U.S.S. SHAD (SS-235) — war patrol report SS-235_SHAD.pdf

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1. Office of Naval Records and History
   - Ships' Histories Section
   - Navy Department

HISTORY OF USS SHAD (SS 235)

A Japanese convoy sluggishly plied the waters of the north Pacific. Thousands of yards away, the slender black finger of a submarine periscope cut the ocean's surface. The eye in its tip swept the ocean around it and then stopped and fastened its attention on the complacent nest of ships. Seconds later it was swallowed up in the long blue swells.

Then--two silvery tracks left the submerged submarine and raced along toward the two big merchantmen of the convoy. Simultaneous flashes of flame leaped up the side of the ships and before the be-fuddled escort ships could gather their wits, another thin, bubbly line marked a tanker and exploded in its bowels.

The angry ships raced for the origin of those torpedo-4 wakes, throwing depth charges to the left and right. In the pig boat below, the decks slanted and tanks rumbled as they filled with water. The electric motors purred and the heavy breathing of each man was audible. There was fear but no panic; sweat poured in the sticky heat.

The captain's order came calmly: "Steady at 250 feet."

Sharp cracks of the exploding depth charges shook the ship and shattered light bulbs. Then silence. At length the last destroyer reluctantly gave up the battle and moved away. Men looked at one another, not talking, feeling as if their breath had been knocked away.

A few terse words came from the conning tower telephone. Ballast tanks were pumped and the sub rose surfaceward. Just beneath the crest of the waves, she stopped and the captain again spoke into the conning tower phone, "UP PERISCOPE!"

The slender pipe jutted through the green water hesitantly and quickly scanned the horizon. "Stand by to surface!" The slender hull, of the submarine rose reluctantly from the deep like an animal that unwillingly leaves the sheltered depths of his forest.

Frothy green water foamed over the sides and down, revealing the white number painted on her prow--235...the signal number of the United States Submarine SHAD.

SHAD's story started back in 1941 at the Portsmouth Navy Yard, New Hampshire. There, on 24 October, the keel was laid. Six months later, scarce months since the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, she was launched. Her sponsor was Miss Priscilla Alden Dudley, daughter of Captain Sydney E. Dudley, USN, Production Manager of the ship yard.

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2 - USS SHAD (SS 235)

SHAD had no sooner disturbed the placid flow of the Piscataqua River, then myrain workmen swarmed aboard the new hull and started work on installing the sound gear, instruments, and other accoutrement necessary to make her a competent member of the "Silent Service."

Less than two months later, the submarine was commissioned and became an official unit of the United States Fleet under the command of Lieutenant Commander E. J. MacGregor III.

On 27 July 1942, the SHAD stood out of Portsmouth and traveled to the submarine base at New London, Connecticut. There, an intense training program was conducted including 200 practice dives and 90 torpedo approaches with a total of 150 hours submerged.

Alterations were made to her silhouette by removing unnecessary topside gear. An accident while in training necessitated a dry dock period at New London, upon completion of which, she was declared ready for wartime operations.

Early in the morning of 19 October 1942, the SHAD slipped quietly out into the Atlantic Ocean on a course which would eventually load the ship to a point off the coast of French Morocco. This was a special mission patrol and its object was to conduct secret reconnaissance in Port of Mehediya, French Morocco, in preparation for the Allied occupation.

Under the able command of skipper MacGregor, this mission was successfully completed and was of sufficient merit to warrant the award of the submarine combat insignia to the officers and crew. No offensive action was possible and on 23 November the SHAD moored at Rosneath, Scotland for repairs and further training.

On 20 December, the SHAD was once again underway on her second patrol--this time in company with the USS BLACKFISH. Eighty-one vessels were sighted during this 23 day cruise, the majority of them neutral Spanish vessels. However, five separate attacks were made on suspicious contacts, sinking one towing trawler and one barge. The primary value of the patrol was the accumulation of valuable information on enemy and neutral shipping in the Bay of Biscay and Spanish coastal areas. On 7 February 1943 the SHAD received instructions to depart the assigned patrol and return to port. She moored in the Clyde area at Rosneath, Scotland for post patrol refit and rest for the crew on 12 February.

By using 50% of the crew to assist the relief crew and tender forces, the work of refitting was completed by 3 March 1943, and on 7 March, the SHAD departed Scotland enroute to the Bay of Biscay, on the third patrol.

With the assistance of friendly aircraft, an enemy convoy of one large merchant ship and four destroyers was intercepted on 1 April near the French coast. A total of eight torpedoes was fired at the

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3 - USS SHAD (SS 235)
convoy and seven explosions. Two destroyers were sunk and a large freighter was badly damaged. On 2 April, the SHAD departed the assigned area and proceeded again to the Clyde area. For this third patrol, the SS 235 received the submarine combat insignia.

Upon completion of another rest and refitting period, the SHAD was ready for sea in all respects on 27 April 1943. The entire complement had enjoyed a seven day leave and Lieutenant Commander E. J. MacGregor III had been relieved as commanding officer by Lieutenant Commander R. F. Pryce. On 4 May the SHAD departed the Scotland area on her fourth patrol of the war and journeyed into the Norwegian and Iceland waters. Lack of enemy contacts and the monotonous presence of ice and cold weather combined to make the patrol an uneventful one. The patrol was terminated by orders and the SHAD, once again put into the harbor at Rosneath, Scotland.

With the assistance of the USS BEAVER, a subtenor, the SHAD completed her post patrol upkeep in eighteen days. The crew returned to the ship after an eight day leave and with them Lieutenant Commander MacGregor, who again assumed command of the SHAD. On 5 July 1943, the SHAD departed the Clyde River for her fifth war patrol, which was conducted while enroute to New London, Connecticut. Training exercises were conducted during the course of the patrol but no opportunity was offered to inflict damage on the enemy.

On 27 July, the SHAD arrived at the U. S. Submarine Base, having sailed a total of 32,000 miles in European waters and had inflicted severe casualties on enemy surface craft.

After decision to complete one patrol in the Pacific theater of operations prior to having a Navy Yard overhaul, the SHAD received two weeks voyage repairs at New London and departed 11 August, transitting the Panama Canal and arriving Pearl Harbor 7 September. There she was given two weeks voyage repairs by the sub tender BUSHNELL.

On 28 September the SHAD moved slowly out of Pearl Harbor. Past the drydocks and machine shops, camouflaged buildings, and the waving sailors on other ships, she moved out to sea. Around her played the little PTs, like guarding propofiles and farther out on the horizon, look outs on old four-pipers watched her through glasses. In the bright sunlight, most of her crew walked the narrow catwalks, getting their last look at the land, the sky and the ocean. Soon the ship would be locked--all hatches except those leading to the conning tower would be closed. Nobody would be allowed on deck except the officers and lookouts admitted to the bridge. The remainder of the crew would live below in the machinery cluttered interior.

The sun rode to the west. The Pacific's swells rocked her gently as her Diesels pushed her along the ocean's surface. Every mile to the west meant increase in tension. She was a lone wolf on prowl.

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4 - USS SHAD (SS 235)

Just before dawn of the 22nd of October, a convoy of two cruisers and three escorts was sighted. SHAD sent ten torpedoes hurtling toward the ships and then dived for the bottom. One hundred fifty. Two hundred. There she stayed, while the disabled cruisers rained depth charges down on the vulnerable submarine. At long last the explosion stopped and SHAD lost all contact with the attacking ships. Cautiously she surfaced. Her prow cut through a film of oil which covered the ocean for about two square miles, and it was determined that the first cruiser had received two hits, the second cruiser one hit and one hit on a destroyer. All were listed as damaged as no positive evidence was available of sinking.

Shortly after midnight on 27 October another attack was conducted against a convoy of three transports and one freighter escorted by a destroyer. The GRAYBACK, a submarine in SHAD's group, was in a position to observe the results of the attack and reported the following: one large transport of 9,138 tons sunk, two other transports damaged and in the excitement, a small freighter collided with one of the transports and was also badly damaged. In addition, one of the transports which was badly damaged was later sunk by the GRAYBACK. The SHAD then pointed her prow toward Midway and upon arrival there refueled for her trip back to Pearl Harbor. This patrol had been highlighted by the first depth charging the SHAD had ever undergone.

Five days after arrival at Pearl Harbor, the SHAD departed for the Bethlehem Steel Company's San Francisco shipyards for overhaul. She arrived back in Pearl Harbor on 11 May 1944. There, all main motors and generators were worked over and the conning tower was enlarged.

On 29 June 1944, Lieutenant Commander (now Commander and skipper of the FLYING FISH) Lawrence V. Julian reported as Commanding Officer, relieving Lieutenant Commander MacGregor.

A ten day training period was conducted prior to departure on patrol, 12 August 1944. SHAD's seventh war patrol took her to the homewaters of Japan. On the 24th, 25th, and 26th, of August the sub encountered a typhoon of such intensity that it was necessary to submerge to 203 feet to escape its destructive battering.

On 30 August, a contact was made with one PC boat, a heavily loaded freighter and one small patrol yacht. Three torpedoes were fired with evidence of one hit. A severe counter attack followed consisting of thirty-four depth charges in forty minutes. No material damage was done. During the next week, several high speed targets were seen at great range, but persistent Japanese air patrols and occasional aerial bombs forced the SHAD to remain deep.

On 16 September, a convoy of one large, heavily loaded transport, one destroyer and one patrol craft was attacked with four torpedoes. Three hits were assured and one sinking was established. Severe depth charging, lasting two hours, followed. On 19 September the heavy

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5 - USS SHAD (SS 235)

seas abated enough to conduct an attack against a CHIDORI type destroyer with four torpedoes, three of them hitting. Breaking up noises confirmed the immediate sinking of the destroyer and as usual, the other escorts attacked and dropped eleven depth charges. On 21 September, an enemy gunboat was sighted and subsequently sunk with one of three torpedoes fired.

The next day, the SHAD narrowly escaped destruction by maneuvering through the wakes of two torpedoes; one of which passed just under the stem and the other about twenty yards beyond. They were evidently from an enemy sub.

The last four torpedoes in the forward nest were fired at a freighter on 24 September, one good hit obtained, and the ship was heavily damaged. It headed for the beach to avoid sinking. SHAD avoided counter attack by departing full speed from the area.

On 1 October she moored at the Submarine Base, Midway Island, after completing a typhoon-racked passage from the patrol area. The submarine combat insignia was awarded to the officers and crew for completing this very successful patrol.

SHAD was refitted by men of Submarine Division 62 and the crew enjoyed a two week recuperation period. On 25 October the SHAD took departure of Midway in company with the USS REDFISH and the USS BANG, acting as a coordinated attack group. This patrol was conducted in the area off the Northeast coast of Formosa and the southern islands of the Nansei Shoto group for its first part, and in the East China Sea in its final phase.

After an inconsequential contact on a convoy, the SHAD returned to Saipan for repairs. Upon completion of this work, the SHAD roamed the East China Sea on the second half of her patrol and finding nothing there but cold weather, turned homeward. On 5 January she moored in Pearl Harbor.

There, she underwent a complete refitting and underwent several alterations, the most outstanding of which was the replacement of the 3-inch deck gun with a 5-inch and the modification of the forward torpedo tubes to accomodate electric tubes. Following the excellent recuperating period at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, all hands returned aboard and began training and exercises. The 235 departed Pearl Harbor on 31 January on her ninth patrol. She refueled at Saipan on 12 and 13 February and took departure with the USS PETO and USS THRESHER which acted as a coordinated attack group in the Luzon Straits-China Coast area.

On 24 February an aircraft forced the SHAD to dive and due to a material casualty to the conning tower hatch, a large quantity of water flooded in and rendered inoperative all of the radar gear and much of the pumping and electrical apparatus.

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6 - USS SHAD (SS 235)

This patrol offered three opportunities to attack but all were thwarted. Twice the coming of dawn forced the submarine to submerge and depart the area before attacking, and once the ships sighted were high speed hunter-killer groups. After an uneventful but rough trip, the SHAD arrived in Apra Harbor at Guam on 31 March 1945.

There, the electrical equipment, which had been damaged in the sub's "wet dive" was repaired and Lieutenant Commander D. L. Melhop relieved Lieutenant Commander L. V. Julian, as commanding officer.

Extensive training exercises were conducted, SHAD was pronounced ready for sea and on 3 May she took departure of Apra Harbor in company with USS DRAGONET, USS BALAO and the USS SPIKEFISH. This coordinated attack unit operated in the Yellow Sea and the East China areas. On 15 May, the second day in the attack area, an unescorted tanker was fired upon and sunk by four well aimed torpedoes.

On the night of 17 May, the monstrous black shadow of a three island freighter loomed in front of the submarine. She was escorted by two small destroyers. In water barely deep enough to float the SHAD the attack was conducted and three torpedoes were fixed. One torpedo hit the target near the forward well, breaking off the entire bow. The vessel did not sink, since she was in only seven fathoms of water. The escort vessels gave chase, but the superior speed of the SHAD soon opened the range.

An investigation on 21 May of a strong radar contact revealed two CHIDORI class destroyers on an anti-submarine sweep. In a defensive move, three torpedoes were fired in a "down the throat shot" but no hits were made. The destroyers began to blast SHAD with three inch shells, but once again the superior speed of the submarine outdistanced her attackers. On 7 June the submarine destroyed a small junk by gunfire. Later in the day, she attacked a small three island freighter and sunk her with two torpedoes. Her sole under sea armament consisting of two torpedoes, the SHAD returned, to Midway, where she was awarded the submarine combat insignia for this remunerative patrol.

After a normal refit and training period, SHAD, on her eleventh war patrol, departed Midway and went on life-guard duty. On 15 August, she received orders to stop offensive action. Two days later, SHAD headed for Midway, arriving there on the 22nd of August. Thus ended the war career of the submarine SHAD.

Upon conclusion of voyage repairs at Midway, the SHAD returned to the United States, via Pearl Harbor, and moored at the Naval Supply Depot at New Orleans, Louisiana. Liberty and leave were granted to the officers and men, and for the first time in its history, the hatches of the SHAD were thrown open for visitors during Navy Day, 1945.

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7 - USS SHAD (SS 235)
By Directive dated October 1947, USS SHAD (SS 235) was transfered to the FIRST Naval District to train Naval Reserves.

* * * * *

USS SHAD earned one Battle Star on the European-African-Middle Eastern Area Service Medal for participation in the Algeria-Morocco Landing on 8-11 November 1942.

She also earned five Battle Stars on the Asiatic-Pacific Area Service Medal, for participating in the following operations:

1. Star/Iwo Jima Operation
   - Assault and Occupation of Iwo Jima -- 15 February to 16 March 1945

2. Star/Okinawa Gunto Operation
   - Assault and Occupation of Okinawa Gunto -- 24 March to 30 June 1945

3. Star/THIRD Fleet Operations against Japan -- 10 July to 15 August 1945

4. Star/Submarine War Patrol - Pacific -- 8 September to 24 November 1945

5. Star/Submarine War Patrol - Pacific -- 12 August to 1 October 1944

* * * * *

STATISTICS

OVERALL LENGTH 312 feet
BEAM 27 feet
SPEED 20 knots
DISPLACEMENT 1,475 tons

* * * * *

Restencilled August 1951

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SS235/A16-3
Serial 035

a/o Postmaster
New York, N.Y.
November 25, 1942.

From:  The Commanding Officer.
To:  The Commander Submarine Squadron FIFTY.
SUBJECT:  First War Patrol of the U.S.S. SHAD.
Reference:  (a)  Consubron 50 Conf. 1tr. FC5-50/A16(4)
    Serial 001 of November 24, 1942.
Enclosure:  (A)  Reconnaissance Report of Mehediya, French
    Morocco.
    (B)  War Patrol Report.

1. The report of the subject patrol is forwarded
herewith as enclosures (A) and (B).

E.J. MAC GRIDOR.

Flumed
A5674

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1942 and completed on July 15, 1942 at the U.S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. After completion until October 15, 1942 a program of intensive training and material preparation for war time operations was carried out in the Portsmouth - New London area. During this period an SD radar, bethothermograph, RBO receiver, and 20 m.m. gun were installed by Submarine Base, New London assisted by ship's force. Alterations to the ship's silhouette was made by removal of torpedo and boat handling gear, fair water around periscope sheers, and life lines except for periscopes left remaining from forward edge of conning tower fair water aft to the gun on both sides.

SPECIAL TESTS FOR VARIOUS SURFACES WERE CONDUCTED which were beneficial in treating the officers and crew. Improper operation of torpedo firing valves was remedied by installation of Electric Boat Company design of firing valve cups. The ship was in an eminently satisfactory condition of readiness for war time operations on October 19, 1942.

1. HARRATIVE

Took departure from point seven miles east of Montauk Light on course 130° T at economical speed on surface at night and submerged during day. Conducted periscope patrol during daylight except when weather conditions prevented.

Reached longitude 70° W and changed base course to 101° T to arrive at assigned latitude south of the Azores.

Passed longitude 65° W. Commenced surface running during entire day except for dives during twilight and for training.

Sighted mast of steamer bearing 110° T. Ten minutes later sighted kingpots of this steamer and made quick dive to escape detection. Attempted to close on normal approach course for identification but excessive range and large angle made this impossible.

Surfaced.

Changed course to 065° T heaving arrived in assigned latitude south of Azores and commenced running submerged during daylight. Seas prevented continuous periscope patrol. Conducted sound patrol at 140° with occasional periscope observations.

Seas abating. Started periscope patrol during daylight. After surfacing at the end of evening twilight the SD aircraft detector reader was started.

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31
2235 2 At a point 110 miles NW of Macieira, Is., Contact was made on the SD. Made quick dive to escape detection.
2317
Nov. 2
0322 2 Changed course to 145° T in order to pass through new point in latitude 34 N and 13 W in accordance with Admiralty's despatch 1851A/1.
0535 2 In a point 215 miles NE of Madeira, Is., SD radar indicated aircraft at eight miles.
0537 2 Range had decreased to four - six miles. Made quick dive to avoid detection and remained submerged since twilight was only twenty minutes away.
Nov. 3
0355 2 In latitude 34 N longitude 13 W as directed. Changed course to 087° T to head for patrol area off Mahediya.
Nov. 4
1930 2 Sighted searchlights from Gesablanes harbor over horizon to starboard.
2330 2 Entered patrol area off Mahediya Light.
Nov. 5
0115 2 Sighted light of small boat close aboard which was believed at first to be a patrol craft but which was probably a fishing boat. Maneuvered at various speeds to avoid this small vessel. Stood in to northward to clear and then in towards Mahediya harbor.
0527
1700
1902
2035
Nov. 6
0214
1400
1946
Nov. 7
0530
1955
Made quick dive and by
was inside 25 fathom curve and took moving pictures of coast.
Surfaced lying to because of extreme phosphorescence of water;
well trimmed down. Maintained a position about six miles NW of the town in order to observe any movements of shipping.
Observed formation of four brilliantly lighted steamers standing out of Mahediya harbor to the north. Remained inboard of these vessels to avoid detection. Received CommAssGroup 34.2 2105A/6 directing us to commence beacon duties at 8 minus 5 hours and informing us that Destroyers would contact beacon submarine at 8 minus 5 hours.
Set course towards harbor entrance in order to close water to submergence.
Submerged and at
took moving pictures of Mahediya harbor, breakwater, and possible landing beaches at a distance of about two miles just inside the twenty fathom curve. Partially developed soundings off breakwater entrance.
Surfaced lying to just north of breakwater in order to observe movements of shipping.
Made running dive. Continued developing soundings off the breakwater and took additional pictures of possible landing beaches either side of Mahediya.
Surfaced just off breakwater in position AX.

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2140
Radar contact bearing about 0900 T. Since contacting Destroyer was not expected until approximately 2300, dove in order to escape detection by a possible patrol craft standing out of Mahe-diya. After submergence Destroyer sent by sound gear "BT make characters on special light".

2235
Surfaced in AX lying to and commenced sending by special light to seaward and from

2300
on many radar contacts were made on approaching U.S. vessels. Trained special light on all radar contacts and visual contacts.

Nov. 8
0000
Approximately 15 ships off Mahe-diya. Informed by ComTaskGroup 34.8 that Boarding Officer was on way. This officer never reached this vessel.

0523
Directed to cease position transmission by ComTaskGroup 34.8. Landing operations were begun at this time. First fire on our forces from beach defenses. This fire was returned by our Destroyers.

0608
Was directed by ComTaskGroup 34.8 to clear area submerged on course 510° T. West ahead at standard speed on two engines. Made quick dive on 510° T. This vessel was actively and accurately engaged, all day on November 8. Two very close approaches by Eberle were broken off only after this vessel identified herself by smoke signals and by sound gear transmissions.

1940
Surfaced.

2017
Charged course to 270° T having reached latitude 35 N enroute patrol area between Cape Sim and Madeire.

Nov. 9
0320
Sighted two brilliantly lighted neutral merchantmen and closed to investigate.

0355
Passed ahead of these vessels who were on course 190° T speed 9 knots apparently enroute to Casablanca. Since these vessels were enroute to Casablanca and were undoubtedly at sea when the assault started they were not molested. Resumed course 270° T.

1035
Having reached longitude 100° W set course for patrol area 222° T.

Nov. 10
Prior to morning twilight received ComSubRon 50 21052/9 ordering attack to be made on all French Naval units encountered, and the reporting of any movements north from Dakar. SAD was directed to relay this message to BLACKFISH. Message was transmitted twice blind to BLACKFISH but acknowledgement was not obtained. This fact was reported to ComSubRon 50.

1937
Surfaced in assigned area and commenced conducting aggressive search using SJ radar and sound equipment to fullest extent to locate possible enemy vessels.

2058
Sighted what appeared to be a rocket bearing 295° T. Changed course towards it to investigate. Searched area visually and with radar.

2113
No contacts made visually or with radar. Stopped to listen with sound gear.

2235
No contacts were made. Resumed routine patrol of area.

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11 Nov. 11
0630 Decoded GUNNELS despatch 102350 reporting U-boat contact and at
0700 changed course to 050° T to head for nearest point of contact
in our area.
1940 Surfaced and conducted search of NE corner of area.
Nov. 12
0000 Sighted what is believed to have been white verys rocket dead
ahead bearing 1960 T. Stood over on the course for three
miles. Searched with sound and radar unsuccessfully.
1508 Sighted small brilliantlly lighted steamer apparently Spanish
or Portuguese merchantman, course 219, speed 9 knots, appen-
ently headed for Canaries.
Nov. 13
0040 Sighted what is believed to be a rocket on the port beam.
Stood over to investigate but unable to locate source by radar
or sound.
0110 Very faint echo on radar. Changed course to westward to devel-
op this echo and ran towards it for three miles. This was
later believed to have been an echo on a very large wave be-
yond the normal range of wave echoes.
Nov. 14
0250 Received ComSubRon 50 1219/13 directing us to proceed Rose-
neath, at a surface speed of advance of 11 knots, and remain-
ing submerged by day until after passing point "B".
Nov. 15
0300 Positive radar contact on two targets to the westward.
0510 Sighted two U.S. Destroyers on course 2630 T. speed 15 knots
apparently standing out of Gibraltar or a north Moroccan port.
0517 Passed through point "B". Changed course to 2580 T. Commenced
surface running during daylight.
Nov. 16
0640 Arrived point "C". Changed course to north. Reported position,
course, and speed to Admiralty. Speed of advance still 11 knots
as previously directed.
Nov. 17
1350 Passed through point "D". Changed course to 0650 T. Decoded
POS 2126A/16 directing us to proceed submerg. east of 157 W
and to rendezvous at 1200 A on November 22.
Received POS 1422A/17 giving his new estimate of our speed of
advance of 13.5 knots.
Nov. 18
0537 Made radar contact on three ships to northwestward at range of
eight miles. Because of large echos on radar, knew target
to be large surface vessels and therefore did not investigate
as it was assumed this to be a convoy. Therefore, considered
that shadowing was not in-order.
0630 POS 2130A/17 was decoded. This despatch gave position of con-
voy in our 0530 position and confirmed our previous assumption.
POS 1211A/17 which directed daylight submergence east of 20° W
was decoded during the night of 17 - 18 November and was not
received in time to dive during daylight on the 17th.
0706 Commenced running submerged during daylight.

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19 Nov. 0125 Passed through point "H". Received FOS 1334A/10 which permitted submarines to remain on the surface when east of 8° W.

: 20 Nov. 0015 Reported to FOS new estimated time of arrival at Rendezvous as 1500 Z on 21 November.

: 0326 Passed through point "H". Changed course to 058° T.

: 0420 to Submerged to avoid close aircraft detector contact. Decoded Commander Submarine Flotilla No. 3 despatch 1613A/20 which directed rendezvous with tender in point E at 1600 on the 21st.

: 21 Nov. 1345 Commenced running on surface during daylight having passed 8° W. Made five dives to avoid approaching aircraft during the morning making attempts to identify yourself with searchlight and flares. Arrived at rendezvous. Made rendezvous with escort and proceeded into and anchored inside Falmouth net.

: 23 Nov. 1100 Underway clearing harbor astern of escort, La Caprice, in accordance with POIC Falmouth sailing orders of 23 November. Rendezvoused with BARB and HARRING and proceeded in company to Rosenesth.

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0 WEATHER

(a) No unusual weather conditions were encountered. In general, the weather was fair and normal for all areas during this season of the year.

(b) A detailed report of the weather conditions found off Mehediya is contained in enclosures (A).

3. TIDAL INFORMATIONS

(a) No unusual current or tidal conditions were noted. A more detailed report of tidal and current conditions existing off Mehediya is included in report on this area submitted in Enclosure (A).

4. AIDES TO NAVIGATION

(a) Navigational lights at Mehediya were either not burning, or else were so dim that they could not be seen more than a mile seaward. The soundings shown on the chart off this port were found to be essentially correct. Development of the twenty, thirty, forty, and fifty fathom curves was made and is being forwarded to the Hydrographic Office.

(b) A geographic location of Mehediya Light as shown on charts BA 91 (Plan of the West Coast of Morocco), HO Misc. 10528-1, and HO Misc. 10014-11, did not agree with the location given in the Light List. The latter location was used as it was felt that this position would be the one used by the surface vessels.

5. DESCRIPTION OF MINOR VESSELS

(a) No enemy combatant vessels were sighted.

6. AIRCRAFT STATION

(a) No aircraft was sighted except for British patrol and fighter flights on November 21, 1942, while approaching Lando Island, England.

7. ARTICLES

(a) No attacks were made as no enemy vessels were sighted.

8. ANTI-SUBMARINE INSTRUCTIONS

(a) No enemy anti-submarine measures encountered.

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9. MINI SWIMMING

(a) No enemy mine fields were located and no enemy mine sweeping operations were observed.

10. MAJOR CASUALTIES

(a) No major casualties or defects were experienced with the exception of damage done to the cutter door on tube number eight. This damage is reported in detail in paragraph 10.

11. RATIO

(a) The performance of the TBI transmitter, RAF-5 and RAL-5, and TUS receiver and transmitter was excellent and free from all casualties.

(b) The performance of the SD radar was satisfactory although it appeared that the equipment became slightly out of adjustment on November 20, 1942. Investigation as to the possible cause of this malfunction and full report will be made on the next semi-monthly radar reports.

(c) The performance of the SJ radar was unreliable. The range unit is not fully operative and the equipment will only operate intermittently. The equipment would operate satisfactorily up to 15000 yards range for approximately 3/4 of an hour at the end of which period no outgoing pulse could be created. By allowing this set to cool off by shutting it down for ten to fifteen minutes it could then be started up and would operate normally and would operate in a partially satisfactory manner for another 3/4 to 1 hour.

12. SOUND

(a) There were no casualties to any of the sound equipment and it operated in a normal and satisfactory manner during the entire period.

13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY

(a) The health of the officers and crew was excellent. Only three men days were lost due to illness and these three days were the result of one man in the crew having a head cold. There was no abnormal amount of constipation, any serious illness or injury.

(b) The ship was extremely habitable during the entire period. The newly installed RSO receiver and record player contributed very much to the general morale of the crew.

(c) The food available was excellent and very well prepared. Fresh bread was made daily and the diet was supplemented by vitamin capsules after the tenth day.

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14. MILTS STAMPED

(a) Hiles steamed and fuel used to beacon station was 3768 miles, 31744 gallons.

(b) Miles steamed and fuel used on beacon station was 201 miles, 1345 gallons.

(c) Miles steamed from beacon station to patrol station was 313 miles, 2740 gallons.

(d) Miles steamed on patrol station was 451 miles.

2100 gallons.

(e) Miles steamed from patrol station to Base II, Rosneath, Scotland was 2507 miles, 24379 gallons.

(f) Total miles steamed and total fuel used was 7280 miles, 62308 gallons.

15. ENDURANCE

(a) The amount of endurance remaining upon completion of patrol is estimated as follows:

| PERSONNEL | FUEL | TORPEDOES | FOOD | WATER |
||------||------|-------|
| 25 days  | 21 days | 100%      | 60 days | 45 days |

16. REMARKS

(a) Material - BuShips (Machinery)

1. The performance of the entire main propulsion plant was excellent and left nothing to be desired. Not even the slightest derangement or casualty marred the patrol.

2. Except for a few minor grounds in auxiliary machinery which were readily remedied, all other equipment performed normally and satisfactorily.

(b) Material - BuShips (Hull)

1. Bow planes except from 00' to 30' rise while making 131 knots directly into a fairly heavy sea while proceeding from patrol station. This caused the interlock switch on the bow plane rigging out motor circuit to open. A detailed report on this subject will be made. With the exception of this derangement all other equipment operated in a normal and satisfactory manner and required only routine care and adjustment to keep it in good operating condition.

(c) Material - Burse of Ordnance.

1. The following routines were established upon departure from New London. Daily serviced three torpedoes, one from each tube nest, and one from the racks. Exercised proper emergency stop valves and tested firing circuits. Semi-weekly disengaged hydro spindles and operated gyro setting motors. Weekly greased all tube fittings. No defects were found on servicing torpedoes with the exception of slight air leaks in two torpedoes. It is believed that the above routines constitute the minimum require-

— page 19 —
1942 while making a routine test of the firing circuits a hot run of a torpedo in tube number eight was caused by an inexperienced torpedoman striker carrying out the routine negligently and without authority. Before the governor link was broken the torpedo had moved forward in the tube, striking the outer door with sufficient force to jam it in a slightly open condition. The casualty was practically identical in nature to that experienced by a submarine on patrol in the Pacific. This daily test of the firing circuits is supposed to be carried out under the well-illustrated supervision of the leading torpedoman in accordance with department order which was promulgated after knowledge of the above-mentioned similar casualty had been received by this vessel.

The master saloon ship valve was not closed as it should have been and a slight leakage of air passed the individual solenoid stop valve to the firing key permitted the leakage of air past the letter stop valve after the air had previously been bled down in accordance with the proper procedure, resulting in operation of the firing valve when the key was pressed.

Upon surfacing that night, and using extreme care and taking necessary precautions, the torpedo was removed from the torpedo tube, the explorer, booster, and detonator removed, and the torpedo given an "after run treatment". The removal of this torpedo could not have been accomplished except that it was in an upper tube, sea were relatively smooth, and the ship was temporarily trimmed with a slight down angle. The tube was necessarily left flooded during the remainder of the patrol. Administrative steps have been taken to prevent future casualties of this nature.

(a) Condition of Topside Paint and Bituminous Approximatey 75% of the bitumastic of the tank tops and pressure hull was lost during this patrol, and the same percentage of gal. in the area around the water line is missing.

(b) Target Bearing Transmitter
Both target bearing transmitters were flooded the first time this vessel went to 250' during the first part of the patrol. This casualty is believed to have been caused by inadequate and poorly installed packing around shaft.

(c) Bathothermograph
The bathothermograph is considered a very valuable piece of auxiliary equipment. The record cards taken will be forwarded to the Woods Hole Oceanography Institution, via the Squadron Commander, for further analysis.

— page 20 —
0 Navigation
No use was made of the bubble sextant except for familiarization. The results were not very satisfactory. Good fixes were obtained during clear weather using the high grade sextant, even without the aid of moonlight.

: 0 Daily Routine
Normal sea routine was followed with reveille being held daily at 0700 for all hands except on Sundays and on two very rough days. All hands turned to at 0800 carrying out material routine and cleaning up the ship. On Friday, field day was held. The net results of this daily work period was very encouraging. The ship was maintained in an excellent material condition and the state of cleanliness remained high. Probably the best results of this daily work period was to provide a daily period of physical work which broke the normal submarine routine of watches and sleep; this effectively prevented any problem of boredom and insatiable which might have occurred. Smoking during dives was controlled. The smoking lamp was lighted after meals and at intervals of approximately two hours thereafter.

A large breakfast was served starting at 0715 daily, light lunches consisting of soup and sandwiches at 1130, and a large dinner at 1915 which usually was just subsequent to surfacing.

: 0 Food
The concentrated soup which was served on this patrol for the first time was enjoyed by all hands and is recommended that it should be carried on future patrols.

: 0 Radio
The AA Fox schedules were easy to copy until reaching a position approximately 30° W longitude. Rugby and Whitehall broadcasts were at times difficult to receive while enroute to assigned beacon station because of interference of an unidentified station within 2 kcs of the broadcast frequency. The 0030 Whitehall schedules were the most reliable and the easiest ones to copy.

It is recommended that consideration be given to provide a direct channel of communication with the Basic Group Commander during any future similar operations as took place on November 9, 1942 and subsequent days.

The 2400 Kcs circuit was so crowded that it would have been almost impossible to send any highly important message over this circuit without great delay.

It was noted that Gibraltar was guarding 4765 Kcs instead of 4740 as given in the communication annex of the operation order.

— page 21 —
1. Reconnaissance and Beacon Duties.
1. Experience obtained in carrying out the assigned reconnaissance and beacon duties should be of value for future operations of this nature. It is considered that a period of three days for thorough penetration and observation of an enemy coastal area might prove inadequate especially in an area in which very limited information is known beforehand. The presence of a large number of patrol craft in such an area might cause a delay in the penetration of the area to such an extent that little time would be left for thorough reconnaissance. It is therefore recommended that in the future operations of this nature that more latitude is allowed the Commanding Officer in the number of day which he has available for the penetration and reconnaissance of an area.
2. The Commanding Officer of a submarine performing reconnaissance preliminary to an assault should have detailed knowledge of the exact plan for landing of the assault force. He may then more intelligently perform his reconnaissance work and be better able to evaluate the possible effects of any newly discovered situation existing that might be observed.
3. Provisions for the withdrawal of a submarine from her beacon station in waters in which large numbers of enemy submarines might be concentrated and in which heavy anti-submarine patrols are to be conducted should be more thoroughly covered in future operation orders. The beacon submarine should be given a surface escort until the submarine is well clear of the area in which our own forces are to conduct the anti-submarine patrols. The withdrawal should normally take place as early as possible before the landing or assault is started.
4. It is recommended that beacon stations be assigned relative to a known and permanent navigational object or other object rather than a geographical position. This will eliminate any confusion arising from differences in geographical location of objects on different charts.

— page 25 —
20
: 014
: 21
: 100

: 22
: 040
: 1600

: 25
: 100

: 26
: 1900
: 28
: 3015
: 300
: 502

: 20
: 100

: 20

— page 26 —
0711
Latitude 34-33-3 N. longitude 05-52 W. sighted lights of two small vessels. Went ahead flank speed in order to take position ahead of these vessels.

0715
Submerged 3000 yards ahead of these two vessels because of approach of morning twilight and bright moonlight. From a position 500 yards off track it was observed that the leading vessel was a steam trawler with yellow stack with green bands towing a similar type vessel. These vessels were on southeasterly course. Unable to make accurate observations as to details of these two vessels because of insufficient daylight. These vessels were well inside of area "P". However, their small size did not warrant the expenditure of torpedoes and it was deemed imprudent to conduct gun action against two vessels simultaneously which might be armed, and in an area wherein a submerged U-boat was known to be.

0810
Changed course right to 1150 T to gain position for continuation of search that night for German submarine previously encountered.

1938
Surfaced in latitude 44-34-9 N. longitude 05-25-1 W. and commenced search on course 3200 T for U-boat.

2233
Secured from search and changed course to 200° T to conduct patrol in area K-506.

Dec. 30
Decoded FOS despatch 1219/29 directing SHAD to proceed to patrol station off Bilbao. This was repetition of despatch sent during day light which was not received because heavy weather prevented copying schedules submerged. Previous intelligence had been received regarding the prospective early departure of a German or vessel from Bilbao. Went ahead full speed on three main engines and set course for Bilbao.

0600
Sighted the navigational lights of four steamers on westerly courses which had all apparently departed from or passed by the Bilbao area at approximately the same time. Wide range of illuminated colors was seen on three of the vessels. Bright moonlight prevented close approach on the surface for investigation of fourth vessel on which no sign of illuminated colors could be seen at about 6000 yards. In view of the intelligence of the prospective early departure of a German or vessel from Bilbao, presumably sailing for a French port, the short time until the beginning of morning twilight, and desirability of arriving at the earliest possible moment in newly assigned patrol area, no attempt was made to work ahead of this fourth vessel so that closer observation could be made of her identity while submerged.

0715
Close proximity of fishing vessels and increasing twilight made submergence necessary in order to avoid detection five miles north of Bilbao breakwater. It was subsequently learned that German or vessel sailed at 0600 this date. Inability to copy schedules submerged due to heavy seas on the previous day and late receipt of second repetition of FOS despatch 1219/29 lost opportunity to intercept enemy or vessel. Prior to receipt of FOS despatch 1202/29 it had been decided to maintain a patrol just outside territorial waters off Cape Villano but upon receipt of this despatch which directed: (a) to ascertain enemy or shipping routes in neutral waters, and; (b) attack enemy vessels if definitely identified and repeat and not within territorial waters. It was decided that the most favorable position was to maintain a patrol

— page 28 —
10-15 degrees, list and wind direction in the water. Stood away to eastward and back around northward to west of target expecting to make careful inspection of damage done by periscope observation after daylight but lost sight of target in heavy rain squalls after diving. This vessel was not heard or seen enroute Bilbao during the day art there is possibility that she might have sunk as at least two hits were observed to have been made at water line. Frequent daylight fishing activity inside the 50 fathom curve off the Cape necessitated maintaining submerged patrol five miles off the Cape in order to avoid fouling fishing gear.

Received FOS despatch 1401A/5 advising of departure of German ore ship S.S. SCHARACHBERGER from Bilbao at 0900 on January 5th. If this vessel had departed at time stated it would have arrived off Cape Lachichaco about 1015-1030 at which time the SHAD was five miles northeast of Cape Villano and it seems very unlikely that the SCHARACHBERGER could have slipped by unnoticed in spite of the heavy seas running, the high black background of the coast, and the glare from the morning sun when making periscope observations of the coast line. Shortly after surfacing, a small trawler was sighted with two similar to that engaged on the night of 2 - 3 January. Then closing this ship for identification, radar picked up two small vessels quite close to the trawler, one ahead of the trawler and one astern of the barge. These two smaller radar contacts were believed to be accompanying escorts so the range was not closed to less than 1700 yards, but the vessel was trailed to determine track. Investigation was concluded when this trawler turned back on a westerly course when in a position in about longitude 2 - 30 W. The exact nature of this trawler or ore vessel and accompanying craft (?) remains obscure. Since radar gave a very definite indication of two smaller targets accompanying the vessel her character was viewed with suspicion.

Surfaced. Heavy sea conditions which have continued since December 30th have prevented putting men on deck to attempt removal of jammed pro-jectile in deck gun.

Sighted lights of vessel and closed to investigate and commenced tracking target. Target determined to be on course 650° T, speed seven knots, having tracked target from position ahead, astern, and on her beam. Ship was showing no colors, was showing running lights and towing lights. Radar indicated a small barge astern. Ship was in area "P" (free-for-all area) on approximate course for Bordeaux. Deck gun still inoperative so decided to use one torpedo on this vessel. Fired one torpedo, depth setting zero, from the forward nest at a range of 700 yards, 900 track. Torpedo passed under the target and failed to explode. Fired second torpedo which also passed under target. Trawler increased speed to eleven knots after second torpedo crossed track and changed course to 150° T, standing clear of free-for-all area and heading towards coast. In view of the two encounters with small ore vessels which were attempting to cross the free-for-all area on courses headed for Bordeaux, and of the fruitless nature of the patrol off Cape Lachichaco, it was decided that a few days surface and submerged patrol in area "P", the free-for-all area, on line across most probable routes between Bilbao and Bordeaux might prove fruitful.

— page 29 —
1610
In latitude 43-50 N, longitude 02-19 W, sighted the mast and stack of what appeared to be about a 2000 ton ship bearing 0800 T on a south-south-easterly course. Attempted to close submerged but could not decrease the range at submerged speed.

1735
Target changed to a southeasterly course, and gradually opened the range. Bridge was well aft on this vessel. Inasmuch as she was well within the free-for-all area to the northeastward of Bilbao, a possibility exists that it was an ore vessel on a return trip from Bordeaux. Surfaced. Sea conditions permitted work on deck gun. Removed jammed projectile from deck gun by the use of a home made backing-out slug. Received FOS despatch 1011A/10 designating three definite German ore vessels that may be attacked in territorial waters in accordance with SMI message No. 40. Previous to the receipt of this message the conduct of a close in patrol on the harbor of Bilbao or off Cape Villano had been considered but discarded: (a) these two positions would not permit ascertaining enemy shipping or to test in neutral waters east of Cape Machichaco, and; (b) because of the contour of the coast, it was extremely unlikely that any enemy vessel would be found outside of territorial waters until she had passed Cape Machichaco. With authority to sink certain enemy ships inside of territorial waters in accordance with SMI message No. 40, close inshore submerged patrol between Cape Villano and Bilbao was decided upon. A close inshore patrol of Cape Villano also offers opportunity of intercepting and identifying any blockade runners which might be eastward or westward bound in territorial waters.

Jan. 13
Commencing on this date, the time of moonrise, and the intensity of moonlight was such that night surface patrols had to be conducted well to seaward because of habitual presence of many fishing craft in this area.

Jan. 16
Made reconnaissance of Bilbao harbor from point inside of 20 fathom curve, and as close to breakwater as the harbor mouth would permit. Periscope moving pictures were made of the harbor and its environs. Roll No. 1, Exposure 35/0.

Jan. 18
From a position 800 yards on the beam of the S.S. CASTILLO MONTIEL, took moving pictures as the ship rounded cape Villano enroute Bilbao. Roll No. 2, Exposure 44/25'. Name was clearly seen in white letters under the bridge. The presence of this vessel in the Bilbao area was viewed with suspicion as she was reported enroute Gijon to Barcelona on January 15th.

Jan. 22
Received FOS despatch 1052A/22 advising of arrival in Bilbao of German ore ships S.S. NORDFELS and S.S. LIVADIA. These two vessels must have arrived during the night as during daylight of January 21st a close inshore submerged patrol had been conducted off Cape Villano. Extremely bright moonlight and high visibility conditions during the night of 21 - 22 January did not permit a close patrol of the coast line. It is interesting to note that on this particular night while patrolling eight to ten miles off shore, and using the SJ radar to detect any vessels which might attempt to slip into port unobserved by hugging the dark shore line, great difficulty was experienced during the early morning house in avoiding a group of four or five small vessels which stood towards Bilbao on south-south-easterly courses and which gave the impression, as one after the other they were sighted over a period

— page 31 —
045
in final bearing for each of the three straight bow shots. Two of these torpedoes passed either side of the NORDFELS, the wakes being very apparent in the smooth seas. The third torpedo appeared to run slightly erratically to the right. At this time it was observed that NORDFELS was attempting to signal astern by flashing light, and fired three rounds with her dock gun and my rounds with machine guns at our general position. A few moments later took quick look with periscope to try to discover to whom NORDFELS had been sign-lining but did not sight any vessel astern. Went ahead at six knots at 90 ft, on slightly diverging course from NORDFELS hoping that one of the torpedoes fired might have not been heard to hit and that she might slow from her original sight and one half knots speed and permit continuance of attack until vessel was completly destroyed. During this period commenced reload of forward tube nest.

Sighted ship 3-1/2 to 4 miles to southwest identified as "German ore ship Livadia".

NORDFELS reversed course by turning away towards coast and heading back to Bilbao harbor. Came to normal approach course at six knots to close track.

Observed white smoke coming from stern of NORDFELS which seemed to be listed slightly and down by the stern. Took motion pictures of this vessel at this time.

Fired one torpedo, 1000 Stbd. track, straight bow shot, with 1200 yard torpedo run. Heavy explosion heard fifty seconds after firing. When vessel failed to show positive evidence of sinking, came right at high speed and fired one torpedo at a 1400 yard torpedo run at 1350 torpedo track, 10 feet gyro angle. This torpedo was seen to run hot and straight but did not take its angle. As it passed down the side of the NORDFELS, that vessel fired about 250 to 300 rounds of heavy caliber machine gun bullets at the wake.

NORDFELS lowered life boats to the waters edge and closed LIVADIA. LIVADIA and NORDFELS returned to inner harbor. SHDProceeded submerged on southwesterly course in order to close inner harbor and keep these two vessels under observation.

Sighted LIVADIA behind the breakwater in inner harbor but could not see NORDFELS.

Sighted steel hulled (Dutch Scoot) type vessel to the northeastern. This vessel exhibited no colors or identifying marks other than the three letters "TIL" on its bow. This Scoot was painted slate gray. Look periscope motion picture of this vessel.

Surfaced just outside territorial waters three miles northwest of Bilbao inner harbor and continued patrol until moon rise at which time cleared patrol area to the northward and patrold eight to twelve miles north of coast because of very bright moonlight.

Decoded FOS despatch 1939/25 which indicated that enemy aircraft had possibly reportd the presence of a submarine on the surface in late afternoon in position about 40 miles north-northwest of Cape Villano. This plane possibly might have been a special anti-submarine patrol plane despatched to the area as a result of the torpedoing of the S.S. NORDFELS.

Heard explosion and sighted that appeared to be rapidly falling green flare about four miles distance over Cape Villano.

Sound picked up on 18 kilocycles, supersonic signal which greatly resembled the sound of our own echo ranging equipment at intervals of approximately every four seconds. The only vessel that could be sighted

— page 32 —
907
at this time was small Spanish or vessel bearing 135° T, range 2000 yards. The supersonic signals had were determined not to be emanating from this vessel but from a true bearing of about 080°. Periscope observations disclosed no vessels in the vicinity. The approaching darkness and hazy visibility limited the range of observation.

907
rigged for depth charge attack and went to 180 ft. Screw noises picked up on bearing 080° T. The possibility that these signals might have come from a fathometer was dismissed after carefully listening to them. Identical screw noises on a second vessel detected. Both vessels in relatively close proximity to each other on parallel courses. Both vessels making approximately 120 turns and sounded very similar to the propeller noises from the large fishing vessels normally encountered in this area. These vessels passed within 400 to 800 yards on approximately course of 270° T about 3 to 3-1/2 miles off the Cape Machichaco Cape Villano head. Used simple ova-sive tactics until echo ranging became inaudible.

015
Surfaced. Caught not see any navigation lights in direction in which echo ranging vessels had taken.

an. 27
351
While patrolling 7-1/2 miles north of Cape Machichaco during bright moonlight, dove to avoid unseen aircraft whose fast approach was detected by SD radar. In view of great liklihood that the aircraft might remain in the area, and surfacing would only possibly be followed by another dive to avoid detection, with consequent drain on the battery, decided to remain submerged. Set course for close inshore patrol off Cape Machichaco. During submerged patrol this date was constantly embarrassed by the presence of fishing vessels engaged in fishing east of Cape Machichaco and north of the fishing port of Bermeo. The conduct of a patrol off Cape Machichaco is rather difficult because of the habit of presence of a large number of fishing boats in this area and is much less efficient than a patrol off Cape Villano because of the presence of these vessels.

an.28
750
Sighted five small ore vessels standing down from Cape Villano towards Bilbao harbor, very close inshore. Approaching twilight and range of 3000 yards made positive identity of these vessels impossible, but none of four observers could note the presence of any printed colors on the hull of these small ore vessels. They were about 800 tons each, and it was quite definitely ascertained that they were not flying any colors. It is strongly suspected that these vessels were five enemy ore vessels similar to that group mentioned in the MZ message No. 13.

an. 30
225
while patrolling 2-1/2 miles north of Cape Villano, sighted trawler showing Spanish colors on easterly course. This vessel did not appear to resemble in its details, any type previously seen and upon reaching a point 1/2 mile away, between Cape Machichaco and Cape Villano, reversed course heading for 8°1'. When last seen was on westerly course heading up the coast.

009
sighted the lights on a small ore boat or large trawler. These lights strongly resembled those seen on both ore vessels which were attacked in area "P" previously. This vessel remained in the same general vicinity for the next hour and then stood away on a southerly course.

et.1
002
sighted lights of vessel which appeared to be from the same vessel observed on January 30th. This vessel stood out from the direction of Bilbao and having arrived in a point approximately three miles north of Cape Villano stopped and laid to until 0330. Continued pre-sence of Livadina in bilbao, in spite of the fact that she is loaded and

— page 33 —
2025
Feb. 4
01:45
Sighted lights of ship which appeared identical with those sighted on three previous occasions and her movements this night very brazenly into the free-for-all area afforded great circumstantial proof that this vessel was an enemy anti-submarine vessel or decoy. It was believed that on this night she was attempting to lead us into the free-for-all area, and into some form of anti-submarine trap. The relatively small volume of this target to the enemy, the suspicious movements of this, or a similar vessel on different nights, and the conviction that the LIV.DL was waiting in port for the successful outcome of anti-submarine measures made the decision not to attack this vessel by gun fire as the only sane and prudent one. Returned to normal night patrol area.

0335
arrived in night patrol area. Ship previously shadowed, continued out of sight on course 030° T.

Feb. 5
0625
Submerged on course 000° T.
Leaving patrol station as directed by FOS despatch 1312/2.
Sighted Sunderland aircraft on westerly course, altitude 300-400 ft. No Sunderland was scheduled to be operating in this area. A Sunderland was reported scheduled to operate in late 16 this forenoon (off Ferrol). If this was friendly Sunderland she was about 350 miles from her reported operating sector.
Surfaced in latitude 14-17 longitude 03-12.

2045
Feb 6
0155
Received FOS despatch 0031/6 directing patrol in vicinity of latitude 45-25 N, longitude 03-01 N. Ships position 45-25 N 03-07 N. Commenced patrolling on northerly and southerly courses just outside of 100 fathom curve.
In latitude 42-25 N, longitude 03-07 N submerged on course 130° T. Commenced periscope patrol.
Sighted large steam driven fishing vessel of approximately 700 gross tons engaged in fishing and making 60 RPM.
In latitude 42-24 N longitude 03-07 surfaced and commenced patrolling.

-9-

— page 34 —
334 Slighted group of Tt lights on vessels ong-god i fishing.
: 107 Changed course to 347° T1c ving patrol station in accordance with FOS
: 120 Changed course to 315° T to avoid several large size fishing vessels
: 142 Engaged in fishing.
: 229 Sighted beam of a large searchlight bearing 030° T at a range of
: 233 5 to 8 miles. Searchlight was only turned on for a matter of 3 to 5
: 239 seconds and during that time made a horizontal sweep of the ocean to
: 239 Westward.
: 239 Sighted side lights of small vessel at estimated range of 8000 yards.
: 239 Sighted darkened patrol vessel bearing 030° T on westerly course.
: 240 Movements of patrol vessel indicated that we might have been seen.
: 240 Sent ahead flank speed on four main engines on course 270° T. Patrol
: 240 vessel had closed to 2700 yards while we were working up speed but was
: 240 rapidly left astern when we reached 16-1/2 knots heading into a rough
: 240 sea.
: 325 Lost radar and visual contact with patrol vessel. Changed course to
: 325 head for day light diving position.
: 351 Latitude 45-47° N longitude 4-01° W submerged on course 345° T and
: 351 commenced submerged patrol. Low visibility, fogging of 10.2 periscope
: 352 in high power, and rough seas precluded efficient periscope patrol.
: 352 While at 125 ft. propellor noises of vessel making 60 RPM picked up by
: 352 sound. Believed to be submerge German submarine making approximately
: 352 3 knots. Commenced tracking target on TDC and maintaining position
: 352 2500 to 3000 yards directly astern with intention of trailing until she
: 352 surfaced and then conducting night torpedo attack.
: 015 Finally decided that sound target was a large fishing vessel engaged in
: 015 fishing at slow speed, since at a range of 1200-1500 yards, sound could
: 015 unmistakably hear sound of screws alternately leaving and entering the
: 015 water while pitching in the heavy seas then running.
: 052 In latitude 46-12°N longitude 4-15° N surfaced on course 325° T.
: 052 From this hour until 22:45 steered various courses to avoid three fishing
: 052 vessels.
: 045 Clear of fishing vessels. Changed course to 000° T.
: 045
: 610 In latitude 47-50° N longitude 5-35° N submerged and commenced patrol on
: 610 course 329° T. Heavy seas, poor visibility, and heavy rain squalls
: 305 Changed course to 299° T.
: 305 Changed course to 000° T.
: 045 In latitude 46-10°N longitude 6-10, surfaced.
: 045
: 735 Sighted Lizard's Head light bearing, 00L0° T.
: 735 Arrived rendezvous. Changed course to 02L0° T.
: 800 Escorting trawlers not at rendezvous. Proceeding towards Falmouth in
: 800 accordance with instructions issued by Captain of Submarine Squadron
: 800 THREE despatch 2347A/8.
: 950 Passed through boom.
: 025 Moored at Falmouth, England.
: 025
: 120 U.S.S. HERRING stood into port and moored alongside.
: 120
: 750 Underway for Rosneath, Scotland in company with escort vessel H.M.S.
: 750 CUTTY SARK and U.S.S. HERRING.
: 810 Passed through boom.
: 910 H.H.S. SEVERN rendezvoused with escort, HERRING and SHAD, proceeding in
: 910 company to Clyde area.
: 812 Arrived in Clyde during afternoon.
: 812

— page 35 —
2. J.E. THE
(a) Weather encountered during the entire patrol was normal for the area in which operating. During approximately one half of the month of January 1943 the weather in this area was bad. Moderate breezes of eleven to sixteen knots to strong gales of forty one to forty seven knots were experienced, with sea conditions ranging from condition five (heavy seas) to condition seven (rough seas). During a period of five to six hours on one day mountainous seas were encountered. During the stormy period the skies were normally very overcast; visibility fair, but varying at times from one to thirty very suddenly because of squalls. Sky was generally .7 to .9 overcast and during moonless nights such intense darkness prevailed that a submarine could approach a lighted vessel to one hundred to two hundred yards if so desired and still have no fear of being sighted. During this period the weather was changeable from bad to worse.

(b) During the second half of January, and continuing with minor exceptions to the end of this vessels patrol, the wind which had been blowing from a westerly direction, shifted into the south. Way in and day out for a period of approximately eighteen days only little or no appreciable swells were the order of the day. The weather during this period was very balmy and dry considering the season of the year. Visibility very good; sky only .2 to .4 overcast and during moonlight nights the horizon was very clearly and sharply defined and great care had to be taken during this period to insure that small fishing craft that infested the area did not sight this submarine.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION
(a) No abnormal tidal conditions were noted. The predicted easterly set of about one knot was observed at all times when a wind of force two or better from the south-southwest around to north-northwest was blowing.

4. AIDSTO NAVIGATION
(a) The aids to navigation located along the coast from Bilbao to Pesajes are excellent and are considered far above the necessary needs for a coast in which the water is so deep and foggy weather so infrequent that even a merchant ship captain unfamiliar with the coast could safely pilot his vessel along this coast by merely keeping his distance off the mountainous shore by eye.
(b) Cape Iachichaco light is a twenty seven mile light and at no time during night during the forty seven days on patrol was this vessel ever out of sight of this light except momentarily during a rain squall. At infrequent intervals for short periods, Iachichaco light becomes erratic in performance as evidenced by a change from its normal characteristics to a steady white light or total eclipse.

— page 46 —
6. AIKRAFT SIGHTED

(a) During a moonlight night, on January 27, a very definite prospective of an approaching aircraft was made on the S.D. radar. The aircraft was detected at ten miles and quickly closed to four miles. Upon surfacing ten minutes later there was no aircraft in vicinity as indicated by S.D. radar.

(b) At 0930 on February 2nd, two Blohm & Voss flying boats (BV-138) were sighted by periscope flying about 300 feet above the water. At 1600 that same day a Dornier (18-K) was observed through periscope flying about 200 feet above the water. All three of these planes were apparently searching for submarines.

(c) On February 5th, a Sunderland (flying boat) was observed through periscope on a westerly course. There was no report of this plane scheduled in this area.

7. ATTACKS

(a) Attack No. 1.
1. Number of torpedoes fired: 2.
2. Firing interval: 50 seconds.
3. Point of aim: MOT.
4. Range: 700 - 650 yards.
5. Track angle: 90°
6. Depth setting: 0
7. Estimated draft of target: 10-11 ft. (based upon firing results).
8. Torpedo performance: Hot straight and normal.
9. Enemy estimated speed: 7-1/2 knots.
10. Results of attack: Both torpedoes unmistakably passed under the target and apparently failed to fire electrically.

(b) Attack No. 2.
1. Number of torpedoes fired: 2.
2. Firing interval: 10 seconds.
3. Point of aim: MOT.
4. Range: 600 yards.
5. Track angle: 150 - 160 port.
6. Depth setting: 0.
7. Estimated draft of target: 15 ft.
8. Torpedo performance: Unobserved because of smooth glassy sea and closeness of enemy.
9. Enemy estimated speed: 8-1/2 knots.
10. Results of attack: One hit caused small fire on board target.

(c) Attack No. 3.
1. Number of torpedoes fired: 3.
2. Firing interval: 10 seconds.
3. Point of aim: Astern.
4. Track angle: 180°.
5. Range: 1300 yards.
6. Estimated draft of target: 15 ft.
7. Depth setting: 0.
8. Torpedo performance: Two hot straight and normal. One torpedo angled off at about 15°.
9. Enemy estimated speed: 8-1/2 to 9 knots.
10. Results of attack: No hits.

— page 47 —
1. Number of torpedoes fired; 2. 2. Firing interval; 3 minutes. 3. Point of aim: MOT. 4. Range: 1100 - 1250 yards. 5. Track angle: 95 starboard and 135 starboard. 6. Depth setting: 0. 7. Estimated draft of target: 15 ft. 8. Torpedo performance: First torpedo hot straight and normal. Second torpedo ran straight instead of 15 left. 9. Enemy estimated speed: 9 knots. 10. Results of attack: First torpedo hit.

8. ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES

(a) Anti-submarine Surface Vessels.
On January 26th at about 1830 echo ranging was detected on eighteen kilo-cycles on the sound equipment. The only vessel in the vicinity at this time was a 150 ft. steam trawler. The exact bearing of the source of this echo ranging was very difficult to determine, but it unmistakably was not from this Spanish trawler which was proceeding at a slow speed about 2000 yards away on easterly course. Between 1900 and 1930 the intensity of the echo ranging increased and finally screw noises were heard approaching from the direction in which it had originally been estimated the echo ranging had come. The possibility that this ranging might have been a fathometer was dismissed, as the supersonic signal heard was coming from a vessel which was searching rather than from a head fixed in one position. No attempt was made to ascertain the source of this echo ranging by periscope observation, because of heavy seas running and very poor visibility existing at 1830. Simple evasive tactics at 180 ft. were followed which took this vessel well clear of the source of the signals.

(b) Anti-submarine Aircraft.
At 0350 on January 27th while patrolling 6-1/2 miles north-northwest of Cape Villano, S.D. radar detected plane coming in fast, closing range from ten to four miles rapidly.
P08 despatch 1939A/25 indicated by its text that an enemy aircraft was operating in the Bilbao area on the afternoon in which the S.S. NOIDFELS was torpedoed. In connection with this despatch it is remarked that this vessel was forty miles from the latitude and longitude mentioned therein and at no time during the day was on the surface.
At 0930 on February 2nd, two Blohm & Voss flying boats (BV-138) were sighted through periscope flying about 300 ft. above the water. At 1600 that same day a Dornier (18-K) was observed through periscope flying about 200 ft. above the water. All three of these planes were apparently searching for submarines.
On February 5th a Sunderland flying boat was sighted on easterly course. This plane was only sighted once but the officer making the observation was positive as to the identity of the plane because it was flying from 150 to 250 ft. above the water.

9. MINE SWEEPING

(a) No enemy mine fields were located and no enemy mine sweeping operations were observed.

— page 48 —
10. MAJOR CASUALTIES

(a) Bow Planes.

On January 1st, 1942, the submarine failed to rig in twice after surfacing. Upon examination of the operation of the bow plane rigging gears it was found that shear pins, piece No. C3, Portsmouth Plan No. 738-220, were sheared, causing the planes to be jammed. On January 2nd, upon surfacing the same casualty occurred and the pins were renewed again. At this time it was discovered that the foundation for port sector gear bearing was out of line with the vertical plane and possibly with the horizontal plane and that the bearing bolts were loose. Loosening of the bearing, and the bending of the foundation forward from its proper vertical position had qualified the aircraft to be caused by the heavy pounding action of the seas on the bow planes on the three previous occasions on which the shear pins had failed. After the third bow plane rigging in failure, the cause of the failure, was attributed to a distortion of the superstructure in way of the bow planes which shortened the travel of the bow planes from the fully rigged out to the fully rigged in position. Planes would therefore come up against hull before limit switch cut out rigging motor with consequent failure of shear pins. The bow plane rigging limit switch was reset. For the next ten days no trouble was experienced with the planes but on January 13th the planes again failed to rig in upon surfacing. The shear pins were again found to be sheared and were renewed. Thereafter the bow planes were always rigged in prior to surfacing as this latest failure was believed to be due to some new cause. A reoccurrence of this same bowplane casualty occurred when the planes were not rigged in prior to surfacing. Pins were renewed. When planes were rigged in the port bow plane lacked about fourteen inches of travel in arc to be fully rigged in when the starboard bowplane was against the hull. Examination of the bow plane rigging gear disclosed that there had been aslipped between piece No. B and piece No. A, Portsmouth Plan No. 724-201 of seven teeth widths. This slippage was caused by failure of the port plane to come up against the mechanical stop in the fully rigged out position, which in turn was caused by misalignment of the gear foundation caused by the planes being pounded in the heavy seas in the rigged out position during the reoccurrence of the first three casualties. Hereafter the bow planes were rigged out after diving and rigged in before surfacing by the torpedo room, the last 15 to 20 percent of the rigging in each direction being accomplished by hand in order to avoid further casualties to the shear pins. For the remainder of the patrol no more casualties of this nature occurred using this procedure. A total of eight sets of shear pins had been sheared previous to this time. Weekly greasing of the bow plane tilting and rigging gear was routinely accomplished both in the torpedo room and the superstructure. Average diving time was increased by 10 to 15 seconds by not having bow planes available until three minutes after diving.

(b) Derangement of Magnification Shifting System on No. 1 Periscope.

The control for changing magnification on No. 1 periscope broke or became deranged during a routine periscope patrol and prevented the use of low power. The high power control continued to function. The exact nature of the failure will not be known until the tender is able to disassemble the periscope for inspection.

(c) Torpedo Data Computer - Improper Operation of.

It was discovered that on certain relative bearings, depending upon the target course, that operation of the target course and relative bearing dials was defective. This defect manifests itself by the necessity of using an abnormal amount of torque to turn these two dials over a certain small arc of operation. An investigation was made at sea but because of the construction of the computer, it was impossible to ascertain the cause of the trouble without completely dismantling one of the major units which was impracticable. This defect did not prevent the use of the computer, and so no attempt was made to effect repairs at sea. The torpedo data computer had been in operation 198 hours at the time of this casualty.

— page 49 —
(d) High Pressure Air Compressor Motor - Failure of Field Coil Insulation.
The brass nipple on the vent line from the circulating water pump to No. 2 air compressor carried away at 110 ft. Before this leak was discovered and brought under control several gallons of water sprayed into No. 2 air compressor motor through the ventilation grill. The motor was drained, washed with distilled water and carbon tetrachloride, and dried out with a hot air blower. Satisfactory negative readings could not be obtained on one field coil due to defects in the original insulation. A new field coil was installed from spares on board, and satisfactory readings and operation was obtained after 70 min-hours of work.

11. RADIO
(a) Reception of schedules on the surface was entirely satisfactory. Fair to good reception submerged could only be obtained at keel depths of 58 ft. or less when little or no seas were running. The T.B.L. transmitter was not operated at any time during the patrol. There was no opportunity to use homing procedure with aircraft.
(b) There appeared to be a slight decrease in the sensitivity of both radar sets. However, these sets gave satisfactory performance day in and day out with minor exceptions for the duration of the patrol.

12. SOUND
(a) There were no casualties to any of the sound equipment which operated in a normal and satisfactory manner during the entire period.

13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY
(a) Health
The health of the crew during this patrol was slightly above average but did not approach the excellent state which obtained on the first patrol. There were no serious illnesses but there were fourteen cases of colds and sore throats, and twenty three man-days lost by people on the binnacle list. The greatest amount of these colds occurred during the first half of the patrol. Continued lack of sunshine, and the damp cold weather at Rosneath prior to departure are considered as causes together with the large decrease in the amount of fresh vegetables available. Compulsory routine dosages of vitamin pills by all hands and encouragement of the daily use of the sun lamp which resulted in the majority of the crew taking sun lamp treatments, appeared to have beneficial effects. Hereafter, compulsory use of vitamin pills and continued use of the sun lamp will be continued both in port and at sea.

(b) Habitability.
The habitability of the ship was excellent. The routine use of both air conditioning plants while submerged was the greatest contributing factor. One plant was insufficient to keep the air dry and wholesome. Forty eight consecutive days submerged would have taken a lot out of the crew had it not been for use of both air conditioning plants at all times when submerged.

— page 50 —
(c)  Food.
There was a notice.ble decrease in the quality of the food on this patrol
inasmuch as no replacements were available from the tender of many of the items
which had been heavily stocked prior departure from New London. One of the
most popular foods served on any patrol are eggs for breakfast. In spite of
all efforts made, this vessel was only able to obtain one case of eggs
prior to departure on this patrol.

1.:
    MILIES STEAMED

(a) (1) Number of dives - 51 dives.
(2) Hours submerged - 629.1 hours (147 days).
(3) Hours surface - 672.9 hours.

(b) (1) Total miles by Pit log - 7880.7 miles.

(c) (1) Total miles by revolutions - 8367.6 miles.
(2) Miles submerged by revolutions - 11480.5 miles.
(3) Miles surface by revolutions - 6907.1 miles.

(d) (1) Main engine hours (total) - 1213.9 hours.
(2) Main engine hours (charge) - 291.7 hours.
(3) Auxiliary engine hours - 89.8 hours.

(e) (1) Total fuel used - 58313 gals.
(2) Fuel used for propulsion (est) - 44785 gals.
(3) Fuel used charge (est) - 13528 gals.
(4) Lub. oil used, 2190 - 115 gals.
(5) Lub. oil used, 9250 - 495 gals.

(f) (1) Air compressor hours - 249.4 hours.
(2) Main storage battery cycles - 264 cycles.

(g) (1) Evaporator hours - 710.2 hours.

(h) (1) Fresh water made - 22570 gals.
(2) Battery water made - 2660 gals.
(3) Total water made - 25230 gals.

35.1 gals per hour.

(i) (1) Fresh water used - 29770 gals. 6.8 gals per man per day.
(2) Battery water used - 2560 gals.

(j) (1) Air conditioning condensate made (est) - 3015 gals.

15.  EIDURANCE

(a) The amount of endurance remaining upon completion of patrol is
estimated as follows:

PERSONNEL 15 days.  FUEL 15 days.  TOIPEDOES 67%  FOOD 10 days.  WATER 9 days.

— page 51 —
16. REARKS

(a) Material - BuShips (Machinery)
1. The performance of the entire main propulsion plant was excellent. Not even the slightest derangement occurred.
2. Except for minor grounds in topside wiring, all other equipment operated in a normal and satisfactory manner.

(b) Material - BuShips (Full)
1. Repeated bow plane casualties described in paragraph 10 and the necessity for renewing field coils on the high pressure air compressor motor also mentioned in that paragraph, were the two greatest deficiencies.
2. Four 1/4" brass nipples installed in the salt water piping of this vessel have carried away under pressure since October 1942, due to loss of material by electrolytic action. These were in the salt water lines of the air conditioning and refrigeration systems in which no zincs are inst.lled, except in the condensers. In addition, valves in the trim manifold are eroding so fast that several had to be reground twice during this patrol. The installation of zincs in these systems, or substitution of valves and nipples of a more resistant material, is considered to be of the utmost importance.

(c) Material - Bureau of Ordnance.
The lack of the destructive effect of a torpedo on the ore vessel S.S. NORDFELS was at first very mystifying. Both torpedoes apparently ran at a depth of approximately 14 ft. The torpedo apparently exploded just under the turn of the bilge. The dead weight, of the heavy, dense, viscous mass of the ore very effectively acted to absorb the force of the explosion. After absorbing this force a great quantity of ore very likely then drops out through the hole blown in the ships bottom, and was replaced by water having only 1/6 of the specific gravity of the ore. It is seriously doubted whether this vessel would have reached port if it had been torpedoed at sea in rough weather, as the subsequent action of this vessel in lowering her life boats to the waters edge just outside of the harbor of Bilbao indicates that the explosion had caused serious damage to her hull as a whole with consequent danger of sinking.

One torpedo which was in the flooded tube for a 4"roximtely ten minutes was found upon inspection after the tube was drained down to have had a flooded exploder mechanism. An exploder mechanism from another torpedo was put in this torpedo.

The hitting power of the 3" deck gun is inadequate. A 4" gun, firing a projectile with the increased bursting charge of a 4" shell, would be highly desirable for use on those few occasions when a deck gun might be profitably used against small enemy vessels whose size did not warrant the expenditure of a torpedo. The night gun action with the 3" deck gun was excellent experience as it taught many valuable lessons in regards to this sort of offensive action. A deck gun mounted forward is invaluable for offensive night operations under the few circumstances in which a deck gun can be profitably used. A deck gun mounted forward of the bridge firing ammunition having flashless propellant charge would have afforded, on this patrol, a good possibility of the destruction of a German U-boat. The Commanding Officer would be very pleased to have available two deck guns when operating in the same general area again.

The fire power of the 20 m.m. gun as witnessed during the night gun action is outstanding but the full effectiveness of this weapon was not realized because of defective ammunition. The propellant charge of the ready

— page 52 —
1. The pressure proof stowage caused many misfires with the ammunition ineffectively volume of fire. Long habitual stowage of 20 m.m. 2. The moisture laden air in the pressure proof stowage will gradually subject the propellant charge to the moisture of condensation inside the stowage with consequent misfires and jams. 3. The gun action which took place on January 14th demonstrated the necessity of flashless powder as a propellant charge for a submarine patrol. 4. The fire is very inefficient without flashless powder. It is believed that a more effective fire could have been maintained by training the gun on the beam at 0 to 30 elevation, coming the ship to bring the gun to bear and firing when the ship was felt to be on an even keel. Corrections to train being made by small course changes and to pointing by changing the time of fire to a different part of the roll. At the short ranges at which such an action would be conducted in order to effectively keep the target under heavy 20 m.m. and 30 c.l. machine gun fire, this means of fire control for the deck fun should prove to be utterly feasible and quite efficient until flashless powder is available.

(d) Spare Parts.

The replacement of certain on board spares is a matter of great concern. Every effort has been made to obtain excess of on board spares which by experience are known to be most liable to expenditure. The procurement of some of these excess spares by requisitions submitted months ago has still been unsuccessful, and generally speaking the situation in this matter is getting slowly but progressively worse. The rapid replacement of certain on board spares, which is normally made at a submarine base immediately upon arrival, can now only be accomplished by despatch request and airplane shipment.

(e) Lorries.

The morale of the crew was excellent in spite of the bad weather, few targets, and a noticeable decrease in the veracity and quality of food. The night gun action contributed highly to the state of morale as through it the crew was able to substantially find an outlet for action. No complaints about the lack of targets was heard after this gun action. The torpedoing of the NOLDRELS, and the presence of enemy planes in the area searching for a submarine, was generally sufficient to alleviate the boredom of a long patrol during which nothing happens.

(f) Lookouts.

The excellent work of the ten special lookouts was one of the outstanding features of the patrol. These men, carefully selected for their fundamental qualities, and especially trained for the performance of this duty, and standing no other watches, are considered to have decreased the war time dangers of a submarine on the surface at night time to a minimum. The security resulting from the vigilance of a selected group of this type, heavily contributes to the over all efficiency of the submarine as reflected by the confidence of the Commanding Officer, officers, and all the crew, in the ability of these men to be the eyes of the ship on the surface. One German submarine approximately one third the size of this vessel, was sighted by one of these lookouts before the German submarine apparently sighted this vessel, even though the relative positions of the two submarines would have slightly favored the enemy in this matter. Again one of the lookouts on a dark night sighted a small darkened patrol vessel off the coast of France at a range of

— page 53 —
4000 to 4500 yards. In the first case the SJ radar did not make contact with the target until it had been coached on to the proper bearing by the CPF over the Deck.

(4) Allowance of Personnel
It is most strongly recommended that the crew of this vessel be maintained at a minimum of 67 men. This number is mandatory if the full potential fighting efficiency of this submarine is to be maintained, especially on the surface at night time when the best defense against surprise enemy action lies in the allowance of specially trained lookouts detecting the enemy and the ship very quickly taking the offensive by bringing into full use very modern and excellent equipment which if constantly manned makes these submarines the fastest shooting submarines in the world. A decrease in the number of men allowed in the crew on a long patrol would not permit a flexibility of organization without loss of efficiency when through illness or accident a man is placed on the binnacle list.

— page 54 —
1. The following information and observations made during the course of this vessels patrol in the Bilbao area is submitted:

(A) Enemy Snipping routes.
(1) Daylight routes.
During daylight all enemy ore vessels both of large and small tonnage upon leaving Bilbao harbor round up on a northeasterly course to Cape Villano and thence on an easterly course to Cape Machichaco, at all times staying within one and three quarters to two miles off shore. From this point, they either could cut directly across through international waters to inland waters at a point ten to fifteen miles distance from Cape Lachichaco or else follow around the headland staying well within territorial waters. No enemy vessels were observed between Cape Machichaco and Pesajes although part of the patrol was spent in this area and consequently the exact route between Machichaco and the Pesajes area is not definitely known. However, it is an opinion, that because of the nature of Cape Machichaco headland which on its eastern edge runs approximately north west south east, that enemy ore vessels may be expected to pass slightly outside neutrals waters for a distance of five to ten miles after passing eastward of Cape Machichaco. There is some possibility that the larger enemy ore vessels might, after passing through some point eastward of Cape Machichaco, set a course directly for Bordeaux or more northern French port. This possibility is fostered by the sighting, during a submerged patrol, of the masts and stack of a steamer of about 2000 tons on a south-south-easterly course crossing through area "P" heading for Cape Machichaco.

(2) Night routes.
No definitely identified enemy vessels were encountered during night making a coastwise passage, but it may be safely assumed that the night time passage through this area follows that mentioned in paragraph (1) above with the exception that they undoubtedly maintain position further off shore than during daylight hours as all traffic generally passes the Cape Villano - Cape Machichaco headland at night at a distance of four to five miles. The enemy should be able to sail his ore vessels in and out of Bilbao harbor with relative impunity, despite the presence of a hostile submarine in the Bilbao area, if he takes advantage of those conditions of visibility, weather and sea which so often in this area make a submarines patrol by day or night subnormal in efficiency. Definite identification of an enemy vessel at night time, except on moonless, overcast nights, is very difficulty to possibly obtain, as it is only on nights of this nature that close enough approach can be made, 300 - 600 yards, to definitely distinguish illuminated colors. During the periods of bright moonlit nights that were obtained on ten days, and regardless of the condition of the skies, an enemy vessel could very easily sail darkened close into the coast and not be sighted against its high black background, whereas, a submarine on the same type of night, even trimmed down, is very liable to be sighted even when its night patrol is being conducted at a greater distance off shore than normally, but still within effective radar range.

(3) Routes of Small German Ore Vessels.
It is strongly believed that a large percentage of the ore shipments between Bilbao and French ports is carried in small bottoms of 300 - 600 tons. One group of five of such vessels arrived Bilbao at about 1805 on January 28th. The approach of evening twilight, a slight haze, and the blending of the silhouettes of these vessels against the headland made it impossible to

— page 55 —
1. Based upon the encounter with the S.S. [UNKNOWN: ship name] and the arrival of the five small ore vessels mentioned in subparagraph 3, and the unobserved arrival of the S.S. [UNKNOWN: ship name], it becomes quite apparent that the normal and habitual sailing hour of German ore vessels from Bilbao or from a French port is between approximately 0700 to 0900. Because of the short passage involved this would permit even relatively slow ships to make this passage in sufficient time to arrive at their destination just before or just after the end of evening twilight.

(C) Ore Shipment From Ports Other Than Bilbao.

Both small ore vessels, which this vessel trailed into and attacked in the free-for-all area on a line between Bilbao and Bordeaux, did not sail from Bilbao. It is believed that they came from one of the many small ore ports which are found along the coast westward of Bilbao, and which only permit the entry of small ore vessels of light draft. Both these aforementioned vessels arrived at a point seven to eight miles north of Bilbao from the westward, at about 0330, and apparently, having ascertained their position off Cape Villano, then set a direct course for Bordeaux. Based on the known fact that many small ore vessels 'proceed in company with E-boat escorts, (SIZ message No. 45) it is believed that these two ore vessels which were attacked, might have been independently owned vessels of Spanish registry engaged in the lucrative but hazardous pursuit of blockade running.

(D) Navigation.

The aids to navigation located along the coast from Bilbao to Posajes are excellent and are considered far above the necessary needs for a coast in which only a relatively small number of vessels make passage except for those engaged in regular coastwise traffic. Along the coast the water is deep right close inshore, foggy weather infrequent, and a merchant ship captain unfamiliar with the coast could safely pilot his vessel along this coast by merely keeping his distance off the mountainous shore by eye. Cape Machichaco light is a twenty seven mile light and at no time during night time during the 46 days on patrol was this vessel ever out of sight of this light except momentarily once during a rain squall. At infrequent intervals for short periods, Machichaco light becomes erratic in performance as evidenced by a change from its normal characteristics to a steady white light or total eclipse. The predicted easterly set of about one knot, was observed at all times when a wind of force two or better from the south-south-west around to north-north-west was blowing.

During the first half of the month of January 1943 the weather in this area was bad. Moderate breezes of 11 to 16 knots, to strong gales of 41-47 knots were experienced. Sea conditions ranged from condition 5 (heavy seas) to condition 7 (rough seas). During a period of five to six hours on one day mountainous seas were encountered. During the stormy period the skies were normally very overcast; visibility fair, but varying at times from 1 to 30 very suddenly because of squalls. Sky was generally .7 to .9.

— page 56 —
1. During the second half of January, and continuing with minor exceptions to the end of this vessel's patrol, the wind which had been blowing from a westerly direction, shifted into the south. Day in and day out for a period of approximately eight days only little or no appreciable swells were the order of the day. The weather during this period was very balmy and dry, considering the season of the year. Visibility very good; sky normally only 2 to 4 overcast, and during moonlit nights the horizon was very clearly and sharply defined and great care had to be taken during this period to avoid closing small fishing craft that infest the area.

2. (b) Fishing Vessels.

During this patrol there was much fishing activity taking place in the area. The localities in which this fishing takes place and the passage of fishing vessels to and from port, curtailed patrol areas in a sector bearing northeast to east-south-east, a radius of eight miles from Cape Machichaco. In this sector the habitual presence of a large number of fishing vessels make necessary extreme care in making periscope observations and at night time make the area untenable for patroling, except on the darkest nights. On the eastern side of the Cape Villano-Capo Machichaco headland is located the fishing port of Brameo, from which a large number of fishing vessels are operated. Fishing is very seldom curtailed by bad weather. The two most common types of fishing vessels that were encountered were:

(a) A small twenty foot, internal-combustion engine boat of a type resembling a large and heavily built whale boat. (See sketch).

(b) A fifty to sixty foot steam launch with one lug rigged sail at stern.

These vessels frequently fish inside of the fifty fathom curve off Cape Machichaco. Great care must be taken in passing submerged in their vicinity that the planes or propellers do not foul in any of the fishing gear. Very few of the fishing fleet operate from Bilbao, and no fishing activity was noted close off Cape Villano except on small fishing boat on one day. The majority of the fishing fleet however, seem to favor a fishing bank six to fifteen miles north-northeast of Cape Machichaco. A small number were observed fishing regularly between eighteen to twenty two miles off the coast north of Cape Villano.

(F) Spanish Public Vessels.

No vessels were sighted during the patrol which we identified or appeared to be Spanish public vessels. However, on January 26th at about 1730 echo ranging was detected on eighteen kilocycles on the sound equipment. The only vessel in the vicinity at this time was a 150 ft. steam trawler. The exact bearing of the source of this echo ranging was very difficult to determine but it unmistakably was not from this Spanish trawler which was proceeding at a slow speed about 2000 yards away. Between 1730 and 1830 the intensity of the echo ranging increased and finally severe noises were heard approaching from the direction of the originally estimated true bearing of the source. The possibility that this ranging might have been a fathometer was dismissed, as the supersonic signal heard was coming from a vessel which was searching rather than from a head fixed in one position. Because of

— page 58 —
1. General Information.

The glow from what might be open harth furnaces located in bilbao and in a town about ten miles west of Bilbao are nightly occurances. These glows last for periods ranging from ten minutes to one half hour and with good reflection from the clouds throw a lot of light on the harbor approaches. From a position just west of Point Galea on a clear day a limited reconnaissance of the inner harbor may be made by periscope. The stack and masts of steamers anchored behind the western breakwater can be seen.

The water in this area is normally phosphorescent and is not the cause for very much concern except on very dark nights at speed above fourteen knots.

Sound conditions in the area are bad to poor especially inside the 100 fathom curve and especially bad inside the 50 fathom curve. The very bad conditions inside the 50 fathom curve are attributed to the high noise level in the water arising from the heavy surf pounding at the base of the shore line, as well as the shallow depth. The best listening range obtained on a small speed ore vessel outside the 100 fathom curve was 4900 yards.

— page 59 —
15 FEB 1943
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FIFTY.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Admiral (Submarines).
    (2) The Admiralty.
    (3) The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD - Report of STCOD War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Additional Data on Attacks Made -
    (Paragraph 7 of Report).

1. The SECOND War Patrol report of the SHAD is forwarded herewith. The report contains valuable information on enemy and neutral shipping which has been passed on to the submarine now in the area concerned. The attention of the commanding officer is directed to digressions from the prescribed paragraphing of reports and to the fact that the report is slightly more voluminous than necessary.

2. The night gun attack on January 4th was well conducted. It has since been learned that both the towing vessel and the ore-laden barge were sunk. It is unfortunate that the gun jam that terminated this action could not be cleared prior to the contact with a similar tow on the night of January 9th. Two torpedoes were wasted on this shallow draft target, when gunfire would probably have sufficed.

3. Attention is invited to the entry in the narrative at 0745, December 30th. Again it is clearly indicated that submerged reception in rough seas is unreliable and that important operational information should be retransmitted on first U.S. schedule after submarines may be expected to be on the surface at night.

4. Inasmuch as the SHAD had knowledge of the presence of two German ore ships in Bilbao on January 22nd she should have made at least three tubes ready for firing immediately upon sighting the NORDFELS at a range of 4800 yards. Once the advantage of position was lost it is questionable whether the expenditure of three torpedoes on an approximately 180° track was warranted against a small target. The action of the commanding officer in watching the target's actions and renewing the attack was correct and aggressive. It has been since ascertained that the target was hit in the vicinity of her screws and was docked in Bilbao for repairs. The performance of the torpedoes was very poor. Of the

— page 60 —
15 FEB 1943
: U.S.S. SHAD - Report of SECOND War Patrol.

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**Subject:**
U.S. CONFIRMATION - BRITISH SECRET

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**Subject:**
U.S.S. SHAD - Report of SECOND War Patrol.

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**Subject:**
5. There is considerable evidence in this report that A/S measures, at least to the extent of searching, are being conducted within and outside Spanish territorial waters. If the Sunderland flying boat reported patrolling of Capes Villano and Machichaco on February 4th was in fact a captured British plane it reproaches a serious breach of neutrality. The use of echo ranging in this area and the possible use of decoys as a support for A/S measures will bear further investigation.

6. A stiffening of demands on neutrals to supply advance and accurate information on shipping in this area would seem prohibitive. If these demands are not complied with it is recommended that a total blockade of Spanish ports be declared.

7. Early delivery of flashless H.E. 3"50 cal. ammunition is hoped for. It is particularly necessary in an area such as the Bay of Biscay.

8. On February 1, after 180 hours of operation, the sound bearing converter of the torpedo data computer became inoperative. It had been operating stiffly for some time. Upon arrival at the Base the chassis was pulled out for inspection. Several parts, including the S.M.A. ber and carriage and balls from the bearing that supports the small bivalve gear of the P2 resolver. Temporary repairs have been effected by the tender and shipment of entire new sound range converter assembly has been requisitioned by air. Ensign Baczenski, attached to Base I, lent skilled assistance in this repair. The casualty is attributed to improper assembly in that the scribe mark of the range resolver was in error by twenty yards at the zero setting. A separate letter will give details. Upon receipt of a new unit assembly the old one will be returned to the Bureau.

9. Foods in the quantity and amounts desired were not available when the SHAD left for patrol. Eggs are now being obtained in quantity from Ireland and special submarine foods are on order from the United States.

— page 61 —
15 FEB 1943
: U.S.S. SHAD - Report of SECOND War Patrol.

10. Periscope pictures taken with motion picture camera will be forwarded to the Admiral (Submarines) and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. Negative will be sent to Commander Submarines, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

11. The following damage was inflicted on the enemy by the SHAD:
    Sunk: Tonnage
    1 towing trawler: 600 tons
    1 ore barge: Undetermined
    Damaged: [damaged text here]
    1 ore vessel (NORDFELS) 1200 tons.

12. The officers and men of the SHAD are to be congratulated on showing a marked aggressive spirit throughout the patrol.

13. Because of the restriction placed on the distribution of U.S. submarine patrol reports by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, it is requested that subordinate commands be furnished with only such extracted information as is considered necessary.

N. S. IVES.

DISTRIBUTION:
The Admiralty
The Admiral (Submarines)
Connaeveu
Cominck (2)
VOpnav
Cincpac
Cinclant
Comsopac
Comsowcspace
Comsubpac
Comsublant (2)
Consubsowcspace

— page 62 —
1
Date: 1
Location (long): 43-54.8 N
Torpedoes Fired: 02-42.4 W
Rounds Fired (Gun): 66 - 360 - 20mm and 1500 - 30 cal.
Hits: 7-20 - 3" hits
Number: 1 - 800 trawler or tug and barge
Sunk (Tonnage): -
Number Damaged or probably sunk: -
Type of Target (Nationality): -
Range 1500: -
Yards or Less: 400-800 yards
Range More Than 1500 Yards: -
Periscope Depth: -
Surface Night: Yes
Deep Submergence: -
Estimated: -
Draft Target: 61 - 101
Torpedo Depth: -
Setting: -
Bow or Stern Shot: -
Track Angle: 80-90
Gyro Angle: 0-10°
Estimate Speed Target: 7-9 knots
Firing Interval: 50 seconds
Spread - Amount and Kind (How applied): -
Fired by T.D.C.:
Remarks: Attack No. 2: Both torpedoes unmistakably passed under target but failed to explode.

ENCLOSURE (A)-1

— page 63 —
3
Date: Jan. 25, 1943
Lat. (Lat.)
Location (Long.)
Torpedoes Fired
Rounds Fired (Gun)
Hits
Number
Sunk (Tonnage)
Number Damaged
or probably sunk
Type of Target
(Nationality)
Range 1500
Yards or less
Range more
Than 1500 Yards
Periscope Depth
Surface Night
Deep Submergence
Estimated
Draft Target
Torpedo Depth
Sctting
Bow or Stern Shot
Bow
Track Angle
Gyro Angle
Estimate Speed Target
Firing Interval
Spread - Amount
and Kind (How applied)
Fired by T.D.C.
Remarks:
One hit on 3rd attack caused small fire on board. One hit
screws on attack No. 5 but failed to explode. Two torpedoes ran with improper angles. Orc angled off 150L in-
stead of straight and one failed to take 150 angle. Sound range 2100 yards, weather clear, calm, slight swell, wind force 2. Enemy returned fire with deck gun and machine guns.

ENCLOSURE (A)-2

— page 64 —
16-3 Serial 0499
Please refer to file: MAR 17 1943
UNITED STATES FLEET
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE
20 GROSVENOR SQUARE
LONDON, W.1

CONFIDENTIAL
From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD - Report of Second War Patrol.

Reference:
(a) Comarveu Conf. 1st End. A16-3 serial 0376 of 27 Feb. 1943 (Forwards Comarveu 50 Conf. serial 011 of 15 Feb. 1943 and subject report).
(b) Comarveu Conf. 1st. A16-3 serial 0482 of 16 March 1943 (Forwards Comarveu 50 Conf. serial 012 of 15 Feb. 1943 SHAD action reports, and Admiral (S) Minutes 443/SM.4341 of 5 March 1943 and 544/SM.4341 of 6 March, 1943).

Enclosure:
(A) Admiral (S) U.S. Confidential Minutes No.SM.4076/838 of 11 March, 1943.

1. Enclosure (A) supplements reports submitted with references (a) and (b).

2. The poor performance of submarine torpedoes is noted and particular attention is invited to the fact that the only torpedo to hit the target did not explode.

H. R. STARK

Copy to:
Comsubron 50
(less enclosure)

— page 65 —
1943, by H.M. Consul, Bilbao, is forwarded with reference to my report of 5th March 1943, No.443/SM.4341 forwarding U.S.S. SHAD's report of Second War Patrol:

x    x    x

"There are various versions of the attack on the iron ore vessel NORDMEL'S, but what really happened appears to be as follows:

"The NORDMEL'S left Bilbao harbour at about 9.30 a.m. on Monday the 25th. Half an hour afterward the LIVADIA followed her. When still only a short distance from here, actually just past Plenica, she was intercepted by a British submarine which fired 4 torpedoes at her missing with the first three, which exploded on the rocks, and scoring a hit on the stern of the vessel with the fourth, which did not explode. This last torpedo, however, broke two of the propeller blades and indented a few of the plates.

"The LIVADIA heard the explosions and turned back. The NORDMEL'S was also able to reach harbour. She was making a little water and is now being unloaded for repairs. The damage is only very slight and she will be ready in a few days."

x    x    x

Rear Admiral

Signed: [Signature]

[Signature]

Rear Admiral

— page 66 —
10.10.8
R.S. No. 4 0369
MAR 22 1943
CONFIDENTIAL
From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. SHAD - SECOND War Patrol.
Reference: (a) Connaveau Conf. ltr. A16-3 serial 0499 of March 17, 1943.
Enclosure: (A) Admiral (S) Secret (U.S. Confidential) Minute SM.4341/86 dated 17 March, 1943.
1. Enclosure (A) supplements the comments contained in or referenced in reference (a).

Copy to:
Comsubron 50
J. G. BRAY, JR.
BY DIRECTION

1943 APR 5
11
08

— page 67 —
20.12.42 to 12.2.43.

From: ADMIRAL (SUBMARINES)
Northwards, London, N.W.3

Date: 17th March 1943

To: THE COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE.
(The Commander, U.S. Submarine Squadron Fifty.)

The following remarks on the Second War Patrol carried out by U.S. Submarine "SHAD" are forwarded in continuation of my minute No.443/3M.4341 of 6th March, 1943.

2. U.S. Submarine "SHAD" carried out an excellent patrol, showing a fine offensive spirit. The Commanding Officer's patrol report is most comprehensive, containing much valuable information.

3. W/T Reception submerged.

This important subject has been dealt with separately in my letter 514/3M.4076 of 3rd March, 1943 (operations against "PHAKOTIS").

4. Information of Movements of Neutral Ships.

This matter has been dealt with in my letter 514/343/840 of 11th March 1943.

5. Sighting and attempted attack on U-Boat - 28th December 1942.

It is noted that U.S. Submarine "SHAD" prepared only two tubes for firing at the supposed U-Boat. In view of the great importance of these targets it is suggested that a full salvo should have been prepared.

Rear Admiral.
ENCLOSURE (A) TO SERIAL No. 0530.

— page 68 —
SS235/A16-3
Serial 046

U.S. CONFIDENTIAL
C-O-N-E-N-T-I-A-L
DECLASSIFIED
By:  The Commanding Officer.
To:  The Commander, Submarine Squadron FIFTY.

Subject:  U.S.S. SHAD - Report of THIRD War Patrol.

Reference:  (a) Subslant Confidential Ltr. No. 6CL-42.
    (b) Consublant Confidential Ltr. A16-3 (6)/(0753) dated
    October 15, 1942.
    (c) Consubron 50 Confidential Ltr. FC5-50/A16(14) serial 061
    dated November 24, 1942.

Enclosure:  (A) Report of War Patrol - U.S.S. SHAD.
    (B) Still camera pictures of merchant shipping.
    (C) Log of vessel sighted.
    (D) Track charts.

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), enclosure (A) is
   forwarded herewith. Enclosure (C) is forwarded to Flag Officer, Submarines
   and Admiralty only. Enclosure (D) is forwarded to Flag Officer, Commanding
   Submarines.

FILMED
48791

— page 69 —
U.S.S. SHAD
Report of 3rd. War Patrol. Period from March 7th to April 12, 1943. Area K.508 (off Bilbao, Spain). Operation orders: C.S.S. 50 4/4-43 of March 4, 1943 F.S.L. 2 of March 1, 1943

PROLOGUE

Arrived Base II, Rosneath, Scotland on February 12, 1943 from Second War Patrol. Commenced refit February 13, 1943, by tender repair force and fifty percent of crew, plus 19 members of the reserve crew. Fifty percent of the crew and one third of the officers on leave at one time. The remainder of the officers and crew standing the duty every other day. Completed refit on March 3, 1943. The work of the tender repair force was excellent considering the somewhat limited facilities of the U.S.S. BEAVER for tending a fleet submarine. Officers and crew thoroughly enjoyed their leave and liberty. Space part and supply problem improved over the condition existing upon departure for the second patrol. Ship demped. Ship's call lookouts trained on Lookout Training Table at H.M.S. FORTH. Two days of intensive submerged and surface training.

HARVATIVE

In following narrative contacts are not mentioned unless significant because of very large number involved. Approaches were made for either identification and possible attack on all contacts other than fishing vessels contacts.

March 7
11,000 - Underway from the CLYDE area in company with the U.S.S. HERRING and escort vessel the H.L.I.S. LACARTICIENSE.

March 8
1300 - Conducted firing of deck gun, 20 mm. and .30 cal. 1800 - Arrived at a point 7 miles north of Round Island, Scilly Isles. Escort left formation. Commenced proceeding independently on course 250 degrees(t) submerged to assigned area via route "GREEN". Running on surface at night. Advance 160 miles a day.

March 9
Between 2130 and 2300 sighted about eighteen fishing vessels engaged in fishing on Great Sole Bank.

March 11
2105 - Passed through Lat: 45°-01' (N), Long: 12°-54' (W) as directed by Captain (S) 3 desp. 1509A/7.

March 12
0614 - In Lat: 44°-33'(N) Long: 09°-38'(W) dove to avoid aircraft detected coming in fast by radar. Remained submerged as beginning of morning twilight was only a short time away.

March 13
0555 - In Lat: 44°-27'(N), Long: 06°-12'(W) dove to avoid aircraft detected coming in fast by radar. Remained submerged as morning twilight began at 0603. 2355 - Radar contact on plane which did not approach closer than six miles.

Enclosure (A)

— page 71 —
0608 - Submerged. Lat: 45°-18'(N), Long: 06°-07'(W).
1236 - Decoded Cinc Plymouth 1009A/18 assigning new position Lat: 45°-27'(N), Long: 03°-10'(W). To use best sustained speed enroute.
1240 - Ready to surface but SD radar needed adjustment. Decided to adjust prior to surfacing.
1306 - Radar adjusted - ready to surface but sighted what was apparently a plane flying over area. (Aircraft contact #3).
1310 - All clear by radar and periscope - surfaced on course 080 degrees(t) and went ahead flank speed (18 knots). Heavy surface haze - visibility (7).
1337 - Sighted vessel bearing 060 degrees(t) - range about four miles - submerged - Battle Stations - vessel identified as small steam trawler. (Fishing vessel contact #57).
1410 - Surfaced and went ahead at 18 knots.
1620 - Ordered not to proceed further east than Long: 04°-00'(W) unless in contact with enemy. (CINC Plymouth 1229A/18).
1711 - Radar contact on plane (19 miles) Lat: 45°-16'(N), Long: 04°-45'(W).
1830 - Enemy (still do not have information as to type) reported in Lat: 44°-50'(N), Long: 19°-20'(W). ??????? at 1647Z/18. Standing by to be "homed" by aircraft.
1913 - Decoded Cinc Plymouth 1822A/18 which stated that it is considered that better position of enemy to be Lat: 45°-05'(N), Long: 04°-20'(W). Set course 095 degrees(t) to intercept assumed 15 knot enemy.
1914 - Enemy merchant vessel reported on course 090 degrees(t), Lat: 44°-50'(N), Long: 04°-20'(W) by HS521 (four groups of this message would not break).
1930 - Decoded Cinc Plymouth 1847A/18 advising enemy course 091 degrees(t), speed 10.5 knots, and for SHAD not to cross the 100 fathom curve.
1931 - Commenced search from the flank at 18 knots for enemy course 060 to 125 degrees(T). Heavy surface haze. Visibility (5) up moon - visibility (3) in all other sectors. Sea smooth - no swell. "Homing" would have been in valuable.

March 19
0020 - Decoded Cinc Plymouth 2315A/18 directing SHAD to proceed to patrol area K508 if not in contact with enemy by 0300.
0100 - Completed search from flank for all enemy courses between 060 - 125 degrees(T) for initial enemy positions; and for enemy courses of 080 to 110 degrees (T) from position ten miles south to fifteen miles southwest of initial position.
0300 - Completed station patrol for enemy positions twenty to twenty five miles west of initial position and ten miles either side of latitude 45°-05'(N). Went ahead full speed, 16 knots on course 165 degrees (T), enroute regular patrol station.
0605 - Lat: 44°-06'(N), Long: 03°-12'(W). Submerged.
0620 - Decoded Cinc Plymouth 0457A/19 advising that S.S. KAULDI ready for sea at 1855A/18. Information received to locate to intercept.
Enclosure (A)

— page 72 —
210  Closed coast and took up patrol off Cape Machichaco - Villano headland.
: 2215 - Received FOS 212A/19 advising that S.S. KAULDI and LIVABIA had sailed from BILBAO about 0005A/19.

March 20
: 1221 - Sighted Spanish steamer on easterly course. (Contact #25). Made identification approach. Identified by name on side as S.S. ALEJANDRO - BILBAO (slight doubt as to exact spelling of name). Estimated tonnage to be well over 2500 tons - unreported.
: 2313 - Sighted and made identification approach on surface to within three miles (bright moonlight precluded closer approach) on vessel on easterly course showing illuminated Spanish colors. (Contact #28). No vessel reported eastbound tonight - tonnage about 2500 to 3000.

March 21
: 1215 - "contact #30. Made identification approach on S.S. SERATES (3559 tons). Vessels movements unreported. This might be same vessel sighted eastbound the previous night.

March 22
: 0215 - Advised that S.S. BALDUR arrived BILBAO on nineteenth and started loading. The arrival of this vessel and the departure of KAULDI and LIVADIA strengthens belief that armed trawlers are escorting vessels to BILBAO, arriving about midnight with immediate turnabout, escorting loaded ore vessel(s) to FRANCE on return voyage. From previous intelligence it appears that lately these arrivals and departures take place about every fifth to seventh night.
: 2230 - Decoded FOS 2216A/22 advising of thr arrival of two small German ore vessels, the BORDSEE and SFERBEANT at BILBAO on the twenty-second. These vessels most probably arrived during the night of 22-23 March, when full moon and very high visibility conditions precluded close patrol of shipping lanes. Also advised that BALDUR expected to complete loading on 26th.

March 23
: 0415 - Received FOS 2219A/22. No convoy passed BILBAO.

March 24
: 1219 - Aircraft contact #11. (Enemy plane making flight over Spanish waters.)
: 1815 - Decoded FOS 1737A/24 changing patrol area to K-505 (south of Latitude 44° N.). Commenced clearing coast on course 345° at six knots submerged.
: 2020 - Surfaced forty-five minutes before end of evening twilight and set course for new patrol area at 15 knots, then 17 knots and finally 18 knots as engines came off charge. Diving by day to avoid being sighted.

Enclosure (A)

— page 73 —
0858 - Aircraft Contact #12.
: 1522 - Aircraft Contact #13.
: 2230 - Arrived in area K-505 in Lat:43°51'(N).
Commenced patrolling in eastern section of area.

: 1655 - Decoded POS 15334/26 directing return to K-508; principal objective interception of enemy ore traffic from BILBAO. Changed course to 100° (T). Upon surfacing in evening commenced proceeding at 15 knots to BILBAO, investigating shipping encountered enroute.

: 1048 - Received POS0958A/27 advising of departure of S.S. BALDUR and KAULDI at 0015.

: 0015 - Arrived in area K-508 in Lat:43°37'(N).
: 0219 - Arrived in patrol area off Cape Machichaco.
: 2040 - Advised that S.S. BORDSEE and SPERBEANT left BILBAO at 0100 March 25th. SHAD patrolling in area K-505 (POS 1737A/24).

Continued patrol in close vicinity of Spanish coast with three to six miles radius from Cape Machichaco Light. RUGBY went off the air at 1655A/30. Unable to copy WHITEHALL schedules on 51 kcs while submerged as this frequency is outside of range of variable tuning condenser in antenna system.

: 2315 - Decoded POS 1122A/31 directing SHAD at best surface speed to intercept enemy forcaion of one merchant ship and three destroyers reported by aircraft at 1013 in Lat:44°03'(N), Long:070°32'(W), 12 knots, course 070°(T). SHAD's position: Lat:43°34'(N), Long:020°45'(W). 2317 - Set course 000°T, full speed, 17 knots.
: 2335 - Decoded POS123A/31, reporting that enemy's formation consists of one merchant ship and four destroyers on course 080°(T), speed 17 knots at 1113A/31. Due to late receipt of this message, because of inability to copy 51 kcs submerged, will be able to intercept west of 100 fathom curve only, if enemy is further westward than reported or if actual speed is fourteen knots or less. Set course 020°(T).

: 0030 - Directed by POS 2326A/31 to return to patrol in areas K-507 and K-508, if enemy is not intercepted by 0100A/1. (time of arrival of enemy at 100 fathom curve at 17 knots.) 0220 - Lat:44°11'(N), Long:020°32.5'(W), Made radar contact on two vessels of enemy formation bearing 330°(T), range 11,350 yards.
During the ensuing one hour and twenty minutes maneuvered to attain favorable attack position steering various courses at speeds of from 18 to 19½ knots. Presence of two lighted vessels in area, apparently trawlers, who were making an estimated 14 knots and appeared to be attempting to close SHAD, and an enemy course change of fifty-five degrees away to 035°(T) delayed attack. Enemy speed 15 knots.

(5) Enclosure (A)

— page 74 —
1. Fire approach and attack conduct by radar ranges and radar precision bearings - very dark night - no horizon except faint one to the northwest - water highly phosphorescent. Enemy course change, and relative high speed of enemy formation made attainment our position ahead of enemy out of the question with only three hours until the beginning of morning twilight and the close proximity of the 100 fathom curve and the French coast. During the approach all five targets were clearly detected by radar at range of about 9000 yards. Merchant ship made distinctly larger "pip" on screen, and was screened by the four destroyers stationed on port and starboard bow and quarter, forming very close inner anti-submarine screen.

0339 - Attain position on starboard quarter of formation - front left flank screen, merchant ship, and rear right flank screen practically in line - range to rear right flank destroyer 2000 yards - making full power in endeavor to close range and better track - but realized that could not delay firing much longer as our large, highly phosphorescent bow wave should have been sighted before this. Can now faintly make out rear left flank destroyer. 0342 - Commenced firing bow tubes as rear left flank destroyer now made out to be heading for SHAD on apparent collision course. Average gyro angle 11° left - using one and one half degrees spread to obtain heavy-density spread on the three ships in line in formation.

0342-40 (about) Completed firing bow tubes - right full rudder. Lat: 34°-37.4'N, Long: 02-18'W Six torpedoes fired. 0343 - Two terrific explosions on rear right flank destroyer, and rear left flank destroyer were hit one to two seconds apart and sank practically immediately. Smoke from explosions rose like curtains two to three hundred feet into the air and overlapping each other, covered what appeared to be a distance of 800 to 1200 yards. Two targets disappeared from radar screen and never subsequently reappeared. Destroyer which was seen on collision course had run into destroyer - (fortunately) - the rear right flank destroyer was believed to have changed course right just prior to or immediately after firing first torpedo.

0344 - (about) Two more torpedoes exploded at about seven to fifteen second interval. (Proper run to merchant ship).

0345 (about) - Another torpedo explosion. (Proper run to front left flank destroyer.)

0346-20 (about) - Fired two torpedoes from after tube nest - using new set-up on TDC obtained by radar on merchant ship. Range indicated this ship might have been slowed by torpedo hit and, or might have changed course right following movement of front right flank destroyer who apparently about this time came about and subsequently chased SHAD.

Enclosure (A)

— page 75 —
1 (Cont'd)
Kept changing course in small increments to keep nearest enemy vessel astern.
0350 - Heard loud explosion.
0351 - (about) - Heard explosion.
0354 - Heard explosion. Did not sound like an "end of run" explosion or depth charge. Destroyer overtaking at 3700 yards.
0357 - Heard explosion. Did not sound like an "end of run" explosion or depth charge. Opening range slowly on destroyer, drawing away at full power. Although range rate was not checked, the Executive Officer on the radar equipment noticed that the range to the merchant ship and third destroyer believed hit did not indicate that these vessels were moving away at a relative speed of about thirty knots (presumption that they had been hit at stopped), and secondly that they appeared to disappear from radar screen at a smaller range then was to be expected.
0415 (about) - Pursuing destroyer faded out from radar screen at about 8000 yards. Continuing withdrawal at full power on course 200°(T). Close proximity of 100 fathom curve, short time to the beginning of morning twilight and presence of one undamaged destroyer caused decision not to attempt to close enemy again to ascertain damage done and renew attack.
0518 - Submerged in Lat:44°-12'N, Long:02°-37'W) and set course of 2150°(T). ESTIMATE OF SITUATION: Enemy will reason that attacking submarine came from BILBAO area because (A): short distance to that area; (b):knowledge that an Allied submarine has been operating in that area; he will conduct determined anti-submarine measures in that area. DECISION To patrol in area K-507 for three or four days or until intelligence is received that enemy ore vessels are loading in BILBAO.
April 2
Patrolling in area K-507 in shipping lanes.
2330 - Received instructions for leaving patrol.(FOB 021107).
April 4
0200 - Set cloaks to zone (-2).
2235 - Commenced withdrawal from patrol enroute Base II, Rosneath.
April 11
0805 - Rendered with U.S.S. HERRING and escort vessel H.M.S. HONEYSUCKLE and proceed to Clyde area arriving April 12.
2. WEATHER.
The weather was very good during the entire patrol. No unusual weather was encountered.
3. TIDAL INFORMATION
No unusual tidal conditions were noted.
4. AIDS TO NAVIGATION.
All aids were as listed on charts and pertinent publications.
(7) Aclosure (A)

— page 76 —
5. ENEMY WARSHIPS OR MERCHANT VESSELS SIGHTED.

The merchant with four escorting destroyers reported by FOS was contacted by radar at 0220 April first in Lat:40-20(W), Long:02-29(W). Course 090(T), speed 15 knots. The merchant ship was apparently a 7000 to 10,000 ton blockade runner. This is formation that was successfully attacked. Very dark and overcast night kept any of these vessels from being sighted except one destroyer - the details of which could not be made out but it appeared to be large NARVIK class to one of the lookouts.

6. AIRCRAFT SIGHTED.

| NO | TYPE  | TIME | DATE    | POSITION    | VISUALLY |
|----|-------|------||||
| 1  | SUNDERLAND | 1820 | 3-8    | 50°08' (N), 06°20' (W) |          |
| 1  | DORNIER | 18-K | 1025    | 45°12' (N), 06°02' (W) |          |
| 1  | FW187  | 1219 | 3-24    | 43°30' (N), 02°51' (W) |          |
| 3  | 0000  | 0858 | 3-25    | 45°55' (N), 06°35' (W) |          |
| 1  | FW187  | 1522 | 3-25    | 43°53' (N), 06°52' (W) |          |

BY RADAR

| DATE  | TIME | RANGE (Miles) | POSITION    |
|-------|------|||
| 3-10  | 0240 | 9-23          | 49°13' (N), 12°42' (W) |
| 3-12  | 0610 | 15-8          | 44°33' (N), 09°42' (W) |
| 3-13  | 0555 | 17-4          | 44°27' (N), 06°11' (W) |
| 3-13  | 2355 | 17-6          | 44°15' (N), 04°55' (W) |
| 3-17  | 0945 | 18-7          | 45°11' (N), 06°04' (W) |
| 3-18  | 0012 | 27-13         | 45°13' (N), 06°02' (W) |
| 3-18  | 1711 | 19-15         | 45°15' (N), 04°53' (W) |
| 4-7   | 0620 | 22-18         | 44°11' (N), 12°16' (W) |
| 4-8   | 0120 | 20-12         | 46°40' (N), 12°26' (W) |
| 4-9   | 0235 | 18-14         | 48°52' (N), 12°22' (W) |

7. PARTICULARS OF ATTACK.

Attack #1:
Number of torpedoes fired: 1
Firing Interval: 1
Point of Aim: 1

Track Angle: 1

Six (6) bow- Two (2) stern tube.
Eight (8) seconds.
Blockade runner in center of formation, which was just about in line with rear right flank screen.
(a) - As only one ship was sighted prior to firing exact tracks not known.
(b) - Rear left flank destroyer (sighted) was hit by torpedo at about a 095°(s) track.
(c) - Rear right flank on about a 115°(s) track.
(d) - TDC angle on merchant ship and third destroyer:
Bow tubes - 133°Starboard.
Stern tubes - 140°Starboard (actual track believed less see narrative).
Enclosure (A)

— page 77 —
7. PARTICULARS OF ATTACK. (Cont'd).

Estimated Draft of Target:
Torpedo performance:
Result of Attack:
Evidence of Sinkings:

Merchant ship - 25 feet.
Destroyers - 10 - 12 feet.
Excellent - all firing was done on surface at full power.
Five to six hits on ships of formation.
Two destroyers were seen to be blown out of the water, and two of the large "pips" on SJ radar screen disappeared right after the two destroyers were hit, and never reappeared. No positive evidence that the merchant ship sank, but judging by the number of hits made, the inability of the destroyers to take a magnetic explosion, the numerous explosions heard after firing - some of which could not have been and of run explosions - it is felt very likely that the merchant ship and third destroyer sank.

8. ENEMY MEASURES.
None observed.

9. ENEMY MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS.
None observed.

10. MAJOR DEFECTS EXPERIENCED.
No major defects or casualties of any but the slightest nature.

11. RADIO RECEPTION:
Very good to excellent on surface - very good submerged on loop on 16 kcs, down to sixty-two feet keel depth during the calm weather that prevailed 90% of the patrol - fair from 62-64 feet during same period. It appears necessary to be on such a course that periscope shears are not in line with geographical location of transmitter.

Impossible to copy on 51.5 kcs submerged because of fact that antenna variable tuning coupling condenser has only a range from 15-35 kcs.

The CRIGGION broadcast on 16 kcs. were an average of signal strength three (3) as compared to RUGBY's strength four (4).

The reception of aircraft signals on the vertical antenna while ship was submerged was very good to excellent. (3980 kcs.)

No homing precedence was received although aircraft had one excellent opportunity. Always tuned for its use while on the surface.

(9) Enclosure (.)

— page 78 —
12. SOUND CONDITION AND DENSITY LAYERS:

Sound conditions ranged from bad to poor inside of 100 fathom curve and from poor to fair outside this curve. No density layers were encountered.

: 13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY.

The general health of the crew was excellent. This is partially attributable, it is believed, to the more general use of the sun lamp and greater amnistration of vitamin capsules than obtained on any previous patrol. The absence of any marked cases of constipation is particularly noteworthy. The oral hygiene of the crew has shown much improvement over last patrol.

The habitability of the ship was excellent.

: 14. MILES STEAMED.

| Surface | 5971.7 |
| --- | --- |
| Submerged | 1070.4 | 33 days | 506 hours |
| TOTAL | 14901.3 |

: 15. FUEL OIL EXPENDED.

| 49,820 gallons. |

: 16. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING:

| | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Terpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Fresh water | Personnel |
| 16 | 37,580 gallons | 35 days | 32 days | 20 days |

: 17. None. Patrol terminated by orders.

: 18. REMARKS.

1. There was a grand total of 904 contacts, of which 102 were merchant ships and 802 were fishing vessels.

2. The value of the S.J. and S.D. radar equipment was never more manifest than on this patrol. The S.J. radar performed in a highly satisfactorily manner throughout the patrol. Only by its use could the successful attack on April first been possible. The performance of the S.D. radar was excellent at all times.

3. This was the first patrol on which considerable quantities of fresh frozen meat were not lost through spoilage. This is directly attributable to the painstaking and conscientious personal attention of the Squadron Medical Officer, Lieutenant Commander C.H.C. SMITH, (MC), U.S.N.R., who inspected each item of meat before it was placed in the chill room.

4. All machinery and equipment continued to function in the highly creditable manner which has characterized previous patrols, and part of the credit is due to the excellent work of overhauling accomplished by the tender repair force of the U.S.S. BEAVER.

5. The performance of duty of Lieutenant-Commdr O.C. ROBBINS, USN, Executive Officer, and Lieutenant S.L. JOHNSON, USN, Gunnery Officer, during the action on April first was especial commendable and will be made the subject of future correspondence.

Enclosure (A)

(10)

— page 82 —
26. 3-20 : 43-30 : 02-29 : 5000 : 255: 160 : 6kts: 1220 : Blue hull, straight bow, counter stern, long fore-castle, well deck with mast & boom, high bridge structure with stack aft of bridge. Two boats. Two caps-tans on poop, 240' in length, 1800 tons app.

27. 3-20 : 43-41 : 02-42 : 10000 : 152: 090 : 21L42 : Sighted lights of vessel.

28. 3-20 : 43-37 : 02-45 : 6000 : 220: 090 : 9kt: 2313 : Sighted lights of vessel (app. 2500-3000 tones). Flying Spanish colors colors (illum.) 3 island steamer, medium size bridge, straight bow, counter stern, heavily loaded. Minimast in middle of after-wall deck, foremost aft, break on forecastle, stack directly aft of bridge. Kadarcontact at 17,500 yds.

29. 3-21 : 43-34 : 02-46 : 137: - : 0010 : Sighted ship's lights.

30. 3-21 : 43-32 : 02-53: 2500 : 117: 270 : 7kts:1215 : Conventional Spanish vessel, 3 island type, 35 00 tons, straight bow, counter stern, Spanish colors painted on bow and stern. Type - mast, bridge, ventilator, stack, mast king-post. Took still pictures. Exp.#4,5. Roll #2. S.S. SERANTES, BILBAO.

31. 3-21 : 43-28 : 4000 : 121: 270 : 6kts: 1250 : Small Spanish coastal vessel, 3 island type, 1000 tons, straight bow, counter stern. Ty- mast, bridge, mast, stack, two sets of colors on side (Spanish).

(4) Enclosure (c)

— page 83 —
32. : 3-21 : 43-30 : 02-50 : 8000 : 123 : 270 : 10kts: 1800: Small Spanish coaster, black hull, foremost white dark short mainmast, white superstructure, 800 tons, hull red below water line, high forecastle, long low stern, foremast on forecastle. Spanish colors flying from stern.

33. : 3-21 : 43-41 : 02-47 : 20000 : 183 : 270 : 2210: Sighted lights of vessel (possibly S.S. ALEJANDRO) stood by BILBAO on north- ly course at 0000.

34. : 3-21 : 43-30 : 02-50 : 6000 : 105 : 2kts: 1935: Medium size sailing ships (2).

35. : 3-21 : 43-41 : 02-59 : 26000 : 183 : 090 : 2312: Sighted lights of medium size steamer.

36. : 3-21 : 43-41 : 02-54 : 24000 : 172 : 180 : 2330: Two (2) small coastal steamers.

37. : 3-21 : 43-30 : 02-51 : 10000 : 070 : 275 : 10kt: 1253: Small coastal vessel, single island type, black hull, white superstructure, black stack amidships, 1200 tons. Spanish colors.

38. : 3-21 : 43-29 : 02-62 : 6000 : 317 : 090 : 8kt: 1310: Small coastal vessel, 3 island type, stack and bridge amidships, black white superstructure, 1000 tons.

39. : 3-21 : 43-29 : 02-51 : 18000 : 122 : 090 : 7kts: 1316: Heavily laden vessel, 3 island type, stack and bridge amidships, two masts, heading for BILBAO.

(5) : Enclosure (c)

— page 85 —
0
DESCRIPTION OF VESSELS
SIGHTED OTHER THAN
FISHING VESSELS (CONT'D)

No.: DATE: LAT & DIST: LONG: ANCE (YDS): BRG: COURSE: SPEED: TIME:

— page 86 —
60. 3-26 43-55 4000 320 090 0900 'Small coastal steamer .1000 tons.
: 61. 3-27 43-50 05-06 10000 136 West 10kts 0521 Spanish coaster .1500 tons. Illum.
: 62. 3-27 43-12 04-49 6000 135 280 7kts 0823 Spanish coaster. 700-900 tons.
: 63. 3-27 43-40 07-27 6000 258 090 9kts 1601 Spanish tanker. 2000 tons. (Not reported in ships movements.)
: 64. 3-27 43-40 04-20 6000 196 090 9kts 1901 Small ore vessel. 700 tons. Identity unknown and description unobtainable due to greatness of range.
: 65. 3-27 43-38 04-18 4000 135 270 7kt 2135 Lights of small coastal steamer.
: 66. 3-27 43-38 04-18 6000 138 280 7kts 2135 Lights of small coastal steamer.
: 67. 3-27 43-38 03-56 6000 127 270 8kts 2342 Spanish coastal vessel. Illuminated Spanish colors aft.
: 68. 3-28 43-36 02-47 12000 161 270 0226 Illuminated Spanish coaster. 1500 tons. Stood past BILBAO.

(8) Enclosure (c)

— page 90 —
5 0260
FC5-50/A16
Serial 047
c/o Fleet Post Office,
New York, New York.

U.S. CONFIDENTIAL - BRITISH SECRET
April 13, 1943.

C-O-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FIFTY.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Admiral (Submarines).
(2) The Admiralty.
(3) The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Subject: U.S.S. SEAD - Report of THIRD War Patrol.

Inclosure: (A) Track Charts (to Admiral (Submarines) only).

1. The report of the THIRD War Patrol of the SEAD is forwarded herewith. The duration of the patrol was thirty-seven days of which twenty-three were spent on station.

2. The material condition of the SAD upon arrival was excellent.

3. It is extremely gratifying that after so many comparatively fruitless patrols in the Bay area an opportunity to inflict major damage on the enemy presented itself. The SEAD took full advantage of this opportunity, making aggressive and intelligent use of radar and fire control equipment, to obtain the maximum effect from her armament. This attack demonstrates, as has been done before by our submarine in the Pacific, the tremendous possibilities inherent in the flat-troop submarine when such use is made of surface speed, radar, T.D.C., and sound equipment. Much credit is also due to the operations personnel and to the units of the Hinnetton Coastal Command who made possible the interception of such an important convoy.

4. Again there is evidence of German air patrols in side Spanish territorial waters and lack of information on Spanish shipping.

5. It is noted that nine explosions were heard. It is possible that at least two of these were and of run explosions and one or two were internal explosions from the destroyer escorts sunk.

48791 FILMED

— page 91 —
6. A well done to commanding officer, officers, and crew of the S.H.A.D, who are belicved to have inflicted the following damage on the enemy:

Sunk - 2 destroyer-type escorts.
Probably sunk - 1 8000 to 10,000-ton AK, loaded.

The matter of awards will be made the subject of separate correspondence.

7. Because of the restriction placed on the distribution of U.S. submarine patrol reports by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, it is requested that subordinate commands be furnished with only such extracted information as is considered necessary.

N. S. IVES.

DISTRIBUTION:
The Admiralty
The Admiral (Submarines).
Commcvcu
Comlnch (2)
VOpncv
Cinepac
Cinclant
Comsopsc
Comsowcspsc
Comsubpse
Comsublant (2)
Consubcowcspsc.

— page 92 —
0242
Date: April 1, 1943
Lat. (Lat.): 44 - 37 N.
Location (Long): 02 - 18 W.
Torpedoes Fired: 5 or 6
Mits:
Number Believed: 2 DD Escorts
Sunk:
Number Damaged or Probably Sunk: 1 DD Escort and 1 A (8000-10000-ton)
Type of Target (Nationality): German
Range More Than 1500 Yards: 1700-3000
Surface Height: Yes (19.5 knots own speed) Usinr only radar ranges and bearings and TDC
Estimated Draft: 10-12 Feet DD
Torpedo Depth Setting: 25 Feet AK
Bow or Stern Shot: 2 feet
Track Angle: 6° 00' and 2 stern
O'ro Angle: 170° left to 90° left
Estimated Speed Target: 16 knots
Miring Interval: 3 seconds
Spread - Amount: 0
and Kind (How applied) Divergent 1/3
Fired by T. H. C. Yes

Remarks:
Intense darkness and pursuit by 4th destroyer prevented ascertaining total distance but accuracy of data used (radar ranges and bearings, mooring board solution, large number of explosions heard, and radar evidence after firing) indicate estimated results are correct.
Point of Aim: Blockade runner in center of formation which was just about in line with right rear destroyer.
Tracks: As only one ship was sighted just prior to firing exact tracks were unknown.
Torpedo Performance: Excellent, all firing was done on the surface at full power.
Evidence of sinking: Two destroyers were seen to be blown out of the water, and two of the large "pipes" on the S1 Radar screen disappeared right after the two destroyers were hit and never reappeared. No positive evidence that the merchant ship sank but judging by the number of hits made, the inability of the destroyers to take a man- netic explosion, the numerous explosions, it is felt likely that the merchant ship and third destroyer sank.
Evasive Tactics: Kept pursuing destroyer astern while making full power.

— page 94 —
16-3
Please refer Serial 0814
to file: 1ST ENDORSEMENT TO:
Consubron 50 serial (047)
of April 13, 1943.

UNITED STATES FLEET
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE
20 GROSVENOR SQUARE
LONDON, W.1
APR 21 1943

CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. SHAD - Report of THIRD War Patrol.

---

The attack showed these destroyers to be escorting the merchant ship. The Admiralty states positively that no other destroyers then those four have been in that area for a considerable period of time.

10. Admiralty offers a possible explanation that some of the SHAD's torpedoes exploded in wakes of, or for some reason beyond lethal distance from their targets, and in this connection attention is invited to reference (b). Admiralty has positive information that Italian magnetic torpedoes fired at British ships have exploded in the wake. Similar failures with British torpedoes have been experienced.

11. In view of the foregoing this Command will make no announcement regarding this engagement.

12. The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe is much impressed by the SHAD's approach and attack on this blockade runner and its strong escort group. It was a well conducted aggressive action with a fine display of offensive spirit and cool courage. The Commanding Officer, officers and men of the SHAD are commended on the basis of the action taken, even though the results were disappointing. The matter of rewards will be considered upon receipt of recommendations from the Squadron Commander.

---

| Date Rec'd | Art. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
||------|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Oper.      |      |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Asst. Oper. |      |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Commr.      |      |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Engr.       |      |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Sqn. Sec.   |      |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Commn.      |

Copy to:
Consubrant (with 1 copy basic report)
Consubron 50 (less basic report)
CO USS SHAD " " " "

-2-

— page 95 —
2315B, March 31st, 1843, while engaged in conducting a routine patrol in an assigned area off BILBAO, SPAIN, orders were received to intercept an enemy formation consisting of one inward-bound blockade runner escorted by four destroyers. The enemy's position, course and speed as reported by aircraft at 1013 was given as Latitude 44-03 (N), Longitude 07-32 (W), speed 12 knots on course 070 degrees true. This information was not received until this late time because of the inability of the submarine to copy 51 kcs. submerged.

At this time the SHAD was in close vicinity to Cape Machachacao near BILBAO. An estimate of the situation revealed that a successful search from the flank for enemy course between 050 and 090 approximately might be made for the given enemy speed and course north was set at 17 knots.

At 2335 information was received correcting the enemy's course and speed to 080 degrees true, 17 knots. If this information was correct as to speed, it was apparent that the enemy could not be intercepted prior to reaching the one hundred fathom curve off the coast of FRANCE. The commanding officer therefore decided to set such a course so as to intercept the enemy if by chance the initial position might have been in error to the eastward, or the speed less. Under these circumstances, it might be possible to intercept shortly before he reached the one hundred fathom curve. It would also be possible to intercept him if the initial position was correct but speed was fourteen knots or less. Set course 020 degrees true.

The night was very dark, there was no horizon visible except a very small faint one covering only a few degrees of arc to the northwest and it was realised that the most probable manner in which the enemy would be sighted, if at all, would be by the phosphorescent bow waves or wakes. The SJ radar (directional with range feature) would have to be relied upon almost exclusively to make initial contact and attack. The sea was calm with slight swell. Wind 3-5 knots.

The best estimate of the probable time of contact if the original enemy position was correct and providing he was making fourteen knots was 0230.

— page 96 —
0220, two very definite radar contacts were made on relative bearing 330 degrees - range 11,350 yards. Commenced tracking by radar to obtain course and speed, using Torpedo Data Computer and Mooring Board. Enemy course 035 degrees, true, speed 15 knots, was readily and quickly ascertained and checked. No visual contact had yet been made. In the general area at this same time were two fishing boats that appeared to be large trawlers, showing proper running lights and about this time made a course change which at their estimated 14 knots (iron radar plot) were close to a collision course with the SHAD. It was thought likely that these might be enemy anti-submarine vessels. During the next five to ten minutes, effort was made to work around these trawlers to obtain a position ahead of the enemy formation, but this was unsuccessful as each time that the SHAD changed course the trawlers apparently changed course to close enemy formation. While attempting to work around them, the radar was temporarily used to track the trawlers, and when the enemy formation was again picked up by radar, the information did not check with previous data and it was discovered that the enemy had made a change away of about 60 degrees to a new course of 035 degrees true, thus placing the SHAD well back on the starboard quarter of the formation - enemy still invisible in the dark night.

Went ahead at emergency speed (20 knots plus) to close enemy. During this period of time the radar was in constant use in checking the setup on the T.D.G. and mooring board solution of the enemy formation course and speed. The close proximity of the one hundred fathom curve made it mandatory to make attack at earliest possible moment and precluded the possibility of being able to work up ahead of the formation. Tubes were made ready and a collision course was set by use of the radar data which was now being used in "precision" (accurate to 5°) for bearings. During this approach all five vessels of the formation had been picked up by radar and from the bearing and range of each unit, it could be seen that the enemy blockade runner was being protected by having a destroyer on each bow and quarter at 900 to 1000 yards off the blockade runner's track.

The approach was continued at emergency speed and having arrived at a point 2000 yards from rear starboard screen, the port lookout sighted the rear part of the silhouette of the left rear escort. All information was verified by radar. Although it was realized that the enemy should shortly sight the SHAD, it was decided to hang on until the last possible moment to obtain the constantly improving track angle. The radar was used to give immediate warning of the movements of any of the escorts that might make a movement that would indicate sighting. However, it is felt that the enemy considered themselves "home" and were tired after a long day of eluding the Coastal Command planes and running through the Bay, and were keeping an ineffectual

— page 97 —
1. At about this time a course charge of the port rear escort to the right indicated that she had sighted SHAD or was supplied. It was now on never. A final radar precision bearing of the center of the formation (blockade runner) was put into the T.D.C. and all bow tubes fired with a spread which was calculated to give the thickest coverage of torpedoes through the center of the formation and cover the target and two of the escort vessels. After completion the firing of the bow tubes, a turn away of about 180 degrees was made, the D.C. setup was fed a new range and precision radar bearing to the nearest enemy and three at a time were fired. The escort vessel was then picked up by radar closer SHAD at about 17 knots, although still no vessels except the left rear escort had been sighted at any time. After the explosion of five of the bow tube torpedoes, two of the five previously very pronounced targets on the radar screen disappeared and never subsequently reappeared.

By use of the radar, successful surface withdrawal was made from the one escort (apparently right bow escort) which was searching for SHAD. This was accomplished by running at 20 knots and constantly changing course to keep the enemy dead astern. This pursuing destroyer was sighted momentarily against the previously mentioned small patch of horizon that was visible, range 3,700 yards. Twenty-seven minutes after firing, successful retirement had been accomplished - unfortunately this chase totally precluded the possibility of making a second attack on the formation until they were well within the one hundred fathom curve of Bordeaux.

This attack could not have been conducted with any good probability of success without the use of radar -- the commanding officer on the bridge never saw the enemy formation except the left rear escort just prior to firing.

The following points of interest are enunciated below:

(a) It is improbable that the enemy would have been located except through the use of the radar.
(b) If the only means of locating the enemy formation on a dark night of the type he had been by lookouts, it is highly probable that the contact would have been at such close range that a successful attack could not have been carried out because of the suddenness of which the enemy would have been encountered.
(c) By use of the radar and radar alone was contact able to be maintained.
(d) The accurate information as to course and speed could have only been obtained by use of the radar.
(e) The type of formation could have only been ascertained by radar plot.
(f) Successful retirement on the surface was made not a "hit or miss" proposition by the use of the radar.

— page 99 —
963/SM-4341
SUBJECT: U.S. NAVAL WAR PATROL
COMMANDER: U.S. NAVAL WAR PATROL
(Copy to: Commander, U.S. Submarine Squadron 50)

Forwarded for information.

2. U.S.S. SHAD was employed on anti-bloated runner and ore trade patrol in the Bay of Biscay.

3. On the night of 31st March/1st April 1943, U.S.S. SHAD arrived out an attack on an inward bound blockade runner, believed to be the PIETRO ORSEOLO, escorted by 4 Narvik Class destroyers. The choice of interception course and skilful use of R.D.F. resulted in a magnificent attack which speaks volumes for the efficiency of the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander F.J. MacGregor, U.S. Navy, and his company in U.S.S. SHAD. It is regretted that it is not possible to substantiate the most understandable claims made. Air reconnaissance and intelligence have indicated that the blockade runner was severely damaged by torpedoes, lost a proportion of her cargo, but reached port. The escorts appear to have been undamaged. It is not possible to say with any certainty why the remaining explosions took place, but it may be there was some failure of the magnetic pistols of the torpedoes.

4. U.S.S. SHAD's attack was the confounding episode in the long and tedious patrols carried out in the Bay of Biscay by the submarines of U.S. Squadron 50. In my opinion this is one of the most gallant and outstanding attacks I have heard of for a long time.

5. Any remarks found necessary in regard to special points raised will be forwarded separately to the authorities concerned.

Northway, London, N.W. 3
1st May 1943.

Enclosure:
Copy of relevant signals.

— page 100 —
35AD - REPORT OF THIRD WAR PATROL
7th March - 18th April 1943

Enclosure to Admiral (Submarine) No. 938/No. 4341 of 8.5.43)

COPIES OF REPORT SIGNALS

NAVAL MESSAGE
TO: SHAD FROM: POS.
SURGE CYPHER
List F number 63 arrived 8th April 14th.
0 307 A/16.3.43.

TO: SHAD FROM: POS.
SURGE CYPHER
List F number 63 arrived 8th April 14th.
0 307 A/16.3.43.

TO: SHAD FROM: POS.
SURGE CYPHER
HEIDAL GLASS A/S Travellers as shown on Page 15 of CB 3076
are reported to have been operating in your area.
1 041 A/16.3.43.

TO: S/M/S SOUTH OF 51 degs. NORTH
(R) ADMIRALTY 165
C. IN C. PLYMOUTH
HEADER CYPHER
1. No results have been obtained from air reconnaissance
owing to weather.

2. If not in contact with enemy 3/s proceed with all
despatch after dark en-devoid of reach patrol positions as
soon after dawn as possible.

SHAKESPARES (P.231) 44 degs. 57 mins., 10 degs. 01 mins.,
HEARING ... 44 degs. 30 mins., 08 degs. 01 mins.,
SHAD ... 45 degs. 10 mins., 06 degs. 02 mins.

(Amended by 1944/16) 1 839 A/16.3.43.

TO: S/M/S SOUTH OF 51 degs. NORTH FROM: F.O.(8)
SURGE CYPHER
In order to increase chance of sighting, SHAKESPARES (P.231),
HEARING, SHAD and ULTR (P.53) should remain on surface during
daylight 17th March if circumstances permit.
1 839 A/16.3.43.

TO: SUBMARINES SOUTH OF 51 DEGS NORTH
(R) ADMIRALTY 167
C IN C PLYMOUTH
H.Q.C.C.
SURGE CYPHER - LIEUTENANT
From 1800 17th March SHAD and HEARING are to act under orders
of C IN C PLYMOUTH. F.3.L.2 para 3 (b) refers.
1 716 A/17.3.43.

— page 102 —
3 -
U.S.S. SEAD - REPORT OF THIRD TAR PATROL
7th March - 12th April, 1943 (Continued)
(Enclosure to Admiral (Submarines!) No. 980/34434 of 2nd, May, 1943)

To: U.S.S. SEAD
(R) ADMIRALTY 780
POS

---

**SECRET CODE IDENTIFIER:**

My 1822, Course 091 degs speed 10.5 do not cross 100 fathom line.

1847A/18

---

To: SEAD
(R) ADMIRALTY 784
POS

---

If not in contact with enemy by 0300 proceed to patrol.

2315A/18

---

To: SUBMARINES SOUTH OF 51 DEGS H. POS
(R) POS

---

SECRET - CRITICAL - IDENTIFIER:

SPANISH 59 GERMAN 63 fully loaded in outer harbour BULBO ready for sea 1855 18th.

0457A/19

---

To: S/S S. of 51 degs. M.
POS

---

SECRET CRITERIA:

List P No. 59 and 63 sailed from Bilbao about 0005/19.

2124A/19

---

To: SEAD
(R) CDR C. PLYMOUTH
POS

---

SECRET CRITERIA IDENTIFIER:

German SS BODSSER 959 tons carried steam 181 feet long 15 feet draught and German SS. SPERBER 839 tons 216 feet long 15 feet draught arrived BULBAO 2nd March.
(2) Add above to list P as numbers 64 and 65 respectively.
(3) List f number 61 expedite to complete loading at BULBAO 26th March.

2216A/22

— page 104 —
7th March - 12th April, 1943 (Continued)

(Enclosure to Admiral (Submarines') No. 988/34, 4341 of 2nd, May, 1943)

To: S/South of 51 Deck, North
C/D C/PLYMOUTH
ADMIRALTY 298

To: S/South of 51 Deck, North
C/D C/PLYMO

— page 105 —
11th March 1943. No. 344076/838

To: THE COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE

(Copy to: Commander, U.S. Submarine Squadron 50)

The following extract from a report dated 1st February, 1943, by H.M. Consul, Bilbao, is forwarded with reference to my minute of 5th March 1943, No.443/3441 forwarding U.S.S.TAD's report of Second War Patrol:-

"These are various versions of the attack on the iron ore vessel NODDMS, but what really happened appears to be as follows:-

"The NODDMS left Bilbao harbour at about 9.30 a.m. on Monday the 25th. Half an hour afterward the LITVADIA followed her. When still only a short distance from here, actually just past Plenica, she was intercepted by a British submarine which fired 4 torpedoes at her missing with the first three, which exploded on the rocks, and scoring a hit on the stern of the vessel with the fourth, which did not explode. This last torpedo however, broke two of the propeller blades and indented a few of the plates.

"The LITVADIA heard the explosions and turned back. The NODDMS was also able to reach harbour. She was making a little water and is now being unloaded for repairs. The damage is only very slight and she will be ready in a few days."

(Signed) O. B. BARRY

Rear Admiral

— page 106 —
16-3
Serial: 01005
CONFIDENTIAL
From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD - Third War Patrol.

Reference: (a) Connaeveu 1st End. A16-3 serial 0814 dated 21 Apr. 1943.

Enclosure: (A) Admiral (S) Minute No. 988/SM.4341 dated 1 May, 1943.
(B) Admiral (S) Minute No. 989/SM.4341 dated 1 May, 1943.

1. Subject patrol report was forwarded by reference (a) with the comments of this command.

2. The matter of awards for the SHAD's attack on an inbound blockade runner and its destroyer escorts will be covered by separate correspondence.

P. H. DASTEDO
BY DIRECTION

Copy to: (less enclosures)
Consublant
Consubron 50
CO USS SHAD.

— page 108 —
0242 (CDR)  Location: Latitude 44°37' (N)
Longitude 02°18' (W)

Weather conditions: Dark, moonless, overcast.
Sea conditions: One.
Sound conditions (if applicable): One.
Type of operations: Intercept enemy (German) Blockade Runner.
Specific objective: Intercept four (4) DD's and one (1) AK.
Forces engaged: Own
    One (1) SS.
(Name and Type) Enemy Four (4) Destroyers. One (1) Blockade Runner. (7000-10,000-ton merchant ship).
Type of attack (Own/Blockade - scratch one) Night surface.
Brief Description Attacked formation, SS speed 19.5 knots. Fired spread of eight (8) torpedoes. Four or five hits.
Weapons employed:
    Own Mark 14-3 torpedoes (a).
    Enemy

— page 109 —
1. Ammunition expended _Light (9) torpedoes.
2. Evasive tactics employed:
   - Own Kept pursuing destroyers astern while making full power.
   - Enemy

— page 110 —
1943
Serial (045)
FIRST INDORSEMENT to
CO, SHAD Conf. 1Er A16
Serial 048 of April 12, 1943.

U.S. CONFIDENTIAL - BRITISH SECRET

C-0-N-F-1-D-T-N-T-I-A-L

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FIFTY.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Admiral (Submarines).
(2) The Admiralty.
(3) The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD - Action Report, forwarded of.

1. Forwarded, concurring with the report in substance.

2. Substantiation will be obtained through intelli-gence and a full report will be made by this command at a later date.

N. S. IVES.

CC: CO, SHAD.

OVER
RETO

2000.00 MAJ 26 AT ( ) 5:20:03

— page 111 —
989/SM.4341
SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.
COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE (2 copies).
(Copy to each)

Forwarded, A copy of my remarks on the Patrol Report (No. 989/SM.4341 of 1st. May, 1943) is attached for convenience of reference.

Northways,
London, N.W.3.
1st May, 1943.

Hear Admiral
Admiral (submarines)

ENCLOSURE (B) TO SERIAL NO. 01005

— page 112 —
88235/A16-3
Serial 052

DECLASSIFIED - ART. 0145, CONVAJINST 5510.1C
BY OP---03B91C DATE 3/3/12

DECLASSIFIED

FILMED
6 01998

— page 113 —
6 01998

Report of 4th. War Patrol. (Period from 4 May to 16 June 1943. Patrol line north of Iceland and finally northeast of Faeroes). Operation orders: CSS 50 7-43 of 2 May 1943. FSB-2, 4 June, 1941. FSC-3, 5 May, 1941

PECLOGUE

Arrived Base II, Rosneft, Scotland on 12 April 1943 from Third War Patrol. Commenced refit on that date by tender repair force and fifty percent of regular crew plus 22 members of the reserve crew. Officers and crew were given seven days leave each, those remaining standing duty every other day. Only routine work was required as the ship was in excellent material condition following the 3rd War Patrol. The tender work was of uniform excellence and the spare parts problem again was considerably improved. Check runs over the degaussing range were made. Radio direction finder was calibrated. Two days of submerged and surface training were conducted prior to departure, using high speed target one day. On April 27 Lieutenant Commander R.F. PRYCE, U.S. Navy relieved Lieutenant Commander E.J. LAC GRECOR as Commanding Officer and Commanded the ship during this patrol.

---

**NARRATIVE**

4 May
1000 - Underway from the CLYDE area in company with the U.S.S. HERMIT and escort vessel, the H.M.S. LAC.PAICI USE.

5 May
1600 - Conducted firing for test and training of .20 mm and .30 cal machine guns in a position west of the Shetlands.

6 May
0008 - Escort left formation in a position west of Huckle Flugga light, Shetland Islands. Proceeded independently on course 000° at a directed by 0(S) 9 dispatch 0519013 May 43, caroute to patrol line W. 0658 - In Lat 62°-22'(N) Long 01°-37'(N) dcv to avoid aircraft moving in fast by radar. 0738 - Surfaced, all clear.

9 May
0100 - Decoded POS 091752 B May reporting movement of Middleton through Denmark Strait.

9 May to 17 May
On patrol line W. Submerged twelve hours each day. Visibility generally good except for intermittent snow flurries.

17 May
0400 - Left patrol station caroute line DD as directed by 0(S) 9 despatched 161651 B May.

- 1 -

EMICLOSURE (A)

— page 114 —
17 May (cont'd)
0626 - Broke radio silence to request location of new patrol line DD. Location of new patrol line was transmitted but once (HS283) at 1700 B on 16 May. This message was not completely submerged because of excessive static. This however did not delay Shad's departure for new station since the line of bombing restrictions obviously meant for Shad were followed. Unfortunately this message was not retransmitted on either of the two long schedules that HS 283 would not be retransmitted. Shad's transmission as mentioned above was sent at 0626 17 May, promptly receipted for by station HMS, Iceland and, just as promptly, HMS 283 was reposted and received at 0900 the same morning. 0712 - In Lat 65°-03'(W) Long 114°-12'(W) dove to avoid aircraft moving in fast by radar. Ficked up at 13,000 yards. 0756 - Surfaced.

19 May
0200 - Arrived on patrol line DD. As there is no period of darkness in the Latitude established routine of submerging approximately nineteen hours daily to conform with directive. Surface at Lull for about two hours and again at 0100 for about three hours daily to change batteries. Periscope patrol maintained except for two days of rough weather when a sound patrol was kept at 120' except for routines. This procedure served to keep the battery up and at the same time provide a good quality of air in the boat.

24 May
0120 - In Lat 65°-22'(W) Long 00°-18'(W) dove to avoid 11-200 sighted to westward. 0111 - Surfaced, all clear.

19 May to 30 May
Patrol routine as above.

30 May
1630 - Surfaced to detonate mine in Lat 61°-14'(W), 1-54' with 20 mm machine gun. This mine was visible by periscope at range 0F 6,000 yards and was at first believed to be a conning tower. 1643 - Lookout sighted what no believed was a periscope close aboard (about 500 yards) on port quarter. Turned away for stern shot at her and made ready stern tubes. Neither commanding Officer nor Officer of the Deck could see this periscope. Scoured tubes and continued battery charge. Cleared area. 1730 - Completed routine charge and dove for periscope patrol.

3 June
1511 - In Lat 64°-57'(W) Long 01°-37'(W) dove to avoid aircraft moving in fast by radar. Remained submerged conducting periscope patrol.

-2-

— page 115 —
30 May to 4 June  Routine periscope patrol 19 hours daily.

: 4 June  1153 - Heard thrice distinct explosions believed to have been depth charges bearing 030 T, at range greater than 2,000 yards. Nothing in sight by periscope.

: 4 June to 10 June  Routine periscope patrol 19 hours daily.

: 10 June  0800 - Departed line DD enroute Lorwick, Shetland Islands, as directed by POS despatched 0818L2 B of June 1942. Sp: of advance 100 miles daily.

: 12 June  0800 - Surfaced as directed in position east of Huckle Flugga, and proceeded Lorwick.

: 14 June  1500 - Departed Lorwick, in company with HMS, CUTLYSARK, escort.

: 16 June  0630 - Arrived Clyde.

2. WEATHER.

Weather was normal for the area and season. Very little difficulty was experienced with icing while north of Iceland. On 14 May sighted first small bits of ice (10°-24" above water). No large icebergs were seen. Except for occasional snow flurries and fog, visibility was good to excellent throughout the patrol and was suitable for plane reconnaissance.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION.

Current set in at 68 ft. Long 16 ft was 0.5 knots to the southwest. In at 65° Long 1° the set was variable and averaged 0.1 knot.

4. AIDS TO NAVIGATION.

No repairs.

5. ENEMY WAR SHIPS OR MERCHANT VESSELS SIGHTED.

None.

6. AIRCRAFT SIGHTED.

(a) Visually

| TYPE | TIME | DATE | POSITION | COURSE | RUMORS |
|------|------|------||||
| LIBERATOR | 0520 | 6 May | 62-07, 1-07 | S/L | Very low |
| FW 200 | 0120 | 24 May | 65-22, 00-48 | 055°T | Very low |
| B & V 138 | 0526 | 7 June | 64-57, 1-33 | 100°T | Very low |

- 3 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 116 —
6 AIRCRAFT SIGHTED. (Continued)

(b) By Radar

| TYPE | TIME | DATE  | POSITION | COURSE | RETURNS |
|------|------|-------||||
| --   | 0658 | 6 May | 6-22, 1-37 | --     | --      |
| --   | 0712 | 17 May| 68-03, 14-12| --     | --      |
| --   | 1512 | 3 June| 64-57, 1-37| --     | --      |

7. PARTICULARS OF ATTACKS.

None.

8. ENEMY MEASURES.

None, except plane reconnaissance.

9. ENEMY MINE SEEPING OPERATIONS.

None.

10. MAJOR DEFECTS EXPERIENCED.

None. Accounted for and accounted for in the report.

The following is a summary of the submarine's condition and actions taken during the patrol:

The submarine was unescorted on the surface but difficult and undependable subground. In the area north of Iceland transmissions could not be fully received on the loop at depths up to 150 feet due to background noises. The vertical antenna was successfully used in lieu of the loop but of course in rough weather waves blocked out parts of the transmission. A thorough inspection of the loop and receiver will be made upon arrival in port to determine whether or not the fault lies in own equipment. In any event, reception submerged cannot be relied upon in any area in any submarine, regardless of whether the fault is due to equipment failure or to atmospheric conditions.

12. SOUND CONDITIONS.

Unknown since no contacts were made. Much less background noise was noted, however, than in the Bay of Biscay.

13. HEALTH AND HEALTHABILITY.

The general health of the crew was excellent. Minor head colds were experienced in the Arctic Circle. The air conditioning equipment did not prevent condensation inside the ship while in the Arctic Circle but the moisture content of the conditioned air is not considered too high for moderately long patrols.

— page 117 —
14. HILES STEILED.
Surface: 5080.7
Submerged: 1259.9
Total: 6540.5

15. FUEL OIL EXPENDED.
50740 gallons.

16. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING.
Torpedoes: 24
Puel: 27870 gallons
Provisions: 25 days
Fresh water: 30 days
Personnel: 20 days

17. FACTORS DETERMINING END OF PATROL.
None. Patrol terminated by orders.

18. RELIARS.
(a) No definite contacts were made with enemy submarines. Of the six aircraft contacts there were radar only, one both radar and sight, and two sight only (one while submerged). Of the three planes sighted one was identified as a Liberator near the Shetlands, one a Pocke-Tulf 200, and on a Blohm and Voss - 135 both in Lat 65°H. All three were flying at low altitudes. Conditions for air reconnaissance were generally good.

(b) The necessity of employing every means available in combating the German U-boat is recognized. In order to assist in the evaluation of such employment of own submarines the following observations are submitted. Fundamentally the effectiveness of anti-submarine patrol is a matter of plane geometry using these factors: (1) Radius of visibility, (2) Radius of sound equipment, (3) Radius of radar equipment, (4) Own and enemy speed normally used and that available, (5) Quality of own and enemy lookout and alertness of fire control party, (6) Own and enemy fire control.

Practically all of these factors tend to make the chances of locating a submarine a remote one but, if one be located, the last two factors should make the encounter a successful one. It is suggested that in order to improve the chances of sighting a U-boat that air reconnaissance be employed to extend the submarine horizon and that intensive drill with air reconnaissance units be held. While the optimum conditions, of course, will be reached with air and submarine units trained and operated together exclusively it is also realized that many factors make this a practical impossibility at present.

In lieu thereof, the following is considered possible of achievement. Have any aircraft operating near submarine units test transmitter at certain definite and very frequent intervals-hourly if possible. This, at least will enable submarines to keep on in frequency with the aircraft.

— page 118 —
6 0199g

Should any aircraft contacts be made, own submarines will be immediately informed. Frequent drills should be held in port or during the working up period prior to a patrol as available aircraft will permit in order to familiarize operators with the procedure employed by aircraft.

— page 119 —
FC5-50/A16
Serial 080

c/o Fleet Post Office,
New York, New York.

June 17, 1943.

U.S. CONFIDENTIAL - BRITISH SECRET

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FIFTY.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Admiral (Submarines)
    (2) The Admiralty.
    (3) The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD - Report of FOURTH War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Track Chart (To Admiral (Submarines) only).

1. The report of the FOURTH War Patrol of the U.S.S. SHAD is forwarded herewith. The duration of the patrol was forty-three (43) days. The patrol was conducted in the Iceland-Norwegian Area.

2. The material condition of the submarine and the physical condition of the crew was of the same excellence that has obtained on all previous patrols.

3. The patrol report of the U.S.S. SHAD is well prepared and the Squadron Commander concurs in the remarks of the commanding officer. In regard to aircraft cooperation, it is recommended that a similar procedure as detailed in F.S.L.2, paragraph 13, be adopted. It is regrettable that no opportunity was afforded to employ the offensive weapons of the SHAD.

4. Corrective action is being taken to increase the ruggedness of the antenna system. The JK-QC motor generator will be repaired.

5. The detection of three low-flying planes by the SD radar is noted with interest. The U.S.S. SHAD is equipped with the U-type SD antenna which serves to decrease the angle of propogation of the outgoing signals considerably to that angle obtained with the J-type antenna as installed in the U.S.S. HERRING.

6. 0199A

— page 120 —
6 01998

Subject: U.S. Submarine Patrol Report of Fourth War Patrol.

6. Because of the restriction placed on the distribution of U.S. submarine patrol reports by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, it is requested that subordinate commands be furnished with only such extracted information as is considered necessary.

N. S. IVES.

DISTRIBUTION:
The Admiralty
The Admiral (Submarines)
Commancu
Cominich (2)
Vopnav
Cincpac
Cinclant
Comsopac
Comsowcspac
Comsubpac
Consublant (2)
Comsubsowcspac.

6 01998

— page 121 —
1609.5 01998
Serial 01195 UNITED STATES FLEET
First ENDORSEMENT TO: 20 GROSVENOR SQUARE
Consubron 50 serial 080 LONDON, W.1
dated 17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL
From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD - Report of FOURTH War Patrol.

1. Nine advance copies of subject patrol report are forwarded for distribution to U.S. Naval commands listed in basic letter except Commander Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.

2. By copy of this letter two copies of subject report are being forwarded direct to Commander Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.

Copy to:
Consublant (with 2 copies basic report)
Consubron 50 (less basic report)

JUN 23 1943
BY DIRECTION
[Signature]
[Date]
[Page Number]

— page 123 —
58235/416-3
Serial 066

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Task Group 17.14
       (2) The Commander Submarine Division - 122
       (3) The Commander Submarine Squadron - 12
       (4) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD, Report of War Patrol Number 6IX

Enclosure: (a) Subject Report
       (B) Track Chart of patrol in area (for Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet).

1. Enclosure (a), covering the Sixth War Patrol of this vessel, but the first war patrol in the Pacific area, which was conducted in the East China Sea, as part of Task Group 17.14, during the period 28 September to 24 November 1943, is forwarded herewith.

B.J. L.C. GAGOR

FILMED
6/2/20

— page 124 —
1. RECORD: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Sixth War Patrol

2. (a) PROLOGUE

Returned from European Theatre of operations to New London, Conn. Two weeks voyage repairs at the Submarine Base. Work limited to such items that would enable this vessel to proceed to Navy Yard, Mare Island, for overhaul. Interim docking at the Submarine Base, August 6-9, when scheduled to proceed to Pearl Harbor for war operations prior to overhaul. Departed New London August 11. Arrived Pearl Harbor September 7th. At arrival conference the decision was made not to overhaul prior to one patrol, because of the large number and extent of outstanding alterations, and the morale benefit of not delaying in making a patrol in the Pacific after the many months waiting for this opportunity. Two weeks voyage repairs alongside U.S.S. BUSHNAK. Overhauled two main engines (2200 hours), and installed mounts and stowage for two fifty caliber machine guns and ammunition. Sound test, followed by six day training period during which fired six torpedoes. Readiness for sea September 27, 1943. Delayed eighteen hours by necessity of replacing defective 110 pump.

(B) NARRATIVE

Sept. 28
C700 V-W
Departed Pearl Harbor for INDIAY with the PC 549 as escort. Operating under Combatant 17 Operation Order #217-43 as part of Taskgroup 17.14. Parted company with escort.

Sept. 29-30
Narrative MIDWAY conducting training, enroute, surfaced and submerged.

Oct. 1
0915 Y
Moored in nest alongside U.S.S. SPARROW at MIDWAY. Received 19030 gallons of fuel oil. Installed new range unit in SJ radar. Underway from alongside SRAMY in company with CARGO and GRAYBACK. Took station as leading ship in task group. Went ahead at two engine speed to open out to proper patrol distance. CHOO middle ship, GRAYBACK rear ship. Patrol dismount 14 miles. Proceeding to assigned patrol areas.

Oct. 2-4
Conducted group communication training and individual ship training. Rendezvousing daily at sunset.

Oct. 5
Closed CARGO at sunset and received written instructions. Proceeded to open up from CARGO.

-1- Enclosure (4)

— page 125 —
6-8
Continued training daily. Made sight contact of CDR by
periscope at 1100 L on Oct. 7th.

Oct. 9
C825 K
Sighted CDR by high periscope. Barometer falling.

Oct. 10
0615 K
Arrived at patrol point assigned by group commander.
0630 K
Submerged and commenced patrol as previously directed.
1704 K
Heard seven explosions. -ssumed to be attack by one of group
Lat. 28-39
on enemy convoy about which contact report had been received.
Long. 137-55
Made preparations for surfacing.
1735 K
Surfaced after having extreme difficulty in raising 45 head.
Decided to assume that attack had been made by counter submarine
(C-40) on a northbound convoy and to conduct a retiring search
on course 030 degrees (T) pending information.
1906 K
Received report from submarine making contact (which one not
known) reporting enemy bearing 090 degrees (T), course 350
Long. 135-06
and 060 degrees (T), -ss group is not in regular areas there is
no reference point or position for reporting enemy's position.
2030K
Covered enemy course from 200 to 010 degrees (T), speeds 8
to 10 knots. Lacking information decided to retire on course
north at 13 knots and attain position ahead of enemy and then
conduct station patrol in position to possibly intercept
northbound convoy.

Oct. 11
0608 K
Submarine not making initial attack reported enemy course 130
Lat. 30-57
degrees (T). This would indicate a southbound convoy and there-
Long. 138-15
fore possibly a second and now contact. Lacking position of
enemy decided to follow original plan of trying to intercept
northbound convoy.

0630 K
Commenced station patrol on surface at 10 knots on course 090
Lat. 31-01
degrees (T). Using high periscope.

Long. 130-16
0641 K
Sighted smoke bearing 060 degrees (T). (CONTACT #1)
0646 K
Sighted most bearing 082 degrees (T). Appeared to be destroyer
on course 245 (T), at range of about seven miles.
0647 A
Submerged to avoid being sighted. Came to MAC and commenced
approach on smoke. At first bearing seemed to be decreasing
and then commenced to increase slowly.
0740 K
Sighted masts of a ship hull down angle on bow about 30 star-
board. During following fifty minutes appeared to be closing
track.
0640 K
Identified ship as tanker on course 210 degrees (T). Where did
destroyer go that was on 245 degrees (T)? Cannot close sub-
merged range about 10 miles so will allow range to open up
and then surface and work around ahead to attack position.
0950 K
Surfaced and commenced running on parallel course with target
Lat. 31-00
at range of about 15 miles, and abaft his beam. Sent contact
Long. 138-20
report on special frequency -living enemy course of 210 degrees
-2-

— page 126 —
0915 K
Gradually starting to overtake tanker when ship was sighted bearing 321 degrees (T), estimated range 12 miles.
: 0919 K
Identified destroyer as C. IDIOLI class oceango, rare rapidly at estimated speed of about 15 knots, submerged and went to Battle to attack. When CHIDORI was picked up thru. ship's scope, was tracked out on course 170 degrees (T) making ten knots. Unable to close to or close than 5000 yards. Sea Condition 3 made the necessary six ft. of depth setting against this type of target impractical even if within course range. This CHIDORI might possibly be escort moving southward to pick up northbound convoy or escort vessel. Believed sighted at 0651 protection tanker and had sighted us hull down and once over to investigate.
: 1034 K
Lost sight of escort vessel. Decided to remain submerged and await development.
: 1126 K
Sighted most of ship bearing 165 degrees (T).
: 1132 K
Identified as CHIDORI on course 350 degrees (T) and appeared to be conducting sound patrol.
: 1203 K
Commenced patrol normal to CHIDORI's course.
: 1904 K
Surfaced. Decided to stand south on course 170 degrees (T) towards initial position in area while awaiting further instructions. Sea activity slowly.
: 2107 K
Heard what appeared to be a small, like two muffled explosions on starboard bow, slight but bearing in superstructure as we are running partially trimmed down under brit. hit near. Changed course to 220 degrees (T) to close source of apparent distant explosions.

Oct. 12
0610 K
Beginning of morning twilight. Will continue surface patrol in area until this evening and then proceed to regular area unless otherwise directed.
: 0715 K
Near two distant explosions (have not determined that source of supposed explosions heard on previ use night was a 1.5o0 bulkhead in superstructure).
: 0804 K
Another distant explosion.
: 0845 K
Another distant explosion.
: 0845 K
Sighted smoke bearing 210 degrees (T), estimated range 20 miles.
: 0845 K
Lat. 28-44
: 0850 K
Smoke now appeared very heavy and was if from a vessel on fire. Closing on source of smoke.
: 0856 K
Smoke disappeared.
: 0910 K
No sign of mast or ship-continued stabbing south searching for source of smoke.
: 0927 K
Sighted stack and mast of ship hull down bearing 223 degrees (T). Unable to be sure of large angle on bow as port or starboard. Ship is very close to position in which CHIDORI

— page 127 —
1157 K
Later report making attack on damage of torpedo by escort. Not realizing at the time that vessel was stopped in water, considerable time was spent with confusing results in attempting to trace so as to obtain attack position. After before, during, on one course while closing target, six hit the upperworks of escort vessel by high periscope. Stored away on parallel course, and then attempted to work about, still not realizing target was stopped.

1157 K
Realized that target was not on southwesterly course but stopped, submerged, and engaged periscope from estimated range of 10-12 miles.

1209 K
Heard first of serious of fourteen depth charge explosions during the following hour. Using target on course 170 degrees (T) at 2 knots, and for silent running. Very smooth and glassy sea. During next three hours continued to close target which was similar to HIGHLIGHTED in previous section. During first part of approach destroyer patrolled in vicinity. During second part of attack, the escort was partially stopped at slow speed, stopping at times, and remaining mostly to southwest of it. At about 1500 it had been noted that target was raising steam, decision made to close target to about 2500 yards and fire torpedoes when escort was furthest away on her port. When range had decreased to about 5500 yards the movements of escort indicated that his suspect was submerged in vicinity as he commenced patrolling on line between us and target at across our track at 15 knots and would stop at end of each leg, which from shorter and shorter as we approached. Intermittent training of bow planes and squeal in stern planes believed responsible for detection but irregular, irregular and so short for duration to not permit accurate bearing. Glassy sea made periscope work very difficult.

1515 K
Escort stopped one depth charge when dead ahead of us and commenced flashing a light on his lower foremast in our general direction. It was now apparent that we must not escort in order to finish off target which any moment now might have enough steam up to get underway even though he appears damaged, with Plimsoll mark about two to four feet under water. Carefully checked speed and went to course, and at

1515 K
When escort turned left (HIGHLIGHTED) eastwesterly at end of easterly leg of patrol, fired three torpedoes at 1000 yards range on 120 track and using spread to cover his expected movements to avoid when track is seen in glass sea. About ten seconds after firing first torpedo (bubbles and steam very noticeable) escort started changing course towards us. Torpedoes sounded to run properly and one appeared to be headed for him for dawn threat shot.

1515 K
Torpedoes either missed or passed under him (depth setting six feet) and with escort's engine on bow fitted starboard and decreasing fast, range 1500 yards, went to deep submergence and commenced evasive tactics. Ten deep negative temperature gradient. Shortly later there came four charges

- 4 -

Inclosure (..)

— page 128 —
1825 K
: 1915 K
: Oct. 13
: 0051 K
: Lat. 28-45
: Long. 137-21
: 0052
: Oct. 14
: 1348 K
: 1915 K
: 2116 I
: Oct. 15
: 0101 I
: 0102 I
: 0157 I
: 0900 I
: 1155 I
: 1236 I
: 1919 I
: Oct. 16-17
: 5
:

— page 130 —
22
0000 I
Lat. 29-08
Long. 124-05
0026 I
0051 I
0125 I
0145 I
0201 I
0207 I
0211 I
02-11-36 I
0215 I
02-16-13 I
02-16-56 I
0217 I
02-17-55 I
0415 I
0522 I
0518 I
0629 I

U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Sixth War Patrol

Attained position on port bow of enemy and should not be
silhouetted at dawn. Sky seven-tenths overcast. Escort
2000-3000 yards from track of targets.
Honorise. Sent second position report of enemy to CDR and
CRYBACK.
Sight contact. Two large vessels bearing 317 degrees (T),
range 11,200 yards. Sighted port escort.
Sighted escort on starboard flank of targets. Gradually
working ahead of and across enemy from port to starboard
flank. Base course 150 degrees (T), speed 15 knots.
Arrived in position 2000 yards from track on starboard flank.
At range to nearest large target of 11,000 yards, submerged
to 42 feet and continued radar approach on course 160 degrees
(T).
Steadied on firing course of 100 degrees (T).
Sighted enemy by porpoise and went to periscope depth.
Starboard escort passed close astern though not sighted.
Formation second to have changed course away.
Corroded firing three torpedoes at first sight and two at
second ship. -average firing interval eleven seconds. Formation
saw no lookahead. Three of the torpedoes were sighted. -Next
Sound signalling near starboard. Four explosions
ahead full speed with left full rudder. Four explosions
checked with firing of first to third, and fifth torpedoes.
Heard series of short, rapid whistle signals. -During this
time and at
Steady on firing course 320 degrees (T).
Corroded firing after tubes at 14 second intervals at third
ship (two stacks) using periscope bearings.
Explosion.
Started to 200 feet in forty fathoms of water. Ranging for
depth charge attack and commenced evasive tactics.
Received first of pattern of four charges--close. During
next two hours escort alternately went ahead and stopped to
listen. Received one more close and two more distant charges.
Heard a distant explosion at 0356 and another at 0411.
Lost intermittent contact with escort.
Surfaced in last 26-31 miles, 124-11.
Sent out contact report.
Found large oil slick in locality of attack. Slick about
one mile wide and very pronounced over distance of at least
two miles.
(After further study of silhouettes concluded that two
leaning ships might have been battleships--tall, solid
forecastle structure seen rising from long, low hull--could
not so stacks - also propellor boat very heavy - on surface
radar pipes were very large and ships looked large to eye.
Third ship in column large D of unidentified class (2 stacks).

Conducted routine surface and submerged patrol in accordance
with task group patrol plan. During this period sighted the
lights of twelve sunken ships.

- 7 -

Walgreure (A)

— page 131 —
0ct. 25
2331 I
Lat. 30-48
Long. 126-26
2334 I
Oct. 26
0904 I
Lat. 28-50
Long. 127-37
1305 I
Lat. 28-31
Long. 127-56
1600 I
Lat. 28-24
Long. 128-03
2326 I
2344 I
Oct. 27
0001 I
0014 I
0017 I
0018 I
0019 I
0020 I

Received special signal from task group commander assigning
square FP-19 for patrol on Oct. 26. Previously had received
garbled signal and had asked for repetition by procedure
sign without using any calls.
Set course for seas and square at two engine speed. Could
not arrive on station prior dawn of Oct. 26 on four en. lines.
Sighted the lights of two sampans during the night.

Sighted amphibian type patrol plane boarding C15 de. reces (T),
distant six miles on westerly course. Dove to avoid detection.
Decided to remain submerged for three hours in zone to which
have been sighted as there was only 34 miles to go to
assigned square.
Surfaced and went ahead full power on three engines (17 knots).
Contact on SD radar range 18 miles, moving in. Submerged.
Only four miles from assigned position as decided to remain
submerged to avoid being sighted in vicinity, which is close
to LHD 0 SHAD, and in which area it does not seem possible
to remain more than two hours on the surface during daylight
without being forced by aircraft to dive.
Arrived in assigned patrol square (FP-19).
Surfaced and commenced surface patrol.
Had radar contact on three large vessels bearing 240 degrees
(T), distant 14,000 yards. Dark night, no moon but clear sky.
Commenced tracking. (CONTACT: 044)
Set contact report to CDRO and GUYAKOK giving true bearing
of enemy.
Reported enemy course and position by special code. Enemy
formation apparently consists of three large ships and one
escort on starboard flank, course 650 degrees (T). Decided
to attack from port flank according with attack doctrine.
Crossed ahead of formation about three miles and at

Came left to course 160 degrees (T) with intention of making
night surface attack, but enemy formation appeared to be in
line of bearing of ships with port flank advanced and SD
within 500 yards of track of port flanker. Normally would
have turned away and made another approach from port side
but in view of report attack doctrine for ship making initial
contact to attack as soon as possible, decided to stand
across track and fire stern tubes at right flank transport.
Submerged to 42 feet to avoid detection by escort and commenced radar approach.
Escort had good and detected by radar coming up on
starboard quarter and should pass about 300 yards astern.
Went to 60 feet.
Escort passed astern- cannot see through periscope but can
hear screws of right flank transport.
Fired four torpedoes from after next using sound bearing as
final bearing and two degrees spread.
Went ahead full speed and started down to 290 feet.
Heard two muffled explosions eight seconds apart.

- 8 -

— page 132 —
0001 I
Hard third explosion: 22 to 25 seconds later.
Time and torpedo run checked to show hits with first and second shots.
First depth charge--quite close, followed by 10 more during next half hour in which they gradually seemed to become more and more distant. Four de.creo negative temperature gradient.
Heavy crackling noise reported by sound in direction of where attack took place. Sounds as though target breaking up.
Heavy crackling noise faded out as it got out of the air.
Short up to this time had seemed to be stopping, listening and dropping and then again, but now commenced to choke range. No crashing at first was quite close and sorews could be heard intermittently, but then sorew noise faded out and only ringing seemed to do this same as at Gave permission to vent W.R.T. so forward tubes could be drained down.
Depth charge--close. This was closest one of all and shook the ship considerably. Some roaring loud again and then during next two hours became farther and farther, but opinion was that escort was still in vicinity so decided to remain submerged until the beginning of morning twilight. Intermittent squall of storm plumes and rubbing of bow planes seemed to be of some help to our friend. During this period intermittently heard: sorews of escort.
Echo ranging now very faint.
Depth charge--next very loud. Five depth charges--not very loud. One depth charge--not very loud.
Periscope depth--nothing in sight.
Sighted smoke bearing. 002 de.creos (T) and float type plane circling in vicinity. Came to MAC and commenced approach when bearing was seen to increase. (CONTACT # 5)
Discontinued approach when range started to increase at 4 miles. Target seemed to be all type freighter on course 110 degrees (T), spaced 8 knots. One or two float type planes were circling target continuously and surface pursuit was out of question.
Sighted masts of what appeared to be a freighter--hull down bearing 320 degrees (T), distant about 14 miles with two planes circling in vicinity. Commenced approach.
Two distant explosions.
Six distant explosions.
Three distant explosions.
Lost sight of freighter entirely. (light have zigzag)
Very faint echo ringing from about 315 degrees (T).
Sighted masts of ship bearing 315 degrees (T), range 10 to 12 miles. Continued on normal approach course. Might be destroyer.
Lost sight of masts bearing 327 degrees (T), but still

- 9 -

Enclosure (..)

— page 134 —
0156
Lat. 27-23
Long. 123-14

Nov. 5-7

Nov. 8
1108 I
Lat. 28-44
Long. 131-00

1124 I

Nov. 9

Nov. 10

Nov. 11

1220 I
Lat. 27-43
Long. 131-48

2200
Lat. 27-43
Long. 132-33

Nov. 12
Lat. 27-45
Long. 132-43

Continued surface and submarine patrol in south-eastern
corner of area.

Continued surface and submerged patrol in south-eastern
corner of area.

Continued surface and submerged patrol in same locality.

Conducted surface patrol on easterly and westerly courses.
Then departed area 11-i. after 30 days on station. Making 10
knocks on one main engine.
Will patrol in Lat. 27-43, Long. 132-33 in hope that it will
be fruitfull.
Passed very close aboard to three Japanese on wooden wrackage
about eight by five feet in dimension. Ten were apparently
sailors and had no food or water on raft or any article that
might have had little one value. Obsequently passed more
wreckage including badly decomposed body in life jacket.
Commenced patrol on east and west courses five miles either
side of this position.

At 0300 set course for MIDLY at one engine speed carrying
zero float to save fuel.

— page 138 —
15:00, 28-23N, 1050K, 120-04E, 27-53N, 1106I, 27-49N, 1223I, 26Oct., 28-50N, 0904I, 26Oct., 28-31N, 1437I, 27Oct., 28-11N, 0801I, 27Oct., 28-10N, 1020I, 12Nov., 27-59N, 0845I, 12Nov., 27-59N, 133-35E, 12Nov., 27-59N,

— page 139 —
U.S.S. SHAD (SS 235) - report of sixth war patrol
:  (H) - TACK DATA
:  U.S.S. SHAD
:  Time 1542 I
:  Date 12 Oct. 1943
:  Lat. 20-30 (H)
:  Long. 137-17 (E)

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: One KURI class destroyer defending a damaged AK similar to HIYOSI MARU. Made contact using high periscope while conducting periscope patrol. AK was dead in water and DD was patrolling in close vicinity on various courses and speeds. Day time.

Ship(s) Sunk: None

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: None

Damage Determined by: None

Target Draft: 6 ft.
Course 266 (T)
Speed 15k
Range: 1000 (at first...)

Oom Ship Data

Speed 2.6
Course 130
Depth 64
Angle 4 (U) (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Periscope attack: using navigational plot, sound and T.D.C. Fire control instruments and party functioned well and torpedoes appeared to run normally. Target is believed to have suspected presence of submarine - manouvred rapidly after firing first torpedo and avoided but it appeared that one torpedo ran very close or under target. Spread was used to cover expected maneuvers of target. Torpedo wake and steam very apparent in smooth, glassy sea.

Tubes Fired: 1 2 3

Track Angle: 112S 114S 116S

Gyro Angle: 023 024 026

Depth Set: 6' 6' 6'

Power: High High High

Hit or Miss: Miss Miss Miss

Erratic: No No No

- 16 - Enclosure (..)

— page 141 —
1. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 2. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 3. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 4. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 5. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 6. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 7. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 8. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 9. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 10. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 11. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 12. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 13. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 14. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 15. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 16. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 17. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 18. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 19. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 20. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 21. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 22. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 23. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 24. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 25. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 26. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 27. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 28. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 29. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 30. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 31. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 32. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 33. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 34. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 35. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 36. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 37. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 38. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 39. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 40. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 41. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 42. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 43. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 44. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 45. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 46. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 47. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 48. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 49. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 50. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 51. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 52. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 53. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 54. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 55. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 56. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 57. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 58. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 59. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 60. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 61. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 62. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 63. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 64. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 65. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 66. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 67. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 68. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 69. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 70. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 71. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 72. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 73. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 74. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 75. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 76. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 77. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 78. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 79. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 80. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 81. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 82. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 83. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 84. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 85. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 86. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 87. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 88. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 89. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 90. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 91. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 92. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 93. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 94. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 95. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 96. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 97. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 98. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 99. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 100. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 101. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 102. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 103. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 104. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 105. TROOPERS: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
: 106

— page 142 —
U.S.S. SULP (SS 235) - Report of Sixth War Patrol
Torpedo attack No. 2 (cont'd)
Mark Torpedo 14-34 14-34 14-34 14-34 14-34 14-34 14-34 14-34 14-34
Serial No. 23922 24908 25335 41986 39221 23153 24911 25366 23582
Bk. Explorer 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1
Serial No. 6895 6131 5689 7109 6119 17565 6459 12289 6464
Actuation Set C C C C C C C C C
Actuation C C C C - - - - -
Actual
Bk. Warhead 16 16 15 16 16 16 16 16
Serial No. 26411 1573 1874 2189 10618 1972 2134 2674 1824
Explosive TXT TXT TXT TXT TXT TXT TXT
Pilot 0 8 8 0 8 0 8 8
Lt. Wt. 1R 1L 0 1R 0 1R 1L 2R
Spec. Condition Condition Two
Overall
Activity F.H. F.H. F.H. F.H. F.H. * * F.H. F.H.

*Overhauled by U.S.S. BUSHHELL

- 19 - Enclosure (...)

— page 143 —
U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Sixth War Patrol

(H) ATTACK DATA:

U.S.S. SHAD
Time: 0018 (I)
Date: 27 Oct. 1943
Torpedo Attack No. 3
Lat. 28-25 (N)
Patrol No. 6
Long. 128-04 (E)

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:
Radar contact on three large transports in column and appeared to zig zag. Clear, dark night-partially overcast. One destroyer on starboard flank.

Ship(s) Sunk
One (See remarks)

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk

Determined:
Two explosions at proper time interval from firing for torpedo run. Sound heard heavy crackling noises of ship breaking up for about forty minutes after attack. Screw noises not heard after explosions. Total of 3 explosions. Task group commander reported all three probably sunk on basis of some later observations.

Target Depth: 15
Course: CD45
Speed: 10.5
Range: 2100 (at firing)

Omn Ship Data:

Speed: 3
Course: 150
Depth: 60
Angle: 0 (at firing)

FIRB CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA:

Type attack
Enemy course and speed by plot and T.D.C. checked. Zigzagging detected by both plot and T.D.C. Radar approach (surface and submerged). Fired using sound bearings. Divergent spread.

Tubes Fired
7
8
9
10

Track angle
100S
101S
102S
103S

Gyro angle
15L
12L
11L
10L

Depth Set
12'
12'
12'
12'

Power
High
High
High
High

Hit or Miss
Hit
Hit
Hit

Erratic
No
No
No
No

Enclosure (A)

— page 148 —
1. U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Sixth War Patrol

RADAR (Cont'd)

picture is present on the screen during a period when the relative position of enemy ships and escorts is of prime importance to the success of the approach.

The SD radar operated without casualty and gave over 600 hours of good performance throughout the patrol. For a period of two to three months, excessive interference has been experienced on the radar screen. During this patrol, a lengthy process of elimination, diselapsed this interference was caused by faulty electric fans throughout the ship, and proper stops immediately resulted this situation. The SD radar was keyed manually during this patrol to decrease the possibility of enemy detection by direction-finder. Results were good, but it is hoped some method of automatic keying will be available for the next patrol, as greater efficiency will be realized with such a modification.

(H) SCOUND GUN AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Enroute to station, it became impossible to raise the QB sound head with normal hydraulic pressure. The sound head is known to be partially sprung, but it is believed that there is leakage of oil past the control valve to such an extent that a block and tackle is necessary to supplement hydraulic pressure in raising the sound head before surfacing.

Sound conditions in the East China Sea were normal with occasional high noise levels, probably surface and bottom effects. Nothing hindered sound listening and the reception of accurate sound bearings during the attacks made on the patrol.

(O) DENSITY LAYER

Enroute to the East China Sea from HIDAY, density layers were observed beneath an average depth of 170 feet. Negative gradients from 10 to 16 degrees were then found down to 300 feet. Outside the 50 fathoms curve in the CHINA SEA, but in the JAPANESE ORIENT, the isostatic normal layer was found to exist down to 220 feet with a thermocline of 10 degrees at 340 feet.

Inside the fifty fathom curve on a 14 degree negative gradient was recorded between 170 and 210 feet.

(F) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HEALTHBILITY

The health of the officers and crew was excellent. There was one case of an attack of appendicitis, acute, successfully treated with an ice-pack and sulfathiazole (four doses of 15 g in every four hours). The variety of food was very good and ample. The ship was extremely habitable. The novelty installed small air-consitting units in the coming tour and room conservation of the supply ventilating piping to an exhaust duct made a marked improvement in the coming tour submarine. Improvement of the ventilation in the forward battery during the last half of a battery charge is needed. The warm battery gas was back up in the exhaust system making the forward battery air quite bad.

- 29 -

[Handwritten notes and annotations]

— page 149 —
26 - [UNCLASSURO: name]

---

### (Q) PERSONNEL

The performance of the officers and enlisted personnel during the entire patrol and especially under combat conditions left nothing to be desired. Only a few of the crew had ever made combat patrols in Japanese waters, although the nucleus of the crew had made four to five patrols in European waters. All hands were very steady under depth charging and during the entire patrol no personnel errors were remarked either while patrolling or during attacks. Duties were performed with a high degree of efficiency at all times.

Appropriate commendations of officers and enlisted personnel who have made four or more war patrols on this vessel will be forwarded according with Consubmarine List, 10-43 of 19 July 1943, paragraph 3 (C).

The performance of duty of a group of ten specially selected and trained lookouts was outstanding on this as well as on all previous patrols.

In the opinion of the commanding officer nothing contributes to the ability of a submarine crew to remain for long periods at sea without a marked loss of efficiency and enthusiasm than following a strict daily (except Sundays and after night attacks) routine of reveille, breakfast, work on a cleaning station and group instruction by officers and leading men on specially and submarine knowledge.

---

### (R) MILITARY STANDARD-FUEL USED

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **PARTLY TO KIDNEY** | **1265 mi.** | **19030 gal.s.** |
| **KIDNEY to area** | **3161 mi.** | **27635 gal.s.** |
| **In area** | **1459 mi.** | **27635 gal.s.** |
| **Area to KIDNEY** | **3191 mi.** | **26855 gal.s.** |
| **KIDNEY to PARL** | **1287 mi.** | **16630 gal.s.** |

---

### (S) JURATION

Days enroute to area, 16
Days in area, 30
Days enroute to PARL, 13
Days submerged, 263

---

### (T) PATROLS OF INDIVIDUAL RATINGS

| | **Torpedoes** | **Fuel** | **Provisions** | **Personnel Factor** |
| | **8** | **9,660 gal.s.** | **10 days** | **15 days** |

Limiting factor this patrol - Terminated by operation order but fuel would have terminated it otherwise.

— page 150 —
1. CONFIRM and RECOMMENDATIONS on the Coordinated Attack Plan will be made the subject of separate correspondence after an opportunity has been had to evaluate different aspects of the patrol with the task group commander at PEARL HARBOR.

2. It is not known whether or not the SUFFISHT was camouflaged, or whether or not she sighted the SUD on the night of November 14th. At the time of contact adjustments were being made to the SUD radar and no range was obtained. The night was dark and partially overcast, at a range of about 3000 yards contact was made by a lookout. A large angle on the bow was presented, partially night and depicted relief lookout was able to make out the coming tower fairwater and gun with out any difficulty through binoculars but it is extremely unlikely that she would have been sighted at 3000 yards except by highly trained lookouts with very good binoculars.

3. The torpedo overhaul personnel of the submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, is to be commenced for the excellent performance of the torpedoes fired by this vessel. There were no known duds, all torpedoes ran hot, straight and normal. On two occasions torpedoes were left in flooded tubes for a considerable period because of insufficient of venting down the pressure in W.R.T. while being hunted by an escort vessel following attacks. Upon examination no flooding had taken place.

4. In attack against the coruscators (battleships) believe explosion at C2-16-56 was possible hit on the stock escorting destroyer which was apparently at shorter range than shown on T.C., and possibly even over in response to sound signal from starboard escort, to assist in 4/8 measures. The explosion did not sound like a depth charge to experienced hands on board.

5. Upon arrival at LIDWLY, heard from CRO that Task Group commander saw and heard two torpedoes hit very large transport, and understood he saw or heard one or two more hits on second ship, and that all three torpedoes. The torpedoes were in line of bearing, with nearest one on starboard flank, the other two ships would have shown very little open water between their respective sterns and sterns, and with the firing being done on sound bearing with ample spread to right- at near apexes that the third explosion heard about 22 to 25 seconds after second of first two, hit a second ship. Transport sunk estimated to be 10,000 to 12,000 and other two slightly smaller.

6. The Commanding Officer of the GRAYL at LIDWLY stated that on following morning he counted about two dozen lifeboats in water. This would indicate very large ship.

— page 151 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division ONE TWENTY TWO.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

1. The Sixth War Patrol of the U.S.S. SHAD was the first for that vessel in the Pacific Area.

2. This patrol was also the first in which submarines acted as a coordinated group employing a definite doctrine under a Group Commander, who was in one of the submarine group. The lessons learned, difficulties encountered, and recommendations for needed improvements in doctrine are to be covered in a separate report to be submitted by the Group Commander. The patrol lasted for a period of 59 days of which a total of 30 were spent in areas assigned. The patrol was terminated by order of the Group Commander but leak of fuel would have also necessitated the same decision in any case. The SHAD returned with eight torpedoes on board.

3. All attacks were well conducted and aggressively carried out. It is noted, however, that in some instances the Commanding Officers decisions were necessarily influenced by group doctrine and the proximity of friendly forces. Scorn vorth while contacts were made but it was possible to close only three for attack. A total of sixteen torpedoes were fired for eight hits and a very good average of 50%.

Attack No. 1.
In this attack it was necessary to dispose of a protecting escort prior to an attempt on a crippled AV. Unfortunately due to a glassy sea and the range (1000 yds.) the DD sighted the wakes and was able to avoid by combing the tracks. It would soon that a better time for firing on this would have been when DD and AK were in line or overlapping.

Attack No. 2.
This was a Night Combined Radar and Periscope Attack on two cruisers escorted by three (3) DD's. Here was an example of the Commanding Officer's decision being influenced by group doctrine. Ordinarily the proper procedure would have been to fire the entire forward not at one cruiser in an attempt to make sure of it before swinging for a stern tube attack on the second ship. Instead the SHAD fired 3 at the loading target, 2 at the second and then swung and fired 4 at the third. His reason was that he believed it was better to slow or stop as many as possible and leave them for the Trailer to finish off.

— page 152 —
1. FRS-122/A16-3/ Serial 063
: CONFIDENTIAL
: FIRST ENDORSEMENT to U.S.S. SHAD - Report of Sixth War Patrol.
: Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

The correctness of this decision in a coordinated attack group is an interesting point and should be given further study and consideration. This attack resulted in two hits on the first cruiser and one in the second from the forward nest. Of the four fired from the stern tubes only one hit; this was very probably due to the fact that the target was a DD instead of a cruiser, as first believed, and the torpedoes ran under (10 ft. setting) or possibly because the gyro angles (average 660) were unfavorable.

Attack No. 3.
This was a Night Radar Attack on a convoy of three AP's and one AK escorted by a DD. The range, track, and gyro angles on the firing position attained were all good and resulted in four hits out of four stern tubes fired and sank a large AP of approximately 10,000 tons. This is the only result reported by the SHAD. However, the GRAYBACK observed this action and reports that the other two AP's were hit and damaged as they were in an overlapping line of bearing. In addition, in the excitement, the small freighter collided with one of the AP's and was also damaged. One of the AP's, set on fire, was smoking heavily and was later sunk by the GRAYBACK.

4. The health and morale of the officers and men appeared excellent. The material condition also appeared good and all defects noted can be corrected at the scheduled Navy Yard overhaul which will take place prior to the SHAD's next patrol.

5. It is felt that the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew of the SHAD are to be congratulated on a very fine first patrol and should be credited with having inflicted the following damage on the enemy:

| Damage | Type | Tonnage | |---|------| | 1 | Frigi Maru type AK | 9,138 tons | | 1 | Kamo Maru type AP (50% credit) | 4,262 tons | | Total | 13,400 tons | | DAMAGED | | 1 | Cruiser type unknown | 10,000 tons | | 1 | Cruiser type unknown | 10,000 tons | | 1 | DD | 2,000 tons | | 1 | AK type unknown | 3,500 tons | | Total | 25,500 tons |

R.M. PEACHER.

— page 153 —
FC5-12/A16-3
Serial 0114
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS SHAD Report of
Sixth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Twelve,
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

1. The remarks and summation of damage made by the Commander Submarine Division One Twenty Two are concurred in.

2. A thorough investigation and study of the problems which arose and the results of the decisions made on the firing line will be of inestimable value in "he arriving at a solution for a more finished Doctrine of Cooperative Attack."

3. It is a pleasure for the Commander Submarine Squadron Twelve to congratulate the Captain, Officers, and Crew of the SHAD for having made her First War Patrol in the Pacific a successful one by inflicting much damage to the enemy.

J. B. GRIGGS.

— page 154 —
21 DEC 1943
: 103434

---

**SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET**

**Serial 01803**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**THIRD ENDORSEMENT to**
**SHAD Report of Sixth War Patrol,**
**CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 313**
**U.S.S. SHAD - SIXTH WAR PATROL.**

**From:** The Commander-Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
**To:** The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
**Via:** The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

**Subject:** U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.
(28 SOVAR 1943 + 25 NOVEMBER, 1943).

---

1. The sixth war patrol of the SHAD was the first in the Pacific area. The SHAD was one of three submarines forming the first coordinated attack group operating on Pearl Harbor.

2. The patrol was aggressive and well coordinated. Of the three attacks made the SHAD was successful in causing serious damage to important targets of the enemy. The enemy was not prepared for the attack and was well carried out; it was later learned that the Japanese had succeeded in sinking one of the damaged transports.

3. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia Award.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew for the aggressive and successful patrol. The SHAD is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

| **SUNK** | **DAMAGED** |
|||
| 1 - Transport (FULL MARU class) | 9,138 tons |
| 1 - Transport (KAMU MARU class) | 4,262 tons |
| **Total** | **13,400 tons** |

| **DAMAGED** | **DAMAGED** |
|||
| 1 - Freighter (class unknown) | 3,500 tons |
| 1 - Light Cruiser (class unknown) | 7,000 tons |
| 1 - Light Cruiser (class unknown) | 7,000 tons |
| 1 - Transport (KOKURYU MARU class) | 7,369 tons |
| **Total** | **24,869 tons** |

---

- 1 -

— page 155 —
1/2/1943
FF12-10/A16-3(8)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01803
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SHAD Report of Sixth War Patrol.
CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 313
U.S.S. SHAD - SIXTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.
(28 September to 25 November, 1943).

* One-half credit assigned to the SHAD for the sinking of the KIMO in view of the fact that the GRAYBACK later sank this badly damaged vessel.

** These two vessels credited as damaged to the SHAD because they were later seen by the GRAYBACK and reported as being damaged. The time interval indicates that the SHAD apparently damaged or caused them to be damaged by collision because of his attack.

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
Intel. Cen. Pac. (1)
Ocean Areas
Comservpac (1)
{adv.Base Plan,Unit}
Cinclant (2)
Comsublant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Comsubspac (20)
SUBA, MI (2)
ComsubspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Subspace (2)
Consubstrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Subspace (1)

J. A. WOODRUFF, Jr.
Flag Secretary.

— page 156 —
0/0/1943
In Reply
Refer To:
FC5-4/A12-1/A16-3
Submarine Squadron Four
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
NOV 28 1943

From: Commander Task Group 17.14.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. FLEET.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
       (2) Commander-in-Chief, PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: War Diary.

Reference: (a) CinCpac Fleet Ltr. 10L-43, Rest.,
            A2-11/A12 Serial 1153 of 21 April, 1943.

Enclosures: (A) War Diary of Task Group 17.14 - Period
           26 September, 1943 to 21 November, 1943. Page 2
       (B) Coordinated Attack Doctrine of Task
            Group 17.14. Page 10
       *(C) Patrol Report of Task Unit 17.14.1-

— page 157 —
1. The task group was composed of three submarines, task units 17.14.1, 17.14.2, and 17.14.3.

This unit: Task Group 17.14.

The next higher echelon: Task Force 17.

Major Task Force: U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

2. The operations of Task Group 17.14 were carried out in accordance with Commander Submarines, PACIFIC FLEET operation order #217-43, Serial 001347 of 25 September, 1943.

3. Enclosures (B), (C) and (D) cover the details of the activities of Task Group 17.14 required by reference (a); this report will cover only the broader aspects of a "Wolf Pack" operation.

4. Exercises with convoys to and from Hawaii, with the helpful cooperation of the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, were conducted for several weeks prior to the departure of this Task Group. One, two and three submarines operated with the convoys, attacking singly, in pairs and in groups of three. It became apparent that three submarines would be the ideal number to use for a coordinated attack. Two could not be expected to cover all possibilities and four would be unwieldy. Until an effective means of employing and controlling more can be devised, I recommend the groups to be limited to three. However, it is quite possible and would be very effective to employ more than one group in the same general area by keeping them well separated by plan.

— page 158 —
5. Using the game board on the w.rdroom dance floor at the Submarine Base, problems were set up for groups to attack single ships and groups of ships. The studies of these games produced excellent results and a doctrine of coordinated attack by three submarines was evolved.

6. On 23 September, 1943, the Force Commander (Rear Admiral C. A. Lockwood, jr., USN) authorized a group consisting of the CERO, SHAD and GRAYBACK. The area assigned was the East China Sea.

7. The CERO and GRAYBACK left the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor on 26 September for Midway. Enroute various communication exercises were held and the doctrine was revised and put into shape. The SHAD joined in Midway and Task Group 17.14 left Midway on 1 October for the Area. Communication drills were held enroute and a few signals were added to the list.

8. Enemy convoys were expected to pass west of the Bonins to and from Tokyo Bay and this Group patrolled along these routes on 10 October. Submarines were submerged when GRAYBACK made a contact and attacked. The SHAD received the contact report and although various targets were sighted on 11 October, no attacks were made. The signal did not get through to the CERO. CERO heard about twelve depth charges but could not detect the direction. A depth charge direction indicator would have been very valuable here.

9. On the night of 11-12 October when proceeding toward area, CERO made contact by radar. The Commanding Officer did not know just where the other two submarines were and we did not have a grid of this area. No contact signal was made. This was a fault in the plan that needed correction. CERO attacked twice, sinking one ship and damaging another with four torpedoes. When last seen just before dark, it was low in the water with a destroyer alongside.

10. All submarines were in assigned squares on the 13th and proceeded to successive squares according to the plan.

11. On 14 October GRAYBACK made a contact. Again all submarines were submerged and signal did not get through.

— page 160 —
14. 30 October, GRAYBACK closed CERO to deliver report of action of 27th. Gave Commanding Officer GRAYBACK oral orders to return to Midway, since he had but three torpedoes remaining aft and was near the end of his fuel. Gave orders SHAD and CERO to patrol own areas. On 4 November, about 9:00 p.m., CERO sighted convoy. Trailed from ahead until about 1:00 a.m., 5th, then fired nine long range torpedoes, three at each of three larger targets. These appeared to be three large AKs, two medium AKs, and four escorts. Light conditions were bad for this attack, it being dark for periscope attack yet too light to close on surface for short range attack. Since the depth of water was around thirty fathoms shoaling toward the Yangtze bank, the Commanding Officer CERO was justified in accepting the long range shots rather than to close and get sighted, which might have resulted in the loss of opportunity to get ahead again in order to attack, because of the shallow water ahead. Three hits were heard and one flash was seen. It is estimated that one of the large AKs received one hit and another two hits. No evidence of ships sinking was noted.

15. With five torpedoes aft and one forward, CERO left her area on the seventh with sufficient fuel for one engine speed to Midway and the required reserve.

16. On 11 November, CERO sighted the masts of a ship. The visibility was a little hazy and the CERO made an end-around run on what was thought to be a good target. The maneuver was very cleverly executed and the CERO finally attained a firing position for using stern tubes. At this point, it was discovered that the target was an escort vessel of about 150 tons and the chaser was then in a position to be chased. No guns were seen and CERO made a battle surface when the target was about 5,000 yards away. Fifty rounds of 4" were fired and about four hits were obtained, setting the patrol craft on fire. It was interesting to note that the patrol craft headed directly for the CERO, dodging back and forth to avoid being hit. It is most probable that he was attempting to close to machine gun range. However, due consideration was given by the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. CERO, to the possibility that he was carrying a torpedo.

17. On 9 November, CERO diverted course and increased speed to attempt to intercept an enemy contact. This was not sighted. It is felt that more use should be put to es-12 195 tablished search methods.

— page 161 —
18. Each submarine performed very well even though it was the CERo's first patrol, the Captain of the GRAYBACK's first patrol and the SHAD's first patrol in the Pacific. The operations areas were in location where air attack could be expected at any time and Commanding Officers felt that the element of surprise could be best maintained by daylight submerged and night surface operating. Information of daylight contacts could not be transmitted to other submarines of the Group and the full effect of the Group could not be brought to bear.

19. While a complete analysis cannot be made, it is felt that in all cases torpedo performance was not satisfactory. CERo hit a large ship about 16,000 tons with four torpedoes and seven hours later she was still afloat. The GRAYBACK hit a ship similar to the ASAKA MARU with four torpedoes and was not sure that she sunk, but it is not conceivable that she could have remained afloat. The cruiser that received three hits from the SHAD is a remarkable ship if she remained afloat.

20. Experience with this Task Group indicates that the Task Group Commander actually embarked in one of the submarines is not entirely desirable and it is felt that the Task Group Commander can serve a more useful purpose at Pearl in that he may break down information and direct submarines to proceed in accordance with a search plan which he may lay out. He should be as closely attentive to the operations as if he were actually on board a submarine. Messages concerning the Group should be directed immediately to him and he should reply or pass out the operational information without delay. The Task Group Commander is in no position when he is embarked to send out long despatches including the details of a search. This, however, can be done by radio from Pearl. It is proposed to work out Task Group problems on the Game Board employing this method of control.

21. The Group Commander feels that with the benefit of the experience gained in this Group Patrol, other Groups should prove even more successful. Most of the contacts were made during daylight when submarines were submerged.

22. It appeared that the caps, learning of the presence of more than one submarine by the double attack on 12 October and further by hearing our radio signals, changed their counter-attack method. When a single submarine at-

— page 163 —
28. Early installation of P.P.I. screens is urged.
29. The development of the periscope radar and depth charge direction indicators should be speeded up if possible.
30. It is considered that the following damage was inflicted upon the enemy by this Group:

| Date | By  | Hits | Name and Type       | Tonnage |
|------|-----|------|||
| Oct. 12 | CERO | 2    | Like Tottori        | 5973    |
| 14    | GRAYBACK | (?) | Kozui              | 7072    |
| 22    | GRAYBACK | 4    | Asaka              | 7399    |
| 27    | SHAD  | 2    | Fuji               | 9138    |
| 27    | SHAD & GRAYBACK | 1 & 1 | Kamo              | 8524    |

| Date | By  | Hits | Name and Type       | Tonnage |
|------|-----|------|||
| Oct. 10 | GRAYBACK | 1 | AK                  | 5000 Est. |
| 12    | CERO | 4    | Mamiya             | 15820   |
| 22    | SHAD | 3    | Cruiser            | 7000 Est. |
| 22    | SHAD | 1    | Cruiser            | 7000 Est. |
| 27    | SHAD | 1    | AK                  | 3500 Est. |
| 27    | SHAD | 1    | Cryoku             | 7365    |

| Date | By  | Hits | Name and Type       | Tonnage |
|------|-----|------|||
| Nov. 4 | CERO | 2 in 1 | 1 in 1 | 2 AKs | 17500 |
| 11    | CERO | Gunfire | Patrol Boat | 150    | 63,335 |

TOTAL DAMAGE INFLICTED TO THE ENEMY: 101,441 TONS

12 02195
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 164 —
31. The Group Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and members of the crews of the CERO, GRAYBACK and SHAD on their excellent performance and recommends that awards in keeping with the policies of the Board of Awards be made to the personnel of these submarines.

[Signature]
[Date]
[Enclosure (A)]

12 02195
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 165 —
1/1
FF12-10/A12-1(1)
A4-3(1)(16)
Serial 01854
COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
DEC 7 1943

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
C.T.G. 17.14 1tr.
F05-4/A12-1/A16-3 of
28 November, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Commander Task Group 17.14 War Diary.

1. This first coordinated attack group under the command of Captain C. B. Monsen, U. S. Navy, operated in the East China Sea. This area has in the last few months been highly productive and in it convoys of 10-12 ships had been encountered. Prior to his departure, the group commander had had considerable experience in convoy attack exercise and was the originator of the convoy exercise game board. Both of these activities have proven very beneficial in giving submarines and their fire control teams valuable experience in convoy attack procedure.

2. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, consults in the statement made in paragraph 4 that the group sizes should be limited to a maximum of three submarines. This limitation is necessary because of the difficulty in controlling a larger number of submarines and also because the small size of the usual Japanese convoy does not warrant the use of more. Placing more than one group in an area is not considered feasible at this time, since there is an insufficient number of submarines available.

3. With regard to comments made in paragraph 20 as to control of the attack group, the Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, is not entirely in accord with the idea of attempting to control such a group from Pearl Harbor. Communication delays are inevitable since the Fox and Haiku schedules must necessarily carry a very great amount of traffic in addition to submarine traffic. It is believed that control of an attack group must be exercised by a group leader who is actually in the area and who may be a Division Commander or the senior commanding officer of the group. This officer supervises the day by day local patrol areas of his ships.

— page 167 —
1854
Serial: 01854
COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
DEC 7 1943

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
G.T.G. 17.14 ltr.
FC5-4/A12-1/A16-3 of
28 November, 1943.

Subject: Commander Task Group 17.14 War Diary.

---

to the minute picture may be available to the high command. Thus, the entire attack group can be and is D/F'd constantly, allowing the convoys to evade or at least prepare the escorts for "killer action". With our submarines in the Pacific, much credit for their success and our own light losses can be attributed to the fact that, in general, they have observed nearly complete radio silence; exceptions to this are made when contacts of convoys or of combatant units demand reports. It is strongly felt that this practice is sound. Although torpedo attacks reveal the presence of a submarine in area, radio silence still denies the enemy the continued information of the submarine's location and of the extent of his visit. Some of the problems which must be overcome in setting up a control policy if long range control is to be used are:

(a) Position of submarine must be known. This requires frequent use of the radio; this, of course, is also a problem when control is in the area.

(b) Weather conditions are usually unknown. This does not apply when control is in the area.

(c) Visibility - The same applies as in subparagraph (b).

(d) The condition of the submarine is not known; i.e., on the surface or submerged, material condition, fuel and torpedoes on hand, etc.

6. The suspected presence of submarine groups may well cause the Japanese to change his escort tactics as mentioned in paragraph 22. If such is the case, then another advantage has been gained by grouping submarines.

— page 168 —
12/21/1943
: 4-3(1)(16)
: Serial 01854
: CINCPAC
: Care of Fleet Post Office
: San Francisco, California,
: DEC 7 1943

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
C.T.G. 17.14 1tr.
FC5-4/A12-1/A16-3 of
28 November, 1943.

Subject: Commander Task Group 17.14 War Diary.

7. The recommendations made in paragraph 26 regarding weather fronts is considered worthy of investigation. Such practice has been used by the Germans who were able to give valuable information to their submarines by means of weather stations located in the Arctic regions. If not possible now, our weather central may soon be prepared to furnish submarines with weather front information along the Empire routes such that they can take advantage of these fronts. This will be investigated.

8. By copy of this endorsement the Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commander Task Group 17.14, not only for the efficient manner in which this group was organized and maintained, but for the intense study and preparation made prior to his departure.

Copy to:
C.T.G. 17.14.

— page 169 —
1/4/43
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Serial 03174
CONFIDENTIAL
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

2nd Endorsement to
C.T.G. 17-14 ltrs.
FC5-4/A12-1/A16-3 of
28 November 1943.

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet

Subject: Commander Task Group 17-14 War Diary.

1. Forwarded. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the First Endorsement are concurred in.

2. The decision of the Commanding Officer of the SHAD to spread 9 torpedoes over what he then believed to be three cruisers, is open to question. His intention was to make hits on three of them rather than limit it to two, with the hope that any ship hit would be finished off by the submarine of his own attack group. However, considering the probability of misses and "duds", and the ability of modern cruisers to stay afloat and continue at fair speed even after one or two torpedo hits, this question should be given further consideration.

3. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commander of Task Group 17-14 and the officers and men of the SHAD, CERCO, and GREYBACK, for their handling of this Co-ordinated Attack Group.

Copy to:
ComSubsFac
C.T.G. 17-14

G. H. MEMORRIS
Chief of Staff

— page 170 —
1/16-3
Serial: 081
C-O-N-F-I-D-T-S-S-I-F-D
From: To: Via:

Subject: U.S.S. S.S.D. - Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

Enclosure: (1) Subject Report.
(2) Track Chart. (For ComSubPac only.)

1. Enclosure (1), covering the SEVENTH war patrol of this vessel conducted off the southeast coast of HONSHU, including those islands of the NINPO SHOTO group north of the BONINS, during the period of 12 August 1944 to 1 October 1944, is forwarded herewith.

L. V. JULIHN.

FILMED
90961

— page 171 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived Pearl Harbor on 25 November 1943 from Sixth War Patrol and five days later proceeded to San Francisco for overhaul at BETHLEHEM STEEL. Scheduled for completion on 28 February 1944 but excessive gear noise in the starboard reduction gear delayed departure until 5 May 1944. Conducted ninety-six hours of full-power running enroute to Pearl to burnish gear and arrived on 11 May 1944. Commenced fifteen-day training period on 13 May 1944 prior departure on Seventh Patrol. Progressed through the 28 May 1944, two hours prior to embarkation on patrol, the decision was made to pull all main motor and main generator armatures. During this time it was decided also to enlarge the conning tower by addition of the elliptical SIS head and install the Sub Base Pearl Harbor E & R developed arrangement of periscope hoisting gear which removed periscope hoisting motors, contractor panel and drive from conning tower. All outstanding alterations were completed on this vessel both by Bethlehem Steel and Sub Base Pearl Harbor with the notable exception of shock mounting the main control cubicle due to non-availability of material. Major alterations were: Installation of LRT, PTI, IFT, AFT, VHT, JPT, and periscope in conning tower, TDC Mk III-5, high-powered SJ and slotted antenna, 4 inch gun forward, Berleley type trim pump, new type forward battery arrangement, enlarged conning tower, experimental periscope hoists, T-shaped gaskets on exterior hatches; plus conversion of 4 main ballast tank to fuel ballast, cutting down of bridge to "TRIGGER" type, experimental 40 MM gun installed on cigarette deck aft, removal of outboard battery ventilation piping.

Since the completion of the Sixth War Patrol the following officers were attached: Lieutenant R. L. KENNERLY, USNR; Lieutenant A. L. SCHALLIA, Jr., USN; Lieut. (jg) J. B. POTTER, JR., USNR; Lieut. (jg) Duane BROWN, USNR; Ensign G. L. MORRIS, USNR; Ensign F. C. TACKEY, USN; Ensign J. R. SCHUMACHER, USNR; and the following officers were detached: Lieut. Comdr. R. C. HUSTON, USNR; Lieutenant S. L. JOHNSON, USN; Lieut. (jg) J. B. POTTER, JR., USNR; Ensign B. F. GRIMES, USN; Ensign P. C. TACKEY, USN; Ensign J. R. SCHUMACHER, USNR; Boatswain W. L. MC CLURG, USN; Machinist E. R. REVES, USN; Machinist J. A. LOMIE, USN.

On 29 June 1944 Lieutenant Commander L. V. JULIAN, USN, relieved Commander E. J. MAC GHEGOR, USN, as commanding officer.

On 30 July 1944 commenced training period for new commanding officer. On 9 August 1944 training completed after firing nine exercise torpedoes including one Mark 18. The vessel was sound-tested during the training period. On the morning of 10 August 1944 fired short-range electric torpedoes in East Loch to test bow tubes. Results indicated all bow tubes unsatisfactory for Mark 18 torpedoes and will have to be modified at the first opportunity. Deemed at Beckoning point on night of 10 August 1944. 10 - 11 August 1944 loaded.

(B) MARRATIVE

12 August
1400 (W)
Departed Pearl for area via Midway pursuant to ComSubPac's Operation Order No. 273-44.

-1- ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 172 —
2100 Detached escort after making trim dive.

13 - 15 August Enroute to midway blessed by excellent weather. Conducted daily dives and drills. Pired the 4-inch gun at a target brought along for the purpose. Learned that the new slotted SJD antenna was a great improvement over the former solid-parabola model. Trained all hands in the use of the small caliber armament.

16 August 0510 (Y) Escorting planes sighted. Two SBD's.

0635 Sighted midway islands.

0037 Moored alongside U.S.S. GULF at Berth S-2, Midway. Commenced fueling. Transferred two men who were sick and received three new men on board.

1530 Underway escorted by planes.

1612 Made trim dive after sunset.

17 August Dropped this day crossing the International Date Line.

16 - 23 August Enroute to the area conducting the customary daily drills and training dives. Zigged during the daylight hours. Earned the SD radar until about 500 miles from Tokyo. Had five lookouts plus the J00D, OQD and high periscope watch during daylight hours; also the QB sound gear was turned on at all times but housed when speeds were in excess of ten knots. In the area it was planned to zig and run the SJ radar night and day when surfaced. No SD to be used in the area or within 500 miles of the Japanese mainland. Sighted a floating contact mine (with horns and barnacle encrustations) on the afternoon of 23 August. Circled and finally sank it with 20 mm fire in Lat. 320 10.31' N Long. 109 00' E. Weather throughout passage to the area was uniformly excellent.

(ALL TIMES KING UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.)

21 August 1810 (K) Crossed the eastern boundary of area LA heading for AOGH SHINA on which to make landfall.

25 August 0117 Radar contact on AOGH SHINA at approximately 80,000 yards. Headed up for course to run between AOGH SHINA and HACHIO JIMA before diving in the morning.

0255 Dove on SJ radar contact moving in from 18,000 yards to 9,000 yards very fast. Suspected aircraft although never saw anything. (Aircraft Contact #1)

- 2 - [ELICITURE (A).]

— page 173 —
0314
    Surfaced and proceeded as before. No moon now as it set early in the evening.

0612
    Dove and conducted submerged patrol just west of AOGASHIMA. Visibility quite poor due to frequent squalls. Using high periscope sweeps.

1203
    Sighted vessel and turned to attack. (Ship Contact 31). The target was soon revealed as a large trawler, so avoided. Decided against a battle surface due to the heavy cloud cover-age then prevalent.

26 August
    Conducting submerged patrol west of SUMISU SHIMA when the boat began to roll heavily. Visibility was practically nil with continuous showers and mist. After broaching twice decided to patrol on the surface.

1545
    Surfaced in the middle of a full-fledged typhoon and promptly took considerable water down the hatch. Turned over the scows slowly heading into the sea. After cleaning up below and airing out the boat at

1725
    Dove. Took three minutes before the boat caught and started down. Went to 200 feet to enjoy the evening meal as periscope patrolling was impossible.

2206
    Surfaced and spent a pretty rugged night hanging on.

27 August
0532
    Dove with no apparent decline in the fury of the storm. Had a position well fixed by the SJ radar on TOKI SHIMA which lay about 15 miles to the eastward. Remained at 200 feet most of the day with occasional looks at periscope depth to see if the weather had changed any.

1800
    Surfaced solely to air out the boat and check on the weather. Discovered the rain had stopped and the barometer was rising rapidly but the seas were only slightly lessened in their enormity.

1827
    Submerged again and enjoyed the evening meal at 200 feet.

2300
    Surfaced to find the storm had abated considerably though great care was still required in the selection of a course to prevent pooping or taking of water down the conning tower hatch.

28 August
0312
    Picked up a small contact on the radar at 7200 yards astern. Trailed on steady southerly course and speed. As target was obviously small, unscor ted, steering a straight course.

— page 174 —
0511
and the seas were still too rough for maneuvering, made no effort to close him. (Ship Contact 2).

0511
Submerged somewhere southwest of TORI SHIMA and conducted periscope patrol.

1730
Picked up SOU FU GAN ROCK. Headed to the eastward of the islands mentioned in the preceding entries of this report after surfacing in a smooth sea with a bright moon overhead.

2012
It took just twenty minutes to convert 14 fuel ballast to a main ballast including the time required to blow it up and vent it four times for cleaning purposes. A man was on deck about one minute turning the reach rods to the ten-pound blow out-off in the superstructure. It was not necessary to open any deck hatches. The rest was all done inside the boat by the leading auxiliaryman and the fuel oil king. This system, devised by Lt. F. GILLER, Jr., USN, uses no blank flanges.

29 August
Submerged during the forenoon but the clear skies and smooth seas, which prevailed, indicated an effort at better area coverage by surface patrolling.

1237
Surfaced with TORI SHIMA visible about 15 miles to the westward and commenced a run at two-engine speed to the east and north. After nightfall, when a battery charge was to be started, garnered a grey hair when it was learned that the interlock on the controllers to shift from "Generator" to "Battery" bus had been deranged so that a change could not have been made on a quick dive during the day.

30 August
Night surface patrolling when at.

0416
The CB sound operator reported pinging. (Ship Contact 3). Almost immediately the SJ radar found the target on the indicated bearing at about 17,000 yards. Not a very distinct pip. Named tracking stations and commenced to run with the target at a slightly reduced range. Before the tracking party had an answer it was nearly dawn, so closed the targets (three of them indicated by radar now) estimated track and at.

0535
Dove. Named battle stations.

0600
First glimpse of targets: PC boat in van wearing back and forth in front of noxt ship in column, a small heavily-laden freighter with a converted yacht patrolling astern. The SHAD was making the approach from the target's port side. A rather large angle on the bow indicated a nip-and-tuck effort to close the target to a proper firing range. Closed at high speed and was gratified to see the enemy vessels make a moderate port zig towards the SHAD.

-41- ENGLISH (A).

— page 175 —
0646
All set to shoot from forward with a 900 port track and a 1600-yard torpedo run when the patrol yacht astern of the target decided to wave this way and take up station on the target's port flank. This put the SHAD close and directly in front of him so at

: 0648
Rigged for depth charge attack and dropped down to ninety feet while the yacht passed overhead.

: 0654
Periscope depth again with the patrol yacht going blithely on his way. Still had a shooting set-up, though not so desirable as previously, with a 130° port track and torpedo run of nearly 3000 yards. Decided to "give it a go" anyway and at

: 0656
Commenced firing three torpedoes. The first torpedo fired with the gyro not matched (it went out at approximately 300 right of desired course). Almost forty-five seconds intervened before the second torpedo went out followed by the third at a proper interval. For a long period there was no observed reaction on the part of the enemy to this performance until the PC boat turned astern and apparently intercepted the track of the first torpedo. The other two torpedoes were still running when the PC escort was seen approaching "bows on" down the reverse of their tracks. (ATTACK NO. 1)

: 0701
Ordered 300 feet and at

: 0702
The first of 314 depth charges fell. These came at intervals until

: 0758
The last of the depth charge reaction although screws were heard at odd times for nearly another forty-five minutes.

: 0937
At periscope depth. All clear. Commenced reload forward at once. Although no claim to destruction of this target can be made with the paucity of facts at hand, the following small account of evidence indicates a slight possibility of this: (1) The bottle sound operator, a man of great skill and experience, followed the second or third torpedo directly into the target which he had on his gear; however, he heard no explosions. He reports that in this regard he had heard no explosions either on a previous patrol of the SHAD, although evidence of hits was manifest. (2) The diving officer, plus a man in the forward room, believed they heard muffled explosions shortly before depth charging. The man in the forward room had them timed for a torpedo run of 3200 yards. (3) Later on the JP sound operator had noises which sounded to him like the breaking up of a target. The reported bearing was about 800 from the estimated last position of the target; however. (4) After surfacing around noon there were large oil patches which the SHAD passed through for about one hour. Just prior to a forced dive a particularly heavy

- 5 -

ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 176 —
0-0-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
accumulation of oil streaked off in the direction of TORI SHIMA. (5) The persistent two-hour search and counter-attack when the screws of both vessels were frequently heard may also have indicated a hit. If the target were unscathed, it would seem more logical that just one of the escorts would have remained for holding down purposes until escape of the merchantman could have been effected. Straws in the wind.

1205
Surfaced and passed through heavy oil streaks for the next hour.

1317
Dove on SJ radar contact followed by sight of a ZEKE coming in fast from the direction of TORI SHIMA. (Aircraft Contact 2)

1523
One bomb. Remained submerged for the rest of the day.

2006
Surfaced and commenced run to westward preparing to shift to Area 5B.

31 August
A brilliant, moon-filled night with a calm sea. Dove three times at various periods because of the appearance of a pip on the radar at about 5500 yards which closed rather slowly for a plane but too fast for surface craft. Each time it was more or less astern putting us up-moon; but even in the bright luminescent night nothing in the sky or on the surface could be seen. Wasn't sure it was aircraft but didn't want to take a chance on having ZEKE drop his "other shoe" to find out. The range at contact indicated a small target.

0410
Interference on SJ. It might be the PILOTFISH to the south in the BOMINS moving near the northern part of his area.

0529
Submerged during the forenoon.

1216
Surfaced and headed up to the northwest to enter new area by the morning. During the afternoon passed through considerable flotsam such as oil drums, kegs, life jackets, a corpse in a life jacket. Whodunnit?

1505
Picked up pips on radar similar to last night. This time the OOD had daylight on his side. In a moment the mystery was solved. A flock of birds appeared on one bearing and a large bird closed in on the other. It seems probable that the SHAD spent a sleepless night ducking birds on the radar.

1 September
Headed up toward KAHTOKI on two engines but did not make it before daylight. Spent the day submerged about 40 miles bearing 130° T from SHOTO ISSAKI.

- 6 -

ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 178 —
1000
Sighted ships coming southward from MIKI Saki. (Ship Contact #6) Starboard bow angles. SAD was inshore of them. Turned to seaward to close. Practically dead ahead. Group consisted of a medium freighter (about 5000 tons) well in van followed by two small cargo carriers, (estimated about 1000 tons) apparently self propelled, very similar in appearance to our conerete stowage barges. On the seaward (port) quarter of the freighter was a patrol craft of non-descript PC type. To the south of the SAD were two motor sampans apparently just listening and waiting.

1010
Targets came on quite fast and zigged to present a port angle on the bow. Still a good setup, though it put the SAD right under the escort again. Gave a stern-tube shot, however, with electrics for a change and admirably suited to the glassy sea condition.

1013
Ready to fire. Target again zigged away and so at

1015
Commenced firing two tubes aft, track angle 900, torpedo run 3000 yards. (AITACK NO. 2) Did not fire three torpedoes as planned because no TDO "solution" light was to be had with the increased run of torpedo due to a larger angle on the bow inserted at firing. This was commanding officer's first experience with electronics. Realized later that although it was well known the run of the electric torpedo was limited to about 2700 yards, old habits of thought in times of stress eradicated this fact and great was the resulting confusion.

1020
One torpedo explosion clearly heard. Periscope not up.

1021
With escort close aboard on port beam quietly went deep and rigged for silent running.

1031
First of 16 depth charges at intervals for about one hour.

1301
Periscope depth. All clear. If it is not unreasonable that an electric torpedo could run for four minutes, it is believed that one hit was probably registered on the target. The JP sound operator reported hearing the torpedo run all the time up to the explosion. The circumstance was that temperature has been consistently around 850 to 870 which would aid a long-than-usual torpedo run. If these torpedoes explode at end of run, which from available information is evidently quite unlikely, then both torpedoes should reasonably have exploded on the bottom. The water under the target was believed to have been at least 300 feet in depth.

- 8 - EAGLESURF (A).

— page 179 —
1.040 Heard a string of 12 distant depth charges. Wondered if the ALBACORE had made contact and was getting the local treatment.
: 1.026 Received one aircraft bomb although plane was never sighted. Went to 120 feet for a while. Heard distant depth charging at intervals throughout the day.
: 2005 A string of eight distant depth charges. Something or somebody is catching it.
: 2011 Surfaced with moon just newly risen.
: 2225 Dove as plane with running lights closed in fast. (Aircraft Contact #5)
: 2324 Surfaced.
: 4 September 0012 Radar interference to southwest. Just be the ALBACORE all safe and sound.
: 0022 The usual APR signals on 82 and 102 mcs. heard.
: 0145 Dove again for plane sighted visually at about one mile. No running lights but saw exhausts this time. (Aircraft Contact #7)
: 0252 Surfaced.
: 0430 Had to go to four engines in order to close the coast by diving time.
: 0552 Dove about 5.5 miles bearing 180° T from MIKI SAKI.
: 0656 Closing beach sighted a couple of patrol boats and a motor sampan running up and down the coast inside the 100 fathom curve.
: 0700 A fix positioned SHAD inside the 100 fathom curve about 2500 yards due east of MIKI SAKI LIGHT. Turned to southwest to patrol coast and remained practically stationary for the next three hours due to the northeasterly sweep of the prevailing current.
: 0702 One aircraft bomb not too close but rather definitely indicating a lack of welcome. No plane ever sighted.
: 0915 Patrol boat in sight at various times commenced pinging and gradually made a wide circle to seaward. Throughout the day could hear distant depth charging at intervals. (Ship Contact #9)

- 9 -
ENCLOSURES (A).

— page 180 —
11147
Patrol boat pinging with another in company now converging on SHAD. 'Planned down to 250 feet rigging for depth charge attack and silent running. The glassy surface gives the A/S outfit maximum ping-range conditions.

: 1300
Periscope depth. All clear.

: 1354
Pinging and visual appearance of patrol craft again caused a retirement to the depths and silent running once more. This is something of a routine.

: 1458
Periscope depth. All clear.

: 2013
Surfaced and moon same up about fifteen minutes later.

: 5 September
Headed up toward OAI SAKI tonight for a change of scenery. All work and no play off the west coast of the KUAI NO NADA.

: 0525
Dove on radar contact at 18,000 yards closing rapidly. (Aircraft Contact 29) Did not see the plane but it was apparently coming directly in from ahead. After daylight found it very difficult to ascertain position accurately due to sameness of coast and no identification of numerous peaks to be seen. Finally believed we were over the tongue of relatively shallow water extending due south of OAI SAKI substantiated by the radar fix taken prior to diving. A cautious fathometer reading gave 30 fathoms. Not good. Apparently a strong easterly set had taken charge during our entry here. Turned to the southwest as the most direct course out to the 100 fathom line.

: 0940
Sighted heavy column of smoke to westward on horizon. (Ship Contact 111) Judging by smoke's progress it looked as though SAD was in an excellent position. At this time had just passed a red buoy about 1000 yards to starboard. Estimated position Let. 34° 31.5' N Long. 138° 07.5' E. It seemed to be just inside the 100 fathom curve about 12,000 yards due south of the coast.

: 0952
Headed west at increased speed to get in deeper water as position was still not accurately determined. Went to battle stations.

: 1001
Sighted V/L patrolling along coast from east to west. (Aircraft Contact 110)

: 1021
Situation now clear. A large tanker, fully loaded, exact type not seen in current publications but believed of about 7 or 8 thousand tons with following escorts: two motor sampans just ahead of him on other bow, an LCI close on his starboard (seaward) quarter, a patrol craft further seaward on his starboard quarter, two motor sampans out on his starboard beam.

-10- ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 181 —
1025
Tanker zigged sharply toward the coast at nearest range of 5000 yards. Went ahead at high speed; but no luck! This valuable target could not be closed.

1039
Turned and pulled clear to seaward with escort pings tuning up in several directions. It soon looked as though OWL'S SAIL LIGHT was the point at which a "changing of the guard" took place as there could be seen coming from the eastward several more patrol craft, including what appeared to be a sort of DE. In addition a flight of about 5 four-engined planes were briefly sighted overhead, undoubtedly LAVIS though the direct underbody glimpse did not reveal the flying boat hull. (aircraft Contact #11)

1103
Tent deep quietly, rigging for depth charge attack and silent running as two pinging patrol craft commenced to close in from astern. One of these was quite persistent and trailed until

1301
Then his pinging off in the distance could be heard but he was no longer visible through the periscope. Noticed on a high hill west of OWL SAIL LIGHT, estimated position Lat. 34° 14' N Long. 138° 01' E, two high towers with a lattice work on them believed to be properly identified as large radars. The events of the morning; i.e. the plane which precipitated the morning dive, the sharp zig of the tanker away from SHAD's position, the heavy air and surface coverage finally noted, coupled with experiences which followed upon surfacing, strongly indicated that some radars in the vicinity were functioning very efficiently. It should be stated that the SHAD went closer than usual to the coast before diving this morning, quite by accident of navigation rather than by intent.

2007
Surfaced and discovered the enormous set of 7 knots to the southwest since the morning contact. This in contrast to the easterly set of the night before.

2025
Searchlight sighted bearing 0000 T, estimated position Lat. 34° 56' N Long. 137° 09' E. It was quite dark before moonrise when a lookout sighted in the loom of the searchlight, which was pointed skyward and generally on the SHAD's bearing, a high speed craft heading this way. The radar had not been searching across the land, in accordance with instructions, so did not pick this target up. Cleared on four engines and the enemy vessel was not seen again. This incident gives further weight to the evidence of enemy radars in this

- 11 - ENCLOSURE (i).

— page 182 —
2115
: 6 September
: 0L47
: 0503
: 0533
: 0631
: 0751
: 0803
: 0916
: 0916
: 0927
: 1030
: 1125
: 2001

Immediately vicinity. Due to the set of the current DINO SAKI was the closest point of land upon surfacing.

I. Sonris.

Decided to head down toward KAWTORI SAKI for the morning dive.

Sighted ship almost dead ahead in moonlight. (Ship Contact 312) Looked very close but radar could not get a pip until range had been closed to 12,000 yards. This indicated a relatively small ship with two others now faintly discernible near by. Commenced tracking at once and discovered base course of enemy vessels to be about 3100 T, apparently headed for the same spot as the S.A.D.

Dis dawnlight was coming in rapidly, decided to close the coast at high speed with the hope of interception in a daylight submerged attack. Had to haul out of sight of targets in order to do any running as the new day's light was not in the S.A.D's favor. The coast of KAWTORI SAKI was clearly visible now and at

Dove and ran at high speed on what was believed to be a converging course with the targets.

Sighted just the tops of one small vessel. Went to battle stations. Tracked and held on until

But could never close.

Another target, a small cargo carrier, was sighted and commenced approach.

Target disappeared in rain and was not seen again.

Sighted target which was either a cruiser or a destroyer coming suddenly out of the rain. (Ship Contact 313) Drops on periscope rendered vision difficult. Turned to attack. Target was a LIEKE destroyer. Trailed and closed him (never could get inside of 1000 yards) until

When DD joined up with some small cargo vessels off KAWTORI SAKI and herded them all off to the southward.

Sighted two FETE's patrolling the coast. Secured from battle stations. (aircraft Contact 313)

Turned southward and followed along the coast encountering the usual rash of patrol craft and motor sampans which infest the 100 fathom curve.

Surfaced and headed eastward.

- 12 - EMULSION (..).

— page 183 —
2210
: 7 September
: 0548
: 1956
: 9 September
: 0532
: 0730
: 1140
: 2000
: 10 September
: 0150
: 0532
: 1300

**Note:** The text is a detailed transcript of a WWII submarine patrol report, including various sections such as critical instructions, distinguishing between typed and handwritten text, preserving formatting, preserving unclear or degraded text, and preserving special elements.

— page 184 —
11 September 1952
: 1505
: 1518
: 1952
: 11 September 1952
: 0527
: 0739
: 0840
: 0848

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

while after rising out of the water. Convoy finally sighted but remained at considerable distance most of the time as they hugged the beach. Finally determined the group to consist of three small vessels; i.e., a type escort, and two stacks-aft cargo carriers, none estimated at more than 2000 tons. Escorts besides A were PC boat, large sampan, three smaller motor sampans; plus, the usual clarcraft overhead.

Convoy zigged towards as anticipated in making turn down coast. Range to A escort closed to 2000 yards momentarily, PC escort very close aboard on bow. Was just about to fire at run of 2300 yards, 1000 port track when decided tracking dope had been too poor and range was too great for such small ships. Only just before firing had any ranges at all been possible, and the target used had been the A escort which was maneuvering considerably. Did not realize his escort capacity until latterly so nearly of size with the other two vessels was he. The decision was made reluctantly but with a distinct sense of innate better judgment prevailing.

Turned away and quietly went deep as escorts milled overhead.

One aerial bomb, reason not known as SLD was at 150 feet. (aircraft Contact 18)

Surfaced and decided to return to save spot tomorrow. So far, the theory that enemy targets would cut the corner of the sight had been clearly disproven. SLD was 5000 yards from the beach during the approach with the targets still in shore by 3 - 4 thousand yards.

Koon just at the quarter now and not rising until about half an hour after midnight.

Dove in same position as previous day and commenced closing patrol position inside 100 fathom curve.

Large patrol boat, zero angle on bow, suddenly appeared out of peculiar haze prevailing. Quietly went deep and rigged for silent running. Numerous other screws heard coming in, among them slow heavy ones.

Came up for a look and sighted following: One "killer" escort vessel close aboard, two motor sampans nearby, two small sailing-motor sampans to seaward; and far inshore, hull down, passing to the northeast toward D.I.O. SLI a large stack-aft tanker, already with a starboard angle of 1000. (Ship Contact 20)

Forced deep again while a veritable convention of milling screws went on overhead. They wore all over the dial. This was convincing enough! Three days here and good contacts every

— page 185 —
12 September 0531
Dove about 7 miles south of coast west of OIAI SAKI LIGHT where the 100 fathom curve bends close to the beach to form a small bay of deep water. Position was not certain due to the bad weather prevailing and the peculiarity of the terrain making even a radar fix difficult. Used the fathometer judiciously and by quick cuts on the coast during rare intervals when the rain and mist broke open pretty accurately confirmed the location.

1011
Sighted small black smoke column coming out of rain squall to westward. It moved rapidly to the west and nothing more was seen of it. Just have passed north of SAD during one of the periods of low visibility.

1145
Glimpsed patrol boat in distance but he too passed out of sight soon afterwards and was not seen again. (Ship Contact #22)

2004
Surfaced in rough sea and decided to try the entrance to the SURUGA WAN on the morrow as our first venture in a new area.

13 September 0012
Received via HAIKU schedule first report of ALBACORE's contact of two vessels heading through SLAD's area. Put on four engines to gain position at once. While enroute now position received second message from the ALBACORE, this time on the area frequency. The ALBACORE's third contact report was being copied on the area frequency when it was re-broadcast on the HAIKU. ALBACORE's excellent handling of this contact is deeply appreciated.

0532
Dove about seven miles due north of MIYAKI SHIMA and conducted alert periscope patrol in hope of interopting ships reported by the ALBACORE. Saw nothing but two small motor vessels throughout the day.

2005
Surfaced and conducted night patrol westward of MIYAKI SHIMA and HIKU SHIMA enroute SURUGA WAN.

114 September 0525
Made morning dive in approximate center of entrance to SURUGA WAN on the line. Running between OAI and IRO SAKI LIGHTS.

0634
Sighted masts of ship in morning sun and soon went to battle stations. (Ship Contact #24) Target came on rapidly with SHAD in good position ahead. Two PC escorts, one on each quarter were now evident. Target was small AK estimated at about 2500 to 3000 tons, and believed to be very new as it had sharp, clean lines and was freshly painted. Sighted KATE.

- 15 - INCLOSURE (A).

— page 186 —
0719
With TDC checking nicely, 650 port track, torpedo run of 800 yards, depth setting 4 feet, commenced firing three electric torpedoes aft. (ATTACK NO. 3) This was considered a nearly perfect set-up.

0720
Observed nearest escort close aboard with zero bow angle so decided to take full advantage of the wakeless feature of the torpedoes and started down deep. No torpedo explosions.

0727
Two very heavy detonations, now believed to be aircraft bombs, inasmuch as there were only two of them and the rush of water through the superstructure which lasted about 20 or 30 seconds after each explosion indicated the source as having been deep. Nothing more but the milling of screws as target and escorts proceeded on their way. This whole affair was a terrific disappointment as a complete post-firing check reveals absolutely nothing which could account for the failure to hit the target. Only the possibility that a depth setting of four feet was too shallow for the number four sea then obtaining presents itself as an answer to the problem. As commented on by the bridge-playing executive officer, "Perfect hand, well played, down four!" (NOTE: CSP dispatch received this very night gave confirmation to the suggested reason for no hits.)

0906
Came to periscope depth. All clear. Regained patrol station and had the thin solace of realizing the advantages of electric torpedoes which allowed the attack to remain undetected. It is believed the escorting plane may have seen a swirl in the water as speed was put on to go deep after firing, thus bringing down the two bombs. Two patrol boats and a KATE (Aircraft Contact 20) were sighted during the remainder of the day but no more targets.

1311
Austere and lovely FUJI SINA cleared her head above the clouds for a while and many of the crew were given the opportunity to see the famous landmark.

1958
Surfaced and decided to try a night patrol between MIYAKI and ZENSURO rocks. Hastened down that way on two engines.

15 September 0526
Dove between MIYAKI SINA and KOZU SINA for day submerged patrol of this area. Three small sampans and one cargo coaster only contacts of the day.

1955
Surfaced and patrolled down between MIYAKI SINA and KOZU SINA to ZENSURO rocks enroute to SAKURA. Air where it was intended to conduct the next day's submerged patrol. Very dark night.

2100
Passed about five lighted sampans south of KOZU SINA.

- 16 -
ENDOSURE (A).

— page 187 —
16 September
0340
Well into mouth of SURUGA WAN with OLAI SAKI and IRO SAKI LIGHTS both visible when radar picked up contact at 5000 yards on starboard bow. Distinct pip but small and drawing away to the eastward.

0453
Reversed course to southward both to avoid this small contact, believed to be a patrol boat, and to kill time until the morning dive inasmuch as the present position was about the desired spot for submerging.

0500
Came back to northerly course and at

0530
Dove.

0608
Enough daylight to get an excellent cut on FUJI SAKI and IRO SAKI. Also sighted heavy smoke column south of IRO SAKI with bearing hauling across to westward through the south. (Ship Contact 26) Commenced closing southward at once.

0632
Battle stations.

0644
Target now showing above horizon occasionally, a nice freighter-transport estimated similar to SAIPAI IAFU (OII 206-J revised page 39). Just the tops of an escort on the near (landward) side could be seen well back on the target's starboard quarter. A JAKU was sighted circling the target now. (Aircraft Contact 21) Sky overcast, sea about force three. Very favorable conditions for an attack.

0701
Rigged for depth charge attack and silent running as target zigged slightly away giving a nice set-up and also throwing the starboard escort back farther on the target's quarter.

0709
Commended firing four 3k 23 torpedoes from forward (spread 4" inside stern, 2" inside bow, 2" aft of stern, 2" ahead of bow) with torpedo run of 2200 yards, gyros 100 L, track angle 950 starboard, depth setting 6 feet. (ATACK NO. 4) It was believed from the close observations just prior to firing that the target was loaded with troops, although this is not positive due to the grey light of the overcast morning and the swift passage of events at such a time. That the vessel was fully loaded is certain.

0710
After the last torpedo left the tube took a quick look aft of the target to check the escort. Observed the following: a MINIMIZER destroyer with about 1100 starboard angle on the bow apparently in the act of crossing from the target's starboard to port quarter; and astern of the DD, but definitely on the near quarter, a large P boat. It is not known if there were

— page 188 —
0-0-N-7-I-D-8-H-T-I-7-L

any other escorts on the seaward side of the target. Had the
fleeting thought of attempting to shoot the DD with the two
torpedoes remaining in the tubes forward. It's uncertainties
due to range and his movements at the moment, the presence of
the PC and the plane (not seen for the past fifteen minutes),
plus the tell-tale fan of four torpedo tracks closely indicating the SHAD's position swiftly dashed any such temerity aside
and the order was given to go deep -- but fast!

0711
Three quick torpedo explosions heard clearly throughout the
ship. The sound operator followed the torpedoes directly into
the target, easily distinguishable by its slow heavy screws.
The heavy screws were never heard again and for about three
minutes definite crackling and breaking up noises could be
heard on the target's bearing. It is believed he sank at once.

0714
First of 39 depth charges. Wow! what a lacing, but what could
lessen any of the joy and thrill of hearing those beautiful
torpedo hits after so much disappointment and heartache. From
the least to the highest the SHAD's confidence and morale was
revitalized and renewed by the music of those wonderful
explosions.

0908
Last of depth charges but screws and piping were heard until
nearly another hour.

1153
Periscope depth. All clear. Rainy and overcast with heavy
seas making up. Ideal coverage for retirement from the scene
of action.

1946
Surfaced in rough sea and headed for the ZENI SU - HIKURA
SHIITA area.

17 September
Conducted east-west patrol between ZENI SU rocks and HIKURA
SHIITA during the night diving south of HIKURA SHIITA for day
submerged patrol. No contacts of any description. Very strong
currents experienced as usual in close proximity to those
islands.

1949
Surfaced and headed back for the SURUGIYA PATROL in the
morning. Seas were running very high from the southwest and
not just a few personnel were violently ill.

16 September
0519
Dove on the customary east-west line drawn between OAI and
HIO SHIITA on the western side of SURUGIYA. Seas were still
enormous and a voiceless soliloquy was entered into to determine just how much actual firing could be done under such
conditions. Finally decided that it's target was big enough
where a least depth setting of twelve feet could be used
safely, an attack would be feasible; otherwise, the SHIITA
presence was nothing more or less than reconnaissance.

- 16 - ENCLOSURE (1).

— page 189 —
0-0-N-P-I-D-3-N-T-I-4-L

Patrolling turned out to be quite a business with the periscope looking through brilliant green water one moment and then archly surveying an enormous valley between seas next. Obviously under neither conditions was the covering radius very great. Remarkable atmospheric clarity accompanied the heavy seas condition, however and land on both sides of the bay as well as towering PUJI SAN made piloting an easy matter.

Sound picked up sorew noises followed by visual sighting of the tops of a vessel. (Ship Contact 22) The low radius of visibility previously mentioned was thus confirmed for the enemy vessel was already close at hand. Turned to approach at once and between the waves was soon revealed a small cargo vessel heading eastward. No escort was visible and target passed at a least range of about 3500 yards. Ceased all attempts to close when the small nature of the vessel was positively determined as it was felt the accurate firing of torpedoes at the depth indicated by the target's size would be a great uncertainty as well as a fruitless revelation of the SHAD's continued presence in this excellent hunting ground.

Sighted KAT2 close aboard on opposite side of SHAD flying westward. (Aircraft Contact 22) with the possibility that the periscope may have been sighted started down to ninety feet for a short interlude.

Just as the deeper depth was being sought sound picked up fast screws close on port bow which passed rapidly aft on that side. Believe it was the seaward escort of the target and SHAD was passing down between the two.

At periscope depth again. Nothing in sight.

Surfaced in seas still very rough though somewhat abated since morning.

Dove at sight of plane's running lights nearly overhead on quarter. (Aircraft Contact 22) Searchlights had previously been observed astern in the general region of OMI SAKI which undoubtedly had some connection with the plane's presence.

Surfaced.

Dove again as plane was now sighted low over water coming in astern with apparently a bright landing light turned on. (Aircraft Contact 22) as it was a dark but unusually clear night cannot decide if either of these contacts was directed against the SHAD or merely coincidental. The use of running lights and then a bright landing light evokes a measure of incredulity if deliberate attacks were being made.

Surfaced and continued southward planning to enter SURUG. WAN again in the morning.

- 19 - SCHOOLS (1).

— page 190 —
19 September
0059
Encountered definite siren noises on sound gear and turned
away. Nothing by sight or radar however. This was repeated
twice more during the next hour and one half and still remains
a mystery. It was not a shipboard noise as it changed relative
bearing.

0210
Radar contact. Lat. 34° 01' N Long. 138° 29' E, bearing 312° T,
21,000 yards. (Ship Contact 28) Commenced tracking at once.
Finally had a large and small target (the latter visible at
13,000 yards) zigging heavily on approximate base course 240° T.

0400
Having gained position ahead turned in for the attack and
flooded down. Very dark night with faint horizon visible.

0417
The enemy vessels had been allowed to close in to about 9,000
yards when the tracking party detected a course change of about
ninety degrees, so had to blow up and try to gain position
ahead once more. Only another hour of darkness remained. It
would be genuine good fortune if the SUD could make it.

0440
Target now zigging heavily on base course 170° T.

0510
Bridge personnel could dimly see targets on horizon in faint
dawn light. The one to the left looked bigger but the radar
indicated that the one to the right was the larger though
more distant.

0530
Finally had to dive because of approaching daylight. It did
not look very favorable from an attack point of view inasmuch
as both targets now had large bow angles and were still
about 9,000 yards away.

0540
Destroyer type vessel now near in gloom of dawnlight and act-
ing very much as though he were searching for something. In
the distance and very indistinct was seen the other vessel but
it looked strange and elongated. It was also smoking heavily.
With all tubes ready approached the destroyer.

0553
Suddenly the target presented a ninety-degree starboard angle
on the bow. It was clearly seen to be a CHIDORI TBD. Put in a
quick set-up on the TCD and commenced firing the bow tubes.
(ATTACK NO. 5) Fired four Mk 23 torpedoes with 30° right
gyro, 110° starboard track angle, torpedo run of 2600 yards.

0554
After all torpedoes had left the tubes glanced at the other
target and got the definite impression he was a small PC type
vessel headed for the CHIDORI. He was not smoking. Fearing
possible misses on the target and consequent speedy counter-
attack down the torpedo tracks, ordered deep submachine gun
silent running.

- 20 - ENCLOSURE (..).

— page 191 —
0555
Heard three clear torpedo explosions followed by the most audible sounds of bubbling, creaking, groaning, and cracking. It was quite perceptible through the hull everywhere in the boat and cheers of jubilation rang through the SHAD as it was realized the target had been practically demolished. So the hunter became the hunted and it was good to savor the results of the chase.

0558
Heard fast screws approaching from the direction of the target followed by 11 depth charges.

0729
Placing in the distance when one loud depth charge was received fairly close aboard. Suspected an aircraft bomb as no more fell. The single a/S craft working on the SHAD following this attack produced some new sounds not heard before although other submarines have mentioned a similar experience. These were light popping noises like pistol shots heard throughout the counter-attack plus audible splashes and no depth charges. Letallic clanking was also heard for sometime although nothing more ominous resulted.

It is realized a hypothesis to explain what was seen on the radar and what actually eventuated is required. No vessel the size of a CHIDRI would appear on the radar screen at 21,000 yards, the range at first contact. It is believed the following situation actually obtained. A large vessel (type unknown) escorted by a CHIDRI and a smaller vessel similar to a PC boat was intercepted by the SHAD on base course 2400 T. This would head them for SHIMO. HIS JET to arrive shortly after daybreak. It is assumed they issued from the SHAD area via the channel off IAD SHL. SHAD picked them up almost due south of O.C.I. SHAD. Tracking was conducted at ranges of about 12,000 yards where a large and a small vessel were always visible on both PPI and "L" screens. Then an attempt was made to turn in for a surface attack (the range having closed to 9,000 yards) the enemy vessels, apparently equipped with some sort of radar, detected SHAD's presence and turned radically away. The nearest range to the targets at diving time was still about 9,000 yards, so it is conceivable that the bearing and rough distance of SHAD's diving position from the enemy was known to him. The CHIDRI closed this position leaving the major target to be escorted away by the PC boat which had never appeared on the radar screen because the range had never been closed sufficiently coupled with the false belief that the one small pip observed was the only escort any way. With the large target safely away from the diving area the PC boat changed course to assist the CHIDRI in searching for the SHAD. What resulted has already been recounted.

0947
Ports cope depth with faint piping astern. Just sighted tops of searching vessel with two KITES circling low around him continuously. (aircraft Contact 25) He was taking no chances.

— page 193 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-D-I-T-I-A-L
Phosphorescence from bow wave was a French-curve of unwanted beauty. Searchlights seen in direction of OIAI SAKI as on previous occasions.

2024
Quick dive as exhausts from plane coming in dead ahead were sighted after radar had just reported contact. (Aircraft Contact #27)

2046
Surfaced. About three lights seen on horizon spread out at wide angles of bearing. Blinking noted from them at odd intervals.

2100
Dove as plane was followed in from astern by light of his twin exhausts. (Aircraft Contact #20)

2135
Surfaced and decided to patrol up through channel off IWO SAKI and the islands of the IZU SHOTO group while enroute to new area.

21 September
Night surface patrolling between IWO SAKI and TO SHIJA.

0305
Turned eastward and rounded TO SHIJA at a distance of two miles in order to minimize the possibility of radar detection from O SHIJA.

0401
Had small vessel on radar closing from starboard quarter. Went to four engines briefly and rapidly lost enemy astern.

0444
Slowed down once more proceeding to morning diving station.

0520
Dove on southerly course bearing 1200 T from TO SHIJA distance ten miles.

0720
Sighted two unidentified fighter planes, bearing 0300 T, distance five miles. (Aircraft Contact #29)

0740
Sighted two SALLY's, bearing 0950 T, distance ten miles. (Aircraft Contact #30)

0855
Sighted tops of vessel bearing 0170 T. (Ship Contact #32) Vessel closed rapidly with zero angle on the bow; and as he was unidentifiable from such an angle, went to battle stations.

0907
Target now appeared to be a gunboat or minelayer of some kind so decided to shoot him if possible.

0920
With stern tubes ready, track angle 1100 starboard, torpedo run 2600 yards, gyro 30° R, depth setting 4 feet, fired the three electric torpedoes remaining aft. (ATTACK NO. 6) At the instant of this sound operators who had reported fast screws bearing to the right of the target just prior to firing, glimpsed for a moment a smaller vessel of patrol variety.

- 23 - ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 194 —
0923
Heard one loud explosion. All three sound operators (JP, CB, and JK) reported as follows: (1) Target's jammers slowed and then ground to a stop almost immediately. (2) Though much fainter than on the previous attack, the noises of sinking were unmistakable; i.e., bubbling, creaking, breaking and clunking. The after torpedo room heard several dull explosions following the loud detonation. For about five minutes the breaking up noises were heard on the sound gear. From this it is believed the target sank though somewhat more leisurely than the CHIDOKI of two days ago. Target reasonably identified as similar to the PG "MAGA" listed under "auxiliaries" in ONI 41-42.

0925
Sound reported light fast screws in direction of stricken vessel. The target's heavier screws were never heard again.

0928
First of 10 depth charges. A/S vessel was relatively quite persistent as his screws and pings did not fade out until nearly three hours later.

1300
Periscope depth. All clear. Restored conditions to normal.

1422
Sighted BATTY bearing 010° T, range eight miles. (aircraft Contact 351)

1505
Sighted two unidentified planes, range four miles. (aircraft Contact 32) Had intermittent faint echo-ranging throughout the afternoon.

1751
Two distant depth charges.

1755
Sighted several small craft at various bearings prior to sunset most of which were heard pinging at odd times.

1949
Surfaced and headed down between ISAYA SIDA and the smaller islands to the westward conducting night surface patrol.

22 September
Heading down toward HUIJO JIMA to patrol the northerly approaches to its harbors.

0400
Two torpedo wakes making a 120° port track angle with SAD passed ahead as follows: one just under stem, the other about 20 yards beyond. (Lat. 35° 26' N Long. 139° 30' E) Nothing identifiable on the radar. Put rudder over full right and went all ahead flank. There! what a lot of cold sweat, dry throats and sandy knees after that horrible minute! The arrow-like tracks were clearly visible to both deck officers and the port lookouts all of whom sighted them at about the same instant. It was a very dark night, SAD making ten knots on

— page 195 —
0520
Dove about 18 miles bearing 350° T from HACHIJO JIMA to conduct submerged patrol along northerly approaches to the harbors of that island.

: 0943
Sighted about four large motor cockers with sails heading down for the ISLAND from the north escorted by a motor torpedo boat. (Ship Contact #35). Not large enough to shoot, so did not close. Very strong easterly set experienced here.

: 2017
Surfaced and headed to the northwest bound for one more try in SUGAWA WAN.

: 23 September
A dark night where the phosphorescent tracks of large fish were easily discernible in the black water. Had several frantic rudder movements as a result, the memories of the previous morning's close call being still very vivid.

: 0533
Dove with small pip on radar closing in slowly from starboard beam. Was in desired position for day's patrol and so planned to avoid small craft at silent running if necessary. After diving, the sound operator reported screws up on starboard bow. Did not see how target could get up there so rapidly, but had no choice except to believe the sound gear.

: 0720
After turning and going deep with silent running, the peculiarity of the so-called screw noises invited disbelief. Finally concluded we had been on fish with an amazing propensity to simulate screw beats. Careful and critical listening indicated the difference from the real thing. Came to periscope depth and resumed normal submerged conditions.

: 1132
Sighted small coastal patrol boat heading from west to east. Turned to avoid. (Ship Contact #36)

: 1257
Sighted NAVIS, bearing 0030 T, range eight miles. (Aircraft Contact #33)

: 1350
Sighted probably same NAVIS on opposite course.

: 1400
Sighted BENTY heading east, bearing 2400 T, range four miles. (Aircraft Contact #34). Beside the above-mentioned contacts nothing was sighted on this usually productive station. Suspected we had been "had" either by a re-routing of traffic far up into the SUGAWA WAN before crossing over or perhaps they were running through at night.

: 1950
Prior to surfacing while at radar depth, radar picked up large pip astern at 13,000 yards. (Ship Contact #37)

— page 196 —
1955
Surfaced and opened out range on target, now seen to be escorted by a smaller pip. How soon to westward but rapidly going down behind some heavy clouds.

2010
Commanded tracking target while charging batteries. Enemy vessel was heading eastward across the SURUGAN and finally tracked at speed of eight knots. It was evident he would pass around IRO SHI and then head up along the western shore of the SHI and until ready to proceed across to TOKYO KAINAN.

2157
Commanded running wide circle around IRO SAKI at range of about 12 miles heading up for point about equidistant from TO SHI, O SHI and TSUMEKI SAKI. Depending upon completion of battery charge, patrol boat opposition, weather and enemy radar efficiency planned to make the attack around midnight.

2339
Had destroyer-sized pip on radar at 16,000 yards closing in from O SHI on southerly course. (Ship Contact 38)

2344
Turned and headed south to track approaching craft.

24 September
Destroyer-sized pip closed in to 8,000 yards and then headed back to O SHI.

0009
Turned back to northwest to close original target now seen on radar to be off TSUMEKI SAKI and tracking at seven knots, course 0450 T. He was apparently following right up the coast line.

0056
Upon target was about half way between TSUMEKI and INAORI SAIS, turned in for the attack. Eight was God-given for this kind of work. Heavy clouds overhead with spitting rain and strong winds boiling the sea into white caps prevailed. It was absolutely black. Several patrol craft were ringing the target at about 4,000 yards range; but with the dark night and the radar, had no trouble avoiding. Two escorts, one inbound and one outboard of target, could be seen on the radar screen.

0100
Commended firing last four torpedoes remaining forward, gyro 400 l., torpedo run 2900 yards, 450 starboard track, depth setting 6 feet. (ATMAC NO. 7) Had to fire entirely by radar bearings and spread at the TDC. Did not intend to fire such sharp track angles; but after once putting SHI on a firing course for a 900 track, doped off and started shooting as soon as torpedo run and gyro angles were satisfactory. The one degree spread between torpedoes was probably excessive; but the target's pip on the radar at 3,000 yards was so large, the accuracy of the bearings was questionable.

0102
Turned away and commenced withdrawal from firing point at full power.

- 26 - ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 197 —
0103
One tremendous explosion felt on the bridge and heard below. Radar indicated one escort chasing SHAD at 4,000 yards astern. Range opened steadily, however. Radar watched target carefully and it soon became clear damaged ship was heading for the beach about three miles away.

0105
Small vessel about 3,000 yards on starboard beam closed slowly while dropping rapidly aft in bearing then range commenced to open. SHAD was logging 20.7 knots in a rough sea.

0132
Radar reported damaged target to be on beach now at point about three miles southwest of ISAKI. Target still visible at 21,000 yards.

0203
Heading on course 110° T to pass between O SHIA and TO SHIA when radar picked up medium-sized pip at 16,000 yards on starboard beam. Target closing rapidly.

0205
Changed course to avoid, but could not turn very far for long pinned between the two islands.

0223
Target passed astern at 6,500 yards. High winds and rain squalls of the cloudburst variety now the order of the night. Perfect for uninterrupted retirement in an area loaded with enemy radars, searchlights, aircraft and patrol boats.

0248
Transmitted SHAD's Serial ONE to ComSubSpaC and to SEADEVIL regarding location of beach and damaged ship of the night's attack. This was sent to NPL who promptly authenticated and receipted for it.

0304
Transmitted SHAD's Serial 0.2 twice over the area frequency.

0539
Dove to allow all hands to relax and catch up on sleep. Running at 120 feet with looks every hour.

1917
Surfaced in rough seas and commenced return.

2007
Sent SHAD's Serial TWO giving results of patrol.

2115
Received ComSubSpaC's despatch ordering SHAD to depart area and proceed to 1WAY for refit.

25 - 28 September

Enroute MIDWAY from patrol station. From surfacing on the 24th until 28th plowed eastward against seas of typhoon proportions. Crew was so exhausted from inability to sleep dove for greater part of the day on the 27th. At 0204 on the 27th blip came on radar at 12,000 yards bearing 0869 T. (Ship Contact 4141). Turned to southeast to avoid and target passed clear to westward.

— page 198 —
1 October (Y)
Weather now clear and bright. Taking up lost time. At 0410 on the 30th sent SHAD'S Serial THREE reporting position and requesting rendezvous off MIDWAY at sunrise on 1 October. At 0915 on the 30th received despatch instructions for rendezvous and entering MIDWAY on the first. On 30th set clocks ahead one hour to zone time minus twelve (-12). Fired deck gun and 40 M4 gun for training purposes on morning of the 30th.

1 October (Y)
Repeated this day on crossing International Date Line from west to east.

0617 Sighted two escort planes (SBD's) and established voice and visual communications with them.

0852 Entered swept channel MIDWAY ISLANDS.

0903 Moored starboard side to S-9, Submarine Basin, MIDWAY ISLANDS.

— page 201 —
1525 K : 33-31 N : Patrol Boat : 11,000 : 045 T : P : Probably
: 2 Sept : 135-57 E : : 10 Kt : : same as 56.
: 1000 K : 33-44 N : Convoy : 8,000 : 210 T : P : ATTACK
: 3 Sept : 136-06 E : 1 Freighter : 14 Kt : : No. 2
: : 2 Sea Trucks : : : : :
: : 1 PC :

— page 202 —
26. 0608 K : 34-32 N : AP, DD, PC : 15,000 : 270 T : P : [TATLICK]
    : 16 Sept : 130-26 E : : 8 Kt : : NO. 4
: 27. 1118 K : 34-36 N : Small : 4,000 : 090 T : P : :
    : 18 Sept : 138-33 E : Freighter : 8 Kt : :
: 28. 0210 K : 34-02 N : Freighter : 21,000 : 260 T : R : [ATTLICK]
    : 19 Sept : 138-30 E : TBD, PC : 13 Kt : : NO. 5
: 29. 0742 K : 34-36 N : Small Coastal : 8,000 : 135 T : P : :
    : 20 Sept : 138-36 E : Freighter : 8 Kt : :
: 30. 0745 K : 34-36 N : Unidentified : 24,000 : 240 T : P : :
    : 20 Sept : 138-36 E : : 10 Kt : :
: 31. 1006 K : 34-40 N : PG : 14,000 : 250 T : P : :
    : 20 Sept : 138-30 E : : 12 Kt : :
: 32. 0855 K : 34-23 N : PG, Smaller : 12,000 : 180 T : P : [ATTLICK]
    : 21 Sept : 139-44 E : Vessel : 12 Kt : : NO. 6
: 33. 0439 K : 33-26 N : Unidentified : Unknown : Unknown : Torpedo
    : 22 Sept : 139-30 E : : : Wake :
: 34. 0738 K : 33-32 N : PT : 2,500 : 000 T : P : :
    : 22 Sept : 139-42 E : : 20 Kt : :
: 35. 0913 K : 33-30 N : Convoy : 5 or : 8,000 : 160 T : P : :
    : 22 Sept : 139-47 E : 6 Coasters & : 10 Kt : :
    : : Sampans with : :
    : : PT escort : :
: 36. 1132 K : 34-35 N : Coaster or : 7,000 : 090 T : P : :
    : 23 Sept : 138-34.5 E : Patrol Vessel : 8 Kt : :
: 37. 1950 K : 34-24 N : Ship with 2 : 13,000 : 080 T : R : [ATTLICK]
    : 23 Sept : 138-35 E : Escorts : 7 Kt : : NO. 7
: 38. 2339 K : 34-28 N : Unidentified : 16,000 : 170 T : R : :
    : 23 Sept : 139-15.5 : : 17 Kt : :
: 39. 0203 K : 34-35 N : Unidentified : 15,200 : 350 T : R : :
    : 24 Sept : 139-25.5 E : : 12 Kt : :
: 40. 0223 K : 34-35 N : 2 Patrol : 9,000 : Unknown : K : :
    : 24 Sept : 139-30.5 E : Vessels : :
: 41. 0204 L : 34-30 N : Unidentified : 12,000 : 270 T : R : :
    : 27 Sept : 151-03 E : :

NOTE: In addition to above contacts many other craft of less than 200 tons were contacted.

- 31 -

ENDORSEMENT (L).

— page 203 —
25 Aug: 30 Aug: 2 Sept: 3 Sept: 3 Sept: 3 Sept: 4 Sept
U Time (ZONE) : 02:14 L: 1317 K: 0919 K: 0513 K: 1130 K: 2220 K: 0110 K
B Position: Lat. : 32-25N: 30-43N: 33-24N: 33-29N: 33-39N: 33-23N: 33-30N
L Long. : 1140-16E: 1140-35E: 1135-51E: 1136-29E: 1136-08E: 1136-30E: 1136-36E
A Speed : 14 : 18 : 2 : 14 : 4 : 10 : 11
R Course : 280 : 158 : 340 : 320 : 310 : 320 : 020
I Trim : Surf : Surf : Per : Surf : Per : Surf : Surf : Surf
N Minutes Since Last :
E SD Radar Search :

— page 205 —
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :
S Date : 8 Sept:10 Sept:10 Sept:10 Sept:14 Sept:14 Sept:16 Sept
U Time (ZONE) : 1703 K: 1000K 1300 K: 1518 K: 0708 K: 0955 K: 0644 K
B Position: Lat. : 33-34N :34-09N :34-09N :34-08N :34-33N :34-33N :34-32N
M Long. : 136-08E:136-31E:136-30E:136-32E:138-39E:138-34E:138-26E
: 2 : 2.5 : 3 : 2 : 2 : 2 : 3
R Course : 100 : 240 : 080 : 135 : 035 : 280 : 160
I Trim : Per : Per : Per : 150 Pt.: Per : Per : Per
N Minutes Since Last : : : : : : :
E SD Radar Search : : SD R.D.R NOT USED DURING PATROL
: : : : : : :
: 2 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1
Type : V.L : RUFS : VAL : Unk : K.TE : K.TE : J.KE
Probable Mission : Pat : Pat : Esc : H : Esc : Pat : Esc
How Contacted : Per : Per : Per : Bomb : Per : Per : Per
Initial Range : 6,000 : 4,000 : 4,000 : 0 : 7,000 :10,000 : 8,000
Elevation Angle : 30 : 50 : 30 : Unk : 80 : 100 : 50
Range & Relative : : : : : : :
Bearing of Plane : ND : ND : ND : Unk : ND : ND : ND
When It Detected : : : : : : :
S/M :
(State(Beau- : : : : : : :
Sea:(fort) : 2 : 1 : 1 : 2 : 3 : 3 : 4
(Direction(Rel) : 080 : 300 : 100 : 135 : 055 : 170 : 315
Visibility (Hiles) : 4 : 25 : 10 : 5 : 3 : 2 : 3
(D) Height in : : : : : : :
I Clouds:(Pt.) : 3,000 : 4,000 : 6,000 : 6,000 : 3,000 : 5,000 : 2,000
Overcast : 80 : 40 : 45 : 40 : 50 : 30 : 60
(Bearing (Rel) : - : - : - : - : - : - : - :
Moon:(angle : - : - : - : - : - : - : - :
S (Percent : Not : Not : Not : Not : Not : Not : Not
Illum. : Up : Up : Up : Up : Up : Up : Up : Up
: : : : : : : :

Type of S/M Camouflage on this patrol: LIGHT GRAY.

-34- ENGLISH (..).

— page 207 —
29 30 . 31 . 32 33 34 .

S Date :21 Sept:21 Sept:21 Sept:21 Sept:23 Sept:23 Sept:
U Time (ZONE) : 0720 K: 0740 K: 1422 K: 1505 K: 1257 K: 1400 K:
B Position: Lat. :34-25N :34-24N :34-23N :34-22N :34-37N :34-35N :
M Long. :139-45E:139-45E:139-41E:139-42E:130-34E:138-34E:
A Speed : 2 : 2.5 : 2.5 : 2 : 2 : 2 : 2 :
R Course : 180 : 180 : 145 : 145 : 160 : 160 :
I Trim : Per : Per : Per : Per : Per : Per :
N Minutes Since Last : : : : : : :
E SD Radar Sear : : SD Radar NOT USED DURING TROOPING

Number : 2 : 2 : 2 : 2 : 1 : 1 :
A Type : Fighter:Bombers: BETTY : KLTE : MLVIS : BETTY :
I Probable Mission : Trans : Trans : Pat : Trans : Pat : Pat :
R How Contacted : Per : Per : Per : Per : Per : Per :
C Initial Range :20,000 :20,000 :16,000 :8,000 :6,000 :4,000 :
R Elevation angle : 100 : 200 : 50 : 100 : 30 : 30 :
A Range & Relative : : : : : : :
F Bearing of Plane : ND : ND : ND : ND : ND : ND :
T When It Detected : : : : : : :
S/A : : : : : : :

(State (Beau- : : : : : : :
C Sea:( fort) : 2 : 1 : 3 : 3 : 2 : 2 :
O (Direction(Rel) : 315 : 255 : 205 : 230 : 240 : 240 :
N Visibility (Miles) :Unlim'd:Unlim'd:Unlim'd:Unlim'd: 3 : 5 : 5 :
D (Height in : : : : : : :
I Clouds:( Ft.) :20,000 :20,000 :20,000 :16,000 :1,600 :1,600 :
T (Percent : : : : : : :
I Overcast : 30 : 30 : 30 : 40 : 75 : 75 :
O (Bearing(Rel) : - : - : - : - : - :
N Moon:(angle : : : : : : :
S (Percent : Not : Not : Not : Not : Not : Not :
Illum. : Up : Up : Up : Up : Up : Up : Up :
: : : : : : : :

Type of S/A Camouflage on this patrol: LIGHT GRAY.

- 36 - ENCLOSURE (..).

— page 208 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(H) ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. SHAD TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1. PATROL NO. 7.

TIME 0656 K DATE 30 AUGUST 1944 LATITUDE 31-10.2 N LONGITUDE 140-28.5

TARGET DATA -- DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION: (EU) Small MFM freighter similar to SENKAI IARU. (2101 Tons).

SHIP DAMAGED: Similar to SENKAI IARU (2101 Tons) Page 146, ONI 208-J (revised).

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: Experienced sound operator followed torpedo into target. Two reliable personnel heard muffled explosion. Possible breaking up noises heard later. Surfaced three hours later and passed through very heavy oil patches in the area. Persistent counter-attack by two vessels who would not logically leave an unscathed vessel alone for a hold-down.

TARGET DRAFT: 10 Feet. COURSE 160 SPEED. 9 RANGE 3,000 (AT FIRING)

OWN SHIP DATA

SPEED 2 COURSE 205. DEPTH 64 Feet ANGLE 10 DIVE (AT FIRING)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK: PERISCOPE ATTACK.

TUBES FIRED ONE TWO THREE

TRACK ANGLE 120 P 120 P 125 P
GYRO ANGLE 030 354 355
DEPTH SET 4 Feet 4 Feet 4 Feet
POWER HIGH HIGH HIGH
LIT OR KISS MISS : POSSIBLE HIT MISS
ERRATIC NO NO NO
MARK TORPEDO 23 23 23
SERIAL NUMBER 61956 33798 61297
MARK EXPLODER 6-4 6-4 6-4
SERIAL NUMBER 21815 8537 12204
ACTUATION SET CONTACT CONTACT CONTACT
ACTUATION ACTUAL

— page 209 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-L-L

REPORTS:
Number one tube was fired with a gyro angle of 030, while the gyro angle order at the TDC showed 358. This discrepancy was caused by a last minute shift from a target aft to a target forward, and the gyro setter forward was cut in while the gyro angle order showed a large gyro angle. Therefore, the gyro setter started sluing at great speed and was still following up when the tube was fired.

U.S.S. SHAD TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2. PATROL NO. 7.

TIME 1015 K DATE 3 September 1944 LATITUDE 33-45 N LONGITUDE 136-06 E.

TARGET DATA -- DANGER INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION: (EU) Clean, grey-painted freighter similar to KIBBASSIAN H.RU. (L607 Tons) This is a very approximate similarity due to the briefness of periscope exposures in glassy sea and numerous escorts nearby.

SHIP DESTROYED: Similar to KIBBASSIAN H.RU (L607 Tons) Page 254, ONI 208-J (revised).

DANGER DETERMINED BY: One torpedo explosion clearly heard.

TARGET DRAFT: 10 Feet. COURSE 200, SPEED 14 RANGE 3,200 (AT FIRING)

ON SHIP DATA:

SPEED 2 COURSE 140 DEPTH 64 Feet ANGLE 19 RISE (AT FIRING)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA:

TYPE ATTACK: PERISCOPE ATTACK.

TUBES FIRED SEVEN EIGHT

TR.CK N.CLE 100 P 100 P
GRO N.CLE 139 135
DEFT SET 6 Feet 6 Feet
POWER SINELE SINELE
HIT OR MISS HIT MISS
ERRATIC NO NO
M.RK TORPEDO 13-1 18-1
SER.I.L NUMBER 54710 55505
H.RK EXPLODER 6-5 6-5
SER.I.L NUMBER 9138 8682
.CTUTION SET CONT.CT CONT.CT
.CTUTION ACTUAL CONT.CT -- -
M.RK W.RHEAD 18-2 18-2
SER.I.L NUMBER 2630 3059
EXPLOSIVE TPX TPX
FIRING INTERV.L 0 10
TYPE SPREAD PERISCOPE PERISCOPE
SEA CONDITIONS 1 1
OVERFLU .CITIVITY Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

- 38 - ENCLOSURE (A).

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REMARKS: Firing on this attack, was delayed and thus a more favorable set-up lost because the correct solution light was flickering on and off due to a torpedo run of about 3,200 yards. The torpedoes were then fired with-out correct solution light.

U.S.S. SLAD TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3. PATROL NO. 7.

TIME 0719 K DATE 14 September 1944 LITUDE 34-36 N LONGITUDE 138-38 E.

TARGET DATA -- DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUCTIONS

DESCRIPTION: (EU) Small freighter, appeared new as it had clean lines and was freshly painted. Roughly similar to KOZUMARU (4180 Tons), Page 126 ON 208-J (revised). Believed actually smaller than KOZUMARU.

D.M.G. DETERMINED BY: HONE.

TARGET DRIFT 10 Feet. COURSE 308 SPEED 11 RANGE 800 (LT FIRING)

UNIT SHIP DATA

SPEED 3 COURSE 248 DEPTH 64 Feet. ANGLE 10 RISE (LT FIRING)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK: PERISCOPE ATTACK.

TUBES FIRED TEN NINE EIGHT

TR.CK ANGLE 63 P 63 P 63 P
GYRO ANGLE 178 170 174
DEPTH SET 4 Feet 4 Feet 4 Feet
POWER SINGLE SINGLE SINGLE
HIT OR MISS MISS MISS
ERRATIC NO NO NO
MARK TORPEDO 18-1 18-1 18-1
SERIAL NUMBER 55127 54700 54633
MARK EXPLODER 8-5 8-5 8-5
SERIAL NUMBER 9523 9582 8858
CUTLATION SET CONT.CT CONT.CT CONT.CT
CUTLATION CUTL
MARK W.RHED 18-2 18-2 18-2
SERIAL NUMBER 2709 2072 2751
EXPLOSIVE TFX TFX TFX
FIRING INTERVAL 0 12 13
TYPE SPREAD PERISCOPE PERISCOPE
SIL. CONDITIONS 3 3 3
OVERALL ACTIVITY Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

- 39 - ENCLOSURE (..).

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U.S.S. SHAD TORPEDO TIT.CK NO. 4. P.TROL NO. 7.

TIME 0709 K D.TE 16 September 1944 L.TITUDE 34-32.5 N LONGITUDE 138-25.5 E.

TARGET DATA - D.A.G.E INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION: (EU) Target medium-sized transport freighter N.F.M. similar to S.I.P.I.N. T.R.U. (5533 T-uns).

SHIP SINK: Similar to S.I.P.I.N. T.R.U. (5533 Tons), Page 39, ONI 208-J (revised).

D.A.G.E DETERMINED BY: Heard three torpedoes hit followed by silence of target's screw and definite breaking up noises.

TARGET DRAFT 10 Feet. COURSE 250 SPEED 8 RANGE 2200 (LT FIRING)

OWN SHIP DATA

SPEED 3 COURSE 170 DEPTH 64 Feet. ANGLE 10 DIVE (LT FIRING)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE TIT.CK: PERISCOPE TIT.CK.

TUBES FIRED ONE TWO THREE FOUR

TRACK ANGLE 95 S 90 S 90 S 90 S
GYRO ANGLE 348 347 352 349
DEPTH SET 6 Feet 6 Feet 6 Feet 6 Feet
POWER HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH
HIT OR MISS NO NO NO NO
ERRATIC NO 23 23 23 23
MARK TORPEDO 61804 33808 49588 41576
SERIAL NUMBER 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
SERIAL NUMBER 18557 6322 11545 950
ACTUATION SET CONT.CT CONT.CT CONT.CT CONT.CT
ACTUATION SET CONT.CT CONT.CT CONT.CT
L.A.R. W.R.RED 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
SERIAL NUMBER 34182 11381 11399 18024
EXPLOSIVE TFX TFX TFX TFX
FIRING INTERVAL 0 9 9 10
TYPE SPREAD PERISCOPE PERISCOPE PERISCOPE
SEA CONDITIONS 4 4 4 4
OVERALL ACTIVITY Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

U.S.S. SHAD TORPEDO TIT.CK NO. 5. P.TROL NO. 7.

TIME 0553 K D.TE 19 September 1944 L.TITUDE 33-40 N LONGITUDE 138-18 E.

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TARGET DATA -- DATE INFLICTED:
DESCRIPTION: (EC) Positive CHIDOAI or similar class identification as seen in ONI 41-42.

SHIP SINK: One CHIDORI Class TED.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: Heard three torpedoes hit, followed by positive breaking up noises on sound gear.

TARGET DRAFT 6 Feet. COURSE 131 SPEED 13 RANGE 2,500 (LT FIRING)

ON SHIP DATA:

SPEED 3 COURSE 084 DEPTH 64 Feet. ANGLE 10 DIV. (LT FIRING)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA:

TYPE ATTACK: FERISCOPE ATTACK.

TUBES FIRED SIX FIVE FOUR THREE

TRACK ANGLE 110 S 110 S 110 S 110 S
GRO. ANGLE 035 039 038 045
DEPTH SET 4 Feet 4 Feet 4 Feet 4 Feet
POWER HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH
HIT OR MISS HIT HIT MISS HIT
ERRATIC NO NO NO NO
LARK TORPEDO 23 23 23 23
SERIAL NUMBER 53250 62264 49074 49900
LARK EXPLODER 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
SERIAL NUMBER 17523 17907 3764 7833
ACTUATION SET CONT.CT CONT.CT CONT.CT CONT.CT
ACTUATION ACTUAL CONT.CT CONT.CT CONT.CT
MARK MARKED 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
SERIAL NUMBER 17074 2440 13134 20867
EXPLOSIVE TPX TPX TPX TPX
FIRING INTERVAL 0 12 5 11
TYPE SPREAD PERISCOPE PERISCOPE PERISCOPE PERISCOPE
SEA CONDITIONS 3 3 3 3
OVERALL ACTIVITY Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.N.

U.S.S. S.S.D. TORPEDO ATT.CK NO. 6. F.TROL NO. 7.

TIME 0920 K DATE 21 September 1944. L.TITUDE 34-23 N LONGITUDE 139-43 E.

TARGET DATA -- DATE INFLICTED:
DESCRIPTION: (EU) Gunboat type vessel briefly seen in silhouette estimated similar to S.S.C. (FG2) (780 Tons) in ONI 41-42.

SHIP SINK: Estimated similar to S.S.C. type FG2 (780 Tons) in ONI 41-42.

- 41 -

ENCLOSURE (..).

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DANGER DETERMINED BY: Heard one torpedo hit. Sound heard target's screws stop followed by characteristic sinking noises on target's bearing.

TARGET DRAFT 6 Feet. COURSE 182 SPEED 12 RANGE 2,200 (LT FIRING)

ON SHIP D.T.

SPEED 3.5 COURSE 260 DEPTH 64 Feet. NOISE 10 RISE (LT FIRING)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO D.T.

TYPE T.T.CK: PARISCOPE T.T.CK.

TUBES FIRED TEN NINE SEVENTH

TRACK NO. 110 S 110 S 110 S
GYRO NO. 207 211 217
DEPTH SET 4 Feet SINGLE SINGLE SINGLE
POWER SINGLE SINGLE SINGLE
HIT OR MISS MISS HIT HIT
ERRATIC NO NO NO
M.RK TORPEDO 18-1 18-1 18-1
SERIAL NUMBER 55832 55130 55464
MARK EXPLODER 8-5 8-5 8-5
SERIAL NUMBER 8728 8641 8902
ACTUATION SET CONT. CONT. CONT.
ACTUATION ACTUAL 18-2 18-2 18-2
PARK NUMBER 3028 3120 3287
SERIAL NUMBER T.T. T.P.X. T.P.X.
EXPLOSIVE 0 10 10
FIRING INTERVAL 3 PARISCOPE PARISCOPE
TYPE SPEED 3 3 3
SURVEILLANCE SUBMARINE Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

U.S.S. SHIP TORPEDO T.T.CK NO. 7. P.TROL NO. 7.

TIME 0100 K DATE 24 September 1944 L.TITUDE 34-43 N LONGITUDE 139-04.5 E.

TARGET D.T. -- DANGER INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION: (UN) Target never seen. Radar pip indicated him to be of medium to large size.

SHIP DESIGNED: One medium H.RU - unseen.

DANGER DETERMINED BY: Heard one torpedo hit and followed vessel into beach by radar as it beached itself.

TARGET D.R.T. 10 Feet. COURSE 040 SPEED 7 RANGE 2,800 (LT FIRING)

- 12 - ENCLOSURE ().

Note: The image provided is a scanned copy of the original document, and the OCR output is a transcription of the text. The text is in English and includes various technical terms and commands related to submarine operations.

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1. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-L
2. ON SEPT D.A.T.
3. SPEED 11 COURSE 310 DEPTH SURFACE
4. TYPE ATTACK: NIGHT SURFACE ATTACK.
5. TUBES FIRED
6. TR.CK. R.GLE 45 S 45 S 45 S 45 S
7. GYRO R.GLE 321 321 321 321
8. DEPTH SET 6 Feet 6 Feet 6 Feet 6 Feet
9. POWER HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH
10. HIT OR MISS MISS MISS MISS HIT
11. ERRATIO NO NO NO NO
12. MARK TORPEDO 23 23 23 23
13. SERIAL NUMBER 49815 49914 61991 49936
14. MARK EXPLODER 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
15. SERIAL NUMBER 2032 5453 21768 8203
16. COTUTION SET CONT.OT CONT.OT CONT.OT
17. COTUTION ACTUAL

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In all other instances single targets were being heavily escorted as they passed. Absolutely standard procedure was to find the major escorts on the target's quarter to seaward. The other escorts consisting of sampans, etc., moved ahead, astern, and on the beams of the ward ship. An aircraft could always certainly be found overhead. Regardless of the sinuosities of the coast no short cuts were ever made by any of the JAP ships.

A whole new concept of submarines targets had to be worked out on this patrol in order to get used to. the idea of so many small targets. The exceptions to this were three large tankers observed at various times. A medium-sized vessel soon became the criterion of a fine target. One crevice in JAP logic was the fact that targets were apparently passing across the mouth of the SURUGI. W.1.1 directly on the line between the flanking points of OMI and IRO SALIS, until SHAD got in a successful attack. After this, traffic was noted running both to the north of this line and at night. A mild sort of anti-submarine patrol was encountered off SURUGI. W.1.1 in the early mornings before diving.

On all attacks, except the last one made on the surface at night, countermeasures came sure and swift. The one exception to this was the third attack where three electric torpedoes missed and SHAD's presence remained undetected, although two aircraft bombs did fall eventually. When the steam torpedoes were fired, the depth-charging was logically and usually pretty good at first. Accuracy dropped rapidly, however, due to the remarkable gradients found in all instances while in the area. The firing of electric torpedoes produced plenty of reaction when hits were made, though somewhat delayed and accurate rather by chance. Evasive tactics consisted of those tried and true maneuvers: (a) Go deep (350 feet). (b) Run slow. (c) Keep the stern to the S/ craft, though not always at a sacrifice to maintaining a general course of withdrawal. A premise of SHAD's periscope attacks in this area was to go deep and quiet immediately after firing. This paid big dividends although there were two occasions when it might have been possible to wait and see the hits. The chance of misses on warships, however, indicated no change of policy.

The tactics of the S/ craft were about the same as those previously encountered; i.e. a big barrage of charges at first followed by combined listening and pinging. These craft were definitely at a disadvantage when the sharp gradients are properly considered. Tremendous respect was gained for aircraft bombs or depth charges. On several occasions when all was quiet and sorne were more or less distant, terrific explosions were heard, rocking the boat and sending little chills of "white-hot-was-that?" up the spine. Some of the closer depth charges in the first flurry following an attack were undoubtedly these jumbo aircraft eggs. What was now in S/ tactics seemed to be the lack of pinging purely as a precautionary measure. Only on the first attack was pinging responsible for revealing the target's presence and this stopped after sunrise. The persistence of the S/ craft seemed to be greater than ever before experienced. Not that the SHAD was held down any undue length of time, but the JAP. S/ vessels were usually observed in the distance with aircraft overhead continuing their search for long hours after an attack. The skill of patrol craft in these calm coastal waters is notable. SHAD tried on several occasions to evade at periscope depth -- with no luck. On two occasions the SHAD was literally run out of the patrol area of the day by the

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accuracy and determination of these craft.

Other submarines have mentioned, so it is not new to comment on the peculiar popping noises heard on two occasions during this patrol following an attack. It sounded like pistol shots, but the concept prevails that small charges are being dropped to locate the submicroscopic submarine. Splashes through the hull were also heard with no succeeding detonations. Metallic clanking apparently very near the hull was another sonic manifestation, but has no answer here.

SHAD was just secretly congratulating herself on the absence of any midget submarines or their attendant torpedoes when two of the latter were sighted a fractional measure ahead of the bow. If the JAPs can produce anything more disconcerting than this, it is hoped somebody else will tell all about it.

It is of interest that no A/S craft of any description, or for that matter any vessels such as fishermen, were encountered when more than 20 miles off the HONSHU coast. SHAD might have been operating in the middle of the Pacific except for an occasion I encounter with planes at night. On this score (night-flying planes) the JAPs used them frequently but often with running lights and usually when very near the coast. Between the SUD radar and alert lookouts no serious trouble was encountered from planes, although their nuisance value was quite real.

(K) HADER DEFECTS AND DANGER

ELECTRICAL

While on training exercises at Pearl Harbor the SHAD first experienced difficulty with the mechanical interlock on the main control cubicle. The battery selector lever slipped out of the shoe where the sliding interlock bar is connected to the lever. This was remedied by manufacturing a new shoe with lips built up higher. Several days later, while again on training exercises, the port reverser jammed due to a binding on the back of the shoe. The binding caused the interlocking bar to snap. SubBase, F.H. opened the interlocking table to remove the broken slide bars but could not determine the cause. New interlock bars were installed and the one for No. 4 generator selector broke and jammed the board on test. The decision was made to make a new set of interlocking bars for all elevens and now shoes with built-up edges of 3/8". These were made out of soft steel and another succeeding set had to be made of tool steel. The soft steel set is now carried aboard as spares. On 29 August while running on the surface in the area, the maneuvering room watch went to shift the "bus selector" from "bus tie open" to "bus tie closed" and found the interlocking bars to be jammed. The interlocking device was removed from the system and was left that way for the remainder of the patrol. It was questionable how long the spare would last, so it was not installed inasmuch as positive selection was now obtained though without the protection for which the interlock was devised. It is suspected that the entire interlocking table has somehow been re-installed lower than that of the original design.

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ORDNANCE

Mark 23 torpedo, serial no. 49265, continued to flood every time the tubes were made ready. An attempt to locate the difficulty met with no success, so the torpedo was secured in the racks and the SHAD's torpedo allowance on this run was virtually reduced to 23.

The results of the tests conducted at Pearl Harbor indicate the SHAD's forward tubes require some modification before Mark 18 torpedoes may be fired from the bow. The exact nature of the modification is not known, but it is desired that this situation be rectified at the earliest possible time.

HULL

The ventilation to the forward torpedo room is definitely inadequate. When on the surface it becomes even worse as the suction through the forward engineer room where the engines are running reduces the air supply to the ventilation system. It is hoped a booster blower of some sort might be installed.

The trim line to No. 3 auxiliary tank developed a small leak while on station. It was discovered in a place difficult to reach and silver soldering alone met with no success. Finally it was plugged and silver soldered. This held for about ten days, after which the leak reappeared.

(L) RADIO

Reception of the HAINA FOX Schedules was good at all times. The revised broadcast hours for the 14390 Kc band, effective 20 September, filled in the one weak spot in the operating schedule. The present schedule is considered excellent.

Reception on the new area frequency was also good, although the distances over which this frequency is used are relatively small, the nature of the traffic requires high-order reception and the new frequency (2880) is definitely an improvement over the old one.

No serial messages were missed throughout the patrol.

(HA) RADAR

The radar equipment performed very satisfactorily with a minimum of casualties. After leaving MIDWAY on route the patrol area the radars were not out of commission for an hour during the entire patrol. The SD radar was used only enroute to and from the patrol area during the daylight hours in the customary five-seconds-out-of-every-thirty manner by means of the high voltage variac. The SD radar on the other hand was used continuously when on the surface and during its 515 hours of operation was unusually reliable. This equipment figured in three radar approaches and was the navigator's right hand. The only casualty (which even then only partly decommissioned the set) occurred enroute MIDWAY from PEARL HARBOR when the flexible cable to the PPI unit sheared off. Replaced the cable out of spares and drew another at MIDWAY. A precautionary measures and based on proper manifestations the following were changed during the patrol: TR tube, cathode ray tube in range indicator, V8, and the 721 tube.

- 16 - ENGLISH (a).

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Second sweep land echoes were frequently picked up while in the area and the complete excellence of the SJ equipment was exemplified in ATACK NO. 7 when a medium-sized target was picked up at 20,000 yards, readily tracked over a period of several hours even when it was so close to land as to be almost obscured by the land; and after the attack, by means of the radar, it was possible to follow the movements of the target into the shore until he obvi-ously beached himself. At 18,000 yards the target could be seen lying not over 100 yards from the land pips.

The new slotted antenna reflector proved to be a great improvement over the old solid-parabola type. Inherently the new antenna was excellent and the modification performed at LHDN on the SJ equipment which increased the gain in the video stages contributed much to the instrument's fine performance by helping to make lobing easier and more accurate.

All in all it would be easy to become overly sentimental about the SHAD'S SJ radar. It was the eyes of the ship at all times on the surface. From air-craft, from patrol boats it gave warning as it did also from dangerous navigational obstructions. The navigator used it with eminent success to the exclusion of any other means while in the area. Three attacks consummated with success were possible only because of the SJ. To see the picture of the last attack on the PPI screen as though observing it from the air with islands all around and patrol craft and escorts too, brought home again the marvel and the wonders of this superior equipment.

It may be stated that the SD was so little used that its presence on board is felt to be unnecessary. In the early days of its use it was a splen- did thing, but the SJ radar can apparently do the same job as well and do it better.

While due credit for the fine performance of the SJ radar has been given to the equipment itself, the man who cared for it and worked on it as a labor of love long before the patrol began as well as in the patrol area, was WADE, Clifford Honroe, 553 06 55, RT2c(T), V-6 USNR. His performance of duty was most noteworthy.

(R) SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions were generally only fair in this area. It is believed the average range at which scows were picked up did not ordinarily exceed 3,000 yards though instances of longer ranges were experienced. On days of flat calm the ranges were naturally greater, going out to as much as five or six thousand yards. During these days of glassy sea conditions enemy patrol boats were especially proficient in plug-range searching and the SHAD's ship's noises apparently were readily detectable. It is of interest that the JP gear often obtained greater listening ranges than either of the super-sonic devices. Also the use by the J.P. was of both sonic and super-sonic pinging is verified inasmuch as the JP operator could frequently report pinging when none was to be heard on the QB or JK. On this patrol with one exception no attempt was made to "ping-range" prior to firing due to the silence required under conditions of close approaches and no counter-pinging by the enemy. Noted on this patrol was the fact that explosions were usually intensely loud in the JP gear.

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D. R. POSITION  :  SURFACE:  LAYER  :  TEMP. :  GREATEST
DATE  :  TIME :  LATITUDE  :  LONGITUDE :  TEMP. :  TEMP. DEPTH :  GREATEST :  DEPTH
    :  (GCT)  :

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Commander J. V. WILSON, U.S. Navy.

3. While specific names have been mentioned in this report, it is only a gesture toward giving credit where due rather than pointing out individuals as notably recognized above others. So impressive was the personal gallantry and individual devotion to duty of the officers and men on this patrol that it is deemed wiser to resort to the succinct statement that their performance of duty was in accordance with the Navy's highest standards rather than submit to the inadequacy of a spontaneous praise however sincerely felt.

(R) TELES STEAMED -- FULL USED

| Item | Description | Quantity | Notes |
|------|||-------|
| Pearl Harbor to Midway | 1291 Miles. | 17095 Gallons. |       |
| Midway to Area | 2221 Miles. | 25950 Gallons. |       |
| In Area | 4730 Miles. | 40580 Gallons. |       |
| Area to Midway | 2150 Miles. | 36415 Gallons. |       |

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

| Item | Description | Quantity | Notes |
|------|||-------|
| Torpedoes | Fuel | 14600 Gallons | Provisions | Personnel Factor |
| 0* | 30 Days | 30 Days | 30 Days |

* NOTE: One torpedo on board in useless condition.

(U) RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

Enroute to and from the patrol area a watch was maintained on the APR/1 Radar Detector five minutes out of every thirty minutes. After arrival on station a continuous watch was maintained on this equipment while surfaced at night.

Only three contacts were encountered prior to arrival on station. The first two were picked up at 2205 (2) 20 August 1944 (approximate position Lat. 31° 35' N; Long. 162° 21' E). One frequency was 150 meps with approximately a 60 cycle PRF which came in with increasing strength for about five minutes and then faded. At the same time a contact at 132 meps lasted for about three minutes, being weaker and with a slightly higher PRF. The third contact occurred at 1040 (2) 22 August 1944 (approximate position Lat. 32° 05' N; Long. 153° 32' E). Frequency was 130 meps, with a 60 cycle PRF and the source antenna apparently sweeping at about 20 minutes.

Upon arrival in the patrol area off HONSHU between KURTORI SAKI and TOKYO KURU-MURF frequent contacts were made at night while surfaced; but at no time was it possible to isolate contacts as being landbased, shipborne, or airborne other than by reference to previous reports. At one time a crash dive was

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1. No "low order" explosions were encountered on this patrol.

2. Eight Mark 10 torpedoes were carried in the after torpedo room on this run. No special difficulties in upkeep and maintenance were experienced. The torpedoes were charged every eight days regardless of the gravity drop by having one in the rack and one pulled halfway from a tube for simultaneous charging until voltages were constant for one hour. ...all eight of these electrics were fired resulting in only two hits, which is certainly not good. The three which missed "cold" on .TT.CK NO. 3 were particularly destructive of confidence in the Mk 18 torpedo; however, it is felt that a real test of this weapon has not yet been given by the SHD and the poor results were probably all traceable to the commanding officer's lack of experience with them. The advantage of their wake-less feature is deemed especially important for patrols in the Empire areas, although balanced against this on the side of the Mk 23 torpedo is the added range of the latter without which certain targets could not possibly be reached.

Sixteen Mark 23 torpedoes were carried in the forward room. The repeated flooding of torpedo No. 49265 has already been mentioned under section (K) of this report. Good performance resulted with eight hits out of fifteen torpedoes fired forward and every combination is reposed in this fine weapon.

3. An experimentally-installed 40 in gun was located aft on the SHD's cigarette deck prior to this patrol; and, while no opportunity was afforded to use it on station, the impression gained from exercise firings is extremely favorable. Until experience to the contrary proves differently, the gun is considered a good addition to this vessel's armament.

4. The enlarged conning tower alteration accomplished at Pearl Harbor before departure on this patrol which thus allowed the DRT to be placed atwarships across the after bulkhead adjacent to the TDC, resulted in a fire-control party remarkable for its quiet efficiency during either surface or submerged approaches. ...source of constant obstruction and irritation was the presence of the SD radar-mast tube in the after end of the conning tower. In general, the roominess and the planned comfort of the SHD's conning tower was a great satisfaction.

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5. The Sub Base, Pearl Harbor, installed the E & R developed experimental arrangement of periscope hoisting gear which removed the periscope hoisting motors, contactor panel and drive from the conning tower. These were re-installed on the periscope tubes in the control room with hoisting cables running up inside of the tubes back into the conning tower. To lead the cables from the tubes to the lifting yoke on the periscope requires nine to ten sheaves for each periscope. Here are the considered advantages and disadvantages of the installation.

ADVANTAGES:
(1) More room in the conning tower, although the arrangement of the sheaves on No. 1 periscope effectively blocks out nearly as much space as one periscope hoisting motor.
(2) The number of additional sheaves for each cable is believed to have increased the load on the hoisting motors by nearly 80% and is confirmed by the slowness of hoisting and the ready heeling of the motors.
(3) No. 2 periscope is never put on the bumper because a slack in the cable means a consequent overlap on the hoisting drum located in a watertight housing on the side of the periscope well in the control room. Sub Base, P.H. was able to rewind the cable by pulling it all up into the conning tower, but SHAD's auxiliary-men on patrol found it more suitable to open the water-tight housing below. Either method is tedious and lengthy procedure. As a result it might be of interest to note that the plow-stock cables on No. 2 periscope underwent severe depth-charging and deep depths without apparent injury.
(4) Of minor note is the fact that because the cables run through the bilges in the conning tower they must be kept heavily greased resulting in the situation where it is impossible to keep clean in the conning tower for more than a few minutes.

In general it is believed the advantages outweigh the disadvantages for the latter undoubtedly can be rectified as time permits. The SHAD wishes to commend Lt.Commdr. T. F. MORRIS and Kochinist. K. K. KulluU at Sub Base, Pearl Harbor, for their diligence and painstaking efforts to make this new installation as nearly perfect as possible. It was a pretty tough assignment.

6. The SHAD's method for utilizing No. 4 Main Ballast as a fuel ballast on this patrol will be described hereafter. While the arrangement is believed as secure against depth charging as any of the systems on a submarine, it is presumed that the fuel from this tank will be utilized first and conversion from fuel ballast to main ballast will be made prior to or shortly after entry into the area. The number of men who have been lost, and the dangerous situations consequent to "lying to" in the execution of the conversion methods requiring blank flanges and the disconnecting of operating springs and linkages topside, have been considerable. The only alteration required for this method is to have a T-shaped wrench extension installed from the ten-pound blow stop valves in the superstructure to terminate about two inches above the main deck.

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movie projector. These are the little things that have rendered submarining so much easier than those first patrols at the beginning of the war. To the long list of scientists; technicians; builders; zealous naval personnel including the constructors, the policy guiders, the repair crews and those who have gone before us -- all who have built into submarines the big things that really count and often go unseen (but are there, nevertheless, to give to operating personnel the confidence that no finer boats exist anywhere else in the world) great tribute and humble thanks is proffered herewith.

- 56 - ENCLOSURE (A).

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1. The Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-T.O.
To : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
    Subordinate Command Navy No. 1504.
    The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
    The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SIXTY (SS235) - Report of Star Patrol Number Seven.

1. The SIXTY's seventh patrol covered a period of fifty-one days, 31 days being spent in the assigned area south of HONSHU. A very good coverage of the area was made in which a total of forty-one contacts were made.

2. Eight contacts worthy of torpedo fire which could be closed to firing range were made.

ATTACK #1: 1. Lade a periscope attack on a small AK with a PC and converted yacht as escorts. Three LARK 25 torpedoes were fired at 3200 yards, 1300 track, 4 feet depth. Fired first torpedo without gyro matched.

ATTACK #2: 1. Lade a periscope attack on an AK in a convoy with two sea trucks and a small PY. Fired two LARK 16.1 torpedoes, at 3000 yards, 1000 track, 6 feet depth. Did not have TDC solution light on firing. One possible torpedo explosion heard timed for 2700 yards.

ATTACK #3: 1. Lade periscope attack on a small AK with escorts. Fired 3 LARK 13.1 torpedoes at 800 yards, 650 track, 4 feet depth. Torpedoes probably ran under.

ATTACK #4: 1. Lade periscope attack on a freighter-transport similar to SIXTY-RU with at least one LITTLE DDD and PC as escorts. Fired 4 LARK 25 torpedoes at 2200 yards, 950 track, 6 feet depth. Three torpedo explosions with definite cracking and breaking up noises were heard on the target bearing.

ATTACK #5: 1. Lade early morning periscope attack on CHIDORI (DD small). Fired 4 LARK 25 torpedoes at 2800 yards, 1100 track, 4 feet depth. Heard three torpedo explosions and definite breaking up noises.

— page 229 —
6: Made a periscope attack on PC (similar to SAGA) with two escorts. Fired 4 Mark 23 torpedoes at 2800 yards, 1000 track, 4 feet depth. Heard one torpedo explosion, screws stopped and definite breaking up noises.

ATTACK # 7: Made radar attack on unidentified type vessel with two escorts. Fired 4 Mark 23 torpedoes at 2800 yards 450 track, 6 feet depth. Heard and felt one tremendous explosion. Target tracked by radar as heading for beach and being beached.

3. It is recommended that the following damage be assessed:
   - SINK
   - Attack #4, 1 AK (Similar to SAIPAN IARU) EU
   - Attack #5, 1 TBD (CHIDORI) EC
   - Attack #6, 1 PC (Similar to SAGA) EU

DAMAGED

ATTACK #7, 1 Unidentified target UN

POSSIBLY DANGER EVIDENCE RECOMPLETE

ATTACK #1, 1 AK (Similar to SENMAI-IARU) EU
ATTACK #2, 1 AK (Similar to AKIBA-SAN-IARU) EU

4. Two torpedo wakes passed just ahead of SHAD while on night surface patrol.

5. Following each attack except the night radar attack and one attack where Mark 18.1 torpedoes were fired the SHAD was held deep by aggressive depth charging. There is again evidence of a new type anti-submarine device used by enemy escorts. In this patrol report it is described following attack #4 as making "light popping noises like pistol shots heard throughout the counter attacking plus audible splashes".

6. The valuable experience gained by the SHAD on the first patrol of the new Commanding Officer will pay dividends in patrols to come. The new Commending Officer, Officers and crew are congratulated on inflicting severe damage to the enemy.

D. F. WILLIAMSON.

— page 230 —
0163
Serial: 0163
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
4 October 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO, U.S.S. SHAD report
of Seventh War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Subordinate Command, Navy No. 1504.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks contained in the first
endorsement. Evidence of damage to the enemy in the first and second at-
tacks is not conclusive and assessment of same is withheld.

2. The Commanding Officer, Officers and crew are further con-
gratulated upon the completion of this arduous patrol which inflicted heavy
damage to the enemy.

J. H. WILL.

— page 231 —
13 OCT 1944
Serial 02244
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SHAD Report of
Seventh War Patrol.
SUBSUBSAP PATROL REPORT NO. 544.
U.S.S. SHAD - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
(12 August to 1 October 1944).

1. The seventh war patrol of the SHAD was conducted off the Southeast Coast of Konshu and the Nanpo Shoto Islands North of the Bonins.

2. Excellent area coverage was maintained and numerous, although many of them small, contacts were made and seven aggressive attacks delivered. Intensive anti-submarine measures were encountered, including two near misses by enemy torpedoes while on night surface patrol. Fortunately, the SHAD suffered no serious injury and was able to inflict severe damage upon the enemy.

3. This patrol is designated as "Successful" for Combat Insignia Award.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this successful patrol, a fitting reward for the SHAD's return to combat areas after a protracted absence. While it is possible that some damage was inflicted upon the enemy in attacks numbers 1 and 2, unfortunately the evidence is not conclusive enough to substantiate assessment. The SHAD is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

| ACTION | DAMAGE | TONNAGE |
||||
| 1 - Medium AK (SAIPAN MARU Type) (EC) | - 5,500 tons (Attack No. 4) |
| 1 - TB (CHIDORI Type) (EC) | - 600 tons (Attack No. 5) |
| 1 - PG (SAGA Class) (EU) | - 800 tons (Attack No. 6) |

TOTAL SUNK: 6,900 tons

— page 232 —
FF12-10/A16-3(15)
Serial 02244
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SHAD Report of
Seventh War Patrol.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 544.
U.S.S. SHAD - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
(12 August to 1 October 1944).

DAMAGED

1 - UN - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 7)
TOTAL SUNK AND DAMAGED 10,900 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
ComInCh (7) C: A. LOCMOOD, Jr.
CInCpac (5)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean Areas (1)
ComServPac (1)
CinClant (1)
ComSubsLant (8)
S/In School, NL (2)
ComSoPac (2)
ComSoResPac (1)
ComSubSoWesPac (2)
CTT 72 (2)
ComNorPac (1)
ComSubsPac (40)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ComSubsPacSubOrdCom (3)
All Squadron and Division Commanders, Pacific (2)
SubTrainPac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

E. L. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

— page 233 —
103672 FILMED

U.S.S. SH.D. (SS-235)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY: 01/01/1945
DATE: 01/01/1945

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. SH.D.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division THREE HUNDRED ONE.
    (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY.
    (3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
    (4) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SH.D. - Report of War Patrol Number Eight.

Enclosure: (1) Subject Report.
    (2) Track Chart (for ComSubsPac only).

1. Enclosure (1), covering the EIGHTH war patrol of this vessel conducted in two periods: i.e., the first, off the northeast coast of FORDOS, and the the southern islands of the HANSEI SHOTO group; the second, in the western portion of the East China Sea off the CHINA coast, during the period of 25 October 1944 to 5 January 1945, is forwarded herewith.

L. JULIEN.

[Signature]
[Date]

— page 234 —
25 October 1550 (Y)
Departed HIDAY for area via SAIPAN in company with U.S.S. REDFISH and U.S.S. BANG to act as a coordinated attack group under Comdr. L. D. MC GREGOR, JR., USN, commanding the REDFISH, to be known as "SANDY'S SLUGGERS", in accordance with ComSubsFac's Operation Order No. 353-44 of 19 October 1944. Ushered out of sunny MIDWAY by driving rain and high winds.

26 October
Omitted this day upon crossing the International Date Line from east to west.

27 October - 2 November
Enroute SAIPAN conducting daily ship's drills; training dives; and pack communication drills with VHF, SJ radar and the pack frequencies. Zigged night and day when running at less than three-engine speed. Had five lookouts plus the

-1-
EXPLOSURE (A).

— page 235 —
2 November 0622 (L)
: 1135
: 12144
: 1135
: 12144

: 3 November 0200 (K)
: 1135
: 12144

: 2 - ENCLOSURE (..).

: 1135

— page 236 —
0350
All's quiet. Returned to the nest alongside the FULTON.

: 0800
Underway from S.I.P.I.N. enroute area ELEVEN Charlie in company with B.U.G escorted by U.S.S. CHAPION (L/3/1). REDFISH delayed at S.I.P.I.N. for several hours pending the completion of some unknown repair.

: 1214
Made trim dive.

: 1303
Surfaced and continued as before.

: 1639
REDFISH joined up.

: 1818
Dove having sighted plane coming in with zero bow angle. Probably friendly.

: 1903
Surfaced.

: 4 November
Enroute patrol area conducting daily dives and drills.

: 1219
Exchanged calls by searchlight with eastbound BURRISH.

: 2050
Using SJ radar exchanged calls with eastbound COD.

: 5 November
Sighted P.R.C.H. VEL, rose bearing 2460(T), distance 6 miles.

: 1310
Exchanged calls with U.S. LIBERTOR bomber.

: 6 November
0337
Dove from plane sighted dead ahead close aboard (C/COMTACT 1).

: 0406
Surfaced and continued as before.

: 1730
Entered eastern boundary of area ELEVEN Charlie and headed for first patrol point previously agreed upon.

: 7 November
0525
Dove from plane sighted in distance and picked up on SJ radar, closing. (C/COMTACT 2)

: 0533
Surfaced.

: 0830
Indo routine dive to commence submerged patrol on station.

: 1920
Surfaced.

- 3 -
ENCLOSURE (.)

— page 237 —
8 November
0613 Had plane pip on radar but did not close, so remained on surface. (C/COMTT 3)

0710 Dove and conducted submerged patrol.

11426 Surfaced for sun line.

11457 Dove and resumed patrol.

1935 Surfaced.

9 November
0717 Dove for submerged patrol.

0925 Sighted plane in distance (BETTY). (C/COMTT 3)

1942 Surfaced in rough sea with barometer falling rapidly.

2100 Ship's pharmacist's mate reported a member of the crew to be suffering from a pain which had all the appearances of acute appendicitis.

2115 Changed course to head for S.I.F.I. and sent out S.H.D's first to ComSubSpac, info REVISIT and BANG, reporting situation.

10 November
0718 Dove.

1938 Surfaced. The patient had a pain which became increasingly sharp up to an early hour this morning, when the aggravation suddenly seemed to burst inside and the pain rapidly dissipated itself. The possibility of peritonitis remained like an incubus until late tonight when the ship's "Doc" reported the patient was free of pain, fever and all other symptoms of complications. Could only imagine that the swollen appendix had burst into the intestine or that the original diagnosis was incorrect.

2035 Reported situation in S.H.D's second to ComSubSpac, information to the rest of the pack, and turned westward to join up with the "SLUGGERS". In the middle of a full-fledged typhoon now.

11 November
0729 Dove on station for submerged patrol between YON-KUNI and LIKOTE Islands.

1950 Surfaced. Seas still very rough. Weather overcast and squally.

- 14 - ENCLOSURE (..).

— page 238 —
12 - 18 November
Conducting daylight-submerged and night-surfaced patrols in assigned positions just north of the Islands of YOKAKUNI, IRIHO, ISHIKA and HIYAKO with no sightings of any sort, except that at 0250 on the 17th picked up by radar and by sight just west of YONAKUN JIMA a large JAPANESE hospital ship, properly light, on northerly course, speed about 15 knots. (SHIP CONTACT #1) Converted No. 4 fuel-ballast to main-ballast on night of 17 November.

19 November
Conducting patrol off eastern approaches to KIIRUN in accordance with instructions from pack leader.

20 November
To date have scarcely seen the sun shine in this area. Conditions of clouds, rain and mist prevail day and night.

1220
Through a temporary break in the mist sighted a sizeable vessel off SAMOHI KAKU heading northward along the coast. Commenced approach at once. (SHIP CONTACT #2)

1210
Convoy appeared consisting of five ships. Ran at high speed submerged but convoy's course was already opening away upon sighting and could never close to less than eight thousand yards.

1300
Plane. (BETTY) sighted overhead. (A/C CONTACT #5)

1327
Secured from battle stations and watched convoy round BITO KAKU and apparently head into KIIRUN.

1500
Patrol vessel appeared on southeasterly course and passed close astern enroute to eastward. (SHIP CONTACT #3) (NOTE: Later confirmed this to be vessel sunk by REDFISH with gunfire.)

1755
Heard one or two distant explosions, similar to depth charges.

1918
Surfaced and gave information on day's contact to pack commander with a suggestion for close beach patrol of deep water along POROSA coast north of KARENKO HARBOR for several daylight periods. Received dispatch from pack commander instructing the pack to take stations at dawn tomorrow in accordance with the above suggestion.

2037
Maneuvered at four-engine speed avoiding two patrol boats.

2145
Clear of enemy nuisance craft.

21 November
Dove on westerly course about 11 miles southeast of KARENKO HARBOR. Sets grew very rough with high winds sending rain, spray and mist over the entire area. Periscope observations made with difficulty and only occasional glimpses of lend gained.

ENCLOSURE (A).

- 5 -

— page 239 —
1010 Suddenly a break in visibility revealed KARRENKO HARBOR dead ahead, distance about one mile. No shipping seen and observations were not good. Turned away to the northeast to parallel coast.

1950: Surfaced and headed northeast for night patrol station.

2230: Received instructions for the next day's patrol point from the pack commander.

22 November: Conducting night surface patrol about ten miles off the TAIMAN coast.

0600: Heading in for a close-in beach patrol submerged.

0725: Received message from ComSubPac to the "SLUGGERS" suggesting a return to SAIPAN for fuel to be followed by a two-week's patrol in Area 12 where things were hot if the present area was devoid of contacts. At the time this seemed like an excellent suggestion as Area ELEVEN Charlie had been pretty dull so far.

0731: Dove and continued to close FORMOSA coast about fifteen miles north of KARRENKO HARBOR.

1000: Paralleled coast at from two to four miles during remainder of day.

1950: Surfaced and received contact report from REDFISH on convoy of about six ships heading on course 110°, speed 8. Commenced closing at once.

2142: Contacted convoy and commenced tracking from southward. (SHIP CONTACT #4) Pack commander instructed SHAD to make attack from convoy's starboard side.

2238: Turned in for attack with moon temporarily under a cloud.

2249: Moon burst out from clouds and SHAD was directly under the shaft of light with the convoy in darkness at 4,000 yards. Two escorts on starboard beam and one on the port bow commenced closing so turned and withdrew for the nonce.

2300: Conducting another end-around. BUG to the eastward and REDFISH to the north.

2315: Convoy changed course to south which put the SHAD in excellent position, so turned in for another attack.

2335: With leading escort (afterwards identified as CHIDORI) dead ahead at 3,000 yards slaved down and ordered bow tubes made ready.

- 6 - ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 240 —
2338
Range to the CHIDORI was now around 1,000 yards; three bow tubes ready. (ATLANTIC NO. 1) SHAD was in an excellent position to fire at the leading escort and then spray the oncoming ships of the convoy with the remaining bow-and stern-tubes while turning away. It looked like a dream set-up, when suddenly the most bitter chain of events conspired to destroy all chances for success. Everything seemed lined up on the bridge and orders to "fire when ready" had been given to the conning tower. At this point the fire-control party reported some difficulty with matching of gyros at the tubes. Suddenly three bow-tubes were fired in quick succession. The fire-control party reported they had not fired them and the bridge personnel could see that the torpedoes were about 20 degrees aft of the target's stern. Now at 800 yards range the JLP was signaling to the SHAD with a small light. It was obviously time to pull clear.

2339
Turning left with full rudder and full speed when it was realized the "jig" was up and diving was perhaps the better recourse with an enemy TBD at such close range. Looked ahead and saw the massed shapes of the entire convoy close aboard as the bridge was cleared.

2340
Dove rapidly to 200 feet.

2343
Was just going to come up and try sound or radar shots on the passing parade in the belief that the CHIDORI had gone on, when the first of ten very close depth charges began to drop. Clawed for deeper depths at once. That was one of the most efficient drubbings encountered to date; and, reflectively, nothing less should have been expected when it is realized that all the JLP had to do was put his rudder over and let 'em go. (The first lieutenant reports that a manifold wrench, which had been missing for several months, made its appearance in the middle of the bracing by suddenly dropping on the deck from nowhere.)

When the excitement had subsided substantially, the following facts were extricated from the chaos; Upon orders to "make ready the bow-tubes" all the tubes were flooded. The outer doors on tubes 2, 3, and 4 were opened. As the outer door on 2 started to open a hot run resulted in the tube. The forward movement of that torpedo, bending the gyro spindle, rendered automatic gyro-input impossible to the remainder of the next. The conning-tower fire-control party was informed of the situation in the forward torpedo room and logically ordered hand matching of gyros at the tubes. Apparently the jamming of 2 gyro spindle was not great enough to prevent hand movement of the gyro-input system. The conning-tower was reporting the generated gyro angles over the battle phones to the tubes when an angle of "four one" was misunderstood to be "fire one" as also were "four two" and

- 7 - ENCLOSURE (i).

— page 241 —
23 November 0016
Distant explosions heard. Hope the rest of the "SLUGGERS" are getting in their locks.

0045
Surfaced about 11,000 yards from enemy ships with explosions and blossoms of light visible on that bearing. Already it looked as though about three ships in the convoy were missing.

0051
Continued tracking remainder of convoy and reported to pack commander SHUD's situation. Included in the report the information on that SHUD was tracking, but would not attack any more because of the weakness of a tube in the event of further depth-charging; all though it had already proved itself capable of withstanding considerable punishment once already tonight.

0106
For the next hour depth-charging and explosions were heard in abundance. Had the thrill of watching one of the remaining pips of the convoy disappear on the FPI screen indicating success on the part of the REDFISH or BUG.

0200
Received information that REDFISH was in contact with two ships of convoy which SHUD was tracking so turned to southeast to close point of first attacks in hope of finding cripples, intercepting other portions of the enemy group or possibly picking up a survivor.

0258
Running at about 5,000 yards from two unidentified small vessels with radar interference on that bearing and a possible small pip beyond them when suddenly gunfire and lights were observed. Troopers seemingly began arcing towards the SHUD, so at

0303
The OOD dove. Heavy depth-charging followed; but if intended for SHUD, was all quite distant. Later believe the firing was all directed at one of the other submarines. (NOTE: Conversation with REDFISH at SHUD indicates this was the case and SHUD probably dove prematurely.)

- 8 -

ENCLOSURE ():

— page 242 —
0304: Sorews and -pinging how-ever were heard close aboard almost continuously for the next two hours and the sounds of surf on YOAKUNI Island began growing louder as the set of the current was in that direction.

0515: Surfaced with the nearest target 6,400 yards on starboard bow. Very black night. Radar reported enemy vessel moving in rapidly.

0517: Turned away and put all four engines on the line at full power. Those excellent Fairbanks-I-orse engines slowly opened the range on the patrol vessel (which had closed to 4,000 yards) now following astern. At 13,000 yards the DAF disappeared on the radar screen.

0530: BANG reported having sunk four and damaged one; REDFISH reported having sunk two; SHUD feeling terrifically disappointed over her ill-luck could only hope that some chaos to the enemy and assistance to the other "SLUGGERS" had been imposed by her abortive attacks. (NOTE: REDFISH later at S.IFAN verbally gave the SHUD a generous nod along this line by revealing that the leading escort had dropped astern of the formation to work the SHUD over which momentarily weakened the convoy's protection considerably.)

0535: Two pips on the radar to the northward at 13,000 yards. Made quick track and reported position, course and speed to the pack commander.

0600: Sighted searchlights from the two vessels previously mentioned.

0730: Dove and all hands turned in to rest from a fatigue unmitigated by the sweetness of any SHUD success.

1950: Surfaced and reported to pack commander that SHUD would have to repair damage to outer door of No. 4 tube before making any more attacks and was therefore heading for S.IFAN.

2300: Intercepted despatch from REDFISH to ComSubPac indicating BUG was returning to PLAN HURBOR, all torpedoes expended; REDFISH and SHUD heading for S.IFAN in company.

'24 November: Surface running enroute S.IFAN from patrol area.

1026: Changed course to put lookout-reported periscope astern at position; Lat. 22° 20' N; Long. 126° 33' E.

1030: Made report of probable sighting to pack commander.

1840: Dove for trim.

1902: Surfaced and continued as before.

- 9 - ENCLOSURE (..). 10

— page 243 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-L-L

26 November
0929
Dove and made preparations to pull the spent torpedo out of No. 4 tube. No luck. Water poured in through outer door faster than the trim pump could take care of it through the the tube drain line. (NOTE: Later at S.I.P.N. the PULPION repair force was unable to pull the torpedo into the vessel either; not due to the inflow of water, which was negligible with the ship flooded down off't raising the tube nearly out of the water, but because of the gyro-spindle which was jammed pointing forward. Finally, forced open the outer door, attached a line to the nose of the warhead and had a motor-launch ahead of the S.H.D pull the torpedo out of the tube.)

1020
Surfaced and sighted REDFISH to northward.

1030
Joined up with REDFISH and remained within visual distance enroute to S.I.P.N.

2015
Encountered three friendly submarines on opposite course. Exchanged signals with U.S.S. R.L.ZORB.C.K. other two undoubtedly TIEFISH and SIGHUNDO.

27 November
Incompany with U.S.S. REDFISH closing point of rendezvous with escort vessel from S.I.P.N. Numerous friendly planes sighted.

1216
Sighted destroyer U.S.S. G.R.Y.SON (DD435) and closed to join up.

1235
Set course for S.I.P.N. in company with REDFISH and destroyer G.R.Y.SON. The latter promptly relayed the news by VHF that the U.S.S. had raided S.I.P.N. last night and that another air-raid had just commenced. These were in retaliation for the first and second raids on TOKYO by B-29's based in the H.I.L.I.S.

1301
Sighted ROT. Island.

1330
Sighted TINITI Island.

1448
Sighted S.I.P.N. Island.

1555
Received message from escort that air-raid was over at S.I.P.N.

1723
Pilot came aboard at not gate entrance and continued up T.N.P.G harbor channel.

1805
Tied up in nest alongside starboard side of U.S.S. FULFON outboard of REDFISH.

- 10-

— page 244 —
28 November to 4 December 1944

In SAIPAN Harbor while repairs to No. 4 torpedo tube were being effected by the repair force of the U.S.S. FULTON. Had frequent air-raids of which the one on the night of 28 November was the most spectacular ever witnessed by this vessel. On 29 November went into drydock, ARD25, for five days. Discovered that while no shafting to the outer door of No. 4 tube had been damaged, the entire case housing the worm-quadrant and pinion had been twisted perceptibly. This was correctac in the FULTON machine shop and re-installed on the night of 3 December. Received personal mail with great joy on 1 December. Left the drydock on the morning of 4 December and tied up in the next outboard of U.S.S. CALLAH, TUNA, and KETE along port side of FULTON. Pired a dummy from No. 4 tube with satisfactory results. Took aboard four steam torpedoes forward and made ready for sea.

5 December
1100

1600

1800

1855

-6 - 8 December

9 December
0350

0757

1947

2107

Underway for patrol area in accordance with ComSubPac's dispatch 3ppp21 of November, escorted by F01126. U.S.S. REDFISH, operating under same orders, departed on 2 December for the patrol area (western portions of ELEVEN Able and Baker) where SIAD will join up at the first opportunity, estimated as the evening of the 12th.

Released escort vessel and continued as before.

Made trim dive.

Surfaced and continued toward patrol area.

Proceeding toward assigned area conducting daily training dives and drills enroute. At 2320 on the 6th received dispatch from ComSubPac informing REDFISH that SIAD would rendezvous on the evening of the 12th. Message also contained congratulations to SIAD's commanding officer on the birth of a son.

Commenced picking up land on radar at 100,000 yards.

Dove with islands of HAWSEI SICTO GROUP at 35 miles on radar.

Surfaced and headed for passage through TOKARA KAIKYO (COUNTRY STRAIT).

APR intercepting various frequencies, armed up SD and had it ready to flash on momentarily if airborne frequency produced a saturation pip. Tried it several times but no contacts indicated.

- 11 -

EXCLUSIVE (A).

— page 245 —
10 December
Transmitting: COASTAL STRAIT to enter the East China Sea. Very dark night. Growing cold. Heavy seas from the northwest.

0001
Small SU pip at 7,000 yards on starboard beam. Radar interference noted. Alert for exchange of recognition signals. None came, so challenged. No reply. Target passed abeam to starboard at 5,000 yards. Possibly SUNFISH or SEADEVIL.

0400
KUSAKAKE SHINA at 42,000 yards on radar.

0730
Dove.

1940
Surfaced and continued toward the northwest.

2105
DAMO GUNTO on radar at 56,000 yards.

11 December
Heading west and southwest approaching patrol area.

0736
Dove. (NOTE: The morning's celestial fix was the last such position obtained by the navigator until departure from the area some two weeks later.)

11420
Sighted BETTY bearing 3500(T), course soutwesterly. (A/C CONTACT 46)

1806
Observed floating mine close aboard. Throughout the day saw numerous corpses in life jackets.

1947
Surfaced and entered northern boundary of patrol area.

12 December
0740
Dove on approximate point of rendezvous with REDFISH and patrolled there during the day.

1836
Surfaced about one hour before dark in order to facilitate making the expected rendezvous. Heavy seas were making up from the northeast and clouds were thickly racing overhead. The information imparted by the KETE at SAIPAI that this area was bitterly cold certainly was no deviation from the truth. The wind and rain together made it an ordeal to remain on the bridge for any length of time.

1848
Radar interference to southward. Commenced closing at once.

1904
Received challenge and sent reply by radar to REDFISH.

1920
Sighted REDFISH and received message by blinker to head on course 1500(T) and stop.

1950
REDFISH came around stern and took up parallel course to windward. Finally effected mutual exchange of information by way of line-throwing gun and water-tight container.

- 12 - EXCLUSIVE (a).

— page 246 —
2010
Following several unsuccessful attempts to get a line across. (NOTE: SHAD had some comments on the area obtained from the commanding officer of the SEALION, Comdr. E. REICH, USN, who had arrived at GUARD before the SHAD's departure.)

Completed exchanges and proceeded in company with the REDFISH at visual distance toward the southwest in accordance with patrol instructions just received from the pack commander. General plan was to proceed to southern boundary of the area, SHAD to westward REDFISH to eastward, until 15 December. After this date REDFISH would return to the northern half of the two areas (north of Lat. 27° 30' N) and work there until 20 December while the SHAD patrolled the southern half (south of Lat. 27° 30' N).

13 December
0741
Dove in the eternally savage seas an commenced submerged periscope patrol. Depth control quite difficult. An epidemic of colds now sweeping through the boat, those affected including the skipper and the majority of the other officers.

1853
2048
Surfaced.

2105
Opened out on REDFISH and conducted night-surface patrol at one-engine speed.

i
Dispatch received tonight told of impending fleet action off HUDORO and urged all hands to be on their toes. Prayed that weather would modify sufficiently to allow a submarine to travel on at least two engines headed into the sea. The running actions of a torpedo in these seas was also conjectural.

14 December
0530
Fuel-ballast tank 30, 4 went dry but the seas were too high to permit anyone on deck for the change-over to main ballast.

0714
1916
Dove for submerged patrol.

Surfaced and headed to the westward to pick up some islands off the CHINA coast by radar for a position. No fix of any sort for four days now.

2153
TUGUYUNG TAO at 15,000 yards on the SJ.

2325
Good fix obtained on several small islands and turned back southeast to patrol assigned station.

15 December
0745
Dove for submerged patrol.

- 13 -

ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 247 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1920
16 December
0026
0755
1950
2205
2320
18 December
0746
1950
19 December
0247

Surfaced on northerly course. Seas of typhoon proportions though barometer has never dropped below 30.20 inches.

Exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. REDFISH who closed to 4,000 yards where information was exchanged via VHF.

Dove.

Surfaced for night patrol.

Made radar contact on TUNGYUNG TAO for position and turned to eastward to cross patrol area.

Made daily dive.

Surfaced in undiminished seas. Rain and mist in constant attendance.

Made radar contact on TAISHAN LIBERATOR at 52,000 yards.

Ran with seas at good speed to allow man to go on deck to open reach-roads to ten-pound blow lines to Ro. 4 in. B. tank, the only action required topside when converting from fuel to main ballast. Converted Ro. 4 to main ballast. Received the news tonight that our forces had made an as yet unopposed landing on HINDORO Island.

Made daily dive in northeastern corner of southern area conducting alert periscope patrol.

Surfaced and ran NE-SW patrol line in northeast corner of above-mentioned area.

Radar pip at 25,000 yards indicated large ship approaching from the northeast. Bridge reported brilliant glow from the indicated bearing. Commenced tracking at once. (SHIP CONTACT #5)

Large hospital ship now appeared and tracked on steady course 2200(T), speed 15 knots, all of which constituted a practical work on the emotions ranging from highest elation to dull despair, and the hope that the enemy's bright lights would somehow be suddenly extinguished.

Hospital ship disappeared to the southwest. Seas had moderated perceptibly. It would have been the first night possible for surface approach and attack.

Dove for day's patrol submerged.

- 14 -

ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 248 —
1952
Surfaced and headed westward to obtain land-radar fix. Seas still very rough and uncomfortable. Skies overcast.

20 December
0158
Picked up TAISHAN LIEHTAO Island on the radar at 42,000 yards.

0225
Changed course to southward to patrol southern edge of area.

07147
Dove for daily periscope patrol submerged.

19146
Surfaced and headed northward.

21 December
0753
Made daily dive after taking station along the anticipated track of a north-bound task force reported observed by the China Air Group.

1355
PETE bearing 3200(T), range about 5 miles, running to the southwest. (A/C CONTACT 96)

1950
Surfaced and discovered the bow planes would not rig in. Also the forward-bridge speaker had become inoperative. Lay to while a new inboard shear-pin was installed in the bow-plane rigging gear. A new coil and speaker diaphragm was installed in the forward-bridge speaker. Seas were remarkably calm for the first time since entering this area.

2030
Sent first message to CONAVGroup in accordance with Com-SubPac's dispatch 289929 of November 1944.

2333
Radar contact on TAISHAN LIEHTAO Island bearing 3000(T), at range of 42,000 yards.

2350
Radar contact on small vessel at 7,500 yards. Naveuvered to avoid.

22 December
0100
Picked up HIESHAN LIEHTAO Island at 40,000 yards.

0105
Sighted two bobbing white lights bearing north true.

0117
Made radar contacts on small craft at 7,000 yards and turned to avoid.

0120
Sighted the exhausts of a plane bearing 0400(T) and made a quick dive. (A/C CONTACT 98)

0150
Surfaced and continued as before. Clear night for the first time in eleven days.

0334
Sighted probable aircraft eastern from the bridge but it did not close and was not seen again.

- 15 - ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 249 —
07/45
Made daily dive, but not before receiving the REDFISH's report to ComSubPac of her attack resulting in the sinking of a large aircraft carrier on the night of the 19th. Wow! What a nice piece of submarineing that job was.

: 1017
Sighted masts of two large trawlers heading southward. Avoided and passed clear. (SHIP CONTACT #6)

: 2000
Surfaced and turned to pass through the area of the REDFISH's carrier attack with the remote idea of picking up a possible prisoner. The weather had been quite good for the past two days which enhanced the probability of still finding survivors.

: 23 December 0750
Made routine dive.

: 1952
Surfaced and patrolled on northeasterly course at one-engine speed departing area.

: 2325
Passed floating mine to starboard in moonlight.

: 24 December 0744
Dove.

: 1955
Surfaced and headed up toward DANJO GUNTO.

: 2225
Encountered radar interference bearing 280°(T). Tried to exchange recognition signals. Probably one of the BLAZER pack.

: 25 December 0737
DANJO GUNTO on radar at 55,000 yards.

: 0747
Dove for the day.

: 0936
Pinging heard on QB sound gear.

: 0947
Just sighted tops of small patrol craft on northwesterly heading at about 7,000 yards range. (SHIP CONTACT #7)

: 1005
Enemy vessels passed clear and disappeared from sight and sound.

: 1237
Sighted DANJO GUNTO through periscope bearing 030°(T).

: 1930
Sound operator picked up scows bearing 085°(T). Could not see their source through the periscope even though the night was brightly moonlit.

: 1934
Changed course to put scows noises astern.

- 16 - ENCLOSURE (A). 17

— page 250 —
2000
: 2010
: 2026
: 2031
: 2107
: 2142
: 26 December 0027
: 0030
: 0334
: 0336

Surfaced and immediately sighted by eye and radar two small vessels on bearing 1300(T), range 6,000 yards.

Making full power to run around the enemy small craft which were lying exactly on the desired course-line of the SHAD.

Had a definite small pip on the radar come in rapidly from 9,000 yards astern and disappear at practically zero range. None of the bridge personnel could see anything in the clear moonlit night, so did not dive. APR had a saturation pip on the JAP airborne frequency (155 mcs).

Pip opened out, drizzled and then the quartermaster spotted a plane high and directly overhead. The plane was sighted solely because of the clear moonlit night as no exhausts or running lights were visible. (A/C CONTACT #9)

Dived and was followed at once by two jolting bombs. Decided the clear night, the small craft, the proximity of islands and enemy airfields was a little too risky for a while, so remained submerged for about two hours.

As was expected, the screws of the small craft soon appeared in the sound gear. Turned to put them astern.

Screws disappeared to the northeast.

Surfaced and discovered the night now heavily overcast, considered a stroke of good fortune. Had previously hoped to transit CONTACT STRAIT before dawn, but that seemed somewhat remote now.

Made all possible speed to the southeast approaching the STRAIT, finally gaining four engines for propulsion as the battery charge was completed. Used a cow-bell warning signal under the bridge ladder in the conning tower from the radio room to indicate a saturation pip on the APR on the JAP airborne frequency (155 mcs). This served to alert everyone on the bridge and also caused the SJ radar operators to be especially attentive to the possible approach of aircraft. Twice on the ringing of the warning bell the SJ was secured for about four minutes in case the strength of the signal was being used by enemy aircraft to determine direction. No attacks resulted, but this is not a conclusive procedure as land-based radars of near-airborne frequency were also present.

Sighted plane in distance: astern by exhaust flashes. (A/C CONTACT #10)

Plane disappeared and was not again seen.

- 17 -

ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 251 —
0500
Frequent radar fixes on the surrounding islands indicated that between the hours of 0500 and 0630 the SHAD averaged 24 knots at full-power with the help of a following sea and and easterly set of the current.

0738
Dove in the middle of CO.LINET STRAIT with broad daylight already illuminating the east.

0758
Plane sighted (RUFE) bearing 195°(T), range at out 3 miles. (A/C CONTACT 1/11) Suspect the coast watchers on YAKU SHIMA probably sent that one out to look the situation over. As was hoped, a strong easterly set to the current in the STRAIT helped to move the SHAD rapidly out into the Pacific.

0900
Lt. (jg) Duane BROWN, USNR, held Protestant Christmas services in the after torpedo room while Lieut. Frank E. (1/DOAD, USNR, conducted corresponding Catholic services in the forward torpedo room.

1100
Commenced celebration of Christmas Day by assembling in the after engine room to open gift packages and sing carols.

1300
Served eggnog and cake for luncheon.

1900
Partook of delicious Christmas dinner.

1915
Sighted plane with running lights in moonlight bearing 3210(T), range about 3 miles. (A/C CONTACT 1/12)

2009
Surface and headed eastward enroute PEAR HARBOR.

27 December
0202
Sent SHAD's third to ComSubPac reporting departure from area and heading for PEARL HARBOR.

1100
Ship sighted on horizon bearing true north. (SHIP CONTACT 1/6) Commenced maneuvering to determine target's course and speed. Finally judged it was practically stopped, so closed on the surface. When it was believed likely that SHAD might be sighted at

1215
Dove to approach submerged. Closed target's last true bearing at 2/3 speed submerged.

1225
Sighted target through periscope at a depth of 50 feet. (Posit. Lat. 290 36' N; Long. 1310 35' E.)

1327
Enemy vessel now visible at normal periscope depth, range about 7,200 yards.

- 18 - ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 252 —
1358
Went to battle stations submerged. Target now clearly seen as a small vessel similar to converted yacht or sea-going tug with large radio antennas, a mainmast of steel lattice-work, and a deck gun on the forecastle. As the seas were quite heavy and the small craft was rolling tremendously, became extremely dubious about the effectiveness of a shallow setting on an electric torpedo. Too rough for battle surface, however; so lined up to attempt stern shots as the electrics were loaded aft.

: 1407
Under ready the after tubes and went to silent running. Coming in on the target's starboard bow. The latter was lying to on a southerly heading.

: 1500
At a range of 700 yards came about to bring stern tubes to bear.

: 1508
Presumably all lined up. Looked through the periscope and was amazed to find that the range was now about 2,000 yards and that the vessel was apparently even smaller that the previous foreshortened view of it had indicated.

: 1509
Put over rudder to make another full turn in order to close the target, though still not at all sure a torpedo would function well enough to touch it.

: 1510
Suddenly the small craft speeded up its screws and presented a small bow angle. Presumed enemy had probably been listening on sound gear and had confirmed any suspicions of SHAD's presence by a glimpse of the 'scope'.

: 1511
Started down deep and rigged for depth charge attack.

: 1515
Sound gear tracked target going by and no depth charges fell. As enemy's 'screw noises faded at

: 1524
Returned to periscope depth and observed vessel apparently lying to again at about 7,000 yards distance. Decided enough time had been spent on this spittick and turned away to withdraw before surfacing.

: 1635
Due to the desire to close this target quietly, the after tubes were made ready almost an hour before coming to the firing point. When the torpedomen in the after room were later routining these electric torpedoes after the tubes had been flooded to make them ready, it was noticed upon with-drawing 'No. 9 torpedo into the room that it was sizzling with heat and gasses were venting inboard. Obviously a flooding of "short" of some kind had occurred. It was deemed wisest, after speedy deliberation, to expend this torpedo at once, anticipating the possibility of a torpedo battery-comportment explosion or even that the heat was

— page 253 —
1637
: 1805
: 28 December
: 1015
: 1135
: 1327
: 1601
: 29 December
: 31 December
: 1030
: 1 January 1945
: 0230
: 2 January
: 3 January
: 0824

**Suffice to set off the warhead. The torpedo was therefore reloaded at once and fired.**

About 90 seconds later a dull explosion occurred, though not at all like a regular torpedo explosion.

**Surfaced and continued eastward.**

Enroute PEARL HARBOR from patrol area. Received ComSubPac's routing message.

**SOPU GAN Island sighted bearing 0420(T), distance 35,000 yards.**

**SOPU GAN abeam to port distance 15 miles.**

**Lade quick dive upon sighting twin-engined bomber (BETTY) bearing 2150(T), distance about 5 miles on southerly course.**

**Surfaced and resumed easterly course.**

**Set clocks ahead one hour to zone time minus ELEVEN (LOVE).**

**Sighted U.S.S. SORDFISH and passed close aboard on opposite course.**

**Changed to zone time minus TWELVE (NINE).**

**Sent SHAD's fourth to ComSubPac reporting positions within HIDWAY 500- and HOMOLULU 1000-milecircle.**

**(EAST LONGITUDE)**

**Converted safety tank to a variable as forward and after trims are nearly dry.**

**(WEST LONGITUDE)**

**Crossed Interlational Date Line from west to east and changed to zone time plus ELEVEN (XRAY).**

**USN LIEUTENANT 330 sighted with zero angle on the bow at four miles coming out of cloud with a "sighted-sub-sank-same" gleam in his eye. This is near position of periscope reported by DEVILFISH yesterday afternoon. Finally showered this pilot with searchlight's full beam and he condescended to identify himself. The above performance might have been entitled "How To Keep From Growing Old" if friendly character of plane had not been reasonably assured.**

**ENCLOSURE (A).**

**21**

— page 254 —
1500
Received ComSubPac's rendezvous message addressed to both SHAD and APOGON.

2130
Rādar interference noted on true bearing 055° probably APOGON. Attempts to exchange recognition signals unsuccessful.

4 January
'Changed to zone time plus TEN (WILLIAM).

0915
Sighted U.S. S-24 at 8 miles distance. Exchanged signals at a comfortable range; then he closed in, looked the situation over and went on his way.

1133
Sighted submarine on port bow. Closed and exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. APOGON. Joined up in company proceeding to joint rendezvous.

5 January
0520
Made rendezvous with PCL85 and in company with U.S.S. APOGON bet course for FEARL HARBOR.

0936
Entered swept channel.

1011
...ica uj silvjrtiovse, k...i

— page 255 —
5HAQ #8
: C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
: (C) WEATHER
: The weather in both Areas ELEVEN Charlie and the western part of ELEVEN Able and Baker was at least consistent in its adherence to that described in current publications. Both areas provided days of storm, cold, rain and mist almost unbroken by any calm or clarity of skies.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
: Currents experienced were in close agreement with information contained in H.O. publications.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
: Once more the value of the radar as the navigator's most important piece of equipment becomes apparent when operating adjacent to land masses. Due to the weather and some of the military obstacles introduced by the enemy in the area of the latter half of this patrol, the radar looms as an indescribable blessing for peace of mind and accuracy of position.

KARENKO, SANCHO KAKU on the northeast coast of FORDOSI, and HEISEN Island lights off the CHINA coast were sighted showing normal characteristics.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS
: No. : Time : Lat. North : Type(s) : Initial : Est. Course : How : Remarks
: : Date : Long. East : Range. : & Speed : Cont.:
: #1. : 0250 K : 24-10 : Hospital : 20,150 : 350 : SN : :
: : 17 Nov. : 121-57 : Ship : : 13 : :
: #2. : 1220 K : 24-58 : Convoy : 15,000 : 315 : P : :
: : 20 Nov. : 122-07 : : : 11 : :
: #3. : 1450 K : 25-02 : Patrol : 5,000 : 090 : P : :
: : 20 Nov. : 122-04 : Vessel : : 6 : :
: #4. : 2112 K : 24-10 : Convoy : 18,000 : 110 : R : ATTACH
: : 22 Nov. : 122-21 : : : 7 : NO. 1
: #5. : 0247 K : 27-15 : Hospital : 17,000 : 220 : SN :
: : 19 Dec. : 122-55 : Ship : : 15 : :
: #6. : 1017 K : 29-29 : Two : 6,000 : 100 : P :
: : 22 Dec. : 123-36 : Travelers : : 5 : :
: #7. : 0938 K : 31-58 : PC : 5,000 : 160 : Sonar :
: : 25 Dec. : 127-55 : : : 12 : :
: #8. : 1100 K : 29-39 : Patrol : 15,000 : : SD :
: : 27 Dec. : 134-35 : Yacht : : 0 : :

P - Periscope
R - Radar
SD) Surface
(SI) (Day
(SI) (Night

- 22 - ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 257 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. SHAD TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1. PATROL NO. 8.
TIME 2338 K DATE 22 NOVEMBER 1944. LATITUDE 24-16 N LONGITUDE 122-28 E.
TARGET DATA -- DAMAGE INFLICTED
DESCRIPTION: CHIDORI type TED.
TARGET DRAFT 6 Feet. COURSE 120 SPEED 6 RANGE 800 yards.
OWN SHIP DATA
SPEED 9 COURSE 020 DEPTH Surface ANGLE 0
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
TYPE ATTACK: NIGHT SURFACE ATTACK.

Having obtained a favorable attack position on a CHIDORI escort, range 3,100 yards, 90 S track, gyro angle near 000, the bow tubes were ordered to be made ready. While oping the outer door of number 4 torpedo tube, a "hot run" in the tube followed, which jammed the gyro-spindle of that tube, thereby overloading the gyro-setter motor so that it failed to follow up thereafter. While matching gyro angles by hand, the forward torpedo room mistook a gyro angle for an order to fire and they did so. Three tubes were fired, none having match gyro angles.

| TUBES FIRED | ONE | TWO | THREE |
||-----|-----|-------|
| TRACK ANGLE | 120 S | 120 S | 120 S |
| GYRO ANGLE | 031 | 032 | .033 |
| DEPTH SET  | 4 feet | 4 feet | 4 feet |
| POWER     | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH |
| HIT OR TISS | MISS | MISS | MISS |
| ERRATIC   | NO  | NO  | NO  |
| MARK TORPEDO | 14-3A | 23 | 23 |
| SERIAL NUMBER | 26615 | 41436 | 62488 |
| MARK EXPLODER | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 |
| SERIAL NUMBER | 5774 | 8336 | 6386 |
| ACTUATION SET | CONTACT | CONTACT | CONTACT |
| ACTUATION ACTUAL | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
| MARK W.R.HAD | 3665 | 3484 | 13666 |
| SERIAL NUMBER | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| EXPLOSIVE   | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| FIRING INTERVAL | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| TYPE SPREAD | NONE | NONE | NONE |
| SEA CONDITIONS | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| OVERHAUL ACTIVITY | SUFMARINE TASE, NAVY NC. 1504. |
| REMARKS -- All three tubes were fired while attempting to match gyro angles by hand, and all were fired before being matched.

-24- ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 258 —
1. The trim line to No. 3 auxiliary tank developed several pin-hole leaks after a section of it was repaired during the last refit. It is believed the entire line should be renewed at this time.

2. A source of continual trouble has been the leakage of the cooling coils straps are attached to each turn of the coil. By cutting the straps between each coil-turn the difficulty has been largely eliminated and it is reported that this condition be investigated with a view to procuring coils thus adapted or a suitable substitute therefore.

3. Fracture of a bell-orank to the bow-buoyancy vent linkage during a dive which rendered the vent inoperative could have had a results which might easily have been fatal under different circumstances. The careful investigation of the links to regular intervals was part of this vessel's routine but the fact that the connection of other submarines to this position was not made.

4. The air-conditioning and ventilating units now on this vessel include the originally installed double air-conditioning units forward and aft, plus recently installed small units in the conning tower and the forward battery. A booster-blower in the ventilation line was installed during the last refit to get air forward of the control room when surfaced with more than one engine running. This all has improved conditions vastly but the CPO bunkroom in the forward battery is still far from good. The installation of a small air-conditioning unit similar to those used in the conning tower is believed to be the answer to the problem.

5. No inboard hatches are installed on the SHAD and, in view of the recent harrowing experience of another U. S. submarine, are urgently requested.

6. During depth-charging the holding-down pins to the hand training of the JK-QC sound equipment were sheared off rendering the hand training gear useless. This was repaired at SAIPAN.

-25-

ENCLOSURE (A).

26

— page 259 —
1. Scored shafting to the evaporator blower units with the availability of only one size of gland sealing rings has rendered one unit inoperative after several hundred hours as the rings are successively chewed up by the shaft. It is hoped the new type blower unit might be procured in replacement.

Electrical:
1. With the installation of the ventilation blower, an AC unit, the deficiency of the ship's IC capacity, long indicated, was glaringly emphasized. An alteration to take care of this is already in effect and the added capacity is certainly much needed at the first possible moment.

2. The forward-bridge speaker must dead suddenly and it was learned the coil on speaker diaphragm was burned out. Fortunately the "on board" spares were adequate to quickly rectify this situation.

3. The recently-installed double charging panel in the forward torpedo room for use with electric torpedoes was removed at MIDWAY for the use of the U.S.S. BANG, it not being possible at that time to fire electric torpedoes from this ship's bow tubes. Re-installation of this unit is indicated now that it is anticipated that the required modification to the bow-tubes will be accomplished.

4. Reported follow-up difficulties with the gyro-regulators has been experienced. The equipment will pass all routine tests with flying colors and then at the moment of actually preparing to fire develop eccentricities and a temporary moment. Thorough check and re-check under simulated battle conditions under the guidance of the best available base fire-control repair talent is indicated. The fact that a shift to "island running" is sometimes made throughout the vessel just prior to firing may be revealing.

Ordnance:
1. The hot run in No. 4-tube was found to be due to improper clearances in the stop bolt. This particular tube was reported carefully checked by the last refit activity and not it failed to meet the requirements when again inspected after the casualty is not known.

2. Flooding of the electric torpedo (Mk 18-1, Serial No. 54792, loading activity Submarine llday) in No. 9 tube after being made ready for about one hour and subjected to a pressure not exceeding 80 pounds resulted in either a shorting or chemical reaction in the battery compartment. The internal heat in the torpedo was considered incidental to a dangerous situation and the torpedo was therefore promptly expended.

3. An attempt to fire the 40 Mi gun aft after a long period of submerged days resulted in failure until it was revocalled. The two guns were properly fired and the crew of the torpedo boat was not injured. A previous failure to fire had indicated the source to be too much grease around the perils on the rammer. Henceforth a practically greaseless breech block, and breech end of the barrel will be maintained in conjunction with frequent applications of liquid oil.

-26- ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 260 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
which can be easily poured over these parts upon surfacing.

4. Before firing electric torpedoes forward repeated tests have indicated that a modification to the bow tubes must be made. That this be done at the earliest moment possible so as not to deprive the SHAD of the advantages of this new weapon is urgently requested.

(L) RADIO NRL

: Reception of the SUB FOX was good throughout the entire patrol as no serial messages were missed while at sea. During the latter part of the patrol there were, however, occasional instances when NRL could not be heard from 1700 to 1900 Zebra on any frequency.

In answer to the comments requested in ComSubPac's dispatch 251/38 of November regarding the shift from 9515 kos to 9090 kos, it is believed that this did not result in any great improvement. The occasion never arose where it was found necessary to use the new frequency 13655 kos except during the daylight periods enroute to and from the area.

(II) RADAR

Both radar sets performed to a high degree of efficiency throughout the patrol. The SD radar was used only east of the HAINAAS enroute to and from patrol, and was keyed for a period of 5 seconds every 30 seconds by means of the high voltage variac. The SJ radar was in operation for about 900 hours. By having the opportunity to get the SJ completely serviced at SAIPAN in mid-patrol, a minimum of difficulty was encountered despite the great length of time this gear was in operation. The magnetron was changed at SAIPAN after about 500 hours service and all tubes were checked and renewed where necessary (two 6AC71's, one 6AC7, and the Shepherd-Pierce tube).

On this patrol the SJ radar was used extensively in communication with other friendly submarines for recognition purposes and contact in the manner could usually be established at distances estimated (no pip evident) of about 17 miles. Average ranges to submarines were about 13,000 yards at initial contact, while they could be tracked out to about 15,000 yards as the range opened. The navigator found the radar absolutely indispensable during the patrol as foul weather prevented celestial observations. By approaching land to a range in miles approximately equal to the square root of its height in feet land-radar fixes could normally be obtained.

The following casualties occurred, keeping the SJ radar out of commission for a total of 5 hours 53 minutes.

| Date | Symptom | Trouble Found & Repair Effected | Time Lost |
|------||||
| 29 Oct.| No High Voltage Fuses blown | C-7 shorted (coupling between V4 and V5) replaced. | 4 hrs. 33 min. |
| 15 Nov.| Heater to range unit not working | DC input was made to wrong terminals. Changed to 505 and 506 to restore operation. | Submerged, no time lost. |

- 27 -
ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 262 —
3. One seaman received from the relief crew at MIDWAY-burst-an' cardrum on the first occasion when the pressure in the boat exceeded one inch. He stated he had never had a pressure test. This man was transferred to the PUERTO at SAIPAN. As it is believed that facilities for this test are available to all submarine activities, it is felt that all relief crews should be required to subject all men to pressure tests-before transferring them to operating submarines.

4. One fireman received from SUBLIV 62 relief crew as a replacement just prior to getting underway was discovered later to have impetigo and to be totally deaf in one ear. He is also unable to adjust himself to the pressure differential between the operating engine rooms and the after battery room. He will doubtless have to be transferred at the end of the patrol.

5. The following medical cases were reported:

| DISEASES AND INJURIES | No. of CASES | SICK and BINNACLE DAYS |
||||
| ABCESS, ALVEOLAR       | 1           | 5                  |
| APPENDICITIS, ACUTE     | 1           | 21                 |
| CATARRHAL FEVER, ACUTE | 23          | 0                  |
| CONTUSION, BACK        | 1           | 0                  |
| CYST, TRAITOMA, INFLAMED | 2          | 0                  |
| CISTITIS, ACUTE, NONVENERAL | 1          | 0                  |
| FUNGUS INFECTION, SKIN | 4          | 0                  |
| FURNICLE             | 1           | 0                  |
| GASTRITIS, ACUTE       | 3           | 0                  |
| GASTRITIS, CHRONIC     | 2           | 0                  |
| GASTROENTERITIS, ACUTE | 1          | 6                  |
| GERMAN HEALSES       | 1           | 2                  |
| OTITIS, EXTERNA        | 5           | 0                  |
| OTITIS, MEDIA, ACUTE    | 1           | 0                  |
| PROSTATITIS, ACUTE, NONVENERAL | 1          | 0                  |
| SEASICKNESS          | 5           | 0                  |
| SINUSITIS, FRONTAL    | 1           | 3                  |
| STRAIN, MUSCULAR, BACK | 2          | 0                  |
| TORSILLITIS, ACUTE     | 1           | 5                  |
| IMPETIGO             | 1           | 0                  |

Food
The commissary department on this vessel continues to enjoy the highest praise from all hands for the quantity, quality and variety of the food prepared and served aboard. The lack of certain fresh foods at SAIPAN was noted but no criticism could be lodged when it was observed how much superior was the submarine allowance compared to that for any of the other forces present.

Habitability
With the newly-installed, booster blower in the crow's mess habitability on this patrol was excellent. The CFQ quarters, however, could be vastly improved with the addition of a small-coming-tower air-conditioning unit which it is hoped might be obtained during the next refit. Operating in areas where it was either cool or cold somewhat abetted the condition of habitability.

-29- ENCLOSURE (i).

— page 263 —
1. (a) Number of men on board during patrol
   (b) Number of men qualified at start of patrol
   (c) Number of men qualified at end of patrol
   (d) Number of unqualified men on their first patrol
   (e) Number of men advanced in rating during patrol

2. Again great emphasis was placed on the SHIP's established training program. The length of the patrol and the enthusiasm manifested by the new men accounts for the considerable number qualified. Although nearly fifteen men were transferred during the last refit, most of whom were old-timers and consequently key hands, the manner in which younger men aboard stepped into the large shoes, just vacated was an inspiration to remark and gives unqualified confirmation to the superior quality of both the men and their submarine training.

3. From the point of view of morale and spirit it is well known that a patrol with such little tangible return for the effort expended as was this one, is perhaps the most difficult of all to make. For that reason then the plain signs of superb spirit, of unquestioned devotion to duty, of cheerfulness, of unflagging militancy everywhere manifest among the officers and men demands a tribute from their commanding officer which other Navy men have eloquently but unsentimentally expressed by saying merely, "Well Done!"

(R) MILES STEAD - FUEL USED

| MILES | GALLONS |
|-------||
| 2490  | 32,500  |
| 1193  | 12,900  |
| 2603  | 29,090  |
| 1403  | 15,365  |
| 1833  | 23,950  |
| 1526  | 13,125  |
| 4490  | 67,400  |
| 11409 | 152,115 |
| 4135  | 42,215  |

(S) DURATION

Days on route to AREAS
1. To 11 C
2. To 11 A - B & 12

Days in AREAS
1. 11 C
2. 11 A - B & 12

Days on route to. Bases
1. SHIP
2. PEARL HARBOR

Days submerged
1. 11 C
2. 11 A - B & 12

Days in SHIP
1. 7
2. 15

ENCLOSURE ().

- 30 -

— page 264 —
1. No evidence was noted during this patrol indicating efforts of enemy to either jam or D/F the radars. Of course, the SD was not in use when in the area.

2. To detect the use of enemy radars, PR-1 and SPI-1 were manned continually while cruising on the surface in the vicinity of enemy land areas. Probably made, some of them made while submerged, and in only one instance was there conclusive evidence of detection by air-borne radar. On this occasion the PR-1 gave a contact on 155 ms, sweeping at first, which later steadied up and increased in intensity. When the pulse on the SPI-1 reached the saturation point, the plane was sighted close aboard. The pulse width on this radar was 12.5 microseconds and the pulse frequency about 1200 pulses per second.

(V) REMARKS:
1. SHAD never had better periscopes both from a visual clarity point-of-view and from the standpoint of looking around the packing. MIDWAY's work in this regard was the best encountered anywhere so far.

2. After the previous patrol it was reported that the Sub Base, PEARL HARBOR, E & R-developed experimental periscope hoisting arrangement had certain advantages and likewise, disadvantages. Among the latter was the excessive noise in No. 1 periscope when either raising or lowering. Long hours at MIDWAY on the part of the base E & R Officer, Lt. Comdr. C. O. PAYNE, USN, finally revealed the source of the noise as a roller bearing installed upside down on the thrust side of the periscope motor. When the SHAD left MIDWAY, No. 1 periscope was as quiet as No. 2, and both are now exceptionally noise-free.

3. With so much zig-zagging being done these days everywhere at sea and the installation of the true-relative bearing indicator in a position somewhat inconvenient to the SU radar operators, a true bearing indicator was deemed advisable. Lt. Comdr. J. V. WILSON, USN, the SHAD's executive officer, working with Ensign G. W. INMAN, USNR, at the Submarine Base, MIDWAY, contrived a selsyn-differential-motor type indicator which is now installed just above the present relative bearing and target bearing indicators at the radar operator's station. It has proved to be of inestimable value during this patrol and as it is conveniently very small is recommended to those interested for installation on all submarines. Although another true-relative bearing indicator has already been allowed as an alteration, the size of those instruments makes questionable the desirability of the installation for use at the radar.

- 31 -

ENCLOSURE (..):
32

— page 265 —
4. "Tribute to the all-around excellence of facilities at MIDWAY has already been paid in this report. One minor difficulty occurred, however, considered worthy of comment. For the last ten days of the SHAD's stay there no personal mail was received which, if due to the exigencies of war, is easily overlooked; but if caused by negligence, is sharply criticized.

5. The on board presence of coccoloches in great numbers was just becoming apparent as the SHAD prepared to depart from LIDWAY. As a preventative measure it was requested that carboxide fumigation be effected. No carboxide was available and instead numbers of small black "freon-bombs" were substituted with the statement that carboxide was no longer available because "someone, somewhere had been badly poisoned on one of the boats.". Previous experience with substitutes for the efficacious carboxide caused this commanding officer to greet the new method with considerable misgivings. Results soon confirmed this lack of confidence in substitutes. The pest army merely became enraged with the tiny onslaught of the "Freon-bombs" and the human inhabitants of the SHAD have now been fighting a losing war on board for nearly sixty days.

It is urgently requested that carboxide fumigation be effected, with more careful supervision if necessary, for the conquest by the SHAD's cookroach army has finally become intolerable.

6. Pressure-proof binoculars were installed for and aft on the SHAD's bridge during the last refit. It is felt that while these have the disadvantage of somewhat obstructing vision for bridge personnel, the advantage of accuracy and reliability fulfills a need long felt in the operating submarines.

7. On 5 November 1944 the SHAD passed within six miles of PARBOLE VELA, which provided an excellent view of the atoll. In the event that anyone might be interested, it is stated that there was no evidence of enemy activity or installations at this time.

- 32 -

ENCLOSURE ():

— page 267 —
4/16-3
Serial: 024
CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS SHAD (SS235) - Report
of Eighth War Patrol.

From: [Name]
To: [Name]
Via: [Name]

Subject: [Subject]

1. Forwarded, occurring in the remarks of the
   Commander Submarine Division THREE HUNDRED ONE.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR con-
   gratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the
   U.S.S. SHAW upon completion of this strenuous patrol.

W. V. O'REILLY

35

— page 268 —
1/3/45
FF14-15A16-3(15)
Serial 0105
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SHAD Report of
Eighth War Patrol.
CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 638
U.S.S. SHAD - EIGHTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Eighth War Patrol
(25 October, 1944, to 5 January, 1945).

1. The eighth war patrol of the SHAD, under the command of Lieutenant Commander L. B. Julihn, U.S. Navy, was conducted off the Northeast Coast of Formosa and the Southern Islands of the Nansei Shoto Group, and in East China Sea Areas. The SHAD, along with the U.S.S. BANG (SS385) and the U.S.S. REDFISH (SS395), formed a coordinated attack group with the Commanding Officer of the REDFISH as Group Commander.

2. This long, arduous patrol under most adverse weather conditions, despite aggressive and thorough area coverage, resulted in but two contacts worthy of torpedo fire, both of which were convoys. The first could not be closed for attack; and a torpedo tube and interior communication casualty spoiled the attack on the second convoy. The other two submarines of this group, however, practically decimated it.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is not authorized.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complcte Reports)
Cominch (7)
CMO (5)
Cinczac (6)
IGPOA (1)
Comsorvpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Consubsalant (3)
S/M School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Comsopec (2)
Comsowospac (1)
Comsubsowospac (2)
CTG 71.9 (2)
Co.norpac (1)
Consubspac (20)
SUBAD, HI (2)
ConsubspacSubordcom (3)

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

EXTRA: ORIGINAL
SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 269 —
117561 FILMED
5 MAY

SS235/A16-3
Serial 091
C-O-N-F-I-D-B-N-T-I-A-L
By: [Signature]
Date: 5 MAY 1945

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
Enclosures:

1. Enclosure (A), covering the NINTH war patrol of this vessel conducted in the waters of LUZON STRAIT at the waters close to the CHINA coast between HAINAN ISLAND and PRATAS REEF during the period of 31 January 1945 to 30 March 1945, is forwarded herewith.

L. JULIEN.

— page 270 —
1915-16
Arrived Pearl Harbor, T.N.H., from Eighth War Patrol (72 days) on 5 January 1915 for normal refit. Due to the large number of unaccomplished alterations, refit was extended to seventeen days during which time the installation of the following major items was achieved: 5-inch special submarine deck-gun aft with appropriate additional pressure-proof ammunition stowage; depth charge direction indicator; third IC motor generator unit; charging panels for electric torpedoes forward; depth charge "dogs" on all torpedo loading hatches and inboard hatches for remaining deck hatches; ST periscope radar; Ward-Leonard torpedo hydrogen-burner panels in both torpedo rooms; small true-relative bearing indicator at SJ radar; range-doubler and speed-halfway unit for TDC; dummy log; spindle-type firing valves in all tubes (This was discovered to be cause of SHAD's previous inability to fire electric torpedoes from the forward tubes); adjustable open sights on 40mm gun; chrome rollers for torpedo tube shutters; plunger-type signal ejector in after torpedo room; and modified reballasting. Ship was in drydock for three days during refit period.

On 23 January 1915 ship's company returned to duty after an excellent recuperation period at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel.

Prior to departure on patrol the following officer personnel changes were effected: Detached: Lieutenant M. L. SILVER, USNR; Lieutenant Fred GILLEN, Jr., USN. Attached: Lieutenant (jg) R. Y. FRAZIER, USNR; Ensign J. ABELS, USNR; Ensign H. A. TAYLOR, USN.

On 24 January 1915 conducted underway sound tests. From 26 - 29 January carried out training exercises under the direction of Captain E.S. HUTCHINSON, USN, as training officer. Fired five exercise torpedoes during this period. On 30 January loaded and fumigated ship.

This refit at Pearl Harbor was considered a good one, with a few glaring exceptions, and was conducted in a notably more efficient and business-like manner than that which obtained during the SHAD's post-overhaul refit of five months before. The part to be played by the Submarine Force in the tactical situation then prevailing in the Pacific, however, lent an urgency to the SHAD's departure which not only prevented training in some of the newer weapons now available, but reduced the post-repair period to a point, which in looking back, was undesirable for a vessel of this age where numerous small deficiencies are apt to overwhelm a ship's company already working night and day making preparations for embarkation on another patrol.

-1- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 271 —
3J January
1700 (WW)

Departed Pearl Harbor: ... accordance with CommAdm Pacad OpOrder No. 2-4-5 and joined up with USS FERRO and USS THRESHER enroute Saipan, this coordinated attack group to be known as "Middleton's Mobsters" commanded by Commander J. R. MIDDLETON, USN, in the THRESHER. USS TILEFISH was also in company as far as Saipan, though not a member of this pack.

1-11 February
Conducted daily ship's drills, training dives, end-around runs, tracking, pack communications and fire-control procedure enroute Saipan. On 3 February (Posit. Lat. 21° 15' N., Long. 175° 50' W) sighted what was believed to be a periscope about 3,000 yards away on the ship's port quarter. Cleared at high speed. On 4 February 1945 due to crossing the International Date Line from east to west.

12 February
0210 (K)
Made rendezvous with LOI #1054 who escorted all four submarines into Saipan.

1041
Passed through net gate at Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, and received pilot on board.

1222
Moored outboard in nest alongside port side of USS PULTON. Commenced receiving fuel and undergoing minor voyage repairs.

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 272 —
13 February
1000 (K) Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, Jr., and Captain R. G. Voce held a conference on board the FULFON for the commanding officers of the four submarines present to brief them on the impending operations.

1636 Underway in accordance with ComSubPac's Secret Operation Order No. 14-45.

1757 In company with escort LCI #371, the other "Mobsters" and the USS TILEFISH and set course to enter the western safety lane.

11-17 February Enroute patrol area (Luzon Straits), conducting daily drills in company with the "Mobsters" and the TILEFISH. On 16 February the USS TILEFISH left the pack to proceed to her separate patrol station in "Maru Morgue". Passed the USS ARCHERFISH on opposite course also on this date. On 17 February 1945 (in position Lat. 209 35' N., Long. 1270 41' E.) sighted a floating mine and finally sank it with 20mm fire, after expending considerable small arms ammunition of all types.

18 February
0754 (K) Submerged for day's patrol to eastward of Luzon Straits, inasmuch as explicit area instructions from ComSubPac had not yet been received.

1200 Position: Lat. 20° 15' N. Long. 123° 39' E.

1711 Surfaced.

2100 Received despatch orders from ComSubPac to patrol Luzon Straits south of Lat. 20° 30' N. until 1 March 1945.

2200 Pack commander's despatch giving orders for conducting patrol in Luzon Straits south of Lat. 20° 30' N. and east of Long. 120° 00' E. was received.

19 February
0100 (K) Passing between Batan and Balintang Islands in Luzon Straits on westerly course.

0751 - Dove for submerged patrol.

1200 Position: Lat. 20° 07' N. Long. 121° 32' E.

2000 (IK) Surfaced. Changed time to zone time minus 93 for convenience.

2200 Intercepted PETO's message concerning a case of acute appendicitis on board.

2300 PETO ordered by ComSubPac to depart station to rendezvous with BURRFISH and transfer patient.

- 3 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 273 —
20 February
0310 (IK) SJ radar not functioning well.

0753 Dove for patrol submerged.

1200 Position: Lat. 19° 45' N. Long. 120° 14' E.

1952 Surfaced.

2210 Received instructions from Pack Commander to divide the area until return of the PETO.

21 February
0207 (IK) SJ radar out of commission. Searching with ST radar.

0510 Received ComSubPac's despatch regarding downed aviator near southern boundary of area belonging to the pack ("Bonnett's Blazers") to north of the "Mebsters". As the point was 100 miles from SHAD's position and both THRESHER and the "Blazers" had reported themselves in position nearby, did not attempt to join in search.

0728 Made daily dive.

1022 Sighted unidentified plane bearing 0240T, distance 6 miles.

1200 Position: Lat. 19° 45' N. Long. 120° 18' E.

2001 Surfaced.

22 February
0554 (IK) Sighted white light bearing 3550T. As ST radar could not pick up anything and SJ was still out of commission maneuvered to avoid.

0728 Dove.

1200 Position: Lat. 20° 01' N. Long. 120° 42' E.

2000 Surfaced in rough seas.

23 February
0200 (IK) Picked up land on ST radar gaining rough fix (inaccurate bearings) for the first time in two days due to overcast weather.

0720 Dove.

1200 Position: Lat. 20° 09' N. Long. 121° 37' E.

1955 SJ radar back in commission but will not key it any longer as one of the high voltage filters is only kept from grounding by temporary measures.

- 4 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 274 —
2000
Surfaced again in heavy seas with skies thickly overcast.

24 February
0721 (IK)
Dove fr day's submerged patrol.

1200
Position: Lat. 19° 58' N. Long. 121° 54' E.

2115
Sighted plane coming in from astern. Sounded diving alarm for crash dive. Hatch would not close readily. Took considerable water into coming tower and pump room before hatch was seated. (See REMARKS for details as to how this casualty occurred and MAJOR DEFECTS for the resultant material troubles.)

2140
Surfaced and lay to until various essential pieces of equipment in pump room and conning tower, which had been flooded out, were restored to operating condition.

2300
Underway at two-engines speed heading eastward to clear the islands in Luzon Straits in the event it would not be judicious to dive in the morning with vital pieces of equipment not functioning. Following equipment still out of commission: All radars, all conning-tower-operated sound equipment, both high pressure air compressors, one low pressure blower, drain pump, one IC motor generator, one air conditioning unit.

25 February
0130 (IK)
Now have SJ and ST radars back in commission, drain pump is O.K., and it is believed that by late this afternoon (in time for evening's surfacing) one high pressure air compressor will be operating. With this information, turned back toward the Islands and took station south of Babuyan Island.

0225
In response to her request, sent position to PETO who has apparently rejoined the pack.

0639
Dove for submerged patrol. Used the supersonic sound pile and hand training gear in the forward torpedo room.

1200
Position: Lat. 19° 21' N. Long. 121° 47' E.

1310
Sighted unidentified bomber (possibly B-24), distance 3 miles, bearing 315°.

2030
Surfaced 5 miles south of Babuyan Island in bright moonlight with one high pressure air compressor back in commission.

2050
Dove from aircraft sighted by lookout aft.

2130
Surfaced.

- 5 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 275 —
26 February
0250 (IK) Challenged by PETO via SJ radar. Could not reply for reasons given previously. Both members of the pack were informed of SHAD's inability to key the SJ.

0719 Dove.

1200 Position: Lat. 19° 31' N. Long. 121° 06' E.

2013 Surfaced.

2130 No. 4 fuel ballast went dry. Seas too rough to convert to main ballast, however.

27 February
0718 (IK) Dove.

1200 Position: Lat. 19° 23' N. Long. 121° 04' E.

2005 Surfaced.

2340 Received despatch from ComSubPac ordering the "Mobsters" to move to the westward to take up patrol in the extreme western portions of "Convoy College" on 1 March 1945. The despatch pointed out that the best hunting would be found in the far western sections of the "Campus" close to the China coast.

28 February
0005 (IK) Changed course to westward in accordance with instructions received from pack commander.

0723 Dove.

1200 Position: Lat. 19° 35' N. Long. 119° 42' E.

2030 Surfaced and converted 4 fuel ballast tank to main ballast. Commenced closing previously-given point for rendezvous with other two members of the pack.

2326 Entered western areas of "Convoy College".

1 March
0200 (IK) Running parallel to USS THRESHER at about 4,000 yards range, using VHF to receive instructions for conducting patrol in new areas assigned.

0330 PETO joined up and was given the same information as above. It was agreed that all EOMs would be destroyed by 0130(I) tomorrow.

0510 Pack split up to proceed to assigned stations.

0730 Dove.

- 6 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 276 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
0845: Sighted USS PETO on surface running on northwesterly course.
1200: Position: Lat. 19° 47' N. Long. 117° 27' E.
1955: Surfaced.
2214: Dove from aircraft coming in on SJ radar.
2230: Surfaced.
2 March
0000 (IK): Sighted periscope in bright moonlight on starboard bow at range of about 1,500 yards, 0.0.D. turned toward and went ahead at full power on all four main engines. Periscope was seen by all lookouts and was observed later astern in the distance.
0007 (IK): Set clocks back one half hour to zone time minus nine.
0300 (I): Destroyed ECM before entering salvagable waters.
0526: Contacted PETO by radar and closed to 4,000 yards. Exchanged information by VHF. Reported midnight periscope sighting. Learned that PETO and SHAD had destroyed ECM but THRESHER had not done so by the time the "Mobsters" received a message from ComSubPac apparently ordering the pack to refrain from doing so. The instructions contained in C.T.F.'s Secret OpPlan No. 1-45 on this point appear to be precise and explicit. CSP's contrary orders arrived too late for the SHAD and PETO to carry them out.
0700: Received message from THRESHER indicating she would inform ComSubPac that she alone in the pack has an ECM.
0726: Dove.
1200: Position: Lat. 21° 36' N. Long. 115° 19' E.
1500: Sighted several junks or sampans.
1955: Surfaced. Found numerous strong APR contacts in this area near Hong Kong and encountered frequent sailing junks while on the surface.
3 March
0710 (I): Dove.
1200: Position: Lat. 21° 28' N. Long. 113° 59' E. Sighted numerous sampans and junks as before.
2002: Surfaced into clear night. Moon not yet risen. APR contacts' frequent and strong.

-7- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 277 —
2104
Sighted several flashing white lights ahead; as though signal-lighting. Pips on radar at 5,000 yards. Maneuvered to avoid.

2119 Dove as aircraft contact moved in rapidly on SJ radar.

2124 Heard numerous distant explosions.

2215 Surfaiced.

2253 Dove from aircraft closing fast on SJ radar screen.

2310 More distant explosions heard.

4 March
0050 (I)
Surfaiced. Received word from San Francisco news broadcast that 114th Air Force planes had destroyed five ships in Hong Kong today. No wonder the Japs seemed out of humor tonight.

0711 Dove.

1200 Position: Lat. 21° 18' N. Long. 114° 27' E.

2007 Surfaiced.

5 March
0120 (I)
Aircraft contact on SJ radar closing rapidly. Dove.

0237 Surfaiced.

0711 Dove for day.

1200 Position: Lat. 21° 17' N. Long. 113° 30' E.

1300 QB sound training motor-generator back in commission. Sound head may now be operated normally from the conning tower.

2011 Surfaiced. Very dark night.

2127 SJ radar out of commission. Slowed to one-engine speed and set watch on sound gear.

2211 Right full rudder! All ahead flank! as the wakes of three torpedoes were clearly seen by most of the bridge watch to pass just ahead of the SHAD's bow. Heuled clear at high speed.

2217 Reported position and nature of enemy attack to the rest of the pack and dove to await repair of the SJ radar, or until the moon came up (scheduled for shortly after midnight).

- 8 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 278 —
6 March
0025 (I) SJ radar back in commission.
0035 Surfaced.
0658 Pip on SJ radar at 13,000 yards. Size of pip indicated something in the nature of a DE or possibly a submarine. As dawn was fast coming in, made hasty track of target and
0714 Dove to make approach submerged.
0727 At periscope depth and had first glimpse of target in faint dawn light. (Ship contact #1). It looked like a large Sugar Able, stacks aft, goal-post masts, escorted by a DD or DE and a smaller PC. Angle on bow was about 750 port, range by ST radar 7,000 yards. Commenced to close at high speed submerged.
0730 Battle stations manned. Both escorts were on near side of target, one well ahead and the other right on the beam. Later the ST had four pips on the radar which might have indicated a third escort. By the uncertain light of a grey dawn, only three ships were seen.
0736 Convoy zigged towards SHAD about ten degrees. Bow tubes made ready. Range to nearest escort now 3,800 yards. One more look and then expect to shoot.
0740 Sound reported scows suddenly growing fainter.
0741 Periscope observation revealed entire convoy had turned away about 900 and was rapidly going "over the hill" in the dawn. Course of target at point of anticipated attack was about 310° or well to the left of the 040T course necessary to reach Hong Kong. The enemy vessels had obviously come as close as they did to the SHAD while on the most westerly leg of their zig plan. Depth of water and proximity to Hong Kong precluded an end around. This was a tremendous disappointment, as may be imagined.
1200 Position: Lat. 21° 01' N, Long. 112° 32' E.
2013 Surfaced and commenced moving toward new station off the east coast of Hainan.
7 March
0720 (I) Dove.
0743 Distant explosions.
1200 Position: Lat. 20° 23' N, Long. 111° 23' E.
2008 Surfaced and closed the Taya Islands off the northeast coast of Hainan to obtain a radar fix. No celestial sights for the past three days due to heavy overcast.

- 9 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 279 —
2345 THRESHER reported contact with convoy about sixty miles from SHAD's position, course 080°, speed 8 knots. Took course to intercept at once.

8 March 0013 (I) THRESHER reported she was attacking from starboard and later reported attack completed, "Missed".

0216 Picked up convoy on radar at 9,500 yards. (Ship contact #2). Either ships are pretty small or radar is not working at usual peak, or possibly both. Suspect the latter.

0217 Went to night surface attack stations and commenced tracking. PETO reported she was going to attack with special weapon, so SHAD maneuvered to gain position ahead of convoy and await report that PETO had completed attack.

01430 Still no report from PETO, who is apparently submerged, so decided to close in and make attack. The consistently small pipa made by the convoy, sometimes being difficult to see at 7,000 yards, and the very tight formation held by them, instilled a repeated conjecture as to their true size. The seas were at least force 3 and a shall torpedo depth-setting here was not recommended. Compromised on an eight-foot depth-setting.

0453 Turned in for the attack and made ready the bow tubes.

0506 When 5,000 yards from the convoy, word came from the PETO that she had not attacked and also "Probably a killer group. Very suspicious." This additional evidence as to the questionable nature of the target group, plus the THRESHER's "Miss" and the SHAD's own misgivings in the matter, governed the decision to turn away in order to gain position ahead for a dawn submerged approach. It was considered wise to see what this outfit really looked like.

0557 At a range of 7,500 yards, SHAD nearly broadside to the enemy vessels attempting to gain station ahead, three loud concussive "whoomf's" were heard in the coming tower. The bridge immediately reported gunfire and shell splashes close aboard.

0600 Dove at once and turn away from the militant enemy target group. Screw noises and pinging were heard astern for some time, but then faded out indicating an apparently half-hearted search. Conversation with the bridge watch, who saw the gunfire, leads to the possible further complication of an already unclear situation. The gunfire was reported to be coming from a bearing well forward of the radar bearing of the target group but no pips in that direction were ever seen on the SJ screen. Possibility of maladjustment of the bearing indicators on the radar were checked later and found not to exist. The fact remains that fairly accurate gunfire was laid on the SHAD by the enemy at ranges in excess of 7,500 yards. It will be interesting to compare notes with the other members of the pack on this night's events.

- 10 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 280 —
1200 Position: Lat. 19° 37' N. Long. 111° 46' E.
: 2019 Surfac'd.
: 9 March 0115 (I) Dove from aircraft contact on SJ radar, closing rapidly.
: 0223 Surfac'd.
: 0707 Dove.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 20° 47' N. Long. 112° 23' E.
: 2010 Surfac'd.
: 2200 Received despatch from the pack commander dividing the area west of 114° East Longitude into three parts for rotating patrol of three days in each part by the members of the pack.
: 2330 Received despatch from China Air Group reporting the sighting of two cruisers and several small gun boats anchored near Tinhosa Island off the east coast of Hainan. It is wondered if these could somehow have been the vessels conducting a rendezvous when the SHAD was about to attack last night.
: 10 March 0330 (I) Dove from an aircraft orrasing directly overhead. Heard and seen by all the bridge watch. Not picked up by radar, although a pip at 10,000 yards was seen just before radar went under. This is the first time an enemy aircraft has closed in on the SHAD without being seen either by the bridge watch or on the radar at a reasonable diving distance. Why the Jap didn't strafe and drop his bombs when he was in an excellent position to do so remains a mystery. The APR operator reports that there was a strong contact on 178 m.c. just as the bridge ordered the dive.
: 0431 Two heavy explosions not far away.
: 0450 Four heavy explosions closer. Face saving, perhaps?
: 0606 Surfac'd.
: 0713 Dove for day's submerged patrol.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 20° 58' N. Long. 112° 47' E.
: 2010 Surfac'd.
: 2255 Dove from aircraft, again very close. Not actually seen by any-one as the night was sooty black, yet all the bridge personnel heard a peculiar "rushing air" noise and the doppler effect of

- 11 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 281 —
11 March
0002 (I) Surfaced.

0711 Dove for day's submerged patrol.

1200 Position: Lat. 20° 00' N. Long. 112° 32' E.

2013 Surfaced.

12 March
0450 (I) Received contact report from THRESHER of enemy convoy consisting of two escorts and one large vessel; also included information that an unsuccessful attack had already been made. From the course and speed given, decided to head west at four-engine speed and patrol submerged on the enemy's projected track, anticipating the possibility of interception. The continuously-obscured skies had rendered the SHAD's position doubtful, so the decision to intercept was accompanied by many misgivings as to the probability of its realization.

0525 FETO said she was proceeding to intercept the THRESHER's contact.

0625 Another unsuccessful attack reported by the THRESHER also giving the enemy's latest course and speed.

0708 FETO in contact with the Jap convoy and reports she will dive for the attack. Dawn is well advanced now.

0736 Dove on what was estimated to be the enemy's track to Hong Kong, and established alert high periscope watch.

1200 Position: Lat. 20° 09' N. Long. 111° 53' E.

1202 Fugitive fog banks commenced rolling in and out of the immediate area. Began to search with the ST radar in addition to the high periscope.

1211 Heard intermittent pinging on an easterly bearing. Turned toward the sounds at once after searching with the periscope and radar without success. Pinging grew louder and more steady.

1250 Closing the pinging now at high speeds submerged, searching every fifteen minutes with the periscope.

- 12 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 282 —
1:30 Briefly sighted through a break in the mist what appeared to be the tops of a large Jap destroyer at approximately 12,000 yards. (Ship contact #3). Angle on the bow was close to 900 port which put the enemy on his approximate base course to Hong Kong. Nothing else'sedn.

1332 Resumed submerged approach at high speed.

1315 Searched and sighted column of black smoke. Resumed approach as before.

1353 Suddenly sighted in the fog a large merchant vessel partially obscured in the bad visibility. Only goal-post masts and merchant ship outlines could be indistinctly detected. The bow angle could have been either 400 or 1400 port, but the latter was the only logical one.

1355 Resumed the approach as before for another fifteen minutes, but the pinging faded out gradually. Considered the possibility of surfacing for an end-around, but patchy fog and intermittent overcast made the likelihood of Hong Kong-based enemy planes attacks too risky, considering the already impressive batting average they had rung up in the dark against the SHAD. Broke off the approach. A bitter disappointment. Apparently, the enemy had escaped the FEO's onslaught as well as that of the THRESHER, for he made rendezvous with the SHAD at a time indicating he was still using his reported speed of ten or eleven knots.

2011 Surfaced.

2150 Reported to the pack commander the unsuccessful events of the day.

2203 SJ radar contact at 6,000 yards moving in rapidly.

2204 Dove. This contact was preceded by an APR contact at 160 m.c.

2309 Surfaced.

2322 FETO reported briefly on the events of her morning's contact "No attack. Target was Tatuwa Maru."

2329 Another SJ radar contact closing fast from 5,500 yards.

2330 Dove. No previous APR contact. This along with two previous experiences points to the possibility of Jap airborne radars of frequencies other than those dovered by the TH-2/SFA box.

13 March 0038 (I) Surfaced and closed what was believed to be the traffic focal point off the Hainun east coast as deduced by the pack commander (Lat. 180 40' N.; Long. 1100 40' E.) following his several days in that area.

- 13 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 283 —
0712 Dove for day's patrol.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 19° 00' N, Long. 111° 10' E.
: 2005 Surfaoed.
: 2157 Took radar fix on Tinhoa Island at 32,000 yards.
: 11 March 0710 (I) Dove.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 18° 52' N, Long. 110° 47' E.
: 2014 Surfaoed.
: 15 March 0716 (I) Dove.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 18° 56' N, Long. 111° 03' E.
: 2013 Surfaoed.
: 2300 Received despatch from ComSubPac for SHAD and FETO to move eastward and take up lifeguard stations at positions assigned. SHAD's "puka" was approximately 60 miles due east of Hong Kong on the northern edge of the area. THERESHER was ordered to join up with the "Blazers" for the remainder of the period on station.
: 2320 Set course for new station in increasing heavily-opposed seas.
: 16 March 0130 (I) Received information from ComSubPac of proposed strike this morning. Reported to FETO at once that SHAD could not make assigned station due to the weather.
: 0713 Dove.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 20° 12' N, Long. 112° 36' E.
: 2011 Surfaoed.
: 17 March 0712 (I) Dove.
: 0800 Fit log out of commission.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 20° 12' N, Long. 113° 58' E.
: 2006 Surfaoed. Bad weather. Position is doubtful. Pathometer has suddenly become man's only friend.

- 14 -

— page 284 —
18 March
0701 (I) Dove.

Position: Lat. 21° 15' N, Long. 115° 24' E.

Surfaced. Still rough and overcast. No sights.

Pit log back in limited commission. It now has a jury-rig unit in it of questionable reliability.

: 19 March
0701 (I) Dove.

Position: Lat. 21° 48' N, Long. 116° 40' E.

Surfaced. The same old lovely weather. One-engine speed and hang on to your hats! Fourth day; no fix.

: 20 March
0030 (I) Received report from ComSubPac of strike today on Amoy.

Dove.

Position: Lat. 22° 09' N, Long. 116° 25' E.

Surfaced and manned various circuits to conduct lifeguard duties during scheduled strike. Silence on all the frequencies.

Dove after hearing no calls for help.

Surfaced. "Fixless".

Received orders from ComSubPac extending patrol time for "Mobsters" by five more days. These orders also directed the SHAD to proceed to Guam for refit at the expiration of this time on station.

: 21 March
0200 (I) Information regarding a strike today received from ComSubPac.

Dove.

Position: Lat. 21° 44' N, Long. 116° 19' E.

Surfaced to conduct lifeguard services for shipping strike from Amoy to Hong Kong. No services asked for by the aviators, although they were heard once briefly on the VHF using the proper calls. The navigator snapped a couple of much-needed sun lines through the variable cloud covering.

Dove again.

Surfaced.

- 15 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 285 —
22 March
Obtained a good celestial fix this morning as the skies cleared for the first time in a week.

0703 (I) Dove.

1200 Position: Lat. 21° 48' N. Long. 116° 39' E.

2000 Surfaced into a calm sea with bright stars and a fat half-moon. overhead.

23 March
0040 (I) Sent despatch to ComSubPac requesting advice regarding a patient on board who had been running high temperatures constantly for four days. The symptoms were quite similar to those of dengue fever, but that seemed illogical inasmuch as the SHAD had been clear, presumably, of the mosquito-carrier of this disease for forty days. There was the remote possibility of course that an infecting mosquito from the Philippines or China had been blown to sea and bitten this man, a lookout. The patient suffered from chills, back-ache, headache, rash, swollen throat, inability to take food and little water. Sulpha therapy had been used by the ship's pharmacist mate. Penicillin was on board if necessary.

0630 Received reply from Force Medical Officer advising use of penicillin in suggested amounts.

0655 Dove.

1200 Position: Lat. 21° 46' N. Long. 116° 55' E.

1955 Surfaced into seas once more very rough and skies solidly overcast. That other weather was too good to last!

2115 Received orders from ComSubPac to depart station and head for Guam. THRESHER and PETO ordered to move eastward and take up lifeguard stations formerly guarded by PETO and SHAD.

2150 Dove from plane contact on SJ radar closing at 5,600 yards. Heading into the heavy seas produced a very slow dive and once more it is believed the enemy plane did not see the SHAD.

2254 Surfaced and headed eastward departing station.

24 March
0656 (I) Dove.

0820 The "stop" on the starboard main motor field rheostat sheared off and permitted the movable control button to drop between the first and last stationary contact buttons; thus, immobilizing the rheostat control wheel. Stopped the starboard shaft and commenced repairs.

- 16 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 286 —
1200 Position: Lat. 21° 09' N., Long. 118° 31' E.
: 1216* Starboard shaft back in commission by making a temporary repair. Replaced the sheared "stop" with a 4-20 machine screw.
: 1932 Surfaced and continued eastward.
: 25 March 0300 (I) Changed time to zone time minus ten.
: 0729 (K) Dove west of Luzon Straits. Progress eastward greatly retar. by heavy opposing seas.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 20° 51' N., Long. 120° 31' E.
: 1955 Surfaced.
: 2055 Radar interference at 150°T, probably "Hiram's Necklers".
: 2352 Made radar contact on Itbayat Island in Luzon Straits at a range of 32,000 yards.
: 26 March 0120 (K) Picked up Batan Island on radar at 37,000 yards.
: 0130 Commenced eastward transit of channel between Itbayat and Batan Islands.
: 0512 Pip on radar at 10,000 yards, bearing 350°T, probably friendly submarine on opposite course as radar interference is very strong.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 20° 45' N., Long. 123° 49' E. Weather overcast. Seas rough.
: 27 March 1200 (K) Position: Lat. 20° 46' N., Long. 129° 10' E.
: 1730 Sent message to CTG-17.7 reporting self in western safety lane.
: 28 March 0130 (K) Received message from CTG-17.7 giving time and rendezvous for SHAD on 30th.
: 0140 Passed westbound friendly submarine at 8,000 yards.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 19° 20' N., Long. 135° 00' E. No abatement in weather conditions. Bucking the seas all the way so far.
: 29 March 0911 (K) Passed USS SPOT on opposite course and exchanged greetings.
: 1000 Sighted U.S. submarine, probably POGY, on opposite course. Too distant to exchange signals.

- 17 -
- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 287 —
1200 Position: Lat. 16° 28' N. Long. 140° 05' E.
: 1605 Escanged signals with USS SNOOK proceeding on westerly course.
: 1810 Received despatch designating escort.
: 2230 Reported to CTG-17.7 that heavy weather would delay SHAD's rendezvous by at least two hours.

30 March
0/15 (K) Radar interference bearing 1000T. Probably USS PIOUDA and USS CREVAILLE on westerly course up the safety lane.
: 1005 Sighted plane (B-25) and exchanged signals.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 14° 10' N. Long. 143° 51' E. Feared we were going to be approximately another two hours late for rendezvous when at
: 1235 Sighted vessel and closed.
: 1215 Exchanged signals with USS RABY (DE 698) and joined up with escort.
: 1217 Set course for Apra Harbor.
: 1510 Sighted Guam dead ahead.
: 1615 Entered Apra Harbor.
: 1630 Pilot came aboard.
: 1700 Moored alongside U.S.S. APOLLO, starboard side to. The SHAD is to be refitted by Submarine Division TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-ONE.

- 18 -

ENGLOSURE (A)

— page 289 —
1. No. 1 periscope (the ST radar periscope) has leaked excessively since its installation. The packing has been removed by Pearl Harbor, the PULPCH and the ship's company with no effect. It is believed that the deep 09 and 130° scribe marks running the full length of the periscope may have something to do with this difficulty; and the excessive drainage from the upper packing housing through a specially-installed drain indicates this packing to be relatively useless. Only by means of a temporary arrangement of rubber tubing from the drain-pan was the periscope rendered useable on this patrol.

2. The hatch latch to the upper conning tower hatch does not function properly, as it allows the hatch to burst open when the "dogs" are just "clear" of the seat whenever there is a pressure of more than one inch inside the boat.

3. Excessive moisture was present in both the supply and exhaust ventilation lines within the ship on this trip. In the exhaust line, especially, the condensate blown up by the battery blowers accumulated in large quantities in spite of drain lines at the bottom point of the blower casing surrounding each battery blower impeller; and as a result, the exhaust line has corroded through in several places.

4. The SJ radar, after its remarkably fine performance on the previous patrol, early on this trip was discovered to be working at a definitely reduced efficiency, sometimes amounting to an estimated 45% below peak ability. Enroute to the patrol area the members of the pack agreed to exchange recognition signals once every hour in order to train personnel in SJ communications. One of the two filter choke coils in the high voltage rectifier (not an "on-board spare") developed a ground, and other ailments seemed to assist the gear from then on. Only due to the tireless efforts of the entire radar staff on board was the equipment kept functioning as well as it did.

5. A leak in #2 generator air cooler developed during the latter part of the patrol and that section was out out for the remainder of the journey as no "on board" spares are provided.

6. In the pitometer log (type RB25) the pump motor field rectifier burned out and a temporary measure was worked out to give field excitation to the pump motor from the 115 volt DC lighting circuit. This unit is not an "on board" spare.

7. The "stop" on the starboard main motor field rheostat sheared off. A 20 machine screw was installed as a temporary repair.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 290 —
6. About a week before departing the patrol station, #1 air-conditioning... circulating water pump froze up and became both mechanically and electrically... inoperative. As it is located outboard of the other air-conditioning circuit... ing water pump as well as the ice-machine pump and would require the removal of all of these units in order to break it down for repair, it was decided to... operate the one air-conditioning pump remaining on both air-conditioning... Other considerations were the fact that the boat was inordinately hot dur... this patrol and the refrigerator could not stand being out of commission for... the length of time it was estimated it would take to repair this defective... 9. As the conning tower ventilation lines come up through #1 periscope... they were subject to revision when the well was modified for the ST periscope... installed during the last refit. Apparently numerous pin-hole leaks remained in some of the obviously difficult-of-access areas of the piping around the well which have considerably reduced the flow of air to the conning tower, and allowed water from the conning tower bilges to drain into the radio room via the hull ventilation supply line.

10. Probably due to the unique periscope hoisting arrangement (SubBase Pearl Harbor E & R developed experiment) which includes as many as nine separate sheaves per cable in the system, the cables to both periscopes broke on this patrol. These cables had all been renewed prior to the beginning of the trip. It is requested that the special, expert attention of the refitting activity be given to this situation with a view to introducing ameliorating measures for the future if possible. The cables to #2 periscope were renewed at sea with no great difficulty. As the casualty to #1 periscope occurred on the day of departure from the area and renewal presented a much more difficult problem than that offered by #2, the severed cable to #1 was left untouched.

11. The SHAD is unable to guard NPM frequency, and the pack frequency simultaneously. The installation of a third high frequency receiver (already authorized) is very much needed.

12. During last refit a Depth Charge Direction Indicator was installed. Two days after leaving Pearl Harbor it grounded out and the FULTON repair force could not touch it as an item of voyage repair, due to a preliminary investigation revealing complete flooding through the superstructure junction box.

13. On this patrol the RBO system was early rendered useless when the input transformers were accidentally burned out upon installation of the new transcription player in the crew's messing compartment. This casualty emphasized the general inadequacy of the system as it is at present installed for those are not sufficient cables to allow the full, designed operation of the equipment. Sufficient cables to allow three selections are requested and also the relocation of the receiver control unit into the radio room, thus removing it from the control room.

14. Present instructions for charging batteries being what they are, patrols in the warm-water areas off China and the Empire have made heavy demands on the ship's air conditioning to keep the boat reasonably habitable. In addition to the originally-installed air-conditioning units forward and aft, plus

— page 291 —
15. In order to install the ST radar equipment in the control room, the quick-closing, plunger-type, stop valve in the conning tower ventilation line had to be inverted. The inundation of the conning tower on this patrol revealed that this inversion was unsatisfactory as the pressure of water from above is sufficient to flip open the valve. Either a new type valve or a holding line of some sort is required.

16. Continuous difficulty with sticking liquidometer gauges has been experienced for several patrols now. The gauges to safety tank and forward trim are the most frequent offenders.

17. Inadequate pressures were found in the compensating portion of the fuel oil system on this patrol; and, frequently, it was necessary to run the trim pump to alleviate the condition. It is believed that the relief valves in the lines may be set too low; but, as the valves have already once been reset, investigation and counsel by the rof organization is desired.

18. Water was found in both reduction gears about a week before the termination of the patrol on station. A leak in the cooler to the port reduction gear was discovered and a spare cooler installed. It was also found that the sluice-valve between the port and starboard reduction gears was open; and, as no source of water into the starboard side was ever discovered, it was thought that the deficiency had been rectified. A few days later, however, a slow ingress of water into the starboard side was again noted. The point of entry of this water has not yet been located, and assistance in this regard from the repair organization is requested.

19. Following the flooding on the night of February 24th, the below-listed electrical units were rendered out of commission:

Pump Room
(a) #1 and 2 air-conditioning compressors, circulating-water pumps, and duplex starting panel.
(b) #2 I.C. motor generator.
(c) 200# air compressor.
(d) #1 and 2 high pressure air compressors.
(e) Both QC-JK and QB sound training motor generators.
(f) Refrigerator compressor and circulating-water pump.
(g) SD radar mast and height motor.
(h) Auxiliary electrical power distribution panel.

Coming Tower
(a) Receiver units to both QB and QC-JK sound piles.
(b) SJ radar.

— page 292 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Control Room
(a) SD radar.

All motors and panels exposed to oil and salt water were flushed with hot, fresh water and blown dry several times. Where needed, hot air blowers and lamp banks were applied. The following equipment was thus put back in condition within a very few hours of the casualty:

(a) Refrigerator compressor motor and circulating water pump motor.
(b) #1 and 2 air conditioning compressor motors and circulating water pump motors.
(c) #1 and 2 low pressure blower motors.
(d) #2 high pressure air compressor motor.
(e) SJ radar.

The QB and QC-JK training motor generators were disassembled, cleaned, baked and reinstalled; thus restoring them to use within a week or so. By great effort the SD radar mast hoist motor was also rendered usable, as were the receiver units to the sound piles in the conning tower. Due to the low impedance of the SD antenna mast, the SD radar operates orotational. Despite all efforts to the contrary, the following units could not be recovered to use:

(a) #1 H.P. air compressor.
(b) 200# air compressor motor.
(c) Auxiliary electrical power distribution panel short circuit between the two supply switches to the L.P. blowers, requiring removal of panel section.

Ordnance and Gunnery
1. The work on the gyro-regulators and TDC, performed by the last refit activity, was proven to be of an unsatisfactory caliber. In the first place, this vessel has had a much-repeated cycle of gyro-regulator difficulties, usually glaringly apparent at highly critical times. The equipment passes all routine tests with clear margins and then at the moment of actually preparing to fire, certain eccentricities appear. This was supposedly carefully investigated during the last refit; but it was a reoccurrence of the difficulty just prior to getting underway which delayed the SAD's departure by several hours, and even then the trouble was completely eradicated. Although the tests had been made immediately upon returning to the boat, shortly after getting underway from Pearl Harbor, routine tests on the TDC revealed malfunctioning. Long hours on the part of the ship's fire-controIman indicated elemental deficiencies which should properly have been eliminated by the refit agency. The chief difficulties were along the line of poor lubrication, improper lubrication, dirty contacts, poor adjustments, frictional parts requiring replacement.

(L) RADIO

Reception on the Sub Fox schedules was not of the best during this run. There were periods in the early morning (about 1930 to 2130 Zebra) when all frequencies would fade out completely. The frequencies of value in the area.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 293 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

were 60l5 and 9090 kcs. Upon receipt of ComSubPac's despatch of 12 March 1945 on the subject, a receiving log was immediately begun, a copy of which will be forwarded to ComSubPacAddComd as directed. In general, this log shows the tendency for all frequencies to fade out as described above. After 2130 Zebra until the morning dive, 9090 kcs. was received as a fairly good signal. After passing Luzon Straits moving eastward, however, all frequencies were easily received at all times.

On the occasion of sending SHAD's serial one to ComSubPac, 6170 kcs. was first tried. A Jap was transmitting on this frequency and it was necessary to shift to l235 where the traffic was promptly handled. Whether or not the Nip communicator was properly engaged in handling his own traffic or was attempting to jam the frequency, is unknown.

(M) RADAR

1. SJ-1
   The performance of the SJ-1 radar was far below par as the sensitivity was way down during most of the patrol; and, during the last three weeks on station, ranges obtained on various land masses were often only approximately 60% of those obtained on the previous patrol.

It is believed the trouble was instituted by the excessive keying done when the boats of the pack practised radar communications during the first fifteen minutes of every hour enroute to station. The main line fuses began to blow out occasionally in the main control unit. Sensitivity became noticeably reduced as indicated by the shorter ranges obtainable on the accompanying submarines. On February the equipment failed completely as there was no high voltage and the main line fuses blew immediately. Discovered the trouble finally to be in the high voltage rectifier where the large filter choke (LI) was shorted to ground. No spare is provided for this coil and, as no other coil on board of similar size was available, by-passed this section of the filter and removed the coil in the hope of insulating it to ground with fish paper, mice or whatever insulating materials were to be found. With the coil out the set apparently operated satisfactorily, until an attempt was made to key the equipment and the main line fuses blew out once more. The equipment had been in operation about 3/4 of an hour; but this time when the fuses went out, the filament supply fuses (F3 and F4 in main control unit) blew also. These latter fuses in addition supplied the power to the relay circuits which inter-connected the SJ and ST. It took all of one day to locate this trouble which turned out to be a defective selenium rectifier in the ST wave guide switching unit. Oddly enough, the fuses to this circuit in the ST junction box did not burn out.

Eventually, a defensive condenser in the master multivibrator in the modulation generator (probably the basic cause for the trouble in the first place as it was putting faulty drive on the 5D21 tube) was found. Replaced this condenser and a new magnetron was tried. The magnetron had been renewed in the process of locating the difficulty the previous day; but it could not be well tuned up for it appeared to be oscillating all over the spectrum instead of on a particular frequency. The latterly-installed magnetron seemed

— page 294 —
2. ST
Since the ST uses so many circuit elements in common with the SJ, many of the latter's troubles were reflected in it. Insofar as the ST was used without these accompanying difficulties, however, its performance seemed highly satisfactory. On one occasion a range of 7,800 yards on a medium-sized merchant vessel was obtained running at 59 feet. No previous performance record is available for comparison in this regard.

3. SD
The SD was used with great circumspection, as on all recent previous patrols, and performed satisfactorily enroute to the patrol area. When the conning tower, pump room and part of the control room were inundated on the night of February 24th, however, some of the salt water entered the receiver.

— page 295 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

and the base of the antenna mast. It was possible to restore the receiver to normal operation, but the antenna has a low resistance and good matching between transmitter and antenna cannot be made. The set operates, but the sweep is jumpy and the transmitter appears to be improperly loaded.

4. IFF
So far as is known, the BN and ABK units operated satisfactorily.

(N) SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions on this patrol were generally poor due to the shallow water and rough seas encountered.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

No density layers were encountered on this trip as few deep dives could be made and little bathymetrograph data were obtained.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY

Health
Ship's health on this trip was in general considered good. Besides the usual minor ailments the following cases were reported:

| Condition                  | No. of CASES | SICK DAYS |
||||
| CATARRHAL FEVER            | 1            | 3         |
| COMMON COLD                 | 15           | 0         |
| DIAGNOSIS UNDETERMINED (DENGUE ?) | 1           | 12        |
| GASTROENTERITIS, ACUTE        | 2            | 1         |
| WOUND, LACERATED SCALP      | 1            | 0         |

As indicated in the NARRATIVE the case of dengue(?) was apparently responsible for the orders ending the patrol only three days out of an extended five days beyond the termination date given in the original operation order. The patient was given sulpha therapy from the onset of the fever. Upon receipt of despatch advice from the Force Medical Officer, 100,000 units of penicillin were administered and within 24 hours the fever had abated somewhat. Whether this salubrious effect was achieved as the result of penicillin treatment or in the ordinary course of events is of course not known. Intravenous feeding of this patient was necessary for about five days.

Food
Once more it can be said that the food on this patrol was of a high order of excellence from all points of view. The length of the patrol began to close out a number of the more luxurious items, but starvation was a long way off when the quantity of canned goods stowed throughout the boat is considered.

Habitability
As never before the battery-charging requirements these days, resulting in a battery maintained at close to the maximum allowable temperature of 130°, resulted in heavy demands on the air conditioning units to keep the vessel ENCLOSURE (a).

— page 296 —
1. (a) Number of men detached from previous patrol
   (b) Number of men on board during patrol
   (c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol
   (d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol
   (e) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol

*Includes two transferred at Saipan enroute station.

2. Training proceeds on the SHAD at a customarily excellent pace now that a well-established program has been tested and not found wanting. In addition to the former methods of instruction, test and qualification, there was instituted during this run the plan of making unqualified officers become the instructors in various systems. The impetuous thus lent toward their qualification was invaluable and the "get-the-facts" attitude in the wardroom was silently applauded.

3. This being the SHAD's second straight patrol with little or no tangible return makes the matter of morale a very important one. In the earlier days of wartime submarine training it was enough to let the tonnage sunk or damaged speak for itself; but, now with a paucity of targets and a great deal of just plain old routine (not entirely devoid of thrills either), the lethargy of long diving days, of rough sleepless nights and limited exercise must be mitigated by reiteration of the task to be done and a clear portrayal of the part submarines are now playing in the great strategical and tactical plans laid out by those responsible for conducting the war. There is no question of the high morale tone on the SHAD nor can too great a tribute be paid to all hands for the achievements of this apparently unproductive patrol. To be a completely effective unit at sea after the accidental flooding of 24 February required immense effort on the part of all. The routine breakdowns and deficiencies were not inconsiderable either; and, after normal refit and recuperation, the SHAD will be eager and ready to embark once more on the execution of whatever the task assigned.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

| MILES | GALLONS |
|-------||
| 3659  | 47,500  |
| 1700  | 17,500  |
| 5200  | 51,000  |
| 1600  | 23,000  |

(S) DURATION

| Days | Enroute to area | 18 |
|------||----|
| Days | In area         | 35 |
| Days | Enroute to base | 5 |
| Days | Submerged     | 36 |

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 297 —
1. RADAR Countermeasures
An APR/SPA watch was maintained continuously when on the surface in the patrol area. A good many intercepts of enemy radar transmissions were detected and a complete log kept of the contacts. Thus obtained, these data very much duplicate similar information collected on a previous patrol and only the more pertinent will be mentioned. A frequency now to this vessel was 178 mcs. with a PRF between 240 and 300 and a pulse length of about 0 microseconds. Evidence adduced indicated that it was probably both ship and airborne. Just prior to detecting three torpedoes fired at the SHAD on the night 5 March, 178 mcs. had been heard on the APR. On another occasion where a night flying aircraft swooped down low over the boat, a strong 178 mcs. contact was heard. While near the islands in Luzon Straits, contacts on 103 and 105 mcs. were frequently encountered. PRF for both frequencies was always near 500. It was believed these radars were laid-based. Once at the approximate position (210 20' N; 115 5' E.) a strong signal of 78 mcs., 500 PRF, and pulse duration of 60 microseconds was detected. Believe this too was land-based. Numerous contacts at or near 155 mcs. were encountered, but these already have been established more or less as an airborne frequency, though there are exceptions of course.

2. Communication Countermeasures
No very definite efforts toward jamming or other countermeasures were noticed on this patrol with the possible exception of the instance already mentioned in section (L).

3. Sonar Countermeasures
None.

(V) REMARKS
1. While the commanding officers of the submarines constituting the coordinated attack group of this patrol were being briefed by Admiral LOCKWOOD and Captain VOGE at Saipan, the Admiral made the comment, "How can a boat dive with the hatch open?" (Apropos the flooded conning tower on the POLAR which had just staggered into Midway). A first reaction to this question on the part of other submariners is "Yes, how in the world does it happen that boats dive with open hatches when there are so many precautions set up to prevent it?" It is happening, however, not too infrequently of late; and, while the SHAD's commanding officer at the above-mentioned conference may have been

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 298 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

heard to give a noise somewhat resembling a snort on hearing the Admiral's question, the account which follows is given in all humility as one example of how "it can happen here"!

On the evening of 24 February 1945 the SHAD had been surfaced for about one hour and was zigging at two-engine speed under a bright, clear, moon-filled sky just off Batan Island in Luzon Strait. The hatch from the b to the conning tower had indicated the need of some lubrication on the dogging mechanism, so a young (and not too-experienced) member of the quarter master gang who was off duty at the time requested permission to grease the hatch. The COD warned him to be ready to dive at any instant and then go his new mission to carry out the request. This was acknowledged by the young man who then stood on the ladder with his head and shoulders in the hatchway to carry out the operation. He evidently laid the cable to the hatch to one side of the dogging wheel and proceeded to open and close the dogging mechanism in order to work in the lubricant he was applying.

At the crucial instant when the dogging wheel was turned to the point where the dogs were in the fully extended (or usual "hatch closed") position, one of the lookouts sighted what he thought was a plane coming in from astern. The cry of "plane close aboard" by any of the bridge watch is tantamount to "clear the bridge" on the SHAD and all the lookouts commenced to sluice down the hatch into the conning tower. This rush engulfed the young quartermaster and knocked him clear of the conning tower ladder before he could spin the dogging wheel and retract the dogs into the "hatch open" position. As is customary on this vessel, the COD was the last man down the hatch on the dive and he endeavored to close the hatch as usual. In this event the COD upon reaching for the closing cable could not find it in the customary place, for in the rush of lookouts the cable had been flipped behind the hatch. It took several precious seconds to find the cable and then pull the hatch down. In the meantime the vents had already been opened since the sound of the diving alarm. When the hatch finally did drop down, the COD was horrified to observe that it would not seat. He saw at once what the trouble was, however, and frantically began to turn the dogging wheel to retract the extended dogging lugs.

By this time the commanding officer had arrived in the conning tower; and, observing the situation, had to make the immediate decision as to whether or not the COD would get the hatch closed in time or order the vents closed and blow up again at once, even though a plane was expected to plant its bombs on the bridge at any moment. Continuation of the dive with the chance of getting the hatch closed in time looked like the best decision at the moment. It turned out to be the wrong one, however. When the COD was just about to get the dogging lugs completely housed, sea-water commenced pouring into the conning tower in hard, solid gouts thus preventing any further operation of the dogging wheel. The control room closed the lower hatch to the conning tower at once and the order to surface was given immediately by the commanding officer inasmuch as the danger imposed by the plane had now momentarily dropped into second place on the agenda of the difficulties. Perhaps, too, the rising water already at knee depth was unfairly prejudicing the decision. Fortunately, within a few seconds the boat was

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0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

sufficiently surfaced to stop the flow of water around the hatch, after which, the dogs were properly thrown home and the diving alarm sounded once more. The probable continued presence of the aircraft had again taken first place on the danger list.

A few seconds before this, upon surfacing, an up angle on the boat had caused the water in the conning tower to disappear with a loud gurgle down the open drain of #2 periscope well; but not before the water had piled up sufficiently aft in the conning tower to thoroughly soak down the sound gear. As the pump room was the recipient of all the drainage from #2 periscope well, the level of sea-water in that locality became almost immediately about two feet above the deck plates. The diving alarm sounded again and the boat naturally assumed a down angle to comply. The water in the pump room now rushed forward and shorted out the pump room breakers. Immediately all power except IC was lost and the motor to the hydraulic plant went out. It is needless to describe the results of shifting to "hand power" on the planes and the vents, the bow-planes being jammed in hard dive, the several hair-raising rides up and down between 30 and 250 feet, the total effect of the water sloshing around in the pump room, and finally the diving officer's decision to surface when communications to the conning tower were briefly interrupted by the inadvertent switching off of the Voyeall augmented by the gleam of a red light from the conning tower upper hatch on the control room indicator board. It is sufficient to say the boat was surfaced and the damage inventoried as described under section (K) of this report.

In retrospect it is noted that two things are wrong with this picture. First, the quartermaster lubricating the hatch dogging mechanism should have stood on the bridge deck level and leaned over to work on the hatch. Then if the dive had come, he could have stepped aside, allowed the bridge personnel to go below, and followed as the last man, closing the hatch himself inasmuch as he alone knew its exact status. Second, the drain to #2 periscope well has been kept open as a matter of routine in the belief that it could always be closed swiftly from the control room by means of the drain-valve reach-rod there to the pump room. The fallacy in this belief was that the valve handle in the control room was now obscured behind a multiplicity of more recently-installed equipment and the valve itself in the pump room was under water. A handle on the reach-rod high in the overhead of the pump room would have been a handy item.

2. Several messages from Chungking reporting contacts made around 2000(I) were not received and decoded until about 0400(I) when it was too late to utilize the information in taking station for the morning dive. An earlier schedule, or possibly an arrangement for direct aircraft-submarine communication, might be of value to submarines operating off the east coast of Hainan.

3. The experience of this patrol amply confirmed the statement contained in the Asiatic Pilot to the effect that weather off the China coast between Hong Kong and Amoy is frequently overcast and unfavorable for colonization. The SHAD went for one entire week without obtaining a fix of any description in this area of strong currents. If, while carrying out lifeguard duties, one of the planes had called for help, the SHAD would have been severely

— page 300 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

handicapped by her doubtful position. Anticipating the increasing importance of this area, and admittedly not knowing much about the applicability of the equipment, it is desired to call the attention of proper authorities to the possibility of installing a Loran system to serve the area at the earliest practical moment.

4. The value of the new pressure-proof TBT is unquestioned; and yet the size, creating a considerable obstruction as they do to the OOD's are of visibility, seems perhaps unduly large for the service performed. Frankly, a more constructive alternative does not present itself at this moment; but officers who were in England report that they saw there on a captured German submarine a similar device of much better design. One other point about these TBTs is that they could well use a daylight-reading azimuth circle on the chart which is not now provided.

5. Direct and continuous periscope bearing available to the TDC has been a frequently-desired thing if it could be gained without the addition of too much equipment in the conning tower. It is believed that the adapter section on the bottom of the new ST periscope, in conjunction with a selsyn, would provide a ready means for easily transmitting this fire-control information into the target designation system.

7. This commanding officer cannot become too enthusiastic over the possibilities of the ST periscope radar. When the SJ radar was out of commission, the ST was used to gain rough fixes in its stead; and it was also used as a search radar. The values derived from its designed use are priceless indeed, and from many angles it was intensely disappointing not to make any attacks during this patrol; but especially was it so from the viewpoint of being deprived of the privilege of making a practical battle test of this splendid new piece of equipment, the ST radar. Its deficiencies (poor bearing perception, large periscope head, very sensitive tuning adjustment, shared units with the SJ, and shorter periscope tube) are well known to all who are familiar with this new device; but great tribute and praise nevertheless is extended enthusiastically to those who are responsible for the reality of it--in this war!

-31-

ENCLOSURE (A)

32

— page 301 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division TWO EIGHTY ONE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY EIGHT.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of War Patrol Number NINE.

1. On her ninth war patrol U.S.S. SHAD was a member of a coordinated attack group which included U.S.S. THRESHER (Commander J. R. MIDDLETON, U.S.N., Group Commander) and U.S.S. FETO. The duration of the patrol was fifty-eight days of which thirty-five were spent in . . . Thirty-six days were spent submerged.

2. Three suitable torpedo targets were encountered none of which were attacked. On the morning of March increasing visibility forced SHAD to submerge before the enemy base course was accurately determined and a firing position could not be reached. On the following night, acting on information supplied by THRESHER, SHAD established radar contact with a group of ships. The radar appearance and the disposition the enemy suggested a hunter-killer group, a suspicion shared by FETO. The Commander of the enemy suggested a periscope attack at dawn. While SHAD was maneuvering for the decision of the principal target, whereupon she submerged, turned away and lost contact. It appears probable that an inefficient radar deceived SHAD as to the size and nature of the contact. To be capable of delivering a well directed three gun salvo, obviously radar controlled, at a range of about 7500 yards the undetected escort could not have been much smaller than a destroyer, consequently the reflections which were obtained must have been from ships of considerable size. Had SHAD been able to remain in the surface without undue risk an end around and attack might yet have been possible. Shortly after noon on 12 March, again acting on a THRESHER contact report, SHAD briefly sighted an enemy merchantman escorted by a destroyer but could not close.

3. SHAD experienced the intense air-borne opposition to be expected in this area. It is, however, worthy of note that in the majority of cases there was no APR indication of the proximity of enemy planes.

— page 302 —
1955/281/AL6-3
Serial: (017)
C-O-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of War Patrol Number NINE.

Probable enemy periscopes were sighted on two occasions and on the night of 5 March a salvo of three torpedoes, fired at SHAD on a broad port track, was narrowly avoided.

4. Communications were complicated by the fact that SHAD, and presumably PETO, missed the first transmission of an urgent dispatch from Commander Submarine Force of March and proceeded to destroy ECM as previously directed by the Group Commander.

5. In his remarks the Commanding Officer has discussed at length the accidental flooding of the conning tower and pump room on the night of 24 February. The Division Commander has but two thoughts to add. Before undertaking the work, involving as it did the ability of the submarine to dive, every precaution should have been taken against surprise encounter, submerging if necessary and rigging adequate preventer on the hatch. Under any circumstances this work should have been carefully planned and done under the direct, personal supervision of a thoroughly competent, experienced officer or petty officer. The heroic efforts of the ship's company to restore the ship to fighting trim are most commendable.

6. On her return from patrol SHAD was clean and shipshape and in fair material condition. It is estimated that three weeks will be required for a satisfactory refit.

L. H. CHAPPELL

— page 303 —
FCS-28/A16-3
Serial: 098
C-O-N-F-E-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO 33.5 SH/D (SS235) Conf.
1st. Serial 091 dated 30
March 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-EIGHT.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet;
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of War Patrol Number NINE.

1. Forwarded concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-ONE in the first endorsement.

J. M. WILLIAMS

— page 304 —
4 03543
Serial 0794
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SHAD Report of
Ninth War Patrol.
CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 713
U.S.S. SHAD - NINTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Ninth War Patrol
(31 January to 30 March 1945).

1. The ninth war patrol of the SHAD, under the command of Lieutenant Commander L. V. Julihn, U.S. Navy, was conducted in the Luzon Straits - China Coast, between Hainan Island and Pratas Reef, areas. The SHAD, along with the U.S.S. PETO (SS265) and the U.S.S. THRESHER (SS200), formed a coordinated attack group with the commanding officer of the THRESHER as the group commander.

2. This long adventurous patrol resulted in two contacts but unfortunately neither could be developed into attacks. The SHAD had a close call in an emergency dive when the conning tower hatch dogs were in the extended position and the hatch could not be closed. The whole patrol was mixed with good and bad luck. The Force Commander wishes the SHAD all good luck on the next one.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is not authorized.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Compl. Reports)
Corinch (7)
GTO (5)
Cincpac (6)
JICPOA (1)
AICPOA (1)
Co.servpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Consusblant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Consopac (2)
Consowospac (1)
Consubswospac (2)
CTG 71.9 (2)
Comonpac (1)
Consubspac (3)
ConsubspacAdCom (20)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ConsubspacSubordcom (3)

MERRILL COMSTOCK.

All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Pacific (2)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

E. L. HYNES, 2nd, Flag Secretary.

EXTRA - ORIGINAL
SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB. OP.16
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 305 —
130197 FILMED

U.S.S. SHAD (SS235)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California, 045, OPAWNT 1945
BY 0100 0187 DATE

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. SHAD (SS235)
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Commander Submarine Division ONE FORTY TWO.
Commander Submarine Squadron FOURTEEN.
Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of War Patrol number TEN.

Enclosures: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track Chart.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the Tenth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the EAST CHINA SEA and YELLOW SEA areas during the period from 3 May 1945 to 16 June 1945, is forwarded herewith.

D.L. McHugh
D.L. McHugh
D.L. McHugh

— page 306 —
3 May 1500(K) Underway from alongside USS APRA Harbor, Guam, from 9th War Patrol and moored alongside the U.S.S. APOLLO (AS25) for refit. Assigned to Submarine Division 281 for administration.

Because of a partially flooded conning tower and pump room, the electrical work was extensive requiring an extended refit.

A new commanding officer and a new executive officer reported aboard.

Completed refit and training period on 30 April 1945. With a few minor exceptions all work was satisfactory. Training was adequate.

(B) NARRATIVE

OFFICER'S BOARD

Lieutenant Commander D. I. McHOO, USNR
Lieutenant C. C. WHITE, Jr., USNR
Lieutenant R. F. FLATTER, (R)L, USNR
Lieutenant E. C. CODY, (DE), USNR
Lieutenant J. P. RICH, (DE)R, USNR
Lieutenant G. J. FITZPATRICK, (D), USNR
Lieutenant J. C. L. MORRIS, (DE), USNR
Ensign J. A. BURNS, (R), USNR
Ensign H. A. TAYLOR, USN

CFOs on Board

BENNO, P.F., CTM(A)(T)(SS), V6, USNR
BOSLEY, W.C., CTM(A)(T)(SS), USN
GOLDSBY, H.O., CY(T)(SS), USN
KOBERSTEIN, D., CDL, CDS(T)(SS), USN
LEE, R.W., CDM(A)(T)(SS), USN
MURPHY, R.F., CTM(A)(T)(SS), USN
SERBY, J.L., CTM(A)(T)(SS), USN
SHEFFS, J.H., CDM(A)(T)(SS), USN
WHITE, J.L., Jr., CPMA(A)(T)(SS), V6, USNR

*NOTE: Total war patrols given above include this patrol.

3 May 1500(K) Underway from alongside USS APOLLO enroute patrol area in East China and Yellow Seas, in company with USS DRAGONET, USS BILLO and USS SPIKEFISH with SC-1069 as escort. Our pack is to be formed of DRAGONET (Pack Commander), RAY, SLID and Balao and is to be known as the LEGIONS.

1720 Submerged to check trim.

1729 Surfloaded.

-1-

— page 307 —
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1850 Escort departed. Set course to follow prescribed routing into area with a speed-of-advance of 3 knots.
2230 Exchanged recognition with USS SPOT.
4 May
1022(K) Made training dive.
1010. Surfaced.
1200 Position: Lat. 16° 05' N. Long. 141° 28' E.
1310 Made training dive.
1350 Surfaced and sighted a carrier with at least two destroyers to the north of us about 12 miles and heading towards GUAM. Presumed they were friendly but sent contact report to DRAGONET.
1600 Changed to minus 9 time zone.
1600(I) Received visual message from BALAO to the effect that she was returning to port. Told her we would pass message to DRAGONET when we next saw her.
5 May
0430(I) SPIKEFISH parted company.
0810 Contacted DRAGONET and sent visual message concerning BALAO's return to port.
1049 Made training dive.
1134 Surfaced.
1200 Position: Lat. 19° 34' N. Long. 137° 40' E.
6 May
1147(I) SJ radar out of commission.
1200 Position: Lat. 24° 54' N. Long. 137° 46' E.
1317 Made training dive.
1334 Surfaced.
1830 Received orders to be on lifeguard station tomorrow morning. By using all speed available, will be only an hour late in arriving on station.
1645 SJ radar back in commission.

-2-
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 308 —
2100 While keying SJ radar in order to exchange recognition with DRAGONET, it went out of commission again. Contacted DRAGONET by visual and told her about our lifeguard station. Apparently, our radar just cannot stand being keyed.

7 May
1115(I) Reached lifeguard station. During the day heard and saw many friendly aircraft.

1200 Position: Lat. 29° 27' N. Long. 134° 56' E. Listened to RAY's recovery of downed aviators.

1400 Received orders concerning tomorrows lifeguard station and set course accordingly. We will have to use considerable speed to arrive on time. Too much of this and we will be using all of our fuel.

8 May
1000(I) On station but our cover has not shown up. Saw and heard many groups of friendly planes during the day.

1200 Position: Lat. 29° 58' N. Long. 140° 33' E.

1400 "Tail End Charlie" told us that it was all over for the day. Set course to westward in hopes that we would be going on into our area.

1416 Made training dive.

1455 Surfaced.

2100 We have received no specific orders but have instructions that we will not enter area until the 13th. We presume that we will have some more lifeguarding so headed east again.

9 May
0900(I) Since we had nothing else to do, decided to look over TORI SHIMA.

1200 Position: Lat. 30° 06' N. Long. 140° 15' E.

1309 Divved when a plane at 4 miles appeared to be diving on us.

1323 Surfaced and contacted friendly plane on VHF.

- 3 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 309 —
1. Commenced reconnoitering southern side of TORI SHIMA from ranges of 4 to 6,000 yards. Observed definite radio antennas and a dugout on southwestern side of the island. Two men were seen to run up the hill on the southwestern side and duck behind an odd pile of rocks at the top. There was a definite radar on 150 mcs., 500 PRF. At the same time we saw the two men run up the hill, this radar went off and did not come on again until we had left the island behind by 7 miles. We believe that the radar station is located at the top of the hill where we saw the two men. We did not try to shell this place because our ammunition would have been no good against the dugout and we could not have elevated enough to bombard the probable radar station without listing the ship.

2. Received instructions concerning tomorrow's lifeguard station and set course accordingly.

10 May
0730 (I)
Arrived lifeguard station.

1000
Our air cover showed up and communication was established.

1200
Position: Lat. 29° 37' N., Long. 137° 00' E. About this time our air cover departed, while TREFANG reported a life raft at Lat. 30° 15' N., Long. 135° 30' E. This plane would not give much information but we headed in that direction to help in search. Upon orders from TREFANG we searched to eastward and she to westward. After darkness set in we commenced firing green stars but gave it up after three hours because the high percentage of duds would have soon left us with none.

11 May
0450 (I)
Completed search with negative results and TREFANG came alongside to receive our BCM. Because of our own carelessness, the knot securing the BCM to the line slipped and the BCM was lost over the side at Lat. 30° 15' N., Long. 135° 30' E.

0500
Farted company with TREFANG and set course for our area.

0929
Made training dive.

0937
Surfaced. Sighted several friendly aircraft this morning.

1030
Conducted small arms firing drill on floating mine. After expending about 2,000 rounds of .30 and .50 cal. ammunition with mine still unsenthed, proceeded on towards area.

1200
Position: Lat. 29° 37' N., Long. 133° 15' E.

1457
Lookout sighted a periscope 3,500 yards abeam to port and we maneuvered to avoid. No one else saw the periscope but the lookout was positive. From his description it looked very much like one of our ST periscopes.

-4-
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 310 —
0000(I) Received orders for lifeguard station and also word about aviators in rubber boat. Put all four main engines on propulsion. In order to look for the aviators, we will attempt to pass through NANSEI SHOTO on surface, going just south of AKUSEKI JIMA.

0523 We were about 12 miles southeast of AKUSEKI JIMA when SD reported a plane at 2 miles. The sun was just coming up and it was quite light but cloudy. The range opened out to 4 miles and we thought we had not been seen.

0527 Lookout reported plane diving on us and we dived. On passing 100 feet received one light bomb above us. The only damage was a little broken glass and the revolution counters going out. Decided to stay submerged the rest of the day.

1200 Position: Lat. 29° 19' N. Long. 129° 40' E.

1853 Surfaced about one half hour before sunset. We will have to use all speed available to reach our lifeguard station on time.

. 1055 Sighted one float plane about 10 miles astern.

13 May
0105(I) Reached lifeguard station.

0502 Dived, maintaining a watch on lifeguard frequency using SD mast.

0621 Sea was calm and visibility unlimited so we surfaced.

1200 Position: Lat. 32° 03' N. Long. 128° 57' E.

1325 Our fighter cover has not shown up and we have heard nothing indicating that a raid was going on. Since it was clouding over, we dived and maintained a watch on lifeguard frequency using SD mast.

1600 Changed to minus 8 time zone.

1622(H) Surfaced and set course toward FUJIA SHIMA.

2125 Having passed within 9,000 yards of FUJIA SHIMA with no contact, set course for tomorrow's lifeguard station.

2320 SJ radar made contact at 16,000 yards. This appeared to be a plane circling us.

2330 Contact closed us rapidly and at 6,000 yards we dived. APR had not received any new contacts and no IFF indication was received.

2347 Surfaced.

-5- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 311 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14 May
0300(H) Received from DRAGONET that she was pulling clear of area to work on bow planes.

0336 Reached lifeguard station. We heard a little chatter on the radio which might indicate that the raid today would be a little closer to us. One group of planes was heard talking on VHF about "a wake down there". We piped up, asked them to be careful.

0406 It was getting quite light but very cloudy so we dived maintaining a watch using the SD mast.

1200 Position: Lat. 31° 57' N. Long. 126° 30' E.

1320 Surfaced and asked LAY if she had heard any of our planes today. She replied in the negative.

1333 Dived and maintained a watch as before.

1830 Surfaced.

2053 Received instructions from DRAGONET about our patrol station. We are to patrol between latitude 25° 15' N. to 25° 55' N. near longitude 125° 40' E. Cannot see how this will offer very much. Decided to pass north of SAISIU TO in hopes of picking up a target.

15 May
0700(H) SAISIU TO is in sight about 12 miles to the southwest, and it is quite cloudy. Dived for a submerged patrol.

1200 Position: Lat. 33° 40' N. Long. 126° 50' E.

1612 Surfaced. It is dark and stormy with the sea about force three from the northwest.

2014 Made radar contact on ship at 12,500 yards and started tracking. Target appeared to be unescorted and steering a more or less steady course of 025°(T) at a speed of 6.5 knots. Apparently, he is running from SAISIU to the KOREA/ARCHIPELAGO. We crossed his bow so that we could fire with the sea. Target first sighted on bridge at 3,500 yards.

2101 Fired 4 torpedoes, depth set 6 feet, with a 2° spread, near a 90 port track, at about 2,000 yards range. Radar bearings were used because we had no cross wire illumination on BTEs. After firing we closed in to about 1,600 yards before turning away. Target was definitely laden and had his stack aft. He was about 350 feet long.

2106 One hit in middle of target. This was immediately followed by several flashes and a huge column of smoke which completely obscured the target. We pulled out to 3,000 yards, slowed and waited.

— page 312 —
2112 Target was seen to sink by eye at the same time it disappeared from radar. Our best estimate is that this ship was a 2,600 ton tanker like the one shown on page 13 of supplement #3 to ONI 208 J Rev.

: 2113 Set course for area.

: 2238 Passed between KO TO and KAIGAN SHO.

: 16 May 0410(H) Dived with KO TO well in sight about 12 miles to the northeast.

: 1200 Position: Lat. 34° 48' N. Long. 124° 55' E.

: 1855 Surfaced and proceeded northward along the 20 fathom curve.

: 17 May 0410(H) Dived for submerged patrol about 12 miles west of SHOKU TO. We can't see that much good can come from this area. All daylight traffic undoubtedly stays well within the 10 fathom curve. We would like to stay in 20 fathoms and are definitely not going inside of 10 during daylight. If there is any night traffic, we may be able to get some of it.

: 1200 Position: Lat. 35° 36' N. Long. 125° 37' E. All day we have been mixed up with fishing boats. Sometimes it is very hard to stay clear of them. We have passed within 500 yards of several and they seem to be harmless KOREAAN fishermen (and women).

: 1908 Surfaced and set course towards the beach. Spent a large part of the time dodging fishing boats who undoubtedly saw us.

: 2000 Commenced taking soundings every five minutes.

: 2118 Radar made contact on a ship at 13,000 yards just as it rounded MATSU TO which was lighted. Commenced tracking. He appeared to be a large ship on a southerly course with one or two small escorts. The moon was right behind us but fortunately was behind clouds most of the time. One of the presumed escorts was about 3,000 yards ahead of the target but dropped back to within 500 yards of him. The attack was also made difficult by a couple of fishing boats which kept us from steering the courses we wanted. Apparently, the target was going to pass to the eastward of UI TO, so we were a little rushed. At one time during the approach the fathometer gave a depth of 4 fathoms when the chart showed we were still in 10. Target was in sight on the bridge at about 5,000 yards, although he could not be seen all the time because of his land background. Target was identified as a fairly large 3-island freighter with a tall stack. Binocular computation of length gave 700 feet. Sealing this down because of over optimism would leave him at 500 feet.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 313 —
2152 Started firing four torpedoes from bow tubes. We slowed down and opened the outer doors just prior to firing but were still making between 12 and 13 knots. Each torpedo broached with a roar right after leaving the tube. All except the third one fired ran normal except for initial broaching. The third torpedo ran on the surface and also seemed to be erratic in course. All depths were set at 6 feet. Because our one bad torpedo had us worried, we started turning away about 30 seconds after firing.

2154 Target belched smoke and started changing course.

2154-30 One hit in forward well of target. There was a lot of smoke and the bow of the target broke right off.

2155 We were heading towards some deeper water when the after lookout reported an escort, which looked like an SC, coming right at us dead astern at about 500 yards. Radar gave the range as 930 and that quickly opened as we built up to 20 knots.

2215 There were a series of explosions on the target, three of which were quite severe. The flashes could easily be seen in our conning tower while the bridge reported them as definitely on the target. There was too much flame for them to have been gunfire. The target was only in 7 or 8 fathoms of water, and it is doubtful if it will ever sink completely. However, with his bow gone and with him severely damaged by internal explosions, we do not believe that much can be salvaged. Our best estimate is that he was a 6,000 ton freighter. The so-called escorts could not be picked up by radar over 7,000 yards. Also, other than chase us, they took no offense action. We now believe they were acting more as pilot boats than as AS vessels.

2236 Slowed to standard speed and resumed battery charge. The rest of the night was quite hectic with us spending our time dodging fishing boats.

2330 Received word that pack is now known as LEGIONNAIRES and is composed of PAY (Flock Commander), SCAPBARDFISH, BALAO, SEAD, SEGUNDO, BILLFISH and SEACAT.

16 May
0345(H) Dived for submerged patrol along 25 fathom curve. Sea is glassy calm and there are still lots of fishing boats.

0650 Heard explosion nearby. Planed down to 120 feet and rigged in sound head. O.O.D. had been using about 7 feet of periscope in order to get a good out on land.

0700 Heard another explosion above us and fairly close. This one shattered a little glass and put our revolution counters out again. Believed these explosions were bombs from a plane and thought that we might be leaving a slick. Stayed down at 120 feet.

— page 314 —
0000
C-O-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Came up to periscope depth and immediately saw a NATE close aboard and apparently circling us. Raised down to 150 feet. Soundings still show about 3 fathoms under keel.

1000
Came up to periscope depth. Seas are still glassy calm but our plane is no longer around. Discovered a string of bubbles from #6 MBT and commenced checking for cause. Finally determined to be a leak in one of the air bottles of #4 bank in #6D.

1200
Position: Lat. 35° 34' N. Long. 125° 32' E.

1904
Surfaced. Tonight is dark and rainy but still fairly calm. It would be a good night to go into shallow water again but we have worked so far from the beach today that we can't make it very well. Probably it is too dark for the Japs to be running ships in shoal water.

19 May 0300(H)
F.ailly received message from RAY after trying most of the night. Our area is divided into 7 parts and we will rotate every 5 days. SHAD's area is the same as before except it is extended to latitude 36° 30' N. We believe that there should be a greater concentration on the SHANTUNG-DANSEI GUNTO run.

0L00
Dived for submerged patrol around SHOKU TO. Had many fishing boats in sight all day.

1200
Position: Lat. 35° 54' N. Long. 126° 00' d.

1909
Surfaced while it was still fairly light. There was about a half moon and it was very clear. We consider it entirely too light to go into water where it is too shallow to dive. It is very doubtful if we could get close enough to a ship to shoot without being seen.

1930
Set course to head towards KARUPPI RETTO. We cannot avoid passing within 500 yards of some of these fishing boats but they show no concern.

20 May 0000(H)
Radar contact at 10,000 yards. Started tracking. Our maximum range on a fishing boat with sails up has been about 6,000 yards. Target tracked zigzagging on a southerly course at an average speed of 3.5 knots. Considered that it might be a patrol vessel and so waited until moon had set before heading in.

0106
Went to battle stations and started attack. Made ready 3 tubes forward and 3 aft but left doors closed. Tried to maneuver for stern tube shot. This took lots of time because target made some big zigs.

- 9 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 315 —
0154 Secured from battle stations with red faces when it was identified as a sailing vessel. He was definitely larger than any of our fishing boats but we interpret our orders as not to harm him.

: 0200 Torpedo in #5 tube was found to have a partially flooded afterbody. We will replace it and try to get it back in commission.

: 0400 Dived for submerged patrol about 10 miles south of KAFUREPPI RETTO.

: 1200 Position: Lat. 35° 32' N. Long. 125° 14' E.

: 1916 Surfaced in very eerie visibility conditions. There was a high light fog through which the moon could be seen dimly. We could see land at 400 yards very clearly. We had an aircraft contact report of a Sugar Able at Lat. 35° 13' N. Long. 124° 15' E. The report was for noon today and we would have trouble making the position by daylight. Decided to make one more try in close to the beach in hopes the fog would be thicker there.

: 2052 Commenced a half hour tracking drill on a rock which plot showed making 20 knots (twice our own speed). After checking our position and plot discovering that he was plotting bearings 180° out of phase, gave up this attack.

: 2146 Decided it was far too bright to go inside of 10' fathoms, so set course to southwest. For the remaining three days in this part of our area we will stay further out to sea in hopes there is still some traffic crossing the Yellow Sea at this point. An amplifying report from the aircraft indicated there were six Sugar Ables instead of one as previously reported.

: 2345 Radar made contact on a ship at 9,500 yards. Commenced tracking.

: 21 May 0000(H) Plot indicated we were tracking two ships on a line of bearing about 4,000 yards apart, zigzagging about a base course of 340°(T), at 10 knots. Radar indicated that both ships were the same size, and it could not hold contact outside of 11,000 yards. From all indications we had an anti-submarine sweep, but we felt we had to be sure, so we crossed over to eastward to come in for an attack from down moon. The first ship could be seen from the bridge at about 9,000 yards. At 4,000 yards, targets were easily identified as torpedo boats very similar to a CHIDORI. By this time we were sharp on the bow of the eastmost target and felt we could not turn away without being seen. Did not relish submerging and then being discovered. Just before firing, plot and TDC indicated a zig toward us which left us with a 350' starboard track. This zig was not seen on the bridge.

- 10 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 316 —
0106
Commenced firing three bow tubes at about 2,300 yards range, with a depth setting of 4 feet. All torpedoes had hold-down nuts installed. Between the second and third torpedo, control party put target back on course that she had before apparent zig towards. This was a mistake since it nullified spread.

0108
Commenced turn away at full speed. At same time target started a turn towards.

1109
Fired three torpedoes from stern tubes for a down the throat shot. Range was about 2,000 yards, but the shooting was too hurried since target had not settled down.

0112
Obtained no hits. Commenced a retirement to northeastward with target in hot pursuit.

0113
Target commenced shooting at us with an estimated 3" gun. Range opened at a constant rate and none of the splashes were close, although we could hear them whistle when they passed over us. Target was using slow fire and must have had trouble seeing us, because he only got out 8 rounds before the range opened to 4,000 yards.

0133
Target dropped three depth charges but seemed to continue the chase at 14 knots. We were rapidly approaching KAPUREPIT RETTO, it being only 6 miles away, so we commenced slowly changing course through north around to westward. Scoured from battle stations. We have no regrets over making this attack because, even though the target was small, with the calm sea and good tracking, we should have sunk him. Our fault was in getting a little panicky and firing without the best fire control set-up. Also, we should have shot back at him with our deck gun while he was shooting at us. With our Mk. 32 ammunition we could have done some damage. The second ship never got closer than 7,000 yards, and we never paid much attention to him. Neither target could have had radar or radar detection equipment.

0200
Slowed down and set course for yesterday's aircraft contact. During the rest of the night, made several contacts of sailing boats. With their sails up, radar would make contact at 10,000 yards which was about the same range they could be seen from the bridge.

0345
Dived for submerged patrol.

1200
Position: Lat. 35° 57' N. Long. 124° 39' E.

1900
Surfaced and commenced patrol across possible sea lanes between KOREA and CHINA. Contacted several sailing boats during the night.

22 May
0100(H)
Dived for submerged patrol.

1200
Position: Lat. 35° 57' N. Long. 124° 39' E.

— page 318 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
2353 We could not keep contact on our friendly plane and when SU radar reported a contact at 6,000 yards, closing rapidly, we dived. He certainly could have helped us by telling us he was flying over us.

27 May 0007(H) Surfaced.

0100 We have had no contacts but the SEACAT has had several. We decided to fudge on assigned position and patrol off DAISEI GUNTO. This will be all right unless the BILLFISH decides to do the same.

0400 Dived for submerged patrol about 12 miles southwest of DAISEI GUNTO.

1200 Position: Lat. 37° 43' N. Long. 124° 33' E.

1914 Surfaced.

1940 Made radar contact at 22,000 yards and commenced tracking. Radar was getting good lobing bearings at 21,000 yards range. Target tracked on course 130°(T), speed 10 knots, but he was in close to land and heading for shoal water. His position was Lat. 37° 40' N. Long. 124° 55' E.

2000 It was entirely too bright to consider a surface attack in shallow water and we were trying to decide how we could best intercept this target when radar picked up another good contact at 16,000 yards out in open water.

2020 Our target was tracked at zero speed and we closed to 9,000 yards and have seen nothing. Decided something was fishy so changed course to put target directly in path of full moon.

2040 Target and moon's bearings were the same and there was nothing there.

2050 Target disappeared from radar. At all times this target gave a sharp pip. Visibility was very good. While we were tracking, SU radar had one aircraft contact 20,000 yards to the north of us. Also, SD radar gave us a friendly plane at 14 miles. SD radar also had several pips on electronic disturbances at various ranges. We are quite sure that our contact was some kind of decoy. Who it was intended for, we don't know. It could have been dropped from one of our own planes.

2052 Set course to intercept our first target along banks off SEKINO SUDO. If he is of fairly deep draft, he will have to come out nearly to the 10 fathom curve unless the Japs have an inner channel, which is quite likely.

2115 Sent message to RAY suggesting that we concentrate on SHANTUNG - DAISEI GUNTO run.

- 13 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 319 —
28 May 0030(H)
Having covered speeds from 5 to 12 knots without contacting our target, set course back to sea again. At this time we had three sailing boats in sight and some possible planes on radar. With all of the atmospheric pips tonight, we believe now that there may have never been a ship at all. For about 15 minutes we had very strong interference all the way around the disl on the SJ radar.

0230 Received orders from RAY to patrol near GOTO RETTO to assist our patrol planes which might get in trouble. Set course accordingly.

0420 Dived for submerged patrol.

1200 Position: Lat. 36° 15' N. Long. 125° 13' E.

1730 Surfaced.

1800 Fog closed in.

29 May 0200(H)
Passed between KOKUZAN TO and BANSAI TO.

1000 Fog lifted but there is a solid light overcast.

1200 Position: Lat. 32° 26' N. Long. 126° 06' E.

1500 Set course to northeast in order to patrol KOREA - SLSIBO run.

1610 Dived to check trim.

1630 Surfaced.

1923 Made contact by radar on small ship at 6,500 yards and started tracking.

2100 Dived.

2200 Surfaced.

— page 320 —
30 May
DIVED for submerged patrol.

: 1200 Position: Lat. 33° 49' N. Long. 127° 59' E.
: 1833 Surfaced.
: 2100 Made a sweep to within 5 miles of SHORI TO with negative results.
: 31 May
DIVED for patrol, staying 4 miles south of SHORI TO.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 34° 19' N. Long. 127° 30' E.
: 1050 Surfaced, having sighted nothing but sail boats all day.
: 1 June
DIVED for patrol 3 miles east of HAKU TO.
: 1200 Position: Lat. 33° 52' N. Long. 127° 34' E.
: 1230 A light fog set in so we surfaced.
: 1330 Fog lifted.
: 1820 Sighted a plane which appeared to be a PRIVATEER. Tried to raise him by VIP with no results.
: 1016 Plane disappeared on a true bearing of 080°(T).
: 1822 Sighted plane bearing 080°(T). We thought this was the same plane.
: 1823 Plane identified as a RUPE so we dived. SD gave a range of 4 miles.
: 1900 Surfaced and set course towards SASEBO.
: 205 Made radar contact on two small ships at 9,600 yards and started tracking.
: 220 We had to stay at about 8,000 yards in order to keep ships on radar. They tracked on a westerly course with a speed of 72 knots.
: 2221 Nearest ship turned towards and we turned away to course 240°(T).
: 2222 Target increased speed and so did we. Finally ended up at 15 knots with target dead astern at same speed holding the range steady at 6,000 yards. It was a very dark night and impossible for him to sight us. After he detected us, we only trained the radar on him every two minutes and we doubt if he could have DF'd it.
: 2245 Decided to test target and changed course to 190°(T).

- 15 -

ENCLOSURE (4)

— page 321 —
22:47 Target turned to follow us. There is very little doubt that he has a fairly good radar which is over 1,000 mcs. (upper limit of our APR).

: 22:50 Increased speed to 18 knots.

: 23:00 Target turned away. Apparently, he could not hold contact much over 8,000 yards.

: 23:10 Slowed down and set course toward SASEB0. With our one:unsuccessful attack on this type of target, we can't see much chance for anything good out of attacking them.

2 June
0340(H) Dived for submerged patrol about 5,000 yards of IKITSUKI SHIMA.

0345 Sound reported echo ranging bearing 340°(T).

0350 Sighted two torpedo boats very similar to CHIDORIIS at about 15,000 yards heading east. We could not close and they passed north of IKITSUKI SHIMA.

1200 Position: Lat. 33° 22' N. Long. 129° 16' E.

1855 Surfaced. APR can give you about as many contacts as you can ask for, most with the report of "strong and steady".

1900 Set course for southern port of GOTO RETTO which is where the RAY had ordered us. We had thought we could do better here.

3 June
0400(H) Dived.

1200 Position: Lat. 32° 46' N. Long. 127° 50' E.

1610 Surfaced. During the night we had several contacts by radar on friendly submarines, but could not answer their challenge by radar. Tried using a blinker light once but don't know if it was seen or not.

4 June
0026(H) Bridge watch heard and saw plane passing port quarter. Dived.

0012 Surfaced.

0350 Dived for submerged patrol 6 miles south of FUKE SHIMA.

0815 Sighted two odd-looking trawlers very close to beach. We could not close them.

1200 Position: Lat. 32° 24' N. Long. 120° 40' E. Three definite bedspring radar antennas were sighted at different spots on FUKE SHIMA. They rotated very slowly. We believe this slow rotation accounts for so many reports from APR of "strong and steady".

- 16 - ENCLOSURE (A) 17

— page 322 —
1905
Surfaced for patrol to southeast of FUKE SHIMA.

5 June
0405(H) Dived for submerged patrol about 8 miles to eastward of FUKE SHIMA.

1200
Position: Lat. 32° 30' N. Long. 129° 00' E.

1934
Surfaced.

6 June
0300(H) Received orders from TIRAMPE. The message was ambiguous and apparently one whole set-up was left out in encoding. Our best interpretation is that we should go back to area 12. We were planning to patrol off BONO ISAKI but can hardly do it now. We also thought that the SECONDU would be the senior ship in the area.

0405
Divied for submerged patrol south of FUKE SHIMA.

1200
Position: Lat. 32° 54' N. Long. 128° 31' E.

1900
Surfaced and set course to pass north of SAISHU TO.

7 June
0014(H) Contacted ship by radar at range of 8,000 yards.

0025
Closed to 3,000 yards and identified ship as sailing junk on course 060°(T), making 1½ knots. Since he was in the middle of the East China Sea and heading for TSUSHIMA STRAIT, we assumed he was a Jap.

0055
Closed to 500 yards and fired a burst of 20mm into his sails and he lowered them immediately.

0110
Went alongside, took a line, from him and tried to send over a boarding party but could not because of the fairly heavy swells. We trained a light on him and could discover neither fishing gear nor cargo. There were about 10 men on deck. He could have had some cargo stowed below decks.

0120
Backed clear and at about 50 yards range fired two pens of 20mm into him along his water line.

0130
Fired several rounds of 40mm into hull.

- 17 -

ENCLOSURE (A) 136

— page 323 —
0135 Secured from battle stations. Darkness made it almost impossible to hit this target effectively with anything other than 20MM and that only within 50 yds. range. He would not burn but he holed all along the waterline making it doubtful that he will ever reach port.

0425 Div'd for submerged patrol between REIZUI TO and SEIZAN TO.

1200 Position: Lat. 34° 05' N. Long. 126° 50' E.

1845 Sighted unescorted freighter bearing 204°(T), over 16,000 yards. Went to battle stations and commenced approach.

1900 Target best identified as a small 3-island freighter with 2 masts, at least one of which was a tripod. The best we can say is that he was similar to KOHOKU MARU as shown on page 104 of 208-J Revised. He was smoking heavily.

1934 It was getting fairly dark when we fired four fish, spad 1° at about an 80° port track, with a torpedo run of 1,300 yards.

1936 Obtained two hits spaced almost 30 seconds apart indicating that the first and third torpedoes hit.

1938 Target sank completely.

1942 Surfaced. There were many people in the water and a great deal of debris. For the next 20 minutes we tried to get some survivors aboard. We managed to get two alongside but, even by hanging over the side and lifting on them, they would not come aboard. We were able to get a line around a life jacket of one but his jacket tore apart.

2010 With REIZUI TO clearly in sight at about 5 miles, we did not care to stick around much longer. Set course to head back into area 9 and sent message to Comsubpac telling him we only have one fish forward and two aft. We still will not be able to leave area 9 until after sunset on the 9th which is as scheduled. We also sent a message on the Pack frequency to all boats in the area indicating our intentions. Could only obtain receipts from KAY and SEGUNDO.

2035 Passed friendly submarine.

2120 Passed another friendly submarine.

8 June 0405(H) Div'd for submerged patrol off DANJO GUNTO.

1200 Position: Lat. 32° 01' N. Long. 129° 38' E.

1850 Surfaced and set course for COLNETT STRAIT.

— page 324 —
2110 Had plane on SJ at 10,000 yards which closed rapidly to 6,000 yards so we dived.

: 2117 Surfaced.

: 23145 With SJ indicating a plane closing rapidly from 10,000 yards to 5,000 yards we dived. At this time AFR was indicating an odd, very fast sweeping radar at 160 mcs. Was sweeping too fast to obtain a pulse rate.

: 9 June 0005(H) Surfaced.

: 0118 SJ indicated another plane which did not close.

: 0337 SJ indicated another plane at 10,000 yards which did not close.

: 0345 Dived for submerged patrol and completion of transit of COLNETT STRAIT.

: 1200 Position: Lat. 29° 46' N., Long. 130° 43' E.

: 1600 Surfaced and set course for MIDWAY.

: 10 June 0000(H) Set all clocks ahead one hour.

: 1200(1) Position: Lat. 29° 20' N., Long. 136° 23' E.

: 11 June 0007(I) Set all clocks ahead one hour.

: 1000(K) Talked to a Liberator by VHF.

: 1040 Made training dive.

: 1100 Surfaced.

: 1200 Position: Lat. 29° 08' N., Long. 114° 19' E.

: 2130 Commenced test discharge at six hour rate.

: 12 June 0415(K) Completed discharge with 106% capacity.

: 1200 Position: Lat. 28° 55' N., Long. 114° 26' E.

: 13 June 0000(K) Set all clocks ahead one hour.

— page 325 —
1200(L) Position: Lat. 29° 20' N. Long. 155° 20' E.
: 14 June
: 1200(L) Position: Lat. 29° 15' N. Long. 162° 26' E.
: 1400 Made training dive.
: 1500 Surfaced.
: 1600 Overtook and exchanged calls with U.S.S. BILLFISH.

: 15 June
: 0000(L) Set all clocks ahead one hour.
: 1100(H) Exchanged calls with U.S.S. SEA FOX.
: 1200(H) Position: Lat. 28° 47' N. Long. 169° 11' E.

: 16 June
: 1200(H) Position: Lat. 28° 38' N. Long. 176° 01' E.

: 16 June
: 0000(Y) Repeated one calender day.

: 0900 Reached rendezvous and set course for MIDWAY harbor entrance.

-20- ENCLOSURE (A) 21

— page 326 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(C) WEATHER
The weather was unusually good with no storms in the area. Four foggy days were encountered.
Unusual phosphorous conditions were encountered in TOKARA KAIYO. The outline of the ship could easily be seen submerged through the periscope.
(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
Currents up to 1.5 knots westerly to northwesterly were encountered in the vicinity of OSEI TO and KAKUREPPI RETTO. No current was encountered in TOKARA KAIYO.
(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
The SHAD was within visual range of the following navigational lights and observed the following characteristics:
LIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
1. M1 SAKI
2. KOSHIKI
3. SHIRI TO
4. OSEI TO
5. O SHIMA
6. GU TO
7. KIKYO TO
8. KO TO
9. HATSU TO
10. OSEI TO
11. KAKUREPPI RETTO
12. SHOGI TO
CHARACTERISTICS
Extinguished
Normal
Normal
Extinguished
Extinguished
Extinguished
Extinguished
Extinguished
Normal

— page 327 —
1. TARGET DATA
: 2. DESCRIPTION: One single, unscored attack-at-ship. Contacted by radar and target not seen until range was close to 3,500 yards. Best estimate is that it is similar to Type IX(D) modified. Sugar Aisle Sugar shown on page 13 Supplement #3 to ONI-208-J Revised.

Ship(s) sunk: One (1) Tanker, 2800 tons (EU).

Ship(s) probably sunk: ---

Damage determined by: Saw ship sink.

Target draft: --- Course: 026°(T) Speed: 6.5 knots Range: 2010 at firing

OWN SHIP DATA
Speed: 7.3 knots Course: 125°(T) Speed: 6.5 knots Angle at firing: ---

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
Type attack: Night surface radar

Tubes fired: 85P 85P 85P 85P
Gyro angle 355 356 357 358
Depth set 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft.
Fowler 28.1 28.1 28.1 28.1
Torpedo run 1980 1950 1680 1820
Hit or Miss Miss Hit Miss Miss
Brratic (Yes or No) No No No No
Mark torpedo 18-2 18-2 18-2 18-2
Serial number 58221 57328 57305 57836

ENCLOSURE (A) 136

— page 328 —
6-7
Mark exploder
Serial number
Actuation set
Actuation actual
Mark warhead
Serial number
Explosive
Firing interval
Type spread
Sea conditions
Overhaul activity
Remarks

: 8-7
10697
Contact
None
2638
TPX
0
3 L
Sea State 3 from 2900(T)
U.S.S. AFOLLO (A825)
Temperature of injection: 550
Temperature of electrolyte: 620
The time of explosion for #5 tube was 2 min, 5 sec.

: 8-5
10679
Contact
None
1782
TPX
10 sec.
1 R
1 R
3 R

: 8-7
10079
Contact
None
1873
TPX
11 sec.
1 R
3 R

: 8-7
10079
Contact
None
1552
TPX
10 sec.
3 R

: 8-7
1260
Long. 1260 17' E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
Description: Three-island freighter over 500 feet long with a tall, single stack. Escorted by two small vessels.

Ship(s) sunk:
Ship(s) probably sunk: One (1) Large Freighter, 6000 tons (EU).

Damage determined by: Saw one hit in forward well which broke off bow. Remaining porting of target was rocked by explosions for next 10 minutes; three of which were very severe. Water was too shallow for target to sink completely.

Target draft: -- Course: 1760(T) Speed: 10 knots Range: 1600 at firing

CWN SHIP DATA
Speed: 13.5-11.5 knots Course: 1250(T) Depth: Surface Angle at firing: --

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
Type attack: Night surface radar.

Tubes fired: #6 #5 #4
Track angle 138 S 136 S 134 S 133 S
Gyro angle 009 007 006 004
Depth set 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft.
Power 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.5
Torpedo run 2300 2325 2260 2210

ENCLOSURE (A) 136
24

— page 330 —
C-O-N-F-J-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 (Cont'd)

Tubes fired: #6 #4 #3

Track angle 39.8 39.8 72.8
Gyro angle 011.2 010.2 010.2
Depth set 4 ft. 4 ft. 4 ft.
Power 27.1 27.1 27.1
Torpedo run 1800 1700 1750
Hit or Miss Miss Miss
Erratic (Yes or No) No No No
Mark torpedo 16-2 16-2 16-2
Serial number 57812 57446 58185
Mark exploder 8-7 8-5 8-5
Serial number 11125 8489 11111
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual None None None
Mark warhead 18-2 18-2 18-2
Serial number 1262 1282 1430
Explosive TXT TXT TX
Tiring interval 0 sec. 9 sec. 16 sec.
Type spread 1 R 0 1 L
Sea conditions 0 0 0
Overhaul activity U.S.S. APOLLO (A825)

Remarks
Temperature injection: 520
Temperature electrolyte: 590
Plot and TDC indicated a zig toward, shortly before firing. Target was zigged back again before 3rd torpedo was fired. It is believed this, with the small size of the target, caused the misses.

U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4 PATROL NO. 10
Time: 0109 H D=te: 21 May 1945 Lat. 36° 21' N. Long. 125° 22' E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
Description: Same as Attack No. 3

Ship(s) sunk: None

Ship(s) probably sunk: None

Damage determined by: --
Target draft: -- Course: 045°(T) Speed: 10 knots Range: 1985 at firing

GUN SHIP DATA
Speed: 11 knots Course 055-039°(T) Depth: Surface Angle at firing:--

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
Type attack: Night surface radar

- 25 - ENCLOSURE (A) 136

— page 331 —
1944-05-01 10:00:00
Torpedo Attack No. 4 (Cont'd)
Tubes fired: #10 #8 #7
Track angle 0 3 S 0
Gyro angle 168° 175 175
Depth set 4 ft. 4 ft. 4 ft.
Power 27.1 27.1 27.1
Torpedo run 1805 1850 1870
Hit or Miss Miss Miss
Erratic (Yes or No) No No No
Mark torpedo 18-2 18-2 18-2
Serial number 57824 57596 58003
Mark exploder 8-7 8-5 8-5
Serial number 11111 9095 9795
Actuation set Contact Contact Contact
Actuation actual None None None
Mark warhead 18-2 18-2 18-2
Serial number 1567 1661 1455
Explosive TFX TFX TIX
Firing interval 0 sec. 10 sec. 12 sec.
Type spread 1 R 0 0 0
Sea conditions 0 0 0 0
Overhaul activity U.S.S. APOLLO (A825)

Remarks
Temperature of injection: 52°
Temperature of electrolyte: 60°
This was a hurried 'down the throat' shot. Misses
were caused by shooting before accurate course data
on target was known.

U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5 PATROL NO. 10
Time: 1934 H Date: 7 June 1945 Lat. 34° 00' N. Long. 126° 45' E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
Description: Unescorted three-island freighter, smoking heavily. At least one mast was a tripod. The ship was similar to KOHOKU HARI
as shown on page 104 of OHL-2005-1.

Ship(s) sunk: One (1) Medium freighter, 3200 tons (EU)

Damage determined by: Saw ship sink.

Target draft: -- Course: 040°(T) Speed: 10 knots Range: 1640 at firing

OWN SHIP DATA
Speed: 3.5 knots Course 122°-121°(T) Depth: 58 feet Angle at firing: 0°

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
Type attack: Submerged periscope depth

- 26 - ENCLOSURE (A)

27

— page 333 —
1. 1030(K) 11 May 30 - 10 N. 13+ - 01 E.
2. 0647(H) 15 May 33 - 47 N. 127 - 04 E.
3. 1042(H) 30 May 34 - 56 N. 127 - 37 E.
4. 1120(H) 1 June 33 - 40 N. 127 - 57 E.
5. 1020(I) 10 June 29 - 16 N. 136 - 10 E.
6. 1613(K) 11 June 29 - 04 H. 117 - 27 E.

(D) ATTACK MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

In general, anti-submarine measures were slight. No evasion other than high surface speed was necessary.

At least one of the two vessels encountered on the night of 6 June was equipped with a radar operating on a frequency over 1,000 mcs. which could hold contact on us while presenting a small silhouette at a range of 8,000 yards.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

Bow Planes: After 23 days at sea the bow planes in both normal power and hand power developed a knock with every ten degrees of tilt applied. This knock soon came with every three degrees of tilt and became louder and more pronounced. Upon inspection the smoke on the starboard plane was found to have ridges of a tar-like substance on it. Routine greasing never prevented the trouble, nor corrected it after it once started. A burr on the tilting knuckle or in the rigging out shaft which fits around the knuckle may have resulted. The grease line running along the rigging out shaft to the plane knuckle was without any defects and it is believed a good flow of grease was getting to the knuckle. The grease line, one eighth inch copper tubing, may be too small should some old grease causing a clog in the line prevent the maximum amount of grease from reaching the tilting knuckle. The starboard plane or starboard rigging out shaft may be out of line although to the ship's knowledge no wreckage, oil or any other form of debris was run through prior to this difficulty.

No. 2 Periscope - This periscope lost pressure during this patrol, dropping to about 1/2 after three weeks on patrol. The periscope forged up soon after leaving port. This condition has existed for three patrols. The U.S.S. AUGUST (A925) found several pin holes which were repaired during the refit after the 9th patrol. Apparently, all the holes have not been found, and making an approach using a periscope through which you cannot see is most difficult. Another attack periscope should be installed.

DIVULGURE (A)

- 28 -

S-1

— page 334 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(L) RADIO

Radio communication has been excellent during this entire patrol, although it is felt that a little better circuit discipline could be maintained on the S&PLAN frequencies. Three boats sending and another tuning at the same time is too much. Lengthy despatches between members of wolf-packs sometimes clog up the circuit so that it cannot be used for the immediate tactical purpose that it was meant for. It is felt that these messages could be more advantageously transmitted back to base to come out on SUB FORK.

The new arrangement of 9090 from Guam and 9050 from Honolulu works very well. When one frequency fades the other comes in strong. The radio-men have made several favorable comments on this system. These two frequencies were used almost exclusively.

In transmitting four despatches to base from the area, no difficulty was experienced. As soon as the air was clear, the shore station came in after the first call-up in each instance. No material difficulties.

(M) RADAR

SJ - During the last refit extensive work was done on our SJ to try to find the cause of lowered sensitivity. When we finally put to sea, it was felt that the gear was performing pretty well up to par, although the standing-wave ratio was still high and could not be tuned down with the tuning stubs provided. A new High Voltage Rectifier Unit had been installed in place of one that had given considerable trouble when keying. It later proved that the new High Voltage Rectifier was no more resistant to keying than the one we had had before. Since the set went out of commission three different times during the process of keying, we considered that positive evidence that this set could not be keyed. It is felt that the surges during keying must cause resonance in the high voltage side, thus building up excessive voltages some way that causes breakdown in the insulation and thus giving high voltage shorts that do the damage, usually burning out the 836 tubes in the rectifier and, of course, fuses F9 and 10 in the main control unit.

On May 6, prior to entering area, the set went out and was put back in commission by replacing 836's and replacing fuses. Set worked satisfactorily for about 45 minutes until it was keyed again. It immediately went out again. This time, the above remedy was not sufficient. Found a low reading cable between Selector Control Unit and Junction box in coming tower. Finally traced down a shorted High Voltage Transformer. Removed transformer from Unit and applied voltage to primary and immediately observed arcing across terminal five. The insulator was cracked and charred. Having no spare on board, disassembled transformer and replaced insulator with a make-shift insulator we "happened to have" along. Reassembled transformer, thinking our troubles were over. On firing up the set, fuses F9 and 10 went again. Finally found another high Voltage Arc across an insulator.

— page 335 —
0-0-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

between one of the plate leads to the 036's and ground. Cleaned this insulator up, replaced burned out 036 and fuses and the set was back in commission by night of the 7th. Standing Wave ratio showed a dip of 15 on the ABM as compared to the 5 recommended, although the ringtime was normal. Unable to tune down the ratio.

Despite the high standing wave ratio and resulting loss of power, the performance seemed normal, and land targets could be seen out to the end of the sweep, and on May 15 and 18, respectively, picked up two ship contacts that were tracked down and sunk. On occasions, picked up sailing vessels from 8,000 to 11,000 yards. In order to keep sensitivity up, a complete routine check of some one unit was accomplished about every four or five days.

On the night of May 18, keyed radar again to attempt to identify ourselves to another boat and the set went out again with fuses 79 and 10 blown. After cleaning up another charred insulator, replacing 036's and the fuses, it was back in commission again. Did not key it again during the patrol. Were getting pretty low on 036's, anyway.

May 21 picked up a sailing vessel at 14,000 yards. On several occasions had planes out beyond 20,000 yards, one out to 27,000.

During the last week on station, began having trouble with 717A's in pre-amplifier. Ringtime would drop way down and on replacing 717A, the ringtime would come back up to normal. Checked all voltages on these tubes and they appeared to be normal. Later found a loose connection in the 1.P. OUT jack on the B.O. box and replaced. Still gives intermittent trouble, however.

ST - This gear was not used as extensively as the SJ, of course, but in the one attack in which it figured, it performed extraordinarily well. On a 3,000 ton freighter reliable ranges were obtained at 6,200 yards although on previous periscope observation, one weak pip showed up at 12,300 yards which, according to the plot of more accurate ranges obtained later, proved to be "right in there". Occasionally the ST was used to get a fix while submerged in daylight. Despite the infrequent use, the ST was kept in tune and up to normal in sensitivity by regular routining.

SD - Again the SD radar was used "sparingly" while in the area. On the surface at night the SD was kept warmed up and the mast raised, but was not keyed unless the APR indicated an aircraft in the vicinity. Then the SD would be keyed for a few seconds to get a range. However, it was only on a few occasions that a pip would show up. Some difficulty was experienced in keeping the set in tune, operating it so infrequently.

(IV) SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Very few opportunities presented themselves for judging sound conditions. On one occasion, pinging was heard at a range of 20,000 yards or greater. On another occasion, during the submerged attack on the night of 7 June, JP picked the target up at 6,000 yards, and JR and QB picked it up at about 3,500 yards. Only slight negative gradients were indicated by the ET. General background noise was lower than that experienced on previous patrols in shallow water.

3-XTRA, ENCLOSURE (A) 136

— page 337 —
3-XX-NA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

TORPEDONS 3 15,225 25 30

FUEL 25 30

Limiting factor this patrol was expatriation of time limit and expenditure of torpedoes.

(U) COMMUNICATIONS, RADAR AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES

Communications Countermeasures - None.

Radar Countermeasures - The usual large number of contacts on the A/R/SFA was collected and data recorded but on consideration, not much new information is to be gained from it. Rather than repeat all the information that has been reported so many times, only that information which we feel will be of value in increasing the general knowledge of the enemy radars is included. Definite land-based radars were located as follows:

TORI SHIMA, Lat. 30° 25', Long. 150° 15', 150 Mops, PRF 500, pulse width 20 microseconds. When approaching TORI SHIMA the contact was coming in very strong when we sighted two men running up the slope on the western side of the island. Immediately thereafter, the radar cut out and was off all the time we were in sight. As soon as we departed, the radar came back on again. It is unlikely that we were just "shaded" by the island because our position with respect to the island changed sufficiently to be clear for radiation from any direction.

FUKAE SHIMA, Lat. 32° 35', Long. 128° 37', 82 Mops, PRF 500, pulse width 55 microseconds; 96 Mops, 750 PRF, pulse width 30 microseconds; and 158 Mops, PRF 500, pulse width 12 microseconds. While patrolling submerged south of FUKAE SHIMA, three bedspring-type antennas were sighted on peaks, each rotating at slow speed, probably by hand. When on the surface, the characteristics as noted above were observed and recorded. Also, we took pictures, both movies and stills, of these installations. The frequencies indicated might not be positively identified with the antennas, however.

On the night of 8 June, at Lat. 30° 12' N., Long. 130° 00' E., just prior to being forced down by a fast closing pip on the Su radar, a contact at 162 mcs. was picked up on the A/R which had some peculiar characteristics. This signal came in very weak at first, got stronger fast and was very strong when we dived. This signal appeared to be sweeping very rapidly, at least 30 sweeps a minute and probably faster. It was too fast to get much of a pulse rate. Best estimate was in the vicinity of 600 pulses per second. Pulse length was about 12 microseconds. It was presumed, of course, that we dived from a plane. This same contact was detected the following night, but we were not forced to dive.

As recorded in the narrative, there was one incidence that had all the earmarks of a radar decay. Pip showed up first at 16,000 yards, and bobbed up and down in the fashion of a ship. Tracked at a speed of zero, so we tried to close it to see what it was. The pip did not get any stronger,

— page 339 —
020
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
SHAD Tenth War Patrol
Report.

From: The Commander Submarine Division ONE FORTY-TWO.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOURTEEN.
    (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
       Administrative Command.
    (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of War Patrol Number TEN.

1. The tenth war patrol of the SHAD was conducted in the East China and Yellow Sea areas as a member of a coordinated attack group first under the command of the Commanding Officer of the DRAGONET and later the Commanding Officer of the R.Y. The patrol was of forty-six days duration of which twenty-eight days were spent in the area, twenty-four of them being passed submerged.

2. The members of this attack group acted independently most of the time and all of the SHAD's attacks were made while operating alone. In addition, the SHAD performed lifeguard services for seven days but no opportunity to affect a rescue was afforded.

3. Excellent area coverage resulted in five contacts worthy of torpedo fire. Of this number the SHAD succeeded in closing and attacking four, while the fifth contact was tracked but eventually left in order to go after a second radar contact which turned out to be a "phantom". In addition there were several fishing vessels, trawlers, and small patrol boats in the area and the SHAD attacked one small sailing vessel with 20 MM and 40 MM.

ATTACK NO. 1
Early in the evening of 15 May radar contact was made on what developed into a small unescorted 40 or engines aft AK steering a steady course. This target was closed on the surface and at a range of 2,000 yards and with an average 90° port track four MK 18-2 torpedoes set on six feet were fired. One hit was obtained and the target was seen to sink. Although the ship was not definitely identified the best estimate is that it was a small tanker.

— page 340 —
5-142/416-3
SERIAL: 020
C/O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-L-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT TO
SHAD Tenth War Patrol
Report.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of War Patrol Number TEN.

ATTACH NO. 2
During the night of 17 May radar contact was made on a target rounding HTSU TO. At first it appeared that the target had two smaller escorts but subsequent developments indicate that these boats were probably pilot vessels assisting in navigating the target through shallow, dangerous waters. The approach was continually hampered by the presence of several fishing boats and possibly erroneous readings of the fathometer since at least one of the readings was recorded. At a range of 1600 yards and with an average track of 134 strobord four IK 18-2 torpedoes were fired, all torpedoes breached initially but three of them settled down to a normal run while the fourth appeared to run erratically. One hit was seen to blow off the bow of the target and later explosions on the remaining part of the hull indicate that what was left was not salvageable in the 7 fathoms of water in which it was located. The SHAD maneuvered towards deeper water and succeeded in evading the small accompanying vessels which chased but did not attack her.

ATTACH NO. 3 and 4
Close to midnight on 21 May radar contact was made at 9,500 yards on two small targets which appeared to be making an anti-submarine sweep. These targets were tracked and closed on the surface until at a range of 4,000 yards they were identified as two torpedo boats similar to CHIDORIS. As the SHAD believed a turn away would reveal her presence, she continued to close and at a range of 2,300 yards and with a track of about 35 strobord three IK 18-2 torpedoes set at 4 feet were fired. As the fire control party had made an error in the set up and as no hits were obtained the SHAD turned and as one of the targets headed for her she fired three "down the throat" shots from the stern tubes. No hits were obtained and when the target opened fire with their gun the SHAD successfully evaded on the surface.

ATTACH NO. 5
Late in the afternoon of 7 June an IK similar to the KOHOKU was sighted at 16,000 yards, steering steadily course and unescorted. A submerged approach was made and at a range of 1300 yards.

— page 341 —
1-142/416-3
Serial: 020
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-L-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
SH.D Tenth War Patrol
Report.
Subject: U.S.S. SH.D (SS235) - Report of War Patrol Number TEN.

yards, and with an 80° port track four Mk 18-2 torpedoes set on 6 foot wore fired. Two hits were seen and the target sank in 4 minutes. No survivors could be persuaded to come aboard.

GUN ATTACK NO. 1
Early in the morning of 7 June rad. r contact was made at 8,000 yards on what developed into a 50 ton sailing junk. The junk was brought to with a burst of 20 Mk fire and an attempt made to bore her for information. Because of heavy seas all lines gotten over parted and when it became evident that bording w.s not feasible the SH.D located a fire after 20 Mk and 40 Mk into the junk's water line since it was too dark to use the 5 inch effectively. No fires were started but it is doubtful if the vessel reached port.

RECOMMENDED ASSIGNMENT

SUNK

1. 1-0 (EU) (Lt. Ck #1) 2800 tons
1. 1-1 (Large) (EU) (Lt. Ck #2) 7500 tons
1. 1-2 (Large) (EU) (Lt. Ck #5) 4000 tons

D.D. GID

1 Sailing Junk (EC) 50 tons

4. The SH.D returned from patrol in a good state of condition and exceptionally clean. It is believed that the refit can be accomplished in the regular two week period by Squadron FOURTEEN.

5. The Commander of Submarine Division 142 takes pleasure in congratulating the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the SH.D on the successful completion of this most effective patrol carried out for the most part in shallow dangerous waters and for the damage inflicted on the enemy.

D.J. Whirligig (Lt. Cmdr.)

— page 342 —
1C5-14/16-3
Serial: 068
Confidential
SCHOOL DISTRICT: To
USS SUB report of
Tenth Mar Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOURTEEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
    (2) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SUB (35235) - Report of tenth mar patrol;
Comments on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks made by the
Commander Submarine Division. To a draft for copy.

2. The commanding officer, officers and men are congratulating on the appearance of condition of the SUB on return
from patrol, and the change in life of the men while operating
for the most part in dangerous waters.

3. It is recommended that the following be credited
to the SUB:

| Item | Quantity |
|------||
| 1.0 (IU) | 2,800 tons |
| 1.1 (Large) (IU) | 7,500 tons |
| 1.2 (Medium) (IU) | 4,000 tons |
| 1.3 (Small) | 14,300 tons |

DISTINGUISHED
1. SIC (Junk) (IC) | 50 tons |

Copy to: K. C. FISH.
Consubdiv-142
CO SEAD

136
38

— page 343 —
7-19-45
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
4 July 1945.

NOTES:
THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

CONSUSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 806
U.S.S. SHAD - TENTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Tenth War Patrol
(3 May to 16 June 1945).

1. The tenth war patrol of the SHAD, under the command of Lieutenant Commander D. L. McIlholy, U.S. Navy, was conducted in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea area. The SHAD performed life-guard duties, and operated with coordinated attack groups under the command of the commanding officer of the U.S.S. DRAGONET and, later, the commanding officer of the U.S.S. RAY.

2. No opportunity to rescue aviators presented itself during performance of life-guard duties; but as a result of thorough, aggressive area coverage into shallow, dangerous waters, the SHAD was able to deliver five torpedo attacks and one gun attack, which resulted in three more enemy ships being sent to the bottom and one small craft damaged.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the SHAD for this aggressive, fighting patrol. The SHAD is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

SUNK
1 - Small A0 (TM Modified SAS Type) (EC) - 2,800 tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Medium AK (KOHOKU Maru Type) (EC) - 3,200 tons (Attack No. 5)

TOTAL SUNK - 13,500 tons

DAMAGED
1 - MIS (Sailing Junk) (EC) - 50 tons (Gun attack No. 1)

FILMED
TOTAL SUNK & DAMAGED - 13,550 tons

Distribution & Authentication on next page.

B. B. YEOMAN
EXTRA SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB. OP-16
BURN TO F-4253

— page 344 —
12-10(4)/416-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01662
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SHAD Report of
Tenth War Patrol.
CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 806
U.S.S. SHAD - TENTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Tenth War Patrol
(3 May to 16 June 1945).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
CINO (5)
Cincpac (6)
JICFOA (1)
4dICFOA (1)
Comservpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Comsubsplant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubs7thFl (Fwd Chelon) (2)
Comsubs7thFl (Rear Chelon) (2)
Comnorpac (1)
Comsubspace (3)
Comsubspace4dComd (40)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ComsubspaceSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Division
Commanders, Pacific (2)
CSS 3 (Airmail) (5)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1).

E. L. HYMES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

— page 345 —
SS235/A16-3
Serial: 0101
SS235
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California

DECLASSIFIED: 5510.10
BY: 0H0491
DATE: 6/6/79

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. SHAD (SS235).
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division ONE FORTY-TWO.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOURTEEN.
(3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of War Patrol number ELSEVEN.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track chart.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the ELEVENTH war patrol of this vessel conducted in the vicinity of MARCUS ISLAND during the period 11 July 1945 to 31 July 1945, and in the vicinity of HALFMO SHOTO during the period 9 August 1945 to 16 August 1945, is forwarded herewith.

FILMED
140253

— page 346 —
12 July 1945
Arrived Midway Island, T.H., on 16 June 1945 and moored alongside U.S.S. BUSHWELL (AS15). Assigned to Submarine Division 142 (our home division) for refit.

There were no extensive repairs necessary and the refit was very good. Conducted an excellent four-day training period. It was appreciated that the training officers took an active interest in all proceedings.

(B) NARRATIVE

Officers on Board

Lieut. Comdr. D. L. MEHLHOP, USN
Lieutenant J. C. WHEELER, Jr., USN
Lieutenant R. Y. FRAZIER, (E)L, USNR
Lieutenant(jg) D. BROWN, (E)-T, USNR
Lieutenant(jg) J. P. FITZPATRICK, (D), USNR
Lieutenant(jg) G. L. MORRIS, (DE), USNR
Lieutenant(jg) K. R. BAUR, (DE)L, USNR
Lieutenant(jg) H. H. SHIELDS, (D)L, USNR
Design J. ADELS, (D), USNR
Design H. A. TAYLOR, USN

CPOs on Board

BENNO, P.F., CEM(AA)(T)(SS), V6, USNR
BOSLEY, W.C., CTM(AA)(T)(SS), USN
GOOLSBY, H.O., CY(T)(SS), USN
LEE, R.W., CMoMM(AA)(T)(SS), USN
HURPHY, R.F., CRM(T)(SS), USN
SERVEY, J.L., CTM(AA)(T)(SS), USN
SIEFFS, A.H., CMoMM(AA)(T)(SS), USN
WHITE, J.L., CPM(AA)(T)(SS), V6, USNR

*NOTE: Total war patrols given above include this patrol.

11 July
LHOOY (Y) Underway from MIDWAY ISLAND enroute to lifeguard station off NAUCUS ISLAND.

11 - 17 July Enroute area conducting numerous training dives and exercises including two gun firings. Room positions were as follows:

| Date       | Location | Personnel |
||||
| 12 July    | 1200(L)  | 12 July  |
| 13 July    | 1200(M)  | 13 July  |
| 14 July    | 1200(L)  | 14 July  |
| 15 July    | 1200(L)  | 15 July  |
| 16 July    | 1200(L)  | 16 July  |
| 17 July    | 1200(L)  | 17 July  |

(omitted from calendar)

| Date       | Location | Personnel |
||||
| 12 July    | 1200(L)  | 12 July  |
| 13 July    | 1200(M)  | 13 July  |
| 14 July    | 1200(L)  | 14 July  |
| 15 July    | 1200(L)  | 15 July  |
| 16 July    | 1200(L)  | 16 July  |
| 17 July    | 1200(L)  | 17 July  |

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 347 —
18 July
OID(K) Arrived off MARCUS and commenced patrolling, staying about seven miles to westward.

0920 Made training dive.

0935 Surfaced.

1200 Position: Lat. 24 - 18 N. Long. 153 - 42 E.

1235 About four B-29s commenced individual bombing runs on MARCUS.

1610 Sighted and talked with a Coronado.

19 July
OID(K) Submerged and approached MARCUS in order to reconnoiter MARCUS at close range.

0500-0900 Observed west, south and north coasts of MARCUS at ranges from 3,000 to 1,400 yards and obtained the following information: (a) The entire island is well dug-in and, in general, looks very much like that part of MIDWAY which is covered with dugouts. It appeared to be well protected with at least two heavy AA. batteries and several coastal guns. The beaches are all protected by rather flimsy-looking barbed wire entanglements. The only buildings above ground which did not appear to be badly damaged, were two concrete block houses and one power house with a double stack. (b) There are two Mark I radars on the western side of the island and two on the eastern. None of the radars were well protected. There are three tall steel radio towers on the eastern side of the island which, at any distance, look like radar towers. (c) The dock on the south coast amounts to nothing more than two short moles forming a small boat basin. It is doubtful if ships could moor there in any weather. There are two boom-type oranes on these moles. (d) Probably as many as a hundred men were seen at one time along the beach. They may have been tending some kind of fishing gear. At one time, a small motor-driven sampan with about twenty men aboard got underway and stood away from the beach at about 1,000 yards and then returned. This looked like a joy ride. (e) In general, the eastern part of the island had the most vegetation and also seemed to contain most of the people. Decided to shell this part of the island before leaving area.

0915 Surfaced.

1200 Position: Lat. 24 - 19 N. Long. 153 - 46 E.

1204 Divd from unidentified plane.

1210 Identified plane as a Coronado, surfaced and established communication on the VHF.

- 2 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 348 —
20 July
0:10(K) Submerged to make another reconnaissance trip around MARCUS.

21 July
1000(K) Contacted and talked with a Coronado.

1015 Watched B-29s bomb island again.

1200 Position: Lat. 24 - 02 N. Long. 153 - 42 E.

22 July
0:25(K) Submerged to reconnoiter MARCUS again.

1100 Surfaced.

1200 Position: Lat. 24 - 25 N. Long. 153 - 42 E.

23 July
1023(K) B-29s bombed MARCUS.

1200 Position: Lat. 24 - 23 N. Long. 153 - 55 E.

24 July
1024(K) Made training dive.

1100 Surfaced.

1110 Sighted and talked with Coronado.

1200 Position: Lat. 24 - 02 N. Long. 153 - 53 N.

25 July
1140(K) Sighted and talked with B-24.

1200 Position: Lat. 24 - 14 N. Long. 153 - 48 E.

26 July
1200(K) Position: Lat. 24 - 17 N. Long. 153 - 41 E.

1210 Sighted and talked with Coronado.

1510 Made training dive.

1610 Surfaced.

27 July
1200(K) Position: Lat. 24 - 04 N. Long. 154 - 07 E.

-3- ENGLISH SURVEYOR (A)

— page 349 —
28 July
1000 - 1200(K)  Several individual bombing raids on MARCUS by B-29s.

1200  Position:  Lat. 24 - 16 N.  Long. 153 - 47 E.

1330  Submerged and approached island.

1850  Made battle surface 10,000 yards east of MARCUS, but just as we surfaced a rain squall completely obscured the island. It was dark before the squall passed and, consequently, we did no shooting.

29 July
1200(K)  Position:  Lat. 24 - 06 N.  Long. 153 - 54 E.

30 July
1012(K)  Sighted and talked with a Coronado.

1200  Position:  Lat. 24 - 06 N.  Long. 153 - 52 E.

1350  Submerged and approached MARCUS.

1836  Made battle surface about 10,000 yards southeast of MARCUS and commenced bombardment. Used area around two radars and radio masts as target. Used Mark 32 ammunition for first five shots in hopes of catching some people above ground. There was about a force 3 sea running, and pointing was difficult making our rate of fire very slow. Started one fire which from the large column of smoke looked like an oil fire.

1853  After expending 33 rounds of ammunition, enemy commenced returning fire. Submerged.

1910  Surface.

31 July
1200(K)  Position:  Lat. 24 - 15 N.  Long. 153 - 45 E.

1900  In accordance with orders, set course for Saipan via BRIDGESHA.

1 August
1200(K)  Position:  Lat. 19 - 24 N.  Long. 153 - 00 E.

2 August
1113(K)  Passed friendly submarine on opposite course.

1200  Position:  Lat. 17 - 46 N.  Long. 147 - 04 E.

2120  Made training dive.

2150  Surfacd.

- 14 -  ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 350 —
3 August
0830(K) Rendezvoused with SCSJ318 and set course for TANARAG HARBOR.

1400 Moored alongside U.S.S. ORION (AS16). Transferred patient, who had been stricken with rheumatic fever since two days out of MIDWAY. This man had suffered greatly, having lost 23 pounds of weight. Took on fuel and transferred six torpedoes.

14 August
1300(L) Got underway and set course for NATIONAL LEAGUE AREA.

1745 Escort departed. Made trim dive.

1820 Surfaced.

2030 Communication Officer suffered an acute attack of kidney stone colic.

2400 Informed Omsubpac about our sick officer.

5 August
0515(L) Reversed course upon orders of Omsubpac in order to transfer patient.

1200 Position: Lat. 16 - 03 N. Long. 144 - 11 E.

1430 Moored alongside U.S.S. PC-159B and transferred Lieutenant(jg) Duane BROWN, 272335, (E)-T, USNR, and received Lieutenant(jg) Harvey H. SHIELD, 330721, (D)L, USNR.

1440 Got underway and set course for NATIONAL LEAGUE in company with U.S.S. REDFIN (SS272). Speed of advance 13 knots.

1630 Made training dive.

1650 Surfaced.

6 August
1200(L) Position: Lat. 18 - 47 N. Long. 142 - 18 E.

7 August
0900(L) Made training dive.

0920 Surfaced.

1200 Position: Lat. 25 - 47 N. Long. 139 - 51 E.

8 August
1200(L) Position: Lat. 28 - 18 N. Long. 139 - 47 E.

1300 REDFIN departed company.

1900 Received orders for tomorrow's lifeguard station.

-5- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 351 —
9 August
0800(L) Air strike has been cancelled. Decided to look over TORI SHIMA and set course accordingly.

1200 Position: Lat. 30 - 12 N. Long. 140 - 09 E.

1325 While circling island at about 9,000 yards, several buildings suddenly came into view. Submerged for a closer inspection of north-western part of the island. Observed three terraces on hillside with houses, apparently barracks, built thereon. Saw one definite coast defense gun which looked to be about 14". Saw one other gun which may have been an A.A. gun and several probable gun emplacements. We also observed one platoon of men marching along a road out in the hill. With these guns looking down on us, decided not to try a bombardment.

1620 Surflaced.

1700 Received word about tonight's lifeguard station and set course accordingly.

2300 Reached station.

2330 Unexpected air cover showed up. No excitement.

10 August
1200(L) Position: Lat. 30 - 02 N. Long. 136 - 27 E.

1310 Exchanged calls with U.S.S. FLORISSIN (SS221).

1400 Talked on VHF to passing plane who had one engine out. He was low on gas but he was going to try to make IWO.

1500 Received assignment for tomorrow's lifeguard station.

1615 Made training dive.

1720 Surfaced.

11 August
1200(L) Position: Lat. 29 - 48 N. Long. 139 - 18 E. Air strike for today was cancelled. Sighted several lone Invitators.

12 August
1200(L) Position: Lat. 29 - 56 N. Long. 136 - 27 E. Air strike for today was cancelled.

13 August
1045(L) Made training dive.

1115 Surfaced.

— page 352 —
0-0-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

1200 Position: Lat. 29 - 54 N. Long. 138 - 10 E.

1405 Exchanged calls with U.S.S. SEA DEVIL (SS400).

1700 Received instructions concerning tomorrow's lifeguard station and set course accordingly. At least we are getting a little closer to Japan.

11 August
1200(L) Position: Lat. 32 - 02 N. Long. 137 - 05 E.
Many B-29s went over us today going both directions, but none were in trouble.

15 August
1200(L) Position: Lat. 30 - 58 N. Long. 137 - 07 E.

1315 Sunk floating mine by gunfire.

1530 Sunk floating mine by gunfire.

1630 Received instructions to return to MIDWAY, and set course accordingly with a speed of advance of 16.5 knots.

17-21 August
Enroute MIDWAY running along latitude 29 - 15 E. Hoon positions were as follows:

17 August 1200(K) Lat. 29 - 09 N Long. 141 - 39 E.
18 August 1200(L) Lat. 29 - 11 N Long. 146 - 55 E.
19 August 1200(L) Lat. 29 - 19 N Long. 155 - 19 E.
20 August 1200(N) Lat. 29 - 14 N Long. 162 - 23 E.
21 August 1200(N) Lat. 28 - 56 N Long. 169 - 10 E.
22 August 1200 Lat. 28 - 28 N Long. 175 - 24 E.

Set calendar back one day.
22 August arrived MIDWAY.

— page 353 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(C) WEATHER
No unusual weather was encountered. The patrol was marked by continual good weather.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
A set of about 3/4 knot 090 was encountered in the vicinity of Lat. 32 N. Long. 137 E.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
No navigational aids were encountered.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS
There were no ship contacts.

(G) ATTACK JONACTS
There were no aircraft contacts.

(H) ATTACK DATA
No attacks were made.

(I) MINES
Two floating mines were sunk by gunfire at Lat. 31 N. Long. 137 E.

(J) ARTIFICIAL AIRCRAFT AND BEHAVIOR
None.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
SD Radar. (See section M).

(L) RADIO
No casualties were experienced in the radio equipment until the last few days in station. The VHF was our only source of difficulty, and the radiomen were able to cope with this until a lack of spares, the last day in station, put them in a position to continue. The first trouble encountered was an error locating of the ship's radio when the ship was at anchor. This trouble was eliminated by rigging a blower from the ship's supply ventilation duct, and by removing the SCU which was located to close to the VHF to allow proper ventilation.

The most serious of the failures were fortunately performed until after all air strikes were cancelled, and the lack of VHF communication was no great hindrance. At this time the channel #1 receiving crystal chose to go

— page 354 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
out of operation and, soon after switching to channel #2, it did likewise. While keeping a watch on channel #3, a resistor in the Plane/Plane receiver unit burned out.

Having no "on board" spares in either the crystal or the Plane/Plane department, the VHF watch was secured. It is suggested that submergings be provided with such spares in addition to about 300 percent spares in radios, tubes, which must be replaced frequently.

(M) RADAR

SJ radar operation during this patrol was considered exceptionally good. The first few days on station, however, revealed a weak tube, 7-21-A, and after replaced the ring time was increased from 5,700 to 6,200 yards; thus, increasing ranges on MARCUS ISLAND from 17,000 to 24,000 and sometimes 27,000 yards.

The D-3 main power switch burned out, which makes a total of twice in the last three patrols. In view of the fact that this circuit is properly fused for 20 amps, and because of the difficulty met in replacing the D-3 switch, it is suggested that this switch be designed to carry a greater load.

The SD performance was not all it might have been, due to several factors. First, the SD mast must be removed and straightened, paying special attention to the power leads in the mast. Second, it is necessary to move the displaying unit one-half inch forward of its present position to prevent stress on the ceramic insulators caused by the displaying unit shocks when the mast is raised.

At times, the performance was considered normal, but usually it was far below par, giving a maximum range of four miles. The BN unit worked very well, giving IFF returns up to forty miles.

The only casualty to the SD equipment occurred just before leaving station in the indicating unit. The high voltage transformer (T2-2), main power supply to the cathode ray tube, burned out, and having no "on board" spares, the SD radar was necessarily secured.

(N) SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

No casualties were experienced in the sound gear. Since there was no opportunity for sonar tracking or listening, the sound conditions during this patrol could not be determined.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

No unusual density layers were encountered. All bathymetrograph cards have been forwarded to the Hydrographic Office.

- 9 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 355 —
0-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY

In general, health was excellent, since every day was spent on the surface and the weather was good. One man suffered from acute rheumatic fever, with 19 sick days. This man was transferred at Saipan for treatment. One officer, one man kidney stone, and was transferred at sea. Food was good and well prepared.

(Q) PERSONNEL

Number of men detached after last patrol --- 5
Number of men on hand this patrol --- 74
Number of men qualified at start of patrol --- 55
Number of men qualified at end of patrol --- 62
Number of men making their first patrol --- 4

*One man was transferred at Saipan for medical treatment.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

| Miles | Fuel Used |
|-------||
| Midway to Area | 1,350 | 16,230 |
| In Area | 3,406 | 25,190 |
| Area to Saipan | 987 | 9,130 |
| Saipan to Area | 1,213 | 11,510 |
| In Area | 1,970 | 11,080 |
| Area to Midway | 2,765 | 38,860 |

(S) DURATION

Days enroute to area --- 14
Days in area --- 21
Days enroute to base --- 7
Days submerged --- 0

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

| Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel factor |
||------|||
| 16        | 52,000| 30 days    | 30 days         |

Patrol terminated by orders from Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

(U) COMMUNICATIONS, RADAR AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES

(1) Radar - There were interceptions of enemy radar installations on MARCUS ISLAND and TORI SHIMA as follows:

| MARCUS ISLAND CONTACTS ON APR | MUC | Pulse Rate | Pulse Width |
||-----|||
| 305                            | 1000| 2 (weak and sweeping) | 2 |
| 387                            | 1500| 4 (weak and sweeping) | 4 |
| 300                            | 1500| 2 (weak and sweeping) | 2 |
| 98                             | 1000| 15 (very strong and seemed to be steady on us. It is believed we were detected by this radar for, soon after APR contact, we were challenged by blinker) |

Radar on Marcus was not operated continuously--some nights passed with no contacts.

- 10 - ENGLISH (A)

— page 356 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TORI SHIMA CONTACTS ON APR
MC Pulse Rate Pulse Width
151 500 15 (fairly strong)

(2) Radar jamming and deception was neither encountered nor employed.

Radio - Enemy interference was found to be great on the 7945 frequency, but not to the extent that we were unable to read our own signals. That this was enemy jamming is doubtful and was believed to be enemy transmissions.

Sonar - Enemy sonar was at no time encountered during this patrol.

(V) REMARKS
None.

— page 357 —
155-142/16-3
Serial: 028
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
SHAD Eleventh War
Patrol Report.

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of War Patrol Number: ELEVEN.

1. The eleventh war patrol of the U.S.S. SHAD was spent in the vicinity of NARCUS ISLAND and in the NAPPO SHOOT area. Twenty-one of this forty-two day patrol were spent in the area and this time was devoted principally to life-guard duties. The patrol was terminated early upon receipt of despatches directing the SHAD to cease firing and return to port pending final negotiations for the surrender of the Japanese-Forces.

2. Despite thorough care coverage and an alert rescue watch, no targets worthy of torpedo fire were sighted and no eviators were picked up. The SHAD, however, bombarded NARCUS ISLAND.

3. BOMBARDMENT
Shortly before sunset on 30 July 1945, the SHAD battle surfaced about 5 miles southeast of NARCUS ISLAND and opened fire on the two radars and radio masts. One fire which produced a large column of black smoke was started and additional damage was probably inflicted on the shore installations. After expending 33 rounds of five inch ammunition, the SHAD was forced to dive when the shore batteries commenced to return the fire.

4. Two serious cases of illness occurred on board during this patrol but both patients were returned to a base and safely transferred.

5. The SHAD returned from patrol in excellent material condition and exceptionally clean.

— page 358 —
5-142/416-3
Serial: 028
C.O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-I
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
SHAD Eleventh War
Patrol Report.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (S3235) - Report of War Patrol Number 8, ELBEVEN.

6. The Division Commander takes this opportunity to congratulate the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the SHAD on the successful completion of their last patrol of this war and for the damage inflicted on the enemy. During her eleven war patrols the SHAD has built up a reputation as a sound, fighting ship of which all personnel serving in her and the Division Commander are justly proud.

D.L. WHEELCHILD

— page 359 —
05-14/AL6-3
Serial: 0104
Confidential

SECOND HANDED TO:
USS SHIELD Report of
Eleventh I. F. Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOURTEEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
   (2) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHIELD (SS-235) - Report of Seventh I. F. Patrol - Completed on...

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division One attached Port-Two.

2. The Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the SHIELD, both for the completion of her last war patrol and for the splendid record she has achieved.

H. C. FISH.

Copy to:
Consubdiv-142
SHIELD

— page 360 —
1. SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
   - FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18)
   - Serial 02386
   - CONFIDENTIAL
   - NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTERING PATROL AREA.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SHAD Report of
Eleventh War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 893
U.S.S. SHAD - ELEVENTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS235) - Report of Eleventh War Patrol (11 July to 22 August 1945).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
Cino (5)
Cinepac (6)
JICPOA (1)
Comserwpac (1)
Cinclan (1)
Comsubsblant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Baco, PH (1)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubs7thFlt (Fwd Echelon) (2)
Comsubs7thFlt (Rear Echelon) (2)
Comnorpac (1)
Comsubsapac (3)
ComsubspaceAdComd (20)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ComsubspaceSubordcom (5)
All Squadron and Div. Commanders, Pacific (2)
ComSubOpTraGr (Airmail) (5)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

E. L. HYNES, 2nd, Flag Secretary.

— page 361 —
1. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
   - Serial: 02386
   - Sub: FF12-10(A)/A16-3(16)
   - From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
   - To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
   - Via: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SHAD (SS245) - Report of Eleventh War Patrol (11 July to 22 August 1945).

1. The eleventh war patrol of the SHAD, under the command of Lieutenant Commander D. L. Manlhop, U. S. Navy, was conducted in two phases, both of which were devoted to life-saving duties.

2. During the first phase of this patrol the SHAD spent fourteen days on life-saving duty in the vicinity of Marcus Island, after which she returned to Saipan for replenishment of supplies. She then departed for life-saving duty in the Nanpo Shoto Islands area. The second phase of this patrol was terminated after one week on station by the cessation of hostilities with Japan. During this patrol no contacts were made with enemy shipping and there were no opportunities to rescue aviation personnel. The SHAD expended 33 rounds of five inch ammunition in a bombardment of Marcus Island before diving to avert damage to herself from return fire.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is not authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers and crew of the SHAD for the completion of this patrol.

G. C. Crawford, Chief of Staff.

Distribution and authentication on next page.

— page 362 —
1.0 1.1 1.25 1.4 1.6
: 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 14.4 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 14.8 14.4 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 15.2 14.8 14.4 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 15.6 15.2 14.8 14.4 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 16.0 15.6 15.2 15.0 14.8 14.4 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 16.4 16.0 15.6 15.2 15.0 14.8 14.4 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 16.8 16.4 16.0 15.6 15.2 14.8 14.4 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 17.2 17.0 16.8 16.4 16.0 15.6 15.2 14.8 14.4 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 17.6 17.2 17.0 16.8 16.4 16.0 15.6 15.2 14.8 14.4 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 18.0 17.6 17.2 17.0 16.8 16.4 16.0 15.6 15.2 14.8 14.4 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
: 18.4 18.0 17.6 17.2 17.0 16.8 16.4 16.0 15.6 15.2 14.8 14.4 14.0 13.