U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS-179) — war patrol report SS-179_PLUNGER.pdf

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1. SUBMARINES, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0159
CC: SUBPAC REPORT NO. 9
PLUNGER FIRST WAR PATROL.
DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) - War Patrol - report of.

Reference: (a) Submarines, Scouting Force, Confidential Letter No. 12-41.

Enclosure(s):
(A) Copy of subject war patrol report.
(B) Copy of Consubron Four's Comments, Conf. file FF12-10(4)/A16-3, Serial 049 of February 6, 1942.
(C) Copy of Consubdiv Fcrty-Three's Comments, Conf. file:FB43/A16-3, Serial 004 of February 6, 1942.

Enclosures (A), (B), and (C) are forwarded to the Commander for guidance.

The comments of the Force Commander follow.

PLUNGER's patrol was of a duration of 53 days from base to base; 18 days proceeding to station, 18 days on station, and 17 days returning from station. A total period of 10 days was spent submerged during daylight enroute to and from station. As previously remarked in other patrol reports, time enroute to and from station must be cut down to the absolute minimum consistent with fuel economy in order that patrols at such great distances may be effective. Submarines must rely on lookouts for plane detection and accept daylight surface running when the air threat is not too great. Those submarines equipped with Radar which is working efficiently, will have the added warning from this device.

On the night of January 3, PLUNGER sighted a destroyer and immediately dove, apparently to deep submergence, with no periscope observations. Light conditions were not stated, but again it is wished to point out that night surface contacts should be developed whenever feasible if conditions are not such as to unduly endanger the submarine. Except when the submarine is silhouetted by the moon, the advantage always lies with the submarine. Furthermore, after having submerged

DECLASSIFIED
DEC

— page 3 —
1 - Merchantman - 7,200 tons.

DISTINGUISH:
Pacific List 7CM-41:
List I, Case 2: Pl(5); SSF.
Atlantic List 11CM-41: SO(2).
Asiatic List: Consubaf (2)
Special:
EN3(5); EN10(1); EN28(5);
ND14(2); NY1(1); NY9(1);
NY10(2); Subschool New Lond (8).

E. R. SWILBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 4 —
1942
SS179/A14
Serial CO1
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander Task Force Seven.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Division Forty-three.
       (2) Commander Submarine Squadron Four.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER Patrol (conducted December 14, 1941 to February 4, 1942).

Reference: (a) Commander Task Force Seven Operation Order No. 33-41.

Enclosure: (A) Depth charge attack received Jan. 4, 1942.
       (B) Attack on 7200 ton merchantman Jan. 18, 1942.
       (C) Report on radio and sound.
       (D) Report on torpedoes.
       (E) Report on Material.
       (F) Track Charts.

1. This report is divided into two parts, namely; the narrative, and comments and recommendations. The items of major interest are covered in detail in enclosures (A) to (F).

(a) Narrative.
(1) Enroute to assigned area. On December 14, 1941, departed from Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, being escorted to the one hundred mile position circle by the LITCHFIELD. At the first opportunity, a test dive to 250 feet was made to test the after battery hatch for tightness. This hatch had just been reseated by the Submarine Base. The hatch was found to be tight, but a small leak developed around the lower inspection plate on #2 periscope well. After surfacing, the First Lieutenant and one auxiliary man entered #4. main ballast tank and took up on the inspection plate. On the next dive the plate leaked as before. A man was lowered into the periscope well and the leak was caulked. This reduced the leakage considerably.

(2) At 1120 on December 16, passed Nihoa Rock and set course for a point 60 miles north of Midway. Proceeding on two generators during the day and on one generator at night. At 1800 on December 17, made a test dive to 250 feet.

(3) At 0900 on December 18, it was decided to slow to one generator, 80% load, 8-10 knots to conserve fuel. This speed was maintained until arrival in assigned area. At 2130 made a surprise quick dive for training purposes. This procedure of making at least two surprise dives at night was carried out until Saturday, December 27.

— page 5 —
1941
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER Patrol (conducted December 14, 1941 to February 4, 1942)

(4) At 2000 on December 13, passed through a point 60 miles north of Midway and set course for Point. During the night one tube forward and one tube aft were kept ready for firing in all respects except that the outer doors were left closed. The outer doors had been left closed due to flooding of afterbodies of the torpedoes when the outer doors were opened for an appreciable length of time. This is covered in detail in enclosure (D). The fire control phones were kept manned during the night in both torpedo rooms. On the General Alarm at night the outer doors were immediately opened.

(5) At 1730 on December 21, held a battle surface drill and fired five rounds of target ammunition in the 3" gun for training. This was the first time the deck gun had been fired since its installation.

(6) At 2000 on December 22, passed through Point and set Great Circle Course for Point.

(7) At daylight on December 23, entered zone within radius of enemy patrol planes, made a quick dive, and remained submerged during daylight hours. Proceeding on the surface at night. This procedure was continued until arrival at Point. While submerged, 1/3 speed, 5 knots, was maintained at 100 feet, coming to periscope depth for observation every 10 minutes. While submerged, each day two fire control drills were held, and emergency drills, including depth charge attack, were rehearsed. The depth charge attack drills were well worth while, paying considerable dividends on January 4.

(8) At 1100 on December 31 passed Hachijo Jima Island abeam, distant 10 miles. At 1000 on January 1, made a test dive to 285 feet. Number two periscope well still leaked appreciably.

(9) At 0400 on January 2, arrived in the center of the designated area and changed course to 3150 T. At 0615 made a quick dive. At 1000 held depth charge attack drill and went to 290 feet depth. At 1030 held fire periscope observations every 15 minutes. At 1300 held fire control drills. At 1330 passed within 15 miles of Murato Zuki and changed course to North. At 1715, within 10 miles of Oshima changed to a southeasterly course. At 1742 sound reported screws at 090 but nothing could be seen through the periscope. This was a staccato noise similar to high speed screw noises and was picked up intermittently.

— page 6 —
1941
U.S.S. PLUNGER Patrol (conducted December 14, 1941 to February 4, 1942).

throughout the entire patrol. It was not heard at any time enroute to and from the patrol area. During the night the full moon was out bright. An east-west line was traversed.

(10) At 0315 on January 3, in a position 15 miles southeast of Murato Zaki, sighted a ship which appeared to be a destroyer, angle on the tow 100 starboard. The range was approximately 3000 T. As the visibility in that direction was poor, with Murato Zaki in the background, it was decided to dive. At 0325 sound reported echo ranging and screws on the port bow. Echo ranging coming from two sources getting very loud. Increased depth to 300 feet and changed course to 1600 T. Rigged for depth charge attack. Echo ranging from two ships became louder and then passed ahead and faded out on port quarter. More echo ranging was heard dead ahead and on the starboard bow. Echo ranging became louder, but no screws were heard. "Beeping" passed close aboard, but no depth charges were dropped. Evasion tactics were continually employed with silent running. The echo ranging continued until 1200 when it seemed to fade out on the port quarter. At 1200 came up to periscope depth for observation. Nothing was sighted.

(11) On January 4, made a routine quick dive at 0610, at 1830 surfaced, proceeding at 2/3 speed on one generator, 6 knots. At 2030 sighted a puff of smoke one point on the port quarter and then immediately sighted a destroyer, angle on bow 0C. Made a quick dive on course 0680 T. and went to 250 feet. The destroyer made three different attacks, dropping a total of 24 charges. A depth of 315 feet was reached during the attack. The closest explosion was judged to be approximately 100 yards.

(12) On 5, 6, 7, and 8 January, made routine dives forty-five minutes before daylight and surfaced forty-five minutes after dark.

(13) On January 9, at 0000 sighted a destroyer three points about 6000 yards. Made a quick dive and went to 175 feet. Rigged ship for silent running. Screws and echo ranging were heard as the destroyer passed astern. Echo ranging was heard until 0200. At 0225 surfaced on course 1000T.

— page 7 —
1941 to February 4, 1942).

At 0335 changed base_course to 3200 T. At 0554 made routine_cive to 100 feet, making periscope observations every 10 minutes. At 1839 surfaced and changed course to 1800 T.

(14) On January 10, made routine dive at 0557 and surfaced at 1835.

(15) On January 11, made routine dive at 0546. At 0637 sighted a small trawler bearing 1300 T, 1700 relative, range 5000 yards, course 2500 T, angle on the bow 1200 starboard. This vessel was picked up by sound at about the same time it was sighted. At 0825 changed course to 0900 T, remaining at periscope depth, 57 feet. At 1815 surfaced.

(16) Made routine dive on January 12, at 0540 and surfaced at 1812. On January 13, made routine dive at 0551 and surfaced at 1818. On January 14, made routine dive at 0532 and surfaced at 1833. On January 15, made routine dive at 0515 and surfaced at 1840.

(17) On January 16, at 0532 made routine dive. At 0746 sighted a small tug bearing 2750 T, range 8000 yards on course 0850T, angle on the bow 100 starboard. Conducted an approach on this vessel and closed the range to 1000 yards. It was not fired upon because the sinking of such a small vessel did not warrant the disclosure of the PLUNGER's presence in this part of the suido. At 1841 surfaced.

(18) On January 17, while underway on patrol station on course 3250T, at 0050 sighted Murato Zaki Light bearing 3000T. At 0108 sighted the lights of a small fishing boat bearing 2700T in the vicinity of Murato Zaki. At 0531 made routine dive to 100 feet, making periscope observations every 10 minutes. At 1844 surfaced. At 2350, while on course 0750T, the sound-watch reported screws that seemed to be fairly close, bearing 3250 relative. Due to a rain squall, the visibility in that sector was very poor. Nothing was sighted but as the screws sounded close aboard, it was decided to dive, not knowing whether we had been sighted. At 2354 made a quick dive and went to 250 feet, secured for silent running and depth charge attack. Screws were

— page 8 —
1941 to February 4, 1942.

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**Subj:**
U.S.S. PLUNGER Patrol (conducted December 14, 1941 to February 4, 1942).

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**heard passing down the port side and fading out astern.**
At 0157 surfaced.

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(19) On January 18 at 0530, made a routine dive to 100 feet, making periscope observations every 10 minutes. At 0940 sighted a ship bearing 1000 yards, angle on the low 250 port. Manned battle stations. Noticed that the target was steering a zig-zag course, base course approximately 2950T, speed estimated at 9 knots. At 1002 fired two torpedoes from the bow tubes at a range of 550 yards. Both torpedoes hit and the ship was observed going down in approximately 15 minutes. It was a freighter of the London Maru class, 7200 tons. At 2000 surfaced. At 2245 the sound watch reported possible screws at 3150 relative. Made a quick dive to 150 feet. At 0300 surfaced.

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(20) At 0541 on January 20, made a routine dive. At 0714 sighted Haichijo Shima bearing 1100T, distance 40 miles. At 1911 surfaced.

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(21) On 21, 22, and 23 January made routine dives at one-half hour before daylight and surfaced at dark. While submerged proceeding at 1/3 speed, 3 knots, and at 9.5 knots on one main generator at night. Enroute to Pearl Harbor. At 0100 on January 22, changed to (-10) zone time. Carrying a zero float on the battery with the auxiliary engine. Zigzagging during daylight hours and during bright moonlight at night.

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(22) January 24, 25, and 26 proceeding on the surface. At 0600 on January 25, changed to (-11) zone time. At 0930 on January 26, made a series of three dives, one quick and two running in order to flush all residual fuel oil out of the reserve fuel tanks. At 2000 on January 28, passed through a point 20 miles north of Point and changed base course to 0950T, heading for a point 80 miles north of Midway.

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(23) On January 29 at 0547, made a quick dive to 100 feet, making periscope observations every 10 minutes. At 1152 surfaced. Making 80% load on two main generators, zigzagging, base course 0950T. At 1230 set clocks ahead one hour to zone (-12) time.

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(24) On January 30 at 1830, passed through point 80 miles north of Midway and changed course to

— page 9 —
1941 to February 4, 1942.

1020T. At 0900 on February 1, changed time to zone plus 10½ time. At 2330 on February 2, changed course to 1650T. At 0530 on February 3, changed course to 1250T to pass through point 25 miles south of Kaula Island. At 0600 February 4, arrived at rendezvous on 60 mile circle. Proceeding to Pearl Harbor in company with LITCHFIELD and TAUTOG.

(b) Comments and Recommendations.

(1) From the coverage given the assigned area it is believed that no considerable amount of shipping was entering or leaving the Inland Sea via the Kil Suido. Except for the one vessel which was destroyed, only two others were sighted during daylight; a small tug and a small trawler. It was considered inadvisable to attack either of these for it was believed that the enemy patrol thought they had eliminated this vessel from the competition during the depth charge attack, and that larger game might be forthcoming if our presence remained unknown.

(2) It is doubted if there could have been much traffic at night. During the first week on station the moon was quite bright and it is felt that some of any considerable number of ships would have been seen.

(3) During the latter part of the patrol during darkness the ship was usually propelled at 1/3 speed on battery motors, with the auxiliary engine on charge. This made for excellent listening conditions. While no contacts were developed, on several occasions it was necessary to dive when screws were reported close aboard but due to poor visibility nothing could be seen. Possibility that patrol vessels were equipped with Radar was considered.

(4) It is the opinion of the Commanding Officer that if support for the Japanese Activities in the south was being given from the industrial and naval facilities on the Inland Sea during the period of patrol of this vessel, that it was going through the Bungo Suido or Shimonoseki Suido.

(5) Conducting a submerged patrol in such an area in opposition to a destroyer patrol is considered

— page 10 —
1941
U.S.S. PLUNGER Patrol (conducted December 14, 1941 to February 4, 1942).

most difficult. While the sea was quite changeable (this area has been called "The Hatteras of Japan"), there were but few days when periscope depth could be maintained at 1/3 speed without continual danger of broaching. As a result, a depth of about 90 feet was usually kept, coming to 52-53 feet for a careful look every ten minutes. While this afforded excellent training for the officers and men in depth control (the chiefs of the watch were trained as diving officers and became proficient as such), it was felt that undue wear was imposed on the machinery (pumps and planes).

(6) In the late afternoon the state of charge of the main battery was usually such that if a long approach were to be made, little power would be left for withdrawal or evasion tactics in case of counter attack. It was with a feeling of relief that the word that the battery charge was completed was received each night.

(7) The health of the crew was excellent. This is attributed partly to the fact that but two meals per day were served; one at 0730 and the other at 1530.

(8) The morale of the crew was also excellent. Many of the men were visibly shaken during the depth charge attack (also literally) but performed their functions in a highly satisfactory manner. The majority of them will not have seen daylight for a period of almost two months. It is believed that an ample rest period between patrols of this length will pay excellent dividends.

(9) While on patrol station it was the general practice to submerge forty-five minutes before daylight and surface forty-five minutes after dark. It is not considered advisable to delay diving until after star sights are taken in the morning; neither is it advisable to surface early enough for evening stars. It is therefore recommended that submarines be equipped with a bubble seat so that sights may be taken at any time during the night. During most of the patrol the moon illuminated the horizon sufficiently to enable the navigator to take sights at night and fix the ship's position with reasonable accuracy. Frequent fixes were considered necessary due to the unusual current encountered in the vicinity of Kii Suido.

— page 11 —
1941 to February 4, 1942.

(10) The magnetic compass, located on the bridge is fitted with binnacle lights that are supplied from the ship's lighting circuit. The binnacle light must be on in order to read the compass from the conning tower steering station. When the ship is rigged for silent running, and the lighting motor generators are secured. It is therefore highly desirable that the binnacle lights should be wired to take power direct from the ship's battery so that the conning tower steering station may be used when rigged for silent running.

(11) During depth charge attack the ship is rigged for silent running and the conning tower is abandoned, steering is shifted to the control room. There is no means of steering by the standard magnetic compass at the control room steering station. For this purpose one of the small boat compasses has been mounted in the control room. This compass is in good condition but it is too small and erratic, not sufficiently compensated for accurate steering. The depth charge attack encountered on January 4th very strongly emphasized this point. It is recommended that a larger and more reliable magnetic compass be supplied submersible to this type for the control room steering station.

(12) It is recommended that the H.P. air connections in main ballast tanks be silver soldered in accordance with recommendations set forth in Consubscor for letter 01032 of November 1941.

(13) The conning tower eyeports should be blanked off.

(14) It is recommended that the inspection plates to #1 and #2 periscope wells be welded closed. A man can be lowered into the walls in order to repair the buffer, adjust limit switch, clear the drains, etc.

(15) Permanently remove the boats, deck boat covers, and hinged deck sections, except those in the vicinity of the deck gun. If a boat is desired, a collapsible rubber type boat should be carried.

(16) Have on board for patrol a reasonable supply of 2 x 4 and 4 x 4 lumber, together with nails and wood chisels. Considerable use was found for this material in making wooden jury rigs and braces.

-8- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 12 —
1941 to February 4, 1942.

(17) Carry a supply of blank flanges for residual drains and all sea valve, connections inside. A broken residual drain valve in a reserve fuel oil tank caused an oil slick until blank flanged.

(18) Increase the Bureau of Ships Allowance List by one medium size hand pump. During periods of silent running at deep submergence while avoiding detection, a pump of this type would have been useful for pumping the pump room and motor room bilges direct to an auxiliary ballast tank or sanitary tank without having to use the trim or drain pumps.

(19) While submerged on station during daylight, none of the heads were allowed to be blown. A ten gallon milk can, located in the after crew's head was used as a head during the day. Fuel oil and deodorant were used. This system was not entirely satisfactory. It is recommended that the crew's head discharage be piped to #2 sanitary tank or that these heads be fitted with lid, so that they will hold the daily refuse.

(20) It is recommended that a small I.C. motor generator supplied direct from the battery be installed, or that one of the present I.C. motor generators be wired so that it can be shifted to the battery. This would be used during silent running periods, while the ship's lighting motor generators are shut down, to supply desired I.C. circuits such as rudder angle indicator, motor order telegraphs, and telephone bell ringing circuits.

(21) A plentiful supply of spare heating elements, drive belts, and compressor blower gears for the Kleinschmidt Stills be obtained and kept on hand.

(22) The importance of a reliable Radar installation cannot be over-emphasized, even though it be non-directional. It is believed that the Japanese destroyers encountered in designated patrol area were equipped with directional radar.

(23) It is considered important that as a submarine is leaving for a patrol, it should make a 250 foot dive for about two hours to test for leaks and above all

-9- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 13 —
1941 to February 4, 1942.

so that the escort destroyer may look for oil slicks and air bubbles.

(24) In going from periscope depth to 250 feet when preparing for a depth charge attack, it is necessary to expel 6000 pounds of variable water from the PLUNGER, and it is highly desirable that this be done silently and quickly. Also it is desirable that the water expelled have a small forward moment arm in order that speed may be reduced to dead slow on one screw as soon as deep depth is reached. The trim pump now installed makes too much noise and is too slow to be used for this purpose. The method now used in the PLUNGER is to trim the boat with 7000 pounds in the negative tank at periscope depth. 6000 pounds are slowly and silently blown out as depth is increased. An additional 7000 pounds of water are blown from one of the auxiliary tanks to the negative tank soon after reaching 250 feet and this water is then available for expelling from the boat if the deep submergence is prolonged. The fore and aft trim is easily controlled by blowing between the trim tanks. This method of transferring variable water to sea and within the boat has been satisfactory so far as speed and elimination of noise is concerned, but considerable pressure is eventually built up in the boat and the value of the negative tank as a quick submergence tank is very nearly destroyed. In order to eliminate the problem existing, it is recommended:

(1) That an additional tank of about 15,000 lbs. capacity, fitted with a hand-operated flood valve (normally left open) and easily controlled inboard vent be installed for use as a deep submergence tank, or

(2) That the present safety tank be fitted with a liquidometer gauge and inboard vent. In view of the time and facilities available, the latter plan is probably better suited for use in submarines now built or building, but the separated deep submergence tank is recommended for new construction.

D: O. WHITE.

-10- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 14 —
1942.

DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK RECEIVED JANUARY 4, 1942.

1. At 2030, while proceeding on the surface on one main generator at 2/3 speed, 6 knots, charging batteries, the stern lookout sighted a puff of black smoke on one point on the port quarter. At this time the PLUNGER was on course 0680T, heading approximately toward the full moon which was about two hours high. On closer observation the officer of the deck made out a ship, apparently a destroyer, range about 5000 yards, angle on the bow zero. Made a quick dive to 100 feet, and reached that depth about 3½ minutes after first sighting the destroyer. We had apparently been sighted while silhouetted in the moonlight. The destroyer then speeded up considerably omitting the puff of smoke. The first group of depth charges, eight in number, were dropped as we were passing 90 feet. These were judged to be from 1000 to 600 yards away. Depth was immediately increased to 250 feet and course changed to 1800T. The ship was rigged for silent running and completely rigged for depth charge attack. All auxiliary motors and motor generators were stopped. Hand steering and hand power on bow and stern planes was used. The conning tower was abandoned and steering was done by the boat compass at the control room steering station. Approximately 10 minutes after the first attack, anchor was tied up on the starboard beam. Shortly thereafter screws were heard speeding up broad on the starboard bow. At this time our heading was about 1350T, swinging toward 1800T, running at 1/3 speed on one screw. The destroyer increased to high speed and crossed the bow from starboard to port, dropping eight more charges. Judged from the shock, those were about 200 yards away, the last two being the closest. Considerable paint was ferred off the overhead in the forward torpedo room. In fact, the Sound Officer stated that he had to brush off the Q.C. dial a couple of times in order to read it.

2. Depth was increased to 300 feet and at once time 315 feet depth was reached. The third and last attack was made crossing the stern from port to starboard. At this time the PLUNGER was on approximately 1800T. Eight charges were dropped. It is not known whether or not this was the same destroyer. The last four charges shook the ship considerably, especially in the after torpedo room, where the torpedo alcohol tank sprung a leak, spilling a considerable amount of alcohol over the deck. These charges were estimated to be between 200 and 300 feet away. The depth setting on the charges is of course unkown but a good guess would be between 100 and 150 feet. It is believed that the PLUNGER's 300 feet depth reduced the shock appreciably.

— page 15 —
3. The eyeport in the port side of the conning tower started leaking between the glass and its rubber gasket seat. Eventually this was reduced by using a hydraulic jack to force a rubber covered steel plate against the eye port. The #2 periscope well inspection plate leak increased so that after a few hours the pump room bilges were over the floor plates. Instead of using the drain pump, these bilges were baited out with buckets and emptied into #2 sanitary tank. Two light bulbs were broken. All the drawers in the officers' rooms were thrown out on deck. Two portable battle lanterns were thrown off their hangers. The alcohol tank in the after room was ruptured. The ship's boat stowed in the superstructure was loosened from its holding down clamps so that within the next two days it was lost overboard.

— page 16 —
1. On January 18 at 0940, while on course 050°T, sighted a ship bearing 100°T. Range 3000 yards, angle on the bow 200 port, base course 300°T. It was noticed that the ship was zigzagging about 45° from the base course. The mast head height was estimated to be 60 feet. At 0942 came left to 020°T. At 0944 changed speed to 2/3. At 0946 relative bearing 060°, angle on bow 350 port, range 3000 yards. At 0949 angle on bow 300 port, range 2300 yards. Changed course to 040°T and got two tubes ready forward. Estimated speed to be 9 knots. At 0951 changed speed to 1/3. At 0959 angles on bow 250 port, range 1000 yards. At 1000 went ahead 2/3. At 1002 fired one torpedo at the foremast, 105 port track, Estimated range 550 yards, gyro angle zero. At 1002-24 first torpedo hit. At 1002-30 fired second torpedo. At 1002-50 second torpedo hit. The ship took a down angle by the bow and a slight list to port. In about five minutes the screw was out of the water. Several of the crew lowered a boat and jumped over the side. In approximately 20 minutes the ship sank. It was of the LONDON MARU type.

-1- ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 17 —
1. Communications were in accordance with Annex "A" to Comtaskfor seven operation order no. 33-41.

2. No messages subsequent to serial #2 were received from Comtaskfor Seven until January 26. PLUNGER was unable to hear the "V's" transmitted on the 4155 series after December 27, with the patrol station still about 700 miles distant. "V's" were not heard on the return trip until January 27 or at a distance of about 800 miles from the station. It would have been impossible, therefore, to have reported any movement of enemy forces without abandoning the primary mission.

3. NPM Primary Fox Schedules were guarded whenever the PLUNGER was on the surface. The vertical antenna was not exposed to copy schedules while cruising in enemy waters. The special attachment to the direction finder loop for receiving while submerged was not successful at depths in excess of 30-35 feet. NPM's signal strength was sufficient for copying at night until about 2000 GMT, or about one hour before diving while on station.

4. On 20, 21, 24, 25 and 26 December it was noted that two separate stations appeared to be sending "V's" on 4155 kcs., both using the enciphered call sigh on Comtaskfor Seven. Inasmuch as no messages were transmitted and no authenticators used, it was not possible to distinguish the genuine signal from the spurious one.

5. No service whatsoever was obtained from the Radar. This equipment was adjusted and tested before leaving Pearl Harbor by the technicians from the Submarine Base E&R shop. When passing within 4 miles of Nihoa the Radar was cut in and showed no trace of the island. Again when approaching Shiono Misaki on the Japanese mainland the Radar was used and failed to indicate the presence of land. It was therefore considered impossible to place any faith in the instrument for picking up the enemy while on the surface at night. This was unfortunate inasmuch as a reliable Radar - even the non-directional type - would be of inestimable value to a submarine during patrol operations in enemy controlled waters. Not only could a potential target be tracked and located with the Radar, but it would also enable the submarine to stay

— page 18 —
35 days, 13 hours
: 15 days, 0 hours

2. Watches were stood as follows: continuously while on station and at night while cruising. Two radiomen manned the gear at "battle stations". Regular watches were stood by one radioman and four men of other ratings. Value of the continuous watch was demonstrated twice by locating ships by the sound gear; (1) at the same time of sighting by officer at periscope, and (2) before being sighted by officer of the deck at night.

3. There is a local disturbance in the water in this patrol area, Kii Suido, and particularly close in, which proved both troublesome and annoying. This disturbance caused a sound to be produced which exactly resembled echo ranging. It could be picked up on both the JK and QG gear. At times the "beeps" would be single, and at other times in groups of three or four, and regular, like a destroyer developing a contact. This beeping changed bearing when the course was changed. The sound could be heard throughout the JK frequency range. This sound was for several days believed to be a destroyer searching with echo ranging gear over the horizon. It was concluded that:

(1) The sound was not echo ranging, since it could be heard on all JK frequencies.
(2) That it source is either:
   (a) Some type of local fish or,

— page 20 —
4 Jan 1830 90 ft 68 14 Jan 1200 90 ft 68
: 4 Jan 2000 100 ft 67 15 Jan 1750 65 ft 67
: 6 Jan 1200 100 ft 67 15 Jan 0500 100 ft 66
: 7 Jan 1930 1200 1200 75 ft 67
: 7 Jan 0500 120 1200 65 16 Jan 0500 115 ft 66
: 7 Jan 1200 110 ft 69 1200 75 ft 66
: 7 Jan 1400 120 ft 69 17 Jan 1500 75 ft 67
: 7 Jan 1200 100 ft 70 17 Jan 1500 75 ft 67
: 8 Jan 2000 1200 1200 75 ft 66
: 8 Jan 1200 110 ft 73 18 Jan 0500 75 ft 66
: 8 Jan 1200 110 ft 73 18 Jan 0500 75 ft 66
: 9 Jan 2100 1200 1200 75 ft 66
: 9 Jan 1200 100 ft 72 19 Jan 0500 75 ft 66
: 9 Jan 1200 100 ft 72 19 Jan 0500 75 ft 66
: 10 Jan 0515 1200 1200 80 ft 68
: 10 Jan 0515 1200 1200 80 ft 68
: 11 Jan 0525 1200 1200 80 ft 70
: 11 Jan 0525 1200 1200 80 ft 70
: 12 Jan 1200 1200 1200 80 ft 70
: 12 Jan 1200 1200 1200 80 ft 70
: 13 Jan 1200

— page 21 —
1. Leaving the torpedo tubes flooded at night during the rough seas encountered caused frequent flooding of afterbodies and gyro pots in spite of rubber buffer gaskets, careful tail packing and sealing of exhaust valves with heavy packing. To prevent flooding, the following procedure was used: one tube in each torpedo room was kept ready except the outer doors were closed. To make the tube ready was only a matter of the four seconds necessary to open the outer door. The resulting cry gyro pot was thought to be worth the few seconds delay in making the tube ready.

2. Two torpedoes were fired at one target, set at depths of 10 feet and 12 feet, high speed, zero gyro angle. Both ran hot, straight and normal, hitting points of aim. Time of run of first torpedo 24 seconds; second, 21 seconds. It is probable that the exploders functioned mechanically, not magnetically.

3. Phones in both torpedo rooms were manned at night by torpedomen who stood watch-in-three. Instructions were to get two tubes in each room ready immediately upon sounding of the general alarm, which was used only to mean "enemy sighted".

-1- ENCLOSURE (D)

— page 22 —
1. All main engines performed without casualty. #4 main engine blower timing gears require replacement as soon as possible due to teeth breaking off. A separate report on the failure of these gear teeth is being forwarded. The engine is in operating condition but is used only when four main engines are required. In addition to routine inspections and adjustments of all engines, #3 main engine will be given a major overhaul during post-patrol period. The auxiliary engine was used a total of 356 hours during battery charge, battery-motor propulsion, and zero float without casualty.

2. All engine room auxiliaries performed satisfactorily. The lube oil purifiers required replacement of (1) maltene clutch, (1) rubber seal ring and (1) rubber coupling. #2 Kleinschmidt Distilling Unit developed one faulty heating element and required renewed of one complete set of vapor compressor drive belts.

3. Electrical equipment - satisfactory operation throughout, although inspection, cleaning, and adjustment of all equipment will be necessary during upkeep period. #2 lighting motor generator armature will be renewed. Performance of the main storage battery was satisfactory and it is believed that the strenuous working of the battery while on patrol station had a beneficial effect. Total voltage is now slightly higher. There was no opportunity to discharge the battery to determine the capacity, but two unforced low-rated prolonged discharges were made during the patrol. Due to age of the battery, hydrogen obtained during charge and slow discharge is gradually increasing.

4. #1 Kleinschmidt distilling unit was reserved for distilling battery water from fresh water only. This unit was operated 175 hours and distilled 2750 gallons of good battery water, a rate of 15.7 gallons per hours; the low rate being due to lack of operating experience, and insistence upon good test of water made. Fifty gallons of battery water were used per day as an average throughout the patrol, although the rate was much higher while on station. High rate used while on station was due to consistent high temperature of battery and necessary increased ventilation during and after charge while on the surface.

5. Enroute to and from station, with a fairly smooth sea and continued operation of one of the after main engines, the exhaust heated evaporators very nearly supplied all fresh water used enroute. While on station, #2 Kleinschmidt distilling unit was operated 330 hours and produced 9000

— page 23 —
7. The material performance of the ship was excellent considering the hard usage underway. All auxiliaries operated without breakdown during the patrol. The greatest difficulty experienced, from the First Lieutenant's standpoint, was maintaining the watertightness of the boat. Vessels and openings which were tight to periscope and ordinary depths showed leaks when it became necessary to go to 250 feet and deeper in avoiding detection or during depth charge attack. Every effort should be made to eliminate those small but chronic leaks which are found in most submarine's around the periscope, around auxiliary machinery sea valves, crew's head, cable stuffing boxes, stern tube packing, etc. It is strongly recommended that each submarine before leaving on patrol make a dive to deep submergence, at least 250 feet, of at least 2 hours duration.

7. The degaussing cables leaked excessively, through the insulation, at depths below 150 feet. It was necessary to install petcocks on the connection boxes so that the boxes could be drained into buckets.

8. On the first deep dive after leaving the base, a leak developed through #2 per | well inspection plate gasket. In order to remove the gasket it is necessary to enter #4 main ballast tank and move several pieces of pig lead. An effort was made to caulk the leak from inside the well but this was not entirely effective. This leak became worse after the depth charge attack and assumed serious proportions as water rose over deck plates in the pump room. It is recommended that these inspection plates be welded closed.

9. After being depth charged, the port report in the coming tower started leaking through the rubber gasket seat. This leak was reduced by applying a hydraulic jack against a stool plate seated over the report from inside the conning tower. A plate should be welded over both eyeports.

-2-

— page 24 —
10. One boat was carried in the superstructure. On surfacing the night of January 6, it was missing, also the deck cover was gone. The depth charges had apparently loosened the holding down clamps allowing the boat to come free. The boat then pounded the deck cover free and both went over the side. Also the fuel filling hose stored in the superstructure came loose after its holding down clamps broke off.

-3-

— page 25 —
FLAGSHIP
A16-3    Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Serial 049    February 6, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron PCUR.
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Comments on PLUNGER War Patrol.

1. General. The report of the war patrol of the PLUNGER is considered excellent. It is brief and to the point and contains many very good recommendations which will be studied and efforts be made to put them in use on the PLUNGER and other submarines of this squadron. The Commanding Officer was extremely modest in his report of the attack of a 7200 ton freighter and the report of the depth charge attack on the PLUNGER. From the report submitted by him on his first war patrol, it would seem that the patrol was just a matter of routine and not under actual war conditions. Lieutenant Commander D. C. White, U.S. Navy, is to be highly commended for a fine job well done.

2. Torpedoes. Leaving the torpedo tube outer doors closed during the patrol with the procedure as outlined in subject report is considered preferable to leaving the doors open and finding the torpedo flooded when it is time to fire it. As noted, the time to make the first tube ready was only a matter of four seconds. It is not conceivable that a torpedo will be fired in less than a minute after sighting the enemy and the outer door could be easily opened in this interval. Knowing that the torpedo will not be flooded is certainly worth the delay, if this could be a delay. Since the two upper tubes are very hard to open when in condition surface full speed, tubes two or three should be the first ones ready to fire. Only two operations are necessary to fire from the "muzzle door closed" position. Opening door and throwing firing interlock lever switch to the "tube ready to fire position". The maximum time for these operations should be fifteen seconds. The present fully ready torpedo routine may give tighter torpedoes than having the submarine make these adjustments.

3. High Pressure Air Connections. The Commanding Officer recommended that the high pressure air connectors in main ballast tanks be silver soldered. This is being accomplished at the first availability of the ships of this squadron at the Navy Yard.

— page 26 —
4. Conning Tower Eyeports. The Squadron Commander concurs with the recommendation that the conning tower eyeports be blanked off. They serve only as a peace time measure and are very vulnerable, in a depth charge attack, as was demonstrated in the attack on the PLUNGER. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PLUNGER, is to be commended for the ingenious method of blanking off the eyeport that was leaking after the depth charge attack on the PLUNGER.

5. Oil Leaks and Air Bubbles. Every effort should be made to ascertain the derisive locations of oil and air leaks while on patrol. The suggestion of the Commanding Officer that the submarine submerge to 250 feet after rendezvousing with the escort and have the escort observe him for oil and air leaks is well taken. This would give the repair forces and the Navy Yard some idea as to what to work on instead of just reporting air and oil leaks during patrol.

6. Stillness. Continued reports on the fire performance of the electric stills seem to have solved the solution to the battery water problem which formerly limited the endurance of some submarines on patrol. Attention is invited to Submarines, Scouting Force Bulletin No. 34-41 of December 15, 1941, in regards to the operation and cleaning of these stills.

7. Silent Running. Silent running is something that has not been stressed in detail in any previous war patrol reports. The Commanding Officer seems to have taken this seriously at the beginning of patrol and the importance and details of it cannot be stressed too much. In connection with his recommendations of connecting the I.C. motor generating directly to the battery, it is worth of further investigation. The lightning motor generators are very noisy and are not used during "silent running", but the I.C. motor generators are absolutely necessary. The magnetic compasses in the lighters should be connected directly to the battery as recommended by the Commanding Officer. This could easily be done by connecting it to one of the emergency lighting circuits.

8. Bubble Sextants. The subject of having bubble sextants on board for night fixes has been discussed at length before. Every effort should be made to have a bubble sextant on board each submarine leaving on patrol.

9. Boats. The recommendation that both boats be surveyed is well founded and has been directed to be accomplished by Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet Serial 085 of January, 1942.

— page 27 —
10.  RESIDUAL DRAINS.  Authority has been requested by the Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet, to remove residual drains from all reserve fuel oil tanks. There is also an approved alteration to blank off the vents of all reserve fuel oil tanks. The latter will be accomplished before the PLUNGER leaves on patrol.

11.  ADDITIONAL NEGATIVE TANK.  This appears to have merit and should be further investigated.

12.  INSPECTION PLATES FOR PERISCOPE VELLS.  It was agreed at the arrival conference that the inspection plates to Nos. 1 and 2 periscopes wells should not be welded closed.

13.  COMMUNICATIONS.  It is noted that the PLUNGER had no communication failures serious enough to require mention, and that excellent results were obtained with the sound gear.

14.  RADAR.  Because of the scarcity of Radar technicians it is impossible at this time to furnish one to each submarine going on patrol.  Even graduates of the Radar School at the Naval Research Laboratory are inexperienced in the use of the particular type of apparatus installed in submarines.  It is believed that the radiomen who actually operate their own equipment will, after some instruction, operate the equipment and set it in operation.

F. A. DAUBIN.

Copy to:
CSD 43
PLUNGER.

— page 28 —
1942-1943
Serial 004

Pearl Harbor, T.H., February 6, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.
To: Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: PLUNGER War Patrol, Comments on.

1. The Division Commander considers subject report excellent. The narrative and comments are factual and to the point.

2. Every opportunity was taken advantage of to train and drill men and officers in all phases of submarine warfare. That this policy and training were sound was proven by the successful avoidance of other than superficial damage during the depth-charge attacks.

3. The health and morale of crew were excellent upon return. This reflects greatly to the credit of the commanding officer.

4. The following are considered worthy of special note:

   (a) Conning tower eyeports will be blanked with metal to prevent recurrence of casualty described in paragraph 3 Enclosure (A).

   (b) Two torpedoes only were expended. Both hit. Both were fired with gyro angle zero.

   (c) There was very little enemy traffic in the area.

   (d) Suggest-wide publicity (Among Submarines) be given to Enclosure (A).

   (e) The performance of the RADAR was very disappointing. The R.C.A. factory representative, Mr. Jacobs, is in Pearl Harbor and has been requested to inspect the equipment.

   (f) The report of material - its effectiveness and reliability, is very gratifying and is indicative of an outstanding crew and officers.

   (g) The "Comments and recommendations" are all worthy of note.

-1- ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 29 —
5. The Division Commander considers that the FLUNGER, while not rolling up a large score, did not neglect any means to harass and attack the enemy, and that this patrol was performed in a courageous and creditable manner. It is strongly recommended that the commanding officer be considered for the award of the Navy Cross, and that the officers and men of the ship be given letters of commendation.

N. S. IV.S.

Copy to:
Consubron 4.
CO FLUNGER.

— page 30 —
FF12-10/A16-3(5)  SUBMARINES, PACIFIC FLEET  ay

Serial 0858

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
July 27, 1942.

COMSUB PAC TROL REPORT NO. 48
U.S.S. PLUNGER SECOND WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Second War Patrol.

Enclosure:
(A) Copy of subject report.
(B) Copy of Consubdiv 43 Conf. 1tr. FB5-43/A16-3
   Serial 028 of July 20, 1942.
(C) Copy of Consubron 4 Conf 1tr FC5-4/A16-3
   Serial 0225 of July 21, 1942.

1. The second war patrol of the PLUNGER was conducted most aggressively and the tonnage sunk and damaged was well above the average. The Force Commander is especially pleased with the manner in which the PLUNGER maintained contact with a group of three vessels during the night of July second until. all vessels were either sunk or damaged, the attack being broke off only when all torpedoes were expended.

2. It is recognized that patrol reports cannot contain comprehensive data on all factors in connection with each attack. This lack of complete data makes it difficult to determine the reason for many of the misses that are made. It appears from this report that a number of torpedoes were fired on snap estimates from the bridge without the help of the computer and with most unfavorable track angles. It is not desired that commanding officers be reluctant to fire sufficient torpedoes properly spread to secure hits but it must be emphasized that the torpedo situation requires that each attack be made on carefully calculated data using all information and aids available.

3. In order to improve the torpedo performance of this force, it is directed that division and squadron commanders inquire carefully into the details of all attacks made, especially those resulting in misses, and state in their endorsements any pertinent facts in connection with the attacks that contributed to their success or failure.

DESTROYED DECLASSIFIED

AUG 14 1942

H. L. 1
-1-

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C

BY OP-ORBOC DATE 5/4/42

— page 31 —
FF12-10/A16-3(5)  SUBMARINES, PACIFIC FLEET  ay
Serial 0858
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
July 27, 1942.

COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 48
U.S.S. PLUNGER - SECOND WAR PATROL.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Second War Patrol.

4. It is desired to call attention to the fact that the shallow depth settings used by the PLUNGER were necessary because the PLUNGER carried all Mark X-3 torpedoes fitted only with contact exploders.

5. The PLUNGER is credited with inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK
1 Supply Vessel - 9,500 tons
1 Combination Passenger Cargo Vessel - 9,400 tons
Total 18,900 tons

DAIAGED
1 Supply Vessel - 6,000 tons
1 Supply Vessel - 4,000 tons
Total 10,000 tons

R. H. ENGLISH.

DISTRIBUTION:
(21CM-42)
List I, Case 2:
Pl(5), SSs.
Special:
EN3(5); EN10(1); EN28(5);
Comsub1ant (2); Subschool, NL(8);
ComsubSIVPac(2); Cominch (5);
Combat Intel (1).

E. R. SWINBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 32 —
3S179/A16 U.S.S. PLUNGER
Serial 010 July 15, 1942
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander Submarines, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Second War Patrol, Period from June 9, 1942 to
Enclosure: (A) Summary of Submarine Attacks.
1. NARRATIVE.
June 9, 1942
1800(Y) Departed N.A.S. Midway for Patrol Areas
via points
proceeding at 80% on two generators, 11.5 knots.
June 10, 1942
1450(M) Sighted U.S.S. TUNA in position 28-02M, 179-05E, head
ed east.
June 12, 1942
1128(M) Sighted unidentified plane on port quarter, fired
recognition flare which exploded violently.
Personnel on bridge barely escaped serious injury.
Made quick dive to 150 feet. Position 26-02N,
174-40E.
1222(M) Surfaced.
2305(LM) Received message from Contaskfor 7 regarding sail
ing of S.S. Asama Maru and S.S. Conte Verde.
June 13, 1942
1040(LM) Made training dive. Making at least two training
dives each day.
1046(LM) Surfaced.
1145(LM) Sighted unidentified plane and made quick dive to
150 feet. Position 28-01N, 170-05E.
1227(LM) Surfaced.
June 15, 1942
0930(L) Submerged in order to work on torpedoes. Made anti
countermining device inoperative on all torpedoes
after receiving orders to that effect from Consubpac.
June 16, 1942
1843(K) Held battle surface drill and fired 3 rounds of
target 3" ammunition for training.
June 17, 1942
1741(K) Held battle surface drill and fired .50 cal.
machine gun.

— page 33 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Second War Patrol.

June 19, 1942
1740(IK) Signed Tori Shima bearing 2650 T distant 17 miles.
1800(I) Held depth charge attack drill.
1947(I) Surfaced.
2048(I) Sighted a lighted fishing boat(samp) bearing 3050 T distant 9 miles. Position 10 miles north of Tori Shima.

June 20, 1942
1030(I) Sighted a ship 1 point forward cf port beam, distant 7 miles, angle on bow zero. Made quick dive. Identified vessel as fishing sampan with sails. Position 30-34N, 137-40E.
1125(I) Held depth charge attack drill.
1201(I) Surfaced.

June 22, 1942
0643(I) Sighted Tanega Shima and Yoku Shima. Yoku Shima bearing: 28d0 T, distant 30 miles. Piloting through Colnett Strait.
0645(I) Made quick dive.
1814(I) Sighted small fishing boat position bearing 1350 T distant 17 miles from Yoku Shima.
2009(I) Surfaced.

June 23, 1942
0030(I) Entered Patrol Area --- at 30-18N, 130-00E.
0444(I) Sighted Kusakaki Shima bearing 3300 T, distant 12 miles.
1355(I) Sighted a ship hull down bearing 3150 T. Position bearing 2000 T distant 13 miles from Kusakaki Shima.
1415(I) Identified ship as a sailing boat and abandoned approach.

June 24, 1942
Patrolling off Danjo-Gunto.

June 25, 1942
Proceeding to position to eastward of Saishu To.

— page 34 —
1904(I) Sighted Saishu To bearing 307° T, distant 55 miles.
: 2356(I) Received a message from Comtassfor 7 to Task Group 7.6 that S.S. Conte Verde would depart Shanghai about June 29. Decided to proceed to a position off Shanghai in Area to intercept the above vessel. Changed course to 235° T and p.g.c., and went ahead 80% on two generators, 1l.0 knots.

: 0930(I) In position 32-09N, 125-53E, sighted two ships bearing 262° T, distant 7 miles, angle on bow 50° port. Enemy course 085° T. These vessels were diesel driven, and slightly larger than mine sweepers and were of trawler or small tramp steamer construction. The advisability of expending a torpedo on these vessels was doubtful. Conducted approach to firing position and fired one torpedo at second ship. Range 800 yards, 80 track. Torpedo missed, probably due to over-estimate of target speed.
: 1524(I) Sighted two small fishing boats resembling Chinese junks bearing 170° T distant 0 miles. Position 32-01N, 125-40E.

: 1800(I) Decoded routine message from Contaskfor 7 to Task Force 7 stating that S.S. Conte Verde is carrying diplomats and is granted safe conduct.
: 2153(I) Changed course to 140° T and p.g.c. Steering various courses during the night to avoid lighted fishing boats. Approximately 1/2 mile sighted. It was decided inadvisable to attack these boats as they were probably manned by Chinese crews and also it was not desirable to disclose own position at this time.

: 1032(I) Sighted Lukon Island bearing 293° T, distant 15 miles.

: 0300(I) Sighted Two Brothers Islands bearing 311° T, distant 9 miles.
: 0200(I) Sighted a large freighter bearing 350° T, distant 7 miles. Approximate position of freighter bearing 170° T, distant 3 miles from the Brothers Islands.

— page 35 —
1942
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGERS (SS179) - Report of Second War Patrol.

Freighter's approximate course 190° T.
Commenc'd surface approach. Fired four bow tubes at ranges between 2500 and 1500 yards.
Started firing at this range due to bright moonlight. Torp.does missed. Made reload forward. Cut in all main generators and commenced chase at full power, 14.5 knots.
Fired 1 bow tube at range of 400 yards, 170 track as ship was turning to starboard. Hit under after mast. The ship was probably loaded with explosives, as it blew up with a tremendous explosion and broke in half. It sank in about 5 minutes. It was identified as a freighter of Africa Maru class, 9500 tons gross.

June 30, 1942
0700(I) Sighted S.S. COINT VERDE bearing 012° T, on course 180° T, distant 7000 yards, angle on bow 10° starboard. As this vessel had been granted safe conduct it was not attacked. Made photograph. Passed abeam to starboard 800 yards. Position 30-08N, 123-16E.

2212(I) Sighted two fishing boats. Position 30-34N, 123-38E.

July 1, 1942
0507(I) Made routine dive at dawn. At 0510 sound reported screws bearing 30° relative. Due to poor visibility (rain) this vessel was not sighted prior to diving. When sighted through the periscope it was past the firing bearing. After swinging ship left and getting the tubes ready for firing, the track angle was unsuitable for firing, about 170 port. The ship was making approximately 18 knots speed. It was a passenger freighter of about 7000 tons, headed for Shanghai probably from Nagasaki. Position 31-21N, 123-45E.

July 2, 1942
0447(I) Made routine dive at dawn.
1800(I) Sighted Barren Island bearing 266° T, distant 10 miles. Course 270° T.
1940(I) Sighted four ships hull down, apparently in column formation bearing 090° T, distant 7 miles on approximate course 140° T. Changed course to 115° T to close range and track target until dark.

- 4 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 36 —
2105(I) Surfaced. Proceeding on four main generators at full speed, 14.5 knots, in pursuit of four enemy ships. Passed through an area covered by thirty sampans in order to close the range. Some passed close aboard. Three enemy ships change course to 180° T. At 2130 one of the four ships, apparently an escort vessel, similar to old type DD, observed retiring to northward toward Barren Island. Prior to surfacing, the three targets were sized up as follows: leading ship silhouetted stack freighter, about 4000-5000 tons; second ship freighter about 6000-7000 tons; last ship passenger-freighter about 10000 tons. At 2216 fired two torpedoes at trailing ship 180-170 track. First missed, second hit. Target turned on searchlight and made a sweep around the horizon. This ship was probably armed. Target swung hard left with jammed rudder. Fired stern shot which hit amidships. Target sank by the stern in about 5 minutes. Two enemy ships transmitting on 400 kcs. between first and second hit. Probably calling escort destroyer.

2245(I) Remaining two freighters changed formation to line of bearing, about 300 yards apart. Continuing chase, making full power but only able to get 14.5 knots due to heavy condition. Enemy speed about 13.5 knots. After closing to 500 yards fired 1 torpedo at 4000 ton freighter. Miss. Fired 2 torpedoes at 6000 ton freighter. Both missed. Both fired on 170 track.

2254(I) Stern lookout reported a ship closing on our port quarter. This was believed to be an escort vessel raking rendezvous with the formation. The fact that the last two ships remained in close formation after the first sinking indicated that they were expecting to make a rendezvous with another escort.

2254(I) Fired 1 torpedo at 6000 ton vessel, 160 track, range 600 yards. Erratic run, missed. Turned hard left to investigate the ship reported on port quarter. It had cut across our stern and was lost from sight while firing last bow shot.

— page 37 —
2310(I) Continued the chase and at 2332 fired 1 torpedo at 6000 tons of freighters. This torpedo was fired on 170 track and 500 yards range. Torpedo explosion felt below decks. At 2334 swung hard left and fired 2 stern shots at 4000 tons of freighters. Torpedoes exploded. Since it was then after midnight, with battery well down, noon about to come out brightly, and presence of escort vessels in the vicinity suspected, it was decided to clear the area and charge batteries. Changed course to 0900 T and pgc. Result of this engagement: one 9500 ton passenger-freighter sunk; one 6000 ton freighter damaged or sunk; one 4000 ton freighter probably sunk.

July 5, 1942
0500(I) Departed from Area at latitude 30-15N. Pilot instructed through Colnett Strat. Surfaced. Proceeding to midway on two main generators, about 12,0 knots, on route 30 miles north of westbound route. Tomorrow, July 6, will be last submerged run during daylight.

July 11, 1942
0600(K) Received message from Comtaskfor 7 reporting enemy submarine 80 miles south of PLUNGER position. Sighted a plane, distant 4 miles. This plane appeared to be a seaplane scout plane painted silver color. It was possibly a plane from the enemy submarine reported above. Made dive to 100 feet. 0950(K) Surfaced. Proceeding to midway on two main generators. Zig-zagging.

July 15, 1942
Arrived at Midway.

— page 39 —
5. ENEMY VESSELS SIGHTED (CONT.)

DATE & TIME  | TYPE  | POSITION | COURSE & SPEED
June 20, 1942 | 1 sailing | 30-34N | Course 000T
1030(I)    | sampan  | 137-40E | Speed 5 knots

June 22, 1942 | 1 sampan | Be: ring 135 | Lying to
1814(I)    | 17 miles from Yaku

June 23, 1942 | 1 sailing | 32-09N | Course 090
1355(I)    | sampan  | 125-53E | Speed 10 knots

June 27, 1942 | 2 small | 32-01N | Course 270
0920(I)    | trams or | 125-40E | Speed 5 knots

June 28, 1942 | 14 sampans | Bearing 110° | Lying to
2153-2400(I) | 30 miles from | Lucon Island

June 30, 1942 | 9500 ton | Bearing 170° | Course 190
0200(I)    | freighter | from Brother Is. | Speed 11 knots
Africa Nauru class

June 30, 1942 | COMTE VERDE | 30-08N | Course 180
0700(I)    | 123-16E | Speed 20 knots

June 30, 1942 | 2 sampans | 30-34N | Lying to
2212(I)    | 123-38E

July 1, 1942 | 7000 ton | 31-21N, 123-45E | Course 250
0507(I)    | Pass. Frtr. | Speed 18 knots

July 2, 1942 | 4 ships: | Bearing 090 | Course 150°
1 pass. Frtr(9500) | 10 miles from | Speed 12 knots
1 Frtr.(6000) | Barren Island
1 Frtr.(4000)
1 Escort(old type DD
or patrol vessel)

-8- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 40 —
5. ENEMY VESSELS SIGHTED (CONT.)

DATE & TIME: July 2, 1942
TYPE: 30 sampans
POSITION: Bearing 140°, 15 miles from Barren Island
COURSE & SPEED: Lying to

6. AIRCRAFT SIGHTED:

DATE & TIME: June 12, 1942
POSITION: 28-02N
174-40E
REMARKS: Unidentified. Appeared to be Navy PBY patrol plane. Made dive to 150 feet.

June 13, 1942
28-01N
170-05
Unidentified. Similar to Army B-17 but appeared to be painted silver color. Made dive to 150 feet.

July 11, 1942
30-20N
157-05
Small scout seaplane. Silver color. Delivered to be from enemy submarine. Made dive to 100 feet.

-9- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 41 —
1. - :Center :803 :8ft :10ft :nor :12 :miss:small :tramp :steamer :sec :Center :100P:8ft :25ft :nor.:12 :miss:Africa :NaruClass: :1 : - :Center :110P:7ft :25ft :nor.:8 :miss:do : :1 : - :Stern :180 :7ft :25ft :nor.:12 :hit :do : :Seen to :sink :Stern :180 :8ft :20ft :nor.:12 :miss:Raluyo :

— page 42 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Second Var Patrol.

8. ENEMY A/S INCASURES.
It is considered possible that for convoys the enemy is using a "zone escort defense". It appeared, though cannot be positively stated, that the three ships attacked on July 2, were escorted until shortly after dark by an escort vessel possibly basing on the Saddle Islands. Then, after the first ship had been sunk, the other two stayed in close proximity to each other, it seems probable that they were due to meet another escort at dawn, and that call for help had been sent, and they were expecting an earlier rendezvous. Two of the ships were transmitting on 400 kcs., between the first and second torpedo hits on the passenger freighter.

9. MAJOR DEFECTS EXPLAINED.
Material performance was generally satisfactory, and no permanent ill effects from capsizing on the Marine Railway were noted. The following major defects were experienced:

(a) Cracking of main engine cylinder line water jackets. Prior to departure from Pearl Harbor two cracks were found in #3 engine. All of #3 engine liner jackets are now cracked and 3 cracked liners have appeared in #4 engine. #2 engine has 2 possible cracks. All cracks are similar to trouble previously reported by U.S.S. POLACK.

(b) Low individual overall insulation to ground readings main generators and motors. The following readings were obtained upon putting into Midway enroute to station:

#1 main generator - 150,000 ohms
#2 main generator - 5 megs
#3 main generator - 500,000 ohms
#4 main generator - 8 megs
#1 main motor - 100,000 ohms
#2 main motor - 150,000 ohms
#3 main motor - 300,000 ohms
#4 main motor - 400,000 ohms
#5 main motor - 150,000 ohms
#6 main motor - 100,000 ohms
#7 main motor - 250,000 ohms
#8 main motor - 400,000 ohms

Auxiliary generator - 300,000 ohms.

-11- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 43 —
0-N-F-I-D-8-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Second War Patrol.

All generators and motors were thoroughly cleaned by spraying with high grade cleaning solvent obtained from Electrical Shop at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, before starting on patrol and had excellent readings before and after dock trial. The drop occurred between Pearl Harbor and Midway. No definite cause for the low readings has been ascertained, and no further drop has occurred since low readings were first noted. Full power has been made on two different nights at 11:00 PM, but it is believed that these readings should be improved before departing for another extended patrol.

(c) Pounding in stern winch ship rolls. Pounding as noted on the last patrol was again heard at when the ship encountered heavy rolling. Cause of this has not yet been determined, as both stern planes and rudder were removed during Navy Yard overhaul between patrols, and looseness apparently corrected.

(d) Failure of forward air-conditioning. On the homeward leg of the patrol, the line entering the condenser from the compressor of the forward air-conditioning unit cracked horizontally about 2/3 of the way around its circumference, leaking from into the pump room. The ship was at this time still in the warm waters of the Kurushima Current. This, combined with hot, humid weather encountered, caused temperature to rise about 25°C in the ship as far aft as the after battery compartment, and habitability to be seriously impaired. After a period of about 20 hours the crack was successfully repaired. Cracking is believed due to vibration of the line induced by compressor. It is recommended that the line be better supported or cushioned to dampen vibration.

10. RADIO RECEPTION
Reception of NPI on 26.1 kcs. and NPL on 30.6 kcs was very good from ______ until about June 16(six days out of Midway). At this time reception of NPI was still good and NPL was very weak, barely readable. On June 20, NPL unreadable and NPM strength 3-4, varying at about 1500(Z) to strength 1-2, when it became necessary to copy NPM on 8230 strength 5, and 4115 strength 3-4.

While on station reception of NPI on 2.1 kcs was good except for particularly bad weather conditions (static) at various times. However the signal faded out on the 1100(Z) to 1500(Z) watch making it necessary to shift to 8230 kcs. On 8230 kcs reception was excellent except for some nights when weather conditions caused intense static. Reception on 4115 was possible but weak.

— page 45 —
13. FACTORS OF DURANCE RELATING.

Torpedoes  - 0
Fuel  - 4000 gal.s.
Provisions  - 30 days
Personnel  - 10 uays

14. Factor terminating patrol - armament.

- 14 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 47 —
21 July 1942
Serial 0225
COINCIDENTAL:
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUGGER Second War Patrol - Comments on this patrol was well conducted by the PLUGGER. I issues were made with torpedoes due to unfavorable tracks, etc., but the commanding officer was not aggressive in carrying home his attacks until hits were made. The percentage of hits, 32%, is above the general average.

2. The PLUGGER left July on June 9th to start this patrol. The vessel is now refitting at the new periscope to start another patrol from the next point. She will be the first vessel to refit at that base.

3. The cracking of the main engine cylinder liners is inherent in the design. Sufficient liners of the old type were sent to the PLUGGER at the new periscope to replace the cracked liners. It is recommended that all old liners be replaced with new type liners after the next war patrol. These liners will be available at the submarine base by that time.

4. By copy of this letter the Squadron Commander congratulates the commanding officer, officers and crew of the PLUGGER on a job well done.

J.H. BONT, jr.

Copy to: CSD 43
CO PLUGGER

ENCLOSURE "C"

— page 48 —
1. The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander Task Force 42.
Subject: Third War Patrol. - Report of.
Reference: (a) Submarines Pacific Fleet, Confidential
    Letter No. 12-42.
Enclosure: (A) Report of U.S.S. PLUNGER Third War Patrol.
    1. Subject report is forwarded as enclosure (A).
    2. Report compiled in accordance with reference (a).

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY QP-09-892C DATE 6/11/12
DECLASSIFIED

— page 49 —
1942, S-E-C-R-E-T
U.S.S. PLUNGER
Period from 12 October, 1942 to 8 November, 1942.

PROLOGUE
'Arrived Midway 15 July, 1942. Commenced refit on 16 July, 1942, by tender repair forces. On 3 August it was decided that main motors should be lifted to remove grounds and low resistance readings. Beyond Tender capacity. Returned Pearl, 6-11 August, 1942. Continued refit at Submarine Base. Installed B.J. Radar. Not deterred or wiped. Sound tested. Made two day post repair trial, fired 3 exercise torpedoes, conducted S.J. training. Readiness for sea 12 October 1942.

1. NARRATIVE.
12 October, 1942 Departed Pearl in accordance Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet Operation Order #93-42 in company U.S.S. LITCHFIELD and U.S.S. DOLPHIN. Conducted daily training dives and drills enroute.

15 October, 1942 Radar contact with friendly plane, twenty-six miles distant. Not sighted.

16 October, 1942 Entered Midway and moored to U.S.S. FULTON. 0730 (X) Fueled to capacity. Tender force welded leaks around newly installed inboard vents from reserve fuel oil tank main vent lines.

1523(Y) Departed Midway for area. Escorted for 30 miles by P.T. boat. Conducted daily training dives and drills enroute.

21 October, 1942 Received Com Task Force Seven 210157 of October 2336 (L) 1942, changing patrol orders. In position 28-15N., 160-40 E. Changed course to South enroute to assigned point on equator. Planned to pass West of Penape Island.

23 October, 1942 Made quick dive for drill and to work on torpedoes.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 50 —
1323(L) While pulling Torpedo from #5 tube, starting lever was accidentally tripped, causing hot run. Propellor lock was on. Room filled with smoke. After 30 seconds the air was secured. The torpedo was then reloaded, and the after room abandoned because of dense smoke remaining. (For details of this casualty see 18)

1330(L) Surfaced to clear smoke from after room. Decided not to dive again this date to check this torpedo because of length of time required. Expecting radio orders from ComSoPac.

25 October 1942 0812(L) Upon receipt of Comsopac 241152 of October, 1942 assigning area. Changed course to pass East of Ponape Island, this being a shorter route to area.

26 October, 1942 1457(L) Made quick dive to complete work on torpedoes before entering area. Torpedo which had hot run found not damaged.

1855(L) Surfaced.

2206(L) Passed 30 miles East of Ponape Island. Changed course to head directly for area.

29 October 1942 0510(L) Made quick dive. Will enter area this morning, having made entire passage on surface except for drill dives and 2 dives to work on torpedoes.

1100(L) Entered area at Lat. 06-30 S., Long. 159-02 E., commenced patrolling.

1148(L) Sighted large bomb-1 about 4 miles away, silhouette similar to B-17E. Number of motors un-determined.

1920(L) Surfaced. Proceeding to Rekata Bay, involving rec-ceived information from Comtaskfor 42 that best station is between Rekata Bay and Edwards Bank.

30 October, 1942 0515(L) Made quick dive.

0530(L) In half light of dawn sighted what appeared to be tracers fired skyward and return strafing fire by planes. Appeared to be an air raid on Rekata Bay although, no planes were sighted in poor light. 10 miles from Rekata at this time.

- 2 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 51 —
1. Recovered Western entrance of Rekata Bay this afternoon. Visibility poor, no shipping or shore installations sighted. Decided to return tomorrow.
2. Reconditioned West entrance to Rekata Bay this morning and North-East entrance this afternoon. No shipping or shore installations sighted. During night it was proceeding towards Maringe Lagoon.
3. Sighted large unidentified land plane 7-50 S., 159-30 E. Reconnoitered Maringe Lagoon this afternoon from position 2 miles off entrance. Sighted no shipping. Houses seen on Fara Island and Mainland as described in pilot.
4. Sighted flying fortress 07-51 S., 159-30 E - Reconnoitered Maringe Lagoon again this afternoon.
5. While submerged at 55 feet keel depth off Maringe Lagoon entrance on course 3450 T, hit bottom. Q.C. head hit first, jamming. Immediately thereafter hull apparently hit coral about amidships. Came to 40 feet, keeping down angle to keep screws clear. Position 0801-30 S., 159-35-03 E. Chart shows good water in this position. Actual depth estimated to be 52 feet.
6. Surfaced, patrolling between Edwards Bank and Rekata Bay, headed for the latter.
7. Upon receipt of des patch subs 42 No. 12 c/c to head for Indispensable Strait to intercept enemy force. Proceeding on 3 generators. On completion of charge put 4 generators on propulsion. Visibility poor. Raining. Position doubtful. No fix since 1600.
8. Sighted object, 07-59S, 159-52 E, thought to be Ramos Island dead ahead. Radar reported indication 3800 yards bearing 350 relative, 1500T.
9. Stopped.
10. Saw object was ship, later observed to be a Natori class Cruiser, angle on the bow 40 port. Swung hard left getting tubes ready.

- 3 - [EMERGENCY (A)]

- 3 -

— page 52 —
0419(L) Radar range 2200 yards, L on bow 60-70 port.
: 0419(L) Fired 4 torpedoes (heavy heads) from bow tubes with about 12 seconds firing interval. Longitudinal spread, about 90 track.
: 0420(L) Radar range 1900 yards. Dove to 55 feet. Two hits heard while submerging.
: 0421(L) 3 more explosions heard - 5 seconds apart, may be internal explosions in cruiser, or depth charges.
: 0422(L) Periscope observations tried by Commanding Officer and Navigator. Too dark to see.
: 0423(L) Went deep, swinging left, rigging for depth charge.
: 0423(L) Heard target sorews.
: 0424(L) Target sorews slowed and stopped.
: 0427(L) Heard sorews of two probably destroyers maneuvering at various speeds approximate bearing 045°T.
: 0429(L) At 130 Feet, rigged for silent running and depth charge attack. After flooding in, about 10,000 with no change in depth (ship still answering rudder) found we were on the bottom in mud or sand. Stopped. Slowly blowing water to regain trim.
: 0430(L) Heard sorews of five more ships apparently passing about 2500 yards astern, on northerly course. Still to dark to see through periscope. Did not think firing torpedoes while sitting on bottom was justifiable. Did not believe it prudent to surface close to enemy for surface firing.
: 0437(L) Two destroyers reported at 0427 moving away, approximate bearing 045°T.

- 4 -
- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 53 —
0450(L) Last of screws faded out bearing 0600T.
: 0610(L) Came to periscope depth. Nothing in sight. Moderate sea running to westward. Raining.
: 1100(L) Sounding gave : Catbans under keel. Came up to 48 feet. Tracer after sounds increased.
: 1253(L) Sighted plane believed (B-17-E approaching from direction of Isabel shore. Went to 100 feet. 08-21 S., 160-05 F.
: 1922(L) Surfaced. Patrolling strait.
: 2014(L) Sighted white light on beach on bearing of Tanabuli.
: 2120(L) Sighted what appeared to be gun flashes at fairly regular intervals on bearing of Florida and Gudal-canal islands over horizon.
: 2230(L) Proceeding to Brisbane in accordance Comtaskfor 42 despatch 13 affirm.
: 1043(L) Sighted flying Fortress 08-43 S., 160-03 E.
: 1400(L) Sighted two small unidentified land planes 8-52 S., 159-56 E.
: 1923(L) Surfaced west of Guadalcanal Island. Proceeding to Brisbane on surface.
: 5 November 1942 Sighted seaplane, probably PBY, crossing ahead, on course 2500T. Apparently he did not sight us, 12-36 S., 158-51-30 E.
: 8 November 1942 Sighted escort vessel RMAS ECUCHA 0500(K)
: 0645(K) Passed Cape Morton light abeam to port, entering Brisbane.
: 1133(K) Moored to U.S.S. GRIFFIN.

- 5 -
- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 55 —
9. Mine sweeping - None.

10. Major defects experienced.

(a) Torpedo Data Computer Failure.
Data Computer, Mk 1, Mod 3, failed to generate bearing on the first training problem held after leaving Midway. Weeks of repair work were done on TDC by Submarine Base prior departure. Trouble determined to be in middle section. Did not disassemble at sea because of lack of qualified firecontrolman. TDC broke a Shear pin in angle on the bow dial during exercise firing in October - again repaired by Submarine Base. Broke down enroute Midway. Repaired by Fulton. Shear pins are beginning to give way in this instrument, whenever fast setups are cranked in. It is not dependable as a result. This instrument has ond advantage over the Mk 3 in that it automatically analyzes for target course and speed, which is invaluable on surface if radar ranges are available.

It is urgently recommended that, when availability permits, this instrument be completely disassembled and all shear pins be renewed. At present its unreliability makes it a hazard, not a help, in torpedo firing. An alternative is the replacement of the Mk 1 with the Mk 3.

(b) S.D. RADAR.
After leaving Midway, ground readings on vertical antenna mast dropped. Shortly thereafter, RADAR began to double-pulse, slightly at first, then progressively worse, rendering equipment uncertain at best. The entire equipment was checked, and no faults found in either transmitter or receiver. With tubes completely replaced, performance of equipment was the same. The antenna mast ground readings had dropped to 75000 ohms. It is believed that the gasket or the weld around the top of the U - antenna leaked during dives and the entering salt water dried on the inside insulators, grounding the mast. About one-half pint of water was drained from the mast after each all day dive on station.

(c)
Frick refrigerating plant must be worked on continuously to keep it running through the petrol. Letter to Bureau requesting installation of York type compressor written prior departure Pearl.

11. Radio reception was complete from both task forces.
Last consecutive serial received:

From Comtaskfor - 7 LEGION
From Comtaskfor - 42 NK 19A

— page 56 —
U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Third War Patrol.

Last consecutive Serial sent:

To Comtesskfor - 7: No Serials - acknowledgement for LEGION.

To Comtesskfor - 42: 160200 of November. After shifting to Bells broadcast upon passing equator, difficulty was experienced in hearing Belconnen during daylight hours from Oct. 26 through Oct. 28. Accordingly, when Bells faded to unreadability, watch was shifted to NPM. No serial traffic was missed due to the frequent repetition of messages on Bells circuit. After leaving station Bells was received S-5 twenty-four hours a day. Reception of both NPM 26.1 KC transmission and Bells 44.4 KC transmission on loop antenna was impossible at periscope depth.

12. Sound conditions were fair. The area north of Santa Isabel and in Indispensable Strait abounds in high noise level. Crackling noises and whistling in reception were encountered during every watch. On the morning of November 3, conditions were such that various ships of the enemy force were clearly distinguished including a probable large ship and escort on about the same bearing.

13. Health and Habitability.

Health of the crew was good. Two meals were served each day, one at - 0730 and one at - 1530. Several cases of heat rash were treated, while patrolling in the extremely warm waters on station.

14. Miles steamed enroute to and from station.

| To Station | To Station | To Station |
||||
| 4420       | 1230       | 5650       |
| 5650       | 1230       | 5650       |

15. Fuel expended 72,450 gals.

16. Factors of endurance remaining.

| Torpedoes | Fuel 12 | Provisions 25,000 | Days | Water Personnel 1450 gals | 20 days |
||||-------|||
| 12       | 35     | 35              |       |                       |        |

17. No factor of endurance caused ending of patrol. Ordered to return after reporting grounding submerged.

18. Remarks.

(a) Lt. D. H. McClintock, the Executive Officer, fired the torpedoes at the Natori class Cruiser with great skill and presence of mind. Credit for damage to the enemy belongs to him. The other officers and men conducted themselves in accordance with the highest traditions of the U. S. Navy.

- 6 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 57 —
5-Tube Torpedo Casualty (Hot Run in After Room).

While pulling torpedo part way out of #5 tube for charging, the proper! lor lock was put on. A torpedomans mate third olass had the charging lead in one hand and the safety stick in the other. Before putting on the safety stick, he freed one hand by laying the charging lead just forward of the starting lever. The ship took a small up angle and the torpedo moved six inches aft before the holding lines were taut. The starting lever was tripped by the charging! lead causing a hot run. After about 30 seconds the air was secured, by which time the room was full of smoke (see 230ot. account). This was fault of personnel, as safety stick should be installed immediately when starting lever emerges from tube. Torpedo was drained, given a cold run, and made ready again.

(c) The need for loudspeaker system is urgent, to improve bridge communications to remainder of ship during night attacks. TDC is almost useless on surf:ce without the loudspeaker system. This is an approved alteration that should be expedited.

(d) A suggested means for accurately recording times and orders etc., during an attack is a small machine for making records, one of which could be turned on when near the firing point. It is believed these were commercially available at a low price before the war.

- 9 -

ENCLOSURE (a)

— page 59 —
16-3(11)
Serial 0104
SECRET
S-E-C-R-E-T

FIRST ENDORSEMENT TO:
Comdr. T.J. 42 Seerot
1tr. T/42/A4-3, Serial
080 of November 16, 1942.

From:
The Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force,
The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject:
U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179), Third War Patrol;
Comment on:

1. Forwarded strongly concurring in the remarks in paragraph 5 of the forwarding letter pertaining to surrender of the initiative. Had PLUNGER remained on surface after attack on November 3rd he undoubtedly would have been able to make additional attacks by use of radar on the ships whose screws he could hear but which he could not see in the periscope.

2. The initiative, presence of mind, and skill of the Executive Officer, Lieutenant McClintock, are noted with pleasure.

3. Submarines assigned to Area B in the future should be furnished with the information of the shoal off MARINGE LAGOON.

Copies to:
VCNO, Cinepae,
Cineplant, Comsovespae,
Comsublant, Comsubpae,
Comsubsovespae, Comsubron 4,
Comsubdiv 43, C.O. PLUNGER

W. F. HALSEY

— page 60 —
44163 FILMED
TF42/A4-3
Serial 080
SECRET
From:
To:
Subject:
Enclosure:
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.
2. The third patrol of the FLUNGER was terminated on station for only five days. This action was taken upon receipt of a message in which the vessel stated that the QC sound projector and hull had been damaged by grounding while submerged. The probability of serious oil and air leaks as a result of this accident was the factor which made withdrawal appear to be advisable.
3. It is unfortunate that this accidental ground- ing had to occur at a time when the FLUNGER's services on patrol were so urgently needed. Submarines patrolling in areas assigned to this force are subjected to grounding hazards of this nature due to the unreliability of charts and other hydro- graphic information. It must be assumed that the enemy, in routing his forces, takes every advantage of his evident su- perior knowledge of these areas and, although caution is enjoined under normal circumstances, the risks of grounding must be accepted when in contact.
4. By taking quick and determined action upon in- formation supplied by the Task Force Commander from reconnaiss- sance by other forces, the Commanding Officer brought his ship into contact with an enemy force early in the morning of November third. The subsequent action was gratifying. The snap attack on the NATORI class cruiser made within three min- utes of first sighting was exceedingly well conducted. The evidence indicates that two hits were obtained. causing severe, if not fatal, damage. The Task Force Commander congratulates the Executive Officer, Lieutenant D. H. McClintock, who, as officer of the deck, obtained this success against the enemy.

— page 61 —
5. Precipitous diving after a night attack surrenders the initiative to the enemy. In every such attack, high speed retirement on the surface should be attempted and, whenever possible, position ahead for follow-up attacks should be gained.

6. Material:
   - Radar maintenance in submarines continues to be unsatisfactory. The assignment of radar school graduates for duty in submarines on patrol is urgently required.

7. PLUNGER refit is being accomplished by SHERRY.

8. PLUNGER is credited with the following damage to the enemy:
   - Sunk: None.
   - Demaged: One NATORI Class Cruiser.

K. W. CHRISTIE.

Distribution:
- Cominoch, VCNO, Cincpac, Jinclant, Comsopac, Comsowespac, Comsublant, Comsubpac, Comsubsowespac, Comsubrons 4, E, 10, Each SS of TF42 (not to be taken to sea - BURN), CTF42 Patrol Summary File, Comsubdiv 43, CO FLUNGER.

FILMED

— page 62 —
5. Precipitous diving after a night attack surren-
ders the initiative to the enemy. In every such attack, high
speed retirement on the surface should be attempted and, when-
ever possible, position ahead for follow-up attacks should be
gained.

6. Material:
   - Radar maintenance in submarines continues to be
unsatisfactory. The assignment of radar school graduates for
duty in submarines on patrol is urgently required.

7. Plunger refit is being accomplished by Sferry.

8. Plunger is credited with the following damage:
   - Sunk: None.
   - Demaged: One NATORI Class Cruiser.

Distribut ion:
   - Cominch,
   - VCNO,
   - Cincpac,
   - Cinclant,
   - Comsopac,
   - Comsowespac,
   - Comsublant,
   - Comsubpac,
   - Comsubsowespac,
   - Comsubrons 4, 6, 10,
   - Each SS of TF42 (not to be taken to sea - BURN),
   - CTF42 Patrol Summary File,
   - Comsubdiv 43,
   - CO FLUNGER.

FILMED

K. W. CHRISTIE.

CLASSIFICATION THIS CURRSPONDENCE
CHANGED TO: 5.0
AUTHORITY: 5.0
DATE: 1/4/45 1/4/45

FILMED

CONFIDENTIAL

— page 63 —
12
Serial 093
CODECLASSIFIED
CODISUPAC PATROL RECORD NO. 124
U.S.S. SLINGER - FOURTH 'AR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. SLINGER (SS179) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject patrol with comments thereon.

1. The Fourth 'Ar Patrol of the PLUNGER extended from its departure from Brisbane on November 22, 1942, until arrival at Pearl Harbor January 15, 1943. Forty days of the total time of 54 days were spent in the patrol area.
2. The attacks made by enemy planes on January 8 and 11, while proceeding on the surface, are concrete evidencethat the training of bridge lookouts warrants the most careful attention on the part of each vessel.
3. Attention is invited to the method of navigating narrow, steep-to channels by using the edges of the JK noise level, the bearings being tangents on the beach or reef.
4. This was another aggressive patrol for the PLUNGER, carried out in narrow waters and in the face of active enemy destroyer opposition. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are congratulated on their excellent performance. Well done!
5. The PLUNGER is credited with the following damage to the enemy:

| SSN | DESTROYER | DEST

— page 64 —
12-10/A16-3(5)/ SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET (12)
Serial 093
CONFIDENTIAL
CONSUBDAC PATROL REPORT NO. 124
U.S.S. FLUNGER - FOURTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. FLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

"While it is probable that the above vessel was sunk, it was not practicable to confirm it by sufficient observations.

J. H. BRC N, Jr.,
Acting.

DISTRICT OF
Listed: SS.
Special:
FL. 5, EN(5), ZI(5),
Conducteur (2), Ks(1),
Conducteur (2),
Subschool, N.L. (2).

E. K. S. INBURNE,
Fleg Secretary.

— page 65 —
5-4/16-3
Serial 07
CCFIDTIAL
FIRST IN BORN TO
ConsubDiv 43 Cmdr. Ltr.
F15-43/16-3 Serial 06.
Dated 6 January 15, 1943.

Prica: The Commander Submarine Squadron PCU.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. FLUCTUR - Fourth or Patrol, Comments on.

1. The fourth war patrol of the FLUCTUR was of fifty-six days duration of which forty days was on station, mostly submarine. This patrol was a repasival conducted and the attacks made were 100 percent successful and 50 percent hits were obtained.

2. The material condition of the FLUCTUR is considerably satisfactory and it is expected the raft will be collected in fourteen days. The subject of the weakness of the vent risers will be taken up in separate correspondence. A net torpedo data co. cutter will be installed upon receipt and the present one will be placed in operation condition during the raft period.

3. The Commander's Officer, Officers, and Crew are by copy of this account especially contributed on their two successful attacks while in a concentration of anti-submarine ships.

— page 66 —
1942, U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

Period from 22 November, 1942 to 15 January, 1943.

PROLOGUE
Arrived Brisbane, Australia, 8 November, 1942, from Third War Patrol. Commenced refit on 9 November, 1942, by U.S.S. FULTON, U.S.S. SPERRY and Ship's force. Docked. Combination QC-JK Sound head, and new shaft (cast locally) installed. Readiness for sea 22 November, 1942. Not demped or wiped; no training period. Torpedo Data Computer out of commission, as during third war patrol.

1. NARRATIVE
22 November, 1942.
1400(L)
Departed Brisbane in accordance Commander Task Force Forty-Two Operation order No. S56-42. Conducted training dives and drills enroute.

2305(L)
Sighted and exchanged calls with U.S.S. TROUT and U.S.S. GRANTUS. (Both picked up on radar at about 2500 yards range after sighting).

24 November, 1942.
0928(L)
SD Radar reported large flight of planes, distant 10 miles, moving in fast. Made quick dive when range had decreased to 6 miles. Lat. 21-15S, Long. 156-45E.

1004(L)
Surfaced. S.D. Radar leaked badly on 0928 dive. Antenna insulator at top of mast found broken. Removed antenna and replaced it with blank plate, manufactured at sea. S.D. radar out of commission.

26 November, 1942.
0630(L)
Made quick dive. Proceeding submerged. 11°S. will enter area tonight.

2330(L)
Entered area, proceeding to east coast Guadalcanal to reconnoiter, as ordered by Subs-42 despatch serial 18B.

27 November, 1942.
0123(L)
Sighted smoke apparently over horizon.

(1) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 67 —
0127(L) C/C to head for smoke. Noted bearing of smoke changing toward west. Sighted ship below smoke, at first appeared to be a DD making high speed. As we closed, discovered that ship was a submarine, range about 6000 yds, smoking heavily as from starting engines. We were on his bow in good position to attack; submerged and started approach. Submarine changed course and passed about 5000 yds away.

: 0145(L) Surface and chased on four generators with plan of first sighting sub, then running around ahead for position for submerged attack.

: 0247(I) Chased for one hour at end of which enemy should have been in sight. Could not locate sub. Assumed he had seen us and submerged. Cleared area.

: 0250(L) C/C to head for Guadalcanal.

: 0454(L) Made quick dive. Reconnoitered west coast of Guadalcanal, from Vander Bay north to West Cipe, this date. Sighted tents on shore of Vander and Beaufort Bays. No boats or shipping sighted.

: 0528(L) Sighed 3 unidentified planes. Lat 09-50S, Long. 159-33E.

28 November, 1942. Reconnoitered west coast Guadalcanal from Vander Bay south to Cape Hunter. Nothing sighted, except a few tents half hidden in palms. Despatch Subs-42 Serial 18B called for radio report only if positive evidence of recent or future landings was noted. Made no report, since no positive information had been obtained.

1936(L) Surfaced. Proceeding towards Munda Bar, New Georgia Island, where Jap airfield is being constructed according to subs 42 despatch 211102 of November, 1942.

29 November, 1942. Patrolling submerged off southwestern end of Blanche Channel, near Montgomery Island.

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 68 —
30 November, 1942.
Patrolling submerged off southwestern end of Blanche Channel to be in position for enemy task force enroute Guadelcanal this date. (Subs 42 despatch serial 65A.)

1937(L) Surfaced. Proceeding to Munda Bar as ordered by Subs 42 despatch serial 9C

1-2 December, 1942.
Patrolling off Munda Bar. Approached to about 2 miles off reefs. Nothing sighted, except buildings shown on chart as mission, and smoke in probable position of airfield runway construction.

3 December, 1942.
Patrolling off Munda Bar.

1514(L) Sighted unidentified airplane. Lat. 08-30S, Long. 157-05E.

4 December, 1942.
Patrolling off Munda Bar.

0935(L) Sighted U.S. Army B-17 bomber. Lat. 08-33 S, Long. 157-07 E.

5 December, 1942.
Submerged and passed Munda Bar at daylight, proceeding eastward north of Rendova Island. Reconnoitered Rendova Harbor. Passed through channel north of Rendova Island. Reconnoitered east coast of Rendova Island. Passed out to sea again through Balfour channel.

6 December, 1942.
Patrolling off Munda Bar.

0935(L) Sighted U.S. Army B-17 bomber. Lat. 08-22 S, Long. 157-06 E.

1543(L) Sighted U.S. Army B-24 bomber. Lat. 08-30 S, Long. 157-03 E.

7 December, 1942.
Patrolling off Munda Bar and Wana Wana Island.

1505(L) Sighted U.S. Army B-17 bomber. Lat. 08-30S, Long. 157-02 E.

-3- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 69 —
1945(L)  Subfaced. Received Subs 42 despatch serial 12C. Proceeding to east edge of area to be in best position for cripples from Quadlcanal surface battle tonight, complying with above despatch.

8. December 1942. Patrolling east edge of area waiting cripples. After surfacing, returned to Munda Bar.

0852(L)  Sighted U.S. Army B-17 bomber, Lat. 08-23S, Long. 157-09 E.

9-10 December, 1942. Patrolling off Munda Bar.

9th 1514(L) Sighted U.S. Army B-24 bomber. Lat. 08-30S, Long. 157-00 E.

11 December 1942. Entered S.E. end of Blanche Channel, patrolling in channel. Reconnoitered Viru Harobr. No shipping sighted.

1645(L)  Sighted U.S. Army B-25 (North American) bomber, Lat. 8-43 S, Long. 157-43 E.

12 December, 1942. Patrolling off Munda Bar.

1615(L)  Sighted B-25 plane, 08-24S, 157-12 E.

1630(L)  Sighted unidentified seaplane.

13 December 1942. Entered Blanche Channel at south end on surface. Dove at dawn in channel. Proceeding westward patrolling channel. Left channel via pass between New Georgia and Rendova Island.

14 December 1942. Patrolling off Munda Bar and south of Rendova Island.

15 December 1942. Same.

1531(L)  Sighted Jap two float Seaplane. Lat. 09-07 S, Long. 157-20 E.

16 December 1942. Sighted B-17 plane. Lat. 08-20S, Long. 157-20E. 0715(L)  Patrolling off Munda Bar during daylight.

-4- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 70 —
2011(L) Surfaced in rain squall, moon giving some light.

2110(L) While still in moderate rain squall sighted six destroyers in column (2 division of three each) bearing 0000 T, angle on bow 90° stbd estimated range 6000-7000 yards, estimated speed 20 kts, headed for Munda Bar. S.J. Radar could not pick up targets. Considered that range was too great for attack, and that torpedoes would have little chance of hitting at this range when fired with only a guess as to target speed.

2240(L) Headed for Munda Bar on surface.

2250(L) An Air Force appeared over Munda Bar, drop ed flares, and started to drop bombs over this area. Speeded up in order to help them and to benefit ourselves by the illumination from the flares.

2335(L) The smoke lifted a little and 2 DD's were sighted patrolling off Wana Wana PT.

2340(L) S.J. Radar range 6000 yards on right hand destroyer. Estimated that two of the DD's were at the Bar unloading and that the other four were patrolling on the radius of 3 to 3½ miles from the Bar. Since their background was indistinct, consisting of smoke and land, and ours was clear sea horizon, decided to dive and make our attack submerged.

2341(L) Dove. Started approach on right hand DD. It was patrolling on a north and south line at low speed estimated 5 kts.

2342(L) Rigged for silent running.

17 December, 1942.

While watching this DD it reversed course and headed north. (Seen to be of Mutsuki class.)

— page 71 —
0011(L) Fired four torpedoes at this DD, Estimated range 600 yards, 90 port track, speed 5, zero gyro angles; divergent spread by swinging ship, points of aim ± length outside and inside stern and bow. Two hits at 20 and 26 seconds. Destroyer stopped. (Four torpedoes were fired at one destroyer because it was wished to insure destruction of at least one ship.) It was fully realized that counter-attack from the other 5 DD's would follow immediately and vigorously. This proved to be the case.

: 0014(L) After seeing the DD start to sink rapidly by the stern, a quick sweep revealed the second DD approaching rapidly from the port beam. Started to swing to right to bring stern tubes to bear, but this procedure had to be abandoned when attacking DD was seen heading towards us quite close aboard. (It is possible that with a satisfactory T.D.C. we might have been able to fire at this one with stern tubes.) Ordered 250 feet and rigged for depth charge. First salvo landed as we passed 160 feet. The attacks following were very deliberate, but not close enough to cause concern, except to the new men who had not been initiated in the art of receiving depth charges. Echo ranging and listening search continued until about 0200 at which time the remaining DD's left the area, presumably to return to the Shortland Base. When a reload was made it caused activity amongst them which led us to believe that they had heard us.

: 0241(L) Surfaced, cleared area and got in partial battery charge. These days had 15 hours of daylight, and the state of charge of the battery was cause for concern.

: 0500(L) Dove at dawn and patrolled off "Jana Wana Island.

: 1815(L) Immediately after periscope exposure, on which no aircraft were sighted, 4 bombs or depth charges exploded. None very close. Went to 150 feet.

: 1955(L) Surfaced.

— page 72 —
2038(L) Sighted four destroyers (probably Mutsuki class) bearin g north about 8000 yds., angle on bow 80 stbd, close to Wana Wana Island, headed for Munda Bar. Dove because of bright moonlight. Had put in partial charge of 38 minutes. Headed for Munda Bar to attack DD's.

2200(L) Began to hear echo ranging.

2245(L) Sighted 2 DD's patrolling off Munda Bar on various courses and speeds, maneuvering radically.

2300(L) While making lengthy studies of these ships trying to form an estimate on which to fire, we passed into the patrolled area.

2325(L) While still studying these patrolling DD's we sighted one of the DD's unloading at Munda Bar. Changed course to north east and headed directly for it. Occasional lights were seen incident to unloading operations. The DD at which we were headed was the source of the echo ranging we had been hearing.

2345(L) Fired 4 torpedo spread at DD for which we were headed, estimated range 3500 yds. Two hits. Echo ranging stopped and no more was heard what night. It appears that all of their DD's are not equipped for echo ranging. Immediately the two covering DD's approached. Went to 250 feet, secured for depth charge attack, heading to clear the area, running silent.

2350(L) First depth charge. Two attacking DD's dropped several charges on each of ten runs, all much closer than those of previous night.

18 December, 1942. 0005(L) Screws heard through hull passing length of ship from aft forward. One charge landed quite close to after torpedo room. Depth gauge there hit peg at 500 feet; pointer bent and stayed against peg. The face of the depth gage in conning tower was knocked off. Water spurted out of flanges in vent risers of M.B.T., and

— page 73 —
0005(L) (Cont'd)
vent riser for #7 B.T. in aft torpedo room was'bulged and distorted so that it rubbed against hand operating shafting to stern planes. The number on this charge is believed to have been very close to "179". As very much disturbed since they seemed to have accurate contact; considered laying knuckles with high speed turns; but state of charge of battery was such that this could not be kept up for long. Decided to take one more salvo to see if they really had us. Secured gyro.

0016(L) Last depth charge. It was farther away, indicating that they had not had us and the close one was a lucky shot; or that they had been hearing the gyro.

0322(L) Surfaced, started battery charge.

19 December, 1942. Could not keep up this pace (submerged each night) so decided to surface in clear, put in full charge, then take position to attack DD's as they leave in case they have come again for third night.

0110(L) In position west of Jana Jana Island at Battle Stations, waiting for DD's. None were seen. Am sure they did not operate here this night.

0325(L) Secured from battle stations.

2000-2200(L) Submerged off Jana Jana Island at Battle Stations to intercept DD's in case they came the fourth night. Nothing seen from our position. I am sure we would have seen or heard them had they come.

21 December, 1942. Heeded for Munda Bar at 15 kts. Nothing seen.

22 December, 1942. Made careful reconnaissance of Munda Bar and Rendova Harbor. Nothing sighted.

23-24 December, 1942. Patrolling off Rendova Island to intercept Guadalcanal - Shortlands submarine traffic.

- 8 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 74 —
25 December, 1942. Proceeding toward Buraku Island. Crossed area boundary at sunset in accordance with Opond. Enroute to new area north of Santa Island, via Indispensible Strait.

0607(L) Sighted unidentified Monoplane 09-09S, 158-31E.

0655(L) Sighted two B-17 planes 09-10S., 158-32E.

26 December, 1942. Entered Area NW via Indispensible Strait.

1645(L) Sighted U.S. Army Reconnaissance plane. 08-10S, 160-03E.

27-28-29 December, 1942. Patrolling off coast Santa Isabel Island between Maringe Lagoon and Rekata Bay. 28 December reconnoitered Rekata Bay. Sighted several dugout canoes on those dates, apparently fishing.

29 December, 1942. Upon receipt of Subs 42 despatch serial 65B c/c to head for new area - North entrance Bouganville Strait.

30 December, 1942. Enroute new area.

31 December, 1942. Patrolling assigned station (North Entrance Bouganville Strait.

1-2 January, 1943. Bouganville Strait.

3 January, 1943. Sighted Masts of DD on northerly course estimated speed 20 knots, close to Otsu Island. Angle on the bow 50 starboard, range 14,000 yards. Attempted to close on normal approach course. Minimum range about 10,000 yards. DD was probably of atatake class, enroute Kieta.

0825(L) Broke off this approach when angle on bow was 140, when smoke was sighted bearing north. This one should go by us into the Strait. Commenced approach soon made out target to be an Asashio classDD, speed 15, zigzagging. Intended to fire bow shots. A zig toward us decreased probable distance to track at firing point to 400 yards. Reversed course to fire

— page 75 —
0825(L) (Cont'd)
stern shots as torpedoes would not arm or reach depth at 400 yards. Target then made another zig towards us passing about 250 yards astern. Did not fire. Angled after torpedoes for 135 track, but as the range was still too short and the track unfavorable, did not fire. A TDC might have better handled this rapidly zigging target, and enabled us to fire. Periscope not sighted. Crew of this DD was in whites; all guns were manned.

4 January, 1943.
1840(L)
While patrolling submerged (06-125S, 156-04E.) sighted I-53 class submarine range 6000. Closed at high speed. He did not zig and rapidly opened the range; this sub had a rising sun painted on the conning tower and was flying the Japanese naval ensign. Sound could not hear this target at any time. This one was a heartbreaker. An unescorted target, not zigging, out of range.

5 January, 1943.
1003(L)
At sunset departed station enroute Pearl. Made daily trim dives enroute. Received despatch subs-42 serial 96B ordering PLUNGER to keep 30 miles south of assigned route to clear Sailifish. (This will pass us just south of Makin Island).

8 January, 1943.
1003(L)
Sky partially overcast. Kadar inoperative. O.O.D. sighted 4 engine bomber (Kawanishi 97) flying boat, coming out of sun, dead ahead, at the same time noting four bombs in flight. As O.O.D. was clearing bridge, all bombs landed just off port quarter. Nearest about 100 feet. Storm covered by bomb geysers. Probable size, 200 lb bombs. Dove to 150 feet. No damage. This plane might have come from Nauru Island (120 miles), or Makin Island (290 miles). Decided to submerge tomorrow, as route passes within 5 miles of Makin Island, from whence planes might have come.

1314(L)
Surfaced.

— page 76 —
9 January, 1943.
0809(L) Remained on surface until Makin sighted; Weather overcast, raining.
1839(L) Surfaced six miles off Makin.
10-11 January, 1943(M) Proceeding on surface.
11 January, 1943. 1140(Y) Sighted 4 engine Kawanishi flying boat, distance about 3 miles, coming in for attack. Dove. Bombs heard to land when at 80 feet - not close. 07-56N, 175-46W. Attention is invited to the fact that this plane was 575 miles from nearest Jap island.
1400(Y) Surfaced.
12 January, 1943. 0800(Y) Entered Johnston 500 mile circle.
0700(VW) Rendezvoused with escort, Sailfish and Halibut. Moored at Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor.

2. WEATHER.
Flat seas were experienced in Solomons. Weather corresponded to description in pilot.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION.
Normal.

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.
Approach to Munda Bar, and passage through Blanche Channel (south of New Georgia Island) are not difficult, most points on charts cutting in very well. A set of 120, drift 1 knot was experienced north of St. Isabel Island. A southerly set was noted in Bougainville Strait. Two miles south of Makin Island experienced current with set 300, drift 1.3 kts. A method of navigating narrow deep channels by sound alone at deep submergence was tried very successfully. The channel must be very deep and the beach steep to. The ship must be

- 11 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 77 —
U.S.S. FLUNGER - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

pointed into channel by periscope bearings. The edges of the noise level, as heard on J.K. for each tangent of the beach or reef, were used as navigational bearings, giving 3 and 4 point sound fixes. Balfour channel and the channel between Rendova Island and Munda Bar were navigated accurately in this manner, and checked by periscope bearings.

5. SHIPS SIGHTED

| Date       | Time | Type             | Lat(S) | Long(E) | Course | Speed |
||------|||||-------|
| 27 November | 0123 | SS              | 09-49   | 159-14  | 260    | 10    |
| 16 December| 2110 | 6 DD             | 08-19   | 157-20  | 90     | 20    |
| 17 December| 2038 | 4 DD             | 08-19   | 157-20  | 95     | 20    |
| 3 January  | 0810 | DD (Vakatake)   | 06-25   | 156-03  | 0      | 18    |
| 3 January  | 0825 | DD (Asashio)    | 06-25   | 156-05  | 185    | 15    |
| 4 January  | 1840 | I-53 SS         | 06-12   | 156-04  | 350    | 12    |

- 12- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 78 —
3 Unident. 09-503 159-33E 310 3000 27 Nov 0525(L)
Unident. 08-30S 157-05E - 3 Dec 1514(L)
B-17 08-33S 157-07E 000 1000 4 Dec 0932(L)
B-24 08-32S 157-03E 090 3000 5 Dec 0935(L)
B-17 08-30S 157-02E - 2000 7 Dec 1505(L)
B-17 08-23S 157-09E - 6000 8 Dec 0352(L)
B-24 08-30S 157-00E - 2000 9 Dec 1514(L)
B-25 08-43S 157-43E 090 11 Dec 1345(L)
B-35 08-24S 157-12E 090 12 Dec 1315(L)
Unident. 08-24S 157-12E - 1000 12 Dec 1300(L)
Decalane 09-07S 157-20E - 1000 13 Dec 1311(L)
B-17 08-20S 157-20E 270 2000 15 Dec 0715(L)
Decoral U. 08-20S 157-20E - 16 Dec 2250(L) ("I hit reef on 'unna airfield')
Unident. 09-09S 158-31E - 25 Dec 0607(L)
Unident. 09-09S 158-32E 000 3000 25 Dec 0555(L)
Decohr F-2 08-10S 160-03E 100 1000 26 Dec 1645(L)
B-17 7-23S 158-30E 310 4000 28 Dec 0755(L)
Unident. 7-30S 159- - 270 - 29 Dec 0635(L)
4 engine
I. Morishii 01-02N 168-24E 240 3000 6 Jan 1003(L) (Drowned 4 bombs near us)
Bate 07-56E 175-46E 60 3000 11 Jan 1140(Y) (Drowned 4 bombs near us)
B-17 19-05N 161-07E - 1000 14 Jan 1400(X)
B-17 19-07N 161-07E - 1000 14 Jan 1420(X)

— page 79 —
8. ENEMY A/A MEASURES.

During the unloading of 6 DD's at Munda Bar, 4 of the DD's were used as patrols, then the next two would unload etc. Stopping to listen then going ahead slowly was the search method in use prior to PLUNGER's attack on the night of 16-17 December. After one DD was sunk, echo ranging was used by one or more DD's also depth charges. The second night, before our attack,echo ranging was used; after the attack only listening and depth charges.

A plane (not seen) dropped 4 bombs or depth charges on PLUNGER, submerged near Munda Bar. While PLUNGER was surfaced enroute Pearl, a 4 engine Kawanishi flying boat made four near misses with 200 lb bombs. Same type attacked 4 days later.

9. ENEMY MINE SWEEPING OPERATION
None observed.

10. MAJOR DEFECTS EXERCISED

(A) MAIN VENT RISERS (#1 and #7), weak construction of the present vent lines are considered to be of insufficient thickness. The lines are of copper, #7 line (0.D. 7?625). "095 thick #1 line (0.D. 10?75). 1.31 thick and are tested internally at 160" pressure. They are flanged pipes running directly from ballast tank tops to pressure hull through the fwd and after torpedo rooms. Because the rupture of either vent line would cause the probable loss of the ship, it is considered that they should be of the same thickness as the pressure hull and of suitable material, in as much as they are subjected to the same pressure during depth charge attacks and deep submergence. These lines are not fitted with hull stops as is customary on all piping piercing the pressure hull (Vents and floods will not hold against external pressure.)

During depth charge attack of 17-18 December, #7 line was bulged out against stern plane shafting. #1 line squirted water at the flanges.

(B) S.D. VERTICAL ANTENNA MAST - absence of hull valve for.

If the top porcelain insulator of the S.D. radar mast carries away, there is no hull valve or other means of checking the flow of water into the control room. A makeshift screw on cap for bottom of mast was manufactured by tender at southern base, but it is impractical to install this on every dive, and furthermore, it is not completely watertight.

— page 82 —
3.3. FLUOR- Report of Fourth Torpedo Patrol.

SCUTT CONDITION AND DEPOSIT LIST (Cont.)

or five times, and the signal was tried the last two. Range was
enroxi ately 1600 yards. This should have been a good con-
tact for the enemy, but little or no effort seemed made to
develop it, as the echo raning ship continued to search. Pre-
sure or enemy echo raning was checked at 16 kcs. on the
nights of the 15th and 17th. All listening was done with the
overhead JV head and the JV side of the combination keel head.
To difficult was experienced in picking up L and or refs by
the change in noise level.

13. HEALTH AND SURVIVAL.

Health in general was good. Three vessel cases, 4
trench mouth cases, and 4 cat fever cases were treated sat-
isfactorily. After about 30 days submerged in tropical waters,
the physical and mental efficiency of all hands are reduced to
be reduced. At the end of 41 days submerged, this reduction
was very marked.

14. FUEL SUPPLY.

75,000 ellons.

15. FACTORS OF OPERATION.

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions (days) Fresh Water Personnel
8 6000 15 1200 0

17. DURANCE FACTORS.

This patrol was ended on date specified by despatch (Ex-
tension of Oporat date.) However it is well to note that the ob-
solute limit of submarine endurance due to fatigue of per-
sonnel, was reached. After 41 days submerged, (40 on station).
Quick recovery was noted after about three days on surface en-
route Pearl. It is believed that 30 days submerged should be
a maximum in tropical waters, if full battle efficiency is
to be maintained.

— page 85 —
5/3/46-3
Serial 06
COSTITUTIONAL
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNCER - Fourth War Patrol, Comment on.

4. The weak construction of No. 1 and No. 7 rain vent risers is considered a serious military defect and will be made the subject of separate correspondence.

5. It is recommended that a spare upper insulator for the SD radar must be carried aboard all submarines. In case of breaking of the insulator at sea, replacement can readily be made by ship's force. A plug or gate valve to close radar mast as recommended by the Commanding Officer is not considered necessary since the mast is scaled by the lower pressure proof insulator in case the upper insulator is carried away.

6. The same cool and deliberate aggressiveness as has been shown by PLUNCER in the past is again in evidence on this patrol. The Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew are to be congratulated on their success.

— page 86 —
1. The Corraducci Submarine Division PT-4-1. The Corraducci Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. The Corraducci Submarine Squadron. The Corraducci Submarine

— page 87 —
5-43/A16-3
Serial 06
CO-IDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. FLUNGER - Fourth War Patrol, Comment on.

4. The weak construction of Iwo. 1 and Iwo. 7 main vent risers is considered a serious military defect and will be made the subject of separate correspondence.

5. It is recommended that a spare upper insulator for the 3D radar must be carried aboard all submarines. In case of breaking of the insulator at sea, replacement can readily be made by ship's force. A plug or gate valve to close radar mast as recommended by the Commanding Officer is not considered necessary since the mast is scaled by the lower pressure proof insulator in case the upper insulator is carried away.

6. The safe cool and deliberate aggression as has been shown by FLUNGER in the past is again in evidence on this patrol. The Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew are to be congratulated on their success.

— page 88 —
12/10/41-3(5) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET (16)
Serial 0439

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
CONSUBMARINE FORCE
U.S.S. PLUNGER - FIFTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of Subject War Patrol Report.
    (B) Copy of Consubdiv 43 Conf. ltr. FB5-43/ A16-3, Serial 048 of March 29, 1943, with Consubron 4 Conf. 1st end. thereto, FC5-4/A16-3, Serial 072 of March 30, 1943.

1. This, the fifth war patrol of the U.S.S. PLUNGER, was the first for the new commanding officer. The patrol was carried out in a very intelligent and aggressive manner.

2. Combined use of radar with good military aggressive-ness enabled the PLUNGER to carry out two successful night attacks. It is regrettable that four or five hits on the large naval tanker were insufficient to sink it.

3. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet congratulates the commanding officer, officers and crew on their very aggressive patrol, during which they inflicted the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, 0PNAVINST 5510.1C 1 Cargo vessel - 9000 tons
BY. OP-0344C DATE 6/1/42
DAMAGED

1 Naval tanker of the SHIRETOKO Class - 14050 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(1M-43)
List III, SS
PL(5), ENS(5), ZI(5),
Consubblant (2), X3(1),
Consubswespac (2),
Subschool, NL (2),
Comtaskfor 72 (2),
Consubron 50 (2),
Consopac (2),
Cinclant (2).

J. H. BROWN, Jr.,
Acting.
Financed-Swamp-File

E.R. SWINBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 89 —
1. NARRATIVE.

February 16
1305 VW - Underway from PEARL, pursuant to CTF 7, OFORD #26-43. PC escort joined at buoys. Checked RDF calibration. Made trim dive and went to test depth. 2000 escort released.

February 16-18 - Enroute out on two engines, 12 knots, conducting training dives and fire control drills. Fired 3" and 20 mm. guns.

February 21-
No planes sighted 610 to 380 miles from MAKIN.

2350 Y - SJ radar interference at 5 minute intervals. Commenced zigging 30° right and left of base course under constant helm in bright moonlight.

February 22 - Omitted from calendar.

February 23
0055 M - SJ interference ceased. 0111 ceased zigging.

1535 M - Entered area near NW corner. No planes sighted 235 to 70 miles from MAKIN.

2304 L - Sighted APIA ISLAND.

0555 L - Divod, conducting high periscope patrol 55 miles west of MAKIN.

1620 L - Surfaced to obtain sunshine. Used highest periscope to obtain maximum radius of visibility. Sunline showed no had been set 15 miles further to westward than expected.

February 25
0000 L - Set course for TARAWA entrance.

0513 L - Divod 11½ miles off entrance to avoid radar detection.

0700 L - Commenced close patrol covering entrance to TARAWA.

- 1 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 90 —
1216 L. Sighted masts bearing 236 t, distance 16,000 yards, large port angle on the bow. Commenced approach. He had a small escort, vessel on the starboard beam. He was a fine MKFM freighter similar, to NANA MARU, 6750 tons, with a new paint job. A MTB stood out of TARANA at high speed, perhaps with the pilot. Believe the MTB took station as port screen. The target group was zigging, giving us angles on the bow from 65 P to 45 S. When the range was 3100 yards, target zigged toward us, giving an angle on the bow of 105. We c/c left to 165 for a 90 S storm tube shot. Target speed 9 knots. Torpedoes set on 8 feet. Matched gyros for white light method. At 1305 PLUNGER wound up 850 yards aboard of target, but much too close to the starboard screen. Man in the after torpedo room heard him pass close astern. The bearing was changing fast and the gyro "matched" light blinked off as #5 was fired with a gyro of about 183 at the target's foremast. #6 was held up until the "matched" light was steady "on". It was fired at the mainmast. We had "marked" a final range of 850 yards just before firing but did not get it through our I.C. system into the TDC, and the second torpedo went out on 192. 195 was needed to hit the point of aim. No hits. We went deep immediately after firing and took one depth charge astern where we would have been on a bow attack. In the next half hour there were eight more depth charges, one at a time, not too close. The JAP sent AR on his supersonic and shoved off, presumably for more depth charges. More help arrived and they held on astern much too well. We finally threw them off the track by turning south about 1600.

1745 L. After sound had been all clear for an hour we shifted the planes to power and started up. Not over 20 seconds after shifting to power one depth charge exploded fairly close. At 1750 two more not too far away. No screws or pinging whatever were heard. We believed we were making a slick or bubbles and commenced an intensive search for the cause. Apparently these last attacks were from the air. We again changed course to the westward. It was a long hour until sunset.

1900 L. Reached periscope depth, nothing in sight.

2000 L. Surfaced and stole silently away into a hospitable black night, after a five-hour counter-attack.

February 26
0600 M. Day broke bright and clear with a smooth sea. A periscope attack on a properly protected valuable unit off the entrance buoys would be difficult on a day like this. Subsequent attacks would be impossible. Close coverage of the three entrances to JALUIT did not look promising.

1216L. Having attained position from which we can remain submerged by daylight, dived. Conducted fire control and I.C. drill to iron out difficulties we had. Blocked out heretofore elusive noisy high-pitch hum in loudspeaker in conning tower with a pie pan taped over the speaker cone.

- 2 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 91 —
1551 L - With 10 feet of periscope out, sighted the white tips of the 140 foot masts of a SHIRETOKO class fleet tanker bearing 043, distance about 16 miles. In the next hour and 38 minutes PLUNGER closed 8.7 miles by pit log but the minimum range was 6200 yards with an even greater torpedo run. He was protected by an air screen and a surface escort. He was zigging radically with an average course near 283. The escort vessel was about 2000 yards on his starboard quarter, not patrolling, just keeping station. The air screen was at about 4000 feet patrolling well up ahead within 500 on either bow. After 1700 the cruiser observation type plane could not be seen in the air. When the range was 6200 yards the C.O. saw what he thought was the plane on board forward. However, no recovery was observed. He was making turns for ten knots, and checked at 9.5 to 10 on TDC and plot. We lost him just before we thought it was time to surface. By this time we knew a lot about him, and felt sure his number was up.

1845 L - Surfaced. With the aid of radar and Fairbanks-Morse regained contact at 2030, range 14,300 yards, 50 on our port bow. The night was black with low dark clouds in several directions. A big moon will rise at 2400. Commenced gaining position ahead, passing up tanker's port side, keeping range open to 10,000 yards. When we were broad on the horizon on his exact bearing. We thought we had been detected by escort listening and cleared the bridge, except for 0.0,D and C.0., to await developments. No developments came and the "rocket" is now thought to have been a shooting star. By 2310 battery was fairly well charged and went to full power on four engines. 2344 we were dead ahead of target, range 10,000 yards. Faced target. Target on course 265, not zigging, speed between 9.8 and 10 knots. Waited to get target in motion light for periscope attack.

February 28
0000 L - Pulled out on target's starboard bow, 3000 yards off the track just as the moon came up bearing about 090. Target now in sight. 0018 dived to 35 feet and continued radar ranges and periscope bearings. When range was 6000 yards and angle on bow 30 S went to 55 feet. Used gorated ranges and periscope bearings, and came to a 90 S track for bow tubes. Set torpedoes on 10 feet. Sound picked up the escort on 285 relative. 0050 target almost filled field of periscope. Felt we were getting in a little too close, came left 100 to an 80 S track to speed up shooting. At 0052, with gorated range of 1500 yards, fired the bow tubes, all gyros on zero, all to hit between the foremost and stack. First torpedo was fired at foronast with periscope angle of 347 and succeeding torpedoes at 7 s firing intervals. Stop watch times were recorded as follows: 00 s fired #1, 07 s fired #2, 14 s fired #3, 21 s fired #4, 55 s first explosion, 61 s second explosion, 68 s third explosion, 76 s

— page 92 —
U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

fourth explosion. All these torpedoes should have hit, but the last explosion was heard only by sound and the forward torpedo room. Three explosions were heard throughout the ship. The screen was close on our port beam; took the ship to 250 feet after the last shot. No depth charges were dropped at this time. Sound reported the tanker's screws could not be heard. In about 15 minutes, sound reported motor boat screws. The escort was close. We put him astern and when we thought we were clear made a quick reload on No. 1 and 2 tubes, circled around, gradually coming up. At 0145 reached periscope depth. Saw tanker dead in water, having turned completely around, headed about 030. He was down by the stern with considerable more overall draft. The escort was milling around between us and target. The tanker was signalling to the escort with a large green signal light. The C.O. and the Executive Officer looked him over and decided he needed only one more torpedo. Maneuvered into a position about 1150 yards on port beam of target, (filled field in high power).

0155 L - Lined up periscope dead on zero and centered up tanker exactly and fired #1 tube set on 10 feet. Sound heard the torpedo start its run, apparently hot, straight and normal. A few seconds after firing, the tanker turned a searchlight on our periscope and the escort turned toward us at high speed. We went deep and took two depth charges. Our torpedo was never heard to explode although the forward room reported a thud. When we thought we were clear of escort we reloaded #4 tube and maneuvered for position on the other side of target. At this time the Executive Officer and Pharmacist's Mate reported that the men in the maneuvering room and engine room were near prostration from the heat. One man was already receiving treatment.

0225 L - Reached periscope depth 150 on tanker's starboard bow about 2000 yards away. Maneuvered for position on tanker's beam at close range. Escort off tanker's port side was patrolling, stopping, and then going ahead.

0235 L - Sound reported DD propellers and echo ranging. Searched for DD but could not see him. Clouds made visibility spotty. Sound reported DD propellers closing fast. Sound had been too good to doubt them now. Went to deep submergence, expecting barrage from DD. High speed propellers went overhead, but no charges were dropped. At this time the Executive Officer and Engineering Officer advised me to surface before dawn to rehabilitate the ship and crew if at all possible. The ship had been at battle stations the previous afternoon and all night. The ship had dived off four engines at near full power at 0018 and was as hot as a fireroom that has just been secured. The noisy air-conditioning equipment had been shut down as we went in.

— page 93 —
0245 L - c/c to 120 to break off engagement temporarily.
: 0420 L - Reached periscope depth, all clear close aboard.
: 0445 L - Surfaced. Tanker was plainly visible astern. Ran for a friendly rain squall. Ran for half an hour and reversed course to return to point where we surfaced.
: 0530 L - Dived. 0610 c/c to 300 to head for tanker.
: 0705 L - Sighted tanker bearing 314, distance 71 miles. c/c to 314.
: 0803 L - Range 7000 yards, battle stations. As we closed, it was evident that the tanker was still stopped, yawing, with his head about 050. He was still down by the stern, but a little smoke and a feather of steam was coming from his stack.
: 0805 L - Sound picked up screws bearing 320 relative, moving right. Used enough periscope to see escort. Sound gave us continuous bearings on him for the next hour as we closed. He patrolled a line about 3000 yards off the starboard beam of the tanker, starting and stopping, apparently listening. The sea was ruffled a little but there were no whitecaps. Recognizing that listening conditions were good, we rigged for silent running and slowed to our quietest speed, 50 RPM. Hoped that our squaky port shaft would not make signals to the escort. It did not. We did not look for aircraft that we felt sure were there.
: 0817 L - Screen crossed bow, port to starboard, out to 010.
: 0826 L - Screen crossed bow, starboard to port, out to 33.
: 0832 L - Screen crossed bow, port to starboard, out to 010.
: 0840 L - Screen crossed bow, starboard to port, out to 355.

— page 94 —
0844 L - Range 4200, made ready all bow tubes. Set torpedoes on 4, 6, 8 and 10 feet. Thought this would be our last chance at this big fellow, and to make sure he was deleted from H.I.J.M. Navy List we would fire four torpedoes. Kept target bearing exactly 000 relative from here in and stood by to shoot at any time the screen should detect us. We had a quick look at the screen and the tanker about every 6 minutes.

0845 L - Screen ahead again. He turned around and commenced moving out on port bow.

0850 L - Screen bearing 335, still moving to port. As long as he kept going away we kept closing. When the tanker's range was 2800 yards, and the escort bore 315 relative, he started back toward us. Decided now was the time to shoot. Why he made this sashey to port we will never know, but it was very helpful.

0904 L - With all torpedo gyros on zero and the periscope dead on zero, and ship swinging slowly; 0904-00 fired #1 at foremost; 0904-10 fired #2 just forward of the mainmast, 0904-20 fired #3 just abaft the mainmast, 0904-30 fired #4 at the bridge. Started deep immediately. 0904-40 a very loud premature torpedo explosion. 2 m 20 s after the first shot, or 1 m 50 s after the fourth shot heard one good hit. Two torpedoes unaccounted for. c/c to the right to 050 to parallel tanker. Having heard only one hit, hoped to evade escort by crossing under target's bow to other side, the same as last night. At 0910 a sharp depth charge over the periscope shears caused us to abandon this idea, and c/c to 180 to open target. Ran silent under slow constant helm, keeping escort astern, making good about 180. Two depth charges at 0935 fairly close, one at 0937 and 0938. Eased around to west to drop escort but he let go another charge at 1011 and one at 1012. Gradually eased around to east turning through south and by 1100 he was left astern.

1301 L - Reached periscope depth.

1321 L - Sighted plane looking for us.

1422 L - c/c to 000, expecting to sight tanker on port bow if he was still afloat.

1440 L - Sighted same or another plane.

1522 L - Another plane.

— page 95 —
1545 L - Sighted masts bearing 135 T. Took up approach course for possible attack but recognized him as the escort who had been working us over. Reversed course with full rudder. 1615 escort was clear and we came back to north looking for tanker. Hoped escort's presence here meant he no longer had a tanker to escort.

1643 L - Sighted another plane.

1750 L - Bombed by unseen plane. His aim was poor. Went to 130 feet and c/c to 075. 1707 another bomb. 1800 c/c to 115. 1815 another bomb. 1917 c/c to 150.

1924 L - Surfaced.

March 1 -

0543 L - Dived, Several rain squalls in sight.

0630 L - Sighted big patrol plane.

1457 L - Smoke sighted 15 to 20 miles away bearing 169. Commenced approach. This smoke was closed and tracked at 5-3/4 knots until 1818. We never saw his masts but he was just over the horizon. Considered surfacing but we were close to sea plane base and did not want to prejudice our chances that night by getting detected from the air.

1840 L - Surfaced in pursuit of target. 2125 sighted smoke ahead. We lost it from time to time and regained it. Lost smoke for last time at 2225. He was making about as much speed as we were.

March 2

0200 L - Abandoned search. This left us in pass to northward of JALUIT. Decided to patrol north of JALUIT today.

0500 L - Dived north of JALUIT.

0611 L - Sighted plane, went to 100 feet for half an hour.

— page 96 —
1455 L - Sighted smoke bearing 090. Commenced approach. 1511 masts were in sight which turned out to be a medium MFM freighter, apparently of unusual value, as he had two escorts. Freighter was on base course 310, speed 9.5 knots, headed in the direction of KAJALEIN. Minimum range 7,000 yards.

1735 L - Still tracking MFM freighter and escorts, intending to get him tonight. While making a low power sweep sighted a large MKKFKM transport, range 11,000 yards, starboard 70. We shifted targets to the big fellow. Minimum range 9,700 yards. Tracked him until 1830.

1840 L - Surfaced in pursuit of the large unescorted transport. Estimated his speed as 14 knots on course 050, enroute TOJET. We continued the pursuit until 0047. It now appears that we should have dropped him much sooner, but he did have lots of goal posts. We now think he made a large change of course shortly after dark.

March 3
0047 L - c/c to 190 to clear MARSHALLS.

March 4
0524 L - Dived south of KWAJALEIN ISLAND. Patrolling southern approaches to KWAJALEIN entrances.

0623 L - Sighted smoke bearing 352. Commenced approach. Shortly afterwards saw that we were leaving a suicidal wake of bubbles. (See defectors) Discontinued approach and turned away. Leaks were lessened and at 0724 recommenced approach on smoke. Determined target was stopped.

1012 L - Sighted two high radio towers on ENUBUT ISLAND. Approaching SOUTH FASS, three freighters in sight ahead.

1212 L - Sighted patrol boat bearing 116, patrolling 3 miles off SOUTH FASS.

1225 L - Plotted all ships except patrol boat anchored north of KAJALEIN ISLAND safe behind reef.

1913 L - Surfaced and cleared area as another submarine was known to be approaching the MARSHALLS from eastward. By this

— page 97 —
2020 L - Attempted to send message to CTF 7. Transmitter quit. Patrolled in vicinity of 06 N, 177 E, outside areas.

1834 L - Surfac'd. Sighted possible smoke bearing 322. Closed for an hour but nothing developed.

1921 L - Transmitted message to CTF 7, reporting fuel situation, attacks to date, ships at WALJALEIN ISLAND and traffic north of JALUIT.

0200 L - Received CTF 7 serial directing PLUNGER to patrol in vicinity of PONAPE until fuel dictated return to PEARL.

March 6
0544 L - Dived.

1300 L - Commenced approach on tops sighted bearing 353. These turned out to be tree tops on UMAE ISLAND.

1625 L - Surfac'd.

1640 L - Sighted smoke bearing 140 about 15 to 20 miles away and headed for it. By 1710 had mast tops in sight with high periscope. Gaining station ahead on four engines. PLUNGER was making 17.7 knots in her emergency loaded condition. By 1812 we had target on course 080, speed 9-3/4 knots. Lost him in closing darkness and steered course to intercept. Night was dark and no radar contact was made. Covered 9-3/4 knot positions for courses 080 to 100 by 2045. We had positive evidence that the target made a radical change of course shortly after dark.

2045 L - Abandoned search.

March 7 -
Patrolling PONAPE-NARSHALL trade routes.

1133 L - Sighted mast's bearing 270, distance 8,000 yards, angle on bow starboard 60. Commenced approach at 5-3/4 knots. Identified target tentatively as a harbor tanker, estimated

— page 98 —
500-800 tons. Minimum range 6000 yards. Looked him over carefully for guns. None could be seen although we could not be sure, Prepared for battle surface.

1230 L - Surfaced, range 6200 yards, angle on bow starboard 120. Opened fire with 3" gun. He shoveled on the coal; so did we, closing at full power on four engines, keeping him about 400 on the starboard bow. (Our gun is still aft). He deemed it advisable to keep him under fire while we closed. He immediately transmitted on 460 kcs., giving position in plain numerals and got a receipt. By the time the range had been closed to 4400 yards we had straddled him in range and deflection but still no hits had been observed. He was changing course continuously. A few of the shells exploded with a black splash; the remainder made the regular target practice splash. At 1250, 20 minutes after surfacing, the SD reported a plane at ten to eleven miles. Gun crew and bridge force cleared the top side on prearranged whistle signal. The SD reported again that plane was at ten miles. Reluctantly sounded the diving alarm without getting this small armed tanker. 43 rounds 3" expended. 107 rounds left.

This little JAP was handled in a very seamanlike manner. His radio communications were a model of efficiency. The plane showed up promptly. A newscast two days later told about a U.S. sub gunning a JAP ship of less than 1000 tons. If this was our job, the news emanated from TOKYO. There is the possibility that this target was not the innocent harbor tanker he purported to be.

March 7, 8, 9 - Patrolling PONAPE-KWAJALEIN trade route. 1800, 8th, entered area near NE corner.

March 10 1155 L - Sighted two mast tips bearing 230, distance about 8 miles. Commenced approach. 1205 masts bore 232. Unable to pick him up on look at 1215.

1225 L - Surfaced. Closed at full power on four engines, heading for last true bearing of target. Nothing could be sighted even with high periscope. Whatever he was, he was traveling.

1255 L - Div'd.

March 11 2350 L - On course 260, radar contact bearing 290 relative, range 5500 yards. Radar labeled him destroyer. 2354 full power, gaining position ahead.

— page 99 —
0005 L - On radar sweep got a big pip on large ship bearing 307 relative, range 9700 yards. Shifted targets. Night was black, squally, with dark clouds. Lightning flashes every minute or two. We saw him briefly in lightning flashes. He was big, lots of freeboard and superstructure, one funnel, smoking a little intermittently. Targets course 250, speed:10 knots. Data checked for an hour and a half. Had only three torpedoes forward and two aft. Expected to fire 3 bow tubes all to hit. 0136 head in for surface attack on 90 S track, bow tubes.

: 0140 L - The Executive Officer, who has excellent vision, had his glasses glued on the target. At this time, in brilliant lightning flash, target was seen by him and thought to have an angle on bow of zero, indicating he had sighted us. We were wondering why he had not already. Expected gunfire momentarily. Dived to 35 feet and continued to watch radar range and bearing. TDC still checked target on original course, 0143 c/c/ 100 toward target to shoot sonor on an 80 S track, zero gyros, torpedoes set on 8 feet.

: 0145 L - As radar bearing came on 346 fired #1, then #3, at 1600 yard range, Intended to fire third torpedo, but when firing interval was suitable radar bearing was about 352. C.O. withheld third torpedo as he felt that to fire it would be to throw it away astern of target. Stop watches showed 00 s fired first torpedo, 07 s fired second torpedo, 65 s first hit, 70 s second hit, followed in 10 seconds by serious internal explosions for a good half minute. We went deep, expecting the "mD" to give us a barrage. He passed close by but never slowed. No. - depth charges. He was making 188 RPM. We tracked him out on 280 t. Disrated this "mD", now called him small freighter or escort. Commenced coming up to periscope depth.

: 0224 L - Stuck the SJ antenna out, nothing picked up.

: 0235 L - Surfaced. Searched area by radar and sight for wreck. No one doubted that this ship was sunk. We knew there was more of this convoy ahead. Radar had indications on their sweeps during previous approach.

: 0244 L - Took up course 280, the last bearing of small freighter. After going out 3 miles on 280, estimated this convoy was bound for FONAPE and that they would not take up an evasive course, only 60 miles from their destination. c/c to 260 accordingly. Full power on 3 generators, charging on one.

: 0405 L - Torrential rain storm.

: 0420 L - When we on the bridge wore half drowned in the downpour radar picked up a contact bearing 351 relative, 295 yards. Stopped. Range continued to close a little, but we knew the JAPS were as blind as we were in this deluge.

— page 100 —
0426 I - Went ahead full on four engines to gain position ahead. 0446 when we were abeam of this target, radar picked up a medium target, bearing 277 relative; range 6900. Shifted targets. Rain stopped.

0523 I - Reduced power to 80%. Hot pinion bearing.

0537 I - Resumed full power.

0540 I - Daylight coming fast. Cut in on course 200 until TDC showed angle on bow 5 S, then swung right. Target had tracked for an hour on course 265, speed 10 knots. We now had two torpedoes aft and one forward. Planned to give this target the two fish aft, set on 8 feet, both to hit.

0551 I - Dived to 35 feet, and came to 90 S track for stern tubes. Should have waited longer to turn to this track, as we had a firing range of about 2200 yards.

0617 I - Picked up target by periscope. The light was not too good but he looked like a 5000 or 6000 ton conventional freighter. 0622-002 fired #5, 0622-07 fired #6, 0622-19 heavy torpedo explosion, 0622-25 second heavy torpedo explosion. Target's bow obscured by giant gyrser. C.O. sang out "premature" on first explosion. Two minutes later first depth charge. Three minutes later another depth charge. Flooded negative, started deep. Realized depth charges were not close and probably being dropped by target. Ordered periscope depth. 0627 at periscope depth but trim had been spoiled. Did not see target.

0640 I - With nothing in sight, secured from battle stations. With one torpedo remaining forward, set course for PEARL.

March 13, 14 - Enroute.

March 15
0125 - Played tag with phantom radar contact until 0227. Eventually located ground causing trouble.

0553 I - Dived. Made reconnaissance of UJELANG, passing down entire southern side of atoll. Only desecration of nature seen was a lone JAP in a lookout tower and a building at spot labeled beacon on UJELANG ISLAND. KAIO ISLAND appears to be about 40 feet high, densely covered with troops about 50 feet high. Other islands are a little lower and also covered with foliage and trees. Quite extensive installations could be hidden in those islands. No boats or masts could be seen. UJELANG ISLAND was searched carefully at 3,000 yards.

- 12 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 101 —
0525 - DIVED off ENNETT, PATROLLED 4 miles off SOUTH PASS until noon, then proceed to EAST CHANNEL.

: 1407 - Commenced approach on MFM freighter sighted bearing 353. Abandoned approach when target was plotted anchored inside lagoon.

: 1620 - Sighted two masts that turned out to be a sail boat anchored NW of JAPTAIN ISLAND.

: 1858 - Surfaced, set course for BIKINI.

: 0458 - DIVED. PATROLLED off EAST CHANNEL, ENNETT.

: 0652 - Sighted medium sampan standing to eastward out this channel. Avoided. Thought he was going out to escort something in.

: 1106 - Sighted Commandant's sail boat with triangular sail in lagoon.

: 1616 - When we were a little further north than we had previously been, sighted MFM freighter anchored west of PARRY ISLAND. Same as day before.

: 1815 - Sighted periscope bearing 190, estimated 1500 yards. Ship was taken down and turned away and contact reported. Sound heard nothing. Swing right to true bearing of target, coming up to periscope depth. Shut down unessential machinery to reduce own noise transmission and to improve our listening, set our torpedo.

— page 102 —
1829 L - Nothing sighted or heard.
1932 L - Surfaced.
March 17
0200 L - SJ radar interference.
0220 L - Radar contact bearing 193 t, range 8100 yards.
0225 commenced gaining station ahead of target on three generators (one out of commission).
0251 L - Second smaller ship picked up in company. Tracked target on course 310, speed 12, checked perfectly.
0517 L - Getting daylight, 8000 yards, 30° on target's port bow. Came to 90 P track and dived to 35 feet. Continued to track by radar till 0528. OKITU M.RU freighter now in sight. Went to 50 feet. Closed track at standard speed to 1650 yards. 0530 c/c ten degrees right to 80 P track.
0533 L - Fired our one torpedo, zero gyro, periscope bearing 016. Sound heard it running, but tracked it out on 345 relative. Watched target until we knew torpedo had missed. Made sweep for escort, but did not see him. As no more hitting power remained, went deep to avoid escort that we knew was near. Immediately after order to go deep one depth charge exploded, not close. This was the only one on this attack. Sound tracked target going away.
0600 L - At periscope depth saw our target and escort going away undamaged. Set course for PEARL, all tubes empty.
March 18, 19, 20 - Submerged by day through MARSHALLS.
March 21 - Cruising on the surface. No planes.
March 22 - 0100 M - SJ radar contact bearing 116 t, 2250 yards, turned away at full speed. Nothing sighted. Possibly phantom.

— page 103 —
0640 M - SD plane contact at 10 miles; cloudy. Plane closed to 6 miles. Dived. 0746 surfaced. Plane was 450 miles from BIKA.R. Possibly this plane contact at this early hour is related to the 0100 SJ contact.

March 23
1345 Y - Sighted PBY off JOHNSTON. SD did not pick him up. Exchanged recognition signals. He was very friendly. About 1400 he made a practice bombing run on us and shoved off. Rigged 20 mm. in case he came back.

March 24
0716 X - SD plane contact at 10 miles. Did not sight.

March 27
- Made rendezvous with YMS 102.
- Moored Sub Base PEARL on fortieth day of patrol.

II. WEATHER

In the CAROLINE ISLANDS the sea conditions were generally calm, with occasional light winds and rain squalls. In the MARSHALLS near the atolls the sea was generally slightly choppy, assisting periscope patrol. Rain squalls were frequent, particularly at KWAJALEIN and PONAPE. Visibility for the most part was unlimited.

III. TIDAL INFORMATION.

Variable, but generally as per pilots.

IV. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

Fixes on ENVIETOK and UJELANG atolls cut well.

V. SHIP CONTACTS
| No. | Date | Lat. | Type | Initial Range | Est. Course Speed | How Contacted | Remarks |
|-----|------|------|------|||||
| 1   | 1215 | M1-25N | AK  | 16,000       | 085            | P             | Approaching TARAWA ISL. Two escorts - zigging 1st attack. Missed. |
| 2   | 1551 | L6-09N | AO  | 32,000       | 283            | P & R         | Initially by periscope. Surfacad at sunset. Radar contact at 2030 Air screen & escort vessel. 2nd, 3rd, 4th. attacks. 4 or 5 hits. Damaged. |

— page 104 —
16- ENCLOSURE (A)

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

V. SHIP CONTACTS (CONTINUED)

| No. | Date       | Lat. Long. | Type | Initial Range | Course Speed | How Contacted | Remarks |
|-----|||------|||||
| 3   | 1643(L) Feb.28 | 6-05N Escort 167-20E | 5,000 | 320° 8 kts. | P            | Avoided.     |
| 4   | 1520(L) Mar.1 | 6-00N Smoke 168 E | 15 mi. | .050 14 kts. | P            | Could not contact after dark. |
| 5   | 1455(L) Mar.2 | 6-45N AK 169-10E | 15,000 | 310° 9.5 kts. | P            | Two escorts - closest range 10,000 yards. |
| 6   | 1700(L) Mar.3 | 6-45N AK 169-10E | 11,000 | 050 14 kts. | P            | Closest range 9,700 yds. Pursued 6 dark. Could not contact. |
| 7   | 0623(L) Mar.4 | 8-50N 4 AK's 167-50E | 20,000 | Anch. | P            | Behind reef at KNAJALEIN ISLAND. 4 ships off KNAJALEIN ISLAND. |
| 8   | 1000(L) Mar.4 | 8-50N Patrol 5,000 167-50E boat. | 5,000 | 350° 8 kts. | P            | |
| 9   | 1630(L) Mar.6 | 8-25N Masts 18,000 165-55E | 18,000 | 080 12 kts. | P            | Surfaced during daylight and steered to intercept after dark. Could not find him. |
| 10  | 1133(L) Mar.7 | 7-45N Small A0 165-40E | 8,000 | 030 13 kts. | S            | Surfaced - day-light battle surface. No known damage. Forced down by plane. Attack #5. |
| 11  | 1155(L) Mar.10 | 7-37N Masts 15,000 161-29E | 15,000 | 300 30 kts. | P            | Surfaced and closed for half hour. Lost contact. |

— page 105 —
U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

Est. | Time | Lat. | Type | Range | Speed | Course | Host | Remarks
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
No. | Date | Long. | | | | | |
12 | 2350(L) | 7-25N | Small | 5,500 | 250 | R | Took larger target
Mar.11 | 159-30E | | | 10 kts
13 | " | " | Large
 | | | | | | 2 hits, believed sunk, attack #6.
14 | 0420(L) | 7-15N | Small | 265 | R | Probably same as contact #11.
Mar.12 | 158-50E | | | 10 kts
15 | " | " | Medium | 6,550 | R | 2 premature explosions. attack #7.
 | | | | | |
16 | 1407(L) | 11-20N | Small | 12,000 | UNC | P | Inside ENVIETOK
Mar.15 | 162-20E | | | | | | atoll.
17 | 1620(L) | " | Sailing | 12,000 | " | P | " |
18 | 0652(L) | " | Sampan | 6,000 | 090 | P | | |
Mar.16 | | | | | | | 10 kts
19 | 1106(L) | " | Sailing | 10,000 | -- | P | Inside ENVIETOK
Mar.16 | | | | | | | atoll.
20 | 1616(L) | " | " | | | | |
21 | 0222(L) | 10-30N | Medium | 8,600 | 310 | R | Escorted. Fired one
Mar.17 | 162-20E | | | | | | torped. Erratic run
No. | Date | Lat. | Long | type | range | No hits. attack #8.
1 | 1551(L) | 6-09N | | | | | Remarks
Feb.27 | 168-30E | | | | | | |
2 | 1643(L) | 6-05N | | | | | | Patrolling vicinity of
Feb.28 | 167-20E | | | | | | contact No. 2. Dropped
depth charges in vicinity.
3 | 0630(L) | " | " | | | | | Patrolling vicinity of
Mar.1 | | | | | | | contact No. 2.
4 | 0815(L) | 6-45N | | | | | | Patrolling vicinity of
Mar.2 | 169-10E | | | | | | J/LUIT.
5 | 0654(L) | " | " | | | | |
6 | 1230(L) | 7-45N | Unknown | | 10 mi. | | Radar - during battle
Mar.7 | 165-40E | | | | | | surface on contact No. 10.
7 | 0638(Y) | 14-00N | Unknown | | 10 mi. | | Radar - thought to be
Mar.22 | 177-37E | | | | | | J/P patrol plane.
8 | 0754(Y) | 16-39N | | | 8 mi. | | Sighted off JOHNSTON
Mar.23 | 173-10E | | | | | | ISLAND.

- 17 -

ENCLOSURE (4)

— page 106 —
1. U.S.S. FLUNGER - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
: 2. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
: 3. #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6
: 4. Date Local Feb. 25 Feb. 28 Feb. 28 Feb. 28 Mar. 7 Mar. 12
: 5. (Lat.) 1-23N 6-09 N 6-09 N 6-09 N 7-45 N 7-15 N
: 6. Location (Long.) 172-53 E 167-13 E 167-13 E 167-18 E 165-40 E 159-10 E
: 7. Torpedoes Fired on each attack: 2 4 1 4 -- 2
: 8. Hits 0 3-4 0 1 -- 2
: 9. Number Sunk (Tonnage) 0 9,000
: 10. Number Damaged or probably sunk -- 14,000 -- 14,000 -- --
: 11. Type of Target AK 40 40 40 40 40 40
: 12. Range: 20
: 13. Yards 850 1375 1150 2800 4400 1600
: 14. Range More Than 1500 Yards -- -- -- 2800 4400 1600
: 15. Periscope Depth 56 55 55 56 -- 35
: 16. Surface Night
: 17. Deep Submergence
: 18. Estimated Draft Target 20' 22' 24' 24' 8' 22'
: 19. Torpedo Depth Setting 8' 10' 10' 4-6-8-10' -- 8'
: 20. Bow or Stern Shot Storn Bow Bow Bow Bow Bow
: 21. Track Angle 938 1028 80S 90 P 90 S -- 80 S
: 22. Gyro Angle 183 192 0 0 0 -- 0
: 23. Estimate Spood Target 9 10 0 0 13 10
: 24. Firing Interval 35 s 07 s -- 10 s -- 07 s
: 25. Spread - Mount White and Kind light * Long. -- Long. -- Long.
: 26. Rorarks: * Fired,1st torpedo at formost. Fired 2nd torpedo at mainmost.
: 27. Attacks.#2, 3 and 4 all carried out against same ship. Attack
: 28. #5 was a daylight battle surface. Fired 43 rounds 3", no hits.

: 29. ENCLOSURE (i)

— page 107 —
1d
Subject: U.S.S. FLUNGER - Report of Fifth War Petrol.

| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Attack | #7  | #8  |     |     |     |
| Date  | Local | Mar. 12 | Mar. 17 |     |     |
| (Lat.) | 7-10 N | 10-50 N |     |     |     |
| Location (Long.) | 158-25 E | 162-10 E |     |     |     |
| Torpedoes Fired on each Attack | 2 | 1 |     |     |     |
| Hits | 0 | 0 |     |     |     |
| Number |     |     |     |     |     |
| Sunk (Tonnage) | 0 | 0 |     |     |     |
| Number Damaged or probably sunk | 0 | 0 |     |     |     |
| Type of Target | AK | LK |     |     |     |
| Range |     |     |     |     |     |
| Yards | 2200 | 1650 |     |     |     |
| Portiscope Depth | 55 | 55 |     |     |     |
| Surface Night | -- | -- |     |     |     |
| Deep Submergence | -- | -- |     |     |     |
| Estimated Depth | 18' | 18' |     |     |     |
| Torpedo Depth Setting | 8' | 8' |     |     |     |
| Eow or Storn Shot | Storn. | Bow |     |     |     |
| Track Angle | 90 s | 90 s |     |     |     |
| Gyro Angle | 180 | 0 |     |     |     |
| Estimate Spot Target | 10 | 12 |     |     |     |
| Firing Interval | 7 s | -- |     |     |     |
| Spread - Mount and Kind | Long | -- |     |     |     |
| Remarks: |     |     |     |     |     |

Attack # 7 - two premature explosions.
Attack # 8 - 1 erratic run last torpedo.

- 19 - ENCLOSURE (L)

— page 108 —
1, 7,000 ton freighter, draft 20'

Torpedo | Exploder | Gyro | W.H.No. | Explosive | Tube | Depth
:--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
14252 | 009206 | 3053 | 3029 | TPX | 5 | 8'
14451 | 004152 | 3252 | 5010 | TPX | 6 | 8'

Sea Choppy, white caps. No explosions. Both control misses.

ATTACK NO. 2, 14,000 ton tanker, draft 22'

Torpedo | Exploder | Gyro | W.H.No. | Explosive | Tube | Depth
:--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
14535 | 005653 | 3336 | 10102 | TPX | 1 | 10'
14171 | 009569 | 2972 | 9569 | TPX | 2 | 10'
13739 | 014786 | 2407 | 5091 | TPX | 3 | 10'
14289 | 014816 | 3090 | 5025 | TPX | 4 | 10'

Smooth sea, no white caps or swells. First three were hits. All should have hit. Fourth explosion heard only on sound and in forward torpedo room. The second torpedo was very high order.

ATTACK NO. 3, 14,000 Ton Stopped Tanker, draft 24'

Torpedo | Exploder | Gyro | W.H.No. | Explosive | Tube | Depth
:--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
14426 | 009249 | 3227 | 891 | TPX | 2 | 10'

Smooth sea, no white caps or swells. Fired at 470 feet stopped ship from 1150 yards abeam. Torpedo was heard to start its run, apparently normal. No explosion heard.

ATTACK NO. 4, 14,000 Ton stopped Tanker, draft 24'

Torpedo | Exploder | Gyro | W.H.No. | Explosive | Tube | Depth
:--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
14492 | 005620 | 3293 | 643 | TNT | 1 | 4'
14207 | 004654 | 3008 | 4053 | TPX | 2 | 6'
14435 | 010204 | 3296 | 4722 | TPX | 3 | 8'
14177 | 014747 | 2978 | 5831 | TPX | 4 | 10'

No white caps or swells. Range 2800 yards on first shot. Firing interval 10 s. 1 premature explosion 40 s after first shot. 1 torpedo explosion 1 m 50 s after fourth shot. Believe fourth torpedo was the one that hit and exploded; of the other 3, two are unaccounted for.

ATTACK NO. 5, Gun attack.

ATTACK NO. 6, Large AK or AP. Draft 22'

Torpedo | Exploder | Gyro | W.H.No. | Explosive | Tube | Depth
:--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
25084 | 009285 | 8177 | 273 | TNT | 4 | 8'
25101 | 009268 | 8194 | 175 | TNT | 3 | 8'

— page 109 —
1d
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

Sea choppy, white caps. Range 1600, 7 s firing interval. Hits at 65 s and 70 s after first shot.

ATTACK NO. 7. Medium Froighter, draft 18'

Torpedo Exploder Gyro War Head Explosive Tube Depth
14230 005642 3031 4299 TNT 5 8'
25078 009272 8171 8924 TNT 6 8'

Sea choppy, white caps. Range 2200, 7 s firing interval. Prominent torpedo explosion heard and seen 19 seconds after first shot, and another heard 6 seconds later.

Attack No. 8. Medium Froighter, draft 18'

Torpedo Exploder Gyro War Head Explosive Tube Depth
42098 009270 21076 4277 TNT 2 12'

Sea choppy, white caps. With zero gyro angle set on torpedo, sound tracked torpedo out on 345 relative. No explosion.

VIII. ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES.

Merchantmen were escorted by one or two small escort craft, abeam or on quarter. One merchantman had an escort ahead and one astern. These small escorts dropped depth charges one or two at a time after attacks. Petrol boat was off SOUTH PASS at KWAALEIN. Air patrols in MARSHALLS. Bombed by unseen plane after attack on tanker. Echo ringing encountered only twice. Their listening gear seems pretty good. SHREETOKO air screen at 4000 feet, well up ahead. No acrobatics or zooming of masts, just screaming.

Silent running at 250-275 feet under constant helm keeping attacking vessel astern was method of evasion. Ninety degree change of course being made good dropped escort after one attack. Crossing to opposite side of damaged stopped ship eluded protective screen on one occasion. It did not work when attempted the second time. SILENT running seems most important.

IX. MAJOR DEFECTS.

* Major defects on previous patrols.

1. Air bottles in the middle group MET's lock, causing ship to leave a trail of bubbles. 600 lb. manifold also leaks.

— page 110 —
2. The SD mast and antenna leaked again for the fifth consecutive patrol, resulting in continued unreliable operation of this valuable equipment. It is felt that complete renewal is now justified.

*3. The interior communication equipment is inadequate. Installation of the LMC should be given the highest priority.

*4. Thorac is a severe thumping noise in the stern every time the ship rolls 5 degrees on either side. The impact is felt throughout the ship. The noise is believed loose rudder or stern planes. It is worse with each patrol, and it is considered that it should be located and removed prior to the next patrol.

5. No. 1 main generator during patrol did not parallel well with other generators (300 to 700 amps low). Eventually on shifting to full power on four generators, No. 1 generator refused to take any load and is now out of commission. The generator rings between 6 and 10 megohms. The field is in good condition. The difficulty is apparently in the armature circuit.

6. No. 4 main engine blower lower bearing retaining nut backed off, causing the lower impeller to shift aft slightly. On speeding the engine to 720 RPM the lower impeller rubbed against the end plate, causing severe scoring and gouging on the lower and upper lobes. The engine was stopped immediately, and ship's force tore down blower and scraped lobes and removed upper and lower bearings and lower bearing housing. The engine was back in commission in 22-1/2 hours. It is desired that this impeller assembly be renewed during this rofit.

7. The #4 E-G min vent riser carried away due to corrosion.

*8. The inboard vent risers on the #1 and #7 MBT should be renewed with heavier material.

9. Foggy periscopes. After three weeks the high periscope was only about 60% effective, reducing the effectiveness of our patrol accordingly. A week later we estimated the periscope was 50% effective. Circulated nitrogen through periscope for an hour. This helped some but not much. Took suction on periscope with drain pump through an air hose. Pump suction showed 28" vacuum; kept this on for an hour till pump was getting hot. Then bled nitrogen into periscope, continuing suction with pump for half an hour. Secured pump and charged periscope to 7 lbs. This improved periscope a great deal, probably 85% effective. It is hoped the new base and tender process will eliminate fogging of periscopes.

— page 111 —
1d

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

XI. RADIO RECEPTION.

The 415 Kcs series was received strength 5 almost every night. 26.1 Kcs. was our best frequency in GILBERTS, MRSH.LLS and near PONAPE. Interference on 8230 Kcs. by an unknown commercial station was experienced several times on the 1100 schooldays.

SD RADAR:

The third day out radar started double pulsing and check-up showed antenna resistance to ground zero. A drain hole was drilled and tapped into bottom of mast just above the bottom insulator. Drained 1/2 cups sea water off. Flushed with fresh water followed by circulating air through mast. Resistance raised to 70,000 ohms. Washed off top of antenna with fresh water and resistance rose to 150,000 ohms. Operation of equipment now normal. After the next dive the ground reappeared. The head was removed from the antenna and a wrinkle found in the gasket. The head was put back on after applying copalitite to the gasket. This stopped the leak, but the resistance of the antenna remained low. The rubber sheathing was removed from the top insulator and salt water was found under the rubber, thus forming a low resistance path between the risers and ground.

After this good results were obtained with the radar, but the resistance gradually dropped from the 500,000 ohm reading obtained just after cutting away the rubber sheathing. Four weeks later the radar still in operating but reading to ground 85,000 ohms. At this time we were able to pick up J/P plane at 11 miles. One day after this, on way home, a PBY sighted, gave no indication on radar.

SJ RADAR:

With four torpedo attacks on this patrol preceded by night SJ contacts and tracking, it is needless to say that the ship is radar minded. Excellent results were obtained from this equipment throughout the patrol. It is believed that this was due in no small part to an "echo box" by which a check can be made at any time on the operation of the radar. This echo box was fabricated for the boat by the E&R shop at S/M Base, P. H.

Interference listed in narrative consisted of a series of vertical lines as high or higher than the transmitted pulse, sweeping across screen from right to left with uniform intensity. Resistance between the slip rings that supply power to lobing motor dropped to such a point that enough current flowed between these rings to clear the insulation. Reminded this by disassembling the lower part of the mast and replaced the charred insulation.

Tried to operate SJ radar with supply from I.C. motor generator but results were very poor due to poor voltage regulation and frequency of this power supply.

— page 112 —
1d
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

XI. SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS.

Sound conditions good throughout the patrol. Noise levels caused by rain squalls and reefs were normal. Usual fish noises were heard.

The new JU sonic receiver gave an excellent check on our own ship's noises. There were plenty of these. Ranges at which targets were picked up at normal submerged speeds were lower on the JU than on the JK.

XII. HEALTH AND HEALTH-BILITY.

On a battle surface four men sustained ruptured ear drums. Cotton was used by gum crow, but in these cases it did not remain in their ears. These were successfully treated. One ear infection (otitis externa) was treated.

The habitability of the ship was excellent except in the silent running condition. The air conditioning equipment is invaluable.

XIII. MILES STE.MED.

Pearl Harbor to area 1950
Area to Pearl Harbor 3420
Total: 2100
7470

XIV. FUEL EXPENDED

Total for patrol 80,000.

XV. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMLINING.

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel
0 4,000 45 days 15 days

XVI. FACTOR CLUSING END OF THIS E.TROL.

Expenditure of torpedoes terminated patrol.

XVII. REMARKS.

CTF 71's communication serials served the PLUNGER's needs perfectly, both as to content and method of handling.

- 24 - ENCLOSURE (L)

— page 113 —
1d
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

Our M.I T.DG has an unusually long record of unrulability. We use it for tracking in the usual fashion. However, if the attack situation develops normally we do not match gyros, but use the Mk VIII angle solver for periscope angles and straight shots. If the target zigs at the last minute, or should it be desirable to shoot with other than zero gyros, we order gyros matched and use the white light method. Following this policy, the ship believes that 14, out of 16 torpedoes were fired properly directed to hit the targets. Longitudinal spreads desired are obtained by using appropriate firing interval.

On our first attack on the SHIRETOKO we felt the need for the additional torpedo fire associated with two deck tubes. We hope and believe deck tubes can be made to work. We also needed more fuel and more torpedoes and believe that means can be found to help fill these needs.

If we desire to parallel another submarine-minded navy's practice of tending smaller submarines with large ones, the M.R.S.H.L.L area scores an appropriate area. About 60,000 tons of J.P shipping was contacted there in six or seven days. The seas were generally quite smooth.

All officers and men fought with skill and enthusiasm. Their conduct was in accordance with highest traditions of our Naval Service. Lieutenant K. F. Beckman's performance of duty as diving officer on depth charge attacks was particularly outstanding. Typical of his skill is the fact that at no time when the ship was taken deep in her silent running condition did he find it necessary to start the ship's drain or trim pumps.

— page 115 —
5-43/A16-3
Serial (048)
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. LUNGER - Fifth War Patrol - Comment on.

Attack No. 6
A well executed attack by radar. [Hereas radar is excellent for obtaining correct course and speed, it is a well established fact that radar bearings are often in error when the range is reduced below 2000 yards. If impossible to obtain periscope or bridge T.E.T. bearings, it is considered best to shift to sound for firing bearings if the range is inside 2000 yards. As the firing bearings will probably be in error on an attack of this kind, a spread is of utmost importance. On this attack, using predetermined firing bearing with a zero gyro angle, a seven second firing interval between torpedoes gave a spread of 104 feet. This is considered inadequate.

As two hits were made, target screws were heard to stop, internal explosions heard on the target and no radar contact could be made thirty-nine minutes later, it is reasonable to assume that this ship was sunk.

Attack No. 7
Torpedo failures.

Attack No. 8
Sound reported the one torpedo fired on this attack ran out on a relative bearing of 345°. As the gyros were never matched with the T.D.C. on this approach, it is not understood why the torpedo took a 150° left gyro.

3. The best information available at the time PLUNGER left on patrol was to the effect that torpedoes were expected to run within plus or minus three feet of set depth at 500 yards, and three feet shallower than set depth beyond 1000 yards. In spite of this information, depths were set as follows: 8' for an estimated 20' draft 10' for an estimated 25' draft 4,6,8 and 10' for an estimated 24' draft, 8' for an estimated 18' draft and 12' for an estimated 16' draft. Except in the first instance, all torpedo runs were greater than 1100 yards.

Whereas it is difficult to determine the cause of the erratic performance of torpedoes, it is self evident that all torpedoes were set too shallow and it is considered that this may very well have contributed to the poor performance; furthermore, the explosive effect increases with depth.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 116 —
Tb5-43/A16-3  SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY THREE  Rs
: Serial (048)  Care of Fleet Post Office,
: San Francisco, California,
: March 29, 1943.
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Fifth 'ar Patrol - Comment on.

4. The value of radar in detecting and conducting
attacks on enemy ship.ing was clearly demonstrated in this patrol.
Numerous contacts were made which otherwise would have been missed
and the attack on March 12th, which resulted in two hits on the
target, was made entirely with data furnished by radar.

5. It is expected that all major defects reported by
the Commanding Officer will be rectified during a normal refit
period. The SD radar mast will be modified incidental to the work
in cutting down the forward conning tower farewater. Every effort
will be made to locate and eliminate the severe thumping noise in
the stern which has been reported on this and previous patrols.

6. It is considered that this was an aggressive patrol
marked by dogged determination to close and inflict damage to the
enemy. The attacks on the SHIRETAKO Class tanker was deliberate,
well planned and intelligently conducted. The Commanding Officer,
Officers and Crew are to be commended on their determination to
dore in and sink their target despite long hot hours of silent
running while delivering attacks and evading the target screening
vessels.

FC5-4/A16-3  SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR
Serial C72  Care of Fleet Post Office,
CONFIDENTIAL  San Francisco, California,
FIRST DISTRIBUTOR
From:  The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To:  The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

1. Forwarded. The comments of the Commander Submarine
Division Forty-Three are most complete and are concurred in. It is
recommended that all submarines now on patrol and that others before
departing be directed to set the torpedoes at a depth setting of 4
feet less than the estimated draft of the target.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 117 —
12-10/16-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC THEATER

Serial 0715

DECLASSIFIED

COINSURED PATROL REPORT NO. 187
U.S.S. PLUNGER - SIXTH WAR PATROL

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Sixth War Patrol No. (SC) 0413/3/79

Enclosure: (L) Copy of Subject War Patrol Report.
(B) Copy of Consubdiv 43 Conf. 1tr. FB5-43/16-3, No. 3.
(C) Copy of Consubron 4 Conf. 1st. conf. FC5-4/16-3, No. 3.
(C) Copy of Consubron 4 Conf. 1st. conf. FC5-4/16-3, No. 3.

1. This, the Sixth War Patrol of the U.S.S. PLUNGER, was the second for the present Commanding Officer. Occasionally in submarine warfare a Commanding Officer is fortunate enough to find himself presented with a convoy to work on. When such a golden opportunity presents itself, the results then depend upon the Commanding Officer, and his organization.

2. This patrol terminated with such an opportunity. The first contact consisted of a five ship convoy with two escorts. Picking up the convoy late one afternoon, the PLUNGER tracked it and within the next 65 hours sank three ships and probably sank two more; insufficient evidence prohibits crediting the sinking of the last two. The high point of this running attack was the destruction of a large freighter by gunfire, which had been previously damaged by torpedoes. The whole attack was aggressively and tenaciously carried out. The PLUNGER was able to keep the upper hand of the situation at all times by successfully outwriting the efforts of the escort vessels.

3. By making a careful estimate of the situation in each phase of the three day battle, the PLUNGER succeeded in making an impressive percentage of torpedo hits, obtaining twelve hits out of sixteen torpedoes fired. The judgment and tenacity of the Commanding Officer, plus the performance of his organization and material, is considered outstanding.

4. Worthy of note is the fact that the PLUNGER carried out intensive fire control drills while on route to the area which, undoubtedly, contributed to the excellent torpedo performance. The continued improvement, both in the use of and the performance of the SJ radar, is extremely gratifying. Much credit for this is due to the use of specially trained radar officers and technicians.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and men of the U.S.S. PLUNGER for this outstanding war patrol. PLUNGER is credited with having inflicted the following damage: DEBRASSIFIED, 0PNAVINST 5510.1C

DISCASSIFIED

Finished by: [Signature]

— page 118 —
1. FRIE (T.T.U. T.K.E. Class)
2. FRIE (KINAI. M.R.U. Class)
3. FRIE (L.S.AKISIN M.R.U. Class)

Total: 24,068 tons

DAMAGED

1. FRIE (L.K.G.I. M.R.U. Class)
2. FRIE (L.K.G.I. M.R.U. Class)

Total: 14,780 tons

# Identified by photo as of the T.T.U. T.K.E. Class.
* This ship identified by photo as of the PLUNGER as S.S.K.I. M.R.U. in the patrol report was later identified from photographs as the KINAI M.R.U. The S.S.K.I. soon on its stern was, undoubtedly, the identification of its port of registry.

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION:
(11-43)
List III, SS.
Special:
PI(5), EN3(5), ZI(5),
Consubstant (2), X3(1),
Consubsorospace (2),
Subschool, NL (2),
Comatskfor 72 (2),
Comsubron 50 (2),
Comsopac (2),
Cincelant (2),
Comteskfor 16 (1).

E. R. SILENDRUE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 118 —
1. FRIE (T.T.U. T.KE Class) 7,066 tons # 1 FRIE (KINLI M.RU Class) 8,300 tons * 1 FRIE (SAKISIN M.RU Class) 8,700 tons

Total 24,068 tons

DAMAGED

1. FRIE (L.K.G.I M.RU Class) 7,390 tons 1 FRIE (L.K.G.I M.RU Class) 7,390 tons

Total 14,780 tons

# Identified by photo as of the T.T.U. T.K.E. Class.
* This ship identified by, the PLUNGER as S.S.K.I. M.RU in the patrol report was later identified from photographs as the KINLI M.RU. The S.S.K.I. soon on its storm was, undoubtedly, the identification of its port of registry.

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION:
(11-43)
List III, SS.
Special:
Pl(5), EN3(5), ZI(5),
Consublant (2), X3(1),
Consubsovacspec. (2),
Subschool, NL (2),
Comatslfor 72 (2),
Comsubron 50 (2),
Comsopac (2),
Cinclant (2),
Comteskfor 16 (1).

E. R. SILENDRUE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 119 —
1. CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER Report of Sixth War Patrol.

PROLOGUE
March 27, 1943. Arrived PEARL from Fifth War Patrol. March 28 to April 20; thorough refit by Submarine Base. Docked. Deperned. Ioved 3" gun forward. Modified pilot house. Installed IJO pump. April 18-20: training exercises underway. April 21-22 loaded.

I. NARRATIVE
April 23, 1943.
1130 WW. underway from PEARL, pursuant to CTF 17 OFORD #63-43. 1133 transferred last. EE&R man to passing launch. PC escort joined at buoys. Made trim dive and went to test depth. 1930 made radar fire control run on departing escort. Enroute JOHNSTON, speed 16.

April 24.
1120 V sighted PBY. Exchanged recognition signals. No radar contact; plane was low.

April 25.
0630 X JOHNSTON planes joined and screened well. Zigging under constant helm at full speed approaching JOHNSTON. 0745 picked up pilot off entrance. 0810 moored JOHNSTON, delivered mail. Received fuel, oranges and beer on Easter morning. 1100 underway from JOHNSTON under air screen, zigging at full speed. 1250 slowed to 2 engines, for passage to area.

Made three training dives daily. Interior communication and fire control drills were conducted every day until our convoy was sighted. A agile target was simulated. He was attacked with six and sanctimies 12 torpedoes per day in every imaginable situation. Procedure and good interior communications were stressed. The Gunnery Officer spent hours babying the PLUNGER's reluctant MK I TDC. It responded. When the dividends on these drills started coming in they made our pockets jingle.

April 29 (Omitted 28th from calendar)
Approaching TAONGI with possibility of meeting PIKE. Radar interference. Zigged 20 miles south of route to reduce probability of contacting PIKE and to complicate any enemy radar tracking.

April 30.
2311 L phanton radar contact, range 3000 yards; visibility excellent.

May 1.
0635 L sighted JAP plane. Dived to 140 feet and c/c 90°. Plane was 120 miles north of BIKINI. Rounded one torpedo forward and aft. 0745 surfaced.

1030 L sighted another plane, no radar contact. Dived to 140 feet and c/c 90°. Plane was 120 miles, bearing 350, from BIKINI. Rounded all torpedoes. Located source of gushing air bubbles as leaks from air banks in No. 4 MBT's. At 70 feet it looked like the bubble scene in "Fantasia", At this time No. 1 main engine was

— page 119 —
1. CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER Report of Sixth War Patrol.

PROLOGUE
March 27, 1943. Arrived PEARL from Fifth War Patrol. March 28 to April 20; thorough refit by Submarine Base. Docked. Deperned. Ioved 3" gun forward. Modified pilot house. Installed IJO pump. April 18-20: training exercises underway. April 21-22 loaded.

I. NARRATIVE
April 23, 1943.
1130 WW. underway from PEARL, pursuant to CTF 17 OFORD #63-43. 1133 transferred last. EE&R man to passing launch. PC escort joined at buoys. Made trim dive and went to test depth. 1930 made radar fire control run on departing escort. Enroute JOHNSTON, speed 16.

April 24.
1120 V sighted PBY. Exchanged recognition signals. No radar contact; plane was low.

April 25.
0630 X JOHNSTON planes joined and screened well. Zigging under constant helm at full speed approaching JOHNSTON. 0745 picked up pilot off entrance. 0810 moored JOHNSTON, delivered mail. Received fuel, oranges and beer on Easter morning. 1100 underway from JOHNSTON under air screen, zigging at full speed. 1250 slowed to 2 engines, for passage to area.

Made three training dives daily. Interior communication and fire control drills were conducted every day until our convoy was sighted. A agile target was simulated. He was attacked with six and sanctimies 12 torpedoes per day in every imaginable situation. Procedure and good interior communications were stressed. The Gunnery Officer spent hours babying the PLUNGER's reluctant MK I TDC. It responded. When the dividends on these drills started coming in they made our pockets jingle.

April 29 (Omitted 28th from calendar)
Approaching TAONGI with possibility of meeting PIKE. Radar interference. Zigged 20 miles south of route to reduce probability of contacting PIKE and to complicate any enemy radar tracking.

April 30.
2311 L phanton radar contact, range 3000 yards; visibility excellent.

May 1.
0635 L sighted JAP plane. Dived to 140 feet and c/c 90°. Plane was 120 miles north of BIKINI. Rounded one torpedo forward and aft. 0745 surfaced.

1030 L sighted another plane, no radar contact. Dived to 140 feet and c/c 90°. Plane was 120 miles, bearing 350, from BIKINI. Rounded all torpedoes. Located source of gushing air bubbles as leaks from air banks in No. 4 MBT's. At 70 feet it looked like the bubble scene in "Fantasia", At this time No. 1 main engine was

— page 120 —
1. U.S.S. PLUNGER Report of Sixth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER Report of Sixth War Patrol.

reported out of commission with a broken blower impeller shaft. A11 antenna trunks were flooded except the SD mast. It was not a happy day. It was 1200 miles to MIDWAY, and 950 miles to TRUK. Pilot chart showed area weather would be rainy, squally, wind force 3 to 4, no calms. Had no intentions of patrolling off NORTH PASS entrance buoys anyway. 1345 surfaced.

May 1, 2, 3.
Crossing [HARSHALL-GILBERT-PONAPE routes to ENTIRE, using high-est periscope for maximum visibility. No contacts.

May 4.
1415 K entered area. Dived. Average speed PEARL to area 12.1. After plotting all known enemy positions charted two probable traffic routes. The NE route was course 055 from NORTH PASS to Let, 8 N, thence on course 020. The NW route was course 324 from NORTH PASS. Considered the latter route to be twice as good as the former; 1826 surfaced, Patrolled route NE of MURILO ISLAND.

May 5.
0430 K dived 15 miles north of MURILO ISLAND. Patrolled NE route. 1830 K surfaced. Patrolled west and SW of MURILO ISLAND.

May 6.
0430 K dived 42 miles NE of NORTH PASS. 1830 K surfaced 15 miles north of NORTH PASS. Commenced out and in patrol on NW route, 1842 K searchlights over horizon, bearing 171.

May 7.
0433 K dived 30 miles NW of NORTH PASS. Working NW route. 1835 K surfaced, TRUK searchlights bearing 162.

1851 K much to our surprise sighted NOMIN ISLAND 7 miles North. Patrolled NW route between EAST PAYU and TRUK.

May 8.
0443 K dived on NW route, 14 miles off EAST PAYU. Patrolled along this route.

0607 K sighted cruiser type scouting plane.

1320 K sighted the same or similar plane.

1618 K with 10 feet of periscope out sighted masts of our convoy.

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1. U.S.S. PLUNGER Report of Sixth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER Report of Sixth War Patrol.

reported out of commission with a broken blower impeller shaft. A11 antenna trunks were flooded except the SD mast. It was not a happy day. It was 1200 miles to MIDWAY, and 950 miles to TRUK. Pilot chart showed area weather would be rainy, squally, wind force 3 to 4, no calms. Had no intentions of patrolling off NORTH PASS entrance buoys anyway. 1345 surfaced.

May 1, 2, 3.
Crossing [HARSHALL-GILBERT-PONAPE routes to ENTIRE, using high-est periscope for maximum visibility. No contacts.

May 4.
1415 K entered area. Dived. Average speed PEARL to area 12.1. After plotting all known enemy positions charted two probable traffic routes. The NE route was course 055 from NORTH PASS to Let, 8 N, thence on course 020. The NW route was course 324 from NORTH PASS. Considered the latter route to be twice as good as the former; 1826 surfaced, Patrolled route NE of MURILO ISLAND.

May 5.
0430 K dived 15 miles north of MURILO ISLAND. Patrolled NE route. 1830 K surfaced. Patrolled west and SW of MURILO ISLAND.

May 6.
0440 K dived 42 miles NE of NORTH PASS. 1830 K surfaced 15 miles north of NORTH PASS. Commenced out and in patrol on NW route, 1842 K searchlights over horizon, bearing 171.

May 7.
0453 K dived 30 miles NW of NORTH PASS. Working NW route. 1835 K surfaced, TRUK searchlights bearing 162.

1851 K much to our surprise sighted NOMIN ISLAND 7 miles North. Patrolled NW route between EAST PAYU and TRUK.

May 8.
0443 K dived on NW route, 14 miles of EAST PAYU. Patrolled along this route.

0607 K sighted cruiser type scouting plane.

1320 K sighted the same or similar plane.

1618 K with 10 feet of periscope out sighted masts of our convoy.

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2007 K radar contact 30° on starboard bow, range 13600 yards. 2010 c/c to 010 to put convoy ahead and commenced battery charge on 2 main generators, holding contact with one on propulsion. (No. 1 main engine was out of commission with a broken blower impeller shaft. It was urgently needed for the next two days.)

2130 K moonset. Cloudy, starlight night. 2155 secured charge, all engines on propulsion, gaining attack position at maximum speed. When broad on target's starboard quarter, radar went out. Ships were now in sight. Range was kept open as far as possible not to lose sight contact as we moved up abeam. Due to splendid performance by MOSSER, F.D., RTLC, the radar ailmcnt was correctly diagnosed, the magnetron and one other tube were replaced in 20 minutes. Regained radar contact at 11490 yards.

May 9
0247 K PLUNGER was 4000 yards off the track, range 10000 yards from the leading ship in the starboard column. Target checked perfectly on course 350, speed 10.5, not zigging. 0249 swung in on course 260 for 90° starboard track and dived to 35 feet to attack. Tracked by radar until target was seen in periscope, then radar ranges and periscope bearings. At range 2940 yards went to 55 feet,

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2007 K radar contact 30° on starboard bow, range 13600 yards. 2010 c/c to 010 to put convoy ahead and commenced battery charge on 2 main generators, holding contact with one on propulsion. (No. 1 main engine was out of commission with a broken blower impeller shaft. It was urgently needed for the next two days.)

2130 K moonset. Cloudy, starlight night. 2155 secured charge, all engines on propulsion, gaining attack position at maximum speed. When broad on target's starboard quarter, radar went out. Ships were now in sight. Range was kept open as far as possible not to lose sight contact as we moved up abeam. Due to splendid performance by MOSSER, F.D., RTLC, the radar ailmcnt was correctly diagnosed, the magnetron and one other tube were replaced in 20 minutes. Regained radar contact at 11490 yards.

May 9
0247 K PLUNGER was 4000 yards off the track, range 10000 yards from the leading ship in the starboard column. Target checked perfectly on course 350, speed 10.5, not zigging. 0249 swung in on course 260 for 90° starboard track and dived to 35 feet to attack. Tracked by radar until target was seen in periscope, then radar ranges and periscope bearings. At range 2940 yards went to 55 feet,

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0412 surfaced in pursuit of convoy, all engines on propulsion. Tried to send convoy contact report. Could get no output from transmitter. Searched area by radar and sight for wreck. Visibility had been at least 11400 yards during approach. Radar had picked up ships at 13,600 yards. No wreck could be detected. We were soon to see that the target was missing from the convoy. Both escorts were still with the convoy. We therefore concluded that this ship sank.

: 0458 K sighted convoy bearing 317 about 13000 yards away. PLUNGER was silhouetted in best half of horizon 40 minutes before sunrise. c/c with full rudder to 200 to avoid detection. The Executive Officer studied the formation and saw the four remaining MARUs. This was borne out fully later in the day when the four MARUs and 2 escorts were seen at close range. Our attempt to get out of the lighted sector of the horizon was too late and a big searchlight gave us AA as we attempted to skirt his rear. We put him dead astern and called on Fairbanks Morse. The JAP sent AA as long as we could see his searchlight. When no DD came back to investigate we wondered what he was saving his escorts for. Watched him with high periscope. Nothing developed and at 0525 c/c to 300 to pass up his port side for an attack position ahead. Maintained maximum range consistent with keeping the convoy's tops in sight with the high periscope. With our 3 good engines on propulsion and the auxiliary on a 20 amp positive float, made a 147 mile end-around run. At sunrise we had been 200 miles from TRUK and 390 miles from SIRIUS, but no air cover-age or patrol planes appeared. Any little sea plane would have spoiled this job.

1015 K transmitter reported ready for another try on the contact report. Thus far no JAP planes were present and we were 5 hours along.

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0412 surfaced in pursuit of convoy, all engines on propulsion. Tried to send convoy contact report. Could get no output from transmitter. Searched area by radar and sight for wreck. Visibility had been at least 11400 yards during approach. Radar had picked up ships at 13,600 yards. No wreck could be detected. We were soon to see that the target was missing from the convoy. Both escorts were still with the convoy. We therefore concluded that this ship sank.

: 0458 K sighted convoy bearing 317 about 13000 yards away. PLUNGER was silhouetted in best half of horizon 40 minutes before sunrise. c/c with full rudder to 200 to avoid detection. The Executive Officer studied the formation and saw the four remaining MARUs. This was borne out fully later in the day when the four MARUs and 2 escorts were seen at close range. Our attempt to get out of the lighted sector of the horizon was too late and a big searchlight gave us AA as we attempted to skirt his rear. We put him dead astern and called on Fairbanks Morse. The JAP sent AA as long as we could see his searchlight. When no DD came back to investigate we wondered what he was saving his escorts for. Watched him with high periscope. Nothing developed and at 0525 c/c to 300 to pass up his port side for an attack position ahead. Maintained maximum range consistent with keeping the convoy's tops in sight with the high periscope. With our 3 good engines on propulsion and the auxiliary on a 20 amp positive float, made a 147 mile end-around run. At sunrise we had been 200 miles from TRUK and 390 miles from SIRIUS, but no air cover-age or patrol planes appeared. Any little sea plane would have spoiled this job.

1015 K transmitter reported ready for another try on the contact report. Thus far no JAP planes were present and we were 5 hours along.

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1d

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

on our end run. Estimated we should wait until after the next attack to open up. Lt. (jg) W. L. SMITH considered it his personal responsibility that the PLUNGER not lose this convoy nor get sighted by it. He refused to leave the periscope for more than a few minutes at any time from 0500 to about 1615 when he took his station at TDC for the approach.

1547 K attained position 18 miles ahead of convoy. Dived to attack. It was a perfect periscope day. The four MARUS were zigging together on course 025 and 315, steadying for about 3 minutes on each of these courses. Speed 10.5 through the water. SMOKY, the cargo passenger AP still lead the port column followed by the same ship that was there the day before. We wanted to save SMOKY because we could see him best. He was, in all probability, the slowest ship in the formation. None of the modern diesel freighters were ever seen to emit a single puff of smoke. The big four goal poster, similar to ASAKASAN, had moved up and replaced the missing starboard column leader. Two new single engine float type biplanes were on his deck forward. He was followed by a one funnel-three-goal-post diesel AK, thought to be at least the equivalent of the ASAKA. When all ships were on the right leg of their zig, saw an escort bows on, between the columns, astern. Moved outboard the track being made good by the starboard column and then headed back in for bow shots at the leader.

1657 K the leading target steadied on the left leg of his zig giving us a 65 S angle on the bow with a relative bearing of 335, range 2200 yards. 1659 fired tubes 1, 2, and 3, torpedoes on 12 feet, range about 1350 yards, straight bow shots on Mk & angle solver firing bearing, longitudinal spread with firing intervals of 12 and 13 seconds, all aimed to hit inside bow, stack, and inside stern. Immediately ordered gyros matched forward, and gave a set up to TDC on second ship in starboard column. Bearing was near 335, angle on the bow 75 S, range 2200 yards. Fired 4th torpedo, white light method, aimed at his stack, with a gyro of about 353. All ahead full, left full rudder, to bring stern tubes to bear on second target. Took a quick look at an escort on the starboard quarter of the second target about 2500 yards away. Ducked periscope and kept swinging. Torpedoes commenced hitting. Four hits. This meant 3 TNT's on the 4 goal-poster and one TFX on the second target. Upped periscope to see targets. Both these diesel AKs were enshrouded in smoke and haze and ships were firing guns in every direction. Trained on escort. He had a small angle on the bow, pouring out black smoke, as he speeded up. Just at this time he let go a depth charge. He was still at least 1500 yards away but the psychological effect was too great. Ordered "Take her deep". Ten depth charges exploded between 1702 and 1707, none close. Sound reported crackling and gurgling but some of the true bearings did not check.

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1d

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

on our end run. Estimated we should wait until after the next attack to open up. Lt. (jg) W. L. SMITH considered it his personal responsibility that the PLUNGER not lose this convoy nor get sighted by it. He refused to leave the periscope for more than a few minutes at any time from 0500 to about 1615 when he took his station at TDC for the approach.

1547 K attained position 18 miles ahead of convoy. Dived to attack. It was a perfect periscope day. The four MARUS were zigging together on course 025 and 315, steadying for about 3 minutes on each of these courses. Speed 10.5 through the water. SMOKY, the cargo passenger AP still lead the port column followed by the same ship that was there the day before. We wanted to save SMOKY because we could see him best. He was, in all probability, the slowest ship in the formation. None of the modern diesel freighters were ever seen to emit a single puff of smoke. The big four goal poster, similar to ASAKASAN, had moved up and replaced the missing starboard column leader. Two new single engine float type biplanes were on his deck forward. He was followed by a one funnel-three-goal-post diesel AK, thought to be at least the equivalent of the ASAKA. When all ships were on the right leg of their zig, saw an escort bows on, between the columns, astern. Moved outboard the track being made good by the starboard column and then headed back in for bow shots at the leader.

1657 K the leading target steadied on the left leg of his zig giving us a 65 S angle on the bow with a relative bearing of 335, range 2200 yards. 1659 fired tubes 1, 2, and 3, torpedoes on 12 feet, range about 1350 yards, straight bow shots on Mk & angle solver firing bearing, longitudinal spread with firing intervals of 12 and 13 seconds, all aimed to hit inside bow, stack, and inside stern. Immediately ordered gyros matched forward, and gave a set up to TDC on second ship in starboard column. Bearing was near 335, angle on the bow 75 S, range 2200 yards. Fired 4th torpedo, white light method, aimed at his stack, with a gyro of about 353. All ahead full, left full rudder, to bring stern tubes to bear on second target. Took a quick look at an escort on the starboard quarter of the second target about 2500 yards away. Ducked periscope and kept swinging. Torpedoes commenced hitting. Four hits. This meant 3 TNT's on the 4 goal-poster and one TFX on the second target. Upped periscope to see targets. Both these diesel AKs were enshrouded in smoke and haze and ships were firing guns in every direction. Trained on escort. He had a small angle on the bow, pouring out black smoke, as he speeded up. Just at this time he let go a depth charge. He was still at least 1500 yards away but the psychological effect was too great. Ordered "Take her deep". Ten depth charges exploded between 1702 and 1707, none close. Sound reported crackling and gurgling but some of the true bearings did not check.

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1816 K sighted bearing 007. c/c to 007. Reload completed. Surfaced in pursuit. 1830 visibility to northward improved. Three ships in all : ere in sight; two ships hull down bearing 005 and 354 and a ship several miles nearer far from being hull down, bearing 352. Lieut. Condr. T.B. DABNEY, who has the best eyes in the PLUNGER, thought this ship was sinking stern first. The fourth LARU was missing. At this time tried to report convoy's position, course, and speed, and that two LARUs were believed sunk and one damaged. The low antenna trunk resistance caused the plate resistor to burn out. When this had been located and corrected the following day, the convoy consisted of the CHIDORI, PLUNGER and the stopped ASAKA.

1835 R c/c to 350 heading for nearest ship, the one not hull down, all engines on prowlision. Very shortly thereafter he could no longer be seen. It was just at the time a navigator likes to start shooting his evening stars. This nearest ship was never detected again. Nearly half a moon gave us high visibility until it set at 2218. The radar was in good condition as a contact at 2213 proved. Naturally the officers and lookouts were bearing down trying to pick this fellow up. The escorts were still with the last two ships of the convoy when it was contacted again. With 3 TNT hits in one of these ships and an authoritative TX hit in the other, coupled with the related evidence, we concluded that they both sank. Plot showed undamaged ships could be about 16.5 miles ahead. At our speed we would overtake at 2230. Lied down retiring search curve to cover evasive courses to westward of 000, first log to start at 2230.

2213 K radar contact bearing 084, range 11300. We soon sighted what was loft of this convoy. SIOKY and his port column shadow, the ASAKA, wore still making 10.5 knots. Reasoned that the ship seen bearing 354 had joined the ship bearing 005 instead of vice versa. They were on 350, the same old base course. We wondered why the JAP never took up an evasive course. Finally decided he was steering with an iron nickel and didn't know how to change the set up. The ASAKA and SIOKY were 2000 yards abreast, SMOKY on the right, zigging the same as in the afternoon. Radar indicated an escort on the inboard (port) side of the ASAKA.

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1816 K sighted mast bearing 007. c/c to 007. Reload completed. Surfaced in pursuit. 1830 visibility to northward improved. Three ships in all : ere in sight; two ships hull down bearing 005 and 354 and a ship several miles nearer far from being hull down, bearing 352. Lieut. Condr. T.B. DABNEY, who has the best eyes in the PLUNGER, thought this ship was sinking stern first. The fourth LARU was missing. At this time tried to report convoy's position, course, and speed, and that two LARUS were believed sunk and one damaged. The low antenna trunk resistance caused the plate resistor to burn out. When this had been located and corrected the following day, the convoy consisted of the CHIDORI, PLUNGER and the stopped ASAKA.

1835 R c/c to 350 heading for nearest ship, the one not hull down, all engines on prowlision. Very shortly thereafter he could no longer be seen. It was just at the time a navigator likes to start shooting his evening stars. This nearest ship was never detected again. Nearly half a moon gave us high visibility until it set at 2218. The radar was in good condition as a contact at 2213 proved. Naturally the officers and lookouts were bearing down trying to pick this fellow up. The escorts were still with the last two ships of the convoy when it was contacted again. With 3 TNT hits in one of these ships and an authoritative TX hit in the other, coupled with the related evidence, we concluded that they both sank. Plot showed undamaged ships could be about 16.5 miles ahead. At our speed we would overtake at 2230. Lied down retiring search curve to cover evasive courses to westward of 000, first log to start at 2230.

2213 K radar contact bearing 084, range 11300. We soon sighted what was loft of this convoy. SIOKY and his port column shadow, the ASAKA, wore still making 10.5 knots. Reasoned that the ship seen bearing 354 had joined the ship bearing 005 instead of vice versa. They were on 350, the same old base course. We wondered why the JAP never took up an evasive course. Finally decided he was steering with an iron nickel and didn't know how to change the set up. The ASAKA and SIOKY were 2000 yards abreast, SMOKY on the right, zigging the same as in the afternoon. Radar indicated an escort on the inboard (port) side of the ASAKA.

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0005 K were 4500 yards off the track, at a range of 9000 yards. Starlight night, no moon, 50% cloudy. Studied horizon with periscope. Estimated would be able to see ship at firing range, but not much before. Knew escort was between us and ASAKA, and therefore could not remain at 35 feet and use radar in the attack phase. Thought the odds were about even money that a favorable attack situation could be developed under existing conditions. 0011 dived to attack. At 3000 yards the situation looked promising but target could not yet be seen with periscope. Went to 55 feet and sound tracked target. Bearing moved from 060 relative to 070 relative as target made a left zig. Went to 90 feet to avoid ramming, and reversed course. PLUNGER wound up between the ASAKA and SMOKY. Sound was tracking the target across the bow from port to starboard. Came up to shoot. The ASAKA was bearing 339 relative at range of 200 to 300 yards with a 90 S angle on the bow. Swung hard right and it developed into a possible shot at 700 yards on a large track with 650 right gyros. Under the circumstances, considered my torpedoes too valuable to throw them away on such a shot. With our transmitter out, the PLUNGER's responsibility for this convoy was clear. We simply could not afford misses. Secured the tubes. Thereafter we called this our "dry rehearsal dummy run".

0045 K surfaced 4400 yards astern of closest ship; put 3 engines on propulsion, gaining station ahead. The formation was clearly seen at this time. The two ships were abreast and an escort was outboard each of them. 0147 battery was reported 2/3 discharged. It was necessary to put one engine on charge. 0330 all engines on propulsion. The plot showed we were not going to reach the attack position by dawn. The Engineer Officer went aft and got 17 more RPH than had ever before been made on 3 engines.

0045 K with daylight coming fast reached position 4500 yards off the ASAKA track, range 10200 yards. Dived to 35 feet. Tracked by radar. Picked up target with periscope at 5500 yards as he entered the eastern sector of the horizon at dawn. Went to 55 feet. Could see him perfectly. Sighted CHIDORI class torpedo boat on SMOKY's port quarter. Both ships zigged 70° toward us and put us between them. Shifted targets to SMOKY. They zigged back, giving us a 3000 yard shot on SMOKY. Shifted back to ASAKA when his range was 1200 yards, angle on the bow 45 F, bearing 069 relative. Swung hard right and matched gyros forward for white light method. 0503 fired first torpedo with a gyro of about 007 on generated firing bearing. White light had not been turned on. TDC officer protested intelligently and vigorously. Got this word and knew this torpedo would miss. Got white light on and a "set" from TDC and fired next three torpedoes at his stack at 8 second interval, range near 700 yards.

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0005 K were 4500 yards off the track, at a range of 9000 yards. Starlight night, no moon, 50% cloudy. Studied horizon with periscope. Estimated would be able to see ship at firing range, but not much before. Knew escort was between us and ASAKA, and therefore could not remain at 35 feet and use radar in the attack phase. Thought the odds were about even money that a favorable attack situation could be developed under existing conditions. 0011 dived to attack. At 3000 yards the situation looked promising but target could not yet be seen with periscope. Went to 55 feet and sound tracked target. Bearing moved from 060 relative to 070 relative as target made a left zig. Went to 90 feet to avoid ramming, and reversed course. PLUNGER wound up between the ASAKA and SMOKY. Sound was tracking the target across the bow from port to starboard. Came up to shoot. The ASAKA was bearing 339 relative at range of 200 to 300 yards with a 90 S angle on the bow. Swung hard right and it developed into a possible shot at 700 yards on a large track with 650 right gyros. Under the circumstances, considered my torpedoes too valuable to throw them away on such a shot. With our transmitter out, the PLUNGER's responsibility for this convoy was clear. We simply could not afford misses. Secured the tubes. Thereafter we called this our "dry rehearsal dummy run".

0045 K surfaced 4400 yards astern of closest ship; put 3 engines on propulsion, gaining station ahead. The formation was clearly seen at this time. The two ships were abreast and an escort was outboard each of them. 0147 battery was reported 2/3 discharged. It was necessary to put one engine on charge. 0330 all engines on propulsion. The plot showed we were not going to reach the attack position by dawn. The Engineer Officer went aft and got 17 more RPH than had ever before been made on 3 engines.

0045 K with daylight coming fast reached position 4500 yards off the ASAKA track, range 10200 yards. Dived to 35 feet. Tracked by radar. Picked up target with periscope at 5500 yards as he entered the eastern sector of the horizon at dawn. Went to 55 feet. Could see him perfectly. Sighted CHIDORI class torpedo boat on SMOKY's port quarter. Both ships zigged 70° toward us and put us between them. Shifted targets to SMOKY. They zigged back, giving us a 3000 yard shot on SMOKY. Shifted back to ASAKA when his range was 1200 yards, angle on the bow 45 F, bearing 069 relative. Swung hard right and matched gyros forward for white light method. 0503 fired first torpedo with a gyro of about 007 on generated firing bearing. White light had not been turned on. TDC officer protested intelligently and vigorously. Got this word and knew this torpedo would miss. Got white light on and a "set" from TDC and fired next three torpedoes at his stack at 8 second interval, range near 700 yards.

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0650 K reached periscope depth. Saw ASAKA stopped, listed 100 to port, with CHIDORI and one other small escort standing by on her port side. The Executive Officer, and First Lieutenant also saw second escort at this time. What happened to the second escort after this is a mystery. 0605 c/c to 090 to get over on ASAKA's starboard quarter. 0620 c/c to 350 to move up on target's starboard beam for attack. Sea was as choppy as it could be, not to interfere with depth keeping.

0650 K sighted SMOKY lying to about 4000 yards bearing 350 from the ASAKA. PLUNGER had tried hard to earn the respect of this inordinately unprofessional convoy commander. SMOKY was soon to pay with his life for this insult to our submarines. Now went after SMOKY, keeping a close watch on the CHIDORI. While closing, SMOKY got underway and circled ASAKA, passing down his starboard side, and stopped near his port beam. We were too far away to see what was going on but later developments indicated that the ASAKA's crew and passengers were taken off at this time. SMOKY soon moved ahead of ASAKA and stopped, heading near 350. 0723 c/c to 305 heading for attack position aboard of SMOKY.

0825 K SMOKY underway, relative bearing, 336, zero angle on the bow, range near 3000 yards. Commanding Officer estimated 5 to 6 knots. CHIDORI was hopelessly out of position, near ASAKA. Now had one torpedo forward, two stern tubes loaded, plus one reload aft. Swung right for stern tube shots. Target also c/c to his right. Matched gyros aft for white light method. At last minute got turn count. TDC officer on his own initiative compared this with SMOKY's 10.5 knot turn count previously recorded, and ground in 8 knots. 0835 fired stern tubes, range 2500 yards, gyro 170, 100 port track, 16 second firing interval, aimed to hit just inside bow and just inside stern. Peri-scope was trained on CHIDORI when the first torpedo finally hit after a run of 1 minute and forty seconds. Trained periscope on target to see result just as second torpedo hit near the stern. These were TPX heads talking. PLUNGER will willingly forego TNT heads on her next patrol. First

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0650 K reached periscope depth. Saw ASAKA stopped, listed 100 to port, with CHIDORI and one other small escort standing by on her port side. The Executive Officer, and First Lieutenant also saw second escort at this time. What happened to the second escort after this is a mystery. 0605 c/c to 090 to get over on ASAKA's starboard quarter. 0620 c/c to 350 to move up on target's starboard beam for attack. Sea was as choppy as it could be, not to interfere with depth keeping.

0650 K sighted SMOKY lying to about 4000 yards bearing 350 from the ASAKA. PLUNGER had tried hard to earn the respect of this inordinately unprofessional convoy commander. SMOKY was soon to pay with his life for this insult to our submarines. Now went after SMOKY, keeping a close watch on the CHIDORI. While closing, SMOKY got underway and circled ASAKA, passing down his starboard side, and stopped near his port beam. We were too far away to see what was going on but later developments indicated that the ASAKA's crew and passengers were taken off at this time. SMOKY soon moved ahead of ASAKA and stopped, heading near 350. 0723 c/c to 305 heading for attack position aboard of SMOKY.

0825 K SMOKY underway, relative bearing, 336, zero angle on the bow, range near 3000 yards. Commanding Officer estimated 5 to 6 knots. CHIDORI was hopelessly out of position, near ASAKA. Now had one torpedo forward, two stern tubes loaded, plus one reload aft. Swung right for stern tube shots. Target also c/c to his right. Matched gyros aft for white light method. At last minute got turn count. TDC officer on his own initiative compared this with SMOKY's 10.5 knot turn count previously recorded, and ground in 8 knots. 0835 fired stern tubes, range 2500 yards, gyro 170, 100 port track, 16 second firing interval, aimed to hit just inside bow and just inside stern. Peri-scope was trained on CHIDORI when the first torpedo finally hit after a run of 1 minute and forty seconds. Trained periscope on target to see result just as second torpedo hit near the stern. These were TPX heads talking. PLUNGER will willingly forego TNT heads on her next patrol. First

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1020 K sighted three planes on this look. All were hedge hopping the waves. We were 260 miles from SAIPAN. For the next hour planes were everywhere, all very low. Occasional distant underwater explosions were interpreted as aerial attempts to keep us down. 1120 CHIDORI was about 6 miles NE of ASAKA. PLUNGER was about 4 miles, bearing 010 from ASAKA. c/c to 190 to head for stopped ship. He still listed 100 to port and not sinking. Took a quick look at CHIDORI and target every 5 minutes until the range to the ASAKA was about 3200 yards. So many planes had been seen near the ASAKA decided to take no more looks after this until the firing observation. Haneuvered the ship by watching the TDC. Came in to a point 690 yards, 450 on target's port bow, and swung right to get a straight stern shot at 1000 yard range on 90 P track. Upon reaching this point, stood by stern tubes, trained periscope on 180 and raised it for final look. No ship seen. Realized what had happened. ASAKA was being blown down wind at about 1 knot. Trained periscope ahead. Saw a lot of gray paint and the ASAKA's bow. Flooded negative, ordered 90 feet and listened for a loud grating noise. Closed tube doors and vented pressure off torpedoes. Upon reaching 90 feet, the First Lieutenant thought of raising the control room periscope to see when we passed under target. Raised it and kept watching, but we had already passed under him. The Commanding Officer complimented the First Lieutenant on his good common sense, and the Gunnery Officer awarded him a silver iswas on the spot. Ten minutes after reaching "out ordered periscope depth. Raised periscope and trained it dead on 180. Then, we rode the surface the cross wire was just inside the ASAKA's bow. 1246 swung right slowly and fired first torpedo about 4 length inside the bow and 18 seconds later fired the second torpedo at his stack. Three officers timed the firing and the subsequent thuds as follows: QO seconds: fired: 5, 18 seconds fired 6, 51 seconds, first thud, 66 seconds, second thud. Immediately went deep expecting aerial bombing.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 127 —
1020 K sighted three planes on this look. All were hedge hopping the waves. We were 260 miles from SAIPAN. For the next hour planes were everywhere, all very low. Occasional distant underwater explosions were interpreted as aerial attempts to keep us down. 1120 CHIDORI was about 6 miles NE of ASAKA. PLUNGER was about 4 miles, bearing 010 from ASAKA. c/c to 190 to head for stopped ship. He still listed 100 to port and not sinking. Took a quick look at CHIDORI and target every 5 minutes until the range to the ASAKA was about 3200 yards. So many planes had been seen near the ASAKA decided to take no more looks after this until the firing observation. Haneuvered the ship by watching the TDC. Came in to a point 690 yards, 450 on target's port bow, and swung right to get a straight stern shot at 1000 yard range on 90 P track. Upon reaching this point, stood by stern tubes, trained periscope on 180 and raised it for final look. No ship seen. Realized what had happened. ASAKA was being blown down wind at about 1 knot. Trained periscope ahead. Saw a lot of gray paint and the ASAKA's bow. Flooded negative, ordered 90 feet and listened for a loud grating noise. Closed tube doors and vented pressure off torpedoes. Upon reaching 90 feet, the First Lieutenant thought of raising the control room periscope to see when we passed under target. Raised it and kept watching, but we had already passed under him. The Commanding Officer complimented the First Lieutenant on his good common sense, and the Gunnery Officer awarded him a silver iswas on the spot. Ten minutes after reaching "out ordered periscope depth. Raised periscope and trained it dead on 180. Then, we rode the surface the cross wire was just inside the ASAKA's bow. 1246 swung right slowly and fired first torpedo about 4 length inside the bow and 18 seconds later fired the second torpedo at his stack. Three officers timed the firing and the subsequent thuds as follows: QO seconds: fired: 5, 18 seconds fired 6, 51 seconds, first thud, 66 seconds, second thud. Immediately went deep expecting aerial bombing.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 128 —
1303 K reached periscope depth. It looked like the deserted village. No CHIDORI, no planes, and much to our surprise not one man could be seen on the ASAKA. The ASAKA was still listed 10° to port with plenty of freeboard. Any explosions on the last attack would have attracted the CHIDORI to the scene. 1312 c/c to 045 to reach a firing position on ASAKA's starboard beam. Our one remaining torpedo was forward. 1332 c/c to 299 and at 1348 to 290. 1351 fired our torpedo straight bow shot at his stack at about 130° yard range. Observed this hit on the HOT. This TNT MIK16 had the crack and reverberations of a depth charge. A small geyser of water and a big puff of black smoke accompanied the explosion. The 10° port list came off the ASAKA almost instantly with very little increase in draft. We turned away and watched for the CHIDORI. He showed up very shortly with his usual cloud of smoke, still flying the ONE flag and flashing his yellow light on the bridge. He had no idea where we were but dropped one depth charge just for luck. We opened the range and watched the CHIDORI and ASAKA. We knew the ASAKA had four TNT hits, probably all in the engine room, but he was on an even keel with little more than normal draft. We prepared a contact report to CTF 17 adding that we would report positions of the MARU until otherwise directed.

1510 sighted plane.

1718 K slowed to 50 RPM on one propeller as battery was getting low. The urgent need for engines on propulsion had left us with only about half a battery for the last two days. It was at about this time we decided to gun the ASAKA when and if the conditions were favorable. Decided to dive early the next morning to be in the vicinity ASAKA at dawn before planes arrived. Hoped to catch CHIDORI out on a sweep at that time.

1900 K surfaced with ASAKA bearing 340, 8 miles away. Put moon astern and patrolled at low speed. 2110 to 2333 sending contact report. No receipt obtained. but learned next night that message got through.

May 11
0424 K sight and radar contact on ASAKA. 0427 dived to approach. 0515 getting light, no planes, no CHIDORI. ASAKA exactly the same as the day before. He had plenty of guns in sight, but was apparently still abandoned. Made preparations for battle surface as we looked things over.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 128 —
1303 K reached periscope depth. It looked like the deserted village. No CHIDORI, no planes, and much to our surprise not one man could be seen on the ASAKA. The ASAKA was still listed 10° to port with plenty of freeboard. Any explosions on the last attack would have attracted the CHIDORI to the scene. 1312 c/c to 045 to reach a firing position on ASAKA's starboard beam. Our one remaining torpedo was forward. 1332 c/c to 299 and at 1348 to 290. 1351 fired our torpedo straight bow shot at his stack at about 130° yard range. Observed this hit on the HOT. This TNT MIK16 had the crack and reverberations of a depth charge. A small geyser of water and a big puff of black smoke accompanied the explosion. The 10° port list came off the ASAKA almost instantly with very little increase in draft. We turned away and watched for the CHIDORI. He showed up very shortly with his usual cloud of smoke, still flying the ONE flag and flashing his yellow light on the bridge. He had no idea where we were but dropped one depth charge just for luck. We opened the range and watched the CHIDORI and ASAKA. We knew the ASAKA had four TNT hits, probably all in the engine room, but he was on an even keel with little more than normal draft. We prepared a contact report to CTF 17 adding that we would report positions of the MARU until otherwise directed.

1510 sighted plane.

1718 K slowed to 50 RPM on one propeller as battery was getting low. The urgent need for engines on propulsion had left us with only about half a battery for the last two days. It was at about this time we decided to gun the ASAKA when and if the conditions were favorable. Decided to dive early the next morning to be in the vicinity ASAKA at dawn before planes arrived. Hoped to catch CHIDORI out on a sweep at that time.

1900 K surfaced with ASAKA bearing 340, 8 miles away. Put moon astern and patrolled at low speed. 2110 to 2333 sending contact report. No receipt obtained. but learned next night that message got through.

May 11
0424 K sight and radar contact on ASAKA. 0427 dived to approach. 0515 getting light, no planes, no CHIDORI. ASAKA exactly the same as the day before. He had plenty of guns in sight, but was apparently still abandoned. Made preparations for battle surface as we looked things over.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 129 —
0546 K still all clear, 3500 yards abeam ASAKA, bearing 000.
Battle surfaced. Fired 180 rounds 3" including one round of target,
1000 rounds of 20 MM, and 100 rounds of .30 cal., as we closed the
range. Passed 700 yards astern and read ship's name, ASAKA MARU. A
red orange fire was seen through the shell holes after about ten rounds.
Estimate 165 3" hits. His starboard side looked like one big SRP "9"
target. Several fires were started. The SD reported a possible plane
at six miles which fortunately did not develop. There were no stoppages
of the 3" although the gun had to be pushed back to battery by hand
after the first 100 rounds. A muscular negro Officer's Cook named
James Thomas McGuire worked his way up the ammunition line from the
mess room to the gun as the less stalwart were relieved. This Tom-
essee boy really had his heart in his work. When ship's destruction
by fire seemed certain, cleared the decks. 0620 dived. A small
single engine biplane was seen on deck forward. What was thought to
be the fuselage of a transport plane was also seen, but this is not
certain. It is hoped that pictures will show details of his deck and
AA guns, possible depth charge throwers, and other unidentified top-
side equipment. Circled around his bow and headed east to open range.

0732 K the trim CHIDORI returned from a sweep in time to soo the
last of his flock devoured by a roaring fire. Kopt the rango near 4
miles and waited for ASAKA to sink.

0912 K circled an empty clinker life boat with number "11" on its
bow. No further identification could be seen. Sighted a plane, time
not recorded.

0932 K ASAKA exploded like a string of firecrackers, and sank.
All tubes empty, set course for Midway.

1817 K surfaced.

2110 K copied PERMIT!s orders to our cripple, and PLUNGER!s orders
to Pearl. Tried nearly all night on various frequencies including
area frequency to report sinking of ASAKA to prevent noodless diversion
of PERMIT. Steered evasive courses from N to SE, at best speed.

May 12
Enroute to Pearl on surface on 3 engines.

2000 K transmitted brief report of sinking MARU, and amplifying
report of patrol and got a receipt using improvised antenna.

— page 129 —
0546 K still all clear, 3500 yards abeam ASAKA, bearing 000.
Battle surfaced. Fired 180 rounds 3" including one round of target,
1000 rounds of 20 MM, and 100 rounds of .30 cal., as we closed the
range. Passed 700 yards astern and read ship's name, ASAKA MARU. A
red orange fire was seen through the shell holes after about ten rounds.
Estimate 165 3" hits. His starboard side looked like one big SRP "9"
target. Several fires were started. The SD reported a possible plane
at six miles which fortunately did not develop. There were no stoppages
of the 3" although the gun had to be pushed back to battery by hand
after the first 100 rounds. A muscular negro Officer's Cook named
James Thomas McGuire worked his way up the ammunition line from the
mess room to the gun as the less stalwart were relieved. This Tom-
essee boy really had his heart in his work. When ship's destruction
by fire seemed certain, cleared the decks. 0620 dived. A small
single engine biplane was seen on deck forward. What was thought to
be the fuselage of a transport plane was also seen, but this is not
certain. It is hoped that pictures will show details of his deck and
AA guns, possible depth charge throwers, and other unidentified top-
side equipment. Circled around his bow and headed east to open range.

0732 K the trim CHIDORI returned from a sweep in time to soo the
last of his flock devoured by a roaring fire. Kopt the rango near 4
miles and waited for ASAKA to sink.

0912 K circled an empty clinker life boat with number "11" on its
bow. No further identification could be seen. Sighted a plane, time
not recorded.

0932 K ASAKA exploded like a string of firecrackers, and sank.
All tubes empty, set course for Midway.

1817 K surfaced.

2110 K copied PERMIT!s orders to our cripple, and PLUNGER's orders
to Pearl. Tried nearly all night on various frequencies including
area frequency to report sinking of ASAKA to prevent noodless diversion
of PERMIT. Steered evasive courses from N to SE, at best speed.

May 12
Enroute to Pearl on surface on 3 engines.

2000 K transmitted brief report of sinking MARU, and amplifying
report of patrol and got a receipt using improvised antenna.

— page 130 —
2300 L No. 3 main engine out of commission with broken blower, leaving two good engines and the auxiliary.

: 1230 L lookout sighted single-engine biplane. We were 310 miles bearing 110° from 'AIKE.' Diyod. Lookout was sure and identified it as type 95 carrier fighter. 1330 surfaced and sent contact report on possible carrier plane explaining it was seen by only one lookout and that SD did not indicate plane. Also sent RML circle reports on improvised antenna. Included in latter that there was no more news on possible carrier plane.

: 0540 V.I sighted escort at range.

— page 130 —
2300 L No. 3 main engine out of commission with broken blower, leaving two good engines and the auxiliary.

: 1230 L lookout sighted single-engine biplane. We were 310 miles bearing 110° from 'AIKE.' Diyod. Lookout was sure and identified it as type 95 carrier fighter. 1330 surfaced and sent contact report on possible carrier plane explaining it was seen by only one lookout and that SD did not indicate plane. Also sent RML circle reports on improvised antenna. Included in latter that there was no more news on possible carrier plane.

: 0540 V.I sighted escort at range.

— page 131 —
5/8/43 1618(K) 8-35N 150-56E 4AK 1AP 320 10.5 Escorted by CHIDORI and one other escort.

VI AIRCRAFT SIGHTED

| TIME | TYPE | POSITION | REMARKS |
|------|------|||
| 1120/1 | PBY | 20-00N 161-20W | Lookout sighted plane |
| 0735/1 | Unknown | 13-45N 167-30E | Lookout sighted plane |
| 1030/1 | Unknown | 14-00N 166-25E | Lookout sighted plane |
| 0607/K | Obs.Biplane | 8-32N 151-08E | Periscope - patrolling vicinity EAST FAIYU ISLAND |
| 1320/K | Obs.Biplane | '8-32N 151-08E | Periscopes - patrolling vicinity EAST FAIYU ISLAND |
| 1020/K | H. Bomber | 14-29N 149-00E | Twin Engine Bomber |
| 1020/K | M. Mitshubis-98 | 14-29N 149-00E | Single Engine Reconnaissance |
| 1120/K | SOC | 14-29N 149-00E | Single Float Seaplane |
| 1510/K | Divino Wind #97 | 14-29N 149-00E | Double Float Seaplane |

-13- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 131 —
5/8/43 1618(K) 8-35N 150-56E 4AK 1AP 320 10.5 Escorted by CHIDORI and one other escort.

VI AIRCRAFT SIGHTED

| TIME | TYPE | POSITION | REMARKS |
|------|------|||
| 1120/1 | PBY | 20-00N 161-20W | Lookout sighted plane |
| 0735/1 | Unknown | 13-45N 167-30E | Lookout sighted plane |
| 1030/1 | Unknown | 14-00N 166-25E | Lookout sighted plane |
| 0607/K | Obs.Biplane | 8-32N 151-08E | Periscope - patrolling vicinity EAST FAIYU ISLAND |
| 1320/K | Obs.Biplane | '8-32N 151-08E | Periscopes - patrolling vicinity EAST FAIYU ISLAND |
| 1020/K | H. Bomber | 14-29N 149-00E | Twin Engine Bomber |
| 1020/K | M. Mitshubis-98 | 14-29N 149-00E | Single Engine Reconnaissance |
| 1120/K | SOC | 14-29N 149-00E | Single Float Seaplane |
| 1510/K | Divino Wind #97 | 14-29N 149-00E | Double Float Seaplane |

-13- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 132 —
0807/K
5/11/43

TIME: 0807/K
5/11/43

TYPE: Bomber #96
14-29T
149-00E

POSITION: Heavy twin engine bomber - In vicinity

1230/L
5/16/43

TIME: 1230/L
5/16/43

TYPE: Single Engine
Biplane

POSITION: Sighted by lookout, identified by him as carrier fighter typo #95.

5/10/43 it was noted that sovoral planes wore patrolling in vicinity of damaged ship. They probably came from SAIPAN.

VIII ENEMY A/S MEASURES

No enemy A/S measures by surface craft North of TRUK voro soon. Hovvovr, on the day a convoy was sighted a reconnaissance of the crora between EAST FLYU Island and NAHORUTIO ISLAND was made by an SCC typo biplane in the early morning and again in the afternoon.

The escorts with the convoy dropped depth charges when the convoy was attacked but they did not persist in their search. Occasionally they echo ranged but ineffectively.

When the SAIPAN was damaged and dead in the water, sovoral planes wore sent out to patrol two hundred and fifty miles from the nearest base.

IX ENEMY MINE SWEEPING

Nono observod.

X MAJOR DEFECTS

*Major defects on one or more previous patrols.

*1. AIR BOTTLES IN #4 MBT's LEAK. CORRECTIONS OF THIS DEFECT DESERVES THE BEST TECHNIQUE UNDER THE CLOSEST SUPERVISION.

2. Main Engines: April 29, on the sixth day out, No. 1 Main Engine was reported out of commission for the patrol because of a broken blower impellor shaft. On May 15, No. 3 Main Engine went out of commission for remainder of patrol because the studs holding the blower bull gear to upper crank shaft.

*ENCLOSURE (4)

%* Part VII on pages 18 and 19

— page 132 —
0807/K
5/11/43

TIME: 0807/K
5/11/43

TYPE: Bomber #96
14-29T
149-00E

POSITION: Heavy twin engine bomber - In vicinity

1230/L
5/16/43

TIME: 1230/L
5/16/43

TYPE: Single Engine
Biplane

POSITION: Sighted by lookout, identified by him as carrier fighter typo #95.

5/10/43 it was noted that sovoral planes wore patrolling in vicinity of damaged ship. They probably came from SAIPAN.

VIII ENEMY A/S MEASURES

No enemy A/S measures by surface craft North of TRUK voro soon. Hovvovr, on the day a convoy was sighted a reconnaissance of the crora between EAST FLYU Island and NAHORUTIO ISLAND was made by an SCC typo biplane in the early morning and again in the afternoon.

The escorts with the convoy dropped depth charges when the convoy was attacked but they did not persist in their search. Occasionally they echo ranged but ineffectively.

When the SAIPAN was damaged and dead in the water, sovoral planes wore sent out to patrol two hundred and fifty miles from the nearest base.

IX ENEMY MINE SWEEPING

Nono observod.

X MAJOR DEFECTS

*Major defects on one or more previous patrols.

*1. AIR BOTTLES IN #4 MBT's LEAK. CORRECTIONS OF THIS DEFECT DESERVES THE BEST TECHNIQUE UNDER THE CLOSEST SUPERVISION.

2. Main Engines: April 29, on the sixth day out, No. 1 Main Engine was reported out of commission for the patrol because of a broken blower impellor shaft. On May 15, No. 3 Main Engine went out of commission for remainder of patrol because the studs holding the blower bull gear to upper crank shaft.

*ENCLOSURE (4)

%* Part VII on pages 18 and 19

— page 133 —
1943
U.S.S. FLUNGER (SS179) -
Sixth War Patrol.

had sheared, wrecking the gear. Similar parts could have been taken from No. 1 lain Engine but the job could not have been completed by the time we reached port.

3. Antenna trunks flooded ... and aggravated our already unsatisfactory transmitter performance.

4. Poppet valves are completely out of adjustment.

5. Trim and drain pumps: The spark plugs in the new trim and drain pump domes corroded out in a week. Twelve sets of spares will be carried until a better solution is found.

XI RADIO RECEPTION

Reception was normal until the antenna trunk dropped to 2000 ohms. The receivers were then connected to: SD antenna for satisfactory reception during darkness. However, during daylight the "SD radar was in operation and normal reception could not be obtained. Antenna trunk grounds made normal transmission impossible. The inability to load the regular transmitting antenna necessitated using a jury rig which consisted of connecting the transmitter output direct to SD radar antenna shoes. On the topside a portable lead was connected from one of the whips on the SD radar antenna to the forward port antenna. We then worked NTN. While on station the 8470, and 4235 bands were jammed by the JAFS. No results were obtained when using the SD radar antenna alone for transmitting.

LAST I ESSAGE SENT JEANNIE NANA

LAST I ESSAGE RECEIVED CONSULTACER 76

Serial 47 and 49 were missed while trying to transmit report of contact.

The invaluable 3J radar performed well during the entire patrol. Interference now thought internal, was noticed but the system was not materially affected. On several occasions rain squalls were reported as contacts. Radar contacted the convoy at 13600 yards, after visual contact had been lost for two hours. Radar gave its estimate of the size of the convoy as six or possibly seven ships, when convoy consisted of five medium-large freighters and two escort. The tracking doctrine was to report range, and bearing of that target which radar indicated was: nearest and largest. This provided maximum time for sweeping while tracking target.

The SD radar was satisfactory for entire patrol. However, it is hoped that an echo box for this equipment will be available for the next patrol to increase confidence in its operation.

-15-

— page 133 —
1943
U.S.S. FLUNGER (SS179) -
Sixth War Patrol.

had sheared, wrecking the gear. Similar parts could have been taken from No. 1 lain Engine but the job could not have been completed by the time we reached port.

3. Antenna trunks flooded ... and aggravated our already unsatisfactory transmitter performance.

4. Poppet valves are completely out of adjustment.

5. Trim and drain pumps: The spark plugs in the new trim and drain pump domes corroded out in a week. Twelve sets of spares will be carried until a better solution is found.

XI RADIO RECEPTION

Reception was normal until the antenna trunk dropped to 2000 ohms. The receivers were then connected to: SD antenna for satisfactory reception during darkness. However, during daylight the "SD radar was in operation and normal reception could not be obtained. Antenna trunk grounds made normal transmission impossible. The inability to load the regular transmitting antenna necessitated using a jury rig which consisted of connecting the transmitter output direct to SD radar antenna shoes. On the topside a portable lead was connected from one of the whips on the SD radar antenna to the forward port antenna. We then worked NTN. While on station the 8470, and 4235 bands were jammed by the JAFS. No results were obtained when using the SD radar antenna alone for transmitting.

LAST I ESSAGE SENT JEANNIE NANA

LAST I ESSAGE RECEIVED CONSULTACER 76

Serial 47 and 49 were missed while trying to transmit report of contact.

The invaluable 3J radar performed well during the entire patrol. Interference now thought internal, was noticed but the system was not materially affected. On several occasions rain squalls were reported as contacts. Radar contacted the convoy at 13600 yards, after visual contact had been lost for two hours. Radar gave its estimate of the size of the convoy as six or possibly seven ships, when convoy consisted of five medium-large freighters and two escort. The tracking doctrine was to report range, and bearing of that target which radar indicated was: nearest and largest. This provided maximum time for sweeping while tracking target.

The SD radar was satisfactory for entire patrol. However, it is hoped that an echo box for this equipment will be available for the next patrol to increase confidence in its operation.

-15-

— page 134 —
6/6/43
May 22, 1943

Subject: Sixth Var Patrol.
U.S.S. FLUGER (SS179) -

The SD radar did not indicate planes flying at low altitudes except when close in.
The underwater loop was of no use because the RF input coil had not been changed to match RFI's new frequency.

XII SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions were good and the JK and QC worked well. The D-24 Sonic gear developed a short in the fuse holder and the input filter choke opened. This gear although put back in commission was not used to track targets. No density layers were noted.

XIII HEALTH AND HABIT DILTITY

Food was excellent and an ice cream freezer will make it even better. Habitability was very good as there were only six all day dives. Health was normal; a few colds, one broken ear drum and one chanceroid.

XIV MILES STEAMED

Miles steamed enroute station 3100
Miles steamed on station 1150
Miles steamed returning from station 3150
Total miles steamed 7400

XV FUEL EXPENDED

Total fuel expended 84000

XVI FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

FUEL PROVISIONS PERSONNEL

10,000 45 days 25 days

XVII LIMITING ENDURANCE FACTOR

The expenditure of torpedoes terminated this patrol.

-16-

NICOLO, JUN (A)

— page 134 —
6/6/43
May 22, 1943

Subject: Sixth Var Patrol.
U.S.S. FLUGER (SS179) -

The SD radar did not indicate planes flying at low altitudes except when close in.
The underwater loop was of no use because the RF input coil had not been changed to match RFI's new frequency.

XII SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions were good and the JK and QC worked well. The D-24 Sonic gear developed a short in the fuse holder and the input filter choke opened. This gear although put back in commission was not used to track targets. No density layers were noted.

XIII HEALTH AND HABIT DILTITY

Food was excellent and an ice cream freezer will make it even better. Habitability was very good as there were only six all day dives. Health was normal; a few colds, one broken ear drum and one chanceroid.

XIV MILES STEAMED

Miles steamed enroute station 3100
Miles steamed on station 1150
Miles steamed returning from station 3150
Total miles steamed 7400

XV FUEL EXPENDED

Total fuel expended 84000

XVI FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

FUEL PROVISIONS PERSONNEL

10,000 45 days 25 days

XVII LIMITING ENDURANCE FACTOR

The expenditure of torpedoes terminated this patrol.

-16-

NICOLO, JUN (A)

— page 135 —
U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) -
Subject:  Sixth War Patrol.
XVIII Remarks
1. We believe this JAP convoy commander provided us an almost perfect example of how not to conduct ships through waters where enemy submarines are likely to be. Here are some of the things he did and did not do:
   (a) After he left vicinity of TRUK he steered a rhumb line, greatly simplifying interception once he had been detected on his line.(b) He used an unvarying simple 35° right-and-left-of-the-base-course zig zag plan with short legs that never carried him more than 350 yards off his base track.
   (c) He challenged us with AA and did not send an escort back to put us down. (d) After an attack his escorts dropped a few charges and let us up to peruse the convoy. (e) He did not take up-an evasive course at dark, or after attacks. (f) After he had been attacked at 0315 and after sighting us on his trail again at 0500 he did not bother to get a patrol plane to cover him. He kept his own aircraft on deck. (g) He made no sweeps over the horizon with his escorts. (h) He stopped a valuable ship near the torpedoed ASAKA, and then paraded this ship all around the area. (i) He took the gun crew off a ship that apparently could remain afloat from now on.

2. The Commanding Officer believes a small submersible can be moored submerged off some of the enemy's focal points to observe and make contact reports on departing ships. This is exactly the information our fast submarines need to intercept and sink them in ever greater numbers.

3. The performance of all hands left nothing to be desired. Radar, fire control, torpedo, sound, and gunnery personnel turned in beautiful jobs. Lieutenant (jg) W.L. SHITH's skill on the TDC was outstanding. He thought stright and fast and took appropriate action when seconds counted in the attack phase. Lieutenant A.W. PALM's unceasing and fruitful labor on the ship's fire control equipment accurate plotting, and able direction of the ship's guns on a battle surface were outstanding.

— page 135 —
U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) -
Subject:  Sixth War Patrol.
XVIII Remarks
1. We believe this JAP convoy commander provided us an almost perfect example of how not to conduct ships through waters where enemy submarines are likely to be. Here are some of the things he did and did not do:
   (a) After he left vicinity of TRUK he steered a rhumb line, greatly simplifying interception once he had been detected on his line.(b) He used an unvarying simple 35° right-and-left-of-the-base-course zig zag plan with short legs that never carried him more than 350 yards off his base track.
   (c) He challenged us with AA and did not send an escort back to put us down. (d) After an attack his escorts dropped a few charges and let us up to peruse the convoy. (e) He did not take up-an evasive course at dark, or after attacks. (f) After he had been attacked at 0315 and after sighting us on his trail again at 0500 he did not bother to get a patrol plane to cover him. He kept his own aircraft on deck. (g) He made no sweeps over the horizon with his escorts. (h) He stopped a valuable ship near the torpedoed ASAKA, and then paraded this ship all around the area. (i) He took the gun crew off a ship that apparently could remain afloat from now on.

2. The Commanding Officer believes a small submersible can be moored submerged off some of the enemy's focal points to observe and make contact reports on departing ships. This is exactly the information our fast submarines need to intercept and sink them in ever greater numbers.

3. The performance of all hands left nothing to be desired. Radar, fire control, torpedo, sound, and gunnery personnel turned in beautiful jobs. Lieutenant (jg) W.L. SHITH's skill on the TDC was outstanding. He thought stright and fast and took appropriate action when seconds counted in the attack phase. Lieutenant A.W. PALM's unceasing and fruitful labor on the ship's fire control equipment accurate plotting, and able direction of the ship's guns on a battle surface were outstanding.

— page 136 —
1715/8 0659/9 1903/9 2238/9 0246/10
Date: May 1943
Location: (Lat.) 10-18 N 12-24 N 14-29 N 14-29 N 14-29 N
    (Long.) 150-46 E 149-55 E 149-00 E 149-00 E 149-00 E
Number and Type Torpedoes 2 TPX 3 TNT 2 TPX 2 TPX 2 TNT
Fired on Each Attack 1 TNT 1 TPX 2 TNT

Hits: 2 4 3 2 2 duds
Number Sunk (Tonnage) 7390 7390 6000
Number Damaged or Probably Sunk (Tonnage) 7390 7390 6000
Type of target AK 2 AK's AK AP AK
Range 1600 2, 2200 700 2500 1275
T. of Attack: Foriscope (P) 20 20 20 20 20
Estimated Depth of Attack (ft) 20 20 20 20 20
Torpedo Depth Setting 12 12 12 12 10
Bore or Stern Shot 90°s 90°s 60°p to 102°p 90°p
Track Angle 90°s 90°s 75°p 104°p 90°p
Gyro Angle 0° 3 at 000 007 to 170 0
Estimated Target Speed 10.5 10.5 10.5 8 0
Firing Interval 15 s 128-13s 20 s 8 s 16 s 18 s
Spread - Amount and Kind Long Long None Long Long
Was Torpedo Performance Satisfactory? Yes Yes Yes* Yes Duds*

Remarks: * 11 torpedoes MK 14-34 with MK 16 heads. Attacks #3, #5, #6 and #7 were made against the same target.
    Attack #2 was made on 2 separate targets. The first three torpedoes fired at #1 target and one torpedo fired at #2 target.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 136 —
1715/8 0659/9 1903/9 2238/9 0246/10
Date: May 1943
Location: (Lat.) 10-18 N 12-24 N 14-29 N 14-29 N 14-29 N
    (Long.) 150-46 E 149-55 E 149-00 E 149-00 E 149-00 E
Number and Type Torpedoes 2 TPX 3 TNT 2 TPX 2 TPX 2 TNT
Fired on Each Attack 1 TNT 1 TPX 2 TNT

Hits: 2 4 3 2 2 duds
Number Sunk (Tonnage) 7390 7390 6000
Number Damaged or Probably Sunk (Tonnage) 7390 7390 6000
Type of target AK 2 AK's AK AP AK
Range 1600 2, 2200 700 2500 1275
T. of Attack: Foriscope (P) 20 20 20 20 20
Estimated Drift of Target 20 20 20 20 20
Torpedo Depth Setting 12 12 12 12 10
Bore or Stern Shot 90°s 90°s 60°p to 102°p 90°p
Track Angle 90°s 90°s 75°p 104°p 90°p
Gyro Angle 0° 3 at 000 007 to 170 0
Estimated Target Speed 10.5 10.5 10.5 8 0
Firing Interval 15 s 128-13s 20 s 8 s 16 s 18 s
Spread - Amount and Kind Long Long None Long Long
Was Torpedo Performance Satisfactory? Yes Yes Yes* Yes Duds*

Remarks: * 11 torpedoes MK 14-34 with MK 16 heads. Attacks #3, #5, #6 and #7 were made against the same target.
    Attack #2 was made on 2 separate targets. The first three torpedoes fired at #1 target and one torpedo fired at #2 target.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 137 —
1946/10
Date: 15-29 N
Location: 149-00 E
Number and Type Torpedoes
Fired on Each Attack: 1 TNT
Hits: 1
Number Sunk (Tonnage): ---
Number Damaged or Probably Sunk (Tonnage): ---
Type of Target: AK
Range: 1300
Type of Attack: Porispecope (P) : P
Surface (S) Night (N) Radar (R): BATTLE SURFACE
Estimated Draft of Target: 20
Torpedo Depth Satthine: 12
Bow or Stern Shot: Bow
Track Angle: 120 S
Estimated Target Speed: 0
Firing Interval: 0
Spread - Amount and Kind: ---
Was Torpedo Performance Satisfactory?: Yes *

Remarks:
Attack #7 was a battle surface on target damaged by torpedoes in attack #3, #5, and #6 - 180 rounds of 3"50 ammunition, 1000 rounds of 20 MM, and 100 rounds of 30 cal. ammunition were used.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 137 —
1946/10
Date: 15-29 N
Location: 149-00 E
Number and Type Torpedoes
Fired on Each Attack: 1 TNT
Hits: 1
Number Sunk (Tonnage): ---
Number Damaged or Probably Sunk (Tonnage): ---
Type of Target: AK
Range: 1300
Type of Attack: Porispecope (P) : P
Surface (S) Night (N) Radar (R): BATTLE SURFACE
Estimated Draft of Target: 20
Torpedo Depth Satthine: 12
Bow or Stern Shot: Bow
Track Angle: 120 S
Estimated Target Speed: 0
Firing Interval: 0
Spread - Amount and Kind: ---
Was Torpedo Performance Satisfactory?: Yes *

Remarks:
Attack #7 was a battle surface on target damaged by torpedoes in attack #3, #5, and #6 - 180 rounds of 3"50 ammunition, 1000 rounds of 20 MM, and 100 rounds of 30 cal. ammunition were used.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 138 —
1. The sixth war patrol of U.S.S. PLUNGER covered a period of twenty-nine days. Patrol was terminated due to expenditure of all torpedoes.

2. Contact was made with one five ship escorted convoy at 1618 on 8 May, six torpedo attacks and one gun attack being delivered against the convoy between that time and 0932 on 11 May. This series of attacks was marked by tenacity, aggressiveness and skill. Sixteen torpedoes were fired and twelve hits made for the excellent score of 75%.

3. On two occasions the Mk. 8 angle solver with longitudinal spread was used. This method of firing was employed because of extreme unreliability of PLUNGER's Mk. I T.D.C. in the past. There was no hesitation, however, in quickly shifting to the T.D.C. when an opportunity presented itself for firing which necessitated the use of small gyro angles.

On each firing the target's speed was accurately determined either by radar plot or by intelligent use of turn count. This together with favorable track angles and small gyro angles, made it practical to use reasonably small spreads.

After reaching a position for attack on the night of 10 May the Commanding Officer is to be commended for holding his fire when a last minute zig threw him into an unfavorable position. By pushing temptation to one side, valuable torpedoes were saved and ultimate success attained.

4. This is considered an outstanding patrol and the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew are congratulated on their exceptionally fine work.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 138 —
1. The sixth war patrol of U.S.S. PLUNGER covered a period of twenty-nine days. Patrol was terminated due to expenditure of all torpedoes.

2. Contact was made with one five ship escorted convoy at 1618 on 8 May, six torpedo attacks and one gun attack being delivered against the convoy between that time and 0932 on 11 May. This series of attacks was marked by tenacity, aggressiveness and skill. Sixteen torpedoes were fired and twelve hits made for the excellent score of 75%.

3. On two occasions the Mk. 8 angle solver with longitudinal spread was used. This method of firing was employed because of extreme unreliability of PLUNGER's Mk. I T.D.C. in the past. There was no hesitation, however, in quickly shifting to the T.D.C. when an opportunity presented itself for firing which necessitated the use of small gyro angles.

On each firing the target's speed was accurately determined either by radar plot or by intelligent use of turn count. This together with favorable track angles and small gyro angles, made it practical to use reasonably small spreads.

After reaching a position for attack on the night of 10 May the Commanding Officer is to be commended for holding his fire when a last minute zig threw him into an unfavorable position. By pushing temptation to one side, valuable torpedoes were saved and ultimate success attained.

4. This is considered an outstanding patrol and the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew are congratulated on their exceptionally fine work.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 139 —
5-4/A16-3
Serial 0136

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Comsubdiv 43 conf. 1tr
FB5-43/A16-3 Serial 082
dated May 24, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Sixth War Patrol - Comment on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments of Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.

2. This patrol was exceedingly well conducted and the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew are congratulated on a most successful and outstanding patrol.

ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 139 —
5-4/A16-3
Serial 0136

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Comsubdiv 43 conf. 1tr
FB5-43/A16-3 Serial 082
dated May 24, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Sixth War Patrol - Comment on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments of Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.

2. This patrol was exceedingly well conducted and the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew are congratulated on a most successful and outstanding patrol.

ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 140 —
1. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LUTCH. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division FORTY.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. FLIGHT (SS179), Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

Inclosure: (1) Subject Report.
(2) Track Charts (2).

1. Inclosure (1), covering the Seventh War Patrol of this vessel conducted in the Sea of Japan during the period June 16th to July 20, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

Y.H. BASS.

Y.H. BASS.
53301

— page 140 —
1. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LUTCH. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division FORTY.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. FLIGHT (SS179), Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

Inclosure: (1) Subject Report.
(2) Track Charts (2).

1. Inclosure (1), covering the Seventh War Patrol of this vessel conducted in the Sea of Japan during the period June 16th to July 20, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

Y.H. BASS.

Y.H. BASS.
53301

— page 141 —
1. SUBJECT: Report of J.S.S. FLUFF, Seventh Tar Patrol.

2. (A) PROLOGUE:
   - May 22, 1945: Arrived Final from Sixth Tar Patrol. Lay 20 - June 9: Refit by Submarine Base. To 7: JT added to fuel system. Copper Vent risers on Nos. 1 and 7. JT replaced with steel risers. Four main engines overhauled. Removed antenna trunk with straight type. Added 20 in mount on deck aft. Moved. Sounded. June 10, 14, and 15: training exercises, including night runs on 14th. June 15, 17: Loaded. Removed 5" gun. (Installed 4" gun at highway).

(E) MARITIME:
   - June 18: 1500 V. Underway from Submarine Base, PHIL, pursuant to Consubpac OORD No. 112-48. PC 549 joined at buoys. 1535 V. dived to test depth. 1555 surfaced. 1900 V. escort departed. Shrouded area, via bilgeway, zigging when visibility was good. Conducted fire control drill and training dives daily.
   - June 19: 0735 V. Sighted patrol plane 6 miles away, low. To radar contact. Exchanged recognition signals.
   - June 20: 0948 V. Sighted patrol plane 6 miles away. Exchanged recognition signals.
   - June 21: 0645 V. Radar contact on plane at 10 miles, plane opened out to 15 miles. Over sea Mil.
   - June 22: 0316 V. Approaching Hida, zigging at full speed under air search. 0745 V. Hoorad alongside tender. Fuels. Co moored installation of 4" gun.
   - June 23: 1255 V. Trimmed down alongside dock to check for air leaks. To leaks.

-1-

— page 141 —
1. SUBJECT: Report of J.S.S. FLUFF, Seventh Tar Patrol.

2. (A) PROLOGUE:
   - May 22, 1945: Arrived Final from Sixth Tar Patrol. Lay 20 - June 9: Refit by Submarine Base. To 7: JT added to fuel system. Copper Vent risers on Nos. 1 and 7. JT replaced with steel risers. Four main engines overhauled. Removed antenna trunk with straight type. Added 20 in mount on deck aft. Moved. Sound tested. June 10, 14, and 15: training exercises, including night runs on 14th. June 15, 17: Loaded. Removed 5" gun. (Installed 4" gun at highway).

(E) MARITIME:
   - June 18: 1500 V. Underway from Submarine Base, PALI, pursuant to Consubpac OORD No. 112-48. PC 549 joined at buoys. 1525 V. dived to test depth. 1555 surfaced. 1900 V. escort departed. Shrouded area, via bilgeway, zigging when visibility was good. Conducted fire control drill and training dives daily.
   - June 19: 0735 V. Sighted patrol plane 6 miles away, low. To radar contact. Exchanged recognition signals.
   - June 20: 0948 V. Sighted patrol plane 6 miles away. Exchanged recognition signals.
   - June 21: 0645 V. Radar contact on plane at 10 miles, plane opened out to 15 miles. Over sea Mil.
   - June 22: 0316 V. Approaching Hikari, zigging at full speed under air search. 0745 V. Hoorad alongside tender. Fuels. Co moored installation of 4" gun.
   - June 23: 1255 V. Trimmed down alongside dock to check for air leaks. To leaks.

-1-

— page 142 —
2000 Y Underway for area, in company with SHIL and LROT under air screen.
1355 Y Fired 7 rounds from 4" gun at torpedo target. Gun and foundation satisfactory.
2000 Y Lost sight of SHIL and LRC. Hailing two engines
spaced, about 12.5 knots.
Smooth seas, overcast skies, and much fog were encountered
enroute TOKOP STRAIT.

July 1
2047 K Sighted object about 4000 yards away, ten degrees on port bow, 280 true. Stopped. Coaxied radar on target and looked him over. The SC could not pick him up. Hada him out as petrol boat with trial lines, possibly an OTCH torpedo boat. Avoided. (Contact #1).

July 2
0515 I Lookout reported periscope on port quarter. Turned away and dived to 140 foot. Doolittle, not considered contact. 0750 I Fog closed in. 3.3faced. Coaxied for STRAIT. 0710 manned SD, land at 25 miles. 0756 established position with SD and fathometer. Put on 4 engines and by 0910 we word through TROOP. Smooth seas and surface running in fog weather had put us through the STRAIT a full day earlier than we had expected to be. Commenced surface patrol inside WULIUS. 0949 I Fog cleared. Land in sight on both sides of the STRAIT. Dived for periscope patrol off UURFU 10. Loutined all torpedoes.
1226 I Fog closed in, surfaced.
Had two nights and two and a half daylight periods to reach L PRECUST STRAIT (300 miles) on schedule. The nights were about 6 hours long. Not moving without air patrols were present north of HOMIID, located west patrolling at one engine speed. Visibility variable.

July 3
More fog. Ran on the surface. Obtained sun line in afternoon. We were in position to pass through L PRECUST STRAIT tonight but were scheduled for tomorrow night. From PRECUST to area was 420 miles. It was 600 miles to the best part of area, off DOCO ISLAND. Going through on schedule would allow about 48 hours before we were to attack. Going through a day early would enable us to reach best spot, to make better

— page 142 —
2000 Y Underway for area, in company with SHIL and LROT under air screen.
1355 Y Fired 7 rounds from 4" gun at torpedo target. Gun and foundation satisfactory.
2000 Y Lost sight of SHIL and LRC. Hailing two engines
spaced, about 12.5 knots.
Smooth seas, overcast skies, and much fog were encountered
enroute TOKOP STRAIT.

July 1
2047 K Sighted object about 4000 yards away, ten degrees
on port bow, 280 true. Stopped. Coaxied radar on target and
looked him over. The SC could not pick him up. Hada him out
as patrol boat with tri lines, possibly an OTOH torpedo boat.
Avoided. (Contact #1).

July 2
0515 I Lookout reported periscope on port quarter. Turned
away and dived to 140 foot. Doolittle, not considered contact.
0550 I Fog closed in. 3.3faced. Meaced for STRAIT. 0710
manned SD, land at 25 miles. 0756 established position with SD
and fathometer. Put on 4 engines and by 0910 we word through
STRAIT. Smooth seas and surface running in fog weather had
put us through the STRAIT a full day earlier than we had expected
to be. Commenced surface patrol inside STRAIT.
0949 I Fog cleared. Land in sight on both sides of the
STRAIT. Dived for periscope patrol off UURFU 10. Loutined
all torpedoes.
1226 I Fog closed in, surfaced.
Had two nights and two and a half daylight periods to reach
L PRECISE STRAIT (300 miles) on schedule. The nights were
about 6 hours long. Not moving without air patrols were present
north of HOMIID, hadd was patrolling at one engine speed.
Visibility variable.

July 3
More fog. Ran on the surface. Obtained sun line in after-
noon. We were in position to pass through L PRECISE STRAIT
tonight but were scheduled for tomorrow night. From PRECISE
to area was 420 miles. It was 600 miles to the best part of
area, off DOCO ISLAND. Going through on schedule would allow
about 48 hours before we were to attack. Going through a day
early would enable us to reach best spot, to make better

— page 143 —
0000 I.  Land radar contact on SJ, bearing 251, 25,500 yards. This shot. We were a little too far south. But with SJ ranges on the land and an occasional sounding the navigation was not difficult. Went to battle sections, rigged ship for collision, and went through at 17 knots. The water was flat calm and highly phosphorescent. Many large fish approached the ship leaving wakes clearly visible. They came in on all tracks, singly, and in well spread salvoes.

0224 I.  Radar contact bearing 046, 10,500 yards. (Contact #2). He was scouting larger than a bu. He passed aboard at 5000 yards on course 110, speed 10.

0230 I.  Transit of "Union" 3rd completed. Secured from collision. It was getting trilliant. Still foggy.

0235 I.  Divod fast on radar or chart, 246 relative, 1200 yards. (Contact #3). He was in a good position to get a good look at the ship.

0340 I.  Sound picked up propellers bearing 086 true. (Contact #4). He was headed west. Could not see him in periscope with about 2000 yards of visibility.

0630 I.  Still foggy. Surface, proceeding to area. Visibility spotty. Used 3D interdictor.

0912 I.  Sichted small USS. On 2d bearing 221, 7 miles. Divod. (Contact #5). Armored fire control party. He was headed for FLORISS, probably from VLJUTOSCH.

1019 I.  Another small 2d on USS. Freighter sighted standing down from the north. (Contact #6).

catcher cleared. Reached submerged, watched for planes and patrols. Took sea area at 1232 I.  Surface, proceeding to area, crossing estimated shipping lanes to establish 2d routes. Fog soon closed in again.

1535 I.  Radar contact bearing 300, 10,500 yards. (Contact #7). Everyone had been impressed with importance of avoiding detection. Ship was turned away and contact lost before his course and speed were determined. He was on the VLJUTOSCH.

— page 143 —
0000 I.  Land radar contact on SJ, bearing 251, 25,500 yards. This shot. We were a little too far south. But with SJ ranges on the land and an occasional sounding the navigation was not difficult. Next to battle sections, rigged ships for collision, and went through at 17 knots. The water was flat calm and highly phosphorescent. Many large fish approached the ship leaving wakes clearly visible. They came in on all tracks, singly, and in well spread salvoes.

0224 I.  Radar contact bearing 046, 10,500 yards. (Contact #2). He was scuttling larger than a bu. He passed aboard at 5000 yards on course 110, speed 10.

0230 I.  Transit of "Union" 3rd completed. Secured from collision. It was getting trilliant. Still foggy.

0235 I.  Divod fast on radar or chart, 246 relative, 1200 yards. (Contact #3). He was in a good for the 3rd.

0343 I.  Sound picked up propellers bearing 086 true. (Contact #4). He was headed west. Could not see him in periscope with about 2000 yards of visibility.

0633 I.  Still foggy. Surface, proceeding to area. Visibility spotty. Used 3D interdictor.

0912 I.  Sichted small USS. On 2d bearing 221, 7 miles. Divod. (Contact #5). Armored fire control party. He was headed for FLORISS, probably from VLJUTOSCH.

1019 I.  Another small 2d on USS. Freighter sighted standing down from the north. (Contact #6).

catcher cleared. Received submerged, watched for planes and patrols. Took sea area at 1232 I.  Surface, proceeding to area, crossing estimated shipping lanes to establish 2d routes. Fog soon closed in again.

1535 I.  Radar contact bearing 300, 10,500 yards. (Contact #7). Everyone had been impressed with importance of avoiding detection. Ship was turned away and contact lost before his course and speed were determined. He was on the VLJUTOSCH.

— page 144 —
1. June 24
1. 1500 Y Underway for area, in company with SEAL and LPO under air screen.
2. 1555 Y Fired 7 rounds from 4" gun at torpedo target. Gun and foundation satisfactory.
3. 2000 Y Lost sight of SEAL and LRC. Hiding two engines, about 1.5 knots.
4. Smooth seas, overcast skies, and much fog were encountered enroute TOKORO STRAIT.

July 1
1. 2047 N Sighted object about 4000 yards away, ten degrees on port bow, 280 true. Stopped. Coaxied radar on target and looked him over. The SC could not pick him up. Made him out as petrol boat with trial lines, possibly an OTOH torpedo boat. Avoided. (Contact #1).

July 2
1. 0515 I Looked reported periscope on port quarter. Turned away and clived to 140 foot. Doultful, not considered contact.
2. 0550 I Fog closed in. Sirafaced. Coaxied for STRAIT. 0710 manned SD, land at 25 miles. Sirafaced. Coaxied for STRAIT

— page 145 —
1. 2000 Y Underway for area, in company with S.S. L.P. and L.P.O. under air screen.
2. 1355 Y Fired 7 rounds from 4" gun at target. Gun and foundation satisfactory.
3. 2000 Y Lost sight of S.S.L. and L.P.C. Taking two engine spec, about 12.5 knots.
4. Smooth seas, overcast skies, and much fog were encountered enroute STOROFU S.S.L.P.T.

July 1
1. 2047 K Sighted object about 4000 yards away, ten degrees on port bow, 280 true. Stopped. Coached radar on target and looked him over. The S.S could not pick him up. Had him out as patrol boat with trial lines, possibly an OTO.1 torpedo boat. Avoided. (Contact #1).

July 2
1. 0515 I Lookout reported periscope on port quarter. Turned away and dived to 140 feet. Doubtful, not considered contact.
2. 0550 I Fog closed in. Surface. Stopped for ST.L.P.T. 0710 manned SD, land at 23 miles. 0756 established position with SD and fathometer. Put on 4 engines and by 0910 we were through STOROFU. Smooth seas and surface running in fog weather had put us through the ST.L.P.T. a full day earlier than we had expected to be. Commenced surface patrol inside NULI.S.
3. 0949 I Fog cleared. Land in sight on both sides of the ST.L.P.T. Dived for periscope patrol off UURFU 10. Loutinca all torpedoes.
4. 1226 I Fog closed in, surface.
5. Had two nights and two and a half daylight periods to reach L.P.R.C.S.S.L.P.T. (350 miles) on schedule. The nights were about 6 hours long. Not knowing whether air patrols were present north of HONNIDO, headed west patrolling at one engine speed. Visibility variable.

July 3
1. More fog. Ran on the surface. Obtained sun line in afternoon. We were in position to pass through L.P.R.C.S.S.L.P.T. tonight but were scheduled for tomorrow night. From L.R.C.S.S.L.P.T. to area was 420 miles. It was 600 miles to the best part of area, off DOGO ISLAND. Going through on schedule would allow about 48 hours before we were to attack. Going through a day early would enable us to reach best spot, to make better

— page 145 —
1. 2000 Y Underway for area, in company with S.S. L.P. and L.P.O. under air screen.
2. 1355 Y Fired 7 rounds from 4" gun at target. Gun and foundation satisfactory.
3. 2000 Y Lost sight of S.S.L. and L.P.C. Taking two engine spec, about 12.5 knots.
4. Smooth seas, overcast skies, and much fog were encountered enroute STOROFU S.S.L.P.T.

July 1
1. 2047 K Sighted object about 4000 yards away, ten degrees on port bow, 280 true. Stopped. Coached radar on target and looked him over. The S.S could not pick him up. Had him out as patrol boat with trial lines, possibly an OTO.1 torpedo boat. Avoided. (Contact #1).

July 2
1. 0515 I Lookout reported periscope on port quarter. Turned away and dived to 140 feet. Doubtful, not considered contact.
2. 0550 I Fog closed in. Surfaced. Raised for ST.L.P.T. 0710 manned SD, land at 23 miles. 0756 established position with SD and fathometer. Put on 4 engines and by 0910 we were through STOROFU. Smooth seas and surface running in fog weather had put us through the ST.L.P.T. a full day earlier than we had expected to be. Commenced surface patrol inside NULI.S.
3. 0949 I Fog cleared. Land in sight on both sides of the ST.L.P.T. Dived for periscope patrol off UURFU 10. Loutinca all torpedoes.
4. 1225 I Fog closed in, surfaced.
5. Had two nights and two and a half daylight periods to reach L.P.R.C.S.S.L.P.T. (350 miles) on schedule. The nights were about 6 hours long. Not knowing whether air patrols were present north of HOMI.DO, headed west patrolling at one engine spec. Visibility variable.

July 3
1. More fog. Ran on the surface. Obtained sun line in afternoon. We were in position to pass through L.P.R.O.S.S.S.L.P.T. tonight but were scheduled for tomorrow night. From L.P.R.O.S.S. to area was 420 miles. It was 600 miles to the best part of area, off DOGO ISLAND. Going through on schedule would allow about 48 hours before we were to attack. Going through a day early would enable us to reach best spot, to make better

— page 146 —
0005 I Land radar contact on SJ, bearing 25, 25, 500 yards. This stood we wore a little too far south. But with SJ ranges on the land and an occasional sounding the navigation was not difficult. Went to battle stations, rigged ship for collision, and went through at 17 knots. The water was flat calm and highly phosphorescent. Many large fish approached the ship leaving wakes clearly visible. They came in on all tracks, simply, and in well spread salvoes.

0224 I Radar contact bearing 046, 10, 500 yards. (Contact #2). He was scouting larger than a DD. He passed aboard at 5000 yards on course 110, speed 10.

0240 I Transit of "Union" completed. Secured from collision. It was getting visible, still foggy.

0255 I Divod fast on radar or radar, 546 relative, 1200 yards. (Contact #5). He never saw this contact but sounded tracked him. He was headed for 5th.

0545 I Sound picked up propeller bearing 086 true. (Contact #4). He was headed west. Could not see him in port-scope with about 2000 yards of visibility.

0653 I Still foggy. Surface, proceeding to area. Visibility spotty. Used 50 interdictor.

0912 I Sighted small USS. or 2P. It bearing 221, 7 miles. Divod. (Contact #5). Transited fire control party. He was headed for 5th.

1019 I Another small 2P or USS. freighter sighted standing down from the north. (Contact #6).

CATCHER CLEARED. Received submerged, watched for planes and patrols. None seen and at 1325 I Surface, proceeding to area, crossing estimated shipping lanes to establish 2P routes. Fog soon closed in again.

1535 I Radar contact bearing 500, 10, 500 yards. (Contact #7). Everyone had been impressed with importance of avoiding detection. Ship was turned away and contact lost before his course and space were determined. He was on the VLWITCTC.

— page 146 —
0005 I Land radar contact on SJ, bearing 25, 25, 500 yards. This stood we wore a little too far south. But with SJ ranges on the land and an occasional sounding the navigation was not difficult. Went to battle stations, rigged ship for collision, and went through at 17 knots. The water was flat calm and highly phosphorescent. Many large fish approached the ship leaving wakes clearly visible. They came in on all tracks, simply, and in well spread salvoes.

0224 I Radar contact bearing 046, 10, 500 yards. (Contact #2). He was scouting larger than a DD. He passed aboard at 5000 yards on course 110, speed 10.

0240 I Transit of "Union" completed. Secured from collision. It was getting visible, still foggy.

0255 I Divod fast on radar or radar, 546 relative, 1200 yards. (Contact #5). He never saw this contact but sounded tracked him. He was headed for 5th.

0545 I Sound picked up propeller bearing 086 true. (Contact #4). He was headed west. Could not see him in port-scope with about 2000 yards of visibility.

0653 I Still foggy. Surface, proceeding to area. Visibility spotty. Used 50 interdictor.

0912 I Sighted small USS. or 2P. It bearing 221, 7 miles. Divod. (Contact #5). Transited fire control party. He was headed for 5th.

1019 I Another small 2P or USS. freighter sighted standing down from the north. (Contact #6).

CATCHER CLEARED. Received submerged, watched for planes and patrols. None seen and at 1325 I Surface, proceeding to area, crossing estimated shipping lanes to establish 2P routes. Fog soon closed in again.

1535 I Radar contact bearing 500, 10, 500 yards. (Contact #7). Everyone had been impressed with importance of avoiding detection. Ship was turned away and contact lost before his course and space were determined. He was on the VLWITCTC.

— page 147 —
2122 I Radar contact, bearing 155, 7400 yards. (Contact #5). He was on course 050, spot near 17 knots. Radar thought this light be a DD.

July 5
Proceeding to area on the surface in spotty visibility. Smooth seas. ...we were west of a spotty line and the absence of contacts was interrupted to mean that they were using either the direct route from radar or the indirect route.

July 6
0545 I Radar contact bearing 285, 10,000 yards. (Contact #5). Target was on course 115, speed 15, on SHIS-1-IC-11-route.

Eighteen hours hence we could start shooting. Dropped this target when it was determined he would reach port about dark. RACED toward estimated best spot, patrolling across the lanes as they converged northwest of 3000 ISLAND. Foggy but 37 working well. To other contacts.

0700 I Intercepted assigned area.

July 7
0000 I "Hostilities" cleared. ...are now to attack all suitable targets and disperse them in 16 hours. Fog. Visibility 500 yards to 5 miles. Crossed the expected heavy shipping lane.

1150 I Sighted small freighter coming out of the fog, range near 10,000 yards. Pivoted to avoid tang sighted. (Contact #10). Could not pick up target in position.

1202 I Surface to pick up target. Put all engines on propulsion. 1200 sighted in bearing 150 true with angle on the bow, about 150 S. ...got around at 17 knots. Keeping him at maximum range consistent with his contact.

1246 I Dived dead ahead of target, range 13,000 yards. He was on course 215, speed 0.5 knots (used makeshift height 85 feet). (Torpedo attack #1). Raced to straight to 70 shots on 70. 1345 with 1000 yard range, fired to straight to 70 shots on 70. P tracked with 1k 8 angle solver firing bearings, the first at his bridge and second just abaft the stack. Both torpedoes ran apparently hot, straight, and normal. Sound reported a "poosh" but later said it did not sound like a dud. Then no hits were observed, matched guns for white light method and fired third

— page 147 —
2122 I Radar contact, bearing 155, 7400 yards. (Contact #5). He was on course 050, spot near 17 knots. Radar thought this light be a DD.

July 5
Proceeding to area on the surface in spotty visibility. Smooth seas. ...we were west of spotty shipping lanes and the absence of contacts was interrupted to mean that they were using either the direct route from mid-OC to SHIS-1 (C-11) routes further east.

July 6
0545 I Radar contact bearing 288, 10,000 yards. (Contact #5). Target was on course 115, speed 15, on SHIS-1 (C-11) route.

Eighteen hours later we could start shooting. Dropped this target when it was determined he would reach port about dark. RACED toward estimated best spot, patrolling across the lanes as they converged northwest of DOC 1 (LHD). Foggy but 37 working well. To other contacts.

0700 I Intercepted assigned area.

July 7
0000 I "Hostilities" cleared. ...are now to attack all suitable targets and disperse them in 16 hours. Fog. Visibility 500 yards to 5 miles. Crossed the expected heavy shipping lane.

1150 I Sighted small freighter coming out of the fog, range near 10,000 yards. Pivoted to course to sighted. (Contact #10). Could not pick up target in position.

1202 I Surface to pick up target. Put all engines on propulsion. 1200 sighted in bearing 150 true with angle on the bow, about 150 S. ...got around at 17 knots. Keeping him at maximum range consistent with his contact.

1246 I Dived dead ahead of target, range 13,000 yards. He was on course 215, speed 0.5 knots (used makeshift height 85 feet). (Torpedo attack #1). Raced to straight to 70 shots on 70. 1345 with 1000 yard range, fired to straight to 70 shots on 70. P tracked with 1k 8 angle solver firing bearings, the first at his bridge and second just abaft the stack. Both torpedoes ran apparently hot, straight, and normal. Sound reported a "poosh" but later said it did not sound like a dud. Then no hits were observed, matched guns for white light method and fired third

— page 148 —
1450 I Battle surfaced at 4800 yards with target about 100 on our starboard bow. (Cum attack 4). There was no wind and we were making very low speed. The smoke from our first shot so obscured the target that subsequent shots were unduly delayed. In the meantime, target opened up with a 2" gun. His first shot landed 1500 yards on our port bow. The second 1000 yards away, and the third about 500 yards ahead. The 2" of first shots, one of which was seen to fall just short. The situation was not what we were looking for. Divd. Opened out to 9000 yards and at 1524 surfaced. Put all engines on propulsion and target astern to open the range for an end around. Target opened up with his gun but he was far short. He now headed for the nearest land and transmitted on 300 kts. He continued to fire his gun about every minute even when he could not see us. kept target at minimum range for sight contact. We were well forward of his beam when at 1754 I SD radar contact at 7 miles, then 6. (aircraft contact i'l). Lookout sighted plane. Divd to 140 feet and changed course 120 degrees. 1757 I First bomb, close. 1800 second bomb not quite so close. Sea had been mirror like and the swirl apparently persisted. Bomb put bridge speaker out and unlocked one exhaust.

— page 148 —
1450 I Battle surfaced at 4800 yards with target about 100 on our starboard bow. (Cum attack 4). There was no wind and we were making very low speed. The smoke from our first shot so obscured the target that subsequent shots were unduly delayed. In the meantime, target opened up with a 2" gun. His first shot landed 1500 yards on our port bow. The second 1000 yards away, and the third about 500 yards ahead. The 2" of first shots, one of which was seen to fall just short. The situation was not what we were looking for. Divd. Opened out to 9000 yards and at 1524 surfaced. Put all engines on propulsion and target astern to open the range for an end around. Target opened up with his gun but he was far short. He now headed for the nearest land and transmitted on 300 kts. He continued to fire his gun about every minute even when he could not see us. kept target at minimum range for sight contact. We were well forward of his beam when at 1754 I SD radar contact at 7 miles, then 6. (aircraft contact i'l). Lookout sighted plane. Divd to 140 feet and changed course 120 degrees. 1757 I First bomb, close. 1800 second bomb not quite so close. Sea had been mirror like and the swirl apparently persisted. Bomb put bridge speaker out and unlocked one exhaust.

— page 149 —
2017 I. Surfaced, 10°00' south of the coast of the United States. The submarine was lying on a 100° gradient down to 150 feet.

July 8
"Torpedo the lanes north of 1000 until 0900, then the cross roads of the NEGL-JOSEPH, 100-SEISMA and IAL-TUR-SHI. 0-0-SHI routes. Visibility varied between 500 yards and 10 miles. 5° was working well. Patrols on the surface until 1340 I. Sighted plane at long range. (aircraft contact #2). Dived to 140 feet and changed course 90°.

1734 I. Surfaced in order to reach desired position for patrol northeast of 1000 by dawn 9th. Proceeded down the SHISHI-1000 route.

July 9
0021 I. Sighted SHURA SHI-LIGHT.

0407 I. Dived northeast of 1000. North wind brought whitecaps and high visibility to give us excellent conditions for a periscope patrol in this likely spot. Closed the tip of 1000 until we were sure ships could not pass inside us without being sighted. 10° patrols, no planes, until 1841 I. Sighted smoke bearing 099. (Contact 111). Bearing changed to right. Closed his track at best speed on course 160. 1910 5000 ton tanker in sight on NEGL-SHI. About 1940 target passed ahead at 6000 yards. Sun had set at 1910. No was 15° miles from port, and close in to the beach. A third of a moon would make it a bright night in 1000. The target still in sight with periscope at 2000 but if we were to get in at all we had to surface soon.

2000 I. Surfaced to look the situation over. Target was in plain sight without binoculars. 10° probably were in plain sight from the beach. 2005 dive.

2015 I. Surfaced, put 3 engines on propulsion and one on charge, course 160, to overhaul target. The target was in sight at a 5° range of 10,000 yards. The high visibility would require a long one around which was impossible before he entered port.

215 I. Radar contact bearing 357, range 4000 in good visibility. (Contact 112). With nothing in sight, turned away. 31 operator was sure this was not a false contact.

-6-

— page 149 —
2017 I. Surfaced, 10°00' south of the coast of the United States. The ship was in the vicinity of the coast of the United States. The

— page 150 —
2140 sighted small patrol or fishing boat bearing 275 near the moon streak, range about 5000 yards. Radar could not pick him up. Plot showed he was stopped or nearly stopped. Went on around him. He could never be a U.S. after losing his astern made a radical change of course just in case.

July 10
Proceeding to a patrol spot northwest of SADO ISLAND on the IIC-ISIS-ISLAND route. Sighted several stationary white lights, some thought to be blinking, along the coast of SADO. Possibly 1. ding lights on air fields.

0333 I. Dive. High visibility with white caps.

1005 I. Sighted smoke and lasts bearing 082, 14,000 yards, with a small port angle on the bow, apparently a route from IIC-ISIS. (Contact 413). We were in perfect position until he made a navigational change of course of 700 to the left, to head down the coast of SADO. He closed him at 8 knots; the minimum range was over 6000 yards. Could not surface here. This was the last target in our assigned area. Our orders required departure of area at midnight tonight.

2000 I. Surface. Headed northwest to open coast. Expected to run on surface tomorrow and close INSIDE over night for a periscope patrol during one daylight period on the OLYMPUS. The intent of our orders was to clear out fast, but felt this delay warranted.

July 11
Proceeding northward on surface.

1117 I. Sighted possible smoke. Closed. To contact.

about noon when fog closed in decided to move into the coast of KOMITSU north of OLYMPUS ISLAND for night and day in this likely area. 1245 o/c accordingly.

1622 I. Fog cleared. We were 60 miles off OLYMPUS. Dived.

1655 I. Surface.

2135 I. Sighted light on north end of OLYMPUS ISLAND.

Fartrolled up coast passing NOSUIS. SAD IS miles ahead. Many white lights almost evenly spaced along coast. All navigational lights were exhibiting normal characteristics.

July 12
0207 I. Radar contact bearing 021, 5000 yards. (Contact 414). (Attack 15). Put all engines on propulsion and tracked target. Radar placed up a second astern of the first, and label.

-7-

— page 152 —
1942 I. Submerged. Rigged ship for collision while transitting the "unlined" portion.
   1. 110 I to 115 I. Heard echo ranging (or a fathometer) at second interval on 18 ncs from two sources, one or either quarter. Nothing sighted. (Contacts #1 and 20).
   2. 1500 I. Exact time not recorded, passed a small float buoy carrying a vertical six foot re-a vitin two small red pennants (or rags) near its tip. It was thought to be anchored. Latitude 45-45N. Longitude 142-00S. Several similar buoys, considered fishing buoys, but without pennants had been seen adrift in the S.S.C. D.J.P.
   3. 1324 I. Then almost through S.T.L.I.T. sighted a large ship bearing 165, 6000 yards, near the south side of the S.T.L.I.T. (Contact #21). Sent to 2/5 speed to keep him in sight as long as possible. Considered that he was probably USS.I.L. but thought he might be a J.P.AV headed for P.L. I.S. I.U. from S.H.C. O.S.H.I

— page 152 —
1942 I. Submerged. Rigged ship for collision while transitting the "unlined" portion.
   1. 110 I to 115 I. Heard echo ranging (or a fathometer) at second interval on 18 ncs from two sources, one or either quarter. Nothing sighted. (Contacts #1 and 20).
   2. 1500 I. Exact time not recorded, passed a small float buoy carrying a vertical six foot re-a vitin two small red pennants (or rags) near its tip. It was thought to be anchored. Latitude 45-45N. Longitude 142-00S. Several similar buoys, considered fishing buoys, but without pennants had been seen adrift in the S.S.C. D.J.P.
   3. 1324 I. Then almost through S.T.L.I.T. sighted a large ship bearing 165, 600 yards, near the south side of the S.T.L.I.T. (Contact #21). Sent to 2/5 speed to keep him in sight as long as possible. Considered that he was probably USS.L.I.T. but thought he might be a J.P.A.V. headed for P.L.I.T.S.I.U. from S.H.C. O.S.H.I

— page 155 —
1. SUBJECT: REPORT OF U.S.S. FLUGER, Seventh War Patrol.

(F) SUBJECT: U.S.S. FLUGER

| NO. | DATE    | TIME    | LOCATION    | TYPE(S) | ALT. | COORD. | SIGNATURE | DATE | TIME | LOCATION

— page 155 —
1. SUBJECT: REPORT OF U.S.S. FLUGER, Seventh War Patrol.

(F) SUBJECT: U.S.S. FLUGER

| NO. | DATE    | TIME    | LOCATION    | TYPE(S) | ALT. | COORD. | SIGNATURE | DATE | TIME | LOCATION

— page 159 —
1. Tracked with radar on surface. Drove to 35. Saw target in periscope and went to 57. Used parisopoe bearings and generated images. Fired straight bow salutes on 90 S under with 18 single solver firing bearing, longitudinal spread.

| Tracked | Target | Drove | Fired |
|||-------|-------|
| 90S    | 12'     | 12'   | 12'   |
| 90S    | 12'     | 12'   | 12'   |
| 12'

— page 159 —
1. Tracked with radar on surface. Dived to 35'. Saw target in periscope and went to 57'. Used parisopoe bearings and generated images. Fired straight bow salutes on 90 S under with 18 single solver firing bearing, longitudinal spread.

| Tracked | Dived | 90S | 90S | 90S | 90S |
||-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Track | Single | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| Target | 35'  | 12' | 12' | 12' | 12' |
| Power | -    | -   | -   | -   | -   |
| Hit or | Miss | Hit | Miss | Miss | Miss |
| Miss   | No   | No | No | No | No |
| Miss  | 14-30 | 14-30 | 14-30 | 14-30 | 14-30 |
| Miss  | 22-77 | 24-10 | 24-10 | 24-10 | 24-10 |
| Miss  | 0-1  | 0-1  | 0-1  | 0-1  | 0-1  |
| Miss  | 15-75 | 15-75 | 15-75 | 15-75 | 15-75 |
| Miss  | 11 magnetic and contact | Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss |
| Miss  | Contact | Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss |
| Miss  | 16  | 16  | 16  | 16  | 16  |
| Miss  | 15-97 | 15-97 | 15-97 | 15-97 | 15-97 |
| Miss  | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Miss  | 0  | 10" | 10" | 10" | 10" |
| Miss  | 11 Longitudinal | 11 Longitudinal | 11 Longitudinal | 11 Longitudinal | 11 Longitudinal |
| Miss  | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm |
| Miss  | 7    | 7    | 7    | 7    | 7    |
| Miss  | 7    | 7    | 7    |

— page 159 —
1. Tracked with radar on surface. Dived to 35'. Saw target in periscope and went to 57'. Used parisopoe bearings and generated images. Fired straight bow salutes on 90 S under with 18 single solver firing bearing, longitudinal spread.

| Tracked | Dived | Radar | Periscope | Bearing | Image | Sender | Target |
||-------|-------|||-------|||
| 90S    | 12'  |       |           |         |       |        |         |
| 12'    |       |       |           |         |

— page 161 —
2000 volts across the condenser. This casualty is a repeater. Combined efforts of ship, Base, and Yard had previously failed to uncover cause.

The 4255 series was jammed. Despatch was finally cleared by overriding interference at the best hour for transmission (about 1500 GMT, in vicinity of [MILITARY: location]).

Receiving tests on 115, 9090, and 125, 1500 sec. at 1000, 1200, and 1800 GMT were conducted as directed. Signal strength was zero except at 1800, July 15, when 9000 was received 52 and 33, readability poor. No serials were missed. Both our messages were acknowledged.

(1) RADAR

SD radar gave satisfactory operation during the entire patrol except for following casualties: (1) resistor 106 burned out due to shorted 8014 's. (2) condenser 256 and V215 burned out, caused by switching IC motor generators without securing SD. The SD proved very helpful as a navigational aid in passing through ENTORQUE and ENTOUS STATIONS. On one occasion ISHIHI SIT..., elevation 5636 feet, was picked up at 54 miles.

SD radar constantly lost for patrol was as follows: (1) broken lead on 2302; apparently caused by vibration. (2) 35 burned out due to short caused by piece of excess solder. (3) Thermotron blower motor developed bad bearing. (4) Thermotron blower fan missing a blade. (5) Magnetron blower motor brushes improperly installed producing interference on screen. (6) three defective magnets: one of these shorted out after 4 hours service, two others shorted out on installation. (7) tuning stub 2 and 3 and adjacent section of wave guide cleaned to eliminate arcing. (8) replaced V9, V10 in Range Indicator, V2 in transmitter, and V1 and V2 in regulated rectifier.

The three spare magnets which proved defective were tested before leaving P.L.A.L. "possibly gunfire rendered the tubes defective. They will henceforth be stowed in excelsior. The magnetron in operation at the beginning of the patrol had to be reinstalled when it was discovered that our spares were all bad. In spite of the failures the SD was kept operative except for brief intervals until the last magnetron failed on July 15, after we were out of enemy home waters. The 3J has responded to the minute care and attention it receives from our Radar Officer, Lt.(jg) T.J. OSTRICK, and our radio technician, HOSSMAN, F.D., R.T.L.

The 3J has assisted us in every successful attack we have had during the last three patrols.

-18-

— page 161 —
2000 volts across the condenser. This casualty is a repeater. Combined efforts of ship, Base, and Yard had previously failed to uncover cause.

The 4255 series was jammed. Despatch was finally cleared by overriding interference at the best hour for transmission (about 1500 GMT, in vicinity of [MILITARY: location]).

Receiving tests on 115, 9090, and 125, 1500 sec. at 1000, 1200, and 1800 GMT were conducted as directed. Signal strength was zero except at 1800, July 15, when 9000 was received 52 and 33, readability poor. No serials were missed. Both our messages were acknowledged.

(1) RADAR

SD radar gave satisfactory operation during the entire patrol except for following casualties: (1) resistor 106 burned out due to shorted 8014 's. (2) condenser 256 and V215 burned out, caused by switching IC motor generators without securing SD. The SD proved very helpful as a navigational aid in passing through ENTORQUE and ENTOUS STATIONS. On one occasion ISHIHI SUL, a 5566 fleet, was picked up at 54 miles.

SD radar constantly lost for patrol was as follows: (1) broken lead on 2302; apparently caused by vibration. (2) 35 burned out due to short caused by piece of excess solder. (3) Thermotron blower motor developed bad bearing. (4) Thermotron blower fan missing a blade. (5) Magnetron blower motor brushes improperly installed producing interference on screen. (6) three defective magnets: one of these shorted out after 4 hours service, two others shorted out on installation. (7) tuning stub 2 and 3 and adjacent section of wave guide cleaned to eliminate arcing. (8) replaced V9, V10 in Range Indicator, V2 in transmitter, and V1 and V2 in regulated rectifier.

The three spare magnets which proved defective were tested before leaving P.L.A.L. "possibly gunfire rendered the tubes defective. They will henceforth be stowed in excelsior. The magnetron in operation at the beginning of the patrol had to be reinstalled when it was discovered that our spaces were all bad. In spite of the failures the SD was kept operative except for brief intervals until the last magnetron failed on July 15, after we were out of enemy home waters. The 3J has responded to the minute care and attention it receives from our Radar Officer, Lt.(jg) T.S. OSTRICK, and our radio technician, HOSSMAN, F.D., R.T.C. The 3J has assisted us in every successful attack we have had during the last three patrols.

-18-

— page 161 —
2000 volts across the condenser. This casualty is a repeater. Combined efforts of ship, Base, and Yard had previously failed to uncover cause.

The 4255 series was jammed. Despatch was finally cleared by overriding interference at the best hour for transmission (about 1500 GMT, in vicinity of [MILITARY: area code]).

Receiving tests on 115, 9090, and 125, 1500, 2000, and 1800 GMT were conducted as directed. Signal strength was zero except at 1800, July 15, when 9000 was received 52 and 33, readability poor. No serials were missed. Both our messages were acknowledged.

(1) RADAR

SD radar gave satisfactory operation during the entire patrol except for following casualties: (1) resistor 106 burned out due to shorted 8014 's. (2) condenser 256 and V215 burned out, caused by switching IC motor generators without securing SD. The SD proved very helpful as a navigational aid in passing through ENTORQUE and ENTOUS STATIONS. On one occasion ISHIHI SIT..., elevation 5636 feet, was picked up at 54 miles.

SD radar constantly lost for patrol was as follows: (1) broken lead on 2302; apparently caused by vibration. (2) 35 burned out due to short caused by piece of excess solder. (3) Thermotron blower motor developed bad bearing. (4) Thermotron blower fan missing a blade (5) Magnetron blower motor brushes improperly installed producing interference on screen. (6) three defective magnets: one of these shorted out after 4 hours service, two others shorted out on installation. (7) tuning stub 2 and 3 and adjacent section of wave guide cleaned to eliminate arcing. (8) replaced V9, V10 in Range Indicator, V2 in transmitter, and V1 and V2 in regulated rectifier.

The three spare magnets which proved defective were tested before leaving P.L.A.L. "possibly gunfire rendered two defects-ive. They will henceforth be stowed in excelsior. The magnetron in operation at the beginning of the patrol had to be reinstalled when it was discovered that our spares were all bad. In spite of the failures the SD was kept operative except for brief intervals until the last magnetron failed on July 15, after we were out of enemy home waters. The 3J has responded to the minute care and attention it receives from our Radar Officer, Lt.(jg) T.S. OSTRICK, and our radio technician, HOSSMAN, F.D., R.T.C. The 3J has assisted us in every successful attack we have had during the last three patrols.

-18-

— page 163 —
15
days in U.S.S. LITTLE R, Seventh Star Patrol.

PEARL to IDLY
days in U.S.S. LITTLE R, Seventh Star Patrol.

8
days in area
Days in area

— page 163 —
15
days in U.S.S. LITTLE R, Seventh Star Patrol.

PEARL to IDLY
days in U.S.S. LITTLE R, Seventh Star Patrol.

8
days in area
Days in area

— page 164 —
A16-3  COMMANDER SUBLARINE FORCE, F.C.1F1C FLEET,
SUB CRUINATE CO1ND, NAVY NC. 1504
Serial 025
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
July 23, 1943.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO PLUNGER Conf. 1tr
SS179/A16-3 of 20 July
1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

From:  The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Subordinate Command.
To:  The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
    (2) Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. PLUNGER - Seventh War Patrol Report.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the
first endorsement.

— page 164 —
A16-3  COMMANDER SUBLARINE FORCE, F.C.1F1C FLEET,
SUB CRUINATE CO1ND, NAVY NC. 1504
Serial 025
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
July 23, 1943.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO PLUNGER Conf. 1tr
SS179/A16-3 of 20 July
1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

From:  The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Subordinate Command.
To:  The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
    (2) Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. PLUNGER - Seventh War Patrol Report.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the
first endorsement.

— page 164 —
A16-3  COMMANDER SUBLARINE FORCE, F.C.1F1C FLEET,
SUB CRUINATE CO1ND, NAVY NC. 1504
Serial 025
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
July 23, 1943.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO PLUNGER Conf. 1tr
SS179/A16-3 of 20 July
1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

From:  The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
    Subordinate Command.
To:  The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
    (2) Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. PLUNGER - Seventh War Patrol Report.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the
first endorsement.

— page 165 —
1955-101/A16-3
SUBMARINE DIVISION ONE HUNDRED ONE

Serial 054
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, PLUNGER
Conf. 1tr. SS179/A16-3 of 20 July, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate Command, Lighway, T.H.
       (2) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Seventh War Patrol Report.

1. PLUNGER's Seventh War Patrol was conducted from June 18 to July 20, 1943, during which time two deys were spent at Midway.

2. The highlight of this patrol was the area of operations, 9 days being spent in the Sea of Japan, with 4 of these days in the patrol area assigned therein. La Perouse Straits were passed, incoming, during daylight submerged, and were cleared, outgoing, on the surfact at night - in both cases during foggy weather conditions. Shipping appeared to be considerable in volume, straight courses being steered, and without escorts.

3. (a) Torpedo Attack No. 1: This freighter was small and was not heavily loaded. The first two torpedoes may have run under. One may have been a dud or it may have been a low order detonation magnetically as evidenced by the sound operator's report and by the initial preparations to abandon ship. Both torpedoes should have passed within the target limits. Believing the first spread had missed due to control errors, two more torpedoes were fired to increase the spread pattern. These missed - one probably ahead and one astern, where aimed.

(b) Gun Attack: After firing 6 shots, return fire made it advisable to dive.

(c) Torpedo Attack No. 2: Commanding Officer did not have an accurate speed estimate so used 4 torpedoes. A second hit should have resulted just inside the stern, but didn't materialize.

4. Upon passing through the Kuriles enroute home PLUNGER had 39,000 gallons of fuel remaining - ample for a week or more of further operations assuming the use of cocmical speeds to base. This patrol was terminated by provisions of operation order.

— page 165 —
1955-101/A16-3
SUBMARINE DIVISION ONE HUNDRED ONE

Serial 054
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, PLUNGER
Conf. 1tr. SS179/A16-3 of 20 July, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate Command, Lighway, T.H.
       (2) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Seventh War Patrol Report.

1. PLUNGER's Seventh War Patrol was conducted from June 18 to July 20, 1943, during which time two deys were spent at Midway.

2. The highlight of this patrol was the area of operations, 9 days being spent in the Sea of Japan, with 4 of these days in the patrol area assigned therein. La Perouse Straits were passed, incoming, during daylight submerged, and were cleared, outgoing, on the surfact at night - in both cases during foggy weather conditions. Shipping appeared to be considerable in volume, straight courses being steered, and without escorts.

3. (a) Torpedo Attack No. 1: This freighter was small and was not heavily loaded. The first two torpedoes may have run under. One may have been a dud or it may have been a low order detonation magnetically as evidenced by the sound operator's report and by the initial preparations to abandon ship. Both torpedoes should have passed within the target limits. Believing the first spread had missed due to control errors, two more torpedoes were fired to increase the spread pattern. These missed - one probably ahead and one astern, where aimed.

(b) Gun Attack: After firing 6 shots, return fire made it advisable to dive.

(c) Torpedo Attack No. 2: Commanding Officer did not have an accurate speed estimate so used 4 torpedoes. A second hit should have resulted just inside the stern, but didn't materialize.

4. Upon passing through the Kuriles enroute home PLUNGER had 39,000 gallons of fuel remaining - ample for a week or more of further operations assuming the use of cocmical speeds to base. This patrol was terminated by provisions of operation order.

— page 165 —
1955-101/A16-3
SUBMARINE DIVISION ONE HUNDRED ONE

Serial 054
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, PLUNGER
Conf. 1tr. SS179/A16-3 of 20 July, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Division One Hundred One.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate Command, Lighway, T.H.
       (2) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Seventh War Patrol Report.

1. PLUNGER's Seventh War Patrol was conducted from June 18 to July 20, 1943, during which time two deys were spent at Midway.

2. The highlight of this patrol was the area of operations, 9 days being spent in the Sea of Japan, with 4 of these days in the patrol area assigned therein. La Perouse Straits were passed, incoming, during daylight submerged, and were cleared, outgoing, on the surfact at night - in both cases during foggy weather conditions. Shipping appeared to be considerable in volume, straight courses being steered, and without escorts.

3. (a) Torpedo Attack No. 1: This freighter was small and was not heavily loaded. The first two torpedoes may have run under. One may have been a dud or it may have been a low order detonation magnetically as evidenced by the sound operator's report and by the initial preparations to abandon ship. Both torpedoes should have passed within the target limits. Believing the first spread had missed due to control errors, two more torpedoes were fired to increase the spread pattern. These missed - one probably ahead and one astern, where aimed.

(b) Gun Attack: After firing 6 shots, return fire made it advisable to dive.

(c) Torpedo Attack No. 2: Commanding Officer did not have an accurate speed estimate so used 4 torpedoes. A second hit should have resulted just inside the stern, but didn't materialize.

4. Upon passing through the Kuriles enroute home PLUNGER had 39,000 gallons of fuel remaining - ample for a week or more of further operations assuming the use of cocmical speeds to base. This patrol was terminated by provisions of operation order.

— page 166 —
1- FREIGHTER (TOYOKAWA M.RU class) - 5,124 tons

C. LOCKWOOD, JR.

DISTRIBUTION:
Comtech, VCNO, Cincpac (5 ea);
Cincpac, S/M School NL, Comsopec, Consubsweepac, CTF 72, SUBAJ ML, ConsubspecSubordCom, J1l Squad. & Div. Comdr. (2 ea); Serforpac (adv. Base Plan. Unit), Comsowspec, CTF 16, PLUNER (1 ea); Comsubsplant (8); Comsubspec (12);
J1l SS Subspec (less enclosurcs) (1).

R.C. LAWER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 166 —
1- FREIGHTER (TOYOKAWA M.RU class) - 5,124 tons

C. LOCKWOOD, JR.

DISTRIBUTION:
Comtech, VCNO, Cincpac (5 ea);
Cincpac, S/M School NL, Comsopec,
Comsubsweepac, CTF 72, SUBAJ ML,
ComsubspsacSubordCom, J1l Squad. &
Div. Comdr. (2 ea); Serforpac (adv.
Base Plan. Unit), Comsowspec, CTF 16,
PLUNER (1 ea); Comsubsplant (8);
Comsubspac (12);
J1l SS Subspac (less enclosurcs) (1).

R.C. LAWER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 166 —
1- FREIGHTER (TOYOKAWA M.RU class) - 5,124 tons

C. LOCKWOOD, JR.

DISTRIBUTION:
Comtech, VCNO, Cincpac (5 ea);
Cincpac, S/M School NL, Comsopec,
Comsubsweepac, CTF 72, SUBAJ ML,
ComsubspsacSubordCom, J1l Squad. &
Div. Comdr. (2 ea); Serforpac (adv.
Base Plan. Unit), Comsowspec, CTF 16,
PLUNER (1 ea); Comsubsplant (8);
Comsubspac (12);
J1l SS Subspac (less enclosurcs) (1).

R.C. LAWER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 167 —
7/2 Sep 58
BY: [Signature]
DATE: 7/5/58

U.S.S. PLUCHER (SS-79)
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Cal.,
5 September 1943.

Front:
To:
Via:

Subject:
U.S.S. PLUCHER, Report of War Patrol Number Eight.

Enclosures:
(1) Subject Report.
(2) Track Charts.

1. Enclosure (1), covering the eighth war patrol of this vessel in the S.S. PLUCHER during the period August 6, to September 5, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

2. ... S.SS.

Signed:
[Signature]

SSS-93

— page 167 —
7/2 Sep 58
BY: [Signature]
DATE: 7/5/58

U.S.S. PLUCHER (SS-79)
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Cal.,
5 September 1943.

Front:
To:
Via:

Subject:
U.S.S. PLUCHER, Report of War Patrol Number Eight.

Enclosures:
(1) Subject Report.
(2) Track Charts.

1. Enclosure (1), covering the eighth war patrol of this vessel in the S.S. PLUCHER during the period August 6, to September 5, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

2. ... S.SS.

Signed:
[Signature]

SSS-93

— page 167 —
7/2 Sep 58
BY: [Signature]
DATE: 7/5/58

U.S.S. PLUCHER (SS-79)
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Cal.,
5 September 1943.

Front:
To:
Via:

Subject:
U.S.S. PLUCHER, Report of War Patrol Number Eight.

Enclosures:
(1) Subject Report.
(2) Track Charts.

1. Enclosure (1), covering the eighth war patrol of this vessel in the S.S. PLUCHER during the period August 6, to September 5, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

2. ... S.SS.

Signed:
[Signature]

SSS-93

— page 168 —
1705 U. under way from Seventh War Patrol. July 20, 1945: ship was given thorough refit by U.S.S.SS. July 21 and August 1: ship's company returned to ship, tests, loaded for training. August 2 to 4: trained, including night exercises on 5-4. AURUST. August 5-6: loaded.

(2) ARRIVAL

August 6

1705 U. under way from Seventh War Patrol pursuant to CTF 17 Cmd 134-42. Light under air screen, 1100 in company until dark. Conducted daily fire control drills and training drives on course area.

August 14

Approaching ARLOW ST. I in dense fog, navigating by parooid sounds and SD ranges on boats. Made transit on four engines in 300 yards visibility. To contact.

0500 U. entered SL. On course, 275 miles to PARCOWS ST. I. Set course 280, turned 6 degrees to the right of the direct route to all or us to travel 60 miles along F. L. - 50 mi. - 1.5 mi. - 2.5 mi. - 3.5 mi. - 4.5 mi. - 5.5 mi. - 6.5 mi. - 7.5 mi. - 8.5 mi. - 9.5 mi. - 10.5 mi. - 11.5 mi. - 12.5 mi. - 13.5 mi. - 14.5 mi. - 15.5 mi. - 16.5 mi. - 17.5 mi. - 18.5 mi. - 19.5 mi. - 20.5 mi. - 21.5 mi. - 22.5 mi. - 23.5 mi. - 24.5 mi. - 25.5 mi. - 26.5 mi. - 27.5 mi. - 28.5 mi. - 29.5 mi. - 30.5 mi. - 31.5 mi. - 32.5 mi. - 33.5 mi. - 34.5 mi. - 35.5 mi. - 36.5 mi. - 37.5 mi. - 38.5 mi. - 39.5 mi. - 40.5 mi. - 41.5 mi. - 42.5 mi. - 43.5 mi. - 44.5 mi. - 45.5 mi. - 46.5 mi. - 47.5 mi. - 48.5 mi. - 49.5 mi. - 50.5 mi. - 51.5 mi. - 52.5 mi. - 53.5 mi. - 54.5 mi. - 55.5 mi. - 56.5 mi. - 57.5 mi. - 58.5 mi. - 59.5 mi. - 60.5 mi. - 61.5 mi. - 62.5 mi. - 63.5 mi. - 64.5 mi. - 65.5 mi. - 66.5 mi. - 67.5 mi. - 68.5 mi. - 69.5 mi. - 70.5 mi. - 71.5 mi. - 72.5 mi. - 73.5 mi. - 74.5 mi. - 75.5 mi. - 76.5 mi. - 77.5 mi. - 78.5 mi. - 79.5 mi. - 80.5 mi. - 81.5 mi. - 82.5 mi. - 83.5 mi. - 84.5 mi. - 85.5 mi. - 86.5 mi. - 87.5 mi. - 88.5 mi. - 89.5 mi. - 90.5 mi. - 91.5 mi. - 92.5 mi. - 93.5 mi. - 94.5 mi. - 95.5 mi. - 96.5 mi. - 97.5 mi. - 98.5 mi. - 99.5 mi. - 100.5 mi. - 101.5 mi. - 102.5 mi. - 103.5 mi. - 104.5 mi. - 105.5 mi. - 106.5 mi. - 107.5 mi. - 108.5 mi. - 109.5 mi. - 110.5 mi. - 111.5 mi. - 112.5 mi. - 113.5 mi. - 114.5 mi. - 115.5 mi. - 116.5 mi. - 117.5 mi. - 118.5 mi. - 119.5 mi. - 120.5 mi. - 121.5 mi. - 122.5 mi. - 123.5 mi. - 124.5 mi. - 125.5 mi. - 126.5 mi. - 127.5 mi. - 128.5 mi. - 129.5 mi. - 130.5 mi. - 131.5 mi. - 132.5 mi. - 133.5 mi. - 134.5 mi. - 135.5 mi. - 136.5 mi. - 137.5 mi. - 138.5 mi. - 139.5 mi. - 140.5 mi. - 141.5 mi. - 142.5 mi. - 143.5 mi. - 144.5 mi. - 145.5 mi. - 146.5 mi. - 147.5 mi. - 148.5 mi. - 149.5 mi. - 150.5 mi. - 151.5 mi. - 152.5 mi. - 153.5 mi. - 154.5 mi. - 155.5 mi. - 156.5 mi. - 157.5 mi. - 158.5 mi. - 159.5 mi. - 160.5 mi. - 161.5 mi. - 162.5 mi. - 163.5 mi. - 164.5 mi. - 165.5 mi. - 166.5 mi. - 167.5 mi. - 168.5 mi. - 169.5 mi. - 170.5 mi. - 171.5 mi. - 172.5 mi. - 173.5 mi. - 174.5 mi. - 175.5 mi. - 176.5 mi. - 177.5 mi. - 178.5 mi. - 179.5 mi. - 180.5 mi. - 181.5 mi. - 182.5 mi. - 183.5 mi. - 184.5 mi. - 185.5 mi. - 186.5 mi. - 187.5 mi. - 188.5 mi. - 189.5 mi. - 190.5 mi. - 191.5 mi. - 192.5 mi. - 193.5 mi. - 194.5 mi. - 195.5 mi. - 196.5 mi. - 197.5 mi. - 198.5 mi. - 199.5 mi. - 200.5 mi. - 201.5 mi. - 202.5 mi. - 203.5 mi. - 204.5 mi. - 205.5 mi. - 206.5 mi. - 207.5 mi. - 208.5 mi. - 209.5 mi. - 210.5 mi. - 211.5 mi. - 212.5 mi. - 213.5 mi. - 214.5 mi. - 215.5 mi. - 216.5 mi. - 217.5 mi. - 218.5 mi. - 219.5 mi. - 220.5 mi. - 221.5 mi. - 222.5 mi. - 223.5 mi. - 224.5 mi. - 225.5 mi. - 226.5 mi. - 227.5 mi. - 228.5 mi. - 229.5 mi. - 230.5 mi. - 231.5 mi. - 232.5 mi. - 233.5 mi. - 234.5 mi. - 235.5 mi. - 236.5 mi. - 237.5 mi. - 238.5 mi. - 239.5 mi. - 240.5 mi. - 241.5 mi. - 242.5 mi. - 243.5 mi. - 244.5 mi. - 245.5 mi. - 246.5 mi. - 247.5 mi. - 248.5 mi. - 249.5 mi. - 250.5 mi. - 251.5 mi. - 252.5 mi. - 253.5 mi. - 254.5 mi. - 255.5 mi. - 256.5 mi. - 257.5 mi. - 258.5 mi. - 259.5 mi. - 260.5 mi. - 261.5 mi. - 262.5 mi. - 263.5 mi. - 264.5 mi. - 265.5 mi. - 266.5 mi. - 267.5 mi. - 268.5 mi. - 269.5 mi. - 270.5 mi. - 271.5 mi. - 272.5 mi. - 273.5 mi. - 274.5 mi. - 275.5 mi. - 276.5 mi. - 277.5 mi. - 278.5 mi. - 279.5 mi. - 280.5 mi. - 281.5 mi. - 282.5 mi. - 283.5 mi. - 284.5 mi. - 285.5 mi. - 286.5 mi. - 287.5 mi. - 288.5 mi. - 289.5 mi. - 290.5 mi. - 291.5 mi. - 292.5 mi. - 293.5 mi. - 294.5 mi. - 295.5 mi. - 296.5 mi. - 297.5 mi. - 298.5 mi. - 299.5 mi. - 300.5 mi. - 301.5 mi. - 302.5 mi. - 303.5 mi. - 304.5 mi. - 305.5 mi. - 306.5 mi. - 307.5 mi. - 308.5 mi. - 309.5 mi. - 310.5 mi. - 311.5 mi. - 312.5 mi. - 313.5 mi. - 314.5 mi. - 315.5 mi. - 316.5 mi. - 317.5 mi. - 318.5 mi. - 319.5 mi. - 320.5 mi. - 321.5 mi. - 322.5 mi. - 323.5 mi. - 324.5 mi. - 325.5 mi. - 326.5 mi. - 327.5 mi. - 328.5 mi. - 329.5 mi. - 330.5 mi. - 331.5 mi. - 332.5 mi. - 333.5 mi. - 334.5 mi. - 335.5 mi. - 336.5 mi. - 337.5 mi. - 338.5 mi. - 339.5 mi. - 340.5 mi. - 341.5 mi. - 342.5 mi. - 343.5 mi. - 344.5 mi. - 345.5 mi. - 346.5 mi. - 347.5 mi. - 348.5 mi. - 349.5 mi. - 350.5 mi. - 351.5 mi. - 352.5 mi. - 353.5 mi. - 354.5 mi. - 355.5 mi. - 356.5 mi. - 357.5 mi. - 358.5 mi. - 359.5 mi. - 360.5 mi. - 361.5 mi. - 362.5 mi. - 363.5 mi. - 364.5 mi. - 365.5 mi. - 366.5 mi. - 367.5 mi. - 368.5 mi. - 369.5 mi. - 370.5 mi. - 371.5 mi. - 372.5 mi. - 373.5 mi. - 374.5 mi. - 375.5 mi. - 376.5 mi. - 377.5 mi. - 378.5 mi. - 379.5 mi. - 380.5 mi. - 381.5 mi. - 382.5 mi. - 383.5 mi. - 384.5 mi. - 385.5 mi. - 386.5 mi. - 387.5 mi. - 388.5 mi. - 389.5 mi. - 390.5 mi. - 391.5 mi. - 392.5 mi. - 393.5 mi. - 394.5 mi. - 395.5 mi. - 396.5 mi. - 397.5 mi. - 398.5 mi. - 399.5 mi. - 400.5 mi. - 401.5 mi. - 402.5 mi. - 403.5 mi. - 404.5 mi. - 405.5 mi. - 406.5 mi. - 407.5 mi. - 408.5 mi. - 409.5 mi. - 410.5 mi. - 411.5 mi. - 412.5 mi. - 413.5 mi. - 414.5 mi. - 415.5 mi. - 416.5 mi. - 417.5 mi. - 418.5 mi. - 419.5 mi. - 420.5 mi. - 421.5 mi. - 422.5 mi. - 423.5 mi. - 424.5 mi. - 425.5 mi. - 426.5 mi. - 427.5 mi. - 428.5 mi. - 429.5 mi. - 430.5 mi. - 431.5 mi. - 432.5 mi. - 433.5 mi. - 434.5 mi. - 435.5 mi. - 436.5 mi. - 437.5 mi. - 438.5 mi. - 439.5 mi. - 440.5 mi. - 441.5 mi. - 442.5 mi. - 443.5 mi. - 444.5 mi. - 445.5 mi. - 446.5 mi. - 447.5 mi. - 448.5 mi. - 449.5 mi. - 450.5 mi. - 451.5 mi. - 452.5 mi. - 453.5 mi. - 454.5 mi. - 455.5 mi. - 456.5 mi. - 457.5 mi. - 458.5 mi. - 459.5 mi. - 460.5 mi. - 461.5 mi. - 462.5 mi. - 463.5 mi. - 464.5 mi. - 465.5 mi. - 466.5 mi. - 467.5 mi. - 468.5 mi. - 469.5 mi. - 470.5 mi. - 471.5 mi. - 472.5 mi. - 473.5 mi. - 474.5 mi. - 475.5 mi. - 476.5 mi. - 477.5 mi. - 478.5 mi. - 479.5 mi. - 480.5 mi. - 481.5 mi. - 482.5 mi. - 483.5 mi. - 484.5 mi. - 485.5 mi. - 486.5 mi. - 487.5 mi. - 488.5 mi. - 489.5 mi. - 490.5 mi. - 491.5 mi. - 492.5 mi. - 493.5 mi. - 494.5 mi. - 495.5 mi. - 496.5 mi. - 497.5 mi. - 498.5 mi. - 499.5 mi. - 500.5 mi. - 501.5 mi. - 502.5 mi. - 503.5 mi. - 504.5 mi. - 505.5 mi. - 506.5 mi. - 507.5 mi. - 508.5 mi. - 509.5 mi. - 510.5 mi. - 511.5 mi. - 512.5 mi. - 513.5 mi. - 514.5 mi. - 515.5 mi. - 516.5 mi. - 517.5 mi. - 518.5 mi. - 519.5 mi. - 520.5 mi. - 521.5 mi. - 522.5 mi. - 523.5 mi. - 524.5 mi. - 525.5 mi. - 526.5 mi. - 527.5 mi. - 528.5 mi. - 529.5 mi. - 530.5 mi. - 531.5 mi. - 532.5 mi. - 533.5 mi. - 534.5 mi. - 535.5 mi. - 536.5 mi. - 537.5 mi. - 538.5 mi. - 539.5 mi. - 540.5 mi. - 541.5 mi. - 542.5 mi. - 543.5 mi. - 544.5 mi. - 545.5 mi. - 546.5 mi. - 547.5 mi. - 548.5 mi. - 549.5 mi. - 550.5 mi. - 551.

— page 169 —
1943 I. Surface mines and some of floating bearing 160, 6 miles, located for patrol (not yet).

1943 I. Surface mines and some of floating bearing 160, 6 miles, located for patrol

— page 169 —
1943 I. Surface mines and some of floating bearing 160, 6 miles, located for patrol (not yet).

1943 I. Surface mines and some of floating bearing 160, 6 miles, located for patrol

— page 170 —
0342, 125-45E, Report of Eighth U.S. Patrol.

---

**Vitality**:
- Vitality variable processing south on surface.
- 0740 is bridge location sighted, means of sighting type bearing.
- 0750, 16 miles, large standard, the ship is down (contact with).
- The observer in the ship's position, the changed course and.
- We are 1003 mile on the bow. Dived, commenced approach. The.
- on the torpedo. - 0343 route, marking his identity very important.
- ... the room changed course to the left, which showed he was zigzagging, but it put us in an off his track. ... still further type escort.
- The sea station was made his right. 0345 identity almost certain.
- Don't believe me no doubt the same. Point his missing sun was seen.
- Passed with four torpedoes at 4000 yards (attack 1). This value.
- U.S. torpedo, thought to be on LXV, was certainly not trying.
- For it this range but of our torpedoes were extended here with no.
- The target turned to our right, and the torpedoes about the time they.
- crossed his track. ... he noticed a trio of light sail, and spotted up.
- The first spotted up and 1140. ... from us. ... to catch charges.
- After parallelliing torpedoes the target made a further change of.
- course to the left, left flying us a 60° angle on the bow, range 4000.
- ... 0345. It seemed to me that if we saw another turn, but the son turned.
- ... 0345 on all 50 miles from RDU. 3.... to close was possible.
- 1745 I sighted 0345, it practically to the northward (contact.
- 1.5). The small close, and at 1500 to reach to 100 feet and ran.
- right. 1500 left to come on, closest lay. 0345 was joined by.
- 0345 set of series, but the correct about 1040. To joining.
- 0345 I surfaced. Passed in brilliant incisive light for patrol.
- off 0345.

---

**...just 14**

---

**0345 I** | **dived 12 miles north of 0345. ...** | **Closed beach.**
- Commenced running to. 4.4 min motors bearing, putting the port propeller out of collision. It had become apparent that this bearing would have to be re-located.
- 0345 I sighted 0400 ten. in. fire. After standing up coast to.
- made CLAR (contact 015). ... shall wait. The patrol was about a mile.
- outboard of frigat (contact 014). ... made approach but decided to.
- "sit for bigger game."
- 0350 I sighted 0345, 1.5 mile parallel (airline contact 045).
- 0345 I sighted another small 1.5. 0345, 1.5 mile. 0345

— page 171 —
1350.3. 1st Lt. C. J. 1. Report of Night Patrol.

---

**Subject:**
- 1350.3. 1st Lt. C. J. Report of Night Patrol.

---

**Close to shore as he could get. This was the 1st ship that passed out of range of battery. PL-211 was back on an air of the three ships to patrol the coast, patrol boats or no patrol boats. 1140 I sighted another small fast, fast

— page 173 —
0357 I sighted small patrol boat bearing 075, 2 miles (contact 135). Av. dead.

: 0358 I div'd 2 miles off 0357. 135. Cloed beach.

: 0359 I sighted FC type patrol boat (contact 135).

: 0640 I sighted masts bearing 195, 7 miles. (contact 137). A patrol boat was getting unconcertably close, and the sea was again perfect calm. Went to 100 feet and ran silent. At 0728 one depth charge, not intended for FLIGHT. Patrol scores deported northward. 0735 back to pariscoje depth. Masts ve had seen at 0640 were not in sight. Probably a patrol boat that reversed course.

: 1040 I sighted land bilge gliding straight for us. Flooded negative and went down. . . . o bomb, flare looked like a trainer. (airplane contact 135).

: 1130 I sighted 13500 ton freighter. Let him go by.

(contact 135).

: 1230 I sighted smoke that developed into a 4500 ton FLIGHT. Freighter, camouflaged, and armed at (contact 135). 135C attacked. With two straight bow shots, in 6 angle solver firing bearings; torpedoes on 6 feet, range 1350, while 10 hit 1/2 length inside bow. 135C stern. . . . use of first torpedo passed a few yards forward of bridge and 6C announced that torpedo had hit but failed to explode. At sea time sound reported an explosion. The second torpedo very fortunately obliged the target's stern, blowing his rudder off and stopping him. The crew abandoned as he coasted around to his left. His stern went down about three feet but he was not sinking. Brought bow tubes to bear, and at 1405 fired 10. 1 tube, straight shot, set on 6 feet, aimed at his surface. It hit the 1T, demolishing his middle. It would certainly sink him. 1405 dropped down and went ahead standard to clear firing point. 1440 came up to see if ship had sunk. He had disappeared. . . . sent back to 100 feet and stood out.

: 1350 I heard the first of a convoy four depth charges or depth bombs. Host of them could be heard to strike the water, then swish through the water, then the detection, then the rumbling reverberations. . . . a torpedo struck out of that range depth bombs from planes. The duration of the strike after they struck the water was estimated at two to three seconds, which may give a rough idea of the depth settings the FLUSOS on depth bombs. The J.P.S were bombing the area but they did not hit nor shore "e" arc. Scenes were heard ahead and astern, but not close. Echo ringing was heard in the distance. There was the usual pronounced castler layer. 1726 1st explosion.

: 2000 I surfaced, expecting to encounter an organized hunt. I co-ordinates. Had only one torpedo remaining. Headed for ZACUS.

— page 179 —
1. USS LEN, Report of Eighth War Patrol.

2. 0603 I PRC 3. LEL 5 miles Various F
   - ...air coverage for
   - 3-11 traffic.

3. 1638 I OFF 3. LEL 5 miles Various P
   - ...air coverage for
   - 3-11 traffic.

4. 0755 I Off 3. LEL 5 miles Various F
   - ...air coverage off
   - 0-11 traffic.

5. 0745 I Off 3. LEL 5 miles Various F
   - ...air coverage off
   - 0-11 traffic.

6. 1440 I Off 3. LEL 5 miles Various P
   - ...air coverage off
   - 0-11 traffic.

7. 0755 I 4-10- 3. LEL 5 miles Various P
   - ...air coverage 30 mi.
   - off 0-30-11.

8. 1040 I Off 3. LEL 1 mile North P
   - ...air coverage 1 mile
   - 0-11 traffic.

(1) 0001 2.1

— page 181 —
270 Spare 8 500 (at firing).

Spare 5 175 Depth 50' (at firing).

TROOP COMMANDING OFFICER:
[Name]

Type: tactical

Dear superior officer: Fired longitudinal spread using in 6-inch solenoids firing 1/3 length of 1/3 length

— page 182 —
15
Serial No. 9509
Aircraft Type: PT
Type: Intervall
Type Speed: Longitudinal
Sea Conditions: Smooth
Vessel: U.S.S. SPIRIT
Reasons:
*Delivered to have run under target, deeper than set.

PT-15, U.S.S. SPIRIT, 0.5 F.H.C. 0

TWO 000 Z. D.T. just 20, 1940 L.H. 42-15 L.C. 139-58E
1002 I. just 20, 1940

Description:
400 ton freighter, light, sailing independently close in to Japanese beach. Sighted by periscope. High visibility.

Ship Status:
Ship Docked on
Probable Status:
4500 ton freighter.

Damage Detected:
Ey. Ship came torpedo hit it.

Target Depth 1/2 Course 20 Speed. 0 Range 000 (at firing).

C.S. SPIRIT

Speed 3' Course 270 Depth 50' ...into 0 (at firing).

PT-15, U.S.S. SPIRIT

Type - Tactical:
Day periscope attack. Two stern shots, in 6 angle solver firing bearings, and 1/2 hit 1/2 length inside bow and stern. First torpedo hit under this attack. Second torpedo missed eastern. Crew abandoned and target to stop on ground to his left. Sound reported his search following and then stopping. For next part of attack see Part 2 of tactical.

-15-

— page 186 —
0503 Z
1405 I

Description:
Same as in Part 1.

Ship Details:
4500 tons, [FREIGHT: text here]

Ship Damage or
Probable Ship:
[Text here]

Target Draft 1: Course 035 Speed 0, Range 1,00 (at firing).

Ship's Speed:
[Text here]

Type of Ship:
[Text here]

Type of Target:
[Text here]

Type of Fire:
[Text here]

Type of Damage:
[Text here]

Type of Target:
[Text here

— page 187 —
1. USS. LUCKY, Report of Eighth War Patrol.

| Subject: | U.S.S. LUCKY, Report of Eighth War Patrol. |
|||
| Serial No. | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Explosive | ITT | ITT | ITT |
| Firing Interval | 168 | - | - |
| Type Spread | Longitudinal | - | Calm |
| Sea Conditions | Calm | Calm | Calm |
| Remarks: | See "Corporal...attack Report For:". |

(1) U.S.S. LUCKY

Some negative information regarding mines in FLUTTER, was obtained. Ships favor the southern part of FLUTTER. The CHILLIOTTE, a 2nd class, appeared to cover southern, middle, and northern parts of the SLUFF. Our tactical charts show no explosive location of two enemy channels known to be clear of mines. To current greater than 2 knots as established in FLUTTER.

(2) U.S.S. LUCKY

To patrols were encountered in FLUTTER. FLUTTER was patrolled by a CHILLIOTTE, a 2nd class, but after a few hours, the patrol was in a state of confusion. The CHILLIOTTE was not in a state of confusion. The CHILLIOTTE was in a state of confusion. The CHILL

— page 191 —
5-43/A16-3
Serial 0130
CO: FID: TIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO., USS PLUNGER Conf. Ltr.
of September 5, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Eight War Patrols

1. PLUNGER's eight war patrol was a repeat performance of the seventh as far as accuracy was concerned but the "take" was doubled. Shorter than average, the patrol lasted only thirty days of which eight were spent in the area, 6,442 miles were steamed requiring 96,300 gallons of fuel for an average of 15 gallons per mile, a bit above normal consumption. Contacts (43) were plentiful, suitable targets could be selected with care, and in four hits for a percentage of 26.6. Four misses can be attributed to fairly certain control errors, two others may have been control errors or results of search, while the other five are suspected of running deep or being duds. One of these was seen and heard to hit but did not explode. Two ships, each of 4,500 tons, are claimed sunk. Ranges and track angles were favorable except in attack #1 when the range was 2900 yards and the average track was 1280 5/8, but it is felt that the target was sufficiently valuable to warrant firing under these circumstances. The commanding officer was not particularly generous with his sproads.

2. "IJJOR DEFECTS" under Part K is incomplete. Not listed are the serious casualty to #2 and #4 main motor bearings which definitely handicapped the ship during the early part of the patrol and the fact that the T.D.C. was incorrectness is stating resort to use of the Junk 8 Angle Solver which was erratically done. Misalignment of the port tail shafting is suspected. The general material condition of the PLUNGER is reasonably good considering that the last navy yard period ended in June 1942 since which date the vessel has conducted six war patrols. Refits have been thorough and one was of about six

— page 193 —
FC5-4/A16-3
Serial 0228
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS PLUNGER Conf. Ltr.
of 5 September 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of Eighth War Patrol - Comments on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments of Commander Submarine Division Forty-Three.

2. This patrol was aggressively conducted and the Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew are congratulated on another successful patrol.

Copy to:
CSD 43
CO PLUNGER

— page 194 —
1. SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC MLEET
   - Jk
   - TT12-10/A16-3/(16)
   - Care of Fleet Post Office;
   - San Francisco, California,
   10 September 1943.

Serial 01253
COMPLIMENTAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PLUNGER Report of Eighth War
Petrol dated 5 September 1943.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 247
U.S.S. PLUNGER - EIGHTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (3S179) - Report of Eighth War Patrol (6 August to 5 September 1943).

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this aggressive and well conducted patrol. The PLUNGER is credited with inflicting the following damage to the enemy:

SUNK

1. Freighter (unknown class) -- 4,500 tons
1. Freighter (unknown class) -- 4,500 tons

TOTAL-- 9,000 tons

C.A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5) Consubswespace (2)
VCNO (5) CTF 72 (2)
Cincpac (6) CTF 16 (1)
Intel. Cen. Pac. (1) Consubspace (15)
Ocean Areas (1) SUBD, NI (2)
Serforpac (1) ConsubspaceSubordcon (2)
-(Adv.Base Plan.Unit (1) All Squadron and Div.
Cinclant (2) Commanders, Subspace (2)
Comsubslant (8) U.S.S. PLUNGER (1)
S/M School, NL (2) (Endorsements only:)
Comsopac (1) All Submarines, Subspace (1).

R.C. LAWVER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 195 —
1/6-3(5)/(16)
Serial 01253
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PLUNGER Report of Eighth War
Petrol dated 5 September 1943.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 247
U.S.S. PLUNGER - EIGHTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (35179) - Report of Eighth War Patrol, (6 August to 5 September 1943).

Enclosure: (A) Copy of Subject 'War Patrol Report.
    (B) Copy of Consubdiv 43 Conf. 2nd. End.
    F05-4/416-3 Serial 0126 dated 7 September 1943.
    (C) Copy of Consubdiv 4 Conf. 2nd. End.
    F05-4/416-3 Serial 0226 dated 7 September 1943.

1. The eighth war patrol of the PLUNGER was another in a long series of determined, aggressive and successful ones.

2. Making a repeat patrol in the Japan Sea, the PLUNGER had many contacts. All attacks, except one, were made with the idea of sinking as many ships as possible with the least number of torpedoes. More ships would have been sunk had the torpedo performance been better.

3. The PLUNGER's fighting spirit is best exemplified by the fine will to fight on even though material casualties put one shaft out of commission.

4. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia award.

— page 198 —
12
1035: lookout report@c plate. (A/C contact #1). Divd.
1125 surface.

: 13
0737 Y SD radar contact at 10 miles. (A/C contact #2).
Divd. 0500 surfaced.
1653 Y lookout report@c plate. Divd. (A/C contact #3).
1611 surface.

: 14
0613 Y sighted plane. (A/C contact #4). Divd. 0554
surfaced.
0701 Y SD radar contact steady at 10 miles. (A/C contact
#5). Very cloudy. He opened slowly an discrepant from screen
at 14 miles.
1840 Y mounted 20 ft gun on after bridge mount. This was
routine on dark nights in the area.
2200 Y enter@c area.

: 15
0543 Y divd 6 miles off LILI. Roll at 7 miles.
had forced us down for four short drives; otherwise no passage
to LILI had been on the surface. Oricev was very long north
shore but a strong easterly current gave us only about 1 knot
good. Numerous shore pass@c over the atoll during the day.
To surface or air patrols were seen. 1857 surfaced 5 miles Y
of atoll and patrol@c of entrance during night.

: 16
0405 Y SD radar contact on LILI. Roll at 7 miles.
0540 Y divd 5.4 miles from beach. Closed LILI ISL@D
for close observation. Information supplementary to HICFOA
Volume II LILI@C. He@n. is attached as appendix. An addi-
tional track chart for this date is a part of this appendix.
Sir rolls of film are also a part of this appendix.
1300 Y C@FART@C. So@n@n on airfield. (A/C contact
# 6).

Proceeded north along track and of atoll, then along north
side to TOO.0. @n@m@l. Sighted no planes in air today.
1850 Y surf@cod 5 miles off entrance. Patrol@c of
atoll during night.

: 17
0305 Y radar contact on LILI ATOL at 8.2 miles.
0601 Y divd 3 miles off TOO.0. @n@m@l. of LILI. Roll.
0748 Y heard fast light severe bearing 550. (Ship com-
tact #1). Sighted two small vessels at about 6000 yards.

— page 199 —
1607 Y sighted white tipped masts standing out of TORPIA channels. (Ship contact #2). Commenced approach. Identified target as 300 ton two masted diesel freighter, armed forward. Ercise off approach.

: 1742 Y weak echo ranging in direction of TORPIA channel. (Ship contact #3). Commenced approach. Identified target as same inter-island freighter and escort that entered early today. These vessels entering and leaving in use. TORPIA channel, approaching and departing on a line 130-350 from the entrance.

: 1847 Y surfaced 5.5 miles off TORPIA. Proceeded around western end of atoll to take D minus 2 station 20 miles south of HILL I.

Nov. 18 (D minus 2)
No raid was scheduled for this date but we were to make weather report if weather was unfavorable.
0617 Y dived. 0717 surfaced. Came up on voice frequency but heard no transmissisons.
1010 Y 3d contact at 10 miles. (A/C contact #7). Dived.
Plane not sighted.
1024 Y sighted HILL bomber. (A/C contact #5). We saw enemy planes in the air at 1111 today for the first time. Except for occasional showers, weather and visibility were very good all day.
1041 Y surfaced. Patrolled S of HILL during the night. "catcher remained very good during night.
2200 Y HILL searchlights were seen intermittently for three hours. There were at least 5 high intensity searchlights on at one time.
2527 Y saw large plane pass at about 100 feet across bow. (A/C contact #9). It was a very dark night. This was the beginning of a series of events not soon to be forgot.

Nov. 19 (D minus 1)
Station for today 20 miles SW of HILL.
0002 Y lighted plane sighted off starboard bow, closing. (A/C contact #10). Dived. COLD surfaced.
Just before dawn, after our plan's were scheduled to be in the air, a very heavy rain cloud blew in from the east and the intermittent heavy rain lasted for about two and a half hours.
0545 Y about forty minutes before surface search lights were on. The enemy plane was sighted about 1000 yards astern. (A/C contact #11). He was gliding toward the ship emitting red flashes, possibly from his exhaust. Dived. This plane must have been friendly or he would have attacked. However, it was not a friendly

— page 200 —
0553, nine minutes after diving, surface. Immediately named SD, and had many radar contacts, and planes in sight. At various ranges almost continuously. Most of these planes were to be friendly but there was no way of being sure who one was not.

0633 Y unidentified plane close, headed toward us. (A/C contact 1/2). Dived. 0650 surfaced. Many planes in vicinity. 0718 Y another unidentified plane approached with a zero angle on the bow. (A/C contact 1/3). Dived. 0725 surfaced. Many planes in vicinity. 0800 SBDs, TBFs, and F6Fs on SD and in sight. Near pilots talking on 6835.

0651 Y much smoke in direction of HULL. 1022 Y another plane in gliding dive toward us. Dived. 1042 to be a float type fighter. (A/C contact 1/4). Dived. 1043 surfaced.

1055 Y heard pilot say "Hello lifeguard. This is 41. To air opposition over HULL. By 1100 all was quiet, momentarily. 1106 Y saw a very low flying plane thought to be a B-17. (A/C contact 1/5). It appeared to be having trouble and on the officer watching this plane with his periscope thought it crashed in water briefly. 207, cisterns 10 miles. A-24d. 2111 speed. Noise pretty good by. 1137 saw same or similar twin engine plane bearing about 240, distance 8 miles. Dived. 1200 surfaced. 1202 sur- waves, heading for us. (A/C contact 1/6). Dived. 1204 all was fixed. 1206 plane on SD and in sight. By about 1300 all was quiet again. "to rear about 15 miles from HULL. 1234 Y another suspicious plane headed our way. (A/C contact 1/7). Dived. 1405 surfaced. Another wave of planes hit HULL about 1400.

1353 Y noted terrific explosion on HULL. 1355 Y another unidentified plane low and closing fast. (A/C contact 1/8). Dived. 1700 surfaced. 1752 Y another unidentified plane closing fast. (A/C contact 1/9). Dived. 1800 during diving. 1836 surfaced.

1941 Y sent HULL calls 20630 reporting results to date, that an active air patrol was being maintained, and weather. Retralled to HULL during night. Saw something interesting.

Nov. 20 (Day)
- To have assigned station 20 miles 3. of HULL for today. Had no information in CCD or by dispatch regarding any strikes. Had no information in CCD or by dispatch regarding any

— page 201 —
0929 Y sighted HII bearing 025, le miles, 0 dories
: 0955 Y dive. If strike is on, expected to see form, 100
ation of planes with periscope. Assigned SD antenna above water
intermittently. No planes detected until 1456, 1000 feet
1456 Y sighted two SDs with periscopes. Surfaced, Navy
friendly planes in sight and on SD.
1612 Y one of three planes smoking. Kept their in sight.
One of these planes returned to us, and indicated that it had
which it did on 4 engines. Voice radio reported 10 miles
150 from HII airfield, as HII was reference point for such
communications. He made a turn to head for this station which
planes indicated "follow me" again, to the south. After 150, 10 miles
we did. TEF, using alds, kept us on course, steered with
from HII. ISLID, which cleared up all doubts. Reported an
full power. Planes departed. I proceeded to a position near
ing 150 from HII, and took up course 150, until 15 miles from
CC. By this time it was 1640, about 25 minutes after sunup. I
set. Stationed two special lookouts, in addition to our normal
section of four night surface lookouts. Used pole masts, 240 and 060,
about every half minute. I steered course on the thoroughly
always reversing to northwest to cover with the wind. The
as possible. It was a dark night and we could have passed very
close to the ship and not seen him. I did not see him.
: 0540 Y arrived for dawn and to check trim. Ordered
Eased for KOR to check position for forecastle. Tied up for
C700 Y sighted two SDs at 8 miles. Tied off the deck of the
about 15 minutes and presumably searching for men. Reported
0729 Y sighted land and established position. Proceeded to
to a point bearing 150, to lie on KOR and steamed on his out-
expanding square, tracks of succeeding legs being on mine. On
side tracks of previous legs. Tied up planes on the indicated
another strike was being made at HII. Boarded until 14:19.
volces transmissions at 0630. Continued search until 14:30.
: 1117 Y considered further search futile. My OIC directed
us to proceed area 20 miles visibility or reconnaissance
aviators was exhausted. Shaped a course for HII. Tied up
to pass to south and west of HII. On the other hand, the
turned pilots. Kept about 18 miles from land. At three sun
face and two sky lookouts stationed as to our normal
the surface by day in enemy waters.
: 1330 Y received following voice transmission. Hello,
lifeguards, this is 62, search I report for garble. I have a
message for you, of to 000 and headed for HII. 1555 observed
fire over HII.
: 1545 Y received following voice transmission. TIE
lifeguard, surface we have a message for you, and I have
Our instructions were to listen only, but 8535; we were not equipped

— page 202 —
1355 Y. The ships circled us, we felt sure another pilot was down but had no idea where. In a tropical downpour we signaled by searchlight repeatedly where is plane down, but searchlight communications were not satisfactory. In previous days we had exchanged flashing lights and signals readily. One of the planes then made two-message drops, one of which was remarkably close, but could not be seen in the water because of a choppy sea, and heavy rain. Apparently these planes transmit on 6835. At 1600 we heard "Miles to be six miles from us on V-1." Search was conducted south of "Miles" ten miles on and all night. During evening reddened camouflage netting results of searches to date and requested planes to intercept, we could hear but not reply on 6835. Also that it absence of information covered planes of further strikes would depart. On 0730 at sunset twenty second. Conusupo passed the 6th. The 6th of the 6th. The 6th

— page 203 —
130 feet away, later said plane roared over, reversed course with a vertical turn and made a second pass, and repeated for a third pass just as periscope sheers went under. All components reported no holes and ship was taken to 140 feet. Preliminary check showed Executive Officer, four knots, and quartermaster wounded. First aid was begun at once, and of wounded was in accordance with the traditions of the service. 1205 Y reversed course to return to dived pilot at 140 feet, started up for a look. 1255 sighted pilot in boat but inside our turning circle. Swing right, put up SD antenna and prepared to pick up pilot. To planes in sight on SD. 1230 surfaced. 1255 LT. 1210 and Lt. (jS) T. 1230. 1235 Y assisted Lt. (jS) Franklin George SOH 4.2 to deck. 1255 Y headed south at full speed hoping to obtain medical assistance. About 1400 learned that pilot sat 12 for engine bombers headed east around 1150 miles he was in rubber boat. Attempted to raise a shore station to make contact at 1230. 1235 Y surfaced. Lt 142 sent it blind. 1750 Y having reached 5-00 Y, 172-40 E, remained in vicinity to avoid contact with friendly forces to scout it who did not know of our presence. 1755 Y contact report delivered to 1710. 5s sound. sighted unidentified plane. (/C contact #24). Divd. 1510 Y sighted sighted plane overhead. (/C contact #26). Divd. 1532 surfaced. 2130 Y decoded orders to render rescue services until sunset twenty fourth.

— page 204 —
1000 Y sighted JUNO, 1.0 in. (2.5 cm) on enemy planes. 1052 Y dive for unidentified plane. (1/2 contact 1:30). 1055 surface. 1445 Y arrived JUL. Transferred ILIUT. 1.0. 1.

— page 205 —
1658 Y surfaced. Searchlights on HULL intermittently all evening. Sent at least six lighted planes, probably more on in and land at HULL. (A/C contact #35). Felt this night be a strike in the main. Made contact report according to.

Nov. 25.
Patrolled SYS of HULL.
062C Y 3D radar contact closing fast. (A/C contact #34).

Divod:
070C Y sighted unidentified plane flying low and slow near HULL. (A/C contact #35). No signs of raid. Iain Y.
0918 Y saw white smoke eastward of neck of HULL ISLAND.

To planes in sight.
1125 Y sighted low flying BATT. (A/C contact #36).
1511 Y sighted 1500 BATT. (A/C contact #37). (A/C contact #38). Able and depart on southeast course. (A/C contact #38). Immediately headed south to open HULL while cooling contact report on these planes believed headed for our forces to southeast.
1715 Y surface 25 miles S of HULL and sent contact report on planes. 1730 message received for. Divod.
1904 Y surface. Felt cold to S of HULL.
1935 Y heard standby DMD by voice on 6835. 2002 Y searched for HULL intermittently. 2100 Y radar contact on plane at 10,000 yards, closed fast to 6,000 yards. Divod. 2106 surfaced. Lighted planes seen landing.
2123 Y SZ radar contact on plane, 4,000 yards. Divod.
2151 surface.
2153 Y sent to lighted planes. 2139 SZ radar contact at 5 miles. 2141 SZ radar contact on plane 3,000 yards. SEW him from the bridge. 2143 another plane soon toward HULL. 2152 two more planes sighted. (111 A/C contact #38). For evidence that any of these planes saw us or that they had radar that would detect us. Plans were probably same group that had detected HULL about 1630. Patrolled SYS of HULL.

Nov. 27
0532 Y divad off HULL. Iain Y. 1015 HULL in sight. "gushed for raid.
1439 Y sighted 1500 BATT. (A/C contact #40).
180C Y drilled at battle stations submerged, sent deep for depth charge and silent running. Did this about once a week. 2005 Y surface ship did not afford a live target.
101C Y surfaced 10 miles S of HULL.
2005 Y numerous planes were seen and contacted by radar for the next hour. (A/C contact #41). Patrolled west of HULL. Very heavy rain.

Nov. 28
Strong east wind and heavy rain. Storm abated somewhat 0830.

— page 206 —
1020 I HILL in sight ahead. Div'd. Observed island for raids.
: 1525 I sighted: HILL low. ( /C contact #42).
: 1500 I sighted: HILL out on usual 1500 schedule. (1/C contact #45).
: 1750 I HILL or ESTRY took off from HILL. (A/C contact #44).
: 1658 Y surfaced. Radar held contact with HILL to 24,550 yards (best low land radar range during patrol).
: 2141 I sight and radar contact on lightened plane. (A/C contact #43). Usual searchlights on HILL.
: 2136 Y operated vicinity of HILL ISLAND, armout to 24,550 yards on north side of atoll.

Nov. 29
0345 I radar interference, strongest at 250. This was in direction of TOKIO A-53 or on 1-1/2 mile at 1/2 hour of atoll. This indication of radar near TOKIO A-53 not only caused us to dive immediately but influenced the manner in which we covered TOKIO A-53 after surfacing this evening of Nov. 30.
: 1934 Y surfaced 6 miles off pass.
: 1945 I radar interference again confirmed our opinion that a radar was near TOKIO armout. Patrol led of A-53 A-53 during night.

Nov. 30
0340 I div'd when land radar bearings and ranges indicated we were in position. Rain let up about 0730 and we found we were 8 miles east of HILL A-53 miles off the beach. Strong easterly current would prevent our reaching this pass subarrogad before noon. Hade preparations to run for it on surface during first small.
: 0623 I surfaced in heavy squall, proceeded at full power toward pass. 0630 div'd in position. Weather remained very rainy and rough seas made depth control difficult. By this time negative flood could not be closed and the "more effect from negative aggravated depth keeping. (See defects.)
: 1655 I sighted two planes patrolling north of atoll. Those were first planes we had seen north of atoll in two days. Felt soothing vs stirring. Not a close watch.
: 1740 I sighted a 7-10-1 and 3-3-1 on 1-1/2 hour of DD bearing 300, 10,000 yards, amble on the bow 30 port, approaching TOKIO A-53. (Ship contact #5). They tracked at 25 knots. The minimum range was about 8,000 yards. After they were inside the lagoon two CLS and the mast of 2 other ships, possibly DD's were seen close together.
: 1928 I surfaced. Took out to 1-1/2 hour A-53 to be in

— page 209 —
2209 Y sea-children on ILLI interittently.
2345 Y learned that plane was down off ILLI. ...so that strong land base. plane strikes would be made on ILLI Dec. 3.
Listened on 500 Kcs on surface hemsfortn. Proceeding to a point off ILLI I.

Dec. 3.
0130 Y received orders to remain ILLI for land based air strikes.
0245 Y decoded further dispatch on friendly plane down "victinity ILLI" and orders to make every effort to locate survivors. Proceeded.
0600 Y dived. 0650 surfaced. Searching for the crew of a Liberator. Zain in direction of ILLI, visibility less than 7 miles. 0702 land contact on 3d at 7 y miles. 0713 land sighted. Turned away from it, searching just outside visibility of land. Heard long message coded in numbers on 500 Kcs. 0650 visibility? Heard "SD in use. About 0830 the SD went out of commission for minor repairs. Had three surface lookouts, two sky lookouts, C.O., and C.O.D. on bridge.
0610 Y heard and saw small single engine monoplane (possibly LF) pulling out of a dive at same time two light bombs landed 100 yards broad on port bow. Dived. To damage. (A/C contact #47). 1040 back at periscope. Depth ILLI under observation re-arranged of day.
1342 Y ILLI landed at ILLI. (A/C contact #46).
1435 Y sighted seven small single engine monoplanes 3 miles away. (A/C contact #45).
1506 Y sighted a single engine monoplane. (A/C contact #51).
1611 Y sighted twin engine monoplane. (A/C contact #51).
1628 Y sighted a single engine monoplane. (A/C contact #51).
1524 Y sighted unidentified bomber, probably ILLI or BERYL. (A/C contact #55).
1645 Y sighted unidentified bomber, probably ILLI or BERYL. (A/C contact #55).
1647 Y surfaced 8 miles. 1 of ILLI. 2 of ILLI. 3 of ILLI. 4 of ILLI. 5 of ILLI. 6 of ILLI. 7 of ILLI. 8 of ILLI. 9 of ILLI. 10 of ILLI. 11 of ILLI. 12 of ILLI. 13 of ILLI. 14 of ILLI. 15 of ILLI. 16 of ILLI. 17 of ILLI. 18 of ILLI. 19 of ILLI. 20 of ILLI. 21 of ILLI. 22 of ILLI. 23 of ILLI. 24 of ILLI. 25 of ILLI. 26 of ILLI. 27 of ILLI. 28 of ILLI. 29 of ILLI. 30 of ILLI. 31 of ILLI. 32 of ILLI. 33 of ILLI. 34 of ILLI. 35 of ILLI. 36 of ILLI. 37 of ILLI. 38 of ILLI. 39 of ILLI. 40 of ILLI. 41 of ILLI. 42 of ILLI. 43 of ILLI. 44 of ILLI. 45 of ILLI. 46 of ILLI. 47 of ILLI. 48 of ILLI. 49 of ILLI. 50 of ILLI. 51 of ILLI. 52 of ILLI. 53 of ILLI. 54 of ILLI. 55 of ILLI. 56 of ILLI. 57 of ILLI. 58 of ILLI. 59 of ILLI. 60 of ILLI. 61 of ILLI. 62 of ILLI. 63 of ILLI. 64 of ILLI. 65 of ILLI. 66 of ILLI. 67 of ILLI. 68 of ILLI. 69 of ILLI. 70 of ILLI. 71 of ILLI. 72 of ILLI. 73 of ILLI. 74 of ILLI. 75 of ILLI. 76 of ILLI. 77 of ILLI. 78 of ILLI. 79 of ILLI. 80 of ILLI. 81 of ILLI. 82 of ILLI. 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of ILLI. 162 of ILLI. 163 of ILLI. 164 of ILLI. 165 of ILLI. 166 of ILLI. 167 of ILLI. 168 of ILLI. 169 of ILLI. 170 of ILLI. 171 of ILLI. 172 of ILLI. 173 of ILLI. 174 of ILLI. 175 of ILLI. 176 of ILLI. 177 of ILLI. 178 of ILLI. 179 of ILLI. 180 of ILLI. 181 of ILLI. 182 of ILLI. 183 of ILLI. 184 of ILLI. 185 of ILLI. 186 of ILLI. 187 of ILLI. 188 of ILLI. 189 of ILLI. 190 of ILLI. 191 of ILLI. 192 of ILLI. 193 of ILLI. 194 of ILLI. 195 of ILLI. 196 of ILLI. 197 of ILLI. 198 of ILLI. 199 of ILLI. 200 of ILLI. 201 of ILLI. 202 of ILLI. 203 of ILLI. 204 of ILLI. 205 of ILLI. 206 of ILLI. 207 of ILLI. 208 of ILLI. 209 of ILLI. 210 of ILLI. 211 of ILLI. 212 of ILLI. 213 of ILLI. 214 of ILLI. 215 of ILLI. 216 of ILLI. 217 of ILLI. 218 of ILLI. 219 of ILLI. 220 of ILLI. 221 of ILLI. 222 of ILLI. 223 of ILLI. 224 of ILLI. 225 of ILLI. 226 of ILLI. 227 of ILLI. 228 of ILLI. 229 of ILLI. 230 of ILLI. 231 of ILLI. 232 of ILLI. 233 of ILLI. 234 of ILLI. 235 of ILLI. 236 of ILLI. 237 of ILLI. 238 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— page 210 —
1201 Y observed smoke and explosions on NML. 1205 saw a burst near 5 of our bombers. Our information had been that this strike was scheduled for yesterday.

: 1215 Y raised SD antenna above water. 1217 saw a single engine monoplane gliding toward FLU. Distances were heard flooded negative and started down. Light explosions were heard through hull as plane probably strafed surface where he had seen our SD antenna and periscope. (A/C contact #57).

: 1435 Y saw BERTY land on NML. (A/C contact #57).

: 1510 Y another BERTY took off NML. (A/C contact #58).

: 1855 Y sighted low flying plane, probably BERTY, in evening twilight, running dark. (A/C contact #55).

: 1935 Y surfaced 20 miles S. of NML in bright moonlight. Opened out to report intensified enemy air patrols, bombed surface searches near NML, unsuccessful attack on cruiser, and intention to patrol off TOKIO. 253 in absence of information on downed aviators.

Dec. 5
: 0040 Y attempted to send message. TAP interference plus poor atmospheric conditions made it impossible. 0240 secured transmitter. Headed for slot end back down it toward TOKIO.

: 0604 Y dived on slot. 0700 at ULU ISL. D.

: 0843 Y sighted low flying NML. (A/C contact #60).

: 1233 Y lost all main yopulsib air auxiliary power for about one minute.

: 1600 Y sighted low flying NML. (A/C contact #61).

: 1926 Y surfaced in bright moonlight.

: 2200 Y delivered our 050920 to FTL.

: 2200 Y delivered slot to NMLISL. Listened on 300 Kcs. as usual.

Dec. 6.
: 0533 Y dived 6 miles I of ULU ISL. Patrol had a point 2 miles off TOKIO entrance. Rough seas. Rainy. No ships or planes sighted.

: 1537 Y surfaced 65 miles I of ULU ISL. D.

: Patrol left slot. No contacts.

Dec. 7
: 0504 Y battle stations on radar contact bearing 156, 10.5 miles. 1540. C518 secured from battle stations.

: 0555 Y dived 7 miles I of ULU ISL. Patrol had a point 3 miles off TOKIO.

: 1054 Y took pictures of BURIT, TOKIO, and NML ISL. DS near TOKIO entrance. Details of reconnaissance in appendix "A".

: 1540 Y surfaced 9 miles I of ULU ISL. D.

: Patrol left ULU ISL. D. slot.

Dec. 8
: 0529 Y dived 55 miles I of ULU ISL. D. Patrol had a point 3 miles off TOKIO.

-14- (Enclosure (.)) 15

— page 211 —
0C18 Y: sighted 3LL heading for 1LL. 0G21 safe sure or similar plane. (./C contact #62).
: 1200 Y: sighted small sail boat in lagoon. (Ship contact #13).
: 1826 Y: sighted smoke on 1LLI indicating another strike.
: 0512 Y: sighted light on 1LLI bearing 165.
: 0537 Y: surfaced 7.9 miles off 1LL. Almost full moon.
: 1635 Y: surfaced 7.9 miles off 1LL. Almost full moon.
: 1630 Y: sighted 3LDS contact 8 to 24 miles. (./C contact #63). Patrolled slot.

Dec. 9
: 0400 Y: sighted low flying lighted large three or four miles away on course. (A/C contact #64). Divel. Patrolled off 1LLI.
: 0829 Y: two distant unidentified planes toward 1LLI, possibly dog fighting. (A/C contact #65).
: 0649 Y: sighted small sail stick just inside lagoon. (ship contact #14).
: 1415 Y: sighted 1LLI over 1SLD, headed for 1LLI. (A/C contact #66).
: 1925 Y: surfaced. Patrolled slot to the 1st of 1LLD.

Dec. 10
: 0603 Y: dived 9 miles to 1LLS. Patrolled 3 miles off

— page 212 —
0703 Y sighted enemy heading south. (A/C contact #00 P-35). Proceeded to point 2 miles off P-00 P-35. On or about 2 miles south of P-00 P-35. Sighted. Proceeded toward P-00 P-35. At 1/2 mile on

— page 215 —
1555Y Off
11/15 11:11
: 1752Y Off
11/19 11:11
: 0524Y Off
11/20 11:11
: 0705Y Off
11/20 11:11
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11/22 11:11
: 1736Y Off
11/22 172-503
: 1653Y Off
11/22 172-503
: 1101Y Off
11/22 172-503
: 1754Y Off
11/25 172-503
: 175

— page 217 —
3. 15ACY Off 12/0 1111 Pil.ter 4 1 P
: 32. 104Y Off 1/0 1111 Bo'ber 7 1 P
: 34. 1937 Off 1/0 1111 Several 6-24 3D radar
: 35. 1004Y Off 12/4 1111 Pil.ter 7 1 P
: 37. 1453Y Off 12/4 1111 BMT 9 1 P
: 39. 151CY Off 12/4 1111 BMT 8 1 P
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: 186. 0650Y Off 12/8 1111 Uniden

— page 218 —
1705Y 10-22N 2 U-8 N SD Dived.
12/13 174-00E identified miles -- radar

(2) ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. "LU CEN TORPEDO ATTACK #1 PATROL #9

TIME 0520 MT DATE Dec. 2 LAT. 6-17N 10.0, 171-40E

TARGET DATA - Damage IT FLIGHT

Description: One MACAR class CL followed by one DD. Construct was made by Mk 8 radar at 12,920 yards, bearing 147. Night horizon was good to south- and but exceedingly murky to northward, especially so to northwest.

Ship(s) Sunk: None

Damage or Probable Damage (Ship): None

Target draft: 13 Course 300 (est.), Speed 27 (est.), range 1400 (at firing) av.

ON SHIP DATA

Speed: 11 Course 210 Depth surface Angle 0 (at firing).

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type attack: Right radar surface attack. Tracked target continuously from 12,920 yards bearing 147 by radar to 1200 yards bearing 179. Upon initial detection came to an estimated 90% track which was also firing course (210). Sighted target from bridge at 5000 yards, and very shortly afterwards saw a DD astern of CL. Solved targets course and speed by plot and TDC. Fired straight bow shots using bridge. Fired straight bow shots firing bearing 329. Fired first shot at 0 time 30' forward of stem; second shot at 10 seconds after just forward of bridge; third shot at 17 seconds after bridge; fourth shot at 25 seconds after deck house; fourth shot immediately after fourth shot when radar range was about 1100 last radar range before an event under was 850 yards. Torpedo run averaged about 1000 yards. Sound tracked unceremonied number of torpedoes running straight. At 0586 (seconds not recorded), heard 3 or possibly 4 loud

-22- (Enclosure (A)) 23

— page 219 —
1. TDC solution prior to firing
: 2. Plot solution prior to firing
: 3. Estimate from bridge by eye
: 4. DATA USED ON FILING
: 5. Reconstructed plot
: 6. Reconstructed plot of TDC data
: 7. Reconstructed from best navigational information
: 8. Best estimate after post-analysis

(b) Zero gyros and a pure longitudinal spread were used. The TDC, while entering radar range and bearings and using course 310, speed 26, generated hitting gyro angles (viz., with no spread) of 355, 000, 003, and 010 for the successive shots.

(c) About six minutes after shooting, three sound operators got turn counts on propellers, thought to have been the DD, of 205 to 208 ZF. This would indicate about 22 knots, and is widely at variance with radar data known to be reliable (unless target slowed after getting fairly well clear of pass).

The reason for misses is not known.

| Tubes Fired | #1  | #2  | #3  | #4  |
||-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Track angle | 90S | 90S | 90S | 90S |
| Gyro angle | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |
| Depth Set. | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 |
| Power | High | High | High | High |
| Hit of Miss | Miss | No | No | No |
| Miss | No | No | No | No |

— page 228 —
35-12N-16-3(8)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET hch
Serial 02017
CONFIDENTIAL

THIS ENFORCEMENT TO
PLACE REPORT OF
MINT: Harr Patrol
COMBAT SPA C PATROL REPORT NO. 339
U.S.S. PLUNGER - NINTH YEAR FLOOR

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SSN 75) - Report of Ninth Year Patrol.
(5 December to 18 December 1943).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominoch (5)
CNO (5)
Cinepac (6)
Total: Ceno. Pac (1)
Ocean Area: (1)
Comeservice (1)
(1st Base Plan, Unit) (1)
Cinelant (2)
Comsubplant (8)
S/M School, ML (2)
Comspac (2)
Comsowespace (2)
Comsubsowespace (2)
OTF 72 (2)
Comservice (2)
Comsubspace (20)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ComsubspaceSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Bit.
Commanders, Subspace (2)
Comsubstrainpac (2)
All submerines, Subspace (1)

A. A. WOODRUFF, J.R.
Flag Secretary.

— page 229 —
5/1/44
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

8 March 1944.

From: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Commander Submarine Division F.O.T.T. R.R.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUG, Report of War Patrol Number 7.

Inclosures: (1) Subject Report.
(2) Track Charts. (for Consubuca only).

1. Transcribe (1), covering the U.S.S. War patrol of this vessel conducted off the southeast coast of U.S.S. and during period 13 January, to 8 March 1944, is forwarded herewith.

2. B.B.S.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C

BY: OP-3267C DATE: 5/1/44

DECLASSIFIED

68686 FILMED

— page 230 —
1943, 1st patrol

CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. PLUG 3, Report of Tenth War Patrol

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived 1st December 18, 1943, from Ninth War Patrol. Dec. 18 to Jan. 2; received an excellent refit by Submarine Base, 1st, and Relief Crew, submarine Division 45. Repairs were THOROUGH and were carried to CONFLICT in an orderly procedure. Replaced two periscopes; overhauled three main engines; no major alterations completed. Jan. 3-5; loaded for training. Jan. 6, 8-10, including night of tenth, training and trials underway. Jan. 11-12; loaded. Lt. (jg) 3d. Lt. 1st,

— page 231 —
28
0745 N. bridge lookout sighted mast bearing 316, distance 7 miles. (Ship contact 12, 32-12N, 140-37E). Looked in over with periscope. Identified as an escort or patrol. Nilo searching for any other ship he might be locating, saw him turn toward us. Turned away at full speed.
0650 K sighted 40C SML. (in Southern Islands) 36 miles distance. Dived and patrolled across traffic lane along eastern side of 1st PO SOTO. Visibility was excellent and seas smooth, but no ships or planes were seen.
1806 N. surfaced with 40C SML bearing 322, 20 miles. Closed 40C. to check radar; initial range 14 miles. Tuned radar and held contact out to 18 miles.

Jan. 29
Crossed to western side of 40C SOTO. Patrolled for remainder of night and all the following day on this important north-south TOKYO traffic lane. Negative results.
0616 I dived 27 miles, bearing 135 from BAY. 13D 10C.S. Again visibility was high and seas smooth, but no ships or planes were seen. Possibly the vicinity was being given a wide berth because of STRIKE'S attack on convoy near here about a week ago. During day obtained deviation curve on magnetic compass.
1758 I surfaced 19 miles, bearing 026 from 40C. Headed up traffic lane along western side of 1st PO SOTO enroute area five. Stopped every quarter hour to listen for jingling. 2519 radar contact on 40C SML, bearing 040, 22 miles.

Jan. 30
0440 I radar contact bearing 500, 5800 yards. (Ship contact 43, 33-17N, 139-06S). Tracked him at battle stations. He was on course 025, speed 10. Nile ve were stopped, heard him echo ranging, long scale, with our 1st tuned on 10 Kcs. Radar lost contact at 7240 yards. Dropped the target and searched astern of him, but he was escorting nothing.
0626 I dived with 40C SML bearing 102, distance 52 miles. Throute assigned area. Patrolled across southwestern approaches to TOKYO. Visibility was generally good but no air or surface craft were seen.
1800 I surfaced. Headed for a point along the 40C COAST, 17 miles west of 0.1 SML. Very bright half moon set about 2240. No night patrols seen. SD was not used.

Jan. 31
Intended to dive 15 miles out, two hours before daylight but wound up less than five miles from the beach before radar picked up a peak further inland. Avoided three lighted sanjans.

— page 232 —
0514 I dived 13 miles, bearing 150 from [HANDWRITTEN: LIGHT. Patrolled 3 to 4 miles off shore in 50 to 150 fathoms. It was a clear sunny day with many white caps, which was fortunate, as perhaps a hundred planes were seen during the day, evidently from an air field a few miles north of KAKUZUKA. (A/C contact #1).

: 0811 I sighted ship bearing 050, 6000 yards. (Ship contact #4, 34-36N, 137-36S). He was a 2500 ton [HANDWRITTEN: BALLIST], unescorted, but covered by an air screen. He was armed forward, camouflaged, and zigging frequently. Thought we could do better. Turned away and let him go by 1700 yards astern.

: 0842 I sighted another small 1500 ton nondescript coaster headed west. (Ship contact #5, 34-35N, 137-36S). Lot him go by.

ATTACK NUIE 02F

: 1612 I sighted smoke and masts bearing 290, 7000 yards. (Ship contact #6, 34-38N, 137-46S). It developed into a convoy about 1500 yards ahead. Continued to zigzag in the strait, was about 2500 yards ahead. Continued to zigzag in the strait, was about

— page 233 —
12 imots on various courses. They sloved to four imots. Then they did this we sloved or stopped to avoic boing heard. No gradually worked around them and headed south. Lost contact on radar at 9560 yards.

0622 I dived 35 miles south of S. 1. Charge had been completed at 0605. Echo ranging was heard intermitently during day, and there was an occasional distant explosion. Hunt was still on. Very rough seas prohibited depth control at less than 2/3 speed. Ran at 90 feet except for an occasional look. 1805 I surfaced 97 miles, bearing 105, from S. 1. Brilliant half noon setting later than midnight makes viti- cravall from the coast after an attack difficult. Over, decided to patrol off S. 1. HI. following morning and to pull out at noon unless an attack could be delivered earlier. Proceeded accordingly.

Feb. 2
0024 I sighted S. 1. HI. LIE. which assisted greatly in reaching desired diving point 15 miles off S. 1. HI.
0145 I rear land contact bearing 15, over 40,000 yards.
0433 I dived 15 miles off S. 1. HI. hours before sun- rise. Estimate their land based radar range on a submarine at just under 15 miles, making it necessary to dive early and close the coast in darkness to be in a suitable patrol position by sunrise.
0537 I echo ranging to the S. 1.
0804 I reached position 2600 yards off S. 1. HI. Patrol led in vicinity. Avoided several fishermen.

HT-1. U.S. 1. HI. T.O.
0828 I sighted smoke bearing 214, distance 9 miles. (Ship contact 18, 55-35N, 125-003). Sighted air screen. Shook developed into a convoy of six freighters in to: columns. The port column was one small HI. freighter which was two miles further along than the leader of the starboard (savard) column. Sea was calm, with an occasional faint white cap. Crossed ahead of seavard column to attack from inbound side as scoots were expected to be on seavard side. Tracked small inbound freighter for speed. Sighted a squat funnel coal powder as the fourth ship insavard column. Passed down inbound side of this column and swung in toward this loaded medium freighter for bow shots at just under 1000 yards. Fired two torpedoes aimed to hit his forward and after holds. Shifted to small freighter astern and fired two torpedoes at his bow on a small track. First two torpedoes were heard to hit with 35s run. Next deep penetrating aerial bobbing. Escorts were hopelessly out of position to seavard.

(4) (HCLOUR (4))

— page 234 —
3SC 3CCL 1T.T.C.]. The depth charging which followed was long, persistent and inaccurate. Pinging was not used at any time. They never knew where we were but dropped about 140 depth charges or bombs. (See 3SC 3CCL 1T.T.C.). The ran as silent as FLU. It will run and opened the coast on a south-castory course, hoping the J.R. STRI. would help push us out. The came up for a look about 1201. Saw a plane. Sea was glassy with a light swell. At this point felt that the time we have taken during rests to trim the boat down to test for air leaks is well worth while. Ducked, oriscope and kept it down. Believed condition of surface made sighting of periscope too likely under the circumstances. Made reload and ran at 90 feet intending to look at any scores heard. 1311 explosions commenced getting much closer. Checked the boat again for leaks. No bubbles. No screws were heard but depth charges or bombs were in the vicinity. Sent back to battle stations and dropped down deep. Commenced a slow constant zig hoping to spoil any fancy air tracking that was going on. Explosions continued, gradually getting further away. Probably a strategic area bombing. 1900 reached periscope depth. Bright noon over clouds provided good all around indirect lighting. 2004 surfaced 25 miles SE of HILTON with explosions in distance. Headed out on 140 in light rain.

Decided not to attempt further patrols near beach until there was at least an hour between each of evening twilight and noon rise. Closing the coast should not be too difficult, but clearing the coast after an attack, under a bright noon, during a vigorous 3 hunt, is indeed serious business. Equipment any patrol in area 5 and 6 that was not along the coast would produce no results. Accordingly proceeded to an unassigned area about 90 miles 3T of BUCCO SUDO, on the UGO-3.1P.-TUKR run line. This was also on the TONL. CO TO-TONO run line. Hope the full moon would help us pick up a convoy in this vicinity.

Feb. 3
0654 I dived 30 miles south of SIOCO I.S.N.I. Patrolled south of HII SUDC in rough sea. 1750 surfaced. Headed west.

Feb. 4
0702 I dived on UGO-3.1P.-TUK route 50 miles from SHIZUAI SII. Rough sea. 1204 surfaced for good look around and sun line. 1212 dived. 1802 surfaced. Patrolled vicinity.

Feb. 5
0643 I dived. Fairly rough sea. 1510 surfaced for look and sun line. 1513 dived. 1812 surfaced. Patrolled across routes.

(5) (CLOSED (.))

— page 235 —
6
0635 I div'd. Patrols in smooth sea with excellent visibility.
1050 I sighted D.VF or FTS. Bearing 093, 4 miles. (A/C contact #4). He headed in that direction but plane was screening nothing. 1815 surfaced. Headed down S.I...route.
1941 I sighted small bleak vessel bearing 249, estimated range 5 miles. (Ship contact #9, 31-01N, 150-11). Received radar on bearing, but it could not pick him up. Initially opened target 2000 yards at 'mich time sight contact was lost. Reversed course and closed target five miles without regaining contact. There was a. suspicion this contact was a submarine. If so, there was a possibility that he was friendly although no 5J interference had been noticed. Having returned to within 2000 yards of contact's initial position, turned 90° to course 145 for about 15 miles, then resumed patrol.

Feb. 7
0623 I div'd. 'eather fairly smooth. 1038 sighted A.VF or EMILY flying boat headed west. (A/C contact 1517 surfaced. Patrols under full moon.

Feb. 8
0625 I div'd. eas moderate.
1512 I sourd. picked up noise which was very realistic, and was thought possibly a submarine submarine. Tracked him at battle stations. Turn counts of 100, 160, 90, and 50 rpm were obtained. kept headed for the alleged submarine at various depths. After about 45 minutes of this the submarine resolved into a school of fish.
1625 I sighted object bearing 004, distance 6 miles. (Ship contact #10, 31-09N, 135-35E). Tracked at battle stations. Periscope was quite foggy. Object developed into a large seamain with pilot house amidships. He had two tall slender radio masts. In the top of the pilot house he had a Charley mobile that looked like a periscope. At about 5000 yards his identity was finally clearly established. He was steering various courses, obviously not fishing, and apparently searching for submarines. Then he was about 1200 yards away he turned toward us and we went deep and rigged for silent running. There is no reason to believe he saw us, as he kept on going. Reached him disappear to westward. Considered running this fellow but believed we were in an excellent position to intercept a convoy so long as our presence remained undisclosed.
1821 I surfaced.
2024 I commenced getting radar interference on the 5J, bearing 029. (Ship contact #11, 31-02N, 135-46E). By 2048 its

— page 236 —
1. USS PLUGGER, Report of Tenth War Patrol.

bearing was 022, and by 2112 it was 012. It had all the characteristics of another SJ. To the best of our knowledge no friendly submarines were in the vicinity. He had obviously detected our presence as he kept trained on us for lengthy periods. Visibility under a full moon was excellent. 2117 dived and headed on last bearing of interference...after an hour and a half with no developments surfaced at 2302 and cleared the vicinity on all engines. No further interference. Thereafter we considered that there might be a friendly submarine in area seven.

Feb. 9
CSC I | Cmnd on SJF. route. Weather good.
1032 I | surfaced. Patrol led on surface until 1105. Then dived.
1322 I | sighted DAVE. (C/ contact #6).
1825 I | surfaced.
1922 I | sighted unidentified object bearing 340 in bright moonlight. (Ship contact #12, 30-59N, 133-41E). Turned away and coached radar on bearings, but nothing could be picked up. C.O. and O.C.J., having looked object over, believed it was a large ship perhaps 6 miles away. He headed for it on all engines, expecting radar to pick him up shortly. He were at battle stations and thought range was at least 6 miles when at 1930 the SJ picked him up at 2850 yards. Dived instantly to periscope depth making tubes ready. Sighted target in periscope and made him out as a sampan, and turned away with a guaranteed range of 850 yards. He was stopped. Sent deep and ran silent. Came back up and watched him. He remained stopped until we lost him. He gave no indication of having detected us but he should have unless all occupants were asleep. This may have been a trap. He let him alone.
2130 I surfaced and cleared vicinity.

Feb. 10
0625 I | dived on SUCO-TUR-3.1F. route. Patrol led in rough seas.
1815 I | surfaced.
1820 I | lookout reported gunfire bearing 030. Dived. There was a heavy cloud in that direction but nothing had been detected by radar. 1835 surfaced. All clear. Lightning was subsequently seen.

Feb. 11
0646 I | dived on SJF. route and worked northward intending to patrol off 113010 SJF tomorrow. 1300 surfaced for look around. 1310 dive.
1830 I | surfaced. Headed for 113010 SJF. The sea was flat calm and a brilliant full moon rose at 1935. There was not the faintest trace of a cloud in the sky. It was considered too

— page 237 —
1. U.S.S. FLUGER, Report of Tenth War Patrol.

bright to close the coast. At 2230 reversed course to work the routes from EUIGO to the South for two or three more days.

Feb. 12
0635 I dived, patrolled across the BUGO routes in rough seas.

0923 I sighted small fast monoplane bearing 240, distance 5 miles. (A/C contact #7). 1017 I saw same or another plane. 1814 I surfaced in a very rough sea, raining, visibility zero. Barometer dropped 13 points in 2 hours. Experienced current of 4.9 knots in JULI STRAIN. Proceeded westward, crossing BUGO-RABUL route.

Feb. 13
0625 I dived. Weather had cleared but seas were still high. Patrolled and RABUL and JULI routes. 1507 changed course to head for coast. 1831 surfaced.

1856 I sighted probable smoke bearing 261. Closed on that bearing on 4 engines for an hour. Smoke was most realistic. Turned south on a guess that ship was headed away from BUGO. Then moon came up visibility was almost like day. Nothing could be seen. 2141 headed for SHIGO JLS-KI.

Feb. 14
Crossing BUGO lanes.
0635 I dived. Patrolled in rather rough seas. Exercised fire control party and went deep for depth charge drill in preparation for following days' expected activities. 1820 surfaced 70 miles bearing 239 from SHIGO.

2212 I sighted a red orange flare like a railroad brakeman's fuzee, perhaps 2 miles away. (Ship contact #13, 33-01N, 135-01E). Dived. Turned away and listened. Heard nothing. 2235 surfaced. Suspected we may have been detected by a small boat. Cleared vicinity and voiced back toward SHIGO.

Feb. 15
0425 I radar contact on land 20 miles. 0432 dived two and a quarter hours before sunrise. Found isothermal down to 250 feet. Sighted numerous aircraft during the day. (J/C contact #9). Also avoided many trawlers, fishing boats, and possible patrol craft off SHIGO. (ship contact #14). Sound conditions were excellent.

1207 I sighted smoke from at least four unknown types vessels, bearing 306. (Ship contact #15, 33-25N, 135-45E). Sent to battle stations and tracked smoke which plotted N of SHIGO JLS-KI. Found range was over long as the ships proceeded toward KII SUGO. These ships did not pass SHIGO S-KI. Only smoke and nest tips were seen. It was determined that they

— page 238 —
1523 I sighted smoke and masts of U.S. freighter bearing 042, distance 6 miles. (Ship contact #IC, 35-25T, 135-37T). He was camouflaged with a mottled reddish brown which blended almost perfectly with the beach. He had a high white tipped masts. Estimated 4000 tons. He had a D.V.A air screen but no surface escort. Wound up with a minimum range of 2400 yards when we were 3600 yards off the beach. Whether to accept this shot, or let him go by, was a very close decision. Data looked good. 1357 fired three torpedoes 1/5 length inside bow, 1/5 length inside stern and 1 length astern. The unbalanced spread was intended to cover any maneuvers to avoid. No hits. Evidently neither the target nor air screen saw wakes until torpedoes hit the beach. He or the planes began dropping depth charges, and shells were heard hitting water. After all torpedoes hit the beach saw target emit much smoke as he went ahead full. Aircraft were dropping bombs without knowing where we were. Sent deep and went to st.n.d. dard speed to clear firing point. Slowed and heard screws. Ran silent as we opened coast. The enemy carried out another vigorous but inaccurate depth charge attack, cropping 61 depth charges or bombs during a period of 2h hours. (See TRIP COUTTLET, MT. 1. 1750 I reached periscope depth. All clear until 1.17 when sound picked up light fast screws, which we could not see because of darkness. Put him astern and soon lost him. 1954 I surfaced and headed south. 2143 I sent dispatch reporting results to Cate, and that one bow and four stern torpedoes remained. Headed east to continue patrol along NAPO SHOTO where stern torpedoes could be more advantageous fired than along the coast.

Feb. 16
0558 I. 1. 1124 I sighted plane. (A/C contact #11).
1615 I sighted HACHIO JI and AOC. SHI to eastward.
1617 I surfaced. Patrolled on west side of TRIP SHOTO on TOKYO H-3 traffic lane.

Feb. 17
0544 I. 1. 155. 0544 I. 1. 155

— page 240 —
1. USS PLUG 3, Report of Tenth "ar Patrol

ago. The radar, TDC, and fire control circuits were suffering from moisture incidental to the loss of the air conditioning plant. Sent to 80 feet and commenced repairs.
1547 I refit complete. Both propellers and full power available. The auxiliar* gang can fix anything. Tried to run at periscope depth, but it was too rough. Sent back to 80 feet. 40 foot periscope would be very helpful on rough days.
1800 I surfaced. Patrol led in stormy seas west of 1-40 SHOT.

Feb. 22
0511 I sighted 40C bearing 035, 01 miles.
0547 I dived. Patrol led west of the H.C.H.I.D.-OC line in rough sea. 1150 sighted medium bomber headed 11. (../C contact #13). 1817 surfaced. Passed between H.C.H.I.D. and OC.
2038 I intercepted submarine contact report on southbound convoy. Headed south at best speed. Doping to contact convoy at dawn. 2245 reached finishing rate on battery charge. Sent to full power on all main generators. Seas were smooth enabling PLUG to make 17 knots. Visibility was poor to indifferent.

Feb. 23
0003 I lookout sighted low dark object, bearing 500 relative, close aboard. A white light flashed three times, like a blinker gun. Turned hard away and lost object astern. (Ship contact #17, 51-56N, 140-24E). Could not get a radar contact, although 3J had given us a 26 mile range on OC. A few hours earlier. Lookout called this a submarine on converging course. Realized it might be one of ours but had no 3J interference. Avoided and resumed chase.
0150 I radar contact bearing 123, 7 miles. (Ship contact #18, 31-21N, 140-28E). Battle stations.
0153 I sighted a fishing boat close aboard on same bearing as radar contact. (Ship contact #19, 51-27N, 140-26E). Boat apparently opened lighted engine compartment which revealed his presence. Avoided fisherman at full speed and headed back for 7 mile radar contact.
0200 I regained radar contact bearing 140, 8 miles. Traced two ships which were zigging widely on base course 160, speed 10. Visibility was very poor and ships could not be seen. The only means we had for determining the size of these ships was their appearance on the radar, plus the fact that they were zigging. We knew our equipment was working well from a recent 26 mile check on OC. Back in 1L. We had no difficulty in tracking the OC out to 17000 yards. Pigs on these two ships were very weak and frequently faded completely, even at ranges down to 9000 yards. Our radar department thought that in all probability these pigs were escorts or small freighter size. Plot showed them headed toward the estimated noon position of the

— page 242 —
1942, 1st patrol, 100th war patrol, U.S.S. FLUEGR, report of Tenth War Patrol.

---

**Papa's:** port became three wars a medium or large (11 in a) which was selected as the secondary target. On "Mama's" port began was another medium, outboard of which were two escorts. One of those escorts was ranging well ahead. Data on convoy other than on primary and secondary target is based mainly on swops in low power. There were zigging wildly, more or less together. Escorts were echo ranging. Scars were almost calm, with a ripple on swells about 2 feet high. Then target was at about 5000 yards, sound reported a torpedo closing on a constant bearing of 65 relative, which was the bearing of an escort. Flooded negative and went to 100 feet, after which reported torpedo could no longer be heard. Came back to periscope depth. A range of about 1500 yards the primary target zigged, increasing in angle on the bow from 15P to 70P. Fired our only forward torpedo at his attack at 900 yards. Heard this hit while getting a set up on secondary target for stern shots. "Mama" was crossing our stern at a range of about 250 yards. Swaying ship and waited for range to open for shots on a large track. Escorts were not close; saw them coiling in on both beams. Also saw that "Papa" was after anti-ships. Already the oil had spread out from his beam and was burning alongside. It was a lovely sight. Before any possible shot developed on secondary target there was a loud explosion near the conning tower. "Mama" had probably tossed it over. Went deep and took the most severe depth charging the PLUGGED has had in ten patrols. (See THIRD COUTTER ATTACK.)

1451 I heard what sounded like target sinking. This noise was clearly audible through the hull. 1456 started up.

1509 I reached periscope depth, all clear class aboard. There was much smoke apparently from oil burning on the surface bearing 195 to 198. Saw mast of one escort near source of smoke. Concluded that the target had sunk at the attack point which plot showed was 10,800 yards away, bearing 197. Secured ship from depth charge and silent running. During remainder of afternoon escort mast were in sight intermittently as the search using echo ranging.

1826 I surfaced in a flat calm sea in poor visibility. Our fuel situation precluded any further chase. Set course for our return track.

This convoy contained some valuable ships and was a long way from S.I.F. or TRU. He still had four excellent torpedoes and 28,000 gallons of fuel. Believe we could have overtaken and made another attack, and at same time lead other submarines to this convoy for its complete deletion. However, this would have required refueling PLUGGED at sea from another submarine, we could like to practice this during our next training period, using a flexible fire hose.

2150 I commenced transmitting contact report on convoy and result of attack.

— page 243 —
2203 I while still transmitting, sighted distant white light bearing 155. (Ship contact #23, 30-16N, 141-40E). Avoided.
2217 I transmission completed.

Feb. 24
0250 I sighted white light bearing 210, closing. (Ship contact #24, 30-16N, 142-10E). Avoided.
0325 I sighted distant lighted plane bearing 180. He was circling at varying altitudes and was in sight for at least ten minutes. (A/C contact #14). This is considered highly significant as the visibility was poor. He may have been searching with instruments for submarines.
0523 I dived. Shoots seas and high visibility. Patrolled seaward routes 3E of TOKYO.
1524 I surfaced to investigate possible pinging reported by sound. Sighted nothing. 1529 dived.
1745 I surfaced. Proceeding toward INDIAY. Weather was stormy for two days, then moderated.

Feb. 25 - 1ar. 2
Uneventful passage to INDIAY. Steamed on two engines in rough following sea, making 10 knots.

March 3
0520 Y sighted TAC.
0600 Y made rendezvous with planes.
0956 Y moored INDIAY. Received fuel and a few fresh provisions.
1639 Y underway from INDIAY for PEARL.

March 4 to 7
Enroute PEARL.

March 8
0720 VW made rendezvous with POCY and PC 602. VW moored Submarine Base, PEARL.

(C) ENTER

(a) Enroute from INDIAY to III SUDO in JULY rough seas and strong head winds were encountered. Speeds as low as 5 knots had to be used to minimize the amount of water taken down the

(14) (TOLSTOY (..))

— page 244 —
U.S.S. LUGER, Report of Tenth Tar Patrol.

conning tower hatch and main induction. Hailstorms were frequent. By the time of arrival in the area most of the binoculars were damaged from water. This handicapped the ship's lookouts in patrol operations. (b) Off the SE coast of HOSHU the weather was too rough for good periscope patrolling about eighty percent of the time. Fortunately, on the days we patrolled close to the coast, the seas did not hamper our periscope work. This may be because of the lee afforded by the land. (c) Returning to LIDAY the weather was as per pilots.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

Off the SE coast of HOSHU (February), currents usually conformed with charts and Pilots as to set, but drift varied considerably. Near HACHIJO JIMA and OCCHU currents as high as 4.5 knots were encountered, in some cases opposite in direction to that expected.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

Charts were adequate for inshore navigation. Daylight navigation along the coast of HOSHU was always done submerged in the vicinity of lighthouse which enabled us to fix positions readily. As we closed the coast, before lighthouses were picked up, mountain peak piloting was resorted to with indifferent results, mostly because we could not identify the many peaks on the rugged coast. The 3rd radar was invaluable in closing the coast during darkness, in view of the changes in current that occur close in.

On the night of 1-2 February, 1944, HACHIJO JIMA light was sighted at 0024 from the bridge at a range of 26 miles. Its timed characteristics were: Group (3) flashing white every 15 seconds. This light was extinguished at about 0215 when it was 21 miles distant. HACHIJO JIMA light was also picked up, at a distance of about 9 miles, later the same morning, burning with normal characteristics. We were submerged at the time.

The view of OCCHU as shown on H.O. chart 5257 is approximately correct, but the picture of H.O. on page 658 of the J.P. pilot Vol II, 1940, is of some other island.

During the heavy weather experienced on this patrol, spray drenched both Navigator and escort sentry. As a result the sentry's horizon and index mirrors were ruined. By backing both mirror holders with paper adhesive tape and scotch tape, water was kept out, and this trouble was practically eliminated. Also, on dark nights with poor horizons, the invariable coat of spray made the clear section of the horizon mirror almost opaque. As a result, the horizon was lost at the left edge of the mirror. Lt MIDWAY, enroute P.H.A., cut away transparent part of horizon glass. Preliminary test looks good. Will try it in area next patrol.

(15) (RESOLVE (A))

— page 245 —
1. 1624(I) 35-18N
Jan 26 147-36E

2. 0745(I) 32-13N
Jan 28 140-37E

3. 0440(I) 33-17N
Jan 30 159-06E

4. 0611(I) 34-36N
Jan 31 137-36E

5. 0842(I) 34-35N
Jan 31 137-36E

6. 1612(I) 54-38N
Jan 31 137-48E

7. 0025(I) 34-14N
Feb 1 137-55N

2. Patrol boat
Patrol boat
Patrol boat
Patrol boat
Small freighter camouflaged
Small freighter.
Medium -I, lo, squat stack.
6500 tons.
(2 hits)

2. Patrol boat
Two trawlers, 214 probably pat- 20000
316
15000
300
6200
050
6000
056
15000
280
7000
196
8500
Various A
4 ot 12

(16) (CLOSURE (.))

— page 246 —
8. 0828(I) 33-35T Convoy consisted of 6 small and medium AS. (four hits)

9. 1941(I) 31-20N Small black object.

10. 1625(I) 31-09T Fishing boat or A/S vessel.

11. 2024(I) 31-02T Unknown (SU inter-ference).

12. 1922(I) 30-59N Small sawn high bow and stern.

13. 2212(I) 33-01N Red orange flare.

14. Var. Off SHOOO Numerous small craft.

15. 1207(I) 33-25T Smoke over 8 miles.

16. 1323(I) 33-25T. H. A. 4000 tons.

195. 1523(I) 33-25

— page 248 —
3.3. LUNGA, Report of Tenth War Patrol.

seen in areas five and six were within 3000 yards of the shore. Their surface escorts were to seaward.

(2) No ships, other than large sampans, were seen 50 to 120 miles from BUCO SUDO on the direct routes from BUCO TO S.IF., TRU, ALU, or RABUL, over a period of several days early in February. However, the JTS kept the vicinity under air patrol, possibly indicating that we were missing convoys being routed along these important lanes.

(G) PLANE CO.T.CTS

| DATE | LAT  | TYPE | BAG. | DIST. | CON- | COUS | TACTED | R.I. | R. |
|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------||------|----|
| NO.  | TITL | LOG | TYPE | UNKNOWN | 15 mi. | --  | --     | --  | -- |
| 1.  | 0637(I) | 33-29N | Unknown | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Jan22 | 163-08E | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 2.  | 0706(I) | 34-36N | Unknown | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Jan 31 | 137-56E | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 3.  | 0756(I) | 33-33N | Float type | -- | -- | Var. | DP | -- | -- |
| Feb 2 | 136-00E | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 4.  | 1050(I) | 31-33N | D.V.F | 093 | 4 mi. | Var. | DP | -- | -- |
| Feb 6 | 133-25E | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 5.  | 1039(I) | 31-24N | E.ILY | 025 | 6-7 mi. | DP | -- | -- | -- |
| Feb 7 | 103-47E | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 6.  | 1322(I) | 30-38N | J.IVIS | 223 | 4 to 5 miles. | 250 | -- | -- | -- |
| Feb 9 | 133-54E | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 7.  | 0923(I) | 31-45N | Small mono-plane. | 241 | 5 mi. | 150 | -- | -- | -- |
| Feb 12 | 133-15E | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 8.  | 1017(I) | 31-45N | Small mono-plane. | 045 | 4 mi. | 35 | -- | -- | -- |
| Feb 12 | 135-22E | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 9.  | Var. | SEI.CO | Various | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Feb 15 | J.S.M.I | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

(19) (INCLUSIVE (..))

— page 249 —
10. 1350(I) 33-27N D.T. 4-5 mi. -- DF air screen for convoy.
Feb 15 135-47E --
11. 1124(I) 32-30N Unidenti- 270 N DP
Feb 16 138-40E fied. 10 mi. --
12. 0924(I) 32-14I Biplane 154 N DP Non retract-
Feb 20 135-01S able wheels.
Old single
engine land bi-
plane.
13. 1150(I) 32-37N Iedium 017 N DF Circling over
Feb 22 139-22E bombor. 5 mi. -- H.CHUDO JUN.
14. 0325(I) 30-20N -- 180 -- IL Plane circled
Feb 24 142-24E 6 mi. -- over the water.
Running lights
were on. Plane
was in sight
for about 10
min.

(TEXT OF DOCUMENT)
U.S.S. FLUGER
Torpedo Attack No. 1
Patrol No. 10
TIE 1636 I Date Jan 31, 1944 Lat. 34-37N Long. 137-50E
0736 Z Jan 31, 1944

TARGET DATA:
Very heavily laden medium freighter with one
broad squat funnel and two coal-joint type masts;
headed toward TOKYO. --prepared to have very
broad beam, and in view of his low freeboard,
man have been on one carrier. He was heavily
escorted by two CHIIDOI TADS and a small fre-
ighter type escort, and was covered by an air
screen, indicating a ship or cargo of unusual
value. They were sighted by periscope in mid-
afternoon in good visibility while patrolling
the SE coast of H.SHU, 17 miles west of O.HI
S.M.I.

Ship(s) Sunk
(20) (H.CHUDO (..))

— page 250 —
U.S.S. FLUGEL, Report of Tenth Tar Patrol.

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk
One heavily laden 6500 ton freighter believed sunk.

Damage Determined By
Heard two timed hits from a four torpedo spread covering 200/s of target length. Explosion table:
00s fired 1 1-49s muffled explosion
08s fired 2 2-00s explosion
17s fired 3 3-13s explosion
27s fired 4 5-42s explosion
Explosions heard 8-19 depth charge
throughout boat 8-21 depth charge
and on sound gear 8-30 depth charge
8-43 depth charge

This indicates that third and fourth torpedoes hit with torpedo runs within 125 yards of TDC generated torpedo run of 2200 yards, and at proper interval. Immediately after firing, we went ahead full and started deep, at which time sound lost target screws because of on-proceedings and torpedoes running. Target's screws were never heard again. The target was not heard breaking up around the dial, together with a close depth charging could have come out breaking up noises. Target was loaded so heavily that it is considered that he did not have enough reserve buoyancy to survive even one torpedo hit, much less two hits. The moderately rough sea existing makes it unlikely that he could have reached the beach about a mile away. The three escorts gave their undivided attention to the FLUGEL for more than an hour after the attack. It is believed that he sank immediately after being hit.

Target Draft 26' Course 055 speed 9 range (TDC) 2200

O.I. SHIP DET.

Speed 3.4 Course 325 Depth 55' angle 00

FIRST CONTACT OF TORPEDO DET.

This was a daylight periscope approach. Target's speed was solved by plot and TDC. Gyros were matched and the hold bearing method employed. Torpedoes were spread longitudinally, points of aim being 2 length ahead, 2 length inside bow, 2 length inside

— page 252 —
3.5 Course 090 Depth '57' .angle 0°

FIRST COASTAL TARGET D.T.

Sighted smoke with periscope in daylight. Developed into northbound convoy described above. Crossed ahead to inbound side as it was expected his escorts were to seaward. Saw two D.V. air screens, one well ahead, and one over convoy. Tracking leading inbound ship on TDC and plot for speed. Suspected he was an escort.

(23) (I CLOSURE (..))

— page 253 —
1. U.S.S. FLUGER, Report of Tenth Tar Patrol.

shifted targets to leading ship of outboard column, and headed down between columns. Saw that fourth ship in outboard column was the only goal poster. Raised for him, and turned in at 11:11 with bow bearings method, aimed to hit forward and after holds. Never these torpedoes could not miss, and heard them hit while getting set-up on next freighter. Fired two torpedoes at second freighter's bow on a 32P track with gyros of 040, TDC range 1430. The second freighter is believed to have been swinging right. Board those two torpedoes hit with 35s run. Sent deep immediately after firing at second freighter, expecting aerial bombing.

| TUBES FIRED | '1' | '2' | '3' | '4' |
||-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Track angle | 115F | 115P | 32P | 32P |
| Gyro angle | 343 | 345 | 048 | 048 |
| Depth Set | 9' | 9' | 9' | 9' |
| Power | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or Miss | Hit | Hit | Hit | Hit |
| Drastic | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Ink. Torpedo | 14-8. | 14-3. | 14-3. | 14-3. |
| Serial No. | 25527 | 23238 | 25238 | 24227 |
| Ink. Exploder | 6-1. | 6-1. | 6-1. | 6-1. |
| Serial No. | 4754 | 12537 | 12688 | 6649 |
| Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation actual | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Ink. 'Arhead | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No. | 10303 | 11267 | 11068 | 10164 |
| Explosive | TP. | TP. | TP. | TP. |
| Firing Interval | 10s | 35s | 7s | 7s |
| Type Spread | * | * | * | * |
| Sea Conditions | .n. occasional faint white cap. | | | |
| Overhaul activity | S/1 Base, 11D.Y. | | | |

* '1' fired at forward well deck, '2' at after well deck of first target. '3' and '4' fired at bow of second.

U.S.S. FLUGER
TORPEDO ATTACK #3
PATROL NO. 10
TITAN 1357 I D.TE Feb 15, 1944 Lat. 25-10N Long. 136-10E 0457 Z
Feb 15, 1944

TORPEDO D.T. - D.C.G. T. N. L. I. C. D.

Description
4000 ton T.T. coastal freighter, well camouflaged, with white tipped high masts. Sighted with periscope in high visibility. Saw one air screen. To surface escort.

(24) (INCLOSURE (..))

— page 255 —
1/5 length inside bow, 1/5 length inside stern, and 1 length astern. Misses attributed to excessive range.

U.S. FLAG: Torpedo Attack No. 4 Patrol No. 10
TLS 1227 I Date Feb 15, 1944 Lat. 30-30N Long. 140-20E
0327 Z Feb 15, 1944

Description:
Four or five freighters in loose line abreast with two escorts on each flank. Target was large KMT. three goal post freighter possibly acting as a naval auxiliary. Convoy was south bound on TOKYO-SH.P.I.-TUN lane, east of 1-170 SOTO. Slight smoke with high periscope while hunting on surface.

Ship(s) Sunk
Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk

One large , possibly acting as a naval auxiliary, believed sunk. Estimated 7500 tons.

Damage Determined By:
Heard the torpedo hit and immediately after-ward observed target in flares and apparently stopped. He was burning badly a.idships and much oil was burning in the water alongside him. This may have been a gasoline fire. At this point we were forced down and depth charged. At 1451, two and a half hours after the attack, heard breaking up noises through the hull. At 1509 observed much smoke, apparently from oil burning on water at attack point, 10,800 yards away. One escort was seen circling this smoke, and one or two others were heard pinging in the vicinity for the next hour. This attack was observed by 3-100 and possibly another friendly submarine. This target is claimed sunk.

Target Draft 26' Course 185 Speed 10.5 Range 950

C.M SHIP D.TA

Speed 3 Course 300 Depth 56' angle 0°

FIRST CO.TROL AND TORPEDO D.TA

1118 sighted masts with periscope. Made periscope approach on large as primary target and medium as secondary target. At 1300 yards primary target zigged, increasing angle on bow from

— page 256 —
15P to 70P. Attacked him with our only bow torpedo at 950 yards, on 99P track, gyro 526. Secondary target was crossing our stern at about 250 yards. A heavy explosion occurred near conning tower before range on secondary target was great enough to shoot. Sent deep.

FOURTH ATTACK:

Tube Fired
Track Angle
Gyro Angle
Depth Set
Po er
Hit or liss
Brantic
Hk. Torpedo
Serial No.
Hk. Exploder
Serial No.
Actuation Set
Actuation Actual
Hk. Harhead
Serial No.
Explosive
Firing Interval
Type Spread
Sea Condition
Overhaul Activity

(I) LINES
To data.

(J) A/S MEASURES

Pursuant to a recent directive by CIO, the .../S. I. SULUS are covered in a greater detail than heretofore.

FIRST COUTAR ATTACK: A medium or large ...H proceeding along HONSHU coast had two CHLORIS on his seaward quarter, the first about 1500 yards, and the second about 3000 yards. He had a small freighter type escort about 2500 yards ahead. This freighter escort had a crows nest in his forecast. The CHLORIS echo ranged long scale during the approach. The small freighter was never heard echo ranging. Just before we attacked, one of the CHLORIS shifted to short scale keying causing us to hasten the attack by firing 100 before gyros reached zero. He probably got a doubtful contact on us at about 2000 yards when near our beam. ... in isothermal existed down to 260 feet. Seas were moderately rough. Fired

(27) (CLOSURE (-.))

— page 257 —
1635-55 to 1637-22. Torpedoes hit at 1638-44 and 1638-55. The most two explosions at 1640-00 and 1642-37 may have been torpedoes at end of run or when hit the beach. After torpedoes hit, both escorts used short scale. Light fast screws and echo ranging were almost all around the dial. The first barrage of 5 depth charges exploded at 1645-14, 15, 16, 25, 56 and 43 seconds. To think this barrage was fairly close along the port side and NOT near the firing point, nor on torpedo wakes. Lights broke, valves opened, and loose gear bounced around. The had gone ahead full, and swung toward the escorts hoping to pass between them as we increased depth to 260 feet. After about three or four minutes slowed to 75 ft. Ship was kept swinging in an attempt to put escorts abaft beam and to prevent their crossing ahead. Then escorts were heard coming in from ahead, and crossing bow, tried to swing toward to spoil run. The small freighter did not echo range; he seemed to hold position near our port beam and one of his attacks was particularly well delivered across our bow. There is a strong suspicion that he was equipped with some means of ranging because his attacks were very good to have been delivered on listening data only. No pinging could be heard coming from him on 14 to 35 Kcs. The first few runs were apparently made on reasonably good data as the bearing of the attacking escort moved up the beam and across the bow in the after-ward fashion for a good drop. Then an echo ranging attack was made the pinging continued during and after the drop, at various times during the attack, heard screws and pinging from an escort known to be stopped; and at times pinging and screws were stopped and the escort was known to be close. At times long dashes varying from 6 to 30 seconds in duration were heard, but this was noted only after they had lost us. Air screen and sea condition prevented detailed observation of any equipment on escorts. The small escort type freighter was noticeably light in draft. It is our impression that attacks were made at rather low speeds, possibly as low as 10 knots, but we think they used stern drops. The barrages came at 1645, 1650, 1655, 1700, 1725, 1734, and 1738. The estimate that charges were not heavier than 600 lbs. One barrage thought to have been the second, knocked the boat down from 250 feet to 260 feet, indicating a depth setting less than 250. Another barrage moved the boat distinctly upward at least 10 feet from 260 to 250 feet. The worst shock was in pump room. While some of these barrages were well delivered none caused any real damage or leaks. The hunt after this attack lasted well into the night, echo ranging or screws being heard until 2210. The second attack at 2546, 12 miles bearing 164 from attack point, fifteen minutes after a half moon had set. At 0025 encountered two patrols 23 miles, bearing 173, from the attack point. Throughout the following day echo ranging and distant explosions were heard while about 60 miles south of the attack point.

— page 261 —
1. IN HOT LUB OIL COLD COLD both failed within three days after being bombed at periscope depth. The spare cooler was installed and one leaky core was repaired and replaced. 2. COLD CO

— page 262 —
1. U.S.S. FLUGER, Report of Tenth War Patrol.

On one occasion we heard J.P. transmissions on 460 Kc. that sounded very close. It was most desirable to DF those transmissions. I feel that the ship's JDF should be made useful instead of being decommissioned.

(1) RADAR

The 3D radar performed satisfactorily. I've become so DF conscious of the 3D that it was not used near the Empire. On bright moonlight nights we felt the need for an aircraft warning radar that was not so likely to attract aircraft and .../S vessels.

SJ RADAR: The invaluable 3D radar performed satisfactorily during the entire patrol except for the loss of lobe switching shortly after arrival in the area. The trouble was traced to the antenna assembly but it was deemed inadvisable to remove the cover plate from the back of the antenna to eliminate the trouble while in the area. Two instances of interference from other radars on this patrol, plus our experiences of last patrol when we were unable to identify 3D boogers during r. scue operations, have convinced us that I'm equipment should be installed at the earliest possible time. In the interim some method of signalling with the 3D is needed.

(2) SOUND GEAR AND SCUD CODES

The JK and JK-3C equipment was satisfactory. It is hoped the new type JP head will prove more useful than the old toroid type.

In January and February sound conditions were excellent off SHIOTO, LITTORI and OAI SAI. They were good along the NOTO SHOTQ and 50 to 120 miles SE of BUGO.

(3) DEFICIT LAYS

Isothermal down to 260 feet were found in January and February between LIDL and the Empire. "Ithin five miles of the coast, off SHIOTO, LITTORI, and OAI SAI, negative gradients of 2° to 4° were found with the breaks between 140 and 180 feet keel depth. BT cards have been mailed to CIO.

(4) HEALTH, FOOD, .../SABILITY

The health of the crew remained generally good. Common colds were few considering the winter ACSU area of operations, and usual vet bridge frost storm seas. Colds responded satisfactorily to simple treatment with Alir of Terpin Hydrate, ...F.C. capsules,

— page 264 —
U.S.S. LUCER, report of Tenth Tar Patrol.

Days enroute to INDY: 9
Days enroute INDY to PEAL: 5
Days submerged: 27

(T) FACTORS OF DIRECT RATIFICATION

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor

4 800 gallons 15 days (at INDY)

Limiting factor this patrol was insufficient fuel.

(U) REMARKS

None.

(35)

— page 265 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. FLUNGER - Report of War Patrol Number TEN, Comments on.

1. The tenth war patrol of FLUNGER was of fifty-six days' duration. It was conducted off the southeast coast of HONSHU and SHIKOZU. It was characterized by competent planning, aggressiveness, and skillful attacks. The great possibilities of immediate counter-attack from escorting aircraft prevented witnessing of sinking on certain attacks. All attacks were made in daylight.

2. ATTACK NO. 1
   Four torpedoes were fired at a medium A, heavily loaded. This was the best target in a convoy escorted by two CHIDORI's and aircraft. Two timed hits were heard while FLUNGER was going deep. The target probably sank.

ATTACK NO. 2
   Two torpedoes were fired at each of two ships in a convoy. Timed hits were obtained with all four torpedoes. Both ships probably sank.

ATTACK NO. 3
   Three torpedoes were fired at a 4,000 ton coastal freighter with air escort. Firing range of 2,400 yards is not considered cause for missing; error in speed estimate seems more probable.

— page 266 —
1/2" FIRE CONTROL TORPEDO
Serial (022) Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
COORDINATOR
FIRST AND SECOND TORPEDO
CO FLUNGER CONF. LTR.
of 8 March 1944.
Subject: U.S.S. FLUNGER - Report of War Patrol Number TEN,
Comments on:

ATTACK NO. 4

One torpedo, only one left forward, was fired at
a large AK at 900 yards range. A hit was obtained and target was
observed to be on fire. Definite breaking up noises were heard
and the ship undoubtedly sank. Set up for firing stern tubes at a
medium AK in same convoy was spoiled by start of counter-attack
before range opened out sufficiently.

4. The discussion of counter-measures is complete.
The proposal to fuel submarines at sea employing fire hose appears
to have merit and trial is recommended.

Although many submarines pressure test all torpedoes
in tubes after departure for patrol, the practice is not believed
universal. FLUNGER's experience should convince all of the
necessity for such test.

5. The Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew of
FLUNGER are congratulated for a very successful and aggressive
patrol. Seven hits for twelve torpedoes fired at targets with
surface and air escorts speaks highly for the efficiency of the
fire control party. It is recommended that FLUNGER be credited
with inflicting the following damage to the enemy:

SUCK

1 Freighter 6,500 tons
1 Medium Freighter 5,500 tons
1 MFR Freighter 3,000 tons
1 large AK 7,500 tons
TOTAL22,500 tons

D.C. WHITE.

Copy to:
CO FLUNGER

— page 267 —
11/jak
FC5-4/A16-3
Serial 077
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
13 March 1944

CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO PLUNGER Conf. Ltr.
of 8 March 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER - Report of War Patrol Number TEN.

1. Forwarded, fully concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division FORTY-THREE.

2. All of the PLUNGER's ten war patrols have been successful. There is no better criterion for judging the ability of the commanding officer, officers and crew than by the results obtained.

3. With great pleasure the Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR congratulates the commanding officer, officers and crew on another of their long string of victories.

C. E. McMISEN.

— page 268 —
1/2-10/A16-3(15)/(1-2) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET mr
Serial 053
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PLUNGER Report of
Tenth War Patrol.
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 388
U.S.S. PLUNGER - TENTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.
(13 January 1944 to 8 March 1944).
1. The tenth war patrol of the PLUNGER was conducted in the Empire Area.
2. In keeping with previous performances, the PLUNGER turned in another excellent patrol. All attacks were well planned and determined and most aggressively conducted in the face of strong enemy anti-submarine measures.
3. The Commanding Officer's remarks regarding improvement of enemy anti-submarine measures are timely. We must be constantly on the alert for any new anti-submarine methods the enemy might employ. The nine light and close explosions heard during Counter Attack No. 4 might be an indication of a new development.
4. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.
5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this well conducted and very aggressive war patrol. The PLUNGER is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

SUNK
1 - Freighter (class unknown) - 6,500 tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - Freighter (class unknown) - 5,500 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Freighter (class unknown) - 3,000 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Freighter (class unknown) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 4)

TOTAL 22,500 tons

Distribution and authentication on following
C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

— page 269 —
11/1/44
FF12-10/A16-3(15)/  SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0513
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PLUNGER Report of
Tenth War Patrol.
CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 388
U.S.S. PLUNGER - TENTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.
(13 January 1944 to 8 March 1944).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
CNO (5)
Cinopac (6)
Intel. Cen. Pac. Ocean Areas (1)
Comservpac
(Adv. Base Plan. Unit) (1)
Cinclant (2)
Comsubsblant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
Comnorpac (1)
Comsubspac (40)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ComsubspacSubordcom (3)
All Squadron and Division
Commanders, Subspac (2)
Comsubstrainpac (2)
All Submarines, Subspac (1)

E. L. HYNES, II,
Flag Secretary.

— page 271 —
8 March, 1944 and commenced refit by Sub Base, P.M.H.R.BOR. On 13 March 1944, Commander R.H. BASS, USN was relieved as commanding officer by Lieutenant Commander Edward J. FAHY, USN who had completed the U.S.S. PLUNGER's Tenth 'War Patrol as P.C.O., Executive Officer, and Navigator.

During the refit docking, it was found that the tank sides and frames of twelve ballast tanks were cracked to such an extent as to necessitate replacement.

The added time of refit occasioned by the repair of these tanks resulted in a very thorough refit which was greatly appreciated by a hard working crew whose efforts are continually directed to the maintenance of fairly old equipment. The refit period was used to good advantage by training the fire control party in daily sessions on the attack teacher, training planesmen in daily sessions on the Askani device, and by sending a full quota to all schools available.

During this refit a PPI was installed, alterations to provide for Mark XVIII torpedoes were finished bow buoyancy tank and about a third of the superstructure were replaced, and TCE, VHF (SCR-274-N) Apr-1 APA-6 equipments were installed.

Lieutenant (jg) J.W. STULL, USNR, and Ensign E.A. OZIMEK, USN reported on board for duty.

Conducted a one day special mission for FHSIC. Had an excellent training period of six days and two ni hts with Commander D.C. HITE, USN as training officer. Readiness for sea May 6, 1944. Father T.H. REILLY, Lieut.Comdr.(ChC) USNR, Sub Base Chaplain, said Mass on board the morning of May 6, 1944.

B. Narrative

May 6, 1944

1330 (Vw) Underway for eleventh war patrol in company with U.S.S. POMPON, escorted, until dark, by SC752, enroute Midway.

— page 272 —
10
0735 (Y) Arrived MIDWAY; moored starboard side to alongside U.S.S. PROTEUS, outboard of U.S.S. CATO, Topped off with fuel, lube, and water. Repair force of tender came on board to work on #2 air compressor and to assist in repair of various small jobs.

: 11
1620 (Y) Underway for patrol area, with air escort until dark. Officers and men of the U.S.S. PROTEUS had worked unceasingly to effect repairs to #2 air compressor with excellent results.

: 12 - 18
May 12 - 18
Enroute area, two engine speed, holding drill dives for each section and daily fire control drills, followed by deep dive and silent running. Every effort was made to reduce noise of our equipment listed as "above the maximum permissible limits."

: 19
May 19
0935 (K) Sighted oil patch in water.

0938 (K) Sighted single engine plane bearing 1700T distance about 12 miles on northerly course. Div'd and headed toward probable track, hoping to see surface targets.

1213 (K) No signs of smoke or masts, surfaced, and continued on course to area.

: 20
May 20
0915 (K) Sighted what appeared to be a large barnacle encrusted floating mine with rectangular horns. Sea glassy flat. Object was passed well clear.

— page 273 —
1454 (I) Decided it would be impractical to enter area 142 only to vacate it four hours later. Therefore planned to adjust advance to enter 14-L at mid-night. Submerged to make several small repairs to engines, steerings gear, pit log, and bow planes. Patrolling to westward.

: 1954 (I) Surfaced and proceeded to enter area.

: 0223 (I) Ficked up our first enemy radar on the APA-PR equipment. Innocuous as this seemed at the time, it soon became a nerve-wracking menace. The operator's frantic shouts of "He has been trained on us for ten minutes," caused many of the crew to spend their off-watch time looking at the cathode ray indicator with an awesome respect that should have been saved for the death ray. "Trained on us" was changed to "steady signal." But even so, for the rest of the patrol, there remained the constant knot of spectators fascinated by the green electronic signature of an enemy radar.

: 1920 (I) Radar contact range 30,000 yards. Navigator insists it is not land. Stationed radar tracking party, commenced tracking.

: 2010 (I) Secured radar tracking party. Contact was land. We are eighteen miles south of our estimated position and are inside the SKATE's area.

: 2049 (I) Radar contact again. Operator states it is land, Navigator insists it is not. Stationed radar tracking party.

: 2100 (I) Contact definitely determined as land. Position fixed. Secured radar tracking party.

: 2145 (I) Converted 2A and 2B reserve fuel tanks to main ballast tanks. The vents on these tanks are fitted with the new Sub Base vent covers and were converted in about half the time usually required. Shifted to Waiting Area - 4E.

— page 274 —
0421 (I) Submerged before "dawn patrol" made its sweep.
: 0719 (I) Sighted single engine "DAVE" or "FLETT" floatplane on 0500T, about six miles away on course 1400T. Closed plane's track.
: 0914 (I) Surfaced to get sun line and good look around area.
: 0950 (I) Dived on SD contact, six miles. Power on stern planes failed while on hard rise when at 80 feet and ship surfaced. After a seemingly long time on the surface we were submerged again and squared away.
: 1250 (I) Sighted single engine "DAVE" or "PETE" floatplane distance two miles on northerly course.
: 1900 (I) Surfaced, no sign of smoke or masts. Visibility excellent. Started on search curve.

May 26

: 1115 (I) While submerged sighted barnacle covered mine, the color of bright red lead, floating on surface about 200 yards away. Position Lat. 270 45', Long. 1420 17'. Avoided.

May 27

: 0421 (I) Dived.
: 1058 (I) Sighted single float single engine biplane bearing 3060T apparently landing in biht between KURO SAKI and KOHAI SAKI of OTOTO JIMA of the CHICHI JIMA group.
: 1856 (I) Surfaced. Fog setting in.

— page 275 —
1921 (I) Radar contact 0700T, range 6000 yards. Stationed the radar tracking party. Target's course determined as 3100T speed 7 knots, not zigzagging. Lost target at range of 8500 yards. It was decided target was a "tired fisherman going home." Had rigged sound gear when speed was changed to full. A streamlined free flooding dome should be installed over keel mounted heads to minimize water noises when submarine is cruising on the surface. Even when running one engine, carrying a zero float, the water noises are too high for efficient listening watches.

: 1942 (I) Secured radar tracking party. Slowed to one engine speed, changed course to left to 1200T in order to clear contact on opposite course.

: 1955 (I) Torpedo wake passes under muzzle of 4" gun from port to starboard. "Practically 90 track. Right full rudder, all ahead full. "tired fisherman" pretty fair torpedoman. Decided our contact nu t have been a submarine, or a small tender for a midget sub in the immediate vicinity. A PT or patrol boat would have chased us. Commanding Officer, Officer of the Deck, Junior Officer of the Watch, and three lookouts saw wake. Water highly phosphorescent. Torpedo run was straight as an arrow. Increase in number of Christians on board was noted.

May 29

: 0508 (I) Dived.

: 0801 (I) 0.0.D. sighted large round object which seemed to be a mine, and went to 120 feet. Upon regaining periscope depth object could not be seen.

: 0955 (I) Sighted large piece of floating wreckage.

: 1241 (I) Sighted another large piece of floating wreckage. This spot is now called the waiting area but the neighborhood of SOUF CAN is notorious as a watery terminus of enemy convoys.

: 1906 (I) Surfaced.

— page 276 —
1921 (I) Picked up radar interference bearing 0760T. Assumed that this was KINGFISH. Radar interference indicated ship was on a southerly intercepting course.

: 2150 (I) Radar contact 0820T range 4650. Stationed radar tracking party.

: 2155 (I) Lost target on SJ screen. Target not sighted. Bearings of interference end of target had been identical.

: 2204 (I) Radar interference ceased. From all evidence available hopcd thct this was GROUPER about to enter her area, who had made a subinerged approach on us. If it was, it again emphasized the need for (a) IFF connected to SJ (b) SJ circuit modified so that it may be used for receiving pulses from another radar without transmitting pulses from own gear.

: 2205 (I) Secured radar tracking party, opcncd out on submerged sub and resumed search to southwest. After our experience with torpedoes a few days ago we a cauctly cncnry-sub conscious.

: 2220 (I) Radar interference again to the northeast. This persisted for the next four hours. Various signals on the APA-APR cquipment.

May 30

: 0242 (I) Radar contact 3230T range 26000 yards. Stationed radar tracking party. Operator thinks it is land. Navigation Department positive that it is not. Tracked target which proved to be SOUU GAN.

: 0503 (I) Dived.

: 0904 (I) Sighted "BETTY" bomber bearing 2900T, distance 4 miles on northerly course.

: 1550 (I) Seas picking up. Visibility getting poor with rain squalls all around thc horizon. Had momentary glimpse of small MFH steamer and casts of about four other ships. No smoke visible. Thought to be on northerly course.

— page 277 —
1553 (I) Battle Stations submerged, commenced approach. Visibility getting much worse. Came to radar depth several times, nothing on radar.

: 1658 (I) Decided ships were on southerly course. Surfaced and started chase down estimated track.

: 1750 (I) Sighted periscope on port bow at estimated range of 250 yards. Junior Officer of the Watch and forward port lookout saw this periscope very clearly. A sketch of it is included in this report. Corps traced to sweep our entire length, then submerged. Changed course radically to the right, made after tubes ready but in the rough seas excising it would have been a waste of material to have fired two torpedoes on an approximate true bearing only.

: 1837 (I) Radar contact 1610T range 13150 yards. Stationed Radar tracking party. Visibility very poor.

: 1919 (I) Radar has contact at 1660 yards bearing 080T. TDC tracked t.ais at six knots on convoy course. Unable to see anything on that bearing. Have turned away and made after tubes ready again, matched gyros ready to shoot at this enemy submarine."

: 1925 (I) Decided against shooting. Have lost radar contact on convoy. Decided to make a navigational end around to get ahead of convoy. Moon is attempting to break through the overcast, and, thanks to our sub contacts, we are on the west or moon side of the convoy.

: 2130 (I) Radar interference on the SJ, bearing 0980T. This is getting monotonous. Friend or enemy?

: 2155 (I) Radar contact 3380T range 9500 yards. Stationed radar tracking party. Radar interference seems to have closed and changed course to make approach on us.

: 2212 (I) If this convoy it is well over to the west of its original track, according to navigational plot, and is on base course 2000. With range down to 5200 yards dived on track to commence approach.

— page 279 —
2300 (I) Sighted escort vessel astern on northwesterly course. Sighted two other small vessels. Decided this was not the convoy but probably additional escorts out of CHICHI JIMA to meet the convoy.

: 2305 (I) Rigged for silent running, went deep. The three vessels milled around overhanging stopping and starting their screws intermittently. Checked torpedoes for flooding.

May 31

: 0020 (I) Heard four explosions fairly loud. Thcsc sounded like torpedo hits, and wcre assumed to have been fired by KINGFISH.

: 0031 (I) Heard another explosion. This one sounded very far away.

: 0121 (I) Torpedoes checked and secured. Surfaecd. Decided against further search for convoy (a) since our contacts seem to have been patrol vessels instead of convoy and (b) if KINGFISH has attacked, the remaining two and half hours of darkness would be insufficient time in which to find and get ahead of targets. Decided we should have stayed on surface, instead of diving.

: 0315 (I) Heard echo ranging "very close" on bcarring 3500T. Nothing on radar, nothing sighted. Worked around to westward to have target silhouetted against light sky in cast. Nothing sighted, echo ranging stopped after ten minutes.

: 2254 (I) Weak radar interference on SJ on 2300T. We are now about 35 miles SSE of SOUF GAN.

: 2311 (I) Additional radar interference on SJ on 0100T.

June 1

: 0322 (I) Radar interference to the northward is very strong. Pulse rate 1000 per second measured on AFA-AFR equipment. This is believed to be the GROUPER although the pulses do not look like SJ pulses. Also have what is thought to be KINGFISH.

— page 280 —
0400 (I) Div'd.
: 0545 (I) Sighted U.S. submarine bearing 1940T, watched him dive
: 1930 (I) Surfaced. Nothing seen nor heard all day.
: 1933 (I) Radar contact on TORI SKI-1A bearing 3340T, range
: 5000 yards.
: 2225 (I) Converted 15A F.B.T. to k.B.T. This conversion
: 0935 (I) took over an hour and a half. Vent covers were old
: style.

June 2

: 0457 (I) Div'd.
: 0935 (I) Sighted "BETTY" bomber bearing 2300T distance 4 miles
: on course 1600T.
: 1900 (I) Surfaced. Decided to work back to our area along the
: west side of CHICHI JIMA. With the arrival of CAR
: plus SWORDFISH, we are distinctly off base up north
: in waiting area.

June 3

: 6152 (I) Radar contact on MUKO JIMA, 1100T range 12 miles.
: 0423 (I) Sighted YUME JIMA bearing 0700T, distance 19 miles.
: 0425 (I) Div'd, closing CHICHI JIMA.
: 1255 (I) Sighted single engine single float biplane over
: CHICHI JIMA on northerly course.

- 10 -

— page 281 —
1932 (I) Surfaced, proceeding through narrow corner of CAR's area to our own bailiwick.

2059 (I) Radar contact on HAHA JINA, 0680T range 63,000 yards.

June 4

0340 (I) Very strong signal on APA-APR on 307 mcs. Same pulse rate as our own. Nothing noted on SJ. This could be a subharmonic of 5 band equipment but nothing was seen on SJ screen.

0500 (I) Dived, working back toward HAHA JINA, across BONIN-MARIANAS traffic lanes.

1922 (I) Surfaced, patrolling across BONIN-MARIANAS traffic lanes. Visibility, because of moon and lack of clouds is excellent.

2335 (I) Sighted KITA KO JINA. Ten minutes later radar had contact on this land bearing 2300T range 70000 yards.

June 5

0338 (I) KITA I'O JINA still visible on PPI range 80000 yards.

0500 (I) Dived, patrolling across BONIN-MARIANAS traffic lanes.

1912 (I) Surfaced, decided to patrol further west toward KAZAN RETTO group.

June 6

0140 (I) KITA I'O JINA on PPI, bearing 2540T range 80000 yards.

0305 (I) Sighted KITA I'O JINA, distance 35 miles.

0450 (I) Dived.

0630 (I) Sighted "BETTY" bomber painted light blue color, bearing 2380T range 6 miles, circling. Headed toward track. Visibility excellent.

1000 (I) Sighted mast bearing 3070T, came to normal approach course.

— page 282 —
1005 (I) Possibly two ships, went to battle stations. On normal approach course making 7.3 knots except during observations.

Targets resolved themselves into a tanker, resembling ELDORADO (Page 271 ONI 208-J revised) with a PC type escort on each bow, plus a KATE type airplane for inner airscreen, plus BATTY bomber, which continually ranged in and out of the picture, as an outer screen. BATTY was painted light blue. Tanker must be full of aviation gas to warrant such loving care.

1245 (I) Gave up the chase, targets over the hill, on direct course for I'0 JIMA which they should reach by 1800. Closest range was about 12,000 yards. Not a single puff of smoke did these ships emit. There is the old Jap smoker?

1439 (I) Sighted small patrol boat with radio masts and rising sun flag painted on bow, bearing 2550T range 4 miles, on course 0500T speed 5 knots, zigzagging. Several men seemed to be working on something in the boat just forward of the tiller. Came around astern of him at range of 4200 yards in the event that he was the forerunner of something coming north. Nothing sighted.

1920 (I) Surfaced. Nothing in sight. Nothing on radar. Working way up toward NHA JIMA in a fan patrol to cross this newly found "traffic lane."

June 7

0422 (I) Dived, petrolling across north-south traffic lane from CHICHI JIMA.

0700 (I) Sighted small patrol craft 80 to 100 feet long bearing 2380T on course 3150T speed 10. While tracking him for the next hour, course changed to 0500T, all the while making radical zigs. Decided something was sure to show up in this neighborhood.

1750 (I) Sighted masts of two ships. Went to battle stations, commenced approach. More masts, southerly course. Hulls now in sight. Have three small craft exactly similar to the craft seen at 0700 this morning plus two steam trawlers, NRT type about

— page 283 —
150 feet long, 300 tons. The formation of ships was roughly two columns with the two trawlers in the east column, the three smaller craft in the west column. Formation was very loose and at first gave the impression that it was a force out sweeping an area. Cut in astern of this outfit, feeling that something bigger might be following. Nothing else was sighted.

1929 (I) Surfaced, started search in area to west, north, and east of the "spitkits" to locate traffic.

2230 (I) Further traffic not found. Decided to head east to get in position for next convoy which seems to be carefully passing just outside our eastern areas.

June 8

0001 (I) Sighted low flying patrol craft in bright moonlight, bearing 0650T distance about 3000 yards with a large starboard angle on the bow on an intercepting course. Changed course and speed to avoid and end around this craft. Shortly after our turn away, and while smoke cloud from additional engines materialized in an otherwise clear evening, patrol craft swung around toward to present a large port angle on bow. Pulled away and worked around to desired course.

0115 (I) Sighted two engine plane bearing 0850T, range about 6 miles, on southeasterly course. Dived. It was felt that this plane had been summoned by our earlier contact who had almost certainly sighted us.

0143 (I) All clear. Surfaed.

0438 (I) Dived. Checked number 2 periscope which had been fogging badly. Found no pressure in 'scope'. Circulated dry nitrogen and recharged. This became a daily occurance. Pressure was always zero the next day. Soap testing revealed no leaks.

— page 284 —
1929 (I) Surfaced, continuing eastward toward estimated track of convoy.

: 2240 (I) Sighted plane bearing 1900T, distance six miles. Div'd.

: 2345 (I) All clear. Surfaced.

June 9

: 0330 (I) Sighted plane bearing 2000T. Altitude about 30, distance estimated as 15 miles on southeasterly course, opening. Apparently not sighted, did not dive.

: 0416 (I) Div'd.

: 0417 (I) Sound heard two explosions.

: 0422 (I) Heard seven explosions, followed by several more explosions until 0432. KICFISH attacking.

: 0740 (I) Three explosions, much closer, thought to be dead ahead.

: 1054 (I) Sighted BATTY bomber bearing 2100T, distance three miles, on course 3450T. Plane was painted light blue. Visibility excellent.

: 1915 (I) Nothing further seen nor heard, surfaced.

: 2150 (I) Sighted twin engine plane, very low altitude heading toward with ten degree port angle on the bow, distance "one mile". Div'd and, while passing eighty feet, people in control room and wardroom insist they heard noises similar to 20 millimeter strafing. Since the H.I.I patrol run, when six men were wounded by a Jap ZERO, this boat is acutely "strafe" conscious.

: 2246 (I) Surfaced, all clear.

— page 285 —
0117 (I) Radar interference on SJ bearing approximately 2000T. Not too similar to SJ.
: 0315 (I) Radar interference disappeared on bearing 1300T.
: 0430 (I) Div'd, working toward BONIN-MARIANAS traffic lanes.
: 1848 (I) Sighted petrol boat bearing 2300T, range 5,200 yards, steering courses from 0150 to 1350, speed 5 to 8 knots. His general course was not taking him toward any known objective. Avoided and changed course to run down the reverse of patrol boat's average course.
: 1940 (I) Surfaced, still running down same course.
: 2103 (I) No contacts, headed for next area which we are to enter at midnight.

June 11

: 0230 (I) Entered next area - 14P.
: 0502 (I) Div'd intending to close CHICHI JIMA.
: 1917 (I) Surfaced after making very little casting due to currents.
: 1944 (I) Radar interference bearing 0400 T looks very much like another SJ, probably GAR.
: 2000 (I) Converted 3/3A and 3B from F.B.T. to H.B.T.

June 12

: 0507 (I) Div'd to cover neighborhood of NISHINO SHIMA.
: 1920 (I) Surfaced.
: 2018 (I) Received Combat Record 120507 shifting our area to that around SOTU CAI, began working over toward SOTU CAN - CHICHI JIMA line.

— page 286 —
1. DIVED on SOUGAN - CHICHI JIMA line, working up toward SOUGAN.
2. SURFACED.
3. Officer of the Deck and forward starboard lookout reported "torpedo wake" on 120 port track, which supposedly passed under conning tower. Cleared locality. Night was very dark, with heavy rain squalls. Subsequent investigation revealed that Radar operator thought he had had contact in one of the rain squalls at 4000 yards but he had quickly "lost it" and had failed to report it.
4. DIVED in neighborhood of SOUGAN.
5. After watering batteries developed a 225 volt ground, which was located in after battery subsequently.
6. SURFACED, making every effort to isolate and clear after battery ground.
7. RADAR contact on SOUGAN, bearing 200T range 19,600 yards.
8. Ground in after battery still not located, started charging forward battery.
9. HEARD several explosions through the hull in Forward Torpedo Room and in wardroom. Sound heard nothing, nor could personnel on bridge hear anything. Consensus of opinion was that explosions were to the southward, changed course to 190T.
10. THREE explosions were heard through the hull in the Forward Torpedo Room, which were thought to have come from a south westerly direction. Changed course to 260T.
11. TWO more explosions were heard through the hull in the Forward Torpedo Room, and were thought to be one point on the port bow.

— page 287 —
0507 (I) With sea picking up and 225 volt ground in after battery still not located, dived to allow electricians steadiper platform for disconnecting individual cells of after battery to hunt for ground.

0605 (I) Heard a series of distant explosions through the hull, which continued intermitently for the next two hours; not heard by sound.

1152 (I) Ground in after battery located and cleared. Seas are becoming mountainous, depth control difficult at 100 feet. Ship broached from 70 feet.

1925 (I) Surfaced in typhoon seas, got about a foot of water in coming tower with lower hatch closed. Seas at least 30 feet high. After the tanks were blown dry, started bettery charge. A roll of 51 degrees was registered on the control room inclinometer, during the next hour.

2200 (I) In the "eye" of the storm, very little wind, stars visible, seas tumultuous and confused. Passed through "eye" and wind began to increase, soon reaching a force of 50 - 60 knots; from 2300 to 2400 barometer reading increased 16 points. By 0300 the worst of the storm was over, C.O. left the bridge. Typhoon behaved exactly like the description in the book.

June 16

0535 (I) Dived, clearing up zero grounds in various pump room auxiliary machinery. Why not make the lower coninnt tower hatch quick-closing like the upper one?

1919 (I) Surfaced closing SOU CAN.

2130 (I) Made nightly ap roach on SOU CAN.

June 17

0555 (I) Dived patrolling on traffic lanes southeast of SOU CAN.

— page 288 —
1912 (I) Surfaced. Stationed radar tracking party, definite "ship contacts", range 11,500 yards, bearing 3040T. SOFU GAN bears 2950T range 11,500 yards.

: 1959 (I) "Contacts" developed as SOFU GAN has "escorts" tonight. Secured radar tracking party.

: 2301 (I) Started sending PLUNCER first to Combubac, requesting extension of time in area, and reporting weather. Jap also joined the party with plenty of power.

June 18

: 0248 (I) NPM tells us to go ahead with our message, giving our call and reference numbers, hears us SJ. Sent message again "words twice". No Jap interference. Received no receipt. Dept asking for receipt. Recent message: on second harmonic. Still no receipt. NPM should have had very little difficulty with this transmission. Circuit seemed clear.

: 0344 (I) Secured transmitter, after almost five hours of sending.

It is sincerely hoped that a naval radio station will be established in the Marianas, if for no other purpose than to "work" submarines. It is suggested that the antennas of this station be directional in sectors beamed toward enemy areas for greater efficiency in transmission and reception.

: 0601 (I) Div'd to patrol back across area in which we transmitted. If we have been DF'D and the Japs send out a punitive expedition we should at least see some patrol vessels.

: 1914 (I) Nothing sighted, surfaced. Japs must be busy elsewhere.

— page 289 —
0215 (I) No word received from ComSubFAC, and since subs west of Marianas should be allowed a clear circuit to NPM during this momentuous time, decided not to resend message, cleared area to allow PLAICE to move in.

0601 (I) Dived, delaying departure, patrolling in 4A across possible traffic lanes. Three enemy subs DF9d in vicinity. Hoping one may put in an appearance.

1916 (I) Surfaced, patrolling on one engine still awaiting reply from ComSubFAC.

2014 (I) Received receipt for our message sent on 17 June.

2114 (I) Received ComSubFAC 190233 authorizing extension of time in area. Set course to reenter area. Upon consideration of the fact that all subs can reenter DULKERS DERBY areas after the twentieth, and feeling that the PLAICE has moved westward to SOFU GAN area, decided to enter and patrol PLAICE's former area.

June 20

0530 (I) Dived in eastern half of area 4E, working to south and to west.

1913 (I) Surfaced, to reenter area in neighborhood of SOU CAN, having received ComSubFAC 200626 telling PLAICE to keep clear.

June 21

0530 (I) Dived with SOU CAN bearing 3120T distance 12 miles, to work southeast across possible traffic lines.

1912 (I) Surfaced on course to leave area.

— page 290 —
0544 (I) Dived for one last try across an old convoy route.
: 1815 (I) Surfaced; set course for Midway.
: 0815 (Y) Arrived Midway, moored starboard side U.S.S. PROTES, Sub Base, MID. AY.

- 20 -

— page 291 —
0.3.5. PLUNGER ELEVENTH PAR. REPORT OF.

(C) WEATHER

The weather enroute to the area was good, westerly currents and following seas were consistent. In the area it was generally clear except for a period of about two hours before sunrise and two hours after sunset when complete overcast and light fog were common. This condition prevailed to the East and North of the BONINS. To the south of these islands the weather was excellent. There was a typhoon on June 15 and June 16; its general movement was northeast passing close to SOFT GAIN. Mountainous seas, and strong winds of force eight were noted.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

Accurate determination of currents was impossible due to the infrequency with which fixes were obtained. Tidal currents observed agreed in general with the JICPOA Bulletin No. 15-44 of March 20, 1944.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

None.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS

See attached sheet.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

See attached sheet.

(H) ATTACK DATA

None.

(I) MINES

Floating mine sighted 27° 45' N 142° 17' E.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES

The paucity of contacts does not lend itself to any thorough consideration of enemy anti-submarine measures, however, the presence of night flying aircraft, possibly making sweeps ahead of convoys, was noted. These planes were flying on nights when the moon was full and visibility was excellent with scattered clouds. Since we were not using the SD the planes were not radar equipped and that any probable approaches on us were made after

— page 293 —
1. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Cont'd)
2. Auxiliary Engine
   - The PLUNGER has made three successive war Patrols without an auxiliary engine. Request for replacement was refused on the grounds that Sub Base PEARL would put the present engine in full operation. The overhaul was not successful. At present the engine cannot be run at all due to excessive overheating. If sufficient spares were made available the engine could be rebuilt but no ordinary repair job will suffice. Separate correspondence has been initiated regarding this.
3. Main Storage Battery
   - During charge on the night of June 1 - 2, cell Ivo. 57 forward failed to attain full gravity. Suspect symptoms and treatment gave every evidence that cell 57 had an internal short.
   - Efforts to give the battery a six hour discharge were frustrated when cell 57 reached the low voltage limit of 1.585.
   - Further charging and attempts at discharging were complicated by the extremely high temperatures of cells 72, and 87 forward. The reasons for these high temperatures are still under investigation.
   - The full analysis of the battery conditions, with attempts at treatment, will be covered in separate correspondence.
4. RADIO
   - The signal strengths of Kaiku frequencies, as received in the BONNIS area, are shown in the accompanying table I. The figures are averages of daily records kept over a period of one month. It is suggested that it 14390 kc. were started at 1800 GCT instead of 20000 GCT, reception in this area would be greatly improved, for at this time reception on 4525 is very poor. 4525 is used by the Japs and occasionally causes interference of strength 5. Ordinarily NPM can be received through this interference.
   - 6390 has some JAP interference. Static interference is strength 2 at 2000 GCT.

- 23 -

— page 294 —
9090 has some static interference which is most bothersome from 1830 to 2030 GMT since this is the only frequency on which schedules can be copied consistently at that time.

: An underwater loop made at the Navy Yard, PEARL HARBOR gave good results as an underwater antenna. The loop is mounted on the port side of periscope shears 37 feet above the keel and is connected through an adapter unit to the RAK-1.

On the way to the area this loop was tested on the 16.68 kc. Keiku schedule each day during the trim dive. Signal strength was S-4 to S-5 about 500 miles out of INDIAY at keel depths of 45 to 60 feet. At 0600 GMT on May 14 at latitude 29N, longitude 1730E, ship was swung through a complete circle at keel depth of 42 feet while listening for 16.68 kc schedule. Signal strengths for indicated ship's head are given in Table II. It is encouraging to note that these results were obtained when we were about 1700 miles from NPA. 16.68 kc from NPA was received S-5 -3 on the SD vertical antenna at keel depth of 45 feet off CHICHI JIMA (whips were 3 to 4 feet out of water).

Three transmissions were made prior to the usual request for rendezvous. The first was made in the area and was acknowledged two days later. There had been no receipt for the message and the ship believed the transmission had been unsuccessful. The TBL antenna loaded as soon as turned on for the first time in six patrols. When we gave up on the transmission after almost five unsuccessful hours the Communication Department felt that it could not win at radio transmission.

The second transmission was another disappointment. We came on the air and received S-0 from NPA. Our next efforts were received S-2 to S-3 by NPA. We again transmitted the message and even after two days there was no receipt.

Our third transmission was a bit more successful. We received S-2 on our first call up - then "hit" - then "Shift frequency to 4145 kc. and re-send." We interrupted transmission to receive a schedule. When we called up on 4145 kc. we received a receipt for our first transmission on the regular schedule.

(II) RADAR

SJ Radar performance was satisfactory except for the touch-ometer cable from the antenna training assembly to the deflection coils of the PPI. This cable is not sturdy enough for the

— page 296 —
1. RADAR (CONT'D)
2. RADAR DETECTOR
3. The radar detector and pulse analyzer gave excellent and abundant results. This gear is far superior to the ARC which the PLUNGER had at one time. We have only the TN-2A and TN-3A units; and only the TN-2A has motor driven tuning. The ship attempted to get a jury rig for motor driven tuning of the TN-3A at PEARL HARBOR. Machinist KAAILAU of E & R completed blue print drawings for a feasible system but the ship was unable to get the necessary parts made.
4. At MIDWAY a switching arrangement was installed which enabled us to use the motor generator provided for the VHF as a 28 volt D.C. power supply for the motor drive of the TN-2A unit. This worked very satisfactorily. The PLUNGER hopes that it will be able to obtain a complete set of motor driven tuning units for the APR.
5. The data obtained with the APR are included as part of a separate report submitted to CinCPac, Counter-measures Section.
6. The PLUNGER has made a conscientious effort to employ the APR to maximum extent. A watch bill was established for running the APR continuously while on the surface in the area.
7. (N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
8. Although there were no large ship contacts within sound range during this patrol it is believed that sound conditions were poor.
9. Enroute to the area a false target shell was fired. Fing ranges were obtained on this target up to 740 yards. It is believed that the sensitivity of the keel mounted sound head is below normal. During the current refit an endeavor will be made to determine whether or not the sensitivity of the head is normal.
10. (O) DENSITY LAYERS
11. The characteristic bathymetrograph card in the area covered by this patrol indicated that the water was isothermal to 90 or 100 feet where a 2 to 50°F. negative gradient was found. Below 100 feet the curve followed close to the isoballast line.

— page 297 —
0) DENSITY LAYERS (CONT'D)

The area around SOFU GAN showed a layer with a 20F. negative gradient between 80 and 100 feet on May 30. Following the typhoon on June 15 the water in this area was isothermal to below 100 feet.

The greatest layer in the area around the BONINS was found off HAHA JIMA. At that point a 50F. negative gradient was found, between 30 and 60 feet on June 7.

North of KITA IWA JIMA, on June 6, a 30F. negative gradient was found between 30 and 45 feet.

In and enroute to and from the area the cards taken corresponded closely to the conditions indicated on the chart, "Summer and Winter Bathythermograph Records for the Pacific Area," prepared by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution at Woods Hole, Mass.

The cards taken during the patrol are being forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HEALTH-BILITY

Health in general was excellent. Fair weather and calm seas were probably contributing factors.

Food was varied and good. The ice cream freezer continued to be an asset.

Habitability was good. The air conditioning system performed perfectly for the first time in three patrols.

(Q) PERSONNEL

The turnover of 24 men during the last refit was larger than usual but regular instruction and the leaven of old hands resulted in making these men useful cogs in the machine. Again it was noticed that men who were submarine school graduates qualified in less than half the time required by non-graduates.

(R) MILES STEADED - FUEL USED

| MILES | FUEL (GALLONS) |
|-------||
| PEARL TO MIDWAY | 1340 | 17,819 |
| MIDWAY TO AREA | 2050 | 20,645 |
| IN AREA | 4288 | 40,670 |
| AREA TO MIDWAY | 2050 | 28,259 |
| | 107,393 |

— page 298 —
13
Days in area: 34
Days enroute to base: 9
Total: 56
Days submerged: 34

(T) PATROLS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

| Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel Factor |
||------|||
| 16        | 4500  | 10 plus days| Indefinite      |

Petrol was terminated by order of ComSubPac.

(U) REMARKS

It is felt that more effective use of the submarines around the ENTRON could be made (a) if two east-west lines of subs were established, one line north, the other south of ComSubPAC, (b) if the three subs closest to a convoy track were to work together as a tactical unit.

It is suggested, since almost all submarines are now being equipped with a means for voice modulating the TEL transmitters, that a further step be made in providing speech scramblers for the voice transmissions. Intership communications would then be greatly expedited and would be safe from decryption. Simple voice code would further shorten transmissions.

Moreover, should submarines be patrolling submerged in a line across a prob.ble convoy route, the need for a constant listening watch on radio is obvious, since the boat making contact should transmit to the others. This logically leads to a need for a slender whip antenna which can be left raised continuously while submerged.

A top-loaded whip antenna could be mounted atop the 3D mast and connected thereto through a steel pipe of about one inch in diameter. While submerged this small diameter pipe could be left up practically all the time for continuous reception of schedules, contact reports, transmissions from aircraft, etc. This whip could also be used for VHF transmissions.

— page 304 —
1
FB5-202/A16-3
Serial (039)
C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
USS PLUNGER (SS179) 11th
War Patrol Report.

From: The Commander Submarine Division TWO HUNDRED T.O.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
       (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) Eleventh War Patrol Report - Comments on.

1. The cleventh war patrol of the U.S.S. PLUNGER was of fifty-six days duration, thirty-four of which were spent in the areas around the Bonin Islands. Only one contact worthy of torpedo attack was made; a tanker with one escort. Unfortunately the PLUNGER was unable to close the range to less than 12,000 yards. Air coverage, prevented the PLUNGER from making an end around during the day.

2. The PLUNGER had several contacts with the usual small surface patrol craft and thirteen aircraft contacts. On June 9th it is noted that a plane got in to one mile before being sighted by the bridge force. This contact took place at 2150 and it is presumed that the SD Radar was not in use. On light nights it is believed that the value of the SD Radar far exceeds the danger of being DF'd. On May 28th and again on June 15th, bridge personnel reported torpedo wakes passing under the conning tower. As the war progresses and the Japs get more on the defensive, we shall have to expect them to employ their submarines defensively and be on the alert for attack by enemy submarines. In the same category come floating mines which should be destroyed by gunfire as our ships are getting more numerous than theirs in these areas.

3. Material casualties during this patrol were about in keeping with what this class of submarine is experiencing except for the casualty to number four main engine. On May 25th while diving from an enemy plane, the stern planes jammed on hard rise and the PLUNGER broached; this could have been disastrous. No reason for this loss of power has been mentioned in the patrol report, but this casualty will be investigated and corrected during the refit period.

— page 306 —
1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division 202 in his first endorsement.
2. Material casualties and difficulties experienced by PLUNGER give serious concern.
3. The use, by the enemy, of his submarines as anti-submarine vessels, is becoming more evident. It is probable that the most effective anti-submarine weapon the enemy will possess in the future, will be his own submarines.
4. Personnel of PLUNGER are congratulated for their fine spirit and high morale after an arduous patrol.

Copy to:
ComSubDiv 202
ComSubDiv 43
C.O. PLUNGER

Lt. L. PACE

— page 308 —
7 04233
Serial 01396
CONFIDENTIAL

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT to
PLUNGER Report of
Eleventh War Patrol.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 466.
U.S.S. PLUNGER - ELEVENTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Eleventh War Patrol.
(6 May to 30 June 1944).

1. The sixth war patrol of the PLUNGER was the first for the new Commanding Officer, as such. The patrol was conducted in the Bonin Islands Area.

2. The PLUNGER was unable to close for attack the few contacts worthy of torpedoes. Area coverage was excellent.

3. It is of note much enemy anti-submarine activity was apparent throughout the area and that the PLUNGER was fired upon by enemy submarines on two occasions. It is extremely important that look-outs are instructed in anti-submarine training as well as anti-aircraft training.

4. This patrol is not designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
ComInCh (7)
CNO (5)
CinCpac (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean Areas (1)
ConservPac (1)
CinCiant (1)
ComSubsLant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
ComSoPac (2)
ComSubsoWesPac (2)
CPT 72 (2)
ComNorPac (1)
ComSubsPac (20)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ComSubsPacSubOrdCom (3)

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, SubSpa (2)
ComSubsTrain2ac (2)
All Submarines, SubSpa (1)

E. L. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

EXTRA ORIGINAL
SORC. MICRO
PHOTO LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 310 —
1944

| Date | Time | Location | Activity |
|------|------|||
| July 25, 1944 | 0230 (Y) | Went to Battle Condition of Roadiness Two. All hands on board, ready to get underway in anticipation of attack by enemy task force. | |
| 0730 (Y) | | | |
| 1530 (Y) | | | |
| July 24-30 | | | |
| July 30. | | | |
| 1015 (L) | | | |

— page 311 —
1402 (L) Entrance buoys, 1402 U.S.S. TROLL abeam. Entered lagoon.

: 1508 (L) Ironed starboard side to alongside U.S.S. BUSHILL, outboard of U.S.S. LILACOCK, in 1402 LACOCK.

July 31-August 1

: U.S.S. TROLL completed voyage repairs; unable to reduce sparking of 141 turbo-blow. Tender repair force estimated that the blower could be used for 6 to 10 more times and that complete disassembly was necessary to effect repair. Decided to take it as is and use it sparingly.

August 1

: Father J. H. GRAY, Licut. (ChC) USNR, Chaplain in U.S.S. TROLL, said class on board U.S.S. PILGRIM.

: Underway for area escorted by U.S.S. LILACOCK (D120).

: Parted company with escort after we had made trim dive. Entered class D lane.

: Dived for SD contact which did not show IFF and started closing, distance 10 miles.

August 2

: Made submerged practice approach on U.S.S. BUGLE and it was escort. 1st detected.

: Passed for a beam to starboard, distance 40 miles. SJ radar out of commission.

: Left the confining restrictions of the class D lane to strike out into the wide open spaces of a class B area.

: Made trim dive. Stayed down long enough to allow all ballast tanks blow lines to fill up through the checks in order to determine compensation figures. With water in blow lines up to control room man-folds decided added weight vs. about 2500 lbs. This checks with figures for last patrol, ergo all checks still lock.

— page 312 —
0852 (L)    Surface d, in area.
: 1118 (L)    SD cont. et. 54 niles which gave IFF returns
    unlike regular code.  Flanc diu not close.
: 1213 (K)    Divided to flush out 97 mi.B.T. which had been con-
    verted from F.B.T. to I.B.T.  Found we had several
    leaks both oil and air in spite of every effort to
    oilmin to then, and that our "camouflage" is a mis-
    noar in these waters.  We feel naked when submer-
    ged in this glassy sea.  It should be painted
    with t

— page 313 —
0755 (K) Divod to 45 feet to initian. D w.r.tch and listening watch as lifeguard frequency. Closing TRUK, keeping a continuous periscope watch.

1405 (K) With TRUK 15.5 miles away and nothing seen nor heard of on air strike, change course to south to parallel TRUK .toll. till at 45 feet.

During the previous night the radio technician had painted the "D" masthead insuIator with glyphol in an effort to eliminate low resistance readings. By daylight we discovered that he had used red glyphol. The effect of this glari.g r.d top on a light grey "poles" as it ploughed through the water was startling!

1550 (K) Docidcd strike must be over without nishrp. Changed course to 1100T to opn. TRUK. Intend to surface as soon as parts in coming tower are rounded up.

1719 (K) Surface... cut course to 10.0F .toll, in order to inter.ot possible right-running supply ships. 3d still out.

1742 (K) Slightly object on the horizon through high periscope which lo.ked like a submarine coming tovor. Tracked this and made "enc. round" through squall areas. Target was not a submarine; started closing went to Battle Stations.

Target was made out as a drifting battle to target about six feet high and twelve feet long. Closed and held 20m target practice; secure from Battle stations. 3d gave a feeble g.sp and got a range of 2450 yards.

August 7

0625 (K) Submerged to patrol. across TRUK - 11.1m line and to close 10.0P .toll. Took advantage of this period to work on a preparatory to tuning it on LORF. Disconnected line to lube oil cooler of 2 min engine in order to repair hole in the line.

— page 314 —
1554 (K) 10 hrs.

1712 (K) 10 hrs.

1905 (K) 10 hrs.

0605 (K) 10 hrs.

0655 (K) 10 hrs.

0932 (K) 10 hrs.

0936 (K) 10 hrs.

1105 (K) 10 hrs.

1900 (K) 10 hrs.

August 9

0625 (K) 10 hrs.

This engine will be out of commission for another day. Once our only auxiliary engine has not worked for several patrols, we now have three engines for flying and propulsion.

Sight at 1. Island bearing 036°T distance about 10 hrs.

Dive at 1. Island bearing 105°T distance 2.5 miles ahead. Course to open LOA. Toll preparatory to surfacing. 10 slips or surface craft of any kind were on in the lagoon.

Surface at 1. Island bearing 036°T still out of commission. Cross at 1. Island bearing 105°T. Heavy squalls all during the night.

Sight at 1. Island bearing 036°T. This line heads to the water on a line 165°T. This line leads to the Solomons and Admiralties.

Divot when more slicks were encountered also on 195°T. Came to course 195°T. Fergha's traffic or submarines use this line.

Sight at 1. Island bearing 036°T. At about 500 feet altitude, flying slowly from west to east about five miles away. Thinking that he might be the harbinger of traffic we decided to remain in this area. Set rated component g magnetic compass.

With nothing in sight and with SJ still out of commission, surfaced. Set course north to patrol across the PALAU - TARU line especially off PIANPU Pass. For a tally the visibility was excellent except for the two hours after sunset. Islands of TUKAToll were easily visible during the night. Number 2 main engine back in commission.

August 9

0625 (K) 10 hrs.

Dive to close PALAU-UTU Islands and to work on the SJ. Plan to surface after sunset and tune the SJ on the island.

— page 315 —
1855 (R)
Surfaced, with PISARIS Island of the AQUITO Group of ring 3250T, distance about four miles. Only 15 minutes after launch and it is too light to be so close. SJ still not working so set course for tomorrow's lifeguard position.

2021 (K)
SJ radar reported in commission.

August 10

0055 (K)
RADAR interference on the SJ screen "all around the dial." It was impossible to determine any bearing of maximum strength. So are about 11 miles south of HOWLIF Island in the NLL Island group. This suggests a possible 10cm shore based radar.

0550 (K)
Radio morning train drive. Rain squalls around the horizon.

0807 (K)
Surfaced in a rain squall, started closing TRUK.

0929 (K)
With visibility improving to excellent and TRUK Islands looking like Gibraltar dead ahead, bearing 2250T, distance 18,000 yards, divod. If the "zoo" is going to be both this place today we are going to see it. Closed to 12,000 yards. As the wave wore on and no evidences of strike were present, opened out proper radar to surfacing. Still was lying on the 3T. This equipment is like the one horse shay. ... comes to have fallen apart completely. Troubles is remedial in one section, only to find that further trouble has developed in another section.

1802 (R)
Surfaced. Set course for NLL Island to tune SJ radar if we can get it working properly.

August 11

0006 (K)
Circling 6000 yards northeast of NLL Island turning the SJ.

0035 (K)
Crystal current has failed. Cave up tuning and set course for TRUK - NOI! line.

0615 (K)
Divod to approach MOLLUK Island on TRUK - NOI! line and to work on SJ radar.

— page 316 —
1757 (N) Surfaced with FLUOR Island in sight bearing 1460T distance 12 miles. No intend to close the island to tune the radar and to check on ships in the lagoon.

Since the surf will not set for about an hour yet, made 'round around' to close island from a sector of comparatively 'poor' visibility.

1943 (N) We have approached TOINOM Island of the FLUOR, toll to within 4000 yards and radar does not have the slightest pip on the screen. Changed course north to clear the island before we go around or get shot at. Mother night without the radar. 2 ships in the lagoon. Got course for tomorrow's lifeguard locale.

...just 12

0533 (N) Made trim dive.

0625 (N) Surfed, patrolling to the northeast of TAU, with a 2 mile range to be held during daylight.

0845 (N) Voice to life made fire and... "There is LOCIID V-1" made with FLUOR's call. Six tubes could cloud cover prevented our picking up planes. Our SD is showing its usual triple trace and 'jittering' all over the place - no contact.

0851 (N) Voice from plane "Fire a run."

1017 (N) With TRUX twenty eight miles away, and not having heard any further transmissions we charged course east, after deciding that the strike was over. Two days later a CHIEF. of the TAU stated that in 1-7 Lieutenant had bad TRUX at 1-5. There couldn't be more than 3 or 4 of the Libs. on our side. A suicide to be done. So SUBPAC for more information.

1047 (N) Sent FLUOR for 2-0 CS. 3-1 C, requesting time of strikes.

1325 (N) Div. 1t came to 2-10 RAMP. In we decided that we will concentrate on getting the DJ in commission and that a barrier six foot sand bar will provide a suitable target for uninterrupted daytime tuning.

— page 317 —
1832 (K)
After 3rd 3d 5th 6th out of commission.
This makes the ninth successive day.

August 13

0510 (K)
...after another all-night session the 3d finally looks somewhat normal. Closing...INTO REAF.

0556 (K)
made trim dive.

0624 (K)
Surfaced. ...to had intended to be eight miles from the rocf at this time but a morning fix shows that we still have 19 miles to go.

0645 (K)
Sighted DAILY bomber bearing 300°T about 8 miles away on a easterly course. Divod, not detacted. ...arc west of INTPO REAF; he is patrolling to the northward of the rocf. He certainly seems to be 'way off base.

1030 (K)
Light explosions were heard. Perhaps our plane is an advance scout for something.

1104 (K)
Surfaced to find the roof and for surface patrol-ling. 3d is almost solid overcast with scattered thunderheads.

1105 (K)
Divod. High poriseopa had picked up a ship dead ahead. "Cont to bottle stations, condemned approach.

1146 (K)
Tracked target which showed spoof zero after several attempts to close on the "small approach course." Closed at standard spot, hoping to find the rocf before we ran ground.

1315 (K)
By this time we are 1200 yards from the northwest side of the rocf and discover that our target is very high out of the water and that he is either inside the 1-gun or 2-gun or the east side of the rocf. He is still 4 1/2 miles away. Chnged course to round the southern end of the rocf approach target from the southeast.

The 3/8" plan of INTPO REAF on 1.0. chart 5201 is not too much help.

1825 (K)
...after battling a two knot current and navigating by surf missiles, with very air squalls to hinder bearing taking or surf, we are south of the target. Target is a nice gray painted on which shines when the sun hits it and is similar to the 2-0 in. U, gross tonnage 4958, (page 102 - ONI 208J) with a gun forward and aft, about 5".

- 8 -

— page 318 —
1835 (i) Unable to make out the target through the periscope, surface. To open the ref. radar could not pick up the target. First but about 10 minutes tuning brought it out. It was tracked out to 20,000 yards. It seems that the 3J is working at last. Very clear cloud has a silver lining because we would never have closed MIRTO after if the 3J had been operating properly.

2305 (i) Went to battle stations, started approach, followed a rain squall in toward target. No did not know what kind of a watch was being kept on board and those cruis were still in good shape.

2346 (i) Pierced four bow tubes range 2600 yards, 112 starboard track, zero gyro angle, depth setting 3 feet. Sea was force 8. Torpedo fired from tube 4 ran erratic. It curved excessively to the left before straightening out to explode on the reef. The second and third torpedoes, aimed for the 3J.O.P., exploded directly under the stack. Target was seen to keel over to port and then right itself and was covered with a dense cloud of smoke; yellow flickers of flame appeared in several places on the target.

2550 (i) To mark assurance doubly sure, fired two after tubes 3-700 yards, track 108 starboard, depth setting 4 feet. Two explosions observed in the path of noise covering the target.

2557 (i) Secured from battle stations. Our one chance to watch target disappear for the radar screen without interruption is failed unless we blast away the reef!

— page 319 —
0350 (I)  Sighted light on airplane bearing 1200T. Plane seemed to be searching and was in sight for over fifteen minutes. Passed about six miles away. No were apparently detected and were intent on clearing the area. Did not dive. No indications of radar on the TRU.

: 0606 (II)  Divot south of the TURN - FORFI - COLOUR line. If the TRU have run stuff north of this line they are running south of it now.

: 1824 (I)  Surf coast.

: 1826 (II)  Transmitted FLUNGER second to COSUBPrE. Got course for TRU.

: 0835 (I)  Dist. for tri., on lifeguard station.

: 0829 (II)  Jurifood.

: 0845 (I)  Much testis by planes on lifeguard frequency.

: 0918 (II)  "That's for next run."

: 1025 (I)  "There is a Japanese Zero."

: 1035 (I)  "That til. did you hit the water? What was your position?"

: 1037 (I)  Put four engines on propulsion ready to effect a rescue.

: 1043 (I)  "Ipri. shows 106 over."

: 1150 (I)  ...after patrolling our lifeguard sector looking for 6 w. planes and having heard nothing further on the TURN from radio, change course for and ...in the event that the plane was down on its way home. TAU was 15.5 miles to the west- ward.

: 1415 (I)  Sighted object on the horizon bearing C19OT; closed at full speed early to find that it was a rusty oil drum. ...ark it with Torry gun.

: 1725 (I)  In due tri. dive.

— page 320 —
1830 (I) Surfaced; changed course to forth. The have no more lifeguard dates and if there is no word tonight of further strikes nor of a downed plane we intend to patrol west of TRUK while the opportunity offers. There must be traffic somewhere and it seems logical to suppose that it would be between TRUK and F.L.U.

: 2330 (I) Still no word of further strikes nor any information of a downed plane. Changed course to 2850T to patrol rear FORTH F.L.U.

: August 16

: 0601 (I) Submerged to patrol between F.L.U. Islands and FORTH F.L.U. of Trulk. toll.

: 1835 (I) Surfaced, nothing sighted. Decided to work to westward of TRUK.

: 2005 (I) Had several radar signals on the F.L.U. one of which was so close to be scanning us as if trying to get a bearing.

: 2045 (I) IR signals are now up to saturation and seem to be focusing most of their attention in our direction. This was land based radar. The are 21 miles from F.L.U. island on the north of the TRUK toll.

: August 17

: 0520 (I) Local routed sound had struck a subicargo object. Shaft was forced about six inches up into the boat and jammed there. Interceptor log was checked and found to be undinged. The j.r was felt in the forward torpedo room but was not felt on the bridge.

: 0536 (I) Divod to patrol west of TRUK. The have plotted all previously reported snips contacts on chart no. 5201 for traffic analysis purposes. The have divod in a spot that is thick with contacts -- on the chart. The ocean, however, remains barren.

: 1106 (I) Local routed had is now operative but it cannot be housed. The shaft, apparently, is bent.

: 1835 (I) Surfaced, nothing sighted. Interfilling over toward F.L.U. and L.D.Z. L.G.I. bank.

— page 321 —
0800 (K) Dived to patrol from southwest toward TUR to cover traffic for SO.TH. P-35.

1010 (K) Sighted a bearing 0220T, started approach. TDC time motor failed after threatening to do so for three patrols. This is a fine place to be able to say "I told you so." "Je are going to try to regain the time-motor armature which is started.

1045 (K) "Must" turned out to be a large spar buoy with a cutter's red flag on its top. For the next seven hours we passed through a welter of floating lumber, toapots, a surf board, coconuts, and birds perched on these objects. Uncurious course changes were necessary to avoid hitting these pieces with the periscope.

1600 (K) Our epidemic of colds, sore throats, and earaches has caught up with the TDC op-rotor. Liout. J.T. CLARK, III was taken off the watch list and turned in with Otitis Media (D.U.) to T.D.C., no T.D.C. operator.

1626 (K) Surface with the sea still glassy flat, with numerous rain squalls and thunderheads around us, and in visibility variable. Decided to work to the northward toward IANOUITO Island to intercept traffic from BALAU to TUR which might be coming in off NOGAUI, GAVITTER and HITCHCOCK Bunks.

August 19 During the night we had tried to put in an equalizing charge but high battery temperatures necessitated stopping it after two hours overcharge. The cell gravities are all over the lot and are definitely lower than they should be.

0630 (K) Dived to close PISALIS Island of IANOUITO -toll.

1835 (K) Surprised after working northwest, paralleling the reef about four miles out. No ships sighted in the lagoon even though the periscope was raised more than 10 feet out of water in a glassy flat sea with perfect visibility.

— page 322 —
2135 (K) Received ComSubPac 190984 detailing us to further
    lifeguard duties. Changed course to head for
    lifeguard sector. We still have dates of strikes
    only - no times. Times of strikes will be sent
    later if known. But we will not get any informa-
    tion on times of strikes.

august 20

0305 (K) Div'd to patrol north of the MLL Islands and to
    effect minor repairs.

0830 (K) ...ill engines were placed out of commission to repair
    a rather bad leak in the starting air system.

1200 (K) Lieut. D. D. CLARK, III returned to duty. The
    T.D.C. operator is now ok, but two attempts at
    rewiring and repairing the T.D.C. time motor
    ended in failure. The T.D.C. joins our growing
    collection of museum exhibits.

1400 (K) ...air leak repaired, all engines back in commission.

1800 (K) Surfaced, proceeding to lifeguard sector.

august 21

0020 (K) Radar contact 268°T range 18,000 yards. Stationed
    the radar tracking party, making approach.

0045 (K) Cops, belay it! Contact is MURILO Island.

0606 (K) Made trim dive on lifeguard station.

0751 (K) Surfaced, patrolling lifeguard sector using
    ION and DUBLOW Islands for fixes.

0756 (K) Port main motor contactors will not carry load.
    Equalizers are out. Stopped port screw, to
    effect repairs.

0917 (K) 3D radar contact 14 miles closing. Decided that
    this night be our B-24s. Sky is full of cumulus
    clouds.

0920 (K) Sighted 27 B-24s going in for attack; started
    closing TUR at best speed on one screw. The
    "one logged lifeguard." ---

— page 323 —
0925 (K) B-24s passed directly overhead, altitude (by SD) 5 1/2 to 4 miles, headed toward TRUK.

0930 (K) Saw ... fire around B-24s. Two Jap zeros pretending to be interceptors. Bombs exploding on MOUNTSILA.

0943 (K) Our L... are heading for the barn; 27 still intact, still in formation. Four ZU-OS making very long passes at the formation like pump dugs yapping at a herd of elephants. They also seem to be dropping white phosphorous air "depth charges", none very close to our planes.

0954 (K) We are "lost" one of the ZU-OS in all the cumulus clouds.

0955 (K) So we start four .il.les. Sighted -- a ZURO. .n.ole on to our --zero. Seconds alay in sounding the diving al rin -- zero.

0957 (K) Explosion, not close. The felt later that this ZU-RO dropped one of his air "depth charges" instead of a regular bomb. Guess there must be a Japanese DFC for getting subs, because those ZU-OS wanted no part of 27 healthy Liberators.

0958 (K) We were at 170 feet when the explosion occurred. With only one screw available we had the boat trimmed rather heavily.

0958 (K) Still doing down, trim away out of commission. Blow v. a.rible water at of auxiliaries. Descent checked, returned to periscope (to. th. .all cl ar set course to clear ZUK.

1215 (K) Two .sighted fl.ng in a large circle around us .out 4 - 5 miles away. Fortunately today is one of the few days when the glassy calm sea is broken up by whitecaps - actually!

1308 (K) Sighted AUFF floatplane circling us, range about 4 - 5 miles. Continued to watch him and determined that the center of his circle is definitely at the stern of us, about two or three miles away. The Jap zoones are certainly trying to get an oak loaf cluster the easy way.

— page 324 —
1740 (K)
Despite the short time of this dive and our running at one third speed, our battery gravity is alarmingly low. Did a to move to the northward to get in an equalizing charge. This battery has a much diminished capacity.

: 1830 (I)
Surfaced, wondering what might carry away next. This boat has not had a heavy Yard overhaul since May, 1942. Incorrect, even then quite a lot of the working tide was spent in repairing the damage suffered by this vessel when it fell off the Pearl Harbor Marine Railway, during that overhaul.

: 2007 (I)
...able to make standard speed on the port shaft.

: August 22
Equalizing charge completed! Gravities have dropped an ev. of 14 points in the forward battery and 18 po. at. in the after battery since the last equalizing charge in mid-Aug. Corrected switchboard voltage 333.

: 0830 (I)
Converted 75 A.P.O. tank to M.B.T.

: 0931 (I)
Divv for trim.

: 1131 (I)
Surfaced.

: 1305 (I)
Divv to patrol north of HITO RRF.

: 1810 (I)
Surf. ccd. We are going over to HITO RRF to check on our victima.

: 1909 (I)
Divv when two planes were sighted bearing 146°T on course 050°T. We were silhouetted against a setting moon at this time.

: 2005 (I)
Surf. ccd.

: August 23
Laser contact at 13,000 yards bearing 268°T. This should be our victima.

— page 325 —
0450 (I) Dive to close the rc f and look over the damage we had done. Trim pump out of commission, under-going overhaul.

: 0548 (I) Sighted our victim dead ahead and Iuch higher on the roof. Closed to 1200 yards. Took pictures through the periscope. ...allowed all hands to take a look. ...met a shambles! The once nicely painted ship is now a mass of rust and wreckage. The bridge is now vanished. Both guns have been blown off. There are three gaping holes in the hull. The after rate is twice as long as the others and daylight shows through from the other side. ...we can lose into the engine room. The interior is gutted and empty. The after end of the ship would collapse except that it rests on the rudder post. Flotsam and debris of every description line the roof on either side of the hull.

: 1001 (R) Start of repairs to #1. Heinschmidt co. cor. 0.0.5. sighted PT boat with zero angle on the bow and full speed. ...but deck, rigged for depth charge and silent running. Nothing heard on sound, except roof noises. The C.O. believes that the PT boat was so fast that it was still running with the surf breaking over it.

: 1100 (R) ...to periscope port; secure from silent running.

: 1819 (R) Surfaced, set course for TAUL. 3J radar went out of commission between the second and third blasts of the surfacing alarm.

: 1905 (R) Converted 12 F.B.T. to H.B.T.

: 2030 (R) Made dive to wash out #2 and #5 M.B.T.

: 2055 (R) Surfaced. Still working on the SJ radar.

August 24

: 0642 (R) Sighted LOS.P .toll bearing 2540 distance 14 miles.

: 0655 (R) Dive to close LOS.P .toll. Started work on the trim pump; thought we had it repaired yesterday. Clos ed to 1.5 miles, saw nothing except nati rc and no e'idence of the inter-island "camera" mentioned by U.S.S. F.I.M.T.

— page 326 —
1610 (K) SJ radar back in commission.
: 1628 (K) Surfaced, started fan patrol to work up to life-guard station.
: 2008 (K) SJ radar contact, 1500 yards bearing 120°T. 0.0.D. dived, believing it was a plane. The mufflers on all and no main engines are "shot" and when these engines are in use, the roar is terrific. . . .irplane jolted could not be heard above the din, unless a plane were right on top of us.
: 2111 (K) Surfaced, enroute to lifeguard station.

August 25

: 0036 (K) Radar contact 1800 yards bearing 120°T. 1othing sighted, right full rudder all ahead full, endeavoring to cut contact astern. This was only the beginning. . . . So was glassy call, visibility was poor to fair. . . . For the next half hour we had radar contacts "all around the dial." Turn away as we could not shake them. . . . We were surrounded. . . . To followed involve and evolute spirals, loxodromic curves and sinuous snakings and still we were surrounded.

: To give up. . . . Abjectly and unconditionally we surrounded. . . . To head for one of those "contacts". There was nothing there. . . . Species of Japanese torpedo-man must be after us tonight. If so, we will concede the "Battle of the Fips."

: 0117 (K) Back on our course, conditions normal.

: 0601 (K) Dived on station.

: 0805 (K) Surfaced, patrolling in lifeguard area. Heavy cumulus clouds all around the horizon. SD going full blast. . . . Under what time this strike will take place?

: 0650 (K) AR h.s. is usual signal from TRUK radar. However, it has now settled down on our bearing. . . . We feel that our SD, radiating for almost an hour, has tipped our hand. The Jap evidently figures the raid

— page 327 —
0925 (R) SD contact at 24 mil s, no IFF.
0945 (R) Raid is over, planes are heading out. No sea 12 planes in the first group. There is the second group: IOW we see them running in and out of the cumulus and nitbus clouds. Count 17. Both groups closed up. All planes seen O.K. To stragglers, no smoke.
1008 (R) "didn't have any oxygen, co-pilot hurt, had to go down."
1010 (R) "Go ahead for TORsion, this is Lundy."
1015 (R) "Magner this is Boglight."
Planes still in sight when over 54 miles away and still in formation. Followed planes out to over 40 miles or the SD which put them about 80 miles from TUR. No calls for us. Signals heard "five by five". 12th Jap across starting to return to TUR, we dived and had outwhorst to close the lagoon.
1815 (K) Surface running south parallel to U.S. lagoon. Radar on U.S. island is plainly visible in the du.
1947 (R) To have had with Island's radar trained on us steadily to eight minutes. They now challenged us by bi-motor, sending the character for slant sight (X), cover and over again. At 2010 (R) on 20 I.N. 1944, the same 1.3ft. challenged the U.S.S. PERMIT by sending numerical one repeatedly, as the PERMIT. "put light astern and cleared out."
August 26
0605 (R) Dived for patrol along SOUTH F.S.S - S.F.M.I. Line.
1150 (R) With one ex-operator still out of commission and with the water in number one fresh water tank tainted (we suspect a leak from the crew's head volume tank which was installed in the fresh water tank - horrible thought!) we have 800 gallons in Fresh Water tank #2, plus about 100 gallons of slightly oily water in pl auxiliary tank.

— page 330 —
1. DIVED with EAST FLY UISLAND bearing 115°T, distance 10.5 miles.

After carefully examining the island from a range of 2000 to 5000 yards we found nothing to substantiate the "reported ADF". We have concluded that if there was, once, an ADF on the island it has since been removed.

Decided not to bombard it "for practice." Radar Officer, with almost no spare tubes loft, is profoundly relieved.

1819 (1) SURFACED.

September 2

0552 (1) DIVED to patrol west of PLAYLU PASS.

0850 (1) Discovered #2 air bank losing pressure. Found that the air flasks in #4D H.E.T. were leaking fast enough to "blow" the tank.

Bled down the pressure in the two air flasks in #4D H.E.T. and isolated them. The now have 10 air flasks isolated, out of use. Close depth charged in those glassy seas with such leaky air flasks and FLUGER, alias LOCIFIER, H.L. LET, etc. would have had a rather sad time.

1812 (1) SURFACED, patrolling west of PLAYLU PASS, with position checks on TOL Island during the night.

September 3

0608 (1) DIVED, closing PL. FLU PASS. Our relief enters the area today. If still no word from Consubiac -- high no BLAST!

— page 331 —
1940 (i) radar contact, range 18,450 yards bearing 184°T. Stationed the radar tracking party, began approach. Radar operators are certain it is ship. Navi-gator says nearest land bears 147°T, distance 19 miles.

: 0520 (ii) Squalls lifted. Our "contact" is plainly visible as ILLIUS Island plus four other small islands of the ILLIUS (S.L.I.) Islands group. Range 11,500 yards. 1o chips in the lagoon.

: 0630 (ii) Divoc, he's doing west.

: 0950 (ii) Joe is lassy cala. ... huge persistent swirl of bubble as seen aft of us. Investigation shows that the i' banks in N.B.T. 45°D are "blowing."

: 1018 (ii) Surface to bloa down and isolate the four air flasks in 45°D. The total of 8 air flasks now isoll to d. Checked position by bearings on IGU- and ILLIUS Islands of the I.O.M.T. (H.I.L.) group.

: 1035 (ii) Divoc, in the water battery batteries, ... re going to try to complete another aqualizing charge and we are prepared to "jump out" a defective cells.

: 1755 (ii) Surface d. Started equalizing charge.

: 1934 (ii) Converted 45°D.B.T. to 45°D.T.

: 1437 (ii) Equalizing charge completed after cutting finishing rate and stopping the charge for a time to permit certain cells to cool off.

...various battery gravities had dropped as follows: (from midway equalizing charge): Forward 15 points, after 25 points. Switchboard voltage is up from 325 to 535 volts. Definite evidence of sulphation.

: 1407 (ii) Divoc for trim. Decided to send results of charge to ConubPa. "to have been told we are going to BRIBE... for refit. The battery condition may necessitate a FLAR L.H.A.04 refit.

: 1830 (ii) Surface. Sent FLUNGER third to ConubPa. Set course for I.T.F.M.U Island. JICFO. bulloting lists "reported 3DF" on the isl.n.d. ... to intend to bomb it.

— page 332 —
1606 (..) Surface. Transmitted LUNCHER first to CTF Seventy Two reporting for duty. Set course to clear the area and make for the class D lane to SEADLER.

2244 (K) Had a "cor" strong radar signal on the ARR. Judging from the meter in which the signal faded out it was believed that this was a radar equipped plane. SD was not manned. Full moon shining. Nothing sighted.

September 4 - 16

In the LISPAD with a stop for fuel, at SEADLER, October 5. Crossed the LINE on September 5 and paid due homage to-ling-optune as all newly-made shellbacks can attest.

Conducted six hour battery discharge on 11 September and re-caught a capacity of 75.8%. The last underway six hour battery discharge, conducted 27 June, enroute LIDL Y, gave a capacity of 79.1%. If the capacity of this battery is not improved for the next patrol -- GOULD is liable to lose a customer and we do mean permanently.

September 14

1026 (K) Moorea + New Farm, Harf, Brisbane, Australia. Deo Gl tias!

— page 335 —
1. TARGET D.T. - D. 1. 1944 Lat. 8-07.5N Long 154-19.5E
2. TARGET D.T. - D. 1. 1944 Lat. 8-07.5N Long 154-19.5E

Description:
The target is sighted through high periscope at 1105 (X) in azimuth, while approaching the target on the surface. Divd anu commenced approach. Target was traced at speed zero anu close examination led to the belief that it was aground on the east side of the target. Target was freshly painted, with boats at the davits, guns of approximately 5" size for and aft, and apparently ship-shape and seaworthy in over report. The ship was identified as being similar to the ship 1-2U, 4955 tons, pp 102, ONI 2085. Concluded he had probably run around the previous night, and was fully capable of being salvaged. Tarpaulin rigged over his head, loading had and explosions, which were as likely dynamite or the rest, indicated that he work had a day begun. Tri d unsuccessfully to round the reef in time for daylight attack, so decided to make a night surface attack.

Ship Sunk:
One mid-Atlantic target similar to the ship 1-2U, 4955 tons, pp 102, ONI 2085.

Damage determined by:
Observed two hits in OT from bow torpedoes, and two additional explosions in smoke p.ll covering target first stern torpedoes. Close examination of target through periscope on 24 August revealed the following: (1) Three large holes in hull at waterline: one just forward, and one just aft of the stern; the other two extending into the entire after quarter of the ship's length on both sides, slightly being plainly visible through this hole, (2) the bridge burned and was charred and rusty, (3) the bridge ran gun platforms had collapsed and the guns had apparently been blown off.

Target Draught:
6 feet Headline 5280 Speed - 0 Range - 2600

O.N. SITP D.T.

Speed:
to 8 knots Course: 2600 Depth: Surface angle: 0

Type - t.t.a.e.k:
1. G.I. surface at using radar ranges and TET
2. Type, First torpedo was offset 20 to the right, the second and third aimed at 10T, and the fourth offset 20 to the left. Continuous bearing method was used with TDC. After ship had been swung to bring stern tubes to bear, target was observed in

— page 336 —
U.S.S. ULTIMATE (Fleet) - Report of:
- Tubing and tubes 5 and 6 were fired on generator barge, with no spread.

Tubes Fired:
- Tubing: 112 S - 112 S
- Tubes: 112 S - 112

— page 337 —
7-27-44 8-1-44 8-1-44 8-5-44
S
U
B
R
I
N
E

Date: 7-27-44 8-1-44 8-1-44 8-5-44
Time (zone): 1635 K 1320 K 1649 K 1118 K
Position: Lat. 18-56N 6-56N 6-55N 7-20.5N
Long. 175-14.0E 169-30E 169-10E 155-05.5E
Speed: 13.5 11.0 11.8 16.0
Course: 220 286 266 090
Trin: SURF SURF SURF SURF

Minutes since last SD Radar Search: 0 0 0 0

Number: 1 1 1 1

Type: UNKNOWN UNKNOWN UNKNOWN UNKNOWN
Probable Mission: PATROL PATROL PATROL PATROL
How Contacted: SD SD SIGHT IFF return
Initial Range: 4 miles 16 miles 7-8miles34 miles
Elevation Angle: - - 10°

Range & Relative
Bearing of Plane
when it Detected
Submarine: UNKNOWN ID ND ND

Sea: (mount 1 2 1 1
(Direction (rel) 330 020 090 290
Visibility: 7 miles 10 miles 10miles Unlimited
Clouds (Height in ft 2000 ft 5000 ft 5000 ft 3000 ft
(percent overcast 75% 50% 40% 70%
(Bearing (rel) - - -
noon (angle - - -
Percent Illum. - - -

— page 339 —
1. CR. FT COI (Continued)
CONT. CT TUBER 9 10 11 12

Date 8-21-44 8-21-44 8-21-44 8-22-44

Time 0955 K 1215 K 1058 K 1909 K

Position Lat. 7-50.0N 7-50N 7-54.5N 8-45N
    Lat. 152-26.0C1 152-27T 152-50T 154-31T

Speed 13.1 3.5 5.5 9.9

Course 330 060 060 130

Trim SURT PTI TLT SURF

Minutes since last SD radar search 0 2hr 20min 0 SD radar
    scanned and picked up
    plane one
    minute after
    being sighted

Number 4 2 1 2

Type 2K2 2K2 UHF UNION

Interceptors Search Search Patrol

How Contacted SIGHT SIGHT SIGHT SIGHT

Initial Range 10-12 mi. 4-5 mi. 5-5 mi. 6 mi.

Elevation -45° 70° 20° 30°

Range & Relative
Bearing of -lane
when it Detected
Submarine 6-7 mi. STD ND ND

(Amount 2 2 2 2
Sea (Direction (Rel) 000 030 030 270

Visibility 15 20 20 Unlimited

Cloud (Height in ft. 5000 5000 3000 3500
    (Percent overcast 50% 60% 70% 40%

( Bearing - - -
(0.0N (angle - - -
(Percent Illum. - - -

— page 340 —
8-25-44 8-25-44 8-25-44 8-25-44
: 0824 K 1010 K 0925 K 1000 K
: 7-59N 7-20.5N 7-51N 7-55N
: 152-40.9N 152-29N 152-25N
: 14 14.8 18.5 14.6
: 000 550 065 145
: SURF SURF SURF SURF
: 3D radar 0 3D 0
: manned & manned
: picked up
: plane on
: min. after
: being sighted

Number 29 21 2
Type 1LTR- 1LTR- 1LTR-
Probable mission 1LTR- 1LTR- 1LTR-
R
: 1LTR-

— page 341 —
17 18 19
Date 8-20-44 8-29-44 9-3-44
Time 1218 H 1441 K 2500 K
Position Lat. 7-52N 7-52N 6-58N
    Loi 152-29J 153-41J 150-00J
Speed 3.7 3.6 12.0
Course 090 050 195
Trim F/L F/L SUT
Injunctions since last
SS radar reei. 3hrs 15min 3hrs 15min 1st. mined
Number 1 2 1
Type RUD 1 RUD 1
Probable mission P.TROL F.TROL S.L.CI
...at - Signal
How Contacted SIGHT SIGHT 290 mg
Initial Range 6-8 miles 8-10 miles UIDOW
Elevation angle - 0.5 UIDOW
Range & Relative
Learing of Flare
when it Detected
Submarine IND 1D 1D
Sea (mount 1 1 2
(Directio (Lt) 025 025 095
Visibility 10 miles Unlimited 15 miles
Clouds (Height in ft. 2500 3000 2500
(Frcent overcast 75% 60% 80%
Moon (bearing (Lt) - 305
Angle - 600
Percent Illum. - 100%

— page 342 —
1. USS U.S.S. LUCYCT Twelfth War Patrol - Report of.

(I) 1. USS
   - To data.

(J) ... II-SUN...II... 3. SUNS
   - Aircraft patrols...are the only.../S measure encountered around
   TUR... During the... 1st of august 15-14 we watched a plane search-
   ing in our vicinity for 15 minutes without picking us up. There
   was no moon and no ev...nces of rain... were detected. This pl...n
   occurred within four hours of our attack on a ship. To wor...
   about 130 miles out...orth east of TUR, but since we had seen
   several planes... this approximate area previously; it is felt
   that this plane... have been put off... on outlying patrol to warn
   against air strikes... from...LIGHT.

(II) 2. JOR DEFECTS
   - ELECTRICAL

1. Main Storage Battery: - The battery showed a continual
decline in average gravity throughout the patrol. Upon leaving
lifeway, average gravity of the forward battery was 1.249 and the
after battery 1.251. The battery was given an equalizing charge
on 22 August after which this average gravity forward was 1.255
and aft was 1.244. The battery was given an equalizing charge on
31 august after which this battery was given an equalizing
charge in preparation for a 6-hour discharge on 11 September.
The average gravity forward was 1.251 and aft was 1.255. The
battery was put on zero float for 4 hours to allow it to cool
and was as possible. The discharge was conducted submerged at
the 6-hour rate. Cell 2 for each 6-hour rate reached the
low voltage limit of 1.055 volts. The approximate time
of 4 hours was 4 minutes. The battery was discharged at the
6-hour discharge rate of 37 JUNK, prior to entering lifeway
after time last past 6. The capacity of 79.1 per cent.

The total battery voltage corrected to 800F has risen from
325 to 335 volts. The battery has reached an advanced stage of
sublimation. The battery temperature limit has been reached to which
treatment can be...t...v...n...and must be corrected first.

...a complete report is being read under separate correspondence.

2. Main Power Curbide: - Upon surfacing, August 25 the port
main motors were not equalized and 2 and 2/8 motors in series
were carrying 1100 amps while 4 and 8 were carrying only 450
amps yet to be equalizing breaker did not trip. Upon examination
it was found that only 80 amps were flowing in the equalizing
circuit. All att...r...t...s...t...led to bring up the load on 4 and 8
by varying the shunt field rheostat.

— page 345 —
1. The U.S. Submarine Patrol Report of:
   - (I) J. JOE DEFECTS (Continued)

FULL

1. H.F. air distribution manifold: - Crinding in of the valves on this manifold has been found to be no longer effective. ...t
   - The air manifold has been cleaned and the

— page 348 —
1. Last, a little more grass than when we started. However, we were skeptical of proper performance because the CRT had a loose base, our rudder space CDR had terrific astigmatism, and we had observed a rising iron in the filament of the tube socket to the porcelain calculation of the socket.

2. Detuned the visual system. Finally got an echo on an island at 11,000 yards. Fair but still not satisfactory.

Decided to incorporate the field change which had been made at mid-way as we thought it was satisfactory. Also discovered that crystal current was still lower than normal. Then we bore in retuning. Lost all grass. The tube was not lit. Changed T-2 tube and discovered that the T-2 circuit could not be adjusted properly for the crystal current. After reassembling the circuit, found that the signal was not in the correct range. We tried to retune the circuit, but the circuit was not in the correct range. We tried to retune the circuit, but

— page 350 —
2145 (Local) (-10) - August 17, a signal of 21 megacycles, 7 microseconds pulse duration, undetermined pulse frequency, was detected a for several seconds.

On one occasion, passing near to Tall Island, SJ radar interference was reported but no signal was detected on the PR.

(F) SOUND ID SOUND GEAR

Sound condition in the area were extremely good although the only target was a table with numerous rocks. During the approach on the 1 round was sounded on the navigational plot.

In the area at 1.7°-40' | Long. 150°-10' | on August 17, 1944, 0520 (1) the hull mounted sound had struck a submerged object. The ship was forced to break out of the airfield in training torpedo aircraft. The weather was too cloudy and after that time.

(G) DENSITY IN THE WATER

In the area the water was 150 feet deep. On August 29, 1944, 1.5°-00' | 154°-30' | the sand showed a break at 250 feet. The area was broken and the water was 150 feet deep. The ship was forced to break out of the airfield in training torpedo aircraft. The weather was too cloudy and after that time.

(H) HEAT, FOG, AND BLEEDING

Approximately twenty percent of the crew suffered from colds and external injuries. The condition of colds, lack of sleep as a result of continual repairs, to equipment, and lifeguarding resulted in a constant nervousness and irritability, which fluctuated in intensity with the magnitude of the three items mentioned. There were six of colds, six of which had elevated temperatures. While no fever was present, one officer and three men were out on the sick list. It was the case of external fever. There were two cases of D. (1) this illness. One man had the ringer's on his right. The other had a lesion on his left. The lesion was covered by the U.S.S. It is believed that the lesion was caused by a poison.

The food was very good. Fresh frozen fruits supplied by the U.S.S. It is believed that the lesion was caused by a poison.

Carboxides (Frequent) was not available during the past refit. Therefore, the boat put to sea with a fairly good crew which had a good record. It is hoped that the boat will receive a proper investigation before it is necessary to qualify our new crew passengers.

- 40 -

— page 351 —
1. LIFEGUARDING
...are to CFT Seventeen's board, '252-44 left several questions unanswered and it is more suggested that this annex be amplified to include the following information:

(a) If a plan is damaged, how the submarine may be notified of the voice frequency without notifying the Japs as well.

(b) The alarm riser should be notified in code when the strike is over.

— page 353 —
3. Dummy Radar Targets
As we cruised around TRUK and noted on our ARR the many active radars trained on us, or just searching, the thought occurred that we could wage our own little "war of nerves", and give the Japs some sleepless nights, by floating rod-like radar targets over TRUK with the prevailing winds using balloons for suspension. We know their radar frequencies now. The targets could be cut to give maximum reflection at times frequencies.

4. Infra-red Searchlight
After the scveal counters, a night, with pips on phantom targets on the Su, we decided that what we needed was an infra-red searchlight with corresponding "translating" binoculars. This would greatly facilitate identification of targets at night, especially little "spit kits" or possible submarines.

Moreover, with the bridge illuminating the target and with the "translating" binoculars installed at pointers and trainor positions deadly accurate gunfire at night against small targets would be possible.

5. Cloudflare
The modified 2.5g y design, 32/353-B, with which we were painted is, of course excellent for night work, but it is definitely detrimental to a submarine working in a flat glassy sea, where the water is clear (unlike the Yellow Sea and the Nukoshio).

The suggestion is made that a water soluble whitewash or kalsomine be developed for submarines operating in waters such as existed around TRUK during our patrol. This "paint" could be applied to the black painted conning tower fairwater, bridge structure, shears, etc., upon surfacing at night. A couple of 10ft whitewash brushes used energetically could cover the aforementioned structures in a matter of minutes. One is then camouflaged for the night. A dive at dawn would run the light color away leaving an entirely black submarine.

— page 354 —
1. FLUNGER'S Twelfth War Patrol
Serial 0334
C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. FLUNGER (SS179)
Report of Twelfth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. FLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Twelfth War Patrol - Comments on.

1. FLUNGER's Twelfth War Patrol was spent off TRUK performing lifeguard services. No opportunities for rescues were presented.

2. The one worthwhile target encountered was an AK similar to the SANKO MARU, aground on MINTO REEF. FLUNGER fired six torpedoes for four hits, one torpedo running erratic. Target was effectively destroyed.

3. The excellent suggestions of the Commanding Officer in Section U, with reference to lifeguard submarines appear sound, and merit careful consideration.

4. The material condition of FLUNGER is very poor. It is noted that the last navy yard overhaul was in May 1942, and it is recommended that FLUNGER be given another overhaul at the earliest possible date.

5. This patrol is designated "Successful" for the award of Combat Insignia.

6. The Task Force Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the FLUNGER upon the successful completion of a patrol rendered particularly arduous by material casualties, and for inflicting the following damage upon the enemy!

SUNK

1 AK (SANKO MARU Type) (EC) - - - - - 5,000 tons

7. Since FLUNGER was under the operational control of Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET, he is requested to assume credit for the tonnage sunk.

J. M. HAINES.

10 0123

— page 355 —
15(72)/A16-3/Ih.
Serial 0334
C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. FLUNGER (SS179) - Report of Twelfth War Patrol - Comments on.

DISTRIBUTION:
ComInCh (3 - direct)
VCNO (2 - direct)
VOPNAV (Op-23c)
Com 1st Flt
Com 2nd Flt
Com 3rd Flt.
GHQ, Sec. 22
ComSubs-1st Flt (25)
ComSubs-2nd Flt
ComSubs-7th Flt (25)
CSS-4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, and 28.
CSD-43 and 53.
OInC, S/M School, N.L., Conn. (2)
Fltr. Radio Unit, MELBOURNE.
CO USS FLUNGER.

F. P. HURRY,
Lieutenant, USNR,
Force Secretary.

10 01:33

-2-

— page 356 —
1892 A
Serial: 6143
C-Q-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS PLUNGER (SSI79)
Report of Twelfth War
Patrol.
From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PLUNGER (SSI79) - Report of Twelfth War Patrol.
1. Forwarded.
R. H. C. Cuzin.
By direction.

— page 357 —
1-0
: 1-1
: 1-25
: 1-4
: 1-6

END OF REEL
JOB NO. 1-0
THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO–NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

D-62264