U.S.S. RASHER (SS-269) — war patrol report SS-269_RASHER_Part2.pdf

— page 8 —
5
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L (H) ATTACK DATA
U.S.S. RISHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 5
Time 0210-54 (H) Date 6 August 1944 Lat. 14-14.2N Long. 117-16E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was in company with two small AKs of
             about 1000 tons and a PC or SC acting as escorts.
             It was identified as the large AP-AK, KOSEI MARU.
             Contact was made by SJ radar at 16,000 yards.
             Visibility: full moon, hazy horizon in target's
             sector.

Ship Sunk:   One (1) large AP-AK, KOSEI MARU (EC) - 8223 tons.
             (Page 205, ONI 208-J, Revised)

Ship(s) Damaged - None.

Damage Deter- Five torpedo explosions were heard and timed at the
mined by:    proper interval. All torpedoes were tracked into the
             target by sound and none beyond. It is believed all
             six hit but only five are claimed. Immediately after
             the explosions, sound reported the target's screws
             had stopped. Continuous exceptionally loud breaking-
             up noises were heard throughout the ship and by sound.
             Upon surfacing at a range of 8400 yards, SJ radar had
             only two contacts instead of the three as before the
             attack. Three small ships could be seen in the vicin-
             ity of the firing point whereas four were seen by
             periscope before firing. Four days after the attack
             while patrolling the same vicinity we passed through
             an area of large packing cases, floating wood, sev-
             eral Jap bodies with life belts, etc. (See Torpedo
             Explosion vs. Run Table on page 35 of this report.)

Target Draft 29' Course 105° Speed 8 knots Range 1350 yards (at
                                                      firing)

                                Own Ship Data

Speed 3 knots Course 328° (swinging right) Depth 64' Angle 1° up to 0°
                                                      (at firing)

                           Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Combination radar tracking and night periscope attack.
             The targets base course and speed were determined by
             radar tracking. Own ship was maneuvered into a position
             on the targets base course, range 15,000 yards, at which
             point we dove to radar depth. The targets were then
             tracked by radar range, and periscope and sound bearings
             to a range of 5000 yards. We then went to periscope
             depth and tracked to the firing point. The firing set-up
             was by periscope observation, using a single ping range.
             A spread of 2° was imposed on the generated TDC gyro angles.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RISHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 5
Time 0210-54 (H) Date 6 August 1944 Lat. 14-14.2N Long. 117-16E

Typo attack: Due to an over excited torpedoman, #1 tube was fired
(continued) by hand with #6 tube, and #2 with #5 tube. No pre-
 matures resulted from this casualty. The large gyro
 angles were forced on us by a zig a few minutes before
 firing, and by the approach of an escort. The spread
 was developed from aft forward to increase the fan
 effect. All torpedoes ran hot, straight, and normal.

| | No. 6 | No. 1 | No. 5 | No. 2 | No. 4 | No. 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes Fired - | | | | | | |
| Track Angle - | 105° S | 105° S | 109° S | 109° S | 112° S | 116° S |
| Gyro Angle - | 62°10' | 62°10' | 62°30' | 62°30' | 62° | 61° |
| Depth Set - | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' |
| Power - | High | High | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or Miss - | Hit | ? | Hit | Hit | Hit | Hit |
| Erratic - | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo - | 14-3A | 23 | 14-3A | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Serial No. - | 41680 | 61851 | 49275 | 61928 | 49508 | 61871 |
| Mark Exploder - | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 |
| Serial No. - | 25239 | 17370 | 25253 | 17383 | 14352 | 17379 |
| Actuation Set - | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual - | Contact | ? | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Mark Warhead - | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
| Serial No. - | 3258 | 16961 | 12959 | 9491 | 16986 | 16967 |
| Explosive - | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval - | 0 | * | E | ** | 8 | 8 |
| Type Spread - | 3°L | 3°L | 1°L | 1°L | 1°R | 3°R |
| Sea Conditions - | 2-3 | 2-3 | 2-3 | 2-3 | 2-3 | 2-3 |
| Overhauled by - | Torpedo Depot, Navy Number 137 | | | | | |
| Remarks - | HSN | HSN* | HSN | HSN** | HSN | HSN |
| * Fired by hand at the same time as #6 and possibly hit at same time.
| ** Fired by hand at the same time as #5.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 5
Time 2122-28(H) Date 18 August 1944 Lat. 18-16.1N Long. 120-20.9E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was a large unidentified gasoline loaded
AO. It was in the leading and largest section of a
two group convoy of approximately 18 ships with an
unknown number of escorts. Radar contact was made
on the convoy at 15,000 yards. Visibility: no moon,
raining.

Ship Sunk: One (1) large AO (EU) - 10,000 tons.

Damage Deter- Observed, heard, and timed two torpedo hits at the
mined by: proper interval. The target was seen to blow up and
part of it landed 500 yards from the remainder of the
ship, both parts burning fiercely. Explosions con-
tinued with large flare-ups persisting for about twen-
ty minutes. (See Torpedo Explosion vs. Run Table on
page 35 of this report.)

Target Draft _?_ Course 190° Speed 12 knots Range 2800 yards
(at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 15 knots Course 310° Depth - Surface run

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Night radar attack. The convoy was tracked at 10,000
yards until the base course and speed were determined.
It was planned to fire six torpedoes forward at one
target and four torpedoes aft at the next astern using
a large spread hoping to hit targets beyond, as well
as those two, but the multiplicity of target pips and
side lobes on the radar screen confused the radar
operator until we were forced to turn away by an
escort ahead. The stern tubes were brought to bear
and we commenced firing a spread of four torpedoes
with 2° offset. As there was doubt that the gyros
were matching the firing was stopped after firing two
torpedoes with 3°L and 1°L offsets. Both torpedoes
fired were tracked by sound on proper courses. Con-
tinuous radar ranges and bearings were used during
firing. The spread was developed from aft forward.
Both torpedoes ran hot, straight, and normal.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

                                                                TORPEDO ATTACK #2

Tubes Fired -                     No. 7             No. 8
Track Angle -                     122° S            125° S
Gyro Angle -                      183°              185°30'
Depth Set -                       6'                6'
Power -                           High              High
Hit or Miss                       Hit               Hit
Erratic -                         No                No
Mark Torpedo -                    23                23
Serial No. -                      53119             61854
Mark Explodor -                   6-5               6-5
Serial No. -                      17382             17376
Actuation Set -                   Contact           Contact
Actuation Actual -                Contact           Contact
Mark Warhead -                    16-1              16-1
Serial No. -                      16989             16994
Explosive -                       TPX               TPX
Firing Interval -                 0                 8
Type Spread -                     3°L               1°L
Sea Conditions -                  2-3               2-3

Overhaul Activity - Torpedo Depot, Navy Number 137
Remarks -                         HSN               HSN

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 5
Time 2210-37 (H) Date 18 August 1944 Lat. 18-09N Long. 120-13E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was a large three deck AP situated in
             the same group of the convoy attacked in Attack #2.
             Visibility: no moon, raining.

Ship Sunk:   (a) One (1) large AP (EU) - 10,000 tons.

Ship Damaged or (b) One (1) large unidentified (UN) - 4000 tons.
Probably Sunk:

Damage Deter- (a) Three hits were observed, heard, and timed at
mined by:     the proper interval on the AP. The target immed-
             iately began smoking heavily amidships and small
             fires broke out. Radar showed the AP as dropping
             out of the formation and making a very slow speed
             or stopped, with its escorts milling about. Several
             low power steady red lights were seen in the vicini-
             ty of the target, very probably life boat markers.
             The radar pip acted very erratically, diminished in
             size, and finally disappeared from the radar screen.
             When returning to the attack position about four
             hours later, radar had three small contacts picked
             up at 2000 yards (probably life boats) one of which
             was blinking a white light. The three torpedo hits
             with the long spread indicates that the target was
             very long. Smoke was seen for a few minutes
             after being hit and was burning and smoking.
             (b) One torpedo hit was heard and timed to hit an
             unidentified target beyond and ahead of the AP. (See
             Torpedo Explosion vs. Run Table on page 35 of this
             report.)

(a) Target Draft ? Course 240[HANDWRITTEN: °] Speed 13 knots Range 3300 yards
(b) Target Draft ? Course 240[HANDWRITTEN: °] Speed 13 knots Range *3900 yards
                                                              (at firing)
                                                              *estimated

                               Own Ship Data

Speed 13.5 knots Course 122.5[HANDWRITTEN: °] (swinging right slowly)
Depth - Surface Run

                           Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Night radar attack. Own ship was maneuvered into a
             position to fire a spread of six torpedoes, torpedo
             run 3000 yards, track 70[HANDWRITTEN: °] starboard, with a 2[HANDWRITTEN: °] off-
             set at the nearest large target, at a time when sev-
             eral targets were in an approximate line of bearing

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 5
Time 2210-37 (H) Date 18 August 1944 Lat. 18-09N Long. 120-13E

Type Attack: beyond. This large fan spread on a small track was
(continued) chosen so that torpedoes missing our main target
would hit the targets beyond. Continuous radar
ranges and bearings were used during the firing.
The spread was developed from aft forward increas-
ing the fan effect. All torpedoes ran hot, straight,
and normal.

Tubes Fired - No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 No. 5 No. 6
Track Angle - 71° S 73° S 76° S 79° S 81° S 85° S
Gyro Angle - 8° 7°30' 8° 8°40' 10° 11°30'
Depth Set - 6' 6' 6' 6' 6' 6'
Power - High High High High High High
Hit or Miss - Hit Hit Hit Miss Miss Miss
Erratic - No No No No No No
Mark Torpedo - 23 23 23 23 23 23
Serial No. - 61866 49637 61995 49451 61809 61892
Mark Exploder - 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial No. - 17378 17363 25358 14274 17368 25261
Actuation Set - Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual - Contact Contact Contact - - -
Mark Warhead - 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
Serial No. - 16975 9493 9487 17487 9500 13370
Explosive - TPX TPX TPX TPX TPX TPX
Firing Interval - 0 8 8 8 8 8
Type Spread - 5°L 3°L 1°L 1°R 3°R 5°R
Sec Condition - 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-3

Overhaul Activity - Torpedo Depot, Navy Number 137.
Remarks - HSN HSN [HANDWRITTEN: *]HSN HSN HSN
*Went ahead of [UNCLEAR: ir] and hit unident beyond.
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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RAGS (SS292) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4 PATROL NO. 5
Time 2214 (H) Date 15 August 1944 Lat. 18-09.2N Long. 119-56.1E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was a large unidentified AO astern and
beyond the AP in Attack #3. Several other ships were
out still farther and well bunched. Visibility: no
moon, raining.

Ship Sunk: (a) One (1) large AO (EU) - 10,000 tons.

Ship Damaged or (b) One (1) large unidentified ship (UN) - 4000
Probably Sunk: tons.

Damage Deter- (a) Two torpedo hits were seen and three were heard
mined by: and timed at the proper interval on the AO. One
half hour later at a distance of four miles from
the attack position, a target was tracked at very
slow speed or stopped. Four hours later, we passed
through a heavy layer of oil roughly two and a half
miles long situated about two miles from the damaged
target's last observed position. (The set and drift
in this locality would easily account for this small
difference in position.) Radar had three small con-
tacts picked up at about 2000 yards, one of which
was a flashing white light (probably life boats).
Two shorts were picked up in this vicinity but no
large targets, one to the north of the oil and the
other to the south. The three hits using the large
spread indicates that the target was very long.
(See Torpedo Explosion vs. Run Table on page 35 of
this report.)
(b) The fourth torpedo missed ahead of the AO and was
heard to hit an unidentified target beyond.

(a) Target Draft ? Course 240° Speed 13 knots Range 3750 yards
(b) Target Draft ? Course 240° Speed 13 knots Range 4600 yards
[HANDWRITTEN: (at firing)]
*estimated

Own Ship Data

Speed 15 knots Course 317.5° (swinging right slowly)
Depth Surface Run

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Night radar attack. After firing in Attack #3 we
turned bringing the stern tubes to bear on the next
large target astern. A large spread of 2° was used
so that misses on our target would hit the targets
beyond. Continous radar ranges and bearings were
used during firing. Spread was developed from aft
forward to increase fan effect. All torpedoes ran
hot, straight, and normal.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

                                            TORPEDO ATTACK #4

Tubes Fired -       No. 7       No. 8       No. 9       No. 10
Track Angle -       93° S       94° S       95° S       96° S
Gyro Angle -        192°30'     196°30'     198°        199°20'
Depth Set -         6'          6'          6'          6'
Power -             High        High        High        High
Hit or Miss -       Hit         Hit         Hit         Hit
Erratic -           No          No          No          No
Mark Torpedo -      23          23          23          23
Serial No. -        26513       61815       49299       49582
Mark Exploder -     6-5         6-5         6-5         6-5
Serial No. -        13662       17352       17348       17346
Actuation Set -     Contact     Contact     Contact     Contact
Actuation Actual -  Contact     Contact     Contact     Contact
Mark Warhead -      16-1        16-1        16-1        16-1
Serial No. -        13439       17223       13426       17134
Explosive -         TPX         TPX         TPX         TPX
Firing Interval -   0           8           8           8
Spread -            3°L         1°L         1°R         3°R
Sea Condition -     2-3         2-3         2-3         2-3
Overhaul Activity - Torpedo Depot, Navy Number 137
Remarks -           HSN         HSN         HSN         *HSN
*went ahead of target and hit unident beyond.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
TORPEDO ATTACK #4

| | No. 7 | No. 8 | No. 9 | No. 10 |
| :| :------ | :------ | :------ | :------ |
| Tubes Fired - | | | | |
| Track angle - | 93° S | 94° S | 95° S | 96° S |
| Gyro angle - | 192°30' | 196°30' | 198° | 199°20' |
| Depth Set - | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' |
| Power - | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or Miss - | Hit | Hit | Hit | Hit |
| Erratic - | No | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo - | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Serial No. - | 26513 | 61815 | 49299 | 49582 |
| Mark Exploder - | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 |
| Serial No. - | 13662 | 17352 | 17348 | 17346 |
| Actuation Set - | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual - | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Mark Warhead - | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
| Serial No. - | 13439 | 17223 | 13426 | 17134 |
| Explosive - | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval - | 0 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Spread - | 3°L | 1°L | 1°R | 3°R |
| Sea Condition - | 2-3 | 2-3 | 2-3 | 2-3 |
| Overhaul Activity - | Torpedo Depot, Navy Number 137 |
| Remarks - | HSN | HSN | #HSN |
| *wont ahead of target and hit unident beyond. |

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5 PATROL NO. 5

Time 2330-28 (H) Date 18 August 1944 Lat. 18-09N Long. 119-56.1E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was a large munitions loaded AK. It was
in company with at least two other large ships and
one escort from the original convoy contact of attack
#2. Visibility: no moon, raining.

Ship Sunk: (a) One (1) large munitions loaded AK (EU) - 7500 tons.

Ship Damaged or (b) One (1) large unidentified ship (UN) - 4000 tons.
Probably Sunk:

Damage Deter- (a) Two hits were observed and three were heard and
mined by: timed, in the large AK. The target exploded with a
tremendous munitions explosion and burned for a
short period. Fifteen minutes later it disappeared
from the radar screen. Six hours after the attack a
large oil slick was found one mile north of the tar-
get attack position.
(b) The first torpedo veered right due to sea condi-
tions before taking its course and missed the AK and
was observed, heard, and timed to hit an unidentified
target 1400 yards beyond and on the AK's starboard
quarter, in the same relative position noted for it
on the PPI screen a few moments before. This target
was tracked later to the south at one knot speed
with one escort and both radar pips disappeared from
the radar screen at 15,000 yards. Although this
latter target probably sank, the range at which the
pips disappeared makes it too uncertain to claim
sinking. Targets of the same size gave strong pips
at 19,000 yards during the attacks. (See Torpedo
Explosion vs. Run Table on page 35 of this report.)

(a) Target Draft ? Course 290° Speed 13 knots Range 2200 yards
(b) Target Draft ? Course 290° Speed 13 knots Range *3700 yards
(at firing)
*estimated

Own Ship Data

Speed 9 knots Course 053.5° (swinging left slowly) Depth Surface Run

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Typo Attack: Night radar attack. This was a bow tube shot in which
four torpedoes were fired with a 2° offset. Contin-
uous radar ranges and bearings were used during the
firing. The spread was developed from aft forward
to increase the fan effect. All torpedoes ran hot,
straight, and normal.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TORPEDO ATTACK #5

Tubes Fired - No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4
Track Angle - 64° P 67° P 71° P 75° P
Gyro Angle - 352°30' 353°40' 354°10' 353°
Depth Set - 6' 6' 6' 6'
Power - High High High High
Hit or Miss - Hit Hit Hit Hit
Erratic - No No No No
Mark Torpedo - 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. - 39862 39890 49341 23278
Mark Exploder - 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial No. - 25135 25138 25260 25129
Actuation Set - Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual - Contact Contact Contact Contact
Mark Warhead - 16-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
Serial No. - 3010 3000 3571 11890
Explosive - TFX TFX TFX TFX
Firing Interval - 0 8 8 8
Type Spread - 3°R 1°R 1°L 3°L
Sea Condition - 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-3
Overhaul Activity - Torpedo Depot, Navy Number 137
Remarks - *HSN HSN HSN HSN
* Missed AK and hit an unidentified ship beyond.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6 PATROL NO. 5
Time 2333-25 (H) Date 18 August 1944 Lat. 18-09.2N Long. 119-56.1E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was a large two stack AP situated astern
of the leading target in attack #5. Visibility: no
moon, raining.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship Damaged or One (1) large AK (CU) - 10,000 tons. (probably
probably Sunk: went aground)

Damage Deter- Observed, heard, and timed two torpedo hits at the
mined by: proper interval on the AP. The AP was tracked at
five knots until shortly before daybreak when an
escort illuminated it with a searchlight. It was
seen to be very low in the water. The target was
apparently headed for the beach to ground itself.
(See Torpedo Explosion vs. Run Table on page 35
of this report.)

Target Draft ? Course 300° Speed 13 knots Range 2100 yards
(at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 16.5 knots Course 194.5° (swinging left) Depth Surface run

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Night radar attack. After attack #5 we turned to
bring the stern to bear on the next target astern
and fired two torpedoes with a 2° offset. Contin-
uous radar ranges and bearings were used during
firing. Spread was developed from aft forward.
Both torpedoes ran hot, straight, and normal.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
TORPEDO ATTACK #6

Tubes Fired - No. 9 | No. 10
Track Angle - 85° P | 89° P
Gyro Angle - 200°30' | 198°
Depth Set - 6' | 6'
Power - High | High
Hit or Miss - Hit | Hit
Erratic - No | No
Mark Torpedo - 23 | 23
Serial No. - 61878 | 61877
Mark Exploder - 6-5 | 6-5
Serial No. - 25112 | 24993
Actuation Set - Contact | Contact
Actuation Actual - Contact | Contact
Mark Warhead - 16-1 | 16-1
Serial No. - 16967 | 16998
Explosive - TFX | TFX
Firing Interval - 0 | 8
Type Spread - 1°R | 1°L
Sea Condition - 2-3 | 2-3
Overhaul Activity - Torpedo Depot, Navy No. 137 | Torpedo Depot, Navy No. 137
Remarks - HSN | HSN

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Torpedo Explosion vs. Run Table
TORPEDO ATTACK #1
| Tube No. | Explosion | Hit Interval | Torpedo Run for Hit Int. | TDC Gen. Run |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | 52 sec. | 52 sec. | 1300 yards | 1400 yards |
| 5 | 58 sec. | 50 sec. | 1250 yards | 1400 yards |
| 2 | 59 sec. | 51 sec. | 1275 yards | 1400 yards |
| 4 | 64 sec. | 48 sec. | 1200 yards | 1400 yards |
| 3 | 70 sec. | 46 sec. | 1150 yards | 1400 yards |

TORPEDO ATTACK #2
| Tube No. | Explosion | Hit Interval | Torpedo Run for Hit Int. | TDC Gen. Run |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 2-00 sec. | 2-00 sec. | 3100 yards | 3180 yards |
| 8 | 2-15 sec. | 2-07 sec. | 3287 yards | 3230 yards |

TORPEDO ATTACK #3
| Tube No. | Explosion | Hit Interval | Torpedo Run for Hit Int. | TDC Gen. Run |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1-46 sec. | 1-46 sec. | 2727 yards | 2910 yards |
| 2 | 1-53 sec. | 1-45 sec. | 2700 yards | 2880 yards |
| 3 | 2-05 sec. | 1-49 sec. | 2806 yards | 2740 yards |
| 4 | 2-25 sec. | 2-01 sec. | 3127 yards | |

TORPEDO ATTACK #4
| Tube No. | Explosion | Hit Interval | Torpedo Run for Hit Int. | TDC Gen. Run |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 2-15 sec. | 2-15 sec. | 3500 yards | 3600 yards |
| 8 | 2-30 sec. | 2-22 sec. | 3686 yards | 3680 yards |
| 9 | 2-40 sec. | 2-24 sec. | 3739 yards | 3730 yards |
| 10 | 3-17 sec. | 2-53 sec. | 4513 yards | |

TORPEDO ATTACK #5
| Tube No. | Explosion | Hit Interval | Torpedo Run for Hit Int. | TDC Gen. Run |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2-08 sec. | 2-08 sec. | 3300 yards | |
| 2 | 1-23 sec. | 1-15 sec. | 1900 yards | 1900 yards |
| 3 | 1-29 sec. | 1-13 sec. | 1847 yards | 1820 yards |
| 4 | 1-35 sec. | 1-11 sec. | 1794 yards | 1780 yards |

TORPEDO ATTACK #6
| Tube No. | Explosion | Hit Interval | Torpedo Run for Hit Int. | TDC Gen. Run |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | 1-22 sec. | 1-22 sec. | 2086 yards | 2000 yards |
| 9 | 1-31 sec. | 1-23 sec. | 2113 yards | 2020 yards |

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— page 26 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fifth War Patrol.

it was by-passed, and care was used to see that the high voltage switch
was not turned on until one minute after starting the equipment.

     After starting the equipment one evening, it was reported that
though there was a rough sea present, there were no wave pips on
the scope. A check was made and it was found that there was no
crystal current. The crystal was inspected and replaced with no
result. The 762B (B.O. tube) was then replaced and the crystal
current was restored. After these repairs, the set was tuned
using the wavemotor, with excellent results.

     For a short period, the PPI was out of commission due to loss
of the sweep. The trouble was traced to a loose range switch
which resulted in breakage of the connection of the wire carrying
300 V. to the rotor control. This condition was remedied by tight-
ening the switch and resoldering the broken connection.

     The new transmitter-receiver consistently picked up large tar-
gets at 15,000 to 19,000 yards, and small sailboats were picked up
on several occasions at 10,000 yards. Friendly submarines were
picked up at 7000 to 8000 yards, and followed out to 9500 yards be-
fore the pips disappeared. Lobo switching could be used out to
12,000 yards.

     Too much cannot be said for the keying feature installed in
the SJa. It furnished an ideal method of challenging radars in
our vicinity and is a most useful method of exchanging tactical
data with friendly submarines. It was an invaluable aid in our
frequent rendezvous with the U.S.S. BLUEFISH.

     In the convoy attack, the night of 18 August, the PPI was a
most important factor. Escorts could be distinguished by the
relative size of their pips on the PPI, and their position rela-
tive to the main convoy groups was never in question. During the
attack an accurate picture of the convoy disposition was always
available to the Commanding Officer.

     Due to the large number of targets present on the night of
18 August, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between
side lobes and targets. This occasionally hampered the attack.
It is recommended that the present type antenna (CR-66ADH) with
its bothersome side lobes be replaced by an antenna without the
side lobe characteristic.

     The present training gear with power training in only one
direction is considered inadequate. It is slow in shifting from
target to target and a small sector cannot be thoroughly swept,
except in hand training. Training control similar to the sound
head training control would be desirable. A reversible, variable
speed hydraulic training system is highly recommended.

     An enemy shipboard radar was detected after the first attack

- 40 -

— page 31 —
FB5-45/A16-3

Serial: 0103

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO RASHER Conf. Ltr. SS269
A16-3 Serial 021 of 9/3/44,
Report of FIFTH War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FIVE.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

1. The FIFTH war patrol of the U.S.S. RASHER was conducted off the west
coast of LUZON under the operational control of ComTaskFor-71. The duration of
the patrol was forty-five days of which sixteen days were spent in the area.

2. Early in the morning of August 6th, six torpedoes were fired from the
bow tubes in a submerged moonlight periscope attack on a large ship identified as
the HOSEI MARU escorted by two small AK's and an SC. Range was 1350 yards, 105-
116S track, gyro angle 62 degrees right, depth setting 6 feet. Five correctly
timed hits were heard as RASHER went deep to avoid being rammed by one of the AK
escorts. Loud unmistakable breaking up noises were heard in all compartments.

3. Shortly after dark on August 18th, RASHER made radar contact with a
large convoy consisting of about 13 large ships and several escorts on southerly
course along the western shore of northern LUZON. Five night surface attacks were
made on this convoy during the night. The night was so dark that targets were
rarely seen prior to firing. When firing position was reached for the first at-
tack difficulty was experienced in isolating the desired targets on the radar due
to the numerous large targets and side lobes. Course was reversed and a target
selected for stern tubes. At 2122 two torpedoes were fired from the stern tubes
at a large target, range 2800 yards, gyro angles 5 degrees right, 125° S track,
depth setting 6 feet. Two hits exploded a large tanker, part of which blew off
and landed about 500 yards from the remainder. Both parts burned fiercely then
disappeared. It was intended to fire four torpedoes at this ship out doubt as to
the proper matching of gyro angles caused fire to be checked after the second
torpedo. The two torpedoes thus saved in the destruction of this gasoline laden
tanker were effectively used later.

4. At 2211 six torpedoes were fired from the bow tubes at another large
ship of the convoy, range 3300 yards, 71° S track, gyros 8° right, depth setting
6 feet. At 2214 four torpedoes were fired from the stern tubes at a large ship
on the port quarter of the bow tube target, range 3750 yards, 93° S track, gyros
13° right, depth setting 6 feet. Three hits were seen and heard setting the bow
tube target afire. It was seen to be a large transport. A timed hit of a stern
tube torpedo was heard on another target more distant. Two hits were heard and
seen in the stern tube target. Another properly timed hit was heard on this same
target. A fourth hit from stern tube torpedoes was timed indicating a ship beyond
the stern tube target had also been hit.

- 1 - SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-FIVE
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

5 September 1944.

— page 32 —
SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-FIVE

FB5-45/A16-3

Serial: 0103

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

5. After evading an escort on the surface and observing the remainder of
the convoy to divide into two groups RASHER commenced approach on the largest
group. At this time four torpedoes remained forward and two aft. At 2339 the
four torpedoes in the bow tubes were fired at a large AK, range 2200 yards, 64 P
track, gyros 7 degrees left, depth setting 6 feet. Three minutes later the two
torpedoes were fired from the stern tubes at a large AP astern of the first tar-
get, range 2100 yards, 85 P track, gyros 20° right, depth setting 6 feet. Two hits
were seen and three hits heard on the leading target, which evidently was carrying
munitions and exploded. The fourth bow torpedo was seen and heard to hit a ship
beyond the bow tube target. The two stern tube torpedoes were seen to hit their
target.

6. The entire patrol was exceptionally well planned and conducted. The
convoy action during the night of 18-19 August was definitely a most outstanding
performance. The high percentage of torpedo hits on the five night surface at-
tacks which were all made by radar indicates a most efficient fire control party.
Information furnished by the RASHER during the night enabled other submarines in
the vicinity to attack ships of this convoy.

7. All major defects will be corrected during the forthcoming Navy Yard
overhaul on the West Coast. Provision will be made for additional air condition-
ing and ventilation in the forward battery compartment. The fresh water system
should be thoroughly investigated during the overhaul to determine the cause of
the unpleasant metallic taste.

8. The commanding officer, officers, and crew of the RASHER are most
heartily congratulated on the completion of this splendid aggressive patrol which
resulted in such extensive damage to the enemy.

[SIGNATURE: K. C. Hurd]
K. C. HURD.

— page 33 —
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR 11/tel
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
9 September 1944.

FC5-4/A16-3

Serial 0337

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. RASHER Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander
Submarine Division FORTY-FIVE.

2. The night surface attacks (Nos. 2,3,4,5 and 6) were
a gratifying exhibition of the destructive capacity of a smartly
handled submarine. The coordination of all hands aboard the RASHER
enabled them to fire 18 torpedoes for 16 hits in two hours and
eleven minutes; then effect an unimpeded withdrawal, abetted by the
obvious enemy confusion.

3. It is with great pleasure that Commander Submarine
Squadron FOUR welcomes this competent and aggressive guest from
the Southwest Pacific, and extends his heartiest congratulations.

[SIGNATURE: C. J. Erck]
C. F. ERCK.

— page 34 —
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET hch
FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(16)
Serial 01954
[HANDWRITTEN: F4253]
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
11 September 1944.
CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN: R-253]
[STAMP: 9 03684]
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
RASHER Report of
Fifth War Patrol.
[HANDWRITTEN: 10-2-44.]
NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 517.
U.S.S. RASHER - FIFTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS270) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
(22 July to 3 September 1944).

1. The fifth war patrol of the RASHER was conducted in
areas west of Luzon Island. The RASHER and BLUEFISH (SS222) formed a
coordinated search and attack group, the Commanding Officer of the
RASHER, Commander H.G. Munson, U.S. Navy, acting as Group Commander.

2. The patrol was smart, alert, and aggressive through-
out and resulted in outstanding damage to the enemy. Twenty-four tor-
pedoes were fired for twenty-one hits in the six aggressive attacks
made.

3. This patrol is designated as "Successful" for Combat
Insignia Award.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratu-
lates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this fighting,
highly successful patrol. It is also noted with pleasure that, in the
five patrols conducted by the RASHER, she has built up the outstanding
record of damage to the enemy of 19 ships, totaling about 127,000 tons
sunk and 13 ships, totaling about 68,500 tons, damaged. The RASHER is
credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy
during this patrol, all of which took place in Commander Task Force
SEVENTY-ONE areas who is requested to assume credit accordingly:

S U N K

1 - AK (KOSEI MARU type)(1) - 8,200 tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - Large AO (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Large AP (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 3)
1 - Large AO (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 4)
1 - Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 5)

TOTAL SUNK 45,700 tons

Distribution and authentication
on following page.
- 1 -
[STAMP: FILMED]
EXTRA [CHECKMARK] ORIGINAL
SORG. [CHECKMARK] MICRO
PHOTO-LAB CP-16
RETURN TO F-4253
[HANDWRITTEN: 09]

— page 35 —
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(16)
Serial 01954

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
RASHER Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 517.
U.S.S. RASHER - FIFTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS270) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
(22 July to 3 September 1944).

— page 36 —
FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial: 02066 Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
CONFIDENTIAL 16 August 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) [HANDWRITTEN: 269] - Report of Fifth War Patrol
(22 July to 3 September 1944).
Reference: (a) ComSubsPac Third Endorsement FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(16), Confiden-
tial Serial 01954 dated 11 September 1944 to subject patrol
report.

1. In reference (a) the RASHER was credited with sinking one large
AO, 10,000 tons, Attack No. 4. Based upon information obtained from prisoners of
war sources and further discussion of this attack with the commanding officer
of the RASHER at that time, it is now confirmed that the ship sunk was an OTAKA
Typo CVE, 20,000 tons. Accordingly, all copies of reference (a) will be cor-
rected to read as follows:

SUNK
1 - AK (KOSSEI MARU Type) (EC) - 8,200 tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - Largo AO (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Largo AP (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 3)
1 - CVE (OTAKA Type) (EC) - 20,000 tons (Attack No. 4)
1 - Largo AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 5)
TOTAL SUNK 55,700 tons

DAMAGED
1 - UN - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 3)
1 - UN - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 4)
1 - UN - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 5)
1 - Largo AP (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 6)
TOTAL DAMAGED 22,000 tons
TOTAL SUNK & DAMAGED 77,700 tons

G. C. CRAWFORD,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (7) SUBAD, HI (2)
CNO (5) ComsubspacScbordcom (3)
Cincpac (6) All Squadron and Division
JICPOA (1) Commanders, Pacific (2)
ComServpac (1) Comsubpac (2)
Cinclant (1) All Submarines, Pacific (1)
ComSubslant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsopac (2) [SIGNATURE: E. L. Hynes]
Comsovwspac (1) E. L. HYNES, 2nd, EXTRA : ORIGINAL
Comsubsovwspac (2) Flag Secretary. SORG. MICRO
CTF 72 (2) PHOTO-LAB OP-16
Comnorpac (1) RETURN TO F-4253
Comsubspac (3)
ComsubspacAdCond (40)

— page 37 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

U. S. S. RISHER (SS269)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
16 March 1945.

SS269/A6-3
Serial: ( 105 )

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. RISHER.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet .
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Division 281.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 22.
(3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(4) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RISHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number Six.
Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Charts (ComSubPac only).

1. Enclosure (A) covering the Sixth War Patrol of this vessel
in the southern part of East China Sea during the period from 20 January
1945 to 16 March 1945 is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: B. E. Adams]
B. E. ADAMS, Jr.

[STAMP: 114800 FILMED]
18 APR 1945

— page 39 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject:                               U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

20 December 1944

     1206 (T)          Departed U. S. Naval Drydocks, Hunter's Point, Calif.,
                       enroute Midway, T.H., via Pearl Harbor, T.H.

     1400 to 1600      Conducted special exercises with aircraft south and
                       west of Golden Gate escorted by PC 799, and thence
                       took departure for Pearl Harbor.

20 December 1944
to
28 December 1944

                       Enroute Pearl Harbor. Passage characterized by ex-
                       tremely rough weather and frequent radar failures.

28 December 1944
to
29 December 1944

                       At Pearl Harbor. Fueled, made minor voyage repairs,
                       exchanged torpedoes, and transferred and received
                       passengers.

29 December 1944
to
2 January 1945

                       Enroute Midway with continuing rough weather and radar
                       troubles. Ensign S. J. ROBB, U. S. N. R., a passenger,
                       helped materially with our radar difficulties.

3 January 1945
to
6 January 1945

                       At Midway, T.H., undergoing voyage repairs.

7 January 1945
to
17 January 1945

                       At Midway. Held sound tests, cavitation tests, degauss-
                       ing check-ups, and training exercises including wolf-
                       pack tactics. Fired six Mk 14-3A torpedoes in low power
                       as exercise shots.

                                                              ENCLOSURE (A)
2

— page 52 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER & Report of War Patrol Number Six.

0609 Noise level drew aft to 090°T. Changed course to 200°T
     and started up to radar depth.

     The sound conditions were extremely poor. A turn
     count of 90 rpm was obtained shortly before firing -
     obviously wrong. Sound was unable to pick up targets
     beyond 4,000 yards. Even when a target passed directly
     overhead, a turn count could not be gotten - the screw
     sounded as a high noise level which soon faded away.

0619 All clear on SJ radar. All clear on SJ radar at 40
     feet. Secured from depth charge, made reloads forward,
     and secured from Battle Stations.

     Believe now that we had attacked an advance screen of the
     main body for the following reasons:
     1. The quick turn and over-run of the nearest target.
     2. The sound of it as it passed overhead - no heavy
        screw boat.
     3. No hits - (so I thought).
     4. The pinging heard after the attack.

     As it was becoming light topside, decided to conduct
     high periscope search down expected target track.

1330 Surfaced. Patrolling in vicinity of attack.

2152 Radar contact (S/C #12), range 5,400 yards. Tracked
     on course 210°T, speed 7 knots. Avoided. Lost con-
     tact at 8,800 yards. Believed to be sailboat or small
     pickot.

     During night accurately kept position fixed using
     radar on the Island.

17 February 1945

     In Patrol Area. Assigned station is Lat. 26-55 N,
     Long. 120-55 E.

0222 Headed for regular assigned station, of 30' latitude
     and 30' longitude, the center of which is Lat. 26-15 N,
     Long. 120-45 E.

                                                      ENCLOSURE (A)

15

— page 53 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

1050         Dove, when O.O.D. mistook SJ radar operators report of
             land contact to be a plane contact. Land identified
             as Tung yung Tao. Decided to patrol submerged in
             close to Tung yung.

1700         Surfaced with Tung yung Tao bearing 212°T, range 19
             miles. Headed for new station Lat. 26-40 N, Long.
             120-40 E assigned by pack commanders dispatch.

18 February 1945

             In Patrol Area. Assigned station is Lat. 26-40 N,
             Long. 120-40 E.

0353         Set course to head for new patrol station centering
             at Lat. 26-35 N, Long. 121-35 E, as directed by pack
             commanders message.

0743         Sunk mine #8. Lat 26-34 N, Long 121-33 E.

0950         Mine #9 blew up and scattered souvenirs on deck,
             Lat 26-33 N, Long. 121-36 E, and evidently drew flies
             for at

0957 - 1036  Dove for plane (A/C #1).

1341 - 1700  Dove for "BETTY"(A/C #2). Possibly sighted us.

2252         Radar contact on PILOTFISH, range 8,700 yards.

19 February 1945

             In Patrol Area. Assigned station is Lat. 26-35 N,
             Long. 121-35 E.

1230         Received a plain language despatch on wolf-pack
             frequency by a close and loud transmitter giving
             noon position, course and speed of Ama Maru, a Jap
             relief ship granted safe conduct. Despatch was not
             in good english and was followed by several Jap
             characters. Ship position less than 60 miles away.
             The Japanese evidently do not trust our subs.

1920         Made radar contact on FINBACK, range 9,000 yards.

2018         Radar contact, range 2,800 yards. May have been mine
             or floating debris. Avoided.

                                                           ENCLOSURE (A)
16

— page 54 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

20 February 1945

                                In Patrol Area. Assigned station Lat. 26-35 N, Long.
                                121-35 E.

0630                            Changed course to head for previously assigned station
                                the center of which is Lat. 26-15 N, Long. 120-45 E.

1157                            Radar fix on Tung yung Tao bearing 270°T, distant
                                31,300 yards.

1338                            Dove for "BETTY" (A/C #13), sighted at 2½ miles
                                coming out of low overcast and headed directly for us.
                                No bombs! Too close for comfort; will patrol sub-
                                merged.

1901                            Surfaced in very rough seas. Making turns for 5 knots,
                                with SOA 1 knot.

21 February 1945

                                In Patrol Area. Assigned Station Lat. 26-15 N, Long.
                                120-45 E.

1220                            Dove for "ZEKE" (A/C #14) coming out of haze at 4½
                                miles and headed directly for us. Rigged for depth
                                charge and went deep. ZEKE appeared to have no
                                bombs but ten minutes later a large bomb exploded
                                not close. ZEKE may have called over a friend.
                                Aircraft have been active in this area. Will patrol
                                submerged.

1420                            Sighted Sailboat (S/C #13).

1529                            Sighted Tung yung Tao bearing 247°T.

1648                            Another sailboat (S/C #14) loaded to the gunwales
                                with Chinamen (or Japs) and headed south.

1725                            Sighted 2 LILYS (A/C #15) searching low over the water
                                to the westward.

1930                            SET course to head for area around Lat. 27-45 N, Long.
                                121-35 E, as directed by pack commanders dispatch re-
                                ceived this morning. Instructions are to be in new
                                position at 22000, patrol three hours, and then re-
                                tire toward new area centered at Lat. 27-15 N, Long.
                                121-15 E. Surfaced.

                                ENCLOSURE (A)
17

— page 55 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

22 February 1945 In Patrol Area, Assigned Station Lat. 27-45 N,
                  121-35 E.

                  Sailboat Day. Improved weather brought out sailing
                  vessels of every description. In the light fog of
                  early morning a ghostly radiance prevailed in which
                  sails of these vessels could be seen over three miles.
                  These wet sails gave radar contacts of over 7,000
                  yards.
0000-0900         Contacted 16 sailing vessels (S/C's 15-21) appear-
                  only engaged in fishing.

0400              In new area Lat 27-15 N. Long 121-15 E.

1026              Dove for BETTY (A/C #16). Not detected but will stay
                  down for the day.

1451-1630         More sailing vessels (S/C's 22 & 23).

1950              Surfaced.

23 February 1945

                  In Patrol Area proceeding south to station Lat. 25-33
                  N, Long. 128-48 E, as assigned for today and tomorrow
                  by pack commander. PILOTFISH and FINBACK stations to
                  north and west.

0310              Radar contact bearing 090°T, range 7,000 yards (S/C
                  #24). Tracked target on course 300°T, speed 5 knots.
                  Target was probably a sailboat or small picket, as
                  the radar pip was very small.

0643              Dove with daylight to patrol submerged in FORMOSA
                  STRAIT on course south.

0835              Heard 12 distant explosions.

0849              Heard echo ranging at 220°T, and later at 235°T.
                  Could not distinguish whether bearings were of same
                  or different pinger - bearings approximate.

0902              Sighted escort vessel (S/C #25) bearing 223°T, range
                  10,000 yards estimated. Visibility was poor, angle
                  on bow 50° starboard. Battle Stations. Came right.

                                                            ENCLOSURE (A)

18

— page 56 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER Report of War Patrol Number Six
to northwesterly course but on next look the lead ship
of a convoy could be seen on the same bearing with a
90° port angle on the bow.

0906 Two depth charges - distant.
0907 Another underwater explosion.
0908 Could now see two AK's with 90° plus port angle on
bow. Also two escorts. Changed course to 129°T to
parallel and wait for a zig toward. Several attempts
were made to obtain ST radar ranges with no success.
0912 Convoy could be made out to consist of the following
or similar ships in close column: HINO MARU #3 with
cut-down stack, AKITO MARU, and ELDORADO followed by
two SUGAR DOGS or landing craft abreast of each other.
Escorts were four in number (although only three could
be seen at one time) and consisted of 3 CHIDORI and
one gunboat. They were stationed one ahead, one
approximately 2,000 yards on each beam, and one astern
of the convoy. At approximately five minute intervals,
the escorts stations in a counterclockwise direction.
The convoy, if zigging, was using alternate 20° - 30°
course changes. A rough track (inaccuracy of ranges)
gave a course of 126°T, speed 9 knots.

Sound conditions were good. Although the screws of
the targets could not be heard, the escorts could,
and sound could tell when the nearer two escorts
changed course to shift stations. The echo ranging
of the escorts came in very clearly also, Range to
escorts 7 - 9,000 yards.

At no time was estimated range to targets less than
8,000 yards, and while we carried Mk 14-3A torpedoes,
the chance of hitting in low power was extremely re-
mote with no accurate speed check and with dispersion
of targets. None of the targets were laden - all
riding high - which seems strange inasmuch as they
were heading for KEELUNG, FORMOSA.

0932 Three random depth charges. Not seen.
0958 Convoy showed no inclination to head toward us.
Secured from Battle Stations. Range to targets
10,000 yards bearing 180°T, angle on bow 105° port.

ENCLOSURE (A)
19

— page 58 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
                                                                1-A-
Subject:                                        U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

2213            Radar contact on FINBACK at 9,000 yards.

2314            Received message from pack commander to shift station
                to area centered at Lat. 27-10 N, Long. 123-25 E.
                Proceeding to new station.

2357            Sighted mine #12, Lat. 26-41 N, Long. 120-57 E.

26 February 1945 In patrol Area.

0656 - 1100     Conducted short submerged patrol in vicinity Lat.
                27-20 N, Long. 121-55 E and proceeded eastward.

1843            Mine # 13 startled all hands by exploding with one
                round of .50 cal. directed by the Chief of the Boat,
                GALLI, CGM. Lat. 27-09 N, Long. 123-31 E.

1850            Headed westward.

27 February 1945 In Patrol Area. Assigned station center at Lat.
                27-10N, Long. 123-25 E.

0015            Assigned new station, Lat. 28-45 N, Long 122-30 E,
                by pack commanders despatch. Changed to northerly
                course.

0855            Lookout reported a destroyer bearing 003°T, range 10
                miles. (S/C #27) Put target astern and tracked ahead.
                Target course 200°T, speed 8 knots zigging wildly.

0955            Sent contact report to pack.

                Expected target to be fore-runner of a convoy but at

0958            Lost contact. Slowed to 1/3 speed and commenced zig
                zagging to allow target to catch up with us.

1000            Reversed course at full speed to regain contact.

1037            Heard two (2) underwater explosions.

1041            One explosion.

1046            Another underwater explosion.

                                                                ENCLOSURE (A)

                                                                21

— page 59 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

1100     Regained contact bearing 019°T range 18,000 yards
         and observed flashes of gunfire from target. The fall
         of shot was not observed. I am unable to explain the
         movements of the target as observed - one possible - a
         newly commissioned ship exercising guns, getting turn-
         ing data at various speeds with varying rudder angles,
         compensating magnetic compass.

1110     Sighted mine #4 at Lat. 28-12 N, Long. 123-07 E.

1120     Sent additional contact report to pack.

1337     Sighted "PETE" over target (A/C #19).

1339     Dove as "PETE" came toward us at five miles.

1429     Surfaced on four engines to regain contact.

1436     Heard 5 explosions which sounded like torpedoes at 10
         second intervals. Thought that PILOTFISH or FINBACK
         had gotten our target.

1453     Sighted two "PETES" over target bearing 329°T as we
         regained contact. On various courses and speeds to
         maintain contact.

1500     Two underwater explosions.

1507     Sent another contact report.

1511     One "PETE" dropped a bomb. Could see and hear explosion.

1514     Nine depth charges dropped by target who seemed to be
         running back and forth on short east-west legs. Could
         see explosions.

         Several officers and the Chief Quartermaster was called
         upon to identify the target. All identified target as
         KATORI class light cruiser. With angle on the bow of
         45 and less the target was identical with KATORI, but
         two notable exceptions were apparent with angle on the
         bow of 90. i.e. There was a definite separation be-
         tween the forward superstructure and the foremast. The
         stack was equidistant between the foremast and mainmast
         and was short and squat. The mainmast was also cut down.
         The catapult could not be seen although this might well
         have been indistinguishable due to gear cluttering up
         the main deck amidships.

                                             ENCLOSURE (A)

22

— page 66 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. FISHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

assisting patrol craft, and when we were forward of
his beam, turned on us.

Changed courseb eastward to open the beach.

0300 Changed course to 030°T to head for assigned station
     Lat. 28-10 N, Long. 122-15 E.

0520 SJ contact (S/C #42) bearing 340°T, range 7,800 and
     6,400 yards. Flashes of radar interference from the
     same bearing. Probably the same radar equipped
     patrol craft with his cohorts. Avoided.

0643 Sighted two masted sailing vessel (S/C #43) bearing
     340°T, range 15,000 yards.

0645 Sight and radar contact on FINBACK at 9,200 yards.

0822 Heard and saw explosion on bearing where FINBACK was
     seen on last periscope sweep.

0823 Dove for "KATE" over FINBACK position. (A/C #26).

0850 Lost sight of "KATE".

1126 Sighted "THELMA". (A/C #27).

1325 Sighted "DAVE" (A/C #28) and went to 90 feet as his
     angle on bow closed to zero at two miles.

1400 Back at 60 feet.

1504 Sighted "KATE". (A/C #29).

1624 Sighted two "RUFES". (A/C #30).

1736 Sighted 2 "KATES" (A/C #31).

1939 Surfaced.

2025 Fixed position on SHAHO ISLAND Light.

2200 Departed area in accordance with dispatch orders of
     ComSubPac. Proceeding through Area #12 enroute, GUAM.

9 March 1945

     Enroute GUAM proceeding through Area #12.

                                                      ENCLOSURE (A)
                               29

— page 70 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject:                               U.S.S. RISHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

0255        In center of COLIETT STRAIT made SJ radar contact on
            two patrol craft (S/C #44) bearing 135°T, range
            11,900 yards. Both patrols tracked on course 010°T,
            speed 8 knots and were echo-ranging. Weak swooping
            SJ radar interference from their bearing, however it
            is believed that this emanated from PILOTFISH or
            FINBACK who, we thought, were ahead of us.

0319        SJ radar contact on two additional craft bearing 106°
            T, range 9,100 and 8,800 yards. Course 010°T, speed
            8 knots.

            Avoided all patrol craft and completed transit of the
            strait.

0730        Weak radar interference detected at 154 mcs. which
            increased in intensity until.

0741        Dove for (A/C #35) at eleven miles.

0755        Lost sight of aircraft.

0856        Surfaced.

12 March 1945

            Enroute GUAM.

0718 - 0800 Dove for unidentified aircraft. No IFF at four miles.
            No SD contact.

1030        SD contact at 7 miles with IFF. Range closed to 5,000
            opened to 7 miles and was lost. IFF out to 23 miles.
            Sighted and closed CURENFISH (SS393) for short parley
            regarding conditions in Areas 11 A and 11B.

13 March 1945
[UNCLEAR: 14 March 1945]
15 March 1945

            Enroute GUAM.

16 March 1945

            Enroute GUAM.

0915        Made contact with escort PC 824 at rendezvous.
            Proceeding APRA HARBOR.

                                                                ENCLOSURE (A)

                                                                    34

— page 71 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject:             U.S.S. ALSHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

1300                 Moored APRA HARBOR.
                     Sixth War Patrol Terminated.

32                                                           ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 74 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS
CONTACT | DATE | LAT: | TYPE | INITIAL | COURSE (T) | HOW CON- | REMARKS
NUMBER | TIME (I) | LONG. (E) | | RANGE (YDS) | SPEED (KTS) | TACTED |
|||||||
1       | 1-26-45  | 17-24       | SS       | 10,000      | 060          | Sight    | USS SEADOG
        | 1326     | 148-26      |          |             | 15           |          |
2       | 1-27-45  | 16-51       | DD       | 14,700      | 040          | Per.     | USS SENNETT
        | 2025     | 146-25      |          |             | 10           |          |
3       | 1-30-45  | 17-43       | SS       | 15,000      | 135          | Sight    | Friendly Picket
        | 1707     | 142-00      |          |             | 15           |          |
4       | 2-4-45   | 31-52       | SS       | 4,800       | 000          | SJ Radar | USS SILVERSIDES
        | 1950     | 127-30      |          |             | 12           |          |
5       | 2-9-45   | 27-55       | AH       | 20,000      | 045          | Sight    | Hospital Ship
        | 0430     | 122-49      |          |             | 12           |          |
6       | 2-14-45  | 26-11       | SS       | 3,000       | ---          | Sight    | Periscope
        | 0850     | 121-01      |          |             | ---          |          |
7       | 2-14-45  | 26-22       | Sailing  | 20,000      | 240          | Sight    | 2 Mast Junk
        | 1018     | 121-05      | Vessel   |             | 7            |          |
8       | 2-15-45  | 25-50       | 2 - Unk  | 14,000      | 310          | SJ Radar | Attack # 1
        | 0319     | 120-44      |          |             | 7            |          |
9       | 2-15-45  | 26-01       | Unk      | 10,000      | 030          | SJ Radar |
        | 0535     | 120-45      |          |             | 7            |          |
10      | 2-16-45  | 26-45       | 3 - Unk  | 17,800      | 030          | SJ Radar | Attack # 2
        | 0507     | 120-56      |          |             | 18           |          |

35
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 75 —
Subject: C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS (Continued)

CONTACT | DATE | LAT. (N) | LONG. (E) | TYPE | INITIAL | COURSE (T) | HOW CON- | REMARKS
NUMBER | TIME (I) | | | | RANGE (YDS) | SPEED (KTS) | TACTED |
------- | | | | | | | |
11 | 2-16-45 | 26-57 | 121-04 | Unk | 4,900 | 200 | SJ Radar | 10 cm. Radar
| 0539 | | | | | 2-3 | |
12 | 2-16-45 | 26-54 | 121-02 | FC | 5,400 | 210 | SJ Radar | Avoided
| 2152 | | | | | 7 | |
13 | 2-21-45 | 26-25 | 120-47 | Sailing | 7,000 | 220 | Per. | 3 Mast Junk
| 1420 | | | Vessel | | 5 | |
14 | 2-21-45 | 26-28 | 120-49 | Sailing | 5,000 | 220 | Per. | 2 Mast Junk
| 1648 | | | Vessel | | 5 | |
15 | 2-22-45 | 27-30 | 121-31 | Sailing | 3,000 | | Sight | SJ Radar Fishing Boat
| 0027 | | | Vessels | | | |
16 | 2-22-45 | 27-31 | 121-33 | Sailing | 3,000 | | Sight | Fishing
| 0044 | | | Vessels | | | |
17 | 2-22-45 | 27-34 | 121-36 | Sailing | 5,000 | | Sight | Fishing
| 0103 | | | Vessels | | | |
18 | 2-22-45 | 27-42 | 121-40 | Sailing | 5,000 | | Sight | Fishing
| 0148 | | | Vessels | | | |
19 | 2-22-45 | 27-38 | 121-43 | Sailing | 5,800 | | Sight | Fishing Lights,
| 0344 | | | Vessels | | | | | Fishing
20 | 2-22-45 | 27-26 | 121-29 | Sailing | 5,600 | | Sight | SJ Radar Sighted Lights
| 0555 | | | Vessels | | | | | Fishing
21 | 2-22-45 | 27-09 | 121-16 | Sailing | 10,000 | | Sight | Fishing
| 0858 | | | Vessels | | | |

36
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 76 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.
(F) SHIP CONTACTS (Continued)

CONTACT | DATE | LAT. (N) | TYPE | INITIAL | COURSE (T) | HOW | REMARKS
NUMBER | TIME (I) | LONG. (E) | | RANGE (YDS) | SPEED (KTS) | CONTACTED |
|||||||
22 | 2-22-45 | 27-08 | 2 - Sailing | 6,500 | 200 | Per. |
| 1455 | 121-20 | Vessels | | 6 | | |
23 | 2-22-45 | 26-59 | 2 - Sailing | 7,000 | 090 | Per. |
| 1630 | 121-14 | Vessels | | 5 | | |
24 | 2-23-45 | 26-33 | Unk | 7,000 | 300 | Per. | Sailing Vessel or
| 0310 | 120-47 | | | 5 | | | Small Picket
25 | 2-23-45 | 25-35 | 4 - PC | 9,500 | 126 | Per. | Heard pinging first,
| 0905 | 120-47 | 5 - AK | | 9 | | | air cover
26 | 2-25-45 | 26-15 | AH | 19,000 | 220 | Sight & | Hospital Ship
| 0005 | 120-42 | | | 16 | SJ Radar |
27 | 2-27-45 | 28-25 | CL | 28,000 | various | Sight | Maintained sight con-
| 0855 | 123-05 | | | 15 | | | tact during day.
28 | 2-27-45 | 28-24 | PC | 11,800 | 000 | SJ Radar | Unable to Make con-
| 1930 | 123-04 | | | 7 - 10 | | | tact with SJ
29 | 2-27-45 | 28-29 | PC | 11,000 | 000 | SJ Radar | Unable to Make con-
| 2140 | 123-01 | | | 10 | | | tact with SJ
30 | 2-28-45 | 29-07 | 3 - PC | 12,000 | 190 | Sight | Hazy Horizon Avoided
| 1000 | 122-36 | | | | | |
31 | 3-1-45 | 28-49 | Unk | 3,400 | - | SJ Radar | Avoided
| 0406 | 122-21 | | | - | | |
32 | 3-1-45 | 28-53 | Sailing | 5,000 | 000 | SJ Radar | Two-Masted
| 0725 | 122-31 | Vessel | | | | |

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 77 —
Subject: C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RASHER - Report Of War Patrol Number Six.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS (Continued)

| CONTACT NUMBER | DATE TIME (I) | LAT. (N) LONG. (E) | TYPE | INITIAL RANGE (YDS) | COURSE (T) SPEED (KTS) | HOW CONTACTED | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | 3-1-45 0755 | 28-52 122-48 | Sailing Vessel | 7,000 | 320 2 | Sight | Two-Masted |
| 34 | 3-1-45 1841 | 28-40 122-32 | Sailing Vessel | 4,500 | 000 5 | Sight | Avoided |
| 35 | 3-4-45 0006 | 27-23 121-19 | Unk | 7,000 | 000 5 | SJ Radar | |
| 36 | 3-4-45 0527 | 27-02 121-03 | Sailing Vessel | 4,500 | - - | Sight & SJ Radar | |
| 37 | 3-4-45 1839-2223 | 27-22 121-05 | Several Sail- ing Vessels | 4-7,000 | Various | Sight | Avoided |
| 38 | 3-7-45 1926 | 27-40 121-23 | Patrol | 11,000 | 000 9 | SJ Radar | Radar equipped - Con- tacted at Dusk |
| 39 | 3-8-45 0005 | 27-44 121-23 | Unk | 6,400 | 100 5 | Sight | Blinking White Light |
| 40 | 3-8-45 0030 | 27-44 121-39 | Unk | 5,400 | - - | SJ Radar | Probably Patrol |
| 41 | 3-8-45 0037 | 27-42 121-41 | Unk | 7,300 | - - | SJ Radar | Probably Patrol |
| 42 | 3-8-45 0513 | 27-53 120-07 | 2 - Patrol | 7,800 | 200 8 | SJ Radar | Radar Equipped - Possi- ble same as Contact #38 |
| 43 | 3-8-45 0643 | 27-51 122-24 | Sailing Vessel | 15,000 | 120 5 | Sight | Two-Masted |
| 44 | 3-11-45 0255 - 0319 | 30-11 122-11 | 4 Patrol | 8-12,000 | 010 8 | SJ Radar | Patrolling COLNETT STR. |

— page 78 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. R. SHEPARD'S Report of Air Patrol Number Six.
(C) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

| | CONTACT NUMBER | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S | Date | 1-28-45 | 1-30-45 | 1-30-45 | 1-30-45 | 2-3-45 | 2-4-45 |
| U | Time (Zone) | 0640 (H) | 0745 (I) | 1453 (I) | 1535 (I) | 1415 (I) | 1109 (I) |
| P | Position: Lat. (N) | 16-22 | 16-13 | 17-17 | 17-26 | 29-43 | 31-12 |
| P | Long. (E) | 145-00 | 143-15 | 142-20 | 142-12 | 130-49 | 128-36 |
| L | Speed | 13 kts | 13 kts | 13 kts | 13 kts | 12 kts | 12 kts |
| E | Course | 180° (t) | 316° (t) | 330° (t) | 315° (t) | 290° (t) | 310° (t) |
| M | Trim | Surf. | Surf. | Surf. | Surf. | Surf. | Surf. |
| E | Minutes Since Last | -- | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | -- |
| N | SD Radar Search | | | | | | |
| T | | | | | | | |
| A | Number | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| I | Type | B-29 | B-24 | B-24 | B-24 | Unk. | B-17S |
| R | Probable Mission | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol |
| C | How Contacted | Sight | SD | SD | SD | Sight | Sight |
| R | Initial Range, Miles | 2 | 7 | 13 | 6 | 5 | 6 |
| A | Elevation Angle | 2° | 5° | 6° | 6° | 4° | 10° |
| F | Range & Relative Bear- | 2 mi. | 4 mi. | ND | 6 mi. | ND | ND |
| T | ing of Plane When it | 045° | 160° | | 330° | | |
| | Detected Submarine | | | | | | |
| | (State Beaufort) | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| C | Sea: | | | | | | |
| O | (Direction Rel.) | 330° | 000° | 000° | 000° | 295° | 250° |
| N | Visibility, Miles | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| D | Clouds: (Height in Feet) | 15,000 | 15,000 | 20,000 | 15,000 | 15,000 | 6,000 |
| I | (Percent Overcast) | 100 | 40 | 60 | 60 | 90 | 10 |
| T | Moon: (Bearing Rel.) | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| I | (Angle) | Day | Day | Day | Day | Day | Day |
| O | (Percent Illum) | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| N | | | | | | | |

Type of Submarine Camouflage on this patrol: Light Gray.

ENCLOSURE (A)
39

— page 90 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

(I) MINES

     A total of twenty-two mines were sighted during the patrol. Nineteen
of these were in the East China Sea, and the other three were at the
northeast end of the NANSEI SHOTO. Whenever possible, the mines were
destroyed using .50 cal. gunfire. Of the eleven that sunk, four blew
up. The others were probably destroyed, as hits were observed before
darkness terminated firing. The other nine were avoided, because of
darkness, planes in vicinity, or a more important mission.

     The mines were spherical, and allbut one had four horns and one or
two lifting pad-eyes. The one exception had six horns and two pad-
eyes. Although some mines were fairly new and others were covered
with heavy marine growth, it was impossible to determine from this,
which ones would detonate.

     Mines sighted are as follows:

MINE NO. | DATE    | TIME(I) | LAT. N | LONG. E | REMARKS
|||||
1        | 2-2-45  | 1030    | 27-32  | 133-34  | Sunk
2        | 2-2-45  | 1818    | 28-16  | 133-02  | Probably Sunk
3        | 2-5-45  | 0940    | 31-04  | 124-52  | Sunk
4        | 2-5-45  | 1053    | 31-05  | 124-50  | Sunk
5        | 2-5-45  | 1505    | 30-28  | 124-26  | Sunk
6        | 2-13-45 | 0732    | 26-51  | 121-37  | Sunk
7        | 2-13-45 | 1632    | 26-46  | 121-35  | Blew Up
8        | 2-18-45 | 0743    | 26-34  | 121-33  | Sunk
9        | 2-18-45 | 0950    | 26-33  | 121-36  | Blew Up
10       | 2-24-45 | 1953    | 25-33  | 120-45  | Avoided (dusk)
11       | 2-25-45 | 2045    | 26-39  | 120-46  | Avoided (dark)
12       | 2-25-45 | 2357    | 26-41  | 120-57  | Avoided (dark)
13       | 2-26-45 | 1818    | 27-09  | 123-34  | Blew Up
14       | 2-27-45 | 1116    | 28-12  | 123-07  | Sunk
15       | 2-27-45 | 2153    | 28-36  | 123-10  | Avoided (dark)
16       | 3-3-45  | 1819    | 27-23  | 121-51  | Probably Sunk
17       | 3-5-45  | 0825    | 25-43  | 120-44  | Avoided
18       | 3-9-45  | 0424    | 30-16  | 124-08  | Avoided (dark)
19       | 3-9-45  | 0714    | 30-51  | 124-34  | Blew Up
20       | 3-9-45  | 0948    | 31-06  | 125-05  | Plane in Vicinity
21       | 3-9-45  | 0949    | 31-06  | 125-06  | Plane in Vicinity
22       | 3-10-45 | 0922    | 30-56  | 126-35  | Attempted to Sink
         |         |         |        |         | Sea too Rough.

ENCLOSURE (A)

51

— page 101 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.
[HANDWRITTEN: NRL]
[HANDWRITTEN: CRD]
(U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES
[HANDWRITTEN: 2-XTRA]
The following intercepts were obtained on enemy radars using APR 1
TN2 and SPA equipment:

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Date | 2-2-45 | 2-3-45 | 2-8-45 | 2-11-45 |
| Lat. (N) | 31-23.5 | 30-07.5 | 28-14 | 27-52 |
| Long. (E) | 128-19.5 | 130-16.8 | 123-41 | 122-22 |
| MCS. | 98 | 150 | 290 | 90 - 150 |
| P.R.F. | 750 | 600 | Unk. | 1,000 Approx. |
| Pulse Width | 15 mcs. | 18 mcs. | Unk. | 3 mcs. |
| Location | Unk. | Airborne | Unk. | Unk. |
| Keyed | No | No | No | No |
| Sweep Rate | Unk. | Irregular | Irregular | Not keyed |
| Pulse Shape | [Pulse Shape Drawing] | [Pulse Shape Drawing] | Too weak | No definite |
| | | | to appear | Pulse |
| | | | on SPA | |

| | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Date | 3-5-45 | 3-9-45 | 3-11-45 |
| Lat. (N) | 25-23 | 31-43 | 29-38.8 |
| Long. (E) | 120-41 | 126-50 | 131-18 |
| MCS. | 75 | 135 | 153 |
| P.R.F. | 500 | CW * | 500 |
| Pulse Width | 26 mcs. | ----- | 15 mcs. |
| Location | FORMOSA | Unk. | Aircraft * |
| Keyed | Yes * | Steady | ----- |
| Sweep Rate | Irregular | Steady | Irregular |
| Pulse Shape | [Pulse Shape Drawing] | [Pulse Shape Drawing] | [Pulse Shape Drawing] |

[HANDWRITTEN: 63]
62 ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 102 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. TRASHER - Report of War Patrol Number Six.

(U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES (Continued)
[HANDWRITTEN: NRL
CRD
2-XTRA]
Additional Information:

Contact #4 seemed to be jamming.
Contact #5 sounded as though letters were being keyed.
Contact #6 signal was strong and steady. May have been a non-direct-
    ional homing device for planes.
Contact #7 this plane was sighted at a range of eight miles. It was
    a medium bomber.

(V) MK XVIII TORPEDOES

On 16 December 1944 loaded four mark 18-1 torpedoes forward and four
aft, at U. S. Naval Drydocks, Hunter's Point, California. On 2
January 1945, charged the mark 18-1 torpedoes to a final voltage of
176. During the seventeen days that the torpedoes had been aboard,
the gravity had not dropped more than fifteen points and the charge
only required three hours.

On 5 January 1945, mark 18-1 torpedo #56742 had a short hot run of
about 4 or 5 seconds duration. The torpedo was being loaded into
the tube with the air stop valve closed, the safety stick in, and
the propellor lock on. There was enough clearance forward of the
firing lever for the lever to move and release the air trapped be-
tween the firing lever and the stop valve. This air temporarily
closed the starting contacts, energized the motor, and started the
torpedo running. The propellor shaft sheared off at the propellor.
No other damage was done to the torpedo. The torpedo was turned
into the Torpedo Shop, Submarine Base, Midway, Navy 1504. On 13
January 1945, the torpedo was returned with a new shaft and was
loaded into the after room. The other 3 electrics were also
transferred to the after room.

Four electrics were fired on 15 February 1945, at a small patrol
craft in a state 3 sea. Depth was set at four (4) feet, but the
torpedoes evidently ran under. These torpedoes were not equipped
with the depth holding drum nut.

The torpedoes were charged on an average of once every eight days
after departing Midway. Every torpedo was ventilated with air
each morning. This eliminated the danger of hydrogen explosions.
Four hydrogen burner wires burnt out, one on each torpedo in the
tubes, and they were renewed, the torpedoes ventilated, and the
circuits reenergized with no troubles. No torpedoes required
watering.

63
ENCLOSURE (A)
[HANDWRITTEN: 64]

— page 103 —
FC5-28/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY-EIGHT

Serial No. 080. Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 21 March 1945.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO, USS RASHER Conf. Ltr. S3269/
A16-3, Serial 105, dated 3/16/45.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-EIGHT.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Sub-
marine Division TWENTY-EIGHT in the first endorsement.

[SIGNATURE: J. H. WILL.]

— page 105 —
FB-282/A16-3
Serial (012)
CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO RASHER Conf. Ltr. SS269/
A16-3, Serial 105, dated 3/16/45.

From: The Commander Submarine Division TWO EIGHTY TWO.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY EIGHT.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
The Commander in Chief, United States, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number
Six.

1. The Sixth War Patrol of the U.S.S. RASHER was
conducted in the southern part of the East China Sea as part of
a coordinated attack group composed of PILOTFISH, FINBACK and
RASHER. The patrol extended over a period of fifty-five days,
thirty one of which were spent on station, and was terminated
by the provisions of her operation order.

2. There were forty-four ship contacts including four
friendly vessels and two hospital ships but the vast majority-
sailing vessels engaged in fishing and small patrol craft. Two
attacks were conducted:

ATTACK #1.

This attack was conducted on the surface against
an unknown target in very poor visibility in the early morning
hours of February 15,1945. The target was never sighted but it
was believed from the size of the radar pip to be a patrol boat
with a similar ship in company about 3500 yards on the starboard
quarter of the target, course steady, speed 6.75 knots. This
latter vessel was not detected until RASHER had started in for
a bow tube attack when the plan was changed and stern tubes were
brought to bear. Four Mark 18-1 torpedoes were fired set at four
feet depth on a 62° Starboard track, gyros very small, 1° divergent
spread between torpedoes with a run of about 2600 yards. The
solution appeared good but no hits resulted. This attack was con-
ducted entirely by radar, the performance of which appears to have
been spotty, and erratic bearings may easily have caused the tor-
pedoes to miss a small target. The Commanding Officer did not
consider the targets worthy of further torpedo expenditure and
broke off the contact.

-1-

— page 106 —
FB5-282/16-3
Serial (012)
CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO RASHER Conf. Ltr. SS269)
16-3,Serial 105, dated 3/16/45

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number
         Six.

— page 107 —
FB5-232/A16-3
Serial (012)
CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO RASHER Conf. Ltr. SS269/
A16-3,Serial 105, dated 3/16/45.
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number
Six.

SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO EIGHTY TWO
o/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

20 March 1945.

tracks of the three vessels concerned shows RASHER directly between
the near flank ship and the newcomer. The Division Commander con-
curs in the Commanding Officer's post-firing analysis that the ves-
sels encountered were probably destroyers and the primary cause for
failing to obtain hits was the fifteen foot depth setting on the
torpedoes.

4. In the forenoon February 23rd, RASHER was unfortunate in
being unable to close a convoy contacted so close to Keeling, For-
mosa, that there was no time for an end around before they could
reach port. This convoy had both air and surface escort.

5. On February 27th sight contact was made on a vessel which
was firing her guns and depth charges. She resembled a KATORI Class
Cruiser but the Commanding Officer does not believe she was large
enough to warrant this classification. However she had air cover and
it appeared as if she were launching her own planes. RASHER set
four torpedo runs to her pack and succeeded in bringing FINBACK
to the scene. After sundown the target was closed and it turned out
to be a small vessel unworthy of torpedo fire. There is some doubt
however that the vessel seen in the daytime and the vessel contacted
after dark are the same.

6. During the evening of March 7-8 RASHER made an end
around on a radar equipped patrol vessel which was apparently track-
ing RASHER and drawing her toward help and shallow water. The ruse
was discovered in time for RASHER to extricate herself from six
patrol boats.

7. It is noted with interest that RASHER encountered twenty-
two drifting mines on this patrol.

8. The patrol was hampered throughout by poor performance
of the SJ radar in both the electronic features and in the newly
installed hydraulic training. Every effort will be made to put this
equipment in shape during the current refit. The 7 M.O. system gave
considerable trouble which strengthens the Division Commanders op-
inion that the general performance of this equipment is decidedly
unsatisfactory.

-3-

— page 108 —
FB5-282/A16-3
Serial (012)

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO RASHER Conf. Ltr. SS269/
A16-3, Serial 105, dated 3/16/45.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number
         Six.

— page 109 —
4 01898
FF12-10(L)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
[HANDWRITTEN: R-4257]
Serial 0701 Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
CONFIDENTIAL 3 April 1945.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to [HANDWRITTEN: R-4257] NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
RASHER Report of [HANDWRITTEN: 4-18-45] DESTROYED PRIOR TO
Sixth War Patrol. ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 701
U.S.S. RASHER - SIXTH WAR PATROL

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Sixth War Patrol
(20 January to 16 March 1945).

1. The sixth war patrol of the RASHER, under the command
of Lieutenant-Commander B. E. Adams, Jr., U.S. Navy, was conducted in
the southern part of the East China Sea. The RASHER, along with the
PILOTFISH (SS386) and FINBACK (SS230) formed a coordinated attack
group with the commanding officer of the PILOTFISH as group commander.

2. Some forty odd contacts were made during this long
determined patrol, most of which were small ships. Two torpedo at-
tacks were delivered. No hits were obtained on the first attack,
probably due to long range and a small target. It is estimated that
one hit was obtained in an unidentified target on Attack No. 2.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol
is not authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congra-
tulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this aggres-
sive patrol, during which the following damage is estimated to have
been inflicted upon the enemy:

D A M A G E D

1 - UN 4,000 tons (Attack No. 2)

MERRILL COMSTOCK.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
CNO (5) Comsubspac (3)
Cinopac (6) ComsubspacComd (20)
CICPOA (1) SUBAD, LI (2)
CICPOA (1) ComsubspacSubordcom (3)
Comservpac (1) All Squadron and Div.
Cinclant (1) Commanders, Pacific (2)
Comsubslnt (8) Subtrainpac (2)
S/M School, NL (1) All Submarines, Pacific (1)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
Comsopac (2) [HANDWRITTEN: E. L. Hynes, 2nd] EXTRA ORIGINAL
Comsowespac (1) SORG. MICRO
ComsubsoWespac (2) E. L. HYNES, 2nd, PHOTO-LAB OP-16
CTG 71.9 (2) Flag Secretary. RETURN TO F-4253
Comnorpac (1)
[STAMP: FILMED]
70

— page 110 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

U.S.S. R.H.M. (SS-269)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
29 May 1945.

C269/16-3
Serial: 010
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. R.H.M.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 121.
     (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 12.
     (3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. R.H.M. (SS-269) - Report of War Patrol Number Seven.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
           (B) Track Charts.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the Seventh War Patrol of this vessel
conducted in the HITO SHOTO and KII SUIDO areas during the period from 17
April to 29 May 1945 is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: Unclear]
C. J. R. H.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C]
[HANDWRITTEN: BY OP-09B9C DATE 6/1/73]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

[STAMP: 126680 FILMED]

— page 120 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of 1st Patrol Number. D.V.N.

1545 Surfaced.
     SJ and ST radar out of commission. 7 LC operating about 1/3 of the
     time. (See material defects).

1616 Dove for unidentified plane, 7 miles. Decided to stay down and to do
     work on the radars and 7 LC.

1952 Surfaced. Headed for HONSHU JILL. SJ and ST out of commission.

     Bright moonlight.

2130 Sighted small vessel bearing 090 T, estimated range 7,000 yds. (side
     contact No. 3). Commenced tracking. Estimated his speed, 6.5 kts,
     by tracking on his beam and his course, 330 T, by tracking ahead.
     Identified target to be a small sea truck of perhaps 200-300 tons. It
     is too rough for a gun attack and besides we can't see what his arma-
     ment is. Continued tracking, hoping to get both radars in commission
     before attacking.

28 April 1945

     1200 (K) position
     Lat. 34-22 N.
     Long. 139-31 E.

0026 Sighted HONSHU JILL bearing, 284 T, range about 5 miles.

0049 SJ radar in commission. Continued tracking and found our previous
     solution was very nearly correct. His course 330 T, speed 6 kts.

0122 Battle stations. Just before submerging, 5,000 yds ahead of the tar-
     get, noted we had two very small sea trucks with him, one on either
     beam.

0126 Submerged. Details of attack are included in separate correspondence.

0320 Surfaced. Headed northwest intending to dive north of HONSHU JILL for
     submerged patrol today.

0500 Radar contact 050 T, range 4800 yds. Saw nothing, and then pip disap-
     peared. Put it down to the rad vicinity.

0521 Submerged for patrol between HONSHU JILL and KOZU JILL.

0801 Sighted two JINKS bearing 325 T, range 3 miles, heading northeast.

     We soon discovered this was a difficult spot to patrol because the
     current was N.W., 3.6 kts. Spent the day fighting it as it was sweep-
     ing us into the HONSHU's run.

- 9 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 122 —
O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject:                               U.S.S. RISHER - Report of 1st Patrol Harbor SEVEN.

— page 132 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

2140 Observed gun fire from the target group. RASHER opened slowly as we
     pulled out to the northwest. All torpedoes missed ahead. Considered
     making two stern nest but the gunfire and a small alerted target were
     factors which decided us against making another immediate attack.

2143 Explosion, end of run.

2143-15 Explosion, same.

2143-45 Explosion, same.

     Looking back on the attack, we felt we had a good set-up on firing, and
     we were certain of at least one hit. We made a surface attack because
     we wished to retain the maneuverability this type of attack offers, but
     the C.O. feels now it may have been wiser if we had made a submerged
     attack and fired at this small target at very close range.

     Decided against further attack for the following reasons:

     (1) Before we could have gotten into position to make a second attack
         the target would be at its destination, HACHIJO JIMA.

     (2) In order to reach our lifeguard station on time, it was necessary
         to depart immediately.

2147 Headed for lifeguard station making best speed. Tracked target out to
     11,000 yds range when his angle on the bow was 170 T. He was now on
     course 150 T which headed him directly for HACHIJO JIMA.

2220 Made reload forward.

11 May 1945

     1200 (K) Position
     Lat. 33-29 N.
     Long. 136-31 E.

0043 Sent RASHER two to Comsubpac acknowledging receipt of message direct-
     ing us to relieve TORSK.

0302 SJ radar contact 30,000 yds, bearing 050 T. Lost it almost immediately.
     Turned on SD, all clear. Nothing on APR.

0308 SJ radar contact 3300 yds, bearing 030 T. O.O.D. cleared the bridge,
     slowed to reduce our wake, and as he sounded the diving alarm he heard
     the roar of motors overhead.

     Submerged. In all probability this was one of our own planes but we
     wish they wouldn't use these tactics.

0345 Surfaced.

- 2 - INCLOSURE (A)

— page 151 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

(H) GUN ATTACK No. 1

U.S.S. RASHER (SS-269) Gun Attack No. 1 Patrol Number SEVEN
Time: 0330 (K) Date: 29 April 1945 Lat: 33° 45' N Long: 139° 20' E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Sunk: None

Damaged or
Probably Sunk: Two Sea Trucks: One (1) of about 100 tons, one (1) 50 tons.

Damage Deter-
mined By: Observation of numerous 20 MM hits in both targets and several
40 MM hits in the 100 ton target, which set him on fire. This
target was listing heavily when last observed.

Details of Action

Action took place under bright moonlight. Targets were engaged
using one 20 MM and one 40 MM at an opening range of 1,000 yds,
later closing to 200 yds. 600 Rounds of 20 MM HEI and HEIT
48 rounds of 40 MM ammunition were used. No return fire was noted.

40 MM Crew had difficulty seeing the target due to tracer fire
from the 20 MM which impaired their night vision. 40 MM perfor-
mance was poor during the early stages for this reason; but at
closer ranges, with full automatic operation, was most effective.
20 MM ammunition had no apparent incendiary effect.

(I) MINES

No minelaying operations were noted. A total of 11 drifting spherical mines
were seen, and whenever possible were sunk by gunfire.

Mines sighted are as follows:

MINE NO. | DATE | TIME (K) | LAT. (N) | LONG. (E) | REMARKS
---|---|---|---|---|---
1 | 4-21-45 | 1556 | 29-25 | 137-40 | Sunk
2 | 4-22-45 | 0958 | 30-21 | 138-59 | Avoided (Lack of time)
3 | 4-23-45 | 0756 | 32-19 | 140-15 | Sunk
4 | 4-23-45 | 1725 | 33-23 | 140-20 | Exploded
5 | 5-1-45 | 1000 | 33-19 | 139-22 | Exploded
6 | 5-2-45 | 1741 | 32-31 | 136-50 | Sunk
7 | 5-6-45 | 1500 | 31-49 | 133-10 | Sunk
8 | 5-7-45 | 1112 | 31-40 | 133-44 | Sunk
9 | 5-8-45 | 1010 | 33-17 | 140-20 | Sunk
10 | 5-22-45 | 1056 | 33-09 | 137-12 | Avoided (Heavy seas)
11 | 5-23-45 | 0150 | 33-39 | 142-33 | Avoided (Night)

- 40 - ENCLOSURE (1)

— page 154 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RIGHIN - Report of War Patrol Number S.V.N.

(L) RADIO Continued:

The following is a tabulation of frequencies used during the patrol with
pertinent comments:

SubFox

4515 kcs This frequency was never used. Signal strength inferior to 6045 kcs,
9050 kcs, and 9090 kcs at all times.

6045 kcs This frequency used from 1800 to 2200 GCT. Signal very weak towards
the end of this period, usually shifted to 9050 kcs.

9050 kcs From 1000 to 2200 GCT signal strength was good. Signals on 9090 kcs
were clear and louder than 9050 kcs from 1000 to 1800 GCT, but at
1800, 6045 kcs came in strong and radio guard was shifted to 6045
kcs at this time.

9090 kcs This frequency was fair from 0500 to 1700 GCT. In general indistinct
keying on this frequency caused us to use 9045 kcs and 6045 kcs more
over these other frequencies and reasonably good signal strength.

13655 kcs These two frequencies were about equally good from 2200 to 0400 GCT.
16730 kcs Both began to fade at about 0500 GCT and guard was shifted to 9050
kcs or 9090 kcs at this time.

No effective Jap interference was experienced on any of the above
frequencies, and at least one of the subfox frequencies was loud and
clear at all times.

500 kcs No distress signals were heard. Only traffic on this frequency was
a daily transmission from RMS to HPM.

4475 kcs The lifeguard frequency was a channel for air submarine and submarine
to submarine communication and varied from poor to good. See section (T)
for further discussion.

Wolfpac Frequencies

Both the standard and alternate frequencies were guarded. Very
little traffic either Jap or friendly was heard.

VHF

Only traffic heard was our own communications with our air cover.

Ship to Shore

Three ship to shore transmissions were made. In all cases 8470 kcs
was used and HPM was called. Difficulty was experienced in sending
R.S.H.M. serial no. We commenced calling HPM at 1100 GCT without
success. HPM had very weak signal strength and apparently our sig-
nal strength was low in spite of good power output from our T.E.

- 43 - INCLOSURE (B)

— page 156 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. R SHAD - Report of 3rd Patrol Number S.VIII.

(II) SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Failure of the cam operated microswitch on the TD: caused loss of many
hours of operation. The immediate cause of failure of this switch was
the tripping spring which broke frequently from fatigue. Further, the
latter part of the patrol; the entire switch was badly worn and required
constant adjustment to keep it in operation. It is suggested that this
switch be redesigned along more rugged lines, to withstand the contin-
uous use it receives.

Some loss of sensitivity was noted with the TD: installed as compared
with the original B Unit installation. It is likely that this is due to
poor electrical contact between the collector braids and the terminal
blocks. These connections should be redesigned so as to give a posi-
tive locked contact that will automatically release when the sound
head is raised.

Sound conditions in the MIPO SHOTO area were very poor. On one
occasion pinging could not be detected until the range was closed to
7,000 yards. Sound conditions in the MII SUIDO area were generally
good. No unusual sound conditions were encountered.

- 45 - CLOSURE ( )

— page 164 —
SUBMARINE DIVISION ONE THIRTY ONE
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
30 May 1945

F35-121/A16-3
Serial: 024
CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS RASHER - Report of
War Patrol No. 7 dated
29 May 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Division ONE THIRTY ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(3) The Commander in Chief, U.S. FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

1. The seventh war patrol of the RASHER was con-
ducted in the Tenpo Shoto and Izu Suido areas and extended
over a period of forty-three days with thirty-two days being
spent in the patrol area.

2. The patrol was carried out in a thorough and aggres-
sive manner but unfortunately resulted in few torpedo target con-
tacts. The majority of the patrol was spent in life guard duty.

3. Torpedo Attack No. 1 was a night surface approach
on an auxiliary transport (T-1) accompanied by one small escort.
Six torpedoes, set at four feet, were fired on a run track of
77° and average torpedo run of 2,800 yards. Target was observed
to zig toward about 50° at 1½ minutes after firing, which caused
torpedoes to miss ahead. Stern tubes were not fired due to gun-
fire from the target and a small patrol which was already alerted.
Target would reach Hachijo Jima before an end around could be
made for another attack.

On 29 April 1945, one sea truck of 100 tons and one
of 50 tons were badly damaged in a well-conducted gun attack with
20 MM and 40 MM.

4. Upon return from patrol RASHER was in a clean and
shipshape condition and in good material condition. Refit will
be completed in normal time.

5. The administrative Division Commander congratulates
the commanding officer, officers and crew for the completion of a
long and arduous patrol and regrets that more enemy targets were
not available to this splendid fighting ship.

[SIGNATURE: V. L. LOTHROP]
V. L. LOTHROP

— page 165 —
SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWELVE

F05-12/A16-3                                 Care of Fleet Post Office,
                                            San Francisco, California,
Serial 0110                                 1 June 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS RASHER (SS269) -
Report of War Patrol
No. 7 dated 29 May
1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
      (2) The Commander In Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

1. Forwarded concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine
Division ONE TWENTY-ONE.

2. Attention is invited to comments regarding communications
with B-29 Air Cover on 24 April. Intensive efforts to improve communica-
tions between planes and submarines must be continued. Establishment of
joint communications schools for aircraft and submarine communication
personnel is recommended.

3. It is recommended that the U.S.S. RASHER be credited with the
destruction of one sea truck (100 tons) and the damaging of one sea truck
(50 tons) as the result of her well conducted gun attack of 29 April.

4. The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE congratulates the
Commanding Officer, Officers and crew upon the completion of this ardu-
ous patrol and the damage inflicted upon the enemy which is important
damage at this stage of the war when even small types of sea transport
are extremely valuable to the Jap.

[SIGNATURE: C. W. Wilkins]
C. W. WILKINS.

[HANDWRITTEN: 490]
[HANDWRITTEN: 55]

— page 166 —
F12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01442 [HANDWRITTEN: feym the ms]
CONFIDENTIAL
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
14 June 1945
[HANDWRITTEN: R-w-s] [HANDWRITTEN: 6 0136]

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
RASHER Report of [HANDWRITTEN: 6-27-45] NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
Seventh War Patrol. DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 78
U.S.S. RASHER - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Seventh War Patrol
(17 April to 29 May 1945).

1. The seventh war patrol of the RASHER, under the com-
mand of Lieutenant-Commander H. D. Nace, U. S. Navy, was conducted in
the vicinity of the Nanpo Shoto Islands and off Kii Suido. Life-
guard services were performed in addition to offensive patrol.

2. Although area coverage was good, few targets worthy
of torpedo fire were encountered. The single torpedo attack on a
landing craft was frustrated when the target maneuvered radically to
allow torpedoes to pass ahead. In a well conducted gun attack a
picket boat was sunk and his companion was damaged.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is
not authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congra-
tulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the RASHER
upon the completion of this long patrol. The RASHER is credited
with having inflicted the following damage to the enemy:

S U N K
1 - Picket Boat (EC) - 100 tons (Gun attack No. 1)

D A M A G E D
1 - Picket Boat (EC) - 50 tons (Gun attack No. 1)

TOTAL SUNK & DAMAGED - 150 tons

[STAMP: FILMED]

Distribution and authentication
on following page.

[HANDWRITTEN: - 1 -]

E. E. YEOMANS.

EXTRA - ORIGINAL
SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB. OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

[HANDWRITTEN: 490]
[HANDWRITTEN: 56]

— page 167 —
1d
FF12-10(4)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01442
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
14 June 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
RASHER Report of
Seventh War Patrol.
NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 781
U.S.S. RASHER - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Seventh War Patrol
(17 April to 29 May 1945).

— page 168 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st Copy]

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
19 August 1945.

SS269/A16-3
Serial #016
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
C-DECLASSIFIED-A-L

From: The Commanding Officer,
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Division
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron
(3) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(4) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS-269) - Report of War Patrol Number Eight.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Charts (For CTF 71 only)

1. Enclosure (A) covering the Eighth War Patrol of this
vessel conducted in the FORMOSA and GULF OF SIAM areas during the period
from 23 June 1945 to 19 August 1945 is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: C.B. NACE]
C.B. NACE.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP-09B9C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/72]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

[HANDWRITTEN: Filmed]
[HANDWRITTEN: 138168]

— page 169 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

(A) PROLOGUE

     Arrived Midway on May 29, 1945, upon completion of seventh war
patrol. Commenced refit by U.S.S. GRIFFIN and Submarine Division
121 on May 30, 1945. Lieut. W.E. NORRINGTON, Jr., USNR, and Lt(jg),
F.R. WRIGHT, USNR, were detached; Lt(jg), V.R. HEATH, USNR and
Ensign L.R. PAVELKA, USN reported aboard for duty.

     Completed refit on June 12, 1945. Conducted 5 day training period
with Commander W.T. NELSON, USN, CSD-121 as training officer. The
refit was excellent and the cooperation received from all the
personnel at Midway was outstanding. The officers and crew
thoroughly enjoyed the rest period and the Commanding Officer
continues to feel that Midway is the best of our advance bases.
Ready for sea on June 23, 1945.

(B) NARRATIVE

                       OFFICERS AND C.P.O.'s ON BOARD

NAME                                   NUMBER OF WAR PATROLS PRIOR THIS ONE

Lt.Cdr. G.D. MACE, USN                                  7
Lt.Cdr. H.M. CAIN, Jr., USN                             7
Lt.(jg) G. WILCOX, USNR                                 1
Lt.(jg) R.E. WOODBURY, USNR                             6
Lt.(jg) W.R. WRIGHT, USNR                               0
Lt.(jg) H.E. GEER, Jr., USN                             4
Lt.(jg) R.F. WADE, Jr., USN                             1
Lt.(jg) F.L. LYNE, USNR                                 2
Ensign L.R. PAVELKA, USN                                0
Ensign P.J. SASGEN, USNR                                7

CASS ELS, K., CTM(PA), USN                              8
GRIGSBY, L.F., CMM(T), USN                              7
KEYRICH, C.M., CRT(AA)(T), USNR                         7
LAINI, H.H., CMM(AA)(T), USN                            8
LENNON, F.D., CTM(A1)(T), USN                           4
PETERSON, L.A., CEM(T), USN                             6
STOEHR, W.F., CPhM(AA)(T), USN                          2
WEIGHILL, W.I., CCS(AA)(T), USNR                        5

23 June 1945:

1622(Y) Underway from Midway for Saipan in accordance with CTG 17.5
        despatch operation order 20-45. RASHER is Task Unit 17.3.54.
        Escorted by fighter planes.

1721(Y) Made trim dive.

                                   - 1 -                               ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 170 —
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

1737(Y) Surfaced.
1830(Y) Released plane escorts.
        Conducted daily training dives, fire control drills, and gun
        firing at balloon targets enroute SAIPAN.

25 June 1945:
0405(M) Crossed international date line.

26 June 1945:
0228(K) Received message from Comsubspac directing us to remain north of
        22 N until west of 162 E.
0535(L) Sent RASHER one acknowledging receipt of this message.

27 - 28 June 1945:
        Enroute SAIPAN.

29 June 1945:
0542(L) Exchanged recognition signals by SJ radar with U.S.S. MUSKALLUNGE
        and at 0545 sighted her bearing 290 T, range 8 miles. (Lat. 20-06 N,
        Long. 157-57 E).
1738(L) Sent RASHER two to CTG 17.7 requesting SAIPAN rendezvous.
2130(L) Received message from CTG 17.7 confirming rendezvous.

30 June 1945:
1310(L) Sighted U.S.S. BERGALL on opposite and parallel course bearing
        300 T, range 10 miles. Exchanged calls. (Lat. 18-20 N, Long.
        150-20 E).

1 July 1945:
1931(K) Exchanged recognition signals by SJ radar with U.S.S. SEA FOX who
        is behind us and with whom we are to rendezvous in the morning.
        During the night, passed various friendly surface ships.

2 July 1945:
0530(K) Made rendezvous with U.S.S. SEA FOX and escort, LCI 1098, and
        proceeded to SAIPAN.
1033(K) Moored alongside U.S.S. ORION, Saipan. Accomplished voyage repairs
        and received patrol instructions. Our destination is Sowespac.

- 2 -
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 173 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

11 July 1945:

          1200(I) Position
          Subic Bay

1407      Underway for patrol, RASHER is Task Unit 17.1.3, operation order
          #92-45. Our patrol area is Southwest of FORMOSA. We are to
          relieve CABRILLA and perform lifeguard services for the Fifth Air
          Force as required.

1542      Made trim dive and remained submerged for 2 hours while escort
          conducted "Baltimore " runs.

1750      Surfaced.

1800      Commenced radar tracking exercises using escort as target.

2046      Released escort. 3 Engine speed enroute area SW of FORMOSA.

12 July 1945:

          1200(I) Position
          Lat. 17-57 N
          Long. 118-25 E

          Sighted numerous friendly planes during the day.

1416      Made trim dive.

1441      Surfaced.

1522      PBY closed to 3 miles, pulled flare and submerged.

1546      Surfaced.

13 July 1945:

          1200(I) Position
          Lat. 21-38 N
          Long. 120-29 E

0130      Sent RASHER one to Fifth Air Force; stated that RASHER had relieved
          CABRILLA, gave them our position and reported for duty.

0450      Intercepted message for CABRILLA from Fifth Air Force requesting
          her services from 1130 to 1400(I) south of FORMOSA. CABRILLA had
          departed this area to search for survivors so we headed for life-
          guard station on four engines.

                                  - 5 -                         ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 174 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

0600 Sent RASHER two to Fifth Air Force requesting assigned lifeguard
     station be moved west so we could arrive at requested time of 1130(I).
1045 Established communications with our cover by voice on 4475.
1134 Sighted our cover, a PBY, and established communications by VHF.
1230 Arrived on lifeguard station, 20 miles due south of FORMOSA, with
     our PBY overhead.
1430 Our cover departed for base, after informing us no planes were down.
1532 Made trim dive.
1619 Surfaced. Patrolled east of FORMOSA.
2240 Received first of two messages from Fifth Air Force requesting us to
     perform lifeguard duty tomorrow.
2300 Received 2nd message.

14 July 1945:

1200(I) Position
Lat. 21-33 N
Long. 120-25 E

0724 SD contact, 8 miles, unidentified. Submerged.
0745 Surfaced.
0844 Sighted our cover, a PBY, bearing 110 T, range 5 miles. Established
     communications by VHF.
1030 Our cover reported no planes down and departed for base.
1100 SD contact 2 miles, unidentified. He may have been overhead and
     obscured by the brilliant sun. Submerged.
1158 Surfaced.
1204 Sighted our PBY cover for the afternoon strike. Established
     communications by VHF and vectored him to our position.
1330 Our cover informed us no planes were down and departed for his base.
2230 Received message from Fifth Air Force requesting we perform lifeguard
     duties tomorrow.

                                   - 6 -                               ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 175 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

15 July 1945:

                     1200(I) Position
                     Lat. 22-30 N
                     Long. 119-59 E

0514         Submerged west of TAKAO and commenced closing to the 100 fathom curve.

0700         Sighted unidentified plane heading north up the coast of FORMOSA.
             Seas are like glass and the sun in back of the land makes it
             difficult to fix our position. Used the fathomoter at frequent
             intervals.

0840         Sighted a PBM who was to be our cover for the strike this morning.
             Came to SD depth and attempted to communicate with him by VHF with
             no success.

1030         Made second unsuccessful attempt to communicate with our cover
             using 4475 Kcs.

1305         Sighted unidentified plane flying up the west coast of FORMOSA.

1845         Sighted two small escorts or PT boats bearing 080 T, range 8,000
             yards, angles on the bow alternately large port and starboard. They
             were making high speeds judging by their movement relative to the
             land in the back ground. They may have been sweeping a channel
             from TAKAO. (Ship Contact #1) We were to find out tomorrow these
             were definitely PT boats.

1859         Both PT boats out of sight; apparently they returned to TAKAO. We
             maintained our position here in hopes something would come out.

1920         Sighted sampan bearing 102 T, range 7,800 yards. (Ship Contact
             #2) He was headed for TAKAO.

2116         Surfaced. Patrolled across routes from TAKAO to the southwest.

16 July 1945:

                     1200(I) Position
                     Lat. 22-09 N
                     Long. 118-54 E

1426         SD contact 12 miles closing. This plane showed IFF but continued
             to close with a small angle. Submerged. While submerging,
             identified the plane as a B-24.

1430         Surfaced.

                                   - 7 -
                                                           ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 176 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

1815 Heading north 17 miles west of TAKAO when the high periscope sighted
      a HFM MARU bearing 000 T, range about 35,000 yards, angle on the bow
      40° port. (Ship Contact #3)

      Went to battle stations and commenced tracking to determine his base
      course. It appeared that he had come out of the PESCADORES CHANNEL
      and although his course was SW he was probably headed for TAKAO which
      would make his base course 150 T.

1821 Target bearing 000 T, range 30,000 yards, angle on the bow about
      60 port.

1832 c/c to 300 T to close the range.

1841 Target zigged left, angle on the bow 10 port.

1844 c/c to 240 T.

1853 Target zigged left again, angle on the bow 30° starboard.

1857 c/c to 090 T. It appeared now he was headed for TAKAO and so we
      commenced closing the track as rapidly as possible. We were closing
      land rapidly and would have to dive soon as the sun was still up.

1927 With the target bearing 350 T, angle on the bow 20 port, range
      25,000 yards, distance to land 10 miles, submerged and continued to
      close the track of his base course.

1937 At 50 feet, target bearing 346 T; only the tops of his masts were
      visible.

1939 Sound picked up high speed screws bearing 340.

1941 Sighted two PT boats, range about 7,000 yards, headed NW in the
      general direction of the target. (Ship Contact #4). They were
      the same boats we saw yesterday. It
      appeared they may be going out to bring the ship in and so we
      continued to close the track on which they had come out. We
      continued to search for the target but never saw him again. It was
      getting dark rapidly now, but a half-moon would enable us to see
      anything which came by.

2030 Sound picked up high speed screws bearing 270 T.

2032 Sighted the same 2 PT boats heading in towards TAKAO.

2041 PT's passed us at 2,000 yards and we tracked them at 15 kts. It
      appears they either went out to tell our target of our presence or
      else were looking for us, as we were probably sighted from the beach
      before we submerged.

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— page 177 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

2050 Sighted sweeping searchlight bearing 028 T.
2143 All clear. If our target had only been making 6 kts he would have
     been here by now. He probably closed the coast which put him 6 - 7
     miles from our position.
2144 Surfaced.
17 July 1945:
     1200(I) Position
     Lat. 21-34 N
     Long. 118-09 E
     Patrolling west of FORMOSA.
2245 Received message from Fifth Air Force requesting our services from
     1245 to 1400 tomorrow.

18 July 1945:
     1200(I) Position
     Lat. 21-42 N
     Long. 120-15 E
0804 Made trim dive near our lifeguard station and decided to remain
     submerged long enough to charge the torpedoes in the forward tubes.
1130 Sighted PBY bearing 070 T, range 8 miles.
1133 Surfaced.
1136 Established communications and sight contact with our PBY cover for
     today's strike.
1300 Our cover departed for his base after informing us there was no work
     to be done. We remained on station until 1400.
1400 Set course to move around to east coast of FORMOSA for night patrol
     and close in submerged patrol tomorrow.

19 July 1945:
     1200(I) Position
     Lat. 22-30 N
     Long. 120-59 E
0530 Submerged 10 miles east of FORMOSA and closed coastline. Patrolled
     from 2 - 3 miles off, running up the coast.

- 9 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 179 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

24 July 1945:

          1200(I) Position
          Lat. 21-27 N
          Long. 117-13 E

          Patrolling west of FORMOSA

1140      Made trim dive.
1158      Surfaced.
1514      Made practice dive.
1546      Surfaced.

25 July 1945:

          1200(I) Position
          Lat. 22-02 N
          Long. 120-36 E

0504      Submerged 15 miles west of southern tip of FORMOSA and commenced
          closing the beach. Patrolled 4 - 5 miles off the beach.

1409      Sighted unidentified plane bearing 320 T, range 10 miles, low,
          flying westward.

2041      Surfaced.

26 July 1945:

          1200(I) Position
          Lat. 21-12 N
          Long. 121-28 E

          Patrolling south and east of FORMOSA.

0549      SD contact 3 miles with JFF. Plane continued to close but was not
          sighted. Submerged.

0614      Surfaced.

27 July 1945:

          1200(I) Position
          Lat. 22-14 N
          Long. 119-09 E

          Patrolling west of FORMOSA.

- 11 -                                                    ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 183 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

4 August 1945:
    1200(I) Position
    Lat. 22-17 N
    Long. 119-19 E
    Patrolling west of FORMOSA.

0800    Having had no fix since 1 August, headed for FORMOSA to establish
        our position.
0852    Sighted PB4Y2 bearing 290 T, range 10 miles.
1300    Sighted PB4Y2 bearing 020 T, range 10 - 15 miles.
1320    Sighted sailing junk, bearing 056 T, range 8 miles. Headed towards
        (Ship Contact #6). He was about 25 miles due west of TAKAO.
1340    Established radar contact on junk at 6,000 yards. Went to battle
        stations surface.
1345    Fired 5 - inch shell close to junk. The junk's crew doused sails and
        hoisted a Chinese flag. Came alongside and identified the crew of 10
        men as being Chinese. There was nothing on board except a pile of
        fishing nets. They were very humble, on their knees, and by sign
        language indicated that they needed water. Gave them food and
        water and departed friends.
1444    Made trim dive.
1455    Surfaced.

5 August 1945:
    1200(I) Position
    Lat. 21-40 N
    Long. 119-40 E
    Patrolling west of FORMOSA.

1335    Sighted PB4Y2 bearing 300 T, range 10 miles. Exchanged calls with
        him by VHF.
1745    Received message from CTF 71 directing us to remain in the area
        until relieved by the COMSUB 8 about 8 August.
2052    Shortly after dumping garbage sacks over the port side, an excessive
        vibration occurred apparently coming from the port screw. Stopped
        and maneuvered at various speeds. The vibration soon disappeared
        and at 4 engine speed conditions appeared to be normal.

                                                                    - 15 -
                                                                    ENCLOSURE (A).

— page 185 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

0430 Received message from Fifth Air Force assigning us a lifeguard
     station for a strike today at 1130.
0605 Sighted PB4Y2 bearing 240 T, range 14 miles.
1100 On lifeguard station.
1130 Sighted our cover, a B-17, at 5 miles. He commenced circling us.
1300 Our cover departed after informing us no pilots were down. Seas
     began making up in the afternoon which was probably a result of the
     typhoon to the west of us.
2315 Received message from Fifth Air Force assigning us a lifeguard
     station for a strike tomorrow at 1030.

8 August 1945:
     1200(I) Position
     Lat. 21-25 N
     Long. 120-50 E

     Patrolling west and south of FORMOSA.

0821 Sighted PB4Y-2 bearing 095 T, range 10 miles.
0912 Sighted unidentified plane bearing 060 T, range 12 miles. Plane
     showed IFF but continued to close with a zero angle.
0917 Submerged.
0925 Identified plane as a B-17 through the periscope.
0933 Surfaced. Headed for lifeguard station with our B-17 cover over us.
0952 SD contact 7 miles, no IFF.
0953 Sighted 2 engine fighter plane on our starboard bow coming out of
     the clouds, high, and closing fast.
     Submerged. 2 or 3 bombs exploded, not close, while we were still at
     30 feet.
1015 Surfaced. Continued to head for lifeguard station. Informed our
     cover on VHF that we would submerge when we arrived on lifeguard
     station, but would continue to communicate with him.
1048 Submerged on lifeguard station.
1143 Surfaced.

- 17 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 187 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

1530 Made trim dive and conducted 2 hours "Baltimore Runs" with escort.
1730 Surfaced. Commenced radar tracking exercises using escort as target.
2030 Parted company with escort. Headed for SIAM GULF via JOINT ZONE.

12 August 1945:

          1200(I) Position
          Lat. 13-46 N
          Long. 115-42 E

          Enroute patrol area.

1130 Sighted plane bearing 115 T, range 6 miles. No IFF. Unable to identif
          plane. Submerged.
1225 Surfaced.

13 August 1945:

          1200(I) Position
          Lat. 10-15 N
          Long. 111-24 E

          Enroute patrol area.

0931 Sighted Privateer bearing 240 T, range 8 miles.
1037 Test fired all guns.
1356 Made trim dive.
1407 Surfaced.

14 August 1945:

          1200(I) Position
          Lat. 7-33 N
          Long. 106-23 E

          Enroute patrol area.

0928 Made trim dive.
0936 Surfaced.

15 August 1945:

          1200(I) Position
          Lat. 7-33 N
          Long. 107-23 E

- 19 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 188 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

Patrolling in SIAM GULF.

0725 Submerged 8 miles north of GREAT REDANG ISLAND.
0925 Sighted sail bearing 339 T. (Ship Contact #7)
1010 Surfaced. Headed for sailing junk sighted at 0925.
1023 Went to battle stations surface.
1031 Fired 2 shots across bow of sailing junk. Junk doused his sails.
1036 Came alongside junk and sent boarding party over. Discovered cargo
     of rice aboard and commenced to jettison same. The crew of the junk
     was composed of Malaysians, and their papers indicated they were working
     for the Japs.
1101 Sighted 2 planes bearing 180 T, range 12 miles. Cleared the bridge.
1120 Planes out of sight, commenced circling junk and forced natives to
     jettison the remainder of the cargo which amounted to about 2 tons of
     rice.
1235 Headed up the GULF OF SIAM toward the fishing fleets.
1400 Received serial Love from CTF 71 which directed us to cease offensive
     operations against Japanese forces.
1504 Exchanged calls and mutual cheers with CARBONERO who was headed out of
     the gulf towards PULO TENGGOL.
1800 Received serial Nan from CTF 71 which directed us to proceed to
     SUBIC BAY.
1803 Headed for SUBIC BAY.
2200 Sent RASHER fifth to CTF 71 acknowledging CTF 71 serials Love and Nan
2202 Received serial How from CTF 71 which we missed as a result of the
     morning dive. This directed us to cease operations against small craft.

16 August 1945:

1200(I) Position
Lat. 7-47 N
Long. 106-49 E

Enroute SUBIC BAY

- 20 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 191 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject:         U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS
Contact No. (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)

Date        7-15-45       7-15-45       7-16-45       7-16-45       7-28-45
Time (I)    1850          1920          1815          1940          1755

Lat. (N)    22-34         22-34         22-05         22-38         22-18
Long. (E)   119-56        119-55        119-56        120-00        118-29

Type        PT Boats      Sampan        MFI MARU      PT Boats      Junk
            (2)                                       (2)

Int. Range  8,000 yds     7,800 yds     35,000 yds    7,000 yds     20,000 yds

Course Est. Patrolling    090           150           Patrolling    090
Speed       15 kts        5 kts         Unknown       15 kts        5 kts

How Con-    Periscope     Periscope     High Peris-   Periscope     High
tacted                                  cope                        Periscope

Remarks     -       Unable to     Avoided       Boarded &
                                        close                       found to be
                                                                    Chinese

Contact No. (6)           (7)

Date        8-4-45        8-15-45
Time (I)    1320          0925

Lat. (N)    22-35         7-28
Long. (E)   119-30        107-25

Type        Junk          Junk

Int. Range  20,000 yds    10,000 yds

Course Est. 270           180
Speed       5 kts         5 kts

How Con-    High Peris-   Periscope
tacted      cope

Remarks     Boarded and   Boarded. Crew
            found to be   was Malayan.
            Chinese       Jettisoned cargo
                          of rice.

- 23 -                                                ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 196 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

     No density layers were observed.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABILITY

     The health of all hands was excellent throughout the patrol.
Several cases of prickly heat occurred, which were cleared up within a
short period of time. Only 3 days were spent submerged. Food was good
throughout the patrol. As usual, the boat was dry and comfortable
surface and submerged.

(Q) PERSONNEL

     (a) Number of men detached after previous patrol - 20
     (b) Number of men on board during patrol - 78
     (c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol - 61
     (d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - 69
     (e) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol - 5

     Seven men were advanced in rating during this patrol.

     The state of training is considered excellent. Daily school of
the boat was held for unqualified personnel.

     The Commanding Officer desires to take this opportunity to
particularly commend the engineers, electricians, radiomen, auxiliarymen
and radar technicians of this vessel for the splendid work they have
done in keeping their equipment in top notch condition at all times.
Appropriate entries have been made in the service records of the men
considered primarily responsible.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

     Midway to Saipan | 2,732 miles | 38,000 Gallons
     Saipan to Subic Bay | 2,422 miles | 33,000 Gallons
     Subic Bay to Patrol Area | 538 miles | 10,325 Gallons
     In Patrol Area | 7,728 miles | 100,055 Gallons
     Patrol Area to Subic Bay | 520 miles | 10,000 Gallons
     Subic Bay to Patrol Area | 1,350 miles | 19,000 Gallons
     In Patrol Area | 183 miles | 2,500 Gallons
     Patrol Area to Subic Bay | 1,350 miles | 17,000 Gallons

(S) DURATION

     Days enroute Midway to Saipan - 8
     Days enroute Saipan to Subic Bay - 7
     Days enroute Subic Bay to Patrol Areas - 6
     Days in Areas - 28
     Days enroute Patrol Areas to Subic Bay - 5
     Days Submerged - 3

- 28 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 198 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of War Patrol Number EIGHT,

(U) COMMUNICATIONS, RADAR, AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES (Continued)

| Number        | 6         | 7           | 8           | 9           | 10          |
|||||||
| Date          | 7-22-45   | 7-23-45     | 7-27-45     | 7-28-45     | 8-4-45      |
| Lat. (N)      | 22-24     | 22-01       | 22-32       | 22-10       | 22-38       |
| Long. (E)     | 119-26    | 119-19      | 119-52      | 120-51      | 119-42      |
| HCS           | 152       | 70          | 165         | 92          | 163         |
| PRF           | 1000      | 500         | 500         | 750         | 500         |
| Pulse Width   | 10        | --          | 10          | 13          | 12          |
| Probable      | FORMOSA   | FORMOSA     | FORMOSA     | FORMOSA     | FORMOSA     |
| Source        |           |             |             |             |             |
| Keyed         | No        | No          | No          | Yes         | No          |
|               |           |             |             | (Medium     |             |
|               |           |             |             | Strength)   |             |
| Sweep         | Yes       | Yes         | Yes         | No          | Yes         |
|               |           | (Very Weak) | (Med. Str.) |             | (Med. Str.) |
| Sweep Rate    | Irregular | Irregular   | Irregular   |             | Irregular   |
| Pulse Shape   | [HANDWRITTEN: ~] |             |             |             |             |
| (V) REMARKS   | None      |             |             |             |             |

- 30 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 199 —
FC5-22/A16-3
Serial 0209
CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269)
Report of Eighth War Patrol.

From: Commander Submarine Squadron Twenty-two.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.
(2) Commander, Seventh Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

1. The U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) departed MIDWAY on 23 June 1945 for
her eighth and last patrol of World War II. Lieutenant Commander C.D. NACE, U.S.
Navy, commanding. The patrol was of 58 days duration and was terminated by the
cessation of hostilities on 15 August 1945.

2. Twenty-seven days were devoted to lifeguard services for the
Fifth Air Force in the vicinity of southern FORMOSA. Altho orbitted for numerous
strikes all planes returned safely. One possible torpedo target was sighted
entering TAKAO but could not be closed for attack. Two Chinese junks were in-
spected and allowed to proceed when found to be empty. RASHER was caught on the
surface and bombed twice during this period but miraculously escaped damage.

3. After an overnight stop at SUBIC BAY on 10 August 1945 for fuel,
food and ammunition RASHER continued her patrol for one day in the SIAM GULF. At
1031 on 15 August 1945, she announced her arrival on station by firing two rounds
of five inch across the bow of a Malayan cargo carrying junk, boarded her and
jettisoned a cargo of rice. Thus was the proud war record of the gallant ship
RASHER brought to a close. At 1400 cease firing orders were received. At 1800
RASHER was recalled to SUBIC.

4. RASHER returned from this long patrol clean and in excellent
material condition. There are no serious defects and her refit will be accomp-
lished in the normal period by the U.S.S. HOWARD W. GILMORE and Submarine Division
221 Relief Crew.

5. Commander Submarine Squadron Twenty-two takes pleasure in welcoming
the U.S.S. RASHER alongside and with the greatest of pride congratulates the
Commanding Officer, officers and men on the RASHER's outstanding contribution to
the successful conclusion of the war.

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY-TWO
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
20 August 1945.

[SIGNATURE: E. S. Hutchinson]
E. S. HUTCHINSON.

— page 200 —
F224-71/A16-3
CONFIDENTIAL
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS RASHER Conf. Ltr.
A16-3 Serial 016, dated
19 August 1945. Report
of Eighth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Eighth War Patrol -
         Comment on.

1. The Eighth War Patrol of the RASHER under the command
of Lieutenant Commander C. D. MACE, U.S.N., was conducted off FORMOSA
and in the GULF of SIAM.

2. The first phase of the patrol was devoted to the per-
formance of lifeguard duty off Southern FORMOSA. There were no
opportunities for rescue. RASHER then fueled at SUBIC and patrolled
the GULF of SIAM for one day before her patrol was terminated by the
cessation of hostilities.

3. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is not
authorized for this patrol.

4. The Force Commander is proud of this fighting ship and
of her great war record, and congratulates the Commanding Officer,
officers and crew of the RASHER upon the completion of this last war
patrol, which was concluded by peace overtures from the enemy.

[STAMP: RECEIVED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 8]
[STAMP: Room 2055]
[STAMP: FILE COPY]
[STAMP: 5 SEP 1945]
[STAMP: In File No. (W)] [HANDWRITTEN: 185060]
[STAMP: Reg No.]
[STAMP: Copy No.]
[STAMP: By] [HANDWRITTEN: M]

UNITED STATES NAVY
12/hr
24 August 1945

JAMES FIFE.
[STAMP: SEP 6-]

-1-

— page 201 —
F24-71/A16-3
UNITED STATES NAVY
12/hr
Serial 0458-A
[STAMP: CONFIDENTIAL]
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
24 August 1945

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS RASHER Conf. Ltr.
A16-3 Serial 016, dated
19 August 1945. Report
of Eighth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Eighth War Patrol -
Comment on.

— page 202 —
REG. NO [HANDWRITTEN: P-1931]
PHILIPPINE SEA FRONTIER. S. NO [HANDWRITTEN: 10 C1778]
REG. SHEET NO [HANDWRITTEN: 175]

Phil/F3/mdd
A4-3(1)(8)

Serial: 0916

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS RASHER Conf. ltr.
A16-3, Serial 016,
dated 19 August 1945.

8 - OCT 1945

From: Commander Philippine Sea Frontier.
To : Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Subject: USS RASHER (SS 269) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

2. Routing has been changed to substitute Commander Philip-
pine Sea Frontier for Commander Seventh Fleet, as Commander Submarines
Seventh Fleet is now Commander Submarines Philippine Sea Frontier.

[SIGNATURE: N. C. Gillett]
N. C. GILLETTE
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
ComSubsPSF

— page 203 —
[HANDWRITTEN: NRS 1977-35]

[HANDWRITTEN: RASHER (SS-269)]
[HANDWRITTEN: WORLD WAR II REPORTS]

[HANDWRITTEN: ALL MATERIAL ON THIS REEL IS DECLASSIFIED]

[HANDWRITTEN: 16 MM]

— page 204 —
Office of Naval Records and History
Ships' Histories Section
Navy Department

HISTORY OF USS RASHER (SS 269)

The submarine USS RASHER amassed a brilliant war record during
her eight war patrols in World War II. For her highly successful
first, third, fourth and fifth war patrols, she was awarded the
Presidential Unit Citation.

USS RASHER was built by the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company at
Manitowoc, Wisconsin where her keel was laid on 4 May 1942.
Launched on 20 December 1942, the submarine was sponsored by Mrs.
G. C. Weaver, wife of Commander G. C. Weaver, USN, then Supervisor
of Shipbuilding, Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company.

USS RASHER was commissioned on 8 June 1943 with Commander E.
S. Hutchinson, USN, installed as the first commanding officer of
the submarine. The new submarine departed Manitowoc on 27 June
1943 for New Orleans via Great Lakes, Illinois River and Mississippi
River in floating Drydock, arriving at New Orleans on 3 July 1943.

Departing from New Orleans on 10 July, RASHER arrived at the
Canal Zone on the 16th to commence a 21-day training period at
Perlas Islands, Gulf of Panama. By 8 August, RASHER was on her
way to Australia, crossing the Equator on 17 August and arriving
at Brisbane, Australia on 11 September 1943. From New Orleans,
RASHER had at this time steamed 9,600 nautical miles.

Final preparations for her first war patrol were made at
Brisbane, and, after a short stop at Darwin on 2-3 October, RASHER
departed for her first war patrol area in Makassar Strait and
South Celebes Sea.

On 4 October, RASHER was forced down by an unidentified
plane and the captain decided to remain submerged for his approach
to Ambon to arrive without being sighted. At dawn the sub arrived
off Ambon and a Sampan, apparently aware of the RASHER's presence
stopped over the point of submergence and stayed around the
vicinity for about three hours.

While patrolling the approaches to Manipa and Kelang Pass on
the night of 8-9 October, RASHER sighted smoke on the horizon and
approached to develop an attack. It was a bright moonlit night
and two ships were determined to be steaming together. After
changing course and foiling the first attack approach, RASHER made
an end run and divided her spread of torpedoes between the two
ships. The torpedoes missed the first ship and sank the second.
The ship that was missed dropped a few depth charges and opened
fire with a deck gun, but inflicted no damage on RASHER.

While patrolling off Ambon on the morning of 13 October, smoke
was sighted coming out of the harbor and four ships soon appeared
over the horizon, two tramp merchantmen with escorts. A float

— page 205 —
-2- USS RASHER (SS 269)

type plane was also noticed hovering over the ships. RASHER managed
to get off a salvo of three torpedoes for each of the two merchant-
men before an explosion, believed to have been an aerial bomb,
drove her down deep. Four explosions were heard at times agreeing
with the estimated torpedo run to the targets, but no actual hits
were observed.

A depth charge attack of 23 or 24 explosions were heard but
none came very close. Noises were also heard of ships breaking
up. Upon surfacing for a look about two hours later, no smoke
could be seen and RASHER commenced a search for any remains of the
convoy.

RASHER had no further opportunity to fire until 31 October.
She was patrolling the sea lanes from Balikpapan to Truk. At 1429
the masts of a ship were sighted on the horizon very close to the
Celebes shoreline. A float-type plane was also noticed near the
ship and RASHER trailed the target until dark. She then surfaced
and started chasing the ship which appeared to be a tanker. A
spread of three torpedoes fired from the stern tubes apparently
missed but two minutes and 29 seconds after firing, a flash and
explosion were seen from the bridge, followed by another ten
seconds later. The time of the explosion did not check with the
time of the torpedo run but the tanker nevertheless burst into flames
and burst into flames. The glare from the fire illuminated the
entire area and intermittent explosions continued until 2345 when
the ship evidently sank.

In the early afternoon of 8 November 1943, a medium-sized
tanker with escort was sighted. RASHER moved into position to
fire a spread of torpedoes from her stern tubes. Just before
firing a Jap lookout dressed in yellow polo shirt and cap, raised
his binoculars and looked in the direction of the sub. Shortly
after, two hits were observed on the target. The Jap ship swung
around 90 degrees and appeared dead in the water and slightly
down by the stern.

The escort vessel cut her bow toward RASHER and commenced drop-
ping depth charges. The skipper took the sub deep and rigged for
silent running. After sporadically dropping depth charges, the
escort commenced pinging for about an hour and 20 minutes. RASHER
then surfaced to find nothing in sight.

On 9 November, RASHER moved to Mangkalibat for the remainder
of her patrol. A group of ships was sighted and trailed in the
early morning. It was bright moonlight, RASHER could not make
a radar approach within 4,000 yards without being detected. She
therefore attempted to stay ahead of the targets until dawn.
However, another vessel appeared ahead of the submarine and forced
her to dive, reverse course and make a radar and periscope approach.

— page 206 —
-3- USS RASHER (SS 269)

At 0119, two of the ships were recognized as large tankers of
about 10,000 tons. These ships were selected as the prime targets
and four torpedoes were unleashed at the first and the remaining
two torpedoes leapt out after the second tanker. A third ship
was recognized as a large destroyer and the second tanker fired a
rocket and signalled to the destroyer. Out of torpedoes, RASHER
could do nothing more than save herself, which she did by rigging
for depth charging and taking evasive action. No explosions were
heard at the end of the torpedo runs in the conning tower but the
forward and after torpedo rooms reported hearing hits. A few depth
charges rumbled down into the murky depths for RASHER but they did
not find their target. About an hour later, RASHER surfaced in a
heavy rain squall. Later that day a patrol vessel was sighted
pinging for a submarine but with her torpedoes expended, RASHER
was on her way to Australia. Before she cleared the area, she
sighted a Japanese patrol craft about the same time the sub was
sighted. The Jap vessel fired white rockets and exchanged recogni-
tion signals which RASHER sidestepped her and opened the distance.
The searchlight from the ship played on RASHER and a few rounds of
shells reached out for the sub but they only served as a farewell
salute. RASHER then set course for Fremantle, Australia via
Molucca Passage. Enroute she fell afoul of several more patrol
craft, one of which, on 11 November, kept the submarine pinned down
with her sound equipment from 0215 until 2158. As a last shot at
RASHER, an unidentified patrol bomber bombed her on the 20th
while she was submerging. Despite her frequent hostile encounters,
the sub arrived safely and undamaged at Fremantle on 24 November.

During the refit period, Commander E. S. Hutchinson was relieved
by Lieutenant Commander W. R. Laughon, USN, as commanding officer
of RASHER, on 9 December 1943.

Departing from Perth, Australia on 19 December 1943, RASHER
set out for her second war patrol, this time in the area of the
South China Sea. "Lady Luck" did not come aboard RASHER on her
second war patrol. Torpedo performance was marred by at least 6
premature explosions. Seven contacts were made
with targets worthy of torpedoes. The first contact was a small
freighter which was sighted while making a dawn dive on 26
December. The ship could not be closed submerged and a surface
chase was considered unwise at this stage of the patrol. The
second attack was made with an escorted Jap freighter after RASHER
had been forced down by an air patrol. The third contact was a
freak long range sighting caused by a mirage on the glassy surface,
and the targets were lost while pursuing. The fourth contact, on
27 December, was made on a high-speed target with an unfavorable
attack angle in restricted waters; successful pursuit was impos-
sible.

The new year, 1944, found RASHER enroute to Bulo Condore,
South China Sea. "Happy New Year" was observed by an entry in the
ship's log. The submarine USS BLUEFISH was also in the vicinity

— page 207 —
-4- USS RASHER (SS 269)

and RASHER exchanged messages to coordinate an attack on a three-
ship convoy with escort. Darkness was closing in on 4 January
1944 when RASHER went in to make the first attack on what developed
to be a convoy of three tankers.

Gain a favorable firing position, RASHER selected a tanker
fired the first of four torpedoes. However, the first torpedo ex-
ploded prematurely about 400 yards from the sub, completely
obscuring the target and spoiling the attack. The ship turned
sharply to the left and commenced firing 20 millimeter tracer
shells and her broadside gun through a 90 degree arc. The tanker
showed a red light from the masthead for about 20 minutes and
appeared to be hit as he was stopped, swinging around on various
headings and making no apparent effort to escape. From 9 to 16
minutes after firing, three underwater explosions were heard and
felt from the target direction, but no flashes other than gunfire
were observed on the bridge. It appeared that the second torpedo
scored a hit.

An exchange of gunfire and explosions indicated that BLUEFISH
was taking her section of ships under attack. One of the tankers
under fire from BLUEFISH burst into flames which quickly enveloped
the entire ship.

Closing for another attack, RASHER fired six torpedoes from her
bow tubes. The second and the fifth torpedoes erupted prematurely.
The first and fourth torpedoes ripped into the tanker sides
causing heavy explosions which vibrated through the submarine.

After midnight, RASHER closed another target and after stalk-
ing her prey she move in for the kill. The ship appeared to be
a very large tanker and the skipper carefully fired four torpedoes
toward her. The first and second torpedoes exploded prematurely
and the submariners were something less than happy over the erratic
torpedoes which they were risking their lives to fire. However,
the third and fourth torpedoes scored hits and the ship exploded
as flames shot high into the sky. The explosions continued and
smoke and flame spread all over the ship and reached several ship
lengths on either side.

After watching the hugh tanker burn and settle for several
minutes, RASHER drew away from the scene because the flames were
making a beacon for miles around and planes were expected any
minute. About the time the submarine had drawn 20 miles away, the
flames which had almost died down, shot up into the air again
and then the flames and glow disappeared completely as the ship
apparently sank.

RASHER then proceeded to patrol the sea lanes between the
Empire, Takao and Singapore. On 11 January, the sub was patrolling
3 to 5 miles east of Cape Varella Light when a Jap escort vessel
was sighted. The submarine skipper hoped that he was on his way
to meet a south-bound convoy. His hope was later rewarded when
two transports appeared on a southerly course. After a very

— page 208 —
-5- USS RASHER (SS 269)

difficult approach, hampered by unfortunate zig-zags, rain squalls,
and patrol vessels patrolling ahead of RASHER. She moved in close to
the shore to bring the convoy against the background of the rising
moon. RASHER's position was embarrassed by the ships hugging the
coastline to within one mile and several escorts pinging up just
where the submarine had hoped to gain a firing position. The sub
was thus forced to delay her attack until after she had passed
Camranh Bay. Finally, at 2217, RASHER was able to fire a spread
of 3 torpedoes at the No.#1 target. The first torpedo hit with a
tremendous explosion which knocked out lights throughout the sub
and popped the paint off the bulkheads. A hasty set-up on the
second target failed to produce any hits.

The escorts commenced pinging and firing depth charges. But
since they were not very close, it was apparent that RASHER's
position was not known. After the escorts had cleared the area,
the sub did likewise. With only one torpedo remaining, RASHER
could not follow the ships into shallow water.

On 17 January, two ships were picked up by radar and, after
closing the distance, they were sighted from the bridge; one escort
and one large, beautiful cargo ship of 10,500 tons. With only one
torpedo, the captain of RASHER was very careful to use it judicious-
ly. However, again his approach was fouled and foiled by running
into rain squalls, sailboats, escorts and embarrassing course
changes on the part of the numerous befouling boats and the target.
With admirable tenacity, RASHER continued after the target from
0437 until finally gaining a firing position at 1952. The
precious, last torpedo was carefully sent on its way only to blow
itself to bits 20 seconds after leaving the torpedo tube. It was
a hat-smashing disappointment!

A weary, aggressive, but luckless group of submariners pulled
into Freemantle, Australia when RASHER arrived on 24 January 1944.
By the end of their second war patrol, they were seeing premature
torpedoes in their nightmares.

Following a refit period, RASHER got underway for her third
war patrol on 19 February 1944, to be conducted in the Java and
Celebes Seas. After making a rendezvous with the submarine USS
RATON, plans for a coordinated search were made. The first tar-
gets were not long in appearing through intermittent rain squalls
and RASHER worked into position to fire four torpedoes at the
larger of the two Japanese freighters. The first of two escorts
had gone by ahead of the large freighter before firing, and three
hits out of four interrupted the freighter's voyage.

As the escort wheeled around to see what had happened, RASHER
immediately started to locate the second freighter. The escort
vessel returned to RASHER's firing position and made a wide sweep
in a futile search for the freighter which had been sunk.

— page 209 —
-6- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Crossing astern of the second freighter, RASHER came to a
firing position on the opposite side from the second escort and
fired another spread of four torpedoes. The first torpedo hit
forward and the second hit under the stack, sending up a tremendous
column of black smoke and debris. The ship appeared to sag in
the middle after this hit. A third torpedo then crashed into the
stern and any question as to the ship's future was definitely
settled. She began to settle aft, slowly at first, and then
rapidly until the water folded over the ship completely.

The submarine RATON, during this action, was closing the
scene but RASHER was in the most favorable position for approach
and attack. The skipper of RASHER informed RATON that there were
no more targets, he apologized for hogging the show and cleared
the area. The escorts were last seen circling in the area with
nothing left to escort and with an embarrassing report to write
up before returning to port.

Finding no further targets in this general area RASHER crossed
the Equator on 28 February and headed for the traffic lanes in
the Celebes Sea between Basilan Strait and Halmahera. Fishing
boats and nets with glass floats were the only things contacted
besides patrol planes until, on 3 March, an exceptionally alert
lookout, Seaman Cashel, sighted indications of smoke on the horizon
to the westward. Surging ahead at full speed, RASHER drew within
visual range of nine ships, three of them escorts. The ships
appeared to be transports or freighters steaming in two columns
with an escort on either side and one trailing astern. It was a
favorable picture through the periscope except for a Sally bomber
hovering over the convoy and a sudden course change which forced
RASHER to trail them until dark.

At 1937, one of the ships in the rear of the formation appar-
ently sighted the sub and opened fire with a deck gun and then
with 2 or 3 guns of four or five-inch calibre. The firing was
taken up by the escort on the port bow of the convoy as he headed
toward RASHER. A chase ensued in which the escort gunfire was
observed to be not of the fleshless type though the shells were
splashless.

By outrunning the escort, RASHER worked around to a position
ahead of the convoy to await the moon set at 0100 before coming
in for a firing run. At this point the sub's radar went out of
order so the skipper submerged and headed for the center of the
convoy. Picking out the nearest large target, the skipper fired
the first of three torpedoes at 0230. While quickly planning the
second victim, the first two torpedoes were heard to hit. The
periscope was turned to bring the first target into view just as
the third torpedo exploded near the ship's stern.

Three more torpedoes were unleashed as RASHER swung around to
bring her stern tubes to bear on a ship that was bearing down on
her. However, the Jap ship was only 600 yards away and RASHER

— page 210 —
-7- USS RASHER (SS 269)

still had 90 degrees to turn in order to fire a straight stern
shot down the freighters throat. A quick sweep around the
horizon with the periscope revealed the ship previously hit was
completely obscured by a pall of heavy smoke. There was also an
escort, about 1500 yards away, headed for the sub with the well-
known "bone in his teeth."

None too soon, RASHER dove as the freighter passed overhead
and let go with a depth charge that shook the sub from stem to
stern. However, no damage was done to RASHER and the subsequent
depth charge explosions were at a more comfortable distance.

The persistent escort ship lurked over the submarine from 2249
until 2340, alternately listening and then speeding up his screws
while coming in for another depth charge drop. After surfacing at
0004, RASHER set out to regain contact with the remaining ships of
the convoy. The one Jap escort was circling around at 11 knots,
apparently searching for survivors. However, not wishing to be
sighted, RASHER skirted around the escort to pursue the ships of
the convoy. Another contact was picked up and followed but it
turned out to be a motor whale boat and RASHER set course for
the Balikpapan-Palau traffic route.

On the night of 4 March, another exceptional lookout sighted
a puff of smoke in the moonlight 15 miles away to the south.
Taking after the contact, RASHER found out that the ship was an
anti-submarine patrol which was on the lookout for a certain
audacious submarine. Several shots were fired at RASHER before
a safe distance could be opened.

Contact on the convoy was again established at 0037 and RASHER
pulled ahead of the Jap ships to track them until the moon had
set. The convoy appeared to consist of five large ships and two
or three escorts. With her bow and stern torpedo tubes readied,
RASHER charged in and fired two torpedoes from her bow tubes at a
large freighter. While swinging the sub around for a stern shot,
the skipper watched both torpedoes run under the target. Four
torpedoes were fired at the second large cargo ship. The control
party informed the captain when the torpedoes were due to hit and
he watched the ship receive one hit which made the smoke billow
out.

RASHER took time out to reload the last four torpedoes in
her stern tubes. The two trailing ships in the convoy were selected
as the recipients because they were the largest and closest, which
was important because daylight was an hour away. As RASHER swung
around to bring her stern tubes to bear on the cargo ships, two
escorts were seen closing in directly toward the sub. A hasty
set-up caused the torpedoes to miss and three of them were heard
to explode at the
end of their runs. Flame was sighted on the
horizon at 0503 and RASHER hustled in the direction to investigate.
The officer of the deck later sighted a shower of sparks in the air.

— page 211 —
-8- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Looking through the periscope upon drawing near, the smoke and
explosions were found to be from the convoy attacked before dawn.
There were four cargo ships or passenger cargo ships with three
escorts. They were zig-zagging madly, but, being without torpedoes,
RASHER could only shoot with her camera.

On 8 March, RASHER pulled into Melville Island to reload
torpedoes before continuing her patrol in the vicinity of Lombok
Strait. On 13 March, a tug was sighted with a barge in tow, moving
close along the north coast of Lombok. A patrol craft was sighted
ahead of the tug, but the sub had apparently been sighted by this
time since the anti-submarine vessel was making about 20 knots
toward the sub. FLASHER could not open the distance on the Jap
ship and when the range closed to 4400 shells were heard whistling
overhead and falling to either side. As a defensive measure,
RASHER took the offensive with four torpedoes. The escort apparent-
ly saw the wake of the first torpedo and spun around on a new
course. All four torpedoes missed and the last two broached, but
it halted the chase as it caused the Jap skipper to consider the
possible consequences of heroism.

RASHER drew away from one patrol craft and encountered two
more. There were now three Jap patrol craft after her, all of
them pouring out black smoke and making about 20 knots. One of
them began to fire his 4.7-inch gun but the splashes were all
short. However, the escorts were drawing closer to RASHER and she
had been forced into shallow water. The skipper hoped to hold
out until he passed Sepanjang Island before diving, after an hour's
run with water 60 or more fathoms. The Japs were firing too close
for safety at 0150, when RASHER reached water that was deep
enough to dive. With clear visibility and a full moon, the sub
would never be able to evade the patrol craft before daylight by
running on the surface. As soon as RASHER submerged, the ships
commenced echo ranging and headed directly for the sub. Starting
down deep, RASHER was at 180 feet below the surface when 11
fairly close depth charges rocked the sub, breaking light bulbs
and putting the sound gear out of commission.

After much starting and stopping of screws and pinging of
sound gear, the escorts dropped five more depth charges. The
ships continued to patrol the area very thoroughly to prevent
RASHER from leaving the area before daylight. At 0550, RASHER
came up for a periscope sweep to see if the area was clear enough
to slip through the patrols. Two patrol vessels were still in
sight, the nearest one about 2,500 yards away. As RASHER pulled
away at periscope depth, four vessels or their smoke were in
sight until 0950.

During the day RASHER worked on her radar which was not
working reliably. After dark the radar was tested on Sepanjang
Island for about an hour; it was still not working properly. Two
contacts on ships during the night proved to be patrol craft echo
ranging and they were avoided. The surface was oily smooth on

— page 212 —
-9- USS RASHER (SS 269)

14 March and since the area was heavily patrolled with both air-
craft and surface ships, RASHER was forced to submerge fairly
deep between periscope observations. Two small cargo ships were
sighted during the morning and when RASHER passed 80 feet on her
way up for another look, at 0855, she received one depth charge or
bomb from an aircraft. Another very close depth charge rattled
through the sub breaking steam lines, lamps and putting the
periscope out of focus. At this point the skipper took her down
deep since the escorts were speeding up and the sub was not close
enough to the targets to get off a worthwhile shot even if the
cargo ships hadn't already zigged away.

Depth charges thundered around RASHER fairly close but not
close enough to damage the sub. The escorts started echo ranging,
alternately listening until , at 1404, she reached periscope depth
to find the sea clear. While the escorts continued pinging and
dropping depth charges about ten miles away, RASHER set course
to patrol off the northwestern coast of Bali.

The officer of the deck sighted a submarine on 19 March and
a pursuit was made for firing position. A spread of four torpedoes
was fired but the Japanese submarine spotted the torpedo tracks
and turned off course. It was an RO-51 type submarine with a large
size merchant flag painted on the conning tower.

After a discouraging number of ship contacts developed into
anti-submarine patrols, it was refreshing to sight the smoke from
a convoy of ships on 27 March. After RASHER started her approach
toward the sub and she headed between the two
leading ships. With targets overlapping, the captain fired four
torpedoes at the nearest ship and two more at the more distant
one. The first noise of the first hit was heard in the conning
tower, but no explosion appeared through the periscope.

A loud explosion, heard throughout the sub, was a hit on the
first target fired at. It struck just abaft the stack. Three
rapid explosions were then heard and debris could be seen splash-
ing in the water astern of the first target. Another loud explo-
sion was heard and a huge pillar of orange-red flame burst and
rose about 500 feet into the air. Making a sweep around with the
periscope, the captain saw one of the cargo ships charging in
directly toward RASHER. Two escorts were following suit and
although a good surface show was going on, the captain decided to
go deep. The screws of the cargo ship were the first to be heard
whirring overhead and in a few minutes the first eleven depth
charges blasted the water around the sub. The explosions knocked
some cork off but did no other damage. Three escorts, plying
for RASHER, dropped 24 more depth charges from 0910 to 1017.

Two tremendous explosions were heard at 13 seconds apart. They
were apparently from the first ship attacked as a cargo of oil or
ammunition blew up. Following the explosion, sounds were heard
of a ship breaking up. The escorts also began to work back in
RASHER's direction with renewed vigor.

— page 213 —
-10- USS RASHER (SS 269)

After the escorts moved far enough away, RASHER came up for a
periscope sweep. Two remaining cargo ships were seen with three
escorts milling around 8,500 yards away. One of the ships had a
boom over the side and, in a few minutes, picked up a lifeboat.
The two ships then commenced steaming around in tight circles,
apparently looking for additional survivors while the escorts con-
tinued their submarine hunt.

RASHER had completed reloading her torpedo tubes and headed
for the remaining two ships. A Betty type bomber was soon search-
ing for a very unpopular submarine and later, a Jake type recon-
naissance plane was also spotted. At least three planes were
hovering over the area and the hornets nest was stirred up to the
point where RASHER could not follow the remains of the convoy.
The remainder of the patrol brought no further targets and RASHER
pulled into Fremantle on 4 April 1944, drawing to a close her
third war patrol.

RASHER moored alongside the tender USS ORION for a refit
period followed by training exercises with USS CHANTICLEER and
USS ISABEL. Underway for her fourth war patrol on 30 April 1944,
RASHER set course for her patrol in the Molukka-Celebes Sea area.

The first opportunity to fire torpedoes developed on 11 May
when RASHER investigated smoke on the horizon and found the masts
of five Japanese ships; two cargo ships, a naval auxiliary or mine
layer of about 3,000 tons and two ships which appeared to be coast-
al mine layers. After maneuvering to avoid detection by the
escorts, RASHER fired four torpedoes at one of the cargo ships.
The second ship in column was then fired at with two torpedoes.
Just before one of the escorts charged in at RASHER for forced
her down. After depth charging and echo ranging for some time,
RASHER finally worked her way clear of the last escort and started
to the rear of the convoy. The smoke of the convoy was
sighted just before darkness closed in but the ships were soon
lost under cover of darkness.

Contact was later made on the convoy and although they were
steaming only 2,500 to 3,000 yards off the beach, RASHER was
maneuvered between the convoy and shore to take advantage of the
dark background. Three torpedoes were fired at each of the two
freighters and since both were perfect set-ups, the skipper
watched all torpedoes run straight, hot, and under the targets.

By going across the course of the ships, in between the first
and second ships of the column, RASHER gained position to fire the
stern tubes. Two explosions were seen and heard, one on the pas-
senger-cargo ship and another on the large escort or naval
auxiliary which had just pulled out from behind this ship. The
ships commenced dropping depth charges and firing their guns wildly
for the next five minutes. The submarine skipper realized that
the Japs did not know that the submarine was on the surface.
RASHER opened the distance ahead to reload and come in for a
submerged approach in the moonlight.

— page 214 —
-11- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Four torpedoes were fired at the freighter in the convoy at
2303 and one of the torpedoes struck home as the ship instantly
flashed into flames which covered the entire ship and quickly
spread over the surrounding water. An attempt was made to swing
the sub around for another shot at the passenger-cargo ship, but
the submarine was too close and the Jap ship went by before a
torpedo could be fired.

The trailing escort was closing fast on RASHER by this time
and the skipper was heard which sounded like an internal explosion on the target. A few depth
charges came down, not too close, and finally the ships drew away
Only the fast whirring screws of the escorts and the slow, heavy
beat of the passenger-cargo ship could be heard.

Coming up to periscope depth, the nearer escort was only 3000
yards away, the other escort was in the vicinity of the burning
ship, and the dim shape of the passenger-cargo ship was drawing
off in the distance. Another chase ensued after the ship. While
passing the burning freighter, it was noticed that the deck was
awash and the burning oil or gasoline had spread over an area
of about 500 yards.

Rain squalls alternately helped and hindered the approach on
the remaining ship of the convoy. After chasing this ship from
2353 on the evening of 11 May, RASHER unleashed four torpedoes at
the transport-cargo ship at 0930 on 12 May. The ship turned
in a turn after the torpedoes had been fired, but it appeared
that she could not avoid being hit. However, one of the torpedoes
started an erratic run and the Jap ship came right through the
position where this errant torpedo should have gone. A few depth
charges went off in the vicinity of RASHER and several sets of
screws were heard passing overhead. After a final warning depth
charge erupted, the escorts took off at high speed in the direction
of the target ship. RASHER set coursefor Darwin under the cover
of a very heavy rain squall to reload torpedoes.

On 14 May, while passing through Latitude 6°-51' South, Longi-
tude 119°-32' East, a small raft with a flag flying was sighted.
Upon inspection, three dark-skinned natives were found perched on
the outrigger. As the submarine approached, they made signs of
hunger and thirst. When brought on board, they were so weak that
they could hardly walk. The skipper decided to keep them on board
until they had regained their strength and then put them on some
passing sailboat.

Arriving at Darwin, Australia on 21 May, RASHER removed the
three natives and took on board 18 torpedoes, fuel and fresh water.
By 1934 that evening she was on her way again to continue her war
patrol.

On 24 May, a large sailboat was sighted, larger than the aver-
age boat in the area, and RASHER, having already been seen, decided

— page 215 —
-12 USS RASHER (SS 269)

to close for investigation. The sailboat failed to heave to after
two bursts of 20 millimeter gunfire, since it maneuvered to
evade. RASHER put a few shots through the mainsail. Closing to
about 400 yards, a radio antenna could be seen on the deck. This
called for further investigation, but none of the six men previous-
ly seen working on the deck would come out. Since the vessel es-
tablished itself as enemy by its actions, RASHER put a few more
shots through the sail and proceeded to sink the sailboat with
about 300 rounds of 20 millimeter fire through the hull at the
waterline.

On 29 May, the officer of the deck sighted smoke on the
horizon through the periscope. RASHER surfaced and commenced a chase.
At 1834, the target ship made a change of course as though to put
in at Kaboeroeng Island. The sub skipper then decided that a
quick attack by moonlight would be wiser than to wait for the
moonset. At 2012, RASHER fired the first of a spread of three
torpedoes. One of the escorts picked up the sub at this time and
headed for her, forcing deep submergence. A torpedo explosion
was then heard and the targets screws were silenced. A vigorous
depth charging was started by the Jap escorts, fortunately not
too close.

After working her way clear of the escorts, RASHER surfaced
and headed toward the scene of activity again. The large target
was seen still on the surface with two escorts circling around.
Having reloaded torpedoes, the skipper decided to wait for moonset
to administer the finishing touches.

It was after midnight and the first few minutes of Memorial Day
had ticked off. RASHER was to make this a truly memorial holiday.
Although an escort was headed toward the selected spot for firing,
RASHER perisited in the attack, taking advantage of the poor
visibility. One torpedo was sent on its way but it veered to the
right before settling on its track. A second torpedo hit the
fired. The first torpedo hit the ship near the stern and the
second crashed into the ship under the bridge. A truly tremendous
explosion followed which turned the black night into day.

Suspicions that the escort had seen the submarine were con-
firmed when the Japs opened up on RASHER with a three-inch deck
gun. After the first shot whistled over the bridge, the top-
side watch was set below and the skipper had about decided to dive.
However, the Japs ceased to fire after four well trained shots
went high. Recalling the bridge watch topside, the skipper de-
cided not to dive and the sub cleared the area with little of the
Jap ship left except burning oil on the surface.

On the night of 2-3 June, RASHER made contact on some fast-
moving men-of-war in the vicinity of Davao Gulf. A high speed
approach brought the sub close enough to identify the large ships
as one Atago Class cruiser and one of the Nachi Class. An escort-
ing destroyer turned toward RASHER and forced her to open the

— page 216 —
-13- USS RASHER (SS 269)

distance. Numerous aircraft appeared on the scene soon after day-
light and kept the submarine down for the better part of the day.
On the morning of 4 June, another cruiser, of the ATAGO Class, was
sighted but the glassy sea made attack conditions unfavorable.

That afternoon, the stick masts of a man-of-war were seen over
the dip of the horizon. RASHER commenced her approach and
identified the ship as a destroyer of the FUBUKI Class. Raising
the periscope once more before firing, the skipper noticed that
the destroyer was heading toward the sub at 10,000 yards. The
periscope was definitely sighted during this observation and the
Jap destroyer headed more directly toward RASHER. The Jap sailors
were apparently going to General Quarters for they were running
around the decks madly as the destroyer passed about 100 yards
ahead. RASHER managed to go deep before the first depth charges
were heard to explode.

Many Jap aircraft were patrolling in the area and RASHER
started on her way to patrol the sea traffic route down the east
coast of Mindanao and toward Molucca Passage and Morotai Strait.
On 7 June, smoke was sighted on the horizon, and after avoiding
an air patrol, RASHER closed the distance to identify eight
medium-sized freighters with four escorts. After making her ap-
proach, the nearest Jap escort was discovered to be the ex-USS
STEWART, the destroyer which the Japs had raised and salvaged from
Surabaya, where she had put in for battle-damage repairs. Closer
inspection identified two of the ships as passenger-cargo ships
of 5,000 to 6,000 tons. One of the escorts apparently made
contact on the sub and forced her to lost position. The ships
apparently made radar contact since they turned away and opened
the distance on RASHER.

It was decided that RASHER could neither get ahead of the con-
voy nor get into a position for a submerged attack in Morotai
Strait before daylight. The skipper then set course to reach a
Pass in an attempt to reach a point on the traffic route between
Balikpapan and Davao as soon as possible. This meant going
through the passage during daylight. It was a plan that had a
chance if the planes were not too thick.

By 0800, RASHER was going through Siaoa Passage. She maneuvered
around two large three-masted sailboats to avoid detection and
kept out of sight of three aircraft contacts. Finally, at 1604,
two columns of smoke were seen coming over the horizon. Select-
ing an auxiliary as her target, RASHER fired six torpedoes. The
first hit under the bridge, throwing a column of water mast-high.
Two other hits were scored near the after turret followed by what
appeared to be a magazine explosion since the entire after part of
the ship up to the stacks was immediately obscured by flame. A
total of five definite torpedo hits were heard. The target was
blowing up to the bridge and by smoke past the forward
turret. Sailors on the forecastle were scrambling up to the port
rail. A destroyer came bearing down on RASHER by this time and
spoiled the show by forcing the sub down deep.

— page 217 —
-14- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Loud breaking up noises and underwater explosions were heard
by the sound gear and through the hull. The noises persisted for
about an hour and were the loudest that the submariners had ever
heard. As the escort passed over head, four depth charges came
down after RASHER. The explosions were close and ripped
up the sub down twenty feet and shook
marine severely, although no apparent damage had been caused.

When coming up to periscope depth at 1802, three separate fires
were visible over an area of about 1,000 yards. In one of these
fires the flames could be seen surrounding the top of a mast, the
only part of the ship still visible above the surface. While the
escort vessels were still "sniffing around" for a submarine at
some distance, RASHER quietly slipped away.

In the early darkness of 13 June, the quartermaster sighted
the shapes of several ships at 0115. The ships were headed for
the Pula Tiga Group of islands, steaming through water which had
many shoals varying from 6 to 40 fathoms of water. RASHER headed
for Huha Island where the hundred fathom curve was only a mile
from the reefs which encircled the island. However, as she
headed for the area of planned attack, the stern of a destroyer
was seen just ahead of the submarine and going just where RASHER
was headed. However, the smoke of the convoy was sighted astern
in the first rosy glow of dawn, and RASHER changed to an approach
course, hoping to avoid being sighted by the air patrols.

With numerous planes operating overhead, it was inevitable
that RASHER should be forced down. It was not until 1838 that
the sub could come up for a look around the horizon. The convoy
was nowhere in sight. Taking off on the most likely course, the
convoy was again sighted at 0512 on 14 June by the officer of the
deck. After a pursuit which looked none too promising, the con-
voy made a favorable course change and the skipper decided to
fire two torpedoes from his stern tubes at both of his ships and
three torpedoes from his bow tubes at another selected target.

The first of the stern shots were fired at 0901 and the second
spread of torpedoes was unleashed a minute later. The first
torpedo was heard to hit and the skipper took a look at the ship
as the second torpedo ripped into the first Jap ship fired at.
It was already down by the stern when the second torpedo hit.
Quickly swinging the periscope around to look for planes, escorts,
and other targets, the ex-destroyer STEWART was seen headed
directly for the sub. About this time two more explosions were
heard, which sounded like the third and fourth torpedoes striking
home.

At 0904, the first target was seen to have turned over with
the bottom showing and the keep up. The formation began to scatter
in wild disorder as RASHER selected a likely candidate for the
three torpedoes from the bow tubes. There were still no planes
visible and none of the escorts heading too close. One Jap

— page 218 —
-15- USS RASHER (SS 269)

freighter was heading in toward RASHER and the bow tubes were
fired at a short range; just long enough for the torpedoes to arm
themselves. One torpedo explosion was heard less than a minute
later.

Going deep, RASHER heard one string of ten depth charges ex-
plode followed by four more much closer. After listening to the
escorts pinging for a while, the sub came up to periscope depth
for a look around. The ex-STEWART was 4,600 yards away cutting
across the submarine's bow. While heading for this escort, the
submariners inspected the two remaining torpedoes. The Jap ship
was apparently picking up survivors since his speed was varying
from zero to four knots. The masts of the remaining ships of the
convoy could be seen disappearing "over the hill." Further pursuit
of the convoy was unwarranted.

While patrolling west of Ambon Bay entrance light, the officer
of the deck sighted a submarine chaser standing out of the western
side of the bay. Thinking the escort may have been coming out to
meet a ship, the skipper took a careful look around and 15 minutes
later a medium-sized freighter hove into view. The ship had just
emerged from a heavy rain squall which soon spread over the entire
area. Observations were difficult and few, but it was enough to
give the skipper a course and speed check and to also pick up two
escorts with the freighter.

RASHER's last two torpedoes were fired at this ship and about
the time of firing, one of the escorts was seen heading directly
for the sub at 1,500 yards. RASHER dove deep and heard one of the
torpedoes hit followed by a loud, prolonged, rumbling explosion.
Two escorts moved in quickly and worked the submarine over with
16 depth charges which were well-placed considering that the sub-
marine could not possibly be heard because of the heavy rain on
the surface.

About an hour later, RASHER came up to periscope depth but
could see nothing in the direction of the target because of the
heavy rain in that vicinity. Heading for Ombai Passage and home,
RASHER moored to the wharf at Fremantle, W. A. on 23 June 1944.

While at Fremantle, RASHER received an excellent refit by Sub-
marine Repair Unit 137 and Relief Crews from Submarine Squadron 16.
A training period lasted from 10 to 15 July, and on 17 July, Lieut-
enant Commander Willard R. Laughon was relieved as Commanding
Officer by Commander Henry G. Munson.

Underway for her fifth war patrol, RASHER departed Australia
on 22 July 1944, to conduct coordinated attacks with the submarine
BLUEFISH in areas west of Luzon. Commander Munson in RASHER
acted as the group commander.

On the night of 5-6 August, RASHER picked up a radar contact
which developed into a Japanese convoy with escort. One ship was

— page 219 —
-16- USS RASHER (SS 269)

thought to be the KOSEI MARU, a ship of 8223 tons, steaming in
company with two small freighters and two escorts.

At 0211, RASHER fired six torpedoes at the largest ship and
heard five torpedoes strike the target as she went deep to avoid
being rammed. The target's screws stopped immediately and loud
unmistakable breaking-up noises were heard throughout the submarine.
The skipper decided that the target's wake, he easily evaded the
ambitious though ineffective escorts. The sunken Jap ship was
later revealed as the cargo ship SHIROGANESAN MARU.

One of RASHER's men broke his arm just above the elbow during
a training dive on 8 August and, as it could not be splinted with
the material at hand, the submarine sent a message to BLUEFISH
and HOE. The latter was scheduled to leave for her base in two
days and on the 9th, the patient was transferred to USS HOE.
RASHER and BLUEFISH then patrolled together. Later in the day,
the subs ran through a large amount of wreckage in the area of
RASHER's last attack.

Life guard duty, tropical storms and Jap aircraft were the
order of the day until a convoy was contacted on the night of 18
August. There were about 13 ships in the convoy with about 6
escorts. The composition and disposition of the ships was never
fully determined for it was a dark night, no moon and a thick
overcast with almost continuous rain. The targets were selected
by radar as they could readily be sorted out from the smaller
pips made by the escorts. The speed, number of escorting vessels,
the great size of the convoy and of the individual ships, plus
the intense aerial activity proceeding its passage, indicated that
this was an exceptionally important convoy. This later proved
to be the case.

At 2122 a spread of four torpedoes was readied for firing.
After two had left the tubes, it was doubted that the gyros were
matching properly. RASHER accordingly drew off and ran up along
the starboard flank to attack again. As the submarine steadied
down, both torpedoes were seen and heard striking home. The tar-
get ship was apparently a huge tanker laden with gasoline judging
from the appalling explosion with a column of flame 1,000 feet
high. The entire sky was a bright red momentarily and the
target, and the whole convoy was seen for an instant. Part of the
ship blew off and landed about 500 yards from the remainder of
the tanker. Both parts burned fiercely for about 20 minutes
and then disappeared from sight in one grand final explosion.

The nearest escort decided that something had gone slightly
amiss and responded by firing his guns at all points of the com-
pass, reversing course and diligently depth charging the water
two miles astern of RASHER. Pandemonium and confusion joined
hands and reigned supreme in the convoy. Lights flashed on and
off, side lights turned on, depth charges fell in every direction
of the ocean joined by gunfire. Some 40 millimeter tracer shells

— page 220 —
-17- USS RASHER (SS 269)

passed astern of RASHER, about 100 yards off in deflection and way
over in range. To say that all this firing was in vain would hard-
ly be true for the submariners thoroughly enjoyed the spectacle.

During this time the skipper was busily working out a second
attack and sending a message to BLUEFISH, 83 miles ahead of the
convoy. While RASHER attempted an end around run, the convoy
obligingly changed course to hasten the next torpedo attack. The
largest target was selected from the convoy (at least 11 large
targets were seen on the radar scope) and at 2206 RASHER fired six
bow tubes at the prime target and let go four more torpedoes at
a large target immediately to the left and beyond the prime target.

Three timed hits were heard on the first target and the ship
immediately began burning and smoking heavily. It was seen to be
a large transport and many low-power lights, probably lifeboat
markers began to appear. A minute later, another torpedo struck
home on a second target beyond and ahead of the transport.

Timed hits were then heard on the second large target; first
two hits together, then a third properly timed torpedo explosion.
The fourth torpedo missed this target and it too struck a ship
beyond. The transport was completely dead in the water in a
half hour, four miles from the attack position. Four hours later,
while returning through this same vicinity, RASHER passed through
a thick layer of oil roughly two and a half miles across. Three
small objects were contacted at close range, one of which was
blinking a white light, indicating that it was a lifeboat. Two
escorts were also detected in the vicinity. It was believed that
this target was a large tanker and that it was sunk. The usual
depth charging, gun firing and signalling began anew, with the
escorts rushing around like rats in a cage.

One of the escorts took after RASHER, but the submarine shook
her off the trail. The radar scope showed the huge transport
dropping behind the formation with two escorts dropping back with
her. As RASHER approached, the radar pip grew small and smaller
and finally disappeared from the radar screen. This transport
was considered sunk.

Another broadcast was sent for help as RASHER needed help badly.
She was almost fresh out of torpedoes, having only four in the
forward tubes and two aft. By 2300 the leading part of the con-
voy had split into two groups and RASHER approached the largest
of the two groups which consisted of at least two large ships in
column with one very non-hostile escort on their starboard bow and
a third large ship on the port quarter. Four torpedoes were
fired at the leading target and the two stern torpedoes were fired
at the second target. Three timed hits were heard on the leading
target and two of them were seen. A minute later another torpedo
was seen and heard to strike a ship beyond the first one. This
one was a lucky bonus hit by the first torpedo fired.

— page 221 —
-18- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Two timed hits from the stern tubes were heard ripping into
the second target. A very pronounced ammunition explosion followed
on the first target, and she was stopped in her tracks. The ship
burned for a few minutes and disappeared from the radar screen.
The escort joined the ship which was hit by the stray torpedo and
moved to the south. RASHER hauled out to the west to consider the
situation.

BLUEFISH was contacted again to see why she hadn't joined
RASHER. However, she had intercepted two of the tankers which
RASHER had scattered from the convoy and sank them both. Informa-
tion on the Jap ships was then sent to Commander Task Force 71,
and RASHER closed the last attack point to investigate the latest
information.

The escort and the ship that caught the stray torpedo had
slowed to 1 knot and the pip disappeared from the radar screen
about 28 minutes after midnight. The ship which had been hit by
the two stern torpedoes was heading for the beach at 5 knots.
About an hour and a half later, another large ship was tracked
heading for the beach. This was one of the damaged ships from the
earlier attack. At 0410 an escort joined one of the large cripples
and suddenly illuminated the big ship with a large, high-intensity
searchlight. The big ship apparently did not appreciate being in
the spotlight and opened up with two rounds from a large gun. The
point of aim could not be determined, but the submariners hoped
that the escort was the target receiving "the honors."

During her brief but uncomfortable career under the klieg
lights the Jap ship was revealed to be a large, two-stack transport
riding very low in the water. Since RASHER was out of torpedoes
and dawn was beginning to break, BLUEFISH was informed of the two
cripples heading for Port Curimao and RASHER cleared the area. At
0550, the submarine SPADEFISH was raised on the circuit and she
revealed that she had sunk two of the large transports which
RASHER had probably scattered in her first attack on this very
important convoy. The carefully laid plans for escorting this
huge convoy had been completely shattered under the devastating
attacks of RASHER, BLUEFISH and SPADEFISH.

After the prolonged and intense activity in attacking this con-
voy, RASHER's weary crew finally had a chance to rest as the sub-
marine went deep and headed for Midway via Balintang Channel. Ar-
riving at Midway on 30 August, RASHER fueled and departed for
Pearl Harbor on the same day in company with the submarine POMPON.
After conducting training exercises enroute, the submarines
arrived at Pearl Harbor on 3 September 1944, thus concluding
RASHER's fifth war patrol. RASHER continued on to the West Coast
for an overhaul, refit, and alterations, arriving at the Naval
Dry Docks, Hunter's Point, California on 11 September 1944.

During the overhaul, Lieutenant Commander B. E. Adams, USN,
relieved Commander H. G. Munson, USN, as commanding officer of
RASHER.

— page 222 —
-19- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Departing from Hunter's Point on 20 December 1944, RASHER con-
ducted special exercises with aircraft south and west of the
Golden Gate Bridge and then set course for Pearl Harbor. Stopping
only at Pearl Harbor, RASHER continued on to Midway, arriving on
17 January 1945.

Departing from Midway on 20 January 1945, RASHER joined PILOT-
FISH and FINBACK in a coordinated attack group to patrol an area
in the southern part of the East China Sea. The sixth war patrol
of RASHER was characterized by numerous plane contacts and the
sinking of many floating mines. There were over forty enemy
ship contacts although the majority of them were sailing vessels
and two of them were hospital ships.

The first attack took place on 15 February when RASHER followed
a radar pip to draw within attacking distance. However, just
before firing, another vessel about the size of an escort was
sighted coming up on the beam of RASHER. The plan of attack was
changed from firing bow tubes to a stern shot. The target was
apparently smaller than estimated for the solution to the torpedo
problem was good although all torpedoes missed. The target was
not considered worthy of further torpedo expenditure.

The second torpedo attack on 16 February resulted from a con-
tact report on three capital ships of the Japanese Navy with
several destroyers in company. As RASHER approached, contact was
made with a small vessel closing the submarine from ahead. In
order not to have her attack frustrated by this newcomer, RASHER
turned in to an attack course and dove to radar depth. A set-up
was made on the ship on the near flank, but just before firing,
the target ship turned toward RASHER. Changing to two other over-
lapping targets, the skipper fired a spread of six torpedoes.
One explosion was heard on a timed hit. This was scant return
for the bravery shown in firing an attack in the face of an on-
coming, fast enemy warship. As the fates would have it, this was
the only torpedo hit that RASHER could claim for a long, ag-
gressive patrol.

During the evening of 7-8 March, RASHER made an end around on
a radar-equipped patrol vessel which was apparently tracking
RASHER and attempting to draw her into a trap and shallow water.
The ruse was discovered in time for RASHER to extricate herself
from six patrol boats.

This luckless patrol terminated as RASHER pulled into Apra
Harbor, Guam on 16 March 1945. During the refit period, Lieutenant
Commander C. D. Nece, USN, relieved Lieutenant Commander B. E.
Adams as commanding officer on 1 April 1945.

As choice surface targets were becoming more scarce in the
western Pacific, air activity was increasing. The need for air-
sea rescue work was accordingly greater. When RASHER departed
Guam on 17 April 1945, to commence her seventh war patrol, she

— page 223 —
-20- USS RASHER (SS 269)

war sent out to join the life guard league in the vicinity of Nanpo
Shoto. The patrol extended over a period of 43 days with 32
days spent in the patrol areas of Nanpo Shoto and Kii Suido.

Although the majority of the patrol was spent in life guard
duties, RASHER did manage to uncover several small targets. On
29 April, one sea truck of 100 tons was sunk and another one was
badly damaged in a well-conducted gun attack with 20 and 40
millimeter shells.

On 10 May, a night surface attack was made on a small
auxiliary with escort. Six torpedoes were fired in a good spread.
However, the target was about to enter port at Hachijo Jima and
made sudden course change of 50 degrees which made the torpedoes
miss ahead. There was considerable phosphorescence in the water
and the ships were undoubtedly alerted. RASHER could not close
for another attack before the ship entered port and had to depart
immediately to arrive on her new lifeguard station on schedule.

The only other opportunities RASHER had to open fire were in
sinking floating mines. No planes were forced down near the sub
and she returned to Midway on 29 May 1945, bringing to an end her
seventh war patrol.

Following her refit period, RASHER departed Midway on 23 June
1945 for her eighth and final patrol of World War II. The patrol
was of 58 days duration and was terminated by the cessation of
hostilities on 15 August 1945.

For 27 days, RASHER provided lifeguard services for the Fifth
Air Force in the vicinity of southern Formosa. Although orbitted
for numerous strikes, all planes returned safely. One possible
torpedo target was sighted entering Takao but could not be closed
for attack. Two Chinese junks were inspected and allowed to
proceed when found to be empty. RASHER was caught on the surface
and bombed twice during this period but miraculously escaped
damage.

After an overnight stop at Subic Bay on 10 August for fuel,
food and ammunition, RASHER continued her patrol in the Gulf of
Siam. At 1031 on 15 August, she announced her arrival on station
by firing two rounds of five-inch shells across the bow of a
Malayan, cargo-carrying junk, boarded her and jettisoned a cargo
of rice destined for the Japanese. At 1400, cease firing orders
were received, and at 1800 RASHER was recalled to Subic. This
brought to a close the outstanding war career of USS RASHER, a
submarine that put everything she had into every assignment given
her, large of small.

RASHER departed from Subic on 17 August 1945, to commence the
long voyage home via Pearl Harbor and the Panama Canal. She
arrived at Tompkinsville, Staten Island, New York on 6 October
1945. From the time RASHER departed from New Orleans, after fit-
ting out, until arriving at Tompkinsville, she had churned through
122,655 nautical miles of salt water.

— page 224 —
-21- USS RASHER (SS 269)

During her first five war patrols, RASHER sank more tonnage of
enemy shipping than any submarine in the history of the world,
except one,-- USS FLASHER, a sister ship. RASHER was officially
credited with 99,901 tons of enemy shipping sunk, while FLASHER
was credited with but 1,230 tons more. The total tonnage of enemy
ships estimated as damaged by the various commanding officers of
RASHER totaled an additional 62,481 tons.

The value of enemy cargos and combat loaded troopships which
RASHER prevented from reaching a destination is impossible to
estimate. In terms of Japanese soldiers who never arrived to
fight and ammunition which didn't arrive to be fired at U. S. troops
enemy planes which never got in the air, RASHER's contribution
to the war effort was truly tremendous.

It was confirmed after the war that one of the ships sunk by
RASHER was the escort carrier TAIYO, the former German luxury
liner which was taken over by the Japanese after World War I and
converted to an escort carrier.

Reporting to the Submarine Base at New London, Connecticut,
USS RASHER (SS 269) was placed out of commission in reserve by
directive dated January 1947.

RASHER earned the Presidential Unit Citation for her outstand-
ing war record, the text of which reads as follows:

Text of Citation is:

"For outstanding performance in combat during her
First, Third, Fourth and Fifth War Patrols in enemy
Japanese-controlled waters. Operating dangerously in
bold defiance of watchful and aggressive enemy air
patrols, the USS RASHER penetrated deep into forward
areas to cover the enemy's vital supply lanes, tracking
her targets relentlessly and striking hard at heavily
escorted convoys. She launched her torpedoes ac-
curately despite unfavorable attack opportunities and
inflicted tremendous losses on the Japanese in thousands
of tons of valuable shipping sunk or damaged. Tenacious
in pursuit, devastating in her fire-power, the RASHER
has given striking evidence of her own readiness for
battle and of the gallant fighting spirit of her officers
and men."

— page 225 —
-22- USS RASHER (SS 269)

RASHER also earned seven Battle Stars on the Asiatic-Pacific
Area Service Medal for the following operations:

1 Star/Submarine War Patrol, 24 September - 24 November 1943
1 Star/Submarine War Patrol, 19 December 1943 - 24 January 1944
1 Star/Submarine War Patrol, 19 February - 4 April 1944
1 Star/Submarine War Patrol, 30 April - 23 June 1944
1 Star/Submarine War Patrol, 22 July - 3 September 1944
1 Star/Iwo Jima Operation, 15 February - 8 March 1945
1 Star/Okinawa Gunto Operation, 21 April - 21 May 1945

Compiled: July 1952

— page 226 —
DATE 4 January 1944
FROM Commanding Officer USS RASHER(SS-269(
SUBJECT SPECIAL MISSION

Report(to CTG 71.1)of offensive mining operation dur-
ing SECOND WAR PATROL. Field of eleven mines laid off
Poulo Condore.
(SOWESPAC:SUB OPS)
FILED: War Diary

Separately as ORIGINAL

MICROSERIAL NO.

DATE 9-19 August 1944
FROM Commanding Officer USS RASHER(SS-269)
SUBJECT COORDINATED ATTACK GROUP

Report of operations in the South China Sea in company
with USS BLUEFISH(SS-222). Report covers 22 July-19
August although submarines operated separately in the
earlier part of patrol.(SOWESPAC:SUBMARINES)
FILED: War Diary

Separately as PROCESSED COPY;as DUPLICATE COPY

MICROSERIAL NO.

DATE 28 April 1945
FROM C.O. USS RASHER (SS-269)
SUBJECT SUBMARINE ACTION REPORT, Forwarding of

Forwards report of one torpedo firing on SEVENTH WAR
PATROL in the Nanpo Shoto and Kii Suido areas. No hits
claimed.
(CENPAC: SUBS)
FILED: War Diary

Separately
as Enc. to SUBSPAC ser C0048 of 18 Jun 45

MICROSERIAL NO. NAME RASHER
SERIAL 001
DATE 18 January 1944

| ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3480-13 (11-33)
| G 20432

NAME RASHER
SERIAL 025
DATE 3 September 1944

| ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3480-13 (11-33)
| C 10451

NAME RASHER
SERIAL 0001
DATE 29 May 1945

| ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3480-13 (11-33)

— page 227 —
SS269/S81-1
Serial (001)
DECLASSIFIED

[HANDWRITTEN: 3] [HANDWRITTEN: RWP]
U.S.S. RASHER
[HANDWRITTEN: 1-43]
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.
[HANDWRITTEN: yhu] [UNCLEAR: 1080] 18 January, 1944

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander Task Group SEVENTY-ONE POINT ONE.

Subject: Offensive Mining Operation of U.S.S. RASHER (SS269)
on 4 January, 1944.

Reference: (a) ComTask Force SEVENTY-ONE Operation Order No. 49-43
of 17 December, 1943- Annex "DOG".
(b) Conf. OP-30 M2-FM (SC) S81-1 Serial 0530830, 12 June, 1943.

Enclosure: (A) Overlay of H.O. Chart #5501 showing mine plant.

1. In accordance with Annex "DOG" of reference (a), the
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) carried out an offensive mining operation on 4 January, 1944
at 0115 HOW time.

2. The following information is hereby submitted as outlined and
required by enclosure (B) of reference (b):

(a) The mine plant was made along the following positions about 14.5
miles from Poulo Condore:

1st Mine - Lat. 09° 01.0' N. Long. 106° 38.8' E.
6th Mine - Lat. 08° 59.8' N. Long. 106° 41.0' E.
11th Mine - Lat. 08° 58.2' N. Long. 106° 43.3' E.

The track of the ship approximated a sine curve on base course
115° T. at a speed of 8 knots.

The spacing of the mines was 0.6 miles by Pitometer Log.

A running series of navigational positions by radar ranges
and visual bearings were obtained on Poulo Condore for a period of one
hour and a half, the last position being obtained forty (40) minutes be-
fore starting the plant. The white rock, height 187 feet, northeast of
Poulo Condore, is an excellent Navigational Aid. Depth of water was ten
(10) to sixteen (16) fathoms.

It is believed that the location of the plant is only accurate
to within 2000 yards, since variable currents were detected in this vicinity.

No enemy defenses were encountered.

(b) One submarine was employed.

-1-

— page 230 —
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269)

SS269/A16-3
Serial ( 025 )
CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN: (line through "CONFIDENTIAL")]
DECLASSIFIED

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
3 September 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
(Commander U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - U.S.S. BLUEFISH (SS222)
Coordinated Search and Attack Group.)
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: War Patrol of U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - U.S.S. BLUEFISH
(SS222) Coordinated Attack Group.

References: (a) Report of War Patrol Number Five, U.S.S. RASHER (SS269).
(b) Report of War Patrol Number Five, U.S.S. BLUEFISH
(SS222).

Enclosures: (a) Subject War Patrol.
*(B) Coordinated Search and Attack Instructions.
*(C) Chart Insert showing patrol areas.
* Consubspac only.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the subject War Patrol is sub-
mitted herewith. This group operated in the South China Sea, east of
Luzon in the special area shown in Enclosure (C). References (a) and
(b) cover the detailed activities of the two ships of the group. This
report covers only the part of the patrol where the submarines opera-
ted as a Coordinated Group.

2. The detail instructions for the group were prepared and
distributed prior to the start of the patrol and in consultation with
the staff of Commander Task Force Seventy-One. It will be noted that no
detailed search plan is included. The search was developed from day to
day on the basis of past contacts, intelligence, and contacts from ad-
jacent ships; instructions for each day's search were passed to BLUEFISH
by visual signals at the nightly rendezvous thus avoiding the use of
radio until contact was made.

H. G. MUNSON.

ENCLOSURE (C)

[HANDWRITTEN: 50]

— page 231 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: Patrol of U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - U.S.S. BLUEFISH
         (SS222) Coordinated Attack Group.

— page 232 —
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
3 September 1944.

SS269/A16-3
Serial ( 025 )
[STAMP: CONFIDENTIAL]

From: The Commanding Officer.
(Commander U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - U.S.S. BLUEFISH (SS222)
Coordinated Search and Attack Group.)

To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: War Patrol of U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - U.S.S. BLUEFISH
(SS222) Coordinated Attack Group.

References: (a) Report of War Patrol Number Five, U.S.S. RASHER (SS269).
(b) Report of War Patrol Number Five, U.S.S. BLUEFISH
(SS222).

Enclosures: (A) Subject War Patrol.
*(B) Coordinated Search and Attack Instructions.
*(C) Chart Insert showing patrol areas.
* Consubspac only.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the subject War Patrol is sub-
mitted herewith. This group operated in the South China Sea, east of
Luzon in the special area shown in Enclosure (C). References (a) and
(b) cover the detail activities of the two ships of the group. This
report covers only the part of the patrol where the submarines opera-
ted as a Coordinated Group.

2. The detail instructions for the group were prepared and
distributed prior to the start of the patrol and in consultation with
the staff of Commander Task Force Seventy-One. It will be noted that no
detailed search plan is included. The Rasher has developed from day to
day on the basis of past contacts, intelligence, and contacts from ad-
jacent ship; instructions for each day's search were passed to BLUEFISH
by visual signals at the nightly rendezvous thus avoiding the use of
radio until contact was made.

H. G. MUNSON.

ENCLOSURE (C)

[HANDWRITTEN: 50]

— page 233 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: Patrol of U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - U.S.S. BLUEFISH
(SS222) Coordinated Attack Group.

(A) PROLOGUE

Operation orders of CTF 71 to RASHER and BLUEFISH directed
that they proceed together from FREMANTLE to EXMOUTH Gulf for
coordinated training, thence independently via separate routes
to the "WHITLASH" areas west of LUZON and there to conduct
coordinated search and attack.

Prior to departure both ships exercised in one convoy
attack exercise and one game board problem in coordinated at-
tack tactics.

(B) NARRATIVE

22 July 1944

1300(H) Group departed FREMANTLE and started up bombing restric-
tion lane, conducted attack exercises on each other.

24 July

2300(H) Released BLUEFISH who proceeded via DARWIN and MOLUCCA
Passage.

RASHER proceeded via EXMOUTH Gulf for fuel, LOMBOK and
MACASSAR Straits.

4 August

RASHER arrived area CHALILE and established east-west
fixed patrol in vicinity traffic junction.

6 August

0211(H) RASHER attacked and sank large escorted AK south of
SCARBOROUGH Shoal.

Shifted patrol to northeast corner of area CHALILE.

9 August

0545(H) Made rendezvous with BLUEFISH (and also with HOE to
transfer patient).

Established stationary patrol across known lanes south
of SCARBOROUGH, BLUEFISH 15 miles to eastward.

11 August

Shifted to area DCC in accordance Oporders. Conducted
close in submerged stationary patrol for coastal traffic.

- 1 - ENCLOSURE (..)
[HANDWRITTEN: 57]

— page 234 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: Patrol of U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - U.S.S. BLUEFISH
         (SS222) Coordinated Attack Group.

— page 235 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: War Patrol of U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - U.S.S. BLUEFISH
(SS222) Coordinated Attack Group.

— page 236 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: War Patrol of U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - U.S.S. BLU.FISH
         (SS222) Coordinated Attack Group.

prevailing during most of the coordinated search period when
sights could not be obtained.

(D) REMARKS

         Although no contacts worthy of attack were made while
actually operating as a coordinated group and thus no opportunity
was afforded to test the method used, this system is not good
for two submarines operating in a large area where the traffic
routes are only poorly known as it affords good search coverage.
The scouting line was normal to expected enemy traffic routes at
all times.

         On the night of 18 August BLU.FISH was very fortunately
rejoining, having been detached several days previously to finish
off a grounded ship. She was able to contact and sink two large
tankers who had apparently scattered from the main body of the
convoy when attacked by RASHER. It is believed that the two trans-
ports contacted by SP.D.FISH, one of which she sank, were remnants
of this same convoy.

(E) DAMAGE TO THE ENEMY

Date       | By       | Sunk                  | Tonnage
|||
5 August   | RASHER   | 1 AK (KOSEI Maru)     | 8223
18 August  | RASHER   | 1 AO (large)          | 10,000
18 August  | RASHER   | 1 AP (large)          | 10,000
18 August  | RASHER   | 1 AO (large)          | 10,000
18 August  | RASHER   | 1 AK (large)          | 7500
19 August  | BLU.FISH | 1 AO (large)          | 10,000
19 August  | BLU.FISH | 1 AO (Whale factory)  | 10,000
           |          | TOTAL -               | 65,723
           |          | Damaged               |
18 August  | RASHER   | 1 Unknown             | 4000
18 August  | RASHER   | 1 Unknown             | 4000
18 August  | RASHER   | 1 Unknown             | 4000
18 August  | RASHER   | #1 AP (large)         | 10,000
           |          | *grounded             |
           |          | TOTAL -               | 22,000

- 4 -
[HANDWRITTEN: 54]

— page 238 —
S0269/.16-3
Seri 1: 0001
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

U.S.S. RASHER (SS-269)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
29 May 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. RASHER.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via :
Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Administration.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER, Top Secret Report of Firing Mark 27 Torpedo,
Patrol Number Seven.

Enclosure: ( ) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure ( ) is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: C. S. Luce]
C. S. LUCE.

— page 239 —
T-O-I S-U-B-J-E-C-T

Subject: U.S.S. BICHILL - Report of Firing Mk 27 Torpedo Patrol No. Seven
U.S.S. BICHILL (SS-269) Mark 27 Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol Harbor Seven

Time: 0206 (K) Date: 28 April 1945 Lat: 33-34.5 N Long: 139-14 E
Sound Conditions: Fair, low background noise. Depth of Water: 750 fathoms
Distance to nearest
Shore or Reef: 9300 yds to I.M.R. JI... Sea Conditions: State 1.
Is it raining? No.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: The target was a 200-300 ton sea truck accompanied by two
small sea trucks, in a steady course. Sight contact was
made by periscope as the SJ radar was temporarily out of
commission. It was a moonlit night, visibility very poor.
Ships Sunk: None.
Ships Damaged: None.
Damage Deter-
mined By: No explosion heard.
Target Draft: 4 ft. Course: 330° T Speed: 6 kts Range: 1,000 yds at firing
Target Turn Count: No turn count taken - high speed screws.
Target Bearing at
Firing Instant: 183° Rel. - 158° T.
Peculiarities noted
in Target's Sound
Output: Ordinary high speed screw noises; light whining screws.

ON SHIPMAN:
Speed: 4 kts Course: 335° T Depth: 150 Ft. Angle: 1 down at firing.

FIRE CONTROL & TORPEDO DATA:
Was target aware of submarine's presence? No.
Was submarine being depth charged? No.

Type Attack: When first sighted, the target group was tracked by TBT
bearings and estimated ranges as the SJ radar was tem-
porarily out of commission. When the radar was repaired,
the target group was tracked by SJ and their course 330° T
and speed 6 kts was determined.

- 1 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 240 —
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Subject: U.S.S. LING - Report of Firing 27 Torpedo Attack No. 1. Seven
27 Torpedo Attack No. 1 (Continued)

We submerged 5800 yds ahead of the target on his track to 27
feet depth, continued tracking him, and maneuvered to maintain
a good position on his port bow. This was relatively easy as he was
on a steady course. When the range closed to 1000 yds, we went
to 150 feet and continued to track the target by sound. When
the accurate range was 1,000 yds, it was reported that the noise
level of the target's screws was sufficient to attract the
torpedo to the normal. (See comments for further details on how firing was deter-
mined).

Tube Fired From: | # 7 | Fired at: | Torpedo was properly ejected.
Hits or Misses: | Miss | Time From Firing to Hit: | Miss
Mark Torpedo: | 27-2 | Serial No. | 437
Mark Torpedo: | 27 | Serial No. | 304
Mark Torpedo: | 27 | Serial No. | 1001
Arming Distance
Set: | 100 yds.
Training Activity: USS CLOWNS (S-19)

Comments: | Five Mark 27 torpedoes were carried on this patrol. One was kept
in #7 tube all the time. The fish were routinely
checked weekly.

During the training period, 4 Mark 27 torpedoes were fired at a
target with excellent results. At this time an attempt
was made by the S.O.N.S. expert to construct a
decibel curve based on target's range vs sound level in
decibels. The point at which the torpedo
would attract the noise of the target's screw was determined.
The sound level was sufficient to attract the torpedo.
A curve was obtained on prior to departure.
A curve for small craft, which had previously been deter-
mined, was used. Upon this information on the
target, it was ejected when the noise
level was 10-
decibels above that to attract the torpedo.
The motor increased to "off the scale" up to 75 seconds from
firing slowly. The
S.O.N.S. close to when he went overhoard because the sound
changed very rapidly at this time. We are unable to
explain the miss.

- 2 -
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T ( )

— page 241 —
END OF REEL
[HANDWRITTEN: AR-128-81]
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: E-108]
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|||1.0
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|||2.8 |||2.5
|||3.2 |||2.2
|||3.6 |||2.0
|||4.0 |||1.8
|||1.6

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[IMAGE: Department of Defense seal with "DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE" and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION