U.S.S. HADDO (SS-255) — war patrol report SS-255_HADDO.pdf

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OPERATOR: [signature]
DATE: 3-13-75

THIS MICROFILM IS THE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO—NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET, START & END
NAVEXOS 3968

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SS255/A9
Serial (06)
DECLASSIFIED

From:  The Commanding Officer.
To:  The Commander Submarine Squadron FIFTY.
Subject:  U.S.S. HADDO - Report of 1st War Patrol.
Enclosure:  (A) Subject report.
1. Enclosure (A), is herewith submitted.

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY: OP-09292C DATE 5/30/42

47903

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3.5" FLEET POST OFFICE
New York, N.Y.

U.S.S. HADDO
Report of 1st War Patrol. Period from April 9, 1943 to April 30, 1943. Enroute New London, Conn., to Rosneath, Scotland. Operation Order 40-43.

PROLOGUE.

Readiness for sea date following completion of alterations to blowers and timing gears of main engines was April 1, 1943. On that date completed repair of burned out main motor bearing. Underway for training operations and sound tests April 1-3, 1943. Docked on marine railway Submarine Base, New London, Conn., April 4-5, 1943, for repair of leaky fittings on 3 High pressure air bank.

1. NARRATIVE.

April 9
1600 (Q)
Underway from Submarine Base in accordance with operation order. Lade trim dive in Block Island Sound and exercised at Battle Surface.

2012 (Q)
Passed Pt. Judith Buoy on schedule and set speed 12 knots on assigned track.

2020(Q)
Struck submerged object which bounced along the stbd, side damaging pitotmeter log sword arm. No other damage apparent.

April 10
0530 (Q)
Dived and began submerged running during daylight. Surfaced at 2025 (Q) and resumed running on engines.

April 11-13
Proceeding on surface at prescribed rate of 26N miles per day. At 1418 (Q), April 11, sighted mast and stack of fast merchant vessel on a westerly course bearing 170°T, distance about 3-9 miles. Sound gear picked up disturbance on this bearing at practically the same time. Dived to keep out of sight and surfaced at 1510 after sound contact had been lost.

April 14-19
Proceeding along assigned track on the surface during darkness and submerged during daylight rate of advance 115 miles daily. At 2200 (Q) April 19, 1943 passed through "Chop" point, Long. 40°-00' and came to base course 075°T.

April 20-25
Conducted petrol along assigned track, on surface during darkness, submerged during daylight, daily advance along base course 115 miles. Encountered strong winds and rough seas during most of this period. April 24 and 25 ship rolled 7-8: a side at 150 feet. No contacts were made.

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U.S.S. HADDO - report of 1st War Patrol.

April 26
Arrived at route point Let. 50°-20'N, Long. 22°50'N and changed base course to 029°T. Continued submerged patrol during daylight. Weather conditions improved considerably during the day and seas abated after 5 days of rough weather.

April 27
Conducted periscope patrol during daylight on course 029°T. Duration of dive today was 17 hours.

April 28
Passed through route point Let. 54°55'N, Long. 20°30'N at 0100 (Z) and route point Let. 56°30'N, Long. 13°01'N at 2000 (Z). At 2030 (Z) set course for rendezvous off Barra Head. Ran both on surface and submerged during daylight.

April 29
On surface all day. Encountered seven lighted fishing craft in the vicinity of the 100 fathom curve west of Barra Head during the evening.

April 30
Made rendezvous with escort in assigned position at 0415 (Z) and proceeded to Rosneath in company.

2. MEATIER.

Considerable rough weather was encountered but rate of advance was not affected as both wind and sea were usually abaft the beam. However, heavy swells prevented running constantly at periscope depth on 20, 22, 23, 24 and 25 April. Wind and seas shifted constantly during the passage between NW and SW. Navigation was difficult during the later part of the trip due to continual overcast. Fortunately a good star fix was obtained the evening prior to making a landfall.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION.

None observed.

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

No comment.

5. CONTACTS WITH ENEMY VESSELS.

No contacts were made.

6. AIRCRAFT SIGHTED.

No aircraft were sighted during the entire patrol until after making the rendezvous off Barra Head.

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MELODRA (A)

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7. SUMMARY OF ATTACKS.
None.

8. ENEMY A/S MEASURE.
None observed.

0. ENEMY LINE S' REPLIC OPERATIONS.
None observed.

10. MAJOR DEFECTS EXPERIENCED.

(a) On April 9th, while underway in darkness, an unidentified floating object struck the radiomen's log toward arm, bending it sufficiently to block off the dynamic orifice tube, and prevent housing. The ship's spare sword arm was installed while underway, pushing the damaged piece overboard and her operated satisfactorily since.

(b) On April 10th, the 3rd starco cooler coil of 1 High Pressure Air Compressor developed a serious leak. Coil was removed, and it was found that the two longitudinal battens, soldered to each turn of the coil had pulled away from the coils, and had torn out a piece of the tubing wall on one coil. The hole was sliver soldered, and no leaks have been encountered since, but all 3rd and 4th stage coils will be removed and tested during current refit.

(c) On April 11th, while making norman dive, propulsion was lost on port screw. Investigation revealed that the bolt and nut had dropped out of the pivot link of the bus selector switch operating linkage in spite of the lock washer installed. The Starboard switch had engaged before the bolt dropped clear, allowing starboard motors to operate from the battery. The loose bolt was reinstalled in a few minutes, and full propulsion regained. No other loose bolts were found at this time, or on April 2nd, when control cubicle was inspected, prior to getting underway.

(d) Number 1 periscope became to stiff for two men to turn, after several days at sea. Number 2 periscope binds heavily on certain bearings, it is hoped that these defects can be remedied by tender forces, during current refit.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO - Report of 1st Ypr Patrol.

(e) The brake on No. 2 periscope slips excessively, allowing periscope to hit lower stop, after limit switch trips. The brake will be cleaned and re-adjusted during current refit.

(f) Erratic operation of JD Radar was noted on April 26th, and consisted of:

1. Double and erratic p1.1 stations.
2. Erratic marker control.
3. Intermittent stray flashes on screen.
4. Excessive noise on 1IC and radio receivers emanating from SD.

A thorough check of circuit, including replacement check of all tubes indicates that trouble is due to mismatching of duplex unit and contacts and inside arching of antenna unit. The antenna will be removed and trouble isolated and remodied during refit.

11. RADIO.

NAA schedules were copied from time of departure to chop. Three numbers 112, 136 and 137 were missed, the schedule otherwise being solid from NR 91L to 164. Rugby was copied from chop to destination; HS 982 was the first number copied on this schedule. Some eleven numbers were missed during the first three days following chop due to poor underwater reception and the fact that these numbers were evidently not repeated on night broadcast.

The fixed non-rotatable DQ loop on this ship hinders the operators in obtaining the best signal. Altering course for every schedule is not always desirable. Underwater reception was impossible below a keel depth of 62 feet although previously with the DQ mounted in a lower position NAA was copied at 65 to 68 feet in the New London, Area.

No transmissions were made.

12. SOUND CONDITIONS.

One sound contact was made. Conditions were good at this time; a medium sized ship being picked up at approximately 18,000 yards. No density layers were noted. The Bathythermograph generally recorded a straight line zero gradient.

13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY.

The health of the crew during this patrol in general was excellent. There was one case of Catarrahal Fever which resulted in only one sick day. One officer suffered a severe gastrointestinal attack the cause of which was not determined. The patient responded to the treatment by the pharmacists rate but will require a thorough

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CONFIDENTIAL
Subject:  U.S.S. HADDO - Report of 1st 'ar Patrol.

check up by a medical officer. There were numerous cases of sea sickness the first two days at sea.

The habitability was satisfactory considering the extended duration of the dives towards the latter part of the patrol.

14. MILES STEAMED.

3418

15. FUEL DEPENDED.

29,440 gals.

16. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE TRAINING.

TORPEDOS    FUEL    PROVISIONS    FRESH WATER PERCENT (days)
24    60,740 gal.    60 days    Unlimited    30

17. This patrol was terminated on orders of Flag Officer Commanding Submarines.

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0934 UNITED STATES FLEET
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE
20 PROCEEDINGS SQUARE
LONDON, W.I.
MAY 10 1943

CONFIDENTIAL
From: [Name]
To: [Name]
Subject: [Subject]
Subject: [Subject]

For distribution to U.S. Naval commands listed in basic letter except Commander Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.

2. By copy of this letter two copies of subject patrol report are being forwarded direct to Commander Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.

V. G. BRAY, Jr.
BY DIRECTION

Copy to:
[Name]
(With 2 copies of basic report)
[Name]
(With

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0934 UNITED STATES FLEET
Serial 0934 UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE
Please refer FIRST REPORTS to 20 GROSVENOR SQUARE
Consubron 50 serial 060 LONDON, W.1
dated 3 May 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL
From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO - Report of FIRST War Patrol.

1. Hine advance copies of subject patrol report are forwarded for distribution to U.S. Naval commands listed in basic letter except Commander Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.

2. By copy of this letter two copies of subject patrol report are being forwarded direct to Commander Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.

Cory to:
Consublant
(with 2 copies of basic report)
Consubron 50 (less " ")

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3 MAY 1943
From: Commander Submarine Squadron FIFTY.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Admiral (Submarines).
    (2) The Admiralty.
    (3) The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO - Report of FIRST War Patrol.

1. The report of the FIRST War Patrol of the U.S.S. HADDO is forwarded herewith.

2. This patrol was conducted while enroute from New London, Connecticut, to Rosneath, Scotland. The length of the patrol was twenty-two (22) days with fourteen (14) days spent patrolling submerged in the vicinity of suspected enemy submarine routes with a primary objective of the destruction of enemy U-boats. It is regretted that no enemy contacts were made.

3. An inspection of the main engine gears on this vessel after arrival in port showed them to be in excellent condition after an average of one hundred and sixty (160) hours of operation.

4. The material condition and spirit of the crew were excellent throughout the patrol.

5. Because of the restriction placed on the distribution of U.S. submarine patrol reports by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, it is requested that subordinate commands be furnished with only such extracted information as is considered necessary.

N. S. IVES.
DISTRIBUTION:
The Admiralty
The Admiral (Submarines)
Commaveu
Commswspac
Comsubpac
Comsubplant (2)
Comsubbowspac.

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1943 to June 23, 1943. Area - Mid-Atlantic. Commander Submarine Squadron FIFTY Operation Order 9-43, date May 16, 1943.

PROLOGUE.

Arrived Rosneath, April 30, 1943 from New London, Conn., and moored alongside U.S.S. BEAVER. During the refit period all known material defects were corrected by the ship's and tender forces: Held sound tests in Loch Goil, May 12-13, 1943. May 16, 1943, received orders that readiness'date had been advanced and HADDO would get underway May 18, 1943 to relieve HAKO on patrol. No training operations were conducted prior to sailing for patrol station.

1. NARRATIVE. All times are zone -2, (B)

May 18 Underway with escort HIS WAVENEY.

Passed through Clyde Boom and set speed 14 kts. Arrived at point 8 miles south of Barra Head at 2200, one hour ahead of schedule. Circled in the vicinity for 30 minutes. Then set course 294T speed 12 on assigned route. Zig-Zagging with constant helm. Parted company with escort.

May 19 At 0200 made radar contact with ship ahead at 5000 yds. Headed for ship at 0202 sighted her at 3500 yds. on opposite course. Exchanged challenges and ship then sheered off and was recognized as four stack destroyer, of the TOM class. Between 0310 and 0328 made several radar contacts on ships of convoy, so at 0328 changed course to southward to get clear. At 0450 exchanged challenges with another escort vessel of the same convoy. Changed course to open further on convoy. At 0630 dived for trim. Surfaced at 0643 and resumed surface running. No further contacts were made. At 1900, having passed first route point changed base course to 265°T.

May 20 Proceeding on surface to patrol area. Ran submerged from 1558 to 2007 to retard rate of advance.

May 21 Proceeding on surface, base course 268°. At 1530 in lat. 57°-29'N long. 27°-34'W; lookout reported sighting periscope bearing 095°R, 355°T, distance 1000-2000 yds. Came to course 175°T to put it astern and made ready tubes #9 and #10, torpedoes set for 40 ft. Alleged periscope was seen only by the stbd. lookout, and subsequent questioning.

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U.S.S. HADDO - Report of 2nd War Patrol.

May 21:
Cont'd.
revealed that he had two momentary sightings of it at the time contact was reported. Sent to four engines and ran to southward. Came to base course 240°T at 1619 and slowed to two engines at 1749. In view of rough seas existing it is probable that the lockout sighted a low flying bird or piece of driftwood. Had a submarine reached the position where sighting occurred it probably would have fired torpedoes. Considerable driftwood was sighted in this area. It is believed that this contact was very questionable. Dived at 1820 and ran submerged to retard rate of advance along route.

May 22:
Surfaced at 0102. In accordance with instructions began running or. surface at night and diving during day as much as practicable, maintaining advance of 100 miles daily along route to patrol area. Dived at 0625.

May 23:
Surfaced at 0045. Dived at 0638 proceeding along base course 21°T. Weather moderated during the day after two days of rough going.

May 24:
Surfaced at 0110. Scarfriz, first since evening of the 20th was 5 miles west of DR position. On the 0430 schedule received FOCS 231248B which directed HADDO patrol station be changed to square "C3". Dived at 0650 and at 0815 changed course to 120°T, to get on the assigned line to new station, proceeding submerged by day.

May 25:
Surfaced at 0112, proceeding on course 190°T, to assigned patrol area. At 0655 dived and commenced periscope patrol along route, TTA 0530, 26th. At 1955 changed course to 196°T. Weather partially cloudy, occasional showers; light winds and moderate swells from east. At 2329, at 58 feet depth, in lat. 53°-02'N, long. 36°-09'N, sighted a 517 or 750 ton U-Boat on surface bearing about 355°R and on an easterly heading. Estimated angle on bow was about 90° port, rough estimate of range, 8000 yards. Went to battle stations and swung left to 135°T to attempt to close range. At 2338 U-Boat was not in sight, evidently had dived. Assuming the U-Boat may have heard us and dived, slowed to 50 RPM. At 2341, sighted U-Boat again with an angle up by the bow, evidently, had just surfaced, bearing 161°T, angle on bow estimated at 110° port, on approximate course 100°T.

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U.S.S. HADDO - Report of 2nd War Patrol.

May 25
Cont'd.

Resumed efforts to close. About 2350, heard series of rapid, sharp, distant explosions, possibly the U-Boat having machine gun drill, still unaware of our presence. At 2355 came to course 100°T, range increasing. Estimated enemy speed 6-8 kts., course 085-090°T. Enemy was not, at any time, picked up on our sound gear.

May 26
At 0002 changed course to 085°T, trailing, in hope that U-Boat will change course toward us. At 0045, having lost contact, changed course to 260°T to open out range. Decided to surface before dark and attempt to run around enemy to the southward during darkness to gain position for daylight attack, ahead of enemy on his estimated track. It was considered impracticable to trail or circle to northward as we would be silhouetted in the long twilight. At 0122 surfaced and began running to southward, having been submerged for 18.3 hours. At 0220 set course 090°T. At 0530 began working northward having reached position ahead of enemy on his estimated track. Leather at this time had become overcast with frequent rain squalls. At 0625 dived and took up periscope patrol on course 000°T. At 0827 changed course to 270°T. At 2300 having made no contacts during the day, changed course to 230°T heading for patrol area.

May 27
Surfaced at 0135. Arrived center of patrol square "C3" at 0630. At 0659 dived and commenced submerged patrol at periscope depth. Received 3OOS 27111FB on 1700 schedule and at 1800 set course 140°T heading for new patrol station in "D3", in accordance with instructions.

May 28
Surfaced at 0118, proceeding on two engines to new station. At 0452 SD radar showed a plane at 6 miles, closing, dived. Surfaced at 0550. At 0645, dived for another plane contact on SD radar at 5 miles and closing. Commenced submerged patrol in area "D3".

May 29
Patrolling southeast corner of area "D3" in accordance with instructions in 3OOS 27111FB. Surfaced at 0110. At 0710 dived and resumed submerged patrol.

May 30 - June 2
Patrolling on station, submerged by day, no events of interest. Running on dead reckoning due to general overcast weather conditions.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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U.S.S. HADDO - Report of 2nd War Patrol.

June 3
Surfaced at 0100 in fog and rain. At 0303 SD radar picked up possible plane at 8 miles and followed it in to 4-1/2 miles at which point it started opening again. Did not dive as visibility at this time was about 1000 yards. At 0700 dived and resumed submerged patrol, fog lifted during the morning. Strong winds and heavy seas from NW developed during the early evening hours.

June 4
Surfaced at 0130 into heavy seas and wind of gale force from northwest. At 0515 SD radar picked up contact at 10 miles which closed to 9 miles and then went out. At 0710 dived. Weather improved during the day but heavy swells from the west held on. Seas were too rough to maintain periscope patrol.

June 5
Surfaced at 0123. Secured first navigational fix in seven days which plotted about 12 miles east of DR position. Dived at 0700. Copied ROGS 051251B on the 1700 schedule, directing HADDC proceed patrol in square "D1". Overcast and raining most of the day.

June 6
Surfaced at 0124. At 0143 dived when SD radar contact had closed from 4 to 3 miles. At 0215 started'up SD and got a contact at 8 miles and closing, remained submerged. At 0229 started up SD radar and got a pilot at 11 miles. At 0302, with SD radar showing all clear, surfaced and resumed battery charge. At 0325 dived for SD radar contacts at 4 and 6 miles, surfacing at 0403. At 0445 dived SD contact at 10 miles closing in. Surfaced at 0505. It appears that radar equipped aircraft were searching for us. At 0510 SD radar made a contact at 10 miles but lost it in a few seconds. At 0703 dived, resumed submerged patrol and set course 270°T proceeding to new patrol station in "D1".

June 7
Surfaced at 0125 and continued shifting areas using RPM for 14 kts on two engines. Fresh winds and rough seas from southeast with intermittent heavy rain. Dived at 0728. At 1545 arrived in center of area "D1" by DR.

June 8
Surfaced 0200 and resumed surface patrol in rough seas from southwest, frequent heavy rain. Dived at 0720, running sound patrol with hourly periscope observation. Ship rolled considerably at 135 feet during the day.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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1. SUBJECT: U.S.S. HADDO - Report of 2nd War Patrol.
2. SUBJECT: June 21, 1943, Surfaced at 0820 and proceeded along route. At 0845 pulled a flare and dived after tracking an SD radar contact from 3 to 5 miles. This plane was not sighted either. Upon surfacing at 0948, SD radar made contact at 6 miles. Immediately closed the hatch and went down again. At the radar indicating no targets, surfaced at 1053 and proceeded along our route on two engines.
3. June 22, 1943, Proceeding of surface toward rendezvous off Barra Head. About 0400, steady rain set in and seas started building up from South. At 0410 SD radar made plane contact at 9 miles. Tracked plane in to less than 1 mile and out to 5 miles. At 0430 passed route point "H". Visibility improved about 1200 and at 1320 sighted Barra Head bearing 0350, distance 6 miles. Arrived at rendezvous, point "K" at 1500 and maneuvered in the vicinity awaiting arrival of escort. At 1735 joined escort, HS SCITAR and set course for the base.
4. June 23, Passed Clyde Boom at 0803. Parted company with escort at 0815. At 0848 moored alongside U.S.S. HARRING, Rosneath.

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EXCLUSIVE (A)

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2. WEATHER.

Weather encountered was in accordance with information contained in the North Atlantic Pilot. General overcast predominated with constant shifting of wind and sea. No sustained period of any one set of conditions was experienced. Rough weather with winds of gale force was encountered on June 4th and again on the 19th and 20th.

3. TITIAL INFORMATION.

Tidal currents wore normal.

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

None.

5. REMARKS OF ATTACKS.

The only contact made was with the U-boat sighted May 25, 1943. This vessel had the typical U-boat silhouette with a gun on deck forward. No after gun could be seen. The ship appeared to be painted light gray. It could not be determined at long range whether the U-boat was of the 517 or 750 ton type.

6. DESCRIPTION OF AIRCRAFT SIGHTED.

No aircraft were sighted while outside of coastal waters. All aircraft contacts listed in this report were on the 3D radar and except for the contacts on June 21st, were made during the night.

7. SUMMARY OF ATTACKS.

None.

8. ENEMY A/S MEASURES.

None observed.

9. ENEMY MINE S'KEEPING OPERATIONS.

None observed.

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10. TERRORIST ENCOUNTERED.

June 9. Power operation of stern planes was lost for a period of four hours, when trouble was traced to a break in the wiring lead from the Rise switch to its terminal post, apparently caused from repeated vibration of the panel. A new lead was installed by ship's force, and satisfactory operation obtained since.

June 12. After morning dive, water was found to be leaking through negative tank flood valve. Repeated operation of the valve, and locking closed by bend, failed to remedy leak. It appears that the flood valve gasket has been damaged. Tender force divers will be asked to attempt renewal of gasket, during current upkeep.

June 12. Pitometer log commenced stopping momentarily, at irregular intervals when ship was making 2-3 knots submerged. With control unit contact closed, the pump stopped intermittently, though pump turned freely by hand. Pump motor commutator, brushes, and contact arm tips will be inspected and cleaned when equipment can be decommissioned.

11. RADIO RECEPTION.

HS schedules were copied from number 300 to number 765, seven numbers having been missed.

Surface reception was good to excellent until, during the latter part of the patrol, a local or shipboard interference developed, resulting in a high noise level which made copying difficult to impossible at certain times. This interference occurred on the transponder frequency when line voltage was high; the exact cause of this disturbance has not yet been isolated. Generally speaking, the 'whitehall signal was better than that of Rugby at night while on station.

For submerged reception with the fixed loop, the ship had to be brought to a course with the transmitting station approximately on the beam. Then, providing that the weather was such that a depth of 57 feet or less could be steadily maintained, reception was satisfactory.

No transmissions were made.

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7 043

ENCLOSURE (A)

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12. SOUND CONDITIONS.
No sound contacts were made. Sea and water conditions were such that the Bethylthomorphograph at no time recorded a temperature gradient.

13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY.
The health of the crew during this patrol in general was excellent. There were two cases of impetigo which occurred early in the patrol. One case was cured with applications of ammoniated mercury. The other case was persistent throughout the patrol and will require further treatment in the sick bay.

Habitability was satisfactory considering the extended duration of the divos. Average length of divos was 18 hours, 20 minutes.

14. TITLES STATED.
4516
15. FUEL DEPENDED.
39,630 gals.

16. FACTORS OF DURANCE RATING.
TORPEDOES: 24, 45,600 gals 30 days
FUEL PROVISIONS: 30 days
FRESH WATER: Unlimited
PERCENT (days): 20

17. This patrol was terminated by orders.

18. RATARS.
The patrol was discouraging in that only one definite contact with the enemy was made and that one could not be developed into a successful attack.

The performance of machinery and material in general was very satisfactory.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 22 —
016-3 01287 UNITED STATES FLEET
Please refer: Serial 01287 UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE
to file: FIRST ENORSEMENT TO: 20 GROSVENOR SQUARE
Consubron 50 serial 083. LONDON, W.1
dated June 25, 1943.
CONFIDENTIAL
From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HADDO - Report of SECOND War Patrol.

1. **Hine advance copy of subject report are forwarded herewith for distribution to the U.S. Naval commands listed in the basic letter except Commander Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.**

2. **By a copy of this letter, two copies of the subject report is being forwarded direct to Commander Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.**

3. **It was most unfortunate that the HADDO was unable to develop the only positive U-boat contact made during this patrol. The area as covered. At the time this patrol was ordered, there were indications of considerable U-boat activity in this area. However, there appears to have been a general U-boat movement away from this area as there has not been a single merchant vessel sunk in the North Atlantic convoys since May 17, 1943.**

P. H. BASTEDO
ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF

Copy to:
Consublain (with 2 copies basic report)
Consubron 50 (less basic report)

— page 23 —
5-50/A16
Serial (083)
c/o Fleet Post Office,
New York, New York.

U.S. CONFIDENTIAL - BRITISH SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Fifty.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Admiral (Submarines).
(2) The Admiralty.
(3) The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO - Report of SECOND War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Track Chart (To Admiral (Submarines) only).

1. The report of the SECOND War Patrol of the U.S. S. HADDO is forwarded herewith. The duration of the patrol was thirty-seven (37) days, of which about thirty (30) days were spent in waters believed to be traversed by U-Boats in the Atlantic.

2. No major defects were noted. The material condition of the ship and the physical condition of the crew upon return to port were excellent.

3. Radio reception submerged appears to be superior in submarines equipped with the fixed loop.

4. Except for the U-Boat sighting on May 25th, the patrol was uneventful. It is regrettable that the HADDO was unable to gain a favorable firing position after this late sighting.

5. Cooperative air reconnaissance or surface running with periscope observations at regular intervals would, by extending the submarine's horizon, increase the effectiveness of A/S patrols.

6. Because of the restriction placed on the distribution of U.S. submarine patrol reports by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, it is requested that subordinate commands be furnished with only such extracted information as is considered necessary.

N. S. IVES.
DISTRIBUTION:
The Admiralty - The Admiral (S).
Comnavcu - Cominch (2)
Vopnav - Cinepac - Cinclant
Comsopac - Comsowespac
Consubpac - Comsublant (2)
Consubsowespac.

50955 FILMED 7 043

— page 25 —
SS255/A16-3
Serial 050

U.S.S. HADDO (SS255)
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
4 February 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
From:  The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HADDO (SS255)
To:  The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via:  The Official Channels.

Subject:  U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of War Patrol
Number FOUR.

Enclosure:  (A) Subject report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the fourth war patrol of this vessel, conducted in the PHILLIPINE ISLANDS AREA during the period from 14 December 1943 to 14 February 1944, is forwarded herewith.

John Corbuss.

DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPAWINST 5510.1C
BY OP 498C DATE 5/3/72

68683

FILMED

4 0265

— page 26 —
14 DECEMBER 1943
U.S. S. HADDO - REPORT OF FOURTH MAR PATTOL
PERIOD FROM: 14 DECEMBER 1943 TO 4 FEBRUARY 1944

A. PROLOGUE:
Departed Rosneath, Scotland, July 10, 1943. Conducting anti-submarine patrol enroute New London, Conn. Arrived New London, July 29. Conducted test-firing Mk 18 torpedoes at Newport, August 17-18. Departed New London, August 21. Arrived Navy Yard, Mare Island, September 13. Commenced major overhaul. Replaced NOR engines with Winton 16-278A type engines. Converted No. 4 MET to a reserve fuel tank. Installed ballistic protection, deep well trim pump, 110 hp-draulic pump. JP sound equipment, high powered SJ radar transmitter and P.P.I. Removed degaussing equipment and 3'50 caliber gun, replacing it with a 4'50 caliber gun mounted forward. Conducted post repair, sound trials and deep dive. November 10-12. Depermed. November 11. Inclined and reballasted. Departed Mare Island, November 18. Arrived Pearl Harbor November 25. Granted three days for voyage repairs, followed by an eleven day training period. Conducted sound tests, fired seven Mk 18 torpedoes for test purposes and six Mk 14. Kod 3 torpedoes for training. Dydrooked December 10th to replace "singing" propellors and to repair JK-3C sound equipment. Readiness for sea December 14th.

B. NARRATIVE:
14 December 1943
DEPARTED PEARL in company with TULLIMBE, HADDOCK, and HALLIBUT under escort of SC-1006 enroute MUDAY in accordance with ComSubPac Secret Operation Order 293-43 of 12 December 1943.
1600 (V-W) Made trim dive.
1630 (V-W) Surfaced.
1930 (V-W) Released escort, increased speed to four engine speed to open accompanying submarines.
15 December 1943
0815 (V-W) Plane contact No. 1, Exchanged recognition signals with friendly PB2Y.
0841 (V-W) Plane contact No. 2, Exchanged recognition signals with friendly PB2Y.
1100 (W) Made trim dive for half an hour. Held fire control drills.
16-17 December 1943
Enroute MUDAY. Holding training dives and drills daily. Weather became rough during afternoon of 17th. Reduced speed to 10 knots and making 6 knots good.

18 December 1943
0715 (Y) Contacted escort planes.
1015 (Y) Arrived MUDAY. Mooried alongside "JUNKER. Took aboard 17140 gallons of fuel. Sub Base repaired leak in high pressure air line from No. 4 bank, dried out three pairs of binoculars, adjusted clutch on stern plane, repaired one typewriter damaged by last nights storm and checked

-1- 4 0265

— page 27 —
19 December 1943
1000 (Y) Underway escorted by planes to 30 mile circle. Heavy seas from southwest are running.
14.25 (Y) Plane contact No. 3: Picked up plane at 14 miles on radar. Not sighted.
20 December 1943
0000 Set clocks ahead 24 hours and dropped December 20th from log.
21-22 December 1943
23 December 1943 Seas and wind abated during the night.
0702(H) Sighted submarine bearing 345T, hull down. Identified from silhouette as friendly.
1944(H) Opened-track for one hour and then resumed base course.
24 Dec., 1 Jan. 1944 Uncomfortable. Conducted trim and training dives.
2 January 1944 Picked up BALTIMORE ISLAND at 36,150 yards by 3Y radar. Subsequently picked up BABYBAY ISLAND at 62,000 yards and BALTIM ISLAND at 77,000 yards. Obtained a three point fix.
0200 (H) Commenced passage thru BALTIMING CHANNEL. Increased speed to 17 knots.
0430 (H) Completed passage.
0540 (H) Drove. Commenced submerged patrol across Singapore-Emprise traffic route.
1844 (H) Surfaced.
3 January 1944
0551 (H) Drove. Continuing patrol across Singapore-Emprise route.
1848 (H) Surfaced.
4 January 1944
0545 (H) Drove. Patrolling sixty miles off coast of LUZON for Kanilae-Emprise traffic.
1705 (H) Sighted small powered fishing vessel off Stewart Benk. Ship contact No. 1. Being this far out and power driven, he is probably a spotter. Avoided.
1848 (H) Surfaced.
2018 (H) Sighted same fishing boat at 11,000 yards. Avoided. Moon is becoming troublesome.

— page 28 —
5 January 1944
0536 (H) Bove, Commenced closing coast off LINGAYAN CULF.
1858 (H) Surf:coed.
6 January 1944
0533 (H) Bove.
0633 (H) Sighted smoke; Ship contact No. 2. Came to normal cpc.
1857 (H) Proceeded to 1000 yards, sighted smoke; Able to close sufficiently to see masts
7 January 1944
0537 (H) Bove. Patrol led off entrance to SUBIC BAY and northern approaches to MANILA.
1850 (H) Surf:coed. Proceeded to southwestern part of area to patrol northern entrance of PALAWAN PASSAGE.
8 January 1944
0220 (H) Obtained contact on radar at 6,000 yards, ship on the bow
   - Brilliant moonlight. Treadk target to 10,000 yards
   - Course 190° speed 10 knots. Lost target and unable to re-course contact. Searched area for an hour and half. From
   - Sighted ship at 10,000 yards. No contact. Lookouts and quartermaster reported seeing a low
   - Not sighted by 00D or Commanding Officer. No sound contact.
0538 (H) Bove. Considered advisability of surface patrol but decided that if anything important was needed our way air cover was provided and target diverted from our area.
1850 (H) Surf:coed. Commenced running a rottering search curve on courses to CALAVITE PASSAGE and west of CARA ISLAND LIGHT.
9 January 1944
0536 (H) Bove. Commenced patrol off CALAVITE PASSAGE. Closed W-BANG ISLAND to four miles. Sighted radio or radar masts and what may have been gun emplacements on western end of
   - Strong northwest current encountered just about holding our way.
1903 (H) Surf:coed with nearest land 13,600 yards away. Had just surf:coed when we were challenged by a searchlight on W-BANG ISLAND. Put stern to beach and opened at high speed. Foc:confident the Nips have either radar station or very good sound gear on this island.
1950 (H) Radar contact on plane at 14 miles, closing rapidly. Plane contact No. 4. Drove when plane was 12 miles away. Had
   - Placed to enter VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE via CALAVITE PASSAGE but brilliant moon and the fact we had been sighted changed this decision.
2050 (H) Surf:coed. Cleared area to south and westward in event anti-submarine vessels were called out. From a careful reconnaissance of CALAVITE PASSAGE it is doubtful if a ship
   - 4 0265

— page 30 —
1910 (H) 17 January 1944
0300 (H) Proceeding North of 'JUBANG ISLAND, Closed cleared away. Brilliant moonlight. Visibility unlimited. Sighted small islands at 30,000 yards. Considered detection by patrol craft for from islands a certainty if we continued on. Decided to observe entrance to harbor from northeast of SHIMO BANK. Dovc. Approaching MANILA HARBOR.

0521 (H) Sighted sea plane, Plane contact No. 5. He was patrolling off harbor entrance. Heard pinging of small plane vessel bearing 045. Estimated range 10,000 yards. Heard pinging from vicinity of JUBANG ISLAND but it may have been another patrol boat clatho he was not sighted. Observed CORRIDOR ISLAND and noted buildings which appeared to be barracks. No signs of shipping activity. MANILA is not blocked out at night. Surfaced. With the activity of patrol boats and the air search, believed that a convoy was due to leave. Choice of whether it was going north or south was to be made. If it went north an excellent opportunity presented itself. If south, restricted water, strong currents and numerous island observation posts were to be contended with. In either event smooth water, excellent visibility and moonrise shortly after 2300 would exist. The lack of shipping to the northward since our arrival in this area seemed to indicate a movement was due in that direction. Accordingly altered course to put us 10 miles off CAPONE ISLAND. Kept coast within radar range on way north. With this new transmitter any good sized ship would be picked up at 15000 yards. Radar contact at 6,000 yards. Tracked target at 5 knots course 150. Closed to 4,000 yards and sighted small sampan about 75-100 feet long. Single mast raised deck house. As it turned out later, he proved to be a small patrol boat. Avoided him and continued patrol.

2304 (H) Radar contact at 7,000 yards. Closed and sighted another small sampan somewhat similar to one previously sighted. Tracked him on course 230 speed 7 knots. Moon had risen and visibility was unlimited. Feel certain he sighted course of 230 made no suspicious he was trying to draw near convoy from CAPONE ISLAND. Sighted large searchlight on MARIVALIS MOUNTAIN. It appeared to be signalling. Headed for point five miles west of CAPONE ISLAND. Dovc at 0525. Heard loud pinging. Observed small patrol boat bearing 350 range about 5,000 yards. Ship contact No. 5. Pinging was on 16 KGS. He were near the 50 fathom curve and didn't have too much room to maneuver. Changed

0620 (H)

— page 31 —
1910 (H) : 17 January 1944
: 0300 (H) : 0521 (H)
: 0820 (H) : 0930 (H)
: 1923 (H) : 2304 (H)
: 0305 (H) : 0620 (H)

He was small and not worth a torpedo. No indication of guns, depth charge or radio.
Surfaced. Proceeded westward of CABRA ISLAND to patrol northern approaches to VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.

Proceeding North of 'LUBANG ISLAND.
Circus cleared away. Brilliant moonlight. Visibility unlimited. Sighted small islands at 30,000 yards. Considered detection by patrol craft for from islands a certainty if we continued on. Decided to observe entrance to Kribor from northeast of SEIKO BANK.
Jove. Approaching MANILA HARBOR.

Sighted sea plane. Plane contact No. 5. He was patrolling off harbor entrance. Heard pinging of small petrol vessel bearing 045. Estimated range 10,000 yards.
Heard pinging from vicinity of LUBANG ISLAND but it may have been another patrol boat cliho he was not sighted.
Observed CORNERIDOR ISLAND and noted buildings which appeared to be barracks. No signs of shipping activity.
MANILA is not blocked out at night.
Surfaced. With the activity of patrol boats and the air search, believed that a convoy was due to leave. Choice of whether it was going north or south was to be made.
If it went north an excellent opportunity presented itself. If south, restricted water, strong currents and numerous island observation posts were to be contended with. In either event smooth water, excellent visibility and moonrise shortly after 2300 would exist. The lack of shipping to the northward since our arrival in this area seemed to indicate a movement was due in that direction. Accordingly altered course to put us 10 miles off CAPONE ISLAND. Kept coast within radar range on way north. With this new transmitter any good sized ship would be picked up at 15000 yards.
Radar contact at 6,000 yards. Tracked target at 5 knots course 150. Closed to 4,000 yards and sighted small sampan about 75-100 feet long. Single mast raised deck house. As it turned out later, he proved to be a small patrol boat. Avoided him and continued patrol.

Radar contact at 7,000 yards. Closed and sighted another small sampan somewhat similar to one previously sighted. Tracked him on course 230 speed 7 knots. Moon had risen and visibility was unlimited. Feel certain he sighted course of 230 made no suspicious he was trying to draw near every from CAPONE ISLAND.
Sighted large searchlight on MIRAVALIS MOUNTAIN. It appeared to be signalling. Headed for point five miles west of CAPONE ISLAND. Dove at 0525.
Heard loud pinging. Observed small patrol boat bearing 350 range about 5,000 yards. Ship contact No. 5. Pinging was on 16 KOS. We were near the 50 fathom curve and didn't have too much room to maneuver. Changed

— page 32 —
0901 (H)
0930 (H)
1046 (H)
1101 (H)
1435 (H)
1500 (H)
1800 (H)

U. 3. HADDO - REPORT OF FOURTH PATROL

end around. He was smoking heavily so no difficulty was experienced in keeping track of him. Closed range until his stack, masts and bridge were visible. Tracked showed course about 220 speed 9 knots and inside of reef. Loud signal on 500 KG.
Rapid change of true bearing indicated target had changed course. Tracking now showed him on 290 speed 8-9 knots. Altced course and commenced another end around.

Loud signals on 500 KGS:
Loud signals on 500 KGS. Tracking showed target on base course 305 speed 9 knots. Target zigging between 330 and 280.
Having gained a 'position' ahead of target dove and commenced approach.
Got first good look at target. She was about 1500 to 2000 tons and on old coal bunker, with two tall masts, a single tall stack deep wells fore and aft and a gun mounted on the high forcoastal and high poop. A small escort, about 150 feet long fitted with a gun forward and a peacially shpod tripod after mast was patrolling astern. Both ships wore constant helming 60 speed 9 knots at a range of 3,500 the target zigged away 70 and commenced a constant helm on a new base course estimated to be 260. Attempted to close but the range was too great. Surfaced and on base course 260 with a 60 constant helm, not to chose this target was based on the following facts:
(1) Fuel was reaching the point where it could not be wasted with a 3,000 mile trip to be made.
(2) The target was small.
(3) It would require three engine speed for on and around and then two engine speed to track him and determine the new base course he had assumed after dark.
(4) FLASHER was due to enter our patrol area that night or the next day. The Operation Order confirmed by a dispatch directed us to clear the area after dark to night.
(5) There was strong possibility that the target was a decoy or even a ghost ship. The last statement is based on those observations:
a. The peculiar route of following down PALATIN CHANNEL and then heading out to sea on course 305.
b. The excessive smoking of the target which was carried on all day.
c. The small amount of distance made good during the day (about eighteen miles).
d. The three sets of signals sent on 500 KGS.
From the strength of the signal it is believed that the target was doing the transmitting.
e. The small sized escort that was accompanying him.
We were now out of our regular area and the future movements of the COD were unknown.

— page 33 —
24 January 1944
0330 (H) Picked up interference on SJ radar. Appeared to be carrier.
04:30 (H) Docked area enroute FRENCHVILLE.
0557 (H) Dovre. Transmitting East GUYO PASS.
1859 (H) Surf. food.
25 January 1944
1900 (H) Enroute FRENCHVILLE.
2200 (H) Passed between PARL BAH. and LAPAR ISLAND.
26 January 1944
27 January 1944
0533 (H) Dovro.
1815 (H) Surf. food.
28 January 1944
0536 (H) Slighted U. S. submarine on northerly course, probably
1703 (H) BOWFIN or BILLITISH. He passed 1000 yards from us on one
    leg of his zig. It was too bad he wasn't a Jap for it
    was a nice sot up for either bow or stern tubes.
    Surf. food. Conducted two hour patrol off KAKASAR in hopes
    we would encounter a target.

29 January 1944
0930 (H) Enroute FRENCHVILLE.
1812 (H) Ship contact at 26 miles. Plane contact No. 7. Fix
2200 (H) showed us into desired position so remained submerged.
    Surf. food. Poor visibility throught the day.
    Commenced transit of LOMBOK STRAIT. Heavy thunderstorms.
    Heavy lights observed on both BAII and LOMBOK STRAIT.

30 January 1944
0130 (H) Enroute Frenchville.
031 January 1944
1-3 February 1944
4 February 1944
1335 (H) Enroute Frenchville.
1530 (H) Contacted escort, U.S.S. ISADEL.
    Arrived Frenchville.

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0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U. S. S. HADDO - REPORT OF FOURTH WAR PATROL

C. WEATHER:

The weather agreed in general with the Sailing Directions and pilot charts. Extremely glassy water was encountered off LIZON and MINDORO. Along with light cirs and clear skies, Brilliant moonlight for the greater part of the time in the area provided unlimited visibility. Thunderstorms with much lightning were encountered in the vicinity of LOMBOK.

D. TIDAL INFORMATION:

The currents encountered in the PHILLIPINES were very much varied south of LUBANG ISLAND and west of C.P.C. CLAVITE. The northwesterly current of one and half knots was found, 'Off C.P.C. CLAVITE, no particularly current so experienced. North of APO PASSES in MAKASAR STRAIT was replaced by a northeasterly one and a half knot. A five knot southerly current existed in SIBITU PASS. At the southern end of LOMBOK STRAIT very heavy tide rips were encountered. These rips appeared as waves of four to five feet high and looked exactly like surf breaking on a reef. This disconcerting experience occurred about the time the tide was changing from ebb to flood.

E. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:

No navigational aids as such were bearing. The radar was of great assistance in determining our position in restricted waters. Charts in general were found to be good.

— page 36 —
7
: 6
: 5
: 4
: 3
: 2
: 1

| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 |

— page 37 —
2. ATTACK DATA:
No attacks were made.

I. MISSES:
No minelaying or minesweeping activities were observed.

J. ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND REASONS FOR ATTACKS:
Nothing particularly noteworthy was observed. Echo ringing with a pinging noise similar to that used by our own equipment and also a frequency modulated note was observed. A frequency of about 16 KCS was employed.

Two of the ships contacted were escorted by small seapacks about the size of our 110 foot sub-chasers. It is believed the remaining ship had two larger escorts judging by the smoke. It is surprising that no anti-submarine vessels were encountered in SIBITU passage. MAKASAR or LOMBOK straits. Anti-submarine patrols and air searches are carried on in the vicinity of KATALIN in addition to irregular sweeps along the coast to the north of SUBIC BAY. One such patrol of two sub-chasers was encountered.

K. MAJOR OBJECTS ATTACKED:
No. 2 Main Engine.
While underway on four main engines making 230 RPMs, (about 70-90 combination) at 0900, 1 J. Navy, 1944, a routine inspection of number two main engine showed the head of number nine cylinder to be vibrating. The engine was cut out and stopped in. No investigation. Closed the throttle. The cylinder had not been run. The head was removed at the end of the first 650 pounds of thrust. The head

— page 38 —
0600, 15 January, 1944, after surfacing from the morning trim dive, the starting resistance for the port main motors which is in circuit for both the series one and series two positions of the starting handle was observed to be smoking. An immediate close inspection revealed the fact that the insulation between adjacent resistance bars was burning slightly. The load was removed from the port motors. The fire was extinguished immediately. The resistance was run out with a megger and found to be normal. The load was released to operate properly the port motors, and the contactors were observed to operate properly when the starting handle was moved from step to step. No further trouble of this nature has been experienced. It is possible that the series two position contactor failed to operate, causing the motors to run on the starting resistance.

PITOMETER LOC:

The pitometer log again required constant care and attention by ship's fore to thoroughly check the control. It became critical to find out the commission six times. Upon passing 125 feet it ceased to function entirely. The installation is erratic in performance and considered to be entirely unreliable.

CIRCUIT OPERATOR SYSTEM:

The electrical load to the gyro compass repeater in the coming tower developed a leak outside the pressure hull resulting in the flooding out of the repeater in the coming tower and grounding of all loads to the gyro panel. This condition was corrected by disconnecting the faulty cable from the panel and using spare leads from #1 and #2 periscope stable azimuth elements.

SURVEYOR'S REPORT SYSTEM:

In addition to the above mentioned cable, the cable to the running lights grounded out, flooding the fuse distribution box in the coming tower. Two other cables developed leaks thru the packing glands that have been impossible to repair at sea. One of these cables has been passed in a to t. of four inches.

RADIO AND SOUND:

3J Reder Motor Generator

The motor generator located in the Forward Engine room proved to be unsatisfactory in that it is too small for the new 3JA equipment. This machine, Type CG-21 A35 Joriel 024406, with capacity output of 1350 watts, was critically installed for 3J-1 equipment. Accordingly the 3JA equipment was supplied power from the IC motor generator distribution board (See reder).

JK/QC and QB Sound Equipment

The training of both sound heads became difficult as the patrol progressed as indicated by an overhanging of the training motor generators and the trimming motors. The cause of this trouble has not been definitely ascertained but swelling of the wooden bearings or misalignment of the shafts may be the cause. Frequent and copious

— page 39 —
0-0-N-F-T-I-D-E-N-T-T-A-I:
U. S. H.D.D.O. - RICH OF FOCUS
U. S. H.D.D.O. - RICH OF FOCUS

lubrication was restored to at frequent intervals with no particular improvement.

L. RADIO:
Radio reception was satisfactory at complete files of S. KAR series W.S. received. The 16.68 frequency was very satisfactory until December 25th when 2080 miles from P.P. U. U. it which continued to be good until December 27 when at 4.925 and 9090 bands the core, VLF from P.P.U. it was necessary to shift to 14390 band. In bands, considerable jamming by the XPS on both these frequencies was experienced.

One message was transmitted and cleared on 8470 to VLF after considerable difficulty in establishing commuic tones.

M. RADAR:
The performance of the now S.J-A transmitter and PPI W.S. excellent. Ship targets were tracked to 14000 yards. X3 Ind invaluable help in navigation. The ship was in the 80000 yards moving of the electronic range monitor. In this connection it is recommended that all electronic range monitors be incorporated in the A scope so that the non-liner section of the trace beyond the limit of the 14390 range stop can be thus marked for reading land target ranges above 44000 yards.

The usual run cloud targets were encountered but little confusion was experienced in identifying them as such and not in real targets. However, on 23 identification in broad d.v. light at 2900 yards caused some concentration until a flock of birds (bout 100) were discovered on the reported bearing. Bird flock indications were encountered on several different occasions and were discovered to be feeding from something on the surface of the water.

At no time during the 2.0 trial was either the 3.7 or the 3D radar out of commission when its services were desired, speaking well for the radar maintainer. No restoration took place.

No instruction books were provided at the time of the S. KAR section of this new equipment when installed. Fortunately, a small photostat copy of the wiring diagram of the PPI (D-150961) was obtained from the R. R. Officer of the USS GARFAR. This provided sufficient to cover those casualties that actually occurred to the ship given by this drawing. Also the important information that was not to the adjustment of this roll. The only significant information that was not should be made available to the maintenance personnel.

SJ. IOTOR GENERATOR
Supply 175-345 volts DC
S. R. 024406
Consisting of the following:
1. CG-21AAU DC motor-3600 RPM
2. CG-21AAU Alternator

-14-

— page 40 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:
U. 3. HADDO - REPORT OF PICTURE 2 TRGL

Out put 115 volts, 13 cps, 1 phase, 60 cycles, 1.35 kilo-
watts, 3600 RPM.
3. CG-20MA3 control unit.
The above motor generator set was found to be unable to
load of the new 35-A transmitter and PTI. By measure-
ment it was found that the 35-A and PTI required 1.7 KVA at a power
factor of about .87.

Under this load the voltage output of the CG-21-M-1 clter-
motor was found to be 90 volts at 53 1/3 cycles. By means of the
line auto-transformer T2 (Fig. 1 D.N.G. CG-23-M-1) in the control unit
this voltage could be raised to a maximum of 100 volts at the equip-
ment. Still well below proper operating voltage.

In order for the IC motor generator to carry its normal
load the radar equipment it was found necessary to increase
the DC motor overload settings from 53 cps to 72 cps. This vessel is
is equipped with 10KVA IC sets. It is understood that these 10KVA
IC sets are to be replaced with 15 KVA capacity. One other clter-
native would be to split the load and place only that amount on the
3J motor generator that it can safely carry.

3J C.S.U.A.T.I.T.S
PPI unit.

Sweep erratic, shortened to one fourth length. Found
7 megohm-10 watt intonsifier voltage divider resistor. R44, D.N.G.
D-150961, burned at one end and open. As no spares were available
the resistor was required by bracing the carbon spiral and bridging
with copper wire. The resistance was lowered from 7 megohms to 6
megohms by this procedure but coperation was satisfactory.

Inner circle of sweep was found displaced to the left
effect. A continuity test showed horizontal centering coil had no
effect. A continuity test showed horizontal centering coil and focusing coil.
As no spares were available the coil assembly was replaced, displaced
slightly from its normal position in azimuth and along the neck of the
tube so that the vertical centering coil effected the beam at an
angle resulting in both horizontal and vertical motion of the beam.
By this arrangement and proper adjustment of the interconnecting
coil and vertical coil the beam was made to occupy the center of the
screen.

Arcing over was discovered at the high voltage rect-
ifier tube base (705A-V 9, D.N.G. D-150961) between the holding pin
of the filament clip on the socket and the grounded holding down
clamp about 1 inch away. The circling was eliminated by removing the
clamp in the vicinity of the filament clips.

RANGE INDICATOR

Sweep disappeared. Found high voltage rectifier cor-
denser C36 (D.N.G. CJ-55-M-1) shorted. Replaced from spares, operation

4 0265

— page 41 —
3. HADDO - REPORT OF PC-1 AIR PATROL

normal.

Sweep on A scope erratic. No control of receiver tuning. Turning receiver tuning to extreme clockwise position made regulator lamps go out and sweep blured. Found receiver tuning potentiometer P9, D/G, CW-55AAL defoctive. Replaced from spares, operation normal.

I. F. APPLIFIER

Sweep on both the A scope and PPI jumped intermittently when warmed up. Found V202 (6A07) D/G, D-150412 shorting internally. Replaced with new tube, operation normal.

ANTENNA TRIGGER UNIT

The key in the gear box's section of the meter drive had to be roll-out on three occasions. Twice the key itself broke and the third time this key was scrap sufficiently to allow the key to drop out of the shaft.

3D

The performance of the 3D radar was excellent. Placed targets were detected out to 12 miles and 1 and indications were received at 32 miles.

In PEARL HARBOR provision was made for keying of this equipment so that it could be placed in operation intermittently (5 seconds every 60 seconds) to make it more difficult to DF.

Pertial blocking of the 3014A tubes was made possible by the addition of a 90000 ohm resistor in the grid rotun circuit. This resistor was placed in the center top lead of the filament transformer right at the transformer T101 (D/G, W-305172) and parallel with a keying relay. With the key closed the relay shorted the additional resistance allowing normal operation with 10 Ma. plate current. With the relay open, key up, the additional bias produced by the added resistor dropped the plate current to about 4Ma, and prevented the tubes from oscillating. This procedure worked satisfactorily and is deemed a necessity in view of the many reports received of NIP DF-ing of the 3D signal.

However, with the tube partially out of, the high voltage between filaments and ground rose to such a value that the current was experienced between the filament leads and the surrounding filament's tank (L102) tubing at the ends of the tank nearest the filament.

This rating was eliminated by pulling the insulator between filament lead and tank tubing well down over the filament lead thereby substituting a dielectric of higher break down than air to this increased voltage. The equipment operated normally from the on.

— page 42 —
0-0-N-P-I-D-Z-N-T-I-A-L:
U. 3. HADDO - REPORT OF FOURTH PATROL

N. SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS:
Sound conditions in general were good. Echo ranging on fish noises and whistles were noted throughout the patrol.

Dofacts concerning unsatisfactory operation of the DD-I equipment.
No echo ranging was employed.

O. DENSITY LAYERS:
Density layers were found at the following position.

| Latitude | Longitude | Keel Depth | Amount |
|||||
| 12°-22'N  | 119°-11'W  | 120        | -3°    |
| 12°-58'N  | 120°-21'E  | 100        | -1°    |
| 12°-53'N  | 120°-23'W  | 90         | -1°    |
| 14°-59'N  | 119°-24'W  | 140        | -2°    |
| 15°-17'N  | 119°-14'W  | 120        | -2°    |
| 17°-20'N  | 118°-45'W  | 60         | -3°    |
| 18°-42'N  | 119°-40'E  | 100        | -6°    |

The new isobellast cards proved to be of value in adjusting trim with change in depth.

P. HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY:
The health of the crew was in general good. One man suffered from a fractured foot and another suffered from a fractured foot.

The food was well prepared and the men varied as possible.

Habitability of the boat was fair. The new cooling water promptly when submerged. A readjustment of the distribution of air between the forward and after parts of the ship should be undertaken. Temperature of the forward battery and control room were good.

Q. PERSONNEL:
The conduct and performance of duty of both officer and enlisted personnel was of the highest order. It is unfortunate that the opportunity did not present itself to conduct successful attacks on the enemy for the first and anticipation with the necessary intelligence. In spite of the negative results it is believed that the morale and confidence of the officers and crew is high and the

— page 43 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T- L:
U. S. S. HADDO - REPORT OF FOURTH U.S. PATROL
Corr. of Officer desir. to take this opportunity to commend the
for their cooperation and assistance in conducting this first patrol.
in the Pacific.

R. MILITARY STANDARD:
Pearl to Midway 1290 17; 140
Midway to area 3532 39; 015
In area 3745 28; 518
Area to F. F. 4162 3; 24 38, 881

S. DURATION:
Pearl to area 17 days
In area 23 days
Area to F. F. 12 days
Days submerged 22

T. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REPORTING:
Torpedoes 24 4,102 gals. 10 days

Personal Factor:
14 days

Limiting factor of endurance - Patrol terminated by
Operation Orders.

U. MARKINGS:
The new Winter origins performed in a reliable manner
but they smoke excessively when any change of speed is made. This is
an undesirable feature when making a night surface attack, since
the smoke is white and o silty soon. It is to be hoped that this in-
tallation of new piston-airs will result in a reduction of its duration.

-18-
9920 t

— page 44 —
25 February 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL
FCS-163-5
SERIAL 0121

FRT. UNDERSEA
H.D.D. Report of 4th
War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLAG.
The Commander SEVENTH FLAG.

Subject: U.S.S. H.D.DO (SS255) - Report of Fourth War Patrol - comment on.

1. The fourth war patrol of the U.S.S. H.D.DO was the first one for this ship in the Pacific and covered a period of fifty-two days, of which twenty-three days were spent in the assigned area. It is not considered that coverage was thorough, an excessive number of days submerged (22) being registered. This was undoubtedly due in part to the Commanding Officer's previous experience in the Bay of Biscay, which was such practice was mandatory, as well as by his lack of familiarity with the methods employed in the Pacific.

2. Two contacts were made with targets suitable for torpedo fire, although both of these were relatively small. It is regretted that neither of these contacts were developed aggressively, the advantage of inaccuracy in the ship's company in a convoy of a successful attack against even such small targets, outweighing in large part the considerations set forth in the report for not further developing the contacts.

3. The material condition of the H.D.DO is considered excellent, the new Winton engines although still afflicted with excessive smoking, proving not reliable. The improved S7 radar installation as well as the new H.D.DO are the first such son in this theatre, and it is hoped will have opportunity on subsequent patrols of this ship to demonstrate their worth. Refit will be accomplished in the normal period.

4. The Squadron Commander takes pleasure in welcoming the H.D.DO to this area and expresses confidence that subsequent patrols of this ship will be more fruitful of damage to the enemy.

F. H. HINES.

4 0265

— page 45 —
844
UNITED STATES NAVY 4 0265 16/m
Serial: 0262
24 March 1944.

G-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S.S. HADDO Conf. Ltr.
A16-3 Serial 030, dated
4 Feb., 1944. Report of
Fourth War Patrol.

From: Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Fourth War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The Fourth War Patrol of the HADDO, of fifty-two days duration, was conducted in the PHILIPPINE waters, principally in the MANILA area.

2. At the time of sighting the BOWFIN on 28 January, that vessel was engaged in hot pursuit of a very important target; namely, the CVS KAMOI. It is regretted that the HADDO did not make her presence known to the BOWFIN at this time so as to have joined in the chase and attack, or to have destroyed the cripple after the BOWFIN's attack. After receipt of the BOWFIN's report of attack that night, it is considered that the HADDO should have decided to return to the scene of the encounter.

3. The overloading of the IC motor generator sets is noted with concern. There is no prospect of reducing the load on these sets but rather it will probably increase. It is recommended that 15 KVA IC motor generator sets be installed in all submarines not so equipped and all radar equipment be supplied from this source.

4. The remarks of the Commanding Officer concerning the excessive smoking of the Winton 16-27A engines is concurred in. The excessive white smoke that adversely affects surfaces of speed is a real hazard that adversely affects surface operations during daylight and darkness.

5. This patrol is not considered successful for purpose of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

FILMED -1-

— page 46 —
24 March 1944.
Serial: 0262
G-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-J.

SECOND INDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. RADIO Conf. Libr.
A16-3 Serial 030, dated
4 Feb., 1944. Report of
Fourth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. RADIO (SS255) - Report of Fourth War Patrol -
Comment on:

7. No damage was inflicted on the enemy.

R. W. CHRISTIE.

DISTRIBUTION:
Comlach (3) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav (2) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav Op-23e (1)
Com1a6F1t (1)
Com2n4F1t (1)
Com3rF1t (1)
Com4tF1t (1)
Comsub1stF1t (4)
Comsub2ndF1t (4)
CTRF-71 (4) - (Complete)
CTRF-72 (2)
CSS-16 (1)
DivcomsRon-16 (1)
S/M School N.L. Conn. (2)
Each S/M W.A. (1) - NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN

P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
Flag Secretary.

— page 49 —
1. PROLOGUE
A. ARRIVED Fremantle, Western Australia 4 February 1944 from 4th war patrol. 4 February 1944 to 18 February 1944, underwent refit by Submarine Repair Unit (Navy 137), Fremantle, Western Australia. On 18 February 1944 Commander John Corbus, U.S. Navy was relieved as commanding officer by Lieutenant Commander C.L. Mintz, Jr., U.S. Navy. Period from 18 February to 28 February 1944 spent in loading and training.

B. MARRIAGE
29 February 1944
1300(H) Underway from Fremantle, Western Australia commencing 5th war patrol in accordance with CTF 71 OpOrd No. 26-44. Conducted training exercises with HMAS ADELAIDE in submarine exercise area until, at we set course for Exmouth Gulf.

1. March 1944
Enroute Exmouth.
1200 Lat. 29-30-00 S Long. 113-20-00 E

2. March 1944
Enroute Exmouth.
1200 Lat. 23-35-00 S Long. 112-35-00 E

3. March 1944
0915(H) Loaded to fuel barge at Exmouth Gulf and commenced fueling.

1377(H) Completed fueling and got underway for Lombok, bombarding Sunday Island (at mouth of Exmouth) in passing.

1200 Lat. 22-15-00 S Long. 114-13-00 E.

4. March 1944
Enroute Lombok.

— page 50 —
1200
Lat.: 16-43-00`S
Long.: 114-55-00 E

5 March 1944
Enroute Lombok.

1200(H) Being 140 miles south of Lombok, dove to avoid detection.

1830(H) Surfaced and continued towards Lombok, planning to enter strait at 0230(H), 6 March.

1200
Lat.: 11-06-00 S
Long.: 115-24-00 E

6 March 1944
Enroute Lombok.

0220(H) Entered Lombok.

0400(H) Through Lombok, and commenced patrolling north western approaches to strait, staying about 10 - 15 miles bearing 0200T from eastern point of Bali.

0600(H) Submerged, closed to 11 miles off Bali.

1600(H) Low visibility off Bali Coast. Surfaced, relying on our S3 to prevent anybody from running our blockade undetected.

2315(H) Intermittent radar interference on S3.

1200
Lat.: 08-17-45 S
Long.: 115-48-30 E

7 March 1944
Patrolling northwest approaches to Lombok strait.

0100(H) S3a Radar interference abruptly stopped.

0114(H) While lying to, 12 miles northeast of Bali Peak made radar contact 6700 yards bearing 0270T, and at sighted patrol vessel with small angle on bow 5000 yards away, got going and avoided by running to westward. (Ship contact #1)

— page 51 —
0214(H) Got 2 SJ contacts, range 16,000 yards, right where we had loft patrol vessel. Contacts lost immediately and never regained, but C.O. saw pips personally. Started toward E full power, and at parade contact on patrol vessel range 6900 yards, between us and entrance to Lombok. Ran around him to northward end by Norwizard and by were in middle of Lombok entrance. No pips down in strait, and, with daylight coming in an hour, just resumed patrol right there.

: 0310(H) Submerged in middle of northern entrance. Sent the day analyzing night's contacts, and finally decided to send HADDO to. One radio message reporting possibility of enemy ships passing South Lombok. "Remember Pearl Harbor" kept sticking in my mind.

: 1756(H) Surfaced and headed away to northwest in order to send message.

: 1358(H) Obtained receipt for radio message and headed back to station.

: 2119(H) Back on station in middle of North Entrance to Lombok, lying to.

: 1200 Let. 08-04-00 S Long. 115-43-30 E.

: 0450(H) Radar contact, 8000 yards. Tracked at 3 knots and subsequently identified target as two nested sechooner.

: 0550(H) Submerged in middle of North Entrance to Lombok. There will be the current take us today?

: 1134(H) Sighted KOSYO I-RU (2030 tons) unescorted, not zigzag, bearing 0560T, range 12,000, angle on bow 300 port, cutting across northern entrance of Lombok. (Ship contact # 2) commenced approach, but he slowly turned away to parallel northeast coast of Bali. He decided that we could chase him on the surface and still stay on most probable route between Jocrebaya and Lombok.

: 1350(H) Surfaced in pursuit, planning to run around him to northward as he hugged the coast. Lacking full power, gaining bearing fast, everything rosy - PLAN RADAR CONTACT - 3 LINES! Down like a rock. (Plan contact # 1)

: 1411(H) At 47 feet, reaching for the bottom and wondering

— page 52 —
1503(H)    U.S.S. HADDO, Report of Her Patrol Number Five.

: 1756(H)    In position 5 miles north of northern tip of Bali, target not in sight, dove and headed back along this track.

: 1824(H)    Sighted target bearing 119°T, angle on bow 100 stbd., range 12,000 yards.

ATTACK NO. 1 - 3 TORPEDOES - NO. 2 LIGHT

Unescorted target was on steady course 2900T, making 8.2 knots - A sub school set-up.

Commenced firing forward with 600 stbd. track, 1100 yard torpedo run, 00 gyro angle, using periscope to aim one at lot, one ahead of bow, and one aft of stern.

Firing interval 8 seconds. Despite now delay wheel, torpedoes 1 & 2 sank, penetrated after 23 second run. Retched target turn and run for beach with 180 track. Torpedo no. 3 undoubtedly missed aft.

: 1929(H)    Surfaced and ran north to get back on Sobrèbre - Lonbok line. Commenced inactivity exploring.

: 2100(H)    On line, heading back for Lonbok, 40 miles away.

: 1200    Lt.: 08-03-03
    Long.: 115-53-15 3

2. Patroling in midDLE of northern entrance of Lonbok.

: 0552(H)    Submerged.

: 0936(H)    Sighted fleet biplane (Dave) patrolling our area. (Plane contact # 2)

: 1104(H)    Sighted torpedo boat (similar to OHC class) patrolling our area. (No. kept clear (Ship contact # 3).

: 1903(H)    Surfaced.

Spent night constant helmine around entrance for line vorw nebd in bright moonliht.

— page 53 —
1200(H)  Let. 08-04-00 S
Long. 115-52-00 E

10 March 1944

0552(H)  Submerged, still in middle northern entrance to Lombok.

1033(H)  Sighted and heard our torpedo boat follow patrol. He apparently patrols back and forth along northern approaches, and we had clue Devil's own time avoiding him. At
he crossed our stern about 700 yards astern at which time we were down under a temperature gradient, leaking like a scive through three bed cable glands, thinking what a crowd two ships can be in an area some 60 miles square.

1253(H)  Patrol disappeared to westward.

1607(H)  Patrol back again going east. We kept closer this time and finally, at
he disappeared into Lombok. Surface and headed up to northwesterward to charge a very low battery.

1200(H)  Let. 08-18-30 3
Long. 115-45-30 3

11 March 1944

0018(H)  Patrolling northwesterward approaches Lombok.

0423(H)  Sighted and avoided patrol.

0520(H)  Sighted patrol again. Avoided.

0600(H)  Submerged. Patrol pinging to southward but not in sight. Pinging faded out as he hauled to southeast.

1352(H)  Surfaceed.

1200(E)  Let. 07-58-00 S
Long. 115-47-00 E

12 March 1944

Patrolling off Lombok.

— page 54 —
3.3. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Number Five.

0318(H)    Sighted and avoided patrol vessel.
0500(E)    Started North to station.
1358(E)    Plane radar contact 16 miles. (Plane contact # 3) 00D had orders not to dive unless plane closed to 15 miles, but almost immediately after pip appeared, the screen became jammed by outside interference making it virtually impossible to see pip. At Dove.
1400(E)    Surface.
1639(E)    Surfacod.
1200(E)    Let. 06-38-15 S
    Long. 116-37-00 E
13 March 1944
Southern Kekesgar, enroute station.
0755(E)    Sighted what appeared to be small jetrol vessel ahead. Being in no hurry, dove. Later identified object as plain fronds.
1845(E)    Surface.
1200(E)    Let. 03-50-00 3
    Long. 118-10-00 E
14 March 1944
Northern Kekesgar, Enroute station.
0420(E)    Sighted small craft to northeast, coming south at high speed. Avoided to westward. (Ship contact # 4)
0500(E)    In bright moonlight 700D sighted a sparscope 600 yards on port beam. Executiv officer and one look-out also saw it and all were loud in their conviction that it was the real thing. He were making 17 knots at the time and turned away to starboard. At
0501(E)    A great flare burst on port beam, still going up. C.O., not knowing for sure whether flare was a U.S. Sub identification signal or a plane flare, clocerd bridge. Through misunderstanding, steersman sounded diving alarm so down we went. Chocked up and found that green was wrong color. A mysterious situation. Might have been CHURCH.

— page 55 —
1835 (E)
1930 (E)
2100 (H)
2117 (H)
2133 (H)
1200 (H)
15 March 1944
0611 (H)
0630 (H)
1500 (H)

COMMENT:
U.S.S. HADDON, Report of Mar Petrol Number Five.

Comment on submerged petrol.

Surfaced.

Radar contact bearing 0300T, 18,000 yards.
(Ship contacts 5 and 6)

ATTACK 10. 2 - 6 TORPEDOES - 1 POISIBLE HIT

Target was a big tanker escorted by 1 DD which may have been Ex USS JESTART.

Tracked target until, at
we knew no was making 12 knots on an erratic constant
helm zig, base course 205. Commenced closing at
high speed to attack, planed to shoot 3 at each with
bow tubes since DD was on near flank of target. As
we approached this firing position both ships started
to swing away, giving a 1300 port track, range
3600. The dog had chocked so well I decided to fire
then despite extreme torpedo run, since moon was
just starting to light things up to a start.

Fired 3 at escort and 3 at tanker. 4 Minutes
and 27 seconds after last shot got first series of 7
explosions - probably due to fish explosions at end
of run, but it is possible one of last three hit
tanker. Both ships immediately presented their
sterns and headed west, at operator undiminished
spread. Flewod chain oes of second attack poor in
view of impending bright moonlight, proximity to
Belikpepan, and cisclosure of our presence.

The failure to sink both ships was due to 4400
yard torpedo run with large tracks. Should have held
fire and made end round for new approach submerged.

Heading North to station.

Let. 00-50-00 S
Long. 119-03-00 E

In Northorn Kakkassar, anroute Sibu tu.

Sighted flot plane (Dev) to eastward. (Plane
contact # 4) Dovo.

Surfaced.

Reversed course to 180°T to petrol Balikpepan -
Devao route in Colobes 3oe.

— page 56 —
2136(H) On above route, patrolling back and forth.
1200(H) Let. 02-15-00
Long. 119-47-00 B

16 Lerch 1944
Patrolling in Colobos Sea.
0330(H) Headed North for 3sibutu.
2000(H)-2229(H) Passing through 3ibutu.
1200(H) Let. 02-51-00
Long. 119-56-00 B

17 Lerch 1944
In Sulu Sea enemy submarine Líndoro Strait.
1200(H) Let. 07-47-00 N
Long. 120-16-00 B

18 Lerch 1944
In Sulu Sea enemy submarine Líndoro Strait.
1100(H) Entered Cuyo Rest Pass.
2000(H) Entered Líndoro Strait. Used a post Pass, passing 3 miles to South of Apo Island, east than North, between Apo Island and Loroç Rock. By Closer of straits, headed west.

19 Lerch 1944
In South China Sea headed for Cape Sa HOI, Indo China.
1200(H) Let. 13-12-00 F
Long. 118-08-00 B

20 Lerch 1944
In South China Sea headed for Cape Sa HOI, Indo China.
1200(H) Let. 13-55-00
Long. 113-42-00 B

21 Lerch 1944
In South China Sea headed for Cape Sa HOI.

- 8 -

— page 57 —
0247(H) 1625(H) 1859(H) 2121(H) 1200(H) 22 March 1944 1107(H) 1137(H) 1141(H) 1200(H) 23 March 1944 1325(H) 1900(H) 2104(H) 2053(H) 2104(H)

— page 59 —
1529(H) Dov for reconnaissance of Prattle Island. Took pictures. A very modern looking and wall developed large radio station. Plan to bombard before leaving area.

: 1915(E) Surfaced and hooked up towards east coast of Hainan.

: 1200(E) Let. 16-35-00 N Long. 111-19-00 E

: 27 March 1944

: 0950(H) Commenced patrolling 5 miles of Tinhoos Island on East Coast of Hainan. Slight fog.

: 1327(E) Placed radar contact 4 miles (Plano contact #7.) Dove.

: 1422(H) Surfaced.

: 1200(E) Let. 18-35-00 N Long. 110-34-00 E

: 28 March 1944

: 1112(H) Sighted Zeke type plane distant 5 miles. Dove. (Plano contact #8.)

: 1251(H) Surfaced.

: 1400(E) Strong radar interference on SD - similar to that encountered from planes in Lickasser. Dove.

: 1834(E) Surfaced and hooked southwest along coast.

: 1200(E) Let. 18-36-00 N Long. 110-38-00 E

: 29 March 1944

: 0251(E) 35 Radar contact, range 19,000 yards bearing 182°T. (Ship contacts 8 - 14.) Commenced tracking. Contact proved to be a convoy of about 7 ships on base course about 345° heading up to make a landfall on Southern point of Hainan. Six small snooky LKUR3 were in column, and a large unidentified ship was 2000 yards out on their stercord bow no roost us. Picked

— page 61 —
30 March 1944
0353(H) Sighted plane flying low on periscope course
(Plane contact # 9.) Dov.
Surface.
0746(H) L.t.: 16-52-00 K
1200(H) Long.: 109-47-00 Z

31 March 1944
0613(H) Dov 5 miles off Kulco R.I. for submerged patrol.
Countless fishing boats.

1448(H) Sighted most of small ship standing up coast
from south. (Ship contact # 15) Tracked and
photographed him. Appeared to be about 300 to 1000
ton coast. Pilot reported similar to (but not) Hunsgrove
Herr. Dock gun forvered. Decided to attack with gun
at night. Kopt him in sight until 1830. Not zigzag.
Surfaced and started North after target.

1924(H) With target still theoretically 16,000 yards
2047(H) Chug made radar contact 15,000 yards bearing 2790T.
(Only contacts 16-18) Closed end picked up two
smaller ships. Commenced tracking. Group was not zig-
zagged and was making 7.8 knots on course 005. Tracked
until.

1200(H) L.t.: 15-12-00 H
Long.: 109-12-00 Z

1 April 1944
0200(H) Closed group twice in moonlight to identify.
Approved to be one coast. Pilot reported plus two smaller
unidentified ships - possibly escorts. Finally
decided to fire two fish at the biggest one since
the dogo was perfect.

ATLANTIC 30. 5 - COASTAL PATROL
2 NORFOLK 1 HIT

0215(H) Fired two bow tubes, range 1330, 800 track,
depth setting 4 foot, spread 10 either side. LT.

SAI.1st torpedo run under target. SAI and Felt
2nd torpedo hit. Thoro never was a violent explosion,
but target was enveloped in smoke and sparks. Thoro
followed several sharp explosions with loud reports
like gun fire. The radar job got smaller than the other
two but never did disappear. Hung around until

— page 62 —
0315 trying to get the picture. At one period got 4 small jips.

Hooked back to firing point. Nothing seen.

No seam to heve no satisfactory weapon to attack two or more of these small-ermod coastal freighters. I am sure wo hit this ship - Prob-bly with c. dud which shook loose tho soot in his stock and holed him.

[Exasperating Note: - Twice while we were tracking this outfit, 8000 yards on their beam, we almost ran down fishing boats which were lying to, impossible to see more than 300 yards. In to the coss the fisherman lit a bright flare to avoid collision. Leda us feel anything but inconspicuous.]

Dove

Surfaced and headed South for Cape 3A HOI.

Off 3A HOI. Very fishermen.

Let. 16-06-00 1
Long. 109-38-00 2

2 - 3 April 1944

Conducting submerged patrol 6 - 15 miles off Cape 3A HOI.

4-2-44
1200(H)
Lt. 14-38-00 R
Long. 109-13-00 2

4-3-44
1200-(H)
Lt. 14-37-00
Long. 109-16-00 3

4 April 1944

Off Cape 3A HOI.

0815(H)
Set course to Southeast across South China Sea.

Radar contact bearing 0630T, Range 19,000 yards. (Ship contact # 19) Bright moonlight. Closed sufficiently to identify target as very large, unescorted 200 on southwesterly course making 13 knots zigging radically. Having only 4 torpedoes forward can. 3 cft, decided to track this ship until moonest to:

(1) Permit close range surface attack.
(2) Definitely determine his zig zing.
Commence to tracking and getting position checked.

— page 63 —
5 April 1944

Still tracking above target.

ATTACK NO. 6 - LARGE XAC - 7 TORPEDOES
NO HITS

Getting dark. We hadn't definitely determined the zig plan but knew that target steered one of four courses - 255, 240, 190, 175. Closed target and took station dead ahead of him, range 6000 yards, on course 2400T waiting for him to zig to south.

Target zigged to course 190T and would probably be there for at least 20 minutes. Turned toward for bow shot.

Fired bo' tubas, range 1830 - 1500 yards, depth set 10', firing interval 10 seconds, track about 80' stab. Every thing steady on ct firing. One minute after firing target tooted his whistle and turned toward us. He crossed chock of him and, using observed angles on bow as he slowly swung, fired the stern tubes very deliberately. Firing interval 20 - 25 seconds, range 800 - 1100 yards. Bo hits.

If I had this attack to do over again I wouldn't know what to do differently and can give no reason for absence of hits. Subsequent analysis showed that target should have been hit with two tubes with course error of 30'. Torpedoes must simply have run under or been duds.

Target began shooting wildly in our direction and we parted company. Commenced return to Frenchville.

Dove.

Surfaced.

Sent HADDO NO. T.C to CTF 71 informing him of torpedo expenditure and return.

Lt. 12-18-00 H Long. 111-48-00 E

Enroute lindoro.

- 15-

— page 64 —
1758(H) Sighted sceptre headed towards us. (Plane contact # 10) Dove.
: 1850(H) Surfaced.
: 1200(H) Lct. 12-44-00 K Long. 113-03-30 E
: 7 April 1944
: 0030(H) Entered Apo West pass Kinoro Strait.
: 0118(H) Sighted small petrol vessel 4500 yards to southward. (Ship contact #20) Be tried to close but was too slow.
: 0550(H) Sighted plane - range 5 miles. (Plane contact # 11) Dove.
: 1326(H) Surfaced, entering Jalu Sec.

The period beginning 0000(H) 8 April 1944 to 0000(H) 11 April 1944 was spent in performing a special mission and is the subject of a sepcrtre report to CTF 71.

: 1200(E) Lct. 11-34-00 N Long. 121-32-00 E

: 0000(E) 60 Miles northwest of Jolo Island.

: 0622(E) Sighted corvette to go petrol vessel be ring 3450T, hull down. Be sighted us shortly thereafter and came towards us. Ran awry at full power. (Ship contact # 21)

: 1200(H) Lct. 06-49-00 N Long. 120-48-00 E

: 12 April 1944
: In Sulu Sec.

: 1200(H) Lat. 07-19-00 N Long. 120-27-00 E

: 13 April 1944
: In Sulu Sec.

— page 65 —
1200(H) L.t.: 08-04-00 E
Long.: 120-53-00 E

14 April 1944
Enroute Francnntle.
Sighted and spoke USS LUSITAN.
Dove 30 miles north of sitbut.
Surfaced.
Trough sitbut.
Lt.: 05-20-00 N
Long.: 119-38-00 E

15 April 1944
In Geleese sec.
Dove 20 miles north of Lecksscr.
Surfaced.
Lt.: 01-26-00 E
Long.: 119-21-00 E

16 April 1944
In Lecksscr.
Off Cege Hillin, plane rad r cont.ct, 11 miles.
(Plans contact 12.) Dove.
Surfaced off Cege Lnndcr.
Lt.: 02-44-00 3
Long.: 118-29-00 E

17 April 1944
In Flores sec enroute Lombok.
Being 40 miles North of Lombok, dove.
Surfaced.
Entered Lombok at extreme eastern side.
Radr contact, 11,800 yards, bearing 208°T.

— page 66 —
U.S.S. HADOO, Report of War Patrol Number Five.

:  I've been outguessed. (Ship contact # 22.) avoided by running to westward.

:  Radar contact, 9000 yards bearing 020°T. Turned south and avoided. (Ship contact #23)

:  Through Lonbok.

:  Lt. 07-04-00 S Long. 116-26-00 E

:  Enroute Fremantle.

:  Arrived Fremantle.

- 18 -

— page 72 —
U.S.S. HADDO, Report of her Patrol Number Five,
H, ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK FORM

U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 5

Time 1905(H) Date 3-8-44  Lt. 7-59-00 3  Long. 115-03-15  E.

Target Data - Demage Inflicted

Description: SENKAR or KOSYO KAZU type vessel on straight course,

Ship(s) Demaged: None.

Target Draft 12  Course 290  Speed 8.2  Range 1500.

Own Ship Date

Speed 3  Course 170  Depth 18'  Angle )

FIRST CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Attack was a straightforward submerged approach on a non-zigzagging target. Firing was accomplished by the "White light method," with points of aim as follows:

#1: 1 LOT
#2: Just fwd of targets bow
#3: Just aft of targets stern.

Reason for misses: Only torpedo aimed to hit premeatured.

- 24 -

— page 74 —
U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Five.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. HADDO (33255) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 5

Time 2121    Date 3-14-44    Lt. 00-33-45 S    Long. 119-08-45 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Large damaged tanker escorted by unidentified destroyer since waving 400 either side of base course 2050T. DD leading tanker.

Ship(s) Damaged: None.

Target Draft 12    Course 205    Speed 12    R.P. 3600

Own Ship Data

Speed 14.6    Course 250    Depth 18°    Angle 0°

Fire Control - Torpedo D.T.C.

Light surface radar approach. Tracked target for 1 hour and 45 minutes then closed at high speed for attack. Crossed T.T. shortly after 1 hour and 45 minutes. Crew was in unfavorable condition of nonstop, fired engine. Misses probably due to excessive torpedo run. CT. reported used with TTT for firing. Sould have held fire and started another end round for submerged approach.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. HADDO (33255) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 5

Time 2121    Date 3-14-44    Lt. 00-33-45 S    Long. 119-08-45 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Large damaged tanker escorted by unidentified destroyer since waving 400 either side of base course 2050T. DD leading tanker.

Ship(s) Damaged: None.

Target Draft 12    Course 205    Speed 12    R.P. 3600

Own Ship Data

Speed 14.6    Course 250    Depth 18°    Angle 0°

Fire Control - Torpedo D.T.C.

Light surface radar approach. Tracked target for 1 hour and 45 minutes then closed at high speed for attack. Crossed T.T. shortly after 1 hour and 45 minutes. Crew was in unfavorable condition of nonstop, fired engine. Misses probably due to excessive torpedo run. CT. reported used with TTT for firing. Sould have held fire and started another end round for submerged approach.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. HADDO (33255) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 5

Time 2121    Date 3-14-44    Lt. 00-33-45 S    Long. 119-08-45 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Large damaged tanker escorted by unidentified destroyer since waving 400 either side of base course 2050T. DD leading tanker.

Ship(s) Damaged: None.

Target Draft 12    Course 205    Speed 12    R.P. 3600

Own Ship Data

Speed 14.6    Course 250    Depth 18°    Angle 0°

Fire Control - Torpedo D.T.C.

Light surface radar approach. Tracked target for 1 hour and 45 minutes then closed at high speed for attack. Crossed T.T. shortly after 1 hour and 45 minutes. Crew was in unfavorable condition of nonstop, fired engine. Misses probably due to excessive torpedo run. CT. reported used with TTT for firing. Sould have held fire and started another end round for submerged approach.

— page 75 —
U.S.S. HADDOCK, Report of War Patrol Number Five.

Subject:  Tubes Fired

Track Angle: 130P, 132P, 134P, 138P, 139P, 141P

Gyro Angle: 5R, 2R, 0, 4L, 6L, 7L

Depth set: 6', 6', 6', 10', 10', 10'

Power: HI, HI, HI, HI, HI, HI

Hit or Miss: Hiss, Hiss, Hiss, Hiss, Hiss, Hiss

| Contact Set | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
||-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Serial No.   | 26067 | 26177 | 26169 | 24420 | 40139 | 40509 |
| Lierk Exploder | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A |
|              | 7003  | 6996  | 7833  | 6717  | 6855  | 13150 |

| Contact Set | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
||----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Serial No.   | 4955 | 5075 | 1021 | 11199 | 11335 | 10954 |
| Explosive   | Torpoz | Torpoz | Torpoz | Torpoz | Torpoz | Torpoz |
|              | 6    | 7    | 20   | 10   | 12   | 12   |

| Type Spread | - TDC | OFFSET |
||------||
|              |      |        |
| Sea Conditions | Caln | Caln | Caln | Caln | Caln | Caln |
| Overhaul Activity | NTD IV 137 |

— page 76 —
U.S.S. HADDO, Report of:  er Patrol Number Five.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FOR:

U.S.S. HADDO (35255) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 5

Time 2104 (II)  Date 2-23-44  Lt. 11-34 K  Long. 109-25  S

Target Date - Damage Inflicted

Description:  Small coastal freighter on straight course.

Ship(s) Damaged:  Kono (later damaged by gunfire)

Target Draft 10  Course 170  Speed 68  Range 1400

Own Ship Date

Spoed 3.3  Course 280  Depth 18°  Angle 0

Fire Control and Torpedo Date

Night surface radar approach. Tracked non-zigging target for 2 hours. Fired with TBT bearings, range 1400, 70° track, using on offset spread 30 on each side of 10T. Both torpedoes should have hit.

Rerson for missos:  Lust have run under.

— page 77 —
U.S.S. HADDON, Report of Her Patrol Number Five.

Subject:  Tubos Fired

Tubes Fired  No. 1  No. 2

Truck Angle  70P  72P

Gyro Angle  0  2 L

Depth Set  6'  6'

Power  Hi  Hi

Hit or Kiss  Kiss  Kiss

Erratic  Not observed  Lot observed

Herk torpedo  14-3A  14-3A

Serial No.  22991  40493

Herk Exploder  6-1A  Inactivated  6-1A  Inactivated

Serial No.  6721  6016

Actuation Set  Contact  Contact

Actuation Actual 16  16

Herk Torpedo  11567  10912

Sori1  Torpex  Torpex

Explosive  0  16

Tiring Intervcl  TDC  Offset

Type Spread  Calm  Calm

Sec. Conditions  NTD Navy 137

Overhaul Activity  NTD Navy 137

- 29 -

— page 78 —
U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Five.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM:

U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4 PATROL NO. 5.

Time 0433(H) Date 3-29-44 Lct. 17-39-30 H Long. 109-54-30 B

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Convoy of about seven ships, one large and six small unidentified LARUS, zigzagging on base course 3450T.

Ship(s) Damaged: One large unidentified LARU.

Damage determined by: Two large explosions observed by bridge personnel and heard below.

Torpedo drift 20' Course 265 Speed 10.5 Range 3300

Own Ship Date

Speed 9 Course 320° Depth 18' Angle 0

Fire Control and Torpedo Date

Light surface radar cruiser. Test bearings using offset spread.

- 30 -

— page 80 —
U.S.S. HADDO, Report of Her Patrol Five.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FOR:

U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5 PATROL NO. 5

Time 0216 Dato 4-1-44 Let. 16-36-30 K Long. 109-06-45 Z

Target Deta - Dmago Inflicted

Description: One coastal freighter and two smaller unidentified typos, possibly escorts, on straight course.

Ship(s) Dumped: One coastal freighter.

Dmago determined by:
Bridgo personnel saw one torpedo hit; no violent explosion, but target was enveloped in smoke and sparks. Radar zip got snarl, but never disperced.

Torget draft 10' Course 0050 Speed 7.5 Range 1380

Own Ship Deta

Speed 5.2 Course 109° Depth 18' Angle 0

Fire Control: and Torpedo Deta

Night surface red r coproach. TET bcorings using offset sproad 40 each side of LOT.

- 32 -

— page 82 —
U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Five.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. HADDO, (3S255) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6 PATROL NO. 5

Time 0500(H) Date 4-5-44. Let. 12-16N Long. 111-20 E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Largo unescorted Abl0 stoveing radicel zigzag course.

Ship(s) Damaged: Nono.

Target Draft 15 Course 109 Speed 10 Range 1830.

Own Ship Data

Speed 12 Course 090 Depth 18° Angle 0

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Night surface radar approach. TEST bearings using offset spread 10° and 15° each side of IOT for bow tubes, each stern shot fired at IOT.

Reason for missos: Torpedoes ran under.

- 34 -

— page 84 —
35 -

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Five.

Tubes Fired: No. 3, No. 4, No. 5, No. 6, No. 7, No. 8, No. 10

Track Angle: 31.5, 80.3, 81.5, 99.5, 20.0, 45.2, 60.0

Gyro Angle: 1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0

Depth Jot: 10.0, 10.0, 10.0, 10.0, 10.0, 10.0, 10.0, 10.0

Polar: H1, H1, H1, H1, H1, H1, H1, H1

Hit or Miss: Liss, Liss, Liss, Liss, Liss, Liss, Liss, Liss

Error: UNDEFINED

Lick Torpedo: 14-3A, 14-3A, 14-3A, 14-3A, 14-3A, 14-3A, 14-3A, 14-3A

Serial No.: 40494, 40496, 25374, 40122, 26115, 24126, 26143

Mark Exploder: 6-1A, 6-1A, 6-1A, 6-1A, 6-1A, 6-1A, 6-1A, 6-1A

INACTIVATED

Serial No.: 6703, 6710, 6999, 6036, 6726, 6708, 3543

Actuation Set: CONTACT

Actuation Actual: 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16

Serial No.: 11855, 4093, 10429, 40122, 4386, 10144, 1233

Explosive: TORPED

Firing Interval: 0, 11, 10, 17, 170, 20, 25

Type Spread: TDC OFFSET, None, None, None

Sea Conditions: CALL

Overhaul Activity: TID New 137

— page 85 —
U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Number Five.

GUN ATTACK REPORT FORK

U.S.S. HADDO (3S255) GUN ATTACK FO. 1 PATROL FO. 5.

Time 2104(H) Date 3-23-44 Let. 14-34 N Long. 109-25 E

Target Date - Damage Inflicted

Damaged: Small coastal freighter.

Two and possibly three 4" gun hits, and nearly 20 H and 30 cal. machine gun hits observed.

I. LINES

No minifields were encountered nor were any mining operations observed.

J. A/S LEAVES US AT VESTIC TACTICS

No unusual A/S measures were observed and no occasion requiring the use of evasion tactics occurred.

K. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DIALOGUE

The lubricating oil consumption of the main engines was excessive. The trouble appears to be in the oil control rings which allow oil to get past them. The oil once having gotten past the control rings, goes to two places, first past the compression rings whence it is burned in the cylinder, giving off a continual blue smoke, and secondly into the air box, from which as much as 4 gallons have been drained during a four hour watch while running at the 75°-90° percent combination. Over the end of the petrol, these air box drainings were caught in buckets and returned to the sumps after being run through the clarifiers. This is probably a poor practice, but was highly necessary at the time.

From the substance of Consubmarine 1tr: FM12-10/341(70), serial 1770 of 20 November 1943, it appears that those engines were installed with the wrong oil control rings in them. The rings now in use have a 1/32" screw for the proper ring has a 1/64" face. It is conceivable that the smaller face ring may reduce the oil consumption. The proper rings were ordered while in Pearl Harbor. It is understood that similar rings have been ordered by the

— page 86 —
U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Number Five.

Commander Submarines Southwest Pacific Fleet.

The excessive leaking around cable packing glands at creation depths is considered to be a major military defect. This ship is equipped with an enl.riged conning tower hatch trunk to accomodate all cables between control room and conning tower. It is strongly recommended that all cables now running through the pressure hull be relocated thorin as soon as possible. It is suggested that a certain count of this work be undertaken during each rofit.

All serics recovied. No further comment.

(a) General

This vessel has 3E radcr cquipment which differs from the older 3J equipment in that it has the new 3J1 (higher power) transmitter plus the PPI sarcon and new type range'unit. 3E radcr performance left little to be desired, from the point of both reliability and results achieved. Targets could be picked up as follows:

| TYPE T.RECT | RANGE |
||-------|
| Schoonors  | 3000 - 4000 yards |
| U.S. SUBS  | 8000 - 9000 yards (had on) |
| Chidori T.B. | 9000 - 11,000 yards |
| DD& small KARUS | 15,000 yards |
| Lcrge KARUS | 18,000 - 20,000 yards |
| High land | 90,000 yards |

(b) PPI

The PPI proved invelucble as a search screen and a navigational rid. Its' velue as an rid in determining the disposition or number of c group of ships would be greatly inoroced by the olinintion of minor lobe pips which, at short ranges, make all targets appear as 3 targets on PPI screen. It is believed that to reducing the width of the projected signal would accomplish this result.

(c) Defects

The most serious difficulty encountered was a mechanical failure of the power trcining of the 3Ja.

— page 87 —
U.S.S. HADOO, Report of War Petrol Number Five.

A worn gear sheft in the driving train sheered at a point adjacent to a bearing surface on the shaft due to a flaw in the metal: The remainder of the worn gear sheft was drilled, then shrunk on a piece of stock turned down to fit and further strengthened with a tapered pin. This excellent piece of machine work by the auxiliary gear restored the equipment to normal operation.

K. SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

No sound contacts were made. Sound conditions were those generally observed in this crew.

O. DENSITY LAYERS

Density layers observed were those normally occurring in this crew.

P. HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY

Health, habitability and scirity conditions were normal.

The spoilage of the entire lot of fresh potatoes after two days at sea put an unfortunate burden on the commissary department in substituting for this large single item on the daily menu.

The medical officer on board was of the opinion that the most furnished this ship was not of the usual quality furnished submarines in this crew.

Q. PERSONNEL

4.0 Throughout

R. TITLES STANDARD - FULL USED

Base to Area 1: 7,765 miles - 24,519 gals.
In Area 7: 7,357 miles - 70,489 gals.
Area to Base 2: 2,530 miles - 32,489 gals.

NOTE: Pit log mileage used.

S. DURATION

Days around to area: 6
Days in area: 39
Days around to base: 9
Days submerged: 17

— page 89 —
25 April 1944.
F-15-16/16-3
Serial # 02652
UNITED STATES NAVY

C-O-N-F-T-I-D-E-R-T-I-A-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS HADDO Report of
Fifth War Patrol SS255/
A16-3 Serial 08 dated
22 April 1944.

From:
To:
Vic:

Subject:
U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Fifth War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The fifth war patrol of the U.S.S. HADDO extended over a period of 54 days, from 29 February 1944 to 22 April 1944. After 7 days of patrolling the northern approaches of LONDON STRAIT, HADDO conducted patrol in the northwest part of the SOUTH CHINA SEA. The patrol was terminated when all 24 torpedoes had been expended in 6 aggressive attacks. This was the first war patrol as Commanding Officer for Lieutenant Commander C.W. MARTIZ, Jr., U.S.N.

2. HADDO's first torpedo attack upon an unescorted AK was frustrated when two of the three torpedoes fired prematurely. The remaining influence exploders were inactivated. On attack No. 2 against an escorted AQ, maneuvers of the target placed HADDO in an unfavorable firing position. Six torpedoes were fired but no definite hits were observed. Attack No. 3 was a night radar attack on a coastal freighter in which two torpedoes were fired with depth set at 6 feet. It is believed that these torpedoes ran under the target. The same target was then attacked by gunfire but the attack was finally broken off due to the proximity of land. In attack No. 4 HADDO scored 2 hits from 4 torpedoes on an unidentified freighter in another night radar attack. Since this target did not appear to be sinking an end around run for a daylight attack was attempted but the target was lost from the radar screen at 16,000 yards. Further search revealed nothing and it is possible that this ship sank. Attack No. 5 was another night radar one in which 2 torpedoes were fired at another co:stal freighter. One torpedo was observed to hit and one ran under the target. The final torpedo attack was upon a large XAO in which seven torpedoes were fired. HADDO had tracked the target for 7% hours and attained excellent firing position. No hits were observed. All torpedoes in this attack were set for 10 feet depth.

3. The HADDO returned in excellent material condition. The replacement of oil control rings will be made on receipt of material. Cables will be rerouted through the coming tower hatch trunk as time permits. The repair of the SJ training gear by ships' force is noted with approval. It is expected that the refit will be accomplished in the normal time.

— page 90 —
5. The Task Group Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew on the conduct of an aggressive patrol and on the damage inflicted on the enemy.

H. H. McLean.

— page 91 —
12-bt
Serial 0445
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
CO, USS HADDO Report of
Fifth War Patrol SS255/
416-3 Serial 08 Dated
22 April 1944.

From: Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Viv: Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO - Report of Fifth War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN are concurred in.

2. HADDO's Fifth War Patrol was very actively and aggressively conducted. A large number of the targets were small shallow draft vessels which undoubtedly accounts for some of the misses. A submarine of the NARWHAL Class using its six inch guns could very effectively deal with the small vessel traffic to and from HAINA noted by HADDO, and also severely damage the Radio Station on PATTLE ISLAND.

3. The excessive smoking and high oil consumption of the General Motors 278A engines has been commented on in previous endorsements. It is hoped that the oil control rings now enroute by air will greatly reduce these military hazards.

4. This patrol is designated as "Successful" for purpose of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

5. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew on the conduct of the short reconnaissance patrol assigned and for inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

DANGER:
1 - AK (Large unidentified) 6,000 tons.
1 - AK (Small unidentified) 2,500 tons.
1 - AK (Small unidentified) 2,500 tons.

TOTAL 11,000 tons.

RECEIVED S-C FILMS
X3E Room 2055
DATE: 27 April 1944
Cable No. (8) A/C: 3(2-3) 2-5
Cable No. 121806
Cable No. 25231

R. W. CHRISTIE.

— page 92 —
15 May 1944.
A-16-3 Serial 0445.
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
CO, USS HADDO Report of
Fifth War Patrol SS255/
A16-3 Serial 08 dated
22 April 1944.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO - Report of Fifth War Patrol - Comment on.

DISTRIBUTION:
Coninch (3) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav (2) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav Op-23c (1)
ComlstFlt (1)
Con2ndFlt (1)
Con3rdFlt (1)
Con7thFlt (2)
ConSubs1stFlt (4)
ConSubs2ndFlt (4)
CTF-72 (2)
CSS-12 (1)
CSS-16 (1)
DivComs Ron-12 (1)
DivComs Ron-16 (1)
S/L Secool N.L. Conn. (2)
E-ch S/L W.A. (1) - NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN

P. F. STRAUB, Jt., Flag Secretary.

— page 93 —
0-3/roj
Serial: 0/3/6

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HADDO R. port of
Fifth War Patrol SS255/
A16-3 Serial 08 dated
22 April 1944.

From: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO - Report of Fifth War Patrol - Forwarding of.

1. Forwarded.

H. W. GRAP,
Chief of Staff

— page 95 —
84198 FILMED

U.S.S. HADDO
Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
16 July 1944.

From: [Handwritten text]
To: [Handwritten text]
Via: [Handwritten text]

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Number Six.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the sixth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the Netherlands East Indies area during the period 18 May 1944 to 16 July 1944 is forwarded herewith.

C. J. NITZ, Jr.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C

BY: OP-9896 DATE: 15/12/42

DECLASSIFIED

— page 96 —
18 May 1944
1300 Underway from Fremantle, 7.A. on sixth war patrol, enroute exercise area.
1609 Released HMS DUDDO. Too rough to accomplish any training. Set course for Exmouth.
1200 Lat. Fremantle; 7.A. Long. Fremantle, 7.A.

19 May 1944
1200 Enroute Exmouth.
1200 Lat. 28-25-00 S Long. 112-45-15 E

20 May 1944
1200 Enroute Exmouth. Crossed Lat. 25 S at dark.
1200 Lat. 25-26-30 S Long. 112-16-00 E

21 May 1944
1200 Moored to fuel barge, Exmouth. 'as greatly angered to find the trainer's sight on.4" gun flooded. See dissertation on poor gun sights under 'material defects'.

1756 Fueling completed. Underway for Ombai Strait. Held 4" gun practice on way out Exmouth.
1200 Lat. 22-10-00 S Long. 114-20-00 E

22 May 1944
1200 In Indian Ocean, enroute Ombai.
1200 Lat. 19-02-00 S Long. 115-47-45 E.

— page 97 —
23 May 1944
In Indian Ocean, enroute Ombaï.
Lat.: 15-19-45 S
Long.: 118-52-15 E

: 24 May 1944
In Indian Ocean, enroute Ombaï.
Submerged in order to approach Koepang undetected.
Surfaced.
Entered Sawoe Sea close aboard Dao Island. Sent
night cruising past approaches to Koepang.
Lat.: 11-53-00 S
Long.: 121-39-30 E

: 25 May 1944
In Sawoe Sea enroute Ombaï.
Submerged, proceeding toward Ombaï Strait close
aboard Timor Coast.
Sighted unidentified plane flying north over Timor.
(Plane contact #1)
Surfaced and proceeded through Ombaï.
Received CTF 71 serial 1 ordering us to patrol
Kendari approaches.
Lat.: 09-18-00 S
Long.: 123-48-00 E

: 26 May 1944
In Ombaï, enroute Kendari.
Clear of Ombaï, heading for Buton Island Passage.
Sighted unidentified plane, distance 6 miles.
(Plane contact #2)
Dived, and with prospective glassy sea, submerged
patrol, off Kendari, spent afternoon reloading stern
tubes with Ik 18 torpedoes.
Surfaced.
In Buton Passage, received CTF 71 serial 1 ordering

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE (1)

— page 98 —
U.S.S. H.M.D.O., Report of War Patrol Number 32x
- us to Kau Bay by 29th. We will have no time to stop at Kendari.
- Lat.: 06-54-00 S
- Long.: 124-14-30 E

27. May 1944
- In Kolukka Sea, enroute Halmahara.
- Contact on plane radar, distance 22 miles, Faded out at 23 miles. (Plane contact #3)
- Contact on plane radar, distance 23 miles. Faded out at 24 miles. (Plane contact #4)
- Contact on plane radar, distance 26 miles. Then contact closed to 14 miles. (Plane contact #5)
- Surface.
- 2000-2200 "Hile passing through northwest corner of Geram Sea had interference from U.S. Sub on 3J radar.

2324. Received CTF serial telling us to stay away from Kau Bay until 30th. Decided to head for coast of Halmahara in vicinity of Djalolo and patrol up coast close in shore during the 29th.
- Lat.: 03-32-00 S
- Long.: 125-05-00 E

28. May 1944
- In southern Kolukka passage enroute Djalolo, west coast of Halmahara.
- Sighted unidentified plane to southeast, distance 8 miles. Divded. (Plane contact #6)
- Surface.
- About 4 miles off Ternate Island, sighted unidentified plane. Distance 5 miles. Divded. (Plane contact #7)
- Remained submerged the rest of the afternoon close inshore. Looked in Djalolo roads; empty.
- Surface and spent night cruising slowly up coast.
- Lat.: 00-39-00 N
- Long.: 127-02-00 E

-3- ENCLOSURE: (A)

— page 99 —
29 May 1944
Off N.W. coast Halmahora.
Submerged. Continued patrol up coast. Performing major repair to 3J Radar.
0943 Sighted plane (Topsy) headed East. (Plane contact #81). Surfaced and proceeded to Kau Bay, going around Morotai Island. 3J functioning poorly.
2100 Entered area.
1200 Lat. '01-53-00 N Long. 127-40-00 E

30 May 1944
In northeastern approaches Kau Bay.
0435 Submerged.
1401 Sighted smoke of at least 6 ships to westward, estimated range 40,000 yards, close against western shore of Kau Bay. (Ship contact #1)
1442 True bearing change indicates convoy headed out, but as yet cannot tell which side of Morotai Island they will go.
1540 Convoy headed out Morotai Channel. Surfaced and commenced and around Morotai Island at high speed in effort to intercept tonight. Commenced replacing 1k 18s with 1k 14s in stern tubes.
1624 Simultaneous sight and radar contact on Zoku type plane coming at us from over Morotai Island. Distance 6 miles. (Plane contact #9)
1628 Divied to 150 feet changing course cnroute.
1628 One bomb, not close.
(Sidelight: Not 5 minutes before plane contact the had passed a small native canoe close aboard. Three natives got a ringside'sect to a one sided fight.)
From present position can surface at dark and still have chance of interception.

-4- ENCLOSURE (a)

— page 100 —
1. SUBJECT: U.S.S. HADDO, Report of "Far Patrol Number 312.

: 1323 Surfaced and resumed chase. Should contact convoy about 2400. SJ performing very poorly. Sent message on voice frequency to RADAR giving dope on convoy. Reported message twice but got no reply.

: 2030 Off northern end of Korotai Island. The SJ failed completely. Broke off the chase because our chances of finding convoy in the dark without radar were not good enough to warrant going so far off station. SJ not remained of night going south to coast just south of Kau Bay. Replaced Mk 14s with 18s aft.

: 1200 Let. '01-47-00 N Long. 128-33-00 E

: 31 May 1944

: Off Kau Bay.

: 0432 Submerged 7 milos K.'. of Tg. 'Jafanli to intercept any traffic that might anchor in Boeli Bay overnicht.

: 0532 Sighted patrol vessel to northward coming down the coast. He was a large sampan type tra'mer. Passed about 3000 yards inboard of us and discep'ro'd to southward, apparently heading into Boeli Bay.

: 0624 Heard weak pinging to northeastward. Rotting in sight.

: 0635 Sighted flot blipane cruising up coast headed north. (Plane contact 410)

: 0820 Sighted twin engine bomber (Sally) cruising down coast headed south. (Plane contact 411)

: 1825 Surfaced and lay to. Continuing work on still dormant SJ Radar.

: 2218 Lt. (jg) Vicbranz, who, with our two good radar technicians, had been working almost continuously on the SJ for two days, bounced into the wardroom to announce that he had pips "a mile high" on the SJ. All done to 'all thrce. Headed south for reconnaissance of Boeli Bay, looking for anchored targets.

: 1200 Let. '01-05-00 N Long. 128-47-00 E

: 1 June 1944

: Off Boeli Bay; Helmachora.

: 0241 Do not believe there are any ships at all anchored in the bay - in any case none that could be reached.

— page 101 —
U.S.J. HADDO, Report of Mr. Petrol Tanker Six.

Headad back up to yesterday's station off Tg. Majarli.

0430 Submerged.

1023 Sighted ship which appeared to be DD or TS to
southward, zero angle on bow. Went to battle stations and
made stern tubes ready. First range by' periscope was
7000 yards at which time ship was definitely identified
as a torpedo boat going to beat all time. (Ship contact
#2).

Turned off' track but did not fire due poor dope and
draft of target. TM passed 900 yards astern making about
21 knots and shortly disappeared over horizon to northward.

1323 Having seen nothing, and believing that any traffic
anchoring overnight in Eoeli Bay would have appeared by
now, surfaced and headed northeast at high speed to get
on Palau - New Guinea line. Sky was overcast with thunder-
storms to northwest.

1327 Plane radar contact 4 miles. Dived. (Plane contact

1353 Surfaced and continued, using 3D continuously.

1409 Sighted unidentified plane to southeast, distance
10 miles. Dived. (Plane contact #13)

1426 Surfaced and continued.

1500 Jamming or interference on 3D.

1522 Plane radar contact 5 miles. Dived. (Plane contact

#14) At time of diving we were in heavy rainstorm, but
pip was closing readily.

1547 Surfaced in heavy rain. Keying 3D once every minute.

1600 Jamming or interference on 3D.

1602 Plane radar contact 7 miles. Dived (Plane contact

#15) Flying weather looks impossible, visibility is almost
nil, and yet some plane is not only out here, but acts as
though he knew we were. Changed my plans and stayed down.
We got in some good training in fast diving. Lost
plausible explanation seems to be that a shore station was
locating and possibly jamming our 3D, meanwhile directing
a plane search.

- 6 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 102 —
1758
Surfaced and continued to northeast to get on Pelau - Sorong route.

During the evening converted 1/4 to main ballast tank and made two dives to flush it out.

1200
Lat.: 01-11-00 N
Long.: 128-45-00 E

2 June 1944

Northeast of Halmhachr on Pelau - Sorong route.

Interference on plane red r. (120 miles from nearest land) Dove and decided to remain submerged during day to preclude the detection our 3D invitoes.

Surfaced twice during day to get sun nights.

Spont night scouting at high speed on Pelau - Sorong route.

1815
Received CTF 71 serial orderings as up to 1 oro Culf after 4 June.

2010
Received CTF 71 serial ordering us up to 1 oro Culf area by 5th June.

1200
Lat.: 03-05-00 N
Long.: 130-08-00 E

3 June 1944

Northeast of Halmhachr on Pelau - Sorong route.
Spont day submerged and night scouting at high speed. Just a lot of fuel down the drain.

1834
Received CTF 71 serial giving aircraft contact report on large Jcp Kevval Force. At this time we were 75 miles on the port quarter of the force reported. Chasse uscloses.

1200
Lat.: 03-35-00 N
Long.: 130-18-00 E

4 June 1944

Still scouting Pelau - Sorong line.

0200
Fool we have exhausted the possibilities of this race. Jet course for 1 oro Gulf planning to pass just north of Karekolong Island.

0255
Sent HUDX one to CTF 71 acknowledging the orders changing our station and admitting our fruitless patrol.

— page 103 —
5 June 1944

To date:

0811 About fifty miles due north of Halmacher, sighted heavy smoke to northward. It looked like smoke from several ships. (Ship contact #3)

Hedged towards the smoke and found shortly that the smoke was coming intermittently from a CHLORI or OTORI. Who had a zero angle on the bow and whose bridge top was in sight through periscope. He had obviously seen us.

0826 Dived and went to battle stations submerged.

0838 Target started pinging. He was steering courses 220 and 190 - each for about 3 minutes, giving us alternate. He was 15 short of the 15. He was

— page 104 —
0238 In bright moonlight sighted heavy black smoke to northward. (Ship contact #4)
Start tracking end closing until, at 0311 made radar contact on small patrol vessel at range 9000 yards. He was smoking intermittently like our contact yesterday. Nothing else around so proceeded as before.
0343 Submerged.
1831 Surfaced, closing Sarangani Island.
1200 Let. '05-00-00 N Long. 126-08-00 E.

6 June 1944
Loro Gulf.
0430 Submerged 5 miles off Lequiling Point and commenced patrolling up East Coast of Gulf.
1417 Sighted smoke to westward, distance 15 miles. To spent the rest of the afternoon closing and tracking a definitely identified A1 (class 1-6) (smoking) according by two smaller unidentified craft.
1842 Surfaced and closed the group from dead eastern trying to find the big ship they must be escorting. At 16,000 yards under a full moon all three could be seen, All still smoking intermittently, but no other ships. No radar contact. We've been sucked in for three times running. (Ship contact #5)

Since these babies had apparently come from Pasilian Strait (course 115 speed 3.5, not zigging) felt we were wasting our time here and headed across the gulf to patrol off Tepitanana Channel in Sulu Archipelago.
1200 Let. '06-10-00 N Long. 124 07 00 E

7 June 1944
Loro Gulf enroute Sulu Archipelago.
0450 Submerged off Tepitanana Channel.
0654 Sighted bomber (Jally) over Pasilian headed southwest. (Plane contact #16)
1838 Surfaced and headed at high speed to the Southeast to get on Ealikpapen - Davao line.

- 10 - ENCLOSURE (-)

— page 105 —
1200 Lat. '06-23-00 N
Long. 122-10-00 E

8 June 1944

Hor Gul enroute Balikpapan - Devco line.

0447 Submerged.

1050 Distant explosions. The jig is up.

1828 Surfaced and, with misgivings, continued to patrol Balikpapan - Devco line.

2203 Heard from RASHER she had sunk a ship to southward of us. Headed back towards Basilan Strait.

1200 Lat. '04-19-00 N
Long. 123-56-00 E.

9 June 1944

Koro gulf enroute Basilan Strait.

0515 Submerged.

1550 Sighted smoke to westward (Ship contact 7)

Commenced approach, turning to southwest. The target was always in the direction of the sun and, although easy to get dope on, we could not make out his color.

1732 Up scope; stand by to fire. Range 1500, 80° track. Hospital ship. Photographed.

1829 Surfaced and continued towards Basilan.

2217 Sighted convoy to northeast in bright moonlight. Range 35,000 yards. (Ship contact 7)

Convoy was determined to consist of two columns of smoke! Harus with at least five escorts on base course 120° T. The escorts were small 3C or TE, and were all at least 8000 yards out from the convoy - so far out in fact that only once were we able to get radar contact on any thing but an escort. Decided to run around and submerge ahead of convoy.

1200 Lat. '05-08 00 N
Long. 123-26-00 E

10 June 1944

Tracking convoy in Koro Gulf.

— page 106 —
0125 Ahead of convoy. Submerged. Before diving had flooded down and stopped trying to get a radar range before diving. However one escort was so plainly visible we could not wait. Subsequent events indicated escort saw us.

0134 Headed at middle of convoy. Pinging fairly close dead ahead. Went deep to sneak past under a layer but escort had some sort of contact be cause at.

0200 Two escorts were pinging around our vicinity and at.

0212 Two depth charges, set shallow but within 300 yards.

One escort hung around for about one half hour more then hauled off to north.

0302 At periscope depth, could see convoy to eastward, they obviously gone around us to northward.

0318 Surfaced. Sent HUDO two giving dope on convoy but could get no receipt. Tried voice frequency without success.

0330 With dawn only one hour away gave up and headed for Basilan, knowing we could not get around target on surface with air activity in this area. The escorts with this outfit were very intelligently disposed for bright moonlight making it impossible to get any real dope without being seen.

— page 107 —
0444 Submerged.
0935 Sighted float plane (Pote) circling around about 3 miles away. (Aircraft contact #17)
1833' : Surfaced
2115 Commenced patrolling entrance Basin Strait.
1200 Let. 06-18-00 N Long. 123-15-00 E

11 June 1944

East entrance Basin
0440 Submerged
0705 Sighted plane (Dave) close aboard. (Aircraft contact #18)
0920 Sighted plane (Dave) (Aircraft contact #19)
This plane circled around all morning.
1125 Sighted masts of a ship and smoke to northwest (Ship contact #8)
He had come out of Basilan up in the shallow water, and was hugging the northern coast of the gulf.
Ran at standard speed most of the afternoon trying to keep smoke in sight.
1825 Surfaced, having just lost sight of smoke. Chased at high speed.
1910 Radar contact dead ahead on two targets, range 6900 yards. Could not believe all that mast and smoke could have come from a target as small as radar range indicated. Got TDC set up on those and ran on around looking for possible third.
2011 Received CTF 71 serial 31 telling us to exchange stations with HARD.
2038 Nothing found so concluded the small ships were our quarry. Turned around, manned all guns, and at 2057 found them again.
2118 Pitch black, range 400 yards, opened fire with 4".
- 13 - ENCLOSURE: (4)

— page 108 —
2145
Onc burning: fiercely, the other, hit with at least ten 4" and innumberable 20 mm was a smoking wreck but not in flames. Ceased firing and headed for Tapiantage channel.in Sulu Archipelago.

Both targets wore small coastal ships, and the one which caught fire was carrying oil or gasoline since the fire and periodic explosions lit up the sky to northward for hours afterwards, flames being plainly visible 35 miles away. Hindsight indicates that the A/Ship contact #5) sighted on 6 June was probably escorting a similar pair.

1200 Lt. '06-53-00 K
Long. 122-37-00 E

12 June 1944

Western Koro Gulf.

Conducted submerged patrol at Tapiantage Channel entrance.

1834 Surfaced and headed for Sibutu.

1200 Lt. 06-21-30 N
Long. 122-10-00 E

13 June 1944

Enroute Sibutu.

0430 - 0500 Lay to and exchanged information with HARDER. The resultant delay will keep us from reconnoitering Tawi Tawi anchorage today.

0513 Submerged.

1855 Surfaced, enroute southern entrance Sibutu.

2150 Commenced patrolling southern entrance Sibutu.

1200 Lt. '04-57-30 N
Long. 120-20-00 E

14 June 1944

Southern approaches Sibutu.

0439 Received CTF serial 4 csking for info on Tawi Tawi anchorage.

0500 Dove 2 milcs south of reefs at southern side of Tawi Tawi anchorage. Closed for good look into anchorage.

— page 109 —
0515-0615 Observed anchorage from 3 mile off reefs using 15 foot of scope. Completely empty except for about 10 large mooring buoys.

Resumed patrol of Sibutu.

0711 Sighted float plane (Dev) (Aircraft contact #20)

During day observed much smoke on Sibutu Island.

1351 Surfaced and sent DD despatch reporting no ships Tawi Tawi. Belconnen recaptured.

1200 Let. 04-41-00 N Long. 119-47-00 E

15 June 1944

Southern entrance Sibutu.

0148 Not having heard DD three rebroadcast on the Fox schedule, sent it again. Finally had to use plain (and harsh) language to get an authentic telegram from Coonawarra. Immediately got our message back on Perth Fox, making it look as tho our second transmission may have been unnecessary.

0500 Submerged

1849 Surf. cod

2018 Received OFF 71 seri. 1' assigning us Loro Gulf again in addition to South Sibutu.

Immediately started back to Briclan's since the Sibutu area is so empty it's not even patrolled.

1200 Let. 04-42-00 N Long. 119-42-00 E

16 June 1944

Conducted part submerged and part surface patrol off channels to eastward of Jolo. Continued on to Basilan at dark.

1200 Let. 05-51-00 N Long. 121-37-00 E

17 June 1944

Conducting submerged patrol off Basilan Strait. Plan to stay here until we sink something with a torpedo. Our electric fish cell tops are melting, so we've got to get rid of them somehow.

— page 110 —
1200
U.S.S. EADDO, R port of wcr Patrol Hebrr Sir.

---

**18 June 1944**

Conducting submerged patrol off Caslins Strait.

---

**1547**
Sighted smoke to southeast (Ship contact 79)

---

**1158**
Photographed some hospital ship's contact 76.

---

**1449**
Sighted masts and stack of small coastal steamer to northward. (Shi) contact 10) He was coming out north side of Caslins as had the other two we gunned. Started after him.

---

**1547**
Target out of sight. Jurfaced 12 miles east of Sibago Island and immediately scv tarfot - still an easterly course. Started end around.

---

**1009**
Target reversed course and headed back into Caslins. Dove.

---

**1820**
Surfaced, target in sight, headed east again, and too close for this much light. Dived for 15 minutes and then spent remainder of night searching to northeast. Ended up at dawn off east side of gulf.

---

**1200**
Lt. 06-40-30 F
Long. 122-36-00 E.

---

**19 June 1944**

Northcast side of Loro Gulf. Planned to spend the day on the surface making a circuit of the gulf, returning to Caslins from southeast and off gulf on returning to Caslins.

---

**0728**
Sighted unidentified plane boring 170 relative (350 T) (aircraft contact 21)

---

**Divod. Commanding Officer was not on bridge at time; and was told by lookout that plane was going way over, crossing our'stern on a westerly course. Came up to periscope depth, and while half heartedly searching for plane with periscope, wandering if we had been sighted, at

---

**0735**
got one bomb pretty close. Very surprised.

---

**1830**
Liner damage: Closed coast and remained submerged remainder of day.

---

**1200**
Surfaced and headed back to Caslins.

---

**1200**
Lt. 06-52-00 F
Long. 123-51-00 E.

— page 111 —
20 June 1944

Petrolling submerged off Basilan.

0540 Sighted smoke and hoard pinning to south of the east coast of Basilan Island. At this time we were patrolling due east of pass between L'nhil and L'lanipas. Island hooked for Jibago Island but convoy (at least 3 ships) rounded L'lanipas. (on Basilan Island) close aboard and turned west at that our over seagoing noro then smoke. (Ship contact #11)

0838 Sighted plane (Jufo) making the morning patrol rounds. (Aircraft contact #22)

1200 Let. '05-55-00 K Long. 122-37-00 E

21 June 1944

Petrolling submerged off Basilan.

0642 Sighted plane (Davo) on morning patrol (aircraft contact #23)

2024 Received OFF serial 1: ordering us to take over another area covering southwest approaches Davco. Since we cannot reach Davco Gulf by dawn will spend tomorrow in traffic into southeast corner Loro Gulf.

1200 Let. 06-27-00 N Long. 122-24-00 E

22 June 1944

Enroute Basilan to Davco.

0232 Radar contact (3000 yards), saw and heard small patrol on starboard bow. Avoided.

0447 Submerged.

0920 Sighted plane (Pl.no contact #24)

1015 Sighted plane (Pl.no contact #25)

1123 Sighted plane (Pl.no contact #26)

1144 Sighted plane (Pl.no contact #27)

1832 Surfaced and continued towards Davco Gulf.

1200 Let. '05-50-00 K Long. 124-19-00 E

— page 112 —
23 June 1944

Southwest Devco Gulf,
Hoard pinging towards coast. Closed, and at
Lido radar contact at 8000 yards on a petrol vessel
going up the coast. Nothing also around. Avoided.
Submerged 5 miles off coast.
Sighted trawler type vessel going down coast. Could
be petrol.
Sighted smoke to southward coming up coast. Went
to bettle stations and closed coast but at
Target identified as catcher type trawler.
Sighted Zoke type plane flying down coast. (Plane
contact 28)
Sighted m.sts of ship (DD or TR) to southeast,
headed towards Devco. He never came closer than 15,000
yards. (Ship contact 12)
Sighted two small trawlers going up the coast.

I am convinced that this small stuff is hauling
cargo and not petrol, particularly as it is always
accompanied by aircraft.

Sighted two Zoke type planes, distance 3 to 4 miles,
(Aircraft contacts 29 and 30)

I watched them for about 15 seconds before one
pooled off and headed down. It was. Did not rise scope
for 3/4 of or hour and when I did the plane was still
searching around astern.

Sighted plane (Rufe) (Aircraft contact 31)
Sighted plane (D.vo) (Aircraft contact 32)
Sighted plane (Rufe) (Aircraft contact 33)
Sighted plane (Rufe) (Aircraft contact 34)

The surface has been absolutely glassy all day.
With so many aircraft the periscope obscures. No
necessarily short and hence inefficient.

Surfaced.

- 18 - ENGLISH (L)

— page 113 —
1200 L.t. '05-40-30
Long. 125-35-00

24 June 1944

Southwest Devoe Gulf.

0522 Submerged off coast.

0741 Sighted plane (Rufo) (Aircraft contact #35)

1051 Sighted smoke to south coning up coast. Went to
batt stations, but at
1337 from range of 4000 yards saw a convoy consisting of
the drogs of the Phillippines:

1. Catcher type trawler
2. Small coastal steamer towing
3. Hull (no masts or superstructures)
4. Launch
5. Mystery boat, going along at 5 knot convoy speed
   with sail up in a flat c.lm.

Nothing big enough to torpedo and unidentified
plane circling around to be sure nobody shot a gun at
them. (Plane contact #36)

1505 Sighted plane (Rufo) (Plane contact #37)

1344 Surfaced and went up west coast of Devoe Gulf close
to coast looking for this morning's "convoy" with an
eye to gunning. Couldn't find them. Believe they
anchored somewhere.

2226 SJ interference from US Sub over towards cape San
Augustin.

1200 L.t. '06-00-45
Long. 125-47-45

25 June 1944

Southwest Devoe Gulf.

0430 Submerged in Sargento Strait ylannin to run up
coast during the day.

0801 Sighted plane (Zoko) (Plane contact #30)

1012 Sighted small patrol coning down coast. Avoided.

1117 Sighted plane (Sally) (Plane contact #39)

1515 Sighted bomber (Sally) (Plane contact #40)

- 19 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 114 —
1838 Surfacod. Had 3T interferoance from PADDLE during ...night.

1200 L.t. '05-46-00 N
Long. 125-38-00 E

26 June 1944

Southwest Devco Gulf.

0127 Received CTF serial # ordering us to Ceram Joc, leaving horc tomorrow night.

0439 Submerged to patrol 3 miles of Point Calian.

0827 Sighted plane (Rufo) (Plane contact #41)

0905 Sighted plane (Zock) to southward. (Plane contact #42)

0912 Hocrd pinging bearing 170°T. Charged course to East, although nothing was in sight.

0920 Sighted plane (Rufo) bearing 160°T. (Plane contact #43)

0952 Sighted large tanker escorted by 1 DD and 1 TB borer 145°T r-nge 16,000, angle on bow 50° port. (Ship contact #12)

This angle on bow never decreased although r-nge closed to 10,000 yards. Target passed through this center of the entrance to the gulf and then, instead of turning north towards Devco, turned away and disappeared towards Cepo Jen Augustin.

Everybody here fools low and ineffective.

1617 Anchor pl-ns (Rufo) Plane contact #45)

1843 Surfacod.

1200 L.t. '06-03-30 N
Long. 125-46-30 E

27 June 1944

Southwest Devco Gulf.

Spot day patrolling 12 miles off point Calian. Usual quota of pl-ns including two J-kcs and a Lilly. (Plane contacts #46 to 50 inclusive)

- 20 -

ENCLOSURE (1)

— page 115 —
U.S.S. MIDO, Report of War Patrol Number Six.

We have had good looks at all aircraft and conclude the following:

1. Virtually all types are based at Davo.
2. Davo Gulf is patrolled by at least two float planes during the day. The planes do not appear until 0730, and provide air screens for any traffic.
3. The west coast of the gulf is the usual route for planes going north or south.

During our stay here there was a plane in sight on at least one fourth of the periscope exposures, although it was not called a new contact if it appeared to be seen recently.

Also to be noted is the fact that we had no ship contacts at night. I do not believe the J.P.s now traffic through the entrance to the gulf without plenty of air cover if they can help it. Considering the normal glassy calm, it is a sound plan.

1826 Surfaced and headed south for Cermeno Sea.

1200 Lt. '06-03-15 N
Long. 125-54-15 E

28 June 1944

Cruising on the surface through Eastern Celebes and Molucca passage around the north of the island.

Dived for plane radar contacts at 1147 and 1432.
(Plane contacts #51 and 52)

I plan to patrol at the extreme eastern end of our new area where there is a traffic focal point off the southern tip of Halmahara.

1200 Lt. 02-21-00 N
Long. 126-37-00 E

29 June 1944

In Patiente Strait enroute Obi Strait.

0522 Passed between Pokal and Kocsoo Island. The morning was very misty so continued on surface although surrounding land made SD radar useless.

0533 While admiring the scenery was rudely awakened by float plane (Plane contact #53) which forced us to dive and dropped two bombs somewhere eastern. This could be

— page 116 —
30 June 1944

U.S.S. LUDO, Report of War Patrol Number 3x.

a tough place to get caught so ran submerged at 120 turns between looks until.

1100 Than we ontorod Obi Streit.

1102 Sightod plane patrolling Obi Streit. (Plano contact #54)

1416 Sightod Pl-na (Pl-no contact #55)

1200 Let.'00-52-00 3.
Long. 128-02-00 3.

30 June 1944

Northcoast corner Corrn 3ce.

045 Submerged

0957 Since thorc arc sc mcrv passcs through which shipping may come, dooidd submcrgpd patrol offrcd too limited chances of contact. Surfcoed.

1055 Sightcd unidentitfiod pl-no hcadoo towrds us. Divod. (Plano contact #56)

We are really plaguod with pl-nos.

1820 Surfcoed.

1200 Let.'01-28-00 3
Long. 128-43-00 3

1 July 1944

Northcoast corner Corrn 3ce.

0438 Sent third cnd sixth cffficors scherc on Tepporshcscjje Island as oocst watchers. With thair hioight of cyo ashorc they should be able to cover frr more thn we could cn the surfco.

0454 Submcrgod, rormining within visucl signallings distance of Topporshcodjo.

0630 Received signal fron coost watchers tht tht they could only got about 3/4 of thc wcry up thc islt and informing us of thoir blind scctor. Shiftod our position accordingly to qovor blind scctor.

1318 Surfcoed to mako a surfcoe swcpc to northwast (Dlind sector from islond)

- 22 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 117 —
1348 Plane radar contact 5 miles. Divod. (Plane contact #57)
: 1541 Surfacod.
: 1823 Picked up beach watchers.
: 2204 Sent HADDO requesting extension.
: 1200 Lct. 01-29-30 S.
: Long. 128-40-45 E.

2 July 1944
: Northeast Corem Sea.
: 0608 Plane radar contact 11 miles, closing. Divod.
: (Plane contact #58)
: Lockout cleats to have seen plane.
: 1624 Surfacod.
: 2036 Received CTF 71 serial 0 directing us to leave area on 6th.
: 1200 Lct. 01-33-00 S.
: Long. 128-36-00 E.

3 July 1944
: Northeast Corem Sea.
: 0602 Sighted plane headed towards us. Divod. (Plane contact #59)
: This area is such that some surface cruising by day is virtually mandatory to cover possible routes and convoys if we get sighted we are probably wasting our time. Decided to surface every 2 hours during day for good look.
: 1200 Lct. 01-18-00 S.
: Long. 123-51-00 E.

4 July 1944
: Northeast Corem Sea. Patrolling submerged as before.
: Surfacing every 2 hours.
: 1723 Surfacod and hooked through Ob1 3tr.it.
: 1200 Lct. 01-15-00 S.
: Long. 123-50-00 E.

- 23 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 118 —
5 and 6 July 1944
Molukke Sea.
Spont 5th off Eastern entrance Obi Jtrait and 6th off southern tip Panama Island.
Recoived CTF 71 Series two despatch keeping us west of 126° E.
1200 Lat. 01-51-00 S
Long. 126-57-00 E
1805 6 July
Enroute Darwin.
patch
190° Sent HADDO duty giving ETA darwin.
1200 Lat. 02-32-00 3
Long. 126-00-00 E
7 July 1944
Enroute Darwin. Spont dry submerged in Banda Sea on Socrabyac-Ambon route.
1550 Sighted plane. (Plane contact #60)
1200 Lat. 06-12-00 3
Long. 125-53-00 E
8 July 1944
Timor Sea enroute Darwin.
Three plane contacts; two of which forced us to dive. (Plane contacts 61, 62, 63)
1200 Lat. 09-34-00 3
Long. 128-05-00 E
9 July 1944
0830 Arrived Darwin. Unloaded all steam torpedoes, fueled, and at
1800 departed for Exmouth.
1200 Lat. 12-26-00 3
Long. 130-58-00 E

- 24 - ENGLISH (..)

— page 119 —
10 - 12 July inclusive

Enroute Exmouth
Passed three U.S. subs northbound and dove for once
probably friendly plane contact. Sent HADDO message
giving ETA Exmouth.

1200
Lt. '12-47-45 S
Long. 127-01-00 E

1200
Lt. '15-00-00 S
Long. 121-25-00 E

1200
Lt. '18-04-00 S
Long. 116-10-00 E

13 July 1944
0800
Arrived Exmouth, defueled to coil barge, filling it,
and act
1714 deported for Fremantle.

14 - 15 July 1944
Enroute Fremantle.

16 July 1944
0800
Arrived Fremantle.

— page 120 —
U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Number six.

C. WEATHER

Weather conformed to published meteorological information.

D. TIDAL INFORMATION

No unusual tidal conditions were observed.

E. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

Navigational aids conformed to existing navigational publications.

- 26 - ENGLISH (A)

— page 128 —
6-3 62 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

- 34 -

INCLUSURE (A)

— page 129 —
2100(H) DATE: June 11, 1944
TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLUENCED

SUNK: One 250 ton trawler type cargo vessel (EU).

PROBABLY SUNK: One 250 ton trawler type cargo vessel (EU).

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: Vessel sunk observed to burn brightly on first 4" gun hit subsequently followed by six large explosions - flames visible 30 miles; vessel damaged hit by at least ten 4" gun salvos and numerous 20 mm and 30 cal rounds - smoking badly and settling down by storm when last observed.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Ships first sighted at 1130 proceeding northeast from Basilan Strait, one smoking steadily and one using cuadrangular sail. Trailed submerged throughout afternoon; surfaced at dusk. Second ship dropped sail at sunset, but her speed apparently did not diminish. Picked up with radar at 6500 yards, and, after tracking target for short time; made approach from eastern. With target broad on starboard beam, distance 400 yards, opened fire with 4" gun. At end of five rounds target observed to be sniking heavily. Shifted to second target, and on first round of 4", vessel burst into flame. Shifted back to first target and poured at least eight more rounds of 4" and 120 of 20 mm plus 300 rounds of 30 cal. into hull. Holes in hull and more black smoke observed, but target did not sink. Left after with one target burning brightly and other smoking heavily. Six large explosions with attendant great clouds of smoke were observed at intervals from the bridge during the withdrawal.

- 35 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 130 —
1. LINES
No ninofields' wore encountered, nor were any mining operaticns observcd.

J. A/S LEASURES IN VASTIC TACTICS
The escorts of the convoy encountered on the night of June 9th wore stationed unusually far out, at 1.1st 3000 yards, making radar tracking of the main body virtually impossible without being sighted.

K. MAJOR DEFECTS IN DILIGENCE
(a) Oil seal rings.
The new oil seal rings and expanders for our G.I. engines definitely solved the problem heretofore experienced of lube oil consumption.

(b) Mk 39 gunsights.
This is the third submarine the Commanding Officer has served in since this year began, and on all three the Mk 39 gunsight periodically flooded. On this patrol our trainer's sight was completely flooded four days after leaving port. Ship's force broke it down, dried it out and reassembled it using "COPLATITE" as the scaling agent. Sight remained dry thenceforth.

The Commanding Officer considers that the Mk 39 sight is not sufficiently reliable, and recommends that it be really "rot type" sight be designed. With reliable gun sights plus the tremendous advantages that our 3D radar gives us, both in spotting and ranging, the deck gun is an effective weapon. Open sights are virtually useless, and binocular sights good only at night where target can be closed to point blank range. This Commanding Officer does not consider the deck gun a last ditch weapon to be used only if unable to dive, and believes that if our subs are going to carry a gun around, there should be some reliable means of aiming it.

Perhaps something might be learned from British or German design.

This subject becomes increasingly important as small boat traffic increases.

(c) Flexible hose connection - L.O. system.
During the exercise period of this vessel on 14 May 1944, the flexible hose connection on #2 main engine carried away. This connection was placed on all four main engines during the last navy yard overhaul at Kure Island Navy Yard. (Bureau of Ships Plan Number 55-34501 - 136856 Alt.) "2 3/4" I.D. Flexible Hose Connection Sound Isolation - L.O. System.) A spare or replacement material

— page 131 —
1944, the ship divided for a plane radar contact at which time #3 main engine was on charge. The control lever of generator #3 was in the battery bus position and the reverse current relay failed to trip out the generator. No. 3 main generator, being driven by the battery as a motor, continued to turn over #3 main engine until the controlroom placed the control levers of #3 generator in the off position. Examine figs 8 and 9 of #3 main engine revealed in both cases; broken piston, broken liner and twisted connecting rod. It is also suspected that the crank shaft has been misaligned and a complete examination of the engine with the necessary gauges will be required to determine the full extent of the damage.

(e) Pit Log.

The pit log on this patrol as well as the last patrol was a constant source of annoyance. It was useless in tracking enemy vessels and could not be depended upon for navigational uses. It has been necessary for this vessel to use hand changes in speed on the TDC in all tracking problems.

L. RADIO

No major defect or damage was experienced.

M. RADAR

On 30 May 1944 the SJ-4 radar failed completely due to a leaky nodulator network. The network was replaced from ship's spares, but the set gave extremely poor performance for the next 24 hours. After repeated tuning satisfactory results were obtained, but upon inspection during the trip from the area to Fremantle the spare network was found to be leaking badly. It is believed that these leaks developed around the filling hole plugs in the

— page 133 —
24
Torpedoes
Fuel
Provisions
Personnel Factor
24
21 days
21 days
21 days

Limiting factor this patrol: Orders terminating patrol.

U. RENROKS
(a) Instead of returning track charts to the submarine commander, it is recommended that they be kept on file by crews at the operations office. Prior to going on patrol it would be of considerable interest to the Commander Officer to see where other recent patrols had been within the area and where they sank ships.

(b) Joe narrative of June 1, 1944 regarding JD rad.rd.rotation by JY aircraft under condition of zero visibility.

(c) The following changes in dock gun carriage are considered highly desirable to reduce the risk of fire in the ship's turret: 1. The gun carriage should be made of a material that is not combustible, such as steel or aluminum. 2. The gun carriage should be designed to withstand the heat and pressure of the fire. 3. The gun carriage should be designed to be easily accessible in an emergency. 4. The gun carriage should be designed to be easily removed in an emergency.

(1) Rollout of 4" gun PT. This would permit the submarine to choose the range when firing at an armored ship. This gun can fire at a rate of 3 or 4 rounds per minute. This gun can fire at a rate of

— page 134 —
1. The Sixth War Patrol.
To: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

1. The sixth war patrol of the U.S.S. HADDO, conducted in the Celebes Sea, Helimhera and Davo areas was of 60 days duration. While the patrol was aggressive and active, it was interrupted by a torpedo attack which forced the submarine to surface. The submarine was then torpedoed by a Japanese submarine, but the attack was repulsed. The submarine was then torpedoed by a

— page 135 —
FE24-71/A16-3
Serial: 0790
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HADDO CONF. Ltr.
A16-5 Serial 010 dated 16
July, 1944. Report of
Sixth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTE FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Sixth War Patrol - Comment on.

1. HADDO's Sixth War Patrol was conducted in the
   CELERIES SEA, MORO GULF, HALMAHERA and DAVAO areas.

2. The Force Commander considers that the risks
   involved in the landing and return of the two officer coast
   watchers out-weighed any probable advantages.

3. This patrol is designated "not successful" for
   the purposes of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

4. The HADDO is credited with inflicting the
   following damage on the enemy by gunfire:

   | Damage | Type | A-K | TOTALS |
   ||------|-----||
   | 1       | (MIS) | TRAWLER | 250 TONS |
   | 1       | (MIS) | TRAWLER | 250 TONS |
   |         | TOTAL | 500 TONS |

P. F. STRAUB, Jnr.
Flag Secretary.

R. W. CHRISTIE.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominchi (3) Direct CTF-72 (4)
Vice Opnav (2) Direct CTF-72 (2)
Vice Opnav Op-23c (1) CSS-12 (1)
ComlstFlt (1) CSS-16 (1)
Com2ndFlt (1) DivComRons-12 (1)
Com3rdFlt (1) DivComRons-16 (1)
Com7thFlt (2) S/M School N.L. Conn. (2)
ComSubs1stFlt (4) *Each S/M W.A. (1)
ComSubs2ndFlt (4) *NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN.

— page 136 —
1130
Reg. No. 8 055
R.S. No. 6

Al6-3(F-3/roj)
Serial: 6-3

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS HADDO Conf. 1tr.
Al6-3 Serial 010 of
16 July 1944. Report
of Sixth War Patrol.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

R. H. COOK
By inspection.

— page 139 —
1. USS. ZADD, Report of Mr. Petrol. Lumber Seven.
Subject: U.S.S. ZADD, Report of Mr. Petrol. Lumber Seven.

A. PROLOGUE
Arrived FRENCH, 7 a.m. 1st. 1944 from sixth war patrol. Spent period July 16, 1944 to July 30, 1944 undergoing refit by Submarine Repair Unit (U.S. Navy 137). Period July 30 to August 8, 1944 spent in training and loading.

B. TRAVELS
All times 10.

3. August 1944
Undestroy FRENCH on Seventh. Mr. Petrol, enroute exercise area.

2300 Completed exercises with U.S.S. ISSELL and CODRUS CHRISTMAS. Deported for LOUIS GULF.

9 and 10 August 1944
Enroute LOUIS. Passed three friendly submarine subs.

11 August 1944
Fueled and held gun practice in LOUIS GULF.

1500 Left LOUIS enroute LOUIS. Our ultimate destination is the west coast of LOUIS. There we will rendezvous and form coordinated attack group with HARDEN and HARD. C.O. HARDEN is Group Commander.

1300 The pipe between 10 a.m. 1st. 1944, exhaust valve cut the muffler developed a large hole, causing us to sound like an approaching thunder storm. Had it by wrapping a five gallon can around the pipe.

Noon post. 22-00-00 S Long. 114-13-00 E

12 and 13 August 1944
TIDIAN OCEAN. Enroute LOUIS STRAIT.

— page 140 —
U.S.S. HADJ, Report of Far Patrol Number Seven.

Passed one southbound friendly sub and HARDER, northbound, on the 12th. HARDER was going to be delayed 12 hours or would be pro-posed to be delayed 12 hours or would be pro-posed to arrive at another entrance to LONDON at day break 14th. Passed southbound friendly sub on 12th.

14. August 1944

0545
1859
15 August 1944
0014
0545-0610
0624
0738
0748
0917
0923
1215

At completed transit LONDON, having bucked 6 - 7 knot current for over 20 hours. Encountered one unidentified small patrol or sail boat in middle of northern entrance. Avoided. Use concealment something with our pit log sword arm, bending or breaking it.

Set course for south western entrance to MACASSAR STRAIT. Installed our spare pit log sword arm.

0545-0610
Sighted plane. Divcd. (Plane contact No. 1)

0624
Sighted plane. Divcd. (Plane contact No. 1)

0738
Sighted two planes, one on each end, loaded towards. Divcd. (Plane contact No. 2 & 3.)

0917
Suffaced.

0923
Sighted plane. Divcd. (Plane contact No. 4)

1215
Suffaced. Plane in sight. Divcd. (Plane contact No. 5)

— page 141 —
16 August 1944

Southam I.K.433 Northbound.

With CAPT HUDD and three sailors in sight submerged for reconnoiter of day.

Just before surfacing our jet loo sword arm apparently struck something and the jet loo started acting erratically. After surfacing it was found that sword arm could not be housed - even with a chain full so at

sent HUDD (desperate) asking HUDD (from to have passed us) to designate a rendezvous for transfer of spare sword arm.

Received message by voice from HUDD (suggesting a rendezvous for 1900 tomorrow night - 292 miles away. By

we had managed to get a fairly consistent reading out of the pit log by blowing down, and, considering it virtually impossible to average 15 knots without using excessive amount of fuel, at

sent HUDD a message on voice cancelling rendezvous. Slate: carr is as the sword arm we claimed it down to keep it from being pushed in at day depths.

Rec'd to 8000 yard radar contacts off C.F. MILLI during all the communicating.

Room posit. Lt. 03-22-00 3 Long, 113-17-00 3

17 August 1944

Northern I.K.433 Northbound.

Plane radar contact, 10 miles. Div'd. (Plane contact no. 6)

0704. Surfaced.

Investigated a large sechoor which was sailing between I.K.433 and SOUTH I.K.433. Apparently all K.E.I. crew except the boss who could have been J.E.

— page 143 —
1910
- Sighted plane. Div. (Flaps contact i.c. 11)
- Surfaced.
- It are worried about the high hazard performance of our plane radar. Attent any radar detector on radar we will not a great disavantage on bright moonlight nights.

: 2100
- No. 4 F.H.T. per day. Converted it.

: 2345
- Entered CUT 2.3T P.25. P.25.

: 20 August 1944
- In CUT 2.3T P.25 northbound.
- Submerged.
- Surfaced.
- Entered P.O. 2.3T P.25 of 11.10.0.3M.IT.

: 2125
- Received message from HARD for coasting in "important rendezvous" 15 miles southeast of CUT 2.3T P.25. Intercepted speed to 17 knots which should get us there about 0100.

: 2330
- Simultaneous sight and radar contact on a properly lighted hospital ship standing down from the north on opposite end parallel course. Passed the 5000 yards aboard. (Ship contact no. 1)

: 2130
- Noon post. Lt. 11-36-00 F.
- Long. 121-20-00 E.

: 21 August 1944
- In HARD for rendezvous. Radar contact on 2.3T.
- HARD came alongside and told us that there were at least 16 enemy ships held up in 2.3T. (southern side of CUT 2.3T) and that the entrance to the was patrolled by the active SS vessels the had contacted.

- 5 -

— page 144 —
0.3.3. 0.00, Report of War Patrol Number seven.

---

**Subject:**
- U.S.S. DD0, Report of War Patrol Number seven.

---

**Subj:**
- 0235
- 0230
- 0419
- 0515

---

**HARDER moved away to northeastward. He lay to.**

---

**Dived with DD 6,000 yards on starboard bow, HARDER 4,300 yards on port bow, south coast of CAPTAIN about 3,500 yards due north. Headed for coast. Jent deep for BR card then came back up to radar depth. The DD was 4,500 yards away on a parallel course escorting us northward.**

---

**Sav convoy start to sortie - ore long column. (Ship contact no. 3) Includes vehicle outfit.**

---

**ARTICLES:**
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1

---

**The sea was calm with small swells, so, in view of expected air cover, used little scope and very quick looks. Our plan was simple - run north closing the coast until something crossed ahead that was near enough to shoot at. Ran at 50' at 4.5 knots between looks.**

---

**Leading ship of column crossed ahead at range of 6,000 yards. This meant we were bound to get a shot if not detected, since the column extended all the way back into the bay.**

---

**Depth charging started on all sides and kept up, almost uninterrupted, until 0616. I have never heard such a din, nor would I have believed it possible for the whole day fleet to unload so many carriers so readily. Could see two escorts on port beam and three on starboard side - all about 3,000 yards away and all**

— page 146 —
0619
Save an AP or AK dead ahead appearing to hit by one torpedo and iships. This produced another barrage of charges which lasted until 0625.

0625
Saw three ships in column astern of the hit ship she. out to their left - torcrs us! angle on the bow 30 degrees port, with a continuous 3 ship target developing. Attributed range 2,900 yards.

0627
Commenced firing bow tubes with a 30 degree right gyro angle, track about 50 port, continuous 3 ship target, applying spread by periscope. (See sketch of firing set-up)

0630
Immediately started deep expecting aircraft bombs. Heard five torpedoes hit with times of run varying between 14.0s and 2n 02s. Heard the 6th torpedo explode at the end of 3n 34s run. The first five fish must have hit in the targets, but the 6th night heve exploded on the beach which was about 2n miles away. I saw three of our torpedoes running while firing - all leaving light smoke but headed correctly.

Depth charging, which lasted almost continuously until 0730. Counted over 100. None were close at all, but majority seemed to be where we have been. Used Selby's sine wave to evcde the yincers, all the torpedoes were set at 4' depth in hopes of catching any intervening escorts. This ship was all hit, loaded, and looked new. Heard definite breaking up noises until 0653.

0720
At' periscope depth 6,000 yards from coast of attack. Saw one ship apparently burning and to her right a tremendous cloud of dense black smoke which rose very high and was gradually forming a great dark pall over the area. I-o escorts joining around in same vicinity, occasionally dropping depth charges. The times of, torpedo runs were:

#1 1m 55s
#2 1m 53s

These two probably hit middle ship.

#3 1m 45s
#4 1m 40s

— page 147 —
22 August 1944

: 0130

: 0730

: 0834

: 0957

: 1003

: 1009

: 22 August 1944

: 0130

: 0730

: 0834

: 0957

: 1003

— page 149 —
3.3. HUDD, Report of "dr Patrol Interpreter."

Subject: 0540
Reload forward completed.

0542
Heard and observed the unidentified ship to be hit and sunk by the HURDR. Took picture.

ARTICLES: 4
2 DRAFT DESIGNS (JU)
3 TORPEDOES
1 SHIP

Similarly cruised on a torques to re-arrange to de-creased DDs until at 0620 with range to nearest 2,400, fired 3 torpedoes, two at nearest, which had 20 degree angle on the 0, and 1 at the other which had a 20 degree angle on her and was about 3,000 yards away. -It is said near DD but missed far one. I realize no. that I should have waited for better set up on DD 2. ... missed torpedoes.

0636
Mile 6 torpedoing around at periscope depth for set up on the remaining destroyer's sonar system. Also aboard - could be heard through the hull, and simultaneously heard HURDR's call on the sonar gear. She was between us and the target. Interpreter her signal to them "Gangway" so went to 150 feet and cleared out. At 0655 heard HURDR sink the third and last ship. ...tched it go down with its stern sticking out. Ruled off to westward submerged.

06312
Sighted HURDR on surface as surfaced ourselves about 600 yards from her.

0325
Hile I was standing back on the oil crate deck trying to operate the valido-tellico, seabody said, "More's the HURDR!" Looked around and saw two gone. Since our plane radar was out of commission figured she had a plane contact. Dived with that "heads up" feeling. Our last orders had been to rendezvous tonight about 60 miles due west of CAP BALTAR so headed up to northwest.

1301
Sighted plane. (Plane contact no. 12)

1323
Surfaced and continued northwest towards rendezvous.

1354
Received orders from HURDR to rendezvous off coast north of SUDO DAR.

— page 150 —
2133
At the rendezvous, made contact on HUD - this third number of the group - who had just arrived from DAR.HI.

: 2214
While steaming slowly north, waiting for HUD, made radar contact on a destroyer headed south. Told HUD I would attack. (Ship contact 0.5)

: 2214
(but lots of exclamation points)

Commenced tracking the target while riding position up ahead for a stern shot, there being only one torpedo left forward. It was a pilot. Black night with cloudy horizon. Target was steering straight course 105° t, at 11 knots. Got 500 yds ahead ahead of target, slow, and concluded pulling slowly out to right for a strafing track. Sighted target when range was 4400 yards. The angle on the bow should have been about 20 starboard but was zero. At the sea line, the tactical depth charge was 2.00 tons. Same further right. Angle on the bow still zero. Right some more. Range 3300. Still headed at us. Went ahead flank speed 110% on all courses. Range steadied down at 3300 for awhile but then began to close again slowly. He had the bull by the tail. Decided to fire down his throat in hopes of at least diverting him, so at 3300, 2500 yard torpedo run, fired four torpedoes from after tubes using TEL bearing and off set spread; 1/3 degree between torpedoes. Fully expected to hit. At 3300, range still slowly started to creep down. Fired 1.00 ton. Fired

— page 151 —
23 August 1944

U.S.S. HADOC, Report of Her Patrol in the North Pacific Ocean.

First time - probably for morale effect.

Moon posit. Let. 14-25-00 T Long. 119-48-00 E

Off east coast of IWO heading north for CPB BOILING.

Immediately on surfacing from previous night had attempted to contact RADR by voice without success.

Contacted RADR and arranged for rendezvous 20 hours from now. Decided to run north at high speed so we could patrol off CPB BOILING. To return morning in view of tonight's attack right at 14-25-00. Previously designated rendezvous. I should have ordered RADR to come with me.

Sent HADOC dispatch informing CPB 71 of our torpedo situation (1 forward, 4 aft) and also clarified results of attack number one as reported by RADR.

Dived eight miles off coast just south of CPB BOILING and commenced closing coast. 14-25-00 for BT card and when, at I made the first periscope exposure, there to the northward was a big tanker coming down the coast. Range 11,000 yards, angle on the bow. 00 starboard. He was running about a mile off the beach. (5.1) contact 16. 6).

ATTACHED TO: 6
ASSAULT REPORT (HQ) (Incidental later by
Photograph to be
KAMITAKA class)

Closed beach at full speed in an effort to intercept the tanker.

Tanker changed course away, conferring to the coast. At this time sound picked up a zigzag and I made out an ASSAULT class DD trailing very back on near quarter of tanker. Shifted to DD as target. We were running silent all the time in case of an unseen escort, but at range 4000 yards the destroyer became aware of our presence and backed towards us, alternately presenting a small starboard turn port angle on the bow. I believe the DD sent the sun.

— page 152 —
0653-28
Four reyid explosions. He had fired the four torpedoes almost simultaneously because the situation was precarious. He had to fire enough to insure hitting, and it had to be done quickly. One hit and the rest were countermined. Stayed close, just to be sure, until when I observed the destroyer to be lying to with his bow blown off and slightly down by the head. Photographed. Transcribed around for the kill with our last torpedo, and after carefully ascertaining that target was in fact stopped, at 600 yards, 90° track, zero gyro angle, fired our last torpedo to hit anti-ships. The torpedo took a slight left angle and just missed. Catastrophic! Layby we should have waited longer before firing, but at the time the boat got second to grab the opportunity while it lasted.

0827
Using SD mast sent an urgent plain language message to any U.S. sub on 2350 telling of the situation. Hung around all day and watched with sinking heart while two trawlers and a destroyer came out at and commenced getting the target in tow. Three planes appeared and circled the group all day. (Ship contact No. 7) (Plane contact 10.13)

1200
The target moving south with one tracer towing the other tracer made fast astern, to keep target from yawing, and the destroyer throttling up and down about 3000 yards outboard. Has able to keep abreast of group at 50 turns so slow was the progress.

1908
Surfaced and promptly located target by radar about 250 yards off the beach at CALIF. POINT. Sent urgent message to HAK and LADAR. Got receipt. Both coming. Target is apparently going to spend the night where he is. Sent LADAR a redcavous position about 9 miles of since one of the trawlers was getting troublesome.

2035
Received CDR 71 dispatch ordering us to proceed to the advanced base where ORIG will be. 2car JLT.

— page 153 —
2220
KARDY flying to 'alongside: Gave this all the dope, received Sam's blessing, and left his wolf pack, heading south. HAD also at rendezvous.

2240 Sent HADD despatch to CTF 71 reporting morning's attack and expenditure of torpedoes.

Noon posit. Lat. 16-03-00 N
Long. 119-39-00 E

24 August 1944

Off east coast of IWO, southbound.

0513 Submerged.

1853 Surfaced.

2000 Commenced transit of HIDDON STRAIT.

During the evening received entrance instructions for advanced base.

Noon posit. Lat. 13-42-00 N
Long. 119-45-00 E

25 August 1944

HIDDON STRAIT, APO 53 P-53, southbound.

0230 Entered CIVO 53 P-53.

0800 Entered SULU SEA.

1503 Sighted plane (transport) overhead. SD not running. Divod. (Plane contact No. 14.)

2345 Passed between DDG 63 ISLAND and FALKLAND.

Noon posit. Lat. 09-12-30 N
Long. 120-51-30 E

26 August 1944

Off PEARL BAY, southbound.

0315 Entered ISLAND PASSAGE.

0455 Entered CELIBES SEA and turned east.

— page 154 —
27, 28, and 29 August 1944

Undergo in safety lane enroute advanced base in lagoon 3,2, of DIAK. At 1045 on 27 August sent HADDO despatch giving 2,1, advanced base. One recorded plane contact (Plane contact 10, 17) on 23th. Many contacts with friendly planes.

Koon posit. 27th 28th 29th
Lat. 04-50-00 K 03-13-00 K 01-27-00 K
Long. 126-15-00 E 131-04-00 E 136 30 00 E

30 August 1944

Enroute advanced base.

0511
Loored to nest alongside ORION at advanced base.

31 Aug. and 1 Sept. 1944

Alone at ORION at advanced base. Re located food, fuel and torpedoes. Required 3 1/2 hr.

Received CDR 71. Report modification of original operation order by hand from CDR 71.5.

2 September 1944

At advanced base.

0700
Undervay for patrol ar ea to rejoin our original coordinated attack group.

Koon posit. Lat. 00-34-00 S
Long. 136-27-00 E

3,4, and 5 Sept. 1944

Undervay in safety lane from BIAK to our patrol area off HAMIL. Sighted friendly submarine on 5th.

— page 155 —
6 September 1944

U.S.S. HADDON, Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

at 0500, at which time we entered the CELEBES SEA just south of DAVAO GULF. (Plane contacts No. 19, 19, and 20)

Noon posit. 3rd 4th 5th
Lat.: 02-21-00 N 04-00-00 H 04-52-00 N
Long.: 133-55-00 E 129-00-00 E 125-00-00 E

6 September 1944

Undercarved 28 miles from southern entrance to SIDUYU.

Submerged in middle of SIDUYU PASS.

Completed transit SIDUYU.

Exchanged recognition signals and the usual amenities with BASSA which followed us through the passage. Used 3D for signalling and it worked well.

Passed between 30C CAT ISLAND and FEAST DARK.

Noon posit. Lat.: 04-00-00 E
Long.: 119-50-00 E

7 September 1944

SUJU SEA, northbound.

Boarded and examined a small sailboat. PHILIPPO'S with a cargo of copra. Burned bananas for cigarettes.

Sighted a tanker and 1 DD to westward, range 15,100 yards. Hade radar contact and commenced tracking. (Ship contact No. 3)

Then we closed to 12,000 yards on DD he turned towards us and started to smoke. (bright moonlight) Since we couldn't tell whether it was a zig or if we had been sighted, hauled off to eastward and continued tracking by bearings on DD.

Tanker cut of sight, trying to get some idea of the base course by bearings on the DD. Our best estimate at this time was 040, and since it was getting light to eastward (silhouetting us) we cut to

— page 156 —
0514
- Submerged
- Sighted smoke bearing 214°T. The sea was so unbelievably glassy that we took pictures of the non-existent horizon.

: 0543
- Determined by bearing change that the target was on an easterly course. No apparently came out of BALABAC hooked for BASHLAU.

: 0700
- Surfaced and commenced end around. The target has an 8 hour run to ZABOAHGA at his estimated 10 knot speed. It was so calm that our wake was visible for as far as could be seen through the high periscope. Target and escort in sight through periscope and occasionally from bridge.

: 0740
- Sighted small craft bearing 085°T, 20 degrees on our port bow. It did not appear to be a scuttle or a submarine. While wondering what to do our minds were made up for us at 0750 when we had a plane radar contact at 10 miles which closed to 8 miles before we dove. (Line contact No. 21)

: 0802
- One bomb right overhead. I firmly believe we could be seen at this depth so went to 200 feet. Give up the ghost on the tanker as it will probably duck into the shallow water of the SULU. RECIPELACO. Turned north.

: 1013
- Surfaced.

: 1029
- Plane radar contact 14 miles. Divcd. (Plane contact No. 22)

: 1310
- Surfaced and headed for EAST CUYO PASS.

: 1752
- Experienced three sharp tremors through the boat. Possibly distant explosions or earth quakes.

: 2043
- Dove to flush out No. 4 N.B.T.
- Noon posit. Lat. 07-23-00 N
- Long. 120-32-00 E

8 September 1944
- SULU SEA, northbound.

— page 157 —
0200
U.S.S. MIDDOK, Report of War Patrol Submarine
Entered CUYO EAS 1435. Submerged for
0722
Remainder of day.
1733
Sighted power driven fishing smgan on parallel
course about four miles to northward. Jay flag
painted on pilot house.
1837
Dusk.

APPROX. 7
FIGHTER JAPAN
4" GUN

Surfaced, closed to 75 yards and sank with 14
rounds of point detonating. Triad unsuccessfully to
find survivors in dark anorcast a mass of floating
debris.

Entered APO EAST PASS of MIDDORO STRAIT.

Noon post. 11-26-00 N
Long. 121-25-00 E.

9 September 1944

MIDDORO STRAIT, northbound.

0315
Off CALAVITE, clear of MIDDORO STRAIT. Tried
to raise RADAR on 2350, using voice and C7, but got
no answer. Figured that if MIDDORO were in the
area DOG she would have heard us, and that the
she was probably heading well out to westward in
accordance with CTF 71 aboard order. Headed west
and speeded up to get clear of coast so we can remain
on surface today. Plan to tell MIDDORO our plans
tonight via radio PARTI.

1230-1330
Tried unsuccessfully to get MIDDORO dispatch off
to PARTI on 12705 kcs. - 1 hour.

1855-1930
Spent 45 minutes getting MIDDORO dispatch off on
8470 kcs. We have spent almost 2 hours of continuous
transmitting to get off a 39 group message. This
evening we deliberately used the MIDDORO call in a
feebly attempt to kick this message into the air. We
were two different boats instead of one submarine
obviously heading towards a shipping lane. PARTI
finally told us to go ahead and eventually received

— page 158 —
10 September 1944

SOUTH CHINA SEA, heading west towards CALVIN BAY.

Submerged.

1545
Sighted mast of vessel to southward. Tracked on a northeasterly course until when target reversed course. No head norv soon more than a single mast. Suspected it was one of our attack group and surfaced. Called on voice frequency and identified ship as the HANS.

1910
Lying to alongside HANS. Transferred a couple of radar crystals to HANS and learned that HANS had been patrolling independently since the evening of 24 August - the day after we left the area enroute BIAK.

1941
Commenced coordinated search to northwest.

Koon posit. Lat. 13-56-00 i.
Long. 112-50-00 E.

11 September 1944

SOUTH CHINA SEA, scouting to northward in convoy with HANS.

0703-0730
Trim dive. Commenced patrolling back towards the south, HANS to westward.

1930
HAKE alongside for conference. Decided to lie here until 2300 and then back in column towards CALAVITE.

2300
Headd back towards CALAVITE.

Noon posit. Lat. 14-44-30 K
Long. 112-47-00 E.

— page 159 —
12 September 1944
SOUTH CHINA SEA enroute to HILL AIR in company with H.M.
1100-1130 Trim dive.
: Noon posit. Lat.: 13-53-00 N.
Long.: 115-18-00 E.

13 September 1944
SOUTH CHINA SEA enroute to HILL AIR in company with H.M.
0531 Surfered.
1836 Surfaced.
1849 Received CTF 71 days to deactivate this roll pack to cover VERO ISLAND P.S.S. and PLATFORM PASSAGE to detect any movement of Day naval units from or to HILL AIR.
2005 Iade radar contact on and exchanged messages with FLASER.
2120 In view of CTF 71's deactivation, sent H.M. a message assigning her a patrol station for tomorrow, 10 miles bearing 340° from CHINA ISLAND LIGHT.
Shortly thereafter received a message from FLASER saying he would cover the northcatastron approaches to HILL AIR.
2260 Rendezvous with H.M.
2300 Proceeding independently to tomorrow's patrol station. No will cover VERO ISLAND P.S.S.
Noon posit. Lat.: 13-31-00 E.
Long.: 119-16-00 E.

14 September 1944
Off CALVIN.
0437 Submerged and commenced transit 2.1. VERO PASS.

— page 160 —
0904
Six sea trucks passed almost overhead westward (outward) bound. 'Has terribly tempted to follow.'

1000
'Well within VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE having passed close aboard one of PUFFER'S'beached tankers. Took station in middle of passage.'

1120
Saw smoke and tops of an unidentified freighter apparently northbound of GOLO ISLAND. Range about 22,000 yards. (Ship contact No. 9)

1855
Surfaced.
Noon posit. Lat.: 13-36-00 N
Long.: 120-33-00 E.

15 September 1944
VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.

0145
Submerged.
Sighted float'plane, close aboard overhead. (Plane contact No. 23)

0638
Sighted 3 fighter planes headed south. (Plane contact No. 24)

1849
Surfaced and proceeded out of VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.

1355
Made radar contact on and avoided small craft lying to in CALVITTE PASS. Headed south to patrol tomorrow of northern tip BUSUAIGA ISLAND.

2320
Sent HADDO despatch informip. CTF 71 that we were no longer covering VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.

Noon posit. Lat.: 13-39-00 N
Long.: 120-36-00 E.

16 September 1944
Northern approaches PALAIAN PASSAGE.

0523
Submerged.

— page 161 —
1315
Sighted plane. (ZIPPY) (Plane contact No. 25)
18:28
Surfaced and spent night making a sweep to the northwest and back towards CAP CALAVITE.
Noon posit. Lat.: 12-43-00 N
Long. 119-46-00 E

17 September 1944
Off CAP CALAVITE LIGHT.
0500
Submerged.
18:33
Surfaced. Spent night making sweep to northwest and back feeling that traffic at night was very unlikely off CALAVITE.
Noon posit. Lat.: 13-29-00 N
Long. 121-14-00 E.

18 September 1944
Off CAP CALAVITE LIGHT.
0451
Submerged.
0545
Jap PG(E) passed between us and the cap southbound nearest range 10,000 yards. Wouldn't have fired at him anyhow as sea was much too rough for shallow depth settings.
1834
Surfaced. Spent night making sweep to northwest and back to new area off CARA ISLAND.
2321
Received final part of CTF serial 4 assigning us aircraft lifeguard duties for 21st and 22nd September.
Noon posit. Lat.: 13-28-00 E
Long. 120-12-00 E

19 September 1944
Off CARA ISLAND.
0449
Submerged.
0520
Sound picked up light screws to westward. In the early morning light could faintly see 2 SCs or PCs

— page 162 —
20 September 1944

Off CAPE CALVITE LIGHT.

Submerged.

Sighted plane (AUVF) close aboard apparently patrolling in a southerly direction. (Flare contact No. 26)

Sighted smoke bearing 058°T, up in CALAVITE PASSAGE. (Ship contact No. 10).

ATTACK NO. 8
KALIKAZE DESTROYER (EU)
4 TORPEDOES
1 HIT

At the time of sighting smoke we were about 6 miles off CAPE CALAVITE LIGHT. No immediately commenced closing the coast on a southeasterly course.

1115
11140
1200

Hasts of many ships in sight.

Sighted float plane (AUV) patrolling low over the convoy. (Flare contact No. 27).

By this time convoy was determined to be disposed in two long columns of at least five ships each, with 3 escorts scattered around indiscriminately. On destroyer was patrolling back and forth between the loading ships of the two columns. All ships appeared in the light condition.

Convoy, which up to this time had been on a southwesterly course, giving us a port angle on the bow, (coming through CALAVITE PASS) turned south to round the cape. This placed us dead ahead of the convoy between the two columns. Turned north and

— page 163 —
1214
U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

headed towards. Kept shifting targets from one column to the other as they made small zigs, altcrnately presenting a 10 degree angle on either bow. The DD that was between the two columns was getting close and it looked as though he would pass right over us if he didn't pick us up first with his yinging. One of the escorts further back in the convoy dropped a couple of propaganda charges.

1219
Angle'on bow on leading ship' now 10 degrees' starboard, range 3,000. Reversed course. While turning, saw that the near DD was forging ahead and cutting across the bow of leading ship in eastern column. Angle on bow 50' starboard. Got a quick set up on the DD, and, after a chock set up, at' fired the 4 stern tubes with zero gyro, 100 track, using 4 feet depth settings on 1k 18 torpedoes. Torpodo run 2,000 yards. Applied spread by periscope to insure 1 hit. The western column was too far away to shoot at with the bow tubes, so started to turn hard right to bring bow tubes to bear on leading ship of near column. Almost immediately after firing, over-enthusiastic use of the poppets in the after room caused us to lose depth control and start to sink.

1220-50
One tricondous explosion in direction of DD. Actually shook HADDO worse than any shock we've so far received. Targets pinging and screws ceased and wore 'never heard again. At this time we had a 17 degree up angle hanging at 72 feet.

1225
Efforts to regain periscope depth having proved futile, flooded negative and after more minutes anxiously hanging at 70 feet started down. Still no near escorts. Board and of run explosions of westward.

1230
Back at periscope depth. Convoy's smoke in sight to southward. Nothing in sight at seone of attack. Spont remainder of afternoon in vicinity of attack. The only question in my mind regarding the disposition of our target had been whether he had possibly managed to remain afloat. The violence of the explosion, the simultaneous abrupt end of his' screws and pinging, the absence of counter attack, and his absence from the seone 1h hours after firing all convince me that he sank immediately.

— page 164 —
0615
- Air raid warning: "U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Number Seven."
- "Had we not fired, 13 torpedoes I believe the U.S.S. HADDO would have sunk us we hung on to our position and planed our course."

0615
- "Sighted enemy submarines of smoke of a convoy standing out of SUBIC BAY heading north close to the coast. (Ship contact No. 11)"

0700
- "Sovcral ships of the convoy in sight. But our air raid was at 11.00. 0711

— page 165 —
1013
Immediately on surfacing we sighted a destroyer about 9 miles away and the smoke of another ship further in the same direction. At first we thought the DD was possibly damaged by the possibly friendly 36 planes which had apparently passed right over him. (Ship contact No. 12 and 13)

1013
However, we were disillusioned when DD was seen from the bridge to turn towards us. Figured that if this DD and the other smoking ship were unharmed, then the planes must be Jap.

1014
Divod. We never saw the DD again and subsequently learned that the planes were friendly, and that they did eventually sink the DD. Commenced approach on smoking ship which was getting nearer. Still just smoke visible.

1103
Sighted heavy smoke to the northwest. We were still within two miles of our assigned station, and both smokes seem to be converging on us. (Ship contact No. 14).

1146
Both ships plainly in sight. The ship to the northwest is the TAKSAGO M.RU (2C), a beautiful hospital ship, and the one coming out from the beach is a man-of-war (MU) tentatively identified as a mine layer by the cr-ne'aft. The hospital ship had float plane circling it, and a second float plane was over the CL. (Plane contact No. 33)

1221
Photographed the hospital ship from about 5,000 yards on her port beam. She was on a straight course for N.N.I.L., but as I took pictures she turned away and reversed course. This manoeuvre combined with the plane cover, got us excited, and we broke out all printed matter relative to the immunity of H's.

1245
CI and H were milling around together. Apparently the CI is trying to tell the H something, because he practically went alongside. Took more pictures of the two together, and kept jockeying around for a shot at the CI who was keeping pretty close to the hospital ship. Hasty research had failed to reveal a definite excuse to attack the H.

— page 167 —
2302
Hooked back at high spool for our life guard station.
Moon posit. 14-30-00 N
Long. 120-00 E

22 September 1944

Off MARINE on route SUBIC BAY for life guard duty.

0L09-0L46 Made trim dive.

0520 On station off SUBIC BAY.

0601 Heard MARINE broadcast stations announce beginning of air raid.

0605 Sighted float plane (RUFE) flying up the coast.
(Plane contact No. 34).

0609 Sighted a second plane flying up the coast.
(Plane contact No. 35).

From this time on we had almost continuous radar contact on one or more planes.

0648 Sighted formation of carrier type planes heading out to sea. Today we at least have the satisfaction of hearing our aviators talking over the radio.

0715 Sighted 2 BETTY bombers coming in at us about 50 feet off the water from seaward. Angle on bow zoro, range 4,000 yards. Divod! (Plane contact No. 36).

- According to dope subsequently received, one of those BETTYs was shot down by our planes as it approached BATTLE.

0720 Surfaced.

0750 Heard plenus say thoy thought they saw a life raft in the water. Almost simultaneously, we saw a plane zoom the water about 15 miles to the north, right off the COPONES ISLANDS.

0759 Mine fighters coming in fast right at us. Stayed up trying to identify them but they kept headed directly at us. With range 12 miles my nerve

— page 168 —
0810
0810
0854
0926
1043
1207
1420
1531

U.S.S. H.D.DO., Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

FAILED and we divod, but as we were going down we heard somebody say over the radio "Hello Sallow Face, how come you are still in the radio?" I thought it was a joke, but I was wrong. We were up, started asking the planes if they had any business for us but could not. We were told that we could not go on, so we went ahead at full power towards the C.P.M.S. ISLIMS where we could occasionally make out two planes circling. By this time there were no other planes in sight except those we had. The radio said that we were in a position to attack. We were in a position to

— page 169 —
1711
- Plane radar contact 6 miles. Dived (Plane contact No. 36).
- Surface and proceeded south to patrol north of BUSANGA ISLAND.
- Noon posit. Lat. 14-30 E Long. 120-00 E

23 September 1944
- Off BUSANGA ISLAND.
- Submerged.
- 1810
- Surface and commenced sweep to westward.
- 2052
- In view of
  (1) Improbability of shipping traffic in this area tomorrow, and
  (2) Tomorrow's air strike over central Phillipines, decided to spend tomorrow in TABLAS STRAIT. Headed down through I.I. JORO STRAIT.
- Noon posit. Lat. 12-55 E Long 120-12 E

24 September 1944
- EAST APO PASS, southbound.
- 0600
- Entered TABLAS STRAIT.
- 0655
- Submerged.
- 1803
- Surface and headed for FREANTLE.
- Noon posit. Lat. 12-09 E Long. 121-54 E

25, 26, and 27 Sep. 1944
- Southbound from area to FREANTLE.
- 0100, 26th
- Cleared SIBUTU PASS.
- 0700, 27th
- Cleared MACASSAR STRAIT.
- 1522 27th
- Plane radar contact, 7 miles. (Plane contact No. 37). Dived for 20 minutes.

— page 170 —
25th 26th 27th
Noon posit. 25th 26th 27th
Lat. 03-03 N 01-34 E 04-51 S
Long. 120-30 E 119-23 E 117-36 S

28 September 1944

TLOX-3 SSA, southbound.

Entered LODOK JRLTL.

0230-0330 Tracking and running around patrol vessel which was first contacted at 10,000 yards, apparently lying to in middle of strait. Last have heard us because he got going and eventually closed to 4,400 yards before we got clear.

04.00 Cleared LODOK.

Noon posit. Lct. 10-53 S
Long. 115-16 E.

29 September - 2 Oct. 1944 inclusive

Underway in INDIA OCEAN enroute FRETTLE.
On 29th and 30th September sent ETA and correction thereto to CTF 71.

Noon posit. 29th 30th 1st
Lat. 17-24 3 22-00 3 27-17 3
Long. 113-49 2 111-40 2 111-54 2

2nd
Lct. 30-23 3
Long. 113-53 2

3. October 1944

0800 Arrived rendezvous, FRETTLE, LA.
1030 Iored at FRETTLE, LA.

— page 174 —
1. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS
NO. 1 2 - 3 4, 5 6
DATE 8-15-44 8-15-44 8-15-44 8-15-44 8-17-44
TITLE 0614 0743 0923 1215 0610
LAT. 7-10 S 7-03 S 6-57 S 5-40 S 01-00 T
LONG. 116-25° 116-27° 116-29° 116-26° 119-20° 119-20°
SUB SPEED 14 14 14 14 14
SUB COURSE 00 023 023 023 027
TRI. Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf
LTE. SHORE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
R.D. 37.2MKT 1 2 1 1 1
NO. AIRCRAFT 1 2 1 1 1
AXIS RUM 1° 1° 1° 1° 1°
PROBABLE 45 2 2 2 2
MISSION 1 1 1 1 1
HOT CONTACTED 14,000 12,000 16,000 20,000 20,000
LENGTH 5° 1° 3° 2° --
DISTANCE 1 1 1 1 0
RANGE & REL. UNK UNK UNK 320 --
BEARING OF PLATE 50 50 50 50 50
SIGHTED
STATE OF SEA 1 1 1 1 0
(BEAUFORT)
SEA DIRECTION 090 090 090 090 0
(REL)
VISIBILITY 50 50 50 50 50
(ILLUS)

- 36 -

— page 175 —
U.S.S. HADDON, Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

| Subject | Height (ft) | Length (ft) | Width (ft) | Depth (ft) | Depth (m) | Depth (ft

— page 176 —
U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

G. AIRCRAFT STATUS

NO. 7 8 9 10
D.TE 6-17-14 6-13-14 6-13-14 6-13-14
TIE 1-01 0-600 1355 1355 0854
L.T. 01-03.5 03-00 04-28 04-28 07-43
LOG. 119-47 120-07 119-40 119-40 120-19
SUB SPEED 14 14 14 14 14
SUB COURSE 027 347 357 325 022
TRIK. Surf Surf Surf Surf Surf
HTT. SLC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
R.D. SEARCH
10. AIRCRAFT 1 1 1 1 12
TYPE Unk SALTY or RUFISHELL TEL CARRIER
"lencs
HP & KATE

PROBABLE PAT PAT AS PAT PAT TRIPS.
MISSION
HON. Reader Sight Sight Sight Sight
CONT. COTED
INITIAL 23000 20000 15000 25000 23000
RANGE
ELVATION -- 2° 4° 2° 4°
N.CLE
RANGE & REL. -- Unk 220/7.5 325/12.5 260/14
BEAR & CT
PLATE LIST
SHELTER
STATE OF SEAL 0 0 0 0 0
(SE UPORT)
SEA DIRECTION -- 090 130 130 0
(REL)
VISIBILITY 50 50 50 50 50
(ILLES)

- 33 -

— page 178 —
U.S.S. TIDD, Report of Her Patrol Number Seven.

G. AIRCRAFT
10. 11 12 13 13 14
DATE 8-19-44 8-22-44 8-23-44 8-25-44
THE 1810 1301 1000 1000 1503
LAT. 09-17.5 N 14-26 N 16-05 N 15-05 N 03-23.5 N
LOG. 120-50.5 B 119-46 B 119-43 B 119-43 B 120-38 B
SUB SPEED 14 2.4 2.4 2.4 18
SUB COURSE 023 320 110 235 135
TRAIL Surf Per Per Per Surf
11. SINCE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
R.D. SEARCH 1 1 1 2 1
TYPE D.V.F. L.V.F.S. S.S.L.Y. T.P.S.T.
PROBABLE PAT. PAT. H. R. R.T.S.
MISSING:
NO. Sight Sight Sight Sight Sight
L.T. T. 16000 10000 6000 3000 10000
SURVEYING 2° 3° 3° 3° 70°
MAGNETIC
RACE & REL. 285/8 240/5 330/3 330/3 190/2
B.E.R.I.C. OF
PLATE NEW
SIGHTED
STATE OF SEA 1 1 1 1 3
(BEAUFORT)
SEA DIRECTION 135 100 135 135 210
(REL)
VISIBILITY 20 20 10 10 10
(HILLS)

— page 180 —
15 16 17 18 19
D.TE 8-26-44 8-26-44 8-23-44 9-1-44 9-1-44
THE 0540 1453 1630 0620 0303
LAT. 04-34 N 04-17 N 03-03 N 03-11 N 03-10 N
LOG. 120-00 E 122-30 E 131-44 E 130-03 E 129-47 E
SUB SPREAD 13 13 13 17 6
SUB COURSE 100 090 050 290 290
TRAFF. SURF SURF SURF SURF SURF
L.T. SHOE 0,0 0,0 0,0 0 0
R.D. S.R.CT 1 1 1 1 -
TYP. Unk INCST 24 Unk Unk
PROB.SLE PAT. 300/4 14000 10000 22000 20000
L.Ission
NO. SIGHT SIGHT SIGHT SIGHT RADAR RADAR
RANGE & REL. 270/3 300/4 160/5 Unk Unk
BELL OF PLACE SHIFT
SIGHTED
STATE OF SEA 1 1 1 1 0
(DELIVERT)
SEA. -- -- S! 020 --
DIRECTING
VISIBILITY 5 5 5 50 45
(ILLS)

- 42 -

— page 182 —
20 21 22 23 24
NO. 9-5-44 9-7-44 9-7-44 9-15-44 9-15-44
DATE 1030 0750 1029 0638 1000
TIME 04-57 N 04-13 N 07-39 N 13-36-30N 13-39-00N
LONG. 125-11 E 120-35E 120-30 E 120-39-30E 120-36 E
SUB SPEED 17 3 15 3 3
SUB COURSE 265 090 330 296 130
TRAFF SURF SURF Per Per
M.S. SURF 0 0 0 0 0
R.D. SURF 1 1 1 1 1
NO. AIRCRAFT 1 1 1 1 1
TYPE Unk Unk Unk M.T. Fighter
COMBAT R.D.R. CD R.D.R. CD R.D.R. Pcr Per
INITIAL RANGE 20000 20000 26000 -- 5000
ELEVATION ANGLE -- -- -- 45° 3°
RANGE & REL. Unk Unk Unk 200/1 170/2½
BEARING OF PLANE HEN SIGHTED
SPLIT OF SEA (BEAUFORT) 0 0 0 0 0
SEA DIRECTION -- -- -- 2 2
VISIBILITY (MILES) 20 50 50 10 15

- 44 -

— page 184 —
25
NO. 9-16-44
DATE 1315
LAT. 12-50
LONG. 119-40
SUB SPEED 3
SUB COURSE 195
TRIK Per
MIN. SINCE 0
R.D. SEARCH
NO. 1
TAPE BERTY
RODABLE
LOSS
INITIAL RANGE
13
BLEVATION 1°
RANGE & REL. 13/350
DISTANCE OF
PLANE MADE
SIGHTED
STATE OF SEA 2
(BEUFORT)
SEA DIRECTION
VISIBILITY 15
(HELPS)

: 26
9-20-44
09-46
13-27
120-14
3
355
Per
1
RUTE
P.T
Per
1
D.V.S
Per
1
D.V.S
Per
1
Lookout
Per
1
30000/285
1

— page 185 —
U.S.S. HIDDO, Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

CLOUDS (ft) 3000 3000 4000 4000 5000
HEIGHT (ft) 100 40 50 40 40

o/o OVERCAST 100 o/o 40 o/o 40 o/o 40 o/o

LONG. BEARING
LONG. GALE
LONG.
LONG.
ILLUMINATION

— page 186 —
30 31 32 33 34
D.TE 9-21-44 9-21-44 9-21-44 9-21-44 9-22-44
TIE 0841 0852 0943 1146 0605
L.T. 14-32 14-32 14-27 14-27 14-30
LONG 119-55 119-54 119-56 119-55 119-59
SUB SPEED 3 6 6 3 8
SUB COURSE 280 280 180 270 210
TRI: Per surf Per Surf
: IN, SINCE
R.D. SE, RICH P.T P.T Unk Unk P.T
T.PE
2.0B. BLE P.T Lookout Per Per Lookout
MISSION
10/1
CO.TT.CVED
INIT.I.L 30000 20000 -- 12000 30000
R.1GE
ELEVATION 2° 4° 2° 5°
A.GLE
R.TG & REL. 30000/156 20000/100 12000/010 30000/220
BE.RIG OF
PLINE .HEAT
SIGHT.D
STATE OF SEA 1 1 1 1 1
(BEAUFORT)
SEA
DIRECTION
VISIBILITY 15 15 15 15
(ATLAS)

— page 188 —
35 36
D.TE 9-22-44 9-27-44
TIE 0609 15 14-30 05-40 S
L.T 119-59 117-07 8
SUB SZED 8 18
SUB COURSE 210 212
TRIE Surf Surf
LII. SIVCE -- 0,0
R.D. SE.RCH
NO. IRCR. FT 1 1
TYPE RUFE Unk
PROB. BLE P.T Unk
MISSION
HO. Lookout R.D.R
CONT. CTED
INITIAL 30000 14000
R.AGE 3° --
SIZE OF S.L. 3000/180 14000/-
BEARING OF
FL.NE. MEN.
SIGHTED
STATE OF S.L. 1 2
(B.E.U.FORT)
SE. DIRECTION
VISIBILITY 15 15
(H.I.E.S.)

— page 189 —
U.S.S. HUDD, Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

CLOUDS HEIGHTS (ft): 4000 12000
0/0 CWER: 80 0/0 20 0/0
.000
R.L. BEARING
.000

— page 190 —
1. U.S.S. HADDO
: 2. TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1
: 3. PATROL NO. 7
: 4. Date 21 August 1944
: 5. Lat. 13 21.8 N Long. 120 19.1 E
: 6. TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
: 7. Description: Three loaded AKs (EU).
: 8. Ships Sunk: One Large AK (EU)
: 9. One Medium AK (EU)
: 10. Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: One large AK (EU) possibly damaged.
: 11. Damage Determined by: Saw one ship burning, and saw huge smoke
: 12. Target Draft: 30' Course 255 Speed 10 Range 3030 (at firing)
: 13. OWN SHIP DATA
: 14. Speed 3 Course 359 Depth 60' Angle 0° (at firing)
: 15. FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
: 16. Type Attack: Periscope attack. Fired two torpedoes to hit each of
: 17. three over-lapping ships. Torpedo fired at foremast
: 18. and mainmast of each ship respectively.

- 52 -

— page 191 —
1 2 3 4 5 6
Truck Angle 053P 052P 050P 045P 048P 061P
Gyro Angle 023°20' 024°30' 026°20' 027°40' 013°00' 015°00'
Depth Set 4 4 4 4 4 4
Power Hit Hit Hit Hit Hit
Hit or Miss Hit Hit Hit Hit
Targets No No No No No
Tank Torpedo 23 23 23 23 23 23
Serial No. 530923 49446 49454 49682 61842 61873
Mark Xploder 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial No. 17367 17343 17387 25030 14313 25515
Actuation Set Con Con Con Con Con Con
Actuation Actual Con Con Con Con Con
Serial No. 9494 17544 16962 17209 16959 16966
Explosive TPJ TPJ TPJ TPJ TPJ TPJ
Firing Interval 8 Seconds
Type Spread Spread by periscope
Sea Conditions Glassy smooth
Overhaul activity HD Navy 137

Exploded on beach
Reason for miss - fire control error

- 53 -

— page 192 —
1944
Date: 22 August 1944
Lat. 14-15 N
Long 120-05 E
Target Data - Damage Limited

Description: Two unidentified destroyers, one unidentified small transport.

Ships Sunk: Kono

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: One destroyer damaged with one torpedo. (HU)
One small transport (HU) damaged with one torpedo.
torpedo.

Damage Determined by: Hit on destroyer observed by Commanding Officer, Communication Officer and C.O. from bridge. Also observed by USS [NAME].

Second hit observed by Commanding Officer, Communication Officer, Engineer Officer and C.O.

Target Draft 9 Course 145 Speed 11 Range 3500 (at firing)

ON SHIP D.M.

Speed 14 Course 035 Depth surface Angle -- (at firing)

TYPE ATTACK: Surface attack. One torpedo aimed at IOT, other two spread by TBT, one just astern, other just ahead of target.

- 54 -

— page 193 —
3 3 5
Tubes Fired
Track Angle 121.3 122.3 120.5
Gyro Angle 359.50 002 359
Depth Set 3 3 3
Power Hit 1 1 1
Hit or Miss Hit 1 1 1
Erratic 14-3A 23 23
Hark Torpedo 25896 43786 61830
Serial No. 6-5 6-5 6-5
Lark Exploder 25359 25569 25573
Serial No. Con Con Con
Actuation Set Con * Con
Actuation Actual 16-1 16-1 16-1
Lark Warhead 17437 9497 9504
Serial No. TNT TNT
Explosive 8 Seconds
Piring Interval TNT Spread
Type Spread
Sea Conditions
Overhaul activity
End of run explosion

- 55 -

— page 195 —
1 2 6
Tract angle 084 035 083
Cyro angle 000 001 359
Depth 6t 3 3 3
Povor Hi Hi Hi
Hit or liss liss liss
Erratic No No No
Lark Torpedo 23 23 23
Sorial No. 43042 43264 61360
Tark Explorer 6-5 6-5 6-5
Sorial No. 25314 17364 25377
Sotuation set Con Con Con
Sotuation actual * * *
Tark /arnhead 16-1 16-1 16-1
Sorial No. 17505 34236 16774
Explosive TPA TPA TPA
Piring Interval 8 Seconds
Tyro Spread Spread by TB!
Sea conditions Ruffed
Overhaul activity LTD Navy 137

* End of run explosion.

Missed as a result of fire control error. Target was evidently stopped or backing down. Forthcoming dawn produced lengthy tracking.

— page 196 —
0620
Date: 22 August 1944
Lat: 14-15 N
Long: 120-05 E
Target Data - Damage & Pilots
Description: Two damaged destroyers lying to.
Ships Sunk: One destroyer. (EW)
Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: None
Damaged Deteriorated by: Commanding Officer saw target blow up and sink bow first.
Target Draft (1) 9 (2) 9
Course 180
Speed 0
Range 2400 (at firing)
3000
ON JET DATA
Speed 3
Course 090
Depth 60
Angle 0 (at firing)
FIRE CONTROL & CRIPESC DATA
Type attack: Periscope attack. Fired two torpedoes at first DD; one at foremast, other at mainmast. Fired third torpedo at second DD 100.

— page 197 —
3 3 3
Track Angle 090 S 090 3 085 5
Gyro Angle 000° 359° 003° 10'
Depth Spot 3 3 3
Power Hi Hi Hi
Hit or Miss Hit Miss Miss
Irratic No No No
Dark Torpedo 23 23 23
Serial No. 61913 49545 49631
Dark Explorer 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial No. 25643 25541 17539
Actuation Spot Con Con Con
Actuation Actual Con * *
Dark Harpooned 16-1 15-1 16-1
Serial No. 34261 17507 13436
Explosive TNT TNT TNT
Firing Interval 8 Seconds
Type Spread Spread by periscope
Sea Conditions Ruffled
Overhaul Activity HPD Navy 137

* Hard end of run explosion.
Miss due to excessive range on and target.

- 59 -

— page 198 —
3 3 5
Track Angle 090 S 090 S 085 S
Gyro Angle 000° 359° 003° 10°
Depth 3 3 3
Rover Hit 11 11 11
Hit or Miss Hit 11 11 11
Irratio 10 10 10
Mark Torpedo 23 23 23
Serial No. 61913 49545 43531
Mark Exploder 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial No. 25643 25541 17539
Actuation 3ct Con Con Con
Actuation actual Con * *
Mark Jerrold 16-1 15-1 16-1
Serial No. 34261 17507 13436
Explosive TRX TRX TRX
Firing Interval 8 Seconds
Tyro Spread Spread by periscope
Sea Conditions Ruffled
Overhaul Activity HMD May 137

* Hard end of run explosion.
  Miss due to excessive range on 2nd target.

— page 199 —
2308
Date: 22 August 1944
Lat. 15-12-30 Long. 113-44 E
TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: One destroyer, unidentified type

Ships Sunk: None

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: None

Damage Determined by:

Target Draft 9 Course 240 Speed 20 Range 3500 (at firing)

ON SHIP DATA:

Speed 19 Course 240 Depth - Surface Angle -- (at firing)

FIRST CONTROL AND INFRONT DATA:

Type - attack: Down the throat from stern tubes, using 1/3 spread and TBT bearing.

- 60 -

— page 200 —
7 7 3 9 10
Track angle 0 0 0 0
Gyro angle 180°07' 179°53' 130°15' 179°45'
Depth set 3 3 3 3
Power
Hit or miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Hit or miss
No
No
No
No
Hit or miss

— page 201 —
3.3.1.000
Tino: 0653
Tino: 23 August 1944
Tino: 16-06.5
Tino: 119-44.5
Tino: 278 0H 206 J.

Doscription: Ono dastroyor, KAMIKAZE Class. (EC)
Ship's rank: Kone
Ship's name: Dangged or
Prob. by: Ono dastroyor, KAMIKAZE Class. (EC)
Damege: Detcrmined by: Picture and observation, Correlating
Officer and most of ship's officers and
some personnel saw dastroyor lying to
with her bow rising up to bridge and
forecast bent double.

Target: 267 - 3000 14 Range 600 (at firing)

CRITICAL DATA:
3.3.1.000 2.3 262 Depth 60 Angle 0 (at firing)

TYPE ATTACK: 2D TARGET DATA

Type attack: Down the throat from stern tubes using periscope bearings; Spread by periscope as follows;
mainmast, foremast, aft or stern, forward of bow.
Returned and fired last torpedo at range of 800
yards, 90 port track for bow tube. Use
target speed zero after three check bearings.
No reason for miss on given.

— page 202 —
7  # 7  # 9  # 10  # 2
Tubos Fired
Tracé Anglo
Cyro Antic
Depth Dot
Power
Hit. or Miss
Brartie
Lark Torpedo
Joriel No.
Lerk Exploder
Joriel No.
Actuation Det
Actuation Actual
Lerk Jerboa
Joriel No.
Explosive
Tiring Intoxal
Type Jproud
3a Conditions
Overnail Activity
# Countermined
TA with TNT cap
# Exploded end of run
+ Exploded end of

— page 203 —
1944
U.S.S. HADDO
TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. HADDO
TORPEDO ATTACK 1944
Date: 9-20-44
Lat. 13-27-30 N. Long. 120-15-00 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Ten unidentified 'AK's with one KALIKAZE class DD and 2 AM escorts. AK's formed in two columns of five each with DD per-trolling on their starboard bow and the small escorts somewhere astern dropping occasional embarrassing charges.

Ships Sunk: One KALIKAZE class DD (2U)

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: NONE

Damage Determined by: One hit with accompanying tremendous explosion at the correct time of run. Heard other 3 end of run explosions. No counter attack. Screws and pinging stopped.

Target Draft 81 Course 150 Speed 11 Range 2090 (at firing)

OMNIHIP DATA

Speed 3 Course 255 Depth - Per. Angle 1°D (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Submerged attack; periscope ranges and bearings, periscope'spread, one on meimmast, one on foramast, one ahead, one astern in order named.

— page 204 —
7 8 9 10
Track Angle 098 S 094 S 098 S 091 S
Gyro Angle 193 191 193 167
Dopthot 3 3 3 3
Power
Hit or Miss Hit Miss Miss
Erratic No No No
Mark Torpedo 13-1 18-1 18-1 13-1
Serial No. 55451 55318 54928 55270
Mark Explorer 8-5 8-5 8-5 8-5
Serial No. 9044 9339 9240 8942
Actuation Jet Con Con Con Con
Actuation Actual Con * * *
Hark Warhead 13-2 13-2 13-2 13-2
Serial No. 1592 2752 2691 2655
Explosive TPA-2 TPA-2 TPA-2 TPA-2
Firing Interval 10 Seconds
Type Spread Periscope
Sea Conditions Ruffled
Overhaul Activity U.S.S. ORION

Remarks - All torpedoes ran hot, straight and normal.

*End of run explosion

-65-

— page 206 —
1 2 3 4 5 6
Tubos Fired
Track Angle 098 S 097 S 104 S 102 S 105 S 106 S
Gyro Angle 003 001 008 006 010 011
Depth 3t 3 3 3 3 3
Power Hit Hit Miss Kiss Kiss
Hit or Miss No No No No No
Erratic 23 23 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Mark Torpedo 49499 49555 24394 24699 25479 40308
Serial No. 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Merk Exploder 25764 25681 25782 25710 25755 25674
Serial No. Con Con Con Con Con Con
Actuation Actual 16-1 16-0 16-0 16-1 16-1 16-0
Serial No. 13663 3001 5637 12000 12841 3036
Mark Verhoad 16-1 16-0 16-0 16-1 16-1 16-0
Serial No. 13663 3001 5637 12000 12841 3036
Explosivo TPX-2 TPX TPX TPX TPX-2 TPX-2
Firing Interval 8 Seconds
Type Spread Offset Spread
Sea Conditions Choppy
Overhaul Activity U.3.3. ORION

Remarks - All torpedoes ran hot, straight and normal.

*End of run explosions.

- 67 -

— page 207 —
1. HADDO
U.S.S. HADDO
GUN ATTACK NO. 1
PATROL NO. 7
Time: 1847
Date: 9-8-44
Lat. 11-48 N
Long. 121-10 E
TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
Sunk: Sampan with Jap merchant flag painted on side.
Damaged or
Probably sunk:
Damage Determined by: Observation.

DETAILS OF ACTION:
Picked up sampan at dusk, closed and kept just astern of him by running at high speed as he closed to 75 yards, opened fire with forward twenty millimeter, raked deck, opened fire with 4"/50, hit on first round. Fired fourteen rounds, hit with cloven. Used 60 rounds of 20 M.L. Target caught on fire and sunk.

- 63 -

— page 208 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. LDD, Report of War Patrol Hunter Seven.

I. MISSING:
To comment.

J. ARTIC-SUBAREAE LSSURED VISION TACTICS
Operations in the exercise area off FRENCH have been greatly misleading in that Jap SS vessels dotted this ship at far greater ranges both on the surface and submerged than did any of our escort type vessels during the training period. This is particularly noted in attacks 5, 6, and 9.

K. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DISLINES.
At start of this patrol, the resistance reading on 7/4 main generator armature was averaging about 130,000 ohms. So far it has maintained this average going as low as 100,000 ohms at times. The auxiliary engine was out of commission the entire patrol making it impracticable while enroute to carry a zero float, thus necessitating frequent battery charging with consequent continuous high battery temperature.

L. RADIO
1. H.D.DO acted as port of a coordinated attack group. Voice communication on 2830 kilocycles was good; however, it is recommended that in the future, submarines communicating by voice in the patrol area use a different call each day in order to avoid obvious dislosure of ineffective enemy J/S measures.

2. Before departing on patrol, coordinated attack groups should assign applicable geographical places to call the spare geographical code groups in the aircraft code.

3. The addition of VHF equipment is considered absolutely essential to properly perform this function of lifeguard duty and would also be of great value for wolf pack communications.

M. RADAR
The SJ radar performed well throughout the patrol; the SD radar was out of commission during entire first part of patrol because of broken transmission line in mast.

— page 209 —
U.S.S. H.D.D., Report of Jar Patrol Number Seven.

Subject: SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

Sound gear and sound conditions were excellent.

0. DENSITY LEVELS

On all occasions of going deep, a 3° - 4° negative gradient was found around 2001 off the east coast of U.S.C. One fantastic layer was found in the middle of the SOUTH CHINA SEA where a negative gradient of 24° was encountered between 70 and 200 feet - like trying to dive into mercury.

P. HE LITH, FOOD, AND HEAT DILTITY

Normal.

2. PERSONNEL

No comment.

R. LITLES STEEL - FUEL USED

Base to area: 2647 miles
Days in area: 7179 miles
Days enroute to base: 2882 miles

3. DURATION

Days enroute to area: 13
Days in area: 34
Days enroute to base: 9
Days submerged: 22

T. FACTORS OF DURATION RELATING TO

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor

14 20102 50 days 14 days

Limiting factor this patrol - orders terminating patrol.

U. RECHARGES

1. It was obvious from the intense depth charge attack encountered off P.U.S.D. in attack, it that the Japs are suffering from no shortage of depth charges.

— page 210 —
3.
Subject: U.S.S. H.D.D.O., Report of [Air Patrol Number Seven]

2. It is considered that some form of radar detector is essential. This vessel has none and wants one.

3. The vessel carried eight 1k 13 torpedoes aft. To difficulty was experienced in upkeep, nor was any erratic portf. no noted, and it is certifying as evidenced in attack 6, to note how rapidly they attain their set depth.

5. It is considered that the present TST is inaccurate. The constantly believe that had we a TST accurate to within 4° in attack 5, we would have made a hit.

6. Again on this patrol the enormous desirability of a 40 kt gun was apparent. With increased friendly air activity in our areas, gun targets are likely to become more frequent than torpedo targets.

7. It cannot be stressed too strongly that efficient aircraft lifeguard services cannot be rendered without the VHF equipment. On this patrol's lifeguard duty, had this vessel been equipped with VHF periscope antenna, there is a strong possibility that we might have saved an aviator known to have tried to find us as he was going down. Also, with VHF equipment, we would have had none of the problems of recognition encountered on the two days of life guard duty. VHF would also be of enormous value in wolf pack operations.

8. Much of the exchange of information between submarines done while wolf-packing is done by lying to alongside each other. Such conferences would be infinitely easier if submarines were equipped with bull horn amplified microphones.

— page 211 —
5-12/16-3/FB5-121 SUBMARINE SQUADRON THELVES
Serial 0296
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
17 October 1944.

From: COMMANDER SUBMARINE TO:
To: U.S.S. HADDO - Report
Vin: The Commander Submarine Squadron THELVES.
(1) The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Seventh War Patrol - Comments on.

1. The seventh war patrol of the U.S.S. HADDO was conducted in areas of the Philippines during the period 8 August to 3 October 1944. It was of fifty-six days duration with thirty-four days spent in the area. The HADDO formed a coordinated attack group with the HARDER and HAKE. The Commanding Officer of the HARDER was group commander.

2. During this very aggressive patrol, eight torpedoes attacked and one gun attack were made. Thirty-four torpedoes were fired and twelve hits were made. In addition a naval aviator was rescued.

Attack No. 1 - A daylight submerged attack on a large escorted convoy. After an approach made while escorts were dropping depth charges, fired six torpedoes at three overlapping AKs and heard five hits while going deep to evade. Two hits were timed for each of the AKs and a fifth hit was timed for a third AK.

Attack No. 2 and 3 - Night surface attacks on a DD. Three torpedoes were fired on the first attack; one hit the DD and another hit another target. On the second attack twenty-one minutes later with three torpedoes fired at the same DD, all missed due to a speed error.

Attack No. 4 - A daylight periscope attack on two damaged DD's. Two torpedoes were fired at the near one which received one hit and sank. A torpedo fired at the far DD from a bad firing position missed. Heard HARDER's screams very close aboard so went deep and cleared out.

Attack No. 5 - A diversionary night surface attack on a pursuing DD. Fired four torpedoes "Down the Throat" with torpedo run of 2,500 yards; all missed.

— page 212 —
5-12/16-3/FB5-121 SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWELVE

Serial: 0296

CONFIRMATION:
FIRST REPORTMENT to
U.S.S. HADDO - Report
of Seventh War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Seventh War Patrol - Comments on...

---

Attack No. 6 - A daylight periscope attack on a DD. Fired four storm tubes "Down the Throat" at a range of 600 yards. One hit and the rest were believed countermined. Twenty-one minutes later fired the last torpedo at this damaged DD and missed.

Attack No. 7 - A daylight periscope attack on an air screened convoy of ten AAs and three escorts. A shot at the DD escort was offered so fired four extra torpedoes and got one hit. Depth control was lost due to improper use of poppets so the effects of the hit were not noted; however, the DD was not present on later observation.

Attack No. 8 - A night surface attack after an air and

— page 213 —
24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12a/pr
Serial_01254 26 October 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HADDO Conf. Ltr.
A16-3 Serial 013, dated
3 October 1944. Report
of Seventh War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Seventh War Patrol - Comment on.

1. HADDO's Seventh War Patrol was conducted in the SOUTH CHINA SEA off the West Coast of LUZON and MINDORO in a Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of HARDER, HARK and HADDO. After expending all torpedoes HADDO reloaded at MIOS WOMEN II. On returning to the area Lieutenant Commander O. W. NIMITZ, Jr., U.S.N., took command of the Group consisting of HADDO and HARK.

2. HADDO made successful attacks on three convoys, sinking two AKs in the first, and one DD from each of the other two. A small AP which was damaged by HADDO in one of the latter convoys, was later sunk by HARDER. Credit for this sinking has been equally divided between HADDO and HARDER.

3. In a submerged "down the throat" attack on a DD escorting a tanker, one hit knocked the bow off up to the bridge. The last torpedo, fired as a "kill" shot, missed, and HADDO had the heart-breaking experience of watching the damaged ship being towed into shallow water. In view of the heavy damage received it is very likely that this ship eventually sank.

4. While on Lifeguard duty off SUTHERNAY HADDO rescued one downed fighter pilot.

5. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is authorized for this patrol.

6. The Force Commander takes pleasure in congratulating HADDO Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew on the aggressiveness, determination, and skill, which produced such gratifying results.

— page 214 —
12a/pr
Serial: 01254
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HADDO Comr. Icr.
A16-3 Serial 013, dated
3 October 1944. Report
of Seventh War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Seventh War
Patrol - Comment on.

The following damage was inflicted in this well conducted and highly successful patrol:

SUNK

1 - AK (Large - KU) 7,500 Tons (Attack No. 1) 1
1 - AK (Medium - EU) 4,000 Tons (Attack No. 1) 1
1 - DD (EU) 1,200 Tons (Attack No. 4) 1
1 - DD (KAMIKAZE Class - EU) 1,300 Tons (Attack No. 7) 2
1 - Large Patrol Vessel - EU) 1,000 Tons (Attack No. 9) 1
1 - AP (Small - EU) 4,000 Tons 2,000 Tons (Attack No. 2) 1
1 - MTS (Fishing Sampan) 100 Tons (Gun Attack No. 1) 1

Total 17,100 Tons

DAMAGED

23 Aug 1 - DD (KAMIKAZE Class - EU) 1,300 Tons (Attack No. 6) 2

Grand Total 18,400 Tons

* - Tonnage divided between HADDO and HARPER.

R. W. CHRISTIE.

DISCRIPTION:
Convoy 1 (3) - Direct 7,000 Tons (2)
Vice Captain 2 - Direct 7,000 Tons (2)
Vice Captain 1 (1)
Convoy 1 (1

— page 215 —
17 NOV 1944
CN-15113
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HADDO Conf. I.t.r.
A16-3 serial 013, of
3 October 1944.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Seventh War Patrol - Comment on.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Seventh Fleet congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew of the U.S.S. HADDO for the completion of a highly successful and aggressive patrol during which 17,100 tons of enemy shipping was destroyed and one destroyer damaged.

C. E. VAN HOOK
Deputy.

— page 216 —
21 February 1946.

USS HADDO (83255) 7th War Patrol
Date of Attack: 23 August 1944
Position: South of CAPE BOLINAO, LUZON

During an approach on a large AO HADDO was detected by a DD escort and was forced to fire DD when she came in to attack HADDO. Four explosions were heard - one hit in DD, other 3 torpedoes countermined by explosion of first torpedo. HADDO observed DD to be taken in tow by a trawler.

DHI credits the HADDO with the sinking of the DD17 ASOKAEE of 1270 tons in this attack and Japanese lists confirm the loss. Accordingly, credit assessment for this patrol should include 1270 tons under BUNK and "DANAGO" deleted. Commanding Officer, Comdr. C. V. Nimitz, Jr., U. S. Navy.

Copy to:
ComSubLant
SubSchool New London
60 38-255
Op-23E
Op-414C3

— page 218 —
SS255/416-3
Serial 016
DECLASSIFIED

Prox:  Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To  :  Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
Via  :  Commander Submarine Division FOUR.

Subject:  U.S.S. HADDO, Report of Her Patrol Under Attack.

Enclosure:  (A) Subject Report

1. "Enclosure (A), covering the object we patrol of this vessel conducted in the Philippines Island near during the period 23 October to 27 December 1944, is forwarded herewith."

2. "DECLASSIFIED"
3. "DECLASSIFIED-ART. C445, OPNAVINST 5510.10C"
4. "BY O.P.0987C DATE 5/28/2"

103528

— page 219 —
1500
: 28 October
: Deported Fremantle in accordance with Combat Group
: 71.1 Oprder 159-44 for the eighth war patrol. Conducted
: underway sound test and, in company with the U.S. Navy,
: made night radar runs on the USJ island. Deported
: exercise area at 2300 in company with the RCO enroute
: 22th Gulf.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO, Report of War Patrol Number Eight.

A. PRECLOSE

Arrived Fremantle, V.A. on 3 October from 7th
war patrol. U.S.S. GRIFFIN and Relief Crew SubDtr 122
Cornered Refit. Installed V.A.P., IAP, DR and XR-5PA.
16 October, refit completed. On 18 October Lieut.-Corr.
F.C. H.M.S., Jr., USN relieved Condr., O.C. H.M.S., Jr., USN
as Commanding Officer. 22 October to 26 October conducted
training exercises for which Condr. 3.3. H.M.S. Jr. USN
was training officer. 28 October, readiness for sea.

B. TARRATIVE.

Officers and chief petty officers attached.

| TITLE | PRIOR PARTICULARS | TITLE | TITLE |
|-------||-------|-------|
| Lieut.-Corr. F.C. H.M.S., Jr., USN | 5 | | |
| Lieut.-Corr. R.L. DOLLIG, USN | 3 | | |
| Lieut. F.J. RUDER, USN | 2 | | |
| Lieut. H.E. HAMMUSSLER, Jr., USN | 0 | | |
| Lieut. J.I. HICKEY, USN | 0 | | |
| Lieut. J.H. HASSEL, USN | 4 | | |
| Lt. (jg) H.I.V. FALSH, USN | 0 | | |
| Lt. (jg) A.C. VILBRAZ, USN | 2 | | |
| Lt. (jg) E.R. FLYNN, USN | 7 | | |
| Lt. (jg) C. HARTDICK, III, USN | 4 | | |

BALOGH, J.E., C.J., USN | 7 | | |
BANKE, G.C., OCM, USN | 7 | | |
DENFELD, E.E., CROU, USN | 7 | | |
HINZMAN, L.L., CRT, USN | 7 | | |
LOFFEN, I., CROU, USN | 7 | | |
SLITE, T.H., CROU, USN | 7 | | |
VOLT, T.H., CROU, USN | 7 | | |
TOLSTOY, G.O., OCM, USN | 7 | | |

C.T. Recorder | 7 | | |
Iainewering Room | 7 | | |
Aft. E.R. | 7 | | |
Radio Room | 7 | | |
Control Room | 7 | | |
Control Room | 7 | | |
Control Room | 7 | | |

(1) NOTE: Underlined words refer to times in left column.
All times are 10' unless otherwise noted.
Positions given are for 1200.)

1500

28 October

Deported Fremantle in accordance with Combat Group
71.1 Oprder 159-44 for the eighth war patrol. Conducted
underway sound test and, in company with the U.S. Navy,
made night radar runs on the USJ island. Deported
exercise area at 2300 in company with the RCO enroute
22th Gulf.

— page 220 —
U.S.S. RADIO, Report of War Patrol Number Eight.

29 - 31 October
Enroute Exmouth Gulf in company with PARGO. Cold
daily periscope approaches and night radar tracing
drills. The value of these exercises was shown by a
marked improvement in our sound and radar operators, in
our lookouts and in the fire control team. RADIO
searched by ping ranging while acting as target. Ping
ranging was improved to such a point that the submerged
PARGO was on one occasion picked up and tracked in from
3600 yards, and consistently so from 2500 yards.

31 October
Located alongside PARGO and RADIO at fuel barge,
Exmouth Gulf. Received 17000 gallons of fuel oil.
Underway independently, enroute LOBOK STRAIT.

1 - 3 November
Enroute Lombok. Exchanged recognition of meals
with four southbound U.S. submarines. Fell in with
PARGO on the second and made day and night approaches.

3 November
Approaching Lombok Strait. Sinkhoed eight or ten
small stick buoys with Jap flags attached - 4000 yards
south of the strait. Closed to 26000 yards of Lombok
and dove. Commenced transit at 2/3 speed to get as far
along as possible so that the hour and a half of darkness
before moonrise might be used in clearing the northern
entrance. At the southern entrance transoundus took
rips were encountered and standard speed was required
to keep RADIO between 80 and 150 feet. Fortunately an
unusual one knot northerly set was assisting the transit.
The bathymetrography showed a ten degree gradient
along the depth of 90 feet. The transit of Lombok
Strait was completed at 2100 with the rising of the
moon. No contacts were made other than those
variety.

Sighted a sailboat at about 5000 yards.

4 November
Lat. 05-06 3 Long. 117-25 3
In Lakassar Strait. Made trip day and surfaced
40 minutes later. Weak 5d interference to the north
which soon disappeared. During the day sighted several
small sailboats and avoided.

5 November
Lat. 00-39.5 Long. 115-29 3
SD contact at 22 miles, opened to 26 and then
closed rapidly to 12. Dove. Surfaced on hour later
and closed the Borneo Coast to intercept Balikpapan.

— page 221 —
2330
: 0300
: 1208
: 2100

: 0645
: 0952
: 1851

: 0650
: 1244
: 1620

: Monday, 6 November
: Lat. 06-47 N  Long. 120-05 E
: Clearer Pearl Bank at four engine speed.
: Picked up a 26 mile contact on the SD. Lockout sighted
: him at 14 miles; a four engine bomber. Triad to
: interrogate over IFF with no luck so gave. Surfaced
: 1 hr 11 min later. Hove to and crossed top side.
: Converted #4 fuel bellast to main bellast.

: Wednesday, 8 November
: Lat. 11-00 N  Long. 121-25 E
: Enroute Tablas Strait via Cuyo East Pass.
: Shipshot on port beam at 1500 yards.
: Inasmuch as five-foot of scope was exposed for et
: last one minute, and he didn't fire, it is caused
: that it must have been the southbound BNL or CUTLINK.
: Jont check flank speed and the evasion was effectively
: covered by a smoke screen from the engines.
: Jhon passing through these islands chains the land
: pips on the 3D radar screen at four and five miles
: caused some uneasy moments.
: Sighted a two engine bomber and gave. Surfaced
: 46 minutes later.
: Sighted a two engine bomber and gave. Followed
: with scope and surfaced when he had disappeared to
: south - submerged for 15 minutes.

— page 222 —
0806
: 0924
: 1135
: 1210

Subject: U.S.S. LADD, Report of War Patrol Number Eight.

Reached Maestroc do Campo Island at 2100.

southern tip of Mindoro might be cleared during darkness.

Thursday 9 November
Let. 12-50 N Long. 120-29 T
In Inderro Strait enroute Cape Calavite, joining BARBERO and REDFIN for wolf pack.
SD contact at 8 miles, closing. Dove. Surf. cod 46 minutes later.
Periscope sighted two vessels ahead (to the west) at about 26000 yards, angle on bow 110 port. This set up indicated they were transiting Apo. West Pass. For an end around it was necessary for us to use the east pass. Reversed course for end around and went ahead four engine speed. Sent contact to wolf pack with no one receiving. Sighted what appeared to be a patrol vessel near Apo Reef and maneuvered to clear it, and the reef, at 6000 yards. Patrol vessel turned out to be a shack with two radio masts. Visibility about 26000 yards with seas building up. Four engines produced only 16 knots.
The situation was a veritable squeeze play for when the target group was again sighted after our rounding Apo Reef it was evident they were going to the west of Palawan. This meant the attack would, if we were able to reach the spot on time, be in the rather rocky and shallow waters to the north of Busuanga Island. The Radar tracked one ship from 26000 yards and picked up the other at 23000 yards. At 2000 yards three escorts were seen. Large target was a medium AK similar to the AKITA IARU and the smaller was an engine-craft, bridge craft tanker which seemed to be about 250 or 300 feet long. Escorts were either DE or AK types but these escorts were never clearly seen and hence not accurately identified.
The target group made a zig to the left which gave them a sharp angle on the bow at 17000 yards. Dove to prevent being sighted. Continued approach at standard speed for one hour and 20 minutes; looks being taken every 15 minutes. Plot showed that we would be 4000 yards off the Colocoto Rocks at the time the convoy passed that point. It was impossible for the attack to be made any further to the south because of a 7% fathom spot. At this time the seas had freshened so that at 60 feet the tops of the escorts could only occasionally be seen. Depth control was difficult, but well handled.

— page 223 —
1333
1500 yards to the target. 1500 yards from the track with no escorts near; the plan being to fire a 60 track at 300 yards with zero gyro angles. At this point the target turned to his left giving an angle on the bow of five port. Crossing his bow at a range of about 1000 yards was an escort heading toward us and pinging on a short scale with an unusually long note. This escort had been on the targets starboard beam when we dove and there had been no pinging previous to this time. Rather than fire a down the throat shot with an escort bearing down on us in 30 fathoms of water I took the alternative of trying for a stern tube shot at his quarter. Next to 130 feet and turned the bow toward the pinger. The target passed close aboard to port with his bearings dropping off but the pinger's bearings cease up the starboard side and then appeared to recover so course as his bearings dropped off, and his pinging stopped. While pinging he remained on short scale.

7790

— page 224 —
1526
Surfaced (sub 3 hr 16 min) in extremely heavy seas and poor visibility. Colored area can be seen just off the NOL (now Conflagration - Bldg.10 had lost contact). Radar replies, telling us to patrol independently south of Oclavito.

Friday 10 November
Lat. 13-27 N. Long. 120-15 E
Dove at daybreak and commenced a submarine patrol three miles off Oclavito. Seas have moderated to state three.
Surfaced at dusk. (sub 12 hrs 17 min)

: 0548
Saturday 11 November
Lat. 13-25 N. Long. 120-15 E
Dove at daybreak and commenced a submarine patrol three miles off Oclavito. During the forenoon sighted a small barge and an .5 patrol boat plus radio. Surfaced at the vicinity for several hours. Surfaces at dusk. (sub 12 hr 52 min). Recovered at 1400 and changed information.

: 0510
Sunday 12 November
Lat. 13-20 N. Long. 120-15 E
Dove at daybreak and commenced submarine patrol three miles off Oclavito. For several hours turning about 50 feet below surface. Surfaced at 1500. Sighted a small, smaller and signaling is in a coastal sector commenced a procedure approach. From the range got to 3000 yards at 15 knots on a 5-6 knot course for no matter how maneuvered to follow us into the northeast of precision. Then the range got to 1000 yards and went deep and ran silent. Soon was a fleet of all and sound conditions excellent. Then turned to the south over head his screen stopped. He apparently bore to and was trying to remain a lost contact. Ran at 50 turns for 30 minutes and with his range at 3000 yards and to 4 knots to open out further. At 1743 turned to no longer in sight in the evening haze.
Surfaced at dusk. (sub 12 hrs 42 min)

: 1514
Monday 13 November
Lat. 13-00 E. Long. 120-15 E
Return left area - H.D.30 now rolled to port of one. Dove at daybreak for a submarine patrol between Oclavito and Opo Reef. Sighted two aircraft flying north, one of them was passing us to cross and the other was making shots across at a point about four miles from us. A group no longer so it was now about 2-3 knots underway.
Arriving exhausted the possibilities of our morning traffic from Faluan Day, surfaced at 2000 and went to the north to the east of Oclavito. Sighted a small, smaller and signaling is in a coastal sector commenced a procedure approach. From the range got to 3000 yards at 15 knots on a 5-6 knot course for no matter how maneuvered to follow us into the northeast of precision. Then the range got to 1000 yards and went deep and ran silent. Soon was a fleet of all and sound conditions excellent. Then turned to the south over head his screen stopped. He apparently bore to and was trying to remain a lost contact. Ran at 50 turns for 30 minutes and with his range at 3000 yards and to 4 knots to open out further. At 1743 turned to no longer in sight in the evening haze.
Surfaced at dusk. (sub 12 hrs 42 min)

: 1535
Tuesday 14 November
Lat. 13-00 E. Long. 120-15 E
Return left area - H.D.30 now rolled to port of one. Dove at daybreak for a submarine patrol between Oclavito and Opo Reef. Sighted two aircraft flying north, one of them was passing us to cross and the other was making shots across at a point about four miles from us. A group no longer so it was now about 2-3 knots underway.
Arriving exhausted the possibilities of our morning traffic from Faluan Day, surfaced at 2000 and went to the north to the east of Oclavito. Sighted a small, smaller and signaling is in a coastal sector commenced a procedure approach. From the range got to 3000 yards at 15 knots on a 5-6 knot course for no matter how maneuvered to follow us into the northeast of precision. Then the range got to 1000 yards and went deep and ran silent. Soon was a fleet of all and sound conditions excellent. Then turned to the south over head his screen stopped. He apparently bore to and was trying to remain a lost contact. Ran at 50 turns for 30 minutes and with his range at 3000 yards and to 4 knots to open out further. At 1743 turned to no longer in sight in the evening haze.
Surfaced at dusk. (sub 12 hrs 42 min)

— page 227 —
U.S.S. ZIDD, Report of 1st Patrol Number Thirty.

Friday 17 November
Lat. 14-01 N  Long. 119-44 E
The last of contacts during the past several days led to a review of our tactics. Perhaps our surface running had caused us to be spotted, or our SD had been D/7d. Plen of action for the day - submered for two hours, surfaced for 15 minutes without the use of the SD, etc. This plan was carried out during the day on a 'speedway' patrol 10 miles northwest of Cabra Island light. There was still no contacts.
Exchanged calls with BLAGNITI over S7
Sighted a BENTRY while submerged.
Witnessed a searchlight display over Island.

Saturday 18 November
Lat. 12-57 N  Long. 120-14 E

Directed by CTF 71 to conduct offensive reconnaissance at northern entrance to Lindoro Strait. Took station 8 miles northwest of Apo Island Light.
SD contact at 5 miles - Dove. While submerged sighted 5 more aircraft. Of the six aircraft sighted during the day four were making passage from Island to Palawan and the other two were patrolling.
Surfaced (sub 10 hrs 53 min)

Sunday 19 November
Lat. 13-00 N  Long. 120-10 E
Conducting offensive reconnaissance northwest of Apo Island Light.
Sighted a NEIL and dove. Watched plane make search of area for a half hour and then surfaced (sub 55 min) as the plane returned to Island.
Sighted a BENTRY and dove. Surfaced 27 minutes later as he stood off to the south.
SD contact at 5 miles - dove. Surfaced 40 minutes later.

Monday 20 November
Lat. 13-10 N  Long. 120-22 E
Conducting offensive reconnaissance 10 miles south of Capo Calavito.
Sighted float plane and dove. Surfaced in 15 minutes after following him out of sight in the cove.
SD contact at 7 miles; dove when range closed to 5 miles.
Sighted tops of mast to the northwest and commenced approach. Ship was identified as A.1.1 class but continued approach for drill. Closed to 2500 yards and then broke off approach. Target was running parallel.

— page 228 —
1742
: 0928
: 1020
: 1735
: 2130
: 0545
: 1200

: Tuesday 21 November
: Let. 13-10 IV
: Long. 120-19 Z
: Conducting offensive reconnaissance 10 miles south of Cape Calverite.
: Sighted two fighter planes in formation and dove.
: Planes searched area until 0955.
: Sighted two ships to the north with light plane escort.
: Commenced approach.
: Convoy consisted of one coastal tanker of exact similarity to the HURTAR LIZURO.
: Tender was lit and rolled perceptibly.
: Decided target too small and light for torpedoes but continued approach for practice.
: When the target group had passed by, and with a range of 4500 yards, both ships came about and left to our south 15 minutes before again reorganizing course and standing off to the south.
: The float plane did not get within the convoy but remained with the group.
: The ship was not sighted by the convoy but remained with the group.
: The ship was sight

— page 231 —
1837
: 1341
: 2014
: 0559
: 1240
: 1450
: 1717
: 0001

---

**Confidential**

**Subject:** U.S.S. RADIO, Report of Her Patrol Number Eight.

Shifted targets to the smaller vessel. It was difficult to track as he was zigging about thirty or forty degrees to either side of our bearing. Range closed from an estimated 1500 yards to 700 yards at which time the two remaining torpedoes forward were fired, each aimed at the 10.03, one using a 20 yard and the other a 5 yard. Both missed. Both

— page 232 —
1330
Sighted a RUFF at eight miles. Followed him for about five minutes through the scope with the range opening when he suddenly turned toward. Dov. Received two bombs as we reached 130 feet.

For the next four hours we went south at 2/3 speed and even though we travelled nearly 12 miles the RUFF continued to circle a spot about two miles on our port quarter. This led to the uncomfortable thought that perhaps we had an oil leak.

At dusk the RUFF was lost in the scops. Surprised (sub 4 hrs 35 min).

2030
Aircraft sighted close aboard. He was closing and was signalling with a strong searchlight. His running lights were on. Dove. Ten minutes later received one bomb.

2310
Surfaced, having been submerged two hours 40 minutes. A saturation pip of 150 ncs was seen on the SEA. This pip overpowered the interference of our SD. Dove.

2320
Wednesday 29 November
Lat. 13-30 N Long. 118-15 E
Patrollight Manila-Saigon route 60 to 100 miles west of Manila.

0020
Horn 20 distant, depth charges. Weak pinings on 145 true. Came to periscope depth but sighted notching in the bright moonlight. Pinging lasted for about an hour and faded out on 130 true. This was about the same bearing as our position of the last bombing so it was assumed to be a search for us. The next evening we were told by the BARRERO that this was a convoy of three AKs and three escorts. She had attacked at about 4k but was picked up by the scorpion after 4k. She had received the 20 depth charges. The 2L/30, retarded her plane coverage for the coast of the night, hence it would have been impossible to close the target group had we correctly assumed its identity.

0316
Started to surface. At 90 feet got on 3D contact at 2 miles. Retired to 90 feet.

0501
Surfaced (sub 6 hrs 19 min).

0545
Sighted an aircraft close and low to the water.

0715
It was closing fast. Dove. Surfaced one hour and half later.

2000
Rendezvoused with the BARRERO (nor sonier well) and received instructions to patrol southeastward part of area. BARRERO and RADPHI had returned to area for wolf pack operations with EADO.

1100
Thursday 30 November
Let. 12-33 N Long. 115-41 S
Enroute southeastern part of area.
Sighted plane and dove. Surfaced one hour later.

— page 233 —
1205
Received instructions from CTF 71 to contact offensive reconnaissance off west entrance of north channel of Balabac Strait. Set course for new station at two engine speed.
Sighted plane and dove. Surfaced 41 minutes later.

: 1140
Friday 1 December
Lat. 03-58° 1 Long. 116-58° 8
Enroute to Balabac Strait.
3D contact at 10 miles. Dove. Surfaced 1 hour 2 minutes later.
3D contact at 7 miles. Dove. Surfaced one hour 33 minutes later.
Received instructions from CTF 71 cancelling offensive reconnaissance. DARBUC therefore instructed HADDO to patrol southern entrance to Pelawan passage.

: 1000
Saturday 2 December
Lat. 09-20° 1 Long. 117-22° 3
Petrolling southern entrance to Pelawan passage.
3D contact at 18 miles. Closed to 14 and dove.
Surfaced 1 hour 25 minutes later.
3D contact at 15 miles, closing. Dove. Surfaced 1 hour 6 minutes later.

: 1135
Sunday 3 December
Lat. 10-55° 1 Long. 113-18° 8
Patrolling southern entrance to Pelawan passage.
3D contact at 24 miles - closed to 21 and dove.
opened.

: 1252
Monday 4 December
Lat. 11-02° 1 Long. 113-22° 8
Received instructions from CTF 71 to proceed to Subic Bay for possible lift-up guard duty. Set course for new station at two engine speed.
3D contact at 8 miles. Dove. Surfaced 50 minutes later.
Sighted plane and dove. Surfaced 20 minutes later.
Sighted plane on horizon. Dove when it closed to 10 miles. Surfaced 20 minutes later.
3D contact at 18 miles - closed to 14 and dove.
Surfaced 1 hour 15 minutes later.
3D contact at 10 miles closing. Dove. Surfaced 58 minutes later.
3D contact at 16 miles; closed to 12 and then opened.

: 0030
: 0825
: 1010
: 1055
: 1205
: 1403
: 1509

— page 234 —
1645
- Sighted submarine to the north. Closed and identified
  her as BARBERO. Exchanged information over WIR. She
  had no contacts since last rendezvous with HADDO.

: 0119
- Commenced getting strong 150 nms signal on APR.
- SD contact at 14 miles; closed to 10 and then
  opened. Lost APR signal shortly thereafter.
- SD contact at 12 miles closing. Dovg. Surfaced
  58 minutes later and went ahead 3 engines speed to close
  Tublo and intercept possible morning traffic.
- Dovg 12 miles from entrance to Subic Bay and
  continued to close at 2/3 speed.
- Reached patrol station 4 miles off entrance to
  Subic Bay.
- Watched a NELL drop throo depth charges about
  3 miles to the north.
- Sighted two motor-sailors, distance three and
  five miles.
- Sighted a NELL.
- Surfaced at dusk having been submerged 9 hours
  59 minutes. APR signal of 150 nms was heard on surfacing.
- SD contact at 7 miles. Dovg. Surfaced 2/
  minutes later. For the remainder of the night 150 nms
  signals were heard.
- Witnessed AA firing and searchlight display over
  Manila.
- Sighted running lights of an aircraft. Bearing
  changed rapidly forward. Apparently two were not
  sighted so did not dive.
- SD contact at 17 miles. Closed slowly to 8 miles
  Dovg. Surfaced 1 hour 16 minutes later.

: 1814
- Wednesday 6 December
- Let. 14-36 N Long. 120-10 E
- Patrolline off entrance to Subic Bay
- Lookout and OOD sighted plane close aboard passing
  down sterbord beam. Simultaneous 5J and SD contacts
  of 2 miles. Dovg. Surfaced 1 hour 5 minutes later.
- SD contact at 6 miles. Dovg. Remained submerged
  and closed Subic Bay submerged at 2/3 speed. Arrived
  on station four miles off entrance to daybreak.
- Sighted six BERTIES flying to the north in formation
  at 500 feet.
- Sighted RWR'float plane which patrolload crew for
  next several hours.

- 16 -

— page 235 —
1425
: 1501
: 1718
: 1806
: 1620
: 2000

U.S.S. RADIO, Report of Jar Patrol Number Eight.

Sighted DAVE float plane. A heated discussion as to whether it was actually a DAVE or the RATE that had been with us was settled when both wore sighted simultaneously, notwithstanding about 2 miles to the south. Slighted convoy for which those two planes were the air escorts. Convoy on course north, Angle on bow, sharp. Convoy consisted of one medium AQ and one escort. A more oversteer yacht to the west and a trawler to the east. was possibly a third small escort which was reported on one look. 'With the aircraft overcoer and a calm sea there was not much time devoted to a search for escorts. 'When AQ was at 2300 yards with a 30 degree angle on the bow, sound reported fast scares at 5. Both of the DRE reported that escort was flying on a frequency covered by neither. Pinchers was on a search sea and consisted of circles which blocked out all other sound. Took a look on bearing of fast scares at 5 degree the converted yacht at close range with a 5 degree angle on the bow. Set torpedoes on zero foot and turned toward. Before we could act set to a course was at about 300 yards. Went deep under a depth of 5 speed. Escort passed over us about a minute later as we were passing. 60 feet. To depth escorts approached. His scares were plainly heard through the sound mount from his unusual yinging he also had an unusual forward. It looked like a mortar with about a 5 foot 5 inch barrel. There was possibly more than the one barrel. It was not a sighted overaction. When 60 feet was again reached the range was 4000 yards which did not warrant a shot. Therefore Shortly before sunset convoy at 2/3 speed for a night attack. and away from the coast which it had been following closely. Sliched a JATE float plane which passed directly overhead on its way to the north. One half hour after sunset surfaced and commenced approach on convoy at two engine speed, changing to two engines. Week APR signals were picked up at 1500 yards and they were tracked at 9 knots on course 300. In view of the probable aircraft coverage, decided to make approach from the starboard quarter which was the opposite beam from the large escort, the oversteer yacht. With the RADIO on the 40's steerer beam at 6000 yards turned toward to close for the attack. To gain a good firing position it was necessary to cross in front of the starboard escort at about 1500 yards.

— page 238 —
0925
type, about 500 tons, two tripod masts with two stacks
widely separated, one stack being near each stack.
It had a gun shield forward and an A4 mount aft.
Closed to 1000 yards to get a good look and then opened
at 200 feet. Surfaced when range generated (using 14
knots) to 14000 yards and continued to open at one
engine speed. Gunboat went out of sight but was again
sighted on reverse course ten minutes later. Opened
for 15 minutes at 4 engine speed. This was the same
tactic that was being used by our two warship to get
of the 25th, i.e., that of lying off 60 to 100 miles
from Manila during an air strike and maneuvering radically
on station.

: 1415
Sighted a large ship to the northeast with small
angle on the bow. Dove and commenced approach although
ship appeared to be white and was assumed to be a
hospital ship. Target was on steady course of 25,
speed 13 knots and at 10,000 yards was clearly
identified as a properly marked hospital ship. Again
identification was unsuccessful as to type. It had
two stacks and the superstructure was of four decks
amidship with two decks continuing to the far tail.
There is no ship of this type in OIC305. After
stack approached to be false and was of a slight different
reak and size than the forward stack. Pictures were
taken at 3500 yards.

: 1600
Surfaced with the range at 13000 yards.
Sighted two bombers at 14 miles and touched them
out of sight on a course toward Manila.

: 1707
Sunday 10 December
Let. 14-50 H. Long. 119-59 3
Enroute Capones Island to intercept U-505 to
Manila from the north.
Dove at daybreak south of Capones Island on a
petrol station 8000 yards off this coast. During this
day sovon planes were sighted, six of them. U-505 and
one flot type.
Surfaced (sub 12 hr 4 min) at dusk and moved out
25000 yards from the coast for the night patrol station.
A signal of 150 was heard on the air at last
continuously from surfacing until midnight.
Sighted plane and dove. Plane had a zero circle
on the bow and was showing running lights (white).
Surfaced 30 minutes later.

: 1752
Monday 11 December
Let. 14-47 H. Long. 119-59 2
5J Radar picked up aircraft at 3000 yards,
closing fast. Dove. Surfaced 53 minutes later.

: 2010
: 0110
: 20

— page 239 —
0223
Subj: 0540
This plane was undoubtedly equipped with radar but it was never detected on the FR and was definitely not 150 mas. No probably relieved the one that was equipped with the 150 mas set at midnight. Dove at daybreak south of Caponas Island and took station 3600 yards from the coast. Observation at 0700 finding was heard to the northeast. Pining was in the morning the north, northwest and southwest. Also during the morning seven aircraft were sighted, one of these, a fleet plane, seemed to be patrolling. The others were seen in an observation. At 1109 four planes were seen in an observation to the north; three were fleet planes and one was a bomber.

1141
Sighted six planes in scope. Two pairs of 1125 were skimming the water at what seemed to be not over 25 feet, and two fleet planes were at about 150 feet in formation. Both fleet planes started a dive stations for they seemed to want to go to a depth of 150 feet. The aircraft were in the water and were sighted at 1150 feet. The aircraft were in

— page 243 —
10. D.A. 1600 13-20 2 1600 170 5
7 1600 13-20 2 1600 170 5
8 0300 11-03 3 6000 260 11
9 0416 11-05 2 10000 260 12
10 0516 11-07-05 1 DD 15000 250 19
11 0615 11-10 3 15000 250 19
12 1704 13-10 05 16000 150 13
13 1020 13-10 3 16000 150 13
14 2130 13-13 1 7500 330 11.5
15 0545 13-15 1 15000 150 13
16 1200 13-15 1 4000 210 7
17 0215 13-34 2 2500 160 2
18 1305 14-00 2 DD 15000 95-135 14
19 1512 14-37 1 320 320 5
20 1640 14-36 1 5000 050 5
21 1501 14-35 1 10000 310 5
22 1506 12-10 1 3 Escorts 3.5

- 25 -

— page 244 —
10. 22 0610 11-15 15
    Dec 3 11-05-34 3
    Unident 20000 060 15
    Unident 30000 250 12
    Unident 16000 170 14
    Unident 16000 170 14

G. 11. 24 1230 11-19-59 1 1 40 1 42

H. 11. 1 1400 04-44 5 117-25 3
    DAVIS 5 11les Unit SD
    Unident 22 Unk 2
    Unident 26 Unk 2
    Unident 8 2000 150
    Unident 8 2500 150
    Unident 8

— page 246 —
10. 28 1010 13-57 1st 8 230° 150
    Nov 13 120-14 3 200° 150
    Nov 15 120-15 3 200° 150
    Nov 13 120-13 3 200° 150
    Nov 19 120-13 3 200° 150
    Nov 19 120-10 3 200° 150
    Nov 19 120-10 3 200° 150
    Nov 19 120-13 3 200° 150
    Nov 20 120-13 3 200° 150
    Nov 20 120-11 3 200° 150
    Nov 20 120-13 3

— page 250 —
11. 0700 14-46 113-57
11. 1200 14-49 113-59
93 1235 14-49 113-59-30
94 1515 14-47-30 113-59-30
95 1711 14-40-30 113-59-30
96 2010 14-46 113-49
97 0110 14-46 113-48
99 0710 14-45 120-00
100 0313 14-45 120-00
101 0900 14-45 113-59
102 0901 14-45 113-59
103 1010 14-46 113-59
104 1055 14-46-05 113-59
105 1109 14-47 113-59

- 3 -

— page 252 —
U.S.S. DUC, Report of Her Patrol with A.B.
Subject:
H. A. U.S.C. (Torpedo Attack Report Form)
U.S.S. DUC 2022-00 A.B. 1-4 35-12N 125-45E
Time 1350 Date 9 November 1944 1st. 12-27 1st. 12-05
PAGE DTL - DLC & INTL
Description: One A.S. similar to A.B. 1-4 (attack 1-1-1).
One A.B. 1-4, 1

— page 254 —
1930 Date: 25 November 1944, Ict. 14-01, Icn. 11-20-2

DESCRIPTION:
No identification was made. Attack was on larger
of the two torpedoes, a two-stack ship with a light
superstructure. It was first identified (ex 1200) as in
the trillbit) as an 2. Beam was apparently much broader
than a DD. Attack was on an unidentified DD or DD.

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: One large two stack warship (1)

Damage Detected by: One hit observed affecting torpedoes
deep red color for several seconds followed by a large cloud
of smoke. Within 5 minutes breaking up noises were heard.
Area was searched one hour 15 minutes later. No results.

| Course | Depth | Speed | Range (at 1/2 mile) |
||-------|-------||
| 1-2    | 9     | 135   | 12-16            | 3050 600 |
| 1-3    | 9     | 330   |                   |       |

ORIGINAL D.D.

| Course | Depth | Range (at 1/2 mile) |
|-------|-------||
| 1-2    | 3     | 195             | 0° 0° |
| 1-3    | 3     | 190             | 0° 0° |

TRUE SCROLL 2 OF 2

True attack: Periscopes and radar equipment. Tried to torpedoes at torpedoes at larger ships. Tried to torpedoes at torpedoes at other ships which was coming from ahead of torpedoes. Spread set by periscopes.

- 35 -

— page 259 —
1 2 3 4
Track Angle 25P 25P 26P 26P
Gyro Angle 358:40 359:10 359 359:30
Depth Set 2 2 2 2
Power Hi Hi Hi Hi
Hit or Miss Miss Miss Hit Miss
Erratic (yes or no) No No No No
Mark Torpedo 23 23 23 23
Serial No. 53192 63369 24750 41509
Mark Exploder 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial No. 26119 14087 26396 26099
Actuation Set Con Con Con Con
Actuation Actual -- -- -- Con --
Mark Harhead 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
Serial No. 12907 34276 11761 2454
Explosive Typ-2 Typ-2 Typ-2 Typ-2
Firing Interval 0 7 14 27
Type Spread 4 R 5 L 5 L 2 R
Sea Conditions From HX, condition 2
Overhaul Activity U.S.S. CAPT.
Remarks All torpedoes ran hot, straight and normal. It is probable that at least one of the torpedoes ran under a converted yacht of about 1000 tons.

— page 261 —
5. A rough evaluation of range using JP. 2-inch minimum gain:
   (a) Signals could be seen up to 20 miles.
   (b) Scope became saturated at 10 miles.

: 6. Most planes sighted at night used armoring lifts (white). Airplanes were significantly faster, a 3-day trip to 1,000 miles shorter, and landing light at 1,000 feet was reached for 2 or 3 miles.

: 7. Following doctrine was developed while on section:
   (a) MR kept on vicinity of 150 miles except for quick search every three minutes.
   (b) Men on plane had to be saturated sent to 4 knots to eliminate wake.
   (c) Men on plane fully saturated kept 30 for 10 seconds following each trip on SPA.
   (d) Men aircraft started keying on a saturated signal - DOWN.

8. Two MR units are needed; one to keep the pre-arrival frequency, and the other to stay on surface alert and other possible aircraft frequencies.

The convoy contacted on this lift of December 16 at 10:00. The convoy was 10 miles from the surface screen. Two planes were circling the convoy but were not in the convoy. The convoy was 10 miles from the surface screen but was not in the convoy. The convoy was 10 miles from the surface screen but

— page 262 —
U.S.S. RADIO, Report of Her Patrol Number Eight

Subject:

(B) The pilotage again gave unsatisfactory performance, the main difficulty being lack of spare parts. Upon landing, the enemy aircraft was observed to be in a state of disrepair. The aircraft was found to be in a state of disrepair, and the pilot was ordered to return to base. The pilot was ordered to return to base, and the aircraft was ordered to be repaired. The aircraft was ordered to be repaired, and the pilot was ordered to return to base. The aircraft

— page 263 —
150 ms for three minutes followed by a cockpit search at the "A" unit band. The 3D was manned for all station signals around 150 ms. All plane contacts (later confirmed by signals, radio or bombing) were made on this frequency, with possible exception of two night aircraft contacts which were not indicated on PR-SPA.

| No. | Date  | Time | Lot. | Freq. | PRP | P.I. | Antenna Rot. |
|-----|-------|------|------|-------|-----|------||
| 1   | 11-5  | 0215 | 01-00 W | 152  | 500 | 6 ns | Irregular |
| 2   | 11-9  | 1330 | 13-01 N | 748  | 125 | 3 ms | none |
| 3   | 11-14 | 0200 | 14-07 W | 520  | 220 | -     | none |
| 4   | 11-20 | 1620 | 12-24 W | 150  | 500 | 6 ns | none |
| 5   | 11-22 | 1200 | 13-09 W | 150  | 500 | 6 ns | heavy-to-rotation possibly clevitate surface station |
| 6   | 11-24 | 2000 | 13-09 W | 150  | 500 | 6 ns | 11 min. (expired.) |
| 7   | 11-24 | 0200 | 13-33 W | 520  | 200 | 4½ ns | none |
| 8   | 11-27 | 1700 | 13-43 W | 155  | 500 | 5 ns | 3 min |
| 9   | 11-28 | 1600 | 13-49 W | 150  | 1000 | -     | circled-sighted |
| 10  | 12-5  | 2100 |       | 155  | 500 | 1½ ns | none |
| 11  | 12-11 | 1300 | 14-50 W | 147  | 500 | 5 ms | none |
| 12  | 12-17 | 0600 | 15-20 W | 115  | 550 | 15 ns | Scipion |

- 45 -

— page 265 —
U.S.S. INDOC, Report of Her Patrol Number 13-3.

P. HEALTH, FOOD, AND HEALTH
Good

Q. PERSONNEL
(a) Number of men on board during patrol
(b) Number of men qualified at start of patrol
(c) Number of men qualified at end of patrol
(d) Number of unqualified men neither their first run
(e) Number of men advanced in rating during patrol

Plan of training for non-qualified non-verified for daily lectures by three non-qualified officers on the special systems and subjects throughout the boat. After completion of the lecture program, the non-qualified men were split into small groups and shown through the individual rooms by specially placed rotary officers. After instructing the non-qualified men in the use of the radio, the men were tested for final qualification by a board of two qualified officers. The board of officers and men came in for a variety of disciplinary and disciplinary exercises. The performance of the NUDO's crew is of a high order. The performance of duty of each officer was uniformly excellent. During the performance of the exercises the NUDO's crew was uniformly excellent. The NUDO's crew was uniformly excellent.

R. HILLS STRAIN - FULL USED
Base to area: 1230 miles
In area: 7770 miles
Area to Saipan: 1575 miles
Saipan to Pearl: 3212 miles

S. DURATION
Days enroute to area: 5
Days in area: 40
Days enroute to base: 17
Days submerged: 17

T. PICTURES OF DURATION RATING
Torpedoes: 4
Fuel: 37300
Provisions: 1.5 days
Reserve: 14 days

U. RADIO AND RADIO EQUIPMENT USED
No comment.

— page 266 —
U.S.S. EDDO, Report of War Patrol Number 3, 1944.

V. NOTES

The VHF is an efficiently satisfactory means for communication between submarines and aircraft.

Closer cooperation between aircraft and submarines would have been beneficial several times during this patrol. In the future, with our aircraft covering the China Sea, it will become an effective weapon.

The following program is suggested:

(a) Develop a simple yet effective communication procedure for aircraft-submarine work similar to the fighter-director procedure.

(b) Mount a fully pitched VHF antenna on the 3D mast so that VHF might be used when submerged.

(c) Provide a VHF outlet on the bridge under the 7 IC system so that the OOD can have immediate and effective communication with any friendly plane he sights.

With a system has been tried experimentally with excellent results on two-way conversation from bridge to pilot at 35 miles.

— page 267 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.
Serial 02
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
2 January 1945.

From:
To:
Via:
(1)
(2)
(3)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HADDO Eighth Patrol.

Subject:
U.S.S. HADDO Eighth War Patrol, comments on.

1. The Eighth War Patrol of the U.S.S. HADDO was of sixty (60) days duration, made under the operational control of Commander Task Force 71. The HADDO's patrol was conducted in areas west of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. This was the first patrol for the new Commanding Officer as such.

2. All attacks were well planned and aggressively conducted. A summary of attacks follows:

FIRST TORPEDO ATTACK - 9 November 1944 - This was a brilliantly executed and around attack made in the day time. Because of the dangerous shoals and reefs, the HADDO had to maneuver skillfully in making this and around. The target was a long chase of the HADDO finally submerged ahead of the target group in the only safe position left for it to do so. Just as the HADDO was about to fire at both targets with a good set-up, an alert escort forced the HADDO deep. The HADDO, however, was able to return to periscope depth quickly and although the range and angle on the bow were not favorable, the HADDO felt that after such a long and arduous chase she was justified in an attempt to hit at least one of the targets. The HADDO fired four Mark XVIII; three at the AK and one at the tanker. The AK zigged away before the torpedoes could hit, but on timed hit was made on the tanker. The hit probably sank the tanker because of its small size. The HADDO was forced deep by an escort which depth charged the HADDO for some time.

SECOND TORPEDO ATTACK - 25 November 1944 - This was a Radar submerged approach on two men-of-war. As the night was dark actual identity of these ships was impossible, except one was quite large and had two stacks. Obtaining a favorable position the HADDO fired four at the large man-of-war and two at the small one. One observed hit was obtained in the large ship prior to being forced deep by the second one which avoided the HADDO's two torpedoes and rendered a severe depth charging to her. Inasmuch as no further pinging was heard from the vessel hit and only one set of screws was heard, it seems quite possible that this unidentified warship was sunk.

THIRD TORPEDO ATTACK - 6 December 1944 - This was a night surface attack made against a medium tanker, a small freighter and three escorts. An

— page 268 —
4. The HADDOS complete area patrol was made with practically constant enemy air coverage to contend with. 118 air contacts were made at all times of the day and night. This shows that the enemy is stressing more and more the use of the air arm for anti-submarine measures.

5. The HADDOS attempt to get in on a large convoy off the CAPONES ISLAND was thwarted by having the convoy pass between CAPONES ISLAND and the Mainland, safe from submarine attack. The commanding officer's comments regarding this maneuver are of no use and it is believed that this passage should be mined by our air force as soon as possible in order that enemy convoys will have to pass outside of the island.

6. The HADDOS arrived from patrol in a fair material condition and will be overhauled at one of the yards in the San Francisco Area. The boat was in a fine state of cleanliness and the morale of the crew was high.

7. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR congratulates the commanding officer, officers and men of the HADDOS for this aggressive and successful war patrol.

— page 269 —
4 January 1945.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS H.DDO (SS255) Report
of Eighth W.W. Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division FOUR-FOUR.

1. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR contract-ulates the Commander's Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. HADDO upon completion of this patrol, and for the resulting loss to the enemy.

2. It is recommended that the U.S.S. HADDO be credited with the following:

| SURN | DATAGEL |
|------||
| 1- AO(EC), 4,000 tons | 1- AO(EU), 3,800 tons |
| 1- AK(EU), 1,000 tons | 1- Man-of-War |
| Total sunk | 5,000 tons | Total Damaged | 3,000 tons |
| Plus 1 Man-of-War. |

Total Sunk or damaged - 8,800 tons, plus 1 Man-of-War.

J.R. O'LEGAN
W. V. O'LEGAN

— page 270 —
2-10/AL6-3(15)
Serial 042
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
HADDO Report of
Eighth War Patrol.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 632.
U.S.S. HADDO - EIGHTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: The eighth war patrol of the HADDO, under command of Lieutenant Commander F. C. Lynch, U.S. Navy, was conducted in areas west of the Philippines. The HADDO maintained excellent air coverage despite intense enemy anti-submarine measures, and made numerous contacts although many were small ships. Four aggressive attacks were delivered, and severe damage was inflicted upon the enemy.

2. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

3. The Commander submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officers, officers, and crew for this highly successful patrol. The HADDO is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

| TYPE | DAMAGE | TONNAGE |
|------|||
| 1-UN (Combatant Type) | -4,000 tons (Attack No. 2) |
| 1-LEIDIUM AO (EC) | -4,000 tons (Attack No. 3) |
| 1-UN (Probably Coastal AK) | -1,000 tons (Attack No. 4) |

TOTAL SUM: 9,000 tons

DAMAGED

1- Small AO (Stacks Art Barge Type) (EU) - 2,000 tons

TOTAL SUM AND DAMAGED 11,000 tons

NOTE: Since the above damage was done under the operational control of Commander Task Force seventy-One, no record is requested to assume credit accordingly.

Distribution and authentication on following page.

C. A. LOC.000, Jr.

— page 271 —
12-10/A16-3(15)
Serial 042
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD INDIRECTLY to
HADDO report of
Eighth War Patrol.

COLUSSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 632.
U.S.S. HADDO - EIGHTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.
(28 October to 27 December 1944).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
ICPOA (1)
Comservpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
Consusblant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (2)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CTG 71.9 (2)
Comnorpac (1)
Consusspac (40)
SUBAD, IL (2)
ComsubspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron & Division Commanders, Pacific (2)
Substrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific(1)

S. K. H. Hynes, 2nd, Flag Secretary.

— page 272 —
1-10/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLIGHT
Serial 0114
CONFIDENTIAL
Front: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.
Reference: (a) ConsubPac third end. FF12-10/A16-3(15) serial 42 of 4 January 1945.
1. Reference (a) credits U.S.S. HADDO with certain damage to the enemy including the damage of a small oil tanker which was attacked on 9 November 1942 in position 12-27 N, 120-05 E - one hit was obtained.
2. Reliable intelligence, subsequently received, states that HSSHAU No. 2 was sunk in the position and on the date shown above, as a result of HADDO's attack. Accordingly reference (a) is modified as follows:
(a) Delete all after the word "patrol" in second sentence of paragraph 5 and substitute thereof:

SUKK
1 - AO (EISENHAU) 2,000 tons
1 - UT (Combattant type) 4,000 tons
1 - Medium AO 4,000 tons
1 - UT (Possibly Coastal AK) 1,000 tons
TOTAL SUKK 11,000 tons

FRANK T. WETKLINS,
Chief of Staff.

RECEIVED SC FILES
Room 2055
W. S. Stoeffler
Commander, USN
File Secretary

DISCLAIMER:
CTO (12) (6) (1)

— page 274 —
35255/A16-3
Serial 011

U.S.S. HADDO
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
16 July 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HADDO.
The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
(1) The Commander Submarine Division 341.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 34.
(3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO Report of War Patrol Number Nine.

Enclosures: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track Chart.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the ninth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea Area during the period 31 May 1945 to 16 July 1945, is forwarded herewith.

DEDECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY: 02-0287C
DATE: 5/30/42

135/174

— page 275 —
CONFIDENTIAL

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived at Pearl Harbor on 27 December 1944 from Light
"War Patrol. Departed Pearl Harbor on 30 December 1944, at
receiving voyage repairs from Submarine Squadron Four,
arrived at Hunter's Point on 5 January 1945 and for five
sections days conducted test firings at 1.15 Torpedoes from
bow tubes to determine whether bow shutter interferences exist
on this class submarine. On 10 December 1945 arrived at
Island Navy Yard and commenced overhaul. If on completion of
overhaul and trials departed on 16 April 1945 for Pearl
Harbor.

Arrived at Pearl Harbor on 27 April 1945 and was assigned
to SubRon Twelve for voyage repairs. From 2 April 1945 to
11 May 1945 conducted six-dard training exercises with Oar
teams of 1111s, 1R, 1

— page 277 —
1. PROLOGUE (Cont.)
At Pearl Harbor the following units were installed:
(1) Additional 40mm gun.
(2) Loran (DAS - 3).
(3) SCR 610, FM Transceiver.
(4) Intermediate and high frequency directional antennas (AJO) on port and starboard side of conning tower.
(5) APR 5-AX high frequency RCA receiver.

On 16 May departed Pearl Harbor for Saipan, in accordance with ComSubFacAdCom OpOrd Number 93-1-45. On 28 May 1945 arrived at Saipan and moored alongside U.S.S. ORION (AS18), for voyage repairs.

III

— page 279 —
1412
CONFIDENTIAL
(All times are zone description -9, unless otherwise designated. Daily noon positions are given directly under the date of the narrative.)

SULARY OF HADDON'S ITINERARY
HADDON was directed by ComTask Group 17,19 to conduct a rotating petrol, remaining in each assigned area for five days:
5-11 June - Off southern Kyushu, between Kaimon Lisaki and Bono Isaki.
12-16 June - Nagasaki-Fukase Shima Area. Spent two days off Fukase Shima, one off Nagasaki, one off Niki Wan and one cruising down the east coast of Koshiki Retto.
17-22 June - In the middle of the East China Sea, on the Nagasaki-Shanghai Route.
23-26 June - In the middle of route between Kokuzan Shoto and coast of China.
27 June - Surfaced and submerged off Daikokuzan.
28 June - Submerged off Shaan Gunto.
29 June - 2 July - Spent two days surfaced and submerged in Chosen Kan route, three days submerged off Chosan Kan and one day excercising at a wolf pack sweep.
3 July - 5 July - Spent two days surfaced and submerged in Laotichshan Channel and one day submerged off Dairon.
6-7 July - On scouting line off Shantung Front.
8 July - Submerged in Laotichshan Channel.
9 July - Sweeping northeast corner of Yellow Sea.
10-11 July - Heading south through areas 9 and 12.

31 May 1945
1412
Underway in accordance with Submarine Force Pacific Fleet Operation Order #115-45, as Task Unit 17,19,3. In company with Task Group 17,19, known as Street's Sweeper, consisting of the U.S.S. THE (SS420), Lieutenant Commander STREET, and the U.S.S. SEA OIL (SS405), Lieutenant Commander HALL. While en route to patrol areas, daily training dives and practice approaches were made.

— page 280 —
1 June 1945
Lat. 18013115"N
Long. 14205600"E
Made two practice submerged approaches on TIRANTE.

: 2 June 1945
Lat. 2207000"N
Long. 13904915"E
Made three practice torpedo approaches on SEA OWL.

: 3 June 1945
Lat. 26058130"N
Long. 13903345"E
Made one practice approach on SEA OWL.

: 4 June 1945
Lat. 3903400"N
Long. 13603400"E
Sank floating mine with 40mm guns. Line failed to explode.

: 5 June 1945
Lat. 2902630"N
Long. 13048400"E
Departed company with SEA OWL and TIRANTE and proceeded independently to patrol areas.

: 5 June 1945
Lat. 2902630"N
Long. 13048400"E
Received message from SEA OWL to the effect that "The enemy is scattering torpedo wakes." Our doubtful position placed her about 25 miles ahead. We continued on present course but commenced "zig in speed", i.e., changing speed by one engine every 20 minutes. Steering, as usual, was by course clock.

: 6 June 1945
Commenced passage between Akuseki Jina and Ko Jima.

: 7 June 1945
Sighted a float plane at about six miles and dived, remaining submerged for 32 minutes.

— page 281 —
6 June 1945
Lat. 31°09'00"N
Long. 130°14'30"E

Commenced submerged patrol on line between Kaimon
h. Isaki and Bono l. Isaki.

Sighted about 25 Japanese planes of various types,
apparently forming up for a raid on Okinawa.

Sighted about 45 Jap planes. Again they formed up and
headed south.

Sighted yet another group of 40 planes forming up and
heading south.

Surfaced and set course for Kusakaki Shima to test
our tent contactor receiver with the enemy's reported tent
contactor surface search radar. This test was highly
described to gain some badly needed data on their gear, on
our gear, and experience for our APR-5X operators. We were
particularly anxious to determine (a) Distance the APR-5X
was able to detect Japanese 10 contactor radar, (b) bearing
accuracy of 3° in receiver condition (without synchronous
pulse) on Jap 10 contactor radar, (c) at what range Jap 10
contactor radar can pick up under various conditions,
and (d) if Japs can d/f our SJ.

Unfortunately, no 10 contactor radar could be detected
on this or several other reported installations which we
closed several times during the patrol.

7 June 1945.

Lat. 31°16'00"N
Long. 130°19'30"E

Divid for submerged patrol between Kaimon l. Isaki and
Bono l. Isaki.

Sighted Plane (Val Type).

Surfaced.

Sighted two-engine bomber, distant about five miles,
and dived. Surfaced 40 minutes later.

— page 282 —
8 June 1945
Lat. 31°10'00"N
Long. 130°29'00"E

0045
Sighted unidentified aircraft closing bow from starboard to port at about six miles. Apparently he was making an approach for landing.

0410
Dived for submerged patrol between Kainon Lisaki and Bono Lisaki.

0510
Sighted two sub-chasers and closed to 3,000 yards. Sub-chasers on steady course heading west.

2004
Surfaced.

2245
Radar contact on two targets about 300 yards apart, steady course 125. Speed 14.5 knots. Closed to visual range (5,000 yards), and identified as two sub-chasers.

9 June 1945
Lat. 31°07'30"N
Long. 130°26'30"E

0420
Dived for submerged patrol off Bono Lisaki. Sighted various fishing boats during the day.

2008
Surfaced.

10 June 1945
Lat. 31°21'00"N
Long. 130°07'15"E

0434
Conducted submerged patrol off Bono Sak.

1615
Surfaced in poor visibility.

2256
Sighted single unidentified plane heading toward us at four miles, signalling with landing lights. Dived, and surfaced one hour and 18 minutes later.

11 June 1945
Lat. 31°23'45"N
Long. 130°01'45"E

0432
Dived for submerged patrol off Bono Lisaki.

1901
Surfaced and set course for new patrol station.

— page 283 —
12 June 1945
Lat. 32°29'00"N
Long. 128°53'00"E

0455 Div'd to conduct submerg'd patrol 6,000 yards off the southeast coast tip of Fukec Shima.

1845 Surfaced.

13 June 1945
Lat. 32°22'15"N
Long. 128°47'15"E

0513 Commenced submerged patrol 6,000 yards off the southeast tip of Fukec Shima.

0617 Heard pinging to the north, and several minutes later sighted two sets of masts. Visibility was intermittent and poor. Both targets appeared to be small patrol vessels. With the range at about 6,000 yards, the nearest target had a small angle on the bow, but appeared to be a large enough target for investigation. Target tracked on course 180, speed 9.5 knots, and was identified as a Kaibokan #2 Class frigate. The other target was of a smaller type and remained about 1500 yards on the frigate's beam.

0654 Lade ready four bow tubes. At firing point, bearings started generating off at about 10 per minute. Corrected solution to a bearing error of 2/100 per minute, which showed him to have come left about 8. Target's small length necessitated this delay in firing to get an accurate solution.

0700 Fired on 1k. 18, range 1300 yards, tr.ck 148 starboard, gyro 130' right.

0700-25 Fired on 1k 18, range 1850 yards, 153 starboard track, 170' right gyro angle.

0700-40 Heard a jolting explosion--saw nothing on target's bearing.

0700-55 Another jolting explosion--again saw nothing. Target turning to his right.

0701-10 Losing depth. Going down rather fast, so ordered 200 feet.

0702 Heard muffled explosion. Came right and put target at

— page 284 —
12 June 1945 (Cont'd)
At nine minutes after 1-ring, first of depth charges was released of an ineffective 19-charge barrage. All depth charges were astern. The DCDI was of good use in showing their pattern in depth. Of a three-charge salvo, two would be above and one would be below 25 ft.

A reconstructed story of the attack is a rather unusual one. The torpedoes were fired directly into a moderate sea with a four-foot depth setting. The first torpedo ran hot, straight, and normal. The second torpedo was a 15-second premature, the concussion of which fired a third Mk. 18. It also prematurely fired a 15-second run. The firing of the third torpedo was totally unexpected and even though the torpedo had not been quickly remarkably quickly considering the two rather startling close explosions - the poppet valve was not closed for several valuable moments. The shock also cracked open the outer door on tube No. 6 which had not been ready. The added weight forward resulting from these two incidents resulted in the temporary loss of depth control.

It is believed that the target sank as substantiated by the following facts:

(1) On the first premature the target started coming to his right. He came just far enough right so that the firing bearing for the original set-up of a 143 track (a 130 Ipad angle), was the correct solution for his generated 60 track. The first torpedo resulted in a timed hit. This problem works out for a hit or the TDC at. the 1800 yard range of the timed hit.

(2) JT sound had tracked his screws in nicely from about 6,000 yards, and the signal was strong at the time of the first premature. After the water turbulence of the pre-matures had subsided no screws were heard; this, in spite of the fact that the submarine and the target were at that time closing.

(3) No depth charges were heard for nine minutes, which was the time required for the outboard vessel to close the scene. This vessel's screws were picked up at about five minutes after firing.

(4) During the subsequent depth charging only one vessel was heard.

(5) It is not believed a target of this size can withstand one torpedo hit.

— page 285 —
13 June 1945 (Cont'd)
After the unreadmitted firing of the torpedo in No. 3 tube, the outer door could not be closed. There were anxious moments while conjecturing as to whether there was a partially ejected torpedo in that tube or not.

1,000 yards. Lieutenant Harry H. HAZUSSLER, Jr., USNR, volunteered to go over the side to investigate. After several minutes of being battered around the bow by the seas, he found that 7 tube was clear of torpedoes, apparently the battering of the sea cleared up (at least temporarily) the tube troubles, for the door was then closed without difficulty, much to the relief of all hands.

By this time the radar officer had replaced the several shattered tubes in the radar and sound gear and the RADIO seemed to be mechanically recovered from her two unitlessly belches.

Haddad for the next patrol station off the southern approaches to NAGASAKI. Set course southwest to a point 20 miles to the south of NOLO SAKI. SJ radar was used on this leg of the approach. However, it was secured when the RADIO came north in an attempt to approach her station undetected.

14 June 1945
Lat. 32°35'30"N
Long. 129°40'15"W

Submerged seven thousand yards off NOLO SAKI. Commenced closing the beach.

Sighted large hospital ship standing in from the west. Closed this hospital ship at 2/3 speed, assuming that she was using the traffic lane for NAGASAKI. "This closing on hospital ship a continuous string of depth charges was heard.

Sighted two coastal mine-layers rounding NOLO SAKI at high speed throwing over their depth charges with great abandon. Apparently we had not made our approach undetected. Reversed course and started approach on these mine-layers but were unable to close to less than 4500 yards.

Heard pinging to the south and sighted several masts. This was just what we were waiting for! Commenced closing those ships to the south. All targets seemed to have exceptionally heavy superstructures and were tracked on course N" in an irregular formation. Six targets in all were sighted.

— page 286 —
14 June 1945 (Cont'd)
1205
All targets channelled course to the east. The closest
target was identified as a whale-killer type trawler with
her ontrine superstructure from stem to stern covered with
a greenish-brown net camouflage. Subsequent observations
showed that all targets were thus camouflaged, when all
six ships were heard to be pinging on various frequencies,
the approach phase was discontinued and the retiring phase
initiated.

At that time there was only one vessel of the six that
was to the north of us, so the evasion course to the north
was taken. The critical point in the evasion came when the
next ship was on our port beam with a zero angle on the
bow, the range 1500 yards. There was an island 1,000 yards
on our starboard hand and 180 feet of water below us. Next
to 150 feet at 2/3 sp.rad. For about one hour there was
much loud pinging and then the sweep retired to the south.

1330
Came to periscope depth and continued retirement on a
northerly course.

1400
A loud and definite scraping noise was heard, which
slowly passed aft for almost the full length of the boat.
Came hard left and now the hull began to cover the northern
129-100, night well be a mine field to cover the northern
approach to Nagasaki. There are from 30 to 40 fathoms of
water and it was evident that all shipping asisiously
avoided this area, including our searching party of six
pingers, the hospital ship, and fishing vessels.

The hospital ship, on her approach from the west, made
a 500 to 600 change of course in order to clear this area
while standing into Nagasaki.

Even though we were not using out SJ or SD radar on our
approach to NOHO SAKI this morning, we were quite obviously
detected, undoubtedly by the 100 magnetic shore radar which
had established itself on us during the last six or eight miles
prior to diving. The TRAMMET's daring surface foray into
those parts five days ago seems to have invigorated the non-
orable local defense commissioner, as was more than evident
by the aircraft activity encountered later that evening. The
most discouraging thing of the morning exercise was that in
the face of all these measures there was no shipping about
which was worth a torpedo. Two medium AKE were seen to ap-
proach Nagasaki from the north; an approach inaccessible
to submarines by reason of depth of water and mine fields,
but an approach that could be easily mined by our aircraft.

During the afternoon a float plane was seen patrolling
the area near us flying close to the water.

— page 287 —
14 June 1945 (Cont'd) 1947
: 1947
: 2021
: 2210
: 2219
: 0245

: 15 June 1945
: Lot. 3291315'N
: Long. 12905415'E

: After about ten minutes of strong 150 megacycle signal, the SJ contacted a high speed target, 1500 yards astern.

: - 10 -

— page 288 —
15 June 1945 (Cont'd)
This target was tracked to be circling over our highly visible phosphorescent wake. The commanding officer decided that there had been enough of this foolishness, so dived to await daylight when the advantage of Vesprador equipment could be conbated by the naked eye. This was a far cry from the happy days when we had the night time advantage by reason of our far superior radar equipment. I firmly believe that these aircraft were being attracted by our S.J radar (our SD-2 was not being used).

0514 Surfaced.

0627 Divd to make submerged patrol off ONIKI: AN.

1530 Surfaced in poor visibility and commenced sweep with our SJ radar.

1625 Sighted a small patrol craft at about 6,000 yards and dived.

1630 Sighted RUFE type plane circling our diving point. This, again, is empirical proof that Japanese aircraft in this area D/F our SJ radar transmission.

1950 Surfaced, and commenced investigating coasting standing to the south from two to four miles off the coast. Investigated all harbors on route.

16 June 1945

Lat. 31°44'15"N
Long. 129°52'30"E

0135 Sighted exhaust flames of aircraft close aboard and dived, surfacing one hour and ten minutes later.

0700 Submerged for patrol off KOSHIKI RETTO, surfacing at several times during the day, to take advantage of poor visibility.

1955 Surfaced and set course for our next area in East China Sea on the SHANGHAI-NAGASAKI traffic route.

17 June 1945

Lat. 32°06'00"N
Long. 126°37'30"E

It was planned to dedicate our five-day patrol in this area to an attempt to intercept large surface ships that were undoubtedly making the SHANGHAI-NAGASAKI run by the most direct route. It was reasoned that they un-

— page 289 —
17 June 1945 (Cont'd)
dountedly had ten contingent radar-recceivers and had, by the use of these receivers, successfully avoided our patrolling submarines. To this end, our APR-5AX was reinstalled in the conning tower and connected to the SJ antenna to intercept their 10 centimeter radar. Unfortunately, no contacts were made. The commanding officer is more prone to blame the malfunctioning of the equipment than the plan itself. While in this area, much success was had by contacting Navy patrol bombers by VHF.

18 June 1945

Two small, unidentified boats were sighted, suddenly emerging from a fog bank. An end-around on these boats was attempted on occasional visual bearings, necessitated by a maximum SJ range of 7,000 yards and a varying visibility of from 5,000 to 15,000 yards. These boats changed course radically three times, probably on sight contact with us. The third time they contacted a fog bank, after which we lost all contact. Continued four engine speed for two more hours before the search was discontinued.

By reason of our having lost these two contacts on an attempted end-around the rather obvious point is that an end-around should not have been attempted in such conditions of visibility, but that we should have immediately engaged them in a gun battle. However, we were particularly dis-rious of making a submerged approach for a much-needed fire-control drill, inasmuch as our fire-control system does not lend itself at all well to simulated drills. This, plus the fact that we were unable to identify the targets, made it seem best to conduct a submerged approach prior to a contemplated gun battle.

Fell in with U.S.S. DHUTA (SS335) and exchanged information. They had apparently engaged our two contacts by gunfire, but had broken off. The engagement when their 5-inch gun jammed.

19 June 1945

Lat. 31°58'30"N Long. 126°08'15"E

Unventful surface patrolling.

— page 290 —
20 June 1945
Lat. 31°58'00"N
Long. 126°09'45"E

Unventful surface patrolling.

21 June 1945
Lat. 32°00'15"N
Long. 126°27'30"E

22 June 1945
Lat. 34°21'45"N
Long. 124°01'15"E

Unventful surface patrolling.

23 June 1945
Lat. 34°21'30"N
Long. 124°06'15"E

Unventful surface patrolling.

24 June 1945
Lat. 34°15'30"N
Long. 123°51'15"E

Unventful surface patrolling.

25 June 1945
Lat. 34°37'15"N
Long. 125°11'45"E

Unventful submerged and surface patrolling off
DAIKOUZAN TO.

— page 291 —
26 June 1945
Lat. 34°00'00"N
Long. 126°40'00"E

'While cruising to the north of SISKU TO, we witnessed a large fire commence as a series of explosions. The bearing of this fire was plotted to be the town of SISKU. In a matter of minutes it started the whole town was ablaze in a tremendous fire. Occasional explosions were heard, which were followed by flames momentarily flaring up hundreds of feet. We assumed that this was a fire bomb raid and were greatly impressed with the sight, but felt that we could have been of more assistance had we known about the plans for this raid.

Submerged in southern entrance of one of the channels into the inland passage of the west coast of NOREA. Visibility was about 5,000 yards with both SI and SJ out of commission incident to returning. Sound gear was relied on for detection of contacts.

Pineging was heard to the south. SI was hastily put back in commission and on the first sweep a large target was picked up dead ahead at 2,800 yards. Simultaneously the pinings were passing down our sub-troop, slow target scan like this was a perfect set-up—a large, slow target and us inside the screen. Our target was tracked as best it might be with the ST radar alone and it was soon realized that this target was an island and the current was such that it had made it seem probable that the target had a speed of six or seven knots. Came to 40 feet for an SJ sweep with the intention of surfacing and giving chase to the pinger, when with a flash of flame and smoke, the SJ was raining gear expired. In twenty minutes the SJ was back in commission but all was clear except for our original target, the island.

Now that we had committed ourselves to the use of the SJ, the current being such that it was inadvisable to remain subcrewed, we surfaced and continued to patrol this channel in spotty visibility.

Contacted two friendly aircraft who said, by way of VHF, they had no contacts for us. Two hours later received a message over SISKU to the effect that aircraft had sighted two DE's and several small Icarus's anchored in a harbor about five miles from where we had been patrolling during the day.

Vent to battle stations and proceeded to the harbor's entrance to search the harbor thoroughly by use of the SJ in visibility which was not more than 1,000 yards. Nothing was detected in the harbor, although from our position in the harbor entrance, there could have been no ship anchored there which was more than 5,000 yards from us.

— page 292 —
26 June 1945 (Cont'd)
It was strange that these aircraft contacted two hours previously had not told us over the VHF of enemy ships in our vicinity. It also was strange that such a report should prove to be false. Perhaps the reporting aircraft had made an error in navigation and the aircraft we had contacted previously were Japanese. At the time of the contact we were somewhat suspicious of them for they:

(1) Had 161 navigable radar which came and went with them. Those could have been Bogies who often trail our search planes.

(2) They demanded authentication and were the first of the many friendly planes we had contacted to do so. They would not give us authentication, however, even after we had authenticated properly.

(3) The airman's accent was not thought to be a truly American one at the time.

(4) They would not give us their call even though asked for it.

Set course for our new patrol area off CHOSNA Kail.

27 June 1945
Lat. 37°51'15"N
Long. 124°43'45"E

Unventful surface patrolling ten miles off CHOSNA Kail.

23 June 1945
Lat. 37°56'15"N
Long. 124°17'30"E

While patrolling on surface ten miles off CHOSNA Kail sighted two medium AOKs, two small AOKs and one identified escort rounding CHOSNA Kail from the north and standing into the restricted inland passage that skirts the west coast of OKDA. Our only chance of intercepting this convoy was at a point some 25 miles to the south where this inland passage is partially open to the sea. Next ahead on four engines, and aided by a two knot southerly set, we arrived at this point about one-half hour before sunset but no convoy was sighted. They had either been aided by a four or five knot set (which was not unlikely, inasmuch as we had a two knot set in the open sea), or they had anchored. The most likely anchorage was JULI TO, to which we proceeded for investigation.

— page 293 —
23 June 1945 (Cont.)

2230 Arrived off Juni To and found no ships in the harbor. The night was intensely dark and a fishing fleet of at least 75 boats, all lighted, were occupying the eight fathom bank immediately to the south. An arc-light on Shosei To, about 10 miles to the northwest, commenced signalling. It certainly wasn't signalling to us, but it aided that 'Eerie' feeling. While we were off Juni To, three aircraft searched the area with their landing lights. We were certain that they were friendly, but we could get no response on VHF or IFF. The water was too restricted to make diving desirable, so we have to and played fishing boat for about 10 minutes. Their closest range was about 3000 yards, and it is doubtful that they picked us up.

2250 Retired to the west, dodging various units of the northern flank of the fishing fleet.

29 June 1945

Lat. 37°37'00"N
Long. 124°37'15"E

0435 Dived for submerged patrol, 6000 yards off Chosan Kan.

2045 Surfaced.

30 June 1945

Lat. 37°53'00"N
Long. 123°46'15"E

During this day and night the Sweepers held a Wolf Pack: exercise, sweeping the open sea route to Dairen from the south.

0805 Fell in with the U.S.S. PADDLE (SS263) and exchanged information by megaphone.

1 July 1945

Lat. 37°56'00"N
Long. 124°34'30"E

Conducting surface patrol three miles off Chosan Kan in limited visibility.

0744 Dived as visibility improved.

1050 Surfaced. Visibility had again deteriorated.

— page 294 —
1 July 1945 (Cont.)

1150
JK sound detected pinging to the north. Visibility about 500 yards. Went to battle stations and started closing the coast. ST picked up the first target at 5,000 yards. When the range got to 3,000 yards tracking was commenced with the use of the SJ radar. A sweep on the PFI showed six ships loosely in column. They were tracking on course 225, speed 8; angle on the bow 0°, range to nearest target 2800 yards.

1209
Convoy changed course to 184, again giving us a zero angle on the bow. To continue opening to the east would put us on Chosen Ko, so we reversed course and at 2500 yards rounded the convoy's bow for an attack on its starboard quarter. In the glassy sea our wake at 15 knots was tremendous and it seemed certain that they had been alerted by it. A seventh ship was picked up at 6,000 yards on the convoy's starboard quarter, but it appeared to be very much like the many fishing boats we had sighted, and to avoid it would have ruined our plan of attack, so it was ignored. The came in on the convoy's starboard beam and commenced firing at the largest ship, firing two torpedoes at each ship with a 10 spread either side of the MOT, to accommodate errors in torpedo speed.

1218-00
Fired Torpedo #1, 1320 starboard track, 390 right gyro, torpedo run 2900 yards.

1218-11
Fired second torpedo at first target.

1218-40
Fired third torpedo at second target, 1080 starboard track, 140 right gyro, torpedo run 2800 yards.

1219-09
Fired fourth torpedo at second target.

1219-33
Fired fifth torpedo at third target, 1450 starboard track 500 right gyro, torpedo run 4300 yards.

1219-45
Fired sixth torpedo at third target.

1221-05
Heard first torpedo hit.

1221-20
Heard second torpedo high.

1221-38
Fired seventh torpedo at fourth target, 990 starboard track, 10: gyro angle, 3300 yard torpedo run.

1221-45
Heard third torpedo hit.

1221-55
Fired eighth torpedo at fourth target.

SJ made a sweep prior to firing after tubes and reported all clear to the west, except for a fishing boat dead ahead. It was no time to worry about a fishing boat. Started opening on that course.

— page 295 —
1223
Hord a barrage of automatic fire, and shortly after saw the frightening sight of a"frigate bearing sharp on the starboard bow, emerging from the fog with a zero angle on the bow. "Lookouts below!" "All head flank! Left full- rudder!" Her fire was increasing in temoor. "Radar range 800 yards!" It was obvious she was going to ram us, and there was nothing we could do about it with our speed at seven knots, building up slowly. The Commanding Officer saw no other alternative, so ordered, "Dive the boat!" At this moment, the OOD, Lieutenant J.H.M. NASOI, USNR, saw that the frigate was turning away and yelled, "Don't dive! She's turning!" The order was quickly given: "Belay the dive!" "Right full rudder!" This maneuver suit us on an almost parallel and opposite course, with radar range just under 500 yards. By this time the frigate was firing a full battle practice, but miraculously enough, nothing seemed to hit us--most likely because of the tremendous deflection angle. The HADDO crew was watching out a full 15,3 knots, leaving a beautiful, low-hanging, brown smoke screen. The frigate started following us, and so on the form time stood down with the HADDO as guide, on course 300, the frigate astern at 1300 yards. Licking up speed, but still operating, and with another escort, unseen, but as large or larger than the frigate, on our port quarter at about 3500 yards.

1233
The after escort suddenly stopped and the norer frigat turned about to return to her companion. Shortly after, four depth charges went off, and there was only one target on the radar screen. He then turned to follow us, but by this time the range was about 12,000 y rds.

The fog was lifting and there remained only a few scattered banks. Assuming he was following our wake in smoke we swept from one fog bank to another, which resulted in our doubling back to pass within five miles of the scene of the attack.

Finally, we were out of all the fog, and into the crystal-clear afternoon. It was naked feeling. The escort had closed to 10,000 y rds at this time, so when he emerged from the fog bank, we dived.

Apparently he had had enough, for he did not follow our tracks, but went over to the coast where we saw and heard him, pinging for the rest of the afternoon.

Now, back to the targets:

1224-10
Hord the fourth torpedo hit.

1224-28
Hord fifth hit.

— page 296 —
1 July 1945 (Cont.)

1224-40 Heard two depth charges.

1224-57 Heard one depth charge.

1225-04 Heard two depth charges.

1225-15 Heard sixth hit.

1225-34 Heard seventh hit, which was followed by a tremendous surface explosion and many immediate smaller explosions. The concussion of that last explosion was such that it was only explosion noted and reported by the bridge during the time the target explosions and heavy black columns of smoke four hours later. Shortly after firing at the fourth target explosions and heavy black columns of smoke, the fire was soon from the bridge, and by the periscope watch, to rise several hundred feet above the fog bank from three ships. The only thing seen of the targets themselves was a funnel, mast, funnel, of one ship sighted over the cloud banks by the man on the periscope. This, however, disappeared shortly after its explosion.

2 July 1945

Lat. 38°03'15"N
long. 124°03'00"E

The HADDO was scheduled to shift across this date to be relieved off Chosan Kan by the U.S.S. TRUTA (SS421). It was reasoned that the TRUTA would not arrive on station until late afternoon, so the HADDO returned to Chosan Kan in the hopes of finding some remaining evidence of her attack the day before. On arrival at Chosan Kan at daybreak in a heavy fog it was found that an area three miles long was covered by an oil slick, despite a three to five knot current. This indicated one or more of the targets we sank yesterday was a tanker.

0743 Div'd 6,000 yards off Chosan Kan as visibility improved

0903 Surf'cod.

0934. Div'd.

1150 Heard pinging to the north, and commenced closing the beach.

1200 Sighted PC and whale-killer type escort passing us about 8000 yards, spaced 14, apparently steering by constant helm. Did not attack because of targets' size and excessive range.

— page 297 —
2 July 1945 (Cont.)

1623
Surfaced and set course through the entrance to the inland passage to initiate a gun attack against two forward landing junks who were about ten miles inside this land passage. One of them was anchored and apparently filled with 50 or more troops. The other was approaching the anchorage. We fired 16 rounds for 12 hits at the one underway, range 1600 yards, and 17 rounds for 9 hits at the anchored one, range 3600 yards. Because of reefs those were the close ranges we could obtain.

Firing was commenced at 1718 and ceased at 1751. Both targets were left capsized.

While firing at the second target, some distant gun fire was heard. No explosions were seen close aboard, so nothing more was thought of it. After our gun was secured and we were hot about to open water, some explosions were seen to fall about 4,000 yards astern. Finally, we scuttled the target for a PC sitting against a land background, 14,000 yards to the east. Apparently this was a close as he intended to get, for he was occasionally unmasking his after gun.

1902.
Fell in with the TRUTH and exchanged information with ViF. She told us she had four Jcp fighters some 30 miles to the north at about the same time as our gun attack - and we were so confident that there were no Jap planes in the area.

Set course for patrol station off Port Arthur.

3 July 1945
Lat. 38°27'15"N
Long. 124°16'45"E

1012
Sighted small Diesel trawler and manned, battle station surface.

1016
Fired one 40mm round across his bow, whereupon he hove to.

1022
Boarding party, consisting of Lieutenant J.H.M. H.SON, USNR; Edward O. DOLMUS, GML(T), USA; and Paul S. OEHART, MOHM(T), USA, boarded the boat and put seven marines on the crew in the trawler's dinghy. They were given bread and sausage. The captain was taken onshore. The ship's papers were confiscated as well as binoculars, the ship's cloak, and compass. The trawler was set afire, after three barrels of our fuel oil were dumped on deck. The trawlers cargo was too inaccessible for examination, but the ship's papers showed that she had cleared the port of Shanghai for an unknown destination.

— page 298 —
3 July 1945 (Cont'd)

1334    While on the surface in Laotiehschan Channel in poor visibility, QB picked up pinging to the north.

1338    SJ started tracking.

1340    Targets came into sight at 4500 yards. HADDO submerged and attempted to close at standard speed. The targets were identified as one PC and a small tanker in light draft. The were unable to close closer than 4200 yards. Soon afterwards the targets entered a fog bank and all tubes were made ready.

1408    Surfaced at four-engine speed in an attempt to close targets and fire while they remained in the local fog bank.

1414-00  Fired first torpedo at target, 1300 port track, 10 left gyro, range 2500 yards.

1414-09  Fired second torpedo.

1414-25. Fired third torpedo. No hits were heard. Torpedoes were fired into a slightly choppy sea with waves no more than one foot high. All torpedoes had a four-foot depth setting, but were seen to run most of the time on this surface, particularly the last one fired, which seemed to be a little too deep. The torpedoes were fired at 10 or 15 degrees off its course. The problem checked well with the TDC generating into the radar, showing no errors in either range or bearing for over two minutes. A spread of 10 was used to cover errors in torpedo speed. However, it seems most probable that the striking down of the torpedoes by their surface running caused the target to be missed. The firing set-up was not ideal, but it was imperative that the torpedoes be fired as quickly as possible to take advantage of existing visibility. Upon realizing the first three torpedoes had missed, another approach was commenced by coming up the target's starboard quarter. By this time the escort had come about and had closed to 1800 yards. Obviously she was alerted, so the HADDO changed course and opened out to the northwest where visibility appeared to be the poorest. The PC dropped a barrage of about 20 depth charges that seemed to make the deck come up and slap your feet - probably the effect of 23 fathoms of water rather than the size of the charge.

The fact that the escort was alerted seems to substantiate the assumption that the torpedoes ran all the way on the surface. This is in contrast to our previous attack in a glassy sea where all torpedoes immediately took their depth at four feet and could not be seen.

— page 299 —
4 July 1945
Lat. 38°46'15"N
Long. 121°35'30"E

Submerged for patrol 4,000 yards off shore at the southern edge of Dairen. Visibility was extremely poor.

JT picked up screws between us and the beach. Closed to within 1700 yards of the beach without seeing the target. It was probably a small fishing boat.

Surfaced and opened to the south and in poor visibility.

Dived.

Surfaced.

5 July 1945

Lat. 38°31'30"N
Long. 121°02'30"E

Dived for submerged patrol of the Laotichishan Channel.

Surfaced in poor visibility for a battery charge and fresh air.

Sent lookouts below and dived the boat.

It was discovered that FORTER, Elton Sherman, Jr., 577 43 77, SS2, USNR, was probably missing. He had been after lookout at the time of the dive so we immediately surfaced and returned to the diving point.

Commenced searching for missing lookout at two-engines speed, using Lira DRT to effect thorough area coverage. The sea was state "3" and visibility not more than 300 yards.

Curner C. C. WOLBER, USNR, J00D, sighted a man in the water on the port beam, at a range of 1000 yards. This was a most remarkable sighting, in that visibility could not have been more than 500 yards and that neither he nor anyone else sighted the man again until the range had closed to about 500 yards. Lieutenant J.H.L. NASON, USNR, dived into the water and assisted FORTER on board. FORTER had used rare good judgment in inflating his trousers and thus being able to retain afloat for a period of three hours and 16 minutes.

The fact that FORTER had blown up his trousers had probably made him more susceptible to the effect of the wind and hence his drifting some 3,000 yards from the point of dive. FORTER was in surprisingly good condition at the time of his recovery, despite the fact that the injection was 65°.

— page 301 —
7 July 1945 (Cont.)

This convoy apparently consisted of three or more escorting ships. The HUDD set course for Point atroits, where it was planned to intercept this convoy. The TRUTH set course for very little submarine activity in Pasic Strait, it was decided to rendezvous with the TRUTH at her assumed 2300 position, rather than to exchange messages on the PLAN and thereby risk alerting the Japanese to the fact that there was submarines in that vicinity.

8 July 1945

Let. 38-34°00"N
Long. 121°07'00"E

0005
Capt. noted U.S.S. TRUTH (SS-21) by J.S., and notified her of such information as we had on the convoy. The TRUTH replied that she was returning to Pasic Sea. The TRUTH was not contacted during this night.

0544
Gathered in fair visibility for patrol of Lootelissiean Channel.

0732
There in line of 3000' and set course on that bearing.

0739
Advised convoy at 15,000 yards, angle on this bearing 30° steerings. Ships identified in this convoy were two DD's, one large tanker, and one medium tanker.

0740
Turned course to 010° ten yards and passed steamer in an attempt to intercept this convoy. It passed Kraitulik Peninsula.

0942
After two hours of running at steamer's speed, convoy passed close aboard Kraitulik Peninsula at 5 miles from HUDD of about 9,000 yards.

1939
Surfaced and set course to the coast, and message to TRUTH telling of convoy and that, in the absence of further instructions, we would make another attempt to patrol of Lootelissian Channel in this morning. Shortly thereafter we received a message from the TRUTH directing us to depart from the coast.

— page 302 —
9 July 1945
Lat. 38°59'45"N
Long. 123°30'15"E

Received message from TRIMBLE telling us parmission was reported to conduct subaerial patrol in the norning and that she would also conduct submerged patrol to the east of DARTNEY. By this time it was too late to return to LADYTHSH. CHANNEL, so during the day a surface sweep was made along the 20 friday bank at the northeastern edge of the Yellow Sea. Nothing was sighted on this sweep with the exception of the bow of a ship which appeared to have been sunk for at least a year.

At sunset set course south to depart area.

Exchanged calls by SJ with U.S.S. SPOT (SS413) and U.S.S. QUEENFISH (SS393), who were patrolling off CHOSHI KAI.

10 July 1945

Lat. 35°00'45"N
Long. 124°39'15"E

While making passage north of S.ISHU TO, SJ made a contact at 15,000 yards, 000° T.

Went to four-engine speed and changed course to north by reason of its unsteady characteristics and the fact that it appeared to be stopped.

ODD and quartermaster simultaneously sighted a torpedo wake on the starboard bow. The rudder was put left full and course changed to south. Torpedo wake passed astern and was kept in sight for over one minute. Simultaneously with sighting the torpedo wake SJ radar interference was received from approximately the same bearing as the wake. Exchanged calls by way of SJ with the U.S.S. S.S. ROBBIN (SS407). We signalled to her, "Did you fire a torpedo at us?", whereupon she replied: "Man your SCR 610"; which we construed as tacit admission. No success was had with communication on SCR 610 and the HADDO came to course east to close the S.S.S. ROBBIN. Later she replied by SJ that she had NOT fired the torpedo.

Passed through large gasoline slick in the water.

— page 304 —
15 July 1945
Lat. 17°27'15"N
Long. 143°47'00"E

Uneventful surface cruising, three engines by day and one by night.

16 July 1945

0900 Entered Apra Harbor. Completed HADDO ninth war patrol

— page 312 —
35 -

CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. HADDO
Time, 1218(I);
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2
Date, 1 July, 1945;
Lat., 38-08;
Long., 124-38 E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Contact made by JK sound while running on the surface in a fog. 3J radar manned and a convoy of six ships was seen on PPI scope. Appeared to be five medium cargo ships and one escort. Seventh ship, trailing convoy on starboard quarter, was first seen from the bridge at 800 yards.

Ships Probably sunk: Four Unidents.

Damage Determined by: Saw three separate explosions from the bridge above fog bank on bearings of first three targets, porisocope watch saw LFI clove fog bank and huge explosion with resulting loss from sight of LFI on bearing of first target. Heard timed hits on fourth target and felt terrific concussion from explosions on the bridge. Following day oil slicks two miles long wore seen despite 3.5 knot current.

Target Draft, Unknown; Course, 1840T; Speed, 8.2 knots; Range, 2440 to 3500 yards.

Own Ship Data

Speed, 7.5 to 19 knots; Course, 0990T, 2810T, Depth, Surface, Angle, 0.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Dry surface radar attack in fog using 3J radar bearings and ranges fed into the ICRK 4-0 TDC. Chocking solutions by feeding TDC generated ranged and bearings into 3J LK 3 range transmitter and tricining controller was mainly responsible for the high percentage of hits on this attack.

— page 313 —
1. Tubes Fired
   - Tubes Fired: 133 S 135S 1083 1103 1453 1465 995 1023
   - Gyro Angle: 39R 40R 14R 15R 50R 49R 1R 6R
   - Depth Set: 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
   - Power: 28 Kts 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
   - Hit or Miss: Hit Hit Hit Hit Hit Hit Hit
   - Erratic: No No No No No No No No
   - Mark Torp.: 18-2 18-2 18-2 18-2 18-2 18-2 18-2 18-2
   - Serial No.: 99932 58239 99973 99954 100084 99939 57456 100157
   - Lark Exploder: 8-7 8-7 8-7 8-7 8-7 8-7 8-7 8-7
   - Serial No.: 16609 16771 16377 10831 16579 16617 16539 15147
   - Actuation Set: Contact
   - Actuation Actual: Contact
   - Mark Warchead: 18-2 18-2 18-2 18-2 18-2 18-2 18-2 18-2
   - Serial No.: 6330 6267 6051 6091 6202 6332 6160 5910
   - Explosive: TFX TFX TFX TFX TFX TFX TFX TFX
   - Firing Interval: 1 11 0 29 0 12 0 17
   - Type Spread: Divergent
   - | ER | EL | ER | EL | ER | EL | ER | EL
   - Sec Condition: Glassy Calm
   - Overhaul Activity: S3PH
   - Remarks:
   - Title of Run: 3-05 3-09 3-05 4-47 4-43 3-37 3-39
   - Tcrp Run: 2878 2940 2878 4465 4400 3377 3407
   - Electrolyte Temp.: 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
   - Injection Temp.: 54 54 54 54 54 54 54

The first two torpedoes were seen to breach on low-lying the tube but sought their depth before 200 yards. All other torpedoes took their 4 foot depth nicely.

- 36 -

— page 314 —
U.S.S. HADDO
Time, 1414(T); Date, 3 July, 1945; Lat.,38-27 N; Long., 121-00 E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted:

Description: One small tanker in light draft.

Ships Sunk: Non

Ships Probably Sunk: None

Damage Determined by: None

Target Draft, Unknown; Course, 190°T; Speed, 7.3 knots; Range, 2710 yds.

Own Ship Data

Speed, 9 knots; Course, 240°T; Depth, Surface; Angle, 0.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Dry surface radar attack using 5T radar bearings and ranges fed into the LARK 4-0 TDC.

- 37 -

— page 315 —
1. Tubes Fired
   - Tracks Angle: 1° 30' 15"P
   - Gyro Angle: 1° 14' 4"
   - Depth Set: 4° 28 knots
   - Power: 4
   - Hit or Miss: Miss
   - Erratic: No
   - Mark Torp: 16-2
   - Serial No.: 100093
   - Mark Exploder: 8-7
   - Serial No.: 16632
   - Actuation Set: Contact
   - Actuation Actual: 16-2
   - Mark Verhead: 6015
   - Serial No.: 6227
   - Explosive: TEX
   - Firing Interval: 0
   - Type Spread: Dive: 3/4 R
   - Sea Conditions: Force 1
   - Overhaul Activity: 3/4 R
   - Force 1: 1
   - Force 1: 1
   - SDPH: 3/4 L

Remarks:
- Time of run: 7:10
- Torpedo run: 7:10
- Electrolyte Temp.: 64°
- Injection Temp.: 64°

Torpedoes were fired into a state "on" sea with waves no more than a foot high. Torpedo #99095, fired from tube no.5 with a 4 foot depth setting breached and ran on the surface, swerving about 15 or twenty degrees either side of its course. No unusual noises were heard in the forward torpedo room as the torpedo was fired. The other two torpedoes also ran about half the time on the surface, and had four foot depth settings. The escort was immediately alerted which indicated that the torpedoes were running surfaced when near the target. Visibility at the time was not over 1,000 yards.

The problem had trecked nicely having generated for two minutes without cav at a 20 minute bearing error or a 50 yard range error. It is submitted that the lessons were caused by slow torpedo speed causing a slight error in the seas. The torpedoes were spaced one degree each way from the IOT, but the torpedo spaced forward which would have been spread to compensate for slow torpedo speed was the one that was soon to run partially erratic.

— page 316 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. HADDO
Time, 1719(1);
GUN ATTACK NO. 1
Date, 2 July, 1945; Lat, 38-02 N; Long, 124-41 E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Sunk: Two (2) PEBBLE type (0,N.I, 208-J Supplement No. 2, FAR EASTERN SHALL CRAFT, page 179. No.1 - 300 tons, No. 2 300 tons.

Damage Determined by: Targets were seen to capsize and sink in shallow water.

Details of Action

Target No. 1
Gun 3"/2
Rounds 16
Type Annunition 1650 yards
Ranges 12
Hits 9

Target No. 2
3"/25
16
H. F. Fuzes
1650 yards
9

The Fire Control System used was the HADDO Bearing Rate - Range system. Using SJ radar the problem was set up on the T.D.C. and the bearing rate determined from the Bearing Rate Indicating device. The Fire Control Recorder is the Conning Tower used the Bearing Rate Range cards formulated from bearing rates and range tables for the 5"/25 and determined the collection for the opening shots at each target. Detection and range were transmitted to the sight-settler over the 1/2 circle system. Spots were made from periscope observations at the corrections entered in the Fire Control Recorder's table. The sight-settler was transmitted to the sight-settler. Collection accurate, with remarkably good, range error being the primary cause of the near misses.

- 39 -

— page 317 —
32-39 N. Long lost in the usual areas in the southern part of the Yellow Sea. One fairly new floating mine was observed five miles off Oniki Wan.

| NO. | DATE  | TIME (GMT) | LATITUDE | LONGITUDE | REMARKS |
|-----|-------|||||
| 1   | 6/4/45 | 0645      | 29-33-30 N | 135-40 E  | Sank with 40 MM Guns |
| 2   | 6/5/45 | 2238      | 29-26-45 N | 131-54-30 E | Avoided |
| 3   | 6/15/45 | 2118      | 32-14-00 N | 129-51-45 E | Avoided |
| 4   | 6/18/45 | 0045      | 31-54-00 N | 126-30-45 E | Avoided |
| 5   | 6/21/45 | 0955      | 32-50 30 N | 126-06-30 E | Avoided |
| 6   | 6/21/45 | 1124      | 32-59-45 N | 125-59-15 E | Avoided |
| 7   | 6/21/45 | 1210      | 33-12-30 N | 125-57-15 E | Avoided |
| 8   | 6/24/45 | 0633      | 34-04-00 N | 124-04-30 E | Avoided |
| 9   | 6/24/45 | 0640      | 34-02-00 N | 124-04-45 E | Avoided |
| 10  | 6/24/45 | 0644      | 34-01-30 N | 124-04-30 E | Avoided |
| 11  | 6/24/45 | 0700      | 33-59-30 N | 124-06-10 E | Avoided |
| 12  | 6/24/45 | 0709      | 33-59-45 N | 124-09-15 E | Avoided |
| 13  | 6/24/45 | 0721      | 34-00-30 N | 124-13-15 E | Avoided |
| 14  | 6/24/45 | 0740      | 34-00-45 N | 124-16-30 E | Avoided |
| 15  | 6/24/45 | 0800      | 34-01-00 N | 124-21-30 E | Avoided |
| 16  | 6/24/45 | 0901      | 34-07-00 N | 124-21-30 E | Avoided |

— page 318 —
17 6/24/45 1102 34-09-30 N 124-23-00 E Sank with 40 LMG, Very loud explosion
18 6/25/45 1104 34-22-00 N 125-07-30 E Probably sunk by 30 caliber gun-f. re - did not explode.
19 6/27/45 2015 35-51-30 N 126-16-00 E Avoided
20 6/27/45 2018 35-51-30 N 126-16-00 E Avoided
21 7/10/45 1015 33-52-15 N 125-58-15 E Avoided

(J) ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES AND EW-SION TACTICS
While off Nagasaki at night two torpedoes were fired at us, probably from aircraft. The night was dark but the water was highly phosphorescent.

Again off Nagasaki we were hunted by six pinging whale-killer type ships. They were undoubtedly alerted by the surface search radar on Nome Saki.

After our attack on a convoy off Choson Kan a frigate to keep from doing so, and he had to change course to five miles when HADDO dove. This frigate gave chase and had closed off diving and carefully avoided that position for the remainder of the afternoon. Again near Choson Kan a PC fired many rounds at us from extreme range and showed no desire to get any closer. Apparently the Jap escort vessels are developing a respect for submarines. This, however, does not lessen the respect the commanding officer has for Jap depth charges, particularly in shallow water.

North of Saishu To two stationary radar targets were encountered at ranges of around 10,000 yards. While investigating one of those targets, HADDO had a torpedo fired at her from a baring of about 45 degrees from the target. Both targets had an unsteady characteristic which caused the belief that they were radar reflectors.

TDC and plot from targets noted are listed as follows:

| TYPE TARGET | RPH | SPMD (KTS.) (TD3 & PLOT) |
||-----||
| AP-UN 2     | 156 | 8.5                         |
| AH (UNK)    | 145 | 12.5                        |
| Escort (UNK)| 162 | 12.0                        |
| PC         | 194 | 12.0                        |
| PC         | 136 | 7.5                         |
| DE         | 148 | 8                          |

- 41 -

— page 319 —
1. Hull and Machinery.
The like 7 armastor gyro compass azimuth, follow-up motor failed to operate on June 28. Source of trouble was traced to a frozen shaft bearing. Motor was replaced from on board spares, and compass performed satisfactorily.

On two occasions during the patrol, the bow planing tiltering mechanism failed to operate. On both occasions a broken contractor arm on the dynamic braking relay was discovered and replaced from spares.

The type four periscope leaked salt water excessively the entire patrol during submerged operation. Various remedies were sought including applying of different greases in varying amounts to the scope barrel and grease connections, filling in scribe marks on the barrel with tackiwax, and honing down scratches on the barrel. Between the time of initial installation at Ibaro Island and the start of the patrol, the periscope was removed from the ship five times because of binding in train and resultant deep gouges in the scope barrel. The last overhauling activity, Sub Base Pearl, removed most of the gouges and all the binding in train. "Neither the excessive leakage is caused by the inefficiency of the Gerlock packing or the remaining gouges on the scope barrel has yet to be determined.

The standard Navy binocular is used for bridge use as not possible the watertight qualities required for all-watch or during a patrol. By constant vigilance on a binocular carrying from rain or fog and by immediate use of a binocular carrying from air or exposure to moisture, most of the binoculars can be kept in commission. The like 90 binocular used with the like 8 T3T is watertight and possesses excellent optical qualities; the provision of as good a binocular for all-watch bridge use is a necessary and highly desirable item.

No. 4 Engine Lub Oil Pump Failure - First indication of casualty was No. 4 engine lub oil pressure dropping to zero. The engine was stopped and inspection showed following results: After the lub oil and plate cover was removed, the drive gear could be rotated by hand. The lub oil pump was then removed; the extended and splined drive gear shaft was discovered to be broken off one and one half inches inside the hub of the lub pump drive gear in the cam shaft drive. An extractor tool and nut was turned out on the lathe, drive shaft removed, and spare pump installed.

The O.C.M. required the constant services of a qualified repairman to keep it operating. Most of the trouble was caused by the erratic functioning of the stopping contacts and stepping contact paws which required constant adjustment. It is believed the 20M with a coverter basket would be a more mechanically reliable unit.

— page 320 —
2. Ordnance and Gunnery
During Torpedo Attack No.1, Mk 18-2 torpedoes numbers 57380 and 100132 exploded prematurely after 15 second runs. Torpedoes were fired into a force 3 sea, depth set 4 feet, own speed 1.8 knots, submarine depth 60 feet, angle 0.

The submarine explosion from number 2 torpedo caused tube number 3 to fire. Tube number 3 muzzle door then would close only 45 degrees, and observation through the sight glass flood ports in the breech door showed what appeared to be torpedo tail vances in the muzzle of the torpedo tube. Upon surfacing, inspection of the shutter 2 muzzle door (no more, no obstructions could be seen, and the muzzle door closed easily after this inspection. It is believed the obstruction worked clear upon surfacing in the heavy seas. No marks or defects were found inside the tube except for a slight burr on the stop bolt. The stop bolt was replaced and the tube reloaded. The tube was fired twice on attacks after this experience and both firings were normal.

Hk 18-2 torpedo no.99895 fired while on the surface from tube one,5 breached and ran on the surface swerving twenty degrees either side of its base course. Seas were force 1, depth set 4 feet, own speed 8.5 knots.

On 10 June, 1945, the air flask pressure of Mk 18-2 torpedo no.100093 was found to have dropped to 1600 psi. The air was bled from the torpedo and work begun on tightening the air leads in the aft torpedo. While tightening the leads to the stop valve, the wrench slipped from the nut and shorted across the electric leads to the starting switch causing the motor to start. The propeller lock being installed, the torque of the motor starting shorted the after propeller shaft forward of the after propeller hub. The wrench was removed from the leads immediately and power was on the motor only two or three seconds. The tail assembly of the torpedo and the propeller shaft were removed. The main propeller shaft was cut off aft of the forward bow gear hub and drilled and tapped for a new after shaft. A new after propeller shaft was turned out on the lathe and installed. The torpedo, fired on the surface with a 4 feet depth setting, breached on leaving the tube but sought its depth and ran hot, straight and normal thereafter.

— page 322 —
1. The VHF functioned well during the first half of the patrol, but the oxide rectifier supplying voltages to the band isolator and the tube filaments failed to supply proper voltages during the latter half and no suitable spare is carried aboard. The failure of this rectifier caused a decrease in receiver gain and improper operation of the band isolator. In view of the important task assigned this piece of communications equipment, it is felt that sufficient spares should be supplied to keep the stock in working order. None were available during our overhaul.

A.PR-1 and A.PR-5AX - The A.PR-1 turned in its usual steady performance and, despite a dearth of contacts during the latter half of our run, continues to be a most valuable piece of equipment.

The A.PR-5AX was unsatisfactory during the entire run due to continued burning out of crystals and oscillator tube filaments. The former difficulty was traced to the simultaneous use of the 5-AX and SJ, and a procedure was introduced in which the 5-AX antenna was removed while the SJ was in operation. Apparently the 5-AX crystals are unable to stand the shock of the SJ signal. The source of trouble in the oscillator filaments has not been determined.

A.0 antenna system - The A0 low frequency antennas became grounded shortly after installation in Pearl Harbor. The readings were increased by the USS ORION during voyage repairs at Saipan where it was found that the low frequency beacons were flooded. The improvement was short-lived during the patrol run and it is believed that the beacons are again flooded. Better luck has been obtained with the high frequency A0's during the runs and those have been used continuously with the A.PR-1 giving good results.

SD - The SD turned in its usual satisfactory performance. One 6014-1 tube was replaced.

IFF - The IFF had only one minor casualty. The antenna switching field to work on two occasions keeping the BK from transmitting. The difficulty was found to be poor contact in the relay. The contacts were repaired and the BK-BK antenna shift took place as before.

(N) SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
1. Casually to QB and JK Training factors.
   During the patrol the QB head was trained at scanning speeds for long periods of time for T.D.H. gp.ration. At the time of the casualty the gear was in operation with the head lowered and the ship proceeding at standard and flank speed during evasive maneuvers. As a result of the excessive speeds, a water leak occurred through the packing gland around the QB.

— page 323 —
1. This is a training motor shaft. This caused the lower field coils to short out and burn through their insulation. The QB training motor was repaired by using the one good upper field coil from the J1 training motor. This worked satisfactorily until the line voltage load during a battery charge caused arcing between the coil and the frame, probably due to noise, until in the coil. The QB motor was taken down, the coil dried out and re-insulated with gylpitol, glass cloth wrapping, and 'fish' paper. It was reassembled and has operated satisfactorily since. Precautions have been taken however, to shut down motor training during a battery charge. Improvements in bilge drainage will be made during the next rofit. Due to the extreme value of the T.D.M., equipment and its constant use, it is deemed wise to carry one complete set of coils as part of equipment spares.

2. Sonar Gear Operations.

JT - This equipment operated satisfactorily throughout the patrol with the exception of slipping of the relative bearing dial on its shaft. This was remedied by removal of the dial and contact punching it to the shaft collar. Bearing accuracy was good. Fixation ranges varied from 5,000 - 15,000 yards depending on local sound conditions.

QB - This equipment was used consistently in conjunction with the T.D.M., during slow speed surface patrol with detection success as noted in the narrative. Submerged it was manned in the conning tower for detection of pingers and proved to be one of HADDON's leading contact markers.

JK-QB - This gear was manned in HADDON sound room (forward torpedo room) during slow speed, poor visibility, and surface patrol. It led to detection of 'pinging' escorts of attack #2. During the one submerged approach it was used for all around search. Only casualty experienced was with training motor (see QB, JX-QB training motor. causality) and this occurred late in the patrol.

(0) DENSITY LAYERS

Several unusually large thermoclines were noted on the B/T cards in the Yellow Sea. At periscope depth the average temperature change noted was.5°F. Four of the unusual cards noted at periscope depth were:

| TIME (I) | DATE  | LAT.  | LONG.  | THERMOCLINE |
||-------|-------|||
| 0430     | 6/15/45| 31-55 N| 126-08 E| 19°        |
| 0515     | 6/23/45| 34-15 N| 124-06 E| 24°        |
| 0500     | 7/3/45 | 38-22 N| 121-31 E| 24°        |
| 0430     | 7/9/45 | 39-06 N| 123-33 E| 26°        |

— page 324 —
(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY.
    'During the HADDO's recent overhaul much time and effort was spent in a project to improve the lighting and coloring in the conning tower, control room and wardroom. To, this end the assistance was enlisted of an interior decorator from the University of California, a color psychologist from the Naval Hospital, Mare Island, and a lighting engineer from the Helophane Company. The results wore most successful. Eyestrain in each of the compartments was out to a minimum. The cheerful and restful qualities of the color schemes wore greatly appreciated by all hands.

It is most heartily recommended that an immediate study be made of the lighting conditions and color effects aboard submarines. I have been told that such studies have been underway for some time. If so, it would be of interest to those making the survey to see what the HADDO accomplished in three months.

(Q) PERSONNEL
    (a) Number of men detached after previous patrol - 23
    (b) Number of men on board during patrol - 74
    (c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol - 47
    (d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - 53
    (e) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol - 20

The officers and crew of the HADDO are most deserving of praise from the commanding officer. Their aggressiveness toward meeting the enemy, their cheerfulness during a patrol filled with anxious moments and continuous mental strain, and their incessant efforts to keep the boat in top material condition wore an honest and actual inspiration to the commanding officer. The success of this patrol is theirs.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED
    Scipan to area - 1670 miles - 22320 gals.
    In area - 6489 miles - 61378 gals.
    Area to Guam - 1700 miles - 32303 gals.

(S) DURATION
    Days enroute to area......6
    Days in area......36
    Days enroute to Guam......5
    Days Sub. (8 hrs. or more)..19
    Days Sub. (4 - 8 hrs.)......3

— page 325 —
6 1k 15 4,000 gals. 10 days

(T) CONDITIONS, RADAR, AID SONAR COUNTER MEASURES

Radar Countermeasures
(1) There were too many signals encountered in the Kyushu Area for the situation to lend itself to intelligent analysis. In general, all contacts conformed with the frequencies and locations given in GinCpa - CincPoA RC: E-1 (Serial 003700 of 11/11/44), the outstanding exception being that no 10 cm. radar was encountered. The only signals received in area 12 were an infrequent 162 meg. signal in the Dairen - Fort Arthur area and an intermittently keyed 156 meg. signal of Daikokuuzan To.

(2) No jamming observed.
(3) No deception noted.
(4) No photographs of interest.

Communications Countermeasures
(1) The only enemy radio signals copied were jamming signals on our own frequencies.

(2) Enemy jamming.
a. Sub Fax - Jamming was experienced intermittently on all frequencies and was particularly effective when we were north of 34°N.

In the northern part of area 12, where radio reception was the most difficult, it was discovered that the Gun-Lecyed 9050 frequency was by far the best received with the least effective jamming. It was noted that this frequency, which is secured from 2 - 6 hours GMT, was the only daytime frequency that could be copied with any consistent degree of success in this most distant part of the area.

The majority of the jamming was the "C" type, although the "sweep through" type was sometimes employed.

b. Ship-Score - Uniformly good communications experienced except on the night of July 1, when at post 38°N, 124°E, enemy jamming prevented us from raising HF on 4235 or 8470 kcs. We finally made contact on 12705 kcs after nearly four hours of futile calling.

c. SAFPLAN - All frequencies were constantly but ineffectively jammed. Numerous aircraft contact reports and submarine transmissions were received on SAFPLAN frequencies.

(3) No deception noted.

— page 326 —
Sonar Countermeasures
None encountered.
(V) REMARKS

Notes of possible interest.
All "shootable" contacts were picked up by intercepting pinging, both while HADDO was surfaced and submerged.

SJ was generally used for two sweeps every three minutes when going from one area to another.

ST was used for surface sweep when on station.

Only enemy aircraft encountered while on the surface was while using the SJ. The SD was not used.

SJ was used when tracking targets inside of 3,000 yards, and when used for tracking, was used continuously. There is no evidence that this use of the SJ alerted the escorts.

ST is hazardous to use as a surface search by reason of its unstable tuning characteristics.

(Note: As far as HADDO is concerned the question of whether or not to use the SJ or the ST for surface search is still a debatable one. The above is just presented as observations and we draw no conclusions.)

The optical qualities of the type IV periscope is one of the most effective of recent improvements. As a surface search it widens the ship's horizons by many fold. A target can be picked up at a greater range with one foot of the type IV scope exposed than with ten feet of the attack scope. That has been repeatedly proved during this patrol.

— page 327 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division 341.
   To : The Commander in Chief, U.S. FLEET.
   Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron 34.
   (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
   (3) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

2. The ninth War Patrol of the USS HADDO was conducted in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea areas as a member of the coordinated attack group known as "Street's Sweepers" under the command of Lieutenant Commander John H. Street in the TIRANTE. The patrol was of forty-seven days duration of which thirty-six were spent in the area, and of the latter nineteen were spent submerged.

3. EXCELLENT area coverage with much time spent in foggy weather close to the not-too-well charted enemy shores produced an unusual total of nineteen separate contacts, which included many patrol craft and one hospital ship. Unfortunately of the contacts worthy of torpedo fire only three could be closed for attack.

4. ATTACK NO. 1. Early in the morning of 13 June while subjuggled off the southeast tip of Fukao Shima, pinning was heard and several minutes later two sets of masts were sighted in the air. The ship was identified as a Kaibokan No. 2 class frigate (LCC) and was selected as the target; the other, a smaller type, was not identified. At an average range of 1825 yards with an average 150° starboard track, two 14K 18-2 torpedoes set on four feet were fired. The second torpedo prematurely after fifteen seconds with a jolting explosion causing a third torpedo, which had been made ready, to fire. This torpedo also prematurely after a fifteen second run. The first torpedo resulted in a timed hit, but due to loss in depth control the target could not be observed. Following the timed-hit explosion only one set of scows were heard and the HADDO was ineffectively destroyed by only one ship.

— page 329 —
1/2/45
FIRST UNDERSEA SUBMERSIBLE
USS HADDO Report of
9th War Patrol

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of War Patrol
Number Nine.

track at a range of 2500 yards. Unfortunately no hits
resulted. All three torpedoes were seen to run much of
the time on the surface and this may have caused the misses.

4. In mid-afternoon of 2 July during an expert
"gun shot" which lasted only twelve minutes the HADDO sunk
two Pechili type small craft of approximately 300 tons each.

5. A total of 21 floating mines were sighted
during the patrol. On one occasion while submerged in 30
to 40 fathoms of water in position 32-39N, 129-40E contact
was made with an object which caused a loud scraping noise
as it passed down the side from forward aft. This may have
been part of a mine field.

6. On 5 July following a normal dive the absence of
the after look-out was discovered. The HADDO surfaced and
after three hours and sixteen minutes of well planned search-
ing in a heavy fog recovered the missing man, who in a time
of distress had shown exceptional coolness and presence of
mind by inflating his dungaree trousers and using them as a
life jacket.

7. The HADDO recovered four prisoners, two of whom
wore Naval ratings.

8. A now after propeller shaft was turned out on
the ship's lathe and installed in a Mk. 18-2 torpedo, replacing
a broken shaft. The torpedo, fired in an attack later, broached
on leaving the tube but sought its depth and ran hot, straight
and normal thorafater. This speaks well for the HADDO personnel

(3)

— page 330 —
9. The HADDO arrived in good material condition and the state of cleanliness and general appearance was outstanding. The.rofit will be conducted by Submarine Division 341 and the Fulton in the normal time.

: 10. The Administrative Division Commander takes pleasure in congratulating the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the HADDO on the successful completion of this most effective patrol carried out for the most part in shallow dangerous waters, and for the damage inflicted on the enemy.

J. W. BLANCHAID.

— page 332 —
1. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, reported to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, that the submarine HADDO was in the vicinity of the North Pacific Ocean, and that the submarine was in a state of readiness for action. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, ordered the submarine to report to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, for duty.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Ninth War Patrol (31 May to 16 July 1945).

1. The ninth war patrol of the HADDO, under the command of Lieutenant Commander F. C. Lynch, Jr., U. S. Navy, was conducted in the East China Sea - Yellow Sea areas. The HADDO along with the U.S.S. SEA OWL (SS405) and the U.S.S. TIRANTE (SS420) formed a coordinated attack group with the commanding officer of the TIRANTE as group commander.

2. With thorough and daring close inshore area coverage under foggy weather conditions the HADDO uncovered numerous enemy contacts during this outstanding patrol. Three torpedo and one gun attacks were made. Despite a Mark 18 pre-mature on the first attack which set off another Mark 18, one timed hit was obtained on a KAIBOKAN No. 2 Class frigate. On the second attack eight torpedoes were deliberately and carefully fired into a convoy of six ships under most adverse, foggy weather conditions and seven hits obtained. After this attack, skillful maneuvering, nerve and good luck saved the HADDO from a most persistent attack by a frigate type escort which suddenly came out of the fog close aboard. The short, but most effective gun action, accounted for two PITCHLI Type small craft.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers and crew of the HADDO for this daring and highly successful patrol. Due to the foggy weather conditions which prevailed, evidence of damage to the enemy is not as conclusive as might have been the case under better weather conditions. It is estimated, however, that the following damage to the enemy was inflicted during this patrol and the HADDO is so credited:

— page 333 —
1- PF (KILBOKAN No. 2 Class) (EC) - 700 tons (attack No. 1)
4- UN (Merchant Type - 4,000 tons each) - 16,000 tons (attack No. 2)
1- Escort Vessel (EU) - 1,200 tons (Separate Report)
2- MIS (FGHIII Type - 300 tons each) - 600 tons (Gun attack No. 1)

TOTAL SUNK: 18,500 tons

MERRITT COSTOCK, Deputy.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
(7)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(8)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(1)
(2)
(2)
(1)
(2)

— page 335 —
SS255/A16-3
Serial 022

DECLASSIFIED
From:  The Commanding Officer.
To:  The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  Official Channels.

Subject:  U.S.S. H.D.D.O. (SS255), Report of War Patrol
Number Ten.

Enclosure:  (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the tenth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the Empire Area during the period 10 August 1945 to 12 September 1945; is forwarded herewith.

PRINK LYNCH

DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.10
BY O.P. 0209 C DATE 5/9/42

DECLASSIFIED

— page 336 —
16 July 1945 from the Ninth War Patrol. U.S.S. FULTON (AS11) and SubDiv 341 commenced refit under the command of Lieutenant Commander L. R. VASRY, USN. During the refit a periscope TBT, manufactured by the United Shoe Machinery Company was installed on #2 by the United States Navy. On 31 July the crew returned from Camp De Ley Periscope, consisting of Captain James W. BLANCHARD, USN, ComSubDiv 341, and on 10 August the HADDO was ready for sea.

During the period 16 July to 10 August the following changes in officer personnel occurred:

20 July - Gunner Charles Orval WOLBARD, USN, received notification of his appointment for temporary duty to the rank of Ensign, USN, as of 15 June 1945.

21 July - Lt. (jg) Wallace Sherman WEAVER, USN, was transferred to Naval Drydocks, Terminal Island, San Pedro, California, for duty.

29 July - Lieutenant James Francis CALVIN, USN, reported aboard for duty from SubDiv 201.

31 July - Lt. Comdr. Richard Lee DOWNING, USN, was transferred to SubDiv 201 for duty.

1 August - Lt. (jg) John FordE CAROLAN, DE, USNR, reported aboard for duty from SubDiv 341.

4 August - Ens. Robert Taylor RHEA, Jr., DE, USNR, reported aboard for duty from SubDiv 342.

7 August - Lieutenant John Henry Mason NASON, DE, USNR, was transferred to SubDiv 341 for duty.

— page 337 —
4
CONFIDENTIAL
(B) NARRATIVE

OFFICERS
Name    Total No. of Patrols    Battle Station
LYNCH, Frank Curtis, Jr.,    8    Approx
Lt. Comdr., USNR

CALVERT, James Francis,    9    A. Approx
Lt., USNR

H.JUSSLER, Harry H., Jr.,    3    TDC
Lt., USNR

McCUNE, Joseph McCrary, Jr.,    3    Sound
Lt., USNR

VIERANZ, Alfred Colville    5    Radar
Lt., USNR

KELLER, John Gens,    2    Diving
Lt. (jg), USNR

HARTDEGEN, Carl III,    7    Plot
Lt. (jg), USNR

CAROLAN, John Forde,    1    Asst. TDC
Lt. (jg), USNR

RHEA, Robert Taylor, Jr.,    1    Rate Plot
Ens., USNR

WILBER, Charles Orval,    11    Repair
Ens., USNR

CHIEFS
Name    Total No. of Patrols    Battle Stations
MERRILL, William Clyde,    10    Hydraulic Minifold
272 42 97, CTM(AA)(T), USNR

NORTON, Alroy Andrew,    6    Air Manifold
376 01 58, CMOMM(AA)(T), USNR

POE, Gerald Gordon,    9    Repair Aft
382 53 00, CMOMM(AA)(T), USNR

SELEY, George Ernest,    6    Electronic Repair
606 94 23, CRT(AA)(T), V6, USNR

-2-

— page 338 —
10 August 1945
1458
Commander Sumitomo Force Pacific Fleet Operation Order #193-45 as Task Unit 17.1.41. HUDO was escorted by PC-824 from departure Apr 1. Harbor until 1930.

2000
News was received over the radio that the Japanese had sued for peace.

11 August 1945
Lt. 17-00-N
Long. 144-14-E

Uneventful.

12 August 1945
Lt. 20-11-N
Long. 140-23-E

Peace discussions continuing.

1350
Contacted U.S.S. BLACKFISH (SS221).

13 August 1945
Lt. 24-51-N
Long. 139-48-E

Uneventful. J-p-nose notified that the United Nations would accept their surrender.

14 August 1945
Lt. 29-57-N
Long. 138-22-E

1200
Arrived on lifeguard station. H.DDO had aircraft cover from 1428 until 1710 during bombing mission.

15 August 1945
Lt. 30-00-N
Long. 138-20-E

Remaining on lifeguard station.

1006
Received ComSubPac Serial 32 which directed that -11 offensive action be ceased.

-3-

— page 339 —
15 August 1945 (Cont.)
2030 Contacted friendly force of seven DD's and DD's.
16 August 1945
Lt. 30-04-N
Long. 137-00-E
During afternoon sank two mines and one belly tank with rifle fire.
2000 Set course for area "3" at two-engine speed.
17 August 1945
Lt. 32-52-N
Long. 139-20-E
1350 Pressed Hachijō Shimōn to starboard t-bout sixteens miles.
1700 Sank a floating mine with rifle fire.
18 August 1945
Lt. 37-18-N
Long. 142-04-E
Arrived in area "3". During the afternoon sank two mines by gunfire.
19 August 1945
Lt. 37-55-N
Long. 143-13-E
Sank two mines with gunfire.
20 August 1945
Lt. 38-10-N
Long. 143-22-E
Uneventful.
21 August 1945
Lt. 38-24-N
Long. 143-31-E
Uneventful.

-4-

— page 340 —
22 August 1945
Lt.: 38-15-N
Long. 144-17-E

: 23 August 1945
Lt. 38-00-N
Long. 145-00-E

Uneventful.

: 24 August 1945
Lt. 37-35-N
Long. 144-02-E

1810
Fall in with Trsk Group 38.1 which consisted of many battleships and aircraft carriers. HDDO operated a unit of this group for about two hours and enjoyed immensely the opportunity of seeing such a unit - the evolution of aircraft taking off and landing on the carriers was of particular interest.

: 25 August 1945
Lt. 38-06-N
Long. 143-45-3

: 26 August 1945
Lt. 37-43-N
Long. 142-35-E

Uneventful.

: 27 August 1945
Lt. 37-49-N
Long. 142-51-E

Uneventful.

: 28 August 1945
Lt. 37-50-N
Long. 142-38-3

0821
Fall in with U.S.S. M.N.S.F.I.D. (DD728) and scoured information.

-5-

— page 341 —
29 August 1945
During the evening calls were exchanged with the
RUNNER, MUSKALLUNGE and QUILLBACK.

: 30 August 1945
Fell in with "Bennie's Peacemakers", U.S.S. RUNNER,
Commander R.H. BASS, S.O.P.A., ARCHERFISH, CAVALLIA,
MUSKALLUNGE, GATO, TIGRONI, RAZORBACK and SEA C.T. Set
course for Tokyo Bay escorted by U.S.S. H.D.DOX.

: 31 August 1945
Moored in nest alongside U.S.S. PROTEUS in Tokyo Bay.
Later in the afternoon the tender and all submarines
shifted berths to Yokosuka Bay.

1 - 2 September 1945
Moored.

3 September 1945
Undorway in company with "Bennie's Peacemakers" en
route Pearl Harbor. One officer and twenty-four men
reported aboard as passengers for Pearl Harbor.

4 - 11 September 1945
Uneventful. Cruising in formation. U.S.S. RUNNER
O.T.C. and S.O.P.A.

12 September 1945
Arrived Pearl Harbor.

— page 343 —
1. ENGINEERING.
On 20 August the flexible drive shaft of #2 main engine
tachometer magneto sheared off on the magneto end. A solid shaft
was manufactured on board and installed in the magneto. Results
since this installation have been satisfactory.

2. Upon inspection of the torpedo the following were found:
all hand-hole spiders were bent so as to require straightening;
eighteen battery caps were broken; the hydrogen burner screen had
a hole in the side 1/4 inch by 1/8 inch; the battery compartment
after bulkhead was forced about 1/2 inch aft and had a hole where
the starboard battery track was partially torn loose; the wrench
after bulkhead was forced forward of its normal position, the
bulkhead studs having sheared off; battery acid was found on the
cell tops and under cell group 1-4; the battery had a 35 volt negative
ground and a 28 volt positive ground.

Due to the condition of the wrench the battery leads were
disconnected; the air bled from the air flasks; the exploder mechanism,
detonator, and booster removed; and the torpedo loadd into
Tube No. 2 for safety, the torpedo being ventilated twice daily while
in the tube.

The depth-setting spindle was bent when pulling the torpedo
from the tube and was replaced.

(L-M) R.DIO. AND R.D.R

ST - The ST operated well during the training period but was
not used during the patrol. It was, however, necessary to return it
several times to keep it in good operating condition.

SJ - This gear operated satisfactorily throughout the patrol.
The new training system and antenna control unit gave very good
service.

The regulated rectifiers do not regulate properly and cause
intermittent trouble in both ST and SJ radars. It was necessary
to continually readjust voltage output manually.

— page 344 —
1. The new RT-19/ARC-4 functioned very well throughout the patrol and was used many times communicating with aircraft and surface ships with good results. However, the SCR 624 gave poor results on tests with planes and negative results on tests with surface ships. This ship was unable to draw proper testing gear for either VHF set, but with the testing gear available, both sets give the same results, and the personnel of both the HIDDO and the U.S.S. FULTON are unable to understand the poor operation of the SCR 624.

2. The SCR 610 was not used during the patrol, but it operated satisfactorily during the training period.

3. PR-1 and PR-5.X - The PR-1 operated well as usual.

4. The ARC-5.X was used with some results but the high background noise made it ineffective with all but the strongest signals.

5. The location of the PR-5.X in the conning tower with selection of stub antenna (for accurate bearings) is practical and would be very effective with more satisfactory receiver.

6. AJO Antenna System - Poorly designed and tactically ineffective.

7. SD - The SD radar turned in its usually satisfactory performance. One set of transmitter oscillator tubes (8014) and two amplifier tubes in the pre-amplifier were replaced. It remains, however, obsolete.

8. IFF - The Mk. III IFF was tested with several planes and worked well during the patrol.

(N) SOUND GUARD AND SOUND CONDITIONS:

1. Sonar Gear Operation.

JT, JK-QC - These equipments operated very satisfactorily during the training period but were not used on patrol.

QB - This equipment was used constantly in conjunction with the TDM during the entire patrol. It was found that the QB training M-G set ran consistently hot. It is suggested that switching arrangement be installed to alternate the load between the QB and the JK-QC training M-G sets so that a casualty to one would not mean the loss of this important gear.

TDM - The equipment operated well during the patrol.

— page 345 —
1255 8/20/45 38-05-N 143-12-E 180
1527 8/26/45 37-30-N 142-28-E 310

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HEALTHBILITY

Food was well prepared and plentiful. There were no cases of injury or illness.

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men detached after previous patrol - 15.
(b) Number of men on board during patrol - 75.
(c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol - 47.
(d) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol - 16

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

Guam to area - 1248 miles - 15037 gal.
In area and to Tokyo - 4243 miles - 32831 gal.
Tokyo to Pearl Harbor - 3399 miles - 47375 gal.
(Pit log miles used.)

(S) DURATION

Days on route to area4
Days in area and to Tokyo17
Days en route to Pearl Harbor from Tokyo....10
Days submcrged0

(T) FACTORS OF E'DURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor

14 Mk. 18 31569 gal. 40 days 40 days
6 Mk. 14 5 Mk. 27

Limiting factor this patrol - dispatch orders.

(U) COMMUNICATIONS, RADAR AND SONAR COUNTER-MEASURES

1. Communications Counter-measures.

(a) No enemy jamming or communications counter-measures were encountered on any circuit and reception was good on Sub Fox, Sarplan and Lifeguard frequencies.

-10-

— page 346 —
1. COMMUNICATIONS, RADAR, NO SONAR COUNTER-MEASURE (N.M.) (U) (b) Ship-shore were good except on the night 22-August when the over-rowing of all ship-shore frequencies necessitated three-hour delay in clearing a message.

(c) No deception noted.

2. Radar Counter-measures.

(a) Several week signals were encountered in "3" which in general conformed with location given in J'prnase Shore-Based Radar Notations (Cinepce File A22-1(2)/A8).

(b) No jamming observed.

(c) No deception noted.

— page 348 —
11/jhc
FC5-10/416-3
Serial: (C301)
CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND TRANSMISSION TO:
U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) -
Report of War Patrol
Number: Ten.

From: [Name]
To: [Name]
Via: [Name]

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of War Patrol

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Division FORTY-FOUR.
2. The Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. HADDO upon the completion of that vessel's Tenth War Patrol.

G. F. PETERSON

— page 349 —
12-10(A)/A16-3(18)
Serial 02361
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
HADDO - Report of
Tenth War Patrol.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. (925) Rennumbered 898
U.S.S. HADDO - Tenth War Patrol.
File by old no.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDO (SS255) - Report of Tenth War Patrol
(10 August to 12 September 1945).

1. The tenth war patrol of the U.S.S. HADDO, under the command of Lieutenant Commander F. C. Lynch, Jr., U.S. Navy, was to have been conducted in waters south of the Japanese Empire.

2. HADDO had been on station but one day when orders to cease hostilities were received. 'No enemy shipping was sighted nor was there any occasion for lifeguard services. Seven drifting mines were found all of which were destroyed.

3. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is not authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, is pleased that the HADDO, who in ten war patrols in all theaters of action has inflicted great damage on the enemy, had the opportunity to be present at the final capitulation of the Japanese Empire. The commanding officer, officers, and men of HADDO may well be proud of the combat record of their ship.

G. C. CRAWFORD,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports) (7) SUBAD, HI (2)
(Complete) (5) ConsubspacSubordcon (3)
GNO (6) All Squadron and Div.
Cinepac (1) Commanders, Pacific (2)
JICPOA (1) ConsubSpTrGr (airmail) (5)
ADICPOA (1) Substrance (2)
Conservpac (1) All Submarines, Pacific (1)
Cinclant (8)
Consublant (2)
S/N School, NL (2)
CO, S/N Base, PH (2)
Consopac (1)
Consowospac (1)
Consubs?thFlT (Fwd Echelon) (2)
Consubs?thFlT (Rear Echelon) (2)
Connorpac (1)
Consubspac (3)
ConsubspacAcond (20)

E. L. HYNES, 2nd.,
Flag Secretary.

— page 354 —
1 July 1915
NAME: HADHO
FROM: C.O. USS HADDO (SS-255)
SERIAL: COI
DATE: 16 July 1915
SUBJECT: SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT, Forwarding of the Last Cina Sea and Yellow Sea areas. Claims sinking of one escort of five ship convoy in Lat.38.08N, Long. 124.38E.
(CENPAC: SUBS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately as Enc. to SUBPAC ser 0021/0 of 28 Jul 15

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT: 0001 FOB 3/30/15 (11-55)

— page 355 —
55255/10-3
serial 001
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

Title: Declared Secret
Date: 22 April 1944
To: The Secretary of the Navy, U.S. Dept. of the Navy
From: The Secretary of the Navy, U.S. Dept. of the Navy
Subject: The Secretary of the Navy, U.S. Dept. of the Navy
Reference: ( ) subject
Description: ( ) subject
Source: ( ) subject
Date: 22 April 1944
Source: ( ) subject
Date:

— page 358 —
22-7/16-3
Serial: 00/37
SEGRET
From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
To: The Commander SEVENTY-FIFTEEN.

Subject: Special Report Covering Activities of U.S.S. HADDO, from 0000(H) 8 April, 1944, to 0000(H) 11 April, 1944, Forwarding of.

Reference: (a) USS HADDO Secret Itr, A16-3, Serial CCL, dated 22 April, 1944.

Enclosure: (A) Original copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) Is forwarded herewith.

P. G. NICHOLS,
Chief of Staff.

— page 360 —
20 August 1944

HARDER arrived off C.P.2 CLIVITE on 20 August, 1944, and, other through information received from RAY or GUITARO, or from our observation, learned that a large convoy was anchored for the night in P.L.U.N.DAY on the south coast of C.P.2 CLIVITE, HINDORO ISLAND.

2155 HADDO, proceeding north through HINDORO STRAIT, was told by HARDER, via voice radio, to rendezvous 15 miles southwest of C.P.2 CLIVITE. HADDO went ahead at full power and on

21 August 1944

0130 HARDER and HADDO effected rendezvous. HARDER outlined the following plan of attack, presupposing a dawn sortie in the direction of HINIL:

HADDO was to attack from the southwest, HARDER from the west, and RAY and GUITARO from northwest

— page 361 —
22 August 1944

HARDER and HADDO, in company, proceeding north past ANILA.

0130 "Both HARDER and HADDO made simultaneous radar contact on three ships to the northward. HARDER took station on port quarter and HADDO on starboard flank of convoy. Convoy tracked by HADDO to be on course 115 miles 11.5 knots towards ANILA.

3

— page 362 —
0330
HADDO informed HARDER that it considered targets too small due to size of radar pips. HARDER replied that he was not convinced. HADDO commenced trailing 6,000 yards astern until at

0335
HARDER gave a convincing demonstration of his judgment by getting one hit in the port screen. HARDER then fell back and at

0424
HADDO attacked starboard screen, getting one hit in it and one hit in the third vessel.

0443
HADDO made second but unsuccessful attack on damaged destroyer.

0509
HARDER and HADDO dove and proceeded towards some of attack. As soon as it was light enough, the convoy was soon to consist of one medium AP plus 2 DD's, all hit and lying to.

0549
HARDER hit and sank AP.

0620
HADDO hit and sank one DD.

0636
HARDER and HADDO both lining up for shot at remaining DD. HADDO heard HARDER's screws through the hull, went top and told HARDER by sound that HADDO would get closer.

0655
HARDER hit and sank remaining DD.

This was the last coordinated attack conducted by this attack group. HARDER had prescribed 6 rendezvous north of BUMAR for the evening of 22 August. On arrival there HADDO contacted HARDER, just arrived on station, and almost immediately thereafter contacted a DD which she immediately but unsuccessfully attacked.

Upon completion of HADDO's unsuccessful attack, not being able to raise the HARDER by radio, HADDO arranged a rendezvous with HARDER for the evening of 23 August and proceeded north to spend the 23rd of CPL BOLINAR. HADDO took this action in view of her unsuccessful attack at some of last rendezvous prescribed by HARDER.

On 23 August at dawn, HADDO attacked and damaged a destroyer off CPL BOLINAR but expended her torpedoes in so doing. HADDO maintained

— page 363 —
1. Coordinated Attack Group Consisting of HARDY, HAZY, HUDD - Report on.

Subject: Coordinated Attack Group Consisting of HARDY, HAZY, HUDD - Report on.

contact with damaged destroyer plus salvage group throughout the 23rd and at dusk informed both HARDY and HAZY of the situation, and arranged a rendezvous south west of POINT CALIF. At 2220 on 23 August both HARDY and HAZE had reached the rendezvous. HUDD then left the area enroute advanced base near BLAK.

HUDD, on returning to area from BLAK, contacted HAZE at 1900 on 10 September and learned that HAZE had had no contact with HARDY since 24 August, when HAZE last saw HARDY's periscope off CALIF. POINT. HARDER evidently at that time was attempting to close and attack the damaged destroyer.

On 14 September HAZE departed for base. During the period 10 - 14 September HUDD and HAZE had no contacts.

C. COMMUNICATIONS

1. The "Calkie Telkie" is worthless equipment for inter-superior communications. In its stead is recommended VHF equipment and "Dull Horn" amplified megaphones.

2. All space geographical code groups in the Aircraft Code book should be assigned positions within the "roebble" patrol area prior to departure of the attack group.

3. The informal ship calls within the attack group should be changed frequently during the patrol.

— page 365 —
12 0177
UNITED STATES NAVY
Serial: 01539
K-w-441
12-12-44
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. HADDO Conf. Ltr.
A16-3 dated 15 August, 1944.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLIGHT.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLIGHT.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLIGHT.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of HARDER, HADDO and HAKE - Comments on.

1. The Coordinated Search and Attack Group of HARDER, HAKE and HADDO was ordered to patrol off the West Coast of LUZON between NUTILA and LINGAYIN GULP under the tactical command of HARDER's Commanding Officer, Commander S. D. DEALEY, U.S.N.

2. The Group Commander directed two highly successful coordinated attacks. The first was made on a convoy which sortied at 12:00 A.M. August 22 from an overnight anchorage in PALAU BAY, South of LE PALAIVATE. Commander D. ALEY disposed HARDER, HADDO and HADDO to cover the sortie. The latter submarine had joined up after tracking this same convoy for two days. RY sank one medium AP and HADDO two large AK's.

3. In a series of coordinated attacks commencing at 0130, 22 August HARDER and HADDO wiped out a convoy consisting of a small fast AP escorted by two DD's.

4. HADDO became Group Commander on returning to the area after a reload at LUZON. But there were no further coordinated attacks prior to HAKER's departure 14 September.

5. The Force Commander congratulates the Group Commander, and HARDER, HADDO and HAKE on inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK
By HARDER (estimated from despatch reports)

1 - DD (EU) 1,200 Tons
1 - AP (Small - EU - 4,000 Tons) 2,000 Tons

EXTRA: ORIGINAL
SUNG: MIGRO
PHOTO-LAS: 00-P-16
O F-42K

FILMED -1-

— page 367 —
12/24-71/16-3
Serial_01339
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. HUDDO Conf. Ltr.
16-3 dated 15 August 1944.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of HARDER, HUDDO and H.K.E - Comments on...

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominoh (3) - Direct
Vice Opnav (2) - Direct
Vice Opnav Op-23c (1)
Com1stPft (1)
Com2ndPft (1)
Com3rdPft (1)
ComSubs1stPft (30)
ComSubs2ndPft (4)
CIF-71 (4)
CTF-72 (2)

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO NAVY CORROBORATED MUSEUM.

P. F. STRAUB, JR.
Flag Secretary.

— page 368 —
35-12N
Serial #024
U.S.S. BARBARO (SS-317)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

DECLASSIFIED
2 January 1943.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Official Channels.

Subject: Co-ordinated Attack Group - U.S.S. BARBARO (SS317), U.S.S. BARBARO (SS327), U.S.S. HARD (SS255) - Report of War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the activities of a Co-ordinated Attack Group consisting of the subject vessels, conducted in the South China Sea Area, during the period from 26 October 1944 to 20 December 1944, is forwarded herewith.

I.S. HARTMAN.

— page 370 —
2-4 November 1944

BARRERO and REDFIN contacted each other off Cape William and proceeded in company through Makassar Strait, Celebes Sea and Sibutu Passage.

2130(H) 4 November 1944 - Directed REDFIN to pass northward of Tubatane Neffs and Cagayan Islands, BARRERO to the southeast while transiting Sulu Sea.

6 November 1944

2245(H) Assigned REDFIN northern third of Area Able 6, BARRERO center and HADDO southern third. HADDO did not receipt for message and had not joined up.

7 November 1944

Received orders from Task Group Commander to patrol area Able 4 in addition to Able 6. Sent message to group dividing up the area.

8 November 1944

1620(H) REDFIN contacts two tankers at Lat. 17° 11', Long. 117° 46', course 265°T, speed 10. BARRERO proceeding to intercept.

1700(H) REDFIN reports speed of 12 knots for target group.

1935(H) REDFIN commences attack.

1937(H) BARRERO requests and receives revised position of REDFIN. Position received later proved to be in error, cause unknown.

2015(H) BARRERO commences honing on REDFIN SJ interference.

2045(H) REDFIN reported attack completed, results negative, that target has two escorts and that REDFIN is on port flank.

2105(H) BARRERO makes contact with targets and informs REDFIN.

2134(H) REDFIN commences second attack.

2136(H) BARRERO informs REDFIN that both escorts are on starboard flank.

2154(H) REDFIN sinks leading tanker.

2208(H) BARRERO attacks second target, obtains one or two hits.

- 2 -

Enclosure (A)

— page 371 —
8. November 1944 (cont'd)
2215(H) REDFIN reports completion of attack.
2250(H) BARRERO informs REDFIN that she is being chased by escort in hopes REDFIN can take the opportunity to attack second target.
2315(H) BARRERO, having shaken the escort, asked REDFIN if she was in contact with east tanker. REDFIN replied that it bore 0930T, distance 10 miles.
2345(H) BARRERO informed REDFIN that she was attacking.
2350(H) BARRERO obtained one or two hits on target setting it on fire.

9. November 1944
0040(H) REDFIN reports her target sank and that she has four torpedoes forward and four aft remaining.
0320(H) Informed Tank Force Commander of results to date.
1015(H) HADDO reports contact with a convoy at Lat. 12°50' N., Long. 120°16' E., course 190°T, speed 9. As this position is just off Apo Island and the force appeared to be heading for shallower water of the Calamian Group, the HADDO was directed to attack. The BARRERO was at the time 90 miles to the westward and the REDFIN farther to the north.
1730(H) BARRERO directed by Task Force Commander to proceed to Alos Woendi for replenishment of logistics; Commander Austrian REDFIN became OTC of the attack group.

12. November 1944
REDFIN damages an AK at Lat. 13°00' N., Long. 118°13' E.

13. November 1944
REDFIN ordered to Alos Woendi for replenishment of logistics.

18. November 1944
BARRERO departs and REDFIN arrives Alos Woendi.

25. November 1944
HADDO obtained one hit and is believed to have sunk a destroyer.

-3-
Enclosure (A)

— page 375 —
35-12N-125-45E
CO-ORDINATED ATTACK GROUP

D = PEAKERS (cont'd)
set up, attacks on ships leaving port could be delayed long enough to get enough boats in position and the ships far enough out at sea to insure destruction of all ships.

-7-
Enclosure (A)

— page 378 —
24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 14/pr
Serial: 0265 6 February 1945.
C-0-N-F-I-D-B-N-T-I-A-L
C-0-N-F-I-D-B-N-T-I-A-L
USS BARBERO (SS-217) to:
USS BARBERO

— page 379 —
2/5/46
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of Firing Mark 28 Torpedoes During the Ninth War Patrol of the U.S.S. HADDO (SS255).

Enclosure: (A) U.S.S. HADDO - Secret Report of Firing Mark 28 Torpedoes, War Patrol No. 9 (OO USS HADDO Secret Itr. File SS255/All-3, Serial 001, dated 16 July 1945).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. The Force Commander congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the HADDO for the successful employment of this new weapon. This sinking has been so credited in the Force Commander's endorsement of the ninth war patrol.

JERRIH COSTCOK, Deputy.

DISCRIMINATOR:
- COINCH (2)
- CDR (2)
- Cinopac (3)
- Consubspace (2)
- ConsubspaceAddCond (2)
- Consubstraimpac (2)
- Consubslant (2)
- Consub3?thFlt (Fwd Echelon) (2)
- Consub3?thFlt (Near Echelon) (2)
- All Squadron Commanders (1)
- All Division Commanders (1)
- BuOrd (2)
- BuShips (2)
- CO, USS HADDO (less Enc.(a))(1)

E. H. HIMS, 2nd, Flag Secretary.