U.S.S. ROBALO (SS-273) — war patrol report SS-273_ROBALO.pdf

— page 1 —
START OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: H-108]
[HANDWRITTEN: AR-145-77]

|||1.0 |||2.8 |||2.5
           |||3.2 |||2.2
|||1.1    |||3.6 |||2.0
           |||4.0 |||1.8

OPERATOR [HANDWRITTEN: DEBOSE]

|||1.25 |||1.4 |||1.6
DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 3-4-77]

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[SEAL: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET, START & END
NAVEXOS 3968

— page 2 —
Ships Data Section
Public Information Division
Office of Public Relations
Navy Department

A BRIEF HISTORY OF USS ROBALO (SS 273)

When the submarine USS ROBALO left Fremantle, Australia in her
on her third and last war patrol. on 22 June 1944, she was leaving
It was her last patrol not by choice but by the fortunes of war. It was
like the beginning of every other patrol. Every man and officer in the
crew knew that it might be the last, but they did not think about it.
Their thoughts were concerned with the things that were happening at
the moment; turning valves, watching dials, navigating the ship. Any
thoughts of not coming back were kept deep down within each man and
became only part of the tension a submariner knows during war patrols.

Little publicized, the submariners go about their dangerous
missions with sealed lips and at great personal risk, inflicting tremendous
devastation to the enemy. They are men of the "Silent Service." Silently
and unsung they prey upon enemy waters and when they are lost they go
down silently and unseen by the world. In this way ROBALO met her end.

Authorized by Act of Congress on 19 July 1940, the submarine
ROBALO was built by the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company at Manitowoc,
Wisconsin. The ship's keel was laid on 24 October 1942 and she was
launched on 9 May 1943. Mrs. E. S. Root, wife of Captain E. S. Root,
USN, (Retired) served as sponsor of the ship. Commissioned on 28
September 1943, Commander M. M. Kimmel, served as the first commanding
officer of the submarine.

In her first war patrol, USS ROBALO hunted for Japanese ships in
an area west of the Philippine Islands, where she damaged a large freighter.
Her second patrol was in the South China Sea near Indo-China; here she
sank a 7,500-ton tanker which was badly needed to lubricate and drive
the far-flung Japanese war machine.

USS ROBALO, skippered by Commander M. M. Kimmel, departed Fremantle
on 22 June 1944 on her third war patrol. She set a course for the south
China Sea to conduct her patrol in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands.
After traversing Makassar and Balabac Straits, she was scheduled to
arrive on station about 6 July and remain until dark on 2 August 1944.

On 2 July, a contact report stated that USS ROBALO had sighted a
FUSO class Japanese battleship with air cover and two destroyers for
escort. The ship was then in Latitude 3°-29' North, Longitude 119°-26'
East, just east of Borneo. No other messages were ever received from the
submarine and when she did not return from patrol, she was presumed to be
lost.

1.

— page 3 —
The following information was received via the Philippine
guerrillas and a U. S. Navy enlisted man who was a prisoner of war at
Puerto Princesa Prison Camp on Palawan Island in the Philippines. On
2 August, a note dropped from the window of the prison cell in which
survivors from USS ROBALO were held. It was picked up by an American
soldier who was on a work detail nearby. The note was in turn given
to H. D. Hough, Yeoman, second class, USN, who was also a prisoner at
the camp.

Hough contacted Mrs. Trinidad Londoza on 4 August. She was the
wife of the guerilla leader, Doctor R. R. Londoza, who furnished further
information on the survivors. From these sources, he put together the
following facts.

USS ROBALO was sunk on 26 July 1944, two miles off the western
coast of Palawan Island from an explosion in the vicinity of her after
battery. It is expected that the explosion was caused by the submarine
striking an enemy mine. Only four men swam ashore; an officer and three
enlisted men. They were Ensign Samuel L. Tucker, Floyd G. Laughlin,
quartermaster first class, Wallace K. Martin, signalman third class and
Irwin C. Poston, electrician's mate second class.

They made their way through the jungles to a small barrio north-
west of the Puerto Princesa Camp. Japanese Military Police captured
them there and confined them in the jail. They were held for guerilla
activities rather than as prisoners of war, it is believed. On 15
August, they were evacuated by a Jap destroyer and no other information
is known regarding their destination or whereabouts.

It is possible that they may have been executed by the Japanese
or that the destroyer in which they were embarked was sunk. In any case,
the note stated that there were no other survivors. A grateful nation can
only say "God rest their brave souls."

STATISTICS
ST.D.RD DISPLACEMENT 1,525 tons | ARMAMENT 1-3" Dual Purpose Gun
                                | 2-20MM AA batteries
OVERALL LENGTH 307 feet        | 10-21" Torpedo Tubes
BEAM 27 feet

2.
Stencilled 4 May 1948.

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[HANDWRITTEN: 1st Copy]

U. S. S. ROBALO (SS273)

Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
6 March 1944

SS273/A16-3
Serial 04
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
C O N F I D E N T I A L

From: The Commanding Officer, U. S. S. ROBALO.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Official Channels.

Subject: U. S. S. ROBALO, Report of War Patrol Number One.
Enclosure: (A) Subject report.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the first War Patrol of
this vessel conducted in Philippine Island Area during the
period 8 January 1944 to 6 March 1944, is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: S. H. AMBRUSTER]
S. H. AMBRUSTER.

DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP09B9C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/72]

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

[HANDWRITTEN: FILMED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 68688]

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CONFIDENTIAL

(A) PROLOGUE.

     Commissioned 28 September 1943 at Manitowoc, Wisconsin.
After installing chrome-plated liners in main engines and
holding builder's trials, departed 24 October 1943. Arrived
Balboa, C. Z., 11 November 1943. After firing contract
torpedoes and holding preliminary training, departed on
3 December 1943. Conditions in this area were ideal for
training. Arrived Pearl Harbor, T. H., 17 December 1943.
Had four days of voyage repairs, in which time installed
friction belt-type drive for revolution counters and resist-
ances that could be out in bow and stern plane motors' shunt
field to allow power operation during 'silent' running.
Had final training period. Bad weather conditions reduced
the actual firing of torpedoes to a minimum. Held sound
tests, results satisfactory.

(B) NARRATIVE.

     8 January
1330(V) Departed Pearl escorted until darkness by PC-581.
          ROBALO under temporary command of the Executive
          Officer, Lieutenant Commander C. W. Fell, USNR.
          The Commanding Officer at this time was on sick
          list.

     9-11 January
          Made daily training dives and held drills.
0730(X) 10 January, exchanged recognition signals with a
          "CORONADO" plane.

     12 January
0915(Y) Arrived Midway and refueled.

     13 January
1640(Y) Commander S. H. Ambruster, USN, returned on board
          and resumed command.

     14 January
0940(Y) Departed Midway with plane escort for patrol area.
          Crossed International date line.

     15-26 January
          Made daily training dives and held drills. Except
          for the last two days encountered heavy head seas.
          23 January, passed to the command of Commander
          Task Force Seventy-One.

     27 January (all remaining time 'H')
0405 Made land fall on RAPU RAPU ISLAND.
0531 Submerged and patrolled off RAPU RAPU ISLAND to
          intercept northbound traffic from SAN BERNARDINO

-1-

— page 6 —
CONFIDENTIAL

27 January (continued)
0531 Submerged and traffic from LEGASPI. Several small sails
     in sight during most of day.
1840 Surfaced and patrolled north of SAN BERNARDINO LIGHT.

28 January
0535 Submerged in same area.
1837 Surfaced.

29 January
0541 Submerged in same area. Heavy seas and tricky currents
     made depth control difficult the last two days.
1623 Surfaced and proceeded to northern tip of BATAG ISLAND
     and conducted surface patrol.

30 January
0530 Submerged and patrolled two miles off BATAG ISLAND.
1823 Surfaced and patrolled same area.

31 January
0528 Submerged. Same as yesterday.
1830 Surfaced and proceeded down coast of SAMAR to SURIGAO
     STRAIT.

1 February
0526 Submerged and patrolled eastern approach to SURIGAO
     STRAIT.
1825 Surfaced.
1945 Commenced transit of SURIGAO STRAIT.
2122 Radar contact 9,600 yards, 270° relative (contact #1).
     Good visibility, but could not make visual contact.
     Plotted course 290° slightly converging to ours, speed
     14 knots. Increased speed to draw ahead.
2210 Lost radar contact 11,800 yards. Slowed, but could not
     regain contact. Proceeded through SURIGAO STRAIT.

2 February
0255 Completed passage through SURIGAO STRAIT and started
     patrol off BINIT POINT.
0525 Submerged and patrolled three miles off BINIT POINT.
1823 Surfaced.
1943 Closed LIMASAMA ISLAND and took advantage of calm
     water to retune radar. Had much better performance
     afterward. Also started removing lead ballast from
     topside, as getting dangerously low in variable water.

3 February
0200 Completed removing 14,000 pounds of lead ballast and
     proceeded westward.
0515 Submerged off J.GNA, BOHOL. Closed within two miles
     of harbor and found no activity. Wharf empty and
     trees obscured most of town. Only building of any size

Enclosure (A)
                               -2-

— page 7 —
CONFIDENTIAL
3 February (continued)
0515 was a white store house. Twenty or more small sails in
     sight along coast.
0730 Proceeded westward.
1826 Surfaced.
2132 Sound picked up pinging (contact #2).
2135 Radar and OOD picked up two targets off southeast end of
     SIQUIJOR ISLAND, range 16,000 yards. Tracked them on
     course 025° T, speed 10. Visually they appeared to be
     destroyers and sound reported two ships pinging. Our
     chance of intercepting them was if they turned to east-
     ward after nearing BOHOL ISLAND, so changed course to
     get ahead of them on that presumption.
2222 Destroyers changed to left and headed in general direc-
     tion of CEBU. Lost contact at 20,000 yards. Night
     visibility much too good.

4 February
0522 Submerged and patrolled between APO ISLAND and SIQUIJOR
     ISLAND.
1840 Surfaced and patrolled between APO ISLAND and SLATON
     POINT.
2115 Sighted small patrol craft on easterly course (contact
     #3). Apparently sighted us as he changed course
     toward us, held it for a while and then headed up
     toward the coast of NEGROS.

5 February
0530 Submerged and patrolled south of APO ISLAND.
1845 Surfaced and patrolled as night before.

6 February
0525 Submerged same area.
1840 Surfaced and proceeded westward.
1936 Sent ROBALO serial to CTF-71 and headed north.
2145 Sighted small patrol craft (contact #4) bearing 035°
     relative, distance 8,000 yards. Evaded on surface.

7 February
0003 Radar contact (contact #5) range 8,400 yards. Sighted
     small patrol craft and evaded on surface. Both patrol
     craft were heading for our position of radio trans-
     mission.
0540 Submerged and patrolled south of NASO POINT.
1840 Surfaced.

8 February
0532 Submerged and patrolled three miles west of NASO POINT.
1843 Surfaced.

9 February
0537 Submerged and patrolled off PUCIO POINT.
1834 Surfaced.
Enclosure (A)
-3-

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CONFIDENTIAL

10 February
0532 Submerged and patrolled TABLAS STRAIT.
1846 Surfaced.

11 February
0530 Submerged and patrolled southern approach to VERDE
ISLAND PASSAGE.
1850 Surfaced and patrolled between MARINDUQUE ISLAND and
DUMALI POINT.

12 February
0445 Sighted dark object which appeared large enough to be a
target. It had a land background and hard to distinguish.
Started to take position ahead of it off coast of
MINDORO.
0528 Submerged.
0557 Sighted target which was a large two-masted sailboat and
headed for MARINDUQUE ISLAND.
1845 Surfaced.

13 February
0525 Submerged east of VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.
1639 Sighted convoy of mine sweep escort and two large ships
in column, range 24,000 yards (contact #6). Commenced
approach. Best range obtained on first and larger ship
was 4,200 yards, so concentrated on second ship which
was about 2,000 yards astern of first and closer.
1729 Fired four torpedoes. One hit. Ship headed toward us
and stopped. Maneuvered to obtain better position for
finishing off target.
1743 Escort by this time had returned and was heading for us.
1745 Seven depth charges while going deep, none very close.
1755 Six depth charges, little closer.
1905 Lost contact with mine sweep.
1926 Periscope depth. Nothing visible through periscope.
Came up to 45 feet and made radar sweep and it was
reported all clear.
1934 Surfaced and found the mine sweep 2,000 yards on star-
board quarter. Why the radar did not pick it up is a
mystery, unless there was a wave interfering as it
swept by. Decided to try to evade on surface as battery
was low and did not want to try surfacing again after
the moon arose in two hours. Thought for a few moments
we were getting away undetected, but at 2,500-yard range,
the mine sweep opened fire with about a 3" gun. One
shell passed overhead, but the rest were off to starboard.
At 4,000 yards he turned on a searchlight for a minute
but kept it trained to starboard of us in the direction
of his firing. At 4,500 yards he stopped firing.
Fired between 25 and 30 rounds. Decided against firing
own gun as it was too dark for accurate fire and did
not desire to aid the mine sweep's wild shooting by
giving them a point of aim.

Enclosure (A)
-4-

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CONFIDENTIAL

                 13 February (continued)
2003 Lost sight contact with mine sweep, range 5,950 yards.
2025 Lost radar contact, range 12,450 yards.
2100 Radar and sight contact with motor torpedo boat or small
     patrol craft, range, 3,200 yards. Evaded on surface.
2155 Decided to patrol east of MARINDUQUE ISLAND, but had
     radar contact ahead, range 8,000 yards. Sighted another
     patrol craft and headed south. Decided this area would
     be hot for a while.
2317 Radar contact, dead ahead, 4,200 yards.
2318 Submerged. Sound contacted two sets of light screws
     which drew aft.
2344 Lost sound contact.

                 14 February
0035 Surfaced.
0528 Submerged.
1845 Surfaced.
2105 Sent ROBALO serial TWO.

                 15 February
0550 Submerged. Patrolling southern approach to CUYO WEST
     PASS between QUINAN OF THE SEA BANK and PEDRO BLANCO
     BANK.
1838 Surfaced and patrolled same area.

                 16 February
0540 Submerged same area as yesterday.
1652 Sighted mine sweep (contact #7) south of us, range
     14,000 yards. Plotted his courses to be short legs
     east and west.
1744 Mine sweep disappeared in easterly direction.
1824 Surfaced with SJ radar out of commission. Repaired in
     three hours.

                 17 February
0533 Submerged in same area as yesterday.
1850 Surfaced.

                 18 February
0055 Sighted patrol craft north of us, range 8,000 yards.
     Appeared to be the same one sighted the day before.
0526 Submerged.
0718 Sighted tops of large AK (contact #8), range 24,000
     yards. Later saw tripod top of escort.
0745 Closest range obtained was approximately 18,000 yards.
1854 Surfaced and proceeded south and patrolled southwest
     of CAGAYAN ISLAND.

                 19 February
0526 Submerged.
1853 Surfaced and proceeded north to south entrance of CUYO
     WEST PASS.

Enclosure (A)
                                -5-

— page 10 —
CONFIDENTIAL

20 February
0525 Submerged.
1855 Surfaced.

21 February
0528 Submerged.
1853 Surfaced and proceeded south and patrolled southwest of
CAGAYAN ISLAND.

22 February
0526 Submerged.
1850 Surfaced. Patrol terminated by operation order.
1926 Sent ROBALO serial THRE and headed for Freemantle, W.A.

23 February
2139 Passed PEARL BANK.

24 February
0015 Entered SIBUTU PASSAGE.
0130 Radar contact, range 8,000 yards, opposite course, speed
12.5 knots. At 4,000 yards sighted small outline and
knowing NARWHAL was in vicinity and should be transit-
ting passage about that time, did not close.

25-26 February
Passing through CELEBES SEA, slowing, exploiting
possible shipping lanes.

27-28 February
Passing through MAKASSAR STRAITS.

29 February
0545 Submerged 60 miles north of LOMBOK.
1430 Sound picked up pinging, bearing 270° T.
1433 Exposed 17 feet of periscope, but could not see any thing.
Pinging drawing aft and finally lost bearing 290° T.
1900 Surfaced.
2216 Radar contact, bearing 192° T, range 5,800 yards. Target
was three miles north of center of entrance of LOMBOK
STRAIT. Poor visibility and could not see target.

1 March
0041 Completed passage of LOMBOK STRAIT and enroute to
FREEMANTLE, W. A.

2-5 March
Enroute to FREEMANTLE, W. A.

Enclosure (A)
-6-

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CONFIDENTIAL

(C) WEATHER.

     During passage from MIDWAY to SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT,
P. I., heavy head seas, force five to seven, were encountered
from 14 to 24 January.

     In SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT approaches the weather was clear
and fair.

     In the MINDANAO SEA the weather remained clear and fair.
Few nights were cloudy and the water was always ruffled by
light breezes. Moonlight became too bright for comfort.
Ships were visible at 18,000 yards.

     In the SULU SEA, weather remained good. No calms were
encountered. A few rain squalls occurred.

     In MAKASSAR STRAIT, the weather became rainy, with an
overcast sky most of the time.

     Throughout the patrol, when the moon was going through
the full phase, visibility was frequently too good to have
permitted undetected night surface approaches to targets
within useful ranges.

(D) TIDAL CURRENTS.

     SAN BERNARDINO area -- Not predictable. Strength up to
three knots north of SAN BERNARDINO ISLAND.

     SURIGAO STRAIT -- Tide Tables gave data for ABUYOG and
HINUNANGAN. These proved fairly correct, allowing for about
four hours difference at the inside end of the strait.
Indications were that the ship came in on the crest of the
flood tide as predicted, strength about four knots, direction
south.

     MINDANAO SEA -- Weak and unpredictable currents.

     SULU SEA -- Passed into SULU SEA close to NEGROS during
flood current shown in Tide Tables for PORT BONBONON and
experienced strong set to westward. Little current off
NEGROS when proceeding northward. Fairly strong currents off
PANAY and TABLAS ISLAND. Inshore set near NASO POINT.
Currents in TABLAS STRAIT and eastern VERDE ISLAND pass
seemed to follow data shown on chart and in tables. At the
south end of the CUYO WEST PASS the set was generally to the
northeast about one knot. Between the CAGAYAN ISLANDS and
PEARL BANK at night 22 February, a strong westerly set was
experienced. This changed to easterly during the day.
Passing between PEARL BANK and LAPARAN ISLAND, the current
followed data on the chart and in Tide Tables (for PEARL BANK).

Enclosure (A)
-8-

— page 13 —
CONFIDENTIAL

Not much current was experienced from PEARL BANK to the head
of SIBUTU PASSAGE. Tide rips were not strong. This was
indicated by a prediction of slack water in the Tide Tables
for SIBUTU ISLAND at the time of passage.

A southwest set was experienced along the west coast of
CELEBES as far as CAPE WILLIAM. Then to north of KUIU
KALUKUANG, a southeast set was apparent. Very little current
was noted from there to LOMBOK.

During passage through LOMBOK STRAIT, it was observed
that the ebb current to the southward persisted for three to
four hours after time of low tide given in tables for
AMPENANG on LOMBOK ISLAND. This agreed with information
given in the Sailing Directions.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

No lighted aids were seen north of the Barrier to VIERDE
ISLAND PASSAGE. Lighthouse structures remain as shown in
light lists.

Radar bearings and ranges were generally quite satisfac-
tory for night piloting.

Prominent peaks, land features, tangents, and lighthouse
structures were used for day navigation and night piloting
when visible, throughout the area.

Enclosure (A)
-9-

— page 14 —
CONFIDENTIAL
(F) SHIP CONTACTS.
No. | Time | Lat. | Type | Initial | Est. | Speed | How Con- | Remarks
    | Date | Long. |      | Range | Course |       | tacted |
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1 | 2122 | 10-34 N | PC? | 9,600 | 290 | 12 | Radar | Never sighted target.
  | 2-1-44 | 125-45 E |     |       |     |    |       |
2 | 2135 | 9-05 N | 2 DD's | 16,000 | 025 | 10 | Sound | Both DD's pinging.
  | 2-3-44 | 123-45 E |     |        |     |    |       |
3 | 2115 | 8-57 N | PC | 9,000 | 080 | 12 | Sight | Appeared to be 100 to
  | 2-4-44 | 122-54 E |    |       |     |    |       | 150 foot single mast.
4 | 2145 | 9-11 N | PC | 6,000 | 190 | 10 | Sight | Appeared to be 100 to
  | 2-6-44 | 122-30 E |    |       |     |    |       | 150 foot single mast.
5 | 0003 | 9-14 N | PC | 8,400 | 150 | 10 | Radar | Appeared to be 100 to
  | 2-7-44 | 122-07 E |    |       |     |    |       | 150 foot single mast.
6 | 1639 | 13-21 N | CM | 24,000 | ZZ | | Sight | Similar to KYUSYU MARU
  | 2-13-44 | 121-25 E | AP |       | 340-290 | 12 | Sight | Similar to JOHORE MARU
  |         |          |    |       |    |    |       |
7 | 1652 | 10-18 N | CM | 14,000 | 7 | | Sight |
  | 2-16-44 | 128-38 E |    |       | 90-270 | 7 | Sight |
  |         |          |    |       |    |    |       |
8 | 0718 | 10-16 N | AK | [UNCLEAR: ?] | 015 | 14 | Sight | (Saw only two stick masts
  | 2-18-44 | 120-22 E | AO | 24,000 | | | Sight | with stack between end
  |         |          |    |       |    |    | Sight | near after mast.
  |         |          |    |       |    |    | Sight | No tripod mast similar
  |         |          |    |       |    |    | Sight | DD.

Enclosure (A)
-10-

— page 15 —
CONFIDENTIAL

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS.

     No enemy aircraft encountered.

(H) ATTACK DATA.

     U. S. S. ROBALO Torpedo Attack No. 1, Patrol No. 1,
Time 1729, date 3 February 1944, Latitude 13-30 N., Longi-
tude 121-13 E.

                       TARGET DATA

Description: Convoy consisted of one mine sweep, one AP
             similar to KYUSYU MARU and one AK similar to
             JOHORE MARU in loose column. The escort
             appeared to be on a steady course 310° T, and
             the two ships were zig-zagging on short legs
             within 25° each side of base course. Their
             movements were not coordinated and the first
             ship was close to escort while the second
             lagged at least 2000 yards astern. Sighted
             convoy at 24,000 yards with good visibility
             condition. Started approach on first ship,
             KYUSYU MARU class, but unable to close
             sufficiently to obtain high-speed torpedo run,
             so shifted to the JOHORE MARU class ship.

Ships Sunk:  None.

Ships Damaged: Fired four torpedoes at JOHORE MARU type ship,
             6,182 tons. One hit.

Damage Deter- Saw and heard one torpedo hit aft, which co-
mined by:    incided with run of first torpedo - 1'-58".
             Target swung toward us and stopped and could
             not determine extent of damage. Do not
             believe target sunk.

Target Draft 12 feet, Course 320°, Speed 12 knots, Range
3,100.

Enclosure (A)                                 -11-

— page 16 —
CONFIDENTIAL

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 3.7, Course 235° T, Depth 67 Feet, Angle 1 - 0,
2 - 1 D, 3 - 1½ D, 4 - 1/2 D.

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack | Periscope
| | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
Tube Fired | 93 S | 95 S | 97 S | 99 S |
Track Angle | 6.5 R | 8 R | 9.75 R | 11.5 R |
Gyro Angle | 8° | 8° | 8° | 8° |
Depth Set | 8' | 8' | 8' | 8' |
Power | H. | H. | H. | H. |
Hit or Miss | No | No | No | No |
Erratic | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
Mark Torpedo | | | | |
Serial No. | 39897 | 39885 | 39666 | 40395 |
Mark Exploder | VI-4 | VI-4 | VI-4 | VI-4 |
Serial Number | 17437 | 12128 | 7890 | 7756 |
Actuation Set | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. |
Mark Warhead | XVI-1 | XVI-1 | XVI-1 | XVI-1 |
Serial Number | 10534 | 11152 | 3204 | 11529 |
Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
Firing Interval | 9 sec. | 9 sec. | 9 sec. | 9 sec. |
Type Spread | DIVERGENT SPREAD |
Sea Conditions | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm |
Overhaul Activity | HOLLAND | HOLLAND | PEARL | PEARL |

(I) MINES.

No mines nor mining operations encountered.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS.

The mine sweep that dropped depth charges was either not
equipped with echo ranging or did not use it. After dropping
thirteen charges, expected more even though he appeared to
lose contact. Used the typical tactic of stopping and then
going ahead for short intervals until JF sound equipment lost
him. Quite surprised to see him lying to so close upon sur-
facing and not moving for a thirty minute period.

While running silent the JF proved by far the most
efficient of all the sound equipment. Slow power operation
of bow and stern planes was beneficial in keeping down the
confusion of constantly changing exhausted planesmen.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE.

1. Auxiliary Engine
Two failures of individual cylinders due to breakage

Enclosure (A)
-12

— page 17 —
CONFIDENTIAL
of exhaust valve stems. Necessitated replacement of piston
and head, complete.

2. No. 1 Main Engine.
Needle bearings in wrist pin bearing, No. 1 cylin-
der, broken and missing. Renewed piston assembly complete,
connecting rod and bearing.

3. Stern Planes.
The stern planes clutch failed to shift from
'power' to 'hand' at times. This is apparently a design
defect.

4. Air Pressure Blow Manifold.

The bow buoyancy tank and safety tank high-pressure
blow valves on 3,000-pound manifold leaked so badly that the
valves had to be ground in and secured for remainder of
patrol.

The two knocker valves on 600-pound blow manifold
leaked badly and had to be ground in. The seats on all
valves on 3,000-pound and 600-pound manifolds seem to be
machined off center.

(L) RADIO.

The entire radio outfit functioned without casualty or
incident. Reception and transmission were satisfactory.

(M) RADAR.

The SD-4 radar functioned without incident or casualty.

The SJ-1 radar is serial No. 1 of its type. Several
difficulties were encountered, but on the whole the set gave
satisfactory service.

The following is a brief resume of troubles encountered
in the SJ and remedies taken:

The training gear stiffened up several times when
run in power for the P.P.I. There are definite indi-
cations of misalignment in the antenna trunk worm gear
assembly. These gears were inspected for freezing,
none was found, and no attempt was made to disassemble
the unit further as this is definitely a shop and not
a shipboard job. To have taken down this part of the
gear would risk putting the entire radar unit out of
operation. Power training was used as seldom as
possible for the greater part of the patrol, to prevent
a recurrence of stiffening. There remained serious risk

Enclosure (A)
-13-

— page 18 —
CONFIDENTIAL

that the P.P.I. would have been useless in an attack on
a convoy, or worse, use of power training would have
caused freezing of the training gear at a crucial time.

The P.P.I. unit has another defect in the tube cir-
cuit which has not been definitely determined. The first
indication of trouble was an uncontrolled brilliancy in
the sweep. Investigation disclosed a cracked base on the
V-3 (6SN7GT) tube. After replacement the sweep appeared
normal in intensity but would not and will not remain in
focus. The reason for this is not now apparent.

In the transmitter, a leaky modulation network
exists. It is understood that this is often inherent
in the design of the set, and causes a slight reduction
in output and a tendency to drift off in receiver
frequency tuning. The A.F.C. remains constantly tuned.

Twice the low voltage switch (D-3) in the main con-
trol unit failed due to excessive heating of the contacts,
which broke the insulation strips. It is believed that
a better design of switch structure will eliminate this
trouble. The automatic time delay relay switch (S-1),
also in the main control unit, failed once. Cause was
not determined. The set was out of operation for about
three hours each time these switch casualties occurred.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

The operation of the sound gear throughout the patrol was
satisfactory. There were no material failures.

The opportunities for observing sound conditions were all
too few. From all indications, however, they were generally
very good. Twice echo ranging was picked up at ranges of from
ten to fifteen miles. This occurred just south of the island
of SIQUIJOR and in the southern end of MAKASSAR STRAIT.

During the attack in the eastern approaches of VERDE
ISLAND PASS, the supersonic gear did not pick up screws until
the range had closed to about 3,800 yards. Here the JP proved
to be more sensitive, making contact at about 5,000 yards.
These ranges were affected by the high background present
during this action.

Enclosure (A)
-14-

— page 19 —
CONFIDENTIAL
(O) DENSITY LAYERS.

Latitude Longit^e of Dive Layer Depth Depth of Temperature Differen-
                                                tial of Layer

1 8-57 N 123-07 E 285' 265' -5° F
2 10-30 N 121-50 E 270' 180' -6° F
3 13-06 N 121-37 E 280' 140' -6° F
4 13-30 N 121-30 E 290' 100' -7° F
5 12-55 N 121-52 E 315' 200' -3° F
6 10-12 N 120-45 E 280' 180' -6° F

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY.

    Health. In general, the health of both officers and
    crew was excellent. Below average number of cases of con-
    stipation and athletes foot, no cases of skin rash. Lost
    services of a man during practically entire patrol due to
    severe lacerations of right hand which required eight
    stitches.

    Food. Was able to maintain a varied and balanced diet
    throughout the entire patrol. During all day dives,
    eliminated noon meal, substituted sandwiches and fruit
    juices.

    Habitability. Excellent, at no time was it necessary
    to use means of purifying the air.

(Q) PERSONNEL.

    The original complement of the ship at commissioning
    contained 30 qualified men, 21 with previous war patrol ex-
    perience, out of 69. Only 4 remain unqualified in submarines.
    Present state of training of all hands is high.

    Performance of duty of officers and crew under combat
    conditions was all that could be desired.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED.

    Pearl to area           4,172 miles 46,845 gallons
    In area                 4,123 miles 39,115 gallons
    Area to Fremantle       1,542 miles 18,355 gallons

(S) DURATION.

    Days enroute to area    15
    Days in area            36
    Days enroute to base     6
    Days submerged          36

Enclosure (A) -15- [HANDWRITTEN: 4 0273]

— page 20 —
CONFIDENTIAL
(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING.

Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel Factor
|------||
20        | 3,700| 20         | 15

(U) REMARKS.

None.

Enclosure (A)
-16-

— page 21 —
UNITED STATES NAVY
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
705-16/A16-3
Serial 0144
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
C.O. ROBALO Report
of 1st War Patrol

From: The Commander Task Group SEVENTY ONE POINT THREE.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. ROBALO (SS273) - Report of First War
Patrol - comment on.

1. The first war patrol of the U.S.S. ROBALO
covered a period of fifty-eight days of which twenty-nine days
were spent in the area assigned.

2. Of the three contacts with worthwhile targets
one developed into an attack. Four torpedoes fired at 3,100
yards produced one hit on a 6,182 ton AK of the "JOHORE MARU"
type. Counteraction by the escort prevented determining the
extent of damage or further pursuit of the convoy.

3. The material condition of the ROBALO is very
good and the refit can be completed in the usual length of
time.

4. The Squadron Commander is pleased to welcome
the Commanding Officer, Officers, and crew of the ROBALO,
and to congratulate them on the damage inflicted upon the
enemy.

[SIGNATURE: H. H. McLean]
H. H. MCLEAN.

— page 22 —
2

FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 16/ems
Serial: 0256 23 March 1944.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS ROBALO Conf.Ltr. A16-3
Serial: 0144, dated 13 March,
1944. Report of 1st War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S.ROBALO (SS273) - Report of First War Patrol -
Comment on.

1. The remarks contained in the first endorsement are
concurred in.

2. It is probable that a large proportion of the south
bound traffic from Manila will be routed through Verde Island and
Rompog Passes and heavy patrols conducted by all types of anti-
submarine vessels may be expected.

3. The removal of 14,000 pounds of lead ballast while on
patrol is being investigated and will be the subject of a separate
report.

4. This patrol is not considered successful for purpose
of award of Submarine Combat Insignia.

5. The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET, congratulates
the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew of the ROBALO on inflict-
ing the following damage to the enemy:

DAMAGED
1 - AK (JOHORE MARU TYPE) - - - - - - - 6,182 Tons.

R. W. CHRISTIE.

DISTRIBUTION &
AUTHENTICATION
(See 2nd page).
- 1 -

4 0273

— page 23 —
FE24-71/A16-3
Serial: 0256
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S.ROBALO (SS273) - Report of First War Patrol -
Comment on:

— page 24 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

U. S. S. ROBALO (SS273)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
30 May 1944

SS273/A16-3
Serial 07

C [STRIKETHROUGH: DECLASSIFIED] I A L

From: The Commanding Officer, U. S. S. ROBALO.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: Official Channels.

Subject: U. S. S. ROBALO (SS273) - Report of War Patrol
Number Two.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the Second War Patrol
of this ship conducted in the South China Sea during the
period 10 April 1944 to 30 May 1944, is forwarded herewith.

M. M. KIMMEL.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP-HRGC] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/73]

[STAMP: 79930 FILMED]

— page 25 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
                                                                Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE

6 March

        Arrived in FREMANTLE, W. A., from First War Patrol.
Commenced refit and sent officers and crew on two weeks
leave.

8 March

        Interrupted refit; officers and crew returned; under-
way for six day emergency period at sea.

14 March

        Returned FREMANTLE, W. A. - continued refit and sent
officers and crew on leave. During the refit period the
following was accomplished:
        (1) Overhaul #1 and #2 main engines.
        (2) Drydocking.
        (3) Routine refit of ship with no major jobs.
                The forward battery electrolyte analysis showed
an excessive amount of nickel present which necessi-
tates charging the forward and after batteries
separately once the finishing rate has been reached.
This defect could not be remedied because of a lack
of the necessary battery acid but should be corrected
during the next refit period.

29 March

        Officers and crew returned from rest period.
Lieutenant Commander M. M. Kimmel, USN, relieved Commander
S. H. Ambruster, USN, as Commanding Officer.

30 March

        Loaded stores and made preparations for sea.

31 March - 2 April

        Proceeded to sea, conducted sound tests, deepened,
and conducted training exercises.

3 April

        Alongside effecting minor repairs.

-1-

— page 26 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBAIO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

4-7 April
Underway conducting training exercises and fired three
exercise torpedoes. Training period under the supervision
of Captain G. W. Patterson, USN, CSD 161.

8-9 April
Alongside. Loaded torpedoes and stores.

(B) NARRATIVE (All times HOW)

10 April
Departed FREMANTLE, W. A. for patrol area. Conducted
day and night joint exercise with U. S. S. BONEFISH and convoy
until 2400.

11 April
Enroute DARWIN, W. A. Conducted training dives and
drills.
0645 Exchanged recognition signals with U. S. S. CABRILLA
on opposite course. Ship Contact #1.
1430 Sighted unidentified plane distant 15 miles, Lat. 28-39 S,
Long. 113-01 E. Remained on surface. Not sighted.
Plane Contact #1.

12, 13, 14, 15 April
Enroute DARWIN. Conducted training dives and drills.

16 April
Enroute DARWIN. Conducted training dives and drills.
0100 #2 Main engine out of commission. #3 Unit had a
cracked liner.
0911 Radar contact on three planes, range 10 miles, Lat.
12-15 S, Long. 126-23.5 E. Contact closed to 6 miles
so dived to evade. Plane Contact #2.
0930 All clear on Radar. Surfaced.
1515 Liner replaced, #2 main engine back in commission.

17 April
0540 Rendezvous with escort vessel ML 809.

-2-

— page 27 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

17 April (Continued)

0835 Moored to jetty in DARWIN, W. A. Commenced taking on
fuel and water.
1345 Completed fueling - received 28,284 gallons Diesel
oil.
1438 Underway. Ran magnetic range and then cleared harbor.
Enroute for pass between eastern end of TIMOR ISLAND
and LETI ISLAND.
1830 Slowed to 2/3 speed for night in order to (1) Adjust
speed to transit pass tomorrow night and (2) save
fuel.

18 April

Enroute eastern end TIMOR ISLAND.
Secured SD Radar for remainder of patrol. Plan to
use SD only for specific occasions.
0807 Sighted unidentified plane, distant 8 miles, course
330 (T), bearing 050 (T) - Lat. 10-33 S, Long.
128-34 E. Submerged to evade. Plane Contact #3.
0830 All clear, surfaced.
0839 Sighted plane bearing 075 (T), distant 10 miles,
course 270 (T) (heading in our direction) - Lat.
10-33 S, Long. 128-34 E. Submerged to evade.
Plane Contact #4. This was probably the same plane
as in Contact #3.
0910 All clear, surfaced.
1650 Made land fall on TIMOR, closed to 40 miles distant,
and submerged to await darkness.
1745 Surfaced and commenced transit of passage between
TIMOR and LETI ISLAND. Went ahead at 3-engine speed
(16.5 knots). Plan to run on surface tomorrow in
BANDA SEA if we can be well clear of WETAR ISLAND in
the morning.
2359 Completed transit. Slowed to 2-engine speed.
Entered BANDA SEA.

19 April

0500 Position Lat. 6-27 S, Long. 126-12 E, about 60 miles
north of WETAR, and GUNUNG API in sight 20 miles to
eastward. Enroute MOLUCCA PASSAGE on surface.
1216 Sighted small sail boat bearing 000 (T), distant 7
miles. Manned 20mm and 30 cal. guns, had 4" gun
crew standing by below, headed for sail boat.

-3-

— page 28 —
1
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

19 April (Continued)

Closed to 1800 yards to investigate - he furled his
sails promptly and stood by. Boat was small, not over
30 or 35 feet long, quadrilateral mainsail, a jib, the
usual fishing apparatus, no markings or colors. There
were 4 occupants, all coal black natives. No sign of
radio gear or antennae. Decided against sending a
boarding party or having him alongside. He appeared
nothing more than a native sail boat so we left him,
much to his evident relief.
1543 Sighted HIBU ISLAND bearing 027 (T) distant 40 miles.
1726 Made trim dive.
1743 Surfaced. Commenced transit of PITT PASSAGE into
(north) MOLUKKA SEA.
2331 SJ Radar contact on small craft, range 3000 yards,
position Lat. 2-26 S, Long. 126-19 E. Sighted him at
2300 yards. He was apparently a native sail boat lying
to. Went around him.

20 April

Enroute SIBUTU PASSAGE via BANGKA PASSAGE, running on
surface in MOLUKKA SEA.

1124 Crossed equator in long. 126-00 E.
1410 Made land fall on TIFOR. CELEBES ISLANDS bearing 037 (T) distant
about 25 miles.
1600 Sighted northern end of CELEBES.
1708 Made trim dive.
1750 Surfaced, commenced transit of BANGKA PASSAGE.
2152 Completed transit, set course for SIBUTU PASSAGE.
Sighted several small boats during passage.

21 April

Enroute SIBUTU PASSAGE through CELEBES SEA on surface.

1841 Made trim dive.
1904 Surfaced.
2320 Made land fall on SIBUTU ISLAND.
2345 Commenced transit of SIBUTU PASSAGE on 3 main engines.
2348 Radar contact 228 (T), range 1500 yards. Lat. 4-43 N,
Long. 119-40 E. This was a small patrol boat which
we sighted from bridge. Swung right and quickly left
him astern. We were not sighted.

-4-

— page 29 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
                                                              Patrol.

                                          22 April

                                  TRANSITING SIBUTU PASSAGE.

0012 SJ Radar contact dead ahead, 350 (T), 3600 yards.
     Lat. 4-46 N, Long. 119-39 E. Swung hard left.
     Range closed to 2200 yards when we sighted a
     second patrol boat. Opened out to west and swung
     around him. Again we were not sighted.
0130 Clear of SIBUTU PASSAGE - enroute pass between
     PEARL BANK and LAPARAN ISLAND.
0445 Clear of pass between PEARL BANK and LAPARAN
     ISLAND. Enroute BALABAC STRAIT, through SULU SEA,
     running on surface.
0500 Slowed to 2 main engines.
1738 Made trim dive.
1746 Surfaced.
2145 Made land fall on BALABAC ISLAND.
2215 Commenced transit of BALABAC STRAIT on 3 main
     engines.
2400 Completed uneventful transit. Slowed to 2 main
     engines. Set course to pass south of DANGEROUS
     GROUND enroute to assigned area.

                                          23 April

     Enroute assigned area, running on surface, in SOUTH
     CHINA SEA, south of DANGEROUS GROUND.

0024 Radar contact 214 (T), 7000 yards. Position Lat.
     7-40 N, Long. 116-55 E. Commenced tracking, and
     closed in order to sight target. Target on course
     340 (T), speed 10 knots, presenting a large star-
     board angle on bow. Radar interference on his
     bearing. Our course 245 (T). Ship Contact #2.
0030 Target changed course directly for us and increased
     speed to 15 knots. We came around to 060 (T), put
     the stern to him, and eased along at 1/3 speed
     allowing him to close. At a range of 3200 yards
     sighted his bow wake and, shortly thereafter, could
     see what definitely resembled a submarine - angle
     on bow zero. Afraid this might be U.S. Submarine.
     Increased speed to full on 4 main engines, and at
     this time target reversed course, opening out from
     us, and slowed to 10 knots. Apparently he had
     sighted us and turned away. In all probability
     this was the U.S. Sub. for: (1) In view of CTF 71

                                          -5-

— page 30 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

23 April (Continued)

certain information rec'd we expected U.S. Sub. to be in
this vicinity. (2) he looked like a submarine, (3) he
looked like a submarine, (4) he turned away after
having sighted us and determined that we were a sub-
marine, (5) he was using radar and seemed to know
where we were all the time. If this was not the
U.S. Sub. but an enemy submarine, we still couldn't
risk attacking because of the uncertainty existing,
so decided to work around clear of him.
0050 Target on course 240 (T), speed 10, range 7000. Came
to course 270 (T). Commenced working clear of him to
north.
0100 Target changed course to 170 (T). We steadied on base
course 245 (T). Lost him at 9200 yards.

24 April

Enroute assigned area running on surface in SOUTH CHINA
SEA.

0930 Entered assigned area in position Lat. 9-00 N, Long.
110-24 E. Set course to make land fall on PULO CECIR
DE MER.
1336 Passed through large oil slick Lat. 9-47 N, Long.
109-57 E.
1729 Sighted sail boat through high periscope bearing 284
(T), distant 7 miles. Turned away to keep from being
sighted as we wanted to enter the area undetected.
1732 Sighted BETTY type plane, close aboard, on port beam,
bearing 330 (T), on opposite and parallel course - at
a distance of not over 2 miles. Plane Contact #5.
This one had certainly slipped in on us, probably
coming in from behind the sun. Sky was clear, SD
Radar secured as we were only 60 miles from coast.
Lat. 10-29 N, Long. 109-26 E. Dived immediately.
One faint explosion heard in conning tower as we were
going down; then at 55 feet a very loud and close
explosion on the port side forward - probably a bomb.
This one jarred the entire boat violently and caused
extensive damage. In diving, the engine induction
had flooded due to a personnel error in carrying out
the normal procedure of looking the valve closed upon
diving. This man tried to look the induction valve
closed before power had been applied to close it.
When power was applied the hand operation handles
were spun out of his control, causing the end grips

-6-

— page 31 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

24 April (Continued)

to fly out and jam on adjacent piping, thus leaving
the induction valve partly open. The Executive
Officer caught this error immediately when the
Christmas tree lights for the induction valve showed
neither green nor red, and went aft and closed the
valve by hand. The valve was closed before the
explosion. Diving control was lost temporarily
but we leveled off at 350 feet by bubbling bow
buoyancy and safety. Eased up to 200 feet and began
assessing damage and making repairs. Cleared area
at high speed to east.
Damage sustained is covered in detail under (K)
but the following is a brief summary:
(a) All the usual minor casualties such as broken
bulbs, glass, fans sheared off, corking, etc.
(b) SJ Radar - out of commission, training hand
wheel knocked off and fell to control room,
stiff training of mast.
(c) Conning Tower Hatch - sprung; so that we take
a slug of water at 45 feet when surfacing or
diving.
(d) #1 Main Vent Riser - flange leaking badly.
(e) Pit Log - Leak in sword arm.
(f) JP Sound Head - out of commission, and trains
stiffly.
(g) Hydraulic Steering - Bad leak in normal power
between speed gear and change valve in control
room. Can steer but slowly and lose oil
steadily.
(h) Antennae Trunk - flooded
2013 Surfaced, cleared area at high speed. Upon sur-
facing found following damage:
(a) Pelorus smashed, running lights smashed.
(b) Port and center antennae down.
(c) Antennae trunk insulator caps smashed.
(d) #1 Periscope window shattered and periscope
flooded. #2 Periscope considerably jarred,
low power out of commission, high power is
usable, but not completely clear as the jar
has caused black spots in the field. However
it is felt that an attack and periscope watch
can be conducted satisfactorily. The lack of
low power will be a handicap.
(e) Gaskets on #4 and #1 port main ballast tank
vents partially blown out.

-7-

— page 32 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

24 April (Continued)

(f) 4 Inch Gun - breech cover smashed and split, sight
    telescopes smashed, sight yoke bent.
(f) Auxiliary engine exhaust valve jammed closed.
    During night continued repairs and plan to sub-
    merge tomorrow, well clear, for final check of our
    condition.

25 April

Continuing repairs to damage.

0545 Submerged to continue check and repairs.
0800 Inspection for air leaks revealed #6 impulse tank has
    a steady stream of air bubbles - bled it down. #2
    Main ballast tank has a small leak - not serious
1300 Made deep submergence. Tight except for minor leaks
1800 A final check up shows that we can repair all major
    items except:
    (a) Periscopes.
    (b) 4 Inch Gun.
    (c) SJ Radar lobing and PPI.
    (d) JP Sound Head.
    The SJ Radar is in the doubtful class but the
    technician feels he can get it working. If he can,
    we will continue patrol, otherwise I think it better
    that we return for repairs. Will give him a couple
    of days to get it working.
1910 Surfaced. Set course for ISLE DES PECHEURS in order
    to tune Radar and patrol in that vicinity tomorrow.
    Continued repairs topside and below.
2000 Tried for an hour and a half to clear despatch
    without success. Finally sent blind twice. Do
    not want to transmit as we close coast.

26 April

0330 Made land fall on ISLE DES PECHEURS. Closed to permit
    tuning of SJ but no luck in getting it back in commis-
    sion.
0521 Submerged 9 miles off coast of INDO-CHINA and 6 miles
    from ISLE DES PECHEURS bearing 275 (T). Continued to
    close coast. Sea flat and calm.
0806 Sighted the masts of a convoy bearing 250 (T) distant
    14000 yards, Lat. 12-00 N, Long. 109-19 E. Ship
    Contact #3. Heard pinging at same time. Went to
    battle stations and closed at high speed but it looks

-8-

— page 33 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

26 April (Continued)

hopeless. Convoy consists of at least 3 or 4 MARUS
with a PC escort and one other escort, course 180,
speed slow, large port angle on bow, and hugging
coast. It was difficult at this range to tell the
exact number of ships in convoy against the land
background. Could definitely make out the tops of
three and thought we could see a fourth. The PC
was easily distinguished because he was patrolling
well to seaward of convoy and was the closest ship
to us. Running at high speed and deep in between
looks, we were never able to close range to less
than 11-12000 yards.
0930 Gave up chase. Convoy was almost out of sight to
south. Secured from battle stations. We were just
too far out to get an attack in.
1230 Two miles off HC NAI POINT on coast. Wish we'd been
here at 0800.
1530 Sighted smoke bearing 200 (T). Disappeared to south.
1947 Surfaced. Opened out from coast to send message.

Plan to work coast at least as long as the moon is
favorable for getting in close undetected, as we
think the main part of Japanese shipping in the
area hugs the coastline.
2130 Cleared despatches - then set course to
close coast. Many small craft in sight during day.

27 April

Closing coast for submerged daylight patrol. Sea
calm and flat.

0330 SJ Radar in commission at last. We don't know
how long but it appears normal. With the SJ in
commission feel that we are justified in continuing
the patrol. Our worst handicap is the condition of
the periscopes and if #2 periscope folds up then we
are licked. Until it does we can make effective
attacks on the surface and submerged and we will
continue the patrol.
0513 Submerged off coast between CAMRANH and PHANRANG
BAYS. Continued to close.
0900 Patrolling parallel to coastline two miles off.
Many small sailing boats and native craft in sight.
1955 Surfaced.
2250 Moonset. Closing coast to patrol 10 miles off

-9-

— page 34 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

27 April (Continued)

during night. There may be shipping along the coast
at night and at this range we should pick it up
without being detected from shore installations.

28 April

Patrolling 10 miles off coast of INDO-CHINA.

0510 Submerged 7 miles off CAPE PADARAN. Continued to close
coast.
0703 Patrolling 2 miles off CAPE PADARAN.
2015 Surfaced.

29 April

0010 Commenced closing coast to patrol 10 miles off in
vicinity PHANRANG BAY. Moon has set. Sea glassy.
0517 Submerged 6 miles off coast between PHANRANG and
CAMRANE BAYS. Working into coast, then plan to
patrol north up coast.
1200 Passing CAMRANE BAY. Kept clear of submarine detector
loop reported by RAY.
1650 Sighted small inter-island steamer bearing 219 (T)
distant 12000 yards. Ship Contact #4. Lat. 11-58 N,
Long. 109-18 E. Went to battle stations and closed
track. He was on course 005 (T), speed 8 knots, not
zig zagging but hugging coast. Allowed him to pass
at 1800 yards as he was too small for torpedo shot -
not over 5-700 tons. ARM with a small gun forward.
A possible escort.
2007 Surfaced.

30 April

0030 Moon set. Closed to 5 miles off ISLE DES PECHEURS and
commenced north and south patrol.
0517 Submerged off POINT HON MAI. Sea glassy.
0730 Two miles off coast.
0935 Sighted a small steamer similar to Contact #4 with a
cleaner and newer look. He was bearing 199 (T) and
worked to the north of us, then reversed course, and
continued to patrol in the vicinity north and south
of CAMRANE BAY. He was in sight until 1500, undoubt-
edly a patrol vessel. We had hopes something might
happen.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
                                        Patrol.

30 April (Continued)

1240 Sighted a small pilot type tug boat, single stack,
     single stick mast, and pilot house. He passed us
     at 800 yards going south and entered CAMRANH BAY.
1616 Sighted a trim, neat, compact PC boat bearing 194
     (T) distant 7000 yards. Lat. 11-58 N., Long.
     109-18 E. He was on course 020 (T), speed 15 knots,
     and presented us with a zero angle on bow. Opened
     out from track and he passed at about 1200 yards.
     Considerable superstructure forward, a single mast,
     and one gun forward.
2015 Surfaced. Decided to patrol north of HON LON to
     intercept any possible convoy that this patrol boat
     might be contacting tonight.

1 May

0100 With the moon fairly well down closed to 7 miles
     off HON LON and patrolled north and south.
0515 Submerged. Patrolling 2-1/2 miles off HON LON.
     Sea choppy.
2010 Surfaced. No contacts.

2 May

0516 Dived 6 miles off coast between CAMRANH and PHANRANG
     BAYS. Closed to 2-1/2 miles for patrol working
     southwest across PHANRANG BAY to CAPE PADARAN. Sea
     choppy.
1150 Sighted small steamer, 15-1800 tons, bearing 280 (T)
     distant 11000 yards and a few minutes later a
     second steamer slightly smaller than first bearing
     287 (T) distant 11000 yards. Lat. 11-29 N., Long.
     109-11 E. Ship Contact #5. The second ship was
     considerably astern of first. Both were standard
     steamers with two. Went to battle stations and
     closed at high speed. The targets were coming out
     of PHANRANG BAY and, after clearing the point,
     changed course to the north on 020 (T) (as we
     expected) in order to hug the coast. We were never
     able to close to less than 5200 yards on either
     ship. The fact that we were off the opening to
     PHANRANG BAY, instead of in our usual spot close
     to the coast, enabled these ships to slip by.
     Targets not zig-zagging, speed 9 knots. Whether
     to fire or not was a decision we never had to make -
     they were border line cases.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

2 May (Continued)

During the approach sighted tops of two very small
vessels (300 tons) on the same general bearing as
targets and thought at first these might be escorts.
But they were inside of targets, even closer to coast,
and apparently proceeding independently. No pinging.
1328 Broke off attack. Secured from battle stations.
1355 Sighted small steamer bearing 345 (T), distant 8000
yards, 25° port angle on bow, on course 190 (T),
speed 8 knots. Closed to but he was much too small
for attack - possibly 500 tons - and allowed him to
pass at 1500 yards.
2027 Surfaced.

3 May

0512 Dived 5 miles off EON HAI POINT. Continued to close
coast.
0602 At periscope depth sighted PC boat bearing 040 (T)
distant 4 miles. He was lying to but in a few
minutes got up speed and headed south passing us at
about 1000 yards. This was the same PC seen here at
1616, April 30.
0738 Sighted smoke bearing 190 (T). Position Lat. 11-58 N,
Long. 109-19 E. Ship Contact #6.
0804 Smoke developed into a convoy of three Marus and two
escorts. One 5000-ton Maru, ATM, was the largest ship
and leading the formation. The remaining two Marus
were much smaller. The two escorts were on either side
of the leading Maru and slightly forward of his beam.
No pinging. We chose the first ship as the target,
went to battle stations, commenced the approach. The
discussion of this approach is a very painful subject
to the Commanding Officer - how I ever arrived in a
position such that we could miss on an elementary
approach as this is beyond me. However - angle on
bow 10 starboard, range 12000 yards, commenced closing
track. Target on course 010 (T), speed 12, not zig
zagging, and the set-up checked well all the way. At
a range of about 4000 yards we were dead ahead of the
escort who was about 700 yards off the track - con-
siderably closer in than I had expected. Up to now I
had made the approach for a bow tube shot and planned
to fire from inside the escort at the first two targets
with the bow tubes. It was apparent, however, that we
were going to be very close to the track so started to

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— page 37 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
     Patrol.

3 May (Continued)

     swing left to cross the escort and fire stern tube
     shot at a greater range. While swinging took
     another look at escort and he had swung to his
     right giving us a small port angle. Made the
     decision then that we would not get clear of escort
     so decided to swing back and accept close shot on
     sharp track with bow tubes. Escort passed astern
     without detecting us. With a generated range of
     1800 yards raised periscope for final firing check
     but got ducked. This was unfortunate at this time
     because I didn't want to fire without another set-up,
     and the range was closing rapidly. Finally got a
     set-up with a range of 1100 yards and at
0848 Fired first of 6 torpedoes at target with a torpedo
     run of 750 yards, 23 starboard track, depth 10 feet,
     spread 1°, 333° gyro. All missed. Undoubtedly
     because of too short a torpedo run. The control
     party erred in firing the last two torpedoes as the
     run was far too short. The second ship in column
     was well astern and in our position so close to the
     track there was no chance for a shot here. One
     escort was heading for us. Started deep.
0850 First depth charge followed closely by two more.
     Fairly close but nothing serious.
0900 Two depth charges. Not so close. We were at 170
     feet and heading for deeper water. Escorts were
     pinging intermittently.
1014 All quiet, started up for a look. At 80 feet 4
     explosions - sounded like bombs. Went back down.
1232 Five depth charges. We hadn't heard any screws on
     sound gear for two hours and didn't now. Pinging
     had stopped entirely.
     Discovered we must have a leak in main induction as
     all drains show a steady stream. Holding depth fairly
     well and avoiding pumping by bubbling safety slowly.
1253 Last two depth charges. Not close.
1612 At periscope depth - all clear. Went back down to get
     a trim and pump bilges.
1745 At periscope depth - completed reload forward.
2135 Surfaced. Decided to let the coast cool off a bit
     and patrol remainder of area.

4 May

0543 Dived. Went deep to check leak in main induction.
     Have a very slight leak at periscope depth which

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— page 38 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

4 May (Continued)

develops into a steady stream at 300 feet. Will in-
spect topside tonight and check again tomorrow.
0903 Surfaced. Patrolling area.

5 May

0817 Dived to conduct further test of induction. Could not
locate leak topside last night. Made two-hour test at
300 feet. The leak is on the port side, apparently,
as this pipe fills first. Then water flows around to
the starboard induction pipe from the port side. At
300 feet we take in about 1200 pounds an hour, but we
held depth for two hours at 2-3 knots without pumping
or blowing, and since we handled this leak for 8 hours
satisfactorily during the depth charge attack on May 3,
decided to remain on station. Hope it gets no worse.
1116 Surfaced. Patrolling area in vicinity of Dangerous
Ground.

6, 7 May

Patrolling area on surface.

8 May

0705 Sighted enemy submarine bearing 250 (T) distant 9 miles.
Ship Contact #7. Lat. 12-13 N, Long. 113-12 E.
Reversed course, went to 4 engines, opened out, and
commenced tracking, working around him to east.
Tracked him for 7 hours at which time we were dead
ahead of target. Tracking showed that he was zig
zagging about 40-50 degrees either side of his base
course 040 (T), and when he was on his far leg he
would be out of sight for periods of thirty to forty
minutes. He was making around 17 knots for, even with
his zig zagging, we were working very slowly ahead at
19 knots.
1029 Passed through debris, barrels, water kegs, etc. Lat.
12-55 N, Long. 113-40 E.

1412 On target base course, submerged. Went to battle
stations.
1435 Sighted I class submarine, commenced approach. He had
a Jap merchant ship flag painted on conning tower.
Shortly after commencing approach discovered he was
constant helming, and our tracking had shown that he

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— page 39 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

8 May (Continued)

must be zig zagging as well. He was on base course
020 (T) during our approach swinging 50 degrees either
side, gave 4 knots. Came to course 110 (T), normal
to his course. At a range of 2300 yards we had an
acceptable bow tube shot on a 70 port track with a
not too large gyro angle. However, I wanted a closer
range and waited for a stern tube shot. This was a
mistake because the range was actually much closer
than 2300 and we were to the left of his base course,
so that when he swung left he passed astern close
aboard - too close to shoot and the bearing changing
so rapidly that we had to wait for a firing set-up.
There was now no choice but to fire a stern tube
nest with large gyro angles (246-262), range 1500
yards, 150 starboard track, 1/2° spread, depth 90 feet.
1500 Fired 4 torpedoes from stern tubes. Missed. Sighted
wakes of torpedoes close to target. About a minute
after firing target swung left and paralleled torpedo
tracks. When it was apparent we had missed went to
90 feet as a safety precaution and at
1505 Heard three sharp metallic clicks or small explosions -
followed by three loud but distant explosions -
either torpedoes or depth charges. We lean toward
the torpedo theory because a good many of the crew,
as well as several of the officers below, heard what
they thought were fast screw noises passing us.
1525 At periscope depth. Our target was bearing 347 (T),
hull down and on his way. Reloaded aft, checked
torpedoes forward.
1805 Surfaced, resumed patrolling area.

9 May

Patrolling area.
1050 Sighted wreckage of a sunken ship. Investigation
showed it was a piece of a bulkhead with two doors,
some clothing, ship piping on bulkhead, and a small
life raft tied to wreckage. Lat. 13-09 N, Long.
113-09 E.

10 May

Patrolling area and closing coast.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

11 May

0514 Submerged off HON DOI ISLAND about 20 miles south of
CAPE VARELLA. Patrolling close to the coast.
0849 Sighted small coastal steamer, LFM, 700 tons - course
north, speed 12. Allowed to pass at 1500 yards. Too
small for a shot.
2007 Surfaced. Patrolling area.

12 May

0518 Submerged close inshore off CAPE VARELLA. Sky overcast,
intermittent rain squalls.
1647 Sighted our usual small steamer - 500 tons.
2006 Surfaced.

13 May

0515 Submerged close inshore off HON DOI POINT.
1445 Sighted two small steamers - 500 tons.
2000 Surfaced.

14 May

0507 Submerged close inshore off CAPE VARELLA.
0650 Sighted small steamer - 500 tons.
1125 Sighted small steamer - 500 tons.
2001 Surfaced.
The condition of our only remaining periscope has been
getting worse the past three days. At times it is
fairly clear, then fogs very badly. In addition the
periscope sometimes seems to be out of focus and
objects sighted are indistinct and appear double. It
would be very difficult to attack with the periscope
in one of its bad moments. We have had rainy, misty
weather the past three days, however, and part of the
trouble may be due to this.

15 May

0045 Set course for the Dangerous Ground Area. Patrolled
on surface during day.

16 May

Patrolling Dangerous Ground Area.
0817 SD Radar contact at 14 miles. Dived. Plane Contact
#6. Lat. 10-13 N, Long. 115-37 E.

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— page 41 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

16 May (Continued)

0855 All clear. Surfaced.
1200 Sighted smoke bearing 190 (T).
1236 Smoke identified as convoy, commenced tracking and
     moving ahead to gain position for attack. Lat.
     9-33 N, Long. 115-41 E. Ship Contact #6. If the
     convoy was on course north as we suspected then our
     position was too far off the track for an attack.
1236 Sighted MAVIS type patrol plane to west of us and
     ahead of convoy, distant 18 miles. Plane Contact #7.
     He disappeared in clouds. Stayed on surface hoping
     to close track.
1243 Sighted same plane, this time too close for comfort
     so dived just as he passed over head. Considering
     around noon, we would not be able to close track
     for a periscope attack and, considering our peris-
     cope which is no better today, perhaps this is just
     as well. Decided on night attack and commenced
     trailing submerged at 4-6 knots. Convoy passed us
     on northerly course - counted tops of ten ships and
     three DD. Constant pinging.
1910 Surfaced. Started chase.
1956 Made Radar contact on convoy at 15000 yards, Lat.
     10-29 N, Long. 115-30 E. Commenced tracking and
     working around to east. There were so many pips
     on Radar and so close together that tracking was
     difficult. A PPI would have been invaluable. The
     after TBT chose this time to ground out. Convoy was
     on course 000 (T), speed 8, and not zig zagging which
     was surprising. Night was fairly dark with no moon
     due until 0145 and slightly overcast. Sea calm. As
     nearly as we could tell the convoy was a box-like
     formation with ships in line of bearing and column.
     Could see two escorts ahead and one on the starboard
     quarter - probably were more.
2347 Commenced attack #3. Target was a large tanker, 7500
     tons, with stack aft, and a long, low main deck.
     DD escort was on his starboard quarter. At 8000
     yards target was very distinct. Lined up the TBT
     on target and headed in at 2/3 speed. The set-up
     checked perfectly and we were in good position. At
     4000 yard range the DD swung right and gave us a zero
     angle on bow. Held on until torpedo run was 3200
     yards, then at
2358 Commenced firing 6 torpedoes on a 72 starboard track,
     9° right gyro, depth 10 feet, 1° spread. Attack #3.
     As the third torpedo went out the DD swung back to

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— page 42 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
                                        Patrol.

16 May (Continued)

his left - we had not been sighted. After firing
swung right to line up on next target just astern of
tanker but range to this ship was 3800 yards so held
fire. Saw one hit on target just aft of midships but
heard no explosions. With the set-up and spread it
seems almost impossible that we could have less than
3 hits on this ship and he settled as though he had
been hit more than once.

17 May

0001 Light flashing from target. The entire convoy turned
     and gave us a 180 degree angle on bow except the target
     which remained as it was.
0004 Two explosions.
0005 The forward and after ends of the target appeared to
     have separated and his main deck was no longer visible.
     At first thought he must have broken in two but this
     was probably due to his settling in water. At 4000 yards
     could see only the forward and after ends of target much
     lower in water and slightly down by the stern. At about
     6000 yards could no longer see target. Believe he sank.
     We were being chased by escort but had never been sighted
     and had no difficulty getting clear. Heard 10 or 12
     depth charges.
0025 Heard last depth charge. Now working ahead for next
     attack. This would have to be a quick one as we only
     have a little better than an hour before moon rise.
0130 Convoy formed up fairly rapidly - still on course 000
     (T), speed 8. We headed in at 1/3 speed on another
     target with DD on his beam. Had a nice set up at 4500
     yards on target when DD changed course to his right
     and headed in our direction with a slight port angle.
     Range to DD was 2800 yards. Shifted attack to DD.
     Reset stern and bow tubes to 6 feet. Swung right at
     standard speed to bring the stern tubes to bear and
     exhaust smoke poured out - so slowed to 2/3. As soon
     as we got around and made steady, checked set-up and at
0136 commenced firing 4 Mk 18 torpedoes from stern tubes,
     torpedo run 1300 yards, 182° gyro, 94 port track, spread
     1/2 degree, depth 6 feet. Attack #4. Missed. Why he
     hadn't seen us before this we'll never know because he
     stood out bigger than a house. The TDC checked nicely
     on bearings and range and it looked like a good firing
     set-up. As second torpedo was fired target could be
     seen turning toward us - we probably missed him because

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— page 43 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
                                        Patrol.

                          17 May (Continued)

          of his turn. If he had held on 30 seconds longer
          it would been a different story.
0136 Sighted searchlight on us at range 1300
          yards. Cleared bridge and dove.
0140 As we passed 250 feet - the first of 19 heavy,
          solid, depth charges, all delivered in less than
          two minutes. He was trying for a kill with every
          thing he had. Fairly close, rocking the boat, but
          causing no known damage. We had a beautiful layer
          of 17 degrees. Much pinging from three or four
          escorts all around us but don't believe they ever
          really got a lead.
0250 Last depth charge. Not close.
          The leak in main induction is much worse and the
          induction fills rapidly. Had sea pressure on inboard
          flappers in each engine room and maneuvering room.
          Found we could not open any flapper in induction
          until draining induction about half way, and then it
          was quite a job to unseat them. This, along with
          the periscope, convinces me we should go home for
          repairs.
0735 At periscope depth. All clear but could still hear
          pinging.
1115 Last pinging heard.
1312 Surfaced. Set course for scene of first attack on
          convoy. Found no evidence, but our evening fix
          showed that we had been about 14 miles from scene of
          attack.
1600 Set course for northern part of area.
1630 Cleared ROBALO despatch #4.

                          18 May

          Enroute LOMBOK STRAIT through SOUTH CHINA SEA.

                          19 May

1144 Sighted sailboat bearing 241 (T), Lat. 6-12 N, Long.
          108-19 E. Went around him on surface.
2300 Received CTF-71 Serial 37. Decided to run submerged
          through JAVA SEA.

                      20, 21, 22, 23 May

          Enroute LOMBOK STRAIT through JAVA SEA, running sub-
          merged during daylight.

                                -19-

— page 44 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

24 May
0541 Submerged. Transiting pass adjacent to KANGEAN
ISLANDS.
1850 Surfaced.
2035 Radar contact on small boat. Went around him.
2323 Entered LOMBOK STRAIT on 4 main engines.
2352 Radar contact, 136 (T), 8200 yards. Sighted patrol
boat from bridge. Is patrolling on 273 (T), speed
8 knots. Went around him to west.

25 May
0121 Completed transit of LOMBOK STRAIT. Set course for
bombing restriction lane.

26, 27 May
Enroute Fremantle, W. A.
0320 Radar contact bearing 355 (T) distant 6650 yards.
Tracked target - he was on course South, speed 16.
Undoubtedly the ANGLER. After closing to 4500 yards
he turned away and passed clear to west.

29 May
Enroute Fremantle.

30 May
0630 Made assigned rendezvous. Patrol completed.

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— page 45 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS IGUALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

(C) WEATHER

Weather during the first part of the patrol was
seasonal, and quite fair. Many glassy calms were
encountered during passage from 17 April to 24 May in
the following seas: TIMOR, BANDA, MOLUKKA, CELEBES, SULU,
and SOUTH CHINA. Calms remained the rule until about
4 May when patrol was conducted in the CHINA SEA away
from the INDO CHINA COAST. Also at this time the first
of frequent rain squalls were encountered, there being
almost none prior to this time. Sailing Directions
weather comment for this area was borne out by conditions
encountered. In May rain squalls and clouds became more
frequent, as the southwest monsoon began. Little change
otherwise. Very light winds.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

No current was observed in open sea areas enroute to
station. In SIBUTU PASSAGE the tidal current followed
closely the data given in Tide Tables for SIBUTU ISLAND
and PEARL BANK. In BALABAC STRAIT, very little force of
current was encountered. In the SOUTH CHINA SEA, as the
INDO CHINA COAST was approached, a steady set to the north
and northeast was found. Close inshore - about four miles
or less - in latitudes from 11°-30' to 12°-30' N a north
and northeast current prevailed with a force of from 0.8
to 1.2 knots. While patrolling in the CHINA SEA,
latitudes 9°-00' N to 12°-30' N and longitudes 112° to
115° E, very little current was encountered, even when
near reefs in the DANGEROUS GROUND AREA. Again in near
the coast at CAPE VARILLA 11 to 15 May, a north to north-
east set was observed, strength up to 2 knots. This does
not agree with information given in the Sailing Directions.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

None observed.

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— page 46 —
CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War Patrol
(F) SHIP CONTACTS

| No. | Time Lat. Date Long. | Type | Initial Range Miles | Est. Speed | Course | How Contacted | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0645 29-09 S 4-11 113-06 E | US Submarine | 5 | 14 Knots | 171 T | SD | Believed US Submarine did not attack. |
| 2 | 0017 7-40 N 4-22 116-55 E | SS | 4 | 10-15 Knots | 060 and reverse | P | Unable to close for attack. |
| 3 | 0806 12-00 N 4-26 109-20 E | Convoy 3-4 escorts | 7 | Slow | 180 | P | Too small. May be an escort. |
| 4 | 1650 11-57 N 4-29 109-18 E | 500 Ton Island Steamer | 5.5 | Northerly 6 Knots | 020 T | P | Unable to close for attack. |
| 5 | 1130 11-29 N 5-2 109-11 E | 2 Marus | 5.5 | 9 Knots | 010 T | P | Attack No. 1. Missed. |
| 6 | 0738 11-56 N 5-3 109-19 E | One 5000 Ton 2 Small Marus escorts | 9 | 12 Knots | 040 | SD (P) | Attack No. 2. Missed. |
| 7 | 0705 12-13 N 5-8 113-11 E | Jap I-153 Class SS | 7 | 17 Knots | 000 | SD (P) | Attack No. 3 and 4. Missed. |
| 8 | 1200 9-53 N 5-16 115-41 E | 10 or 12 DD escorts | 25 | 8 Knots | 000 | SD (P) | Tanker. Missed DD. |

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— page 47 —
CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War Patrol

(G) PLANE CONTACTS

No. | Time | Date | Lat. | Long. | Type | Initial Range Miles | Est. Course | How Con-tacted | Remarks
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1 | 1430 | 4-11 | 2-39 S | 113-01 E | Unidentified | 15 | - | SD | Remained on surface. Undoubtedly friendly.
2 | 0911 | 4-16 | 12-15 S | 126-23 E | Unidentified | 10 | 330 T | R | Overcast, not sighted. Dove at 6 mi. range. 3 pips on radar.
3 | 0307 | 4-16 | 10-33 S | 128-34 E | Unidentified | 10 | - | SD | Dove. Probably same plane as No. 3. Headed in our direction.
4 | 0007 | 4-16 | 10-33 S | 128-34 E | Unidentified | 10 | 270 T | SD | Dove. Plane dropped bombs causing damage.
5 | 1732 | 4-24 | 10-29 N | 109-26 E | BETTY | 2 | 080 | R | Not sighted. Closing so dove to avoid.
6 | 0815 | 5-16 | 10-13 N | 115-39 E | Unidentified | 14 | - | SD | Closing. Dove to avoid sighting.
7 | 1244 | 5-16 | 9-55 N | 115-39 E | MAVIS | 16 | 000 | SD | Closing. Dove to avoid sighting.

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— page 48 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA

USS ROBALO Torpedo Attack No. 1, Patrol No. 2, Time
0848-17, Date 3 May 1944, Lat. 11-58 N, Long. 109-15.5 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Convoy of 3 Maru's in column and 2 escorts,
one on either bow of leading ship. First
ship 5000 tons, MFM, other two considerably
larger and much smaller. Not zig zagging,
target course 010 (T), speed 12 knots.
First sighted through periscope during sub-
merged patrol at range of 16000 yards,
angle on bow 10 starboard. Closed track and
when 700 yards off track was dead ahead of
escort. Could not clear escort in order to
fire at a greater range so decided to
accept sharp track shot at close range with
bow tubes. Ducked at 1800 yards when set
up needed for firing. Finally got set-up
range 1100 yards and fired 6 torpedoes
with run of first 750 yards, 23 starboard
depth 10 feet, 333° gyro. All
missed. Range may have been closer if
masthead estimate had been in error and
fish never got to set depth. Control party
erred in firing last 2 torpedoes as run
was far too short.

Ships Sunk: None.

Ships Damaged
or Probably
Sunk: None.

Damage Deter-
mined by: None.

Target Draft 15 feet, Course 010° T, Speed 12, Range 970
Yards.

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 2.6, Course 237° T, Depth 67 feet, Angle 1° up.

- 24 -

— page 49 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
  Patrol.

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Periscope attack, all torpedoes hot, straight and normal.
All fire control instruments satisfactory.

| Tubes Fired | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Track Angle | 23 S | 24.5 S | 26 S | 27.5 S | 29 S | 30 S |
| Gyro Angle | 332.5 | 335 | 337.5 | 340 | 342.5 | 345 |
| Depth Set | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Power | Hi | Hi | Hi | Hi | Hi | Hi |
| Hit or Miss | M | M | M | M | M | M |
| Erratic | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Mk Torpedo | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No. | 6446 | 8899 | 7832 | 8936 | 8701 | 8768 |
| Mk Exploder | VI-4 | VI-4 | VI-4 | VI-4 | VI-4 | VI-4 |
| Serial No. | 17742 | 7748 | 9242 | 7871 | 12164 | 5850 |
| Actuation Set | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. |
| Actuation Actual | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Mk Warhead | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
| Serial No. | 10944 | 10970 | 2639 | 2935 | 11395 | 944 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval | 10 Seconds | | | | | |
| Type Spread | Longitudinal | 1° Between Torpedoes | | | | |
| Sea Conditions | Calm | | | | | |
| Overhaul Activity | N.T.D. 137 | | | | | |
| Remarks | Missed - Torpedoes probably ran under due
| | to short torpedo run | | | | |

US Submarine Torpedo Attack No. 2, Patrol No. 2, Time
1500-45, Date 8 May 1944, Lat. 13-43 N, Long. 114-16 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Japanese I class submarine sighted on the
  surface and tracked for 7 hours to gain
  position for attack and to determine his
  base course. Target unescorted, sighted by
  high periscope on surface, visibility un-
  limited. Sea calm with a ripple. Tracking
  showed target to be zig zagging 40-50
  degrees either side of base course 040 (T).
  During the approach discovered he was con-
  stant helming as well, and on base course
  020 (T). Came to course 110 (T), normal to
  his base course. At a range of 2300 yards
  had an acceptable bow tube shot on a 70 port
  track with a not too large gyro. Decided
  to wait for a stern tube shot at closer range.

- 25 -

— page 50 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

This was an error as the range was actually
less than 2300, which fact coupled with our
being slightly to the left of his base
track, swung him too close to the stern
for a shot - and the bearing changing so
rapidly that we had to wait for a firing
set-up. Finally fired with gyros 246-262,
1500 yard range, 150 starboard track, 1/2
degree spread, depth 9 feet. All missed
due either to control errors or target's
sighting tracks and turning away.

Ships Sunk: None.

Ships Damaged
or Probably
Sunk: None.

Damage Deter-
mined by: None.

Target Draft 16 feet, Course - Constant Helm, Base Course
020° T, Speed 17, Range 1500 Yards.

OWN SHIP DATA
Speed 2.5, Course 076° (T), Depth 67 Feet.

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
Periscope attack, all torpedoes hot, straight and normal.
All fire control instruments satisfactory.

- 26 -

— page 51 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

Tubes Fired         | 7     | 8     | 9     | 10
Track Angle         | 150 S | 146 S | 136 S | 120 S
Gyro Angle          | 246   | 250   | 256.5 | 262
Depth Set           | 9     | 9     | 9     | 9
Power               | Hi    | Hi    | Hi    | Hi
Hit or Miss         | M     | M     | M     | M
Erratic             | No    | No    | No    | No
Mk Torpedo          | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A
Serial No.          | 5508  | 8595  | 5169  | 8404
Mk Exploder         | VI-4  | VI-4  | VI-4  | VI-4
Serial No.          | 11034 | 4336  | 11918 | 17732
Actuation Set       | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. | Cont.
Actuation Actual    | ----  | ----  | ----  | ----
Mk Warhead          | 16-1  | 16-1  | 16-1  | 16-1
Serial No.          | 2522  | 1715  | 11393 | 11369
Explosive           | TPX   | TPX   | TPX   | TPX
Firing Interval     | 10 Seconds
Type Spread         | Longitudinal 1/2° Between
                    | Torpedoes.
Sea Condition       | Ripple
Overhaul Activity   | N.T.D. 137
Remarks             | Control error or target
                    | turned away.

US. Sub. Torpedo Attack No. 3, Patrol No. 2, Time
2359, Date 16 May 1944, Lat. 11-13 N, Long. 115-38 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Convoy of 10-12 ships escorted by at least
3 DD. Convoy in box like formation, ships
being in line of bearing as well as column.
NOT zig zagging, course 000 (T), speed 8.
First sighted while patrolling on surface,
unable to close for attack, forced down by
MAVIS type plane. Tracked after dark.
Made attack on 7500 ton tanker, stack aft,
long, low main deck. DD escort on his star-
board quarter. Closed in on surface at 10
knots. At 4000 yard range DD turned toward
us with a zero angle on bow. Held on until
torpedo run of 3200 yards then commenced
firing 6 torpedoes from bow tubes on 72
starboard track, 90 right gyro, depth set
10 feet, 1° spread. No explosions heard but
sighted one hit from bridge. With set-up
should have been at least 3 hits in this ship
and probably did as he settled rapidly.

- 27 -

— page 52 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
                                        Patrol.

No way of determining which torpedoes hit.

Ships Sunk:         One. Tanker - 7500 Tons.

Ships Damaged
or Probably
Sunk:               None.

Damage Deter-       Saw one torpedo hit from bridge. Watched
mined by:           ship either break in two or settle until
                    main deck no longer visible at 4000 yards.
                    Target out of sight at 6000 yards.

Target Draft 18 feet, Course 000° T, Speed 8, Range 3000
Yards.
                    OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 10, Course 244° T, Depth Surface, Angle 0.

                FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

All fire control equipment functioned properly. All tor-
pedoes ran hot, straight and normal.

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|:|:------|:------|:------|:------|:------|:------|
| Tubes Fired | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| Track Angle | 73 S | 74 S | 74 S | 75 S | 75 S | 75 S |
| Gyro Angle | 8.5 R | 8.4 R | 11.0 R | 9.0 R | 13.6 R | 9.7 R |
| Depth Set | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Power | Hi | Hi | Hi | Hi | Hi | Hi |
| Hit or Miss | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Erratic | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Mk Torpedo | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No. | 6624 | 6585 | 6629 | 6600 | 8981 | 4952 |
| Mk Exploder | VI-4 | VI-4 | VI-4 | VI-4 | VI-4 | VI-4 |
| Serial No. | 6243 | 12662 | 7537 | 11999 | 12546 | 5317 |
| Actuation Set | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. |
| Actuation Actual | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Mk Warhead | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
| Serial No. | 9725 | 1635 | 9034 | 10616 | 2823 | 3145 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval | 10 Seconds | | | | | |
| Type Spread | Longitudinal - 1° between torpedoes |
| Sea Conditions | Calm | | | | | |
| Overhaul Activity | N.T.D. 137 | | | | | |
| Remarks | E.S.N. | | | | | |

*No explosions heard - unable to determine which torpedoes
hit but sighted at least one.

- 28 -

— page 53 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
                                Patrol.

USS ROBALO Torpedo Attack No. 4, Patrol No. 2, Time
0138, Date 17 May 1944, Lat. 11-25 N, Long. 115-36 E.

                       TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Same convoy as attack #4. Not zig zagging,
             course 000 (T), speed 8. Started attack on
             ship of convoy on surface at 1/3 speed. At
             range of 4500 yards on target, destroyer
             escort changed course and headed in our
             direction with a small port angle on bow.
             Range to DD then 2800 yards. Shifted
             attack to DD, reset depth settings to 6
             feet. Swung right to bring stern tubes
             to bear and when steady fired 4 Mk XVIII
             torpedoes, torpedo run 1300 yards, 182
             gyro, 94 port track, spread 1/2 degree,
             depth 6 feet. Missed. As second torpedo
             went out, target swung to his left toward
             us and undoubtedly turned inside of tor-
             pedoes. Forced to dive and received depth
             charge attack.

Ships Sunk:      None.

Ships Damaged
or Probably
Sunk:            None.

Damage Deter-
mined by:        None.

Target Draft 10 feet, Course 058, Speed 9, Range 1370 Yards.

                          OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 10, Course 320 (T), Depth Surface, Angle 0.

                   FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

All fire control equipment functioned properly. All tor-
pedoes ran hot, straight and normal.

                               - 29 -

— page 54 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

Tubes Fired | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10
Track Angle | 94 P | 96 P | 91 P | 92 P
Gyro Angle | 182.5 | 180.5 | 177.0 | 176.5
Depth Set | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6
Power | Hi | Hi | Hi | Hi
Hit or Miss | M | M | M | M
Erratic | No | No | No | No
Mk Torpedo | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18
Serial No. | 683 | 530 | 925 | 785
Mk Explosive | IV-2 | IV-2 | IV-2 | IV-2
Serial No. | 76172 | 16954 | 16222 | 1616
Actuation Set | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. | Cont.
Actuation Actual | M | M | M | M
Mk Warhead | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18
Serial No. | 77 | 368 | 171 | 102
Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX
Firing Interval | 10 Seconds
Type Spread | Longitudinal - 1/2° between torpedoes
Sea Conditions | Calm
Overhaul Activity | N.T.D. 137
Remarks | Missed due to target's turning.

— page 55 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

grown worse, because after evading at 350 feet on 17
May, the inboard flappers were found to be under full
sea pressure and were very difficult to open.

(2) No. 1 periscope upper window was shattered and the
periscope flooded. A metal plate was made to cover
the opening but could not be made to fit well enough
to prevent flooding, although four nights' work was
spent on this project. The periscope had to be
allowed to remain flooded. Also, the large plug at
the bottom was frozen in, and only the small plug
could be removed. It was impossible to get enough
pressure behind a fresh water line to fill up the
periscope with fresh water, otherwise this would
have been done. Could not fill periscope from top
because the lens blocked the tube.

(3) No. 2 periscope low power prisms were broken or
jarred out of line, rendering low power view in-
operative. High power prisms had many chips,
causing black spots in the field, and frequently
fogging and double images appeared. At the end of
the patrol the periscope was not good enough to
permit an effective approach and attack.

(4) No. 1 periscope hull gland and holding bolts leak
steadily at deep submergence. Could not stop the
leaking.

(5) The lower conning tower hatch was sprung so that it
wouldn't shut. The hinge supports apparently are
out of line. By backing off the nuts holding the
spring guides, the hatch could be dogged and sea
pressure probably would have closed it. These last
two items indicate that the alignment of the entire
conning tower should be checked. There may be dents
in the pressure hull at the sides of the No. 1
periscope hull opening.

(6) The steering system change valve in the control room
was damaged and caused considerable loss of hydraulic
oil - this was repaired.

(7) No. 1 and No. 4B MBT port main vent valve gaskets were
partially blown out. These were repaired.

(8) No. 1 MBT vent riser in the forward torpedo room
leaked badly around the flange nearest the hull.

- 31 -

— page 56 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSUR. (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

     This leak was reduced to a slight trickle by setting
     up on the studs.

(9) The upper conning tower hatch was sprung enough to
     admit a slug of water down to 45 foot depth.

(10) Gasket on bonnet of main engine circulating water sea
     suction valve, after engine room, was partially blown
     in. It has held so far but must be renewed.

(11) Bad air leak in No. 6 impulse bottle. The bottle was
     blown down and carried thru' war.

(12) Air leak in No. 2 MBT.

(13) The external salvage air lines to No. 1 MBT were
     crushed.

(14) There are numerous rattles in the superstructure,
     also a rattle in port side of safety tank.

(15) Numerous valves and glands had to be reseated or
     tightened. Hundreds of small bolts and screws hold-
     ing lockers and bulkheads in forward and after
     battery compartments were broken, and some lockers
     fell off. Much corking was broken and cracked.

ORDNANCE

(1) The 4" gun breech housing was crushed and ruptured,
     the sight yoke bent, training made stiff, bore
     flooded, and one telescope sight smashed. The
     housing was pried off - one dog catch had to be
     broken - and each night the gun was swabbed out and
     greased. This gun could not have been used, since
     the breech mechanism and training were not trust-
     worthy.

ENGINEERING

(1) Conning tower and control room gyro compass repeater
     shafts knocked out of alignment. Straightened and
     repaired.

(2) Bridge electrical gear:
     (a) Gyro repeater smashed and cable grounded out.
     (b) Rudder angle indicator element smashed and
         cable grounded out.

- 32 -

— page 57 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

(c) Diving and collision alarm contactor boxes
crushed, cables grounded out.
(d) Talkback system speakers broken up, also the IMC
lift system was devised utiliz-
ing the throat microphone connection on the
bridge and this was satisfactory.
(e) TBT units grounded out. Both units were repaired
but the after TBT has grounded out again.
(f) Side running lights smashed. Removed.

(3) About 50 light bulbs were shattered, including all
emergency lights in conning tower, control room,
forward battery, and forward torpedo room. Wide-
spread grounds and blown fuses, fans knocked down,
etc. All repaired.

(4) The Pit log sword arm was ruptured and the log
flooded. Rodmeter repaired.

NOTE: Damage to radio, radar and sound gear listed
under (L), (M), and (N).

Following casualties not the result of bombing:

(1) Cracked liner #13 unit, #2 main engine. Renewed
liner and engine back in commission in 12 hours.
(2) The old story of the trim and drain pumps still
holds - heavy pounding when pumping at deep depths.
(3) No. 3 Engine - #1 and #8 units ran hot. Upon inspec-
tion found one exhaust valve in each unit badly
chipped. Renewed faulty exhaust valves, piston rings
on each unit and the head on #8 unit.

- 33 -

— page 58 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
                                                              Patrol.

(L) RADIO

          Following damage caused by bombing:

          (1) Port and high antennae down, insulators smashed.
              Could not replace high antenna. Rigged port
              antenna by using spare inside insulator with
              enlarged hole in flange.

          (2) Two port leads in antenna insulators broken,
              causing trunk to flood. Made new flanges, but
              could not set up on studs enough without break-
              ing them. This is believed due to their design,
              which calls for holes all the way through the
              stud shank where looking pins are inserted, thus
              unnecessarily weakening the studs. The trunk
              continues to flood. When surfacing, the SD mast
              is used for reception until the trunk dries out.

          (3) Glass insulation window for SD mast leads from
              shoes, between control room and radio shack,
              was cracked.

(M) RADAR

          Following damage from bombing:

          (1) The SJ mast was knocked out of line and is
              difficult to train between the bearing of 325
              and 090. There is a knock in the worm and pinion
              gear assembly at the base of the mast which is a
              further indication of misalignment.

          (2) The training assembly between the clutch and mast
              is undamaged, but the training motor shafting is
              badly sprung and must be realigned
              during the coming refit.

          (3) The SJ lobe switching motor located just below the
              parabolic reflector in the mast appears to be
              damaged. Visual inspection of the housing shows it
              has been crushed. It is possible, however, that
              this motor is still being energized, and if this is
              true, the lobe separation mechanism itself (also
              in the mast) is damaged. In any event, there is no
              space separation of the sweep when attempting to
              lobe.

                                                              - 34 -

— page 59 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
                     Patrol.

(4) The PPI sweep is very unstable. There is no control
     over brilliance, centering or focus of the sweep.
     This unit was isolated from the rest of the gear and
     no further check was made because the lack of power
     training rendered the unit useless.

(5) The cathode ray tube in the range indicator was
     broken but when replaced by the spare the unit
     functioned satisfactorily. There is a flutter of
     the step at approximately 44,000 yards, but this
     has had no effect on the efficiency of the unit.

(6) The sweep showed at times no grass or grass that
     was jumpy and intermittently flashing on the screen.
     The cause for that was traced to the I.F. section
     of the transmitter. It was not eliminated until
     both I.F. amplifier tubes were replaced.

     The equipment was out of commission for two days
following the bombing and the night of 3 May following a
full day of silent running. This latter casualty was
the result of excess moisture. After a day of drying
out, it again functioned properly.

     The SD Radar has given satisfactory service through-
out the patrol. However, on the third of May with the
pump room bilges full during depth charge attack, the
base of the mast was flooded. Since that time the mast
has shown a 30,000 ohm reading to ground. This, no doubt,
has cut down on power output, but it still picked up a
Jap patrol plane at 14 miles. The recommendation for
use of 118 megacycles to prevent DFing was investigated.
Although the necessary equipment is on board for accom-
plishing this, it was deemed infeasible since coupled
with the mast ground, power output would have been
reduced too much. The ground could not be cleared at
sea.

(N) SOUND

     The JP sound gear was another casualty of the
bombing of 24 April. The shaft through the hull has
been sprung and makes training the head most difficult.
The gear picks up no noise of any sort. The receiver
has been checked and found to be in good shape, so it
is concluded that the head or external leads are
severely damaged.

                     -35-

— page 60 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

The supersonic sound gear has apparently functioned
satisfactorily throughout the patrol. Several times when
in shallow water near the INDO CHINA COAST north of
CAMRANH BAY, the gear failed to pick up high-speed screws
at a range of approximately 1500 yards. However, at a
later date in deep water, far from land, it picked up
screws at an approximate range of 5000 yards. Nothing had
been done to the gear in the interim, so it was assumed to
be the result of local sound conditions.

- 36 -

— page 61 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
                                                              Patrol.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

          Density layers were observed as follows:

                    LATITUDE          LONGITUDE          LAYER          DEPTH

          1.      31° 56' S         114° 24' E         20°            220'
          2.      22° 15' S         112° 45.5' E       40°            280'
          3.      11° 28' N         109° 27' E         160°           160'
          4.      10° 56' N         110° 27' E         120°           180'
          5.      11° 58' N         109° 19.5' E       180°           100'
          6.      11° 43' N         114° 28' E         140°           200'
          7.      11° 43' N         114° 28' E         150°           200'
          8.      13° 43' N         114° 16' E         120°           100'
          9.      11° 23' N         115° 32' E         190°           120'

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY

          Health - In general excellent with a few cases of
heat rash. One man was confined to bed for six days
with Catarrhal Fever.

          Food - Entirely satisfactory.

          Habitability - Excellent.

(Q) PERSONNEL

          The conduct of officers and crew was in keeping with
the best traditions of the service. All hands had several
chances to show their mettle under fire and responded
excellently.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

          Fremantle - Area         4,387 miles        46,300 gallons
          In Area                  3,786 miles        27,585 gallons
          Area - Fremantle         3,053 miles        32,900 gallons
          Total                   11,226 miles

(S) DURATION

          Days enroute to area13
          Days in area25
          Days enroute to Fremantle..... 13
          Days submerged13 (in area)
                                        plus 4 (enroute)

- 37 -

— page 62 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)--USS ROBALO (SS273)--Report of Second War
Patrol.

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor

4 10,900 30 14 days

Limiting factor this patrol - material condition caused
by enemy action.

(U) REMARKS

Too much credit cannot be given to the officers and crew
for the splendid manner in which they went about repairing the
damage suffered on April 24. In particular credit is due to
the electrical and auxiliary gangs and to the radio technician.
These groups worked steadily at every opportunity to repair
the major damage as well as the endless minor items. It is
because of their efforts that we were able to continue the
patrol, and it is because of them that I regret the patrol was
not more productive.

- 38 -

— page 63 —
FC5-12/A16-3                                          SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWELVE                                          W1

Serial 066                                                                Care of Fleet Post Office,
                                                                          San Francisco, California,
CONFIDENTIAL                                                              6 June 1944.
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS ROBALO Report of
Second War Patrol.

From:             The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
To   :            The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via  :            (1) The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
                  (2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject:          U.S.S. ROBALO (SS 273) - Report of Second War Patrol.

                  1. The Second War Patrol of the U.S.S. ROBALO was of 51 days
duration, 37 of which were spent north of the barrier. The patrol, the
first for Lieutenant Commander M.M. Kimmel, U.S. Navy, as Commanding
Officer, was aggressively conducted despite the handicaps of extensive
damage resulting from a near miss by an aircraft bomb on the first day
in the assigned patrol area.

                  2. ROBALO expended twenty torpedoes in four attacks on enemy
targets. Six torpedoes were fired in the first attack, made by periscope
on a convoy of 3 AK's with 2 escorts. All torpedoes missed possibly due
to range estimate error or torpedoes not having settled down at set depth.
Subsequent depth charging developed a leak in the main induction which be-
came progressively worse during the patrol. Four torpedoes were fired on
an unsuccessful submerged attack upon a surfaced enemy submarine after a
well executed end around run and approach. Submarine evidently sighted
wakes and changed course to parallel the torpedoes. Six torpedoes were fired
in a successful night surface radar attack on tanker in a convoy of 10 - 12
ships escorted by at least 3 DD's. Firing was started at 3200 yards when one
of the escorts appeared to have detected ROBALO and headed for her. In attack
#4, four torpedoes were fired at one of the escorts of the same convoy at a
range of 1300 yards. ROBALO was evidently sighted during firing. The DD
evaded torpedoes by changing course and forced ROBALO to submerge; it then
commenced the delivery of a severe depth charge attack, which seriously in-
creased the leak in the main induction.

                  3. It is noted that ROBALO did not employ her "SD" radar until
after the bombing on 24 April by a plane which succeeded in getting into a
range of about 2 miles before being sighted. It is believed that to insure
security this equipment should be used for a short period each minute through-
out the day despite the possibility of being DF'd. Subsequent to this bombing
ROBALO was severely handicapped for the remainder of the patrol by the damage
to both periscopes.

                                                                - 1 -

— page 65 —
FE24-71/A16-3
Serial: 0632
C-O N F I D E N T I A L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS ROBALO Conf.Ltr.A16-3
Ser.07, dated 30 May, 1944.
Report of SECOND War Patrol.

From: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
To: Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. ROBALO (SS273) - Report of Second War Patrol -
Comment on.

1. The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE
are concurred in.

2. As pointed out by the Commander Submarine Squadron
TWELVE, the aggressiveness and determination displayed in continu-
ing this patrol despite considerable damage incident to the bomb-
ing attack on 24 April is most commendable.

3. With respect to detection of enemy planes it is
considered essential that full capabilities of SD and SJ Radar,
and of lookouts be utilized to the utmost. Analysis of various
plane contacts indicates that no one system is infallible.

4. This patrol is designated as "Successful" for purpose
of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

5. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding
Officer, Officers, and Crew on this aggressive and persistent pa-
trol and for inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK
1 - AO (EU) 7,500 Tons (Attack No. 3)

[HANDWRITTEN: Q. B. Griggs]
J. B. GRIGGS.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (3) - (Direct).
Vice Opnav (2) - (Direct).
Vice Opnav Op-23c(1) CTF-72 - - - - - (2)
ComlstFlt (1) CSS-12 - - - - - (1)
Com3rdFlt (1) CSS-16 - - - - - (1)
Com5thFlt (1) DivComs Ron-15 - - - - (1)
Com7thFlt (2) DivComs Ron-16 - - - - (1)
ComSubslstFlt (4) S/M School N.L. Conn. (2)
ComSubs2ndFlt (4) Each S/M W.A. - - - - (1) - NOT TO BE
CTF-71 (4) TAKEN TO SEA
BURN
UNITED STATES NAVY
12/ms
30 June 1944

— page 66 —
[STAMP: Reg. No. 10094]
[STAMP: R. S. No. 7 04486]

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3 (F-3/eeh)

Serial: [HANDWRITTEN: 01964]

[STAMP: 22 JUL 1944]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS ROBALO Conf. ltr. [HANDWRITTEN: ✓]
A16-3 Serial 07 dated
30 May 1944 Report of
SECOND WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.
To : Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. ROBALO (SS273) - Report of Second War
Patrol - Comment on.

1. Forwarded.

[SIGNATURE: R. H. CRUZEN]
R. H. CRUZEN,
By direction.

— page 67 —
UNITED STATES
SUBMARINE LOSSES
WORLD WAR II

Reissued with an Appendix of
Axis Submarine Losses, fully indexed,
by
Naval History Division
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington: 1963

— page 68 —
ROBALO (SS 273)

ROBALO under Cdr. M. M. Kimmel, departed Fre-
mantle on 22 June 1944 to conduct her third war
patrol in the South China Sea in the vicinity of the
Natuna Islands. After traversing Makassar and Balabac
Straits, she was to arrive on station about 6 July, and
stay there until dark on 2 August 1944.

On 2 July a contact report stated ROBALO had
sighted a Fuso-class battleship with air cover and two
destroyers for escort in 3°-29'N, 119°-26'E, just east
of Borneo. No other messages were received from
ROBALO and when she did not return from patrol, she
was reported as presumed lost.

The following information was received via the Phil-
ippine guerrillas and a U.S. Navy enlisted man who was
a prisoner of war at Puerto Princesa Prison Camp,
Palawan, P. I. On 2 August 1944, a note dropped from
the window of the prison cell in which survivors from
ROBALO were held was picked up by an American sol-
dier in a work detail and given to H. D. Hough, Y2c,
USN, another prisoner. On 4 August, Hough contacted
Mrs. Trinidad Mendosa, wife of guerrilla leader Dr.
Mendosa, who furnished further information on the
survivors. From these sources, he put together the
following facts:

ROBALO was sunk 26 July 1944, two miles off the
western coast of Palawan Island as a result of an ex-
plosion of her after battery. Four men swam ashore,
an officer and three enlisted men: Samuel L. Tucker,
Ens.; Floyd G. Laughlin, QM1c; Wallace K. Martin,
SM3c, and Mason C. Poston, EM2c. They made their
way through the jungles to a small barrio northwest of
the Puerto Princesa camp. They were captured there
by Puerto Princesa Military Police, and confined in the jail.
They were held for guerrilla activities rather than as
prisoners of war, it is said. On 15 August 1944, they
were evacuated by a Japanese destroyer, and nothing
further is known of their destination or whereabouts.
They may have been executed by the Japanese or the
destroyer may have been sunk. At any rate, they were
never recovered and their note stated that there were
no other survivors.

M. M. Kimmel

It is doubted that a battery explosion could be suf-
ficiently violent to cause the sinking of the ship; more
likely ROBALO struck an enemy mine.

In her first patrol, in the area west of the Philippines,
ROBALO damaged a large enemy freighter. Her second
patrol was in the South China Sea near Indo-China where
she sank a 7,500-ton tanker.

U. S. S. ROBALO

— page 69 —
U. S. S. ROBALO (SS-273)

Name                               Rate        Name                               Rate
ACKLEY, James W. . . . . . . S1        *LAUGHLIN, Floyd G. . . . . QM1
BAILEY, John BTM2        LEAHY, Richard J. . . . . . . SC3
BELL, Robert WSM1        LEFEBVRE, John W. . . . . . CEM
BOEHLES, Jerome P. . . . . . TM1        LEVY, Donald J. . . . . . . MoMM3
BREEDEN, Charles E. . . . . . EM3        LOVELL, Denzel W. . . . . . EM1
BRERETON, Walter A. . . . MoMM1        LUTMAN, J. AENS
BROKMAN, Gilbert . . . . . . S1        MARTIN, Ray EEM2
CAGLE, Columbus L., Jr. MoMM1        *MARTIN, Wallace K. . . . . . SM3
CARTER, Hubert E. . . . . . LCDR        MARX, Marvin JEM2
CHANGARY, Stephen J. MoMM3        MATTHEWS, William G. . . . Y1
CLARK, Edward O. . . . . . . S1        MCKNIGHT, H. F., Jr . . . . LTJG
CLIFFORD, Marvin D. R. . . . S1        NICHOLS, Harvey E. . . . . . F1
COOPERMAN, Herman M. . . RT2        NICLAS, John J. . . . . . . MoMM2
COTTERMAN, Stanley N. . . PhM1        O'BRIEN, John J. . . . . . . MoMM2
CRESS, Donald C . . . . . . . RM3        O'ROURKE, Edward P. . . . . F1
DICKERSON, Darrell E. . . CMoMM        PAW, Edward JFC2
DITTMAN, Calvin L. . . . . . TM2        PHELPS, Billy BTM1
DOWNEY, Wallace L. . . . MoMM2        POSTON, Mason C. . . . . . . EM2
DVORACEK, James L., Jr . . . F1        PRIDDIS, John FCEM
ERVIN, Lyle FMoMM1        PROSEUS, Reginald J. . . . . . LT
FELL, C. WLCDR--XO        RAMSIER, Harold L. . . . . MoMM1
FINK, Dean ERM3        ROOT, Charles A. . . . . . MoMM1
FLANAGAN, Arthur J. . . . . GM2        RUSSELL, Stanley J. . . . . . F2
FONDON, George M. . . . . . F1        SMITH, Stephen W. . . . . . . GM3
FRICKER, John J. . . . . . . SC2        SONEMANN, Walter F. . . . RM3
GERDES, Herman J., Jr . . . ENS        SPEENER, Russell W. . . . . . S1
GLEATON, Elliott, Jr . . . . . CK2        SPENCER, Samuel E. . . . . . CTM
GRAHAM, Kimball E. . . . . . EM1        TAYLOR, Herschel P. . . . MoMM1
HAMILTON, Howard L., Jr . . TM3        *TUCKER, Samuel L. . . . . . ENS
HART, James F., Jr . . . . . . TM3        USEALMAN, Harold E. . . . . S2
HOOD, Harley TTM3        VAN DEURZEN, Joseph R MoMM3
HURST, Jack A. . . . . . . MoMM2        VARNEY, Elmer G. . . . . . . S1
IVEY, Holly Berry . . . . . . RT1        VIRGA, Ciro RF1
JACKSON, Nyle M. . . . . . . TM2        VOGEL, Frederick P. . . . . . TM3
JAMBOR, William E. . . . . . GM1        WILKERSON, Dale F. . . . MoMM2
JOHNSON, Emil H. . . . . MoMM1        WILLIAMS, Davie L. . . . . . SFM1
JOHNSON, Nathan Y. . . . . SC1        WILSON, Frederick J. . . . CMoMM
KESTERSON, William G. . . MoMM2        WINNAN, Roland O. . . . . . EM3
KIMMEL, Manning M. . . LCDR--CO        WLODARCZYK, Sigmund J. . . F1
KONEN, Arthur C . . . . . . . S2        WOOD, Claude E., Jr . . . . . QM3
ZEA, Calvin BTM3

* Survived sinking but not recovered postwar.

101

— page 70 —
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

UNCLASSIFIED "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY".
TOP SECRET
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
of an
INVESTIGATION
conducted at the headquarters of
THE COMMANDER SUBMARINES SEVENTH FLEET
by order of
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES FLEET
and
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

To investigate the circumstances connected
with the loss of the U.S.S. Robalo and the
the loss of the U.S.S. Flier.

14 September 1944.

[HANDWRITTEN: File Copy for 7th gth]

[HANDWRITTEN: First Exhibit 3]

— page 71 —
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

TOP SECRET

Investigation of the circumstances connected with the loss of
the U.S.S. Robalo and the loss of the U.S.S. Flier.

INDEX

Organization of the investigationPage 1
Introduction of defendant1
Introduction of counsel for defendant1
Commanding officer's narrative read2
Adjournments13, 36
Introduction of interested party2
Introduction of counsel for interested party2
Investigation finished42

TESTIMONY
Name of witness             : Investigating : Defendant : Interested
                            : Officer     :           : Party.
J.D. Crowley,               :1,2,3,8,37,38 :34         :35,36
cdr, usn                    :             :           :

Surviving officers          :3            :           :
and men of Flier            :             :           :
R.W. Christie,              :1,2,4,5,6,7,9 :12,13     :42,43
r.adm., usn                 :10,11,12      :           :

J. W. Liddell, Jr,          :20,21,22     :           :22
lt, usnr                    :             :           :

A.E. Jacobson,              :14           :           :
ens, usnr                   :             :           :

A.G. Howell,                :17,18        :18         :17
ort, usn                    :             :           :

D.P. Tremaine,              :19           :           :
for2c, usn                  :             :           :

W.B. Miller,                :15           :15         :
momm3c, usnr                :             :           :

J.D. Russo,                 :19           :           :
qm3c, usnr                  :             :           :

E.R. Baumgart,              :16           :           :
momm3c, usnr                :             :           :

H.H. McLean,                :25,26,28     :           :26,27,28
capt, usn                   :             :           :

M.J. Tichenor,              :29,30,31,33,34:           :30,31,32
capt, usn                   :             :           :

J.L.P. McCallum,            :24           :           :24,25
lt cdr, usn                 :             :           :

W.H. Kimbrough,             :23           :           :
lt, usnr                    :             :           :

G.W. Patterson,             :38,39        :           :
capt, usnr                  :             :           :

M.W. Shea,                  :40,41        :           :
lt cdr, usn                 :             :           :

W.A. Lent,                  :41,42        :           :
cdr, usn                    :             :           :

W.R. Laughton,              :20           :           :
lt cdr, usn                 :             :           :

— page 72 —
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

TOP SECRET

EXHIBITS

Exhibit | Character of | Admitted in
        |              | evidence
||
A       | Commanding officer's narrative| 2
1       | Operation Order Number 100-44| 4
2       | Operation Order Number 80-44| 4
3       | Reckoning letter of U.S.S. Flier| 20
4       | Degassed condition of U.S.S. Flier| 31
5       | Degassed condition of U.S.S. Robalo| 41

1

— page 73 —
UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF1/A17

September 5, 1944

TOP SECRET

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations.
To Rear Admiral Freeland A. Daubin, U.S. Navy.

Subject: Investigation into loss of U.S.S. RABALO and U.S.S. FLIER.

1. Under authority of 5 U.S. Code 93 you are hereby detailed
to investigate the circumstances connected with the loss of the
U.S.S. RABALO and the loss of the U.S.S. FLIER.

2. In accordance with the provisions of the statute above
mentioned, you are given authority to administer an oath to any witness
attending to testify or depose during the course of the investigation.

3. You will make a thorough investigation into all the
circumstances connected with the loss of the U.S.S. RABALO and the loss
of the U.S.S. FLIER, and upon the completion of the investigation you
will make a complete report to the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, via the Commander, Seventh Fleet,
of the facts which you deem to be established. You will further give
your opinion as to whether any offenses have been committed or serious
blame incurred.

4. Your attention is particularly invited to the applicable
portions of section 725 and to section 734, Naval Courts and Boards.

5. The Commander, Seventh Fleet, is hereby directed to afford
you such facilities as may be necessary to the proper conduct of the
investigation and to furnish the necessary clerical assistance.

6. The classification of TOP SECRET is hereby assigned to all
proceedings and reports incident to the investigation herein ordered.

E. J. KING,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
and
Chief of Naval Operations

— page 74 —
TOP SECRET

After full and mature deliberation, the Investigating officer
finds as follows:

FINDING OF FACTS

1. That the U.S.S. Flier, in accordance with Task Force
Seventy-One Operation Order Number 100-44, "Exhibit 1", departed
Fremantle 2 August 1944 to proceed to war areas stopping at
Exmouth Gulf for fuel and thence proceeding via Lombok Strait,
Makassar Strait, Sibutu Passage and Balabac Strait.

2. That prior to departure, the Operation Order and the
annexes thereto were explained to the commanding officer by the
Operations Officer, his assistant, and the Intelligence Officer,
and that he was thoroughly briefed by these officers, and
finally by Commander Task Force Seventy-One, and was given all
available information concerning the enemy and enemy minefields.

3. That the Operation Order, with the annexes, issued to
Flier, contained all available information.

4. That the organization of the Operations Office of Commander
Task Force Seventy-One, and the method of briefing commanding
officers of submarines is exceedingly thorough and excellent in
all respects.

5. That prior to departure from Fremantle, Flier had had a
normal refit, had been ranged to determine her degaussed condi-
tion, and materially, was ready for patrol in all respects.

6. That the Flier, after her refit, had been given the
customary training in approaches and fire control under the
supervision of Captain George W. Patterson, Junior, U.S. Navy.
Her crew consisted of eight officers and seventy-seven enlisted
men, total of eighty-five. The commanding officer, Commander
J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, was an experienced submarine command-
ing officer, having made six war patrols. The other officers
and enlisted personnel were well trained and qualified in all
respects to take a submarine on war patrol.

7. That in working up the reckoning of the U.S.S. Flier, none
of the ship's records or charts were available, having been lost
with the ship. All information pertaining to fixes, and times,
are approximate only, having been supplied by the commanding
officer, the navigator, and other ship's personnel from memory.

8. That on 13 August the Flier passed Bancoran Island to port
on course 270° True, and at 1540 intercepted the steamer route
through Balabac Strait, Nasubata Channel, and changed course to
254° True to follow this route. A slight northerly set was
noted and 256° True was steered to follow this steamer route.

9. That the Flier's Operation Order in paragraph (x) (3)
stated: "Stay clear of readily mineable waters in the vicinity
of the Sulu Archipelago and Balabac Strait. Use deepest water
routes in transitting Sibutu, Balabac, or Mindoro Straits".

10. That the phrase, "deepest water routes", was explained
by the Operations Officer to mean the Nasubata Channel, as this
is the deepest water route through Balabac Strait.

— page 75 —
TOP SECRET

11. That forty transits of Balabac Strait have been made and
    those of recent dates are as follows:

    10 February 1944----Crevalle
    13 February 1944----Tinosa
    17 February 1944----Puffer
    18 February 1944----Ray
    24 February 1944----Bluefish
    25 February 1944----Bonefish
    26 March 1944----Bluefish
    19 April 1944----Crevalle
    22 April 1944----Robalo
    8 May 1944----Crevalle
    10 July 1944----Lapon

12. That in the intelligence annex to the Operation Order, and
    with the Operation Plan, all available information concerning
    Japanese mines and mining operations were given. This informa-
    tion has been studied by the investigating officer, but cannot
    be made a part of this record on account of its classification.
    The deep water route through Balabac Strait, Nasubata Channel,
    was considered the safest; and the Crevalle's track in her
    transit through Nasubata Channel on 8 May was given. This
    track is shown on U.S.C. & G.S. Chart Number 4326, enclosure
    (C) to "Exhibit 3". There is also shown on this chart the
    track of the Lapon which transitted Nasubata Channel on 10
    June 1944. The track of the Lapon was not available to the
    Operations Officer until 24 August 1944, which date was subse-
    quent to the sailing of the Flier.

13. That on the night of 13 August 1944, the Flier had all
    underway stations fully manned. The watch was alert. No ships
    or planes were sighted by the lookouts. The commanding officer
    was at the conn on the bridge, and the navigator was in the
    conning tower. The proper charts were in use. The course
    through Nasubata Channel had been plotted on the chart, also the
    course of the Crevalle through the channel. The Coast Pilot
    and Tide Tables had been studied. Radar bearings and soundings
    were being taken at frequent intervals and were being plotted.
    Listening gear was manned. Nothing was heard. Speed was
    seventeen knots, four engines, auxiliary engine carrying the
    auxiliary load, with a zero float on the battery.

14. That on the night of 13 August 1944, during the transit
    of the Flier through Nasubata Channel, the sky was overcast,
    there was no moon, visibility was about eight thousand yards,
    practically no wind, and the sea was calm. A slight set to the
    northward, indicating a current of less than a knot, had been
    noted by the navigator in his approach to the channel.

15. That a terrestrial fix at 1800 on landmarks on Palawan
    and Balabac Island was obtained. Last position was determined
    by radar ranges. Last sounding was forty-one fathoms. This
    last position is shown at 2200 on U.S.C. & G.S. Chart Number
    4326, enclosure (C) to "Exhibit 3".

16. That Flier's fix at 2200, just prior to the explosion and
    her sinking was about eight hundred yards to the southward of
    the Crevalle's Track, which track lay in water of over one
    hundred fathoms. This fix was also about eight hundred yards

— page 76 —
TOP SECRET

northward of the Lapon's Track.

17. That, navigationally, the course being followed by the
Flier through Nasubata Channel was a safe track. Insofar as
danger from Japanese minefields was concerned, the Flier's
track was between the track used by the Crevalle on 8 May 1944
and that used by the Lapon on 10 June 1944.

18. That shortly after 2200 there was a terrific explosion
from an outboard source, apparently on the starboard side, and
the Flier took a down angle by the bow and sank within a matter
of seconds. This position is latitude 7°-58'-30" South,
longitude 117°-13'-40" East.

19. That after the Flier sank, fifteen of the ship's company
were accounted for in the water:

Commander John D. Crowley, U.S. Navy.
Lieutenant James W. Liddell, Junior, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Ensign Alvin E. Jacobson, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Lieutenant J. E. Casey, U.S. Navy.
Lieutenant Paul Knapp, U.S. Navy.
Lieutenant (junior grade) W. L. Reynolds, U.S. Naval
Reserve.
Ensign Phillip S. Mayer, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Howell, A. C., CRT, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Tremaine, D. P., FCR2c, U.S. Navy.
Miller, W. B., MoMM3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Russo, J. D., QM3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Baumgart, E. R., MoMM3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Hudson, E. W., CMOMM, U.S. Navy.
Pope, C. D., CGM, U.S. Navy.
Madeo, G. F., F2c, U.S. Naval Reserve.

20. That during the night of 13 - 14 August, while attempting
to make their way to land, the following disappeared and are
believed lost:

Lieutenant Paul Knapp, U.S. Navy.
Lieutenant J. E. Casey, U.S. Navy.
Lieutenant (junior grade) W. L. Reynolds, U.S. Naval
Reserve.
Ensign Phillip S. Mayer, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Hudson, E. W., CMOMM, U.S. Navy.
Pope, C. D., CGM, U.S. Navy.
Madeo, G. F. F2c, U.S. Naval Reserve.

21. That, on 14 August at about 1530, and various times
thereafter on the same afternoon, the eight survivors reached
shore on the eastern end of Mantangule Island, a distance of
about fifteen miles from the spot where the Flier sank. All
of them had been in the water for a period of over seventeen
hours. On 23 August the survivors finally arrived at Brooke's
Point and, through a coast watcher's unit, made radio contact
with the Commander Task Force Seventy-One and were picked up
by the U.S.S. Redfin on 31 August 1944.

— page 77 —
TOP SECRET

22. That at Cape Bulikuyan on Palawan Island Commander Crowley
encountered Sergeant Pascoqual de la Cruz, Philippine Army,
U.S.A.F.F.E., who had just returned from a reconnaissance trip
to Balabac Island and he gave Commander Crowley information con-
cerning the Robalo.

23. That the explosion which sank the Flier came from an
underwater outside source. It did not come from an enemy sur-
face vessel, or plane, since none were sighted or heard. The
ship was rocked by the force of the explosion and there was a
great rush of air from the conning tower followed by debris, a
geyser of water, and a strong smell of oil.

24. It cannot be stated whether the Flier was sunk by an enemy
mine or torpedo. Giving credence to intelligence reports that
enemy minefields had been laid north of Makassar Island, and the
fact that the Flier was in mineable waters--about forty-one
fathoms--when the explosion occurred, and finally the fact that
the survivors were in the water in the near vicinity until late
afternoon of the next day, and saw no enemy at the time of the
explosion, or enemy searchers later in the area, much weight must
be given to the opinion that it was a mine, anchored or drifting,
and that the sinking of the Flier, at this time, was unknown to
the enemy. As for a torpedo sinking the Flier, this is dis-
counted since the bridge watch or the SJ radar picked up
nothing, and the enemy submarine, if surfaced, would have had
to have been within a few thousand yards of the Flier.

25. That, according to all available intelligence information,
the Japanese use only contact mines. Minefields laid in areas
subject to rough seas or currents will not normally endure for
periods longer than six months. Japanese mines have been found
adrift in the vicinity of the Sulu Archipelago.

26. That the U.S.S. Robalo, in accordance with Task Force
Seventy-One Operation Order Number 80-44, "Exhibit F", departed
Fremantle 22 June 1944 to patrol the South China Sea and
approached to the Gulf of Siam south of latitude 9° North and
west of longitude 112° East. This was changed on 16 July 1944
to the area west of longitude 108° East until Ray's departure
from the area. Robalo was directed to fuel at Exmouth Gulf,
thence proceed via Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, Sibutu
Passage, Balabac Strait, and South of Dangerous Ground.

27. That, prior to departure, the Operation Order and the
annexes were explained to the Commanding Officer, his
Operations Officer, his assistant, and the Intelligence Officer,
and that he was thoroughly briefed by these officers, and
finally by Commander Task Force Seventy-One, and was given all
available information concerning the enemy and enemy minefields.

28. That prior to departure from Fremantle, Robalo had had a
normal refit, had been ranged to determine her degaussing con-
dition, and materially was ready for patrol in all respects.

29. That the Robalo, after her refit, had been given the
customary training in approaches and fire control under the
supervision of Commander Willis A. Lent, U.S. Navy. Her crew

— page 78 —
TOP SECRET

29. The personnel of the ROBALO consisted of eight officers and seventy-three enlisted men, a
total of eighty-one. The commanding officer, Lieutenant Manning M. Kimmel, U.S. Navy, was an experienced
submarine commanding officer, having made five patrols. The
officers and the enlisted personnel were well trained and
qualified in all respects to take a submarine on war patrol. [HANDWRITTEN: K]

30. That Robalo's Operation Order, in paragraph (x) (4)
stated, "Stay clear of readily mineable waters in the vicinity
of the Sulu Archipelago and Balabac Strait. Use deepest water
routes in transitting Sibutu Passage or Balabac Strait", and
that in the intelligence annex, the route followed by the
Crevalle through Balabac Strait--Nasubata Channel--was given.

31. That Fact Number 11 applies to the transitting of
Nasubata Channel in the case of the Robalo.

32. That on 2 July 1944 Robalo reported her 0800 How position
as 06°-59' North and 119°-26' East, and that she had sighted one
enemy battleship and two destroyer escorts which had gotten by
her.

33. That this position reported by Robalo is her last known
position.

34. That from this position at 0800 How, 2 July, she could
have transitted Balabac Strait--Nasubata Channel--the night
of 3 - 4 July 1944.

35. That on 11 August 1944, and thereafter, unsuccessful
attempts were made to communicate with the Robalo.

36. That it cannot be stated how the Robalo was lost. After
reporting the enemy battleship and two destroyer escorts on 2
July, she may have been DF'd and sunk by enemy surface forces
or planes. There are well formed rumors that survivors from
the Robalo were taken by the enemy on Balabac Island. The
Robalo could have transitted Balabac Strait--Nasubata Channel--
on the night of 3 - 4 July, and could have been sunk by a mine
while transitting this channel.

37. That, referring to paragraph 22 of the Finding of Facts,
Sergeant Pascual de la Cruz gave the following information
which, while not factual, is the best obtainable:

(a) Robalo sank on 3 July 1944 as the result of an explosion
in the forward battery compartment.
(b) The reported position of the Robalo was forty miles west
of Balabac Island.
(c) There were four survivors of the Robalo who were found
by the Japanese on Comiran Island and taken prisoner.
(d) Of the four prisoners, one was the commanding officer,
one was Ensign Samuel L. Tucker, U.S. Naval Reserve,
and one was Martin, Wallace K., signalman third class,
U.S. Naval Reserve, and the identity of the fourth was
not known. [HANDWRITTEN: 120]
(e) The commanding officer and the unidentified prisoner were
shot, either deliberately or while trying to escape.

— page 79 —
TOP SECRET

(f) Ensign S. L. Tucker and "quartermaster" Martin survived
    and are war prisoners at Puerto Princessa, Palawan.
(g) Sergeant de la Cruz also told Commander Crowley that the
    Robalo had departed Port Darwin on a date in June,
    a fact which he had no means of knowing, unless he had
    learned this from the Japanese or from the survivors of
    the Robalo. This gives credence to his story, as does
    also the fact that he had the names of two of the crew,
    namely, Ensign Tucker and "quartermaster" Martin.

OPINION

1. That the Operation Orders for the U.S.S. Flier and for the
   U.S.S. Robalo, prepared by Commander Task Force Seventy-One,
   contained complete directives and information for the routing of
   the submarines to their respective patrol areas.

2. That from all available intelligence information the
   routing of these submarines through Balabac Strait--Nasubata
   Channel--was the safest route.

3. That in the loss of the U.S.S. Flier and the U.S.S.
   Robalo, no blame was incurred by the interested party, Rear
   Admiral A. R. Christie, U.S. Navy, Commander Task Force Seventy-
   One, or any member of his staff.

4. That in the loss of the U.S.S. Flier, no blame was incurred
   by the defendant, Commander J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, the com-
   manding officer, or any member of the Flier's crew.

5. That in the loss of the U.S.S. Robalo, there is no evi-
   dence of any blame that can be ascribed to the commanding
   officer, Lieutenant Commander Manning M. Kimmel, U.S. Navy, or
   to any member of the crew of the U.S.S. Robalo.

6. That the loss of the U.S.S. Flier, while transitting
   Nasubata Channel, must be ascribed to the hazards of war.

7. That the loss of the U.S.S. Robalo, in a position unknown,
   must be ascribed to the hazards of war.

— page 80 —
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First Day

Headquarters of the
Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet,
Thursday, 14 September 1944.

The investigation began at 1405.

The investigating officer, Rear Admiral Freeland A. Daubin,
U.S. Navy, administered the prescribed oath to Cecil Leland
McCormick, chief yeoman, U.S. Navy, the reporter, who took
seat as such.

The investigating officer read the order directing him to
make the investigation and which is hereto prefixed.

The investigating officer announced that the investigation
would be conducted with closed doors.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the
investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. John D. Crowley, Commander, U.S. Navy, at present attached
to the Staff of Commander Task Force Seventy-One.

2. Q. I have been detailed to investigate the circumstances
connected with the loss of the U.S.S. Robalo and the U.S.S.
Flier. Were you the Commanding Officer of the United States
ship Flier when she was lost?

A. I was.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he would
be a defendant in this case and that the evidence taken in the
investigation might, since admitted under oath, be used at any
time against him and that he had the right for counsel.

The defendant requested that Commander Charles H. Andrews,
U.S. Navy, act as his counsel. Commander Andrews took seat
as counsel for the defendant.

The investigating officer appointed Lieutenant Commander
Willard R. Laughon, U.S. Navy, to work up the reckoning of the
U.S.S. Flier from what available information there was from
the time she sailed from Fremantle, Western Australia, until
she was lost.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the
investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

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A. R. W. Christie, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Commander
Submarines Seventh Fleet, and Commander Task Force Seventy-One.

2. Q. Were the Flier and the Robalo operating under your
command?

A. They were.

Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy, informed the investi-
gating officer that he had an interest in the subject matter of
the investigation in that he was the signer of the Operation
Orders under which the Flier and the Robalo were operating at
the time they were lost. He requested that he be allowed to be
present during the course of the investigation, examine
witnesses, and introduce new matter pertinent to the investiga-
tion in the same manner as a defendant.

The request of Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy, was
granted.

The investigating officer informed the interested party that
the evidence before the investigation might, since admitted
under oath, be used at any time against him and that he had the
right for counsel.

The interested party requested that Captain George W.
Patterson, U.S. Navy, act as his counsel. Captain Patterson
took seat as counsel for the interested party.

Commander J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, defendant, was recalled
as a witness by the investigating officer, and was informed of
his privilege not to testify, if he so desired. The defendant
waived this privilege and was then advised that the oath pre-
viously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. Commander Crowley, you have the narrative of the loss
of the Flier?

A. Yes, sir, I have the narrative. Here it is.

The copy of the commanding officer's narrative was submitted
to the defendant and to the interested party, and by the in-
vestigating officer offered in evidence. There being no
objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit A".

The following surviving officers and members of the crew of
the U.S.S. Flier were assembled and duly sworn and the narra-
tive of the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Flier of the
disaster was read to them by the commanding officer in the
presence of the investigating officer and the interested party:

Lieutenant James W. Liddell, junior, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Ensign Alvin E. Jacobson, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Arthur G. Howell, CRT, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Donald P. Tremaine, FCR2c, U.S. Navy.
Wesley P. Miller, MoMM3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.
James D. Russo, QM3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Earl R. Baumgort, MoM3c, U.S. Naval Reserve.

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2. Q. Is the narrative just read to the court a true state-
ment of the loss of the United States ship Flier?
A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. Have you any complaint to make against any of the sur-
viving officers and crew of the said ship on that occasion?
A. No, sir.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to
examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and resumed his status as a
defendant.

Examination of the surviving officers and members of the crew
of the U.S.S. Flier:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. Have you any objections to make in regard to the narra-
tive just read to the court, or anything to lay to the charge
of any officer or man with regard to the loss of the United
States ship Flier?

None of the surviving officers and members of the crew of the
U.S.S. Flier had any objection to the narrative in its present
form or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man
with regard to the loss of the U.S.S. Flier.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine these surviving
members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to
examine these surviving members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier.

The investigating officer informed the surviving members of
the crew of the U.S.S. Flier that they were privileged to make
any further statement covering anything relating to the subject
matter of the investigation which they thought should be a
matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been
fully brought out in the commanding officer's narrative.

The surviving members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier stated
they had nothing further to say.

The surviving members of the crew of the U.S.S. Flier were
duly warned and withdrew.

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Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy, interested party, was
recalled as a witness by the investigating officer and was
advised that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. Admiral, did you issue and sign the Operation Order for
the U.S.S. Flier?

A. I did. Here it is, Operation Order 100-44 of 31 July 1944.

Operation Order Number 100-44 was submitted to the defendant
and to the court and by the investigating officer offered in
evidence. There being no objection, it was so received and
marked "Exhibit 1".

Statement by the investigating officer: The annexes of the
Operation Order for the Flier and the annexes of the Operation
Order for the Robalo, contain much information that is Ultra
Secret. These have been thoroughly examined by the investiga-
ting officer, but on account of their classification are not
made a part of this record.

2. Q. Did you also issue and sign the Operation Order for the
Robalo?

A. I did. Here it is, Operation Order 80-44 of 20 June 1944.

Operation Order Number 80-44 was submitted to the court and
by the investigating officer offered in evidence. There being
no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit 2".

3. Q. Can you state what date the Flier and what date the
Robalo sailed?

A. The Flier departed Fremantle at 1500 How August 2, 1944.
Robalo departed Fremantle June 22, 1944.

4. Q. On what date do you assume that the Robalo was lost?

A. A message was received from U.S.S. Robalo by the Head-
quarters of Commander Task Force Seventy-One on 2 July. In
that message she reported her position as follows: at 0800 How
latitude 03-29 N., longitude 119-26 E. In that message she
reported the information that one enemy battleship, two
destroyer escorts and an aircraft carrier had gotten by her.
No further information has been received from the Robalo despite
our repeated attempts to establish communication. For three
successive days beginning 11 August Robalo was asked to report
her position. No answer has been received. The Robalo should
normally have returned to Fremantle on or about 14 August.

5. Q. Is it your assumption that she was lost soon after the
2nd of July, the date she last reported her position?

A. I estimate that the Robalo met with a disaster sometime
shortly after her radio transmission on the 2nd of July.

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6. Q. In the Operation Order for the Flier, how was she routed
to her area--by what channels?

A. Flier was directed to depart Fremantle and proceed to
Exmouth Gulf via Bombing Restriction Lane. Thence proceed via
Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, Sibutu Passage and Balabac
Strait to patrol Areas 201 and 202 in accordance with the
schedule given in detail in the Operation Order. She was
directed to start passage at dark on the 11th of Sep-
tember and to proceed to Fremantle via Mindoro Strait, Sibutu
Passage, Makassar Strait and Lombok Strait. She was further
directed to stay clear of readily mineable waters in the vicini-
ty of the Sulu Archipelago and Balabac Strait and to use deepest
water routes in transitting Sibutu, Balabac or Mindoro Strait.
She was further authorized to return via Karimata Strait, Java
Sea and Lombok Strait, if deemed more feasible and in such case
to advise the Commander Task Group Seventy-One point One.

7. Q. Admiral, has it been your practice when a submarine
sails, after you have approved and signed the Operation Order,
to personally brief the commanding officer? If so, will you
tell in general how you brief them?

A. It is my general custom to interview the commanding officer
just before his departure in order to discuss the proposed
patrol and to emphasize certain features of importance on
methods and policies and in connection with the existing tacti-
cal situation. I always make a point of insuring that the com-
manding officer is satisfied with the material condition of his
ship after the refit and that he is satisfied with the officer
and enlisted personnel assigned to the ship and with the state
of training. It has been my practice to emphasize the risk of
enemy submarines from the minute of departure and during the
passage south of the Barrier because of the natural let
down in vigilance with transitting these relatively peaceful
waters. During this briefing, there is usually a free discus-
sion of such things as the use of the SD radar, torpedo depth
settings, the advisability of gun actions and such matters.

8. Q. In the case of the Robalo and Flier, did you follow your
usual practice and brief the commanding officer of each of these
ships?

A. I did.

9. Q. You stated that the route for the Flier was through
Balabac Strait. Have you made it a practice to route submarines
through that Strait?

A. Submarines are routed to various patrol areas with the fol-
lowing considerations in mind: (a) shortest distance and time
to area; (b) separation of submarines; (c) diversification of
routes; (d) enemy opposition; (e) phases of the moon; (f) explo-
itation of traffic en route. We endeavor to insure that no one
route becomes a "Beaten Path". If two or more depart at about
the same time, we choose the routes to separate them in time and
place to avoid the consequence of patrol vessels or planes being
alerted by an attack, a sighting or a DF fix. Submarines are
operated in groups only in open sea areas. Since I took command

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of the Task Force we have made passages in the NEI area as
follows:

          Lombok98
          Ombai26
          Timor Sea60
          Sunda8
          Alas Strait1
          Sibutu95
          Mindoro35
          Balabac40
          Alice Channel4
          Karimata15
          Surigao10
          San Bernardino0
          Basilan0
          Makassar93
          Molucca78

Transits of Balabac Strait through Nasubata Channel, since the
first indications of enemy mining activities, have been made as
follows:

          10 February 1944---Crevalle
          13 February 1944---Tinosa
          17 February 1944---Puffer
          18 February 1944---Ray
          24 February 1944---Bluefish
          25 February 1944---Bonefish
          19 April 1944-----Crevalle
          28 April 1944-----Robalo
          8 May 1944Crevalle
          10 July 1944------Lapon

On 7 June 1944, Redfin executed a special mission taking her
well into shallow water in North Balabac Strait. In the Intelli-
gence annex to the respective Operation Orders given Robalo and
Flier there is to be found the following: "Mine and underwater
obstructions have apparently been laid in Balabac Strait north
of Mangsee Island". Subsequent to the completion of the above
operations, the U.S.S. Crevalle transitted Balabac Strait using
the following route: initial point (08-02.5N, 117-27.0 E.),
then course 240° distance 7.6 miles to (07-58.7 N., 117-13.5 E.),
then course 254° distance 2.35 miles to (07-58.0 N., 117-11.2
E.), then course 224.5° distance 3.15 miles to (07-55.7 N.,
117-08.2 E.), then course 199.5° distance 5.60 miles to
(07-50.5 N., 117-07.0 E.), then course 184.0° distance 5.25
miles to (07-45.25 N., 117-06.6 E.), then course 230° to clear
Strait. Robalo was routed to the Anambas Islands via Balabac
instead of Karimata to have him available in the Southern
Celebes Sea area in support of the Noemfoor Island operation.
Flier was routed to French Indo China for the following reasons:
(a) Karimata was congested at the time with the Crevalle and
Lapon southbound and the Ray northbound; (b) probability of
better hunting against the enemy in Makassar Strait at that
time; (c) to separate Muskalunge and Flier who left port on the
same date for mutual training. One was routed through Balabac

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and the other through Mindoro Strait to separate them and to
increase exploitation of enemy traffic. Information was also
given at a later date to the Flier which would have necessitat-
ed his transitting Balabac Strait in order to intercept an
enemy convoy reported by other Blue submarines.

10. Q. Was the Flier given all the information regarding enemy
mines that you had available?
A. Yes.

11. Q. Will you please state what relative enemy hazards exist
insofar as submarine operations are concerned?
A. I consider the greatest danger from the enemy to our sub-
marines to be, in order of importance: (1) submarine torpedoes;
(2) depth charges; (3) aircraft bombs; (4) mines, either drift-
ing or in a field; (5) nets and other obstructions.

12. Q. In your opinion, how was the Robalo lost?
A. Intense enemy activity in Makassar Strait in early July
leads me to believe that the Robalo may have been successfully
hunted down by enemy anti-submarine aircraft and surface vessels
shortly after his radio transmission, but as it has been rumored
that survivors from the Robalo have been taken by the enemy in
Balabac Island, then it seems likely to me that the Robalo was
destroyed in some of the channels of Balabac Strait and possibly
by contact with a mine, either anchored or drifting. There has
been a very considerable amount of evidence about drifting mines
particularly in the vicinity of Balabac and the Sulu Archipelago.

13. Q. You heard the narrative concerning the loss of the
Flier. In your opinion, how was the Flier lost?
A. It seems to me that the evidence indicates that the Flier
was destroyed by an explosion from outside, either a torpedo,
an anchored mine or a drifting mine.

14. Q. Have you any other information at this time that is
pertinent in regard to the loss of the Robalo and the Flier?
A. We have always been faced with the possibility that the
enemy would succeed in closing to us some of the various
passages in the NEI and Philippine area. We have always real-
ized that he would make every attempt within his power to pre-
vent the United States submarines proceeding from the bases
which he knew existed in Australia to the areas where they
thought thought could intercept his traffic. Such opposition would
take the form of Sono-Buoy, radar detection devices both ashore
and in ships and airplanes, patrol vessels of all types, air-
craft, mines, nets and cables. We have considered that Soenda,
Alas, Balabac, Alice Channel, Karimata, Surigao, San Bernardino
and Basilan were mineable, and Lombok, Sibutu, Mindoro, Balabac
and Makassar were heavily patrolled by surface vessels. Sibutu,
Mindoro, Makassar and Molukka were heavily patrolled by planes
intermittently. Due to the depth of water, current and width,
we have considered Ombei, Lombok, Timor Sea, Mindoro, Makassar,

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MOLUKKAS and Sibutu unmineable effectively. With special refer-
ence to Balabac, my conclusions were as follows: (a) that the
main channel, middle channel, Lumbucan Channel and North Balabac
Strait were readily mineable and in the light of that fact
should be avoided; (b) that Nasubata Channel could not be mined
effectively in the deep water routes. This channel can be
traversed with a least depth of one hundred fathoms a mile wide.
The Coast Pilot says: "Nasubata Channel is five miles wide be-
tween Troughton Reef and Comiran Danger Bank with depths above
100 fathoms in the fairway. This is an excellent deep water
channel for a considerable amount of 'straits' shipping rounds
Cape Melville and passes to the northwestward of Comiran
Island into the Sulu Sea. In navigating this channel, it is
only necessary to guard against the effects of the tidal stream,
which, when combined with the surface current set up by the
wind, sweeps with considerable velocity at times in the general
direction of the prevailing wind. In July, after a continuance
of unusually fine weather, with light east and southeast winds,
the current set with a velocity of from 3/4 to 2-1/2 knots in a
westerly direction. The mean velocity observed for thirteen
consecutive hours was 1-3/4 knots".

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The investigating officer did not desire further to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, withdrew, and resumed status of
interested party.

Commander J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, took the stand voluntarily
to testify concerning the loss of the U.S.S. Robalo, and was
advised that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the investigating officer:

Q. Commander, do you have any information from the natives
regarding what happened to the Robalo?

A. Yes, sir. Sergeant Pasqual de la Cruz, Philippine Army,
U.S.A.F.F., whom I encountered at the Guerilla outpost at Cape
Bulliluyan, Balabac, on 21 August 1944, and who recently
returned from a reconnaissance trip to Balabac Island. This
trip was made to verify a rumor that some Americans had been
captured there. He received the following information which he
told me: The U.S.S. Robalo was sunk by an explosion in the for-
ward battery on 3 July 1944. The reported position of the
vessel at the time of the explosion was forty miles west of

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Balabac Island. There were four survivors of Robalo who were
found on the beach on Comiran Island. From his story, of which
the facts are not clear, I arrived at three possible solutions
as to the fate of the survivors: (1) that all four were sur-
prised on the beach and jumped up, two escaped and two were
captured; (2) in the foregoing event, two were captured and two
were shot; (3) in the foregoing event all four were captured
and two were deliberately shot after capture. The names of the
two survivors made prisoner were reported to me as Lieutenant
Tucker and Quartermaster Martin. One of the others apparently
was the commanding officer of the Robalo, and no information
exists or was given to me as to the identity of the fourth.
The reason for the conflicting stories as to the fate of the
survivors is that Sergeant de la Cruz received the information
from different sources. One other thing that he also told me,
which the Robalo departed Port Darwin on a date late in June.
I do not remember accurately. I believe it was the 29th.
Apparently it came from the survivors. The two prisoners are
reported to have been sent to the Japanese prison camp at
Puerto Princesa, Palawan. This is all of the information that
I have.

The interested party did not desire to cross-examine this
witness.

The investigating officer did not desire further to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, withdrew, and resumed his seat as
defendant.

Commander J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, defendant, was recalled
as a witness by the investigating officer, and was informed of
his privilege not to testify if he so desired. The defendant
waived this privilege and was then advised that the oath pre-
viously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. On the night that the Flier was lost, do you remember
who had the watch on the bridge?

A. The officer of the deck was Lieutenant Casey. However, I
was on the bridge and I had the conn.

2. Q. Do you remember how many lookouts you had?

A. Yes, sir. In running the passes I make a practice of
posting the following watches: (1) four officers, two forward
on the bridge and two aft on the bridge; (2) the navigator and
a quartermaster in the conning tower; (3) four enlisted lookouts

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on the periscope shears; (4) the battle station radar operator
on the radar; (5) the radar tracking party stationed; (6) one
battle station sound operator on the sound gear; and (7) the
radar detector manned. All this is a continuous watch. The SD
radar is manned as circumstances warrant. On the occasion of
transiting Balabac on the night of 13 August, all of the above
mentioned were set with the exception of the SD radar which was
not manned because of a complete overcast with no moon.

3. Q. What is your estimate of the visibility in yards from
the bridge?

A. It was a clear dark night. Comiran Island was sighted
with 7 X 50 binoculars at a range that I estimate to have been
eight or nine thousand yards.

4. Q. What makes you believe that the Flier struck a mine
instead of being sunk by an enemy torpedo?

A. It is my clear impression that the explosion was on the
starboard side. I feel certain that if a torpedo were launched
from a ship or plane we would subsequently have been informed
of his presence by his investigating the area of the sinking.
I realize the possibility of a torpedo attack launched from a
tube on shore; however, the most probable location for a weapon
of this sort in my opinion would have been Comiran Island which
was on the port hand. Roughton Island which was on the star-
board hand is a very small coral atoll.

5. Q. In your narrative you gave a list of the survivors.
Are you able to testify as to the stations of these survivors
at the time the Flier was sunk?

A. The following men were stationed as lookouts, all on top of
the closed bridge structure: Millar, Baumgard, Hadeo and
Hudson. Hellar was seen by no one after the vessel sank, and
his fate is not known. Lieutenant Casey, Lieutenant Reynolds,
Ensign Jacobson and Ensign Mayer, together with myself, were on
the bridge. Lieutenant Liddell, Lieutenant Knapp, Howell,
Tremaine, Russo and Pope were in the conning tower. Hudson,
who was seen by one man and reported badly injured, was chief
of the watch in the control room.

6. Q. Who was the navigator?

A. Lieutenant Liddell was the executive officer and navigator.

7. Q. Did you have confidence in him as a navigator?

A. I have implicit confidence in him as a navigator.

8. Q. You stated in your narrative that you obtained a posi-
tion on Comiran and Roughton Islands at about 2130. Did you
inspect the chart and verify these positions from available
information?

A. After the fix obtained on Comiran and Roughton Islands, I
did not personally inspect the chart. I was on the bridge sur-
veying the entire situation. However, I had personally

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inspect the terrestrial fix obtained prior to sunset and
verified it.

9. Q. Was the chart in use the largest scale chart of the
channel and island?

A. Yes, sir. U.S.C. & G.S. chart number 4326 was being used
to navigate the vessel.

10. Q. Was that chart corrected up to date?

A. Yes, sir, to the best of my knowledge.

11. Q. Had you and the navigator studied the Sailing Direc-
tions?

A. Yes, sir.

12. Q. What was the depth of the water in the approximate
position where the Flier sunk?

A. The soundings prior to the very last one before the
disaster were running between sixty-five and ninety fathoms.
The last sounding obtained was forty-one fathoms. Immediately
upon getting this sounding, I called the navigator under the
hatch to discuss a course change to bring us into deeper water.
I interrupted this discussion to call for another sounding to
verify the last one received. It was at this time that the
explosion occurred.

13. Q. Were you steering by gyro compass?

A. Yes, sir, we were steering by the master gyro, checking
with the auxiliary gyro and the armored vehicle type magnetic
compass.

14. Q. What was the error of the master gyro?

A. I don't remember exactly but throughout the entire trip the
error of the master gyro was essentially zero. The auxiliary
gyro was also checked continuously within about one degree of
the master.

15. Q. When was the last azimuth taken?

A. I would like to refer to the navigator for that. I believe
it was the forenoon of the day of the disaster.

16. Q. Do you know whether or not you had been sighted by any
enemy vessels or planes prior to entering the straits?

A. We ran on the surface throughout the entire day of 13
August. A continuous periscope watch in addition to the
regularly assigned lookouts was maintained, and no surface
craft were sighted by us. I consider it highly improbable
that we could have been sighted by a surface craft under these
circumstances without our seeing him. No aircraft were sighted
although at about 1400 we had an SD radar contact at eighteen

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miles which opened and we did not dive nor sight the plane. Our
closest approach to Palawan Island prior to darkness was about
thirty miles, and I doubt if we could have been sighted from
there. My subsequent experiences there give me reasonable
assurance there were no enemy coast watchers on that island.
After darkness nothing but land contacts were made with the SJ
radar.

17. Q. At the time of the sinking of the vessel and during the
long period the survivors were in the water, and during and
until the time you contacted friendly forces, have you anything
to say regarding the conduct of the surviving officers and men?

A. The time of the actual sinking was so short that I was
unable to make any observations during this period. After the
survivors were in the water and throughout the entire period
until we were picked up by friendly forces, the sound advice
accorded me and the superb qualities of leadership exhibited by
Lieutenant Liddell constituted an inspiration to all hands. The
conduct of Ensign Jacobson, Howell and Russo as exemplary. The
conduct of the remaining survivors was satisfactory throughout.

Cross-examined by the interested party:

18. Q. You are a submarine captain of long experience, do you
consider that an enemy submarine could have fired torpedoes at
Flier without being detected either before or after firing?

A. I have implicit trust in the ability of our SJ radar equip-
ment and the operator stationed at the time of our transitting
Balabac to pick up a target the size of a surfaced submarine,
with the possible exception of a midget submarine, at a minimum
range of six thousand yards. Unless the enemy has more effect-
ive night periscopes than we have, I consider a submerged
attack improbable in the visibility conditions existing. No
radar contact except land targets was made. Nothing except
land was sighted and throughout the period we remained in the
water, several hours of which I feel were in close vicinity of
the sinking, nothing was sighted. For these reasons it is my
opinion that it is highly improbable that an attack was
launched from a submarine.

19. Q. Evidence indicates that Nasubata Channel can be tra-
versed with the least depth of one hundred fathoms for a width
of one mile. Why was the Flier in a lesser depth?

A. The problems facing the commanding officer of a submarine
in transitting a channel of this sort are as follows: (1) the
problem of safe navigation; (2) the problem of maintaining sea
room in event of a contact with a surface patrol; (3) the pro-
blem of passive measures such as anchored or floating mines. In
the case of Nasubata Channel, Roughton Island to the north has
extensive reefs extending on the channel side of the island. A
combination of the navigational problem together with that of
maintaining sea room in case of contact with a surface patrol
craft indicated to me the advisability of running as far south
as possible in good water. It was my intention not to get into

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water of less than fifty fathoms and after the sounding of
forty-one fathoms I was in the process of discussing a course
change with the navigator to bring me back into the deeper
water.

20. Q. Was it your intention to follow the recommended route
of the U.S.S. Crevalle?

A. Originally it was my intention to do so but when we found
ourselves slightly south of that track after establishing our
position relative to Comiran and Roughton Islands and from the
fact we were converging that track, I maintained the course we
were on.

21. Q. How much safe water clearance is there between the
Crevalle Track and Roughton Island?

A. One point eight miles from the nearest point to the reef.

22. Q. Have you any data relating to the current existing at
that time?

A. The Sailing Directions would indicate the current to be
about one and one half to two knots at the time of our transit.
It was near the strength of flood.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to
examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, withdrew, and resumed his status as
defendant.

The investigation then, at 4:55 p.m., adjourned until 9:40 a.m.
tomorrow, 15 September 1944.

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Second Day

Headquarters of the
Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet,
Friday, 15 September 1944.

The investigation began at 9:40.

Present:
Rear Admiral Freeland A. Daubin, U.S. Navy, the investigating
officer;
Cecil Leland McCormick, chief yeoman, U.S. Navy, reporter;
The defendant, Commander J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, and his
counsel;
The interested party, Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy,
and his counsel.

The record of proceedings of the first day of the investiga-
tion was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the investigation
were present.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the in-
vestigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Alvin E. Jacobson, Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve, stationed
on the U.S.S. Flier.

2. Q. What was your station on the night of 13 August?

A. At nine o'clock I went on watch as JOD, stationed on the
after cigarette deck. At the same time, the other JOD was there
so I was on the starboard side of the cigarette deck. That was
my station until I was swimming.

3. Q. Before you went on watch, had you accustomed your eyes
to the duties of a night lookout?

A. Yes, sir, for thirty-five minutes.

4. Q. What, approximately, was the visibility at the time you
were on watch?

A. The visibility was fairly good. You could see as far as
the land. It was cloudy. As far as I remember it was good.

5. Q. Did you sight any ship or any suspicious object in the
water during the time you were on watch?

A. No, sir. I sighted nothing except land.

6. Q. What do you think was the cause of the loss of the
Flier?

A. I believe it was a mine that hit the starboard side around
the officers' country somewhere below the surface.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

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None of the parties to the investigation desired further to
examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the
investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rate, and present station.

A. Wesley Bruce Miller, motor machinist's mate third class,
U.S.N.R. I don't know what my present station is.

2. Q. On the night of 13 August what was your station on the
Flier?

A. Forward port lookout.

3. Q. Before you went on watch had your eyes been night
adapted?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. For how long a time?

A. For about twenty minutes.

5. Q. What was the visibility conditions?

A. Well, I could see land at eight thousand yards but it was
very poor. The sky was overcast. No stars out. It was cloudy
and dark.

6. Q. During the time that you were on watch did you see any
ship or any suspicious object in the water?

A. No, sir, I saw nothing in the water. I could see a light
on the beach. There was a lighthouse there but nothing in the
water.

Cross-examined by the defendant:

7. Q. Was it a light or a lighthouse you saw?

A. I couldn't say. It was very dim. It was where the light-
house was and I imagine it was a lighthouse.

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None of the parties to the investigation desired further to
examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the
investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rate, and present station.

A. Earl Raymond Baumgart, motor machinist's mate third class,
attached to the U.S.S. Flier.

2. Q. On the night of 13 August, what were your duties on the
Flier?
A. After starboard lookout.

3. Q. Before going on watch had your eyes been night adapted?
A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. How long?
A. For a half hour.

5. Q. What was the visibility?
A. It was very overcast. It wasn't too visible.

6. Q. Could you see land?
A. Yes, sir, I could with binoculars.

7. Q. During the time you were on watch did you at any time
see any ship or suspicious object in the water?
A. No, sir, none at all.

8. Q. Did you see any light ashore?
A. No, sir, I did not see any light.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to
examine this witness.

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The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the
investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rate, and present station.
A. A. G. Howell, chief radio technician, U.S. Naval Reserve,
U.S.S. Flier.

2. Q. On the night of 13 August, before the Flier was lost,
what was your station?
A. I was operat ng the radar for navigational purposes.

3. Q. How long had you been operating it?
A. I believe an hour or more. I couldn't tell the exact hour.
When we began to get in reach of the islands and needed naviga-
tion.

4. Q. What contacts did you make?
A. We had contact with the lighthouse on the port. We had
reefs or small islands on the starboard. We had Balabac ahead.
We had small island on the port bow just beginning to come in.
On the starboard side, quite a distance away, we had land
coming in. That is all I can recall.

5. Q. Had you made any ship contacts?
A. We had made no ship contacts.

6. Q. Did you give all this radar information to the
navigator?
A. The information was continuously going to the navigator and
to the bridge.

7. Q. Was the radar operating efficiently?
A. The radar was operating as good as it has ever worked and
it was in very good condition.

Cross-examined by the interested party:

8. Q. During the time you were operating the radar before the

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explosion, did you notice any radar interference?

A. None at all.

9. Q. How long before the explosion occurred did you obtain a
bearing and range?

A. Right up to the minute of the explosion I was giving them.

10. Q. Did you obtain a bearing and range of the large pip on
the port bow?

A. If you mean the lighthouse, yes. I believe we were going
254° True and it was about 280° Relative just forward of the
port beam at a range of five to seven thousand yards as near as
I can recall.

Cross-examined by the defendant:

11. Q. You had relatively close land on both sides, do you
recall which was closer?

A. Yes, sir, on the starboard side it was about two thousand
yards closer.

12. Q. When the close radar contacts were first made, how were
they verified as being land contacts?

A. From the general conformation and also checking with the
navigator. I gave bearings on three or four different places
and gave the tangents. With the tangents we gave and some
soundings, we located where we were. We were exactly where
we should be according to radar.

13. Q. Do you recall furnishing information to the radar
tracking party to check the speed of any of these contacts?

A. Yes, sir. As I recall there was one you wanted specifi-
cally checked on and the radar tracking party said it had no
speed. It was the lighthouse we were checking on.

14. Q. Do you recall the last radar range?

A. It was between five and seven thousand yards. I believe it
was between fourteen and eighteen thousand to the land dead
ahead of us.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to further
examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

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The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
advised that the oath previously taken by him was still binding,
and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rate, and present station.

A. James D. Russo, quartermaster third class, U.S. Naval
Reserve, attached to the U.S.S. Flier.

2. Q. What were your duties aboard the U.S.S. Flier on the
night of 13 August?

A. I was recording the cuts they were making on the various
landfalls by the radar. I was in the conning tower.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to
examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
advised that the oath previously taken by him was still binding,
and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rate, and present station.

A. Tremaine, Donald P., firecontrolman second class, U.S.
Navy, attached to the U.S.S. Flier.

2. Q. On the night of 13 August what were your duties aboard
the U.S.S. Flier?

A. We had a radar tracking party on and I was the talker in
case we made contact.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to
examine this witness.

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The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The investigation then, at 12:15 p.m., took a recess until
1:30 p.m., at which time it reconvened.

Present:
The investigating officer, the reporter, the defendant and
his counsel, and the interested party and his counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the trial were
present.

Lieutenant Commander Willard R. Laughon, U.S. Navy, the
officer appointed by the investigating officer to work up the
reckoning submitted to the court and by the investigating
officer offered in evidence a letter and charts showing the
position of the U.S.S. Flier from 1500, 13 August 1944, until
the time she was lost, the accuracy of which he took an oath.
There being no objection it was so received and marked
"Exhibit 3". The investigating officer read the letter to the
court.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any statement covering anything relating to
the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should
be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not
been fully brought out.

The witness stated that he had nothing to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
advised that the oath previously taken by him was still binding,
and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. J. W. Liddell, Junior, Lieutenant, D-V(G), U.S. Naval
Reserve, U.S.S. Flier.

2. Q. On 13 August what fixes did you obtain from 1500 on
and by what means?

A. Terrestrial on the peaks of Palawan Island at approximately

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1800. Made a landfall on the peaks of Balabac Island just
prior to sunset and obtained another fix at this time. At
1930 made radar contact with Balabac Island and commenced
getting radar fixes using Palawan and Balabac Islands at approxi-
mately ten minute intervals. As Nasubata Channel was approached
and just when the other islands began to come in on radar fixes
were obtained at shorter intervals.

3. Q. Did your fixes show any set?

A. The fixes indicated a slight set to the northward. However,
it was practically negligible.

4. Q. What was your compass error?

A. An azimuth obtained late in the afternoon indicated the
compass error to be .2 west.

5. Q. How did soundings check with fixes by the fathometer?

A. The soundings verified the position of fixes.

6. Q. Did you have the Crevalle Track which was mentioned in
your Operation Order laid down on your chart?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Were you endeavoring to follow this track?

A. During the early part of the passage it was intended to
stay a little south of the track to further clear Roughton
Reef. From a point off Comiran Island it was intended to fol-
low the track of the Crevalle.

8. Q. How far out?

A. I would say about one and one-half miles.

9. Q. Were you endeavoring to stay outside the one hundred
fathom curve?

A. During the early stages of the approach of Nasubata Channel
the track laid down took the vessel inside of the one hundred
fathom curve.

10. Q. At what time were you inside the one hundred fathom
curve as you remember?

A. I would say we crossed the one hundred fathom curve at
about 1830.

11. Q. It is noted from the chart that you were south of the
Crevalle Track and the Crevalle Track through the channel lay
in water one hundred fathoms or over. At what time did you
intend to meet the Crevalle Track and follow that track through
the channel?

A. When the Flier was north of Comiran Island.

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12. Q. How often were you taking soundings?
A. Nearly continuously.

13. Q. How often were you taking radar bearings on the
Islands?
A. We obtained radar fixes at a maximum of five minute
intervals.

14. Q. How often were you plotting the ship's position?
A. I kept a continual plot of the position of the ship.

15. Q. Did you previously lay down a track through the
channel?
A. Yes, sir.

16. Q. Had you consulted the Coast Pilot, Philippine Islands,
Part II, regarding the passage through the channel?
A. Yes, sir.

17. Q. Did you obtain all information from the Coast Pilot
regarding tides and currents?
A. The information regarding currents is very limited.

18. Q. Previous to the time the ship was sunk, how had your
fixes checked with your course as laid down on the chart?
A. The fixes showed the ship to be slightly north of the
course.

19. Q. How far north?
A. Maximum of a mile.

20. Q. When a sounding of forty-one fathoms was obtained,
what action did the commanding officer take?
A. I discussed with him the desirability of changing course
to the right where there was deeper water. In the midst of
this discussion the vessel sank.

Cross-examined by the interested party:

21. Q. What instructions were given you by the captain rela-
tive to the navigational track through Nasubata Channel?
A. The captain and I had previously looked at the chart show-
ing the track of the Crevalle and had decided to follow this
track with the exception of clearing Roughton Reef by a distance
of about three miles.

Reexamined by the investigating officer:

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22. Q. After the sinking of the Flier and during the long
time the survivors were endeavoring to reach land, have you any
comments to make regarding the difficulties of the personnel
and their behavior, commendable or otherwise?

A. I think the conduct of all was commendable without excep-
tion.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to
examine this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the
investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. W. H. Kimbrough, Lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve, attached
to Commander Task U.C. Seventy-One Staff.

2. Q. In your capacity as Intelligence Officer on the Staff
of Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet have you been furnished
information from Commander Seventh Fleet regarding enemy
mining activities in the various island channels?

A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. Do you keep a complete and up to date file of this
information?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. Do you give this information to the Operations Officer
and the Assistant Operations Officer on Commander Submarines
Seventh Fleet Staff?

A. Yes, sir.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine
this witness.

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The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the
investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Lieutenant Commander J. L. P. McCallum, U.S. Navy,
Torpedo and Gunnery Officer, Staff, Commander Submarines Seventh
Fleet.

2. Q. In your capacity as Gunnery and Torpedo Officer, have
you obtained information concerning Japanese mines?

A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. Will you please tell us what you know regarding the
depth of water in which they are planted and characteristics as
to their type, whether or not they have ever gotten adrift and
been picked up by Allies and any other information you have
concerning Japanese mines?

A. Japanese have only moored contact mines within the
knowledge of our intelligence. No magnetic mines are known to
be used by the Japanese. Contact mines used by them are in
general similar to U.S. contact mines. No known Japanese mines
are in use that are not directly affected by the dip of any
current that may exist in localities where they may be laid. I
have no direct knowledge of the depths in which Japanese mines
have been laid, but the Dip Tabulation for U.S. mines indicates
that fields laid in depths over fifty fathoms in any locality
where an appreciable current may be expected is of such a
degree that the mines would not be expected to contact a ship
when currents are in excess of one and one-quarter knots. I
have received intelligence indicating that the Japanese mines
have been found adrift in the vicinity of the Sulu Archipelago
and Balabac Straits. Minefields laid in any areas subject to
rough seas or to currents of the order of one to two knots will
not normally endure for periods of over six months. It does
not mean that a high percentage of the mines will be cast adrift.
I base this statement on the experience of the Allies in con-
nection with the North Sea field.

Cross-examined by the interested party:

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4. Q. Have you available data to give the estimated dip of a
mine anchored in one hundred fathoms of water set to eight feet
depth at low water slack when subject to a current of one and
one-half knots?
A. Yes, sir, it is sixty feet.

5. Q. Anchored mines usually contain a device rendering them
inoperative when on the surface. Do you know anything regarding
the reliability of such device?
A. Yes, sir. Most contact mines are fitted with a hydrostat
intended to render the mine inactive should the mine be cast
adrift. The dependability of this device as shown with exten-
sive use is such that it cannot be used in minefields moored
near the surface. In addition, the spring of the hydrostat is
of such construction that if a mine rises to the surface after
submergence at deep depth there is no assurance that the mine
will become disarmed.

6. Q. From your Dip Tabulations, what is the dip indicated
for mines planted in forty-one fathoms of water to a set depth
of eight feet when exposed to a current with a strength of one
and one-half knots?
A. Twenty-six feet.

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the
investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. Heber Hampton McLean, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commander
Submarine Squadron Sixteen.

2. Q. What was your station on or about 20 June 1944?
A. On 20 June 1944, in addition to my duty as Commander
Submarine Squadron Sixteen and Commander Task Group Seventy-One

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point Four, I was assigned additional duty as Operations
Officer, Task Force Seventy-One. I served as Operations
Officer during the period from 22 May until the latter part of
June.

3. Q. At that time was the Robalo operating as a ship of that
Task Force?

A. Yes, sir. Robalo was under refit and training and departed
on patrol under Task Force Seventy-One on 22 June 1944.

4. Q. I show you a copy of an Operation Order. It is part of
the record of this court. Is that the Operation Order under
which she departed?

A. Yes, sir.

5. Q. Will you state generally what her route was to the
operating area?

A. The Robalo was routed through Lombok, Makassar, Sibutu
and Balabac Straits to her operating area.

6. Q. As Operations Officer, did you brief the commanding
officer of the Robalo and explain to him in detail his Operation
Order?

A. Yes, sir. The normal procedure is for the commanding
officer to discuss the Operation Order with the Intelligence
section and with Commander Jensen. Upon conclusion of that,
the Order is again gone over with the Operations Officer. It
is my recollection that this procedure was followed in this
case. I am certain no commanding officer ever departed on
patrol until the Operations Officer had found out if he fully
understood the Operation Order.

7. Q. Can you state definitely that the commanding officer was
given all the information regarding enemy movements of all kinds
and enemy minefields of which you were in possession of at that
time?

A. Yes, sir.

8. Q. It is noted in the Operation Order that the latest
information is contained Annex Able. Was this information in
Annex Able thoroughly discussed with the commanding officer?

A. Yes, sir.

Cross-examined by the interested party:

9. Q. What is your previous experience in the combat area in
the Southwest Pacific?

A. I arrived in this area July 1942, assumed command of
Submarine Division Twenty-One and additional duties as Assistant
Operations Officer. I then went on war patrol for a period of
two months on the Sargo. On completion in late October, I

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assumed duty as Commander Submarine Division Sixty-One and
Operations Officer of Submarines Seventh Fleet in which
capacity I served until becoming Chief of Staff to Commander
Submarines Seventh Fleet in March 1943. I served in that
capacity until December of the same year when I returned to the
States for a brief period. I returned to the area in late
February 1944 and assumed command of Submarine Squadron Sixteen
and of the waterfront activities.

10. Q. What important considerations determined the routing
of the Robalo?

A. At that time the Flasher, Crevalle, and Angler were depart-
ing for group operations in the South China Sea which had been
vacant for some time. They were routed via Lombok and Karimata
Straits, and it was so timed that they would transit Karimata
Strait on successive days. The Robalo was sent via Sibutu
and Sibutu to be available to support Southwest Pacific Force
operations in Noemfoor which was scheduled in the latter part
of June. For this reason and in order to diversify routing of
submarines through the islands, the Robalo was routed through
Sibutu and Balabac Strait.

11. Q. In the light of all information then available to you,
did you select the routing with any reservation as to the risk
of enemy opposition? In other words, did you consider the
route reasonably safe?

A. I considered this route as safe and possibly safer than the
one via Karimata.

12. Q. What enemy opposition do you consider existed in Lombok
Strait?

A. Patrols would likely be encountered and possibly aircraft.
I consider that the depth of water and current would preclude
the effectiveness of any mines.

13. Q. What are the risks to be met in traversing Karimata
Strait?

A. There is a long stretch of comparatively shallow, readily
mineable, water. As I remember there is some two hundred miles
of water around fifteen to eighteen fathoms. If a submarine was
detected in that stretch an efficient anti-submarine group
would make it very dangerous for a submarine. There is also the
possibility of surface patrol and aircraft.

14. Q. What are the principal risks in transitting Sibutu
Passage?

A. Enemy surface and air patrols.

15. Q. What are the principal risks in transitting Balabac
and Nasubata Channel?

A. Nasubata Passage could be covered by surface and air
patrols. We had previous indications of mining in that area.

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Investigation was made as to the probable effectiveness of such
mines and it was considered in the deep water of this passage,
with the probable currents existing, that moored mines would
not be effective. The Crevalle had made a westbound and east-
bound passage of this Strait just prior to the departure of the
Robalo and had reported no indications of mines.

16. Q. Would you, then, consider this routing to be reasonably
safe under the conditions of warfare?
A. Yes, sir.

17. Q. Did the Commanding Officer of the Robalo express or
imply any dissatisfaction with any phase of his orders?
A. No, sir.

18. Q. In your experience as Operations Officer, do you know
of any instance on the part of any commanding officer to
hesitate to accept the dangers incident to the patrol operations
upon which he was ordered?
A. No, sir.

Reexamined by the investigating officer:

19. Q. When were you relieved as Operations Officer?
A. On the 26th of June Captain Tichenor relieved me as
Operations Officer. Three days later he departed for the
East Coast to attend a conference, and I again took over the
job until my own departure for the East Coast on the 2nd of
July.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated:

I would like to state that on Kimmel's previous patrol his
ship suffered severe damage from an aircraft bomb and that
despite this damage, which would have influenced a less
determined commanding officer to return to port, he continued
on patrol. At the time he departed on his subsequent patrol,
I felt that he was fired with a strong determination to go out
and get them.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the

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Investigation and declared as follows:
Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank and present station.
A. Murray Jones Tichenor, Captain, U.S. Navy, Operations
Officer, Staff, Commander Task Force Seventy One.

2. Q. When did you assume the duties as Operations Officer of
Task Force Seventy-One?
A. 1 September 1943.

3. Q. Were you Operations Officer when the Flier departed on
2 August?
A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. I show you an Operation Order. Can you identify it as
the Operation Order that was prepared for the Flier prior to
her departure on 2 August?
A. Yes, that is a true copy of the Operation Order.

5. Q. State briefly the routing of the Flier?
A. Flier departed Fremantle 2 August to proceed to the South
China Sea, routed via Exmouth Gulf, Lombok Strait, Makassar
Strait, Sibutu Passage and Balabac Strait.

6. Q. Did you and your assistants prepare the Operation Order
for the Flier?
A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Please state fully, but concisely as possible, the
method used in preparing Operation Orders and explain the
briefing of the commanding officers.

A. Future planning of patrols is done by myself and Commander
Jensen on a preliminary basis and then, almost invariably, I
discuss them with the Commander Task Force. After this the
individual Operation Order for the submarine is written in the
rough form by Commander Jensen. This rough draft of the Opera-
tion Order is thoroughly checked over by myself and changes
made as considered necessary in discussion with Jensen. It is
then presented to the Chief of Staff who likewise may make alter-
ations or changes. In the majority of cases the rough draft
is taken to the Commander Task Force for his preliminary
approval. The orders are then written in the smooth and
submitted through the same channels as in the rough for signa-
ture by the Task Force Commander. During this period the com-
manding officer of the submarine generally has visited the
operations office several times. He is told the area in which
he is going to patrol, is interviewed by Commander Jensen and
myself, and then by the Intelligence Officer on
subjects pertaining to his patrol, principally in respect to

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northern and southern approaches to Palawan Passage are through
Mindoro and Balabac respectively. These areas are considered
of utmost importance to us at the present time and are areas
that have been very productive. Submarines transitting Mindoro
or Balabac Strait necessarily cut the Japanese shipping route
from Iri to Manila.

11. Q. At about the time that Flier was due to traverse
Balabac did you receive some spot information regarding enemy
traffic in Palawan Passage?

A. At about the time we believed the Muskallunge and Flier
were in the vicinity of Mindoro and Balabac Straits respectively,
we received a despatch from the Puffer about interception of a
convoy in the western approaches of Mindoro Strait and that she
had inflicted damage on that convoy and was trailing cripples.
This convoy was, I believe, heading southwest, bound in the general
direction of Palawan Passage. We sent that information to submarines on
patrol and a special directive for the Muskallunge to endeavor
to intercept that convoy and I believe called special attention
of the Flier to the Puffer's information.

12. Q. Regardless of Flier's routing, in order to act on that
information regarding the Puffer's convoy, would it have
necessitated her traversing Balabac?

A. From the position where we believed Flier to be at the
time we had the information, I consider that it would have been
necessary for the Flier to transit Balabac Strait in order to
intercept the convoy at the southern end of Palawan Passage.

13. Q. Is the passage of the submarines of the Seventh Fleet
to the operating areas opposed by enemy anti-submarine measures
and if so what is the nature of them?

A. I consider that submarines approaching operating areas are
opposed by every anti-submarine measure that the enemy is able
to bring against them; namely, aircraft, patrol vessels,
destroyers, radar, mines, reports of sightings by vessels,
mining, underwater sound devices; in fact, every anti-submarine
measure known.

14. Q. Do you consider that the routing selected for the
Flier constituted undue risks to her?

A. I do not consider that the routing of the Flier had any
more risk attached to it than the routing of any other submarine
through the operating areas.

15. Q. When you briefed the commanding officer of the Flier
did he express any objection to the Operation Order?

A. To the best of my knowledge he did not.

Reexamined by the investigating officer:

16. Q. Please state what was the last information received
from the Robalo.

A. The last information received from Robalo was a despatch

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at about 1020 local time on the morning of 2 July, from a
position in the western part of Celebes Sea, which reported
that she had sighted a task force, consisting of one battle-
ship and two destroyers, that she had been unable to close.
Position, course and speed were reported.

17. Q. What attempts were made to get in touch with the
Robalo by radio and on what dates?

A. No attempts were made to get in touch with Robalo until it
was considered that she was on her return trip to Fremantle and
was in such a position that we should be receiving her despatch
report of time of arrival. Robalo was expected to return to
Fremantle from patrol on or about 14 August. Not having heard
from her on 11 August, we requested her to give us her
position and estimated time of arrival Fremantle. This
message was sent out on normal submarine schedules for a period
of three successive days. No reply was received.

18. Q. Have you any opinion as to what might have happened to
the Robalo?

A. At the time Robalo was overdue, I was of the opinion that
she had met with misfortune after her radio communication to
us reporting the contact of the Task Force, and probable as a
result of that contact. Since that time I have received
information which indicates otherwise.

19. Q. I show you U.S.C. & G.S. Chart Number 4306. It has
been prepared by Lieutenant Commander W. R. Laughon, U.S. Navy,
showing the tracks of the Flier through Masubate Channel. On
this chart also is the track of the track of the Crevalle
through this channel which was given in the Flier Secret annex
to the Flier Operation Order. Also on this chart is the Lapon
when she went through this channel on 10 July. When did
the track followed by the Lapon come into your possession?

A. After the Lapon returned from patrol.

20. Q. Did you have this information prior to the time the
Flier sailed?

A. No, sir. This was received about 24 August.

21. Q. Will you state to the court the navigational instruc-
tions given in the Lapon Operation Order relative to transitting
the Sulu Archipelago and Balabac Strait?

A. The Lapon, in her Operation Order, was instructed to
"stay clear of readily mineable waters in the vicinity of the
Sulu Archipelago and Balabac Strait. Use deepest water routes
in transitting Sibutu, Mindoro and Balabac Straits".

22. Q. It is noted that the same phraseology "deepest water
water routes in transitting Sibutu, Balabac and Mindoro
Straits" is also used in the Flier Operation Order. Will you
please amplify this phrase?

A. By use of the phrase "deepest water routes" of the

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respective straits, it is intended that submarines in transit-
ting the straits, with due consideration to the vagaries of
navigation, will proceed, in general, through the deepest
channels. In the case of Balabac Strait this definitely meant
that Nasubata Channel should be used.

23. Q. It is noted upon this chart that the Crevalle Track is
about eight hundred yards to the northward of where the Flier
was sunk, and the Lapon Track is about eight hundred yards to
the southward of where the Flier was sunk. Do you consider that
the Lapon Track which lay between the Crevalle Track and the
Lapon Track was a safe track as regards enemy minefields?

A. Such would certainly be a correct assumption, for both the
Crevalle and the Lapon transitted the strait safely.

24. Q. Do you consider that, since the Flier was not using
at the time she was sunk the deepest water through Nasubata
Channel, there was a violation of the Operation Order "use
deepest water routes when transitting Sibutu Passage and
Balabac Strait"?

A. No, sir, I do not.

25. Q. As Operations Officer, can you give me a summary of
the pertinent despatch information sent to the Robalo and
received from the Robalo on her war patrol number three?

A. Yes, sir, as follows:

(1) Despatch 240837 June - Sent to Cominch stating Robalo
    departed Fremantle 22 June to patrol South China Sea.
(2) Despatch 020220 July - Robalo reported sighting enemy
    Task Force 0800 Now 2 July in position 03-29 N.,
    119-26 E.
(3) Despatch 160729 July - Robalo instructed to confine her
    patrol to area west of longitude 108-00 E. as of 18 July.
(4) Despatch 191246 July - Robalo informed all the area
    designated in her Operation Order now available to her.
(5) Despatch 110904 August - Robalo directed to report her
    position and estimated time of arrival, Fremantle.

26. Q. Can you give me a summary of the pertinent despatch
information sent to the Flier and received from the Flier on
her war patrol number two?

A. Yes, sir, as follows:

(1) Despatch 051117 August - Sent to Cominch stating Flier
    departed Fremantle 2 August to patrol off French Indo
    China Coast.
(2) Despatch 121616 August - Told Flier to note Puffer's
    third message. (Puffer's third referred to movements of
    enemy units).
(3) Despatch 141506 August - Told Flier to note Muskallunge's
    second message. (Muskallunge's second referred to move-
    ment of enemy units).

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Recross-examined by the interested party:

27. Q. From last reported position, could Robalo have reached
Balabac Strait by the night of 3 July?

A. Yes, sir.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

At his own request the defendant, Commander John D. Crowley,
U.S. Navy, took the stand to testify, was advised that the oath
previously taken by him was still binding, and testified as
follows:

Examined by the defendant:

1. Q. What is your estimate of the maximum draft of the
Flier just prior to the sinking?

A. The vessel was in diving trim. All ballast tanks dry. I
believe that the draft is seventeen feet, ten inches.

2. Q. In previous testimony you gave three considerations of
a submarine commanding officer in transitting passages between
islands in enemy controlled waters. These are: (1) possibility
of contact with enemy mines; (2) presence of enemy anti-
submarine vessels; and (3) navigational dangers. Which of these
did you consider primary in this particular instance?

A. I considered that safe navigation together with the
maintenance of sea room in the event of contact with an A/S
vessel combined as the considerations of primary importance. I
considered the possibility of enemy mines secondary to these
others.

3. Q. In your experiences of making passage through various
channels, during this war as submarine commanding officer,
where the navigational aids are unlighted and not well known,
have you found that the unpredictable currents, in spite of all
the information available, make it necessary to give sufficient
sea room to avoid grounding in darkness on poorly charted reefs?

A. In my experience in these waters, which had been limited
to one previous patrol, I found the information very sketchy
and undependable. I believe the safest method is to allow as
much sea room as possible and observe current as it appears on

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the plot and be alert to correct the course as necessary to
meet the circumstances.

4. Q. What was the primary method used in obtaining fixes?

A. Radar plot. Soundings were used for verification.

5. Q. Did you consider the sea room between the Crevalle
Track and the reefs of Roughton Island sufficient to
warrant taking your ship more to the north then to the south?

A. The Crevalle Track is north of the central axis of the
navigable water. Based on considerations of keeping maximum
sea room, a track south of the Crevalle Track is indicated.

6. Q. Do you think the explosion on the Flier was from a
battery?

A. No. I believe the explosion was from an external source.
At the time of the explosion I had four main engines on the
propulsion and the auxiliaryengine carrying the auxiliary load
with a zero float on the battery. I consider from the fact the
battery was not being charged that very little probability of a
battery explosion existed.

7. Q. In your narrative you expressed the statement the
explosion was on the starboard side. Did you feel any movement
of the Flier to port at that time?

A. I recall very definitely a side-ways whip back and forth.

8. Q. Please state exactly where you were and what your
actions were from the time of the explosion until you went into
the water.

A. I was standing in the center of the forward end of the
bridge at the time of the explosion. The aggregate of my
impressions fixed the source of the explosion as forward on the
starboard side near the waterline. I was aware of the start of
a column of water in the air and the next thing I knew I was
holding on to the rail near the after TBT on the port side. I
immediately upon regaining my faculties ran forward to sound the
collision alarm which is on the starboard side just above the
conning tower hatch. The impressions that I received at this
time are as follows: there was a very strong smell of fuel oil,
the conning tower was dark, there was a strong blast of air
venting out the conning tower hatch, there was noise of flooding
and screams emanating from below, personnel were coming out of
the conning tower hatch. At the time I reached the forward
part of the bridge the bridge deck was starting under. The
vessel apparently had a down angle of about the same amount
that is taken on a normal dive. My next impression was that of
being projected through the water at a great forward speed, and
as the bridge went under I was washed out through the after end.
I never saw nor felt any trace of the vessel after this.

Cross-examined by the interested party:

9. Q. Did you have the track of the Crevalle laid out on your

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chart?

A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. It is noted that your Operation Order stated: "Stay
clear of the readily mineable waters in the vicinity of the
Sulu Archipelago and Balabac Straits. Use deepest water routes
in transitting Sibutu, Balabac, or Mindoro Straits." Why did
you not follow the Crevalle Track which is laid according to
the deepest water route of Nasubata Channel?

A. I consider that in any approach to Nasubata Channel from
the eastward it is necessary to pass through some mineable
water. I did not consider that the Crevalle Track constituted
the best approach for a westbound passage from the standpoint
of navigation through this relatively narrow passage between
the unlighted reefs in the face of unpredictable currents.
Furthermore, I do not consider that it provided the greatest
available room to maneuver in the event of contact with an
enemy surface patrol. The track I selected I consider to be
more favorable to both the above considerations, and in
addition it was designed to pass through the bottleneck, which
is probably the most readily mineable spot, in the deep water.

11. Q. In the narrowest part of the channel, how far south
of the Crevalle Track was your track?

A. Eight hundred yards.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The investigation then, at 4:45 p.m., adjourned until 9:30
a.m., tomorrow, 16 September 1944.

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Third Day

Headquarters of the
Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet,
Saturday, 16 September 1944.

The investigation began at 9:30 a.m.

Present:
Rear Admiral Freeland A. Daubin, U.S. Navy, the investigating
officer;
Cecil Leland McCormick, chief yeoman, U.S. Navy, reporter;
The defendant, Commander J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, and his
counsel;
The interested party, Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy,
and his counsel.

The record of proceedings of the second day of the investiga-
tion was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the investigation
were present.

The refit commanding officer of the U.S.S. Flier not being
present in the area, at his own request the defendant, Commander
J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, took the stand to testify, was advised
that the oath previously taken by him was still binding, and
declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. Please state how long the Flier was under refit prior
to her departure on 2 August and her general material condition
at the end of the refit.

A. The Flier was refitted by the relief crew of Submarine
Division One Sixty-One and the tender forces of the U.S.S.
Orion during the period July 5, 1944, to July 19, 1944. The
regularly assigned commanding officer relieved the refit com-
manding officer on July 19, 1944. Subsequent to that date the
vessel was sound tested, satisfactorily completed a dive to
test depth and satisfactorily completed all machinery tests.
The first sound test was not satisfactory because of excessive
water noises emanating from the starboard screw. The vessel
was docked on July 26 to investigate the cause for this situa-
tion and during docking the starboard tailshaft was replaced
with a spare. Both propellers were replaced by spares recently
checked for pitch and the starboard strut bearings were pulled
and brought to standard clearance. Subsequent to undocking on
July 31, the vessel was again given an underway sound test and
was pronounced satisfactory. I personally listened to the
sound test and concur with the decision. Flier was ranged to
determine her degaussing condition on July 5, 1944. The
results of the observation of that ranging are in this letter.

The letter was submitted to the investigating officer and to
the court and by the witness offered in evidence. There being
no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit 4".

The witness continued:

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It is my opinion that Flier was in all respects ready for sea
when she departed Fremantle on 2 August 1944 for second war
patrol.

2. Q. What was the general condition of the battery and the
battery ventilation system at the end of the refit?

A. The condition of the battery was excellent and the battery
ventilation was satisfactory in all respects. Regular charging
procedure was followed and hydrogen readings were always well
within the allowed limits.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the
investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. George Warren Patterson, junior, Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commander Submarine Division One Sixty-One.

2. Q. Were you the training officer for the Flier prior to her
departure on last patrol?

A. I was.

3. Q. Will you please state in your opinion the efficiency of
the officers and crew of the U.S.S. Flier?

A. In my opinion the efficiency of the officers and crew of
the U.S.S. Flier was excellent. My personal observation of the
operations of the Flier underway during the normal training
period convinces me that the state of training of both the
fire control and ship control parties of the U.S.S. Flier was
excellent. Commander J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, a graduate of
the submarine school at New London, Connecticut, was qualified
to command submarines. He had made five war patrols in command
of the S-28 operating in the Aleutians area. He had made one
war patrol in command of the U.S.S. Flier. He was a graduate
of the PCO school at New London, Connecticut. He had on 1
August 1944 had command of the Flier for a period of eight
months. The executive officer, Lieutenant J. W. Liddell,

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Junior, U.S. Naval Reserve, was qualified in submarines. He
has been recommended for qualification in command. He first
entered the submarine service during the summer of 1941 as an
officer on board the U.S.S. Snapper. He was engineering
officer on board the U.S.S. Flier at the time of commissioning
and had served on board the Flier for a period of eight months.
Lieutenant P. Knapp, U.S. Navy, the engineering officer of the
Flier, was a graduate of the submarine school and the Naval
Academy, class of 1942. He has been recommended for qualifi-
cation in submarines. On 1 August 1944 he had served on board
the Flier three months. Lieutenant J. E. Casey, U.S. Navy a
graduate of the submarine school and the Naval Academy, class
of 1942, was gunnery and torpedo officer of the U.S.S. Flier.
He had served on board the Flier eight months on 1 August 1944.
Ensign W. I. Reynolds, U.S. Navy (junior grade), the
communication officer of the U.S.S. Flier, was qualified in
submarines and had served on board the Flier on 1 August 1944
for a period of three months. Ensign H. A. Baehr, U.S. Navy,
first lieutenant of the Flier, had been recommended for quali-
fication in submarines and had served on board the Flier on 1
August 1944 for a period of eight months. Ensign Phillip Mayer,
U.S. Naval Reserve, a graduate of the submarine school, reported
on board the Flier during her refit at Fremantle. He was
assigned duties under training. Ensign A. E. Jacobson, junior,
U.S. Naval Reserve, was a graduate of the submarine school and
was commissary and assistant gunnery and torpedo officer on
board the Flier. On 1 August 1944 he had served on board the
Flier a period of three months. Ensign H. A. Miner, U.S. Navy,
had been recommended for qualification in submarines, and was
the assistant engineering officer and diving officer on board
the U.S.S. Flier. On 1 August 1944 he had served on board the
Flier a period of eight months. Of the seventy-seven enlisted
men on board on 13 August 1944, fifty-seven were qualified in
submarines. The percentage qualified was about seventy-four
percent. During her last refit thirteen new men were transfer-
red to the Flier and of this number seven men had made at
least one war patrol on other submarines. At the end of her
first war patrol, the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Flier
made the following statement concerning personnel in his war
patrol report: "A large percentage of both officers and enlisted
personnel received their first combat experience during this
patrol. Their performance of duty was exceptional and reflected
the soundness of the underway training program conducted at
New London and Pearl Harbor. Extensive use of the available
training facilities ashore from the time the crew was first
formed until the present has paid dividends. In addition, the
extended period from commissioning until this patrol, together
with a small personnel turn-over, has resulted in more than the
average training for a new boat".

The defendant did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

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The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, withdrew and resumed his seat as
counsel for the interested party.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the
investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Maurice William Shea, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Raton.

2. Q. Were you the refit commanding officer of the Robalo
prior to her departure on her last patrol?

A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. Please state how long the Robalo was under refit and
her general material condition prior to her departure on last
patrol.

A. The Robalo was under refit for a period of fourteen days
and after that she operated, under went a post refit prior to
going on patrol which total time was approximately twenty-three
days. The post refit was divided between operations and
repairing minor repairs upon return to port.

4. Q. At the time of her departure, was she in all respects
ready for sea insofar as material condition was concerned?

A. Yes, sir.

5. Q. Had she received the customary refit?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Was the commanding officer satisfied as to material
condition?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Had she been sound tested?

A. Not during my tour as relief commanding officer of the
Robalo.

8. Q. Do you know in your knowledge whether or not she did
receive a sound test prior to her departure?

A. Yes, sir, she did as it is customary to sound test all
boats prior to patrol.

9. Q. Had she been ranged to determine degaussing condition?

A. Yes, sir. Robalo was ranged on 30 May 1944 and her
degaussed condition is contained in this letter.

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The letter was submitted to the investigating officer and to
the court and by the witness offered in evidence. There being
no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit 5".

10. Q. What was the general efficiency condition of the
battery and battery ventilation system of the Robalo?

A. Excellent, sir.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the
investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Commander Willis A. Lent, U.S. Navy, Commander Submarine
Division One Twenty-One.

2. Q. Were you training officer for the Robalo prior to her
departure on her last patrol?

A. Yes, sir, I was.

3. Q. In your opinion what was the general efficiency of the
officers and crew prior to her departure?

A. From a training standpoint both the officers and the crew
compared favorably with the other submarines I have trained in
this area. The commanding officer had had the experience of
one patrol in command of the Robalo prior to this training
period, and had made at least five patrols on other fleet sub-
marines in the Pacific as second or third officer. The
executive officer, Lieutenant Commander C. W. Powell, U.S. Naval
Reserve, had completed two patrols as executive officer of the
Robalo which was his only experience in the Pacific. Both the
third officer and the fourth officer, Lieutenant Commander H. E.
Carter, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant R. J. Proseus, U.S. Navy, had
been on the Robalo from fitting out on, and I consider them
very capable submarine officers. There was one other officer,
Lieutenant (junior grade) H. F. McKnight, junior, U.S. Naval
Reserve, who had been on the boat since commissioning. The

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engineering officer on the second patrol was Lieutenant O'Toole
who had made two patrols on the Robalo and several on other
fleet type boats. He was detached from the ship during refit
period with the idea of being sent to new construction but
plans were changed in order to strengthen the Robalo. He was
transferred to that ship. Ensign J. A. Lutman, U.S. Navy, was
assigned to the Robalo. Ensign S. L. Tucker, U.S. Naval
Reserve, and Ensign H. J. Gerdes, junior, U.S. Navy, were
relatively inexperienced officers, both of whom were transferred
to the Robalo I believe after her arrival in this area. Robalo
sailed with a crew of seventy-three men of whom fifty-two were
qualified. Nineteen men were transferred to the relief crew
between the second and third patrols. Seven men of the Robalo
crew were transferred after the first patrol and were returned
after the second patrol.

4. Q. In your opinion was the Robalo well trained and ready
to go on patrol?

A. Yes, sir. I reported to the training officer after firing
torpedoes that in my opinion the Robalo was ready to proceed
on patrol.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The investigation then at 12:10 p.m., took a recess until
1:45 p.m., at which time it reconvened.

Present:
The investigating officer, the reporter, the defendant, and
his counsel, and the interested party and his counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the trial were
present.

At his own request, the interested party, Rear Admiral R. W.
Christie, U.S. Navy, took the stand, was advised that the oath
previously taken by him was still binding, and declared as
follows:

Examined by the interested party:

1. Q. Do you as Commander Task Group Seventy-One point One
and signer of Operation Order 100-44 consider that the orders
in paragraph (x) (3), "Use deepest water routes in transitting
Sibutu, Balabac or Mindoro Straits" left any discretion to the

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commanding officer?

4. Information regarding the likelihood of mines to be
encountered by the Crevalle was given in various manners: (1) the
general information from well before the war to the date of the
Operation Plan was contained in an annex so marked; (2) other
information, Ultra Secret in nature, was given in an annex to
the Operation Order; (3) in the Operation Order itself was given
the paragraph quoted, (x) (3). In the annex to the Operation
Order the track of the Crevalle which had made several safe
passages through Balabac Strait was given as information. The
term "use deepest water routes, etc." in (x) (3) of the
Operation Order was a direct order. The information regarding
the Crevalle track was specifically made information to dif-
ferentiate it from an order. It is, however,
pertinent to state in general the operational policy of this
command is to tell the submarine commanding officer what to do
but not how to do it. Instructions to use deepest water routes
was given for the specific reason that we considered that mines
could not be effectively planted in that deepest route through
Balabac Strait, which is Masubata Channel. Since this is the
be crux of the question, I will amplify the general operation
policy further to say that I can readily understand that the
commanding officer may have had many good reasons for not fol-
lowing precisely the track of the Crevalle, but that he must
have realized that the safest route was the deepest water
route insofar as the mine menace was concerned.

None of the parties to the investigation desired to examine
this witness.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous question-
ing.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness upon having his testimony read to him, pronounced
it correct, was duly warned, withdrew and resumed his seat as
an interested party.

Neither the investigating officer, the defendant, nor the
interested party to the investigation desired any more witness.

Commander J. D. Crowley, U.S. Navy, defendant, submitted a
written statement, which statement was read and is appended.

Rear Admiral R. W. Christie, U.S. Navy, interested party,
submitted a written statement, which statement was read and is
appended.

The investigation was finished, all parties thereto with-
drawing.

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STATEMENT OF COMMANDER JOHN D. CROWLEY, U.S. NAVY, BEFORE
REAR ADMIRAL F. A. DAUBIN, U.S. NAVY, INVESTIGATING OFFICER.

I wish to state that upon Flier's departure for Second
War Patrol I consider that she was in excellent material
condition, and that the personnel situation both as to the
general background of experience and state of training was
entirely satisfactory to me.

Before my departure I was carefully and thoroughly briefed
by the Intelligence Officer, Assistant Operations Officer, and
Operations Officer of the Staff of Commander Task Force Seventy
One, and on the forenoon of departure was additionally in-
structed by the Task Force Commander.

During the night of 12 - 13 August 1944, I received in-
formation from the Task Force Commander as to the course, speed,
and position of the remnants of a convoy previously attacked by
Puffer off Cape Calavite. Flier's position at the time of receipt
of this information was such that by employment of surface
running throughout daylight on 13 August 1944, I could transit
Balabac Strait and proceed to inter-
cept the convoy twenty five miles west of Balabac Island at
0230 14 August 1944. In the absence of specific instructions
prohibiting transit of Balabac Strait, I would have done so in
pursuit of this convoy even if I were not originally so routed.
It was, therefore, in a spirit of eager anticipation of early
contact with the enemy that we approached Balabac Strait and
with absolutely no feeling of apprehension as to special
hazards that might lurk there.

In my approach to Nasubata Channel I believe that the
route employed was sound in that it was favorable to safe
navigation, despite the probability of unpredictable currents,
and that it was also favorable to evasion of enemy patrol
craft. In addition, it was designed to put the vessel in deep
water in the narrow part of the channel between Comiran Island
and Boughton Island.

The primary means employed for determining the position
of the vessel was the radar plot and this was reported as check-
ing perfectly. Single ping soundings were taken at frequent
intervals to verify the plot, and I required a report from the
navigator after each sounding as to how well it agreed with the
chart. All soundings were in agreement except the last one of
forty one fathoms which was less than expected and I immedi-
ately conferred with the navigator relative to a course change
to put us into deeper water. At the same time, the possibility
of error in reading a single ping sounding was recognized and
another was ordered for verification. It was at this time that
the explosion occurred.

The state of the tide, about midway between low and high
water, would indicate that the strength of flood could be
expected. Flier was definitely set to the northward prior to
sinking and every indication is that the survivors were set
to the northeastward by the flood tide and then to the
westward by the ebb tide, being then in such position as

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to be principally affected by the flow through North Balabac
Strait and surroundings. This appears to substantiate the
existence of a strong current at the time of the sinking, and
expert testimony has been introduced which shows that if the
depth of the water were forty one fathoms and the velocity of
the current were one point five knots, a moored mine would dip
to about twenty six feet below the surface. This is well below
the keel depth of a fleet submarine.

The nature of the explosion was such as to impress upon me
the opinion that it was near the surface. I did not observe any
tendency to lift the boat although I did feel a sharp sidewise
jar. Nothing that I observed gave me the impression that the
vessel was hogging or sagging which result would almost
certainly accompany severe damage to the keel. It appears
probable then that the vessel may have struck a floating mine.

I do not feel that Flier was at any time subjected to any
risk over and above that which must be willingly accepted by
submarine personnel operating in wartime through these passes
in which the enemy is exerting every means at his disposal to
deny us passage. I respectfully submit my past war record of
five patrols in command of an S-class submarine in the
Aleutians and one patrol in command of Flier as a background of
experience upon which the foregoing conclusions are based.

I deeply regret the loss of a fine ship together with
seventy eight fine shipmates and friends. The other survivors
join me in paying this final tribute to them.

Very respectfully,

JOHN D. CROWLEY,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Flier.

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STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL R. W. CHRISTIE, U. S. NAVY, BEFORE
ADMIRAL T. A. DAUBIN, U. S. NAVY, INVESTIGATING OFFICER.

As Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet, and Commander Task
Force Seventy-one, I am fully responsible for the operation of
some fifty submarines. In planning their operations, I am
keenly alive to the very great risks which they accept in the
waters of the enemy. In each case, the hazards are calculated
against the opportunity for inflicting damage upon the enemy.

Specifically in the cases of Robalo and Flier, I requested
that an investigation be conducted by an officer not connected
with my organization and one who is senior in rank to me. The
purpose of this request was to establish the facts by a disin-
terested investigator while all witnesses were available and to
determine whether our operating methods were proper.

The officers upon whom I depend in the Operations Division
are all men of long experience and possessing professional compe-
tence of the highest order. I do not know any better men in
the submarine service for the job of Operations Officer than
Captain Tichenor and Captain McLean. They have had actual com-
bat experience in a submarine against the enemy, as have I, and
have learned by actual experience the pressure and scope of the
anti-submarine measures the enemy has been able to effect.

Evidence that the submarines of Seventh Fleet have been
operated with skill, determination and success lies in the re-
sults which are tabulated below. These figures cover the opera-
tions of the submarines under my command from March 1, 1943 to
September 1, 1944.

                                        TF-71         TF-72         Submarines
                                                                    7th Fleet
1. Number of Patrols                    126           73            199
2. Number of Submarines                 48            32            80
3. Tonnage sunk                         1,531,640     404,292       1,935,932
4. Tonnage damaged                      844,317       297,519       1,141,836
5. Tonnage sunk and
   damaged                              2,375,957     701,811       3,077,768

6. Man-of-war sunk                      CL-1, CM-3    CL-1,         CL-2, CM-4
                                        DD-17,        XCVS-1,       XCVS-2,
                                        XCVS-1,       DD-20, XAV-1, DD-37, XAV-2,
                                        XAV-1,        ACV-1, SS-2,  ACV-2, SS-3,
                                        ACV-1,        DM-1, TB-1,   DM-1, TB-2,
                                        SS-1, AS-1,   PT-1, AS-1.   PT-2, AS-2.
                                        TB-1, PT-1.

7. Man-of-war                           BB-1, CV-1,   CA-1, CL-1,   BB-1, CA-1,
   Damaged                              CVS-1,        DD-3, PO-1,   CL-1, CV-1,
                                        CM-4, DD-2,   TB-1.         CVS-1, CM-4,
                                        CGA-1,                      DD-5, CGA-1,
                                        XAV-2,                      XAV-2, AV-1,
                                        AV-1, TB-1,                 TB-2, PO-1,
                                        XCVS-1.                     XCVS-1.

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It will be noted that since 10 April 1944, when we were di-
rected to attack enemy destroyers when possible, that twenty
enemy destroyers have been sunk. The month of August 1944 is
our greatest month with 270,500 gross tons sunk and 104,100
damaged. Preliminary reports indicate that September will be
even more successful. Percentage of torpedo hits for the last
eleven months has been 40.1. The following submarines of this
force have received the Presidential Unit Citation: Trout,
Gudgeon, Bowfin, Greenling, Guardfish, Wahoo. Action is pend-
ing in the case of Harder and Bonefish.

This damage has not been effected without loss. In Task
Force Seventy-one during my command the following submarines
have failed to return from patrol: Grenadier, Grayling, Cisco,
Capelin.

In the final analysis, the burden of enemy pressure lies
on the shoulders of the captains of these fine submarines. They
are selected after many eliminations with the greatest of care.
The Commanding Officer of the Flier, Commander Crowley, has made
five war patrols as Commanding Officer of the S-28 in the
Aleutians. He has made two war patrols as Commanding Officer of
the Flier. He has been recommended for the award of the Navy
Cross for his success achieved on his first war patrol in the
Flier. He has been recommended to command a division.

The Commanding Officer of the Robalo, Lieutenant Commander
Kimmel, was an officer long experienced in submarines. His
first patrol in the Robalo was most fearlessly and aggressively
conducted. Near the beginning of his patrol his ship was se-
verely damaged by the enemy, but in spite of that he continued
on patrol. I consider Commander Crowley and Lieutenant
Commander Kimmel to be officers of the highest type, profession-
ally competent, experienced and possessing qualities of leader-
ship and character that are exemplary.

The burden of responsibility in directing the operations
of these submarines is a very heavy one. I feel the loss of so
many splendid young men in the Robalo and Flier very personally.
It is small comfort to feel that the planning and direction of
the operations of these vessels has been done to the very best
of our ability.

R. W. CHRISTIE,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet and
Commander Task Force Seventy-one.

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NARRATIVE OF SECOND WAR PATROL OF U.S.S. FLIER.
(All Times HOW and Approximate.)

At 1500 August 2, 1944 - Departed Fremantle, W. A. for
Second War Patrol and made an uneventful passage in accordance
with routing, passing East of PEARL BANK into the SULU SEA at
0300 August 13, 1944.

August 13, 1944 - Rounded BARCORAN ISLAND to the north-
east on the surface at a minimum range of 19 miles and at 1500
took departure from BARCORAN ISLAND to converge and then run
down the recommended steamer route approaching BASUBATA CHANNEL.
At 1800 made landfall on BALABAC ISLAND and obtained a fix
using bearings of peaks on BALABAC and PALAWAN ISLANDS. (No
evening stars were obtained because of a complete overcast.)
The fix showed the vessel to be on the steamer route about 50
miles from BALABAC ISLAND. The route intended to be followed
through BALABAC STRAIT was that recommended by the U.S.S. CRE-
VALLE and given in annex to the Operation Order. At 1800 com-
menced taking intermittent soundings to establish crossing the
100 fathom curve, and continued taking them thereafter. All
soundings checked with the chart. At 1930 made radar contact
on BALABAC ISLAND and shortly thereafter on BUGSUK ISLAND. At
2100 made radar contact on COMIRAN ISLAND at 16,000 yards range.
At 2130 sighted COMIRAN ISLAND, and about this time made radar
contact with ROUGHTON ISLAND. Speed had been reduced to five
knots while the landfall on COMIRAN and ROUGHTON ISLANDS was
being made, but when the position of the vessel relative to
these points had been verified speed was increased to seventeen
knots.

At 2200 with COMIRAN ISLAND bearing 190 T distance about
6,700 yards there was a terrific explosion estimated to have
been on the starboard side abreast of the forward battery. Oil,
water, and debris deluged the bridge. There was a tremendous
venting off of air through the conning tower hatch and the
vessel sank in about twenty or thirty seconds while still making
about 17 knots through the water.

It is my opinion that a mine was in contact with the hull
just below the waterline at the time of the explosion, since
there was no tendency to lift the ship, and it is further my
opinion that the hull was clearly holed and not that the vessel's
back was broken.

The following personnel were seen by various of the sur-
vivors to be in the water after the vessel had sunk:

CROWLEY, John D., #70079, Comdr., USN
LIDDELL, Jr., James W., #85674, Lt. D-V(G), USNR.
HOWELL, Arthur C., #647 83 45, CR1, USNR.
TREMAINE, Donald P., 375 93 43, FC2c, USN.
MILLER, Wesley B. 882 95 54, MOMM3c, USNR V-6.
RUSSO, James D. 705 22 98, QM3c, USNR V-6.

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BAUMGART, Earl R., 305 92 74, MOMM3c, USNR V-6.
KNAPP, Paul, #123451, Lt., USN.
CASEY, John E., #123674, Lt., USN.
REYNOLDS, William L., #105645, Lt.(jg), USNR.
MAYER, Phillip Stanley, #270779, Ens., E-V(G), USNR.
HUDSON, Edgar Walker, 295 24 90, CMOMM(AA), USN.
POPE, Charles DeWitt, 261 88 13, CQM(AA).
MADEO, Gerald Francesco, 642 94 60, F2c, USNR.

The word was passed for all survivors to gather together but
Lt. Reynolds, Hudson, and Pope did not re-appear. Ens. Mayer
was being assisted by Howell but after about 20 minutes he was
unconscious and had to be abandoned. Shortly thereafter Lt.
Knapp became separated from the party and was not again seen nor
heard.

The sky was completely overcast and no land was visible
except occasionally during flashes of lightning. It was my
first impulse to swim towards COMIRAN ISLAND, but after consi-
dering the chance of falling into Japanese hands there, it was
decided to try to make one of the coral reefs to the northwest-
ward. The occasional flashes of lightning and some breaks in
the cloud cover to the southward permitted us to orientate our-
selves at intervals, but much of the time in between we were
probably swimming in circles.

After moonrise at 0300 it became easier to remain orien-
tated. All this time Lt. Casey had been unable to see and had
been guided in his swimming by various members of the party. At
0400 he apparently became exhausted and went under. It
was about this time that land became visible ahead and there-
after our efforts were directed toward it.

Madeo now began to fall behind the group but because of
the strong currents it was apparent that the only hope for any-
one lay in swimming at best speed, and he was therefore told to
do the best he could toward the land. He was not seen nor heard
after 0500. After daylight the seas began to pick up making
swimming more difficult and the party began to separate, all
having the objective clearly in sight. By 1330 five of the
group, Lt. Liddell, Ens. Jacobson, Howell, Baumgart, and myself,
had reached a floating palm tree about two miles from MANTAN-
GULE ISLAND, and swam with this aided by the current to the reef
off the south coast near the eastern end of that island. Upon
coming ashore at 1530 this group was met by Russo who had swum
the entire distance. At 1700 Tremaine was found on the eastern
end of the island by Lt. Liddell. A lean-to was constructed and
the night was spent on the sandy portion of the beach.

The spot at which we landed and spent the first two nights
commanded a view of the vicinity of the wreck. At no time was
any activity noted. A plane which passed overhead at 1500 did
not deviate from its course toward BALABAC.

August 15, 1944 - The Commanding Officer and the Executive
Officer made an inspection of the east coast of the island to
search for food and water and to formulate a plan for reaching
the most likely spot where friendly natives could be found. It
was decided to construct a raft and proceed via BYAN and GABUNG

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ISLANDS to BUGSUK ISLAND with PALAWAN ISLAND as the ultimate
objective. The search for food and water resulted in one
coconut which was divided among all hands. At 1700
Miller appeared in camp from the western end of the island where
he had been at work throughout the day and reported he
had found nothing at that end. At 1800 a large geyser of water
was seen to rise from the beach at a point followed by the sound
of a distant explosion, the source and reason for the explosion
is unknown. The vicinity had been observed throughout the day
and at no time was any activity noted, and again a plane passed
over in the afternoon without deviating from its course.

August 16, 1944 - In the forenoon the party moved to the
eastern end of the island and gathered drifted pieces of bamboo
which were lashed together with vines into a raft about seven
by four feet. Two paddles were constructed of bamboo. At 1500
shoved off for BYAN ISLAND and landed on the northwest point of
that island just after sunset. The night was spent there.

August 17, 1944 - At 1600, near low water slack, made our
way with the raft across a coral reef to GABURO ISLAND landing
on the southwest point at sunset and spent the night there.

August 18, 1944 - We worked our way east along the south
coast of GABURO ISLAND searching for food and getting into posi-
tion for the trip to BUGSUK ISLAND. One edible drifted cocoa-
nut was found and divided among all hands. Immediately upon
rounding the southeast point of GABURO ISLAND a group of build-
ings was visible on BUGSUK ISLAND. At 1400 shoved off for
BUGSUK ISLAND and landed and left the raft on APO ISLAND at 1700.
The buildings were cautiously approached on foot but no sign of
life was apparent. The buildings apparently had been evacuated
for sometime, and had subsequently been looted. There was an
excellent grove of cocoanut trees here and a cistern from which
all hands drank. The night was spent in the house.

August 19, 1944 - Shortly after sunrise two native boys
appeared, one of whom could speak English reasonably well, and
he told us that if we would accompany him he could provide us
with food and water. He also warned us not to drink the water
in the cistern as it had been poisoned. However, no ill effects
were subsequently noted. He guided us to a building apparently
an old school house, about a mile inland, and here we were met
by Mr. Pedro Sarmiento, leader of the BOLO Battalion of BUGSUK
ISLAND, together with three soldiers armed with rifles and six
men with blow guns and bolos. We were told by Mr. Sar-
miento that he had a small sailboat (classed as a sampit) avail-
able, and that his orders were to return any Americans found to
Brooke's Point, PALAWAN. He also said that a landing party of
Japanese was expected soon at the spot on which we had landed,
and that he was anxious to get us clear of that vicinity. We

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ate a meal of fish and rice and started out immediately in the
direction of the BUGSUK River, this was our first meal since
leaving the FLIER.

The distance to the boat was about eight kilometers, and
it soon became apparent that our physical condition would not
permit making the entire trip at one time, so we stopped and
spent the night in a small native hut about halfway. From this
time on we were fed regularly.

August 20, 1944 - We completed the trip to the boat, and
about 1600 departed for the guerilla outpost at CAPE BULILUYAN,
PALAWAN, where we arrived about midnight.

August 21, 1944 - We were met at CAPE BULILUYAN by Ser-
geant Pasqual de la Cruz (PA), U.S.A.F.F.E., who relieved
Mr. Sarmiento of responsibility for our safe conduct. Sergeant
de la Cruz then told me the information he had concerning the
loss of the ROBALO. We remained in the Army Barracks here until
we departed for BROOKE's POINT in the same sampit at about noon.
Before departure I requested Mr. Sarmiento to make a search of
the islands in the vicinity of BALABAC STRAIT for any other
survivors of ROBALO or FLIER, and he assured me he would do
this. The wind was not favorable so we anchored in the evening
in the TUBA River.

August 22, 1944 - Underway at 1100 for BROOKE's POINT
arriving there early the following morning. Near sunset a
Japanese launch was sighted on the horizon and was evaded by
dousing sail and rowing into the beach.

August 23, 1944 - Upon arrival at Brooke's Point we were
escorted to the home of Captain N.B. Mayor, Infantry (PA)
(USAFFE) Acting Commanding Officer of Sector D of the Sixth
Military District. Also at this point there was found a U. S.
Army Coast Watcher Unit who put their communication facilities
at our disposal. Submitted report to CONTASKFOR SEVENTY-ONE
and then we were offered transportation to an evacuation point
about 5 miles inland. Here we received medical treatment using
the facilities of the coast watchers and were afforded the best
available food and lodging by Mr. T.H. Edwards, an American
citizen in business at Brooke's Point before the war and now
in evacuation.

August 26, 1944 - Received instructions from Commander,
Seventh Fleet, to arrange details for rendezvous and evacuation.

August 27, 1944 - Conferred with Captain Mayor regarding
the availability of transportation and cooperation of his forces
in the evacuation plan.

August 28, 1944 - Submitted plan for rendezvous to Com-
mander, Seventh Fleet.

August 29, 1944 - Received Commander, Seventh Fleet's
approval of rendezvous plans and notification that REDFIN would

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be there on the 30th and again on the 31st if necessary.

August 30, 1944 - At 1330 a small Maru anchored near
rendezvous and remained there. The security signal was not dis-
played because of his presence, but by 2000 the evacuees were
all embarked in two small boats, one equipped with an outboard
motor and voice radio equipment and towing the other. It was
decided to attempt to establish radio contact with REDFIN before
moving to seaward of the Maru, but attempts made between 2000
and 2200 were unsuccessful. It was then decided to head out
to the southeastward, well clear of the Maru, and to again
attempt radio or visual communications being careful to keep
the light concealed from the Maru. At 2330 established radio
communications with REDFIN but because of weak signal strength
had to use CW instead of voice. At 0050 August 31, sighted
REDFIN and reported aboard to the Commanding Officer at 0103.

JOHN D. CROWLEY,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding Officer,
U.S.S. FLIER (SS250).

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[CROSSED OUT: SECRET]
[CROSSED OUT: S-2-C-R-E-T]

UNITED STATES NAVY                                12/gr.
                                                  TASK FORCE SEVENTY-ONE,
                                                  TASK GROUP SEVENTY-ONE POINT ONE,
                                                  U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223), FLAGSHIP.

OPERATION ORDER                                   PERTH, WEST AUSTRALIA.
No. 100-44.                                       31 July, 1944. 1635 HOW.

TASK ORGANIZATION
(a) U.S.S. FLIER - Commander J. D. CROWLEY, - 1 SS.
    (Task Unit 71.1.8)

1. (a) Enemy information found in Task Group 71.1 Operation
    Plan Number 1-43, of 1 September, 1943.

   (b) Latest intelligence information and prospective move-
    ments own forces contained in Annex "ABLE" to this
    Operation Order.

   (c) Principal Japanese Shipping Routes as contained in
    Annex "CHARLIE" to this Operation Order. These
    indicate general routes only.

2. This unit will wage unrestricted submarine warfare against
   the enemy in order to destroy enemy shipping and to deny
   the enemy use of vital traffic lanes.

3. (a) FLIER

    (1) DESTROY ENEMY SHIPS.

    (2) When directed about 2 August, 1944, depart
        FREMANTLE and proceed to EXMOUTH GULF via
        Bombing Restriction Lane. There fuel to
        capacity.

    (3) Thence proceed via LOMBOK STRAIT, MAKASSAR STRAIT,
        SIBUTU PASSAGE, and BALABAC STRAIT to patrol areas
        201 and 202 in accordance with following schedule:

        AREA 201 - Weeks commencing 7 August, 21 August
                   and 4 September, 1944.

        AREA 202 - Weeks commencing 14 August and 28
                   August, 1944.

        Change patrol areas each Sunday.

- 1 -

— page 133 —
[STAMP: SECRET]
UNITED STATES NAVY
12/gr.
TASK FORCE SEVENTY-ONE,
TASK GROUP SEVENTY-ONE POINT ONE,
U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223), FLAGSHIP.

OPERATION ORDER
NO. 100-44.

— page 134 —
[STAMP: SECRET]
S-E-C-R-E-T

UNITED STATES NAVY 12/gr.
TASK FORCE SEVENTY-ONE,
TASK GROUP SEVENTY-ONE POINT ONE,
U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223), FLAGSHIP.

OPERATION ORDER PERTH, WEST AUSTRALIA.
NO. 100-44. 31 July, 1944. 1635 HOW.

— page 135 —
NAVAL MESSAGE

ACTION ASPRO PUFFER ROBALO X SERIAL 99 X STEVENSON X
CANCEL PATROL AREA FOUR ZERO ONE X PROCEED DIRECTLY
ACCORDANCE YOUR OPORD ROUTING TO PATROL AREAS THREE ZERO
ONE AND THREE ZERO TWO BETWEEN LATS SIXTEEN DASH THIRTY
AND EIGHTEEN DASH THIRTY NORTH X SELBY X ALL AREA FOUR
ZERO ONE NOW IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO YOU X KEMMEL X
RAYS EARLY RETURN MAKES ALL OF HUNTING GROUNDS ASSIGNED
YOUR OPORD AGAIN AVAILABLE TO YOU

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:
[SIGNATURE: M. J. Jensen]
M. J. JENSEN,
Commander, U. S. Navy.

ORIGINATING OFFICER [HANDWRITTEN: 32]
T.O.D.
ORIGINATOR 079-71

DATE AND
TIME GROUP
191216

PRECEDENCE:
ROUTINE HOW TRANSMITTED:
ACTION
70 71.1
SYSTEM: 100-B
INFORMATION
CODING:
TYPING:
[STAMP: OUTGOING] COPY TO
REC'D
RELEASED BY
DATE:
19 JULY 1944.
| 00 | 01 | 05 | 06 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 16 | 20 | 64 | 70 | 86 | 90 | 95 |

— page 136 —
NAVAL MESSAGE

ACTION ROBALO INFO CHINA SEA BOATS X COMMENCING DARK EIGHTEEN
JULY CONFINE YOUR PATROL TO AREA WEST OF LONGITUDE ONE ZERO EIGHT
EAST X SERIAL 75 X RAY WILL START WORKING SOUTH OF NINE
NORTH BETWEEN MERIDIANS ONE ZERO EIGHT AND ONE TWELVE ABOUT THAT
TIME X

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:
[SIGNATURE: M. J. Jensen]
Commander, U. S. Navy.

ORIGINATING OFFICER 12
T.O.D.
ORIGINATOR | HOW TRANSMITTED: | ACTION | INFORMATION
GTR-71 | | TG-71.1 |
DATE AND | 00 | 01 | 05 | 06 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 16 | 20 | 64 | 70 | 86 | 90 | 95
TIME GROUP
160729 |
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE
CODING:
TYPING: OUTGOING
DATE: 16 July 1944.
COPY TO
REC'D
SYSTEM: 108-B
RELEASED BY

— page 137 —
S̶E̶C̶R̶E̶T̶
SECRET
UNITED STATES NAVY
TASK FORCE SEVENTY-ONE,
TASK GROUP SEVENTY-ONE POINT ONE.
U.S.S.BONEFISH (SS223), FLAGSHIP.

OPERATION ORDER
NO. 80-44.

PERTH, WEST AUSTRALIA.
20 June, 1944. 1620 HOW.

TASK ORGANIZATION
(a) U.S.S.ROBALO - Lieut.Comdr., M.M.KIMMEL, - 1 SS.
(Task Unit 71.1.18)

1. (a) Enemy information found in Task Group 71.1 Operation
Plan Number 1-43, of 1 September, 1943.

(b) Latest intelligence information and prospective move-
ments own forces contained in Annex "ABLE" to this
Operation Order.

(c) Principal Japanese Shipping Routes as contained in
Annex "CHARLIE" to this Operation Order. These
indicate general routes only.

2. This unit will wage unrestricted submarine warfare against
the enemy in order to destroy enemy shipping and to deny
the enemy use of vital traffic lanes.

3. (a) ROBALO

(1) DESTROY ENEMY SHIPS.

(2) When directed, about 22 June, 1944, depart
FREMANTLE for EXMOUTH GULF via the Bombing Rest-
riction Lane; there fuel to capacity.

(3) Thence proceed via LOMBOK STRAIT, MAKASSAR STRAIT,
SIBUTU PASSAGE, BALABAC STRAIT, and South of DANGER-
OUS GROUND to patrol the SOUTH CHINA SEA and approach-
es to the GULF of SIAM South of latitude 9° North
and West of longitude 112° East, paying particular
attention to SINGAPORE - SAIGON, SINGAPORE - MANILA,
and SINGAPORE - EMPIRE traffic routes.

(4) At dark on 2 August, 1944, depart area for return
to FREMANTLE via BALABAC STRAIT, SIBUTU PASSAGE,
MAKASSAR STRAIT, and LOMBOK STRAIT. Stop at EXMOUTH
GULF only if fuel is required.

- 1 -

— page 139 —
COMMANDER SERVICE FORCE
SUBORDINATE COMMAND
SEVENTH FLEET
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif. S/mr.

S81-6
Serial: 0326

5 July, 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

From: Commander Service Force, Subordinate Command,
SEVENTH FLEET.
To : Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.

Subj: Degaussed Condition of Submarines.

1. The following tabulation gives the degaussed condition
of the USS FLIER which ranged 5 July, 1944 :-

Safest present zone of operation 70N.
Minimum present safe depth below keel at 70N. 42 feet.
Minimum present safe depth below keel at 80N. 43 feet.
Worst present heading South.
Best present heading North.
Minimum safe depth below keel at 80N if
degaussed 42 feet.
Worst headings if degaussed North & South.
Best headings if degaussed East & West.

Remarks : This submarine does not require degaussing.

/s/ R. E. LAWRANCE.

Certified to be a true copy:

[SIGNATURE: P. F. Straub Jr.]
P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

cc: CTG 71.3
CO USS FLIER.

— page 140 —
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

COMMANDER SERVICE FORCE
SUBORDINATE COMMAND
SEVENTH FLEET
S81-6 Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif. s/mr.
Serial: 0233

30 May, 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

From: Commander Service Force, Subordinate Command,
SEVENTH FLEET.
To : Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.

Subj: Degaussed Condition of Submarines.

1. The following tabulation gives the degaussed condition of
the USS ROBALO and the USS BONEFISH which ranged 30 May, 1944.

(A) USS ROBALO :-

Safest present zone of operation. 8°N.
Minimum present safe depth below keel at 8°N 39ft.
Worst present headings North & South
Best present headings East & West.

Remarks : Degaussing could not improve the condition of
this submarine.

(B) USS BONEFISH :-

Safest present zone of operation. 8°N.
Minimum present safe depth below keel at 8°N 52ft.
Worst present heading South
Best present heading North
Minimum safe depth below keel at 8°N if 37 ft.
degaussed North & South
Worst headings if degaussed East & West.
Best headings if degaussed

Remarks : This submarine requires degaussing by Flash D.

/s/ R. E. LAWRANCE.

Certified to be a true copy:
[SIGNATURE: P. F. Straub]
P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

CC: CTG71.3

— page 141 —
[STAMP: SECRET]
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

23 September 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET
"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"
Subject: Investigation into the loss of the U.S.S. ROBALO and
the U.S.S. FLIER.

This is an investigation convened by COMINCH to inquire
into the circumstances connected with the loss of the U.S.S. ROBALO
and the U.S.S. FLIER.

The U.S.S. ROBALO departed Fremantle 22 June 1944, and
last reported her position at 0800, 2 July as 03-29N, 119-26E, stating
in addition that an enemy force of 1 BB, 2 DE, and 1 CV had gotten by
her. No further information has been received.

The U.S.S. FLIER departed Fremantle 2 August. On the
night of 13 August, the FLIER was making transit through Nasubata
Channel. Last sounding was 41 fathoms. Shortly after 2200 there was
a terrific explosion, and FLIER sank within a matter of seconds. No
enemy surface or air units had been sighted, and there was no evidence
of an enemy SS being in the vicinity while survivors were in the water.

Eight survivors including the commanding officer, reached
land on 14 August and made contact with a coast watcher's unit. The
commanding officer of the FLIER was given information at this time that
the ROBALO sank on 3 July as a result of an explosion in the forward
battery compartment, that four survivors including the commanding officer,
were made prisoners by the Japanese, and that two of these, including
the commanding officer, were shot either deliberately, or while trying
to escape.

The record is in the proper form, and the findings and
opinion are in accordance with the evidence.

COMINCH directs that the record be forwarded via Commander
Seventh Fleet, but since COMINCH is the convening authority, Commander
Seventh Fleet, being in a lower echelon, is in no sense a reviewing
authority. He merely comments on the record and adds any information
that may help the convening authority to evaluate the investigation. His
action is not one of "approval" but one of "concurrence".

If F-2 has any additional evidence which would throw light
on the loss of these two ships, such should be appended to the suggested
endorsement as an enclosure and the endorsement and enclosures attached
and bound in front of the first page of the record.

A suggested endorsement is attached.

"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"
[SIGNATURE: J.J. DeCelles]
J.J. DeCelles

[HANDWRITTEN: Com 7th Flt]
[HANDWRITTEN: S-6096 RS]
[HANDWRITTEN: FILE A2-3]
[HANDWRITTEN: (1)]

— page 142 —
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
A17-25(F-6-2/dcw)

Serial:
UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

23 September 1944

Commander Seventh Fleet has carefully evaluated the
attached record of investigation and concurs (or does not
concur *) in the findings of fact and opinion of the investigat-
ing officer.

[SIGNATURE: T. C. Kinkaid]
T. C. KINKAID,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander Seventh Fleet. [HANDWRITTEN: BHH]

* (In case of non-concurrence add "in the following instances
etc.").

"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"

— page 143 —
END OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: H-108]
[HANDWRITTEN: AR - 145 - 77]
|||1.0
|||1.1
|||1.25
|||1.4
|||1.6

|||2.8 |||2.5
|||3.2 |||2.2
|||3.6 |||2.0
|||4.0 |||1.8

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[SEAL: Outer ring: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Inner ring: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION
D-52264