U.S.S. DRUM (SS-228) — war patrol report SS-228_DRUM_Part1.pdf

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1. U.S.S. DRUI - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
PERIOD FROM APRIL 17 TO JUNE 12, 1942.

AREAS - - - - - AID - - - -
1. NARRATIVE. (All times are KING unless otherwise
   labelled)

17 April  Left Pearl Harbor for Area ----- via MIDWAY.
17-21 April Enroute MIDWAY conducted ship drills, fire control
   drills, and training dives.
21 April 0655(W) Moored in MIDWAY Lagoon to fuel. 1030
   Departed MIDWAY.
25 April 0941(L) About 500 miles north of TAKE, made Radar
   contact at 5 miles which closed to 2 miles.
   Submerged. 1035 Surfaced.

27 April 0945(L) Sighted Large airplane crossing ahead of
   us at about 4000 feet. Lat. 29 - 01.5 N.; Long.
   155 - 30.0 E. Submerged. Surfaced at 1045.

28 April 1225 Radar contact at 10 miles. Submerged.
   Lat. 29 - 31.0 N.; Long. 150 - 00.0 E.
   Surfaced at 1303.

30 April 1045 Sighted enemy plane distant 6 miles; making
   Radar contact simultaneously. Submerged.
   Surfaced at 1145. 1300 Submerged because of
   broken low clouds in order to enter area undetected
   tomorrow morning.

1 May 0930 Entered Area ----- submerged. 2124 about 40
   miles southeast of TAKE SWIDO (entrance to TAKOYA),
   full moon in cloudless sky, sighted an enemy air-
   plane close aboard. Either the plane switched on
   its lights--- presumably as a recognition signal-
   or we then became aware of them. Submerged at
   once. Surfaced at 2210 to patrol at 6 knots and
   to be off the harbor entrance at daylight.
2355 Sighted a medium sized ship with considerable
   top-hamper about two miles on the port bow. Swung
   to close and attack.

2 May 0002 Fired two torpedoes, one hit (Attack No. 1).
   At time of firing second torpedo became aware of a
   destroyer near the target closing as at high speed.
   Went to 100 feet to avoid ramming, firing one
   torpedo at destroyer as we dove (Attack No. 2).

-1- INCLOSURE (A)

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SS228/A16-3
Serial 08
DECLASSIFIED
From: The Commanding Officer,
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: War Patrol - report of.
Reference: (a) Submarines; Pacific Fleet, Confidential
Letter 10, 3-42.
Enclosure: (A) U.S.S. DRUM War Patrol, Report of.
1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (A)
is forwarded herewith.

Copy to:
Comsubdr 8, Consubdiv 101.

ENCLOSURE (A)

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U.S.S. DRUI
SUBJECT: U.S.S. DRUI - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.

Missed. 0010 Came to periscope depth, found destroyer lying to eastern, range about 1500 yards. Fired three torpedoes (Attack No. 3). Missed. Periscope incapable of train due to cockbilling of hoisting ring. Made repairs to periscope. Original target not seen. 0155 Decided to clear vicinity submerged. 0200 Sporadic depth charge attack began, lasting until 1800. Surfered no damage. Sound search ended 1930. 2230 Surfaced, stood to southward charging batteries.

3 May Rested the crew. Service torpedoes. Position doubtful.

7 May Closing coast off KATIRI ZAKI. Sea made up so that depth control became impossible at periscope depth. Blew out negative tank flooded gasket. 1630 surfaced involuntarily from 90° feet in a gale with heavy seas. Set course to ride out.

8 May Land abated, turned to close coast. 2300 Sighted KASHIIO ZAKI and SHIOHO ZAKI lights.

9 May Conducting submerged patrol off the coast north of KATIRI ZAKI. 1353 About 3 miles off shore; sighted 5-6000 ton vessel south bound. 'lade attack, fired four torpedoes from stern tubes, violent explosion (Attack No. 4). This ship was probably a naval auxiliary, similar to our C-1 freighter; 5-6000 tons, loaded, exceptionally neat and new looking. Could not make out naval design. Decided to shift operations to Area ---, available to us for several days, then return to this promising hunting ground.

11 May Patrol in vicinity IWURA SHIIA and HITAYA SHIIA for north-south traffic from Tokyo Bay. Received message from Commander Task Force SWENI concerning damaged CV and assigning Area --- to us as additional for the remainder of patrol.

12 May Patrolled passages of IZW SHIO. Noted searchlights on O SHIIA illuminating east channel to Tokyo. Spent the night in heavy rain, passing south and west of O SHIIA to patrol western Tokyo entrance channel tomorrow.

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EXPLOSURE (A)

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13 May
0928 While submerged 9 miles off TSUMEKI SAKI - light, sighted inbound steamer. At 0956 attacked with one torpedo. Ship split in two and began to settle, crew abandoning (Attack 10.5). This ship was a freighter of about 6000 tons (photograph taken after firing). 1000 sighted a bomber about 1 mile away, headed toward us. 1001 Planes began bombing. Went to 100 feet. 1025 Depth charge attack began, lasting until 1143. Suffered no damage. Supersonic search ended 1600. Proceeded submerged to the southeast to clear islands in strong current.

14-15 May
Received orders from Commander Task Force SEVEN to stay in Area ---- for remainder of patrol. Patrolling passage of IZU SHOTO. Sighted numerous small craft.

16 May
Submerged 7 miles west of IKUMA SHIMA sighted a large vessel south bound with three trawler-type escorts. Unable to close because of extreme range. The master gyro became erratic.

17 May
Stopped gyro to renew bearing.

19 May
Patrolling into castor channel Tokyo entrance. Heavy rain and sea building up. Turned to south-east. 1330 Broached during periscope exposure owing to heavy seas. 1345 First of four depth charges--getting--progressively closer. No propellers' heard. The gyro requires further adjustment. Surfaced in strong northwest wind and heavy seas.

20 May
Experienced difficulty getting the ship under in heavy seas. Stopped the gyro for further adjustments. Sea conditions preclude operations.

21 May
Riding out storm.

22 May
Patrolling about three-miles off shore of IODINA SAKI, sea glassy with long swells. Sighted six ships, including one destroyer; unable to close any suitable targets. Sighted numerous small craft, which imposed much manouevring to avoid, and commanded attention of periscope. Sighted 1 bomber one mile away.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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23 May
Had intended closing the coast north of our position yesterday. Failed to sight KATSUURA light as planned; postier doubtful. During the day sighted numerous small craft which imposed maneuver. Sighted one destroyer hull down, one gunboat, and several trawler-type vessels.

25 May
0230 Sighted KATSUURA light and lights of shore line. Closed the coast. 1430 Iade' approach on a small steamer; allowed it to pass. 1600 Commenced approach on north bound coastal steamer, 2-3000 tons. 1638 Fired one torpedo, hit 'abaft stack (Attack No. 6). (Photograph taken). She settled rapidly by the stern, afire aft, and sank.

26-27 May
Working along coast to patrol off IJURO SAKI. Lunacrous small craft.

28 May
While submerged, about 5 miles cast of IJURO SAKI sighted 10,000 ton Naval tender for transport bound up the coast. 1858 Fired five torpedoes--missed. (Attack No. 7). Target maneuver successfully to avoid. 1918 Hard explosion of a light bomb, apparently from air escort.

31 May
Submerged 5 miles off IJURO SAKI, sea glassy. Small craft around us all the time. Fould the nets of one, and experienced a heavy bung which upon surfacing suddenly, appeared to have been a'not cable strikingly the periscope. Chars and No. 2 periscope. 1440 Iadar an explosion--probably an airplane bomb. 1550 Sighted a patrol bomber, 1 mile, 1637 Sighted a patrol bomber, 1 mile; went to 100 feet. 1655 Picked up fast propeller which faded out in 5 minutes. The presence of planes and the complete lack of shipping make it appear that since our uns successful attack of May 28, the enemy has instituted active anti-submarine measures here. Surfaced, decided to return to PEARL, since there was not sufficient time to gain a good position for the single day remaining of our allowed period.

1 June
Started return to base.

3 June
1118 Radar contact, 12 miles. Submerged. 1230 Surfaced.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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5 June
Received orders from Commander Task Force SEVEN to close IIDWAY and look for burning enemy BB. Continued return route as best course to comply.

6 June
Received orders from Commander Task Force SEVEN to patrol a line to intercept a damaged enemy CV. 1400 (Loves) Attained position on proscribed line and commenced search.

7 June
0724 (like) sighted unidentified aircraft; distant about 3 miles. Submerged. 0746 Surfaced. 0918. Radar contact, miles. Submerged. 0942 Surfaced. Crossed International Date Line.

7 June
1500 (Y) Received orders from Commander Task Force SEVEN to return to PEARL.

12 June
Effected rendezvous with NARVAL, TRIGGER, and escort, and arrived PEARL.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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U.S.S. DRUI: REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.

In bad visibility near land, the Radar was useful in getting a rough fix-when the ship's position relative to high points-of land was already known approximately.

Numerous navigational lights on shore were sighted at night, and all appeared to have the characteristics described in reference (a). Then close to shore in daylight, submerged, it was possible to keep the ship's position by cutting in objects on shore and prominent mountain peaks.

The fathometer was useful when close to shore. Soundings were obtained by single pings.

5. Description of Vessels Sighted.

CONTACT: DATE: POSITION: COURSE: SPEED: DESCRIPTION
NO.

1. :May: Off NAGOYA : 250 : 10 : Medium sized ship.
2. :May: Off SHIONO : 230 : 25 : Attack No. 1
3. :May: Off SHIONO : 240 : : Lasts only.
4. :May: Off SHIONO : 240 : 8 : 3000 ton freighter
5. :May: Off SHIONO : 240 : 10 : 5-6000 ton freighter
6. :May: Off SHIONO : 240 : 9 : Attack No. 4
7. :May: Off SHIONO : 240 : 9 : 6000 ton freighter
8. :May: Off SHIONO : 240 : 10 : 2000 ton freighter
9. :May: Off SHIONO : 240 : 10 : Small gunboat
10. :May: Off SHIONO : 240 : 10 : Small freighter
11. :May: West of 160 : 7 : 10,000 ton freighter
12. :May: Off NOJIMA : 240 : 10 : Escorted by 3 trawlers.
13. :May: Off NOJIMA : 240 : 10 : SMITHONO class DD
14. :May: Off KATSUURA : 240 : 10 : 3 upbound empty and 3 downbound loaded freighters.
15. :May: Off KATSUURA : 240 : 10 : 1 DD, and PG
16. :May: Off KATSUURA : 240 : 10 : 1 small freighter; 1
17. :May: Off INUJO : 240 : 10 : 2-3000 ton freighter.
18. :May: Off INUJO : 240 : 10 : 1 Attack No. 6
19. :May: Off INUJO : 240 : 10 : 10,000 ton Naval tender
20. :May: Off INUJO : 240 : 10 : for transport. Attack No.7.

Sighted numerous small craft throughout the patrol.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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U.S.S. DRUI
SUBJECT:  U.S.S. DRUI - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.

6. Description of Aircraft Sighted.

DATE:  POSITION  :NO.:  DESCRIPTION
Apr. :Lat. 2-00.0 N.  : 1 : U.S. Navy PBY
7 :Long.163-10.0 7  :
Apr. :Lat. 2-12.0 N.  :
18 :Long.163-20.0 7. : 1 : U.S. Navy PBY
Apr. :Lat. 27-36.0 N.  :
25 :Long.166-30.0 7. : 1 : Radar contact only.
Apr. :Lat. 29-02.0 N.  :
27 :Long.155-30.0 7. : 1 : Japanese flying boat type
Apr. :Lat. 29-38.0 N.  :
28 :Long.148-53.0 7. : 1 : Radar contact only
Apr. :Lat. 30-27.0 N.  :
30 :Long.139-11.0 7. : 1 : Japanese flying boat
May :Lat. 34-10.0 N.  :
1 :Long.137-38.0 7. : 1 : Japanese, type unknown
May :Lat. 34-39.0 N.  :
13 :Long.139-11.0 7. : 1 : Japanese flying boat
May :LT. 32-01.0 N.  :
22 :HONSHU  : 1 : Seen briefly thru periscope.
May :LT. 32-01.0 N.  :
31 :HONSHU  : 2 : Landplane bombers
June :Lat. 34-30.0 N.  :
3 :Long.153-05.0 7. : 1 : Radar contact only
June :Lat. 32-01.0 N.  :
7 :Long.174-25.0 7. : 1 : Unidentified.
June :Lat. 32-01.0 N.  :
7 :Long.174-47.0 7. : 1 : Radar contact only

In addition to the above, sighted various friendly planes patrolling MIDWAY-PEARL HARBOR.

-8- ENCLOSURE (A)

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U.S.S. DRUI
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. DRUI - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL

8. Enemy A/S Iscasures.

Japanese traffic is routed close inshore wherever possible. The Japanese coast' and island passages visited are patrolled by destroyers and converted trawlers equipped with supersonic and probably sonic gear. The Inas along the coast are also patrolled by aircraft. Important ships are escorted.

The depth charge attack of 21 May was very persistent (16 hours). Lost of the dropings were single, though barrages were employed toward the end. Approximately 31 charges were heard. That there were silent sonic vessels engaged in this attack is evidenced by the sudden detonation of depth charges after a period of almost an hour of silence in our sound gear.

The bombing and depth charge attack of 13 May was less persistent, but it developed with amazing rapidity. Airplanes apparently sighted the torpedo wake, so that the prompt attack with bombs was natural. But the unmistakable sound of propellers and echo ranging equipment within five minutes of a periscope sweep which revealed no vessels, and the prompt and close depth charges were surprising. The very high speed screws and the quickness of their arrival on the scene suggest motor torpedo boats. During this attack about 17 charges were heard.

During this patrol, hundreds of small craft were sighted. Undoubtedly many were simply fishing. Lost of those sighted at night were lighted; some were not. Although one cannot be sure that many of these are engaged in anti-submarine observation, there is good reason to believe that some are. For example this ship spent two days and nights in the north-south passage of the IZO SHOTO without sighting any, small craft, then closed the coast, sank a ship, and rettired under depth charge attack. The following day and night, in the area previously deserted, small craft were numerous. Possibly these are placed as nuisances, which they unquestionably are to a submarine trying to attain--undetected--a good position for attack on worth while targets.

The depth charges heard on 19 demonstrated that weather is no deterrent to Japanese anti-submarine activities. The sea was very rough (we broached), and sound conditions for surface vessels must have been bad. Our broaching brought on the attack undoubtedly, but the fact that the dropings became pro-gre actively closer and were distributed over a period of two hours, would make it appear that they were from a surface craft, not an airplane.

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EMICLATURE (A)

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9. Major Defects Experienced.

"A" Fire Control

The target' boaring transmitters were not used' because of their unreliability. Errors up to 5 degrees developed, but these were not constant. Therefore, no correction could be applied with any assurance of its being right.

"B" Torpedoes

(a) One torpedo, in flooded tube at 60 feet for 15 minutes, contained 10 gallons of water in aft torpedo and a completely flooded gyro pot. Inspection revealed the gasket beneath the air manifold access plate broken, and the studs of the plate not set up tightly.

(b) One torpedo, in flooded tube at 60 feet for 20 minutes, contained a completely flooded exploded. The screw was installed in this torpedo.

"C" C. & R.

(a) Negative tank flood valve gasket was blown after one week on station. Tank was carried full' thereafter. Loss of the use of negative tank proved a definite military deficiency.

(b) The master blow valve to the after' group of main ballast tanks developed a bad pit in its seat. Two efforts were made to repair this, the second being successful. The after and middle group vents were left OPEN while submerged on station.

(c) The attack periscope was foggy throughout the patrol.

(d) During the fight attack of 1-2 May, the attack periscope, number two, was lowered by using the "emergency lowering" push button. The slack wire cutout switches failed to function rapidly enough when the lower limit of periscope travel was reached. The after hoisting wire unrecoded from the drum to such an extent that when the periscope was hoisted again, the after wire took all the weight. This caused the lifting ring to cock, and prevented the training of the periscope. After the after wire was rearranged on its drum, the periscope could be trained.

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U.S.S. DRUI
SUBJECT: _ U.S.S. DRUI - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.
"Dr" Engineering.

On May 18, the south rotor bearings of the gyro
compass became very noisy and were removed. On June 11,
a similar failure occurred in the north rotor. The bearings
became noisy and caused the gyro to vibrate excessively.
Both casualties were preceded by a loss in vacuum
in the rotor casings.

Cause of defect is not known.

10. Radio Reception.

Communications were very good between this task
unit and Commander Task Force SEVEN through IMTI.

All messages sent by Commander Task Force SEVEN
were received in their entirety except the first one, received
the first night in the area. The first few groups of this
message were missed due to radar interference and extensive
submerged operations that night and the following night.

MTI could be heard on low frequency at all times
while on the surface, but it was difficult to copy the Fox Schedules for about one hour at sunset and sunrise beyond 2500 miles
from Pearl Harbor. At these times these schedules could be
clearly heard on one of the high frequencies. Submerged reception at periscope depth on MTIs low frequency, using loop
coupling unit, could not be obtained beyond 1200 miles from
Pearl Harbor.

The enemy appeared to be jamming 4115 and 8230
kilocycles, and at times it was impossible to copy on 4115
kilocycles due to this interference.

Transmissions to Commander Task Force SEVEN were
sent directly to MTI on 4235 kilocycles at night.

Associated Press was copied at 0600 GMT on 12550
and 6270 kilocycles from station IFS/IMA6 at San Francisco.

Five enemy plane contacts were made by the SD Radar;
however, there were several instances in which the known presence
of planes was not detected by the Radar. This leads to the
conclusion that reliable negative information cannot be obtained
with this Radar. A Radar warning bell located in the control
tower and operated from the radio room, proved to be of great
value in notifying the bridge of Radar contacts.

- 12 - ENGLISH (A)

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U.S.S. DRUI
COIFFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: U.S.S. DRUI - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL

Last Consecutive Serial Sort - 3
Last Consecutive Serial Received - 13

11. Sound Conditions.

Sound conditions off the southeastern coast of Japan were very poor. The maximum range at which targets were picked up was 3000 yards, and there were instances when the crews of heavy ships making about 10 knots could not be detected at 900 yards. These poor sound conditions are probably caused by the large number of minute particles of foreign matter suspended in the water. There were disturbances in the water, thought to be of volcanic origin, some of which could be easily mistaken for light high speed crews. Enemy echo-ranging equipment operated on 21 kilocycles.

There were no density layers observed.

12. Health and Habitability.

The health and morale of the crew were excellent during the entire patrol. There were no illnesses except minor complaints of no consequence. Vitamin tablets were issued in accordance with current instructions. The food was good, well cooked and well varied. The crew were fortunate in having on board an apprentice seaman-cook, making a total of three, which was arranged to be a duty for the first time to be carried out. During the 31 days in the area, a total of 1930 hours were observed as follows:

0330 - 0430  Precatast.
1130 - 1230  Dinner.
1930 - 2030  Supper

Soup or sandwiches were generally served at 1600. These meal hours were satisfactory.

The boat was comfortable throughout the entire period of operations. The air conditioning system was used during submerged hours, using one or two units as necessary. During one or two exceptionally long dives it was necessary to use CO2 absorbent and oxygen.

13. Factors of Endurance Remaining:

| Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions (days) | Personnel (days) |
||------|||
| 7         | 12,000 | 21             | 7              |

- 13 -  ENCLOSURE (A)

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14. The patrol was terminated by the provisions of the operation order.

15. Miscellaneous comment and figures which may be useful to others:
   - Time on station: 31 days
   - Fuel used on station: 12365 gallons.
   - Miles on station: 2274
   - Fuel (gal/nile) on station: 5.45
   - Fuel (gal/cay) on station: 393
   - Ave. C.G. at start of charge: 1:201
   - Ave. duration of charge: 2:9 hours
   - Fresh water (man/day): 2:37 gallons.
   - Air conditioning condensate (day): 50 gallons.
   - Total miles steamed: 9600

The first time we were depth charged, the refrigerator tor notors were stopped on the order "Rig to Run Silent". It was some time before we became aware that the cold room temperature was rising and the system quit in again. This oversight cost us a little meat. On a tropical patrol it is much more serious.

-14-

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1. The 1st War Patrol of the DRUM entered for
   April 17 to June 12, 1942. Of this patrol of fifty-seven
   days, thirty-one were spent on station. It is particularly
   to be noted that the DRUM was forced to submerge a but four
   times enroute to station.

2. The patrol was aggressively carried out, close
   inshore, in an area of extensive anti-submarine operations,
   and the ship was smartly handled in the face thereof. The
   loss of the use of magnetic tack early in the patrol imposed
   a handicap, especially during heavy weather. Attention is
   invited to the indications of the use by the enemy of rotor
   torpedo boats for anti-submarine work.

3. The procedure of four torpedoes on the 1st
   of 2 May against an attacking destroyer resulted in
   unfortunate. The Commander Officer stated that the destroyer
   was hit to hit, so was on throughout the first part of the last
   three of these four torpedoes. It is concluded that there
   was justification for a decision to take advantage
   of the opportunity presented. The failure of any of the
   hit cannot be claimed.

4. Observation of the officers and crew of the DRUM
   upon return from patrol indicated an excellent state of morale.

5. The Division Commander concludes the Commander's
   report, officers, and crew of the DRUM for a well conducted war patrol and for the damage inflicted upon the enemy.

O. S. COLOUGH.

Copy to:
Commander EIGHT.
C.O. DRUM.

— page 19 —
A16
Serial 046
June 13, 1942.

Confidential
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Eight.
To: Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: First war Patrol, U.S.S. DRUM; Comments on Report of.

1. The DRUM during her first war patrol remained on station for a period of 31 days of a total time of 56 days absent from base. This is considered a very creditable performance. It is to be noted that the patrol was terminated by the provisions of the Operation Order, and not by reaching the limit of any factor of endurance.

2. This patrol appears to have been well and aggressively conducted. Firing ranges on all but one of seven attacks were within fifteen hundred yards. Two of the attacks were made at night on the surface; all other attacks were made from periscope depth. Patrol station in close proximity to the coast of enemy homeland was maintained for a considerable part of the time on station.

3. Enemy anti-submarine measures in the area are clearly and accurately portrayed by the report, and should be of considerable assistance to submarines assigned this area in future.

4. The DRUM is credited with the following losses inflicted on the enemy during the period of this patrol:

   One medium sized ship - Damaged.
   One 2-3000 ton freighter - Sunk.
   Two 6000 ton freighters - Sunk.

5. It is considered that personnel of the Drum are to be congratulated upon a smart and alert initial war patrol.

C. H. ROPER.

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3088
FF12-10/A16-3(5) SUBMARINES, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0692 9-0459 Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
June 19, 1942.

COMBUBAC PATROL REPORT NO. 36
U.S.S. DRUM - FIRST WAR PATROL.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) - Report of First War Patrol.

Enclosure:
(A) Copy of subject report.
(B) Copy of Comsubdiv 101 Conf. 1tr. FB5-101/AL6-3, Serial 0101 of June 13, 1942.
(C) Copy of Comsubron 8 Conf. 1tr. FC5-4/A16, Serial 046 of June 13, 1942.

1. The first war patrol conducted by the U.S.S. DRUM was excellent in every respect.

2. It is noted that three torpedoes were fired at a destroyer whose bearing had remained constant for a considerable time, using no spread at a range of more than 1500 yards and at an estimated speed of zero and that all torpedoes missed. This same situation has occurred in several previous patrols conducted by submarines of this force. It must be remembered that a constant bearing indicates a relative speed of zero knots and not an actual speed of zero knots. If the problem is set up on the torpedo data computer, a solution of actual enemy speed can be quickly obtained.

3. The DRUM is credited with inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK
1 Seaplane Carrier - 9,000 tons
1 Freighter - 6,000 tons
1 Freighter - 6,000 tons
1 Freighter - 3,000 tons
24,000 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(21CM-42)
List I, Case 2: Special:
Pl(5), SSs EN3(5); EN10(1); EN28(5);
Consublant(2); Subschool, NL(8);
ComsubbSWPac(1); Cominch(5); Combat Intel(1).

E.R. SWINBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 22 —
1942.
SUBJECT: U.S.S. DRUM - Report of Second War Patrol.

PERIOD FROM JULY 10 to SEPTEMBER 1942.
AREA ______. OPERATION ORDER NO. 61-42.

1. NARRATIVE. (All times are KING unless otherwise labelled).

10 July
Left Pearl Harbor for Area ______. Conducted ship drills, fire control drills and training dives enroute.

12 July
Received orders from CTF-7 to investigate an enemy vessel believed aground on Rongelap Atoll.

16 July
Increased speed to full on two engines to arrive 'off Rongelap Atoll on the morning of the 18th, when another enemy vessel may arrive at scene of grounding.

18 July
0507(L) Submerged about 25 miles north of Rongelap to reconnoitre. Made landfall 1245, and at 1445 sighted most of grounded vessel in Lat. 110-25T0 N, longer steamer driven craft patrolling east-west to the northward of grounded ship. The situation did not present a promising submarine opportunity. Decided to return tomorrow to take advantage of any "break" which might occur, such as refloating and towing of ship or reduction of patrol; and to proceed on our way if there were no change.

19 July
Submerged observation of situation at Rongelap revealed no change. Blew out negative tank flood gasket. Opened out to surface and continue to assigned patrol area.

22 July
Submerged to conduct patrol off Ponape. 0944(L) three miles north of Ponape reef sighted enemy vessel to the eastward and started approach. At a range of 4500 yards identified target as the TAGASHAGO MARU, bearing all the correct emblems of a hospital ship. Discontinued the approach.

— page 23 —
22 July (Cont'd) 1600(L): a small boat passed over us.
1630(L) sighted a steam trawler idling between us and harbor entrance.
1848(L) sighted steamer standing out of harbor and commenced attack. Fired two torpedoes in gathering darkness; missed (Attack #1). The patrol trawler which had been accompanying target, circled us after we fired. Decided against surface pursuit because of presence of patrol boat, close proximity to Ponape air base, and wide chice of target to course after clearing point of reef.

23 July Stopped gyro compass to restore vacuum.

24 July Entered Area.

25 July 0500 Submerged on course 000°(T) to await daylight for fix, reversing course to 180°(T).
0600 Obtained fix, 3 miles south of South Island, and sighted two patrol craft to the northward. Thus, we must have submerged, close aboard the reef and the patrol craft. Distant explosions between 0750 and 0810. Spent the rest of the day dodging patrol craft close aboard.

27 July By process of elimination today established the source of constant stream of bubbles from the hull to be the forward torpedo impulse bottles. In flat seas obtaining have adopted the practice of bleeding them down before diving.

30 July 0800 Made approach on 3-4000 ton armed cargo vessel standing out of Otta Pass to the southeastward. Having obtained good position for stern tube shot, lost ability to attack through combination of radical zig-zag and the gyro angle limitations imposed by the Mark XV torpedo.

31 July Received information of KENYO MARU enroute from Rabual, and decided to shift position to westward of Royalist Reef tomorrow.

1 August Sighted two small st. amers which entered Aualap Pass, and one which came out the same pass. Unable to close any of them.

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ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 24 —
1. U.S.S. DRUM - Report of Second War Patrol.

2. August
Sighted 1 ship clearing Fizion Pass standing to westward out of range. Sighted masts and stacks of what appeared to be two sizeable cargo vessels standing southeast from Ottawa Pass but unfortunately on the opposite side of Royalist Reef from our position. Two patrol craft close aboard today.

3. August
0020 South of Ottawa Pass sighted two dark objects which were identified as small craft. As we opened out from these at high speed, heard 7 explosions. 0815 Submerged 6 miles east of South Island, heard three depth charges close enough to be personal. Nothing in sight. Assumed that plane had sighted us in glassy sea. More explosions at 0822. Came to periscope depth at 0900, saw nothing. Distant explosions until 1319.

4. August
Patrolling approaches to southeast end, Royalist Reef. Patrol craft passed within a mile during the afternoon. Received information from CTF-7 concerning running depth to be expected with various torpedoes and warheads. Decided to stand to the southward tonight, and spend part of tomorrow re-arranging all torpedoes in the forward room in order to have some loaded which could be expected to run at a depth of less than 20 feet, for use against destroyers.

5. August
Rearranged torpedoes.

6. August
0920 Sighted enemy cargo ship, began approach. 1000-Fired three MK XV torpedoes from stern tubes, one hit (Attack #2). Almost simultaneously with explosion of torpedo, Heard several bombs close aboard. The target turned away, stopped and re-started her propellers, and was somewhat obscured by a light grey haze. When a bomb splashed not far from the periscope, concluded our observations and went deep. No positive evidence of damage to the target was seen during this minute of observation. The bombing continued until 1028, a total of 14 "sticks" or sets of explosions becoming progressively more distant. Meanwhile the DRUM was running silently and deep because of doubtful sound contacts. Heard distant depth charges astern at 1630. Continued south in order to repack badly leaking port stern tube bearing tonight.

- 3 -

ENGLOSURE (C)

— page 25 —
7 August
    Heard 'distant' depth charges to the northward; nothing in sight. Presumably this is a systematic working over of our yesterday's attack area.

: 8 August
    Received information from CTF-7 concerning arrival of a submarine tender from the eastward on the 12th.

: 10 August
    Glassy seas. Three patrol craft.

: 11 August
    0700 Ten miles bearing 240°(T) from South Island, heavy rains, visibility zero. Sound picked up screws on port beam. Raised periscope and found an enemy submarine of the I class, forward of our beam, northbound. She was gone in the rain before anything could be done about her. Decided that our best chance to cover all possible approaches of the expected submarine tender lay in being east of South Island, which would give us a chance at her whether she approached Otaa Pass from north or south of Royalist Reef.

: 12 August
    Received information from CTF-7 that submarine tender would arrive 13th; and that enemy submarines were coming to Truk from the south.

: 13 August
    Patrolling between Royalist Reef and main reef. 0630 Two barrages of distant depth charges. During the morning one patrol craft and one small steamer stood out, the steamer too small for attack.
    2130 Received orders from CTF-7 to proceed to patrol southern entrance to Kaviking. Set course 190°(T), speed 15 knots.
    2240 Sighted three shapes, two to the southwest, one dead ahead (190°(T)). Stopped to listen and study. A few minutes later we were all enveloped in a downpour, - visibility zero - which lasted for 40 minutes. Contact was lost and not regained. Evidently we had at least found a convoy; but what it consisted of and which way it was going is a matter of conjecture.
    2340 Resumed course to new patrol station.

-4- ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 26 —
15 August
0645. Made landfall on Mussa Island, distant 45 miles. Decided to close to 20 miles, and conduct surface patrol around island at that distance. 1240 Course 180° (T), sighted enemy cargo vessel bearing 105° (T), distant 8-10 miles, course north. Turned to 030° (T), and increased to full speed to get into position which would permit attack. 1256 Sighted an airplane about 4 miles on the port bow headed toward us. Submerged; ran at 100 feet for five minutes; then came to 'periscope depth. Closed target at full speed. Observed airplane circling target. Abandoned approach at 1400 when it was obviously hopeless. Received information from CTF-7 concerning possible arrival at Kaviking of an enemy AV and another ship on 20 and 19 August respectively.

16 August
0530 Submerged on station southwest of Kaviking entrance. The attack periscope has been fogging badly for a good ten days. Today, it became quite useless. Shifted #1 periscope to the conning tower.

17 August
Submerged south of Steffen Strait. 0610 Sighted enemy destroyer, began approach. 0633 Fired three torpedoes - all missed (Attack #3). 0638 Destroyer made two depth charge attacks, both of which were very close. Minor damage:-(a) Radio antenna lead-in trunk flooded. 0815 Resumed periscope patrol. Received message from CTF-7 concerning arrival of an Auxiliary Carrier at Kaviking on the 19th.

20 August
Submerged south of Steffen Strait, sea smooth. 0600 Sighted masts of vessel in semi-darkness, and commenced closing to investigate. Identified her as a "SHINONOME" destroyer, speed about 19 knots, standing to the entrance. She passed at a range of 3000 yards. Did not attack. 1050 Sighted small craft standing out. Observed her for sometime. She was a small steamer, with a bow very much like our net-tenders. 1312 the same craft stood north and back into the strait.

— page 27 —
21 August: Submerged south of Steffen Strait. Rain squalls and poor visibility. 1700, when 2 miles south of Strait, sighted enemy destroyer evidently lying to on a westerly course in the entrance. About 2 minutes after our sighting her, and while we were studying her against the bad background of mist and trees, she turned south. Sound then picked up her screws, Range 4000, angle on bow zero, speed 26 knots. She passed over us a few minutes later and continued to the southward.

: 22 August: Received orders from CTF-7 to depart August 24th via point 19 for Midway.

: 23 August: Submerged patrol east and west course off Dyau Island.

: 24 August: 1900 Surfaced and commenced return to Base at Midway. Decided to spend tomorrow in a submerged patrol about 10 miles west of Mussa.

: 25 August: Cruising on surface. 0450 Sighted lights of an airplane close aboard on starboard quarter. Submerged, and spent the day as planned off Mussa.

: 27 August: 0926 Cruising on surface near southeast corner Area. As we emerged from a rain squall sighted enemy destroyer bearing 340°, distant 6 miles, angle on bow 35' starboard. Submerged. Destroyer passed, minimum range 8000 yards. Remained submerged for two and a half hours on reverse course of destroyer's course. 1245 Surfaced, resumed return route.

: 30 August: 1008(L). Lat. 140-50' 0 N, Long 166-42' 0 E. Sighted airplane distant about 5 miles, and submerged. 1050 Surfaced.

: 31 August: 0452(L). Sighted two airplanes about 2 miles on port bow, and submerged. 0530 Surfaced.

: 2 September: (YOKE): Effected rendezvous with escort and entered Midway.

— page 28 —
2. Weather.

(a) Truk Area. The weather was generally fair. Heavy showers were frequently encountered resulting in zero visibility. The surfaces of the water was disconcertingly smooth practically all the time.

(b) Kavien Area. Same as Truk except that showers were a little more frequent. Heavy-showers over the pass occurred usually about 4-5 o'clock in the afternoon, obscuring it from our view.

3. Tidal Information.

No strong or unusual tides or currents were noted.

4. Navigational Aids.

Peaks and tangents of Islands at both Truk and Kavien were excellent for cutting in the ship's position and simplified position keeping.

-7- ENGLISH (c)

— page 29 —
5. DESCRIPTIONS OF ENEMY VESSELS SIGHTED

Time | Description | Posit | Course | Speed | Remarks
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
18 July | 4, miscellaneous type - patrol | :1122810N | :16695710E | :Various: | -
18 July | :craft | :1122510N | :16695610E | : -
09:30 I | TAKUSAGAO MARU | :0700510N | :290 | :12Kts
22 July | BR 115 #84 | :15882310E | : -
(4) | Freighter-4000 ton | :0700510N | :290 | :12Kts
1848 I | Similar to S-48 Re- | :1582041E | :0750(7) | :8kts: Attack #1
22 July | :cognition Jap Mer- | : -
chantmen | : -
(5) | :0001 K | :Unidentified in | :0620241E | :ON | :This was a
25 July | :darkness | :15380010E | : :patrol boat
:on station.
(6) | :Patrol craft - 200 | :0700110N | :Station: | :This boat was
29 July | :tons | :152-01E | :O:ary | :on station at
:all times.
(7) | :Freighter-Similar to | :0700810N | :0900(ZZZ) | :Cleared Oft.
0700 K | :S-50 - Redognition of | :15125310E | :c/c to :10kts Pass.
30 July | :Jap Merchantman | :0300(T) | : -
(8) | :Small freighter-2000 | :0701110N | :0800 | :Entered Aua-
0748 K | :tons MFM | :15124610E | :and c/c | ? :lap Pass.
1 Aug. | :to 0400 | : -
(9) | :Small freighter-1500 | :0701110N | :Entered Aua-
0900 K | :tons MFM | :15124610E | : ? :Lap Pass.
1 Aug. | : -
(10) | :0701210N | :Cleared via
1042 K | :Unidentified MFM | :15124810E | :2700 | :Aualap Pass
1 Aug. | : -
(11) | :1924 K | :Patrol craft - night | :0655610N | :Various: ? :
1 Aug. | :unidentified | :15124310E | : -
(12) | :Patrol craft - 500 tons | :This vessel
0800 K | :MFM | :0700510N | :180 | :8kts:was seen sev-
2 Aug. | :

— page 31 —
28 Aug. : 1700 K : DD "SHINONOME" class : 21 Aug. : 0925 K : "SHINONOME" class : 27 Aug. :

| Time | Description | Posit | Course | Speed | Remarks |
|------||-------||||
| 1    | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 2    | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 3    | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 4    | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 5    | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 6    | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 7    | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 8    | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 9    | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 10   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 11   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 12   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 13   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 14   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 15   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 16   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 17   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 18   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 19   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 20   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 21   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 22   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 23   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 24   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 25   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 26   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 27   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 28   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 29   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 30   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 31   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 32   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 33   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 34   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 35   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 36   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 37   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 38   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 39   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 40   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 41   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 42   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 43   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 44   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 45   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 46   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 47   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 48   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 49   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 50   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 51   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 52   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 53   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 54   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 55   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 56   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 57   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 58   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 59   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 60   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 61   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 62   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 63   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 64   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 65   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 66   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 67   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 68   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 69   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 70   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 71   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 72   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 73   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 74   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 75   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 76   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 77   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 78   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 79   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 80   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 81   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 82   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 83   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 84   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 85   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 86   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 87   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 88   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 89   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 90   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 91   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 92   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 93   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 94   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 95   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 96   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 97   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 98   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 99   | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 100  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 101  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 102  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 103  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 104  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 105  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 106  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 107  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 108  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 109  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 110  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 111  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 112  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 113  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 114  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 115  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 116  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 117  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 118  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 119  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 120  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 121  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 122  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 123  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 124  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 125  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 126  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 127  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 128  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 129  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 130  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 131  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 132  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 133  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 134  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 135  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 136  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 137  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 138  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 139  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 140  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 141  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 142  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 143  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 144  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 145  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 146  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 147  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 148  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 149  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 150  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 151  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 152  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 153  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 154  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |         |
| 155  | 0830 X     | 180°  | Parallel | 1000 ft. |

— page 32 —
7. Particulars of Attack.

attack*No. :Firing:Est. :Pt.:Draft :Set :Est. :Track:Torpedo
Jo. :Torp: :Range:of :of :Depth:Speed:Angle:Perfor-
:

— page 33 —
8. Enemy A/S Measures.

The general picture of enemy A/S measures of 0fta Pass was much like the familiar one of Pearl entrance. Small craft of miscellaneous types cruised aimlessly about, stopping, starting, and changing course frequently. This, combined with the glassy sea prevailing, made observation difficulty, and kept us on pins and needles much of the time.

Probably some of thamany explosions in the Truk area were embarrassing charges covering shipping we could not see. But once or twice they were sufficiently close to be the result of our having been sighted by aircraft.

The depth charge counter-attack following our unsuccessful attack on the destroyer on 17 August was remarkable in the shortness of its duration and in the fact that as far as we could tell, no sound gear was used. Both attacks were smartly executed and very close. The destroyer held her course for all our torpedoes had passed, then she turned and came right for the periscope. Her second attack came in on the port quarter. She passed right over us, but released her charges a little too late.

9. Major Defects Experienced.

(A) ENGINEERING.

#1 Lighting Motor Generator ran away when speed regulator grounded. Damaged field coils, armature windings, and ventilation impeller. Temporary repairs effected by ship's force.

Pitometer Log - erratic performance commencing July 11th and eventually becoming completely inoperative submerged during the last week on station. Cause unknown.

Main engine exhaust valves leaked throughout patrol. Serious defect developed in #3 M.E. exhaust valve which on three occasions failed to close until after ship had submerged. Valve was finally closed by repeated attempts with hydraulic power. Subsequent inspection topside revealed no apparent defect. #2 M.E. exhaust valve froze in the closed position on one occasion, and was finally opened with a crowbar under the rocker arm to valve topside. This type exhaust valve appears to be too delicate and temperamental for submarine use.

- 12 - ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 34 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. DRUM - Report of Second War Patrol.

(B) G & R.

"Negative tank flood valve gasket was blown prior to arrival on station. Tank was carried full thereafter. Loss of the use of negative tank is a definite military deficiency.

The attack periscope (No. 906; type 89KA40/1.414) logged up so badly after twenty days on station that it was necessary to shift No. 1 periscope (No. 856; type 89KA40/1.99) to the conning tower. No difficulty was experienced in this operation which was completed in six hours.

Excessive air leakage from the forward impulse bottles necessitated the adoption of the practice of bleeding them down each morning prior to diving.

During the depth charge attack of 17 August, the radio antenna trunk flooded. Most of the leakage was stopped by tightening up on the improperly locked studs of the handhole plate just above the pressure hull. The small leakage which persisted throughout the remainder of the patrol was probably due to damaged insulators.

(C) RADIO, SOUND AND RADAR.

On August 23, the radar developed a ground which rendered it inoperative. After two days searching several burned out resistors and capacitors were located and replaced. The radar was again made operative, but its efficiency was doubtful.

10. Radio Reception.

Radio reception was complete at all times; however, when NPM shifted from the 8 thousand to the 12 and 16 thousand bands at 1900 G.C.T., radio reception off Kavieng became very difficult.

Last Consecutive Serial Sent: -2.
Last Consecutive Serial received -8.

11. Sound Conditions and Density Layers.

Sound conditions off 'Truk were from fair to good. The maximum range at which bearings were obtained was about 6000 yards. At Kavieng sound conditions were excellent. Bearings and screw counts were obtained on destroyer screws at 10,000 yards. During the heavy rain storms which occurred frequently in this area the sound gear was nearly useless be-

- 13 - ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 35 —
14 - ENCLOSURE (c)
Subject: U.S.S. DRUM - Report of Second War Patrol.
cause of the heavy background noise caused by the rain.
There were no definite density layers observed.
12. Health and Habitability.
The health of the crew was excellent. The habi-
tability of the ship was very good thanks to the efficient opera-
tion of the air conditioning plant.
During. submerged operations the following meal
hours were observed:
0330 - 0430 Breakfast
1130 Dinner (cold meal)
1800 Supper
The food was good and well prepared.
13. Miles steamed enroute to and from station - 8500.
14. Fuel oil expended - 74,800.
15. Factors of endurance remaining:
Torpedoes Fuel Provisions (days) Fresh Water Personnel (days)
16 18600 30 Unlimited 7
16. This patrol was ended by orders of Task Force Commander.
17. Remarks.
(A) RADAR. In the vicinity of Truk, there appeared
intermittently on the normal radar line long, thin, vertical
lines topped with small blocks which curved continuously back and
forth across the screen. In addition, there were brilliant half
moon shaped interferences which blocked out half the normal line.
Both of these indications were present several times during dark
nights when our own submarines nearby would not, presumably,
have had their radars in operation. Possibly the explanation is
the presence of enemy shore radar or radar detector.
(B) It is not possible for one submarine effectively
to cover Ota Paas. Royalist Reef lies close athwart the pass,
necessitating submerged patrol on one side or the other; or leads
one, as it did us at times, to try to be in two places at once.
by covering the approaches to Royalist Reef itself.

— page 36 —
FC5-10/A16-3/101  SUBMARINE SQUADRON TEN
Serial 021  Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
September 12, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
From:  The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To:  The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. DRUM - Report of Second War Patrol.

1. The second war patrol of the U.S.S. DRUM covered a period of 54 days. The results of this patrol were disappointing in that while a large number of contacts were made, only a small number could be developed, and many were not considered worth developing. It is believed that excellent opportunities to sink two destroyers were presented on 20 and 21 August.

2. Patrols such as encountered on 18 and 19 July protecting a grounded ship must be expected. The risk attached to penetrating such a patrol must be weighed against the value of the target. It is believed that larger patrol craft, probably, was worth a torpedo.

3. The DRUM is refitting at Midway.

-1- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 37 —
1. While the report of the second war patrol conducted by the DRUM appears to be a succession of lost opportunities and disappointments, I am certain that it was more aggressive in nature than the colorless factual statements of the report seem to indicate. The Commanding Officer did not explain why the grounded maru to which he was directed on July 18th presented an unpromising target. A statement of the controlling unfavorable features of the situation should have been made for clarity.

2. Saving the best torpedoes for "the big chance" is a matter of individual judgement based upon the probability of that chance materializing. In the type of war now being waged, however, I believe that no opportunity should be lost merely to save for that "lucky day". Although it is not definitely stated that a desire to expend Mark XV torpedoes influenced the attack position gained and lost on July 30th, the remark under the particulars of attack No. 2 leads one to believe that this is true. If so, it was an error in judgement in my opinion.

3. Material:

Drum is being refitted by the Fulton. The major material casualties experienced on this patrol were not many in number nor of particularly serious natures. The most serious defect was that experienced with nos. 2 and 3 main engine exhaust valves. This may be a defect in design and it is assumed that the Fulton will conduct a thorough investigation and will submit recommendations in the premise if necessary.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 38 —
2.3.2.2. 10 0387
Reg. No. 2.3.2.2. 10 0387
Serial 01071
FF12-10/A16-3(5) SUBMARINES, PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U.S. FLEET
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.
September 15, 1942 OCT 6 15 43

CONFIDENTIAL
CONSULAR PATROL REPORT NO. 66
U.S.S. DRUM - SECOND "AR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) - Report of Second "ar Patrol.

Enclosure:
(A) Copy of Consubron 10 Conf 1tr FC5-10/ 1-6-3/101 Serial 021 of September 12, 1942.
(B) Copy of Consubdiv 102 Conf 1tr F35-102/ 1-6-3 Serial 013 of September 13, 1942.
(C) Copy of subject war patrol.

1. The comments of Commander Submarine Squadron Ten and Commander Submarine Division 102 are concurred in.

2. The judgment of the Commanding Officer in not attacking the grounded ship to which he was directed on July 18th is accepted. However, it is believed that the target was valuable to be so well guarded and that every effort should have been made to complete her destruction by evading patrols, or sinking them if necessary.

3. The information on the approach on July 30 is meager. The stern shot should normally be reserved for sudden changes in course by target, emergencies, etc. If the attack is based on the intentions of a stern shot, the submarine will frequently be left "Snipe Hunting" (Holding the bag).

4. The decision of Commanding Officer on August 6, 1942, to use evasive tactics is concurred in. However, if the ship was disabled, a later follow up was in order. After once going under and losing the enemy air, there is little danger in a subsequent quick observation and follow up.

5. Initiative was used in regulating the advance to the patrol area so as to be able to reconnoiter PONAFE enroute and still arrive in the area on time.

42971 FILMED -1-

— page 39 —
1. U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) - Report of Second War Patrol.

6. Many uncompleted contacts were made, and, though realized that all cannot be followed to a successful conclusion, every effort should be made to realize this ambition. Determination, judgment and orthodox procedures will usually result in a proper balance of good and hard luck.

7. The DRUM is credited with the following damage to the enemy:

DAMAGED
1 freighter - 4,000 tons.

R. H. ENGLISH.

DISTRIBUTION
(21 GI-42)
List I, Case 2:
Pl(5), SSs
Special:
EN3(5); Consubliant(2);
Comsubsowospac(2);
Comnich(5).

E. R. STENBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 41 —
634250
190
3/42:11-7

FF12-10/A16-3(5) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01304
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
November 16, 1942

DECLASSIFIED
COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 93
U.S.S. DRUM - THIRD WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) - Report of Third War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Comsubdiv 42 Conf 1tr FB5-42/A4-3. -
    Serial 061 of November 10, 1942.
    (B) Copy of subject war patrol.

1. In spite of poor torpedo performance, and, in one instance, poor torpedo fire control, the U.S.S. DRUM on her third war patrol turned in a creditable score of damage inflicted upon the enemy.

2. The percentage of torpedo hits (17.4%) is below average. Three misses are known to have been caused by premature explosions. This number of premisses is beyond reasonable expectancy based on past torpedo performance of submarines of this Force. Every effort is being made to determine and eliminate the cause of premature explosions. An examination of the one torpedo remaining in the DRUM, upon return from patrol, showed that both the torpedo and the exploder had been properly adjusted and no abnormal conditions could be found.

3. To assist in an analysis of the DRUM's torpedo performance, the following summary has been prepared:

(a) Misses unaccounted for

— page 43 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-TWO.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM - Report of Third War Patrol.

1. The DRUM is in good material condition and will be back in a fully operating status at the end of the normal refit period (2 weeks). It may be decided later to dock her for purposes of cleaning and painting the underwater body. No other items will require docking, both stern tubes being considered satisfactory.

2. Opposed to the excellent manner in which the ship's material stood up in general is the very unimpressive torpedo performance. Of twenty-three torpedoes fired four hit; 26,237 tons were sunk or 1140 tons per torpedo fired. It is understood that the torpedo which the vessel brought back has been thoroughly checked by the Base Torpedo Shop and no abnormal conditions found.

3. Special effort will be made to prevent flooding the radio antenna trunk due to damaged insulators. It is noted that the same defect was experienced on the previous patrol.

4. The excellent state of preservation of the paint on the periscopes on the vessel's return from patrol was conspicuous, proving that etching the surface is most effective.

5. The conduct of the patrol itself and the excellent report thereof are dividends we're beginning to collect as a result of added seasoning and experience by commanding officers who were naturally proficient to begin with.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 44 —
23 Sept. 0530 (Yoke) Left. Ilday for assigned areas. The port main shaft began heating up during the afternoon. 1930 (Mike) Crossed 180th Meridian, changed date to 24 Sept.

: 24-29 Enroute, conducting ship; gun, and fire control drills for training. Stopped port. shaft four times during darkness to repack or rearrange packing in stern tube.

: 1 Oct. 0745 (King) Radar contact, 9 miles. Submerged. Surfaced 0826.

: 2 Oct. Commenced daylight submerged cruising, about 35 miles east of our area and under low broken clouds. 2040 (Inter) Entered area.

: 3 Oct. Iade landfall in Ilkura. Jhina. The sea made up so that depth control at periscope depth was impossible.

: 4 Oct. Sighted a freighter similar to Chokai Iaru and began approach, but were unable to close. She appeared to be using a constant helm zig-zag method.

: 6 Oct. Shifting operations to Kuhano Ieda in area

: 7 Oct. When submerged three miles east of Iivazaki Wan, sighted medium sized freighter downbound close inshore. Iade approach, but failed to gain good attack position. Sighted a small steamer upbound, too small to shoot. Just after sunset sighted ship resembling the Kamakura Iaru, travelling under diplomatic immunity and due in Yokohama about four days ago. She had a large white cross painted on her stack; and after dusk she was brilliantly lighted with side floodlights and the usual lights of passenger vessels. During this day, samps, junks, and various small craft were numerous.

-1- [END OF REPORT]

— page 45 —
8 Oct. 0902: When submerged for miles off I'iki Saki Light, sighted smoke, which after some fifteen minutes developed into an air-escorted convoy of four freighters downbound, the first three in close column, the last trailing by about a mile and a half. Commenced approach. 1007 fired two torpedoes at leading ship - both missed. 1009 fired two torpedoes: Attack at second ship - one hit. 1010 fired: 1/1 two torpedoes at third ship - both missed. Turned to use stern tubes, but found that ship 1 was maneuvering radically; down coast, ships 2 and 3 similarly up coast, while ship 2 was dead in the water, burning, rapidly settling by the stern, and required no more torpedoes to finish her. She was similar to Koyada Taru - 5337 tons. Decided to clear out, bombs having been falling since the firing of our last salvo. 1017 Sighted two bombers, and began running at 80 feet between observations. 1150 Sighted a biplane in a glide toward us. 1210 Resumed periscope patrol. Decided to stand to southward, and gain position east of Shiono Misaki for tomorrow's patrol.

9 Oct. 0155: While closing east sighted a ship to the eastward, dark of the moon, overcast 1007, visibility poor. L'aneuvered to identify and ascertain course and speed. After two hours decided that gaining position ahead for submerged attack was impossible in view of approaching daylight, and that night surface attack under visibility conditions existing would probably be a failure, resulting only in the loss of a good position for submerged patrol within our grasp. 0425 Sighted a ship to the southward, which looked very much like a destroyer. Opened to the northeast as dawn broke, and submerged. 0710 Sighted a Tonanzuu type torpedo boat range about 7000 yards. Did not attack, since her draft makes the effectiveness of our torpedo unlikely. It is likely that the ship sighted just before dawn was this same torpedo boat. 1031 Sighted a biplane patrolling the coast; and later the smoke of a steamer inshore out of reach. Heavy rain set in, lasting until 1625.

— page 46 —
1628 Sighted a freighter, distant 6000 yards and began approach. 1645 fired two torpedoes at a range of 1200 yards (Attack/2). First torpedo exploded prematurely about halfway to target. Second torpedo missed. Target turned away and opened fire with her gun. Fired a third torpedo three minutes later which hit with devastating effect. She sank in about a minute and a half, her disappearance followed in about 5 seconds by another heavy explosion. She was similar to Lyons Iaru (7000 tons).

10-11 Oct.
13 Oct.
Heavy seas made periscope patrol impossible.

1435 While submerged three miles off Katsuura Light, sighted a 'limekaze class destroyer to seaward bound southwest. Began approach, but were unable to get closer than 5000 yards, and she passed out of sight. Turned to close coast again. 1545 Sighted 3 freighters and one passenger-frighten north bound against the shore, but we were unable to close to good firing position - our reward for having gone to seaward for the DD.

1650 Sighted medium sized freighter (about 5000 tons) downbound and began approach. 1731 Fired two torpedoes at a range of 1600 yards. (Attack 3 The first exploded remarkably about half way to target (30 sec.), and the second missed. Target turned and presented poor opportunity for more shooting, hidden against the hills in failing light. 1738 one bomb, close. A trawler or corvette type patrol craft had been idling about 1000 yards on our off bow during this approach. At 1746 he passed over our stern and dropped two close depth charges. Began evasive tactics. A four hour sound search ensued, in which apparently supersonic and sonic equipped vessels participated: 'There were as many as seven within hearing, at one time, and on two occasions ships passed directly over us without realizing that they had done so. Last sound contact 2240. Surfaced at 2300.

EICLATURE (B)
-3-

— page 47 —
16-18 Oct. Position [Coulthull, Heavy rains, heavy seas, visibility poor. Finally determined position 1620 the 18th.]:

— page 48 —
22 Oct.
: "While submerged four miles south of Shiono
: Lisaki sighted a Tohoizuru class torpedo boat
: engaged in a supersonic search. After about
: an hour she disappeared to the westward.
: From 0900 to 1700 today we were so situated
: that no ship could have rounded Shiono Lisaki
: in either direction without our scouting it.
: Still nothing was sighted but one torpedo boat!
: 2140 on the surface in bright moonlight.
: patrolling into the moon at six o'clock to close
: Shiono Lisaki, before daybreak, sighted a sub-
: marine lying to the southward about 2500
: yards distant. We were at this time 3 miles
: south of our area limit and at approximately
: that this was a friendly submarine on the re-
: tiring line of area. Stopped to the north-
: ward to avoid. Two hours later we had indicat-
: ions of another radar in vicinity.

23 Oct.
: Submerged patrol close inshore off Liki Sakii.
: Light surface haze made curious visibility
: very poor. Small outboard, small freighter, two
: trawlers, numerous small craft. The entire day
: was spent in that should have been excellent.
: hunting ground, but there was no traffic of any
: importance.

24 Oct.
: Position doubtful. Sighted two medium sized
: freighters, unable to close.

25 Oct.
: Divod ten miles from Daio Sakii Light. 0545
: On coming to periscope depth before sunrise
: sighted medium sized freighter, range about
: 5000 yards, angle of the bow 90, and passing
: out of range to northeast.
: 0610 Another medium sized ship north bound
: but close. Inshore and out of range.
: 0700 Two trawler type patrol craft flying the
: naval ensign made a sweep toward us and turned
: southwest.
: 0359 sighted a medium sized freighter upbound
: close inshore, and started approach.
: 0940 Pired two torpedoes at range of 1250 yards,
: both of which passed under target without ex-
: ploding. (Attack 45). 0942 Pired to more
: torpedoes. Forty-nine seconds after firing, the
: first of these exploded close to and in
: line with the target's stack, and threw up a
: large guset of water from which small bright

— page 49 —
27 Oct.
1235: While submerged two miles off shore between Nojima Saki and Katsuura sighted three frigates southbound in company but not in formation zigzagging independently. Decided to attack first and largest freighter, similar to Koryu Iaru (6700 tons). 1325: Pirae two torpedoes, both missed. (Attack: 1/2) 1326: Pirae two more torpedoes and went to 90 feet in a hurry to avoid collision with 1/2 freighter. High was very close aboard, angle on bow zero. 1327: Icard explosion of fourth torpedo. 1939: Came to periscope depth. The target had closed the beach somewhere, was dead in the water, listed wall to port, settling by the stern, well on the way to sinking. (The other frigates had taken shelter in kimogawa. Then were a white junk and three small fishing boats within 100 yards of us at this time, which may explain lack of aircraft bombs. Jet course to clear vicinity. Upon surfacing at 1:12 observed searchlights and other unusual lights on shore in the vicinity of our attack. Jet course to clear area and return to base.

28 Oct.
Cleared area.

30-31 Oct.
High winds and very heavy seas forced reduction of speed. Iade good about 5.5 knots.

2 Nov.
(LOW) Iade dive for trim and went to test depth to observe tightness of maneuvering room hard patch.

— page 50 —
1124 (like) Received orders from CTF 7 concerning Japanese submarine 800 miles to the westward. Notified 7.1.10 as directed. 1719 (like) Received orders from CTF 7 to proceed to Pearl.

: Crossed International Date Line and changed date to November 3rd.

: 2353 (Yoke) Received rendezvous instructions from CTF 7.

: 1050 (X) Sighted TRIGGER to the southward.

: 0845 (X) Sighted TRIGGER and exchanged recognition signals.

: Effected rendezvous with LITTLE and TRIGGER and entered PEARL.

-6-

— page 51 —
1. Weather: On the 30th, the crew was generally excellent. On the return trip, the ship was very generally rough and on two days, October 30 and 31, the heavy seas cut speed to 6 knots for about 40 hours. Three days were lost on station because of seas too heavy in which to conduct a periscope patrol, and two days were lost due to poor visibility. Visibility along the coast between Iliki, Saki, and Shiono-Iisaki was usually hampered by a heavy atmosphere. "Inds were generally in the NE, average force 3.

2. TIDAL INFORMATION:
   - Currents encountered were generally as indicated in the Asiatic Pilot and on charts. As stated in the Asiatic Pilot local winds influence the direction of flow of the Iuroshio and when easterly winds predominated a stronger westerly set was experienced.

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:
   - Navigational lights observed as follows:
     (a) Shiono Iisaki - not sighted from less than 10 miles distant on the surface.
     (b) Kashino Saki - normal
     (c) Kantori Saki - normal
     (d) Iliki Saki - normal
     (e) Ko Shima - normal
     (f) Daio Saki - one white flash every 20 seconds.
     (g) Tojima Saki - not sighted from seven miles distant on the surface. The lighthouse has apparently been rebuilt since the DRU's first patrol in this area in May 1942. At that time Tojima Saki lighthouse was a green-brown, squat tower and now is a tall, white lighthouse.

The SD radar was invaluable in navigating at night. The high grade sextant was used to fix the night position with good results.

— page 52 —
U.S.S. DRUM - Report of Third War Patrol.

5. DESCRIPTIONS OF ENEMY VESSELS SIGHTED

Time : Type : Position: Course: Speed: Description :

— page 54 —
5. (Cont'd)
: : Position:
Time : Type : Lat. : Long. : Course : Altitude
(29) : : : : : :
0859(I):Freigh- : 136-58E :050(T) : 6.5 :MFM- :5000 :tons Attack #5.
Oct. 25:ter : : : : : :
(30) :

— page 55 —
7. Particulars of Attacks.

:No.: Fir- :Est.:Point: :Set: :Track:
At- :Torping:Range: of:Draft:Dep:Est.:Angle: Torpedo
tack#:edo:Int.: :Aim:Tar.:th.:Speed:

— page 56 —
1. No.: Firing: Est.: Pt.: Drift: Set : Est. : Track:
tack#: Torp. Int. : Range: of : Tar:-Dep:-Speed:Angle: Torpedo
:

— page 58 —
U.S.S. DRUM - Report of Third War Patrol.

Subject:  and no special repair work is recommended. However, at the next dry docking of the DRUM the port shaft and stern tube bearing should be aligned, and the grooves in the shaft removed.

(B) RADIO, SOUND AND RADAR.
During the first depth charge attack the radio antenna trunk flooded. This same defect was experienced last patrol, and the leakage was found to be due to a damaged insulator.

10. Radio Reception.
Radio reception was complete at all times.

Last consecutive serial sent - 041835.
Last consecutive serial received - 060559.

11. Sound conditions and density layers.
Sound conditions along the southeastern coast of Japan were poor.

There were no definite density layers observed.

12. Health and Habitability.
The health of the crew, except for a few colds, was excellent. The habitability was excellent also. During submerged operations the following meals hours were observed:

0330 - 0430 Breakfast
1130 Dinner
1730 Supper
The food was very good and well prepared.

13. Miles steamed enroute to station 2290 (Nav).
Miles steamed enroute from station 3580 (Nav).

14. Fuel oil expended - 75,000 gallons.

15. Factors of endurance remaining:
Torpedoes Fuel Provisions [days] Fresh Water Personnel
1 18000 gal. 30 Unlimited 14

16. This patrol was brought to an end by the virtual expenditure of torpedoes.

17. Remarks - miscellaneous.
(a) Four days of this patrol were spent off Mikura Shima in the hope that there we might encounter men-of-war bound between Yokosuka and the Solomons. Other submarines enroute have seen important ships in this locality. Our time there produced only one sighting - a small freighter.

- 14 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 59 —
17. Remarks - miscellaneous. (Cont'd)

(b) On previous patrols it had been impossible to keep paint on the periscopes. Prior to this cruise, the FULTON etched the periscopes, and the paint adhered perfectly.

(c) Recapitulation of torpedoes fired:

| Attack # | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
||----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Hits   | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Misses (TDC) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Misses (target maneuver) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Misses (which should have hit in view of other hits with same firing data) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Premature explosions | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Misses (probably due to pre-matures ahead of them) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Peculiar explosion (air flask?) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Duds (known to have passed under) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTALS | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 23 |

Thus, of 23 torpedoes fired, 5 were certainly of no service to us, and 4 more were almost certainly of no service.

No one likes to blame his tools. I cannot but feel that we accomplished only half of what we earned, and even a smaller fraction of what we were capable of doing with good explorer performance. Not one of the attacks was hasty: not one was fired from extreme range or from a poor initial position. There was no "seaman's eye" background for shooting. Many long range, doubtful opportunities were passed up, in the sure knowledge that with the time available to us in the areas we should be able to use all torpedoes on good; calculated attacks. Developments during attacks #2, #5, and #6 resulted in the expenditure of more torpedoes than should have been used. But even with the firings as they stand, we should have accounted for seven ships instead of four.

— page 61 —
8.20
18. No. 2 01051

FF12-10/A16-3(5)/(12) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0110

DECLASSIFIED

CONSUMBAC PATROL REPORT NO. 130
U.S.S. DRUM - FOURTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS22E) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject war patrol report and
Consubdiv 101 comment thereon.

1. This was the first patrol for the present
Commending Officer.

2. The Force Commander congratulates the officers
and crew on the splendid execution of the carrier attack.

3. The DRUM is credited with the following damage
to the enemy:

DAMAGED
1 Carrier of RYUJO class 7,600 ton
1 Tanker 8,000 ton
TOTAL - - - 15,600 tons

J.H. DROIT, Jr.,
Acting.

DISTRIBUTION
(1M-43)
List III, SS
Special:
Pl(5), EN3(5); ZI(5),
Consublant(2), X3(1),
Consubsowespac(2),
Subschool NL (2).

E.R. SWINSURNE,
Flag Secretary

46027 FILMED

— page 62 —
1942 from Third War Patrol. Commenced refit on November 9, 1942 by Submarine Base personnel. On November 14, 1942, Lieutenant Comdr. R.H. Rice, U.S. Navy was relieved as Commander of Submarine Base personnel. On November 23, 1942, S/S Radar installed. Completed training period on November 24, 1942. Completed on November 26, 1942. Readiness for sea date, November 29, 1942. Not departed nor wiped.

1. NARRATIVE:

Nov. 29 Left Pearl Harbor for area, via Midway, under escort of U.S.S. BERVILL. Passed through the Japanese defenses and training divers enroute.

Dec. 13, 1245 (Y). Arrived Midway. Took on fuel and lubricants, topped off fresh and battery water and fresh provisions. Made repairs to S/S Radar. Passed through the Japanese defenses and training divers enroute.

Dec. 12, 0910 (K) Made SD radar contact on plane 16 miles distant. Submerged

— page 63 —
1110(K). Having allowed the escort to pass ahead of us, we closed the track at high speed and at 1200 yards torpedo run, fired four torpedoes. Swung ship to left immediately, to bring the stern tubes on. We have taken in a lot of water forward through the poppets and the boat is getting heavy. Forty seconds after firing, heard one (1) sharp explosion. Several seconds later heard a long reverberating explosion. Raised the periscope. The carrier is listing to starboard, and down by the bow. There is a large smoke cloud at the break of her flight deck forward. The ship was so listed that the entire top of the flight deck was visible to the Commanding Officer. At this point she was firing her guns at the periscope. A large wake over to the right shows the DD is heading our way. Sound reports were too fast to count. 1112(K). With the stern tubes coming on now, raised periscope for final bearing. We are losing depth control, the target is barely visible over the wave tops. At this point the first bearing was incorrectly transmitted to the T.D.C. When the corrected bearing was introduced, the Commanding Officer could no longer see the target. Did not attempt to fire the stern tubes, as the destroyer was now close aboard. Ordered 200 feet. 1118(K). Port srew again out of commission. Running two thirds on starboard. 1121 (K). A' string of 9 depth charges, all close and shook the boat considerably, but no damage. Destroyer retired for second attack. 1135(K). Destroyer passed directly overhead. Screws were hard plainly throughout ship. A string of 7 depth charges, each one coming progressively closer. All of these were closer than the first salvo. No damage. At this point the boat had got very heavy, and reached a depth of 350 feet, before it was stopped by putting a bubble in safety; a very undesirable condition, but there was no alternative. Having the port shaft out adds to our difficulties. 1150(K). Destroyer passed directly overhead again, but apparently he had lost contact, and dropped no depth charges. He withdrew in the direction of the carrier and was no longer heard. 1300(K). Port shaft is back in commission. 1445(K). Surfaed and proceeded to investigate scene of attack. 1510(K). Sighted a very large gasoline slick about a mile wide and extending in a direction about 140°(T). Proceeded on this course to investigate thoroughly. 1540(K). Radar reported a plane contact. Submerged and thus ended our investigation. Went to 150 feet and commenced permanent repairs to port shaft.

— page 64 —
2000(K). Attempted to get contact report through to NPM, but was unsuccessful. At great deal of Japanese transmission and interference was noted. After trying for four (4) hours sent the message through blind twice. We have now completed the repairs to the port shaft in-torlocks and hope we experience no more trouble with this.

Dec. 13. 0700(K). Submerged. (2) distant explosions. 0730(K). Heard two (2) distant explosions. We are very near the vicinity of yesterday's attack. We make some wind guesses at the meaning of these explosions. Perhaps the Japs are putting the finishing touches (of necessity) to our handiwork of yesterday. We decided to remain submerged today for the following reasons: (1) Service torpedoes. (2) Determine cause and extent of trouble in port mini shaft control interlock. (3) Make repairs to the drain pump. All the above accomplished and at 1310(K). Surfaced.

Dec. 14. 0700(K). Submerged. Decided to remain submerged during the daylight henceforth until we reach our area and have completed our mine laying; in order to insure our undetected entrance into Bungo Suido.

Dec. 16. Entered operating area. 1915(K). Surfaced. Proceeding towards area assigned for mine plant. 2120(K). Made SJ radar and sight contact on enemy destroyer simultaneously. At this instant enemy turned on search light; which swept directly astern of us. 2123(K). Submerged. Tracked enemy by sound. Went to 200 foot. 2130(K). Destroyer dropped 6 depth charges close, and commenced a supersonic search. We employed evasive tactics. 2300(K). Lost all contact with DD.

Dec. 17. 0145(K). Surfaced. Proceeded to assigned mine plant area. 1430(K). Arrived in assigned area and commenced mine plant. 1645(K). Completed mine plant and set course to clear to southward. Excellent work by the torpedo room personnel. We have plenipotenced our mines in the vicinity of a gas buoy in Lat. 32-49.0 N., Long. 132-13.0 E., which is obviously a mid-channel marker.

- 3 -

ENCLOSURE (1)

— page 65 —
18. Deployed patrol of approaches to Bungo Suido on the 160°-340° line, which so well served the TRIGGER. Very bright moonlight nights.

Dec. 20. 2315(K). Made sight contact on true bearing 255°. Submerged because of bright moonlight. Searched carefully with periscope and SJ radar at 40 feet, found nothing; so at 2335(K). Surfaced and proceeded to investigate in direction of true bearing.

Dec. 21. The destroyer is still with us and now too close for comfort, so at 0100(K). Submerged. Enemy commenced supersonic search on 13 KOS.

Dec. 24. Lost contact.

Dec. 24. 0413(K). Heard screws and echo ranging of two A/S vessels. 0600(K). Lost all contact.

Dec. 24. Surfaced.

Dec. 24. Sighted patrol boat at about 5,000 yards. He is blinking a recognition signal at us. We blink back at him with the signal gun, and he turns away. However, he can't find this one in his signal book, so he is back again, blinking. We return the compliment, trying to imitate a Japanese signalman striker. He is satisfied finally and goes on his way and we on ours. All these patrol boat contacts have resulted in forcing us out of our assigned area.

Dec. 24. We have a dispatch from CTF-7 which we cannot understand and another which it is impossible to decode. Since we are outside our area, it is decided to transmit a request for clarification. Also transmitted a report on attack of 12 December.

Dec. 25. We receive a message from CTF-7 cancelling the despatch we could not understand. It was improperly addressed to us.

Dec. 26. 0015(K). Made SJ radar and sight contact on patrol boat. Took course to avoid.

Dec. 26. Made SJ radar contact at 14,000 yards. Sighted large ship, hull down, in bright moonlight. Radar and plot indicate target zigzagging on course 320°(T), speed above 25 knots.

— page 66 —
0130(K). Submerged to avoid detection, and continued tracking with SJ radar at 40 feet. Closest range 9,000 yards. Target pulling away rapidly. Abandoned approach and at 0230(K). Surfaqed. Received acknowledgment of our contact report from CTF-7, also received a message in a system we cannot decode. Decided to remain outside the area for another transmission-on.

Dec. 27 Received clarifying message from CTF-7. We have had to remain outside our area for three (3) nights in the process of getting this communication matter cleared up.

Dec. 29 0130(K). Made SJ radar contact over 15,000 yards. Commenced tracking. Target is two ships on course 0450(T), speed 15 knots and we are abaft of the beam, about 160 track. Bright moonlight and heavy seas. No moonlight at all. Bright moonlight and

— page 67 —
2325(K). 5J radar reported a contact on bearing 045°(T), range 15,000 yards. Stopped and commenced tracking. 2250(K). Commenced approach, closing the track at full speed. 2300(K). Radar reports this is a large ship with another small ship escorting her. Plot reports course 160°(T), speed 12 knots. 2313(K). Radar reports another small ship escort. There are three (3) ships in this group, the escorts patrolling ahead and on either side. No sight contact yet. 2316(K). Target is now in sight, but very indistinct. The starboard screen is a destroyer and is now very close. Port screen not visible. Decided to attack astern of the near escort. 2317(K). Starboard screen passed ahead of us at about 1000 yards. We are fortunate in having a low clouded background and are not seen, although for a moment it was nip and tuck. The range to the destroyer is now opening. The commanding officer concentrated on the target ship, a low island superstructure amidst ships, probably a large tanker. The quartermaster has been told to watch the destroyer, which no goes with evident concentration. We are closing the track at full speed. Radar and plot have established course and speed at 160°(T), 12 knots. We are sure of our data. 2320(K). Range to target 2,000 yards, about 1500 yards astern of starboard escort. Fired three (3) torpedoes. Knowing that our presence will soon be discovered, we turned sharply to the left and submerged, we about a minute and a half after firing, torpedo room reported one (1) explosion. This is not heard by the control party. 2322(K). At periscope depth, a heavy attenuated explosion is heard. Sound reported screws slowed gradually and stepped. Intense activity by destroyer screws. 2325(K). Two (2) depth charges, not close. Went to 200 feet, commenced evasive tactics. Much manouvering by the destroyers, but they do not come close. 2345(K). Lost all contact with screws.

Jan. 6 0015(K). Had just determined to come to the surface, when we heard two (2) heavy explosions. Immediately thereafter, sound hears screws and two (2) ships commence a supersonic search to the southward of us. 0215(K). Lost all contact. 0250(K). Surfaced. Knowing that in the morning the hounds would be out, we cleared the area at high speed to the eastward. - 6 - ENCLOSURE (1.)

— page 68 —
8. Left the area along our return line to transmit our 081300.

: 12. On surfacing in heavy seas, sneer pins to bow planes carried away. They were replaced, but on rigging the planes in, sheer pins again carried away. After being renewed the second time, it was discovered port plane was about 100 ahead of starboard. Our bow planes are now practically useless.

: 13. Attack #3: Lat. 31-26.0N, Long. 142-39.0 E. 0755(1). Sighted smoke on the horizon; closing it rapidly on this course, picked up masts and stack. Turned to course 0000(T), converging track about 300. 0815(K). Target is making about 4-5 knots. Course 330(T). Submerged and took course to intercept at two thirds speed. Weather is much too rough to permit a periscope attack; particularly with the bow planes in present condition. If we attack, it must be by sound. 0943(K). Sound reports as serious, also aboard. Change of bearing indicated he is passing astern of us. Since we came to course for a 90 track and at 0948(1). Fired two (2) torpedoes from 100 feet. 0952(1). Heard one (1) very loud explosion, and forty seconds later another similar explosion. Since we cannot come to periscope depth, we shall never know what these explosions were, although the time interval seems too long to be our torpedoes. 0953(K). Sound reports fast screws, in addition to target snip. New contact sounds like a DD. Where did it come from? 1015(1). Lost all contact. Decided to remain submerged till sunset.

: 14. 1910(M). Sighted white flare astern about 10 miles distant. Unidentified. Posit: Lat. 32-42.0 N., Long. 146-30.0 E.

: 15. 2315(M). Made contact on 3rd radar at 4350 yards, bearing 0350(T), changed course in direction of bearing to investigate. Nothing found. 2325(M). Lost contact. Resumed base course. Posit: Lat. 32-50.0 N., Long. 154-00.0 E.

: 19. 1300(Y). Sighted ladder planes. 1430(Y). Entered ladder plane and secured to dock. Took on 16,802 gallons of fuel oil.

: 20. 0900(Y) Departed ladder for Pearl. 21. 0400(Y) Sighted friendly tanker under escort on opposite and parallel course. Pos. Lat. 25-22N., Long. 174-07.0W.

: 24. 0630(W). Sighted escort at assigned rendezvous.  (W). Moored at Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

- 7 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 69 —
2. WEATHER

The weather during this patrol was not worthy for the number of days of rough seas and overcast skys experienced. We had approximately forty percent (40%) of days when the seas were so rough that depth control at periscope depth was extremely difficult. The large number of overcast days was extremely difficult. The large number of overcast days made position keeping difficult, particularly in view of the strong northeast currents encountered during January.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION.

The flood and ebb of the tides effect the currents off the east coast of KYUSHU, being northerly during the flood, and southerly during the ebb tide; the southerly current being the stronger of the two.

Drifts as high as three (3) to three and five tenths (3.5) knots were experienced in the KUROSHIO during January, in the vicinity of the southeast corner of the operating area.

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

While engaged in planting mines, a gas buoy, red and white striped, was observed in Lat. 320-49' N., Long. 1320-12' E. This is believed to be a marker for mid-channel, for night entrance and exit.

The following lights were observed to be burning with normal characteristics: OKINO SHIMA, TOSAKI HANA and SHIMANOURA. TOI MISAKI light was seen to be burning, but with altered characteristics.

— page 70 —
5. DESCRIPTION OF ALL SHIPS STARTING
No. | Date | Type | Course | Time | Depth | Distance | Coordinates | Time | Depth | Time

— page 72 —
7. PARTICULARS OF ATTACKS.

Track: No. | Firing: Gyro | Track: Est. | Point: Draft | Stt | Torpedo
: 1 | : 7" | : 2L | : 98S | : 1200 | : 15' | : 10'
: : 1R | : 101S | : 1200 | : : | : : | : : :
: : 4R | : 104S | : 1250 | : : | : : | : : :
: : 7R | : 107S | : 1300 | : : | : : | :

— page 73 —
1. The destroyer was of the "ASASHIO" type and had red and white bands around her stock. She patrolled ahead about 1000 to 1500 yards, and employed no supersonic echo ranging. The course was 1400(T), speed 14 knots.

The carrier was using the constant helm method of zig-zagging. The screw counts were: Carrier - 170 R.F.M.; the destroyer - 150 R.F.M.

After the torpedoes hit, the carrier screws stopped and were not heard again. Sound reported the usual cracking noises of a torpedoed ship for an hour afterward.

It is unfortunate that we were forced down after we surfaced, and were unable to investigate thoroughly the large gasoline slick, as it may have revealed something interesting.

Attack #2.

This attack was the first one made by this Commanding Officer, using data furnished entirely by the 3rd radar. At no time was the target itself sufficiently clear to permit obtaining accurate bearings or estimates of her course by eye. The destroyer, however, passed close aboard and was plainly visible. By the aid not so much as a well is uncomprehensible, except that we had the advantage of the background. Radar definitely reported three (3) targets, one at a greater and one at a lesser range than the large ship. This therefore, was a valuable ship, but its identity cannot be definitely established. The Corrinding Officer saw (and this was corroborated by two lookout out of the 0,0,D.)'a long low shape with a low superstructure jutting up andiships. This description it would appear that the ship was a large tanker. It is certain that we hit him with one torpedo and possibly with two. The Corrinding Officer cannot vouch for the explosion reported by the torpedo room, as it was not heard by the control party. However, at this point the conning tower was not completely submerged and this may be the explanation. Our fire control data was considered good, as we had the target on the plot over a considerable length of time, and were able to check and recheck his course and speed at 1600(T), 11 knots.

After the first two depth charges were dropped, apparently indiscriminately, the whole target group changed bearing to the westward, and it was ten (10) minutes before any determined search was made by the destroyers. It is believed that the target was heading either for ARIKE MAN, or for the nearest beach, although her screw were not heard again after the torpedo explosion.

It is believed that we completely fooled the escorts by taking a northerly course to retir. Or it may be that they believed the attack to have been made from the port side. At any rate, all their efforts to find us were concentrated to the southward, and thereby enabled us to surface during the night and clear the area, which would undoubtedly set a good going over in the morning.

- 12 -

ENCLOSURE (1)

— page 74 —
3. Attack #3.

It is possible that this ship was the same or one similar to the 2-ship encountered by the TRIGGER in this same vicinity. She was about 5,000 tons, NIM composite superstructure, similar to P.L.O.1RU. The explosions heard may have been depth charges dropped by this ship or by the other vessel whose screws were heard after the explosions.

This approach was conducted entirely by sound, as our bow plinies were practically useless, and with the heavy seas running, bracing at periscope depth was certain. The Commanding Officer knew the chances of hitting were very small under the above conditions, but since the T.D.G. set-up checked very well with the sound bearings, he could not resist the temptation to fire anyway, and trust to luck.

6. ENEMY #/SMSURFS:
This area is very well patrolled, particularly the line approximating course 160°(T) from the entrance to Bungo Suido. It should be noted that all patrols were sighted at night. Only two (2) sampans were seen during daylight. No patrols were encountered close to the coast. It is evident that the patrols are concentrating at the intersection on the aforesaid 160° course line, with the steamer line from V.N. DIEMEN, starting to the northeastward to MUROTO SIKI and SHIONO MISUKI. Patrolling is done by old destroyers and craft which resemble submarine chasers. It is believed that these boats return to their anchorages at daylight.

9. None encountered.

10. MAJOR DEFECTS:
(a) Engineering.
(a) December 11, 1942 - Main Control Panel in Manning Room (See Bungo Dvg. No. 3S228-352-1379 .lt.). A hinge pin in the operating lever linkage for contacts, piece 4 became partially cut due to its set screw being broken. This jammed the linkage, making it impossible to put the port motor starting lever into series position (to close piece 4). This put the port motors out of commission for about 20 minutes, while the trouble was located and the pin and set screw replaced.

The trouble was first thought to be caused by the "75% field" interlock not operating, and the interlock solenoid was removed for inspection. It was put back in slight misalignment causing another casualty on December 12.

- 13 - ENCLOSURE (1)

— page 75 —
1942 - Main Control Panel in Mancelwring Room (Sec Contractors Dwg. No. 32-J-4.41). Due to having been improperly aligned when replaced on December 11, the plunger core (piece 33) jammed in its recess in the port motor starter slide (piece 2), making it impossible to move the port starter lever. The interlock was removed, thoroughly tested and found to be in good condition. It was then replaced and carefully aligned. No further trouble has been experienced.

(c) December 16, 1942 - Lost main power, due to tripping out of battery tank contactors (Contractors Dwg. No 11-1-4.451-1). While making a quick dive, in shifting propulsion from engines to battery, the battery tank contactors tripped out. (The positive side contactor in the forward battery wall and both positive and negative contactors in the after battery wall). Contactors were reset by hand. Subsequent investigation showed that the contactors were set to trip at 14 Kiloamps, which is the minimum setting. Settings of all contactors were increased to 19 Kiloamps. (a) All main engine outboard exhaust valves leaked. No leaks occurred unless making a quick dive with main or in-ones on propulsion immediately prior to the dive. Cause thought possibly to be due to back pressurization exhaust heater, preventing the valve from making a good seat, or to contraction of the valve disc when cooled, after sealing.

(c) The port reduction gear tube oil sump tank leaked, allowing salt water to get into the reduction gear tube oil. An unsuccessful attempt to find and stop the leak was made during the last refit. More effective measures should be taken during this overhaul.

(f) 35 Radar. Shortly after leaving Pearl Harbor, resistor R-104 in the oscillator converter unit burned out, causing resistors R-51.1 and R-51.2 to burn out in the transmitter receiver unit. This defect was corrected by Submarine Force, Midway. The training motor proved too small to carry the load and heated excessively. It was used only sparingly in order to prevent a total casualty.

The training shafts and gears were not properly aligned during installation. As a result, the entire unit was hard to operate, and was very noisy. Misalignment may have been partly responsible for excessive heating of the motor.

B: Hull.

(a) The attack periscope fog did intermittently during the latter part of the patrol.

(b) The trim pump was, as usual, noisy. Early correction of this defect is strongly recommended.

— page 76 —
15 - ENCLOSURE (A)

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM - Report of Fourth War Petrol.

(c) The sheer pins in the bow plane shafting sheared when the planes were nearly in the rigged-in position, during surfacing in a heavy sea. These pins were replaced and the plinck rigged in. Again the pins sheered, and again they were replaced. Upon examination of the rigging system, it was discovered that the port sector gear was mashed with the starboard sector gear, four (4) teeth in advance of its normal position; and that the rigging out stop in the port sector gear was carried away. This resulted in the port plane returning to its normal rigged-in position, while the starboard plane was still slightly rigged-out.

On subsequent drives, the planes were rigged out by hand, care being taken not to go to the full rigged-out position; thus preventing the sector gears from again unmashing. The planes tilted satisfactorily in this uneven position, however, as an added precaution, no more than ten (10) degrcs tilt was put on them.

11. RADIO

Radio reception was complete. Last consecutive serial number sent 170900. Last consecutive serial number received 240725. Much difficulty was experienced in transmitting to NPH.

Radar: The 3J Radar performed very efficiently. The Commanding Officer cannot praise this equipment too highly. It proved itself invaluable on many occasions. It is regretted that more opportunities to use it for attack were not presented.

Our experience with the 3J radar equipment has shown that the following results may be expected: (a) Large ships will be picked up at 14,000 - 15,000 yards; also any ship picked up at this range is at once identified as a large ship. (b) Destroyers will be picked up at from 8,000 to 10,000 yards. (c) Large sized sampans and patrol boats will be picked up at 5,000 - 7,000 yards. (d) Loaden sappers will not be picked up, or may serve a ragged pip at ranges under 4,000 yards.

Our radar operators became proficient in recognizing the character of pips, and were correct in their judgment on every occasion. On the night of 5 January, the large vessel was picked up first and at a shorter range the operator readily recognized first one and then a second destroyer escort; one at a lesser and one at a greater range than the target ship. "With-out this information the Commanding Officer would have been unable to form a correct estimate of the situation.

The radar proved itself invaluable defensively also, as it prevented us from running up on a patrolling destroyer on several occasions.

— page 77 —
15. FUEL EXPENDED 109511 GALLONS.

16. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING:
   - Torpedoes: 15,614 GALLONS
   - Fuel: 7 DAYS
   - Provisions: 30 DAYS (Estimated)
   - Fresh Water: None

17. This patrol was ended by provisions of the operation order.

18. GENERAL REMARKS:
   - The officers and men of this ship conducted themselves in accordance with the highest traditions of the Navy during this patrol. Their tireless efforts and attention to duty were remarkable under all conditions.
   - This patrol was 'disappointing' in the small number of contacts in the area. More time was spent 'out of the area than was the intention of the Commanding Officer for two (2) reasons: (1) Transmission of three (3) messages, two (2) of which were to clear up communication difficulties caused by our inability to decode a badly garbled message. (2) Navigational difficulties caused by an unexpected easterly set of 3-4 knots, coupled with long periods of overcast skies, during which no star sights could be obtained.

- 16 -
- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 79 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS223) - Report of Fourth 'Var Patrol.

1. The Fourth 'Var Patrol of DRUM was conducted off Japan, extended for 56 days, 29 days of which were in the patrol area.

2. Three attacks were made, nine torpedoes were fired, and three hits were made for a score of 33½. In addition, a mine field was laid.

3. The attack on the carrier, which was using a "Constant Rudder" zig plan, was well executed. It was very bad luck that two of the six bow tubes contained mines. In an attack on any such valuable target, it is important that the volume of fire be as high as possible, utilizing both bow and stern tubes, as DRUM attempted to do.

4. DRUM is overhauling at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

Copy to:
Consubron 10
CO DRUM!

— page 81 —
6 01326
Serial 04
DECLASSIFIED-A-1
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander Submarines Southwest Pacific.
Subject: U.S.S. DRUM - War Patrol Report, forwarding of.
Reference: (a) Submarine Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 8-42.
Enclosure: (A) U.S.S. DRUM - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (A) is herewith forwarded.
B.F. McMAHON.
Copy to:
Consubron 8
Consubdiv 81

FILMED
50533

— page 82 —
1200 (M) Passed to Command or Commander Task Force 72.
1837 (L) Surfaced; no enemy activity.

April 2
ALL TIMES HEREAFTER ARE LOVE (L).
Cruising on surface, 130 miles from Makin and Tarawa Islands, awaiting patrol instructions. Adjusted advance to arrive off Nauru Island at dawn, tomorrow.

April 3
0502
Submerged 24 miles west of Nauru Island.
0740
Sighted Nauru Island, distant 15 miles.
0936
Heard two (2) distant bomb explosions, but sighted no planes.
1438
Approached to within one (1) mile of west shore of Nauru and took eight (8) reconnaissance pictures. No military targets were observed on land or sea. Reversed course and at Surfaced, heading west.

April 4
Received Subs 72 NR 11, assigning us a patrol area. Also received instructions to run submerged during daylight.
0537
Submerged and commenced all day periscope patrols.

April 8
Entered area at Latitude 00°-07.5' N, Longitude 152°-13.0' East.
2100
Received Subs 72 NR 30 concerning a convoy sighted heading north, and proceeded to its April 9, 1200 position.

April 9
Sighted smoke bearing 080° T. distant 12,000 yards. (Contact #1) (Attack #1). Latitude 00°-32.0' N, Longitude: 150°-05.0' E. Commenced approach at high speed. Sound picked up enemy echo-ranging. Determined convoy to consist of four (4) medium-sized freighters and one PC boat. Two (2) freighters were lagging with the escort on their quarter, starboard, then port.
1356
Fired three (3) torpedoes from the bow tubes at the last freighter. The escort, PC #39, was then 1,000 yards, bearing 300° relative. Went to 200 feet and commenced evasive tactics.
1358
One (1) hit.
1402
First of twelve (12) depth charges, none close.
1435
Last depth charge. Suffered no damage.
1600
Echo-ranging ceased. Returned to periscope depth nothing in sight.
1642
Surfaced, and headed for the vicinity of the attack.
1715
Sighted one (1) empty life boat, several rafts, loud-speakers, and other debris. Picked up a life

— page 83 —
6 01326
U.S.S. DRUM - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
Period from March 24, 1943 to May 13, 1943.
Operation Order: 43-43.
Area: On Equator between 153° East and 145° East.

PROLOGUE:
Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H., on January 24, 1943 from Fourth War Patrol. Commenced overhaul by Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, on January 25, 1943. Completed overhaul on March 11, 1943. Trim and drain pumps silenced; laminated battery jars installed; 4"/50 caliber gun installed forward of conning tower; pilot house cut away and a second 20 mm mount installed; all out-standing alterations completed. Commenced training period March 16, 1943, and completed it on March 19, 1943. Ready for sea March 24, 1943. Flashed and depermed.

1. NARRATIVE:
March 24, 1700 (W) Underway from Pearl Harbor in company with FC 586.
March 26, 0605 (X) Made trim dive.
March 27, 1015 (X) Went to four (4) engine speed to arrive in Johnston Island on time.
March 27, 1500 (X) Escort returned to Pearl.

March 27, 0805 (X) Sighted Johnston Island.
March 27, 1015 (X) Moored to U.S.S. MIDWAY at fuel dock, Johnston Island. Took on fuel and lub oil, water, stores, and one (1) bottle of beer per man, with the complements of the Ship's Service, Johnston Island.
March 27, 1500 (X) Departed Johnston Island, without escort.

March 27, 0805 (X) Surface cruising, training dives, battle surface drill - fired 14 rounds 4"/50 ammunition and 240 rounds 20 mm. A squeal developed in the port stern tube bearing at 40 R.P.M. and below. The gland was repacked and the squeal disappeared on April 1, 1943.

April 1, 0542 (M) Commenced submerged patrol in pass between Makin and Matthew Islands.

-1-

— page 84 —
1200 (M) Passed to Command of Commander Task Force 72.
1837 (L) Surface; no enemy activity.

ALL TIMES HEREAFTER ARE LOVE (L).
April 2 Cruising on surface, 130 miles from Makin and Tarawa Islands, awaiting patrol instructions. Adjusted advance to arrive off Nauru Island at dawn, tomorrow.

April 3
0502
0740
0936
1438
1857
April 4 Received Subs 72 NR 11, assigning us a patrol area. Also received instructions to run submerged during daylight.
0537 Submerged and commenced all day periscope patrols.

April 8 Entered area at Latitude 00°-07.5' N, Longitude 152°-13.0' East.
2100 Received Subs 72 NR 30 concerning a convoy sighted heading north, and proceeded to its April 9, 1200 position.

April 9 Sighted smoke bearing 080° T. distant 12,000 yards.
1158 (Contact #1) (Attack #1). Latitude 00°-32.0' N., Longitude: 150°-05.0' E. Commenced approach at high speed. Sound picked up enemy echo-ranging.
1230 Determined convoy to consist of four (4) medium-sized freighters and one PC boat. Two (2) freighters were lagging with the escort on their quarter, starboard, then port.
1356 Fired three (3) torpedoes from the bow tubes at the last freighter. The escort, PC #39, was then 1,000 yards, bearing 3000 relative.
1358 One (1) hit.
1402 First of twelve (12) depth charges, none close.
1435 Last depth charge. Suffered no damage.
1600 Echo-ranging ceased. Returned to periscope depth nothing in sight.
1642 Surfaced, and headed for the vicinity of the attack.
1715 Sighted one (1) empty life boat, several rafts, loud-speakers, and other debris. Picked up a life

— page 86 —
12 April 12
Swing ship submerged for deviation curves of two (2) new aviation magnetic compasses, one mounted in control room, one in conning tower.

: 14 April 14
While circling in Latitude: 10-29.0° N, Longitude 1480-28.0° E, sighted four (4) ships, bearing 250° T, distant about three (3) miles (Contact #3). No contact was ever made on the SJ Radar. Four (4) days ago, we had targets at 19,000 yards!
: 16 April 16
Heard four (4) depth charge explosions.
: 20 April 20
'Submerged to 200 feet on course 070° T., opening range, running silent. Heard intermittent pinging and screws, gradually fading out on bearing 250° T; and two more depth charges at 0632 and 0710.
: 22 April 22
Sighted smoke bearing 2480 T.
: 24 April 24
Sighted tops of one small freighter and masts and stack of another larger one bearing 195° and 199° T, range 12,000 yards. Commenced closing. The bearing of the smoke remained steady, while the two (2) ships drew to the left, then right, and finally left again.
: 25 April 25
The smoke also commenced drawing to the left. Determined enemy course as 165° T, speed 5.5 knots, but could not gain an attack position submerged.
: 27 April 27
Changed course to open range, commencing mooring board solution - to gain position ahead of convoy and not approach closer than 15 miles.
: 29 April 29
Surfaced and started chase at 19 knots.
: 31 April 31
Sighted smoke bearing 1510 T. The bearing drew to the left to 0750 T, while the plot showed an increase of speed to 10 knots.
: 1 May 1
Lookout sighted a large monoplane making a bombing run on us, range about 5 miles. Submerged to 150 feet; but no bombs were dropped. Latitude 000-05.0° S. Longitude 1480-43.0° E. Picked up enemy echo-ranging at an estimated range of 10 miles. Decided not to continue pursuit because of 1) Unreliable or possibly no SJ radar for a night attack; 2) Loss of several miles while submerged; 3) Presence of friendly submarines on track.
: 3 May 3
Surfaced and sent contact report.

: 5 April 5
Received new area assignment. Continued patrol in vicinity of our last contact.

: 17 April 17
Intermittent heavy gunfire felt and heard faintly
: 19 April 19
by the bridge watch, direction undetermined. Latitude: 10-35.0° N., Longitude: 1480-25.0° E.

: 18 April 18
Sighted smoke bearing 310° T. (Contact #4) (Attack #3). Latitude 10-55.0° N., Longitude: 1480-24.0° E.

— page 87 —
6 01326
U.S.S. DRUM

Commenced approach on fully loaded freighter similar to TATUTAKE MARU, 7065 tons (MFKM)
Fired four (4) torpedoes from the bow tubes.
Premature explosion.
Two (2) hits, one at forward well, the other abaft
stark. Ship listed to port and commenced sinking,
screws stopped.
List decreasing, but screws still stopped. Swung
to bring stern tubes to bear.
Fired two (2) torpedoes from the stern tubes.
Two (2) premature explosions within one (1) second
of each other, about 500 yards from the enemy, in
line with his bridge.
Fired two (2) more torpedoes from the stern tubes.
both missed astern, and at
Heard "end-of-run" explosions. The ship was still
afloat, with little change in condition.
Swing again to finish her off with the last two (2)
loaded torpedoes.
Her bow went under, and the crew took to the boats.
Ship sank. The camera officer took eight (8) pic-
tures. Gave all hands a look at either the sinking
ship or the three (3) lifeboats in the water. Many
small and several heavy explosions accompanied the
breaking up of the ship.
Cleared area.
Surfaced, standing to westward toward Palau - Rabaul
route. On surfacing, the port 75% motor field in-
terlock refused to lift, and power on the port screw
was lost. This is the third (3) successive patrol
on which this casualty has occurred.

April 22 Sighted patrol boat bearing 354° T., range 8,000
yards. (Contact #5). Latitude 00°-11.0'N. Longi-
tude 146°-26.0'E. He was not pinging, and disappear-
ed to the westward at 0725.

April 23 Sighted smoke bearing 230° T, distant 10 miles. (Con-
tack #6). Latitude: 00°-12.0'S, Longitude: 1470-
08.5'E. Attempted to track the enemy submerged but
no further smoke was sighted. Decided to gain posi-
tion for submerged attack before dark, providing the
smoke sighted was no illusion.
Surfaced and commenced chase at four (4) engine
speed.
Sighted the smoke again - apparently one ship, oil
burning, on 300° T, making 11 knots.
Lookout and Commanding Officer sighted plane bearing
290° T, distant about 6 miles. Submerged to 150 feet.
JOHNSON, L.H. #628-80-46, Slc, sighted this plane, as
well as the one which ended our pursuit on April 14.
Determined that we can be at the enemy's 0800 posi-
tion by surfacing at sunset and using four (4) engine
speed all night.

— page 88 —
1930
Surfaced and commenced pursuit. Sent message regarding contact and chase.

April 24: Submerged at the 0700, 11 knot position of the contact. Latitude 10-33,0' N, Longitude: 1440-06.5' E. Sighted a plane through periscope, close to the horizon, at about 6 miles, and followed it from 2400 T to 3050 T.

2030: Surfaced and commenced petrolling. Palau - Rabaul. The weather was generally overcast and squally, with poor visibility.

April 25: Petrolling Palau - Rabaul and Truk - Wewak lanes. The weather was generally overcast and squally, with poor visibility.

May 1: Received Subs 72 NR 92 ending the area patrol at dawn on May 3. Commenced patrolling in a southeast-ery direction in order to be at the southeast corner of the area at dawn May 3.

May 3: Left area in Latitude: 00-30.0' S., Longitude: 1500-00.0' E.

May 5: Passed between Feni and Green Islands submerged. No enemy activity observed.

May 7: Surfaced and took two (2) heavy seas down the Conning Tower hatch. The pump room machinery, with the exception of the gyro, hydraulic plant, and radar, was grounded out. All machinery was in commission by 0400 May 8.

May 8 - 10: Continued submerged running, wind and sea southeast, force 5-6.

May 10: Received rendezvous instructions, and adjusted speed to arrive as directed.

May 13: Affected rendezvous with escort, SC 648, and proceeded to Brisbane.

2. WEATHER:
Clear sky, excellent visibility; light airs and calm seas. The order of the day's cruise to station and during the first half of the day, or so. When the moon waned, the weather changed abruptly to a continually overcast sky, winds from the north and west up to force five (5), sea condition four (4), with heavy swells, and generally poor visibility with numerous squalls.

- 6 -

— page 89 —
6 01326
U.S.S. DRUM

3. TIDAL INFORMATION.

When the wind and sea remained steady for more than one (1) day, currents up to one (1) knot were experienced in the area.

In the pass between Feni and Green Islands a set of one to two (1-2) knots to the east was noted. The wind was from the west, force four (4), at the time.

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

None sighted.

The high grade sextant gave good results at night throughout the patrol.

5. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY VESSELS SIGHTED.

Contact:

— page 91 —
1 2 3 4
Attack  : 0254 1550 0246 0254
Time  : April 9  April 9  April 18  Apr.18,1943
Date- Use G.C.T. : 000-32.ON : 10-37.ON : 10-55.ON : 10-55.ON
Location- (Lat.) : 11500-05.OR:11490-20.OR:148024.OR:148024.OR
Number and Type
Torpedoes Fired :
on Each Attack
: 3 - 14-3A : 3 - 14-3A : 4 - 14-3A : 14-3A 14-3A
Rits
Number Sunk
: 1 2 2 0 0
(Tonnage)
Number Damaged
or Probably
Sunk (Tonnage)
Type of Target
: Freighter : Freighter : Freighter : Freighter
Range:
2000 2800 1500 2000-2100
Type of Attack:
Periscope (P)
: P RSI : P : P
Night (N)
Radar (R)
Estimated Draught
of Target
: 15' 15' 25' 35'
Torpedo Depth
Setting
: 10' 10' 15' 20'
Bow or Stern
Shot
: Bow : Bow : Bow : Stern
Track Angle
: 120p 117p 140p 140p 59p 58p 102s 81s
118p 140p 59p 57p 100s 80s
Gyro Angle
: 0 3R 5L 5L 6R 7R 1R 4R
1R 5L 5L 6R 8R 1L 1L
Estimated
Target Speed
: 6.5 7.0 10.5 0
Flag Interval
: 7 secs 7 secs 7 secs 7 secs,20secs
Spread-Amount
and Kind
: Diverg. Diverg. Diverg. Div. Div.
Was Torpedo
Performance
Satisfactory?
: Yes : Yes : No : No
Remarks:
Attack #1-Four (4) ship convoy, one (1) escort.
Attack #2-three (3) ship convoy, one (1) escort.
Attack #3-one (1) premature explosion.
Attack #4-two (2) premature explosions.
Attack #3, 4a, 4b - Same unescorted ship.

— page 93 —
6 0401
U.S.S. DRUI:
Subsequently, the motor blower circuit caused visible interference on the screen. This was caused by grounds on the thyratron and magnetron blower circuits. The blowers, designed to be run dry, require lubrication, which under the high operating temperatures, causes the grounds. The magnetron blower was disconnnected; while the thyratron blower was overhauled frequently to prevent these grounds. The range step was lost during the last week on station. The cause of the failure is believed to lie within the crystal tank. A modification of the bearing indicator is recommended. During the attack on the escorted three (3) ship convoy, the radar operators experienced much difficulty in maintaining contact with the escort and the chosen target. A bearing indicator similar to the repeaters installed in the sound gear, giving both true and relative bearings would be ideal.

10. RADIO RECEPTION.

Reception of the NPN schedules was complete. The Belconnen schedules were received with little difficulty, although three (3) serials were missed. Transmission to NPN proved more satisfactory than to stations in the Southwest area. No results were obtained on the submerged loop on NPN's 16.3 kilocycles.

Last serial sent: 080712.
Last serial received: 120643.

11. SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS.

Sound conditions were average. The enemy had little success with echo-ranging. Likewise, we had difficulty obtaining a range by pinging in the attack on the unescorted freighter on April 10, 1943. No density layers were observed.

12. HEALTH AND HEALTHABILITY.

In spite of the warm weather, the boat was comfortable and dry. CO2 absorbent was spread prior to diving each morning, and noticeably improved the air at the end of the day. The food obtained from the SPERRY was not of as high quality as that carried on previous patrols. Coca Cola syrup and several hundred CO2 capsules were enjoyed by all hands. The health of the crew was excellent.

— page 94 —
13. MILES STEAMED.
Miles steamed to area: 3598.
Miles steamed to area: 2836.
Miles steamed from area: 1907.
TOTAL: 8341.

: 14. FUEL OIL EXPENDED.
To area: 37566.
In area: 18206.
From area: 18170.
TOTAL: 72942 gallons.

: 15. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING.
Torpedoes Fuel Provisions(Days) Fresh Water Personnel
10. 32743 gals. 10. Unlimited. 0.

: 16. FACTOR ENDING PATROL.
Orders of CTF 72 ended the patrol.

: 17. REMARKS.
The torpedoes on this patrol were far from what could be expected fifteen months after the outbreak of war. Three (3) out of eight (8) torpedoes, fired in a single day, went off prematurely; and all torpedoes the Commanding Officer had the opportunity to observe; smoked excessively. It is disconcerting to say the least, to lug torpedoes several thousand miles through the trials and tribulations of a patrol, only to have them blow up in your face. I believe it would be practically impossible to get hits on a vessel as alert and maneuverable as a warship in the calm waters prevalent in the Solomon Area, with torpedoes having the trail of smoke ours do.

This vessel was given a six (6) week's overhaul at Pearl (they call it the "50 cent job"). Considering the time allotted, Pearl did an excellent job, particularly on the C&R work. However, a longer overhaul period is recommended to eliminate the small casualties which arise after a rushed overhaul. A longer overhaul period would

— page 95 —
6 0401

U.S.S. DAUM

also enable all hands (particularly the Commanding Officer) to return to the States on leave. Personnel, like machinery, cannot keep on going without rest.

A daily news item, such as the fall of Tunis and Bizerte, would be appreciated by all hands.

During this patrol the air conditioning plant condensed 150-200 gallons of fresh water per day. This water is thrown away and cannot very well be used for washing, due to its offensive odor. This water has been analysed, however, and is chemically pure. It is recommended that some sort of filter be devised that will eliminate this offensive odor, so that the water may be used for washing.

This is the third successive patrol that sticking of the port motor field interlock has caused us to lose power on the port screw. This casualty left the vessel with but one screw during the attack on a carrier during the fourth patrol. The seriousness of the casualty was stressed during the overhaul, but the same thing happened again. This interlock has been worked on by four (4) different submarine overhaul activities without remedying the defect. This leads the Commanding Officer to believe there may be an inherent defect in the interlock circuit, and at the first available opportunity a thorough check by a factory representative should be made.

During the last refit, the brass section of the conning tower fairwater was etched with a silver sulphate solution. This turned the brass's dark brown. Even though the paint fails to adhere, the brass surface is still non-reflecting.

— page 96 —
6 01326
FC5-8/A16-3
Serial 050
DECLASSIFIED
FIRST ENDORSEMENT TO
CO DRUM Fifth
'War Patrol Report.

From: Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHT.
To: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228), Fifth War Patrol;
Comments on.

1. The DRUM'S fifth war patrol was of fifty days duration, of which, twenty seven days were spent on station. Considerable damage was inflicted on the enemy in spite of the relatively few contacts made.

2. The torpedo performance is disappointing. It is noted that the depth setting for one of the premature explosions was fifteen feet and for the other two, twenty feet. No explanation is apparent for the cause of these prematures.

3. Excessive battery grounds existed upon return from patrol. Investigation shows that the sealing compound used during the renewal of jars had cracked at the seal, permitting acid to spill over. All jars will be resealed with new compound during the current refit as the compound used was either defective or it was not correctly applied.

4. The port motor field interlock will be removed and examined thoroughly for some construction defect which apparently exists.

5. The regular standard refit will be accomplished by the FULTON.

6. The Squadron Commander wishes to congratulate the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the DRUM on a very successful patrol.

W. II. DOWNS.

— page 97 —
6 01326
FF12-15(72)/A16-3/hdh
Serial 0170
DECLASSIFIED
SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO
CO DRUM Fifth War Patrol
Report.

From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander, THIRD FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) - Report of Fifth War Patrol; comments on.

1. DRUM departed Pearl Harbor March 24, 1943, on her Fifth War Patrol. After a brief stop at Johnson Island for fuel she proceeded to Nauru Island which she reconnoitered, on April 2, with negative results. On April 8 she arrived in her initially assigned area on the Truk-Steffen Strait route in the vicinity of the equator. She was informed that an escort convoy sighted by a Fifth Air Force reconnaissance plane was headed through her area and, about noon April 9, DRUM intercepted this convoy and attacked it with three torpedoes, sinking the freighter, OYAMA MARU of 3,809 tons with one hit. DRUM was depth charged by the escort following this attack but suffered no damage. She continued to trail this convoy and attacked again before daylight, scoring two hits from three torpedoes fired and sinking a 5,000 ton freighter. This sinking was observed by radar. Following this attack DRUM took position ahead of the remainder of the convoy for a daylight attack but the convoy was not again sighted. On April 11 DRUM was moved westward to the Babel-Flews route in the vicinity of the equator. There on the morning of April 14 she sighted a convoy comprising three ships plus one escort which she was unable to close submerged. She attempted to chase on the surface but was forced to dive by a screening plane and could not close to attack range. During the afternoon of April 18 DRUM attacked a large, loaded, unescorted, southbound freighter with four torpedoes. One torpedo exploded prematurely but two hits were obtained. The target apparently was not sinking, so DRUM fired two additional torpedoes which exploded prematurely, followed by two others which missed. This ship subsequently sank without further torpedo expenditure. A patrol vessel was sighted on March 22. On March 23, DRUM attempted to develop a smoke contact by surface running but was forced to dive by a plane, and never sighted the target. This smoke contact is also attributed to reconnaissance by the Fifth Air Force. DRUM had no further

— page 98 —
6 01326
FF12-15(72)/A16-3/hdh
Serial 0170
DEBLASSIFIED
May 15, 1943.
Subject: U.S.S. DRUIS (SS228) - Report of Fifth War Patrol; comments on...

CONTACTS and, on May 3, was ordered to proceed to Srisbane, passing between Bougainville and New Ireland enroute. She arrived at Brisbane on May 13, after a fifty day patrol.

2. DRU made the most of her limited attack opportunities during this patrol and conducted her attacks in a skillful, aggressive manner. Considering that three of the fourteen torpedoes fired were prematures, the percentage of hits obtained is well above average. The dogged pursuit of the convoy sighted on April 6 is especially commendable. After the second attack, the remainder of the convoy probably dispersed or made a radical change of course, which accounts for the failure to again mc?e contact at daylight. It is considered that the clear radar evidence following the night attack on April 10 is sufficient to credit a sinking. It is unfortunate that two determined attempts to close targets on the surface were frustrated by screening aircraft. The three prematures reported are deployed, but fortunately, in this case, the enemy did not escape damage as a result. Torpedo depth settings of 15 and 20 feet in unusually calm seas were no insurance against prematures.

3. Two of DRU's contacts during this patrol are directly attributed to reconnaissance aircraft of the Fifth Bomber Command. This reconnaissance has been especially valuable during recent weeks due to the reduction in shipping in this area.

4. The possibility of a radar installation at NAURU Island is noted.

5. DRU is congratulated in inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK
One (1) freighter, OTAMA NARU - - - - - 3,809 tons.
One (1) freighter

— page 99 —
6 01326
Serial 0170
DECLASSIFIED
May 15, 1943.
Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) - Report of Fifth War Patrol; comments on.

DISTRIBUTION:
Comlink (Advance copy) (2)
VCNO
Com 1st Flt
Com 2nd Flt
Com 7th Flt (2)
Consubs 1st Flt
Consubs 2nd Flt
Consubs 7th Flt
All SS TF-72 (Not to be taken to sea BURN)
CTR-72 War Patrol, Summary and Boat Files
CSS 6 & 8
CSD 01 & 82
OInC, S/M School, N.L. Conn. (2)
CO DRUM (File)

— page 100 —
0944
C-DECLASSIFIED:
3rd. Endorsement on
CO USS DRUM's Conf.
1tr. A16-3 Ser. 04
of May 15, 1943.

From: / The Commander South Pacific.
To: / The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228), report of Fifth War Patrol.

1. It is a pleasure to forward this excellent
report of a productive and well-conducted submarine war patrol.

W. F. TALSEY

Copy to:
VCNO
Cinepac
Cinclant
Comsowespac
Comsubpac
Comsublant
Comsubsowespac
CTF 72
Comsubron 8
Comsubdiv 81
C.O. U.S.S. DRUM

— page 102 —
8 02112

U.S.S. DRUM:
ROT OF SIXTH WAR PATROL
From: 7 June 1943
To: 26 July 1943
(Hot to be taken to sea by Sub. airs - BURI)

— page 103 —
8 02112
SS228/A16-2
Serial 0-6

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. DRUM.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States-Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander, Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.
       (2) The Commander, Submarine Squadron-EIGHT.
       (3) The Commander Submarine Division-EIGHTY-TWO.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM, Report of War Patrol, Number SIX.

References: (a) Cominch Confidential Ltr. FF1/A6-5, Serial 01529 of May 17,1943.
       (b) Comsubsowestpac Confidential Ltr.A16-3, Serial 0217 of January 9,1943.

Enclosures: (A) Subject report
       (B) Plot of Attack number 1 (CTF-72 only)
       (C) Track chart during patrol (CTF-72 only)

1. Enclosures (A), (B) and (C), covering the sixth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the area north of the Bismarck Archipelago during the period June 7,1943 to July 26,1943, are forwarded herewith.

B.F. MC NAHON.

53304 FILMED

— page 104 —
8 02112

A) PROLOGUE:

Returned from fifth war patrol on May 13,1943.
Normal refit by U.S.S. FULTON at Brisbane, Australia.
Ready for sea, June 4,1943. Fired 15 rounds of 4"/50-caliber at a towed target; held sound listening test;
conducted three night radar training approaches; and
made sound runs for destroyer. Made deep dive on
June 6,1943, and developed leak in conning tower
eyeport. Returned to Brisbane for repairs. Ready for
sea, June 7,1943.

Mission: DESTROY ENEMY VESSELS in Solomons - Bismarck - New Guinea area.

(B) NARRATIVE:

June 7,1943:
1250(K) Underway from alongside U.S.S. FULTON in
company with HMS BANALLA.
2130 - 2230 Conducted night radar runs.

June 8,1943:
0235(K) Obtained "ghost" echo on radar 130° to
right of escort at same range. This is the first
distinct "ghost" echo over obtained by us.
0801 Commenced sound runs for escort, followed by
succesful deep dive.
1309-1624 Conducted four submerged approaches.
On the dive for the fourth approach, powr on the
port screw was lost. This casualty was caused by
the failure of the 75% motor field interlock. This
is the fourth successive patrol on which this
casualty has occurred.
1624 Set course for HORSE. Escort returned to port.
1200 POST: LAT. 26°-1210 S ; LONG. 155°-1510 E
DIST: 229.9 FUEL 1699

June 9,1943:
Conducted three training dives.
1613(K) Blow negative tank flood valve gasket on
third dive. Experience proves that the "T" shaped
gasket can be blown!
1200 POST: LAT 21°-5215 S ; LONG 156°-0510 E
DIST: 283.2 FUEL 2729

June 10,1943:
Conducted three training dives. Diving time is
affected but little by loss of negative tank.
Practiced going d.cp without use of negative.
1200 POST: LAT. 16°-5910 S ; LONG. 156°-3510 E
DIST: 319.0 FUEL 2918

— page 105 —
1917(L) Submerged.
1200 POST: LAT. 10°-2210 S ; LONG. 156°-4710 E
DIST: 191.4 FUEL 1624

: 1914 Submerged.
1200 POST: LAT. 8°-3610 S ; LONG. 155°-1510 E
DIST: 178.8 FUEL 1685

: 1913 Submerged.
1200 POST: LAT. 6°-5010 S ; LONG. 154°-0210 E
DIST: 179.8 FUEL 1588

: 1917 Submerged.
1200 POST: LAT. 4°-1810 S ; LONG. 154°-3710 E
DIST: 174.4 FUEL 1396

: 1914 Submerged.
1200 POST: LAT. 01°-4510 S ; LONG. 154°-0110 E
DIST: 174.3 FUEL 1486

: 1913 Submerged.
0200(L) Sighted three ships bearing 2200(T) distance
20,000 yards. (Contact #1) (Lat.10°-1210 S ;
Long. 153°-4010 E). Commenced tracking with
the radar at ranges of 13,500 yards to 21,300
yards. Determined convoy base course as 1250(T),
speed 9 knots, until 0400, then 1900(T).

(2)

— page 106 —
0548
June 17, 1943: (Continued)
0548
Submerged and commenced closing the "t"rack of the convoy at high speed.
0625
Sighted two freighters and one MUTSUKI class destroyer, bearing 005(T), distance 10,000 yards, angle on the bow 00. Manned battle stations (1attack #1) (Lat. 20-0310.8; Long. 153-4410 E)
0655-51
Fired #7 tube.
0656-00
Fired #8 tube.
0656-03
Fired #9 tube.
0656-15
Fired #10 tube.
0656-30
Went to deep submergence and commenced evasive tactics.
0656-59
#7 torpedo hit.
0657-07
#8 torpedo hit.
0657-12
#9 torpedo hit.
0702
First of 3 depth charges, not close.
0703
6 depth charges, close astern, overhead, forcing the boat down about 15 feet to 310 feet.
0715
Bulkheads of torpedoed ship collapsing.
0811
2 depth charges, distant, total 11.
0835
Returned to periscope depth. Nothing in sight.
June 18, 1943:
0546(L) Submerged.
1948
Surfaced.
1200
POSTIT: LAT. 100-5010 S; LONG. 1530-5710 E
DIST: 161.5
FUEL 1365

June 19, 1943:
0534(L) Submerged.
1945
Surfaced.
1200
POSTIT: LAT. 000-3815 N; LONG. 1540-0310 E
DIST: 99.7
FUEL 444

June 20, 1943:
0543(L) Submerged.
1946
Surfaced.
1200
POSTIT: LAT. 000-4710 N; LONG. 1530-0010 E
DIST: 97.5
FUEL 334

June 21, 1943:
0543(L) Submerged.
2005
Surfaced.
1200
POSTIT: LAT. 21515 N; LONG 1510-4710 E
DIST: 139.6
FUEL 682

— page 107 —
22,1943:
0550(L) Submerged.
2005 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 30-0910 N; LONG. 149-1610 E
DIST: 175.5 FUEL 1390

June 23, 1943:
0600(L) Submerged.
Serviced torpedoes, and found one exploder
completely flooded. Made magnetic feature
inoperative.
2020 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 20-5310 N; LONG 1470-3410 E
DIST: 148.4 FUEL 1159

June 24, 1943:
0009(L) Sighted two dark objects bearing 0950(T), distant about 8,000 yards. (CONTACT #2)
(Lat.30-3510 N; Long. 1470-2310 E). The
radar was unable to obtain a contact.
0025 Commenced closing to investigate. One object
may have been a patrolling destroyer or the
U.S.S. GREENLING; while the other could not
be identified as a ship. Thst both objects
were closed is not impossible. The rising
moon, end visibility conditions unfavorable
to us made further development of the contact
impracticable.
0130 Cleared the area to the westward.
0603 Submerged.
2020 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 30-3810 N; LONG. 1460-3910 E
DIST: 90.4 FUEL 348

June 25, 1943:
0610(L) Submerged.
2022 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 30-3010 N; LONG. 1460-4410 E
DIST: 96.9 FUEL 363

June 26, 1943:
0612(L) Submerged.
2015 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 30-2910 N; LONG. 1460-4010 E
DIST: 93.2 FUEL 345

June 27, 1943:
0610(L) Submerged.
2022 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 30-2310 N; LONG. 1470-0910 E
DIST: 94.3 FUEL 346

— page 108 —
8 02112
June 28, 1943:
0620(L) Submerged.
2020 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 1°-55'10 N; LONG. 148°-55'15 E
DIST: 149.3 FUEL 747

June 29, 1943:
0700(L) Commenced surface patrol to westward.
1921 Submerged for trim dive.
1957 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 1°-02'15 N; LONG. 149°-17'15 E
DIST: 156.7 FUEL 876

June 30, 1943:
0700(L) Commenced surface patrol to westward.
1920 Submerged for trim dive.
1950 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 00°-57'10 N; LONG 149°-13'10 E
DIST: 224.2 FUEL 1213

July 1, 1943:
0700(L) Commenced surface patrol to westward.
1920 Submerged for trim dive.
1950 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 2°-45'10 N; LONG. 149°-13'15 E
DIST: 266.7 FUEL 1636

July 2, 1943:
0700(L) Commenced surface patrol to westward.
1925 Submerged for trim dive.
1950 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 1°-58'15 N; LONG 149°-19'15 E
DIST: 223.5 FUEL 1517

July 3, 1943:
0700(L) Commenced surface patrol to westward.
1924 Submerged for trim dive.
1953 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 1°-51'10 N; LONG. 149°-09'15 E
DIST: 223.7 FUEL 1206

July 4, 1943:
0700(L) Commenced surface patrol to westward.
1915 Submerged for trim dive.
1953 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 2°-04'10 N; LONG. 148°-13'15 E
DIST: 222.7 FUEL 1228

July 5, 1943:
0700(L) Commenced surface patrol to westward.
1900 Submerged for trim dive to 200 feet.
1950 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 1°-08'10 N; LONG. 148°-15'15 E
DIST: 217.4 FUEL 1221

— page 109 —
6, 1943:
0355(L) Made radar contact bearing 290°(T) at 5000 yards.(CONTACT #3) (Lat. 10-20; N; Long. 150°-10; E). Lost contact at 7200 yards. Closed to investigate but no further radar contact was obtained, nor was the target ever sighted.
0700 Commenced surface patrol to westward. 1115 Sighted a floating mine (Lat.10-35;0 N; LONG 150°-15;0 E). 1155 Fired 180 rounds of 20 M.M. ammunition and exploded the mine at a range of 200 yards. The only casualty was the junior officer of the deck, who suffered a small scratch on his finger from a piece of shrapnel.
1253 Made aircraft contact on S.D. radar at 12 miles. Plane not sighted. Submerged (ATLANTIC COTACT #2) (Lat.10-37;0 N; LONG. 150°-05;0 E).
1353 Surfaced and resumed surface patrol. 1200 POSIT: LAT. 10-35;0 N; LONG. 150°-13;0 E DIST: 252.9 FUEL 1850
July 7, 1943:
0701(L) Submerged.
1330 Heard echo ranging bearing 2350(T), on 18 kilocycles at about:38,000 yards.(CONTACT #4) (Lat.00-50;0 N; Long.147°-12;0 E). Heard screws bearing 2330(T) at about 30,000 yards. Commenced closing track at high speed. Manned battle stations submerged. 1357 Sighted plane over target group.(AIRCRAFT CONTACT #3) (Lat.00-50;0 N; Long.147°-12;0 E) 1411 Sighted mags and stack of a tanker, engine on the bow, 80° port, range 24,000 yards. 1515 Secured from battle stations submerged; unable to close to less than 16,000 yards. 1607 Lost contact with echo ranging at about 40,000 yards. 1750 Heard two sharp explosions, resembling torpedo explosions. 1800 Surfaced, and headed down track of tanker at high speed. Sent contact report. 2145 Sighted smoke bearing 150°(T)(CONTACT #5) (Lat.00-37;0 N; Long.148°-13;0 E). Commenced closing to investigate. 2230 Sighted red light. 2348 Made radar contact on ship at 16,200 yards. 1200 POSIT: LAT. 00-53;0 N; LONG. 147°-16;0 E DIST: 310.7 FUEL 4343

— page 110 —
8 02112
July 8, 1943:
0020(L) Identified ship as hospital ship properly lighted in accordance with the Hague Convention Agreement of 1907. Changed course to continue search for tanker in the direction of Kavieng.
0616
Submerged.
2015
Surface.
1200
POSIT: LAT. 00°-59'15 S; LONG 148°-48'15 E
DIST: 189.2
FUEL 1757

July 9, 1943:
0623(L) Submerged.
2002
Surface.
1200
FOST: LAT. 00°-15'10 S; LONG 150°-54'10 E
DIST: 158.7
FUEL 1163

July 10, 1943:
0700(L) Commenced surface patrol to westward.
1925
Submerged for trim dive.
1950
Surface.
1200
POSIT: LAT. 1°-59'15 N; LONG. 153°-00'10 E
DIST: 232.5
FUEL 1716

July 11, 1943:
0700(L) Commenced surface patrol to westward.
1200
POSIT: LAT. 3°-00'10 N; LONG 151°-14'10 E
DIST: 232.5
FUEL 1311

July 12, 1943:
0626(L) Submerged.
2007
Surface.
1200
POSIT: LAT. 1°-08'10 N; LONG. 150°-13'15 E
DIST: 255.4
FUEL 1944

July 13, 1943:
0626(L) Submerged.
1955
Surface.
1200
POSIT: LAT. 00°-06'10 N; LONG. 149°-09'15 E
DIST: 101.2
FUEL 359

July 14, 1943:
0502(L) Submerged.
0920
Sighted smoke bearing 304°(T). (CONTACT #6)
(Lat. 1°-24'10 S; Long. 147°-59'15 E).
Commenced the approach.
0938
Heard echo ranging on 17 kilocycles.
0954
Heard screws of enemy convoy.
1022
Sighted masts of four ships, with two angles on the bow port, and two, starboard. Manned
battle stations submerged.
1045
Three escort vessels in sight.

(7)

— page 111 —
14,1943: (Continued)
1100 When the range of the left most ship in the convoy closed to 6500 yards, 2800 yards to the track, the convoy changed base course 60° to the right to 170°(T).
1115 Secured from battle stations submerged, unable to close the range to less than 5800 yards. The leading freighter (6500 tons)(KKFKK) was listed slightly to port, damaged aft. The other three freighters (4000-5000 tons)(MFM, well dock) appeared to be undamaged.
1420 Sighted two large aircraft over the convoy. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #4) (Lat. 1°-30:10 S; Long. 148°-05:10 E).
2005 Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 1°-28:10 S; LONG. 148°-00:10 E
DIST: 164.3 FUEL 1355

July 15,1943:
0634(L) Submerged.
2006 Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 00°-11:15 S; LONG. 148°-13:15 E
DIST: 102.7 FUEL 356

July 16,1943:
0625(L) Submerged.
2003 Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 00°-02:1 5'N; LONG. 148°-22:15 E
DIST. 103.3 FUEL 359

July 17,1943:
0626 (L) Submerged.
2000: Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 1°-04:10 S; LONG. 150°-52:10 E
DIST. 201.0 FUEL 2410

July 18,1943:
0345(L) Sighted LIHIR ISLAND, distant 45 miles.
0625 Submerged.
0740 Sighted TANGA ISLAND, distant 45 miles.
2002 Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 2°-54:10 S; LONG. 153°-32:10 E
DIST: 197.9 FUEL 2021

July 19,1943:
0236(L) Sighted GREEN ISLAND, distant 16 miles.
0515 Submerged.
1114 Sighted four-engined monoplane(AIRCRAFT CONTACT #5)(Lat.50°-05:10 S; Long.154°-00:10 E)
2002 Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 5°-08:10 S; LONG. 153°-59:10 E
DIST 174.3 FUEL 1314

— page 112 —
20,1943:
0522(L) Received orders to search for life raft with three RAF fliers aboard. Commenced closing position at 19 knots on course 3220(T).
0730 Sighted enemy submarine on the surface, bearing 0830(T); distant 10 miles, (CONTACT #7)(Lat. 70-24:10 S; Long. 1530-4910 E) His course was 1600(T), and he passed out of sight rapidly.
0740 Sighted plane bearing 3100(T), distant 11 miles (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #6)(Lat.70-22:10 S; Long. 1530-4710 E). This plane was later identified as an RAF "BEAUFICHTNER".
0800 Sighted enemy submarine on surface, bearing 0810(T), distant 10 miles (CONTACT #8)(Lat.70-07:10 S; Long.1530-3510 E). This submarine was sighted because of his heavy black exhaust smoke. His course was 3150(T), parallel to the DRUM, but he dropped astern and disappeared rapidly.
0905 Exchanged recognition signals with the "BEAUFICHTNER" (A-0H). Was informed that the life raft could not be located. Told him of the enemy submarines to the eastward, and off he went. His later actions did not indicate that he had sighted any enemy submarines, however.
1030 Sighted a second plane, unidentified, though similar to the "BEAUFICHTNER" in appearance, bearing 3300(T), distant 12 miles.(AIRCRAFT CONTACT #7)(Lat.60-4810 S; Long. 1530-1615 E) Commenced search in area to westward of reported position of raft.
1035 Sighted object resembling a submarine, bearing 3310(T), distant 5 miles.
1046 Submerged and commenced closing to investigate. Identified object as a large tree. Set a watch on the aircraft-frequency,7105 Kcs., on the periscope antenna at 50 feet. Heard numerous signals, but nothing further on the search for the raft.
1930 Surfaced and continued search for the raft.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 60-4210 S; LONG. 1530-1410 E DIST: 274.1 FUEL 3770
July 21,1943:
0147(L) Received orders to abandon search. Set course for Brisbane.
0615 Submerged.
1955 Surfaced.
POSIT: LAT. 80-2610 S; LONG. 1530-4010 E DIST: 186.1 FUEL 1651

— page 113 —
0620(L) Submerged.
1230 Sighted ROSSEL ISLAND bearing 258°(T) distant 30 miles.
1944 Surfaced.
1200 POST: L.A.T. 15°-16°0 S; LONG.154-39°0 E
DIST: 201.1 FUEL 2178

: 1200 POST: L.A.T. 15°-12°0 S; LONG. 153°-53°0 E
DIST: 242.6 FUEL 3133

: 1200 POST: L.A.T. 20°-18°0 S; LONG.154°-51°0 E
DIST: 330.0 FUEL 3471

: 1200 POST: L.A.T. 24°-20°0 S; LONG 154°-32°0 E
DIST: 271.9 FUEL 2760

: 1200 POST: L.A.T. 24°-20°0 S; LONG 154°-32°0 E
DIST:

— page 114 —
8 02112
The weather during the entire time in the area bounded by 20 S to 40 N, and 1460 E to 1540 E was unfavorable for submerged attack. The unfavorable conditions included; calm to glassy seas, little or no wind, frequent rain squalls with attendant poor visibility, and partly cloudy skies. The barometer was steady at 29.76. On one, and only one, day out of thirty-three, was there a semblance of white caps.

(D) TIDL INFORMATION:
In the patrol area, 20 S. to 40 N and 1460 E to 1540 E, currents of one-half knot setting east to southeast were experienced at times.
In the area, westward of the Solomon Islands, from 100 S to the pass between New Ireland and Buka, currents of 1.0 to 1.5 knots setting suctheasterly were encountered.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:
None sighted.

(11)

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— page 117 —
1. ATTACK DATA
U.S.S. DRUM
TORPEDO ATTACK #1 PATROL NO.6
Time: 0655(L)  Date: 17.JUNE,1943 LAT.02-03:10 S;
LONG.153°-44:10 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION:
Two frigates and one destroyer in convoy. Destroyer patrolling across track astern. Larger freighter (KKFKK) similar to KYUSYU MARU (8666 Tons) attacked with four torpedoes. Smaller freighter (MF) (6500 tons) was on starboard bow of larger one. Contact made by sighting on surface in good visibility with squally background. Tracked by S3R Radar in varying visibility at ranges of 13500 to 21300 yards. Crew ahead of convoy at dawn en route submerged attack with stern tubes.

SHIP SUKK:
1 Freighter, located with deck cargo, similar to KYUSYU MARU, 8666 tons.

SHIPS DAMAGED:
None.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY:
Hearing 3 torpedo hits and ship breaking up, with 2 compartments collapsing. The noises were the same as those heard during a sinking witnessed on the fifth patrol.

TARGET DRAFT:
25 FEET  Course 190°  Speed 2 Range 1475

OWN SHIP DATA:
Speed: 2 Kts  Course:110°(T) Depth:64 Feet  Angle: 0°

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA.

TYPE ATTACK:
Tracked with TDC at 9 knots (95 RPL) perfectly. Target zigzagging from 170°(T) to 210°(T) in three to five minute lags. Fired with periscope bearings being fed into TDC before each shot. Spread set using offset dials - 5'L, 2'L, 2'R 5'R. Sound met heard all torpedoes running to the target. The target's screws stopped immediately after the three torpedo explosions: while the screws of the second ship and destroyer were still heard.

(14)

— page 118 —
8 02112
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA (Continued)
Explosions occurred 1m08s, 1m07s, and 1m04s after "firing the first three torpedoes.

TUBES FIRED #7 #8 #9 #10
TRACK ANGLE 80° P 81° P 78° P 84° P
GYRO ANGLE 180° 179° 182° 176°
DEPTH SET 18' 18' 18' 18'
HIT OR MISS HIT HIT HIT MISS
ERRATIC NO NO NO NO
MARK TORPEDO XIV-3A XIV-3A XIV-3A XIV-3A
SERIAL NO. 41733 20219 25155 22565
MARK SEALED. VI-1 VI-1 VI-1 VI-1
SERIAL NO. 9260 9385 9388 10052
ACTUATION, CONTACT CONTACT CONTACT CONTACT
SET & MAG. & MAG. & MAG. & MAG.
ACTUATION, CONTACT CONTACT CONTACT
ACTUAL
MARK WARNED XVI XVI XVI XVI
SERIAL NO. 8576 5779 6401 4328
EXPLOSIVE TNT TNT TPX TPX
FIRE INT. - 9 Sec. 8 Sec. 7 Sec.
TYPE SPREAD D I E R G E N T
59' 29' 29' 29'
SEA CONDITION CALM SEA -SLIGHT SWELL FROM
SOUTHEAST.
OVERHAUL, ACTIVITY. U.S.S. PULTON.

(I) MINS
A floating mine was detonated by twenty
millimeter fire in Istituto 10-3510 N, longitude
150°-1510 E.
This mine was spherical, about three feet in
diameter, and mounted four of five contact horns. No
antitank were visible.
The detonation threw a shrapnel splinter about
two-hundred yards, and produced a goyser about 100
feet high.

(J) ANTI SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASIVE TACTICS
1. The convoy of Attack #1 was formed with the
leading ship about 1,000 yards on the starboard
bow of the second, and larger freighter; and was
zigzagging by simultaneous ship movements in three
to five minute legs. The destroyer was making 13-14
knots (160 RPM), and was patrolling across the track
of the convoy about 1500 yards astern of the second ship.
He had three anti-aircraft guns manned, all pointing
skyward.

— page 119 —
1. The approach was conducted in such a manner that the target was, in general, between the destroyer and the DRUM. Thus, the three torpedo explosions were the first indications of the DRUM's presence.

: 2. Without slowing to less than 200 RPM the destroyer made two effective passes, dropping three charges six minutes after firing, not close; and a minute later dropping six more close astern, jarring the boat considerably, but causing no damage. The destroyer did not use echo ranging at any time.

: 3. Two distant depth charges were dropped on hour ten minutes later. All contact was lost two hours twenty minutes after firing. Four aircraft bombs were dropped, not close, but the plane was not seen, four hours forty minutes after firing.

: 4. The convoy of Contact #6 on July 14, 1943 consisted of four freighters with three escorts.

The freighters were in a constantly changing formation with the largest leading, and the other three loosely grouped astern. The ships zigged radically and apparently independently. In the early stages of the approach, both starboard and port angles on the bow were observed, changing frequently. The escorts were stationed ahead, astern and on the port quarter of the formation. Only the leading escort was seaworthy. He searched on the torpedo, and the possible resumption of its former course five hours later may have been the execution of the standard Japanese convoy policy.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

1. C&R:
   A minor casualty occurred on the trim pump when a plug blew out of the rear side of the pump. The plug could not be replaced without cutting a hole in the storeroom bulkhead aft of the pump. A large manhole will be cut in this bulkhead to make the entire after side of the trim pump accessible.

2. TORPEDOES
   One exploder, #4076, was found completely flooded. This occurred when the torpedo was subjected to a depth of about 110 feet; which depth was reached (as the boat went deep) before the forward tubes were all secured.

— page 120 —
8 02112

MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE, TORPEDOES (Continued)
Prior to the time the boat went deep the tubes were ready five minutes. The magnetic feature of the exploder was made inoperative and the exploder reinstalled. The torpedo was not fired.

3. ENGINEERING
ENGINES:
Several leaks in the exhaust risers developed indicating the system is generally eroded and lines in need of renewing. On one occasion a main engine exhaust valve failed to open completely necessitating adjustment of operating shaft. A plaque of erratic governors occurred during which several engines "hunted" at all speeds. Adjustments were made and springs renewed to overcome this defect. On 6th day, July 1, 1943, #2 Aux. engine refused to stop in spite of emergency air and hand stop operation. The fuel racks were sticking. A request has been submitted to install a means of stopping the engines by cutting off the air supply. Such an installation is provided for "Winton" engines.

MAIN POWER:
Port main motor 75% field interlock failed to function putting the port shaft out of commission. This casualty has occurred on three previous patrols.

SHARTS AND REDUCTION GEARS:
The starboard stern tube still leaks excessively. This is caused by leakage in the slightest. Once again to decrease the leakage in the slightest. Once again the reduction gear hub oil system became emulsified due to salt water leakage into the port sump tank. This occurred on three previous patrols.

1. MC SYSTEM
The bridge throat microphone box flooded five times, before it was discovered that the cause was a combination of oversized gasket and oversized stuffing box.

VALVE COMPRESSION DISTILLER
Continued low capacity was corrected by installing proper shunt field rheostats. Oil and vapor seal rings leaked continuously until all on board spares were used. On June 15, 1943 a major derangement occurred in the starboard unit. The unit had been getting progressively noisier until it was shut down and dismantled. The assembly was found to be misaligned and the taper pins used to lock the impellor drive shaft gear on the shaft were loose allowing the lobes to strike each other. Both lobes and both gears had to be renewed. This latter casualty is attributed to inferior tender overhaul.

PITOMETER LOG
The bellows seal contact face was eroded by salt water causing inaccurate speeds. Spare parts for this unit are sorely needed.

(17)

— page 121 —
1. RADIO
Radio reception was good. All serials sent on the Belconnen schedules were received. The high frequency, however proved much more satisfactory than the low.

Transmission on the 4235 kilocycle series was successful to NPM and to several Australian stations. NPM's 16.68 kilocycle transmissions could be heard, but not copied, while on the surface; and were never heard while submerged.

Reception on the periscope antenna at 50 feet was successful on 7105 kilocycles during the search for the RAAF flyers.

LAST SERIAL SENT: 220902
LAST SERIAL RECEIVED: 251326

(M) RADAR:
1. SD RADAR
The operation of the SD was satisfactory throughout the patrol. One contact was made in the area at 12 miles; and several contacts during the search for the life raft on July 20, 1943.

The radar mast again failed to function properly. It refused to lower while the ship dived. This is the third successive patrol on which this casualty has repeatedly occurred.

The trouble has been attributed, at various times, to: (1) uneven hoisting cables; (2) improperly functioning limiter and slack wire switches; (3) misalignment of bearings; and (4) a bent mast. During this refit the mast should be pulled and completely overhauled.

2. SJ RADAR
A new range record is claimed for the SJ Radar. Bearings and ranges up to 21,300 yards were obtained on an 8666 ton freighter which were accurate enough to be plotted during the tracking of the target.

The operation of the radar was highly satisfactory, although the blower motors again caused some visual interference on the screen, and had to be overhauled periodically.

Three days out, the motor generator failed. Inspection revealed that the keyway in the shaft of the coupling between the motor and the generator was worn to the point of being completely inoperative. This motor generator had been taken out of the ship by the tender force just prior to getting underway, and the casualty is attributed to inferior work by the tender personnel. The keyway was repaired and the motor generator has operated over five hundred hours without further trouble.

— page 122 —
8 02112

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
Remarkable sound reception was experienced in the area near the equator between 150° E and 146° E. Echo ranging was heard at about 38,000 yards and screws at about 29,000 yards during one approach. Bearings of echo ranging were obtained 30 degrees in error, when the pinging was deflected from a rain squall. Fish groans and squeaks produced the majority of the noise interference encountered during the patrol.
The recurrent grounds in the cables piercing the pressure hull continued to be a source of trouble; and necessitated putting the sound gear out of commission during battery charges. During the homeward trip; power training for both heads was put out of commission by these grounds. All these cables must be renewed during the next refit.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS
The bathymetrograph installed during the last refit, operated satisfactorily.
One definite density layer was noted at latitude 20-03'10 S; long.153-44'10 E, in the early morning hours. A decrease in temperature of five degrees occurred between 150 and 250 feet. During the depth charge attack at this time, the destroyer made but two effective passes, maintaining good contact only about ten minutes.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY
The health of the crew was slightly below the usual standard. Besides several severe colds, there were three mild cases of "Vincent's Angina" which were prevented from spreading by the prompt action of the pharmacist's mate.
The quality of the food obtained from the FULTON in Brisbane was definitely below par. Even a small quantity of fresh frozen foods would have enlivened an otherwise drab bill of fare.
By spreading about one can of CO2 absorbent on each all day dive, the boat was kept comfortable at all times. The air conditioning system functioned extremely well, producing about 200 gallons of water daily. A means of "sweetening" this water by filtering would be highly desirable.

(Q) PERSONNEL
The performance of the crew was commendable during the entire patrol. The morale and the state of training are high.

(R) MILES STEAMED -FUEL USED
| BRISBANE TO AREA | 1955 MILES | 17405 GALS. |
||||
| IN AREA           | 5565       | 38483      |
| AREA TO BRISBANE| 1951       | 19823      |
| TOTAL            | 9481       | 75711      |
| (19)            |            |             |

— page 123 —
20
FUEL 17694 Gals.
PROVISIONS 0
WATER 14 Days
PERSONNEL 0
LIMITING FACTOR THIS PATROL: Orders of Commander T.F.-72.

(U) REMARKS:
The failure of the port field interlock on June 8, 1943 left the port screw inoperative until the interlock was tripped out by hand. This is the fourth successive patrol on which this casualty has occurred.
The Commanding Officer cannot stress too strongly the military hazard of the inherent defect, and again recommends that a factory representative be consulted to determine the cause and remedy.
The action of the convoy on July 14, 1943, in radically changed course away from the enemy's coast was seen until two hours afterward, and the escorts made no attack on us. The range at the time of course change was five to six thousand yards, too great a range for the ships to sight us although the sea was glassy. The escort gave two prolonged dashes on echo ranging about the time of course change. A successful attack still could have been made at long range if the Commanding Officer had realized it was a change in the base course rather than a zig away.
Attack restrictions south of 45 S were received during the patrol. It is recommended that they be lifted for boats between BUKA and NEW IRELAND. This area is usually traversed at night when identification, except by challenge is impossible. If our forces are in the area the submarine could be so notified.
The system of training developed by Commander TASK-FORCE SEVENTY-TWO is realistic. The Commanding Officer feels that, in a shorter time, a great deal more is accomplished than at Pearl Harbor.

— page 124 —
8 02112

FC5-8/A16-3
Serial 093

DECLASSIFIED
PIRKIN DONAGH TENT to
CO DRUI report of
Sixth "War Patrol.

From: Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHT.
To: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUI (SS228) - Sixth "War Patrol;
Comments on.

1. The DRUI'S sixth war patrol was of forty-nine
days duration, of which, thirty-three days were spent in
the combat zone. relatively few contacts were made, only
one of which w.s. developed into an attack.

2. In general, the material condition of the
DRUI upon return from patrol was very good. The casualty
to the port field interlock solenoid will be repaired by
a complete renewal of the solenoid interlock. This casualty
was reported by radio and included three new water tanks to
obtain a complete new interlock from the Navy Yard,
Portsmouth. The material has arrived and renewal will be
undertaken during the present refit. Under separate
correspondence complete report of this design failure is
being forwarded to the Bureau of Ships. Difficulty with
the 3F radar motor generator has been experienced in other
submarines. It is felt that both the frame supporting
the motor generator and the coupling are of insufficient
strength. This coupling has but one key. As an expedient,
additional keys are being installed. A separate report
is being submitted to the Bureau on this subject.

3. The DRUI will be given a regular refit by
the Submarine repair Unit, assisted by the DRUI. The
commanding officer, officers and crew of the DRUI are to
be congratulated on a successful patrol.

V. 11. DO NOT SELL.

23

— page 125 —
8 02112
FF12-15(72)/A16-3/Fk
TASK FORCE SEVENTY-TWO, 8 02112
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
28 July 1943.

From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES SLIET.
Via: (1) The Commander, THIRD SLIET.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) - Report of Sixth War Patrol, comments on.

1. DRUM departed Brisbane 7 June 1943, on her Sixth War Patrol. Early in the morning of 16 June she contacted a three ship escorted convoy north of LYRA SLIET heading southeast. She shadowed this convoy on the surface using radar, and made submerged attack after dawn. Four torpedoes were fired at 8,600 ton freighter loaded with cargo on deck, three of which hit. The target was heard to sink. Later, considerable wreckage was seen in the vicinity by aircraft on reconnaissance flight. An expert depth charging by the destroyer followed, but no serious damage was sustained. During the early afternoon of 7 July a large eastbound tanker was sighted near Latitude 10° N., Longitude 147° E. DRUM was unable to close this tanker submerged, and just prior to surfacing for the chase, heard two torpedoes fired by ESTO hit. She surfaced at dusk and chased but mistook a lighted red cross of a hospital ship for the burning tanker and failed to regain contact. The forenoon of 14 July she made an approach on a four ship southbound escorted convoy, one ship of which had already been damaged by HINGO. The convoy made a radical course change and avoided DRUM. Air coverage preventing a surface chase. Enroute Brisbane DRUM spent the day and evening of 20 July searching for three aviators on a life raft near Latitude 70° S., Longitude 154° E. She was unable to locate the raft, although assisted by friendly plane. Two Jap submarines were contacted on the surface during the search, but they quickly disappeared at high speed. DRUM arrived Brisbane on 26 July, after a 49 day patrol.

2. DRUM had only three contacts during this patrol with ships worth torpedoing, of which only one was developed. The one attack was conducted in a skillful and aggressive manner, three hits being obtained from the four torpedoes fired. The contact with the hospital ship on 7 July

— page 126 —
8 02112
Serial 0240
DECLASSIFIED
Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS225) - Report of Sixth War Patrol; comments on.

was unfortunate in that DRUM's ship thinking it was the damaged tanker. The large change in course made by the convoy of 14 July may have resulted from a "probable submarine contact" by one of the escorts. As this convoy had already been attacked and thereby especially alerted, every precaution was no doubt being taken to prevent any further attacks. Air attack assistance on this convoy was requested but did not materialize.

3. The performance of DRUM's SJ radar was of an exceptionally high order, as was that of her underwater sound equipment, which indicates excellent care in maintenance and commendable proficiency in operation of this delicate equipment on the part of her personnel.

4. On 6 July DRUM detonated a floating mine by 20 mm. machine gun fire. The position of the mine was Latitude 10-35' N., Longitude 147°-00' E.

5. DRUM is credited with inlicing the following damage on the enemy during this patrol, which is designated as "successful" patrol for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia.

SUNK

One (1) Freighter (KYUSYU NAIU) ...... 6,666 tons.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (Advance copy) (2)
VOFNAV (Op-23c)
Com 2nc Flt
Comsubs 1st Flt.
Flt Radio Unit, MELBOURNE
ALL SS TF-72 (Not to be taken to sea - BURN).
CSD 81, 82.
OINC, S/M School, N.L. Conn. (2)

VCNO
Com 1st Flt.
Com 7th Flt. (2)
Comsubs 7th Flt.
CTF 72 Var Patrol, Summary and Boat Files.
CO DRUM (File).

25

— page 127 —
15 AUG 1943
Al6-3/(11)
Serial 01363
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE
OF THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER
ab

DECLASSIFIED I-A-I
3rd Endorsement on
CO USS DRUM Report
of Sixth War Patrol.

From: The Commander South Pacific.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS 228), Report of Sixth War Patrol - comments on.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander South Pacific congratulates the
Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. DRUM on
a successful war patrol.

W. F. HALSEY

Copy to: VCNO
Cinopac
Cinolant
Comsowespac
Comsubpac
Comsublant
Comsubsowespac
CTIF 72
Comsubron 6
Comsubron 8
Comsubdiv 81
Comsubdiv 82
CO USS DRUM

[Signature]
W. F. HALSEY

[Handwritten notes and stamps]
[Handwritten notes

— page 128 —
11 095

U.S.S. DRUM
REPORT OF
SEVENTH WAR PATROL

From: 16 August 1943 - To: 6 October 1943
(Not to be taken to sea by submarines - BURN)

57153

— page 129 —
11 095
U.S.S. DRUM (SS228)
DECLASSIFIED: A L
SS228/A16-3
Serial 0-8
From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. DRUM.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander, Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.
(2) The Commander, Submarine Squadron, EIGHT.
(3) The Commander, Submarine Division, EIGHTY-TWO.
Subject: U.S.S. DRUM - Report of War Patrol, Number SEVEN.
Reference: (a) CTF-72 Conf.ltr. FF12-15(72) /A16-3/05-fm Serial 0200 of 4 June 1943.
Enclosures: (A) Subject report
(B) Plots of Attacks #1-#3 (CTF-72 only)
(C) Track Chart (CTF-72 only)

1. Enclosures (A), (B) and (C), covering the SEVENTH war patrol of this vessel conducted in the area between the Admiralty Islands and the north coast of New Guinea during the period 16 August 1943 to 6 October 1943 are forwarded herewith.

B.F. MC MAHON

— page 130 —
11 095

(A) PROLOGUE

Returned from SIXTH war patrol 26 July 1943.
Normal refit by the Submarine Repair Unit, assisted
by U.S.S. FULTON, at Brisbane, Australia. Port motor
field interlock replaced. Wiped. Ready for sea:
16 August 1943.

(B) NARRATIVE

16 August 1943:
0925 (K) Underway from alongside U.S.S. FULTON.
1130-1330 Conducted sound listening test in
    Moreton Bay, Australia.
1450 Fired 16 rounds of 4"/50 caliber and
    120 rounds of 20 MM ammunition at a
    towed target.
1645 Anchored at examination point in Moreton
    Bay.
1820 Underway in company with HMAS GOULBURN,
    (J-167) and U.S.S. BOWFIN and U.S.S. TUNA,
2135 Made trim dive near point VAN.
2230-2340 Conducted night radar runs.
1200 POSIT: LAT.270-20:0 S LONG.1530-14:0 E
    DIST: 30.0 FUEL: 146.0

17 August 1943:
0735-0840 (K) Conducted submerged approach on
    HMS GOULBURN.
1237-1330 Made successful dive to 320 feet.
1915-1955 Conducted night radar approach on
    HMS GOULBURN.
2350 Left the training group and proceeded
    independently via point POND.
1200 POSIT: LAT.250-50:0 S LONG.1540-50:0 E
    DIST: 212.7 FUEL: 1880

18 August 1943:
1200 Conducted three training dives,enroute
    point MILL.
1200 POSIT: LAT.220-12:5 S LONG.1540-31:0 E
    DIST: 288.1 FUEL: 2581

19 August 1943:
1900 (K) Effected rendezvous with U.S.S. COUCAL
    in LAT.150-20:0 S LONG.1530-15:0 E.
1903 Exchanged recognition signals with
    U.S.S. FONPON, on opposite course.
1940-2150 Conducted night radar runs on COUCAL,
    enroute JOMARD ENTRANCE.
1200 POSIT: LAT.170-10:0 S LONG.1530-45:5 E
    DIST: 346.0 FUEL: 3479

(1)

— page 131 —
20 August 1943:
A M Conducted two submerged approaches on COUCAL.
P M Conducted two night radar runs on COUCAL.
COUCAL reported that a DF report put a Japanese submarine inside JONDARD ENTRANCE. Sent a dispatch to CTF-72 concerning this report.
1200 POST: LAT.130-06:0 S LONG.1520-36:0 E DIST: 294.3 FUEL:2817

: 21 August 1943:
0635 (K) Sighted land to westward of JONDARD ENTRANCE. COUCAL reported that she believed the DF report of yesterday in error. Received no confirmation of it from CTF-72. Decided to carry out fueling as planned.
0730 Entered JONDARD ENTRANCE.
0900 Commenced fueling from COUCAL in LAT.110-04:0 S LONG.1520-13:0 E.
1100 Received 13,264 gallons of fuel; filled with fresh water; topped off with stores and obtained several necessary items from COUCAL.
1115 Underway to the northward in company of COUCAL.
1255 Submerged to give COUCAL an hour of sound training.
1445 Surfaced and parted company with COUCAL.
1454 Submerged during daylight from now on.
1933 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 100-57:0 S LONG.1520-09:0 E DIST: 238.6 FUEL: 1888

: 22 August 1943:
0100 (K) Set clocks to minus eleven (-11) zone time.
ALL TIMES HEREAFTER ARE "LOVE"
0545 Submerged.
1948 Surfaced.
1200 FGTT: LAT.90-58:0 S LONG.1530-11:0 E DIST: 101.2 FUEL:552

: 23 August 1943:
0604 (L) Submerged.
1610 Sighted a large two or four engined monoplane, distant 5 miles (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #1)(LAT. 70-52:0 S LONG.1540-05:0 E)
1946 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT.80-00:0 S LONG: 1540-05:0 E DIST: 133.8 FUEL: 2045

— page 132 —
24 August 1943:
0325 (L) Sighted BUKA ISLAND bearing 0450T, 095 distant 35 miles.
0525 Submerged.
0800 Sighted smoke bearing 0050T, distant 10 miles. (CONTACT #1) (LAT. 50-07.5 S. LONG.154-11:0 E). During the morning, this developed into a patrol boat, echo ranging on 18 kilocycles, patrolling on east-west courses, midway between GREEN ISLAND and CAPE HENPAN. He never approached closer than about 7 miles.
1145 Lost contact with patrol boat.
1947 Surfaced.
2350 Sighted an aircraft flare in the vicinity of the BUKA -NEW IRELAND pass. This may have been from a "BLACK CAT" POSIT: LAT. 50-00:0 S LONG.154-19:5 E DIST: 190.6 FUEL 1988

: 25 August 1943:
0552 (L) Submerged.
1950 Surfaced.
During the evening, we passed about five miles north of MALUM ISLANDS, having been set southward, but did not sight them.
1200 POSTIT: LAT. 30-08:0 S LONG.1550-03:0 E. DIST: 179.6 FUEL: 1534

: 26 August 1943:
0558 (L) Submerged.
Found a leaky blow valve in the air flask of the torpedo in #5 tube. Recharged it, and defied that we may unload it through the muzzle tomorrow. If we don't shoot, we shall have to replace it with a tight torpedo the following day.
2020 Surfaced.
1200 POSTIT: LAT. 20-25:0 S LONG.1520-30:0 E DIST: 175.6 FUEL: 1468

: 27 August 1943:
0545 (L) Submerged between NEW HANOVER and MUSSAU ISLANDS. The sea is glassy, the visibility excellent.
0845 Sighted two float biplanes ("DAVES") headed for KAVIENG. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #2) (LAT. 20-02:0 S LONG.14905:0 E)
1000 Sighted another "DAVE" also headed toward KAVIENG. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #3) (LAT. 20-01:0 S LONG.1490-50:0 E)

— page 133 —
27 August 1943 (Continued)
1045
Sighted smoke bearing 1630T distant 30,000 yards (CONTACT #2) (LAT.20-01:0 S LONG.1490-48:0 E) This contact later developed into a two ship convoy with a single escort echo-ranging on 18 kilocycles. One steamer was an MFM type, the other an MMF, both small, and smoking heavily. When first sighted these ships appeared to be on an easterly course and consequently passing well clear. No attempt was made to close them.
1120
Sighted still another "DAVE" headed for KAVTENG, (ATRCAFT CONTACT #4) (LAT.20-00:0 S LONG.1490-46:0 E)
1135
Sighted a type Zero float plane ("RUFE") in a glide toward us. Went deep to avoid detection, but no bombs fell. (ATRCAFT CONTACT #5) (LAT.20-00:0 S LONG.1490-45:0 E)
1225
Upon returning to periscope depth, discovered that the convoy was on a northerly course going from TINGWON to the eastward of MUSSAU, It was now too late to close them. The great range at which the smoke was sighted had led us to believe they were not closing us. Their speed was about 3 knots.
1545
Sighted smoke bearing 1600T, distant 50,000 yards (CONTACT #3) (LAT.10-49:0 S LONG.1490-37:0 E) Commenced tracking and estimated the course to be 3100T, speed 7 knots. Determined the convoy to contain at least four ships with two escorts pinging on 18 kilocycles. Build not close them for a daylight attack.
2019
Surfaced, and commenced closing the convoy. 2230
Made radar contact at 17,550 yards. Commenced the approach.
1200
POSIT: LAT.10-56:0 S LONG: 1490-43:0 E
DIST: 166.6
FUEL: 1395

28 August 1943:
0030 (L)
Manned battle stations (ATTACK #1) (LAT.10-30:0 S LONG.1480-35:0 E)
0054-15
The after escort, broad on the starboard bow, range 3000 yards, turned on a small searchlight.

— page 134 —
28 August 1943 (Continued)
0054-30 Fired #3 tube
-37 Fired #4 tube
-44 Fired #5 tube
-51 Fired #6 tube
0055 Submerged, with the escort about 2500 yards away, still showing his light. Shifted targets to the next ship in the convoy. (LT/LT#1A)(LAT.10-30:0 S, LONG.148-35:0 E)
-20 Fired #2 tube
-0056-41 Heard #4 torpedo hit
-50 Heard #5 torpedo hit
0057 First of three depth charges, close, knocking small bits of cork loose, as we pass 230 feet.
0058-30 Heard #2 torpedo hit.
0100 Five depth charges, close, but overhead. Two vessels echo-ranging, and staying right with us, as we evade on southerly to south-westerly courses.
0111 Three more depth charges, close.
0113 One more.
0114 Three more, farther away.
0203 Seven this time, still farther.
0226 Five in the last barrage, distant. A total of twenty seven charges were dropped, but they caused no damage.
0515 Surfaced and cleared the area to the westward. There was no opportunity to regain contact for further attacks.
0606 Submerged.
2020 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 10-43:0 S LONG.1470-58:0 E DIST: 116.5 FUEL: 843

29 August 1943:
0016 (L) Submerged.
0058 Sighted smoke bearing 2830T., distant 20,000 yards. (CONTACT #4) (LAT.10-32:0 S LONG.1460-02:0 E). Commenced the approach. (ATTACK #2) (LAT 1-32:0 S LONG.1450-59:0E)
0922 Manned battle stations submerged. (ATTACK #2) (LAT 1-32:0 S LONG.1450-59:0E)
0959-47 Fired #1 tube
-55 Fired #2 tube
1000-02 Fired #5 tube
1006-42 All missed.
2024 One "end of run" explosion, which jarred the boat considerably.
1200 Surfaced.
POST: LAT.10-31:5 S LONG.1450-55:5 E DIST: 124.9 FUEL: 890

— page 135 —
30 August 1943:
0647 (L) Submerged.
2030 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT 20-24:0 S LONG. 144-07:5 E
DIST. 127.7 FUEL 782

: 31 August 1943:
0620(L) Submerged fifteen miles off the coast of
New Guinea in LONG. 1430E.
0800 Sighted the masts of a small coastal steamer
close inshore, out of reach. (CONTACT #5)
(LAT 30-07:0 S LONG. 143005:0E).
1400 Sighted a small MAN steamer with a deck cargo,
similar to HOKO MARU, 1514 tons. (CONTACT #6)
(LAT.20-59:0 S LONG. 1430-00:0 E) The minumum
range was 8000 yards.
2025 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT.30-00:0 S LONG. 1430-04:0 E
DIST. 95.7 FUEL: 325

: 1 September 1943:
0624 (L) Submerged.
Patrolled in the vicinity of 30S, 1430E.
The peaks and other landmarks are extremely
difficult to identify, KAIRIRU ISLAND is
the only reliable point in this locality.
2030 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 30-00:0 S LONG. 1420-57:0 E
DIST. 95.6 FUEL: 319

: 2 September 1943:
0631 (L) Submerged.
2037 Surfaced.
Sighted searchlights during the evening in
the vicinity of BUT and DAGUA; and a bright
glow in the sky near V.EYAK.
1200 POST: LAT. 20-57:0 S LONG. 1430-21:0 E
DIST. 92.5 FUEL: 320

: 3 September 1943:
0430 (L) More searchlights along the NEW GUINEA
Coast.
0625 Submerged.
2030 Surfaced.
Decided to shift operations to a point
between HOLLANDIA and AITAPE, and close the
coast there.
1200 POST: LAT. 30-01:0S LONG. 1430-01:0 E
DIST. 87.4 FUEL: 344

— page 136 —
4 September 1943:
0630 (L) Submerged.
Closed to about four miles from the
coast, and patrolled parallel to it.
2030
1200
POSIT: LAT. 20-52:0 S LONG. 1410-47:0E
DIST: 91.7
FUEL 320

: 5 September 1943:
0627 (L) Submerged.
Again closed the coast to about four
miles. Saw the smoke of two or three
fires in the jungle, but no other
evidence of civilization.
2032
1200
POSIT: LAT. 20-50:0 S LONG. 1410-55:0E
DIST: 90.0
FUEL: 376

: 6 September 1943:
0630 (L) Submerged.
Closed to about two miles, slightly to
the westward of our position of the last
two days. Saw a few huts in a small clearing near the beach.
2037
1200
POSIT: LAT. 20-51:0 S LONG. 1420-00:0 E
DIST: 89.5
FUEL: 315

: 7 September 1943:
0628 (L) Submerged.
Closed to about three miles from the coast.
Sighted one heavy bomber ("SALLY"), headed
to seaward from HOLLANDIA. (AIRCRAFT
CONTACT #6) (LAT.20-53:0S LONG.1410-57:0E)
During the afternoon, we saw about fifty
or more huts, just off the beach between
LONG's 1410-36:0 E and 1410-40:0 E. A few
fires were visible, but no other signs
of life could be seen.
2032
1200
POSIT: LAT.2053:0 S LONG.1410-57:0 E
DIST: 97.0
FUEL: 365

: 8 September 1943:
0629(L) Submerged.
1158
Sighted smoke bearing 2880T, distant
16,000 yards. (CONTACT #7) (LAT.20-44:0 S
LONG. 1410-37:0 E) Commenced the approach.
1244
Manned battle stations submerged (ATTACK
#3) (LAT.20-44:0 S LONG.1410-36:0 E)

(7)

— page 137 —
8 September 1943 (Continued)
1336-02  Fired #7 tube
    -10  Fired #8 tube
    -18  Fired #9 tube
1337-02  #8 Torpedo hit about fifty feet abaft the MOT.
1338-35  Ship sank, leaving about 100 survivors in lifeboats, on rafts, and in the water.
    Commenced closing the area to survey the survivors. There were far more men aboard than are necessary to man a 3000 tonner.
1407  Sighted a small freighter bearing 1050T, headed westward, distant 10,000 yards.
    (CONTACT #8)(LAT.2-45:0 S LONG.141°38:0 E)
    Commenced the approach. The freighter was a 1500 - 2000 ton MFH, well deck type, zigzagging from 2500T to 2900T in four minute legs; and towing several small sampans.
1432  When the range was 800 yards, angle on the bow 250 starboard, the target zigged at the periscope, bombs commenced falling, and we went to 150 feet.(ATRACRAFT CONTACT #7)(LAT 2-45:0 S LONG.1410-40:0 E).
1437  Returned to periscope depth and saw the freighter heading for the beach, range 3500 yards. It was obvious that he had known a submarine was present when he sighted the wreckage from our first attack; That he had sighted us; and that he would not give us a further favorable attack opportunity. He cruised parallel to the beach, close in, for the next hour and showed no inclination toward coming out to rescue the remaining survivors, some of whom were still in the water.
1600  Decided against expending any torpedoes on him and cleared the area.
1600  The Commanding Officer saw an irate member of the torpedoed ship's company kick one of his shipmates over the side of a lifeboat.
1615  Heard numerous small explosions, either gunfire or light aircraft bombs.
1800  All hands partook of an EIGHT layer monster birthday cake which the galley baked for LYTLE, G.W., Clc.
2032  Surfaced.
1200  POST:  LAT. 2-44:0 S LONG.141°37:0 E
    DIST:  96.2    FUEL:  34.4

— page 138 —
9 September 1943:
0643 (L) Submerged.
2032 Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 20-00:0S LONG. 1410-50:0 E
DIST: 108.9 FUEL: 537

: 10 September 1943:
0630 (L) Submerged.
2032 Surfaced.
The SJ radar obtained pips within 1000 yards several times, but nothing was seen except partly submerged tree trunks, upwards of one foot in diameter and thirty feet in length.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 10-50:0 S LANG. 1420-01:0 E
DIST: 98.2 FUEL: 355

: 11 September 1943:
0630 (L) Submerged.
2032 Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 10-38:0 S LONG. 1410-52:0 E
DIST: 99.8 FUEL: 336

: 12 September 1943:
0630 (L) Submerged.
2032 Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 10-45:5 S LONG. 1410-59:0 E
DIST: 94.1 FUEL: 322

: 13 September 1943:
0630 (L) Submerged.
2036 Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 20-04:5 S LONG. 1420-11:0 E
DIST: 37.6 FUEL: 357

: 14 September 1943:
0630 (L) Submerged.
2034 Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 10-32:0 S LONG. 1410-52:0 E
DIST: 92.3 FUEL: 328

: 15 September 1943:
0630 (L) Submerged.
2034 Surfaced.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 10-39:0 S LONG. 1410-53:5 E
DIST: 93.5 FUEL: 321

— page 139 —
16 September 1943:
0630 (L) Submerged.
2034 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 10-28:0 S LONG. 1410-31:0 E
DIST: 93.1 FUEL: 379

: 17 September 1943:
0625 (L) Submerged.
2035 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 20-05:0 S LONG. 1420-10:0 E
DIST: 103.5 FUEL: 445

: 18 September 1943:
0625 (L) Submerged.
2033 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 20-08:0 S LONG. 1440-00:0 E
DIST: 118.7 FUEL 814

: 19 September 1943:
0613 (L) Submerged.
2020 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 20-00:0 S LONG. 1450-17:0E
DIST: 98.7 FUEL: 337

: 20 September 1943:
0613 (L) Submerged.
2021 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 20-04:0S LONG. 1450-10:0 E
DIST: 95.6 FUEL 371

: 21 September 1943:
0623 (L) Submerged.
2031 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 20-05:0 S LONG. 1430-44:0 E
DIST: 122.2 FUEL: 755

: 22 September 1943:
0622 (L) Submerged.
2030 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 20-21:5 S LONG. 1440-33:0 E
DIST: 119.4 FUEL 716

: 23 September 1943:
0100 (L) Received orders to terminate patrol.
0300 Passed HERMIT ISLANDS aboard to port,
distant 13 miles. No enemy activity
observed.
0615 Submerged.
2015 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT.10-19:0 S LONG.1460-13:0 E
DIST: 142.2 FUEL 1189

(10)

— page 140 —
24 September 1943:
0558 (L) Submerged.
2003 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 00-17:0 S LONG.1490-09:0 E
DIST: 175.5 FUEL: 1941

: 25 September 1943:
0555 (L) Submerged.
1945 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 00-18:0 S LONG.152-06:0E
DIST: 182.5 FUEL: 2455

: 26 September 1943:
0552 (L) Submerged.
1924 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 10-53:0 S LONG. 1540-48:0 E
DIST: 192.0 FUEL: 2477

: 27 September 1943:
0541 (L) Submerged.
1921 Surfaced.
1200 POST: LAT. 40-37:0 S LONG.1560-01:0E
DIST: 133.5 FUEL 2642

: 28 September 1943:
0553 (L) Submerged.
0730 Sighted a large monoplane on a northerly course, distant 8 miles (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #8) (LAT 60-30'0 S LONG.1580-25'0 E)
1512 Surfaced.
1536 Sighted a submarine bearing 3270T, distant 8 miles in LAT.60-41'0 S LONG.1580-47'0 E.
1540 Submerged to establish identity of submarine, since we expected to meet U.S.S. GADM today.
1600 Surfaced, identity established, and recognition signal fired. Proceeded in company with GATO to rendezvous.
1200 POST: LAT. 60-35'0S LONG.1580-36'0 E
DIST: 198.5 FUEL 2662

: 29 September 1943:
0255 (L) Sighted RAMOS ISLAND distant 35 miles.
0515 Exchanged recognition signals with escort, U.S.S.JUNI (APD 6), and proceeded to TULAGI HARBOR.
AM Sighted numerous friendly surface craft and aircraft.
1025 Moored to YOG 41 in TULAGI HARBOR.
1100 Commenced defueling.
1200 GUARDFISH came alongside for fuel. Since the barge could not receive and give fuel at the same time, defueling secured until GUARDFISH is fueled.

(11)

— page 141 —
29 September 1943:
Continued.
Gave GUARDFISH our excess fresh meat.
2145  Defueling completed transferred 36,156
gallons of diesel oil to YOG 41.
1200  POSIT: TULAGI HARBOR, SOLOMON ISLANDS
DIST: 247.7  FUEL 2746

: 30 September 1943:
Received orders to give U.S.S. GATO our
gyro south rotor, and await spare from
BRISBANE.
1323(L)  GATO underway with our gyro rotor.
1200  POSIT: TULAGI HARBOR, SOLOMON ISLANDS
DIST 00.0  FUEL 0

: 1 October 1943:
2200(1)  Spare rotor recieved, and gyro in
commission.
1200  POSIT: TULAGI HARBOR, SOLOMON ISLANDS
DIST: 00.0  FUEL 254

: 2 October 1943:
0855(L)  Undersway in company with HMNZS MATAI.
1500  Submerged to give MATAI sound training.
1635  Surfaced, and proceeded independently.
1200  POSIT: L.A.T. 90-12'OS  LONG.1590-35'5'E
DIST: 3540  FUEL 268

: 4 October 1943:
1200  POSIT: L.A.T. 130-09'5' S  LONG.1570-36'0'E
DIST: 314.6  FUEL 3680

: 5 October 1943:
1200  POSIT: L.A.T. 230-18'0 S LONG.1540-33'0'E
DIST: 348.0  FUEL 4470

: 6 October 1943:
0250(L)  Sighted CALOUNDRA LIGHT bearing 2700T
distant 35 miles.
0325  Sighted CAPE MORTON LIGHT bearing 2500T
distant 20 miles.
0410  Sighted a ship in the vicinity of point VAN.
He refused to answer challenge. Sent a
dispatch to CPT-72 concerning this ship,
which was not a submarine.
0600  Identified ship as a friendly merchantman.
0930  Entered BRISBANE RIVER.
1030  Moored to U.S.S. FULTON
DIST: 307.5  FUEL 4820
(12)

— page 142 —
11
995

(C) WEATHER
The area between the north coast of New Guinea and the Admiralty Islands was far more favorable for submerged operations than the areas nearer the equator. The average winds were force two, predominantly southeast to southwest. On five days the seas were calm and glassy; but during the remainder, sea conditions up to three were experienced.
Nearly every night extremely heavy lightning along the New Guinea coast was seen, which at times assumed the appearance of gunfire.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
Variable currents up to one knot, setting southeast to southwest were noted well off the coast of New Guinea, south of the Admiralty Islands. A westerly set of one knot, close to the coast between ATTLE and FOLLANDIA, was encountered on four successive days.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
None sighted.
No uncharted shoals were discovered anywhere between the north coast of New Guinea and the Admiralty Islands, between longitudes 1450 E and 1400 E.

— page 145 —
27 August 1943, heard echo ranging on 18 kilocycles at 1850(L); tracked submerged, and estimated the convoy's course 310° T, speed 7 knots until dark. Surfaced, and closed, stopping every half hour to obtain bearings on the pinging, which continued throughout the engagement. Made radar contact at 2230(L) at 17550 yards, and determined convoy to consist of five medium freighters and two escorts. They were travelling with three freighters in line, with one ahead and one stern. One escort led the formation; while the other brought up the rear. The visibility was good, with a glassy sea, bright starlight, and few horizon clouds. The merchantmen were sighted at 20000 yards.

SHIPS SINK: NONE

SHIPS DAMAGED: (1) One medium sized freighter damaged and probably sunk.
        (2) One medium sized freighter damaged.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY:
(1) Hearing two torpedo hits in first ship.
(2) Hearing one torpedo hit in the second ship.
(3) Hearing the "ship breaking up" noise from the vicinity of the attack.

TARGET DRAFT 16 COURSE 3100 SPEED 10 RANGE:
#1 - 3200
#1A-4400

OWN SHIP D.T.A

#1-SPEED 15 COURSE 030°t030°D DETTH SURFACE ANGLE 00
#1A-SPEED 10 COURSE 058° and 076° DEPTH 30 ANGLE 50D

(16)

— page 146 —
11 095

ATTACK DATA (Continued)

TYPE ATTACK:
- Tracked the convoy by radar, using a plot and the TDC. Determined the course as 310° T, speed 10 knots. The convoy was not zigzagging. Gained an attack position on the port beam of the leftmost ship, and took a course for a 100° port track at 15 knots, presenting less than a 10° angle on the bow to the target at all times.

ATTACK #1:
- Fired four torpedoes, using radar ranges and bearings, at 3200 yards, torpedo run 3200 yards. Spread of 20L, 1/2°L, 1/2°R, 20R using offset dial, gave gyro angles from 2°R to 20L, as the ship was swinging slowly to the right. Results: Two hits 2M-04s and 2M-06s after firing the second and third torpedoes.

ATTACK #1A:
- Fired two more torpedoes, while swinging hard right and diving to avoid the escort bearing down from starboard, at a second ship beyond the first, Range by radar 4400 yards, torpedo run 4400 yards. Spread of 1/2°L, 0° using the offset dial, gave gyro angles of 260L and 47°L. Results: one hit 3M-15s after firing the first torpedo of this salvo.

— page 148 —
2000 tons, MFP type.
Sighted smoke while submerged at 20000 yards, in good visibility. Light wind, rippled surface.

SHIPS SINK: NONE
SHIPS DAMAGED: NONE
DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: -
TARGET DRAFT 10 COURSE 1100T SPEED 12 RANGE 2000 Yds.

OWN SHIP DATA

SPEED 2 COURSE 170° DEPTH 64 FEET ANGLE 00

TYPE ATTACK: Normal submerged approach, using bow tubes. The distance to the track was excessive, but the firing bearing was reached before the track could be closed. A torpedo run of 2000 yards on a 1240P track had to be accepted. Several good echo ranges were obtained inside 3000 yards. The spread, using the offset dial, was 1°L, 00, and 18R, a total of 200 feet. The three torpedoes were tracked by sound to and beyond the target. The Commanding Officer saw heavy smoke from one torpedo pass under the target's counter, but did not see the other two torpedoes. One end of run explosion, jarring the boat considerably, occurred 5°55' after firing the first torpedo.

— page 150 —
11
095
OWN SHIP DATA
SEED 2 COURSE 030°T DEPTH 65 FEET ANGLE 0°

TYPE ATTACK: Normal submerged approach, tracking target with TDC, and obtaining echo ranges inside 3000 yards. Fired the stern tubes at a range of 1350 yards, using a spread of 20L, 20R introduced by the offset dial.

The second torpedo hit about fifty feet abaft the MOT, 52 seconds after firing. The third torpedo ran astern, but the first was not seen. Both the second and third torpedoes smoked heavily. There were no end of run explosions.

ATTACK #3

TUBES FIRED #7 #8 #9
TRACK ANGLE 79 P 80 P 81 P
GYRO ANGLE 1 R 0 1 L
DEPTH SET 10 10 10
POWER High High High
HIT OR MISS Miss Hit Miss
ERRATIC ? NO NO NO
MARK TORPEDO 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
SERIAL NO. 32525 24757 24795
MARK EXPLODER VI-1 VI-1 VI-1
SERIAL NO. 17651 5002 6262
ACTUATION SET Mag. Mag. Mag.
Con. Con. Con.
ACTUATION ACTUAL

— page 151 —
1. The convoy of attacks #1 and #1A was formed with an escort leading, followed by a single maru, then three freighters in line, another single maru, and finally another escort. The two escorts each ranged on 18 kilocycles from the time the convoy's smoke was sighted until contact was lost twelve hours later.

The pinging, during darkness, enabled us to maintain contact until the SJ radar picked the convoy up at 1750 yards.

The trailing escort sighted us, turned toward, and showed a small searchlight about 15 seconds prior to firing, at a range of 3000 yards. No counter measures were employed prior to diving, however.

The depth charging, which followed the attack, was as prolonged as the DRUM has undergone in several patrols, lasting one hour and thirty-five minutes, with the sound search lasting about three hours. A total of 27 charges were dropped.

During the first half hour of the counter attack, several effective runs were made. Echo ranging was used throughout the attack, and no single ping, while the other employed double pings. Both used automatic keying, and never, even during an attack, was the interval less than 8 seconds.

The first depth-charge exploded close aboard when the boat was at 230 feet, going down, and knocked small bits of cork loose. It is of interest to note that the DRUM has never suffered any material damage, never had any appreciable cork dislodged, never had any lights broken, and never had any "sundry" loose items thrown clear of the bulkheads during seven patrols, and numerous depth charges.

The first eleven charges were in the "fairly close" category. The other sixteen were increasingly farther away.

Evasive tactics included silent running at 300 feet, using 80 RPM most of the time. The initial courses were about 50° to the left of the chosen retiring course. The retiring course was assumed as soon as the enemy began falling astern.

— page 152 —
1. ENGINEERING:
During the last refit, an effort was made to synchronize the TBT's both electrically and mechanically. Two days out, both TBT's flooded out, and were useless the remainder of the patrol. A more accurate system of bearing transmission is desirable, though this ship has never relied on the TBT bearings during an attack. Renewal of the selsyn units has been requested, and may solve the problem.
After functioning well for the first month, the pitometer succumbed to a series of attacks and passed away on 17 September 1943. The final diagnosis is:
1. Rotary seal bellows contact surface non-corrosion resistant.
2. Control unit contact arm slips on shaft due to bricker lower stop rod on bellows assembly.
3. Lack of all spares now shows up in all parts of the system.
A new control unit design has been submitted to the U.S.S. FULTON.
Twice a month engine exhaust valves froze in the closed position after deep submergence and/ or depth charge attack. This is due to the 750 angle seat, and can not be prevented.
Salt water was found in the starboard reduction gear sump for the third successive patrol. It is believed the water on the gear housing flange bolts are loosened by depth charging and vibration. Lock nuts are now installed, but a more positive means of preventing the housing from becoming loose is imperative.
#2 Vapor compression distiller again gave trouble, though its output was satisfactory. The compressor lobes were striking each other, and even after a complete overhaul, continued to do so. The gears are believed worn. A new compressor unit has been requested.
The U.S.S. FULTON finally solved the port 75% motor field interlock trouble, which has been with us for five patrols, A new interlock coil, frame, and plunger was installed during the last refit, and never was power lost on either shaft during this patrol.

— page 153 —
1. R.DIO
No difficulties were experienced either in reception or transmission. All messages were sent to Australian stations.
There were no material casualties.

: 2. RADAR
1. SJ
Not one minute of operating time was lost during the entire patrol. Land targets up to 45,000 yards, and ships up to 17,550 yards were detected. The: magnetron installed has been, operating perfectly for 1000 hours.

2. SD
Operation of the SD radar is uncertain. On 28 September, it failed to operate on: surfacing. The cause was the failure of a resistor and a condenser in the cathode ray tube power circuit. The following day planes were detected at 16 miles, and land targets, 8000 feet high, at 60 miles. A thorough adjustment of the equipment has been requested.

3. ARC-1
Although the time on station was spent in close proximity to known enemy radar installations (NEWAK and HOLLANDIA), no indications of radar were obtained. The unit apparently operated satisfactorily, for shipboard noises were readily detected.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
All sound gear cables piercing the pressure hull were renewed during the last refit. No material difficulties were experienced during this patrol.

Sound conditions were average in the area between the NEW GUINEA coast and the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS. Screws of small steamers were heard at: 6000 - 8000 yards. Many fish noises made conditions poor at times.

(24)

— page 154 —
10-30° S LONG, 148°-35° E, The temperature decreased 30° between 150 and 250 feet, and possibly another 30 to 320 feet. The gradient did not afford much protection during the early phases of the depth charge attack between 0100(L) and 0230(L) on 28 August 1943.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HEALTHBILITY.

The crew suffered the usual minor ailments concomitant a shift from the cool climate of Brisbane to the tropics. One man was given oxygen through an escape lung to aid his breathing when he suffered from a severe chest cold.

The food was definitely superior to that obtained from the U.S.S. FULTON for the sixth patrol. The addition of fresh frozen fruits and vegetables was appreciated by all hands. The meat, especially the steak, was more tender, and definitely tastier. Cocoa Cola, made with water, and set in the cold room to "ice up" was a delicious drink at any and all hours of the day.

One-third of a can of CO2 absorbent in each torpedo room on the all day dives made the boat comfortable throughout the run.

(Q) PERSONNEL.

In spite of a turnover of one-third of the crew during the last two refit periods, the state of training, as well as the morale, is excellent. This is due to a combination of two things. First, the caliber of the non-qualified personnel obtained from the Submarine Division EIGHTY TWO is high. Second, a vigorous training routine has been established prior to leaving on patrol; and continued during the entire run. Seventy per cent of the personnel aboard are now qualified.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED.

| Item | Quantity | Value |
|------||-------|
| BRISBANE TO AREA | 2776.2 Mi. | 24288 Gals. |
| IN AREA | 2390.4 " | 10590 " |
| AREA TO BRISBANE | 2530.0 " | 33057 " |
| TOTAL | 7696.6 " | 67935 " |

(25)

— page 155 —
3) DURATION
Days enroute to area 14
Days in area 24
Days in combat zone 34
Days enroute to base 13
Days submerged 38

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
TORPEDOES 12
FUEL (36,156 gals., transferred to TULAGI) 2578 gals.
PROVISIONS 0 Days.
PERSONNEL 14 Days.

The orders of Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO to end the patrol.

(U) REMARKS:
The COUCAL was very cooperative. With her assistance several small casualties were repaired in a thorough manner in lieu of the chewing gum and bailing wire method in vogue while on patrol. The refueling was handled expeditiously; and 13,264 gallons of fuel, plus stores and fresh water, were received in two hours.

The shipping routes off New Guinea are very indefinite. I believe that small craft usually run close inshore, and that for this area, the best place to operate would be close inshore, above HOLLANDIA, in the vicinity of CAPE D'URVILLE.

The type voltage regulator installed on both the radio and IC motor generators is inadequate. The transmission of two messages was delayed until adjustment could be made to the regulator. The IC motor generators are run using "rheostat" control instead of regulator control. If no new design regulators are available complete reconditioning of the present ones is necessary.

— page 157 —
11 095
FF12-15(72)/A16-3/Pk
TASK FORCE SEVENTY-TWO,
Care of Fleet Fost Office,
San Francisco, California,
10 October 1943.

From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) - Report of Seventh War Patrol; comments on.

1. DRUM departed BRISBANE on her Seventh War Patrol 16 August 1943. Enroute Jomard Entrance she made day and night training approaches with U.S.S. COUCAL as target. She entered Jomard Entrance the 21st, and after topping off with fuel from COUCAL, proceeded independently for her patrol area. While passing between BUKA and GREEN ISLAND, DRUM sighted an antisubmarine petrol, but was not detected. After passing to the north of NEW IRELAND, DRUM, on the 27th, made sight contact with a two ship escorted convoy, but could not close. Day-light surface chase was impracticable because of float plane patrol. Later the same day she sighted a larger convoy of five medium freighters with two escorts, on which she made a night surface attack, Latitude 10-31' S., 1480-35' E. Six torpedoes were fired at two leading ships of this convoy and although DRUM was forced to immediate evasive action by the escorts, three hits were heard. The next morning DRUM unsuccessfully attacked an unescorted 2,000 ton freighter, missing with three torpedoes. Patrolling along the north coast of NEW GUINEA, DRUM's days were uneventful until 8 September, in Latitude 20-44' S., 1410-36' E., she attacked an unescorted freighter of about 2,900 tons. Three torpedoes were fired, of which one hit. The target sunk in ninety three seconds. Half an hour later another small freighter approached the scene, but being warned by the debris in the water or by plane on patrol, enemy avoided DRUM's attack. No further contacts were made, and on 23 September DRUM departed her patrol area for BRISBANE, stopping at TULAGI enroute to partially defuel and supply GATO with a replacement for a defective gyro rotor. After receiving a replacement rotor for her own gyro, DRUM proceeded to BRISBANE, arriving 6 October 1943.

2. The night of 27-28 August, southeast of MUSSAU, was a successful one for DRUM. Following up an afternoon contact with a northbound convoy of five freighters and two escorts which she had been unable to close submerged, she chased and reestablished contact after dark. Contact was initially regained by underwater sound detection of very helpful echo-ranging pings of the escort vessels. Radar gained contact at

— page 158 —
11 095
FF12-15(72)/A16-3/Pk
Serial 0311
DECLASSIFIED
Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) - Report of Seventh War Patrol; comments on.

17,500 yards. DRUM attacked shortly after midnight, dividing her bow torpedoes between two freighter targets. She scored two good hits on one target, and one on the other, and then withstood without damage a heavy depth-charging by the escorts. A subsequent aircraft contact report indicated that both of DRUM's targets sank.

3. There was no definite evidence of faulty exploder performance in any of DRUM's attacks, although the absence of hits on the day attack of 29 August may have been due to a failure of the magnetic feature of a torpedo passing beneath the target's keel.

4. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the DRUM are congratulated with having inflicted on the enemy the following damage during her Seventh War Patrol, and it is designated as successful for purposes of Combat Insignia Award:

SUNK
One unidentified freighter 5,000 tons
One unidentified freighter 5,000 tons
One unidentified freighter 2,900 tons
TOTAL 12,900 tons

JAMES FIFE.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (Advance copy - 2)
VONO
VOPNAV (Op-23c)
Com 1st Flt
Com 2nd Flt
Com 3rd Flt
Comsubs 1st Flt
Comsubs 2nd Flt
Comsubs 7th Flt
CSS 3, 6, 8, 10, 16, 18
CSD 81, 82, 101
CTF 72 War Patrol Summary

Oinc, S/M School, N.L. Conn. (2)
Flt Radio Unit, MELBOURNE
All SS TF-72 (Not to be taken to sea - BURN)
CO DRUM (File)

— page 159 —
11/An
Serial: 02111
20 OCT 1943
DECLASSIFIED
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
CO DRUM Report of
Seventh War Patrol.
From: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) - Seventh War Patrol;
Comments on:
1. Forwarded.
H. W. CRAF
Chief of staff.
Copy to: CNO
22 NOV 23
RECEIVED
U.S. FLEET
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

— page 161 —
SS228/A16-3
Serial 011
DECLASSIFIED
From:  The Commanding Officer, USS DRUM.
To:  The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject:  U.S.S. DRUM - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

Enclosures:
(A) Subject report.
(B) Plots of Attacks #1-#3. (CTF-17 only).
(C) Track Charts of Patrol in Area. (CTF-17only)

1. Enclosures (A), (B), and (C), covering the EIGHT war patrol of this vessel conducted in the area between the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO and the CAROLINE ISLANDS during the period November 2, 1943 to December 5, 1943, are forwarded herewith.

D. F. WILLIAMSON.

1 0117

— page 162 —
1943
Returned from SEVENTH war patrol 6 October, 1943.
Normal refit by the Submarine Repair Unit at Brisbane, Australia.
Docked for painting, 22-23 October, 1943. Four days intensive
training with U.S.S. PC 1123 and U.S.S. COUCAL, including gun
firing practice approaches submerged, and radar approaches sub-
merged and surfaced. Ready for sea: 2 November, 1943.

(B) NARRATIVE:
All times are "LOVE".

2 November, 1943:
1100 Underway from Submarine Base, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA.
1337-1530 Conducted sound listening tests in MORTON BAY.
1930 Passed CAPE MORTON light abeam to starboard and
proceeded to sea independently.
FM Sighted two allied convoys, one outbound, one inbound.
Sighted HMAS AUSTRALIA conducting night battle
practice. Sighted U.S.S. RAY and HMAS BENALLA con-
ducting training exercises.

1200 POST: BRISBANE RIVER
DIST: 10.0 FUEL: 60.0

3 November, 1943:
Cruising on the surface, enroute TULGII.
Conducted three training dives and held fire control
drills.

1200 POST: LAT.24°-17:5 S LONG. 155°-00:5 E.
DIST: 287.6 FUEL: 2811

4 November 1943:
Cruising on the surface.
Conducted three training dives.
Compensated control room magnetic compass.

1200 POST: LAT.20°-08:0 S LONG. 157°-05:5 E.
DIST: 296.4 FUEL: 2395

5 November, 1943:
Cruising on the surface.
Conducted three training dives and held fire control
drills.

1200 POST: 150-45:0 S LONG. 157°33:0 E.
DIST: 295.3 FUEL: 2592

6 November 1943:
0655 Sighted and exchanged recognition signals with
U.S. Navy TBF Avenger. (ATCRACHT CONTACT #1)
(LAT.12°-09:5 S LONG. 157°-41:0 E.)
Conducted three training dives.

— page 163 —
6 November, 1943: (Continued).
1200 POSIT: LAT.110-12:0 S LONG. 157044:0E
DIST: 298.4 FUEL: 2291

7 November, 1943:
0220 Sighted RUSSELL ISLANDS, distant 30 miles.
0510 Sighted and exchanged recognition signals with U.S. Navy PBY.
0515 Sighted and exchanged recognition signals with escort, S0729, and proceeded to TULAGI HARBOR.
1045 A five minute air raid alert held up fueling.
1103 Escorted to Oiler YOG-41, and commenced fueling.
1310 Took 12,458 gallons of diesel oil.
1405 Escorted alongside USS ALCHIBA and filled all fresh water tanks. Anything else the ALCHIBA had was made available to us, but we were satisfied with the water alone.
1507 Underway in company with S0729.
1900-1922 Conducted trim dive, and sent escort back to TULAGI.

1200 POSIT: TULAGI HARBOR.
DIST: 251.6 FUEL: 2091

8 November, 1943:
0705 Cruising on the surface enroute area.
1800-1814 Conducted trim dive.
1814 Sighted BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND bearing 2350T, distant 100 miles.

1200 POSIT: LAT.60-13:0 S LONG. 158-02:5 E
DIST: 301.6 FUEL: 2416

9 November, 1943:
1800-1835 Trim Dive.
1900 Arrived in area, and commenced surface patrol at 10 knots.

1200 POSIT: LAT. 20-10:0 S LONG. 1550-04:0 E.
DIST: 356.6 FUEL: 3278

10 November, 1943:
1115 Sighted large plane bearing 0750T, distant 12 miles. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #2) (LAT. 10-04:ON LONG. 151-43:0E). Avoided detection by turning away and slowing to 5 knots.
1235 Sighted one two engine bomber (SALLY) bearing 0600T, distant 6 miles. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #3) (LAT. 10-05:5 N LONG. 151-29:0 E).
1236 Submerged and serviced torpedoes.
1441 Surfaced and resumed patrol at 10 knots.

— page 164 —
10 November, 1943: (Continued)
1200 POST: LMT. 1-07:5 N LONG: 151Q-34:0 E.
DIST: 342.5 FUEL: 2810

11 November, 1943:
0605 Sighted convoy bearing 0300T, distant 13000 yards in early dawn. (CONTACT #1) (LAT.00-20:0 N LONG. 1430-45:0 E).
0608 Submerged and commenced the approach.
0614 Manned battle stations submerged.
0625 (LAT.00-19:0 N LONG. 1430-40:0 E).
0170-23 Three escorting destroyers.
-29 Fire #1 tube.
-30 Fire #2 tube.
-30 Fire #3 tube.
-43 Fire #4 tube.
-45 Fire #5 tube.
-50 Fire #6 tube.
-56 Fire #7 tube.
0711 Sent deep, and commenced evasive action.
0711-25 #2 torpedo hit.
-33 #3 torpedo hit.
0716-30 First of four depth charges.
0726 Last depth charge, two of which were close aboard, overhead. No damage.
0815 At periscopes depth, sighted one SUBHIC or SHIGURE class destroyer bearing 1150T, distant 5000 yards conducting a routine supersonic search.
1009 Reload completed. Changed course to close destroyer for attack.
1045 Sighted destroyer bearing 1250T, distant 20000 yards, angle on the bow 1300.
1115 Surfaced and commenced search of area of attack.
1230 Sighted two depth charges marker buoys near debris and sound from the depth charging, but no wreckage or oil.
1300 Sent contact report.
1200 POST: LMT. 00-20:0 N LONG. 1480-38:0 E.
DIST: 243.9 FUEL: 1715.

12 November, 1943:
0450 Sighted a submarine on the surface, bearing 3350T, distant 5000 yards. (CONTACT #2) (LAT.10-58:0 N LONG. 1490-04:0 E).
0452 Submerged.
0505 Identified submarine as friendly. It was probably the SUBHIC.
0512 Submarine disappeared, either submerging or turning away.
0520-0525 Attempted to exchange recognition signals by underwater sound, but obtained no answers to our challenges.
0745 Surfaced and resumed 10 knot patrol.

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1 0117

— page 165 —
12 November, 1943: (Continued).
1200  FOSIT: L.T. 20-16:5 N LONG. 1490-38:5 E.
DIST: 230.0  FUEL: 1338

: 13 November, 1943:
0617-0700  Trim dive.
1010  Sighted the mast and stack of a large ship
    resembling a tanker, bearing 1120T, distant
    25000 yards. (CONTACT #3) (L.T. 20-16:0 N
    LONG. 1490-20:0 E.). Commenced tracking to
    gain position ahead for submerged attack.
1030  Lost contact with the ship and failed to
    regain it in spite of closing the estimated
    track at flank speed. The visibility became
    poor due to many rain squalls. Commenced a
    search of the possible escape courses, covering
    speeds up to 15 knots.
1345  Back tracked to cover slower speeds of the
    tanker, but found nothing.
1715  Set a course to arrive at estimated down
    position of the tanker, assuming he was headed
    for TRUK.

1200  FOSIT: L.T. 20-27:0 N LONG. 1490-37:0 E.
DIST: 269.5  FUEL: 1896

: 14 November, 1943:
0517-0534  Trim dive.
0630  Arrived at estimated dawn position of the
    tanker. Commenced a search down his track.
    Results negative.
0950  Commenced searching to southw.r.d. on the
    R.B.U.L. - TRUK route, for a heavy cruiser dem-
    aged by the SC.M.F.
2200  Heard an explosion through the hull resambling
    a torpedo. (L.T. 20-21:0 N LONG. 1490-35:0E)
    Stopped and listened for echo ranging, but
    heard nothing.
2205  Went ahead at five knots, manning sound.
2400  Resumed 10 knot patrol, sound search having
    revealed nothing. Hope the Japs finished off
    the cruiser for us!

1200  FOSIT: L.T. 40-11:5 N LONG. 1500-32:0 E.
DIST: 314.9  FUEL: 2590

: 15 November, 1943:
0150  Sighted two or three ships, probably men o'war,
    bearing 1950T, distant 24000 yards, in squally
    weather. (CONTACT #4) (L.T. 20-03:0 N
    LONG. 1490-22:0E). Attempted to close and track
    them. Estimated their course 0250T to 0500T,
    speed about 20 knots.
0250  Lost contact when the ships entered a heavy
    (4)

— page 166 —
15 November, 1943: (Continued)
squall. Continued searching at high speed to no avail.
0345 Resumed 10 knot patrolboard last reported position of enemy cruiser.
0521-0538 Trim dive.
1051 Sighted one float biplane ("PETE"), bearing 2400T, distant 6 miles. (LAT. 10-09:ON LONC. 1450-06:0 E.) Submerged.
1130 ...t 50 feet, picked up definite evidence of radar interference on the SD.
1203 Surfaced and continued search for wounded cruiser in the vicinity of 10-10:0 N, 1490E. Results Negative.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 10-08:0 N LONG. 1480-59:5 E. DIST: 282.5 FUEL: 2060

16 November, 1943:
0525-0539 Trim dive.
Surface patrol at 10 knots.
1200 POSIT: LAT. 20-27:0 N LONG. 1490-45:5 E. DIST: 268.7 FUEL: 1549

17 November, 1943:
0310 Sighted a surfaced submarine bearing 2250T, distant 5000 yards. (CONT. CT #5) (LAT. 10-34:ON LONG. 1500-02:0E). This probably was the SC. NE. He sighted us about the same time, and both turned away and cleared the area.
0525-0543 Trim dive.
0955 Sighted two float biplanes ("PETES"), bearing 2550T, distant 6 miles on a northerly course. (LAT. 10-35:ON LONG. 1490-02:0 E). Submerged to avoid detection.
1015 Surfaced.
1140 Sighted smoke of three ships, bearing 2050T, distant 24000 yards. (CONT. CT #6) (LAT. 10-34:ON LONG. 1480-37:0E). Commenced tracking using the low periscope. Determined base course, 3450T; speed 7.5 knots; convoy consisted of three marns and two escorts.
1327 Submerged. Named battle stations submerged. (ATTACK#2) (LAT. 10-48:ON LONG. 1480-24:5 E).
1440-15 Fire #1 tube.
-22 Fire #2 tube.
-29 Fire #3 tube.
-35 Fire #4 tube.
1440-40 Went deep and commenced evasive action.
1441-26 #3 torpedo hit.
1444 First of three depth charges. Faint chips and bits of cork were knocked loose.
1447-17 End of torpedo run explosion.

(5)

— page 167 —
17 November, 1943: (Continued)
1448 String of twelve depth charges, fairly close, in pairs an... singly.
1503 Last depth charge. A total of 15 charges were dropped, but they caused no damage.
1550 At periscope depth, sighted the damaged ship, bearing 0750T, distant 12,000 yards, listed about 200 to port; one escort between us and the ship; and two columns of smoke to the northward. Commenced closing for kill.
1700 ...mother maru and the second escort are lying to near the damaged ship, range 9000 yards, apparently they plan to tow the damaged ship, or to remove personnel should she sink. The other escort is now well to the south, conducting a routine supersonic search.
1915 Two distant explosions, apparently depth charges, but no escorts were in sight at the time. The third maru, which had been cruising at slow speed beyond the damaged ship, proceeded southward with one escort.
1920 Could not close the damaged ship by dark. Decided to pull clear, surface, and return to finish off the damaged ship,(and possibly the other ship also) using radar.
2005 Surfaced, and commenced closing the target group.
2050 Made contact on an escort bearing 0900T, distant 3500 yards.
2053 The escort flashed the letter "A" at us, having made a radar or a sound contact, since the visibility was exceptionally poor and we had our tail toward him. Commenced a search of the area near the escort to locate the damaged ship.
2359 Completed the search and found nothing. It is believed that the damaged ship sank between our last look at about 1930 and our return to the area at 2050. Commenced search along the probable route of the remaining ships of the convoy.
1200 POST: L.T. 10-33:0 N LONG. 1480-33:0 E. DIST: 261.0 FUEL: 1498
18 November, 1943:
0833 Sighted smoke bearing 0210T, distant 15000 yards. (CONTACT #7) (L.T. 30-03:0N LONG. 1480-37:0 E). Commenced closing and tracking.
0342 Lost contact when the "BLACKFISH" submerged, but we did not realize it was a submarine. Kan at flank speed and attempted to regain contact.
1005 Broke off chase and resumed 10 knot patrol.

— page 168 —
18 November, 1943 (Continued)
1115
Sighted a submarine bearing 1080T, distant 18000 yards. (L.T. 3-25:0 N LONG. 148-35:0E).
Commenced closing the submarine.
1132
Submerged and continued closing the submarine.
1220
Determined that the submarine had also submerged.
Charged course to southward, went deep and serviced all torpedoes.
1510
Surfaced and exchanged recognition signals with the "BLACKFISH". The whole story was now clear. It was obvious that all our contacts to-day were with the "BLACKFISH"; and that we roared by him at about 0900, making 19 knots. Closed the BLACKFISH and asked that he remain in company until we tuned our radar with its new magnetron. He did likewise.
1945
Parted company with BLACKFISH with both radars in better condition.
1200
POSIT: L.T. 3-24:0 N LONG. 148-35:0 E.
DIST: 214.3
FUEL: 1716

19 November, 1943:
0958
Sighted the mast of three ships, bearing 0610T, distant 20000 yards. (CONTACT #8) (L.T. 1-16:0N LONG. 149-34:0 E). Tracked at high speed on the surface. Determined the course as 1700T; speed as 7 knots. No were about 8 miles from the track at the time of sighting.
1045
Sighted one two-engine bomber ("S.LLY") bearing 1300T, distant 5 miles. (L.T. 1-05:0N LONG. 149-39:0 E). Submerged and commenced closing the track at high speed. Identified convoy, much to our disappointment, as three 100-300 ton trawlers, one with a small landing barge in tow, and four small motor sampans. Discontinued the approach at 4000 yards, when guns of about 6 pound caliber were seen mounted on the trawlers. Decided not to use the deck gun in view of: (1) The trawlers' guns; (2) the small value of the targets; (3) the presence of aircraft; (4) the unnecessary revelation of our position.
1357
Surfaced and resumed 10 knot patrol.
1425
Sighted a very large unidentified plane bearing 2800T, distant 15 miles. (L.T. 1-10:0N LONG. 149-43:0 E). Provided detection by turning away and slowing to five knots. This plane was headed south.

— page 169 —
19 November, 1943 (Continued):
1200    POSIT: L.T. 19-03:0 N LONG. 1490-42:0 E.
    DIST: 253.6    FUEL: 1397

20 November, 1943:
1215-1310    Submerged during a violent rain squall.

1200    POSIT: L.T. 20-20:0 N LONG. 1480-35:0 E.
    DIST: 210.1    FUEL: 1475

21 November, 1943:
0250    Patrolling to the westward at standard
    speed.

1200    POSIT: L.T. 20-44:0 N LONG. 1440-4915 E.
    DIST: 290.0    FUEL: 1931

22 November, 1943:
0250    Evidence of an SJ radar in the vicinity
    present on our screen. This remained until
    the radar was secured at daylight. Believe
    BLACKFISH was astern of us and that the
    interference was caused by his SJ.

0531-0549    Strike smoke of three ships bearing 3070T,
0907    distant 30000 yards. Commenced tracking on
    the surface. Determined convoy to consist
    of four murs, on base course 130T.
    (CONT.LCT #9) (L.T. 20-53:0N LONG.1410-36:5E)
1003    Submerged and commenced the approach.
1042    Launched battle stations submerged. (..TT.CK#3)
1137-39    Fire #1 tube.
    -45    Fire #2 tube.
    -52    Fire #3 tube.
    -58    Fire #4 tube.
1138-30    Went deep and commenced evasive tactics.
1139-45    First of three small explosions.
1142-15    Heavy explosions, possibly end of torpedo
    run explosion.
1143-20    Second heavy explosion.
1215    Returned to periscope depth and sighted
    the four freighters lying to bearing 1550T
    to 1800T, distant 4000 to 5000 yards, on
    headings between 2700T and 2900T. None were
    visibly damaged, however. The two PC boats
    were between the DRUM and the freighters,
    distant about 2500 yards, conducting a routine
    supersonic search.
1225    At deep submergence, having seen one PC boat
    heading in our general direction.
1243    First of four 600 pounders, close!

(8)

— page 170 —
22 November, 1943 (Continued):
1312 Escort passed overhead from the starboard quarter. His screws were plainly audible through the hull.
1313 Four more big ones, really close, overhead abaft the conning tower. The most serious damage these caused was a crack in the conning tower door frame and plating. See paragraph (K) for all the details.
1325 Three 300 pound charges, farther away. Total 11. 1630 it pariscope depth, noting in sight, though the echo ranging was still audible bearing 2450T.
1752 Surfaced. Headed northeast to send contact report and to report the crack in the conning tower.
1900 Changed course to attempt to regain contact with the convoy and trail it.
2107 Received orders to pull clear.
1200 POST: L.A.T. 30-02:0 N LONG. 1410-35:0 E. DIST 248.9 FUEL: 1418

23 November, 1943:
0105 Received orders to head for PE.R.L.H.R.SOR. Set course 0240T.
1100 Passed to operational control of Commander Submarinos Pacific, having been under Commander Task Force 72 since 1 .pril, 1943.
1200 POST: L.T. 50-29:0 N LONG. 1440-04:0 E. DIST: 272.2 FUEL: 2606

24 November, 1943:
0001 Picked up indications on the A.R.C of a radar station, probably on OLIM.R.AO ISL.NDS, LAT. 70-40:0 N, LONG. 1450-47:0 E. Went to four engine speed to be well clear of the area by dawn.
1200 POST: L.T. 100-15:0 N LONG. 1460-50:0 E. DIST: 342.1 FUEL: 3933

25 November, 1943:
0548-0606 Trim dive.
1800 ...11 hands enjoyed an excellent Thanksgiving Dinner, right down to ice cream, pie and cake for dessert.
1200 POST: L.T. 130-11:5 N LONG. 1500-29:0 E. DIST: 316.6 FUEL: 3266

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1 0117

— page 171 —
26 November, 1943:
0800-0830 Trim Dive.

1200 POSIT: LAT, 140-28:ON LONG. 1550-08:OE
DIST: 309.1 FUEL: 3219

27 November, 1943:
0100 Changed to -12 zone time.
0616-0630(m) Trim Dive.

1200(m) POSIT: LAT, 150-45:5 N LONG. 1590-44:5 E.
DIST: 306.9 FUEL: 3243

28 November, 1943:
1255-1318(m) Trim Dive.

1200(m) POSIT: LAT, 170-03:ON LONG. 1640-24:0 E.
DIST: 304.1 FUEL: 3335

29 November, 1943:
0806-0825(m) Trim Dive.

1200(m) POSIT: LAT, 170-59:ON LONG. 1690-24:0 E.
DIST: 294.6 FUEL: 3181

30 November, 1943:
0630-0639(m) Trim Dive.

1200(m) POSIT: LAT, 180-51:ON LONG. 1740-05:0 E.
DIST: 287.9 FUEL: 3289

1 December, 1943:
0610-0623(m) Trim Dive.
1530 (m) Crossed the International Date Line.
Changed to ± 12 zone time and the date to
30 November, 1943.

1200(m) POSIT: LAT, 190-36:5 N LONG. 1790-11:0 E.
DIST: 304.9 FUEL: 3301

30 November, 1943:
2200(Y) Changed to ± 11 zone time.

1 December, 1943:
0806-1012(x) Trim Dive.

1200 (x) POSIT: LAT, 200-22:5N LONG. 1750-52:5N
DIST: 287.2 FUEL: 2882

— page 172 —
2 December 1943:
0400 Changed to ± 10 zone time.
1208-1220(w)Trim-Dive.

1200 POSTIT: LAT. 20°-33:0 N LONG. 171°-21:5 W
DIST: 277.6 FUEL: 2306

3 December 1943:
0808-0820(w)Trim Dive.

1200 POSTIT: LAT. 20°-38:5 N LONG. 166°-53:5 W
DIST: 260.0 FUEL: 3128

4 December 1943:
1200 (w) POSTIT: LAT. 20°-50:0 N LONG. 161°-31:5 W
DIST: 304.7 FUEL: 3221

5 December 1943:
0200(w) Changed to ± 9½ zone time.
0615(VW) Sighted and exchanged recognition signals
with SCORPION.
0642 Sighted and exchanged recognition signals
with escort, FQ580.
Proceeded with full speed to Pearl Harbor.
AM Sighted friendly planes.
1100 Moored to Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

(11) 1 0117

— page 176 —
1 PATROL NO. 8
TIME 0710(L) D-TE 11 Nov. 1943 LAT. 0°-19:0 N
LONG. 148°-40:0 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION:
Three transports in column (form DOG), escorted by three destroyers, one on port bow of leading ship, one on port quarter of last ship, one on starboard beam of second ship. The leading ship was an 8000-9000 ton KMFKM freighter-transport; the second ship, the target, was a 11000-12000 ton passenger ship; the third ship was not well identified, but was about 6000-7000 tons. The convoy was sighted prior to dawn on the surface. Submerged and closed track in growing light. Attock made in glassy sea one-half hour after sunrise.

SHIPS SUNK: NONE.
SHIPS DAMAGED: One 11000-12000 ton passenger ship similar to YASUJUNI NARU (11930)tons (MFM)

DATAGED:
DETERR. INED BY:
(1) Hearing two torpedo explosions 56s and 57s after firing #2 and #3 torpedoes.
(2) The time of run of these torpedoes gives a range of 1500 yards, while the estimated range was 1750 yards. The explosions sounded similiar to, but were more distant than the premature explosion of No. 1 torpedo which was seen about 500 yards ahead of the DRU.

TARGET DRAFT 25 feet COURSE 1900T SPEED 7kts RANGE 1750Yds.

OWN SHIP DATA

SPEED 3kts COURSE 1100T DEPTH 64feet ANGLE 0°

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK:
Sighted the convoy on the surface and submerged at about 18000 yards. Closed the track of the target group, which was zigzagging on 3 to 10 minute legs. When the range was 3800 yards, 3600 yards to the track, the target group changed course 25 degrees toward us, presenting a favorable attack opportunity.

(15)

1 0117

— page 177 —
1st ATTACK DATA (CONTINUED)

TYPE ATTACK:
(A spread of 1° degrees between the torpedoes was set using the offset dial.

Bearings were fed into the TDC during the firing of the first three torpedoes, after which the attention of the Commanding Officer was directed to the closest destroyer on the starboard bow.

There were no end of run explosions.

— page 179 —
3. ATTACK DATA (CONTINUED).

U.S.S. DRUM TORPEDO ATTACK #2 PATROL NO. 8
TIME 1440(1) DATE 17 Nov. 1943 LAT. 10-48:0 N
LONG. 1430-24:5 E
TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION:
Three freighters in line of bearing, escorted by two PC boats (one was #33), one on port bow of leading ship, the other on starboard

— page 181 —
24 feet Course 172°T Speed 7.5 kts. RANGE 2350
OWN SHIP DATA
TYPE ATTACK:
Sighted the smoke of the convoy on the surface at about 30000 yards. Tracked, using #1 periscope, and determined the base course as 130°T with the convoy zigzagging on 7-3 minute legs from 090°T to 170°T. Submerged 22000 yards ahead of convoy and conducted a normal approach using the bow tubes. Gained a position between the two columns of the convoy, and fired four torpedoes at the leading ship in the starboard column using a 1 1/20 offset dial spread between torpedoes on a 118°F track at a range of 2350 yards, torpedo run, 2600 yards. Firing bearings were fed into the TDC during the firing. The target showed no indications of leaving sighted the DRUM, even after firing the torpedoes. However, the only explanation for the misses if misses is that the torpedoes were sighted and the target maneuvered to avoid.

ATTACK #3
TUBES FIRED
#1 #2 #3 #4
TRACK ANGLE 118°P 117°P 117°P 116°P
GYRO ANGLE 6°L 5°L 5°L 4°L
DEFT SET 16 16 16 16
POWER HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH
HIT OR MISS MISS MISS MISS
ERRATIC? NO NO NO NO
LARK TORPEDO XIV-3A XIV-3A XIV-3A XIV-3A
SERIAL NO. 39498 22711 39543 22714
LARK EXPLODER VI-1 VI-1 VI-1 VI-1
SERIAL NO. 5070 7303 6596 6625
ACTUATION SET CON&MAG CON&MAG CON&MAG CON&MAG
SATUATION ACTUAL - - - -
MARK WARRED XVI XVI XVI XVI
SERIAL NO. 2675 1762 1789 2631
ENPLOSIVE TPX TPX TPX TPX
FIRING INTERVAL 6 6 6 6
TYPE
SPREAD 20L 3/4L 3/4L 20R
SEA CONDITIONS RIPPLED, SLIGHT SWELL
OVERALL ACTIVITY SUBASE, BRISB. NE, AUST.

(20)

— page 182 —
1 0117
(1) Two probable end of run explosions occurred 4m-36s and 5m-41s after firing the first torpedo.

(I) MINUS
None encountered.

(J) ANTI SUBMARINE SENSORS AND REVERSIVE TACTICS:
Counter -TTL. 1
The expected heavy depth charging following attack #1 never materialized.
The convoy was escorted by three AS.SHIO or SEICUKUE type destroyers, one on the port bow, one on the port quarter, and one on the starboard beam of of the column. They were echo ranging on 16, 16.5, and 17 kilocycles.
The premature explosion of the first torpedo gave the destroyers their first indication of the DRUM'S presence. ...all immediately ceased pinging and commenced a sound listening search. One distant depth charge was dropped five minutes after firing. Five minutes later a pair of close ones were dropped, and a minute later a parting shot.
The three destroyers continued the search for about one half hour after which two left to rejoin the convoy. The third destroyer was seen echo ranging about 5000 yards astern one hour after the attack. No good contacts were obtained and maintained by any of the destroyers.
The sea was glassy, and a sharp gradient was noted at about 280 feet.
Snavis: measures included running silent and gradually working away from the listening destroyers, leaving them well astern after one hour.
During the surface search of the area of the attack, two barrels with bamboo poles, attached (but ...no flags attached to poles) were sighted close to depth charges debris and foam.

COUNTER -TTL. 2.
FC 33 and his pal did an excellent job of depth charging after attack #2.
The DRUM attacked the leading ship from its port bow, going inside the escort undetected. Until the attack was made, the escorts echo-ranged on 16-20 kilocycles, using automatic keying, often shifting frequencies.
Two and a half minutes after the torpedo explosion, three depth charges exploded close overhead, jarring point and bits of cork loose. Thereafter, the escorts maintained fair contact by listening and dropped twelve more charges, none as close as the first barrage. At 1510, one escort commenced echo

— page 183 —
2 (Continued)
ranging, but never regained contact.
One hour and ten minutes after firing,
DRUM commenced evading at periscope depth. Although
the escort came within 2500 yards (close enough to see
his "FC33"), he never made a contact.
Five hours after firing two distant charges
exploded, but no escort was in sight at that time.

: 3.
The working over the PC's of attack #3
gave the DRUM, put counter attack #2 to shame. This
time the close ones were really close, and they were
big!
The attack was executed from a position
between the two columns of the convoy. The escorts did
not know a submarine was present until numerous small
and large explosions occurred after the torpedo firing.
During the approach, both escorts echo-ranged on about
18 kilocycles, automatic keying, 8 second intervals.
Apparently the PC boats could not find
the DRUM in the melee of screws in close proximity to the
convoy. For about one half hour, a supersonic search
was conducted while DRUM evaded at deep submergence to
the northwestward, on the reverse of the convoy's base
course. At that time DRUM came to periscope depth to
look things over.
The escorts were 2500 yards away between us
and the convoy, which was apparently lying to on head-
ings 270°to 290°T. While we were at periscope depth,
one escort made sound contact and headed toward us, as
we returned to deep submergence.
Twenty-eight minutes after our look four
six hundred pounders went off close aboard. One half
hour later one escort, having alternately listened and
pinged, passed overhead just abaft the conning tower
and dropped four more big ones. These were even closer
than the first barrage and caused the damage listed in
paragraph (K)(1).
Ten minutes later a parting shot of three
three hundred pounders went off farther away. After that,
sound contact was not regained by the escorts who contin-
ued to listen and echo-range for about two hours, gradually
pulling away.
The final evasion course was northeast, after
having boxed the compass at verious times during the counter-
attack. Six hours after the attack, four hours after the
last barrage, DRUM surfaced and found nothing in sight.
Sound conditions were exceptionally good.
There was no temperature gradient to three hundred feet.

— page 184 —
1. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE.

(a) DAI AGE FROM #3 DET. CHARGES ATTACK.
   - Cracks the conning tower door frame at the upper hinge and the plating adjacent thereto for about four inches. Water entered at about two or three gallons a minute at deep submergence.
   - Caused the port vent riser of #7 MBT to leak at a flange.
   - Started the maneuvering room hard patch leaking again over the center of the main control cubicle. This was a week spot prior to the refit following the second patrol when the USS FULTON succeeded in caulking the patch. No trouble had been experienced for about one year.
   - Caused #5 and #6 impulse bottles to leak slightly.
   - Deranged the low power system of #2 periscope.
   - Deranged the target speed dial of TDC.

(b) DANGER FROM #2 DET. CHARGES ATTACK.
   - On several of the closer depth charges, the suction valve from the fuel oil collecting tank opened and allowed fuel to enter the after engine room in a fine spray. On the fourth such occasion, it refused to reseat, and about five hundred gallons of fuel oil went into the bilges. Heavy fumes permeated the after part of the ship. This valve was tested the following day at 275 feet and proved tight. It also held well during the heavier depth charging on 22 November, 1943.

(2) ENGINEERING:
   - On two occasions November 9 and 26, #2 auxiliary engine failed to stop on diving. In both instances the engine was stopped by closing the outboard exhaust valve. This blew the gaskets on the explosion plates, but caused no other damage. Both times the racks were found clean and showed no evidence of sticking.

(3) TORPEDO:
   - Torpedo #39804 flooded twice, having about six gallons of water in the afterbody each time.
   - Torpedoes #39601 and #22673 had about two pints in the afterbody.
   - In all cases the gyros were dry and no cause for flooding was apparent. The torpedoes were under pressure not over fifteen minutes.

(23)

— page 185 —
3) TORPEDOES (CONTINUED)

Exploder number 6604, functioned prematurely after twenty seconds of running. The depth setting was fifteen feet. The sea was glassy. The tube was flooded about one minute before firing.

(L) RADIO.
No material casualties were experienced. Both BELCONNEN AND NEM schedules were copied satisfactorily. All transmissions to Australian stations were successful.

(M) RADAR.
(1) SJ RADAR.
The performance of the SJ during this patrol was poorer than during any previous patrols.
All material talent in the Brisbane area worked until sailing time to make the lobe switching operative. These efforts were unsuccessful. Thus in spite of operation of the lobe switching motor, the lobe switching unit failed to function properly at any time.
The magnetron installed in Brisbane was unstable and unreliable. On 18 November, a rendezvous with the BLACKFISH in the area permitted us to install and tune a new magnetron after which the SJ appeared more reliable, though the lobe switching unit was still inoperative.

(2) SD RADAR
The operation of the SD was not consistent. Unstable plate voltage of the cathode ray tube is the apparent cause of this. A complete overhaul of the SD is necessary and has been requested during the present refit.

(3) ARC-1
The ARC finally found an enemy radar, though efforts to do so on four previous patrols had been unsuccessful.
This radar probably was on OILRAD ISLNDS, latitude 7°-40:0 N, longitude 145°-47:0 E. Its frequency was 230 megacycles, pulse rate 900.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS:
In the region near the equator between longitudes 152° East and 140° East, sound conditions proved good. Three attacks were made, during two of which excellent sound conditions maintained. There was very little background noise present most of the time.
Screws of escoarts and merchant vessels were heard at about 6000 yards on several occasions.
The sound gear functioned well throughout the patrol.

(24)

— page 186 —
0) DENSITY LAYERS.

As usual, density layers were few and far between in the area between the BISMARCK-RICHFIELD and the C.ROLINEs.

The complete lack of any kind of layer during the depth charging of 22 November 1943 no doubt made the escorts' task considerably easier.

Several bathythenograph crds were taken.

| D.TE | LMT. | LONG. | SURF. | T. | LEAST T. | AT |
|------|-------|-------|-------|----||----|
| 10   | Nov. | 1943  | 00    | 370| 330      | 230T.|
| 17   | Nov. | 1943  | 29N   | 1380| 870      | 350  |
| 18   | Nov. | 1943  | 39N   | 1430| 870      | 130T.|
| 22   | Nov. | 1943  | 39N   | 1410| 880      | 87.50|

(P) HE.LTH. FOOD, AND HE.BIT.BILITY.

Except for one slight case of heat prostration during the running silent period on 22 November, 1943, the health of the crew was excellent.

The food was well prepared at all times. It was unfortunate in that, that no meat except beef and lamb were obtainable in Australia; nor were any fresh frozen vegetables or fruits available.

Since most of the patrol was spent on the surface, h bitability was excellent. The supply of fresh potatoes in the forward torpedo room proved a bracing place for flies. The forward torpedo room waged an intensive, though loss in, but the against them, finally resorting to the Admiral Halsey sloan, "KILL FLIES, KILL FLIES, KILL MORE FLIES, —!"

(Q) PERSONNEL:

The state of training and morale of the crew is good. In spite of long hours under gl-rig visibility conditions, the lookouts performed very well. The lack of casualties to material speaks well for the operating personnel.

Again, as on the seventh patrol, the caliber of the personnel obtained from the Submarine Base in Brisbane and from Submarine Division EIGHTY-TWO proved high.

1 0117

(R) MILES STANDARD - FUEL USED.

BRISE.NE TO .REA 2097.5 mi. 17934 Gals.
IN .REA 3672.0 mi. 26499 Gals.
.REA TO FEAL TRBOR 38 48.4 mi. 40584 Gals.
TOTAL 9617.9 MI. 85017 GALS.

(S) DURATION:
DAYS ENROUTE TO .REA 7
DAYS IN .REA 15
DAYS ENROUTE PEARL H.RBOR 13
DAYS SUB.EMERGED 0

(25)

— page 187 —
10
FUSIL 20873 gals.
PROVISIONS 40 Days
PERSONNEL 30 Days

LIMITING F.C.TOR OF THIS F.TROL:
Damago sustained during depth charging ended the patrol.

(U) RE-ACKS:
Of the fifteen days on station, only thirty-seven hours eleven minutes were spent submerged. Of this time some twenty hours were during attacks and counter attacks.
It is significant to note that all six aircraft contacts in the area were in the vicinity of 10° North. Although much time was spent near 20° North, no planes were sighted in that locality.

— page 188 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division Cnc Khrudc Cnc. To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. Via : (1) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. (3) The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.

Subject: U.S.S. DRUI - Report of Star Patrol Number 8ICHT.

1. DRUI: Eight per Patrol was conducted in the Caroline - New Ireland Areas, returning from Brisbane to Pearl, after serving with Task Force 72 for the past eight months. Fourteen of the total of 34 days were spent in the patrol areas and practically all of this was surface patrol. Damage due to depth charges (cracked Conning Tower door frame) caused the DRUI to be ordered to return to Pearl ahead of schedule.

2. This was the first patrol for a new Corronding Officer.

3. Attacks:

(a) 11 November. Attack on 3 transports screened by 3 destroyers. Six torpedoes were fired at a large transport resulting in 1 observed premature and 2 timed hits. The second torpedo may have prematurely returned rather than the first. The firing setup was excellent. This was an exceedingly skillful, unobserved day periscope attack with flat calm, within 500 yards of the nearest destroyer.

(b) 17 November. Day periscope attack on 3 AKS and 2 PCS. 4 torpedoes resulted in 1 hit on an AKS. This target was aggressively followed up although closely guarded by an escort. Evidence that it sank between 1930 and 2050 is considered ample. Target was seen stopped and listing 20°, and down by the stern, from 1441 until 1930 (about dark) and could not be located at 2050 and for 3 hours thereafter although the PC boat which had been standing by all afternoon was on the radar screen at 2050 at range 2800 yards and was not lost by radar until range was 6100 yards.

(c) 22 November. Day periscope attack on 4 AKS and 2 PCS. Four torpedoes produced no positive hits although several explosions occurred and the AKS stopped for a short period.

All three attacks were skillfully conducted in smooth seas, at close firing ranges, and unobserved prior to firing, and against first class opposition.

— page 189 —
1-101/16-3
Serial 074
DECLASSIFIED:
FIRST EDITION: 1st
CO DRUM: Conf. 1tr. SS228/
A16-3 serial 011 of 12/5/43

Subject: U.S.S. DRUM - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

4. Two other worthwhile contacts were made but could not be located again in heavy rains. One of these was also too fast to be closed from the initially unfavorable position.

5. Depth charging was moderate on first attack (3 DDs), was heavy and close on second attack (2 PCs), and was exceedingly heavy and caused considerable damage on 3rd attack (2 PCs). Large charges were used in this last encounter.

6. DRUM will be given a three week refit for repair of battle damages and to accomplish various alterations.

7. Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One congratulates the new Commanding Officer and his crew on an exceedingly aggressive patrol and on their damage to the enemy.

Copy to:
CO DRUM.

— page 190 —
FC5-10/A16-3
Serial 0203
DECLASSIFIED
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) Eighth War Patrol - Comments on.
Reference: (a) CO DRUM Conf. 1tr SS228/A16-3, Serial 011 of 5 December 1943.

1. The Eighth War Patrol of the DRUM extended for a period of thirty-five days, of which fifteen days were spent in the assigned area. The patrol was terminated due to damage sustained to the conning tower following the depth charge attack on 22 November 1943.

2. A total of nine surface contacts were made during the patrol, three of them on friendly submarines. On two aircraft contacts, the DRUM presented its stern to the plane and reduced speed, thus reducing its silhouette and wake, and thereby avoided detection. By reason of her excellent state of training and her alert bridge force, the DRUM was able to patrol on the surface; this undoubtedly accounted for many of her contacts. A total of three attacks were made.

3. Although the evidence of sinking of the passenger freighter on 17 November is not entirely conclusive, it is considered sufficient to warrant credit for sinking.

4. The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten congratulates the Commanding Officer and personnel of the DRUM on this aggressive, well-conducted and successful patrol.

5. It is recommended that the DRUM be credited with the following damage inflicted on the enemy.

SUNK
AK (Similar to NAMINOVE MARU) - 4,731 tons.
DAMAGED
AP (Similar to YASUKUMI MARU) - 11,930 tons.

Copy to: C. V. STYER.
CONSIGNATUR 101
CO DRUM.
1 0117

— page 191 —
1/1/1943
Serial 01897
DECLASSIFIED
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
DRUM Report of
Eighth War Patrol.
COMSUBSPEC PATROL REPORT NO. 322
U.S.S. DRUM - EIGHTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. DRUM (SS228) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.
(2 November to 5 December 1943).

1. The eighth war patrol of the U.S.S. DRUM was the first for the new commanding officer, as such. The patrol was spent in the operational areas of the Commander Task Force Seventy-Two and enroute to Pearl Harbor. The shortness of this patrol was caused by a close depth charging attack which cracked the conning tower door frame.

2. While in area the DRUM conducted a good, aggressive, surface war patrol and succeeded in inflicting damage to the enemy.

3. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia Award.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this aggressive war patrol. The DRUM is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

SUNK
1 - Passenger-Cargo Vessel (NAMINOUE MARU class) - 4,731 tons

DAMAGED
1 - Transport (YASUKUNI MARU class) - 11,930 tons

Note: This damage was inflicted in the operational areas of the Commander Task Force Seventy-Two, who is requested to assume credit accordingly.

Distribution and authentication on following page.
J. H. BROWN, Jr., Acting.

— page 192 —
12-10/A16-3(8)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01897
DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
CNO (5)
Cincapac (6)
Intel. Cen. Pac.
Ocean Areas (1)
Comservpac (Adv.Base Plan.Unit) (1)
Cinolant (2)
Comsubslant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsubpac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Comsubpac (20)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ComsubpacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Subpac (2)
Comsubstrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Subpac (1)

E. L. HYNES, II,
Flag Secretary.

— page 195 —
SS228/A16-3
Serial 043.
BEGASSFIELD A.I.

From:  The Commanding Officer, USS DRU.
To:  The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) The Commander Submarine Division One
    (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
    (3) The Commander Submarines, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
    (4) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. DRU., Report of Tar Patrol Number NINE.

Enclosure:  (A) Subject report.
    (B) Track chart in area (Consubpac only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the ninth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the 30th ISLADS during the period April 9, 1944 to May 31, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

D.F. WILLIAMSON, Comdr. USN.

76247 FILMED

— page 196 —
35.5. DRUG (SS228)

4. PILOGUE:

Returned from BIGHT patrol on December 5, 1943.
Three wcck refit by Submarine Bosc, Pearl Harbor, T.H.,
assisted by the relief crew of Submarine Division 101.
Installed new after bulkhead (without door) in conning
tower replacing bulkhead (with door) cracked by depth
charging. Completed alterations outstanding, including:
(1) deep-well trim pump, (2) conversion of p4 i.B.
T. to F.B.T., (3) S3a radar and PPI. Refit completed
27 December, 1943. Training, including four exercise
torpedoes, January 1-3, 1944.

During the dive to test depth on January 1, 1944,
the conning tower took a permanent set at all four
corners on the horizontal centerline.

Between January 4 and 8, 1944, the conning tower
was inspected by tender, base, and yard, and on letter
date it was deteriorated that a new conning tower was not
c.d.

Left Pearl Harbor January 9, 1944 and arrived Iarco
Island on January 16, 1944.

Left Iarco Island on March 22, 1944 with a new thick
hull conning tower, and all other tiers completed.
Arrived Pearl Harbor March 29, 1944.

Training, including four exercise torpedoes, and
special camouflage tests off Hawaii, April 3-6, 1944.

Loaded April 7 and 8, 1944. Ready for sea April
9, 1944.

B. NARRATIVE:

PRIL 9, 1944:
1100(V.) Underway in accordance with Consubpac Operation
order No.127-44, in company with T.BOK and
PC 573, via JOSTSTOF ISLAND.
1603 Made trim dive.
1920 Released the escort and opened to north of
track, while T.BOK opened to southward.

PRIL 10, 1944:
0855(V.) Made dive to test depth.
1400 Changed to plus 10 zone time.
2200(W.) LANC, G.S., 291-63-36, I.o.tlc USN discovered
a crack about twelve inches in length, in the
weld of a circular plate in the hull of the
aircraft. This plate was torn inches
in diameter, and was installed by the Iaro
Island i.avy yard when they removed two degaussing cable stuffing tubes. The crack apparently
went through the weld, although it was minute
on the outside and did not leak on submergence.

— page 197 —
1120(T) SIGNED AT: JOHNSON ISLAND SD. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #1)
1130 SIGNED AT: ISLAND, DISTANT 3 MILES.
1315 LOOSED STATION: TURBINE AT N.
A.S. JOHNSON ISLAND. COMMENCED REPAIRS TO PLATE IN STATION.
1400 CHANGED TO: PLUG ENGINE ROOM.
1500(2) STURGEON: GOT UNDERWAY.
1600 T.B.BOR: LOOSED SLING.
2200 A NEW PLATE WAS WELDED INTO THE HULL BY THE REPAIR FORCE AT THE ISLAND. RECEIVED 12306 GALLONS OF FUEL, WATER AND SALT PROVISIONS.

: 0620(2) UNCREWAY FOR AREA IN COMPANY WITH T.B.BOR.
0852 DIVE TO TEST DEPTH TO TEST NEW PLATE WAS SUCCESSFUL.

: 0630(2) SIGNED AT: T.B.BOR BEARING 1690T, DISTANT 8 MILES. (CONTACT #1)

: 0900(2) CHANGED TO: PLUG ENGINE ROOM. CHANGED TO:

— page 198 —
22, 1944:
1110(1) 18 mile contact on 3D radar. Not sighted. Disappeared at 20 miles. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #2).
1510 Sighted AITA I.O J.I.A., bearing 216 T, distant 35 miles.
1515 Sighted I.C J.I.A., bearing 246 T, distant 24 miles.
1555 Sighted a: AVIS flying boat, bearing 225 T, distant 20 miles, near I.C J.I.A. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #3).
1600 Dove in order to enter the area undetected, on passing between AITA I.O J.I.A. and I.O J.I.A. hill preparing to surface, made sound contact and then sighted a small patrol boat bearing 094 T, distant 3500 yards. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #3). He was on a southeasterly course and passed clear.
2010 Surface, but never made radar contact on the patrol boat.
2120 Entered the area.

: 24, 1944:
0645(1) 18 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. Disappeared at 20 miles. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #4).
1005 20 mile contact on SD radar. Sighted 2 planes (unidentified), bearing 270 T, distant 8 miles. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #5).
1012 Dove.
1116 Surfaced.
1128 9.11E contact on SD radar. Not sighted.
Dove. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #6).
1230 Surface.
1238 20 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #7).
1320 14 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #8).
1343 20 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #9).
1645 15 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. Closed to 8. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #10).
1647 Dove.
1800 Surfaced.

: 25, 1944:
0630(1) Sighted a: trawler type patrol boat on south-carly course, bearing 068 T, distant 12000 yards. (CONTACT #4). Encouraged to avoid detection on the surface.
1015 Sighted stern patrol boat bearing 158 T, distant 10000 yards, on northeasterly course. Advised to avoid detection on the surface. Decided to patrol the vicinity to see if there may be something coming through today.

— page 199 —
FRIL 26, 1944:
0100(T) Shifted to second area of rotating patrol.
0710 14 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. Closed to 12 miles and opened again, but remained on the screen until
0750 Closed to 7 miles. Dove. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #11).
0835 Surfaced.
0840 9 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. Dove. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #12).
1011 Surfaced.
1154 10 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. Dove. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #13).
1300 Surfaced.
1312 20 mile contact on SD radar. Closed to 10 miles. Not sighted. Dove. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #14).
1605 12 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. Disappeared at 14. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #15).

: FRIL 27, 1944:
0320(T) Rade doubtful 3J radar contact bearing 293 T, distant 18500 yards. Disappeared immediately, and was not sighted. This patrol was possibly the same ship as that of contact #4.
0812 Sighted a float blipane (PETE) over CHI-CII JLA. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #16).
1150 Sighted a convoy consisting of two coast-al freighters and three small escorts, bearing 187 T, distant 9000 yards. (CONTACT #7). The freighters were similar to SHII I-RU, 1200 tons. Decided they were not worth torpedoes to carry in the patrol. The convoy entered FTLAT KO.
1315 Sighted trawler of CONTACT #6 returning to FTLAT KO. He passed about 5000 yards to the eastward.
1945 Surfaced and opened to the westward.

: FRIL 28, 1944:
0430(T) Sighted lighted sampan bearing 220 T, distant 10000 yards. (CONTACT #8). Closed to 6000 yards, and then opened to northward.
0740 7 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. Dove. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #17).
0834 Surfaced.
1010 10 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. Opened to 16 miles. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #18).
1123 14 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. Opened to 21 miles. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #19).

— page 200 —
1050(K) 13 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. Opened to 17 miles. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #20). Sighted 2 mile bearing 109 T, distant 33 miles.

: 1015(K) 9 mile contact on SD radar. Not sighted. Dove. (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #21)