U.S.S. WHALE (SS-239) — war patrol report SS-239_WHALE.pdf

— page 4 —
2- USS WHALE (SS 239)

Just before sunrise the following morning, the lookout sighted a Japanese convoy. The submarine bore in for the attack. Torpedo fire was answered by a bedlam of explosions, but it was too dark for positive identification of the targets and no sinkings could be ultimately confirmed. Two of the ships were damaged, however. In the morning light these were seen limping off, surrounded by swarms of sampans which had scuttled out from shore to rescue survivors. The damaged ships had little choice. Either they veered in and grounded on a rocky shore, or they ran into the minefields.

Before the WHALE could observe the outcome of the situation, she was driven under by a destroyer that came tearing out of the harbor on the hunt. While she was under two heavy explosions rumbled from the direction of the minefields. Presently there were two more explosions. Busy with evasive maneuvers, she could not determine the outcome of these detonations, but postwar Japanese records showed the sinking of a cargo ship by a mine in this area.

For several days the WHALE remained in these dangerous waters, taking periscope pictures of headlands and beaches, gun emplacements and naval installations. In the teeth of Japanese flying boats, sampans, and harbor patrols, camera shots were made of the shoreline between Ashizuri Zaki and Murato Zaki, with the WHALE raising her periscope at some points only 500 yards offshore.

In leaving for home on 30 October, she encountered a Chidori patrol boat just outside the 100-fathoms curve, and received her first strenuous depth-charging. The first spread flooded the inductions, opened valves and sent her plunging toward sea-bottom with a 200 up-angle. As the blasts went off around the sub, her light bulbs were pulverized, glass and paint chips flew into the faces of the men, and the boat pitched like a wild seesaw. Finally, she shook her hunter and headed seaward. A night was spent on surface repairing the damage, then the WHALE headed home, photographs secure and minefields planted for the harvest season.

The next two months, November and December 1942, were spent in Pearl Harbor refitting and repairing the damage done on the first patrol. On 3 January 1943 the WHALE sailed for the Marshall Islands and her second patrol. Cruising off Kwajalein on 13 January, she sighted an old freighter outward bound for Truk. With four torpedoes she promptly blew the bottom out. Down at sea went the WASHIRO MARU, 3,550 tons. Some time later, the WHALE sighted a Japanese patrol boat which was making squares around an apparently defined latitude and longitude. After watching this anti for awhile, Commander Azer decided the craft was waiting for another vessel. From the patrol boat's location, he deduced that the other vessel was heading down from Saipan, and the WHALE started up the hypothetical track. On 17 January a large passenger-cargo ship loomed on the horizon and advanced toward the WHALE's periscope. Battle stations were manned and the WHALE began the approach. As the liner grew on the periscope lens, Commander Azer could see the decks crowded with brown troops, helmeted gunners lounging at the gunnounts, officers in white on the bridge. Reinforcements on their way to Bougainville.

Closing the range, the WHALE maneuvered into attack position. Three bow torpedoes were fired for three hits. One hit aft of the stack, the second blew wreckage up through the forward hold; and the third hit aft. The target began a turn toward the submarine as she swung hard right and set up for a stern tube.

— page 5 —
3- USS WHALE (SS 239)

shot. A good hit from the stern tube stopped the ship cold. It was taking a considerable port list and smoke billowed from the after part. The WHALE worked up to windward to observe the target better, and found the fire under control and the list corrected. Another torpedo was fired from the stern tubes, but this missed. All except the gun crews had abandoned ship. The target settled about two feet over-all and then maintained its depth, deck guns shooting wildly. The WHALE closed and fired a sixth torpedo from the bow tubes, which hit aft of the superstructure deck. The target remained doggedly afloat, and a seventh torpedo was fired from the bow tubes. It hit with a terrific concussion, but the ship did not change trim or draft appreciably. An eighth torpedo from the stern tubes hit, but little concussion was felt.

It was now getting dark, and though the target was sinking slowly on even keel, it still looked salvageable. Hoping to dispose of it before planes or rescue ships arrived, a ninth torpedo was fired. This hit just under the stack and the explosion ripped away both sides of the ship about ten feet below the main deck. The 9,815 ton transport HEIYOU MARU now settled more rapidly, and at the last observation the main deck was only a few feet from awash condition.

Continuing the patrol in the Truk area, the WHALE sank the 5,624 ton transport SHOAN MARU and damaged a 7,500 ton tanker on 27 January 1943. She arrived at Midway on 2 February to end her 29 day patrol with little damage due to enemy action.

By 16 February the refitting was completed. On the 20th Lieutenant Commander A.C. Burrows relieved Commander Azer as skipper. Departure for the third patrol was delayed by a fire in a main motor starter, but by 28 February the WHALE was on her way. By 9 March 1943 she was in her area off Saipan and Tehapag harbor which was full of Japanese ships. On the 19th an end around and submerged approach was made on two freighters by the light of a bright moon. At 0815 six torpedoes were fired for two hits on each ship. The first ship hit, a 7,500 tonner, sank immediately and the other blew up later, but the escort prevented the WHALE from observing the sinking of the latter, but she later surfaced to find a large oil slick. On 23 March three ships left Tanapag, and after a 17 hour chase a submerged approach was begun on two of the freighters. The first, the 6,406 ton KENYO MARU blew up, but a torpedo fired at the second ship made a circular run, forcing the WHALE to go deep. On 27 and 29 March attacks were made on freighters but no hits were obtained. The killer left the area on the 30th, and arrived at Midway after a 42 day patrol.

The third refit ended on 5 May and the WHALE departed for her area, Wake and Saipan. At Wake her primary duty was navigational assistance for the air strikes on the island, with additional duty of rescuing any aviators forced down at sea. From her position she watched the bombing on 16 May, but there was no opportunity for rescue work. She then steamed to her old hunting grounds, and by the 25th was again counting ships off Saipan. That evening the 3,580 ton freighter SHOEI MARU was seen leaving the harbor. It was trailed out of the area and, after an end around and submerged approach at moon-rise, sunk.

Ship counting in the harbors and patrolling the Guam-Saipan area occupied the next ten days until the masts of the sea plane tender, HIJMS KAMIKAWA, were sighted. Also sighted was another periscope. No known U. S. Submarines.

— page 6 —
4- USS WHALE (SS 239)

were in the area with the WHALE, but the chase of the tender was also the escape course from the periscope. That night, a radar depth approach resulted in three hits on the 15,000 ton ship. Two escorts forced the WHALE to retire, precluding further attacks. On 9 June hits were scored on two freighters, but again escorts prevented the sub from observing the results. The next day she left the area for Pearl Harbor and refitting by the USS GRIFFIN.

Four weeks later, the WHALE was again at Midway, and on 28 July sailed for her fifth patrol to be conducted in the Bonin Islands area. On 8 August the periscope watch sighted an aircraft ferry and a destroyer escort in waters near the Marianas. A submerged approach resulted in the sinking of the 7,149 ton aircraft ferry, MARUTO MARU. A typhoon cut the fifth patrol short. Two generators, the auxiliary generator and the induction were flooded. Numerous small electrical fires were started, and the battery cells began working loose. By the 23rd, 56 cells were cracked, and it was decided to leave the area. That night a convoy was contacted and attacked. After a radar depth approach hits were scored on a 7,000 ton freighter and a 10,000 ton freighter. Due to poor visibility the results were not observed, and the WHALE continued out of the area submerged. Another ship was attacked the next day, but she only succeeded in bringing a severe depth-charging upon herself. On 7 September, the WHALE entered Pearl Harbor to begin a major overhaul.

Repair work and training were completed by 21 December 1943. Christmas was spent at Midway, and the next day the WHALE headed for the Bonin Islands to begin her sixth patrol. On 16 January 1944 the SEAWOLF relayed information on a convoy which resulted in a night action during which the WHALE sank the 5,870 ton cargo ship DENMARK MARU, and damaged a tanker. The SEAWOLF watched the action as the WHALE was being depth charged. The next morning the two killers concerted their efforts to sink the 4,865 ton cargo ship TARUSHIMA MARU. Lack of fuel made it necessary for the WHALE to leave the area and return to Midway for a base overhaul. During the stay at Midway Commander Burrows was relieved by Lieutenant Commander J.B. Grady, USN.

The seventh patrol was conducted in the East China Sea, beginning on 16 March 1944. Despite 26 days in the area only one target was contacted. After a submerged approach at night on 9 April 1944, the 5,401 ton cargo ship HONAN MARU was sunk. By 3 May the WHALE was in Majuro alongside the SPERRY for refitting.

She left for her eighth patrol on 28 May, heading for Empire waters. This entire patrol was characterized by intense anti-submarine warfare. On 7 June an inconclusive attack was conducted on an escorted convoy. Hits were scored on a 10,000 ton transport and a 4,000 ton freighter, but the persistent escorts prevented observation of the results or further attack. The patrol terminated at Pearl Harbor on 16 July 1944.

On 3 September, after topping off alongside the HOLLAND at Tanapag, the WHALE steamed to Luzon and the Philippine area for her ninth patrol. The first part was conducted as an offensive reconnaissance in support of the fleet. On 6 October she caught a large tanker off northwest Luzon. The 10,241 ton AKANE MARU went down in flames. The sixty-nine day patrol ended with a three day unsuccessful search for the Japanese Fleet, and the WHALE headed for Midway and the PROTEUS.

— page 7 —
5- USS WHALE (SS 239)

The Nansei Shoto was again the scene for the WHALE's tenth patrol. During this fifty-seven day patrol only one ship was seen, a 500 ton trawler which was unsuccessfully attacked with torpedoes. In order not to return empty handed, the WHALE entered her first surface gun action on the night of 23 December to sink four fishing boats for a total of 410 tons. After a short tour of lifeguard duty and a reconnaissance of the Okinawa area shore installations, she nosed into Pearl Harbor on 15 January 1945 for onward routing to Mare Island, California and her second major overhaul.

During the stay at Mare Island Commander Grady was relieved by Lieutenant Commander F.H. Cards, USN, as commanding officer. The WHALE departed Mare Island in the spring, completed training at Pearl Harbor and headed for patrol in the Empire area on 15 June 1945. A week of the patrol was spent around Wake Island, and then on 6 July she fueled at Guam and left for Bungo Suido to conduct lifeguard services for the carrier strikes. On the 24th three men from a downed TBM were picked up, and at noon two more men were rescued from their rubber boat. The next afternoon a pilot, who had been covering another down in the Inland Sea until short of fuel, bailed out alongside the sub and was soon taken aboard. Still later that day two more Navy men were picked up. After a 90-mile run on 29 July, seven B-29 flyers were picked up in a period of three hours with the aid of a B-29 spotting and dropping flares. No enemy targets were sighted during this time, and the long patrol ended on 14 August 1945 when she moored alongside the USS ORION in Saipan. A few days later the WHALE sailed for Pearl Harbor and New York with the enviable record of eleven successful war patrols during which she was officially credited with 57,716 tons of Japanese shipping sunk and 15 aviators rescued.

The USS WHALE earned: 11 Battle Stars on the Asiatic-Pacific Area Service Medal for participating in the following operations:

1. Star/THIRD Fleet operations against Japan -- 11 July - 10 August 1945
1. Star/Western Caroline Islands operation
   Capture and occupation of southern Palau Islands -- 6 September - 14 October 1944
   Assaults on Philippine Islands -- 9-24 September 1944
1. Star/First submarine war patrol -- 9 October - 10 November 1942
1. Star/Second submarine war patrol -- 3 January - 2 February 1943
1. Star/Third submarine war patrol -- 26 February - 11 April 1943
1. Star/Fourth submarine war patrol -- 9 May - 21 June 1943
1. Star/Fifth submarine war patrol -- 23 July - 7 September 1943
1. Star/Sixth submarine war patrol -- 21 December 1943 - 3 February 1944
1. Star/Seventh submarine war patrol -- 6 March - 3 May 1944
1. Star/Biginth submarine war patrol -- 29 May - 16 July 1944
1. Star/Tenth submarine war patrol -- 21 November 1944 - 15 January 1945

— page 8 —
6. USS WHALE (SS 239)

The following officers received awards while serving aboard the USS WHALE:

NAVY CROSS

Lieutenant Commander J. B. Azer, USN ---(Two)
Lieutenant Commander A. C. Burrows, USN

SILVER STAR

Executive Officer, Frederick E. Janney, USN
Lieutenant Commander J. B. Grady, USN --- (Three)
Lieutenant Commander F. H. Carde, USN

By Directive dated January 1947, the USS WHALE was placed out of commission, U.S. Atlantic Reserve Fleet, berthed at New London, Connecticut.

STATISTICS

OVERALL LENGTH 312 feet
BEAM 27 feet
SPEED 20 knots
DISPLACEMENT 1525 tons
COMPLEMENT 8 officers and 72 men

Compiled: 2 February 1954

— page 9 —
9 Oct
0900 Vd: Departed Pearl under escort for assigned area via MIDAY. Usual training dives and battle surface drills enroute. Expended twelve rounds of 3"/50 Cal. target ammunition and one round flashless ammunition.

11 Oct
0923 X: Sighted PBY plane to southward on westerly course, distance 15 miles.

1420 X: Sighted a Mk. 6 300 lb. mine adrift. Sank mine by 20 mm and .30 Cal. machine gun fire.

13 Oct
0900 Y: Made rendezvous with escort 30 miles east of MIDAY.

1310 Y: Morred to USS FULTON in MIDAY lagoon. Fueled to capacity. Made repairs to faulty head valve. Made systematic search for cause of noisy vibration noticeable in vicinity of No. 4 main engine mufflers. Strengthened grease fitting braces. Yelded in more strength members between superstructure and hull. Decided to remain overnight to complete these repairs.

14 Oct
0554 Y: Departed MIDAY.

22 Oct
1200: Radar contact 9 miles; submerged.

1300 N: Surfaced; resumed course.

23 Oct
2230 J: Sighted light dead ahead and two more on port bow.

FILMED
44403

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 10 —
23 Oct.
2230 J
(Cont'd Manifevered to avoid. Believed to be sampans.

2330 J Passed Hachijo' Jima to starboard; distance 8 miles.

24 Oct.
1400 I Radar contact; submerged, routed torpedoes.

1730 I Surfaed.

25 Oct
0000 I In assigned area. Traveled entire route at one engine economical running speed. Remained on surface except for three routine training dives and two forced submergences on radar contact.

0515 I In Kii Suido; proceeded to reconnoitre area designated for mine plant. No mine sweeping activities sighted. No. A/S measures, except for numerous sampans w'ich appeared to be patrolling, (or enroute to station). rather than fishing. Many of the larger motor sampans forced us to maneuver to avoid. A 300 ton trawler passed directly over dur stern.

1545 I When 8 miles bearing 3300 from Hino Misaki, proceeding along what we believed to be the steamer lane to Kobe, we sighted two freighters outward bound approximately one mile from the coast line. These freighters were definitely inshore from the area designated as first preference for mining.

1615 I Sighted another freighter, bound for Kobe, also well inshore. The results of these observations showed definitely that the mine plants, to be effective, would have to be moved closer inshore. Believing that it would better accomplish the mission, a new area embracing the plotted steamer lanes was charted so that the extremities of the mine plants would cover an area starting approximately two miles from the shore line and ending about 1/4 mile from shoal area.

1715 I At slack water commenced mine laying. While engaged in first plant a medium freighter, inbound, passed 500 yards inshore from us. A few minutes later, while still on the same plant, another freighter, outbound, passed within 400 yards to seaward of us. (Letting such targets go by

— page 11 —
25 Oct
1715 I
Cont'd is unpleasant business; but to have fired on them would
have precluded successful completion of the mine plant.
Furthermore evasion and escape would have been difficult).

1916 I Completed mine plants. (Geographical positions shown
in Annex "A").

2035 I When 5 miles off Kireme Saki, surfaced under full moon
and full power; cleared area, dodging sampans.

26 Oct
0000 I Set course for Seto Saki to arrive two miles from the
point at day break. It was our opinion that much of
the traffic went through the area at night, and we
believed we could intercept some inbound traffic at
this point at daybreak.

0420 I Submerged in full moon, 9 miles from Seto Saki.
Position fixed from Navigation Lights which were burning.

0520 I Heard propellers on relative bearing 015°. It was too
dark to see anything on this bearing.

0535 I Sighted large freighter in the darkness directly ahead,
range about 4000 yards, 2 miles from shore. This
contact was made sooner than we had planned, for it
was our desire to get in close to the beach before the
traffic arrived.

0541 I After seeing that we could not close the range further,
decided to fire a three torpedo spread on track angle
1200. Morning twilight beginning, background still dark.

0541-30 Fired 1st torpedo.

0541-45 Fired 2nd torpedo.

0542-15 1st torpedo hit. Large column of water engulfed target.
(Target similar to RAKUYO MARU, 9400 tons)
Sew another heavy freighter about two miles ahead of
target, well out of range.

0542-25 Fired third torpedo at target. Saw target down by bow
with screws emerging. Sighted large escort vessel
bearing down on us. Swung hard right to clear torpedo
track; ordered deep submergence. Sighted medium
freighter astern of 1st target.

- 3 -

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 12 —
26 Oct
0543-10 Third torpedo hit target. (2nd torpedo apparently missed ahead).

0544-15 Heard deep rumbling explosion, which, may have been internal; swinging rapidly; going down. Ordered 65 feet and all tubes ready.

0549-40 At periscope depth. Stern tubes were bearing for shot at medium freighter; fired two torpedoes. (Target similar to UYO NARU 7500 gross). Both torpedoes smoking heavily. Saw 1st torpedo missing ahead; lost track of second.

0551-05 Fired third torpedo at 2nd target. Target blew whistle, and commenced maneuvering.

0554-00 Third torpedo hit. Locked for escort. Saw a fourth freighter, (Similar to SHINKYO NARU 5100 ton gross), heading for us directly astern, 1000 yards. Fired straight stern shot at fourth freighter, zero angle on the bow. Started deep; heard heavy torpedo explosion aft 43 seconds after firing. Propellers of freighter stopped.

0557 I Started for periscope depth.

0604 I Periscope depth, swept around:
   First freighter fired on not seen; sampans heading for spot; second target listing slightly to port, and appeared headed for beach; but had not checked speed; fourth freighter had sunk. Large escort vessel previously mentioned bearing down on us from about 1000 yards range, on Port Beam, angle on bow 0°. No chance for other observations before going deep to avoid escort closing in. (No torpedoes left in after room for a shot at the escort).

0630 I Shook off escort.
0640 I Started for periscope depth.
0649 I At periscope depth. Many sampans seen converging on scene of action from all directions. Escort vessel could not be distinguished from other vessels silhouetted against dark background. Observed two c-lumns of smoke in direction of action. Another column of smoke in direction of mine field. Further observation impossible, because of the general confusion of sampan sails and dark background. Broke off engagement. - - - had enough - - Japs apparently had enough, for no pursuit took place. Cleared area at slow speed. Decided to have a look at Ashizuri Saki.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 13 —
26 Oct
0810 I Sighted seaplane in direction of firing area.
0840 I Distant underwater explosion astern in direction of mine field.
0911 I Distant underwater explosion astern in direction of mine field.

1708 I Sighted two planes well astern hovering over mining and firing area.

27 Oct
0501 I Submerged 8 miles from Ashizuri Saki.

0700 I When 1.5 miles off light, sighted radar installed on hillside just above light. The antenna was of the double bedspring type similar to those installed on our larger vessels two years ago. The antenna was being slowly and continuously trained in azimuth. Took several pictures.

Sighted numerous sailing and motor sampans and one small patrol during day, but no heavy traffic. During night patrolled line between Ashizuri Saki and Murato Saki, Sighting many sampans, apparently fishing.

28 Oct
0442 I Submerged 8 miles south east of Murato Saki.

0710 I Took pictures of radar, anti-aircraft battery, radio station and light. Patrolled 3 miles off shore in direction of 0 Shima.

1028 I Commenced approach on inter-coastal steamer.

1049 I Abandoned approach as steamer was too small for expenditure of torpedoes. He observed he was zig-zagging, and to seaward of 100 fathom curve. No other traffic sighted, but in view of contacts made off Murato Saki on previous patrols, decided to remain in vicinity another day.

1842 I Surfaced. Patrolled on course line from Murato Saki to Hino Misaki.

2310 I Avoided patrol at full speed.

— page 14 —
29 Oct
0051 I Made radar approach on what was assumed to be a large vessel. Dove in moonlight to 42 feet and continued approach, Upon closing to 1700 yards and getting ready to fire, recognized target as large motor trawler. Discontinued approach.

0448 I Submerged 8 miles north east of Murato Saki and continued patrol on line between Murato Saki and Kamato Saki. Sighted nothing but sampans and small petrol vessel.

1840 I Surfaced. Sighted small vessel with running lights in vicinity of Murato Saki. Navigational lights were burning along shore. Believing that shipping was expected to pass, we conducted radar patrol near Murato Saki. Nothing developed, however, and at 2300 we were forced to leave the station to arrive on attempted daylight diving station 18 miles north west of Ichie Saki.

30 Oct
0405 I Submerged 18 miles bearing 290° T. from Ichie Saki and patrolled in direction of Ichie Saki. Believing that the mine plant had forced traffic into deeper water, it was our plan to be 10 miles off shore at daybreak. This contention was strengthened by the track of the coastal steamer we had sighted two days before, which was outside the 100 fathom curve and zig-zagging.

0847 I Heard pinging. A few minutes later sighted smoke. Started approach.

0910 I Sighted two freighters identified tentatively as TOSEI MARU 5500 ton gross and LILA MARU. Also sighted the escort, a torpedo boat of the OTORI class, which was at first mistaken for a destroyer. Then just about in firing position, all targets zigged 90° to starboard. This put us about 1500 yards from the track of the torpedo boat and 3800 yards from the track of the two freighters. Decided to fire two torpedoes at each ship and at

0941 I Fired two torpedoes at torpedo boat. Thirty seconds later, the torpedo boat started turning toward us, apparently having sighted torpedoes which were smoking badly. Second torpedo appeared to pass under stack of torpedo boat, but did not explode. Two torpedoes were fired at the LILA MARU type freighter. Sound track indicated that both missed astern. The remaining two torpedoes were fired at the TOSEI MARU type freighter, as we stared down to avoid the torpedo

- 6 -

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 15 —
30 Oct
0941 I
Cont'd boat, which was now bearing down on us not more than 1000 yards away. Sound tracked the first one as a miss ahead. The second was heard to hit, but since the initiative had been surrendered no observation of results could be made. A few minutes later, the first depth charges exploded as we passed 150 ft. These were very close, shaking the boat considerably and causing the lights to go out momentarily. The level of at 300 ft. and attempted evasion tactics on easterly course in the direction of the beach. It soon became evident that we were getting heavy aft rapidly, the boat taking a 15° up angle and settling slowly below 300 ft. The engine air induction line and the hull induction line were reported flooded and the battery outboard ext. line as flooding. Moreover, the inboard flapper on the hull induction in the engine room was sprung and leaking badly. The starboard shaft stern tube gland was also reported leaking badly and the shaft squealing. At 360 ft. it was necessary to increase speed to maintain depth. This kept the torpedo boat informed of our location and close depth charging continued; Propellers of a large vessel and another escort were heard approaching on the starboard bow. The larger vessel continued on course, the escort broke off and joined in the depth charging. By sending all spare men forward (50 men in the forward torpedo room) we were able to reduce the up angle from 150° to 50°. After about 20 depth charges had been dropped we seemed to have shaken the escorts, although propeller noise and pinging was still audible. By this time (1040) we were making 2/3 speed (105 rpm) to keep from sinking. The attempted to blow some water from after trim and at the same time work up to a shallower depth. Immediately the escorts picked us up and depth charging started anew. Again we shook them, mainly by slowing down and gradually settling. At 370 feet we speeded up once more to keep from going deeper. At 1230 all seemed quiet with only distant pinging audible. Once more an attempt was made to lighten the boat aft. By speeding up we worked up to 250 ft. and as we came up continued blowing after trim to sea. But at 1250 came propeller beats closing in and by the time we had settled to 300 ft. two more depth charges, close. This time we had better control, however, because of the partial blowing of after trim. Two explosions were felt unlike depth charges. They seemed to be directly above and probably

- 7 -

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 16 —
30 Oct
0941 I
(Cont'd) were bombs from planes. They were considerably muffled, and other than shaking the boat, did no damage. For the third time we shook the patrol, By 1500 it was absolutely necessary to come to a shallower depth, to get rid of more water in after trim and to pump engine room and motor room bilges, which were filling steadily to the danger point. Coming up was a slow process. Gradual ascent was necessary to properly vent induction lines and prevent rupture of piping. The boat also had to be lightened as we came up to maintain shallower depth. This strange phenomenon was also experienced by the SILVER SIDES while patrolling this area. It is attributed to an increase in density of water at lower levels. By 1713 we reached periscope depth; nothing in sight.

1814 I
Surfaced; running on two engines, taking suction through conning tower hatch until water could be cleared from induction lines. After considering the extent of damage received and the state of armament (1 torpedo remaining), it was decided to conclude the patrol and return to base.

2355 I
Departed patrol area, having been on station a total of 6 days.

2 Nov
1600 J
Commenced search for sampan reported disabled in this area. Weather bad visibility never more than two miles. However, radar working well and being used to good advantage.

3 Nov
0800 J
Discontinued search, having covered area thoroughly.

10 Nov
0815 VW
Made rendezvous with escort. Proceeded to Pearl Harbor.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 17 —
9
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE - Report of First War Patrol.

Part II - WEATHER.

Fair weather with glassy seas for all except first day in area, when a light N.E. wind brought a fair choppiness to the sea. Surface visibility five miles due to a smoke haze. Volcanic dust was apparently the cause of this haze. Ceiling unlimited. To and from station was marked by fairly heavy storms as frequent intervals when in East Longitude.

Part III - TIDAL INFORMATION.

Current in Kii Suido follows the tide with a maximum of about one knot. The Japanese current averaged only about half of what is shown on chart.

Part IV - NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

All navigational lights were burning on both shores of the Kii Suido when traffic was due to pass and some time when there was no traffic. On several nights the lights were observed to be extinguished.

Hino Misaki: Characteristics unchanged.
Ichio Zaki (Seki): Characteristics changed to steady red light.
Kanata Saki: Characteristics unchanged, except visible on light miles.
Murato Saki: Characteristics very irregular. Light frequently off entirely; very bright on other occasions and very dim at odd hours of the night.
Ashizuri Saki: Characteristics unchanged.

Where ever a Life Saving and Signal (L.S.S.) Station is marked on Chart #5317 a steady square white (almost yellow) light is left burning whenever traffic is passing or approaching. During the evening of October 28th, while patrolling between Murato Saki and Hino Misaki, the signal station lights were apparently turned on as we passed. This may have been a coincidence or the Japanese may have thought we were on the home port and turned them on for our benefit.

— page 18 —
10/25 0945 I Hottorshi 11 33-10 N 220 8
Trawler 137-30 E
After 0945 sighted many large and small swamps in Kii Suido.
Too numerous to itemize.

| Date | Time | Type | Position | Course | Speed |
|------|------|------|||-------|
| 10/25 | 0945 | I | Hottorshi | 11 | 33-10 N | 220 | 8 |
| 10/25 | 0945 | I | Launch | 11 | 33-48 N | 130 | 11 |
| 10/25 | 0945 | I | Torpedo |

— page 19 —
U.S.S. VALE - Report of First War Patrol.

Part V (Continued)

Contact    Date    Time    Type    Position    Course    Speed
17.    10/28   0600-   10-12 Sampans per hour from Murto Saki to Oshima
18.    10/28   1022-1  Freighter   33-18N   020    11
    RYUKO   134-15S
    (3000)(295+)
    Range accessible. Ship too small
19.    10/28   1800-   6 Motor Sall
   0200 I  Trawlers between Murato Saki & Hino Misaki
20.    10/29    Same as 17.
21.    10/29    Same as 19.
22.    10/30   0850 I  Freighter   33-34N   260    12
    LIMA MARU   135-15E
    (7000)(445+)
23.    10/30   0850 I  Freighter   33-34N   260    12
    TOSEI MARU   135-15E
    (5500)
    1 hit probably sank
24.    10/39   0850 I  OTORI Type   33-34N   260    14
    Torpedo Boat   135-15E

Part VI - AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

Type    Position    Course    Altitude    Time    Date
Seaplane    33-36N    (Radar Contact)    0900H   10/22
    135-18E
Two Seaplanes  33-36N    (Radar Contact)    1400 I   10/24
    135-18E
    Circling over firing   08101   10/26
    area.
Two Seaplanes  33-36N    Circling over mines   17081   10/26
    135-18E    and firing area.

- 11 -

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 20 —
6
: 2
: 2
: 66,00
: 13
: 5
: 39%
: 1
: 27,500 (?)

Part VII - STATISTICAL DATA

Total number of attacks --- 6
Sinkings by torpedo fire --- 2
Probable sinkings --- 2
Successful torpedo attacks --- 66,00
Torpedoes fired --- 13
Torpedo hits --- 5
Torpedo hits --- 39%
Near Misses* --- 1
*Torpedo ran under Torpedo Boat failed to explode.

Tonnage-sunk by mines unknown. (Strike evidence of some sinkings or damage.)

Tonnage-sunk by Torpedoes --- 14,500
Tonnage-probably sunk --- 13,000
Tonnage-sunk by mines --- (?)
Total --- 27,500 (?)

Part VIII - A/S MEASURES

Sampans, fishing in groups, were accompanied by a naval patrol-boat. The patrol-of-one group was seen on one occasion to communicate with a shore station. It is possible that when a sampan sights a periscope, it communicates with the patrol, which in turn spreads the alarm by radio or by visual signal with a shore station. Sampans do not keep an effective lookout for periscopes. Neither are the patrols efficient, for, we passed close to them on several occasions, even taking pictures of them, and were not detected to our knowledge. It is believed that these patrols do not carry depth charges, although this was not definitely determined.

When we first arrived in the area it was evident that large ships were accompanied by smaller merchant-ships during daylight which followed a storm. It is believed the smaller, more maneuverable freighters carried depth charges and would run down and attack submarines firing on the larger freighter. This was the experience of the SILVERSLIES in one of her attacks while on patrol in this area. All ships traveled close inshore inside the 100 fathom curve, literally bouncing off the rocks.

After the nine plant on October 25th and the dawn attack on October 26th, shipping appeared to keep clear of the beach, employed large zigs and made speed chances. All shipping of any consequence which we encountered was escorted by torpedo boats. In one instance, two freighters were escorted by one torpedo boat. In another, one large vessel was escorted by one

— page 21 —
U.S.S. WHALE - Report of First War Patrol.

torpedo boat, or at least the escort has exactly the same propeller noise as the torpedo boat depth charging us. This escort also joined in the depth charging, the larger ship standing up the coast.

The commanding officer of the torpedo boat making the initial depth charge attack on October 30th deserves a compliment for doing a good job. The two torpedo boats gave us about four bd hours before we managed to get away. We now have a healthy respect for their ability.

Japanese escorts appear to swarm with lookouts. The rail of the torpedo boat was practically lined with them. But in spite of a glassy sea and good surface visibility, all indications were that we were not discovered until we fired torpedoes. There is no evidence, either, that we were picked up by echo ranging or listening, although sound conditions were excellent at the time.

If any search of the area by planes was conducted, it must have been inefficient or lacking of thoroughness. Weather conditions and color of sea were ideal during daylight for plane spotting during our stay in the area, yet we were never nolested. As soon as an attack is made, however, planes came quickly on the scene.

Evasive tactics employed were in many respects similar to those used by the Commanding Officer of the FLYING FISH (described in USS FLYING FISH Report of Second War Patrol). In fact, our evasion and escape paralleled that of the FLYING FISH closely, except at no time did we have more than two A/S vessels working on us and not nearly so many depth charges were dropped. Evasion was first carried on in an easterly direction toward the beach, to take advantage of the poorer scund conditions, and then to the south to get clear.

— page 22 —
U.S.S. VHALE - Report of First War Patrol.

Part IX - MAJOR DEFECTS

1. The engine air and hull inductions and the battery outboard exhaust were completely flooded and under pressure during the depth charge attack and deep surfacence on October 30th. Having previously uncovered these weaknesses during trials at test depth, Mare Island reputedly had remedied them. Result is proved to the contrary, however, and as the commanding officer feels that the safety of the boat is involved, separate correspondences is being submitted.

2. During the passage from station to Pearl Harbor all main motors developed dangerous sparking at the brushes necessitating slowing to 160 RPM. As this is a rebcurrence of the trouble which delayed this vessel in reporting to the Fleet and must be corrected before making another patrol, a separate report is being submitted.

3. After the first few depth charges on October 30th, the starboard shaft developed a pronounced swishing and squealing in the vicinity of after trim at any speed greater than 95 RPM. It is believed that either the stern tube or strut bearing was damaged by a near miss. Dry docking will be necessary to accurately locate and correct this noise.

4. Due to the excessive noise of the trim and drain pump, which sound like trims coming into Grand Central Station, it is absolutely out of the question to use them when employing evasive tactics. It is mandatory that these pumps be silenced.

— page 23 —
1. U.S.S. WHALE - Report of First War Patrol.

PART X - RADIO AND RADAR

(A) RADIO

1. Reception of NPM FOK on station was excellent excepting for one hour period between 1900 and 2000 GCT when NPM seizes 8230 and transmits on 12345; at which time reception varied from impossible to copy to good. "Suggest NPM remain on 8230 until at least 2000 GCT. If possible until 2100 GCT.

2. Impossible to receive NPM when submerged with loop antenna unless within 1200 miles circle and at no greater depth than 55 feet.

3. Evidence on one occasion of Japanese jamming 12345 as well as 4235.

4. Transmission to NPM at distances over 2500 miles on two occasions was successfully completed. The first time was at 1100 GCT and contact with NPM was made on 4235 within one minute. The second transmission, consisting of two despatches was started at 1730 GCT on 4235 and contact was made after four call ups and first despatch was transmitted. Shifted to 8470 and conditions were better but not excellent. NPM asked us to shift to 12705, but at this frequency we could not be heard. Shifted back to 8470 and transmitted second message of this group successfully, receiving "RODGEK" from NPM.

5. Condition of radio material is considered excellent.

6. Reception of RBO receiver was fair on station. Now broadcasts from KWID on 7250 could be picked up with reasonable degree of success. KGEI on 9300 and later 7250, could not be received on station, but reception was good to and from station.

7. The procurement of a radio technician rating proved valuable in material work. Three operators and one technician is considered a minimum.

(B) RADAR

1. Reception on both SD and SJ was considered excellent as a rule.

2. SD Radar ranges were as follows:
   (1) Land from 32 to 42 miles maximum.
   (2) Aircraft from 9 to 25 miles maximum.
   (3) At 140 hours 8014 oscillator tube became weak and caused unstable operation in transmitter. As there

— page 24 —
U.S.S. WHALE - Report of First War Patrol.

arc two tubes in push pull hookup, both tubes, were replaced to obtain proper "match up". The tubes replaced had been operating for 123 hours.
(4) At 172 hours condenser in low voltage rectifier (C154) became shorted and was replaced. Associated tube (523) was replaced also, plus all fuzes in that circuit.
(5) At 188 hours 8014 tubes were replaced again as they became weak and unstable.

3. SJ Radar ranges were as follows:
(1) Land from 14 to 17 1/2 miles maximum.
(2) Surface craft from 8000 to 14000 yards maximum.
(3) At 136 hours SJ broke down and all units were taken out to give them a good routine check. Main casualty was the oscilloscope tube SHPL which was replaced. But SJ still did not work satisfactorily until the following work was done.:
(a) Replace eight (8) other tubes which were weak.
(1) Two (2) 616 and one (1) 6SNT in "knocker" circuit in transmitter unit.
(2) One (1) VR150/30 and one (1) 2x2 in rectifier circuit of the oscilloscope.
(3) One (1) 6J67 and one (1) 6AC7 in amplifier circuit in range unit.
(4) One (1) 6J67 in the video stage in receiver unit.
(b) One (1) 50 mmfd. condenser in amplifier circuit of range unit.
(c) Loose connections at tube socket and various loose connections in transmitter at voltage terminal strip.
(4) At 148 hours replaced thyratron motor as it had a burnt-out bearing.
(5) At 160 hours regulated rectifier voltmeter in main control unit was replaced as shunt had broken lead.
(6) At 163 hours replaced fuze in antenna lobing motor.
(7) At 202 hours replaced fuze for 110 v./c for rectifier.
(8) At 206 hours replaced fuze for heater elements in transmitter and range unit.

4. On one occasion a signal was picked up at about 4000 yards range, decreasing to zero range and backout to 4000 yards on opposite bearing. The signal was caused by a heavy storm passing over the ship.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 25 —
5. It is recommended that an oscilloscope be procured for this vessel, for service work on Radar. Repair work time could be cut down 50% with the oscilloscope.

6. Very poor to no signals were obtained from the smallest sampans.

7. It is recommended that a motor be installed to turn SJ Radar antenna. This would be invaluable for routine searches.

Last consecutive serial received "ENTICE" Last consecutive serial sent "LAUNDRY"

PART XI - SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS

Sound conditions were in general excellent, except when closer than three miles to the shore line. Even in shallow water (100 fathoms or less) good sound conditions prevailed. Inshore of three miles, propeller beats were frequently confused with surf noises.

A density layer was encountered at about 275 feet. Below this depth our propeller beats must have been lost to enemy A/S vessels, although we could still hear their propellers and their pinging. Any unusual noises, however, such as blowing or pumping, were immediately picked up by them, and drastic action followed.

PART XII - HEALTH AND HABITABILITY

The health and morale of the crew were excellent throughout the patrol. The only word that describes their attitude during depth charge attack is "inchenalant".

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 26 —
U.S.S. WHALE - Report of First War Patrol

PART XIII - MILES STEAMED

(a) Pearl Harbor to Midway -- 1244 Miles
(b) Midway to Station -- 2487
(c) On Station -- 843
(d) Station to Pearl Harbor -- 3764

Total 8338 Miles

PART XIV - FUEL OF EXPENDED

Miles Steamed Fuel Used Gal/Mile

Pearl Harbor to Midway 1244 11,550 9.28
Midway to Station 2487 15,555 6.25
On Station 843 5,555 6.59
Station to Pearl Harbor 3764 45,827 12.18

# Topped off at Midway

PART XV - FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes -- 1
Fuel -- 24,143 Gal.
Provision -- 60
Fresh Water -- Full
Personnel (days) -- Depending on stress of duty assigned from fifteen (15) to twenty-five (25) days.

PART XVI - FACTOR CAUSING TERMINATION OF PATROL

Damage sustained during depth charge attack.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 27 —
U.S.S. WHILE - Report of First War Patrol.

Part XVII - REMARKS

1. It was noted with satisfaction that the approaches to the area mined by this vessel were not defensively mined. A defensive mine field could very easily have been employed to protect the shipping lanes through the Kii Channel.

Definite information as to time of low water in the Kii was lacking. Low water was determined by observing the current. When the drift of the ebb current became zero, the plant was begun.

2. In the torpedo attack conducted the morning of October 26th, it is unfortunate the second target fired upon was not sighted until the turn away from the firing point was accomplished. A shorter range would have resulted if the bow tubes had been used, and enough torpedoes would have remained aft to fire on the escort vessel.

Identification of targets on the attacks on October 26th were difficult because of reduced visibility.

All torpedoes were believed to have functioned normally except the one which passed under the torpedo boat and failed to explode. The depth setting on this torpedo was 6 ft. The drift of the torpedo boat is listed as 6 ft. The first torpedo fired was set at zero. This torpedo, however, was a miss. Several of the torpedoes were seen to smoke badly.

Some means of dealing effectively with the small, speedy, and highly maneuverable patrol vessels must be found. A small, fast torpedo which arms quickly and seeks its depth quickly is suggested. The explosive charge need not be greater than 100 lbs., nor need the range be great.

3. The hundreds of sampans cluttering up the area caused many itchy fingers among nerbers of the gun crews. Many of them were large and would have made worthwhile targets. However, the only place where successful gun action could have been carried out against those vessels would have been on those found between Murato Saki and Ashizuri Saki, which were out of range of any shore batteries. Even then such attacks would have to be properly timed and carried out to be worth the risk.

Some gun action during the

— page 30 —
1 Freighter - 9,400 tons

DAMAGED

1 Freighter ↑ 7,500 tons
1 Freighter - 5,139 tons
1 Freighter - 5,500 tons
Total - 18,139 tons

R.H. ENGLISH.

DISTRIBUTION
(35-12N-42)
List III: SS
Special:
FL(5); EN3(5), ZI(5),
Consub (2), X3(1),
Consubsowespac (2).

E.R. SWINBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 31 —
5-42/A4-3/ Serial 062
COLLECTED BY: CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE, San Francisco, California, November 16, 1942.

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-TWO.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE - Report of First War Patrol.

1. Although but six days on station, the WHALE had a patrol full of lively events but once again the material defects are a source of considerable concern.

2. The dangerous sparring of main motor brushes and flooding of all (engine air, hull and battery ventilation) induction piping are defects of serious proportions. Arriving at a decision as to the proper remedial action to be taken on the main motors and then taking that action is going to delay the ship going out on next patrol as it will most likely entail making the ship available at a navy yard. Due to that uncertainty and press of other refit work only such items of the WHALE refit as are within the capacity of the relief crew (and ship's force - 50%) are being accomplished. If the vessel does go to a yard and time permits, the trim and drain pumps should be silenced. Corrective action on the induction piping must be taken.

3. The information submitted covering operation and maintenance of both radars was most comprehensive and should prove valuable tips in warning other submarines of expected difficulties.

4. In connection with the third paragraph under number 4, the following paragraph of part XVII (Remarks) the commanding officer has been directed to submit separate recommendations if he feels any of his personnel are deserving of awards.

5. It is most gratifying to note that the commanding officer recognized several developments of the patrol as having been previously experienced by other vessels and it indicates a thorough preparation on his part by studying patrol reports and discussing experiences with other commanding officers.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 32 —
1. U.S.S. WHALE
2. Serial 01
3. CONFIRMED
4. From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
5. Subject: U.S.S. WHALE - Report of Second War Patrol.
6. Period from January 3, 1943, to February 2, 1943.

PROLOGUE:

Arrived Pearl Harbor 10 November 1942 from first war patrol.
10 November - 26 November: Made repairs to main motors.
28 November - 30 November: Underway for motor trials.
1 December - 26 December: At Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

(1) Overhauled and tested main and hull inductions.
(2) Cut down superstructures and installed raised 20 mm. gun mount.
(3) Replaced 3 inch gun with a 4 inch gun mounted forward of the conning tower.
(4) Blinked off battery exhaust piping.
(5) Stretched propeller shafts and realigned bearings and stern tubes (this was controlling job).

28 December: Depermed.
29 December: Listening test; independent operations.
30 December - 31 December: Training period.
1 January - 2 January, 1943: Made preparations for war patrol.

PART I - NARRATIVE

Jan 3: Underway from Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H. made 1300 (W) rendezvous with PC escort at entrance buoys. Made a trim dive in the submarine sanctuary, then proceeded on course to area, 1805 parted with escort.

Jan 3-10: Enroute to Marshall Islands at 13 knots average speed. During passage, made many training dives and conducted frequent drills. These dives and drills were necessary to iron the kinks out of the officers and crew resulting from seven weeks in port. Spent considerable time in training new gun crews and new men in the armament arrangement.

— page 33 —
1. S.S.S. MAIL - Report of Second War Patrol.

Jan 11
Since it was not possible to arrive off KwaJalien atoll by daybreak, decided to spend a day submerged off toje. Rainy weather hampered a close inspection of the lagoon. The Northern anchorage appeared to be devoid of shipping. Lookout towers appeared to have been built on Goat Island and adjoining islands. No radar towers were sighted; however, this should not be accepted as conclusive as we never had a good clear view of the islands.

Jan 12
Concluded all day submergence of KwaJalien Atoll, while approaching the atoll, radar signals were picked up at intervals of 7 minutes sweeps. Just prior to diving, when about 12 miles from Koi Island, the radar signals swept us continuously. He closed to a position approximately 2 miles from the reef, south of Koi Island to observe the anchorage. No ships were present. Four tall tripod towers were located on an island south of Koi and on these towers were mounted radar antennas. The antennae were of a construction similar to the S.J. antennas installed in our submarines, except that they were considerably larger. New buildings construction was in evidence. Unfortunately, no pictures were taken just at this time we were ready to start clicking a large fly-by boat was seen circling over us. He remained in the vicinity about three hours, forcing us to go deep between periscope observations. After that, rain usually precluded any possibility of good photography. A no doubt were spotted and tracked by radar before diving, and this plane was assigned to search for us. This is an indication that any successful approach to Truk will have to be preceded by a long submarine run.

1610 M
Surfaced, Patrol led along Empire-KwaJalien route. Radar signals similar to those previously observed.

2200 M
Set course for Truk, patrolling along what we estimated to be the east board line from KwaJalien to Truk.

Jan 13
Sighted an object dead ahead about 17 miles distant. Went ahead at full power. Man close enough to see steamer masts, estimated angle on the bow as approximately 30° starboard; submerged and can come to normal approach course. Subsequent observations revealed that the target had zigged a few. Therefore at

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 34 —
0711 M
    Surface and started a 117-mile run to gain position
    ahead. Observations indicated that target's base course
    was 320, speed 13 knots.

0800 M
    Target changed base course to 260°, apparently heading
    for Truk. This nullified nearly all wind gained in
    the way of favorable position.

0922 M
    Heavy rain squalls; lost target.

1008 M
    Visibility increased; regsined contact.

1009 M
    Dovoloped 415 volt ground in No. 3 Main Generator,
    Roduoad speed to 17 knots.

1010' -
    Intermittent heavy rain squalls. Lost contact many
    1200 M
    times.

1300 M
    Forked into a position believed dead ahead of target,
    Submerged as he came out of rain squall, 9 miles away,
    with 0° angle on the bow. Commenced approach.

1336 M
    Fired 3 torpedo spread, range estimate 1700 yards. When
    no explosion occurred in allotted time for torpedo run,
    obtained a new set-up and fired a fourth torpedo. A
    split second after the fourth torpedo was fired the first
    torpedo hit, breaking off about 100 feet of the target's
    stern. The second torpedo hit just forward of the bridge
    and the third missed action. Number 4 hit. Target was
    a new ship similar in all respects to the African Maru
    (ONI 208-J, page 93), except that bow appeared to have
    more radio. Two depth charges were heard probably mounted
    on stern and exploding at set depth as stern sank. The
    target opened fire with 4in forward gun, firing in our
    direction. We hauled out to prepare for battle surface
    if target failed to sink. This, however, was not neces-
    sary, as target sank within six minutes after being hit.
    Abandon ship was smartly carried out. Three life boats
    got away, each containing about 21 men. Survivors were
    all in uniform of dark color and wore life jackets. No
    crew wore shipped and no attempt was made to row color of
    the scene of the sinking.

1500 M
    Continued toward Truk running submerged, routing torpedoes and locating ground in No. 3 main generator.

— page 35 —
0, 5, 5, WHALE + Report of Second War Patrol.

Jan 15
1500 K

Jan 16
0416 K

1335 K

1555 K

1840 K

1945 K

2001 K

Jan 17
0449 K

1300 K

1400 K

Subj: U.S.S. WHALE + Report of Second War Patrol.

Entered across: commenced closing Truk Atoll.

Observed peculiar signals on SD radar indicating the close proximity of another radar; submerged, at the time visibility was very low; heavy rain and low clouds.

Sighted patrol cutter similar to our PC Boat. No was zigzagging radically at high speed. Misunderstood to avoid closing patrol, as we did not want to disclose our presence. It was our belief that he was making a rendezvous with shipping around to Truk. The patrol soon passed out of sight in the heavy rain on a North easterly base course.

Surfaced. Continued rectangular patrol in general vicinity.

Sighted some patrol cutter down ahead angle on the bow, range about five miles. Submerged. Could not see target through periscope, but after closing, picked up his propellora drawing away in a Southerly direction.

Surfaced and stood to northward 13 miles. Here we established a search line clear of the area of operations of the patrol cutter, Kopt SD radar secured.

Commoned patrolling along the Truk-Kaprio route, proceeding in the direction of the Enrico, Kopt SD radar secured until 0800 so as to be well clear of any shore based resources.

The pusher signal of another radar getting stronger so far free land, and finally putting our SD out of form caused deep abatement. Under such conditions we could not have directed presence of planes. Mechanical operation of SD was chaotic and for hours.

Started roti. lag search on surface, using periscope for greater range of visibility.

Sighted passengor-freighter bearing 290° true distance 15 miles. Submerged and started approach.

— page 36 —
1459 K. Fired three torpedo spread at 1500 yards, 90° port track, depth-sitting 20 feet. Three hits - one hit aft of the stack; the second blew wreckage up through forward hold; and the third hit aft. Target started turning toward us slowly from 13-to 11 knots. Swung hard right and obtunded out of for a stern tube shot.

1504 K. Fired single stern shot at range of 600 yards. Hit aft. This was a good hit, stopping the target cold. The first was sinking by the stern, took considerable port list and smoke billowed from aft port of ship. Took pictures, firmly convinced this was the graveyard of another Japanese ship. Key of the crew had an opportunity to view this sinking ship through the periscope.

1517 K. Hving out of up to windward to observe the target, was astonished to find the fire under control and the list correct. Tor was sinking rapidly, over the side through port to the hoos. Fired another torpedo from stern tubes, but this issued due to control error. Target was dead in water shooting wildly with lock guns.

1532 K. Crew and passengers abandoned ship although gun crews remained at oasts. Target still about 10 feet overall and then maintained its depth. Closed and fired sixth torpedo from bow tubes set at 30 feet. This hit aft of superstructure deck.

1645 K. Target still floating. Fired 7th torpedo from bow tubes set at 5 feet. This hit with terrific concussion, but did not kill trim or draft of ship appreciably.

1701 K. Fired 6th torpedo from stern tubes. This was hard to hit, but very little concussion was felt. It is doubtful if the torpedo exploded.

1609 K. Getting dark. Target sinking slowly on an even keel, but still locked salvageable. There was no sign of life on board, although it was believed the gun crews had not yet abandoned ship. Sinking to the surface of the water, the ship was about 12 feet. This depth setting was used in the belief that the second dock was intact and keeping the ship afloat. This hit right under the deck and the explosion rippled away both sides of vessel about ten feet below the main deck.

— page 37 —
1809 K Target now settled more rapidly, the main deck being a few feet from awash; condition at last observation. This vessel had absorbed seven and possibly eight torpedo hits. The cargo must have been of such a nature as to prevent her from sinking more rapidly. Target was identified as Heiyou Maru (ONI 208-4, page 64). On retiring we found ourselves in the midst of eight boats full of survivors, approximate ly 50 men to each boat. These men were dressed in both white and blue uniforms. One boat was passed close aboard, and survivors made ready to hit the periscope with their cars.

1854 K Surfaced. Shortly after surfacing commenced getting radar signals in SD radar similar to those of the previous day. Finally secured SD, as believed that bearings were being taken on our signal. Retired to east to send despatoh to Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Jan 18 Patrolling submerged along Empire-Ponap3 steamer lane. Commanding Officer unable to walk because of inflamed ankles joint's, diagnosis arthritis.

Jan 19 Patrolling on surface enroute to channel between Fayu and Namonuito Islands, zig-zagging radically, Decided to spend some time in that vicinity as full moon and calm seas precluded undetected approach to close vicinity of North Pass.

1300 K When in close proximity to where Heiyo Maru had been sunk, passed through area of considerable floating debris and oil slick.

Jan 20 Patrolling on Surface across Fayu-Namonito Islands channel. Nothing sighted.

Jan 21 Patrolling on surface across Fayu-Namonito Islands channel.

0910 K Sighted a vessel believed to be a fishing sampan or a submarine. Submerged. Had vessel in sight through periscope for about fifteen minutes and then it disappeared. This strengthened our belief that it was a submarine. Continued submerged patrol for the remainder of the day.

Jan 22 Patrolling on surface across Fayu-Namonito Islands Channel.

— page 38 —
0958 K
Sighted what was believed to be a periscope and periscope shears of a bracing submarine, range about 6000 yards. The object soon disappeared. Submerged and closed point, but could see nothing. Neither was anything detected on sound gear.

1030 K
Sighted a fishing vessel of popular construction. Although it had no sails furled it was analyzed as having a speed of three knots. Sound could detect no screw noises. Being submarine conscious by now, we let the vessel alone.

1710 K
Sighted destroyer of Fubuki class, angle on bow 100 port, range 8000 yards. It range 5000 yards he signed left 90° and quickly disappeared over the horizon headed toward Truk. Thinking he may have been making a sweep for some larger vessel, continued patrol in direction from which he came. Nothing was sighted. Made a large sweep of the area after surfacing but found nothing.

Jan 24
Patrolling submerged along Truk-Empire steamer lane, closing poing shore we had seen patrol vessel on January 16.

Jan 25
Patrolling on surface along Truk-Krajelein steamer lane.

2212 K
Sighted smoke in bright moonlight bearing North, distance 13000 yards. Made radar track and estimated course of vessel as 083°. Made high speed and run to gain favorable position ahead.

2328 K
Submerged ahead of target, on its track, range 12000 yds. Commoned radar approach.

Jan 26
When range was reduced to 3000 yards and target was clear-ly visible in periscope, went to periscope depth. Considered visibility under bright noon too good for an undetected radar approach.

0008 K
Fired 3 torpedo spread from the stern tubes at target tentatively identified as J0, SX70 MARU (ONI 208-J, page 273), first torpedo hit amidships. A few seconds later

— page 39 —
0008E (Cont'd)
the second torpedo exploded prematurely. This would have hit about 75 feet inside the bow head at finished its run. The third torpedo was not seen or heard to explode. The tanker's engine stopped and a red flare was fired. This was the first indication we had that an escort was present, although a periscope sweep at the time failed to reveal the escort.

We were getting a setup for a fourth torpedo when the tanker started engines and turned toward us. The dock guns commenced firing in our general direction. We went hard left to open the range for the fourth torpedo, but before we could get a TDJ setup that was analyzing correctly, sound picked up fast across approaching from the port beam. A quick periscope check revealed a PC boat, angle on the bow sea, a close aboard and coming in fast. Want ahead full to clear escort's track, but when his bearing did not change appreciably, started deep, We were passing 160 feet when the first depth charge exploded with considerable shooting effect, breaking lights, gauges, sending ran reeling from their stations, opening doors that were closed and alarming closed doors that were open. A total of eleven charges were dropped, even at a success-ively more comfortable distance.

0001 K: Propellers of escort faded; commenced coming to periscope depth.

0001 I: It periscope depth. Nothing in sight. Made radar sweep. Nothing detected.

0001 I: Surface. Commenced pursuit of target along base course at high speed.

0001 K: Abandoned pursuit. In bright moonlight, and with radar operating efficiently, should have picked up target long before this time if it had continued course and speed. Believed target had headed for nearest land possibly Pompeo. Considered searching in that direction, but gave up the idea because only an hour and a half of darkness remained and at daylight passes would be out forcing us under and making an end run exceedingly difficult if not impossible. Decided to patrol Pompeo-Empire steamer Lane.

0700 K: Sighted two planes well astern flying low. Submerged. Those were not detected by SD.

0759 K: All clear on SD. Surface. Continued surface patrol.

— page 40 —
634 K Sighted smoke of steamer about 15 miles on starboard bow. Began end run to gain position ahead. Lost target at dusk.

1950 K Established radar contact with target. Tracked course, and speed.

2148 K In position 13000 yards ahead of target. Moon just rising. Submerged for radar approach.

2235 K Just before firing, target zigged directly toward us, went to periscope depth and full speed to open track for stern tube shot. Only one torpedo remained aft.

2241 K Fired one torpedo from after tubes. Had a perfect set-up, echo range 1500 yards and target tracking on TDC. In the time allotted for torpedo run a dull thud was heard throughout the boat. No explosion occurred. Sound heard the torpedo running up to the instant of the thud. The target showed no consternation, whatever, continuing course and speed. Rather than swing for hasty bow shots, decided to wait until daylight for next attack.

2313 K Surfaced. Maneuvered around end to gain position ahead.

Jan 27 0200 K Dead ahead of target: range 12500 yards.

0534 K Submerged. Ran with target to determine zig-zag plan.

0620 K Commenced approach.

0654 K Fired a 1 torpedo spread, first torpedo 2° N gyro, 80° starboard track, range 1250 yards. Spread used 30° depth setting 12 feet, after hearing no explosions in the allotted time for torpedo run, felt certain torpedoes had run deep and under. Set 10 feet depth on 4th torpedo and fired. This one also failed to explode. Target now became aware of our presence, started shooting at our periscope with the after deck gun with commendatory accuracy, and turned away presenting a 180° angle. Set fifth and sixth torpedoes on 10 feet and fired with zero gyro angle. Fifth torpedo ran slightly to the left and exploded prematurely when about two-thirds of the way to the target. The sixth torpedo passed right under target's stern and must have run under its full length, but failed to detonate. Target now commenced dropping depth charges and continued to draw away.

— page 41 —
1312 K
Reached Position ahead of target and submerged. Found the target no longer bothering to zig-zag.

1424 K
Fired last remaining torpedo, depth setting 16 feet, 11" loft gyro angle, 105 port tronk, range by echo and periscope, 1250 yards. Hit, just abaft stack. Scared boats bearing irregular, slowed, and finally stopped. The target listed to starboard, oven though a port treck was used. The estimated draft was 18 feet. The torpedo must have run under and exploded on the opposite side, where most of the damage was done. The target's guns opened up on an imaginary submarine on its starboard hand. Also there was a lot of commotion rigging a collision net over the bow. The target had to run out of hand, with the result it ended up entangled in the propeller. We circled around watching the show, proceeding up the starboard side. All life boats were rounded and some were lowered. The gunners finally spotted our periscope and ravo us something to worry about; so, we released a dummy periscope through the signal gun and circled back to target's port side for a more uninterrupted observation. The gunners continued to blast the dummy until they noticed the ruse. The target had gradually settled about 8 feet by the bow and was a similar amount lighter aft. Boiler fires meanwhile had died and the stack stopped smoking. Some of the boats went aft to clear the collision mat. By 1700 all boats were recalled, all men wore back on board and the watch was posted. Shortly after, one of the lookouts spotted our periscope to port, and shelling commenced. Later, attempts were made to get up steam, but all attempts were still unsuccessful by night fall. We considered engaging the target with our 4 inch gun, but the target's gunners had shot too much accuracy firing at our periscope for us to risk damage. Withdraw 8000 yards and surfaced after sunset. The target was identi-

— page 42 —
2130 K Transmitted information to CTF 7.

2145 K Set course for Midway.

Jan 30 Radar indication, distance 4 miles; submerged, when pass-1300 L ing 150 feet, bomb exploded very close. Lookouts did not see this plane. Continued submerged for remainder of day- light, as position was only 70 miles from Wake Island.

Feb 2 Entered channel, Moored outboard of U.S.S. TRIGGER, 1034 Y.

PART II - WEATHER

In the Marshall Islands sea conditions varied from 4 to 6. Prevailing winds were from ENE, force 4 to 6. Rain squalls were frequent, and over the atolls they were quite persistent.

In the Carolines sea conditions rarely exceeded force 3. One third of the time flat calm prevailed with long, low swells. Visibility was for the most part unlimited with occasional rain squalls. In the vicinity of Truk and Hall Islands, the rain squalls were very heavy and much more frequent.

Enroute to and from station sea conditions were generally good, becoming rougher on getting closer to Midway.

PART III - TIDAL INSTRUCTION

No abnormal tidal conditions were encountered.

PART IV - NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

No navigational aids were observed.

— page 43 —
1. 0600 16 8-40N PATROL 36000 1200 266. Sunk
2. 1555 15 153-00S 10000 1200 045. 00 Class
3. 1440R 151-25R AP 24000 1000 135. Sunk
4. 0920R 150-30R SS 10000 8000 310. to speed us both down
5. 0958R 149-30R SS 6000. 1200 180. to minature Tan Cut
6. 1200R 149-40R Sampan9000 2000 160. to minature Tan Cut
7. 1730R 150-30R DD 9000 2000 160. Sunk Class
8. 2212R 156-40R OA 10000 1100 083. to radio hit
9. 0012R 156-40R PATROL 1200 100 053. Chips Attack
10. 1634R 155-15R AV 30000 1000 328.2 3 To "start" attack

From VI - ATTENDANT SIGNATURE

| Date | Lat. | Long. | Wx | Name | Att | Course |
|------|------|-------|----|-------|------||
| 1.  | 0746| 167-33| 3000| 1000| 1000| Searchin|
| 2.  | 0700| 156-25| 2000| 2000| 2000| (not by radar)|
| 3.  | 1300| 155-40| 8000| Unknown| Unknown| Attack|

Notes: Plans were consistent with their absence.

— page 46 —
1. Repeated flooding of antennae Trunk.
2. Trim jump excessively noisy at depths greater than 60 feet. Due to noise its use when in vicinity of patrol vessels is out of the question.
3. Air conditioning unit desired for Corning Torpedo.
4. #2 Sanitary Tank is entirely too small. This is a source of ill health and great discomfort on long dives.
5. Porous casting #9 firing valves.

PART I - RADIO RECEPTION & RADAR

Radio Material was excellent. All transmissions were made on port after: Ing antenna with excellent results. Antenna trunk flooded on each dive. Buggest different type gaskets.

SJ Radar oscilloscope tube SHFI and 722A in the transmitter circuit needed replacing due to weakened condition.
SJ viper contacts were replaced.
SD Radar: No comments.

LAST CONSECUTIVE MESSAGE RECEIVED: WAIT

LAST CONSECUTIVE HEGGAGE SENT: HALITOSIS

PART II - SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LEVELS

Sound conditions were very good to excellent except when affected by rough sea conditions. No density layers were found.

PART III - HEALTH AND HABITABILITY

Common colds were numerous and can case of serious caterpillar fever developed. One man suffered a temporary case of nervous shock as result.

— page 48 —
U.S.S. WHALE - Report of Second War Patrol.

PART XVII - REMARKS (CONTINUED)

and know exactly what sigs to expect and then to expect them. Ranges were checked by both mast-head heights and stack's height and coincided with each range. The IDC analysis was perfect.

The following table is submitted as a brief statement of torpedo performance:

| No. Torpedoes | Percentage |
|||
| 24             | 12.50      |
| 3              | 8.33       |
| 2              | 8.33       |
| 5              | 20.84      |
| 12             | 50.00      |

All torpedoes were seen, or tracked by sound, as running hot, straight, and normal. All torpedoes were Mark XIV-34A.

— page 49 —
1. Regulations regarding routing of torpedoes were strictly complied with. Whenever a torpedo tube was flooded in preparation for firing, the torpedo was withdrawn and inspected for tightness. In every case the torpedoes were found tight. The maximum time any torpedo tube remained so flooded was twelve minutes. Pressure never exceeded that of periscope depth.

2. Two night radar approaches were attempted on zig-zagging targets, augmented by periscope observation. The results were satisfactory. The coming tower periscope, a 1.416" aperture, even then optically treated for better night vision, gave only fair results. The control room periscope, a 1.99" aperture, also optically treated for night vision, proved much more satisfactory and the commanding officer used it on the second approach. In the control room, however, he was not able to maintain proper contact with the radar operation or the TDC, which are located in the coming tower.

It is urgently recommended that the No. 1 periscope be modified so as to operate from the coming tower similar to the present No. 2 periscope. This modification could be accomplished by removing the present chart desk in the coming tower and locating it in its place the hoist and hoist motor of No. 1 periscope. This arrangement would not destroy the motor-tight integrity between the coming tower and control room.

A periscope is almost a necessity in a radar approach to keep a lookout for escorts if for no other reason. The escort of the tanker we attacked on January 26th must have been well concealed on the opposite quarter of the tanker at any range up to 3000 yards. In this position he was not soon until just prior to dropping depth charges.

3. Much of the time on station was spent patrolling on the surface along steamer lanes. By using the periscope for searching, the radius of visibility was increased to eight miles on the horizon and tops of ships up to eighteen miles. No excessive periscope vibrations was experienced even at full power. Most Japanese vessels seem to smoke excessively, cool burners especially, but oil burners as well. This smoke is often visible as far as 16 miles and can be used to advantage for bearing while working to a favorable approach position.

Cruising on the surface is more tiring for a bridge watch, however, and an occasional day submerged may be necessary to rest.

4. The .50 Cal. air cooled machine guns proved highly satisfactory, although no service tests was made. They are much easier to handle and can be mounted in main loss time than the cumbersome radar cooled type.

— page 50 —
5. Information is leaking to this command as to how to interpret radar disturbances. Any information as to how far from their sources radar disturbances can be detected on our radar screen, whether our radar signal can be D.P'd, and if this D.F. causes any disturbance in our screen, would be appreciated.

6. If Navy Intelligence has any information as to the number of depth charges the various types of Japanese anti-submarine vessels carry, this information would be of considerable value if disseminated to submarines. Our present information is limited to only 14, which credits most Japanese destroyers with 14 depth charges; this no know to be an under estimation.

Escorted vessels encountered far from bases usually have only one or two escorts. An attacking submarine, having information as to the number of depth charges carried by the escort, can never trace the attack unhampered and unhurried if it is known that all or more all depth charges have been expended by the escorts.

7. The splendid devotion to duty of all officers and men during this war patrol, the second by this vessel, is again worthy of the highest respect.

- 19 - [FIGURE: 1]

— page 51 —
5-10/AL-3
(FB5-102)

Serial 012

CONFIDENTIAL

From:
To:

Subject:

1. The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten, the Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Washington, D.C.

2. A perfect score of certain sinkings on all attacks made. It is disheartening to a submarine commanding officer to experience premature explosions, duds, and poor depth performance of torpedoes.

3. Every effort will be made to obtain the information requested in paragraphs 5 and 6 of part "XVII - Remarks" of subject report.

4. The Commanding Officer, officers, and men are congratulated on an aggressive, well-conducted patrol.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 52 —
1955-102/416-3
Serial 019
UNIDENTIFIED

From:
To:
Subjects:

The Commander Submarine Division ONE HUNDRED TWO.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Second War Patrol; Comments on:
1. The Second War Patrol of the WHALE was conducted in the same intelligence, aggressive manner as the First.

2. There is no question that torpedo performance limited the effectiveness of this patrol, however, successful it seems. The Commanding Officer's remarks in paragraph 1, part XIII of the report shows that 37.5% of the torpedoes fired were defensive. While control or personnel error might possibly account for some of the suspected erratic performance, it appears that the case against the torpedo is well founded. It is known, however, that every effort is being made to improve torpedo exploder performance and it is hoped that the fruits of this effort will not be delayed much longer.

3. The Commanding Officer's recommendation that the control room periscope be replaced by a conning tower periscope with large aperture or use at night is concurred in and is the subject of separate correspondence.

4. It is understood that the information requested in paragraphs 5 and 6 of part XVII of the report regarding the radar disturbances, the probability of having own radar BFD and the number of depth charges carried by various types of Japanese anti-submarine vessels has been referred to qualified agencies for answer.

5. The Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew of the WHALE have earned a "Well done" on this patrol. Even by discarding the probable erratic performance of torpedoes and torpedo exploders, the 50% hits obtained and observed is commendable.

— page 53 —
12-10/A16-3(5)/ SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET (12)
Serial 0196
CONFIDENTIAL

GOSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 137
U.S.S. HALE - SECOND WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALE (SS239) - Report of Second War Patrol.

Enclosure:
(A) Copy of Subject Patrol Report.
(B) Copy of Consubron 10 Conf 1tr.F65-10/ A16-3(FB5-102) Serial 012 of February 8, 1943.
(C) Copy of Comsubdly 102 Conf 1tr.FB5-102/ A16-3 Serial 018 of February 9, 1943.

1. The WHAIZ is once again credited with an excellent patrol. The percentage of hits is most gratifying, but the torpedo performance continues to be a great disappointment.

2. This command concurs in remarks expressed in enclosures (B) and (C).

3. The information requested in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Part XVII of the basic report has been taken up in separate correspondence. The question of radar disturbance has been referred to the Research Laboratory, and the number of depth charges carried by enemy vessels has been promulgated by de-patch.

4. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are congratulated on their aggressive, profitable patrol, during which they are credited with the following:

SUNK
1 Transport (Africa Maru Class) - 9,500
1 Transport (Heijo Maru Class) - 9,815
Total ...... 19,315

DAMAGED
1 Tanker (Soyo Maru Class) - 7,500
1 Freighter (Meijo Maru Class) - 5,600
Total ...... 13,100

Finished - 11

J. H. BROWN, Jr.,
Aoting.

Authentication on next page.

— page 54 —
12/12/1943
Serial 0196
CONFIDENTIAL

CONSUBAP PATROL REPORT NO. 137
U.S.S. WHALE - SECOND WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Second War Patrol.

DISCRIMINATION
(11-43)
List III: SS.
Special:
PI(5), EN3(5), ZI(5),
Consubstantial (2), X3(1),
Consubdowspear (2),
Subschool, N.L. (2),
ConfTaskFor 42 (2).

R. R. SILPURNE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 55 —
12-10/415-3(15)
Serial 0100
CQ: 12-10/415-3(15)
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. MEADE (SS233) - Report of Second Per Patrol.
Reference: (a) ConSubPac third end. 7-12-10/415-3(5)/(12) serial 0156 of 12 February 1943.

1. In reference (a) U.S.S. MEADE was credited with certain damage to the crew including damage of one enemy tanker of 7,500 tons and one enemy freighter of 5,500 tons. The freighter was hit with one torpedo and was left dead in the water in position 12-10' N, 155-15' E. The attack took place on 25 January 1943.

2. Reliable intelligence, subsequently received, states that this MEADE was 5,500 tons was sunk, as a result of MEADE's attack, in the position on the data shown above.

3. Accordingly, reference (a) is modified as follows:

(a) In paragraph 4 delete all after the word "follower" and substitute "reporter".

| SSN | 1 - AP (AFRICAN NAVY Class) | 9,500 tons |
|    | 1 - AP (AFRICAN NAVY Class) | 9,215 tons |
|    | 1 - AP (SCALE NAVY) | 5,500 tons |
|    | TOTAL SSN | 24,915 tons |

| DATE | 1 - 40 (SCALE NAVY Class) | 7,500 tons |
|      | TOTAL DESTROYED | 7,500 tons |
|      | TOTAL SSN & DAMAGED | 32,915 tons |

RECEIVED SC FILES
Room 2055
Frank T. Atkins
Chief of Staff
21 FEB 1946

File No. 06/26-323
Doc. No. 196767

Distribution & authorization on next page.

— page 56 —
12/10/46-5(12) SUBLIE TO: OIC, 40110 FLAG kn

Serial 0100
CONTINUED

Subject: U.S.S. [SS239] - Report of Second War Patrol.

DISCRIMINATION:

| Code | (12) |
|------|------|
| Chinese | (6) |
| JAPAN | (1) |
| Conservative | (1) |
| Incident | (1) |
| Consultant | (8) |
| SS School, II | (2) |
| CC, SS, Base, 2X | (1) |
| Conscience | (2) |
| Subscribing Squadron | (4) |
| Submarine | (1) |
| Conscience | (40) |
| SS, II | (2) |
| 11 Squadron and Div. | (2) |
| Conscience | (5) |
| Subscribing Squadron | (5) |
| 11 Submarines, Pacific | (1) |
| 2nd, C. S. A.

— page 57 —
83239/A16-3
Serial 05

DECLASSIFIED
From:
To:
Subject:
Enclosure:

The Commanding Officer,
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,

U.S.S. HALE - Report of Third War Patrol.

(A) Track Chart (with Original Text).
(B) Submerged Radio Reception Tests.

Part I - MARITIME
February 2, 1943 to April 11, 1943.

Operation Order No. 27-43.

PROLOGUE

Arrived Midway February 2, 1943 from Second War Patrol, commanded refit.

February 16 - Completed refit.
February 20 - Lieutenant Commander John H. Ayer, USNR, relieved by Lieutenant Commander Albert C. Burruss, USNR.
February 22 - Late test dives and underway tests subsequent to refit.
February 26 - Underway for patrol area. Fire in main motor starting resistance. Retraced to Midway.
February 27 - Fire resistance arrived by plane, installed and tested.
February 20 - Underway for patrol area. This vessel was lost departed on December 28, 1942. No training period was scheduled, nor were any practice torpedoes fired.

PART I - MARITIME

Mar 1-5
(UTC)
Enroute, held daily training dives for all sections fired 47/50 cal. gun, 20 m.m. and 50' for training.

MAR 5-8
(UTC)
Began crossing Empire routes to Wake from Hawaii, to Wake from Honolulu, to Strait from Hawaii. Patrolied on the surface with periscope up. No contacts.

Mar 8
(UTC)
Entered area, average speed 13.5 knots enroute. Surface patrol, parascope up, due east of Guam Island, Mariana Islands, across possible Truk-Manoa route. At sunset crossed Mariana between Zealandia, Bank and the Island of Guam.

2230 (A) - Sighted an unidentified small craft headed for Saipan. This boat was picked up by sound while in zero making 10 knots at a range of 6500 yards.

FILMED
49787

ENGLOUISE (A)

— page 58 —
U.S.S. WHALE - Report of Third War Patrol.

Mar 9
0600 (K)
Patrolled on the surface, port scope up, across possible Truk, Saipan route most of Marianas. At sunset closed to a range of eight to ten miles on the chain of islands and patrolled south towards Saipan.

Mar 10
0500 (K)
Sighted Saipan Island, dove and approached Tanapag Harbor.

0645 (K)
Sighted 3 planes headed north toward Anetanan Island.

0816 (K)
Sighted tops of patrol vessel off Harbor entrance. Counted eight ships at anchor.

0933 (K)
Picked up fast series by sound. It was a destroyer headed for entrance at about 24 knots. Range about 5000 yards.

1000 (K)
Took a series of pictures of S-3 par Island and Harbor. Aircraft warning radars are located on all high peaks on Saipan Island. A surface radar was seen on Nakagaha Island. A large gun emplacement is located in the harbor at the end of North Reef.

1800 (K)
Commenced approach on freighter.

1813 (K)
Broke off attack, "freighter" was a small 10" ship, smaller than those seen by our submarines off Aden and Truk, with usual characteristics, looking good from ahead, but is dead give away at 900 angle on bow. Several boats of "Tuna-type" construction returned to port about this time; each of them was armed with a small gun forward.

1935 (K)
Surfaced.

1955 (K)
Enemy radar indications on SW radar. Scarcelights swept area behind us, then the sky.

Mar 11
19 (K)
Continued to close Tanapag Harbor daily, diving at dawn, arriving at our chosen observation point north of roof-to "count our chickens" about 0900. Reminder of day spent at three to eight miles from entrance observing activities of patrol ships and planes. Periodically throughout the day distant small explosions were heard that may have been blasting, nothing of any special interest was noted, except that when we were to the north of entrance a freighter came in from the west completely out of range. When we moved to the west, a freighter got in the harbor from the north. Trips of passed us at 24-26 knots with a minimum range of 4000 yards. Crossed the traffic lines 3 miles N.E. of the harbor entrance was always exciting, as there was at least three boats coming and

— page 59 —
U.S.S. MAINE - Report of Third War Patrol.

Mar 11, 1943
15 (K)
[Cont'd]

and going, such as patrols, trawlers, etc., although nobody
scored to hear us. Except for those periods, it was, in all,
very dull work and certainly not immediately profitable. The
prospects of a "killing", however, were outlined by the task
of approaching close enough before diving soon to become more
difficult. On the 17th at 0455, in very poor visibility, we
almost ruined a 3-masted sailing vessel which was undetected up
to the range covered by the General Prudential Rule. Nodious
to say, the distance to the island being about 12 miles, we
avoided (collision) and dove. Do not believe we were even
sighted. The next morning, having over shot our diving position
several miles and being about 10 miles from the harbor, although
it was pitch black, we were twice challenged by the
authorities before submerging. From this and the results at
Knajlochin on last patrol, a conch echo has been drawn that Jap
surface radar on fortified islands are effective on "Bots on"
submarines up to, but not more than, 12 miles. A torpedo boat
and several planes were seen to investigate this area after day
break, but as a small fishing vessel came in from the same direc-
tion about dawn, perhaps we rode an undetected approach again.
On the 17th we developed a serious noise in the port shaft.
Even at slow speeds, the noise occurred at a very low level.
Side of 180°, drowning out sounds of other vessels approaching
from aft and making a reaction that must have been heard for miles.
On March 16th, about 2000, when retiring from Tanapag sighted two
small unidentified vessels headed for Saipan. Began end-around
run. That this chase was going to be close could be seen as once.
Targets were making about 11 knots on course 090. We were aboard
of them at an approximate range of 10 miles. They were about
15 miles from Saipan. At 2300 abandoned end-around run as the
leading ship and the WASH were being challenged by the search
light in the harbor, distance seven miles. Made best away on
a northwest course (bright moonlight) at 19 knots feeling dis-
gruntled and a bit leery of something plane attack. We had never
allowed enough to identify these ships. Radar pipes indicated small
ships however. This patient waiting off Tanapag ended on:

Mar 19
1600 (K)
Sighted 2 large freighters and one torpedo boat or DD escort
headed out on 280, speed 9 knots. Giving thanks for this break
in the routine of shepherding a harbor full of merchant ships, we
set out in pursuit. Unable to close, so trailed, and at:

1805 (K)
Surfaced; vessels having been out of sight for one hour.

2030 (K)
Regained contact by radar at 21,000 yards and commenced last
end-around, soon was high and full.

— page 60 —
0000 (K)  Submerged ahead of enemy, commenced approach. Seas were high and rough. All attempts to run in at 62 radar depth (about 42 feet) failed. Attempted to make approach by periscope but moon went behind clouds making visibility poor even with 41 periscope. Heartily we wished for a large-aperture periscope. Net result, with convoy still zigging, we ended up in an unfavorable firing position directly ahead of the escort, who became suspicious, and (probably of our loud escort) stopped, listened and searched for us for about three quarters of an hour while the freighters went steaming away.

0150 (K)  Surfaced, escort having turned off and gone on, Radar contacts at 6 miles and 11 miles. Rsumed chase and end-around.

0655 (K)  Again having obtained favorable position ahead, dove and commenced approach, keeping the escort on the "off" side this time. Targets were making same speed as previously tracked, about 9.5 knots, zigging 45' left and right of base course, swinging through entire 90' for each zig. Observed convoy on surface with port scope, in daylight, prior to diving.

0815 (K)  Fired six torpedoes, a spread of three at each freighter. Divergent spread of 20, 100, 10

— page 61 —
1042 (K) Finally reached periscope depth. It was a long process. Being about 5500 yards from the scene of action headed back.

1055 (K) Surfaced to close. No ship in sight.

1110 (K) Sighted huge oil slick ahead covering a large area. Headed for it. Plane contact on SD radar at 4 miles, drove. Prior to seeing the "pulp", the SD radar screen became distorted and the "jumped" quite similar to the disturbance encountered on last patrol, when escort vessel was sighted. It is suggested that Jap TBS or radar disturbance our image on the SD area in those proximity. Headed 90 feet when bomb hit. There was considerable concussion, and the usual damage to light mble and gauges resulted. All cloaks were damaged and stopped. Chronometer seemed to have stood up all right, however, but several superstructure deck platos were carried away and the bridge smokestack and transmittter were put out of commission. This is the 2nd radar escape the WHILE has had from air bombs and the third actual bombing. The general consensus is that this one was, by far, the closest.

2017 (S) Surfaced. Cleared area.

Mar 21
0656 (K) Dory, plane sighted on horizon, coming at us from the general direction of Suluan. Radar failed to pick up this plane. Patrol led traffic lanes to Kobo and Tolda.

Mar 22
0525 (K) Dory and approached Tenango Harbor. Set course for our observation point (about 1 mile north of north reef Tenango Harbor, from which position the whole harbor can be seen).

1135 (K) Sighted masts of two ships and smoke of third leaving harbor. Commenced approach but it was impossible to close range. Trailed at five knots.

1140 (K) Lost contact with freighters when were apparently headed to west of north. From a plo of their actions on leaving the harbor, their course was determined to be about 340, speed 8.5 knots. These solutions were of course not to be trusted because only once were able to get close enough to the side nearest us to get an accurate range, the other freighters possibly the escort being washed and well out of direct vision the entire time.

1925 (K) Surfaced and commenced search at best speed, starting on course 320, with the intention of working to 330, 330, etc., until daylight.

— page 63 —
047 (K) Third large explosion, followed by a series of sounds like depth charges. More explosions than this vessel has ever experienced. Shells still dropping down close. Target sinking but not very fast.

: 042 (K) Fourth loud explosion. Target's storm under but sounding hollow. His own, even with a list. This is a big ship! His signalling worried us considerably; thinking the escort was coming and we might get forced down before seeing him sink, fired a fourth torpedo, straight stern shot at.

: 0422 (K) Torpedo ran hot straight and normal for one minute, was then heard to circle, heading back in our direction. We went to 120 feet and prayed, torpedo reached a relative bearing of 060. Torpedo changed it's mind after reaching our bomb and headed back for freighter.

: 0426 (K) Torpedo exploded followed by a fifth and sixth loud explosions. All quiet. Frigighter's gun firing stopped.

: 0441 (K) Reached 65 feet again. Target was from stern to stack end on fire forward.

: 0544 (K) Morning: twilight, surface to see a little boiler out to get clear of area. Scouting target still burning with bow up, stern under, determined to go back to stack and two pictures. This was the twelfth ship sunk or damaged by the U.S.S. THALE, for a total 60 for, of 31 days on station, for only three war patrols.

: 0602 (K) Dove again, reversed course to return to hull.

: 0712 (K) Picked up scores bearing 180° turn.

: 0726 (K) Sighted 6th ship, range about 4 miles from scene of action. We were between 9th ship and position of hull on 270-090 line of bearing. Hedo survived attempts to make an approach, hoping at 90 foot bottom observation fielding that there would be a plane overhead, but his actions were extremely disconcerting. He stopped, started, circled, went on course 090, 000, 180, 270, each look was right or left around the clock score 90 or 180 degrees. He ransacked the old submarine tender HOMBASH, with the following exceptions; bow and stern built up at least 10 more foot giving him extremely deep rolls, pilot house higher and reels for about 50 depth charges aft. Almost all hands were on deck in whites, and distributed on vantage points about the superstructure and elevated portions of the vessel as look outs. He frustrated six attempts to close by his manoeuvres. His draft appeared to be about 4 feet.

: 7-

— page 64 —
1. U.S.S. THALE - Report of Third Torpedo Patrol.

0807 (K)  Abandoned all ideas of attack and returned to action soon. Lost of smoke was still hanging over oil slicks, but second target had sunk. Abandoned ocean and turned north.

Per 24, 0555 - 1524 (K)  Surfaced.

2250 (K)  Crossed Harriers, passing Fagor Island about to starboard above mines.

Per 25, 0541 - 1840 (K)  Drove. Patrol led submerged Epriro-Iruk routes.

2250 (K)  Surfaced.

0958 (K)  Sighted smoke of vessel, later rode out on a small freighter. Became approach.

1122 (K)  Broke off submerged approach; distance to track too great. Trailed until.

1450 (K)  Surface and gave chase. Treaded target by smoke during the remaining daylight hours on "end-around".

2215 (K)  Torpedo chief of target and drove. Low rising. Fairly good visibility. Took last radar range at 4000 yards, then shifted to sound ranges.

— page 65 —
2308 (K) Fired two stern torpedoes; no explosions. Set-up was as follows: 1300 yard firing range, 92 port track, 20' loft gyro angle with a spread of 3° between torpedoes to give a linear spread of 230 feet at the target. Sound tracked the torpedoes to the target. The T.D.C. had checked perfectly. Depth setting was 12 feet. Either one or both of the torpedoes should have hit. The torpedo misses apparently were undetected as the target did not maneuver at all. One torpedo exploded at the end of its run, 5 minutes, 56 seconds (high power).

Mar 27 0014 (K) Surfaced; began second end-around run.

0513 (K) Submerged, gained position ahead of target and closing on opposite course.

0606 (K) Fired spread of three torpedoes, bow tubes. All missed. It is impossible to understand how those torpedoes could have missed unless they ran deep, as experienced in the last patrol. A 4° degree [V] tangent spread was used to give a linear spread of 180 feet between torpedoes at this target, range 900 yards, practically zero gyro angle, 93° port track, depth setting 12 feet, estimated drift 16 feet. Continuous sound ranges were obtained with frequent periscope observations. The set-up was ideal and checked exactly "on" with the T.D.C. The target speed had been checked for a period of at least ten hours by endar pilot. About one minute after firing target turned loft and commenced firing deck guns at periscope. To swing loft for a stern shot and at:

0613 (K) Fixed two stern torpedoes, spread 3° apart to give a linear spread of 245 feet of the target, set at 8 feet, 1060 port track, sound range 1400 yards and gyro angles at about 3° left. Again both torpedoes were tracked to the target by sound with no results. As far as we can ascertain either the target's draft was greatly overestimated or the torpedoes ran deep or both. Target course remained steady during run of torpedoes. This target had the number 436 painted on her side.

0618 (K) Target zigged out full power, smoking heavily.

— page 66 —
1311-18
A total of seven torpedoes fired at a small freighter and no hits. The thought of the fuel expended on the long, end-around runs, coupled with the loss of the torpedoes themselves, made the crew breaking! but an inadequate expenditure. And yet, each firing had been preceded by a careful track and, except for the last two torpedoes, an undetected approach. Ranges and other data were accurate. While I had originally committed myself to the torpedo worthiness of the vessel, I refused to commit myself or my ship to fire one more torpedo at her - particularly since I could not hope to fire under better conditions then had previously received. Secured from battle stations and devoutly requested the lord that if He couldn't help the WHALE, please don't help the Jap!

1845(K) Surfaced.

Mar. 28 (KING) Patrolled on the surface on two engines, on course 240, intending to cross to Saipan-Truk route.

0807 (K) Sighted smoke of small freighter bearing 227° T headed for Truk. Began end-around run on surface.

0930 (K) Sighted second ship at 14 miles range, on port quarter, apparently headed north towards the Empire. As a position had been reached slightly ahead of beam of last target, continued to work ahead of him leaving second target to continue, for the time being, toward the Empire.

1145 (K) Dove. Front to Battle Stations.

1310 (K)- Intended to fire a 3 torpedo 350 divergent spread, range 1250, 90° track, 100' loft gyro. Started to fire spread - while firing the aircraft was observed to start a zig. Two torpedoes were fired before this was obvious. First torpedo had been fired to hit, 2nd spread to go ahead and

1311-18 Fired third torpedo corrected for course change and with spread angle 20' right to allow for diminution of speed due to turn. All three missed, probably ahead. From a post firing analysis, it has been determined that these misses had been due to firing on the Imokelo; it should have been known that a zig was due within 2 or 3 minutes. The fact that the target made a zig slightly early should have been anticipated, especially with a veteran control party. All hands concerned are hanging their heads over this attack.

— page 67 —
1845 (K). Surfaced, Began first leg of search curve for enemy.

Mar 29. Sighted target, Tracked and gained position ahead.

0405 (K)

0508 (K). Lost contact in haze and rain squall.

0548 (K). Dove ahead of target on tracked base course.

0618 (K). Sighted target, commenced approach.

0740 (K). Distance to the track 10,600 yards. Target had changed base course to the left at sunrise during period of adverse visibility. Standard speed submerged was used but was insufficient to close target.

Since insufficient fuel remained to allow another enroute run to gain position ahead of target, was forced to abandon any idea of pursuit. The disappointment here was temporad, however, by the fact that only one torpedo remained, and I had reason to hope that another, and perhaps larger target might be encountered on our return northward along the Empire-Truk route.

1831 (K). Surfaced. Headed north, course 340 along Truk-Emprise routes. Those attacks just about cured us of attacking any small freighter with following characteristics: Halo bow. Heavy mast forward and aft, length approximately 200 to 300 feet, small mast on poop post forward of pilot house, Composite superstructure, High funnel, 3" gun forward and aft, (and plating of ammunition) Very heavy appearance but of about 2000 tons or less. Neither this vessel nor the one preceding it have been identifiable. The above characteristics apply to both of these vessels.

— page 68 —
30 (KING)
: 31 (0125(K))
: 2233(K)
: Apr 6 1412 (X)
: 1645 (Y)
: 2335 (X)
: Apr 7 1005 (Y)
: Apr 8 1645 (X)
: Apr 10 0834 (X)
: Apr 11 0619 (W)

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 70 —
14 - ENCLOSURE (A)

| No. | Date       | Position         | Description                                                                 | Initial Min. Range | Est. Range | Notes |
|-----||||||-------|
| 1   | Mar. 10   | 15-18N           | Patrol Ship Daring 151T 8000                                                                 | 4000            | 230       |
| 2   | Mar. 10   | 15-17N           | Destroyer Entering                                                                 | 8000            | 5000       |       |
| 3   | Mar. 10   | 15-14N           | "U.S. Ship, Freighter, Deep 8000"                                                                 | 4000            | 060       |
| 4   | Mar. 10   | 15-20N           | "Ellis, High Masts, High Bow & Storm, Mast wall fwd&aft"                                    |                  |            |       |
| 5   | Mar. 11   | 15-20N           | Samoan                                                                                  |                  |            |       |
| 6   | Mar. 12   | 15-22N           | Single Stack Freighter                                                                    |                  | 10000       |       |
| 7   | Mar. 12   | 15-22N           | 4 to 5000 tons                                                                          |                  | 6000       |       |
| 8   | Mar. 13   | 15-22N           | Small Patrol                                                                          |                  |            |       |
| 9   | Mar. 13   | 15-20N           | Boat (trawler)                                                                        |                  |            |       |
| 10  | Mar. 13   | 15-16N           | Sighted Samoan                                                                        |                  |            |       |
| 11  | Mar. 14   | 15-15N           | Fishing craft                                                                        |                  |            |       |
| 12  | Mar. 14   | 15-22N           | New type DD 1250 tons                                                                    |                  | 8000       |       |
| 13  | Mar. 14   | 15-20N           | Bearing 270 T (24 knots)                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 14  | Mar. 14   | 15-20N           | Samoan distance 5 mile                                                                    |                  |            |       |
| 15  | Mar. 14   | 15-20N           | Trawler Bearing 183 T                                                                    |                  | 3000       |       |
| 16  | Mar. 14   | 15-15N           | Small Craft Bearing 128T                                                                    |                  | 8000       |       |
| 17  | Mar. 14   | 15-15N           | Torpedo Boat                                                                          |                  |            |       |
| 18  | Mar. 15   | 15-18N           | Sighted DD Rubuki Class                                                                    |                  | 6000       |       |
| 19  | Mar. 15   | 15-18N           | 1850-Tons, Bearin 165T                                                                    |                  | 6000       |       |
| 20  | Mar. 15   | 15-18N           | Two small vessels end                                                                    |                  | 6000       |       |
| 21  | Mar. 15   | 15-17N           | Merchant ship                                                                          |                  | 6000       |       |
| 22  | Mar. 15   | 15-17N           | Sighted two trawlers                                                                    |                  |            |       |
| 23  | Mar. 15   | 15-17N           | (Fake freighter)                                                                        |                  |            |       |
| 24  | Mar. 15   | 15-17N           | Sighted Patrol Boat                                                                    |                  |            |       |
| 25  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Sighted "U.S. Ship"                                                                    |                  |            |       |
| 26  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 27  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 28  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 29  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 30  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 31  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 32  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 33  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 34  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 35  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 36  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 37  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 38  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 39  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 40  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 41  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 42  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 43  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 44  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 45  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 46  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 47  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 48  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 49  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 50  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 51  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 52  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 53  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 54  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 55  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 56  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 57  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 58  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 59  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 60  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 61  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 62  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 63  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 64  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 65  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 66  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 67  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 68  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 69  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 70  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 71  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 72  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 73  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 74  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 75  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 76  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 77  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 78  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 79  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 80  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 81  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 82  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 83  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 84  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 85  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 86  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 87  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 88  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 89  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 90  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 91  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 92  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 93  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 94  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 95  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 96  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 97  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 98  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 99  | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 100 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 101 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 102 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 103 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 104 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 105 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 106 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 107 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 108 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 109 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 110 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 111 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 112 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 113 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 114 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 115 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 116 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 117 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 118 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 119 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 120 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 121 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |                  | 7000       |       |
| 122 | Mar. 15   | 15-20N           | Freighter returning                                                                    |

— page 72 —
15-22N. Three 120-foot bombers, 2 miles
11 0645 Mar 10 145-37E 180 T.
    15-20N
2. 1150 Mar 10 145-44E Slighted Seaplane C
    15-22.5N Three small 6-type float planes,
3. 1000 Mar 13 145-39E 5 miles.
    15-21N Plane flying low over water,
4. 0620 Mar 17 145-45E 5 miles.
    15-19N Large plane flying in NE direction;
5. 1000 Mar 18 145-43E very low, 5 miles.
    15-18N Large type four engine land base
6. 1120 Mar 18 145-42E bomber, 2000 feet.
    16-03N
7. 1112 Mar 20 143-08E Bombed by plane. (Radar contact).
    17-17N Sighted plane, low altitude, 10 miles,
8. 0850 Mar 21 144-36E bearing 191 T.

@. Seaplane was sighted many times over harbor and approaches, it
   is apparently part of the regular harbor patrol.

Note: All time listed above was in Time Zone "KING".

— page 75 —
1. The area close-in around Tanapag Harbor, Saipan is strongly reminiscent of Pearl Harbor. Patrol craft of various sizes and kinds maintain a continuous surveillance of the area and planes can be seen landing and taking off from what must be a land-plane and sea-plane base at the northeast end of Tanapag Harbor. Since the WHALE spent nine days in close reconnaissance of the harbor and vicinity, undetected, it must follow that these patrols - boats, surface and air - are not particularly alert, especially may this be said of the former since the noise of our port screw must have been audible over a considerable distance.

2. Foreign radar interference on our SD was experienced almost each night upon surfacing. This usually took the form of periodic sweeps, with intervals of about fifteen seconds. On one occasion this interference was accompanied, upon surfacing, by a powerful searchlight beam which seemed to be trailed directly on WHALE, but it quickly moved to the southward in train and it was evident that either a drill was in progress or the lights were up to aid a plane in landing. As pointed out in the narrative, it appears that their surface radar if effective against a submarine, bows-on, to a distance of about twelve miles. After indications that this was true, WHALE submerged each morning slightly outside this radius.

3. Depth charging by the escort vessel on the occasion of the attack on the convoy on March 20, 1943, was neither sustained nor accurate. His hovering over our vicinity was, however, embarrassing and forced us under even we wanted to remain at periscope depth.

4. The presence of the plane in the vicinity of the above attack was not unsuspected. Although we were 123 miles from Saipan, it was thought highly probable that plane counter-submarine measures would be immediately undertaken following the sinking or damage of their ships. All lockouts and the SD operator were especially cautioned. The bridge received the radar warning when the distance was but 4 miles and, as previously pointed out, the WHALE reached 90 feet when the bomb went off. The shock was violent throughout the vessel but was most severe in the after torpedo room where it knocked men to the deck. The damage, as indicated in the narrative, was superficial only and served, perhaps the useful end of spurring the lookouts on to do a better job.

Mine Sweeping Operations: None observed.

— page 76 —
1. STARBOARD MAIN MOTOR STARTING RESISTANCE

Upon leaving port for station, the resistor failed, heated excessively, and caused a fire which burned the excitation cable. The cable was reserved and a spare starting resistance was installed. (A derangement report was submitted.)

2. KLEINSCHMIDT EVAPORATOR

This water of No. 2 evaporator became contaminated with oil. Was found necessary to replace all vapor and oil seal rings in the compressor unit as they had hardened with wear.

3. TRIM PUMP

Due to its excessive noise the trim pump once again proved useless whenever there was a patrol boat in the vicinity. Surely there must be some noiseless pump of desired capacity manufactured in the States which could replace the present installation.

4. MAIN SHAFTING

A very loud metallic noise developed somewhere in that portion of the main shafting which is outside the hull. Its exact location could not be ascertained, but the noise persisted at even creeping speed. Locating and eradicating the source of trouble must be accomplished during the coming period.

— page 77 —
U.S.S. WHALE - Report of Third War Patrol.

Part X - RADIO RECEPTION - RADAR

RADIO:
Radio material was in excellent condition throughout the patrol. The antenna trunk flooded on our first deep dive and thereafter on normal all-day dives. We copied on A115, 8230, and 12345 kcs, with good results, excepting for about an hour starting at 1700 GMT, when reception was only fair.

Transmitted on 4235 kcs with no difficulties experienced in contacting a shore station. The information on submerged reception when obtained completely will be the subject of an enclosure to this patrol report.

SD RADAR:
Ranges of mountains 2000 and 3160 feet elevation were recorded at 25 and 27 miles respectively. Aircraft was picked up at a range of 8 miles. Before starting patrol re-installed the 29" whips in place of 26" whips and ranges were increased about 300%. 1/4 mile rosiners gave better results than the 1/2 mile rosiners in the grid circuit for 801A's. 801A's still worked better with 1/2 mile rosiners, Installed a filter across AC line to transmitter. Surge in line voltage apparently harmed out at 801A after 86 hours use. Both 801A's were replaced with 801A's. An 8014 was shorted from filament to plate, probably caused by near miss of airplane bomb. This tube left early 25 hours. Interference which had bothered us throughout the early part of the patrol was traced to the constant frequency generator in the pump room. It's armature was replaced. Another 8014 became shorted and was replaced with a tube which had 25 hours operation and it matched perfectly. 3rd radar caused interference on SD, which makes it appear that an outside radar is beamed on ours. Staffs our tuning by the plans on March 20th, the 3D trace broke up irregularly, perhaps caused by a TBS or enemy plane radar but more likely by the constant frequency generator which had previously produced a similar disturbance. A similar effect can also be obtained by arsing electrical equipment.

- 21 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 78 —
1. SUBJECT: U.S.S. WHALE - Report on Third War Patrol.

2. SUBJECT: SJ RADAR:
   - Excellent results were obtained with this gear - picking up a 9000 ton freighter at 23000 yards, a 7000 ton freighter in this convoy was also picked up at 17000 yards, difference of bearing 3 degrees. Land was picked up at 34000 yards.
   - The rectifier of the indicator unit was flooded due to a locking flange in pump room, but it was quickly dried into no ill effects.
   - The SJ was operated with filament voltage applied continuously at night and plate voltage applied only when riding sweeps.

LAST CONSECUTIVE MESSAGE RECEIVED: Sub: Serial 70

LAST CONSECUTIVE MESSAGE SENT: 1 2

PART XI - SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS

Around Saipan sound conditions were only good for about 4000 yards due to local disturbances of this water. When away from the islands sound conditions improved considerably and sounds were picked up at about 8000 yards and a sound count was obtainable inside 7000 yards. Excellent echo ranging was obtained up to 2400 yards on the last two attacks. The experienced no echo ranging by the enemy and we were not aware of any density layers. In this connection, the installation of a betheymograph would enable us to determine presence of density layers, an alternative would be to install a thermometer to be read inside the boat, which would give the temperature of the water.

— page 80 —
2167
: 4675
: 1984
: 1200
: 10026

PART XIII - FUEL EXPANDED

Total for Patrol: 98630 gallons.

PART XIV - FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions (Days) | Personnel (Days)
:---:---:---:---
1 | 15000 * | 20 | 5

* Fueled at Midway

PART XVI - GOVERNING ENDURANCE FACTOR

F. Roll terminated by expenditure of fuel oil.

EXCLUSIVE (A)

— page 81 —
1. The percentage of torpedo hits obtained on this patrol leaves much to be desired by the U.S.S. WHALE. One miss each on the first four attacks is to be expected with the spreads employed and on the last attack the three misses may be attributed to control errors in that the torpedoes were fired on a "buckle" and all three probably passed ahead. Had the third torpedo of this last spread been fired immediately following the first two a hit would probably have resulted, however, a new set up was "cranked in" and the target seeing the wakes of the first two torpedoes probably continued his swing and avoided the last one.

The circular run which occurred in attack No. 5 is attributed to a material failure in the steering mechanism. As the torpedo was tracked by an experienced sonar man for one minute during which time it appeared to be running hot, straight and normal, no other explanation is offered as to why it should suddenly commence circling to the left. This torpedo was set at 16 feet depth. A hit is claimed because it was traced around in a circle back to the target and exploded immediately after which two very heavy explosions were heard from the target.

The above paragraphs explains all but the seven misses which occurred in attacks No's. 6, 7, and 8, all on the same ship. As set forth in the narrative the control data on these attacks was (and still is) considered excellent. The gyro angles in attacks No. 8 (38° L) were excessive, however, it is impossible to see why all these torpedoes missed. The theory that the size and draft of this target were vastly overestimated is well within the realm of possibility, however, it is firmly believed that some of these torpedoes ran deep.

All the torpedoes carried on this patrol were Mark 14 and Mods with the "A" modification completed. They were modified at Pearl Harbor, carried on the TINKER on her last patrol, turned in to Torpedo Shop, Midway, overhauled and very carefully checked by ship and shop personnel and issued to the WHALE. They were considered to be in excellent condition and no blame can be placed on Midway. It was very gratifying not to have any "duals" or premature explosions as experienced on the second patrol with torpedoes issued by Subase, Pearl Harbor.

— page 82 —
U.S.S. WHALE - Report of Third War Patrol.

All torpedoes were routed in accordance with existing instructions and no major deficiencies were noted. On one occasion a small amount of water was drained from two afterbodies immediately after going to deep submarine to avoid depth-charges and the outer doors were not closed fast enough. This was to be expected and no damage resulted.

Enroute to the patrol area and while patrolling on the surface during daylight hours four torpedoes forward and two in the after tubes were kept at 35 feet depth. No injurious effect was noted and these torpedoes apparently ran normally. The forward torpedoes registered hits. This practice has since been discontinued.

As a matter of interest the statistics on the first three war patrols of this vessel show the average torpedo hitting range to be 1900 yards, the average missing range 1550 yards. Furthermore, several of the actual hits, that should have been contact explosions were magnetic - indicating that the torpedoes may not have reached set depth at 1500 yards.

In the larger sense there were no "Major Defeats" which developed or this patrol. For this I wish to give full credit to the Submarine Base, Midway, and the personnel thereof, both officer and enlisted, who gave so freely and unstintingly of their services. The IMO hydraulic pump, which Midway installed, functioned perfectly and is a vast improvement over the previous installation, particularly in its quiet operation.

The trim pump continues to be the submarine's major enemy. The Jap could have no better ally on an evasion attempt than a running trim pump. The unbelievable din set up by this mechanical Sword of Damocles is nothing short of phenomenal. Surely this problem can be solved. I, for one, pray that its solution is not too far distant.

Again the need was felt for a larger aperture periscope in the conning tower for night work.

The period spent submerged off Sipan brought to our attention the urgent need for a larger No. 2 sentry tank. The capacity of this tank is but 250 gallons and is inadequate for the disposal of all the vessel's wastes during the average day-long dive.

— page 83 —
1. Low frequency can not be copied beyond 1500 miles when totally submerged.
2. Low frequency can be copied down to 60 feet within 1100 miles during morning hours.
3. Low frequency can be copied in evening hours within 900 miles at 60 feet.
4. Bearing of station is not critical through arc of 600.
5. Heading of submarine has no noticeable effect on submerged reception.
6. Loop coupling unit type CH-50085 (frequency 15 to 35 kc) is only two thirds as effective as the loop coupling unit made at Mare Island Navy Yard. This latter unit contains one stage of amplification.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 84 —
1. The Third War Patrol of the Whale covered a period of forty-two days, twenty three of which were spent in the assigned area. It was terminated due to expenditure of fuel and all but one torpedo. This entire patrol was conducted in an aggressive and determined manner. Every attack was preceded by a prolonged, clever, skillful and relentless surface chase in which radar was employed to maximum advantage.

2. Attacks. Every attack was pressed home and skillfully executed. The torpedo spreads employed were adequate in every case without needless expenditure of torpedoes. Following attacks were made when necessary and possible. Each ranges were obtained and used on two occasions when radar exposure prepared to be hazardous. The double attack conducted in moonlight on the early morning of March 23rd with Lieutenant Kerlfinger at the periscope and Lieutenant Denney at the T.P.C. was particularly effective and well done. This type of torpedo-control organization, first employed by Lieutenant Commander Morton in Echo, appears to be highly in favor with some submarine commanding officers.

3. Torpedo Performance. On torpedo evidently ran very erratic in course but eventually collided with the target and exploded. At least two of the five torpedoes fired in this first two attacks on the small Aft on March 26 - 27 should have hit. The commanding Officer's opinion that the hitting torpedoes in these two slices were deep-runners is concurred in.

4. Material. Compliant about the present noisy and inefficient train pump in all vessels of this Squadron is so common and is so well known to all interested activities and bureaus that one substitutes to make further mention of it. Current alterations authorized to be made to the present installations during next Navy Yard availability periods serve only as a satisfactory stop-gap and it is hoped that a silent and efficient pump of any design will be ready available in the near future.

A radar with the efficiency and reliability of the Teles, supplemented by a large aeroplane, binocular and light protected periscope in the number one station is considered to be ideal for night attacks. The development and eventual installation of such a periscope is again recommended.

Table as in excellent material condition upon return from patrol. Spare will accomplish normal refit inspection and repairs.

5. For a roll conducted, aggressive and effective patrol, the Commander, Officers and Crew and congratulated by the Division Commander.

BIOLOGIES (B)

— page 85 —
5-10/A16-3
(FB5-102)
Serial 054

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TEN
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
April 13, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TEN.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (S3239). Third War Patrol - Comments on.

1. The third war patrol of the U.S.S. WHALE extended over a period of forty-two days, of which twenty-four days were spent on station.

2. A total of twenty-three torpedoes were fired on nine separate attacks; nine hits were scored for a percentage of 39.14%. Misses were due to erratic depth performance and control errors. Since the WHALE refitted at Midway, no training period was conducted prior to departure on patrol. It is expected that the fire control party will benefit considerably by the training period which will precede the ship's departure on next patrol.

3. Obtaining proper provisions at Midway for a war patrol has become a pressing problem. This situation will become more acute as greater numbers of submarines refit in Midway. It is recommended that immediate steps be taken to remedy the food shortage and to improve the food quality available for submarines at Midway.

4. In spite of the misses and erratic torpedo performance, the WHALE made a creditable showing on this patrol. Although evidence of sinking is not entirely conclusive, it is believed sufficient good to credit sinking of the MOAMIWA MARU and ARIZONA MARU types. It is recommended the WHALE be credited with the following damage inflicted on the enemy:

| Damage | Weight | Type | Tonnage | Location |
|||------|||
| 1      | 7000   | TNT  | 9257    | TONNAGE  |
| 2      | 7000   | TNT  | 7497    | TONNAGE  |
| 3      | 7000   | TNT  | 9684    | TONNAGE  |
| 4      | 7000   | TNT  | 33506   | TONNAGE  |

5. The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten congratulates the Commanding Officer and personnel of the WHALE on an excellent and profitable patrol during which considerable damage was inflicted on the enemy.

ENCLOSURE (c)

— page 87 —
12-10/A16-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, FACIFIC FLEET A

Serial 0502

CONFIDENTIAL

COMBUSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 167
U.S.S. MALLE - THIRD WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. MALLE (SS239) - Report of Third War Patrol.

DISTRIBUTION
[IN-43]
List III: SS
Special:
  PI(5), IM3(5), ZI(5),
  Consubstant (2), X3(1),
  Consuboswespac (2),
  Subschool, NL (2),
  Comtaskfor 72 (2),
  Consubron 50 (2),
  Consopac (2),
  Cinclant (2),
  Comtaskfor 16 (1).

E. R. STAUFFER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 89 —
1943
1348(M) - HALE 540 miles from take Island ordered to be 30 miles east of take at 0500(L) May 16, 1943 to assist in guiding-in Army Liberator Bombers to take Island for bombing attack, and to pick up crews from shot-down or seriously damaged planes. Since HALE ordered to remain undetected, decision made to (1) acknowledge orders after dark, and (2) run submerged during daylight after today. Steered for Wake Island at full power on four engines. It was considered necessary to make daylight landfall on take so that our position for honing would be accurate.

May 14, 1943
(L) - Ran submerged during daylight, at three engine speed after dark.

May 15, 1943
0440(L) - Submerged.

0720(L) - Sighted one aircraft - believed to be Kawanishi 95, similar to our SOC cruiser plane.

0922(L) - Sighted take Island about eight miles, tops of water towers, observation tower, top of large hangar, and mast of grounded freighter (sunk by TUNKY and FIREBACK) visible. Also sighted two trawler type patrol boats about four miles off the reef. With take bearing 270°T stood to the eastward. Surfaced after dark about 35 miles east of take.

2300(L) - Commenced guarding required frequencies for take bombing attack.

May 16, 1943
0500(L) - On station on surface making three engine speed doing figures-eight 30 miles east of take Island - broad-daylight. Had previously been ordered to remain on surface after 2300(L) May 15, 1943 until released by Bombardment Group Commander or attacked by enemy. HALE had received no hint as to the probable time the Army would attack so we believed it would take place just after dawn. Kept SD radar manned. Weather conditions excellent, scattered clouds on horizon - unlimited ceiling.

— page 90 —
0520(L) - Sighted one aircraft bearing 100°T, 18 miles on radar, heading east. Appeared to be large flying boat (or Liberator bomber?). Passed out of sight into clouds to eastward. Breathed a deep sigh of relief. It was a Jap, the dawn patrol had passed without sighting us.

0540(L) - Sighted large flying boat (or Liberator bomber?) bearing 290°T, radar range 16 miles, on course about 600°T headed in direction of Midway. Line ran as at about 100° elevation and we were directly in line with it and the plane so it would have been extremely difficult for him to have sighted us. As it is a Jap or the Army?

0715(L) - Sighted fourth aircraft (same type) distant 15 miles to eastward - passed into cloud and not seen again. The lookouts are really on their toes this morning. The traffic situation around here looks like LaGuardia Field. Apparently the bombing has not yet taken place - or has it? Wonder whether the Army will meet one of these patrols on the way out and ruin the show.

0942(L) - RADAR contact at 29 miles, report 29 miles, "pig" one inch high.

0945(L) - Sighted flight of seven Liberator bombers bearing 020°T distant 27 miles headed for lake. Up until now we thought the raid had either taken place or had been postponed.

1008(L) - Lost sight of planes to westward, distance 21 miles.

1014(L) - Still thirty miles from lake - sighted brilliant red-orange flash and then saw a huge cloud of smoke rise from direction of lake. It started up slowly then mushroomed out and must have shot two or three thousand feet high. Sighted smaller puffs of smoke rising to right and left.

— page 91 —
1943: 1017(L) - Helmsman radar contact on planes returning - apparently some of them were heading directly toward HAL. He headed south to avoid having enemy fighters drawn over us. Scattered clouds overhead.

: 1021(L) - Sighted liberators - now widely separated except for three in close formation to the northward. One Liberator headed generally in our direction. Counted five or six fighters in hot pursuit. Observed one fighter make an attack from below on the three Liberators in close formation. No made a steep climb to attack, then suddenly went into a dive with white smoke pouring from his tail. He dropped three or four thousand feet and then apparently regained control and leveled off. Lost of the fighters, however, appeared to be looping at a resplendid distance. He counted seven Liberators, the same number as we had seen originally, and none seemed to be in trouble. They were not, however, wasting any time in getting clear.

: 1026(L) - Did not think the daps would head us at this time. Then the radar range dropped to 42 miles, however, we submerged in a hurry. Were not sure whether the contact was one of our Liberators or a cloud-shrouded Jap.

: 1037(L) - Periscope depth. Nothing in sight. Put ED radar mast up - contact at 7 miles which soon increased to 10 and disappeared. Scattered clouds overhead.

: 1048(L) - Surface on course in direction of Liberators' departure.

: 1052(L) - Radar contact at 9 miles coming in fast. Submerged. Nothing heard on radio while on surface.

: 1219(L) - Surface.

: 1225(L) - Radar contact 11 miles coming in fast. Submerged. Contact had closed to 7 miles when radar past went under.

: 1229(L) - Bomb explosion about 500 yards astern. No damage, but to 120 feet and headed south. Radio reported that just as we dived we were being culled on the counterforce frequency. To a sonic observer, having both the EALs and the Jap in view, this cat-and-mouse game would have had the aspect of a Kaystanes comedy, and the humor of it was not wholly lost on us - thanks to our SD.

— page 92 —
1943
U.S.S. WHALE - Report of Fourth War Patrol

May 16, 1943
L455(L) - Felt slight jar as from distant explosion.

L458(L) - Another explosion a long way off. Decided to stay submerged until dark. Wanted to take a look at Wake but it was too late in the day so make it submerged.

1922(L) - Surfaced. Received message on NIM schedule releasing us from duty in connection with the bombing. Headed for the patrol area which has been assigned us upon receipt of our orders diverting us to Wake. Same area as third patrol. This special assignment has cost $1,000,000 gallons of fuel over the normal expenditure required from Midway To Wake arounts area 14. It is hoped this expenditure of almost ten per cent of our capacity will not subsequently cause embarrassment in area operations.

May 17, 1943
L417(L) - 215 miles bearing 245°T from Wake Island - lookout sighted aircraft very low on horizon distance about 12-15 miles. Submerged. SD radar did not pick up plane probably due to low altitude. Believe we were not sighted. Type aircraft - unidentified.

1529(L) - Surfaced and continued enroute area.

May 18, 1943
L705(L) - 450 miles from nearest Jap Base - ENTEROK - lookout sighted plane low on horizon distance 10-12 miles submerged.

1750(L) - Surfaced and continued enroute area.

May 20, 1943
(KING) - As were about to cross stoner lanes between Truk and the Empire decided to spend one day on surface patrol- ling lanes. Experience on previous patrols in this vicinity indicated that this was a very likely spot to pick up some tonnage.

2000(K) - Results of days' search negative so headed for area.

May 21, 1943
1020(K) - Entered area 110 miles from Saipan. Submerged to remain undetected on final approach to Saipan.

— page 93 —
1943
Subj: U.S.S. WHALE - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

May 22, 1943
0136(R) - Passed between Anson and Farellon at Medinilla Islands and set course for Tampag Harbor, Saipan.

0432(R) - Submerged. Approached to within two miles of reef of Tampag Harbor just west of Moro Point. Only one ship was observed in the harbor. This ship was similar to the MEIYO HAKU which had been damaged by the WHILTIN on her second patrol, about 200 miles east of Saipan. No other activity noted. No anti-submarine patrols sighted, general information the same as given in last patrol report; only one aircraft sighted over Saipan - float type zero fighter. Dedicated to investigate Lauiu Bay so headed south along eastern coast of Saipan. Nothing sighted.

1936(R) - Surfaced and commenced patrol of Saipan-Truk route.

May 23, 1943
0430(R) - Submerged on line between Saipan Channel and Truk.

0754(R) - Sighted aircraft - identified as a GUNITE type 97.

014(R) - Sighted aircraft - HITSUICHI type 96 - appeared to have taken off from northern point on Tinian Island.

0133(R) - Sighted second aircraft - similar to one seen at 0314.

1935(R) - Surfaced after a very dull and unprofitable day. Proceeded towards Rotor to investigate the alleged existence of a submarine base.

May 24, 1943
0427(R) - Submerged 15 miles southeast of Rotor and approached harbor. No ships in harbor. No sign or activity which might indicate the presence of any kind of a naval base. No patrol activity.

0935(R) - Sighted sampan fishing about five miles southwest of harbor.

1941(R) - Surfaced and headed for Guam.

— page 94 —
1943
May 25, 1943
04/41(K) - Sumerged 17 miles northwest of Port Apra:
1141(K) - Sighted masts of three ships in Port Apra. Approached within two miles of reef and out in positions of ships. Kept to be able to fire into harbor as the FLIGHT FISH had done. As far as we could ascertain, however, each ship was encountered in such a way as to be protected by reef-islands. They must have learned their lesson since bearings taken from different positions of THAI showed them across fully protected. The ships were tactically identified as follows: KILO MARI 30, 3, 4, 391 tons, SAKITO HABU, 7, 126 tons and ONO MARU, 6, 667 tons. The SAKITO HABU reported damaged by the FLIGHT FISH appeared to be slightly down by the sea and the superstructure looked very black, as though it had been burned.

1217(K) - Small retriever type sampan sighted, apparently patrolling off harbor entrance. It appeared to be unarmed and no depth charges were visible. This was the only sign of any anti-submarine measures. No aircraft sighted.

1520(K) - Stood out from harbor on course to the Enrico.

1750(K) - Sighted freighter (KIMO MARI No.3) standing out of Port Apra. Commenced tracking. Decided not to attack until after dark well clear of Guam in order not to spoil the chances of getting either of the other two ships still at anchor later on. Freighter was unescorted but was making very erratic zig, speed 10 knots, base course 338°, headed for Kobe.

1946(K) - Surfaced to the westward of freighter and commenced end around run on three engines. Target was then 11,000 yards to northeast of us. Radar not working too satisfactorily, lost contact. Commanded closing base course of target in effort to regain contact.

2013(K) - Regained contact at 16,450 yards momentarily, and then lost it again. Scramped for target in vain. Finally decided he must have changed base course. He headed for Saipan and at.

2113(K) - Regained contact at 14,000 yards.

— page 95 —
1943 Cont'd
2230(K) - Redacted position ahead of target now on base course QDOT headed for San Juan. Tracked target very carefully and discovered that, as we had hoped, he had ceased zig-zagging and was steering a steady course.

2322(K) - Range closed to 9,000 yards, submerged to 42 feet and, for the time being, lost radar contact.

2342(K) - Sound picked up target's series which were blending in with our own.

2350(K) - Regained radar contact at 5,200 yards. Plot & TDC showed that target had commenced zig-zagging again after bearing steered straight course for one hour. More was not yet up and the horizon was barely discernible.

May 26, 1943
0004(K) - Moonrise. Sighted target with the U.S. periscope at radar range of 4,100 yards. Target started on the right leg of a zig-zag course right for a bow shot, 90 port track.

0006(K) - Went to 50 feet, shifted to No. 1 periscope and QD sound gear. Target turned towards us prior to our plotted time of zig and we were then about three hundred yards off his track. He turned hard right to come around for a stern shot and a poor track angle when target suddenly zigged away again. Do not believe he was using a constant helm but he might just as well have been. Checked our swing and obtained firing set up. The firing range was believed to be around twelve hundred yards when a serious of pings gave the disconcerting range of 650 yards.

0014-10(K) - Cranked in setup, (checked on,) and fired first torpedo - 110° port track, 10° left gyro angle, torpedo run 500 yards.

0014-19(K) - Fired 2nd torpedo spread 6° left.

0014-27(K) - Fired 3rd torpedo spread 6° right.

0014-30(K) - First torpedo hit with a blinding orange flash, midway between stack and bow of freighter and evidently blew the whole bow away.

— page 96 —
1943 Contd.
0014-38(K) - Freighter submerged up to the bridge - narrow out of water at an angle of about 50°. This was a torpedo-wired and was undoubtedly a magnetic hit. The wires entered at the junction of the obstruction, but the destructive effect was almost unbelievable. The estimated draft of the target was 22 feet, depth setting 12 feet. The torpedo undoubtedly ran well under the target as it would not have had time to reach its set depth. It is believed the second and third torpedoes passed ahead. But the target not been stepped down in its track, the third torpedo would undoubtedly have hit.

0017-35(K) - Soundman heard answer to no answer of target, coming in fast. Could see nothing, but went deep anyway.

0019-52(K) - Heard explosion from target - probably a boiler - target heard breaking up - loud crackling noises, etc. The reload. Sirens not heard again, believe acutdamp had been mistaken.

0132(K) - Surfaced two miles from some of sinking in bright moonlight. Nothing in sight. Believe there were no survivors. It had taken target four minutes to sink. Headed back to Guam to await departure of other ships.

0436(K) - Submerged 17 miles northeast Port Apra. Spent today and the most two days making a periscope patrol off shore Port Apra during daylight and running northwest to Saipan-Pelei route during each night returning to Port Apra by 0430 each morning. The two remaining ships at anchor in Port Apra were still well protected by reefs islets. No sign of their getting underway. Only activity noted at all was a trawler of about 150 tons which patrolled off the harbor off and on during this day. No aircraft sighted.

Nov 28, 1943
1955(K) - Surfaced 17 miles northeast of Port Apra and examined patrol of lane from Guam to Saipan. Light clear, but very thick.

2030(K) - Hade radar contact at 10,400 yards bearing 3.7°, Commence track ing.

2041(K) - Made second radar contact very close in bearing to first contact - range of two "pips" was 10,750 and 11,400 yards. One "pip" was slightly larger than the other, but both were very small.

— page 97 —
1943 Combat
2041(R) = Compensated and/or trained run to the eastward, targets, base course was 050° which headed for the eastern entrance of Saipan Channel. Radar operator reported an operational flash across the 3rd radar screen when he was trained on the targets which indicated the possibility of one of the targets making periodic radar sweeps in our direction. Plot showed targets were parking large ships.

2246(R) = Last contact at 11,000 yards - made still, power on front engines and uncovered targets' base course cutting in sharply to gain position ahead as soon as possible - targets' speed was estimated at 10 knots. Could not figure out whether target was not operating at maximum efficiency or whether targets were very small ships. Past performance had given us ranges on elusive targets as far as 21,000 yards. In this case 11,000 yards appeared to be the maximum obtainable.

2200(R) = Rognied contact at 16,000 yards.

2207(R) = Range opened to 11,000 yards and no lost contact. Slowed from 19 to 3 knots as we were directly ahead of targets on this base course - and ready to commence attack. Plot indicated at this time that targets had not -1g speed for the last half hour and were still steering the outmocked base course. Wanted to regain contact and attack.

2242(R) = Had not regained contact as needed on reverse of targets' base course at 4-00 on engines speed. Radar appeared to be working normally. All through it was very dark. Believed we could see for at least 4,000 yards.

2305(R) = Still no sign of targets, they had obviously made a radical change in base course so we laid down a search curve to cover 900 changes to either right or left. Command records to outswerd on at 2347(R).

2347(R) = Having covered all possible trends to the eastward, assuming the original estimated target speed of 10 knots, commenced following a rotating search curve to cover the possible westerly courses towards the Empress.

Ex 29, 1943
0225(R) = Moonrise - good visibility - still nothing in sight.

— page 98 —
29, 1943
Q415(K) - Reached what we believed to be the extreme weathery point of search curve. Slowed to one angle and commenced surface periscope patrol on Empire route during morning twilight.

0510(K) - Finally gave up the chase after the biggest disappointment this ship has yet experienced. Submerged on Quarantine route heading back for Guam, periscope patrol. The following theories are advanced on the lost radar contact: (1) The "dope" wore two patrol vessels patrolling the lane at which the HUDM WAH (No 3) was sunk and they were hunting for us. There are lost contact; they had reasoned the northern limit of their patrol and simply reversed course. (2) A patrol vessel was escorted by another ship and we were being tracked by their radar. What we reasoned the probable attack position they went about to the south to avoid. (2) There is a remote possibility that the targets were two submarines who played us up by radar and then submerged. In any event it would have impossible for any type of target to have sighted us. It is believed that (1) is correct since two likely looking patrol vessels were later seen off Tinian.

0555(K) - About 60 miles bearing 295° from Rote island, much movement, life raft drums, etc. Before these probably came from ship we sunk night of May 27th.

May 30, 1943
Q442(K) - Submerged 17 miles northwest of Port Arre, Guam.

0934(K) - Sighted twelve of harbor observers - The SAITO NAR and ONE NAR were still at anchor in an area position as previously plotted. No other ships or patrol vessels noted. The presence of these two ships substantiates our belief that one radar contact the night of the 26th were not these ships. Continued periscope patrol towards Saipan. Decided we were wasting time sitting off Guam. As long as there has been a submarine active in this vicinity, the Japs will probably keep those ships there indefinitely. Sorry our victim of the other night had not been Empire-bound, since, in that event the Japs would not have learned of his demise for many days.

Feb 31, 1943
Q452(K) - Submerged 20 miles southwest of Mindanao Island.

— page 99 —
1943
(Unknown)
U.S.S. HALE - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

May 31, 1943
1146 (K)
Sighted two trawler type armed patrol vessels off Tunis Harbor and one ship at anchor very close-in to beach.

1311 (K)
Sighted nor patrol vessel similar in appearance to our corvette but smaller (about 700 tons). He out close across our bow, but evidently did not detect us.

1318 (K)
Sighted fourth patrol vessel. It has a two masted schooner, carried depth charges and a small gun turret. Sighted small freighter probably 8000 - 9000 tons, moored in close to the beach. It was apparently scored from sea aft so as to present a 150° angle on the bow to seaward. Did not consider it a northwester target in view of this position angle presented. Stead out to the northwest along Salina-Batran route. It was then too late to permit observation of Tannin Harbor during daylight.

1944 (K)
Surfaced and stood up to rendez Antalyan Island.

2352 (K)
Picked up Antalyan Island in 3D radar at 2N miles. Spent next two hours chocking and tuning 3D and 5D radars on Antalyan. Having spent the last eleven days submerged with very hot weather, decided to move out on Salina-Batran route, about 150 miles from Salina, and spend two days on the surface on trawls which had previously produced sinkings for the HALE.

June 1, 1943
(Unknown)
HALE's first birthday anniversary. Celebrated with "shipping over chow". Editorial staff issued special edition of "HALE TRISHA" commemorating HALE's three and one-half year patrols during which time she sunk or damaged 13 ships, a total of 97,991 tons, in only 41 days on station. Patrol led on surface on Breguet-Salpin routes 165 miles northwest of Salina.

June 2, 1943
0700 (K)
Set course for Guana, underway on the surface.

June 3, 1943
0510 (K)
Submerged 18 miles northwest of Guana. Closed Port Apra and spent day sinking observations of the harbor. Same two ships still at anchor in same position. Solider they must both be damaged, otherwise cannot understand why they would spend so much time in this place. Nothing else sighted except the usual sunken patrol.

1944 (K)
Surface 12 miles off harbor and set course to pass between Rota and Guana for surface patrol of Empire-Truk route.

— page 100 —
1943
(KING) Underway on surface striding to the eastward.

June 5, 1943
0.33(K) On surfacing, following daily trials drive, bow plane's shoes plan broke while rigging planes in.

0522(K) Completed repairs to bow planes.

1230(K) Petroling on surface on destroyer-truck route - No. 2 periscope was sighted mast and dingy posts of large ship bearing 3320' distance about 17 miles. Downwind and around run on four engines.

1232(K) Ditto getting up speed and swinging light, officer-of-the-deck and lookout sighted and positively identified a periscope about four thousand yards on the port beam - Glancy sea - 'Astrid' and feather distinguished. Periscope disappeared. Continued swing putting periscope astern - no torpedo wake sighted. If we had not sighted the large ship on the horizon we would have walked into a perfect setup. To warn them about 550 miles west of Suisan, 420 miles from Truk exactly on the trade route.

1320(K) Having gained positive about of target on what we believed to be the reverse of his huge course (1680) submerged for aye-reech. It was soon apparent that our estimate of target's base course was greatly in error, or he had changed base course to the right; the latter was the most probable, since a careful plot had been made prior to diving.

1457(K) Abandoned approach having run at the third speed since 1310(K) and been unable to close track to within 7,000 yards. Positively identified target as the H.M.S. KING'S class steamer 'Tahiti'. 15,650 tons displacement. Sighted best of escort vessel trailing astern but was never able to get a look at it.

1529(K) Ditto target about 15 miles to southwest, surfaced and began east around run.

1604(K) Regained sight contact - base course plotted at about 1880', speed 15 knots.

— page 101 —
1943 Craft:
1825(K) Sunset - commenced closing target radiolally to westward.

1940(K) Nade radar contact at 13,750 yards bearing 2550°.

2145(K) Completed comprehensive pilot of target's air sig seg plan - haze course at sunset had changed to 1330°, epicod 15 knots, position of escort still uncertain but very close to target. Frequent rain squalls - black night.

2150(K) Battersight to 42 feet and headed towards target.

2205(K) Changed course right for a 90° port track - storm shots.

2206(K) As visibility increased slightly and target range was 4,000 yards went to 60 feet and tracked target by sound. Sound bearings were erratic. Target and escort were apparently very close together and the sounders, though very experienced, seemed to be shifting from one to the other. Unusually, definitively, to pick up target in either periscope - horizon pitch-black again. When track angles become arced escort was determined to be on the close bow of the target. Finally, "Sound" settled on the target's screen but they commenced to blend in with our own theory making an exact analysis difficult. Using a track angle of 1350°, gyro angle 30° left, at

22-10-35(K) Fired 1st torpedo spread 2° left.

22-10-45(K) Fired 2nd torpedo spread 2° right.

22-10-56(K) Fired 3rd torpedo spread 6° left.

22-11-04(K) Fired 4th torpedo spread 6° right.

22-12-35(K) Torpedo explosion - sighted large orange flash on target's bearing through periscope. First hit.

22-12-44(K) Explosion - sighted second flash, and torpedo hit.

22-12-59(K) Explosion - sighted flash, 4th torpedo hit. 3rd torpedo must have passed ray ahead. The actual torpedo run of 3,500 yards was about 700 yards beyond the predifited run. This range error can be called out the large offset used thus providing three very lucky torpedo hits. Target's screens stopped instantly and were never heard again.

— page 102 —
1943
2216(K)  Heard transoceanic rumblings explosions from target - probably with gasolino and bombs followed by what sounded like torpedoes. Still unable to see anything.

2217(K)  Escort was running wild. Hooded towards us so we must dodge.

2237(K)  Small explosions - "founded" reported rumbling noises from direction of target.

2240(K)  Depth charge above than the last. Noted a 40° temperature gradient from 250 to 300 feet. We were still protected by this. - Escort now at a distance of 1,000 yards.

2246(K)  Nothing more heard from target - feel convinced that he could not have witnessed 3 torpedo hits. Believe he sank about 26 minutes after first hit. Escort's search failed out.

2355(K)  Surfaced. Nothing in sight. But course to westward at best speed.

June 6, 1943
(KING)  Patrols on surface to westward.

June 7, 1943
0428(K)  Submerged 13 miles north of Saipan and commenced periscope of Saipan-Daprio routes.

1945(K)  Surfaced and patrolled to northmost of Saipan on Empire route.

June 8, 1943
0428(K)  Submerged 15 miles northwest of Saipan and closed harbor for observations. Patrols on north and south line five miles off harbor entrance. No ships in harbor.

0205(K)  Sighted scout observation seaplane.

1055(K)  Sighted train engine land, based bomber.

1257(K)  Sighted 400 ton trailer type patrol vessel off entrance.

— page 103 —
1943 Conti
1425(K) - Sighted four engine machine.

1955(K) - Surfaced. Set course, at beat speed for Engire-Truk route, through the Mariana, southeast of Seipan.

June 9, 1943
KING - Patrolling on surface, base course 1340T. Frequent rain squalls sometimes reducing visibility to zero.

1530(K) - Sighted smoke on horizon, distance about 14 miles, bearing 2320T. Closed and sighted masts and king posts of two large freighter, unable to locate sea-court. Commended end-court on four engines hoping to be able to get attack in prior to sunset.

1830(K) - Sunset. Gained position 16 miles ahead on estimated base course of convoy. With only about 45 minutes of daylight remaining, were afraid to close for attack because it was expected that the convoy would change base course at the end of evening twilight. We did not have sufficient fuel remaining for another high speed run for a second chance. Base course at that time was about 1650T.

1844(K) - Still tracking from ahead - convoy changed base course to left to about 1450T. Closed on enemy bearing to gain radar contact. One freighter making near.

1942(K) - Made radar contact at 15,400 yards. Commenced plot to determine exact zig zag plan. Convoy was found to be steering 1800 for 10 minutes then 1300 for 24 minutes and report.

2105(K) - Sighted convoy from bridge, consisting of the two large freighters about 800 - 1,000 yards ahead of each other with the escort ahead and between them. Submerged to 42 feet and changed course to close.

2120(K) - ROGINED radar contact at 7,250 yards and sighted smoke through No. 1 periscope.

2132(K) - Lost targets in periscope but maintained accurate radar plot on left had freighter - one right for a 900 starboard track, target then being on the left leg of his zig.

— page 104 —
1943 (Cont'd)
214(K) - Went to 54 feet, TDC solution considered excellent.
2136(K) - Sighted right hand target through No. 1 periscope.
2142(K) - Plot reported only four minutes to go until the next zig to the right, so we swung left to fire a 100-last gyro aghs on a 70° starboard track.
21-46-25(K) - Fired first torpedo to hit.
21-48-40(K) - Fired second torpedo spread 30 right.
21-46-55(K) - Fired third torpedo spread 30 left.
21-47-00(K) - Shirted to second fighter.
21-48-05(K) - Explosion - First torpedo hit.
21-48-12(K) - Explosion - Second torpedo hit.
21-48-40(K) - Second fighter, which was slightly to the left of the first target and about 900 yards along, had commenced zig to the right. With a 40° to 20° degree starboard track at
21-48-55(K) - Fired fourth torpedo to hit.
21-49-11(K) - Fired fifth torpedo spread 30 right.
21-49-28(K) - Fired sixth torpedo spread 30 left.
21-49-34(K) - Right full rudder, all ahead full. Angle on the bow of 2nd freighter about 100 starboard. Target must have passed down between the fourth and sixth torpedo tracks.
21-51-50(K) - Tremulous explosion from first ship followed by two more explosions. It is believed that one or more of the last three torpedoes aimed at the second freighter hit the first freighter already damaged. They were very close together in bearing. Sporadic gunfire, not close. Continued turning hard right. 2nd freighter passed about four hundred yards astern still turning to her right. She steadied on 270° presenting about a 150° track. We checked our swing on 120° and at.

— page 105 —
21-52-38(K) - Fired tube No. 7 to hit.
21-52-42(E) - Sorens heard coming in fast on starboard bow at started deep. We were at 50 feet, using No. 1 periscope.
21-52-46(K) - Fired tube No. 8 exposed 60 right.
21-52-54(K) - Fired tube No. 10 opened 60 left.
21-54-00(K) - Sorens passed to starboard.
21-54-38(K) - Heavy torpedo explosion astern.
21-54-48(K) - Second explosion. Probable second hit.
21-58-48(K) - Another deep rumbling explosion which sounded like an internal explosion with the usual accompanying water noises of a ship breaking up.

21-59-10(K) - There then followed a series of six or more explosions of varying intensities and descriptions. They occurred over a period of about one minute and it was impossible to tell what they were. Some of them might have been gunfire, depth charges, internal explosions or anything else, however, all hands were of the opinion that at no time did they actually think they heard what sounded like a depth charge. None of the explosions were close. The escort never was identified. For the next three quarters of an hour scores were heard all around us. There were at least six different scores located on various bearings. Most of them sounded like motor launches. The escort's reports which were fairly clearly circled around us a number of times and twice passed directly overhead but dropped no depth charges. WHILE commanded to open out to the westward.

2244(K) - Heard one deep muffled rumbling explosion quite far off. There was no preceding detonation click.

2252(K) - Heard escort's scores fading out, bearing 100°F.

2330(K) - Nothing more heard on sound gear so surfaced. Careful radar search revealed nothing, too black to see. Having only 27,000 gallons of fuel remaining, set course for Midway - sight torpedoes remaining.

— page 106 —
1943, 1st patrol of fourth patrol, U.S.S. HALIBURGH, 8,572 tons and 1,000 tons of torpedoes, 7,520 tons. The first freighter, XAO, was definitely hit by two or probably by four torpedoes, but at 16 feet. The second freighter, AAGISHA, was definitely hit by two and probably two TIRTs, hands set at 16 feet.

June 10 - 13, 1943.
- Aneruoto, Midway.

June 14, 1943.
0453(L) - SB radar contact at about miles closing rapidly. Submerged. Position 180 miles N of Wake Island.

1933(L) - Surfboard and continued aneruoto Highway.

June 16, 1943.
1000(Y) - Arrived approximately fifteen miles off Midway. Unable to locate island due to storm, zero to 5000 yards visibility all day. Received radio bearings from Midway and finally obtained 5Y radar range of 22,000 yards on island at dusk.

June 17, 1943.
0500(Y) - Entered Midway lagoon. Fuel on board 3000 gallons. Fueled. Removed 4"-50 cal gun and all 4" ammunition.

1300(Y) - Departed for Pearl Harbor.

June 19, 1943.
0505(X) - Sighted and passed U.S.S. RAGUUS and escort at range of about nine miles. To signals unchanged. Bolioye no more not sighted.

June 21, 1943.
Arrived Pearl Harbor.

— page 108 —
1. May 15 19-23H 146-168 1st off Guantanamo
   0922(1) 166-168 1st off Guantanamo
    Jako 1st off the net
   1st off the net

2. May 22 14-44.31 1st off Sulu, anchored just west of Tora 2t, 3stair to 1st off Tora 2t, 3stair to

— page 109 —
1. SUBJECT: U.S.S. WAVE - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

PART V: CONTACTS (CONT'D)
Line    Initial Min. Estimated
No. Date Position Description    Range    Course

14. June 5 16-20 Nests & King Packs of
    12-20(1)151-26E large ship bearing 332T:3400 24000 180T &
    H.I.J.M.S. KAHARA.
    Att gunshot
    at gunshot
    133T.

15. June 15 16-20 Shipyard torpedo
    1232(1)151-20S designated, insufficient.

16. June 19 16-20 Shipyard torpedo
    15-30(1)146-49E of two large freighters 28000
    bearing 232T - RADIO HARD
    and AMIGASAN MABU.
    Both believed sunk.

17. June 8 15-16
    1257(1)145-34.9B type patrol vessel, off entrance.
    Tampan Harbor, Singapore.

18. June 9 18-16, 20
    15-30(1)146-49E of two large freighters 28000
    bearing 232T - RADIO HARD
    and AMIGASAN MABU.
    Both believed sunk.

PART VI - ALTORATUS CONTACTS
Line    No. Date Position Description

1. May 15 19-29 KAHARA
    0720(1)166-162

2. May 16 19-10.7B Large Flying boat, 16 miles.
    0520(1) 167-03.22

3. May 16 05-10B Large flying boat, 10 miles.

4. May 16 05-10B Large flying boat, 10 miles.

5. May 16 07-15B Large flying boat, 15 miles.

6. May 16 09-12B Radar contact at 29 miles.

- 22 - SIGNATURE (A).

— page 110 —
1. U.S.S. YELLOW - Report of Patrol

PART VI - AIRPORT CONTACTS (CONT'D)

The
Date: Position Description

7. Lay 16 19-18:7H Sighted, light of several Liberator bombers, bombs, 0935(1)167-03.2m in 020°d distance 27 miles ahead for takeoff.
8. Lay 16 19-18:5H Sighted Liberator (seven) fighter operated 1021(1)167-06 with 5-7o meters in hot pursuit.
9. Lay 16 19-15.8H Radar contact 7 miles, TAPE bombed by plane.
10. Lay 16 1037(1)167-12.2m sighted aircraft 15-15 miles, unidentified.
11. Lay 16 16-52.8H Sighted aircraft 10-12 miles, unidentified.
12. Lay 22 14-44.3H One float type zero sighted through port-close.
13. Lay 25 14-57.6H Sighted one aircraft located as MANHUNT, 0754(1)145-46.5 type 97.
14. Lay 23 0814(1)165-95.
15. Lay 23 0813(1)165-95.
16. Lay 23 0813(1)165-95.
17. Lay 23 0813(1)165-95.
18. Lay 23 0813(1)165-95.
19. June 15-14.3H Sighted scout observation seaplane, 0805(1)145-35.
20. June 8 15-15.8H Sighted with one land based bomber, 1655(1)145-31.
21. June 8 15-12H Sighted 4 engine flying boat.
22. June 14 21-55H Radar contact 6 miles closing rapidly, 150 miles 0453(1)165-00. Station Fok. Not sighted.

- 29 - [HOLOGRAM (A).]

— page 113 —
35.5, 12N, 125-45E
Serial: 239/
Subject: U.S.S. WHALE Report of Fourth Patrol.

PART VIII - A/S INQUIRIES

Anti-submarine measures encountered on this patrol were unusually mild. In four attacks three were made against targets accompanied by escort vessels. None of the escort vessels were identified as to type. They were never bested to echo range. All attacks were made at night due to water undetected by the escorts before and after firing. Two depth charges were dropped and none of them were within a thousand yards.

All four targets attacked zig zagged ridiculously, but with a good margin. Plot at night this disadvantage was reduced to a minimum. All targets inside a change of at least 20° in bass course to the east of enemy bearing. In the case of our first target a change of bass course of 62° was made after dark.

In the last two attacks against two escorted fighters in which both were hit and probably sunk, about five or six motor launches were heard. This led us to believe that the escort did not drop any depth charges for fear of killing people in the water who were being picked up by the launches.

The Navy aircraft contacts rate more in number than we previously encountered. On May 18th we saw several to be forced down 45 miles from nearest Jap base, Brest, Brittany, Pasalong, Malinlind. It still the spot. In the Malinlind patrols, while we have stayed on the surface unmolested on three patrols within 150 miles of bunk, Saipan etc. we always got forced down if not bombed while going by plane. It was very discouraging to be forced down before patrols 180 miles of Malinlind while returning to Manila, abandoning the only safe place near in the thousands in on the thirty miles of enemy shore they never expect to find you. At least it is our opportunity. And, once to think of it, no more bombed shore, too.

PART IX - MAJOR DEPOTES

1. 35 Radar Motor Generator.
   The field firing in the motor of the 35 Radar Motor Generator started out due to excessive starting current as a result of salt-encrusted starting resistance. Bruises and bearings had to be removed, the anti-aircraft work taking 3 days. During this period the AC supply to the 35 Radar was taken from the IC board.

2. High Pressure Air Compressor.
   The starter high pressure air compressor was put out of commission due to an undetected water leak between fourth stage head and fourth stage shell allowing water to lock down fourth stage shell to joint between fourth stage and...

— page 114 —
35, 12N, 125, 45E
Serial: 239
Subject: U.S.S. THALES - Report of Fourth Int. Patrol.

PART II: MAJOR DISPATCHES

2. High Pressure Air Compressor Field:
   - Third stage shock and exhaust air inlet. From there it was drawn up into first stage suction chambers into the machine and formed salt cakes.

   Two ring-worm found to be broken in the fourth stage and all rings were badly worn.

   The port high pressure air compressor was temporarily out of commission when the third stage cooler broke. It was found to be full of small pin-point balls and the breakers holding it had collapsed. The highly corrosive characteristic of worn injection temperatures, 84°F, undoubtedly was one of the major factor causing this defect. A spare cooler was installed and compressor placed back in commission.

   Due to the above defects and the large number of hours (750) on these Hardie Type Compressors, a major overhaul during this refit is imperative.

3. Hydraulic Plant:
   - The air and oil sides of the hydraulic accumulator were repacked by the tender during the last refit, after three days of continuous operations the accumulator began to thump, upon surging and discharging. This faulty operating mechanism was repaired by the U.S. Submarine Base, Midway.

   Two defects were found to be the cause of the trouble. (1) The sealing rings were left out, and the packing was not sealed prior to installation. After several days' operation the packing became tight. (2) The packing had been set too tight in the first place due to the lack of sealing rings.

4. Forward Torpedo Tube Shutters:
   - Most the forward torpedo tubes shutters are in the open position a loud rattling noise may be heard. It is believed that this may be caused by one of the following. (1) Either or both the vertical and horizontal rollers are damaged. (2) The roller tracks have become damaged or warped. (3) The bailing holding the pine which attach the shutters to the outer and inner walls of the torpedo tubes.

   Since commissioning the shutter rollers have increased as much as 21/16". It is urgently recommended that steps be taken during the current refit to return the clearances to their original values.

- 27 -

INCLUSION (A)

— page 115 —
U.S.S. HALE - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

PART X - RADIO RECEPTION AND RADAR

During this patrol radio reception was good. This was largely due to the excellent condition of material. A little difficulty was experienced in transmitting on 4235 Kcs, due to another submarine, several shore stations, and two Japanese transmitters at the same time. After shifting to 870 Kcs, transmission was made without trouble. While transmitting to Oahu, 15 on June 15, difficulty was encountered in clearing a message through Radio Midway although contact was made within one minute of the first transmission and the transmission of the message completed in 10 minutes. It was necessary for us to remain in contact for another hour while NQJ requested "repeater". NQJ insisted that our callsigns were incorrectly encrypted and that questioned the call signs used. Inasmuch as the call signs had been checked and rechecked at least 10 times, it is believed that poor radio procedure on the part of NQJ caused the delay. During this time, we were subject to enemy pingings. This could have been avoided if the message had been received for and the text broken.

Last consecutive serial received - SubPac 102 Zebra.

Last consecutive serial sent - 2

Serial 45 was not received but was obtained from USS SPRAY.

CDR RADAR

During this patrol the performance of the SD Radar was only fair, apparently due to a lack of sensitivity. The equipment could not be relied upon at a range greater than 11,000 yards even on large enemy fighters. Towards the latter part of the patrol a slight interference was noted on the radar screen and was promptly erased by the blower motors in the transmitter.

SD RADAR

The performance of the SD Radar during the first part of the patrol was excellent, however toward the latter part it was only fair, being reliable only at relatively short ranges. It was frequently unstable when more than 7 million per second were drawn by the transmitter.

Interference encountered - The TH. blower motor caused large masses of "grass" to sweep across the screen, and while transmitting on the TH. the "SD" was practically useless. Raising and lowering

— page 116 —
U.S.S. HALE - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

SD R.D.R. (Cont'd)

the periscope and operation of the "SJ" caused "picket fences" to appear on the screen. The control room bell was found to be the cause of additionall interference. Sparking at the brushes on the constant-frequency generator in the pump-room caused a large mass of "grasse" to swoop across the screen at fifteen second intervals. This interference was eliminated by replacing the armature of the constant-frequency generator. The transmitter still doubled-pulsed at more than 7 milliamperes. We therefore concluded that the antenna was acting abnormally at the most head. Since we were on station and submerged during the daylight hours, no stcpe were taken to remedy this situation and the transmitter was operated at reduced power.

PART XI - SOUND CONDITIONS & DENSITY LAYERS

Sound conditions were found to be same as previously reported in this area. Close to the bench conditions were only fair, improving considerably when elzen of land. Screws were picked up at a maximum range of 7500 yards and although no echo ranges were attempted outside of 2400 yards, excellent results were obtained within this range.

The bathythorograph instilled last refit elded in detecting density layers on two occasions when evasive tactics were employed. After the last attack a density layer with a four degrees temperature gradient from 250 to 300 feet was encountered. This however did not hinder our ability to pick up the excort's screws. It is believed that a bathythorograph which can be used to at least 400 feet would be of considerably more benefit than the present one installed which registers to only 250 feet.

PART XII - HEIJNE AND HABITABILITY

The health of the crew was excellent throughout the patrol.

Although the water was quite hot the habitability of the boat was generally good despite prolonged submerged operations off herbers. The on-going deficiency which stands out and requires immediate correction is the installation of an air conditioning unit in the conning tower. The efficiency of the control party during an approach is greatly hampered by the crowded and overheated conditions which exist. It is urgently recommended that definite steps be taken to insure the procurement and installation of a suitable air conditioning unit in the conning tower during this current refit.

— page 117 —
U.S.S. HELLFISH - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

PART XII - HEALTH AND HABITABILITY (CONT'D)

It is considered highly desirable that an ice open freezer of the 10 gallon capacity type be installed on board this vessel.

PART XIII - STRIKES

Pearl Harbor to Winooski
Wake to reach
In over
Ahead to Midway
Midway to Pearl Harbor

Total: 1675

PART XIV - FUEL EXPENDED

114,016

PART XV - FACTORS OF DURATION RELATING TO

Torpedoes
Fusil
Provisions (Days)
Periscope (Days)
8
3922
15
10

Fueled at Midway

PART XVI - COVERING SCHOOL NO. FACTOR

Patrol terminated by expenditure of fuel oil.
3,022 gal. remaining on arrival Midway.

30
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 118 —
1. U.S.S. WHALE - Report of Fourth War Patrol

Part VIII - REMARKS

The increase in percentage of torpedo hits obtained on this patrol is indeed gratifying to the WHALE. The performance of all torpedoes fired appeared perfect and the rank of the Torpedo Shop, Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. B. is appreciated. While only one hit was actually scored on the freighter sunk on the night of 25 May, for purposes of torpedo analysis, the third torpedo plots as a hit - the date being due to the fact that the first torpedo stayed the enemy dead in the water and practically upended his. It is believed the WHALE did ascertain better on tonnage on this patrol than on the last - with torpedo expended, three of sixteen vessels twenty-three, respectively.

Again, circumstances dictated night attacks in all cases for the WHALE on this patrol. While this attack technique is not deliberately sought, it is undeniable that it has produced dividends in results. It is, however, a deprivation not to be able to get pictures and, where there are escorts, in the case of bad visibility, the submarine is precluded from staying at periscope depth and taking further advantage of any camouflages on the part of the escort. Again, too, these night attacks served to further impress me with the fact that No. 1 periscope is simply inadequate for the purpose of following up the end of a radar approach. Following a carefully conducted radar approach in which all target data is observed, including all range plans, the perfect MC solution requires only accurate bearings - and in many cases of night visibility it is all too difficult to obtain those with No. 1 periscope. It is again strongly recommended that a large aperture, high light transmission periscope be developed and installed to the end that the maximum effectiveness of the radar approach may be achieved.

In the interior, however, it is again recommended that No. 1 periscope be shifted to the conning tower without delay, since the communication problem between No. 1 periscope and the TDC appears insoluble.

While the WHALE returned to the same area in which she worked on her last patrol, the conditions found were quite dissimilar. This time no large body of shipping was found in Tanapag Harbor. All ports visited in the Marianas, however, gave the impression that only necessary inter-island traffic was moving between them. As a consequence, the WHALE found her targets only after long high speed fuel accounting runs. Attention is invited to this peculiarity of this area - since the WHALE suffered from lack of fuel on both her patrols in area fourteen. Traffic may now east or west of the Marianas through a path.

— page 119 —
1. USS, FRAT = Report of Patrol Patrol.

Part XVII - REMARKS

hundreds of miles wide, and at present the submarine in area fourteen is the only one to work on it in these latitudes. This is emphasized since the THALE entered her area after having expanded approximately ten per cent of her fuel soloy oil the after jet on expenditure over and above that necessary to move the THALE from Midway to the area. That such an occurrence is uncommon, however, is fully understood but it is pointed out to the end that, whenever possible, submarines designed this area may realize that fuel conservation should be a paramount consideration.

It is firmly believed that the ships have learned their lesson with regard to protection of anchored ships. The THALE quite accurately plotted the position of the two ships in Fort Ajar, Oran, by many bearings taken next and south of the harbor and it was clear that, while the temptation was strong, any firing would be merely a waste of torpedoes.

Again, the Commanding Officer can but say that his vessel answered every call made and her official functioning enabled us to gain position ahead of every enemy ship sighted. There were discovered numerous sections, however, numerous defects, which while not so serious as to compel her to impel to vessel's effective action. These included such faults as an open coil in the magnetic brake, an anodized of the bow plane rigging gear, main engine timing gear 5" rate, pit log pump bearings badly worn plus very leaky water seal, dirty lubricating water generators, and faulty oil sound need locking gear. The difficulties inherent in overbuilding a submarine by a crew other than the vessel's own are thoroughly understood and appreciated. Likewise, the hundreds of men hours expended by the tender during a re-fit are now that appreciated. It remains true, however, that if the operating personnel is to have that full and complete confidence necessary in an overhaul crew, the latter must thoroughly and painstakingly fulfill each of its myriad duties. In the failure to properly overhaul the above items the tender sighted the re-fit and used the operating personnel to do work out of proportion to those items mentioned, since confidence was lost generally in the THALE of the accomplished work. This necessitated many hours of checking and inspecting all in addition to the watches required on a war patrol.

Number one parispeco was the first in attacks and was extremely ably handled by Lieutenant Coader, C. L. HARRIS, Jr., U.S.N., The G.O. retained at the Torpedo Data Computer in the conducting tower. Left F. F. JANNEY, U.S. N., the Executive Officer and T.J.S. operator, is especially deserving of the highest commendation for his masterful handling of this heart of our fire control system. The ship, her officers and crew cheerfully and ably met every demand and their work was in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service.

— page 120 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division ONE HUNDRED TWO.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarine Squadron TEN.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE - Fourth War Patrol: Comment on:

1. The Fourth War Patrol of the Whale covered a period of forty four days from date of departure Pearl Harbor until arrival at Midway. Of this period two days were spent on a special mission and twenty one days were spent in the assigned area. Patrol was terminated due to expenditure of fuel. The patrol area was thoroughly covered; contasts were developed in a skillful and determined manner and attacks pressed home. The Whale again used the radar to full advantage in tracking the enemy and gaining attack position.

2. Comments on Attacks:

Attack No. 1. Hey 26: In view of the shipping present in Port Apra, the Commanding Officer's decision to withhold attacks on the AK until it was well clear of the island is considered sound. After losing radar contact a correct analysis of enemy's probable movement enabled contact to be regained and a successful attack carried out. A favorable track and adequate spread were employed, and though it was successful in this case, the torpedo run was too close to the arming and running depth limits. Both ranges obtained before firing corrected a considerable error in estimated range.

3. Attack No. 2. June 5: When submerged attack had to be abandoned, prompt surface to begin and maintain sight contact during daylight and use of radar to track target after dark enabled the ship to gain position for night attack. Three hits were observed out of four torpedoes fired. With a track of 135° and a torpedo run of about 3,000 yards the spread employed would give an excessive coverage at target track. It is probable that target zigged toward submarine after torpedoes were fired.

4. Attacks No. 3. 4 and 14. June 9: These attacks were made on a convoy consisting of two AK's and one escort vessel. Radar was used for tracking and approach until targets were visible in the periscope, attacks were then made using periscope. In attacks No. 3, three torpedoes from bow tubes were fired at first AK identified as the Kano Iaru. Track angle was favorable and the spread gave adequate coverage at enemy track. Two explosions were heard at times which checked closely with estimated torpedo run.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 121 —
785-102/416-3
Seria: 059
Caro of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
June 19, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. WEARE - Fourth Patrol: Comment on:

5. In attack No. 4 three torpedoes from bow tubes were fired at second AK identified as the American Naiu. Torpedoes were fired on a 150 - 20" break at a range of 1,250 yards. Target had already started a zig towards before torpedoes were fired and all missed. Attack No. 4 was a second attack on the same target. Three torpedoes were fired from stern tubes on a 145" break at range of 2,400 yards. The spread of this range was excessive. Two explosions were heard at this incident in torpedo run of about 3,000 yards.

6. Following the attack on June 5th and June 9th when depth charges were not close in, the first instance and no depth charges were dropped in the second instance, it is believed that the ship could have been brought to periscope depth much sooner with the probability that sinkings could have been verified or follow up attacks made in case enemy was only damaged.

7. Torpedo Performance:

Of the 16 torpedoes fired four hits were actually observed and four hits heard at times corresponding closely with estimated torpedo run, for a percentage of 50%. This is well above the average. It is gratifying to note that there were no prior-tures, duds or erratic runs on this patrol.

8. Material:

The table returned from Patrol in very good material condition. She will be refitted at Pearl Harbor and it should be accomplished in the normal period.

9. The Commanding officer, officers and crew of the Whale are congratulated on a well conducted and productive patrol.

— page 122 —
5-10/A16-3/TB5-102
Serial 0100

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To: Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. WEALIE - Fourth Var Patrol - Comments on.

1. The fourth war patrol of the U.S.S. WEALIE was aggressively carried out and good area coverage was obtained.

2. It is noteworthy that every valuable target contacted was successfully attacked. The number of such contacts were few, but the ratio of hits was high, being 9 out of 16 fired for a percentage of 56.3%.

3. Attention is invited to the observations of the Commanding Officer concerning changes in base course following evening twilight in part VIII of the patrol report. Many submarines tracking targets have experienced changes of base course after dark. Such movements should be anticipated.

4. The Commanding Officer's remarks in part XI of the patrol report that the bathymetrographs of a type usable to 400 feet, are concurred in. It is the Squadron Commander's opinion that most density layers exist below 250 feet.

5. Due to insufficient evidence only one sinking can be credited, although it is quite likely that the seaplane tender and at least one other AK sank. Commander Submarine Squadron Ten congratulates the Commanding Officer and personnel on another highly successful patrol during which the following damage was inflicted on the enemy:

SUNK

AK (Hino Naru No. 3 Class) 4391 tons.

DAMAGED

AK (Kanikawa Class) 15650 tons.
AK (Kano Naru Class) 8572 tons.
AK (Nagisan Naru Class) 7620 tons.
Total 31842 tons.

ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 123 —
1. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

Enclosure:
(A) Copy of Subject War Patrol Report.
(B) Copy of Consubudiv 102 Genf. 1tr. PB102/A16-3, Serial 059 of June 19, 1943.
(C) Copy of Consubudiv 10 Conf. 1tr. PC5-10/A16-3/PB102, Serial 0100 of June 19, 1943.

1. The Fourth War Patrol of the WHALE was the second for the Commanding Officer. Once again the WHALE conducted an aggressive and successful patrol.

2. The WHALE carried out excellent area coverage in this extremely large area. Although few contacts available for torpedoes were found, the WHALE was able to capitalize on those that were located. All attacks were made at night, using the radar effectively, and although apparently successful, only two can be credited as sinkings. All attacks were very well conducted.

3. It is noted that the SU radar did not function as efficiently as it should. This should be corrected before departure on the next war patrol. The 250 foot bathythermograph installed in the WHALE at present will be replaced in the near future with the new 450 foot bathythermograph.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew on this successful patrol. The WHALE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

SINK

1 - Froghter (HINO MARU #3 Class) - 4,391 tons
1 - Froghter (KANO MARU Class) - 8,572 tons

TOTAL: 12,963 tons

DAMAGED

1 - Converted Scapane Tender, (KAMIKAWA MARU Class) - 15,650 tons
1 - Froghter (AMIGASAKI MARU Class) - 7,620 tons

TOTAL: 23,270 tons

Distribution and authentication on following page.

C. L. LOCKWOOD, JR.

— page 124 —
12-10/-16-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

Serial 0814
Confidential
GOMBUSPAC PTROL REPORT NO. 202
U.S.S. WHILE - FOURTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. WHILE (SS239) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
VCNO (5)
Ginpec (5)
Ginclant (2)
Gonsublant (6)
S/M School, ML (2)
Comsopec (2)
Comsovepec (1)
Comsubsovepec (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Comsubspace (10)
SUBD, ML (2)
Comsubcomsubpace (2)
Mldwy (2)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Subspace (2)
U.S.S. WHILE (1)
(CONSUBSPEC Endorsement only)
All Submarines, Subspace (1)

R. C. LAVIER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 125 —
SS239/AL6-3
Serial 09
C.O. DECLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. THALES (SS239).
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Commander Suoerarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. THALES (SS239), Report of War Patrol number Five.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track Chart (with Original) for Consubpac only.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the fifth war patrol of this vessel conducted in (1) the vicinity of BONN ISLANDS and (2) in the EAST CHINA SEA during the period 23 July, 1943 to 7 September, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

/s/ A. C. BURROWS

FILMED
SS394

— page 126 —
(A) PROLOGUE
Arrived Pearl Harbor June 21, 1943, from Fourth Air Patrol, commenced refit.
July 11, 1943 - Conducted underwater tests subsequent to refit by U.S.S. GRIPFIN.
July 11-17, 1943 - Continued refit.
July 17-18, 1943 - Training period - fired three exercise torpedoes.
July 18-23, 1943 - Continued refit by U.S.S. GRIPFIN, assisted by Submarine Base.
July 23, 1943 - Underway for Midway. Ship's force continued refit.

(B) NARRATIVE
July 23-26, 1943
(Y) - Enroute Midway, continued refit, held daily training dives, fired 3"50 cal gun, 20 mm and .50's for training.
July 26, 1943
1640(Y) - Sighted mine and sank same by gunfire. (This is the third mine sunk by this vessel while enroute to and from Midway and Pearl.)
July 27, 1943
1300(Y) - Arrived Midway (Delay in arrival ordered by CTG 17.5). Refit continued by U.S.S. SPERRY, (See Para. K - HIJOR DEFECTS).
July 28, 1943
0908(Y) - Completed refit! Departed Midway for patrol area.
August 1, 1943
1055(L) - Sighted mine and sank same by gunfire (position Lat 28-04.2N Long 165-13.2E). Believe it was a Jap mine.
August 4-5, 1943
(K) - Co menaced crossing known Tokyo-Truk shipping lanes so spent two days patrolling east and west on surface. Stormy weather - heavy seas - poor visibility.
August 5, 1943
0835(K) - Very heavy seas. Wave came over and covered whole bridge structure, a large amount of water was taken in to the conning tower and thence down to control room and pump room. Closed lower conning tower hatch and completely flooded conning tower bilges to floor plates. Later splashing against gyro panel grounded-out gyro, also ground-load-out turbo blower starting panels in blower room. Repairs affected in about two hours. Consider ourselves very fortunate in view of what might have happened. S.J. radar very luckily escaped drenching in conning tower.

— page 127 —
1152(K) - S.S. radar contact at 24 miles coming in fast. Submerged. Plane no sighted.

1125(K) - Surfaced.

Heavy seas continued. Headed southwest, with the sea, for a point 120 miles south east of QASARATA GUNTO on another known shipping lane. Developed large battery ground positive 220V, negative 120V, discovered pounding in heavy seas had cracked more battery jars, bringing our total to ten cells forward and thirteen aft. Jumped out two more cells forward and aft. Cleaned all cell tops, pumped wells, etc., and reduced ground to positive 180V, negative 70V. This is the first time since she was built that the HAILE has experienced any really heavy seas, but the experience served to reveal the defective character of the steel-insert cell jars installed in this vessel.

August 7, 1943
0940(K) - Sighted HINAI SHIA RETTO, bearing north, distant 20 miles by S.D. radar. Headed SSE on route to SAIPAN.

2335(K) - Sea subsided. Headed back to the northeast to cover TOKYO-TRUK lane to eastward of BONINS.

August 8, 1943
0555(K) - Upon surfacing after trim dive discovered S.D. radar was out of commission. Since we were then about 135 miles from OASATARA CHUTO and on air-patrolled traffic lanes, decided to dive until S.D. was repaired and torpedoes routed.

0645(K) - Periscope watch sighted large freighter and destroyer escort bearing 1890T, range about 7000 yards, angle on the bow 150 port. Target immediately zigged loft, presenting an angle on the bow of about 450 stbd. Swing loft for a 1250 stbd track at high speed to close target.

0653(K) - Target range 2500 yards, escort on starboard quarter. Target zigged twice and ended up in a perfect firing position for us, 1100 yards range, 900 stbd track. When about to fire spread of straight bow side fwd gyro regulator failed. Shifted to hand operation of gyro regulator and at

0657(K) - Fired three torpedoes, spread 10 with a 1150 stbd track, 170- right gyro angle, torpedo run 1200 yards.

0657-57(K) - Explosion. Torpedo fired to pass ahead hit about 50 foot aft stack. Estimated target speed about 14 kts, actual spec about

— page 128 —
1943 Cont'd
0657-57(K) - 15 to 16 kts. Target stopped dead in its track, listed to starboard and started down by the stern, bow rising about 5 feet clear of the water.

0658(K) - Shifted set-up to destroyer, which was about 1000 yards, bearing about 1650 (R) from freighter. Just when we were about to fire on destroyer she speeded up and turned sharply to port and started down instead of up the torpedoes! tracks thus presenting about 1600 starboard track angle. We had fired down-sun and down-wind with fairly heavy white caps. Our position was never detected, so remained at periscope depth throughout. Freighter did not appear to be sinking fast enough so at

0704(K) - Fired one torpedo which hit about anchiships - Target started to sink faster. Took pictures. The crew, which had fallen in at quarters in whites began to abandon ship in a smart, military manner. There were about three or four hundred men, however only the starboard life boats were lowered. Believe the remainder took to reefs. In the meantime the destroyer continued to search to the westward of us chaining course and speed constantly thus precluding any possibility of a shot at him. He dropped about 8 depth charges which sounded louder than the torpedo hits. Had we not been able to match him we would have thought they were within five hundred yards. Believe the daps are now using a much heavier depth charge.

0730(K) - Freighter's bow raised to an angle of about 50° and then, stern first, she headed for the bottom. WHALE remained within 1000 yards of reef until the sinking. Loud breaking-up rotes and internal explosions heard through hull and sound gear. Commented opening range to the eastward raking occasional observations of destroyer, which was still casing metal about.

0830(K) - Decided it was time for the arrival of aircraft so cropped down to 120 feet. Up until this time the destroyer made no attempt to pick up survivors and never came within 2000 yards of the scene of the sinking.

0852(K) - Heavy distant explosion - probably an aircraft bomb.

0855(K) - Distant heavy explosion.

0947(K) - Distant heavy explosion.

The destroyer was identified as belonging to the two-stark ANTIATL CLASS. The freighter resembled in all respects the "HOSEN LAPD" of 9600 tons, (No. 35 in "Recognition of Japanese Leychamons" of February 12, 1942). It is a 10,000 ton vessel had been converted to a naval auxiliary.

— page 129 —
1939(K) - Surtaced and stood to northeast to patrol eastern TOKYO-TRUK routes. Continued work in an effort to reduce battery ground.

August 9-10, 1943
(K) - Made surface patrol of eastern TOKYO-TRUK routes.

August 11, 1943
(K) - Returned westward for surface patrol of TRUK routes close to BONINS.

1914(K) - Heard 4 or 5 distant explosions, lay have been volcanic disturbances or distant depth charges. Nothing in sight.

2000(K) - Surfaced.

2200(K) - Received Consubpacific dispatch giving option on remaining in present area or proceeding to a new operating area. Acknowledged same and heeded for East China Sea.

August 15, 1943
1025(I) - Sighted SUNAKOSE JIMA of the NAISEI SHOJO.

1120(I) - Submerged to remain undetected prior to entering CHINA SEA. Decided to enter south of AKUSHAI JIMA.

2007(I) - Surfaced in night, full moonlight - circles sky, flat calm sea, unlimited visibility.

2100(I) - Sighted large darkness astern bow about 7 miles ahead, midway between USSEKI JIMA and KODAKA SHIMA. Continued to close to see what move he would make in hope to avoid run around him. Sighted flashing red light to starboard. Identified four more patrol boats closing in from the north - all signalize by flashing red light. We came about 10-15 miles from the coast. When out of sight of patrol, changed course to south westward to outflank patrols and enter south of KODAKA JIMA. The patrols were alert, however, and had anticipated our move. Before we could get through they had got to close to us. They were easily spotted because of the red lights. The two largest vessels, which resembled our PC class, tried to close but had no trouble leaving them astern at nineteen knots. Decided we could never get through on the surface in this vicinity so after losing sight of the patrols headed northeast parallel to TOKARA GUNTO.

— page 130 —
1957(I) - Surface seven miles from SHIMA Light having spent fifteen hours at 76 rpm in making good but eighteen miles. These narrow passes are definitely not recommended for west-bound submerged passage.

August 17-18, 1943
(I) - Conducted submerged patrol on direct line from VHF DIEEN SHIIT to SHIMA. No contacts. Sea glassy flat.

August 19, 1943
(I) - Conducted submerged patrol off SHIMA Light, DIEEN GUNTO. No contacts. Sea slowly changing from a dead, flat calm to rough. Barometer falling rapidly. Sky has an extremely ominous appearance. Typhoon is certainly in the making.

August 20-23
(I) - It has arrived. It must try, though of the East China Sea, as predicted by Bowditch, the realistic pilot and such other aids available, is upon the HALE. Rolled submerged at 140 feet during daytime but had to head into mountainous sea at night. Cracked battery jars reached fifty-six. (For details see Para K). After surfacing the night of the 21st, a wave came over and flooded the conning tower to above the dock plating - got lower hatch closed just in time, however, but both portsecoo walls were flooded. Flooded both main and hull industries in effort to get an engine started. Closed induction immediately but the damage had been done. Grounded out two main generators and the auxiliary generator. Rifles were completely flooded in both engine rooms. Hull supply line carried water into all compartments, including after battery well but chlorine was overtaxed. Water started towards main control cubicle but an alert electrician's note closed bulkhead flapper prior to starting a fire. After was taken in radio-shock. Numerous small electrical fires were started throughout the ship but were quickly brought under control. Main storage battery gravity low with full voltage grounds forward end aft. Unable to charge. Barometer 29.12", wind velocity 50 kts at times reaching full gale force. The rain was heavy and unrelenting and struck the watch with almost bullet-like force. The mountainous seas made it

— page 131 —
1943

August 23, 1943

2243(I) - Position 20 miles west of Alsharkhi SHINA - Radar contact at 9000 yards. Night dark, clear a'noppiro. Pips indicated convoy. Tracked convoy, gained position ahead. Determined enemy headed for KASSAKI.

August 24, 1943

0111(I) - Submerged to 42 feet at range of 13000 yards - lost radar contact.

0134(I) - Rejoined radar contact at 7400 yards. Plan was to fire salvo of bow tubes then turn and fire stern tubes from the cannon (westron) flank.

0142(I) - Continued tracking-in convoy. Flot showed 4.12 to 2000 yards to west of its track, when we suddenly received a range and bearing which placed us directly on the track of at least one ship of the convoy. Known was up but clouds air-crad visibility constantly. Unable as yet to see through periscope. At 4000 yards range went to 55 foot and continued tracking horizontally screens by sound. He were then forced to turn right and open distance to track to westward for stern shots.

0151(I) - On course for 900 port track, finally sighted large, loaded tanker estimated range 2400 yards.

0155-29(I) - Fired a salvo of four torpedoes with periscope bearing - spread 30 between torpedoes. Landed last sight of target - heard scores of sound ship to left of tanker, also scores astern and beyond tanker - tracked torpedoes out - all running normally. Swung hard-right to bring bow tubes to bear, and at

0156-42(I) - Explosion corresponding to torpedo run of 1800 yards.

0158-40(I) - Explosion corresponding to torpedo run of 3200 yards.

0200-50(I) - Explosion.

0201-08(I) - Explosion - The origin of these last two explosions is unknown. They sounded identical to two first two explosions which are claimed to be hits on two different ships. There is a possibility that the last two torpedoes exploded at the on of their run or they may

— page 132 —
U.S.S. THALE - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

---

**August 25, 1943**

**0105(I) - Surfaced. Completed passage thru strait and shepcd course for INDIAY.**

**0455(I) - Skimmered.**

**1902(I) - Surfaced.**

— page 133 —
25, 1943
2251(I) - Transmitted our serial T.O to Commupec.

: 25, 1943
0244(I) - Radar contact at 15,750 yards - three distinctships. Commenced end-around run on four engines. Tracked targets on course 330°, speed 9.5 kts. Hoped to gain position ahead for attack just after dawn.

: 15(I) - Targets changed base course to 010°. Since but forty-five minutes of darkness remained, all red course to right radically to gain position ahead - taking advantage of poor visibility.

: 58(I) - Submerged 2000 yards to west of targets' track and commenced closing. Visibility poor, frequent rain squalls.

: 10(I) - Sighted destroyer escort by heavy smoke. Range about 8500 yards with angle on the bow of about 5° port.

: 13(I) - Sighted large AK about 3000 yards on port quarter of destroyer.

: 21(I) - We were then in excellent position to make an attack on both the destroyer and the AK - using storm and bow tubes - so swung right to course for a 90° port track on the destroyer. Sighted second large AK stern of first, the latter leaving an angle on the bow of about 30° stabd., range about 3500 yards.

: 27(I) - With a 90° port track, estimated range 1700 yards, straight stern shots, fired a salvo of three torpedoes at destroyer - spread 2°, almost instantly destroyer commenced backing full so at

: 28(I) - Fired fourth stern shot using 3½ kts. target speed, DC tracking noon with continuous guriscover bearings. Destroyer continued to back, then swung hard left. Torpedo depth sections used - 7 feet, sea - calm. Sighted setup to large AK. It had zigged right - presenting a zero angle on the bow. To turned hard left and observed destroyer coming down torpedo tracks - also with a zero angle on the bow.

: 28(I) - Destroyer was showing three or more lights and was just two-blocking signal flag (not identified) on steerboard yard arm. Sent deep as DD headed for us with a bone in his teeth.

: 33(I) - Five close depth charges dropped, shaking HMS considerably, but all were above us. The fact that we were dead ahead of the AKs, and headed towards them, probably hampered the DD and thus decreased the effectiveness of this attack. Found good density layer at 200 feet but continued deeper. Destroyer was unable to pick us up again although we could hear him milling about.

— page 134 —
0835(I) - Hound sound of distant explosions - probably aerial bombs.

: 1854(I) - Surfaced and continued towards HUDAY.

: 1437(I) - Passing through DOLINS between TORI SHII and SUISU SHINA sighted sampan under sail. Passed clear to southward.

: 1207(K) - Sighted type 97 flying boat. Submarines: D. Position: 600 miles to HUDAY, 630 miles to EMPIRE.

: 1518(K) - Surfaced.

: 0057(K) - Transmitted our serial THUG to Consubmarine.

: 1400(Y) - Arrived MIDAY.

— page 135 —
1. U.S.S. WHITE - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

September 3, 1943
1530(T) - Departed IIDAY for PEARL.

September 6, 1943
1230(X) - Sighted U.S.S. JACK on opposite course. Excavated calls etc.
First sighted JACK through periscope hull cow by engine smoke
at a distance of about twelve miles, then sighted top of
periscope shears.

September 7, 1943
1000(T) - Arrived PEARL.

— page 136 —
5.5.5. H.I.E. - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

(C) NEITHER

The typhoon encountered by the H.I.E. was of class IIIId as listed in Lowditch, revised edition, 1936, page 286.

The b.rc.rotor's minimum reading was 29.12", however, the average racing throughout the disturbance was 29.24".

At the beginning of the typhoon the direction of the wind was from the southeast, force about four and the direction of the sea was from northeast. After twenty-four hours the wind shifted to the northeast. The velocity had reached a steady force of about ten, accompanied by frequent gusts of force twelve. The H.I.E. at this time was in the left end or navi.ble semicircle with the center of the storm bearing south southeast and axut sixty to one hundred miles off the storm's track. This distance off the track is based on the fact that the force of the wind would not have been so great nearer the storm center.

About eighteen hours later the wind shifted to the northwest; and the sea broke around to the north. The force of the wind and sea did not slacken. This shift indicated to us that the storm center had now moved to the east northeast. During the final stage of the typhoon the wind shifted to west by south indicating that the storm center was to the north and passing clear. It was at this time, however, that the maximum force of the typhoon was experienced.

During three fourths of the typhoon the H.I.E. was able to maintain radar contact on DAHO CUNTO. Finally, rough seas, bad visibility and unknown currents caused us to lose contact so we stood clear to the south southeast.

Visibility throughout the storm was very poor. It rained continuously and frequently the rain came down in torrents, making it impossible to keep the lookouts on the bridge.

Other than the typhoon no other unusual weather was encountered.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

Conditions were as reported in the various pilot guides. The Japanese current in the East China Sea was found to conform very closely to the current chart.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

During daylight the peaks on the various islands of the NISAI SHOOT provided excellent fixes. At night accurate navigation was done by radar ranges and by ranges on night peaks using both the SD and S.J. r.ers. The only lights sighted were GUL SHIN Light, the 6TH. Light (D.J.O. GUNTO) and H. SAKI Light on KAU ISLAND. The characteristics of these lights were inaccurate with the Light List - including range of visibility. GUL SHIN and H. SAKI Lights were not extinguished following the attack on the convoy the night of the 24th.

— page 139 —
0657(-10) (0704)(-10)
Date: 8 Aug., 1943
Target Data - Distance Inflated

Description:
Target was hit with second torpedo from a spread of three about 1/3 ship's length forward from the stern. It immediately took an angle of about 15° down by the stern. Later one more torpedo was fired and hit just forward of the first. It took an angle of about 50° by the stern and sank.

Ship(s): Suni
FREIGHTER, 9600 tons, KOSHIN NIRU

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk
None

Damage Determined by
Observation, periscope

Target Draft 16 feet
Coursed 260°T
Speed 15-16 kts
Range 1100 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 2.3 kts
Course 260°T
Depth 63 feet
Angle 1/2° Dive

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type attack
S1, P & TDC

| Attack | Type | Attack | Type | Attack |
||------||------||
| Tubes | Fired | # 1 | # 2 | # 3 | # 4 |
| * Track angle - | 112 S | 117 S | 123 S | 115 S |
| * Gyro Angle - | 17 1/5° R | 28°R | 26°R | 24°R |
| * Depth Set - | 12 ft. | 12 ft. | 12 ft. | 12 ft. |
| * Power - | High | High | High | High |
| * Hit or Miss - | Miss | Hit | Miss | Hit |
| * Erratic - | No | No | No | No |
| * Mark - | MKL-iiod.3k | MKL-iiod.3k | MKL-iiod.3k | MKL-iiod.3k |
| * Serial No. - | 23401 | 23474 | 23183 | 23159 |

— page 140 —
U.S.S. THALES - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

(H) TORPEDO ATTACK ONE & ONE (CONT'D)

Tubes Fired # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5

*Actuation Set - Made inoperable electrically

*Actuation Actual - Contact Contact

*Mark Arremed HK. 16 HK. 16 HK. 16 HK. 16

*Serial No. - 9509 6239 5333 9517

*Explosive - Torpex Torpex Torpex Torpex

Piring Interval - 0 13" 13" 0

Type Spread - Divergent 0° 4° 4° 1°

Sea Conditions - Choppy Choppy Choppy Choppy

Overhaul Activity - Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

Remarks - Upon about to fire spread of straight bow shots on first three torpedoes the forward gyro regulator failed. Shifted to hand operation of gyro regulator and fired three torpedoes. The misses on two first and third torpedoes were due to an understatement of speed which resulted in their going astern of target. Spoof estimated at 13-14 kts, actual speed probably 15-16 kts.

The fourth torpedo fired may be considered attack 14 which was on the same ship and given minute after the first was fired. The ship had slowed to about 2.5 knots after being hit by the second torpedo and had changed course to 600°.

U.S.S. THALES (SC239) - TORPEDO ATTACK NO. TWO - PANOL NO. FIVE

Time 0155(I) Date 24 Aug. 1943. 1st. 330-15, 2d. 1290-00. 7th

Description
The approach was made at night just at noonrise with the targets down moon. The visibility was very poor. Just prior to firing we found ourselves only a few hundred yards from the torpedo track. It was necessary to pull away from the track and fire in a hurry. Our aim was so close to the target's track that we explained by the large current setting us to the northeast and towards the target. The current is much more off the target than on the target.

- 14 -

— page 141 —
U.S.S. H.M.I.E. - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

Subject:  TORPEDO ATTACK NO. TIO (CONT'D)

Ship(s) Sank: NONE

Ship(s) Damaged or
Froebly Sunk: Ships were not identified but were believed to be a freighter of 7000 tons and a tanker of 10000 tons with engines aft.

Damage Determined by: Two explosions timed to correspond to an 1800 yard and 3200 yard torpedo run. No more explosions were heard but were about a five minute run.

Target Draft: 12 feet Course: 340° Speed: 0.5 Range 2400 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed: 4 kts. Course: 240° Depth: 60 feet angle: 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: SN - P - R - TDO

Tubes Fired: # 9 # 10 # 8 # 7 #

* Track angle - 92° 94° 95° 97°

* Gyro angle - 5 1/2° 7° 1/2° 3 1/2°

* Depth set - 10 ft. 10 ft. 13 ft. 10 ft.

* Power - High High High

* Hit or Kills - Hit Hit Miss Miss

* Torpedo No No No No

* Mark Reported MK14-1od, 3 MK14.1od

— page 142 —
0526(I) 26 AUG. 1943 1st. 30-32.5TH Long 130-06.21Z

---

**Torpedo Attack No. 210 CONFIRMED**

| Tubes Fired | # | # | # | # |
||----|----|----|----|
| *Actuation Set - | 9 | 10 | 8 | 7 |
| *Actuation Actual - |  |  |  |  |
| Contact |  |  |  |  |
| *Mark Warhead - | K,16 | K,16 | K,16 | K,16 |
| *Serial No. - | 9601 | 9520 | 2428 | 5888 |
| *Explosive - | Torped | Torped | Torped | Torped |
| Firing Interval | 0 | 8 | 12 | 11 |
| Type Spread - | Div. 3° | Div. 3° | Div. 2° |  |

See Conditions - Choppy

---

**Overhaul Activity - Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor**

---

**Remarks -**

In this attack the firing range was 2400 yards yet one torpedoes exploded after an 1000 yard run. This was due to the torpedo hitting a ship of which we did not see at time of firing, although screws were heard corresponding to its position. A large divergent spread was used to offset the probable range error of the intended target. This resulted in hitting two ships.

---

**U.S.S. THALE (85239) - TRACK NO. THREE & THREE & PATROL NO. FIVE**

| Time | Date | Distance | Time | Date | Distance |
|------|------||------|------||
| 0526(I) | 26 AUG. | 1943 1st. | 30-32.5TH | Long | 130-06.21Z |

---

**Torpedo Date - Defense Inflicted**

---

**Description**

Approach was made on what was thought to be a large DD but turned out to be a CHIDARI CLASS NORMAL BOAT. This mistake in identity caused an error in mistread height which resulted in range being too large. The actual range at time of firing was about 1050 yards.

---

**Ship(s) Sunk**

NONE

— page 143 —
6 ft. Course 035°T Speed 10 & 36 kts. Range 1700 (et firing)

Type attack SD - P - TDC

| Type | Attack | 3 | 4 | Attack 3 |
|------||----|----||
| Tubes | Fired | # | 7 | # | 10 | # | 9 | # | 8 | # |
| * Track angle | 93° | 95° | 96° | 92° |
| * Gyro angle | 2° | 2° | 1° | 2° |
| * Depth Set | 7 ft. | 7 ft. | 7 ft. | 7 ft. |
| * Power | High | High | High | High |
| * Ebratic | No | No | No | No |
| * Mark Torpedo | HK.14, Mod.3 | HK.14, Mod.3 | HK.14, Mod.3 | HK.14, Mod.3 |
| * Serial No. | 23180 | 23169 | 23163 | 24074 |
| * Mark Explorer | HK.6, Mod.1 | HK.6, Mod.1 | HK.6, Mod.1 | HK.6, Mod.1 |
| * Serial No. | 6389 | 5990 | 6356 | 6138 |
| * Actuation Set | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| * Actuation Actual | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| * Mark Torpedo | HK.16 | HK.16 | HK.16 | HK.16 |
| * Serial No. | 4253 | 4073 | 4695 | 4004 |
| * Explosive | TNT | TNT | TNT | TNT |
| Firing Interval | 0 | 8" | 8" | 60" |

— page 144 —
7 # 10 # 9 # 8
Type Spread - Div. 2# Div. 2# Div. 2#
See Conditions - Choppy
Overhaul activity - Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

Remarks:
The range error should never be significant since the shots were virtually straight steam shots. Torpedoes should have run at four feet. It is believed that at least one torpedo ran under target, thus giving an erratic depth performance. Target commenced backing full immediately after we fired, so later fired one torpedo using target speed 32 knots.

* Enter for each torpedo fired.
# Enter whether set for contact and magnetic or only contact actuation when applicable and on next line, your best estimate of type actuation actually resulting.

— page 145 —
1. U.S.S. H.I.E. - Report of Fifth Torpedo Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. H.I.E. - Report of Fifth Torpedo Patrol.

(1) NOTES:
No enemy diving activity was observed. It is desired to invite attention to the fact that the "H.I.E." has sunk by gunfire its third "friendly" mine (all appeared to be IX VI's) while making passage between U.S.A. and F.R.I. Harbor. Those mines are considered an unnecessary hazard. One mine believed to be Japanese, was sighted and sunk at Lat. 28-04.5N Long 165-00.28, 530 miles bearing 3500T from H.I.E. ISLAND.

(J) A/S RESCUES. ID AVISION TECHNIQUES:
In the attack August 8, 1943, on the destroyer escorted by the destroyer was definitely not on the alert. He ran from 2000 yards of the torpedo tracks and as a result never saw within 2000 yards of the "H.I.E." He dropped several depth charges none of which were closer than three thousand yards. "H.I.E." observed the destroyer from periscope depth for one hour following the attack. Several aircraft bombs were dropped at a distance about an hour and a half after the attack.

As stated in the narrative the passes into the RST CH.L. SE. are well patrolled.

In the attack on the convoy August 24, 1943, our position was apparently never detected and no evasion tactics were employed.

In the attack on the destroyer, August 26, 1943, the destroyer commenced backing full immediately after we fired and it is believed well before he could have sighted the torpedo. The propeller wash of the DD, due to full-power backing, was so striking that shortly after the third torpedo he'd been fired, the periscope officer observing the DD shouted "Ho's hit!" Unfortunately, however, this belief was engendered by the tremendous propellar wash coupled by heavy black smoke which poured from his stack. He probably acted instantly on hearing the sound of the torpedo impulse bubbles. He ran up the torpedo tracks, but his attack was hampered by the close proximity of the convoy. One well-laid pattern of six "H.I.E." shaking depth charges was dropped. Thereafter we found refuge under a heavy density layer commencing at 200 feet and scum contact was lost.

Only three enemy aircraft contacts were made during this patrol.

(K) K.J.OR. DEFECTS:
1. Kein Storage Battery.

The extremely heavy weather encountered during this patrol resulted in

— page 146 —
U.S.S. THULE - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

(K)  ENJOY DEFECTS (CONT'D)

a total of 56 cell jars cracked and battery grounds as high as 220 volts, washing of cell jars reduced the ground to 70 volts after 3 days of continuous labor. Moderately rough seas landed, only increased the grounds, however, to approximately 150 volts. During the period when the heavy grounds were present, it was necessary to charge the battery although the grounds ranged as high as 220 volts. The steel insert jars in this battery, Exide Ironclad VII-47, are believed to be the cause of this trouble and must be replaced with laminated rubber jars before the THULE is again subjected to rough weather or enemy depth charging. Experience has shown that not only does a cracked jar lessen the capacity of the battery and increase the vulnerability to ground-out, but also that it can cause complete contamination of the electrolyte within a period of nine days. This contamination, if undetected - and it probably would not be detected during a patrol - will reverse the cell during a high rate of discharge and will then generate hydrogen in dangerous quantities. This is believed to be an unnecessary risk to which to subject our submarines and it is requested that the laminated jars be installed at once.

2. Auxiliary Generator.

Water pouring down the main engine air induction into the forward engine room, during the typhoon, partially flooded the auxiliary generator, grounding out the armature and lower field. Small amounts of oil which seeped into the generator from the bearing during normal operation added to the difficulty. Repeated attempts at being and cleaning could not raise the resistance of the two in series to over 10,000 ohms. It may be necessary to replace the armature if its resistance can not be brought up to at least a megohms. It will be mandatory to install the air scroll as called for in BuShips list SS212-84/561/(515-815) of March 16, 1943, in order to prevent the above mentioned oil seepage into the generator.

3. Main Motors.

Although not a major defect in its present stage, the fact that sparking at the brushes on 7-1 main motor has returned in a slight degree may be indicative of the early reoccurrence of the THULE's faulty main motor commutator. It is again requested, therefore, that skewed slotted armatures be installed at the first opportunity.

4. Hull.

On the first deep submergence test after departure from Pearl Harbor No. 1 periscope flange was found to leak in several steady streams of water. The pecking gland also leaked badly. The leak leaks necessitated an overnight delay in Midway at which time the U.S.S. SPFBR completely stopped all leaks.

— page 147 —
U.S.S. HUE - Report of Fifth Torpedo Patrol.

(K)  MAJOR DEFECTS

4. Hull (Cont'd)

This periscope was moved from the control room to the conning tower by the U.S.S. GRIFFIN during refit. Several attempts were made to stop leaks by the repair force of the U.S.S. GRIFFIN but without success. The SPERRY accomplished in a matter of a few hours what the GRIFFIN had failed to do in ten days.

(L)  RADIO

Radio reception was normal. Reception on the 4115 Kc bend was much clearer than on the 8237 Kc bend when NPS.1.1.fixed to the latter frequency at 1900 GTC. Transmissions were cleared in a remarkably short time although several Japanese stations tried their best to interfere.

(M)  RADAR

SJ radar performance was excellent. Maximum indications were 90,000 yards on land and 17,000 yards on ships. MDM was picked up at a range of 26,000 yards. The lobing mechanism, however, failed to operate satisfactorily. Faulty packing permitted a short return to leak on to the collector rings and ring spacers causing a short between the lobing rings. The rings had been dented during the refit period. A shield is needed to keep salt water clear of the ring assembly. Distinctive "loor motors" caused considerable interference on the screen. The SJ radar is up low flying planes at a range of 6,000 yards.

SD radar performance was erratic and unreliable. There are several blind spots in the field pattern ahead and astern. When properly tuned, land was picked up at maximum range of 46 miles and a plane at 24 miles. With apparently the same settings, the SD failed to pick up planes at distances of 5-6 miles. Arcing occurred at the last, and it is believed that the insulation has worn away to such an extent that the salt water has leaked into the coupling. A new antenna assembly is urgently requested. Considerable interference is noticed on all radio receivers when the SD is in operation. Rein squalls caused instibility and produced electrostatic interference.

Both radars were used to good advantage as aids to navigation.

(N)  SOUND

Sound conditions were normal in all areas. No exceptional conditions were noted.

— page 149 —
1. Pearl Harbor to area 3172 mi. 30840 gals.
In Area 4527 mi. 33328 gals.
Area to Pearl/Harbor 1264 mi. 16012 gals.
Total 11866 mi.

(R) DURATION
Days enroute to area 11 days
Days in area 23 days
Days enroute to base 12 days
Days submerged 14 days
Total 46 days

(T) FIGURES OF ENDURANCE RATING
(Torpedoes) Puc1 11,000
Gals. 15
Provisional Factor 4
Prisoners 15
Prisoners 4
Prisoners

— page 151 —
1. U.S.S. H.I.E. - Report of Fifth Torpedo Patrol.

(U) REARRS

The failure to include each submarine in the distribution of patrol reports has already been felt on the H.I.E. On this patrol this vessel departed en aere for which she held briefs for one upon which no information was available. Had recent patrol reports been aboard, invaluable data on the East China Sea areas would have been available to the ship. It is strongly urged that the enlistment of submarine from this distribution be reconsidered since the only way we can profit by the experience of others is to have ready reference to the records of that experience. It is believed that the civilians which accrue from this for ourselves any real or fancied gain in security. And it is not enough to have these documents "available" at a shore library - they should be on board where they may be studied and discussed by all officers.

No, I periscope was shifted from the control room to the conning tower during last refit. It functioned satisfactorily but it is not an adequate substitute for the large aperture, high light transmission instrument which must be developed to the end that maximum effectiveness of the radar approach may be achieved.

Again the Commanding Officer can but say that his vessel, even though damaged, answered every call made and her efficient functioning enabled us to gain position ahead and attack every enemy torpedo target sighted.

It. Condr. F. E. JANNEY, USN, Executive Officer & Piro Control Officer, did his usual outstanding job at this I.D.C. and is deserving of the highest commendation. The ship, her officers and crew - especially the electricians - cheerfully and safely met every demand and their work was in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service.

— page 152 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-TWO.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) The Commander-in-Chief, J.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. "HALE" (SS239) - Fifth War Patrol.
Comments on:

1. The "HALE" spent a total of forty-six days on this patrol. Of this time twenty-three days were spent in two areas. The patrol was terminated early because of the poor condition of the main storage battery.

2. This is the third patrol of the present commanding officer in the "HALE." Five separate torpedo attacks were made on two single targets and one group of targets. Twelve torpedoes were expended with two certain hits, two probable hits and eight misses.

3. Attacks:
   - Attacks #1 and #2 - Target, 9600 ton freighter, escorted by destroyer. Sighted soon after sunrise while submerged approximately 7000 yard range with 150 angle on bow. A subsequent zig to left shortly after sighting gave target 450 angle on bow. The approach consisted of closing the track at high speed to obtain a reasonable firing range. Within twelve minutes of sighting three torpedoes were fired at a range of 1200 yards, 1150 track with 30 spread, one torpedo hit stopped target which took a 15 angle down by storm. Seven minutes later fired single torpedo, 1100 yards range, which hit and caused target to sink shortly thereafter.

   - Attack #3 - Target consisted of a loaded tanker and two freighters escorted by a destroyer or patrol boat. This convoy was tracked by radar during darkness for a period of two and one-half hours while executing and end-around run. Four torpedoes were fired, range 2400 yards, 950 track with 5 spread, at largest target which by sound later proved to be the middle target of three. Single explosions were heard corresponding to torpedo runs of 1800 yards and 3000 yards. Two more explosions were heard which corresponded very closely.

— page 153 —
1. U.S.S. "HALE (SS239) - Fifth War Patrol - Comments on.

to end of run. In view of sighting a heavy column of smoke from the tanker, which appeared to be stopped with the escort circling, it is quite probable that damage had been inflicted on this vessel. With only two hours of darkness remaining and doing close to 1000 feet together with a sudden 20 knot increase of the battery groups the Commanding Officer considered it unwise to press the attack.

Attacks #1 and #5 - Target consisted of a CDRDI class torpedo boat escorting two frigates which were tracked by radar during darkness for a period of about two hours and fifteen minutes while making an end-around run. Excellent position was obtained about a tenth of a mile from the enemy's escort, which was believed to be a large destroyer, and subsequent low tide attack on the frigates, three torpedoes were fired at the escort, range 1700 yards, 90° track, spread 2/0. The escort avoided by backing at which time a single torpedo (the only remaining in steam tubes) was fired using three and one-half knots target speed. All torpedoes missed. In view of the materiel condition of the HALE and the commanding officer's desire to destroy the entire convoy, his decision in this case to initially attack the presumed destroyer escort is considered correct.

1. Material:
   The condition of the main storage battery with fit six crackled cells and excessive grounds will necessitate removal of entire battery prior to the next patrol. This will be accomplished by the submarine base during current overhaul. The ground on the auxiliary generator and the spar plating at the brushes of No. 1 main motor will also be investigated and remedied. The excellent performances of the 5J radar is noted. The 5D radar installation will be overhauled and the antenna assembly inspected.

5. The Commanding Officer and officers of the HALE are congratulated on an excellent patrol under very adverse conditions. The outstanding devotion to duty of the crew, who by dint of long hours of hard work succeeded in keeping their boat in the patrol area for an extended period in highly commendable.

— page 154 —
5-4/A16-3
Serial: 5-4/A16-3
Submarine Squadron FOUR
C-0-K-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS WALES Fifth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. WALES (85239) - 12th War Patrol.
Comments on:
1. Forwarded. The comments of Commander Submarine Division Fort-Two to concurred in.
2. The forwarder forwarded comments to the commanding officer, and also to the fleet's successful patrol.

Copy to:
CSD 42
CO WALES

— page 155 —
1. SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
FF12-10/A16-3(5)/(16)
Serial 01279
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
WHALE Report of Fifth
Lar Patrol dated 9-7-43.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 248
U.S.S. WHALE - FIFTH LAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Fifth War Patrol, (23 July to 7 September 1943).

Inclosure:
(A) Copy of subject war patrol report.
(B) ComSubDiv 42 Conf. 1st end. FB5-42/A16-3
    Serial (027) dated 8 Sept. 1943.
(C) ComSubRon 4 Conf. 2nd end. FC5-4/A16-3
    Serial (0232) dated 10 Sept. 1943.

1. The fifth war patrol of the WHALE was terminated early because of cracked battery jars resulting from the jars working in severe typhoon weather.

2. The time spent in area was profitable, however. The WHALE made good, aggressive attacks on the three contacts worthy of torpedoes.

3. Of interest is the fact that sound conditions checked well with the Sound-Ranging chart of the North Pacific Ocean recently furnished submarines of this Force.

4. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia award.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this aggressive and successful patrol. In addition the WHALE is commended for the excellent work in correcting the battery damage mentioned above. The WHALE is credited with inflicting the following damage to the enemy.

SUNK

1 - Froghter (KOSHIN MARU class - 6,530 tons)

— page 156 —
1. Tanker (unknown class) - 10,000 tons
: 1. Freighter (unknown class) - 7,000 tons

TOTAL: 17,000 tons

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
YONO (5)
Cincapa (6)
Intel. Gen. Pac.
Ocean Areas (1)
Sarforpac
(Adv.Base Plan.Unit (1)
Cincant (2)
S.M School, NL (2)
Comsubsplant (8)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CPT 72 (2)
JTM 16 (1)
C.Jesubpac (18)
SUPAD, MI (2)
QuickspaceSubordcom (2)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Subspace (2)
U.S.S. WHALE (1)
(Intervenants only:)
All Submarines, Subspace (1).

Cedward H. H

— page 157 —
1 - Tanker (unknown class) - 10,000 tons
1 - Freighter (unknown class) - 7,000 tons

TOTAL: 17,000 tons

C. A. LOOKWOOD, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
TONO (5)
Cinopac (6)
Intel. Cen. Pac.
Ocean Areas (1)
Serforpac
1 Adv. Base Plan. Unit (1)
Cinolant (2)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsubsplant (8)
Cumsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CMP 72 (2)
JTP 16 (1)
Cumsubsap (18)
SUPAD, MI (2)
CumsubspaSubordcom (2)
All Squadron and Div.
Comanders, Subspace (2)
U.S.S. WALN (1)
(Interchanges only:)
All Submarines, Subspace (1).

Colonel H. H. H. J.

— page 158 —
1. Enclosure (A), covering the Sixth War Patrol of this vessel in the BONIN ISLANDS AREA, during the period from 21 December 1943 to 3 February 1944, is forwarded herewith.

A. C. BUHROTS.

FHL 67745 FILMED

— page 159 —
239/P16-3
Serial 01
Care of Fleet Post Office,
S-1 Francisco, California,
February 3, 1944

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. WHALE.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track Chart for Consubpact.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the Sixth War Patrol of this vessel in the BONIN ISLANDS AREA, during the period from 21 December 1943 to 3 February 1944, is forwarded herewith.

A. C. BURROWS.

— page 161 —
0906(I) - Sighted periscope about 500 yards broad on port beam (constant helming at the tide). Port stern to periscope, went ahead flank speed. Periscope reappeared astern after about 50 sec. with about 3 feet of scope showing; seen by OOD and three lookouts.

1200(K) - Completed crossing TOTO-TRUK ship's line.

2130(K) - Converted Nos. 4A & 4B R.P.E.Ts to I.E.Ts.

January 3, 1944

0631(K) - Surrendered to grind in main ballast tank blow valve and repair S.D. radar.

0956(K) - Completed repairs - surfaced.

2210(K) - Made S.J. radar contact on I.M.I. I to SHIA (3162 ft.) at 90,000 yards range. Closed and tuned S.J. radar.

January 6, 1944

0225(I) - Made S.J. radar contact on I.M.I. I to SHIA at 90,000 yards.

0500(I) - Passed between I.M.I. I to SHIA and I to SHIA on course east.

0536(I) - Surrendered to conduct periscope patrol on TOTO-TRUK route passing to east of I.M.I.S.

1743(I) - Surfaced to conduct radar patrol on same track.

January 7, 1944

(I) - Continued surface patrol to south and southeast of OCS.S.H.A.

2236(I) - S.J. radar contact on I.M.I. I to SHIA at 90,000 yards.

January 8, 1944

1049(I) - Aircraft contact on S.D. radar at 30 miles. Contact retained until

1114(I) - Signals faded out at 37 miles. Attics time we were 30 miles west of a line between OCS.S.H.A. GUTO and the I.M.I.S. It is believed that a large flight of planes were enroute south. Nothing sighted.

— page 162 —
1713(I) - Sighted, by periscope, what appeared to be funnel top bearing 2760T. Corroded closing at best speed.

1753(I) - Sighted steady white light bearing 3500T. Ship turned out to be small sampan. Later sighted four more small sampans all showing steady white lights. Maximum S.J. radar range obtained on sampans was 11,000 yards, however 6,000 yards was about the effective range for initial contact. Beyond 6,000 yards the "pip" was so faint that it would probably not have been noticed if the presence of the sampans was unknown.

January 10, 1944

2055(I) - Patrol of this area! Sent WHILE Serial No. 1 to COLUSBAC recausting return to active duty in another area.

January 11, 1944

0718(I) - S.D. radar out of commission - Sub.ergo to conduct periscope patrol until repairs effected.

1751(I) - Surfaced. S.D. radar still out of commission (See I.JO3 DISCOT).

January 12, 1944

0515(I) - Submerged to continue S.D. radar repairs.

1757(I) - Surfaced and closed ILLI I to S.I.A to test and tune S.D. radar - operation satisfactory.

January 13, 1944

(I) - Headed southwest to conduct patrol between H.M.S.I.S. and B.C.H.S., crossing lanes from EURO SUDO and KOBE to THUK.

January 14, 1944

0231(I) - Submerged for moonlight periscope patrol.

0925(I) - Nothing sighted. Surfaced.

1350(I) - Received "S.S. U.S. patrol" dispatch giving information on convoy heading our way. Conducted surface patrol to southwest.

— page 163 —
0151(I) - Iade radar contact on "SEA-OIL" and sunk yards. Commenced end run.

0930(I) - Submerged ahead of convoy - closed for attack.

1055(I) - Abandoned attack when convoy zig-zag wide - opened to westward. Intention was to bring at least two of the vessels under fire on approach, but was thwarted, so at

1058(I) - Surfaced and commenced second end around run on convoy. Convoy consisted of two medium-to-large freighters, one tanker and two escorts believed to be "OTOMI" class torpedo boats. Escorts were echo ranging.

1703(I) - Submerged ahead of convoy for attack. Convoy had altered base course at 1500(I) from 1550 to 1600T. This was verified by "SEA-OIL" message. Escorts were patrolling one ahead of center ship and one on left flank. Convoy appeared to be in a line of bearing. While on base course ships were almost abreast of each other. Picked center ship, the largest of the two freighters, as our target. At this time it appeared that ships were too far apart to be able to attack two of them. Convoy zig-zag plan consisted of zigs 300 to right and left of base course at about 4 to 5 minutes intervals - settling on base course between zigs, speed 9 knots.

1722(I) - Sunset - sky overcast.

1605(I) - Angle-on-bow of center ship zero, range 2000 yards, escort on his port beam. Target due to zig.

1606(I) - Target zigged 30° right. We came right for a 90° port track, straight stern shot.

1607(I) - Escort cut in between target and WILIS and either "pinged" on us, heard tube-making-ready noises, or sighted periscope because at

16-07-20(I) - He dropped one depth charge at a range of about 400 yards. Very loud explosion!

16-07-36(I) - At this instant the escort, freighter and tanker were almost in line at ranges of about 400 yards, 600 yards and 2000 yards respectively. Fired first of three stern tubes at freighter, spread 40. Depth setting 12 feet. (Note: No "escort eliminator" on board).

— page 164 —
16-07-37(I) - Started deep and fired second and third fish.

: 16-08-11(I) - Torpedo explosion, followed 6 sec. later by second torpedo explosion. Two hits on freighter.

: 16-08-50(I) - Explosion. (At this time we thought this was a depth charge a long way off, however several hours later the "SNAILOR" reported that we had sunk one ship and stopped one. This, then, was a hit on the tanker with a torpedo run of about 1650 yards).

: 1611(I) - Reached 265 feet and commenced evasive tactics.

: 1616(I) - Depth charge - not close.

: 1618(I) - Depth charge - not close, went to 320 feet.

: 1623(I) - Depth charge.

: 1626(I) - All quiet - started up for a look.

: 1635(I) - Eard breaking-up noises and many small explosions all around. Speeded up to get out from under sinking freighter. Eard more echo ranging. Breaking-up noises heard through hull.

: 1645(I) - Started up again to periscope depth. Got to 250 feet when screws and echo ranging started coming nearer.

: 1904(I) - Six depth charges very loud and very close shook boat up considerably, but no apparent damage. Sent deeper and finally got a 30° temperature gradient.

: 1939(I) - Three more depth charges directly overhead - too close. Kept trying to evade by keeping escort astern and constantly swinging to prevent her from attaining a constant bearing. These last charges knocked the boat vertically downward from 326 feet to 362 feet.

: 2000(I) - Another depth charge almost alongside.

: 2026(I) - Same as last. We then had an 60° temperature gradient and found it very difficult to hear his screws. The "pinging" would become very loud, stop, and then an explosion would follow about 20 seconds later with no screws heard.

All hands had a very healthy respect for this Jap's ability. He was good! Finally he lost contact, ran out of depth charges, or decided to return to what was left of his fold.

: 2347(I) - Surface at last and decided to get clear and check condition of the boat. Found conditions normal except for full-voltage battery ground and 70° stab list. Finally reduced battery

— page 165 —
1944-01-16 11:00:00
: 2347(I) - rounds and after several attempts maneuvered to blow stbd. tanks and remove list. Believe 10" blow check valve to N. 44 BT stuck and caused list.

January 17, 1944

0040(I) - Heeded back towards scene of attack.

0243(I) - Received message from "S.S. 1.01" to the effect that one ship sank, one ship was stopped and the other freighter was needed south alone. She entered the lane freighter by run fire, was driven off, but fired at to change course back in our direction to the north. Believed from this information that one escort was standing by the stopped tanker and the other was searching for us. He was the scene of the attack. Just as we received this message we made radar contact on the freighter to the eastward of us escorted by the "S.S. 1.01". He tracked her while "S.S. 1.01" assisted by sending her zig-zag plan and speed on arc frequency.

0500(I) - With the battery charge completed, went to 42 feet depth for radar attack. Beating of warning twilight.

0513(I) - Sighted target.

0517(I) - As it was taken to light for 42 feet went to 60 feet for periscope approach.

05-23-50(I) - Fired four st. hit bow shots, 90° port track, torpedo run 200 yards, spread 2°. Depth set at 12 feet.

05-25-05(I) - Hit, heard and observed, between bow and st. ck. Another lesser explosion followed. Head tide lay at its most known water level a sea and hit low radar detection in was made on her. At least two hits should have resulted with the spread used.

05-27-05(I) - Explosion - probably internal.

0529(I) - Two more explosions - probably torpedoes at end of run.

0530(I) - Target concluded circling at slow speed. At this point we were extremely anxious to sink this target as quickly as possible in order to avoid surfacing further initiation at the heads of the escort vessels as experienced the previous evening. The target appeared to be undamaged except for a slight trim down by the bow and for the fact that she had slowed and was circling. She had undoubtedly called for assistance and since the escorts could not be too far distant, an expedition sinking was imperative. Therefore at

— page 166 —
0531(I) - Fired single bow shot at a range of about 1400 yards. Target shifted rudder and swung away - IISS.

0536(I) - Fired single bow shot - target appeared to have stopped circling and was taking about 3 knots. Range 1200 yards, 110 stbd. track. Depth 12 feet. IISS - unexplainable since followed out by sound and appeared hot, straight and normal.

0539(I) - Explosion - cause unknown. Radio reloaded.

0619(I) - Target was dead in the water, but still did not appear to be sinking so fired single strait, but now shot set at 10 feet at a range of 1100 yards. IISS. This torpedo must never land an erratic depth performance.

0632(I) - Swung to bring stern tubes to bear. Target had definitely stopped.

0630(I) - At a range of 600 yards fired a straight stern shot set at 10 feet, 900 port angle on bow, target speed zero. Torpedo ran deep. IISS. Stretched draft 22 feet.

0632(I) - At a range of 1150 yards, same set up, depth set at 6 feet, fired another stern torpedo and hit squarely under the stack. Target started down by the bow.

0639(I) - Took motion pictures of target going under.

0650(I) - While preparing to surface heard a series of about 6 depth charges a long way off. Nothing in sight. Believed escort may have found "SEA-COLIN". Decided to stay submerged. Hope and pray "SEA-COLIN" is not getting worked over. She did an excellent job and the WHILE is greatly indebted to her.

1127(I) - Heard a series of about five depth charges or bombs at extremely long range, bearing approximately south.

1616(I) - Surfaced and cleared area to east.

January 18, 1944

(I) - Continued surface patrol to the south westward to cover possible routes of damaged tanker to CHICAGO JIMA.

January 19, 1944

1650(I) - Returned to northcast. With I.I.I. I to SHINA bearing 0230T, 21 miles - set course to the southeast.

January 20, 1944

0942(I) - S.D. radar contact at 27 miles. Position 126 miles bearing 1250T from I.I.I. I to SHINA. Submerged. Plane not sighted.

— page 167 —
1. U.S.S. H.I.S. (85239) - Report of Sixth War Patrol

January 20, 1944 Cont'd

1134(I) - Surfaced.

January 21, 1944

1314(I) - S.D. radar contact at 15 miles. Position 56 miles bearing 0280T from LAUG IS. Submerged. Plane not sighted.

1740(I) - Surfaced.

January 22, 1944

0213(I) - Closed PAJROS IS. to 22 miles to check S.D. radar then set course west.

0915(I) - S.D. radar contact 15 miles. Position 110 miles bearing 3000T from LAUG IS. Submerged. Plane not sighted.

1204(I) - Surfaced.

January 23, 1944

(I) - Surface patrol to westward of BONUS and TAHITI.

January 24, 1944

0653(I) - Visibility about 7 miles. Had just completed high periscope sweep when lookout sighted object on horizon dead ahead. While turning, periscope was again hoisted and identified object as a submarine, angle on the bow 15° stab. Apparently he sighted us at the same time because he started turning away, but then seeing us put our stern to him he turned back, presented a 30° stab. angle on the bow and commenced trying to make an end run around us. At the same time, we were trying to make an end run around him. He was taking considerable smoke so we thought it was probably an E.O.R. or Winton boat (HILL belonging, of course to the F.I. Club). The range commenced to open so he headed directly for us and the range remained constant. It was impossible to identify him positively, but from the course on which he was sighted, he was probably a Jap. Our recognition signals were believed compromised until 26 January.

0942(I) - Our friend changed course to the left about 40° and disappeared in the haze. His maximum speed was about 19 knots - the same as ours.

1003(I) - Changed course left 200°.

1031(I) - Submerged - Came to near all approach course with hope of being able to close track in time to attack.

— page 168 —
1050(I) - Fire in the trim pump starting panel (See: JOURNEY CUTS)
Control room immediately filled with smoke. Xtra. used fire
out smoke continued.

1057(I) - Forced to surface because of smoke - Headed west on
four engines and gradually made wide sweep back to the north.

1620(I) - Headed for eastern part of area. Fuel remaining 30,000
cals.

January 26, 1944

1930(K) - Sent ME.18 Serial Two infor.ing CO. SUBBAC of termination
of patrol for lack of fuel. Set course for LIDAY.

February 3, 1944

0900(Y) - Arrived LIDAY.

— page 171 —
1. 0947(I) 12-31-43 159-00.8 E
2. 1049(I) 1-8-44 142-51.7 B
3. 0942(I) 1-20-44 143-26 B
4. 1314(I) 1-21-44 145-43.1 B
5. 0915(I) 1-22-44 143-35 B

- 12 -

— page 172 —
860
: 9 kts.
: Range 180° (at firing)

Ship(s) Sunk: 22
Ship(s) Damaged: 250
Damage Determined by Explosions heard and time checked with distance of torpedo run. Breaking up noises heard on sound gear. Verified and witnessed by U.S.S. SEALOF.

Target Draft: 22'
Course: 250°
Speed: 9 kts.
Range: 180° (at firing)

Own Ship Data:
Speed: 34 kts.
Course: 170°
Depth: 63°
Angle: 1/2°
Dive: (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data:
Type Attack: Periscope and TDC.
Tubes Fired: #_7_#_8_#_9_#
Track Angle: 99°
102P
104P
191L
26-30L
20L

— page 174 —
U.S.S. THALE - Report of Sixth War Patrol

Date: 17 Jan. 1944

Lat: 23°08' N Long:135°09' E

Target Data - Damage Inflated

Description: Target was the remaining undamaged freighter of the convoy in attack #1, SEA'OLF had tracked while THALE was being held down by depth charge attack, and transmitted position, course and speed data when WHALE was able to surface.

One hit was observed and there is a possibility of a second of low order detonation. A minor explosion was heard but not seen at a time which checked with the run of the fourth torpedo. It is strongly believed that one or more torpedoes in the sea/ocean deep because, with the data as accurate as it was, at least two hits should have resulted.

Ship Sunk: Freighter, 7000 tons, unidentified

Damage Determined by: Saw ship sink. Freighter took slight down angle after hit forward. Sank about 5 min. after last hit.

Target Draft - 22'1" Course - 030°T Speed 9.5 kts. Range - 2070 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 3.4 kts. Course 120°T Depth 63' Angle 1/2° Dive (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Radar, periscope and TDC.

Tubes Pired: #_1_ #_2_ #_3_ #_4_

Track Angle: 90° 91° 90° 96°

Gyro Angle: 2°R 1°L 2°R 5°L

Depth Set: 12' 12' 12' 12'

Power: High High High High

Hit or Miss: Hit Miss Possible Miss Hit

— page 175 —
1. U.S.S. "HALE" (SS239) - Report of Sixth War Patrol

| U.S.S. "HALE" | TORPEDO ATTACK NO. | PATROL NO. |
||||
| Tubes Fired   | #_1             | #_2      | #_3 | #_4 |
| Erratic      | No              | No       | 2   | No |
| Mark Torpedo | 14-3A           | 14-3A    | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No.    | 40594           | 39481    | 39789 | 25769 |
| Mark Exploder| 6-1A           | 6-1A     | 6-1A | 6-1A |
| Serial No.    | 12065           | 8013     | 11434 | 1510 |
| Actuation Set | Contact        | Contact  | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual | Contact | - | Contact? | - |
| Mark Warhead | Mk.16          | Mk.16    | Mk.16 | Mk.16 |
| Serial No.    | 5990            | 2712     | 2729 | 11009 |
| Explosive    | Torpex         | Torpex   | Torpex | Torpex |
| Firing Interval | 0 | 8 sec. | 8 sec. | 8 sec. |
| Type Spread  | - Divergent 20° | - | - | - |
| Sea Conditions | Moderate swell | | | |
| Overhaul Activity | SUEARINE BASE, PE RL H RROP, T.R. | | | |

- 16 -

— page 176 —
U.S.S. THLIE (SS239) - Report of Sixth War Patrol

(H) ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. THLIE
Date: 17 Jan. 1944
Target Data - Damage Inflated

Description
Target, the freighter damaged in attack #2, was swinging slowly at a speed of about 3 knots. The first two torpedoes were fired while target was still swinging. A lead was given to offset this swing as determined by observation.

The last three torpedoes were fired with target dead in water at close range.

Ship(s) Sunk
Freighter, 7000 tons, unidentified. Same ship as attack No. 2.

Damage Determined by
Observed sinking of ship thru periscope.

Target Draft 22' Course 040°-200°T Speed 3-0 kts. Range 700-1500 yds (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 3.4 kts. Course Various Depth 63' 31" Angle 1/20 Dive (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack
Periscope attack firing single torpedoes at the freighter damaged in attack #2.

Tubes Fired
# 5 # 6 # 1 # 9 # 10

Track angle
100S 82P 134S 92P 102P

Gyro angle
1° 9-30L 3° 8°L 2-30L

Depth Set
12' 12' 10' 10' 6'

Power
High High High High High

Hit or Miss
Miss Miss Miss Hit

Erratic
No No Yes Yes No

Hark Torpedo
14-3A 14-3L 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A

— page 177 —
U.S.S. THI.LE (SS 239) - Report of Sixth War Patrol

| U.S.S. THI.LE | TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 24 | PATROL NO. 6 |
||||
|              | Fire Control and Torpedo Data |             |

Tubes Fired:
- Serial No: 40155, 40152, 40461, 26479, 26241
- Mark Warhead: 16, 16, 16, 16, 16
- Serial No: 18001, 11061, 10569, 2727, 10943
- Explosive: Torpex, Torpex, Torpex, Torpex, Torpex
- Firing Interval: 0°, 0°, 0°, 0°, 0°
- Sea Conditions: Moderate Swell
- Overhaul Activity: SUBMARINE B.S.E., PEARL HARBOR, T.H.
- RECARES: The first two torpedoes fired missed due to the target changing her observed rate of sailing and the extremes of the swing.

The third and fourth torpedoes missed due to erratic depth performance. The first hit obtained on the target was with a torpedo set to run 12' on curve. It was very little change in over all drift after 1/2 hour. It is the target was heavily loaded it is considered that the estimate of draft made at firing was a very reasonable one.

- 18 -

— page 178 —
1. IINES
No data.

(J) ANTI-SUE RING BASURES AD VISION TACTICS

Air coverage in this area was much better than previously experienced on any patrol. The believe we were not sighted at any time which was due to the efficient operation of our S.D. radar.

The depth charging of the night of January 16 was the most persistent and severe attack that we have had since our first patrol. Repeated attacks and accurately-issued patterns gave evidence of a well-trained Jap crew and extremely efficient sound equipment. The supersonic gear used was tuned to about 20 IC. It covered a much narrower frequency band that we have noted before.

It appears that the enemy is managing its tactics with regard to submarines. In the past we have found that a few nuisance depth charges were dropped after the initial ones, however the tendency now appears to be that the escort will do its best to eliminate the sub since while the ship or ships continue on to their destination. If two escorts are present, one will probably remain to attack the submarine while the other remains to guard any crippled ship or the remainder of the convoy.

(K) IADOR DIRECTS AD DILGE

Iain Ennies

Number three main engine was a constant source of trouble. The gasket on the fuel oil filter gasket flare was found to be restricting the flow of oil to half of the engine. It allowed the engine to run normally at standard speed on a 60/90 co-bination, however it would not hold the load at full power. Fuel oil pressure gauge readings were normal. The gasket was removed and replaced and the engine was able to take full power. When this gasket was removed it was found that it only had a 3/6" hole cut instead of a 3/4" hole. This 3/6" hole restricted the flow of fuel oil. If the hole in this gasket had been cut properly by the machinist at STUART BAS, Pearl Harbor all of this trouble would not have occurred. After two weeks on station the engine again failed to hold the load. Procter readings increased from 7200 F. to 10000 F. in fifteen minutes. This indicated that the engine was out of timing. Investigation showed that the timing bracket adjusting screw nut had backed off until only four turns were holding the nut on the adjusting screw. It is believed it was assembled without a cotter key. If it is adjusting nut had backed off four more turns on the adjusting screw it would have fallen into the timing chain thus completely disconnecting the engine.

— page 179 —
1. JAR DEFECTS AND DANGER CONT'D

Evaporators

The kleinsmidt stills did not operate satisfactorily between Pearl Harbor and Midway. They rode oily water. The U.S.S. BUSHMILL replaced both compressor units and no further trouble was experienced.

Grounds

Electrical grounds were experienced in both batteries. These grounds were cleared up by washing and blowing down the battery tops.

Trim Pump Starting Panel

The trim pump starter controller first step resistor stuck due to a weak spring on the lifter release contact. This caused the resistor to become cherry red and to burn the cable insulation prior to pulling the power clear in the control room. A large amount of smoke in the control room caused us to surface. The controller box was in operation after 12 hours labor. A new finger release spring is needed in the controller box.

(1) RADIO

Reception was good throughout the patrol. Interference from Jap stations was persistent, especially during reception of submarine schedules and transmissions. It appears that the Japs guard these frequencies and transmit effectively jam transmissions by sending numbers, code or by transmitter tuning. Extending the transmission time on ELU (4525 Kc.) to 2100 GCT is warranted and higher power is always appreciated. It appears that most Jap communicators prefer the area frequency of 450 Kc. for local transmissions. Because full power is necessary to contact other submarines in the area in order to override local stations, our chances of being "D-7" are increased.

(1) RADAR

SJ-A

As on previous patrols, the SJ.A. radar pulled "its weight", not only as an instrument of attack and defense but also as a navigational aid. The installation of a high-powered transmitter and a F.P.I. unit proved highly successful. Although the F.I. unit is not as sensitive as the SJ.A. in picking up targets, it is a much better instrument for sweeping. The excessive noise caused by the power rotation of the antenna at high speed was effectively eliminated by a speed rheostat installed by the U.S.S

— page 181 —
1. R.D.R. Cont'd
   : C.U.O.

Prior to departing for patrol, a radar detector (C.U.O.) was obtained. Although results were negative, it was used as a searching instrument on several occasions, when the presence of enemy radar appeared probable. The S.J. and G.D. were secured while this equipment was in operation.

(2) SOLD C.E.R. A SOLD CONDITION

The performance of all sound equipment was satisfactory throughout the patrol. The holding down stowage were sufficient to hold the heads at deep submersion, but the bearings cracked. A different design or better bearings should be installed.

(3) DENSITY I.N.F.R.S

The average sound conditions encountered on this patrol did not agree too closely with the Sound-damaging Chart of the North Pacific Ocean.

On only three occasions did we discover a temperature decline of as much as 10°F. per 100 feet at about 150 feet. At all other times, except on the night of our depth charging, the isothermal layer was found to extend as deep as we went. On one occasion we dived to three hundred forty feet with no temperature change.

On the night of January 16 we discovered a negative gradient of about 40°F. per 100 feet starting at 260 feet, however, this density layer proved to be insufficient for evasive tactics. We were relieved to find that, starting at 350 feet, the temperature dropped 40°F. in ten feet.

An "afternoon effect" of 30°F. was observed at a depth of 150 feet several times.

(4) HEALTH, FOOD AND HEALTH

General health was excellent. One case of second degree burn was expeditiously treated with sulfatiazole and caused the victim a minimum of trouble and discomfort. The usual cases of colds, cat fever, constipation and sores were encountered. The food was good although the ill it did not occur of chicken available was to be re-rotted. It is also suggested that commercial cuts for roasts and steaks be made available to submariners to supplement the use of boneless beef. Living conditions were satisfactory with the exception of the forward battery. It is strongly recommended that the ventilation system be redesigned to provide more air for the crew.

— page 184 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-ONE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate Command.
       (2) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HALE - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

1. The HALE's Sixth War Patrol, conducted in the area of the Bonin Islands, was of forty-three days duration, with twenty-two days in the assi-nced area. The patrol was terminated when the fuel on hand was reduced to the safe minimum for return to Midway.

2. Although the area was well searched, it was unproductive until a convoy, being trailed by the SEALOOF, was intercepted. A submarine, probably enemy, was later sighted, but a combination of evasive action by the enemy and a fire in the HALE's rear ended the chase. Enroute to the area, a periscope was sighted but by the time the submarine was verified, the opportunity for effective attack was lost.

3. The attacks made by the HALE were very well and aggressively conducted:

   (a) A convoy of two frigates and a tanker were in line of bearing. As HALE was about to fire, an alert escort crossed between the submarines and the tanker, made contact, and dropped one submarine depth charge. HALE immediately fired three torpedoes, two of which hit the near frigate and one hit the tanker. A severe depth charge in followed.

   (b) The night following the first attack, a frigate which had attempted to escape, was turned back to the scene of the attack by SEALOOF. HALE made contact, traced and made a submarine attack at dawn which resulted in one and possibly two hits. Five more torpedoes were fired singly at this crippled ship but the first four missed, two probably running too deep. The last one set at 6 feet sank the target.

— page 185 —
PB5-61/15-3
Serial 039
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. WHALE - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

4. The excellent work of the SEAWOLF in trailing and accurately reporting the movements of the convoy for over two days, is commendable. In addition, the SEAWOLF again assisted the WHALE by attacking with gunfire, a fire-hitter attempting to escape and turning it back toward the scene of the earlier attack which it was finally sunk by the WHALE.

5. The WHALE is in good material condition and will be refitted in the normal period.

6. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are commended on another very successful patrol. It is recommended that the WHALE be credited with the following damage to the enemy:

S-U-N-K
1 - FRIHTER (Unidentified) 7,000 tons.
1 - FRIHTER (Unidentified) 7,000 tons.

TOTEL 14,000 tons.

D-A-M-I-G-E-D
1 - Tanker (Unidentified) 7,000 tons.

B.C. SMITH.

— page 186 —
16-3
Serial 024
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS WHALE Report of
Sixth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet
Subordinate Command.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

1. The excellent teamwork of the SEAWOLF in tracking and transmitting concise and useful information to WHALE, who took every advantage of the opportunities presented, and the WHALE's tenacious attack on two freighters and a tanker while being depth charged, are the highlights of this patrol.

2. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are congratulated on their aggressive action against the enemy.

Copy to:
USS WHALE
Commander-61
J. A. CoNNOLLY

— page 187 —
1 - Frigther (class unknown) - 7,000 tons (Attack #1).
1 - Frigther (class unknown) - 7,000 tons (Attack #2 and 2A).

TOTAL: 14,000 tons

DAMAGED

1 - Tanker (class unknown) - 7,000 tons (Attack #1).

DISTRIBUTION:
502. [Name the distribution

— page 188 —
1. Enclosure (A), covering the Seventh War Patrol of this vessel conducted in the EAST CHINA SEA during the period 6 March, 1944 to 3 May, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

J. B. GRADY.

FINAL
71536

— page 189 —
1944, U.S.S. WHALE (SS 239) - Report of Seventh War Patrol

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived MIDWAY February 3, 1944, from Sixth War Patrol, commenced refit by Submarine Base, MIDWAY. On February 9, 1944, Lt-Comdr. J.B. RADY, USN relieved Condr. A.C. BURROWS, USN as Commanding Officer. Completed refit on February 19, 1944, but suffered casualty to starboard propeller so departed MIDWAY for PEARL HARBOR for docking. Enroute PEARL HARBOR, conducted 300 ft. test dive. On reaching 300 ft. the fathometer carried away in the forward trim tank and depth control was temporarily lost. (See Major Defects) Entered ARD-8 at Submarine Base, PEARL HARBOR, T.H. February 24, 1944. Renewed both propellers and fathometer.

February 27 - March 3, 1944

Conducted tests and training exercises underway. Fired three torpedoes.

March 6, 1944

(Y) - Enroute MIDWAY - held training dives and exercises. Encountered very heavy head seas the entire trip.

March 11, 1944

(Y) - Arrived off MIDWAY - Heavy seas prevented entry so formed column eastern U.S.S. CRIMSON in company with six other submarines.

March 13, 1944

1220(Y) - Entered MIDWAY.

March 14, 1944

1356(Y) - Departed MIDWAY for patrol area.

March 16, 1944

1019(Y) - S.D. Radar contact at 8 miles. Sighted Vega Ventura bomber - Exchanged recognition signals.

1310(Y) - S.D. Radar contact at 9 miles. Sighted Vega Ventura bomber - Exchanged recognition signals.

March 21, 1944

0925(K) - Commenced getting interference on S.D. radar screen. Interference continued until at -

— page 190 —
115(K) - Radar contact at 10 miles - Submerged. Plane not sighted. Position 435 miles brg. 3480T from MARCIUS IS.

: 1447(K) - Surfaced.

: 0805(K) - Interference on S.D. radar screen.

: 0943(K) - Sighted submarine on surface through periscope.

: 0946(K) - Submerged and connected approach.

: 1040(K) - Identified submarine as friendly so fired three smoke bombs and surfaced. Exchanged calls with U.S.S. POLLACK. Proceeded in company with POLLACK towards TORI SHI'A. Decided to conduct submerged patrol following day on scouting line with POLLACK on what appeared to be a likely shipping route passing just to the eastward of TORI SHI'A and OGASTAR GUNTO.

: 0600(K) - Submerged 68 miles brg. 1340T from TORI SHI'A with POLLACK 10 miles brg. 0600T from us. Conducted periscope patrol.

: 1925(K) - Surfaced in heavy sea. Conducted radar patrol to south and southeast. No contact. On surfacing received last part of a message in contact code garbled. Called for repeat but only answer was from a Jap requesting we send V's so kept silent.

: 0614(K) - Lookout sighted about 8 feet of periscope on the stbd. beam distance about 800 yds. - very rough sea. Turned away.

: 0616(K) - Sighted two smoke bombs - color indet. minate. They appeared to be more yellow than red, red being the correct color. Believe this could have been either the HADDOCK or POLLACK. As submarine did not surface we continued enroute area.

: 0933(K) - S.D. Radar contact 11 miles - submerged - plane not sighted.

— page 191 —
1247(I) - S.D. Radar contact 16 miles, submerged. Plane not sighted. A delay in lowering the S.D. radar mast while diving caused excessive vibration of the mast which was later found to have broken the conductors where they joined the transformers inside the radar mast. (SEE PART (II))

0912(I) - Surfaced. Pound S.D. radar out of commission.

March 26, 1944

0336(I) - S.J. Radar contact at 4500 yds. Radar plot indicated speed zero. Circled contact and closed but pitch blackness prohibited sighting. Decided to await daylight to see what we had found.

0440(I) - Contact showed one steady white light then a second and a third and started going ahead six knots on course 200°. Finally made contact out as a fishing boat and decided to leave it and proceed to our area.

0639(I) - Submerged to conduct periscope patrol. Sky was overcast and without a S.D. radar deemed it inadvisable to take a chance against further aircraft contacts.

1825(I) - Surfaced.

March 27, 1944

0500(I) - Completed repairs to S.D. radar so continued enemy area on the surface. The two radr technicians, chief radioman and chief motor machinist, made did a truly remarkable job in repairing the S.D. radar, a job which has probably never before been accomplished by a boat at sea. It was necessary to remove the entire 34 feet of conductor tubing through the bottom of the mast after disassembling the base of the mast and removing the mast yoke topside. They spliced and soldered the broken conductors together and then screwed the entire length of each conductor up through the mast back on to the yoke. It was necessary to break the conductors in three sections to remove them. Through their combined efforts, skill and hard work the operations of the I.E. have been greatly affected, to say nothing of the peace of mind dependent on an efficient S.D. radar.

March 28, 1944

0257(I) - Heading into very heavy seas at slow speed towards AKUSEKI SHIZU. S.J. Radar contact at 14,500 yds. 292°T. Closed and commenced tracking. Tracked target on course 170°T, speed 8 kts. At 5000 yds. we were unable to make out target or determine the existence or not of any small escorts because of the high seas. Torpedo performance at any suitable depth setting was questionable. Opened range ahead of target to await daylight and see what we had.

— page 192 —
0613(I) - Submerged and commenced approach. On closing, identified target as a coastal patrol boat of the Thale-Killer type, 250 gross tons, length 120 ft., shown in miscellaneous section of ONI -8J (revised). Abandoned approach. Gun attack was out of the question as we were then thirty miles from the nearest air base, AWAO SHINA. Continued submerged petrol back to the north.

1847(I) - Twelve minutes after sunset - at 50 ft. depth, just about to surface, sighted Otori Class torpedo boat, range about 4000 yds. dead ahead, 60 port track. Extremely noisy seas prohibited sighting before reaching 50 ft. High noise level drowned out screws. Very faint pinging heard on periscope bearing. We were not sighted and torpedo boat disappeared to southward. Position 55 miles brg. 120°T from AKUSENKI SHINA.

1927(I) - Surfaced.

2324(I) - Radar contact on AKUSENKI SHINA at 95,000 yds.

March 29, 1944

0432(I) - Passed between AKUSENKI SHINA and LUKUN SHINA, entered EAST CHINA SEA. No patrols contacted.

0525(I) - Submerged for periscope patrol.

1926(I) - Surfaced 15 miles west of GULSHINA. Light burning in accordance with Light List. Patrol led east and west.

March 30, 1944

(I) - Submerged patrol between GULSHINA and KUSUKAKI SHINA. KUSUKAKI Light burning in accordance with Light List.

March 31, 1944

(I) - Submerged patrol between KUSUKAKI SHINA and DUNO GUNNO.

April 1, 1944

(I) - Routine patrol off KUSUKAKI SHINA.

0915(I) - Sighted large flying boat headed east. Unable to identify.

April 2, 1944

(I) - Routine patrol west and northwest of DUNO GUNNO. Very bright moonlight at night.

April 4, 1944

0500(I) - Sighted light.

— page 193 —
1944 - Cont'd
0516(I) - Submerged.
0615(I) - Sighted small trailer showing light.
1445(I) - Sighted saman.
1942(I) - Surfaced.
2143(I) - Radar contact on QUIPART IS. at 90,000 yds. brg. 295°T.
2240(I) - Sighted several lights and what appeared to be an Aero beacon on QUIPART IS.
2355(I) - Sighted aircraft closing us - Submerged - (Bright moonlight unlimited visibility).

April 5, 1944
0054(I) - Surfaced.
0100(I) - Sighted aircraft. Submerged. Below those planes were engaged in night flight training rather than anti-submarine patrol.
0114(I) - Surfaced. Connected using S.D. radar and cleared area to the south-east.
0145(I) - Secured S.D. Radar.
0506(I) - Sighted lighted saman. Conducted submerged patrol between QUIPART IS. and DAJUO GURTO.

April 6, 1944
(I) - Submerged patrol off FUKU-SAKI between FUKU-SAKI and KOSAKI REMO.
April 7, 1944
(I) - Submerged patrol between DAJUO GURTO and O SHIDAI.

April 8, 1944
(I) - Submerged patrol between QUIPART IS. and IKI SHIDAI.

2226(I) - With TSUSHI-I brg. 040°T distant 25 miles made radar contact on ship at 23,250 yds. brg. 341°T. Connected tr cking and end-around run. Sea very rough - full moon with scattered clouds. Tracked target on course 269°T speed 12 kts., unescorted and star-ring straight course.

2330(I) - Passed lighted saman at about 7000 yds.

— page 194 —
0113(I) - Completed on-arrival run and submerged for pariscoop attack under full moon. Found it impossible to maintain depth control at 42 ft. Sighted target through periscope at 8000 yds. Fired to get echo ranges, but it was impossible with the high seas. T.D.C. set-up check "On" with plot's course and speed.

: 0140-25(I) - Fired four tow tubes with the first, third and fourth torpedoes set at 10 ft. and the second at 6 ft., 800 stbd. track, torpedo run 1550 yds., 2 longitudinal spread. Estimated target draft 16 ft. Under moderate sea conditions it is considered that four torpedoes would have been necessary and a larger spread would have been easier. However the poor torpedo depth performance to be expected under existing conditions dictated the firing of at least four torpedoes in order to obtain at least one hit.

: 0111-27(I) - Second torpedo (8 ft. setting) hit directly under stack. Others missed - probably erratic as there was no sound. Target slowed but slowed no signs of sinking so at -.

: 0114(I) - Fired one bow shot set at 6 ft. - miss.

: 0115(I) - Target was dead in the water, range 1200 yds., estimated draft 18 ft., fired one straight stern shot set at 6 ft. Fires. Sound tracked torpedo directly towards target for about 800 yds. than it roared off to the right to miss target.

: 0152(I) - Fired second straight stern shot set at 6 ft., range 1800 yds. Expected a premature explosion but torpedo ran and hit between stack and stern. Target exploded and sank in 15 seconds. The target was identified as a three island freighter similar in appearance to the HINO HINO, page 164 of ONI - 8J (Row.) except that the stack was exactly in the center of the midship island and the estimated length was 450 ft. Estimated tonnage approximately 5000 tons.

: 0157(I) - Surfaced and cleared the area.

(I) - Submerged petrol between DULO TUNO and QUART IS.

: 1301(I) - Sighted sampan.

April 10, 1944

: 0112(I) - Sighted aircraft approaching from westward with running lights. Burning. Submerged. Do not believe this was an A/S patrol.

: 0147(I) - Surfaced.

(I) - Submerged patrol just west of UUI GITO and NUSKAI SITA.

— page 195 —
1944

(I) - Submerged patrol off GAJA SHIDA.

1007(I) - Sighted sampan under sail.

1935(I) - While preparing to surface, at 42 ft. depth obtained "pip" on S.J. radar screen at 12000 yds. closing rapidly. Range closed to 2000 yds. with rapid change in bearing; so returned to periscope depth. "Pip" was low flying plane.

1941(I) - Raised S.D. radar mast and had aircraft contact at nine miles going out.

1946(I) - Surfaced. All clear. This plane was the first concrete evidence of any existing anti-submarine measures in 14 days in the area.

April 12, 1944

(I) - Submerged patrol between DAWO GUNTO and KAS.YATA ISAKI.

C923(I) - Sighted sampan.

1923(I) - Sighted lights towards SHITAYA SHIDA.

1941(I) - Surfaced.

2155(I) - Sighted several lighted sampans.

April 14, 1944

0518(I) - Sighted TSUSHIYA IS. Submerged.

0650(I) - Heard distant echo ranging. Nothing in sight. Headed in direction of echo ranging and at -

0714(I) - Sighted masts of viat was probably an old destroyer, angle on the bow about 90°F, range about 14000 yds. Unable to close for further identification before masts disappeared to northwest.

1240(I) - Sighted two saupans.

1952(I) - Surfaced 15 miles south of TSUSHIYA IS.

1953(I) - Two search lights appeared to the eastward over the horizon. One was sweeping the surface in our direction and the other was sweeping with an angle of elevation of about 30°. They may have been on IKI SHIDA.

2026(I) - Three lighted saupans or patrol vessels commenced closing us from the northeast.

2039(I) - Picked up plane on S.J. radar to the w.stward closing rapidly - submerged.

— page 196 —
U.S.S. THALIS (SS 239) - Report of Seventh War Patrol

April 14, 1944 Cont'd

2102(I) - At periscope depth sighted light on trawler. Came to radar depth and picked up trawler at 4000 yds. Range. Opened range to the south.

1212(I) - Surfaced with trawler 8000 yds. astern.

2157(I) - Sighted two search lights just over horizon in direction of TSUSHIYA IS., both sweeping the surface in our direction. Cleared area to the south-west.

2232(I) - Sighted two more lights to westward.

April 15, 1944

(I) - Submerged patrol between QUMPART IS. and HIKU TO. Sighted numerous sampans and sailing junks.

April 17, 1944

0017(I) - Position 40 miles southeast of HAKU TO made S.J. radar contact on the ships 15,000 yds. to the northeast. Commenced closing and tracking. Pilot showed their speed was 18 kts., course 240°. When we had closed to 10,000 yds. contact turned right to 270° and after 15 minutes turned to course 295°. An attack or end-around run was out of the question. The sea was flat calm with a brilliant phosphorescence. Believe contacts were two small destroyers or torpedo boats making an anti-submarine sweep of the area. "Pips" disappeared to the northwest at 19,000 yds. The "C.U.O." gave no indication of radar and no echo ranging was heard.

1024(I) - Sighted smoke and commenced closing. Smoke turned out to be a trawler of about 500 tons. At this point anything would have been a welcome target, however in spite of using high speed for a long period of time we were unable to close to less than 7000 yds.

1947(I) - Surfaced and headed towards NAGASAKI. Sighted numerous lighted sampans between DANJO GUNTO and PUAKI SHIDA.

April 16, 1944

(I) - Submerged patrol north of KOSAKI RETTO.

April 19, 1944

0511(I) - Submerged and passed between UJI SITE and KUSAKKI SHIDA headed for BONO ISAKI.

1157(I) - Sighted twin engine bomber on northerly course.

2009(I) - Surfaced and made S.J. radar contact on plane at 7000 yds.

— page 197 —
1944: 2011(I) - Submerged on sighting running lights on plane.
: 2036(I) - Surfaced and headed south between KURG SHI. and KUS.KIKI SHI.
: 2055(I) - 'Ade' S.J. radar contact on plane at 16,000 yds.
: 2058(I) - Range closed to 7000 yds. and running lights were visible so submerged.
: 2154(I) - Surfacing S.D. radar. Had radar interference on S.D. screen resembling typical plane radar interference. Obtained rad r interference on S.J. radar screen from direction of KUS.KIKI SHI

— page 198 —
1939(I) - Position 60 miles east of SULINGE SHIP - prepared to surface, hoisted S.D., radar mast and immediately had aircraft contact at three miles! Contact moved in to two miles and we went to 90 ft., Night was pitch black with a heavy overcast.

1954(I) - All clear. Surfaced.

2004(I) - Lookout and J.O.O.D. sighted running lights of aircraft. Submerged. (This contact doubtful - nothing seen on S.D. radar screen.)

2027(I) - All clear. Surfaced.

2212(I) - Noted strong interference on both S.D. and S.J. screens. No contacts.

April 24, 1944

(I) - Continued enroute BOLTIS on surface at three engine speed.

— page 199 —
0609(K) - Passed SOU CAN 5 miles abeam to stbd.
: 0625(I) - S.D. radar contact at 18 miles. Submerged.
: 1055(I) - Surfaced.
: 0919(K) - S.D. radar contact at 12 miles. Submerged. Position 205 miles
: 1110(K) Surfaced.
: 1112(K) - Signed aircraft on horizon, distant about 18 miles - possibly
: 0708(K) - Surfaced.
: 1122(K) - Signed aircraft on horizon, distant about 18 miles. Resembled
: 1202(K) - Surfaced.
: 1202(K) - S.D. radar contact at 22 miles. Not sighted. Contact did not
: 1307(K) - S.D. radar contact at 14 miles. Not sighted. Contact did not
: 1423(K) - Inde rendezvous with escort, U.S.S. FAIR.
: 0630(K) - Entered JURO, moored alongside U.S.S. SPERRY.

— page 202 —
1. USS: 329 (S. 229)
   - Report of: Seventh War Patrol
   - Home Port: Honolulu, Hawaii
   - Date: 12 July 1944
   - Time: 1500 hrs
   - Speed: 16 knots
   - Course: 350°
   - Distances: 1000 yds, 1500 yds, 2000 yds, 2750 yds, 6000 yds, 9000 yds
   - Course and speed: 350°
   - Distances: 1000 yds, 1500 yds, 2000 yds, 2750 yds, 600

— page 209 —
21 -

PART (H)

U.S.S. THALE

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1A

PATROL NO. 7:

REMARKS:
(Cont'd)

The second torpedo in this attack obviously had an erratic performance either in depth or direction probably caused by the state of the sea. Tracking by sound indicated that this torpedo may have turned off course to right after running about 1000 yds. Exactly the same data was used in firing the last two torpedoes and the first was set on 6 ft. and the second on 6 ft. A premature explosion was to be expected on the last torpedo, but it resulted in a hit at 1800 yds. No missile exploded at the end of their runs.

— page 210 —
1. MINES.
   - No data.

(J)  ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

Anti-submarine measures in the EAST CHINA SEA during this patrol consisted mainly of night aircraft patrols. Frequent night aircraft contacts were made both by sight and using the S.J. radar. The S.D. radar was used in the area only for very short periods of time and then when the presence of aircraft was definitely established. It is believed that at no time was the S.D. radar in operation long enough to "homes" a plane. Almost all aircraft sighted carried running lights, however there is a possibility that the exhaust flames may have been mistaken for lights in some cases. Every evening for about two hours after sunset in the immediate vicinity of GAJA SHIMA and NUSAKAKI SHIMA low flying aircraft made a thorough sweep. Aircraft were also encountered around midnight in the vicinity of QUELPART IS. and DANJO GUMTO. Special attention is invited to the contact just prior to surfacing on 23 April 1944. Only two daylight aircraft contacts were made by periscope observation in the area and these may have been transport planes, however daylight surface patrolling is believed to be out of the question.

The passes into the EAST CHINA SEA are considered to be well patrolled, but with a dark night the transit can be made without too much difficulty.

Many small vessels were sighted at night burning single white lights. Most of those were probably fishermen, but it is suggested that small surface patrols may carry lights either as bait for the "shot"em up" boys or for protection against bombing by their night air patrols.

It is strongly believed that our presence though not our exact position was known to the Japs almost the entire time in the area. Our invaluable weapon, the high-powered S.J. radar, must have given us away and ships routed around us with iniquity. An effort was made to change our daily area of operations to remedy this, but to no avail.

The only echo-ranging encountered was close to TSUSHIMA IS, and then it passed too far away for identiffic tion.

Shallow water operations in this area constitute a definite hazard and a feeling of uneasiness. The CHINA traffic undoubtedly uses a route inside the KORAN ARCHER-ELACO easily mineable against submarines.

Operations close to the beach of southern approach to SASERO and NAGASAKI, inside 100 fathom curve, were not attempted.

The "WAIEBS" one sinking of an unescorted freighter steering a straight course is considered a freak circumstance reminiscent of the early part of the war and cannot be expected to reoccur.

Although Jap radar is undoubtedly inferior to ours it is still efficient enough to route ships well clear of a submarine through detection of our radar beam. Aircraft radar is considered ineffective, but will still "scare the hell out of you."

The only evasion tactic used was submergence on all aircraft contacts.

— page 211 —
1. Vapor Compressor Stills

Number one and two vapor compressor units failed. Both stills were out of condition for four days. Number two failed first and four hours later number one failed. Upon inspection of number two still the following was found defective: 1. The drive and driven impellers were rubbing. 2. V.C. gear was cored up. 3. V.C. bearing drive end wiped. 4. V.C. bearing gear end wiped. In order to insure proper operation upon repair the above parts were removed plus the following: 1. V.C. seal bushing. 2. V.C. lock nut drive end. 3. V.C. lock washer drive end. 4. V.C. lock washer driven end. 5. Rotary seal. 6. Seal drive end. 7. V.C. seal. 8. Tapered pin. 9. Gaskets on bases of compressors. After assembling the lobes in the case it was impossible to obtain the proper clearances between the lobes and the case. After trying all adjustments, the lobes were aligned properly and the correct clearances were obtained after 48 hours of scraping of the lobes. Approximately .015" was scraped off each lobe. Number two still operates at full capacity.

The casualty to number one compressor was similar to number two, however the impeller shaft was twisted and the impellers were frozen and had been rubbing against the casing. Number one still was rebuilt from used spares. Two bearings, a SKF 305 from the auxili.ry engine spares and a hoover 305 from the electrical were used. This still operated at 66% capacity.

The "TAIL" received these two compressor units from the USS BUSHHELL in Dec. 1943. Our spare impellers did not catch the casing of these compressors. Our vapor compressor spares box is depleted and a new set of spares is needed. It is necessary to have two new compressors installed.

The above parts used are listed on pg. 48 fig. 5 contractors plan no. 2-223 alt. "Instruction for operation and maintenance of vapor compressor stills".

Cause for failure of stills is unknown.

2. High Pressure Air Compressors

The third stage cooler on no. 1 compressor cracked because of vibration. This crack resulted in water leaking into the cylinder. Three rings were broken on the third stage piston and were replaced. The piston rings were worn very thin. All rings in each compressor were installed at

— page 212 —
U.S.S. THALE (SS 239) - Report of Seventh Tar Patrol

2. High Pressure Air Compressors (Cont'd)

The same time, therefore it is desired that a complete new set of rings be installed in all stages of both compressors. The cooler was replaced by the spare. The cooler may possibly be repaired.

3. Corning Tower Hatch Latch

The upper corning tower hatch latch broke. Attempts were made to brace it, but were stopped when the boat devolved endangered the hatch gasket.

4. Pathfinder Head

Prior to departure on patrol on a 300 ft. test dive the fathometer head was forced into forward trim tank. Investigation showed that the studs securing the head to the keel were corroded to about half their original diameter. A new head was installed by the USS SPERRY.

5. The repairs to the S.D. Radar would have been much more difficult to perform had the THALE not had the Submarine Portable Oxy-acetylene Holding Outfit which we drew in Pearl Harbor prior to the start of this run.

(L) RADIO

Reception was fair to good throughout the patrol. The usual Jap interference was encountered especially during reception of submarine schedules. Two lettered serials were missed and several YIKU serials were missed apparently because of failure to repeat all numbers at night that had been sent during the day.

(RADIO)

SD-1 - Although the SD-1 Radar was not continuously operated in the area, it was completely reliable, except for a period of forty hours when the antenna was out. Planes were picked up at an average range of 13 miles. This gives an overall performance of about 12 miles per plane during the last five patrols. YIKU SITA, 6030 feet high, was picked up at a range of 51 miles.

On March 25, it was noticed that the vertical position of the trace was effected by the roll of the ship. Tagger readings were taken from shoes to ground and an intermittent short was detected. It was determined that both conductors were broken and a normal trace resulted only when the broken lines were contacting each other. A one inch strap-iron jury rig hoisting yoke was installed and cable clamps were attached to the hoisting cables as a precautionary measure. This permitted emergency raising or lowering of the mast and facilitated removing conductors from the lower end of the mast. After removing the masthead yoke, it was found that both conductors were broken.

— page 214 —
160 ma, of plate current when the "Fine Frequency Control" was at its end point.

In the area, repeated tunings of the Transmitter-Recovery failed to improve the sensitivity. After a complete check of the Transmitter and the IF amplifier it was found that when the receiver was tuned for maximum echo response the BFO was operating 73 megacycles above 1/2megaton frequency. Due to the emergency nature of the case it was decided to attempt tuning pf the IF receiver even though the proper equipment was not available as part of the ship's allowance of test equipment. By setting the BFO to operate at 60 mcs above the generator and adjusting the tuning slugs of the IF receiver to give maximum voltage drop across the cathode resistor in the final stage of the IF amplifier, maximum echoes could be obtained simultaneously with maximal crystal current. This improved sensitivity 300 per cent.

Low voltage rectifiers tube failures depleted ship's spares to such a point that substitution became a necessity. The octal sockets were removed in favor of four pronged ceramic sockets to accomodate 523 rectifier tubes. It was found that with 523's as rectifiers, higher regulated voltage could be obtained and that it was unnecessary to "tune" the number 2 regulated rectifier in order to eliminate oscillations of the IF amplifier in Range-Indicator.

For the remainder of the patrol the SJ-a gave peak performance. A medium freighter was picked up at 23,250 yds. on the PPI in a rough sea. Side lobes were visible at 14,000 yds. Small trawlers were picked up at 15,000 yds. Small boats were picked up at an average range of 8000 yds. Planes were picked up at 19,000 yds. Land was consistently picked up at ranges of 100,000 yds. to 210,000 yds. Those long range echoes appeared to be rain squalls out after circling weather conditions and navigational position and noting that the true bearing and ranges remained fairly constant it was assumed that these were "secondary" echoes. By calculation, the time between transmitter pulses allowed a main scale range of 115,000 yds. with the transmitter pulse rate set at 1500 cps. The returning echo from one pulse would be indicated on the trace of the following pulse at a position which was equal to the navigational range minus the calculated main scale range (115,000 yds). These long range echoes depended upon atmospheric conditions, and were fuzzy and indistinct. For example, on April 21, SHISHU TO (QUART IS., 6368 feet high) was picked up at 210,000 yds. (navigational range) bearing 3300T. This "secondary echo" appeared at the extreme right hand sea of the main scale. On April 10, upon surfacing, ZHU SHI'A (5030 ft. high) was picked up on the main scale at a range of 85,000 yds. As the range opened the echo moved off the right hand edge of the scale and reappeared at the left hand edge of the trace as a "secondary" echo, which was cut 137,000 yds. At this time a rain squall was encountered and the echo disappeared. On one occasion at least a dozen "secondary" echoes appeared at ranges from 120,000 yds to 160,000 yds. A navigational check corroborated the position and range of these "loops".

— page 215 —
3.0 T. Date Position Character of Liner
2C40 3-29-44 29° 57' N 2° 30' N
129° 20' E 4° 30' E
2026 3-31-44 31° 56' N 2° 30' N
129° 00' E 160° 00' E
1936 4-1-44 31° 12' N 2° 30' N
129° 11' B 2° 30' B
2022 4-6-44 32° 12' N 0.5° Positive gradient to 70°
128° 50.2 B 1° negative gradient from 70° to 305°

No other density layers were experienced by the TILE on her deep or routine dives.

- 27 -

— page 216 —
U.S.S. THALE (SS 239) - Report of Seventh War Patrol

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY.

The health of the officers and men was excellent with the exception of the few cases listed below.

One man suffered from an abscess of the right forearm. It is believed the cause was a small burn which was, outgrown immediately to the attention of the Phis. It was treated with hot, aqnesium sulfate packs and was eventually lanced, hence healing rapidly. The usual number of cuts, bruises, and headaches were encountered.

The food was excellent, and plentiful and well prepared. However toward the end of the run the food began to acquire an 'ice box' taste.

The habitability was good, although it is recommended that ventilation supply forward be reconstructed so more air can get to the forward battery.

A few cocirroaches have been noticed and fumigation is required at the termination of the run.

(Q) PERSONNEL

The personnel situation was very satisfactory during the WHALE's Seventh War Patrol. The expected detachment of two officers and transfer of a number of ratings who have made all seven of the THALE's war patrols still constitute a severe loss at the end of this patrol. Training of reliefs for most of the old hands is proceeding satisfactorily except for quartermasters and signalmen. No amount of drill on a handmade blinker light will produce a signalman who is able to read flashing light from another ship. It is believed that any man who aspires to become a quartermaster or signalman on board a submarine should know how to signal before being transferred to a submarine.

(a) Number of men on board during patrol 72
(b) Number of men qualified at start of patrol 50
(c) Number of men qualified at end of run 60
(d) Number of unqualified men asking their first patrol 7
(e) Number of men advanced in rating during patrol 17

(R) JULES STEAD - FIELD USED.

PEARL HARBOR to MIDWAY
MIDWAY to AREA
In AREA
AREA to TAJURU

Total - 11,620 mi. 124,432 gals.

21,980 gals.
36,130 gals.
24,722 gals.
41,600 gals.

— page 217 —
22*
: 26
: 10
: 30

Total - 58 days

* Includes 5 days delay enroute to and off of MIDWAY due to heavy weather.

(T) FACTS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

| | Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel Factor |
|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|
| 17 | 5,000 gals | 7 days | 10 days | 10 days |

Limiting factor this patrol -

Patrol terminated on [SEPTEMBER 7, 1942] orders from [Comsubpacs].

(U) REMARKS

The Commanding Officer regrets the lack of opportunities to inflict more damage on the enemy.

- 29 -

— page 218 —
35-102/16-3
Serial 026
C-O-N-T-I-D-E-H-T-I-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT TO
CO HULLS report of
Seventh War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division OIC HUNDRED TWO.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TEN.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE - Seventh War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The Whale Seve nth War Patrol covered a period of fifty-eight days, twenty-six of which were spent in the assigned area, the East China Sea.

2. Despite good area coverage, only one contact worthy of torpedo fire was encountered. This contact was a single medium or small freighter proceeding unescorted on a steady course in full moonlight. Heavy seas were running. Seven torpedoes were expended, four in the initial attack obtaining one hit followed by three single torpedo attacks after the first hit had stopped the ship. It is believed that the ship's draft had been overestimated since it was the torpedoes with very shallow depth settings which hit. The ship was sunk with the seventh torpedo.

3. This patrol was particularly arduous due to high winds and heavy seas. It was most disappointing to the new commanding officer due to lack of contacts. In spite of these uncontrollable circumstances, however, the Whale officers and crew returned from patrol in excellent spirits.

4. Refit will be conducted by Sperry in the normal refit period. The unusual vapor-compressor casualties will be investigated and corrective measures applied. All four main engines require overhaul this refit which will be done. It is suggested, however, that hereafter engine hours be controlled so that engine overhauls can be staggered with no more than two engines requiring overhaul in any one refit period, preferably one engine in each engine room.

The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are congratulated upon the completion of this arduous patrol and the sinking of one enemy ship.

— page 219 —
5-10/AL6-3
Serial 094
CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO
CO WHALE 1tr. SS239/
AL6-3, Serial 07,
dated 3 May 1944.

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
U.S.S. VHAIE - Report of Seventh War Patrol Comments on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division One Hundred Two.

2. This is the first patrol for this fighting ship that less than 20,000 tons sunk or damaged has been turned in. However, it is emphasized that this is no reflection on the VHAIE personnel inasmuch as "you can't hit'em if you can't see'em.

3. VHAIE is to be congratulated upon getting all that was possible out of this arduous patrol, and it is recommended that the following damage to the enemy be credited:

SUNK

1 Freighter
Approximately 5,000 tons.

C. F. ERICK.

Copy to:
Consubdiv 102,
CO. VHAIE.

— page 220 —
113 RECEIVED S/C FILES
23RD ROOM 2055
Distribution and authentication of the following page.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTERING PATROL AREA.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
(6 March to 3 May 1944)

1. The seventh war patrol of the WHALE was the first for the new Commanding Officer, as such. The patrol was conducted in the East China Sea.

2. Excellent coverage of the area was made by the WHALE. However, only two contacts worthy of torpedoes were sighted. Unobtrusively the use of enemy shore radar stations contributed somewhat to the lack of targets.

3. The two night attacks made in the early morning of 9 April were aggressively and tenaciously conducted. The WHALE succeeded in damaging a freighter on one attack, following this up by a second attack which caused the ship to explode and sink.

4. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this aggressive war patrol. The WHALE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

SUN
1 - Freighter (class unknown) - 5,000 tons (attacks 1 and 1A).

113 RECEIVED S/C FILES
23RD ROOM 2055
Distribution and authentication of the following page.

Note: This report will be destroyed prior to entering patrol area.

SIGNATURE: [Signature]
Date: 6 March 1944
[Signature]

— page 221 —
12/10/16-3(15)/16)  Serial 0937
COSTFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
WHALE Report of
Seventh War Patrol.
COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 420
U.S.S. WHALE - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
(6 March to 3 May 1944).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
CINO (5)
CinCpac (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ccean Areas (1)
ComServPac (Adv. Base Plan. Unit) (1)
CinClant (2)
ComSubsLast (8)
S/li School, NL (2)
ComSoPac (2)
ComSubsPac (1)
ComSubsotiesPac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
ComNorPac (1)
ComSubsPac (40)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ComSubsPacSubOrdCom (3)
All Squadron and Division Commanders, SubsPac (2)
ComSubsTrainPac (2)
All Submarines, SubsPac (1)

E. L. Hynes, 2nd, Flag Secretary.

— page 222 —
12/10/16-3(15)/16
Serial 0937
Confidential

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
WHALE Report of
Seventh War Patrol.

COLSUSSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 420
U.S.S. WHALE - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
(6 March to 3 May 1944).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
ComInCh (5)
CNO (5)
CinCpac (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean Areas (1)
ComServPac
(Adv. Base Plan. Unit) (1)
CinClant (2)
ComSubsLant (8)
S/L School, NL (2)
ComSoPac (2)
ComSubsVesPac (1)
ComSubsVolvesPac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
ComNcrPac (1)
ComSubsPac (40)
SUBAD, LI (2)
ComSubsPacSubCrdCom (3)
All Squadron and Division
Commanders, SubsPac (2)
ComSubsTrainPac (2)
All Submarines, SubsPac (1)

E. L. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

— page 223 —
1. Enclosure (A), covering the Eighth War patrol of this vessel conducted in the Empire Rotating Area, during the period 28 May 1944 to 16 July 1944, is forwarded herewith.

J. B. GRADY.

Flumed
83179

— page 224 —
U.S.S. THALE (SS 239) - EIGHTH TAR PATROL

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived MAJURO from Seventh War Patrol on 3 May, 1944 and moored alongside SPERRY, using East longitude date and minus eleven time. Decided this was a mistake after missing a luncheon with Commander Submarine Squadron Ten by exactly one hour. He was keeping West longitude date and plus twelve time. Commenced normal two week refit on 3 May, 1944 (West longitude date). JP so and year was installed and all four main engines were re-ringed during refit.

During the refit period Lt-Comdr. W. T. ALFORD, U.S.Navy relieved Lt-Comdr. F. E. JANNEY, U.S.Navy as executive officer and navigator. Lt.(jg) H. D. RACE, USNR was detached and Ensigns K. L. YORK and W. J. FURLONG, USNR reported on board for duty.

Underwent three day training period, consisting of independent ship exercises and practice approaches. No torpedoes were fired. Departure on patrol was twice delayed, once on orders from CTF 17,6 due to an enemy submarine contact in the safety lane, and again when the port stern tube packing wiped two hours after getting underway for patrol.

Ready for sea and underway for patrol at 1300(L), 28 May, 1944, (East longitude date) with CASSIN (DD 372) as escort.

(B) NARRATIVE

29 May, 1944
Underway with escort in safety lane.
0523(L) Lade trim dive.
0540(L) Surfaced.
0550(L) Released escort. Continued up safety lane.

30 May, 1944
Underway in safety lane.
0400(L) Lade trim dive.
0416(L) Surfaced.
1130(L) Cleared safety lane and set course for area in accordance with operation order using constant helm zig.superimposed on Plan #6, which should give the opposition a few headachses.
1500(L) Lade training'dive. Conducted practice approaches for fire control party.
1557(L) Surfaced.

31 May, 1944
0400(L) Lade trim dive.
0415(L) Surfaced.
1123(L) SD contacts on three planes, range 26 miles.
1132(L) SD contacts on three planes, range 26 miles. (Suspect t.ese are ours joing and coming on a MAK raid.)

— page 225 —
1246-52(L) Various SD contacts at about 20 miles.
: 1524(L) Made training dive. Conducted practice approaches for fire control party.
: 1530(L) Surfaced.
: 1540(F) Surfaced.

: 1530(K) Made dive for trim and training fire control party.
: 1624(K) Surfaced.

: 1530(K) Sighted drifting mine in Latitude 25-21.9N, Longitude 154-55.2E. Spherical, with four horns. Heavily encrusted with barnacles. Circled for one half hour firing 20 mm, B.A.R. and tonny guns, but apparently are aren't such good gunners, and the mine was still afloat and apparently undamaged when we continued on our way at 1156(K). Don't like having so many people on deck this close to IARCCS.
: 1530(K) Made training dive. Conducted practice approaches to train fire control party. (Our DRT in the control room makes it easy to simulate approaches).
: 1636(K) Surfaced.

: 1530(K) Made training dive. Conducted practice approaches for fire control party.
: 1558(K) Surfaced.

: 1530(K) Made trim dive.
: 1550(K) Surfaced.

: 1530(K) Took reverse course of probable shipping lane to BONTI'S and WIRITAS.
: 1330(K) Made dive on shipping route. Risk to avoid possibility of air detection. Rounded all torpedoes in anticipation of using a few in the near future.

: 1548(K) Drove for periscope patrol.
: 0553(K) Fix shows us to be twelve miles west of expected route of shipping. Changed course to 030 to close. Taking looks every 10 minutes.
: 1251(K) Sighted aircraft about 7 miles to eastward on southerly course.

— page 226 —
1251(K) Decided this was convoy's air escort and that convoy was passing us by to eastward. Remained submerged until-
: 1617(K) Surfaced and began searching to southeast, putting in a quick charge. Expected air patrols but none developed.
: 1923(K) OOD sighted smoke bearing 0100T, distant 15-20 miles. He are abaft his beam and have considerable running to do. At dusk we lost contact with the smoke. Continued working ahead until-
: 2135(K) Lookout sighted smoke bearing 0160T and shortly afterwards radar contact at 23,700 yards. Only one ship was smoking and this one effectively disclosed the position at two critical times.
: 2154(K) In position ahead, commenced approach. Targets' base course 150, speed 8 knots. Full moon you could read a newspaper by and we are silhouetted by the rising moon.
: 2207(K) Saw white flashers light from convoy immediately followed by 20 depth charges. Another flash after the depth charges. No explanation for this since they continued their course and speed. Apparently they are a bit nervous, or else the are is a friend in the vicinity we are not aware of.
: 2235(K) 4th convoy at 17,000 yards drove to periscope depth on opposite course. At 17,000 yards the arrangement on the PPI occupied a square 1/4 inch on the side. The disposition was impossible to determine.
: 2257(K) Targets in sight in periscope, range 8100 yards. They appear to be in two parallel columns and we are in good position on the port bow of the port column. About this time the moon became obscured by clouds and the visibility was none too good. A total of four freighter were counted in the starboard column and two in the port column, others could have been astern. Character of escorts was undetermined and only three were sighted. All appeared to be Chiodoris or destroyers. One close abo rd the port bow of the leading ship in the starboard column, another close aboard the port bow of the port column leader and the third abo rd of no. two in the port column. The largest ship in sight was the port column leader, a transport of about 10,000 tons. This ship's superstructure covered about one third it's length and it had a low thick stack and very high freeboard. At 4000 yards he escort crossed over ahead to her starboard bow, leaving us a clear field. Commenced firing three torpedo spread at largest ship, torpedo run 950, track 50 port, 25 degrees right yaw.
: 2315(K) Shifted to second target, a PPI freighter in starboard column with practically no freeboard, and fired a three torpedo spread. Star and heard one hit under stalk of first target. Started deep in her direction and rized for depth charge.
: 2317(K) Heard two timed hits on second target.
: 2320(K) Three depth charges, none close.
: 2321-2347(K) Much milling around topside, and we were congratulating ourselves on getting off so lightly when at-
: 2348(K) A string of four fairly close ones were dropped. Secured JB sound head, too noisy.

— page 227 —
8 June, 1944
0012(K) Six depth charges. This guy is improving, as he goes on, and doesn't waste any.
0020(K) Six more, all very close. Apparently a pinger is coaching on the droppers. Have three or four sets of escort screws on various bearings. Any course we take seems to head for a least one of them. Bad leak around # 2 periscope.
0020-0107(K) Much pinging, but no attacks. Secured JK, too noisy. JP doing an excellent job giving us the dope.
0103(K) Screws overhead. A very close string of ten charges in a beautiful run from the port quarter right over us. These were almost too good. They 'malked' firing up to us. (See Section K for damage).
0128(K) About this time BCTYK, the dog, met the first lieutenant. At 415 feet, very heavy. A total negative gradient of 20 from surface to 415 feet aided depth control. Slow negative as gently as possible, started coming up slowly. Previous attempts to use speed in excess of 60 rpm created much noise and brought escorts at once. Elowing turned out to be less noisy and safer. Our shirits and screws are very noisy at any speed over 60 rpm and at any depth down to 415 feet. Trim pump not mentioned because of common knowledge of its noisy character.
0140(K) Nothing on sound. Hope we have lost them.
0155(K) Distant pinging.
0157(K) Faint screws.
0200-0310(K) Clearing area to southeast.
0256(K) Distant depth charge.
0327(K) Surfaced on four main engines. Nothing in sight.
0413(K) Broadcast dope on convoy twice on 450 kcs for benefit of boats to south of us. Changed course to 2700T. Considering the short period until daylight, the lead the convoy has, the expected morning air cover the Commanding Officer did not deem it prudent or wise to attempt to regain contact until damage was inspected and repaired.
0920(K) Heard 16 distant depth charges or bombs.
0930(K) Heard 4 distant depth charges or bombs.
1327(K) Two distant explosions.
2007(K) Surfaced.
2118(K) Received report of crippled freighter in tow 120 miles to north of us. Carnot overtake before daylight. FACHJO JIMA airfield would prevent daylight chase. 'Continued enroute to assigned area.

9 June, 1944
0424(K) Fade SJ contact on TORI SIA bearing 2190T, 5000 yards.
1403(K) SD contact, 30 miles - faded out at 32 miles.
2015(K) Fade trin cive. Safts are very noisy t a y speed over one third.
2140(K) Surfaced.

— page 228 —
10 June, 1944
0408(K) Made trim dive.
0422(K) Surfaced.
1430(K) Set clocks back one hour to Zone -9 time.

11 June, 1944
0440(I) Dove for submerged patrol.
1207(I) Sighted small plane bearing 3150T, 7000 yards.
1246(I) Same or similar plane, 4000 yards coming in. Tent to 150 feet to avoid.
1400(I) Periscope depth. All clear.
1945(I) Surfaced.

12 June, 1944
0430(I) Dove for submerged patrol 60 miles southeast of TOI ISLKI.
0604(I) Sighted "KUEW" type plane bearing 0600T, range about 6000 yards. Tent to 150 feet.
0631(I) Periscope depth. All clear.
0656(I) Sighted distant peaks of KUEW bearing 3070T.
1105(I) Sighted "KUEW" type plane bearing 3030T coming in. Tent to 150 feet.
1140(I) Periscope depth. All clear.
1425(I) Sighted plane bearing 0250T, distance 5 miles. Not identified.
1747(I) Sighted "KUEW" type plane bearing 2820T.
1860-1830(I) Heard 30 distant underwater explosions. Probably depth charges.
1848(I) Sighted "KUEW" type plane bearing 1150T, distance 4 miles.
2005(I) Surfaced. Got our first fix since the 10th, and were only about sixty miles north of where we thought we were.
2209(I) Sighted running lights and heard engine of plane right over us - apparently we were not seen, as he went off.
2303(I) SJ contact on land bearing 3030T, distance 60,000 yards.

13 June, 1944
0000(I) OOD, JOD and one lookout saw torpedo wake pass across bow on 1500 starboard track. Paralleled it and bent on four engines to clear. He had just sighted left radically (using plan 4) and are very glad of it.
0118(I) Sighted large red light bearing 1800T. Suspect it to be a fishing boat of some sort.
0143(I) SJ contact bearing 1640T, range 23,000 yards on same bearing as red light. Connected tracking.
0209(I) Target is hospital ship on steady course 070T, speed 15 knots. Properly lighted - she looks like a Christmas tree and is very large.
0340(I) Saw lights of two planes coming in from 0000T, distance about three miles. Dived to avoid an encountered submerged patrol. There were been few dull moments tonight. He are 40 miles east of TOSKI HINA.

— page 229 —
0500(I) #2 Evaporator out of commission.
1614(I) Sighted two planes (H.P) bearing 2950T, range about twelve miles.
1700(I) #2 Evaporator back in commission.
1825(I) Sighted white smoke bearing 2930T - apparently from the beach.
There is a factory over there.
2P15(I) Surfaced.
2025(I) Sighted flashing white light on beach. It cuts in on the fix as
TOS.KI H.H., but the characteristics are different.
2135(I) Pit log o.t of commission.
2228(I) Pit log back in commission.

14 June, 1944
0027(I) Pit log out of commission. SJ is still out.
0312(I) SJ back in commission.
0416(I) Dove for submerged patrol 50 miles east of TOS.KI H.H..
0530(I) Pit log back in commission.
0710(I) Sighted two planes (D.V.E) bearing 3030T, range 3 miles.
0743(I) Two distant explosions.
0755(I) Three distant explosions.
0800(I) Trim pump out of commission.
0812(I) One more distant explosion.
0958(I) Another distant explosion.
1150(I) Gyro out of commission. 'Out in Auxiliary.
1300(I) Trim pump back in commission.
2020(I) Surfaced.
2100(I) SJ out of commission.
2200(I) SJ back in commission.
2300(I) Found four holding down bolts on reduction gears sheared off.

16 June, 1944
0417(I) Completed repairs to reduction gear.
0421(I) Dove for submerged patrol 60 miles south of ASHIZURI ZAKI.
1447(I) Master gyro back in commission.
2007(I) Surfaced.
2030(I) Trim pump out of commission.
2153(I) Trim pump back in commission.

17 June, 1944
0526(I) Dove for submerged patrol 65 miles south of ASHIZURI ZAKI.
2007(I) Surfaced.
2120(I) SJ out of commission.

— page 230 —
13 June, 1944
SJ back in commission. It has been out of commission about 50 percent of the time since its last depth charging.
Dove for submerged patrol 60 miles south of ASHIZURI ZAKI.
Surfaced.
Sighted plane bearing 320°T, range 6 miles. Dove to avoid.
Surfaced - all clear.
Radar and sound contact at 2500 yards, dead ahead. Put four engines on the line to avoid. Range closed to 1300 yards.
(Visibility was fair but nothing sighted.) Evidently a small patrol boat or a midget. This is the second instance of a night plane contact being followed by a surface or submarine contact - the other was the torpedo fired at us on the 13th. Could be a team.

16 June, 1944
Dove for submerged patrol 60 miles south of FUJINO ZAKI.
Surfaced.

20 June, 1944
Sighted peaks behind 10MT S-1K bearing 020°T, distance twenty miles.
Sighted ship bearing 010°T, range 7000 yards, apparently a patrol boat. Dove for submerged patrol. The SJ showed all clear on both of these contacts - that little confidence we had in it is rapidly disappearing. It has been erratic and unreliable for about two weeks now, which doesn't help much when we try to close the coast.
Two distant explosions.
Two distant explosions.
Suspect the PC may have heard us dive - we make enough noise now to wake anybody up. Anything over 60 rpm makes our shafts howl.
Routined torpedoes.
Surfaced.

21 June, 1944
Dove for submerged patrol 145 miles south of SHINO ISAKI.
Surfaced.

22 June, 1944
Dove for submerged patrol 30 miles east of SHINO ISAKI.
Sighted small sanan bearing 245°T, range 4000 yards. Provided.
Pive distant explosions.
Sight d small fishing boat bearing 210°T, range 7000 yards. Provided.
Surfaced.
Lend contact on SJ bearing 335°T, distance 40,000 yards.

— page 231 —
23 June, 1944
Dove for submerged patrol 25 miles southeast of SHIOWO ISL. K. Surfaced.
JODD sighted coming toward and awash hull of small submarine on starboard quarter, range about 500 yards. ODD and one lookout thought a torpedo passed astern after we had turned away. Cleared area on four main engines.

24 June, 1944
Dove for submerged patrol 60 miles east of SHIOWO ISL. K. JF picked up scores banging 2600T. Put periscope up on that bearing and sighted patrol boat be.ring 2530T, angle on the bow zero, range about 1500 yards. Tent deep (2651) and rigged for silent running. Target passed right over but a.percently did not see or hear us, as he kept right on going.
Periscope depth - all clear. Secured from silent running and resumed patrol.

25 June, 1944
Dove for submerged patrol 30 miles southeast of D.I.O S.K.I. Sighted a tall patrol boat or sanan baring 2840T, range 4000 yards. Ivoided.
Another sanan baring 060T, range 5000 yards.
Various and sundry sanans. Local fishing fleet in action to the south of us. To are about twenty miles south of D.I.O S.K.I. Surfaced.

26 June, 1944
Took sounding with fathometer - 800 fm.
Dove for submerged patrol all rig the hundred fathom curve between D.I.O S.K.I. and O.I.S.K.I.
Sapan baring 0820T, range 4000 yards.
Another sanan.
Two planes (unidentified) baring 0170T, range about twelve miles.
Sapan baring 0310T, range 4500 yards.
Sapan baring 3100T, range 6000 yards.
Sighted light of plane over lend baring 0090T.
Surfaced. Two large searchlights are playing on the clouds astern of us - apparently an airfield.

— page 232 —
28 June, 1944
Dove for submerged patrol sixty miles west of H.M.S. SHII.
Sighted H.M.S. SHII, bearing 056°T.
Sighted H.M.S. SHII, bearing 037°T. Sighted various sampans during
the afternoon.
Pinging loer bearing 205°T - in direction of H.M.S. SHII.
Surfaced.
Reder contact bearing 338°T, range 3400 yards. Closer area on
four engines.

29 June, 1944
Sighted white light bearing 069°T. [apparently sampan]
SD r:car contact, 17 miles. Faded out at 19.
SD radar contact, 7 miles closing. Dove, and at 0908 received
one small bomb - not close. He are 30 miles southwest of
SUISU SHII.
Surfaced.

30 June, 1944
Dove for submerged patrol 30 miles southwest of LOG. SHII.
Sighted LOG. SHII bearing 053°T.
Surfaced 12 miles south of LOG. SHII.
Rader interference, apparently from another SJ.

1 July, 1944
Dove for submerged patrol 40 miles east of H.CHIJO SHII.
Sighted E.CHIJO SHII, bearing 256°T, distance 21 miles.
Surfaced.

2 July, 1944
Rader contact on H.M.S. SHII, bearing 273°T, range 66,000 yards.
Sighted rotating white searchlight on H.M.S. SHII, apparently
in aircraft beacon.
Dove for submerged patrol 25 miles east of H.M.S. SHII.
Surfaced with H.M.S. SHII, bearing 230°T, range 25 miles.
Rader contact bearing 150°T, range 4000 yards. Closer area on
four engines. OOD sighted dark object when r:go closed to
2500 yards.

3 July, 1944
Rader contact bearing 230°T, range 3300 yards. Closer area
on four engines. Nothing sighted although range closed to
2200 yards before we could get going.
Dove for submerged patrol on line between H.M.S. SHII, and E.CHIJO
SHII.
Sighted H.CHIJO SHII bearing 211°T, distance 20 miles.
Sighted sampan bearing 273°T, range 6000 yards. Woided.
Various and sundry sampans.
Surfaced with H.CHIJO SHII, bearing 206°T, range 45,000 yards.

— page 233 —
1944
C059(I) Submerged for periscope patrol 25 miles east of AOGASHINA.
1953(I) Surfaced.

5 July, 1944
0325(I) SD radar contact 9 miles. Dove.
0357(I) Surfaced. All clear.
0430(I) SD radar contact, 12 miles. Dove and decided to stay down for day. We are too close to HACHIJOSEITA to avoid air patrols.
1958(I) Surfaced and set course for KIDAIY.

6 July, 1944
0846(I) Lookout sighted plane bearing 350°T, range about 7 miles. Dived to avoid.
1007(I) Surfaced. All clear.
1600(K) Made training dive.
1720(K) Surfaced.
1750(K) Passed small life raft.

7 July, 1944
1157(K) Lookout sighted plane (HEITY) bearing 355°T, range 15 miles. Dived to avoid.
1236(K) Surfaced. All clear.
1540(K) Made training dive.
1647(K) Surfaced.

8 July, 1944
1530(K) Made training dive.
1647(K) Surfaced.

9 July, 1944
1530(L) Made training dive.
1648(L) Surfaced.

10 July, 1944
1530(L) Made training dive.
1645(L) Surfaced.

11 July, 1944
1701(Y) Arrived 1DAY.

12 July, 1944
1530(Y) Departed 1DAY for PARL ERROR.

16 July, 1944
1030(V-T) Hoored at Submarine Base, P.H., T.H.

- 10 -

— page 234 —
1. SUBJECT: U.S.S. HALE (SS239) - RIGHT WAR PATROL

(C) NEATHER

The weather enroute to the area from MAJURO was moderate. Smooth seas were experienced with the prevailing wind from the NE, average force 2. The average mid-day temperature was 76°F; and the average barometer reading was 29.80".

The weather in the area was good. The weather was in agreement with the data given in the H.O. Publications for this area. The average midnight temperature was 73°F. The average barometer reading was 29.78". Celestial navigation was possible 95% of the time while in the area.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

Currents varied considerably, but were roughly in accordance with the data obtained from the Pilot. Directional arrows on the current chart are reasonably accurate, but in most cases the drift was found to be greater than indicated.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

A flashing white light was sighted on TOSAKI HANA. Its characteristics were three one second flashes followed by a seven second period of darkness.

A revolving aircraft beacon which was visible for about forty miles was seen on AKURA SHIDA.

— page 237 —
5/31/44 : 5/31/44 : 6/7/44 : 6/9/44 : 6/11/44 :
: 1128(L) : 1132(L) : 1251(K) : 1403(K) : 1207(K) :
: 17-51N : 17-55N : 32-13N : 30-44N : 30-26.1N :
: 165-55.5E : 165-45E : 141-43E : 139-24.6 : 133-46.4E :
: 13.5 : 13.5 : 2.1 : 9.8 : 2.3 :
: 295 : 295 : 325 : 320 : 270 :
: Surf : Surf : Per : Surf : Per :
: 0 : 0 : 0 : 0 :
: 4 or more: 1 : 2 : 1 :
: Probably : Probably : Possible : Possible :
: B-24 : B-24 : ARY : FLY-boet : MARY :
: Bomb : Bomb : Possible :
: TAKIS IS. : TAKIS IS. : Esc : Pat : Pat :
: SD : SD : Per : SD : Per :
: 32-26 nt.: 29-19 nt.: 5-7 nt.: 32-24 nt.: 3-4 nt. :
: 50-70 : 50 :
: ND : ND : ND : ND :
: 1 : 1 : 3 : 1 :
: 25 : 25 : 25 : 10 : 10 :
: 7000 : 7000 : 7000 : 3000 : 4000 :
: 3 : 4 : 1 : 10 : 10 :

— page 239 —
6/12/44 : 6/12/44 : 6/13/44 : 6/13/44 : 6/14/44 : 6/14/44
: 1848(I) : 2209(I) : 0340(I) : 1614(I) : 0520(I) :
: 31-13.5N : 32-04.9N : 31-45.2N : 31-46.N : 31-11.5N :
: 131-55.1N : 131-55.0E : 132-28E : 131-50E : 132-42.5E :
: 2.5 : 10.5 : 9.5 : 2 : 2 :
: 090 : 320 : 030 : 270 : 300 :
: Per : Surf : Surf : Per : Per :
: Pat : Pat : Pat : Pat :
: Si : Si : Si : Si :
: Per : Per : Per : Per :
: 2 mi. : 7000 yds. : 12 mi. : 12 mi. :
: 45° : 50° : 70° : 30° :
: ND : ND : ND : ND :
: 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 :
: SS7 : ESR : ESR : ESR : ESR :
: 10 : 7 : 5 : 25 : 20 :
: 5000 : 4000 : 5000 : 4000 : 5000 :
: 10 : 7 : 9 : 4 : 7 :

— page 240 —
6/14/44 : 6/15/44 : 6/18/44 : 6/27/44 :
: 0800(T) : 1305(T) : 0717(T) : 2105(T) : 1010(T) :
: 31-15.4, 31-22N : 31-45N : 31-51.ON:3A-37,AN :
: 132-35.0, 132-215 : 132-36.5E:132-51.5E:137-51E :
: 2.5 : 2.5 : 2.5 : 10 : 2 :
: 300 : 300 : 030 : 020 : 090 :
: Per : Per : Per : Per : Per :
: Pat : Pat : Pat : Pat : Pat :
: Per : Per : Per : Per : Per :
: 8 mi. : 8 mi. : 3 mi. : 4 mi. : 12 mi. :
: 40 : 30 : 10 : 40 : 20 :
: ND : ND : ND : ND : ND :
: 1 : 1 : 2 : 2 : 1 :
: E : E : NNI : RIB :
: 20 : 25 : 30 : 7 :
: 5000 : 5000 : 7000 : 7000 :
: 7 : 6 : 4 : 4 : 5 :

— page 241 —
6/29/44 : 6/29/44 : 7/5/44 : 7/5/44 : 7/5/44
: 04:15(I) : 0907(I) : 0325(I) : 0430(I) : 0846(I)
: 32-23,0N, 31-13,2N, 33-25N, 33-28,2N, 33-26,7N:
: 139-26,2N,139-24,8E,141-02E : 141-55,4B,143-44,9B:
: 2 : 16.5 : 15 : 12 : 16
: 180 : 160 : 310 : 300 : 070
: Per : Surf : Surf : Surf : Surf :
: 25 sec.: 25 sec.: : : : 5 sec.
: 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1
: Unk : Unk : Unk : Unk : Unk
: Unk : Fat : Fat : Pet : Pat
: SD : SD : SD : SD : SD
: 17 mi. : 10 mi. : 9 mi. : 12 mi. : 8000 yds
: : : : : : 50
: ND : Unk : ND : Unk : ND
: 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 2
: 0.5 : 0.65 : 3.45 : 3.45 : 000
: 6000 : 5000 : 7000 : 1000 : 10000
: 2 : 6 : 3 : 6 : 10
: 15 : 7 : 7 : 7 : 10
:

Design of S/I: Canouflage on this patrol
Design 32/9SS

- 18 -

— page 243 —
2314(K) 7 June 1944 31°N 143°-55°E

Target Data - Demarc Inflicted

Description:
Sighted smoke of convoy and made end-around gaining position ahead on track. Tracked by radar from first contact at range of 23,700 yards. As we were silhouetted by a full moon, submerged on opposite of convoy's base course at range of 17,000 yards and conducted periscope approach.

That portion of convoy actually soon consisted of two parallel columns of frigators with four in starboard and two in port column. One escort close aboard port bow of leading ship in each column and on abeam of the last ship in the port column.

Gained position to fire three bow tubes at large Transport which was leading ship in port column then remaining bow tubes at third ship in starboard column. Accepted small track on first target to be able to fire on second target immediately without changing course which would have precluded the possibility of a shot at this target.

For only one hit was obtained. In to the actual track being smaller and range greater than estimated. In the final stages of the approach it clouded over and the moon was obscured making accurate observations difficult.

Ship Damaged:
Estimated uncertain - Large Transport (LP) - 10,000 tons.

Damage Deterrmined by:
Board explosion - saw smoke and debris thru periscope immediately thereafter.

Target Draft 18' Course 165 Speed 8 Range 1150 (at firing)

Own Ship Data
Speed 2 Course 270 Depth 81 Angle 1/2° Down (at firing)

— page 245 —
2316(K) Date: 7 June 1944  Lat: 31°N  Long: 143°-55°E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:
Attack on third ship in starboard column of convoy in attack No. 1. Shifted targets immediately following attack No. 1 and fired three remaining bow tubes.

Ship Damaged:
Estimated uncertain - medium freighter (AK) - 4000 tons.

Damage Determined by:
Explosions tied for torpedo run.

Target Draft: 221 Course 165 Speed 8 Range 2000 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 2 Course 270 Depth 60° Angle 1/2° Down (at firing)

Fire-Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:
Radar - Pariscope - TDC

Tubes Fired:
Tracks - 6
Gyro - 6
Depth - 6
Pwr - 6
Hit or Miss - 6
Grauic (Yes or no) - 6
Mark Torpedo - 6
Serial No. - 6
Mark Exploctor - 6
Serial No. - 6
Ltution Sot - 6
Ltution Cueal - 6
Mark Perhead - 6
Serial No. - 6
Explosive - 6
Firing Interval - 6
Type Spread - 6
Sea Conditions - 6
Ovorhaul Activity - 6

| Type | Contact | Hit | Hit | Hit | Hit |
|------||-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Radar | -      | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| TDC  | 6-4    | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 |
| 6SP  | 13/1L  | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 |
| 10L  | 6      | 6   | 6   | 6   | 6   |
| 6     | 6      | 6   | 6   | 6   | 6   |
| High | High   | High | High | High | High |
| Hit  | Hit    | Hit | Hit | Hit | Hit |
| No   | No     | No | No | No | No |
| 14-3L| 14-3L  | 14-3L| 14-3L| 14-3L| 14-3L|
| 40508| 40508  | 40508| 40508| 40508| 40508|
| 6-4  | 6-4    | 6-4  | 6-4  | 6-4  | 6-4  |
| 12408| 12408  | 12408| 12408| 12408| 12408|
| Contact| Contact| Contact| Contact| Contact| Contact|
| 16-1  | 16-1   | 16-1  | 16-1  | 16-1  | 16-1  |
| 11257| 11257  | 11257| 11257| 11257| 11257|
| TX    | TX     | TX    | TX    | TX    | TX    |
| 0     | 8 sec. | 8 sec.| 8 sec.| 8 sec.| 8 sec.|
| Divergent| 2/0 | 2/0 | 2/0 | 2/0 | 2/0 |
| Moderate| 1/0 | 1/0 | 1/0 | 1/0 | 1/0 |
| USS SPRAY| (.512)| (.512)| (.512)| (.512)| (.512)|

— page 246 —
15-55 S., 15-55 E. It was about six feet in diameter and had four visible horns. It had apparently been in the water for a considerable period of time, as it was heavily encrusted with barnacles and marine growth. An attempt was made to sink the mine by gunfire, using 20 mm and B.A.R. fire, but after 15 minutes the mine was still afloat and we cleared the area, as we did not like having so many men on deck so close to HARCUS.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE LEASURES AND VISION TACTICS

The anti-submarine measures encountered after attacking the convoy the night of 7-8 June were the most accurate this ship has yet encountered. All attacks were coordinated, with one escort sitting out on the beam and coaching the others on. The closest attack was made by a destroyer who came in from the port quarter while our sound men were engaged in other sectors. He dropped a string of ten which walked right up to us and gave us quite a beating. I hate to think of what his eleventh might have done to us had he dropped it. Some of the escorts were apparently listening while others pinged, as our noisy screws drew unwelcome visitors as soon as we speeded up. Our evasive tactics consisted of going deep (350-420) and running as silently as our present condition will permit, which is not very silent.

A small enemy submarine was sighted on one definite occasion in the area close to SHIKO and HOSHIKU and were suspected several other times when we had close radar contacts and one torpedo wake with nothing in sight on clear start-lit nights. We used a radical zig-zag at all times on the surface regardless of visibility, and believe it caused the misses on the two occasions we were fired at.

Enemy aircraft were active at night in the BUNGO SUIDO and approaches but were apparently not equipped with radar since one passed directly overhead without indications of contact. Submarine contacts came one half hour after sighting night flying planes, which might indicate some sort of coordinated search. The CD radar was not used at night at any time in the area.

Aircraft were active during daylight in the vicinity of EICHIJO SHIDO.

— page 247 —
1. Shafts, Propellers and Reduction Gears:

The WALE is a noisy ship. Prior to entry of the area the WALE discovered it had a squeal on the port shaft. The squeal was very strong at 80-90 rpm. After the depth charging on 8 June we had definite vibrations that can be felt throughout the ship when making 70-80 rpm; and it is most difficult to tell which shaft makes the more noise. Strong heavy beats are heard at this speed. So, of this noise could be eliminated if the WALE had modified propellers. The WALE modified propellers were removed 25-26 February, 1944. A strut bearing may have excessive clearances. The reduction gears need a close inspection. Four holding down bolts were sheered off during the depth charging and it is very possible that they are not in alignment. Thrust clearances and back lash readings are necessary.

2. Main Motors

At parallel operation number three main motor carries more of the load than number one main motor. Number three has a squeal at 50 to 70 rpm. This occurred during the depth charging and we do not know as yet which and of the motor is causing the squeal. This squeal may be caused by the reduction gears being out of alignment.

3. Vapor Compressor Stills:

Each still had its compressor changed during the last refit. On the third day of the patrol number two still was in operation and after three hours of making water it had to be secured because the loops were rubbing. The compressor was disassembled and adjustments for proper clearance were made. The still operated 150 hours and again had to be disassembled and readjusted. New gears had to be installed. At the end of the patrol it is operating at full capacity and is running smoothly.

Number one still made a pounding noise after 110 hours of operation and the compressor was removed and clearances taken and proper adjustments made. The still operated satisfactorily for three weeks and then again started pounding. Upon disassembling the drive shaft was found cracked thus new impellers had to be installed, and since we had used the spare gears of the new impellers on number two it was most difficult to get the new impellers and old gears properly timed. The still now runs at full capacity.

This is the second consecutive run the WALE has had to disassemble its stills. It has been noted that at no time were the proper clearances found in accordance with the manufacture's instructions although the compressors were just received from the tender.

— page 250 —
U.S.S. "S23-39" - EIGHTH PATROL

Subject:  Sound conditions and operation were considered normal. On the attack of June 7-8, pinging was detected at 17,000 yards (17-18 kcs) by the JK, and screens at 10,000 yards. The 3D detected screens at approximately 7,000 yards, and the JP at about the same range. JP pinged on this night ranged from 17 to 24 kcs with at least three separate frequencies being used. The JP proved a valuable supplement to our listening gear and during the latter part of the depth charge attack was the only sound gear in operation, the JK and 3D having been secured because of training noises. Maximum effectiveness of the JP could not be realized because of the extreme noisiness of own ships' gear such as bow planes, screws, and trim pump. We did no echo ranging during this patrol.

(D) DENSITY LAYERS

The following density layers were experienced:

| G.C.T. | Date       | Position         | Character of layer          |
|||||
| 0640   | 6-3-44     | 25-43.5 N       | 10° negative gradient from surface to 90° |
| 0600   | 6-4-44     | 27-49.1 N       | 5° negative gradient from surface to 140° |
| 1800   | 6-7-44     | 31-02.2 N       | Isothermal to 80° - 3° negative gradient from 80° to 140° - 2° negative from 140° to 418° |
| 1100   | 6-12-44    | 31-13.5 N       | 4° negative gradient from surface to 120° |
| 1115   | 6-15-44    | 31-38.2 N       | 5° negative gradient from surface to 120° |
| 1057   | 7-5-44     | 33-37.5 N       | 9° negative gradient from surface to 120° |
| 1900   | 7-4-44     | 33-25.5 N       | 5° negative gradient from surface to 130° |

Depth above is given as read on batterygraph card which is set to read from blister

No other density layers of note were experienced by the JK on her deep or routine dives.

— page 251 —
10. High Pressure Air Line:

A slight leak in the high pressure air line from number four air bank which occurred during the depth charging was repaired by ship's force by silver soldering.

(1) RADIO

Reception was good. No serious were missed. 9090 kcs was used most of the time and was by far the best night frequency. However, on several occasions every night P.P.I's 9050 transmitters would either completely cut out for a short period of time or would lose part of its output and leave barely audible signals. In some cases when signal faded out P.P.I. would increase his power and repeat a number of the groups previously sent even to.ough no errors had been made.

The 6630 kcs signal seemed to be under modulated and for this reason was used very little.

No messages were received on 450 kcs but we heard numerous Jap signals. Several nights the Japs sent steadily for four or more hours on this frequency. Numerous times we could hear a transmitter tuning but nothing developed.

The only repairs necessary were the replacement of three oil filled condensers in the R.A. and R.L.

Usual Jap interference was encountered during our only transmission on 4235 kcs but our message got through with very little difficulty.

The increased power now being used on 17370 kcs is a great improvement. It is now a good working frequency where before it was always too weak to use.

(2) RADAR SD-E.

The SD-E radar gave very reliable performance until death charged. We had a normal SD-A radar after leaving the U.S.S. S.S.RHY upon completion of refit. We were getting ranges of 20 to 23 miles on our own patrol planes. After a few days out there appeared an intermittent vortical deflection of the whole sweep on the screen. The receiver indicator was examined and a loose coaxial lead was noticed. Vibrations of this coax caused a variation of the R.P. tuning coil which was corrected to it. Securing the coax and rotating the R.P. was all that was necessary to correct the trouble and improve the equipment to the extent of ranges on planes out to 34 miles. Occasionally planes were picked up between 15 to 26 miles and left before they got in to 15 miles. One plane got into 10 miles before it was first picked up on the SD-A.

— page 252 —
1. U.S.S. THULE (SS239) - EIGHTH WAR PATROL

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HEALTHBILITY

The health of the officers and men during the patrol was excellent with a few exceptions.

The was a slight outbreak of colds at the beginning of the run, however, there were no serious complications. There were several bad boils, resulting in lymphangitis, which were successfully treated with hot soaks and sulfa drugs, and one sprained foot resulted from clearing the bridge on a fast dive. The usual run of cuts, bruises and constipation were encountered.

The food was good considering the type of operations encountered. The small amount of fresh and fresh frozen fruits and vegetables available at loading time was regrettable.

The boat was fairly comfortable most of the time with the exception of a few days succeeding an equalizing charge, when the temperature throughout the boat was fairly high. A booster air conditioning plant installed in the ventilation line forward of the control room would improve matters immensely.

(Q) PERSONNEL

The personnel situation is satisfactory. Recruits obtained from Division 102 relief crews during last refit are above the average.

Twenty ratings were transferred at the end of the last patrol including a number of commissioning personnel. The present satisfactory personnel situation will not continue if so large a loss is a.ain sustained.

The performance of all hands under severe depth charging was exemplary and gratifying.

| Rank | Number of men on board during patrol | 72 |
|------||----|
|      | Number of men qualified at start of patrol | 50 |
|      | Number of qualified men at end of run | 60 |
|      | Number of unqualified men making their first patrol | 13 |
|      | Number of men advanced in rating during patrol | 11 |

(R) TILLS STATED - FULL-BUILT

| Rank | Number of men | 1,418 | 26,083 | 3,039 | 28,632 | 33,545 | 19,824 | 108,084 | 3,045 |
|------||-------|||||||-------|

— page 253 —
10
: 20
: 7
: 4
: 28

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes  Fuel  Provision  Personnel Factor
18  10,000 gals.  10 days  10 days

* Took aboard 15,000 gals at MIDWAY.

Limiting factor this patrol - Operation Order.

(U) REMARKS

No remarks.

— page 254 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY THREE.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239), Report of War Patrol No. 8, SIGHT.

1. The EIGHTH war patrol of the WHALE was of fifty days' duration of which thirty days were spent in the Empire Rotating Areas.

2. The WHALE made 'contact' with one medium-sized convoy, one hospital ship and various patrol craft and A/S vessels. A night periscope attack was made against the convoy on 7 June 1944. Three torpedoes were fired at a large transport and three at a medium-size freighter. One hit was seen and heard in the large transport. Two timed hits were heard on the second target at the WHALE was going deep. From the severity of the depth charging which followed at least one of these ships probably sank.

3. Here again we have further evidence of the use of Japanese submarines as A/S vessels. One torpedo wake was sighted crossing ahead on June 13, and then again on 23 June the conning tower of a small submarine was sighted at a range of 500 yards, with a possible torpedo wake astern. It appears quite plausible that radar-equipped aircraft are spotting submarines in position from which a torpedo attack can be made.

4. Materially, the major defect is the high noise level of the shafts at anything but very slow speeds. All evidence points to mis-aligned shafts and reduction gears.

— page 255 —
1. AF (EU) 10,000 t.c.m.s
: 1 AK MFM (EU) 4,000 t.c.m.s
: 1 AF (EU) 10,000 t.c.m.s
: TOTAL 14,000 t.c.m.s

D. C. WHITE

Copy to:
CO WHALE.

— page 256 —
11/jak
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
19 July 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS "HALE Report of
Eighth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. "HALE - Report of "War Patrol Number EIGHT.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.

2. The excellence of the "HALE's bridge watch not only was responsible for the successful contact with an enemy convoy but undoubtedly saved the ship from enemy submarine and air action.

3. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew on the completion of their eighth consecutive productive war patrol.

C. F. EROCK.

— page 257 —
1-10/A16-3(15)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0511
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
WHALE Report of
Eighth War Patrol.
CO:SUBSEAC PATROL REPORT NO. 476
U.S.S. WHALE - EIGHTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.
(29 May to 16 July 1944).

1. The eighth war patrol of the WHALE was conducted in areas South of the Empire.
2. Prior to entering the area, the WHALE contacted a heavily escorted convoy and conducted an aggressive attack which resulted in damaging two enemy ships. Because of intense enemy anti-submarine activity the results were unobserved. During the time in her assigned area, no contacts were made worthy of torpedo fire.
3. This patrol is designated as "Successful" for Combat Insignia Award.
4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

DAMAGED
1 - Large Transport (class unknown) (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - Medium Freighter (class unknown) (EU) - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 4A)

TOTAL 14,000 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominoch (7)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean Areas (1)
Comservpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Comsubslant (1)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
Comcorpac (1)
Comsubspac (40)
SUBAD, III (2)
ComSubspacSubordocom (3)

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Subspace (2)
Comsubstrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Subspace (1)

E. L. HYNNS, 2nd, PHOTO-LAB. OP-16
Flag Secretary.
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 258 —
SS239/416-3
Serial 017
SS
CONFIDENTIAL
DEUTSCH
From:
To:
Via:
Subject:
Enclosure:

1. Enclosure (1), covering the ninth war patrol of this vessel during the period 21 August to 29 October, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

2. This patrol was conducted in two parts, the first as a unit of scouting lines in connection with the PULU operation and the second as a unit of a coordinated attack group operating in the "CONVOY COLLEGE" areas south and west of FORIOSA.

J. B. GRIDY.

FKLMD
03740

— page 259 —
21 August, 1944

Ready for sea and underway for patrol in company with SE.HORSE and SEGUNDO as part of a coordinated attack group under command of Captain C. T. THIKINS, USN, OTC in SE.HORSE. THILE operating as task unit 17.18.7.

(B) NARRATIVE

21 August - 3 September, 1944
Enroute S.I.P.N. Conducted training exercises with SE.HORSE and SEGUNDO.

3 September, 1944
0515(I) Made rendezvous with escort U.S.S. DODES (DD 375) and proceeded to S.I.P.N.
1033(I) Ordered in next alongside HOLLAND at TANFAG HARBOR, S.I.P.N., GIRLINGS ISL.NDS. Submarines REDFISH and PICUDA also present. Received 40,000 gallons of diesel oil from HOLLAND and repairs to low frequency side of radio transmitter. Group Commander held short conference on pack procedures and communications. Communications enroute S.I.P.N. had been generally satisfactory but the large number of frequencies which have to be guarded required some changes in frequency plans.

Commanding Officer of HOLLAND arranged for a short tour of S.I.P.N. via jeep. The destruction wrought by our forces is unbelievable until actually seen. We certainly did not envy our army (Cont'd)

— page 260 —
0810 Underway for patrol in company with other "BEGINS" clearing SAIPAN via western safety line with HED (Ate 100) as escort.
1213 Sighted U.S. Task Force consisting of various carriers, cruisers, tankers, and destroyers headed in direction of SAIPAN.
1324 Made trim dive.
1337 Surfaced.
1410 Escort left formation and headed back to S.I.P.N.

5 September, 1944
1052 Cleared safety lane. Proceeding independently heading for rendezvous with E.R.BERO.
1836 Made trim dive.
1910 Surfaced.
2130 Exchanged calls with SEALION.

6 September, 1944
0435 Made trim dive.
0516 Surfaced.
0910 Sighted plane bearing 260T, distance 12 miles. Submerged.
1144 Surfaced.
1215 Sighted plane bearing 300T, range 12 miles. Submerged.
1251 Surfaced.
1511 SD radar contact - 17 miles. Submerged.
1549 Surfaced.

7 September, 1944
0620 Made trim dive.
0703 Surfaced.
1000 Sighted plane bearing 140T, range 12 miles. Submerged.
1136 Surfaced.
1232 Submerged to check for air leaks.
1244 Surfaced.
1526 Submerged to check for air leaks.
1537 Surfaced.
1605 Stopped. Flooded down to check for air leaks.
1615 Flooded down to top of shears. Leaks are from vicinity of 40 mm mount.
1625 Surfaced.
Believe all plane contacts to date have been friendly.

8 September, 1944
0432 Made trim dive.
0455 Surfaced.
1200 Heard about carrier strike on P.I.U over broadcast from San Francisco.
1237 Submerged.
1350 Sighted S.I.R. ISLAND, P.I. bearing 241T, distance 45 miles.

— page 261 —
1914: Surfaced.
: 1930: Made contact with BURRO. Commenced maneuvering to close.
: 2030: Launched rubber boat to deliver package to BURRO.
: 2050: Recovered rubber boat. Set course for waiting area.

: 9 September, 1944
: 0636: Made dive to effect repairs to emergency I.C. panel in control room.
: 1340: Panel back in commission.
: 1416: Surfaced.
: 1900: Arrived on station in waiting area.

: 10 September, 1944
: 0300: Commenced st steering north-south courses in accordance with instructions of Bear Pack Commander.
: 1312: Made training dive. To still have air leaks.
: 1325: Surfaced and then flooded down again to determine cause of air leaks. Bubbles were found to be coming from #1 periscope shears and from guard rail around the lookout platform.
: 1345: Surfaced. Removed upper handhole plates in shears and drilled vent holes in guardrail to remedy air leaks.

: 11 September, 1944
: 1515: Made training dive.
: 1526: Surfaced.

: 12 September, 1944
: 0626: Contact on SD radar. This developed into several planes from 4 to 40 miles. All showed friendly on IFF. Visibility is poor.
: 0648: Submerged to let friendly planes clear area.
: 0756: Surfaced. Friendly planes still around. Exchanged recognition signals by light with two scout bombers. While submerged decoded several messages affecting our operations, one changing initial point of Zoo scouting line and one telling of friendly forces operating in this area. Set course for new position on scouting line to arrive by 0500, 13 September, 1944.
: 0944: Lookout thought he saw a plane fall into water bearing 110T, distance about 12 miles. Went to flank speed and headed over to investigate. Listened in on all possible frequencies for information, but heard nothing.
: 1025: Nothing in sight. Commenced rotating search of area.
: 1145: Completed search. Set course for position on scouting line.

: 13 September, 1944
: 0500: Took station on scouting line and commenced patrolling station on courses 055T and 235T in accordance with operation order.
: 0725: Sighted two unidentified single engine land planes bearing 190T, range twelve miles. Received nc IFF response. Planes turned toward and closed to six miles.
: 0731: Submerged.
: 0628: Surfaced. All clear. These were probably friendly planes, but we had know way of proving it. Tried to send contact report to

— page 262 —
0628
CONSUMPTION of Commander THIRD FLET, but no results. Continued attempts to transmit on various frequencies for seven hours, when a receipt was finally received from IPM.
1323 Received contact report from SQUAD SEIZING that she had been strafed by two planes - could be our contact as his time was one hour later than ours.

0730 SIGHTED two planes bearing 1957, range twelve miles.
0740 Submerged to avoid detection.
0839 Surfaced. [ILL clear.]
1145 Received news of carrier attack on VIS.IN ISL.INS from San Francisco.

15 September, 1944
1107 Made trim dive.
1148 Surfaced.

16 September, 1944
1239 Made trim dive.
1219 Surfaced.

17 September, 1944
1000 Received despatch changing position of BARR PIT to Lat 21-10 N, Long 126-10 E, and exits of line to 070°T - 250°T.
1214 Made trim dive.
1306 Surfaced.
2000 Received orders from SEALCRESER carrying change of station.

18 September, 1944
0839 Made trim dive.
0950 Surfaced.
1200 Set course for new scouting line position.

19 September, 1944
0526 Made trim dive.
0543 Surfaced.
1407 SD radar contact - 10 miles. Faded out almost immediately and was not sighted.

20 September, 1944
1618 Made trim dive.
0642 Surfaced.
2030 Arrived on station on new scouting line and commenced scouting in accordance with despatch orders from Zookeeper.

21 September, 1944
0514 Submerged for periscope patrol across route of reported enemy submarine.
1210 Surfaced.

— page 263 —
2300 within fifteen feet this time. Light again disapeared when close aboard and reappeared astern. No explanation. Our guess - man with watertight flashlight who didn't desire rescue by us. Continued toward patrol station south of G.R.M. BI.

27 September, 1944

0235. JR picked up strong signal on 153 meg increasing in intensity. Possible plane contact on SJ. Submerged.

0348. Surfaced. With contact on SJ closing fast from 11,000 yards to 8,000 yards and strong 153 meg signal on JR, submerged. Decided this was enough and we would stay down.

0915. Sighted smoke through periscope bearing 070T drawing to north.

0935. Surfaced to investigate smoke. Vessel in sight through high periscope appear to be a trawler. Enjoyed the fresh air until sighted small float plane heading our way. Submerged.

1009. One medium bomb fairly close. No damage.

1012. Heard echo ranging bearing 116T.

1110. Sighted mast bearing 115T. Looks like a patrol boat. This patrol craft, a small PC type, searched the area in our vicinity until 1500. While evaded b. running silent under c. ten degree density layer when he came close.

1150. Heard numerous distant explosions - apparently somebody else has visitors.

1640. Heard echo ranging again - apparently our friend is back.

1648. Sighted small patrol boat bearing 023T.

1740. More distant explosions.

1756. Sighted fleet plane bearing 000T, range about six miles.

1805. Two explosions at medium range, apparently one bomb and one depth charge.

1845. Lost contact with patrol boat.

1949. Surfaced. Secured SJ during moonlight. Named JR and SJ receiver to detect enemy radar. A peaceful night resulted.

28 September, 1944

0226. Sonset. Commenced sweeping with SJ at fifteen minute intervals.

0556. Submerged for periscope patrol 60 miles south of POROSI.

1950. Surfaced in bright moonlight and headed for rendezvous point. Using JR and SJ receiver to detect enemy radar.

2255. Took signal on JR on 153 meg. Signal increased in strength until at.

2339. Submerged to avoid detection.

29 September, 1944

0016. Surfaced and headed for rendezvous. Sweeping with SJ at fifteen minute intervals.

0400. Tent close aboard SHORSE and received written instructions for conducting remainder of patrol in areas 11 Detect and 11 Delete. GROUPER has been detached from "HELRSM".

— page 264 —
22 September, 1944

0549 Made trim dive.
0606 Surfaced.
1710 Made trim dive.
1838 Surfaced.

23 September, 1944

0500 "CONVOY COLLEGE" detached from "200" to enter CONVOY COLLEGE, SEARCHES and GROUP moved up to fill gaps in forward scouting line.
0607 Made trim dive.
0639 Surfaced.
1603 Sighted plane bearing 340T, range seven miles. Submerged.
1838 Surfaced. Ill clear.

24 September, 1944

0643 Made trim dive.
0702 Surfaced.
1118 SD radar contact, ten miles. Not sighted. Submerged.
1111 One bomb explosion at medium range.
1207 One distant explosion.
1754 Surfaced.
1832 Sighted twin engine plane bearing 310T, range eight miles. Submerged.
2030 Received orders to disembark "200" and proceed to "CONVOY COLLEGE" as a coordinated attack group of four submarines called the "BENIS". Movement to commence at 0900, 25 September, 1944.

25 September, 1944

0618 Made trim dive.
0849 Surfaced.
1830 Entered Convoy College area.

26 September, 1944

0612 Made trim dive.
0631 Surfaced.
0728 Sighted plane bearing 310T, range eight miles. Submerged.
0925 Surfaced. Ill clear.
1021 Sighted Y/MI Island of Betan Island group bearing 23CT, distance 41 miles.
1130 Sighted plane bearing 035T, range eight miles. Submerged.
1943 Surfaced in middle of Bash Channel.
2109 Radar contact bearing 346T, range 12,000 yards closing rapidly. Had strong signal on PR at the same time on 153 mugs. Submerged.
2135 One distant explosion. (Probably a depth charge)
2252 Surfaced.
2300 Sighted small white light in bright moonlight at about 1000 yards range. Closed to investigate. Then close aboard, light disappeared. Nothing sighted. Light reappeared eastern close to track. Circled, put light in the moonshine and came close aboard again. Passed.

— page 265 —
2300 within fifteen feet this time. Light again disappeared when close aboard and reappeared astern. No explanation. Our guess - man with watertight flashlight who didn't desire rescue by us. Continued toward patrol station south of G.R.N. BI.

27 September, 1944
0235 JR picked up strong signal on 153 mags increasing in intensity. Possible plane contact on SJ. Submerged.
0348 Surfaced. With contact on SJ closing fast from 11,000 yards to 8,000 yards and strong 153 mags signal on JR, submerged. Decided this was enough and we would stay down.
0915 Sighted smoke through periscope bearing 070° drawing to north. Surfaced to investigate smoke. Vessel in sight through high periscope appears to be a trucker. Enjoyed the fresh air until sighted small fleet plane heading our way. Submerged.
1009 One medium bomb fairly close. No damage.
1012 Heard echo ranging bearing 116T.
1110 Sighted mast bearing 115T. Looks like a patrol boat. This patrol craft, a small PC type, screened the area in our vicinity until 1500. The vessel was running silent under a ten degree density layer when he came close.
1150 Heard numerous distant explosions - apparently somebody else has visitors.
1640 Heard echo ranging again - apparently our friend is back.
1648 Sighted small patrol boat bearing 023T.
1740 More distant explosions.
1756 Sighted fleet plane bearing 000T, range about six miles.
1805 Two explosions at medium range, apparently one bomb and one depth charge.
1845 Lost contact with patrol boat.
1949 Surfaced. Secured SJ during moonlight. Janned JR and SJ receiver to detect enemy radar. - peaceful night resulted.

28 September, 1944
0226 Moonset. Commenced sweeping with SJ at fifteen minute intervals.
0556 Submerged for periscope patrol 60 miles south of POROSIA.
1950 Surfaced in bright moonlight and headed for rendezvous point. Using JR and SJ receiver to detect enemy radar.
2255 Weak signal on JR on 153 mags. Signal increased in strength until at
2339 Submerged to avoid detection.

29 September, 1944
0016 Surfaced and headed for rendezvous. Sweeping with SJ at fifteen minute intervals.
0400 Tent close aboard SEHORSE and received written instructions for conducting remainder of patrol in areas 11 Detect and 11 Delete. GROUPER has been detached from BEAR.

— page 266 —
1. Set Course for newly assigned station southwest of FORTOSA.
: 2. Submerged for periscope patrol 100 miles southwest of FORTOSA.
: 3. Surfaced and headed for new section of area in accordance with instructions received from Commander BURNS at last night's rendezvous. Using AAR and SJ receiver to detect enemy radar.
: 4. Radar interference on AAR at 153 mks. Interference increased in strength until at
: 5. Submerged to avoid detection.

30 September, 1944

: 0300 Surface.
: 0203 Interference on AAR at 153 mks getting stronger rapidly.
: 0205 Submerged to avoid detection.
: 0310 Surfaced.
: 0528 Lookout sighted what appeared to be a plane heading towards us from dead eastern. Submerged. There was no indication of enemy radar.
: 1947 Surfaced.
: 2301 Radar interference on AAR at 153 mks. Interference increased in strength until at
: 2313 Submerged to avoid detection.
: 2315 Received message from Commander BURNS designating areas for 3, 4, 5 and 7 October.
: 2345 Surfaced.

1 October, 1944

: 0338 Interference from another SJ in the vicinity.
: 0415 SJ radar contact bearing 000T, range 5900 yards. Exchanged radar recognition signals and calls with SEGUNDO.
: 0632 Lost radar contact on SEGUNDO.
: 0710 Sighted plane bearing 250T, range 6 miles. Submerged.
: 1014 Surfaced.
: 1410 Heard three distant explosions.
: 1659 Received orders from Commander BURNS to form scouting line. Set course for new position.
: 1718 Sighted plane bearing 090T, range 6 miles.
: 1909 Surfaced in the first heavy seas of the patrol.
: 1925 Interference on SJ.
: 1945 Exchanged radar recognition signals and calls with SEGHORSE.

2 October, 1944

: 0447 Received message about hospital ships from Commander BURNS with orders to resume normal station assignment. Set course for station.
: 0750 SD radar contact, 24 miles. Submerged.
: 0958 Surfaced.
: 1011 SD radar contact, 6 miles. Submerged.
: 1443 Surfaced. Had an immediate SD contact at 6 miles so at 1444 Went back down again. Surface patrol during daylight is difficult if not altogether impossible.
: 1932 Surfaced.

— page 267 —
1956 Dove for plane on APR.
2023 Surfaced.
2043 Dove for plane on APR.
2147 Surfaced.

1 Oct. 1944

0001 Dove for plane on APR.
0113 Surfaced.
0603 Dove for periscope patrol 60 miles north of CAPE BOYDOR, LUZON.
1944 Surfaced in rough seas.
2304 Received orders from Commander BEARS designating patrol stations for remaining time in area.

4 Oct. 1944

0029 Dove for plane on APR.
0156 Surfaced.
0608 Dove for periscope patrol 60 miles north of C.FE BOYDOR, LUZON.
1924 Surfaced.

5 Oct. 1944

0047 Dove for plane on APR.
0158 Surfaced.
0245 Received message from Commander BEARS regarding extension of time in area.
0600 Dove for periscope patrol 15 miles west of C.I.Y.N. IS., 3.BUY.N ISLAND GROUP.
0645 Sited DALUPIRI ISLAND bearing 1557.
1946 Surfaced.
2030 Received message from Commander BEARS with instructions to search lanes to western limit of area.

6 Oct. 1944

0530 Received message from Commander BEARS to conduct search to north of Latitude 19-20 N, Longitude 118-15 E. Put four engines on the line and started heading west - we have seventy-five miles to go.
1027 In position. Commenced scouting east and west on two hour legs. Visibility varying constantly - light rain squalls and mist.
1215 SJ radar contact bearing 0607, range 27,000 yards. Commenced tracking. Sent contact report on peck frequency.
1230 Sighted dim shape of several ships through high periscope. Convoy now appears to be on course 1907, speed 10 knots. Transmitted this information to pack. Receipted for by SEARSE only. Radar shows at least nine ships, possibly more. We can make out two large tankers, and one large tender - type through high periscope.
1336 Nearest escort now 15,000 yards. Ships in sight from bridge. Visibility is opening out rapidly.
1339 With range to nearest large ship 22,000 yards sent message, "diving for attack", and did so.
1356 Can see one large tanker with periscope. No other large ships seen during attack. There they went in a mystery. Eventually saw two

— page 269 —
8 October, 1944

0832 Ride trim dive.
0849 Surfaced.
1125 Picked up life ring in Latitude 19-22 N, Longitude 118-38 E. This is about ten miles from where we sank the tanker on the sixth.
1900 Received orders from CO:SUBP.C to patrol safety lane west of 122 E from 11 to 14 October.
2100 Received orders from CO:SUBP.C to rendezvous with SHPO and C.BRILL. Set course for rendezvous.

9 October, 1944

0000 SJ radar contact bearing 101T, range 28,000 yards. Commenced tracking.
0038 Contact identified as a properly marked hospital ship on course 010T, speed 14 knots. Discontinued appro-ch.
0040 Received message from unknown originator in aircraft code giving position of three freighters. Set course 230 at four engine speed to attempt interception. Sent message to SHPO and C.BRILL. Delaying rendezvous until tomorrow night.
0440 Commenced scouting along reverse of convoy's reported track at two engine speed.
1003 Ride trim dive.
1025 Surfaced. Set course for rendezvous point.
1138 Plane contact on SD, range 12 miles. Submerged.
1235 Surfaced.
1505 SJ radar contact, 17,000 yards closing rapidly. Submerged.
1622 Surfaced.
2130 Rendezvoused with SHPO in Latitude 19-45 N, Longitude 119-35 E. 2230-2340 Transferred THREET, Lamine (n), 368 66 591, Moult (T), USN via rubber boat to SHPO for further transfer to SHPO for medical treatment. Delivered copies of all effective Submarine Area Notices, Cinepac Zone Notices and pertinent dispatches to SHPO.

10 October, 1944

0000 Rendezvoused with C.BRILL. In Latitude 19-51 N, Longitude 119-38 E. Delivered copies of all effective Submarine Area Notices, Cinepac Zone Notices and pertinent dispatches via heaving line.
0135 Set course for patrol station.
0611 Submerged to routine torpedoes.
1005 Surfaced.
1006 SD radar contact, 6 miles. Submerged.
1233 Surfaced.
2130 Sighted exhaust flare of plane bearing 315T, range about 7 miles. Submerged.
2349 Surfaced.

11 October, 1944

0312 Exchanged SJ recognition signals and calls with BL.CK.FISH.
0750 SD radar contact, 30 miles. Submerged.
0900 Surfaced.
1525-1545 Various SD contacts milling around at 25-35 miles. One of them closed to 16 miles, so at

— page 270 —
1546 Submerged,
1752 Surfaced.

12 October, 1944

0250 Dov for plane on PR.
0332 Came up to 40 feet. Plane is still around as the interference on the PR is very strong.
0407 One distant explosion.
0418 Surfaced. Heard our planes talking on lifeguard frequency. Continued to hear them most of the day.
0800 3 SD radar contacts between 10 & 13 miles. Submerged.
0830 Surfaced.
0835 Sighted ship bearing 115T, range about 14,000 yards. Target came out of a poor background and was sighted by high periscope and bridge watch almost simultaneously.
0837 Submerged. Commenced approach.
0900 Target looks like a minelayer, but is not like any in our book. She has twin 5" mounts forward and aft, and a large stack just forward of her mainmast. She looks to be about 2500 tons. Angle on the bow is large.
0942 Broke off approach, minimum range 5000 yards. She plots on a base course of 300T at about twelve knots - may be faster.
1018 Surfaced to attempt end-around. Set course 310T at three engine speed.
1110 Nothing sighted. Changed course to 345T in case she headed up for UKNO.
1243 Still nothing sighted. She was zigging with no apparent plan, but don't see how she could have disappeared so fast. Quite a disappointment, as it was a nice target with no escorts and apparently no sound gear.
1602 Sighted plane bearing 195T, range 10 miles. Submerged.
1724 Surfaced.
2045 Radar contact bearing 140T, range 26,000 yards. Commenced tracking. I have some interference at 153 mags on the PR, so this may be a plane.
2110 Seized tracking target is two planes.

13 October, 1944

0306 Dove for plane on PR.
0338 Surfaced.
0700 Heard our planes talking on lifeguard frequency. This continued for several hours.
0920 SD radar contact, range 8 miles. Submerged.
1018 Surfaced.
1508 Sighted plane bearing 315T, range 12 miles. Submerged.
1630 Surfaced.
2100 Received orders to proceed to INDY for raft.

14 October, 1944

0723 SD radar contact, 10 miles. Submerged.
0918 Surfaced. Seas are increasing, and we are taking some water down the hatch.

— page 271 —
1030 SD contact, 20 miles. Faded out at 23 miles.
: 1143 SD contact, 6 miles. Submerged and had considerable difficulty getting down.
: 1352 Surfaced in BASHI CHANNEL and started heading for the barn.

15 October, 1944

0000 Making passage through BASHI CHANNEL en route MIDWAY.
0619 Made trim dive.
0632 Surfaced.
0857 SD contact, 30 miles. This was the first of many plane contacts which harassed us all day. None showed IFR. The were forced down four times during daylight.
2002 Made radar contact on friendly force. Radar ranges over 40,000 yards - either these are very large ships or we have the best SJ in the force.
2300 Received orders to take new station at southwest end of BASHI SHOT in anticipation of Jap Fleet sortie.

16 October, 1944

0031 Made first of several dives for a persistent plane on the ATR. Apparenty the Japs are doing a thorough job of scouting this area tonight.
0736 SD contact, 10 miles. Submerged.
1854 Surfaced.
2112 Dove for plane on ATR.
2150 Surfaced.

17 October, 1944

0429 Dove for plane on ATR.
0520 Surfaced.
0529 Dove for plane on ATR.
0543 Surfaced.
0737 SD contact, 6 miles. Submerged.
1905 Surfaced.
2345 Dove for plane on ATR.

18 October, 1944

0030 Surfaced.
0414 Dove for plane on ATR.
0502 Surfaced.
0530 Received orders from CSUSUP to leave station and head for MIDWAY. Set course for safety lane.
0628 SD contact, 4 miles. Submerged.
0935 Surfaced.
1641 SD contact, 6 miles. Submerged.
1739 Surfaced.

19 October, 1944

0602 Made trim dive.
0617 Surfaced.
0918 SD contact, 8 miles. Submerged.
1005 Surfaced.

— page 272 —
20 October, 1944

0745 Made trim dive.
0758 Surfaced.
1110 SD contact, 30 miles. Faded out at 20 miles.
1156 SD contact, 26 miles. Came in to 15 miles and then faded out at 30 miles.

En route MIDWAY.
29 October, 1944.

1100 Arrived MIDWAY.

— page 275 —
1 2 3 4 5
Date 9/2/44 9/2/44 9/3/44 9/3/44 9/4/44
Time (Zone) 0840(-10) 1415(-10) 0700(-9) 0720(-9) 0650(-9)
Position: Lat. 17-20N 17-13N 16-15.6N 16-16N 15-10N
Long. 149-14.5E 148-37.2R 145-15E 145-16E 143-48.7E
Speed 12 kts. 12.5 kts. 18 kts. 15 kts. 12 kts.
Course 255 255 150 155 270
Tria Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf
Minutes Since Last
SD Radar Search 1 1 1 1 1
Number 1 1 1 1 1
Type PR PR PR B24 PB!
Probable Mission Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat
How Contacted Sight Sight Sight Sight Sight
Intitial Range 17 mi. 15 mi. 18 mi. 17 mi. 14 mi.
Elevation Angle 10 3 3 5
Range & Relative
Bearing of Plane 14 mi. 6 mi. 10 mi. 10 mi. 8 mi.
Then it Detected 340 225 000 000 270
S/N:
(State (Beau-
Sea: (fort) 0 0 1 1 1
(Direction(Rel) 270 270 240 240 290
Visibility (Illes) 9 9 7 5 5
Clouds: (Flt. 3000 2000 2000 2000 3000
(Percent
Overcast 5 5 10 6 7
(Staring(Rel) D D D D D
'oon:(Anle 1 1 1 1 1
(Percent 1 1 1 1 1
Illum.

Type of S/M Canouflage on this patrol Design 32-3SS-B

— page 276 —
6 7 8 9 10 11
Date 9/5/44 9/5/44 9/5/44 9/5/44 9/6/44 9/6/44
Time (Zone) 0642(-9) 1450(-9) 1452(-9) 1452(-9) 1215(-9) 1511(-9)
Position: Lat: 15-34.2N 15-48.8N 15-48.8N 15-48.8N 15-03.5N 15-00N
Long: 140-525 139-118 139-118 139-118 135-208 139-50.3E
Speed 14.5 Kts, 14 Kts, 14 Kts, 15 Kts, 15 Kts
Course 297 258 258 258 260 260
Td/m Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf
Minutes Since Last 0 0 0 0 0
SD Radar Search

Number 1 1 1 1 1 1
Type B24 Unk 324 Unk Unk Unk
Probable Mission Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat
For Contacted SD Slqht SD SD Slqht SD
Initial Range 12 mi. 21 mi. 20 mi. 20 mi. 12 mi. 20 mi.
Elevation Angle 8 8 Unk Unk 4 Unk
Range & Relative
Bearing of Plane 10 mi. Unk 9 mi. Unk Unk Unk
Than it Detected 359 030
S/L:
(State (Beaufort) 0 0 0 0 6 0
Sea: (direction(Rel) 290 270 270 270 270 .270
Visibility (Miles) 9 9 9 9 9 9
(Height in
Clouds: Ft. 2000 2000 2000 2000 3000 2500
(Forecast
Overcast 6 4 4 3 4
(Bearing(Rel) D D D D D
Moon(angle 4 4 4 4 4 4
(Fercent Y Y Y Y Y
Illum.

Type of S/L: Canouflage on this patrol Design 32-3SS-9

— page 277 —
12 13 14 15 16
: 9/7/44 9/12/44 9/13/44 9/14/44
: 1000(-9) 0628(-9) 0810(-9) 0725(-9) 0730(-9)
: 14-21, 21-36 11-33, 30N 11-30N 14-38, 48N
: 131-33, 18 127-49, 38 127-42, 122-32, 128 127-37, 30E
: 14 kts. 11 kts. 11 kts.
: 258 200 000 235 235
: Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf
: 1 0 1 1 1
: 1 3 2 2
: Unk Unk SB2o Urk Unk
: Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat
: SD,SJ & SIGHT SD SIGHT SIGHT SIGHT
: 4,8 10 - 12 mi. 12 mi. 12 mi. 12 mi.
: 12 mi. & 14 mi. 35 mi. 12 mi. 12 mi.
: 1 1/2
: Unk Unk 7 mi. 12 mi. ND
: 270
: 2 1 1
: 250 300 300 300
: 9 5 6 9 6
: 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
: 5 10 10 7 10
: D D D D D
: Y Y Y Y Y

* Numerous friendly carrier based planes.
Type of S/S Camouflage on this patrol Design 32-38S-B

— page 278 —
17 18 19 20 21
: 9/14/44 9/23/44 9/24/44 9/26/44
: 1913(-9) 1603(-9) 1138(-9) 1832(-9) 0728(-9)
: Lat, 14-37, 12N 24-11, 2N 24-10, 30N 24-14N 24-36N
: Long, 127-37, 30E 126-31E 126-27E 126-42, 3E 127-40, 6E
: 8 kts. 8 kts. 7 kts. 8 kts. 14 kts.
: 235 070 250 070 250
: Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf
: 5 sec. 5 sec. 5 sec. 5 sec. 5 sec.
: 00 out 30 sec. out 30 sec. out 30 sec. out 30 sec.
: 1 1 1 1 1
: Unk Unk Unk Unk
: Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat
: SJ Sight SD Sight Sight
: 13 mi. 8 mi. 10 mi. 8 mi. 15 mi.
: Hink 5 Unk 1 1
: Unk ND 10 mi. 10 mi. 10 mi. 10 mi. 10 mi.
: 1 4 3 2 3
: 360 080 140 070 010
: 3000 2000 2000 2000 2000
: 8 5 3 2 3
: 5 5 5 5 5
: 5 5 5 5

— page 279 —
22 23 24 25 26 27

Date: 9/26/44 9/26/44 9/27/44 9/27/44 9/27/44 9/27/44

Tiro (Zone): 1130(-9)2110(-9) 0235(-9)0412(-9) 1009(-9) 1756(-9)
Position: Lat. 21-27N 21-16.5N 21-10F 21-09.1N 21-08.8N 21-09.5N
Long. 122-113 121-41E 121-15E 121-02.1E 121-01.3E 120-00.8E

Speed: 14 kts 13 kts 3 kts. 8 kts 17 kts 2 kts.

Course: 255 240 250 260 220 220

Trin: Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf Per
Minutes Since Last
SD Radar Screen: 0

Number: 1 Unk. Unk. Unk. 1 1

Type: Unk. Unk. Unk. VLF. PSIP

Probable Mission: Pat. Pat. Pat. Pat. Pat. Pat.

How Contacted: Sight SJ Air. SJ Sight Sight

Initial Range: 15 mi. 6 mi. 6 mi. 18 mi. 5 mi.

Elevation Angle: 3i Unk. Unk. Unk. 2 3

Range & Relative
Bearing of Plane ID 6 mi. Unk 8 mi. 12 mi. Unk
Terr it Detected 096 350 000
S/I

(State (Beaufort) 2 2 2 2 2
Sea (Direction(rel) 190 305 290 290 290 330
Visibility (Miles) 30 5 4 5 30 30
Clouds: (Pft. 6500 6500 6000 5000 3000 3000
(Percent
Overcast 4 2 2 2 2 2
(Bearing (Rel) D D D D
Moon (Angle A A A A
Percent Illum. Y Y Y Y Y

Type of S/I Canouflage on this patrol: Design 32/355-B

- 20 -

— page 280 —
26 29 30 31 32
: 9/28/44 9/23/44 9/30/44 9/30/44 10/1/44
: 2339(-9) 2258(-9) 0528(-9) 2313(-9) 0710(-9)
: 21-02.3N 21-02.12N 20-42.9N 20-13.30N 19-33.4N
: 120-08.5E 119-50.16E 119-21.3E 118-48.6E 118-15.4E
: 13 kts. 17 kts. 9 kts. 6 kts. 9 kts.
: 255 125 240 130 240
: Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf
: 00 00 00 00 1
: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
: Pet Pat Pat Pat Pat
: APR APR Sight ATN Sight
: Unk Unk 8 mi. Unk 8 mi.
: Unk Unk 2° Unk 2°
: Unk Unk Unk Unk
: 6500 6500 2000 2000 2000
: 2 2 2 3 4
: 0
: 40 60 98 100
: 100% 100% 100% 100%

Type of S/S: Cam unless on time patrol
Design 32/38S-B

— page 281 —
33 34 35 36 37 38

Date: 10/1/44 10/2/44 10/2/44 10/2/44 10/2/44 10/3/44

Time (Zone): 1716(-9) 1011(-9) 1444(-9) 1956(-9)2043(-9) 0001(-9)

Position: Lat. 19-09.1N 19-11N 19-03.9N 19-19N 19-19.12N 19-19N

Long. 113-15.4N 119-45.5N 119-45.9N 120-02N 120-06.30N 120-22N

Speed: 7 kts. 7 kts. 8 kts. 8 kts. 8 kts. 8 kts.

Course: 090 045 045 090 090 090

Trim: Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf

Minutes Since Last SDR Radar Search: 0 0 00 00 00

Number: 1 Unk. Unk. Unk. Unk. Unk.

Type: Unk. Unk. Unk. Unk. Unk.

Probable Mission: Pat. Pat. Pat. Pat. Pat.

How Contacted: S/Lit. SD. SD. AFR. AFR. AFR.

Initial Range: 8 mi. 15 mi. 6 mi. Unk. Unk. Unk.

Elevation Angle: 3° Unk. Unk. Unk. Unk. Unk.

Range & Relative
Bearing of Plane
Than It Detected
S/M

(State (Beau-
Sea: (fort) 3 5 4 5 5 5

Direction(Rel) 080 000 045 045 045 045

Visibility (Diles) 15 10 30 10 8 2

(Height in
Clouds: Ft. 3000 2000 2500 2000 2000 2000

Percent
Overcast 6 9 6 5 5 5

(Bearing (Rel) B B B 050 050 050

Ioon:(Angle A A A 20 25 25

Percent. Illum. ¥ ¥ ¥ 95

Type of S/M: Camouflage on this patrol Design 32-3SS-B

— page 282 —
39 40 41 42 43 44

Date: 10/5/44 10/5/44 10/6/44 10/7/44 10/9/44 10/9/44

Time (Zone): 0029(-9) 0047(-9) 2253(-9) 0024(-9) 1138(-9) 1505(-9)

Position: 1st. 19-19.5N 19-23N 18-57.5N 18-52.9N 18-43.6N 19-30.5N

Long.: 120-11.2N 120-50N 117-50E 117-46.4E 118-26.4E 118-47.8E

Speed: 5 kts. 4 kts. 16 kts. 16 kts. 11 kts. 11 kts.

Course: 030 090 215 225 045 005

Trim: Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf

Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search: 00 00 00 00 25 sec. 0

Number: Unk Unk Unk Unk 1 1

Type: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

Probable Mission: Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat

How Contacted: APR APR APR APR SD SJ

Initial Range: Unk Unk Unk Unk 12 mi. 16,900 yds.

Elevation Angle: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When It Detected S/M

S/M (State (Beau- 5 4 3 2 4 4

Seas: (fort) Direction(Ral) 330 335 190 170 030 030

Visibility (Miles) 2 mi. 2 mi. 4 mi. 5 mi. 10 mi. 10 mi.

Height in Clouds: Ft. 3000 3000 7000 2500 2500 2500

(Percent Overcast 6 4 4 4 4 4

(Bearing(Rel) 000 000 -225 - -
Moon(angle

Percent Illum. 90 50 20

Type of S/M Canouflage on this patrol Design 32-395-B

- 23 -

— page 283 —
45 46 47 48 49 50
10/10/44 10/10/44 10/11/44 10/12/44 10/12/44 10/12/44

Date
Time (Zone)
Position:
Lat.
Long.
Speed
Course
Trim
Minutes Since Last
SD Radar Search
Number
Type
Probable Mission
How Contacted
Initial Range
Elevation Angle
Range & Relative
Bearing of Plane
Men It Detected
S/H
(State Boat,
Seas (port)
Direction(Rel)
Visibility (lifes)
Heights (ft)
Clouds (ft)
Percent
Overcast
Bearing (Rel)
Moon (Angle
Percent Illum.
S

| Date | Time (Zone) | Position | Lat. | Long. | Speed | Course | Trim | Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search | Number | Type | Probable Mission | How Contacted | Initial Range | Elevation Angle | Range & Relative Bearing of Plane | Men It Detected | S/H | (State Boat, Seas (port) | Direction(Rel) | Visibility (lifes) | Heights (ft) | Clouds (ft) | Percent | Overcast | Bearing (Rel) | Moon (Angle | Percent Illum. |
|------|||------|-------|-------||------|||------|

— page 284 —
51 52 53 54 55 56

Date: 10/12/44 10/12/44 10/12/44 10/12/44 10/13/44 10/13/44

Time (Zone): 0800(-9) 1602(-9) 2045(-9) 2045(-9) 0306(-9) 0920(-9)

Position: Lat: 20-24.9N 20-40.8N 20-45N 20-43.5N 20-43.8N 20-34.8N

Long: 120-21.2E 120-32.1E 120-17E 120-11.5E 120-09.5E 120-10.8E

Speed: 5 kts. 8 kts. 8 kts. 10 kts. 8 kts. 8 kts.

Course: 075 120 270 270 090 270

Trin: Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf

Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search: 0 0 00 00 0 0

Number: 3 1 2 2 1 1

Type: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

Probable Mission: Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat

How Contacted: SD Sizht JFR JFR JFR SD

Intitial Range: 15 mi. 10 mi. 13 mi. 13 mi. Unk 8 mi.

Elevation Angle: Unk 2 Unk Unk Unk Unk

Range & Relative Bearing of Plane: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

When It Detected S/H:

(Slate (Beau-Sea: (fort) 2 2 2 2 2 2

(Direction(Rel) 345 350 140 150 000 150

Visibility(Isles) 15 mi. 13 mi. 10 mi. 7 mi. 12 mi. 10 mi.

Height in Clouds: Ft. 3500 2000 2000 3000 2000 3500

(Percent Overcast) 4 5 1 3 5 4

(Bearing (Rel) -

Moon(angle

— page 285 —
57 58 59 60 61 62

Date: 10/13/44 10/13/44 10/13/44 10/13/44 10/13/44 10/13/44

Time (Zone): 1508(-9) 2058(-9) 0723(-9) 1030(-9) 1143(-9) 0857(-9)

Position: Lat. 20-37.8N 20-37.4N 20-38N 20-44.4N 20-47.2N 21-15N

Long. 119-20.6E 110-36.5E 120-39.5E 120-56.5E 120-56.7N 124-54.9E

Speed 6 kts. 5 kts. 5 kts. 5 kts. 5 kts. 11 kts.

Course 270 090 060 060 060 095

Trim Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf

Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search 0 0 0 0 0

Number 1 1 1 1 1 1

Type Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

Probable Mission Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat

Hor Contacted Sight SD SD SD SD SD

Initial Range 10 mi. 23.5 mi. 10 mi. 23 mi. 6 mi. 30 mi.

Elevation Angle 10-20 Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

Range & Relative Bearing of Plane
When It Detected Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

S/M

(St. te (Beau- 3 4 4 4 4 4

Sea: (fort)

(Direct on(Rel) 120 330 350 340 340 320

Visibility (miles) 10 mi. 4 mi. 10 mi. 5 mi. 5 mi. 15 mi.

D (Height in

Clouds: (Ft. 1500 2000 1500 2500 3000 3500

Percent

Overcast 3 3 6 4 6 8

(Bearing (Rel) -

Ikon: (Angle

(Forent Illum,-

Design 32/3SS-B

Type of S/M Canouflage on this patrol

— page 286 —
63 64 65 66 67 68
: 10/15/44 10/15/44 10/15/44 10/15/44 10/15/44 10/15/44
: 0920(-9) 0947(-9) 1013(-9) 1016(-9) 1138(-9) 1639(-9)
: 21-14.7N 21-14.2N 21-13.8N 21-13.5N 21-13.5N 21-09.2N
: 121-54.9E 124-00.2E 124-02E 124-05.5E 124-33.6E
: 11 kts. 11 kts. 11 kts. 11 kts. 11 kts. 12 knts.
: 095 095 095 095 095 095
: Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf
: 0 0 0 0 0 0
: 1 1 1 1 1 2
: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
: Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat
: SD Slight SD SD SD SD
: 35 mi. 10 mi. 28 mi. 12 mi. 12 mi. 10 mi.
: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
: 4 4 4 3 2
: 340 340 340 340 330 330
: 12 mi. 15 mi. 15 mi. 14 mi. 10 mi. 10 mi.
: Ft. 4000 4000 4000 4000 2000 6000
: 7 7 7 7 9
: -
:

— page 287 —
69 70 71 72 73 74

S Date 10/15/44 10/16/44 10/16/44 10/16/44 10/16/44 10/16/44

U Time (Zone) 14:29(-9) 0031(-9) 0106(-9) 0150(-9) 0200(-9) 0736(-9)

R Position: Lat. 21-10N 21-45N 21-52.5N 21-52.5N 22-41N

A Long. 124-24, 28 124-158 119-11, 48 119-11, 48 119-11, 48 123-50, 28

R S.eeed 12 kts. 12 kts. 12 kts. 3 kts. 3 kts. 9 kts.

N Course 095 335 335 335 335 335

Trim Surf Surf Surf Red Red Surf

Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search 0

Number 1 1 1 1 1 1

A Type Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

R Probably Mission Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat Pat

R How Contacted SD AFR AFR AFR AFR SD

F Initial Range 10 mi. Unk Unk Unk Unk 10 mi.

Elevation Angle Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

Range & Relative Bearing of Plane

Then It Detected Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

S/S:

(State (Beau-)

C Sea: (fort) 2 2 2 2 2 2

O (Direction(Rel) 330 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5

N Visibility (miles) 35 mi. 8 mi. 8 mi. 8 mi. 8 mi. 30 mi.

D (Height in

I Clouds: Ft. 6000 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500

T (Percent

I Overcast 7 3 3 3 3 5

O (Bearing (Rel) -

N Moon:Angle -

S (Percent Illum. -

Type of S/A Camouflage on this petrol Design 32/3SS-B

— page 288 —
75 76 77 78 79 80

Date: 10/16/44 10/17/44 10/17/44 10/17/44 10/17/44 10/16/44

Time (Zones): 2112(-9) 0429(-9) 0529(-9) 0737(-9) 2345(-9) 0414(-9)

Position: Lat. 23-25.2N 23-32.5N 23-30.8N 23-25.8N 23-36.4N 23-36N

Long. 123-25.2E 123-25.9E 123-30.5E 123-25.5E 123-21E 183-100

Speed: 9 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts. 9 kts. 10 kts. 9 kts.

Course: 030 090 270 090 020 270

Trim: Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf

Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search: 0

Number: 1 1 1 1 1 1

Type: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

Probable Mission: Pat Pct Pat Pat Pat Pat

Initial Range: Unk Unk Unk 6 mi. Unk Unk

How Contacted: AFR AFR AFR SD AFR AFR

Elevation Angle: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

Range & Relative Bearing of Plane then it Detected S/A:

(Slate (Seaboat) 2 2 2 2 2 2

Seat: 2

(Direction(Rel)060. 045. 048. 028. 020. 150.

Visibility (Miles) 3 mi. 6 mi. 6 mi. 40 mi. 8 mi. 6 mi.

Height in Clouds: Ft. 4000 3000 3000 3500 3000 3000

(Percent Overcast) 3 2 2 3 1 1

(Bearing(Rel) - - - - - - -

MoonAngle - - - - - - -

PercentIllum. - - - - - - -

Type of S/A: Camouflage on this patrol Design 32/335-B

— page 289 —
81 82 83 84 85 86

Date: 10/18/44 10/18/44 10/19/44 10/19/44 10/20/44

S
U
B
A
R
T
N
E

Trin
Minutes Since Last
SD Radar Search

Number
1 1 1 1 or 2 1

Type
Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

Probable Mission
Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

How Contacted
SD SD SD SD SD

Initial Range
4 mi. 8 mi. 8 mi. 32 mi. 30 mi. 26 mi.

Elevation Angle
Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

Range & Relative
Bearing of Plane
Which It Detected
Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk

S/M

C
Sea:
(Surface)
Fort
(Depth)
(Height)
(Percent)
Overcast
(Bearing)
Moon:
(Altitude)
(Percent)

(State (Beaufort)
(Direction(Rel)
Visibility (Miles)
Clouds:
(Pct)
(Pct)
(Bearing(Rel)
Moon(Altitude)
(Pct)

Type of S/M Camouflage on this patrol

- 30 -

— page 290 —
87 88 89 90 91 92

Date: 10/21/44 10/22/44 10/23/44 10/24/44 10/25/44 10/26/44

S
U
B
M
A
R
I
N
B
R
F
T

Time (Sone): 0855(-9) 0808(-9) 1247(-9) 0953(-9) 1006(-9) 1033(-9)
Position: Lat: 22-52.2N 22-30N 22-35N 22-28N 22-28N 22-28N
Long: 137-59.9E 142-11.9E 147-51E 151-44E 151-44E 151-44E
Spoed: 12 kts. 12 kts. 13 kts. 13 kts. 13 kts. 13 kts.
Course: 095 090 095 095 095 095
Trim: Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf
Minutes Since Last
SD Radar Search: 3 3 3 3 3 3
Possible
Number: 1 3 1 2 1 1
Type: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
Probable Mission: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
How Contacted: SD SD SD SD SD SD
Initial Range: 26 mi. 17 mi. 20 mi. 32 mi. 23 mi. 32 mi.
Elevation Angle: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
Range & Relative
Bearing of Plane: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
Then It Detected
S/A:

(State (Beau- 2 2 2 2 2 2
Coast: (fort 330 325 335 335 335 335
(Direction(Rel) 15 15 25 15 15 15
Visibility (tiles) 3000 3500 3500 3500 3500 3500
(Height in
Clouds: (Ft. 3 3 3 6 6 6
(Percent
Overcast
(Bearing(Rel) 3 3 3 6 6 6
(oon:(angle
Percent Illum. 3 3 3 6 6 6

Type of S/A Camouflage on this patrol: Desian 32-38S-B

- 31 -

— page 291 —
U.S.S. HALE (SS 239) - Report of Ninth Per Patrol.

Subject:  U.S.S. HALE (SS 239) - Torpedo Attack No. 1 - Patrol No 9

Time:  1411-35 (I)  Date:  6 October, 1944  Lat: 19-40.5N Long: 118-05.2E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:  Estimated certain (EC).  Large modern tanker (10,000 tons); engines aft; raked bow.  Nearest resemblance in 208-J (Revised) is the GENYO. AYU page 277.

Ship Sunk  One Large AO - 10,000 tons (EC)

Damage Determined by:  Five timed hits; breaking up noises, STABORSE observed destroyer rescuing survivors.

Target Draft:  121  Course:  190°T  Speed: 14 kts.  Range: 2500 (at firing)

---

Own Ship Data

Speed:  3 kts.  Course:  280°T  Depth: 63'  Angle: .000 (at firing)

---

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:  Radar - Periscope - TDC

Tubes Fired:  #_1_  #_2_  #_3_  #_4_  #_5_  #_6_

Track Angle 108P  109P  111P  112P  114P  116P

Gyro Angle  340  337  337  335  335  332

Depth set  8 ft.  8 ft.  8 ft.  8 ft.  8 ft.  8 ft.

Power  -  -  -  -  -  -

Hit or Miss  Hit  Hit  Hit  Hit  Hit

Erratic (Yes or No)  No  No  No  No  No

Lark Torpedo  23  23  23  23  23

Serial No.  61973  49764  61950  61876  49694  50057

— page 292 —
U.S.S. WHALE (SS 239) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.

Subject:  U.S.S. WHALE (SS 239)  TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1  PATROL NO. 9

Tube Fired:  # 1  # 2  # 3  # 4  # 5  # 6

Mark Exploder 6-4  6-4  6-4  6-4  6-4  6-4

Serial No.  2591  7106  18226  6238  12150  5883

Actuation Set  Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact

Actuation Actual  Contact Contact Contact Contact -- -- Contact

Mark Warhead  16-1  16  16-1  16-1  16-1  16-1

Serial No.  12881  2186  18179  17638  34189  13250

Explosive  TFX  TFX  TFX  TFX  TFX  TFX

Firing Interval  8 seconds.

Type Spread  Divergent

Sea Conditions  NE, moderately rough sea.

Overhaul Activity Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

REFERRALS:  Number five missed ahead because target was making slightly less than 14 knots.

- 33 -

— page 293 —
1. MINE
No mines or mining activity were encountered.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASIONS TACTICS

No new anti-submarine measures were encountered. Radar-equipped planes were encountered on an average of three times a night, but were avoided by diving when the ATR indicated a strong signal. (Half way up the field). From SJ ranges obtained on two occasions, it is believed that this occurs when the range is between 20,000 and 30,000 yards. Planes used 153 megacycles, while the depth charge attack on 6 October was ineffectual and apparently THALE was never contacted by sound. A 14 degree density layer was of great assistance. Evasion tactics consisted of going deep (300') and running silent until clear of the area.

On 27 September we were sighted by a small plane south of GARAN DI. The plane dropped one bomb after we were submerged. Apparently the plane was teamed up with a patrol boat which arrived on the scene shortly afterwards and hunted for us all day.

(K) LADDER DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

I.C. Emergency Switchboard Panel:

A short circuit caused by a loose connection inside the panel melted the solder on two additional connections. Connections were re-soldered and the loose lead secured.

Auxiliary Panel:

Auxiliary panel was shorted out by water which splashed up from the pump room bilges. Bakelite backboard was severely burned. Burned bakelite was scraped off, grounds cleared, and the panel put back in commission with a reading of 150,000 ohms. This panel is a source of trouble whenever water is taken down the conning tower hatch.

Pit Log:

The following casualties caused the pit log to be out of commission for a considerable part of the run: 1. Faulty connection on low voltage side of control unit contactor. 2. Control unit piping leaks caused control unit contactor arm to freeze up. 3. Excessive leaks from drip fitting of pump unit caused loss of pressure on dynamic side of pump. All spare seal rings were used and attempts to manufacture rings from material on hand were not effective.

— page 294 —
1. SUBJECT: U.S.S. HALE (SS 239) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.

(K) JAPAN DEFECTS AND DAMAGE CONT'D

Target Bearing Transmitter:

The forward TBT and cable to the conning tower flooded out and defied the best efforts of the ship's force to put it back into operation. This is the third successive patrol in which this instrument has failed to operate properly. The luminous numbers cannot be read closer than two or three degrees, which would make it necessary to rely on radar, periscope, or seaman's eye to obtain a firing bearing for night surface attacks.

SJ Berrings and Ranges:

The present installation is used to provide true bearings and ranges at the plotting station. At present considerable error is introduced into bearings at the plotting station when the ship is yawing because of the necessity for reading the ship's head on the fly when the SJ operator marks the relative bearing. Much conversation and word passing would be eliminated and a quicker, more accurate solution of enemy course and speed would result if the plotting party had these two elements of the problem available on repeaters.

4.1 Periscope:

The power shift on this periscope became inoperative when the two small screws which hold the stop on the shifting shaft were sheared off. The handle was removed and the screws replaced by two which were found in the electrical spares on board. It is recommended that these screws be made of a stronger material than the brass now used.

Ice Machine:

The wiring to the ice machine motor was grounded as a result of water dripping on it. Cable was renewed and motor put back in operation.

Main Storage Battery:

Three cells, #497, #789 and 1267 are low capacity cells, and have continued in use after three treatments at three consecutive refits. The capacity of these is not yet low enough to require jumping them out. Their condition is not definitely deteriorating. During the last refit the battery is sensitive was consulted and he recommended that these cells be renewed at the next overhaul. No further individual treatment is recommended or desired.

— page 295 —
9515 is sometimes effectively jammed around 1700 GMT by two broadcast stations, one believed to be Radio Tokyo, and the other of unknown identity. It is recommended that another transmitter be used on a frequency between 12 and 14 megacycles to supplement 16730 as a daytime frequency since 16730 cannot usually be copied before 2100 GMT, and then the signal is rather weak for an hour or so.

Six transmissions were made to NPL; of these, four were made at night on 8470 without delay, although as many as eight or ten Jap transmitters tried to jam us. Once, after being told to go ahead by NPL, a strong signal kept us from hearing him but, by continuing to transmit and ignoring the jamming, we cleared the message. Of the two daytime transmissions, one was cleared on 8470 after repeated attempts to raise NPL on 16940. Atmospheric conditions are believed to have been unusually bad on this day. The transmission of October 18 was cleared on 16940 after a delay of two hours, due partly to traffic congestion and partly to trouble in raising NPL.

Communications within the wolfpack were handled efficiently on the 2000 Kc band, using CW exclusively. The VHF could be used only at very short ranges between subs, usually under 2000 yards.

Material difficulties were confined to the TBL. The Intermediate Frequency unit became inoperative on the day of our departure from Pearl and was not corrected until reaching Saipan. The HOLLAND technicians, after much searching, found the trouble to be caused by a faulty C-86. The High Frequency master oscillator unit caused considerable trouble because of loose contacts on the range switch. This switch finally failed completely, causing complete breakdown in communications until it was corrected by ship's company. Shop 12 at Pearl supposedly corrected this mechanism during our last refit.

(K) RUDER

The SJ-a radar performed its numerous duties satisfactorily. During this patrol it was used for communications in addition to its normal duties. Performance was at all times reliable, and good ranges were obtained as indicated by the following:

- Submarine - 16,000 yds.
- Four Eng. Plane - 16,000 yds.
- Saipan Island - 80,000 yds.
- Batan Isl. nd - 130,000 yds.
- Submarine - 17,800 yds.
- Kauai - 170,000 yds.
- Jap Convoy - 30,000 yds.
- Hospital Ship - 29,000 yds.
- U.S. Task Force - 43,000 yds.

* Secondary echo

— page 296 —
1. RADAR Cont'd

Material failures were tubes, coax cables, and 3D motor generator. The equipment was out of commission four hours during 900 hours of operation. The emergency I.C. motor generator supply was used for a total of 35 hours while the 3D motor generator was under repair during three different occasions.

The SD-a radar served it's purpose as a pre-warning device for detection of planes. It gave reliable operation with a few exceptions that the lookouts said it had been out of service for a long time. The maximum range obtained was thirty five miles.

Out of 660 hours of operation a total of four hours were lost due to material failure. Loss of sweep on the scope necessitated the replacement of a shorted condenser (C-255). On another occasion the transmitter and indicator were flooded out from water taken through the hatch. Drying and cleaning the equipment placed the SD back in operation.

The Pre-Amplifier installed last refit gave no noticeable improvement in ranges or in operation.

The FP equipment installed during last refit gave returns out to thirty five miles. No material failures were encountered with this equipment.

The ARP proved an efficient radar detector and contributed a great part in evading Jap radar equipped planes. Over thirty interceptions between 146 and 156 megacycles (majority at 153 megas.) with a PRF of 700-800, and pulse width of 5-8 micro seconds, were encountered in the vicinity of FORMOSI and LIZON. Jap shore based radars were intercepted between 93 and 99 megacycles, with a pulse rate of 700-1000. One intercept was made at 207 megacycles with a PRF of 900. Numerous other intercepts were made on U.S. surface craft and aircraft radars.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Screws of a petrol crate were heard on JP and QB on September 27 at ranges of about 5000 yards. Echo ranging by same vessel was on 17.3 kcs.

On the attack of October 6 echo ranging on 17.5 kcs was heard at 17,000 yards by QB and JK. Screws of large tanker were picked up at 9000 yards by JP and about 7000 yards by the QB and JK. Loud bracing up noises of the tanker were later heard on all three sets of sound gear while at deep emergence. There was nothing to indicate that we were detected by echo ranging either at periscope depth or at deep submergence where we were favored by a 14° negative gradient. The above sound contacts were made south and southwest of FORMOSI.

— page 297 —
U.S.S. THALE (SS 239) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS Cont'd

We did no echo ranging.

The jp seems most effective for detecting scows of heavy ships, but against lighter targets does not obtain ranges as great as those of the supersonic equipments.

During our last refit in Pearl Harbor every effort possible was made to procure sound recordings for the instruction of sound operators but none were obtainable.

One attempt was made to use the fathometer. This was unsuccessful because the fathometer would not key on long scale, cause as yet undetermined.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

The THALE experienced two marked density layers on this patrol.

| Time | Date       | Position | Character of layer |
|------||||
| 1049(Z) | 27 Sept. | 21-24 N 120-45 E | Isothermal to 200 ft. - 110 negative to 260 ft. |
| 0925(Z) | 6 Oct.   | 19-32 N 118-07 E | Isothermal to 240 ft. - 140 negative to 320 ft. |

No other density layers were experienced on this run. The cards are being forwarded to the proper authorities.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, & HEALTH-FILTHY

The health of the crew as a whole was excellent considering the length of the patrol. The cases encountered were as follows: (1) Possible puncture of r.t. cornea caused by a flying chip of copper, which necessitated transfer of the patient to the U.S.S. ASPRO (SS 3C9) for transportation to SAIPAN where the patient could receive medical care. This was done on orders from CONSUPERC. (2) One possible case of appendicitis, chronic, which resulted in five sick days. Treatment prescribed by Submarine Force Medical Officer, Navy No. 128 was followed successfully. (3) One second degree burn of r.t. foot caused by hot gravy spilling on a cook during heavy seas. Burn became infected, but was healed by use of sulfa ointment. There was a normal number of lacerations, bruises, and constipation cases.

The food in general was good, considering the length of the patrol. Failure of the ice cream freezer early in the run was keenly felt.

With the addition of the new booster air conditioning unit in the control room, habitability of the forward part of the boat was greatly improved.

— page 298 —
1. PERSONNEL
The personnel situation is satisfactory. All hands turned in an excellent performance on this long patrol. The radio technicians in particular are deserving of special credit. They had longer hours of watch than anyone else but kept all their equipment in efficient operating condition in spite of the additional load.

School for qualification in submarines and any moment in rating was held throughout the patrol. There are a number of personnel qualified for advancement for which there are no vacancies.

Replacements have been trained for the expected loss of key men and inexperienced or non-rated men will be suitable replacements for any transfers we make.

25 men made the ninth war patrol that were not aboard at the end of the eighth. Of these 25 men, only one had completed the practical factors for the next higher rating when received. One of these had held his present rate for two years and another for 20 months.

| Item | Number of men on board during patrol | Total |
|------||-------|
| (a) | Number of men qualified at start of patrol | 78    |
| (b) | Number of qualified men at end of run | 54    |
| (c) | Number of unqualified men making their first patrol | 65    |
| (d) | Number of men advanced in rating during patrol | 14    |

(R) ITLES STATED - FULL USED

PEARL to SAIPAN - 21 Aug. to 3 Sept. 3,345 mi. 33,517 gals.
SAIPAN to 1st scouting line - 4 Sept. to 12 Sept. 1,395 mi. 16,105 gals.
On 1st scouting line - 10 Sept. to 12 Sept. 647 mi. 2,640 gals.
To 2nd scouting line - 12 Sept. to 13 Sept. 194 mi. 2,403 gals.
On 2nd scouting line - 13 Sept. to 18 Sept. 1,455 mi. 10,395 gals.
To new scouting line - 18 Sept. to 20 Sept. 617 mi. 4,165 gals.
On new scouting line - 20 Sept. to 25 Sept. 842 mi. 7,004 gals.
Scouting line to area - 25 Sept. to 26 Sept. 368 mi. 3,061 gals.
In area - 26 Sept. to 15 Oct. 2,571 mi. 25,914 gals.
Area to last scouting line - 15 Oct. to 18 Oct. 548 mi. 7,163 gals.
Last scouting line to IDAY-18 Oct. to 29 Oct. 3,360 mi. 28,360 gals.

Total 15,342 mi. 140,727 gals.

— page 299 —
19 days.
On 2nd scouting line and en route 6 days.
New scouting line and en route 7 days.
In area (en route to and from) 20 days.
In last scouting line till departure 3 days.
for 1IDAY
En route 1IDAY 12 days.
Days submerged 14 days.

Total 70 days.

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING:
Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor
18 9,000 gals. 8 days -?

(U) REMARKS:
Aircraft Contacts:
Sixteen pages of this report consist of aircraft contacts. Quite a lot of paper work. It is recommended that the information required on aircraft contacts be reduced if possible to cut down on the clerical work.

SJ Radar:
The "SJ" uses the SJ in daytime when the visibility is reduced, concentrating on the sectors of reduced visibility. On the day of the contact with the minelayer the visibility appeared good enough to assure sight contact with any type surface ship at maximum range. However, the target was not picked up until the range was such that we were forced to dive immediately to prevent being sighted ourselves. Had we been using the SJ the target would have been picked up at sufficient range to allow us to remain on the surface, track the target and gain a good attack position. Moral-use the SJ when there is any question about the visibility.

AFI and Pulse Analyzer:
This instrument was used to give early warning of enemy search planes using 150 megacycle radar. On monolit nights all radar was secured and this instrument used entirely to detect Jop planes. Not having any exact information to go on we arbitrarily assumed that a plane was fairly close when the pulse analyzer showed a signal of half saturation or stronger. Then this strength signal occurred we dove. Probably some of these dives were unnecessary, but we received no bombs using this system.

— page 300 —
1. U.S.S. TALIS (SS 239) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.

(U) RATARS Cont'd

Tolpack Operations:

There was only one convoy contact and hence only one opportunity to operate as a peak against enemy ships. On this contact the SHUDDO was unfortunately not in a position to use the information we sent out. The SEAFORSE was able to make contact and sank a destroyer. This was the TALIS first wolfpack experience and we would like to try it again.

I.C. Forewarn:

Since the TALIS went into commission additional equipment has been installed requiring alternating current. Some of these are the hydrogen burner circuits for the mark 18 torpedoes, the booster unit installed in the ventilation system in the control room, the SD radar, the SJ when its motor generator fails (this is quite often because it is also overloaded with the additional power required for the later model SJ), additional radio receivers, APR, IFF, etc. In the original installation one I.C. motor generator was able to carry the load under practically all conditions. At present the situation is critical. Both motor are required while running on the surface with either radar running off the I.C. power. If one motor generator fails some vital equipment must of necessity be secured. This situation is extremely undesirable. It is recommended that new I.C. motor generators be installed with sufficient capacity to carry the load singly under all conditions.

40 M.Gun:

There was no opportunity to use this new gun against the enemy. Judging from practice firings it is an excellent weapon. However, the parts and fittings are not built to stand the corrosive effect of constant exposure to salt water. Non corrosive metals should be substituted where possible. The mount traps considerable air when submerged and continues to give off bubbles 20-30 minutes after submerging. Better venting ahould be provided.

Mk 13 Torpedoes:

This is the first patrol that the TALIS has carried Mk 16's and no particular trouble was experienced in their maintenance.

After the first couple of battery charges on the Mk. 18-1's a charging panel from the forward room was transferred aft. This perished the charging of all eight torpedoes in approximately eight hours time. Since most of this patrol was spent on the surface, very little discomfort was experienced from the additional heat and there was no indication of hydrogen concentration.

The torpedoes in the tubes were ventilated every forty eight hours until it was found this field to keep down the condensation. Ventilation every twenty four hours reduced condensation to a minimum. A drain plug in the battery compartment is necessary if the forty eight hour routine is to be used.

— page 302 —
05-20/A16-3
Serial: 0191
CARE OF Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
31 October 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT:
To: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY.
Via: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
(1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate Command, Navy No. 1504.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.C. WHALE (35239) - Report of NINTH War Patrol.

1. The Ninth War Patrol of the U.S.C. WHALE occurred a period of 69 days of which 36 days wore spent either on a scouting line or in patrolling the assigned areas. WHALE was member of a coordinated attack group which operated under the tactical command of Captain C. W. Wilkins, U.S.N., in the SEAHORSE.

2. During the first part of the patrol the group was engaged in offensive reconnaissance in support of the flot action against Palau and the Philippines. The second part was spent in patrolling Luzon Straits and the South China Sea. While on route to Midway the WHALE was diverted to a station at the southwest end of NINGBI GHOTO where three days wore spent patrolling in anticipation of a sortie by the Japanese Floats.

3. On 6 October a well executed daylight attack was made on a large tanker travelling in an escorted convoy. Six bow tubes were fired on a 110-track, 3000 yard run, with a depth setting of 8 feet, and 5 hits obtained. Such a high percentage of hits with this long torpedo run is evidence of a very able approach officer and a well organized fire control party. The sinking of this ship was later confirmed when the SEAHORSE sank the destroyer which was engaged in picking up the survivors.

— page 303 —
5-20/16-3
Serial: 0191
31 October 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO WHALE 1tr SS239/16-3
Sor. 017, of 30 Oct. 1944,
Report of NINTH War Patrol.

5. The length of the patrol, the numerous planes
   contacts both day and night, and the scarcity of worthwhile
   targets made this a rather arduous period for all hands.
   Nevertheless, the personnel appeared to be in excellent spirits
   upon their return and morale was high.

5. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are
   congratulated on their participation in the float operation
   which resulted in the capture of Palau and on the completion
   of another successful patrol.

L. S. PARK.

-2-

— page 305 —
12-10/A16-3(15)
Serial 02483
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
WHALE Report of
Ninth War Patrol.
COMBUSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 568.
U.S.S. WHALE - NINTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.
(21 August to 29 October 1944).

1. The ninth war patrol of the WHALE was conducted in areas between Formosa and Luzon, and in support of the attacks upon and occupation of Palau. The WHALE along with the U.S.S. SEAHORSE (SS304), the U.S.S. SEGUNDO (SS398), and for a short period the U.S.S. GROUPER (SS214) formed a coordinated attack group with the commanding officer of the SEAHORSE as group commander.

2. As a result of our air and surface force operations at the time, contacts were few. The WHALE, however, in addition to a splendid performance as a member of the reconnaissance group in support of air and surface forces was able to develop one contact into a beautifully conducted attack which resulted in the sinking of a large enemy tanker. The satisfaction derived from this successful attack should go a long way towards relieving the strain of an otherwise long arduous patrol.

3. Award of submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this important and successful patrol, the ninth consecutive successful patrol for this fighting ship. The WHALE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

SUNK

1 - Large AO (GENYO MARU Type) (EC) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 1)

Distribution and authentication on following page.

C. A. LOCKWOOD
EXTRA ORIGINAL
SORC MICRO
PHOTO-LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 306 —
112-10/A16-3(15)
Serial 02483

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
WHALE Report of
Ninth War Patrol.

COLUSPAC CTROL REPORT 10. 568.
U.S.S. WHALE - NINTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.
(21 August to 29 October 1944).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
Intel, Cen, Pac, Ocean areas (1)
Conservpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Consubsalant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CTR 72 (2)
Comnorpac (1)
Consubspac (40)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ConsubspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Division Commanders, Pacific (2)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

E. L. HYNES, 2nd, Flag Secretary.

— page 307 —
SS239/A16-4
Serial 02
DECLASSIFIED
FRO: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Commander Submarine Division FORTY TWO.
Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239), Report of War
Patrol number Ten.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track chart. (Consubpac only)

1. Enclosure (A), covering the tenth war patrol of this vessel in waters around the HANSEI SOTO, following the SLUTH schedule of the LACUS rotating patrol, during the period 21 Nov. 1944 to 15 Jan. 1945, is forwarded herewith.

J. B. GRADY.

FINALIZED: 10/4/49

— page 308 —
1. 1944
0900(Y) Unclear: to test periscopes, 40 m. gun, and pit logs with observers or aircraft report on search to observe tests.

1130(Y) RADIO observers left s.i.p. Deferred: IDY for patrol.

21 November - 30 December 1944

En route patrol area. Conducted training dives and drills for air control party. At 1207(1) on 20 Nov for encamp calls with ACY.

1 December, 1944

0022(N) Each interference on 22 at 154 sec.

0725(C) Sighted SOUT on bearing 2940 T, distance 25 miles.

1100(N) Sighted twin-engine plane bearing 1670 T, range 7 miles. (A/C 1) Surprised.

1305(N) Surprised.

2 December, 1944

- No results.

— page 309 —
3 December, 1944

0:07 (1) Surprised to routinize torpedoes.

1142 (1) Surprised.

4 December, 1944

All subsequent lines are zone minute miles unless otherwise indicated.

0540 Sighted USS J.J. de Ruyter 266° T, distance 40 miles.

0534 Dove for submerged patrol 35 miles east of USS J.J.

1127 Surface in lat. 26-30° N, long. 120-21° W, with a strong signal on the starboard side, steering slightly to port of USS J.J.

2247 Sighted white light bearing 310° T and made radar contact on same bearing at 26,000 n.m.s. (3/4) Co. agreed treating.

2320 Target is a large Los Angeles ship, properly armed. Secured trawling party.

5 December, 1944

0604 Weak to anchor to sight on star at 155 sec. Apparently coming from southern end of 0.2 mile.

0605 Dove for submerged patrol 20 miles east of southern end of USS J.J. made in port. No other ships in vicinity.

1100 Received radio report: "curve of distance to 0.2 miles. Ca. see no shipping in sight. Tune to see if it touches with chart 0.0 miles."

1110 Surface area 0.2 miles.

6 December, 1944

0605 Dove for submerged patrol 100 T, range 5 miles. (-/C+2)

1101 Sighted plane bearing 110° T, range 5 miles. (-/C+2)

1620 Surface in heavy seas. 1 miles northeast of USS J.J. making steerwise speed to northwest. Any rain squalls. No evidence of radar in this locality.

— page 310 —
7 December, 1944

0655 Dove for submerged patrol 16 miles west of IOW (I.O.) SHIA. Will head down toward N.H. 10 today and hope the weather improves.

1620 Surfaced 20 miles northwest of IOW. J.I.A. Headed down towards N.H. 10. Weather is still bad.

6 December, 1944

0453 Strong signal at 153 mge on AGR. This signal not been seen before and was probably land based on IOW SHIA. The signal was sweeping at about 1 RPM and ste. died on us twice, so at

0454 Dove for submerged patrol 11 miles north of AGUNI SHIA.

1610 Surfaced 17 miles north of AGUNI SHIA. Strong signal at 99 mge on AGR which soon ste. died on us. Patrol from AGUNI SHIA.

2010 Another radar at 97 mge apparently from IOW SHIA which also ste. died on us. These two radar's effectively cover the area to avoid IOW SHIA and force a submarine to dive too far out to work all the way into the point and out again. The J.I.A. went as far in as time permitted and saw absolutely nothing. Not a plane, boat, or any sign of life.

9 December, 1944

0506 Had interference on SJ receiver - apparently there is another high-frequency radar in the vicinity, but no friendly subs are near us. He crew 30 miles northwest of IOW SHIA.

0635 Dove for submerged patrol 22 miles northwest of IOW SHIA.

1236 Sighted plane bearing 160° T, range 10 miles. (C/M3)

1647 Surfaced 15 miles northeast of IOW SHIA.

10 December, 1944

0500 Strong signal on ATA at 153 mge - apparently the morning watch has been posted on ATA SHIA.

0540 Dove for submerged patrol 20 miles northwest of AGUNI SHIA.

— page 311 —
10 December, 1944 Cont’d.

1141 Took pictures of a [GUN] at a range of two miles. Rope they will slow the location of the radar. Not able to identify anything with periscope except radio towers on the corner.

1037 Surface 15 miles northwest of [GUN] at 150 sec, near interference at 99 sec.

2000 [GUN] signal at 97 sec, probably 110 sec.

11 December, 1944

054C Late trial crew.

0307 Surface. Co. encased surfaces patrol along western edge of area.

1229 Six inch single engine float plane erring 2070 T, range 6 miles. (1/0, 4) Dove.

1300 Co. engaged on firing 11 periscope, which has been fogging badly.

1606 Surface.

12 December, 1944

0000 The ding cast into the water to patrol submerged between [GUN] and a 10,000 ft. range and very poor visibility.

0423 Signal on at 156 sec. 10,000 miles, bears 0.60 T, range 44,000 yards.

0535 Visibility still very poor. Set course to move to west of [GUN] and patrol on surface.

0931 Interference on 5rd radar about zero rel. live. Loc. out sight a periscope-like object bearing 350° relative, range 3000 yards. Went to 11th speed and turned towards.

1003 Interference is now absent - so set out on periscope radar?

1227 SD contact, 14 miles. (1/0, 5) Dove in to 6 miles and then went out out and disengaged.

1245 SD contact, 14 miles (1/0, 6) dove out. Disengaged at 16 miles.

— page 312 —
12 December, 1944: Caut'c
1245 They now we are here but the visibility is only 3-4 miles and they are unable to locate our exact position.
1c16 lade tri. give.
1c42 Surrecad.
13 December, 1944
0000 He is for area between Ica SHL and Icuino SHL.
0417 Si n1 at 156 mge on mda, apparently from Icuino SHL.
This signal was on us intermittently until at
0543 Dove for surrecad patrol lo miles west of Icuino SHL.
1615 Surrecad & miles north of Icuino SHL. Have signal at 156 mge on mda from Icuino SHL.
1c25 sighted stev while lit on Icuino SHL
14 December, 1944
0000 Heading north for area to westward of mda I. Intend to give twenty miles from Icuino and move in submerged.
0427 With mda C SHL bearing 090° T, range 23 miles, a strong signal at 156 mge settled on us. He seems to have us well located, so Icuino West. Ill patrol submerged to northward of Icuino SHL.
0600 Dove for submerged patrol 30 miles north of Icuino SHL.
1607 Si ltsa trin enined plane se rrs 310° T, range 6 miles. (A/C 7)
1c14 Surrecad 35 miles northwest of Icuino SHL.
1830 Co. eneed converting 14 SHL.
1915 Capitata conversion.
15 December, 1944
0000 Require in to euroi cla e to mda I C SHL.
0435 Signal on mda at 156 mge. Becuracd I can message in, intended to give close to msuic SHL. Ill signal intercepted in intensity until at

— page 313 —
15 December, 1944 Cont'd
0536 Dove for submerged patrol. 0 miles west of 1110 S.W.
Sent deep to check for sight, none present.

1125 Surface patrol.

1900 Co. engaged receiving port stern tube.

2115 Completed receiving port stern tube.

16 December, 1944

C036 S.T. 2d cart contact be.rig 0600 t, range 11,00 yards.
Co.leaned tracing. (5/C 1/2)

0207 In position ahead of target, who is on steady course of
1400 T at 7 knots. Went to battle stations. Ruled off
track, made stern tubes ready and waited.

0255 Allowed target to go by, range 900 yards, angle on bow 90
port. Too small to shoot at in this heavy sea, although
we believe she would do well to get a torpedo in calm water. She
is a small coastal type or landing craft. Secured from
battle stations and ready for 1000. 3.5 miles.

0500 Sighted small patrol boat or fighter bearing 230° T, range
1400 yards. Went to flank speed and avoided. (5/C 1/3)

0540 Strong signal at 11 deg, probably from 100.00 miles S.W. Dove
15 miles south of 100.00 T. It is for patrol between 100.00
and 110.00 T.

1619 Surprised with strong signal at 156 deg - his tracking party
must be still a good workman. Uses are still heavy.

17 December, 1944

0000 No. 1c. for western end of area to patrol in vicinity of
hundred fathom curve tomorrow.

0712 Dove for submerged patrol.

1405 Sighted plane (BATY) bearing 120° T, range 6 miles.
(1/2/C 1/6)

1611 Surprised. Be is now down to force 3.

2020 Co.leaned receiving stern tube.

2127 Completed receiving stern tube.

— page 314 —
15 December, 1944

0000 The mine east to patrol in vicinity of [NAME OF SUBMARINE] at 155 mile east of us. This probably comes from [NAME OF SUBMARINE].

19 December, 1944

0000 Heading west to patrol western end of area along the numbered
   - 0514 Red card hundred fathom curve.
   - Changed course to east.

1045 SD contact, 4 miles. (C/10) submerged.

1742 Surfaced.

20 December, 1944

0000 The mine east to move into area "London". Seas are heavy
   - 031C strong signal on 4th at 155 sec. Vessel course to open
   - 031C strong signal on

— page 315 —
21 December, 1944

0629 Dove for submerged patrol 25 miles east of MULL JET.

1400 Sighted 8 twin engine planes (HULL) bearing 310° T, range 6 miles. (A/C 14)

1645 Sighted a sea and mast of two ships wearing 332° T. Calm sea approach. (S/C 4)

1715 Targets are trawlers on course 170° I at 5 knots. ...targeting to east in position for a storm shot.

1626 Broke off approach. Under to close track surreptitiously to insure little these shallow targets.

1630 Surface in bright moonlight and co. enesc'd tracking. The are 14 miles east of MULL - too close for gun play.

1959 Sighted a third tender bearing 241° T, range 7000 yards. (S/C 5)

2025 In position on track of targets, two are on course 175° T at 5 knots. Dive to recar each co. enesc'd approach.

2057 Target's not near 001° T, range 2100 yards. Went to 60 feet each co. enesc'd firing off track.

2110 Fire tubes 7 & 8 at 1/2 inch. Trailing 23° right gyro, 120 stbd track, 900 yard torpedo run, depth sea zero feet, using periscope devices for each shot.

2111 First tubes 9 & 10 at second trawler with 50 left gyro, 10 stbd track, 1150 yard torpedo run, depth sea zero feet, using periscope devices for each shot.

2116 One explosion, distant.

2119 One explosion. Tracks sounded more like depth curves than each of run explosions. Took to first explosion from first torpedo, 6'-13", ran the last torpedo, 7'-26". This seems to be excessive for torpedo run time. However, the torpedoes had just been fired and the men ran should have resulted. The trawlers continued on their way obviously unaware of the attack. The explosions were deep clear seas they must have been dropped by some other than the trawlers.

The targets were two trawlers or about 500 tons in column of steam course. We had been in the area about three weeks, never fired a 1-16, sea conditions excellent or zero setting,

— page 316 —
21 December, 1944 Cont'd

2119 The course and speed had checked for three hours, targets considered worthy of a torpedo - hence the decision to shoot. No explanation for the misses unless they warrant the targets.

2121 Surface on four main engines to clear area. Target's seen to be continuing on their way. Number ten tube is out of commission with a blown exhaust on the crew in view.

2145 SJ contact to ring 1440 T, range 5200 yards. Luck radar interference on the bearing of this target, but we received no answer to SJ recognition signals. Check course to 070° T to open out. Believe it is one of Post's planes.

2210 Lost contact.

2240 SJ interference bearing 040° T.

2250 Checked recognition signals and calls with ICHISH.

22 December, 1944

0300 Number ten tube deck in commission.

0530 Dove for submerged patrol at eastern end of area.

1614 Heard various distant underwater explosions.

1725

1743 Surface.

25 December, 1944

0146 Sighted plane bearing 000° T, range 4 miles. (L/C 15) Submerged.

0241 Surface.

0605 Dove for submerged patrol 12 miles southeast of... C

— page 317 —
23 December, 1944  Cont'd

1614 Surface and subsurface into the passes between mid-Atlantic and the Atlantic and off the east coast. 155 sec. apparently we are losing the track of two stations. One on the south and one on the north. 1.0 tonner got the results checked.

2040 Surface radar light bearing 315° T.  C engaged course to head for it.

2110 Four small targets on S/C cut out 5000 yards.  (Gun attack n1) 40 min and 20 m. misfired and was not used during the action. Second shot hit, and third set the target on fire from star to star. Crew jamming over this time. Very pretty, but it takes a good dozen. Visibility is fair, with the moon behind a small overcast.

2147 C engaged firing at second target, range 300 yards. (Gun attack n2) The crew at this one has already abandoned ship. For good hits make is settling rapidly. 3.0 gun in rowboat. Set course for third target, range 5000 yards.

2205 C engaged firing at third target with 4° and 50 caliber, range 0.0-500 yards. (Gun attack n3) 3.0 rated hitting after first shot and also co. engaged to settle after 4 hits. 1.0 crew and a really light hit, as the was lying to apparently abandoned.

2206 Second target observed to sink.  First is still burning rightly.

2220 C engaged firing at fourth target, range 500 yards. (Gun attack n4) 3.0 is a really abandoned. 1.0 but nine hits left her in the coast wash.

2221 Third target sank.  First target is gone, leaving oil or gasoline burning on water - none of the others burned, although to settle seem to scatter the completely.

2230 Set course to clear area and get away from the target. 1.0 tr. firing parties. 1.0 tend to patrol near N.L.I. 1.0 tomorrow.

— page 318 —
23 December, 1944
This was the first time this was fired a gun in anger and it was an interesting experience for all hands. Don't think it would be much fun it the O.0.one. There contending to issue, however.

24 December, 1944
0555 Visibility is poor, so decided to visit H.M.I. J.H. later. See code for torpedo S.S. 5.

— page 319 —
26 December, 1944

0626 Dove irr surgered patrol 45 miles east of HNL JI.

1253 Sighted plane (S.I.Y.) searing 2900 T, range 6 miles. (L/C W19)

1757 Surfaced

— page 320 —
29 December, 1944

0146 Do not locate enemy at 25 yards to port.

0209 No contact on plane at 15,000 yards, with strong signal at 155 sec. Report. (A/C 24)

0630 Dove for surface patrol 5 miles southeast of OTOI. Report.

1522 Sighted six small seaplanes leading to or off OTOI. Report. (5/C 10)

1012 Surface.

30 December, 1944

0115 Hard to climb party on 1 October. I went into action on 1 Dec. Secured at 155 sec. Report. (A/C 24)

0210 Do not contact on plane at 15,000 yards with simultaneous strong signal at 155 sec. Report. (A/C 24)

0415 I hear party in action again on 1 Dec. They start trecking every mile we get within 25 miles of this island.

0617 Dove for submerged patrol 17 miles north of OTOI. Report.

1122 Surface.

31 December, 1944

0040 Dove for corrected plane with was determined to be a star pilot.

0044 Surface.

0503 Dove for submerged patrol 55 miles east of OTOI. Report.

1602 Surface.

1 January, 1945

0646 Dove for submerged patrol 20 miles northwest of TACO. Report.

1023 Surface. I do not see out of area. Will take a look at ILLI. Report.

2 January, 1945

0400 Sending 155 sec r.c.r on ATC.

— page 321 —
2 January, 1945 Cont'd

0410 Sighted IITA DAITO J.I.A bearing 116° T, range 32,000 yards.

0436 Dove for submerged patrol with IITA DAITO J.I.A bearing 100° T, range 20,000 yards.

0941 Took pictures of radar installation on IITA DAITO. Position of rad. r is 25-49-22 N, 131-14-30 E. Radar is rotating.

1029 Took panorama pictures of IITA DAITO bearing 343° T, range 1 1/3 miles.

1350 Sighted Liberator bomb bearing 340° T, range 6 miles. Plane circled over IITA DAITO and then moved down to IITA DAITO.

1355 Numerous light explosive... sounded like gunfire.

1612 Surfaced 4 miles north of IITA DAITO, heading for the barn.

1613 Strong radar signal on 103 mge.

3 January, 1945

0558 Made trim dive. Stayed down to work on conning tower rudder angle indicator.

0944 Surfaced.

1258 SD contact, 21 miles. (A/C #26)

1300 Sighted twin engineed plane bearing 295° T, range 7 miles. Submerged.

1341 Surfaced.

4 January, 1945

0538 Made trim dive.

0552 Surfaced.

0615 Received orders from Consubpaco to spend one daylight period in the vicinity of SOU GAIN seacracing for survivors of downed balcor twenty nine. Set course for SOU GAIN 65 miles away.

— page 322 —
0910 S. 1st. 5-29 distant 12 miles. 2nd received previous word from GTC 17.7 that plane would be scaring. Plane was assigned voice and CW calls on 4475 kcs and 17310 kcs. WHILE has no call. Attent to communications with plane on those frequencies with voice and CW, no results.

1130 Passed 1 mile north of 50°U CWT, no signs of life.

1200 B-29 passed overhead and told us of VHF contact raft had been sighted 4 miles bearing 040°T from TORI SHINA. Loaded torpedo and torpedo gear. Plane was apparently not guarding 4475 kcs. No lifeguard frequency. This necessitated the use of the raft and approaching the ALE to VHF range to give us any information. LINGPISE was also searching vicinity received scraps of this message but not the words "TORI SHINA" and consequently wasted the afternoon searching the vicinity of 50°U CWT.

1306 Plane again overhead and informs us that raft is now 6 miles bearing 040° from TORI SHINA, that we will circle raft, and that there is no chance gun fire from south side of TORI SHINA.

1400 Passed 10°U SEI A abeam to port, range 6 miles.

1427 Plane reports he has temporarily lost sight of raft. He is continually in sight and is now 12 miles from the coast. Seas are increasing steadily, now about 10°C.

1446 Plane now reports raft to be 12 miles northeast of island.

1505 Sighted small rubber inflated float. Questioned plane and he reports that he dropped some equip and which landed to left of raft and he is now 12 miles from the coast. Seas are still increasing and visibility decreasing.

1602 Plane regained contact with raft and reported his position as 25 miles 040° from TORI SHINA that he was circling and shooting flares. Could not see plane or flares. Plane intermittently in sight in a rain squall between WALE and island. WALE is 19 miles by 5°R. A. from island. Plane is 5-7 miles away by 5°R. A. and between us and island. Don't understand his report of 25 miles. Sea is force 5.

1600 SJ read a contact on plane 4 miles ahead. We see him occasionally turning in a tilt circle in a rain squall. Plane is now 2 miles ahead and reports that he has lost the raft and is circling the estimated position. WALE

— page 323 —
4 January, 1945 Cont'd
scarched the estimated position but found nothing. The visibility is only 500 yards and the sea force 5.

1604 Plane reports he must depart for base.

1636 Commenced retiring to search along course 040 for the night firing from Vryz. Sent to intervals. Sc. reached out to 40 miles.

At one time plane had reported 11 survivors in refit. We were greatly disturbed to realize that we were within 1 or 2 miles of the refit several times and still unable to locate it.

It is considered that the plane did a remarkable job of spotting the raft under the existing sea and visibility conditions.

The following is offered in criticism in hopes that it will aid in future situations of this kind:

The plane would not answer calls on lifeguard frequency. This caused the plane to leave the raft to give us information, delayed our arrival on the scene and prevented the KINGFISH from receiving the word and joining the search.

Apparently, no smoke floats were used. They would have been of great assistance in locating the raft.

5 January, 1945

- Sent dispatch during night giving results of search and that WALE was continuing search. Received dispatches with information that another plane would be searching today, that KINGFISH would join search with same voice cell as WALE.

0300 Started working back toward TORI SULA, 30 miles away. Sea has moderated to force 3 and wind is dry down.

0547 Led trio dive. 0557 Surreptitiously.

0630 Coincided box screen to northeast of TORI SULA.

0636 SD contact, 9 miles, this may be today's plane, faced out at 14 miles.

0826 Sighted E-29, range about 11 miles. Tried to communicate with E-29 on 4475 kms, no results.

— page 324 —
5 January, 1945 Cont'd

0856 Sighted KINGFISH to southeast. Assigned her a search sector from 060° T to 090° T, dist. 1,000 miles from TORI SINA. While will cover the sector between 0300 T and 0900 T.

0902 Plane overhead. Contacted him on VHF and inquired if he was guarding life-guards frequency. Answered in the negative but said he would guard it if we so desired. Advised him that it was our wish and shortly thereafter established good communication with plane on life-guard frequency.

1200 SEADRA.GON joined search, in conjunction but she is not in sight.

1225 Sighted plane range about 6 miles. While discussing twin engines, four engines, split tails etc., plane closed to 2 miles, opened bomb bays and ducked into cloud. Submerged, Ko bombs? (A/C 27)

1240 Periscope depth. Flare oriel is a identified as a "WELL" medium bomber.

1314 Two bombs at, claim range.

1342 One bomb, so, went close. Lo, read it, but both KINGFISH and SEADRA.GON had been forced down.

1421 Surfaced. Plane is in sight over TORI SINA.

1422 Submerged when plane turned and headed for WEALE.

1536 Sighted friendly submarine, SEADRA.GON, through periscope bearing 1670 T.

1542 Fired recognition signal and surfaced. Advised SEADRA.GON to search at discretion. Unable to contact plane or KINGFISH.

1615 Cont'd: CONTACT KINGFISH by radio, since has no information.

2126 Kessage from CTG 17.7 st. tcs plane sighted two ships with one escort at 1400 on source 170° T about 20 miles from our position at that time. On this course the ships would have passed through the area. The plane had been searching all morning.

2155 Reported no. live search results. Will continue search until ordered otherwise.

— page 325 —
6 January, 1945
0237 Received orders to proceed to base. Set course for MIDWAY.

11 January, 1945
0912 (Y) Deported MIDWAY.

15 January, 1945
(W) Arrived PEARL HARBOR, T.H.

— page 330 —
1. U.S.S. H.I.E. (SS239)  TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1  PATROL NO. 10
Time 2050(I) Date 21 Dec. 1944 Lat. 29-09.5N Long. 129-50.0E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description- 500 ton trawler
Ship(s) Sunk- None
Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk- None
Damage Detrained by-
Target Draft 51 Course 170 Speed 53 Range 900 (at firing)

Own Ship Data
Speed 2.5 Course 260 Depth 62' single 194° (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type attack- Radar appears to follow by night periscope attack in bright moonlight. Spread applied by periscope bearings. 'I' issues are believed to be result of torpedoes under-running target.

Tubes Fired- # 7 # 8
Track angle 106S 104S
Gyro angle 23R 24R
Depth Set 0 0
Power - -
Hit or miss - -
Erratic No No
Lark Torpedo 18-1 18-1
Scuttle 1 No. 55890 56258
1 Exploder 8-5 8-5
5 1 No. 9192 9079
6 1 Son Set Contact Contact
-

— page 331 —
500 ton trawler
Ship(s) Sunk - None
Ship(s) Damaged None or Probably Sunk
Damage Determined by -
Target Draft 51 Course 170 Speed 51 Range 1200 (at firing)

Type Attack:
R.дар approach followed by night periscope attack in bright moonlight. Spread applied by periscope bearings. "Issues are believed to be result of torpedoes under running target.

Tubes Fired:
- Track Angle 75S 75S
- Gyro Angle 8L 9L
- Depth set 0 0
- Power - -
- Hit or Miss "Miss" Hits
- Erratic No No
- Mark Torpedo 18-1 18-1
- Serial No. 56370 56351
- Mark Exploder 8-5 8-5
- Serial No. 9986 56351
- Actuation Set Contact Contact
- Actuation Actual 18-2 18-2
- Mark Head 2701 2735
- Serial No. TX
- Explosive 7 sec.
- Firing Interval Periscope bearings, inside bow and inside stern.
- Type Spread State 2
- Sea Conditions U.S.S. PROTUS (S19)
- Overhaul activity

Recarks:
The torpedoes had been given a full 7 amp. charge
five hours before firing.

Torpedoes were apparently not sighted.

- 24 -

— page 332 —
2141(I) Date: 23 Dec. 1944 Lat. 29-04N Long. 129-45E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Sunk - 1 Trawler, 150 tons - marked with No. 304 on side and flying Japanese aircraft flag.

Damage determined by - Vessel observed to sink.

Details of Action

4"-50 gun fire was used to sink this vessel. Fire was opened at 400 yards and six 4" torpedoes were observed out of the 10 rounds of high capacity ammunition expended. Although fires were again set it is doubtful if more than one of the projectiles exploded.

— page 333 —
4"-50 gun fire was used to sink this vessel. Fire was opened at 500 yards with one miss followed by at least nine hits out of fifteen rounds. Although about half of the fuses were set on the high capacity ammunition used, only one or two projectiles were observed to detonate. Fire was checked at a range of 75 yards.

Fire was controlled as in gun attacks 1 and 2.

U.S.S. WALE (SS239) GUN ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 10

Time 2205(I) Date 23 Dec. 1944 Lat. 29-04N Long. 129-45E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

4"-50 gun fire was used to sink this vessel. Fire was opened at 500 yards with one miss followed by at least nine hits out of fifteen rounds. Although about half of the fuses were set on the high capacity ammunition used, only one or two projectiles were observed to detonate. Fire was checked at a range of 75 yards.

Fire was controlled as in gun attacks 1 and 2.

U.S.S. WALE (SS239) GUN ATTACK NO. 4 PATROL NO. 10

Time 2220(I) Date 23 Dec. 1944 Lat. 29-04N Long. 129-45E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Sunk - 1 Trawler, 100 tons - unmarked

Damage determined by - Vessel abandoned by crew and settling rapidly when last seen.

Details of Action

4"-50 and 50 caliber gun fire was used to sink this vessel. Fire was opened at 500 yards and closed to 150 yards, 16 rounds of high capacity ammunition were used with fuses set. Again only two or three projectiles seemed to detonate out of the 9 hits observed. About 600 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition were fired on the same area.

Fire was controlled as in gun attacks 1, 2 and 3.

- 26 -

— page 334 —
1. USS SHIA (SS239) - Report of Tenth War Patrol

(I) INES
One floating line was sighted at night on the surface 20 miles east of TOKUO SHIA. No other lines or evidence of .ining activity were observed in any part of the NANSEI SHIO.

(J) ANT SUB. RIB. I. SURS. ND V. SIO. LCTICS
The only anti-submarine measures encountered were a few night flying planes, so. of which were equipped with 155 meg radar. On two occasions this radar gave a very strong signal on the AFR when the range to the plane was 19,000 yards by SJ. The lack of patrol craft of any sort is surprising in view of the many shore based radar stations in this area. There was no evidence of patrol craft in the vicinity of ANPA ISAI.

(K) JATOR BERTOTS AD DA AGI (ENGINE RIG)
1. Stcrn Tubcs- Both Jacked excessively. Ship's force took up on packing gland. axilu. amount and wore unable to stop excessive flow of water. Both tubcs wore partially repacked and packing glands were adjusted. Both stern tubcs will have to be completely repacked during refit.

2. Salt water line to port lub. location oil cooler developed pil-holo leaks. Atta pte to braze line caused now leaks to develop as fast as the old ones were stopped. A new line was manufactured and installed by ship's force. Sounding of these salt water lines shows wcacked condition. Complete section of line will have to be removed during refit. All salt water lines will have to be carefully inspected and tested in port to insure that others are not still airily pitted and corroded.

3. Scvcn frcsh water leaks can 14.5 Vvcr encountered at various ti. cs during patrol. One leak was caused by worn injector adapter and gskct. Complete adapter and gskct were removed. Remaining six leaks wc due to faulty gron.cts resulting from long usage. During refit a 35" hydrostatic test will have to be made and all leaky or faulty gron.cts removed.

4. Flooded auxiliary engine on dive due to faulty operation of outbo. rd exhaust valve. This valve could not be closed until a depth of 60 feet was rc. cned at which ti. sca pressure closed valve. Water was blown out and engine inspected; no apparent d. age. Failure of valve is believed to have been

— page 335 —
5. Train engine outboard exhaust valves open to very sluggishly. Numerous tiles these valves have closed slowly but as yet have not failed completely. Cause is believed to be faulty rings in control cylinder. During refit all four control cylinders will have to be pulled and replaced.

6. Fuel Oil and Lub Oil Purificers - Ship's force had to renew four sets of bearings and four spindle units. All purificers are very noisy. All bowls will have to be checked for balance and traces for alignment.

(2) TARGET SPECS AND D.D.G. (ELECTRICAL)

1. The auxiliary generator tor flooded out because of missing drain line. This drain line was left out during service. The generator was not discovered by Ship's force until casualty occurred. Water rose to a height of approximately six inches inside generator casing which caused grounding out of shunt field. Upon discovery Ship's force put out blisters, which in turn caused generator. The generator was then flushed with fresh water. After generator was wiped dry a hot air blower was mounted and hot air circulated for approximately 24 hours. After a 24 hour period field readings increased to 50,000 ohms. The generator was then run under load and readings instantly increased - present readings 400,000 ohms. Desired cycle current of generator during refit.

2. Reversor Current Relay - Auxiliary Generator has been inoperative for two runs. The tests to adjust it were made during previous refits. Due to this relay being inoperative this generator was not tripped out on diving rescuings in the generator motorizing and driving the auxiliary engine at a depth of 90 feet in one particular dive. This could easily cause a major casualty. During refit suggested that the cycle current of this unit be effected and if this is not successful suggest another type relay be installed.

3. Rudder Angle Indicator - Stator of coming tower reactor started out. Ship's force removed rotor and placed in operating condition.

4. Bridge Gyro Repetition has been a 90 volt, 2-ohm, and is blowing fuzes on the 36 special system. Repetition still operates when fuzed. Overhaul by the refit activity is being requested.

— page 336 —
5, Battery grounds were a constant source of trouble. At one time the ground on the after battery reached 140 volts. The battery was broken into three parts and ground finally eliminated. Cause of grounds was insufficient cleaning during refit.

6. #2 Periscope was inoperantive for one day due to a short between the coil and lower wires of the pilot circuit.

7. Hydrogen Detector was erratic during the entire run. All attempts by Ship's Force to locate it in proper operating condition failed. Capable of overhaul and calibration of detector will have to be effected during refit.

8. Pit Log - Follow-up drive - Motor had its shading coil open up. New motor was installed and good operation of Pit Log resulted during this period of the run.

9. The three definitely bad battery cells which needed to be removed during this refit. Coll 124F shows definite signs of sulfation - low specific gravity and high voltage. Coll 76F and 49F have excessive amounts of suspended sediment and iron matter. The suspended matter is bilious to be caused by deterioration of spercrators.

10. Main motors #2 and #4 do not perform properly. Continuous adjustment of the balance rheostat is required to eliminate the motor lapses anywhere near equal. When running to standard speed on four main engines, #4 in motor goes the load at times and losses it at other times, depending upon the load on the screw. Fluctuations in #4 in motor from 1200 to 3400 c.p.s. are not uncommon, while #2 in motor is comparatively steady from 2100 to 2500 c.p.s. #4 in motor has the load while accelerating and loses it while decelerating.

(1) JUNIOR DEFENCE S.ND D.L.G. (HULL)

Periscopes - Both periscopes forged excessively. Picking glands and boring have in them considerable gritty substance which can be felt grinding the scopes when they are turned. As a result, both periscopes are badly scored. #1 periscope was tested for pressure and found to be down to 2". It was reach rigid with nitrogen but slid with improved cent.

The new SJ antenna course was periscopes to vibrate excessively until a counterweight was installed on the antenna. With

— page 337 —
1. U.S.S. (SS239) - Report of Tenth r. P. tROL

---

### (I) MAJOR DIRECTS AND D.D.G. (HULL)

The counterweight acted and the antenna trained on 045 relative to the vibration has been elicited. This bearing of 045 varies somewhat with the sub. sub. grd spec. It is hoped that the vibration can be elicited by some other means.

---

### (II) MAJOR DIRECTS AND D.D.G. (GUNTRY)

The gun action fired during this xtrol was the WHALE's first. The 4" gun was the deciding factor in these actions and operated perfectly in spite of the fact that it had been losing steadily for two p.trols. Nothing could be done to correct this during the previous refit as there was no proper packing available on the ship. This was a night action and open sights were used about fifty percent of the time at close ranges. The points and the inner discovered that the fire across wires on the open sights were so close together as to be confusing. It is suggested that the second and fourth wires be removed.

---

...the beginning of the action the 40 gun fired, and as this trouble had been encountered during training period it was considered expedient to secure the gun and send the crew below. Although it is possible that the fully automatic caused the misfire (the gun was cocked and fired twice on the same projectile), the crew on the breech of the piece was a...are likely to use...as the previous misfires had been caused by pitting on the breech of the piece it had been set to prevent pitting during this patrol. After the misfire the breech block was not grasped on the face piece but wiped off every second night with an oiled rag. In route to refit he set the gun fired perfectly.

---

The cut. atic loader was taken below and cleaned thoroughly three times during the present run. In spite of this any parts were discovered frozen. ...set or this trouble was found where brass and steel parts were absent.

---

The d. crth of 40 p. pro ports avail ble during refit was not regrettable. There were none available through the refit to the point of the 2nd activity, and it was only through the cooper trial of the 2nd Defense Battalion...rines at...always that necessary parts were obtained. This organization supplied the...with a rear door to replace her badly sprung one and also took a cut on the breech face piece that required pitting and put the gun back into firing order. A clay pitted roller patches and rollers could not be replaced.

— page 338 —
10 tube drain valve gasket was blown from its seat when the valve was opened with 10" air pressure still in WRT. The drain valve was dismantled, a new gasket put in and tested to satisfaction.

(1) RADIO

Communications were satisfactory. All messages sent were delivered with little difficulty. On one occasion an Australian station took our message and delivered for us, on this occasion, the circuit was as easy to work as a local station. Communications with INDPL were very good. Little jamming was expected. The only jamming in the radio on any of the Sub Fox frequencies was on 6045, which was easily overcome by shifting frequencies. No ComSubPac serials were missed. At only one time were the skeds unreadable on any frequency, that was for a period of one hour and forty five minutes 0915 to 1100, on December 13. This was not due to jamming but to weather conditions. IND was copied on his 1800 schedule with case but only three messages were copied on the 1000 schedule that were solid, this being due to the signal fading out completely. A higher frequency for this early evening schedule may give better reception. The press on Sub Fox gave us an opportunity to have a ship's paper most of the time on station and the copying of this press is very good for the opertors. Only minor material failures occurred, which were repaired by ship's force.

R DIO TRANSITION NO. 1

1 December, 1944. Attempted to establish communications with IND on 8470 but the only one we could raise was a Jap. (Sec. jamming report number 1). Shifted frequency to 4235 and delivered our message, 1 hour and 45 minutes from the time of first attempt on first frequency. No received on sub Fox.

— page 340 —
1. Ship U.S.S. WHALE (SS239)
2. Position, bearing and altitude when enemy radio signals were observed
   - Lat. 29-04.24 Long. 137-30E
3. Position of transmitting station
   - Unknown
4. Date of jamming 1 Dec., 1944
   - Time: From 1300(Z) to 1412(Z)
5. Frequencies jammed
   - 8470, 4235
6. Describable signal jammed (Freq., type of modulation, etc.)
   - CW signal on 8470, 4235
7. Use of circuit (tactical, administrative)
   - Tactical
8. Was enemy jamming signal stable
   - Yes
9. What was ratio of strength of own signal to enemy jamming signal
   - Station being worked by Whale - 1:1 jamming station - 3
10. What was power output of own transmitter at time of jamming
    - 150 watts
11. Location of enemy jammer
    - Probable shore unknown X
12. Type of jamming signals
    - CW-Ident. Keying
13. Effectiveness of jamming
    - Could not hear station being worked when jammed
14. Action taken to overcome jamming
    - Shifted frequency
15. Bandwidth covered by enemy jamming signals
    - 3 kcs
16. Did jamming transmitter appear to be monitored by a lock-in receiver
17. If frequency was shifted, how long before enemy jammed new frequency
    - 15 minutes
18. Narrative:

Immediately after calling NPM on 8470 an unknown station answered, using excellent procedure, with the exception of his own cell his sending was very clear and distinct, his own call was never clear enough to make out, he, using the effect of a very salty operator, after our preliminary call to NPM he also called NPM telling him we were calling him (NPM) and had a message for him. Up to this time the unknown station sounded very authentic. We again called NPM but could not hear him answer. The unknown station then said that NPM heard us strength zero and told us to give him our message and he would deliver to NPM for us. He than asked him to authentic, still not being able to make out his call, but got no reply. That was the first indication that he was possibly a Jap station. He then called us telling us to send V1s. We again asked him to authenticate, but upon him not doing so shifted frequency to 4235, after shifting to 4235 we called NPM and he immediately replied telling us to go ahead. We asked him to authenticate and got an immediate response with the proper authentication. We had delivered our message to NPM and NPM had regorod for it when we were again cut in on by an unknown station. This station did not try to work us. We had questioned NPM on his authenticator for his Roger as we did not clearly understand it. The interfering station would not come on until NPM came to the actual authentication, at which time he would break in and send nothing in particular for a couple minutes. After this he happened three times we had figured out NPM's authentication so secured the circuit and resumed our regular watch.

— page 341 —
1. Ship U.S.S. WHALE (SS239)
2. Position, bearing and altitude when enemy radio signals were observed-- Let. 31-20 N Long 141-00 E
3. Position of transmitting station Unknown
4. Date of jamming 5 Jan. 1945 Time: From 1255(2) to 1329(2)
5. Frequencies jammed 4155
6. Describe signal jammed (Freq., t pe of modulation, etc.) 4155 CW
7. Use of circuit (tactical, administrative) Tactical
8. Was enemy jamming signal stable Yes
9. What was ratio of strength of own signal to enemy jamming signals Own - 1 Jamming - 3

10. What was power output of own transmitter at time of jamming 150 watts
11. Location of enemy jammer Unknown (Probable shore) Unknown X
12. Type of jamming signals CW-rancon keying
13. Effectiveness of jamming Could not hear station being worked when jammed
14. Action taken to overcome jamming None, jamming was occurring intermittently
15. Bandwidth covered by enemy jamming signals 3 kcs
16. Did jamming transmitter appear to be monitored by a look-in receiver Probably
17. If frequency was shifted, how long before enemy jammed new frequency
18. Narrative:

Upon establishing communication with NDF4, a very loud jamming station came in and tried to drown us out. Were sure it was intentional jamming as the frequency was clear when we established communication. As we had already established communications when the jamming station came up we went ahead and sent our message. By reason of his not jamming continuously we were able to obtain a roger from NDF4, during one of the periods when our jammer was resting.

— page 342 —
5,6,7 Dec., 1944 - Report No. 3

1. Ship _U.S.S. WHITE (SS239)
2. Position, bearing and altitude when enemy radio signals were observed
   - Lat 28-00 N Long. 126-00 E
3. Position of transmitting station Unknown
4. Date of jamming 5,6,7 Dec.,1944 Time: From 1000(2) to 1700(2)
5. Frequencies jammed 6045
6. Describe signal jammed (Freq., type of modulation, etc.)
7. Use of circuit (tactical, administrative) Administrative
8. Was enemy jamming signal stable Yes
9. What was ratio of strength of own signal to enemy jamming signals
   - NPAI - 1 Jamming - 2
10. What was power output of own transmitter at time of jamming
11. Location of enemy jammer Unknown
12. Type of jamming signals CH-Random Keying X Voice X
13. Effectiveness of jamming Couldn't copy
14. Action taken to overcome jamming Shifted frequency
15. Bandwidth covered by enemy jamming signals 5 kcs
16. Did jamming transmitter appear to be monitored by a look-in receiver
   - No
17. If frequency was shifted, how long before enemy jammed new frequency
   - New frequency allright
18. Narrative:

On these dates jamming was the most effective. There is voice on 6045 at practically all times but CH can be read though if necessary. There appear to be stations working all around 6045 but with proper tuning they can be eliminated. The above times are the only exceptions we experienced. When we would shift from 6045 we would usually find 4515 a very good frequency.

— page 343 —
12 December, 1944 - Report No. 4

1. Ship U.S.S. WHALE (SS239)
2. Position, bearing and altitude when enemy radio signals were observed - Lat. 27-00 N Long. 128-00 E
3. Position of transmitting station - Unknown
4. Date of jamming - 12 December, 1944
5. Frequencies jammed - 2160
6. Describe signal jammed (Freq., type of modulation, etc., 2160 CW
7. Use of circuit (tactical, administrative) - Tactical
8. Was enemy jamming signal stable - Yes
9. What was ratio of strength of own signal to enemy jamming signals Owned - 1 Jammed - 3
10. What was power output of own transmitter at time of jamming -
11. Location of enemy jammer - Unknown (Probable shore)
12. Type of jamming signals - CW
    CW-Random Keying - X
13. Effectiveness of jamming - Could hear nothing but jammer
14. Action taken to overcome jamming - None
15. Bandwidth covered by enemy jamming signals - 3 kcs
16. Did jamming transmitter appear to be monitored by a look-in receiver? Possibly
17. If frequency was shifted, how long before enemy jammed new frequency

18. Narrative:

Jammer came up while operations, of which we had no part, were taking place. Tried to tune jammer out but with no success. Could hear other stations only when jammer was not keying. The jamming had the appearance of random keying, saying nothing in particular.

— page 344 —
1. R.D.R
SJ-2 radar The SJ rad r perforated c&cqucrtcly in its dutics throughout this patrol. The following ranges' rc cxtracts from the r der log.

Lidway Island 37,000 yds.
Okinawa JI. (1600 ft.) 92,000 yds.
Okinoyorabu JI. (795 ft.) 83,000 yds.
Yoron Jina (317 ft.) 70,000 yds.
Planc

— page 345 —
1. SOUND GUN AND SOUND CONDITIONS

by a pariscooper bearing, the scows at 7,000 yards but the J.K could not hear the initial three-range was less than 2,000 yards. The second targets were sc.pon, which the QB picked up at 2500 yards with the J.K still unable to hear until range became 2000. Followed the scows out to a range of 3000 yards on QB, J.K and J. where they could no longer be heard. The worm on the worm drive for the QB lit switch is not long enough and three tics the crew had to be put back on the worm before the QB could be used.

(0) DENSITY I.Y.M.S

No temperature gradients were encountered. The water in the area was at all tics isothermal down to 100 feet. The occasional of deep submergence snowed isothermal conditions to three hundred feet. Occasionally in late afternoon small negative gradients were encountered at sixty feet, none being more than one degree.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HEALTH

The health of the officers and crew was excellent throughout the patrol.

The food this patrol was of good quality and well prepared. The beef received at Idlewys was of excellent quality. All hands keenly appreciated the constant supply of ice cream, the freezer never failing to give good service. Fine dinners were enjoyed on each of the three holidays, lacking only in celery, which we were unable to obtain.

With the booster air conditioning unit installed in the COC, habitability was better this patrol than on any other, and the ventilation in all compartments is considered adequate. During the latter part of the patrol one air conditioning unit was secured because of the low temperature of the outside air.

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men on board during patrol: 77
(b) Number of qualified at start of patrol: 58
(c) Number of qualified at end of patrol: 70
(d) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol: 8
(e) Number of aviators in retiring during patrol: 4

— page 347 —
15-1 torpedoes were carried in the after room only. The only casualty resulted when torpedo #56256 developed a very high ground several hours after the tube had been flooded. The technical seal in the tail section was found to have failed and caused a short across the terminals. This seal was renewed and the ground eliminated.

Charging intervals averaged nine days at the recommended 7 a.m. hr. rate. The lower temperature of the water in the patrol area resulted in a much lower amount of condensation in the torpedoes and a smaller drop in specific gravity, averaging .18 points in nine days.

— page 348 —
1944 - Report No. 1

1. Ship _U.S.S. WHILE (SS239)_
2. (a) Position at time of intercept _Various positions to east and north of OKINAWA JIMA_
   - (b) Location of enemy radar: _Northeast of OKINAWA JIMA_
3. Was enemy radar: Shipborne _Airborne_ Landbased X _Unknown_
   - (a) Describe enemy installation: _No data_
4. Intercept Equipment _N/FR-1 and N/SPI-1_
   - (a) Frequency _99_
   - (b) FRF _750_
   - (c) Pulse Width _40_
   - (d) Sketch Pulse
   - (e) Was Lobe Switching Used _No data_
   - (f) Polarization enemy signal _No data_
   - (g) Sweep Rate _1 sweep every 2 minutes_
5. (a) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GCI, or I1 Surface search
   - (b) Evidence for this conclusion _Stoated on for varying periods_
6. (a) Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, faded, etc. Tracked on bearing 040°T - 175°T at range of 15-25 miles. Faded at about 35 miles.
8. Narrative:
   This radar was encountered every time we closed the east coast of OKINAWA. The station was apparently secured from 2030 to 0430 each night. Data comes from six observations.

— page 349 —
26-05N - 128-05E
: x Location of enemy radar _Probably on CHUM ZIKI, Southern OKINAWA SHIWA_

3. Was enemy radar: Shipborne _Airborne_ Landbased _X_ Unknown

(a) Describe enemy installation _No data_

4. Intercept Equipment _AN/APR and AN/SFA-1_

5. (a) Frequency _156_ Dial Readings _156_
   (b) PRF _500_ How Measured _Pulse meter on SFA-1_
   (c) Pulse Width _How Measured_
   (d) Sketch Pulse

   (a) Was Lobe Switching Used _No data_
   (f) Polarization enemy signal _No data_
   (g) Sweep Rate _No data_

6. (a) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GCI, or AI
   Surface search

   (b) Evidence for this conclusion _Steadied on for four minute period_

7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he
   searched, tracked, faded, etc. _Trakked on bearing 090° T at range of_
   23 miles.

8. Narrative:
   This station was turned on at 0500 and immediately steadied on us and
   tracked until we dove.

— page 350 —
1944 - Report No. 3

1. Ship _U.S.S. SHILSH (SS239)_
2. (a) Position at time of intercept _Various_
   (b) Location of enemy radar _GUNI SHILSH, OKINDA GUNTO_
3. Was enemy radar: Shipborne _Airborne_ Landbased X Unknown
   (a) Describe enemy installation _No data_
4. Intercept Equipment _IN/PR end IN/SPI-1_
5. (a) Frequency _99_ Dial Readings _99_
   (b) PRF _700_ How Measured _Pulse meter on SPI-1_
   (c) Pulse Width _50_ How Measured _Estimated using SPI-1_
   (d) Sketch Pulse
6. (a) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GCI, or AI Surface search
   (b) Evidence for this conclusion _Steadiad on for varying periods_
7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, faded, etc. Tracked on bearings 045°T - 325°T at range of 15-25 miles. Faded at about 50 miles.
8. Narrative:
   This radar was encountered whenever we closed GUNI SHILSH, and was apparently in opcrtion continuously. Data comes from 5 obscrvations.

— page 351 —
1944 - Report No. 4

1. Ship U.S.S. WHILE (SS239)

2. (a) Position at time of intercept
   - Various

   (b) Location of enemy radar
   - KUME SHIMI

3. Was enemy radar: Shipborne, Airborne, Landbased, Unknown

   (a) Describe enemy installation
   - No data

4. Intercept Equipment
   - AN/PRC and AN/SPI-1

5. (a) Frequency
   - 150
   - Dial Readings
   - 150

   (b) PRF
   - 450
   - How Measured
   - Pulse at or on SPI-1

   (c) Pulse Width
   - 12
   - How Measured
   - Estimated using SPI-1

   (d) Sketch Pulse

   (e) Was Lobe Switching Used
   - No data

   (f) Polarization of enemy signal
   - No data

   (g) Sweep Rate
   - 1 sweep every 25 minutes

6. (a) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GOI, or II.
   - Surface Search

   (b) Evidence for this conclusion
   - Steadied on for varying periods

7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which it was searched, tracked, faced, etc.
   - Tracked on bearing 000°T - 015°T at ranges up to 28 miles.
   - Faded at about 40 miles.

8. Narrative:
   This station went into operation at 0500 each morning.
   Data comes from 4 observations.

— page 352 —
1944 - Report No. 5

1. Ship U.S.S. H.L. (SS239) ______

2. (a) Position at time of intercept: Various ______

(b) Location of enemy radar: Probably IYE SHI, OKIN, GUNTO ______

3. Was enemy radar: Shipborne, airborne, Lendbassed, Unknown ______

(a) Describe enemy installation: No data ______

4. Intercept Equipment: ______

(a) Frequency: 97 ______
(b) PRF: 740 ______
(c) Pulse Width: 45 ______
(d) Skutch Pulse ______

(c) Was Lobe Switching Used: No data ______
(f) Polarization of enemy signal: No data ______
(g) Sweep Rate: 1 sweep every 3 minutes ______

6. (a) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SIG, GCI, or AI Surface search ______

(b) Evidence for this conclusion: Stordied on for vrrvine periods ______

7. Intention of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, faded, etc. Tracked on bearings 2700T - 3200T at ranges of 11-25 miles. Padded at 50 miles ______

8. Narrative:
   This radar tracked whenever we closed IYE SHI. Data comes from 4 observations.

— page 353 —
1944 - Report No. 6

1. Ship U.S.S. WHILE (SS239)

2. (a) Position at time of intercept Various

(b) Location of enemy radar

3. Was enemy radar: Shipborne Landbased Unknown

(a) Describe enemy installation No data

4. Intercept Equipment AN/AFR and AN/SPI-1

5. (a) Frequency 10 cHz. Dial Readings No data
   (b) PRF No data How measured No data
   (c) Pulse Width No data How Measured No data
   (d) Sketch Pulse No data

(e) Was Lobo Switching Used No data
(f) Polarization of enemy signal No data
(g) Sweep Rate No data

6. (a) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, CCI, or AI

(b) Evidence for this conclusion

7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he tracked, faded, etc.

9. Narrative:
   Interference was noted on SJ screen on several occasions. On one occasion a periscope-like object was seen ahead when the interference was ahead. After turning toward and passing over, the interference reappeared astern.

- 46 -

— page 354 —
156
(a) Frequency
(b) PRF
(c) Pulse Width
(d) Sketch Pulse

Dial Readings:
How measured
How measured

Pulse meter on SF-1
estimated using SF-1

(a) Was Lobe Switching Used
(b) Folerization of enemy signal
(c) Swoop Rate
(d) 1 sweep every 3 minutes

6. (a) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GCI, or I
   Surface search

(b) Evidence for this conclusion: Stenciled on for varying intervals

7. Action of enemy rad r, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tr cked, faded, etc. 'Trecked on bearing 200°T - 345°T at range of 15-30 miles. Faded at about 50 miles.

8. Narretivic:
   This radar was noted in the vicinity of TOKUINO SHII: on every occasion we closed the island. It is masked bct:icn 140°T and 190°T by a higher peak. Data comes from 9 observations.

— page 356 —
1944 - Report No. 9

1. Ship U.S.S. H.L.E.S. (SS239)

2. (a) Position at time of intercept: Various

(b) Location of enemy radar: KIKI JIH

3. Yes enemy radar: Shipborne, .airborne, Lendbscd X Unknown

(a) Describe enemy installation: No data

4. Intercept Equipment: N/PI-1 and N/SP-1

5. (a) Frequency: 81
   (b) PRF: 475
   (c) Pulse Width: 20
   (d) Sketch Pulse

(c) Yes Lobe Switching Used: No data
(f) Polarization of enemy signal: No data
(g) Swcop Rate: 1 swcop every 3 minutes

6. (a) Yes radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GCI, or I Surface search

(b) Evidence for this conclusion: Studied on varying intervals

7. Action of enemy rad r, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, fired, etc. Tracked on bearings 010°T - 180°T at range of 15-25 miles. Fired at 55 miles.

8. Narrative:
   This radar was account rad along the entire east and north coast of H.I. O SHII., Date from 15 observations.

— page 357 —
1944 - Report No. 10

1. Ship U.S.S. "H.L. (SS-239) - Various

2. (a) Position at time of intercept - Various

(b) Location of enemy radar - Probably YOKO.T.SHIN.

3. Was enemy radar: Shipborne, airborne, landbased X Unknown

(a) Describe enemy installation - No data

4. Intercept Equipment - N/PR-1 and N/SP-1

5. (a) Frequency 157
   (b) PRF 450
   (c) Pulse Width 8
   (d) Sketch Pulse

   (e) Was Lobe Switching Used - No data
   (f) Polarization of enemy signal - No data
   (g) Sweep Rate - 1 sweep every 3 minutes

6. (a) Yes radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GCI, or I
   Surface search

   (b) Evidence for this conclusion - Straddled on for varying periods

7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which
   he searched, tracked, faded, etc. - Tr.cked on bearing 120°T - 230°T
   at range of 15-25 miles. Faded at 33 miles.

8. Narrative:
   This radar was encountered on surfacing between YOKO.T.SHIN.
   and ...HI O SHIN. and tracked us as we passed YOKO.T. heading
   west. Dtr. from 4 observations.

— page 358 —
1. Ship U.S.S. HIL (SS239) _
2. (a) Position at time of intercept _Varicus _
(b) Location of enemy radar _T.K.R.: JIL, ROKR: GUNTO _
3. Was enemy radar: Shipborne, airborne, landbased, unknown _
(a) Describe enemy installation _No data _
4. Intercept equipment _N/PR-1 and AN/SP-1 _
5. (a) Frequency _155 _
(b) FRP _400 _
(c) Pulse width _10 _
(d) Sketch Pulse _
(c) ...as Lobe Switching Used _No data _
(f) Polarization of enemy signal _No data _
(g) Sweep Rate _1 sweep every 25 minutes _

6. (e) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GCI, or AI Surface Search _

(b) Evidence for this conclusion _Ste: died on varying intervals _

7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, fended, etc. _Tracked on all bearings at any range inside 25 miles. Faded at 60 miles. _

8. Narrative:
   This radar picked up every time we came within 25 miles of T.K.R. from any direction. Date from 23 observations.

— page 359 —
1944 - Report No. 12

1. Ship U.S.S. HILL (SS239)

2. (a) Position at 11:30 - intercept - Various

(b) Location of enemy radar - Vicinity of COASTAL STRIKE

3. Was enemy radar: Shipborne - Airborne - Land-based X Unknown

(c) Describe enemy installation - No data

4. Intercept equipment - HURR-1 and H/SF-1

5. (a) Frequency 75 - Dist. Readings 75
   (b) PRF 450 - How measured - Pulse meter on SF-1
   (c) Pulse width 30 - How measured - Estimated using SF-1
   (d) Sketch Pulse

(c) Was Lobo Switching Used - No data
(f) Polarization of enemy signal - No data
(g) Swap Rate - Irregular

6. (a) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GCI, or II Unknown

(b) Evidence for this conclusion

7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, fought, etc. - Fired at about 60 miles.

8. Narrative:
   Date from 3 observations,

- 52 -

— page 360 —
1. Ship U.S.S. H.L. (SS239)
2. (c) Position at time of intercept Various
   (b) Location of enemy radar
3. Was enemy radar: Shipborne, airborne X Land-based, unknown
   (a) Describe enemy installation No date
4. Intercept equipment (M/R/L and SP/1)
5. (a) Frequency 155
   (b) PFR 1000
   (c) Pulse Width 9
   (d) Sketch Pulse
   (e) Is Lobe Switching Used No date
   (f) Polarization of enemy signal No date
   (g) Swap Rate None
6. (a) Is radar used for surface or air search, GL, GLG, GCI, or I Surface search
   (b) Evidence for this conclusion

7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, fired, etc. Unknown. Signal was strong when range was 19,000 yards to plane.

8. Narrative:
   On two occasions when 60 miles from land a strong signal on the IR was accompanied by a plane on the S/L at 19,000 yards. The plane did not come in although the signal remained strong and steady for several minutes.

— page 361 —
1. Ship U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) ______

2. (a) Position at time of intercept: West of INNATI DAITO SHI'IA
   (b) Location of enemy radar: INNATI DAITO SHI'IA

3. Was enemy radar: Shipborne, Airborne, Landbased X Unknown
   (a) Describe enemy installations: Antenna rotating on top of green shack.

4. Intercept Equipment: AN/YK-1 and AN/SP-1

5. (a) Frequency: 155
   (b) PRF: 475
   (c) Pulse Width: 12
   (d) Sketch Pulse
   (e) Was Lobe Switchin': Used No data
   (f) Polarization of enemy signal: No data
   (g) Sweep Rate: 1 sweep every 2 minutes

6. (a) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GCI, or AI: Air search
   (b) Evidence for this conclusion: Did not steady on at range of 10 miles.

7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, faded, etc.: Faded at 30 miles.

8. Narrative:
   The station was sighted and periscope pictures taken from a range of 1 mile. Station is on southern coast of INNATI DAITO JIMA.

— page 363 —
PB5-42/A16-3
Serial ( 02 )
CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST INDORSEMENT to
USS WHALE Report of
Tenth War Patrol.

From:  To:  Via:

Subject:  U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of War Patrol
Number Ten.

1. The tenth war patrol of the U.S.S. WHALE was conducted in the waters around the NANSEI SHOTO. It was of fifty-seven days duration of which thirty days were spent in the area, twenty-nine days submerged.

2. This patrol was characterized by a splendid successful gun attack on four enemy small craft, by arduous life-guard duty, lack of suitable torpedo targets and by most complete icta on enemy radar installations, this data including photographs.

3. Summary of attacks follows:

(a) On 21 December 1944 two two-torpedo salvoes were fired at enemy trawlers from excellent positions. No hits were made. The attacks were made by periscope after a radar approach. In bright moonlight. The torpedoes fired were Mark 16 with depth setting zero, small gyro angles, torpedo runs about 1,000 yards. Apparently the torpedoes ran under the targets for the firing data should have been excellent. The target speed used was 5 knots.

(b) On 23 December 1944 four enemy small craft were sunk by gun-fire in the first gun action of the WHALE. The 40 mm. miss-fire and the 20 mm. jammed, so the destruction of the enemy craft was effected entirely by means of the 4" mounted forward and the 50 caliber. A high percentage of the 4" high capacity shells were duds.

4. The famous WHALE returned from patrol clean and shipshape, as usual. She now goes to the West Coast for overhaul.

— page 364 —
5. The Division Commander takes pleasure in congratulating the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the WHALE upon the completion of this patrol and the complete destruction of four enemy craft by gun-fire. It is regretted that targets were not available so that the WHALE could demonstrate again her efficiency at torpedo fire. It is also regretted that the search for aviators, so well done, was not successful.

R. S. BENSON.

— page 365 —
11/jfa
Serial: 050
17 January 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS WHALE (SS239) - Report
of Tenth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division FORTY-TWO.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. WHALE upon completion of this patrol and the resulting damage to the enemy.

3. It is recommended that the U.S.S. WHALE be credited with the following:

SUNK

1 - MIS (Trawler) - 150 tons (gun attack)
1 - MIS (Trawler) - 100 tons (gun attack)
1 - MIS (Motor Sampan) - 80 tons (gun attack)
1 - MIS (Motor Sampan) - 80 tons (gun attack)
410 tons

Total Sunk - 400 tons

M. V. Cidaga
W. V. O'Regan

— page 366 —
12-10/A16-3(15)
Serial 0218
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT
REPORT OF
Tenth War Patrol.
COLLUSBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 64
U.S.S. WHALE - TENTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.
(21 November, 1944, to 15 January, 1945).

1. The tenth war patrol. The WHALE, under the command of Commander J. B. Grady, U.S. Nav., was conducted in the Hansei Shoto Areas. The WHALE performed liquefied duties as well as offensive patrol.

2. Despite thorough area coverage the WHALE's contacts were limited to small enemy craft. On 500 ton trawler, the largest contact made, was unsuccessfully attacked with torpedoes at close range but no hits resulted, probably due to the torpedoes undermining the target. The WHALE found some relief from this long arduous patrol in four aggressive night gun attacks against two trawlers and two sampans the night of 23 December, all of which were sunk.

3. Award of the Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this 8th conductive successful war patrol during which the WHALE has sunk, in addition to the damage inflicted on this patrol, 14 ships for 114,184 tons and damaged 12 for a tonnage of 92,509. The WHALE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

| Item | Description | Quantity | Tonnage |
|------||||
| 1    | MTS (Trawler) | 150 tons | 1       |
| 1    | MTS (Sampan) | 80 tons  | 2       |
| 1    | MTS (Motor Sampan) | 3       | 3       |
| 1    | MTS (Trawler) | 4       | 4       |

TOTAL SULK 5 FEB 1945 tons

Authentication and distribution on following page.

— page 367 —
12-10/AL6-3(15) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0218
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
WHALE Report of
Tenth War Patrol.
CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 54
U.S.S. WHALE - TENTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SE239) - Report of Tenth War Patrol
(21 November, 1945), to 15 January, 1945).

E. L. HAYES, 2nd, Flag Secretary.

— page 368 —
016
Serial: 016
U.S.S. HULB (SS 239)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
25 August 1945.

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
U.S.S. HULB (SS 239), Report of War Patrol Number Elcorv.

Enclosures:
(A) Subject report.
(B) Track Charts.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B), covering the eleventh war patrol of this vessel conducted in the BUGU SUIDO area during the period 15 June 1945 to 25 August 1945, is forwarded herewith.

F.H. C.

— page 369 —
U.S.S. THALE (SS 239) - Report of War Patrol Number Eleven.

(A) PROLOGUE:

Arrived Pearl, 15 January 1945 from 10th War Patrol and proceeded to Bay Area for overhaul at Navy Yard, Mare Island, California.

Arrived Mare Island on 26 January 1945 after unloading torpedoes at Hunter's Point the preceding day.

With the exception of the hydraulic plant and periscopes, all parts of the boat including the morale of all hands, received an excellent overhaul.

The following major alterations were completed:

(1) Conning tower enlarged and new arrangement installed including new DRT.
(2) Hydraulic periscopes hoisting gear installed.
(3) Mk IV periscope and ST radar installed.
(4) New double hatches installed.
(5) Flood valves for #2 IMBT removed.
(6) SD mast removed from conning tower and foundations for SV radar installed.
(7) Radio shack rear ended.
(8) Bom planes altered to rig in and out on 150 dive.
(9) 5" gun and ammunition scuttle installed and magazine remodeled.
(10) Spindle type firing valves and "T" shaped gaskets installed in torpedo tubes.
(11) 7" system installed.
(12) SJ-1, ST, SD-5 radars were installed.
(13) "T" ring, talk back and foundations for JT sonar were installed.
(14) RAL-7 and TEL-6 installed to replace older equipment.
(15) DCI installed.
(16) 200 pound air compressor relocated in after engine room.
(17) Two recirculating water pumps installed in each engine room.
(18) Main control cubicle shook mounted.
(19) Target designation system for radar, sonar and TBT's was installed in conning tower and control room.
(20) New 1k 8, 1od 0 and 1k 38 binoculars were installed on the bridge.

Upon arrival in Pearl the following changes were made:

(1) SCR 610 and RAO-3 installed in radio shack.
(2) APR-5 installed without antenna.
(3) TDI installed except for dome.
(4) Second 40ft gun and two new large ready magazines installed.

— page 372 —
22 June 1945 (Continued.)

0900(L) Set all ship's clocks to zone -11 (L) time.

1010(L) Commenced patrol across J.F.W. I&E supply lines.

1200(L) Position: 20-20N, 165-10E.

23 June 1945

0513(L) Liade trim dive.

0545(L) Surfaced.

0854(L) Dove.

0956(L) Surfaced and resumed search.

1200(L) Position: 20-23N, 165-56E.

2008(L) Possible contact on S'L at 2/420T. Headed down bearing at flank speed but contact did not materialize.

2111(L) Resumed search.

24 June 1945

0502(L) Liade trim dive.

0619(L) Surfaced.

0852(L) Quartermaster on high periscope thought he sighted mast or high periscope on horizon at 2100T. Flank speed towards contact which disappeared. It may have been an enemy submarine which sighted us and dived. Consequently at

0909(L) changed course to 180PT. If he didn't dive and was headed for HMC at 16 knots or less, should sight him soon.

1003(L) He must have dived. Having taken position south of his probable position, dove and went to silent running with frequent looks and careful sound watch to pick him up surfaced or submerged.

1056(L) He must be on his track so changed course to 3250T to head up the track.

— page 373 —
24 June 1945 (Continued.)

1200(L) Position: 20-05', 166-00E.
1400(L) ...it two knots he has passed us. Securco frcn silent running. Temperature in maneuvering room 126°. The air conditioning was very popular.
1530(L) Surfaced and continued surface search.
1832(L) Torpedo indication on WM. Turned away and went to flank speed.
1837(T) ...mother indication so dove. These indications were probably not torpedoes, although there were two or three fair consecutive traces. There was no indication to the car.
1905(L) Surfaced and resumed search.

25 June 1945

0528(L) Dove.
0600(L) Surfaced to continue search.
1200(L) Position: 20-20', 166-08E.
1224(L) Dove.
1315(L) Surfaced and continued search.

26 June 1945

0026(L) Dove from possible but improbable torpedo on WM. Front to silent running at 200 feet.
0104(L) Surfaced and continued search.
1200(L) Position: 20-41', 166-13E.
1215(L) Dove to work on noisey sound motor generator.
1442(L) Surfaced and continued search.

— page 374 —
0-N-F-I-D-N-T-I-L

U.S.S. THULE (SS 239) - Report of War Patrol Number Eleven (Continued).

27 June 1945

0839(L) Dove for submerged patrol, anti-submarine motor generator.

1200(L) Position: 20-02N, 165-08E.

1655(L) Surfac'd and continued surface search.

28 June 1945

0445(L) Dove for submerged patrol.

1200(L) Position: 20-15N, 165-38E.

1400(L) Commenced swinging ship to compensate magnetic compasses.

1926(L) Surfac'd to conduct surface search.

30 June 1945

0445(L) Dove for submerged patrol.

1200(L) Position: 20-22N, 165-18E.

1925(L) Surfac'd for night search.

2100(L) Departed for Guam on course 270°T in accordance with Combat Service School orders.

1 - 6 July 1945

Enroute from first patrol station to Guam. Continued training emphasizing diving without the use of hydraulic power. Time interval of the cycle of the hydraulic accumulator indicated that internal leaks are again developing in the system. Sighted several U.S. ships during this

— page 375 —
1 - 6 July 1945 (Continued.)

period, 1000(K), 5 July - Exchanged calls with PC 1223
who was escorting two merchantmen.

Non positions:

1200(L) 1 July 1945: 20-20N, 164-20E.
1200(L) 2 July 1945: 19-43N, 158-23E.
1200(L) 3 July 1945: 18-45N, 153-23E.
1200(K) 4 July 1945: 18-04N, 148-36E.
1200(K) 5 July 1945: 16-36N, 144-54E.

6 July 1945

1218(K) Moorad alongside U.S.S. POLLO (AS 25).

Made the following personnel changes while in GU:*

Transferred B.O.N., Charles Raymond, OR(....)(T), USN to the hospital and F.M.H.R., Horace Raymond, CSL(....)(T), USNR to a relief crew. Transferred and disqualified one fireman. OLSDN, Norman Hartinus, CQ(I)(T), USN, a second class radioman, two seamen and a fireman reported for duty.

7 July 1945

1500(K) Underway from Apra Harbor for lifeguard duty after a very successful 27 hours alongside the U.S.S. POLLO. A great deal of work was accomplished and a large part of the crew enjoyed a nights' rest at Camp Dooley. All this was due to the splendid services rendered by Submarine Division 261 and the U.S.S. POLLO.

2201(K) Hade trim divo.

2229(K) Surfaced.

8 July 1945

1000(K) Fired 40Mils at metal buoy that initially looked like a mine.

— page 376 —
8 July 1945 (Continued.)

1200(K) Position: 17-07N, 14-56E.
1400(K) Numerous B-29s passed overhead.
1520(K) Made trim dive.
1903(K) Surfaced.
2018(?) Picked up a series of phantom pipes on SJ from 1500 to 500 yards.

9 July 1945

0120(K) SJ contact on U.S.S. RUDDY at 16,500 yards. Exchanged calls.
0800(K) Set all ship's clocks back one hour to conform with zone -9 (I) time.
From here throughout remainder of this report all hours of the day will be indicated in (I) time, unless otherwise indicated.
1116 Investigated life raft. It was empty with no sort of identification.
1149 Unencrypted to avoid possible periscope sighted by lookout.
1152 Periscope turned out to be a fish. Good training!
1200 Position: 20-39.5N, 139-58E.

10 July 1945

0448 Line I-29s overhead.
0426 Iado trim dive.
0645 Surfaced.
1200 Position: 25-32N, 139-40E.
1507 Hiany planes overhead, B-29s, B-24s and fighters.

— page 377 —
10 July 1945

2000 S/S contact at 300°T, 16,500 yards. Stationed tracking party and at

2015 exchanged recognition calls with U.S.S. ROT (DD 418). Picked up his S/S or SC radar on the APL. Have been using S/S intermittently with maximum silent interval of two minutes. This may account for the close range of the U.S.S. ROT when first contacted.

11 July 1945

0142 Possible mine passed close on the starboard hand.

0515 Detonated a mine with 40ft. Position: 29-25N, 139-37E.

0525 Made trim dive.

0541 Surfaced.

0922 Headed for TORI SHIELD to turn up the SD.

1047 S/S contact on TORI SHIELD bearing 050°T at 75,000 yards.

1200 Position: 30-20N, 140-06E.

1229 Dove with TORI SHIELD. 15 miles bearing 045°T. No orders for lifeguard station so will make a survey of the island submerged before turning up the SD.

1231 Went to silent running to check cavitation.

1321 Completed curve with gratifying results. Our screws are very quiet.

1635 Rain and poor visibility preventing any sort of survey. Surfaced to tune up SD with TORI SHIELD at scorpion.

1842 Sighted ship bearing 300°T thru high periscope.

1842.30 Launched tracking party.

1843 Charged course to 120°T to avoid detection. No appeared close.

— page 378 —
11 July 1945 (Continued.)

1853 Lost contact so headed down. true bearing. Began to pick up strong sweeping SJ interference. Hollicee we sighted the high periscope on one of our submarines. It was just at dusk and he undoubtedly secured his periscope causing us to lose contact with him.

12 July 1945

0449
Surfaced.

0516
Sighted life raft floating awash; manoeuvred to pick it up but couldn't relocate it again in the fairly heavy sea.

1200
Position: 30-59.3N, 138-04W.

2133
Lidar trim dive.

2148
Surfaced.

"157
SD contact at 6 miles closing with no IFF.

2158
Dove with contact at 4 miles.

2350
Surfaced on station for B-29 lifeguard duty.

13 July 1945

0001
Numerous B-29s on a south-easterly course. Manoeuvred on station attempting to establish communications with Super Dunbo. He finally could hear us on VHF and we could hear him on 4475

— page 379 —
14 July 1945

C-0-M-F-I-D-T-I-I-I-L
U.S.S. [NAME OF SUBMARINE] (38 239) - Report of War Patrol Number eleven (Continued).

14 July 1945

0442
Dove for submerged patrol.
Position: 30-15N, 135-24E.
Enroute to new station.

15 July 1945

0445
Dove for submerged patrol.
Position: 30-15N, 135-24E.
Surfaced on station.
B-29s began to appear enroute to Nip Lend.

16 July 1945

0015
Heard Super Dumbo calling us but could not raise him on WH or on 4475. He finally called us on 3310 kcs. Here by CJ and when we answered by CJ he opened up with voice. Tried 4475 again but he still could not hear. Got a radic check with ITO with no trouble and then finally raised our cover. We now have 5 by 5 communication on 4475 but apparently our WH is out completely. He circled us until his radar went out and then he disappeared.

0237
Super Dumbo requested and received permission to return to base. No fly-flys down as far as we could tell.

0845
Sank floating mine with 40th.

1200
Position: 30-15.3N, 135-24.8E.
Intercepted message to SM. FOX about downed zeolite 85 miles from us.

1214
Four engines making full speed on course 0620.

1219

— page 380 —
15 July 1945 (Continued.)

1733
Changed course to base course 075°T while it is our best estimate of its drift. Reduced speed to standard on two and commenced search from position of oil slick given by plane.

1750
Sighted SD PO at 16,000 yards bearing 150°T and commenced closing her for additional information. She turned towards us, while exchanging information SD PO sighted the life raft and pilot and proceeded to pick him up. Congratulate him if both boats hadn't changed course, neither would have seen him.

1825
Set course for night's life guard station.

2213
Lade trim dive.

2232
Surfaced on station.

17 July 1945

0221
Lade contact on VHF with cover. (VHF had been completely overhauled during the day.) For the first time we seem to have good communications with our cover without using 4475.

0344
Cover returned to base.

0356
Arrested to BUGO SUDO and station for next day's strike.

1150
Dove from SD contact.

1200
Position: 32-03.5T, 155-26T.

1227
Surfaced, weather had blown up so that we would not be able to reach station in time for the night's mission.

13 July 1945

0055
Changed course to 268°T.

0130
50 miles from station. Tried to raise cover on 4475 by calling him every fifteen minutes for an hour and half. No results. There was about a 25 knot wind but the mission

— page 381 —
19 July 1945 (Continued.)

apparently came off as we had several contacts on SD from 30 to 50 miles.

0455 ASHUZURI SAKI at 95,000 yards bearing 310°T by SJ.

0542 Dove for patrol off ASHUZURI SAKI.

1200 Position: 23-27N, 133-09B.

2001 Fast screws on JK which we tried to track for about a half hour. Fish noises!

2045 Surfaced about 20 miles south of ASHUZURI SAKI.

2118 Dove from plano at 8 miles on SD.

2130 Surfaced. Planned to head around ASHUZURI SAKI and in towards OKINO SHI.

2145 Dove when three bright lights were sighted flying by about 3 or 4 miles on the beam. Thus the history of the Jap planes who searched with lights began.

2211 Surfaced.

19 July 1945

0047 Dove from "pip" which executive officer observed closing rapidly on PPI scope.

0100 Exce was embarrassed to learn that "pip" was radar operator moving in range scale!

0116 Surfaced.

0203 Dove from genuine plane on SJ at 3 miles.

0220 52 feet and raised SD mast. Plane is still there.

0249 Surfaced.

0401 Dove for submerged patrol at entrance to east channel in BUTCO SUIDO.

— page 382 —
19 July 1945 (Continued.)

1200 Position: 32-29.5N, 132-36E.
1745 Took pictures of HMS SHI, UKURI SHI, IKINO SHIMI and EINO SHI.
2036 Surfacad.
2125 Plane on SJ at 10,750 yards.
2134 Lost contact.
2313 Dove from plane on SJ at 4000 yards - 800 yards as SJ antenna went under. No bomb?!!!!

20 July 1945

0100 Surfacad.
0407 Dove for submerged patrol off eastern approaches of EURO SUIDO.
1200 Position: 32-33.5N, 132-32.5E.
1615 Sighted black run type buoy. Position: 32-36N, 132-32E. Probable not anchored in this deep water.
2005 Surfacad. It was rough.

21 July 1945

0425 Dove for submerged patrol off eastern side of EURO SUIDO.
1200 Position: 32-21N, 132-22E.
2005 Sighted two orange lights through the periscope which remained on the sea bearing for 6 minutes. Nothing on ST scope. Tent to battle stations. These lights appeared to be on the wings of a plane with a zero angle on the bow. The idea of Jap planes searching for us with lights seemed fantastic.
2142 Dove from plane with two orange lights - very close.

— page 383 —
0-0-F-I-D-N-T-I-I-L
U.S.S. TULAN (SS 239) - Report of War Patrol Number Eleven (Continued).

21 July 1945 (Continued.)

2203
Commence closing the beach patrolling on northerly courses.

0147
Irregular object in the water that appeared to be a large belly tank or buoy.

0401
Dove for submerged patrol off eastern side of BURGO SUIDO.

1200
Position: 32-32.2, 132-53.7N.

1547
Sighted bulk can turret.

2013
Surfaced.

23 July 1945

0009
Dove from plane at 5 miles on SW closing.

0055
Surfaced.

0108
Dove from another close plane on SD.

0148
Surfaced.

0217
Another plane within 5 miles closing - dove.

DALGONER had life-guard on this night so those planes were undoubtedly our own toys returning from a scheduled raid; but they did not show LTF and there was no way we could identify them.

e won't get in a full charge tonight.

0244
Surfaced.

— page 385 —
24 July 1945 (Continued.)

024. Two bombs were jettisoned at 090°, 2 miles.

0856 The cover was relieved by two more fighters. The relieved fellors certainly were anxious to get into the fight - they zoomed over toward the land looking for coastwise shipping, but as we suspected there was none. They ended up by strafing a lighthouse.

1045 Plane down about 15 miles from us! Headed for him.

1120 A sick TBH is coming in to ditch alongside us. Also a sick fighter. About this time another plane was reported down and additional reports were coming in on first plane down. All this was on the VHF - the communicators were going crazy. There were about 300 planes overhead and it was hard to know which one would ditch.

1123 TBH ditched about 300 yards on our starboard bow.

1130 Picked up three survivors from TBH: Ensign William Albert STERNBERG (415541), A-1, USNR; CRAFT, Robert Wesley, 720 93 25, A-12, V-6, USNR and GRAY, Howard Francis, 357 87 04, A-12, V-6, USNR, of VT-34. The fighter pilot was now having a hard time of it. Headed toward him but when we were only 25 feet away he sank and disappeared. One officer had been assigned to keep this pilot under observation while we picked up the survivors of the first plane. The fighter ditched his plane perfectly, climbed out on the wing, and seemed to slip and fall into the water. As we approached it was seen that his rubber boat had been opened but not inflated; it had probably been ripped or punctured. The belly tank showed holes from flak which had pierced from bottom to top on a lin: which might have gone up through the cockpit. On the approach the bow planes had been rigged out which was a mistake. It was too rough to put a man on then and with them rigged out it was impossible to place the boat close alongside the man. The first heavy of the life ring was a bit short but well within reach of him; but he made no effort to reach for it. He seemed to be barely floating with his head under water most of the time and his mae west flapped in the waves showing it was not inflated. Before a swimmer could dive for him, he went under and did not come up again. This was a heart rending

— page 386 —
24 July 1945 (Continued.)

experience which few of us will ever forget. In spite of all efforts to relocate him he never reappeared.

1157 Headed for the first reported survivors at flank speed. Our cap had located them. One plane orbitted and the other recovered us in their direction.

1200 Position: 32-38.5N, 133-02E.

1214 Steadied on orbitting plane.

1245 Sighted smoke float alongside survivors. The cap had kept a smoke alongside the survivors the whole time and had even estimated the bearing and distance of the boat from the smoke which allowed us to plan an approach.

1310 Two survivors: Lieutenant (jg) Dennis Laverne HARRON, (315515), L-1, USNR and KNOUCK, Omer Daniel, 642 04 78, 1M3c, W-6, USNR from VE-16 were brought aboard.

For those survivors we flooded the after group and they practically paddled their rubber boat on deck. To took them aboard between the corning tower and gun mount aft.

All survivors were in excellent condition except for GULY, who had taken a lot of water and was sick to his stomach; but even he was up and around by night fall.

1315 Flank speed toward another survivor reported in our vicinity.

1321 Left full rudder!!

1321,45 Right full rudder - raised a mine by 5 feet. Navy stomachs sank to the deck!

1354 Sighted another mine.

1400 The picture of Iffeguerding for the Navy was becoming clearer. Our fliers had been briefed as to where the lifeguard submarines were located and we imagine the succeeding waves expected us to be in the same place. Pioneer possible they planned to ditch right alongside us. More strikes were heading in toward the target and hero was the 31113 30 miles west of the station where they would be expecting us.

— page 387 —
24 July 1945 (Continued.)

Our cap was recounted to relay our position to all incoming flight leaders so they could guide their airplanes to us. We would like to know if the information of our new position ever got to the planes who would be interested.

1405
Commended search in position of plane reported to have ditched. Our cover, joined from time to time by as many as five additional planes, carefully searched the entire area until at

1743
cover departed for home carrier. There had been no trace of the lost plane and we feared the position was very badly in error or pilot and plane crashed and sank. However, we continued on our search plan.

The second strike had now been completed and there were several pilots down in forbidden waters. The or three had a chance of peddling to a point where we could reach them so we directed their cover to signal a course for them to paddle.

1745
Hard voices on WW indicating a plane planned to ditch near us. Called voices on both circuits giving our position but got no reply. Although the voices were loud they did not answer us or give a call. There were no planes in sight or on either radar. We may have ditched near our assigned station so we planned to proceed there at dusk when we would have completed a thorough search of the area where we were then operating.

1945
Set special watch for 1100(Z) flares which survivors may fire.

2021
Set course to search for plane we believed down near our original station.

2215
Commenced search.

2301
Dove from plane at 9 miles closing.

2347
Surfaced to continue search.

Estimate of results of the day:

— page 389 —
25 July 1945 (Continued.)

0049 surfaced and exchanged calls. He was searching for survivors and disappeared to contact other boats. He believed he had been shadowed by a bogey and warned us to be cautious.

0050 Continued search.

0333 Drove from plane at 4 miles and closing - no IFF. Perhaps this was our friends bogey.

0404 Surfaced to continue search plan.

0502 Secured search upon receipt of reports on aviators downed and proceeded to near station for search.

0515 Sighted 5 friendly planes. Two of these were our cap and we despatched them to search after giving them our evaluation of the boat possibilities. Both of them disappeared and we heard them contact the DRAGONET.

0645 Received word of a pilot in a life raft sighted by our cap. He was one of the boys who paddled out of the ENVO SUIDO. Headed for him at flank speed.

0649 DRAGONET was enroute to rescue also. She was 2 or 3 miles closer so we broke off our approach and continued to next most likely position.

0652 Received word that DRAGONET needed no assistance. She got the pilot after penetrating a floating mine field with our cap dropping flares on the mines to guide her in.

0723 Left full rudder! avoided a mine.

0735 Passed two mines at 800 yards.

0740 Sighted two mines, one on either bow about 150 yards apart. He passed between them.

0745 Passed a mine at 800 yards.

0807 Line at 1000 yards.

— page 390 —
25 July 1945 (Continued.)

0910    Line at 1000 yards. 80C MMS, Section (I).

0918    Commenced search plan.

1032    Sighted DDTDOT and closed to exchange information.

1140    Resumed search with help of our cap.

1200    Position: 32-30F, 132-18D.

1355    Line at 200 yards.

1530    Line at 1000 yards. The foolproof a search plan laid out on the DDT and by keeping these mines plotted in we avoided future encounters with them.

1600    Received word that a fighter was going to ditch alongside us in about an hour and a half.

1630    Our cap was low on gas so fighter planned to ditch as soon as he could reach us. Relayed to ditching pilot wind and sea data.

1643    Sighted ditching plane coming in and fired mortar shells to guide him. The pilot later declared that this was an excellent idea.

1647    Plane made a beautiful landing about 300 yards on our second board bow and at

1651    Lieutenant Knute Nome (12/24/43), 1-1, USNR, of VF-16 came aboard. This rescue, if it can be called such, featured beautiful coordination of information and communications by our cap.

The pilot who ditched was covering one of his friends who was downed 80 miles up in the BUBBO SUIDO. He recieved purposely after the time when he had enough fuel to return to his carrier so that he could vector in a Dunbo and protect his fellow zombo in a life raft. It was not until a Dunbo was reported enroute that our pilot left to ditch alongside us. His actions indicate his confidence in life-guard submarines which is certainly a compliment to the submarine force.

— page 391 —
25 July 1945 (Continued.)

1735 Contacted cover for Dumbo which was to effect rescue. Lieutenant Loe's friend. He gave them all the information over our VHF.

1848 A mine at 1500 yards. Banned 40lb but was unable to detonate it. Shot off a horn and made a dozen or more hits which only bounced off. All these mines are old, tough craters enrushed with bermaclos.

1913 Resumed search plan.

1950 Intercepted message on VHF indicating another plane was planning to ditch. The talkers could not hear us.

2000 Plane intended to ditch alongside us in a few minutes.

2010 Piring flares, mortars and vorys to guide him in. Fourth of July display for the WIPs 12 miles south of OKINO SHI.

2017 Sighted lights of a plane going down very close to OKINO SHI.

2020 Communications were bad, but we finally deduced that this plane was the PBI which previously had gone into the BUNGO SUIDO to effect a rescue. He finally got him on the VHF after he had landed near OKINO. He offered him assistance but he decided to try and make his base with all CO gallions of gas. He wished him good luck and he flew over us enroute after taking off. He believe he rescued Lieutenant Loe's friend and one other pilot.

2052 Sighted flare and tracers at 1410 and discharged course to investigate. He later learned that the DUGOUT was strafed about that time.

2119 Plane at 9 miles on SJ.

2126 Plane at 5 miles on SD - no IFF - dove.

2128 Broached and heard someone calling on VHF.

2142 Surfaced and continued search.

— page 392 —
25 July 1945 (Continued.)

2255 No results in this investigation. Turned north to take station about 10 miles to east of DRAGONET's lifeguard station.

26 July 1945

0027 Contact on SD at 10 miles - heard him on VIP. He is DRAGONET's cover. Asked him to show IFF and to tell this DRAGONET that we were within 10 miles and ready to assist lifeguarding in any way possible.

0225 Contact on SJ at 19,000 yards - DRAGONET. This was an excellent range for this SJ.

0243 Plane on SJ at 43 miles - showed IFF.

0522 Sighted 3 mines. In the next twenty minutes we sighted forty floating mines, many of which were close aboard. Those may be the mines among which the DRAGONET received her aviator yesterday.

0552 Dove from SD contact at 5 miles. No IFF. Remained submerged patrolling south of OILNO and rested. All hands had been going hard for the last two days.

1200 Position: 32-24T, 132-31E.

1930 Surfaced.

2056 Dove from plane sighted from bridge.

2019 Surfaced.

2232 Dove from plane on SD at 8 miles with no IFF which would not answer on VHF. This was a little early for the scheduled B-29s.

2302 Plane still at 3 miles. For the next hour and half there were one to three planes within 10 miles every time we raised the SD mast. They were probably the superforts ahead of schedule.

— page 393 —
27 July 1945

0057 At last, with no planes within 12 miles, surfaced and identified ourselves to nearby planes over VHF.

0100 Sighted DRAGONET's Super Dumbo after contacting him on VHF. Many planes overhead. We had no station but were standing by in case needed.

0231 Super Dumbo returned to base. The only possible customer up to that time was a plane with a damaged instrument panel who decided to try and make his base. The hope he got in all right.

0359 Plane on SJ at 23,000 yards.

0428 Super Dumbo came back on VHF with a report of a plane seen to explode about 20 miles from us in the DRAGONET's area. Went at flank speed toward spot.

0455 Radar contact on DRAGONET at 10,500 yards.

0525 Commenced search for any indication of survivors from exploded plane.

0715 Cover departed.

0820 Further search seems useless on so nebulous a report, so dove for submerged patrol 15 miles south-west of CHINO SHIMA.

1200 Position: 32-30N, 132-14.5E.

2010 Surfacod.

2230 Plane at 12 miles - showed IFF.

2254 Plane with no IFF at 4 miles - dove. Trust this wasn't one of our boys forcing us down. Feel we must assume he's unfriendly at 4 miles with no IFF.

2316 Surfacod. Another B-29 mission for which we have no station but for which we stoochy in case we were needed.

— page 394 —
28 July 1945

0027 Made contact with DRUMETT'S Super Dumbo.

0200 Super Dumbo returned to base. Didn't see any planes tonight as we were off the line of approach.

0201 Set course for C400 station for carrier strike.

0300 On station.

0530 Made contact with cap and as strike was not due for a few minutes we sent cap to look for shipping - results negative.

0700 Strike went over the target. Many bogies.

0642 Three plane crews downed in restricted area.

0930 One planned to ditch by us. It was rough and we made tight circles to make a slick and churn up a wake he could see.

1035 Ditching plane decided to head for his carrier.

1044 Survivor in life jacket donned where we can reach him but 20 miles away - flank speed.

1056 Another life raft 10 miles from this one. Our station was too far out to be able to make these rescues quickly.

1100 Another survivor 12 miles from the last. Also two more in restricted waters.

1118 Another in restricted water.

1130 Two men down just three miles from the men we were headed for.

1143 Still another down where we couldn't reach him.

1150 PER picked up our single yellowjacket but ran into trouble getting off the water. He headed for the air in the life raft.

1200 Position: 32-30.8N, 132-48.1E.

— page 395 —
28 July 1945 (Continued.)

1209 Sighted orbiting planes.

1217 Sighted life raft.

1233 Flooded down aft to bring aboard survivors.

1236 Lieutenant Commander William Whitley BUGH, Jr., (65271), USS and BOUGH, Charles Evans, 510-50-06, radio, V-6, USNR from VB-86 aboard in excellent condition. PSH was in sight and he asked us to standby as they were having trouble with their radio-off. He offered to lighten their load by taking survivors from them but they decided to try and take off with all hands.

1259 Set course for next position after telling PSH we would return if needed.

1400 Commended search plan. Divided planes to search a circle around us with a radius of fifteen miles. Planes returned within a half hour and reported negative results. This was a pretty quick search!!! Sent them out again, this time to cover the position of the only other survivors we knew of that we could reach.

1541 Sighted mine dead ahead - all back emergency!!

1549 Resumed search plan.

1650 Cap returned to base. He noticed a vast difference in the cooperation and grasp of the problem by our various caps.

1701 Contacted Dunbo on rescue mission to north. He knew of no business for us.

2000 Planned to stop across the two positions where planes were reported down on three angles shooting flares and hoping for a reply. He had already covered this territory pretty thoroughly but it was worth a try.

2004 Sighted flares but they were steady and too high to be from a raft. They must have been deep signals over HUSHU.

2005 Commenced firing green buck rogers shells at 10 minute intervals.

— page 396 —
28 July 1945 (Continued.)

2105 When ready to fire last flare SJ reported a plane at 3 miles. Tracked him down our starboard beam and did not fire any more flares.

2317 Dove from a plane on SJ at 8000 yards closing. This was definitely not a friendly act.

2345 Surfaood.

29 July 1945

0035 On station for B-29 lifesguard. SD showed IFF at 26 miles. Contacted him on VHF.

0137 Raid finished with all planes returning safely so our Super Dumbo headed home.

0504 Commenced search plan on best estimated position of a downed aviator. It knew the PBMs picked up several men in our vicinity and it is very likely they rescued the man we searched for yesterday. Asked for estimated positions of all downed aviators unaccounted for.

0842 Asked BUMBO to relay a message to ITO requesting information on survivors.

0846 Contacted today's cover who will be with us in an hour.

1012 Difficult communications with another Super Dumbo who could not untangle the confusion between the similar call numbers of the H.M.S. and DRAGON and who insisted on authentication before he would report the position of a survivor. Finally learned that there were survivors about 80 miles away in a restricted area. This time we were suspicious and insisted on his authentication. The reference point was not the current one; the authentication was not according to correct procedure; the position was far away and in a restricted area; but it was something more definite than anything else we had at that time so!

(1) Gave Super Dumbo our I.T. and asked that he arrange for a relief if he was unable to remain over the survivors until we could arrive.

— page 397 —
29 July 1945 (Continued.)

(2) Instructed the cover who had been assigned to us to take orders from the DRUGNET and informed DRUGNET of our intentions, requesting that they use our plane to help in their search around BUNGO SUIDO.

(3) Requested coverage to enter restricted area from ComSubPac, reposting the need to keep a plane over the survivors.

1136 Plane at 6 miles closing - no IFF - dove.

1200 Surfaced. There was a five sea and what seemed a large part of it flooded into the conning tower when the hatch was opened. Fortunately there was no damage.

Position: 32-08N, 133-21B.

1202 Contacted PBI overhead on WFP. He showed no IFF and he must have forced us down. This tended to make the scuttled personnel in the conning tower and control room a little bitter, not to mention the more serious aspects. He knew nothing of the survivors for whom we were looking.

1413 Slowed and commenced circling while trying to contact plane which should have been covering the survivors. To were five miles from the restricted area and as yet had no authority to enter.

1515 Received instructions from ComSubPac to leave restricted area immediately after piloting up survivors and not to enter a restricted area without his authority. Apparently Com SubPac believed we were already in the area.

1535 Still couldn't raise any plane. Presume the original Super Dunbo had to shove off although his relief was due at 1500(I). Will run towards points we were given at flank speed calling our Super Dunbo as we go. Planned to return at flank speed if we didn't get him within an hour.

1600 Lookout spotted life raft. This was the first time we had sighted a survivor without the help of a plane and it restored faith that if there had been survivors in the vicinity of our other searches we would have seen them.

— page 398 —
1602 Another life raft.
: 1615 Picked up 2nd. Lt. James Cloud BRIGHTBELL, 02079261, USN-7.
: 1617 Second raft was empty. This was one which had been dropped by B-29.
: 1637 Sighted red flag being waved from another raft. Heeded for him. The red flag was a great help to a searching submarine.
: 1640 Sighted what seemed to be a man in a mask in a mask west in the water but a thorough investigation revealed nothing.
: 1655 Sighted another life raft. The DRT was excellent for plotting these positions. We sighted some of these rafts at 12 or three places thus obtaining a cut on them. These sites were very accurate.
: 1657 Sighted a 3" and contacted him on VHF. He joined the sonar.
: 1715 Brought 2nd Lt. George Sylvernus LOUIS, 0837166, USN-7 aboard. He had a 6" contact shoulder and was in pretty bad shape. Super Dude scrolled looking for another raft. This Dumbo was very helpful.
: 1719 Sighted another raft. The man in this raft jumped up and down to attack our attention.
: 1725 Picked up USS LOUIS, 1st Mark, 6954987, S/Sgt., USN-7.
: 1727 Headed for raft which plane was orbiting. He also dropped flares.
: 1751 Brought BRIGHT, 1st Lt. Eugene, 12168186, Cpl., USN-7 and WINDER, Harold Leslie, 36468198, Sgt., USN-7 aboard. Plane had departed to look for more survivors.
: 1759 Sighted mine.
: 1800 Learned from rescued flyers that they were members of a B-29.

— page 399 —
29 July 1945 (Continued.)

crew that had lost a propeller returning from the raid. The propeller had flown off into an air pocket and fuel tank which had started a fire along the side of the plane. It went into a flat spin. They had all jumped with the exception of three who probably couldn't get out. That left a probable three in the water. By keeping a DRT record of where the men were picked up and determining in what order they had jumped from the plane it was possible to make a fair estimate of the course of the plane and the probable position of the remaining survivors. The Super Dumbo cooperated by searching in the sectors we suggested.

1824. Super Dumbo located another raft and drop ed a smoke bomb.

1847. Rescued lst. Lt. Raymond Edward SHUELAY, 0677144, USAF, plane commander, and KIDD, Sam Clark, 38305364, Sgt., USAF. The latter was in very bad condition, suffering from shock, sunburn and water immersion. These two men had been in a one man raft for two days. One more possible survivor so planned to continue search until 2300 when plane promised to escort us from the area.

Picking up these flyers, particularly the last ones, I tried to use that flooding damn aft was the most practical way to bring people aboard. The also found that it was much easier to spot men who waved red flags from their rafts than those who did not.

1850. Commenced search plan to locate eighth crew member.

2035. No luck yet so fired rockets hoping he had one with which to answer. Had already requested RADOMIT to take our lifeguard station for the night.

2300. Flank speed on four engines to clear the area with our excellent Super Dumbo for an escort.

30 July 1945.

0000. Released plane as we were clear of the restricted area. Explained that we would make arrangements to return if he located the last man.

— page 400 —
30 July 1945 (Continued.)

0300 O'KIE, William John, QH3c, was taken ill while on watch. The Pharmacist's late diagnosed gastric ulcers.

0305 Commenced surface patrol 35 miles east of OKIO SHIA.

0310 Contacted plane which was relief for our friend of last night. Apparently he did not know what the cope was at all and it took us about an hour to get him straightened out and back to his station searching for the eighth zo mile. He was also mixed up with the hull numbers of DRAGOIT and HALE. (293 and 239.)

0630 Received information on five ships 15 miles north of OKIO SHIA. Proceeded to entrance of east channel at best speed.

0948 Plane returned and requested that he confirm this information. He reported two men-of-war and three others. He could not reach these ships but hoped they would attempt a sortie. Released the Super Dunbo. It's a new kind of war when a submarine has a plane to locate targets.

1010 Made trim dive.

1105 Surfaced. Japs weren't flying.

1200 Position: 32-27N, 132-26E.

1230 Dove for submerged patrol 15 miles south-west of OKIO SHIA. (A plane did show up at 3 miles just at this time quickening our decision to dive.)

1340 Placed up to 35 feet and attempted to call the Dunbo who should have been sent to search for the eighth number of our B-29 crew.

2021 Surfaced.

2340 Plane at 4 miles on SD - dove.

31 July 1945

0125 Surfaced.

— page 401 —
31 July 1945 (Continued.)

0358 Dove for submerged patrol off eastern approaches to the BUNGO SUIDO. It is believed that one of the ships inside BUNGO SUIDO was a cruiser.

1054 Surfaced to replenish the air and move farther toward the channel. With 105 people a fifteen or sixteen hour drive is extremely hard on all hands to the point of being dangerous.

1140 Dove south-west of O.INO SHINA.

1200 Position: 32-29N, 132-21E.

2034 Surfaced.

1 August 1945

0040 SD contact at 10 miles with IFF.

0050 Plane passed overhead as first believed to be the SD contact. However as it was then seen to be a single engine plane, we could only conclude that he was a Jap. There was nothing on the SL at the time.

0500 Dove for submerged patrol off OKINO SHINA.

0709 Surfaced to close the island and replenish air.

0800 Dove for submerged patrol.

1200 Position: 32-20N, 132-27E.

2116 Surfaced.

2 August 1945

0110 Dove for plane inside 8 miles - no IFF.

0150 Surfaced.

0347 SD contact at 10 miles.

0501 Dove in heavy sea. It was impossible to prevent broaching at periscope depth with the tremendous swells so we cruised at 90 feet.

— page 402 —
2 August 1945 (Continued.)

1200 Position: 32-20N, 132-27E.
1550 Surfaced for ventilation purposes.
1552 Plane at 14 miles on SD. Doubt if he could see us in this sea.
1650 Dove.
2038 Surfaced in continuing heavy weather to charge batteries. A 3 knot current to 070° had developed and we were 35 miles from where we thought we were.

3 August 1945

0447 Dove to ride out the storm. Couldn't hold our own with this current so took soundings each half hour.
1200 Position: 32-21N, 132-54S.
1516 Surfaced to replenish air and battery. The storm had abated somewhat but the drift was about the same.

4 August 1945

0430 Dove for submerged patrol off eastern entrance to BUMBO SUIDO.
Uncountered a strong set to the north and east during the remainder of our stay in this area. This made it difficult to open the range to the beach in order to surface at night and thus hampered our submerged patrols. Ran at 2/3 speed for three hours and gained less than three miles against the current.
0612 Surfaced to replenish air and close the range to TOKI SHIMA.
0904 Sighted two friendly planes and exchanged calls on WFR. Asked them to look to see if our cruiser was still anchored inside the BUMBO SUIDO. It was out of their sector area. Nor appreciate how accommodating the first Dumbo had been to go scouting inside BUMBO SUIDO in broad daylight.

— page 403 —
0914 Dove for submerged patrol.
: 1200 Position: 32-39N, 132-25E.
: 2032 Surfaced.
: 2125 Heard plane calling all subs on VHF but couldn't reach him.

5 August 1945

: 0115 Dove from TDI contact and went to silent running. There was a poor trace which was immediately lost on opening this vents and did not appear again after negative was blown. However the operator was convinced that he heard the characteristic "smooth" of a torpedo which was illustrated for him at school. Certainly our continued operations in this small area presented a golden opportunity for his Submariners.

: 0300 Surfaced.
: 0434 Dove for submerged patrol off OKINO SITIA and BUNGOT'S east channel.
: 1200 Position: 32-24E, 132-15E.
: 1300 Spread three cans of CO₂ absorbent in order to remain submerged all day.
: 2044 Surfaced.
: 2215 Dove from closing plane on SD.
: 2236 Surfaced to continue patrol.

6 August 1945

: 1040 Sighted B-29 but could not raise him on VHF.
: 1200 Position: 32-24E, 132-30E.
: 1210 Dove from plane at 10 miles. Continued patrol submerged.
: 2010 Sighted our flares up in the BUNGO SUDO again.

— page 404 —
6 August 1945 (Continued.)

2035    Surfaced.
2154    Dove from plane at 8 miles closing.
2224    Surfaced.
2235    Dove from plane at 6 miles.
2350    Surfaced.

7 August 1945

0416    Dove for submerged patrol in our usual spot.
0930    Sighted two B-29s.
0957    Surfaced for lifeguard station but could not find our cover.
1111    Still no cover appeared and as no date was given on despatches, assumed that raid was not for today. Dove for submerged patrol.
1936    Two bright flares again in the BUNCO SUIDO.
2040    Surfaced.

8 August 1945

0001    Contacted DRAGONET's cover for night's mission and informed him of our rendezvous with the DRAGONET to take aboard their rescued zanies.
0035    DRAGONET on 8J at 6500 yards.
0240    Lieutenant (jg) Robert H. APLINGE, 1st, USS came aboard from DRAGONET via rubber boat pulled by hand lines. Also exchanged movies. Learned from this flyer that DRAGONET had been strafed. This accounts for the treacers we investigated on 25 July. The DRAGONET had also dodged two torpedoes.
0245    Dove from SJ contact dead ahead at 1000 yards. Probably a

— page 405 —
8 August 1945 (Continued.)

mine but with the DRAGON'S two torpedoes fresh in mind, diving from a two man submarine seemed a definite possibility.

0330 Surfaced.

0412 Dove to patrol until the day's strike.

093S Sighted two PBYs.

0950 Surfaced on station for lifeguard duty and established connections with our cover. Before the raid was over we were orbitted by two B-17s, a B-17, two PBYs, a PBY and four to six P-51s. The felt quite secure. No business for all this formidable array of air power.

1200 Position: 32-30N, 132-36E.

1300 Cover secured. Apparently no one was down so dove.

2030 Surfaced and set course to rendezvous point with U.S.S. BLACKFISH.

2145 Plane at 4 miles - but he opened the range.

9 August 1945

0732 Sighted U.S.S. PLAICE had no information for us. Resumed course for rendezvous with U.S.S. BLACKFISH.

1001 Dove from float type plane.

1200 Surfaced.

Position: 31-37N, 134-39E.

1240 Dove from SD contact at 10 miles.

1648 Surfaced.

1903 Sighted U.S.S. BLACKFISH.

1920 Arranged the details for transferring 16 aviators and our patient with the BLACKFISH. Planned to wait until dark.

— page 406 —
9 August 1945 (Continued.)

2110
: Con: enced our ferry service using the rubber boat with lights on bow and stern for propulsion.

2150
: All passengers and patient transferred, set course for next station.

10 August 1945

0215
: Dove from plane at 4 miles.

0353
: Surfaced.

0855
: Detonated mine with 50 caliber shell at 150 yards. This was a little close! Bits of the steel case fell within a few yards of us.

1002
: Dove to hold qualification examination in the engine rooms.

1200
: Position: 30-46°, 136-30E.

1255
: Surfaced.

1907
: Sank mine with 50 caliber machine gun fire.

2015
: Three planes on 3D - one answered IFF so they were fired.

11 August 1945

0122
: Received orders to proceed to SAIPAN for fuel and hence to IIDAY for refit.

1200
: Position: 29-11N, 137-57E.

12-14 August 1945

: Enroute to SAIPAN for refueling. Sighted many aircraft and passed the U.S.S. PILOTISH, U.S.S. DUTCH and another friendly submarine on opposite courses.

: Loon positions:

1200
: 12 August: 23-08N, 139-31E.

1200
: 13 August: 15-30N, 142-21E.

— page 407 —
14 August 1945
0000    Chang'd time to -10 (K) time.
1202(K)    Moored alongside U.S.S. ORION.

15 August 1945
President Truman's declaration announcing the final Japanese capitulation was received.

16 August 1945
1300(K)    Enroute from SAIPAN to PEARL HARBOR, T.H., in company with U.S.S. SC.BRADFISH, Sighted various friendly ships and convoys enroute.

Noon positions:
1200(K)   17 August: 17-47N, 146-49E.
1200(K)   18 August: 19-01N, 153-06E.
1200(L)   19 August: 19-58N, 159-27E.
1200(L)   20 August: 20-56N, 165-50E.
1200(L)   21 August: 20-52N, 172-02E.
1200(T)   22 August: 21-01N, 177-55E.
1200(T)   22 August: 21-11N, 175-42.2N.
1200(X)   23 August: 21-06N, 169-49T.
1200(X)   24 August: 21-56N, 163-24W.

25 August 1945
1025(V.)    Moored at Sail 10, U.S. Submarine Base, PEARL HARBOR, T.H.

- 39 -

— page 409 —
U.S.S. HLE (SS 239) - Report of Har Patrol Number Eleven (Continued.)

(C) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Continued.)

were considered to be of "diving" caliber.

It is believed that some of these thirty-three contacts were friendly planes at short range with no IFF. Almost all of these were encountered during darkness.

(D) ATTACK DATA:

No attacks were made.

(E) NOTES:

The following is a tabulation of mine contacts made:

| Date | Position | Type | Number in area | Remarks |
|------||------|||
| 7-8-45| 16-45N, 144-20E| 4-prong floating| 1| Detonated by 40mi gunfire. |
| 7-11-45| 29-26N, 139-37E| Multi-prong floating| 1| Sunk by 40mi gunfire. |
| 7-16-45| 30-41N, 136-16E| 4-prong floating| 1| |
| 7-24-45| 32-13.5N, 132-34E| do| 1| |
| 7-25-45| 32-30N, 132-38E| do| 1| |
| 7-25-45| 32-21N, 132-37E| do| 1| |
| 7-25-45| 32-22N, 132-30E| do| 2| |
| 7-25-45| 32-24.2N, 132-31E| do| 2| |
| 7-25-45| 32-24N, 132-36E| do| 1| |
| 7-25-45| 32-16N, 132-41E| do| 1| |
| 7-26-45| 32-27N, 1 2-33E| do| 40| |
| 7-28-45| 32-21N, 13.27.8E| do| 1| |

— page 410 —
8-10-45 : 30-45ft, 132-01° : 4-prong floating: 1 : Detonated by 50 : cal. gunfire.
: 8-10-45 : 31-12N, 136-59° : do : 1 : Sunk by 50 cal. : gunfire.

Using our daily study of the currents around BUNGO SUIDO it seems reasonable to believe that many of these mines drifted out of the BUNGO SUIDO. Certainly it is significant that they should be drifting together in such compact clusters. The reason more of them were not destroyed was due to the fact that they were encountered at inopportune times, i.e., while proceeding to the rescue of a downed aviator or at night when Jap planes were always nearby.

(J) ATTITUDES, RESULTS, AND EVOLUTION TACTICS

Antisubmarine measures consisted of night flying planes and enemy submarines. The experienced no enemy activity during strikes.

Evasive action was taken by diving from close planes and on a TDH contact.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DISCHARGE

(i) Hull and Machinery.

(a) Upon starting the auxiliary generator on 22 July 1945 a flash-over occurred. Voltmeter ground readings taken prior to starting revealed normal conditions. Investigation revealed that salt water had entered the generator casing on a dive and was thrown through the armature and field windings by the ventilation fan. Then the load was thrown on the generator the flash-over occurred. Readings taken immediately afterward indicated zero grounds on armature, series, and shunt fields. Efforts of the ship's force to eliminate this grounds with facilities available were unsuccessful.

(b) On 15 August 1945 the series relay coil on #3 I.C. machine.

— page 411 —
1. Hull and Machinery (Continued).

control panel burned up. The machine was operated without this coil as there were no spares aboard.

(c) The fuel and lube oil purifiers in the forward engine room were out of commission for a period of 76 hours. They were grounded out on a dive due to excessive angle on the boat and excessive water in the bilges. Ship's force eliminated all grounds and placed them in good operating condition.

(d) Both periscopes were unsatisfactory. Number 1 leaked oil. Number 2 leaked oil and water and, in spite of correct pressure, was almost continually fogged in high power.

(2) Ordnance and Gunnery.

(a) Eight Mk. 18-2s and eight Mk. 14-3s were carried forward and six Mk. 18-2s were carried aft. The charging interval on the electrics averaged eight days with only one difficulty experienced. Number 100370 developed a 4 volt ground which increased to as much as 80 volts after a fresh charge, which indicated a possible cell leak, though none could be found upon investigation. Cell tops were wiped and soda solution applied to no avail. Torpedo still had the ground when turned over to refit activity.

(1) Radio.

(1) Subfoc.

(a) 9090 kilo-cles would be by far the most satisfactory operating frequency both day and night were it not for the fuzzy slowed effect of the characters caused by double keying from FAN and GULL. This frequency is almost always heard strength five (5), usually with little jamming and interference, but the keying at present makes accurate copying impossible. During the patrol 6045 kcs. was used almost exclusively at night and 17630 kcs. when on the surface during the day. 15655 kcs. was good in the early morning and poor during daylight. 4515 kcs. was seldom used. Rino (9) Consubuca serifs were missed in all and it is believed that most of them were missed because of forced dives during the six-ds. It is suggested that Consubuca serifs be repeated more often for this reason. Several missing serials were interchanged with the DRAGNET and the BLACKFISH. Little difficulty was experienced in transmitting our fourteen (14) messages to Consubuca.

— page 412 —
1. On two occasions contact was attempted with other submarines on 3310 kcs., but, in both instances, we were unsuccessful. This was a very poor frequency for inter-submarine communications. Communication with IWO JIMI on 3310 kcs. and 7945 kcs. was satisfactory but IWO's refusal to authenticate caused us some concern. Excellent results were obtained with 4475 kcs. and WIF once the planes were contacted. On several occasions the planes assisted in inter-submarine communication by relaying messages for us. During the strike periods the WIF circuit was very crowded with several messages overlapping and it was very difficult to extract the information in tacto. In some instances the planes did not use the effective name of the reference point and out of necessity we had to do the same.

(2) SCR-624-1.

(a) Early in the patrol run capacitor C-20601 shorted to ground and resistor R-264 opened due to this short. It is no spare parts are provided for this vital equipment, parts from the SJ spares were substituted. It is a later date both the transmitter and the receiver were inoperative. The mechanical frequency shifter was found to be jammed between channels.

(b) Excellent results were obtained working with aircraft. Ranges were considerably less when working with other submarines. For lifeguard duty the SCR-624-1 is the most important and useful piece of gear on board. Either spare parts or a spare unit should be carried.

(H) RADAR

(1) SD

(a) During the major overhaul in MRC ISLAND, the new SD-5 radar was installed. The operation between MRC ISLAND and PRICE HARBOR proved very satisfactory. During this time only one difficulty was experienced. Quite a few .5 amp fuses in the high voltage filament transformer circuit T-902 were blown. By removing a gassy 2X2 tube this difficulty was remedied.

(b) During operations in PRICE HARBOR, transformer T-902 and the intensity potentiometer R-949 had to be replaced. Satisfactory operation was resumed until arrival at GUIL. However, at GUIL,

— page 416 —
6-21-45 : 1915 : 20-41N, 166-01E
6-23-45 : 1150 : 20-10N, 166-09E
6-26-45 : 1500 : 20-39N, 166-18E
6-28-45 : 0824 : 20-24N, 165-45E

Enroute from GUJ to EUGNO SUDO.

7-9-45 : 2105 : 24-50N, 139-31E
7-11-45 : 0736 : 30-35N, 140-14E

Date : GCT : Position : Gradient : Depth & Time
On station near WARE.
6-21-45 : 1915 : 20-41N, 166-01E : 5° negative layer 180°-130°, 70°-10°
6-23-45 : 1150 : 20-10N, 166-09E : 6° negative layer 101°-140°, 75°-240°
6-26-45 : 1500 : 20-39N, 166-18E : 6° negative layer 181°-100°, 75°-180°
6-28-45 : 0824 : 20-24N, 165-45E : 6° negative layer 132°-100°, 76°-220°

Enroute from GUJ to EUGNO SUDO.

7-9-45 : 2105 : 24-50N, 139-31E : 9° negative layer 170°-40°, 69°-140°
7-11-45 : 0736 : 30-35N, 140-14E : 6° negative layer 172°-60°, 66°-120°

— page 417 —
7-12-45 : 1450 : 31-09N, 135-09E : 7° negative layer : 76°-70°, 69°-140°

7-17-45 : 0327 : 32-08N, 136-27E : 7° negative layer : 76°-80°, 69°-160°

On station near BUNGO SUIDO good negative gradients were constantly available at depths below 100 feet at noted below:

7-19-45 : 1508 : 32-23N, 132-35E : 6° negative layer : 76°-100°, 70°-170°

7-21-45 : 1300 : 32-17N, 132-06E : 9° negative layer : 76°-120°, 67°-200°

7-24-45 : 1449 : 32-23.5N, 132-03E : 9° negative layer : 76°-100°, 67°-250°

7-30-45 : 0204 : 32-22N, 132-3.5E : 9° negative layer : 74°-100°, 65°-160°

Enroute from BUNGO SUIDO to SHIP the following layer was noted:

8-9-45 : 0225 : 30-27N, 133-39E : 9° negative layer : 76°-100°, 67°-200°

Due to lack of targets sound conditions were not noted. All bathymetric record cards have been forwarded to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HEALTHCARE

(1) Health.

(a) Health in general was good. Approximately 14 men days were lost due to minor ailments and one case of acute stomach ulcers.

(b) Note should be made of the condition of the rescued survivors. Two cases of invasion developed, one of which was serious enough to keep the patient in bed for five days; these men had been in the water about 40 hours. The survivors, when picked up, were much weaker than we expected them to be, and more important, they were weaker than they expected themselves to be. One survivor suffered a dislocated shoulder which was reset. After was used to anesthetize the patient.

— page 418 —
1. (2) Food.
   - (a) The food was in general extremely well prepared. Successive loads were taken at 1:00, 1:15, and 1:30. Resulted in safe meat and eggs becoming still fairly antiscu.

— page 419 —
5,056 miles...70,046 gals.
: 7,475 miles...87,048 gals.
: 4,730 miles...74,294 gals.
: 17,251 miles...231,488 gals.

Incluces time spent patrolling off ISLTD.

(S) DURATION:
1. Days enroute to area......16
2. Days in area......41
3. Days enroute to base......15
4. Days submerged......20
5. Total length of run......72

(T) FACTORS OF DURATION:
Torpedoes 25
Fuel 6,050 gals.
Provisions 1G days.
Personnel Factor 7 days

(U) COORDINATIONS, R.D.R., and SONAR COUNTER SIGNALS:
1. Sonar Countermeasures.
2. No sonar countermeasures were encountered.

51

— page 420 —
7-10-45: 2000(I) 112 1200 WEAK: 15 23-57F, Very weak, slow
: 7-10-45: 1100(I) 200 350 5 129-39H, Slow snap.
: 7-11-45: 2000(I) 221 62 6 127-26H, Slow snap, very
: 76 500 55

(b) In the vicinity of QDHQ SH-1, and JUNUZ I S.H.I. almost continuous interference from one or more radar stations was observed. The frequency, prr, and pulse width varied as follows:

| Frequency | Pulse Width |
|||
| 68-00     | 550-600     |
| 76        | 500         |
| 55        | 30-65        |

(c) These radars would remain steady for long periods, at times they would sweep irregularly, often two frequencies would be present, and occasionally one would be separated by at least two seconds.

| Frequency | Pulse Width |
|||
| 94-105    | 350-1000    |
| 97        | 500         |
| 15        | 12-40        |

(d) These radars would remain steady for long periods, at times they would sweep irregularly, often two frequencies would be present, and occasionally one would be separated by at least two seconds.

| Frequency | Pulse Width |
|||
| 145-158   | 400-1200    |
| 152       | 550         |
| 13        | 6-40         |

(e) To more than two frequencies in this band were ever recorded at the same time. They usually swept irregularly and rarely stopped. They were sporadic loops.

- 52 -

— page 421 —
170-179 250-500 8-12'
Mean values, ten observations
176 300 10

(f) Six of these contacts were in the vicinity of OKINO SHIMA, all were near land. One contact showed lobe switching (9-30-45, 32-20N, 132-13S). A regular sweep was used when the contact was not steady. Contacts at this frequency were usually followed by a dive from an aircraft contact.

(g) Communications Countermeasures.

(a) No excessive interference or deliberate jamming was encountered. Although 8475 was constantly covered by a strength five (5) Jap who appeared to be monitoring the frequency. This difficulty was easily overcome by zero beating the Jap. He was more of a nuisance than an effective jammer.

(V) REMARKS

We found a great need for a clearing house for data on downed pilots. We suspected that we did not get word of all the planes which went down in our area and we know we did not learn which ones had been picked up by other rescue facilities. This information would have been particularly helpful on the second day of search.

Several times we worked in an area in which PBYs were also working. We found it difficult to make a mutual cox-range of information and as a result we duplicated each other's area coverage. We strongly suspect that we spent more than half a day searching in an area where the survivor had been picked up by a PBY - and there were other pilots down in other areas where we should have been searching.

Then a plane is going down the initial position reported can very likely be inaccurate. After the plane is down and survivors sighted, an orbiting plane should recheck position and inform lifesavers of any correction referring to any previous reports concerning that survivor.

Pilots are briefed as to the location of lifesavers, but after planes of the first flight are down, the submarine may move thirty miles away from that spot. There should be some positive means of informing succeeding flights of planes of the submarine's new position.

— page 422 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. "HALE" (SS 239) - Report of War Patrol Number Eleven (Cont'd)

---

There were times when we felt particularly safe, and did not need or cap close at hand. Evidently some caps did not understand this for it was very difficult to get them to widen their search area more than ten miles from us.

Several times we were driven down by planes not showing. IFF just prior to a strike. As we were right on the path of the strike it was hard to decide to surface with a plane only three miles away at night even though we felt quite certain it was one of ours. In general the planes have been very helpful by calling us on VHF before they reach our radar range.

It's always a boost to our morale when the Dunbo or Cap passes word to us about what's happening. Words like "Just heard, Navy bogeys at nine o'clock", over the target" or, "Sky clear over the target", makes us feel like part of the show.

Some orbiting planes made very definite maneuvers to assist us in locating the exact position of a survivor, others were not definite enough.

Army survivors hoisted a red flag in their raft. This doubled the range at which we could spot them.

Smoke floats were a decided help. The red smoke set lose by a Navy survivor was particularly easy to spot.

Working on the idea that a pilot planning to ditch may be a bit excited we tried to relay to him the information of force and direction of i:1 and sea even though he might be able to judge them himself. In general the pilots appreciated this and used our data.

In rough seas it is hard for a plane to sight us. We found that by running at full speed with full rudder we could churn up a white circle which helped them considerably. After completing the circle several times the seas were generally calmer in the circle. We were unable to create a practicable slick: similar to the one used by cruisers in cast recoveries.

By firing flares and recognition mortars we were able to guide planes in our direction.

The Army and Navy pilots were very helpful particularly on the VHF watch, in identifying planes, and interpreting their maneuvers.

The morale of pilots could be boosted if they knew somebody would write to their families saying they were safe. Their families are not used to waiting several weeks for mail.

— page 423 —
1. The U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of War Patrol Number Eleven, Comments on.

2. The eleventh war patrol of the U.S.S. WHALE conducted in the BUNGO SUID area during the period 15 June 1945 to 25 August 1945. The submarine was broken by a twenty-seven hour torpedo attack, resulting in the loss of two ships and the sinking of one destroyer. The patrol was a successful one, and the submarine was credited with the destruction of two enemy submarines and the sinking of one destroyer. The patrol was also notable for the successful use of a torpedo attack against a convoy of ships, which resulted in the sinking of one destroyer and the damage to two ships.

3. The commanding officer's remarks concerning life guard duties have considerable merit, and are considered very valuable.

4. The Division Commander congratulates the commanding officer and crew of the U.S.S. WHALE upon their excellent performance of life guard duties and the completion of the WHALE's eleventh successive successful war patrol.

J. C. DIMPSKY

— page 424 —
FC5-10/A16-3
Serial: (0270)
Confidential

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. WHALE (SS239)
Report of War Patrol
Number Eleven

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of War Patrol
Number Eleven

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division ONE HUNDRED TWO.

2. The Submarine Commander takes pleasure in congratulating the Commanding officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. WHALE, upon the successful rescuing of the fifteen evators during a long and arduous patrol, the eleventh for the WHALE.

— page 425 —
1. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. H.H.L. (SS239) - Report of Lieutenant Commander H.H.L. under the command of Lieutenant Commander H

— page 426 —
12-10(A)/ A16-3(18)
Serial 02372
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD INDORSEMENT to
W.H.E.R.C. of
Eleventh War Patrol.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 72
U.S.S. WHALE - ELEVENTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. WHALE (SS239) - Report of Eleventh War Patrol
(15 June to 25 August 1945).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
JICPOA (1)
Conservpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Consubsistant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Consopac (2)
Consowespac (1)
Consubs?thFlt (Fwd Echelon) (2)
Consubs?thFlt (Rear Echelon) (2)
Connorpac (1)
Consubspac (3)
ConsubspacIdComd (40)
SUBAD, IL (2)
ConsubspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Pacific (2)
ConsubOrlTraGr (Airmail) (5)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

E.L. HYMES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.