U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS-394) — war patrol report SS-394_RAZORBACK.pdf

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OPERATOR [SIGNATURE: M. Monroe]
DATE [HANDWRITTEN: May 16, 1980]

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[SEAL: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET - START AND END
NDW-NPPSO-5210/1 (6-78)

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[HANDWRITTEN: RAZOR BACK (SS-394)
World War II
Patrol File
Action Reports

All Material On This Reel Is DECLASSIFIED

For Deck Log - April 1944 - December 1945
Consult National Archives Which Has
Custody.

J.A. KOONTZ]

— page 3 —
Division of Naval History
Ships' Histories Section
Navy Department

HISTORY OF USS RAZORBACK (SS 394)

Though commissioned when less than a year of the war remained, the USS
RAZORBACK completed five successful patrols to sink an unofficial total of
22,350 tons of Japanese shipping. The ship's keel was laid on 9 September
1943 at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Named for a brilliantly
colored food fish of the sunfish family which is found in the Great Lakes, the
USS RAZORBACK was christened by Mrs. H. F. D. Davis, wife of Captain H. F. D.
Davis, USN, at the launching on 27 January 1944. She was accepted by the
Navy at the commissioning ceremonies on 3 April, and turned over to her first
commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander A. M. Bontier, USN.

An intensive training period and shakedown cruise was conducted off
Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Newport, Rhode Island. On 5 June 1944, Commander
Roy S. Benson, USN, relieved Lieutenant Commander Bontier. On 19 July the
RAZORBACK reported to the Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet and set course
for Pearl Harbor.

The first war patrol was conducted east of Luzon by the RAZORBACK as a
member of an offensive group in support of the Palau landings. The Japanese
did not venture forth to oppose this offensive, and the only enemy contact con-
sisted of frequent encounters with anti-submarine planes. Upon her return to
Midway for refit on 21 October 1944, Commander Benson was relieved as skipper
by Lieutenant Commander D. Donald Brown, USN.

On 15 November the RAZORBACK sailed from Midway in company with the
TREPANG and SEGUNDO. Topping off at Saipan the wolf pack headed for the Luzon
Straits. First contact was made on two large vessels escorted by three gun-
boats and heavy air cover. Due to the inability of the submarine to close to
good torpedo range, no hits were scored. Several days later radar contact
was made on several enemy ships. The RAZORBACK made a submerged approach, and
the targets were identified as a hunter-killer group consisting of a destroyer
and two smaller anti-sub craft. An attack was made on the destroyer, but the
counter-attack by the anti-submarine vessels precluded an assessment of damage
done. However, torpedo hits and breaking up noises were heard amid the depth
charge explosions as the RAZORBACK slipped away from the scene.

On the night of 6 December, the TREPANG reported a convoy 40 miles from
the RAZORBACK. By the time the RAZORBACK arrived the TREPANG and SEGUNDO
had sunk all but one ship, that having been stopped by the latter submarine.
After skirting an escort at 2000 yards the target was closed sufficiently for
attack. The RAZORBACK's torpedoes left the 6,935 ton freighter KENJO MARU
in a mass of flames. The submarine surfaced and eluded the convoy's escorts.
She returned to Saipan for additional torpedoes, then rejoined the SEGUNDO to
continue her patrol. On the last day of the patrol, contact was made on a four
ship convoy escorted by the old destroyer KURETAKE, a destroyer escort, and a
float plane. Hits were obtained on a medium tanker, and shortly afterwards
the bow was blown off the old destroyer. The RAZORBACK then retired, surfacing
that night to again pursue the convoy. The moon forced a submerged attack,
which resulted in two more hits. The escort prevented further attack, but the

— page 4 —
-2- USS RAZORBACK (SS 394)

RAZORBACK was credited with the probable kill of a large cargo ship. She
arrived at Guam on 5 January 1945 for her second refit.

On 15 February the submarine set out for the East China Sea for her
third war patrol, in company with the SEGUNDO and SEACAT. Difficulty was
encountered in finding targets by this time. Two unsuccessful torpedo attacks
were conducted on a transport and a three-masted schooner. With the patrol
coming to a close and the score still zero, the RAZORBACK sank four wooden
ships in three separate surface gun actions. The three Japanese prisoners
taken were deposited in Guam, and the RAZORBACK steamed to Pearl Harbor to
terminate her patrol on 26 March 1945.

Refit and training were completed by 7 May 1945, and the RAZORBACK
headed for the Nanpo Shoto and Tokyo Bay area for lifeguard duty. Much of this
fourth patrol was spent on the surface uncomfortably close to Tokyo. At night
the fires resulting from the air raids lighted the horizon. The RAZORBACK's
efforts were rewarded by the rescue of four B-29 pilots and a fighter pilot
during this period. She returned to Midway on 27 June for refit by the USS
AEGIR.

On 22 July the RAZORBACK departed Midway for patrol in the Okhotsk Sea.
On 2 August a number of wooden cargo ships were sighted. In the ensuing sur-
face gun action, six ships were sunk and two damaged. The remainder of the
patrol was spent performing lifeguard services off Paramushiro for Alaskan based
planes. On 31 August the RAZORBACK entered Tokyo Harbor with eleven other
submarines to take part in the formal surrender of Japan. She departed on 3
September, arriving at Pearl Harbor on 11 September and San Diego on the 20th.

The USS RAZORBACK was awarded five battle stars on the Asiatic-Pacific
Area Service Medal for her participation in the following operations:

1 Star/Western Caroline Islands Operation
    Capture and occupation of southern Palau Islands -- 6 September - 14
    October 1944
    Assault on Philippine Islands -- 6-24 September 1944

1 Star/Second Submarine War Patrol -- 15 November 1944 - 5 January 1945

1 Star/Iwo Jima operation
    Assault and occupation of Iwo Jima -- 15 February - 9 March 1945

1 Star/Okinawa Gunto Operation
    Assault and occupation of Okinawa Gunto -- 19 May - 17 June 1945

1 Star/Fifth Submarine War Patrol -- 22 July - 22 September 1945

She also received the Navy Occupation Service Medal, Asia, for the
periods 2-3 September 1945, 4-11 January 1948, 8-16 February 1948, and 7-27
August 1949. The China Service Medal was awarded for the period 12 January -
7 February 1948, and 2 - 6 October 1949.

— page 5 —
-3- USS RAZORBACK (SS 394)

The RAZORBACK remained active with the U. S. Pacific Fleet until
August 1952, when she was decommissioned and placed in the U. S. Atlantic
Reserve Fleet. She is now being reoutfitted at Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
and is scheduled to be recommissioned in March 1954.

STATISTICS

OVERALL LENGTH                               312 feet
BEAM                                         27 feet
SPEED                                        20 knots
DISPLACEMENT                                 1525 tons
COMPLEMENT                                   8 officers and 72 men

Compiled: 7 January 1954

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DECLASSIFIED
O N I G I N A L
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st Copy]

19 October 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. RAZORBACK
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Division, TWO HUNDRED ONE.
(2) Commander Submarine Squadron, TWENTY.
(3) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate Command.
(4) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394), Report of War Patrol Number One.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track chart; to ComSubPac.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the first war patrol of this
vessel conducted in the Philippine Sea - Luzon Strait Area, during the
period August 25, 1944 to October 19, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

2. The commanding officer was also in command of a group of
three submarines, the RAZORBACK, PIRANHA and CAVALLA, constituting the
"DOGS". This RAZORBACK war patrol report, therefore, contains also his
report as pack commander. Due to different destinations for all three
members of the pack, upon completion of the patrol, it was not possible
for the pack commander to include much information on the actions of the
other two. Reference therefore is invited also to USS PIRANHA'S and USS
CAVALLA'S second war patrol reports.

[SIGNATURE: R. S. BENSON]

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C]
[STAMP: BY OP-09B9 DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/72]]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

[STAMP: FILMED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 93090]

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CONFIDENTIAL

(A) PROLOGUE

Keel laid at Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H., on September 9, 1943.
Launched January 27, 1944. Commissioned April 3, 1944. Commenced usual
tests and training exercises. On June 5, 1944, Lt. Comdr. A. M. BONTIER
was relieved as Commanding Officer by Commander Roy S. BENSON, and Lt.
Comdr. J. L. HAINES was relieved as Executive Officer by Lt. Comdr. C. D.
BROWN. On June 23, 1944, having completed normal training exercises, de-
parted New London, Conn., enroute the Pacific. Services rendered to Fleet
Sound School, Key West, Florida June 30, 1944 to July 11, 1944. Transitted
the Panama Canal on July 15, 1944. On July 19, 1944, departed for Pearl;
reported to Cincpac for duty in Submarine Force. This vessel is in Squadron
24 (Captain G. C. CRAWFORD) and Division 242 (Captain C. W. WILKINS). On
August 4, 1944, arrived at Pearl Harbor; five days voyage repairs. In
addition to normal items the following were accomplished: installed 40mm
gun in place of 20mm on after end of bridge, installed VHF and APR, in-
stalled RBH-1 radio receiver in place of one RAL; painted with standard
grey camouflage 32/3 SS-B.

Had the normal 15 days training exercises (Commander D. C.
WHITE, Training Officer). Ready for sea August 24, 1944.

(1) ENCLOSURE (A)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

(B) NARRATIVE

August 25
          Underway from Pearl Harbor, proceeding independently to
rendezvous with other members of "DOG PACK", USS PIRANHA (Lt. Comdr.
H. E. RUBLE) and USS CAVALLA (Lt. Comdr. H. J. KOSSLER), Commanding
Officer USS RAZORBACK in command of "DOG PACK" unit "ZOO" (Captain
C. W. WILKINS in SEA HORSE).

September 1
          Made contact with USS PIRANHA and CAVALLA; proceeding now in
company to Saipan.

September 7
          Arrived Saipan. Unit moored to HOLLAND to top off fuel and
effect minor repairs.

September 8
          Unit underway in company from Saipan.

September 12
          Spent the day on submerged patrol in "Waiting Area".

September 13
          Commenced surface patrol as a unit of the "ZOO" (Captain C.
W. WILKINS, O.T.C.). Each vessel is assigned an individual station.

September 17
          0945(I) Sighted an unidentified plane. Apparently we were not
sighted. Remained on the surface.
          1100(I) Sighted another unidentified plane. Remained on the
surface.

September 19
          1002(I) Sighted a plane similar to EMILY at a distance of about
6 miles. Submerged.
          1056(I) Surfaced.
          1126(I) Sighted a plane similar to NELL at a distance of about
4 miles. Submerged.
          1157(I) Surfaced.
          2012(I) Underway at 4 engine speed to locate and attack ship
reported at Lat. 20, Longitude 132. Other vessels of the "ZOO" continue
offensive reconnaisance.

(2)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

September 20
Patrolling independently the assigned area.

September 21
Stormy weather. At dusk departed assigned patrol area to send
negative report of search. Then returned to vicinity and resumed search.

September 22
Storm subsided. Departed special search area to return to
assigned position in the "ZOO".
0700(I) Sighted unidentified single-engine plane distance
about 8 miles.

September 23
Resumed patrol in assigned position in the "ZOO".
0801(I) Sighted a plane similar to KATE heading for us.
Submerged.
0908(I) Surfaced.
1354(I) Sighted a plane similar to BETTY heading for us
rather close aboard firing its machine guns at us. Submerged.
1534(I) Surfaced and resumed patrol, expecting another plane
any moment.

September 25
0900(I) On orders from "ZOO KEEPER", Bear and Dog Packs are
now proceeding to area eleven detect, this pack, "DOGS", to patrol the
part of that area to the eastward of the meridian of GARAM Bi, FORMOSA.
The traffic will be coming up from the South China Sea and proceeding up
both the east and west coasts of Formosa, thence via the East China Sea
to the homeland. Some of this traffic will undoubtedly hug the China and
Luzon coasts and the latter traffic follow the island chain of LUZON STRAIT
to the southern tip of Formosa, then hug the coasts of that island. Other
fast traffic will cut across and trust their speed as anti-submarine
defense.
This pack is assigned that part of area eleven detect east of
GARAM Bi. If the ships of the enemy hug the coast of Formosa we will not
be able to get to them there, but can still get them as they approach
Formosa. Pre-information, air search and air coverage here is excellent
and planes equipped with radar cover the area thoroughly. Until we find
out how thorough this air search is, will assign portions of the total
"DOG" area to the individual submarines to patrol at will. If the
situation warrants it later will attempt more co-ordinated search. There-
fore, assigned PIKE up to latitude 21-40, CAVALLA down to latitude 22-20,
RAZORBACK in between. Directed them to attack any enemy encountered with-
out delay and without waiting for the arrival of other members of the pack.
Doctrine calls for exchange of information.
Proceeding to area.
1804(I) Sighted an unidentified aircraft at a great distance.
Did not dive.

(3)

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[HANDWRITTEN: M]

C O N F I D E N T I A L

September 26
0829(I) Sighted a plane similar to BETTY at a distance of about
five miles coming out of the clouds right for us. Submerged. He dropped
two bombs.
1112(I) Surfaced and resumed towards the southern point of
Formosa.
1155(I) Sighted twin engine bomber similar to BETTY at about
three miles distance coming at us out of the clouds. Submerged.
We are wasting our time trying to patrol on the surface. Not
only are we exposing ourselves to the certainty of repeated air attacks
but disclosing our location. Therefore, we are going to stay down
tonight and it is our intention to pass between KOTO SHO and GADD ROCK
Formosa and conduct submerged patrol in that passage tomorrow. Unfortunately
we have a bright moon, smooth phosphorescent sea and only 20 miles between
KOTO SHO and GADD ROCK. We have never on this patrol used the SD radar
and are now keying the SJ for two rotations of the antenna every 5 minutes.

September 27
0230(I) While about to pass between KOTO SHO and GADD ROCK
the position of the ship became sufficiently in doubt that, at this
time, we gave up the idea and reversed course.
0258(I) For the past few minutes we have had an 150 mcs signal
on the APR. It was intermittently steady on us increasing in volume.
There was nothing periodic about its being on us or off. Therefore,
assuming that possibly a plane had us on its radar, we submerged. This
is all entirely new to everyone on board. The 150 mcs checks with in-
formation on Jap airborne radar. We had been keying our SJ radar for a
double rotation every 5 minutes.
Decided to send this verification of data to Comsubpac so
headed out on surfacing.
Have also now had an opportunity to observe that air search in
this vicinity is excellent and that, therefore, day and night surface
scouting line of this unit would be out of the question. Therefore,
decided to leave the ships as they are now assigned and make similar
individual assignments for our time to come in area eleven delete.
After we get down in that area it may be possible to organize a co-
ordinated search.

September 28
Succeeded in sending orders to the other "DOGS" on the area
frequency but unable to send radar information to Comsubpac. Now pro-
ceeding back to KOTO SHO and FORMOSA.
1000(I) Sighted a plane similar to NELL at a distance of about
8 miles. We were submerged and apparently not detected.

(4)

— page 12 —
CONFIDENTIAL
September 29-30
Patrolling in the KOTO SHO area. At sunset 30th departed for
new area in eleven delete.
The total area assigned this "Pack" commencing October 1st is
Area Eleven Delete, north of latitude 19-30. From analysis of contacts
made by previous submarines in this area and other data, assume that there
are two traffic lanes in this locality. Slow speed convoys hug the coast
of LUZON, then follow the BABUYAN and BATAN Islands up to GARAN BI, FORMOSA.
High speed convoys and singles cut straight across from the Straits of
Formosa to the South China Sea. Have divided our area into three parts
as follows: one ship take everything to the east of the meridian of
CALAYAN Island up to latitude 19-55, one take everything to the west of
the meridian of CALAYAN Island up to latitude 20-00, the third take the
remainder. The result will be one boat will always cover the BABUYAN-
BATAN route while the other two can cover that route and also the cut-across
route to the westward. In case of receiving information from submarines
either to the northward or southward it will be possible quickly to establish
a line; that is, within the limitations of being able to communicate. Will
try later to organize a co-ordinated search.

October 1
0210(I) Rain had commenced a little over one-half hour ago.
At that time decided to try again keying the SJ radar for two complete
rotations of the antenna every five minutes in order to assist in our
target hunt. Again, contact on the APR, this time 230 mcs, steady on us
intermittently with increasing intensity. Submerged. It is possible that
our SJ merely triggers off a piece of equipment causing this radar signal
and no plane is around. If that is true their equipment is ingeniously
designed. The only way to know is for someone to stay on the surface and
see what happens. (Note: See October fifth for further data on this idea).
1930(I) The weather is stormy, rather heavy seas from the east-
ward; the full moon through an almost total overcast made it nearly as
bright as day. Visibility poor in several directions and excellent in
others. Decided to try again keying the SJ for a double rotation every
5 minutes.
2000(I) Interference on the SJ radar on two different bearings
almost simultaneously. This was followed by a strong signal on the APR
at 155 mcs, steady on. Submerged. Our position at this time was about
80 miles to land. The only assumption that can be made is that we can
not get away with the use of the SJ in this area.
2200(I) Radar interference on ten centimeters which did not
seem to be our type.

October 2
0000(I) Ten centimeter radar signals like our own, being keyed
every five minutes. The true bearing was 180°. Message intercepted indicat-
ing that USS WHALE was driven down by planes.

(5)

— page 13 —
CONFIDENTIAL

October 3
The storm continues with no indication that it will ever cease.
Will send a message tonight for a two night and one day scouting line of
the western part of our area to catch ships cutting across.
After dark sent the message. During the transmission we got
an APR contact on 150 mcs. When the transmission had been completed the
APR signal was strong and steady. Submerged. Did not get receipts for
the message but will act as if they have it and that the scouting line
will be formed as ordered.

October 4
0015(I) Message intercepted indicating that the USS WHALE was
driven down by planes.
0401(I) Strong signal on the APR at 150 mcs, steady on us.
Submerged. This was the first instance of an unprovoked steady-on APR
signal at this frequency. On all previous occasions we had either used
our SJ or our radio.
2000(I) The "Dog Pack" is now presumably in a Scouting Line
on course 270 at speed of 12 knots in order, PIRANHA, RAZORBACK, CAVALLA at
a distance of 30 miles.

October 5 (Still in Scouting Line)
0015(I) Momentary APR signal at 155 mcs. This was followed
immediately by the receipt of a message that the PIRANHA had been driven
down by planes. We had had SJ radar signals from the PIRANHA'S direction
earlier in the evening; we never [UNCLEAR: had any]
0025(I) Intercepted a message indicating that the CAVALLA was
driven down by planes. This settled that matter of how to continue the
Scouting Line with one ship driven down. It has disintegrated.
0032(I) Steady APR signal at 155 mcs. Submerged. This makes
it complete. Since just before the PIRANHA dove we had had intermittent
radar signals on the APR at 155 mcs but not steady on. If the other two
dove because of a signal steady on them the Japs' equipment is directional
and not on land, and it was directed on each of us in turn. The distance to
land was over 100 miles. On surfacing headed back to the eastward. Will
not risk further attack tonight by trying to tell the other two "DOGS" to
discontinue the scouting line. Our attempt at co-ordinated search has
demonstrated its impracticability in this area at this time. On request,
later today, granted CAVALLA permission to remain in the western portion
of our area.

October 6
The storm continues. Have decided to fight the storm through
BASHI CHANNEL instead of BALINTANG CHANNEL though it does not take us out
of our area.

(6)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

October 6 (cont.)
          Spent this date in submerged patrol on the TAKAO-BASCO line.
Found on surfacing that we had been set way up to the northwest. Headed
for BASHI CHANNEL.

October 7
          0325(I) Strong, steady APR contact on 150 mcs. Submerged. All
night we had had an APR contact which appeared to be a rotating antenna and,
from what little directional characteristics our APR antenna has, appeared
to be located on the southern tip of FORMOSA. The APR contact which caused
us to dive was entirely different. It was the third unprovoked APR contact,
strong and steady on.
          Sunset (I) War patrol of the "DOGS" completed. Directed ships
to proceed independently; CAVALLA to Freemantle, PIRANHA to Pearl Harbor,
RAZORBACK to Midway.

October 8
          1400(I) Driven down by 2-engine bomber. He dropped one or two
depth charges.

October 9
          1300(I) Headed up to search for a patrol craft attacked by planes
and by the USS PIRANHA; not located.

October 19
          Arrived Midway for refit.

(7)

— page 15 —
CONFIDENTIAL

(C) WEATHER
While in the LUZON STRAIT area, a storm was encountered which
persisted from 1 October to 8 October. The wind was force 6 to 8, sea
6 to 7, both from the east working to the northeast. Most of the above
period was spent riding out the storm.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
Same as indicated by current publications except close to and
east of Koto Sho, where the current was unpredictable. From 25 to 29
September the set alternated from 045°T to 265°T, the drift in most cases
being less than one knot. On 29 September, between Koto Sho and Formosa,
indicated set and drift were 009°T and 4 knots.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
High peaks on KOTO SHO did not give accurate cuts. Tangents
of KOTO SHO and SHO KOTO SHO proved more accurate. High peaks on FORMOSA
could not be identified.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS
None

(8)

— page 16 —
CONFIDENTIAL

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (REVISED)

CONTACT NUMBER
                                1           2           3           4           5           6
Date                            9/17/44     9/17/44     9/19/44     9/19/44     9/22/44     9/23/44
S Time (Zone)                   0945(-9)    1100(-9)    1002(-9)    1126(-9)    0700(-9)    0801(-9)
U Position: Lat. N              13-57       14-05       17-27       17-30       19-43       22-33
B Long. E                       129-51      130-03      129-13      129-14      132-13      129-08
M
A Speed                         15          15          15          15          15          15
R
I Course                        055         055         354         114         100         289
N
E Trim                          Surf        Surf        Surf        Surf        Surf        Surf
  Minutes Since Last            -
  SD Radar Search
A Number                        1           1           1           1           1           1
I Type                          Unk         Unk         EMILY       Unk         Single      KATE
R                                                                               Engine
  Probable Mission              Pat         Pat         Pat         Pat         Pat         Pat
C How Contacted                 Lookout     Lookout     Lookout     Lookout     Lookout     Lookout
A Initial Range (Miles)         15          12          6           4           8           10
F Elevation Angle °             5           2           5           10          3           3
T Range & Relative              ND          ND          ND          4 mi.       ND          ND
  Bearing of Plane When                                             260
  it Detected S/M
C (State Beau-                  2           2           3           3           3           3
O Sea: ( fort                   150         120         040         040         030         180
N (Direction (Rel)              15          15          30          30          30          30
D Visibility (Miles)            2000        2000        2000        2000        2000        2000
I (Height in                    100         70          20          20          10          30
T Clouds: ( ft.                 -
I (Percent                      -
O (Overcast                     -
N (Bearing (Rel)                -
S Moon: (Angle                  -
  (Percent                      -
  ( Illum.                      -

(9)

— page 17 —
CONFIDENTIAL
(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (REVISED)

CONTACT NUMBER                                7           8           9           10          11          12
S Date                                        9/23/44     9/25/44     9/26/44     9/26/44     9/28/44     10/8/44
U Time(Zone)                                  1354(-9)    1804(-9)    0829(-9)    1155(-9)    1000(-9)    1400(-9)
B Position: Lat. N                            22-58       22-19       21-51       21-45       22-11       20-50
M Long. E                                     128-58      125-38      123-30      123-18      123-11      125-44
A
R Speed                                       15          5           15          15          1.5         15
I Course                                      325         239         220         315         270         130
N Trim                                        Surf        Surf        Surf        Surf        Sub         Surf
E Minutes Since Last
  SD Radar Search                             -

A Number                                      1           1           1           1           1           1
I Type                                        BETTY       Unk         BETTY       BETTY       NELL        Unk
R Probable Mission                            Pat         Pat         H           H           H           H
C How Contacted                               QM          Lookout     QM          QM          OOD         Lookout
A Initial Range (Miles)                       6           16          5           3           8           20
F Elevation Angle °                           20          3           20          15          14          8
T Range & Relative
  Bearing of Plane When                       8 mi.       ND          ND          Unk         ND          15 mi.
  It Detected S/M                             240                                                         160

C (State Beau-
O Sea: ( fort                                 5           1           1           1           1           2
N (Direction(Rel)                             240         340         180         270         000         270
D Visibility (Miles)                          30          25          30          30          30          30
I (Height in
T Clouds: ( ft.                               2000        1500        1500        1600        ---         3000
I (Percent
H Overcast                                    10          80          50          5           0           20
O (Bearing (Rel)                              -
N Moon: (Angle                                -
S (Percent
  Illum.                                      -

Type of S/M Camouflage on this patrol: Standard Grey
                                        32/3 SS-B.

(10)

— page 18 —
CONFIDENTIAL

(H) ATTACK DATA
    None.

(I) MINES
    None.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

    This vessel's only contacts with the enemy were with planes
sighted in the daytime and APR contacts at night, the latter in some cases
undoubtedly radar equipped planes. We submerged to escape air attack by
planes in sight in the daytime seven times, and as result of APR contacts
at night, six times. In general, the enemy planes apparently considered
their task completed when we had been driven under, for they did not make
determined efforts to attack. No gambit tactics were encountered though
we surfaced again while the enemy plane could still very well be in the
vicinity. We were straffed by machine gun fire once, two bombs were
dropped on another occasion, and one or two depth charges released on a
third.

    The outstanding anti-submarine measure encountered, and one
entirely new in the experience of the Commanding Officer, was radar equipped
planes, or other unknown means for causing APR contacts which were determined to be
from radar equipped planes. It was either most fortunate or most unfortunate
that we had this new APR equipment. We assumed that a strong, steady-on
APR signal in a frequency reported to be in use by Japanese radar equipped
planes meant that we were in imminent danger of an air attack. We also
assumed that a reasonably competent aviator could at night, make such an
attack with bombs, depth charges, and guns with a reasonable chance of
success. If these assumptions were correct, we were undoubtedly saved by
the APR equipment, for without it we would have been attacked on the surface
six times, or until one of the attacks were successful. If either of these
assumptions was not correct, the APR ruined us. It caused us:
    (a) To stop using our SJ radar and thereby reduced the effectiveness
        of our night search to a small fraction of what it would otherwise
        have been.
    (b) To hesitate in the use of our radio equipment. On the one
        occasion we used it in Luzon Strait, the Japs were on us before
        the short transmission was completed and we couldn't wait for
        receipts.
    (c) To be driven from the surface nearly every night during the short
        period in the patrol when we were in an area where there was a
        reasonable chance of locating targets.

(11)

— page 19 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L

(d) To discontinue the scouting line on the one occasion when we
    attempted co-ordinated search. It reduced a unit of three
    submarines to nothing more than three individual submarines
    in adjacent areas with communications haphazard and dangerous.

    Possibly aviation and radar experts can assist us in evaluation,
    to determine a proper course of action. If our course of action we
    had a strong, steady APR contact, entirely defensive, was correct, then the
    only value of submarines at night in Luzon Strait is to harass the enemy
    and cause them continued difficulties in getting their ships through and
    continued strenuous anti-submarine effort, both of which are certainly
    worthwhile, though the hunted feeling is far from the glorious feeling of
    watching enemy ships go to the bottom.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

    (a) Torpedoes.
        August 23 - loaded 24 Mark 18-1 torpedoes. None were fired.
        September 6 - torpedo 55890, after being charged for two
    hours, belched smoke from its battery compartment. The charge was stopped
    and the torpedo hauled out of the tube. No grounds or shorts were dis-
    covered. Could not discover what had burned. Cause for smoke undetermined.
    The charge was resumed and the torpedo since has demonstrated no abnormal-
    ities.
        October 6 - Found small hole in top of cell 60 of torpedo 56157.
    Electrolyte sloshes through, but not seriously. No cell top sealing material
    is carried. No action taken.

    (b) Low Pressure Blower.
        This is undoubtedly no news to anyone, but the low pressure
    blower of this vessel makes at least ten times as much noise as the one
    on board older submarines; for example, USS TRIGGER. This blower is
    ROOT-CONNERSVILLE.

(L) RADIO

    The performance of all radio equipment was very satisfactory with
    the exception of the VHF unit and the HRO receiver. The VHF did not work
    properly from the time of its installation through the whole patrol. It
    was installed hurriedly during the last few days at Pearl Harbor and un-
    doubtedly was insufficiently tested prior to our departure. The major
    item found was the antenna flooded out due to a cracked insulator.

(12)

— page 20 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L

Maintenance of the VHF equipment was seriously handicapped by lack of spare
parts and instruction book, including schematic drawings. Neither were
available at Pearl Harbor. If instruction books are still unobtainable, it
is recommended that photostatic copies of schematic drawings or full equip-
ment be furnished submarines to augment part of this obvious deficiency.
The performance of the HBO receiver was extremely unsatisfactory.
Short wave reception was generally poor accompanied by a high noise level
which usually rendered the radio useless. Tuning was poor and very critical,
and much trouble was experienced with drifting. It is not believed that this
particular receiver is defective but rather that the design is at fault.
Location of the HBO in crews' quarters is not recommended. A better location
would be in the radio room or wardroom, where supervision of its use is
possible.

(M) RADAR

All radar trouble was confined to the SJ-1 radar. We list below
the casualties suffered in this equipment by component parts.

Transmitter failures (entailing the loss of 8 operating hours):
1. Local oscillator (726B) ceased to have an output.
2. The voltmeter in the "A" regulated rectifier failed, causing
a 300 volt short to ground.
3. C-508A in the range unit shorted to ground.
4. The high voltage rectifier developed a short on its terminal board.
5. The 5D21 in the modulation circuit developed a grid to cathode short.
6. An 836 tube in the high voltage rectifier became gassy.
7. C-7 in the transmitter, coupling V-4 to V-5, shorted out.
8. Three 5U4G tubes in the "A" regulated rectifier developed plate
to cathode shorts on three separate occasions.
9. Tube V-4 in the transmitter developed a grid to cathode short.

PPI failures (no operational time lost):
1. The CRT's grid started emitting electrons giving extraneous
indications on the screen.
2. The 6SN7 in V-1 became gassy shorting its 300 volt plate voltage
to ground.
3. A wire connecting the cathode of the 6000 volt rectifier tube to
a one megohm resistor separated.
4. A ground developed in the coaxial cable from PG5A in the range
indicator.

Range Indicator failure (no operational time lost):
1. C-36 shorted.

(13)

— page 21 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L

Recommendations:
Move SJ-1 transmitter from present location to the after part of
conning tower. This may forestall trouble from salt spray coming down the
upper conning tower hatch and will certainly provide a better location from
the point of view of combining maintenance with diving the ship.
Since the SJ-1 causes indications on the APN-1, it is desirable for
the APN-1 operator to know exactly when the SJ-1 is transmitting. This
could be arranged by changing the present keying switch to a double throw,
double pole switch, taking the 115 volt primary of the high voltage rectifier
through one side, and 115 volt ship's power through the other side to light
an indicator light at the APN-1. Extra conductors in cable from the conning
tower to the pump room could be utilized in making the connections.
The value of our APN-1 would be materially increased by the addition
of the TN-4 tuning unit to cover the frequency band of 1000 to 3000 mcs.
Inclusion of power driven tuning for all frequency bands would make watch
standing less arduous and therefore more efficient. Comments under part
(L) on VHF maintenance apply to the pulse analyser of the APN in that no
instruction book or schematic drawings were available in Pearl Harbor.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
No sound contacts were made on this patrol. Shortly after
leaving Saipan, the cable leading from the hydrophone to the amplifier on
the JP-1 sound gear became open circuited, rendering this equipment use-
less for the remainder of the patrol. However, this would not have been
much of a loss if we had found any targets because the location of JP in
the forward torpedo room introduces a communication problem which has been
recognized in submarines for years. This resulted in putting sound gear
in the conning tower. If the JP is as superior to QB,QC or JK as reported,
it should be in the conning tower. We should have JP and QC-JK in the
conning tower, and QB elsewhere if necessary.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS
No trouble was experienced in finding density layers at any time
during this patrol. A dive to deep submergence was made every morning and
a bathythermograph card taken at this time. In the PHILIPPINE SEA area a
negative gradient was invariably found at 240 feet with isothermal conditions
down to that depth. In the area about Lat. 22-North, 125-East, conditions
were isothermal to depths of 140 feet where a negative gradient was found and
balancing became possible. In the LUZON STRAIT area, about Lat. 20-North and
Long. 123-East, layers were usually found below 180 feet with isothermal
conditions down to that point.

(14)

— page 24 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L

(R) MILES STEAMED --- FUEL USED

Pearl Harbor to Saipan - - - - 3370 miles - 45,000 gallons
Saipan to Area- - - - - - - 1025 miles - 16,000 gallons
In Area 5135 miles - 54,000 gallons
Area to Midway - - - - - - - 3430 miles - 46,000 gallons

(S) DURATION

Days enroute to area 19
Days in Area 25
Days enroute to base 13
Days submerged 14

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel Factor
24 | 2000 gallons | 20 days | Unknown

Limiting factor this patrol - - - Compliance with orders.

(U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

Radio:

Jamming of radio communications by the enemy was frequently
encountered. This caused some trouble in reception but on the whole was
relatively ineffective. Ten messages were sent in the area, five on the
2000 KC band and five on the ship to shore frequency of the 4235 KC series.
Of these, only one was jammed. This was in the area about Latitude 22-North,
Longitude 126-East, on the night of 25 September, area frequency 2160 KCS.
Jamming commenced immediately after beginning to transmit, with a signal
strength ratio of one to four. The jamming consisted of fast keying of code
on the same frequency. The band width was 6 kcs and it was fairly effective.
However, the message was cleared. No indication of the location of the
jamming station was obtained.
Jamming of NPM schedules was consistent, especially on 9090 KCS
and 6380 KCS. The higher frequencies were usually clear and 14390 KCS could

(17)

— page 29 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L

(25 microsecond scale)

0 5 10

Comments:
     Signal resembled those caused by our own SJ throughout the
patrol; however, the signals persisted after securing our SJ. Shortly
before, interference on the SJ indicated a friendly SJ in the vicinity.
Attention is called to the latter as a possible source of the signals.

7. One contact at Lat. 14-13-N, Long. 130-15-E, was picked up over the
frequency span from 80 MCS (lowest our APR could be tuned) to 220 MCS.
Signals appeared as noise on pulse analyzer and on various radio receivers.
Assume this was caused by St. Elmo's Fire which was in evidence on all
antennas and the bow of the ship. The signals ceased with the disappearance
of St. Elmo's Fire.

(V) R E M A R K S

None

(22)

— page 30 —
FC5-20/A16-3
Serial: 0179
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
October 21, 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO RAZORBACK 1st War Patrol
Report dated 19 Oct. 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Subordinate Command, Navy No. 150A.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific
Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) - Report of First War
Patrol.

1. The first war patrol of the U.S.S. RAZORBACK covered
a period of 55 days of which 25 days were spent on station or in
the areas assigned. The Commanding Officer, Commander Roy S.
Benson, U.S.N., was also in command of a group containing two
additional submarines, PIRANHA and CAVALLA.

2. During the first part of the patrol the group
operated as a unit of the ZOO under the tactical command of
Captain C.W. Wilkins, U.S.N., engaged in offensive reconnaissance
in support of the fleet action against Palau and the Philippines.
The second part of the patrol was spent patrolling the areas east
of Formosa and between Formosa and Luzon.

3. There were no contacts except with enemy planes, the
absence of Japanese shipping being attributed to the large scale
activities of our surface forces and their accompanying air arm.
It is unfortunate that this skillful and experienced submarine
captain did not have the opportunity of repeating his former
successes.

4. Attention is invited to the remarks under sections
(J) and (U) concerning the enemy's use of radar. Considerable
thought and effort was expended by this submarine in making a
systematic collection of information regarding the characteristics
of enemy radar encountered.

5. The RAZORBACK was one of the cleanest submarines to
ever arrive for a refit by this squadron and her material upkeep
indicated unusual care and attention by the officers and crew.

-1-

— page 31 —
SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY

FC5-20/A16-3
Serial: 0179

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) - Report of First War
Patrol.

— page 32 —
A16-3
Serial: 0174
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO RAZORBACK 1st War
Patrol Report dated
19 October 1944.

From:
Via:
Subject:

1.
in the first endorsement. It is strongly recommended suitable
recognition of merit be given to this and other past, present
and future submarine patrols which, by the nature of their
patrol instructions, are permitted little opportunity to enjoy
freedom of action in searching out the enemy. The assists
given other units of our fighting forces as carried out on this
patrol are not insignificant.

Copy to:
Comsubron 20
CO, USS RAZORBACK.
COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET (mc)
SUBORDINATE COMMAND, NAVY NO. 1504.

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
23 October 1944.

The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Subordinate Command, Navy No. 1504.
(1) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) - Report of First War
Patrol.

Forwarded, concurring in the remarks contained

[SIGNATURE: H. W. CLARK]
H. W. CLARK.

— page 33 —
FF12-10/A16-3(15)
Serial 02397
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
hch
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
1 November, 1944.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
RAZORBACK Report of First
War Patrol and Report of
Sixteenth Coordinated Attack Group.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 559.
U.S.S. RAZORBACK FIRST WAR PATROL
and REPORT OF SIXTEENTH COORDINATED
ATTACK GROUP.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) - Report of First War Patrol,
(25 August to 19 October 1944), and Report of Six-
teenth Coordinated Attack Group.

1. The first war patrol of the RAZORBACK was conducted in
areas east of Luzon and off Formosa. The RAZORBACK, along with the
U.S.S. CAVALLA (SS244) and the U.S.S. PIRANHA (SS389), formed an at-
tack group with the Commanding Officer of the RAZORBACK, Commander R.
L. Benson, U.S. Navy, acting as group commander. Further details
will be found in the PIRANHA's and CAVALLA's second war patrol reports.

2. Area assignments and movements of this group were
largely dependent upon coordination with surface and air forces en-
gaged in offensive operations at this time. As may often be the case
under these conditions, few contacts resulted. In the case of the
RAZORBACK, no contacts other than numerous enemy aircraft were made.
However, the potential submarine striking power and supply of informa-
tion to other forces, including negative information, are most valu-
able contributions to the success of offensive operations as a whole.

3. The pertinent comment with regard to radar will receive
thorough study.

4. Award of the Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol
is not authorized.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratu-
lates the group commander and commanding officers, officers, and crew
for completion of this arduous and important patrol. It is regretted
that opportunity to attack the enemy was not afforded this veteran
commanding officer and thoroughly trained new submarine. The second
war patrol of the CAVALLA, who proceeded to the Southwest Pacific
completion of patrol, has not yet been received by this Command.
[STAMP: ORIGINAL]
[STAMP: MICRO]
[STAMP: PHOTO-LAB OP-16]
[STAMP: RETURN TO F-4253]

- 1 -

— page 35 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st Copy]

DECLASSIFIED T I A L
5 January 1945

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394).
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Division
     (2) Commander Submarine Squadron
     (3) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
     (4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394), Report of War Patrol
         Number T.O.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
           (B) Track Chart (To ComSubPac).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the SECOND War Patrol of
this vessel conducted in the LUZON STRAIT area during the period
15 November 1944 to 5 January 1945, is forwarded herewith.

C. DONALD BROWN

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP-09B] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/22]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

[HANDWRITTEN: FILMED]

— page 36 —
(A) PROLOGUE

        Arrived Midway from first patrol for refit alongside USS PROTEUS
(AS19), 19 October 1944; Lt. Comdr. C. Donald BROWN, USN, relieved
Commander Roy S. BENSON, USN, as commanding officer on 21 October 1944;
from 22 to 24 October 1944, drydocked in USS ARD-8; 3 November 1944,
the crew relieved Submarine Division 201 Relief Crew #2; and Ensign W. H.
PATTILLO, D-V(G), USNR, File #270073, reported aboard for duty. In addi-
tion to routine items, the following alterations were accomplished during
refit:
        (a) Installed Mk VIII, Mod. O, TBT's, Shipalt SS240-K.
        (b) Modified sound powered telephone and call bell circuit,
            Shipalt SS246-K.
        (c) Installed bow plane rigging indicator light, Shipalt SS248-K.
        (d) Installed travelling nut type lower limit switch on periscope
            hoist.

        Satisfactory sound test conducted, magnetic signature determined
ship degaussed for Lat. 20 N.
        Had 7-day training period with Commander D. L. WHELCHEL, USN,
(Comsubdiv-201) as training officer. Ready for sea on 15 November 1944.

(B) NARRATIVE

15 November

        Underway from Midway; carried out special periscope sighting
exercise for training O.O.D.'s and lookouts with USS TILEFISH. Took
departure, proceeding independently in accordance with CTG 17.5 orders
of 14 November 1944, to rendezvous with USS THEPANG (Comdr. R. M.
DAVENPORT, USN) and USS SEGUNDO (Comdr. J. D. FULP, Jr., USN); making
frequent training dives and conducting daily battle problems.

17 November

        Skipped this date.

19 November

        Distance unit of Bendix Log out of commission. (See derange-
ments.)
        Conducted satisfactory test on 4" gun which had failed to come
back to battery during training "battle surface".

- 1 -

— page 37 —
20 November
At sunrise, joined USS TREPANG and USS SEGUNDO; proceeding in
company enroute Saipan. Commanding Officer USS TREPANG, pack
commander of ROY'S RANGERS. Notified Group Commander of Bendix
Log spare required at Saipan. Made three training dives, con-
ducted tracking problem.

21 - 22 November
Conducting training dives, exercising radar tracking parties.

23 November
0800(K) Took position on right flank of scouting line, searching for
downed B-29 personnel in accordance with C.T.G. 17.7 despatch
orders of 22 November.
1130(K) Exchanged calls with eastbound USS BURRFISH (SS312).

24 November
0055(K) Radar contact - SARAGAN ISLAND.
0115(K) Sighted SARAGAN.
0600(K) Arrived rendezvous - no escort.
1235(K) Sighted USS DUNLAP (DD384) reporting as escort.
Resumed scouting line with escort leading USS TREPANG.
1600(K) Discontinued search, joined column behind USS TREPANG.
1612(K) Moored port side to USS TREPANG, alongside USS FULTON,
TANAPAG HARBOR, SAIPAN.

25 November
Lt. James H. KING, USN, File #178354, was transferred to, and
Lt.(jg) E. L. JOHNSON, USN, File #197292, was received from
SubDiv-82 Relief Crew. Having been unable to sleep or eat
properly since departure from Midway, KING was not considered
physically fit for combat duty.
1545(I) Having completed minor voyage repairs, got underway enroute
operating area in accordance with ComTaskForce 17 Operation
Order #383-44. Proceeding in company with USS TREPANG, USS
SEGUNDO and USS SPARFISH, with USS CASE (DD 370) as escort.

- 2 -

— page 38 —
26 November
1645(I) Made trim dive.
2200(I) USS CASE completed duty as escort.

Made section dives, exercised radar tracking party.
1917(I) Radar contact on eastbound USS SHAD (SS235) and USS REDFISH
(SS395); exchanged recognition signals with the former.

27 November
0125(I) Radar contact accompanied by SJ interference; opened, made
unsuccessful attempt to exchange recognition signals. Assumed
contact to be eastbound USS KINGFISH (SS234) expected at this
time.

28 November
1651(I) Surfaced from battle problem; SD contact 2½ miles; dived.
(Aircraft contact #1.)
1721(I) Surfaced, all clear.

29 November
0200(I) Entered waiting area.
0210(I) Exchanged recognition signals with eastbound USS ATULE (SS403).
0841(I) Shortly after surfacing from trim dive, sighted an unidentified
single-engine aircraft; dived. (Aircraft contact #2.)
0926(I) Surfaced, all clear.
1147(I) SD contact, 21 miles; sighted unidentified large aircraft;
turned toward and slowed down. We had been keying the SD for
ten seconds at irregular intervals between one and two minutes.
Increased times between keying SD and the plane disappeared.
No IFF was noted. (Aircraft contact #3.)
Conducted battle problem.

30 November - (Unless otherwise designated, all times following are "H".)
0230 Entered patrol area.
0510 Submerged. As we are ahead of schedule, intend to remain sub-
merged this date to prevent detection as we approach CALIGUIN
ISLAND.

- 3 -

— page 39 —
1 December

2240 Entered area assigned by pack commander.

0335 Sighted DIDICAS ROCKS. The Coast Pilot is right when it says
     they can easily be mistaken for ships. At 13 miles they looked
     like a convoy of two large ships with small escort, distance
     about 10,000 yards.

0520 Dived, with CALIGUIN ISLAND bearing 213°T, distant 8½ miles,
     conducting submerged patrol.

1622 Sighted three FRANCES' which made a sweep from BABUYAN to
     CAMIGUIN and back, disappearing to east of the former island.
     The return sweep was directly over us, at about 100 feet over
     the water. (Aircraft contact #4.)

1633 Sighted column of smoke on south side of BABUYAN ISLAND, bearing
     342°T, which drew to right slowly. Came to course 020°T, speed
     standard, depth 100 feet.

1701 Up for a look - sighted JAKE (twin float plane) patrolling to
     eastward of BABUYAN on easterly heading, still indicating a
     target heading in that direction. Smoke still drawing right,
     but no tops in sight. (Aircraft contact #5.)

1705 Sighted tops of small escort bearing 313°T, which appeared to be
     working well out on starboard flank of our target as his course
     at sighting was to southward. Went to battle stations. Dis-
     covered smoke target to be a fire on BABUYAN Island, a good
     trick if the Japs meant it as we interpreted it.

1707 Turned toward escort at 70 turns, a Chidori or large P.C., and
     shortly thereafter sighted a large pair of kingposts bearing
     317°T. Sound picked up three separate pingers who apparently
     alternated from pinging to listening. They were suspicious
     because near pingers, about 1500 yards, kept shifting scales.
     Angle on bow of AK was, at sighting, 70 port, range 12-14,000
     yards.

1709 Sighted another large ship, no masts, no kingposts, went ahead
     standard to close track at 1712.

1718 Slowed to have another look, remained between 40 and 70 turns
     from then on tracking continuously. The targets crossed showing
     the large previously unidentified vessel to be the closer (we
     thought now it was a large AP); we shifted to this target. It
     was getting pretty dark, though silhouettes were reasonably
     clear against a rapidly failing sunset.

- 4 -

— page 40 —
I knew we had a mighty long range for Mark 18's but decided to
shoot for the following reasons:
(a) Convoy appeared to be headed for harbor at CALIGUIN,
as they kept zigging toward in small increments. If they went on,
the pack could not follow them into BABUYAN CHANNEL tonight.
(b) Though our ranges were pretty uncertain, they checked
fairly well on a logical speed, and the bearings were right on
from the second observation of the problem.
(c) The course was almost a surety because of a 90° angle on
the bow check shortly before firing.
(d) The target looked important enough to warrant a gamble.

1739 With range 4200 yards, angle on the bow 95°, speed 9.5 knots,
bearings checking on, fired a full bow nest with a spread of
1000 feet normal to torpedo track. (Attack #1)
Kept periscope on target throughout torpedo run,
bearings still checking on TDC. Target started blinking lights
about two minutes after firing, but did not change course. Hopes
and prayers not answered.

1744 Forward torpedo room reported one explosion. None were heard
or seen in conning tower.

1746 Three depth charges, apparently dropped by escort which had
pulled over where we dived this morning between CALIGUIN and
us, distant about two miles. Started working out to eastward
as current was sweeping us to northwest.

1842 When a bright full moon disappeared temporarily behind a cloud,
surfaced and cleared vicinity at four engine speed.

1910 Received SEGUNDO report that she had heard our convoy and seen
its air escort at 1430.

1934 Turned away from object close aboard reported as periscope by
lookout, momentary radar contact 450 yards dead astern after
turn of 90° which may have been our wake, maybe not.

1935 Sent report of our attack to rest of pack.

2010 Exchanged radar signals with pack commander.
Had numerous airborne radar contacts on APR, as many as
three at a time, which usually faded out when we secured the SJ,
but at,

2121 Submerged for saturated signal on APR.

2214 Surfaced.

- 5 -

— page 41 —
2 December
0305 Submerged for saturated signal on APR.
0342 Surfaced.
0537 Submerged to patrol area to eastward of CALIGUIN thinking it
wise to wait a day before returning to the scene of our attempted
crime.

During the day, seas increased from force 1 to 4, sky overcast.
1757 Surfaced.

3 December

Planes are still flying in spite of very rough weather, but
we get away with it until
0345 Dived for saturated signal on APR.
0444 Surfaced.

0517 Dived for submerged patrol. Depth control is difficult and
we can't see much, even at 50 feet.

1755 Surfaced and started working our way out to northward to
change areas in accordance with pack instructions. Sea has
increased to 5.

1850 Received pack commander instructions to remain in area
pending weather change and further instructions.

2209 Dived for steady APR contact near saturation which appeared
suddenly and increased rapidly. There was no low intensity
warning on this contact.
Jap aviators are using tactics we did not see last patrol.
Often when there's a good, steady, and increasing contact, the
enemy radar is cut off suddenly. As he makes his approach, he
cuts in again at various intervals. We have no other data on
which to rely, so dive on saturated signal. We have tried un-
successfully to catch him on the SD while diving. When I refer
to the Jap radar being cut off, am sure it is not the result of
an unsuccessful search through our sector (because that appears
as a rotating antenna) but rather actually switching off his
radar to minimize our detection advantage as he approaches.

2244 Surfaced.

2336 Dived for saturated APR signal.

- 6 -

— page 42 —
4 December
0020 Surfaced. Took water in conning tower to deck level - no damage.
0517 Dived for submerged patrol. Sea is still about 5.
1755 Surfaced.
2000 Having received instructions to shift area, started for entrance
     to BALINTANG CHANNEL.
2152 Dived for saturated APR signal.
2225 Surfaced.

5 December
0526 Radar contact, three targets, range 14,000 yards, bearing 235°T
     which tracked on an easterly course. Went to four engines on
     course 150°T to get ahead of targets. It was getting light
     fast to eastward placing us at a disadvantage, so at
0535 Submerged to periscope depth. Radar approach not feasible,
     the possibility of broaching being very real in a force 6 sea.
0550 Sighted two ships with sharp angle on bow. There were three
     pips, one medium and two small at time of diving. Sound had
     continuous pinging soon after submergence. Kept headed toward
     what I thought was the bow escort and soon found he was a DD.
     The other two ships were visible from time to time and identi-
     fied as torpedo boats of Chidori or similar class. As no other
     target was in sight, made approach on DD. Left periscope up
     entire approach as high seas kept it from view most of the time.
0616 Fired full bow nest, torpedo run 2350, track 87 starboard,
     depth set 5 feet, torpedoes fired across sea. Each torpedo
     broached initially but appeared to run hot, straight, and normal
     as tracked by sound. (Attack #2)
0618 With what I thought were six broachers on the way, rigged for
     depth charge and sought a gradient. After torpedo room recorded
     three distinct muffled explosions ten seconds apart, first one
     two minutes and ten seconds after firing.
0623 First depth charge. One set of screws and one pinger heard
     during countermeasures.

- 7 -

— page 43 —
0625 Three depth charges, a single followed a few seconds later by
two very close together.
0626 Same.
0712 Lost contact with screws.
0900 Came up for look, all clear, continued normal submerged patrol.
1818 Surfaced.

6 December
0158 Exchanged recognition signals with USS GUNNEL (SS253).
0222 OOD sighted red and green flare - submerged.
0257 Surfaced.
0524 Submerged for patrol off CAPE BOJEADOR.
1810 Surfaced.

2000 Having received contact report from pack commander, started in
to intercept convoy headed for BABUYAN CHANNEL.
2234 Radar contact bearing 070°T, range 17,250 yards. This target
proved to have four escorts, and may have been previously
damaged as he tracked at two to four knots. This apparently
was the only ship left in the convoy.
We avoided the bow escort, which passed down our starboard side,
then we headed toward the target.
With target plainly visible in forward TBT and coming in nicely,
we found ourselves naked, as a bright moon came out from behind
the clouds, so with range 5000 yards
2315 Dived. Lost some time and experienced some confusion finding
ourselves one lookout short as we started to close the hatch
closed ages before we started down; so went to periscope depth.
Target dimly visible through periscope, later zigging toward
affording good stern tube set-up.
2343 Fired full after nest, torpedoes spread 300 feet normal to line
of sight. (Att ack #3)
2345 Three timed hits heard in the conning tower, control room, after
torpedo room and by sound. Hits heard three minutes and four
seconds after firing first fish.

- 8 -

— page 44 —
2348-52-53
Single depth charges.
2355 Target showed a light which soon proved to be the beginning of
a decoy fire.

7 December

Target now turning fiercely, could see sky under about forty
feet of stern and she looked as though she'd soon be down, but
after watching it for some time, closed, tried single ping range
with no results, and at

0008 Fired four torpedoes forward, spread 250 feet normal to line
of sight. (Att ack #4)

0012 Torpedo explosion heard by sound.

0015 Three depth charges.

0052 Explosion observed on stern forcing flames well above mast.

0102 Explosion heard on sound in direction of target.

We were getting close to BABUYAN CHANNEL so evaded four be-
fuddled escorts at periscope depth. No screw crews were heard
although one pinger made a complete circle around us just
before we surfaced.

0126 Surfaced and cleared area at four engine speed, nearest escort
2000 yards to southward.

0205 Three large explosions on target about a minute apart, observed
by OOD to light up the sky. Immediately after second explosion
the fire disappeared. Radar lost contact at 20,000 yards.

0215 Momentary flame observed by OOD in vicinity of our target.

0221 OOD saw explosion bearing 070°T, distant 10,000 yards.
Our position, Lat. 18° 47' N, Long. 120° 49' E.

Received good news of Pack Commander's Jap slaughter; sent
information on our last two targets, and SJ radar deception
encountered last two nights; then received further dope on
excellent results of SEGUNDO. TREPANG and SEGUNDO had the
escorts completely beaten down and befuddled by the time we
arrived on the scene because they bothered us little.

- 9 -

— page 45 —
0534 Submerged.
Definite radar deception was encountered throughout nights of
5 and 6 December, emanating from Luzon. One to thirty-two
false targets appeared on a line of bearing. The true bearings
of this deception from various positions in the area intercepted
roughly on Luzon, Lat. 18-12-N, Long. 121-00-E. See particulars
under part (U).

1811 Surfaced.

8 December

0525 Submerged.

1742 Surfaced, started beating toward BALINTANG CHANNEL against a
state 6 sea.

1808 Radar contact, proved to be USS TREPANG.

2016 Proceeding to Saipan in compliance with Comsubpac despatch
orders of 7 December.

9 December

0521 Submerged with BABUYAN ISLAND bearing 150°T, distant 16 miles.

1801 Surfaced. For some time after surfacing, we had much SJ radar
interference to northward of us which indicated at least three
friendly submarines in the vicinity.

2124 Dived for saturated APR contact.

2215 Surfaced.

10 December

0125 Dived for saturated signal on APR.

0217 Surfaced.

0515 Submerged.

1755 Surfaced.

11 through 14 December

Enroute Saipan, conducting training dives, tracking and battle
problems.

15 December

0500 Rendezvous with PC-1599.
1058 Arrived Saipan, tied up alongside USS FULTON.

- 10 -

— page 46 —
15-17 December
Removed four electric torpedoes, loaded twenty-four air torpedoes,
received 54,000 gallons of fuel, and completed minor voyage
repairs.

17 December
1414(I) Underway in accordance with C.T.G. 17.7 secret despatch orders
of December 1944. We are in company with USS SPOT (Comdr. W. S.
PORT, Jr., USN, group commander), USS BALAO, and USS ICEFISH,
with AM-101 as escort.
2030(I) Escort completed duties, commenced steaming independently enroute
patrol area.

18 through 21 December
Enroute patrol area, making daily section dives and conducting
battle and tracking problems.

19 December
1305(I) SD contact 34 miles; dived when contact closed to 8 miles,
no IFF. (Aircraft contact #6.)

21 December
1235(I) SD contact 27 miles. Plane did not close, visibility poor.
(Aircraft contact #7.)

22 December (Unless otherwise indicated, times below are "H".)
0400 APR indicated presence of a plane varying the output power on
his radar. See Section (U).
0530 Submerged for patrol with Y'AMI bearing 235°T, distant 15 miles.
0944 OOD sighted BETTY through periscope distance 1/4 mile which
apparently passed directly over us just prior to our raising
the periscope - altitude 100 feet. He must have surveyed a
wrench as he went over because the forward torpedo room re-
ported a hammer-like blow on the hull at the same time. Plane
was not seen again. (Aircraft contact #8.)
1047 Sound contact 175°T. Sighted a northbound power fishing boat
which crossed our stern and disappeared at 1125.
1807 Surfaced.

- 11 -

— page 47 —
1827 Submerged for saturated APR signal.
1910 Surfaced.
2230 Reported E.T.A. on station to USS SEGUNDO.

23 December

0202 Radar contact bearing 028°T, distant 33,000. Closed on four
     engines and soon found same type of radar deception encountered
     off N.W. coast of LUZON on 5 and 6 December. Hope the deception
     is followed by as profitable a contact as the last time we
     encountered it.

0330 On assigned station, patrolling with USS SEGUNDO (Commander
     J. D. FULP, Jr., USN, Pack Commander).

0454 Submerged for saturated APR signal.

1806 Surfaced.

24 December

0536 Submerged.

1417 Sighted BETTY bearing 039°T, distant 5 miles. (Aircraft
     contact #9.)

1813 Surfaced.

1913 Having received contact report of USS SEGUNDO indicating convoy
     harbored at SABTANG, headed for BALINTANG CHANNEL at 3-engine
     speed adding #4 when available from charge.

25 December

0420 Submerged for saturated APR signal; contact on SJ as we went
     down, distant 8000 yards and coming in fast. (Aircraft
     contact #10.)

0500 Surfaced.

0523 Submerged for saturated APR signal, on station, with BALINTANG
     ISLAND bearing 062°T, distant 21 miles.

0940 OOD sighted medium AK, hull down, bearing 291°T.

0951 Having determined the target drawing to left went ahead standard
     to close CALAYAN ISLAND in case he chose to come our way;
     estimated angle on the bow 35 port. After several observations,
     noted an old AO to be leading the AK.

- 12 -

— page 48 —
1020 Radical zig of targets produced a 70° starboard angle and headed
     them toward SABTANG. The minimum range on these targets at any
     time was 12,000 yards. Saw no escorts, but sound heard pinging
     at various times in the general direction of the targets.

1133 Targets disappeared on course 025°T, speed about 6 knots. We
     were too close to land to surface for an end around.

1820 Surfaced.

     Received SEGUNDO's report that convoy had circuited them and
     possibly harbored at MUSA BAY. Reported our contact and the
     location of our patrol for tomorrow.

26 December

0526 Submerged about 25 miles N. of SABTANG ISLAND on possibility
     that our contact of yesterday might be northbound today.

1800 Surfaced.

     Reported negative contact and requested instructions from
     SEGUNDO. No receipt for message.

27 December

0529 Submerged with BALINTANG ISLAND bearing 066°T, distant 23 miles.

1804 Surfaced.

     Received negative contact from SEGUNDO, word that her trans-
     mitter was out last night, and orders for resumption of
     patrol in areas previously designated by THEBANG for the 29th.

28 December

0538 Submerged 33 miles bearing 295°T from Y'AMI ISLAND.

0708 Sighted RUFE bearing 110°T, distant 7 miles. (Aircraft
     contact #11.)

0729 Sighted RUFE bearing 280°T, distant 1 mile. (Aircraft
     contact #12.)

0820 Sighted large unidentified plane bearing 165°T, distant 9 miles.
     (Aircraft contact #13.)

0845 Sighted three unidentified single engine planes bearing
     298°T, distant 4 miles. (Aircraft contact #14.)

     Much activity indicated, but no ships sighted.

- 13 -

— page 49 —
1804 Surfaced and headed toward BASHI CHANNEL.

29 December

0240 APR contact with half saturation signal; simultaneous SJ contact on fast moving target, range 26,000 yards.
     (aircraft contact #15.)

0543 Dived for saturated APR signal; our position bearing 056°T,
     distant 15 miles from Y'AMI.

1802 Surfaced.

     Received message from USS SEGUNDO giving us permission to patrol
     independently. Informed pack commander we would
     patrol line between FORMOSA and islands to the southeast,
     and headed back through BASHI CHANNEL. All traffic indica-
     tions have been to and from the west coast of FORMOSA.

30 December

0102 Dived for saturated APR signal. Discovered #4 main engine
     outboard exhaust valve inoperative.

0148 Surfaced.

0515 Submerged, with ITBAYAT ISLAND bearing 130°T, distant 15
     miles. #4 main engine outboard exhaust valve is now holding
     sea pressure.

0935 Sighted unidentified float plane bearing 040°T, distant 6
     miles. (Aircraft contact #16.)

1047 Sighted several ships bearing 250°T, distant 10,000 yards.

1053 Went ahead full speed on course 320°T attempting to get in
     on targets. The convoy consisted of 2 AO's and 2 AK's
     escorted by a DD and TB or DE, with air coverage - one JAKE.
     (Aircraft contact #17.)

1241 Changed course to 285°T. First two targets were by, so closed
     for shot on trailing AO with DD on her starboard quarter.

1245 Changed course to 290°T giving us a 112° starboard track.
     Fired six torpedoes spread 800 feet normal to line of sight,
     range 3200 yards, torpedo run 3400 yards. Started reload
     forward. (Attack #5)

1247 [HANDWRITTEN: +] Timed hits 2m 12s and 2m 20s after firing. The first of these
     was a terrific explosion not observed by me as I had swung to

-- 14 --

— page 50 —
the DD which was coming along much closer to us. When I
looked at the target again he had swung 90°L and visible
damage was a 5° starboard list, and he was smoking heavily.
Did not see him again.

1248 Three explosions heard throughout the ship, not depth charges.
     (All the latter were preceded by a definite click.) Came
     left for stern shot at DD.

1249 [HANDWRITTEN: checkmark] Two depth charges.

1250 Loud breaking up noises reported from control room and engine
     rooms.

1252 Several distant explosions.

1255 Steadied on course 140°T.

1258-30 Fired full stern nest at DD with 110 S track, range 1800 yards,
     spread 200 feet normal to line of sight at speed 13 knots.
     (Attack #6)

1259-30 Torpedo hit disintegrated bow of destroyer in great orange
     ball of flame. Dull thud heard throughout ship. Foremast
     of DD leaned over to 80°.

1310 Amazed to find destroyer had lost no freeboard and was on an
     even keel, in spite of loss of bow, so swung around to finish
     him off. All hands were topsides, manning the rail and the
     superstructure high vantage points.

     Air coverage still in vicinity.

1345 Steady on course 311°T, fired two bow tubes, at range 750
     yards, spread 100 feet normal to line of sight. Thirty-
     nine seconds later one hit swung the destroyer 20° to her
     right and put her well down forward. Right after this hit,
     breaking up noises were heard on sound. (Attack #7)

1346 After a look at the other escort, looked all around and found
     that one AKATAKE had disappeared.

     Since the other escort was a Chidori or DE, evaded at periscope
     depth. During the attacks approximately thirty depth charges
     were dropped, none close.

1601 Surfaced for end around. Pinging was still heard but targets and
     Chidori were not in sight. Went ahead standard on three main
     engines on 350°T.

1610 Radar contact 315°T, distant 26,000 yards.

- 15 -

— page 51 —
1612 SD contact, distant 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #18.)
1632 SD contact closed to 6 miles - dived.
1655 Surfaced, continued end around, keeping nearest target at
    minimum range 18,000 yards during daylight.
1706 Sent contact report to SEGUNDO - no receipt.
1820 Sent second contact report to SEGUNDO - no receipt.
1850 Went to battle stations and started attack as targets were
    approaching the restricted area to S.E. of FORMOSA. (We
    were about 4 miles to eastward of the restricted zone when
    we started in.
1900 Cleared contact report to SEGUNDO.
1922 With the scene brightly lighted by the moon, slowed and turned
    directly toward the convoy to reduce own silhouette. At this
    time we were sharp on their port bow, distant 16,000 yards.
1932 Dived to radar depth at 13,000 yards.
1952 At range 5300 yards, with three targets plainly visible in the
    periscope, went to 55 feet.
    Targets were on line of bearing, 225° relative from leading
    target. Our firing position was dead ahead of the trailing
    (or our right-hand) target.
1959 Fired three torpedoes at leading target, range 3400 yards,
    35 port track, spread 300 feet normal to line of sight.
    (Attack #8)
2000 Shifted to middle target, fired remaining three forward fish,
    range 3480, 25 port track, spread 300 feet normal to line of
    sight. Swung right to get off trailing target's track for
    stern tube shots. (Attack #9)
2001(-) One minute and thirty-five seconds after first torpedo was fired,
    observed flash of hit on first target. This explosion was the
    loudest heard on this ship to date and visibly shook the ship.
    Eight seconds later we timed another hit. Both hits were heard
    plainly on the QB gear; only one torpedo was hear running in
    the direction of the first target following the second explosion.
2002 One minute and forty-five seconds after first torpedo of second
    salvo, observed flash on second target which coincided with
    first of two timed hits heard on JK sound gear.

- 16 -

— page 52 —
2004 Observed gunfire on targets. Indiscriminate firing of small
     caliber guns and flashes, which I attributed to Y guns, were
     observed on both the targets at which we had fired. At
     about this time indiscriminate depth charging started, some
     singles, some in groups.

     It was my intention to fire stern tubes at the third ship,
     but #1 target presented us a 90° port angle on the bow at
     short range. He zigged left 180° giving us a 90° starboard
     track. Started tracking the #1 target.

2012 Having two ping ranges of 1400 yards, fired four stern tubes,
     100 starboard track, spread 300 feet normal to line of sight.
     (Attack #10)
2013 [HANDWRITTEN: ☨] One minute and sixteen seconds after the first torpedo was
     fired, there was a blinding flash followed by a shower of
     sparks between us and the target, in the right-hand edge of
     the periscope field. Swung the periscope to the right and
     could find only one other target about twenty-five degrees
     to the right of the flash. One explosion was heard which
     coincided with the flash. As I could distinctly see three
     targets shortly before the stern tubes were fired and only
     two directly after the blinding flash, am sure the middle ship
     walked into a torpedo meant for the target which had reversed
     course and was partially overlapped by it. At any rate, it
     disappeared in a matter of minutes. It was bright moonlight
     throughout the attack and visibility was excellent.

     Am convinced that the target at which we fired twice was a
     "Q" ship. The hits in her apparently caused her no embarrassment
     and she caused us considerable concern during evasive tactics.
     We evaded at periscope depth, keeping our stern toward her.

2027 The "Q" ship gave us a zero angle on the bow and fishtailed
     toward us. Every time I started off his track he changed
     course to change his angle on the bow from port to starboard
     and vice versa.

2050 Pulled off his track at standard speed and slowed down. He
     passed across our stern, distance 400 yards and shoved off.
     We really felt naked with those empty stern tubes pointed
     his way.

2110 Heard pinging and sighted our DE or CHIDORI bearing 257°T,
     distant 5000 yards.

2118 CHIDORI closed to 2500 yards, appeared suspicious, pinging
     shifted to short scale, and he unloaded about a dozen depth
     charges. We kept him astern and pulled clear.

     - 17 -

— page 53 —
2130 Lost sight of CHIDORI.

2201 With two pingers still in the vicinity, surfaced and cleared
     area at full speed on three main engines. SJ radar had one
     target bearing 210°T, distant 24,000 yards.

     Clearing area in accordance with ComSubPac despatch orders of
     30 December.

2250 Reported to SEGUNDO attack completed, remaining ships scattered,
     and that we were departing from area.

2255 SEGUNDO requested our position.

2331 Sent SEGUNDO our position and results of attacks.

2359 SEGUNDO reported her position NE of KOTO SHO, her search
     negative, and requested enemy course which we reported as
     unknown. The SEGUNDO may very well have wondered at the
     lack of information from us on the convoy attacked. As
     we did not know the SEGUNDO's position and the convoy was
     approaching restricted waters, I felt delay in our attack
     was unwarranted. Developments of the night attack could not
     be reported due to submergence of this vessel. On surfacing
     the situation was as follows:
     Of the original convoy of two escorts and four merchant-
     men, there remained one CHIDORI, one undamaged MARU, and one
     damaged but still efficient "Q" ship. Of these, the undamaged
     merchantman was the only favorable target. We had lost contact
     with her shortly after 2015 and believed the "Q" ship our lone
     contact on surfacing at 2200.
     In view of losing contact two hours previously so near to
     the restricted area, I felt that further search was futile.

31 December

0955 SD radar contact 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #19.) Range
     closed slowly to 10 miles, then opened. Remained on the
     surface.

1954 Received ComSubPac instructions telling RAZORBACK and SEGUNDO
     to proceed to GUAM for refit.

2307 Received instructions from SEGUNDO to rendezvous with her
     tomorrow at 1000.

                               - 18 -

— page 54 —
1 January
0235 Exchanged recognition signals with USS SEGUNDO.
0325 Made radar contact on USS SEGUNDO and proceeded to
station 9000 yards on her port beam.

31 December - 5 January

Proceeding in company with USS SEGUNDO enroute.GUAM,
conducting training dives, and radar tracking drills.

5 January

0445 Radar contact bearing 081°T, distant 15,000 yards.
0500 Exchanged recognition signals with PC-1591, who is
our assigned escort.
0529 Proceeding to GUAM in column behind USS SEGUNDO,
escort leading.
1215 Arrived GUAM for refit.

- 19 -

— page 55 —
(C) WEATHER
The weather was as expected for this season. The first day
in the area, December 1, we had a state 2 sea; from 2 to 11 December
the sea state was 4 to 6. For the second part of the patrol,
December 12 to December 31, the sea state was 2 to 5. For the
most part, weather was overcast.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
In the area 19° to 20° N, 122° to 123° E, the current was
westerly with a drift of about 1.0 knot. Close to and between
Batan and Camiguin Islands this set was consistently northwesterly,
drift 1.5 knots. In the area to the westward of Babuyan Islands the
set was northeasterly, drift 1.0 knot. No accurate information was
obtained on the current in the Balintang Channel although the set
was northerly.
Very little or no current was encountered between longitude
121°20' E, and the BATAN ISLANDS. However, about twenty miles to
the westward a northerly current of about two to three knots was
encountered.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
No navigational lights were seen on this patrol. SJ radar
was invaluable as a navigational aid near land, especially for
navigating in BALINTANG and BASHE CHANNELS in heavy seas with the
weather completely overcast.

- 20 -

— page 56 —
(F) SHIP CONTACTS

No. | Time | Lat. | Type | Initial | Est. Course | How | Remarks
    | Date | Long. |      | Range   | Speed       | Contacted |
----|------|-------|------||||
1   | 1705(H) | 19-20-N | 1 AP | 12,000 | Course 195 | Periscope | In addition to
    | Dec. 1 | 122-01-E | 1 AK |         | Speed 9.5   |           | 3 escorts sim-
    |        |         | 3 Escorts |         |             |           | ilar to Chi-
    |        |         |      |         |             |           | dori, convoy
    |        |         |      |         |             |           | had at least
    |        |         |      |         |             |           | 4 aircraft
    |        |         |      |         |             |           | escorts.
    |        |         |      |         |             |           | ATTACK #1

— page 57 —
(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

No. | Time | Lat. | Type | Initial | Est. Course | How | Remarks
    | Date | Long. |      | Range   | Speed       | Contacted |
----|------|-------|------||||

— page 58 —
No. Time Lat. Type Initial Est. Course How Remarks
     Date Long.        Range Speed Contacted

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No. Time Lat. Type Initial Est. Course How Remarks
     Date Long.        Range Speed Contacted

The data is presented in a tabular format. I will transcribe all the text in the table, including headers and all data points.

No. Time Lat. Type Initial Est. Course How Remarks
     Date Long.        Range Speed Contacted
10   0423(H) 21-31-N 1 Unk. 4 mi. Unknown SJ Radar While diving for
     Dec. 25 120-16-E                                  Saturated APR
                                                       signal.

— page 59 —
(H) ATTACK DATA
U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) TORPEDO ATTACK No. 1 PATROL NO. 2
Time: 1739(H) Date: 1 December 1944 Lat: 19°20' N-Long: 122° E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: The AP at which we fired was part of a convoy of two ships
with at least three surface escorts. In addition, three
'FRANCES' and one JAKE type planes were observed patrolling
the area shortly before the attack. Contact was first
made on one escort by the Commanding Officer, who had been
alerted by the presence of planes and a Babuyan Island
brush fire, initially believed to be the smoke of a ship.
The target was sighted shortly before sunset, which re-
sulted in rapidly failing visibility at the time of
firing.

DAMAGE: No hits were observed.
TARGET DRAFT: 18 feet. COURSE: 196°T. SPEED: 9½. RANGE: 4300.

Own Ship Data

SPEED: 2 knots. COURSE: 265°T. DEPTH: 63 feet. ANGLE: 0°.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: The entire approach and attack was made at periscope
depth. The pinging of three escorts was heard, and the
nearest one appeared suspicious, but at no time were
they directly on us. Torpedo run at time of firing
was known to be excessive as no correct solution light
was on the TDC.
Torpedoes were fired in spite of the above for
reasons stated in the narrative of this report.
Torpedo speed set on TDC was 28.0 knots using a
minus 0.75 knot correction for set depth of 8'.

- 24 -

— page 60 —
ATTACK #1
Tubes Fired | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 | #5 | #6
Track Angle | 125 P | 125 P | 125 P | 126 P | 126 P | 126 P
Gyro Angle | 351 | 350 | 349 | 347 | 346 | 345
Depth Set | 8' | 8' | 8' | 8' | 8' | 8'
Hit or Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss
Erratic | No | No | No | No | No | No
Mark Torpedo | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1
Serial No. | 55115 | 55187 | 55923 | 56031 | 55898 | 55662
Mark Exploder | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5
Serial No. | 9496 | 9000 | 9197 | 9032 | 8839 | 9492
Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact
Actuation Actual | None | None | None | None | None | None
Mark Head | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2
Serial No. | 2652 | 2743 | 2628 | 2161 | 2142 | 2138
Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX
Firing Interval | 10 seconds
Type Spread | Divergent, aft-forward, 1000 feet normal to the line of sight.
Sea Condition | :1
Overhaul Activity | PROTEUS

Remarks: The uncertainty as to torpedo speed, if those fired ran
the required distance, places the cause of the misses
on excessive range. Subsequent analysis, however, shows
a 2½ knot target speed error would also cause a miss
even with the large spread used.

- 25 -

— page 61 —
U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 2
Time: 0616(H) Date: 5 December 1944 Lat: 19-50-N Long: 121-10-E

Target Data -- Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: Enemy ships consisted of one SHIGURE type DD and two
CHIDORI torpedo boats. Contact was made by radar at
range 14,000 yards on a single ship, two smaller pips
showing shortly thereafter. Visibility was fair, in-
creasing rapidly from faint moonlight as the sky lightened
to the east - sky overcast.

SHIP PROBABLY SUNK: One DD (EU) 1400 tons, believed to be of the SHIGURE
class. I spent every moment of my observations of
her on the forward section in order to get a few good
ranges when her waterline appeared. Characteristics
forward of which I was certain were: High forecastle,
clear except for one large gunmount; forecastle break
occurred at forward edge of bridge; masthead height
used was 70 feet which checked perfectly with timed
hits. This ship produced a definitely larger pip
than the accompanying CHIDORIS.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: (a) Three timed hits heard in after torpedo room, the
first of which was two minutes and ten seconds after
firing.
(b) Anti-submarine measures were weak considering
ships at hand. Small depth charges were used, and
only one set of screws and one pinger heard after we
started down.

TARGET DRAFT: 8'9" COURSE: 010°T SPEED: 5 knots RANGE: 2430

Own Ship Data

SPEED: 3 knots COURSE: 246°T DEPTH: 58 feet ANGLE: 1° up.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: Target was tracked by radar long enough to show him
heading toward us into the sea and proceeding at slow
speed. Increased visibility then forced us to dive to
periscope depth. From this point onward a normal periscope
approach and attack was made. Observation of torpedoes
broaching, when first fired, brought about commanding
officer's decision to go deep. Hence hits were not
observed but were heard and timed. Torpedo speed set on
TDC was 28.1 knots, having a minus 1.3 speed correction
for set depth of 5 feet.

- 26 -

— page 62 —
ATTACK #2

| Tubes Fired        | #1    | #2    | #3    | #4    | #5    | #6    |
| :| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |
| Track Angle        | 92 S  | 93 S  | 94 S  | 80 S  | 81 S  | 82 S  |
| Gyro Angle         | 012   | 016   | 019   | 022   | 025   | 031   |
| Depth Set          | 5'    | 5'    | 5'    | 5'    | 5'    | 5'    |
| Hit or Miss        | Hit   | Hit   | Hit   | Miss  | Miss  | Miss  |
| Erratic            | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   |
| Mark Torpedo       | 18-1  | 18-1  | 18-1  | 18-1  | 18-1  | 18-1  |
| Serial No.         | 55927 | 55706 | 56157 | 55889 | 55344 | 56134 |
| Mark Exploder      | 8-5   | 8-5   | 8-5   | 8-5   | 8-5   | 8-5   |
| Serial No.         | 8068  | 8736  | 9749  | 9050  | 8698  | 8274  |
| Actuation Set      | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual   | Contact | Contact | Contact | None  | None  | None  |
| Mark Head          | 18-2  | 18-2  | 18-2  | 18-2  | 18-2  | 18-2  |
| Serial No.         | 2570  | 2172  | 2082  | 2109  | 2695  | 2135  |
| Explosive          | TPX   | TPX   | TPX   | TPX   | TPX   | TPX   |
| Firing Interval    | 10 seconds                                      |
| Type Spread        | Divergent, aft-forward, 500 feet normal to line of sight. |
| Sea Condition      | 6                                               |
| Overhaul Activity  | PROTEUS                                         |

Remarks: A zig toward was detected as third torpedo went out and
         new angle on the bow set on the TDC. Torpedoes were fired
         across a force 6 sea with depth setting of five feet.
         Although torpedoes broached initially, no prematures nor
         end of run explosions were heard. Ship was swinging left
         during firing.

- 27 -

— page 63 —
U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 2
Time: 2343(H) Date: 6 December 1944 Lat: 18-48-N Long: 121-30-E

Torpedo Data -- Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: Target was a large passenger freighter (EU), escorted by
four small ships. One escort was seen with difficulty at
4000 yards by the OOD, when he was spotted by radar.
Another was seen a few hundred yards on target's starboard
hand when the moon came out. Contact was made by radar at
17,250 yards, having been developed from pack commander's
air contact reports. While evading bow escort and making
approach on the surface toward the escort, visibility was in
our favor with a dark horizon behind us. At 5000 yards range,
the moon came out making visibility good all around. This
target had been previously damaged by USS SEGUNDO and it was
tracking at 2 to 4 knots.

SHIP SUNK: One large passenger freighter (EU), with following character-
istics:
(a) Observation from bridge disclosed a large composite
superstructure with short thick stack.
(b) Stern view by periscope in bright firelight showed one
large kingpost aft with elaborately latticed crosspiece.
Aft end of superstructure extended to sides of ship,
block type, as high as kingpost crosspiece.
(c) Estimated tonnage 10,000.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY:
(a) Three explosions were heard by sound, three by after
torpedo room, one by control room. Those by sound were
timed with first hit occurring 3 minutes and 04 seconds,
control timed hit at 3 minutes and 15 seconds after first
torpedo was fired.
(b) Thirteen minutes after firing, target was burning.
(c) See Attack #4 for further evidence of sinking.

TARGET DRAFT: 17 ft. COURSE: 230°T. SPEED: 2 knots. RANGE: 2600.

Own Ship Data

SPEED: 4 knots. COURSE: 320°T. DEPTH: 62 feet. ANGLE: 0°.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: This changed from a radar attack to a periscope attack at a
range of 5000 yards when the moon broke through. A torpedo
speed of 28.8 knots using a minus 0.5 correction for 10-foot
depth setting was put on the TDC. Periscope was kept up con-
tinuously to observe target and watch for escorts.

- 28 -

— page 64 —
ATTACK #3

|                   | #7      | #8      | #9      | #10     |
| :| :------ | :------ | :------ | :------ |
| Tubes Fired       | 68 S    | 69 S    | 69 S    | 70 S    |
| Track Angle       | 155     | 156     | 157     | 157     |
| Gyro Angle        | 10'     | 10'     | 10'     | 10'     |
| Depth Set         | Miss    | Hit     | Hit     | Hit     |
| Hit or Miss       | No      | No      | No      | No      |
| Erratic           | 18-1    | 18-1    | 18-1    | 18-1    |
| Mark Torpedo      | 55580   | 54765   | 56182   | 56380   |
| Serial No.        | 8-5     | 8-5     | 8-5     | 8-5     |
| Mark Exploder     | 9084    | 10039   | 8712    | 9586    |
| Serial No.        | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Set     | None    | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual  | 18-2    | 18-2    | 18-2    | 18-2    |
| Mark Head         | 2479    | 2416    | 3296    | 2170    |
| Serial No.        | TPX     | TPX     | TPX     | TPX     |
| Explosive         |         |         |         |         |
| Firing Interval   | 10 seconds                          |
| Type Spread       | Divergent, aft-forward, 300 feet normal to line of |
|                   | sight.                              |
| Sea Condition     | 4                                   |
| Overhaul Activity | PROTEUS                             |
| Remarks:          | None                                |

- 29 -

— page 65 —
U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) TORPEDO ATTACK No. 4 PATROL No. 2
Time: 0008 Date: 7 December 1944 Lat: 18°48' N - Long: 121° 30' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: Same target as Attack No. 3, burning, down by the bow,
             escorts still circling area in an ineffective manner,
             pinging and dropping random depth charges.

SHIP SUNK:   See attack #3.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: (a) Sound heard one hit 4 minutes and ten
                     seconds after firing.
                     (b) Fire increased in intensity.
                     (c) At 0052, explosion observed on stern
                     through periscope, forcing flames well above mast.
                     (d) At 0102 explosion heard on sound in
                     direction of target.
                     (e) At 0205 OOD observed three separate
                     explosions light up sky at location of burning
                     target. Immediately after second explosion, the
                     fire disappeared except for momentary flareup ten
                     minutes later.
                     (f) From time of surfacing to explosions one
                     hour later, target burned fiercely, lighting up the
                     clouds above it.

TARGET DRAFT: 17 feet. COURSE: 150°T. SPEED: 2½ knots. RANGE: 2900.

Own Ship Data

SPEED: 5 knots. COURSE: 120°T. DEPTH: 62'. ANGLE: 0°.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: This was a continuation of attack #3 when target was seen
             to absorb three torpedoes and not sink. Attempt was made
             to get a ping range, but the distance of the target and
             choppy seas prevented it. TDC torpedo speed used was 28.7
             with a minus 0.5 knot torpedo set depth correction.

- 30 -

— page 66 —
ATTACK #4

| | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 |
| :| :------- | :------- | :------- | :------- |
| Tubes Fired | | | | |
| Track Angle | 152 S | 152 S | 152 S | 152 S |
| Gyro Angle | 000 | 001 | 001 | 003 |
| Depth Set | 10' | 10' | 10' | 10' |
| Hit or Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss | Hit |
| Erratic | No | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 |
| Serial No. | 55492 | 55440 | 56208 | 56211 |
| Mark Exploder | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 |
| Serial No. | 9304 | 8777 | 8975 | 8731 |
| Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual | None | None | None | Contact |
| Mark Head | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| Serial No. | 2587 | 2187 | 2667 | 3226 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval | 10 seconds | | | |
| Type Spread | Divergent, aft-forward, spread 250 feet normal | | | |
| | to line of sight. | | | |
| Sea Condition | 4 | | | |
| Overhaul Activity | PROTEUS | | | |
| Remarks: | None | | | |

- 31 -

— page 67 —
U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5 PATROL NO. 2
Time: 1245(H) Date: 30 December 1944 Lat: 21-00-N Long. 121-24-E

Target Data -- Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: This target was a large AO in a convoy of 4 ships with two
             surface and one air escort. Contact was made by OOD on sub-
             merged periscope sweep, initial range 10,000 yards. Vis-
             ibility, though clear, was hampered by a foggy periscope.

SHIP PROBABLY SUNK:
             (EU) Large AO, LWF, raked bow, cruiser stern, bridge
             structure equidistant from bow and stern about the same
             height as the stack, raised bow and stern. Estimated
             tonnage: 8000.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY:
             (a) Heard two heavy timed hits for generated range (2
             minutes 12 seconds, and 2 minutes 20 seconds).
             (b) Ship had 5° starboard list as it left scene.
             (c) Three minutes after firing, three explosions heard
             throughout ship which did not sound like depth charges.
             (d) Loud crackling noises reported by control room and
             engine rooms five minutes after firing.
             (e) Target was not with convoy when we overtook it in
             daylight end around.

TARGET DRAFT: 25 feet. COURSE: 355°T. SPEED: 4½. RANGE: 3200.

Own Ship Data

SPEED: 4 knots. COURSE: 290°T. DEPTH: 65 feet. ANGLE: 0°.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: Periscope attack. Target was turning away as torpedoes
             reached her, as indicated by her being hit by torpedoes
             spread aft.

- 32 -

— page 68 —
ATTACK #5

Tubes Fired
Track Angle         #1 111 S    #2 112 S    #3 112 S    #4 113 S    #5 113 S    #6 114 S
Gyro Angle             354         353         353         354         355         354
Depth Set              10'         10'         10'         10'         10'         10'
Power                  -
Hit or Miss            Hit         Hit         Miss        Miss        Miss        Miss
Erratic                No          No          No          No          No          No
Mark Torpedo           23          23          23          23          23          23
Serial No.             53064       41659       41362       49329       62064       62082
Mark Exploder          6-4         6-4         6-4         6-4         6-4         6-4
Serial No.             18778       18807       21900       8264        18785       12897
Actuation Set          Contact     Contact     Contact     Contact     Contact     Contact
Actuation Actual       Contact     Contact     None        None        None        None
Mark Warhead           16-1        16-1        16-1        16-1        16-1        16-1
Serial No.             13454       17240       17236       17169       12794       17206
Explosive              TPX         TPX         TPX         TPX         TPX         TPX

Firing Interval . 8 Seconds.
Type Spread       Divergent, aft-forward, 800 feet across line of sight
                  at the target.
Sea Conditions    State 2.
Overhaul Activity FULTON for reload.
Remarks:          Misses due to spread and target's turn away.

- 33 -

— page 69 —
U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6 PATROL NO. 2
Time: 1301(H) Date: 30 December 1944 Lat: 21-00-N Long: 121-24-E

Target Data — Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: Same convoy as Attack #5.

SHIP DAMAGED: One (EC) DD, WAKATAKE Class, 900 tons. - This ship
was sunk in attack #7.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY:
Saw one hit which caused everything forward of bridge
to disappear in a ball of orange flame and knocked
down the foremast.

TARGET DRAFT: 8'3". COURSE: 050°T. SPEED: 13. RANGE: 1800.

Own Ship Data

SPEED: 3½ knots. COURSE: 140°T. DEPTH: 58 feet. ANGLE: 0°.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: Periscope attack when DD came up from starboard
quarter of 40 at which we fired in attack #5.

- 34 -

— page 70 —
ATTACK #6

| | #7 | #8 | #9 | #10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes Fired | 106 S | 107 S | 109 S | 111 S |
| Track Angle | 204 | 209 | 214 | 219 |
| Gyro Angle | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' |
| Depth Set | — | — | — | — |
| Power | | | | |
| Hit or Miss | Hit | Miss | Miss | Miss |
| Erratic | No | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Serial No. | 41344 | 62004 | 52899 | 41185 |
| Mark Exploder | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 |
| Serial No. | 12569 | 8046 | 8849 | 18806 |
| Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual | Contact | None | None | None |
| Mark Warhead | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
| Serial No. | 17165 | 17139 | 16242 | 13805 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval | 8 Seconds. | | | |
| Type Spread | Divergent, 200 feet across line of sight at the target. | | | |
| Sea Conditions | State 2. | | | |
| Overhaul Activity | FULTON for reload. | | | |
| Remarks: | None. | | | |

- 35 -

— page 71 —
U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 7 PATROL NO. 2
Time: 1344(H) Date: 30 December 1944 Lat: 21-00-N Long: 121-24-E

                   Target Data - Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: Same DD as Attack #6. Target still floating with bow
                   blown off. Target's motion appeared to be due to wind
                   rather than its own propulsive machinery. Angle on the
                   now defunct bow was 60 S, but target was moving in
                   direction 180°T, with 2 knots leeway.
SHIP SUNK: One (EC) DD, WAKATAKE Class, 900 tons.
DAMAGE DETERMINED BY:
                   (a) Timed one hit and Commanding Officer raised
                       periscope after this to see the target well down
                       by the bow.
                   (b) Breaking up, poppling, crackling noises heard on
                       sound.
                   (c) A careful look about 2 minutes after the hit with
                       own ship at 58' disclosed no DD.

TARGET DRAFT: 8'3" COURSE: Drifting on 180°T SPEED: 2 RANGE: 750 yds.

                   Own Ship Data

SPEED: 3 knots. COURSE: 310°T. DEPTH: 62 feet. ANGLE: 0°.

                   Fire control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: Submerged periscope approach.

                   - 36 -

— page 72 —
ATTACK #7
#1 #2
Tubes Fired
Track Angle 60 S 60 S
Gyro Angle 351 352
Depth Set 6' 6'
Power -- High
Hit or Miss Hit Miss
Erratic No No
Mark Torpedo 23 14-3A
Serial No. 50032 39790
Mark Exploder 6-4 6-4
Serial No. 12756 859
Actuation Set Contact Contact
Actuation Actual Contact None
Mark Warhead 16-1 16-1
Serial No. 17215 11139
Explosive TPX TPX
Firing Interval 16 Seconds.
Type Spread Divergent, 100 feet across line of sight
at the target.
Sea Conditions State 2.
Overhaul Activity FULTON for reload.
Remarks: Miss due to spread.

- 37 -

— page 73 —
U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 8 PATROL NO. 2
Time: 1959(H) Date: 30 December 1944 Lat: 21-36-N Long: 121-12-E

Target Data -- Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: This was the same convoy attacked earlier in the day at
periscope depth. Contact was regained by radar at 26,000
yards, there being three marus with a plane escort which
disappeared before dark. This part of convoy consisted of
two AK's and one AO. Visibility - bright moonlight.

SHIP DAMAGED: One (EU) medium AK(passenger-freighter), 4000 tons. MFM
type similar to UKAI MARU with the after quarter of her
superstructure removed. She had very high freeboard,
estimated length 350 feet, equipped with sound gear,
a gun, and lots of depth charges. She was capable of
rapid turns though apparently was of low speed.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY:
a) Dull flash observed on target at time of first timed
hit.
b) Two timed hits 1m 35s and 1m 43s after firing on
sound and various other stations.
c) Sound reported only one torpedo running on bearing
of target after second explosion.

TARGET DRAFT: 15'. COURSE: 040°T. SPEED: 5. RANGE: 3350.

Own Ship Data

SPEED: 4 knots. COURSE: 180°T. DEPTH: 60 feet. ANGLE: 0°.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: Surface radar attack until targets seen plainly through
binoculars at 13,000 yards, then submerged radar attack
to 5300 yards. Finished the approach on periscope bearings.

- 38 -

— page 74 —
ATTACK #8

Tubes Fired
Track Angle                 35 P        36 P        36 P
Gyro Angle                  005         004         000
Depth Set                   6'          6'          6'
Power                       High        -           -
Hit or Miss                 Hit         Hit         Miss
Erratic                     No          No          No
Mark Torpedo                14-3A       23          23
Serial No.                  26826       41181       41244
Mark Exploder               6-4         6-4         6-4
Serial No.                  1598        12604       8339
Actuation Set               Contact     Contact     Contact
Actuation Actual            Contact     Contact     None
Mark Warhead                16-1        16-1        16-1
Serial No.                  17167       12780       17195
Explosive                   TPX         TPX         TPX
Firing Interval             8 Seconds.
Type Spread                 Divergent, 300 feet across line of sight.
Sea Conditions              State 1.
Overhaul Activity           FULTON for reload.
Remarks:                    None

- 39 -

— page 75 —
U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 9 PATROL NO. 2
Time: 2000(H) Date: 30 December 1944 Lat: 21-36-N Long: 121-12-E

                                Target Data - Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: This attack was a continuation of attack #8, firing at
             middle target of three. The target was a large AO or
             AK. Visibility - bright moonlight.

SHIP DAMAGED: * One large (UN) AO or AK, 8000 tons. This target was by
             far the largest of the three and gave a saturation pip
             on the SJ radar at 20,000 yards. Positive identification
             was not made. She was, however, considerably larger than
             the target of attack #8.
             (*) This ship was sunk in attack #10.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY:
             (a) Observed dull flash on target at time of first
                 timed hit.
             (b) Hits were timed 1m 35s and 1m 43s after firing
                 the first torpedo.
             (c) See attack #10.

TARGET DRAFT: 30'. COURSE: 040°T. SPEED: 5. RANGE: 3600.

                                  Own Ship Data

SPEED: 4 knots. COURSE: 180°T. DEPTH: 60 feet. ANGLE: 0°.

                             Fire Control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: Divided fire in continuation of attack #8.

                                   - 40 -

— page 76 —
ATTACK #9

Tubes Fired                               #4        #5        #6
Track Angle                               25 P      25 P      26 P
Gyro Angle                                015       014       012
Depth Set                                 6'        6'        6'
Power                                     ---       ---       ---
Hit or Miss                               Miss      Hit       Hit
Erratic                                   No        No        No
Mark Torpedo                              23        23        23
Serial No.                                41124     62887     62555
Mark Exploder                             6-4       6-4       6-4
Serial No.                                21889     12940     797
Actuation Set                             Contact   Contact   Contact
Actuation Actual                          None      Contact   Contact
Mark Warhead                              16-1      16-1      16-1
Serial N o.                               17228     11138     17234
Explosive                                 TPX       TPX       TPX
Firing Interval                           8 Seconds.
Type Spread                               Divergent, 300 feet across the line of sight.
Sea Conditions                            State 1.
Overhaul Activity                         FULTON for reload
Remarks:                                  None.

- 41 -

— page 77 —
U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 10 PATROL NO. 2
Time: 2012(H) Date: 30 December 1944 Lat: 21-36-N Long: 121-12-E

Target Data — Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: Same convoy as Attack #8 and #9. Target was same as
for Attack #8 - one (EU) medium AK. This AK had reversed
course before we fired. Visibility - bright moonlight.

SHIP SUNK: One large (UN) AO or AK, 8000 tons (Same target as
Attack #9).

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY:
(a) Observed blinding flash in right edge of periscope
field followed by a shower of sparks between us and
the target at which we had just fired. (1m 16s after
first torpedo was fired.)
(b) One explosion was heard which coincided with the time
the flash was observed.
(c) Although three targets were plainly observed just
before firing the stern tubes, only two could be
seen directly after the flash was seen. A careful
observation was made all around.

TARGET DRAFT: 25'. COURSE: 250°T. SPEED: 5. RANGE: 1400.

Own Ship Data

SPEED: 4 knots. COURSE: 325°T. DEPTH: 60 feet. ANGLE: 0°.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: Night periscope attack obtaining two ping ranges just
prior to firing. Believe overlapping target took one
of the torpedoes fired, or chose that time to disintegrate
from previous hits. Believe target at which we fired had
stopped as there were no further results from the torpedoes
fired in this attack.

- 42 -

— page 78 —
ATTACK #10

Tubes Fired         #7      #8      #9      #10
Track Angle         100 S   101 S   101 S   102 S
Gyro Angle          204     203     200     201
Depth Set           6'      6'      6'      6'
Power               -
Hit or Miss         Miss    Miss    Miss    Hit
Erratic             No      No      No      No
Mark Torpedo        23      23      23      23
Serial No.          41568   49796   49810   49227
Mark Exploder       6-4     6-4     6-4     6-4
Serial No.          8015    18641   18706   18700
Actuation Set       Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual    None    None    None    Contact
Mark Warhead        16-1    16-1    16-1    16-1
Serial No.          9375    12722   10998   17219
Explosive           TPX     TPX     TPX     TPX
Firing Interval     8 seconds.
Type Spread         Divergent, 300 feet across line of sight.
Sea Conditions      State 1.
Overhaul Activity   FULTON for reload.
Remarks:            No explosion was seen on the target shot at.
                    The torpedo which did go off was seen exploding
                    on target of attack #9.

                    - 43 -

— page 79 —
(I) MINES
There were no mines encountered.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

The only unusual item encountered was the radar deception
emanating from Luzon and Formosa. See part (U) for further information.

In the area to the eastward of the Babuyan Islands for a
distance of about sixty miles, a definite program consisting of night,
radar equipped planes was encountered. The planes would at first
sweep, make radar contact, and turn their radar off. In order to
minimize our detection advantage, as they approached, the planes cut
on their radar for brief intervals only.

Several times planes apparently lost contact when the SJ radar
was secured for fifteen minutes upon the initial APR contact. This
indicated that the planes may be homing on the SJ radar. The evidence,
however, is not conclusive.

Our counter measures to these night radar sweeps consisted
of manning the APR continuously on the surface, searching with greatest
care on 155 and 310 MCS. The signal strength of the enemy radar signal
was calibrated 1 to 7, 7 being a saturated pip. The SJ radar was
secured for fifteen minutes following initial contact, then keyed one
minute out of five for the next fifteen minutes. If contact was not
regained, continuous keying was resumed. We submerged when a saturated
pip appeared on the APR, remaining submerged for one half hour. No
gambit tactics were encountered.

To the westward of the Babuyan Islands and to the northwest
of Luzon no air activity was evident during the first part of the patrol.
Possibly radar planes were patrolling to the eastward of the Babuyan
Islands and surface vessels to the westward. This possibility was
further substantiated by our encounter with 2 Chidori and 1 destroyer
on the morning of December 6, to the westward of Calayan Island. This
group had no apparent purpose other than anti-submarine patrol. After
we fired at the DD, the ensuing depth charge attack by the other vessels
was easily broken off under a 12° negative gradient.

From 23 to 30 December, radar planes were patrolling both
sides of the islands.

- 44 -

— page 80 —
One convoy proceeding through the Babuyan Islands during daylight
was heavily escorted by aircraft and surface vessels; the convoy
contacted to the north of Luzon at night was escorted only by surface
vessels; the third convoy between Y'imi Island and Formosa was escorted
by an old DD, a CHIDORI or DE, and one float type plane. No escorts
were seen with the two ships which circuited us on 25 December, but
pinging was detected on sound.

Of the remnants of the convoy attacked on 30 December, one
AK was equipped with sound gear, K or Y guns, and plenty of depth
charges. Although she passed 400 yards astern of us, I do not believe
she had any sound contact on us.

In all cases except the attack on the first DD, evasion
was carried out at periscope depth, keeping the stern to the hunter.

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— page 81 —
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

Bendix Log
The Bendix Log was out of commission between Midway and Saipan
due to the stripping of the fiber gear on the Bodine Driving Motor. Part
number of the motor is CC 14460, drawing No. CAL 8000-2. Part number of
the gear is not given on the manufacturer's drawing. This was the
second failure of the same gear. Previously the entire motor was re-
placed using the only spare aboard. Spares were unavailable at Pearl
Harbor, Midway, and Saipan. Fortunately, a steel gear used in the
bridge windshield wiper of the USS FULTON was the same size and suc-
cessfully used as a replacement.

7MC Bridge Speaker
The voice coil of the bridge 7MC/1MC speaker flooded out early
in the patrol. Since we were unable to draw spare voice coils in Pearl
Harbor, Midway, Saipan, we were forced to effect a makeshift repair,
which failed on two subsequent occasions due to vibrations. The lack
of this speaker was keenly felt on the night attack on December 30.

Fuel Oil Purifier #2
This purifier failed completely while in the area and was in-
operative for a period of about four hours. The trouble was traced to
burned out bearings in the bearing assembly. The parts which were total
losses due to this were the upper and lower bearings, (part #245), Flex-
ible coupling (part #75), female clutch assembly (parts #70 and 71), and
the spindle screw, (part #74). This casualty was corrected by replacing
all of these parts and thoroughly cleaning and adjusting the whole assembly.
A second breakdown left the purifier inoperative for another four-hour
period. This time the trouble was traced to the drag assembly. Normal
vibration and wear had been accelerated in some manner, perhaps due to mis-
alignment in the drag body casting (part #353), which was made by the USS
PROTEUS during the last refit. The bowl bottom boss sleeve (part #40)
burned, fouling the bowl bottom and burning the drag bushing (part #96)
and scarring the male end drag ferrule (part #95). Parts renewed from
spares on hand were:
Flexible coupling - part #75
Female clutch assembly - part #70
Drag Bushing - part #96
The following parts were not available as spares and were taken from #2
lube oil purifier:
Bearing pulley cap - part #242 Three wing - part #37
Drag body - part #353 Bowl bottom - no number
Drag ferrules - parts #94 & 95

Main engine Outboard Exhaust Valve - #4
The outboard exhaust valve on #4 main engine apparently stuck
open on the morning of 31 December during a dive, although the indi-
cator lights showed it as closed. On the next dive several hours later,
the outboard exhaust valve closed properly and no water leaked by, but

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— page 82 —
some difficulty was experienced in closing the inboard valve. There-
after no trouble was encountered with either inboard or outboard valves.
The muffler on #4 main engine is corroded and requires replacement. It
is possible that piece of metal from the muffler worked its way under
the outboard valve seat and then later dropped out. The state of the
sea was such that it was not possible to investigate this from topside.

Periscopes

Both periscopes fogged in high power on all day dives.
Both periscopes leaked badly at periscope depth.

An experimental type of lighting was installed on #2 periscope
in New London, Conn. This is a blue, indirect lighting and is entirely
unsatisfactory. The approved conventional type of lighting will be
requested during the current refit.

(L) RADIO

The performance of all radio equipment was quite satisfactory
with the exception of the VHF. Transmissions of own SD radar causes
intolerable interference. In order to satisfactorily guard VHF channels,
when in range of other members of the pack, it was necessary to key the
SD radar intermittently to detect transmissions at all, and secure the
SD entirely while receiving the complete message. Communications by
VHF were unreliable, even at ranges of less than 1000 yards. Maintenance
of this equipment is still handicapped by lack of spare parts and in-
struction book, including schematic drawings.

The RBO was moved to the wardroom during the last refit. This
was found to be a better location than the crew's mess where super-
vision of its use was impossible. Despite making use of the unshielded
time tick lead as an antenna lead-in, performance of the RBO was generally
better on this patrol than on the last one.

(M) RADAR

Major Defects in SJ-1 Radar

1. The transmitter lost a large amount of power and a large
false echo appeared at a range of 1900 yards. Replaced a
faulty magnetron after 700 hours operation.

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— page 83 —
2. The bottom plate of the wave guide at the transmitter-receiver
   end became loose causing arcing and loss of power. The de-
   ficiency was corrected by silver soldering plate in place.
3. Three 300-volt voltmeter on the control unit failed on separate
   occasions, necessitating their replacement.
4. Regulated rectifier "A" lost its output when two 5U4G tubes
   developed plate to cathode shorts. The tubes were replaced.
5. The T-R tube failed after 20 hours of operation, necessitating
   its replacement.
6. Condenser C-22A of the transmitter-receiver shorted to ground
   leaving no bias in the unit. The condenser was replaced.
7. Regulated rectifier "A" lost its output when one 5U4G tube
   lost emission. Tube was replaced.
8. Tubes 717 A in the preamplifier section of the transmitter-
   receiver were replaced on three separate occasions due to
   loss of gain and interference on "A" scope.
9. A surge in line voltage caused high voltage breakdown of R-44
   and terminal 5 of T-1 in PPI power supply. This surge also
   carried away the main power switch in the control unit.
   Resistor R-44 and the main switch were replaced. Since we do
   not carry a spare for T-1 we made an emergency repair.
10. A weak 807 tube caused low bias in the transmitter-receiver
    causing erratic pulsing of the transmitter. This tube was
    replaced.

Major Defects in SD-4 Radar

1. Two transmitter tubes were severely overloaded when placed
   in operation during a dive. These were replaced with spares.

Major Defects in Pulse Analyzer of APR

1. The brightness control was grounded out by salt spray. The
   control was renewed, the unit cleaned to eliminate the
   possibility of other parts failing in a similar manner,
   and the unit was restored to operation. A canvas cover for
   the pulse analyzer and APR was made to cover them while in
   a non-operative condition.

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— page 84 —
2. The scope tube 3BPI shorted out on two occasions necessitating
replacement.

Major Defects in BN/LBK

1. The antenna insulator grounded out with salt water. The
insulator was replaced in SAIPAN, December 16.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

JP-1

As on the last patrol, trouble was again experienced with the
cable leading from the hydrophone to the amplifier on the JP-1. During
the first part of the patrol a partial break occurred in the cable con-
ductor at the point where it enters the stuffing box. By increasing
the slack in the cable, strengthening the cable casing with small stuff,
and only using the equipment when at battle stations or when investi-
gating a suspected contact, the cable conductor was kept intact until
replacement at Saipan during reload. During the second part of the
patrol the cable flooded out internally, rendering the JP-1 practically
useless for the remainder of the time in the area.

QB

The cable conductor from the QB sound head to the amplifier
was inadvertently parted when this cable became fouled while the head
was being trained. The cable was replaced without difficulty while
on station.

Sound Conditions

Sound conditions for the greater part of the time in the area
were poor, even though an isothermal layer was almost invariably
experienced to 300 feet. This is attributed to the heavy weather ex-
perienced on all but the first day in the area. On this day, December
5, just to the east of Camiguin and Babuyan Islands, a target group
was tracked without difficulty from a range of eight to ten thousand
yards by both sonic and supersonic sound gear. On December 7, just to
the northwest of Calayan Island, and on December 7, at the west end of
Babuyan Channel, screws could not be heard at ranges estimated at from
one to three thousand yards. In the first case, an isothermal layer
extended to 300 feet; sea condition was state six. On December 7,
the escort circled while we were at periscope depth, pinging continuously,
but apparently failed to pick us up. Depth of the isothermal layer in

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— page 86 —
(O) DENSITY LAYERS

During the first half of the patrol, from the period 31
November to 10 December, good gradients were invariably found;
although they were usually below 300 feet. Normally in the Luzon
Strait-Babuyan Island area, it was necessary to go to 350 feet
before a sharp six-degree negative gradient was found. Conditions
down to that depth were isothermal. On the morning of 5 December
following attack No. two, it was necessary to submerge to 500 feet
before an appreciable layer was found. At that depth, however, a
beautiful twelve-degree negative gradient was located, under which
we had little trouble evading and eventually losing the Chidoris.

During the latter half of the patrol, covering the period
from 17 December to 30 December, much the same conditions were
found with isothermal layers extending to depths below 400 feet
in the area from latitudes 17 to 21 north and from longitudes
142 to 119 east. At 0600(H), 23 December at latitude 20-00-N,
longitude 120-30-E, an isothermal layer extending to 450 feet
was found. The very next day, however, at the same time, at
latitude 20-00-N, longitude 121-40-E, an isothermal layer ex-
tending to 300 feet was followed by a sharp eight-degree negative
gradient. The patrol was continued in this area until 27 December
with the same results. On 27 December at latitude 21-00-N, long-
itude 121-20-E, isothermal layers to 425 feet were again encount-
ered, although the next day at latitude 21-00-N, longitude
122-00-E, a sharp negative gradient at 200 feet was again en-
countered. Heavy seas prevailed throughout this patrol. During
the last part of this patrol evasion of the enemy's counter
attacks were made at periscope depth. At no time did the
attacking vessels make contact by pinging or listening, al-
though we were well within the assured range at all times and
at one time the range decreased to 400 yards. The bathythermograph
showed conditions to be isothermal from shallow depths to well
below periscope depth. It is believed that the enemy's lack
of success may be attributed to the rough seas, with accompanying
high noise level.

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— page 87 —
Date | Local | Depth Necessary | Extent of | Conditions down to | Lat. | Long.
| Time | For Negative | Negative | Gradient | N. | E.
| | Gradient | Gradient | | |
---
18 Nov. | 1302 | N.D. | N.D. | Isothermal to 230' | 24-00 | 175-20
19 " | 1100 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 170' | 23-13 | 173-00
20 " | 2000 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 170' | 20-00 | 168-00
21 " | 2000 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 230' | 19-00 | 156-20
26 " | 1400 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 150' | 16-52 | 142-11
27 " | 0514 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 180' | 18-25 | 139-43
28 " | 1710 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 145' | 19-57 | 131-48
29 " | 1543 | 310' | 4° at 375' | Isothermal | 20-19 | 127-15
30 " | 0700 | N.D. | N.D. | Isothermal to 230' | 20-22 | 128-46
30 " | 0742 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 210' | 20-22 | 128-42
1 Dec. | 0510 | 330' | 4° at 440' | Isothermal to 190' | 19-55 | 124-33
| | | | | 1° neg. gr. from | |
| | | | | 190' to 330' | |
1 " | 2121 | N.D. | N.D. | Isothermal to 190' | 19-21 | 122-36
| | | | | 1° Neg.gr. from | |
| | | | | 190' to 270' | |
2 " | 0500 | 240' | 6° at 400' | Isothermal to 130' | 19-05 | 122-05
| | | | | 1° neg.gr. from | |
| | | | | 130' to 240' | |
3 " | 0545 | N.D. | N.D. | Isothermal to 225' | 19-10 | 122-20
3 " | 2336 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 225' | 19-00 | 122-41
4 " | 2152 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 300' | 19-11 | 122-17
5 " | 1200 | 220' | 15° at 585' | Isothermal | 19-23 | 121-06
6 " | 0524 | 200' | 10° at 300' | 1° neg.gr. | 18-27 | 120-05
| | | | | surface to 200' | |
18 " | 1500 | N.D. | N.D. | Isothermal to 220' | 18-30 | 140-34
19 " | 0534 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 225' | 19-45 | 137-36
19 " | 1311 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 240' | 19-53 | 136-21
20 " | 0540 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 190' | 20-20 | 132-18
20 " | 0845 | N.D. | N.D. | " " 195' | 20-50 | 127-16
23 " | 0454 | 395' | 4° at 420' | " " 395' | 21-50 | 119-51
24 " | 0536 | 450' | 2° at 475' | Isothermal | 21-40 | 120-27
25 " | 0423 | N.D. | N.D. | Isothermal to 220' | 19-47 | 121-41
25 " | 0523 | 230' | 8° at 440' | Isothermal | 19-59 | 121-50
27 " | 0529 | 230' | 4° at 400' | Isothermal | 19-59 | 121-42
28 " | 0538 | 130' | 4° at 500' | Isothermal | 21-05 | 121-21
30 " | 0102 | 180' | 6° at 250' | Isothermal | 21-16 | 122-10
30 " | 1632 | N.D. | N.D. | Isothermal to 150' | 21-07 | 121-28

N.D. — Not Determined. Depth given was maximum for
the dive.

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— page 88 —
(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY
The overall health of the officers and men was good. The
food was good and well prepared.
The untiring efforts of my Chief Pharmacist's Mate were very
instrumental in maintaining a high standard of health of the officers
and men.

(Q) PERSONNEL

Items which contributed in a large measure to the results of
this patrol are as follows:

(a) The state of training for officers and men was high, due
to the untiring and enthusiastic efforts of the Executive Officer, and
the Chief of the Boat. The resulting enthusiasm of trainers and trainees
kept standards high and was gratifying to see.
(b) All officers are aggressive. The frank and intelligent
opinions of my Executive Officer and Torpedo Officer were much appreciated
and proved a great help to me, particularly during attacks.
(c) My complete confidence in the ability of my Executive
Officer kept my load light and insured my being well rested for all
attacks.
(d) The Radar Officer and his technicians kept their equipment
in optimum working order by a continuous and vigorous preventative
routine. Casualties which did occur were corrected with despatch and
ingenuity.
(e) The OOD watch bill was bolstered by our CEM. (recommended
for warrant rank in October 1944) His high degree of intelligence,
officer-like qualities, and ability to accept his new responsibilities
developed a very creditable watch stander. This naturally increased
the efficiency of the OOD's as a group.

Number of Officers on Board 9
Number Qualified 7
Number of Enlisted Men on Board - - - - - - - 75
Number Qualified at Start of Patrol - - - - - 44
Number Qualified at End of Patrol - - - - - - 57
Number of Men Rated on Patrol 7

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— page 89 —
(R) MILES STEAMED
| Miles | Fuel Used
Midway to SAIPAN - - - | 2655 | 37,000 gals.
SAIPAN to Area - - - | 1430 | 19,000 gals.
In Area (Surface | 1200 |
(Submerged | 180 | 1380 | 17,000 gals.
Area to SAIPAN - - - | 1500 | 23,300 gals.
SAIPAN to Area - - - | 1500 | 19,000 gals.
In Area (Surface | 1450 |
(Submerged | 230 | 1680 | 17,500 gals.
Area to GUAM - - - | 1390 | 22,000 gals.
Total in Area: 3060

TOTAL | 11,535 | 154,800 gals.

(S) DURATION
Days enroute Midway to Area - - - | 14
Days in area, prior reload - - - | 11
Days enroute SAIPAN - - - | 5
Voyage repairs and reload SAIPAN - - - | 2 [HANDWRITTEN: vnt]
SAIPAN to area - - - | 4
Days in area, after reload - - - | 10
Area to GUAM - - - | 5
Total days in area | 21
TOTAL DAYS | 51 [HANDWRITTEN: 49]

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
| Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel Factor
| 2 | 44,000 gals. | 20 days | Unknown
Limiting factor this patrol: | Operation Order.

- 54 -

— page 91 —
Comments:
The above radar appeared to be airborne with fixed antenna
arrangement.
Four of the contacts indicated clearly that the enemy can key
his radar while searching or making an approach.
All contacts indicated that the antenna of the enemy radar has
a very wide beam width; however, minor lobes were not apparent.
Ten of the contacts indicated that the enemy can alter the
outgoing signal strength by some switching arrangement. On these
occasions a near saturation pip suddenly dropped in strength to a 1/3
saturation signal.
The following analysis of time relations involved convinced
us that a single radar set produced both signals:
The pulse rate of the received signal was 1000 PPS.
Therefore, the outgoing pulse had a time lapse of
1000 microseconds.

Our pulse analyzer is capable of counting pulse rates
up to 6000 PPS; the recovery time of the analyzer must
be equal to or less than 167 microseconds.

Two airborne radars having continuously varying and
unknown ranges could not be synchronized because
electromagnetic waves travel with a finite speed.
Therefore, a weaker pulse must follow a stronger pulse
by all time delays from 0 to 1000 microseconds.

Two radars (with nearly the same pulse repetition
frequency) would have produced all of the following
presentations:

1. A weaker pulse following the stronger by less
   than 100 microseconds would show up as a second
   pulse delayed in time on the 100 microsecond
   sweep.
2. A weaker pulse following a stronger by 100-167
   microseconds (assuming 167 microsecond to be the
   receiver recovery time) would be shrouded by the
   stronger.
3. A weaker pulse following a stronger by 167-866
   microseconds would appear as a second pulse with
   lower amplitude beneath the stronger pulse at the
   beginning of the trace. This was not observed,
   nor did the pulse counting meter jump to 2000 PPS.
4. A weaker pulse following a stronger by 866-900
   microseconds would shroud the larger because of
   recovery time.
5. A weaker pulse following a stronger by 900-1000
   microseconds would cause the larger to appear
   delayed in time on the 100 microsecond sweep.
   This was not observed.

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— page 92 —
6. A weaker pulse occurring simultaneously with a
stronger pulse would result in additions, cancel-
lations, beating, etc., of the signals with a
resultant presentation which we found unpredictable.

Actually, we believe, all six presentations would not be
observable because the pulse repetition frequencies of the two radars
would be sufficiently different to cause 1, 5, and 6 to appear as
random vertical deflections and only 2, 3, and 4 would be held in
evidence by the persistance of the analyzer scope.
The observed presentation was first 2, then 4, changing
suddenly with long random time delays between changes. None of the
others were observed.
The fact that 3, 5, and 6 were absent was accepted by us as
conclusive proof that our 30 APR contacts were from single radar sets.

Interception of enemy radar signals on SJ-1:

On the nights of December 5 and 6, a strange type of indica-
tion was observed on our SJ-1 radar, possessing properties as follows:
1. Pips ranging in number from 1 to 30, and in range from
8,000 to 80,000 yards were observed.
2. The true bearing of these pips ranged from 165°T to 125°T,
changing with the ship's position so that they always
intersected in the approximate location 18-12-N, 121-00-E.
3. These pips were always within 2° of being in a line of
bearing. Indication on the "A" scope as follows:
[DRAWING]
4. The individual pips looked like land targets.
5. Pips were of low amplitude and amplitude had no
relation to distance.
6. Individual pips did not flutter appreciably.
7. Random deflections on the "A" scope were observed
when the transmitter was secured; however, pips were
not observable.
8. No rain squalls were in evidence from the bridge.
9. Own ship's position was 19-21-N, 120-20-E to 18-47-N,
119-36-E during this interference.

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— page 93 —
The same type of radar deception was encountered December 23.
This time a series of bearings did not establish a definite location;
however, it is believed the source of the signals may have been located
somewhere on a line of bearing passing through points 22-21-N, 120-23-E
and 22-34-N, 120-53-E. Own Ship's position was 21-36-N, 120-08-E
to 21-47-N, 119-45-E during this interference.

In addition to performing tests to identify the deception as
the same type as that encountered December 5 and 6, we established the
following:

1. Changing the pulse rate altered the range of an individual
   pip from 0 to 80,000 yards in range.
2. Changing receiver tuning in either direction from the
   point of optimum radar reception decreased the pip
   height of the false pips.

(V) REMARKS

Torpedoes:
Electric torpedoes were carried forward and aft during the
first phase of the patrol. There were no maintenance difficulties
worthy of note. All torpedoes fired functioned satisfactorily, and
it was observed with pleasure that the six fired at the destroyer in
attack #2 were tracked out on the proper course to obtain three hits
in spite of broaching initially in the state 6 sea.

A full reload of steam torpedoes was obtained from the
USS FULTON (ASll). Twenty-two of these were fired and gave satisfactory
performance in each case.

Gunnery:
There were no gun actions. The 40mm gun was tested after
leaving station on the way to Saipan. Due to accumulated grease in
the bore the first round did not fully seat. Consequently the gun
failed to function. When this round was removed, the second went
all the way in, and the gun fired successfully.

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— page 94 —
FDS-82/A16-3
Serial (01)
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SUBMARINE DIVISION EIGHTY-TWO

8 January 1945

From: The Commander Submarine Division EIGHTY-TWO.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TEN.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) -- Report of Second War Patrol.

1. The second war patrol of the U.S.S. RAZORBACK was conducted in
the LUZON STRAITS Area and was of fifty-one days duration. Twenty-one days
were spent in the area. Time in area was broken into two parts by a trip to
SAIPAN in order to obtain a reload of torpedoes. The RAZORBACK was a member of
the FULP-SEGUIDO-RAZORBACK coordinated attack group commanded by Comdr.
R. H. Davenport in the TREPANG for the first part of the patrol. After the
return from SAIPAN the RAZORBACK rejoined the SEGUIDO with Comdr. J. D. Fulp, Jr.
as pack commander. This was the first war patrol of the commanding officer,
Lieut. Comdr. C. D. Brown, in command.

2. A summary of attacks follows:

(a) FIRST ATTACK: (1 December 1944)
The target group which was contacted at dusk, consisted of two
ships, one being a large AP. This group had three surface escorts and an
air screen. A periscope approach was made and because of value of the
target (the large AP) six torpedoes (Mk. 18-1) were fired at a range of
4,000 yards which was the minimum range that could be obtained. The
decision to fire at this range was greatly influenced by the fact that
the targets probably would reach port by dark. No hits were made.

(b) SECOND ATTACK: (5 December 1944)
This attack was made at dawn against an apparent Hunter-Killer
group consisting of one SHIGURE destroyer (EU) and two CHIDORI Torpedo
boats. The initial contact was made by radar just prior to dawn, and
continued on the surface until the RAZORBACK was forced to dive. Six
torpedoes were fired at the SHIGURE DD. Mean range was 2,430 yards.
Tracks varied between 92° and 82°, gyros 012 to 031. Sea state was 6.
All torpedoes were observed to broach after firing but sound reported
them running toward the target. Three correctly timed hits were heard.

(c) THIRD ATTACK: (6 December 1944)
The target, a large AP-AK, was contacted by radar. This contact
had been developed from the pack commander's contact reports. Two
escorts were present. This target was making about 2 knots through
the water as the result of a previous attack by the SEGUIDO. At a
range of 5,000 yards the moon came out from behind the clouds forcing
the commanding officer to dive. Four torpedoes were fired from the
stern tubes at a range of 2,600 yards; mean track 69°, mean gyros 24°L;
and the depth was set at 10 feet. Three correctly timed hits were heard
and target was soon to catch on fire.

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— page 95 —
F35/S2/A16-3
Serial (001)
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) - Report of Second War Patrol.

SUBMARINE DIVISION EIGHTY-TWO
8 January 1945

(d) FOURTH ATTACK: (7 December 1944)
    This was a continuation of the previous attack on the same target.
    The AP was observed to be burning fiercely and the smoke was seen to rise
    clear of the water. However it was seen to settle back so the commanding
    officer decided to give her the coup de grace. Four torpedoes were fired
    at range 2,900 yards; track angle 152 degrees; and depth set 10 feet.
    One hit was reported as being heard. Immediately after this the fire in-
    creased in intensity. Explosions were seen and heard on the target for
    the next hour. The fires were observed to flare up and die out during the
    last series of large explosions were seen thereafter the target disappeared
    from the radar screen as if it had sunk because of boiler or ammunition
    explosions.

(e) FIFTH ATTACK: (30 December 1944)
    The target group consisting of two AO's and two AK's was escorted
    by one CHIDORI and one destroyer. Six torpedoes were fired at the trail-
    ing AO, a large tanker (EU) of about 8,000 tons. The range at firing
    averaged 3,200 yards; track angle 112°; depth set 10 feet with small gyro
    angles. Two heavy exactly timed hits were heard.
    At this point an approaching DD occupied the commanding officer's
    attention. However the AO was observed to turn 90° away and assume a
    list. Three loud explosions which were neither depth charges nor end of
    run explosions were heard from the direction of the target about one
    minute after the hits followed by loud breaking-up noises. This AO was
    not seen in company with this convoy during the later attacks and is
    believed to have sunk.

(f) SIXTH AND SEVENTH ATTACKS: (30 December 1944)
    The WAKATAKE DD(EC) that approached the RAZORBACK after the fifth
    attack made its last error of judgment. Four torpedoes were fired at a
    range of 1,800 yards, on track angles of 109°. One hit blew the bow off
    this DD. Since it did not sink and was drifting with the wind two more
    torpedoes were fired (attack number 7) at a range of 750 yards. One hit
    sank the target in two minutes.

(g) EIGHTH, NINTH AND TENTH ATTACKS: (30 December 1944)
    Contact was regained with convoy, attacked earlier, upon surfacing
    after sunset. The approach was started on the surface but the excellent
    visibility forced submergence to radar and then periscope depth. With
    the exception of the DD sunk and the AO probably sunk the convoy consist-
    ed of the same ships as were first seen. Three torpedoes were fired from
    the bow nest at the leading AK (Attack 8). Range 3,400 yards, track angle
    35°, average gyros 03°, depth setting 6 feet. Two hits were obtained.
    The set up was then shifted and the remaining three torpedoes from the bow
    nest were fired at the second ship in column. This was the largest ship
    in the convoy and considered to be an AK or AO(UN) of approximately 8,000
    tons. Range was 3,600 yards, track angle averaged 25°, gyro angles 015,
    depth set at 6 feet. Two hits were made. This target blew up and sank
    during the next attack.

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— page 96 —
SUBMARINE DIVISION EIGHTY-TWO

F35/S2/A16-3
Serial (001)
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) - Report of Second War Patrol.

— page 97 —
FC5-10/A16-3
Serial 07

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TEN

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
10 January 1945.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO RAZORBACK Report of
Second War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
      (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) - Second War Patrol - Comments on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the first endorsement.

2. Of the six ship contacts made, RAZORBACK attacked all except
one, which could not be closed, inflicting severe damage on the enemy's
escort forces as well as on his cargo carriers. The Commanding Officer
states that in the attack of 1 December (the first for the RAZORBACK as
well as for himself) there was no reasonable probability of hitting, due
to the excessive torpedo run for MK. 18 torpedoes, and the torpedoes
should not have been fired. The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten concurs.
Although the firing ranges were, in general, high, the results obtained
with 16 hits from 42 torpedoes fired speak well of the fire control
organization.

3. The successful use of ping ranges, without alerting the escorts,
is worthy of note.

4. The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten congratulates the Commanding
Officer, officers, and crew of the RAZORBACK for this alert and aggressive
patrol, and recommends that the damage inflicted be assessed as follows:

SUNK
1 DD SIGURE (EU) 1,400 tons (2nd attack)
* ½ AP - AK large (EU) 5,000 tons (3rd & 4th attacks)
1 AO (EU) 8,000 tons (5th attack)
1 DD WAKATAKE (EC) 800 tons (6th & 7th attacks)
1 AK large (EU) 7,500 tons (9th & 10th attacks)
Total - 22,700 tons

* - ½ credited to SEGUNDO, who had previously damaged this ship.

DAMAGED
1 AK medium (EU) 4,000 tons (8th attack)

Total sunk and damaged - 26,700 tons.
[SIGNATURE: G. L. Russell]
G. L. RUSSELL.

— page 98 —
mr
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
20 January 1945

10/A16-3(15)
Serial 0164
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT
RAZORBACK Report of
Second War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 642
U.S.S. RAZORBACK - SECOND WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) - Report of Second War Patrol
(17 November, 1944, to 5 January, 1945).

21 JAN 1945 NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

1. The second war patrol of the RAZORBACK, under the com-
mand of Lieutenant Commander C. Donald Brown, U.S. Navy, was con-
ducted in the Luzon Strait Area. The RAZORBACK, along with the U.S.S.
TREPANG (SS412) and the U.S.S. SEGUNDO (SS398), formed a coordinated
attack group with the commanding officer of the TREPANG, Commander
R. M. Davenport, U.S. Navy, as the group commander. The RAZORBACK,
midway through the patrol, returned to Saipan for a reload of
torpedoes, then rejoined the SEGUNDO for coordinated attack with
Commander J. D. Pulp, Jr., U.S. Navy, as group commander.

2. This outstanding patrol resulted in six good con-
tacts. A total of ten aggressive torpedo attacks were delivered on
escorts as well as on cargo carriers which resulted in severe damage
to the enemy.

3. Award of the Submarine Combat Insignia for this
patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this
aggressive and highly successful patrol; a fighting performance for
which the RAZORBACK can well be very proud. Unfortunately,
available evidence in the case of Attack No. 2 permits assessment
of damage only. The RAZORBACK is credited with having inflicted the
following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

S U N K
1/2* -Large AP (EU) - * 5,000[HANDWRITTEN: ✓] tons (Attacks Nos. 3 & 4)
1 - Medium AO (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 5)
1 - DD (WAKETAKE Type) (EC) - 800 tons (Attacks Nos. 6 & 7)
1 - Large AK (EU) - [HANDWRITTEN: _]7,500 tons (Attacks Nos. 9 & 10)

TOTAL SUNK 20,800 tons

* One-half credit to SEGUNDO who had previously damaged this ship.

- 1 -

— page 100 —
SS394/A16-3
DECLASSIFIED
[HANDWRITTEN: 1ST copy]

Fr n: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. RAZORBACK
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:

Subject: U.S.S. RAZORBACK, Report of War Patrol
Number THREE.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart.
(C) Chart of Land-based Radar Contacts.
(ConSubPacAdCom only.)

1. Enclosure (A), covering the THIRD war patrol
of this vessel, conducted in the EAST CHINA SEA
period from 1 February to 26 March 1945, is forwarded here-
with.

2. This vessel was a member of FULP'S FIDDLERS,
consisting of USS SEGUNDO (Cmdr. J. D. Fulp, Jr., USN,
pack commander), USS SEA CAT (Lt-Cmdr. R. H. Bowers, USN)
and the USS RAZORBACK.

[SIGNATURE: C. C. Briscoe]
C. DONALD BRISCOE

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP-09B3C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/72]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

[HANDWRITTEN: FILMED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 115202]

— page 101 —
(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived APRA HARBOR, GUAM, from second war patrol on
5 January 1945, for normal refit by the USS SPERRY (AS12) and
Submarine Division EIGHTY-TWO relief crew. In spite of a large
personnel turnover since their last refit, Division 82, with the
cooperation of the SPERRY, accomplished a very creditable over-
haul of engines and auxiliaries. There were no major work items.
Camp Dealey (the materials for which we were amazed to
find were unloaded from the SPERRY less than two months prior to
our arrival) was a very well constructed establishment which
afforded all hands a good rest.
On 20 January, the crew returned to the ship, tested
machinery the next day, and completed a deep dive and underway
tests the day following. Our training period consisted of four
days and one night independent exercises, under Commander L. T.
STONE, USN (ComSubDiv-82), whose suggestions were much appreciated.
Three exercise torpedoes were fired. One extra day and night of
training as a pack with the SEGUNDO and SEA CAT proved very
effective in ironing out small difficulties.
On 31 January, PETTY, H.P., 355 92 65, CEM(T), USN, was
appointed to ELECTRICIAN (T) and transferred to Submarine Division
82; Ensign F. E. FARRIS, USN; File #389559, reported aboard for
duty.

(B) NARRATIVE

Officers:                                       Previous War Patrols
Lt.Comdr. C. D. BROWN, USN                               2
Lieut. R. L. SMITH, (DE), USNR                           4
Lieut. R. S. THOMPSON, (DE), USNR                        2
Lieut. A. R. HERSH, Jr., USN                             4
Lieut. L. B. CRANN, (DE), USNR                           2
Lt.(jg) W. C. ANDERSON, (E)R, USNR                       2
Lt.(jg) E. L. JOHNSON, USN                               1
Lt.(jg) L. T. ADAMS, (DE), USNR                          2
Lt.(jg) W. H. PATTILLO, (D)L, USNR                       1
Ensign F. E. FARRIS, USN                                 0

Chief Petty Officers
FORT, Henry F., CQM(AA), USN                             2
GORDON, James E., CMOMM(PA), USN                         7
PIAZZA, Peter (n), CMOMM(PA), USN                        7

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— page 102 —
(Unless otherwise designated, all times listed are "I".)

1 February
1530 Underway from APRA HARBOR, GUAM, for patrol area as a unit
     of FULP'S FIDDLERS, consisting of the USS SEGUNDO (Comdr.
     J. D. FULP, Jr., USN, Pack Commander), USS SEA CAT (Lt.
     Comdr. R. H. BOWERS, USN), and USS RAZORBACK, with escort
     USS DEMPSEY (DE-1026), in accordance with ComTaskFor 17
     Operation Order #35-45.
2135 Having completed her duty as escort, the USS DEMPSEY
     departed. Started for station 20 miles from USS SEGUNDO,
     30 degrees on her port quarter.

2 February
0600 Made trim dive.
0625 Surfaced.
0642 Spoke to USS SEA CAT, who requested a hydraulic spare
     which unfortunately we do not have.
1200 Position: Lat. 16-40-N, Long. 142-13-E.
1505 Exchanged calls with USS TRIGGER (SS237).
     Had 1 to 3 friendly radar-equipped planes circling us
     too close aboard after dark tonite. Detected them by
     strange radar interference on SJ, which changed bearing
     too rapidly to be a ship. SD located them at 3 to 4
     miles.
2100 Closed USS SEGUNDO for instructions. Had good VHF
     reception at 5200 yards, which is the only satisfactory
     performance we've had with this equipment while underway;
     it functions perfectly in port.

3 February
0540 and 1138 - Made short section dives.
1200 Position: Lat. 20-25-N, Long. 138-29-E.
1308 Exchanged recognition signals with U.S. submarine on
     opposite course. Sun prevented identification.
2000 Spoke SEGUNDO by radar.

4 February
0600 Made section dive; surfaced at 0633.

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— page 103 —
1200: Position: Lat. 24-24-N, Long. 135-14-E.
5 February
0532 As on 2 February, detected ten-centimeter radar-equipped
     plane circling us at 3 miles; dived. Presence of plane
     suspected by rapid bearing change of radar interference
     on SJ; substantiated by keying the SD. The operator
     described the note in the phones as considerably lower
     than friendly SJ. We did not use IFF. If friendly, we
     wish these planes would not come so close.
0600 All clear on SD; surfaced.
0800 Having made up distance we were behind schedule, dived
     for submerged patrol.
1200 Position: Lat. 27-44-N, Long. 133-10-E.
1615 Held battle problem.
1815 Surfaced.
1905 Exchanged calls with SEGUNDO by radar and reported plane
     encountered this morning to pack commander.

6 February
0615 Dived for submerged patrol.
1200 Position: Lat. 29-52-N, Long. 130-57-E.
1831 Surfaced.
1949 Radar contact, 168°T, range 12,000 yards; tracked him
     on same course. Exchanged calls with USS SEA CAT.
2125 Went ahead on four engines to transit COLNETT STRAIT.
2240 Sighted faint white light in direction of YAKU SHIMA.
     During transit we had land radar sets on APR as indicated
     by current publications.
2255 Entered patrol area.
2349 Received contact report from SEGUNDO, placing a submarine
     a few miles north of UMANO SE by our best calculations.
     We skirted 100 fathom curve to north of HIRA SE. Challenged
     by SEA CAT at this point. She is making transit astern of
     us - distant six miles.

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— page 104 —
7 February
0600 Dived for submerged patrol with GAJA SHIMA bearing 170°T,
       distant 12 miles.
1200 Position: Lat. 30-10-N, Long. 129-22-E.
1855 Surfaced; sea has increased to state 5.
1920 Ten centimeter radar interference in direction of
       GAJA SHIMA.
2030 APR contact, 153 mc, strength from one to three sevenths.
       This set appeared to be land based and was steady on our
       bearing for a period of about thirty minutes.

8 February
0600 Submerged.
1200 Position: Lat. 30-01-N, Long. 129-11-E.
1250 Engine room roported hearing two distant explosions.
1853 Surfaced, set course for new area in accordance with
       pack patrol plan.

9 February
0240 Intermittent APR contact, 143 mc, apparently land based.
0600 Dived for submerged patrol with KUSAKAKI JIMA bearing
       126°T, distant 17 miles.
1200 Position: Lat. 31-01-N, Long. 129-20-E.
1901 Surfaced.
2308 Exchanged recognition signals with SEKUNDO by radar.

10 February
0401 APR contact strength four sovenths, steady on.
0403 SD contact 2 miles, dived. It may have been a rain squall.
0429 All clear on SD; surfaced.
0600 Submerged for patrol with UJI SHIMA bearing 082°T, distant
       16 miles.

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— page 105 —
1200 Position: Lat. 31-14-N, Long. 129-12-E.
1853 Surfaced and cleared pack area to send weather report.
2000 Raised NPM. Transmitter went out of commission.
2055 Transmitter back in commission.
2157 Weather report sent and receipted for.

11 February
0600 Submerged for patrol 14 miles S.W. of UJI SHIMA. Intend
       to make passage between UJI GUNTO and KUSAKAKI SHIMA
       today. Assume Jap land based radar cannot detect us
       over 15 miles, but we will be unable to cover much
       area on surface inshore without being discovered.
1200 Position: Lat. 31-01-N, Long. 129-24-E.
1323 Maneuvering room reported distant explosion.
1856 Surfaced; SJ contact 4800 yards.
1900 With a 150 mc APR contact, and the SJ contact closing
       slowly to 4300 yards, dived. OOD thought he saw a small
       vessel after the diving alarm was sounded, so at
1906 Surfaced; SJ contact at 5700 yards, tracked on diverging
       course.
1908 APR contact 155 mc, definitely over saturation and steady
       on. Since we had picket boat or enemy submarine in
       vicinity, went on the assumption that we would be un-
       molested by planes.
1925 Lost SJ contact at 6000 yards. This picket boat had
       ten centimeter radar by which we continued to track it.
       The note of the signal in the SJ phones was considerably
       higher than that of our own equipment. He either did
       not contact us or was not anxious to close.
1951 Received message from pack commander shifting areas in
       reference to a Comsubpac despatch we do not have. With
       our exact location known, (I don't see how we could
       assume otherwise) decided to pose as a picket boat until
       clear of land; this didn't include transmissions on
       pack frequency.
2010 Lost contact with 155 mc APR signal momentarily and picked
       up new 159 mc signal, steady on us and well above saturation.

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— page 106 —
2015 We now had both APR contacts 155 and 159 mc signals
steady on, saturated, with very loud signal.
2116 Went to three engine speed.
2130 New APR contact, 77 mc, maximum strength three sevenths,
contact lost at 2159.
2300 Contact at 150 mc reduced in intensity and suddenly
disappeared.
2307 With 159 mc APR contact varying between three sevenths
and saturation, informed pack commander we did not have
comsubpac message to which he had referred. (TAKA SHIMA
12 miles astern; SHIMA KOSHIKI, 14 miles.)
2346 Received pack commander's instructions to patrol position
Lat. 32-14-N, Long. 127-02-E.

12 February
0004 Went to four engine speed.
0115 Finally lost our persistant 159 mc APR contact. (TAKA
SHIMA 41 miles astern.)
0235 Picked up DANJO GUNTO bearing 337°T, distant 32 miles.
0640 Submerged, with DANJO GUNTO bearing 092°T, distant 41
miles. We are in our assigned patrol area, but 28 miles
short of the point designated by pack commander. Assume
that our not being detected is fully as important as
being exactly on station.

1200 Position: Lat. 32-06-N, Long. 127-22-E.

1851 Surfaced.

1950 Received message from pack commander to return to
regularly scheduled area.

2143 Having had a rapidly moving SJ contact at 26,000 yards,
checked with SD and had possible contact at 3 miles.
Dived. There was no APR warning on this contact which
may have merely been a plane in transit.

2203 Surfaced.

2355 APR contact, 98 mc.

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— page 107 —
13 February
0100 SJ radar interference and signals from 102°T. As this
was also bearing of DANJO GUNTO, did not answer up.
Subsequent bearing change of the interference indicated
the signals were from another member of the pack, but
no further attempts were made to establish identity.
0127 Weak APR contact 150 mc.
0615 Submerged for patrol with SHIMO KOSHIKI light bearing
080°T, distant 46 miles.
1200 Position: Lat. 31-26-N, Long. 129-13-E.
1900 Surfaced.

14 February
0020 Radar contact bearing 323°T, distant 9,450 yards.
0025 Challenged and exchanged calls with SEGUNDO by radar.
0600 Submerged for patrol 7 miles off 100 fathom curve, with
KAMI KOSHIKI bearing 134°T, distant 21 miles.
1200 Position: Lat. 32-01-N, Long. 129-38-E.
1545 Sighted large twin-engine bomber bearing 029°T, distant
6 miles, heading north.
1855 Surfaced.
1930 Sighted loom of intermittent light on various bearings
between 205°T, and 225°T, during period of about ten
minutes. This light was seen three times. There was
no land in that direction.
2007 Fire in the maneuvering room. Remote governor control
burned up.
2012 Went ahead on battery.
2015 Resumed engine propulsion.
2020 Secured from fire quarters.
2328 SJ contact 326°T, distant 25 miles; went ahead on four
engines and turned toward to investigate. Due to several
inconsistent radar bearings the first few navigational
plots put the contact about ten miles from DANJO GUNTO.

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— page 108 —
2352 Sent contact report to rest of pack.
15 February

0010 Having verified contact as DANJO GUNTO, cancelled contact
     report.
0034 Received SEA CAT contact report on three small targets;
     went ahead on four engines to close contact.
0115 Having had no amplifying report from SEA CAT, concluded
     her report as a warning and slowed down.
0117 Received SEA CAT report that she was attacking.
0205 SEA CAT reported completion of attack. With no further
     information, original contact having been at 10,000 yards,
     and targets apparently remaining in same area, felt it
     was our best bet to stay clear.
0210 Pack commander requested type of target from SEA CAT; the
     latter reported unidentified.
0241 Pack commander informed pack he had ceased search.
0600 Submerged for patrol, with FUKAE SHIMA bearing 000°T,
     distant 18 miles.
1200 Position: Lat. 32-20-N, Long 128-40- E.
1858 Surfaced.
2146 Received pack commander's orders to patrol position:
     Lat. 31-54-N, Long. 126-35-E.

16 February

0250 Received pack commander's orders to shift patrol point to
     Lat. 33-36-N, Long. 128-39-E, and to dive at discretion.
0302 Headed for assigned position on four engines.
0623 Submerged for patrol.
1200 Position: Lat. 32-49-N, Long. 127-57-E.
1900 Surfaced.
2150 Went ahead on four engines to assigned patrol position
     anticipating possibility of pack commander using SJ radar
     for signals.

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— page 109 —
2250 In position, slowed to one engine speed. SEGUNDO radar
     interference bore 340°T.

17 February

0013 Received pack commander's orders to patrol position:
     Lat. 34-02-N, Long. 128-40-E.

0610 Submerged on station for patrol.

1200 Position: Lat. 33-58-N, Long. 128-44-E.

1905 Surfaced.

1915 Sighted several lights which may have been navigational
     lights, bearing 335°T.

1942) SJ radar contacts from 2000 to 3000 yards - avoided.
2032)-
2035)

2111 Received message from SEGUNDO reporting her radar out of
     commission.

2258 Radar contact 020°T, distant 18,200 yards; commenced
     tracking. This target was passing very near SEGUNDO's
     possible position, but the range seemed excessive for
     a submarine contact.

2304 SEA CAT reported nine sampans in her area.

2322 Reported radar contact to pack commander and asked if it
     were the SEGUNDO.

2352 Received negative answer.

18 February

0013 Sent complete contact report to pack and continued to
     track at 15,000 yards range. Enemy course was 280°T,
     speed 9, which headed him toward shallow water to north
     of SAISHO TO.

0100 This target was hard to pass up. Since our mission did
     not allow us to attack at this time, secured tracking
     party and headed away to avoid detection, and the pos-
     sibility of being drawn clear of the area for which we
     were responsible.

0112 SEGUNDO reported radar contact; apparently on same target.

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— page 110 —
0120 Lost target, bearing 334°T, distant 21,450 yards.
0151 Had the first of many SJ contacts from 1700 to 4000 yards.
     We were continuously pestered by "pixies" until 0330.
     Some of these contacts may very well have been small boats,
     but nothing was seen from the bridge.
0600 Submerged for patrol.
1025 OOD sighted smoke and the upper works of a ship through
     the periscope, bearing 042°T.
1027 Went to battle stations. The target appeared to be a
     medium tanker or freighter. Only a high bridge just
     forward of a very tall, thin, and smoky stack was observed.
     Did not attempt to close.
1040 Sound picked up fast screws on port quarter which proved
     to be a small lugger on collision course. Turned away.
1105 Secured from battle stations. Hope our primary mission
     comes to a successful close soon. The crew just can't
     fathom this "normal escape course" business in which we
     are apparently engaged.
1130 Sighted two unidentified objects over the horizon, bearing
     280°T. Made out what appeared to be two identical ships,
     two-masted, with single stack. (Stack later proved to be
     small bridge amidships.)
1134 Turned toward and went ahead standard to investigate.
     On subsequent observations determined targets zigging
     radically across our line of sight and back again.
1146 JP reported contact with these targets; light fast screws,
     later variable, speeds sometimes stopped.
1155 Targets hoisted sails; identified them as sea trucks of
     about 500 tons.
1200 Position: Lat. 34-05-N, Long. 128-47-E.
1405 Sighted small sailboat.
1425 Lost contact with pair of targets sighted at 1130.
1535 All clear on periscope.
1903 Surfaced.

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— page 111 —
1930 Sighted lights at 240°T. Later identified as lights of
    two small vessels on easterly heading. These ships had
    bright side lights, and burned alternately (for five or
    ten minutes) a white or another red light under their
    portside lights. They may have been magnetic minesweeps.
    Cleared these targets to the northward.

2222 SJ contact 327°T, distant 9,000 yards.

2235 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with SEGUNDO.

<u>19 February</u>

0135 SJ contact 007°T, distant 9200 yards.

0145 Again exchanged recognition signals and calls with SEGUNDO.

0557 Submerged for patrol.

1200 Position: Lat. 33-57-N, Long. 128-37-E.

1915 Surfaced.

2138 Received pack commander's orders to take station for
    independent ship cooperative patrol; proceeding to new
    pack area.

2200 Having seen no traffic while within range of land radar
    installations, intend to patrol west of TORI SHIMA along
    reported westbound traffic lane from NAGASAKI.
    Exchanged recognition signals and calls with SEGUNDO.

<u>20 February</u>

0612 Submerged for patrol.

1200 Position: Lat. 32-52-N, Long. 127-44-E.

1755 JK reported echo ranging bearing 315°T; nothing in sight
    on periscope.

1758 Went ahead standard to close pinger.

1803 Sighted top of unidentified ship which changed bearing to
    right. Battle stations, torpedo - started approach.

1817 Target definitely identified as a DE.

1822 The best position we were able to attain was with torpedo
    run of 4200 yards, angle on the bow 105 starboard, speed
    13 knots. At this time target zigged away 40°.

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— page 112 —
1906 Surfaced.
1916 Went ahead full on three main engines.
1948 Regained contact on SJ, bearing 128°T, distant 17,900
     yards. Tracked target on base course 100°T at 15 knots,
     zigging 20° to left and right of base course.
2042 Due to excellent visibility, our only possible attack
     was at radar depth from ahead; therefore broke off chase
     with target bearing 115°T, distant 15,000 yards. The DE
     was apparently enroute to NAGASAKI.

21 February
0027 First of three "pixie" contacts, bearing 309°T, distant
     9000 yards.
0058 Secured tracking "pixies".
0145 OOD sighted flare bearing 135°T.
0355 More "pixies".
0618 Submerged for patrol.
1200 Position: Lat. 32-31-N, Long. 127-30-E.
1412 Explosion reported throughout ship and on sound.
1900 Surfaced.
1930 "Pixie" at 2800 yards.
2144 Cleared weather message to ComSubPacAdComd.
2350 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with USS SUNFISH
     (SS281) by radar.
2355 SJ contact bearing 329°T, distant 5400 yards; lookout
     sighted USS SUNFISH; avoided on four engines.
     The SUNFISH was visible, up moon from us, to a range of
     9000 yards with large angle on the bow. She was plainly
     visible at 5000 yards with zero angle on the bow.

22 February
0245 Another "pixie" at 1500 yards.
0618 Submerged for patrol.

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— page 113 —
1200 Position: Lat. 32-33-N, Long. 127-53-E.
1923 Surfaced.
23 February
0600 Submerged for patrol.
1010 OOD sighted smoke bearing 060°T; turned toward at standard speed.
1019 Sighted upper works of MFFM ship.
1023 Battle stations. The target was further identified as an
      unescorted AP.
1046 With torpedo run of 3200 yards, gyros 15 R, track angle 95
      starboard, target speed 16 knots, started firing full bow nest.
      As fifth torpedo left the tube, saw red cross on hull. Checked
      fire. No hits were seen or heard; no end of run explosions.
      (For further details of target, see Attack Data.)
1050 Target turned away 90°.
1056 Secured from battle stations.
1105 Target out of sight.
1200 Position: Lat. 32-35-N, Long. 127-43-E.
1912 Surfaced.
2115 OOD sighted light, bearing 205°T. Put three engines on
      propulsion and closed slowly to investigate. Battle stations.
      Although the light was above the horizon there was no evidence
      of a target on the SJ until
2125 Radar contact dead ahead, distant 5200 yards.
2126 OOD and lookout sighted small darkened ship between the light
      and us, considerably closer. This definitely looked like a
      trap to me, so
2128 Reversed course and cleared vicinity.
2135 Secured from battle stations.
24 February
0030 We had two sets of radar interference on SJ, bearing 075°T
      and 325°T respectively. Both looked friendly, but the latter
      was unexplained and was in the vicinity of SAISHO TO.

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— page 114 —
0450 SJ contact 164°T, distant 32,600 yards.
0455 Went to four engines and closed to investigate.
0515 Possible SJ interference from bearing of contact; not
     soon again.
0532 SEGUNDO receipted for contact report.
0534 Sighted cluster of lights on horizon, target had been
     tracking at zero speed since contact. There were
     several pips on the radar at 16,000 yards.
0537 Slowed to one third. This set-up looked similar to trap
     we encountered last night. Can't believe the Japs are
     going around burning bright lights on good torpedo targets.
0538 Radar reported nearest and largest target closing us at
     fifteen knots, range 13,000 yards; turned away at slow
     speed.
     With only half an hour before dawn, considered it prudent
     to put some distance between us and this contact. The
     ship coming our way was now tracking at nineteen and
     twenty knots so at
0545 Opened at full speed.
0550 Our pursuer changed course and gave us 130° starboard
     angle on the bow, range 11,000 yards.
0558 SEGUNDO and SEA CAT receipted for our report of suspected
     trap.
     From the time of the first contact, the pips on the SJ
     screen looked like false targets. They faded in and
     out and were difficult to track even when we had halved
     the range. The target which bent on twenty knots in our
     direction, however, was easily tracked.
0618 Submerged for patrol.
1127 JP and several compartments reported three explosions.
1133 JP reported another explosion.
1200 Position: Lat. 32-52-N, Long. 128-07-E.
1217 Sighted two cylindrical buoys, one was red marked with
     a white circle enclosing what appeared to be numeral
     eight; the other was grey with a yellow top marked
     with red outer and white inner circle with a green
     center. These buoys looked like 4" ammunition cases
     floating upright.

- 14 -

— page 115 —
1335 Observed momentary flash of light on right tangent of
FUKAE SHI...

1900 Surfaced.
2135 Received orders from pack commander to patrol assigned
area, SEA CAT to work south of 30-23-N and a report that
minecraft were operating in our new area near SHIMONO
SHIMA.

25 February
0629 Submerged for patrol east of SAISHO TO with KYOBUN TO
bearing 000°T, distant 20 miles.
Found our first good gradient in this area at 250 feet.
1200 Position: Lat. 33-41-N, Long. 127-29-E.
1915 Surfaced.

26 February
0606 Submerged for patrol.
1200 Position: Lat. 33-20-N, Long. 128-33-E.
1646 Sighted small mast with pennant on horizon, bearing
221°T; turned toward.
Identified contact as a spherical black buoy with a ten
foot mast on which flew a black pennant and a long tassel
of light cloth.
1912 Surfaced.

27 February
0000 SJ contact 160°T, distant 750 yards. We ran right
through this point but saw nothing that could cause
a "pixie".
0030 SJ contact 272°T, distant 12,000 yards. We closed this
slowly with four engines on the line. Found about a
dozen birds sitting on the water which may have been our
target. The latter disappeared about five or ten minutes
after original contact.
0610 Submerged for patrol.
Heard numerous distant explosions throughout the morning.
They sounded like hammer blows on the hull.
1200 Position: Lat. 33-07-N, Long. 127-00-E.

- 15 -

— page 116 —
1633 JP picked up disturbance bearing 265°T. OOD sighted two
masts on the horizon, same bearing.
Closed track and identified as a power fishing boat.

1830 Lost sight of fishing boat.

1920 Surfaced.

2242 Cleared weather message. Unable to raise NPM; VHA 1
receipted and authenticated for the message.

28 February

0611 Submerged for patrol.

0733 Sighted two-masted sailboat.

0737 Sighted another sailboat.

0843 Sighted third sailboat.

1200 Position: Lat. 34-14-N, Long. 128-07-E.

1315 Sighted fourth sailboat.

1505 All clear on the periscope.

1905 Surfaced.

1920 Heading for patrol point east and slightly north of
KINJO GAN.

2200 SJ contact on land bearing 280°T, distant 4900 yards,
which put us or KINJO GAN about ten miles out of position.

1 March

0115 First of seven SJ radar contacts at 6000 yards.
The sea had roughed up considerably so are reasonably
sure these were not "pixies". These small ships tracked
well and had us pretty well hemmed in for awhile. Targets
tracked at 10 and 15 knots when we were running with or
away from them. The last one encountered stopped when
we turned to opposite course and evaded across his stern.
Decided to patrol off NISHI SUIDO in view of small patrol
boats in vicinity of position of first choice.

0345 Lost contact with last small patrol boat.

0611 Submerged for patrol.

0821 Sighted masts bearing 111°T.

- 16 -

— page 117 —
0838 Made out as three-masted schooner headed directly toward
     us; battle stations torpedo.
     We did not even change course for this follow but waited
     for him to overtake us and then turned off the track.

0928 With a thirty-nine second torpedo run and a cold set-up,
     fired three fish from the stern tubes.
     Everything checked, including half a dozen ping ranges
     so we were amazed when the ship didn't disintegrate.

0930 There was much scrambling about on the schooner and they
     broke out a red flag on deck. Although we could see no
     other ships in the vicinity, assumed he had friends either
     on the surface or submerged within signalling distance.

0940 Secured from battle stations.

1200 Position: Lat. 34-08-N, Long. 128-29-E.

1900 Surfaced, proceeding to next pack area assigned.

2150 Received request from pack commander for torpedo report
     and number of days able to extend patrol.

2248 Cleared answer to pack commander.

2 March
0350 APR contact 155 mc, non-rotating antenna, strength 1/2
     saturation, keyed at irregular intervals.

     The fact that this set was not encountered when we passed
     through this area previously, and that it was being keyed,
     indicated a mobile unit. We could see nothing on the SD
     though the signal reached saturation several times.
     Plotting intensity on various headings revealed nothing
     conclusive, as intensity varied greatly on the same headings.

0525 APR contact dropped from 1/3 saturation to zero and was
     not seen again.

0610 Submerged for patrol west of FUKAE SHIMA.

1200 Position: Lat. 32-38-N, Long. 128-12-E.

1715 Sighted TORI SHIMA bearing 186°T, distant 8 miles.

1905 Surfaced.

1940 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with SEGUNDO.

- 17 -

— page 118 —
3 March
0130         SJ radar out of commission for 30 minutes.
0611         Submerged for patrol.
1200         Position: Lat. 31-26-N, Long. 128-16-E.
1901         Surfaced.
             Could not raise NPM for weather message. NQM receipted
             for it, but we were unable to get a correct authentication.
             Sent message blind three times and secured transmitting.
             Period of transmission was two hours.

4 March
0524         With a saturated land based radar contact of 159 mc, steady
             on us, swung ship. The pattern obtained was inconclusive.
             The strength did fall off on opposite headings, indicating
             the direction of the set. However, it sometimes came in
             saturated on these same headings, indicating difficulty
             for Japs to stay on us (when heading directly toward or
             away) rather than a null in the antenna.
0612         Submerged for patrol.
0808         Two loud explosions heard in control room.
1200         Position: Lat. 30-23-N, Long. 129-43-E.
1912         Surfaced.
2018         A school of porpoises kept the OOD's and captain's
             hearts in their mouths for about half an hour. These
             fish had been trained to run hot straight and normal.

5 March
             Intended to patrol submerged to the southward of BONO
             MISAKI today, but at
0014         Received orders to patrol with pack in area to northward.
0035         Headed toward new area on three engines. Will have to
             stay on the surface during daylight.
0055         SJ interference bearing 166°T.
0804         Lookout sighted KUFE, bearing 102°T, distant 15 miles -
             dived.
0840         Surfaced.

- 18 -

— page 119 —
1038 Lookout sighted two unidentified objects on the horizon,
     bearing 255°T; turned away.
     These were identified through the periscope as two small
     ships, with zero angle on the bow.

1057 Angle on the bow of ships had changed to 30 port; turned
     to take position ahead of targets. Ships now identified
     as two diesel powered sea trucks, apparently engaged in
     fishing.

1100 SD contact, 11 miles.

1107 SJ contact bearing 180°T, distant 7.5 miles; sighted two
     twin-engined bombers through high periscope.

1108 Dived.

1143 Surfaced. Ship contacts out of sight; commenced search.

1200 Position: Lat. 31-51-N, Long. 127-34-E.

1211 Lookout sighted our previous contacts bearing 275°T, distant
     7000 yards. Headed to obtain position astern and up wind
     from fishing vessels.

1233 Lookout sighted aircraft bearing 280°T; OOD identified as
     a single-engine, gull wing plane, with zero angle on the
     bow, much too close aboard; dived and headed directly
     toward targets.

1300 Fishing vessels in sight bearing 293°T, distant 4500 yards.

1341 Battle stations gun action. Was pretty leary of the
     situation in view of the aircraft and targets' affinity
     for practically the same spot, but a fortunate rain squall
     put things in our favor, so at

1353 Battle surfaced.

1356 Commenced firing. The 4" gun was the only weapon that
     started off with a bang, but the 20mm and 40mm were soon
     in action. The .50 cal. MG's proved to be single shot
     weapons, as usual, in spite of the conscientious efforts
     of the gunnery officer. The last guns mentioned were
     working perfectly shortly before we entered the area.

1406 Ceased firing on the first target which had sustained a
     half dozen hits from each of the 4", 40mm, and 20mm guns.
     Target was stopped and burning briskly.

1416 Commenced firing on target No. 2.

1431 With the second target so low in the water that it was
     difficult to hit, shifted back to first target.

- 19 -

— page 120 —
1437 First target sunk after several more 4" hits.
1448 Picked up three survivors from the first target.
1452 Approached the second target to see if it needed any
    urging toward the bottom and saw it sink.
    Pictures were obtained throughout this gun attack.
1453 Secured from battle stations and cleared the vicinity
    on four engines.
    The three prisoners were a bit reluctant about coming
    alongside but they waved us away as we came alongside but
    when the first man got aboard and wasn't shot, the
    others came aboard without much urging. All prisoners
    were wounded to some extent. Approximately twelve
    survivors were left to fend for themselves; one from
    the first and eleven from the second target.
    Think we may do more harm than good by interrogation
    so have limited the questioning to essentials and intend
    to leave the prisoners alone until we can turn them over
    to the experts. They are now stored in separate compart-
    ments under armed guard.

1536 Slowed to two engine speed.
2345 SJ contact 024°T, distant 5400 yards. The seas were much
    too high for any kind of an attack on a shallow draft
    target, so avoided.

6 March
0053 Lost contact with target, bearing 156°T, distant
    10,000 yards.
0324 Received Comsubpac orders to terminate patrol at sunset
    on 8 March.
0540 SJ contact bearing 355°T, distant 8800 yards.
0608 Submerged for patrol heading toward target to investigate.
0700 Sighted two masts, bearing 227°T.
0741 Target is a two-masted schooner with sails furled, drifting
    with the wind. Decided to trail for battle surface later
    in the day. The sea is not favorable for gun action.

- 20 -

— page 121 —
1145 A faulty switch which failed to break the circuit when in
    the off position caused the deep fat fryer to overheat.
    When the cover was removed the fat burst into flame. The
    fire was quickly extinguished by replacing the cover, but
    the fryer continued to emit smoke which so made the boat
    untenable. This naturally might have been extremely
    serious.

1155 Surfaced. The schooner was bearing 145°T, distant 4000
    yards.

1200 Position: Lat. 33-50-N, Long. 128-00-E.

1201 Battle stations gun action.

1215 With range 500 yards, commenced firing with the 4" gun.
    The first round was a hit. Sea conditions were still
    unfavorable (state 4) for good pointing.

1218 Having fired 12 rounds with 75% hits, plus several 40mm
    hits, ceased firing.

1222 Target sank.
    If this ship was any criterion of Jap schooners, our
    three-masted ship (torpedo target of 1 March) was
    probably 150 instead of 500 tons. Today's target was
    riding out the weather to a sea anchor. A lookout and
    the 4" pointer reported four or five men on deck before
    the first shot was fired. Subsequently no sign of life
    was noted.

1223 Secured from battle stations.

1300 Gave one deep fryer the deep six.

1317 SD contact 13 miles.

1319 Dived.

1901 Surfaced.

2047 Cleared weather report and information on the China Sked
    reception to ComNavGrpChina. Although we had easily
    copied their 1900(I) sked tonite, we could not hear their
    receipt. NPM receipted for them.

2103 Reported leaving area to pack commander.

2205 Received SEA CAT message that she had requested extension
    with SEGUNDO.
    We would like to stay with them but feel it inadvisable due
    to poor condition of attack periscope, the apparent fatigue
    of the crew, and the possible loss of one prisoner unless
    we get him to better medical facilities soon.

- 21 -

— page 122 —
7 March
0610 Submerged to patrol in waters between FUKAE SHIMA and
DANJO GUNTO.
#4 outboard exhaust valve is not seating properly.
0853 OOD sighted two small ships bearing 336°T, distant 6000
yards. These appeared to be subchasers or PC boats.
They were zigzagging at about eight knots on base course
190°T. Definite identification could not be made. Since
there was no pinging heard,
0940 Battle stations gun action.
0950 Surfaced.
Range to targets - 8000 yards.
Chased targets. They still looked like SC's and as we
were less than 15 miles from the land for which they
were headed, turned away at 1010.
1015 Secured from battle stations and began surface search in
direction from which targets had come in hopes they were
making a preliminary sweep for something better.
1042 SD contact 14 miles.
1043 Dived and continued submerged patrol.
1200 Position: Lat. 32-22-N, Long. 128-36-E.
1905 Surfaced.
8 March
0605 Submerged for patrol.
1100 Passed close enough to KUCHINOYERABU to see houses, etc.,
in the harbor, but there was no shipping in evidence.
1200 Position: Lat. 30-25-N, Long. 130-07-E.
1737 Sound picked up echo ranging bearing 120°T; OOD sighted
mast on that bearing and turned toward. Was unable to
identify this ship. She worked north along the 100
fathom curve off YAKU SHIMA, where she blended perfectly
with land background.
1845 Lost sound contact.
1900 Surfaced and cleared patrol area enroute Midway.
2030 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with USS TILEFISH,
(SS307).

- 22 -

— page 123 —
9 March

0005 Cleared message to Comsubpac reporting results of patrol.

0802 Quartermaster sighted ship through high periscope, bearing
     033°T. Closed and identified as a sailing ship.

0810 Battle stations gun action.
     Target was a two-masted junk, 100 feet long.

0852 Commenced firing at range 400 yards. The 4" hit con-
     sistently, shots apparently passing through and through
     hull, as we could see daylight through hits in the bow.
     The 40mm and 20mm soon started a brisk blaze aft.

0915 With target burning brightly, one mast down, and thoroughly
     holed, secured from battle stations and shoved off.

0955 The officer of the deck reported he thought he saw a sail
     being raised on remaining mast. Reversed course.

1015 Received Comsubpac's message rerouting us to GUAM to
     discharge prisoners.

1019 Battle stations gun action.

1031 Commenced firing. Raked target from ahead with all guns
     at 50 yards range.

1035 Sighted several survivors.

1040 Alongside one survivor who willingly reported aboard.

     Passed astern of target again raking her with all guns.
     Finally got the remaining mast down and the target
     very near water level.
     There were several lone survivors, plus about six on a
     raft in the vicinity. Felt we had enough prisoners
     aboard for the time being.

1050 Secured from battle stations and cleared area. The target
     had been holed from stem to stern; the debris remaining
     was still afire when we left.

1200 Position: Lat. 29-31-N, Long. 133-39-E.

1340 SD interference.

1400 Sighted submarine through high periscope.

1445 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with USS GATO
     (SS212) by radar.

- 23 -

— page 124 —
1655 Finally cleared rendezvous message to ComTaskFor 17.7 through
     NPN. Unable to raise NDP4.
2230 Friendly SJ interference bearing 048°T.

10 March
0320 Exchanged recognition signals by radar with unknown ship.
0807 Received CSP message to be on lookout for downed aviators.
     Started keeping station 10,000 yards on quarter of USS GATO
     to facilitate search.
0810 Sighted unknown U.S. submarine through high periscope.
1200 Position: Lat. 27-15-N, Long. 137-12-E.
1625 SD contact 15 miles.
1628 Sighted B-29, distant 10,000 yards, no IFF, dived.
1652 Surfaced.
1835 OOD reported what may have been a white flare bearing 195°T,
     turned toward and reported flare to USS GATO by radar.
1857, 1914, 1923, and 1927 - fired green Very stars.
1927 Reversed course.
1947, 1955, 2003, 2008, 2030, 2045, and 2100 - fired green Very stars.
2100 Secured search. Lost contact with GATO.
2203 OOD sighted bright white light bearing 210°T, apparently at
     considerable distance, very high, and of great enough intensity
     to light up the clouds.

11 March
0945 Sighted submarine on high periscope bearing 191°T; exchanged
     recognition signals and calls with USS SPOT (SS413).
1045 Sighted U.S. submarine, not identified.
1115 Made section dive; surfaced at 1145.
1200 Position: Lat. 22-08-N, Long. 137-34-E.
1245 Exchanged recognition signals with unidentified U.S. submarine.

- 24 -

— page 125 —
1425 Made section dive; surfaced at 1450.
12 March
1200 Position: Lat. 17-43-N, Long. 137-57-E.
1346 Received CTG-17.7 message assigning RAZORBACK and GATO same
       escort.
2117 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with USS TRIGGER(SS237).
13 March
1036 Cleared message to CTG-17.7 repeating dawn rendezvous requested
       on 9 March.
1200: Position: Lat. 15-14-N, Long. 141-42-E.
1400 At four-engine speed, the boat literally dived under a wave.
       The port lookout, LONG, E.G., 658 83 27, EM2c, USNR, was knocked
       unconscious. Instinctive and immediate action by Lt(jg) W. H.
       PATTILLO, USNR, saved LONG from going overboard.
1534 Received CTG-17.7 message stating he had not received our first
       rendezvous message, escort to be designated later.
2213 CTG-17.7 designated escort, PC-824.
14 March
0631 In company with PC-824, approaching Guam.
1157 Moored starboard side to USS APOLLO (AS25), APRA HARBOR, GUAM.
       Transferred four Japanese prisoners to Army guard detail which
       reported aboard to receive them.
15 March
       The USS APOLLO gave us every consideration. In view of our short
       stay, we didn't ask for laundry service, but they talked us into
       it. Voyage repairs requested were accomplished with enthusiasm;
       we received plenty of fresh fruit; and left with a warm feeling
       for our treatment. We received 45,000 gallons of fuel.
       Lt. Frank J. O'Hora, (S), USNR, Fild #133067, reported
       aboard for transportation.
1500(K) Underway from GUAM for PEARL HARBOR, in accordance with CTG-17.10
       despatch of 15 March.
1536(K) Joined escort, USS DUNLAP (DD384).
1915(K) Parted company with escort.

- 25 -

— page 126 —
16 March
0800(K) #2 main engine out of commission.
1200(K) Position: Lat. 16-35-N, Long. 145-50-E.
1400(K) #2 main engine back in commission.
2300(K) #1 main engine out of commission.

17 March
0530(K) #3 main engine out of commission.
0800(K) Reported necessary reduction in S.O.A. to CTG-17.7 and ComSubPac.
1200(K) Position: Lat. 17-50-N, Long. 151-04-E.
2000(K) SJ radar interference bearing 116°T.
2015(K) With interference steady on us, sent first major war vessel
          challenge several times slowly; no response.
2030(K) SJ contact 107°T, distant 9500 yards; evaded to northward at
          full on two engines.
2110(K) With this fellow apparently knowing our position and trailing on
          starboard quarter, distant 8500 yards, fired emergency identifica-
          tion signal from Buck Rogers gun. Target opened to 10,000 yards.
2054(K) Received request for 170830 position from ComSubPac in connection
          with USS TIGRONE (SS420) contact report.
2059(K) Received TIGRONE contact report putting periscope one degree east
          of our longitude at time of contact.
2200(K) SJ contact bearing 115°T, distant 9000 yards. This may have been
          the same ship, but I think not.
          We again avoided to northward and soon had signals on SJ
          much to rapid to be read by an experienced signalman, or in-
          discriminate keying to confuse us.
2250(K) Lost contact with target bearing 273°T, distant 11,500 yards;
          his radar interference persisted for thirty minutes.
          The minimum range on these contacts was 8,050 yards. We
          remained on the surface making every effort to avoid.
2300(K) NPN receipted for message to ComSubPac with our answer and
          data on trailer.

          - 26 -

— page 127 —
18 March
0400(K) #1 main engine back in commission.
0523(K) Submerged; surfaced at 0703.
1125(L) SJ interference bearing 270°T.
1147(K) Exchanged recognition signals and calls with USS PLAICE (SS390).
1200(K) Position: Lat. 18-50-N, Long. 155-06-E.
1834(K) Exchanged recognition signals and calls with U.S.S. PLAICE.
19 March - 1200(K) Position: Lat. 19-08-N, Long. 160-54-E.
20 March - 1200(L) Position: Lat. 19-50-N, Long. 166-16-E.
21 March - 1200(L) Position: Lat. 19-57-N, Long. 171-00-E.
                 Conducted deep discharge at the 6-hour rate.
22 March - 1200(M) Position: Lat. 20-07-N, Long. 176-50-E.
23 March - 0215(M) Crossed International Date Line.
           1200(M) Position: Lat. 20-21-N, Long. 177-36-W.
23 March - 1200(Y) Position: Lat. 20-37-N, Long. 171-47-W.
24 March - 0008(Y) #2 main engine out of commission.
           1200(Y) Position: Lat. 20-38-N, Long. 167-14-W.
           1842(X) #2 main engine back in commission.
25 March - 1015(X) Attempted to exchange calls with USS COD (SS294);
                     we could read her, but were unable to get our call
                     to her.
           1200(X) Position: Lat. 20-57-N, Long. 162-42-W.
26 March   0530(X) In company with USS SEGUNDO and USS PIPEFISH -
                     Escort, PC-595.
           1030(X) Arrived Pearl Harbor for refit.

                 - 27 -

— page 128 —
(C) WEATHER

     No unusual weather conditions were encountered. For
the most part the weather in this area, west of KYUSHU and
east of SAISHU TO, was governed by the northwest monsoons.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

     The currents and tides encountered conformed very
closely to the sailing directions predictions. Consistent
currents were encountered as listed below:

LOCALITY                     SET                     DRIFT

COLNETT STRAIT               090 to 110              0.8 to 1.5 knots

30-00 to 30-20-N             010 to 040              0.5 knots
129-00 to 129-30-E

31-00 to 31-20-N             030 to 080              0.3 to 0.7 knots
129-00 to 129-20-E

32-00 to 32-20-N             340 to 020              0.5 knots
128-30 to 129-10-E

32-00 to 33-00-N             ---                     0.0
127-00 to 128-00-E

33-40 to 34-20-N             060 to 100              0.3 to 1.0 knots
128-00 to 128-55-E

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

     No navigational aids were encountered on this patrol.

                               - 28 -

— page 129 —
(F) SHIP CONTACTS

No. | Time (I) | Lat. N | Type                | Initial Est. Course | How           | Remarks
    | Date     | Long. E|                     | Range Speed         | Contacted     |

1.  | 1856     | 31-04  | Patrol Boat         | 4800 110°T          | SJ Radar      | None
    | 11 Fcb   | 129-43 | (Probably)          |      5 knots        |               |

2.  | 2258     | 33-51  | Unknown             | 18,200 280°T        | SJ Radar      | None
    | 17 Fcb   | 128-24 |                     |        8 knots      |               |

3.  | 1025     | 33-59  | Medium AK or AO     | 14,000 220°T        | Day sub.      | None
    | 18 Fcb   | 128-43 |                     |        Unk.         | periscope     |

4.  | 1130     | 34-00  | 2 sea trucks        | 9,000 Various       | Day sub.      | None
    | 19 Fcb   | 128-42 |                     |        Various      | periscope     |

5.  | 1930     | 34-03  | 2 small vessels     | 15,000 090°T        | Sight, night  | None
    | 19 Fcb   | 128-41 | probably mincsweeps |        Unk.         | bridge        |

6.* | 1755     | 32-43  | DE                  | 12,000 100°T        | JK-hoard echo | None
    | 20 Fcb   | 127-38 |                     |        15 knots     | ranging       |

7.  | 1010     | 32-27  | Passenger-Freighter | 16,000 260°T        | Day sub. Torp.| Attack #1
    | 23 Fcb   | 127-40 |                     |        16 knots     | periscope     |

8.  | 0538     | 33-06  | Unknown             | 13,000 090°T        | SJ radar - This |
    | 24 Fcb   | 127-49 |                     |        changed to   | target first de-|
    |          |        |                     |        340°T        | tected heading at |
    |          |        |                     |        19 knots     | us while we were |
    |          |        |                     |                     | invostigating what|
    |          |        |                     |                     | appcarcd to be |
    |          |        |                     |                     | false targets. |

9.**| 1633     | 33-10  | Power fishing       | 10,000 330°T        | JP sound.     | None
    | 27 Fcb   | 127-03 | vessel              |        6 knots      |               |

10. | 0730 to  | 34-07  | 3 fishing vessels   | 5,000 Various       | Day sub.      | None
    | 0840     | 128-15 | under sail.         |        2-4 knots    | periscope     |
    | 28 Fcb   |        |                     |                     |               |

11. | 1315     | 34-02  | Fishing vessel      | 5,000 Various       | Day sub.      | None
    | 28 Fcb   | 128-15 | under sail          |        2-4 knots    | periscope     |

12. | 0115 to  | 34-18  | 7 small vessels     | 5-7,000 Various     | SJ radar      | None
    | 0345     | 128-25 | probably patrol     |        10 to 15     |               |
    | 1 March  |        | boats.              |        knots        |               |

13. | 0838     | 34-14  | 3-masted schooner   | 7,000 310°T         | Day sub. Torp.| Attack #2.
    | 1 March  | 128-35 |                     |        6 knots      | periscope     |

14. | 1038     | 31-45  | 2 sea trucks        | 10,000 Various      | lookout Gun   | Attack #1
    | 5 March  | 127-36 |                     |        2-4 knots    | day time      |

- 29 -

— page 130 —
No. | Time (I) Date | Lat. N Long. E | Type | Initial Est. Range | Course Speed | How Contacted | Remarks
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
15. | 2345 5 March | 127-32 34-17 | Unknown | 5400 | Lying to | SJ Radar | None
- - - | - - - - - | - - - - - |

— page 131 —
(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

          No definite night-flying aircraft were encountered.
     On one occasion the SD radar had contact on what was more probably
     land, at 16 miles. On another occasion the SD radar had a contact
     at 2 miles. This latter contact was probably a rain squall.

          Only one aircraft was sighted while we were submerged.

          A total of four aircraft contacts were made while we were
     on the surface during daytime, keying our SD radar 10 seconds out
     of every 60 to 90 seconds.

                                   - 31 -

— page 132 —
(H) ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. RAZORBACK. TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 3

TIME: 1046(I) DATE: 23 February 1945. LAT: 32-30-N. LONG: 127-40-E

Target Data -- Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: This target was a small unescorted MKF passenger-
freighter similar to YAMATO MARU with exceptions as
follows:
Estimated tonnage 5000; kingposts forward of
bridge were on a raised platform; twin stacks were
taller in proportion; no rake to stacks or masts;
composite superstructure looked slightly shorter in
relation to the hull; forward part of superstructure
appeared rounded or faired at outboard corners, similar
to Jap passenger vessels of modern construction; no
pronounced deck house was noted on the stern.
Contact was made by OOD sighting smoke through the
periscope. Visibility was excellent but the attack was
badly handicapped by a foggy periscope. This may or
may not have been a properly marked hospital ship.
After seeing the red cross on the hull I again looked
carefully at the bridge and stacks for additional red
crosses which were still not apparent. Definite contrast
of colors of hull paint (other than the red cross) was
not seen and I'm almost positive the stacks were black.
Admittedly, these observations were through a somewhat
foggy periscope.
The target was not observed to zig until fired
upon. No known countermeasures were taken by the enemy
as a result of this attack.

SHIP SUNK OR DAMAGED: None. No hits were observed or heard; no end
of run explosions were heard.
TARGET DRAFT: Unk. COURSE: 260°T. SPEED: 16 knots. RANGE: 3200.

Own Ship Data

SPEED: 2 knots. COURSE: 160°T. DEPTH: 63'. ANGLE: 0°.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: This was a periscope attack. The attack developed rapidly
with solution of problem difficult due to fogging of the
periscope, which in turn resulted in erratic ranges. One
ping range was obtained which appeared impossible as it
was a little over half the TDC solution. Another ping
range should have been taken to prove or disprove an
apparent over-estimate of masthead height by the Commanding
Officer. Misses were caused by poor ranges.

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— page 133 —
ATTACK #1

Tubes Fired
Track Angle             95 S      98 S      100 S     102 S     104 S
Gyro Angle              13 R      16 R      18 R      20 R      22 R
Depth Set               8'        8'        8'        8'        8'
Power                   --        high      high      high      high
Hit or Miss             Miss      miss      miss      miss      miss
Erratic                 No        No        No        No        No
Mark Torpedo            23        14-3A     14-3A     14-3A     14-3A
Serial No.              65479     26580     24815     40417     24776
Mark Exploder           6-5       6-4       6-4       6-4       6-4
Serial No.              16976     19367     3026      18556     1901
Actuation Set           Contact   Contact   Contact   Contact   Contact
Actuation Actual        None      None      None      None      None
Mark Warhead            16-1      16-1      16-1      16-1      16-1
Serial No.              14401     16598     12804     13661     12739
Explosive               TPX       TPX       TPX       TPX       TPX
Firing Interval         8 seconds
Type Spread
(feet from MOT)         300' left 180' left 60' left 60' right 180' right

Sea Conditions          State 3, direction 310°T, Temp. 62°F.
Overhaul Activity       USS APOLLO for Mk. 23 - USS SPERRY for Mk 14-3A.
Remarks:                Misses due to fire control errors.

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— page 134 —
U.S.S. RAZORBACK
TIME: 0928(I)
DATE: 1 March 1945
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2
LAT: 34-13-N
PATROL NO. 3
LONG: 128-23-E

Target Data --- Damage Inflicted

DESCRIPTION: A gaff rigged, three-masted schooner, with flying jib,
             outer jib, and jib. She was sailing before the wind with
             no topsails rigged. Her displacement was estimated at
             500 tons. Contact was made by OOD through the periscope.
             Visibility was fair.

SHIP SUNK OR DAMAGED: None.

TARGET DR.FT: Unknown. COURSE: 308°T. SPEED: 6 knots. RANGE: 965 yds.

Own Ship Data

SPEED: 3 knots. COURSE: 215°T. DEPTH: 63'. ANGLE: 0°.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

TYPE ATTACK: This was a periscope attack. We let the target overtake
             us giving plenty of time to get an excellent solution.
             Took a half dozen ping ranges during the last ten minutes
             of the approach with good results. Fired, using continuous
             periscope bearings with three-fish spread, 200 feet normal
             to the line of sight, forward-aft. Torpedoes ran under.

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— page 135 —
ATTACK #2

Tubes Fired
Track Angle         | #10: 106 P | #9: 105 P | #8: 104 P
Gyro Angle          | #10: 8 L   | #9: 8 L   | #8: 10 L
Depth Set           | #10: 6'    | #9: 6'    | #8: 6'
Power               | #10: ---   | #9: high  | #8: high
Hit or Miss         | #10: Miss  | #9: miss  | #8: miss
Erratic             | #10: No    | #9: No    | #8: No
Mark Torpedo        | #10: 23    | #9: 14-3A | #8: 14-3A
Serial No.          | #10: 65938 | #9: 39479 | #8: 26471
Mark Exploder       | #10: 6-5   | #9: 6-4   | #8: 6-4
Serial No.          | #10: 14390 | #9: 19256 | #8: 19472
Actuation Set       | #10: Contact | #9: contact | #8: contact
Actuation Actual    | #10: None  | #9: none  | #8: none
Mark Warhead        | #10: 16-1  | #9: 16-1  | #8: 16-1
Serial No.          | #10: 16349 | #9: 18187 | #8: 16568
Explosive           | #10: TPX   | #9: TPX   | #8: TPX
Firing Interval     | #10: 8 seconds
Type Spread (from MOT) | #10: 100' left | #9: 0 | #8: 100' right

Sea Conditions
State 3, from 090°T, Temp. 58°F.

Overhaul Activity
USS APOLLO for Mk. 23 - USS SPERRY for Mk. 14-3A.

Remarks:
Torpedoes ran under.

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— page 136 —
U.S.S. RAZORBACK GUN ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 3
TIME: 1356(I) DATE: 5 March 1944. LAT: 31-51-N. LONG: 127-27-E.

Target Data -- Damage Inflicted

SUNK: (HIS) Two sea trucks, 100 tons each, hulls similar to sea
trucks described in special article entitled "JAPANESE WOODEN
CARGO VESSELS in ONI BULLETIN." Identity established through
periscope prior to battle surface, and at close range on the
surface. Length established at 85 feet by radar range and
binocular formula.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: Both vessels were observed to sink by all
hands on the topside.

Details of Action

At range 3000 yards at time 1350, with both sea trucks dead ahead,
battle surfaced. With 2500 yard range commenced firing on one of the
vessels which had turned towards. The third 4" shell was a hit and both
sea trucks turned away. Heavy rain commenced, visibility 4000 yards,
difficult to see. After firing ten rounds of 4" for two hits, ceased
fire to close range. Reopened fire at 700 yards. Target burst into
flames and appeared to be badly shattered. Ceased firing to chase other
vessel. At range 800 yards opened fire on second target. Five 4" hits
and many hits from smaller guns were observed before target looked
sufficiently damaged. Returned to first target, which was well down
by stern. Finished him off with all guns. Retrieved three survivors.
Closed second target again. This fellow submerged without further urging.
Fifty rounds of 4" H.C. and common were fired. The empty cases
of two rounds were ejected from the gun with great difficulty.
192 rounds of 40mm HEI and HEIT were fired.
480 rounds of 20mm ammunition were expended.
Despite much expert pampering, the .50 cal. machine guns have
not functioned properly since their installation at Pearl Harbor. They
made no exception in this case.
TDC, radar, periscope and bridge observer combined observations
to furnish 4" gun with data. When within 800 yards of target, kept
range set on 500 yards and scale at midpoint. This gave good results.
Low freeboard of the targets after sustaining hits, and heavy
rain made gunnery difficult. Average firing range was 800 yards. No
return fire was experienced.
Photographs were taken of this action.

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