U.S.S. TRITON (SS-201) — war patrol report SS-201_TRITON.pdf

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This MICROFILM IS THE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET, START & END
NAVEXOS 3968

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22 February, and that she had obtained evidence of enemy radar on 26 February and, and began to patrol Shortland Basin on her way north, and began to patrol Shortland Basin on her way

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29,200 total tons. Her first patrol, conducted around Wake Island, resulted in no damage to the enemy, but her second, in the northern part of the East China Sea, was very productive. In ten days she sank two freighters and damaged a freighter-transport and another freighter. She went back to the East China Sea for her third patrol, and again was most successful. She sank a trawler, two freighters, a freighter-transport, two sawharps, and a submarine. The latter was I-64, torpedoed south of Kyushu on 17 May, 1942. TRITON's fourth patrol was made in the Aleutians. During it, she is credited with sinking two escort-type vessels.

On her fifth patrol, TRITON went into the Solomon area. She sank a tanker, and two freighters, in addition damaging a tanker of 10,200 tons and a freighter. She was credited with having sunk two medium freighters on her last patrol.

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15 August 1940 and after shakedown training, sailed for duty with the Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with a home port at Pearl Harbor, T. H.

She operated out of the Hawaiian Islands on numerous exercises and training cruises until 19 November 1941 when she was detailed on a practice patrol around the Island of Wake. This latter duty became the real thing when she surfaced on 8 December 1941 and learned that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor and that a state of war existed.

The TRITON was on station off Wake on November 26th and commenced a patrol of the area. LCDR W. A. Lent, USN, the submariner's commanding officer, went ashore on 6 December for a conference with the Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station and the Commander, Marine Defense Battalion. That night the submarine departed on a sweeping patrol and arrived back off Wake at mid-day on 8 December. Columns of smoke were observed rising from the island, but it was thought that the smoke was the result of the work going on by the civilian contractors. However, that evening when the submersible surfaced, she received the news of the Japanese attack on Wake and Pearl Harbor and was warned to stay outside the range of the coast defense guns.

Shortly after midnight while the TRITON was on the surface recharging her batteries, the officer of the deck observed two flashes on Wake Island. However, in the lume of the light to the port beam the sighted a destroyer or a light cruiser which suddenly changed course to close the TRITON. The OOD ordered the submarine down and the sound man aboard the TRITON started tracking the vessel. Throughout the whole morning the submarine tracked the ship who was attempting to find the TRITON, and at 1317 the submersible came to a depth of 120-ft and fired four torpedoes on a sound bearing. One torpedo struck the vessel and the TRITON cleared the vicinity using evasive maneuvers. Thus the TRITON became the first Pacific Fleet submarine to strike back at the enemy.

When the TRITON surfaced the next morning she saw no sign of her adversary and continued her patrol. On 19 and 21 December the soundman aboard the TRITON picked up underwater screw noises indicating that another submarine was nearby and it was adjudged to be a Japanese vessel because no other American submarine had been detailed to the Wake Island area. However, no combat action resulted, and on 31 December 1941 the TRITON returned to Pearl Harbor.

She was underway for her second War Patrol on 25 January 1942 and operated in the East China Sea where she made 14 contacts, developing four of them into attacks. After topping off her fuel tanks at Midway on 29 January, she continued west through heavy seas and intermittent squalls. By February 15th the submarine was off Yaku Shima and two days later at Latitude 32°14' North, Longitude 127°14' East, the first contact of value hove into sight.

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3 - TRITON

She was the 1498-ton merchantman SULIYNO MARU NO.5. Two torpedoes were fired and one was observed to hit the after section of the ship. She stopped and commenced settling in a pool of oil. The TRITON dove deep and her soundman recorded several loud explosions. An hour later the submarine surfaced and all that remained of the target was a mass of floats and jetsam.

The next day three more contacts were made, but none developed since they were too far away. But on February 21st two freighters were sighted steaming in a column. The TRITON fired two torpedoes at the lead ship and she broke in two and settled rapidly. As the submarine turned to fire at the second vessel she put her stern to the TRITON and opened the distance with her flank speed. The TRITON surfaced to pursue her quarry but the appearance of a four-engined pontoon aircraft caused the TRITON to dive deep to escape possible bombing. However, the crew aboard the submarine were well rewarded for their day's work for the freighter sunk was the 448-ton cargo ship SHOKYU MARU. Only small coastal ships of 200-tons or less appeared in the TRITON's patrol area the remainder of February and then the weather closed in on the submarine with deep-swelled seas and foggy skies. She departed from her operating station on 3 March 1942 and reached Midway Island ten days later to take on fuel and to transfer to the base an enlisted man who was suffering from an appendicitis. By March 17th the TRITON was outside the submarine net at Pearl Harbor and in mid-morning she was tying up at the submarine docks for a well-earned rest.

Sailing on 13 April 1942 on her third, and perhaps most successful patrol of her short life, the TRITON had on board a new commanding officer, LICDR C. K. KIRPATYLIK, U.S.N. After refueling at Midway four days later, she headed for the China Sea. No contacts were made until 23 April 1943 when the TRITON was in the 300-mile circle of Marcus Island. A night surface attack was made on a trawler but she escaped. However, a sister ship of the KAIHO MARU class, 1000-tons, received the TRITON's deck gunfire attack which left her a mass of splinters and driftwood. After passing through the Nansei Shoto chain of islands and entering the China Sea on 29 April 1942, the TRITON commenced a wide sweep in search of other targets.

At 0812 on 1 May 1942 the TRITON came upon a convoy of six large freighters steaming into firing range. They were in two columns and were escorted by two OTARI class torpedo boats. The TRITON fired two torpedoes at the leading freighter and both were seen to explode against the vessel which later proved to be the 5339-ton passenger-cargo ship CALCUTTA MARU. While the CALCUTTA MARU was sinking, the TRITON fired two more torpedoes at the second freighter, but they both missed, and the submarine dove for deep water to pass under the convoy. Numerous depth charges were heard exploding where she had been located when the original attack commenced. While navigating for a better attack on the remaining ships, the convoy increased speed and disappeared over the horizon. The TRITON returned to the deeply settled CALCUTTA MARU and fired two more torpedoes at her. The first one missed, but the second one broke the merchantman's back and she sank in two pieces.

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4- TRITON

Five days passed as the TRITON scoured the Chinese coast looking for Japanese merchantmen. However, all she saw were small Chinese junks which were not worth a torpedo, nor the possibility of damage on the surface by using the deck gun.

At 0233 on 6 May 1942 the horizon suddenly became forest of masts and rigging as a six ship convoy with several destroyers as escorts came toward the TRITON. LCDR MacKenzie decided to let the convoy pass and hit the rear vessel. Two torpedoes were fired at the trailing merchantman, but both of them missed, and a Japanese destroyer started back along the torpedoes' track in the direction of the TRITON. The submarine fired two more torpedoes in the general direction of the retiring convoy and went for deep water. Two violent explosions were heard as she cleared the area and surfaced. She moved rapidly on her diesel engines to get ahead of the convoy. Soon she was down at periscope depth and as the convoy approached two torpedoes were fired at the third ship, and two more at a fourth cargo vessel. Explosions were heard soon after the first spread was fired, but nothing indicated that the second pair had found a target. A Japanese destroyer came bearing down on the TRITON and once again she headed for deep water and started evasive tactics which shook off her pursuers. When the TRITON surfaced several hours later, no ships were seen in a sinking condition and the convoy had gone. After the war Japanese Naval documents were examined and they showed that the TAITEI MARU, 2209-ton cargo ship, had sunk as a result of the TRITON's first attack, and that the 5660-ton passenger-cargo vessel TAIGEN MARU broke in half and sank as a result of the submarine's second attack.

Fuel and torpedoes were getting low, so the TRITON on May 7th headed for the Nansei Shoto area and a course back to Pearl Harbor. Eight days later the submarine surfaced and blasted to kindling wood two 100-ton Japanese deep-sea sampans. The next day a Japanese carrier and destroyer were sighted six miles away. The TRITON surfaced and chased them hoping to close the distance for an attack. However, when the two combatant ships increased the range, the TRITON merely sent a contact report to any U. S. ship or plane in the area.

Shortly after dusk on 17 May the TRITON was cruising at periscope depth at latitude 29°25' North, Longitude 134°09' East. Some 6200 yards away a submarine with a rising sun flag painted on her conning tower broke the surface and the TRITON's crew immediately went to battle stations. One torpedo was fired at the enemy submersible and it hit near the stern. Part of the submarine was blown over 100-feet in the air and she sank by the stern in a matter of seconds. Thus the Imperial Japanese Navy submarine I-164 met her fate.

Four days later while enroute to intercept a Japanese cruiser which was reported a short distance away, the TRITON spied another Japanese submarine running on the surface. Four torpedoes were fired, but all missed, and the TRITON went deep and cleared the area.

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5 - TRITON

By 23 May the submarine's fuel supply was getting close to the dangerous point and so she set her course for Pearl Harbor where she docked on 4 June 1942.

However, for the TRITON her most dangerous and frustrating experience was yet to come on her fourth war patrol which would take her to the foggy and uncharted waters of the Aleutian Islands. Underway on 25 June 1942 the TRITON sailed for Dutch Harbor, Alaska, but three days later she was diverted to patrol duty around Attu Island which was occupied by the Japanese. Tense fogs prevented visual and celestial cuts to give the submarine accurate positions and there was a constant fear of grounding. On July 3rd, a Japanese destroyer, 1600-ton NENOI, poked its head out of a fog bank and then disappeared in some haze. The TRITON commenced trailing her throughout the whole day and most of the next. However, when the distance closed, the TRITON fired two torpedoes, one of which hit directly amidships and the destroyer capsized to port and sank.

Between 5 and 12 July the TRITON patrolled her area. No contacts were made and her position was always dubious. However, on 12 July the hoisting cable connected the attack periscope broke and the TRITON had to proceed to Dutch Harbor for repairs. She was back in action eight days later and resumed her reconnaissance. A contact was made on July 28th but the freighter ducked into a fog bank and the TRITON's commanding officer decided not to pursue her on the surface.

Mechanical failures once again plagued the TRITON on 29 July when her number one and three engine groups flooded and she had to go to Dutch Harbor for repairs. She was underway on August 3rd from Dutch Harbor to continue the patrol. Shortly after dawn on August 9th while the TRITON was running at periscope depth the officer of the deck sighted an enemy periscope and preparations were made for an attack. But just as the torpedoes were being run into the tubes the soundman reported hearing hissing and swishing sounds which indicated that the TRITON was being attacked. The TRITON headed for deeper water and all hands waited tensely as the torpedoes passed overhead by a few feet. When the TRITON came back to periscope depth to search for her antagonist, nothing could be located.

During the eerie Arctic twilight on August 15th, the TRITON's commanding officer sighted a darkened vessel moving at a slow speed. Four torpedoes were fired and seconds later the darkness vanished in a huge sheet of flame. The vessel disappeared in fog bank and no more attacks could be made.

Returning to Dutch Harbor on 24 August, the TRITON was underway two days later with 24 enlisted Army men and their equipment. They were landed in Kuluk Bay, Adak Island during the night of 27 August and the TRITON continued on for patrol and reconnaissance duty. She returned to Dutch Harbor on August 30th and departed the following morning for Pearl Harbor where she moored at the submarine dock on 7 September 1942.

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6-TRITON
It had been more than two years since the TRITON had received any type of yard overhaul, and the mechanical failures experienced on her fourth war patrol indicated a serious need of repair, so she was placed in the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor from 10 September to 6 December 1942 and thoroughly refitted.

After trials to determine if all operating machinery was in top working order, the TRITON departed from Pearl Harbor on December 16th for her fifth War Patrol. Her first assignment was the familiar waters around the Island of Wake. On December 23rd she was standing by off the island to assist any downed aviators of an Army bombing raid which was carried out that night. The following day she sighted a two goal-post ship heading for the anchorage at Wake. The TRITON closed in near the ship, and shut off all motors as an anti-submarine trawler passed close aboard but continued seaward. Two torpedoes were fired at the large ship which hit her near the foremast and the stack. The target was obliterated by smoke, water and steam, and when the air had cleared, only an oil slick remained on the water where the ship had been.

TRITON moved on to Brisbane Australia, that night, searching for contacts enroute. At noon on 28 December 1942 the officer of the deck sighted a large Japanese merchant ship six miles away. The TRITON was set on a collision course and when the range closed, the submarine fired three torpedoes at the contact. All three hit the ship and she broke into several pieces, sinking in three minutes. The TRITON surfaced and searched the area for survivors. None were found, but a recovered life ring showed the vessel to be the OMT NARU, which was identified at the end of the war as being a passenger-cargo ship of 3,393-tons. That same day the TRITON was ordered to operate against the Japanese Truk-Rabun-New Guinea shipping in the open sea north and northwest of New Ireland.

On station by 30 December, the TRITON was without contacts until 10 January 1943 when she closed a vessel and prepared to attack only to recognize her as a Japanese Hospital ship which was protected from military action by the International Agreement off the harbor. Three days later a NIPPON class tanker was observed off the starboard bow and four torpedoes were fired. One hit the tanker and exploded while another blew up prematurely. The other two missed. The tanker then turned her stern to the TRITON and commenced firing at her periscope with the tanker's stern gun. The attack was broken off, but the TRITON surfaced and raced around and ahead of the tanker keeping sufficient distance from the tanker's deck gun and the eyes of the Japanese lookouts. Again she dove to periscope depth and waited for the tanker. Some 20-minutes later the bulky vessel hove into sight and four torpedoes were fired at her. Two missed. Two geysers of water were seen amidships of the tanker, but no explosions were recorded. The tanker steamed serenely on, and the TRITON could attack no more for her torpedo tubes were empty.

On 16 January 1943 a Japanese convoy of two large freighters, a small cargo ship and three escorts were sighted on the TRITON's starboard beam. Three torpedoes were fired at the leading merchantman,

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7- TRITON

two at the second freighter, and one at the smaller lagging cargo ship. Two torpedoes of the first spread were observed to hit the leading freighter, both torpedoes of the second spread hit their mark. But the TRITON couldn't stay around to complete the job if the ships were merely crippled. The escorts converged on the spot where the submarine had fired the torpedoes and commenced dropping depth charges. The TRITON took evasive tactics and cleared from the area.

That same day, just as the sun was setting on the horizon, a 10,500-ton passenger-cargo vessel was spotted. The four remaining torpedoes aboard were loaded into the tubes; and all were fired at the target. However, no hits were observed, and the AP-4K went steaming on. Since she was out of torpedoes, the TRITON headed for Vitiaz Strait and on 26 January 1943 arrived at Caloundra Head and docked at Brisbane, Australia. LORD G. K. MacKenzie, Jr., USN, relieved LCDR Kirkpatrick as commanding Officer on 14 February 1943.

Underway on 16 February 1943 for her sixth-and last-war patrol, the TRITON united for Japanese shipping between Rabaul and Portland Basin on her way north to her operating area along the equator between longitudes 154° East and 156° East. She was on station by February 23rd and reported evidence of enemy radar on Buka Island. She was southeast of the USS TRIGGER (SS-237) and northwest of USS SWAPPER (SS-185). On 6 March the TRITON left her area to enter that of the TRIGGER to attack a convoy and on 7 and 8 March she stated that the convoy consisted of five merchantmen and one destroyer escort. She amplified the message, giving the group's course and speed and believed that she had sunk two cargo ships and damaged another, having scored three times out of six torpedoes fired on March 6th. One of her own torpedoes had circled and returned to the submarine forcing her to crash dive. The destroyer had moved in and by depth charging had her to stay deep while the convoy escaped. She reported that she later tried two night attacks one dawn attack and one afternoon run on the convoy -- all without success. She was returning to her assigned area when the reports were sent.

About eight hours after the March 8th message was received from the TRITON she again transmitted an action report of a night attack on a convoy where she claimed five hits of eight torpedoes fired. However, she had to crash dive to escape the gunfire and depth charging and could not observe the results of her attack nor follow it up. The TRITON stated that she believed two of the cargo ships to have been sunk.

The last transmission from the TRITON came on March 11th when she reported "Two groups of smokes, five or more ships each, plus escorts......Am chasing." She was ordered to stay south of the equator and was reinforced of the area patrolled by the TRIGGER.

On the morning of 13 March 1943 the TRITON was told that three enemy destroyers had been sighted at Latitude 20° South, Longitude 145° 44' East and that they were on a northerly course. The submarine was informed that the ships were probably on a submarine hunt or a convoy cover and had missed contact.

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8- TRITON

The TRITON on 16 March was ordered to change her area slightly to the east, and told to disregard her area in the event of a convoy chase. She was told to clear her area on March 25th and return to Brisbane. When she failed to make her report of position, new results and estimated time of arrival in Australia, she was ordered to do so. Silence shrouded the TRITON's fate, and on 10 April 1943 she was declared to have been presumed lost. A terse Navy communique on 22 July 1943 stated "The U. S. submarine TRITON has failed to return from patrol operations and must be presumed to be lost. The next of kin of personnel in the TRITON have been so informed."

It was not until after the surrender of Japan that the final results of the TRITON's work on her sixth war patrol could be learned, as well as her fate. The Japanese acknowledged that the 3057-ton cargo ship KIRIHA MARU had been sunk on the equator at Longitude 1450 East on 6 March 1943 and since the TRITON had been attacking a convoy in that area the ship was credited to LCDR MacKenzie and his crew. As to the TRITON's demise, the Imperial Japanese Navy records show that on 15 March 1943 the three destroyers mentioned in the report to the TRITON two days previously had attacked a submarine contact slightly to the north and west of TRITON's assigned area. She no doubt was attacking the last convoy she sighted on March 15th. The action reports submitted by the destroyers leaves little doubt as to the fate of the submarine contact. A great quantity of oil, pieces of wood, corks and manufactured goods bearing the mark "Made in U.S.A." floated to the surface following a prolonged depth charge attack. This summary now fitted in with the TRIGGER's War Diary which stated the on 15 March while she was making two attacks on a five ship convoy she was depth charged by two escorts. She reported distant explosions for an hour indicating that some submarine was being depth charged. Since the TRIGGER was only 10 miles away from the reported Japanese anti-submarine attack it is presumed that she was listening to the death knell of the TRITON.

The USS TRITON (SS-201) earned the following medals during her tenure of service:

AMERICAN DEFENSE SERVICE MEDAL -
1 star--15 AUG 40 - 7 DEC 41
ASIATICO-PACIFIC AREA CAMPAIGN MEDAL
1 star/Name Island -- 8-23 DEC 41
1 star/Seacord War Patrol - 25 JAN - 18 MAR 42
1 star/Anti-Submarine & Assessment ("A") - 17 May 1942
1 star/Fourth War Patrol - 25 June - 7 September 42
WORLD WAR II VICTORY MEDAL

Sinkings credited to the USS TRITON (SS-201)

| Date | Name of Ship | Type | Tonnage |
|------||------||
| 17 Feb | SHINYO MARU NO. 5 | Cargo | 1,498-tons |
| 21 Feb | SHOKYU MARU | Cargo | 1,448-tons |
| 23 Apr | UNKNOWN MARU | Trawler | 1,000-tons |
| 1 May | CALCUTTA MARU | Passenger-Cargo | 5,339-tons |
| 6 May | TAIGI MARU | Cargo | 2,209-tons |
| 15 May | UNKNOWN MARU | Deep-Sea Sampan | 1,000-tons |
| 15 May | UNKNOWN MARU | Deep-Sea Sampan | 1,000-tons |

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17 May 1942
4 July 1942
24 DEC 1942
28 DEC 1942
6 MAR 1943

: I-164
NENOHI
AMAKASU MARU NO.1
OMI MARU
Kiriia MARU
TOTAL

: 1,635-tons
1,600-tons
1,913-tons
3,393-tons
3,057-tons
31,988-tons

STATISTICS

OVER ALL LENGTH: 307-ft. 2-in.
EXTREME BEAM: 27-ft. 3-in.
MEAN DRAFT: 13-ft. 3-in.
COMPLETENESS: 7 Officers
61 Enlisted Men
DISPLACEMENT: 1,525-tons
ARMAMENT: One 3"/50-cal. (D.P.), ten torpedo tubes

Compiled 23 September 1955
Stenciled: 30 September 19

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2-11/2-:
Serial 081
U.S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.T., January 26, 1942.
CONDITIONAL:
From: The Commander submarines, Pacific Fleet, Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
To: U.S.S. TITAN (J3021) War Patrol - Report of.
Reference: (a) Submarines, country, force, Coastguard, Letter No. 12-41.
Enclosure: (A) U.S.S. TITAN (J3021) Report of War Patrol, Coastguard, Letter No. 12-41, with Obscuration of January 3, 1942,

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10/10/45-3(5) SUBMARINE, PACIFIC LIST
Serial 081
U.S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.N., January 26, 1942.

Subject: U.S.S. TRITON (J3201) War Patrol - Report of:
6. Every effort is being made to procure a sufficient supply of flares for recognition purposes.

T. VITTERS.

Distribution:
Pacific List 7C-4-1:
List I, Case 2:
PL(5); 3-2
Atlantic List 11C-4-1: 30(2)
Asiatic List: Consubat(2)
Special:
2-3(5); EN10(1); EN28(5);
EN1(1); X9(1); X10(2);
Subschool, New London (3).

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12-10(6)/A16-3
Serial: 012
UNIT: ST. TETZ NICHOLAS FLETT
SUB: RINKS SCOUTING FORCE
SUB: RINKS SCOUTING FORCE
U.S.S. FLETT, FLAGSHIP

U.S.S. FELTIS (A514), January 7, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIX.
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of Her Patrol - U.S.S. TRITON: (33201).

Enclosure: (a) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith. The principal material defects noted on this patrol were:
   (a) Sparling of engine exhaust.
   (b) Lack of a frequency meter.
   (c) Lack of recognition signals.
   (d) Insufficient capacity for making water.
   (e) Poor corning tower ventilation.

2. Steps are being taken to correct the above mentioned defects.

A.R. LECHAIT.

Copy to:
Consubay 62 (with enclosure)
C.O. TRITON: (33201)

-1- ENCLOSURE (A)

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1317 with the enemy ship suddenly trailing at slow speed, on steady bearing and considering the distance to be 120 feet and fired a salvo of four torpedoes from the stern tubes:

| Time | Distance |
|------||
| 7:00  |          |
| 8:00  |          |
| 9:00  |          |
| 10:00 |          |

At 13-17-58 heard a whistling noise in the sound gear and a dull explosion was heard and felt the torpedo hit the ship. The ship was in a critical position and the torpedo was fired at 120 feet and the torpedo struck the enemy ship. The torpedo struck the enemy ship and the torpedo exploded in the water. The torpedo hit

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7. One attack:
   - Fired 4 torpedoes from tubes 7, 8, 9, and 10.
   - Sound shot, point of air: propellors.
   - Estimated course 320°; estimated speed 3 knots; estimated range 1500.

| Firing Time | Gyro Angle | Track Angle |
||||
| No. 1       | 00° - 00'  | 15-1/2° R   |
| No. 2       | 0° 08'    | 18° R        |
| No. 3       | 0° 20'    | 21° R        |
| No. 4       | 0° 38'    | 33-1/2° R   |

Spread angle 2°

8. ENEMY A/S LEAKSURF:

The enemy vessel encountered on the night of December 10, 1941, did not appear to have supersonic equipment but appeared to be endeavoring to track the TRITON by listening as she stopped her screws frequently for short periods.

The vessels I.e.ard on December 23, 1941, while submerged, were believed to have had supersonic ranging equipment but contact was not maintained long enough to be positive about it.

No close range depth charge attacks were made on the TRITON so no contact is in order on this subject.

9. HAVOC DEFECTS EXPERIENCED:

The only major defect experienced was damage to the lower packing gland of No.2 periscope. This casualty was caused by building up excessive grease pressure in the bearing while greasing with a pneumatic gun. Evidently pecking had been jammed between the gland end periscope so that excess grease could not escape. The gland was badly sprung and adjusting studs bent.

The gyro coups failed the night before arrival at Pearl Harbor and the trouble was not located until after ship was tied up at the Base.

Sparking of engine exhausts was a constant source of concern. Some type of vet exhaust should be installed before the next patrol. This is a very serious military deficiency.

No other serious defects were experienced.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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10. TRANCS:
(a) Radio reception. Except for a few nights when static conditions were bad, radio reception was satisfactory. Torpedoes were copied with no difficulty on the surface and came in clear on the periscope antenna when it was sufficiently exposed while submerged. The chief difficulty experienced by this vessel is that radio is in shifting frequencies due to the lack of a frequency meter. This is considered a serious deficiency and the Commanding Officer feels that some definite action should be taken toward providing a suitable frequency meter as soon as possible.

(b) Density layers:- No observations were made in this regard.

(c) Sound Conditions: - (In the day the U.S.S. WRIGHT arrived at a rate no propeller sounds were heard until the range was closed to 4000 yards. That fact that sea was calm that day may account for the unsatisfactory condition. Although no accurate ranges were taken on other ships heard subsequently sound conditions seemed to be good.

(d) Habitability: - Habitability in general was good throughout the patrol period. However, as soon as the air conditioning plant was shut down there was a marked change for the worse and conditions soon became very uncomfortable. The coming tower is the chief exception. Although this is the vital center of the ship while submerged it is by far the most uncomfortable place in the ship. Ventilation is entirely inadequate and the large number of electrical devices and inci. tor lamps installed there are a constant source of heat. Increased ventilation or a small air conditioning unit should be installed.

(e) Potable and Battery water: - The potable water situation was one of the chief causes of concern during the entire time on station. The tank capacity and type distillers installed in this class submarine are simply not adequate. It is sincerely hoped that the instillation of the electric stills will correct this condition. Potable water consumption the last two weeks on station was cut to an average of about 275 gallons per day by closing off the washrooms entirely and using this water only for cooking, drinking, making battery water, and washing dishes.

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1. U.S.S. TITAN (SS201) - report of second war patrol.

Period from January 25, 1942 - March 18, 1942
Areas 9 and 12
Zone line in area -9

1. NARATIVE.

Underway from Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, in accordance with Commander Task Force 7 Operation Order 10-42 at 0900 (2 4-10), January 25, 1942, proceeding in company with U.S.S. TITAN, under escort, toward midway island, passing north of keaui via points 23 and 24. Escort left formation at 1930 to return to Pearl. During evening diverged from TITAN so that each ship could proceed independently.

Standard speed was set at 13 knots but could not be maintained at all times due to rough head seas encountered. The passage to Midway was uneventful except for the sighting of two RBY patrol planes on January 26.

At 0312 (2 4-12), January 29, sighted the water tower on midway and set course for the channel entrance. TITAN moored port side to pier at 0929. CACHIOT was moored to other side of the pier. TITAN moored alongside CACHIOT about 1115. Took on 16,000 gallons fuel and 1000 gallons fresh water and departed midway at 1630. Prior to departure transferred two men to station for medical treatment and return to Pearl. At 1716 set course 2690 proceeding along assigned route to patrol area.

30 Jan - Passage during this period was uneventful except that con- 13 Feb. tinual bad weather and head seas were experienced retarding the rate of advance and causing excessive fuel consumption. A disturbance over the period of 1 - 3 February was partic- ularly severe and seas from ahead measuring at least 40 feet from trough to crest were encountered all day of the 2nd. At times the pit log was registered as low as 4 knots. To reduce pounding into the seas and conserve fuel proceeded on one engine at speeds varying from 120 - 150 r.p.m. until the evening of February 10. At 1455, February 11 (2-11), the O.D. believed he sighted an unidentified plane in the distance and dived. Isomained submerged until sunset. At this time TITAN was approximately 300 miles north of Japanese Island. During the afternoon of February 8, passed the 500 mile circle from Tokyo and began running submerged during daylight starting

-1- ENCLOSURE (A)

FINKED
40125

— page 30 —
30 Jan - 13 Feb. (Cont'd) the next morning, at 1920 (20-10), that evening sighted a steady white light and closed for an attack. Upon identifying the light as that of a small fishing craft the attack was broken off and Taifun proceeded along route on two engines at 190 r.p.m. Several lighted fishing craft were sighted during the night and course was changed to avoid them as necessary. Set clocks to 6 o'clock - 7 time at 1400, February 10. Left Torii shima 6 miles on starboard beam at 0115, February 11. This was the last fix obtainable prior to entering Tokara. Takkyo on February 15. Resorted to one engine propulsion upon surfacing February 11.

: 14 - 15 Feb. From D.ta. positions expected to make a landfall on 'Taneqa or Yaku Shima the morning of the 14th. At 0115 that date soundings decreased to 500 fathoms and course was reversed to the eastward until 0415 in order to pick up land after daybreak as visibility was reduced, sky overcast and rain falling steadily. By 0815 soundings were increasing again and by 1200 it was realized that Taifun ran on various courses during the night and visibility attempting to fix position by soundings. Weather was miserable, sea rough, sky overcast and raining. By 0445 we were satisfied that our approximate position was known and course was set to pass. Through the 2nd, at 0825 Yaku Shima showed up through the overcast and a fix was obtained. This showed our estimated position to be about 8 miles out. The set in Tokara naikyo was strong and variable but in a general direction. Taifun passed the eastbound convoy of cargo 9 about 1200 and continued passage of attack heading for Utsukushi Light. This light was found to be burning with its normal characteristics and was picked up at 2210, about 25 miles away. No ships were sighted during the passage of the straits. One sampan was seen in the morning and the straits. While in latitude 29-57 longitude 130-22 E at 1045, during a modified supersonic signals were heard. They were picked up bearing about 700 relative and disappeared when bearing 135 relative. The signals were strong at times but nothing could be seen and no serv noises were heard.

-2-

— page 33 —
1623 sighted single wing land plane bearing 030°I altitude about 800 feet, distance two miles. Plane was banking in a long turn when sighted. Evidently it did not see our periscope.

Contact at 1836 sighted smoke bearing 208°I and headed for it but soon lost it in approaching darkness and haze. Retired to northward on surface to make a land'ail on Saichu Tu. Sighted Maro Pu Light at 2342, distance about 5 miles.

Feb. 22. Patrolled line crossing steamer routes to eastward. Weather completely overcast with intermittent rain. No contacts other than fishing craft.

Feb. 23. Patrolling in vicinity of Goto Retto. At 0752 sighted smoke bearing 320°I. Endeavored to close but at 0845 lost sight of smoke. The ship itself was never sighted. At 1040 sighted a single pontoon type seaplane bearing 205°I, on parallel course, distance 5 miles.

Feb. 24. Severe disturbance developed about 0200, heavy rain, lightning seas from north. Abandoned plan to continue patrol to north and set course to run with sea. Ran at deep submergence most of day, too rough for periscope depth. Weather improved somewhat during evening.

Feb. 25. Maintaining patrol southwest of the Shima Light. At 1445 sighted smoke and closed to attack. Attained favorable firing position but close examination proved ship to be a small old coaster of not more than 200 tons and it was decided not to expend a torpedo and give away our position while there was still the possibility of sighting a favorable target before dark.

Feb. 26. Ran to the eastward during the night, proceeding to patrol area to east and north of Danjo Gunto in the direction of Nagasaki Ko. At 1555 Sighted a large patrol plane about two miles distant on a northerly course. Weather was generally unfavorable throughout the day.

Feb. 27. Continued patrol to northward. Nothing was sighted during day except a large patrol plane making a sweep to the northward. Upon surfacing in the evening set course to the south. At 2252 sighted an object on the port bow and headed toward it. Identified object as a ship on estimated course 248°I about 3 miles away, closed to attack.

- 6 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 34 —
1235 heard first of another series of distant explosions, 1235, 1240, 1243. at 1633 sighted smoke bearing 0010 and started to close. By 1643 could make out two masts and top of stack of merchant ship, attempted approach but broke it off at 1739 with ship still hull down and drawing away. Estimated course 2400, could not gain on 2500.

: 1756 sighted smoke bearing 1850, unable to close. at 1835, about 20 minutes after time of sunset, sighted smoke bearing 2540 and started approach. Two masts and single stack could be seen at 1840. at 1850 ship still hull down and at 1858 could see nothing of it through the periscope due to darkness. Broke off approach am considered trelling after dark. However, upon surfacing, it was seen that night was overcast and very dark and clemness of establishing contact very slim. Patrol led normal to steamer lanes during darkness. No contacts were made except with rising boats. In view of number of ships sighted in afternoon decided to patrol same area the next day.

: 19. No contacts, weather conditions very poor, rough seas and low visibility. Have had no fix since departure on Kuskacki.

: 20. No contacts. At 1208 sighted a 4 engine patrol plane bearing 1850 about 5 miles distant on a westerly course. Navigator obtained a star fix in the evening, our first definite fix since departure on Kuskacki on the 15th.

: 21. Standing to the northward. at 0753 sighted smoke bearing 2350 and started to close. Smoke developed into two frigators steaming presumably in column on course No. 10. 0450 at 10 knots. Closed in from starboard for attack, planning to get both ships in position. However, when close it was seen that second ship was on starboard quarter or leading ship and too close to TIONS track for a bow shot. fired two torpedoes from tubes 5 and 6 at leading ship, estimated range 1200 yards. Two bulksoys. Swoing ship to fire at second steamer but he put his stern to us and ran. fired one torpedo on about 1600 track but missed. Leading vessel sank about 8 minutes after being hit. Cleared area to northward. At 1254 sighted a pontoon type seaplane flying near scene of the sinking. At 1440 sighted large patrol plane bearing 1300 passing across our stern about 5 miles away.

- 5 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 37 —
1. USS. TITAN (SS201) - Report of Second War Patrol.

Weather abated somewhat early the 17th. At 0810(Z +10½) sighted USS LITCIFILM, our escort to Pearl and met at 0920(+10½) escorts. Proceeded to Pearl and moored 1514, longside USS PELLIS at Pier 12, Submarine Base, P.H.T.H.

2. WEATHER

The weather encountered was a definite handicap to operations during practically the entire patrol period. Tough head seas were the rule cruise to station and the distance encountered 1 - 3 February was pertinently severe. While in the patrol areas nights were generally overcast with low visibility due to mist or rain. This, probably, by its the reason that only one contact was made during darkness. In this connection, a radar installation would probably have been or value in establishing additional contacts. Due to general overcast conditions and the fact that landmarks were continually obscured, opportunity to fire firing position were few. A severe disturbance developing during the night or 23 - 24 February forced a decision of plans to patrol in the area south. On the 24th and 25th due to heavy seas from the north and inability to fire the ship's position. Actual favorable weather was experienced three days of the period in the area.

3. TIDAL HEIGHT ALIAS

No definite information on this subject was obtained except that too much light should not be placed in the information given in Hydrographic Publications. The currents encountered were at times greatly at variance with the conditions expected. The currents in the vicinity of Takara Takiyo and Kusakaki Light were strong and variable.

4. NAVIGATION

Few aids to navigation are available in the area. Taku Shina is a very good landmark when not obscured. However, the navigational lights on this island are also on Takara Shina have evidently been extinguished. Kusakaki Light is one of the few observed to be burning and was of great assistance both in entering and departing from the area, particularly in view of the currents encountered in the vicinity. The Shima in the Danjo Gunto is a valuable landmark even though the light has been extinguished. It is believed that many vessels endeavor to make a landfall on this island while in passage to the north or south. In good weather the island is visible at least 25 miles during daylight.

The only other lights observed to be burning were Iaro To end Gyn To on Jaislu Tu. Iaro To is believed to be reduced in visibility. Otherwise their characteristics were published.

- 9 -

— page 38 —
5. VESSELS ATTACKED

Contact No. 1:
Sighted in Latitude 31° - 45' N longitude 125° - 45° W, on course 300°T speed about 10 knots. Ship was on old deck forward and aft, straight bow and conning tower stern. Estimated tonnage 3,000. From: smoke observed judged to be coal burning. Peinted dark gray. (Not attacked.)

Contact No. 2:
Sighted in Latitude 32° - 07' N longitude 127°-40° W, at 1010 February 17, on estimate course 60° speed about 10 knots. Ship was a freighter with single stack, ships and two stick masts, last sight of. Believed to be a coal burner. (Not attacked.)

Contact No. 3:
Sighted at 1307 February 17. Diesel powered sapper on course 050°T, speed 12 knots. (Not attacked.)

Contact No. 4:
Sighted at 1403 February 17 on estimate course 050°T, speed 10 knots. Ship was a convoys. Slight smoke at 11:14, February 17, ship was coal burning. Freighter, well deck forward stern, two stick masts, straight bow and conning tower stern. Estimated tonnage 5000 - 7000. Believed to be a coal burner. Peinted dark gray. Attacked in latitude 32° - 12'N longitude 127° - 32'E, at 1431. Delivered ship changed course to 030°T, several minutes before the attack.

Contact No. 5:
Sighted smoke at 11:14, February 17, ship was coal burning. Freighter, single high stack airdiships, two stick masts, the after considerable higher than the forward conning tower. By the time the ship had come to close range it was too dark for observing. Attacked. At a distance, however, she had the appearance of a naval auxiliary. Ship was painted dark gray and estimated tonnage 5000 - 7000 class. Attacked at 1653 in latitude 32° - 14'N longitude 127° - 14'E. Believed vessel may have been HIJMS IJZIJIA, and was carrying munitions. Estimated course 250°, speed 10 knots.

Contact No. 6:
Sighted smoke and masts of ship at 1135 February 18, on a northeasterly course, hull down, latitude 30° - 35'N longitude 126° - 32°E. No other particulars.

- 10 -

— page 39 —
U.S.S. TRITON (SS201) - Report of Second War Patrol.

Contact: Sichted smoke can lasts of ship at 1633, February 18, on southwesterly course. Passed out of sight hull down.

Contact: Sichted smoke at 1835 can later the two masts and stack of a freighter on southwesterly course. Still hull down when lost from sight latitude 30° - 25°N longitude 126° - 15°E.

Contact: Sichted smoke C753 February 21 can later identified two vessels on a northeasterly course, speed 10 knots. Both vessels were of much the same type, large single stack coal burning freighters, well decks forward and aft, striking bows and counter stern. Both ships were painted gray although paint on leading vessel looked more sea worn timber others. Estimated tonnage of each 6000 tons. One still: mast and cargo booms forward and aft on each ship. Attacked at 0928 in latitude 32° - 10°N longitude 126° - 25°N. Attack on first vessel successful, missed the second.

Contact: Sighted smoke at 1445, February 25. Ship proved to be a small coal burning old coaster. Machinery, stack and deck structure were after. Forward deck was clear for cargo. Ship had two masts, radio, straight bow and counter stern. Looked something like a miniature version of old S.S. HAMAL. Was painted gray and flying a dirty set of colors, not identified but not Japanese. Course was 225°, speed about 9 knots, estimated tonnage 200. Broke off contact in latitude 31° - 40°N longitude 126° - 45°E.

Contact: Sighted ship at 2254, February 27, in latitude 31° - 50°N longitude 129° - 03°E on course 2460T, estimated speed 10 knots. Could not make out the vessel clearly in the dark and haze. Features noted were an apparently straight bow, well deck forward and aft and a long high structure anchisps. Ship also appeared to be larger than those previously encountered. Judged to be a combination freight and passenger vessel of about 9,000 tons. Could not determine for sure but believe her to have had a single stack.

All vessels sighted are believed to have been coal burners as they were in most instances picked up by observing black smoke on the horizon and all smoked continually while in sight.

- 11 -

J. NICHOLSON (A)

— page 40 —
6. PLANE SIGNED

A patrol of the East China Sea is evidently maintained using large sea planes of both two and four engine types. Several of these planes were noted while in our area. They were high wing flying boats with the engines set in the wing.

One landplane was sighted fairly close aboard. It was definitely a Japanese Navy dive bomber, 1939 model, low wing monoplane with fixed landing gear.

Several small seaplanes were sighted. They were of the single pontoon biplane type. They usually appeared in the area following an attack by the TITAN.

— page 43 —
15 - INCLUSIVE (A)

---

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Subject:** U.S.S. TRITON (53201) - Report of second war patrol.

---

**Minor defects experienced included: (Cont'd)**

(1) Contactor coil on bow plane tilting motor controller burned out and was replaced.

---

**10. GENERAL NOTES**

**Habitability was very good. While submerged on station the air conditioning plant was run sufficiently to keep down humidity. At times, particularly at night, the electric heaters were used.**

**Health of the crew was excellent throughout the period. Two men were put ashore at 'Midway on the outbound trip for medical treatment for conditions existing when they left Pearl. One day out of 'Midway on return trip one man prepared to be suffering from an attack of acute appendicitis and was put ashore at 'Midway. There were fewer colds than on the first patrol.**

**Communications: No difficulty was experienced at any time copying night "Fox" schedules from N.F. Due to lack of a frequency meter TRITON was unable to shift to 4235 lc's when the 4155 kcs series was cancelled. The first for Com TaskFor 7 was sent via N.FM or N.FL on 4265 kcs on the return trip.**

**The TBL transmitter must be completely checked over prior to the next patrol for loose connections and fittings. This vessel is believed to be the only one in the Squadron which has not been supplied with its frequency meter and has been seriously handicapped on several occasions by not having it.**

**Fresh water. Both fresh and battery water supplies were ample with proper conservation. In transit to and from station the engine evaporators were used and on station the electric still was employed for water making.**

**Endurance. The limiting factor for endurance on this patrol was fuel. Had we not been ordered out of the area we would have been forced to start for Pearl in about two more days for lack of fuel.**

**Sound Conditions were variable throughout the area. In general they were very good in water over 100 fathoms and poor in the west. On part of the area where depths were less than 60 fathoms, rough seas affected conditions greatly and in boundary areas between varying currents conditions were poor. In the Kuroshio there was a great amount of phosphorescence. The water was quite clear but full of organisms. In the western part of the area the water was dirty and full of organisms.**

---

**- 15 -**

— page 44 —
10. GENERAL AARKS (Cont'd)

Unidentified Noises. Many times in widely scattered areas loud clicking noises and squeals, like a regenerative hoarl in a radio, were heard for considerable periods. The source of these disturbances could not be identified but were definitely found to come from outside. It is not believed they are caused by any anti-submarine device. There is a possibility that they may be disturbances from submarine cables.

On the morning of March 1, a very unusual submarine disturbance was noted while about 15 miles southwest of Jusakaki, latitude 30° - 46' N longitude 129° - 10' E. Very loud banging and crackling sounds were heard on the sound gear with occasional whistling noises. It is believed that TITANO must have passed over a submerged volcanic fissure. At one time the forward torpedo room reported they could hear a bubbling noise through the hull.

Commissary - Venus were well balanced and fresh meats, some fresh fruit and quick frozen foods were available practically the entire trip. The cost of rations has not been computed as yet since no invoices were received prior to departure.

-16-

— page 45 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-TWO, the Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
From: The Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-TWO.
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TITAN - War Patrol - Comment.

1. The U.S.S. TITAN made an excellent cruise in many respects. The conduct of the patrol on station was one of the most aggressive and efficient to date. It is especially noted that submerged patrol was conducted from periscope depth. Planes were sighted by periscope. It is considered very probable that not a single enemy plane sighted the TITAN submerged. This fact should be noted by other commanding officers in estimating probable risks for accomplishment of a task. The periscope patrol produced contacts which would never have been made at deep submergence manning the sound equipment.

2. The commendable score of the TITAN's alert patrol is as follows:

One 6000 ton ship probably carrying explosives.
One 5000 ton freighter.
One 5000 ton freighter (damaged and probably sunk).
One 9000 ton passenger freighter probably sunk.

Total: 12000 tons (sure).
14000 tons probable).

It is believed that the attack on evening of 27 February against the passenger freighter should have been pressed home to insure destruction. With this exception it is considered that the action of the commanding officer in his other contacts was correct. The report again accentuates the fact that the enemy in the Pacific is threefold, namely: weather, distance, and the days.

3. The TITAN is due for a navy yard overhaul in June. The material performance of this vessel is due in good measure to an efficient personnel with excellent officer supervision. The action taken by the crew in overheating, 2 main engine after flooding, and in cleaning, vapor compression still after 200 hours operation is noteworthy of good engineering practice.

4. The health and spirit of the TITAN crew and officers upon return to port was particularly fine.

-1- MICROFILM (B)

— page 46 —
5. In view of the excellent patrol conducted by the TITAN in the China Sea under adverse weather conditions and against strong air supports, it is recommended that the commander-in- chief be awarded a Navy Cross. The other officers and men should receive a suitable letter of commendation for any of his officers and men that are deserving.

Copy to: C.56, CO TITAN.

F. H. L. LYNX.

-2-

— page 47 —
6/6/1942
Serial # 084
FC5-6/A16-3
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIX
(6/OL)
Care of Postmaster,
San Francisco, Calif.,
March 18, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIX.
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TRITON (SS201) - Second War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The TRITON's second war patrol covered a period of fifty-two days, of which thirty-seven were spent enroute and fifteen on station. Due to the great distance from base to patrol areas the percentage of time on station in patrols conducted from this base is extremely low.

2. Material performance on this patrol was excellent; no major defects were experienced. Generally speaking, the health and endurance of personnel were excellent although it was considered advisable to transfer three patients to Midway during the patrol.

3. This patrol was conducted in an aggressive manner and inflicted a considerable damage on enemy shipping. It is not considered practicable to patrol on the surface in this area and the commanding officer's action in conducting the greater part of this patrol at periscope depth is approved. It is believed that more positive action to verify the sinking of the ship torpedoed on February 27th might have been taken.

4. Extremely unfavorable weather was encountered during practically the entire patrol. The Squadron Commander considers that the officers and crew of the TRITON are deserving of commendation for the conduct of an excellent patrol under adverse conditions.

5. The Squadron Commander notes with pleasure the aggressive spirit and sound judgment displayed by the Commanding Officer during the entire patrol and extends to the Commanding Officer, officers and members of the crew a "Well Done".

6. Recommendation for awards will be the subject of separate correspondence.

Copy to:
Consubdiv 62
C.O. TRITON.
A. R. McCAND.

ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 48 —
1/2-10/AL6-3(5) SUBMARINES, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0292
Consub PAC TROT REPORT No. 14
U.S.S. TRITON - 2nd WAR PATROL
CONFIDENTIAL
From: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. TRITON (SS201) - Second War Patrol - Report of.

Enclosure:
(A) Copy of TRITON War Patrol
(B) Copy of CSD 62 Conf 1tr FQ62/Alo-3, Ser. 022 of March 18, 1942.
(C) Copy of CSS 6 Conf 1tr FQ5-6/Alo-3, Ser. 084 of March 18, 1942.

1. The TRITON returned from a patrol of 52 days from base to base during the majority of which time she encountered very heavy weather with head seas both enroute to and enroute from the patrol area. This heavy weather was extremely hard on the personnel, but in spite of this, the morale was excellent.

2. The area patrolled was in the northern part of the East China Sea and was apparently searched by air each day, causing the Commanding Officer to make a periscope patrol. In spite of this, fourteen contacts were made, of which four developed into attacks. This number of contacts made from the limited horizon at periscope depth would indicate that this area was quite full of shipping.

3. The TRITON's patrol was conducted as aggressive, if not more so, than any patrol so far conducted by submarines of this Force. It must be pointed out however, that a number of contacts made by the TRITON from periscope depth, had they been sighted and developed on the surface, could have been pushed home to attacks.

4. From the experience of the British in combat-timed and hunting German U-boats with planes, there appears to be very little danger to the submarine even if sighted by a plane at some distance, unless there are surface anti-submarine vessels at hand that can be summoned by the plane. Even in these instances, with the reported poor anti-submarine measures used by the Japanese, the danger incurred is considered to be only that which must be demanded of our submarines in an all out war.

-1- ( ) A/C 3 (2 3) / SS2-0/

— page 49 —
1/2-10/A16-3(5) SUBLINES, POLITIC FLIGHT
Serial 0292
Care of Postmaster,
San Francisco, California,
March 21, 1942.

CONSUMPTION PARCEL REPORT NO. 14
U.S.S. TRITON - 2nd WAR PATROL
CONTINUATION

Subject: U.S.S. TRITON (SS201) - Second War Patrol - Report of.

5. It is not evident from the transcript of the TRITON's war diary that it was attached, only one was seen to sink. It is probable that the second ship attacked also sank. There was too much of a tendency to "delcare the area" after firing torpedoes instead of nicking certain that the ship attacked was actually sunk. Crippled vessels must be sunk.

6. During the four attacks, a total of twelve torpedoes were expended. The extreme shortage of torpedoes at present will not allow this high expenditure for the results obtained. One good hit; using the magnetic exploder, should be sufficient for any 5,000 ton merchant vessel. If one hit does not sink a ship of this type, it should damage her sufficiently to keep her in one spot so that the submarine can deliberately take up a favorable position to finish her off.

7. The attention of commanding officers who may make patrols in the Northern part of the east China Sea, is invited to the tidal and navigational aids information contained in this report.

8. The TRITON is credited with the following damage inflicted upon the enemy:

SUNK
1 Freighter --- 6,000 tons,
1 Freighter --- 6,000 tons,
TOTAL SUNK --- 12,000 tons.

DAMAGED
1 Freighter --- 6,000 tons,
1 Passenger-freighter 9,000 tons,
TOTAL DAMAGED --- 15,000 tons.

(Distribution and authentication on following page).

T. WITNESS.

— page 50 —
12-10/416-3(5)  SUBLISTS, PACIFIC FLIGHT
Serial 0292
COLDSPACE P. HICOL DEPOT NO. 14
U.S.S. TITAN - 2ND WAI. P. HICOL
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. TITAN (SS201) - Second War Patrol - Report of:

DISTRIBUTION:
Pacific List 70k-41;
List I, Case 2,
Pl(5), SSF.
Atlantic List 110k-41;
SO(2).
Special:
ENR(5), ENL(1), ENR(5),
NDL(2), NYL(1), NY(1),
NYL(2), Subschool NLS(5),
ConsubSWPaC(2), Coamcn(5),
Subships Groton, Conn(2).

E. H. SWINBURN,
Flag Secretary.

— page 51 —
5/4/42
U.S.S. TRITON
SS201/A16-3
04
DECLASSIFIED
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-TWO.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron SIX.
Subject: U.S.S. TRITON (SS201) - THIRD WAR PATROL - Report of.
Reference: (a) Consubpactf Contr. Itr. No. 3-42.
Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
1. In accordance with reference (a), Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

FILMED
4/3/39

— page 52 —
1. NARRATIVE
April 13, 1942
0851.(VW)
Departed Pearl Harbor enroute Midway. Conducted daily training dives and various drills while enroute.

April 14, 1942
1418 (X)
Latitude 24O-14'N Longitude 163O-07'W, sighted PBY bearing 2950 distance about 10 miles. Exchanged recognition signals; did not dive. (#1 of paragraph 6).

1458(X)
Latitude 24O-17'N Longitude 163O-18'W, sighted PBY bearing 2900 distance about 15 miles. Exchanged recognition signals; did not dive. (#2 of paragraph 6).

April 15, 1942
0933(X)
Latitude 25O-43'N Longitude 167O-21'W, sighted PBY bearing 0600 distance about 15 miles. Plane evidently did not see TRITON; no recognition signal; did not dive. (#3 of paragraph 6).

1153(X)
Received NPM FOX 6169. After daily training dive found both deck gun sights flooded. (paragraph 9).

April 17, 1942
0500 (X)
With Midway bearing 2720 distance 35 miles sighted two dive bombers (USMC). Exchanged recognition signals; did not dive. (#4 of paragraph 6).

0639(Y)
Arrived Midway. Fueled and accomplished minor repairs (paragraph 9).
While at Midway received information of two Japanese submarines and of several ships of own Task Force.

-1-
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 53 —
1515(Y) Departed Midway for Patrol Area. Upon clearing channel commenced high speed zig zag (17.5 knots) on base course 160°. This action taken as result of information obtained at Midway.

: 1545(Y) Set base course for Patrol Area.

: 1900(Y) Ceased zig zag. Commenced steaming at economical speed on two main engines.

: April 19, 1942 Latitude 26°-59'N Longitude 176°-23'E. After training dive, surfaced and fired 4 rounds from deck gun for training. Found both sights flooded for second time. (See paragraph #9). Cruising on surface except for daily training dive of short duration.

: April 20, 1942 1438(M) With Wake bearing 214°T entered 500 mile circle of Wake.

: 1830(M) Latitude 26°-05'N Longitude 170°-24'E fired four rounds from deck gun for training. Used open sight for trainer (paragraph 9). So far we have experienced excellent weather with slightly following sea; conserving fuel nicely.

: 2100(L) Arrived Point ( ). Inside 500 mile circle of possible Japanese air bases, Radar watch was maintained during probable hours of airplane search. Made every effort not to overwork Radar in order be assured equipment in satisfactory condition when TRITON arrives in more likely aircraft areas.

: April 22, 1942 0600(L) With Marcus bearing 2500T entered Marcus 500 mile circle.

: April 23, 1942 0415(L) With Marcus bearing 2210T, entered Marcus 300 mile circle. Continued on surface.

-2- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 54 —
2238(K) With Marcus bearing 175°OT, distance 249 miles sighted bright glow bearing 2500T. Changed course left to head for light and went ahead on four engines at 18 knots. Brought crew to General Quarters when lights came in sight and continued to close.

: 2322(K) Latitude 28°-22'N Longitude 153°-18'E. ATTACK NO.1. Fired two torpedoes - Missed. Attacked with deck gun and 0.50 caliber machine gun. For target identification see #1 of paragraph 5.

: 2358(K) Enemy settling with bow down. Ceased firing and withdrew at 18 knots. Had observed at least four hits with deck gun at stern, midsection, and bow of target while TRITON was in to close ranges. Number of hits at greater ranges could not be determined in the darkness. Target was continually raked with 0.50 caliber machine gun. The trainer's open sight and partially flooded pointer's sight was proven not satisfactory for night firing. The gun crew could not see target; save at very close ranges, and these same close ranges coupled with blinding effect of gun flashes causes acute danger to own ship by ramming. Gun crew and officers were repeatedly blinded by gun flashes. This was the first time the TRITON gun and gun crew had fired at a target either in peace or war.

: April 24, 1942 0010(K) Nothing in sight, set course for area at economical two engine speed. Had made serious error in estimating target size and tonnage. Two torpedoes wasted.

: 0800(K) Latitude 28°-42'N Longitude 151°-34'E entered Bonin 500 mile circle.

: April 25, 1942 0320(K) Latitude 28°-55'N Longitude 147°-25'E Entered Bonin 300 mile circle. Continued on surface.

-3- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 55 —
U.S.S. TRITON

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. TRITON - REPORT OF THIRD WAR PATROL.

April 26, 1942
0723(I) Latitude 28-58'N Longitude 141°-02'E, sighted biplane, bearing 169°T, distance about 8 miles. (#5 of paragraph 6). Made quick dive; no indication that TRITON was sighted. Surfaced two hours later.

1130(I) Latitude 28-58'N Longitude 140°-31'E Sighted vessel bearing 0130T, distance about 12 miles. Detected direction of movement and dived for attack. (#2 of paragraph 5). No attack; vessel too small. Had been forced down twice this morning, so remained submerged at periscope depth until sighted.

April 27, 1942
1615(I) Arrived War Patrol Area. Had been on surface all day. Miles since Midway --- 2564 miles. Average speed --- -11.72 knots. Fuel since Midway --- -22,600gals. Gallons per mile --- -8.81 gals. (including charges) Fuel remaining --- -67,000 gals.

TRITON, by experiments, had conserved fuel nicely. Loads used and speeds made good, with necessary data, will be the subject of separate correspondence. Made decision to pass the Hansei Shoto between Okinoyerabu Jima and Tokuno Shima and continue west to China Coast. Set course 2540T.

April 28, 1942 Submerged patrol at periscope depth with looks every ten minutes; 15 feet of periscope extended.

April 29, 1942 Submerged patrol as before. Sighted small fishing boat in early morning.

0722(I) Sighted Tokuno Shima on starboard bow and continued through pass in Hansei Shoto. Surfaced about 1915 (I) with Tori Shima bearing 3110T distance about 20 miles. Bright moonlight, but very hazy and rainy until dark. Changed course for Tori Shima for fixed departure. Sighted two small fishing boats.

-4- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 56 —
1942
1620(I) Dived in early morning for submerged patrol. Nothing sighted all day with 15 feet periscope. Surfaced and continued westward.

May 1, 1942
0300(I) Latitude 28°-09'N Longitude 123°-30'E sighted two torpedoes (fishermen) bearing 2360T, distance 6 miles. Submerged at 0541(T).

0728(I) Latitude 28°-07'N Longitude 123°-45'E sighted ship and cargo bearing 2119T, distance 10 miles. Sighted a ship, No difficulty in closing enemy's track.

0812(I) Six freighter and one torpedo boat escort (OTOB Class) now in sight. This group proved to be convoy with two escorts apparently divided into two sections; in one of bearing about 100 miles, and freighters about 100

— page 57 —
0855(I)  Depth 75 feet and passed between the two targets to gain position on other side of convoy. For identification of torpedoed freighter see #3 of paragraph 5.

0855(I)  Eight depth charges aetern of TRITON range 300 - 400 yards (and loud); No damage. Charges spaced as follows: 30/45; 15; 10; 15; 10; 35 seconds respectively. No echo ranging heard. Sound conditions. Very poor with much crackling noise. TRITON was rigged for silent running at beginning of approach. Kept power on rudder, bow and stern planes in order keep fine control of TRITON; Wanted to take look as soon as possible. Both sound heads manned (one on each escort). Navigator watched true bearing, Commanding Officer watched relative bearing, and using 60 RPM (silent speed), maneuvered TRITON to keep both escorts drawing aft at all times. Rudder and annunciators in control room; Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, two sound operators, one quartermaster in conning tower. The, escorts searched back and forth until at 0920(I) no screws could be heard.

0927(I)  Periscope depth. One escort about 2500 yards away, and one about 6000 yards. Took course to clear and at 1000(I) commenced reload forward as silently as possible.

1019(I)  Heard five (5) more depth charges spaced as follows 20; 15; 18; 12 seconds. Not so loud as before. Range estimate 1500 yards. Secured reload (three reloaded).

1047(I)  Periscope depth, and sighted one escort and freighters hull down to eastward. Completed reload; took course to close range. Closed range at first, but at 1311(I), escort and two freighters opened to northward and went over horizon leaving the one damaged freighter behind. Took course to close damaged freighter (This ship appeared to be drifting to northwestward - few personnel

-6- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 58 —
1425(I)
sighted; small gun on freighter's bow).

ATTACK No.3 Tired one stern tube at damaged
freighter from 800 yards with 900 port track.
Torpedo at depth of 30' was seen to pass under
and did not explode. Fired another stern tube
- Hit. Freighter's back broken; commenced
settling; took pictures. Continued to westward
on course 280°T, At 1645(I) freighter sank.

NOTES:
Ships in this convoy high in water
indicating little or no cargo.
Several abandoned life boats seen in
vicinity.
All ships were between 4000 - 6000 tons.

After surfacing and during evening full moon,
maintained Hadar watch for planes.

May 2, 1942
0000(I)
Latitude 28-17'N Longitude 1230-32'E Sighted
two lights on very small boats, undoubtedly fisher-
men. Decided to avoid and continue toward China
Coast. (Later proved to be two trawlers; #5 of
paragraph 5).

0538(I)
Latitude 28-23'N Longitude 1220-31'E Dived for
submerged patrol; course north. During this day
sighted many Chinese junks; typical hulls and
sails. Went in to 25 fathoms taking hourly
soundings.

1940(I)
With Hieshan Island Light bearing 2230T distance
14 miles, surfaced. This light was burning, but
was not sighted prior to surfacing. History, rain
off and on all day. Reversed course to head down
China Coast. At 2015(I), sighted lights of two
small ships evidently taking departure on Hieshan
Island light.
Took northerly course at 15 knots to investigate.
Vessels proved to be small trawlers (about 100
tons); night too dark for deck gun; broke off and
headed south (#5 of paragraph 5). Sighted several
Chinese Junks during night.

-7-
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 59 —
U.S.S. TRITON

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. TRITON - REPORT OF THIRD WAR PATROL.

May 3, 1942
0532(I) With Taichow Lleithao bearing 2840 distance 36 miles made quick dive, and set course 3000T.

1258(I) Sighted islands.

1611(I) Latitude 280-23'N Longitude 1220-12'E sighted ship bearing 3300T, distance about 6 miles, Came to normal approach and vessel passed close aboard. Small trawler (#6 of paragraph 5). Box structure aft. Too small to torpedo.

1717(I) Sighted what appeared to be small freighter bearing 3200T distance 8 miles (#7 of paragraph 5). Ship was just outside the 10 fathom curve. TRITON could not close. Estimated speed 8 knots; course 2120T. Made estimate, that TRITON could overtake freighter after dark; so surfaced before dark and set course to SE, speed 17. Night was very dark - water extremely phosphorescent.

May 4, 1942
0006(I) Latitude 270-26'N Longitude 1210-15'E should have been at posit of enemy if he was making 10 knots. Slowed to 7 knots and changed course to NE to work back over target track. No contacts. Must have been very small and turned into some Chinese port, possibly 'Jenchow. During the high speed ride down the coast, TRITON held steady course and passed at least ten, darkened Chinese Junks, but all cleared nicely (one by about 100 yards). Minimum depth of water was 15 fathoms. Continued submerged patrol on northerly courses during daylight, passed along the 20 fathom curve.

May 5, 1942 Took departure on Hishan Island, easterly course, for battery charge and return for morning dive.

0103(I) Latitude 280-54'N Longitude 1220-43'E sighted dim light bearing 0470T distance unknown. Steered toward light to investigate.

-8- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 60 —
0108(I) Light identified as green side light.
Gave orders for left rudder but helmsman put
hard right rudder on TRITON. Almost immediately
a red light came into view, angle on bow zero
distance 1200 yards and bearing down - TRITON
now silhouetted in moon. Vessel still not identi-
fied, but appeared to be small. Made quick
dive to avoid. Ship passed by stern at high
speed. (Ship probably was trawler).

: 0138(I) Surfaced, nothing in sight.

: 0518(I) Latitude 280-42°N Longitude 1220-29°E made
quick dive and set course 2700 to go in close to
Hieshan Island. Passed Hieshan Island 6 miles
to starboard and crossed 20 fathom curve.

: 0933(I) With Hieshan bearing 0020° distance 7 miles,
sighted ship bearing 0850° at about 10 miles
(#5 of paragraph 5). Commenced approach but
could not reduce range below 10,000 yards.
Vessel appeared to be on course 210° at about
11 knots, and strongly rescaled 210° to eastward
tion. Two large radio antennae, square deck
house forward and aft. This ship was passing
Hieshan light about 10 miles abeam.

: 1015(I) Sighted monoplane fighter or light bomber which
circled the surface vessel several times
(#6 of paragraph 6). Changed course to 0900°
for deeper water. Decided to move to eastward
tonight as own position might be known.

: May 6, 1942
0228(I) Latitude 230-42°N Longitude 1230-50°W sighted
shape of large darkened vessel bearing 1400T,
distance about 4 miles. Changed course toward
and commenced approach.

: 0233(I) Sighted about four or five other vessels;
recognized convoy on course 2200T, speed about
10 - 11 knots. Knew escorts must be present but
could not locate same. Decided escorts must be
ahead and on bows; so made decision to make

-9- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 61 —
0245(I) ATTACK NO.4. Fired two (2) torpedoes with spread - missed (range about 2500 yards). The second torpedo sank at firing. The first torpedo missed ahead; the second (offset toward) would uncautedly have been a hit had it run. Should have gone in closer before firing. After firing turned to the rear, and assumed torpedo track must have been sighted by enemy. When no explosion was heard, circled immediately and at ----

: 0250(I) Commenced second approach on same target from aboard H.S. beam (#5 c/c paragrapgh 5).

: 0255(I) Sighted enemy destroyer standing toward TRITON on reverse course of convoy (#10 of paragraph 5).

: 0259(I) ATTACK NO.5. Fired two torpedoes at same target at range about 1200 yards (re spaced). Turned away to withdraw at high speed. Enemy destroyed very close. At least one, possibly two torpedoes hit target with heavy resounding explosion. This explosion was heard plainly from TRITON bridge even though 2500 yards away and withdrew at high speed on 4 engines. Clouds of smoke and flame appeared, but flames died out. Left destroyer astern without difficulty. Blinker signals sighted in direction of convoy.

: 0309(I) Altered course to southeast to pass around and gain position ahead of convoy. (TRITON speed 18.5 knots). Distant blinking still in sight; some lights bobbing as from small boats. TRITON drew ahead of convoy about 8 - 10 miles to eastward of enemy track. Broadeasted convoy contact report to TASK FORCE SEVEN - No answer.

: 0431(I) Changed course to westward to close enemy. Dawn breaking to eastward. TRITON not in particularly desirable position. (Full power, 4 engines).

-10- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 62 —
0452(I) U.S.S. TRITON - REPORT OF THIRD WAR PATROL.

While on course 2850T sighted enemy destroyer ahead of convoy and bearing 3300T. Sky very bright to eastward. It was now necessary for TRITON to continue to southwest at high speed if we were to gain position ahead.

0524(I) Satisfactory position gained - Made quick dive. Enemy destroyer and convoy had been in sight to westward for 32 minutes. There must be some foundation in the off repeated storied of the deficiencies in Japanese vision.

0613(I) ATTACK No.6. Latitude 28°-19'N Longitude 123°-28'E. Fired 2 torpedoes at third freighter and 2 torpedoes at fourth freighter. One hit on first target (#11 of paragraph 5). Second target avoided torpedoes. (Can't seem to hit two.) This convoy was in a very rough sea. The convoy was in a very rough sea

— page 63 —
0642(I)  Heard first depth charge (very close, but astern; estimate 200 yards). Second charge 86 seconds later and on starboard quarter. Loose nuts and bolts flung from bulkheads - no damage. At 0706(I) could not hear destroyer.

: 0720(I)  Came to periscope depth. Torpedoed ship had sunk; sighted destroyer and convoy to northwest. Altered course to southwest at standard speed, but could not close.

: 0743(I)  Changed course to north to go back over track.

: 1008(I)  Sighted destroyer bearing 3320T, distance about 7 miles and moving slowly to eastward (#10 of paragraph 5). This destroyer was not in company with other vessels, and was undoubtedly the second escort. Could not close range, and even though TRITON continued to northeast for some time, neither the vessel torpedoed at 0259(I) nor any other vessels were sighted.

NOTES: This convoy was also composed of six merchant vessels and two escorts. Sound conditions again were very poor.

May 7, 1942  Continued toward Nansoi Shoto. Encountered first bad day - very heavy seas, no visibility, could not stay at periscopa depth.

May 8, 1942  With Sotsuko Zaki Light bearing 1080T, distance 8 miles altered course to north to cross traffic lanes north of Amami Oshima and remain in contact with any traffic near lani.

1303(I)  Sighted small vessel bearing 1700, distance about 8 miles. Could not close, but vessel was too small to torpedo (#12 of paragraph 5). Passed 4½ miles from Yokotate Shima. and at -

-12- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 64 —
2300(I)  U.S.S. TRITON - REPORT OF THIRD WAR PATROL.

May 9 - 11, 1942  Uneventful.

May 12, 1942  ~~~~~ 0000(I)  Latitude 28°-45'N Longitude 122°-55'E altered course to eastward to cross the Tung Hai again. Hove to for four hours this night with sound gear manned.

May 13, 1942  Continued slowly to eastward. Crossed traffic lanes three times in two days.

May 14, 1942  ~~~~~ 2138(I)  Latitude 27°-44'N Longitude 127°-12'E set course to pass between Tokuno Shima and Okinoyarabu Jima. Went ahead at 17 knots on three engines in order to clear East China Sea prior daylight. TRITON had intended to spend one day more in the Tung Hai, and then, after close reconnaissance of the Nansei Shoto, to explore traffic possibilities about 2100(I) TRITON intercepted a dispatch from COMTASKFORCE SEVEN. The information contained therein was very definite in character. This information was enhanced by three other dispatches, pertaining to same subject, that had been intercepted during past two days. The TRITON was not an action addressee in any dispatch and the following estimate was made.
(1) Target in question was of such evident value as to call for reshuffle of U.S. Submarines in Far East.
(2) Submarines were being disposed to intercept-leaving only two U.S. Submarines (possibly three in waters to westward of Nansei Shoto and Japan proper.
(3) COMTASKFORCE SEVEN had intentionally left TRITON in Tung Hai but COMTASKFORCE SEVEN could not know that TRITON was unable to cross Tung Hai again with fuel remaining.

-13-  ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 66 —
1743(I)
Put one shot across his bow with deck gun and fisherman how to immediately. TRITON also have to about 100 yards away, and by hand signals, directed vessel to come alongside starboard side of TRITON. Sea flat calm with slight easy swell. Fisherman alongside. A boarding party consisting of J.H. EICHANN, Lieutenant, U.S.Navy, T.C. THOMPSON, E.llc, U.S.Navy, and W.H. DUNCAN, R.M. lc, U.S. Navy boarded the fisherman. Searched Ship thoroughly for any evidence that vessel had been, or was to be, employed as patrol vessel. Neither transmitting radio, nor armament of any kind were found. Confiscated one chesp commercial radio receiver for examination. Took aboard TRITON several boxes of fresh fish (flying fish) and ordered crew of 8 men into life boat with food and books of crew, ships log (no entries), navigation handbook, and Japanese ensign, and shoulder marks and Jap Army cap belonging to member of crew. When lifeboat was well clear, TRITON withdrew; opened fire with deck gun, and completely wrecked the vessel with 15 rounds (about 80% hits).

1807(I) Set course 0700T on two engines. Radar had been knocked out by own gun fire.

May 16, 1942 Arrived on station in early morning, and at --

0442(I) Divied for submerged patrol on course 3250T and reverse. Enemy possible position circles were plotted for speeds of 10 - 16 knots, and possible sighting times were carefully noted. At 16 knots the enemy should have been sighted at 1515(I).

1523(I) Latitude 290-05°1'N Longitude 1350-25°E Sighted one destroyer bearing 1130T, distance about 6 miles (#14 of paragraph 5), and immediately thereafter sighted one enemy carrier and one other destroyer (#15 of paragraph 5). Sea was flat calm and glassy; weather was clear except for a severe haze all around horizon.

-15- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 67 —
1630(I)
The enemy literally "popped out" of this haze. TRITON was patrolling at 50 feet with 15 feet of periscope out of the water when enemy was sighted. Enemy was on course 3550T, at a speed assumed to be 16 knots. TRITON came to normal approach course at standard speed 25 seconds after sighting TRITON had only one torpedo in forward room; four tubes aft were loaded and ready. Range to carrier could not be reduced below 6700 yards, and this with bow pointed at enemy. After reversing course to bring four stern tubes to bear, TRITON was abaft carrier beam, range about 9000 yards. Made decision to attempt to overtake on surface as soon as possible. Enemy was zigzagging, and was plotted on courses 3550; 3400; 3100 respectively (Three lege). Base course of about 3250 seemed fairly well established. Enemy went out of sight on 3100.

To come so far and get so close was hard to take.

1630(I)
Surfaced 12 miles astern of enemy; nothing in sight. Set course 3250T and went ahead 17.5 knots on three engines - charging batteries on one main and auxiliary engines. Hadst still out of commission; set extra plane lookout.

1734(I)
Went ahead full power on four engines (19.5 knots) until midnight and covered enemy possible positions between courses 3150-3290 at possible enemy speeds of 17 knots. No further contacts (see track chart). TRITON had prepared contact report prior surfacing. This report was in readiness for transmitting as soon as enemy was sighted. TRITON did not feel free to use radio for the following reasons:
(1) Own presence would most certainly be established, and own attack probably thwarted.
(2) Other U.S. Submarines could not get information until surfacing.
(3) Considered it quite unlikely that TRITON could raise NPM until after dark.

-16- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 68 —
2200(I) Could not get NPM to answer by radio; so broadcast report to any U.S. Man-of-war - no answer.

: 2355(I) Latitude 30°-39'N Longitude 133°-35'E Slowed to 9 knots and reversed course to work back over possible enemy courses - no contacts. TRITON main engines had been at full power for 7½ hours.

: May 17, 1942 Working back toward area; at --

: 1803(I) Latitude 29°-25'N Longitude 134°-09'E Sighted Japanese submarine with rising sun painted on conning tower; bearing 2840T, distance 6200 yards (#16 of paragraph 5).

: 1817(I) ATTACK NO.8 Fired one torpedo - Hit submarine near stern. Part of ship was blown about 100 feet into air. Saw crew abandon ship. Submarine sank by the stern in 2 minutes with bow high in the air and pointed vertically.

: 1827(I) Heard series of 42 explosions through hull and sound gear.

: 1845(I) Sighted about 30 survivors clinging to deck grating. Could not possibly accomodate all; so continued toward area. This ship must have been submerged, and surfaced just before sighted by TRITON.

: May 18, 1942 0512(I) Latitude 280-21'N Longitude 133°-48'E While submerged sighted smoke bearing 0739T at great range. Could not close but determined vessel was on NW course at about 14 knots.

: 0559(I) Surfaced and went ahead 17 knots to NW to gain position ahead. About 15 minutes later, the vessel appeared to be steering various courses and closing TRITON rapidly.

: 0635(I) Enemy headed toward TRITON, and because of reduced ranges - made quick dive. Vessel appeared to be a freighter (#17 of paragraph 5). Enemy turned to NW after about 10 minutes.

-17- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 69 —
0700(I)  Surfaced for second attempt to gain position ahead. Enemy speed determined as 15 knots.
: 0723(I)  Latitude 280-36°N Longitude 133°-41°E. Lookout reported periscope plainly visible 3000 yards on port bow. Made quick dive to 140 feet and abandoned chase which would have been necessary because of fuel shortage and long run (Would have taken 8 hours at high speed).
: 0830(I)  Periscope depth nothing seen or heard of enemy submarine.
: 1147(I)  Latitude 280-35°N Longitude 133°-41°E. Sighted masts of vessel bearing 2850-T, distance 15 miles (#18 of paragraph 5). Could not close range under 6,000 yards and did not fire or surface; Vessel was 2000-2500 tons; guns mounted forward and aft and peculiar box structure amidships and aft. TRITON was suspicious of this morning's experiences.

May 19 - 20, 1942
Continued patrol in NE corner of assigned area leaving in afternoon of 20 May and proceeding slowly to NE in order to cover traffic lanes during withdrawal.

May 21, 1942
Latitude 290-09°N Longitude 136°-57°E. While submerged, sighted Japanese submarine bearing 335°T, distance 6200 yards (#19 of paragraph 5).

1035(I)  ATTACK NO. 9. Four (4) torpedoes - Missed. This submarine had Japanese ensign painted on each side of covering tower, and was flying large ensign from a 20 foot staff. During evening this date received 2NPO of Japanese cruiser, and set course to intercept at midnight.

May 22, 1942
1814(I)  Sofu Gun hearing 180°, distance 5 miles. Keeping to north of our route for practicable enemy interception.

-18- ENGLISH (A)

— page 70 —
1942
0000(K) Latitude 30°-02'N Longitude 141°-46'E. Arrived at enemy possible position, and altered course to SE at slow speed. No contacts; made quick dive at dawn on enemy 15 knot position. continued toward Pearl along assigned route.

May 24, 1942
1720(K) Commenced surface cruising. With Marcus bearing 1270, entered Marcus 500 mile circle.

May 25, 1942
2130(K) Latitude 270-51N Longitude 162°-25'E Sighted Japanese Four-engine Patrol Plane bearing North, distance about 15-20 miles. Made quick dive and surface 1.7 hours later (#7 of paragraph 6). Evidently not sighted.

May 28, 1942
0957(L) Latitude 270-51N Longitude 162°-25'E Sighted Japanese Four-engine Patrol Plane bearing North, distance about 15-20 miles. Made quick dive and surface 1.7 hours later (#7 of paragraph 6). Evidently not sighted.

May 29, 1942
2315(L) Arrived Point ( ).

May 30, 1942
0600(L) With Midway bearing 0770, entered Midway 600 mile circle.

1031(L) Latitude 250-48'N Longitude 172°-45'E. Sighted plane bearing 1900, distance 15-20 miles. Made quick dive - bow planes would not "Rig out". Conning tower broached once, but ship went down again to 110 feet. Maintained good depth control with stern planes only for six minutes, until bow planes were repaired (paragraph 9). Plane identified by lookout as large landplane (#8 of paragraph 6), but identification was doubtful. Surfaced 1.9 hours later; evidently not sighted.

-19- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 71 —
2200(Y)  Within Midway bearing 3300, distance 205 miles entered Pearl 1000 mile circle.

June 3, 1942
0622(X) Latitude 22°-02'N Longitude 163°-10'W Sighted Navy PBY bearing 150°, distance 20 miles. No indication THITON sighted (#10 of paragraph 6).

1600(X) Latitude 21°-29'N Longitude 160°-57'W Sighted Navy PBY bearing 160°, distance 20 miles. Twenty minutes later sighted another PBY bearing 190°, distance 20 miles (#11 and 12 of paragraph 6). No indication THITON sighted.

June 4, 1942
0530 (V.I) Made assigned rendezvous with LITCHFIELD.

1000 (V.I) Arrived Pearl Harbor.

— page 72 —
2. WEATHER - Weather encountered outbound and in the area was favorable.

Seas encountered in the area prevented satisfactory depth control for regular periscope observations on only one day, when about five to fifteen miles off Amami O Shima. On the return trip five to fifteen miles off Amami O Shima, on the heavy head seas.

Cool days and nights; light misty rain, and low visibility were prevalent near China Coast.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION - While in the Japan Stream - forty miles on either side of the axis - the indicated current was consistently encountered while running submerged. However, when on the surface, the current depended entirely on the wind and sea.

In the strait between Tokuno Shima and Okinoyarabu Jima, while running submerged with the wind and sea, force 3, from Nw; no current was experienced setting west although one-half knot during flood tide. However, while making passage on the surface, during ebb tide and calm seas, the current experienced did agree with that shown on chart 5303.

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS - Radar picked up Tokuno Shima (height 2107 ft.) at 26 miles, Torii Shima (height 692 feet, off Tokuno) at 8 miles, and Yokoyate Shima (height 1687 ft.) at 7 miles.

Hieshan Island light, burning as published, was the only light observed. Tungkwa Yu light off Wenchow Bay was not sighted, although TRITON passed 6 miles inside the extreme visibility circle.

- 21 -
- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 76 —
7. PARTICULARS OF ATTACKS:

(a) Attack No. 1.

TRITON crossed astern of target, circled to the left and fired one torpedo at a range of about 1000 yaris. This torpedo missed astern (to the right). The target's hull was concealed by the many bright lights. Fired second torpedo which was not definitely sighted - iiss. Decided vessel must be smaller than anticipated so circled astern and manned deck gun and machine guns.

At 2340, commenced closing at 18 knots; target sighted TRITON, turned out all lights and went ahead 10 - 12 knots keeping stern to TRITON. Had first good view of target.

At 2342 Opened fire - range 1200 yards. Closed range rapidly, keeping target near starboard beam (both ships describing a circle). Last four rounds from deck gun were at large hole in bow of enemy vessel, which immediately went down by bow.

At 2358, ceased firing:
- Ammunition expended:
   - 3" Deck gun - 19 rounds
   - 0.50 Cal. machine gun - 675 rounds
- Hits:
   - (1) Continuous with machine gun.
   - (2) Observed four direct hits with deck gun at close ranges; estimate 25% hits.

(b) Attack No. 7.

Ammunition expended:
- 3" Deck gun - 29 rounds
- 0.50 Cal. machine gun - 228 rounds
- 0.30 Cal. machine gun - 70 rounds
- 0.45 Cal. torpedo gun - 107 rounds
- Hits:
   - (1) Continuous with machine gun.
   - (2) 60% of first target and 40% on second target with deck gun.

- 25 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 77 —
U.S.S. TRITON - REPORT OF THIRD PATROL.

(c) Attack No. 9.

During early stages of the approach, by two separate observations, TRITON was plotted to be 2000 and 1800 yards respectively from target track. TRITON therefore closed track at standard speed. No torpedoes remained for forward tubes. With an anticipated range of 3000 yards, commenced turn to reverse course and bring stern tubes to bear for firing observation. Upon starting to turn, took one lock, and TRITON was practically dead ahead of enemy at 1700 yard range. Gave full speed and reversed rudder to cross track - too late - damage was done. TRITON was forced to fire two torpedoes on large unfavorable port track and at poor range (2000 yards). The enemy sighted tracks and turned radically away presenting 900 - 1000' starboard angle. Fired two more torpedoes as last effort, but both missed.

For other particulars see following prepared form.

8. ENEMY ANT-SUBMARINE MEASURES:

Enemy vessels of over 2500 tons, that were contacted in the East China Sea, were all escorted by either Torpedo Boats (North bound) or Destroyers (South bound). Two convoys were sighted; in each case, the convoy consisted of six merchantmen and two escorts. The first convoy was known to be divided evenly into two sections.

Enemy escorts patrolled during daylight on the bows of leading ship in Section. At night, escorts patrolled from bow down sides of convoy. Convoys vessels were either in column or about ten degrees from column at about 1000 - 1200 yards distance. Convoys did not zigzag.

In the depth charge attacks made by enemy escorts against TRITON, the enemy employed listening only. Escorts, at times, would stop to listen and then get underway at high speed. Two definite explosions, minor in character, were heard prior to depth charge attack made by enemy destroyer. This could have been some type of sounding bomb.

— page 78 —
U.S.S. THITON
Subject:  U.S.S. TRITON - REPORT OF THIRD WAR PATROL.

Depth charges dropped by Torpedo Boats were apparently smaller than charges dropped by destroyers. Three patterns were used; these consisted of eight, five and two charges respectively.

The two destroyers screening enemy carrier were stationed about thirty degrees each side of base course and about 4000 - 4500 yards from carrier. The screens maintained their true bearings from carrier while zigzagging; i.e., all ships turned together.

Two possible Q-Ships were sighted, one off Hioshan Island and the other about half way between the Bonins and the Nansoi Shoto. Both answered descriptions very closely. Enemy trawlers between 300 - 1000 tons were in evidence in the East China Sea. These trawlers worked in pairs and carried one light at night. TRITON could find no definite evidence that trawlers were either fishing or were baling used as patrol vessels. No smaller fishing vessels were sighted in the Tung Hai, but the two Deep Sea Fishermen attacked no radio transmitter.

Japanese anti-submarine measures were unimpressive.

9. MAJOR DIFFICULTIES.

(a) Torpedo tube door inoperative.  April 23.

During the attack, at 2306, number 5 torpedo tube was ordered made ready. The outer door could not be opened. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to open it. Unable to determine cause while at sea.

(b) Fledging of 3" gun telescopes.  April 13.

After the first trim dive, both telescopes on the 3" gun were turned to be flooded. They were cleaned and sealed by the Marine's "officer's" cap during the stop at Midway on 17 April.

- 27 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 79 —
U.S.S. TRITON - REPORT OF THIRD WAR PATROL.

These telescopes were flooded again during the next trim dive on April 19, and were replaced by the spare telescope for the pointer and by an open sight for the trainer. The spare telescope partially flooded prior to the attack on April 23 but was still usable. This prior to the attack on very unsatisfactory, as the trainee open sight proved to be very unsatisfactory

— page 80 —
U.S.S. TRITON - REPORT OF THIRD PARROT.

Fresh water tanks must have new coating (probably cement) prior to next patrol.

10. Radio Reception.

Radio Honolulu (NPM) primary Fox schedules provided the chief means of communication. Low frequency NPM was reliable with normal dawn static east of 135°E. High frequency NPM was reliable west of 135°E although 4115 kcs was jammed by Japanese interference. Interference was from 4120 kcs.

First message to Comsubpac was transmitted blind on 4235 kcs on May 16 at distance of 3700 miles from Pearl Harbor. TRITON received no receipt for this message. Second message was relayed through Midway on May 21. Contact was immediate with signal strength four. NPM receipted for third message on May 24. Contact was established at a distance of 3100 miles from Pearl Harbor.

Time signals were received very clearly from HFG (Radio San Francisco) and NPM on 9090 kcs.

Radar operation was good but required constant attention and adjustment. Main difficulty was due to inexperienced personnel. Land was detected with good accuracy up to 27 miles. Own planes were detected up to a distance of fourteen miles. TRITON detected enemy plane distant 6 miles upon turning on Radar.

11. Sound Conditions and Density Layers.

Sound conditions in area were very poor. This was attributed to shallow depths and minute organisms in water. Sound gear was manned continuously while submerged and ordinarily picked up screw noises at 4000 yards. Usual unidentified noises were heard, particularly in the East China Sea.

No data on density layers was obtained. TRITON has a specimen of water from the Tung Hai for such analysis as Comsubpac may direct.

- 29 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 81 —
U.S.S. TRITON - REPORT OF THIRD PATROL.

12. Health and Habitability.

Health of the crew was very good throughout the patrol. Numerous cods, however, were experienced about Midway during the daily submerged running periods, considerably more colds than last patrol. Two cases of hemorrhoids were successfully treated, by the Chief Pharmacist's initiative without cutting.

Habitability was very good. During submerged running in the Japan Stream, the heat made the ship uncomfortable. Two isolated cases of bed bugs were found and fumigation was resorted to successfully.

Diet was very good, and improved by the acquisition of numerous special foods from NAS Midway outbound. Among these were: tamales, grapejuice, avocado, and canned berries. No frozen foods were available for this patrol, and were surely missed.

Daily routine was not appreciably changed and appeared satisfactory.

13. Factors of Endurance remaining.

(a) Torpedoes - 3.
(b) Fuzi - 5,000 gallons.
(c) Frizilons - Two weeks.
(d) Personnel - Two weeks.

14. Factors of Endurance Causing Ending of Patrol.

(a) Fuel.

15. Remarks.

(a) Holes cut in superstructure decreased diving time. For the period in the area, the average diving time was 47.5 seconds. All dives were made with bow planes in the "Rigged In" position. Minimum diving time was 40.0 seconds; Maximum time was 62.0 seconds.

- 30 -
ENCLOSURE (a)

— page 82 —
1955-62/A16-3(1) SUBMARINE DIVISION SIXTY-TWO
Serial 01A
Care of Postmaster,
San Francisco, California,
June 4, 1942.

Confidential

From: The Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-TWO.
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TRITON - Comments on THIRD War Patrol.

1. This is the third war patrol of the U.S.S. TRITON, and the first patrol of the present commanding officer. It is one of the most satisfactory and most aggressive patrol conducted by any submarine of this force. It reflects great credit on the commanding officer and all officers and men of the U.S.S. TRITON.

2. It is particularly noted that when the commanding officer failed to sink a ship or the first attack, he doggedly pressed into the second attack until the target was sunk. This action is very gratifying and confirms the following.

3. The commanding officer successfully evaded three depth charges and was without damage to his ship or personnel.

4. After fifty-two days at sea the TRITON returned with the officers and men in the best of health and highest morale. Minor defects to material will be repaired as soon as practicable.

5. The TRITON is credited with the following damage inflicted on the enemy:

VESSEL'S NAME: KATURO (Trawler) - - - - - - - 2,000 tons.
HALF TANK (Frigate) - - - - - - - 5,300 tons.
HALF TANK (Fusilier Friggther) 9,400 tons.
TANNYU (Frigther) - - - - - - - 6,965 tons.
I - - (Submarine) - - - - - - - 1,035 tons.

6. The division commander congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and men of the U.S.S. TRITON on another job "WHEEL BOMB".

Copy to: Consubron SIX.
CO TITULI:
F. H. C'LLIDY.
ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 85 —
3S201/..16-3
Serial (08)
CONFUSED
From:
To:
Subject:
Reference:
1. In accordance with reference (a), the subject report is forwarded herewith.

- 1-
-

— page 86 —
5-43/A16-3/:
Serial (037)

CARE OF FLOT-POST OFFICE:
San Francisco, California,
September 7, 1942.

COIFFIDENITI:
From: Commander Submarine Division FOTY-TIME.
To: Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. TRITON - Fourth Tar Patrol, Comments on.

1. Historical performance, health endurance and morale of personnel in TRITON were excellent.
2. No comment is considered necessary on the operations or tactics employed by this ship.

-1- HISTORICAL NOTES (3)

— page 87 —
1942
June 25, 1942
0900 (VJ)
Departed Pearl Harbor in company with PIRB.CK and escorted by LITCHFIELD proceeding toward Dutch Harbor, Alaska. Fired twenty rounds target ammunition from Deck Gun and one pan of 0.50 Caliber at target at 20 knots. Made turn dive, and at dark continued singly toward Dutch Harbor along a route 25 miles west of direct course. Plan to conduct daily training dives and drills while enroute.

June 26, 1942
0534 (X)
Latitude 24°04'11" Longitude 159°41'11". Radar plane contact at 12 miles. Two minutes later sighted U.S. Navy B-17 bearing 180° distance about 12 miles. No indication TRITON was sighted by plane. Radar reported second plane about same distance, which was never sighted from TRITON. (#J of Paragragh 6)

June 28, 1942.
Received Contaskgroup 8.5 OP Orders No. 2-42 and set course for 4th Island and assigned Patrol area.

July 3, 1942.
300 (Y)
Entered assigned War Patrol area. Proceeded cautiously to North toward 4th Island. Dense fogs for three days---took periodic soundings. Loaded to investigate MacDonald Cove on Eastern side of 4th. Enemy ships reported noerod thoro.

July 4, 1942.
0308 (Y)
Made quick dive--Position still uncertain--foggy weather.

-2-
ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 88 —
1942 (Cont.)
0411 (Y)
July 4, 1942 (Cont.)
0411 (Y)
0738 (Y)
1522 (Y)
1532 (Y)
1547 (Y)
1539 (Y)
1547 (Y)

With Point Stab on gattu Island bearing 270° T., distance 143 miles (best estimated position), sighted enemy destroyer (SIGURC CLASS) bearing 284° T., distance about 6,000 yards, angle on bow about 160° T. The two ships sighted slightly, but were still not in sight. Enemy was on course between 250° and 300°; attack was impossible; scuttler of destroyer was patrolling to westward to clear gattu.

Still dense fog - raised freighter and found land at range of 5 - 11 miles. Forced to turn eastward; visibility about 1,000 yards. Changed course to westward at 0935 (Y) and at 1214 (Y), but each time too far rolled in immediately and uncertain.

Fog started to lift again; changed course to 2900°.

With Cape Sabak bearing 310°, distance about 6 miles, visibility increased materially. Sighted enemy destroyer (SIGURC CLASS) bearing 226°, distance about 3,000 yards. Too close to sound General alarm; called all hands.

TUCK NO. 1: Fired two torpedoes at 1,000 yards range, 110° starboard track, 18° port, 1,000 yards,

— page 90 —
1942
July 7, 1942
Made close reconnaissance of :Donald Cove, Agattu Island--results negative. Surfaced at noon and sent report of last three days reconnaissance to Task Group Commander.

July 8, 1942
Patrolled in close to Southwest Coast of Agattu. Poor visibility and inadequate charts kept TRITON well off the beach, but land near water's edge was situated on several occasions.

July 9, 1942
Patrolled South of Agattu on Mylite-Island.

July 10, 1942
0307(Y)
With Agattu bearing 2700 distance about 15 miles sighted four unidentified planes on Southrally course. TRITON evidently not sighted. Made another close reconnaissance of :Donald Cove and East Coast of Agattu. No signs of life--visibility good.

July 11, 1942
Made reconnaissance of :North Coast Agattu as far "East as Patrician point. This coasting does not agree with chart.

July 12, 1942
Patrolled South of Agattu on Mylite-Island.

1905(Y)
Partied Hoisting "Cable on #2 periscope (Attock Scope) (See Paragraph 9). June 2nd and sent report to Task Group Commander.

July 13, 1942
Received orders to proceed Dutch Harbor at 3-Angine speed. Made another reconnaissance of Agattu East coast at very close range--no sign of enemy activity. Departed area for Dutch Harbor at midnight.

July 14-16, 1942
Enroute Dutch Harbor.

-5-
MELOSURE (c)

— page 91 —
1942
July 16, 1942
1340(7)
Arrived Dutch Harbor.

July 19, 1942
2000(7)
Underway Dutch Harbor to Patrol Area North
of Joulua--Scrippsnochnoi Islands.

July 20, 1942
1336(7)
Plan: Radar contact; make quick dive.
Surface thirty minutes later--all clear.

July 21, 1942
1215(7)
Entered Patrol Area. Took first reconnaissance
of North Coast Japanese Island, results
negative.

July 22, 1942
Investigated North coast Little Sitkin Island,
then took station just North of regular Island.
In preparation for expected March Japanese
submarine Patrol 1-15 miles from Joulua.
On North-south courses. Tactical radio antenna
raised and Radio reception established.
Surfaced just before zero hour in order to be
better prepared for change. Hit after to North
during darkness for better change. Returned
to station after changing.

July 24, 1942
0734(7)
"Hit as usual Island bearing 1970 distance 12
miles, at 4-4

— page 92 —
1942 (Contd.)
July 27, 1942 (Contd.)
2035(7)
I heard four explosions at great range. Surfaced to be better prepared for chase. Visibility less than three hundred yards.

2150(7)
Heard more explosions at extreme ranges. Tracked airplane for about twenty minutes by Radar. Plane came in to four miles. Visibility zero.

2301(7)
I heard two more distant explosions. Continued slowly to North. Heavy Auxiliary and DD reported 10 miles astern. RITOT at 2200(7) on course. North Speed 10-12. Visibility still zero.

July 28, 1942
0230(7)
Visibility improved--recovered course to 1800 for one-half hour then took 11/2 course on three engines in case of enemy withdrawal in that direction. No contacts.

0400(7)
Concerned returning to assigned area, and then patrolled as before. North of Segula.

July 29, 1942
Visibility zero about 1300 (7), at which time, with about 1000 yard visibility; submerged to patrol North of Chwostof Pass.

1610(7)
Received contact report. This report had originated in VP plane about 1 hour and 40 minutes before. Information was available to RITOT.

1615(7)
Fog lifted--visibility excellent.

1621(7)
"With Gula Point bearing about 230 T distance 7 miles sighted large-Jap freighter bearing 228 T, distance 12-13,000 yards; engine on bow 80 S speed about 17 knots. Ancy was heading into Chwostof Pass and in very close to Segula Island. The ship went into fog bank at 1635(7); RITOT surfaced in effort to intercept by full speed run around North Coast of Segula.

-7-

— page 93 —
1621(7) (Cont.) Sent contact report. Attach would not be possible unless enemy was silenced up - as by plane bombing attack.

1688(7) 1st and 3rd main engines flooded and one cylinder liner each engine attacked (age paragraph 9). Continued to chase at speed of 15 knots.

1730(7) Visibility reduced to 1,000 yards - enemy not sighted - interception no longer possible; so returned to own area.

2044(7) Two main engines badly damaged - extract not known. Made decision retire to Dutch Harbor at best speed and sent information to Group Commander.

July 31, 1942 1000(7) Arrived Dutch Harbor.

August 1-2, 1942 At Dutch Harbor effecting repairs to 11/2" 3 main engines.

Aug. 3, 1942 2130(7) Underway Dutch Harbor for Patrol Area north of Escuela - Selisogoodhani Island. Island is route north of Aleutian Chain.

Aug. 4, 1942 1255(7) Lat. 53-41° 7", Long 170-58° 7", plane on radar at 12 miles. This plane closed to 9 miles, but was never sighted because of heavy fog (7/2" paragraphed 6).

Aug. 6, 1942 0500(7) Entered Patrol Area - commenced submerged patrol.

0755(7) "With Little Sitkin Island bearing 35, distance 3 miles sighted Jay four-motored seaplane bearing 115, distance 20 miles on course east and 1 to 10 altitude (15° of Paragraphed 6).

1445(7) Heard 6 loud under water explosions as from depth charges - nothing in sight.

Aug. 7, 1942 Conducted submerged patrol just north of Escuela Island in reparation for expected bombardment. Cruising with radio mast out of water in order to receive reports of enemy.

-8-

— page 94 —
7, 1942
1500(7)
1700(7)
2000(7)
Aug. 8, 1942
1347(7)
Au. 9, 1942
0900(7)
1026(7)
1023(7)
1037(7)
1145(7)

U.S.S. TRITON

While 7 miles north of Segula Island sighted Jap four motorized seaplane apparently patrolling 'Kiska' entrance. Sent contact report - no receipt. 46 of periscope 61.
While 21 miles north of Segula Island sighted U.S. Navy P.I. close aboard and 21-1/2 low toward Kiska. (47 of periscope 61).
Heard series of 'elint explosions for about one-half hour.
While 12 miles north of Segula Island, in for, sighted what appeared to be a submarine bearing south, range unknown. This vessel was seen for about one minute before for close in. The sub was not sighted again.(7, 42 of periscope 51).
Shifted patrol to Kiska Area -- and -- on orders from Task Group Commander.
'With Sirius Point (Kiska) bearing 150 distance 6 miles, sighted periscope bearing 300, distance about 3 miles. Attempted to close, but enemy went out of sight immediately. (.75 of para. 5).
Sighted periscope (about 8 feet) of sunken submarine crossing TITAN steam from starboard to port. Swung ship to present stern and made ready after tubes.
Heard very loud air noise from direction of enemy which left little doubt the enemy had fired torpedoes at TRITON. Load while in sound gear. Enemy sub estimated at 2,000 yards range - went deep in a hurry.
Periscope depth - nothing in sight. About one minute after periscope was raised heard another loud noise mistaken for torpedo fire - went deep again. This last noise was traced to on ship.
'With Kiska, Sirius Point, bearing 150, distance 12 miles, sighted Jay four engine patrol plane on course about 340. (.75 of periscope 61).

— page 96 —
17, 1942
1048(Y)
'ith Senisopoehnoi Island bearing 140, distance 12 miles, sighted 'periscope bearing 062, about 4,000 yards range. Periscope was lowered immediately and although TRITON' scarred area for about one hour, the periscope was not seen again.

Aug. 19-22, 1942 Patrol led in likely traffic lanes around Sirius Point, Kiska. At dark Aug. 22, 19/2, departed area for Dutch Harbor.

Aug. 24, 1942 Arrived Dutch Harbor.

2. THE TITAN

The Pilot Chart for July indicating the area for 20/2 fog was not correct as to percentage. Communication at Lat. 36 north and Long. 166 west, the TRITON was in daily fog with visibility very- ing from one to five miles. Above Lat. 42 north, the visibility was much less and often not more than three hundred yards.

In the vicinity of the Near and Far Islands, visibility was rarely more than three miles during early with considerable improve- ment noted during August. In general, the nearest visibility was in close proximity to land.

Although visibility was much improved during August, about 50% of the time this sea was flat, glassy calm - water extremely shos- phroscent with peculiarly shaded horizon affects during the long twilight periods after sunset and before sunset.

2. TRITON INFORMATION

North of Attu with a strong NE wind, a current setting west, 1/4 knot was experienced.

East of Agattu, about 3 - 4 hours before low tide, a current setting 190, 1 knot, was experienced.

During flood tide, while NY of Sanisopoehnoi Island, a heavy current setting 055, 3 knots, was experienced on two occasions.

In general, the currents in the vicinity of the Near and Far Islands usually seemed to be about 1/3 knot setting in an easterly direction.

-11-

— page 101 —
10. RADIO RECEIVING

Radio reception was excellent. Last serial received was Task Group Commander's [TASK GROUP: name] Point (63) at 22-21 August. Last serial transmitted was [TASK GROUP: name] Celestial (9) at 1613.00 August.

During periods of rapid sea state, static was prevalent.

11. SOUND PROPAGATION AND DIRECTIONALITY

Sound conditions were poor. During attack on enemy destroyer on July 4, the destroyer was making about 10 knots, and services were not heard at 1,000 yards.

Lat. 36-56 N., Long 165-31 E.
June 29, 1942 60 feet depth - 630 ft.
Lat. 20-01 N., Long 171-15 E.
June 30, 1942 60 feet depth - 620 ft.
Lat. 10-01 N., Long 161-15 E.
June 30, 1942 110 feet depth - 610 ft.

12. MAJOR RADAR OPERATIONS

During early stages of this patrol, numerous colds were experienced mainly east of the channel. In contrast, during the latter part of the patrol, bad colds and squalls increased and normal resistance gradually increased. The weather was generally clear. This was undoubtedly due to the long hours, unfavorable weather, and the cold, damp atmosphere it was. This, therefore, three cases of urethral infection - non-urethral, traumatic, or suspected urethritis, minor infections, and candidiasis - was made less comfortable by the necessity to leave the hospital. During long northern days in order to conserve battery, the air conditioning was used to reduce the excessive congestion, which endangered electrical equipment.

-15-

— page 102 —
13. MILES STRAIT: BROUGHT TO AND FROM STATION.

(a) Pearl to Agattu 2,400
(b) Agattu to Dutch 990
(c) Dutch to Kiska 570
(d) Kiska to Dutch 570
(e) Dutch to Kiska 570
(f) Kiska to Dutch 570
(g) Dutch to Pearl (Est.) 2,080
Total 7,750 miles

14. FUEL OIL EXPENDED

(a) Prior departure Dutch for Pearl 98,525
(b) Dutch to Pearl (Est.) 22,050
120,575 gallons

15. FACTORS OF INDUCING REACHING

Torpedoes - 18
Fuel - (Refueled at Dutch Harbor)
Provisions (Obtained at Dutch harbor)
Fresh water - Indefinite.
Personnel - 7 days.

16 FACTOR CAUSING DEPARTURE

TRITON was called in for overhaul.

17. RE-ARRANGEMENT

On July 29, 1942, while TRITON was standing continuous radio watch, an "UNCLEAR" contact report was received by TRITON 1 hour and 40 minutes after this report had been initiated by plane, and too late for attack to be made. The report was accurate in detail and gave position of enemy ship which traversed part of TRITON area. At this report had received with only a reasonable delay, the enemy ship could and would have been attacked (probably sunk).

On the day of the Kiska bombardment, no specific information was received relative to enemy ship movements out of Harbor, although such movements were evidently taking place as was indicated by information received two days later.

Existing instructions call for ten (10) second interval between successive torpedoes. The commanding officer feels that he cannot express too strongly his firm conviction that this excessive firing interval must be materially reduced even at the expense of not using the I-ark VI Exploder. Ships can be missed and own ship endangered if this interval is continued. A torpedo firing interval of about 4 seconds is extremely desirable. A suitable countermining device is considered essential.

-16-

— page 103 —
1. The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander Task Group EIGHT point FIVE.
Subject: U.S.S. TRITON - report of fourth war patrol - addendum to.

2. The subject addendum is forwarded herewith.

For whatever value it may contain in conducting future operations of a similar nature.

-1- ENCLOSURE (D)

— page 104 —
1942

1. USS LISLIND. Twenty-four (24) U.S. Army enlisted men embarked in Triton plus 3,700 pounds of equipment; these in addition to own crew. Sgt. Farrington, U.S.A. in charge.

1426 Encountered heavy head seas. Wooden frame boat, lashed on deck, began to carry away. Slowed, throw' boot overboard, and went ahead at best speed.

August 27, 1942

1305 Sighted Great Sitkin Island bearing 2290, distance 30 miles. Forced to continue on surface in order to accomplish mission on schedule. Passed close to Eastern side of Great Sitkin in order to decrease chances of being sighted, from DUK Islands.

1530 With Cape DADAK Bearing 2700, distance 12 miles, made quick dive and headed into KULUK Bay. Lade close reconnaissance of Sandy Beach bearing 2430 from ZEPTO POINT. Senior Army man on board expressed preference to land here if possible. Sea was flat calm-conditions ideal for landing.

1410 Visibility fair-difficult to make out small islands and rocks. Surfaced 1.7 miles from beach and proceeded at 3 knots on course 2700 directly toward landing spot. Triton low in water; anchor backed out to 6 fathoms; lead line runned; 0.50 cal. machine gun manned.

2218 Anchored 500 yards from selected beach, inside 10 fathom curve, and 500 yards bearing 3370 from small unarmed island. All Army equipment and troops had been assembled in crews space with Ship's officer in charge.

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE (D)

— page 105 —
2220
Hannod Dock Gun and small machine guns; opened crews space hatch and conning tower, and commenced landing preparations. Kept troops below decks until boats were inflated, launched, and made ready by ship's force. Four 7-man r.d. two 5-man rubber boats were used. Rubber charging line with four charging connections had been rigged and was connected to depth gauge fitting in conning tower. Thus two valves on two boats could be charged at same time.

2234
Boats Nos. 1 and 2 (7-man boats) loaded with four men, packs, rifles, and some equipment shoved off for beach. Senior man in each boat instructed as to direction of beach. These boats were to land two men and call other equipment, then two men and boat returned to Triton for reloading.

2244
Boats Nos. 3 and 4 (7-man boats) loaded similar to Nos. 1 and 2'shoved off with same instructions and orders.

2245
Boats Nos. 1 and 2 landed safely.

2249
Boats Nos. 1 and 2 started back to Triton.

2252
Boats Nos. 5 and 6 (5-man boats) shoved off from Triton. These two boats carried only three non plus. equipment, and were not to return to Triton.

2254
Boats Nos. 3 and 4 landed safely.

2255
Boats Nos. 1 and 2 returned to Triton. The two remaining soldiers plus miscellaneous equipment were embarked.

2300
Boats Nos. 3 and 4 on way back to Triton.

2305
Boats Nos. 1 and 2 shoved off for second and last trip to beach.

2307
Boats Nos. 5 and 6 landed safely.

2308
Boat No. 3 returned to Triton. Boat No. 4 not required and ordered to return to beach.

-3-

— page 106 —
2310
Boat No. 3 shoved off for second and last trip to beach; all troops and equipment off the ship.

: 2315
Triton underway to clear anchorage. All boats safely landed.

: 2315
(1) Army troops were furnished Knopk life jackets and were fed sandwiches, soup, and coffee just before embarkation.
(2) Each boat was fitted with two small paddles in addition to oars supplied.
(3) All operations were carried out with a minimum of noise and no light.
(4) Equipment, in the main, as follows:
   (a) Packs, rifles, 3 machine guns and mounts, ammunition, hand grenades, radio equipment, medical equipment, bags of food, and miscellaneous gear.
   (5) That portion of equipment having sharp points and corners, was carefully wrapped and padded to prevent puncturing of rubber boots.

: 2315
August 28-29, 1942
Conducted submerged patrol just north and northeast Cape Madagascar. Closed beach at specified times to observe signal from advance reconnaissance party. No signal observed. Navy PBY's sighted several times during 28 August and PBY's were almost continuously in sight during 29 August. The patrol planes on 29 August were conducting anti-Submarine screen in approaches to Kuluk Bay, but there was no evidence that Triton was sighted. At dark, 29 August, surfaced and proceeded toward Dutch Harbor at high speed, keeping south of specified track in order to clear major landing units approaching Kuluk Bay. From the North.

: 2315
August 30, 1942
OCOO
Sighted U.S. Army B-17 and two fighters, flying low and headed west. Triton not sighted.

: 2315
OCOO
Radion on watch reported aircraft radio signals close aboard. About 30 seconds later sighted U.S. Navy PBY, breaking through.

: 2315
OCOO
Radion on watch reported aircraft radio signals close aboard. About 30 seconds later sighted U.S. Navy PBY, breaking through.

- 4 -

ENCLOSURE (D)

— page 107 —
0830 (Cont'd)
U.S.S. TRITON - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

0830 (Cont'd)
clouds toward Triton-range two or three miles.
Exchanged recognition signals, a break-down
of the aircraft radio signals gave meaning,
"Radar contact-an investigating".

1045
Sighted U.S. - ray B-17 and two fighters
flying eastward. Triton not sighted.

2100
arrived Dutch Harbor.

2. FUEL AND LIFELINE.

(a) Illos to and from station
(b) Fuel used (gallons) 1,033
(c) Total miles this patrol
enroute to and from station
(Est) 8,783
(d) Total fuel for (c) above (Est) 134,830

3. RELAYS

The Corronding Officer submits that when
own planes crc conducting anti-Submarine
Patrol in same crc as submerged patrol.
conducted by own submarines, the operations
of both types crc seriously hampered.

- 5 -

ENCLOSURE (D)

— page 108 —
1. TRITON
Serial (014)
Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
September 6, 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer,
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Second adcndum - U.S.S. TRITON (SS201),
Report of 4th War Patrol.

1. Having been previously directed to submit
the Report of TRITON's 4th War Patrol to C.T.C. 6.5 in
Dutch Harbor, Alaska, this brief narrative is submitted
in order to complete the record of this patrol.

2. NARRATIVE:
August 31-Sept. 1, 1942
at Dutch Harbor. Took aboard Six IX IV-1
Torpedoes for delivery to Pearl Harbor, T.H.

September 1, 1942.
1000 (W)
Dejorted Dutch Harbor for Pearl Harbor via
Akutan Pass.
When about 10 miles South of Akutan Pass, in
light fog, sighted Russian LR-rotantanc.
Exchanged recognition signals, but Russian
did not hoist her. Interruption of c.ll. This ship
flew Russian Ensign and had large Russian
Ensign painted on sides, with the letters
"U.S.S.R." underneath the painted ensign.

September 2, 1942.
2045 (W)
Lat. 46°-00'N. Long. 163°-54'N. TRITON
reported to CTF-7 for duty.

September 4, 1942.
TRITON disengaged Task Unit 7.3.4 by CTF-7.
Received instructions for rendezvous.

September 5, 1942
1125 (W)
About 700 miles North of Pearl Harbor sighted
U.S. Navy PBY; exchanged recognition signals.

September 6, 1942.
0330 (W)
About 350 miles North of Pearl Harbor sighted
U.S. Navy PBY; exchanged recognition signals.

September 7, 1942.
0630 (W)
Lt. Cdr. Rondzovous with Lithfield and proceeded into
Pearl Harbor.

#1 - ENCLOSURE (E)

— page 109 —
1. The Commander Task Group: EIGHT point FIVE.
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TRITON - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

Inclosure: (1) Copy of appropriate chart of Igattu Island.
    (B) Report of aadendum to Fourth War Patrol.

1. The fourth War Patrol of the TRITON was characterized by thorough coverage of assigned areas, aggressiveness, and brilliant tactics. Two attack opportunities were presented in each instance against combatant ships sighted at close range, and each resulted in destruction of the target. The success of July 4 was the result of the Commanding Officer's refusal to be discouraged by the fog and navigational difficulties, so prevalent in the area.

2. In view of the fact that the TRITON operated during this patrol from an advanced base, it is worthy of note that she was able to return to that base for repairs on two occasions with a loss of but fourteen days on station. This loss could have been reduced to twelve days, as in one instance she was held at the base an extra two days for strategic reasons. In neither case were the repairs of a nature to force discontinuance of a patrol from a distant station, but their accomplishment at an advanced base allowed the TRITON to be kept in material condition for maximum efficiency at the sacrifice of justifiable periods of time on station.

3. Negative information of any one of any activity ashore on August and the evidence of very limited activity on August after close reconnaissance, is to be noted.

4. The plane contact report mentioned in paragraph 17 is actually consisted of two reports differing widely as to the position of the contact. Plane contacts in the .leutians, during periods of reduced visibility, .reoften sufficiently inaccurate to require digesting, in order to prevent confusion in efforts to intercept. As visibility conditions improve it will be possible for submarines to make direct use of such information in certain tactical situations. Neither on the day of the KISU. bombardment nor thereafter was there any timely or accurate information indicating enemy ship movements out of the Harbor. It is seriously doubted if any occurred.

-1- ENCLOSURE (..)

— page 110 —
5. Attention is invited to the remarks in para-
graph 17, which is not qualified to comment technically. The Task Group Cor-
mander is not qualified to comment technically, but does
observe that the interval is an important factor in simultaneous
attacks upon multiple targets, using one mast of tubes, when it
is desirable to fire more than one torpedo at the first target.
The same is true when firing a large salvo at a major target.

6. The enemy ship destroyed on the night of August
15 is described as having destroyed lines although apparently def-
initely larger than a destroyer. The GROMEM described an enemy
ship which attacked her off Kiska harbor early in July in a sni-
lar manner. Photographs have shown such a ship in the Harbor on
nunccrous occasions. The target was escorted by a destroyer. From
these facts the opinion is expressed that the ship was a light cruiser.

7. The special assignment, [ENCLOSURE (B)], was
carried out smartly and with ingenuity, despite the lack of avail-
able time for adequate training for this type of operation.

8. The Corronding Officer, officers, and crew of
the TRITON are congratulated upon this patrol, which adds again
to the outstanding war record already established by this ship.
The subject of award has been taken up by the Task Force Commander.

- 2 -

[END OF REPORT]

— page 111 —
1. The material condition of the TRITON upon arrival was very good considering that it has been approx. lately two years since her first overhaul. The health and morale of the crew was excellent.

2. Previous comments on TRITON's operations are so complete that no additional are submitted.

ENCLOSURE (F)

— page 112 —
57411
Serial 01074
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
September 15, 1942.

CONSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 67
U.S.S. TRITON - FOURTH WAR PATROL
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TRITON (SS201) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

Enclosure:
(A) Comstackgroup 8.5 Conf 1tr TGC.5/A16-3
Serial 020 of August 31, 1942.
(B) Comsubdiv 43 Conf 1tr FB4-43/A16-3,
Serial 037 of September 7, 1942.
(C) Copy of subject war patrol.
(D) U.S.S. TRITON first addendum to subject war patrol.
(E) U.S.S. TRITON second addendum to subject war patrol.
(F) Comsubbron 4 Conf 1tr FC5-4/A16-3, Serial 0276 of September 9, 1942.

1. The ten second firing interval is considered
   - Excessive and the Bureau of Ordnance has been informed of the
   - Urgency of reducing it. Tests are now being conducted with a
   - view to remedial measures.

2. The patrol of the U.S.S. TRITON was well conducted, determined, and deserving of high praise. She is
   - credited with the following damage to the enemy:

SUNK
1 Destroyer - SHIGURE Class 1,368 tons
1 Destroyer - Leader 1,700 tons

TOTAL - 3,068 tons

DISTRIBUTION
(210M-42)
List I, Case 2:
Pl(5), SSs
Special:
ENJ(5); Comsublant(2);
Comsubsowespac(2);
Cominch(5).

R. H. ENGLISH.
OCT 6, 1942

E. R. SUINBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

DESCRIPTION
Finisbed-Name-File

— page 113 —
2021/A16-3(1)
Serial: (002)
U.S.S. TRITON
(SS 201)
Care of Fleet Test Office,
San Francisco, California.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander Task Force Pompeii.

Subject: U.S.S. Triton - Report of PTMP War Patrol.

Inclosur: (A) Subject Report.

1. The subject report is herewith forwarded.
2. In absence of instructions as to form of report, the Patrol Report is submitted in accordance with latest instructions issued by Combatant.

DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY: [Signature]
DATE: [Date]
COPY TO: [Signature]
[Signature

— page 115 —
0 0

U. S. S. TRITON
(SS 201)

Serial: CONFI
Dec. 22, 1942
(Cont'd)

Counted eight (8) searchlight beams. The Japs are holding a light air raid drill. There could be no better evidence that the Navy attacked, soon to take place, will be a complete surprise.

1926(1) The target plane (side lights burning) turned toward Triton, and in order to be certain that the enemy was not alarmed, minor submerged for twenty-five (25) minutes. Watched part of the show through the Fortscope.

2002(1) Surfaced. Jap drills appear to be over. Some lights still visible on Iceland. One large reddish-green searchlight attached. Triton in position and ready.

2100(1) Patrol led very slowly across assigned station on North-South courses in order to present maximum signal to own planes on Special Equipment for "homing in" the attack. Heard Army plane Radars about 2130(1).

2300(1) First wave of Interceptors commenced bombing attack on Wake. Headed for Island at high speed and watched the fireworks. Plane Tadar managed and planes contacted almost continuously from 2-11 miles. The first attack was, in effect, unopposed, as no enemy fire was sighted. Counted the waves as they came over. Waves starting on the Island. The Japs had guns and searchlights manned during the second and succeeding groups of the Attack force. Jap fire appeared to be 20 or more miles, with a few heavier guns, and undoubtedly some smaller. The Island appeared to be partly covered by clouds estimated at 3000 feet. Our own bombers could not be seen because of the excessive range. However, they must have been fairly low, because the enemy searchlights and tracer lines were moving very rapidly across the sky in an effort to keep on the bombers. There was absolutely no evidence that any of our planes were shot down. About four (1) fires were started (maybe more), but the fires were all extinguished by 2300(1). Just have had some pretty good fire drills, anyway.

— page 116 —
0 0 0

U. S. S. TRITON
(SS 201)

CONFIDENTIAL

Under reported plane almost overhead, and about 20 seconds later, one P-24 flying at about 1000 feet passed overhead. It must have seen us; for the motors were plainly audible, and the right wing dipped at the bow was. Relieving there was a possibility that this plane was in trouble, came back to course East at high speed, but plane leveled off on a course to the Eastward and disappeared.

MOTOR received no word of any damage to own aircraft.

With Peacoak Point (SS corner of Wake Island) bearing 270 distance 10 miles; submerged and proceeded in to make reconnaissance.

Shifted two coal-great masts of ship which appeared to be heading slowly into anchorage just South of Wilkes Island. Changed course left to pass around and come up on this ship from the south (Contact 71).

First ship anchored about 1000 yards bearing 200 from boat landing on Wilkes Island. This ship was the typical business Aft old Tanker type still in to pictures of the 12 knot Jap marines showing in June's, excepting that there were two coal post masts with high mast protruding from the center of the cross-member. The one stack was high and aft of after coal post; ventilators were cowl type; stem was counter. Estimate tonnage as 7-0,000. Shifted trawler type Patrol Vessel standing in general direction of port. The trawler passed about 300 yards to Port, then circled back; brought 1-1/2 hour out to Tanker, and took up patrol to seaward of port. During most of this time rain was falling, and we were able to set only short blured views of the proceedings.

Tain very obligingly ceased - Bright and sunny.

Attack 71 - Ried two torpedoes at range 1300 yards, one at foremost, one at stack - track angle 120° Port. Saw both tracks headed straight and true, and then saw and heard torpedo(s) hit.

— page 117 —
0 0

In Reply Refer to

Serial
Dec. 21, 1942
(cont'd)

0915(T)
0917(T)
1051(T)
1207(T)
Dec. 25, 1942
Dec. 26, 1942
0100(T)
Dec. 27, 1942
1220(T)

U. S. S. TRITON
(SS 201)

CONFIDENTIAL

The target was completely obliterated by water, smoke, and steam. Certain that both torpedoes hit; but the explosions were very close together, and although target appeared to be sinking, fired third torpedo to make certain. This torpedo hit antidebris, and target, when last seen, was going down with stern under.

Some left at full speed to clear area. Jar airfield about two (2) miles away; patrol vessel not sighted. Went to 110 feet and slowed speed, withdrawing to Southeast. About two minutes later near mudflood explosion in general direction on target. Near 11th speed crews of patrol vessel, but was not attacked.

Very very loud explosion and fairly close astern followed shortly by heavy explosion. The preliminary air attack. Second hard to believe they initiated us at 110 feet, but went to 200 feet away. Clad the Army was over last night as this was never been the reason for no aircraft immediately following attack.

Another bomb, not close.

Water very clear - three more bombs, but they seem to have lost us now. Attacked course to Southwest to proceed to east end area. Stayed deep until 1700, and surfaced After dark.

Ned appropriate Chitman Ceremonies and games at 200 ft., then surfaced and proceeded as before.

(Received information of enemy from CT-7 which was very definite in character and required prompt maintenance average speed of 17.0 knots in order to be in position for attack. Accordingly,) increased speed to 11.0 knots. For the next two days we passed, on the surface, between the 'Pershall and Caroline Islands and within 20 miles of Naiweto Island. Only one plane was sighted.

Lat. 30-20N Long. 150-50E sighted enemy, patrol

— page 118 —
0 0

U. S. S. TRITON
(SS 201)

CONFIDENTIAL

type aircraft bearing ME distance about 15 miles.
made quick dive, hope we were not sighted, as then
our presence would be known. Trust not have seen us
no bombs. (Altercraft Contact 1).

Surfaced.

(Arrived at enemy reported position with dive hours
to spare. Room just above horizon to fastward, and
enemy supposedly on Western course. The next two
days run, and the events which followed during this
night proved beyond question that our information
was accurate. Minor tool position two
miles South of enemy reported track as to us.
In the moment, and then at 10 knots on course
111°, commenced back-tracking along course
line hoping to intercept this enemy in the
evening and be on our way. The situation was one
of those kind we dream about, but certain experience
overthrew us in our favor - it - the enemy was on
course.

GOTOM 29, 1942
0000(1)

GOTOM

— page 119 —
0 0 0

In Reply Refer to:
U. S. S. TRITON
(SS 201)

Serial
Dec. 20, 1942
(Cont'd)

Dec. 30, 1942
0620(L)

Dec. 30, 1942 to
Jan. 5, 1943

Jan. 6, 1943

wreckage but not on surveyor could be located.
The Tommy Guns were on the bridge in case of undue
stubbornness, and one gunner kept yelling "House
lies - So silly!" - No answer. Placed up one life
ring which identified ship as U.S. Navy, and has
other Jap characters which will undoubtedly give
name and "Home Port - Today, home can read the stuff.
Estimate damage 67,000, single high stack, counter
storm, two masts.

Withdraw from wreckage and proceeded to area assigned.
Next, D.I. McManus, ..., observes great credit
for his unceasing efforts at accurate navigation
which were so nicely rewarded.

Operational Command passed to CDR 12 - commenced
radio guard on Belcomen.

Received orders from CDR 12 to take up patrol on
Equator at Long 171°. Other dispatches referenced,
but not repeated on this schedule. Came to course
170° while informing T/T Commander that surveyor did
not have original orders. Received both parts of
two part dispatch later in evening, and set course
for assigned station. Still on surface all the
time.

On Equator 60 miles East of assigned station -
commenced submerged patrol on Westerly course.

Submerged patrol in area from Equator to 10-30°
South and 25 miles each side of Long. 151°. With
12 feet of periscope out about 1 minutes
each 10 minutes 1-1

— page 122 —
0 0

U.S. S. TRITON
(SS 201)

Serial: 2216(T)
explosions did not originate on target.

Jan. 12, 1943
(Cont'd)
Went deep at avoid aircraft. Towed more
bombs 20 minutes later, but further away. Stayed
deep for one hour. Checked fire control equipment
and all data for approach and firing.

Jan. 12, 1943
2103(T)
Lat. 00-22°15' Long. 100°00' (Contact #5).
at three 2000 second at radar range
3,000 yards. Identified one medium freighter
and one escort on course about 50. Escort
on port bow of freighter. Commenced opening
range in effort to obtain target course or
course out then launched to dive for submerged
attack. Surface attack impossible due to right
move. Pulled out ahead of target and worked slowly
to westward - determined enemy to be on course
about 1700, speed about 12 knots. East escort
in poor visibility as range increased.

2202(T)
Major still 50 of target range about 12,000
yards (Smoking intermittently) enemy escort sighted
to right of target - angle on bow 0. Range
about 6,000 yards. Escort commenced blinding
Kahn took at 1700, with greens and white blinker
gun. South below for signal gun to blink back at
him and took course dead away at four engine speed.

2204(T)
Jap. escort (either by torpedo boat) turned on
searchlight, before we had opportunity to answer
his signals. Searchlight was off bearing at first,
but swept toward MTON. Cleared bridge. Another
searchlight came on - Deck ahead - about on
horizon.

2204(T)
Dived to 60° - c/c 900 right - rigged for silent
running. Kept periscope up in effort to watch
enemy, and let him have it if possible. Echo
ranging commenced two (2) minutes after diving.

2216(T)
Picked up enemy escort by periscope - broad on
starboard beam - range about 3,000 yards.

2219(T)
Enemy commenced blinker signalling again, but
could not find other ship by periscope. C.O.
taling range on escort using height of blinker
to water line at 35°. Escort range about 1000

— page 124 —
0 0

U. S. TRITON
(SS 201)

CONFIDENTIAL

Rifle up enemy still to SW. He seemed to do
some listening, but mostly pinging - in he came -
The a charging mine.

Mind attack - two changes, 50 seconds apart -
one on port quarter above us - and still close. A
tarbound quarter above us - and still close. A
few light division by now - cables pushed in hull -
weep in "nauwerling room soft patch, but no dis-
raying damage. In spite of terrible heat, merstistent
attacks by enemy, and jarring explosions - this
crew is perfoming like veterans that they are.
They were courageous, yes, but doing their respective
jobs beautifully; all the to grin and crack
too with such as - "No lway, Oscar" - "Hold your
hats". I'm proud of these fellows.

Inquiry faded out hearing 0550m, but came bouncing
in again, and at

Truth attack with one charge - he came a little
doubtful now, but that may be wishful thinking, as
his charge was still closer.
The performance of Lieut. J.R. Crutchfield, xcr,
as diving officer was perfection itself. After
MTRW went deep to crash, no water was pumped
or blown - depth control, at slow speed, was
perfect, and greatly assisted successful evasion.

Inquiry faded out hearing 1700m, and was not heard
again. More is an excellent lesson here for our
own destroyers. This Jap had left us under attack
for something under two hours. Not one time did
he cross ahead while dropping, but all charges
were very close and seemed a little above MTRW.
The whore of water was always in the superstructure.
The heat in MTRW was so great as to most certainly
imperil our own efficiency if enemy attacks continued.
Battery was already low; because charge was dis-
continued at 2100 when enemy vessels were sighted.
With three officers and three lookouts on MTRW
bridge (before diving), the enemy escort was
extremely hard to see on moonlight night with rain
squall in background. This Jap had us in a bad

— page 125 —
0 0

In Reply Refer to

Serial
Jan. 15, 1943
(Cont'd)

0100(1)
Periscope depth - that fresh air looks good.

0106(1)
Surfaced and continued patrol.
Tiring evening received orders to patrol an area between 10-30 South and 11-00 East.

Jan. 16, 1943
(Cont'd)

0650(1)
Tightening on surface to get to 'important position, sighted smoke bearing 160m, over horizon.

0650(1)
Tightening on surface to get to 'important position, sighted smoke bearing 160m, over horizon.

0000(1)
Attach "W" - tried six torpedoes as follows: Three (2) at length 7,000 ton freighter, range 2,600 yards - spaced 10 seconds apart; two (2) at 11,000 ton freighter who was then about 500 yards ahead; and one (1) at escort who was on near side of rear freighter with bow just overlapping freighter's stern. All track angles 100° starboard. Convoy closed away about 7 minutes before first, giving range increase. All straight bow shots agreed. Longitudinally to cover length of freighter targets. Two hits in leading freighter; one hit in rear freighter; and another explosion to the rear which was possibly a hit in the rear freighter or the escort. At the time of firing, one larger escort was dead ahead of and about 1,000 yards from convoy - assumed to be escort Commander and flying a red flag.

- 12 -

— page 126 —
16, 14, 12
(Cont'd)

Jan. 16, 1942
(Cont'd)

One subchaser was well back on the starboard (near) quarter of the convoy. One other escort (DD or torpedo boat) was close in on starboard quarter of rear ship, and was the target for #2 torpedo. Believe sighted strike of another subchaser on far side of large freighter. Total firing time was 70 seconds - 3 targets. After firing, watched escorts who turned toward turn on high speed as torpedoes hit first target. On the way in, the escort leader got suspicious signals to subchaser, turned in direction of advance of convoy and started deep (200'). Enemy seemed to think we turned to the rear. Escorts began echo ranging.

0030(1) Received first of seven or eight depth charges, none too close. Increase a vast difference when we got in our little first. Enemy seemed confused and his counter-attack was half-hearted. Minimum commenced opening range to HE.

0030(1) Nothing on sound gear.

0030(1) Periscope depth - no ships - no smoke - pieces of wood and what appeared to be life raft. Commenced submerged patrol to westward.

1615(1) Lat. 10-21L Long. 115-07E (contact #6) - sighted masts of ship later definitely identified as rotor torpedo class 10,500 ton passenger freighter, bearing 1600, distance about 20,000 yards, zigzagging on base course about 2100. Commenced approach making 7.5 knots to reduce large starboard angle. Have three torpedoes forward and one aft.

1656(1) Attack #6 - Pinned 3 torpedoes using target speed 17 knots, 30 starboard track. Torpedoes fired at bow, center, and stern of target, 1700 yards - no hits. The enemy turned away before the one after torpedo could be brought to bear. Watched target from periscope depth.

1701(1) One loud explosion - this was not a depth charge dropped by target, as the target was watched continuously. (Miss attack discussed under "Particles of Attacks").

— page 129 —
0

In Reply Refer to
Serial
2. TRITON
Weather was seasonably excellent.

2. TRITON INFORMATION
The North Pacific Pilot Chart for December and January shows a vessel's east around the equator at 1500, of 10-40 miles per day. This is entirely erroneous for average weather from 20 December to 15 January. The lines indicate a current setting 0000 warning between 1.1 and 2.0 knots, average - 1.7 knots.

Between Los Angeles Islands in the Admiralty Islands and Tong Island off Viltaiz Strait's east of 1000, drift .2 knots was experienced.

In Viltaiz Strait during calm weather no current was experienced other than an ebb and flood of about 1 knot, although the coast pilot and pilot chart indicated a 1W set of 3-1 knots.

1. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
The Water Tower, on Wake Island, mentioned in previous patrol reports, were still standing on 21 Dec., and served as useful landmarks.

- 16 -

— page 133 —
7
SUMMARY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS
SHIP...USS...Triton

| Attack                                                                 | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
||-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Date (Lat.) (Long.)                                         |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Location (Long.)                                              |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Torpedoes Fired on each Attack                              | 3   | 3   | 4   | 4   | 6   | 3   |
| Hits                                                                 | 2  | 2  | 1   | ?   | 1   | 0   |
| Number (Tonnage)                                              | 7-800 | 6-200 | 0   | 0   | 6-200 | -   |
| Number Damaged or probably sunk                              |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Type of Target                                              |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Range 1000 Yards                                            |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Range 1500 Yards                                            |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Range 2000 Yards                                            |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Range 2500 Yards                                            |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Range 3000 Yards                                            |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Surface Depth                                               |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Deep Submergence                                               |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Estimated Draft Target                                       | 25  | 28  | 29  | 29  | 25  | 29  |
| Torpedo Depth Setting                                      | 15/15 | 15  | 10  | 10  | 10  | 15  |
| Bow or Stern Shot                                             |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Track Angle                                                 | 120°P | 115°S | 124°S | 100°P | 100°S | 85° |
| Gyro Angle                                                  |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Estimated Target Speed                                      | 0   | 0   | 17  | 13  | 12  | 17  |
| Firing Interval                                             |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Spread - Amount and Kind                                   |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Remarks:                                                    |     |     |     |     |     |     |

Note: This form is to be submitted by each submarine with the narrative of war operations. May be submitted in rough.

— page 135 —
7. SUMMARY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS (Cont'd).

: (6)

: Date: Jan. 16, 14
: (Lat.): 1-25-308
: Location (Long.): 1|8-01-45E
: Torpedoes Fired on each attack: 3
: HITS: 0
: Number: --
: Sunk (Tonnage): --
: Number damaged or probably sunk: --
: Type of Target: Passenger-Freighter
: Range: 1700
: Periscope Depth: Yes
: Surface Night: --
: Estimated Depth: 29'
: Torpedo Depth: --
: Setting: 15'
: Bow or Stern Shot: Bow
: Track Angle: 35S
: Gyro Angle: 35N, 7, 9°
: Estimated Target Speed: 17
: Piring Interval: 12, 11
: Spread - Amount and Kind: Longitud-inal

- 20 - (Cont'd)

— page 136 —
1. SUBMERSIBLE ATTACK (CONTINUED).
(1) Attack No. 1. (Straight Bow - Submerged)

The Enemy target was anchored. Two torpedoes were fired at 2 second intervals aimed at the Steak and foremast respectively. C.O. watched both tracks headed true for point of aim. First torpedo hit point of aim 50 seconds after firing, and second torpedo either hit or countermined about 1-2 seconds later. Target was almost obliterated. No make certain of sinking, a third torpedo was then fired at middle of target which hit. Target sinking with stern under. (Target appeared to be Old Jap 12 knot Tanker listed in Jane's at 3,000 Tons).

(1) Attack No. 2. (Straight Stern - Submerged - Light).

Three Tks - Target sank so fast that no earlyvors could be found about 15 minutes later. Miss was sighted on bright moonlight night at range of about 15,000 yards. MTNtor ran up ahead on surface and dived for periscope attack. Target ran into tank again causing greater firing range than previously expected. Tks was lifing which should definitely establish identity of enemy when MTNtor returns to port. (MRT torpedo of -7,000 Tons).

(2) Attack No. 3. (Bow-Surface-Deck)

The Jap Tanker was sighted during early morning twilight at range of about 1,000 yards. Identified target almost immediately as a Tp. Class Tanker (10,000 Tons) Speed 17-20 knots. The C.O. considered that in view of approaching daylight, MTNtor would be unable to open range for deliberate submerged approach. Target appeared to be zigging and was closing range rapidly. Owing MTNtor in to firing course and fired two torpedoes using enemy speed of 17 knots. Torpedo spread was 30 divergent with 00 offset for first torpedo and 20 right offset for second torpedo. Since angle on bow was 900 just before firing, the target course may be considered as accurately known. Range estimate 2,500 yards. One minute after first torpedo, fired two more bow tubes offset 10 R and 00 respectively. The third torpedo exploded prematurely about 100 yards from the MTNtor and about 15 seconds after firing. A geyser about 20 feet in diameter shot about 100 feet in the air. There was no heavy resounding explosion - just a "pft" - and up minutes from first firing, personnel below decks reported hit in target. This explosion in addition to the premature. The target then turned away and MTNtor began chase for a shot up the stern but enemy opened up with gun aft (about 6"), and MTNtor was forced to retire on the surface attempting to run around the Tanker.

— page 137 —
0. U.S. S. TRITON (SS 201)
Serial: 0. U.S. S. TRITON (SS 201)
COMMENDATION ATTACHED (GOSTA):

7. SUBJECT OF SUBMARINE ATTACK (GOSTA):

(d) Attack No. 1 (submerged-Periscope-Stern).

This was a very deliberate approach and attack on same target as Attack No. 2. The CO considered it to be the best approach made by him during three war patrols. During later stages of the approach, the tanker appeared to be down by the bow.

I read four torpedoes. I had just inside stern, respectivly. Range 1200 yards, 100% Port track, (target speed 17.5 knots. Attached target. Marked 20 seconds after firing first torpedo, a large column of water arose out of the tanker just under his bridge, and as he had the bridge. The CO, having seen such before, said "momor" the first hit. There was no explosion. Eleven seconds later, a second column of water arose in vicinity of after mast - this time accompanied by a 1st bubble grey smoke, and the CO said "momor" another hit" but still no explosion whatever. We were all dazed and confused. Commented swinging lights, but no movement. The CO said "momor" and then the

— page 138 —
0
0

In Reply Refer to:
U. S. S. TRITON
(SS 201)
Serial
CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply to: U. S. S. TRITON (SS 201) Serial CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply to: U. S. S. TRITON (SS 201

— page 139 —
0. ENTRY A/2 INSTRUCTIONS:

These measures consisted of escort vessels (tugs, corvettes, boats, and trawlers), signaling in submarine waters, and some aircraft. The small, low silhouette, fast maneuvering A/S vessels are extremely hard to see and are the most effective.

Enemy Echo Range was twice encountered on about 10 rcs and once appeared to be very accurate. Tactical employed were about the same as our own.

The C.O. is still open minded as to the best evasive measures to be employed on attack or when own attack is no longer possible. During evening of war. 1, deep submachine seemed to be the best but and any depth near surface would most certainly have been very much clever to Depth Charge. However, after own attacks on Convoy on Jan. 10, the day attack were not so good and could probably have been evaded as easily at some lesser depth. The great distance to the surface to still be put in attack. The plausible answer seems to be that best evasion of depth charge on many feature including (1) Are own attacks still possible (2) Are enemy in course of attack (3) Was on enemy, thus causing him to divide his attention. (2) Type of A/S vessels (2) Enemy sound gear in use, etc.

2. ENTRY B/2 INSTRUCTIONS:

none significant.

4. NAVY INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) 3rd radar was practically useless. Normal indications were to the usual wave guide and the antenna indicate probable mechanical defects therein. Maximum range obtained was 1,000 yards on Hospital ship - after coaching on target.

(2) Torpedoes - One certain premature, and evidence of other failures.

(2) A bad squeal in Port Shaft developed on two occasions while endeavoring to evade enemy A/S vessels. Squeal appears to be in stern tubings.

11. RADIO INSTRUCTIONS:

Radio reception was complete. Last consecutive message sent was thirty-six serial 111200 of Jan., (as of 22 Jan.). Last consecutive serial received was Commander Task Force forty-two's No. 495 (as of 22 Jan.).

Reception was fairly good using the vertical antenna daily

- 2-

— page 141 —
77,840 Gallons.

16. CAPTURE OF TORPEDOES:
   - Torpedoes:
     - 1
     - 12,040 Gallons.
   - Provision (days):
     - 20
   - Crew:
     - 2
   - Personnel:
     - 2 weeks.

17. RATION OF CASUALTY DRIED OF PATROL:
   - Expenditure of Torpedoes.

18. TACTICS:
   - When enemy vessels are proceeding without escort, through known submarine waters, and targets' identity can be established, it is in doubt as to speed -- fire enough torpedoes to cover spread between enemy cruising and maximum speeds. Be careful that wide zigzags do not give false impression of slower speed.

- 26 -

— page 142 —
1. Enclosure (A) Copy of subject patrol report.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. TRITON on January 26, 1943, arrived at Brisbane, Australia, completing her Fifth War Patrol which covered a period of forty-one days. Twelve days were spent in passage from Iearl Harbor, and included a special assignment of two days assisting in aircraft bombardment of WAKE. During this period TRITON was under the operational control of Commander Task Force SEVEN. On December 28, 1942, she passed to the operational control of Commander Task Force RABAUL - NEW GUINEA shipping in the open sea north and northwest of NEW IRELAND. The patrol was terminated by expediture of torpedoes on January 16, 1943, and TRITON proceeded to Sribane via VITAZ STRAIT. Of the twenty-three torpedoes fired on this patrol, ten were hits, one was a possible hit, one exploded prematurely, two others probably hit but failed to explode, and ten were misses.

3. While at WAKE, TRITON, on December 24, 1942, sank a loaded tanker of about 7,000 tons which had just anchored. Three torpedoes were fired and all hit. Four days later while enroute to the SOLOMONS - BISAKAS Area, TRITON sank a cargo vessel, identified by a recovered life-ring as the OMI MARU, 3,340 tons, with three torpedo hits out of three fired.

4. At dawn, on January 13, 1943, after a period of sixteen days with no attack opportunities, TRITON fired four torpedoes and obtained one hit on a tanker tentatively identified as the AKEBONO MARU, 10,200 tons. One torpedo exploded prematurely on this attack. Through commendable persistence about four hours later a second attack on the same vessel was delivered. Four torpedoes were fired under

— page 143 —
1/2/42/A16-3
Serial 021
C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. TRITON (SS201), Fifth War Patrol; comments on.

---

**TRITON was subjected to very accurate depth charge attacks on January 14 and evasion is indicative of the fact that the commanding officer knows his business well.**

**On January 16, 1943, TRITON attacked a heavily escorted two-ship convoy, sank one loaded cargo ship of 7,000 tons with two hits and probably sank another of 4,000 tons with one, possibly two hits. On the same afternoon TRITON attacked a passenger-frigate of the KOKOU HAKU class unsuccessfully, firing three of her four torpedoes then remaining. The failure of this attack is attributed to error in estimate of target speed.**

**TRITON's Fifth War Patrol was conducted with the same skill and aggressiveness that has characterized all of her war patrols. She is to be heartily congratulated for inflicting the following damage on the enemy:**

| Damage | Tonnage |
|||
| TANKER | 7,000 tons |
| Cargo ship | 3,340 tons |
| Cargo ship | 17,340 tons |
| TOTAL SINK | 17,340 tons |

**Damaged (probably sunk)**
| Damage | Tonnage |
|||
| TANKER | 10,200 tons |
| Cargo ship | 4,000 tons |
| TOTAL DAMAGED | 14,200 tons |

DISTRIBUTION:
See following page

[Signature: James Fife]

— page 144 —
TF42/A16-3
Serial 021
Cerc of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
January 28, 1943.

Subject:  U.S.S. TRITON (SS201), Fifth War Patrol;
commands on.

DISTRIBUTION:
Comlnch (Advance copy)
VCNO
Cincelant
Cincapac
Consowcspac
Consublant
Consubbewspac
All SS TF42 (Not to be taken to sea - BURN)
CTF-42 War Diaries end Petrol Summary F1IC
CTF-42 Boat File
CSS 6, 3
CSD 62
01nc, S/M School, N.L., Conn. (2)
CO TRITON (File).

— page 149 —
1. The submarine was on patrol in the North Pacific on 1 July 1943. The submarine was on patrol in the North Pacific on 1 July

— page 151 —
1.0 1.1 1.25 1.4 1.6
: 1.0 1.1 1.25 1.4 1.6

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NIPPSO--NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

— page 152 —
10 24 25
: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
: 25 14 16

This microfilm is the property of the United States Government

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO—NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET - START AND END
NDM-NPP90-5210/1 (6-78)

— page 155 —
24 Dec 42-16 Jan 43
FROM: USS TITAN (SS-203)
SEAL: 004
DATE: 12 February 1943
SUBJECT: SUBMARINE AVIATION SERVICE, OPERATING OF
Forward (to CITROEN) firing reports for FLYER WAR PATROL
Claims 1 tanker, 1 freighter sunk, 1 freighter and 2 tanker
damaged in WAKI, POLIPE and BASILI areas.
(DEPLOY: SUB (OPER) (SOPAC): SUB (OPER)
FILED: War Diary
Separately as ORIGINAL

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT (DATE) | TITAN (SS-203)
--- | --- | ---
DATE: 16 March 1943 | NAME: TITAN (SS-203)
FROM: CDR DICKY CHAD
SEAL: 003
SUBJECT: LOSS OF USS TITAN (SS-203)
Chronological report of last known facts pertaining to loss
of USS TITAN, submarine on SIXTH MAI PATROL and in SOLOMON
-Insarack area. Information from Japanese sources indi-
cates TITAN sunk 15 March by Destroyer attack.

FILED: War Diary
Separately under TASK FORCE 72 ser none of 10 Apr 43

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT (DATE) | TITAN (SS-203)
--- | --- | ---

— page 156 —
1. The Commanding Officer, U.S. Submarine Force, The Commander Submarine Division 537TY-WO. The Commander Submarine Division 537TY-WO.

Subject: 1. Surface and Submerged Patrol.

Reference: (a) Censubsecofor Ccnf. ltr. FF4/A16-3 Serial 0436 of 12 June 1941.
(b) Commanding U.S. operation order No. 8-41 of 30 October 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Engineering Data.
(B) Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Data.

It is estimated that to make 100 gallons of battery water required 140 gallons of fuel for No. 2 auxiliary engine, 1,680 gallons of fresh water and 1,600 gallons of distilled 1,550 gallons of fresh water daily and charge up the battery. Estimated daily water requirements based on the results of this patrol, are:

(a) 100 gallons
(b) 150 gallons
(c) 200 gallons
(d) 250 gallons

TRITON maintained stationary patrol by lying to the start of battery charges and running at such load on 1 main engine that water could be made as charging rate was cut.

3. Conditions Submerged.
The following torpedo practices were conducted on the days indicated:

(a) First Day By B.T.P. 17th
(b) Second Day By B.T.P. 20th
(c) Third Day B.T.P. 25th

Each day just before time of surfacing a cruiser or battleship was sighted in TRITON's area to the southward. Each morning a scheduled torpedo practice was to be fired, the target group passed through the TRITON's area. The estimated group passed through the area by only an average of 10 minutes. On the fourth day of the patrol a destroyer of Mine Division One made sound runs through the area. Blending at 400 yards, the torpedo was fired at 10 minutes and 10 seconds. There was no time to stop the torpedo practice when it was sighted. There was no time to stop the torpedo practice when it was

— page 159 —
1st. night. 3.7
2nd. night. 4.8
3rd. night. 4.8
4th. night. 1.6

Total 32.3 hours.

17. Air Conditioning and Refrigeration.
   - See enclosure (B).

18. Amount of water condensed in ventilation ducts.

U.S.S. TRITON - 1- ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 160 —
19. Date on drowned exhaust.

No tests carried out. Previous tests have led to conclusion that running engines with drowned exhaust is not practicable unless lying to in a very smooth sea due to the extreme low reserve buoyancy in this condition.

Test performed for Bureau of Ships and Menxim Slicener Co. also showed that exhaust pipe as installed on this vessel, between exhaust valves and nutrifers are practically as serious sources of sound propagation as the exhaust themselves. Plans for these exhaust pipes have been changed but the alteration has not yet been made in THIXON.

Comment by Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Wet mufflers will be installed in THIXON at first opportunity after receipt of materials.

V. A. LENTZ.

COMMANDING OFFICER

U.S.S. THIXON
-5-
ENGLISH (B)

— page 161 —
1st. day 2nd. day 3rd. day 4th. day
Total used: 505 545 548 577
For best water: 93 90 90 109
For exercise heads 30 1 2 2
For engines and purl. 439 455 456 460
All other purposes 0.5 0.7 6.7 6.9
Calls, man/day
7 (f) Torpedo practice.

(b) Totable water distilled.
    | 1st. night | 2nd. night | 3rd. night | 4th. night
    | 265 | 265 | 245 | 187
    | 8.9 | 8.1 | 7.5 | 14
    | 136 | 136 | 135 | 190

Average chlorine - grains per gallon: 0.5 to 3.0
Exhaust - Potable water output - sea smooth - good conditions.
    | 500 | 540 | 550 | 570 | 620
    | 22 | 25 | 26 | 29 | 35

The ship's milivolometer was very satisfactory rigged up as an electric salinity meter.

(c) Battery water output.
    | 1st. night | 2nd. night | 3rd. night | 4th. night
    | 90 | 90 | 90 | 89
    | 90 | 90 | 90 | 89

Gallons
Average per night.
    | 525 | 530 | 555 | 600
    | 15 | 15.5 | 16

Total
Gallons of potable water required to distill one gallon of battery water - 1.1 gal.
Average chlorine content - 20 to .29 gr./gal.
4th night 1700 9.2 16.0
    | 1205 | 1205 | 1205 | 1205
    | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5
    | 4.2 | 4

— page 162 —
5(a) Compartment Readings:

| Compartment | Readings |
|||
| Forward Depth | 88: 80:82 | 87: 50: 59:88 | 82:86 | 69: 57:70:53 |
| Forward Battery | 91: 82:84 | 71: 51: 60:92 | 82: 63:85:72:60:61 |
| Control Room | 91: 85:87:70:72 | 52: 58: 88:85 | 57: 71: 63:68 |
| Armor Piercing | 91: 82:84 | 71: 51: 60:92 | 82: 63:85:72:60:61 |
| Depth Charge |

— page 163 —
1st night 110 105 105 121
2nd night 119 108 107 119
3rd night 116 109 109 120
4th night 117 109 109 122

-2- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 165 —
6 SEP 1942

In Reply Refer to
accno/A/4-9
Serial ( 012 )

U. S. S. TRITON
(serial)

CORE OF THIRD POST, TORPEDO
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.
5 SEP 1942

The [ ] of [ ] was [ ] on [ ] at [ ] in [ ].

The

— page 167 —
700 yards (Run Attack Range: 1000-150 yards)
Kiel depth: Surface
Straight: 3/4" not (s)
Type spread: None
Attack: (unopposed X)
(check) (opposed by air screen close screen)
Detected: (prior to firing)
(check) (after firing X)
(undetected)

...SULTS: (Certain) One (1) 1000 = Ton Japanese transoceanic trawler completely wrecked. Bow partly shot away, trawler sinking slowly.

(Estimated)

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP: None

---

KEY REMARKS: The TRITON, a new submarine, had never before fired deck gun at any target in Peace or War. The last five or six rounds were fired at ranges not in excess of 200 yards—target attempting to keep stern to TRITON, and TRITON, in turn, circling target at higher speeds.

Brief description (Cont'd) TRITON then attacked trawler with 3" gun and a 50 cal. machine gun.

— page 171 —
FOR TORPEDO ATTACK (Own):
Firing range: 800 Yards
Knot depth: 65 Feet
Straight/Shoot(s): X
Type spread: None
Attack: (unopposed X (check) (opposed by air screen/close screen
Detected: (prior to firing (check) (after firing (undetected X
...SULTS: (Certain)  Sunk on (1) Japanese freighter of 5,600 tons. (Manryu Maru)
_

— page 172 —
1942
Date: May 6, 1942
Location: Latitude 35°12'N, Longitude 125°45'E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) ATTACH FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT DROP DECK - THIS REPORT - IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Overcast, heavy atmosphere, visibility 10-15 miles.
SEA CONDITIONS: Slight sea moderate swell.
SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable): (Slight attack on surface).

TYPE OF OPERATIONS: Offensive Patrol - Enemy Intrater (East China Sea).

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Convoy (two (2) Destroyers "Assault" on "Chingma".
Class: Six (6) Frigates and Passenger freighters)
FORCES ENGAGED: ON USS THITON

(Name and Type) ENTRY: USS Thiton (P) 2nd, 1942
Type of Attack: (On/Off - No (No) (No

— page 173 —
2500(1) 1200(2)
Firing range: Surface
Strain: 1/1000(1) 1/1000(2)
Type spread: 1/1000(1) 1/1000(2)
Attack: (check) (opposed by air screen, close screen X)
Detected: (check) (undetected X)

SULTS: (Certain) One certain and probably two hits — Target burst into smoke and flames— heavy explosion. Blinker signals sighted — small boats in water.
(Estimated) Target smoke.

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP
Home

IF REMARKS: On first attack, the second torpedo sunk at firing (this torpedo should have hit). One DD screen was standing toward TRITON during second attack. After successful attack, TRITON withdrew to rear at high speed and commenced circling convoy in preparation for next attack.

— page 174 —
6 May 1942
Time: 0512 (-9)
Location: Latitude 29°10'11" N
Longitude 125°28'18" E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) ATTACK FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT - IT DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY EITHER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Sky overcast, Visibility 30.
SEA CONDITIONS: Slight sea, Heavy swell.
SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable): Poor.
TYPE OF OPERATIONS: Defensive Patrol, Enemy Waters (East China Sea).

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Enemy (Five Japanese freighters and two Destroyer escorts of "ASASHIO" or "STURGE" class) (Same convoy: a had been previously attacked at 0245).
FORCES ENGAGED: OWN USS "STURGE"

(Name and Type) ENEMY Ship attacked was similar to "Takeda" (6900 Tons).

TYPE OF ATTACK (Own A or B): search one)

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Placed two torpedoes at 3rd ship in column one, hit.
Placed two torpedoes at 14th ship, this ship was torpedoes and
availed by maneuvers.
WEAPONS EMPLOYED:
Own Torpedoes
Enemy Depth charges (A/s Screen)

AMMUNITION EXPENDED: Four (4) Mk. 1/4 Torpedoes.

EVASIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED:
Own High speed after firing, then silent running.
Enemy A/S Screen (DD) (Patrol type)/

— page 175 —
1600 Yards. ______
Kee1 depth ______ 63 feet.
Straight/curved shot(s) 2 straight; 2 curved.
Type spread ______ Divergent
Attack: (check) (opposed by /

— page 177 —
500 - 200 yards
KeeL depth ______ Surface
Straight/curved shot(s) = ______
Type spread ______

Attack: (unopposed X)
(check) (opposed by air screen/close screen)
Detected: (prior to firing X)
(check) (after firing)
(undetected)

...SULTS: (Certain) Two (2) Japanese deep sea fishing vessels of 100 tons each completely wrecked.

(Detailed) ______

DAMAGE TO OUR SHIP ______ None

---

**TIP: ATTACK**
(Check)
Periscope
Periscope and TDC
Sound
Sound and TDC

---

**TIP: REMARKS**
Second fisherman was searched thoroughly for any evidence that it had been, or was to be, employed as a patrol vessel - No transmitting radio, no armament of any kind were found.

— page 178 —
1942
U.S.S. TRITON (SS201)    Date: May 17    1942
Time: 1347 (9)    Location: latitude 35-12N
    Longitude 125-45E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) ATTACK FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT "RUN DUCK" THIS REPORT - IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY EITHER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS - Scattered clouds, visibility 35
SEA CONDITIONS - Slight sea, slight swell.
SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable) - Poor
TYPE OF OPERATIONS - Defensive Patrol - enemy waters

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE - One (1) 1-61 Type Submarine

FORCES ENGAGED: OWN USS TRITON

(Name and Type) ENEMY One (1) Japanese Submarine (1-61 Type)

TYPE OF ATTACK (Own /

— page 180 —
21 May 1942
Date: 23 May 1942
Location: Latitude 29°09' N.
Longitude 136°57' E.

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) ATTACH FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT - IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Sky mainly cloudy, visibility 35
SEA CONDITIONS: Slight sea, slight swell
SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable): PX-
TYPE OF OPERATIONS: Offensive patrol - Enemy waters.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: One (1) I-61 type submarine.

FORCES ENGAGED: OWN USS, TRITON

(Name and Type) ENEMY One (1) I-61 type submarines.

TYPE OF ATTACK (Own, search one) Torpedoes

SURVEY DESCRIPTION: Pired two torpedoes with spread on large, unfavorable tracks at poor range; enemy saw tracks, turned radically and swirled both torpedoes. Pired two more torpedoes with spread on favorable tracks but poor range; both torpedoes missed.

Enemy Type: None

AMMUNITION EXPENDED: Four (4) Mk. II-Ic1 torpedoes.

EVASIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED: None

Enemy Type: None

Enemy Type: High speed, probable zig-zagging, and radical changes in course to avoid torpedoes, after having seen tracks.

— page 181 —
2600 Yards, 3000 Yards.
KeeL depth 63 Feet.
XWXKKX curved shot(s)
Type spread 1/2"regret

Attack: (unopposed X)
(check) (opposed by air screen, close screen)
Detected: (prior to firing)
(check) (after firing X)
(undetected)

SULTS: (Certain) All torpedoes missed.

(Detected) ====

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP None

IEF REMARKS

— page 182 —
1st Attack
U.S.S. TRITON (88201)
Date: 1 July 1942
Time: 12:00
Location: Latitude 52°15'51" N
Longitude 17°51'50" E

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. ATTACK FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
2. DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT - IT DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
3. DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Foggy, temperature - 14°C
SEA CONDITIONS: Choppy
SOUND CONDITIONS (if applicable): Poor
TYPE OF OPERATIONS: Attack and destruction of all enemy ships encountered.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: 1 enemy destroyer.

FORCES ENGAGED: OWN U.S.S. TRITON

(Name and Type) ENEMY: Japanese DD (Shigura Class)

TYPE OF ATTACK (Own): search (one) Periscope and TTC.

SHELF DESCRIPTION: Sighted enemy at 3500 yards coming out of fog bank on port beam, 90 starboard angle on bow. Came to normal course and fired 2 torpedoes from bow tubes with 15 and 12 left gyro angles, range 1100 yds. One hit amidships.

WEAPONS EMPLOYED:
Own: 2 torpedoes.
Enemy: _____

AMMUNITION EXPENDED: 2 torpedoes.

WEASIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED:
Own: None necessary.
Enemy: _____

En

— page 183 —
1100 Yards
Key depth ______ 61. Parsecs
X Straight( ) shot(s)
Type spread ______ 2° Divergent

ATTACK
(check)
Periscope
X Periscope and TDC
Sound
Sound and TDC

JUSTUS: (Certain) ______ Ship was hit amidship by one torpedo, headed over on portside and sank about 20 minutes after explosion.
(Anaptage) before sinking.
(Estimated) ______

DAMAGE TO OWN SHIP ______

REF REMARKS ______

— page 184 —
1942
Date: August 15, 1942
Location: Latitude 52°15'00" N
Longitude 175°19'00" E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) ATTACK FIRST - THEN COLLECT DATA FOR THIS REPORT.
(b) DO NOT "GUN DECK" THIS REPORT - IF DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY ENTER A DASH IN SPACE FOR WHICH NO DATA IS AVAILABLE.
(c) DRAW A CIRCLE AROUND THE APPROPRIATE ENTRY IN THIS REPORT WHEREVER SUITABLE.

WEATHER CONDITIONS - Overcast, no wind, fair horizon.

SEA CONDITIONS - Smooth.
    Enemy could not be heard at range if sound conditions (if impalpable) - Poor. 1600 yds, roll bearing 170°, this vessel stopped.

TYPE OF OPERATIONS - War patrol.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE - Destruction of all enemy ships encountered.

FORCES ENGAGED: OWN U. S. S. STRONG

(Name and Type) KENRY 1 - 1st destroyer and 1 cruiser or additional destroyer.

TYPE OF ATTACK (Overcast - orcast) one) Light surface attack using TDC.

SURVEY DESCRIPTION 1 - salvo 2" spread fired from after tubes with approximate 1° 95° aft, track angle, and max. gyro angle 5° R. One torpedo hit and possibly two exploded. Other ship pursued.
WEAPONS EMPLOYED:
    Own 1 torpedoes
    Enemy
    Ammunition expended 1 torpedoes. (Mk. XIV-1)

EVASIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED:
    Own Rapid retirement at full speed on various courses.
    Enemy 4/5 Screen (DD)

— page 186 —
11 SEP 1942
CINCPAC/1
Serial 012 of Sept. 5, 1942.

From: The Commander Submarine Tactical Report
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subject: Action Report.

1. Frequently, action marking torpedo attacks, submarine submarines are forced by enemy anti-submarine measures to leave the periscope out and deep depths without detaching the exact amount of damage incurred by the enemy. In these instances, the Commander Submarine, Chief of the Attack, attempts to evaluate this effect, give credit for initial or damage done enemy vessels when information at hand warrants positive credit. However, in many cases, no credit can be given to the submarine for any successful attack.

2. Once this information is already contained in the patrol reports, can an information provide no information which is not already available, it is recommended that action reports be no longer required from submarine commanders.

Dated: 11 SEP 1942

Copy to:
Commander

— page 187 —
1. Commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander in chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Action reports.

Reference: (a) Consubmarine 1st and 2nd escorts fired FPL2-10/ A16-3 Serial 01047 of 11 Sept. 1942, on CO TATUM Gmt. 1tr. SS201/A16-3 Serial 012 of 5 Sept. 1942.

1. In the interest of reduction in paperwork, the commander in chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet concurs in paragraph 2 of reference (a).

Copy to:
Consubmarine

R. A. SPEE, ADM
Chief of Staff

R. A. SPEE, ADM
Chief of

— page 188 —
3520/Δ16=5(1)
Serial: (001)
DECLASSIFIED
Date: 1/16/43
To: The Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Task Force FRUITY-70.
(2) The Commander South Pacific Force.

Subject: U.S. Submarine Action Reports - forwarding of.

Reference: (a) Pacific Conf. Intr. 360L-12 of Nov. 8, 1942.

1. In accordance with Reference (a), the U.S. Submarine Action Reports listed below are forwarded herewith.

DATE: 1/16/43
SUBJECT: JAP. TELGETHER (7-1,000 tons)
JAX. FREIGHTER (6-7,000 tons) (SST)
JAX. FREIGHTER (10,000 tons)
JAX. FREIGHTER (6-7,000 tons)
2. Torpedo
3. Potentially
4. Sunk
5. Potentially
6. Sunk
7. Potentially
8. Sunk
9. NO AVAILABLE

1/16/43
JAP. FREIGHTER (1,000 tons)
1/16/43
JAP. PSGR. FREIGHTER (10,500 tons)

c/c: Consul
Consul
Consul
Consul

— page 190 —
1500 yards
Own ---
Enemy ---
For Torpedo Attack (Own):
Firing range 1500 yards
Kee1 depth 63 feet
Straight/QUICK (s) (s) Y.Periscope and TDC
Type spread longitudinal
Attack: (unopposed torpedo) (s) Sound and TDC
detected: (prior to firing (after firing X) (undetected)
Results: (Certain) Two torpedo hits - one aft and one amidships. Third torpedo either hit or countermined. Tanker sunk by stern.

(Estimated) Lifter with crane which came alongside tanker sunk. It was no longer visible after firing.

Damage to own ship none

Tasking: (s) or special equipment (detector, depth charge(s)):
J.T. H. Ichimaru Lt. (Name) Lt. (Name) 5012 (ServiceNo.)
made initial contact by (sound) (radar), (SMSD), (MAD), (Sight)
Brier Remarks The target was observed coming to anchor so her cargo was never unloaded. Plan(s) dropped two boats - one at 09/7 and one at 09/9. Other explosions were heard in the distance at 1051, 1029, 1210, and 1212.

— page 191 —
1942.
Date: December 28
Location: Latitude 06-23-50 N
Longitude 160-17-30 E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) Attack First—Then collect data for this report.
(b) Do not "gun deck" this report—if data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy enter a dash in space for which no data is available.
(c) Draw a circle around the appropriate entry in this report wherever suitable.

Weather conditions: Partly cloudy, bright moon, occasional rain
Sea conditions: Moderate sea from NWS
Sound conditions (if applicable): Fair 4000 yards
Type of operations: Offensive War Patrol
Specific objective: Japanese Merchant Vessel (JMK Preflgther 6-7000 tons)
Forces engaged: Own USS TITAN
(Name and Type) Enemy Preflgther JMK line 6-7000 tons
Type of attack (own/Japanese): -scratch one) -light periscope and TDC
Brief description: Target sighted at night - bright moon. -Gained position on surface then dived. -Sunk target with three torpedo hits.

Weapons employed:
Own Torpedoes
Enemy none
Ammunition expended: three (3) torpedoes Mk. XIV-3

— page 192 —
100 yards
Echelon: none
For Torpedo Attack (Own):
Firing range: 1000 yards
Kiel depth: 55 feet
Strait: [STRAIT: text here]
Type attack (check)
Type attack (check)
Sound and TDC
Detected: (prior to firing (check) (after firing X (undetected)
Results: (Certain) Target sunk in less than three minutes from first hit.
(Estimated: [ESTIMATED: text here])
Damage to own ship: none

TECHNICAL NOTE: All text is in the same font and size, except for the ship's name, which is in a different font.

— page 193 —
1943
Date: January 13
Time: 05406
Location: Latitude 00-21.5
Longitude 114-40 E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) **Attack First**—Then collect data for this report.
(b) Do not "gun deck" this report—if data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy enter a dash in space for which no data is available.
(c) Draw a circle around the appropriate entry in this report wherever suitable.

Weather conditions: Cloudy to overcast, Wind from W force 2.
Sea conditions: Calm swells from West condition 2.
Sound conditions (if applicable): Good.
Type of operations: OCNative War Patrol
Specific objective: Enemy tanker

Forces engaged: Own USS TITAN

(Name and Type) Enemy Japanese tanker - Hoppon Karu, three Japanese planes - Attack type floatplanes.

Type of attack (own/other)—scratch one) Surface - dawn

Brief description: Target sighted at dawn just before diving - swung ship fired 1 torpedoes. One hit - one premature - target turned away and opened fire.

Weapons employed:
Own torpedoes
Enemy 5 inch gun

Ammunition expended: 4 Mk XIV-3 torpedoes; 6 rounds

— page 194 —
2,100 Yards
Eaves: Turned away from torpedo tracks.

For Torpedo Attack (Own):
Firing range: 2,100 Yards
Kiel depth: 25 feet
Straight/upward (Dock) (X): Periscope and TDC
Type spread: divergent
Sound: X control of from bridge and TDC
Attack: (unopposed (check)) X (opposed by air screen, above deck) (later) Bound and TDC
Detected: (prior to firing (check)) X (after firing (undetected)

Results: (Certain) Tanker damaged one (1) torpedo hit.

(Estimated)

Damage to own ship

Torpedo (X) or special equipment detector operator (X):
H.C. Van Roosen (Name)
LT. (1st), USN (Rate)
T. (ServiceNo.)
(1st)
made initial contact by (sound) (radar), (SMSD), (MAD), (Sight)

Brief Remarks: Target probably sighted premature explosion of third torpedo and turned away.

— page 195 —
1942
Date: January 15
Time: 0342
Location: Latitude 00-15-50 S
Longitude 114-56-30 E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) Attack First—Then collect data for this report.
(b) Do not "gun deck" this report—if data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy enter a dash in space for which no data is available.
(c) Draw a circle around the appropriate entry in this report wherever suitable.

Weather conditions: Cloudy to overcast, wind from west force 2
Sea conditions: calm, swell, rain, wind condition 2
Sound conditions (if applicable): no
Type of attack (own, enemy, separate, normal, periscope): enemy
Brief description: Fired 1 torpedoes spread the length of the target—two splashes and smoke were seen as if 2 torpedoes hit, but no explosions heard.
Weapons employed:
   - Own torpedoes
   - Enemy planes (3)
Ammunition expended: 4 Mk XIV-2 torpedoes

— page 196 —
0.00 submarine to world alert

Enemy: 32-zag

For Torpedo Attack (Own):

Firing range: 1300 yards
KeeI depth: 63 feet
Straight: 2° 30' 30" (x)
Type spread: longitudinal
Attack: X (unopposed)
(dropped by air screen/close screen)
Detected: (prior to firing)
(after firing)
X (undetected)

Result: (Certain) One torpedo was seen to hit the tanker under the bridge with a large spear of water obscuring the bridge; however, the torpedo did not explode.

(Estimated) One more possible hit. A cloud of blue-grey smoke was seen rising from the after part of the ship.

Damage to own ship: None

LABORATORY (X) for special equipment detector operator(s):

J. J. Lichman
(Name)
LT USN
(Rate)
5012
(ServicenNo.)
made initial contact by
(sound) (radar), (SMSD), (MAD), (Sight)

Brief Remarks: This target was observed down by the bow and thought to be listing to port.

— page 197 —
1943
Date: January 16
Time: 0650
Location: Latitude 01-39 S
Longitude 118-20-30 E

INSTRUCTIONS:
(a) **Attack First**—Then collect data for this report.
(b) Do not "gun deck" this report—if data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy enter a dash in space for which no data is available.
(c) Draw a circle around the appropriate entry in this report wherever suitable.

Weather conditions: Partly cloudy to cloudy. Thin from NW force 1
Sea conditions: Calm from NW condition 1
Sound conditions (if applicable): very good

Type of operations: Offensive war Patrol

Specific objective: Enemy convoy (Two "Japanese freighters of 7000 and 1000 ton respectively).

Forces engaged: Own USS Triton

(Name and Type) Enemy Two freighters (one large and one medium size) four destroyer escorts.

Type of attack (own/other—scratch one) day periscope

Brief description: While on surface sightle convoy two freighters and 5 or 4 escorts. Three torpedoes at large freighter, two at second, and 1 at an escort.

Weapons employed:
- Own torpedoes
- Enemy depth charges
- Ammunition expended: 6 Mk XIV-3 torpedoes, 7 depth charges

— page 198 —
3. Type Attack (check)
KEEP: 52 feet
Periscope
Straight: 0.5 knots (o)
X Periscope and TDC
Type spread: 1.0 nautical miles
Sound
Attack: (unopposed)
Sound and TDC
(checked) (opposite) (check)
Detected: (prior to firing)
(checked) (after firing)
(undetected)
Results: (Certain) two hits on first target (70000tons), one hit on second
freighter (1000 tons)
(Estimated) Second hit on second target or on one of escorts
Damage to own ship: minor glass breakage
Lookout (x) or equipment/equipment/observer (o):
  - Unknown M.W. (Name)
  - X Y Z
  - (X)
  - (Y)
  - (Z)
  - (ServiceNo.)
  - (X)
  - (Y)
  - (Z)
  -

— page 200 —
1. USS
Enemy: 35-12N
For Torpedo Attack (Own):
Firing range: 1700 yards
Kiel depth: 65 feet
Straight: 0° 0' 0" (N)
Type spread: 1.0
Attack: X (unopposed)
(checked) (opposed by air screen/close screen)
Detected: (prior to firing)
(checked) (after firing)
X (undetected)
Results: (Certain) no hits
(Estimated) --
Damage to own ship: none

CRITICAL NOTES:
1. For torpedo attack, use the format:
   - USS
   - Name
   - Rate
   - (Service No.)
   - Made initial contact by
   - (sound)
   - (radar)
   - (SMSD)
   - (MAD)
   - (Sight)
   - Brief Remarks: Target speed was apparently greater than the speed used in the solution of the problem. 17 knots used.

— page 202 —
9/12-15(72)/L11-1/PK
SROBERT
TAK FORCE SEVENTY-TWO,
Cree of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
April 10, 1943.

Subject: Loss of U.S.S. TITAN (SS201).

Merch 7, 1943.
Reported 3 remaining AK, of a five ship convoy with 1 DD escort Latitude 20-30° N., Longitude 142°-14° E., course 300° speed 10 knots, making good 8 knots, at 1800 E., March 7, 1943. Reported she had sunk two ships of that convoy with 3 hits out of 6 torpedoes fired at noon. March 6th, that an erratic torpedo run had forced her to take deep submergence, where she was counter-attacked by the destroyer who dropped 19 depth charges. Reported that she had later attempted two night attacks, one dawn attack, and one afternoon attack but had been unsuccessful on each occasion, and that she was returning to her area of attack at 11 knots.

Merch 8, 1943.
About 8 hours after transmitting her previous report, TITAN transmitted the following message "Amend Triton second. At 2300 made night attack. Fired 8. Be-lieve's hits. Results not observed during melee of gunfire and dog dog attack. Think two able kiggs sunk one damaged. Maybe TRIGGER will verify."

Merch 11, 1943.
Reported "Two groups of smoke, 5 or more ships each, plus escorts, 1° 8., 1480-20° E., at 1130 L., and one hour later. Course 310. Speed 10. kept down by the cover since dawn. Assume TITAN cannot cross Equator. An chasing." This was last word received from TRIGGER.

Was directed to stay south of Equator and informed that TRIGGER had been ordered by Commander to stay west of 1460 and north of Equator.

Merch 13, 1943.
Was informed that at 1000 L., March 13, 1943, 3 DD had been sighted in Latitude 28 S., Longitude 145°-44° E., course 010, speed 16 knots, and advised that they were probably on a submarine hunt or were a convoy over that had missed contact.

— page 203 —
1/2-15(72)/L11-1/FK
SEHCET
TAKE PHONE SEVENTY-TWO,
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
April 10, 1943.

Subject: Loss of U.S.S. TRITON (33201).

March 16, 1943.
Was directed to continue patrol northwest of the SEACELER - MUSSAM line up to the Equator. Wes later informed that one freighter would anchor alongside which had been damaged by TRITON's war proceeding on course 190°, making 2 knots, from Latinus 00-17° N., Longitude 144° 56' E., at 0100 L., March 16th, with two escorts. Was directed to go after them.

March 22, 1943.
Was told to patrol triangle formed by line from SEACELER due north to Equator then to MUSSAM and back to SEACELER. TUNN was pleased southeast of the SEACELER - MUSSAM line from GREMLEN to westward of line north from SEACELER. All were told to disregard areas when on the chase and to take evading action on encountering any submarine.

March 25, 1943.
THITON was told to clear her area and to move east along the parallel 15° S., to Longitude 152° E., then to return to BLISSANE via routing prescribed in his operation order.

2. Commander Teak Force SEVENTY-TWO's operation plan requires each submarine returning from patrol to report position, new results, and estimated time of arrival, on passing Latitude 12° 00' S. TRITON was expected to make this report about March 30th, 1943, and as she did not do so, she was directed on April 2, 1943, to report.

3. No report from TRITON having been received it is assumed that she is lost.

JAMES FIFE.
Copy to:
CincPac
Comdr. 3rd Flt.
Commubs 1st Flt.
Commubs 7th Flt.

COI:ID:11p/0T7Z-543/43