U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS-223) — war patrol report SS-223_BONEFISH_Part2.pdf

— page 1 —
1/2" Type of Gun Used: One 4"/50 cal. deck gun.

Type of Ammunition and Number of Rounds Fired: 46 rounds 4" 50 c.o.l. common.
1 round 4"/50 cal. E.C.

Effectiveness of Fire: Several of the common shells were seen to pass through the target's superstructure without exploding, doing little damage. The shells hitting low in the hull are cleared to detonate, giving the lethal blow and setting the target afire.

Average Range: Average hitting gun range was 3500 yards.
Average radar range was 3100 yards.

Fire Control: Normal fire control system used.

Erratic Performance: The gun sights were in bad need of borer sighting.

— page 2 —
1. MINES
No enemy mine activity was observed.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND VASION TACTICS.

The only unusual anti-submarine factor encountered was night-flying air patrols and air escorts. On the night of July 30th, this vessel was detected and subsequently bombed by an enemy aircraft that appeared to be equipped with radar and/or a radar homing device.

The convoy trailed and attacked August 2 - 3, was escorted by night flying aircraft. There were no indications that the planes with this convoy were radar equipped.

Normal evasive tactics were used in evading sound contact with anti-submarine vessels, employing deep depths for reducing the noise of propeller cavitation of own screws and taking advantage of temperature gradients to blanket submarine noises.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND MALFECTS.

No damage was received as a result of the encounters with the enemy.

No new major defects developed during this patrol. The principal defects and deficiencies of this vessel are:

(a) Main engines smoke excessively.
(b) Auxiliary machinery oversprays during battery charges.
(c) Reciprocating type trim pump is too noisy.
(d) Auxiliary electrical power supply inadequate and not properly controllable.
(e) Both periscopes improperly aligned optically.

The minor material difficulties encountered, during the patrol, are listed herewith for information:

(1). Number 10 unit of #2 main engine began knocking and showed a high exhaust temperature, and low compression pressure. Inspection revealed a cracked exhaust valve and cylinder head. The cause of this casualty was thought to be overloading while engine was cold. A new head and four exhaust valves were reinstalled, and the engine operated satisfactorily.

(2). #1 main engine began using an excessive amount of fresh water. The source of the leak was not readily apparent but investigation showed that the leak was

— page 4 —
1. CONFIDENTIAL
put full field on the generator and causing a very high I.C. voltage with consequent disastorous result on the SJ Radar. (See Radar Section).

(L) RADIO

(A) Two days out of FRENANTLE VIXO's signal strength dropped to S1-S0 and Japanese station's prodmin.ted. Two days south of the barrier the signal strength increased to S3-S5 with very little interference. From the barrier north to Northern CHENGSHA, reception was very good at all times on 9250 kcs. In this area, 4370 kcs was heard S3 for a few hours in the middle of the day, 12360 kcs, varying from 85 to 80 all hours, while the new frequency 16150 kcs, was unheard.

In the SULU SEA, southern end, 9250 kcs. came in very good except in the early morning hours (1700 - 2300 Z) and 4370 kcs. was good for one hour daily during the period 0400 - 0800 Z. In the northern end of this area, we could not hear VIXO on any frequency except during the hours from 1000 to 1400 Z and then only on 9250 kcs. Japanese interference was unnoticeable (?) with a few exceptions when apparently deliberate jamming took place for a period of from ten to fifteen minutes. In most instances we were able to copy through it.

Three serials were transmitted on 8470 kcs. with no repetitions requested. VIXO answered up after first call on each occasion.

(M) RADAR

SJ-2 Radar.

(a) Perform.noc -
The continued excellent performance of this equipment is very gratifying. Three night surface attacks were made and only radar information including final bearings was used.

During gun attacks, the flight of 4" shells was observed on the screen and hits showed-up as a slight distortion to the left hand edge of the target pip. Observing the shell splashes on the screen is a great aid to range spotting.

(b) Casualties -
(1) Echoes disappeared from the screen several times. This was due to poor crystal operation and was corrected by installing a new crystal.
(2) Transmitter stopped pulsing and plate

— page 5 —
1. Current w.s. off scale until fuse F-1 blew out.
   A shorted condenser, C-10, was found to be the trouble source, and replacing it, restored normal operation.

(c) Modifications -
Modifications were made at sea to permit keying the transmitter and receiving other radio transmissions audibly. The authorized modification of CTF 71 Disp. tech 27-807 July.
Soon after making these modifications, messages were exchanged with great facility beyond visual range with U.S.S. CABRILIA via SJ Radar, up to 1 minute range of about 16 miles.

(d) Performance -
Land contacts were obtained at 56 miles. Plans were detected beyond 30 miles. This equipment continues to perform very well and is depended upon very greatly by all hands.

(e) Casualties -
(1) Double and triple traces on the indicator screen and interference lines along the sweep were caused by defective 801A-4 oscillators. Replacing the tubes corrected the troubles.

(2) Remarks -
During this patrol, supply voltage fluctuations in the I.C. system were a constant trouble causing a reduction in the operating life of the 801A-4 tubes. To get around these supply voltage fluctuations and their consequent bad effects, the SJ motor-generator unit was used to supply power to the SD Radar. This procedure is successful and indicates the necessity of a well regulated generator of adequate power to run all installed radar equipment and any additional equipment which might be installed.

The need for an all-band radar detector is also greatly felt, especially since the enemy is apparently increasing night air coverage of convoys. The ARC receiver does not meet this need very successfully. A detector of automatic frequency sweeping is very desirable.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

On all occasions the JK and QB units outperformed the

— page 6 —
1. JP equipment. Screws were detected at 12000 yards on one occasion, but the average detecting range was about 5000 yards. The JP performed better than on any previous patrol.
(0) DENSITY LAYERS
No abnormal conditions encountered.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY.
Health throughout the patrol was generally excellent.
Food was satisfactory and made interesting by excellent baking.
Conditions of habitability were good.

(Q) PERSONNEL.
The farsighted policy of rotating personnel for rest and training has allowed this vessel during five patrols to form a crew of trained men more than adequate to fill the normal complement for one patrol. We are now in a position to request that certain men be returned to the U.S.A. for rest and thence to new construction. Each of these men will have completed at least one year of war patrol service.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED.
| Miles | Gals | Mils | Gals/mile |
|-------|------|------||
| From | 22201| 1681.8| 13.2     |
| In | 71275| 7197.2| 9.9      |
| Area | 15751| 1485.1| 10.6     |
| Total | 109,227|      |          |

Fuel oil remaining - 17,157 gallons.

(S) DURATION
Days enroute to area: 9
Days in area: 32
Days enroute to base: 8
Days submerged: 15

— page 7 —
(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING:
Torpedoes - 0.
Fuel - 17,000 gals.
Provisions - 15 days.
Personnel Factor - 15 days.
Limiting factor of this patrol - Torpedoes.

(U) REMARKS
The experience on July 30, with the night flying plane served to highlight a glaring need of our submarines, if the use by the enemy of such planes is to become at all common. This is the need for an adequate and effective radar detector, which produces no out-going detectable signal of its own. As far as is known by this ship, no such equipment exists or is capable to submarines today. The advantages of such a detector are obvious, in that an enemy plane would have to use radar itself to detect the submarine (except by sight) which in turn would warn the submarine in a time to escape detection by diving. A sub. mine's having to use an aircraft warning radar, even in the centimeter band, at night with the attention greatly reduced visibility, aggravates the problem of whether to use the radar or not, to gain early warning while increasing the risk of detection, for beyond its seriousness during the day-light.

It is realized that to design a single instrument to detect all radar frequencies from low to highest in use today is no mean achievement, and is beyond the scope of this report, except perhaps to suggest that it should incorporate an automatic b.n. sweeping feature and that a synchroscope type of CRO be an integral part of the equipment in order to observe and identify the detected pulses.

An R.C instrument is not installed on this ship but experience of this personnel with it elsewhere indicated it to be entirely inadequate in that it has to be tuned by hand; its range of frequencies is too narrow; it provides no visual display; and it limits a signal of its own in the upper b.n.d. (local oscillator).

Pending the provision of some such instrument, it is believed to be within the design capabilities of some of our tender forces to produce an oscillator, such as

— page 9 —
205-12/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON TALVE
serial 0169
care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
24 August 1944.

FIRST INSPECTION TO:
U.S.S. BOYFISH (SS223) -
report of Fifth Star Patrol.

From:
The Commander submarine Squadron TALVE.
The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
The Commander submarines S.S.VEITH FLEET.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. BOYFISH (SS223) - Report of Fifth Star Patrol - comments on.

1. The fifth war patrol of BOYFISH was of 49 days duration of which 32 days were spent in the CLARIBEL and SULU Seas. This was the first patrol for the present commanding officer as such, which accounts for the detail in this report, and adds credit to the previous excellent record of the vessel.

2. BOYFISH made five torpedo attacks:

Attack No. 1 (A & B). This attack was made on the surface on the 1st of August, four hours before the first attack, and four hours after the first attack. The attack was made at night, which was the only time the surface was visible. The torpedoes were fired at the surface, and the surface was hit at 1:00 a.m. The surface

— page 10 —
5-12-16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON 7-TLVE
Serial 0169
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
24 August 1944.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Fifth War Patrol - comments on.

The new type oil control rings will be installed. A Gould trim pump will be installed during the refit. The bow plane tilting series relay contact arm which broke twice on patrol will be built up; this minor alteration has eliminated a common casualty.

5. The state of health and morale of the crew was excellent upon return from this patrol.

6. The squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew on the conduct of a most aggressive and well executed patrol and on the severe damage inflicted on the enemy.

J.R. HADDEN,
Acting.

— page 11 —
0946
Serial: 0946
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO:
USS BONEFISH - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
1. The Fifth War Patrol of the U.S.S. BONEFISH was conducted in the CELEBES and SULU SEAS. The area was thoroughly and aggressively covered. It was the first patrol for the new Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander L. L. EDGE, U.S.N. as such.
2. The well-conducted gun attacks on diesel supply ships, wooden lugs, etc., were noted. Such attacks should act as a deterrent to this type of traffic, or at least force it to anchor during daylight or in the dark, thus materially increasing the time required for the voyage.
3. This patrol is designated "successful" for the award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.
4. The Force Commander congratulates BONEFISH Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew, on this aggressive and successful patrol in which the following damage was inflicted on the enemy:
   - SINK
    1 - AK (TEN MARU Class - EC) * - 2,000 Tons (Attack No. 2)
    1 - AO (KOKUYO MARU Class - EC) - 1,000 Tons (Attack No. 3)
    5 - MIS - 800 Tons (Gun Attack No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.)
   - TOTAL - 12,800 Tons
   - DAMAGED
    1 - AO (SYOYO MARU Class - EC) - 7,500 Tons (Attack No. 4 & 5)
   - CRAND TOTAL - 20,300 Tons
   *The identification of this ship was obtained from a survivor.

P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
Flag Secretary.
R. W. CHRISTIE.
ORIGINAL COPY

— page 12 —
FE24-71/A16-3
Serial: ______

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS BONEFISH - Report
of Fifth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
Comment on: ______

DISTRIBUTION:
ComInCh (3) - Direct) CTP-72 (2)
Vice Opnav (2) - Direct) CSS-12 (1)
Vice Opnav Op-23c (1) CSS-16 (1)
Com1stFlt (1) CSS-18 (1)
Com2ndFlt (1) DivComSubRon-12 (1)
Com3rdFlt (1) DivComSubRon-16 (1)
Com7thFlt (2) DivComSubRon-18 (1)
ComSub1stFlt (30) S/M School M.L. Conn. (2)
ComSub2ndFlt (4) SubJd, 3ere Island (2)
CTF-71 (1) S/Ms 7th Fleet (1)
CTG-71.5 (1)

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY IN TO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

— page 13 —
21 SEP 1944
UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET
Serial: 1/3 64088

A16-3(1)(F-3/roj)
Serial: 1/3 64088

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
USS BONEFISH - Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

R. H. CRUZEN
By direction.

9 C4088

— page 14 —
18 March 1946

REASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE BY SUBMARINES

Reference: (a) ComSubPac 1tr. FF12-10/L11(1) of 21 February 1946.

USS BONEFISH (SS223) 5th War Patrol
Date of Attack: 8 July 1944
Position: Northern Approaches to Makassar Strait

At 1436 on 8 July 1944 BONEFISH fired four stern tubes at the leading AK in an escorted convoy of three AK's but obtained no hits. At 1445 she fired four bow tubes and heard what sounded like a distant explosion. No evidence of sinking or damage was observed or heard and none was credited.

Japanese intelligence lists state that the RYUEI MARU was sunk at this time. Tonnage of that vessel is not definitely known but is estimated at 2300. Commanding Officer, Comdr. L.L. Edge, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:
ComSubLant
SubSchool New London
CO SS-223
Op-23E
Op-414C3

— page 16 —
SS223/AL6-3
U.S.S. BONEFISH
(55 223)

6 November 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
I A L

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BONEFISH.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels).

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH, Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Charts. (To ConsuPac only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the Sixth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the SIBURSA and SOUTH CHINA SEA west of LUZON during the period 5 September 1944 to 6 November 1944, is forwarded herewith.

L. L. S. 3/4/44

DECLASSIFIED
BY QP-0289c DATE 5/24/42

-1-

— page 17 —
27 August 1944: Refit. Conducted by
Submarine Division 122-2 Relief Crew and the USS S. C. R. L. (R-1) (R-

— page 19 —
5 September 1944

1331 Departed FRANKLINE, W.A., for Sixth War Patrol, in accordance with Commander Task Group SEVENTY-ONE point ON: Operation Order No. 125-44, of 4 September 1944.

Headed for Exercise Area ABLE for coordinated day and night training runs with U.S.S. HANNAH; A.N.A.S. ADMITTED acting as target.

1700 During second training approach, developed flooded PT-1 antenna lead-in. Surfaced and sent message to CTG 71.1 requesting permission to return to FRANKLINE for repairs.

2145 Contacted H.H.S.S. DUBBO, assigned as escort, and commenced return to FRANKLINE harbor.

0036 Recorded outboard in nest alongside U.S.S. CHRYST in FRANKLINE harbor. Replacement of cracked porcelain insulator of PT antenna commenced by tender personnel.

0730 Repairs completed.

0947 Departed FRANKLINE, W.A., and set course for DARLING, T. TER., USN LII, in accordance with above operation order.

1306 Submerged for third and deep dive, for final test for leaks.

1637 Surfaced.

1715 Sighted unidentified merchantman bearing 0470 T; avoided on surface without being sighted.

7-11 September 1944.

Noon Positions:

7 Sept.: Lat. 27° 22' S; Long. 112° 11' E.

8 Sept.: Lat. 21° 02' S; Long. 113° 10.2' E.

9 Sept.: Lat. 15° 00.5' S; Long. 116° 07.2' E.

— page 20 —
10 Sept.: Lat. 15° 00' S. Long. 121° 55.5' E.
: 11 Sept.: Lat. 12° 49' S. Long. 126° 16' E.

Narrative:
Narrative

— page 21 —
13 September 1944
Noon Position: Lat. 10° 48' S; Long. 128° 32' E.
043: Combat on SS Racer, 7 miles (Plane Contact No. 1).
044: Submerged, with contact unsealed, no IFF response, and range at 0 miles. Ordered 120 feet depth, because of smooth sea and clear sky, and because the trim was unexpectedly light and submerged once was correspondingly slow. Believed we had about 30 fathoms in this spot. (Lat: 11° 20.5' S.; Long: 12° 35' E.).
047: We were finally leveling off at 120 feet, ship scraped bottom forward, and port sound head (Jk/Jc), the only one rigged out, was violently hit several times. Immediately blew all main ballast tanks, venting in time to check ascent at 50 feet.
0903: Surfaced, and determined that the Pitometer Log was unsecured, but that the port sound head had lost all sensitivity, trained stiffly, and could not be rigged in more than a foot of air. The blindings beyond that point of a bent chart. The lower craft stops had been badly bent by the impact. A gages above 5 knots, severe vibrations of the sound head shaft occurred.
In view of the inability to rig in the sound head and close the seacocks rate for security or further inspection, and of the bad vibration, decided to transmit SUFFISIENT Serial T.O to CTF 71 requesting permission to return to DUNLIN for diver's inspection of the sound head, and giving T.T.
1205: Contact on SS Racer, range 16 miles; F.D.C. out (Plane Contact No. 2).
1213: Plane contact reappeared at 6 miles; submerged.
1243: Surfaced.
1300: Changed course back toward DUNLIN.

— page 22 —
1530 Obtained receipt for BOTTLER serial No. 2 from RDO, HOTOLULU, after third transmission.

14 September 1944

Room position: FORT D. R.I., F. THRI., USN L.I.

0450 Proceeding: rendezvous; sighted and exchanged recognition signals with assigned escort, K.I....S. IL 609.

0530 Intercepted channel, approaching FORT D. R.I.

0743 Located port side to port side of U.S.S. COUG.L., D. R.I. Harbor. Divers commenced underwater examination of hull. Deplaning off fuel tank water.

1000 Determined that there was no observable damage, except to the sound head, which had been wiped completely off. Damage to sound shaft and guide parts required for repair and estimated time needed for replacement, and also saying that BOTTLER was ready for sea but waiting pending further advice from CTF 71 as to whether to proceed or wait for replacement sound head.

1900 Received dispatch reply from CTF 71 with orders to proceed in accordance with our operation order. Completed fueling, with 13,000 gallons of fuel oil, and 1300 gallons of fresh water received from COUG.L.

2040 Departed FORT D. R.I., and again headed for assigned patrol area via bombing restricted lanes east of THRI.

15 September 1944

Room position: Lat. 10° 40.5', Long. 126° 33' S.

0614 Sighted Blue submarine.

— page 23 —
0630 Transcribed visual calls with U.S.S. CRIVILLI, who asked us to transmit on HL, DAR, for them, because of a casualty to their transmitter. CRIVILLI did not say what trouble was but indicated we could do nothing else to help.

0755 Transmitted BOLIVAR serial No. 3, giving CRIVILLI's HL at DAR.

0306 Submerged for trial.

0625 Surfaced.

1336 Contact on SD radar, at 11 miles (Flame Contact No3).

1336 Flame contact showed IFI indications, and was sighted from bridge, at 6 miles, on opposite and parallel course. It then closed and exchanged visual recognition signals. Identified as RAT Beaufort.

1640 Secured IFI equipment on approach to TILO.

1628 Contact on SD radar at 12 miles; not sighted, no IFI response; moved out (Flame Contact No. 4).

1935 Cont. ctd TILO by SC Radar, bearing 330° T, range approximately 60,000 yards.

2000 Observed radar interference on SD radar, which generated weakly for about two and a half hours, as the bearing changed from the starboard bow to the quarter where it faded out. Believed to be the U.S.S. S.S. HL. Unsuccessful with attempts to examine recognition signals, however.

16 September 1944

Room location: Lat. 07° 20.2' S; long. 124° 30' E.

0107 Completed passag.e east of TILO and entered B.D. ... Set course to pass south of HL.10. In the TILO ... Had originally planned to take time out for a day's submerged patrol in vicinity of B.D. HL.10, but the two-day delay incurred in our return to B.D. HL.10, and the short time available.

— page 24 —
0630 Submerged for trim.
0705 Surfaced.
1524 Passed NORTH ISLAND aboard to port, distance 21 miles.
17 December 1944
Location: Lat. 06° 12' S; Long. 119° 07' W.
0130 Passed 15 miles south of KALOA TOA.
0500 Submerged for trim.
0630 Surfaced and headed up toward ISLAND STRAIT.
- Sighted several small sailboats during the day, the day and the night, the day and

— page 25 —
0950 Changed course to head up BILITZ-PAN-LEINKELLIHAT traffic lane.
0939 Submerged for trim.
0956 Surfaced.
1100 Contact on SD radar, at 12 miles (Plane Contact No.5).
1103 Plane moved in to 6 miles; submerged.
1137 Surfaced.
1352 Contact on SD radar, at 22 miles, moved in to 20 miles and back out, facing at 22 miles (Plane Cont. at No. 6).

1915 Crossed equator, Long. 110° 50' E.

19 September 1944.
1000 Position: Lat. 03° 32' N; Long. 119° 35' E.
0010 Passed Tp. LINKELLIHI had been to port, distance 30 miles. Heaped for SUBTUB PSS. sub.
0921 Submerged for trim and drills.
1146 Surf.ced.
1705 Submerged for trim and drills.
1826 Contacted and subsequently exchanged recognition signals and calls by SD radar with U.S. HINGO.

-10-

— page 26 —
1653 Commenced transit of SIBUTU PASS. ... , with LINCO following at about 4 miles.
: 2024 Completed transit of SIBUTU PASSAGE; headed for pass east of PHIL BAY.
: 2245 Commenced transit of pass between PHIL BAY and DOC CAN ISLAND.
: 2321 Completed transit and headed for EAST CUYO PASS.
: 2335 Lost radar contact with U.S.S. LINCO.
: 20 September 1944.
: No Position: Lat. 08° 55' N; Long. 120° 15' E.
: 0611 Submerged for trim.
: 0638 Surfaced.
: 0914 Sighted SOUTH ISLAND LIGHTHOUSE, TUBS. 11. RATS, bearing 0050 T, distance 15 miles. Change course to pass N. of C.A.Y. ISLAND.
: 1045 Sighted and avoided three sailboats.
: 1540 Sighted C.I.U.S. ISLAND, C.A.Y. ISLAND, bearing 0600 T, distance 9 miles.
: 1725 Converted No. 4 F.B.T. to a U.S.T. and submerged to flush it.
: 1748 Surfaced.
: 1926 Contact on S. tip of PHIL by S. Radar, bearing 0700 T, distance 30 miles.
: Passed up S.S. CUYO P.S. 10 - 15 miles from coast of PHIL.

21 September 1944
: No Position: Lat. 12° 51.2' N; Long. 121° 53.2' E.
: 0300 Entered PHIL & STRIKE and assigned area, and continued northward heading for SIBUTU S. ...

-11-

— page 27 —
0620 Contact on SD Racer, 3 miles (Plane Contact No. 7), submerged; but quickly. Sky overcast; plane not sighted. Set course to pass 3 miles N. of BITON ISLAND, through deepest water, and covering northern entrance to T.BLISS STRIT.

: 0916 Slighted twin engine monoplane, bearing 070° T, range about 7 miles, on NW heading (Plane Cont.ct No. 8).

: 1849 Surraced 3.5 miles to westward of BILTON ISLAND, and continued into SUBWAY SEA.

: 2023 Commenced surface patrol on a triangle averaging about 13 miles distance from BODOC POINT covering 1500 miles of traffic lines through SUBTLESS, ISLAND, RAPID, and south of BILTON ISLAND.

22 September 1944.

**Noon Position:** Lat. 13° 10' N. Long. 122° 30' E.

0522 Submerged on 5-mile patrol line, paralleling, and 3 miles off, coast at SW end of BONDOC ENTRUST.

0555 Sighted string of 12 smallcraft headed SE, close inshore; some of these were largeers or sea trucks; the others were miscellaneous launches.

Sighted several sailboats during the day.

1908 Surfaced, and proceeded to same night surface patrol triangle.

2130 Contacted sailboat by radar; avoided.

23 September 1944.

**Noon Position:** Lat. 13° 10' N.; Long. 122° 30' E.

0506 Submerged on same day patrol line as before.

During the day sighted 11 coast-hugging southbound sea trucks, proceeding, simply or in small groups, and 2 sailboats.

— page 28 —
1920 Surface, and resumed night surface patrol as before.

24 September 1944

Room Position: Lat. 13° 09.2' N.; Long. 122° 31.2' E.

0455 Submerged on same day patrol line as for two pre-
    coeding days. Sighted 3 sailboats during the day.

1636 Surface; headed out of SUBWAY SALT because of
    negative results for three days. Delivered the only
    sure place to see any and all traffic passing through
    these inter-island routes was in the eastern en-
    trance to VERDE ISLAND PASS.

203 Passed DOS ENTERPRISES ISLAND, about to port, 5 miles
    away.

2213 Cont.cted and tracked sailboat by radar at about
    6000 yards. -voided.

25 September 1944

Room Position: Lat. 13° 34.0' N.; Long. 121° 10.2' E.

0030 Commenced surface patrol around 5-mile equilateral
    triangle, with two sides 7 - 10 miles from coasts
    of LIZARD and LINDOKO, respectively, in the eastern
    approach to VERDE ISLAND PASS.

0300 Radar contact on sailboat; avoided.

0500 Submerged in eastern entrance to VERDE ISLAND PASS,
    for patrol along a 5-mile line, 2350 - 1050 ft, the
    western end at 1 mile due north of VERDE ISLAND.

    Sighted nothing but several sailboats during the day.

1950 Surface and proceeded out of pass to night patrol
    station.

    Lay to most of night at eastern area of the triangle
    used the night before. Two spl.1 craft rec.ar con-
    tacts during the night were avoided.

20 September 1944

Room Position: Lat. 13° 55.7' N.; Long. 121° 02' S.

— page 29 —
0457
Submerged in eastern entrance to VARDEN ISLAND, 1935, and set course to pass through it to north of VARDEN ISLAND.

S1: The usual half dozen sailboats, one sea truck, and one power launch during the day. Lost the sailboats seemed to be fishing in the eastern end of the pass. The two power boats passed from eastward and seemed to head toward SHIPWAY BAY.

1150 Passed western end of VARDEN ISLAND about to port 1.5 miles. During next two hours made frequent observations, from 50 feet, of BATHING, BAY, but could observe no ship in inside although town of BATHING was plainly visible.

1206 Sighted rusted hulk of small steamer (est. 1000 T.) beached/UNDOOR coast, near POINT GLENN.

1623 Surfaced in VARDEN ISLAND PASS south-west of LITHO BATHING, clearing first assigned area in accordance with our operation order, and set course to pass between CABLE CHANNEL and LITHO BATHING, to enter next assigned area.

1844 Sighted contact in bright moonlight, followed by radar contact at 7000 yards, on a small vessel approaching from the above pass. Began easing around to hit, not sure of his character but did not have too much room for wide maneuvering. At about 3000 yards made him out as a luger. As he drew ahead at about 2000 yards, he suddenly turned away as if just seeing us!

2052 Received instructions from GY 71 to join SHIPMENT LITHO BATHING,

— page 30 —
0212 Contact on 5J Radar at 21,000 yards range, bearing 0250 T. Changes course toward and con-fluence track-ing. (Ship Contact No. 1). Went to four-engine speed, after tracking target on course 0200 T, speed about 10 knots, in order to pass target and gain position for attack on his port bow.

: 0348 Radar contact at 8800 yards, on port quarter or beam of target, believed to be escort. Decided to work astern and up to starboard bow of target to avoid this port escort.

: 0400 Picked up another escort by radar, this time on target's starboard beam; turned back left to resume pulling ahead to port of target.

: 0411 Changed mind again, since we had only about an hour until dawn began, and decided, since we had found no escorts astern of target, this only thing to do was to pull in close astern and attack from this position. Started moving about 50 yards to the east, in a base course of about 0350 T. We were getting close enough to within 50 yards of this time such that there would be insufficient time for a daylight and-roud, especially with the air cover which would most likely be provided at dawn. A stern course seemed to give our only chance of attacking. This would also give us the advantage of being to westward of target if dawn light overtook us during retirement.

: 0435 Could now make out target to be a large, well loaded tanker. We could smell strong odors of fuel oil, since we were down wind from him.

: 0437 Sound picked up echo-ranging from the escorts (18.4 kcs.).

: 0439 Target zig-zag to his right; so, at

: 0442 - 10 Commenced firing four bow tubes, each set at-ting 6 feet, average gyro angles 00, 1/20' divergent spread, track angle 1600 (S), torpedo run 3500 yards, 8 second firing interval.

: 0442-30 Checked fire, because target seemed to have

— page 32 —
0503  |  Lost target by 5° N, 145° Y, 3,450 yards.
: 0501  |  Several more bi-explosions were seen on target, and four underwater explosions, probably rancom depth charges, were felt. During this time on escort again showed a red truck light and rapidly drew past and then to the left away from the target.
: 0529  |  With the increasing light, flames faded out, and only a bi-column of smoke could be seen from the bridge, although it did not appear now nearly as dark as it was earlier or as was the smoke column still hanging over the vicinity. At this time, from the high lookout position and by periscope, one scout was plainly visible back near where the thinning column of smoke appeared to rise from the water; if any of the target were still, bore water, it was hidden by the smoke but the thinness of the smoke made this seem unlikely. It is believed that actually the target had already sunk, and that one escort had departed for the next one, the other mained behind hoping to detect us.
: 0542  |  Sighted float plane from bridge, in direction of smoke but between it and us, with a small angle on bow. (Plane Contact No. 5). Submerged, and changed course to southward. Ran at 120 feet bce. Use of smooth sea.
: 0506  |  Smoke from target no longer visible, but sighted float plane about 10 miles away (plane contact No. 10).
: 1150  |  Surfaced, and headed to patrol southern approaches to 6° N, 125° W, 10 miles.
: 1240  |  Sighted INDIR, bearing 070° T, range about 50 miles.
: 1530  |  Reached surface patrol, position 30 miles, on CAPE CLAVITE.

-17-

— page 33 —
1536 Contact on SD Racer, at 4 miles (Plane Contact No. 11).
    Plane not sighted due to overcast which had formed
    since noon. Submerged.

: 1634 Surf-see.

: 1819 Contact on SD Racer at 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 12).
    SD Racer reported out of commission with range close
    to 9 miles, and plane not sighted. Submerged.

: 1855 Surfaced in cloud-drained moonlight. SD Racer back in
    commission. Resumed surface patrol on east-west line,
    15 miles SW of CAPT CALAVITE.

20 Sept, 1944.

Noon Position: Lat. 12° 55' N.; Long. 119° 46.5' W.

: 0233 Contact on SD Racer, 16,000 yards, bearing 220° T (Shiz
    Contact No. 2). Turned toward and commenced tracking.

: 0325 Made weak SD Racer contact on two smaller vessels
    accompanying the first contact, at range of 11,000
    yards. Delivered to the escorts.

: 0335 Target tracked on base course about 030° T, speed 6 knots,
    turned to eastward to open track, and a land background,
    and 15 in position to attack on target's starboard beam
    and from astern of the escort on target's starboard bow.

: 0354 Two sets of echo-ranging heard and only two escorts were
    by radar, one on target's starboard bow, the other on its
    port quarter.

: 0410 Working down starboard side of target, rough for attack
    position. Night dark, sky mainly overcast, sea cloudy,
    coast of Hindoo as background for us.

: 0418 Commenced approach at 12 knots, keeping bow on near
    search, and sighted, and was probably a destroyer at night
    was too dark to distinguish details such as stack arrangement
    and had a beautiful firing position from about 2500 to 4
    time, however, as about 3000 yards on the ship's starboard
    bow, so that it was not practical to fire a spread
    to include both the DD and the big ship. About this same
    time, the big target was identified definitely as another

— page 34 —
0439 - 36
Connec'd firing, all bow tubes at the tanker;
average range 2700 yards; 1050 (5) track angle;
second firing interval; 00 average gyro angle; 10
divergent spread, aft - forward; 0 feet depth set-
tinct. The third torpedo was seen to take a bad
angle of about 300 left.

: 0440 - 19
Ceased firing, went to full power with left
full rudder, and began pulling out to 50 since
light streaks in the eastern sky indicated that
pulling around the big escort to the NE or US for
another attack would be impossible, even if the
did not sink. In the turn, the escort which had
been on the target's port quarter was picked up
by radar at 2200 yards, evidently having shifted
over to the starboard quarter of the target.
astern of target or having sighted us. It was then
seen from the bridge rather indistinctly, appear-
ing smaller than the other escort and with a small
angle on the bow. At the time of firing we were
almost dead astern of the leading escort.

: 0441 - 20
Hit heard, felt, time, and seen on the target
a little abaft of the 10T. Sparks, flying debris,
a big column of black smoke, and what looked to be
the beginning of a fire, in addition to the explosion
sion flash, were observed.

: 0441 - 36
Second hit heard, felt, time, and seen on the
target a little ahead of 10T. Same results as before
were observed, except this shock seemed to extinguish
the incipient fire.

: 0448
apparently the trailing escort had not seen us
after all, or was a bit timid, because none on him
opened with no difficulty. Had stern tubes ready,
for him in case... A heavy ball of black smoke hung
over the target and it had not come from the stack.

: 0448
five distant underwater explosions heard and felt
through the hull; believed to be random earth charges.

: 0450

— page 35 —
0453 Target faded from radar screen, at 9400 yards after
    heavy, roun progressively smaller, with both escorts
    still giving sizeable pips at.9650 yards. During
    retirement the target was tracked at rapidly falling
    speed, which was two knots or less when it faced out.
    Considering the heavily loaded condition of the tar-
    get, the shallow depth setings of the torpedoes
    (localulated to "vent" the fuel oil), the negligible
    speed, and the range at which this large ship dis-
    appeared from the radar screen while both escorts
    still gave good indications at slightly greater
    ranges, it is believed that certainly the target
    sank. Post-firing analysis indicates that the second
    and fourth torpedoes fired were the ones which hit.
    A third hit would have no doubt occurred, if the
    third torpedo had not taken its erratic angle.

0504. Distant underwater explosion.

0505. Distant underwater explosion.

0509. Distant underwater explosion.

0521. Began working to the SW after retiring to 3rd and 5th
    in order to prevent being against the morning light,
    and also to work over to a patrol position still on
    the approaches to CAPT CALVIN. Dawn was now upon
    us.

0637. Headed surface patrol station, and patrolled a 0900 -
    2700 T, 10-mile line in western entrance to HIDDOL
    TRAIT.

0640. Contact on SD Radar, 18 miles (Plane Contact No. 13).

0645. Plane closed to 12 miles, unsighted. Submerged.

0901. Surfaced, and resumed patrol.

0924. Cont. on SD Radar, 16 miles. (Plane Contact No. 14).

0932. Contact faded out, still at 16 miles.

0945. Contact on SD Radar, 8 miles; submerged (Plane Contact
    No. 15).

1021. Sighted single-engine monoplane, bearing 3500 T, range
    about 2 miles, with zero angle on bow; went back to

— page 36 —
120 feet (Plane Contact No. 15).
: 1320 Surfaced, and resumed patrol.
: 1501 Contact on SD Racer, 15 miles (Plane Contact No. 17).
: 1505 Range moved in to 10 miles, with plane uns. intercepted.
: 1749 Surfaced and resumed patrol.
: 29 September 1944
: Room Position: Lat. 15° 40' N.; Long. 115° 47' W.
: 0609 Contact on SD Racer at 9 miles; submerged (Plane Contact No. 18).
: 0727 Surfaced, and set course for assist. rendezvous with PLANET's pack 30 miles off CAPRICORN ISLAND.
: 0722 Contact on SD Racer at 20 miles (Plane Contact No. 19).
: 0743 Sighted unidentified plane from bridge as range closed to 12 miles by radar. Submerged.
: 0820 Surfaced.
: 0851 Contact on SD Racer, at 12 miles (Plane Contact No. 20). Hoved in to 10 miles; submerged.
: 0927 Surfaced.
: 0955 Contact on SD Racer at 15 miles (Plane Contact No. 21).
: 0958 Submerged when range became 6 miles.
: 1039 Surfaced.
: 1350 Contact on SD Racer at 11 miles, quickly moving in to 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 22). Submerged. This was getting tiresome, but had to keep trying in order to make our assigned rendezvous with PLANET pack on time. Decided to stay down a little longer this time.
: 1506 Surfaced.

— page 37 —
1650 Sighted unidentified plane from bridge (Plane Contact No. 23).
1656 Contact on SD Radar at 14 miles. Submerged.
1629 Surfaced, in moonlight.

: 1941 In assigned rendezvous position, waiting for contact with, or radio instructions from, FLASHER.

20 September 1944

Noon Position: Lat. 14° 55.7' N.; Long. 119° 46.5' E.

0200 0.0.D. saw what he believed to be a green flare at estimated range of 4 miles, bearing 240° T. Suspected a night flying 4/S plane, he submerged. This had no known meaning as regarded friendly forces.

0414 Surfaced after having conducted continuous periscope watch and observed no more flares.

0743 Sighted float plane from bridge, estimated range 12 miles (Plane Contact No. 24). Submerged, and decided to stay there for submerged until contact should be established. In order to remain undetected until contact should be established, he surfaced.

1635 Surfaced.

1930 Received instructions from FLASHER to leave an area. Received instructions from FLASHER for patrol stations. Ours was centered at: Lat. 15° 52' N.; Long. 119° 18' E.; 9 knots, on an easterly course 6.5° E. Patrol speed, course for assigned position.

1 October 1944

Noon Position: Lat. 14° 58.5' N.; Long. 119° 46' E.

0013 Reached assigned patrol station and commenced surface patrol.

0656 Sighted smoke on horizon toward LULOR coast, bearing 055° T. (Ship Contact No. 3). Changed course toward, at 4-engine speed.

0728 Sighted float plane (plane Contact No. 25) over smoke.

— page 38 —
0730
: Changed course to southward, after picking out most
: advantages coastal point (near CAPONS ISLAND)
: for attacking.

: 0803
: Contact on SD Radar at 14 miles (Plane Contact No.
: 26). This plane was not sighted and the pip fled
: out at 14 miles. The plane over the convoy had
: been kept in sight from the bridge, and it was not
: he. Remained on the surface hoping we had not
: been seen, in spite of our high speed wake.

: 0610
: Cleared contact report to FISHER.

: 0823
: Six columns of smoke now visible.

: 0845
: Cleared amplifying report to FLASHER.

: 0957
: Sighted twin-engine medium bomber at 0600 T, as the
: SD Radar picked him up at 11 miles (Plane Contact
: No. 27). Submerged again hoping we were undetected
: in spite of plane's small angle on bow, and the
: range's closing to 9 miles as we went under.

: 1002
: Noses shattered by depth bomb, not too close, just
: warning us.

: 1002 - 30 Second depth bomb, a bit closer. Went to
: 200 feet, developing several leaky cable packing
: glands.

: 1037
: Back to periscope depth.

: 1050
: About ready to surface, and had just pulled down
: periscope when another depth bomb was heard to hit
: water and then explode. It was farther away, but
: let us know our air cover was still around and may
: have seen the periscope (if so, his aim was very
: poor, anyhow). Back to 200 feet. By now, we had
: already lost so much time that losing any more
: would foil our attempted end around.

— page 39 —
1145 All apparently clear at periscope depth.
: 1150 Faint echo ranging at 038° T, but nothing in sight. We had been forced to dive too far from coast to close it submerged.
: 1640 Surfaced, and headed back for assigned patrol spot. Sent report to FLASHP.
: 2146 Received instructions from FLASHP to patrol in the vicinity of Lat. 160 30' N.; Long. 119° 35' E., to-morrow.
: 2 October 1944
: Room Position: Lat: 160 33.5' N.; Long. 119° 39.3' E.
: 0522 Submerged on station.
: 0958 Surfaced for surface patrol remainder of day.
: 1111 Sighted masts of single ship, bearing 039° T, range about 20,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 4). Turned away for tracking, ready on four engines.
: 1130 Tracked target at 12 knots, on a steady course of 160° T, as if heading for a landfall on CARIB BOLINAO. Commenced end-around, with no signs of escorts or plane coverage.
: 1245 Contact on SD Radar, 11 miles (Plane Contact No. 26). Submerged, luckily within about 4000 yards of target track.
: 1241 Battle Stations Submerged.
: 1256 Squeicious confirmed; target was seen to have markings of a hospital ship. Secured from battle stations.
: 1314 Positively identified "Target" as the TATIANA MARU (Lt. 27 O.N.I. 206 J), as it passed by our bow tubes 1000 yards away. Took pictures. She was very clean and pretty.
: 1340 TATIANA MARU disappeared over horizon, LARILL bound.

-24-

— page 40 —
1543 At radar depth: Contact on SD Radar at 8 miles, closing to 7 miles (Plane Contact No. 29). Went to 120 feet.

: 1734 Surface, and sea course for our old assigned patrol position.

: 2220 Tarrolling on station. Received instructions from NASHIR to commence submerged daylight patrol off CAPE BOLINA on October 4.

: 2 October 1944

: MON - ONSITION: Lat. 15° 22' N.; Long. 119° 53' E.

: 0300 Decided to patrol submerged today off PALAUIG PT.; so began closing coast.

: 0530 Submerged about 10 miles, radar range, from coast, being in much doubt as to exact location. Heavy overcast had prevented both evening and morning star sights, and neither radar contours or periscope bearings on Peals and tangents would cut in well enough. Poor Pit Top performance for the past two days did not help. In order to work this area effectively, patrolling close to shallow water is required, but the reef contours along this stretch of coast are so irregular that accurate navigation is demanded. Therefore, we did not feel justified in closing the coast to the extent originally planned until our position could be ascertained with so. degree of exactness. We headed toward coast, however, taking occasional soundings, which led to little.

: 0-30 still unable to get fix, or sight T. LUCY PT. Light-house which should have been visible by now we felt; so changed course to southward.

: 0924 Sighted mast, bearing 170° T (Ship Contact No. 5), estimated range over 20,000 yards. Assuming he were following coast, headed to intercept, but did not take normal a. reach because of sun, closed nearness of very shallow water.

: 1147 Sighted double float-type monoplane at 145° T, range about 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 30).

— page 41 —
1216 Picked up echo ranging at 1250 T, followed by second set at 1300 T.

: 1221 Plane patrolling ahead of target and getting much closer.

: 1234 Could now make out target's angle on bow to be considerably larger than at first thought. He had changed course even farther to his right than we expected. Came to normal approach course, hoping for a helpful zig in our direction.

: 1315 Target with two PC escorts went by with closest range of 0000 yards. Identified as large tanker.

: 1325 Misunderstood probe off approach, navigational worries certainly having come out of a decent chance at our third tanker. Resumed trying to find out where we were, heading south.

: 1510 Made out a lighthouse at last, believed to be on FLUID 2, although the point did not appear quite as expected.

: 1749 Surfaces, and obtained radar fix on the lighthouse. Again no stars because of clouds. Headed for night patrol station.

4 October 1944

: 0125 Reached for assigned daylight patrol station.

: 0325 Interference on the 3d radar from SW of us. Began trying to close.

: 0328 3rd radar contact at 6500 yards, bearing 235° T, the direction of the interference. Could now make out, in the moonlight, that contact was another submarine, believed to be LAFO, but could not get him to exchange recognition signals. Proceeded toward patrol station.

: 0454 Land contact on 3d radar at 21,000 yards. Began closing.

: 0521 Another 3d contact at 15,350 yards. Didn't like this, as the P.P.I. once again showed us an unfamiliar coast line, with definite islands where none were supposed to be. This last contact seemed to be in a bay or behind the islands.

— page 42 —
0522 In the fast increasing light, finally made out two small patrol-type vessels near the two islands - and then at last, we could see that the 0521 radar contact was the tanker of yesterday (Ship Contact No. 6). It was anchored in a little bay behind the two islands, and the two patrols were evidently making a pre-sortie. /

— page 43 —
0830 Back at periscope depth, all clear, echo ranging faded out, and no explanation of our nasty gremlin.

: 0911 Surfaced in hot pursuit of the tanker. We were heading into a quite heavy sea and stiff breeze, such that the ship began to take a beating, as we made only 14 knots through the water with four engines.

: 1040 No. 4 main engine reported out of commission.

: 1100 No. 4 main engine back in commission, but it was a losing chase, with the target on the inside track around the LIFELINE ENEMY and making 11 knots to our 14 knots. Feel that we were beating ourselves over the head to no avail.

: 1139 Broke off chase with target group still out of sight, and belatedly continued on toward our correct position at one engine speed.

: 1600 Surface patrol, 15 miles off CAPT SOLITANO.

5 October 1944

Moon Position: Lat. 16° 14' N.; Long. 119° 45' E.

: 0415 Sighted C. 15 SOLITANO Lighthouse bearing 075° T, distance about 10 miles.

: 0515 Submerged 5 miles from coast, headed in for submerged patrol, 2 miles from coast.

: 0747 Sighted four, low flying, medium bombers (twin engine and raider), bearing 325° T, estimated range 2 miles (Flame Contact No. 32). These fellows seemed to be on an 4/5 sweeps along the coast from their tactics, but they passed to seaward of us, working to the south.

: 0614 Sighted two columns of smoke bearing 1600 T, on the opposite bearing from that which the planes made us suspect something (Ship Contact No. 7). Turned south.

: 0825 Radio rang in to the southward.

— page 46 —
1207 Another stern of six, with a very small spot. Even the old hands didn't like this one. The boys above went kidding this time, but, so far and to our surprise, no real camee had occurred except to our e/o, on being thwarted a second time this same day.

It was short, and sweet, however, because no more were dropped, even though the last were closest of all. Weintly contact was lost, and we spent the next hour and a half evading at 350 feet and 4.5 knots.

: 1350 Last jing-er sniffed back. to standard scale keying and all jing in began to draw away to southward.

: 1817 Surface, tired and unhappy. Fartoled 15 miles from coast during night.

6 October 1944.

: 1944. Long. 150° 31' N.; Long. 119° 31' E.

During the past nine days, we had had contact with ships and A/S escorts every day but two, and these were replete with plane contacts. The culmination of this period in the assignments of the 5th and its fruitless close death charging of the enemy on the surface seemed desirable for the spiritual benefit of all hands; so decided to patrol on the surface about 30 miles off C. 35° 31' N. to the north.

: 1234 six, three single ships bearing 2470 T (Ship Contact No. 9).

: 1235 Commenced tracing from target's starboard bow, as we went to 4-engine speed to pull ahead. Cut in Sd Radar for tracking purposes, since target was difficult to see in a light horizon haze. Surface or air escorts ever sighted.

: 1315 Target tracked on steady course at about 14 knots, and as identified by high airscope as a large A.P. Hoped he was traveling alone depending on his relatively high speed for safety, but the odds were two to one that he was another A.P.

: 1443 Submerged on target's base course at 21,000 yards range and went to battle stations.

— page 47 —
1515 Target identified as hospital ship by his marking.
: 1528 Positively identified target as the [NAME] [AIRCRAFT] (p. 61, O.N.I. 208 J), the Japs' largest. The previous one had been their smallest. Secured from battle stations and took pictures at 1500 y.rds, 90° (S) track.
: 1604 Surface, heading back for patrol spot.
: 2330 Clearer message to FLASER giving sorry results of yesterday and today.
: 2359 Received radio instructions from FLASER for pack to move out to our old surface patrol spots for tomorrow.

7 October 1944

Noon Position: Lat. 15° 35.1' N.; Long. 119° 11.6' E.
0505 Commenced East-west surface patrol on assigned station.
1547 Shifted what may have been light smoke or clouds, at 103° T., in direction of land. Closed at 4-engine speed for half hour but never saw it again; so broke off and returned, thinking of our decreasing fuel supply for the long trip home.

8 October 1944

Noon Position: Lat. 15° 35.2' N.; Long. 119° 16.2' E.
0553 Submerged for trim.
0632 Surfaced.
1329 Gyro compass out of commission; shifted to auxiliary gyro compass.
2300 Received radio instructions from FLASER to resume submerged patrol off CAPES BOLIVIA to tomorrow.

9 October 1944

Noon Position: Lat. 16° 16.4' N.; Long. 119° 43.0' E.
0532 Submerged 5 miles from coast near CAPES BOLIVIA, and

— page 48 —
0949
Sighted shi_ at 0590 T, estimated range 10,000 yards, Battle Stations.

: 1000
Ship identified as small wooden luger. Secured from battle stations.

: 1254
Gyro compass back in commission.

: 1853
Surfaced, and headed out for night patrol line 7 to 10 miles off coast.

10 October 1944

Room Position: Lat. 16° 20' N.; Lon. 119° 46' W.

: 0520
Submerged 6 miles off coast and closed for patrol 2.5 miles from coast n. ar CPL SUL110.

: 0611
Sighted another luger close to beach, heading north.

: 0728
Sighted sailboat, also close in.

: 0635
Sighted two columns of smoke at 0470 T and 0540 T (Ship Contact No. 10).

: 0930
Heard echo ranging at about 0500 T.

: 0942
Sighted three sets of masts at 0520 T, which soon developed into several more. Convoy evidently headed to pass CPL SUL110 fairly close. Battle Stations.

: 1020
Sighted one of the usual low-flying planes just ahead of convoy (Plane Contact No. 34). Could now see eight or ten ships (maybe more) in two very irregular columns, with one escort patrolling back and forth across it out of formation, and two others visible in the starboard (seaward) bows of the leading ships. About this third ship in the seaward column as a large tanker; the others appeared to be mostly medium A/C's. The formation appeared to be zigzagged together, except the escorts who were patrolling.

The sea conditions were very poor for periscope work, as they had been every time we had been here so far. The surface was almost devoid of ripples, but large

— page 49 —
1040 In excellent position ahead, and would carry at right between the two columns if we could get by the location escort.

1059 All tubes ready.

1105 Targets zig-zag left; commenced with in right to dive, and angles with about 600 (5)

— page 51 —
1235 Two dull, distant explosions.
: 1246 Another distant explosion.
: 1306 Another distant explosion.
: 1314 At periscope depth, all clear, except smoke from the
: 1326 Contact No. 35), and smoke increase to roar columns.
: 1327 Counted 15 distant explosions, as of depth charges.
: 1329 LAPON evidently taking the.
: 1310 Surfaced, and headed southward.
: 1656 Radar interference picked up at 1350 T: turned to
: 1914 Sighted loom of large fire close to beach at 1200 T.
: 1915 Exchanged recognition signals, calls, and info with
: 2100 sent results of contact to FLASH. . . . He felt a bit
: 2105 more satisfied with the day's work than with any of
: 2108 the preceding week, but it irked not to have been
: 2110 able to know the results. . . . He felt sure that our three
: 2112 at least, one other, possibly two, due to the over-
: 2115 layings position of the far column of ships. Since
: 2118 most of the ships were estimated to be making
: 2120 fire, we think we can safely say that at least
: 2122 two, possible three, such were damaged.

All forward torpedoes were now expended, with eight
Lk. 10-1 torpedoes remaining aft.

2200 Received new inshore patrol spots for tomorrow from
: 2200 FLASH. . . . Stations designed to intercept same convoy,
: 2205 assuming it anchored overnight. . . . Ours was farther
: 2208 to north at Lat. 150 40' I.; Long. 1150 45' J., near
: 2210 where we had inadvertently stumbled on the single
: 2212 tanker for the second time, on the 4th.

— page 53 —
1345 Sighted masts of four small vessels at 121° T toward 36° N. Coast which resolved themselves into four luggers, southbound.

: 1411 Sighted monoplane with wheels at 0430 T (Flame Contact No. 36).

: 1430 Six or seven snoks now visible to northward.

: 1455 Battle stations submerged, with masts in sight, bearings drawing slowly to the left as we closed. Look normal approach course.

: 1510 About 10 ships now seen to be strung out in a long column with five or six escorts on the seaward flanks—but the two leading ones were seen to have zigged sharp left around HERRINA MAYOR as it headed for SMUTA CRUZ Harbor. If they all did that we were hopelessly out of position.

: 1512 Headed NE in a forlorn hope of intercepting the tail-enders.

: 1531 Turned south as we counted nine, possibly ten, ships, and the column was seen to be by-passing the harbor entrance after all, and heading south heading, at most, the 20-fathom curve. Could see the super-structures as the closest ones passed about 5000 yards away; many of them looked like very large freighters and at least one was a tanker. If this was the same convoy as yesterday's, the average ship was 1.4 per cent. Could not understand where this outfit would anchor this late in the day, since they were passing by SAINA CRUZ; so had high hopes that they would continue on to MANILA to-night.

: 1605 Scoured from battle stations and began pulling out from coast for surfacing. Lost contact.

: 1802 Surfaced and began end-around while charging batteries. Put engines on propulsion as they became available.

: 1900 Received info from FLASER that a convoy had passed.

— page 54 —
1945
Clear message to FLASH telling of our convoy
and that we were chasing.
Decided that we could intercept convoy near CAPITANS
ID., and took interdictory course staying about
15 miles from coast.

2147
Received dispatch from CTF 71 assigning life-guard
stations to LAFON and us for the 10th through the
18th, giving instructions, and extending our patrol
three days thereafter.

2253
Reversed course off entrance to SUBIC BAY, with still
no contact, and began return trip, sticking to
10 miles from the coast, at reduced speed. Felt
that we must be ahead of the convoy unless it had
speeded up to about 15 knots or more.

12 October 1944
Hoon Position: Lat. 15° 36.2' N.; Long. 115° 59' E.

0130
Received message from LAFON saying that he desired
to patrol well out to westward until intercepting
proceed to life-guard station. As we had no instructions concerning continuation of a torpedo
after FLASH's departure, and since the type of
operations of Joy traffic in these waters had
far prevented any semblance of coordination between
Lafon was told to do as desired.

0150
Abandoned search after retracing convoy's supposed
track as far as FLASH's position, but no contact.
Had sighted by us some way, or had anchored after
all at some unknown and unusual spot.
Decided on a course of 45° to the surface near
our old assigned off-shore patrol point.

-39-

— page 55 —
0620 On surface patrol station.
: 1010 Contact on SD Radar at 14 miles, closing. Submerged; plane not sighted (Plane Contact No. 37).
: 1058 Surfaced.
: 2330 Cleared BOMBSHEER Serial 5 to CLR 71, diving patrol results to date and remaining logistics.
: 13 October 1944
: Noon Position: Lat. 15° 49.5' N.; Long. 119° 43' E.
: 0507 Submerged 4 miles NW of HARTMAN. TAKED for submerged patrol. Picked this spot north of the island so as not to be caught as we had been on the 4th and 11th.
: 0703 Sighted southbound lugger against island.
: 1632 Surfaced.
: During the night, patrolled 10 - 15 miles off coast enroute to tomorrow's submerged station.

: 14 October 1944
: Noon Position: Lat. 15° 16' N.; Long. 119° 41.5' E.
: 0512 Submerged 5 miles off CALIBIAN Lighthouse and proceeded to line parallel to and 3 miles from the coast.
: 0925 Sighted small smoke column at 025° T. Turned toward.
: 1007 Sighted a ship at 040° (T), estimated range 12,000 yards (Ship Contact No. 13).
: 1018 Second ship came into view following first.
: 1031 Battle Stations. The two ships looked like small fire-liners of the 2000-ton class, but the leading one had a suspiciously new looking coat of grey paint.
: 1044 Targets zigged left leaving us farther from their track than we wanted to be. We turned toward beach to close track.

— page 56 —
1056
Began reversal of course to bring stern tubes to bear. By the time we were around, the secona ship in column presented the more favorable track; so he was selected as target. Set depth on torpedoes at 4 feet in spite of heavy swells, bec use of sad perience on previous patrol of seeing eigh ttor- pedoes set at 6 feet run under two A's of similar size.

1106 - 36
Commenced firing four stern tubes at second freighter in column; range 2650 yarsc; 1160 (S) track angle; 4 feet depth setting; 1750 average gyro angles; 10 second firing interval.

1107 - 08
Ceased firing, waiting for hits.

1108 - 10
Heavy, fairly close sounding explosion, just after looking with the .eriscope to see if we had made a bubble on firing. Our first reaction was that it was an aircraft bomb dropped by unobserved air cover; so we started down quickly to 250 feet. Second thought suggested the possibility of a pre-mature, which it really sounded like, due perhaps to the shallow depth setting in rather heavy swells.

1109 - 25
Timed hit on target heard by sound and through the hull; once again this had all the sound of a torpedo explosion rather than a depth charge.

1112 - 30
Explosion, like a depth charge, not close.

1113 - 33
Explosion again like a D.C.; evidently the ray leading maru was an escort type.

1117
Sound reported the beginning of "breaking-up" noises at about 1200 T.

1123
Third depth charge, a little close.

1130
Fourth depth charge, a little closer still.

1132
Fifth depth charge, no closer; evidently random charges.

1140
At periscope depth, nothing visible but the nearby land and one maru, definitely the one which had been leading. He was surprisingly close, about 1000 yards.

— page 57 —
1145 Went back to 250 feet to evade at 4 knots.

1146 Sixth depth charge, no closer.

1156 Breaking-up noises became loud enough to be heard through the hull for the next forty-five minutes. These noises were a little like small underwater explosions, but could not possibly have been detected, or like like, or fish and beach noises. The true bearing of these noises had remained practically constant throughout, between 130 and 110°T.

1210 Seventh...the charge, much farther away.

1205 Eighth and last depth charge, becoming distant sounding.

1226 Back to periscope depth, all clear except land, and masts of escort near.

1233 Last of breaking-up noises heard through hull.

1235 Sighted single-line float plane at 1130 m, circling over water or coast near where attack took place (Flame Contact No. 38).

1748 Surfaced, and patrolled 12 miles off coast on the night.

15 October 1944.

Moon Position: Lat. 15° 45.4' N.; 119° 42.5' E.

0507 Submerged 4 miles NW of HENNA LAY ON again for a last day's submerged patrol.

0529 All of a sudden, a blast of echo ranging on one side loud and close the sound operator at first thought he

— page 58 —
0535
Finally picked up fast, light scopes at 140° T, out of all the pinging. The echo ringing was irregular, short scale keying, with double end even triple keying frequently interspersed with holding the key down for several seconds. He was probably tuning up for the day.

0546
Screws passed astern, apparently fairly close.

0615
At periscope depth with screws fixed out and echo ranging weak and drawing away to the north and all clear except for a lull in the head of the sound.

Our unexpected escort must have been secured for the night near Pearl Harbor or perhaps at SAHINA CRUZ, and was just beginning his day's work when he began warning us his sound gear so close to us. It was just possible that he saw us as we approached our diving spot and came out to investigate, where he was in the last background prevented our sighting him. Anyhow, we confidently expected a chance to get rid of our last four torpedoes today, since he had evidently been making an A/S sweep along here.

1147
Sighted two medium bombers flying south about 5 miles away (Plane Contact No. 39).

1749
Surfaced and set course for assist and life guard station tomorrow, keeping about 12 miles from the coast.

15 October 1944

Room position: IATC. 160° 44.2' N.; LCN. 120° 40.5' E.

0558 Reached assigned life guard station, and commenced

— page 59 —
1233 Sighted plane, followed by SD radar contact at 16 miles (Plane Contact No. 40).
: 1235 Submerged when large closed to 10 miles, with no IFF response, and was identified as a single-float mono-plane like a RUM.
: 1326 Surflaced.
: 1351 Sighted three unidentified planes at 120° F, about 25 miles away, flying north over the coast (Plane Contact No. 41).
: 1523 Sighted float plane from bridge, moving in slowly.
: 1532 SD radar contact showing 3 planes at 11, 12, and 16 miles; sighted second float plane (Plane Contact No. 42). Submerged.
: 16.2 At 45 feet, contact on SD radar at 2 miles; went to 150 feet (Plane Contact No. 43).
: 1710 Surflaced.

During the night, patrolled to southward, 15 miles from coast.

17 October 1944.

Moon Position: Lat. 16° 41.5' N.; Long. 116° 37' W.

0200 Contact on SD radar, bearing 060° T, at 9500 yards (Ship Contact No. 14). Connecct tracking, while pulling out to westward.

0210 Sighted contact indistinctly from bridge; a geard small, but traced at 11 knots on course 2000° T. Suggestion: run first to northwestward. Keel line in sight at between 9000 and 7500 yards, and then cut to eastward astern of him and back up his port (shortward) side, to see if he were escorting a convoy. No other contact cuts upon co-relation of this maneuver, although the coast was only 9 miles away. Closed vessel to 4900 yards to set a better

— page 60 —
0336
Lost contact, an. proceeded back toward life guard station.

: 0540
On station; patrolling as before.

: 0742
Contact on SD Racer at 16 miles (Plane Contact No. 44); faded out at 17 miles, unlit; and with no IFF response.

: 0932
Sighted medium bomber, at 1400 T, range about 12 miles, 90° a.o.s. (Plane Contact No. 45).

: 1058
Contact on SD Racer, followed by six hits; four medium bombers at 23 miles, headed south, over the coast (Plane Contact No. 46).

: 1302
Sighted two medium bombers at 0450 T, flying south over coast, followed by SD Racer coast; at 30 miles, which moved in to 20 miles, before moving out again (Plane Contact No. 47).

: 1330
Sighted four medium bombers at 1050 T, followed by SD Racer coast at 20 and 21 miles; headed north over coast (Plane Contact No. 48).

: 1403
Sighted two more medium bomber types, at 0600 T and 0500 T, heading north and south respectively, at radar range of 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 50).

: 1417
Surfaced, with the latter plane at 12 miles and no IFF response.

: 1505
Surfaced.

: 1527
Contact on SD Racer at 34 miles; faded out, then came back in at 32 miles (Plane Contact No. 51).

: 1555
Contact on SD Racer at 22 miles, followed by sighting three unidentified small planes flying south, at 0350 T (Plane Contact No. 52).

-45-

— page 61 —
1711  Bridge personnel heard four distinct but distant explosions.
1714  Another distant explosion.
1716  Fifth distant explosion.
    Again patrolled to southward, 10 mils from the coast during the night.

18 October 1944
Noon Position: Lat. 15° 44' N.; Long. 119° 43' E.
0530  Jack on station, patrolling as before.
1655  Contact on SD Racer at 22 miles; moved cut to 25 miles before being sighted at 1600 T (plane Contact No. 53). Plane began closing.
0702  Submerged with range at 11 miles, small angle on bow, no IFF response, and plane identified as float type.
0739  Surfaced.
0615  Contact on SD Racer at 28 miles; placed out at 27 miles (plane Contact No. 54).
0912  Contact on SD Racer at 16 miles, followed by sighting a double pontoon-type monoplane at 0600 T, on southerly course (plane Contact No. 55).
0919  Submerged as range closed to 10 miles.
1005  Surfaced.
1025  Sighted plane, appearing to be same as one at 0912; submerged as he a.e. in closed.
1145  Surfaced.
1249  Contact on SD Racer at 20 miles, followed by sighting two medium bombers flying north over coast, at 0600 T (plane Contact No. 56).
1421  Contact on SD Racer at 16 miles; moved in to 16 miles, faced, and then sighted as a medium bomber flying.

-46-

— page 62 —
1540 Contact Failing in and out on 30 Radar at 16 miles, sighted as small float plane, at 0900 T, flying low over the coast.(Plane Contact No. 58) headed north, and losing altitude possibly as if landing. He disap. cared below our horizon, but a minute later reappeared with increased altitude and circled to southward, a.ain disa gearing. We were considering the advisability of closing his last observed position, in spite of his apparently being a float plane and diving no IFF response or courses signals, when at

1557 Contact on 30 Radar at 7 miles; we submerged with no IFF response and without sighting plane (Plane Contact No. 59).

1616 Surfaced.

1621 Sighted one, then three, small unidentified planes at 0750 T, headed south over coast; followed by 50 radar contact at 25 miles (Plane Contact No. 60).

1649 Sighted 1.5th bomber at 0600 T, headed south; 20 radar contact at 25 miles (Plane Contact No. 61).

1628 Strong interference on 30 Radar upon cutting in.

1850 Exchanged recognition signals, and calls with U.S.S. HAUTILUS.

During these past three days of lifeguard duty, we had carefully guarded the assigned VLF, primary and secondary HF channels (except the secondary HF at night was shifted to VLF), and had left AR and SH IFF cut in, but the only indications we ever had that a strike or strikes may have been in were the fact that on the 17th and 18th, radio HAUTILUS (commercial) went off the air part of the day with an air raid warning. In the evening, on both days, also, short meaning-less snatches of a few American phrase were picked up on the primary HF channel. All planes sighted closely enough for recognition had appeared to be enemy types (float planes, etc.), and no IFF responses were ever obtained although the IFF

-47-

— page 63 —
1915
replaced on several times for each contact. Only one contact acted even remotely as if he might be in trouble (1540, 10/16/44), and we were prevented from investigating by another close contact causing us to submerge. The air activity observed was considerable, except that at no time we saw large formations seen, the largest groups being two of four planes each.

: 1915
received messes from CAP 71 living us position of two aviators in a rubber boat about 65 miles to northward of us. Sent on four engines, and started out with little hope of finding them in the dark at least nine hours after they were downed.

: 2316
shifted the low of a British but varying intensity lit. at a point the beach, bearing 0550 T.

: 2340
changed course toward light as four others appeared and it became apparent they were from fires.

: 1920 October 1944
Noon Position: Lat. 17° 17' N.; Long. 119° 30.5' E.

: 0006
Changed course back to the northward, so as to pass SALOACH II. Aboard about 4 miles to starboard, after ascertaining that all five, possibly six, fires were well in toward or against the coast. They were ranged between SALOACH II. and PITCH II. D., with the two brightest positively identified as burning ships, one deep in SALOACH II. The other almost in behind SALOACH II. This made us all the more clear-eyed of finding the two aviators after such visual evidence of their success.

: 0015
glowed to two-engine speed, as we were within ten miles of the reported position.

: 0049
Sighted definite red flare light at 3570 T. The night was dark and largely overcast; so distances were very indeterminate, but we estimated the range as at least 10 miles. Decided for position of flare, although we had no instructions regarding their use, and the only red flares ever previously seen in the patrol areas had been from enemy escort vessels at night.

-48-

— page 64 —
0135
Notch: else had been sighted and we felt we must
be close to or beyond position of the flare; so
fired one red very cartridge, Mr. 2, since the one
we had sighted appeared similar to this.

: 0136
Answering red flare seen at 3550 T, almost dead
ahead, still at indeterminate range, but closer.
Our hopes were now high, since radar had not shown
any contacts which could be patrol vessels. From
cascade at 9 knots.

: 0146
Third red flare ahead to stab board at a range 5
to 6 seconds between 500 and 1000 yards. Night
full rudder, lowing to 5 knots. We had passed
about 200 yards from our aviators and had not seen
them or placed them up by radar. Luckily, however,
they had seen us when we had them aboard, and quickly
fired the flare. They were actually inside our
turning circle; so when we turned and headed east
we only left them farther behind.

: 0200
Still had not sighted anything; so fired a second
red Very flare.

: 0202
Answering flare almost dead astern. Reversed
course, and at

: 0205
Finally made out the rudder boat when it was about
50 yards on our starboard bow and shouts could
already be heard. Raced out bow planes, and after
down lines to them, as we twisted toward them. The
they rowed toward us.

: 0210
Lieutenant (j.) Donald (n.) John, U.S.A., 300 ft.
(Rile Ro. 251275), and Donald A. J., 300 ft.
95, Alt. 20, U.S.K., from a 32C plane of the
U.S.S. U.S.N.H.M.I., came aboard, unhurt, hung, y,
sunburned, and tired, after having been forced
down with a bullet-holed engine at about 1300 (H)
this afternoon. The engine caused by had occurred
during a skip-bombing attack on a tree-camouflaged
enemy escort-type vessel in South Harbor.

The position of the rescue was Lat. 18° 03' N.; Long.
120° 10.2' E., about 14 miles NW from that indicated
in the distress message. They had rowed toward land
most of the afternoon and night, but currents had
a parently set them strongly to the Northward.

— page 66 —
1712 Surface.
17:30 Contacts on SD Racer, at 21 and 24 miles; faced out (Flame Contact No. 67).

16:30 Converted No. 3 and 5 F.B.T. to L.B.T.S.

16:47 Received dispatch from CEF 71 with instructions to leave lifeguard station at sunset on the 20th and proceed to PAMH, shifting Operational Control to CEF 17 at 0800 (H) on the 21st.

20 October 1944
Location: Lat. 16° 45.3' N.; Long. 119° 31' E.

0534 Submerged for trim and to flush out L.B.T.S. No. 3 and 5.

0606 Surface.

0514 Shifted unidentified plane, at 110° T, followed by SD Racer contact at 22 miles (Plane Contact H. 68).

0640 Contacts came in on SD Racer in rapid succession at 15, 16, 17 and 18 miles, followed by more at 20, 30, and 32 miles. None sighted due to light haze (Plane contact H. 69).

0710 Contact on SD Racer at 17 miles, in to 16 miles, and back out to 15 miles, where it faced (Plane contact H. 70).

0844 Contact on SD Racer at 24 miles (Plane Contact H. 71).

0651 Contact closed to 11 miles and faced out. Submerged.

0520 Surface.

1048 Contact on SD Racer at 22 miles; closed at 19 miles (Plane Contact H. 72).

1157 Contact on SD Racer at 22 miles; closing to 12 miles, where it faced out (Plane Contact H. 73).

1203 Contact back in at 10 miles. Submerged.

1303 Surface.

— page 67 —
1512 Shifted flight of 0 or 7 planes at 0900 T, flying south, at estimated range of 30 miles (Flane Contact No. 74).

: 1535 Contact on SD Raaar at 24 miles; faded out at 25 miles. (Flane Contact No. 75).

: 1718 Sunset; headed north.

: 1855 Steady red light on horizon at 0500 T, followed by 3d Aaclar contact at 24,000 yards on that bearing. (Ship Contact No. 15). Turned to close, suspecting AF acain.

: 1913 Could definitely make out outline of red crosses in red lights on our contact. Tacked at 13 knots on steady course of 1500 T. Continue closing, keeping bow toward him, for identification if possible.

: 1931 Unable to make out silhouette at 4000 yards due to blinding effect of his lights, but his marker and lighting were in every respect proper for a hospital ship. Broke off approach, and continued north and.

21 October 1944

Moon Position: Lat. 19° 35.2' N.; Long. 119° 39.6' E.

: 0255 Cleared 30,000 feet Serial No. 1 to 3T 17, diving posit and logistics, and requesting instructions and routing via JAPAN for fuel.

: 0654 Contact on SD Raaar at 19 miles; faded out (Flane Contact No. 76).

: 0714 Contact on SD Raaar at 40 miles; moved in slowly to 17 miles, fading in and out; then moved out and lost at 16 miles (Flane Contact No. 77).

: 0824 Contact on SD Raaar at 20 miles, closing slowly (Flane Contact No. 78).

: 0834 Submerged, with plane at 10 miles, unsmoked.

: 0909 Surfaced.

: 1336 Contact on SD Raaar at 15 miles; faded out (Flane Contact No. 79).

— page 68 —
1400 Contact on SD Nacar at 24 miles; followed by second contact as both moved in to 20 and 22 miles respectively and then back out again (Plane Contact No. 60).

: 1436 Cont. on SD Nacar, at 12 miles; moved in to 10 miles (Plane Contact No. 61). Submerged.

: 1530 Surfaced.

: 1535 Cont. on SD Nacar at 21 miles; raced out at 20 miles (Plane Contact No. 62).

: 1932 Changed course to eastward, heading for BALLISTA CHANNEL.

: 1935 Changed recognition signals and calls with U.S.S. BLUEHAT, via SD Nacar.

: 2030 Received routing instructions from CTF 17, sending via S.S. 2050.

22 October 1944.

Non Position: Lat. 20° 0' 0.2" N.; Long. 122° 0' 0.2" E.

: 0325 Detected strong radar signal on AP-1: 147 mcs., 700 pps. Seemed to be cut off at intervals. Cut in SD Nacar; no contacts.

: 0330 Two signals as above, the second one weaker.

: 0340 Contact on SD Nacar at 25 miles, moved in to 14 miles and back out; APR signals still strong (Plane Contact No. 63).

: 0410 Weak APR signal faded out.

: 0420 . third signal of 153 mcs., 850 pps., being keyed at 45-second intervals, detected by APR.

: 0439 All APR signals faded out.

: 0717 Contact on SD Nacar at 12 miles; moved in rapidly to 6 miles (Plane Contact No. 64). Submerged.

: 0816 At 45 feet, contact on SD Nacar at 12 miles (Plane Contact No. 65); back to periscope depth.

-53-

— page 69 —
0942
Surfaced, and passed 12 miles to southward of SABITANG ID.

1245 Passed from BALTIMORE GAMBLE into PACIFIC OCEAN.

2004 Received additional routing instructions to SAIPAN, from CTF 17.

23 October 1944

Koon Position: Lat. 20° 50.4' N.; Long. 126° 47.1' E.

0021 Cleared via ROD ILLUS., BOSTON Serial No. 2 to CTF 17, acknowledging routing instructions, and giving full names of rescued aviation personnel.

1118 Sailed large unidentified plane on westerly course at 330° T, followed by SD radar contact at 16 miles (Plane Contact No. 06).

2000 (H) Set clocks ahead one hour to 11:00 T.

24 October 1944 (times HST).

Koon Position: Lat. 20° 43.2' N.; Long 131° 46.9' E.

0605 (I) Submerged for trim.

0633 (I) Surfaced.

0809 (I) Sighted unidentified flying boat at 090° T, on southerly course at about 20 miles range (Plane Contact No. 07).

1010 (I) Contact on SD radar at 22 miles, followed by sighting a large unidentified flying boat, closing (Plane Contact No. 08).

1015 (I) Submerged, when plane closed to 15 miles.

1103 (I) Surfaced.

1644 (I) Weak signal on 4T, of 90 mcs., 250 pps.; faded out 12 minutes later.

2225 (I) Cleared, via HII, dispatch to CTG 17.7.7.1

— page 70 —
25 October 1944
Location: Lat. 19° 47.3' N.; Long. 137° 02.9' E.
0444 (I) Contact on SD Racer at 24 miles (Plane Contact No. 69); Reded out at 25 miles.
0906 (I) Submerged for trim.
0934 (I) Surfaced; contact on SD Racer at 20 miles (Plane Contact No. 90).
0935 (I) Submerged again.
0958 (I) Surfaced.
26 October 1944
Location: Lat. 17° 16.3' N.; Long. 141° 52.8' E.
0710 (I) Contact on SD Racer, at 24 miles, closing rapidly to 13 miles (Plane Contact No. 91). Submerged.
0754 (I) Surfaced.
1504 (I) Contact on SD Racer at 10 miles, followed by another at 10 miles five minutes later, both moving in slowly (Plane Contact No. 92).
1511 (I) Alt. 45 feet, contact on SD Racer at 10 miles, following 45 feet, 1200 yards, 1000 yards,

— page 71 —
0009(I) Small contact on SD Radar at 29 miles (Plane Contact No. 93).
0232(I) Contact on SD Radar at 1860 T, range 9550 yards, moving in fast; bearing changed rapidly across stern, and range opened to 18,000 yards. Cut in SD Radar, and obtained contact moving out from 4 to 9 miles, there it faded. No IFF response (Plane Contact No. 94).
0456(I) Sighted ROTA ID., at 1260 T, distance about 35 miles.
    Had several more plane contacts during the morning, saw giving IFF response, some not, but did not endanger.
0635(I) Sighted contact with assigned escort, U.S.S. (C-9), and proceeded to SHALL in company.
1206(I) Recorded outboard in next classified U.S.S. FULTON, in 2-3 N. Harbor, S.IFL, MARIANAS IS., and commenced refueling.

2. October 1944

[noon Position: Lat. 15° 30' I.; Long. 145° 30' E.]
0926(I) Deferred SPLIN in company with escort, U.S.S. FULTON, having received 40,000 gallons fuel oil, and two 11. 23 torpedoes for the forward torpedo room, from the U. S. FULTON.
1400(I) Parted company with U.S.S. PGH-9, and proceeded independently enroute to Pearl Harbor.
    Made daily trim and training dives while enroute.

26. October to 6 November 1944

[noon Positions:
25 October: Lat. 17° 06' I.; Long. 149° 09' E.
30 October: Lat. 16° 16.4' N.; Long. 153° 26.9' E.
31 October: Lat. 19° 12.5' N.; Long. 158° 13.0' E.
1 November: Lat. 19° 31.5' N.; Long. 163° 22.5' E.

— page 72 —
2 November: Lat. 14° 15.3' N.; Long. 168° 27.3' E.
3 November: Lat. 20° 52' N.; Long. 174° 48.5' E.
4 November: Lat. 20° 28.1' N.; Long. 175° 28.6' E.
4 November: Lat. 20° 07.5' N.; Long. 178° 55' W.
5 November: Lat. 20° 43.3' N.; Long. 172° 55.5' W.
6 November: Lat. 20° 57' N.; Long. 167° 05.5' W.
7 November:
6 November:

— page 74 —
0212 0323 0658 1111

Date: 9/27/44 9/28/44 10/1/44 10/2/44

Latitude: 13°29.5'N, 13°05'N, 16°31.7'N, 16°30'N
Longitude: 119°13' E, 120°15.3' E, 119°34.5' E, 119°36' E

Type: A0 and 2 A0 and 2 5 or 6 HARD
Aircraft: AIRCRAFT
Armament: 5 or 6
Armament:

— page 75 —
5. 6. 7. 8.
Fire 0925 0522 0814 1127

Date 10/3/44 10/4/44 10/5/44 10/5/44

Latitude 15024.5°N 15041°N 16013.7°N 16013°N
Longitude 119051°E 120039°E 119044.5°E 119043°E

Type .0 end 2 Sane .0 6 ships & 10 ships
Escorts and 5 escorts 3 escorts
and 3 escorts
In 10 li. 6 mi. 10 li. 7 mi.
files
.1stiated
Course 3300(T) .nchored 1600(T)
and 11 kts. in bay Unknown 6 kts.
speed

Contacted P SD P P

Action Tracked .tempted .tempted .tempted .tempted
Taken approach approach approach approach

-60-

— page 77 —
13. 14. 15.
Time 1007 0200 1855

Date 10/14/44 10/17/44 10/20/44

Latitude 16015'N 16019.5'N 17054'N
Longitude 119040'E 119027'E 120036.5'E

Type 2 small Unident Unident
4KS escort Hospital
Type Ship

Range 6 mi. 3/4 mi 12 mi.
in
files
Estimated
Course 190°(.) 200°(T) Southerly
and 8 kts. 11 kts. course
Speed

— page 79 —
5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
(1) 9/16/44 9/13/44 9/21/44 9/21/44 9/27/44
(2) 1100(H) 1332(H) 0620(H) 0916(H) 0542(H)
(3) 1906.31s 1047.15 12939.1N 12047.71N 13948.1N.
(4) 117950.11E 116009.51E 121043.1E 122051.1E 11936.81E
(5) 15 kts. 15 kts. 13 kts. 2.5 kts 17 kts.
(6) 0410(T) 0410(T) 0160(T) 0160(T) 2700(T)
(7) Surface Surface Surface Submer. ed Surface
(8) 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
(9) - - - - -
(10) - - - TwinEng. Single
(11) - - Patrol Patrol Nonoplane
(12)

— page 80 —
9/27/44 9/27/44 9/27/44 9/28/44 9/28/44
(1) 1535(E) 1519(E) 0640(E) 0924(E)
(3) 13014E 13012E 13007E 12050E 11950E
(4) 12012.8E 12005E 12005E 11950E 11950E
(5) 2.5 kts. 1/2 kts. 6.5 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts.
(6) 270(T) 0900(T) 270(T) 0900(T) 0900(T)
(7) Surface surfaced 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
(9) - - - - -
(10) Patrol - - - - -
(11) Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol
(12) Periscope SD radar SD radar SD radar SD radar
(13) 15 miles 4 miles 10 miles 18 miles 10 miles
(14) 50 - - - -
(15) - - - - -
(16) 3 2 2 2 2
(17) K E E E E
(18) 15 mi. 15 mi. 10 mi. 10 mi. 10' mi.
(19) 6000 2000 2000 20.0 2000
(20) 60% 1000% 90% 100% 100%
(21) - - - - -

-65-

— page 81 —
15... 16... 17... 18... 19...

(1) 5/22/44 9/22/44 9/22/44 9/29/44 9/29/44
(2) 0945(E) 1021(E) 1501(E) 0609(E) 0743(E)
(3) 1257'N 1257'N 1256'N 1257'N 13910.7'N
(4) 119054'E 119055'E 120002.2'E 120003.5'E 120005.2'E
(5) 9 kts. 2.5 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts.
(6) 0900(T) 0900(T) 2910(T) 0400(T) 0350(T)
(7) Surface Submerged Surface Surface Surface
(8) 1/2 - 1/2 1/2 1/2
(9)

— page 82 —
20. 21. 22. 23. 24.
(1) 9/29/44 9/29/44 9/29/44 9/29/44 9/30/44
(2) 0550(H) 0955(H) 1350(H) 1650(H) 0743(H)
(3) 13°10'N 13°16'N 14°06'N 14°36.5'N 14°56'N
(4) 120°05'E 120°06'E 119°39'E 119°43.5'E 119°42.5'E
(5) 9 kts. 9 kts. 17 kts. 17 kts. 11 kts.
(6) 320°(T) 320°(T) 012°(T) 012°(T) 0900(T)
(7) Surface Surface Surface Surface Surface
(8) 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
(9) - - - - -
(10) - - - Unident Float
(11) Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol
(12) 50 inch 50 inch 50 inch 50 inch 50 inch
(13) 12 miles 15 miles 10 miles 14 miles 12 miles
(14) - - - 30 20
(15) - - - - -
(16) 3 3 3 3 5
(17) 5'1 SSI SSI SSI S
(18) 4 miles 4 miles 4 miles 4 miles U.
(19) 2000 2000 2000 2000 6000
(20) 100% 100% 60% 60% 40%
(21) - - - - -

-67-

— page 83 —
10/1/44 10/1/44 10/1/44 10/2/44 10/2/44
(1) 0726(E) 0803(E) 0957(E) 1225(E) 1543(E)
(3) 15925N 15900N 1457.5N 1629N 1628N
(4) 11926.6N 11940N 1190 45.5E 119043N 119040N
(5) 17 kts. 17 kts. 17 kts. 17 kts. 2.5 kts.
(6) 0750(T) 1400(T) 1400(T) 1600(T) 2710(T)
(7) Surface Surface Surface Surface Submerged
(8) 1/2 - 1/2 1/2 -
(9) - 1 - -
(10) Float - 2 eng. - -
(11) Escort - 2 eng. - -
(12) Sighted & Radar 14 mi. 11 mi. 11 mi. 8 mi.
(13) 10 mi. 14 mi. 11 mi. 11 mi. 8 mi.
(14) 20 - 40 - -
(15) - - 11 mi. - -
(16) 2 2 2 2 2
(17) SS SS SS N N
(18) U U U U U
(19) 6000 6000 6000 8000 8000
(20) 40% 40% 40% 70% 50%
(21) - - - - -

-68-

— page 84 —
10/3/44 10/4/44 10/5/44 10/5/44 10/10/44
(1) 1147(H) 0540(H) 0747(H) 1119(H) 1020(H)
(3) 15922H 15945H 15913.7H 15915H 16017H
(4) 11953H 11944H 11944.5H 11945H 11945H
(5) 2.5 kts. 17 kts. 2.5 knts 2.5 kts. 2.5 kts.
(6) 14830T 22030T 035030T 0000(T) 0000(T)
(7) Submerged surface submerged submerged undamaged
(8) - - - - -
(9) - - 4 1 1
(10) 1oat 2 enBomb 2 engBomb 2 engBomb
Twin bussTwin b

— page 85 —
10/10/44 10/11/44 10/12/44 10/14/44 10/15/44
(1) 1358(ft) 14111(ft) 1010(ft) 1235(ft) 1147(ft)
(3) 16017ft 15040ft 15030.21ft 16020ft 1504.1ft
(4) 119038ft 119043.1ft 118059.5ft 119041.5ft 119043ft
(5) 2.5 knots 2.2 kts. 7.6 kts 2 kts 2 kts.
(6) 2700(T) 0100(T) 2700(T) 3500(T) 1300(T)
(7) Submerged submerged Submerged Submerged Submerged
(8) - - 1/2 - -
(9) 1 - 1 1 2
(10) 2 eng monoplane

— page 86 —
40. 41. 42. 43. 44.
(1) 10/16/44 10/16/44 10/16/44 10/16/44 10/17/44
(2) 1233(H) 1351(H) 1523(H) 1622(H) 0742(H)
(3) 1604.5 1604.5 1604.5 1604.5 1604.5
(4) 11903.5 11903.5 11903.5 11903.5 11903.5
(5) 12 lts. 9 lts. 9 lts. 2.5 lts. 9 lts.
(6) 2690(T) 2250(T) 0900(T) 600(T) 2250(T)
(7) Surface Surface Surface Sub. gear Sub. gear
(8) - - - 1/2
(9) 1 3 3 1 1
(10) RUM Unicant 2Pilot&l Unicant Pilot
(11) Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol
(12) Lookout Sighted Lookout .e. esc. 5.1.4

— page 87 —
10/17/44 10/17/44 10/17/44 10/17/44 10/17/44
(1) 10/17/44 10/17/44 10/17/44 10/17/44 10/17/44
(2) 0932(E) 1056(E) 1302(E) 1330(E) 1403(E)
(3) 1604.9'N 1604.5'N 1604.2'N 1604.2'N 1604.2'N
(4) 11933.8'E 11937'E 11932.3'E 11935.6'E 11993.3'E
(5) 9 Kts. 14 Kts. 9 Kts. 9 Kts. 9 Kts.
(6) 2250(T) 3000(T) 0000(T) 2250(T) 0900(T)
(7) Surface Surf. oe Surf.oe Surf.oe Surf.oe
(8) 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
(9) 1 4 2 4 1
(10) 2 eng 2 eng Bomb Bomb Bomb Bomb
(11) Feltrol - - - - -
(12) Sighted sighted sighted sighted sighted
(13) 12 mi. 23 mi. 30 mi. 24 mi. 25 mi.
(14) 10 40 10 20 30
(15) - - - - -
(16) 1 1 1 1 1
(17) K K K K K
(18) U U U U U
(19) 20,000 20,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
(20) 30% 40% 40% 40% 40%
(20) - - - - -

-72-

— page 88 —
10/17/44 10/17/44 10/17/44 10/18/44 10/18/44
(1) 1415(E) 1527(E) 1555(E) 0655(E) 0615(E)
(2) 1602.4'N 1604.2'N 1604.5'N 1704.5'N 1605.2'N
(3) 11903'E 11905'E 11905'E 11905'E 11905.0'E
(4) 9 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts.
(5) 0900(T) 2250(T) 2250(T) 0900(T) 0900(T)
(6) Surface Surface Surface Surface Surface
(7) 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
(8) 2 1 3 1 1
(9) Bonder Unident Unident Float Unident
(10) - - - - -
(11) - - - - -
(12) S/S Raider SD Raider SD Raider S/S Raider
(13) 16 mi. 34 mi. 22 mi. 22 mi. 28 mi.
(14) 40 - - 30 -
(15) - - - - -
(16) 1 1 1 1 2
(17) H N N N N
(18) U U U U U
(19) 10,000 15,000 10,000 15,000 20,000
(20) 40% 40% 40% 50% 50%
(21) - - - - -

-73-

— page 89 —
10/10/44 10/16/44 10/16/44 10/16/44 10/10/44
(1) 10/10/44 1249(?) 1423(?) 1540(?) 1557(?) 1604.21
(2) 10/10/44 1250(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21
(3) 10/10/44 1250(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21
(4) 10/10/44 1250(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21
(5) 10/10/44 1250(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21
(6) 10/10/44 1250(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21
(7) 10/10/44 1250(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21
(8) 10/10/44 1250(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21
(9) 10/10/44 1250(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21 1557(?) 1604.21
(10) Double

— page 91 —
10/15/44 10/15/44 10/20/44 10/20/44
(1) 1550(T) 162(T) 1759(T) 0640(T)
(2) 17031(T) 17015(T) 17005(T) 10505(T)
(3) 11920.5(T) 11903.1(T) 11932.1(T) 12005.5(T) 11905(T)
(4) 9 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts.
(5) 1600(T) 1600(T) 1900(T) 1900(T)
(6) Surface Surface Surface Surface
(7) 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
(8) 2 1 1 4
(9) 2 1 1 4
(10) Unident Unident Unident Unident
(11)

— page 92 —
70-71
(1) 10/20/44 10/20/44 10/20/44 10/20/44
(2) 0710(E) 0044(E) 1048(E) 1157(E) 1512(E)
(3) 16044 160437.7 160431 16045N 16042N
(4) 119033.8 119032.2 119032 119031 11933.5
(5) 9 kts. 8.5 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts.
(6) 1900(E) 2250(E) 2250(E) 2250(E) 2250(E)
(7) Surface Surface Surface Surface Surface
(8) 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
(9) 1 1 1 6 or 7
(10) Undent Undent Undent Undent Undent
(11)

— page 93 —
75. 76. 77. 78. 79.
(1) 10/20/44 10/21/44 10/21/44 10/21/44 10/21/44
(2) 1535(H) 0554(E) 0714(H) 0824(H) 1335(H)
(3) 15044H 16040.2H 15044H, 18053H 19051H
(4) 11040.2H 11904H 11903.8H 11904H 11904H
(5) 9 kts. 152kts. 132kts. 132kts. 13 kts.
(6) 000(H) 3590(H) 3590(H) 3590(H) 3590(H)
(7) Surface 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
(8) 1 1 1 1 1
(10) Undent  Undent  Undent  Undent  Undent
(11) Patrol  Patrol  Patrol  Patrol  Patrol
(12) 2d radar 2d radar 2d radar 2d radar 2d radar
(13) 24 mi. 20 mi. 40 mi. 20 mi. 15 mi.
(14) -  -  -  -  -
(15) -  -  -  -  -
(16) 1 3 3 3 3
(17) Kt  Kt  Kt  Kt  Kt
(18) U U U U U
(19) 20,000 15,000 15,000 25,000 20,000
(20) 40% 40% 40% 30% 40%
(12) -  -  -  -  -

-78-

— page 96 —
90. 91. 92. 93. 94.
(1) 10/25/4 10/26/44 10/27/44 10/27/44 10/27/44
(2) 0935(T) 0714(T) 1504(T) 0009(T) 0232(T)
(3) 2000T 17055T 16049T 15024T 14056T
(4) 15027T 14104T 142029.5T 14353T 14402.5T
(5) 6. etc. 14. etc. 15. etc. 17.5. etc. 14.5. etc.
(6) 069(T) 133(T) 133(T) 137(T) 137(T)
(7) Surface 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
(8) 1 2 1 1 1
(9) Incident Unident Bombed & Unident Unident Unident
(10) Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol Patrol
(11) Radar SD Radar SD Radar SD Radar SD Radar SD Radar
(12) 20 mi. 24 mi. 16 mi. 29 mi. 4.5 mi.
(13) - - 60/50 - -
(14) - - - - -
(15) - - - - -
(16) 2 2 2 3 3
(17) 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2
(18) U U U 5 mi. 2 mi.
(19) 25,000 10,000 15,000 10,000 10,000
(20) 30. 30. 40. 60. 90.
(21) - - 1000(1) 150(1) 30% I1.

— page 97 —
0:00:00
For: 0:00:00
To: 0:00:00
Date: 27 September 1944
Lat: 13° 40' N; Long: 119° 30' E

Target: Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was contacted by SS leader at 0202(1), range 21,000 yards, bearing 0250(1). Visibility: 1/1. No moon, sky overcast. The target group was composed of one large tanker with two unidentified patrol boats, one on either quarter about 2000 yards from the tanker. The tanker was sighted from the bridge at a range of 11,000 yards and was seen to be heavily loaded. Target speed was 10 knots and was zig-zagging radically on extremely short legs.

Ships: (a) [UNKNOWN: name]
(b) [UNKNOWN: type]
(c) [UNKNOWN: Tonnage]

Damage Determined by: One torpedo hit was seen, [UNKNOWN: name], but not [UNKNOWN: name] sighted. The target was hit in the stern. The crew was able to escape. The torpedo struck the tanker's bridge at a range of 11,000 yards and was seen to be heavily loaded. The target speed was 10 knots and was zig-zagging radically on extremely short legs.

The target was sighted at 0202(1), range 21,000 yards, bearing 0250(1). The tanker was sighted at 0202(1), range 21,000 yards, bearing 0250(1). The target was sight

— page 99 —
1. Torpedo Attack Data
Torpedo Attack No. 1.
Tube Fired 13 14 15 16
Zone Time 04:42:10 04:42:24 04:43:03 04:43:20
Range 2850 2840 2840 2840
Torpedo Run 3500 3500 3500 3000
Target Bearings 031°30' 032° 032° 032°30'
Track Angle 157(5) 158(5) 174(5) 174(5)
Gyro Angle 001 001 359:20 000
Depth Set 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft. 6 ft.
Power High High High High
Hit or Miss Hits Hits
Irritate No No No No
Tark Torpedo 23 23 14-34 14-34
Serial Number 49933 61637 26645 39750
Tark Exploder 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial Number 12744 25675 25757 14273
Actuation Set Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual - Contact - - -
Tark Armed 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
Serial Number 12903 12249 12135 12630
Explosive TPA TPA TPA TPA
Type Spread 3/4L 1/4L 1/4L 1/4L
Sea Conditions Slight Chp
Overhaul activity U.S.S. GRIFFIN - - - -
Miss due to Spread - Spread Spread
learks. None. None.

— page 100 —
0340 Date: September 28, 1944.
Lat: 13° 10' N, Long: 120° 00' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted.

Description: The target at was contacted initially by radar at 0320(h), bearing 220°(T), range 10,000 yards. Visibility poor, sky overcast, no moon. The target group consisted of one large tanker heavily loaded and two escorts, one on the starboard bow, possibly a DD, and an unidentified on the port quarter, the former about 3000 yards and the latter about 1000 yards from the target. The target speed was 6 knots on course of 030°(T), zig-zagging about every 9 minutes.

Ship Sunk:
(a) Number: One.
(b) Type: ...(LWT)
(c) Tonnage: 10,000 tons, large heavily loaded.

Damage Determined by:
Two hits were seen, heard and analyzed. The ship was hit by a torpedo at 0340(h) and a depth charge at 1340(h). The torpedo hit the ship at 0340(h) and the depth charge at 1340(h). The ship was hit by a torpedo at 0340(h) and a depth charge at 1340(h). The ship was

— page 102 —
1. 2. 3. 4.
Zone 'A' 04:39:36 04:39:45 04:39:53 04:40:01
Zone 'B' 2.70 2.05 2750 2710
Torpedo Run 2900 2650 2620 2700
Target Bearing 305°(T) 305°(T) 306°30'T 307°(T)
Track Angle 104°(T) 105°(T) 106°(T) 105°(T)
Gyro Angle 359:20 001:10 002 004
Depth Set 0 ft. 0 ft. 0 ft. 0 ft.
Power High High High High
Hit or Miss Miss Hit -hit
Arrival No No Yes No
Mark Torpedo 1A 23 23 23 23
Serial Number 49603 61634 53021 41536
Mark Exploder 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial Number 25647 14228 7274 17092
Actuation Set Contact Cont. Cont. Cont. Cont.
Actuation Actual - Cont. - Cont. - Cont.
Mark Torpedo 16-1 15-1 15-1 15-1
Serial Number 12657 13527 13456 13545
Missile Type TNT TNT TNT
Type Spread 2.5L 1.5L 1L 1R
Sea Conditions Slight Chg.
Overhead Activity CHIEF CHIEF 158245 153245
Miss Due To Spread -

— page 103 —
5. 6.
Torpedo Attack Data: Torpedo attack 2. (Cont.)
Tube Fired: 5. 6.
Zone Tic. 04:40:11 04:40:19
Range 2650 2600
Torpedo Run 2720 2700
Target Bearing 308(T) 308:30(T)
Truck Angle 107(S) 100(S)
Gyro Angle 004;20 004:30
Depth Set 0 feet 0 feet
Power High High
Hit or Miss Miss
Brrratic No No
Mark Torpedo 23 23
Serial Number 61893 53121
Mark Number 6-5 6-5
Serial Number 12736 14230
Location Set Cont.ct Cont.ct
Location Actual - -
Mark Number 16-1 16-1
Serial Number 13670 13463
Explosive TNT TNT
Type Spread 1gR 2gR
Sea Conditions Slight Cloudy
Overhead activity NES 245 NOS 245
Miss Due to Spread Spread
Remarks. -80-

— page 104 —
3. Patrol No. 6.
Torpedo Attack No. 3.
Date: 10 October 1944.
Lat. 16° 20'N; Lon. 11° 45'E.

Correct Data - Marked Inflicted.

Description: The convoy consisted of at least six, but with this, consistent mostly of medium size, but with at least one, and four or more escorts. Periscope observations were too short accurately to identify individual ships or convoy as consisting of the convoy was picked up initially by sound of echo running by escorts, and then some as eventually seen through periscope on the to return. U.S.

— page 106 —
1. Torpedo Attack Data. Torpedo Attack No. 3.
2. Tube fired 1. 2. 3. 4.
3. Zone time 11:05:25 11:08:33 11:06:41 11:06:50
4. Range 2000 1965 1930 1690
5. Torpedo Run 1020 1760 1740 5160
6. Target Bearing 070° 070°30' 071°20' 072°
7. Track Angle 60(5) 60(5) 60(5) 60(5)
8. Gyro Angle 354:10 356 358 000:30
9. Depth S.t 6 feet 6 feet 6 feet 6 feet
10. Power High High High High
11. Hit or Miss Hit Miss Hit
12. Surface - - - -
13. Mark Torpedo 14-3-... 14-3-... 23 23
14. Serial Number 22306 25434 41451 41481
15. Mark Attached 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
16. Serial Number 14266 17159 14169 14055
17. Attach. Set Contact Contact Contact Contact
18. Attach. Actual Contact - - Contact
19. Mark. Arched 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
20. Serial Number 13671 13652 13477 13400
21. Explosive TNT TNT TNT TNT
22. Type Spread S 3/4L 2 1/4L 1/2L 1/2R
23. Sea conditions Calm Calm Calm calm
24. Verriarail activity N. S. B. 245.
25. Misses due to - - -
26. Remarks. * Misses due to hurried setup and spread.

-91-

— page 107 —
5. 6.
True Fired . 11:09:22 11:09:31
Range 3440 3400
Torpedo Run 3100 3060
Target Bearing 066:30 066:30
Track Angle 60(5) 60(5)
Giro Angle 000 002:15
Depth Set 0 feet 0 feet
Power Hit 1 1
Hit or Miss 1 1
Hit or Miss - 1

— page 110 —
7. 8. 9. 10.
Torpedo Attack Data
Torpedo Attack No. 4.
Tube Fired
7. 8. 9. 10.
Zone Time
11:06:36 11:06:46 11:06:56 11:07:08
Range
2690 2720 2740 2770
Torpedo Run
2900 2950 2990 3040
Target Bearing
114T 115T 117T 116T
Tric. Angle
11(5) 11(5) 11(5) 11(5)
Gyro Angle
173 174:50 174:30 174:30
Depth Set
4 feet 4 feet 4 feet 4 feet
Power
- - -
Hit Cr. Miss
Miss. Hit
Hit
Miss. Hit

— page 114 —
34 degrees while that of the cool room remained normal. The system was again recharged, and the expansion valve to the cold room cleaned. The temperature dropped to normal after a peak of 35 degrees. No leaks could be found. On arrival in SHARP the system was inspected by tender personnel from the U.S.S. FULTON, and found to be functioning normally. No leaks could be found. In each case the temperatures remained abnormal for a period of twelve to fourteen hours.

Air Conditioning: Soon after diving for an all day sub-cruise patrol on October 4, it is discovered that one unit of the air conditioning was not in operation. A quick check revealed an open coil in the solenoid valve, replacement of the coil put the unit back in good working order. The unit is now in operation and is now in operation. The unit was out of operation for approximately a day and a half.

Periscopes: During the trial runs, it was noted that the periscope would not come into coincidence, but since it was only slightly out of adjustment, and making a correction required pulling the periscope, and possible delay, it was later that condition for the patrol. On October 1, we were forced down by a plane and took three to the boats, after which, 2 periscope was also found to be out of coincidence even to a greater extent than 1. In addition to the above, both periscope seemed to be excessively under control. Conditions and were a continual annoyance all during the patrol, increasing the difficulty of submersed attacks.

SUBMERGED

During a dive while underway, enroute to assigned patrol station, the out (J/2) sonar head was searched off. Upon returning to SHARP, 200 miles distant, diver's inspection revealed no other damage. However, a chain fall was required to hoist the shaft and outer periscope, and to close the sea valve. As there was no spare at SHARP, to repair the damage, Commander Task Force 71 sent instructions to continue on patrol with only the J/2 and J sonar equipments. No further troubles were experienced with the sound sea during the patrol.

— page 115 —
35-12 Radar: The 35-12 radar crew was in the western Pacific area on 9250 Kcs. from 10002 to 1600 Z. From 10002 to 0300 Z. 12530 Kcs. could be heard with the 0300 Z. 12530

— page 116 —
9/19/44 0348 0332'N. 11903'E. 4° negative to 300 ft.
: 9/26/44 0401 1356'N. 12002.2'E. 1° positive to 140 ft.
: 10/1/44 0157 14057.5'N. 11904.5'E. 30 negative to 200 ft.
: 10/3/44 2142 1504.5'N. 11903.5'E. 30 negative to 200 ft.
: 10/4/44 2115 1520'N. 11903.5'E. 30 negative to 200 ft.
: 10/10/44 2120 1609'N. 11904.5'E. 60 negative to 350 ft.

-101-

— page 118 —
74
(a) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - 52
(b) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - 68
(c) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol - 9
(d) Number of men advanced in rank during patrol - 11

realizing from previous patrols that the unsatisfactory method used of schooling and qualifying men as qualified officers was inadequate. The unqualified officer class a week for conduct and class men in their recent experience. The help of the leaders, and the use of the officers' departments as necessary. A series of lectures were given using the newly acquired slide film, a jettor followed by four torpedo exercises. The interest in this school was particularly good and resulted in sixteen of the twenty-two non-qualified men taking part in the end of the patrol, and was of a satisfactory degree to the officer themselves. The use of the officer officers in the interest and industry of the Navy. It is planned to continue this method of instruction on future patrols.

All this new method without exception fitted into their jobs in short order and the personnel factor did not present any great problem.

The commander's officer wishes to particularly commend HUR, 23-12N, 125-45E, for his devotion to duty during this and four previous patrols of this vessel. By his professional skill and hard work, he has maintained the electrical equipment in working order through any casualties, and has trained the electrician's mates to handle their jobs competently.

— page 120 —
1. USS. BONITA (SS 223).
2. Area Covered on this mission: [area covered]
3. Frequency of this mission: [frequency]
373. Frequency

— page 123 —
24 hours after charging and every 4 hours thereafter.
In our charging routine the 4 ton necces it the tubes
were charged two at a time by pulling half of it or the
tubes. On completion of charging the first two tri-
coces, the two remaining in the tubes were put under
charge. On the following day the reload torpedoes
were put under charge. -were charged the 4th the
7 after-hour in the 3 hours. This procedure was
took to cause a minimum of inconvenience to the
living in the compartment, there being no drums dis-
turbed except at the beginning and end of charging
the reload torpedoes.

Vessels: Certain torpedo investments were noted
in the 3rd, 10th, 1st, 10

— page 125 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY TWO, USS BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

1. The sixth war patrol of the BONEFISH was conducted in the SUBUYAN SEA, and SOUTH CHINA SEA west of LUZON. The patrol was of sixty-six days duration of which thirty-seven days were spent in the operating areas, sixteen days submerged. The MONETARY was, during a portion of that time, part of a co-ordinated attack group with FLASHER and LAPON. Area coverage was co-ordinated but no co-ordinated attacks were made.

2. This patrol was characterized by the amazing number of enemy vessels encountered, by many enemy plane contacts, by four successful attacks and by the rescue of two aviators. The number of enemy ships encountered, total sixty-eight, is in sharp contrast to the experience of so many submarines not only today but at any time in the war. Forty-five of these ships were worthwhile targets.

3. Summaries of attacks follow: (All in the SOUTH CHINA SEA west of LUZON.)

(a) ATTACK No. 1 (September 27th).

The enemy consisted of one large tanker with two escorts, speed 10 knots. A night surface radar attack was made and four torpedoes fired for one hit. Torpedo run 3,500 yards. Track angles 157 to 174. Spread; total one degree. Torpedo depth set six feet. Evaded the escorts on the surface. The tanker was not observed to sink but disappeared from the radar screen at 13,450 yards.

Recommended assessment: 1 AO (EU) 10,000 tons - Sunk.

(b) ATTACK No. 2 (September 28th).

The enemy consisted of one large tanker with two escorts, speed 6 knots. A night surface radar attack was made and four torpedoes fired for two hits. Torpedo run 2,800 yards.

— page 126 —
10 November 1944

SUBJECT: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

Tracked 104-108, Spread: total five degrees. Torpedo depth set six feet. One torpedo ran erratic. Evaded the escorts on the surface. The tanker was not observed to sink but disappeared from the radar screen at 9,400 yards with the two escorts still giving good pips. These escort pips persisted to 13,000 yards.

Recommend: assessment: 1 A0 (EU) 10,000 tons - Sunk.

(a) ATTACK No. 3 (October 10th).

The enemy consisted of about 8 AKS, at least one A0 and 4 or more escorts; speed 8 knots. A daytime submerged periscope attack was made and six torpedoes fired for three times; hits on two or more targets. Neither the hits nor their results were observed, due to proximity of an escort vessel; torpedo runs 1,700 and 3,100 yards. Track angle 60. Spread; total 7% degrees. Torpedo depth set six feet. The timed hits indicate that at least two ships were damaged.

Recommend: assessment: 2 AKS (EU) 4,000 tons each - Damaged.

(b) ATTACK No. 4 (October 14th).

The enemy consisted of two small AKS; speed 8 knots. A daytime periscope attack was made and four torpedoes fired for one hit. Torpedo run 3,000 yards. Track angle 116. Spread; total 2% degrees. Torpedo depth set four feet. One possible premature detection. The enemy was not in sight throughout the periscope while his companion was.

Recommend: assessment: 1 AK (EU) 2,000 tons - Sunk.

4. On her return from this patrol the BONEFISH was clean and in fine condition. She now proceeds to the West Coast for Navy Yard overhaul.

5. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are congratulated upon the completion of this arduous and successful patrol. Not only was severe damage inflicted on the enemy, but two aviators were rescued. This patrol adds another page to the glorious record of this fighting ship.

R. S. BEMSON

— page 127 —
11/bfh
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR
FCS-4/A16-3
Serial 0455
C-O-N-F-I-D-S-N-T-I-A-I-
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO, USS BONEFISH Cmft.
Ltr. SS223/A16-3 dated
8 November 1944.

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
(1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
U.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of the Sixth War
Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander
Submarine Division FORT-TO.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR heartily
congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers, and crew of the
BONEFISH for their fine performance on this patrol.

3. It is recommended that the BONEFISH be credited
with the following:

SUNK
1 AK (EU) 10,000 tons.
1 AK (EU) 10,000 tons.
1 AK (EU) 2,000 tons.
TOTAL SUNK 22,000 tons.

DAMAGED
1 AK (EU) 4,000 tons.
1 AK (EU) 4,000 tons.
TOTAL DAMAGED 8,000 tons.

TOTAL SUNK OR DAMAGED 30,000 tons.

VI. V. O'REGAN.

— page 128 —
145532
Serial 02574
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
BONEFISH Report of
Sixth War Patrol.
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 572.
U.S.S. BONEFISH - SIXTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.
(5 September to 8 November 1944).

1. The sixth war patrol of the BONEFISH was conducted in areas in the Sibuyan Sea and South China Sea west of Luzon. The BONEFISH, along with the U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249) and the U.S.S. LAPON (SS260), formed a coordinated attack group during part of the patrol.

2. Excellent area coverage was maintained, and many valuable contacts were made. Enemy anti-submarine measures were intense but the BONEFISH was able to deliver four aggressive attacks and inflict severe damage upon the enemy. The BONEFISH also had the great pleasure of rescuing two downed friendly aviators during a period of life-guard duty.

3. Award of submarine Combat Insignia is authorized for this patrol.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this highly successful patrol, the sixth outstanding performance in as many patrols. During her six patrols, the BONEFISH has sunk twenty ships totaling 140,323 tons and damaged seven ships totaling 41,981 tons, a record which speaks for itself. The BONEFISH is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol, all of which was accomplished in areas under the operational control of the Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE who is requested to assume credit accordingly:

SUNK
1 - Large A0 (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - Large A0 (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Small A0 (EU) - 2,000 tons (Attack No. 4)

TOTAL SUNK 22,000 tons

91

— page 129 —
1-10/AL6-3(15)
Serial 6C7L
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
BONEFISH report of
Sixth War Patrol.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 572.
U.S.S. BONEFISH - SIXTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - report of Sixth War Patrol.
(5 September to 8 November 1944).

DAMAGE REPORT

1 - Medium AK (EU) - 4,000 tons (Attacked No. 3)
2 - Medium AK (EU) - 4,000 tons (Attacked No. 3)

TOTAL DAMAGED 8,000 tons

TOTAL SUNK AND DAMAGED 30,000 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete reports)
Cominch (7)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (1)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean Areas (1)
ComServPac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Comsubsblant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
S/M Base, PH (1)
Comspac (1)
Comsowespace (2)
Comsubsowespace (2)
CTF 72 (1)
Comnorpac (40)
Comsubspace (2)
SUNAD, MI (3)
Comsubspace (2)
All Squadron and Division (2)
Commanders, Pacific (2)
Substraincpac (1)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

E. L. HYMES, 2nd,
Flaz Secretary.

— page 131 —
SS223/AL6-3
Serial (05)

U.S.S. BONFISH
(SS223)

DECLASSIFIED
7 May 1945.

Pro:
The Commander, Officer.
The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
(Official Channels).

Subject:
U.S.S. BONFISH (SS223), Report of Far
Fartol Number SEVEN.

Enclosures:
(A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Charts.
(C) TOP SECRET Report of Special Mission
(For COSUBACH only).

1. Enclosure (A) covering the SUBMARINE radar patrol
of this vessel connected in the northeast part of the
NATO CHINA Sea and lower SUBMARINE CHINA, the series
of 5 April to 7 May, 1945, is forwarded herewith.

L. L. DIXON.

DECLASSIFIED

DCLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
W-02-02982-C DATE 5/24/45

123 896

— page 133 —
1945
(B) ARRIVAL
5 April 1945: (All times (I) unless otherwise noted).
1500(K) Departed CHN, for patrol in accordance with
Commanding Task Force SUBWAY, Secret Operation
Order No. 74-45, of 5 April, 1945.

The following Officers and their Retty Officers were
attached and serving on board, with previous war patrols
as indicated:

| Name, Rank or Rate | Service or File No. | Number Patrols |
||||
| L. L. DGE, Co. Mander, U.S.N. | 74555 | 4 |
| Fraser S. Cmdt, Lt-Cdr, U.S.N. | 85289 | 4 |
| J. S. SULLY, Lieut., U.S.N.R. | 96031 | 5 |
| Logan G. SGT, Jr. Lt(J), U.S.N.R. | 137696 | 2 |
| R. I. JOHNSTON, Lt(J), U.S.N.R. | 167856 | 2 |
| L. I. A. BURKE, Lt(J), U.S.N.R. | 186829 | 3 |
| D. A. ABEL, ensign, U.S.N.R. | 282821 | 3 |
| D. DURST, ensign, U.S.N.R. | 313601 | 0 |
| R. A. A. OSBORNE, II., Ensign, U.S.N.R. | 341139 | 1 |
| R. H. FRANK, CHOL (A) (T), U.S.N.R. | 36857 | 5 |
| G. I. FULLER, CHOL (A) (T), U.S.N.R. | 27953 | 4 |
| S. E. JOHNSTON, Jr., CHOL (A) (T), U.S.N.R. | 34059 | 3 |
| A. A. LEVESQUE, CHOL (A) (T), U.S.N.R. | 23409 | 4 |

7 April 1945
0315(F) Cont'd and exchanged calls with TITAN by SS RACAR.

1200(T) Room position: Lat. 16° 29.5' N.
    Long. 140° 13.5' E.

1404(T) Submerged one hour for trial and training.

8 April 1945.
0217(T) Contacted and exchanged calls with TITAN by SS RACAR.

1110(T) Submerged 45 minutes for trial and training.

1200(K) Room position: Lat. 20° 45' N.
    Long. 137° 26' E.

— page 134 —
9.April 1945
1200(1)  Hoon Position: Lat. 250 50' N.
    Lon. 1370 52' W.
1224(K)  Sighted vessel bearing 110°(T), range about 10
    miles. Closed enough to identify a U.S. destroyer,
    similar to ORTH, or R.F. G. Glass.
1701(1)  Submerged one hour for training.
2337(1)  Raching received signals with unidentified
    southbound, U.S. submarine by St Naz.
10.april 1945
1124(1)  Sighted Type 93 Japanese mine, (4-horn), circling
    in position: Lat. 290 13.5' N.; Lon. 133021.2' W.
    Exploded it with 40 - .un fire.
1200(1)  Hoon Position: Lat. 290 13.5' N.
    Lon. 1330 21.2' W.
1348(1)  Answered challenge of two U.S. PBM's by light.
1430(1)  Set all shis clocks back one hour to American
    time: (I) Zone time.
1020(1)  Submerged one hour for training.
1730  Sighted Type 93 Japanese mine, drifting in position:
    Lat. 250 10' N.; Lon. 1310 36' W.
    Exploded it with 40 - .un fire.
2215  Slopped from 4- to 2- and saw speed because of
    heavy head seas.

11. April 1945
0022  Contact by St Naz on 30th July, 1945, since about
    50 miles.
06.30  Passed between USS RICHARD J. L. and JO J. L. into
    1st Gulf Stream, with R. P. in position, being
    1st sal of 157 men, 500 tons, -9 knots.
0745  Contact on St Naz at 7 miles (1st contact in
    1); subj. c.d.
1005  Surfaced, and headed toward DITO Cargo.

— page 135 —
1124 Contact on SD Recker at 17 miles, moved in to 12 miles, and back out to 15 miles (Flame Contact No. 2).
: 1200 Noon Position: Lat. 29° 47' N. Long. 125° 04.5' E.
: 1320 Contact on SD Recker at 6 miles (Flame Contact No. 3); submerged.
: 1550 Surfaced.
: 1600 Seas abating; back to 4-engine speed.
: 1642 Contact on SD Nadar, Radin in an out between 15 and 17 miles (Flame Contact No. 4).
: 2040 Changed course to pass about 25 miles to south west of HADJ CHATTO.
: 2132 Contact on SD Nadar, 4.5 miles, soon verified as plane by SD Nadar at 3 miles (Flame Contact No. 5); no AIS signals. Contact lost t about 6 miles.
: 2150 Sent mess. e by HOD to SHADOW reporting on incident arrival in area.

12 April 1945

: 0624 Sighted type 93 Japanese mines, airding in position: Lat. 32° 50.2' N.; Long. 127° 34.5' E. Landed at 40 mi. run fire.
: 1039 Contact on SD Nadar at 6 miles (Flame Contact No. 6).
: 1044 Submerged when plane closed to 10 miles.
: 1000 Noon Position: Lat. 33° 10' N. Long. 127° 35' E.
: 1206 Surfaced.
: 1217 Contact on SD Nadar at 7.5 miles (Flame contact No. 7); submerged.
: 1336 Surfaced.
: 1340 Contact on SD Nadar at 14 miles (Flame contact No. 4); passed out.
: 1343 Line out at 6 miles; submerged.

— page 136 —
1543 surfaced.
1547 Contact on 5. radar at 7 miles (Plan contact No. 9); submerged.
1642 surfaced.
1916 sighted U.S. submarine in the direction, ranging in direction of 9500 yards, after closing.
1928 Exchanged reco motion signals with Sub. 5. 1943, and requested instructions if any. met from Sub. 5

— page 137 —
2020
Detected to be carried by two unidentified small craft, probably sail boats. 5° Redan unable to gain contact, but 5° radar picked them up at 0000 and 0400 yards.

2020
Shortened rec.notation signals and calls with GND VII. By 5° radar, range 9600 yards at 3250(°).

2035
Contact on 5° radar, range 2300 yards (5°). Contacted to 5° radar, range 2700(°). Sonar detected trace, and closing slowly.

Target at first seemed to be on weather course, but soon reversed to zig on base course 0900(°), speed 9, as it came out from behind 1440 to (Lat. 34° 04' E.; long. 127° 30' N.). Went contact at or out to 5° radar and 1440, and at range closed to 5000 yards, the target was sighted to fluctuate rapidly with a set course change. The at still not visible in clear stability, apparently because of slop, but source was again sighted. No indication of target.

2250
Deep to suspect ship struck; but because in short range, to attack as soon as target could be identified. To execute, all this time, 1440 sighted between 5000 and 9000 yards from us, and had sent message saying she also was inverst. But a contact in sight at 1440, as she closed blu at 4000 yards, as he took a sighted.

2316
Set out to cut at 4 feet, delivering target at 5° speed, with sea state fairly 0. Launched to fire at 5° 1200. Range 1200 yards. 5° radar at 5° 1200. 5° radar at

— page 138 —
2359-15 Left full rudder, still out of full over
: all torpedoes were seen to breach several tide- as
: they otherwise seemed to run straight and normal.

: No hits. Metros. cat indicate that target was
: probable zig-zag, with a constant sea surface
: posed on a strehlike zig. This would explain the
: inactivity of bridge personnel to continue on the
: and the slight tracking inaccuracies during approach.

: Target evidently was torpedoes also, because he
: turned and headed down their wake. He
: pursued us for about 20 minutes, but not as if he
: meant it, since he never reached our own
: points.

: During our retirement, the CV-111 closed at
: as if to attack us, but unlike cut in our own
: course, and continued toward selected not just
: spot.

: 2335: Sunk to 35-12N and 125-45E by 0.000 tons of unsuccessful attack. Crew able to establish connection by VHF.

: Considered re-attacking, but felt that his size
: had severely reduced the chances of our torpedoes
: since he would be harder to hit, therefore, he
: believed that attack likely would be on his side of
: the direction, not our side. At this time,
: ammo was running low, and a tactical
: advantage to fire when we ran to the Ominous
: edge of the deck, while the enemy was idle,
: especially for such a small target.

14-31-1945

: 0343: Sighted green flare bearing 3450(T) at intercept range.

: 0314: Lost radar contact on CV-111 at 14,500 yards.

: 0528: Submerged, for patrol course traffic lanes passing from outside, about to follow us.

— page 139 —
0720 Head ten (10) heavy, but distant, underwater explosions; no "click" as sometimes heard preceding depth changes or explosions. Not visible by periscope.

094- sighted plane, [AUTO. YPG; passed about 5 miles away, on steady course (plane contact No. 10). !]

1200 Moon Position: Lat. 33° 52' N. Long. 128° 35' E.

1442 Another distant explosion.

1508 Surfaced.

2244 Exchanged recognition and calls by 3rd Ieadar with OW. ILL. Sent them our course.

15 April 1945

0505 Submerged for patrol off pass between HINGUIHI and ZUCHI O SHI.

Sighted eight small wooden sea trucks or trawlers during day.

1200 Moon Position: Lat. 33° 36' N. Long. 129° 15' E.

1925 Picked up weak echo ranging, two sets, in direction of the passes to eastward of us.

1939 Surfaced, echo ranging vessels not visible.

1947 Mark enough to understand on us to hold to our course, echo ranging.

2001 Contact on 3rd radar at 5500 yards to westward of us; later identified, by keying 3rd radar, as USS U. L. Continued to listen.

2007 Contact on 3rd radar at 13,550 yards, followed almost immediately by one round at 15,000 yards. (High, contact No. 2).

2016 Storm signal on 3rd radar, saw contact at 3 miles, 1500 yds, 2.5 secs; keying 3rd radar, saw contact at 3 miles, 1500 yds, 2.5 secs; went out of commission ten o'clock (all not contact No. 11). Decided not to dive as plane did not believe he could see us now.

-6-

— page 140 —
21.25 receive Combat Sub assembly ship. Life- ward duties for 15 enl 10.pril.

23.05 Secure critical Vessels, not vent to no hit alert station 30 miles 37 of TOSUKA.

16.00 1945

01.12 Contacted 31.00 yards, no exchange recognition and calls by St. Adar.

04.25 Series of strike "pings" on 1st in small groups of two or three from 2200 to 11,000 yards, all about 0.00 (melt) enl 3300 (mel). |

— page 142 —
1546. Surfaced, and made out single PC type vessel heading westward (Ship Contact No. 3). Left him go, and returned to surface patrolling. Thought at time he might be going to pick up plane crash survivors, since we did not yet know a U.S. plane had shot it down.

2036 Headed 17 to patrol in vicinity of S.S.S. 70 (Lat. 34° 20' I.; Lon. 125° 09' E.), during night.

During night, made several unusual and unexpected observations. They were picked up in general at ranges between 12,000 and 24,000 yards. The time they were closed to within 2500 yards, could still not be seen in spite of starlight. The most outstanding were those closed to either which were initially contained at 30,000 yards (though we had some preliminary estimates on this one!). They were extremely difficult to detect between 8 and 9 hours as we closed, and contact was made every week between 24,000 and 16,000 yards, while at 3,600 yards the "hips" were but little larger than they had been at 30,000; no targets were ever seen, although ranges closed to 3000 yards. These contacts were very rare, the direction of which was not second-sleeve schools. We inlinie to the belief that they were probably fishing vessels, most likely lying to, and that the exercise was a caused by atmospheric conditions rather than by a jet trick. The sky was cloudless, with light cool surface winds, but with a thin surface breeze blowing.

A radar signals were most continuously in evidence at several frequencies on the PT-1, but were all evaluated as slow-speed due to the generally long pulse widths (5-10 microseconds). None of them ever were closed to steady on long, if at all. It was suspected that any enemy radar would have a difficult time differentiating between and one of the sailboats.

17 April 1942

0300 Co-med pulling out into deeper water for dry surface patrol.

0632 Contact on SD mast at 19 miles (Pine Contact No.

— page 143 —
17) moved out and faded at 21 miles.

0945 Contact on SD radar, at 19 miles (Plane Contact No. 16); faded out.

1147 Contact on SD radar, at 13 miles (Plane Contact No. 19); moved out to 14 miles and faded.

1200 Room Position: Lat. 33° 00' N. Long. 126° 35' E.

1204 Contact on D radar at 11 miles (Flame Contact No. 20); moved out and faded at 10 miles.

1317 Observer at 40 minutes for trim.

1431 Contact on D radar at 6 miles (Flame Contact No. 21); observed.

1517 Surf. dead.

1604 Sighted vessel, hull down, at 2100 (T); commenced closing.

1512 Vessel identified as two-masted junk. Finally picked up by SS Hagar at 12,000 yards. Went to Battle Cruiser Stations as we drew near.

1540 Clicked junk close aboard tanker, moving; badly strained. Entered Oriental crew members on hall after 6:00 am. With our 40-m. guns manned, actioned for junction crew to put over their tender.

1702 Funk boat almost side; unidentified crew member came aboard. Brought our Senior Day tootsie topside as interjectory, since the new visitor seemed unable to read or understand our Day transcript. Handled by Air Force at 6:00 am. The ship was at least 100 miles from the shore. The ship was at least

— page 144 —
1530 Converted No. 4 F.B.T. to a M.J.T.

2053 Headed toward night patrol station in vicinity of SS500 W.O.

16 April 1945

During night patrolled in toward Korean coast, inside of SS500 W.O. Visibility at this less than 500 yards due to fog; eased in slowly between units of the Irish fleet.

0121 Lay to, with SS500 W.O. bearing about 1700 (T), distance 5 miles. Had hoped this position would allow us to contact anything big moving along the innermost coastal route as well as along the next route out-side of the many small islands and rocks in this vicinity; but the fog made it highly improbable that anything big could move at all.

0332 Began pulling out of shallow water, heading southward.

It is difficult to find any way to get at the Korean coast traffic except by some such method at night with visibility favoring the submarine, but it is believed that a few such attacks could be successful with favorable visibility conditions, no doubt, the convoy would be suffering under a feeling of security, and the sailing list and many small islands would render radar detection of the submarine more than normally difficult. Unfortunately, this night no worthy contacts came along. Had conditions were still good, but nothing like on the previous night, with its phenomenal range. This time, ranges on saliboats were obtained at as much as 14,000 yards, but most came in at about 6,000 yards.

0622 During next 2 minutes, heard 27 distant but strong underwater explosions.

0635 Under 6.6 cm. from and to flank No. 4 I.B.T. main.

0703 Surprised, and headed south to patrol traffic late between IJU and SANSUO.

0745 Contact on SS radar at 9 miles (Plane contact No. 22); submerged.

— page 145 —
0000 The more distant explosions.
: 0013 Surfaced.
: 1051 Contact on SD radar at 7 miles (Flame Contact No. 29); submerged.
: 1200 Recon Position: Lat. 33° 24' N. Long. 125° 04' E.
: 1401 Surfaced.
: 1422 Contact on SD and on Radars at 10 miles (Flame Contact No. 23); Faded, moving out.
: 1450 S/L Type 93 Japanese mine airlift in position: Lat. 33° 19' N.; Long. 125° 05' E. Two of its four horns were already badly bent and smashed, but decided to try the 40 mm. guns again.
: 1514 Contact on SD radar at 11 miles, moving in to 7 miles (Flame Contact No. 24), interrupted target practice on the mine, as we submerged.
: 1559 Surfaced and set course for vicinity of DAKTO GUNTO.
: 2112 Heavy fast inside. Tied inadvisability of trying to accomplish special mission tomorrow; so reversed course to patrol off UKU SHIN. Tomorrow instead.

19 April 1945

: 0537 Contact on 5T Racer, 3500(T) at 11,900 yards and 15,150 yards (high contact No. 4); changed course toward.
: 0547 S/L contact on bridge.
: 0553 Contact on 5T Racer, 3500(T) at 11,900 yards and 15,150 yards (high contact No. 4); changed course toward.
: 0750 Locked sighted small vessel dead ahead with small air at 1000. Submerged.
: 0935 Identified target as wooden sea track.
: 1006 Sighted sea track following first.

— page 148 —
12,000 yards they tracked as clearly toward the northeast. 5 were nicely boxed in between these two contacts and UDT and HIJMSHI SHI, each about 5 miles away; so with strong suspicion, at

0450 Great nor see nearest one fairly clearly, let 6000 yards distant i. after 1. close. 4.

— page 151 —
5.5. BOLINTEN (5323)  SHTMT  MAT 24.01

---

**0510**  Distant underwater explosion.

**0510**  Distant underwater explosion.

**0514**  Air distant underwater explosions. The two sets of echo range were still well up, and the head began to clear, bearing only 200 as a percentage of range until distant casualties patrol spot. Pointing in sight.

**1110**  -line Distant underwater explosions.

**1115**  Four distant underwater explosions.

**1200**  No position:  Let. 530 49° I. 1. 1. 12.0 5° I. 1.

**1222**  Ten distant underwater explosions.

**1253**  Five distant underwater explosions. The CC. located the day's total of 40 explosions, all of which sounded like the C. C

— page 152 —
0521 Submerged for patrol across traffic lanes from UKU
: 1150 Distant underwater explosion.
: 1200 Corrosion: Lat. 330 15' E.
: 1210 Three distant underwater explosions.
: 1215 Distant underwater explosion.
: 1226 Distant underwater explosion.
: 1330 Distant underwater explosion.
: 1336 Distant underwater explosion.
: 1524 Surfaced, with floating object like mine about 200 yards ahead.
: 1935 Verified floating object as Type 93 Jar line (4-horn), drifting in position: Lat. 330° 10' N.; Long. 1270 42' E. Too far to make location at it advisable.
: 1952 Attempted unsuccessful to examine explosion; signals with vessel diving 30 yards interference; located NORAD call for DARAG from him.
: 2001 Contact on 3D Radar at 6 miles; verified as plane by 3D Radar (plane contact No. 37); submerged in 6 miles.
: 2040 Surfaced.
: 2050 Transmitted DDHHS. Serial No to Cmdr, Ivan; later temperature and gradient data.
: 2210 Contact on 3D Radar at 4 miles verified as plane by 3D Radar (plane contact No. 36); submerged with it closing.
: 2336 Surfaced.
: 2342 Contact on 3D Radar at 6 miles verified as plane by 3D Radar (plane contact No. 39); submerged with it closing to 4 miles.

— page 153 —
5-9-41 1945
C016  SURFACES, THE HEADS OF DAY VEHICLES STATION OFF
    EAST COAST OF SHETLAND.

C052  SURFACES OF SHETLAND, and CLOSE TO -5.5 AFT
    LINE 4 MILES EAST OF CENUO.

C005  SHIP'S IN-LINE HEADING, MAKING BODIES OF 'SCOUTING,
    RUNS 2 MILES, ALONG, ALONG, ALONG, ALONG, ALONG, ALONG,
    ALONG, ALONG, ALONG, ALONG, ALONG, ALONG, ALONG

— page 157 —
1200 No. position: Lat. 29° 10' N.
    Long. 132° 31' E.

1227 Buriaced, and set receiver watch on aircraft life- guard frequency.

1330 Submerge, with unsighted plane contact at 5 miles on 50 yards.

1450 Surface.

1425 El. ther and ase close aboard floating metal object which looks like a fantomable plane tank. The more I see the better I am, and it was still pretty clear. I can't see how I can land it. Position: Lat. 29° 10.7' N.; Long. 132° 5.5' E.

1515 Submerged, with unsighted planes contact to on D day, at 5 miles.

1535 Surface.

1605 El. ther B-29 at about 10 miles heeded cautiously.

2100 Secure receiver at on life- guard frequency.

4 May 1945

Iade several 50-1-

— page 158 —
0.50(1) Submerged for trim and to flush No. 3 and 5 i.B.T., after converting the from F.B.T.'s.
0900(1) Surfaced.
1200(1) Position: Lat. 20° 52' N.
Long. 137° 15' M.

Several SD radar contacts during the afternoon, all living, roger IFF response.

8. 22. 1945

0225(1) Coincident 6-hr. test battery discharge.

Several sight and SD radar plane contacts, during day; all living, roger IFF response.

1200(1) Position: Lat. 17° 42' N.
Long. 140° 07' E.

1020(1) Exchanged visual recognition signals and calls with BUDK, headed NE.

1049(1) Fused close aboard float, wooden, vertical-shear objective. Used as cover for 1/2" shell, 1/

— page 176 —
1955-281/A16-3
Serial: (021)
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subj: U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

---

**Submarine Division Two Eighty One**

**Care of Fleet Post Office; San Francisco, California.**

**10 May, 1945.**

---

**Subj:**
U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) - Report of War Patrol
Number SEVEN.

---

**Instruct:**
on the whole this attack appears to have been hurried and ill advised. Under the existing conditions, having a decided speed advantage and with the enemy unaltered BONEFISH could well have maneuvered for a more favorable position before attacking.

---

**4.**
On 16 April BONEFISH rendered life guard services to the enemy by making captives of two Japanese aviation ratings whose plane had been shot down by one of our aircraft. A third declined rescue, preferring unconventional but effective seppuku by drowning.

---

**5.**
The second float observed on the afternoon of 19 April suggests the possibility that the enemy is using an antisubmarine device similar to a sono-buoy.

---

**6.**
On 21 and 22 April BONEFISH completed a special mission, covered by a separate report, in a workmanlike manner.

---

**7.**
On her return from patrol BONEFISH was clean and shipshape, and in good material condition. Future commitments allow her only ten days for refit.

---

**8.**
The Administrative Division Commander has nothing but certainty for BONEFISH's aggressive spirit as evidenced by her decision, particularly in the face of persistent opposition, of shock and difference waters south of Korea in search of enemy shipping. He offers his congratulations on a hazardous special mission well performed.

---

**Signature:**
L. H. CHAPPELL, C.O.

— page 177 —
FC5-28/A16-3
SUBMARINE SQUADRONE TWENTY-EIGHT

Serial No. 0139.
C-C-N-F-I-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENEMY SUBMARINE
CO., USS BENEFISH CONF.
Itr. dated 7 May 1945.

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
U.S.S. BENEFISH - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

1. Forwarded concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division TWENTY-EIGHT ONE.

2. The Squadron Commander congratulates the commanding officer, officer and crew on the completion of a hazardous patrol and on taking valuable prisoners.

J. M. WILL.

— page 178 —
12-10(A)/A10-3(18) SUBMARINE COAST FLEET
Serial 01194
Care of File: Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
21 May 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL:
The following is to be
known and reported to
the Commanding Officer.

COPYRIGHT: U.S. NAVY, 1961.
U.S.S. BONIFIES (SS223) - Report of Seventh Patrol
(6 April to 7 May 1945).

1. The Seventh War Patrol of the BONIFIES, under the
Command of Commander L. L. Edge, U.S. Navy, was conducted in the East
China Sea area. In addition to offensive patrol, intelligence
operations were also conducted.

2. Despite thorough air cover, the enemy was able to evade
our patrols and maintain a high degree of concealment. On the
morning of 7 May, the enemy attacked the Seventh Patrol
with torpedoes, but our patrols were able to intercept and
destroy the enemy's torpedo attack. The enemy's torpedo attack
was unsuccessful, and the enemy was forced to withdraw.

3. A search of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol
is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, consults
with the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew of the BONIFIES
for the completion of this successful patrol.

DISTINGUISH:
(Completions, numbers)
(Combatants)
(7) CTG 71.5
(7) CO
(7)

— page 179 —
1.0 2.8 2.5 1.1 1.8 1.25 1.4 1.6
OPERATOR 1. Fy/c
DATE 3-5-8/

THIS MICROFILM IS THE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO—NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET - START AND END
NDW-NPPSO-5210/1 (6-78)

— page 181 —
19 Sep-11 Oct 1944
NAME: BONEFISH
FROM: CROSS INDEX CARD
SERIAL DATE
SUBJECT Coordinated Attack Group
Report of coordinated search and attack group of USS LAPON USS FLASHER, USS BONEFISH in South China Sea-Manila-Cape Bolinao area. 7C,400 tons sunk or damaged by this
GROUP (SOVESPAC: SUB OPS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately under FLASHER ser 025 of 31 Oct 44

DATE 21-22 April 1945
NAME BONEFISH
FROM Commanding Officer USS BONEFISH (SS-223)
SERIAL 0001
DATE 7 May 1945
SUBJECT SPECIAL MISSION
Report (to SUBSPAC) of check of Nishi Suido in lower Tsushima Straits for mines. Operation conducted during SEVENTH WAR Patrol. Include chart of mine locations.
(CBNPAC/SUB OPS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately as ORIGINAL; as CARBON COPY

MICROSERIAL NO.
ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3480-13 (11-55)
G20432

DATE 18 June 1945
NAME BONEFISH
FROM CROSS INDEX CARD
SERIAL DATE
SUBJECT Loss of USS BONEFISH (SS-223)
Report (to CINCPAC) of last known operations of subject vessel. BONEFISH was on EIGHTH WAR PATROL operating in coordinated attack group with TUNNY & SKATE in Japan Sea. Conducted daylight reconnaissance in Toyama Wan and was
FILED: War Diary
Separately under SUBSPAC ser 00052 of 30 Jul 45

MICROSERIAL NO.
ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3480-13 (11-55)
G-3682

— page 189 —
15-18A16/(00)
Serial 0116
CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS FLASHER (SS249)
Conf. 1tr. SS249/A16-3
Serial 025 dated 31 Oct 44.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

- Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
  (SS260) and U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249), U.S.S. LAPON
  (SS260) and U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) from 19 Sept.
  1944 to 11 October 1944.

1. This coordinated search and attack group was formed on 19 September in the area off Manila, consisting of FLASHER and LAPON, the
   CRUIVALLE having suffered an operational casualty which had sunk a heavily loaded
   transport in a day submerged approach.

2. On 22 September LAPON contacted a convoy and sank a
   tanker. FLASHER could not assist being on lifeguard duty at the time.

3. On 27 September FLASHER sighted a battleship formation
   and the group started an approach. However contact with the formation
   was lost when the FLASHER ran into a large convoy while attempting to
   track the battleships. In a well executed coordinated attack, FLASHER
   sank one medium freighter and damaged an unidentified vessel. LAPON
   shortly thereafter sank a large freighter and a large tanker. All
   attacks were by periscope during daylight. Contact could not be main-
  tained since LAPON was kept down until after sunset by counter-attack
   and could not inform FLASHER of a radical change of base course.

4. The BONEFISH joined the group on 30 September. All three
   boats were disposed about twenty-five miles apart, close inshore along
   the traffic lane. This necessitated submerged patrolling during the day.
   This, plus the fact that the enemy was anchoring his convoys overnight
   in shallow harbors, made daytime coordinated attacks impossible. On
   4 October FLASHER sank two medium freighters in an independent attack
   on a convoy. On 5 October the LAPON got in an attack on a heavily
   escorted convoy but the attack was unsuccessfull. The convoy evidently
   a short overnight in Santa Cruz harbor and was unsuccessfully attacked
   to next day by the FLASHER.

— page 190 —
5-18/16/(00)
Serial 0116
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject:
War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
Consisting of U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249), U.S.S. LAFON
(SS260) and U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223) from 19 Sept.
1944 to 11 October 1944.

5. On 10 October LAPON and BONEFISH got in successive attacks
on a convoy, the former hitting a destroyer and a large freighter which
was later bashed; the latter got hits in two freighters. The FLASHER
saw this convoy on Santa Cruz harbor late in the afternoon and dis-
posed the group to attack the next morning upon departure. However the
convoy eluded the LAPON and BONEFISH, and the FLASHER could not get into
attack position before the convoy had escaped into shallow water.

6. The group was dissolved the next day, 11 October upon de-
parture of FLASHER from the area.

7. Again, as in the last group which the Commanding Officer.
of the FLASHER command, communications were excellent, which accounts
in large measure for the success attained. Experience with this and other
groups bears out the Group Commander in his opinion that three submarines
form the most satisfactory coordinated attack group. The disposition
of the submarines was well considered and although submerged patrol at
intervals along the coast line afforded no opportunity for daytime
coordinated attacks, it was certainly the most logical disposition of
forces under prevailing circumstances.

8. The Squadron Commander heartily congratulates the group
commander and the officers and crew of the three submarines upon a
highly successful mission. The exceptionally heavy air coverage, large
number of escorts and glassy sea conditions necessitated an unusually
high degree of determination and aggressiveness which was clearly evident
at all times.

ELIOT H. BRYANT.

— page 191 —
1-14a/pr
Serial 0216
CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES NAVY
33c from 20 FEB 1945
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS FLASHER Conf. Ltr.
A16-3 Serial 025, dated
31 October, 1944.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET, RECEIVED
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET DEPARTMENT
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
Consisting of U.S.S. FLASHER, U.S.S. LAPON and
U.S.S. BONEFISH - Comment on.

1. FLASHER and LAPON patrolled as a coordinated search and attack group off the west coast of LUZON under the capable direction of the Commanding Officer of FLASHER, Commander R. T. WHITAKER, U.S.N., from September 19 until October 11, 1944.
BONEFISH joined the group on September 30.

2. FLASHER and LAPON made successive daylight attacks on a large east bound convoy south of SCARBOROUGH SHOAL. FLASHER made the first attack, at 0724 sinking one medium AP and damaging an unident, but was not able to surface before LAPON submerged for an attack at 1026. After surfacing at 1102 FLASHER was unable to locate the convoy which had made a radical change of base course after the first attack. LAPON sank a large AK and a large AO, and was then held down until dark. FLASHER attempted to find the convoy that night acting on information obtained from LAPON, but had no success. Since the convoy had no air cover greater success would probably have been attained if LAPON had waited until FLASHER surfaced and regained contact before submerging for her attack.
This was the only good opportunity for coordinated attacks by this group. The traffic along the coast of LUZON was hugging the coast during the daylight and anchoring overnight. This, combined with the heavy air coverage during the day practically precluded coordinated search and attack activities. Successful individual attacks, however, were made by all three submarines.

3. The Force Commander congratulates the Group Commander, and FLASHER, LAPON and BONEFISH on inflicting the following damage to the enemy while acting as a coordinated group:

SUNK
1 - AK (Large - EU) 7,500 Tons (FLASHER Attack No. 1)
1 - AO (Large - EU) 10,000 Tons (LAPON Attack No. 1)
-1-

— page 192 —
FE24-71/A16-3
Serial 0216
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS FLASHER Conf. Ltr.
Al6-3 Serial 025, dated
31 October, 1944.

Subject:
War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
Consisting of U.S.S. FLASHER, U.S.S. LAPON and
U.S.S. BONEPISH - Comment on.

1 - AP (Medium - EU)
7,500 Tons (FLASHER Attack No. 2)
1 - AK (Similar HAWAII
MARU - EC)
9,500 Tons (LAPON Attack No. 2)
1 - AK (Similar HOKKI
MARU - EC)
5,600 Tons (LAPON Attack No. 2)
1 - AK (Medium - EU)
4,000 Tons (FLASHER Attack No. 3)
1 - Escort - EU)
4,000 Tons (LAPON Attack No. 3)
Total 48,600 Tons

DAMAGED
1 - UN
4,000 Tons (LAPON Attack No. 1)
1 - UN
4,000 Tons (FLASHER Attack No. 2)
1 - AK (Similar TEIHOKU
MARU - EC)
5,800 Tons (LAPON Attack No. 3)
1 - AK (Medium - EU)
4,000 Tons (BONEFISH Attack No. 3)
1 - AK (Medium - EU)
4,000 Tons (BONEFISH Attack No. 3)
Total 21,800 Tons

Grand Total 70,400 Tons

JAMES FIFE.

— page 193 —
14a/pr
Serial_0216
30 January 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS FLASHEER Conf., Ltr.
Al6-3 Serial 025, dated
31 October 1944.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
Consisting of U.S.S. FLASHEER, U.S.S. LAPON and
U.S.S. BONEFISH - Comments on:

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominoh (3) Direct CTG-71.5 (2)
Vice Opnav (2) Direct CTG-71.8 (2)
Vice Opnav Op-23c (1) CTG-71.9 (2)
ComlstFlt (1) DivComSubRon-12 (1 ea)
Com2nFlt (1) DivComSubRon-18 (1 ea)
Com7thFlt (2) DivComSubRon-26 (1 ea)
ComSubslstFlt (30) S/M Scclool, N.L. Conn. (2)
ComSubs2ndFlt (4) Comdt: NYD, Puget Sound (2)
CTF-71 (7) SubAd, Mare Island (2)
CTG-71.3 (2) S/Ms 7thFlt (1)
CTG-71.4 (2)

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

B. MILLER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 194 —
7 May 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Special Operation, 21-22 April, 1945 - Report of.

References:
(a) ComSubPac Top Secret Serial 00023 (FF12-10/16-3) of 6 April, 1945.
(b) ComSubPac Top Secret Despatch 160533, of April, 1945.
(c) ComSubPac Top Secret Despatch 250048, of April, 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Plot of Mine Field in vicinity of DANZO GUNTO.

1. Reference (a) assigned the U.S.S. BONEFISH a special operation to locate any existing mine fields in an assigned portion of NISHI JUDO, by use of FM Sonar equipment. This was cancelled by reference (b), but reference (b) assigned a similar operation: to determine what could be found of a reported minefield extending for eighty (80) kilometers, in a line 2340(T) from a position at Lat. 31 52'N.; Long. 1280 12' E. (near DANZO GUNTO).

2. Reference (b) was received during the night of 16 April, 1945, when BONEFISH was near the southern end of TSUSHIMA STRAIT. Since the date of commencement was left to discretion, it was decided to delay two days to complete a scheduled patrol in vicinity of the KOREAN coast. State four seas springing up after that, caused an additional two day delay. The searon was actually commenced in the morning of 21 April, 1945, and occupied the daylight period of two days. Search was discontinued at night, despite state one seas, in order to bolster of the minefield for diving to evade night-flying planes and also to avoid being detected in the immediate vicinity of the field and risking the unnecessary arousing of enemy suspicion of our activities.

ENCLOSURE (C). -1-

— page 195 —
3. At 0524, 21 April, 1945, BONEFISH submerged west of DANJO GUNTO and closed it to obtain accurate fixes and current data, by periscope bearings and ST Radar ranges on the nearest island of DANJO GUNTO. At 0820, course was changed to 1800(T), in position about 8 miles, bearing 3550(T), from the NE end of the reported mine line. Speed of 4 knots, at a depth of 100 feet was used, heading into a current with a set of 340(T) and drift of 0.5 knots. A course heading directly for the end of the line was not taken for fear of missing it. A few minor contacts were made prior to contact on the mines themselves but all were evaluated as something other than mines because of poor shape, poor tone, low persistance, improper relative movement, fading, or combinations of these. Most were thought to be fish.

4. At 1050, the first strong, clear-toned contact was made at about 250 yards, bearing 350(T), followed by another almost immediately thereafter, dead ahead, at a range of 300 yards. Speed was immediately reduced and the ship swung right with full rudder. During the swing, other mines of the line began showing up at regular intervals and along the extended line of the first two; so there was little doubt even from the beginning that these contacts were the expected mines. Course was first changed to 2350(T), but had to be changed back to about 2150 to make good a course parallel to the line of mines, which persisted from now on until late afternoon with beautiful spacing and regularity and only a very few single-mine gaps. Plotting of individual mines was immediately begun, using the DRT on a scale of 500 yds/in. Soon resumed 4-knot speed in order to make good as much distance as possible during the day. Speed variations between 1.8 and 4 knots had no effect on the contacts, either range or tone. During most of the day, contact ranges averaged about 350 yards, with a good state three sea running, but the tones were so clear and bell-like that all other contacts, of which there were many, could not compare and caused no confusion.

5. At 1543, the line unexpectedly ended, after having been tracked uninterruptedly for 11.6 miles since first contacted. At first, it was feared that the sonar gear was at fault, because of the existence of inferior echoes approximately along the mine line extended. A check of equipment indicated nothing wrong however, and these poor echoes were comparable with other poor ones during the day and appeared on both sides. Course was changed by increments to southward.

ENCLOSURE (C) -2-

— page 196 —
1945, Page Three of U.S.S. BONEFISH Top Secret
Letter SS223/A16-3, Serial 0001 of 7 May 1945.

In an attempt to regain contact. A mile and a half to the southward, course was changed to westward for half a mile and then to northward again. It was felt that the break was probably deliberate, and that the line continued, but from an offset point. At 1322, contact was again established on the line, the contacts being every bit as good as before losing the line. We were now on the up-current side of the line, and were almost in the line before being turned parallel to it, which caused a few anxious moments. Due to the lateness of the day, it was decided to trace the re-contacted line in a NE direction back toward the break, thereby definitely establishing the existence of the break and its extent, and also allowing us safely to penetrate to the northern or down-current side for surfacing during the night. At 1900, the break appeared again, and BONEFISH crossed through it and surfaced at 1934. Adjustment of the plot to correct for current indicated that the break was one of about 1500 yards, but that there was no offset. True directions of the line was established as very close to 2240(T).

6. At 0649, the next day, we submerged again to 100 feet, at 4 knots, on course 1800(T), about 5 miles from the center of the originally reported line, just to be on the safe side. Sea had improved to state one during the night. The reduction in background noise, visual and audible, was so marked that again mal-adjustment of the sonar was feared, but checks of equipment and ranges on an F.T.S. bubble again indicated satisfactory operation. At 1154, the mine line was contacted again. This time, the range was in excess of 400 yards, and it appeared as a double line. The latter caused initial confusion and doubt because of its unexpectedness. However, the existence of the line, along the same bearings as yesterday, was soon established, and plotting resumed. It was followed with even less difficulty than on the day before, because initial contact ranges averaged at least 800 yards all day and the line could be clearly seen (even though all individual mines could not to the limits of the 1600 yard scale. The 400 yard scale was used most of the time, however, for convenience in plotting. The double line changed to a single one after 3 miles, went back to double at 445 miles, and finally to single at 5.5 miles from the day's initial contact, for the remainder of the time.

7. That these double rows were actually two rows of mines in not certain, because, although the lines were 150 yards apart most of the time, they seemed to merge just

ENCLOSURE (C) -3-

— page 197 —
9. The line ended and contact was lost at about 1735, and contact was not regained although we continued along its extended direction for 3 miles, and then turned NW for 2 miles before surfacing at 1908. Since this was so close to the expected end of the line, as regards length, it was assumed that this was its true end. No data on the triplane was obtained due to its loss on 13 April, 1945.

10. Recapitulation, and correction of the plots for current and for the best available navigational data gives the following information on the field, as reported by BONEFISH Top Secret despatch Serial One (221401, of April 1945) to ComSubPac:

(a) Begins: Lat. 31° 54' N.
Long. 128° 11' E.
(b) Extends: 47 miles along 224° to end.

ENCLOSURE (C) -4-

— page 198 —
Page Five of USS BENEFISH Top Secret Letter
SS223/A16-3, Serial 0001 of 7 May 1945.

(c) Ends:  Lat. 31° 20' N.
    Long. 127° 34' E.

(d) Single-line density:  15 miles per mile, evenly spaced.

(e) Double Line:  Probable, in center third,
    with lines 150 yards apart.

(f) Mine Depth:  Undetermined, but probably shallow.

(g) Gaps:  One of 1500 yards, 12.5 miles from NE end.

(h) Depth of Water:  79 to 80 fathoms.

(1) Water Temperature:  69° F.

(j) Temp. Gradient:  Isothermal to 200 feet.

(k) Sea State:  1 to 3.

(1) Actually plotted:  15 miles of the NE end;
    18 miles of the SW end;
    strong presumption of the
    existence of mines in the
    intervening 14 miles.

(m) Dates:  21 - 22 April, 1945.

L. L. EDGE.

ENCLOSURE (C)  -5-

— page 200 —
7712-10/4-1
Series: 0002
TOP SECRET
Subject: 4. A second coordinated Attack Group of three submarines was operating to the northwest of the United States. The Group was operating to the west of the NAMAN GAP, by provisions of the operation order, the UNIFIL was to rendezvous with the KATU and TUNI in latitude 40-50N latitude 50-60N at sunset on 23 June, 1945, in preparation for the transit on 26 June, 1945, of a complete of transit. The enemy was to be surprised by the KATU. The KATU was to be surprised by the K

— page 201 —
7312-10/4-1
Serial 0058
TOP SECRET
TO: HONOR
Subject: U.S. BURTON (SS-23) - 1088 OF.

MILITARY ON 14 July, 1945. However, she is not reached. LHAY and has not been heard from since 18 June, therefore, in view of the above facts, the BURTON must be presumed to have been lost while on war patrol in enemy controlled waters at sea since 18 June, 1945.

7. The BURTON carried the complete list of radio-telephone frequencies for submarines analyzed to patrols in enemy-held waters. It is not known whether or not those radio-telephone frequencies have been compromised.

8. This was the eighth patrol of the BURTON, and the fourth patrol for Commander Lawrence. There in command of this submarine, prior to taking over, was the commander of the destroyer escort USS. HANNAH, U.S. destroyer escort USS. HANNAH, U