U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH (SS-171) — war patrol report SS-171_CUTTLEFISH.pdf

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JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: F-108]
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OPERATOR [HANDWRITTEN: HARRIS]
DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6-10-78]

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[SEAL: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, with an eagle]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET, START & END
NAVEXOS 3968

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[HANDWRITTEN: CUTTLEFISH (SS-171)
WWII PATROL FILE
ALL MATERIAL ON THIS REEL IS DECLASSIFIED
FOR DECK LOGS THROUGH OCTOBER 1945
CONSULT NATIONAL ARCHIVES WHICH HAS CUSTODY
J.A. KOONTZ]

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Division of Naval History
Ships' Histories Section
Navy Department

HISTORY OF USS CUTTLEFISH (SS 171)

After earning two Battle Stars during the early part of World War II,
USS CUTTLEFISH was sent to New London, Connecticut, for duty in connection
with the training of new submarine crews.

The submarine was built by the Electric Boat Company at Groton,
Connecticut, where her keel was laid on 7 October 1931. Armed with only
six torpedo tubes and one 3-inch deck gun, the sub when new could make
17 knots at best on the surface. When the war began, she found it
difficult to sustain better than 12 knots.

Mrs. Marjorie W. Bullard, wife of the superintending constructor,
Lieutenant Commander Beirne S. Bullard, USN, christened the submarine at
her launching on 21 November 1933. USS CUTTLEFISH was first placed in
commission on 8 June 1934.

The second vessel of the name, USS CUTTLEFISH was named for a ten-
armed marine mollusk similar to the squid. The first CUTTLEFISH, also a
submarine, was launched in 1904, and renamed B-2 in 1911. She was
stricken from the Navy List in 1922 and used as a target. The (SS 171) was
the first submarine to have air conditioning installed during her construction.

When World War II began, CUTTLEFISH was drydocked in the Mare Island
Navy Yard at San Francisco, California. Lieutenant Commander M. P. Hottel,
USN, was her commanding officer.

Out of the yard on 10 January 1942, the old submarine began her first
war patrol, leaving Midway on 3 February. Ten days later she closed
Marcus Island, and searched carefully for signs of military activity. Her
first target, an inter-island steamer, came into sight on the 28th, and the
ship fired two torpedoes from 2000 yards in a daylight attack, but could
not score. Four hours later she again spotted the steamer, but her slow
speed kept her from closing the range.

Another steamer was sighted off the starboard bow that evening,
and four torpedoes shot out from 1500 yards, only to miss because of the
target's maneuvers. On 2 March the same ship hove into view, but again
CUTTLEFISH lacked the speed to close the distance. A week later she
left the area, arriving back in port on the 24th.

Her second war patrol was equally futile, as slow speed kept her from
gaining a firing position with one exception. The patrol began on 21 April,
when she left Pearl Harbor for Midway, where she stopped for badly-needed
voyage repairs and logistics. Arriving off Saipan on 18 May, she made
reconnaissance photographs to aid naval intelligence before attacking her
first target.

A Japanese torpedo boat came into view on the 19th, and CUTTLEFISH
fired two torpedoes, only to see one run under the target and the other
miss as the boat took evasive measures. As the sub swung for a stern attack,

— page 4 —
-2- USS CUTTLEFISH (SS 171)

she lost depth control, and before she could regain position, the inevitable
depth charging began. The counter-attack kept her down for four hours.

Two days later she sighted a light cruiser, but couldn't get close
enough to fire. On the 23rd she made a night submerged attack, firing one
torpedo tube which missed. Surfacing, she chased her target for two and
a half hours before giving up the chase.

CUTTLEFISH tried to attack a group of three destroyers the next day,
but was discovered and had to go deep for a depth charging which caused
minor damage. On the 25th she left the area. A plane caught her on the
surface during her return to base and dropped two bombs as she went under,
causing no damage.

During the night of 4 June 1942, lookouts spotted a heavily-laden
tanker, and CUTTLEFISH tried for three hours to get into position, only to
see the tanker change course and run away. Bad communications prevented
her receiving messages which would have put her in a position for the Battle
of Midway, and the only evidence she had of the battle was when she
began running through several square miles of wreckage from the battle.
She arrived in Pearl Harbor on 15 June.

Her new commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander E. E. Marshall, USN,
took the ship out on her third war patrol, beginning on 23 July. Two days
out, she heard propeller noises, and began an approach on what was evidently
an enemy submarine. The enemy detected her, however, and fired two torpedoes,
which missed ahead. When the contact was lost, CUTTLEFISH continued to
Midway, and then to her area off the Japanese home island of Kyushu.

On 13 August she sighted an exchange ship, and on the next day
spotted a destroyer, less than 150 yards away. Steaming on a parallel
reverse course, the destroyer was too close for the torpedoes to arm
themselves before hitting, and so CUTTLEFISH tried to set up a stern shot.
Before she could get it off the destroyer sighted her, and she was forced
to dive.

Four days later she sighted another prowling destroyer, and set up an
attack. Just before firing two torpedoes, she picked up the noises of
another ship in the area, and dived after seeing both torpedoes miss, one
striking and the destroyer evading the other. The depth charges began
dropping immediately. The first three forced the bow of the submarine up
twelve degrees, sending her up to 65 feet before depth control was reestab-
lished. The attacks continued for an hour.

The night proved to be a busy one, as CUTTLEFISH sighted another
destroyer and a small trawler, before making her first successful attack
on a large freighter.

The freighter was sighted just as CUTTLEFISH, determined to sink some-
thing, was preparing for a surface gun attack on the small trawler. Getting
into a good position, the eager submarine fired three torpedoes, and then
watched with growing satisfaction as three explosions ripped the ship apart.
As another ship, possibly an escorting destroyer, rushed to the scene,
CUTTLEFISH fired a final torpedo at the freighter, only to see it miss ahead

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-3- USS CUTTLEFISH (SS 171)

and run into the second ship. A bright moon illuminated the scene, as the
freighter turned over and sank.

A typhoon kept the ship from action until 28 August, but shortly after
midnight on the morning of 30 August she spotted the running lights of a
medium-sized ship. After making a submerged approach, the sub discovered
that the ship was partially marked as a hospital ship, and though it seemed
unlikely that she was, she was bound by international law to let her go.

That afternoon another freighter suddenly appeared out of a rain
squall, but the two torpedoes that CUTTLEFISH fired missed, and the target
disappeared into another squall. On 2 September she sighted another ship,
but could not close to fire. Two days later she sighted another, and moved
in toward the target's estimated track. A glassy sea forced her to fire
entirely by sound, and all her torpedoes missed.

That afternoon a large ship, later identified as TONAN MARU NO. 3,
an ex-whaler of 19,600 tons, being used as a combination troop transport
and oiler, was sighted, headed into Ariake Wan. CUTTLEFISH lay in wait until
0130 on the 5th, when her patience was rewarded by having the ship reappear,
in good position for a clear shot.

The submarine loosed three of her torpedoes, scoring one hit. A
heavy explosion rocked the ship as she dived for cover, coming up to fire
one more, which missed as the tanker reversed course, trying to get back
into port before she sank. Hastily reloading, the crew sent one last
torpedo into the target from 400 yards, causing a terrific explosion.
CUTTLEFISH dived to keep out of the way, and heard an internal explosion.
Coming to periscope depth, she could see nothing in the area.

The triumphant sub cleared the area the next night, and arrived at
Midway on 15 September and in Pearl Harbor four days later. But this, her
only successful patrol, was destined to be her last, for the obsolete sub-
marine was soon ordered to New London, Connecticut, to help train new
submariners who would man the more modern subs.

CUTTLEFISH arrived in New London early in December 1942, and on the
31st a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander H. E. Baker, USN,
assumed command. The submarine began a schedule of training cruises from
New London with green submariners aboard, making exercise dives and indoc-
trinating her passengers in undersea warfare. In September 1943, Lieu-
tenant Commander David Connole, USN, assumed command and served until being
relieved in December 1944 by Commander Robert Kelly, USN.

The old submarine left New London on her last cruise in October 1945.
Declared surplus, she was sent to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where, on 24
October 1945, her commissioning pennant was hauled down for the last time.
Pursuant to a Directive of February 1947 the vessel was disposed of by sale.

USS CUTTLEFISH earned two Battle Stars on the Asiatic-Pacific Area
Service Medal for participation in the following operations:

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-4- USS CUTTLEFISH (SS 171)

1 Star/Midway Operation -- 3 - 6 June 1942
1 Star/Third War Patrol -- 23 July - 20 September 1942

STATISTICS

OVERALL LENGTH 272 feet
BEAM 25 feet
SPEED 17 knots
DISPLACEMENT 1120 tons

Compiled: July 1953

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[HANDWRITTEN: 1ST Copy]

FF12-10/A16-3(5)
Serial 0325

SUBMARINES, PACIFIC FLEET
c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California,
March 28, 1942.

COM SUBPAC PATROL REPORT No. 18 March 28, 1942.
USS CUTTLEFISH - 1st WAR PATROL
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

From: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
To : Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH (SS171) - First War Patrol,
Report of.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject report.
(B) Copy of CSD 43 Conf ltr FB43/A16-3 Serial
005 of Mar. 25, 1942.
(C) Copy of CSS 4 Conf ltr FC5-4/A16-3 Serial
091 of Mar. 27, 1942.

1. The area assigned the CUTTLEFISH turned out to
be unproductive of enemy contacts and no relief submarine is
being assigned this area for the present.

2. It is unfortunate that the two attacks made
failed to produce damage to the enemy.

3. The reconnaissance made of Marcus was incom-
plete. The CUTTLEFISH should have remained another day to ob-
serve the Island completely during daylight.

4. No radio communication with CUTTLEFISH was had
from February 2 to March 11, although messages were sent requir-
ing replies. It was assumed that the CUTTLEFISH's radio trans-
mitter was out of commission and some concern was felt about
arranging for a rendezvous for escort into Pearl Harbor. There-
fore, a procedure for entering Midway for communication pur-
poses was sent on successive night schedules to the CUTTLEFISH
and Midway was informed of this procedure.

5. A standard procedure to cover such instances in
the future is being incorporated in the Security Annex of each
operation order.

[HANDWRITTEN: 40166]
CLASSIFICATION REDUCED TO
UNCLASSIFIED Distribution and authentication on following page).
BY AUTHORITY OF
OPNAV INST. 5510.1
DATED 15 JUN 53
By [SIGNATURE: E.C.W.] Date [HANDWRITTEN: 10/25/57]

-1-
T. WITHERS.

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FF12-10/A16-3(5)
Serial 0325

COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT No. 18
USS CUTTLEFISH - 1st WAR PATROL
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH (SS171) - First War Patrol,
Report of.

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DECLASSIFIED
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.

PERIOD: From 29 January 1942, to 24 March 1942.

AREA: A circle with 100 miles radius centered at
Port Lloyd in the Bonin Islands.

ZONE TIME: Minus 10 while in area.

1. NARRATIVE:

Jan 29. (zone plus 10½).
0900 Underway under escort for Midway.
1700 Made trim dive to deep submergence, conditions
satisfactory.
1900 Parted company with escort.

Jan. 30 to Feb. 2.
Uneventful.

Feb. 3. (zone plus 12)
0851 Moored at Navy Pier, Midway, and commenced fuel-
ing. Transferred Ens. L. M. CULLAT, FFT Pearl-
1437 Underway for patrol station via Marcus Island.

Feb. 4 to Feb. 9.
Uneventful. Made daily training dives.

Feb. 10 (zone minus 11)
Commenced submerged running during daylight.

Feb. 11 & 12.
Uneventful.

Feb. 13. (zone minus 10)
0031 Sighted Marcus Island distant about 3 miles.
Observed lights for short intervals on two oc-
casions. Stood off and on until daylight.
Dived and cruised submerged in vicinity of Is-
land. Due to unknown currents, rain and re-
duced visibility, contact was not regained al-
though subsequent plots indicated that we were
within two miles of the island. Had any ships
of any size been present, it is thought that
they would have been sighted during our night
contacts while the weather was clear.

Feb. 14 to Feb. 16
Uneventful.

Feb. 17.
1005 Sighted small sailing junk on southerly course.

-1-
ENCLOSURE (A)

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[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.

Feb. 18.
0030 Entered patrol area.

Feb. 19.
1247 Sighted Chichi Shima Retto distant 13 miles.

Feb. 20.
0642 Dived 8 miles west of Port Lloyd. Visibility
     too poor for reconnaissance.

Feb. 21.
0630 Submerged and conducted sound patrol.

Feb. 22.
0632 Commenced submerged patrol south of Haha Shima.
0830 Commenced surface patrol.

Feb. 23.
     Conducted surface patrol east of Chichi Shima.

Feb. 24.
0620 Submerged and conducted periscope patrol.

Feb. 25.
0450 Sighted white light on sampan.

Feb. 26.
1030 Heavy rain set in.
1215 Sighted steamer bearing 175° (T), distant 3½
     miles. Commenced approach, but lost target due
     to poor visibility and no sound bearings.
1330 Sound reported bearings crossing stern rapidly.
     Unable to see anything.
1400 Stopped raining. Continued reconnaissance of
     Port Lloyd. The vessel sighted was determined
     to be a "Killer Boat", apparently on patrol out-
     side Port Lloyd. Observed Port Lloyd carefully
     and saw no evidence of air activity or possible
     air fields. The only vessel in the harbor was
     another killer boat or trawler. Land marks were
     distinctive and easily recognizable. The harbor
     was viewed from several bearings to insure full
     coverage. The roads, houses, etc., marked on the
     chart were readily discernible.

Feb. 27.
1945 Observed A.A. searchlight drill at Chichi Shima.
     Four lights, two on each side of Island, were off
     and on for about 15 minutes. No planes were seen
     or heard.

-2-
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 11 —
DECLASSIFIED
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.

2330 Sighted lighted trawler.

Feb. 28.
1225 Sighted inter-island steamer. Commenced approach
      and fired two torpedoes from 2000 yards. No hits.
1535 Sighted sailing junk on southerly course.
1650 Sighted inter-island steamer apparently return-
      ing to Port Lloyd. Commenced approach, but
      failed to close range.
2025 Sighted steamer of Lyons Maru class on starboard
      bow. Closed to 1500 yards and fired four torpe-
      does. Target maneuvered to avoid. One explosion
      heard, but no apparent damage to the vessel.
2330 Sighted red light on sampan.

March 1.
2230 Sighted trawler showing lights.

March 2.
1348 Sighted smoke ahead. Commenced approach, but
      was unable to close. Same steamer attacked the
      night of February 28.

March 3.
1400 Sighted sampan.

March 4.
      Conducted reconnaissance Port Lloyd. Nothing new
      observed.

March 5.
0140 Sighted darkened junk.
1125 Sighted junk.

March 6 to 8.
      Uneventful.

March 9.
1600 Set course for return to base.

March 10 to 23.
      Uneventful.

March 24.
      Made rendezvous with LITCHFIELD and proceeded to
      base.

2. WEATHER:
      Except for a gale in the vicinity of Midway where, ac-

-3-
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 12 —
DECLASSIFIED
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.

cording to Midway observers, the wind reached a veloci-
ty of 70 knots and the seas a height of 25 feet, the wea-
ther was, in general, that expected after a perusal of
pertinent Pilots. In the area, visibility was generally
poor, fog and high winds sometimes being accompanied by
lightning. High winds and rain were a frequent occurence.
The sea was generally rough, particularly near the islands.
The temperature was low enough so that no ill effects re-
sulted from the loss of air conditioning. There were
very occasional days of calm seas and clear skies.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION:

The currents around the Bonin Islands are strong and vari-
able and while influenced by the wind, seldom conform to
it. At Marcus a definite current was observed setting
185° with a drift of .85 knots.

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:

No lighted navigational aids were observed.

5. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY VESSELS:

Aside from trawlers, junks, and sampans, the following
vessels were encountered.

Contact #1
1815, February 26. Five miles west of Port Lloyd a
"Killer Boat" apparently armed and used as a
patrol vessel. Has a gun platform abaft fore-
castle head, on which may be mounted a small
gun. Seen at various times on various courses,
but in general, patrolled on 350° - 170° off
Port Lloyd at slow speed.

Contact #2
1225, February 28. Inter-island steamer of about 1500
tons on course 340°, speed 8 knots, 10 miles north-
west of Ototo Shima.
1650, February 28. Same steamer in about same position
on course 160°.

Contact #3.
2023, February 28. Steamer of about 7,000 tons on
course 160°, speed 10 knots (Lyons Maru type) 10
miles northwest of Ototo Shima.

-4-
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 13 —
DECLATIVE
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.

1348, March 2. Same steamer on course 130°, speed
10 knots 5 miles northeast of Haha Shima.

6. AIRCRAFT:
No aircraft other than our own PBY's were sighted.

7. PARTICULARS OF ATTACKS:

Attack #1
Torpedoes fired

— page 14 —
DECLASSIFIED
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL.

(c) Sound conditions.
    No real test. The QB is useless on the surface,
    even when lying to, under average sea conditions.
(d) Habitability.
    In general - excellent. Loss of air conditioning
    would have been serious in hot area.
(e) Water.
    No difficulties encountered in operation of stills
    which experience in operation and cleaning will not
    overcome.

-6- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 15 —
FB43/A16-3
Serial 005

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

From:
To :
Subject:

1.
first War Patrol in very good material condition, indicating
not only a satisfactory navy yard overhaul, but also proper
attention to upkeep on the part of her officers and crew.

2. On the night attack which occurred February
28, 1942, the moon unfortunately shone through the clouds just
prior to firing, thereby revealing the submarine's presence
to the enemy. Due to maneuvers of the target, two torpedoes
passed ahead and two crossed astern. The Commanding Officer
stated that their tracks were quite visible in the phosphores-
cent water. It is of interest to note that, although all
torpedoes were actually seen to miss the target, an explosion
was heard. This might indicate that one torpedo was detonated
by passing through the ship's wake. The rough condition of
the sea made it impracticable to use the deck gun.

3. The lack of radio frequency meters has greatly
handicapped the communications of both the CABALOT and the
CUTTLEFISH. It is understood that steps are now being taken
toward early procurement of this equipment.

4. The Commanding Officer is considered to have
conducted this patrol in a very creditable manner.

Copy to:
Comsubron 4

- 7 -

SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-THREE
U.S.S. PLUNGER, Flagship

c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California.
March 25, 1942

The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.
The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH War Patrol - Comments on.

G. C. CRAWFORD.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 16 —
FC5-4/A16-3
Serial 091

SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR

% Fleet Post Office,
Pearl Harbor, T.H.,
27 March 1942.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To : The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Comments on U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH War Patrol.

1. The CUTTLEFISH required twenty days to arrive on
station proceeding via Midway and Marcus, remained on station
nineteen days, and returned to Pearl Harbor in fifteen days by
direct route.

2. Ample reconnaissance appears to have been made
of this area, with very few targets encountered. The necessity
for stationing a submarine in this locality appears doubtful.
The brief report indicates the lack of activities encountered.

3. In the second attack, on February 28, it would
have been difficult for a ten knot ship of 7000 tons to avoid
four torpedoes fired from a range of 1300 yards on a 100 to 110
track. However no damage was noted though one explosion was
heard.

4. The health and morale of officers and men appeared
excellent on return to port. The material condition of the
vessel while on patrol, except for radio, was excellent.

5. An LM-8 type frequency meter has been authorized
by Buships for the CUTTLEFISH and CACHALOT (Ship Alt. SS25D3
dated May 17, 1941). A despatch is being sent requesting ship-
ping data on this equipment.

6. It is noted that a range of 1500 miles was ob-
tained on the underwater loop at periscope depth. The new
coupling unit which is now being installed in all submarines
is expected to increase this range.

R. H. ENGLISH

Copy to:
CSD 43
CUTTLEFISH

- 8 -

— page 17 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1ST COPY]

FF12-10/A16-3(5) SUBMARINES, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0715 W1
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 37 June 24, 1942.
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - SECOND WAR
PATROL.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

From: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
To : Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH (SS171) - Report of Second
War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject report.
(B) Copy of Comsubdiv 43 Conf ltr FB5-43/A16-3
Serial 017 of June 16, 1942.
(C) Copy of Comsubron 4 Conf ltr FC5-4/A16-3
Serial 0195 of June 17, 1942.

1. The CUTTLEFISH was in position for a good shot
at only one target during this patrol. This attack was a fail-
ure due to loss of depth control. The low surface speed of the
CUTTLEFISH makes it difficult for her to overhaul anything but
the slowest supply vessels.

2. In regard to the Japanese jamming the 4235 series,
this is to be expected. Communication officers must use a little
ingenuity to offset this. Pac 70 lists many frequencies guarded
by NPM and Cincpac, any of which can be used to communicate in
emergency.

3. No damage was inflicted on the enemy.

R. H. ENGLISH.

DISTRIBUTION:
(21CH-42)
List I, Case 2:
Pl(5); SSs
Special:
EN3(5); EN10(1); EN2S(5);
Comsubdiv (2); Subschool, NL(8);
Comsubron (2); Cominch (5);
Combat Intel (1).

[SIGNATURE: E. R. Swinburne]
E. R. SWINBURNE,
Flag Secretary.
[STAMP: 41451 FILMED]

— page 18 —
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - Report of second war patrol.
Period: From April 21, 1942 to June 15, 1942.

1. NARRATIVE:
   Since the patrol was broken into several distinct periods
   the narrative is divided correspondingly.

   A. Enroute Midway. April 21 (Victor William) to April 26
      In accordance with Comsubpac Opr. Order #37-42 departed
      Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, at 0900 (Victor William) on 21
      April. Fell in with WARD at entrance buoys and proceeded in
      her company until dark. At 1545 (Xray) made trim and test dive.
      Conditions satisfactory. Conducted depth charge indoctrination
      practice, the WARD dropping two charges at 480 yards. At 1808
      (Xray) stopped port engine to replace cracked cylinder liner
      jacket. This was the only major derangement during this period.
      Completed passage entirely on the surface in five days arriving
      Midway at 0730 (Yoke) on April 26 without event of note. Gen-
      eral and special drills and instruction held daily. Made land-
      fall on Midway during period of low visibility (estimated 500
      yards) by radar and fathometer northeast of the reef. The engines
      were smoking badly and lub oil consumption had risen alarmingly,
      seven heads were blowing by, bow buoyancy vents were inoperative,
      the radio transmitter had a very low output, and the impulse
      tank lines were leaking badly. In view of the foregoing it was
      decided to lay over for twenty four hours at Midway and try to
      get things into shape. Delivered 18 sacks of mail to the defense
      forces for which they were deeply grateful.

   B. At Midway April 26 to May 2 (Yoke)
      Fueled to capacity. Topped off fresh water and lub oil.
      Inspection of four pistons showed broken and stuck rings with
      signs of incipient seizure. In order to expedite work, save
      fresh water and oil, prevent damage to bearings from piston
      seizure and accomplish topside work decided to undertake repairs
      at Midway. Reported conditions to CTF 7 and asked for extension
      of time on station. Was ordered to remain at Midway until one
      day after completion of repairs and, later, until spares were
      received. The work was completed on the fourth day and we were
      ready for sea on the fifth but the spares did not arrive until
      the sixth day.
      The following major items of work were accomplished by the
      ship's force, assisted greatly by the freely offered services
      and facilities of the NAS, Midway:

- 1 -
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 32 —
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - Report of Second War Patrol.

JUNE 6 (Mike).
Running on surface enroute Midway.
0650 Received message to report position and complied.
Suggested patrol for cripples present position.
1800 In Lat 27-35 N Long 175-00 E began passing a con-
siderable amount of wooden gear - among it was a mess bench
and a boat crutch, the latter with Japanese characters painted
on it over the numeral 2. There were faint traces of oil slicks
but were apparently quite old.

JUNE 6 (Yoke).
0430 Received orders to patrol present position. This
message was missed on its first transmission and not received
until eleven hours after time of origin. We were of course
100 or more miles too far east to be of any use in the chase
for stragglers. It is believed that the reason for the failure
to receive the message earlier is due to fatigue of radio
personnel. The requirements on radion, sound, and radar, along
with constant maintainance work on sound and radar gear, have
kept the radiomen out and resulted in missing or badly
garbled messages.
0500 Sent position report to CTF7 and submerged for
periscope patrol, guarding NPM on our jury rigged radar
antenna.
0730 Sighted PBY going west (Aircraft Contact #8).
1200 Received CTF7's EUROPE but could not decode it.
Surfaced and asked for repeat which we received at 1235.
Plot shows forces to be 135 miles due west making 15 knots
so no attempt was made to intercept. Missing the message
yesterday has put us out of the fight completely.
1356 Made quick dive on radar indication at 12 miles.
Planes not seen and not identified. Must have been a large
formation to give us a 12 mile indication. (Aircraft Contact
#9) Lat 27-40 N Long 176-50 E.
1415 Made quick dive on radar indication at 6 miles.
Sighted 4 B-17 Bombers going west before leaving bridge (Air-
craft Contact #10). Flare failed.
1700 Received CTF7's SAVAGE-garbled.
1750 Received orders to patrol to westward and return
to Pearl if no contact were made before dark. Patrolled to
westward at 12 knots.
2000 Set course for Pearl in accordance with instructions.
2130 Reported course and speed to CTF7 requested repeat
on SAVAGE (garbled) and FARMER (missed).

- 15 -
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 34 —
DECLASSIFIED
[STRUCK THROUGH: CONFIDENTIAL]
Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - Report of Second War Patrol.

— page 36 —
The provided image is a document titled "U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - REPORT OF SECOND WAR PATROL." It contains two main sections: one detailing surface contacts and another for aircraft sightings.

Here's the transcription:

DECLASSIFIED

Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - REPORT OF SECOND WAR PATROL.

— page 48 —
SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY THREE
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
June 16, 1942.

FB5-43/A16-3
Serial ( 017 )
DECLASSIFIED

From: Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.
To : Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH, Second War Patrol, Report of.

1. The patrol covers a period of fifty-six days,
seven days of which were spent at Midway making necessary repairs
to main engines.

2. It is the present plan to completely overhaul both
main engines on the CUTTLEFISH and CACHALOT after each patrol.
There is a large number of work request items to be accomplished
during the present refit and it is estimated it will be five weeks
before this vessel will be ready to start her next patrol. During
refit all unsatisfactory items developed during patrol will be
properly investigated and remedied.

3. Health and endurance of personnel were excellent
and the personnel of the CUTTLEFISH are deserving of credit for
the clean, neat and well cared for appearance she presented upon
completion of this patrol.

4. Whereas the patrol was unsuccessful with respect to
damage to the enemy, such results are to be expected when a
submarine is continually diverted from one area to another as
was done in this case. The reconnaissance of Saipan, Mamagasso
and Lauag islands was well conducted and much information obtained
that may be of future value.

G. C. CRAWFORD.

Copy to:
Comsubron 4
CO. USS CUTTLEFISH

- 1 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 49 —
FC5-4/A16-3
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR
Serial 0195
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
June 17, 1942.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To : The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Comments on U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH War Patrol.

1. This patrol appears to have been conducted under
somewhat adverse circumstances. Although little damage was done
to enemy vessels, excellent reconnaissance of several islands was
performed.

2. The Squadron Commander does not concur with the
statement of the Commanding Officer that it is absolutely impera-
tive to renew all piston rings whether they appear to need it or
not. There are definite instructions issued by the Bureau of Ships
in Bulletin of Information No. 4 as to when piston rings will be
renewed and this will be followed when the engines are overhauled
by the Base. The practice of completely overhauling the main
engines of the CUTTLEFISH and CACHALOT at the end of each patrol
will be followed in the future. It is estimated the time required
for this engine overhaul will be about three weeks depending upon
the work load on the base.

3. It is recommended that repairs to the degaussing
equipment not be accomplished.

4. Consideration should be given to substituting port-
able torpedo handling gear for the tripod. It is felt that this
would remove the interference with the JK equipment. The B head
has been opened and will be checked by the Navy Yard. It is recom-
mended that a later model sound equipment, preferable of the dual
head type, be installed.

J. M. HAINES.

Copy to:
CSD 43
CUTTLEFISH

- 1 -
ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 50 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1ST CONY]

FF12-10/A16-3(5) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0116

Ee
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
September 25, 1942.

COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 73
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - THIRD WAR PATROL
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH (SS171) - Report of
Third War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of Comsubron 4 Conf. ltr. FC5-4/A16-3,
Serial 0301 of September 22, 1942.
(B) Copy of Comsubdiv 43 Conf. ltr. FB5-43/
A16-3, Serial 049 of September 22, 1942.
(C) Copy of Subject War Patrol.

1. The area assigned for this patrol was well
covered. This was the first patrol of the present commanding
officer and errors were made which must be credited to profit-
able experience for future guidance.

2. Permitting a destroyer to get within 150 yards
on August 14 without sighting it indicates a poor lookout which
placed the submarine in a dangerous position with no plans for
either attack or evasion. Fortunately the destroyer was not
alert.

3. It is noted on August 18 that No. 6 torpedo tube
had been flooded all day. Efforts have been made to impress
upon commanding officers that tubes should not be flooded until
starting an attack, and if the attack is not completed, the tor-
pedoes should be withdrawn and rechecked. A well drilled crew can
flood and prepare the tubes for firing by the time the submarine
is steadied on a firing course and the proper fire control set-up
has been made. Premature flooding is bound to result in failure
as proved in this case. If this flooding resulted from a casualty
to the outer door, the torpedo should have been withdrawn and the
tube secured. A good torpedo would probably have prevented the
subsequent depth charging of the submarine.

4. On August 21, the commanding officer fired one
torpedo with gyro angle setting against the damaged freighter
which was thought at the time to be unescorted. Closing the
freighter for a straight shot would have been preferable. Sink-
ing of the destroyer escort is too circumstantial and too de-
pendent on sound alone to be conclusive.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
[HANDWRITTEN: 431984 OP-92C DATE 5/25/72] - 1 - [STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

— page 51 —
FF12-10/A16-3(5) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01116

CONFIDENTIAL
COM SUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 73
U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - THIRD WAR PATROL

Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH (SS171) - Report of
Third War Patrol.

5. On September 4, the CUTTLEFISH had a choice set-
up ahead of his target, but maneuvered to obtain maximum benefit
of sound, thereby delaying the attack. The commanding officer
considered it advisable to fire on sound, because of a sampan
nearby. Had the attack been prosecuted expeditiously and with
determination, these difficulties would not have occurred. Every
effort has been made to discourage firing torpedoes on sound
bearings, particularly against merchant ships. This is a relic
of peace time training which lingers in the minds of some com-
manding officers on first patrols.

6. The sinking of the tanker on September 5 is
considered positive as she was already badly damaged when the
lethal torpedo was fired at 0215, and nothing was in sight five
minutes later at 0220.

7. On the whole, this patrol was well conducted
and the officers and crew are congratulated on the success ob-
tained.

8. The CUTTLEFISH is credited with the following
damage inflicted on the enemy:

SUNK
1 Freighter - 10,000 tons
1 Tanker - 19,600 tons
Total.... 29,600 tons

DAMAGED
1 Destroyer - 1,500 tons

DISTRIBUTION: (21CM-42)
List I, Class 2:
[HANDWRITTEN: ✓] P1(5), SS
Special: Comsublant(2),
EN3(5), ComsubssoWespac(2),
Cominch(5).
[SIGNATURE: E. R. Swinburne]
E. R. SWINBURNE, - 2 -
Flag Secretary.
Ee
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
September 25, 1942.

R. H. ENGLISH.

— page 62 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - Report of Third War Patrol.

Aug. 22
    Conducted submerged patrol east of TANEGA SHIMA, covering
    what I considered a possible shipping route from
    MIYAZAKI to SW PACIFIC via VAN DIEMEN STRAIT.

0546
    Sighted freighter emerging from surface haze, bearing
    020° T. range about 5000 yds headed for VAN DIEMEN STRAIT.
    Disappeared into haze shortly after sighting.

0630
    Surfaced and ran parallel to freighter, hoping expected
    change of course to 235° T for VAN DIEMEN STRAIT would
    close range and give me favorable position. Making 10.5
    knots to her 15 knots.

0743
    Plane on radar, 5 miles. Dived and resumed patrol. Plane
    contacts by radar 10 times during day.

1729
    Sighted masts of ship bearing 190° T on W course.
    Attempted to close, but lost in haze.

Aug. 23
    Patrolling submerged 17 miles W of TANEGA SHIMA by DR
    radar ranges to peaks, and soundings.

0745
    Surrounded by fleet of sailing sampans. 63 in sight at
    1100. Did not attack as to do so would disclose position
    on only route which had shown promise to date. Nine
    plane contacts during afternoon. Star fix after
    surfacing showed set of 90 miles 008° T in past 48 hours.
    Was actually off MIYAZAKI when position thought to be
    off VAN DIEMEN STRAIT.

Aug. 24
    Submerged patrol off eastern entrance to VAN DIEMEN
    STRAIT.

0728
    Sighted Navy Flying Boat patrol plane, 250° T, 12 miles.
    Picked up by radar at 10 miles.
    Radar indicated planes at 1356 and 1502.

1900
    Surfaced. Maintained position until 2200, then started
    into STRAIT.

Aug. 25
0225
    Sighted TANEGA SHIMA, 245° T. 20 miles.

0413
    Dived, heading into STRAIT against strong easterly
    current.

1000
    7 miles inside STRAIT, when current slackened, then
    reversed. This is sign of change of weather. Seas
    picking up, and as we have some indications of approaching
    typhoon reversed course and headed out of STRAIT.

- 11 - ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 67 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - REPORT OF THIRD WAR PATROL.

0816         Sighted small coastal steamer, 1500-2000 tons, close
             in to shore, headed east, distance to track 6000 yds.
             Made approach at moderate speed on chance she might
             veer off coast as freighter seen earlier had done.
             Minimum range 4000 yds. Did not fire, as target not
             worth a spread, and single torpedo if a miss would
             disclose a good position we had attained with consid-
             erable difficulty.
             Patrolled 3½ miles off KANNON ZAKI remainder of day.

1914         Surfaced 5 miles off coast.

2325         In center of Strait, sighted large greenish white light
             dead ahead and well above horizon.

2330         Sighted red and green side lights below above light.
             Dived, as moon directly astern.

2332         Saw bow wave. Went to 100 ft. Ship passed close
             aboard to starboard.

2338         Periscope depth. Ship headed east out of Strait.
             Appeared to be small yacht.

Sept. 3      Conducted submerged patrol 3 to 5 miles off north coast
             of VAN DIEMEN STRAIT.

Sept. 4      Dived 4 miles off coast near ARIAKE WAN and closed to
             3 miles.

0421         Sighted sampan and small lumber sloop heading west
             between us and shore.

0730         Sighted smoke off TOI MISAKI.

0745         Sighted masts of ship, angle on bow zero.

0800         Sighted bridge structure. Appeared to be fairly large
Attack #4    ship, resembling naval auxiliary vessel. High wide
             bridge, two masts, high stack. Angle on bow zero.

                                  - 16 -                     ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 69 —
This looks like a page from a WWII submarine patrol report. I will transcribe all the text, distinguishing between the typed log entries and the header information.

CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - REPORT OF THIRD WAR PATROL.

— page 75 —
CONF - 24 -

Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - REPORT OF THIRD WAR PATROL.

V. DESCRIPTION OF SHIPS SIGHTED.

— page 82 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - Report of Third War Patrol.

10. (Continued).
    f. Packing gland, 2B flood valve operating shaft, in radio
       room leaking.
    g. Six cable brackets spot welded to overhead in engine room
       broken off.
    h. Cover in air conditioning unit in maneuvering room knocked
       off.
    i. Handwheel, secured by set screw on 200 lb. reducer stop
       valve knocked off.
    j. Leaks started in refrigeration system around soldered
       joints.
    k. After surfacing, found navigating desk in pilot house had
       bent bracket and desk split.
    l. After surfacing, found one section of oil hose in super-
       structure loose and bracket carried away.
    m. Glass cover on bridge repeater broken.
    n. Hydraulic expansion tank in conning tower split where
       secured to hull.
    o. Four light bulbs in engine room broken.

X RADIO RECEPTION

    Reception of NPM Fox schedule was good throughout the
patrol. Last serial sent Texas #4; Last serial received Tackle,
#3.

    At 0935 Sed Sept. 7 attempted to send contact report to
CTF 7. Interference on 4235 was heavy, but JOHNSTON received all
but six groups of message on 4265 before interference prevented
transmission of remainder. Assumed JOHNSTON would relay portion
received, and since this embodied main content of message and
position was close to enemy, transmission was discontinued.

    No acknowledgment received, so were forced to transmit a
DUPE at 0845 Zed Sept. 9, thus disclosing position, course and
speed. Interference on 8470 excessive; 4235 clear but repeated
attempts with full power failed to raise NPM. NPS answered on
first call-up on 4265, but JOHNSTON broke in and asked for remain-
ing six groups. Message cleared through JOHNSTON, but no acknow-
ledgment received from NPM.

    Submerged reception on loop antennae was negative. A
simple coupler unit with no amplification used on first patrol
gave good results, but present doughnut loop coupler with ampli-
fier has given unreliable reception up to 200 miles, and no re-
ception beyond that distance.

- 31 - " ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 86 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - Report of Third War Patrol

XVII REMARKS (Continued)

     This vessel is fortunate in having an experienced radar
operator who is fully qualified in maintenance with result that
tube life ran over 200 hours and operation was fully reliable.

     The height of radar mast now used is a distinct handicap
to the submarine on day surface patrol in plane patrolled waters,
as it gives enemy surface vessels at least a two mile advantage in
sighting if their lookouts are equally alert. The need for
switching arrangements which will permit carrying the mast in a
much lower position, even at reduced efficiency, has been com-
mented on previously and rejected because of difficulty of con-
nection of Co-axial leads in lower position, but I believe the
need is sufficient to warrant a study of the difficulties to
discover means of overcoming them.

2. SILENT RUNNING:

     It is not believed that silent running as required at
present could successfully be maintained during a prolonged
depth charge attack.

     Securing of ventilation blowers and air conditioning
plant makes the heat and humidity so enervating that any physical
exertion is exhausting. The exertion required to maintain depth
control, and particularly to change depth, with planes in hand
power and using slow speed, when combined with excessive heat and
humidity exhausts a planesman in fifteen minutes. Our best bow
planesman suffered a strained groin on the planes during depth
charge attack and had to be permanently relieved for duration of
attack.

     CUTTLEFISH planes are electrically controlled and can-
not be left on power for silent running, as contactors and
magnetic brakes can be heard for miles.

     It is recommended that present bow and stern plane
control be replaced with hydraulic control similar to that in-
stalled on newer submarines, and that gear ratio of present hand
control be reduced. Less turns of the wheel to produce a turn
of the shaft, although theoretically the same energy input, would
be easier on the planesmen. It is the excessive number of turns
of the wheel required, rather than the force to turn, that is
tiring; and more positive control of planes would require less
movement of planes to control depth.

- 35 - ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 90 —
FC5-4/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR

September 22, 1942.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
ComSubDiv FORTY-THREE Conf. ltr.
FC5-43/A16-3 Serial 049,
dated Sept. 22, 1942.

Serial 0301

CONFIDENTIAL

From : The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To : The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - Third War Patrol - Comment On.

1. The Squadron Commander concurs in the comments
expressed by The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE. The
patrol was conducted aggressively and the experience gained by
the Commanding Officer on his first war patrol should prove to
be invaluable on future patrols. It is further noted that the
CUTTLEFISH inflicted her first damage to the enemy on this, her
third war patrol.

2. The material condition of the CUTTLEFISH is
only fair. This condition is to be expected of submarines of
her age when returning from an extended war patrol.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 91 —
FB5-43/A16-3
Serial ( 049 )
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY THREE

Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
September 22, 1942.

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.
To : The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.

Subject: U.S.S. CUTTLEFISH - Third War Patrol, Comment On.

1.
The successful attack on the Konan Maru type
tanker was particularly well executed. The Commanding Officer
is to be commended for his correct estimate of the situation
which permitted the CUTTLEFISH to lie to near the target track
in such a position that destruction of the enemy tanker was
inevitable.

2.
It is considered that expenditure of torpedoes
was excessively high. As mentioned by the Commanding Officer
in his report, a 3600 yard shot at a 3000-4000 ton freighter is
not warranted nor was the expenditure of three torpedoes fired
on sound during attack No. 4 justifiable. Being unable to close
the outer door to #6 torpedo tube, it is considered that tube
should have been unloaded and secured for the remainder of the
patrol.

3.
This is the fourth report where failure to realize
hits had been made caused the Commanding Officer to fire
additional torpedoes. From talking to various Commanding
Officers it is evident that when magnetic exploders are used
it is often times impossible to know on the bridge when a target
has been hit, although the explosions are plainly felt inside
the submarine. Steps will be taken to have this information
relayed directly to the bridge.

4.
When such a procedure is practical, conducting
a continuous periscope and radar watch as was done on this
patrol is good insurance against the possibility of a target
getting by unseen.

5.
This was the first patrol for the Commanding
and Executive Officers and although his ship is handicapped
by slow surface speed and short cruising radius submerged,
excellent results were obtained and the Commanding Officer
succeeded in obtaining excellent results. He is to be commended
on his success and the excellent appearance of his ship.
The morale of the officers and men was excellent but it should
be noted again as in the POMPANO that nervous tension created
during a depth charge has a more marked effect on the men who
are on a third patrol than on those who are making their first
or second.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 92 —
END OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: E 108]
[HANDWRITTEN: AR 116-78]

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4.5
5.0
5.6
6.3
7.1

2.8
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3.6
4.0

2.5
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2.0
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THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[SEAL: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

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