

Proceeding to station for night life guarding.

29 July 1945.

Patrolling on lifeguard station.

Iada contact with air cover.

Air cover departed. To planes down in our locality.

Lat. 31-02 N. Long. 140-23 E.

ST interference bearing 260 (t). Just be B-10.

30 July 1945.

Patrolling on station east of SUISSE.

Lat. 30-50 N. Long. 140-29 E.

ST interference bearing 320 (t).

Radar contact bearing 025 (t), range 15,000 yards. Recognized recognition signals with S-0-0S. (Ship Contact #5).

31 July 1945.

Patrolling on station west of SUISSE.

Radar contact bearing 015 (t), range 10,000 yards. Recognized recognition signals with S-0-0S. (Ship Contact #6).

Lat. 32-25 N. Long. 140-36 E.

-10-

— page 318 —
31 July 1945. (Cont').
1715 . Search plane reported survivor in raft at 31-45 N., 140-15 E. Headed for spot at best speed. TULL (SS403) reported she was also heading for this survivor.
1801 Sighted B-24 orbiting survivor.
1850 Sighted Atule hull down bearing 287 (t). (Ship Contact #7).
1913. Retrieved 2nd. Lieut: Edwin "Jarfield, 3rd., 0829783, U. S. Army Air Corps, who had been in the water since about 1400 28 July. Position: 31-51 N., 140-08 E. The look on Lt. Jarfield's face when we picked him up more than made up for the 57 fruitless days we have life guarded.
2200 Began trying to get message out reporting our rescue.
1 August 1945.
015 Got our message out.
1200 Lat. 31-43 N. Long. 139-42 E.
1525 Sighted U. S. sub bearing 098 (t), distance 9000 yards. Exchanged recognition signals with RAC.
(Ship Contact #8).
2 August 1945.
Patrolling on surface on lifeguard station.
0030 Established contact with air cover.
0245 Sighted 4 flares bearing 096 (t) at an indefinite range. Headed on 096 on 4 engines. Lat. 32-04 N., Long. 140-58 E.
0345 Air cover, unable to spot anything, departed station. Intend to search this area remainder of day.

— page 319 —
2 August 1945. (Cont').
0906 Sighted BILAD bearing 336 (t). She joined to assist search, and is to search to the east of us. (Ship Contact #9). Ironing search plane failed to find anything in this area.
1200 Let. 32-16 N. Long. 141-08 E.
afternoon search plane arrived and continued search. no results.
1402 Sighted BILAD bearing 108 (t), distance about 10 miles.
3 August 1945.
Patrolling on surface continuing search.
0050 Received word that no plane was lost in this vicinity. Managed course to head for this afternoon's lifeguard station.
1200 Let. 30-25 N. Long. 140-48 E.
1250 Established VHF communications with air cover. Later he reported no work for us and left station.
4 August 1945.
Patrolling on station west of TORI SH.
1200 Let. 30-13 N. Long. 139-05 E.
5 August 1945.
Patrolling on station west of TORI SH.
1200 Let. 30-44 N. Long. 138-45 E.
1411 Heading for night lifeguard station.
6 August 1945.
Patrolling on surfaco on lifeguard station.
0350 Established communications with air cover.
0615 Air cover departed -- no planes down.

— page 320 —
55231/A16-3 U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) Thirteenth Patrol.

6 August 1945. (Cont!)

0748 Sighted friendly submarine but did not close enough to exchange recognition signals. (Ship Contact 10)

1155 Auxiliary engine blower disintegrated. Engine will be out of commission for the remainder of the patrol.

1200 Lat. 29-18 N. Long. 137-59 E.

1830 Sighted TONASK (SS423) bearing 118 (t). (Ship Contact #11). Exchanged recognition signals.

1935 Headed for tomorrow's station.

7 August 1945.

- Proceeding to lifeguard station.

0105 Lifeguard station changed. Proceeding on 4 engines.

1000 Sighted floating mine;

1009 Sighted floating mine.

1040 Sighted two explosions at 320 (t). Appeared to be plane jettisoning bombs.

1113 Air cover arrived,

1200 Lat. 33-03 N. Long. 138-16 E.

1350 Air cover departed. No emergencies.

8 August 1945.

Proceeding to lifeguard station.

1200 Lat. 29-37 E. Long. 136-01 E.

1309 Air cover arrived.

1459 Air cover departed. Nothing for us. Took departure for "lifeway" in accordance with ConsSubsPac serial 95.

2003 Exchanged recognition signals with B.T.H.S., by ST radar.

-13-

— page 321 —
9 August 1945.
Lat. 29-21 N.
Long. 142-20 E.
Complotted battery discharge. Battery gave 103% when is a 3% increase over last patrol.

10 August 1945.
Lat. 29-15 N.
Long. 147-49 E.
11 August 1945.
Lat. 29-22 N.
Long. 153-14 E.
Sighted dim yellow flashing light just astern of us. Circled at high speed and came by it again. Then we passed abeam we turned the searchlight on it and it was being flashed by what looked to be a bundle of rags about the size of a gallon can. It was exactly the same kind of a light seen last patrol when we had four torpedoes fired at us for our curiosity -- this time we let it go. Lat. 29-17 N. Long. 155-59 E.

12 August 1945.
Lat. 29-21 N.
Long. 166-37 E.
13 August 1945.
Lat. 29-17 N.
Long. 166-37 E.
14 August 1945.
Lat. 28-59 N.
Long. 172-09 E.
15 August 1945.
Lat. 28-33 N.
Long. 177-49 E.
2400 N.
Set clocks back 24 hours.
15 August 1945.
0838 (Y) Arrived: DAY -- Completed TARGET: AR PATROL.

-14-

— page 322 —
SS231/A16-3
U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231)
Thirteenth Patrol.

(C)  "TETHER"
"Tether" was good for the entire patrol.

(D)  TIDAL INFORMATION:
Currents off TACOS IS. and in the Central PACO area were as shown on the current charts.

(E)  NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:
To navigational aids were sighted.

(F)  SELF CONTACTS:
All ship contacts were with friendly forces.
(See next page).

-15-

— page 323 —
SS231/416-3
:  U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231)
:  Thirteenth Patrol.

:  (T)  SIR CONTACTS  (Cont')
:  To: Time   :Lat.:
:  :Date   :Long.   :Types   :Range   :Speed   :Cont: Remarks

1  1815  18-24.6  F.   : 080   USS RONJUL
   7/18  151-59.1  E.   SS  16,000  S14  VIS  (SS253)
2  2008  15-37.9  F.   : 4 Friendly
   7/21  144-48.0  E.   UN  15,000  --  SJ  Ships
3  2300  19-34.9  F.   : 133   USS GRIFF
   7/22  141-12/11  E.   SS  10,600  S14  SJ  (SS253)
4  1652  28-01.8  F.   : DD group
   7/24  139-40.1  E.   DD's  20,000  --  RP  refueling
5  2322  31-07.5  F.   : 160   USS SHORSH
   7/30  139-41.6  E.   SS  10,000  S15  SJ  (SS304)
6  0011  31-07.9  F.   : 160   USS PRINCESS
   7/31  139-41.6  E.   SS  10,000  S15  SJ  (SS386)
7  1850  31-59.7  F.   : 155   USS ATLANTIC
   7/31  140-08.0  E.   SS  18,000  S18  RP  (SS403)
8  1525  32-11.9  F.   : 270   USS FRANKLIN
   8/1  139-45.6  E.   SS  17,500  S12  RP  (SS313)
9  0906  31-57.2  F.   : 150   USS BELLAH
   8/2  141-27.0  E.   SS  17,000  S12  RP  (SS285)
10  0748  29-19.0  F.   : 20,000  --  RP  Unidentified
   8/6  137-36.5  E.   SS  20,000  --  RP  Friendly 3/1
11  1730  29-05.2  F.   : 270   USS TORPEDO
   8/6  137-24.3  E.   SS  17,000  S13  RP  (SS423)

-16-

— page 324 —
35231/AL6-3 U.S.S. HADDOCK (55231) Thirteenth Patrol.

(C) ATTACK OBSERVATIONS:
1. No attacks were made.

(I) FLIGHT TIMES:
   - Date: 7/2
   - Time: 1
   - Latitude: 24-22.9 N.
   - Longitude: 153-40.1 E.
   - Attacked to sink.

   - Date: 7/17
   - Time: 1
   - Latitude: 1422
   - Longitude: 23-49.2 E.
   - Attacked to sink.

   - Date: 6/7
   - Time: 1
   - Latitude: 1000
   - Longitude: 32-33.5 E.
   - Attacked to sink.

   - Date: 6/7
   - Time: 1
   - Latitude: 1009
   - Longitude: 32-35.6 E.
   - Attacked to sink.

(2) ATTACK PROCEDURES:
1. Not encountered.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DISCHARGE:
1. HULL AND CHANNEL:
   (a) The air conditioning circulating water suction line to the refrigeration and air conditioning unit developed two pin hole leaks. Inspection showed the line too corroded to be patched. The defective section was replaced with a section of pipe taken from the drain line cross connection to #3 sanitary tank.

   (b) HULL MOTORS:
   For the past three patrols the resistance reading on #1 lain motor has steadily decreased. During the last raid at 1:1day the reading could

— page 325 —
52331/16-3 U.S.S. HADDOCK (3S231) Thirteenth Patrol.

(I) 1st JET DRIFTS AND DANGER

(b) MAIN MOTORS (Cont.)

not be raised above 275,000 ohms by the time we departed. In the middle of the patrol the ONIC raised this from 200,000 ohms to 400,000 ohms before we continued the patrol. Throughout the patrol a continued run on four engines at standard or full speed for over two hours brought the ground reading on the main power group up to 130 volts.

(c) The air conditioning and refrigeration system circulating water pump motors have been a constant source of trouble this patrol. On an average of 2 or 3 times a day the overspeed trip will trip the motor out. The ship has been unable to find the cause of this. If 2 air conditioning circulating water pump has caused the most trouble. In spite of careful attention it has required a new set of brushes on an average of once a week and as often as daily.

(d) On 6 August while it was carrying the auxiliary load the auxiliary engine blower carried away. The sudden stoppage of the engine caused unnatural stresses on the vertical drive and broke the vertical drive flexible coupling. Both will require replacement.

2. ORDINANCE

During the first part of the patrol the torpedo charging panel in the after torpedo room developed excessive grounds. This panel was replaced by the ORION at SHIPMAN.

(L) RADIO

Radio communications were at all times satisfactory. Tap jamming offered less trouble to rapid and clear communications, incidentally, than did extraneous transmissions and lack of circuit discipline by own forces present, both aircraft, surface craft, and submarines.

The only difficulty to ship/shore traffic on 8 and 12 was the large amount of traffic flowing to the 1st and 2nd HPN. 3310 kcs proved rather ineffective on the one occasion when transmission direct to 1st liaison 170 1st.

— page 326 —
58231/416-3 U.S.S. HADDOCK (53231) Thirteenth Patrol.

(1) AUDIO (Cont'):
was attempted. After several unsuccessful attempts to deliver direct, the subject traffic was routed through NPN on 6 mcs.

No major defects and damage were present. It was noted, however, early in the patrol, that audio feed back was a major problem on the 4475 kc voice circuit. This trouble was countered first by turning the plate voltage switch on the RDH off during transmissions. This remedy made the use of the coming to over extension impossible, so a more practical solution was adopted in the form of an additional set of normally closed contacts on the relay K-201 in the CJS-50064 modulator, connected between the RDH audio output and the speaker/phone circuits. Audio leakage across the contacts is sufficient to permit monitoring own transmissions, but insufficient to allow feed back even when the speaker is on the RDH.

It would be greatly appreciated if provision could be made for a bridge outlet for VHF/CHS operation. This provision would greatly speed up/plane and sub/sub voice communication, and would in turn greatly assist speedy XSR work, and in probable radio coordinates attacks. The outlet would make available all three voice circuits. (VHF, TEL, SCR-610) to the commanding officer on the bridge. It is felt that the mechanical problems presented are easily surmountable.

(2) RADAR
The SJ radar again proved valuable to navigation. Normally expected ranges were obtained on land. No surface forces other than 5/M (ranges 11,000 to 14,500 yards) were contacted.

The SD, operated during daylight hours at irregular intervals, gave notice of flights of aircraft during raids. No enemy aircraft were encountered. 3-29's singly were detected at 22-28 miles, fighters at 6-16 miles. Results were comparatively disappointing.

The SJ, after more than 4000 hours of trouble-free, gratifying operation, is beginning to show more and more signs of puzzling minor failures. The most recent

— page 327 —
1. RIDAR (Cont.)
2. Sound conditions unobserved.
3. Sonar material condition remains good except for TDR failures. The chemical recorder was out of commission countless times during the run because of failures of the fly-back switch on the starboard head azimuth circle. The recorder itself finally broke down to the point of uselessness on the day before the end of the mission. Trouble was traced to failure of the magnetic clutch. No attempt was made to repair.
4. The training gear of the D, despite daily routine, has become noisy from long periods of high-speed operation.
5. An excellent wear-resisting coating for the TP sonar hydrophone was discovered by experimentation. It consists of a coat of gloss-black enamel cut 50/50 with thinner, sprayed on the phone, then covered with a very thin coat of flet-black cut with 4 parts of thinner to one part of paint, to dull the enamel gloss. This thin coat does not reduce sensitivity, and has stood up under 50 days of cruising without a break or chip in the surface.
6. (0) DENSITY LAYERS
   - DATE: 7/8
   - DATE: 0730
   - DATE: 24-31.06
   - DATE: 154-05.42
   - DATE: 100
   - DATE: Reg. at 120'
   - DATE: 7/14
   - DATE: 0500
   - DATE: 24-33.06
   - DATE: 153-46.07
   - DATE: 50
   - DATE: Reg. at 90'
7. Cards have been forwarded to Hydrographic Office.

-20-

— page 328 —
35231/AL6-3 U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) Thirteenth Patrol.

(F) PERSONNEL

Health was good for the entire patrol except for an epidemic of colds the first ten days out of I.D.

Food was only fair. It was well prepared but the selection was very limited. The only frozen vegetable we could get in quantity was green peas.

Mobility was good so long as our air conditioning was working. During the many periods it was out it was most uncomfortable below decks.

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men detached after previous patrol 15
(b) Number of men on board during patrol. 72
(c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol 50
(d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol 61
(e) Number of unqualified men making first patrol 11

The officers and men continue to have the highest of spirits in spite of the unproductiveness of the past two patrols. Their conduct leaves nothing to be desired.

(R) PERSONNEL

Midway to Marcus 1723 miles 23,160 gallons
At Marcus 4197 " 31,536 "
Marcus to Scipan 1123 " 12,575 "
Scipan to Area. 1241 " 19,040 "
Area 4254 " 36,655 "
Area to Midway 2440 " 32,368 "

(S) DRAFTING

Days on route to area (Marcus) 5
Days on route to area (lifeguard) 7
Days in area (Marcus) 18
Days in area (lifeguard) 15
Days enroute to Midway 0
Days submerged 0

(T) PERSONNEL OF DUTCH RACE

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel

All 27,502 gallons

-21-

— page 329 —
35231/A16-3 U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) Thirteenth Patrol.

(U) COLLECTIONS, RIDD, and SOME COURTESY. POSSIBLE.

Unemployed and unencountered.

Sole enemy AP contact was 14c/500/10-20 on TORR.

(V) RARTS

1. It would have been a boost to morale if we had had mail when we arrived at SHI for fuel. There was 5 days notices for RARL to get it to us but somehow things did not go according to plan.

2. It was a pleasure to have Lieut. [REDACTED] aboard. Had we had a little more time we could have almost converted him to the submarine cause.

— page 330 —
15 August, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HADDOCK Report of
Thirteenth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division ONS HUNDRED FORTY-ONE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via:
(1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOURTEEN.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET, administration.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDOCK (SS231) - Report of Thirteenth War Patrol.

1. The Thirteenth War Patrol of U.S.S. HADDOCK, under the command of Lieutenant Commander A. R. STROY, U. S. Navy, was of fifty-three (53) days duration and was conducted in two parts. The first part consisted of Lifeguard duty off MCUCI ISLAND and the second part was Lifeguard duty in the Central NANPO SHOTO area.

2. No contacts with enemy planes or ships were experienced.

3. On 31 July, 1945 HADDOCK had the pleasure of rescuing an enemy fighter pilot who had bailed out of his plane three days before. The coordination between the search B-24 and HADDOCK in effecting this rescue was excellent.

4. The HADDOCK arrived from patrol in an excellent state of cleanliness and in good material condition. All repairs will be accomplished in the normal time by the repair forces of U.S.S. BUSHNELL and the Relief Crew of Submarine Division ONS HUNDRED FORTY-ONE.

5. The Administrative Division Commander heartily congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew of the U.S.S. HADDOCK on the rescue of the enemy pilot and upon the successful completion of the Thirteenth War Patrol of that vessel.

W. T. HELSUN.

— page 331 —
TC5-14/A16-3
Serial: 0100
DECLASSIFIED
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. H.DDOCK Report of
Thirteenth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOURTEEN.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, FLOOD FLEET.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLOOD FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. H.DDOCK (SS231) - Report of Thirteenth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division ONE HUNDRED NORTH-CENT.

2. The H.DDOCK returned in exceptionally clean condition. Necessary repairs can be completed in normal time.

3. The administrative Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew of the H.DDOCK on the rescue of the Army aviator, and on the completion of the submarine's Thirteenth War Patrol.

Copy to:
Consubdiv-141
H.DDOCK

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01433
Serial 0: 347
BECLASSIFIED
TITLE OF DOCUMENT: To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
DATE: 20th October 1945
SUBJECT: U.S.S. LUDOVIC (SSE-1) - Report of Tiltrotl Patrol.
(24 June to 15 August 1945).

1. The Tiltrotl was patrol of the U.S.S. LUDOVIC, under the command of Lieutenant Commander H. A. Strow, U.S. Navy, was contacted in the passage of a short stay at Tampico Harbor, San Juan. The first phase was a 2-hour Island, the second in to a central Navy Base.

2. The patrol was primarily devoted to life-saving services, and the information supplied by a search plane, and CO received one U.S.S. LUDOVIC. The captain or surface craft of our description was encountered. It was not two torpedoes were fired at LUDOVIC, the torpedoes were fired at the same time and were sighted.

3. The award of the Submarine Combat Ensign for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of LUDOVIC on the completion of a successful patrol and on the assistance the rendered to their Force.

EXTRA: ORIGINAL
SORG. MICRO G. C. CLINTON,
PHOTO-LAB OP-16 Chief of Staff.

RETURN TO F-4253

(7) Coronagraph (1)
(5) Consubmarine (5)
(6) ConsubmarineCord (40)
(1) S.S.D., III (2)
(1) ConsubmarineSubordCom (3)
(1) All Squadron and Div.
(1) Commanders, Pacific (2)
(6) Consubmarine (5)
(2) Submarine (2)
(1) Submarines, Pacific (1)
(2) Consomerc (1)
(1) Consubmarine (1)
(2) Consubmarine (2)

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END OF REEL
JOB NO. 478

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

DEFENSE PRINTING SERVICE – WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

D-52254