U.S.S. PUFFER (SS-268) — war patrol report SS-268_PUFFER.pdf

— page 1 —
START OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: H 108]
           [HANDWRITTEN: AR-309-76]

OPERATOR [HANDWRITTEN: LEO]

DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 4/26/76]

|||1.0 |||2.8 |||2.5
|||3.2 |||2.2
|||3.6 |||2.0
|||4.0 |||1.8
|||1.25 |||1.4 |||1.6

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[SEAL: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET, START & END
NAVEXOS 3968

— page 2 —
Division of Naval History
Ships' Histories Section
Navy Department

HISTORY OF USS PUFFER (SS 268)

Our submarines were employed in our mounting offensive in the Pacific
to cut enemy communications to his great sea empire, even attacking shipping
in Japanese home waters. Our subs were also used to support fleet action
as pickets, weather stations, landing reconnaissance raiders and by attack-
ing combat units including ASW vessels.

In a brilliant career of twenty-six months the USS PUFFER took a
steady toll of Japanese shipping, and on her maiden patrol survived a
severe depth charge attack. Decorated with nine Battle Stars, she was also
awarded the Navy Unit Commendation for her heroism during the Fourth War
Patrol.

The submarine's keel was laid at the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company
at Manitowoc, Wisconsin on 16 February 1942. Named for a fish of the
Plectognathi group which inflates its body with air, the PUFFER was launched
on 22 November 1942. Mrs. Ruth B. Lyons, grand-daughter of Mr. Chris Jacobson,
the shipyards oldest employee, served as sponsor.

After extensive trials in Lake Michigan the PUFFER was placed in com-
mission on 27 April 1943, with Lieutenant Commander M. J. Jensen, USN,
commanding. She was then transported to New Orleans, Louisiana on a float-
ing dry dock via the Mississippi River. Upon departure from New Orleans,
she exercised at Panama for a month, and then steamed to Darwin, Australia.

The PUFFER arrived at Darwin on 6 September 1943, and departed the
following day for her First war patrol in the Makassar Strait and Celebes
Sea Areas. Her first opportunity to attack enemy shipping came on 17
September when she made a periscope approach on a group consisting of a
transport, a freighter and one escort vessel. The attack resulted in the
freighter being sunk and the transport damaged. Depth charge attack by the
escort prevented further attack, but she had already exacted from the enemy
a toll in an amount approaching her own cost.

By mid-morning on 9 October 1943, the PUFFER was on the track of a
large Japanese merchant ship. At 1110 she hit the merchantman with two
torpedoes. The target stopped dead in the water and assumed a list, but
refused to sink. Two more torpedoes were fired from the stern tubes.
One prematurely, and the other torpedo either missed or was a dud. So
PUFFER maneuvered for still another attack. The ship's escort, a CHIDORI-
class torpedo boat, had been seen earlier in the morning, but at this time
was nowhere in sight. Left to defend herself, the damaged merchant ship
opened fire on the submarine. Then, at 1125 three distant depth charges were
heard by the PUFFER's sound operator, and a few minuted later there were
"pinging" and the sound of fast screws approaching. Commander Jensen decided
to clear the area, but still hoping to finish off the damaged ship did not
order deep submergence. The attack came raining down. The first attack of
six depth charges let water in all hatches, backed sea valves off their
seats, sprung the sound head bearing, blew numerous gaskets, and damaged the

— page 3 —
-2- USS PUFFER (SS 266)

rudder. Practically all the damage done was inflicted during this
attack. Thereafter she remained at a deep submergence, held down by the
obdurate tenacity of the "pinger". It was evident that the enemy was
to easily follow the PUFFER. She may have been leaving a trail of air bubbles,
or there may have been oil leaks. Most of the enemy's depth charges went
off close by and directly overhead, but they were not set deep enough to
crush the submarine with their explosions.

The enemy would drop a pattern of depth charges, retire, and then
return in a hour or so to make another try. The PUFFER had been submerged
since 0525, and at 1820 another anti-submarine ship joined the first. The
two hammered at the PUFFER until well after midnight. Meantime, the air
conditioning was stopped to conserve power, a bucket brigade was formed to
control the water, and after 12 hours, submergence oxygen was used. The last
depth charges were dropped at 0115 on 10 October, but the Japanese remained
over her making "dry runs" until noon of that day. Thirty-one hours after
PUFFER first submerged, and more than 25 hours after her attack on the
merchantman, the enemy finally left, and the counter-attack was over.
racing current had interfered with evasive maneuvers, and when she surfaced
she found her self in the same spot where she had submerged. Though other
ships have undergone worse attacks, this depth charging was unique in the
stubborn perseverance with which it was conducted and the consistency with
which the enemy tracked the PUFFER. The sub was found to have a sharp port
list, caused by the free water and the flooded induction lines. During
the hour required for her crew to bring her to an even keel, she was a help-
less target since it would have been impossible to use the 3-inch deck gun.
Contact with an enemy patrol plane was made about 15 minutes after surfacing, but
the PUFFER managed to evade and was not attacked. She limped into Port
Darwin on 17 October 1943, and then steamed to Fremantle, Australia for
refit and repairs. During this period Commander Jensen was relieved by
Lieutenant Commander F. G. Selby, USN.

On 24 November 1943 the PUFFER sailed on her second patrol to be
conducted in the Sulu Sea, and approaches to Manila. She enjoyed good
hunting. On 20 December she sank the old 820 ton destroyer FUYO, and on 1
January 1944, the 6,707 ton freighter RYUYO MARU. She also sank an 85 ton
picket trawler by gunfire and one auxiliary naval tender were damaged. Two additional
freighters and one auxiliary naval tender were damaged. She returned to
Fremantle on 12 January 1944 for refit.

She departed for her Third War Patrol on 4 February 1944 which was
to be conducted in the South China Sea Area. This was to be a grueling
patrol in shallow waters. On 22 February a Japanese ocean liner was sighted
off the Natuna Islands on the road between Singapore and Brunei, Borneo.
The PUFFER maneuvered for attack position, and fired a spread of torpedoes.
Explosions boomed, signaling that the 15,105 ton transport TEIKYO MARU went
under. No more contacts were made, and the PUFFER returned to Fremantle
on 4 April 1944.

She sailed from Fremantle on 30 April on her Fourth War Patrol in
Madoera Straits, Makassar Straits, and Sulu Seas Area. In Madoera Straits
she acted as lifeguard for the first Allied carrier strike on Soerabaja. In
a dramatic escape from confined waters she lashed back at her pursuers to sink

— page 5 —
-4- USS PUFFER (SS 268)

After her refit at Midway she departed on 21 May 1945 enroute to the
South China and Java Seas to conduct her Eighth War Patrol. This
patrol was coordinated with various U. S. and Allied submarines. In a surface
sweep of the Northern Bali coast, the PUFFER was able to destroy by gunfire
two Japanese sea trucks and six landing craft on 5 July, and inflict
extensive damage to harbor installations in Chelukan Bawung and Buleng Bali.
She returned to Fremantle, Australia on 11 July 1945.

She departed Fremantle enroute to her ninth patrol. The cessation
of hostilities found the PUFFER patrolling in the Java Sea, tenaciously
hunting the remnants of the once proud Japanese sea power. After repairs
at Subic Bay, she departed on 31 August for Pearl Harbor, arriving on 14
September 1945. On 9 October she sorted with Admiral Halsey's task group
headed for San Francisco. Entering San Francisco Bay on the 15th, the war-
ships paraded in column under the Golden Gate Bridge.

After refitting and training the PUFFER got underway on 2 January
1946 for Honolulu, arriving on 9 January 1946. Here she reported for duty
involving training submarine crews, surface craft, and aircraft. The sub
returned to San Francisco on 19 March 1946, and on 17 April Lieutenant
Commander R. F. Reilly, USN, relieved Commander Dwyer as commanding officer.
On 28 June 1946 he turned the PUFFER over to the Commander Mare Island Group,
U. S. Pacific Reserve Fleet of commission. By Directive dated December
1946 the PUFFER was assigned to the THIRTEENTH Naval District for training
Naval Reserves, with Seattle, Washington her home port.

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the USS
PUFFER for service as follows:

"For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese
shipping and combatant units during her Fourth War Patrol in
the Celebes and Sulu Seas from April 30 to June 21, 1944.
Operating in bold defiance of persistent and severe hostile
countermeasures, the U.S.S. PUFFER daringly struck at
heavily escorted Japanese convoys. Going in despite relent-
less opposition, she penetrated the enemy's formidable screens
to press home her attacks, launching her torpedoes with
devastating speed and decision to sink numerous valuable
units of the Japanese Fleet. Skillfully handled by her
valiant officers and men, she withstood merciless depth
charges and repeatedly returned to deliver crushing blows to
the enemy's vital life lines of supply. Her gallant fighting
spirit, and intrepid devotion to duty were exemplified in an
outstanding combat record, in keeping with the highest traditions
of the United States Naval Service."

USS PUFFER earned nine Battle Stars on the Asiatic-Pacific Area
Service Medal for participating in the following operations:

1 Star/Iwo Jima Operation
Assault and occupation of Iwo Jima -- 17 February - 16 March 1945

1 Star/Okinawa Gunto Operation
Assault and occupation of Okinawa Gunto -- 17 - 27 March 1945

— page 6 —
-5- USS PUFFER (SS 260)

1 Star/First War Patrol -- 21 August - 24 October 1943
1 Star/Second War Patrol -- 24 November 1943 - 12 January 1944
1 Star/Third War Patrol -- 4 February - 4 April 1944
1 Star/Fourth War Patrol -- 30 April - 21 June 1944
1 Star/Fifth War Patrol -- 14 July - 29 August 1944
1 Star/Sixth War Patrol -- 16 December 1944 - 17 January 1945
1 Star/Eighth War Patrol -- 20 May - 11 July 1945

STATISTICS

OVERALL LENGTH                 312 feet
BEAM                           27 feet
SPEED                          20 knots
DISPLACEMENT                   1525 tons
COMPLEMENT                     8 officers and 72 men

Compiled: 2 December 1953

— page 7 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

U.S.S. PUFFER

SS208/A16-3
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
Confidential

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Submarine Squadron SEVENTEEN.
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY ONE.
(3) Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS286), Report of 1st Patrol
in the East.

Enclosure: (A) Secret Report.
(B) Plot of 1st track.
(C) Navigational time plots of contacts
(Enclosures (B) and (C) for Commander
Task Force 71 only.)

1. Enclosure (A) covering the first war patrol of
this vessel conducted in Netherlands East Indies during the
period September 7, 1943, to October 24, 1943, is forwarded
herewith.

[SIGNATURE: H. J. Jensen]
H. J. JENSEN.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C]
BY [HANDWRITTEN: JR-038LS] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/4/22]

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

[HANDWRITTEN: Filmed]
[HANDWRITTEN: 59334]

— page 8 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. TRUANT - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
(Period from Sep.7,1943, to Oct.24,1943.)

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived Brisbane, Australia, from Panama, C.Z. August 21,
1943. Refit by U.S.S. FULTON completed on August 28,1943.
Ship was drydocked August 23-24 to repair silver solder
fitting in #2 air bank located in #2D M.B.T. August 28-30
conducted sound tests and training exercises as follows:
Made two night and eight day approaches on HMAS STUART
and TC 476, made deep dive to test for leaks. Conducted
special depth charge attack and evasion exercises with HML
STUART and aircraft attack exercises with planes from RAAF.
Returned to pilot vessel Moreton Bay and picked up Mr. F.
Adams, Torres Straits Pilot. Departed Moreton Bay at 2300I
August 30,1943, and arrived Darwin, Australia, 1600I
September 6,1943, via Grafton Passage and Torres Straits.
Pilot disembarked at Thursday Island.

(B) NARRATIVE

7 September
0745I Underway for Patrol Area in accordance with ComTasl
For 71 OpOrd No.27-43 of Sep.2,1943.
1145I-1245I Conducted familiarization exercises with RAAF
plane.

8 September
0435I (Ship Contact No.1) In Lat.8-57S Long.127-55E radar
reported target bearing 302°T range 3700 yards.
Changed course to 060°T and commenced tracking.
determined course to be 145°T, speed 15 knots.
Sound reported two sets of screws on about
the same bearing which fast merged into the same bearing
by O.O.D. and identified as a sub.
0447I Changed course to 160°T at flank speed. Radar lost
contact at 7100 yards.
0520I Radar regained contact at 6900 yards. Slowed to 15
knots to continue tracking.
0522I Went ahead flank speed and commenced end around but
abandoned chase when dawn commenced breaking and it
was realized until after sunrise and sub. would not be
in position ahead of sub. Could not be
attained until after sunrise and sub. would not be
in all probability then be submerged. Changed course to
325°T.
0532I Changed course to 060°T and were just steady on
course when radar reported target 700 yards bearing
170° relative at the same time after lookout
reported dark shape on same bearing. Almost immedi-
ately, both the after lookout and radar lost target.
It is believed this second target was a submarine
which we had passed directly over
him. Neither of the contacts could be positively
identified as either friendly or enemy.
0559I Submerged. Decided we would be reported and had
better chance of passing undetected through the
barrier via Fermata Passage.
1504I Surfaced.

-1-

— page 9 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. PUFFER - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
(Period from Sep.7,1943, to Oct. 24,1943.)

2350I Entered Banda Sea through passage between Sermata
        and Leti Islands.

9 September
0534I Submerged.
1110I Surfaced. Proceeding toward Ambon Island patrol-
        ling Koepang Ambon traffic route.

10 September
0536I Submerged. Conducting submerged patrol on approaches
        to Ambon Bay.
1415I (Ship Contact No.2) In Lat.04-08S Long.127-39E
        sighted vessel bearing 343°T. Closed and
        identified as a small patrol vessel. Evaded.
1928I Surfaced.

11 September
0530I Submerged patrolling approaches to Ambon.
1031I (Plane Contact No.1) Sighted a "DAVE" on northerly
        course from Ambon passing well clear.
1927I Surfaced.

12 September
0527I Submerged, patrolling approaches to Ambon Bay.
0940I (Plane Contact No.2) Sighted transport plane on
        westerly course from Ambon, well clear.
1014I (Plane Contact No.3) Sighted three bombers
        "NELLS" coming in for landing on Ambon. Sighted
        two sampans during afternoon.
1929I Surfaced.

13 September
0527I Submerged patrolling approaches to Ambon Bay.
0616I (Ship Contact No.3) Sighted small steamer
        (500 tons) on course 275° speed 7 knots pro-
        ceeding to Ambon. Evaded.
        Sighted several fishing sampans during after-
        noon. Evaded.
1926I Surfaced.
2323I (Plane Contact No.4) Lookout sighted flashing white
        light at 80 elevation bearing 300°T.
2330I Series of flashing red lights sighted at 7°
        elevation bearing 190° relative. Manned SD
        radar for 5 seconds every 2 minutes.
2339I SD radar reported target at six miles closing.
        Submerged.

14 September
0123I Surfaced. Patrolling route from Ambon to Sorong
        Islands.
0552I Submerged.
1815I Surfaced.
2021I Reversed course to continue patrol off Ambon
        in accordance with ComTaskFor 71 orders to con-
        tinue patrol in this area for five more days.

-2-

— page 10 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. PUFFER - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
(Period from September 7, 1943, to October 24, 1943)

14 September
2118I (Ship Contact No.4) Sighted smoke bearing 330° T
  distant 13,000 yards. Commenced tracking and
  determined target base course to be 275° speed
  9 knots.
2138I Commenced end around at flank speed.

15 September
0120I Gained position ahead of target. Reversed course
  and commenced approach.
0133I Dove. No radar contact at 8000 yards. Brilliant
  moonlight so went to periscope depth.
0200I Target identified as small (1000 ton) steamer
  with what appeared to be a small tow behind or
  possibly a MTB. Sound could hear only one set
  of screws. Broke off attack.
0318I Surfaced.
0536I Submerged. Patrolling Ambon Sorong Island rout
1905I Surfaced.

16 September
0530I Submerged. Patrolling off Ambon entrance.
1444I (Ship Contact No.5) Sighted what appeared to be
  a medium freighter coming out of fog over Ambon
  entrance bearing 032° T range 4500 yards. Com-
  menced approach.
1504I Target identified as camouflaged tug on course
  195° T speed 7 knots. Broke off attack.
1530I Tug was smoking profusely and steadily indicat-
  ing an attempt to draw any sub. in the area to
  him. Figured our chance was about to come if
  we covered the Western approaches. This was
  further indicated by the fact that coverage of
  Eastern and Eastern approaches had yielded
  nothing.
1604I (Plane Contact No.5) Sighted "WILL" type plane
  over Ambon.
1912I Surfaced and set a Westerly course.

17 September
0050I (Ship Contact No.6) Sighted darkened ship bearing
  060° T sharp angle on bow range 8000 yards.
  Commenced tracking.
0100I Ship was closing rapidly - brilliant moonlight.
  O.O.D. and quartermaster identified ship as sub
  submerged to commence approach.
0105I Sound lost contact. Never sighted in periscope
  Believed that submarine had submerged. Later
  events indicated that contact was a small escort
  proceeding to rendezvous with convoy.
0227I (Ship Contacts No.7 & 8) In sweeping horizon
  with periscope prior to surfacing, sighted
  an estimated 7500 ton naval auxiliary and 5000
  ton freighter bearing 038° and 043° relative,
  respectively, estimated range 5000 yards. Com-

-3-

— page 11 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. PUMPER - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
(Period from Sep.7,1943, to October 24,1943)

menced approach. No escort visible at this time.
Ships were zig zagging independently and radically
every few minutes. Bright moonlight precluded
exposing radar for accurate range. Sound reported
one set of very heavy screws and another set of
somewhat lighter screws - both slow. Base course
determined to be 042°T.

0240-12I Commenced firing first salvo of three torpedoes
          from bow tubes ten second interval at naval aux-
          iliary on 95° port track estimated range 1600
          yards, torpedo run 1750 yards, three degree
          divergent spread.

0240-45I Shifted to second target for set up.

0242I Commenced firing second salvo of three torpedoes
          from bow tubes at freighter on 101° port track,
          estimated range 1900 yards, torpedo run 2100
          yards, three degree divergent spread.

0242-30I Commenced swinging to bring stern tubes to
          bear since no explosions were heard and it was
          assumed the first salvo had missed.

0244-15I Series of six explosions commenced. There were
          two distinct sets of three explosions, each agree-
          ing very closely with firing intervals used.

0246I The leading naval auxiliary was seen to take a
          small port list and turn away. Sound reported
          all screws stopped. Then periscope was shifted
          to the freighter all that could be seen was
          the bridge structure sinking very rapidly. All
          of the second target disappeared from sight in
          one and one-half minutes.

0247I Two distant depth charges either dropped by the
          naval auxiliary or by the escort which later
          came into sight.

0248I Sound reported heavy screws had started again.
          Periscope observation showed naval auxiliary
          steaming away on course 070°T heading for Ambon
          at a speed of 7 knots as determined by sound turn
          count assuming speed of 7-3/4 knots used in firing
          was correct.

0255I Sighted sub.chaser type escort angle on bow 90°
          port directing a red searchlight on the water
          where the freighter had sunk.

0256I Sound reported light fast screws coming down own
          port side.

0258I Two depth charges - not close. Went deep to get
          under layer at 260 feet to evade.

0345I Sound reported screws were disappearing astern -
          came to periscope depth.

0353I Surfaced. Nothing in sight. Decided attack would
          be futile since Ambon entrance was only 20 miles
          away and daybreak was only 1-1/2 hours away.
          Cleared area at high speed.

-4-

— page 12 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. JUFFER - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
(Period from Sep.7,1943, to Oct. 24,1943.)

17 September
0430-0500I Heard very distant depth charges.
0532I Submerged - conducting periscope patrol. Heard
more distant depth charges.
1922I Surfaced - proceeding to Northern approaches to
Ambon.

18 September
Conducting surface patrol and training dives
during day proceeding to Northern entrance of
Manipa Straits.
2150I (Ship Contact No.10) O.O.D. sighted blinker li-
close aboard challenging with "space" "space"
character. Position Lat.02-42S Long.
126-16E.
2151I Submerged to 150 feet to get below layer at
105 feet and commenced evading. Sound reported
two sets of light screws stopping and starting
at a time searching. This indicates that a
small boat patrol is maintained in the passage
between Buru and Sula Islands. SJ radar is not
very helpful.

19 September
0015I Sound reported screws fading out astern.
0051I All clear - surfaced.
0537I Submerged for patrol off North end of Manipa
Straits.
1917I Surfaced and set course for assigned area.

20 September
Conducting surface patrol and training dives
proceeding to Sioe Passage.
1300I Sighted Tifore Island bearing 007°M.
1314I Submerged-conducting submerged patrol.
1915I Surfaced.

21 September
0542I Submerged, conducting submerged patrol through
Eastern entrance to Sioe Passage.
1930I Surfaced. Many lights visible on both sides of
passage.
2015I Completed passing through Sioe Passage.

22 September
Conducting surface patrol across shipping rout
between Balik Papan and Palau, Rabaul. Sighted
numerous oil drums during day.
1202I Sighted object appearing to be mast on the
horizon - submerged. The mast was later ident-
ified as a two-masted sailboat apparently fishi
1842I Surfaced.

23 September
Conducted surface patrol across Balik Papan -

-5-

— page 13 —
IDENTIAL
JECT: U.S.S. PUFFER - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
(Period from Sep.7, 1943, to Oct.24,1943.)

Palau,Rabaul shipping routes.

24 September
0951I Submerged, conducting submerged patrol across
shipping routes North of Stroomen Kaap, Celebes.
1400I Entered assigned area.
1855I Surfaced.

25 September
0600I Submerged, conducting submerged patrol off North
Watcher, Celebes. Sighted several sailboats
during day.
2004I Surfaced, patrolling across Makassar Straits.

26 September
0605I Submerged, conducting submerged patrol between
North and South Watcher, Celebes. Sighted sev-
eral sailboats during day.
It is believed that sailboats act as spotters.
They remain at shipping focal points during day
with sails up and at night lie to with sails down
making them extremely difficult to see on a dark
night. So far, the Japs have effectively routed
traffic around us.
1911H Surfaced, patrolling across Makassar Straits.

27 September
0500I Submerged, conducting submerged patrol off
Koetei River delta, Borneo.
1910H Surfaced, patrolling across Makassar Straits.

28 September
0501H Submerged, conducting submerged patrol Southwest
of Koetei River delta, Borneo. No fix for 48
hours. We patrolled entrance to
to Balik Papan. Rain and poor visibility all day.
1900H Surfaced. Position doubtful. Patrolling across
Makassar Straits on soundings. Complete overcast.

29 September
0502H Submerged off 100 fathom curve. Conducted
submerged patrol. Visibility poor.
1913H Surfaced. Patrolling on line from Balik Papan
to Cape Mangkalibat. Japs are definitely hold-
ing shipping inside ten fathom curve. Decided
our best chance of getting at them is off the
Northern entrance to Makassar Straits.

30 September
0519H Submerged. Patrolling Makassar Straits.
1905H Surfaced. Conducting patrol off Mangkalibat.

1 October
0506H Submerged - patrolling off Mangkalibat Pt.
1900H Surfaced - patrolling along Balik Papan - Manila
route.

-6-

— page 14 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. TUFFER - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
(Period from Sep.7,1943, to Oct.24,1943.)

2 October
0512H Submerged - intended to conduct surface patrol
        however shifted to submerged patrol due to heavy
        rain storm and very low visibility.
1451H Visibility increased - surfaced and conducted
        patrol along Manila - Balik Papan route.

3 October
        Conducting surface patrol along Palau - Tarakan
        route. Made morning trim dive.

4 October
0516H Submerged off entrance to Tarakan.
0646H (Ship Contact No.11) Sighted smoke bearing 214°
        Turned toward and commenced closing at 6 knots.
        Went to Battle Stations.
0655H Identified target as large (7000 tons or more)
        Passenger freighter on course 000°T, speed 11
        knots. Took normal approach course at high
        speed, going to 80 feet for high speed running
        sea glassy, visibility excellent. Target was
        not zigging and no escort was seen.
0725H When range had closed to 9000 yards, target's
        changed course to 285°T and headed down Tarakan
        Channel. Secured from Battle Stations. This
        was a tough one to see get away after going so
        long without getting so much as even a "nibble"
        at a worthwhile target. It is not believed that
        we were sighted unless it was by a plane that
        we did not see. Continued patrol off Tarakan.
1910H Surfaced, conducting patrol to seaward of Tarakan.

5 October
0510H Submerged, conducting submerged patrol along 5
        fathom curve off southern approaches to Tarakan.
        No sights or fix, using current given in Coast
        Pilot and stream drift chart which seemed to
        agree with previous indications.
1912H Surfaced and set course to seaward with the
        intention of returning after battery charge was
        completed and patrol off Bandoe Reef light the
        next day.

6 October
0048H Struck reef with the ship going ahead at 9 knot
        in position later determined to be Lat.04-10.5N
        Long.118-44E. It was a very dark night with an
        occasional rain. No sights or fix for 60 hours.
        Current used up to this point was that given in
        the Coast Pilot as verified by previous observa-
        tions to seaward off Tarakan. Fathometer had
        been inoperative all day and was back in commis-
        sion at 2200, October 5, 1943. At this time a
        sounding of 1350 fathoms was obtained which
        agreed exactly with the chart sounding at our

-7-

— page 15 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. TUFFER - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
(Period from Sep.7,1943, to Oct. 24,1943.)

estimated position at that time. The C.O.D.
immediately backed emergency and ordered ballast
tanks blown with high pressure air as we had
been riding, partially flooded down.

Lead line soundings showed that the depth of
water forward was between 14 and 15 feet which
gradually tapered off to the Conning Tower at which
point the depth was 20 feet. The draft of
the ship forward as indicated by draft [UNCLEAR: g] was
13 feet 6 inches. Everything indicated that the
ship was being held on a pinnacle just forward of
the Conning Tower.

The following measures were taken to lighten ship
and get clear of the reef:
Blew all ballast and variable tanks.
Blew #3 & #5 reserve fuel ballast tanks losing
approximately 9000 gals. of fuel oil.
Blew 10,000 gals. of fuel overboard from #1
normal fuel tank.
Shifted fresh water aft.
Threw towing pennant overboard.
Made preparations for hauling anchor aft for use
as a kedge.
Made preparations for disposing torpedoes
forward. Fortunately this was not necessary.
Made plans for scuttling ship.

During the above preparations the ship was con-
tinually backed and twisted and sallied by flood-
ing and blowing #6 & #7 main ballast tanks. Could
twist through only six degrees.

0222H While backing emergency full power on four main
engines, ship came clear of reef as though cata-
pulted. A tremendous sigh of relief went through-
out the ship. Current undoubtedly was Northeasterly
and set us to the Northward and [UNCLEAR: caused] us to go around. Immediately
after getting clear fathometer gave a sounding of
100 fathoms. A [UNCLEAR: aft] valve at this time was
backed and unable to hoist shaft clear for closing
gate valve. Pit log rotor meter
bent. Hull damage cannot be determined until
docking. Cleared area at high speed and commenced
putting ship back in diving trim.
0532H Ship back in diving trim and made trim dive, then
conducted surface patrol to seaward until,
1252H Submerged.
1800H Surfaced, proceeding to a station off Streonen
Keep for next day's submerged patrol.

-8-

— page 16 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. TULLIBEE - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
(Period from Sep.7,1943, to Oct. 9,1943.)

7 October
0449H Submerged.
1831H Surfaced and commenced surface patrol off North
        entrance to Makassar Straits.

8 October
0648H Submerged off North Entrance to Makassar Strait
1312H Surfaced.

9 October
0525H Submerged.
0838H Sound reported pinging bearing 000°T turned to
        close.
0852H (Ship Contact No.12) Sighted masts of what was
        later determined to be Chidori Class torpedo bo
        Commenced approach. Target course 210°T, speed
        14 knots, not zig zagging. Minimum range
        attain was 10,000 yards.
0941H Broke off approach and headed in direction from
        which the destroyer had appeared, hoping there
        was more to follow.
1040H (Ship Contact No.13) Sighted masts of ship. Co
        menced approach. Target identified as a very
        large merchantman on base course 220°T, speed 1
        knots; target zigging normally between limits of
        191°T and 238°T - no escort in sight. (Later
        identified as Kinryu Maru shown in ONI 208-J,
        page 44.)
1110H Fired four torpedoes from bow tubes at the
        105 port track, torpedo run 1750
        yards, gyro angle 352°. First two hit just
        aft of bridge and just inside of stern. Ship
        list of at least 50°, the entire stern was
        enveloped in smoke. Believed ship would sink
        rapidly. Nevertheless commenced swinging to
        bring stern tubes to bear in case follow up
        were necessary. Third and Fourth torpedo
        shots were missed astern and ahead respectively. Pictures
        which may help identification.
        Target now presenting her starboard
        side, screws still stopped. Lined up for stern
        shots.
1115H Noted merchantman was
        settling. Target now presenting her starboard
        side, screws still stopped. Lined up for stern
        shots.
1119H Fired two torpedoes from stern tubes, 70 star-
        board track, 175° gyro angle, torpedo run 2300
        yards, target speed zero, used a 1° spread to
        cover current. First torpedo exploded
        prematurely after 10 seconds; second torpedo
        running directly for the target when observed
        premature but never exploded, apparently
        a "dud". At this time noted that Chidori Type
        destroyer previously sighted was closing the

-9-

— page 17 —
CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
OBJ: U.S.S. DU FER - REL
(Period from Sep.7,1943, to Oct. 24,1943.)

scene fast. Ship commenced firing small caliber
guns in our direction. Ship still seemed to
be swinging very slowly. Commenced maneuvering
for another stern shot and favorable track.
1125H Three distant depth charges.
1128H Heard ringing and fast screws getting closer.
Commenced clearing scene, still hoping for another
shot.
1145H Six depth charges very close to the stern which
rocked the boat like a sailboat in a typhoon,
let water in hatches and Conning Tower door.
backed sea valves off seats, blew out plug in
closet (sea pressure gauge line formerly connec-
ted here) allowing considerable water to enter
After Torpedo Room. Apparently sprung rudder
and stern planes as evidenced by increased noise
and overloading of motors. Starboard sound
of engine air induction and ship's ventilation
supply outboard valves. Miscellaneous glass and
cork flew around. Went deep.
1155H One depth charge.
1210H Four depth charges directly overhead and
staggered in depth. We apparently are leaving
an oil slick or air bubble wake or both because
attacking ship never loses us for a second and
then attacks from directly astern, gradually eases up and
stays directly overhead. Current is
around considerably making
evasive maneuvering very difficult.
1344H Heard a distant full explosion in the direction
in which the freighter was last seen. Sound has
never heard freighter screw start.
1345H Five depth charges again very close and directly
overhead.
1525H Two depth charges very close and overhead. It
is impossible to shake this fellow. The manner
in which he keeps on us is uncanny.
1625H Six depth charges the first two of which were
extremely close.
1754H Two depth charges overhead apparently set a little
more shallow or were lighter.
1820H Second A.S. vessel has joined the attack.
1852H Five depth charges again close and overhead.
Commenced re-vitalizing air. The original
vessel is still never losing us, however, the
second vessel seems to be interfering with him.
That a fellow up there can hold his own
with any sound operator anywhere.
2100H Depth control is very difficult. The boat is
running with a twelve degree up angle.

-10-

— page 18 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. PUFFER - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
(Period from Sep.7,1943, to Oct. 4,1943.)

Induction is apparently flooded. Trim pump is
worthless. It is necessary to blow safety to
maintain depth. If only the people in the
Bureau who say an adequate quiet trim pump will
come in due time were here now, I'm sure they
would stop at nothing to correct this serious
defect immediately.
2240H Six more depth charges, extremely close as
usual. This hull is certainly taking it. A
most deep felt "well done" to the welders of th
Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company and the Super-
vising Officer and officials. Electric motors
in the bilges are flooding out. Design must be
changed to re-locate auxiliary motors from the
bilges.

The battle sound operators are doing an out-
standingly good job keeping two attacking vesse
in contact with one sound head that has to be
worked with difficulty by hand. JP sound equi
ment would certainly be a help to them. HETRIC
William Herman, 250 49 66, MoMMlc, USN, is doin
a seemingly tireless job keeping bucket brigad
going and cheering the entire crew.

10 October Submerged, still undergoing depth charge attack
Running as silently as possible at deep sub-
mergence and maneuvering to avoid but not
by any luck, attacking vessels keeping con-
stant contact. Spread CO2 absorbent and bled
oxygen into the boat. Trim exceedingly diffi-
cult to control.

0115H Six more depth charges overhead and dangerously
close. These were the last charges dropped but
attacking vessels remained in contact and made
good sound.
1225H Sound reported pinging had stopped. Lost sound
contact with attacking vessels. Could not
come to periscope depth for a look since safety
and negative tanks had been blown dry and had
pressure in them, auxiliary tanks and after
trim tanks had been blown and had pressure in
them, and a dangerous amount of free surface
water in all bilges and all of the After
Torpedo Room. Pressure in the boat was already
at 12 inches but precluded venting pressure in
tanks into the boat. It was decided to hang on
at all costs until darkness at which time we
would have to come up to surface directly
regardless. Breathing was most difficult
and severe in spite of all that could be
done to re-vitalize the air. Due to tension,

-11-

— page 19 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. PUFFER - REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL
(Period from Sep.7,1943, to Oct. 24,1943.)

bad air, heat, humidity, hard work on bucket
brigades, etc. The crew were practically out
on their feet but carrying on like veterans.
1910H Surfaced from deep submergence in bright moon-
light. Luck was with us - nothing in sight.
Commenced hauling out into the middle of the
Celebes Sea to get the boat back in shape and
charge batteries. We are committed to the
surface for act if necessary. Plan to act
may. Placed all deck guns in readiness for what
if necessary. (See Paragraph (K) for compilati
of major defects and damage.)
1925H (Ship Contact #14) Sighted a small patrol boat
or destroyer ahead. Commenced a reverse end
around to evade; working toward land to place
ourselves against a land background.
2000H Succeeded in evading and lost sight of vessel.
This should be another example to our forces
that an enemy submarine contact deserted is an
enemy submarine saved. We would have been
sure "kill" had the attacking vessels remained
with us just six hours longer.

11 October
0430H Ship again in condition to dive.
0450H Made trim dive - no really serious leaks.
Stayed submerged to rest crew and steady down.
Decided boat could not undergo another attack.
1814H Surfaced.
12 October
Informed CTF 71 we were returning.
0448H Submerged to continue repairs.
1804H Surfaced.
13 October
0412H Submerged for transit of Siaoe Pass.
1826H Surfaced, proceeding down Molukka Passage.
14 October
Enroute through Molukka Passage on the surface.
1507H Submerged.
1812H Surfaced.
15 October
Enroute across Ceram Sea on the surface.
1118H (Plane Contact No.6) Submerged.
1218H Surfaced.
16 October
0407H Submerged passing through Barrier east of Serma
Island.
1837H Surfaced, proceeding to Darwin, Australia.

-12-

— page 20 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: U.S.S. PUFFER - REPORT OF FIRST PATROL
(Period from Sep.7,1943, to Oct.24,1943.)

17 October
Enroute to Darwin, Australia on surface.
1543H Moored to Fuel Dock, Darwin, Australia.
Received 35,751 gallons fuel oil and 6000
gallons fresh water.

18 October
0653H Underway proceeding on surface to Fremantle, -
Australia.
1421H (Plane Contact No.7) Sighted LIBERATOR bomber,
on opposite course, on horizon.

19-23 October
Proceeding on surface from Darwin, Australia,
to Fremantle, Australia, conducting training
dives enroute.

24 October
Arrived Fremantle, West Australia.

-13-

— page 21 —
(C) WEATHER
The weather conditions encountered during this patrol
were in agreement with those given in the Pilots for south-
west monsoon season.

1) TIDAL INFORMATION
Tides and currents were in general agreement with
those given in the Pilots except in the vicinity of Tarakan.
Pilot gives a constant set to the southwest of from 1/2
to 2 knots depending on the state of the tide, instead of
the above current, a current of 1/2 knot setting northeast
was experienced. Through Sape Passage the current runs
eastward at 2 knots. In the area under Cape Mangkalibat
a counter current sets to northward at .8 knots.

2) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
No navigational aids were observed.

-14-

— page 22 —
-15-

No. | TIME & DATE | LAT. LONG. | TYPE(S) | (F) SHIP CONTACTS INITIAL EST. CRSE. & RANGE SPEED | HOW CONTACTED | REMARKS
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1. | 0435 I 8 Sept | 08-57S 127-55E | 2 Submarines | 145°T 3,700 Yds 15 Kts | SN | South of barrier. Could not be identified as friendly or enemy.
2. | 1415 I 10 Sept | 04-08S 127-39E | Patrol Boat | 160°T-060°T 7,000 Yds 3 Kts | P | Small (500 ton) ship. 2 masts; single stack; high bow; 1 gun on stern counter & deck house aft. Jap flag painted on side. Closed range to 2000 yds. Then opened out. Vessel appeared to be patrolling at slow speed, then stopping to listen.
3. | 0616 I 13 Sept | 03-49S 128-23E | Inter-island steamer | 275°T 6,500 Yds 10 Kts | SN | Small (500 ton) ship. High bow, deep well deck, high stern, stack aft & small stick mast aft. Ship on direct line from Ambon to Sorong Islands. Similar to but larger than
4. | 2119 I 14 Sept | 04-08S 130-18E | Inter-island steamer & tow | 275°T 14,000 Yds 9 Kts | SN | Contact No. 3 towing what appeared to be a small tug or possibly M.T.B. or cabin cruiser. Maintained contact and took position ahead. Target identified at 3000 yds through periscope and attack abandoned.

— page 23 —
No.
TIME &
DATE
LAT.
LONG.
TYPE(S)
(F) SHIP CONTACTS (CONT'D)
INITIAL
RANGE
EST. CRSE. &
SPEED
HOW
CONTACTED
REMARKS

5. 1445 I
   16 Sept
   03-50S
   127-58E
   Camouflaged
   Tug
   4,500
   Yds
   195°T
   9 Kts
   P
   Tug about size of HIRI class
   minesweeper with slight
   stack, bow and stern lift up
   of slats, etc. to give im-
   pression of large size when
   viewed from forward or aft.
   First thought to be submarine.

6. 0050 I
   17 Sept
   04-12.5S
   127-11E
   Small escort
   vessel
   7,000
   Yds
   240°T
   15 Kts (est)
   SN
   Could not be identified in
   line, later proved to be
   escort vessel with lines
   similar to our old sub-
   chaser.
   Probably Naval aux.
   transport. Bright moonlight.

7. 0227 I
   17 Sept
   04-14.5S
   127-09E
   Transport
   (lines similar
   to CHAUMONT)
   5,000
   Yds
   024°T
   7.75 Kts
   PN
   Freighter
   similar to
   HEIAN MARU,
   P. 215,00T
   208J.

8. 0227 I
   17 Sept
   [HANDWRITTEN: Same as]
   [HANDWRITTEN: #7]
   [HANDWRITTEN: #7]
   [HANDWRITTEN: #7]
   [HANDWRITTEN: #7]
   [HANDWRITTEN: #7]
   [HANDWRITTEN: #7]
   [HANDWRITTEN: #7]
   [HANDWRITTEN: #7]
   In company astern of Contact
   #7.
   After firing sighted escort
   (same as Contact #6) dead
   ahead.

9. 0256 I
   17 Sept
   04-15S
   127-10E
   Unidentified
   escort
   4,000
   Yds
   270°T
   5 Kts
   PM
   Probably a small boat. Never
   seen. Challenge only was sent.
   Initial course 000°T, closed
   range to 9000 yds, target
   turned in to enter Tarakan.

10. 2150 I
    18 Sept
    02-42S
    126-16E
    Large AP
    about 7000
    tons
    1,000
    Yds
    Unknown
    000°T
    to 285°T
    10 Kts
    S
    First heard pinging on long
    scale then sighted smoke.
    Range could not be closed to
    fire.

11. 0646 H
    4 Oct
    03-09N
    118-40E
    [HANDWRITTEN: 18,000]
    [HANDWRITTEN: Yds]
    [HANDWRITTEN: P]
    [HANDWRITTEN: Could not be identified in]
    [HANDWRITTEN: line, later proved to be]
    [HANDWRITTEN: escort vessel with lines]
    [HANDWRITTEN: similar to our old sub-]
    [HANDWRITTEN: chaser.]
    [HANDWRITTEN: Probably Naval aux.]
    [HANDWRITTEN: transport. Bright moonlight.]

-16-

— page 24 —
No. | TIME & DATE | LAT. LONG. | TYPE(S) | (F) SHIP CONTACTS (CONTINUED) | INITIAL EST. CRSE. & SPEED | RANGE | REMARKS
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
12. | 038H 9 Oct | 01-08N 119-31E | CHIDORI CLASS torpedo boat | 30,000 Yds | 210°T 14 Kts | | P attack on Contact #13 re-turned and conducted depth charge attack.
13. | 1040 H 9 Oct | 01-08N 119-31E | Large AK similar to (KINRYU MARU (P.44,ONI 208J) | 10,000 Yds | 230°T 12 Kts | | P Freighter with no escort in sight.
14. | 1925 H 10 Oct | 01-13N 119-40E | Small patrol boat | 18,000 Yds | 225°T 8 Kts | | P Apparently proceeding to Makassar Straits.

-17-

— page 25 —
No. | TIME & DATE | LAT. LONG. | (E) TYPE (S) | (F) SHIP CONFG. (CONT'D) INITIAL EST. CRSE. & RANGE SPEED | (G) TORPEDO DATA | (H) RESULTS | (I) REMARKS
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
12. | 0838H | 01-08N | Torpedo | 30,000 Yds | P | Fired | attack on Contact #13, re-
| 9 Oct | 119-31E | Boat | 210°T | | | turned and conducted depth
| | | | 14 Kts | | | charge attack.
13. | 1040 H | 01-08N | Large AK | 10,000 Yds | P | Freighter | Freighter zl-za with
| 9 Oct | 119-31E | similar to | 230°T | | | no escort in sight.
| | | | KENRYU MARU | 12 Kts | | |
| | | | (T.44, ONI | | | |
| | | | 208J) | | | |
14. | 1925 H | 01-13N | Small patrol | 18,000 Yds | SN | Apparently | Apparently proceeding to
| 10 Oct | 119-40E | boat | 225°T | | | Makassar Straits.
| | | | | 8 Kts | | |

-17-

— page 26 —
NO. | TIME & DATE | LAT: | LONG: | TYPE(S) | (G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS INITIAL RANGE | EST. CRSE. & SPEED | HOT CONTACT | REMARKS
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
1. | 1030 I 11 Sept | 03-43S | 127-32E | DAVE | 4 Miles | 120 Kts | P | Taking off from Ambon Island. Gaining altitude back of TG.
2. | 0940 I 12 Sept | 03-50 S | 127-59 E | Fokker Transport | 5 Miles | Westerly | P | Torpedo breaking up for landing on Ambon back of TG. Alang.
3. | 1014 I 12 Sept | 03-50 S | 127-59E | 3 NELL(S) | 5 Miles | Easterly | P | Lookout on O.O.D. saw flash in white light and then later flashing red light, which appeared to be recog- nition signals coming from
4. | 2330 I 13 Sept | 04-03S | 126-52E | Unknown | 6 Miles | Unknown | R(SM) | & square aperture. SD Radar picked up plane on sweep a few seconds later at 6 miles range closing. Bright moon- light. Over Ambon Tg. Alang.
5. | 1605 I 16 Sept | 03-50S | 127-56E | NELL | 3 Miles | Northerly | P | SD picked up target at 11 miles closing. Submerged, plane never sighted.
6. | 1118 H 15 Oct | 04-37S | 125-32E | Unknown | 11 Miles | Unknown | R |
7. | 1421 H 18 Oct | 12-06S | 128-59E | Liberator | 11 Miles | Easterly | SD |

-18-

— page 27 —
(H) TORPEDO ATTACK DATA
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) TORPEDO ATTACK C.1, PATROL NO.1
TIME: 0240 I DATE: Sep.17,1943 Lat.04-14S
                                            Long.127-09E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION
This attack was made on a convoy consisting of two ships
and a small escort. The leading ship is believed to
have been a Naval Auxiliary ship or transport which
can be best identified as similar to the U.S.S. CHAUMONT.
The second ship was a heavily laden freighter similar to
HEIAN MARU, Page 215, ONI J. Escort was not seen until
after the attack was completed. From previous contact
it is believed that the escort came from Ambon and
rendezvoused with the two ships. Escort was about
160 feet long and had the same general appearance as
our World War I sub chasers. Formation was roughly
column, open order formation, with ships zig zagging
simultaneously. The zigs averaged 35° and short legs
clocked as follows: 1,4,7,5,11.5 minutes, respectively.
Contact was made by periscope at night when searching
horizon prior to surfacing; after a previous contact with
what was believed to have been a submarine but after the
attack proved to be the escort proceeding to the rendez
vous. It was a moonlight night and periscope visibility
estimated at 6000 yards.

SHIPS SUNK
One freighter similar to HEIAN MARU shown on Page
215, ONI J. listed as 5346 - 5454 tons.

SHIPS DAMAGED
One Naval Auxiliary or transport best described as
similar to the U.S. CHAUMONT with an estimated tonnage
of 7500 tons.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY
Immediately after six torpedoes were heard to explode,
the Naval Auxiliary was seen to take a small port list,
turn very slowly away and sound reported her screws
stopped. Three minutes later the screws were heard to
start at a slightly reduced speed and ship proceeded on
a course to Ambon Base.

After a quick observation of the above ship, the
periscope was shifted to the freighter. All that was
visible above the water was the bridge structure and the
ship sinking lower very rapidly, going out of sight in
one and one-half minutes from the time the six explo
sions were heard. Sound reported all screws stopped
and after the freighter was seen to disappear sound
heard characteristic noises of ship breaking up. Screw
noises of this ship were never heard again nor was the ship
seen in the periscope.

TARGET DRAFT
For Naval Auxiliary or Transport: Target draft estimat

-19-

— page 28 —
TARGET DRAFT (CONT'D)
es 15 feet. Course 024. Speed estimated as 7-3/4
knots. Range estimated as 1600 yards.
For HEIAN MARU type freighter: Target draft esti-
mated as 20 feet. Course 035. Speed estimated as
7-3/4 knots. Range estimated as 1900 yards.

OWN SHIP DATA:
Speed 4 knots. Course 130. Depth 65 feet. Angle ZERO.

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
Fired 6 torpedoes (Torpex Heads) in two salvos of
three each using a 3° divergent spread, first salvo at
leading target and second salvo at trailing target.
This was a periscope attack on a bright moonlit
night with check bearings being applied before firing
each torpedo at ten second intervals. Torpedo depth
set was 12 feet. This depth was ordered since it was
considered that the maximum depth of targets was 20
feet and minimum depth 15 feet.

ATTACK NO. 1
| | No.1 | No.2 | No.3 | No.4 | No.5 | No.6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes fired | No.1 | No.2 | No.3 | No.4 | No.5 | No.6 |
| Track angle | 95°P | 99°P | 95°P | 101°P | 106°P | 101°P |
| Gyro angle | 339½ | 334 | 339½ | 345 | 340½ | 344½ |
| Depth set | 12 ft | 12 ft | 12 ft | 12 ft | 12 ft | 12 ft |
| Power | H.P. | H.P. | H.P. | H.P. | H.P. | H.P. |
| Hit or miss | Miss | Miss | Miss | Hit | Hit | Hit |
| Erratic | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Mark torpedo | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No. | 24367 | 24549 | 22558 | 24809 | 22462 | 41837 |
| Mark exploder | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 |
| Serial No. | 11928 | 9796 | 9730 | 6794 | 6786 | 11957 |
| *Actuation set | CM | CM | CM | CM | CM | CM |
| Actuation actual | None | None | None | C | C | C |
| Mark warhead | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No. | 5685 | 9730 | 842 | 911 | 9707 | 9767 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing interval | 10sec | 10sec | 10sec | 10sec | 10sec | 15sec |
| Type spread | 0° | 3°L | 0° | 3°L | 3°R | 3°R |
Sea conditions | FLAT | CALM
Overhaul activity | U.S.S. FULTON
Torpedo performance | PERFECT
Tube performance | PERFECT
Fire control performance | PERFECT
*Contact - C; Magnetic - M; Contact & Magnetic - CM.

REMARKS
The times between firing and explosions show that the
actual range was double the estimated range used in
firing. Based on this fact as basis for actual range,
target course as determined by periscope observa-
tion being reasonably correct, and an average target
length of 425 feet, the following analysis is sub-
mitted: Target speed was actually from 9 to 11 knots
instead of the 7-3/4 knots used on TDC to make

-20-

— page 29 —
REMARKS (CONT'D)
target track accurately at the greater range. The
first set of three explosions heard was actually the
second set of torpedoes fired hitting the targets -
the torpedo spread to the left or forward of the
target (The second torpedo of the salvo spread 3° to
left of MOT) hitting the leading ship and the remainin
two torpedoes of the salvo hitting the trailing ship.
The first torpedo of this second salvo fired to hit
MOT apparently hit the freighter (second ship), stoppe
it, thus allowing the third torpedo angled 3° to the
right of the MOT to hit. This also accounts for the e
tremely rapid sinking of the freighter on what seemed
be an even keel.

The first salvo of three torpedoes apparently passed
ahead of the leading target and exploded at the end of
their run five minutes after firing and was the second
set of three explosions heard.

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) TORP DO ATTACK NO.2 PATROL NO.
TIME: 1110H DATE: Oct.9,1943 Lat.01-08N
Long.119-31E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION
This attack was made on a single unloaded vessel of
the KINRYU MARU class (ONI 208-J,Page 44). Escort had
passed previously and was searching approximately
10 to 15 thousand yards ahead; it was a CHIDORI class
destroyer. Target was zigging normally between the li
mits of 190° true to 238° true. Contact was made by pe
riscope at a range of approximately 16,000 yards.
Visibility unlimited - sea a very slight chop.

SHIPS SUNK
None actually witnessed.

SHIPS DAMAGED AND POSSIBLY SUNK
One freighter of the KINRYU MARU class shown on Page 4
ONI 208-J, listed as 9,310 tons.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY
Heard two torpedoes explode immediately after saw
target take a list of at least 50 degrees and saw that
the ship from the bridge aft was enveloped in smoke.
Target was very slowly turning away and sound reported
screws stopped and never again heard them start up.
Two and one-half hours later heard a dull explosion
in the direction of the target.

TARGET DRAFT
Target draft estimated at 15 feet, course 233° true,
speed 12 knots, range 1760 yards.

OWN SHIP DATA
Speed 4 knots, course 315° true, depth 67 feet, angle

-21-

— page 30 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Fired Four torpedoes from the forward tubes, the
first two being Torpex heads and the second two TNT
heads. A 3° divergent spread was used and torpedo depth
set was 10 feet. A ten-second firing interval was used
and check bearings used before each shot. TDC was
tracking perfectly and had no apply no corrections.
Nine minutes later two torpedoes were fired from the
stern tubes with a depth setting of 8 feet and a 1°
spread used to cover any possible current. Both were
Torpex heads. The torpedoes were running straight for
the target. The first exploded prematurely after a 16
second run and the second never exploded.

ATTACK NO.2
| Tubes fired | No.1 | No.2 | No.3 | No.4 | No.7 | No.8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Track angle | 105°P | 110°P | 107°P | 118°P | 67°S | 70°S |
| Gyro angle | 354 | 349 | 352½ | 341 | 174½ | 176½ |
| Depth set | 10 ft | 10 ft | 10 ft | 10 ft | 8 ft | 8 ft |
| Power | High | High | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or miss | Hit | Hit | Miss | Miss | Prem- | Dud |
| | | | | | ature | |
| Erratic | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Mark torpedo | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No. | 24191 | 24830 | 23363 | 22434 | 32422 | 20260 |
| Mark exploder | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 |
| Serial No. | 10924 | 6789 | 6789 | 11958 | 11954 | 5762 |
| Actuation set | CONTACT | CONTACT | MAGNETIC | MAGNETIC |
| Actuation actual | CONTACT | CONTACT | MAGNETIC | MAGNETIC | Prem- | Dud |
| | | | | | ature | |
| Mark warhead | 16 | 16 | 15-1 | 15-1 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No. | 3670 | 1051 | 1574 | 3785 | 6034 | 5305 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TNT | TNT | TPX | TPX |
| | | | (TPX extender) | | | |
| Firing interval | 0sec | 10sec | 10sec | 10sec | 0sec | 9sec |
| Type spread | 1°R | 1°R | 4½°L | 4½°L | 1°R | 1°R |

Sea conditions | LIGHT CHOP
Overhaul activity | U.S.S. FULTON
Torpedo performance HOT - STRAIGHT | Prem- Dud
| | ature
Tube performance | PERFECT
Fire control performance | PERFECT

REMARKS
Target apparently sighted wakes shortly before torpe-
does hit and started turning away. The first two
torpedoes hit, both aft. The third and fourth
torpedoes passed astern and ahead, respectively.
Apparently the vessel was running with very little
fuel aboard which permitted it to use empty fuel
tanks for correcting list. When last seen the list
was about 10° and the stern was settling. The "pre-
mature" and "dud" fired nine minutes later unquestion-
ably cheated us of a sure sinking and gave the
destroyer a starting point from which to track us.
Target commenced firing small caliber guns in direction
of premature.

-22-

— page 31 —
(I) MINES
     No mines, minelaying or minesweeping operations were
noted.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

     Ambon Area
     Anti-submarine measures in this area consisted of:
patrol boat described and ship contact #1 employing
listening only, camouflaged tug (ship contact #5)
apparently employing heavy smoke and listening, plane (air
craft contact #4) on bright moonlight nights. Pinging was
never heard in this area.
     After attack #1 the escort passed down the port side
of the ship and dropped two depth charges. The escort was
apparently never sure of our position. Evasion consisted
going under temperature layer and putting escort astern.
     It is believed that a small boat patrol is maintained
the straits between Boeroe Island and Tula Sanana Island.
While making this passage we were challenged; the
challenging ship was never seen but sound picked up two
sets of fast light screws.

     Makassar Straits Area
     On the morning of October 9, 1943, a CHIDORI class
torpedo boat was sighted, apparently on a straight
course for Balik Papan, and heard pinging on the search
scale. As later circumstances show this torpedo boat was
escorting a freighter which was about 15 miles astern.
     After attack #2 the same torpedo boat sighted earlier
was again sighted closing the scene of attack at high
speed. The freighter was firing its small caliber guns in
our direction and had dropped three depth charges. The
torpedo boat closed this ship rapidly and crossed stern
taking station close aboard and dropped six depth charges close aboard. He
then circled down port side and took station astern close
abroad, pinging on short scale directly on us, then work-
ing back and forth across stern. He would follow on
bearing between 190 and 195 degrees relative at slow speed
tracking. After he had tracked us for about an hour his
pinging would stop, he would speed up, screws would be heard
through the hull, and then the depth charges would explode
all close aboard. The patterns dropped varied in number
from two to six and from the times of explosions seemed
to be varied in depth and not thrown out at random to
cover a large area. This procedure was continued until
about 1800H with very little variation and the torpedo boat
maintaining constant contact. We are either leaving a tra
or else this fellow is definitely the best soundman any
of us have ever seen or heard.
     At about 1800H the torpedo boats screws and pinging
became weaker and he seemed to be searching all around.
soon after this sound picked up more pinging further off.
Both ships now continued pinging on long scale astern.
This search astern continued for sometime, then both
ships speeded up, shifted to short scale and closed in astern
taking station close aboard one on each quarter. We were
then tracked and the same events took place as described
above except both ships let go depth charges. From this ti

-23-

— page 32 —
J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS (CONTINUED)

til the departure of one of the attacking ships, one would
listen and the other ping, both on station on the quarters.
While both ships were around there seemed to be a slight amount
of confusion between them, but not enough to let us out. A
number of rehearsal runs were made, screws being heard
throughout the boat but no depth charges. During these dry
runs rapid pinging was heard, and it is believed he was
using his fathometer while crossing.
The last depth charges were dropped at 0115H, Oct.10,
and destroyers maintained contact and continued with runs
until 1225H, Oct.10. Then screws faded out and pinging
stopped.

In brief the runs were made as follows: Destroyer would
feel his way slowly up from astern, pinging manually when close
aboard and shoot several short ones at us when directly
overhead; he would then stop his screws and one or two
pings would be heard (thought to be fathometer);
then he would go to full speed and in due time a gurgling
noise would be heard followed by the explosions of the
charges.

After the first string of depth charges exploded across
the stern the ship was taken to deep submergence, rigged for
silent running and all efforts were made to shake him off.
The bathythermograph showed nothing but a stright line,
while on previous days in other portions of the area. The ship
was exceedingly hard to control in depth because of leaks into the boat, and as
a result turned very sluggishly because of the 10 to 15
degree angle, and the current. Every effort was made
to keep the ship constantly swinging so that the attacking
ship would have difficulty tracking. When the runs would
start the rudder would be put over to clear the charges.
On both attacks the ship attacked dropped depth
charges.

J) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

ENGINEERING

ELECTRICAL
Bow plane resistance switch: Grounded out once.
Repaired in two hours.
Degaussing gear: M-Coil now has reading of 50,000 ohms.
Commutators of M-Coil motor-generator badly damaged due
to attempt to run this machine after it was soaked with
salt water.
Washing machine motor: Two weeks after start of
patrol this motor (overhauled just completed by U.S.
MILTON) was permanently out of commission. The wash
machine motor has been a continuous source of trouble
since commissioning. It is suggested that since we
have to use this machine which is definitely not
designed for this use that a spare motor be carried
aboard.
Pit log: Pit log was out of commission for short periods
of time on several occasions. Cleaning and resetting of

-24-

— page 33 —
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (CONT'D)
control unit contactors remedied the trouble. Rodmeter
was bent when this vessel grounded and was replaced with
spare rodmeter without incident.
Electrical damage due to depth charge:
(1) Both sound generators were immersed in
salt water for nearly a day. The starboard motor
armature was given the hot water treatment and baked
and new field coils were installed. However,
this motor failed again after six hours use. Both
of these motors remain out of commission.
(2) No.1 air conditioning circulating pump motor
was immersed in saltwater. Hot water treatment
and baking out have failed to put this motor back
in commission.
(3) Bow plane starting resistance cracked. Mica chipped
off. Salt water shorted out cables to this resist-
ance causing small electrical fire. Placed back in
commission.
(4) Brushes knocked off both lighting motor generators.
No damage to brushes or rigging.
(5) Magnetic brake spring for stern planes apparently
broken.
(6) Knocked two fans off bulkhead in After Torpedo Room.
(7) Broke various light bulbs and steam tights in After
Torpedo Room, both engine rooms, Conning Tower and
officers' shower.
(8) Broke eight lamps in rudder angle indicator system
and fifteen lamps in TP-TR circuit.
(9) Threw circulating water alarms in engine rooms
out of adjustment.
(10) Spark gap jumped from main cubicle to bulkhead - no
damage.
(11) Unscrewed light bulbs in emergency lighting circuit
in Maneuvering Room, After Engine Room and After
Torpedo Room.
(12) Ruptured bellows in Pit Log. Broke adjusting screw
on lower contact in control unit and jarred contact
settings out of adjustment.
(13) Broke lower glass in bridge gyro repeater. Repeater
flooded.
(14) Completely flooded out TPT cables and equipment,
searchlight cable from Conning Tower to Control
Room, and running lights and cables.

MECHANICAL
Main engines: Engine performance was excellent until
near the end of the patrol. Only minor air starter
check valve and injector failures were encountered.
On Oct.8th, immediately after starting #4 engine,
fresh water pressure was lost. The cylinder liner of
#16 unit was found to be cracked. Renewed liner and
exhaust valves. It is believed engine was started with
water in #16 unit. On Oct.14th, while running 80-90
on three generators, throttleman detected slight knock
in #4 Engine and stopped engine immediately. Bearing
metal was found in the crankcase and further inspection
disclosed that connecting rod bearing of #12 unit was
badly wiped and the journal badly scored. #4 unit

-25-

— page 34 —
(H) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (CONT'D)
bearing was slightly affected. #4 and #12 connecting
rods and pistons were removed, new pistons were secured
in cylinders to cover ports, and engine was placed back
in commission to be used with fourteen cylinders in
emergencies.
Outboard exhaust valves: Enroute from Panama to
Brisbane and from Brisbane to Darwin engine outboard
exhaust valves failed to close numerous times on dives.
It was found that valves would fail to close if
engines were run steadily for eight hours or more prior
to an attempt to close them. Inspection disclosed salt
to be forming on valve seats in a thick hard scale.
After scale was knocked loose valves would close
normally. Details of this serious military defect were
given to U.S.S. FULTON who's remedial action consisted
of simply readjusting all valves. Enroute to Darwin it
was found that this readjusting had done no good what-
ever.
It was decided that the hot valve seats were
evaporating the muffler spray water causing salt scale
to form on the valve seats, and that if the valve
seats could be kept cool the problem would be solved.
To accomplish this cooling, a row of holes were
drilled through each exhaust valve body water jacket in
such a manner that water would spray heavily on
the outer shell of the water
valve seats. The holes in
jacket were tapped and plugged. Since this jury altera-
tion only one failure to close has been encountered even
though engines have had long steady runs of 13 hours or
more.
Damage due to depth charging:
(1) Various gauges thrown out of adjustment.
(2) Caused leaks in flanges of salt water to lub oil
coolers.
(3) Broke gauge glasses in main engine fresh water
expansion tanks.
(4) Caused leaks in #4 engine salt water pump casing.

H U L L
(1) The main induction outboard valve gaskets (engine
air induction outboard valve and ship's ventila-
tion supply outboard valve) were blown off. This
caused the main induction to gradually flood and
undoubtedly emit a stream of air bubbles in the
process to very conveniently locate our position to
the enemy. The Commanding Officer considers the
gaskets as now installed a most serious military
defect that should be corrected by the installa-
tion of "T" gaskets immediately.
(2) All deck hatches, conning tower door, and
escape trunk door were unseated with each salvo
of depth charges and leaked continuously to the
after. It is recommended that these gaskets also
be changed to "T" gaskets since had these gaskets
blown entirely out, the boat would have been lost.

-26-

— page 35 —
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (CONT'D)
     As a matter of interest, the piston-like movement
     of the hatches caused a piece of rope under the
     hatch in the crew's mess to raise up like a charme
     snake every time a depth charge hit.
(3) Rudder post mis-alignment may be indicated by occa
     sional noisy operation in both hand and power and
     overloading of the main steering pump.
(4) Mis-alignment of the stern plane system may be
     indicated by noisy operation and overloading of
     the stern plane motor.
(5) Mis-aligned the door between the Manouvering Room
     and After Torpedo Room. The same is indicated on
     the Conning Tower Door, however, the door can
     still be made tight. It is requested that this
     door be removed as soon as possible.
(6) Items 3,4, and 5, above, might possibly be an
     indication of a possible mis-alignment of the
     stern. Complete checking is necessary during the
     re-fit period.
(7) Leaks in silver soldered joints of #4 air bank.
     Exact location to be determined when in dock. The
     silver soldering of high pressure air lines on this
     vessel is definitely of an inferior quality. This
     vessel has had to be docked on three different
     occasions in its short career to correct defective
     silver soldering. The Commanding Officer felt
     and predicted that this defect in this vessel would
     lead it into serious difficulties if depth charged
     but in each case time was granted only to correct
     the particular joint that was leaking at the time.
     With this condition existing, the vessel cannot
     be taken into combat with confidence.
(8) Antenna trunk flooded.
(9) All shallow depth gauges out of adjustment.
(10) Broken sea pressure gauge in After Torpedo Room.
(11) Backed out plug on Manouvering Room water closet
     flushing line sea valve casting. Plug is in
     opening where sea pressure gauge line formerly
     connected. After the numerous occasions on which
     it has been reported that plugs in sea lines and
     castings blow out, it is not understood why this
     practice is still sanctioned and permitted.
(12) Mis-aligned the starboard sound head shaft.causing
     difficult and noisy training. Had to train by
     hand thereafter.
(13) Port sound head shaft mis-aligned and leaking
     badly.
(14) Broke reach rod on sea valve for sea pressure gau
     in After Torpedo Room.
(15) Broke off wash basin in After Torpedo Room.
(16) Ruptured flanged union of trim line in After Torp
     Room.
(17) Broke off oxygen bottle adapter for valve and gau
     in After Torpedo Room.
(18) Sprung sheet metal doors as follows:
     (a) Crew's head in After Battery (2 doors).
     (b) Air lock door in After Battery.
-27-

— page 36 —
( ) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (CONT'D)
(19) Low air salvage hull valve in Forward Torpedo
     Room sprung leak at hull flange.
(20) Capstan and windlass emergency change valve
     packing gland sprung leak.
(21) Partial sheet metal bulkhead port side aft in
     Forward Torpedo Room sprung.
(22) Forward W.R.T. tank overflow valve to forward
     trim tank leaking.
(23) Broke valve stem on after battery high salvage
     hull valve.

O R D N A N C E

TORPEDOES
Mark 14-3A Torpedo #32422 Mark 6-1 Exploder #11954 was a
premature on firing.
Mark 14-3A Torpedo #20260 Mark 6-1 Exploder #5762 was a
dud on firing.
Mark 14-3A Torpedo #22901 flooded its afterbody when
made ready.
Mark 14-3A Torpedo #25163 flooded its afterbody when
made ready.
On the night of September 15, 1943, torpedo tubes
numbered 7,8,9,10 were made ready at periscope
depth (66 feet) but were not fired due to small size
of target. After securing tubes, the torpedoes were
checked and following conditions were found:

TUBE | MK & TORP.NO | AFTERBODY | GYRO | MK.& EXP.NO. | CONDITION
7 | 14-3A 32422 | Dry | Dry | 6-1 11954 | Dry
8 | 14-3A 20260 | Dry | Dry | 6-1 5762 | Dry
9 | 14-3A 22901 | 2 gal water | Dry | 6-1 6816 | Dry
10 | 14-3A 25163 | 5 gal water | Flooded | 6-1 5133 | Dry

If these torpedoes had been fired it is possible
that #9 would have been a sinker and #10 a sinker or
erratic gyro performance. These torpedoes were in
excellent condition when received from the U.S.S.
FULTON and had been carefully routined in accordance
with existing instructions.
The above torpedoes were again made ready on the
night of September 17, 1943, after the bow tubes had
been fired at the two-ship convoy. The stern tubes were
not fired due to excessive range and large track angle.
Inspection revealed torpedoes in tubes 9 and 10 again
had flooded afterbodies with about a pint of water in
gyro pot of torpedo in #10 tube. Found gyro setting
socket loose in torpedo in #10 tube (#25163).
The torpedoes in tubes #7 and #8 were again made
ready on October 9, 1943, and were fired at freighter
which had previously been hit twice. Torpedo from
tube #7 (#32422) premature in about 15 seconds and
the torpedo from tube #8 (#20260) was probably a dud as
it was set at 8 feet depth and headed straight for the
target but never exploded.
On the afternoon of September 16, 1943, torpedo
tubes numbered 1,2,3,4 were made ready at periscope

-23-

— page 37 —
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (CONT'D)

depth (67 feet) and not fired as the target was a
camouflaged "Q" ship. Outer doors were not opened;
however, when blowing water from W.R.T. pressure
in the tubes reached 20 pounds per square inch
momentarily which approximates pressure in these
tubes at periscope depth. Inspection of the tor-
pedoes revealed no flooding.

3" 50 CAL. GUN - DIFFICULT TRAINING
While routine firing of the 3" 50 cal. gun on the evening
of September 17, 1943, it was found very difficult
to train. However, by September 20 it was training
normal again except for hard spots on the starboard
bow and port quarter. Throughout the remainder of the
patrol the gun trained hard on the starboard bow and
port quarter and occasionally all the way around.
The training of this gun has been a problem since
before commissioning. It has been lifted three times
and temporary remedial action taken by the insertion
of shims under the gun and in the training rack. After
several all day dives the gun again trains hard due to
uneven swelling of the sections of the wooden foundati-
on. This was item 1R of this vessel's commissioning inspec-
tion and survey report and was commented by the Bureau
of Ships as follows:
"The wooden foundation should be firm, level, and
sufficiently flat to provide adequate bearing surface
for the gun. However, the holding-down clip clearance
in the gun should be sufficient to prevent binding
due to slight irregularities resulting from settling
tight on the holding-down bolts. In BuOrd letter
S8 (Prld) of May 7, 1943, the Bureau of Ordnance calls
attention to the wood gun foundation that the wood gun
foundations have 75% bearing surface and be flat within
.002 in. in 45 in. It is desired that the Supervisor
insure that this requirement is met and advise the
Bureaus as to conditions after checking".

DEPTH CHARGE DAMAGE TO ORDNANCE
(1) TBT System completely flooded including both
forward and after TBT's, the selector switch
in the Conning Tower, and the cables between them.
(2) Bent gyro spindles on tubes #5,6,9,10.
(3) Broke pressure gauge to number 10 torpedo tube.
(4) Flooded gyro setters in After Torpedo Room.

COMMUNICATIONS
DAMAGE DUE TO DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK
The rubber covering on the upper end of the SD
Radar mast was found to have two holes pierced in it
due to depth charge attack. The holes were immediatel
plugged with Permatex, but salt water had already
entered the mast. Insulation reading gradually droppe
off until on October 19, 1943, a reading of 100,000
ohms was obtained and the trace became completely
unsatisfactory.

-29-

— page 38 —
(L) RADIO
Radio reception was excellent, all serials were received
messages were cleared in minimum time.
While in the area minor interference was experienced on
KCS between 2245 to 2315. HOW. This interference
sounded like carrier waves from some station using voice.
Last serial received from CTF 7158
Last serial sent to CTF 714

(M) RADAR
Materially both the SJ and the SD radars held up very
well and withstood the effects of the severe depth charging
without incident.
The SD Radar performed excellently in all respects
until Oct.19,1943, when mast grounded due to salt water
entering tube. Only one plane was sighted before being
picked up by radar and he was flying low. High land was
picked up at ranges of from 35 to 40 miles, planes averaged
about 15.
The SJ Radar was very disappointing. It appears ill-
adapted to searching although of great value as a fire con-
trol unit when coached on the target. Ranges obtained
on land targets were never in excess of 20,000 yards.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
Sound conditions were uniformly good throughout the area,
particularly off Cape Mangkalihot on the day of the depth
charging.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS
From the bathythermograph the following temperature
changes were noted:
DATE & | LAT. | LONG. | SURFACE | TEMP.CHGE. | LAYER
TIME | | | TEMP. | AT | TEMP.
Sept 07-23S | 128-09E | 82° | None to 200' |
0745 I | | | | |
Sept 03-4S | 127-26E | 82° | 130' | 79°
0540 I | | | | |
Sept 03-41S | 127-42E | 82° | 80' | 80.5°
0540 I | | | | |
Sept 03-50S | 127-59E | 83° | 120' | 81°
0540 I | | | | |
Sept 03-44S | 128-26E | 83° | 140' | 80.5°
0550 I | | | | |
Sept 04-07S | 129-38E | 83° | 160' | 76°
0556 I | | | | |
Sept 04-06S | 129-11E | 82.5° | 140' | 76.5°
0540 I | | | | |
Sept 04-04S | 128-08E | 82° | 110' | 79°
1500 I | | | | |
Sept 03-51S | 127-57E | 82° | 100' | 80°
0327 I | | | | |
Sept 04-16S | 127-09E | 83° | 260' | 77°
0542 I | | | | |
Sept 02-26N | 125-45E | 86° | 100' | 81°
0630 I | | | | |
Sept 03-04N | 123-37E | 86° | 100' | 83°
0630 I | | | | |

-30-

— page 39 —
(O) DENSITY LAYERS (CONT'D)
TIME &
DATE | LAT. | LONG. | SURFACE | TEMP.CHGE. | LAYER
     |      |       | TEMP.   | AT         | TEMP.
0700 I | 22 Sept 03-13N | 123-15E | 86° | 110' | 82°
0520 I | 25 Sept 00-55N | 119-47E | 86° | 125' | 83°
0530 I | 26 Sept 00-21N | 119-28E | 86° | 190' | 82°
0435H | 27 Sept 01-14S | 117-58E | 86° | 165' | 81°
0450 H | 28 Sept 01-15S | 117-47E | 86° | 170' | 80°
0500 H | 3 Oct 03-25N | 118-10E | 86° | 130' | 83°

On September 29, 1943, the sea became somewhat choppy
as compared to the previous days of flat calm. From then
on there were no layers noted in the vicinity 1°N to 3°N
and 118-45E to 119-30E. The choppiness may have mixed
the water sufficiently to eliminate the layers previously
existing.
Each morning dive was made to 200 feet and the temper-
ature gradient was noted for possible use during day.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY
The health of the crew was excellent; only two men
were lost during the patrol due to a severe case of
athlete's foot. Four men suffered from nervous strain
during depth charging but seemed alright two days later.
The food furnished by the U.S. FULTON was excellent
both in quantity and quality and had a great deal to do
keeping the crew in top notch condition.
Habitability was excellent until the depth charging.
During the depth charging with the air conditioning secured
the heat and humidity rose rapidly and efficiency dropped
off. At the end of 36 hours submerged the men were
breathing heavily and almost completely exhausted in spite
of all available means being used to purify the air.

(Q) PERSONNEL
The performance of duty of the officers and crew during
the entire patrol was most commendable and in accordance
with the highest traditions of the Navy. It was outstand-
ingly so during the grounding and long severe depth
charging.
The performance of duty of Lt.Comdr.F.G.HESS,USN,
Lt.Comdr.L.G.BERNARD,USN, and Lieut.C.R.D.YER,USN, dis-
played a very high degree of professional knowledge and
ability and was in no small measure responsible for
successfully getting the ship off the reefs and success-
fully controlling damage, leaks, and depth control during
the long depth charging. The Commanding Officer is
convinced that the work of these experienced officers made
the difference between saving and losing the vessel.
Their suggestions and untiring efforts were always sound
and correct.

-31-

— page 40 —
(2) PERSONNEL (CONT'D)
The performance of duty of STOLTZ, Frank Nicholas,
5-10-84, CRM(PA), USN, on the one remaining sound
head which had to be trained by hand was particularly
outstanding and made it possible to continually
maneuver the ship to the best advantage during the depth
charging. The performance of duty of HETRICK, William Herman,
5-19-66, MOMM(lc), USN, was particularly outstanding in
organizing bucket brigades, keeping exhausted men trying,
and in general maintaining the morale of the crew at a high
level. Recommendations for suitable awards will be made
subject of separate correspondence.

MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED
Darwin, Australia, to area550 MILES
                                            5665 FUEL
In area5537 MILES
                                            44,008 FUEL
Area to Fremantle, Australia2429 MILES
                                            34,888 FUEL
(Miles shown are actual navigational miles.)
Fuel jettisoned20,119
(3) DURATION
Days enroute to area... 2
Days in areas36
Days enroute to base... 9
Days submerged30

(4) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes                                   12
Fuel (At Darwin, Australia)                 22,933
Provisions                                  20 days
Personnel Factor                            9 days
Limiting factor this patrol: Depth charge damage.

(5) REMARKS
This vessel employs the system of making approaches
with the Executive Officer, Lt.Comdr.F.G.HESS, USN,
making the periscope observations which leaves the
Commanding Officer free to concentrate on maneuvering
the ship to the best attainable position and insure
all other details of firing are correct. On night
attacks and approaches the Executive Officer has been
shifted to the bridge due to better night vision.

-32-

— page 41 —
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN

FC5-16/A16-3
SERIAL ( 027 )
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
PUFFER Report of 1st
War Patrol SS268
serial 050(no date)

U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship,

26 October 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander Task Force SEVENTY ONE.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of 1st War
Patrol - Comment on.

1. The first war patrol of PUFFER covered a period
of fifty-five days, from 31 August 1943 to 24 October 1943,
inclusive. This includes time spent enroute to and from
Patrol was conducted in MAKASSAR STRAIT and CELEBES SEA AREA.

2. The grounding of PUFFER on 6 October was unfort-
unate, but the subsequent freeing of the vessel from the reef
with little obvious damage is commendable.

3. The conduct of the Commanding Officer, Officers
and crew of PUFFER during the prolonged depth charging on
9 - 10 October by a determined and skilled enemy, is worthy
of the highest praise. PUFFER survived this attack solely by
reason of the tenacity and continued efforts of all hands.

4. Material condition of PUFFER, as a result of
the grounding and depth charging, may require more than the
usual two weeks refit period. A thorough examination of hull
and fittings will be made during drydocking. At present it
appears that the silver soldering of the air lines of banks
two and four, plus overhaul of three main engines will deter-
mine the length of the refit period.

5. It is recommended that PUFFER be credited
inflicting the following damage to the enemy:

SUNK
1 AK (HEIAN TYPE) 5454 tons

DAMAGED
1 AK (KINRYU TYPE) 9310 tons
1 Unknown naval auxiliary 5000 tons

TOTAL 14,310 tons

[SIGNATURE: J. M. Haines]
J. M. HAINES.

— page 42 —
24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12-los
serial 0884 5 November 1943

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
[STAMP: 18 NOV 1943]
[HANDWRITTEN: 01-02-23/12]
[HANDWRITTEN: 20,182]
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS PUFFER First War [STAMP: A16-3]
Patrol Report SS268/A16-3 [STAMP: 100137]
serial 050 undated. [HANDWRITTEN: 2307]
[HANDWRITTEN: (23)/SS268]

From: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
To : Commander in Chief UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER Report of First War Patrol -
Comment on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Com-
mander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.

2. Examination of the hull of the PUFFER upon docking
revealed no damage incident to grounding except damage to the port
sound head and the pitometer log rodmeter. No serious damage to
the hull resulted from the depth charge attacks. All high pressure
connections to air banks #2, 3, 4, and 5 are being renewed with
alworth fittings.

3. The depth charge attacks on 9 and 10 October were
exceptional in accuracy and duration. When finally broken off,
the PUFFER must have been believed a "sure kill" by the enemy.
The outstanding demonstration of courage, determination, and moral
fortitude by all hands saved this vessel and merits the highest
praise.

4. This patrol is considered "successful" for purpose
of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

5. The Task Force Commander congratulates the Commanding
Officer, officers and crew on the completion of this rugged patrol,
during which the following damage was inflicted on the enemy:

- 1 -

— page 44 —
[STAMP: Reg. No. 943]
[STAMP: S.S. No. 11 01868]

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3
Serial: [HANDWRITTEN: 02307] 11/An

[STAMP: 17 NOV 1943]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS PUFFER First War Patrol
Report SS268/A16-3 Serial
050 undated.

From: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
To : [HANDWRITTEN: ✓] The Commander in Chief, U.S. FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER - Report of First War Patrol -
Comment on.

1. Forwarded.

2. Attention is invited to the remarks of the
Commanding Officer under the entry October 10, 2000 H.

[SIGNATURE: H. W. Graf]
H. W. GRAF,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
VCNO

[STAMP: RECEIVED]
[STAMP: NOV 26]
[STAMP: 8]
[STAMP: 55]
[STAMP: COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U.S. FLEET
RECEIVED]

[HANDWRITTEN: 36]

— page 45 —
UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

PUFFER arrived Fremantle October 24 from First War Patrol in
vicinity of Makassar Strait and Celebes Sea.

Patrol lasted 55 days
Made 14 enemy contacts.
Made Two Attacks

September 17 (0240I) Fired six torpedoes in night
periscope attack on 5000 ton navalauxiliary and
15,454 ton Hian type AK. Heard six explosions.
Auxiliary damaged and AK sunk.
Lat. 08° 14' S Long. 127° 09'E

October 9, (0838H) Fired four torpedoes at Kinryu
Maru AK. Two hits aft of bridge and inside of stern.
Fired twomore torpedoes, although believed the target
sinking. Onepremature and the other apparently a "dud".
Damaged one 9310 ton Kinryu type AK
Lat. 1° 08'N. Long. 119° 31'E.

SUNK 1 AK (HEIAN type) 9310 tons
DAMAGED 1 AK (KINRYU type) 9310 tons
1 Naval auxiliary 5000 tons
(unidentified)
Total 14,310 tons

Torpedoes expended 12

— page 46 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 2nd copy.]

SS268/A16-3
[STAMP: SERIAL 056]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. PUFFER
C/O Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
January 12, 1944

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron 16.
(2) The Commander Task Force 71.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268), Report of War Patrol
No.2.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Plot of Ship's Track.
(C) Navigational time plots of contacts.
(Enclosures (B), (C), (D) and (E) for
Commander Task Force 71 only.)
(D) Sketch of radar decoy.
(E) Sketch of trawler NANSING MARU.

1. Enclosures (A), (B), (C), (D) and (E) covering
the second war patrol of this vessel conducted in the South
China Sea during period November 24, 1943, to January 12,1944,
is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: F. G. SELBY]
F. G. SELBY

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED ART. 0145, OPNAVINST 5510.1C]
[STAMP: BY OP-09B9C DATE 6/1/72]

[HANDWRITTEN: Filmed]
[HANDWRITTEN: 65595]

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

2 01747

— page 47 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCLOSURE (A)
SUBJECT: U.S.S. PUFFER - Report of Second War Patrol.
(Period from 24 Nov. 1943, to 12 Jan.1944.)

(A) PROLOGUE
Arrived Fremantle, West Australia, from First War
Patrol 24 October 1943. Refit accomplished by U.S.S.
PELIAS completed 13 November 1943. Ship was drydocked
30 October - 5 November 1943; during this time all air
bank silver solder joints were broken and replaced with
Wellworth fittings.

14-23 November conducted sound tests, deep dive
and training exercises as follows: A/S training
exercises and day and night approaches under super-
vision of Commander Submarine Division 161. Lieut.Comdr.
Willard R. Laughon, USN, relieved Lieut.Comdr. Marvin
J. Jensen, USN, as Commanding Officer on 8 November 1943.
Lieut.Comdr. Frank G. Selby, USN, relieved Lieut.Comdr.
Willard R. Laughon, USN, as Commanding Officer on 16
November 1943.

(B) NARRATIVE
24 November
1319H Underway for Patrol Area in accordance with Com-
taskfor 71 Secret OpOrd No.43-43 of 22 November
1943.
1620H-1935H Conducted A/S exercise and night surface
chase exercise.
25-26 November
Underway on surface, proceeding to Exmouth Gulf,
conducting training dives and exercises enroute.
27 November
1010H Moored starboard side to Dutch Tanker ONDINA in
Exmouth Gulf West Australia. Received 13,300
gallons diesel fuel oil.
1519H Underway, proceeding on surface to Patrol Area.
28-29 November
Underway on surface proceeding to Patrol Area.
Conducting training dives and exercises enroute.
30 November
0515H Submerged 50 miles south of Lombok Strait.
1918H Surfaced. Proceeding through Lombok Strait.
Position was in doubt on surfacing due to rain
squalls, poor visibility and lack of star sights
for preceding 36 hours. Wasn't too sure we weren't
headed up Alas or Bali Straits, but SJ radar saved
the day.

-1-
[STAMP: 2 01747]

— page 68 —
(C) WEATHER
Weather appeared normal throughout the patrol
area.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
Proceeding through Makassar Straits a set of
from .4 to 1.0 knots 210°T was experienced.
Off the coast of Luzon the current varied from
.4 to 1.3 knots setting in a northerly direction.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
No navigational lights were observed burning; all
light towers sighted were in their charted positions.

-22-

— page 69 —
(F) SHIP CONTACTS
NO. DATE | TIME & LAT. & LONG. | TYPE(S) | INITIAL EST.CRSE.& SPEED | HOW CONTACTED | REMARKS
1 2200 H | 08-28S | Unknown (be- | 8,000 160°T | R (SJ) | Convoy, never closer than
30 Nov | 116-01E | lieved Patrol | 10 Kts | | 15,000 yds. before we
| | Boat) | | | were driven down, appear
| | | | | as dark shapes on horizon.
| | | | | Closing this ship rapidly
| | | | | and keeping between us.
| | | | | Evaded on surface.
2 0255 H | 14-52N | Unknown (3 large | 20,000 150°T | R (SJ) | Tracked this contact, be-
9 Dec | 119-35E | or 4 small | 10 Kts | | lieved it to be large MARU.
| | MARUS) | | | When sighted it had 4
| | | | | long fishpole masts, be-
| | | | | lieve masts carried an-
| | | | | tennas to provide radar
| | | | | target, because ship it-
| | | | | self was too small to be
| | | | | a good
3 0320 H | 14-51N | DD | 9,600 180°T | SN | Smoking heavily on steady
9 Dec | 119-38E | | 19 Kts & | | course, looked artifi-
| | | | increasing | | cial with dummy stack,and
| | | | | | false superstructure, took
| | | | | | good look, then evaded.
4 0555 H | 14-49N | Built up Sam- | 12,000 120°T | SN | Small Patrol Boat, smok-
9 Dec | 119-33E | pan, probably | 10 Kts | | ing heavily, and burning
| | | "Q" Ship | | | port side light and main
| | | | | | truck light.
5 2030 H | 13-36N | Patrol Craft | 6,000 190°T | SN | Unescorted, zigzagging,
11 Dec | 119-47E | | 8 Kts | | heading for Manila.
6 0200 H | 14-14.5N | A/S Similar to | Base Crse | SN | Developed into Attack #1.
13 Dec | 119-28.5E | HORAI MARU | 21,000 090°T | | Evaded on surface.
| | | 1192 Tons | 10.5 Kts | |
7 0050 H | 14-51N | Small Patrol | 5,300 000°T | SN | Unescorted, zigzagging,
20 Dec | 119-47E | Boat or Sampan | | | heading for Manila.
| | | | | | Developed into Attack #1.
| | | | | | Evaded on surface.
8 0335 H | 14-45N | Large Sampan | 20,000 180°T | SN | Tracked this contact, be-
20 Dec | 119-49E | about 100 Tons | 8 Kts | | lieved it to be large MARU.
| | | | | | Unescorted, zigzagging,
| | | | | | heading for Manila.
| | | | | | Developed into Attack #1.
| | | | | | Evaded on surface.

-23-
01747

— page 70 —
-24-

9 0640 H 14-44N | Convoy: 1 DD, | 40,000 | P
  20 Dec 119-54E | TorpedoBoat, | | picked up at more than
                 | 4-5000 | | 5,000 yards.
                 | Ton MARUS | | Sighted smoke from sever-
                 |           | | al ships, bearing 341°T,
                 |           | | closed smoke and finally
                 |           | | sighted convoy, and
                 |           | | developed into Attacks #2
                 |           | | and #3.

10 0001 H 16-23N | Unknown (be- | 10,000 2000T | SN
   24 Dec 119-34E | lieved Pat- | 17 Kts | Burning running lights,
                  | rol Vessel | | and trying to overtake
                  |           | | us. Target never picked
                  |           | | up by radar or sighted.

11 1207 H 14-22N | Convoy: 1 | 20 Miles 2800T | P
   27 Dec 119-56E | CHIDORI Class | 9 Kts | Sighted smoke from sever-
                  | TorpedoBoat, | | al ships, bearing 105°T.
                  | 3000-4000 | | Smoke developed into con-
                  | Tons | | voy from Manila, with air
                  |           | | cover. Could not close
                  |           | | for submerged attack, so
                  |           | | trailed until dark,
                  |           | | searched all night but
                  |           | | could not regain contact.
                  |           | | On northerly course
                  |           | | rounding Naso Pt. Panay.

12 1335 H 10-27N | Sampan about | 8,000 3400T | P
   30 Dec 121-46.5E | 200 Tons | 12 Kts | I.I.
                  |           | | Developed into Attacks
                  |           | | #4 and #5.

13 0020 H 08-15N | Lge Tender, 2 AP's | 18,000 0500T | R (S)
   1 Jan 122-38E | 2 DD, 8-10 small ships | 8 Kts | Apparently these ships
                                                      | were part of Contact #13
                                                      | and were searching for us
                                                      | on various courses. When
                                                      | last seen all were on
                                                      | approximately same course
                                                      | heading in direction of
                                                      | Mindanao Sea.

14 0555 H 08-27N | 3 Minelayers | 13,000 0500T | P
   1 Jan 122-55E | KAMOME Class | 10 Kts
                  | (450 Tons) |

— page 72 —
(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS
| NO. | DATE | TIME & LAT.& LONG. | TYPE(S) | INITIAL EST.CRSE.& SPEED | RANGE | HOW CON-TACTED | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 7 Dec | 1548 H | P | 9 Miles North | P | | |
|   |   | 13-30N | | | | | |
|   |   | 120-15E | | | | | |
| 2 | 7 Dec | 1142 H | Single | 5 Miles 230°T | P | | |
|   |   | 14-50N | Engine | | | | |
|   |   | 119-31E | | | | | |
| 3 | 9 Dec | 0855 H | Biplane | 9 Miles 270°T | P | | |
|   |   | 14-30N | | | | | |
|   |   | 119-47E | | | | | |
| 4 | 13 Dec | 1340 H | KATE | 5 Miles 270°T | P | Covering convoy on vari- |
|   |   | 14-19N | | | | | ous courses, sighted |
|   |   | 119-50E | | | | | again at 1630 H. |
| 27 Dec | | | | | | | |

-26-

— page 73 —
(H) ATTACK DATA
TORPEDO ATTACK NO.1: TIME 0523H, DATE 13 Dec.1943.
Lat. 14-36 N Long. 119-56 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
DESCRIPTION: At 0150 SJ radar picked up target at
21,000 yards bearing 358°T. Put target on port
quarter, opened out range to 23,750 and started end
around. Target was zig-zagging on courses 060°T to
085° (headed for Corregidor),
base course
speed 11 knots. Could see masts of ship from high
lookout station. Visibility was excellent due to
bright moonlight. Identified target as HORAI MARU
Type by two stacks and masts. No escort. Determined
zig-plan to be:
0-10...115°T 44-55...105°T 91-103...060°T
10-27...070°T 56-63...085°T 104-115...075°T
27-35...100°T 64-74...105°T 116-134...070°T
36-43...070°T 75-90...070°T
SHIPS SUNK: None.
SHIPS DAMAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK: One (1) AP of
about 9,200 tons similar to HORAI MARU Type (Page
16, ONI 208J).
DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: Heard one torpedo hit after
run of 51 seconds. Target's propellers stopped and
then started up at a reduced speed (100 RPM to 72
RPM). When last seen target was down by the bow and
had a list to port.

Target Draft 27.5 Course 050 Speed 9.5 Range 1600
(At firing)

OWN SHIP DATA: Speed 5.0 Course 192 Depth 63 ft
Angle 0° 6° 0° 1° 2° (At firing).
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
REMARKS: After completing end around, dived on ta-
get base track as it was too bright a night for a
surface attack. Fired four torpedoes from the bow
tubes on a "down the alley" shot due to a zig toward
Range 1600 yards, gyro 41R for a 2° port track.
Fired first to hit, second and third spread to right
and left, and fourth to hit. The first torpedo hit
the target forward, second and third missed due to
spread. The fourth should have hit according to the
plot and a second explosion was heard one minute
after the first. This explosion must have been a
depth charge dropped over his stern or an internal
explosion because the time of the explosion does not
coincide at all with any of the torpedoes fired.

ATTACK NO.1
| | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes fired | 2°S | 4°S | 0° | 2°S |
| Track angle | 20° | 40° | 0° | 20° |
| Gyro angle | 41 | 43.3 | 39.5 | 41.7 |
| Depth set | 12 | 18 | 12 | 12 |
| Power | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or miss | Hit | Miss | Miss | Miss |

-27-
2 01747

— page 74 —
Erratic(yes or no)No No No No
Mark torpedo 14-1A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 19212 20322 41691 22901
Mark exploder 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial No. 5781 7213 5069 7172
*Actuation set CM CM CM CM
Actuation actual C - - -
Mark warhead 16 16 16 16
Serial No. 1435 9638 1270 11011
Explosive Torpex Torpex Torpex Torpex
Firing interval 0" 10" 22" 38"
Type spread Divergent [UNCLEAR: t]
Amount spread 0° 2°R 2°L 0°
Sea conditions Moderate - Heavy swells
Overhaul activity USS PELLIAS
Torpedo performance HSN HSN HSN HSN
Tube performance PerfectPerfectPerfectPerfect
Fire control performance Perfect
*Contact - C; Magnetic - M; Contact & Magnetic - CM.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO.2: TIME 0817H, DATE 20 Dec.1943.
Lat.14-44N Long. 119-55E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
DESCRIPTION: Sighted smoke of convoy bearing 314°T
while patrolling submerged on opposite course to previously
sighted radar decoy vessel. After about 50 minutes
could see masts and stacks of some ships, smoke of others
(estimated 8) and one DD. Medium sized freighters in
loose formation with DD ahead. Started approach on AK
but convoy changed course toward me making DD best target
at 5,000 yards, 10S angle on bow, 139° relative. Came
right for straight stern tube shot, 90° starboard track,
but fired with 75° track due to his making sound contact.
Identified as most probably HATSUHARU type but could
have been ASACHIO or SHIGURE. (Other DD, type not
recognized for sure but probably CHIDORI showed up after
Attack #3.) Visibility was excellent.
SHIPS SUNK: One destroyer of the HATSUHARU Class, ton-
nage 1368.
DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: First and fourth torpedo missed due
to spread, second blew stern off, third hit just forward
of bridge. Destroyer sank in about one minute.
Target Draft 9, Course 153, Speed 11(120 RPM), Range 1800
(At firing)
OWN SHIP DATA: Speed 2.3, Course 248, Depth 64, Angle 0°
(At firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
REMARKS: When range was 2,000 yards, the destroyer
interrupted his long scale pinging on 19.2 K.C., shifted
to hand keying and sent several rapid pings followed by a
long ping. As all the pings seemed to be beamed directly
at us it was evident he had made sound contact so fired
early with 170° gyro and 75° track. Used 1-1/2° divergent
spread to give 150% target length spread with 4 torpedoes.

-28-

— page 75 —
ATTACK NO.2
| | #7 | #8 | #9 | #10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes fired | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Track angle | 70°S | 73°S | 77°S | 82°S |
| Gyro angle | 163-3/4° | 167-1/4° | 170-3/4° | 175-1/4° |
| Depth set | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Power | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or miss | Miss | Hit | Hit | Miss |
| Erratic(yes or no) | No | No | No | No |
| Mark torpedo | 14-3 | 14-3 | 14-3 | 14-3 |
| Serial No. | 23698 | 23353 | 23501 | 24751 |
| Mark exploder | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 |
| Serial No. | 14644 | 10529 | 6229 | 5183 |
| *Actuation set | CM | CM | CM | CM |
| Actuation actual | - | M | M | - |
| Mark warhead | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No. | 2219 | 1527 | 2955 | 1480 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing interval | 0" | 10" | 22" | 37" |
| Type spread | Convergent | | | |
| Amount spread | 2-1/4°L | 3/4°L | 3/4°R | 2-1/4°R |
Sea conditions | Moderate
Overhaul activity | USS PELIAS
TorpedoPerformance | HSN | HSN | HSN | HSN
Tube performance | Normal
Fire control performance | Excellent
*Contact - C; Magnetic - M; Contact & Magnetic - CM.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO.3: TIME 0842H, DATE 20 Dec.1943.
Lat. 140-43N Long. 119-53E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
DESCRIPTION: After sinking the destroyer in Attack No.2,
commenced approach on one of the eight freighters.
Picked up target (ITALY MARU Type) by periscope at
range 5,000 yards after regaining depth control. No
escort present at this time, however, a CHIDORI Type
destroyer came out from other side of convoy, being
discovered just after fifth torpedo was fired.
SHIPS SUNK: None
SHIPS POSSIBLY DAMAGED OR SUNK: AK of the ITALY MARU
Type, 5900 tons, Page 179, ONI 208J.
DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: After firing five torpedoes, was
forced deep by remaining escort who depth charged us in
pairs and singles. It is believed that two of the
explosions heard at approximately three minutes after
firing could have been hits on the target.
Target Draft 18,Course 198,Speed 11,Range 4750 (at firing)
Own Ship Data: Speed 2.5,Course 260,Depth 64,Angle 10°
Up (at firing).

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
REMARKS: Picked up target bearing 154° relative, range
5000 yards, angle on bow 70° port. Came right and ran
with target for four minutes hoping for a zig towards.
With angle on bow generated to 85° port, took a look.
No zig, came right for a straight bow shot. As we were
losing on the track angle during the swing, steadied up

-29
2 01747

— page 76 —
on 260°T and fired with 15° right gyro for a 103° port
track, torpedo run 4780 yards (3 min.), used 1/2°
divergent spread. Check bearings between torpedoes #2
and #3 agreed exactly with T.D.C. generated bearing.
#1 torpedo prematured between firing of torpedoes
#2 and #3 after a run of 19 seconds, indicating an
electrical premature. The geyser of water sent into
the air by the premature completely obliterated the
target, preventing the use of another check bearing
and at the same time masking our position for the
remaining escort. After firing the fifth torpedo,
went deep due to the escort bearing down on us with
zero angle on the bow.
In retrospect it is deemed that a larger
spread should have been used in view of the long torpedo
run. Consequently we have changed our spread curves to
give greater coverage for torpedo runs above 2500 yards,
retaining 150% coverage for runs under 2500 yards.

| | ATTACK NO. 3 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 | #5 |
| Tubes fired | 102°P | 103°P | 104°P | 105°P | 106°P |
| Track angle | 16.2° | 15.1° | 14.2° | 13° | 11.4° |
| Gyro angle | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Depth set | High | High | High | High | High |
| Power | --- | Probable | Probable | Miss | Miss |
| Hit or miss | | Hit | Hit | | |
| Erratic | Yes | No | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo | 14-3 | 14-3 | 14-3 | 14-3 | 14-3 |
| Serial No. | 25386 | 39452 | 2339 | 25163 | 24349 |
| Mark exploder | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 |
| Serial No. | 5752 | 7211 | 6664 | 6821 | 9381 |
| *Actuation set | CM | CM | CM | CM | CM |
| Actuation | | | | | |
| actual | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Mark warhead | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No. | 2630 | 3820 | 1521 | 1923 | 1452 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing interval | 0" | 8" | 15" | 26" | 38" |
| Type spread | Divergent | | | | |
| Amount spread | 1-1/4°R | 3/4°R | 1/4°R | 1/4°L | 3/4°L |
| Sea conditions | Moderate | | | | |
| Overhaul activity | USS PELIAS | | | | |
| Torpedo | Prema- | HSN | HSN | HSN | HSN |
| performance | ture | | | | |
| Tube | Normal | | | | |
| performance | | | | | |
| Fire control performance | Normal | | | | |
| *Contact - C; Magnetic - M; Contact & Magnetic - CM. | | | | |

TORPEDO ATTACK NO.4: TIME 0305H, DATE 1 JAN.1944.
Lat.08-49.9N Long.122-56.2E.

TARGET DATA -
DAMAGE INFLICTED
DESCRIPTION: At 0020, SJ radar reported ship contact
bearing 180°T, range 18,000 yards. Put target astern
and started tracking. Radar reported three large

-30-

— page 77 —
targets and two smaller targets which appeared
ently. Maneuvered from port to starboard bow of convoy
to obtain cover of dark hazy background. Formations
eventually determined to be triangular with one ship
on each quarter of leading ship, one destroyer escort
about 3,000 yards ahead and one about 1,000 yards
astern. A few minutes prior to firing radar picked up
8 to 10 smaller ships at 5,000 yards range bearing
from the port quarter to the port bow. For this reason
believe the second ship, which had a silhouette
similar to the seaplane tender CHIYODA without the
hanger deck aft, to be a tender for the smaller ships.
Other two identified as AP's by large amount of super-
structure amidships. Neither destroyer identified by
class but one seen with 60° starboard angle on bow
at 4,000 yards was definitely a destroyer.
SHIPS SUNK: None observed.
SHIPS DAMAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK: One fairly large AP
estimated at 7,000 tons. Darkness precluded obtaining
more detailed characteristics for identification.
DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: Saw second torpedo hit forward of
bridge. Observed bright orange flash followed by
dense black smoke. Target still afloat when we sub-
merged five minutes later and still putting out dense
black smoke.
Target Draft 25,Course 055,Speed 7.5,Range 2100(at firing).
OWN SHIP DATA: Speed 6,Course 290,Depth Surface,Angle
0° (at firing).
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
REMARKS: Radar surface attack in darkness. Fired three
torpedoes at leading ship of convoy, range 2100 yards,
straight shot, track 55° starboard, using radar ranges
and bearings checked by visual observation from
bridge in final stages of attack. Used 2° divergent
spread. First was fired to hit but missed due to man-
euvers of target which had sighted us prior to firing.
Second torpedo was spread 2° to the left and hit just
forward of bridge. Third torpedo missed due to being
spread to right.

                                        ATTACK NO.4
Tubes fired             #1              #2              #3
Track angle             057°S           05°S            061°S
Gyro angle              001°            000°            005°
Depth set               12              12              12
Power                   High            High            High
Hit or miss             Miss            Hit             Miss
Erratic(yes or no)      No              No              No
Mark torpedo            14-3            14-3            14-3
Serial No.              23912           23447           39455
Mark exploder           6-4             6-4             6-4
Serial No.              7181            7210            10311
*Actuation set          CM              CM              CM
Actuation actual        -               C               -
Mark warhead            -               16              -
                        16              16              16

                                        -31-

— page 78 —
Serial No.             1447      5737      1545
Explosive              Torpex    Torpex    Torpex
Firing interval        0"        10"       20"
Type spread            Divergent
Amount spread          0°        2°L       2°R
Sea conditions         Light chop
Overhaul activity USS  [UNCLEAR: ELIAS]
Torpedo Performance    Hot-Straight-Normal
Tube Performance       Perfect
Fire control performance Perfect
*Contact-C; Magnetic-M; Contact & Magnetic-CM.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO.5: TIME 0307H, DATE 1 JAN.1944.
                       Lat. 08-24.9N Long 122-56.2E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION: This attack was made about 3-1/2 minutes
after Attack #4 on the same convoy of three large
ships. Had been sighted by convoy and while firing #1,
#2 and #3, the second ship in column turned right
and came at us with 0° angle on the bow with the
apparent intention of ramming. Immediately after
firing #3 turned to starboard with full rudder at
full speed to put him astern. He continued swinging,
headed to pass across stern and third ship headed
at us to ram. Was going to fire down his throat to
stop him and then swing with bow tubes to get #2 on
the starboard quarter, angle on bow now 135° port,
range 900 yards. Fire control party, however,
stayed on No.2 with radar while I was giving them in-
formation on No.3 including a zero angle on the bow.
Fired all four stern tubes.

SHIPS SUNK: None seen.

SHIPS DAMAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK: Large tender for 8
or 10 small unidentified ships, estimated tonnage
9,000 tons.

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: Heard three torpedoes explode
when they hit at proper time interval for torpedo
runs. Analysis indicates #7 hit port quarter, #8
the stern, and #10 abaft M.O.T.
Target Draft 25(, Course 155, Speed 7.5, Range 1350
                                       (at firing).

OWN SHIP DATA: Speed 16, Course 078, Depth Surface,
Angle zero (at firing).

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
REMARKS: Four fired stern tubes using 0° angle
on bow, range 1350 yards, 16° port track and 104°
gyro angle. Fired #7 and #10 to hit with #8 and #9
spread 1/2° either side of M.O.T. Used radar ranges
and bearings with angles on bow from bridge, radar
being on one target, bridge on another. Actual angle
on bow about 135° port, tracks 152°-145° port. #7
and #8 and #10 hit because the true target course
gave the same gyro angle as generated by the incor-
rect course used in the set-up on the T.D.C. and the

-32-

— page 79 —
SKETCH OF NIGHT SURFACE ATTACKS #4 AND #5 ON 1 JANUARY 1944
FROM 0258 TO 0310. 8 OR 10 SMALL CONTACTS FROM 090° TO 190°
RELATIVE NOT SHOWN.

STERN
ESCORT
[HANDWRITTEN: 0]
[HANDWRITTEN: 345]
[HANDWRITTEN: 7]
[HANDWRITTEN: 10]
[HANDWRITTEN: 12]

[HANDWRITTEN: NO 3]
[HANDWRITTEN: 0]
[HANDWRITTEN: 345]
[HANDWRITTEN: 7]
[HANDWRITTEN: 10]
[HANDWRITTEN: 12]

[HANDWRITTEN: NO 1.]
[HANDWRITTEN: 0]
[HANDWRITTEN: 345]
[HANDWRITTEN: 7]
[HANDWRITTEN: 10]
[HANDWRITTEN: 12]

[HANDWRITTEN: NO 2]
[HANDWRITTEN: 0]
[HANDWRITTEN: 345]
[HANDWRITTEN: 7]
[HANDWRITTEN: 10]
[HANDWRITTEN: 12]

[HANDWRITTEN: ONE HIT]

[HANDWRITTEN: 8.0]
[HANDWRITTEN: MISS 4 FT]
[HANDWRITTEN: 12]

[HANDWRITTEN: THREE HITS]

[HANDWRITTEN: Pfeffer]

LEAD
ESCORT
[HANDWRITTEN: 0]
[HANDWRITTEN: 345]
[HANDWRITTEN: 700]
[HANDWRITTEN: 10]
[HANDWRITTEN: 1200]

SCALE
0 [HANDWRITTEN: 500] [HANDWRITTEN: 1000]
[HANDWRITTEN: N]

[HANDWRITTEN: 12000 YDS]
[HANDWRITTEN: TO BEACH]
[HANDWRITTEN: (MINDANAO)]

TORPEDOES FIRED - 17
HITS - 4

-33-
2 01717

— page 80 —
[HANDWRITTEN: JAPANESE
TENDER]
[HANDWRITTEN: MISS
4FT]
[HANDWRITTEN: 7]
[HANDWRITTEN: 9]
[HANDWRITTEN: 6]
[HANDWRITTEN: 10]
[HANDWRITTEN: 10°]
[HANDWRITTEN: C155A
S7.5]

[HANDWRITTEN: ATTACK NO 5]
[HANDWRITTEN: USS PUFFER]
[HANDWRITTEN: SECOND PATROL]

[HANDWRITTEN: PUFFER
3078
S16]

[HANDWRITTEN: POSITIONS OF TARGET SHOWN AT TIME EACH]
[HANDWRITTEN: TORPEDO CROSSED TARGET TRACK]
[HANDWRITTEN: TRACK LENGTH]

[HANDWRITTEN: 0] [HANDWRITTEN: 500] [HANDWRITTEN: 1000]
[HANDWRITTEN: YARDS]

[HANDWRITTEN: -33A-]

— page 81 —
continual application of radar ranges and bearings
kept the T.D.C. on.
Let me say here that the fire control party
were on their toes and knew that the radar ranges were
not checking with their set-up. They asked twice for
checks on the angle on the bow, and of course I gave
them zero thinking they were on the target astern.
I insisted that they go ahead and fire as the target
astern was getting closer and I could see the after
escort now coming into the picture. Had we fired
using the correct target course we probably would
not have obtained three hits as we would have used
a larger spread.

ATTACK NO.5
Tubes fired | #7 | #8 | #9 | #10
Track angle (est) | 16°P | 13°P | 6°P | 11°P
Track angle (act) | 152°P | 148°P | 141°P | 145°P
Gyro angle | 104 | 107-1/2 | 114 | 110
Depth set | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12
Power | High | High | High | High
Hit or miss | Hit | Hit | Miss | Hit
Erratic(yes or no) | No | No | No | No
Mark torpedo | 14-3 | 14-3 | 14-3 | 14-3
Serial No. | 25512 | 22433 | 20031 | 25493
Mark exploder | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4
Serial No. | 10900 | 7184 | 11961 | 4396
*Actuation set | CM | CM | CM | CM
Actuation actual | C | - | - | C
Mark warhead | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16
Serial No. | 1639 | 1015 | 2151 | 1597
Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX
Firing interval | 0" | 10" | 21" | 29"
Type spread | Divergent | | |
Amount spread | 0° | 1/2°L | 1/2°R | 0°
Sea conditions | Light chop | | |
Overhaul activity | USS PELIAS | | |
Torpedo | | | |
performance | HSN | HSN | HSN | HSN
Tube performance | Perfect | | |
Fire control performance | Perfect | | |
*Contact-C; Magnetic-M; Contact & Magnetic-CM.

GUN ATTACK NO.1: TIME 1200-1600H Lat.10-31S
DATE 7 JAN.1944 Long.115-20E
SUNK: Type Fishing Trawler
Tonnage about 500 tons
Name NANSING MARU NO.16
Method of identity: Jap flag, name furnished
by Javanese survivor.
DAMAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK: None.
DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: Saw ship sink.
DETAILS OF ACTION: Guns used 3" 50 Caliber; rounds
fired 88; type ammunition - High Capacity (Mk 23
Mod 3) 66 rounds, Armor Piercing (Mk 29) 12 rounds,
Common 10 rounds.

-34-

— page 82 —
EFFECTIVENESS OF FIRE: The new high capacity am-
munition is very effective against wooden ship. How-
ever, it still takes a lot of hits to sink a wooden ship
and the need for 3 inch incendiary for submarines was
clearly indicated. Opened fire at 3500 yards with
resultant high dispersion. Effective fire for 3 inch
gun seems to start when range was reduced to about
2000 yards. Used continuous up and down ladders in
range. The most effective hits were those made in
the section of the ship that was low in the water
(the stern) due to slow flooding caused by previous
hits. These hits seemed to blow the bottom out as
the ship sank very rapidly after these hits.
AVERAGE RANGE: 2000 yards.
FIRE CONTROL USED: Ranges from radar. Spotted from
bridge. Observed from periscope.
ERRATIC PERFORMANCE: Gun pointer's telescopic gun sight
(MK 78) fogged up badly after first salvo due to
previous flooding. Presence of water was not evident
before firing. This is the third time one of these
sights have flooded since commissioning. Replaced
telescope with spare and boresighted while coming
down the range for the second run. Used the horizon
for the horizontal wire and the ship's mast for the
vertical wire.

(I) MINES: No mines, minelaying or minesweeping activities
were observed.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS:
On the whole anti-submarine measures encountered
were weak. Of the three ineffective depth charging
attacks the ship underwent, the second (Torpedo Attack
#2) was the longest. It lasted for about an hour and
a half during which time 18 charges and one dud were
dropped in singles and pairs. Echo ranging search con-
tinued for about five hours after the last charge was
dropped. Evasion tactics consisted of going deep, run-
ning silent and keeping the echo ranging astern while
taking the most obvious escape route to seaward. This
escort had a premature and four torpedo tracks as
an aid to locating us originally and was headed
directly at us, range about 2000 yards, when we started
down. Either the sinking of his fellow escort made
him cautious or he secured the attack to pick up
survivors, echo ranging in the meantime for his own
protection. In all three cases we were close enough to
land so that an extensive A/S search would seem warranted
if the ships were available. In the first two instances
we were only about 15 miles from the entrance to a
known naval base, Subic Bay.
About seven hours after being forced down by the
escort on 9 December (Ship Contact #3), we sighted a
single engine land plane probably searching for us
(Aircraft Contact #2). on 9 December three hours after

-35-

— page 83 —
damaging an AP (Ship Contact #6), a PETE was seen (Air-
craft Contact #3).
The convoy sighted on 27 December (Ship Contact #11)
had a single KATE for air coverage (Aircraft Contact #4).
Whether intentional or not he effectively prevented
our surfacing in the late afternoon to maintain visual
contact on the masts of the convoy. He let the con-
voy go on ahead when it was well clear of land and
remained about 30 miles out. The convoy must have
made a very radical change of course at dark or we would
have contacted them by radar during the early part of the
night.
To me, one of the most effective A/S measures encoun-
tered, if it was such, was the 100 ton sampan which
we picked up on the SJ radar at 20,000 yards in the early
morning of 20 December (Ship Contact #8). Although
I saw no antennas, his two tall slim masts forward and
two aft could have been energized in some manner to give
a radar contact. More probably they were made of
metal and that gave the contact. The radar pip continu-
ally faded in and out on the screen but not so much so but
what we could easily track him. This characteristic
coupled with the fact that the pip did not show a
normal increase in size with a decrease in range would
make me very suspicious of such a contact the next
time. We were able to get a range and bearing on
him at 10,000 yards from a depth of 40 feet. Had it
not been for the fact that he finally became visible
in the early morning light we would have wasted four
torpedoes on him and would have given our position away
to the convoy which was following him through our spot.
Ship Contact #10 was very kind of small vessel
capable of an estimated 16 knots, showing side lights.
I say small because when his side lights were very
clear, appearing to be about 2000 yards away, we
could neither see his silhouette nor get a radar contact
on him. He must have been chasing us because after losing
him once on course 018°T he came into view again on our
port quarter while we were on 270°T. His estimated
course was 320°T. His being Christmas Eve one member
of the crew remarked that it was probably Santa Claus
trying to catch up with us.
This type of A/S measure seems very effective
for driving a submarine clear of the coast in order to
allow ships to pass. At least it was effective with
me. There seem to be three choices in this situation:
(1) Gunfire (2) Submergence and (3) Run. I did not
relish maintaining effective gun range and shooting at
a pair of side lights without knowing what was behind
them, nothing could be gained by diving to investigate
as it was already known that he was small and fast -
might result in subjecting the ship to a needless depth
charging, so I chose the third alternative and ran.
I believe it possible that the above ship carried a
radar as evidenced by his ability to follow us on a dark

-36-

2 01 747

— page 84 —
night. Our ARC-1 could pick up no indication of radar,
however. Other suspected use of radar was encountered
on 9 December (Ship contact #3) when the convoy escort
flashed his recognition signal at us from 9600 yards.
This was a bright moonlight night so it is possible
that he saw us. However, he was already coming on
to us fast when we contacted him. On the nights of 10
and 11 December our ARC-1 picked up a radar operating on
278 megacycles. We were about 15 miles west of
Lubang Island both nights. Complete ARC report sub-
mitted separately.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
No known damage was sustained as a result of
the three depth charge attacks.

E N G I N E E R I N G

MAIN ENGINES
The excessive amount of exhaust smoke emitted by
the General Motors main engines continues to be a mili-
tary liability.
On 24 December during a routine bearing inspection
after 234 hours operation, #4 connecting rod bearing
in #4 main engine showed signs of having commenced to
fail. Some bearing metal had already fallen out
of the shell and about one-third of the remainder
looked like it was about ready to go.
The journal of this bearing was ground down during
the first refit to remove the scoring caused by a pre-
vious bearing failure. Inspection of the journal
showed a rather "rough grind" finish with ridges that
could be felt by hand. Micrometer readings indicate that
it is not finished to a standard undersize in that it
has a taper from the web ends to the center of ".0015.
A new bearing was scraped, fitted and run in.
This journal should and undoubtedly can be
smoothed and trued to a standard undersize during
the coming refit. The Commanding Officer will consider
this engine unreliable until the crankshaft is renewed
during the first Navy Yard overhaul of this vessel.

PITOMETER LOG
The pitometer log was overhauled during the last
refit and calibrated on the surface at 12 knots on
the day of departure on this patrol. It seems to
operate satisfactorily on the surface at all speeds of
5 knots and above, however, when submerged it sticks
at speeds from one to five knots. This, of course,
introduces an error in the T.D.C. problem unless own
ship speed is estimated and set by hand. This fault
should be repaired without fail.

SOUND GEAR
Both the port and starboard sound shafts make a rumb-
ling, groaning sort of noise while being trained through
certain sectors. The starboard is the worst of the two.

-37-

— page 85 —
but the port is almost as bad. While attempting to
run silent and employ evasive tactics this noise could
be heard so loudly in the conning tower that the
starboard sound head had to be secured. It is believed
that this may be misalignment resulting from the
grounding on last patrol. Considerable attention
should be given to correcting this defect.

TRIM PUMP
The trim still makes too much noise to use when
running silent and the new quiet type should be installed
just as soon as available.

TALK BACK SYSTEM
The talk back system installed by the Submarine
Repair Unit just prior to departure on patrol, which
provides for three-way communication between the
bridge, conning tower and control room, proved of
inestimable value in coordinating the bridge, con-
trol party and plot during surface tracking and attacks.

O R D N A N C E

TORPEDOES
Of six Mark 14 Mod. 3-A torpedoes that were made
ready and not fired, two were found to have flooded
afterbodies. One of these two torpedoes also had
a flooded exploder. All existing instructions,
routines and precautions had been carried out on these
torpedoes by experienced personnel. No loose inspec-
tion plates or faulty gaskets were found, nor was the
exhaust valve tackiwax seal broken in either case.
Too much water was present to determine the source of
flooding.
The completely flooded exploder was the first
experienced on this vessel. Removed the exploder, found
gasket in perfect shape, dried out exploder, made
electrical feature inoperative and reinstalled using
a new gasket. The five pound pressure test revealed
no leaks and the impeller drag was normal. No cause for
leakage could be ascertained. The base plate and base
plate flange had been center punched prior to this
patrol.
One premature was experienced in spite of the fact
that latest modifications, including less electrical
sensitivity, had been made. On the third attack
the first torpedo exploded prematurely after a run of 19
seconds indicating an electrical premature. This brought
the remaining escort down on us sooner than he would nor-
mally have discovered us. The premature was the second
experienced by this vessel in two war patrols during
which thirty-two torpedoes were fired.

(L) RADIO
Radio reception was excellent, all serials were
received. It was impossible to reach Radio Perth on

-38-

— page 86 —
12,000 Kcs. band from position off coast of Mindoro
when sending our serial no.1. When the shift to the
8000 Kcs. band was made calls were exchanged without
interference. There was apparently no interference
by the enemy during the subsequent transmission because
Radio Perth missed the first fifty groups which eventual-
ly necessitated transmitting over a period of 45 minutes.
Last serial received from CTF 71...... 7
Last serial sent to CTF 713

(M) RADAR

The performance of both radars on this patrol was
outstanding.
The SJ radar in particular again proved its
worth on many occasions. After the disappointing SJ
performance on this ship's first patrol, it was a revela-
tion to see ships picked up consistently at 20,000
yards. In addition to its value as a fire control
instrument, the SJ was used a great deal for navigational
purposes particularly at night and in thick weather.
Land targets were picked up consistently at ranges of
from 60,000 to 70,000 yards with prominent peaks easily
identifiable. It is believed that the installation
of a new 706 AY Strap Magnetron coupled with the
excellent overhaul work done by the USS PELIAS repair
force are responsible for this improved performance.
The performance of the SD radar was again excellent
throughout the patrol.
The PP.I feature for the SJ should be installed as
soon as possible. This will be a great help in attack-
ing convoys on the surface.

(N) SOUND

Sound conditions were very good throughout the
area with screws being heard at all ranges up to 10,000
yards.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

Bathothermograph readings were taken continuously
and were used in evading depth charge attacks.
Off Manila, P.I. a pronounced layer was encountered
at 210 feet on two occasions when being depth charged;
on December 8, 1943, there was an eight degree drop
in temperature between 210 feet and 280 feet; and on
December 20, 1943, there was a twelve degree drop in
temperature between 210 feet and 300 feet.
Off the northwest coast of Mindanao, P.I. a
slight layer was encountered at 120 feet; there was a
temperature drop of four degrees at this depth.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY

The health of the officers and crew was in general
excellent throughout the patrol. One officer suffered

-39-

— page 87 —
from an upset stomach for two days, there were two
cases of sore throats and one man suffered a cut in his
right hand which required four stitches. Total man
days lost was twelve (12). SPALDING, Robert Bruce, 337
30 50, PhM1c, USN, did a fine job of treating the sick
and sewing up the lacerated hand which has healed up
very nicely.
Food was well cooked, palatable and in general very
satisfactory except that we could have carried more fresh
vegetables had they been available at the start of the
patrol. Fresh frozen articles when they become obtain-
able will be a most welcome addition to the general diet.
Habitability was excellent.

(Q) PERSONNEL
The performance of the officers and men was, under
all conditions, in keeping with the finest traditions of
the Naval Service.
The high state of training of this crew is a distinct
credit to the previous Commanding Officer, Commander
Mervin J. Jensen, USN, and the present Executive Officer,
Lt.Comdr. Franklin G. Hess, USN.
Lieutenant Carl C. Dwyer, USN, is the coolest,
steadiest and most efficient T.D.C. operator I have ever
had the pleasure to witness in action.
Lieutenant Stiles M. Ducker, Jr, DE-V(G), USNR, who
came aboard on an hour's notice four days before leaving
on patrol, and having had no previous submarine exper-
ience other than Submarine School, did a job far above
what was expected of an officer of his experience in
taking over the important duty of Engineering Officer.
The crew conducted themselves like the veterans they
are. No commanding officer could ask for a finer group
of men to work with. It is considered remarkable that
only two or three of the crew were still showing any
signs of the nervous order they underwent on the previ-
ous patrol. These men will be left in for a rest.
Of seventeen new men who came aboard without pre-
vious war patrol experience all but two fitted into
the crew very nicely. The high calibre of firemen received
was particularly noticeable. The two men mentioned are
not temperamentally qualified for submarine duty and will
be so designated.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED
Fremantle, W.A. to Area
In Area
Area to Fremantle, W.A.

| Miles Steamed | Fuel Used |
|---|---|
| 3,195 Miles | 34,396 Gals. |
| 3,328 Miles | 24,578 Gals. |
| 2,468 Miles | 36,005 Gals. |

(S) DURATION
Days enroute to Area12 days
Days in Area29 days
Days enroute to Base8 days
Days submerged32 days

-40-
[STAMP: 2 01747]

— page 88 —
(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel Factor
---|---|---|---
4 | 6000 Gals. | 15 days | 15 days

Limiting factor this patrol: Operation Order.

(U) REMARKS
It is felt that not enough is known with regard to the
range of visibility of this type ship under various night
conditions, i.e. dark but overcast, dark but clear, over-
cast with moon, bright moon clear night, forty foot depth
at two-thirds speed, etc. It would seem worthwhile to
conduct a series of tests during submarine training periods,
placing an experienced submarine officer aboard a surface
vessel equipped with radar, to compile the results. Such
information would give submarine commanding officers some
fairly good thumb rules to follow in deciding whether to
remain on the surface or submerge and how soon to submerge.
This ship uses a set of torpedo spread tables developed
by Lieutenant Dwyer which are not unwieldy but still cover
a great many conditions. The proper number of degrees of
spread to use to give one hundred and fifty per cent
coverage of the foreshortened target length for 3, 4, 5
or 6 torpedoes for various torpedo runs is quickly obtain-
able. The commanding officer must decide in advance on the
number of torpedoes to be fired, of course, and estimate
the target length.
On this patrol we confirmed the fact that the point
twelve miles west of Capones Island off the coast of Luzon
which had been designated as the CREVALLE was definitely
a focal point. It appears to me that they could run their
traffic inside the 100 fathom curve along this section of the
coast and have more protection from submarines. Cane fires
were observed burning almost every night high in the moun-
tains. These could well be a landfall for empire traffic
making the Luzon coast and one convoy definitely came through
this focal point while three fires were visible. On the
other hand it may have been coincidence as our patrol was
conducted during the dry season.

-41-

— page 89 —
SUBMARINE SQ ADRO N SIXTEEN
U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship

CONFIDENTIAL

C3S-16/A13-3
Serial 037
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
PUFFER Report of 2nd
War Patrol of 1/12/44

20 January 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
Via : The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS263) Report of 2nd War
Patrol - comment on.

1. The 2nd War Patrol of the U.S.S. PUFFER was
the first for the Commanding Officer as such. This patrol
covered a period of fifty days, thirty-six days being spent
north of the BARRIER. The assigned areas covering the western
approaches to the PHILIPPINES were thoroughly and aggressively
covered. The SJ radar was efficiently used to navigate, avoiding
loss of time on station.

2. Five contacts worthy of torpedo fire were
developed. While making a night surface approach on the first
contact, a convoy, the U.S.S. PUFFER was detected by an escort
at a range of 9,000 yards, forced down and depth charged. The
fourth contact was made during daylight, but a firing position
could not be reached. An air screen held the U.S.S. PUFFER
submerged until dark and contact was never regained.

4. Five aggressive attacks were made on the other
three contacts, resulting in the definite sinking of a destroyer
escort and in damage to at least three other ships. After the
sinking of the destroyer, depth control was unfortunately not
taken of a well earned opportunity to
severely damage the convoy. Great boldness was shown during
the last attacks in remaining on the surface in the midst of
the convoy until both attacks were completed. Twenty torpedoes
were fired with seven definite hits and one premature. Anti-
submarine measures aided by the premature prevented observance
of two possible additional hits. The Commanding Officer
analyzed all approaches, recognized, and took steps to correct
errors in fire control and ship control. The experience gained
during this period should pay large dividends in the future.

5. The gun attack on 7 January was well conducted
and valuable information should be obtained from the prisoners.
The comparative ineffectiveness of the three inch hits again
demonstrates the need for a four inch weapon.

-1-
2 01747

— page 91 —
FE24-71/A16-3
Serial 092
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
PUFFER Report of 2nd
War Patrol Conf. Ser.
056 dated 12 January,
1944.

From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) Report of Second War
         Patrol - comment on.

         1. The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron
SIXTEEN are concurred in.

         2. PUFFER was probably the first U.S. Submarine to
contact and inflict damage on the enemy in the year 1944, and
claims that distinction.

         3. The large tender hit with three torpedoes the early
morning of 1 January, 1944, very probably sank. It is regretted
that the lack of conclusive evidence precludes crediting a defi-
nite sinking.

         4. This patrol is designated as successful for the
award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

         5. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding
Officer, Officers, and Crew of the PUFFER on another successful
Patrol in which the following damage was inflicted on the enemy:

         SUNK

         1 - DD (HATSUHARU CLASS) - - - - 1,368 Tons
         + 1 - TRAWLER (NANSING MARU NO. 16) - - 85 Tons

                                   Total 1,453 Tons

         +Sunk by gunfire.

- 1 -
UNITED STATES NAVY
12-Bt
[STAMP: Reg. No. P.1248]
[STAMP: L.S. No. 201747]

4 February 1944.

— page 92 —
F24-71/A16-3. UNITED STATES NAVY 12-Bt
Serial 092 4 February 1944
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) Report of Second War
Patrol - comment on.

DAMAGED
1 - AP (HORAI MARU TYPE) - - - - - 9,192 Tons
1 - AP (UNIDENTIFIED, LARGE) - - - 7,000 Tons
1 - AUX. TENDER (CHIYODA TYPE) - - 9,000 Tons
1 - AK (ITALY MARU TYPE) - - - - - 5,859 Tons

Total 31,051 Tons

R. W. CHRISTIE.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (3) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav (2) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav
Op-23c (1)
ComlstFlt (1)
Com2ndFlt (1)
Com3rdFlt (1)
Com7thFlt (1)
Comsubs1stFlt (2)
Comsubs2ndFlt (1)
CTF-71 (4)
CTF-72 (2)
CSS-16 (1)
Divcoms Ron-16 (1)
Each S/M W.A. (1) - NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN

[SIGNATURE: P. F. Straub Jr.]
P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
Flag Secretary.

[STAMP: 1944 FEB 22 16 30]
[STAMP: RECEIVED]
[STAMP: U.S. FLEET]
[STAMP: COMMANDER IN CHIEF]
- 2 -

— page 93 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 044]
UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET
                                                                Ref No. [HANDWRITTEN: 2J-17]
                                                                         018170
                                                                TS No.

A16-3/(P-6/cw)

Serial: [HANDWRITTEN: 0877]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
CO USS PUFFER Conf. Ltr.
Serial 056 dated
12 January 1944.

From:           The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
To :            The Commander In Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject:        USS PUFFER - Report of Second War Patrol.

1.              Forwarded.

                                                                [SIGNATURE: R. H. Cruzen]
                                                                R. H. CRUZEN.
                                                                By direction.

[HANDWRITTEN: Original]

— page 94 —
In reply refer to Initials
and No.
CONFIDENTIAL NAVY DEPARTMENT
18 March 1946
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

REASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE BY SUBMARINES

Reference: (a) ComSubPac ltr. FF12-10/L11(1) of
21 February 1946.

USS PUFFER (SS268) 2nd War Patrol
Date of Attack: 1 January 1944
Position: Western approach MINDANAO SEA

PUFFER was credited for her 2nd patrol
with sinking one DL and one trawler and damaging
four ships of a total of 31,051 tons. One of the
ships for which damage was credited was attacked
at 0303 1 January 1944 with three torpedoed for
one hit forward of the bridge. The target was be-
lieved to be an AP and was estimated at 7000 tons.

DNI lists and Japanese verification
state that the RYUYO MARU 6707 tons was sunk at
the time and position of the above described attack.
DNI credits the sinking to PUFFER.

Credit assessment should be changed
accordingly. Commanding Officer, Comdr. F. G.
Selby, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:
ComSubLant
SubSchool New London
CO SS268
Op-23E
Op-41C3

— page 95 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st Copy]

SS268/A16-3 U.S.S. PUFFER
SERIAL 063
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
[STAMP: CONFIDENTIAL]

April 4, 1944

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron 16.
     (2) The Commander Task Force 71.
     (3) The Commander-in-Chief, Seventh Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) Report of War
         Patrol No.3.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
            (B) Plot of Ship's Track.
            (C) Navigational Time Plots of Contacts.
                (Enclosures (B) and (C) for Comtaskfor
                71 only.)

     1. Enclosures (A), (B) and (C) covering the
third war patrol of this vessel conducted in the South
China Sea during the period February 4, 1944, to April 4,
1944, is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: F.G. Selby]
F.G.SELBY

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C]
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP-09B7C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/72]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

71146 [STAMP: FILMED]

— page 96 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A)

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER - Report of Third War Patrol.
(Period from Feb. 4, 1944, to Apr. 4, 1944.)

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived Fremantle, West Australia, from Second
War Patrol on January 12, 1944. Sent officers and
crew on two weeks recreation while Submarine Repair
Unit, Navy #137, and Submarine Division 161 Relief Crew
commenced refit.

On January 26, the officers and crew returned
from recreation. The 26th was spent in stowing pro-
visions, personal belongings, taking care of laundry
and checking job orders. The 27th was spent in
testing all machinery and equipment on the ship, train-
ing new lookouts to clear the bridge, dry diving and
running torpedo fire control problems utilizing the TDC
on an adjacent ship to set up the problems. The details
of these two days are mentioned only because it is felt
that the extra day spent as above resulted in our getting
a great deal more benefit from subsequent training
operations than if we had commenced operations on the
day immediately following our return to the ship.

January 28 - February 2: Conducted independent
exercises and training exercises. A deep dive was made
during the independent exercises. Training exercises
included day approaches, surfaced and submerged, night
approaches, surfaced and submerged, the firing of three
exercise torpedoes, radar tracking, A/S training and a
short range firing run with the three inch gun follow-
ing a battle surface.

The refit given this ship was excellent. It was
clean and livable when we moved aboard, the work was
one hundred per cent accomplished, and most important
of all the great majority of the overhauled machinery
operated satisfactorily. Our operating period was
noticeably free of the multitude of minor repairs,
adjustments, and completing of uncompleted work items
which, in my previous three experiences, have invariably
followed a refit. All credit is due to the officers and
men of the relief crew and the Submarine Repair Unit
and appreciation is hereby expressed for a fine job care-
fully supervised.

(B) NARRATIVE (All times HYPO unless otherwise stated.)

Friday, 4 February

1300 Underway in accordance with Comtaskfor Seventy-
One Operatio' Order No.15-44 to conduct unre-
stricted submarine warfare against the enemy in
the South China Sea.

— page 97 —
1500-2300 Conducted A/S runs and day and night torpedo
          approaches with the USS WILLIAM B. PRESTON.
5-7 February
          Enroute Exmouth Gulf conducting training dives
          and torpedo fire control problems. Received
          12,000 gallons fuel oil from barge at Exmouth.
7-10 February
          Enroute Lombok Strait conducting training dives
          and torpedo fire control problems.

Thursday, 10 February
0607 Submerged for day in order to be in position to
     arrive at Lombok Strait when moon was overhead.
1846 Surfaced and set course for Lombok Strait.

Friday, 11 February
     Clouds and rain squalls covered approach.
0035 Entered Lombok Strait as clouds and rain squalls
     cleared leaving us in the romantic beams of a full
     bright moon.
0229 (SHIP CONTACT #1) Sighted four small patrol boats on
     port bow at northern end of Strait. Position Lat.8-18S
     Long.115-51E. Initial range to closest 4000 yards,
     course about 130°T. Not picked up by SJ Radar.
     Evaded on surface by putting them abaft port beam
     and going ahead flank speed. Only the nearest made
     any apparent effort to chase. He kept his bow pointed
     toward us but slowly drew aft and out of sight.
0258 Lost contact with nearest patrol boat.

     These boats appeared to be in a rough line of
     bearing about 020°T with the northernmost well back
     from the bearing line and the farthest away. Identi-
     fication is difficult since we never saw them from
     any position but a very sharp angle on the bow. All
     looked approximately the same size. The nearest had
     a crosstree on his mast and my impression was that
     he was similar to one of our PC boats. It is possi-
     ble that these boats are patrolling back and forth
     across the northern entrance to Lombok Strait.
0529 Submerged heading up southern approach to Makassar
     Strait. In view of probable sighting coming out
     of Lombok, bright moon for the next few nights,
     expected increase in air coverage over Makassar,
     and desirability of conserving fuel, have decided
     to run through Makassar mostly submerged in the
     daytime this trip. Crossed Soerbaja-Ambon traffic
     route.
1950 Surfaced and set course for Lima Islands. Crossed Soer-
     baja-Palau traffic route.

Saturday, 12 February
0529 Submerged.

-2-

— page 98 —
1337 Having obtained good fix on Lima group of islands,
surfaced and set course for Cape Mandar.
2300 Set course north to pass Cape William about eighteen
miles to westward.
Sunday, 13 February
0002 (SHIP CONTACT #2) Sighted small vessel in moonlight
bearing 020°T. Reversed course and slowed to watch
him. His silhouette with a small angle on the bow
resembled that of one of our submarines. Decided
this might possibly be the USS REDFIN and commenced
working eastward to take advantage of hazy land
background thus putting him in clear western horizon
for more positive identification.
0024 Resumed course 000°T.
0027 Sighted same vessel still on starboard bow, small angle
on the bow. Seemed as if he might have attempted
same maneuver I did, so at
0029 Came to 270°T to open out to westward.
0053 Resumed course 000°T. Never sighted vessel again. SJ
Radar did not pick up this boat although it is picking
up land at over 60,000 yards and rain squalls and
floating tree stumps at from 900 to 4000 yards.
Operator thought he noticed very faint indication of
another radar.
0550 Submerged on course 018°T heading up Makassar Strait.
1855 Surfaced and set course 005°T to take us about five
miles from Pt. Mangalihat. A completely overcast
sky and occasional rain squalls gave promise of
covering the moon during the night. Decoded USS
REDFIN's arrival report this evening so ship sighted
last night was obviously not the USS REDFIN. As
radar did not pick it up, it was most likely a small
power driven sampan or sailboat with sails down.
Monday, 14 February
0025 Sky cleared and moon was bright so changed course to
pass through the center of the entrance to Makassar
Strait. On sighting land again found we had been
set considerable to the southward and could not clear
Makassar by daylight. Decided to run submerged
patrol at entrance.
0535 Submerged.
0810 (SHIP CONTACT #3) Sighted masts bearing 025°T, hull
down, and commenced closing at full speed. Position:
Lat.01-01N, Long.119-35E. Angle on the bow estimated
at 70° starboard, course south, speed about ten knots,
sea dead calm, high overcast and hazy horizon.
0844 Got closest look at estimated range of 10,700 yards
on leading ship. Leading ship was a fairly large
tanker with stack aft, most nearly similar to HOYO
MARU, page 269, ONI 208J. Second ship was also an
engines aft tanker but smaller. In between the two
and inboard of them was a HATSUHARU type destroyer
escort, echo ranging. Convoy was now tracking on
-3-

— page 99 —
course 195°T, speed 12. Continued to run at high
speed on parallel course hoping for a zig toward
or a change of base course to southwest toward
Balikpapan.
0917 With masts only in sight thought I detected a zig toward
to course 220°T.
0935 Got last look at tops of masts. Convoy had apparently
resumed course 195°T. Planned to let them get
fifteen miles away by plot and then surface to track
and gain position ahead.
1001 (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #1) Sighted a PETE at about 1500
feet altitude in the vicinity of the convoy. Con-
tinued on course 195°T watching plane to see if
perhaps it wasn't on a routine flight and would
presently go away. I watched him circle in the
vicinity of the convoy until 1035 and then abandoned
the approach for the following reasons:
(1) Convoy would be warned by the float plane if I
surfaced to chase.
(2) If I commenced a surface chase at dark with a
six knot speed advantage I would have at the
minimum a seventeen hour chase which would extend
on well into the following day.
(3) The possibility of regaining contact with the
convoy after giving them an eleven hour start was
remote.
1907 Surfaced bearing 290°T, 15 miles from North Watcher
Island on course 000°T.
2100 Changed course to 055°T and sent serial number one
primarily so that USS RAY who was two days behind
us would have convoy position, course and speed in case
she was in a position to close.
2107 Completed sending message and resumed base course.
2115 Experienced mild interference on SJ Radar from
another radar.
2117 Picked up weak intermittent signals from another
radar on ARC at 210 megacycles.
2125 All indications of another radar in vicinity dis-
appeared.
Tuesday, 15 February
On surface enroute Sibutu Passage.
1335 Sighted Bongao Peak on Tawi Tawi Island.
1344 Submerged to approach undetected.
1920 Surfaced and commenced transit Sibutu Passage.
Wednesday, 16 February
0045 Completed transit Sibutu - no contacts. Set course
for Singapore-Palau traffic route to follow this
through Balabac Strait.
1645 Could have made Balabac this night by running at
high speed but heavy rain, low clouds and poor
visibility made conditions so ideal for day or night
surface attack that I decided to patrol at five knots
hoping to contact any shipping approaching or leaving
Balabac Strait.
-4-

— page 100 —
2226 Submerged to flush out #3 reserve fuel tank.
2302 Surfaced.

Thursday, 17 February
0555 Submerged. Spent day patrolling approaches to Nasu-
bata and North Channels, east of Balabac Island.
1938 Surfaced and commenced transit of Balabac Strait.
2045 Sighted what appeared to be blinker signals from the
vicinity of Dalawan Bay on Balabac Island which we
were passing at a distance of about four miles. At
times the flashes were regular enough to get an
occasional letter or number and at other times very
erratic and irregular. Considered the possibility
of friendly forces attempting to communicate with
us but did not investigate further as the light was
bright enough to read if it was carefully sent Morse
Code. My final conclusion was that it was either a light
on the beach being obscured intermittently by some-
thing such as a tree swaying in the wind or that if
blinker the characters were Japanese.
2136 Completed transit of Balabac Strait and set course for
southeastern portion of assigned area via route south
of Dangerous Ground and northeast of Friendship
Shoals (Lat.6-30N, Long.112-30E).

Friday, 18 February
1246 (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #2) Submerged for PMTE type float
plane contacted visually at about five miles, bearing
025°T on course about 330°T.
1404 Surfaced.

Saturday, 19 February
1600 Entered assigned area at Lat.4-00N, Long.110-00E, and
set course for a point ten miles north of Soebi Besar
Island.

Sunday, 20 February
0432 Picked up navigational light on Soebi Besar Island
burning with normal characteristics (group flashing
twice every ten seconds).
0621 Submerged with Soebi Besar Island bearing 185°T, dis-
tance eight miles, and commenced east-west patrol
across Singapore-Manila traffic lane.
1950 Surfaced about eight miles north of Soebi Besar Island.
1955 (SFIP CONTACT #4) Radar contact at 9800 yards bearing
003°T followed by three more contacts on approximately
the same bearing. Commenced tracking on four main
engines at seventeen knots.

Convoy was zigging from about 220°T to 270°T making
good a base course of about 250°T to take them between
Soebi Besar and Great Natuna Islands. Three of the
first four ships sighted were very large, their
superstructure having the triangular appearance of
battleships or cruisers. The fourth was considerably
-5-

— page 101 —
smaller and appeared to be a destroyer escort. The
night was too dark and the horizon too hazy to make
out any definite type characteristics on the large ships
but the overall silhouettes were those of men-of-war
and not freighters, tankers, or transports. Also, I
am convinced that none of the three were aircraft
carriers as they did not show the long, straight,
horizontal line of a flight deck that shows up on
carriers at night. The final speed of eighteen and
a half knots at which we tracked them tends to veri-
fy the visual identification of men-of-war.

In the very early stages before I realized they
were making high speed I hoped to get ahead at
seventeen knots, maintain position, and get in at
least a partial battery charge prior to attacking.
As a matter of fact we actually gained eight
degrees in true bearing up until 2200, due to their
zigzagging. At that time with the convoy on our
starboard beam at 13,000 yards they steadied on
course 225°T and we commenced to lose true bearing.
Went to full power, only 18.3 knots by pit log as
fairly heavy swells were slowing us.

In the meantime at 2132 radar picked up six
more small ships in the formation. The disposition
as plotted by radar ranges and bearings on a moor-
ing board showed the three large ships in column
distance 1000 yards, a roving screen ahead, one 2000
yards on the port beam of the second ship, one each
on the port and starboard quarter of the third ship and
three about 2000 yards astern sometimes in column
and sometimes in open order. It is possible that
there may have been one or two screens on the star-
board side that radar did not pick up.
2335 Went to battle stations and made all tubes ready. It
was evident that we could not gain by further chase
as we were losing true bearing so decided to attempt
to close the last three screens at full power.

Monday, 21 February
0010 Commenced closing.
0025 With minimum range 7200 yards, angle on the bow 145°
     port and range commencing to open out broke off the
     attack. Decided not to send contact report yet as
     I expected other traffic in this vicinity and desired
     to remain undetected for a few more days.
0045 Lost radar contact on the large ship at 23,500 yards.
0621 Submerged fifteen miles northeast of Soebi Besar
     Island to patrol Singapore-Manila Traffic lane while
     checking torpedoes and repairing precision sweep on
     SJ Radar.
1948 Surfaced and commenced steering courses for a point
     forty miles southwest of Koti Passage (northernmost
     passage through Natuna Islands) via the northern
     tip of Soebi Besar Island.

-6-

— page 102 —
Tuesday, 22 February
0328 Sighted St.Pierre Island light burning with normal
      characteristics.
0400 Arrived in desired position (Lat.2-05N, Long.108-20E)
      and commenced patrolling along course 056°T at five
      knots.
0710 Sighted masts and smoke of three ships bearing 157°T,
      angle on the bow about 60° port, estimated range 15
      miles. The convoy tracked at about seven knots on
      a course to take them through either Koti Passage or
      Serasan Passage.
0720 (SHIP CONTACT #5) Sighted top of bridge, stack
      and masts of a small destroyer escort.
      I now had two choices: (1) Commence an end around
      immediately with a view to attacking in twenty-two
      fathoms of water at the entrance to Koti Passage; or
      (2) commence a run at high speed back around the
      northern tip of Soebi Besar and thence south to pick
      them up in daylight as they came out of the eastern
      entrance to whichever passage they used. If I chose
      the first plan and their course took them through
      Serasan Passage instead of Koti, I wouldn't be able
      to get in for an attack without accepting twenty
      fathoms water containing numerous shoals and small
      islands even if I could get ahead in time. I chose
      the latter plan as I could make it around to the
      other side of the passages with three hours of daylight
      remaining where the water was from thirty to
      thirty-seven fathoms deep and clear of navigational
      hazards.
0735 Started around islands at 17 knots, tracking convoy
      as we left it. On the closest look I had the ships
      all appeared to be medium or small freighters, single
      mast forward and aft with stack amidships.
1545 Picked up smoke of our convoy in direction of eastern
      entrance to Koti Passage. Slowed to ten knots to com-
      mence tracking. Was taking a series of bearings on
      the islands for a fix when at
1554 (SHIP CONTACT #6) The high lookout reported two ships
      bearing 320° Relative. Swung the periscope to that
      bearing and saw the two stacks, masts and superstruc-
      ture of a camouflaged transport with what looked like
      a yacht trailing astern. Target angle on the bow
      20° port.
1556 Submerged, hoping we hadn't been sighted, and commenced
      approach. Target was zigzagging at intervals of six
      minutes and was giving us alternately port and
      starboard angles on the bow, so that practically the
      whole approach was conducted at full speed except
      for periscope observations. Planned to fire four at
      transport and two at escort from bow tubes but target
      made big zig across our stern in final stages of
      approach.
1702 Got final set up for a stern tube shot, following the
      zig away. Target course 320°T, speed ten, angle on the

-7-

— page 103 —
bow 102° port, torpedo track 110° port, range 2575
yards, torpedo run 2800 yards. Target's course and speed
was checking so well on the TDC that I decided to fire
two at the transport using a twelve foot depth setting
and two at the escort with a six foot depth setting
using periscope offset for spread.
1704-21 Fired #7 at transport.
1704-30 Fired #8 at transport.
1704-35 Got set up on escort.
1704-52 Fired #9 at escort.
1705 Fired #10 at escort and commenced swinging left at
high speed to bring bow tubes to bear.
1706-16 Heard explosion and looked. Hit on transport half-
way between bow and forward stack which threw a column
of smoke and debris about two hundred feet in the air.
Both ships still holding their course. Hauled down
periscope immediately to avoid being sighted at high
speed. Continued to swing.
1706-28 Second explosion. Very dull sounding and much
quieter than first.
1707-11 Noises like sharp crack of gunfire or torpedoes
1708-46 hitting ship without exploding heard by sound
1711-46) operators and some personnel in conning tower.
Presume it was gunfire since the times do not
check with the times of firing the last two torpedoes.
The noise at 1707-11 could have been #10 hitting the
escort without exploding. No gunfire was observed.

Second hit on transport was not observed but I
feel quite positive that the second torpedo hit her in
the stern as she was almost dead in the water on next
look, had a 10° list to port and was swinging to the
left apparently with no steering control. The escort
had reversed course and was showing his stern to us.
Took several quick ranges to be sure the transport was
not coming the way and then commenced closing her.

As we approached I could see some lifeboats already
in the water, more being lowered and all sorts of
gear being thrown over the side. As the ship con-
tinued to swing slowly to the left showing us a 150°
port angle on the bow, I could also see a cargo net
or series of cargo nets strung along the port side
extending down to the water. I could not tell from
this range and angle whether they were being used.
We abandon ship or not but presume they were. Continued
closing and, since the escort was still headed away,
commenced taking pictures.
1720 It began to look as if the ship was not going to sink
from the damage already sustained and also I thought
I saw one of the propellers commencing to thrash the
water so prepared to fire two more. Target had now
swung to give a 120° port angle on the bow.
1724 Fired #1 tube.
1724-07 Fired #2 tube.
1725-30 #1 hit about a quarter length in from the bow.
1725-37 #2 hit about a quarter length in from the stern.
-8-

— page 104 —
Ship began to sink slowly by the stern and at the
same time to roll over on her port side. Obtained a
series of about twenty-five still pictures including
the last two hits and her final death struggles up
until the time she sank with a big explosion aft at
1735.

I have been unable to identify this ship from
any of the data we have aboard on two stack Japanese
or Allied ships. I noticed, too late to be able
to get close enough to read it before she sank, that
she had her name in big block letters on the port
bow. While I could not read them I counted nine
or ten letters. I could only see the one word - there
being no sign of the usual "MARU" after it. I am
inclined to believe it was one of the American, French,
Dutch or Italian ships taken over by the Japanese at
the beginning of the war. Other characteristics
besides her two stacks and two masts were four sets of
kingposts from her forward mast to the beginning of
her superstructure, one set at her after mast, a
big number "2" painted on her after stack and zigzag
camouflage in a vertical plane. Her length of 520
to 530 feet was determined by measuring the angle sub-
tended between her bow and stern (4°) immediately
after the fourth torpedo was fired at her. Range of
2250 yards determined by torpedo run and angle on the
bow was about 120° port although 93° port was used
on the TDC. My estimate of the tonnage is that she
was 10,000 tons minimum. A length versus tonnage
comparison with the ASAMA MARU class gives her 15,000
tons. She was well loaded for she was riding low in
the water when we first fired at her. I believe the
pictures taken will provide the means of positive iden-
tification.

The escort was painted white, had a single stack
aft and gray zigzag camouflaging in a vertical plane.
He looked like either a big yacht or a very small
freighter. Estimated tonnage 800-1000 tons. During
the whole attack he made no effort to depth charge
us but worked his way around to the far side of the
transport and about three or four miles distant. I
believe he is in two of the pictures.

All men in the life boats were in white but whether
this was their underwear or some sort of a fatigue
uniform I couldn't make out. There were about nine
or ten life boats in the water, two of which had only
one man each in them. None of the boats seemed
particularly crowded.

I decided not to make any further attempt to close
the escort and attack him with torpedoes primarily
because I felt sure that the two fired at him set
six feet had passed under him. Nor did I feel that
he was worth risking our ship by tackling him with a

-9-

— page 105 —
three inch gun on the surface in sight of land. I
pulled away submerged on the assumption that (1) the
pictures and information I had should be sufficient
for identification, (2) that our convoy would be
warned if we headed in their direction on the surface,
and (3) that A/S measures in the form of a plane or
destroyer should be forthcoming shortly from the
beach.
1847 (SHIP CONTACT #7) Sighted a WAKATAKE class destroyer
with a twenty degree starboard angle on the bow
headed across our stern, range about 5000 yards.
Went to battle stations while watching to see if he
was going to close us.
1901 Destroyer commenced echo ranging. Maneuvered to
keep him astern as it gradually began to get dark.
2012 He seemed to be getting closer with his pinging but
it was now dark so surfaced and pulled clear on
battery for about ten minutes before starting the
engines. No contact by SJ Radar at forty feet or
on the surface so he must have been a good six miles
away. Took course to close estimated track of convoy.
2114 SJ Radar contacted our convoy at 15,000 yards. Com-
menced tracking and working for position ahead while
charging batteries. Convoy was apparently on the alert
for they were zigzagging radically on base course
about 095°T, speed nine knots. In addition, whether
purposely or accidentally they were remaining in a
dense black raincloud and managed to stay in it the
rest of the night. In comparison our background
without any moon looked like broad daylight. The
escort, which I assumed to be the same small
destroyer that we had sighted with them in the morn-
ing was all over the place, ahead, astern, on the bow,
on the beam, and at one time, during the later stages,
was about 8000 yards out on the port quarter.

Wednesday, 23 February
0005 With the battery charge completed and having gained a
position 12,000 yards on their port bow, angle on
the bow fifteen degrees port, was ready to attack.
Our good luck of the previous day seemed to desert
us with the beginning of a new day for from here on
frustration reigned supreme. To make a long story
short I started in on attacks three times and completed
none of them.
     On the first I swung left to come in at full speed
with a larger angle on the bow. Half way around
radar contacted two small boats 340° Relative at 3100
yards with the range closing rapidly. Swung right
circle around them and still
come in on the convoy. Net result was that I had
lost so much bearing by the time I got clear of them
that I had to work up ahead again.
     On the next attempt, the same two boats were con-
tacted by radar again at 2700 yards. Tried circling
-10-

— page 106 —
outside them again but seeing that this wasn't going
to work tried to circle inside them toward the convoy.
Was enjoying a fair amount of success in losing them
from radar range on them at any time.
this way (maximum when the convoy which now seemed
was 5200 yards) on a base course to be
Decided to take this opportunity to work across
their starboard bow completely lose our two small
contacts and take advantage of the better background.
This was unsuccessful because they began to work
the right again coming around eventually to 130°T.

To make the picture complete I should add here that
in order for them to clear Point Sirik on Sarawak,
Borneo, (Lat.2-45N, Long.111-20E) and continue on to
Miri, they would have to make good a base course of
about 080°T. The southwesterly heading they were
now working around to was heading them into the bay
between Point Datoe and Point Sirik and into pretty
shallow water. The water we were running in was from
25 to 30 fathoms and they were beginning to head for
soundings of 13,16 and 19 fathoms.

The third and final attempt was made without the
two small radar contacts which had been heckling us.
We were headed in at full speed, all tubes ready,
range 7800 yards, angle on the bow estimated at 45°
port, when a steady white light was shown on our
starboard beam. Had the radar train on that bearing
and got a range of 5300 yards closing rapidly. It
was, judging by the size of the radar pip, our escort
whom we had temporarily lost. Swung left to put
him astern. The quartermaster on high lookout saw
another ship make some blinker and another one show a
steady white light. Whether it was a signal for a
routine course change or a change due to our being
sighted I don't know but at any rate they came to
course 150°T and held it, this course heading them
into the harbor at the port of Sarawak. A check with
the chart showed that we would have to use up practi-
cally all of the remaining darkness and get into
fifteen fathom water to attempt another attack. Our
presence in the vicinity was known from the sinking,
the convoy was alert and either suspected or knew we
were chasing them. I wanted to get into minimum thirty
fathom water prior to daylight and their calling out
of the dogs, so at
0328 Secured from battle stations and a disappointing and
anti-climactic chase after our sinking of the previous
afternoon which had put all hands in high spirits.
The past twenty-four hours operations had cost us
5005 gallons of fuel.
0641 Submerged after clearing the area forty miles to north-
ward.
1943 Surfaced and set course for a point 150 miles northwest
of Great Natuna Island on the Singapore-Manila-Empire

-11-

— page 107 —
traffic route. Since our presence in the area was
known decided to send message concerning the men-
of-war sighted on the night of the twentieth
and morning of the twenty-first, the sinking of
the transport on the twenty-second and the approxi-
mate location of the convoy in the USS BLUEFISH Area.
-:-
Thursday, 24 February
0130 Message sent and receipted for. Spent day patrol-
ling on surface at five knots heading slowly
back toward Great Natuna Island.

Friday, 25 February
0938 Submerged twenty-five miles south of Great Natuna
Island.
1945 Surfaced, patrolling in same general vicinity between
Great Natuna and Soebi Besar Islands.

Saturday, 26 February
Patrolling on surface in same general vicinity.
1048 (SHIP CONTACT #8) A five ship convoy with one
destroyer escort popped out of a low lying haze
which had been present all morning. Range about six
or seven miles. They consisted of one transport,
which from that distance looked to be larger than the
one sunk on the twenty-second, at least two tankers
and two other ships which were either freighters
or tankers. They came on us very suddenly and
unexpectedly in spite of the fact that a watch was
being kept with #1 Periscope for five minutes out
of every fifteen. Some idea of the suddenness with
which they appeared can be gathered from the fact
that the officer on the periscope had just com-
pleted one sweep of the horizon and picked them up
on his second round. Their hulls were plainly
visible from the bridge and were picked up by the
lookouts about the same time they were seen through
the periscope.

I knew that it was very probable that we had been
sighted also. If we hadn't been, it was safe to
open the range to track. If we had been and they
weren't sure what we were I knew it would be a
dead give away to dive, so I elected to open out at
high speed. As we started opening out they first
reversed course and then, a few minutes later,
turned to starboard presenting a 90° starboard
angle on the bow on a southerly heading. I couldn't
be sure that their actions were evasive, but if not
it was a most peculiar zigzag plan. There was no
question but what they had been all set to proceed
between Great Natuna and Soebi Besar Islands for
they were right on the edge of the entrance.
1120 I could just barely see them and was positive they
couldn't see us now, so submerged. Commenced closing
on their last true bearing of 094° hoping that we were
undetected and that they would continue on through.
-12-

— page 108 —
1145 (SHIP CONTACT #9) Sighted a destroyer headed at us
with a zero angle on the bow, estimated range 10,000
yards. Turned right to open the distance to the
track and went to battle stations.
1147 He was still headed directly at us. Made ready all
tubes, depth setting six feet. Would have felt a bit
more confident about being able to hit him with some
means. [UNCLEAR: some means]
1155 Picked up his pinging in sound gear.

As he approached I could not determine what class
he was but afterward by checking ONI 14 decided from
his single stack and broken deck forward of the
bridge that he was a mine layer. There does not
seem to be a picture of his exact type in the identifi-
cation pamphlets. He gradually swung left as he closed
and we slowly swung left at one-third speed to keep set
up for a stern tube shot. His echo ranging seemed to
be directly on us. Only twice did he sweep around. I
was determined to let him have all four tubes aft if he
got within range or started in for an attack for
there was the possibility that he might have a deep
enough draft to be hit by a torpedo set at six feet,
whereas otherwise he might have a free afternoon of
depth charging. However, at
1311 He steadied on course 225ºT and at
1315 He secured echo ranging. His echo ranging didn't fade
out. It just plain stopped.

The whole exhibition smelled very suspiciously as
if he knew exactly where we were and very calmly pro-
ceeded to keep us down while keeping out of torpedo
range. The closest he got to us was 4600 yards.

Having last seen the convoy on a southerly heading
I began to suspect that he had swung through this
passage to keep us down while they went through Koti
Passage to the south. On that assumption I headed
south so that if they should still try to come through
here I ought to see them and at the same time heading
for a spot from which we could make a run to their
2100 E.P.
1800 Surfaced in order to be able to arrive at their esti-
mated 2100 position south of Soebi Besar Island and
through Koti Passage.
2100 Arrived at their 2100 position and patrolled the rest
of the night without contact.

In reconstructing the above events, I believe that
they sighted us about the same time we sighted them.
Then, either recognizing us as a submarine or suspect-
ing that we might be one, they headed for the coast of
Borneo where they either took refuge or went through
the eight to ten fathom Api Passage hugging the coast.

Sunday, 27 February
In seven days on station we had now used 20,000
gallons of fuel (this included a 5000 gallon discrep-
ancy), had 42,800 gallons left and figured on needing

— page 109 —
about 30,000 gallons to get back. This left 12,800
for seventeen days more on station, or 700 gallons a
day, which allowance would have to include any chasing.
Decided to work slowly northward to a spot about 100
miles northeast of North Natuna Island and there lie
to on the surface in what looked like a good focal
point for Manila-Singapore traffic.

27 February to 4 March Carrying out above plan.

Saturday, 4 March
2130 SJ Radar interference, followed by SJ Radar contact
and then visual contact by blinker tube with one
of our submarines. Exchanged proper recognition
signals but did not find out what ship it was as he
steamed off in a hurry. It turned out, by verbal con-
firmation two days later, that it was the USS RAY
who was chasing a convoy with the USS BLUEFISH.

I suspected that it was the USS RATON who was
due to come through our area so came back to my
original course and speed to head for a morning posi-
tion of the convoy which the USS RAY had reported
by dispatch was heading our way. No contact. Convoy
was to southwest of me where it was later attacked by
the USS RAY and USS BLUEFISH.

Sunday, 5 March
While maintaining a listening watch on the voice fre-
quency heard the USS RATON calling us. Eventually
established voice communication with USS RATON and
USS RASHER who must have been a great distance from
my area, and later with the USS BLUEFISH. USS RATON
notified me he was in my area. It will be of interest
to plot the USS RASHER's position when the information
is available as I believe she was well beyond the 500
mile expected range of the voice equipment.

Monday, 6 March
1620 Contacted USS RAY visually on surface, exchanged
recognition signals and closed for verbal exchange of
information. He informed me of his shortage of fuel,
intention to remain in my area as long as his fuel
would hold out and then return via Karimata Strait.
We arranged a joint patrol for the night and the
following morning.

7 March to 14 March
Patrolling Manila-Singapore traffic route about 100
miles northeast North Natuna Island, running at 2
knots for steerage way and making daily trim and
practice dives.

Tuesday, 14 March
Our conservation of fuel for the past 17 days left
us with 33,000 gallons this date. This coupled with
the fact that the moon was on the wane made it

-14-

— page 110 —
feasible to investigate the Singapore-Saigon traffic
route in the shallow water chase to the Malayan
coast providing we returned to base via the short
route, i.e. south of Borneo via Karimata Strait and
the Java Sea.
2030 Sent dispatch requesting five day extension on
station. Set course for Pulo Tenggol Island (Lat.
4-50N, Long 103-40E).

Wednesday, 15 March
Underway on surface enroute Pulo Tenggol Island.
Received dispatch authorizing five day extension of
patrol.

Thursday and Friday, 16-17 March
Conducting surface and submerged patrol ten miles
east of Pulo Tenggol Island. No contacts.

Saturday, 18 March
0030 Set course for Djemadja Island, westernmost island
of the Anambas group, to patrol Singapore-Empire
traffic route.

Sunday and Monday, 19-20 March
Patrolling Singapore-Empire traffic route on surface
40 miles north of Djemadja Island.
1800 Set course for point 70 miles northwest of North
Natuna Island.

Tuesday, 21 March
0647 Submerged and patrolled in vicinity of above point.
1908 Surfaced and set course to leave area.

Wednesday, 22 March
Patrolling on surface. Passed between Great Natuna
and Soebi Besar Islands.
1600 Left assigned area enroute Karimata Strait.

Thursday, 23 March
Enroute Karimata Strait on surface.
1340 (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #3) Sighted two bombers on star-
board beam, distance about 8 miles, altitude about
2500 feet. Identified by lookout who sighted them
as BETTYS. Not picked up by SD Radar.
1341 Submerged. The planes, flying in formation, had
turned toward us just before we submerged but were not
sighted again through the periscope. Decided to
remain submerged as we were within visual distance
of the Tambelan Islands and had intended to submerge
about 1430 anyway.
1740 (AIRCRAFT CONTACT #4) Sighted float plane identified
as RUFE, distance about 4 miles, on westerly course.
Went to 100 feet.
1810 Sighted same plane again, this time on southerly
course. Decided he was patrolling in our general
vicinity, possibly looking for us as a result of our
being sighted earlier by the two bombers.

-15-

— page 111 —
2003 Surfaced and set course to pass through the Tambelan
     Islands.
2100 Checked SD Radar for sensitivity and tuning on
     Mendarik Island which is only 364 feet high. We
     got a good pip from the island at 8 miles and only
     minor adjustments in tuning were necessary.

Friday, 24 March
0620 Submerged 60 miles from entrance to Karimata Strait.
1937 Surfaced and commenced transit of Karimata Strait.

Saturday, 25 March
0555 Submerged in 16 fathoms of water.
0603 Sighted black object through periscope and went to
     battle stations. It was still too dark to make out
     what the object was.
0645 Finally made out sails of what appeared to be a
     typical Chinese junk. This boat was on a southerly
     course as we were, but practically becalmed. It
     remained in sight the rest of the day, its bearing
     drawing forward and aft alternately as it got an
     occasional breeze. We closed to about 3000 yards
     range to get a better look at it and take some
     pictures. In my estimation the junk was not worth
     sinking. If Japanese, it did not have the customary
     flag painted on it; if native and being used by
     the Japanese, it was too old, dilapidated and slow
     to conceivably improve the Japanese shipping situ-
     ation.
1914 Surfaced 30 miles east of Discovery East Bank and set
     course to commence passage through Java SEA.

Sunday, 26 March
0605 Submerged 60 miles northwest of Bawean Island.
1905 Surfaced and set course to pass 10 miles south of
     Great Masalembo Island.

Monday, 27 March
0555 Submerged 15 miles southwest of Great Masalembo
     Island. Sighted numerous small sailing sampans
     during day.
1902 Surfaced and set course to pass north of Kangean
     Islands.

Tuesday, 28 March
0557 Submerged 15 miles east of Sekala Island.
1941 Surfaced and set course for Lombok Strait.
2257 Land contact by SJ RADAR on small island off northwest
     side of Lombok Island. Commenced passage through
     Strait.
2310 (SHIP CONTACT #11) Sighted small ship followed by
     SJ Radar contact on it at 2500 yards. Maneuvered
     around it at high speed.
     This was the first of six patrol vessels
     encountered during the passage. Visibility was to

-16-

— page 112 —
our advantage as there was no moon, a varying amount
of surface haze, and the land background of Bali and
Lombok to make use of in evading. All contacts
were encountered from the northern entrance to the
middle of the strait and tracked on courses from
060°T to 090°T at about 9 knots. The first four
we saw in addition to contacting them by radar.
The fifth and sixth we did not see. The sixth was
apparently the largest as we could track it out to
7000 yards, whereas the other five were all lost
on radar at about 4000 yards. I do not believe that
any of these vessels sighted us as none of them
tracked in such a manner as to indicate they were
chasing us. Also, in each case we were able to keep
a dark background behind us.

It took us four hours to complete what is normally
a two hour passage at our speed of 18 knots - not
surprising since our track shows us spending almost
as much time on easterly, westerly and northerly
courses as on our base course of 200°T. The crowning
blow was a half hour spent in evading three tide
rips in formation as we approached the southern
exit. When first picked up by radar at 1200 yards
dead ahead we also spotted them from the bridge.
They were dead ringers for three PT boats kicking up
high bow waves. After turning away from these
gruesome phantom three times with tubes #9 and #10
ready to fire to scare them off our track, and
once cleared the bridge to dive, finally decided to
head at them and pass them at full speed. We got
through all right. Due allowance must be made for the
fact that we (editorial we) were a bit "contact"
happy" after our previous six bonafide contacts.

Wednesday, 29 March
0300 Completed transit of Lombok Strait and set course
     for bombing restriction lane.

30 March - 1 April
Enroute Exmouth Gulf for fuel.

Saturday, 1 April
0830 Arrived Exmouth Gulf and took 14,370 gallons fuel
     from fuel barge.
1430 Departed Exmouth Gulf.

Sunday and Monday, 2-3 April
Enroute Fremantle, West Australia.

Tuesday, 4 April
1430 Arrived Fremantle, West Australia.

-17-

— page 113 —
(C) WEATHER
Weather was normal for this time of year through-
out the patrol area. The weather within 20 miles of
the Natuna Island was characterized by heavy cloud
formations and frequent rain squalls.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
The set and drift of the current throughout the
area varied with the direction of the wind and sea.
Westward of Soebi Island the current varied from
.5 to .9 knot in direction of 045° TRUE.
The current sets eastward in the passage between
Great Natuna and Soebi Islands with a strength of
from .6 to 1.0 knot.
A current of .8 knot setting 020° TRUE was noted
through Karimata Straits.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDE
Soebi Island Light and St.Pierre Island Light were
both observed burning with regular characteristics
and in charted positions.

-18-

— page 114 —
(F) SHIP CONTACTS
NO. | DATE | TIME | LAT. & LONG. | TYPE | INITIAL EST. CRSE | HOW | REMARKS
| | | | | RANGE & SPEED | CONTACTED |
1 | 10 Feb | 0229 | 08-18S | Four (4) small | 4,000 | SN | Avoided on surface.
| 11 Feb | | 115-51E | patrol boats | yds | 130°T
| | | | | | 12 kts | |
2 | 11 Feb | 0002 | 02-48S | Small | 8,000 | SN | Avoided on surface.
| 13 Feb | | 118-33E | patrol boat | yds | 180°T
| | | | | | 16 kts | |
3 | 14 Feb | 0820 | 01-01N | Convoy: 1 DDHATSUHARU | 14,000 | P | Could not close range sub-
| | | | 119-35E | CLASS), 1 lge AO, 1 | yds | 190°T | merged. Air cover pre-
| | | | | med AO, 10 Warships, 7 | | 12 kts | vented surfacing to track.
| | | | | small boats. | | | Could not close at full
| | | | | | | | speed on surface. Unable
| | | | | | | | to further identify due to
| | | | | | | | poor visibility.
4 | 20 Feb | 2000 | 03-20N | Convoy: 3 lge, | 12,000 | R(EJ) | Started long end around
| | | | 108-38.5E | 7 small | yds | 225°T | to attack at night. Could
| | | | | | | 18.5 kts | not gain position for day
| | | | | | | | attack.
5 | 22 Feb | 0710 | 02-12.5N | 3 AK's, 1 escort | 18,000 | SD | Sunk AP, missed small AK
| | | | 108-14E | | yds | 050°T | with 2 torpedoes, did not
| | | | | | | 7 kts | fire more because we were
| | | | | | | | chasing Ship Contact #5.
6 | 22 Feb | 1554 | 03-03N | 1 lge AK, 10 | 15,000 | SD | apparently searching for
| | | | 109-16E | stacks, 1 escort | yds | 280°T | us after Attack #1.
| | | | | 800-1,000 tons. | | 10 kts |
7 | 22 Feb | 1846 | 03-03.5N | 1 DD(WAKATAKE) | 5,000 | P |
| | | | 109-20E | | yds | 030°T | |
| | | | | | | 20 kts | |
8 | 26 Feb | 1048 | 03-14N | Convoy: 1 lge AP, 2 | 12 to | Various | SD | Sighted convoy and at same
| | | | 108-27E | lge AO's, 2 lge AK's | 14,000 | | | time they sighted us and
| | | | | or AO's. | kts | | | avoided. Convoy was on
| | | | | | | | approximately 2500T when
| | | | | | | | sighted.
9 | 26 Feb | 1145 | 03-14N | 1 CM, class unknown | 10,000 | P | Echo ranging on us, worked
| | | | 108-11E | | yds | 080°T | | around to 2200T, closest
| | | | | | | 15 kts | | range 4,500 yards.

-19-

— page 116 —
(H) ATTACK DATA
Torpedo Attack No.1 (a,b,c): Time 1705H and 1724H.
Date Feb. 22, 1944.
Lat. 3-03N,Long.109-16E.
Description: Two stack transport and escort sighted
by high lookout in daytime on surface while making an
end around on a convoy sighted earlier in day. Escort
appeared to be a yacht or small steamer. Visibility
was excellent. Name of ship unknown but believed
to be former Allied ship taken over by Japanese.
Pictures taken may prove means of positive identifica-
tion.
Zig zag plan as follows:
0-3 . . . . . 305
3-6 . . . . . 278
6-13 . . . . . 265
13-20 . . . . . 271
20-27 . . . . . 234
27-38 . . . . . 290
38-45 . . . . . 234
45-50 . . . . . 320
Ships Sunk: One 10-15,000 tons.
Ships Damaged: None (possible hit on escort with dud).
Damage Determined By: Saw three hits and heard fourth.
Watched ship sink and took pictures.

TARGET DATA
Phase Draft Course Speed Range (On TDC at Firing)
(a) 24 320 10 2890
(b) 6 320 10 3450
(c) 30 280 1 2250

OWN SHIP DATA
Phase Course Depth Angle Speed
(a) 203 66 1/2ºD 2
(b) 204 66 2º D 2
(c) 001 66 2º D 3

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA
After sighting target submerged and made periscope
approach. Planned to use bow tubes firing four at
transport and two at escort but last minute zig
necessitated using stern tubes. Fired two at trans-
port and two at escort. Used divergent spread applied
by periscope bearings.

Phase (a), above, covers the first two torpedoes
fired at the transport, Phase (b) the two fired at
the escort and Phase (c) the final two fired at the
transport.

Transport stopped and took a port list after the
first two hit him. The final two, Phase (c), were
fired at him about 19 minutes after the first as it
did not look as if he was going to sink for sure.

-21-

— page 118 —
The liner of #15 unit of No.3 Main Engine was
replaced because of small cracks near a stud hole at
the top. This failure was believed due to improper
tightening of the head.

Sound Gear

Both port and starboard sound projector shafts
continue to make a rumbling, groaning noise while
being trained through certain sectors, this noise
increases rapidly with depth or speed. Attempts
were made to correct this condition during last refit,
and it was thought with some success, but after
operating for a short time the noise returned. It is
believed a complete re-alignment is necessary to
correct this major defect.

Vibration

A vibration in the ship has developed at two-thirds
(4 knots) speed submerged and at full speed (18 knots)
on the surface. As nearly as can be ascertained,
this vibration seems to be coming from the vicinity of
the propellors and strut bearings. It will be inves-
tigated during the coming refit.

(L) RADIO

The reception of "BAKER" schedule is considered to
have been generally satisfactory. Observations made
on each of the frequencies in use at different
times on successive days make the following summation
possible.

For the first six hours of the Greenwich Day no
signal whatsoever is heard on 4370 kcs while excellent
reception is realized on 9250 kcs. The signal
strength on 12630 kcs ranged between S-3 and S-5
with an average interference strength of W-2.

During the next six hours (0600 to 1200 GCT) condi-
tions remain the same except for the appearance of
small interference on 9250 kcs and a gradual fall of
signal strength on 12630 kcs.

From 1200 to 1800 GCT the signal is best heard on
4370 kcs and 9250 kcs. The strength of the signal
being substantially the same with but very little more
interference noted on the higher of the two frequen-
cies. On 12630 kcs the signal and the interference
are of the same amplitude.

The last six hours of the Greenwich Day excellent
signals are heard on 4370 kcs, average signals on
9250 kcs and no signals whatsoever on 12630 kcs.

While on station a listening watch was maintained
on 2880 kcs. Phone reception on this frequency ranged
from fair to good during the early hours of darkness.
At 2200 GCT interference was encountered from a London
broadcast station which comes on the air at this time.

-23-

— page 119 —
Phone transmissions were considered good. Two unknown
ships were heard using the voice calls "Flytrap" and
"Newsboy".

Transmissions on the ship to shore frequencies
were considered good except in one instance on Feb.22nd.
Megger readings in the vertical antenna showed a
direct ground making it impossible to use 16940 kcs.
One attempt was made to resonate the long antenna on
12705 kcs but the transmitter overloaded so the fre-
quency was shifted down to 8470 kcs. The antenna
current meter gave an indication of six (6) amperes but
no reply was received after making several calls.
The port antenna was then tuned to the same frequency
with an output of seven (7) amperes but still no ans-
wering station came in. 4235 kcs was then set up with
a good output indication but also without results.
Retuned to 8470 kcs, made one call and received an
immediate answer.

Megger readings taken on the antenna showed that
the reading to ground varied from three (3) megohms
to 75,000 ohms, the poorer readings being taken after
extended submergence with the better readings received
after several days of surface running.

Last serial received from CTF 71 16
Last serial sent to CTF 71 . . . . . . 5

(M) RADAR

The operation of the SD Radar was, on the whole,
very satisfactory. The greatest part of the trouble
encountered was of a mechanical nature, the most annoy-
ing of which was caused by the moving crystal lead in
the range tank jamming against the moving crystal
this making the ranging unit inoperative. This could
only be prevented by limiting the travel of the moving
crystal to a distance equivalent to 25,000 yards on
the range scale.

A complete check was given this equipment once
each week during which time it was cleaned, tubes tested,
leads and cables checked, and voltage measurements
taken. By the use of this procedure many weaknesses
were apprehended before they had developed sufficiently
to put the equipment out of operation.

The performance of the SD-2 radar was highly erratic,
probably due to a ground in the vertical antenna mast
which caused the resistance to vary from 10,000 to
200,000 ohms. A new type "M" antenna was installed
during the last refit. Results obtained with this
antenna have not compared favorably with those
obtained with the old type "M" antenna previously
installed.

The radiation pattern of this new antenna seems to
be different from that of the previously installed

-24-

— page 120 —
antenna and seems to come closer to the surface.
Land with a height of 800 feet was picked up at six
miles, which indicated a much lower pattern than had
ever been present before on this ship. In addition
to this, three planes sighted on patrol were not
picked up by the SD although their estimated elevation
was over 1500 feet and two of them were large bombers.
These conditions warrant a thorough check of the SD
equipment and possible replacement of the present
antenna.

(N) SOUND
    Sound conditions were fair throughout the area,
    6,000 yards was the maximum at which screws were heard.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS
    Bathythermograph readings were taken continuously
    during this patrol. The only layer encountered was
    northeast of Great Natuna Island when there was an
    eight degree drop in the water temperature at 120 feet.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY
    The health of the officers and crew was in general
    excellent throughout the patrol. One man developed
    gonococcus infection urethra, shortly after leaving
    port and was successfully treated by the pharmacist's
    mate.
    Habitability was excellent.

(Q) PERSONNEL
    The performance of officers and enlisted personnel
    was excellent.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED
                            Miles Steamed    Fuel Used
    Base to area                 3650          43,194
    In area                      3704          28,742
    Area to base                 2875          34,840

(S) DURATION
    Days enroute to area         15 days
    Days in area                 32 days
    Days enroute to base         13 days
    Days submerged               21 days

-25-

— page 121 —
(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes     Fuel          Provisions    Personnel Factor
18            9,600 Gals.   5 days        3 weeks

Limiting factor this patrol: Operation Order.

(U) REMARKS

          It is believed that the passage between Great
Natuna Island and Subi Besar Island at 3°N 108°30'E
may be considered one traffic focal point for Manila-
Singapore traffic. One two-ship formation of men-of-
war was tracked through there, one five-ship convoy
was seen about to pass through and one transport when
sunk was headed for this passage. It is believed that
small, low powered steamers use the three shallow
southern passages through the South Natuna Islands,
i.e. Koti Passage, Serasan Passage and Api Passage.
One three-ship convoy of small steamers was seen pass-
ing through Koti Passage.

-26-

— page 122 —
FC5-16/A16-3
Serial: 0226
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
PUFFER 3rd War Patrol
Report SS266/A16-3
Serial 063 of 4 April 1944.

To: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
C: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Ia: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
    The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS266) - Report of War Patrol No.
         THREE - comment on.

1. The third war patrol of the U.S.S. PUFFER extended over the
period February 4 - April 4, 1944, a total of 60 days, of which 32 were
spent in the patrol areas in the SOUTH CHINA SEA. The patrol was aggressively
conducted and area coverage was thorough.

2. Contacts were made with four enemy convoys, an unidentified
enemy task force and the usual quota of patrol craft, but despite determined
tactics PUFFER was successful in completing only one torpedo attack. While
getting in position ahead to attack the convoy sighted the morning of Feb-
ruary 22nd, a large transport with one unidentified escort was sighted.
PUFFER dived and commenced an approach on the transport and escort. A zig
by the enemy in the late stages of the approach forced PUFFER to fire stern
tube shots with a torpedo run of 2600 yards. Two torpedoes were fired at each
two periscope hits on the transport. No damage was done to the
escort who immediately cleared the vicinity. Observing that the transport
did not appear to be sinking, after 15 minutes PUFFER put two more torpedoes
into her to finish up the job. Four hits on this ship out of four shots
speaks well for the efficiency of the fire control party. Excellent pictures
were obtained of the sinking.

3. The material condition of the PUFFER is good and defects
mentioned will be corrected in the current refit. Note is taken of the
remarks made concerning the creditable performance of the relief crew and
Submarine Repair Unit in refitting the submarine in preparation for the
subject patrol.

4. The state of cleanliness of the ship and the health and
morale of the crew is excellent.

5. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are congratulated
on the conduct of this patrol and on the damage inflicted upon the enemy.

[SIGNATURE: H. H. MCLEAN]
H. H. MCLEAN.
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN

U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship,
9 April 1944.

— page 123 —
[STAMP: 5 0455]
FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12/gr
Serial: 0371 22 April 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS.PUFFER Conf. Ltr.
SS268/A16-3 Serial 063
dated 4 April, 1944.
Report of Third War
Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Third War Patrol -
Comment on.

1. The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron
SIXTEEN are complete and are concurred in.

2. PUFFER's many patrol boat contacts in LOMBOK
STRAIT indicate the enemy is exerting greater effort to deny
the use of this Strait to our Submarines.

3. This patrol is designated as "Successful" for
purposes of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

4. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding
Officer, Officers, and Crew for inflicting the following
damage on the enemy:

SUNK

* 1 - AP (TOKYO MARU) - - - - - 15,105 Tons.

* Former French Ship "D'ARTAGNAN".

R. W. CHRISTIE.

[STAMP: FILMED]
- 1 -

— page 125 —
[STAMP: 3304]
[STAMP: 022173]

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3/(F-3/cw)
Serial: [HANDWRITTEN: 01047]

[HANDWRITTEN: 7 MAY 1944]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
CO USS PUFFER (SS268)
Conf. Ltr. Serial 063
dated 4 April 1944.

From: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Third War
Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

[SIGNATURE: R. H. Cruzen]
R. H. CRUZEN,
By direction.

— page 126 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

SS268/A16
SERIAL 067
[STAMP OVERLAY: DECLASSIFIED]
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels.)

Subject: USS PUFFER (SS268), Report of War Patrol No.4

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Plot of Ship's Track.
(C) Navigation Time Plots of Contacts.
(Enclosures (B) & (C) for Comtaskfor 71, only.

1. Enclosures (A), (B) and (C) covering the
fourth war patrol of this vessel conducted in Celebes and
Sulu Sea during the period April 30, 1944, to June 21, 1944
is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: T. G. Selby]
F. G. SELBY

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

DECLASSIFIED-AUT. 0443, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP-09B2C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/22]

82094 [STAMP: FILMED]

— page 127 —
CONFIDENTIAL
(A) PROLOGUE
    Arrived Fremantle, West Australia, from Third War Patrol
on April 4, 1944. Major work to be accomplished included
overhaul of two main engines, cutting down of bridge to redu-
ce silhouette, conversion of #4 ballast tank to a fuel ballast
tank, realignment of both sound shafts, complete check of
SD radar equipment to improve performance and installation
of PPl unit.

    Refit completed on April 21, 1944. All the above items
were accomplished with the exception of installing a PPl
unit. The SD radar although completely checked and tuned
still gives unsatisfactory range performance. #1 and #2 per-
copes were interchanged to put the attack periscope forward
and #1 was replaced.

    April 22 to April 30: Engaged in training operations.
Conducted sound test, deperming, deep dive, day and night
practice approaches surfaced and submerged, and fired three
exercise torpedoes.

(B) NARRATIVE (ALL TIMES HOW)
    Note: AC - Aircraft Contact.
          SC - Ship Contact.

30 April
0900    Underway in accordance with Comtaskfor 71 Opera-
        tion Order No.50-44 to conduct unrestricted sub-
        marine warfare against the enemy in the South
        China Sea. Routine via Darwin, East of Timor,
        Flores Sea, Makassar Strait, Sibutu Passage, and
        Mindoro Strait to South China Sea.

1130    Commenced coordinated attack exercises with
        RASHER and ANGLER against single ship allied
        convoy with USS ISABEL and HMAS HORSHAM as escorts.

2330    Secured from exercises and set course for Darwin
        via Bombing Restriction Lane and in company with
        RASHER for training exercises. The coordinated
        attack training on the convoy was valuable,
        particularly with regard to ironing out communica-
        tion problems. When larger convoys are available
        and all submarines have a PPl unit this training
        will be of much greater benefit.

1 May to 3 May
        Enroute Darwin conducting training exercises
        with RASHER. I consider this period in company
        with RASHER as time very well spent. In addi-
        tion to the training for lookouts, sound opera-
        tors, the third and fourth officers
        got an opportunity to make several practice
        approaches apiece. I picked up the very useful

-1-

— page 128 —
information that with a bright, half moon overhead the
RASHER could be seen at a range of 9,000 yards but
that we could not pick her up either visually or
by radar when she was making a submerged radar
approach. Sound finally picked her up by echo
ranging at 2,500 yards and coached the bridge and
radar on.

3 May
0805 (AC #1) Sighted Catalina distant about 12 miles
on port beam. No radar contact.

1325 (AC #2) Exchanged recognition signals with PBY. Radar
did not pick up plane until he was in to three and one-
half miles. Since he was flying between 500 and 1,000 feet,
I requested by blinker that he go to 2,000 feet when leaving
us. He agreed to our request but we were still
only able to follow him out to nine miles on the SD radar.
At nine miles the return echo was so small on the screen
that I could hardly see it and, had the radar operator not
been following it out, I don't believe he would have
recognized it as an aircraft contact. This being typical
of our previous experience with this radar during
the last patrol and last two training periods, I am
convinced that our SD radar as a whole is a lemon or
that the new type "M" antenna is far inferior to the old
type.

1441 Fired 10 rounds of three inch target ammunition and two
pans of 20 MM ammunition at home made target consisting
of 10 air filled balloons tied to a wooden crate. Found
trainer's sight badly fogged.

1530 Master gyro out due to loss of vacuum on south rotor.
Ship's force unable to repair. Commenced steering by
auxiliary gyro compass.

1845 (SC #1) Picked up contact 3,450 yards on SJ radar -
closed to investigate and found it was Allied tug proceed-
ing south.

2300 Sent PUFFER #1 requesting new south rotor in Darwin and
services of SD radar representative if available.

4 May
SJ radar out of commission due to mechanical fail-
ure of dipole casting for lower antenna feeder unit.
Sent PUFFER #2 requesting new part in Darwin.

5 May
Pitometer log out of commission. Repaired to the
extent that it registers properly on surface.

6 May to 7 May
1345 (7th) (AC #3) Submerged for SD contact four miles
and closing. Lat. 12° 24.5' S, Long. 127° 02' E.

1415 Surfaced and resumed course.

-2-

— page 129 —
8 May
0615 Sighted escort and commenced entry into Darwin.
1013 Alongside dock in Darwin. Spare parts, radar repair
     man, mail and supplies were waiting. Repaired after
     gyro, SJ radar, three inch gun, ship's refrigeration
     plant, after TBT, bridge talkback (loudspeaker flooded
     through porous casting), took on 35,000 gallons fuel
     and 1,000 gallons lubricating oil.
1743 Underway, enroute patrol area.

9 May
0507 Submerged for trim dive.
0539 Surfaced.
1629 Submerged for trim dive fifty miles from Timor.
1732 Surfaced and commenced transit of barrier east of
     Timor.

10 May
0145 Cleared barrier and set course for Salier Strait.
     Crossed Soerabaja-Ambon and Koepang-Kaimana traffic
     routes during day. Plan to pass through Salier Strait
     submerged in hopes of contacting enemy traffic enroute
     to or from Makassar City.
2036 Sighted Batu Ata Island bearing 266°T distant 17
     miles.
2215 Sighted Siampu Island bearing 002°T distant 20
     miles.

11 May
0406 Made SJ radar contact on Salier Island bearing 252°T
     distant 20 miles.
0504 Submerged 17 miles southeast of Salier Strait and
     commenced transit.
1824 Surfaced 17 miles southwest of Salier Strait.
     Nothing sighted except small sailing craft during
     approach to, transit of and departure from Salier
     Strait. Set course to follow 100 fathom curve along
     southern tip of Celebes until about 2300.
2322 Set course to pass De Bril Island Light 10 miles
     abeam to starboard.

12 May
     Enroute northern approaches to Bali Strait in
     accordance with sealed instructions made effective
     last night by dispatch. Our mission to operate as
     support to a carrier task force strike on Soerabaja
     17 May by conducting an offensive reconnaissance
     patrol of the northern approaches to Bali Strait prior
     to zero hour, giving early information of any enemy
     movement south through this strait. At zero hour,
                               -3-

— page 130 —
dawn, 17 May, to be in Madoera Strait, Lat. 7°30' S,
Long. 113°27' E, to act as a life guard vessel for
any aviators forced down or shot down.

0338 Obtained radar fix on De Bril Light.
1503 Sighted Sekala Island bearing 280°T, distant 10
miles.
1505 Submerged to avoid sighting while closing Sekala
Island to radar range.
1855 Surfaced, obtained radar fix on Sekala Island
and set course to pass Sepanjang Island to star-
board, thence to Bali Strait.

13 May
0512 Submerged 20 miles northeast of Bali Strait and
commenced closing while identifying various mountain
peaks for navigational fixes.

13 May to 15 May
During daytime patrolled a north-south line five
miles from the Java coast and from five to ten
miles from the entrance to Bali Strait. At night
kept within 15,000 yards radar range of the coast
and strait. Small sailboats were in sight almost
continuously during the daylight hours and were
picked up by radar during darkness and avoided.
All were very small, the majority being nothing
more than outrigger canoes with sails.

16 May
1619 (SC #2) Sighted masts and stack of unidentified ves-
sel. Went to battle stations and commenced approach.
1630 Broke off approach. Target identified as trawler
type A/S vessel of about 500 tons or less. He had a
gun mounted forward (looked like a three inch but
probably smaller) and depth charges on his stern.
Due to proximity of beach and desire to remain
undetected did not attempt to engage him in surface
action.
1912 Surfaced and set course for life guard station
in Madoera Strait.

17 May
0009 - 0235 Contacted ten sailboats visually and by radar.
Avoided.
0415 On station.
0455 Submerged for trim dive.
0527 Surfaced and commenced lying to in awash condition
on station, keeping a close lookout particularly
in direction of Soerabaja.

-4-

— page 131 —
Decided to remain on the surface so that aviators
heading for our approximate spot would have a chance to
see us and land or crash close by. Believed that
Japanese aviators would be too busy with the striking
force to see us.

0800 Sighted low cloud of smoke rising through haze
     in the direction of Soerabaja.

0805 (AC #4) Sighted two formations of carrier planes
     which approached us from the direction of the smoke
     cloud and then headed in a general southerly direction.
     I could see at least six planes attacking one of the
     formations but there were probably more that I didn't
     see as the whole show was about 15 miles from us and
     rapidly disappearing.

0815 Heard voice calling "Help, help, help" on the air-
     craft frequency. I had been watching our planes
     closely for any sign of trouble but had seen none
     fall out of formation or head our way so had no idea
     where to look at this time.

0830 Received message from carrier informing me that
     there were three survivors in a rubber life boat in
     the harbor.

0853 Sent message to carrier requesting true bearing and
     distance of survivors from our station.

0900 Received message giving location of survivors in
     Soerabaja outer harbor. This message repeated several
     times.

0923 Amplifying message stated crew of VTB was attempting
     to get out of harbor in rubber boat.

0929 Their chances looked mighty slim. If the Japs
     didn't pick them up, the southeast wind would probably
     blow them in the direction of Madoera Island. Aside
     from the obvious impracticability of entering Soerabaja
     harbor in the daylight on the surface, shallow water
     would prevent approaching their position (Lat. 07°
     12.5'S, Long. 112° 50'E) any closer than 14 miles
     either on the surface or submerged. Decided my only
     course was to remain on station, keep a lookout for
     them and listen for any more distress calls or
     messages until at least the time limit of the operation
     order which was 1230.

     Sent message to carrier informing them that I could
     not penetrate the harbor but would watch for the men.

1002 Sighted masts of a trawler type vessel bearing
     270°T and headed in the direction of Soerabaja.

1005 Submerged to avoid detection. The smoke cloud in
     the meantime continued to rise and spread out over
     Soerabaja. A second smaller column of smoke had com-
     menced to rise to the right of the larger. Later in
     the day I measured the number of degrees the smoke

-5-

— page 132 —
cloud subtended in height and estimated that
it was about 20 miles wide and 4 miles high - 21
degrees high at about 40 miles.

1155 A/S vessel clear, surfaced and commenced lying
to with decks awash. Many sailboats in sight, none
closer than five miles. For a while I entertained
the idea of pulling alongside one of the sailboats
in an attempt to get them to sail into harbor and
look for the aviators. However, memory of my previous
unsuccessful experience in attempting to talk to two
Javanese prisoners (PUFFER second war patrol), one
of whom had gone to Dutch schools and could read and
write, made me decide to give it up as not worthy
enough of success to warrant the chance of detection.
I could vision confused Javanese sailing into Soerabaja
and picking up some Japs to come out and find out what
we wanted.

1245 Received coded message giving us the further
information that the aviators might have taken over
a native sailboat to get out. If this were true and
they sailed towards Zwaantjes Reef Light, this being
the best landmark in line with our position, I
figured they could be in that vicinity about 1800
with the fresh southeasterly wind blowing.

1309 Submerged and commenced heading toward above light.

1330 Burned secret letter concerning task force operation.

1944 Surfaced about eight miles west of our assigned
point and commenced patrolling east-west line.

2035 Decided to put up a visual signal which would
direct aviators to us if they were in vicinity. Took
the light diffuser off the Aldis lamp and spotted
the beam straight up in the air for five seconds.

2037 Sighted a white light in toward beach on bearing
190°T which seemed to flash twice. Headed in this
direction at 10 knots.

2125 No contact and no further sign of light so reversed
course and returned to station. Commenced patrolling
east and west line extended five miles west of our
station. Had decided on questioning lookout who
saw the light that it was high on the beach. It
would have been difficult if not impossible for the
survivors to reach any such location at this time.

Decided to approach all sailboats encountered during
night and signal them with red light attachment for
binoculars.

18 May
0010 - 0040 Sighted anti-aircraft fire, tracers, search-
lights and flash of explosions in direction of
Soerabaja. Assumed our land based bombers were
attacking as it looked too real for a drill.

-6-

— page 133 —
0227 Sighted more AA fire, tracers, searchlights and
explosions in direction Soerabaja.

Up until this time we had contacted four sailboats,
approached to within 400 to 600 yards of them, and
sent series of "V's". None made any response or any
attempt to close us. I knew from a previous test
conducted with the RAY that this light can be seen
and read at 2500 yards. The following radar contact
and subsequent attack prevented our continuing to
search any longer for these survivors. Felt bad
about not finding them as I can well imagine their
disappointment if they worked their way out to our
vicinity the next day and found us gone.

0430 (SC #3) In Madura Strait, Lat. 07° 30' S, Long.
113° 25' E, SJ radar contact bearing 153°T, range
14,250 yards. Pip one inch high indicated large target
which would have been picked up at anywhere from 20,000
to 25,000 yards except for the fact that the SJ was
tuned to a close sweep due to the presence of many
small sailboats. Put four main engines on propulsion
and commenced tracking. Target on course about 270°T,
speed 10, close to Java beach.

0505 Had reached a position 70° on the target's starboard
bow on parallel course, range 12,000 yards. Visibility
conditions were not good for a surface attack as the
night was clear, a bright quarter moon was rising in
the east and the first gray streaks of dawn were show-
ing.

On the other hand navigational hazards prevented
getting ahead for a submerged attack. We were in 31
fathoms of water, the target in 12, Eendrachts Rk. a
3/4 fathom spot, was 20 degrees on the starboard bow
distant 14,000 yards and in the next seven miles on our
westerly course the water shoaled off to 18 fathoms.
Beyond this there were 13 more miles of 18 fathom
water before reaching the 3/4 fathom water of Soerabaja
outer harbor. In addition I wasn't too sure he wasn't
following a swept channel or about to enter one.

In view of the above decided this would be our only
chance to attack and that the very good possibility
of his sighting us and turning away would have to be
accepted.

Started in at full speed aiming for a 115° starboard
track at 3,000 yards range, using TBT bearings and
radar ranges.

0506 Slowed to 10 knots to make ready tubes #1,#2,#3 and
#4.

0510 Tubes ready, resumed full speed, 17.5 knots.

0513 (SC #4) Sighted escort on starboard quarter of target,
range 5,200 yards. Made ready remainder of tubes,
depth setting four feet.

-7-

— page 134 —
0514 (SC #5) Sighted sailboat coming down starboard side of
target. He gave us a nice break for when the range to
the escort had closed to 2,500 yards, he passed between
us. The escort swung around and headed for him either
to avoid collision or to investigate him. I think he
may have sighted both of us about the same time and
picked the wrong customer. He was a trawler type
patrol boat. Why he hadn't seen us sooner I don't know
for we could see him very clearly. He drew aft rapidly.
During this period kept radar on escort and TDC on
target.

0520 Had quite a thrill for a few minutes here as both
the officer-of-the-deck and I decided without doubt
that our target was a flat top. He certainly looked like
it at this range - about 7,000 yards. (SC #6) At this
time sighted another and larger escort ahead of target
slightly on starboard bow.

0524 Range 4,000 yards, target subtended about one-third
of the field of my binoculars, two and one-half degrees,
giving him a length of about 500 feet disregarding
angle on the bow. It was apparent now that he was
an AP or AK with a single stack, well deck fore and
aft, composite superstructure and riding high in the water
- could see his counter stern. His amidships superstruc-
ture being about the same height as his bow and stern
had given us the impression of a continuous flat top
at a distance. Could not make out his masts at any
time.

0525 Slowed to 12 knots and came right 15° for small gyro
angle.

0527 In position, Lat. 07° 36.2' S, Long. 113° 12.5' E,
target course 280°T, speed 10, angle on the 115° star-
board, torpedo track 135° starboard, range 2,450 yards.

0527-00 Fired #1.
0527-13 Fired #2.
0527-25 Fired #3.
0527-39 Fired #4.

0528 Came left with full rudder and went ahead flank.

0529-11 Heard and saw one explosion forward of bridge which
sent up huge black column of smoke.

0529-22 Heard and saw second explosion on stern of target -
another column of black smoke.

0529-25 Heard and saw third explosion on target's stern
which was a brilliant yellowish orange color. This
was not a torpedo but either a depth charge on his
stern or an internal explosion.

About a minute later his stern disappeared and the
bow and rest of the ship seemed to be at an up angle
of about 30°. About another minute later I could see

-8-

— page 135 —
nothing but black smoke where he had been and radar
could no longer get a pip on him. I believe he sank
in about two minutes. Radar lost his pip at 5,000
yards whereas it had previously had contact during
tracking at over 16,000 yards.

From my observations the closest identification
I can make is the ZUIYO MARU class, 7,360 tons, page
126, ONI 208 J (revised). This ship is listed under
"potential naval value" as an AO with an oil carry-
ing capacity of 73,000 barrels, so he may have been
an empty stack amidships, tanker coming into Soerabaja
to load. He was riding high in the water. My length
estimate was verified by the officer-of-the-deck who
was on the target continuously with the TBT. When
the target filled half the field of his glasses the
range was 3,000 yards, giving a length of some 550
feet. Other observations were verified by the officer-
of-the-deck, quartermaster and one lookout who was
assigned to the target.

There are a number of ships 450 to 500 feet long,
6,000 to 7,000 gross tons in ONI 208 J who fill this
general description. Had I been able to determine his
mast sequence I could be more positive of the identi-
fication. I have no doubt that salvage operations
will be commenced very shortly since he sank in about
12 fathoms of water and was only a mile from the 10
fathom curve.

0533 Had come to course 082°T to put escorts astern and
     head out of Madoera Strait - 70 miles to go. Radar
     had two targets; smaller escort on port quarter who
     was dropping back rapidly and the larger escort dead
     astern who was dropping back very slowly - range
     5,000 yards.

Radar lost the small escort at 5,300 yards and one
lookout saw him heading in the direction of the target'
smoke. The escort astern slowly opened out to 5,530
yards and then his range commenced to remain constant.
I still couldn't tell what he was other than that he
had the general appearance of a small man-of-war.
Radar pip indicated that he was smaller than a
destroyer - probably a minelayer.

I had hoped to get out of sight before he found out
which direction I was going but it was too light and
too obvious to him that an easterly course was our
only way out.

0543 Range still 5,530 yards. Could see him quite
     plainly now and from the smoke he was putting out he
     appeared to be making about 130% MEP. We weren't mak-
     ing anything under 100% ourselves.

I decided here that the expenditure of a few
torpedoes was warranted in an attempt to scare him
off our track as I still had 20 miles to run to get into
35 fathom water and expected eventually to be forced
down by planes.

-9-

— page 136 —
Made ready tubes #9 and #10 for long range shots with
a four foot depth setting.
0545-15 Fired #9.
0545-35 Fired #10.
0553 Range opened to 5,560 indicating he might have
altered course slightly for these two torpedoes
although it was not apparent visually.
0555 Manned SD radar, rigged ship for depth charge
attack and commenced reload of tubes #9 and #10 with
Mk 18 torpedoes; bow tubes had been reloaded previ-
ously.
0609 Sun rose.
0625 Range still 5,560. All ballast tanks had been given
an extra blow, safety and negative were blown dry, we were
making 272 RPM's on the shafts and the pitometer log
was clocking 18.5 knots.
A four inch gun aft would have pulled us out
of this spot very nicely. Considering the number of
experiences our submarines have had in not being able
to outrun this very common type of escort and patrol
boat, I believe serious consideration should be
given to mounting four inch guns both fore and aft
if they can be obtained. Two ready lockers on deck
aft of the conning tower holding twelve rounds apiece
should furnish sufficient ammunition to discourage
this kind of a chaser.
0626 Fired #7 tube at him (high power) after carefully
feeding continuous periscope bearings and radar
ranges into the TDC for about three minutes. The
torpedo was observed from the bridge and through
periscope to run hot, straight and normal down the
port side of the target about 300 yards off his
track. After a run of about 3,000 yards the torpedo
broached and continued the rest of the run on the
surface. Target turned slightly to starboard and the
range opened to 5610 yards.
0631-00 Fired #8 tube. Target had a slight port angle on
the bow. Torpedo was observed to run hot, straight
and normal on an apparent collision course with the
minelayer and smoking heavily. This one nearly got
him. About the time he spotted it and turned slightly
to port to let it run down his starboard side, the
torpedo broached, made a 90° right turn and came in
on him for a 90° starboard track. The Nip swung hard
left, was heeling hard over and presenting an 80°
starboard angle on the bow when the torpedo again
broached, turned hard left and headed for him again at
an estimated range of 300-500 yards. It eventually
passed fairly close astern of him on its original
course. I would not be surprised if this skipper
turned in a report on a new type American acoustic
torpedo when he got through talking to himself.
-10-

— page 137 —
0632 Range 6,010 yards and he was headed back at
again. However, we had gained 400 yards. Although
I didn't think of it at the time, if I had it to
over again I believe I would fire a salvo of two
circular runs - one set to circle to the right and
one to the left. I think this would worry him more
and give better results per torpedo expended.

When he swung hard over to avoid the torpedo, could
see that his high forecastle deck was painted orange an
the rest of his hull a dirty brown color. He may have
been partially through a navy yard overhaul when called
out for duty. This silhouette view identified him as
a coastal minelayer of the CMc 13-31 class similar in
appearance to the NATSU SHIMA class with a deep well
just forward of his bridge.

0635 (AC #5) I was beginning to think we were actually
going to be able to pull clear on the surface when we
sighted a "RUFE" 10° on the starboard bow, distant
about 11 miles, elevation 2,000 feet and crossing from
starboard to port on a northerly course. Radar
reported contact at 10 miles as we watched him slowly
crossing the bow hoping he would continue on his way.

0640 He turned toward us and, when the range had closed to
eight miles, I submerged and came hard left for a 90°
port track on the escort. Made ready tube #9, only,
as difficulty had been experienced reloading the Mk
18's and this was the only tube reloaded.

0648 Lat. 07° 31' S. Long. 113° 40' E. TDC set-up check-
ing, angle on the bow 60° port, torpedo track 90° port,
range 1,950 yards, torpedo run 1,600 yards, target
speed 18.2 knots, depth setting four feet, fired #9.
Sound heard torpedo running hot, straight, and normal.

0648-30 Heard first explosion and looked. There was a
large column of water between us and the stern of the
target which may have been either a premature or an air-
craft bomb. I am inclined to believe it was a bomb
as the explosion had a sharper sound than a torpedo
explosion. It was considerably closer to him than to
me and as we started down he was swinging right. I
believe the torpedo missed either due to passing under
him, because the final check bearing had not quite been
cranked into the TDC when we fired, or because it
prematured.

0649 - 0651 Seven more bombs and depth charges were dropped -
none close. Went to 200 feet (bottom at 250 feet),
rigged for silent running and set course 080°T at two-
thirds speed, four knots.

0659 Target made a good echo ranging run up our port side
and across our bow but dropped no depth charges although
he was very close. From here on he never got close
again. We were able to keep him astern with slight
changes of course on the base course of 080°T as his

-11-

— page 138 —
pinging gradually got further away. We had a sharp
thermocline at 180 feet which was probably helping us.
1205 Came to periscope depth. Nothing in sight.
2007 Surfaced and set course 090°T heading for new patrol
station in northern Makassar Strait and Celebes Sea
in accordance with dispatch orders received earlier in
the day.

19 May
0045 Changed course to 135°T while sending dispatch
concerning failure to find downed aviators and sinking
of ship in Madoera Strait.

0125 Radar operator noted interference from another
radar which was typical of our submarine SJ radars.
We were now on course 020°T heading toward the southern
approach to Makassar Strait.

0206 Radar interference closer and on starboard beam.
Believed it to be RATON who was about due to have passed
through Lombok Strait and be heading for the Java Sea.

0355 (SC #7) Radar contact 120°T, range 6,000 yards.
This was in direction of previously noted radar inter-
ference. Turned away and slowed to check his actions.
He apparently had made contact about the same time and
turned away, for the range opened rapidly.

0400 Lost contact. Resumed base course.

0426 Contact again at 050°T, range 6,300 yards. This time
maintained course and speed (17 knots). Contact
remained on steady bearing long enough to track him
and then commenced to drop back. Decided he wanted
to drop aft to pass across our stern so held course.
I was going to have a chance to see him first as he was
going to be silhouetted on the clear eastern horizon
at daybreak.

0530 Sighted Sekala Island bearing 325°T at about 12 miles.

0535 Sighted submarine bearing about 120°T. Recognized
it as one of ours so sent recognition signal twice.
No answer.

0545 Sighted object bearing 250°T. Assigned lookout to
watch submarine while attempting to identify new contact.

0549 Other submarine submerged.

0550 Having been unable to recognize the new target and
not being absolutely positive the other submarine
was friendly, I submerged.

0610 Recognized new target as a small sailboat. Decided
to surface and pull clear. Submarine's refusal to
answer the recognition signal was probably due to the
fact that the sailboat, which he had probably not
identified either, would have seen his answer.

-12-

— page 139 —
0627 Surfaced and zigzagged off at full speed.
0748 Submerged for rest of day.
1708 Surfaced, proceeding toward Makassar Strait. Re-
ceived dispatch orders to conduct offensive reconnais-
sance patrol off southeastern approaches to Tawi Tawi
Bay commencing night of 21 May. Task force consisting
of three battleships, three heavy cruisers, one light
cruiser, destroyers and possibly carrier anchored
there.
20 May
0612 Submerged 30 miles southwest of Cape Mandar. In
order to reach my new station on time I either had
to run through the bottleneck off Cape William in
the daytime on the surface or through the northern
entrance to Makassar Strait itself. Decided on the
latter. Sighted five sailboats during the day.
1836 Surfaced and set course for Makassar Strait at full
speed.
2051 SJ contact 312°T, 3,200 yards. Not sighted but
probably sailboat. Avoided.
2244 SJ contact 030°T, 3,650 yards. Avoided. Lost
contact at 5,100 yards. Could have been a small
patrol boat as the radar pip was slightly larger than
the previous contact. Did not investigate either of
these contacts as they were obviously small and valuabl
time would be lost.
21 May
0224 Submerged to flush out #4 fuel ballast tank which
had gone dry. Stayed down in order to work on SJ
radar which had suddenly failed.
0340 Surfaced. SJ still out of commission. Repaired
during day.
0951 Crossed equator at Long.119° 01' E.
1228 When half way between Cape Mangkalibat and North
Watcher Island sighted a small boat through the perisco
which looked as if it might be a power driven patrol
boat.
1230 Submerged to avoid being seen and identify boat.
1314 Could not see it yet so surfaced. Through the
periscope on the surface it was now identified as a
sailboat.
1400 Completed passage of Makassar Strait heading for
Tawi Tawi Bay at 17 knots.
22 May
0347 Visibility very poor. Reversed course as Bongao
Peak had not been sighted and position was doubtful.
Slowed to three knots.
-13-

— page 140 —
0401 Reversed course to north.
0511 Submerged to commence approach to Manuk Manka
         Island south of Tawi Tawi Bay.
0545 Sighted Bongao Peak bearing 355⁰T, distant 30 miles.
         Set course for point three miles southeast of Manuk Manka
         Island to have a look into Tawi Tawi bay.
0640 (AC #6) Sighted Type "JAKE" twin float observa-
         tion plane bearing 270⁰T on easterly heading.
0904 (AC #7) Sighted about 70 fighter planes in the general
         direction of 102⁰T flying at various altitudes on
         various courses.
0912 Sound picked up fast screws bearing 070⁰T. Ship
         contacts #8, #9, #10, #11 and #12, occurring from
         this time until 0955 were respectively destroyer,
         aircraft carrier, aircraft carrier, destroyer, and
         destroyer. The bearing of the screws was drawing
         quite rapidly to the northward. I could not see any-
         thing but aircraft, until at
0925 Sighted destroyer on true bearing 043⁰, range 7,000
         yards, angle on the bow about 60⁰ port. A minute or
         so later the long, low flat top of a carrier showed up
         astern of the destroyer and on the same course.

         The sea was glassy calm, the sky clear and visibility
         excellent. Went to 90 feet and commenced an approach
         at full speed on the normal approach course hoping for a
         zig toward us. While slowing to take a look sound re-
         ported more fast screws on the starboard quarter. I
         chose to ignore these for the present to concentrate
         on closing the carrier whose angle on the bow was now
         90⁰ port. Went deep and went ahead full again. On
         the next look the carrier was practically out of sight so
         took a look on our starboard quarter. What I had taken
         for granted as another destroyer escort turned out
         to be another carrier and two destroyers, angle on the
         bow about 10⁰ starboard, range about 3,000 yards, one
         destroyer ahead on the starboard bow and one trailing
         astern slightly on the port quarter. By the time I ducked
         the periscope, got a set up on the TDC and put the peris-
         cope back up, the first destroyer and carrier were past.
         By the time I changed the depth setting on the stern
         tubes from 10 to 6 feet, the last destroyer was past.
         The carrier passed 500 yards or less astern and the
         leading destroyer must have passed right over our stern.
         The general effect was similar to the dazzling speed
         with which the participants in a Walt Disney comedy sizzle
         past and disappear in a cloud of vapor.

         The other carrier had now reversed course and, as
         I started another approach on her, I suddenly realized
         that I would get nowhere chasing them frantically and
         that I might as well sit tight, watch closely, and
         await my best opportunity. This I did, taking a course
         that would put us approximately between them. Carrier #1

-14-

— page 141 —
looked similar to the identification picture of the
HOSHO or HITAKA. Although I know the AKAGI was sunk
at Midway, Carrier #2 was much more similar to the
RYUJO or KAGA than any other carrier pictures we have
aboard. The three outstanding features of this
carrier that stick in my mind are (1) mass of framework
forward supporting the flight deck (this immediately
brought to mind the squib in ONI 41 (Nip Notes) which
says concerning carriers "And bow or stern approach to
some, suggests a Nagasaki slum" - that was the general
idea); (2) the flight deck extended practically all
the way to the bow; (3) I did not see any superstruc-
ture, so any there was must have been small or easily
removable for aircraft operations.

Both carriers were discharging their planes.

1013 The smoke from Carrier #2 commenced to hold a steady
bearing so assumed he was heading toward or away from
us - none of the three ships of this group were in
sight.

1015 Could definitely see leading destroyer and carrier
with small port angle on the bow. Took normal course.

1024 Range 2,700 yards, angle on the bow 30° port.

1024-30 Range 2,300 yards, angle on the bow 33° port.

With the carrier on course 060°, speed 20 and
torpedo run about 1,400 yards commenced firing.

1025-20 Fired #1.

1025-30 Fired #2.

Firing bearings were way ahead of TDC bearings so
speeded target up to 25 knots and cranked the range in
to 1,000 yards.

1025-39 Fired #3.

1025-48 Fired #4.

Bearings still not checking. Zigged target left to
040° and decreased range to 600 yards - he looked
that close.

1025-57 Fired #5.

1026-05 Fired #6.

The bearings were checking on the last two shots.
The actual set up at firing by later plot was
target speed 30 knots, angle on the bow 108° port,
torpedo track 137° port, range 660 yards, and torpedo ru
800 yards. My error was in the ranges. I used 50
feet from the flight deck to the water line, whereas
40 was probably more nearly correct. Also, I don't
think I was seeing all the way down to the water line
until we fired and at that time I was giving bearings
only.

-15-

— page 142 —
I should have used considerably more spread than
I did. It just didn't look possible to miss with any of
the torpedoes at that range, however, and I tried for
a kill. I spread with the periscope starting just inside
his bow and spreading the six along his entire length.
Only fast and cool headed work on the part of Lieutenant
William M. Pugh, II, USN, on the TDC got us a possible
hit with the fifth torpedo.

Immediately after firing #6 took a quick look for
the trailing escort. He was about 2,500 yards on
our starboard beam, zero angle on the bow. We had
come up to 63 feet on firing so he undoubtedly had
us spotted. Flooded negative and started deep.

1026-43 Heard one explosion. A later plot of the correct
time of torpedo run indicated that
#6 could have hit on a 175° track but no explosion was
heard. I would classify the hit by #5 torpedo as
"probable". The explosion was heard throughout the
ship except for the Conning Tower and Control Room. The
only person in either of those places who heard the hit
was an officer whose sole duty was the recording
of the times of all explosions heard. Since this explosion
occurred while negative tank was being vented, it is
probable that the noise of the venting air drowned
out the noise of the explosion for all others. The
times of the hit as recorded in the Control Room, Forward
Torpedo Room and After Torpedo Room all checked.

This was most disappointing as he looked so close
that it seemed the torpedoes had to hit. There is
the possibility, of course, that he was in too close
for the first torpedoes to arm.

1028-35 Close depth charge just after destroyer screws
passed over us and we were passing 100 feet. Shook some
cork loose, knocked the rudder angle indicator out
of commission and apparently lifted the hull supply
and main induction valves off their seats enough to
partially flood them for we started getting salt water
down the drains at that time. This was the only close
depth charge.

It is possible this was an aircraft bomb. One of the
amazing things to me about this whole action was that
we were able to remain in the vicinity of the carriers
from 0912 until 1025 without having a plane sight us.
Every time I put the periscope up there were five or six
planes visible close aboard — some passed low overhead
flying toward the periscope and others came up from behind
gaining altitude as they passed overhead. They
appeared to all be forming up subsequent to taking off
and were probably too busy to look for subs. There was
only one plane on deck of the carrier we fired at and
he was in a take off position. I could see the plane
handling crew well enough to see them start pointing at

-16-

— page 143 —
the torpedo tracks after about three torpedoes had been
fired.
1030-40 to 1032-05 Ten depth charges.
1032-05 to 1034-52 Four depth charges.
1039-50 to 1039-15 Four depth charges.
1053-17 One depth charge. This ended the depth charging but
it was only the beginning of the hunting.

1054 - 2305 Five destroyers conducted a systematic search.
Lost them twice during the afternoon when they got
too close by using evasion tactics which the Command-
ing Officer of the Dutch destroyer "J.R.K. HEDES had
previously recommended as being no t confusing to an
echo ranging search group. These tactics will be
discussed under "Evasion Tactics" in case they may
be of value to anyone else. I, for one, am sold on
them.

Tried to get up three different times but was picked
up each time by a listener who apparently pulled the
whole pack over again. I really didn't have much hope
of getting up until the next night.

About 2200 located the current listener on our port
bow and believe I threw him off the scent with a
complete 360° turn. Don't understand why they didn't
use more depth charges unless they are short — they
were close enough several times. I feel that they
knew when they were close to us for they would send
double pings to check their echoes and tune their
drivers a kilometer or so each side of 17.2 kcs.

2305 Surfaced with SJ radar out of commission and commenced
pulling clear.
2325 SJ radar back in commission, no contacts.

23 May
0524 Submerged for all day dive about 50 miles southeast
of Tawi Tawi Bay. Repaired rudder angle indicator
and dried out motor of MK 18 torpedo which had flooded.
Heard eight distant depth charges during the day.
1815 Surfaced and headed for chain of islands along
southern side of Tawi Tawi Bay in order to obtain a good
fix and get into position for a look inside the bay
early in the morning.

24 May
0025 SJ contact bearing 279°T, range 11,500 yards. This
target was lost almost immediately and could not be
located again.
0102 Sighted land bearing 335°T and commenced closing
slowly at five knots.
0141 Sighted more land about 000°T.

-17-

— page 144 —
0155 (SC #13 & #14) Sighted a destroyer at 006°T and
  another at 306°T but took them to be respectively a
  hill and a peak that we were looking for.
  For the next 25 minutes the Navigator and I struggled
  fruitlessly with the problem of making them out in.
0220 Sound picked up screws bearing 005°T — our hill was
  underway.
0225 SJ radar contact at 020°T, range 8,200 yards,
  closing. Went to battle stations while attempting
  to pull away and track. He passed astern and up our port
  quarter at a closest range of 6,800 yards. I might have
  attempted an attack had I not been so completely
  surprised.
0234 Got a good look at target in a flash of light-
  ning and identified him as a destroyer.

0240 Lost target by sight and radar.
0252 Located destroyer again when he fired a green rocket
  or very pistol. This was immediately answered by
  the other destroyer who was broad on our starboard
  bow bearing 290°T. Changed course to 200°T. This put
  one on our starboard beam and one on our port bow.
  It looked very much as if they had us pretty well
  located although I am quite sure they were not using
  radar. When the one got in as close as 6,800 yards he
  should have closed us quickly if he had radar whereas we
  were able to draw away from him by changing course
  away, while tracking him at 22 knots on course
  180°T. Believe they were using sound gear only plus
  sighting us occasionally.
0305 Headed back northward toward low islands and reefs
  on course 020°T. Did not like to do this as our DR
  position showed us to be only 10 miles out but it
  seemed to be the only way to lose them at this point.
  Gradually worked to the eastward and lost sight of the
  last target at 0340 in rain squall.

  While evading these destroyers received dispatch to pro-
  ceed through Sibutu Passage this night (24th) and commence
  a patrol in Area 304.
0455 Submerged and headed for southeastern approach to
  Tawi Tawi Bay. Our position was still in doubt as a
  heavily overcast sky and rain squalls prevented
  obtaining a star fix prior to diving.
  When we finally got a cut on the mountains of Tawi
  Tawi we had been set considerably to the south and
  west and were too far away to close the bay for a look
  inside.
0556 Sound picked up screws bearing 199°T close aboard and
  closing. No sign of a ship could be seen through
  the periscope. Turned to put these screws astern
  and they speeded up to 180 RPM's and finally died out.

-18-

— page 145 —
I suspect that this may have been the BLUEFISH
approaching the station as he was to relieve me that
night.

0708 Distant depth charge.
0758 (AC #8) Sighted floatplane, Type "PETE".
0817 (AC #9) Sighted aircraft, Type "KATE".
0937 (AC #10) Sighted aircraft, Type "PETE".
1416 (AC #11) Sighted aircraft, Type "JAKE". This one
circled around us twice.

Heard total of five distant depth charges during
the day.

1915 Surfaced and set course for position off southern
approach to Alice Channel. I decided not to attempt
passage of Sibutu Passage this night for the following
reasons:
(1) Destroyer patrols were obviously active at the
southern approach and depth charging had been
going on intermittently for two days. This indi-
cated to me that either they thought they still
had me down or someone else was being depth charged
in that vicinity.
(2) From our present position we did not have time
enough to approach the passage from a safe course,
get a fix and proceed through before daylight.
Sent message to Comtaskfor 71 informing him that
I was delaying passage and giving amplifying informa-
tion about the two carriers as requested.

25 May
0705 Sighted Sipadan Island bearing 356°T.
0840 Submerged for patrol close to Mabul Channel to
intercept any shipping running south to Tarakan via
Darvel Bay and Mabul Channel.
Two sailboats only sighted during day.

1845 Surfaced and set course for a point 10 miles south
of Sibutu Island to commence transit of Sibutu Passage
from the southwest.
2322 Obtained fix on Sibutu Hill and Bongao Peak.
2335 Commenced transit of Sibutu Passage to pass at a
minimum range of five miles from the east coast of
Sibutu Island, speed 18 knots.

26 May
0232 Completed transit and cleared Normanby Bank north
of Sibutu Passage. Set course for Dulunguin Point, Min-
danao, about 50 miles north of Basilan Strait, in Area
304.
During the transit patrol craft and destroyers
were conspicuous by their absence. I cannot understand

-19-

— page 146 —
why, with a large task force anchored in Tawi Tawi Bay,
the Japanese feel that they can afford to leave Sibutu
Passage so poorly patrolled. Even two destroyers
working across that 20 mile stretch of water would
go a long way toward blocking it. They had the
destroyers present and are reputed to have a number of
small patrol craft operating out of Tawi Tawi. Maybe
they don't want to use the fuel.

If their battleships have any radar equipment at all
comparable to ours they could train it across the passage,
pick up any ship attempting to make the transit, and send
out an attacking force. Therefore, I assume that
their radar equipment has still not caught up with ours.

I feel sure that if we had a similar task force
in Tawi Tawi Bay that no ship of any size or des-
cription would get through the passage without our
at least knowing it was there and an attack being
made upon it.

0306 (AC #12) Sighted aircraft, Type "SALLY", bearing
115°T, range eight miles; submerged.
1221 Surfaced.
1240 (AC #13) Sighted aircraft eight miles, Type "PETE";
submerged.
1305 Surfaced, resumed course toward Mindanao.
2310 SJ radar contact on land.

27 May
0002 Commenced north-south patrol at five knots, five
miles off Dulunguin Point, Mindanao.
0300 Received dispatch orders to conduct offensive
reconnaissance patrol off northern approaches to Sibutu
Passage.
0301 Went ahead full speed on four main engines head-
ing for passage between Pearl Bank and Doc Can Island
to re-enter Sibutu Passage.
2100 Slowed to 10 knots and commenced approaching Doc
Can Island on course 180°.
2109 Slowed to five knots as low haze had settled all
around the horizon making visibility very poor.
2156 When six miles from Doc Can Island by dead reckoning
reversed course as we had neither sighted any land nor
been able to pick up any by radar. Although we had
obtained a good evening star fix I did not consider
it safe to approach the passage without definitely locat-
ing and identifying either Pearl Bank or Doc Can Island.
Currents in this vicinity are strong, variable and
unpredictable. As Navigator of the PIKE in 1941 I
operated out of Tawi Tawi Bay for a period of about six
weeks and gained an exceedingly healthy respect for
the navigational hazards in this area. On the second

-20-

— page 147 —
war patrol of this vessel I made the southern passage
east of Pearl Bank at night without difficulty but
visibility conditions were such that we were able to
keep out in at all times and run close enough to the
chain of islands to maintain radar contact at about five
miles.

2200 Commenced patroling on northerly and southerly
     courses staying at what I estimated was a safe dis-
     tance to allow for any current. Flooded down so that
     in case of grounding at slow speed we could blow up
     and back off. The next day showed that we had
     been between ten and fifteen miles from the passage
     and probably within radar range of any large man-of-war
     making a sortie.

28 May
0513 Submerged and took course to commence closing Doc
     Can Island. Morning star fix unreliable due to surface
     haze.

1457 As no land had been sighted decided to surface
     and attempt to locate land with periscope. Surfaced.

1500 Sighted island and commenced attempting to identify
     it. Fair cuts on tangents seemed to identify it as Lap-
     aran Island but still unquestionable.

1719 (AC #14) Sighted "P" bearing 211°T, distant about
     seven miles on course about 270°T. Submerged.

1836 Surfaced for star fix. Fix showed us to have been
     set considerably to the westward. Island identified
     as Laparan is actually an island silhouette formed
     by mangrove trees growing on Pearl Bank.

     While surfaced earlier received a dispatch which,
     according to one interpretation of it, indicated
     that I should head for Basilan Strait at high speed. I
     knew that the Force Commander did not know exactly
     where I was. Also knew that if I sent a dispatch and
     waited for a reply it would be too late for the trip
     to be effective. Decided to head immediately for Basi-
     lan Strait and inform Force Commander of my decision,
     requesting confirmation of the correctness of the action.

2255 Received answer telling me to patrol northern
     approaches to Sibutu in accordance with previous
     dispatch orders. Headed at full speed for Pangutaran
     Island to obtain fix and proceed once more toward
     passage east of Pearl Bank.

29 May
0330 Definitely located and identified Pangutaran Island
     by tracing out contour with SJ radar. Set course at
     full speed for vicinity of Laparan Island. It was
     necessary not to spend another day submerged north of
     Pearl Bank Passage since it was too late to get
     through before daylight and a strong northerly current

-21-

— page 148 —
and tide rips make it impracticable to go through
submerged.
0516    Submerged. Laparen Island in sight for naviga-
        tional fixes.
1542    Heard screws on sound gear in direction of Doc Can
        Island. Nothing came out of passage — possibly a
        petrol inside.
1917    Surfaced with good fix and commenced approaching
        Pearl Bank Passage.
2356    Completed passage and headed for point at Lat.
        5° 11' N, Long. 119° 36' E, to commence patrol of
        northern approach to Sibutu Passage.

30 May
0455    Submerged for all day patrol on station.
0650    (SC #15) Sighted smoke in the direction of
        Sanga Sanga Island.
0655    (SC #16) Sighted smoke and mast of another ship
        about two miles astern of the first. Went to
        battle stations and commenced closing.
0708    Masts of both indicated an angle on the bow of
        about 80° starboard. They appeared to run on a south-
        westerly course along the coast of Sanga Sanga Island
        and then gradually turn right and head across the
        northern part of Sibutu Passage toward Sibutu Island.
        These ships looked peculiar from the start.
        Each had two high masts and a stack amidships that
        was almost as high as the masts. both put out dark
        black smoke continuously.
        At a range of about 10,000 yards could see that
        they were quite small. They appeared to be tramp
        steamers of about a thousand tons. Decided not to
        attack. Secured from battle stations.
0812    (SC #17) Sighted single mast of a small patrol type
        trawler well astern of the first two ships.
0900    Lost sight of all ships on bearing 235°T.
1605    (AC #15) Sighted "RUF" type float plane headed in
        direction of Tawi Tawi Bay.
        The water in here was glassy calm necessitating
        the utmost care in the use of the periscope to avoid
        being sighted by the patrol planes. A steady
        northerly current varying from 1.5 to 2.5 knots
        required two-thirds speed between periscope observ-
        ations to maintain position.
1701    Sighted a puff of smoke which apparently came from
        inside Tawi Tawi Bay.
1932    Surfaced, continuing patrol.

-2-

— page 149 —
31 May
0450 Submerged on station.
1201 (AC #16) Sighted four seaplanes, type "PETE", fly-
    ing formation in sections of two and two unidentified
    carrier planes.
1203 Heard three distant underwater explosions which
    sounded like depth charges or aerial bombs.
        (AC #17) From this time until 1600 planes were
    sighted continuously, the sightings following a
    fairly definite pattern and sequence of events.

        First, four to six float planes, Type "PETE" would
    be sighted in the vicinity of Loncao Peak flying in
    sections of two and apparently conducting an A/S search
    south and southeast of Tawi Tawi Bay over Cibutu
    Passage and the south and southeastern approaches
    to the bay. Shortly thereafter carrier aircraft
    would commence to show up in groups of two and three,
    four, then six and so on until what looked like a
    complete wing of carrier aircraft of about 40 planes had
    formed up. These planes climbed to a fairly high alti-
    tude, about 3,000 feet, flew in a large circle and
    slowly faded from sight at their true bearing due
    south. In each case at the time of first sighting
    carrier aircraft, puffs of smoke were observed in Tawi
    Tawi Bay.

        I thought the first group looked suspiciously as
    if they were flying lower as they disappeared so I
    made a very careful check on the second group. This
    group definitely came to a lower altitude as they were
    disappearing on a southerly bearing. I could just
    barely see one group of about six planes flying in
    what looked like a carrier landing circle. Three of
    these planes I saw fly lower and lower until they
    disappeared in the haze just above the surface of the
    water.

        The only plane which came near us was a single
    "JAKE" (AC #18) which banked and headed directly at
    us from a range of about five miles at 1325. Went to
    100 feet for 15 minutes.

        My interpretation of the above events was as
    follows:
    (1) Cruiser observation planes conducting an A/S search
        prior to the cruisers' sortie as escorts for a
        carrier.
    (2) Carrier steaming at high speed inside the bay while
        its planes took off.
    (3) Planes landing back on carrier after successful
        sortie through channel east of Siminul Island.

        All told, allowing for a certain number of duplicate
    sightings, I estimate that there were somewhere over a
    hundred aircraft involved. Our log actually shows a total
    of 151 planes that I counted but I am sure that some of
    these were duplications while they were forming
                                -23-

— page 150 —
up. This could be offset by the fact that I was
observing them at a distance and there may have
been many that never came into my range of vision
at all.

1720 (AC #19) Single "RUFE" at six miles.
1929 Surfaced and pulled clear to the northward to
send message concerning air activity. My esti-
mate was a sortie of at least three carriers with
accompanying cruiser escorts.

1 June
0526 Submerged for all day patrol.
1821 Surfaced. No activity seen during day.

2 June
0440 Submerged for all day patrol.
0731 Sighted small schooner with sails down bearing
321°T, distant about four miles headed north.
0820 Lost sight of schooner.
0850 (AC #20) Sighted "RUFE" at 15 miles bearing 270°T.
0907 Sighted wide black column of smoke rising from
direction of Sibutu Island - appeared to be on it.
This smoke was in sight all morning finally dis-
appearing about 1217. Looked very much like smoke
from a large brush fire on the beach. It is pos-
sible they were burning off an airstrip on Sibutu
Island.
1015 (AC #21) Sighted two float planes, type "PETE",
and one bomber, type "NICK", in vicinity of Bongao
Peak.
1305 (AC #22) Sighted float plane, type "PETE".
1550 (AC #23) Sighted float plane, type "PETE".
1924 Surfaced.

3 June
0442 Submerged for all day patrol. Water is still
glassy smooth, current setting north, moon becoming
too bright for comfort.
1020 (SC #13) Sighted smoke and masts of ship bear-
ing 244°T heading from Sibutu toward Sanga Sanga Island.
This was the same type vessel as the two sighted on
30 May - looked like one of them. Was able to
get a closer look this time. He was smaller than
originally estimated and his masts and stack way
too high for his length. A load of depth charges
aft were clearly visible. Kept clear of him. It
is possible he and the destroyer below were working
as a "hunter-killer" group.
1105 Picked up pinging on sound gear at 160°T.

-24-

— page 151 —
1125 (SC #19) Sighted tops of destroyer at 153°T on an
easterly course, range about 8,000 yards. Went to
battle stations.
1157 Heard another ship echo ranging on approximate
bearing that the small steamer had disappeared.
1203 (AC #24) Sighted two float planes, type "PETE".
Decided that they were making an A/S sweep for the
passage of larger ships, that we had been sighted and
they were hunting for us, or that it was just a
routine sweep. Watched carefully for signs of anything
else coming by but as nothing showed up and they
didn't linger in our vicinity, it must have been a
routine sweep.
1236 (AC #25) Sighted float plane, type "PETE", heading
toward us - went to 100 feet.
1926 Surfaced and set course for Pearl Bank to patrol off
there following day.
4 June
0530 Submerged for patrol off Pearl Bank.
1655 Surfaced and set course for a point about 10 miles
north of Kulassien Island.
2040 Sighted Ubian Island.
2218 Sighted three outrigger canoes in moonlight. Had
one pull alongside to see what information I might be
able to get out of them. Could not get any informa-
tion either by sign language or pidgin English except
that they most emphatically didn't like the Japanese.
Traded two pounds of rice for one fish, one pineapple
and some breadfruit.
5 June
0055 Sighted Kulassein Island.
0756 (SC #20) Sighted through periscope the masts of
three large ships and the tips of the masts of two
escorts, one on either side, bearing 057°T, estimated
range about 30,000 yards.
0800 Went ahead full on four mains and to battle stations
for tracking. Desired to obtain zig plan and base course
prior to submerging for attack. As they appeared to be
following along the chain of islands, their base course
had to be about 220°T.
0826 In position ahead on their estimated base course of
220°T with the convoy itself bearing 020°T, submerged
for attack.
0851 Picked up the three tankers by periscope.
0908 Picked up pinging on sound gear.
0913 Escorts in sight through periscope still keeping
station on port and starboard flank of convoy.
-25-

— page 152 —
During the half hour in which we tracked them
on the surface they appeared to be in a line of
bearing about 000°T - 180°T and zigzagging about 70°
to the right and the left of the base course. After
picking them up, submerged, however, they had com-
menced making very small zigs showing an angle on
the bow of not more than 20° either side. One
possible explanation for this is that they had just
made a landfall on Kulassein Island and were pre-
paring to go south through the passage east of Pangu-
taran Island. All three tankers appeared large, the
largest being the inboard or southerly tanker and
the other two almost as big. Their draft indicated
that they were partially loaded. It would seem
that they would normally be empty headed in this
direction unless they were going into Tawi Tawi to give
their remaining load to the task force.

0926 Made ready all tubes, depth setting eight feet.
Intended to fire the forward tubes in two salvoes
of three each and use the after tubes on the tankers
or escorts as the situation permitted.

0931 Fourth tanker seen about two miles astern of the
first three.

0938 In position Lat. 6° 32' N, Long. 120° 40' E, six and
one-half miles due north of the western tip of
Kulessein Island. Center tanker was headed at us
with zero angle on the bow, right hand target (my
right) was presenting a starboard angle and the left
hand target a port angle and also the farthest away.

Chose right hand target for the first three bow
shots. Target course 220°, speed 14, angle on the bow
35° starboard, torpedo track 50° starboard, torpedo
run 720 yards, own course 062°T, speed 3, TDC checking
perfectly, single ping range of 1,100 yards checked
exactly with generated range.

0940-00 Fired #2 tube.

0940-10 Fired #1 tube.

0940-18 Fired #3 tube.

During the firing continuous periscope bearings
of the TDC were fed to the TDC by periscope. The
firecontrol man assigned to set spread had not
heard a previous order I had given that he was to
not normally spread with the
periscope he assumed that I was doing so this time.
Consequently all three were fired to hit, and for-
tunately all three did.

After firing #3 immediately shifted to the center
tanker who still had a zero angle on the bow and got
a quick set up. Before I could fire, however,

0940-28 First torpedo hit.

-26-

— page 153 —
0940-35 Second torpedo hit.
0940-42 Third torpedo hit.

Took a quick look at the first target and was in time
to see the second one hit while smoke and debris from
the first hit was still in the air. All had hit forward
of his bridge. And he had burst into heavy flames forward.
He was stopped and already commencing to sink by the
bow. The third one hit after I had swung back to the
middle target and just as we fired #4. Those three
torpedoes were respectively a 900 lb torpex head, a
1000 lb torpex head and a 900 lb torpex head.

Got final set up on middle tanker, zero angle on
the bow, course 212°T, speed 14 knots, range 1,130,
torpedo run 820 yards, own course and speed unchanged.

0940-42 Fired #4 tube.

0940-50 Fired #5 tube.

Checked fire. Target had commenced to swing to
the right probably due to having seen the explosions
on #1 target. He couldn't have done anything to please
me more for it gave a 30° port angle on the bow and ob-
viated the necessity of my having to go deep to avoid
being rammed.

0941-10 Fired #6 tube.

Both escorts were well clear and still holding their
courses. We had come up to 58 feet now so had to go
ahead full.

0941-20 Heard and saw one torpedo hit about a quarter length
in from his stern.

0941-32 Heard second torpedo hit but the periscope was
vibrating so much that I couldn't see the target
distinctly. Like the first tanker he immediately burst
into flames aft on the first hit.

0941-36 Heard third torpedo hit.

Had managed to get started down about a minute later
so slowed. Got going down too fast and got to 75 feet
before we could check it.

0944 Got back up to periscope depth. Nothing was left
of the first target but floating debris. One particu-
larly large piece of wreckage looked like the top of his
bridge or a large hatch cover.

Found the second tanker back on my port quarter
burning fiercely aft and his stern just about to go
under. And now an amazing sight greeted my eyes. The
third tanker, which I had ignored in my concentration
on #1 and #2, was just abaft my port beam and listing
about 10° to port. One of the torpedoes fired at #1
target had hit him apparently. Subsequent plot indicate
that the most likely occurrence was that #4 torpedo
which was fired down the throat to hit #2 target missed

-27-

— page 154 —
to the left and 3 tanker ran into it. #5 was
spread one-half degree to the right which was probably
the hit I saw on the stern of #2 tanker. #6 torpedo
was fired with a new set up and probably hit the NOT
or somewhere abaft it.

The escorts, two ninelayers, were now closing in,
though not too close yet. #4 tanker had turned
hard right and was on a northerly course about 6,000
to 8,000 yards from us. Got a quick set up on #3
tanker but the range was 4,000 yards so shifted to
#2 target again. Although he appeared to be sinking
with every hit, one more hit would really
finish him. Got a set up for a stern tube shot with
a 18 tor edo. Target speed zero, angle on the bow
120 port, range 1,040 yards, torpedo run 1,000 yards,
and at

0944-26 Fired #8 tube after feeding continuous bearings
into the TDC for about 1 seconds to be sure he wasn't
moving.
Commenced watching the escorts again. The escort
which had been on the starboard flank of the convoy
was now headed almost directly at us — his angle on
the bow 10° starboard and range about 3,000 yards.
One escort was of the FLETCHER destroyer class or
very similar to it but I did not get a good enough
look at the silhouette of the other to identify it —
probably the same class.

0945-28 Heard #8 hit. Looked at the target and saw the
smoke from the hit. His stern was now under and his
bow coming out of the water at an angle.
0945-40 Ten depth charges in rapid succession — escort
about 2,000 yards away still headed in our direction.
Started deep and rigged for depth charging.
0946 - 0948 Sound heard cracking noises typical of a
sinking ship breaking up. Both operators are familiar
with the sound as they had occasion to listen leisurely
to a sinking ship on our last patrol.
0950 - 0952 Eleven depth charges.
Commenced evasion at 300 feet.
0953 Four depth charges.
0958 Four depth charges.
0950 Ten depth charges.
1005 Escorts commenced echo ranging.
1007 Three depth charges.
1010 - 1014 Eleven fairly close charges but not close enough
to do anything but shake the ship a little — no damage.
1026 - 1030 Eight depth charges.
1120 Commenced easing up to periscope depth to look the
situation over.
-28-

— page 155 —
1153 At 100 feet we either heard us or coincidentally
dropped three more. Started back down.
1212 Four more charges, fairly distant.
1217 Three distant explosions.
1229 Could hear screws and pinging of one escort on each
quarter.
1229 - 1608 We seemed to gradually drew away from the
escorts - our speed had been constant between three
and four knots
1608 Started up for a look - two distant depth charges -
seemed like they were reading our minds Continued
on up slowly while hearing loud pinging.
1704 Distant explosion.
1717 First periscope observation.
1727 (SC 21) Sight masts of one escort much closer
than I thought either of them were - about 9,000 yards.
Changed course to keep him astern.
1910 Surfaced and set course north in bright moonlight.
1920 (AC 26) Sighted exhaust of a plane on starboard
bow. He didn't seem to be coming in for an attack
so hoped he hadn't seen us. He had, however, not
started circling slowly around us. I sent out
letter "U" three times waiting for an answer each time.
He didn't get one as we were busy trying to get the
signal gun up to the bridge. He gave up on the "U"
and started to send "O". This looked very much as
if he had made the foolish mistake of trying out both
the challenge and the reply on us. I commenced to imitate
a frantic signalman. We came to a deadlock here for the
Jap surface ship. He sent to a deadlock here for he
answered back with "U". I now took up sending "O's"
trying to further confuse him into thinking we had all
the signals.

This would have been a fairly risky procedure
except for the fact that we could see him clearly
and I was sure he couldn't come in on a bombing run
before we could shove off. After a couple of minutes he
sent "NONO". This had me stymied so I sent no answer.
I was hoping he would shove off so we could get our
battery charged and return to the scene of the firing
but about this time he cut his gun and started gliding
in. This looked like an investigation run and not a
bombing run. I didn't wait to find out. Surfaced
as I picked him up at 1,600 yards.
1927 One bomb.
1930 Second bomb.
2015 Planed up for a look. All clear on periscope and
D radar.

-29-

— page 156 —
2025 Surfaced. Decided not to return to the vicinity of
P ngutaran Island as we were now located and I anticipated
that he would direct surface craft to our position.
Resumed battery charge and took a westerly course heading
for Cagayan Sulu Island.

As nearly as I can identify the tankers the largest
was very similar to the MUZISAN MARU, page 285, ONI
208 J (revised), 9,527 tons; the second and third similar
to the S.M. CL [UNCLEAR: A] and R.M. MARU, page 284, 7,300
tons, and the fourth I did not see enough of to be
able to identify. There are some 20 other tankers
in the recognition manual capable of making a cruising
speed of 14 knots about half of which have profiles
similar to the tankers attacked. These are all 9,000
to 10,000 ton tankers having cruising speeds of 16
and 17 knots.

There are a couple of other points to be mentioned
with regard to this attack. First, I believe I missed
an opportunity to put two more hits into Tanker #3
which I passed up because of his excessive range of
4,000 yards. I have thought it over considerably since
and I believe I am in low power on the periscope.
Also, the range was as difficult
to take due to his heavy port list. I was using top
of mast to deck.

Secondly, though we got seven hits with seven
torpedoes, the maximum expectancy was only five. One
accidental hit and failure to spread the first three
gave us the two extra hits. Also, I am strictly
cognizant of the fact that the fire control error
of failing to spread the first three did not have cost
us three misses. Only the short range and the fact
that the problem was working so well on the TDC
insured our hitting.

Two native sailing canoes were in the vicinity
and must have observed the entire action.

6 Jun.
0030 Sent message concerning the action of the previous
day, number of torpedoes left, and that we were off station.
0441 Submerged with Cagayan Sulu Island in sight for
all day dive.
1917 Surfaced and headed toward northern approach to
Sibutu Passage.
2200 Received orders to return to Darwin via Sibutu
Passage, Celebes Sea, Molucca Passage and east
of Timor for possible reload.

7 Jun.
0250 Passed over Sandy Bank and headed for Sibutu
Passage.

-30-

— page 157 —
0455 Submerged intending to proceed to northern entrance
to passage. Due to strong northerly current we only
advanced 12 miles all day though running at four
knots between periscope observations.
1605 (AC #27) sighted float plane bearing 037°M, course
130°T, distant six miles.
1930 Surfaced in bright moonlight, excellent visibility,
flat sea. Commenced maintaining "D" radar watch and
proceeding slowly so that our wake would not be picked
up from the air while we were charging batteries.
2200 Battery charge completed - entered Sibutu Passage
at 12 knots.
2245 Put four engines on the line and speeded up to 13
knots.
2318 (AC #23) aircraft contact on the "D" radar at five
and one-half miles closing.
2320 Submerged and closed to four miles.
2356 At depth 49 feet swept with the SD radar. Contact
two and one-half miles - down to 100 feet.

6 June
0126 Came up for another check. SD contact six miles.
It was still closed to four and one-half miles then
went to 100 feet again.
I was not at all happy with our position half way
through Sibutu on diving for we had been experiencing
a two knot northerly current on the surface. Fortunately
it was falling off slightly and gradually dropped down
to .9 knots so that we were able to make some headway.
0145 (C #22) Heard screws bearing 168°T making 168 RPM's.
Did not come up from 100 feet to look for the source
sounded close aboard. They had started up suddenly
and I had not been lying to up there and got underway
in a hurry. He passed across our bow very close aboard
using his fathometer.
0205 Lost screws on bearing 203°T.
0400 Broad C-2 absorbent as our minimum time submerged
would be 19 hours.
1332 (C 23) Sighted destroyer bearing 277°T.
1334 Commenced charging. Kept our stern pointed
toward him to use our two remaining torpedoes if
opportunity presented itself but his closest range
was about 8,000 yards.
1420 Lost screws and diving.
Did not know until later on that the K. RDER had sunk
destroyer in the vicinity this same morning and one
of the other two with the three and the three
is sunk in the next couple of days I hereby nominate

-31-

— page 158 —
the HORDER and Comdr. Dealey as the anti A/S vessel
and skipper of the year.

1902 urfaced. SJ radar interference about 120°T.
1947 (C 24) Sighted an unidentified vessel from the
bridge which looked fairly large but SJ radar could only
pic him up at 12,000 yards.
1948 (C 25) SJ radar contact on ship at 5,550 yards on
the same bearing from which the SJ radar interference
as coming. Assumed it very probable that this was
one of our submarines for three others could be in
this vicinity. We knew we were there for he trained
his SJ on us for several minutes. Commenced track-
ing him as making 17-1/2 knots on course 230°T. Looked like he was making an
and around approach on the larger target so I stayed
closer expecting to hear a torpedo explosion any
minute.

1955 Lost both targets on SJ. In the light of later
information it is possible that this was the HORDER
dodging the six destroyers that were chasing him this
particular night.
2145 (AC 29) SD radar contact six miles and closing.
2148 Submerged when contact got in to three miles
2223 At 40 feet SD contact five and one-half miles
closing. Went back to 100 feet.
2312 Clear on SD at 40 feet.
2316 Surfaced.
2319 SD contact nine miles. Closed to eight and one-
half miles, remained steady for about a minute and
then faded out. Remained on the surface and set
course for Siao Passage.

9 June
033 (C 30) SD contact nine miles, closing.
034 Submerged with contact at seven miles. Not sighted.
005 Surfaced -- all clear.
1525 (C 31) SD contact at 12 miles, closing. Sighted
periscope in our stern at a range of seven miles.
1530 Submerged when he turned toward us.
1522 Surfaced -- all clear.
2020 Commenced transit of Siao Passage.
2326 Completed transit and headed south down to Linka
Passage.

10 June
1610 Submerged to work on steering system which was
giving some difficulty.

-32-

— page 159 —
1014 Surfaced and set course to pass 10 miles east of
Canana Island.
1200 Sighted two sailboats and passed clear of them.
11 June
0225 Headed south east toward Timor.
0255 Sent message giving estimated time of arrival at
Darwin.
0721 (AC 31) SD contact at 10 miles, closing. Surfaced.
0800 Surfaced - all clear.
0900 Sighted large sailboat bearing 116° and changed
course to close. The boat was a small two masted
cabin schooner manned by natives. She carried a
mainsail, a foresail and a jib, had the letters
"WILLICHY" on her bow (one obliterated letter in
front of the "W") and the numbers "R21 or R27 on her
stern. She was a very clean, well rigged and ship
shape looking boat though obviously fairly old. Took
some pictures of her.

After considerable gesturing and yelling, got them
to come into the wind and two of the natives to get
in their dugout canoe and come over. This was all
done with considerable reluctance on their part -
they were apparently much afraid of us - as well as
I would be too, if I was in their shoes. They killed
a lot of time unleashing their canoe and putting it
over and then much more tin in a very unseamanlike
attempt to bail it out from the deck of the sailboat
with a short length of line tied to a pail. I put
up with all that nonsense and kept all hands away
from the bridge so that they would not be more frightened
than they were, for I wanted two volunteers to come back with us.

Two fairly old and very respectful natives came over
for a parley. It was very difficult to get the idea
across that we wanted one of them to come with us
even though I had a printed sheet of Malayan words
taken from one of the C.N.P.S. bulletins. Not result
was that they didn't want to come with us unless they
could take their boat and all passengers. They didn't
like the Japanese and they didn't have any fish aboard.
We all parted the best of friends
with my men offering them one or two or three pounds of
rice and five packages of cigarettes and we with
nothing.

Later, in Darwin, I looked up a Captain Ross,
Australian Army, who speaks fluent Malayan. I wished
to get some useful phrases to cover this sort of
situation. He was very helpful and gave me a pamphlet
printed by the U.S. Army for forces in the Southwest
Pacific Area entitled "A Pocket Vocabulary of Malay
Pidgin English and Japanese Phrases". He said it was
-33-

— page 160 —
the best thing of its kind he had ever seen and, on
looking it over, it looked to me to be very simple
to use. I believe it would be an excellent pamphlet
for all submarines operating in this area to carry.
1046 Resumed course and speed.
1236 Casualty to #3 main generator clutching switch and
starboard main motor contactors required putting the
starboard shaft out of commission. Underway on port
shaft.
1528 Starboard shaft back in commission.
2100 Temporary repairs to #3 main generator completed.

12 June
0250 Sighted Timor Island and commenced passage east of it.
0500 Completed passage.
0558 (AC #33) Submerged for aircraft sighted dead astern
approaching us from a range of about six miles.
Decided to remain submerged for the rest of the
morning as we were ahead of schedule and I did not wish
to send another message changing our time of rendezvous
at Darwin.
1207 Surfaced and resumed course and speed for Darwin.
1703 (AC #34) Sighted aircraft on starboard beam bearing
240°T and headed our direction. Submerged. Plan
tentatively identified as Allied and later verified at
Darwin.
171? Surfaced.
During night received dispatch orders to remain at
Darwin pending further orders and to be prepared to
take on torpedoes, fuel, and stores on short notice.

13 June
0550 Sighted floating aircraft wheel.
0615 Hoisted it aboard to take into Darwin for their
Intelligence section. No other sign of a wrecked
plane in the vicinity.
0621 Sighted escort and commenced passage into Darwin.
1050 Moored port side to dock in Darwin.
Gave Darwin authorities position of aircraft sighted
previous evening and position at which aircraft wheel
was picked up. Commenced loading a few fresh stores,
repairing main engine exhaust elbows and making other minor
repairs and checks of machinery while awaiting orders.

14 June
2030 Received dispatch orders to proceed on to Fremantle.

15 June
0830 Underway for Fremantle via swept channel and bombing
restriction lane.

-34-

— page 161 —
1450 (AC #35) Sighted four LIBERATOR bombers. Picked up
     by SD radar at 22 miles.
16 June to 21 June
     Enroute Fremantle via bombing restriction lane.
18 June
1419 Sighted PBY and exchanged recognition signals.
20 June
0830 Sighted USS FLASHER northbound and exchanged recog-
     nition signals.
1000 Submerged for six hour battery test discharge since
     we were seven hours ahead of schedule and did not wish
     to arrive at night.
1650 Surfaced. Resumed course and speed for Fremantle.
21 June
     Arrived Fremantle.

-35-

— page 162 —
(C) WEATHER
No unusual conditions were found with the exception
of the heavy sea encountered in the vicinity of Sibutu Pas-
sage from May 21 to June 8.

Although the rainy season starts in June, little rain
was encountered north of the barrier.

During the passage through the Malay Barrier, east of
Timor, enroute to Darwin on June 11-12, seas of force 5
from the southeast, the strongest encountered north of
the barrier, made the low bridge very uncomfortable for
bridge personnel.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
A constant northerly current was encountered from May
22 to June 8 in the northern Celebes Sea and Sulu Archipelago
reaching a force of 1.5 to 3.0 knots in the northern ap-
proaches to Sibutu.

In other areas visited the currents agreed with the
coast pilot and current tables.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
No navigational lights were found lighted in Madura
Strait, Makassar Strait, Sibutu Passage and northwest
coast of Borneo, Sidoe Passage, west coast of Buru or
the passage west of Timor.

-36-

— page 163 —
(F) SHIP CONTACTS
| NO | DATE | TIME | LAT. | LONG. | TYPE | RANGE-YDS | COURSE | SPEED | HO | CONTACTED | REMARKS |
|----|------|------|------|-------|------|||-------|----|||
| 1 | 5-03-44 | 1849H | 19-49N | 113-43E | Unident. | 3,450 | 130 T | 10 kts | SN-R | P | Closed to investigate. |
| 2 | 5-16-44 | 1630H | 07-53N | 114-37E | A/S-Trawler | 10,000 | 165 T | 5 kts | SN-R | P | Avoided. |
| 3 | 5-18-44 | 0430H | 07-30N | 113-25E | AO or AK | 14,250 | 260 T | 10 kts | SN-R | P | Torp.Attack #1. |
| 4 | 5-18-44 | 0520H | 07-36N | 113-12E | Small Escort | 5,000 | 280 T | 10 kts | SN-R | P | do |
| 5 | 5-18-44 | 0523H | 07-36N | 113-13E | Sailboat | 3,200 | 015 T | 10 kts | SN-R | P | Failed through form-tion. |
| 6 | 5-18-44 | 0355H | 07-30N | 113-15E | CMQ13 Type | 7,000 | 140 T | 17 kts | R | P | Torp.Attack #2-3. |
| 7 | 5-22-44 | 0925H | 04-34N | 119-49E | S/M | 6,000 | 25 T | 14 kts | P | P | Attempt.exchange | recognition signals. |
| 8 | 5-22-44 | 0925H | 04-34N | 119-49E | HI or AO | 12,000 | 140 T | 25 kts | P | P | Torp.Attack #4. |
| 9 | 5-22-44 | 0945H | 04-30N | 119-50E | DD | 4,000 | 200 T | 30 kts | P | P | do |
| 10 | 5-22-44 | 045H | 04-30N | 119-50E | A/C Type CV | 3,000 | 200 T | 30 kts | P | P | do |
| 11 | 5-22-44 | 1000H | 04-37N | 119-50E | DD | 4,200 | 230 T | 30 kts | P | P | do |
| 12 | 5-22-44 | 1220H | 04-50N | 119-50E | DD | 5,500 | Various | 25 kts | SN-R | P | Evaded. |
| 13 | 5-24-44 | 0255H | 04-49N | 120-10E | DD | 3,300 | Various | 20 kts | SN-R | P | Found. |
| 14 | 5-24-44 | 0036H | 05-15N | 120-25E | DD | 10,000 | 245 T | 10 kts | SN-R | P | V.ed. |
| 15 | 5-30-44 | 0536H | 05-15N | 119-32E | Small A/C | 25,000 | 245 T | 10 kts | P | P | None. |
| 16 | 5-30-44 | 0655H | 05-15N | 119-32E | Small A/C | 25,000 | 245 T | 10 kts | P | P | None. |
-37-

— page 164 —
NO | DATE | TIME | LAT. | LONG. | TYPE | RANGE-YD | COURSE | SPEED | HOT | C | D | REMARKS
---|---
17 | 5-30 | 0312H | 05-14.5N | 119-34E | Unident. | 28,000 | 245T | 10 kts | P | P | P | Possible "Q" ship.
18 | 6-03 | 101 H | 05-04 | 119-33E | One A/S Patrol (A/C Vessel) | 12,000 | 055 | 5 kts | P | P | P | Kept clear
19 | 6-03 | 1125H | 05-13N | 119-36E | One DD | 25,000 | Various | 3 kts | P | P | P | None.
20 | 6-03 | 0733H | 06-40N | 120-43E | Five AO | 30,000 | 220T | 14 kts | SD | P | P | Torp. Attack #5.
21 | 6-03 | 1727H | 06-55N | 120-18E | Two DD-Di | 6,000 | 270T | 10 kts | P | P | P | Avoided - vessel was using 21 Ko fathometer.
22 | 6-03 | 0143H | 04-47N | 119-38E | One C1 | 6,000 | 003T | 10 kts | P | P | P | Avoided - believe S/R evading DD.
23 | 6-03 | 1332H | 04-33N | 119-47E | Unident. | 10,000 | 163T | 5 kts | P | P | P | Avoided.
24 | 6-03 | 1947H | 04-26N | 119-52E | One DD | 12,000 | 130T | 5 kts | P | P | P | Avoided.
25 | 6-03 | 04-41H | 04-41N | 119-52E | Unident. | 5,500 | [UNCLEAR: 130T] | [UNCLEAR: 5 kts] | P | P | P | Avoided.

-38-

— page 167 —
No. | TIME | DATE | LAT. | LONG. | RPT. | COURSE | SPEED | RANGE | BEARING | REMARKS
| I.M. | | | | | | | | |
31 | 1525 | 6-9-44 | 07-14N | 124-04E | 1 [UNCLEAR: RUPP] | 215° [UNCLEAR: C.M.] | 100 kts [UNCLEAR: R-D] | 12 mi | | Unident.
32 | 0721 | 6-11-44 | 05-58N | 125-44E | 1 | Closing | 1200' | 10 mi | R | Submerged
33 | 0558 | 6-12-44 | 06-12N | 127-46E | 1 | 330° | 1500' | 6 mi | SD | Visual
34 | 1703 | 6-12-44 | 06-43N | 123-22E | 1 | 250 kts | 1450' | 14 mi | D-R | Submerged
35 | 1750 | 6-15-44 | 07-03N | 129-23E | 4 LT | 200 kts | 1450' | 21 mi | | Tone.

-41-

— page 168 —
(T) ATTACK DATA
Torpedo-attack No.1 Time: 0527, 18 May, 1944.
Lat.7°36.2' S, Long. 113°12.5' E.

Description
The target attacked was steaming, singly, hugging the Java
coast in Madura Strait, headed for Soerabaja, and protected
by two escorts; a trawler on his starboard quarter and
a C-13 type mine layer ahead. Initial contact was by SJ
radar and subsequent tracking was by SJ bearings and ranges.
Visibility was as good as the sky was clear, a bright quarter
moon had risen in the east and the first gray streaks of
dawn were showing in the east. Target and escort should
have sighted us easily, trawler did but suspect target
failed to see us and confused him. Suspect target failed to
see us because we came in on his starboard quarter and he
was probably busy painting what he had on his port side.

Ships Sunk
One A or AK with two masts, a have seen, two
in active wells fore and aft. Profile most nearly similar
to an auxiliary tanker ZUIYO (U.S. page 126, O.N.I. 208 J (revised),
7,300 tons. Length as determined by number of degrees
subtended in the outer field by Commanding Officer and officer-
of-the-deck was 450 feet but the torpedoes which hit him,
were estimated to be 550 feet so he may have been as large as
10,000 tons.

Ships Damaged: None.

Damaged Determined by
A second and third explosion on ship itself.
The stern going under and later nothing but smoke where
target had been. A range of 5,000 yards although it
had been previously observed easily over 15,000 yards.

Misc. Data
Fired 10 ft, course 230, speed 10, range 2450 yds

Ship Data
Speed 10.5, course 210, on surface.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Attack on surface using SJ bearings and radar
ranges. Came in at 17.5 knots for 110 true and 3,000 yard
firing range, slowing to 10.5 knots at firing. Fired four
torpedoes set on top of keel, 3 and 4 hit. Actual
range obtained 140 starboard to 2450 yards. 71 and 72
torpedoes fired.

-42-

— page 169 —
ATTACK NUMBER 1
| | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4
TUBES FIR'D | 140°S | 139°S | 141½°S | 141°S
TRACK ANGLE | 20°R | 18°R | 18½°R | 18 R
GYRO NGLT | 6 ft | 6 ft | 6 ft | 6 ft
DEPTH SET | Hi | Hi | Hi | Hi
POWER | Miss | Miss | Hit | Hit
HIT OR MISS | No | No | No | No
ERRATIC | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A
[UNCLEAR: I] REPORTED | 24734 | 26201 | 23903 | 24747
SERIAL NO. | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5
MARK NET LOADER | 7607 | 13157 | 833 | 6629
SERIAL NO. | C | C | C | C
*ACTUATION SET | — | C | C | C
ACTUATION ACTUAL | 16 | 16 | 16 | 10
LAST MARKED | 10152 | 6002 | 1933 | 1393
SERIAL NO. | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx
EXPLOSIVE | 0 sec | 13 sec | 12 sec | 14 sec
FIRING INTERVAL | 2½°R | 3/4°R | 3/4°L | 2½°L
WPT SPREAD | Calm | — | — | —
SEA CONDITIONS | Subiaco | — | — | —
OVERALL ACTIVITY | Perfect | — | — | —
OHP DO PERFOR CE | Perfect | — | — | —
HULL PERFOR CE | Perfect | — | — | —
FIR CONTROL PERFORMANCE |
*Cont ct - C. |

-43-

— page 170 —
Torpedo Attack No.2
Time: 0545-0625, 13 May, 1944.
Lat.7°35' S, Long.113°22' E to
Lat.7°33.7' S, Long.113°29.5' E.

Description
This attack consisted of four torpedoes fired at inter-
vals at a minelayer escort which was chasing us after our
sinking of the ship in torpedo attack 1. The torpedoes were
fired primarily to make the minelayer get off our track
and lose ground. His speed was the same as ours
and his range was holding steady. The action was on the
surface in the early morning visibility of a clear day (sun
rose at 0609). All torpedoes were set at a depth of four
feet and aimed to hit. Although it was realized that
the chances of hitting him with a zero angle on the bow and
a 3,000 yard torpedo run were very slim, we decided the
expenditure of torpedoes was warranted to give us a chance
to get into deeper water (at least 35 fathoms) before he
got aircraft and/or more surface vessel assistance. The
fourth torpedo nearly hit him when it broached at the end of
its run and headed for him on a 90° starboard track.

Ships Sunk: None) Target avoided by altering course
Ships Damaged: None) after seeing torpedo wakes.

Target Data
Draft 6 feet, course 032, speed 18.2, range 5500 yards.

Own Ship Data
Speed 13.4, course 032, on surface.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Used radar ranges and continuous periscope bearings for
about two minutes prior to firing each torpedo. First two
not seen as it was still fairly dark. Third fired at about
300 yards down his port side. Fourth broached at end
of run, turned right toward him then as he turned left
to avoid it turned left toward him but eventually missed
close astern.

-44-

— page 171 —
ATTACK NUMBER 2

| | #9 | #10 | #7 | #8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TUBES FIR'D | 0° | 2°P | 0° | 2°P |
| TR CK ANGLE | 181° | 178° | 179° | 178° |
| GYRO ANGLE | 4 ft | 4 ft | 4 ft | 4 ft |
| DEPTH SET | Lo | Lo | Hi | Hi |
| POWER | Lo | Lo | Hi | Hi |
| HIT OR MISS | Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss |
| ERRATIC | No | No | No | Yes |
| MARK TORP DO | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| SERIAL NO. | 26296 | 26192 | 26152 | 25361 |
| WAR EXPLODER | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 |
| SERI L NO. | 13158 | 12424 | 12649 | 12663 |
| *ACTUATION SET | C | C | C | C |
| ACTUATION ACTUAL | 16-1 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| MARK WARHEAD | 1346 | 1494 | 1439 | 2966 |
| SERIAL NO. | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx |
| EXPLOSIVE | | | | |
| FIRING INTERVAL | | | | |

TYPE SPREAD None-
SEA CONDITION Calm-
OVERALL ACTIVITY Subiaco
TORP DO PERFORMANCE One erratic after broaching near
end of run.
TUBE PERFORMANCE Perfect
FIRE CONTROL PERFORMANCE Perfect
*Contact - C.

-45-

— page 172 —
TORPEDO ATTACK No. 3 Time: 0048, 18 May, 1944.
Lat. 7°31' S, Long. 113°40' E.

Description
Same target as torpedo attack #2. This was a stern
tube shot fired after being forced to dive by a plane -
The enemy on diving swung hard to port for a 90° port track
as he passed astern.

Ships Sunk or Damaged: None.

Target Data
Draft 6 feet, course 084, speed 18.5, ran a 2200 yards.

Own Ship Data
Speed 3.5, course 005, depth 65 feet, angle 0°.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Mark 18 torpedo fired from stern tube using periscope
bearing and TDC generated range which had previously been
established on the surface with SJ radar. Due to control
error fired before final bearing was set on TDC. This
may have caused miss although one explosion seen at the
end of 30 seconds in the direction the torpedo was fired
indicated the possibility of a premature. It is also
possible that this explosion was an aircraft bomb as there
was a plane overhead.

ATTACK NUMBER 3
TUBE FIRED | #9
TRACK ANGLE | 37°
GYRO ANGLE | 163°
DEPTH SET | 4 ft
POWER |
HIT OR MISS | Miss
FIRING IC | No
MARK TORPEDO | 18
SERIAL NO. | 53567
EXPLODER | 4-2
ACCUMULATION SET | C
ACCUMULATION ACTUAL |
MARK READ | 18
SERIAL NO. | 350
EXPLOSIVE | T.N.T.
FIRING INTERVAL |
TYPE SPREAD |
SEA CONDITIONS | Calm
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY | Submerged
TORPEDO PERFORMANCE | Perfect
TDC PERFORMANCE | Perfect
FIRE CONTROL PERFORMANCE | Fire control error experienced when
| torpedo was fired before final
| track bearing was set on TDC.

*Contact - C.
-46-

— page 173 —
Torpedo Attack No. 4
Time: 1025, 22 May, 1944.
Lat. 4°37' N, Long. 119°50' E.

Description
The target attacked was one of two aircraft carriers
which, with escorting destroyers, were launching aircraft
about 20 miles south of Tawi Tawi Bay. Visibility was good,
sea as glassy calm and there were some 60 or 70 carrier
planes in the vicinity at various altitudes, speeds and
courses apparently in the process of forming up after being
launched. The flight deck and bow of the carrier not fired
at resembled the HOSHO or RYUJO class carriers. The carrier
fired at appeared larger and, although I now know the AKAGI was
sunk at Midway, it most nearly resembled the identi ication
pictures of the AKAGI and KAGA. The carriers were contacted
by perisco e after first sighting their planes. The
approach to attack position was finally gained by mancuvering the ship
to a position between the two and waiting for one of them
to head in our direction.

Ships Sunk: None.
Ships Damaged: One carrier, unidentified.

Damage Determined by
One probable hit. Actual hit not observed.
A/S measures. Plot indicated that #5 and #6 should have hit.
This was correct for #5.

Target Data
Draft 19 feet, course 054, speed 30, range 700 yards

Own Ship Data
Speed 2, course 161, depth 66-63, angle 1/2°-10 down.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
The attack was made at periscope depth. Speed of 25
knots was used but plot showed that the target must have
been making at least 30 knots for the bearings to change
as rapidly as they did. Although the final bearing did
not check with the TDC solution, torpedoes were fired at
once due to the target's high speed and the possibility of
no further chance to attack. While firing the range was
brought in and the target zigged to the left on the 70
mile line bearing change. Torpedoes were spread along the
target's length by periscope.

-47-

— page 174 —
ATTACK NUMBER 4
| | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 | #5 | #6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TUBES FIRED | 137 P | 139.5°P | 142.5°P | 151°P | 171°P | 175.5°P |
| TR CK ANGLE | 295.5 | 293 | 290.5 | 282 | 284 | 259 |
| DET H SET | 10 ft | 10 ft | 10 ft | 10 ft | 10 ft | 10 ft |
| PO ER | Hi | Hi | Hi | Hi | Hi | Hi |
| HIT OR MISS | Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss | Hit | Miss |
| ERRATIC | — | — | — | — | No | — |
| TYPE | | | | | | |
| TORPEDO | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| SERIAL NO. | 39150 | 25266 | 28209 | 25944 | 26203 | 26206 |
| TYPE | | | | | | |
| EXPLODER | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 |
| SERIAL NO. | 300 | 12660 | 12408 | 17727 | 13166 | 7796 |
| CONDITION | C | C | C | C | C | C |
| ACTUAL | — | — | C | — | — | — |
| TYPE | | | | | | |
| WARHEAD | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16 | 16 |
| SERIAL NO. | 11641 | 11663 | 10105 | 6223 | 1575 | 707 |
| EXPLOSIVE | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx |
| FIRING INTERVAL | 0 sec | 10 sec | 9 sec | 9 sec | 9 sec | 8 sec |

TYPE SPREAD Periscope offset from bow to stern (1st - just
inside bow, 6 - just inside stern).
SEA CONDITIONS | Flat | - | - | - | - | - | - |
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY | Subiaco | - | - | - | - | - | - |
TORPEDO PERFORMANCE | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
TUBE PERFORMANCE | Perfect | - | - | - | - | - | - |
FIRE CONTROL
PERFORMANCE | Perfect | - | - | - | - | - | - |
Contact - C.

-48-

— page 175 —
Torpedo Attack No.5(a)(b)(c) Time: 0940, 5 June, 1944.
                                        Lat.60°32' N, Lon.120°40.5'E

Description

Convoy consisting of four tankers sighted with periscope
while on surface with excellent visibility. Position
of attack while at periscope depth. Two
escorts which were either minelayers or destroyers (similar
to 'MINEKAZ' class destroyers) were disposed on either flank.
Three tankers were in line of bearing and the fourth on a
parallel course about two miles astern. Fired seven torpedoes
at two tankers and got seven hits one of which was accidental
on third target.

Ships Sunk

Two tankers, one similar to HUZISAN MARU, page 285, ONI
203 J (revised), 9,527 tons and one similar SAN CLEMENTE MARU,
page 284, same publication, 7,309 tons.

Ships Damaged: One similar SAN CLEMENTE MARU, as above.

Damage Determined By

Saw first target with three
hits in it, on fire forward, and sinking by bow and three
minutes later nothing but floating debris in its position.

Saw second target on fire astern and sinking by the
stern. It was sinking slowly with two hits in it so fired
third torpedo at it, saw hit and saw stern go under with
the bow coming up.

Saw third ship listing 10 to 15 degrees to port with only
one torpedo hit in it - not on fire but damaged badly enough
so decided it would eventually sunk.

Target Data

(a) Draft 13 feet, course 220, speed 14, range 950 yards.
(b) do 15 do do 14 do do 1130 do
(c) do 30 do 186 do 0 do 1040 do

Own Ship Data

Speed 3, course 062, depth 67-58, angle 1/20-10 down.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Attack submerged at periscope depth. Ran as from a st-
art to deck using 80 feet. Single pin range prior to
firing which checked in generated range. TDC solution
checked in perfectly for first target. Three fired at first
target with 720 yard torpedo run, fired to hit though inten-
tion was to spread. Fired three down throat at second target.
Checked fire after second shot to correct TDC for slight
error in his run. Later fired fourth torpedo
at this target. Gave continuous periscope bearings to TDC for
all seven torpedoes fired.

-49-

— page 177 —
(I) MINES
No mines or mining activities were observed.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND TACTICS
A continuous day and moonlight air patrol was maintained
in the vicinity of the task force
anchored there. Air cover throughout the southern
portion of the Sulu Sea, Celebes Sea, Molucca Sea, Banda
Sea and Timor Sea was considerably heavier than has been
observed in the past. Almost 300 planes were sighted on
this patrol in 35 single contacts. On 24 October 70
enemy carrier planes in large groups
were sighted. On 26 October enemy patrol planes for 13 of which it was
necessary to dive. One and possibly two planes dropped
bombs aimed at us.

Following torpedo attack #1 consisted of
one or two bombs from a float plane and six or seven depth
charges from a single minelayer. Echo ranging was used inef-
fectively. Evasion was accomplished on an obvious escape
course at four knots, 200 feet with a thermocline at 150 feet.

Following torpedo attack #2 on the aircraft carrier,
10 to 12 depth charges were dropped by destroyers in the first
1 1/2 hour following the attack. This was followed by
systematic and coordinated search by five destroyers for
13 hours. While searching two or three would echo range
on two or three listeners, then contact was made, all those
in the near vicinity would commence echo ranging. In the
first five hours, and I think they interfered
with one another for this happened only once. They were,
according to the systematic search curve, on three different occasions while
attempting to come up to periscope depth on the listeners
and called contacts by a series of double pings and by
varying their frequency about one kilocycle, either side of
17.2 Kcs.

Evasion tactics were conducted at 350 feet with the
conning tower just below a sharp three degree thermocline
at a speed of from three to four knots. For the first 1 1/2
hours ventilation, air conditioning, refrigeration, circulation
motor and gyro were left run-
ning. I kept the unsung three times during this period so I
do not think they heard this machinery below the
thermocline. Our sound man prior to departing on patrol
indicated that all machinery except
the last five hours, however, all machinery except the gyro,
IC motor or generator and lighting motor and gyro were secured
since they seemed to hear us.

When any of them got close and indicated that they had
contact I commenced steering a constant helm zig zag course
sixty degrees to the right and left of the base course at
four knots. After seven or eight hours, I slowed to
three knots and then circled off to a new base course.

-51-

— page 178 —
This form of evasion was first suggested to me by the Com-
manding Officer of the Dutch destroyer TJERK HIDES whose
ship was reputed to be one of the best A/S vessels in
the Western Australia area. He contended that this man-
euver at four knots left knuckles at the turns which were
sufficiently strong to give return echoes when pinged
upon; that this confused the plot of the echo ranging
search party no end and gave the submarine a chance to
slip quietly away. He further stated that this was the
only form of evasion that they (the Dutch vessels) had
been unable to solve consistently and that all other
types of evasion tactics fooled them only once - the first
time tried.

Whether this information is theoretically correct or
not, I lost this search group three times with the above
maneuvers. The fact that they regained contact was due to
their persistent search and my attempt to come up to
periscope depth. Further evidence of their confusion is
that though some of them were close aboard while I was
engaged in this maneuver (so not trained directly on us at
start and screws clearly audible), no further depth charges
were dropped. Losing them this way might be coincidence
except that it happened three times on this occasion, and
was successful in losing two minelayers or destroyers fol-
lowing a convoy attack on June 5th.

The fourth attempt to come up was successful. We located
the slow screws of a listener on our port bow - screws just
barely turning over. Having previously pumped out for a
silent trim (thank God for a silent trim pump - also Buships)
we were able to come up very silently running as silent as
possible while making a 360° turn. He had him slowly fade out
though this may have been coincidence and not the maneuver.

Following our attack on the tanker convoy June 5th two
minelayers or small destroyers worked on us. All told they
came so close to us that we could not hear them, and
none of which did any listening alternately. At
one time when we got fairly close I used the tactics
described above and lost them. No temperature gradient was
present in this instance but we were able to keep important
auxiliary machinery running. Shortly following our sur-
facing at night we were picked up in the moonlight by a plane
and bombed but were able to surface half an hour later and
clear the area.

(7) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
(A) Main Engines and Generators
The only mechanical difficulty encountered with the
main engines was the necessity for replacement of connecting
rod bearing upper halves. An inspection every 200 hours
failed to catch them before they began to cause any damage
to the engine. A total of thirteen upper halves and no
lower was replaced.

-52-

— page 179 —
In general when the engines are operated at rated
load and speed the exhaust is fairly clear but when sub-
jected to any sudden increase in load they still smoke
excessively.

While going from a two generator to a four generator
combination on one occasion, the overload relay tripped on
the starboard motors as the controller went from P-1 to P-2.
This was caused by a loose shunt field lead, at the motor
terminal block, on #3 starboard controller output con-
tactors. At the time it was found that #3 generator
had lost its field current. The electrical switch on the
generator field rheostat clutch mechanism had four leads
burned off. This switch was bypassed with jumpers and
the field circuit operated satisfactorily. The starboard
controller field was clutched together at the time, but
it is possible a loose contact in this switch may have caused
the field to discharge under load, thus burning the leads
off. The burned contactors are renewed underway.

Steering
Normal steering was lost on one occasion due to the
steering follow-up gear working off center. The lock nut
on the vertical control shaft for the tilting block of the
Waterbury "A" end in the after torpedo room became loose
allowing the vertical shaft to move relative to the upper
cross-head thus preventing the tilting block from being
moved in a direction to give left rudder. The shaft was
retightened and lock nut made tight restoring normal steering.

Operation of the Centrifugal Trim Pump
The operation of the #1 centrifugal trim pump was most
satisfactory. It was used on several occasions during ap-
proaches and while using evasion tactics and apparently
at no time was the noise level sufficient for detection
by the listeners".

It has been the experience of this vessel that the
priming system installed with this pump is not necessary
after the air has once been thoroughly vented out of the
trim system; one or two dives will usually suffice. To
prevent subsequent air binding it is most important that
the pump not be operated with the vents closed on the vari-
able tank on the suction side, as sometimes happens when
the air manifold men fails to hear the Diving Officer's
orders.

To insure the quietest operation, when starting the
pump, it is imperative that the pump discharge valve be open
as nearly as possible. When securing the pump, the
pump discharge valve should be closed until a resistance is
felt, but not enough to cause a "squish", (usually about
three-quarters of the way) then shut the pump off and at the
same time close the discharge valve slowly. It will be found
that this procedure and a little practice will give noiseless
operation. When pumping in the boat, i.e. forward to
after trim, trim tank to auxiliaries, etc. a loud "slam" or
water hammer will result if the pump discharge is closed too
rapidly.

-53-

— page 180 —
(L) RADIO
The reception of "BAKERS" schedule was very poor this
run. The major reason for this difficulty is attributed
to poor atmospheric conditions which existed during this
season in our patrol area. It became necessary to rely on
repeat transmissions of messages in a large number of cases.
When below the Equator, there was a marked improvement in
reception.

Some interference was experienced from enemy stations
regularly at 1400 and 1930 GCT lasting about fifteen to
twenty minutes. This interference took the form of inten-
tional noise transmissions but it was not believed to be
jamming due to its regularity.

Traffic was handled on the voice frequency during the
carrier task force raid on Soerabaja on May 17th. Communi-
cations with the task force were conducted without diffi-
culty.

Transmissions on the ship to shore frequency were made
with little trouble and, with one exception, traffic was
cleared in a reasonable length of time. In the above
mentioned transmission it was necessary to repeat each
group twice. This is believed to have been the result of two
factors:

(1) The antenna to ground readings were at their
poorest for the run.
(2) High seas were breaking over the antenna during
transmission.

Three of our transmissions were relayed through "WEM".
This station is to be commended for keeping a close watch,
promptness in answering up, and speed and accuracy in
clearing traffic. On June 9th, when reception was very
poor, some numbers were picked up from "WEM" on his repeats
of submarine traffic on 7555 Kcs.

(M) RADAR - SJ

The SJ performance was very good during the entire
patrol. Very little electrical difficulty was experienced,
and the weekly routine checks prevented the occurrence of
trouble due to dirt and tube failures.

The following casualties occurred and were remedied
as listed below:

(1) During the trial runs the tuning plug in the converter
unit was found to be jammed, making it impossible
to tune the unit. This trouble was repaired by the
relief crew.
(2) A casualty occurred to the antenna feeder unit when
the pick-up pin in the lower dipole casting was
sheared off due to mechanical failure as a result
of long use. This resulted in the complete loss
of outgoing signal. The failure was temporarily
repaired by soldering the pin to the casting, but

-54-

— page 181 —
after a short period of operation, it again sheared
off. This necessitated the installation of a new
lower dipole casting to correct the difficulty.
Fortunately this occurred prior to arrival in Darwin
so that new parts could be flown to us.
(3) The antenna feeder unit's slip rings, which were
the original set in the unit, had become grooved
and corroded, and had to be replaced. The gold
platin was completely worn off, and the rings
corroded, due to salt water leakage from the torque
tube while submerged on previous patrol.
(4) In one of the I.F. stages, the plate load resistor
separated from the plate terminal on the tube socket
causing a complete loss of echo. The trouble was
repaired by resoldering the resistor to the plate
terminal.

RADAR - SD-2

The SD performance was unsatisfactory throughout the
patrol, although no difficulties were experienced in upkeep
except for the usual tube replacements.

The primary difficulty is to obtain any reliable range
performance with this set. Out of fifteen contacts made
while on the surface, the SD picked up only seven and two of
these were LIBERATOR bombers outside of Darwin. Six to ten
miles seems to be the reliable range limits of the set
although it did get one BEAUFORT at fourteen miles and
two LIBERATORS at twenty miles. In all cases the original pip
is so small that it is very hard to detect. I have been
with SD radars before which consistently pick up medium
sized planes at from fourteen to eighteen miles and give
a good sized indication on the screen from twelve miles on
in. Other submarines in patrol reports commonly report SD
radar contacts at fifteen miles while operating in the same
areas we have been operating in.

The set has been worked on, checked and tuned too
often during training periods and while on patrol for
there to be anything radically wrong with it electrically.
My reaction is that there is something fundamentally wrong
with this piece of equipment. Either the set itself as a
whole is a lemon or perhaps the new type antenna is faulty
or less efficient than the old type.

True, it did get contacts at eight and ten miles on
the surface and at five miles from a depth of fifty feet and
this was a decided help. However, a more positive indicatio
at a little greater range would give us just a bit more
freedom of action when contacting fast aircraft.

In view of the increased air coverage in our operating
areas I consider it most important to have this set brought
up to the normal standard of SD operation.

In enemy waters within one hundred miles of land the
set was operated for fifteen seconds out of every minute.
Beyond one hundred miles it was operated continuously.

-55-

— page 182 —
(N) SOUND
The sound gear performed satisfactorily
throughout the patrol. Sono ranging was used once just
prior to an attack and the single ping range obtained
checked perfectly with the estimated range. This range was
further verified by the times of torpedo runs or torpedoes
which hit the target.

(1) The JK-C motor generator is very noisy in operation.
(2) The starboard head generates noise as it is
trained which makes it very difficult for the JK
operator to obtain bearings between 030° and 130°.
This noise is believed to originate in the training gears and shafting. It
is necessary to secure the JK for long periods of
time during evasive tactics so that the JK
operator could hear.

(3) The starboard head still rumbles when we are making
over sixty feet at deep depths. Every possible
action has been taken during the last two refits,
including realignment, to eliminate this rumble.
It has disappeared from the port shaft and is not
as bad as it was in the starboard shaft, but is
still there.

The fathometer was used as necessary and operated
satisfactorily.

Sound conditions in the Celebes Sea, Sulu Sea, Sibutu
Passage and vicinity were good. Fairly fast propellers
were picked up as far as 8,000 yards. Others from 5,000
to 6,000 yards.

(O) THERMOLINE

The bathythermograph was used constantly throughout
the patrol and particularly demonstrated its worth while
evading A/S vessels.

The following temperature gradients were noted:
| DATE | POSITION | DEPTH | GRADIENT |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5/ 9/44 | 5°46.5'N | 120°22.0'E | 160-200 | - 5° |
| 5/10/44 | 6°52.5'N | 126°26.3'E | 190-310 | - 8° |
| 5/10/44 | 7°31.0'N | 113°40.0'E | 340-360 | - 7° |
| 5/12/44 | 4°31.0'N | 119°51.0'E | 340-360 | -10° |
| 6/ 2 to | | | | |
| 6/ 4/44 | 5°20.0'N | 119°40.0'E | 120-200 | - 4° |
| 6/ 5/44 | 6°41.7'N | 120°33.6'E | 100-340 | -12° |
| | | | | Thermocline |

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND CLOTHING
1. Health
One case of venereal disease developed after departure
from Fremantle that required treatment at Darwin enroute north
due to the fact that his health record contained the state-

-56-

— page 183 —
nent that he should not be given sulfa drugs for treatment
of any illness.
The health of the crew was otherwise excellent, there
being only a few cases of minor colds.

Food

The food was in general good. Beef was better than
usual because we were careful as to what type we took:
"steak and roasting", "stewing and boiling", and "chopped
beef". Steak and roasting beef though a bit tough is tasty
and considered satisfactory. Stewing and boiling beef is
not only tough and unpalatable but worse than this, it
is about sixty percent waste and therefore a waste of
space in the ice box. Chopped beef is tough, stringy and
unpalatable. In ordering beef we ordered only steak and
roasting beef and we stated specifically that the usual
percentage of the other two types be omitted. One hundred
fifty pounds of the chopped beef got aboard through an over-
sight. The greater portion (about ninety percent) of
hamburgers, meat loaf and meat balls which were served
were made by grinding the trimmings from our steak and
roasting beef. These were satisfactory, but the difference
could be noticed immediately when the cooks ran in any of
the chopped beef.

The beef supply as a whole was very delightfully aug-
mented by five hundred pounds of fresh beef loins obtained
through the Supply Officer of the Submarine Repair Unit.
This beef, known as "Johnson's Beef", was boned prior to
stowage in our ice box. It kept perfectly for the whole
patrol and provided three steak dinners of thick, juicy,
tasty steaks. I personally have never tasted any better
steak anywhere for any price. It would be a fine thing if
arrangements could be made to supply this beef to all
submarines. The last of this beef was eaten on the fiftieth
day of the patrol and was perfectly all right — no spoilage
at all.

Although I understand there is a medical department
order against taking fresh frozen strawberries to sea because
they will spoil, I have not seen the order and having
been shipmates with fresh frozen strawberries which did
not spoil, I took one hundred twenty pounds. These were
obtained through Naval Supply Depot and the storekeeper
who approved the order warned our cook that they were to be
eaten in port. We kept a careful watch on them and there
was no spoilage. The last strawberries were eaten on the
forty-ninth day of the patrol.

However, in spite of the above remarks and any errors I
may have made in the past, I feel that there has been a
great improvement in the variety and quality of the foods
issued to submarines since I started on my first war patrol
out of Pearl Harbor in May, 1942.

-57-

— page 185 —
(T) FACTORS OF TOUR NCE REMAINING
| Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel Factor |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 10700 | 22 days | 20 days |
Limiting factor this patrol: Orders.

(U) REMARKS
I deviate here from the specific subject at hand long
enough to express my admiration and appreciation for one
of our most important and most complicated pieces of fire
control equipment. The Torpedo Data Computer has most
certainly proven itself one of the more valuable fire
control instruments of this war. Without it many of our
submarine's multiple attacks would never have been possible
and many of the simpler attacks would have been less
effective. Despite the fact that it is a complicated
mechanical and electrical precision instrument, it has stood
repeated depth chargings without failing and with minimum
upkeep. I have yet to see a TDC out of commission or on
attack mode in which it was not used.

This, I realize, is not news to submariners but I hope
the people who make it realize what a help it is and what
an important part it has played and is playing in this war.

-59-

— page 186 —
FC 5-16/A16-3
Serial # 0356
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS PUFFER Conf. ltr.
SS268/A16 Serial 067
dated June 21, 1944,
Report of 4th War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Fourth War Patrol -
Comment on.

1. The fourth war patrol of the U.S.S. PUFFER was conducted
during the period 30 April 1944 to 21 June 1944 in the CELEBES and SULU
SEAS. It was of fifty-two days duration of which thirty-four days were
spent in the area.

2. Five torpedo attacks were made which further depleted the
ever dwindling list of enemy tankers and probably damaged a large aircraft
carrier.

ATTACK NO. 1 - A night surface attack on a large AO or AP with two
escorts. Two hits were made out of four torpedoes fired on large
tracks which sank the target.

ATTACK NO. 2 - A series of stern tube "Down the throat" shots (two
in low power and two in high power) at a pursuing minelayer which was
escorting the ship sunk in the first attack. These shots were fired
at a range of 5,500 yards to divert the pursuer. Since they all
missed, the tactical situation was not improved materially.

ATTACK NO. 3 - After diving for a plane, one torpedo was fired at
the same minelayer from a favorable position. A final bearing was
not set and the torpedo missed.

ATTACK NO. 4 - A submerged attack on an aircraft carrier with six
torpedoes after a ten minute approach. One probable hit was heard.
Control errors caused the others to miss.

ATTACK NO. 5 - A submerged attack on a convoy of four tankers and
two escorts with three torpedoes fired with no spread at one tanker
and three torpedoes at another tanker with spread. Three hits were
seen on the first tanker and one hit was seen and one heard on the
second tanker. A third hit heard apparently hit a third tanker.
Another torpedo was fired at the second tanker which also hit. An
effective counterattack prevented further pursuit of this convoy.

- 1 - (Es)
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN
U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship,
26 June 1944.

— page 188 —
7-71/A16-3
Serial: 0686
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

UNITED STATES NAVY 11 1/2/S
8 0373

14 July 1944.
[HANDWRITTEN: R-wz]
[HANDWRITTEN: 8-10-44]

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to: USS.PUFFER
Conf.Ltr.A16-3 Serial 067 dated 21
June,1944.Report of 4th War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Fourth War
 Patrol - Comment on.

1. The Fourth War Patrol of the PUFFER was conducted
in the CELEBES and SULU SEAS. The remarks of the Commander
Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN are concurred in.

2. PUFFER terminated her special assignments to life-
guard and offensive reconnaissance duties by aggressively attack-
ing the enemy and sinking ships.

3. This patrol is designated as successful for pur-
pose of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

4. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding
Officer, Officers and Crew of PUFFER on this excellent patrol in
which the following heavy damage was inflicted on the enemy:

SUNK
1 - AK (Large - EU) 7,500 Tons(Attack No.1)
1 - AO (SAN CLEMENTE MARU Class - EC) 7,300 Tons(Attack No.
 5bc)
1 - AO (HUZISAN MARU Class - EC)- 9,500 Tons(Attack No.
 5a)
 TOTAL 24,300 Tons

DAMAGED
1 - CV (KAGA Class - EU) 26,900 Tons(Attack No.4)
1 - AO (SAN CLEMENTE MARU Class - EC) 7,300 Tons(Attack No.
 5b)
 TOTAL 34,200 Tons

GRAND TOTAL 58,500 Tons

[SIGNATURE: P.F.STRAUB,JR.,]
P.F.STRAUB,JR.,
Flag Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (3) - (Direct) CTF-71 (4)
Vice Opnav (2) - (Direct) CTF-72 (2)
Vice Opnav Op-23c (1) CSS-12 (1)
Com1stFlt (1) CSS-16 (1)
Com2ndFlt (1) DivComs Ron-12 (1)
Com3rdFlt (1) DivComs Ron-16 (1)
Com7thFlt (2) S/M School,N.L.Conn. (2)
ComSubs1stFlt (4) *Each S/M W.A. EXTRA (1)
ComSubs2ndFlt (4) *NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM ORIGINAL

[STAMP: FILMED] [HANDWRITTEN: 63]
PHOTO-LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 189 —
Reg. No. 8 02166

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET S. No.

A16-3(F-3/roj)

Serial: 02196

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

9 AUG 1944

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS PUFFER conf. ltr.
A16-3, Serial 067 of
21 June 1944. Report
of Fourth War Patrol.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Fourth
War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

2. Commander Seventh Fleet congratulates the
Commanding Officer, Officers, and Men of the U.S.S. PUFFER
on the completion of an extremely successful War Patrol
during which a total of 24,300 tons of shipping were sunk
and 34,200 tons damaged.

[SIGNATURE: H. W. Graf]
H. W. GRAF.
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
ComSubs7thFlt
ComSubRon-16
CO USS PUFFER

— page 190 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

SS268/A16
Serial 078
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
USS PUFFER (SS268)
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Cal.
29 August 1944

From : The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States
Fleet.
Via : (Official Channels.)

Subject: USS PUFFER (SS268), Report of FIFTH
War Patrol.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart for ComSubPac.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) covering the
FIFTH war patrol of this vessel conducted in MAKASSAR
STRAIT, the CELEBES SEA, SULU SEA and CHINA SEA
during the period July 14, 1944 to August 29, 1944,
is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: F. G. Selby]
F. G. SELBY

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C]
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP-09B9C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/72]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

87946 [STAMP: FILMED]

9 02960

— page 191 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived Fremantle, WEST AUSTRALIA, from Fourth War
Patrol on June 21, 1944. June 21 to July 5th undergoing
normal between patrol refit by USS ORION and Submarine
Division 161 Relief Crew.

During this refit the JP-1 Sonic Listening Device
was installed and the SJ-1 radar with P.P.I. unit.

July 6th to July 14th engaged in training exercises.
Conducted sound test, deperming, deep dive, day and
night practice approaches, surface and submerged, and
fired three practice torpedoes. Training was conducted
under supervision of Captain G. W. PATTERSON, Jr., USN.

(B) NARRATIVE (all times "HOW", unless otherwise noted)

Note: AC - Aircraft Contact.
SC - Ship Contact.

14 July

1500 Underway in accordance with ComTaskFor 71
Operation Order No. 92-44 to conduct unrestricted
warfare against the enemy in MAKASSAR STR.IT, the
CELEBES SEA, CHINA SEA and then proceed to PEARL
HARBOR, T.H. for refit.
15 - 17 July

Enroute EXMOUTH GULF conducting training dives
and fire control exercises. Pitometer log not
operating properly in spite of complete overhaul
during refit followed by second overhaul on com-
pletion of training period.

17 July

1500 Moored port side to fuel barge at EXMOUTH GULF,
WEST AUSTRALIA. Since fueling would not be finished
prior to darkness decided to remain overnight to
work on Pitometer Log and run calibration runs
next morning.

18 July

0830 Underway for calibration runs on Pitometer Log.
Operation satisfactory on surface at all speeds.

1500 Fired ten rounds three inch ammunition at wreck
off NORTHWEST CAPE for training. Was quite surprised
to get two hits at 5,000 yards range.

-1-

— page 192 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

19 July

Enroute LOMBOK STRAIT conducting training dives
and fire control problems. Pitometer log not work-
ing at slow submerged speeds. Made two hour dive to
effect repairs.

Fired "False Echo Target" Shell for test at 100
feet. Clear and distinct echoes out to 4,000 yards
for 8 minutes after firing. Made noise resembling
propeller disturbance while close to it.

20 July

Enroute LOMBOK STRAIT conducting training dives
and fire control problems. Pitometer log now working
due to the professional ability and a week of un-
tiring efforts on the part of KEMP, Thomas R., EM1c,
U.S. Navy.

1400 Observed partial eclipse of the sun. Latitude
15-56S, Longitude 114-23E.

21 July

Enroute LOMBOK STRAIT.

0900 Increased to 4 engine speed to get through LOMBOK
STRAIT during darkness this night and arrive at a point
15 miles northeast of the northeast corner of JAVA at
dawn for a submerged patrol.

2218 Picked up radar interference on our screen from
the direction of LOMBOK STRAIT. Appeared to be one
of our SJ radars - pulse rate 1,800. The NAUTILUS
was due through here at about this time.

2332 (SC#1) SJ contact on ship on port beam at 9,600
yards on the approximate bearing of the radar inter-
ference. Tracked him on course 200T at 12 knots and
attempted to communicate by keying the SJ radar. No
results. I felt positive that this was the NAUTILUS
and that he knew he had contact with the PUFFER so
took no further action.

22 July

0040 Sighted LOMBOK ISLAND bearing 003T at about 10
miles.

-2-

— page 193 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

0103 Picked up radar interference from the direct-
     ion of LO. ECM. again in this interference had
     the characteristics of one of our SJ radars. Figured
     this was the Y headed south or that the first con-
     tact had been the Y in this was the Y UTILUS.

0120 (0.2) Radar contact on ship headed east
     9,100 yards closing rapidly. Swung to west-
     ward and tracked to him. She swung to the westward
     then back to his southerly course. No inquiry in
     my mind but that this was one of our
     submarines - his speed and actions all in-
     dicated it. So north and continued transit
     of LO. ECM. after trying unsuccessfully to com-
     municate by keying our SJ radar.

     In both instances the RC was sensed but no
     signal was detected. Our own SJ seems to throw out
     everything else and it will have to be secured when
     we are checking for enemy radars.

0200 (0.3) Picked up two patrol boats on SJ radar
     bearing 075°, range 12,500 yards, patrolling at nine
     knots on a northerly course halfway between us and
     LO. ECM. Continued on at full speed on course
     015T.

0235 Patrol boats reversed course. Lost contact at
     13,000 yards.

0315 Completed transit of LO. ECM. and headed
     for desired patrol point covering traffic full
     into 50 R.B. VI. It had been that because
     we could not arrive at our point
     prior to daylight so decided to continue on the
     surface as we could run in undetected.

0642 Submerged 15 miles off the northern coast of
     B. LI and 40 miles east of the position we had
     hoped to be in. The presence of numerous small
     boats and two small unidentified craft made our
     detection and the subsequent routing of traffic
     around us certain if we remained on the sur-
     face.

     Closed the coast of B. LI to two miles and
     patrolled on an easterly course the rest of the day.

9 02960
-3-

— page 195 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1830 Surfaced and set course to run up northwesterly
off CUMBERLAND at OROH HARBOR
T.L.D.
2220 Crossed 200 fathom line at longitude 119°-26'E.

25 July
0516 Submerged 15 miles north of CUMBERLAND
on closing coast to patrol 5 miles off
beach covering LINGAYEN GULF traffic
routes.
1310 Sighted white smoke in direction of beach.
1338 Heavy haze and intermittent rain squalls ob-
scured smoke so pulled up to 40 ft. for sweep with
SJ radar. No contact.
1340 Surfaced and ran at 15 knots for 15 minutes to
gain bearing on smoke if it was a ship. While on
surf course identified as fire on beach.
1356 Submerged 6 miles from beach.
1437 (004) Sighted small patrol vessel bearing 123°,
steaming on southeasterly course close to shore.
Speed 10 knots.
1504 Patrol vessel passed out of sight. Small single
mast trawler type of about 100 tons.
1900 Surfaced and set course to cross northern an-
chorage of LINGAYEN GULF and be in position for
submerged patrol off T.L.D. LINGAYEN on western
side of strait.

26 July
0512 Submerged with T.L.D. LINGAYEN bearing 270°,
distant 8 miles. Commenced closing coast to patrol
4 miles off beach.
1135 Pulled up to 40 ft. for sweep with SJ radar
while in rain squall.

9 02960
-5-

— page 196 —
C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

1728 (C 5) Sighted small trawler type patrol boat at
     10,000 yards on course 030° at 6 knots hunting BORNEO
     coast between P.C. D.N. and P.A. M.L.
     Closed to 5 miles. No contacts.

1904 Surfaced with T.M. bearing 270°, dis-
     tant 5 miles. Commenced patrolling on line of
     bearing 112° 8 miles from P.A. M.L. at 10
     knots, reversing course every hour and a half. With
     our radar cover on this enabled us to cover 35
     miles so we did nothing further. We stayed a half of
     a mile from (except very fast target) on a patrol
     past us.

27 July

0410 (C 6) Radar contact on small ship at range
     11,000 yards, about 10 miles south of P.G.
     M.L. at this time picked up a false con-
     tact at 24,000 yards which we considered chasing 15
     knots. It turned out to be atmospheric contact
     but the actual looked at first very much like a large
     ship escort.

0500 Submerged.

0545 Sighted original contact at about 6,000 yards on
     course 115°, speed 5 knots. A type patrol craft.
     Contact 3, 4 and 5 were in the same di-
     rection of P.C. D.N. and P.A. M.L. in the
     light bearing radar as an escort, we followed
     him until 0730 when we lost him in a rain squall.
     Suspect that these patrol boats may keep an
     out for submarines, their primary duty is to haul sup-
     plies, etc. to light houses keepers and coast watchers.

1911 Surfaced and continued running same type patrol
     as last night.

28 July

0516 Submerged 8 miles from P.A. M.L. and con-
     tinued closing coast.

0908 Sighted two columns of smoke to northwest.

-6-

— page 198 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
catch them while still on an easterly course hugging
the coast before they arrived off P.A. L.U.M.P.I.N.I.
and had two courses of action open to them.

20 July

0401 Four miles off L.U.M.P.I.N.I. had to maneuver to
     avoid being sighted by a sail boat which I felt
     would possibly report our presence. As a result
     we did not reach the desired diving position and
     had to submerge at daylight off the above point.
     This was just about the most spot we could be in
     as it was the logical turning point. Thus began the
     most exasperating morning's submarine operations I
     have been through to date.

0505 Submerged 5 miles southeast of L.U.M.P.I.N.I. POINT.
     Could not safely head toward the beach in any di-
     rection until it was light enough to get cuts for
     there was a 2 knot southwesterly current running.
     Headed into current.

0516 JT sound operator picked up screws in the direct-
     ion of L.U.M.P.I.N.I. POINT, bearing changing to north-
     ward. Took estimated normal approach course at full speed. Visibility con-
     siderably hampered not only by the early morning fog
     but also by numerous floating logs, tree
     branches and the general debris characteristic of
     this area. During the next 15 minutes JT picked
     up one true contact and three false ones.

0535 (SC?) Observed that screws belonged to trawler
     type coastal vessel hugging coast. Broke off approach
     and commenced looking for some of the other re-
     ported screws from going to 90 feet to get rid of
     8 or 10 feet of seaweed trailing from periscope.
     Bumped large log with periscope on coming up. No
     damage.

0608 (SC?) Sighted smoke bearing about 270°.

0618 Sighted two masts on bearing of smoke. Apparently
     a ship heading toward us to round L.U.M.P.I.N.I. POINT.
     Could see beach well enough now
     to keep from being inadvertently set onto it.

     -8-

— page 201 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

0817 PC boat headed back toward convoy and we lost
     sight of him about 10 minutes later.

0838 Reload completed forward.

0842 (AC#1) Sighted dive bomber (RUFE) headed towards
     us from about 4 miles at low altitude. Went to
     150 ft. and commenced pulling clear at 4 knots.

0930 Came up for look and navigational fix. All clear.
     Evasion of escorts and plane had taken us 7 miles
     out.

0939 Picked up echo ranging on approximate true bear-
     ing 290T. Figured this was an A/S vessel sweeping
     for us but on the possibility that it was a target
     which hadn't gotten the news, headed for the beach
     at standard speed.

0956 Heard second pinger on same bearing and sighted
     smoke.

1007 (SC#11) Sighted two masts and top of bridge of
     large vessel and tops of two double masted escort
     vessels. Our only chance to get a shot at him was
     the possibility that he might swing wider around LABUAN
     BINI POINT than the preceding two vessels had or
     that he was going slower.

1025 Couldn't close. Had been running standard and
     full speed for 45 minutes and his angle on the bow
     was 110 starboard, estimated range 5,500 yards.

     This hurt for it was a valuable target. At this
     time I could not positively identify it because of
     the land background and a low haze in the
     which distorted its appearance but its man-of-
     war bow, bridge, tripod mast forward, large size, and
     the fact that it had two large minelayer or des-
     troyer escorts indicated it was valuable. Sub-
     sequent sighting of this ship on the 31st when it
     got past us again and on the 1st of August when
     it didn't, positively identified it as the sub-
     marine tender TSURUGISAKI of 12,000 tons displace-
     ment or her sister ship the TAKASAKI.

     The first two freighters were MFM, not look
     type, not similar to the OSAKI MARU type, 4,000
     tons, page 132, ONI 208J, and the other similar
     to the KIHOKU MARU type, 3,300 tons, page 135.

9 02960
-11-

— page 202 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

1031 (SC#12) Sighted more smoke and masts on approxi-
     mate bearing 280T, so rang up full speed and held
     it. Was determined nothing else was going to pass
     between us and the beach at a greater range than
     2,000 yards.

1042 False alarm. Of four vessels passing, one was a
     steam driven schooner with high masts which made it
     appear large from a distance (actually about three
     or four hundred tons) and the other three were sea
     trucks.

1048 (AC#2) Sighted observation plane (DAVE) apparently
     searching. Not close so kept an eye on him.

1052 (SC#13) While closing the beach one of the PC boats
     had been hard pinging as he came back toward us from
     the direction of the convoy. At this time he passed
     1,000 yards astern using manual keying and alternat-
     ing long pings and double pings. We were set up on
     him but he continued on his way without giving any
     indication of contacting us.

     My purpose in keeping set up on shallow draft es-
     corts when at periscope depth is not to shoot at them
     if they merely get within range but to be prepared
     to shoot if they get within range and start offensive
     action. I firmly believe that, regardless of
     how shallow the draft of an escort, torpedo running
     under him or close to him convinces him that he is
     considered a legitimate target and thereby reduces
     his effectiveness as an A/S vessel considerably.

1103 Navigational fix one mile from shore so commenced
     pulling out to 4,000 yards to patrol parallel to
     the coast on a northeasterly heading to see if any-
     thing else might still be coming through.

1223 (SC#14) Sighted another PC on the port bow heading
     toward us from a range of about 7,000 yards. Believe
     he heard our compressor running. He stopped and
     commenced lying to, listening, when we rigged for
     silent running. Put him astern and slowly worked
     away from him.

1327 Sighted another PC about 2 miles from first.

1414 All clear and quiet. Headed east to be about 15
     miles clear of land and surfacing.

-12-

— page 203 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1916 Surfaced 20 miles east of LABUAN BINI POINT and
headed out of MAKASSAR STRAIT. Since all today's
targets were hugging the coast decided to try and
make contact off TARAKAN. Planned to get fix on
SIPADAN ISLAND (Lat. 4-07N, Long. 118-38E) and then
head for a spot 30 miles northeast of TARAKAN along
the inshore traffic route from TARAKAN north.

30 July
1334 With SIPADAN ISLAND bearing 340T, distant 10
miles, submerged to remain down until dark.
1900 Surfaced with SIPADAN ISLAND bearing 040T,
distant 8½ miles. Set course 223T for a point 19
miles northeast of BUNJU ISLAND.
2318 Commenced patrol 19 miles off BUNJU ISLAND, 32
miles from the channel entrance to TARAKAN, main-
taining SJ radar contact on land preparatory to
submerging at daylight.

31 July
0512 Submerged just outside 100 fathom curve with
BUNJU ISLAND bearing 240T, distant 20 miles and com-
menced closing 10 fathom curve.

It was necessary to make this approach to shal-
low water with the utmost caution as the 10 fathom
curve is only 1½ miles from a three fathom bank
which extends 11 miles from BUNJU on this bearing.
The only navigational points for cuts on the right
and left tangents of BUNJU are high peaks 45 miles
to the north and northwest. Those peaks had been
identified the previous day but on this particular
morning were unfortunately clouded over most of the
time. This meant, in effect, that when we were
about two miles from the 10 fathom curve our po-
sition would have to be fixed by two tangents on
a 500 ft. island 13 miles away. Add to this the
fact that 7 or 8 fresh water rivers emptying into
the sea here make depth control difficult (we
regularly dropped from 65 ft. to 80 ft. or rose to
50 ft.) and the fact that we had intermittent rain
squalls all morning, and it was a tricky proposition.

All the above merely goes to prove that F-to can
be most unkind. For, if we had been able to fix
our position an hour earlier than we did, or if the
two valuable targets which came past had been an
hour later, we would probably have gotten in a then.

-13-

— page 204 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

0919 Position fairly well established by regular use
     of fathometer in conjunction with cuts. We were
     7 miles out from the 10 fathom curve so headed in.

0939 (SC#15) Sighted masts of what at first appeared
     to be two patrol vessels dead ahead in column on a
     northerly course. When a light rain squall in that
     vicinity cleared, a bridge was visible abaft the
     first mast and a stack abaft the second mast. Al-
     though I never saw the hull itself this was apparent-
     ly a large tanker, 6 or 7 miles away with an angle
     on the bow close to 90 starboard. Commenced clos-
     ing at high speed but he was too far away. He made
     one zig about 30 degrees in our direction but then
     zigged away again.

1006 (SC#16) Sighted smoke on port bow from direction
     of TARIKAN. Took a westerly course at full speed
     to close his probable track close to the 10 fathom
     curve.

1023 Picked up pinging of two ships on bearing of target.
     This target turned out to be the submarine tender
     previously sighted off MANGKALIHAT with two minelayer
     escorts similar to the YEYAMA class. The outboard
     escort was doing the smoking.

     Closed this group at high speed until

1106 at which time the target's angle on the bow was
     90 starboard and his range about 6,000 yards. We
     were just too far out to start with. As nearly as
     could be estimated, he was running between the 10
     fathom curve and the 3 fathom shoals and in spite
     of this was zigzagging. Its no wonder that they go
     aground in this vicinity. Needless to say it was
     not pleasant to see him get past us again - to say
     nothing of the tanker.

     Since no chase was practicable here, decided to
     pull out for a couple of hours, surface and head
     for SIBUTU PASSAGE to intercept them at the eastern
     entrance to DARVEL BAY.

     During the approach I made careful written notes
     of his appearance for I was still not quite certain
     what type ship it was other than that it was a man-
     of-war and probably some kind of tender. After the
     approach I made a sketch and then attempted identi-
     fication. His characteristics were so striking and

-14-

— page 205 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

definite that only a sister ship could be mistaken
for this vessel. Man-of-war bow, bridge forward,
small turret forward of bridge, large tripod mast
immediately aft bridge, long stretch of heavily
loaded deck, stack aft, heavy goal post mast abaft
stack, another turret aft of after mast and a
cruiser stern. I had the Executive Officer take
two looks to check on any points I might have
missed. One point we both missed at this range were
his cranes just abaft the foremast. Those were
seen the following day in the lowered position
from a range of 2,000 yards.

The submarine tender shown on page 89 of ONI 41
dated 1941, resembles this ship in practically
every detail and no other ship in any of the
recognition manuals even comes close to it. Ac-
cording to the manual there are two of this class
submarine tender, the TSURUGISAKI and the TAKASAKI
of 12,000 tons displacement each. The following
were the only differences observed.

1. Cranes were in lowered position lying almost
flat on deck.

2. Some sort of cargo was loaded along the whole
length of the deck between the cranes and stack.
This was all covered with tarpaulins.

3. The picture indicates a single tall mast aft
of the stack and a smaller mast and boom right on
the stern. The latter was not seen. The mast
abaft the stack was a heavy goal post type mast
approximately the same height as shown. Either
the manual is wrong on this mast or it has been
changed.

1128 (SC#17) Two PC boats on A/S sweep passed us at
     5,000 yards coming from direction of convoy and
     headed toward TARAKAN.

1323 Surfaced and set course for SIBUTU PASSAGE.

2230 Commenced transit of SIBUTU PASSAGE at 10 knots
     in bright moonlight.

1 August

0147 Commenced patrolling eastern entrance to DARVEL
     BAY.

-15-

— page 206 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

0508 Submerged in Lat. 5-06N, Long. 119-22E and con-
  tinued patrolling eastern entrance to DARVEL BAY.

0935 (SC#18) Sighted smoke to southwest with true bear-
  ing changing to the right. Came to 340T, the ap-
  proximate normal approach course.

0952 Picked up echo ranging on bearing 242T.

1004 Sighted foremast and top of bridge of TSURUGISAKI
  and tops of escorts on either side. Target was steer-
  ing a constant helm plan with present base course
  about 050T so put him eastern while maneuvering to
  get ahead of him on his base course.

1031 Provious observation while he was on his extreme
  left course with the range 7,900 yrds indicated
  that he had either altered his base course to the
  right or that he was varying the amount of his
  constant helm swing. This put us to the left of
  his base course so started right at full speed to
  close and shoot with the bow tubes on his next
  extreme left course.

1037 Target swinging left, angle on bow 40 port, range
  5,000 yrds. Port escort had a 5 starboard angle
  on the bow, was about 2,500 yards out on the port
  quarter of the target, and on our starboard beam.

1042 Angle on bow 90 port. He had just started swing-
  ing back right. Escort still on our starboard beam,
  zero angle on the bow and about 2,000 yards away.
  Felt that I had to fire this one with a periscope
  spread as his constant helming had prevented our
  obtaining more than a rough estimate of his speed -
  somewhere between 13 and 17 knots. I was using very
  little periscope and there was a light chop on the
  surface so the chances were good that the escort
  wouldn't see the periscope.

1043 ATTACK No. 2(n)
  Latitude 5-07.2N
  Longitude 119-34E
  Target course 060T, swinging right, estimated speed
  15 knots, angle on bow 110 port, range 1,750 yards,
  torpedo run 2,130 yards, track 127 port, gyro angle
  10 right, own course 100T.

-16-

— page 207 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1043-00 Fired one - aimed ¼ length ahead.
1043-11 Fired two - aimed just ahead.
1043-18 Fired three - Aimed ¼ length inside bow.
1043-26 Fired four - Aimed at M.O.T.
1043-34 Fired five - Aimed ¼ length inside stern.
1043-40 Fired six - Aimed ¼ length astern.

Swung periscope immedi tely to starboard beam
to look for port escort but found him instead 10
degrees abaft our port beam, angle on the bow 180
and starting to swing left.

He had apparently run right across our stern.

1044-21 First torpedo explosion, loud and heavy.
Could not look immedi tely as we were getting
set up on escort who had commenced to swing left.

1044-30 Dull explosion which was barely heard. May
have been an internal explosion on the ship, a
torpedo dud, or a torpedo exploding in such a way
that it didn't make much noise.

Escort was still swinging left presenting a 90
port angle on the bow. Commenced swinging right
for a stern tube shot. Range about 1,500 yards.

Looked at target to see what had happened to him.
He was slightly down by the bow and still swinging
right. While I was watching at

1044-51 saw another torpedo hit him just under the
bridge. This was one of the most terrific tor-
pedo explosions I have ever seen. It shook us up
considerably. His whole bow and bridge were en-
gulfed in huge cloud of smoke and spray which rose
above the top of his foremast. I think the tor-
pedo must have hit either a fuel tank forward or
a magazine.

On swinging back to the escort, found he had a
50 port angle on the bow range still about 1,500
yards. When he steadied with a 10 port angle on
the bow, his range was 1,200 yards.

9 02960
-17-

— page 208 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1046-48 ATTACK No. 2(b)

Range 1,050 yards, torpedo run 760 yards, commenced
firing three down the throat in spite of a large right
gyro angle. Started deep at the same time for I knew
things would be hot if we missed. We did miss and
things were hot, but not as bad as expected. The
third torpedo was not fired by the Control Party be-
cause we had started down. This probably saved a
torpedo as the set up was pretty much "from the hip".
However, he had us spotted and it was a question of
going deep or shooting and then going deep. If we
had hit him we would have had a period of grace in
which to observe the target and perhaps fire more
torpedoes at it for the other escort had remained
way over on the starboard quarter of the tender.

1048 to 1057 Thirty depth charges in salvoes as follows:
Four, three, five, four, six, three, five. This ended
the depth charging. All were fairly close in that
they shook the ship considerably, turned lights off
and on, and made the cork fly; no damage to the ship,
however.

To add to the growing list of classic remarks
that are born on such occasions as this, one of our
old timers in the Control Room came down with the
following.
"Boy, them was close. I was so scared I
smoked half a package of my own cigarettes
before I knew what I was doing."

During and after the depth charging the QB sound
gear was kept on a continuous sweep all around in an
endeavor to pick up the targets screws while the JK
was kept on the escorts. The targets screws
which had been very heavy and distinct prior to fir-
ing (sound had been furnishing continuous bearings
to TDC), were never heard again after the first tor-
pedo explosion. No difficulty was encountered in
keeping track of the screws of the two escort vessels
which were light and easily distinguished from
the heavy, slower beat of the target's screws. The
JP sound operator had much the same experience. He
picked up the target's screws during the approach
(about 10 minutes before the supersonic gear did and
the fact that he was listening to the target was
checked by periscope observations. After the first
torpedo hit the JP operator could not pick up the
target's screws again.

-18-

— page 209 —
C-O-NF-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

In view of the fact that the various sound
operators did not hear the target's screws after
he was hit and that the depth charging, which did
not prevent our keeping track of the escort's
screws while it was in progress, ended 12 minutes
after the last hit thus giving us a completely
clear field for listening, I feel that it is
perfectly reasonable to establish as a fact that
the target stopped his screws and did not start
them again.

1057-1107 Escorts alternated listening and echo rang-
ing. Maneuvered to keep one on each quarter.

1107 Screws of one escort faded out or stopped on true
bearing 122. Target had been hit on true bearing
100.

1122 JP and JK operators commenced hearing groaning
noises and the crackling breaking up noises of a
ship sinking from 100T to 118T. The JK and JP
operators were familiar with this sound from two
previous experiences in which the targets were
observed to sink. Commanding Officer also put
phones on and listened.

1128 Commenced coming up slowly to periscope depth.
One escort alternately listening and echo ranging
would not speed up above 3 knots even though
ship was heavy and progress slow.

1155 (about) Heard last of crackling, breaking up
noise from direction of target.

1213 (SC#19) Periscope observation. Escort in sight
astern, angle on bow 20 starboard, range 6,000
yards. No sight of target or other escort. Com-
menced swinging slowly to right to head in di-
rection of target and eventually to south through
SIBUTU PASSAGE. Tubes #1, 2, 3 and 4 reloaded for-
ward. Commenced reloading remaining torpedoes for-
ward and aft.

1248 Sight of smoke on bearing 119T. It was the second
escort approaching at high speed. This escort re-
joined the first and they both took an northerly
course and then away at high speed. It appeared
very much as if the one escort had gone over to
the target to pick up survivors about the time we
heard the breaking up noises while the other looked
for us. It was puzzling as to why they would go
off and leave us until at -

-19-

— page 210 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1305 Picked up echo ranging from the direction of the
     western entrance to TAMI TAMI BAY.

1311 Lost sight of original escorts.

1330 (SC#20) Picked up masts of two ships which turned
     out to be a type 40-44 PC boat and a converted trawler.
     The PC was echo ranging and the trawler listening.
     A third A/S vessel could be heard echo ranging farther
     in toward TAMI TAMI, but only the top of his one mast
     was ever seen. Looked like another PC. They made a
     slow sweep past us heading north on an east-west line
     of bearing. These ships came out of TAMI TAMI BAY
     probably to relieve the original two escorts. The
     nearest ship, the trawler, passed about 4,000 yards
     astern of us while we were on an easterly course.

1425 Lost sight of A/S vessels and resumed southerly
     course. Distant echo ranging heard for about another
     hour. We were making 4 knots and aided by a 2 knot
     southerly current so we made good time through SIBUTU
     PASSAGE.

1442 (SC#21) Another small A/S vessel came up from the
     south, headed for scene of attack. Passed us at about
     5,000 yards - trawler type.

     Although we passed close to the estimated position
     of the original ration nothing was ever seen of the
     target or any floating wreckage.

     I believe the sub tender sank for the following
     reasons:

     (1) Screws stopped and never started again.

     (2) Breaking up noises were heard for half an
         hour.

     (3) Not in sight an hour and a half after being
     hit. In order to get clear he either had to go under
     his own power or be towed. With his damage forward
     he would have had to make a high number of turns to
     get clear in an hour and a half, yet we did not hear
     his screws. The two escorts available to tow him were
     observed to leave. A towing vessel would not have had
     time to come out of TAMI TAMI BAY and tow him clear in
     an hour and a half.

-20-

— page 211 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(4) During the night, AWI TAWI BAY, theological
place to seek refuge 1' ne was still afloat, was
carefully reconnoiter' with the SJ radar from a
position two miles of TIJITJI REEFS. Nothing
was found there. Re ge 26,000 yards across the bay.
Neither was anythin seen in the bay the next
morning by perisco'. This search however was not
as accurate as the one made during the night for
intermittent rain squalls and haze prevailed.

One feature o this attack remains somewhat a
mystery. Plot hows that there should have been
't least 4 hi'. There were two very definite
torpedo hits, one very loud timed explosion which
was easily recognizable as a torpedo hit though
not always due to the necessity for watching the
escort which was close aboard, and the second
terrific which was observed and jarred our ship
considerably. There were thirty seconds between
these explosions. Torpedoes were spread from for-
ward of with the result at comparatively small
physic' spread. Any way our recorded data
plots shows a minimum of 4 hits. The only
apparent answer is erratics or duds. No
did, of course, have the one low order explosion
nin seconds after the first hit which might have
be a dud. Another possible answer is that
first hit slowed him down so much that some of the
torpedoes passed ahead.

203 Surfaced half way through SIBUTU PASSAGE having
had no more indications of A/S vessels. The moon
was intermittently covered with low clouds and pas-
sing rain squalls.

120 SJ radar interference in direction of SIBUTU
ISLAND.

2130 (SC#22) Exchanged recognition signals and calls
with RASHER by SJ radar. Told him he might ex-
pect A/S vessels in SIBUTU due to our action there
for which information he thanked me. The bird of
this first communication by means of our SJ radar
keying circuit was amazing. The RASHER's estimated
range was 10 to 15 miles.

2205 Experienced several minutes of difficulty with a
friendly but tired sea gull. After making a couple
of low hovering passes at the bridge which caused
all hands to be quickly covered, he attempted
twice to land on the high lookout's head. Stopped

9 02960
-21-

— page 212 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

laughing long enough to yell a warning to the look-
out who seemed either unaware of or unconcerned with
his plight. Came his answer: "Yes, sir, Captain,
I know it. He tried to bite me a minute ago." Where-
with we gave the high lookout a broom for protection.
He next tried a landing on the revolving SJ mast
and finally made it after nearly spinning in once.
Five or six revolutions were enough - he had to bal-
ance himself with his wings like a tightrope walker.
He finally flew down on deck after what was one of
the silliest exhibitions I have ever seen one of our
feathered friends of the sea engage in.

2 August

0200 Commenced careful sweep of TAWI TAWI BAY with the
SJ radar from a line parallel to and two miles off
TIJI TIJI REEFS. The small islands inside the bay
were picked up as well as the opposite shoreline but
no ships were picked up in between.

0513 Submerged and closed reefs for periscope look in-
side bay. Nothing sighted.

0910 Visibility became very poor so commenced heading
back out into CELEBES SEA.

1250 Surfaced and headed for traffic focal point 45
miles northwest of northwestern tip of CELEBES ISLAND.

1330 (AC#3) Submerged for float type plane which headed
toward us from about 7 miles.

1410 Surfaced and continued on course.

1455 (AC#4) Sighted float type plane at about 10 miles
which apparently did not see us so stayed on surface.

3 August

0100 Commenced slow surface patrol in vicinity of traf-
fic focal point at Lat. 2-05N, Long. 120-05E.

0610 (AC#5) Submerged for plane sighted at a range of
about 10 miles. Stayed down to check operation of
pit log.

0934 Surfaced and continued patrol of focal point.

-22-

— page 213 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
2210 Made dive to flush out #4 fuel ballast tank.
2227 Surfaced.
4 August
Same type patrol as yesterday. During early eve-
ning received dispatch orders to transit SIBUTU PAS-
SAGE and patrol in SULU SEA until dark, 10 August,
then proceed to assigned area off MANILA.
1927 Set course for SIBUTU.
5 August
0845 (SC#6) Submerged for target on SD radar at 10
miles.
0937 Surfaced.
2048 Commenced transit of SIBUTU PASSAGE.
2155 Hit large floating log with healthy jar but
could find no evidence of damage.
2320 Completed transit of SIBUTU and headed for
PEARL BANK PASSAGE.
6 August
0035 Picked up distant SJ radar interference astern.
0253 Passed through PEARL BANK PASSAGE. Navigation
in these waters is not nearly so hazardous with
the new SJ radar.
0316 (SC#23) Exchanged recognition signals by radar
with BLUEFISH.
0437 BLUEFISH closed us for short conference. We
decided to run a patrol line on the surface
fifteen miles apart on the course he was taking
to pass through our area. This we did. At dark,
he continued on his way north and we commenced
closing the coast of MINDANAO heading for
DULUNGUIN POINT.
7 August
0522 Submerged with SAPOAK POINT bearing 082T,
distant 5.5 miles and commenced patrol 2 miles off
coast.

-23-

— page 214 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1143 (SC#24.) Sighted masts of ship bearing 194T ap-
     proaching us from the direction of BASILAN STRAIT.
     Battle stations.

1153 Sighted new masts farther back and closer to
     the beach. I had absolutely no intention of get-
     ting left outside again so immediately closed in
     to one mile off-shore. From this position all I
     had to do was sit and wait as both of them were
     closing me with almost zero angles.

1228 It now appeared that the first target sighted
     would pass in a good position for a stern tube shot
     but that the second target which was closer to the
     beach and about a mile behind was going to be tougher
     to hit. Decided that if I hit the first one that
     the second would reverse course and that could swing
     right and hit him with the bow tubes when he was
     half way around, or, if he held his course, I could
     shoot "down the throat" shot.

     Also could see now that the targets were freighters
     and not as big as first estimated. The mast of an
     escort was just showing up in line with and on the
     port quarter of the first target.

     Our set up was shocking so well on #1 target that
     I decided to fire only one torpedo since the range
     would be close.

1244 Single ping range of 900 yards checked with TDC
     set up.

     ATTACK No. 3(n)

     Latitude 7-50N
     Longitude 122-07.3E

     With range 950 yards, torpedo run 900 yards, angle
     on bow, 88 starboard, torpedo track 101 starboard,
     target course 030, speed 9.5 knots, own course 131,
     speed 4 and gyro angle 179.

1245-20 Fired #7 tube at M.O.T.

1245-55 Torpedo hit M.O.T. The only way to describe
     this sinking is that the target disintegrated in a
     cloud of smoke. It must have been loaded with gaso-
     line or ammunition for he literally blew to pieces.

     -4-

— page 215 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

In this connection and in an effort to compare
relative force of torpedo explosions, I would
like to say here that despite the close range
and the intensity of the explosion, it was not
felt nearly as much on the ship as was the ex-
plosion of the submarine tender at 2,000 yards.

As soon as he was hit we commenced swinging
right for the second target. He was acting as
predicted except that he was reversing course
toward the beach instead of away from it.

ATTACK NO. 3(b)

With the range 1,200 yards, angle on bow 105
port swinging right, torpedo track 114 port in-
crossing, gyro angle 34 right, target course 135,
speed 9.5 knots, own course 167, speed 4,

1247-25 commenced firing two torpedoes aimed ¼ length
inside the bow and ¼ length inside the stern re-
spectively.

1249-25 Torpedoes had not hit, target had steadied on
a course giving us a 135 starboard angle on the bow,
and only the top of the escorts' mast was in sight
to seaward so decided to fire one more.

1249-30 Fired #3 tube after feeding a series of con-
tinuous bearings into the TDC.

1250-14 Saw first torpedo explode on beach to left of
target.

1250-49 Saw second torpedo explode on beach to left
of target. The third torpedo was headed very
nicely toward the target for what looked like a
sure hit but after the second torpedo exploded on
the beach he swung left and showed us his stern.

1251-06 Third torpedo exploded on the beach ahead and
to the right of the target after passing down his
starboard side.

1251-32 First depth charge.

1254 Second depth charge. Escort was now headed in
our direction but I couldn't make out what type
he was having only seen the top of his mast and
zero angle on the bow view. He was small what-
ever he was. Started deep.

9 02960
-25-

— page 216 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1255 Two depth charges.
1255 - 1346 Escort dropped 16 more depth charges, some in
groups of two but most of them singly. He was pretty
good - listened only and apparently attempted to place
each charge rather than drop in salvoes. As it turned
out his accuracy was probably due to an air leak in
the blow down valve on the QB head which we could
hear on our sound gear but were having trouble locat-
ing. As soon as this leak was located and stopped we
had no more depth charges and at

1417 His screws were growing faint on bearing 170T.

1611 Periscope observation. No sign of target or es-
cort.

We were too close to the beach to surface and
would not be able to overtake him after dark as he
only had a 5 hour run to ZAMBOANGA so headed out to
seaward.

The target sunk was very similar to the KOHUKU MARU,
page 104, ONI 208J (rev.), 3,200 tons. His tripod
masts fore and aft were so outstanding that I feel
this identification may be considered positive. The
target missed was most nearly similar to the HIYOSI
MARU type, page 108, 4,046 tons.

Our torpedo distribution was now very poor there
being one left forward and five aft. Since this
would practically limit us to one salvo from the
stern tubes decided to pull clear of the coast to-
night and shift two torpedoes forward.

1904 Surfaced with SAMPOAK POINT bearing 134T, distant
12.5 miles.

2145 Commenced transfer of two torpedoes from the after
torpedo room to the forward torpedo room.

8 August

0107 Completed the transfer of two torpedoes to the for-
ward room. This ticklish job was carefully planned
and efficiently accomplished by Lieut. F. G. GOLAY,
USNR and Lieut. W. M. PUGH, USN with volunteers from
the deck force and torpedo force respectively, all
under the supervision of the Executive Officer, Lt.
Comdr. C. R. DYER, USN.

-26-

— page 217 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

0111 Set course for the southern tip of NEGROS ISLAND
     bearing 075T, distant 17 miles. Closed to 3 miles
     from coast and continued submerged patrol during
     day.

1843 Surfaced with SITON POINT bearing 318T, distant
     7 miles. Set course to pass around APO ISLAND and
     run up to DUMAGUETE to reconnoiter dock there.

2115 Sighted fixed red light on wharf at DUMAGUETE.

2155 Passed four miles from wharf. No ships tied
     up there and no signs of activity. Swept wharf
     with SJ radar as further check. Picked up a
     small boat or buoy dead in water and another
     small boat moving slowly along the shoreline.

2206 Reversed course and headed for APO ISLAND.

2340 Slowed to 5 knots and commenced patrolling half
     way between southern tip of NEGROS ISLAND and
     northern coast of MINDANAO.

9 August

0503 Submerged with APO ISLAND bearing 015T, distant
     6 miles. Patrolled 2 to 3 miles from beach during
     day, paying particular attention to possible traffic
     routes past APO ISLAND.

1855 Surfaced and set course to follow westward along
     CEBU - BALABAC STRAIT traffic route while working
     toward CUYO ISLAND, preparatory to passing through
     MINDORO STRAIT.

10 August

     Patrolling on surface.

1450 Sighted CUYO ISLAND bearing 347T, distant about
     33 miles. Started through CUYO EAST PASS headed
     for MINDORO STRAIT.

11 August

0300 Completed transit of MINDORO STRAIT and set course
     for CAPE CALAVITE.

9 02960
-27-

— page 218 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
0503 Submerged with TRIBILO POINT bearing 015T,
     distant 10 miles.

1530 CAPE CALAVITE LIGHT bearing 047T, distant
     3.3 miles. Decided to spend several days off
     CALAVITE to intercept any traffic coming out of
     CALAVITE PASS headed for PALAWAN PASSAGE or across
     the CHINA SEA. The weather looked ideal for con-
     voys routed this way to be moved. The sky was com-
     pletely overcast with intermittent blows and heavy
     rain squalls reducing the visibility to a thousand
     yards or less. Maximum visibility at any time dur-
     ing the day was about 5 miles.

     Shortly prior to surfacing spotted two two-
     masted schooners running close to the nearest
     islands of the LUBING group.

1855 Surfaced with CAPE CALAVITE bearing 157T,
     distant 5½ miles. Took up a position 5 miles from
     CALAVITE and 5 miles from the nearest island of the
     LUBING group and commenced lying to.

2015 (SC#25) Picked up SJ contact on a small boat at
     7,400 yards, range on course 260T, speed 3 knots.
     Surmised that this was one of the two-masted
     schooners sighted prior to surfacing although his
     course out to sea was rather peculiar. It was too
     dark to see him in spite of the fact that we allowed
     him to come in as close as 3,200 yards before kick-
     ing ahead slowly and putting him astern.

2325 Lost contact with small boat bearing 275T, range
     9,300 yards. Was still suspicious of him and be-
     came even more so when commenced to flash a light.
     He flashed the light intermittently for the next
     hour. This, I'm convinced, was some kind of a
     signal. It was not a lantern hung from a mast bob-
     bing up and down - it was too clear for that when
     it was visible - nor was it signalling by dots and
     dashes in the generally accepted method. It was
     merely an intermittently flashing white light which
     could have meant most anything.

-28-

— page 219 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

12 August

0120 (SC#26) WJ radar contact on small ship bearing
     217T, range 10,950 yards and closing fast. Swung
     to put him astern and attempt to ease slowly off
     his track while getting ready on 4 engines.
     Couldn't get rid of him at two-thirds standard
     or full speed. The sky had cleared about midnight
     (the only time it was clear for a week) and he
     was apparently seeing us in the light of a quite
     bright quarter moon. When we swung to put him
     on the port quarter, he started to draw forward
     on the port side; same thing when we put him on the
     starboard quarter - range decreasing all the time.
     This situation wouldn't have been bad except for
     the fact that we were boxed in with CAPE CALAVITE
     5 miles on the starboard bow, LUBANG ISLAND 6
     miles on the port bow and the CALAVITE PASS on-
     trance to VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE dead ahead. This
     letter I consider a place to enter only after
     careful consideration and then with a large de-
     gree of stealth and not while being chased at
     18 knots.

     Could see our pursuer fairly plainly - well
     enough to recognize him as a small man-of-war.
     Probably a sub-chaser judging from the radar
     ranges but he looked big enough to be a destroyer.

0142 Submerged to 60 feet and swung off the track
     to shoot with stern tubes if he was big enough.

0145 Echo ranging commenced.

0150 Pinging was getting closer and I still couldn't
     see him through the periscope so went to 250 feet.

0225 After maneuvering for 35 minutes he passed
     close aboard once but gradually drew off toward
     CAPE CALAVITE.

0240 Nothing in sight by periscope - pinging faint.

0245 Surfaced and headed westward.

0310 (SC#27) Picked him up again bearing 210T, range
     11,000 yards and opening.

-29-

— page 220 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

0340 Reversed course to head back for CAPE CALAVITE.
This whole series of events during the night looked
very much as if an A/S sweep was being made in the
area in an attempt to clear the way for an incoming
or outbound convoy. My guess was incoming because
of the signalling 15 miles out but I was wrong - it
was outgoing. The flashing white light must have
meant that the coast was clear. I figured that even
if the second A/S vessel had seen and reported us
it was probably too late for a convoy coming from
either direction and aiming to pass CALAVITE at
dawn, to turn back.

0442 (SC#28) Picked up SJ radar contact on three ships
in direction of CAPE CALAVITE at 19,000 yards. Manned
radar tracking party and commenced tracking at 17
knots.

The ships were passing CAPE CALAVITE about 5,000
yards off and were headed on approximate base course
220T. This put us about 10 miles off the track and
it was commencing to get light but fortunately heavy
weather had descended upon us again. Although our
horizon to the south was clear they were in a heavy
rain squall.

0513 Range still 19,000 yards, 6 miles off the track -
submerged and commenced closing track at 6 knots.

Just prior to diving we had picked up what ap-
peared to be radar interference on bearing 200T but
did not have time to check on whether it was friendly
or enemy.

0531 First look since diving. Targets were still
obscured by rain squall although I could see
some smoke and the faint outline of the tops of
one large ship with a small angle on the bow.

This whole approach was peculiar because of
the continuously changing state of visibility.
At times I could only see the escort who was com-
ing down on the starboard bow of our target and
at other times I couldn't see any ships at all.
The escort's continuous pinging prevented their
making any radical change without our picking
up the change in bearing.

-30-

— page 221 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

0602 Could see large bridge and masts of target with
     a 10 degree storboard anglo on the bow. Target on
     port beam, escort on our port quarter with a ten
     port anglo on the bow - looked like he would pass
     close abourd.

0606 Target and escort made radical course change to
     left presenting a sixty to seventy storboard anglo
     on the bow. Identified target as a large tanker
     and at the same timo saw a socond one to the loft
     of him with a zero anglo on the bow. Took normal
     appronch course at full spood.

0614 Zig back to right - anglo on bow 10 storboard.
     Throe ships wore now in sight, two tankers and a
     froighter or passonger ship in column. Escort
     was a dostroyer passing astern and looked as if
     ho would be well cle r by the timo the torgots
     arrived within firing rango. Rango now 6,000
     yards.

0618 Visibi lity cleared on the targets port hand
     and 4 more ships were seen in column of twos,
     one tanker and one froighter in each column.
     Thore were probably more but I couldn't see them.
     It later turned out that thoro were at loast throe
     more escorts although the one dostroyer was all I
     ever saw. From this timo on our target held a
     steady courso until the timo of firing. I ex-
     pected monentarily that ho would zig but it didn't
     make much differonce for ho couldn't get past us
     now no mottor what he did.

0629 First tanker had a 25 storboard anglo on the bow,
     rango 1,500 yards and socond tanker had a zero
     anglo on the bow, rango about 3,000 yards. De-
     cided to shoot the bow tubes at the first one,
     swing right, pull off the track and shoot the stern
     tubes at the socond one.

ATTACK No. 4(a)

Latitude 13-17N
Longitude 120-07.8E

Rango 900 yards chocked by singlo ping rango,
torpedo run 710 yards, anglo on bow 20 storboard,
torpedo track 20 storboard, courso 200T, spood
8.5 knots, own courso 066T, spood 2 knots.

-31-

— page 222 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
0631-00 Fired one at M.O.T.
0631-14 Fired two spread ½o right.
0631-21 Fired three spread ½o left. Saw first torpedo
  running erratic to the right and passing ahead of
  target.

0631-41 Saw and heard second torpedo hit about half
  way between bridge and bow.

0631-45 Saw third torpedo hit just abaft bridge. The
  tanker immediately burst into heavy flames all
  around the bridge and the bow commenced settling.
  Started swinging right and at the same time the
  target started swinging right in what looked like
  an attempt to ram us though it may have been just
  loss of steering control. When the angle on the
  bow was zero had to drop down to 100 feet for he
  was very close aboard. Caught a glimpse of the
  second tanker changing course to the right.
  Started to get set up for sound shot but sound
  was hearing so many screws it was too much of a
  gamble to shoot on sound bearings.

0635 Came back up to periscope depth. I can't give
  a very comprehensive account of the movements of
  any ships but our targets for it was pretty much a
  mad scramble with ships going every direction and
  a continuous pop-popping of their guns as they fired
  into the water. Took a sweep around first to look
  for an escort. Next looked at our
  target who was dead in the water, still burning
  fiercely, and further down by the bow. I was con-
  templating firing one more at him when I looked
  astern and found the previously mentioned freighter
  passenger ship crossing our stern with an 80 port
  angle on the bow, range 1,500 yards. As we were
  getting set up on him I could see another ship out
  beyond him on his starboard bow and partially hid-
  den by a rain squall. The target was an M.T.K.M type
  with his composite superstructure amidships taking
  up about ¼ of his length.

ATTACK No. 4(b)

Range 1,500 yards checked by single ping, torpedo
run 1,470, angle on bow 90 port, track 98 port, course
240, speed 8.5, own course 157 (had swung left while
below periscope depth), speed 3.

- -32-

— page 223 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
0636-48 Fired #7 at M.O.T.
0636-50 Heard two depth charges - not close.
0636-58 Fired #8.
0637-07 Fired #10.

A few seconds after firing saw a large splash
between us and the target and thought for a
moment it was premature until I saw three
other splashes in the vicinity and realized it
was more gunfire.

0637-41 Saw and heard first torpedo hit directly
under bridge and stack.
0637-49 Saw and heard second torpedo hit inside bow.
0638-30 Heard third torpedo explosion. Did not see
this as I was sweeping around with the periscope.
This later turned out to be a hit in the bow of
the second tanker which was on the starboard bow
of the freighter. The original escort was now
headed back in our direction coming up on our
starboard quarter but still distant and the first
tanker was still burning. The freighter took a
heavy port list immediately and commenced set-
tling rapidly.

0640 Two depth charges.
0641 Single depth charge. Escort was now approaching
ing rapidly so rigged for depth charge and started
deep.

On my last look the freighter was in the worst
condition and seemed to be sinking quite rapidly
but the first tanker had stopped settling for the
time being. The second tanker, still in the out-
side edge of a rain squall was reversing course
and appeared to be burning forward.

0643-0722 Conducting evasive tactics. That three
other escorts had shown up was indicated from the
echo ranging of our A/S vessels. They must have
been to the port and far side of the formation for
I only saw one prior to going deep. Thirty-seven
more depth charges were dropped but none of them
were close. Believe there was too much confusion
topside for them to conduct an effective search.
During this period I heard the typical breaking
noises of a sinking ship on the bearing of the
freighter.
-33-

— page 224 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

0735 Started up slowly. All but one pinger had faded
     out on a southerly bearing.

0806 Sighted two tankers dead in the water with a des-
     troyer alongside the inner one probably taking off
     personnel. What I wouldn't have given for a couple
     of more torpedoes at this point! The first tanker
     was still low in the water and down by the bow but
     the fire was out. His topside was a mess - badly
     burned and charred. The second tanker was also
and  looked bent about half way between his bridge and forward
     bow. We got two pictures of him later though they
     may not come out well due to the poor visibility.
     The freighter was nowhere in sight. I feel sure
     it sank, first, because it very definitely looked
     like it was sinking when I last saw it, secondly
     because we heard the breaking up noises and thirdly
     because it was not now in sight whereas the two
     damaged tankers were.

0808 (AC#8) Sighted plane circling over damaged tankers.

     Spent the rest of the day following the two
     tankers which were drifting at about 2 knots in a
     northeasterly direction toward CAPE CALAVITE. Keep-
     ing them in sight was a three day battle with the
     plane, destroyer and the visibility which was grow-
     ing continuously worse. After leaving the side of
     the first tanker the destroyer commenced maintain-
     ing a patrol around both ships echo ranging inter-
     mittently. About 1100 the weather got too bad for
     the plane and we didn't see him anymore. Sometime
     during the morning the fire was put out on the second
     tanker. I feel that both of the ships must have been in
     very bad shape internally for they both appeared
     entirely abandoned and no effort was made to get up
     steam on either one. This in spite of the fact that
     neither had been hit in their engineering spaces and
     that they were obviously drifting onto the steep beach
     at CALAVITE where they would surely break up in the
     heavy seas.

     One tanker appeared very similar to the HUZISAN
     MARU class of tanker page 285, ONI 208-J (rev.).
     Single mast forward, bridge, kingposts abaft bridge,
     single mast aft and stack. The pictures of this one
     may positively identify it. The other was the same
     size and had a single mast forward, single mast aft

-34-

— page 225 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

and stack aft but the after mast was almost
amidships making it look more like the TEIYO
MARU on page 276. Was not able to get pictures
of this one due to interference from the es-
cort and rain squalls. The freighter was most
nearly similar to the HOKKAI MARU class, page 77.
The tankers were apparently empty when hit for
they were riding high in the water. The freighter
appeared to be loaded.

At 1323 gct my last look at the group as a down-
pour of rain enveloped all of us for the rest of the
day. The wind had increased to at least 40 knots
and the seas were mountainous requiring two-thirds
and standard speed to stay at periscope depth and
full speed occasionally to keep us from broaching.

We maintained contact with the destroyer by
heading on the true bearing of his pinging but visi-
bility was not more than 500 yards. This was very
discouraging as I felt sure the heavy seas would
finish sinking the tankers and I wouldn't see it.
If they didn't sink it looked like they would hit
the beach for sure for a tow in this weather
seemed out of the question.

At 1700, with our estimated position 8 miles off
CAPE CALAVITE, I began to get a little worried
that this heavy sea might pile us up on the beach.
I wasn't sure at all that we weren't in a typhoon
although we had not had any of the advance warn-
ings common to a typhoon. Headed out on course
330T. Radar echo ranging until 1810.

1900 Surfaced making full speed with the sea (050T).
No contacts on the SJ radar except with land. The
wind was 40 to 50 knots and the rain still pouring
down so I decided to pull clear of the coast and
get a contact report off concerning the rest of the
convoy, and the fact that the two tankers were
adrift off CAPE CALAVITE.

1920 Picked up strong radar interference on the SJ
radar. It was an extremely powerful radar trained
directly on us and, according to the radio tech-
nicians, was not another SJ radar as it had very
peculiar wave form characteristics. A sketch is
included under remarks on SJ radar.

-35-

— page 226 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

In order that they wouldn't be able to train on
our radar, we secured the transmitter, taking a sweep
once a minute. The bearing indicated that the radar
was located on or just off CAPE CALAVITE. After be-
ing trained on us continuously for about 5 minutes,
he turned his radar off and from then on used it only
intermittently.

1952 Lost radar interference.

2135 Completed transmitting message. Decided to stay
clear of coast until weather abated somewhat and
visibility improved. I didn't think they could do
much about the tankers until the seas calmed down
and it didn't seem advisable to take any risks with
the ship in this weather since we were capable of
no offensive action.

13 August

0500 Submerged. Wind and seas still high, visibility
one mile maximum.

1600 Wind had abated considerably and visibility in-
creased to about 5 miles.

1612 Surfaced and set course for CAPE CALAVITE, seas
still high, wind 20 knots. Received dispatch in-
structions for participation in special task.

2038 Commenced radar sweep of coast starting 3½ miles
off PANTOCOMI POINT which is 6½ miles southeast of
CAPE CALAVITE LIGHT and constitutes the western side
of PALUAN BAY. If we had only started this search
from 3 to 5 miles further south we would undoubtedly
have contacted the remainder of our convoy which,
judging from an intercepted MUSKELLUNGE dispatch,
had taken refuge in PALUAN BAY.

While making this northerly sweep of the coast,
received word that special task was cancelled. In-
tended to submerge close to coast in morning and
search carefully for signs of two battered tankers
on the rocks. Received dispatch orders to commence
return to PEARL HARBOR.

-36-

— page 227 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The radar sweep up to CAPE C.L.VITE actually proved
nothing since the beach is so steep and the hundred
fathom curve so close to it (about 1 mile)
that we might easily have passed both tankers with-
out picking them up against the land background.
The radar screen was full of side lobes from the
land at this close range.

14 August

Leaving area enroute PEARL HARBOR.

15 August

Enroute PE RL HARBOR.
0010 Radar interference bearing 013T.
0110 (SC#29) Exchanged SJ radar recognition signals
     with BLUEFISH whose area we were passing through.
0624 SJ radar interference.
0710 Exchanged recognition signals with RISHER.
0755 Closed for short period of blinker communication
     since our course was taking us close to RISHER.
0800 Passed to operational control of Commander Task
     Force SEVENTEEN.
1242 (AC#9) SD radar contact 6 miles opening.
1508 (AC#10) SD contact 10 miles steady and then
     opening.
2300 Radar contact on ITBAYAT ISLAND bearing 068T,
     distant about 30 miles.
2325 Sighted glow of fire or searchlight in direction
     of ITBAYAT ISLAND.

-37-

— page 228 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
16 August

          As we approached ITBAYAT ISLAND the glow in-
creased in intensity and from the intermittent
manner in which it lighted up the sky it appeared
to be a fire fanned by the wind. Whatever it was,
it was on the far side of the island. Took regular
bearings of the glow until we had it plotted in on
the southern end of ITBAYAT near a 700 foot peak.
It looked like an oil fire but I thought it might
be an active volcano.

0045 (SC#31) On passing the southern tip of the island
     the fire was very bright, lighting up the whole
     northern horizon. It looked too low to be a volcano
     and our bearings were now plotting it right on the
     coast. Finally saw a large kingmast silhouetted
     against the background of fire and part of the bow
     or stern of a large ship at a 45 degree angle.
     Decided it was undoubtedly a large tanker hit by
     one of the wolf packs operating in this area.

          Just in case whoever hit it didn't get a chance
to see what damage was done, I can vouch for the
fact that the ship was destroyed beyond all hopes
of salvage by the enemy. It was the most terrific
fire I have ever seen on a ship - a regular inferno.
We didn't lose sight of the fire until about 0330 and
I think it was just our distance, about 25 miles,
which made us lose sight of it and not because it
went out.
          It was a temptation to hang around and submerge there
the next morning. I didn't because we saw what appeared
to be the silhouette of a destroyer standing by and
because there was no question in my mind that it was
a ship and that no further investigation was necessary
to determine that it was done for. Closest range to
it was 6,000 yards.

17 to 29 August.

          Enroute PEARL HARBOR, T.H.

29 August

          Arrived PEARL HARBOR, T.H.

-38-

— page 229 —
CONFIDENTIAL
(C) WEATHER

The weather while patrolling MAKASSAR STR ITS,
CELEBES SEA and the SULU SEA was excellent with good
visibility, occasional moderate rain squalls and
calm sea conditions. However, in the SOUTH CHINA
SEA off CAPE CALAVITE, MINDORO ISLAND, P.I. the
weather was rainy and overcast with strong winds from
SW until the day of the last attack (12 August) when
the weather approached typhoon proportions. On the
trip from station to PEARL HARBOR the weather con-
tinued rainy, overcast, and rough seas prevailed from
west of MANILA to Longitude 150E.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

Currents noted on this patrol were found to agree
with the current charts and Coastal Pilots. The cur-
rents in MAKASSAR STRAIT were as follows:

Off NORTH WATCHER - 1.0 knots - 205T.

Off MANGKALIHAT - 2.0 knots - 220T.

A strong southwesterly current was found south
of SIBUTU PASS.

(E) NAVIGATION AIDS

One navigational light was seen: DUMAGUETE PIER,
fixed red (NEGROS ISLAND, P.I.).

The SJ-A radar installed prior to the start of
this patrol proved to be of considerably more value
than the old SJ radar as an aid to piloting in re-
stricted waters.

In some ten trips through SIBUTU PASSAGE, we have
become pretty well convinced that SIBUTU HILL, SIBUTU
ISLAND, is not correctly plotted on the chart. It is
not far enough off to make its use hazardous but it
does not cut in well from positions in the northern
part of the passage. We are not able to give a better
location for it, however.

9 02960
-39-

— page 230 —
(F) SHIP CONTACTS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

NO. TIME DATE LAT.      TYPE(S)        INITIAL EST. COURSE REMARKS
                 LONG.                  RANGE   & SPEED
1   2332 21 July 9-12S   U.S. Submarine 9,650   200T    Picked up radar
                 115-42E                        12K     interference 14 minutes
                                                        before contact. Probably
                                                        USS NAUTILUS.
2   0120 22 July 8-45S   U.S. Submarine 9,600   180T    Picked up radar
                 115-45E                        17K     interference 17 minutes
                                                        before contact. Probably
                                                        USS R.I.Y.
3   0200 22 July 8-40S   Patrol Craft   12,250  020T    Usual LOMBOK STRAIT
                 115-47E                13,550  9K      night patrol.
4   1440 25 July 00-48N  Patrol Craft   11,000  212T    Crossed DAMPEI
                 120-05E                        10K     E.V. and hugged coast
                                                        rounding T.G. BOGONG.
5   1728 26 July 00-53N  Patrol Craft   10,000  030T    Sighted smoke at
                 119-01E                        6K      63ft could see ship at
                                                        55ft ship hugging coast
                                                        of BORNEO between T.G.
                                                        D.R.N.D.J.R.N & T.G.
                                                        L.N.G.K.L.I.H.T.
6   0410 27 July 00-52N  Patrol Craft   11,000  115T    Same patrol vessel
                 119-06E                        6K      as Contact No. 5.

-40-

— page 231 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

7    0908    28 July    1-00N    119-05E    Two Patrol Boats.    20,000    6K    P Sighted smoke
                                                                                    as #5 & 6. Same patrol.

8    0535    29 July    00-46N    118-53E    Trawler Type    9,000    7K    P Hugging shore
                                            Coastal vessel                        near T.G.LABOAN
                                                                                    HNI, BORNEO, NEI.

9    0608    29 July    00-46N    118-53E    Coastal Freighter    12,000    085T    P Perfect position
                                            (1,000 ton)                             for shot. Let-go by
                                                                    12K             hoping for larger
                                                                                    target.

10   0659    29 July    00-47N    118-52E    2 Freighters, 1 mine-    20,000    090T    P Convoy hugging
                                            sweeper & 1 subchaser                   coast off TG LABOAN
                                                                    12.5K           BINI. Attack #1.

11   1005    29 July    00-45N    118-53E    2 Submarine Tender    18,000    090T    P Convoy hugging
                                            (TSURUGI), 12,000 tons                  coast of BORNEO off
                                            & 2 Destroyer escorts                   TG LABOAN BINI.
                                                                    12K

12   1021    29 July    00-46N    118-53E    3 Schooner    12,000    050T    P Unable to close.
                                                                    6K      Not suitable
                                                                                    torpedo targets.

13   1052    29 July    00-48N    118-50E    Sub-chaser    5,000    220T    P Broke off from
                                                                    6K      convoy (contact #11)
                                                                                    and returned on /S
                                                                                    sweep. Evaded at
                                                                                    periscope depth.

-41-

— page 232 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
14 | 29 July | 1231 | 00-48N | Two Sub-Chasers | 10,000 | 200T | P On A/S sweep.
   |         |      | 118-52E |                   |        | 10K  | Evaded at
   |         |      |         |                   |        |      | periscope depth.
15 | 31 July | 0939 | 3-41N   | Tanker            | 16,000 | 010T | P Closed to 7,000
   |         |      | 118-07.5E |                 |        | 14K  | yards. Running in-
   |         |      |         |                   |        |      | side 10F curve off
   |         |      |         |                   |        |      | KOERARA S.LINDAU
16 | 31 July | 1006 | 3-40.2N | Submarine Tender  | 18,000 | 010T | P Running behind
   |         |      | 118-05.5E | (TSURUGISAKI) 2 minelayers |        | 13K  | SC#15. Same ships
   |         |      |         |                   |        |      | as #11.
17 | 31 July | 1128 | 3-43N   | Two Patrol Boats  | 5,000  | 220T | P A/S sweep.
   |         |      | 118-06.5E |                   |        | 10K  | Avoided at peris-
   |         |      |         |                   |        |      | cope depth.
18 | 1 August | 0935 | 5-09N   | Submarine Tender  | 35,000 | 010-110T | P Same ships as
   |         |      | 119-30E | (TSURUGISAKI) 2 minelayers |        | 17K  | contacts #11 & 16.
   |         |      |         |                   |        |      | Attack No. 2.
19 | 1 August | 1212 | 5-12.3N | 1 Minelayer       | 7,300  | 325T | P One of escorts
   |         |      | 119-33.5E |                   |        | 5K   | from Convoy (SC#18)
   |         |      |         |                   |        |      | Searching after depth
   |         |      |         |                   |        |      | charge attack.
20 | 1 August | 1330 | 5-09N   | 3 S/S Vessels     | 8,000  | 330T | Sound. Searching for us;
   |         |      | 119-36.5E |                   |        | 6K   | SIBUTU P.SS. Sound
   |         |      |         |                   |        |      | came up from South vic
   |         |      |         |                   |        |      | SIBUTU P.SS. Sound
   |         |      |         |                   |        |      | picked up pinging.

-42-

— page 233 —
21
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1442
1 August
5-05.7'N
119-35.5'E
A/S Vessel
6,000
330m
6K
Coming up
Sound from South thru
STRAIT headed for
scene of attack.

22
2130
1 August
4-42N
119-46E
U.S. Submarine
(Never picked-
up)
Radar
interference nition signals
only
Exchanged recog-
with RASHER by
SJ radar.

23
0316
6 August
6-03N
119-50E
U.S. Submarine
15,000
045T
±7K
SN
USS BLUEFISH -
Exchanged recognition
signals by SJ radar.

24
1143
7 August
7-50N
122-06E
Two AK's
One escort
25,000
340T
9K
P
Attack No. 3.

25
2015
11 August
1-32N
120-14.2E
Unknown
5,700
265T
3K
R
Decoy or
Spotter.

26
0120
12 August
13-34.5N
120-12E
Patrol Craft
11,000
045T
9K
R
A/S Patrol;
Dove to avoid.

-43-

9 02960

— page 234 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

27 0310 13-33N Patrol Boat 12,000 Avoided.
   12 August 120-06E 040T
                                     6K

28 0442 13-28N Four Tankers, 19,000 Attack No. 4.
   12 August 120-03.8E Three Freighters, 215T
                                     1 DD, 3 escorts 8K

29 0110 16-29N U.S. Submarine Unknown USS BLUEFISH. Ex-
   15 August 119-33E changed recognition
                                     signals by radar.

30 0710 17-45N U.S. Submarine 7,200 USS RISPER.
   15 August 119-34E 350T
                                     11K

31 0040 20-42.5N Tanker 32,000 Burning Tanker
   16 August 121-49E 1 escort Drifting SN
                                     and escort.

--44--

— page 235 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(G) IROR ITT CONF.CT.
(Used ONI 232 for Identification - No other avail
(G) IROR ITT CONF.CT. (Revised) Reference: ComSubPac FF 7/30-16-3/(12) 8-1-0207 (blo)

| CONT CT NO. | TIME (Zona) | POSITION - Lat. | Long. | SPEED | COURSE | TRIM | MINUTES SINCE LAST SD R.D.R | SEARCH NUMBER | TYPE | PROBABLE MISSION | HOW DETECTED | INITIAL RANGE | ELEVATION ANGLE | RANGE & RELATIVE BEARING OF FLINE | WHEN IT SIGHTED S/M | DATE |
| :| :| :| :---- | :---- | :----- | :--- | :| :| :--- | :| :| :| :| :| :| :--- |
| 1             | 0342        | 00-42N            | 118-50E | 100   | Por    | 1    | -                             | 1             | D'VE | H                  | P              | 1               | -                | ND                                | ND                    | 7/29 |
| 2             | 1018        | 4-33N             | 119-56E | 140   | Surf   | 1    | -                             | 1             | D'VE | H                  | P              | 1               | -                | ND                                | ND                    | 8/2  |
| 3             | 1330        | 4-33N             | 120-06E | 110   | Surf   | 1    | -                             | 5             | OOD  | Pat.               | Ikt.           | 8               | -                | 340                               | ND                    | 8/2  |
| 4             | 1455        | 4-33N             | 120-06E | 110   | Surf   | 1    | Not Picked                    | 7             | D'VE | Pat.               | Ikt.           | 7               | -                | ND                                | ND                    | 8/2  |
| 5             | 0610        | 2-31N             | 120-06E | 187   | Surf   | 1    | Not Picked                    | 12            | D'VE | Pat.               | Ikt.           | 2               | -                | ND                                | ND                    | 8/3  |
| 6             | 0845        | 3-37N             | 120-10E | 335   | Surf   | 1    | -                             | Unk.          | NELL | Unknown            | Ikt.           | Unk.            | -                | 10                                | ND                    | 8/5  |
| 7             | 0715        | 3-02N             | 121-14E | 340   | Surf   | 1    | -                             | Unk.          | Unknown | Pat.               | Ikt.           | Unk.            | -                | 14                                | ND                    | 8/10 |
| 8             | 0608        | 13-13N            | 120-05E | 270   | Sub    | 1    | -                             | Unk.          | Unknown | Esc.               | SD             | 4               | -                | 3                                 | ND                    | 8/12 |
| 9             | 1212        | 13-13N            | 120-05E | 035   | Surf   | 1    | -                             | Unk.          | Unk. | Unk.               | SD             | 6               | -                | Unk.                              | ND                    | 8/15 |
| 10            | 1205        | 13-13N            | 120-05E | 035   | Surf   | 1    | -                             | Unk.          | Unk. | Unk.               | SD             | 10              | -                | Unk.                              | ND                    | 8/15 |

-45-

9 02960

— page 236 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(H) ATTACK DATA

Torpedo Attack No. 1 (EU) Time: 0749, 29 July 1944.
Lat. 00-47N, Long. 118-50.7E.

Description

The target attacked was one of two medium
freighters hugging the coast in the vicinity of Cape
MANGALIHAT, BORNEO. Escorts consisted of a PT boat
of the first, and a small minelayer on the port
quarter of second target (one attacked). This was
a daylight submerged attack, initial contact on
periscope, sky clear, visibility good, sea moderate.
Missed with six due to firing at long range and hav-
ing target maneuver to avoid torpedoes.

Ships Sunk

None.

Ships Damaged

None.

Identification accordance COMINCH Ltr. Serial
001316 of 29 April 1944.

OSAKA MARU type (EU) . . . . . 4,000 tons
(page 132, ONI 208J revised)

KAHOKU MARU type (EU) . . . . . 4,000 tons
(page 135, ONI 208J revised)

Target Data

Draft 12 ft., course 040T, speed 12.5 knots,
range 5,150 yards.

Own Ship Data

Speed 3.7 knots, course 000, depth 65 ft.,
angle 1° down.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Periscope attack with continuous bearings
of M.O.T. fed into TDC while firing. Spread
by TDC offset dial to cover 200% of the estimated
target length. Torpedoes smoked excessively.

-40-

— page 237 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

ATTACK NUMBER 1
| | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 | #5 | #6
TUBES FIRED | | | | | |
TRCK ANGLE | 132S | 133S | 134S | 134S | 134S | 135S
GYRO ANGLE | 351 | 353½ | 355½ | 355½ | 356½ | 358
DEPTH SET | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6'
POWER | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH
HIT OR MISS | MISS | MISS | MISS | MISS | MISS | MISS
ERRATIC | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO
MARK | | | | | |
TORPEDO | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23
SERIAL NO. | 49309 | 49336 | 49359 | 49547 | 49601 | 41175
MARK EXPLODER | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5
SERIAL NO. | 17274 | 17282 | 17281 | 17271 | 17250 | 13681
*ACTUATION SET | C | C | C | C | C | C
ACTUATION ACTUAL | - | - | - | - | - | -
MARK WARHEAD | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-D | 16-1
SERIAL NO. | 3495 | 3492 | 11710 | 3574 | 1794 | 11979
EXPLOSIVE | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX
FIRING | | | | | |
INTERVAL | 0 | 15" | 13" | 12" | 14" | 12"
TYPE SPREAD | 1L | 3/4L | 1/8L | 3/4R | 1/4R | 2½R
SEA CONDITIONS | - - - - - | - - - - - | CALM | - - - - - | - - - - - | - - - - -
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY | - - - - - | - - - - - | UNSATISFACTORY | - - - - - | - - - - - | - - - - -
TORPEDO PERFORMANCE | - - - - - | SMOKED IN TUBE | NOT RUN | - - - - - | - - - - - | - - - - -
TUBE PERFORMANCE | - - - - - | - - - - - | SATISFACTORY | - - - - - | - - - - - | - - - - -
FIRE CONTROL PERFORMANCE | - - - - - | - - - - - | SATISFACTORY | - - - - - | - - - - - | - - - - -
* Context

-47-

— page 238 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Torpedo attack No. 2(a) (EC) Time: 1043, 1 ugust 1944.
Lat. 5-07.2N, Long. 119-34E.

Description
The target attacked was the 12,000 ton
Japanese submarine tender TSURUGI S XI or her sister
ship the YASIMA. Reports were two YASIMA class
minelayers (EU). This was a daylight submerged at-
tack in which the initial contact was made by peris-
cope. Target was steering a constant helm course
superimposed upon a zigzag plan; visibility was
excellent.

Ships Sunk
One submarine tender of 12,000 tons dis-
placement. This was either the TSURUGI S XI or her
sister ship the YASIMA (EC).

Damage Determined by
Heard two definite hits - possibly three.
Saw that first hit had made target commence to settle by
bow and saw second torpedo hit under bridge causing
the most terrific explosion I have ever seen or felt.
Heard screws stop and never start again and heard break-
ing up noises for half an hour. Ship not in sight one
hour and a half after second hit. Saw the only two
ships available to tow her leave the scene.

Target Data
Draft 18 ft., course 060T, speed 15 knots,
range 1,750 yards.

Own Ship Data
Speed 3 knots, course 100T, depth 66 ft.,
angle 40 down.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Constant helm superimposed upon a zigzag.
Fired just after a swing to the right had been started.
Spread all 6 torpedoes by periscope 1 length ahead, just
head, 1 length inside bow, M.O.T., 1 length inside stern,
1 length aft.

-48-

— page 239 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
ATTACK NUMBER 2(a)

| | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 | #5 | #6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TUBES FIRED | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 | #5 | #6 |
| TRACK ANGLE | 127P | 130P | 136P | 140P | 144P | 148P |
| GYRO ANGLE | 010 | 010½ | 011½ | 011½ | 012½ | 013 |
| DEPTH SET | 6' | 6' | 12' | 12' | 6' | 6' |
| POWER | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH |
| HIT OR MISS | HIT | MISS | MISS | HIT | MISS | MISS |
| ERRATIC | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| MARK TORPEDO | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 14-3A |
| SERIAL NO. | 53224 | 49772 | 53252 | 53173 | 53212 | 25618 |
| MARK EXPLODER | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 |
| SERIAL NO. | 25254 | 25256 | 25273 | 17238 | 25136 | 8788 |
| *ACTUATION SET | C | C | C | C | C | C |
| ACTUATION ACTUAL | C | - | - | C | - | - |
| MARK WARHEAD | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
| SERIAL NO. | 12581 | 12461 | 13230 | 13674 | 13709 | 2990 |
| EXPLOSIVE | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| FIRING INTERVAL | 0 | 11 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 7 |
| TUBE SPREAD | - - - - - | PERISCOPE OFFSET | - - - - - |
| SEA CONDITIONS | - - - - - | C LM | - - - - - |
| OVERHAUL ACTIVITY | - - - - - | USS ORION | - - - - - |
| TORPEDO PERFORMANCE | - - - - - | PERFECT | - - - - - |
| TUBE PERFORMANCE | - - - - - | PERFECT | - - - - - |
| FIRE CONTROL PERFORMANCE | - - - - - | PERFECT | - - - - - |
| *Contact. | | | | | | |

9 02960 -49-

— page 240 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TORPEDO ATTACK No. 2(b)(EU) Time: 1046, 1 August 1944
Lat. 5-07.2N, Long. 119-34E

Description

This attack was made on the port escort des-
cribed under attack 2(a).

Ships sunk or damaged

None.

Identification

Y EYM class minelayer (EU).

Target Data

Draft 8 ft., course 110T, speed 20 knots,
range 1,200 yards.

Own Ship Data

Speed 4 knots, course 048 to 067T, depth 65 ft.,
angle 30 up.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Target's angle on the bow was 10 starboard at
time of firing with range closing rapidly. This was
intended to be a three torpedo salvo for "down the
throat" shot but third torpedo was not fired. One
fired to hit and one spread 30 left by TDC offset.

-50-

— page 241 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
ATTACK NUMBER 2(b)

                  #7      #8
TUBES FIRED
TRACK ANGLE       12S     16T
GYRO ANGLE        256     209
DEPTH SET         6'      6'
POWER             HIGH    HIGH
HIT OR MISS       MISS    MISS
ERR.TIC           NO      NO
MARK TORPEDO      23      23
SERIAL NO.        53215   52904
MARK EXPLODER     6-5     6-5
SERIAL NO.        25243   25242
*ACTUATION SET    C       C
ACTUATION ACTUAL  -       -
MARK WARHEAD      16-1    16-1
SERIAL NO.        12596   13280
EXPLOSIVE         T X     T X
FIRING INTERVAL   0       23"
TYPE SPREAD       AL      0
SEA CONDITIONS    - - - CALM - - -
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY - USS ORION - - -
TORPEDO PERFORMANCE - PERFECT - - -
TUBE PERFORMANCE  - - PERFECT - - -
FIRE CONTROL PERFORMANCE - PERFECT - - -
*Contact.

-51-

— page 242 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
TORPEDO ATTACK No. 3(a) and (b) (EC) Time: 1250, 7 Aug. 44
Lat. 7-50N, Long.122-07.3E

Description
Two freighters escorted by one unidentified escort
vessel were sighted by periscope while conducting sub-
merged daylight patrol. Freighters were hugging coast
of MINDANAO on northerly course; visibility good. Sank
one with one torpedo and missed other with three.

Ships Sunk
One freighter similar to KOHUKU MARU type, page
104, ONI 208J, 3,200 tons (EC).

Damage Determined by
Saw torpedo hit, ship explode and sink.

Target Data
(a) Draft 15 ft., course 030, speed 9.5 knots,
range 950 yards.
(b) Draft 15 ft., course 135, speed 9.5 knots,
range 1,200 yards.

Own Ship Data
(a) Speed 4, course 132, depth 65ft., angle 0.
(b) Speed 4, course 211, depth 65ft., angle 0.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Fired single torpedo from stern tubes at M.O.T. of
first target after checking range with single ping and
having observed TDC set up checking perfectly for a
number of minutes.
Missed second target with two spread by periscope.
There is no apparent reason why both of these shouldn't
have hit. Believe it most likely that target backed
down while changing course. Target maneuvered to avoid
third torpedo fired singly.

-52-

— page 243 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
                                        ATTACK NUMBER 3(a) & (b)

                                        #9        #1        2         #3
TUBES FIRED
TRACK ANGLE                             101S      114P      120P      142S
GYRO ANGLE                              179       034       029       007
DEPTH SET                               6'        6'        6'        6'
POWER                                   HIGH      HIGH      HIGH      HIGH
HIT OR MISS                             HIT       MISS      MISS      MISS
ERRATIC                                 NO        NO        NO        NO

MARK TORPEDO                            23        23        23        23
SERIAL NO.                              53127     49750     49649     53219
MARK EXPLODER                           6-5       6-5       6-5       6-5
SERIAL NO.                              17247     25263     25095     25165
*ACTUATION SET                          C         C         C         C
ACTUATION ACTUAL                        C         -         -         -
MARK WARHEAD                            16-1      16-1      16-1      16-1
SERIAL NO.                              13720     12309     13678     12500
EXPLOSIVE                               TPX       TPX       TPX       TPX
FIRING INTERVAL                         -         0         18"       2:05
TYPE SPREAD                             -         Periscope Tr. 0
SE CONDITIONS                           - - -     C LM      - - -     - - -
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY                       - - -     USS ORION - - -     - - -
TORPEDO PERFORMANCE                     - - -     PERFECT   - - -     - - -
TUBE PERFORMANCE                        - - -     PERFECT   - - -     - - -
FIRE CONTROL PERFORMANCE                PERFECT   - - -     - - -     - - -
*Contact

                                                  -53-
9 02960

— page 244 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
TORPEDO ATTACK No. 4(a)(EU) Time: 0631, 12 August 1944.
Lat. 13-17N, Long. 120-07.8E

Description
Just before sunrise contacted three ships by SJ
radar. Eventually four tankers, three freighters and
one destroyer escort were seen. Three more escorts
were later heard and it is believed that there were at
least three more ships in the convoy which were not
seen due to the exceedingly poor visibility conditions.
There were intermittent heavy rain squalls during the
entire approach which was conducted submerged after
daylight. Ships were disposed in three columns with
about two miles between columns. One escort was 6,000
yards on the bow of the leading ship in the seaward
column - disposition of other escorts unknown. At-
tacked seaward column consisting of two tankers and a
freighter-passenger vessel. Tankers empty - freighter
loaded.

Ships sunk: None.

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk
Identification accordance COMINCH Ltr. Serial 001316
of 29 April 1944.
One Large Tanker (EU) 10,000 tons
(Similar HUZISAN MARU, page 285 ONI 208J, 9,527 tons)

Damage Determined by
Saw two torpedoes hit and fire break out immediately.
Saw target down by bow and low in water. One hour and
thirty-five minutes later saw tanker dead in water, drift-
ing with no steam up. Fire was out. During remainder
of day observed heavy seas doing more damage to tanker
which may have eventually sunk.

Target Data
Draft 10ft., course 202, speed 8.5 knots, range 900 yds.

Own Ship Data
Speed 2, course 066, depth 65ft, angle 10 down.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Daylight submerged periscope attack. Fired three
on 20 starboard track with 700 yard torpedo run, con-
tinuous bearings by periscope, torpedoes spread 10 right
and left by TDC offset dial. First torpedo ran erratic
to right.

-54-

— page 245 —
C-O-N-F*I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
TORPEDO ATTACK No. 4(b) (EU) Time: 0636, 12 August 1944
Lat. 13-17N, Long. 120-07.8E.

Description
Same convoy described in Attack No. 4(a). After
attacking leading tanker in column went to 100 ft. to
avoid being rammed. Coming up to periscope depth 5
minutes later found freighter-passenger ship dead
astern in excellent position for attack. Fired three at
him. Two hit him and third hit bow of tanker about
700 yards on his starboard bow.

Ships Sunk
One large freighter-passenger (EU) . . . . 7,500 tons.
(Similar to HOKKAI MARU page 77,ONI208-J,8,360 tons)

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk
One large tanker (EU) 10,000 tons.
(Similar to TEIYO MARU page 276,ONI208-J, 9,850 tons)

Damage determined by
Saw two hits in freighter. Saw her list heavily to
port and commence settling rapidly. When last seen she
appeared to be definitely sinking and breaking up noises
were heard on her bearing while conducting evasive tactics.
One hour and half later she was not in sight though the
two damaged tankers were.

Heard one hit in second tanker. Hour and a half
later saw him drifting dead in water, no steam up and
on fire forward. Looked like he was bent about his
way over bridge and bow. Took two pictures. Rain
squalls cut out but heavy seas were doing more
damage and he may have eventually sunk.

Target Data
Depth 18 ft., course 240, speed 8.5 knots,
range 1,550 yards.
Depth 18 ft., course 240, speed 8.5 knots,
range 2,000 yards.

Own Ship Data
Speed 3, course 160, depth 65ft, angle 10 down.

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Daylight submerged periscope attack. Fired three
at freighter on 90 port track, gave TDC continuous bear-
ings while firing and spread torpedoes one degree right
and left by offset dial on TDC. Two torpedoes hit target,
once hit tanker beyond.

-55-

— page 246 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
ATTACK NUMBER 4(a) & (b)
| | #1 | #2 | #4 | #7 | #8 | #10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TUBES FIRED | 20S | 21S | 22S | 98P | 100P | 101P |
| TR.CK ANGLE | 336½ | 338½ | 337½ | 162½ | 157 | 157 |
| GYRO ANGLE | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' |
| DEPTH SET | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH |
| POWER | MISS | HIT | HIT | HIT | HIT | HIT |
| HIT OR MISS | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| ERRATIC | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| MARK TORPEDO | 53254 | 52995 | 53135 | 53102 | 53190 | 52775 |
| SERIAL NO. | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 |
| MARK EXPLODER | 17246 | 22545 | 17233 | 25181 | 17248 | 12737 |
| SERIAL NO. | C | C | C | C | C | C |
| *ACTUATION SET | C | C | C | C | C | C |
| ACTUATION ACTUAL - | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
| MARK WARHEAD | 13733 | 13702 | 13695 | 13707 | 13717 | 13704 |
| SERIAL NO. | TFX | TFX | TFX | TFX | TFX | TFX |
| EXPLOSIVE | 0 | 14" | 7" | 0 | 10" | 9" |
| FIRING INTERVAL | 0 | ½R | ½L | 0 | 1L | 1R |
| TYPE SPREAD | | | | | | |
| SEA CONDITIONS - | MODER TE - - - - | - - - MODER TE |
| OVERHAUL ACTIVITY - | USS ORION - - - - | - - - USS ORION |
| TORPEDO PERFORMANCE - | #1 torp. ran | - - - PERFECT |
| | to right of set course | | |
| TUBE PERFORMANCE - | - PERFECT - - - - | - - - PERFECT |
| FIRE CONTROL PERFORMANCE - | PERFECT - - - - | - - - PERFECT |
| *Contact |

— page 247 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(I) MINES
No mining or mine sweeping activities were
observed.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS
Nothing new was encountered in the line of A/S
measures or used in the way of evasive tactics. As
has been my previous experience, echo-ranging escorts
failed to pick us up prior to our actually attacking
their convoy, the majority of depth charges were
dropped in the first ten or fifteen minutes follow-
ing the attack, and escorts were unable to make or
hold contact with us when searching subsequent to a
torpedo attack.

Following torpedo attack No. 1 a short depth
charge attack by two escorts was evaded at peris-
cope depth because the escorts were distant to
start with and no trouble was experienced in keep-
ing them at a safe range. On all other counter
attacks some depth was sought after it became
evident that escorts had located us and were head-
ing for us. Bow planes, stern planes and steering
were shifted to hand but all other auxiliary
machinery kept running. Speed was maintained at
four knots and ship maneuvered to keep escort on
escorts abaft beam.

I find that leaving the auxiliary machinery
running keeps the ship comfortable, has a less de-
pressing effect on the crew and does not seem to aid
the counter attackers. I have followed this policy
during six counter attacks in the last two patrols
during which 203 depth charges have been dropped
and a total of 17 A/S vessels have searched for us.
Only one of those depth charges was close enough to
do minor damage. Only once have we had to silence
the auxiliary machinery and that was on last patrol
during the last few hours of a 19 hour search by
five fleet destroyers. Even then it may not have
been necessary. This is certainly more evidence
that the continued efforts of Buships, Yards and
repair units to silence auxiliary machinery have
not been in vain.

9 02960
-57-

— page 248 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Perhaps one A/S measure of interest was the search
off CAPE CALAVITE on the night of 11 - 12 August by two
A/S vessels prior to the sortie of a convoy from CALAVITE
PASS at dawn. This almost got us out of the way.

Although we have reported the possible use or lack
of use of enemy radar before, this patrol was the first
for this hip in which positive and powerful Japanese
radar interference was experienced. Description and
sketch are shown under section (M). There is no evidence
that this use of their radar aided them in any way. Our
presence in the vicinity was already known and apparently
they did not get sufficient data from their radar to chase
or attack for no chase or attack ensued.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE.

The major defect existing at this time is the need
for completing some one hundred uncompleted alterations.
Of these it is considered that the lengthening of the
Conning Tower, the relocating of the SJ radar mast aft
with subsequent redesign of the interior of the Conning
Tower, and a suitable system of night lighting in the
Conning Tower are the most urgent. It is believed that
most of the uncompleted alterations will be accomplished
during the forthcoming Navy Yard Overhaul of this vessel.

No major defects or damage resulted from this patrol.
Minor defects are as follows:

PITOMETER LOG

During the training period and enroute to station,
the Pitometer Log worked only intermittently. It was
erratic at low speeds tending to stop when speed was re-
duced to 2 knots submerged. Also, it often remained
steady at the surface speed on a dive. The following de-
fects were noted during the various overhauls of this
unit during this patrol:

(1) Flooding out of control unit due to worn fittings.
(2) Contact arm binding with shaft from bellows.
(3) Follow up motor sticking.
(4) Excessive friction in pump drive motor and
    assembly.

This unit should be completely overhauled by ex-
perienced personnel or renewed.

-58-

— page 249 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

BOW PLANES

The brake on the bow planes could not be adjusted
to give satisfactory operation. In one adjustment
the brake was too loose causing slipping and in the
next adjustment too tight causing overheating. It is
recommended that the end of the adjusting nut be
surfaced an octagon instead of square as at present
in order to make finer adjustments.

HIGH PRESSURE AIR COMPRESSORS

Number one H.P. air compressor (Hardie-Tynes)
failed enroute to station due to broken rings on
3rd stage piston. Renewed worn and broken rings on
this piston and ground in 1st stage discharge valves
and 2nd stage inlet valves. Also found a leaky tube
in 2nd stage intercooler. Installed wooden plug in
each end isolating it from air side.

NO. 1 AUXILIARY TANK

During the THIRD patrol the water from No. 1
Auxiliary tank became rusty. During the refit after
that patrol, the tank was cleaned and painted.
Again during the FOURTH patrol the water became rusty
and the tank was cleaned and painted using a zinc
chromate primer and coat of aluminum. The water
from this tank became rusty again early in this
patrol. During each cleaning it was noted that the
rust in the tank was below the water line. Although
a blower was used to dry the tank and the tank was
painted in drydock, the tank surface was evidently
not sufficiently dry for the paint to adhere properly.
It is suggested that cement be used in this tank when
it is necessary to repaint it in the Fremantle Area.

TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER

While routining the TDC, the R&B follow up head
was found to be arcing with resultant burning of the
slip ring near the zero island. Cleaned the rings
with alcohol and readjusted the trolley assembly
to give minimum arcing. This follow up head will
need renewing in the Navy Yard (350 hours of operation).
It is recommended that submarines carry a spare R&B
head.

9 02960
-59-

— page 250 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TORPEDOES

Of the six torpedoes fired on the first attack,
at least three were observed to smoke excessively
throughout their run. The afterbodies of all re-
maining torpedoes were from then on drained twice a
week but at no time was more than the normal amount
of oil found. On a subsequent approach when all
tubes were made ready but not fired, the afterbodies
of three torpedoes were found flooded. These three
torpedoes were changed with ones from the racks,
routined and dried out, and when finally reloaded,
were tested by flooding the tubes for a short period
with no pressure. All three again flooded. Tails
were disassembled, exhaust valves retackiwaxed (tacki-
wax was found loose and cracked in two of the torpedoes)
and shafts carefully cleaned and repacked. In so do-
ing an exhaust pipe of one torpedo was found to be
flooded with oil and excessive amounts of oil were found
in the exhaust pipes of another. These were drained
and dried out. The torpedoes were again tested in the
tubes, found to be tight, and did not smoke when fired.

(L) RADIO

Our reception of the BAKER schedule during the
patrol, up to the time of transferring radio guard from
Radio Fremantle (VIXO) to Radio Honolulu (NPM), varied
from very good to very poor. The most difficulty was
encountered in the area 100 miles either side of the
Equator. This may be attributed, partly, to poor
atmospheric conditions but, principally, to strong CW
interference encountered daily upon surfacing about 1100
GCT and lasting until 1700 GCT. This interference was
a continuous CW signal which would completely block
out the BAKER schedule on frequencies 4370 kcs and 9250
kcs. It became necessary to rely on repeat transmissions
for most messages. North and South of this area, re-
ception was very good with only slight interference
encountered.

All serials were received with the exception of
serial #65 transmitted about 14 July 1944. A close
watch was kept for a repeat of this message but none
was received. Reception of the HAIKU FOX schedule was
very good and all serials were received with no
difficulty.

-60-

— page 251 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Transmissions on the Ship to Shore frequencies,
on two occasions were only cleared after long periods
of call-ups. In both instances our messages were re-
ceived with good signal strength and with no requests
for repeats, so the trouble may probably be laid to
temporary atmospheric conditions. All other messages
were cleared in a reasonable length of time. Two of
our messages were relayed thru Radio Coonawarra (VHM).
This station has done an excellent job in clearing
our traffic in this and previous patrols.

On another occasion, while waiting for "ANY USN
SHIP" (NYAG) to clear traffic with Radio Coonawarra
(VHM), prior to transmitting our message, two stations
were heard using the call sign VHM. The second VHM
cut in towards the end of the transmission with
various operating signals and caused much confusion
before NYAG and the initial VHM properly authenticated
their messages.

The voice frequency was used on two occasions.
A transmission to the USS RASHER was made and re-
ceived for with no difficulty. We were unable
however to get a receipt for a contact report to
the USS ANGLER on August 10th.

Shortly after leaving FREMANTLE, routine megger
checks on all antennas were found to give very low
resistance readings, although readings were infinity
prior to leaving port. An electric light bulb was
inserted inside the antenna trunk to try to remedy
this condition with very little success. Then, all
insulators topside were washed down with fresh water
and dried. A film of oil was placed over each insulator
to prevent salt again caking on the insulators. Megger
readings taken immediately after doing this showed
the following improvement:
Port Antenna 10,000 ohms to 3 megs.
Stbd. Antenna 10,000 ohms to 2 megs.
Auxiliary Antenna 10,000 ohms to 900,000 ohms.

In view of the results of this treatment, the
cause for the low resistance readings may be attributed
to salt caking on the insulators after long periods of
submergence.

A casualty on the TBL-6 occurred due to a faulty
contact in the H.F. band selector switch "B". This
switch works off a gear arrangement contactor which
had become worn and was making poor contact on bands
three and four. As no spares were available, temporary
repairs were made and permanent repairs will have to
be effected on arrival in port.

9 02960 -61-

— page 252 —
C-O-NF-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(M) RADAR
SJ-a

The SJ-a worked very well throughout the patrol and
proved to be of great value in locating targets, as an
aid to navigation, and as a means of recognition. With
the new type transmitter, ranges were doubled on ship
targets and contacts on land targets were made regularly
up to eighty thousand yards. Communication with other
submarines was possible up to fifteen miles with fair
signal strength.

The SJ-a was used over 600 hours during this patrol
with relatively few troubles. This was probably due to
the fact that the equipment was routined at least once
a week. The routining included testing all tubes, check-
ing all coaxial cables and connections, changing the T-R
tube at 300 hours, cleaning the slip rings on the antenna
feeder unit, checking all circuits with an oscilloscope and
making sure that the antenna rotating mechanism and
motor generator set were well lubricated. On several
occasions these routine checks located weak tubes and
loose connections before they caused any trouble.

Most of the troubles encountered were due to de-
fective tubes, although there were a few mechanical
troubles and component part failures. The coupling be-
tween the mechanical indicator and the antenna rotating
mechanism was continually slipping a few degrees result-
ing in inaccurate bearings. This trouble was remedied
by inserting emery cloth between the coupling clamp and
the shaft to prevent slippage. Another mechanical failure
was due to the breaking of the flexible cable to the
P.P.I. unit. A new length of flexible cable was installed.
In another instance, transmitter output was lost due to
the condenser C22B shorting to ground. A spare condenser
was installed and the transmitter again operated satis-
factorily.

Difficulties in the range unit were caused by over-
heating of the tube filaments and also by high tempera-
ture in the Conning Tower. The range unit always worked
perfectly when first turned on. However, after about 3
hours operation, the range stop began jumping and there
was an absence of range pips. If cooled off for about
an hour the gear would again operate properly. It is
suggested that an adequate ventilation system be pro-
vided for the range unit to maintain the proper operating
temperature.

-62-

— page 253 —
C-O N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The lobing once failed to operate due to brass
fil-ings and salt crystals causing a short across the
slip rings. After cleaning the rings, there was no
other trouble with the lobing or antenna feeder unit.

Interference encountered is listed below in
accordance with ComSubPac Conf. Speed letter, serial
0806 of 29 April 1944.

(A) Radar interference

(B) Position - Long: - 120-08E
                 Lat: - 13-31N

(C) The true bearing of the interference was
122 and it covered about 30°. We were unable to de-
termine rotation speed of antenna as the enemy radar
seemed to be trained on us at the time.

(D) SJ-a radar - Magnetron 706 AY.

(E) It could not possible have emanated from
our forces. All indications pointed to a shore
based radar.

(F) The interference showed up very strongly
on both the P.P.I. and "A" scope and lasted for about
5 minutes. The pulse length appeared to be approxi-
mately three times that of the SJ-a and it had about
an eight hundred cycle pulse rate.

Below is the full scale drawing of the wave form
of this interference.

[Diagram of waveform]
PRECISION

[Diagram of waveform]
E PANDED

-63-

— page 254 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SD-2

The SD radar performance was satisfactory during
the entire patrol with the exception of a short period
during which the antenna mast was grounded. This
ground was found to be due to salt crystals lodging on
the rubber insulating cover on the antenna head. The
trouble was removed by washing the antenna head, first
with fresh water, and then with alcohol. After this,
it was dried thoroughly, and then painted with several
coats of glyptol. Megger readings showed a rise from
20,000 ohms to infinity, and remained so for the re-
mainder of the patrol. The only other trouble encountered
was the loss of sensitivity caused by a tube failure.

Airplane contacts on the SD were picked up readily
at from six to twelve miles with fair sized pips. Land
contacts were picked up several times twenty miles, and
in one instance, high land was contacted at forty miles.

Two types of interference were encountered on the
SD radar. The one type, listed in detail below, was
believed to be Jap plane radar. Shortly after the inter-
ference was detected SD picked up a plane contact.

(A) Radar interference

(B) Position - Lat: - 13-16N
Long: - 119-07E

(C) Unknown

(D) SD-2 Radar

(E) The interference could not possible have emanated
from our forces since we were operating in enemy waters
with no friendly planes in the area.

(F) The interference lasted for approximately
thirty minutes and was picked up on the entire "A" band
of the ARC, being strongest at the lower frequencies.
It seemed to have a pulse rate of approximately 100 cycles.

Below is a sketch of the interference as seen on
the SD screen.
[Image of vertical lines representing radar pips]

The other type of interference encountered was caused
by our own SD arcing on the antenna whips, producing a
series of pulses across the receiver screen. This arcing
occurred only when there was excessive moisture in the air
and during heavy rain squalls.
-64-

— page 255 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(N) SOUND

The operation of the sound gear, with the ex-
ception of the QB, was good during the patrol. The
newly installed JP-1 sonic sound gear proved help-
ful, particularly during silent running periods, and
together with JK-C picked up target screws at ranges
from 5,000 to 20,000 yards. While JP sound bearings
are not as accurate as those obtained from the super-
sonic gear, it picks up targets sooner and furnishes
sonic and supersonic bearings. It was used
regularly to check noise conditions on own ship.
The listening conditions in the CELEBES SEA, MAKASSAR
STR IT, SULU SEA and SOUTH CHINA SEA were good.

The QC-1 echo ranging equipment was used with
great success throughout the patrol. On three at-
tacks single ping ranges were taken using the QC
projector and a loud clear echo was received for
ranges of 900, 1,000 and 1,400 yards.

A series of breakdowns and defects were ex-
perienced in the QB sound gear throughout the patrol.
On one occasion the equipment was out of commission
for four days. This occurred when the cam rod in
the training limit switch gear assembly slipped and
tilted the pinion gear. The gears then meshed im-
properly and, when trained, a number of teeth were
sheared off. The gears were temporarily brazed and
straightened out by the ship's force.

On other occasions, the QB failed to train due
to a broken lead in the shunt field winding off the
training motor, a broken lead in the limit switch,
and dirty and pitted contacts in the QB training
unit control. In all cases the necessary repairs
were made.

Both JK-QC and QB sound heads were dragging in rumbling
and scraping at periscope depth. This condition has
existed since the first patrol and several attempts
have been made to eliminate this trouble with only
fair success. Complete alignment check of both
sound heads and training will be requested during
the Navy Yard Overhaul.

-65-

— page 256 —
C-O-N-T-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(O) DENSITY LAYERS:

     The bathythermograph was used on all dives and
its information was very helpful in combatting A/S
measures.

     The information needed on the card for trim ad-
justments would be of more benefit to the diving
officer if the instrument was mounted at the diving
station, where it could be watched by the diving
officer.

     The March 1944 supplement to NavShips 943-F,
NavShips 900018, presents the information on density
layers and diving in the most clear and concise
manner yet seen.

DATE | POSITION | DEPTH | GRADIENT
---|---|---|---
&7/21/44 | 8-03.0S - 115-25.5E | 180-280 | -6
7/24/44 | 0-45.0N - 119-49.2E | 140-280 | -8
7/25/44 | 0-57.5N - 119-08.0E | 180-280 | -3
7/26/44 | 0-56.0N - 119-01.5E | 140-280 | -7.2
7/27/44 | 1-00.0N - 119-04.5E | 140-190 | -0.8
7/31/44 | 5-09.5N - 119-29.8E | 80-280 | -6
8/1/44 | 5-08.0N - 119-34.0E | 80-320 | -8
8/1/44 | 4-48.4N - 120-01.5E | 40-280 | -6
8/2/44 | 4-42.0N - 120-03.0E | 80-130 | -1.5
8/2/44 | 2-26.0N - 120-05.0E | 95-110 | -0.8
8/3/44 | 3-33.0N - 120-08.3E | 105-125 | -1.5
8/7/44 | 7-50.0N - 122-05.8E | 0-20 | +1
8/7/44 | 7-50.0N - 122-05.8E | 80-320 | -10
8/7/44 | 8-57.0N - 122-41.6E | 50-70 | -0.8
8/8/44 | 8-59.0N - 123-14.4E | 180-290 | -2

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY

HEALTH

     The health of the officers and crew was excellent.
An electrician's mate third class received an electric
flash burn about the face and eyes but responded to
treatment and was restored to duty in one day. Another
officer developed a high fever which
was thought to be the result of chronic constipation
induced by worry and nervousness over his appendix. He
was returned to duty in five days. He will be sent to
medical authorities for examination on return to port.

-66-

— page 258 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FOOD

The food was up to normal standards and was
satisfactory.

HABITABILITY

The habitability of the boat was above
average due to the untiring efforts of the First
Lieutenant (Lt. F. H. GOLAY, USNR) and the
auxiliaryman in charge of air conditioning
(DOGAN, F. H., MoMM2c). The recommendations
contained in BuShips Bulletin of Information No.
14 of April, 1944 on "The proper Operation of
Submarine Air Conditioning Units" were followed
and found to give good results. However, the need
for additional cooling coils in the forward battery
compartment remains.

(Q) PERSONNEL:

(a) Men on board during patrol

— page 261 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(U) REMARKS
CAPE CALAVITE on MINDORO ISLAND, P.I. remains
a focal point for MANILA - SAIGON - SINGAPORE -
MIRI traffic. Likewise traffic continues to hug
the eastern BORNEO coast enroute from BALIKPAPAN
to TARAKAN and points north and northeast. This
traffic, even large ships, stays within 500 yards
of land and shoal spots.

An appreciable decrease in air activity was
noted in northern MAKASSAR STRAIT, the CELEBES SEA
and SIBUTU PASSAGE.

It is suggested that standard visual signal-
ling procedure be adopted for communication by
SJ radar following exchange of recognition signals
i.e., a dash by the receiving vessel for each word
or operator's signal sent by the transmitting
vessel. The reason this is suggested is that for
communication at any distance (10 to 15 miles) it
is necessary to keep the antenna trained directly
on the ship transmitting in order to get a signal
strong enough to read. On two occasions while at-
tempting to communicate in a seaway we found that
the change in relative bearing due to roll, pitch
and steering errors necessitated continuously train-
ing the SJ antenna and resulted in our asking for
a number of repeats. This took considerable time
which was not important then but would be during a
coordinated approach. This is assuming, of course,
that it would be preferable to communicate as long
as possible by SJ prior to opening up on the voice
transmitter when conducting coordinated attacks.

[STAMP: 9 02960]
-69-

— page 262 —
FB5-42/A16-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-D
Serial: 059 Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
CONFIDENTIAL 4 September 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
PUFFER Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-TWO.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(2) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS 268) - Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

1. The Fifth War Patrol of the PUFFER was conducted
in Makassar Strait, Celebes Sea and China Sea. The patrol was
terminated because of expenditure of all torpedoes after a
period of 47 days, 23 of which were spent in the assigned areas.

2. The areas were well covered despite some trying
conditions. Eight contacts worthy of torpedo fire were made.
One contact, which was a one thousand ton AK, was permitted to
pass in order to attack a larger ship coming up, three contacts
could not be closed and the remaining four were attacked with
torpedoes.

3. Attacks:

Attack #1. This was a submerged day periscope
attack on two medium AK's with a PC escort ahead and a small
minelayer astern. Six bow torpedoes were fired on about 133°
track, torpedo run 6000 yards. Smoke from the torpedoes was seen
and permitted the target to avoid. After having been frustrated
in several attempts to gain a good attack position on those two
AK's, the Commanding Officer was determined to take these tar-
gets under fire despite the long range. Later on in the patrol
he would have given most anything to have had these six tor-
pedoes to fire at two large tankers he had dead in the water.

Attack #2 (a). This was a submerged day peris-
cope attack on a 12000 ton Japanese submarine tender(TSURUGISAKI
class) with two YAEYAMA class minelayers acting as escorts.
Fired six bow torpedoes, track angle about 136°, torpedo run
2100 yards. One heavy explosion heard, followed nine seconds
later by a dull explosion. Twenty seconds later another tor-
pedo was seen to hit him just under the bridge. There followed
a terrific explosion which was seen to engulf his whole bow and
bridge.

Attack #2 (b). One of the escorts turned and
headed directly for periscope. Two stern torpedoes were fired
down his throat. Unfortunately, both missed.

-1-
9 02960

— page 263 —
FC5-4/A16-3
Serial 0336
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
PUFFER Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR 11/tel
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
9 September 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander
Submarine Division FORTY-TWO.

2. It is recommended that all submarines carry a
spare R&B head inasmuch as this is interchangeable with the S&B
head for the TDC in accordance with the Commanding Officer
PUFFER's recommendation in paragraph (K). While on patrol, daily
checks of the TDC are mandatory for optimum performance.

3. Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR congratulates
the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the PUFFER on this
aggressive and highly productive patrol.

[SIGNATURE: C. F. Erck]
C. F. ERCK.

9 02960

— page 264 —
9 02960
hch
FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(16)
[UNCLEAR: SUBMARINE] FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01902
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
6 September 1944.
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PUFFER Report of
Fifth War Patrol.
NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 513
U.S.S. PUFFER - FIFTH WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United Stated Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
(14 July to 29 August 1944)

1. The fifth war patrol of the PUFFER was conducted in the
Macassar Straits, Celebes Sea, Sulu Sea, and China Sea Areas.

2. Thorough and expert area coverage was maintained and
five good torpedo target contacts made, resulting in four aggressive
attacks. After a disappointing long range first attack, three success-
ful attacks followed and severe damage was inflicted upon the enemy.

3. This patrol is designated as "Successful" for Combat
Insignia Award.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratu-
lates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew for this highly suc-
cessful and aggressive patrol; the fifth consecutive successful patrol
in the outstanding record of the PUFFER. The PUFFER is credited with
having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy, all of which was
accomplished in areas under the operational control of the Commander
Task Force SEVENTY-ONE, who is requested to assume credit accordingly:

S U N K
1 - AS (TSURUGASAKI type) (EC) - 12,000 tons (Attack No. 2(a)).
1 - Small AK (KOHUKU MARU type) (EC) - 3,200 tons (Attack No. 3(a)).
1 - Large AO (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 4(a)).
1 - Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 4(b)).
TOTAL SUNK 32,700 tons

D A M A G E D
1 - Large AO (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 4(b)).
TOTAL SUNK AND DAMAGED 42,700 tons

EXTRA - ORIGINAL
Distribution and authentication J. H. BROWN, Jr. SORC. MICRO.
on following page. PHOTO-LAB OP-16
- 1 - RETURN TO F-4253

— page 265 —
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET hch
FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(16)
Serial 01902
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PUFFER Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 513.
U.S.S. PUFFER - FIFTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
(14 July to 29 August 1944).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
CominCh (7)
CNO (5)
CinCpac (6)
Intel.Cen.Pac.Ocean Areas (1)
ComServPac (1)
CinClant (1)
ComSubLant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
ComSoPac (2)
ComSowesPac (1)
ComSubSowesPac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
ComNorPac (1)
ComSubspac (40)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ComSubspacSubOrdCom (3)
All Squadron and Division
Commanders, Pacific (2)
SubTrainPac (2)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)

[HANDWRITTEN: C. K. Hynes Ind]
E. L. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
6 September 1944.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

— page 266 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

SS268/A16

Serial: (02)

22 January 1945.

C-O-DECLASSIFIED-A-L

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PUFFER.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : Official Channels.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER, Report of War Patrol Number
SIX.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Charts for COMSUBPAC.
(C) Special reports for COMSUBPAC in accord-
ance with COMSUBPAC Conf. Ltr. 0642 of
April 10, 1944.

1. Enclosures (A), (B), and (C) are forwarded
herewith covering the SIXTH WAR PATROL of this vessel conducted
in the Southwestern part of the central NANSEI SHOTO area from
December 16, 1944 to January 17, 1945.

[SIGNATURE: Carl Dwyer]
CARL DWYER

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP-09B9C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/72]
DECLASSIFIED

[HANDWRITTEN: Filmed]
[HANDWRITTEN: 121875]

— page 267 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

A. PROLOGUE:

     Arrived Pearl Harbor, T.H. from FIFTH
WAR PATROL on August 29, 1944, having conducted the
first five patrols in SOWESPAC. August 29 to August
31 undergoing voyage repairs at Submarine Base Pearl
Harbor under the administrative command of Commander
Submarine Squadron FOUR. August 31 underway for San
Francisco, California after firing test shots for
electrical torpedoes in Pearl Harbor Channel.

     Arrived Navy Yard, Mare Island, California on
August 6, 1944. Commenced Navy Yard Overhaul on August
7, 1944.

     The following major alterations and repairs
were accomplished:

     1. ENGINEERING

          (1) Modified mechanical-electrical type of
diving gear and provided with solenoid operated clutches
in the line shafting.
          (2) Modified the drainback traps installed in
main storage battery ventilation system.
          (3) Installed main motor terminals on main
motor and generator terminals.
          (4) Installed one detached fresh water recir-
culating pump in each engine room to provide for cool-
while submerged.
          (5) Installed new type lockout cams on main
propulsion controls in main control cubicle.
          (6) Installed phenolic insulator in main control
battery buses.
          (7) Installed disconnect switches in emergency
light circuit.
          (8) Modified lubrication oil system in main
motor room - in accordance with BuShips ltr. S5212-84/
S45-515 of 12-7-43.
          (9) Installed auxiliary plane angle indicators.
          (10) Modified I.C. switchboard for emergency
A.C. supply to S.J. radar.
          (11) Installed "Ion Exchanger" in each battery.
          (12) Filled shafts with steel grit.
          (13) Modified sound powered telephone and call
bell system.
          (14) Installed bow plane rigging indicator
light.
          (15) Installed 1000 G.P.M. vapor compressor
distilling units - BuShips ltr. C-SS/S58(815-646) of
7-28-44.
          (16) Altered auxiliary engine exhaust by
piping into #4 M.E.

-1-

— page 268 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
A. PROLOGUE: (continued)

2. HULL

(1) Enlarged and rearranged conning tower.
Removed SJ mast to after part of "A" frame. Rem-
oved SD mast from CT and installed SV Eiffel
Tower aft of conning tower.
(2) Installed filters in main hydraulic
system.
(3) Eliminated conning tower door.
(4) Installed doublers on outer hull
plating.
(5) Installed liquidometer gauge in safety
tank.
(6) Installed T-shaped molded gaskets with
retaining ring in exterior hatches, doors, and ind-
duction outboard valves.
(7) Removed salvage air connections from
fuel ballast tanks.
(8) Replaced copper main vent piping in
torpedo rooms with steel tubing.
(9) Completed the conversion of #4 AB M.B.
T. to a F.B.T. by moving air bottles from tank.
(10) Modified hydraulic plant by installing
I.M. O. pump.
(11) Rearranged officer's quarters for in-
creased berthing.
(12) Installed booster air-conditioning
unit in control room.
(13) Substituted welded type joints for
flanged joints on main induction piping.
(14) Installed new type #1 periscope. (RADAR).
(15) Modified bridge to U.S.S. TRIGGER type.
(16) Installed hydraulic periscope and radar
antenna hoist.
(17) Installed connections for emergency
charging of hydraulic plant using windlass and
capstan motor and pump.

3. GUNNERY:

(1) Modified forward tubes to accomodate
mark 18 torpedoes and installed hydrogen burning
circuits and two charging panels.
(2) Installed 4" gun forward.
(3) Installed ammunition scuttle aft of con-
ning tower fairwater.
(4) Installed ramrod type signal ejector in
after torpedo room.
(5) Installed Mk: 8 TBT's except optics.
(6) Installed night lighting on TDC and
half speed device.

-2-

— page 269 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
A. PROLOGUE: (Continued)

4. COMMUNICATIONS:
    (1) VHF (RT-19 ARC/4)
    (2) RBH-2 dual receiver
    (3) Model TBL speech amplifier
    (4) N.Y.M.I. underwater loop coupler.
    (5) LM 18 frequency meter
    (6) RAK/RBH attenuator
    (7) Local control station for JK-QC, QB training
        in Forward Torpedo Room.
    (8) ST periscope radar.
    (9) SJa Radar, Mare Island Target indicator.
    (10) TMC interior communication system.
    (11) IFF equipment (AEK & BN).
    (12) APR-1 with TN/1, TN/2, TN/3.
    (13) AN/SPA-1 pulse analyzer.
    (14) Reduced size of radio room to accommodate SV
        trunk.

During the Navy Yard overhaul period, the follow-
ing changes in officer personnel took place:

Lieutenant Commander Carl R. DWYER, U.S.N. rel-
ieved Commander F. G. SELBY, U.S.N.

Lieutenant (jg) Russell C. FRANK, DE-V(G), USNR,
reported aboard and Lt(jg) K. L. DOBSON, USN, was detached
in accordance with SUBPAC-SUBSLANT exchange program.

Ensign Robert D. WEEKS, DE-V(G), USNR and Ensign
Richard A. MEEHS, DE-V(G) USNR reported from Submarine
School.

Completed Navy Yard overhaul on November 7, 1944.
From November 8 to November 21 depermed, sound tested
loaded, completed unfinished items, corrected defective
items, fired dummy torpedoes, reballasted, structural test
firing, and deep dives. RFS date delayed one day due to
misaligned periscope bearing. Departed Mare Island, Calif-
ornia on November 22, 1944 in accordance with COMSUBRON
FRON Secret Operation Order No. 75-44 of November 20, 1944.
Conducted training dives emergency drills, drills of fire
control. Gave all equipment as heavy service as possible.
Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H. on November 29,
1944. Voyage repairs by Submarine Base under administrative
command of COMSUBRON FOUR and COMSUBDIV 282. Installed
5 inch-25 cal. gun forward, moved the APR-SP-1 equipment
from the radio room to the control room below the SD rec-
eiver, corrected new bridge venturi defects by adding
flared section forward of forward 20MM platform, completed
Mk 8 TBT installation, installed spindle type firing val-
ves, corrected hydraulic leaks in both periscopes, correc-

-3-

— page 270 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
A. PROLOGUE: (continued)

ted vibration in periscope hydraulic cylinders,
installed Arma course clock and corrected minor
defects. These repairs as performed by the Sub-
marine Base, Pearl Harbor was tantamount to a
normal refit. The workmanship was excellent.

Underway training day and night from Dec-
ember 4, 1944 to December 12, 1944 under the sup-
ervision of COMSUBDIV 43, Commander D. C. WHITE,
U.S.N. Fired eight Mark 23 torpedoes in low
power to simulate Mark 18 torpedoes. Concen-
trated on surface firings of both tube nests in
minimum time using large gyros for stern shots
in order to reduce interval between bow shots and
stern shots. One day and night convoy exercise
operating as a coordinated attack group with
BLUEBACK and TAUTOG with Commanding Officer of
the BLUEBACK as task group Commander. Fired all
guns twice at towed target. Ready for sea on
December 16, 1944.

B. NARRATIVE:
NOTES: (1) Times used are indicated by date.
(2) "AC" - Aircraft contact.
(3) "SC" - Ship contact
(4) APR - Radar contact on APR-SPA.

December 16, 1944 (Victor - William):

1345 Underway from Submarine Base Pearl Harbor
in company with the U.S.S. BLUEBACK in
accordance with Commander, Submarine
Force, Pacific Fleet Operation Order
Number 412-44 to conduct offensive patrol
in LUZON STRAIGHT or as part of coordin-
ated attack group composed of U.S.S.
BLUEBACK, U.S.S. SEAFOX and U.S.S. PUFFER,
hereinafter referred to as the "CLIPPERS"
with the Commanding Officer of the BLUEBACK
(Commander M. K. CLEMENTSON, U.S.N.) as
Task Group Commander. Escorted by PC 486
until dark.

1500 Set clocks to plus 11 zone time (X-RAY).

1600 Took station on port beam of BLUEBACK,
distance 5000 yards.

2337 (SC #1) Radar contact bearing 150° T range
21,000 yards on friendly carrier and des-
troyer.

-4-

— page 271 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
December 17-23 (X-RAY):
Enroute to SAIPAN for fuel in company with
BLUEBACK. Conducting daily dives, ship's
drills, firecontrol drills, and coordinated
attack communications.

December 19, 1944 (X-RAY):
0500 Set clocks to plus 12 zone time (YOKE)

December 20, 1944 (YOKE):
0950 Crossed 180° meridian at Latitude 20-59.6 N.
Advanced date to December 21, 1944.

December 22, 1944 (LOVE):
0825 Sighted U.S.S. SEAFOX who was joining the
"CLIPPER" from MAJURO. SEAFOX took position
on starboard beam of BLUEBACK.

December 24, 1944 (LOVE):
Enroute to SAIPAN in company with BLUEBACK and
SEAFOX, conducting drills as before. Estab-
lished following limiting ranges on various
communication systems by tests:
VHF 7000 yards
WOP.CO VOICE 10 miles
WOP.CO CW Several hundred miles
without land interference
SUGAR JIG RADAR 10-12 miles (on surface)
SUGAR TARE RADAR 15 miles (on surface)

December 25-26, 1944 (LOVE)
CHRISTMAS DAY. Enjoyed the Armed Forces Radio
Service special recorded Christmas Program -
and Noel Coward's Movie "In Which We Serve" -
Santa Claus visited every member of the crew
with a package through the services of the
Honolulu Chapter of the Red Cross.
1600 Set clocks to minus eleven zone time (KING)

December 27, 1944 (KING):
0740 "AC #1" Sighted Mariner type search plane -
bearing 017° relative, range 10 miles. OFF
friend. Between this time and entry to SAIPAN
sighted many friendly planes at various ranges.

-5-

— page 272 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
December 27, 1944 (KING) (cont'd):

1044 Made landfall on ANATHAN ISLAND bearing
     305° T distance 25 miles.

1217 Sighted escort PC 1126.

1550 Sighted SAIPAN ISLAND bearing 340° T
     range 20 miles.

1630 Observed low flying B-24 settle into
     water on starboard bow. Changed
     course to 275° T to aid for scene of
     crash and went ahead maximum speed. Made
     preparations to rescue survivors. The
     PC, BLUEBACK and SEAFOX headed towards
     the scene. The PC arrived at the crash
     first and picked up a rubber boatload of
     survivors. BLUEBACK arrived next and
     picked up a survivor in the water. SEAFOX
     arrived and picked up a survivor in the
     water. PUFFER arrived. After a thorough
     search of the area at slow speed, PC and
     "CLIPPERS" proceeded to SAIPAN. The sea
     manship displayed by the PC, BLUEBACK AND
     SEAFOX in picking up these survivors in
     rough seas was out-
     standing.

1903 Moored to BLUEBACK in nest alongside of
     FULTON in SAIPAN harbor. Fueled ship.
     Voyage defects corrected very willingly
     and effectively by FULTON under super
     vision of COMSUBDIV 81 and COMSUBRON 8.

December 28, 1944 (KING):

1448 Underway for patrol area in company with
     SEAFOX, TRIGGER, and PC 1126. BLUEBACK
     delayed 24 hours. Various friendly plane
     contacts (C #2).

2126 Escort departed.

December 29, 1944 (KING):

1012 (LC #3) Plane contact on SD at nine miles.
     IFF - friend.

1500 AC #4 Plane contact on SD at 10 miles.
     IFF - friend. Closing rapidly.

1502 DIVED.

1507 SURFACED.

-6-

— page 273 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

December 30, 1944 (KING):
0050 TRIGGER departed for patrol area.
1156 "CLIPPERS" received orders from COMSUBSPAC
     changing area assignment from LUZON STRAITS
     to the OKINAWA GUNTO in the NANSEI SHOTO.
1221 (AC #5) Not sighted.

December 31, 1944 (KING):
1001 (AC #6) Sighted Friendly plane, range 9 miles.
1208 (AC #7) Sighted plane range 10 miles. Closing
     rapidly. IFF - nothing.
1220 DIVED. On way down IFF indicated friendly
     plane.
1223 SURFACED.
2148 (APR #1) PR contact 75 MC, PW 1½. IFF
     indicated friendly plane.

JANUARY 1, 1945 (ITEM):
0514 Received orders from COMSUBSPAC to furnish
     padded weather message on January 4, 8, 12,
     16.
1755 Received information of daily recco plane
     over OKINAWA from CTG 17.7. Ordered to listen
     on lifeguard frequency and assist if needed.
     Frequency limits of radio receivers will not
     permit guarding lifeguard, Submarine Fox
     and WOLFPAC frequencies at one time.
1233 Received message from SEAFOX via SJ asking if
     we understood the area assignment. Replied
     negative and gave our decode of BLUEBACK message.
1640 SEAFOX ordered PUFFER to take Northern one
     third of area with SEAFOX in Southern one
     third until arrival BLUEBACK.

January 2, 1945 (ITEM):
0130 (APR #2)
0339 Made landfall on OKINOYERABU ISLAND.
0405 (AC #8) SJ contact on an airplane. Did not
     close.

-7-

— page 274 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 2, 1945 (ITEM) (cont'd):
0428 SUBMERGED for transit between JORON
      JIMA and OKINOYERABU.
0700 PUFFER entered patrol area after having
      been out of the war since August 14,
      1944.
1514 Heard 8 distant explosions which sounded
      like depth charges. A reception comm-
      ittee?
1840 SURFACED.
2050 SEAFOX departed for patrol of Southern
      end of area.
2056 Radar contact on BLUEBACK, 104° T, 11,000
      yards. Exchanged recognition signals via
      SJ. Received word from BLUEBACK via SJ
      that we were in the SEAFOX area and that
      PUFFER was to patrol Southern part of area.
2150 (AC #9) SJ radar contact on plane at five
      miles. Informed BLUEBACK.
2151 DIVED.
2210 SURFACED. BLUEBACK departed for area to
      North for patrol until arrival of PARCHE
      on 9th. Ordered PUFFER to inform BLUEBACK
      if we are going to stay here or swap areas
      with SEAFOX. Decided to keep present area
      and started to inform BLUEBACK when at
2225 (AC #10) Radar contacted plane.
2230 DIVED.
2300 SURFACED. Unable to raise BLUEBACK on SJ.
      Did not want to open up on radio so did not
      send any reply.

January 3, 1945 (ITEM):
0129 (APR #3) (AC #11) APR contact 96 MC, PW
      1½. Apparently a patrol plane. DIVED.
0148 SURFACED.
0404 (AC #12) Plane contact on SJ, 22700 yards.
      DIVED.

-8-

— page 275 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 3, 1945 (ITEM) (cont'd):

0417 SURFACED.
0542 DIVED.
1048 Sighted YORON JIMA.
1340 (SC #1) Sighted two Sampans on course 210° T
       Speed 3 knots. AVOIDED.
1845 SURFACED. Patrolled during night off IHEYA JIMA.
1941 Received contact report from plane via CTG
       17.7. Three MARUS South of KUME SHIMA headed
       Northeast. This is in SEAFOX area. They are
       probably headed up OKINAWA GUNTO or going to
       NAHA. Will cover Northern approaches tomorrow.
2012 Received information that a plane is down south
       of OKINAWA near KETE'S lifeguard station.
2230 (APR #4)

January 4, 1945 (ITEM):

0340 (APR #5).
0605 (APR #6).
0616 DIVED. Patrolled Northern approaches to NAHA,
       OKINAWA, between YORON JIMA and OKINOYERABU.
0850 (SC #3) Sighted a sailboat. AVOIDED.
1113 Heard pinging nothing in sight.
1128 Heard pinging. Nothing in sight.
1221 (SC #4)(See chart No. 2338). Sighted two
       masts bearing 215° T. Appeared to be two
       ships rounding N.W. corner of YORON JIMA from
       the Southwest. Began closing at high speed
       submerged. PUFFER is back in the war.
1309 Obtained periscope radar range and a good cut.
       Targets are anchored N.W. of YORON JIMA.
       Closed target at slow speed.
1637 Two targets are now well in sight. They are
       two masted steam driven luggers similar to
       lugger supply vessel type "J" shown on page
       139 of ONI 222-J except they had two masts and
       were larger. The targets were anchored with
       their bows towards the beach giving them a
       heading of 160° T thus putting the wind and sea
       on their starboard quarter. Figured they must

-9-

— page 276 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 4, 1945 (TTEM) (cont'd):

1637 to either beached or moored to two anchors
     to hold this heading. Plot shows targets
     anchored inside of the reef on an East-West
     line of bearing. This is unfortunate because
     the target length will not overlap on a good
     track. The North-South heading was a poor
     choice for them too as it required us firing
     across the seas to obtain a good track. Very
     inconsiderate of them. Due to shoal water
     to the North and East, PUFFER worked to the
     SOUTHWEST running as close as possible par-
     allel to reef and looking the situation
     over. Could see several landing barges and
     several hundred men at the beach (Lat. 27-
     02.8 N) (Long. 128-24.1 E). One boat with
     about 50 men in it came out from the beach
     and came alongside the near lugger for a
     while and then returned to the beach. The
     rest of the men seemed to be going in and
     out of caves there, about 200 yards inland.
     Could see what looked like concealed gun
     emplacements on the tip of H.NEBU S.KI and
     and to Eastward of the point. Decided that
     they were either unloading ammunition or
     holding landing exercises. Figured the tar-
     gets had exceeded their life expectancy as
     they looked very old, so decided to attack.
     Gun action was the logical choice, but
     decided that it was too early in the patrol
     to chance having the pressure hull holed
     by the shore batteries which were only about
     1800 yards from us. In addition the vis-
     ibility was very poor with intermittent
     rain squalls and heavy overcast. Torpedo
     attack did not look very promising due to
     heavy seas, shoal reef, and shallow
     draft of targets, and lack of length in the
     targets. Decided to go in as close as
     possible, take a good look, and maybe
     fire a torpedo. Headed in toward targets
     and reefs, running at minimum speed, rigged
     for silent running, both sound heads, went to
     secret and confidential papers and material,
     taking fathometer soundings once a minute.

1645 Plot shows us one hundred and fifty yards
     from 10 fathom curve. This is minimum safe
     range so came right with full rudder for a
     stern shot. Cannot see the reef. Believe
     these heavy seas are piling water over it.

-10-

— page 277 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 4, 1945 (ITEM) (cont'd):

1645 Looks like a torpedo set at zero depth could
surf board over these waves and get over the
reef. Decided to try experimental zero depth
setting cross-sea shot.

1657 ATTACK No. 1 (a):
PLACE: - Off N.W. tip of YORON SHIMA
Anchored target heading 160° T, angle on bow
106 S, track 106 S, range 1200 yards, torpedo
run 1200 yards, gyro angle 180, depth set zero,
own course 267° T. Set gyros on zero, did not
use TDC, set periscope on 180, conned ship
until cross wire was steady on point of aim
(MOT) for 5 seconds and then at

1657-02 FIRED my first warshot. It missed! Torpedo ran
not straight, and normal. Naturally it breached
repeatedly running across these heavy seas. The
torpedo seemed to have a hard fight to maintain
it's course. A heavy wave would not only veer
it off its course but also apparently move it
bodily down sea. The torpedo apparently
regained its heading very rapidly after each
bounce. Its directivity surfboarding across
those rough waves was amazing. Torpedo track
was followed by watching the occasional breaching.
The torpedo would disappear for a while and then
apparently breach. From periscope angle the
breaching looked like a whale blowing. What
this would look like from a higher point is not
known. Possibly the target can see the track
and/or the torpedo breaching. It is believed
that the spray of water thrown up about every
500 yards is due to the propellers coming out
of the water. The torpedo is apparently going
to hit the target in the bow. As it neared the
target the waves are larger due to piling up
in the shallow water. These waves
bounced our MISS HOPE-FULLY just a little too
far to the right and she passed the target's
bow very close aboard, skipped along about 2000
yards beyond the target, hit a reef and blew up.
The explosion sent a geyser of water into the air
about 100 feet, the wind caught it, and the
people on the beach were sprayed with a salt water
shower. The explosion was hardly heard aboard
ship. Sounded like the detonator click of a
depth charge. Whether this lack of explosive
noise received is due to the shallow depth ex-
plosion or the blocking effect of the shallow
water between us and the torpedo explosion is
not known.

-11-

— page 278 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 4, 1945 (ITEM) (cont'd):

1705 Come around and headed back towards reef
     for another experimental shot. Will close
     to 10 fathom curve to about 500 yards, shoot
     and turn out. Visibility getting poorer.

1716 ATTACK No. 2-(b):
     Same target as before, heading 160° T,
     angle on bow 100 S, track 100 S, range
     1200 yards, torpedo run 1200 yards, depth
     set zero, gyro angle 000, own course 080°T.
     With gyros set on zero, periscope on zero,
     steady on center of target.

1716-35 Fired one torpedo, Ran hot, straight, and
     normal. Same characteristics as first one
     fired except that it seemed to be digging
     into the waves each time it was bounced,
     and thus moved to the left of the point of
     aim. Looked like it would hit the stern.
     With only about 500 yards to go, its motion
     to the left is accelerated, this must be
     the reef's effect as this is the same spot
     where the first one moved off to the right.
     Torpedo passed astern of target about 10
     yards, ran fairly straight for another
     thousand yards then hooked to the left for
     another thousand yards, hit a reef and
     blow up. Hardly heard the explosion aboard.
     After firing, reversed course for another
     experimental shot. Rain is making targets
     hard to see. Seas are abating somewhat.

1724 ATTACK No. 1-(c)
     Same target as before, heading 160° T,
     angle on bow 90° S, track 90° S, range
     1200 yards, torpedo run 1200 yards, depth
     set zero, gyro angle 180, own course 250° T
     with gyros set on zero, periscope set on
     180°, steady on center of targets.

1724-35 Fired one torpedo. Ran hot, straight, and
     normal. Same running characteristics as
     the other two. Running straight as a die.

1726-47 Torpedo hit target about ten yards aft of
     point of aim. Explosion sent a brown column
     of debris 400 yards into the air. Target
     disintegrated. Hardly heard the explosion
     aboard. Had hoped this explosion would
     hurt the far ship, but it was still there
     when last seen.

-12-

— page 279 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 4, 1945 (ITEM) (cont'd):
ATTACK RESULTS:

SUNK - One lugger type supply vessel of
about 500 tons.
Cleared the area at high speed submerged in
order to open out on land before surfacing.

1816 SURFACED.
1917 (APR #7).
2025 Sent PUFFER message No. 1 to COMSUBSPAC
giving weather and information on attack
today.
2105 (AC #3). APR contact shows plane closing in,
so DIVED.
2150 SURFACED.

January 5, 1945 (ITEM):

Patrolling cross traffic route, vicinity of
Japan Stream.

0030 (APR #8). Coming in strong, so at
0031 SUBMERGED - (AC #14).
0108 SURFACED. APR #9, resumed zig-zagging.
0635 SUBMERGED for the morning trim dive, went
deep to check for leaks.
0728 SURFACED. Resumed surface patrol.
0745 Weak radar interference on the SJ. We were
using the SJ because of low visibility and the
possibility of planes in the area. Unable to
determine the bearing. (APR #10).
0902 Test fired 40MM, normal operation.
1239 (AC #15).
1445 SJ radar contact 290° T, 12,000 yards.
1448 Sighted NELL type aircraft (AC #16).
1450 SUBMERGED.
1524 SURFACED.

-13-

— page 280 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 5, 1945 (ITEM) (cont'd):

1557 to Searching area for small SJ cont.ct.
1652 Turned out to be a small oil drum.

1920 Received word the TINOSA would start
     into our area soon.

2245 (JPR #11).

January 6, 1945 (ITEM):

     Patrolling probable traffic route near
     axis of Japan strong.

0027 (JPR #12).
0316 (JPR #13).
0630 SUBMERGED for coming trim dive, and
     wont deep for B.D. record.

0707 SURFACED.

1041 Sighted a floating mine. Sank it with
     gunfire.

1404 Plane contact (AC #17) on SJ at 10,000
     yards. SUBMERGED. At the end of one min-
     ute we were still at 30 feet. Checked
     all vents open, negative flooded, man-
     euvering giving proper turns, pit speed
     9 knots. Gave orders to flood auxiliaries
     sanitary tanks, and bilges, and take a 20°
     down angle. About this time we broke
     through the heavy current and went run-
     ning into the nest down like a rock. But
     not in time to prevent C.O. from leaving
     a permanent set of left hand finger prints
     in the CRS hand rail in C.T. Decided to
     run down sea during daylight and into the
     sea at night in order to improve our
     diving time during daylight.

1448 SURFACED.

1520 Alert lookout sighted plane (AC #18).
     No APR. DIVED. Rigged for depth. Order-
     ed big down angle. Made 300 feet in record
     time when one bomb exploded overhead. No
     damage sounded small and
     shallow.

     On this dive our shafts started squealing
     at 40 R.P.M. up to about 70 R.P.M. All

-14-

— page 281 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 6, 1945 (ITEM) (cont'd):

1520      efforts to quiet them were fruitless. The
          squeal seemed to be in the strut bearings and
          you could hear it better in the After Torpedo
          Room than the Maneuvering Room. A stethoscope
          placed on the stern tubes indicated the same
          results. From this time on until the end of
          the patrol these shafts were noisy. This was
          naturally a constant source of worry to the
          C.O. as we hadn't been able to find any
          temperature gradient yet in this area. Do not
          believe we are justified in returning to the
          base for this as it may be impossible to hear
          it from deep depths. In addition it is not
          believed that it will help an A/S vessel if he
          IS pinging, and if he is listening we can
          overcome this by heading up sea so he cannot
          listen as effectively. All of this wisdom is
          from the Executive Officer who has had two
          years patrol work and commanded an SC in a
          PC. In addition our evasion doctrine calls
          for use of maximum speed up to cavitation
          point. At deep depth this will take us above
          the critical speed. The only possibility I
          believe would be for a listener to trail a
          mike deep in the water. This is a rare
          possibility. Based on these facts we decided
          to stay on station and continue the patrol.
          The noisy shafts will be remedied during next
          refit and thoroughly tested before we go out
          again. These noisy shafts are a distinct
          military handicap.

1650      SURFACED.
2317      (APR #14).

January 7, 1945 (ITEM):
          Patrolling across traffic lane in Japan Stream.
0037      (APR #15).
0130      APR #16.
0200      Exchanged recognition signals with SEAFOX,
          via SJ.
0220      APR #17.
0235      Sighted IYHEA ROTTU. bearing 115° T at 8000 yds.
0615      SUBMERGED for morning trim and deep dive for
          BT card.

-15-

— page 282 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 7, 1945 (ITEM) (cont'd):

0657 SURFACED.
0825 (APR #18).
0843 (APR #19).
1320 SJ RADAR contact on aircraft bearing
     070° T, range 14,200 yards. (AC #19).
     SUBMERGED.
1411 SURFACED.
1924 Received dope from SEAFOX that her SJ
     was out of commission and she was in
     our area by mistake.
2217 Received message from Pack Commander that
     SEAFOX and TUSKER were to work the South-
     ern part of the area.
2254 Message from SEAFOX to take Northern part
     of area, above Lat. 26-45 N and to work
     West on even days.

January 8, 1945 (ITEM):

     Patrolling area off IYE JIMA.
0040 Cleared IYE JIMA sufficiently to get a
     fix by radar.
0244 Aircraft contact on SJ, 12,000 yards.
     (AC #20). SUBMERGED.
0318 SURFACED.
0400 Exchanged recognition signals with
     TINOSA by SJ.
0615 SUBMERGED to flush out #4F.B.T., after
     converting it to M.B.T.
0701 SURFACED.
1370 Sighted periscope stern, evaded at full
     speed. Everything but ships in this area.
1440 SUBMERGED for patrol North of IHEYA RETTO.
1454 Sighted five LILLY type bombers (AC #21).
1900 SURFACED.
1905 (APR #20).

-16-

— page 283 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

January 8, 1945 (ITEM) (cont'd):
1946 SUBMERGED when APR became saturated (AC #22).
2002 SURFACED.
2015 Sent PUFFER second to COMSUBSPAC with weather
     dope. Gave patrol results as one periscope,
     one mine, and many airplanes.

January 9 1945 (ITEM):
     Surface patrol off NW corner of IHEYA RETO.

0210 (APR #22).
0625 SUBMERGED for morning trim and deep dive.
0706 SURFACED.
1520 (APR #23).
1835 (APR #24).
2004 (APR #25).
2025 (APR #26).
2052 Received SEAFOX message giving dope via WOPACO
     on enemy convoy: Went ahead full on four main
     engines and headed for midnight position of
     convoy.

2249 Received SEAFOX dope on her tough luck on
     convoy. SEAFOX says sea's too rough for 6 foot
     depth setting. New position of convoy plots
     then further to west. Aiming now for their
     0200 posit. Our new course brings us closer
     to the wind and sea (NW). Had to secure
     ventilation valve of main induction due to
     water coming down. Steady stream of water
     down conning tower and control room hatch.

January 10, 1945 (ITEM):
0055 SJ radar contact on the convoy at 252° T,
     24,000 yards. (SC #5). Heard two pingers.
     This always helps! With the SEAFOX tracking
     astern this put us in good position for an
     attack on the starboard bow. However this
     would mean firing into the seas which will
     probably produce erratic runs. Decided to
     cross over to port bow and attack from NW.
     This at the cost of darkness time. In addition
     the best background is to the NW. While cross-
     ing over the convoys van, we got a very good
     idea of their disposition, and picked up the

-17-

— page 284 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

January 10, 1945 (ITEM) (cont'd):

0055        two largest ships to attack. By now the seas had in
            creased to make a successful attack problematical.
            Decided to go in and fire three experimental down
            sea zero depth settings using lower tubes, in accor-
            dance with COMSUBPAC patrol instructions. Went in
            for the attack with excellent background at about
            8-10 knots pit speed, kept bows on, worked in astern
            of one of the side escorts and ahead of the port
            quarter escort.

            ATTACK NO. 2

            Range 1875 yards, track 100°P, gyros 350°, using TBT
            bearings, TDC offset. Two overlapping targets.

0249-40     When TBT officer reported that he couldn't see all
            of the target any longer in his binoculars, fired one
            torpedo at port quarter of largest target which had
            the second largest target in the convoy overlapping
            it and 300 yards beyond. Fired second torpedo spread
            1°L and a third on 1°R. Came left and formed up with
            convoy about 1500 yards astern of port bow escort and
            about 1000 yards ahead of port quarter escort and waited
            to see results. Saw first torpedo hit the large target.
            Saw second torpedo hit the large target, followed by
            the ship's blowing up and lighting up the horizon for
            miles around. Words fail to describe the scene. It
            looked like a C.B. DEMILLE movie. Our position in the
            convoy looked a little stupid. Saw a third torpedo
            hit the target beyond the one just sunk. Saw this
            target sink. Two largest pips disappeared on the
            radar. All the ships milled around now. Decided to
            pull out to about 4000 yards and watch their action
            and dropped some depth charges.
            The two escorts on our side turned out to be small
            freighters. They looked as scared as the PUFFER felt
            when night turned into day for a while. Started pulling
            ahead for next attack. Convoy changed base course to
            the right to 110°T. This meant we would be firing in
            direction of SEA FOX who was astern of convoy. SEA FOX
            rated next attack but she had a long end around ahead
            of her, and as PUFFER was in position to attack, decided
            to attack while SEA FOX was ending around the starboard
            side. Sent message via WOPACO to SEA FOX INFO BLUEBACK
            that we were attacking again. No receipt from BLUEBACK.

0354        Exchanged calls over SJ with SEA FOX. Still not certain
            of exact bearing of SEA FOX so opened up on WO PACO with
            plain language voice, told her where PUFFER was and
            found out where she was. Her position was far enough
            south of the convoy so we could attack on good port
            tracks without fear of hitting her. About this time
            radar reported two intermittent pips astern and on the
            port quarter of convoy. Believed them to be airplanes.
            Next up comes word that these airplanes have identi-
            fied us and are calling for help.

— page 285 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L January 10, 1945 (ITEM) Cont'd.
0354 meter radar. Something new has been added! Radar
     reports these pips are steady on the screen now and
     moving right along in our direction. Decided to go in
     and fire ten torpedoes while we could. Started for
     the attack. On the way in we could see that our two
     "airplanes" had mounted 5 inch guns and were now large
     destroyers. Decided not to shoot at them as the seas
     were probably too rough for their shallow draft. With
     these two destroyers moving up along the port side of
     the convoy, it began to look like PUFFER and the two
     cans are going to arrive at the same place at the same
     time, so PUFFER speeded up. With the destroyer's 10CM
     radar, SEA FOX same, and PUFFER'S SJ all filling the
     air at once, the screen was full of interference.
     Tried to use the SJ but it is too rough. Decided to
     make all intermittent sweeps excluding the DD sector.
     At this time one destroyer bore about 70 relative,
     and the near one about 60 relative. General plan was
     to cross ahead of the destroyers, shoot the bow tubes
     at the convoy, cross through the convoy and shoot the
     stern tubes at whatever was available. However, at
     this time the starboard lookout reported that the
     destroyer had seen us. Took a look and could see no
     change, but decided to take the lookout's advice as he
     had been designated to watch nothing but the destroyers.
     So forced to shoot at long range, started firing bow
     tubes at convoy using TBT bearings and radar ranges.

ATTACK No. 3 (a) (b)

Lat. 27-01. 3N Long. 126-34E.

0528 Fired two torpedoes at a single ship aft of the main
     group, range 2600 yards, 56° port track, 12° gyro.
     Started firing four torpedoes at three overlapping
     targets, range 3100 yards, 81° port track, 350° gyro.
     During this time he was on the starboard
     beam. He pulled up alongside of the near destroyer
     bearing about 70° relative now angle on bow zero. By
     this time there was no reason to doubt that the
     destroyers had seen us or had us in their radar. Had
     hoped to complete the bow shooting and move on over
     into the convoy so the destroyers couldn't shoot at us.
     Decided to feint to the left to get the destroyers off
     guard so came left with full rudder. Up to this time
     had tried to keep the destroyer information from the
     conning tower, but they sneaked an occasional sweep on
     the DD's just to be sure the bridge didn't go to sleep.
     A bridge PPI was needed in this type of attack.

                                   -19-

— page 286 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 10, 1945 (ITEM) (Cont'd.)

0528 When the full left rudder went on, the control party
       secured firing the bow tubes in accordance with
       PUFFER fire control doctrine and got set up on the
       two destroyers with being told. Forward TBT then
       shifted to the nearest destroyer. This target then cut
       right to head between us and the convoy. This was his
       mistake as it gave us a good track on him. The other
       destroyer then cut to port toward our stern. Started
       firing aft and steadying up.

ATTACK No.3 (c)

0530 Fired two torpedoes at near destroyer, range 1050 yards,
       106° port track, 122° gyro.

       Fired two torpedoes down the throat at far destroyer,
       range 1200 yards, 0° track, 135° gyro.

0530-53 Saw terrific hit under bridge of first destroyer.

0530-59 Saw second hit in this destroyer in engine space. This
       destroyer sank immediately after the second hit without
       blowing up or taking any angle. One of the two pips
       disappeared on the radar.

       Situation looked a little tense so cleared the bridge of
       the three lookouts, QM, O.O.D., J.O.O.D. forward and
       J.O.O.D. aft. The O.O.D. (Lt. F.H.GOLAY, USNR) volun-
       teered to stay on the bridge. Hiss assistance was an in-
       spiration to the Commanding Officer. About this time the
       second destroyer seemed to have slowed down to a walk
       turn to port and then the sky around was lit up with tra-
       cer fire. In addition nine random depth charges went
       off. The next few minutes saw a grand exhibition of
       radar controlled gunfire. Being in good position to
       observe the rake, it can be stated that there were
       straddles in range, deflection and morale. Ordered Lt.
       GOLAY below and returned to the cigarette deck, stood
       behind EIFFEL TOWER and watched the destroyer. Lt.
       GOLAY remained on the bridge. Heard one timed hit in
       second DD. His boat seemed to be smoking and only his
       after turrets were firing. He had now turned to star-
       board. This was very encouraging. At this time the
       conning tower reported his speed as 4 knots. This
       most welcome piece of news was accompanied by a cessa-
       tion of firing these aforementioned tracers. Lt.
       GOLAY took the conn and started end around.

0532 One timed hit in AK, followed by an explosion. Two
       less pips in SJ radar. Started end around on the con-
       voy. Radar interference from SEA FOX indicated she had
       contact with convoy. Unable raise BLUDBACK on WOFCO so
       sent convoy contact and new base course to BLUDBACK
       via COMSUBPAC (PUFFER #3). DD tracked us out on his
       radar and apparently lost us at 7000 yds. Too late for an-

-20-

— page 287 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 10, 1945, (ITEM) (Cont'd.)

0532 other night attack. Getting ahead of convoy's track
     for a submerged attack. Counted six ships as we passed
     convoy in addition to damaged DD astern. Believe we
     sunk five and damaged one.

     At daylight sighted convoy on starboard beam and a
     smoking destroyer on starboard quarter. Will attack
     convoy and then go after damaged destroyer.

0655 As it began to get lighter now, the destroyer is getting
     closer on starboard quarter, still smoking heavily.
     SUBMERGED. Went deep and went ahead full speed parallel
     to convoy track.

0657 Several depth charges. Very large but distant.

0741 SURFACED. Smoke of convoy on starboard beam. DD far on
     starboard quarter. Started end around on convoy.

0746 APR CONTACT #27. Plane radar getting closer.

0752 Dived. Went deep.

0755 Several bombs.

0807 SURFACED. Started end around again.

0825 APR CONTACT #28.

0915 Closing convoy submerged. Convoy base course changed
     now to 160° T. This is a 50° change to right. Unable
     to close. Watched ships go by out of range, large track
     angle. Ships in convoy now are:
     1 - SHIGURE DD (SC#7).
     1 - AK - Similar to NISSIYO MARU (p172 - 208J)
     1 - AK - Similar to KOKI MARU (p222 - 208J)
     1 - AK - Similar to KEIZAN MARU (p143 - 208J)
     Very disappointing. Too much land in sight to end
     around now. They have headed down toward N.H. Also
     one too many ships here if we sank 5 last night, unless
     the SHIGURE joined up after the attacks.

1140 Sound picked up pinging. Closed in direction of pinging.

1404 Sighted masts of two ships. (SC#8). Large angle on
     the bow. Identified leading ship as a small AK of the
     MFM type similar to SOYA MARU (p26 ONI 208J). The
     second ship in column was a destroyer with a PUFFERIZED
     bow. It looked as if he had run into the end of a dock
     making 30 knots. His forward turret was all messed up
     and elevated about 80°. There was no smoke coming out
     of the bow. Believe this DD was hit in attack No. 3(c).
     Closed at high speed, going deep between looks as DD
     is only making six knots and is pinging.

-21-

— page 288 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 10, 1945 (ITEM) (Cont'd.)

1446         Range 2640 yards, track 95P, gyro 004. Fired three
             torpedoes at DD aimed 1/2 ship length aft, MOT, 1/2
             ship length ahead. This one ended up being aimed
             at MOT of AK.

1448         Range 2800 yards, track 90P, gyro 358° fired three at
             AK, same type of spread. Used depth settings of zero
             due to shallow draft of targets and heavy seas. Could
             see torpedoes "blowing" every now and then. DD either
             saw them or heard them as he turned down the track and
             awkwardly tried to put a bone in that basket mouth of
             his. Came around for a down the throat shot but decided
             he was moving too much water in front of him. This
             would probably deflect a torpedo. Saw one torpedo headed
             on a collision course with AK and very close to him.
             He never changed course. With DD beginning to look
             like a cruiser in the periscope, went deep and rigged
             for depth charges.

1451-14      One timed hit in AK. His screws stopped. No breaking
             up noises. Believe he blew up. Never heard screws
             again. Ran down starboard side of DD, crossed thru
             his wake, and headed up sea to test depth plus maxi-
             mum of dropped 22 depth charges. Pulled clear of DD
             and came to periscope depth.

1615         DD about 5000 yards away still dropping DC's. No AK
             in sight. At his speed he couldn't have cleared the
             area. DD headed into NAHA.

1800         SURFACED.
             (.PR Contact #30)

1802         SC #9
             Sighted two patrol boats. One challenged us with
             searchlight. Evaded on surface at high speed. We
             have to get flat battery up.

1921         APR CONTACT #31.

1932         SJ radar contact 270 T, range 14,000 yards. (SC #10).
             Radar pip size indicates a DE. Tracking until comple-
             tion of battery charge.

1935         Received message from SEA FOX giving her position and
             requesting ours.

2000         PUFFER is being tracked by someone.

2048         Received congratulations from SEA FOX. Obviously this
             made us feel better about the whole deal.

                                  -22-

— page 289 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 10, 1945 (ITEM) (Cont'd.)
2050 Exchanged calls with BLUEBACK. Received "WELL DONE"
     from Pack Commander.
2149 Message from Pack Commander asking how many fish were
     fired.
2209 SEA FOX gave dope on her prospective movements.

January 11, 1945 (ITEM)
     Tracking target north of AGUNI SHIMA.
0039 APR CONTACT #32.
     This target is evidently patrolling. He is using a
     constant helm superimposed on zig plan with counter-
     marches every hour and fifteen minutes. AS PUFFER
     only had two torpedoes left forward decided not to
     attack until we knew his plan well enough. Did not
     believe he was zigging this radically so closed in to
     4000 yards and ran the zig plan with him for an hour.
     Also determined at this time that the target was not
     the SE. FOX or BLUEBACK. Used TBT bearings. TDC
     calling zigs within the minute. Decided we knew the
     dope so at,
0121 Headed in for attack. Target let out a puff of black
     smoke. Cleared at high speed. Target evidently was
     blowing tubes. Started in again. Target countermarched.
     Another end around. Started in again.

     ATTACK No. #5.
     Lat. 26-45N Long. 127-09.5E.
0250 Range 1400 yards, track 117S, gyro 006, fired last two
     bow torpedoes at depth zero. Came left slowly and
     passed about 500 yards astern of target, and headed out
     on his port quarter to watch him blow
     up. He didn't. Both torpedoes missed. No excuse was
     offered. PUFFER wanted this one badly after such a long
     attack. Analysis showed that the target did not hold
     his course on the far right leg when we fired for two
     or three minutes as he had been doing.
0315 Sent message to PACK giving dope on this patrol vessel.
0345 Exchanged recognition signals with SEA FOX.
0437 SJ contact on IHEYA JIMA.
0650 Sent PUFFER 4th to COMSUBPAC.
     -23-

— page 290 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 11, 1945 (ITEM) (Cont'd.)

1404     (SC #11)
         Sighted masts of four (4) ships. Closed at high speed.
         JP heard sonic pinging. Ship's are two trawlers and
         two PC's. The PC's seem to be circling the trawlers.
         Decided to go in slowly, go under the group at deep
         depth, come up on the other side and fire two remaining
         stern tubes at the two PC's. Then go deep, head into
         the sea and clear the area.

         On way towards the group, heard a muffled explosion.
         The batteries of the two remaining torpedoes had blown
         up (See Section K) in the tubes. Went deep, put target
         group astern and built up gradually to full speed.

1555     SURFACED. PC's and trawlers look closer from the bridge
         than from the periscope so,

1557     SUBMERGED.

1610     Situation in after torpedo room requires ventilation
         so SURFACED and evaded patrol craft on surface.

1654     Received COMSUBPAC Serial 9 ordering PUFFER to GUAM for
         refit. Reload at PERTH not available.

1724     APR CONTACT #33.

1741     Torpedo in #7 tube now on fire despite all measures
         possible being taken. Cannot endanger the ship any
         longer. Surveyed one Mark 18 torpedo to the JAPAN STREAM.

1807     APR CONTACT #34.

1921     Received BLUEBACK's message saying she would make our
         weather report after we left station.

2305     SJ Contact 117° T, 9750 yards, U.S. Submarine (Probably
         the PARCHE). AVOIDED (SC #12).

2313     APR CONTACT #35.

January 12, 1945 (ITEM)

         Enroute to GUAM.

0616     Submerged for trim and deep dive. Surfaced.

1119     SD Contact at 22 miles. AC #25, friendly. IFF Indication.

                                   -24-

— page 291 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
January 14, 1945 (ITEM).

                     Enroute to GUAM.

0159         Very alert lookout sighted plane (AC #26) coming in low
             and fast on port beam. SUBMERGED. Went deep in record
             time. No bombs?

0610         Sent PUFFER second to C.T.F. 17.7

1238         SD CONTACT (AC #27) range 25 miles, closing. Closed to
             4 miles, a B-24.

1340         Received message on Sub Fox Schedule saying a B-29 was
             down at 24-15 N, 139-60 E, changed course to head for
             position, as we had been designated by C.T.G. 17.7 as
             a lifeguard submarine.

2026         Sent PUFFER third to C.T.[HANDWRITTEN: 6]F. 17.7

2100         Sighted green rocket on starboard bow, 1000 yards off.
             Began to search area.

2115         Possible ping heard at 010° T, all ahead flank, clear-
             ing area. Proceeding to original position reported.

2333         White-blue rocket sighted dead ahead, range 4000 yards.
             Intermittent contact on SJ. Tracked at 2 knots, 060°T,
             into the wind! All ahead flank, left full rudder!
             While making flank turns, sound reported high speed
             screws passing down port side. Believe this was a Nip
             torpedo.

January 15, 1945 (ITEM).

0100         Received C.T.S. 17.7 dope on Jap trap, clearing area on
             four engines.

0105         Sent PUFFER fourth to C.T.[HANDWRITTEN: 6]G. 17.7 confirming trap.

0415         Sent PUFFER fifth to C.T.S. 17.7.

1337         SD contact 22 miles - Unidentified Bomber (AC #28).

January 16, 1945 (ITEM)

1432         Sighted B-24, Exchanged recognition signals.

January 17, 1945 (ITEM)

1200         Arrived GUAM in company with DRUM and Escort.
(..bout)

-25-

— page 292 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C. WEATHER:
Weather encountered in the OKINAWA GUNTO
area was generally overcast. The average temperature
was 65° F, winds North to North Westerly, average force
10-15 knots. The seas were squally - very rough.

D. TIDAL INFORMATION:
Tidal information in general was as stated
in the Japan Pilot. Average set 042° T. average drift
0.7 knots near the KUROSHIO (Japan Stream). Currents
near islands of OKINAWA GUNTO were variable and slight.

E. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:
None sighted. Position maintained by use
of right and left tangents plus a few peaks. Navigation
on station was done by radar ranges and bearings on islands.
Ran on DR and EP in deep water as it was always cloudy at
star time.

-26-

— page 293 —
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)
SHII CONT. CTS
| NO. | DATE | TIME | LATITUDE | LONGITUDE | TYPE(S) | INIT'L RANGE | EST. COURSE | EST. SPEED | HOW CONTACTED | REMARKS | COMPLETED |
|---|
| 1 | 12/16/44 | 2337 | 20-58 N | 160-30 W | U.S.S. | 21,000 yds | Various | 20 knots | Radar | CV tracked us and then hauled away. Radar cont. ct. was followed by radar interference about 15 min. later. | [UNCLEAR: voided] |
| 2 | 1/3/45 | 1340(I) | 27-14.5 N | 128-17.3 E | Two Sampans | 9,000 yds | b/c 2100 T | 3 knots | Periscope | [UNCLEAR: voided] | [UNCLEAR: voided] |
| 3 | 1/4/45 | 0850(I) | 27-11.3 N | 128-42.3 E | Sailboat | 4,000 yds | Various | 2 knots | Periscope | [UNCLEAR: voided] | [UNCLEAR: voided] |
| 4 | 1/4/45 | 1224(I) | 27-07 N | 128-23.5 E | Supply ship | 12,000 yds | b/c 0260 T | 6 knots | Radar | Attack #1 | [UNCLEAR: voided] |
| 5 | 1/10/45 | 0055 (I) | 26-53 N | 128-28 E | 10 ship convoy | 24,000 yds | b/c 090 T | 6 knots | Radar | Attack #2 | [UNCLEAR: voided] |
| 6 | 1/10/45 | 0500(I) | 27-04 N | 126-29 E | 2 DD's joined | 12,000 yds | 000 T | 18 knots | Radar | Attack #3(a) | [UNCLEAR: voided] |
| 7 | 1/10/45 | 1000(I) | 26-52.8 N | 127-18.8 E | 2 DD's or convoy SC/5 | 24,000 yds | 110 T | 7 knots | Visual | Attack #3(b) | [UNCLEAR: voided] |
| 8 | 1/10/45 | 1338(I) | 26-48 N | 127-15 E | 1 freighter damaged | 14,000 yds | 130 T | 7 knots | Sound | Attack #4. A & B | [UNCLEAR: voided] |
| 9 | 1/10/45 | 1805(I) | 26-51.5 N | 127-22 E | 2 vessels in attack | 26,000 yds | Various | 7 knots | Visual | [UNCLEAR: voided] | [UNCLEAR: voided] |
| 10 | 1/10/45 | 2031(I) | 26-53 N | 127-12 E | 1 DE | 14,650 yds | Patrolling b/c 2100 & reverse | 6 knots | Radar | Attack #5 | [UNCLEAR: voided] |
-27-

— page 294 —
F. ENEMY CONTACTS (Cont'd.)

NO. | DATE | TIME | LATITUDE | LONGITUDE | TYPE(S) | INIT'L RANGE | EST. COURSE | SPEED | HOW LOCATED | REMARKS
U.S.S. PINTADO (SS268)
HOW LOCATED
11 | 1/11/45 | 1404(I) | 27-15 N | 128-22 E | 2 Trawlers | 15,000 yds | 0300 T | 5 knots | Sound |
| | | | | | 2 PC's | | | | |
12 | 1/11/45 | 2305(I) | 27-38.5 N | 128-41.0 E | U.S.S. | 9,650 yds | 2700 T | 2 knots | Radar |
| | | | | | Sub | | | | |
13 | 1/12/45 | 0022(I) | 27-34.0 | 128-46.0 E | Sampan | 7,400 yds | 0410 T | 12 knots | Radar | [HANDWRITTEN: avoided]
| | | | | | | | | 5 knots | |

-28-

— page 295 —
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS266)

G. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS:

| CONTACT NUMBER | 1          | 2          | 3          | 4          |
||||||
| A. DATE        | 12-27-44   | 12-28-44   | 12-29-44   | 12-29-44   |
| B. TIME (Zone) | Sighted    | Contacted  | 1012       | 1600       |
| C. Position: Lat. N | various    | various    | 17-25      | 18-06      |
| Long. E        | types of   | aircraft   | 142-33     | 141-42     |
| D. SPEED       | aircraft   | by SD and  | 14 knots   | 18 knots   |
| E. COURSE      | by SD and  | lookouts   | 310        | 310        |
| F. TRIM        | lookouts   | leaving    | Surface    | Surface    |
| G. Minutes since last | from       | S.I.P.N    | -          | -          |
| SD Radar Search | I.M.G.N    | ISLAND     |            |            |
|                | ISLANDS    |            |            |            |
|                | to         |            |            |            |
|                | S.I.P.N    |            |            |            |
|                | ISLAND     |            |            |            |
|                | entering   |            |            |            |
|                | port       |            |            |            |
| H. Number      |            |            | 1          | 1          |
| I. Type        |            |            | UNK        | UNK        |
| J. Probable Mission |            |            | Patrol     | Patrol     |
| K. How Contacted |            |            | SD         | SD         |
| L. Initial Range |            |            | 18 M       | 12 M       |
| M. Elevation Angle |            |            | ND         | ND         |
| N. Range and Relative |            |            | ND         | ND         |
| Bearing of Plane |            |            |            |            |
| when it Detected |            |            |            |            |
| Submarine      |            |            |            |            |

| CONDITIONS     | 1          | 2          | 3          | 4          |
||||||
| O. Sea (State (Beaufort | 2          | 4          | 3          | 4          |
| (Direction Rel. | 270        | 340        | 050        | 050        |
| P. Visibility (Miles) | 7          | 7          | 7          | 7          |
| Q. Clouds: (Hgt. in Feet | 1500       | 1500       | 2000       | 1000       |
| (% overcast    | 50         | 40         | 20         | 40         |
| R. Moon: (Bearing Rel |            |            |            |            |
| (Angle         |            |            |            |            |
| (Percent Illum |            |            |            |            |

-29-

— page 296 —
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

G. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

CONTACT NUMBER | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
---|---|---|---|---
S. A. DATE | 12-30-44 | 12-31-44 | 12-31-44 | 1-2-45
U. B. Time (Zone) | 1221 | 1001 | 1203 | 0405
V. C. Position: Lat. N | 20-25 | 22-13 | 22-15 | 27-16
W. Long. E | 137-41 | 133-32 | 133-04 | 128-54
X. D. Speed | 14 knots | 13 knots | 13 knots | 10 knots
Y. E. Course | 310 | 330 | 330 | 070
Z. F. Trim | Surface | Surface | Per | Per.
AA. G. Minutes since last | | | |
BB. SD radar search | | | |

| | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
---|---|---|---|---
H. Number | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1
I. Type | UNK | B-29 | B-29 | UNK
J. Probable Mission | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol
K. How Contacted | SD | Lookouts | Lookouts | SD
L. Initial Range | 6 M | 9 M | 5 M | 16,000yd
M. Elevation Angle | ND | 1° | 2° |
N. Range and Relative | | | |
O. Bearing of Plane | ND | | |
P. when it Detected | | | |
Q. Submarine | | | |

| | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
---|---|---|---|---
O. Sea: (State (Beaufort) | 2 | 4 | 5 | 3
P. (Direction Rel | 040 | 030 | 030 | 040
Q. Visibility (Miles) | 7 | 5 | 5 | 7
R. Clouds; (Hgt. in feet | 3000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000
S. (% overcast | 40 | 80 | 80 | 25
T. Moon: (Bearing Rel | | | | 265
U. (Angle | | | | 73
V. (Percent Illum | | | | 30

-30-

— page 297 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

G. AIRCR FT CONT CTS

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

CONTACT NUMBER
| | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S A. Date | 1-2-45 | 1-2-45 | 1-3-45 | 1-3-45 |
| U B. Time (Zono) | 2150 | 2225 | 0129 | 0404 |
| B C. Position: Lat. N | 27-26 | 27-24 | 27-26 | 27-24 |
| M Long. E | 128-00 | 127-57 | 127-42 | 127-51 |
| A D. Speed | 12 | 10 | 9 | 9 |
| R E. Course | 270 | 290 | 250 | 090 |
| I F. Trim | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per. |
| N G. Minutes since last | | | | |
| E SD Radar Search | | | | |

| | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| H. Number | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| I. Type | UNK | UNK | UNK | UNK |
| J. Probable Mission | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol |
| K. How Contacted | SJ | SD | A.P.R. | SD |
| L. Initial Range | 8800 yds | 24 M | | 2700 yds |
| M. Elevation Angle | | | | |
| N. Range and Relative | | | | |
| Bearing of Plane | | | | |
| when it Detected | | | | |
| Submarine | | | | |

| | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C O. Sea: State (Beaufort) | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| O Direction Rel | 050 | 050 | 050 | 050 |
| N P. Visibility (Miles) | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| D Q. Clouds: Hgt. in feet | 2000 | 2500 | 2000 | 2000 |
| I % Overcast | 20 | 25 | 15 | 15 |
| T R. Moon: Bearing Rel. | 170 | 150 | 250 | 045 |
| I Angle | 2 | 14 | 37 | 70 |
| O Percent Illum | 90 | 80 | 75 | 80 |
| N | | | | |
| S | | | | |

-31-

— page 298 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

G. IRCR FT CONTACTS (Cont'd.) U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

CONTACT NUMBER | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16
---|---|---|---|---
S. Date | 1-4-45 | 1-5-45 | 1-5-45 | 1-5-45
U. B. Time (Zone) | 2105 | 0030 | 1239 | 1448
B. C. Position: Lat. N | 27-21 | 27-23 | 29-14 | 27-13.5
M. Long. E | 128-04 | 127-40 | 126-38 | 126-57.2
A. D. Speed | 13 | 10 | 10 | 10
R. E. Course | 270 | 270 | 13 | 040
I. F. Trim | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per.
N. G. Minutes since last | | | |
E. SD Radar Search | | | |

H. Number | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1
A. I. Type | UNK | UNK | UNK | NELL
R. J. Probable Mission | Petrol | Petrol | Petrol | Petrol
C. K. How Contacted | APR | APR | APR | Lookouts
R. L. Initial Range | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 M
F. M. Elevation Angle | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
T. N. Range and Relative | | | |
 Bearing of Plane | | | |
 when it Detected | | | |
 Submarine | | | |

C. O. Sea: State (Beaufort) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4
O. Direction Rel | 270 | 340 | 340 | 330
N. P. Visibility (Miles) | 4 | 4 | 6 | 6
D. Q. Clouds: Hgt in Feet | 1000 | 98 | 1500 | 1500
I. % Overcast | 90 | 195 | 90 | 95
T. R. Moon:Bearing Rel. | | 25 | |
I. Angle | | 20 | |
O. Percent Illum | | | |
N. | | | |
S. | | | |

-32-

— page 299 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

G. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd) U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

CONT CT NUMBER | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20
||||
S A. Date | 1-6-45 | 1-6-45 | 1-7-45 | 1-8-45
H B. Time (Zone) | 1404 | 1520 | 1320 | 0244
I C. Position: Lat. N | 26-50 | 26-55 | 27-41 | 26-29.5
P   Long. E | 216-24.5 | 126-21.5 | 126-46 | 127-20.4
R D. Speed | 9 knots | 9 knots | 9 knots | 9 knots
C E. Course | 340 | 340 | 300 | 270
R F. Trim | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per.
A G. Minutes since last | | | |
F   SD Radar Search | | | |
T | | | |

H. Number | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1
||||
  I. Type | UNK | SALLY | UNK | UNK
  J. Probable Mission | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol
  K. How Contacted | SJ | Lookouts | SJ | SJ
  L. Initial Range | 5-1/2 M | 3 M | 7 M |
  M. Elevation Angle | | 15 | |
  N. Range and Bearing | | | |
    (Relative) of Plane | | Immediately | |
    when it Detected | | | |
    Submarine | | | |

C O. Sea: State (Beaufort) | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2
O   Direction Rel | 000 | 000 | 000 | 030
N P. Visibility (Miles) | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5
D Q. Clouds: Hgt. in Feet | 2000 | 2000 | 1500 | 1800
I   % Overcast | 100 | 100 | 100 | 85
T R. Moon: Bearing Rel | | | |
    Angle | | | |
    Percent Illum | | | |

-33-

— page 300 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

G. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd.)

| CONTACT NUMBER | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S. Date | 1-8-45 | 1-8-45 | 1-10-45 | 1-10-45 |
| U. Time (Zone) | 1455 | 1946 | 0752 | 0908 |
| B. Position: Lat. N | 27-14.5 | 27-17 | 26-58.5 | 27-29 |
| M. Long. E | 128-25 | 128-18 | 126-56 | 130-31 |
| A. Speed | 2 knots | 9 knots | 12 knots | 12 knots |
| R. Course | 270 | 310 | 110 | 090 |
| I. Trim | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per. |
| N. Minutes since last | | | | |
| E. SD Radar Search | | | | |

| H. Number | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I. Type | Lily | UNK | UNK | UNK |
| J. Probable Mission | | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol |
| K. How Contacted | Per. | AOR | PR | Sight |
| L. Initial Range | | 2 M | | 10 M |
| M. Elevation Angle | | 10° | | |
| N. Range and Relative | | | | |
| F. Bearing of Plane | | | | |
| F. when it Detected | | | | |
| T. Submarine | | | | |

| C. Sea: State (Beaufort) | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| O. Direction Rel | 225 | 230 | 330 | 150 |
| N. | | | | |
| D. Visibility (Miles) | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| I. Clouds: Hgt. in feet | 1500 | 2000 | 1500 | 2000 |
| T. % Overcast | 65 | 70 | 95 | 75 |
| I. Moon: Bearing Rel | | | | |
| O. Angle | | | | |
| N. Percent Illum | | | | |

-34-

— page 301 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

G. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd.) U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

CONTACT NUMBER | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28
S A. Date | 1/13/45 | 1/14/45 | 1/14/45 | 1/15/45
U B. Time (Zone) | 1119 | 0159 | 1238 | 1337
B C. Position: Lat. N. | 25-28 | 23-00 | 20-46 | 20-21
M Long. E. | 135-51 | 137-24 | 138-31 | 140-04
A D. Speed | 16 knots | 12 knots | 16 knots | 15 knots
R E. Course | 116 | 180 | 160 | 178
I F. Trim | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per.
N G. Minutes since last | | | |
E SD Radar Search | | | |

H. Number | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1
I. Type | UNK | UNK | B-24 | UNK
J. Probable Mission | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol | Patrol
K. How Contacted | SD | Sight | SD | SD
L. Initial Range | 22 M | 5 M | 25 M. | 22 M
M. Elevation Angle | | 1/2° | |
N. Range and Relative | | | |
Bearing of Plane | | | |
when it Detected | | UNK | |
Submarine | | | |

O. Sea: State (Beaufort) | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1
C Direction Rel | 345 | 120 | 270 | 085
O P. Visibility (Miles) | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7
N Q. Clouds: Hgt. in feet | 3000 | 1500 | 5000 | 2000
D % Overcast | 40 | 70 | 10 | 0
I R. Moon: Bearing Rel | | | |
T Angle | | | |
Percent Illum | | | |

-35-

— page 302 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

G. AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd.) U.S.S. TUFFER (SS268)

CONT CT NUMBER                                                              29
S A. Date                                                                   1/16/45
U B. Time (Zone)                                                            1437
B C. Position: Lat. N.                                                      16-08
M Long. E.                                                                  142-44
A D. Speed                                                                  13 knots
R E. Course                                                                 135
I F. Trim                                                                   Per.
N G. Minutes since last
E SD Radar Search

A H. Number                                                                 1
I I. Type                                                                   B-24
R J. Probable Mission                                                       Patrol
C K. How Contacted                                                          SD
R L. Initial Range                                                          5 M.
A M. Elevation Angle                                                        15°
F N. Range and Relative
T Bearing of Plane
When it Detected
Submarine                                                                   Immediately

C O. Sea: State (Beaufort)                                                  1
O Direction Rel                                                             105
N P. Visibility (Miles)                                                     7
D Q. Clouds: Hgt. in feet                                                   3000
I % Overcast                                                                40
T R. Moon: Bearing Rel
Angle
Percent Illum

-36-

— page 303 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

H. ATTACK DATA: (Con't)

C. FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

ATTACK NUMBER 1 A, B, & C

TYPE ATTACK Periscope

REMARKS: Torpedoes were fired across the sea with a
zero depth setting. All torpedoes broached several
times and took a slight angle, No. 1 to the
right passing close aboard ahead of target, No. 2 to the
left missing stern of target about 10 yards, and
no. 3 to the left missing point of aim by about
5 yards, but hit the target and sank it.

TORPEDO PERFORMANCE (a) 9 EXCELLENT (B) 1 SAME (c) 10 SAME
TUBE PERFORMANCE (a) 9 Perfect (b) 1 SAME (c) 10 SAME
FIRE CONTROL PERF. (a) 9 PERFECT (b) 1 SAME (c) 10 SAME

TUBES FIRED (a) 9 (b) 1 (c) 10
TRACK ANGLE
ANGLE 106 S 100 S 90 S
GYRO
ANGLE 180 000 180
DEPTH
SET 0 0
POWER -
HIT OR
MISS MISS MISS HIT
ERRATIC NO NO NO
MARK
EXPLODER 8-5 8-5 8-5
MARK
TORPEDO 18-1 18-1 18-1
SERIAL
NUMBER (E) 10040 9253 9644
SERIAL
NUMBER (T) 56103 56086 56178
ACTUATION
SET C C C
MARK
WARHEAD 18.2 18.2 18.2
SERIAL
NUMBER 4385 4465 3829
EXPLOSIVE TORPEX TORPEX TORPEX
FIRING INT. NONE NONE NONE
TYPE SPREAD NONE NONE NONE
SEA CONDIT. HEAVY HEAVY HEAVY
OVERHAUL SUB.S
ACTIVITY PHTH SAME SAME

-37-

— page 304 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1. B, & C PATROL NO. 6
TIME (I) 1657 DATE 1-4-45 Lat. N. 27-13.1 Long. 128-23.0

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION -
Single Ship or Convoy TWO SHIPS
Number in Convoy TWO (NO CRED)
Type of Ships LUGGER TYPE SUPPLY SHIPS
Type of Escorts NONE
Name of Ship Attacked UNKNOWN
Method of Contact PERISCOPE
Conditions of visibility POOR - intermittent rain
squalls and heavy over-
cast.

SHIP(S) SUNK: ONE - LUGGER (EU) 500 tons - Similiar to lugger
or supply craft type "J" shown on page 139 of
ONI 222-J except two masted and slightly larger.

SHIP(S) PROB.ELY SUNK: NONE

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY: Saw torpedo hit and ship disintegrate.

TARGET DATA:
TARGET DRAFT 3' COURSE 160 SPEED 0 RANGE 1200
TARGET DRAFT 3' COURSE 160 SPEED 0 RANGE 1200
TARGET DRAFT 3' COURSE 160 SPEED 0 RANGE 1200

OWN SHIP DATA
A. SPEED 2 COURSE 267 DEPTH 64 ANGLE 1°D
B. SPEED 2 COURSE 080 DEPTH 65 ANGLE 2°D
C. SPEED 2 COURSE 250 DEPTH 63 ANGLE 1°D

-38-

— page 305 —
U.O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 6
TIME 0422 DATE 10 Jan 1945 LATITUDE 27°-02'.5 LONG 126-23.5

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION
Single Ship or convoy                               CONVOY
Number in convoy                                    TEN
Type of ships                                       MARUS
Type of escorts                                     1 PC and probably one DD
Name of ship attacked                               OMOROSAN MARU and a freighter
Method of contact                                   RADAR
Conditions of visibility                            Poor - Overcast.

SHIPS SUNK
Number                                              TWO
Type                                                One large gasoline laden tanker similar to
                                                    OMOROSAN MARU (P280-ON1208J) (EU)
                                                    (One large freighter (EU)
Tonnage                                             9,205
                                                    7,500
Name                                                OKUROSAN MARU
                                                    Unknown.

SHIPS DAMAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK - NONE

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY
Saw ship sink                                       Saw and heard two hits on leading
Saw torpedo hit                                     ship which disintegrated. Saw and
Other details                                       heard one torpedo hit in second ship.
                                                    saw it sink. Two pips blew up and
                                                    disappeared on radar screen.

Target Draft P Course 040 Speed 6 Range 1875 (at
                                                                           firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 9 Course 130 Depth Surface Angle 0 (at firing)

-39-

— page 306 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

H. ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK         Night surface attack using TBT bearings and
                    Radar Ranges.

REMARKS             Target was two over lapping ships with a range
                    difference of about 300 yards. Point of aim was
                    stern of leading and closest target.

                    #4      #5      #6
TUBES FIRED         100 P   101P    102P
TRACK ANGLE         353     350     347
GYRO ANGLE          0       0       0
DEPTH SET           ---     ---     ---
POWER               ---     ---     ---
HIT OR MISS         HIT     HIT     HIT
ERRATIC             NO      NO      NO
MARK TORPEDO        18-1    18-1    18-1
SERIAL NO.          56624   56100   55918
MARK EXPLODER       8-5     8-5     8-5
SERIAL NO.          9962    10487   8288
ACTUATION SET       C       C       C
ACTUATION ACTUAL    C       C       C
MARK WARHEAD        18-2    18-2    18-2
SERIAL NO.          4280    1904    1982
EXPLOSIVE           TORPEX  TORPEX  TORPEX
FIRING INTERVAL     0       10"     20"
TYPE SPREAD         0°      1°L     1°R
SEA CONDITIONS      MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY   SUBBASE SUBBASE SUBBASE
                    PH      PH      PH
TORPEDO PERFORMANCE PERFECT PERFECT PERFECT
TUBE PERFORMANCE    PERFECT PERFECT PERFECT
FIRE CONTROL PERFORMANCE PERFECT PERFECT PERFECT

-40-

— page 307 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 A Patrol No. 6.
TIME 0527 DATE 1-10-45 LATITUDE 27-01-3 N Long. 126-34 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION:
Single ship or convoy | Convoy
Number in convoy | Ten
Type of ships | 6 Marus
Type of escorts | Probably 3 DDs and 1 PC
Name of ship attacked | Unknown
Method of contact | Radar
Conditions of visibility | Poor - overcast

SHIPS SUNK | SHIPS PROBABLY SUNK
Number | One | Number | One
Type | AK (UN) | Type | AK (UN)
Tonnage | 4,000 | Tonnage | 4,000
Name | Unknown | Name | Unknown

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY
Heard one timed hit followed by an explosion. No hits
were observed nor were any ships seen to sink due to
clearing the bridge for the DD attack. The two officers
remaining on the bridge never looked at the convoy during
running time of torpedoes. The radar was never trained
in convoy direction during running time of these torpedoes
due to DD attack and therefore did not see any explosions
or ships blowing up. On conclusion of the DD attack ended
around convoy at 5000 yards range and counted only six
ships by SJ radar indicating two sunk with these four bow
shots. Size of missing pips indicated that the two ships
sunk were about 5000 - 7500 ton freighters. Only one
timed hit was heard on this attack. PUFFER recorded times
of explosion in FTR, CR, CT, MR, and ATR, and as proof of
her analysis of firings but try as we could, there was
none heard hit on this second ship. However two ships
were missing from the SJ screen. Again however, the next
day there were seven ships in the convoy instead of six.
The SHIGURE DD may have joined up during early morning
hours.
=

Target Draft ? | Course 110 | Speed 9 | Range 3100 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA
Speed 7 | Course 220 | Depth Surface Angle 0 | (at firing)

-41-

— page 308 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS286)

H. ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK
Radar surface using radar ranges and bearings
Remarks: The first two torpedoes were fired at a
single target aft of the main group of ships,
the second two at the central ship of a group
of overlapping targets (see attached diagram)

ATTACK NUMBER 3A & B

| | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 |
|:|:|:|:|:|
| TUBES FIRED | - | - | - | - |
| TRACK ANGLE | 550P | 560P | 800P | 810P |
| GYRO ANGLE | 012.5 | 013 | 350 | 347 |
| DEPTH SET | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| POWER | - | - | - | - |
| HIT OR MISS | MISS | MISS | MISS | HIT |
| ERRATIC | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| MRK TORPEDO | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 |
| SERIAL NUMBER | 57086 | 57151 | 57135 | 57069 |
| MRK EXPLODER | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5 |
| SERIAL NO. | 9738 | 9011 | 9672 | 10136 |
| ACTUATION SET | C | C | C | C |
| ACTUATION ACTUAL | - | - | - | - |
| MRK WARHEAD | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 |
| SERIAL NO. | 3911 | 3802 | 3752 | 4374 |
| EXPLOSIVE | TORPEX | TORPEX | TORPEX | TORPEX |
| FIRING INTERVAL | 0 | 16" | 48" | 1'-07" |
| SEA CONDITIONS | MODERATE | MODERATE | MODERATE | MODERATE |
| OVERHAUL ACTIVITY | SUBBASE | SUBBASE | SUBBASE | SUBBASE |
| | PH | PH | PH | PH |
| TORPEDO PERFORMANCE | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT |
| TUBE PERFORMANCE | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT |
| FIRE CONTROL | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT |
| PERFORMANCE | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT |

-42-

— page 309 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3C PATROL No. 6
TIME 0529 Date 1-10-45 Latitude 27-01.3N LONGITUDE 126-34 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION
Single ship or convoy | Convoy
Number in convoy | Ten
Type of ships | 6 Marus
Type of escorts | 3 DD's and 1 PC
Name of ship attacked | Two large DD's similar
| to Fubuki Hibiki (EU)
| ONI 41-42)
Method of contact | Radar
Conditions of visibility | Poor- Overcast.

SHIPS SUNK
Number | One
Type | DD
Tonnage | 1700 tons.
Name | Fubuki Hibiki (EU)

Ships DAMAGED
Number | One
Type | DD
Tonnage | 1700
Name | Fubuki Hibiki (EU)

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY - Saw two hits in first DD. Saw him
sink. Pip disappeared on radar. One timed hit in
second DD. Saw bow smoking. He slowed from 25 knots
to 4 knots. Seen next day with damaged bow.
Target Draft 9'9" Course 130 Speed 10 Range 1050 (at
| firing)

OWN SHIP DATA
Speed 11-17 knots Course Turning Depth Surface Angle 0 (at
| firing)

-43-

— page 310 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS286)

H. ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK - Night surface attack.
REMARKS - This one was "From the Hip" using TBT
            bearings, bridge angles on bow and radar ranges.
            Used large gyros in order to speed up firing.

ATTACK NUMBER 3C

| | #7 | #8 | #9 | #10
|---|---|---|---|---
TUBES FIRED | 108 P | 104P | 0 | 0
TRICK ANGLE | 115 | 130 | 130 | 138
GYRO ANGLE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
DEPTH SET | - | - | - | -
POWER | HIT | HIT | MISS | HIT
HIT OR MISS | NO | NO | NO | NO
ERRATIC | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1
MARK TORPEDO | 56427 | 56454 | 55099 | 57104
SERIAL NO. | 18-5 | 18-5 | 18-5 | 18-5
MARK EXPLODER | 9302 | 10152 | 10251 | 8485
SERIAL NO. | C | C | C | C
ACTUATION SET | C | C | - | -
ACTUATION ACTUAL | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2 | 18-2
MARK WARHEAD | 3905 | 4372 | 1987 | 4238
SERIAL NO. | TORPEX | TORPEX | TORPEX | TORPEX
EXPLOSIVE | 0" | 20" | 23" | 25"
FIRING INTERVAL | 1°L | 1°R | 0 | 0
TYPE SPREAD | MODERATE | MODERATE | MODERATE | MODERATE
SEA CONDITIONS | SUBMERGE | SUBMERGE | SUBMERGE | SUBMERGE
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY | PH | PH | PH | PH
| PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT
TORPEDO PERFORMANCE | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT
TUBE PERFORMANCE | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT | PERFECT
FIRE CONTROL PERFORMANCE |

-44-

— page 311 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) TORPEDO ATTACK NO: 4 & 5 PATROL 6
TIME 1446 Date 1-10-45 LAT. 26-48-8 N LONG 127-15-0 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
DESCRIPTION
Single ship or convoy Convoy
Number in convoy Two
Type of ships 1 AK - Small
1 DD (Damaged in attack
No. 3(c)
Name of ship attacked Unknown
Method of contact Sound
Conditions of visibility .Good

SHIPS SUNK
Number 1 - Small AK
Type Similar to SOYA MARU (EU) Page 26 -
ONI - 208 J)
Tonnage 3593
Name SOYA MARU

SHIPS DAMAGED OR PROB. BLU SUNK
NONE

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY - Saw torpedo on collision course with
target and very close aboard it. With the large angle
on bow, torpedo couldn't have missed. One timed hit.
Target screws stopped. Never picked up again. On re-
turning to periscope depth saw escort about 5000 yards
away, but no ship in sight.

Target Draft 9' Course 080 Speed 6 Range 2640 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA
Speed 3 Course 161 Depth 63' Angle 2° D (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

-45-

— page 312 —
[UNCLEAR: FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA]
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)
H. ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK
Periscope
Remarks: Targets consisted of one small AK and one damaged DD.
         The first three torpedoes were fired at the DD. The
         second three at the AK. DD evaded by turning toward
         shortly after firing.

ATTACK NUMBER 44&B

TUBES FIRED #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 | #5 | #6
TRACK ANGLE 94°P | 95°P | 96°P | 90°P | 93°P | 88°P
GYRO ANGLE 006 | 004.5 | 002.5 | 357 | 355 | 000.5
DEPTH SET 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
POWER - | - | - | - | - | -
HIT OR MISS Miss | Miss | Hit | Miss | Miss | Miss
ERRATIC No | No | No | No | No | No
(yes or no)
MARK TORPEDO 18.1 | 18.2 | 18.2 | 18.1 | 18.1 | 18.1
SERIAL NO. 56581 | 56823 | 56024 | 57098 | 54876 | 56597
MARK EXPLODER 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.5
SERIAL NO. 9763 | 9887 | 10420 | 9081 | 9565 | 9629
ACTUATION
SET C | C | C | C | C | C
ACTUATION
ACTUAL - | - | C | - | - | -
MARK WARHEAD 18.2 | 18.2 | 18.2 | 18.2 | 18.2 | 18.2
SERIAL NO. 4460 | 4256 | 4346 | 4276 | 4355 | 4345
EXPLOSIVE Torpex | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex
FIRING
INTERVAL 0 | 6" | 15" | 1'58" | 2'06" | 2'18"
TYPE SPREAD Periscope
SEA CONDITIONS Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate
OVERHAUL
ACTIVITY Sub Base | Sub Base | Sub Base | Sub Base | Sub Base | Sub Base
         P.H. | P.H. | P.H. | P.H. | P.H. | P.H.
TORPEDO
PERFORMANCE Perfect | Perfect | Perfect | Perfect | Perfect | Perfect
TUBE PER-
FORMANCE Perfect | Perfect | Perfect | Perfect | Perfect | Perfect
FIRE CONTROL
PERFORMANCE Perfect | Perfect | Perfect | Perfect | Perfect | Perfect

-46-

— page 313 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5 PATROL NO. 6
TIME 0241 DATE 11 Jan 1945 LAT. 26-45 N LONG. 127-09-5 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION
    Single ship or convoy         Single ship
    Type of ship                  None
    Type of escort                FRIGATE (EU) similar to MIKURA CLASS
    Name of ship attacked         FRIGATE shown on page 90 of ONI 222-J
    Method of contact             Radar
    Conditions of visibility      Poor - Overcast

SHIPS SUNK
    NONE

SHIPS DAMAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK
    NONE

DAMAGE DETERMINED BY
    NO DAMAGE

Target Draft Unknown Course 240 Speed 13 Range 1400 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA
Speed 9 Course 168 Depth Surface Angle [UNCLEAR: ?] (at firing)

-47-

— page 314 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

H. ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK

Night surface attack
Remarks: Using TBT bearings and radar ranges. Target was
         FRIGATE type escort. Was seen to Z16 away just
         after firing second torpedo.

ATTACK NUMBER 5

| TUBES FIRED             | #2      | #3      |
||||
| TRACK ANGLE             | 117S    | 118S    |
| GYRO ANGLE              | 008     | 004     |
| DEPTH SET               | 0       | 0       |
| POWER                   | -       | -       |
| HIT OR MISS             | Miss    | Miss    |
| ERRATIC                 |         |         |
| (yes or No)             | No      | No      |
| MARK TORPEDO            | 18.1    | 18.1    |
| SERIAL NO.              | 56605   | 57103   |
| MARK EXPLODER           | 8.5     | 8.5     |
| SERIAL NO.              | 9715    | 8589    |
| ACTUATION SET           | C       | C       |
| ACTUATION ACTUAL        | -       | -       |
| MARK WARHEAD            | 18.2    | 18.2    |
| SERIAL NO.              | 3806    | 3870    |
| EXPLOSIVE               | Torpex  | Torpex  |
| FIRING INTERVAL         | 0       | 8"      |
| TYPE SPREAD             | 0       | 20'     |
| SEA CONDITIONS          | Moderate| Moderate|
| OVERHAUL ACTIVITY       | Sub Base, P.H.| Sub Base, P.H.|
| TORPEDO PERFORMANCE     | Perfect | Perfect |
| TUBE PERFORMANCE        | Perfect | Perfect |
| FIRE CONTROL PERFORMANCE| Perfect | Perfect |

-48-

— page 315 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
I. MINES

On 6 January 1945 at 1041 (I) a spherical
horned floating mine of the anchored type, was encountered
in latitude 26-53.2 North, Longitude 126-25.1 East. Mine
appeared to have been damaged and evidently been in the
water a long time. It was sunk by 40MM gunfire and did
not explode when hit.

-49-

— page 316 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES and EVASION TACTICS:

No new anti-submarine measures were encountered
however, the tempo of Japanese anti-submarine measures has
increased as much during the 4½ months that the PUFFER was
absent from Japanese controlled waters as it had from the
beginning of the war to that time. This increase in anti-
submarine measures was a distinct shock to every war exper-
ienced officer and man on board. As our capable baker put it:
"Things are getting tough!". A summary of the anti-submarine
measures encountered in this short nine-days-on-station patrol
are listed to emphasize the above:

1. Many contacts with day search planes.
2. Many contacts with night search planes.
3. Bombed twice by planes.
4. 11 MINOS sighted this patrol.
5. 11 ESCORTS sighted this patrol.
6. Radar equipped search planes.
7. Land based surface search radar.
8. Escorts with 10CM surface search radar.
9. One floating mine.
10. Trap using Jap subs against our lifeguard subs.
11. Efficient DFing system.
12. Radar controlled gunfire at night.
13. Jap subs operating in our operating area.
Homing on our IFF.

That the PUFFER ran the gauntlet of these
measures and returned without damage was due to a consid-
erable element of luck plus efficient watchstanding. (See
section "Q" - PERSONNEL). The PUFFER can and will maintain
this watch efficiency at all costs. The PUFFER can make
no prediction about her luck.

It is recommended that the offensive and def-
ensive armor of submarines be increased to include the
following in the priority given:

1. Three (3) CM airplane search radar (see section
   M).
2. Three (3) CM surface search radar (see section
   M).
3. APR-SPM radar search receiver with frequency
   limits of 3 CM to 1000 CM, automatic
   frequency sweep, and directional.
4. IFF - 300.
5. VHF - with guaranteed range of 100 miles and
   non DF'able for WOLFPAC work.
6. Surface speed of 30 knots.
7. Faster diving submarines (30 seconds).
8. Faster turning submarine submerged (2° per sec).
9. Smaller surface silhouette.

-50-

— page 318 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
K. MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGES:

C.                                          R.
open position. An inspection                Bow buoyancy vent periodically sticks in the
and hinge pin bushing on the                at sea revealed the hinge pin
extent that the flapper                     after vent is worn to such an
of the operating gear could                 hits the guide and sticks. The
prevent the flapper from                    not be sufficiently shortened
faulty in not allowing                      hitting the guide. The design
flapper and the guide.                      sufficient clearance between the
wear in bushing.                            PUFFER at fault for not finding

The hydraulic hoist rod packing glands on both
periscopes and the SD mast leaked. This has been a chronic
trouble with the hydraulic periscopes. On inspection, the
chevron packing rings were found to be badly worn on the
inner diameter. High pressure packing was used to stop the
leak. It is believed that the vibration of the hoist rod
causes the packing to break up. It is also believed that
chevron packing is not adaptable to this type of gland.

                                            While at the Navy Yard, Mare Island the bow
                                            planes and rigging circuits were altered to permit the planes
                                            being rigged in on either zero or 15° dive. Partly through
                                            the patrol the bow planes failed to rig in on the 15° dive
                                            position, the load being too much for the motor and panel.
                                            This difficultly will be investigated next re fit.

The after battery hydrogen detector (MSH type)
continues to give false readings. This has been a chronic
trouble since the BONEFISH took our good one and gave us
theirs.

                                            The speed regulator on #3 IC motor generator
                                            failed to control speed of generator during a dive on 4
                                            January 1945, the load surging with the diving alarm and
                                            other equipment. Faulty brush spring tension caused 80 per
                                            cent of unit weak field. The motor surged and the output
                                            jumped to 190 volts and 80 cycles instead of the normal 115
                                            volts, 60 cycles. The increased voltage and frequency caused
                                            the windings in power transformers of LMC, 7MC, record-
                                            ers, and SEA to break down. Faulty operation of speed reg-
                                            ulators on #1 and #2 lighting motor generators did not result
                                            in any damage. The design of these various equipments does
                                            not take care of this overload.

ENGINEERING:

                                            A squeal
developed in the st rb rd shaft
after leaving the advanced base. First reported at 40 turns
and became apparent at increasing speeds up to 100 turns.

-52-

— page 319 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

ENGINEERING (cont'd):

There was an intermediate speed of about 80 turns where the
squeal disappeared. As near as can be determined, the noise
is in the starboard strut bearing. All efforts to quiet the
noise were fruitless.

1 MC FAILURE:

Both signal generators in the 1MC failed when
the power transformers in the power supplies were burned out.
This occurred when the over-speed trip on the ship's A.C.
motor generator failed to operate. The excessive speed of
the motor generator raised the A.C. voltage to 190 volts and
changed the frequency of the supply to 80 cycles. These
changes caused the windings in the power transformers of the
signal generator to break down. The circuit of signal gen-
erator #2 was checked and found to be in good condition.
The burned out transformer was replaced by the shipboard
spare and the unit was returned to normal operation.

7 MC

The operation of the new 7MC during the patrol
was very poor. The relays in the bridge reproducer unit
periodically failed to make proper contact. This was par-
ticularly true of the relay energized when communicating from
the bridge to the Forward Torpedo Room. This relay was
cleaned and operation was satisfactory for a period of 250
hours when the same trouble occurred again. At other times
communications from the bridge would be broken and unintell-
igible. This trouble was eliminated each time by disconnect-
ing the bridge reproducer unit and brushing the relay contacts.
Also, the relays to the Control room and Conning Tower would
remain closed so that both of these compartments would hear
communications between the bridge and other compartments.
The press-to-talk switches in the 7MC toward the end of the
patrol began to operate faulty due to weakening of the springs
in the switching unit on the bridge.

Service tests on this patrol proved that the
present design of the 7MC system had two distinct military
hazards, viz:
(1) The press to talk feature on the bridge, and
(2) The bridge right of way feature. Elimination
of these two features at the earliest practical date is
strongly recommended. Other desirable changes in this system
are:
(1) Make bridge information addressee from all
stations,
(2) Eliminate station feedback,
(3) Add a station in mess hall for ammunition
party control, and
(4) Add a souped-up directional speaker on the
bridge for giving orders to guns, inter-boat talking etc.

-53-

— page 321 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
MARK 18 TORPEDOES

A full load of Mark 18-1 torpedoes was
carried on this patrol, during which three battery explosions
occurred. One of these explosions necessitated the survey of
torpedo Number 57150 from Number seven tube.

The first, a minor explosion occurred in torpedo
#56454 sometime after being charged on 2 January 1945. It
was not discovered until 8 January 1945 when it was removed
from the tube for its routine freshening charge. Several
cell caps had been blown off and a 48 V ground had developed.
The battery and compartment were thoroughly wiped dry with
a solution of baking soda applied. Later, this process was
repeated several times with negligible results. The torpedo
was subsequently fired resulting in a hit on an enemy des-
troyer.

As a result of this explosions, all torpedoes
were ventilated every 24 hours, and were allowed to ventilate
in the racks extra time following each charge, before being
loaded into the tubes.

On the afternoon of 11 January 1945, explosions
occurred in the two remaining torpedoes, Numbers 57150 and
57010 immediately after being loaded into the tubes following
a routine charge. Upon being withdrawn from the tubes, clouds
of sulphurous smoke issued from Number 57150 and the after
body and battery compartment were warm to the touch; a minor
explosion was also found to have occurred in Number 57010,
similar to that experienced on 8 January 1945. All head hole
covers were removed from Number 57150 which continued to smoke
but appeared to be cooling off. The After Torpedo Room was
sealed and abandoned, except for two torpedomen equipped
with breathing apparatus and assigned to watch the torpedo.
The ship was then surfaced and the After Torpedo Room
ventilated. Shortly after surfacing, the torpedo again
started to smoke heavily and a battery fire seemed to be in
progress as the torpedo heated up very rapidly. It was then
decided to fire the torpedo, which was done by leaving hand-
hole plates off, jamming the impeller, loading into #7 tube,
opening outer door and firing immediately by hand.

Despite above explosions and misadventures, it
is desired that we take a full load of 18's on the next
patrol. Performance with zero depth setting in heavy seas
proved excellent.

-55-

— page 322 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
L. RADIO
RECEPTION

(a) NPM Submarine Fox Schedule.
Reception of this schedule varied from fair
to good throughout the patrol. Two serials were missed;
the first when we were forced to submerge at night for
planes, and the second when we were making a night attack.
Enroute to and from the area, frequency 4515 kcs was used
daily from 0800 to 1100 GCT with fair results. In the area,
9090 kcs. was used almost continually, with 6045 kcs as
standby frequency. Reception on 9090 kcs was good except
during the early morning hours when atmospheric conditions
affected our reception of traffic. On 6045 kcs very much
atmospheric, CW and voice interference were encountered
about 1300 and 2100 GCT.

(b) NKN Fox Schedule.
Reception of this schedule on both frequencies
was very good in the patrol area. Some CW interference was
encountered from time to time but it in no way prevented us
from receiving the traffic. No contacts were made by
using this information as we were East of the area covered
by the recco planes. It is suggested that planes should
also be sent to cover the OKINAWA GUNTO area. The Wolf
Pack's efficiency would increase greatly if the planes could
extend their flight to cover this area.

(c) Saipan Harbor Frequency.
A message was received from NDP-4 on 16 January
at 1025 GCT with fairly good reception on 4155 kcs. Reception
on this frequency was good within the 300 mile circle.

(d) WAPOCO Frequency
Messages from the other subs in our pack were
received with good signal strength and readability. However,
on the night of 7 January, (1020 GCT) a partial repeat of a
message from SEAFOX was required because of local Jap stations.

(e) Life-guard Frequency.
Reception on 4475 kcs was on the whole fair.
Aircraft messages came in quite well. However some Jap CW
and voice interference was encountered between 0600 and 1100
GCT from 12 to 14 January and made reception fairly difficult.

(f) VHF
No messages were received over VHF in the patrol
area. Enroute Saipan from Pearl in company with the BLUEBACK,
some test messages were received with ranges varying from
3000 to 7000 yards.

-56-

— page 323 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TRANSMISSIONS

(a) NPM
1. A transmission on 8470 kcs. NPM was
made on 4 January. NPM answered up on the first call and
the message was sent and receipted for with no repeats. The
message was cleared in about 25 minutes.

2. The second transmission on 9470 kcs to NPM
on 8 January was also cleared with little trouble and was
receipted for 18 minutes after the first callup.

3. When transmitting on 8470 kcs just before
dawn on 9 January, we had some difficulty getting thru due
to Jap interference close by. The message took about an
hour to clear and we were forced to submerge at 2150 GCT
without getting a receipt for the message. However the
next night our receipt was received over NPM Sub fox.

4. The same local Jap interference was encount-
ered on 8470 kcs when transmitting to NPM at 2129 GCT, 10
January 1945. The message was receipted for 21 minutes after
start of first transmission.

5. Our fifth message to NPM on 11 January was
also sent out on 8470 kcs, and was sent and receipted for in
a period of 22 minutes at 1046 GCT.

6. On 14 January an urgent message was sent to
NPM on 8470 kcs and receipted for at 1139 GCT in 9 minutes.

(b) NKN
No messages were sent to NKN during this patrol.

(c) Saipan Harbor Frequency.
1. We had a great difficulty getting our first
message to NDP-4 on 12 January. We called on 4155 and 8310
kcs with no success. Then we switched to 8470 kcs and called
NPM. After some time NKN answered up to take our message. We
sent the message but were unable to get a receipt for it.
Finally VIXØ took our message, and receipted for it at 1210
GCT, after being on the air for over two hours. The message
was not sent out over NPM Sub Fox Schedule until 14 January.

2. Our second transmission to NDP-4 on 13 January
also had to be relayed via another station; this time NPM-6
on 4155 kcs. The early morning atmospheric condition made
transmission difficult and many repeats were required before
it was finally receipted for at 2110 GCT. The message took
63 minutes to get thru.

3. The third message to NDP-4 on 14 January had
to be sent to NPM on 8470 kcs after failing to raise NDP-4 on
4155 and 8310 kcs. The message took over one hour to clear and
was receipted for at 0639 GCT.

-57-

— page 324 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
TRANSMISSIONS (cont'd)

4. Our fourth message to NDP-4 on 14 January was
also sent to NPM on 8470 kcs after trying the harbor frequency.
This message was receipted for at 1640 GCT after being on the
air for 35 minutes.

5. The fifth message to NDP-4 on 14 January was
cleared with little trouble on 4155 kcs and receipted for in
18 minutes at 1953 GCT.

(b) VLF
1. One transmission was made on the VLF during
the patrol. At 0220 GCT, 13 January we exchanged messages
with a friendly bomber that was picked up by SD Radar at 25
miles and identified as friendly by IFF. The transmission
and receipt were satisfactory. During the trial period, it
was found that we could only transmit to other subs at a range
from 3000 to 7000 yards. This range is much too small for
effective wolf pack use.

(c) Harbor
Outgoing traffic on this frequency was handled
with little difficulty with one exception. On 9 January at
2157 GCT, we transmitted to the SLIME and NOX. The SLI-
ME received the message and receipted for it in 3 minutes.
Repeated attempts were made to call the SLIME but she never
answered up. 11 other transmissions were receipted for in
reasonable time periods.

LIFEGUARD

(a) We made one transmission on lifeguard fre-
quency to aircraft. On 14 January about 0700 GCT, and the
messages were cleared with little difficulty.

REMARKS:

With the present number and type of receivers
on submarines we are only able to guard one of the following
frequencies at a time: Olfpack, Lifeguard, and Harbor fre-
quencies. It is requested that another R.D. receiver be in-
cluded in sub allowances so that a watch may be kept on two of
these frequencies at once.

-58-

— page 325 —
1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1
M. RADAR

SD2 RADAR * The SD radar performance was excell-
ent. Enrout to and from the patrol area, it was manned 3
seconds out of every 30 seconds. In the patrol area the SD
radar was secured. However, on APR contact of aircraft radar
frequencies the SD radar was keyed to check the ranges.
Throughout the patrol, the SD radar caused no trouble other
than normal vacuum tube failures. However, during the train-
ing period at Pearl Harbor, one of the transmission lines in
the mast was found to be broken near the antenna head. The
transmission lines and antenna head were replaced and the
equipment retuned. This resulted in much higher sensitivity
and good ranges. Ranges were obtained on planes varying from
5 to 25 miles.

SJa RADAR - The SJa performance was very good
throughout the patrol. It was used for both air and surface
search. A number of plane contacts were picked up as far out
as 18,000 yards on the PPI scope. Destroyer escorts were
picked up at 22,000 yards, submarines at 16,000 yards, and
land contacts out to the end of the main sweep. While operat-
ing in the wolf pack the SJa was manned continuously and mess
ages were handled over the radar. There was only one major
part failure during this patrol; this being the oper resistor
R(44), in the power supply of the PPI unit.

RADAR INTERFERENCE

(A) Radar interference

(B) Let 27° -01.3N

(C) Ten centimeter radar
2000 cycles/second - pulse rate 4 times
that of SJa - pulse width.
The radar seemed to sweep back and forth
across the Jap destroyer's bow.

(D) SJa Radar
706 AY magnetron

(E) This radar was definitely located on a
Jap destroyer.

(F) Although the transmitter pulse was much
stronger than an SJa radar, its range was much less. The Jap
destroyer lost contact with us at 7000 yards and tried to
track us by homing on our interference. When we quit keying
our radar and observed this Jap radar interference, it lost
all track of us and began sweeping at random. The interferenc
showed no signs of homing. The sketch below is a full scale
pulse of the interference on precision sweep.

-59-

— page 326 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

M.                                RADAR (cont'd)

          Due to the fact that the Japanese are using ten
centimeter radar, SJC radar is becoming less effective and
the need for a three centimeter surface search radar is be-
coming more evident. The 10 centimeter radar should be re-
tained as a warning receiver.

                                ST RADAR

          The ST radar has operated excellently since the
time of installation during the PUFFER'S recent MINY overhaul.
Only minor difficulties were experienced during this patrol.
The main failure of the equipment was due to two faulty
Sylvania crystal detectors 1N23. In both cases the crystals
lasted about 75 hours during that time, performance was
erratic. A new Western Electric crystal was installed and the
trouble was eliminated. The only other operational difficul-
ties were the normal tube failures. During the patrol, on two
separate approaches, ranges on a Jap destroyer and a small
MARU were obtained out to 4000 yards while at 58 feet. During
the trial runs, the ST was tested thoroughly and it was found
that while on the surface, destroyer escorts could be tracked
to 20,000 yards, submarines to 9000 yards, and landout to
30,000 yards. When submerged to 55 to 58 feet the ranges are
approximately cut in half. The ST was also used as a means of
recognition and communication with other submarines. We were
able to maintain communications out to a range of fifteen
miles with an S-3 signal. One modification was made on our
ST equipment while we were at Pearl. The receiver's local
oscillator tube, type 723ab was wired so that it had plate
voltage when the equipment was in a standby position. This
shortened the warm up time of the equipment.

                                  IFF

          The IFF equipment worked very well in conjunction
with the SD radar. IFF contacts were obtained out to the end
of the sweep of the SD at various times. No failures of the
equipment were experienced throughout the patrol.

                            AN/SPA-1 and APR-1

          The AN/SPA-1 and APR-1 proved to be very valuable
and necessary equipment on this war patrol. It was used al-
most exclusively in place of the SD while in the patrol area
and operated successfully many times as an early warning de-
vice for enemy aircraft. About an equal number of land based
and airborne radar contacts were made and are listed in the
log accompanying this report. The majority of these contacts
were picked up on the TN/2 band (80 to 300 mcs). In the area
a continuous watch was kept on the APR-1; with TN/2 band being
operated for five minutes on one sweep made thru TN/3 band
alternately. It was found that many of the aircraft and land
radar frequencies were the same. However the land based radar
has a greater pulse width and usually a lower pulse rate than
the aircraft radar on the same frequency.

-60-

— page 327 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
M. RADAR (contd)

In using the equipment as an aircraft warning device, the gain
control on the APR-1 unit was constantly kept on full gain
while the gain on the AN/SPA-1 was arbitrarily set on posit-
ion "7". Although there is no direct indication of the range
of the enemy aircraft, it was found that, with these conditions
when the signal on the SPA reached saturation,
the enemy was sufficiently close to warrant submerging.
Enemy land based radar was frequently picked up on the equip-
ment at ranges up to approximately fifty miles, although at
times the signal would be too weak to give any indication on
the AN/SPA-1 screen, or any reliable indication as to pulse
width.

One failure occurred when the power transformer of the
AN/SPA-1 unit overheated and shorted out. This is believed to
have been due to poor ventilation around the equipment. A
duct was installed from the ventilation supply lines and dir-
ected at the gear. The circuit of the unit was checked and
found to be normal. A spare power transformer was installed
and normal operation was resumed. No other troubles were en-
countered in this equipment. Prior to our departure from Pearl
the AN/SPA-1 were moved from the radio room and relocated in
the control room with the SD receiver. In this way one oper-
ator was able to man the SD radar, the APR-1 and AN/SPA-1,
the ABK and BN. It simplified the watch standing greatly and
also eliminated much confusion if it had been necessary to
man it in ourradio room.

If it were possible to incorporate range and directional
features into the equipment. It is an invaluable piece of
equipment. It is recommended that attempts be made to intro-
duce these features into the equipment. It is also suggested
that a circuit be rigged up so that it is possible to switch
electrically from one frequency band to another. This would
save much time and eliminate the need to shift bands manually.

-61-

— page 328 —
Cont. No. | Date | Time (I) | Lat. | Long. | Freq. MC | Pulse Rate | Pulse Width | Pulse Time | Rotation | Location | Remarks
---|---
1 | 12-31-44 | 2148 | 25°-13.5'N | 130°-35.5'E | 75 | 500 | 12 | 2 min. | Intermit | IFF Response | on SD
2 | 1-2-45 | 0130 | 27°-10.5' | 130°-45.9' | 96 | 800 | 10 | 2 min. | Intermit | Plane | Sign. rec. Int.
3 | 1-3-45 | 0121 | 27°-24.8' | 127°-32.8' | 96 | 800 | 10 | 2 min. | Intermit | Plane | For 4 hours
4 | 1-3-45 | 2.3700606 | 27°-25.8' | 128°-13.9' | 96 | 1200 | 12 | 2 min. | Intermit | Plane | Okinoyerago Jima
5 | 1-4-45 | 0340 | 27°-14.2' | 127°-38.0' | 150 | 500 | 13 | 2 min. | In swps | Land | SD on SEAFOX
6 | 1-4-45 | 0605 | 27°-23.5' | 128°-53.0' | 100 | 800 | 35-40 | 2 min. | In swps | Land | Yoron Jima
7 | 1-4-45 | 1917 | 27°-12.7' | 128°-19.0' | 100 | 600 | 14 | 2 min. | In swps | Land | Yoron Jima
8 | 1-5-45 | 0029 | 27°-23.1' | 127°-40.1' | 96 | 1200 | 14 | 2 min. | In swps | Plane | " "
9 | 1-5-45 | 0108 | 27°-23.2' | 127°-10.2' | 100 | 800 | 35-40 | 2 min. | In swps | Plane | No. of Ineya Jima
10 | 1-5-45 | 0744 | 27°-23.5' | 126°-56.2' | 150 | 600 | 1 | 2 min. | In swps | Plane | North of Ineya Jima
11 | 1-5-45 | 2245 | 27°-17.1' | 127°-1.5' | 96 | 1200 | 15 | 2 min. | In swps | Land | Aguni Shima
12 | 1-6-45 | 0030 | 26°-58.5' | 127°-10.2' | 100 | 800 | 35-40 | 2 min. | In swps | Land | Aguni Shima
13 | 1-6-45 | 0315 | 26°-42.5' | 127°-37.3' | 96 | 1200 | 14 | 2 min. | In swps | Land | Aguni Shima
14 | 1-6-45 | 2317 | 26°-57.0' | 128°-16.5' | 149 | 500 | 15 | 2 min. | Steady | Land | Aguni Shima
15 | 1-7-45 | 0037 | 26°-46.0' | 127°-57.5' | 96 | 1200 | 15 | 2 min. | Steady to Land | Land | Aguni Shima
16 | 1-7-45 | 0130 | 26°-53.5' | 127°-24.7' | 96 | 750 | 35-40 | 2 min. | In swp Land | Land | Aguni Shima (SJ range 65000 Yds)
17 | 1-7-45 | 0220 | 26°-51.0' | 127°-16.9' | 100 | 750 | 35-40 | 2 min. | In swp Land | Land | Aguni Shima
18 | 1-7-45 | 0825 | 27°-08.5' | 127°-26.7' | 96 | 500 | 13 | 2 min. | In swp Land | Land | Aguni Shima
19 | 1-7-45 | 0843 | 27°-08.0' | 127°-32.7' | 96 | 750 | 35 | 2 min. | In swp Land | Land | Aguni Shima
20 | 1-8-45 | 1905 | 27°-16.0' | 127°-32.7' | 96 | 750 | 35 | 2 min. | In swp Land | Land | Aguni Shima
21 | 1-8-45 | 2212 | 27°-25.8' | 127°-53.2' | 96 | 1000 | 32 | 2 min. | In swp Land | Land | Aguni Shima
22 | 1-9-45 | 0210 | 27°-25.7' | 127°-18.0' | 96 | 1000 | 35-40 | 2 min. | In swp Land | Land | Aguni Shima
23 | 1-9-45 | 1520 | 27°-04.7' | 127°-22.1' | 96 | 750 | 32 | 2 min. | In swp Land | Land | Aguni Shima
24 | 1-9-45 | 1

— page 329 —
Cont No. | Date | Time (I) | Lat. | Long. | Freq. MC | Pulse Rate | Pulse Width | Rot. | Horizon | Location | Remarks
---|---
28 | 1-10-45 | 0825 | 26°-00.5' | 126°-57.2' | 96 | 750 | 12 | Sweeping | Land | Aguni Shima
29 | 1-10-45 | 0915 | 26°-52.5' | 127°-17.2' | 100 | 750 | 35-40 | 2 min swp | Land | Aguni Shima
30 | 1-10-45 | 1800 | 26°-13.0' | 127°-22.5' | 100 | 800 | 40 | 2 min swp | Land | Aguni Shima
31 | 1-10-45 | 1921 | 27°-00.0' | 127°-22.0' | 150 | 550 | 10.5 | 2 min swp | Land | Aguni Shima
32 | 1-11-45 | 0039 | 26°-51.5' | 127°-1.0' | 96 | 800 | 30-40 | 2 min swp | Land | Aguni Shima
33 | 1-11-45 | 1724 | 27°-20.7' | 128°-00.0' | 100 | 1000 | 20 | Trained | Land | Aguni Shima
34 | 1-11-45 | 1807 | 27°-27.0' | 127°-36.7' | 150 | 500 | 25 | 2 min swp | Land | Iheya Jima
35 | 1-11-45 | 2313 | 27°-05.0' | 128°-05.0' | 250 | 1000 | 20 | U.S. Sub | Okinojerabu Jima
36 | 1-12-45 | 0120 | 27°-29.5' | 129°-36.0' | 81 | 250 | 25 | Constant | Land | Okinojerabu Jima

-63-

— page 330 —
[HANDWRITTEN: SUMMARY OF RADARS
IN
OKINAWA GUNTO AREA]

[HANDWRITTEN: AIRBORNE RADAR
155 MCS
1000 C/SEC
1-45]

[HANDWRITTEN: AIRBORNE RADAR
500-600 C/SEC
1/4 "S"]

[HANDWRITTEN: AIRBORNE RADAR
96 MCS - 1200 C/SEC
1/4 "S" - 2 1/2 MIN SWEEPS]

[HANDWRITTEN: TORI-D SHIMA]

[HANDWRITTEN: SHORE BASED
A/C & S/C RADAR
150 MCS
800 C/SEC
10-45]

[HANDWRITTEN: KUME JIMA]

[HANDWRITTEN: SHORE BASED
146 MCS]

[HANDWRITTEN: AGUNI-JIMA]

[HANDWRITTEN: SHORE BASED
A/C & S/C RADAR
100 MCS - 700-800 C/SEC
35-40-45 - 2 1/2 MIN SWEEPS]

[HANDWRITTEN: IYE SHIMA]

[HANDWRITTEN: SHORE BASED
A/C & S/C RADAR
96 MCS
30-40-45-22
1/4 "S"
2 1/2 MIN SWEEPS]

[HANDWRITTEN: SHORE BASED
150 MCS
1000 C/SEC
OKINAWA]

[HANDWRITTEN: OKINAWA]

[HANDWRITTEN: SHORE BASED
A/C & S/C RADAR
150 MCS
500 C/SEC
20-45"]

[HANDWRITTEN: TONAKI JIMA]

[HANDWRITTEN: SHORE BASED
A/C & S/C RADAR
100 MCS
800 C/SEC
25-40-45"]

[HANDWRITTEN: YORON JIMA]

[HANDWRITTEN: SHORE BASED
A/C & S/C RADAR
147.5 MCS
JIMA]

— page 331 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
N. SOUND GEAR and SOUND CONDITIONS:

The sound equipment functioned very well throughout
the patrol run. Target screws were picked up on JK, QB, and
JP at ranges from 10,000 to 12,000 yards. Good ranges were
also obtained on land contacts. Sound conditions were very
good in the central part of the NANSEI SHOTO area. The fath-
ometer was the only echo ranging equipment used and it operat-
ed satisfactorily. Two Jap PC's sighted during the patrol
were found to have sonic echo ranging gear. JP picked up the
pinging constantly between 500 and 3000 cycles, while the sup-
ersonic gear was unable to hear the pinging. On another
occasion, while making an approach on a Jap destroyer, JK
picked up enemy sound gear with a clicking signal. We were
unable to determine the exact frequency as it was below the
range of the supersonic receivers, and very close to the sonic
frequencies. It is believed to be about 11-13 kcs.

-64-

— page 332 —
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

O.
DENSITY LAYERS:

DATE | L.T. | POSITION | | MAX. DEPTH | TEMP. | | | DEPTH CONT. | REMARKS
| | LAT. | LONG. | (Ft.) | SURF. | MAX. DEPTH | OF LAYER | LAYER (Ft.) |
| | | | | OF | OF | OF | |
1944 | | | | | | | | |
11/12 | 37-51 | 122-47 W | 260 | 62 | 55 | 62 | 150-210 | Not well defined
| | | | | | | | | layer
11/26 | 35-47 | 152-49 W | 325 | 68 | 77 | no layer | | Layer faintly de-
| | | | | | | | | fined
12/4 | 21-04 | 158-13 W | 340 | 80 | 78 | 80 | 300-320 | Layer well defined
12/5 | 21-04 | 158-12 W | 320 | 80 | 77 | 80 | |
12/8 | 21-05 | 158-20 W | 250 | 81 | 81 | no layer | |
12/11 | 21-00 | 159-47.5W | 280 | 79 | 78 | no layer | |
12/27 | 16-32 | 146-14 E | 300 | 84 | 77 | no layer | |
1945 | | | | | | | | |
1/2 | 27-16 | 128-54 E | 290 | 75 | 74 | no layer | |
1/3 | 27-13 | 128-09 E | 280 | 76 | 76 | no layer | |
1/4 | 27-23 | 128-33 E | 300 | 76 | 75 | no layer | |
1/5 | 27-23 | 128-40 E | 310 | 76 | 76 | no layer | |
1/6 | 27-21 | 126-30.5E | 380 | 78 | 76 | no layer | |
1/7 | 27-11.5 | 127-28 E | 320 | 76 | 76 | no layer | |
1/8 | 26-29 | 127-20 E | 300 | 75 | 73 | no layer | |
1/9 | 27-27 | 127-57 E | 290 | 76 | 76 | no layer | |
1/10 | 27-02 | 126-48 E | 300 | 76 | 76 | no layer | |
1/11 | 27-21 | 128-03 E | 300 | 76 | 76 | no layer | |
1/12 | 27-29.5 | 120-06 E | 300 | 76 | 76 | no layer | |

-65

— page 333 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
P. HEALTH, FOOD and HABITABILITY:

     The health of the crew was in general good. The following
were the sick days, with their diagnosis: Carbuncle 9,
Cat fever 3, Dermatitis 20, Conjunctivitis 18, Sprain (elbow)
18. The food was in general good, but poorly prepared. It is
regretted that stocks of fresh frozen foods were limited. The
stowage of fresh potatoes is a problem complicated by the in-
stallation of the auxiliary hatches, as it is no longer
possible to use the after battery hatch for a potato locker.
Habitability was very good. The installation of the booster
blower and air conditioning coil in the control room was very
effective in helping ventilate the forward battery. After five
patrols in tropical waters it was quite an experience to be ever
cool all the time both surfaced and submerged.

-66-

— page 334 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Q. PERSONNEL:

     This boat was fortunate in having a very small
turnover of personnel in Mare Island. Total men lost - six.
One man was left at Pearl Harbor and three in Saipan. The
reliefs and new men received, were of high caliber and seem
very eager. All new men appear to be well indoctrinated and
have benefitted from schools attended. The fact still remains,
however, that no amount of training and indoctrination will
make a seasoned submarine sailor ---- the only thing that will
is to ride the boats.

     The officers and crew performed exceptionally
well under combat conditions. In action with the enemy they
showed coolness, resourcefulness, and a courage that was
inspiring to the Commanding Officer. There were cases of
outstanding personal bravery which have been made the subject
of separate correspondence.

     The number of men carried on board this patrol
(75) was found to be barely adequate for all the watches. A
complement of eighty would be better.

     Eleven officers were attached during this patrol
and this was found to work out very well. The watch standers
were divided into four sections standing three hours apiece.
With the increase in A/S measures, an alert O.O.D. watch is
a necessity. The odd officer was assigned the decoding duty
from 2000 to 0800. This detail was rotated every week. This
detail broke the monotony of deck watches and gave the Junior
Officers a break on sleeping.

     Daily school of the boat was held for each section.
The men were divided into groups, the unqualified people under
qualified men -- each section supervised by their watch
officer.

     Travelling with another submarine in company
affords an excellent chance for tracking drills and general
fire control drills enroute to area. A speed of advance of
thirteen (13) knots is far too much to conduct any type of
diving training, sound training, controller drills, etc.,
particularly with a zig-zag plan to follow.

-67-

— page 335 —
The performance of the Fire Control Party on
this patrol is considered outstanding. The efficiency, calm-
ness and accuracy of this group under severe attack conditions
was an inspiration to the Commanding Officer. During the
attack on the two destroyers at 1000 yards, the only words
spoken by the C.O. were "Angle on bow - 90 Port." The fire
control party did the rest. Especially outstanding was the
work of the Executive Officer (Lt. S. M. DECKER, USNR), TDC
Operator (Lt. W. M. PUGH, II), and the Radar Operator
(DEEM, CRT). Lieut. PUGH's record as a TDC operator is
outstanding. On the two patrols previous to this one, he
was instrumental in the sinking of 61,500 tons and damaging
of 34,000 tons. The results of the attack on the two destroy-
ers was not accidental. The fire control party was drilled
repeatedly in firing this type of shot at the insistence of
our training officer (Commander D. C. WHITE, U.S.N.)

NUMBER ON BOARD 75
NUMBER QUALIFIED AT START 39
NUMBER QUALIFIED AT END 40
ADVANCED IN RATING 6
FIRST PATROL RUN 14

R. MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED:

PEARL HARBOR TO MARE ISLAND 2208 MILES 16,660 GALLONS
MARE ISLAND TO PEARL HARBOR 2548 " 37,137 "
PEARL HARBOR TO SAIPAN 3056 " 45,390 "
SAIPAN TO AREA 1380 " 19,436 "
IN AREA 1625 " 19,414 "
AREA TO GUAM 2021 " 27,945 "
TOTALS 12,838 MILES 165,982 GALLONS

S. DURATION:

DAYS MINY TO PEARL HARBOR 8
DAYS IN PEARL 17
DAYS PEARL TO SAIPAN 11
DAYS IN SAIPAN 1
DAYS SAIPAN TO AREA 5
DAYS IN AREA 9
DAYS FROM AREA TO GUAM 5
DAYS SUBMERGED 4
GRAND TOTAL DAYS 56
TOTAL DAYS PATROL (Saipan to
Area to Guam) 19

[HANDWRITTEN: -68-]
[HANDWRITTEN: 70]

— page 336 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
T. FACTORS OF ENDUR NCE REMAIING

TORPEDOES
FUEL
PROVISIONS
PERSONNEL FACTOR
LIMITING FACTOR THIS PATROL

-69-
1 (possibly defective)
53,700 gallons
30 days
30 days
Orders from Comsubpac
when all but two torpedoes
were expended.

[HANDWRITTEN: 71]

— page 337 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U. REMARKS:

(a) ENEMY MINESWEEPING
No enemy minesweeping activity was observed.

(b) ENEMY DEGAUSSING
No enemy degaussing was observed.

(c) ENEMY RADAR (1) SHIP BASED
In the second attack on the convoy of the night of 10
January 1945 the destroyers encountered had 10 cm radar. He did
not appear to detect us until a range of about 1200 yards, this was
possibly a sight contact. He tracked us out and possibly had a pip
out to about 7,000 or 8,000 yards. From then on he was beaming on
us only when we had our SJ trained on him, evidently following our
interference. We did not beam on him in our sweeps, only training
on him momentarily for quick ranges. For details see section under
RADAR.

ENEMY RADAR (2) LAND BASED
Land based radar in this area very effectively kept us
from close-in night patrolling. It is believed that they never
picked us up, although they did beam on us several times. For
complete data on land based radar - see section M - RADAR.

ENEMY RADAR (3) AIRPLANE RADAR
Considerable number of planes were encountered with
search radar. They forced us down both day and night, but never
will be seen, probably due to our conservative policy of diving
before they had a chance to pick us up. If we had a non-DFable
airplane search radar, with direction, it would be possible to
watch these planes without diving. At night it's hard to tell
whether the plane is covering a convoy or just on a routine search.

(d) TRAFFIC ROUTES AND FOCAL POINTS
Traffic was scarce in the OKINAWA GUNTO area. No traffic
routes or focal points were found. The one convoy encountered
appeared to be following the general direction of the Japan Stream,
but slightly to the eastward of the mean axis. Several small sam-
pans were seen, evidently following the island chain.

-70-
[HANDWRITTEN: 72]

— page 338 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
[HANDWRITTEN: PUFFER #6]
(E) SPECIAL COMMENT

PERISCOPE (ST) RADAR - DOCTRINE ON PUFFER:

1. TACTICAL USES:

A. DAY SUBMERGED ATTACK:
    As early in the approach as possible and whenever
    practical thereafter:
    "UP ONE" (Periscope radar)
    "BEARING MARK"
    "RANGE MARK" (Radar Operator)
    "DOWN ONE - UP TWO"
    "ANGLE ON BOW"
    "BEARING MARK" (TDC operator give generated range).
    "GEIGHT MARK" (masthead, stack, etc.)
    "DOWN TWO"

[HANDWRITTEN: BGHIPS.
NRL
CRD
3-HTR]
    Here the QM reads off the masthead height corresponding
    to the range given by TDC operator.

    This system was tried during the training period and
    the patrol, and it seems to work with certain restrictions.
    Using this scope in the daytime is like waving a size 5 Ensign
    at a target. Depths of 55 to 58 feet have to be used with
    long range and heavy seas. This makes depth control a problem
    in heavy seas. On this patrol the radar periscope was very
    helpful in the attack on the DD, and freighter escort. After
    sighting two targets with a large angle on the bow, a periscope
    radar range was taken, went deep, ran full speed, took a long
    when generated angle on bow was 90°, had to shoot with very
    little dope, range too long for a ping range so took a range
    ST (3000 yards) and shot. It is believed that the use of the
    ST periscope in submerged attack will vary with the tactical
    situation. It is regretted that the ST periscope is shorter
    than a regular periscope. In rough sea approaches even 65 feet
    can be a hazardous depth. Radar periscope depth (55 to 62 feet)
    is a military handicap.

B. SUBMERGED SEARCH:

    The radar periscope is used for searching submerged when
    visibility is low; also at morning and evening twilight. More
    tests will be be run next training period to determine range ex-
    pectancy Vs target size Vs depth Vs sea conditions.

C. NIGHT SUBMERGED ATTACK:

    Use whenever desired. Limitations are: (1) lack of bearings
    and (2) lack of PPI. This makes convoy attacks very difficult.
    Plane detection ability is also unknown. During next training
    period specially designed modifications, if approved, will be
    tried to produce bearings and PPI effect. Also tests will be
    conducted on the plane detection ability.

-71-
[HANDWRITTEN: 73]

— page 339 —
[HANDWRITTEN: PUFFER]                                                              [HANDWRITTEN: BU SHIPS]
[HANDWRITTEN: #6]                                                                [HANDWRITTEN: 1-XTRA]
[HANDWRITTEN: CONTROL]                                                           [HANDWRITTEN: CONNING]
[HANDWRITTEN: ROOM]                                                              [HANDWRITTEN: TOWER]

                                                                                  [HANDWRITTEN: SURFACE]
                                                                                  [HANDWRITTEN: SEARCH]
                                                                                  [HANDWRITTEN: 12-1500X]
                                                                                  [HANDWRITTEN: SURFACE]
                                                                                  [HANDWRITTEN: SEARCH]

[HANDWRITTEN: TRAINS]
[HANDWRITTEN: NEC]
[HANDWRITTEN: U.S.C.]
[HANDWRITTEN: 2000 YDS]
[HANDWRITTEN: CONTROL]
[HANDWRITTEN: ROOM]                                [HANDWRITTEN: URT]

                                                    [HANDWRITTEN: ST]
                                                    [HANDWRITTEN: Console]

                                                    [HANDWRITTEN: TDC]
                                                    [HANDWRITTEN: SC]
                                                    [HANDWRITTEN: 22]

                                                                                  [HANDWRITTEN: SV]
                                                                                  [HANDWRITTEN: AIRPLANE]
                                                                                  [HANDWRITTEN: SEARCH]

                                                    [HANDWRITTEN: SV]
                                                    [HANDWRITTEN: Console]

[HANDWRITTEN: U.S.C.]
[HANDWRITTEN: 2000 YDS]
[HANDWRITTEN: VISUALIZATION]
[HANDWRITTEN: PROCESS]

[HANDWRITTEN: 15]

— page 340 —
[HANDWRITTEN: PUFFER #6]
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

D. NIGHT SURFACE ATTACK:

The ST is very limited for use in night surface attacks due
to lack of bearings and PPI. This is most unfortunate as ST
has a great tactical advantage in that it does not show inter-
ference on any known Jap radar scopes (including 10 cm) or
search receivers. Due to the interlocking SJ - ST receiver
indicator system, the SJ is lost as a search receiver when shifted
to the ST. This means loss of knowledge of maneuvers of 10 cm
equipped escort in the convoy as the escorts can be followed by
the interference and also the knowledge as to when they have
stopped searching and have beamed on you, thus indicating that
you have been spotted. If the SJ - ST systems were not inter-
locked it would be possible to install a radar mast with ST type
wave guide and modified reflector forward of the "A" frames
similar to the SJ aft and use a two way system on this wave
guide and the ST wave guide, use the ST submerged and the new
search radar on the surface. This could still be done by instal-
ling another receiver indicator unit in the conning tower,
similar to the SJ receiver indicator unit.
[HANDWRITTEN: BUSHIPS
NRL
CRD]

E. NIGHT SEARCH:

The use of the ST as a night search radar is limited due to
lack PPI, difficulty of training, and lack of range. Effective-
ness against low flying night planes is unknown. More tests
will be made on these items during next training period. Use of
the ST as a surface search radar except under special conditions
is not deemed advisable until installation of a separate receiver
indicator on the SJ to serve as an early warning device for other
US submarines who are operating on the 10 cm band.
[HANDWRITTEN: 2-XTAN]

2. RECOMMENDATIONS:

Pending development, production, delivery, and installation
of newer types submarine radar, it is suggested that the follow-
ing experimental radar system be installed during the PUFFER'S
next refit at Pearl Harbor: (See sketch.)

- Install another radar mast forward of the "A" frames similar
to the SJ mast. This new mast to contain an ST wave guide and
reflector adapted to surface search type radar. Have the wave
guide of this new radar feed into ST transmitter receiver with
selector valve to choose between ST surface search and ST peri-
scope. Sufficient space is available in Conning Tower forward
of TDC for this unit and still have the added 16" needed for
the larger TDC. Install a receiver indicator unit in the Con-
ning Tower for use of this ST system. Install incidental equip-
ment needed with this in the pump room, removing 200# air com-
pressor and one 10# low pressure blower as necessary.

- During current refit at GUAM, install device to give bearing
effect in ST and a device to give PPI effect with ST in accord-
ance with plans furnished by PUFFER.

-72-
[HANDWRITTEN: 14]

— page 341 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(1) "That #$%&*! Carl is a #$%&*! and I ain't kiddin."

(2) "Damn old Puffer - she's to blame.
    Contact torpedoes - destroy same.
    Now is happy like Jap can be.
    She help us commit Hari-Kari."

(3) "Betcha I Pufferize his bow."

(4) "Captain, of Captain, come change sides with me.
    These are 40mm tracers as you can see."

(5) "Golay, old boy, your swap is a cinch.
    Here on my side, they're shooting five inch."

(6) Torpedo Junction.

(7) "Up all bunks, hold field day throughout the craft."

(8) "Old Frank's chow sure makes me cut loose with some
    nasty ones. WOW!"

(9) With a sudden thump and a hiss of air,
    The fish are on their way,
    And another ship of the rising sun
    Will come to us this day.
    For Carl and his boys are as good as can be,
    But don't let this be misleading to thee
    While on our fair waters this mood is maintained.
    When unleashed on the beach, their passions does flame,
    The'll woo a fair maiden without giving their name,
    And when she conceives they'll call her to blame.
    So! My dear daughter - them you must fear;
    They're a mad pack of demons when filled with beer.
    Tell the others my story and tell it well,
    Steer clear of the PUFFER or end up in HELL.

(10) After beer hose connection.

(11) "I wonder if they have any gum - - - mmmmmmm?"

-73-
[HANDWRITTEN: 76]

— page 343 —
FB5-281/A16
Serial (02)
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
To PUFFER Conf. Ltr.
2268/.16, Serial 02
of 17 January 1945

From: The Commander Submarine Division TWO EIGHTY ONE.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY EIGHT.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of SIXTH War Patrol.

1. The sixth war patrol of PUFFER as a member-of a
coordinated attack group (Commander M. H. CLEMPSON, U. S. Navy
in BLUEBACK, group commander) in the NANSEI SHOTO area was brief,
action filled and gratifyingly productive. The duration of the
patrol was but 31 days, of which nine were spent in the assigned
area.

2. Determined attacks on the first three ship contacts
that were deemed worthwhile targets exhausted PUFFER's supply of
usable torpedoes and resulted in the early termination of the
patrol. As may be expected in this area aircraft contacts were
plentiful.

3. On the afternoon of 4 January PUFFER discovered two
luggers at anchor inside the reef off YORON JIMA. The protected
position of the enemy and the fact that the attack would necessarily
have to be made across heavy seas at a small target made a success-
ful torpedo action seem doubtful. However, realizing that gun
action in the face of enemy shore positions would involve an un-
justified risk and having full confidence in the performance of the
Mark 18 torpedo, the commanding officer made three deliberate
submerged attacks at the nearer lugger, firing one torpedo on each
attack. The first two missed by narrow margins, the third hit and
demolished the target.

4. On the evening of 9 January PUFFER received a con-
tact report from S.M. FOX and proceeded to close. Radar contact was
established on a ten ship escorted convoy shortly after midnight
and two hours later PUFFER attacked two over lapping ships with
three torpedoes from an excellent firing position and was rewarded
with three hits which sank both targets.

-1-
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO EIGHTY ONE
Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

27 January 1945

— page 344 —
FB5-281/A16
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO EIGHTY ONE
% Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

Serial (02)
27 January 1945

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of SIXTH War Patrol.

— page 345 —
F5-201/ 16                                  DIVISION To D.M.P.C.
                                  Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

Serial (02)                                       27 January 1945

C-C-P-I-P-I-P-I-P-I-I-I
Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of SIXTH War Patrol.

— page 346 —
SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY-EIGHT

FC5-28/A16-3 Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
Serial: 024 28 January 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. PUFFER conf. ltr
S-268/A16 serial (02)
dated 17 January 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-EIGHT.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of SIXTH War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine
Division TWO EIGHTY ONE in the first endorsement.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-EIGHT most heartily con-
gratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the PUFFER on the extensive
damage they inflicted on this, their SIXTH War Patrol.

3. It is recommended that the PUFFER be credited with the following:

S U N K

1 Lugger (EU) 500 tons (Attack #1C)
(Type "J", page 139 of ONI 222J)
1 Large AO (EU) 9205 tons (Attack #2)
(Similar to OMUROS MARU)
1 Large AK (EU) 7500 tons (Attack #2)
1 DD (FUBUKI) (EU) 1700 tons (Attack #3C)
TOTAL SUNK 18905 tons.

D A M A G E D

1 AK (UN) 4000 tons (Attack #3A)
1 DD (FUBUKI) (EU) 1700 tons (Attack #3C)
1 AK (EU) 3593 tons (Attack #4B)
(Similar to SOYA MARU)
TOTAL DAMAGED 9293 tons.

TOTAL SUNK AND DAMAGED 28,198 tons.

J. M. WILL.

— page 347 —
FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0114
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PUFFER Report of
Sixth War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 659
U.S.S. PUFFER - SIXTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Sixth War Patrol
(16 December 1944 to 17 January 1945).

1. The sixth war patrol of the PUFFER, under the command
of Lieutenant Commander C. R. Dwyer, U.S. Navy, was conducted in the
southwest part of the central Nansei Shoto Area. The PUFFER, along
with the U.S.S. BLUEBACK (SS326) and the U.S.S. SEA FOX (SS402),
formed a coordinated attack group with the commanding officer of the
BLUEBACK, Commander J. F. Clementson, U.S. Navy, as group commander.

2. This smart, aggressive, outstanding patrol adds
another splendid chapter to the already illustrious record of the
PUFFER. Five daring torpedo attacks were made which resulted in
four enemy ships being demolished and three more seriously damaged or
possibly sunk. Destroyers as well as freighters felt the telling
blows of the PUFFER, one destroyer being sent to the bottom and
another losing her bow.

3. Three Mark 18 torpedo battery explosions were exper-
ienced by the PUFFER during this patrol. This well prepared patrol
report contains much pertinent and thoughtful comment. The comment
concerning the new ST radar is of particular interest.

4. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol
is authorized.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congra-
tulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the PUFFER
for this outstanding and sixth successive, successful patrol. The
PUFFER in her six patrols has sunk 13½ ships for 92,804 tons and
damaged 12 for 99,560 tons. She is credited with having inflicted
the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

- 1 -
Ga
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
5 February 1945.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

[STAMP: EXTRA - ORIGINAL]
[STAMP: SORG. MICRO]
[STAMP: PHOTO-LAB OP-16]
[STAMP: RETURN TO F-4253]

— page 348 —
FF12-10(L)/16-3(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET Ca
Serial 0114 Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
5 February 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
PUFFER Report of DESTROYED PRIOR TO
Sixth War Patrol. ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 659
U.S.S. PUFFER - SIXTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Sixth War Patrol
(16 December 1944 to 17 January 1945).

SUNK

1 - SC (Lugger) (EC) - 500 tons (Attack No. 10)
1 - Large AO (OMUROSAN MARU Type) (EC)- 9,200 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Large AK (EU) - 7,500 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - DD (FUBUKI Type) (EC) - 1,700 tons (Attack No. 30)

TOTAL SUNK 18,900 tons

DAMAGED

1 - UN - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 31)
1 - DD (FUBUKI Type) (EC) - 1,700 tons (Attack No. 30)
1 - Medium AK (SOYA MARU Type) (EC)- 3,600 tons (Attack No. 43)

TOTAL DAMAGED 9,300 tons

TOTAL SUNK & DAMAGED 28,200 tons.

J. H. BROWN, Jr.,
Deputy ComSubSpac.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (7)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
JICPOA (1)
AdICPOA (1)
ComServpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
ComSubSlant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)

(Cont'd next page)

- 2 -

— page 350 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

SS268/A16-3                               U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)
                                         c/o Fleet Post Office,
Serial 020                               San Francisco, Calif.,
                                         22 April 1945.
[HANDWRITTEN: 20] DECLASSIFIED [HANDWRITTEN: AL]
[HANDWRITTEN: ]

From:        The Commanding Officer.
To:          The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:         (Official Channels).

Subject:     U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of War Patrol
             Number SEVEN.

Enclosure:   (A) Subject Report.
             (B) Track Chart (To ComSubPac only).

1.           Enclosure (A), covering the SEVENTH WAR PATROL
of this vessel conducted in the [UNCLEAR: LU ON] STRAITS, SOUTH CHINA SEA
(S[UNCLEAR: ATO], HONGKONG, HAINAN), and the [UNCLEAR: BATE] ISLAND areas during the
period 11 February 1945 to 22 April 1945, is forwarded herewith.

                                         [SIGNATURE: Carl R. DYER.]

DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP 09B9C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/72]           [STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

121875 [STAMP: FILMED]

— page 351 —
SS268/A16-3
Serial 020
CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)
Report of SEVENTH War Patrol

(A) PROLOGUE:

Arrived Guam from SIXTH War Patrol on 17 January 1945.
Assigned to SubRon-28 (Captain J. W. WILL, U.S.N.), Sub-
Div-281 (Commander L. H. CHAPPELL, U.S.N.) for refit, USS
APOLLO, tender. On 18 January, officers and crew were re-
lieved by Relief Crew, and all hands departed for Camp
Dealey for a very pleasant two weeks leave. PUFFER was
docked for work on squeally shafts, noisy QB Sound shaft,
and routine underwater painting.

Refit completed on 1 February 1945. Officers and men
returned to a very clean boat. No alterations were completed.
Lt(jg) PICONE (DE) USNR was detached, and Lt(jg) DELAFIELD
(DL) USNR reported aboard.

Underway February 3 for post repair trials and deep
dive. No major defects except the shaft squeal that has
been intermittent since Navy Yard, Mare Island, overhaul.
Not sound tested, depermed, or wiped. Four days of under-
way training in approaches (surfaced and submerged) with
ComSubDiv-281 as training officer followed by two days load-
ing. Training was handicapped by insufficiency of targets
and target escorts. The various targets furnished during
this training period were as follows:

First Day - LCI
Second Day - LCI
Third Day - SC
Fourth Day - LCI
Fourth Night - DE target with ASR escort
Fifth Day - DE target with ASR escort

"With the present Japanese A/c policy of surrounding
each of their ships with one to four escorts in addition to
air cover, training with single unescorted targets is more
academic than practical. Although every effort was made by
scheduling activities to provide more targets and escorts,
none were procurable. Training with multiple targets well
screened is especially desirable by submarines equipped with
periscope radar in order to train fire control parties and
develop proper technique in target discrimination in view
of the non-bearing feature of the periscope radar. A well
screened multi-ship convoy presents a most difficult peri-
scope radar approach problem especially if the escorts are
using roving tactics. PUFFER is definitely in the "anchor
section" in this type of approach and needs considerable
training at it.

- 1 -

— page 355 —
17 February 1945 (cont'd):
extra-tropical storms and strong winds from N.E.
(6) Our OWN aviators are not to be trusted to come too close
on their inspection run. A definite cautious policy is pro-
bably the best until they get used to our submarines.
0132 SJ radar contact on NORTH ISLAND in LUZON STRAITS.
0327 APR, 93 mcs. Land based. The land based radars are shown
in the narrative on initial contact only. For complete
radar intercepts see Section "U".
0454 Lost radar contact with NORTH ISLAND.
0602 APR contact 152 mcs. Land based.
0605 APR contact 146 mcs. Airborne.
0621 Began keying SJ radar at irregular intergals.
0625 SJ radar land contact at 335° T, approximately 65,000 yards.
FORMOSA.
0630 APR contact 100 mcs. Land based.
0707 APR contact 146 mcs. Airborne. One fifth saturation.
0710 Sighted Japanese Betty type plane, range four miles. SUB-
MERGED.
0842 SURFACED. Proceeding to lifeguard station.
0900 APR contact at 100 mcs. Land based.
0954 SD contact on two planes at 24 and 26 miles.
1144 SD contact 6 miles. No IFF. SUBMERGED.
1200 Position Lat. 21° 13' N. Long. 120° 05' E.
1244 SURFACED, all clear.
1647 Arrived on lifeguard station.
1720 Sighted an aircraft, kapok filled, cushion type life jacket.
Manouvered to recover. Recovered life jacket. Had evident-
ly been in the water some time as it was covered with bar-
nacles. Surveyed it to see that it would float so it would
not attract attention. No markings of any kind.
2026 SD contact on one plane. 6 miles. No IFF. SUBMERGED.
2047 SURFACED.

18 February 1945:
Patrolling lifeguard station.
0304 APR contact 158 mcs. Airborne.
0607 SUBMERGED. 0701 SURFACED.
0855 APR contact 160 mcs. Airborne.
1125 Sighted unidentified plane, closing. No IFF. SUBMERGED.
1159 SURFACED.
1200 Position Lat. 21° 56' N. Long. 120° 57' E.
1206 APR contact 158 mcs. Airborne.
1244 After lookout sights what appears to be a mine. Manouvering
to close.
1300 SD contact 27 miles, closing.
1304 SD contact now 22 miles.
1310 Our mine turns out to be the body of a man floating face
downward. Very bloated.
1315 SD contact has closed to 11 miles.
1450 SD contact still closing. No IFF. SUBMERGED.
1729 SURFACED. All clear again.
1903 Sent PUFFER message to ComSubsPac&Comd giving weather data.

- 5 -

— page 364 —
SS268/A16-3
Serial 020
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)
Report of SEVENTH War Patrol

28 February 1945 (Cont'd):
1039 SURFACED.
1040 SD aircraft contact 9 miles. No IFF. SUBMERGED.
1200 Position Lat. 20° 41.8' N. Long. 120° 31.0' E.
1410 SURFACED.
1523 APR contact, 270 mcs. Shipborne. Very weak.
1815 Sent PUFFER fourth to ComSubPac Comd with weather data.
1930 Received Pack Commander's new area assignments. PIRANHA pa-
trols BASHI CHANNEL. SEA OWL patrols LUZON CHANNEL. PUF-
FER becomes "BLAZER LIFEGUARD".
2236 SD aircraft contact 9 miles. No IFF. SUBMERGED.
2321 SURFACED.

1 March 1945:
Enroute lifeguard station off TAKAO, FORMOSA.
0100 APR contact 69 mcs. Land based.
0518 SJ aircraft contact.
0520 SUBMERGED. 0551 SURFACED.
0800 On lifeguard station.
0911 SD aircraft contact 11 miles.
0912 SJ aircraft contact, 9 miles. Friendly.
0915 Numerous friendly planes about until 1300.
1140 On VHF lifeguard circuit heard the following conversation: "I
believe I see a submarine at five thirty on the water".
"There is something down there". "Think we ought to check it?"
"Roger. Try our IFF on it". "He seems to be moving awfully
fast. I don't believe that is a sub." (It was the PUFFER.)
1200 Position Lat. 21° 40.3' N. Long. 120° 12.2' E.
1616 Sighted several empty oil drums. Sank them with small arms
fire.
2040 Received ComSubPac Serial 13 directing SEA OWL and PIRANHA
to proceed westward to area off HONGKONG.
2157 SD aircraft contact 8 miles. No IFF. SUBMERGED.
2225 SURFACED.

2 March 1945:
Patrolling lifeguard station.
0507 O.C.D. heard, but did not see, an airplane. SUBMERGED.
0540 SURFACED.
0818 APR contact 160 mcs. Airborne.
0831 SD aircraft contact 10 miles. No IFF. SUBMERGED.
0852 SURFACED.
0905 SD aircraft contact 5 miles. No IFF. SUBMERGED.
0924 SURFACED.
0937 Sighted several empty oil drums. Sank them with small arms
fire. Position Lat. 21° 48.5' N. Long. 120° 14.2' E.
1100 Sighted several large formations of B-24s and B-25s proceeding
southward. Evidently the raid is over.

- 14 -

— page 386 —
SS268/.:16-3
Serial 020
CO FIDENI.L

(H) ATTACK DATA:

U.S.S. PUFFER

TIME 2246 H DATE 6 March 1945

DESCRIPTION:

SHIP(S) SUNK,
DAMAGED, OR
PROBABLY SUNK

TARGET DRIFT Unknown

SPEED 12 kts.
(accelerating)

TYPE ATTACK: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)
Report of SEVENTH War Patrol

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 7
LAT. 21-53 N. LONG. 119-29 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
The target was probably a small patrol vessel
or submarine, and was contacted by SJ radar in
poor visibility conditions.

None.

COURSE 165° T. SPEED 12 kts RANGE 2100 yds

OWN SHIP DATA:
COURSE 165° T DEPTH Surface ANGLE 0° At firing

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA:
This was a radar surface attack on a target that ap-
parently made radar contact on PUFFER before PUFFER
did on the target. As the target was in a perfect
firing position when discovered, put target astern,
speeded up, and fired three harassing "down the throat"
shots in order to discommode the enemy and thus gain
much needed evasion time. Insufficient time was a-
vailable to determine a solution on the TDC and tor-
pedoes were fired by swinging ship in accordance with
radar bearings, firing the first to hit, the second
to the right, and the third to the left on a zero
track with depths staggered, 20 feet, 10 feet, and
0 feet. Dived to avoid when enemy torpedo was sighted.

-37-

— page 415 —
S-268/A16-3
Serial 020
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)
Report of SEVENTH WAR PATROL

(U) RADAR AND RADIO COUNTERMEASURES Cont'd):

                                        RADIO JAMMING LOG

DATE        LOCATION        TYPE                                FREQUENCY

2/14/45     20-44           Musical instrument                  9090
            130-35.6        Banjo

Effectiveness: No affect on reception of NPM. Lasted about one
            hour, more a nuisance affect than anything else.

2/16/45     21-16.9         Bagpipe                             NMN, China, 4155 kcs
            121-37.1                                            1800-1830 GCT

Effectiveness: Did not affect reception of traffic. This is the
            only NPM China frequency, and only at this hour,
            which Japs attempt to jam.

2/20/45     21-59.          CW Signals V's                      Lifeguard 4475 kcs.
            119-58

Effectiveness: The continuous transmission of V's and call sign
            UMN or LMN, affects reception of voice transmis-
            sions very much. This applies particularly evening
            hours from 1000 GCT to 1400 GCT.

2/25/45     21-20.4         U.S. Broadcast                      6045 kcs.
            122-04.8        Station (Voice)

Effectiveness: Each night at 1400 a U.S. broadcast station comes in
            on 6045 kcs. completely blacks out NPM FOX. Recep-
            tion up to this time good.

2/27/45     20-25.5         Defective tape                      9090 kcs.
            121-27.0

Effectiveness: Unable to copy.

3/2/45      21-57.3         CW (JAP)                            4475 kcs.
            121-24.5

Effectiveness: Continuous string of V's and transmission of call
            signs LMN or UMN. Strength of signals S-5 very
            effective.

                                        -64-

— page 417 —
[HANDWRITTEN: NRL
CRD
BUSHIPS
3-XRA]

SS268/A16-3
Serial 020
CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)
Report of SEVENTH War Patrol

— page 418 —
[HANDWRITTEN: BOY, THIS AIR-]
[HANDWRITTEN: COVER IS THE NUTS]

[HANDWRITTEN: I'LL PLAY THESE]
[HANDWRITTEN: AND RAISE YOU TEN]

[HANDWRITTEN: 67]

— page 419 —
SUBMARINE DIVISION THREE TWENTY ONE

PH5-321/A16-3                                     Care of Fleet Post Office,
Serial: (024)                                     San Francisco, California.
                                                  27 April 1945

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS PUFFER Seventh War Patrol
Report.

From:             The Commander Submarine Division THREE TWENTY-ONE.
To :              The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via :             (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY-TWO.
                  (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
                  (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:          U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of War Patrol Number
                  SEVEN.

                  1. The seventh war patrol of the PUFFER as part of a
                  coordinated attack group consisting of the SEA OWL, PIRANHA, and
                  PUFFER, was conducted in the Luzon Straits and South China Sea
                  with a ten day extension in the vicinity of Wake Island. This
                  arduous patrol, devoid of suitable torpedo targets, was of seventy
                  days duration. A total of 46 days were spent in the two areas of which
                  13 days were submerged.

                  2. Numerous life guard duties were performed, but there
                  were no opportunities for rescue. PUFFER, however, was fortunate
                  and skillful enough to perform a thrilling night rescue of a member
                  of her own crew washed overboard while converting a fuel ballast
                  tank. Intelligent ship handling coupled with the brave efforts of
                  two swimmers successfully prevented a near tragedy.

                  3. During the night of 19 February, 1945 an alert lookout
                  reported the phosphorescent wake of a vessel which the O.O.D.
                  immediately placed astern. No radar contact could be made although
                  the silhouette of a small, low craft could be made out. Shortly
                  thereafter three wakes were seen of which two were believed to be
                  torpedoes. PUFFER submerged and regained contact by sound with
                  light, high speed screws which gradually withdrew. The pronounced
                  wake and lack of radar contact indicates a motor torpedo boat rather
                  than an enemy submarine, as suspected.

                  4. Evidence of new ASW tactics were discovered by PUFFER
                  during the night of 6 March 1945, in the form of coordination of
                  aircraft and a surface vessel both believed to be a motor torpedo
                  boat. A new type shipborne radar was contacted by APR at the same
                  time a radar equipped plane was circling at 6 miles. Radar contact
                  with the surface craft was established at 2550 yards and placed

                                                  - 1 -

— page 421 —
KC5-32/A16-3                                COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON THIRTY-TWO

Serial: 051                                         Care of Fleet Post Office,
                                                    San Francisco, California,
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L                             29 April 1945.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS PUFFER (SS268) Report
of War Patrol No. SEVEN
dated 22 April 1945.

From:       The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY-TWO.
To :        The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via :       (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
                Administration.
            (2) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject:    U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

1.          Forwarded, concurring in the complete remarks of the Commander
Submarine Division THREE TWENTY-ONE.

2.          The administrative squadron commander congratulates the
commanding officer, officers, and crew upon the completion of this well
conducted long and tiring patrol, and sincerely hopes that the next patrol
may offer favorable opportunities for the U.S.S. PUFFER to demonstrate
again her effectiveness against the enemy.

[SIGNATURE: K. C. Hurd]
K. C. HURD.

— page 422 —
FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET 03747 G.M.
[HANDWRITTEN: 074495]
Serial 01077
Care of Fleet Post Office,
CONFIDENTIAL San Francisco, California,
7 May 1945.

[HANDWRITTEN: R-uss] NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
[HANDWRITTEN: 5-28-45] DESTROYED PRIOR TO
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to ENTERING PATROL AREA.
PUFFER Report of
Seventh War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 747
U.S.S. PUFFER - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS286) - Report of Seventh War Patrol
(11 February to 21 April 1945).

1. The seventh war patrol of the PUFFER, under the command of
Lieutenant-Commander C. R. Dyer, U. S. Navy, was conducted in the Luzon Straits,
northern South China Seas, Wake Island areas. The PUFFER was a unit of a
coordinated attack group, along with the PIRANHA and SEA OWL, the commanding
officer of the SEA OWL being group commander. In addition to offensive patrol,
the group performed lifeguard services.

2. This long, arduous patrol was characterized by various small
contacts. Area coverage was thorough and patrol was well conducted. Presence of
enemy submarines was prevalent during patrol, and the PUFFER had a narrow escape.
She fired a "down the throat" salvo at a possible patrol boat or submarine.
Attack was unsuccessful and torpedoes were fired at the PUFFER, who avoided a
fast dive. Coordinated bombardment was conducted by this group on Protas Island,
the PUFFER causing damage to enemy installations and a motor boat.

3. Excellent seamanship was demonstrated in the recovery of the
men who was washed overboard during the conversion of a ballast tank. The improper
use of procedure by aircraft during lifeguard services is noted. It is regretted
that the PUFFER did not have opportunities to cause more damage to the enemy,
or to rescue downed aviators. The Force Commander hopes she will be favored with
better luck next time.

4. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is not authorized.

[HANDWRITTEN: fog in etc.]
[HANDWRITTEN: ussi] [SIGNATURE: MERRILL COMSTOCK.]

Distribution & Authentication EXTRA - ORIGINAL
next page. SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253
- 1 - [HANDWRITTEN: 517]
[STAMP: FILMED] [HANDWRITTEN: 71]

— page 423 —
FF12-1(A)/A16-3(18)                                SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 01077                                                                Care of Fleet Post Office,
                                                                            San Francisco, California.
CONFIDENTIAL                                                                7 May 1945.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PUFFER Report of
Seventh War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 747
U.S.S. PUFFER - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

Subject:        U.S.S. PUFFER (SS286) - Report of Seventh War Patrol
                (11 February to 21 April 1945).

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch                                                                     (7)
CNO                                                                         (5)
Cincpac                                                                     (6)
JICPOA                                                                      (1)
Adicpoa                                                                     (1)
Comservpac                                                                  (1)
Cinclant                                                                    (1)
Comsublant                                                                  (8)
S/M School, TL                                                              (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH                                                            (1)
Comsopac                                                                    (3)
Comsowespac                                                                 (1)
ComsubsoWespac                                                              (2)
CTG 71.5                                                                    (2)
Comnorpac                                                                   (1)
Comsubspac                                                                  (3)
ComsubspacAddComd                                                           (20)
SULB, MI                                                                    (2)
ComsubspacSubordcom                                                         (3)
11 Squadron and Div.                                                        (2)
All Submarines, Pacific                                                     (1)

[SIGNATURE: B. L. Hynes 2nd]
E. L. HYNES, 2nd.
Flag Secretary.

[HANDWRITTEN: Ga.]

[HANDWRITTEN: 517]
[HANDWRITTEN: 72]

— page 424 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

SS268/A16-3
Serial: 035
C-O [STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
11 July 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Submarine Division
(2) Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY.
(3) Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.
(4) Commander Seventh Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

Enclosures: (1) Subject Report.
(2) Track Chart (ComSubs7th).

1. Enclosure (1), covering the EIGHTH war patrol of this vessel
conducted in the Gulf of Siam Coast and Java Sea Areas
during the period 20 May 1945 to 11 July 1945 is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: Carl R. DUTER.]
Carl R. DUTER.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, CPNAVINST 5510.C
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP-09B9C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/72]

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

[HANDWRITTEN: Filmed]
[HANDWRITTEN: 136736]

— page 425 —
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE.

Arrived MIDWAY ISLANDS, T.H. from Seventh War Patrol on 21 April, 1945
for second successive advance base refit. Commenced normal 14 day refit
by Submarine Division Relief Crew 321 and U.S.S. PELIAS (AS14). Refit
and leave period extended 2 days due to extra docking required to cor-
rect noisy shafts. The major work items were:

1. Remove Shaft Noise.
2. Remove noise from QB Shaft.
3. Overhaul two main engines.
4. Repaired inoperative VHF system.
5. Routine docking.

MAJOR ALTERATIONS:

1. Installed Depth Charge Direction Indicator.
2. Installed Torpedo Detection Modification Kit (TDM) on QB sound gear.
3. Installed Dummy Pit Log.
4. Modified Pit Log Control units.
5. Installed Cities Service Type Hydrogen Detectors.

This refit was excellent; the best that this vessel has received
to date.

The following officers were detached: Lieutenant W.M. PUGH, II, USN
(7 patrols), Ensign J.W. GOIN, USN (6 patrols), Machinist J.P. GUTENSOHN,
USN (6 patrols). The following officers reported for duty: Lieutenant
(jg) D.S. DUGUID, USNR and Ensign A. SHAW, USN.

On 8 May, 1945 completed refit and started 12 day period of tests,
post repairs, training and loading. Sound tested, depermed, made deep
dive and cavitation tests. Eight days underway training under super-
vision of CSD-321 (Captain J. R. WATERMAN, USN).

The following Officers and CPO's were attached during the Eighth
War Patrol:

NAME | RANK/RATE | DUTY | NO. PATROLS
DYER, Carl R. | Lt.Comdr. USN | Commanding | 9
DECKER, Stiles M.,Jr. | Lieut.(DE), USNR | Executive | 7
GOLAY, Frank H. | Lieut.(DE), USNR | Engineer | 6
DUGUID, Donald S. | Lt(jg)(DE), USNR | Communications | 6
BICHE, Robert C. | Lt(jg), USN | Navigator | 5
FRANK, Russell C. | Lt(jg)(DE), USNR | First Lieutenant | 3
DELFIELD, Wilfrid T. | Lt(jg)D(L), USNR | Gunnery | 2
HEEHS, Richard A. | Ensign (DE)USNR | Electronics | 3
WEEKS, Robert D. | Ensign D(L)USNR | Torpedo-Fire Control | 3
McCLURE, Philip A. | Ensign, USN | Commissary | 5

- 1 -

— page 427 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

27 May 1945 Enroute SAIPAN.
0947 K TDM alert on starboard beam. Maneuvered to avoid. Turned out to be the
SEA OWL's scrows as she speeded up on her practice approach (submerged).
1200 K Position: Lat. 18°-23'N; Long. 153°-01'E.
1808 K Made training dive.
2222 K SJ radar contact on U.S.S. PERCH on opposite course.

28 May 1945 Enroute SAIPAN.
1200 K Position: Lat. 16°-57'N; Long. 147°-57'E.
1721 K Made training dive.
2301 K Radar contact on SAIPAN ISLANDS.
2309 K Radar contact on TINIAN ISLAND.

29 May 1945 Enroute SAIPAN.
0039 K SJ radar contact on U.S.S. GUITARRO on opposite course.
0316 K Large flight of B-29's passed.
0616 K Exchanged calls with escort PC 1082.
0845 K Sighted SAIPAN ISLAND.
1200 K Position: TANAPAG HARBOR, SAIPAN.
1207 K Moored TANAPAG HARBOR, SAIPAN alongside U.S.S. ORION (AS18) in submarine
nest consisting of PADDLE, SEA DEVIL, RONQUIL, SEA OWL and
TIRANTE. Commenced loading stores and fuel. No urgent voyage repairs
except defective armature of ventilation booster blower in Control Room.
No replacement was available nor could ours be repaired without a day's
delay.

30 May 1945 At SAIPAN.
1458 K Underway in accordance with ComTaskGroup 17.5 OpOrder 15-45 from alongside
U.S.S. ORION, TANAPAG HARBOR, SAIPAN enroute Southwest Pacific Area in
company with U.S.S. PADDLE, U.S.S. SEA DEVIL and U.S.S. RONQUIL.
1902 K Sighted friendly task force.

31 May 1945 Enroute SWPA.
0150 K Released escort, proceeding through joint zones.
1039 K Made training dive.
1200 K Position: Lat. 17°-45'N; Long. 143°-01'E.
2026 K Received ComSubPac Serial 39-U assigning our Task Unit designation and
area DOG-1 in SoWesPac.
2100 K Set clocks back to ITEM time.

1 June 1945 Enroute SWPA.
0111 I Sent PUFFER Serial ONE acknowledging receipt of ComSubPac Serial 39-UNCLE.
0620 I Parted company with PADDLE, SEA DEVIL and RONQUIL, proceeding independ-
ently through DECAMF.
1200 I Position: Lat. 20°-40'N; Long. 138°-41'E.
1322 I Sighted and passed friendly convoy northbound.

- 3 -

— page 428 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

2 June 1945 Enroute SWP.
0345 I Received information on possible meeting with U.S.S. BREAM.
1200 I Position: Lat. 20°-36'N; Long. 133°-09'E.
1339 I Sighted U.S.S. BREAM. Maneuvered to close to obtain information on
 Southwest Pacific areas.
1507 I Launched rubber boat with Commanding Officer, Communication Officer
 and paddlers to go to BREAM. Began A/S screening.
1645 I Recovered rubber boat and occupants. Proceeding to SWP.
1717 I Ensign SHAW, USN received a lacerated and possibly fractured left wrist
 while working on a main engine.
1930 I Pharmacist's Mate has completed first aid to Ensign SHAW's wrist. Several
 tendons have been severed and cannot be spliced without an operation due
 to recession of the tendons. SHAW stands the possible loss of the use
 of three fingers if he continues the patrol. Decided to send a message
 to ComSubPac and request advice.
1950 I SJ radar contact 252°T, 24,000 yards. Maneuvered to close.
2010 I Exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE93) and U.S.S.
 ROBERTS (DE749). Established VHF communications. Conversed with Doctor
 on MAKIN ISLAND who advised immediate transfer to that vessel for further
 treatment. Maneuvered to close MAKIN ISLAND.
2145 I Received message from ComSubPac telling of "GIBSON GIRL" distress signals
 and possible aircraft survivors south of DECAMPS Air-Surface Zone.
 We were told to watch for them. Set radio watch on 500 K.C.
2155 I Slowed to 10 knots and sent Executive Officer and three especially sel-
 ected (2 CTM and 1 MoMMc) men on dock to make preparations to transfer
 SHAW. Intended to bring him up through the forward torpedo room hatch.
2200 I Junior Officer of the Deck heard a man cry out from the water. Turned
 over a marker light and maneuvered to pick up man, using searchlight for
 illumination. Shifted to batteries. Secured all engines. Posted men
 all along deck rails to hear man in water. Informed CVE by VHF, who
 replied he was sending his escort to assist.
2230 I Sighted GIAIMO, Anthony (n), 201 49 92, CTM(SS), USN apparently uncon-
 scious floating face down in water about 20 yards from marker light.
 MAKIN, Karl William, 406 20 16, MoMMc and DAUPLISSE, Louis P.J.,
 201 55 17, QM, USN went over the side to bring him aboard.
2243 I Recovered man and began artificial respiration on cigarette deck. Con-
 siderable water in his stomach, not very much in his lungs. Informed
 CVE via VHF.
2302 I Motor launch from ROBERTS came alongside with a Chief Pharmacist's Mate
 aboard. Transferred SHAW to motor launch. The Chief Pharmacist's Mate
 advised us to notify the Doctor on the MAKIN ISLAND if GIAIMO does not
 recover consciousness. Continued artificial respiration. Administered
 an intravenous injection of coramine. Motor launch left for the ROBERTS.
 Requested medical advice from CVE on GIAIMO. Reply was to transfer him
 to ROBERTS also. Launch was directed back to the boat.

- 4 -

— page 429 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

3 June 1945 Enroute to S.P.
0001 I Motor launch alongside again. Transferred GLIMO to launch in a Stokes
stretcher. At time of departure, he had not regained consciousness nor
showed any sign of revival since recovery although artificial resuscit-
ation was continuous. Chief Pharmacist's Mate agreed to continue arti-
ficial resuscitation on MALKIN ISLAND. Commanding
Officer, Executive Officer and CQM inspected GLIMO's life jacket (line
test Type) and found both lanyards pulled as evidenced by broken retain-
ing wires and the eccentric arms being in the extended position, but the
CO2 capsules not punctured deep enough to release the CO2. The caps hold-
ing the capsules in place had worked loose, allowing the bottles suffic-
ient clearance to back away from the puncturing pin far enough to cause
a misfire. The life jacket was not inflated, both mouth tubes were
screwed shut and no evidence of any attempt to inflate the jacket by
lung power. It is believed that GLIMO became panicky when the jacket
failed to inflate by the CO2 method and made no attempt to inflate the
jacket by mouth. He was no very moderate (state 1). There was no
external evidence of an injury that would cause unconsciousness.
0254 I Sent PUFFER Serial T/O to CTG 17.7 info ComSubSPac telling of transfer of
SHIM and GLIMO and that we were 157 miles behind schedule.
1150 I Received acknowledgement of our Serial T/O and informing us our sub
notice had been changed to agree with our new position.
1200 I Position: Lat. 20°-43'N; Long. 130°-00'E.

4 June 1945 Enroute S.P.
0917 I Sent PUFFER Serial THREE reporting to ComSubSolPac (CTF-71) for duty.
Passed to operational control of CTF-71.
1200 I Position: Lat. 20°-43'N; Long. 124°-42'E.
1340 I Received Serial EASY from CTF-71 changing our area assignment to DOG-3.
Ordered to patrol with BULHEAD and KRAKEN in a patrol line to prevent
an undetected sortie from the SINGPORE area in connection with Operation
"0-6" - the capture of BRUNEI BAY. Our mission on the patrol line is
to report and destroy any naval force of the enemy which may possibly
threaten this operation.
1700 I Set clocks back to HOW time.
1711 H Made training dive.
2128 H SJ radar contact on B.T.N. ISLAND, bearing 242°T, 70,000 yards.
2217 H SJ radar contact on ITELT ISLAND, bearing 273°T, 55,000 yards.

5 June 1945 Enroute to area DOG THREE off MALAY Coast.
0457 H SD radar contact 3 miles. Submerged.
0515 H Surfaced.
0611 H Various friendly planes on SD.
0645 H SD radar contact on a plane at 8 miles. No IFF. Submerged.
0710 H Surfaced.
0803 H Sighted flight of bombers at 20 miles.
0811 H Made training dive.
1200 H Position: Lat. 20°-40'N; Long. 119°-08'E.

- 5 -

— page 439 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS269) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

1 July 1945 (Cont'd)
1850 WOPACO from CAPITAINE reporting some unidentified contacts SE of us on
     course 020°T, no speed given. Figured that if they are making less than
     10 knots we can intercept them before they reach the blind bombing zone
     in MAKASSAR STRAITS. Headed to intercept.
2115 WOPACO from CAPITAINE - lost contact at dusk, doubtful westerly course,
     speed 10. He is searching to the West. This heads convoy into BECUNA'S
     area. Doesn't look like there is much dope to work on, so at
2135 Reversed course to patrol off CAPE SELATAN.
2153 WOPACO from CAPITAINE giving his position, course and speed.

2 July 1945: Patrolling off CAPE SELATAN.
1200 Position: Lat. 4°-45'S; Long. 113°-48'E.
     Spent the day patrolling between CAPE SELATAN and ARENDS ISLAND. Nothing
     except native sail boats in sight.
1732 Exchanged calls with BAYA, bearing 165°T via SJ radar.

3 July 1945: Patrolling off CAPE SELATAN.
0504 Submerged for days patrol off CAPE SELATAN.
1200 Position: Lat. 4°-17'S; Long. 114°-41'E.
     No contacts but native sail boats during the day. Bottomed once in 75
     feet of water when we hit a fresh water pocket due probably to the BARITO
     RIVER (BANDJERMASIN).
1532 Surfaced, headed South to change areas in normal rotation. BAYA has the
     Northern end of the line for the next three days with the BECUNA in the
     middle. We are off KANGEAN.
2125 WOPACO from BECUNA asking if we had her radar interference SE of us.
     We have, so at
2130 Sent WOPACO to BECUNA - Affirmative.
2230 WOPACO from BECUNA saying she was attacked by aircraft yesterday and that
     there was dawn to dusk air coverage near KANGEAN.
2300 Received CTE-71 orders to depart station darkness 5 July and proceed to
     FREMANTLE for refit. We will need to stop at ONSLOW for fuel.

4 July 1945: Patrolling Northwest of KANGEAN ISLAND.
0516 Submerged for days patrol to close and investigate KETAPANG ANCHORAGE,
     Northwest KANGEAN.
1200 Position: Lat. 6°-59'S; Long. 115°-11'E.
     Nothing so far but native sail boats.
1640 We have now worked well inside the entrance to KETAPANG BAY. Nothing in
     sight. Running at 55 feet. We are about to turn around when we strike
     bottom. The chart shows 11 fathoms here, but we are now at 45 feet and
     on the bottom. SURFACED.
1650 Reversed course and headed out to sea. Harbor is empty.
1714 Sighted two small A/S vessels rounding the NW corner of KANGEAN, and
     proceed into KETAPANG ANCHORAGE. (Ship Contact #3). One appears to be
     a Sub Chaser while the other is a Trawler type.

- 15 -

— page 441 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

5 July 1945 (Cont'd)
           misses. Their shooting was magnificent. The targets were soon demol-
           ished and the boat house area a mass of flames. There seemed to be a
           gasoline storage just behind the boat house as 300 foot high flames
           leaped into the air from there continuously. It was noted that the
           fire on the lugger east of the boat house had died down and the hull was
           still intact so shifted fire to that target. First shell was a hit and
           it started burning again as before. Stopped up the rate of fire and dem-
           olished the lugger.
1234       APR contact of previous night is back again.
1248       With the barges and lugger destroyed, and the gasoline dump and boat
           house on fire and no more targets in sight, secured all guns and retired
           to seaward at high speed to join the LIZARDFISH who had been standing off
           the bay. Expended 33 rounds of 5 inch ammunition for about 28 hits.
           Decided to make a daylight coastal sweep along BALI Coast to seaward
           looking for luggers, sea trucks, and barges. Closed to about 1,000
           yards, stationed the crews at the 5 inch and 40MM guns. All gun crew
           members were put on sector lookout for planes. Started keying the SD
           radar. It is almost useless with so much land return.
1310       APR contact steady on us at saturation.
1330       Found TEMUKUS ROAD empty except for a sunken sea truck, and three native
           sail boats.
1340       Lost sight of LIZARDFISH.
1345       Sighted masts of several ships in BULELENG ROAD. This is stated by the
           Coast Pilot to be the largest trading station in BALI and also a Tele-
           graph Cable Station. Jap radar is trained on us like a beacon but it
           cannot be seen.
1354       The BAY was filled with native fishing vessels of all descriptions in
           addition to one steel sea truck, one wooden sea truck, one powered Sam-
           pan, and one type "H" Landing Barge. (Ship Contact #5). The wooden Sea
           Truck is anchored farthest to the East and next is the beached Landing
           Barge, the motored Sampan and steel sea truck are farther west in the
           mouth of the river and to seaward of the anchored native sail boats.
           The greatest difficulty in this situation is to keep from hitting the
           native boats and homes. Fortunately there are no people along the water-
           front. The steel sea truck and motor Sampan are well camouflaged with
           foliage. The barge appeared to be very new, with a glistening coat of
           greyish-blue paint. With the APR contact steady on us at saturation pip,
           scanned the town and hills anxiously for a control station and possible
           shore batteries.
1358       Opened fire with the 5 inch gun on the nearest target, the anchored wooden
           sea truck with relative bearing 075°, true bearing 145°, range 1100 yards.
           Three rapid hits amidships broke the target in two pieces. Got several
           more hits into the bow and stern sections before the remnants of the tar-
           get disappeared from sight. At this close range it was a revelation to
           see the power and destruction of this 5 inch High Capacity ammunition.
           Fourteen rounds expended. Shifted to the next target in line, the
           brand new, shiny landing craft beached at the waters edge. It looked
           as if it had just been put into the water so we proceeded to christen
           it with three rapid hits, relative bearing 060, true bearing 130°, range
           1200 yards. Five rounds expended.

- 17 -

— page 445 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

(D). TIDAL INFORMATION (Cont'd).

LAT.             LONG.             FATHOMS             TIME
4°-36.9          103°-32.8         16.5                1000
4 -36.6          103 -33.2         16.5                1030
4 -35.6          103 -33.3         17.0                1100
4 -35.0          103 -33.6         17.0                1130
4 -34.5          103 -33.8         18.5                1200
4 -34.2          103 -33.8         17.0                1230
4 -33.7          103 -33.6         17.0                1300
4 -33.5          103 -33.8         17.5                1330
4 -32.8          103 -33.1         17.6                1400
4 -32.0          103 -33.1         17.5                1430
4 -31.4          103 -33.4         17.3                1500
4 -31.9          103 -33.2         18.0                1530
4 -31.4          103 -33.0         17.3                1600
4 -30.0          103 -34.0         16.5                1630
4 30.2           103 -35.5         18.5                1700
4 -30.1          103 -36.3         15.3                1730
4 -30.2          103 -37.2         19.5                1800
4 -30.2          103 -38           21.5                1830

The current from 2 to 10 miles off the East coast of K.NGEAN from
1040 to 1700 (GEORGE Time) on 29 June averaged 026°T 1.1 knot.

On 1 July 1945 the following soundings were recorded at the times and
places indicated. All times GEORGE.

LAT.             LONG.             FATHOMS             TIME
4°-16            114°-25.4         12.8                0530
4 -15.6          114 -26.4         11.9                0600
4 -16.2          114 -27.7         11.9                0630
4 -16.1          114 -28.9         12.0                0700
4 -14.3          114 -28.3         11.5                0730
4 -14.3          114.-28.8         11.3                0800
4 -13.5          114 -30.2         10.6                0830
4 -14.3          114.-30.8         13.0                0900
4 -13.3          114 -31.3         14.0                0930
4 -13.5          114 -31.9         14.7                1000
4 -13.9          114 -32.4         14.3                1030
4 -13.8          114 -33.3         14.0                1100
4 -13.8          114 -34.1         12.1                1130
4 -14.0          114 -35.2         14.9                1200
4 -14.6          114 -36.2         12.0                1230
4 -15.1          114 -37.5         13.1                1300
4 -15.5          114 -38.6         11.3                1330
4 -16.6          114 -39.5         12.0                1400
4 -17.3          114 -40.4         12.1                1430

-21-

— page 447 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION (Cont'd).

LAT.                 LONG.                 FATHOMS                 TIME
6 -49.9              115 -07.4             26.5                    0930
6 -50.8              115 -07.1             27.0                    1000
6 -51.4              115 -07.3             27.1                    1030
6 -52                115 -07.5             25.0                    1100
6 -53                115 -08.4             25.1                    1130
6 -53.1              115 -09.7             16.2                    1200
6 -55.4              115 -08.1             12.3                    1300
6 -54.2              115 -09.0             18.0                    1330
6 -52.5              115 -10.0             21.0                    1400
6 -52.0              115 -09.3             22.0                    1430
6 -52.5              115 -08.4             23.0                    1500
6 -52.6              115 -09               23.0                    1530
6 -53.5              115 -09.4             19.0                    1600
6 -54.1              115 -10.2             14.0                    1630

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

A small wooden light ship was seen beached on the East Coast of KANGEAN
ISLANDS on 29 June (Lat. 6°-53.8'S, Long. 119°-11.4'E). The ship appeared
to be about 40' to 50' long with a square wooden trestle type tower 30'
high, from the waterline, amidships. Boat and tower were painted white
and the hull appeared to have a reddish brown stripe around the gunwhale,
or else the deck was that color making it seem to have a stripe. No light
was observed.

CAPE SELATAN light structure was seen on 2 July 1945. It was not seen
to be lighted during darkness.
The beacon marking the shoal near BULELENG ROAD, BALI, as shown on
chart No. 934, was seen on 5 July 1945. It was a single stake with a round
object on top. It was apparently in the proper place.
Two beacons were observed in the harbor at CHELUKIN BAY, BALI, on
5 July. They were round targets on top of poles, and were apparently in
the proper place as shown on chart No. 934.

- 23 -

— page 448 —
(F) SHIP CONTACTS.
NO. | TIME/DATE | LAT. | LONG. | TYPE | INIT.L RANGE | EST.
| | | | | | COURSE SPEED | HOW CONTACTED | REMARKS
1 | 1813/6-23 | 10-43.0'S | 108-20.0'E | 1 Patrol Boat | 18,000 | 000°T | Sight | Avoided.
| | | | | (Trawler Type) | | 8 kts. | |
2 | 1950/6-29 | 70-03.0'S | 115-29.0'E | Two Patrol | 12,000 | 305°T | Radar | Avoided. On
| | | | | Boats | | 7 kts. | | S/S Sweep.
3 | 1714/7-4 | | | 1 Subchaser | 20,000 | 090°T | Sight | Avoided. Entered
| | | | | ENTRANCE KETAPING BAY | | 10 kts. | | KETAPING BAY
4 | 1200/7-5 | | | 1 Patrol Boat | 4,000 | Moored | Sight | Destroyed in
| | | | | (Trawler Type) | | | | Gun Attack #1.
| | | | | 5 Landing Barges | | | |
| | | | | CHELUKAN BAWANG, BALI | | | |
5 | 1300/7-5 | | | 2 Sea Trucks | 12,000 | Anchored | Sight | Sank: 2 Sea Trucks
| | | | | 1 Landing Barge | | | | and one Landing
| | | | | 1 Motor Sampan | | | | Barge. Gun Attack
| | | | | Many Sailboats(native) | | | | #2. Torpedo Attack
| | | | | BULELENG ROAD, BALI | | | | #1.

-4-

— page 463 —
SUBMARINE SQUADRON THIRTY

FC5-30/A16-3
Serial: 0110
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
~~USS PUFFER (SS268) Report~~
of Eight War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
 (2) The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of EIGHT WAR PATROL.

1. The Eight War Patrol of the PUFFER, under the command of
Lieutenant Commander Carl R. DWYER, was conducted in the South China Sea
and Java Sea areas. Patrol was of fifty-three days duration, twenty-six
of which were spent in the assigned area. From 25 June to 27 June the
PUFFER, ICEFISH, BAYA, HARDHEAD and BULLHEAD formed a coordinated attack
group of which the Commanding Officer of the ICEFISH was O.T.C. From
28 June to 4 July, Commanding Officer of the PUFFER was O.T.C. of attack
group consisting of BAYA and BECUNA. The accidental drowning of GIACIMO,
Anthony, CTM(SS), U.S.N., on 2 June 1945, is regretted.

2. There were no targets sighted during this patrol normally
considered worthy of torpedo fire. Air contacts were few. The PUFFER
picked her last day of patrol to boost morale with a torpedo attack on a
sea truck and two gun attacks on anchored supply luggers and landing bar-
ges.

3. GUN ATTACK NO. 1: This attack was made on 5 July in
CHELUKAN BAWANG BAY, BALI, and followed immediately after a bombardment
by the LIZARDFISH. The PUFFER methodically destroyed five landing barges
(Type A) loaded with gasoline, fuel dump and barge staging station and a
lugger previously damaged by the LIZARDFISH.

GUN ATTACK NO. 2 and TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1: This attack was
made shortly after attack no. 1 on sea trucks and landing barges anchored
in BULELENG ROADS, BALI. The wooden sea truck (SD) and one Type "H" land-
ing barge were sunk. During the action the PUFFER was fired upon by a
shore battery. The PUFFER submerged and fired two Mk. 18 torpedoes at an
anchored steel sea truck to sink it with a hit from the second torpedo fired
after a counter current caused the first "sighting in shot" to miss.

4. The PUFFER returned from patrol in fair material condition.
It is expected that the refit will be completed in the normal time.

5. The Squadron Commander welcomes the Commanding Officer,
Officers and Crew to the Southwest Pacific Area, and congratulates them
upon the damage inflicted upon the enemy.

[SIGNATURE: C. C. Smith]
C. C. SMITH.

— page 464 —
[HANDWRITTEN: F4254]
[HANDWRITTEN: U]
FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 11/4n
Serial 0343-A 31 July 1945
[STAMP: C O N F I D E N T I A L] [HANDWRITTEN: R-mess] 8 02150
[HANDWRITTEN: 8-28-45]

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS PUFFER, Conf. Ltr.
A16-3, Serial 035, dated
11 July, 1945. Report of
Eighth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Eighth War
Patrol - Comment on.

1. The Eighth War Patrol of the PUFFER, under the
command of Lieutenant Commander C.R. DWYER, U.S.N., was conduct-
ed in the SOUTH CHINA and JAV. SEA areas. PUFFER coordinated her
patrol with ICEFISH, BAY, HARDHEAD, BEGUN, and BULLHEAD. From
10 to 22 June PUFFER and H.M.S. TRENCHANT patrolled on a line
South of PULO TENGGOL in support of the Allied landings in BRUNEI
BAY, BORNEO.

2. Area coverage during this patrol was good but no tar-
gets which would be normally considered worthy of torpedo fire
were sighted. Following LIZARDFISH'S bombardment of CHELUKAN
B.A.Y., PUFFER steamed into the BAY and continued the destruction
already commenced. Five camouflaged barges loaded with gasoline
were destroyed, a large boathouse was set afire and a gasoline tank
was exploded. PUFFER then commenced an offensive daylight sweep
along the north coast of B.L.I. TEMUKUS ROAD was empty except for
a sunken sea truck. BULLELENG HARBOR was found to be the scene of
considerable activity and PUFFER was able to sink one wooden sea
truck and one landing craft by gunfire before being driven down by
close fire from a small shore battery after which she demolished
another sea truck with a torpedo. A second torpedo missed the tar-
get and was observed to explode on the beach and start a small fire.

3. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is authorized
for this patrol.

4. The Force Commander welcomes PUFFER back to these areas
in which all of her early patrols were so successfully conducted,
and congratulates her Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew upon the
completion of this patrol during which the following damage was in-
flicted on the enemy:

[STAMP: FILMED] - 1 -

— page 465 —
FE24-71/.16-3 UNITED ST.TES NAVY 11/dn
Serial 0343-A 31 July 1945
[STAMP: C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L]

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS PUFFER Conf. Ltr.
16-3, Serial 035, dated
11 July, 1945. Report of
Eighth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Eighth War
Patrol - Comment on.

S-U-N-K

1 - Sea truck (SCS type) (EU) 200 Tons (Torpedo attack)
5 - Landing Craft (EU) 100 Tons (Gun attack No. 1)
1 - Sea truck (SD type) (EU) 200 Tons (Gun attack No. 2)
1 - Landing Craft (EU) 20 Tons (Gun attack No. 2)
Total 520 Tons

Extensive damage was done to harbor installations in CHALUKAN
BAWANG, and BULELENG, BALI, during a bombardment on 5 July.

W. L. WRIGHT,
A. Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION
Cominch (3) Direct CTG-71.3 (2)
Vice OpNav (2) Direct ComSubRon-22 (2)
Vice OpNav Op-23c(1) ComSubRon-26 (2)
ComSubPac (1) ComSubRon-30 (2)
Com2ndFlt (1) DivComsSubRon-22 (1 ea)
Com7thFlt (2) DivComsSubRon-26 (1 ea)
ComSubslstFlt (30) DivComsSubRon-30 (1 ea)
ComSubs2ndFlt (4) S/M School, N.L.,Conn. (2)
CTF-71 (7) Comdt. NYD, Puget Sound (1)
CTG-71.5 (2) Sub.d, Mare Island (2)
S/Ms 7thFlt (1)

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR
TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

[SIGNATURE: S. B. MILLER,]
Flag Secretary.

- 2 -

— page 466 —
UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

[STAMP: REG. NO F-[HANDWRITTEN: 2586]]
[STAMP: R. S. NO [HANDWRITTEN: 8 01069]]
[STAMP: REG. SHEET NO [HANDWRITTEN: 238]]

[STAMP: 16 AUG 1945]

A16-3(8) (F-3c/ob)

Serial: [HANDWRITTEN: 05568]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
CO, USS PUFFER conf ltr
SS268/A16-3, serial 035,
dated 11 July 1945.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To : [HANDWRITTEN: Commander]-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of [HANDWRITTEN: Eighth]
War Patrol - comment on.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Seventh Fleet notes with
satisfaction the damage inflicted by the PUFFER and the
effective bombardment of the enemy shore installations
in daylight.

[HANDWRITTEN: (R+L)]
[HANDWRITTEN: uss]

[SIGNATURE: T. C. Kinkaid]
T. C. KINKAID

Copy to:
ComSubs7th
ComSubRon 30
CO USS PUFFER (SS268)
[HANDWRITTEN: X]

— page 467 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
21 August 1945.

SS268/A16-1

Serial: (047)

C-O-[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268).
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels).

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER, Report of WAR PATROL Number NINE.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (to CTF 71 only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the NINTH War Patrol of this vessel,
conducted in the East Java Sea during the period 7 August, 1945 to 21 August,
1945, is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: CARL R. DYER.]

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C]
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP 09B9C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6/1/73]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

[HANDWRITTEN: Filmed]
[HANDWRITTEN: 136736]

[HANDWRITTEN: 10 01777]

— page 468 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of NINTH War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE:

     Arrived Fremantle, Western Australia, from EIGHTH War Patrol on 11 July
1945. Commenced normal 14 day refit under the administration of Submarine
Squadron THIRTY (Captain C. C. SMITH).

     The major work items were:

     1. Overhaul of two (2) main engines and one (1) auxiliary engine.
     2. Replaced four main engine mufflers.
     3. Routine docking.

     The major alterations completed were:

     1. Idirectional APR.
     2. Altered return line on the hydraulic periscopes and added stop valves.
        These alterations slowed the hoisting speed about 50%.
     3. Installed Mark 7 DRT in Conning Tower.
     4. JT talkback modification to JP-1 sonar equipment.
     5. Installation of Ward Leonard Type Hydrogen Burner Panel and circuit
        in Torpedo Rooms, and installation of individual Ward Leonard Bat-
        tery Charging voltmeters. (Two forward and one aft).
     6. Installation of extra bunks in crew's space.
     7. Install Mark I Mod. I Signal Projector.

     On drydocking the TDM dome was found to be smashed beyond repair due to
submerged grounding in KETAPANG BAY, KANGEAN ISLAND, on previous patrol. No
replacement dome was available.

     Refit completed on 26 July 1945 and officers and men returned. Lieutenant
S. M. DECKER Jr., U.S.N.R., Executive Officer, was detached for Post Graduate
School, Annapolis, Maryland. No relief was available. Underway 27 July 1945
for post repair trials, deep dive. Eight days of underway training in ap-
proaches (surfaced and submerged) with Commander Submarine Division THREE
HUNDRED ONE (Captain Jesse L. HULL, U.S.N.) as training officer, followed by
two day loading period.

                                   - 1 -
                                                                 10 01777

— page 469 —
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of NINTH War Patrol.

(B) NARRATIVE:

          The following named officers and chief petty officers were aboard
during the NINTH War Patrol:

NAME                                NO. OF PATROLS         DUTY

Carl R. DWYER, Lt. Comdr., USN.     TEN (10)              Commanding
Frank H. GOLAY, Lieut., USNR.       SEVEN (7)             Executive - Navigator
Donald S. DUGUID, Lt(jg), USNR.     SEVEN (7)             Communications
Robert C. BICHE, Lt(jg), USN.       SIX (6)               Engineering
Russell C. FRANK, Lt(jg), USNR.     FOUR (4)              First Lieutenant
Wilfrid T. DELAFIELD, Lt(jg), USNR. THREE (3)             Commissary
Richard A. HEIMS, Lt(jg), USNR.     FOUR (4)              Electronics
Robert D. REES, Lt(jg), USNR.       FOUR (4)              Torpedo - Fire Control
Philip A. MCCLURE, Ensign, USN.     SIX (6)               Gunnery

Eric P. BOLLMAN, CRT(AA)(T), USNR.  SEVEN (7)             Radio
Thomas W. COPELAND, CMOMM(T), USN.  NINE (9)              Auxiliaries
Jay A. DEEM, CRT(AA)(T), USNR.      EIGHT (8)             Radar
Louis B. E. DAUPLAISE, CQM(T), USN. SEVEN (7)             Chief of the Boat
Herbert D. HAYWARD, CMOMM(AA)(T), USN. NINE (9)           Main Engines
Dale L. HODGES, CEM(PA), USN.       TWO (2)               Electrical
Curtis H. MOORE, CSM(PA), USN.      TWO (2)               QM - SM

7 August: (All times are HOW unless otherwise specified.)

1430      Underway for NINTH WAR PATROL from Fremantle, W. A., in accordance
          with ComTaskForce 71 OpOrd 103-45 in company with U.S.S. CAPI-
          TAINE (SS336). Storm building up from the West. Very strong winds.
          White caps in Fremantle Harbor as far up as the ARD-10.
1700      Commenced exercises with target group consisting of U.S.S. CORPUS
          CHRISTI (PF44) and HMAS GLADSTONE.
1915      Secured from exercises due to the storm. U.S.S. CAPITAINE released
          the target.
1954      Took departure from ROTTNEST ISLAND. Set course for War Patrol off
          PULO TENGGOL, MALAY PENINSULA, via Joint Zone, LOMBOK STRAIT, JAVA
          SEA and KARIMATA STRAITS.

8 August: Enroute Patrol Area.

1200      Position Lat. 3° 07' S. Long. 113° 37' E. Conducting dives and
          fire control exercises daily for training of all hands. Alternating
          with U.S.S. CAPITAINE as target, also daily emergency drills and school
          of the boat for all hands.
1255      Sighted unidentified British Submarine probably HMS STUBBORN.
1308      Sighted unidentified U.S. submarine probably U.S.S. BRILL.

- 2 -

— page 474 —
U.S.S. PUFFER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(C) WEATHER:

     Typhoon warnings were published as we got underway from Fremantle, Western
Australia, and heavy weather with South Westerly winds up to forty knots contin-
ued for thirty (30) hours.

     Excellent weather conditions were encountered in JAVA SEA and SOUTH CHINA
SEA.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION:

     Tides or currents observed in INDIAN OCEAN, JAVA SEA and SOUTH CHINA SEA
agreed with those in Coast Pilots.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:

     None observed.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS:

NO. | TIME | LAT. | TYPE | INITIAL | EST. COURSE | HOW | REMARKS
    | DATE | LONG. |      | RANGE   | & SPEED     | CONTACTED |
----|------|-------|------||||
1   | 0049(H) | 8-25 S | Small A/S | 6300 yds. | 090°T, 6 kts | SJ Radar | Avoided in
    | 13 Aug. | 115-51 E | Vessel |         |             |           | LOMBOK STR.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS:

     No aircraft contacts in JAVA SEA or SOUTH CHINA SEA.

(H) ATTACK DATA:

     No attacks made.

(I) MINES:

     None sighted.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS:

     At 1243, 12 August (Lat. 10-30 S, Long. 112-13 E) sighted a flag on a mast
bearing 070° T, range 12,000 yards. Maneuvered to close and investigate. The
object proved to be a cylindrical steel buoy weighted to float upright with a
twenty foot mast flying a flag of horizontal black, white and red stripes of
equal width. The most obvious explanation for this object is a booby trap, al-
though it could have been a marker for the BALIKPAPEN landings or a fishing
marker which had drifted south. Took pictures and avoided.

     A patrol boat was encountered in LOMBOK STRAITS and avoided on the surface.

- 7 -

— page 476 —
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of NINTH War Patrol.

(L) RADIO:

Reception: Reception of NVB (Subic Bay) was excellent. Signal strength of
9250 kcs. during the day averaged between strength three to five; night time signal
strength averaged between strength four and five. 12,630 kcs. maintained an aver-
age signal strength from three five daylight hours. The 4370 kcs. signal during
daylight hours was strength one, but night time strength averaged between four and
five. Each of the three frequencies mentioned were alternately used throughout
the patrol. Very little interference of any kind was encountered except during
the period when near the equator, where atmospheric conditions plus an enemy CW
station made reception somewhat less efficient. The station in question contin-
ually repeated the letters JAS, SA, with no other identification data. It is be-
lieved an attempt at hampering the direct by jamming was the objective. However
the attempt was unsuccessful and all traffic for the period was received without
difficulty. At no time, when below the barrier, was it necessary to shift to the
BAKER re-broadcast by Radio Perth. All serials were received. The reception of
the press schedules was excellent and greatly appreciated.

Reception of the TOPACO frequencies was very good, traffic to and from
other submarines was handled quickly and no difficulty experienced.

Transmissions: The first ship-to-shore transmission was made in the East
Java Sea area. Station NVB could not be raised and the despatch was cleared
through Radio Perth (VIXO). No enemy deception was encountered. Time required
to clear message, twenty-five minutes.

The second transmission of ship-to-shore was made about 900 miles from Subic
Bay. Station NVB was raised on the second attempt. A request for repetition was
received, due to heavy interference, strength three at Subic and strength five
at this station. Message was sent again repeating each group twice. NVB in-
formed us that VIXO had receipted for the message. Transmission required thirty
(30) minutes.

The VHF operated normally, giving ranges of about 6,000 yards with other
submarines.

No material defects were encountered in any unit of radio gear.

(M) RADAR:

SJ-a Radar: As a whole, the SJ-a radar worked satisfactorily throughout
the entire patrol. Poor ranges experienced in the early part of the patrol were
remedied by proper alignment of the antenna feeder unit and retuning of the
equipment.

ST Radar: The operation of the ST was normal although this equipment was
used very little. One casualty occurred when the shutter in the wave guide pick-
up assembly jammed allowing the echo box to be on all the time. This resulted

- 9 -

— page 480 —
FC5-22/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY-TWO Bn
Serial: 0214 Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
CONFIDENTIAL 22 August 1945.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) -
Report of Ninth War Patrol.

From: Commander Submarine Squadron Twenty-two.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.

1. The U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268), Lieutenant Commander Carl R. MEYER, U.S.
Navy, Commanding, departed FREMANTLE, W.A., on 7 August 1945, for her ninth war
patrol which terminated upon arrival at SUBIC BAY, P.I., 21 August 1945.

2. PUFFER arrived on station in the JAVA SEA early on the morning of
13 August 1945. While she patrolled on a scouting line with U.S.S. CAPITAL
(SS330), H.M.S. THOROUGH and H.M.S. TRENCHANT, Offensive patrol was terminated at
1300, 15 August 1945 upon receipt of orders from Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet. At
1614 orders were received to return to SUBIC BAY.

3. The PUFFER is in excellent material condition and not in need of a
regular refit. Voyage repairs will be accomplished by the HOWARD W. GILMORE.

4. The Commander Submarine Squadron Twenty-two is proud of the
opportunity to congratulate the gallant ship PUFFER, her Commanding Officer,
officers and crew on their outstanding war record which contributed so much to
the final victory of our forces in World War II.

[SIGNATURE: E. S. Hutchinson]
E. S. HUTCHINSON.

10 (1777)

— page 481 —
FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12a/mn
[HANDWRITTEN: Serial 0462]
[STAMP: CONFIDENTIAL] 25 August 1945.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS PUFFER Conf. Ltr.
A16-1, Serial 047, dated
21 August, 1945. Report
of Ninth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. PUFFER (SS268) - Report of Ninth War Patrol -
Comment on.

1. The Ninth War Patrol of the PUFFER under the command
of Lieutenant Commander C. R. DWYER, U.S.N., was conducted in the
JAVA SEA.

2. The PUFFER was ordered to proceed to SUBIC at the
time of the conclusion of hostilities after five days in her area.
There were no opportunities for attack.

3. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is not
authorized for this patrol.

4. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding
Officer, Officers and Crew of the PUFFER upon their fine war
record which contributed materially towards the defeat of the enemy.

[SIGNATURE: James Fife]
ORIGINAL COPY

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (3) Direct ComSubRon-22 (2)
Opnav (2) Direct ComSubRon-26 (2)
Opnav Op-23c (1) ComSubRon-30 (2)
ComlstFlt (1) DivComSubRon-22 (1 ea)
Com2ndFlt (1) DivComSubRon-26 (1 ea)
Com7thFlt (1) DivComSubRon-30 (1 ea)
ComSubPac Adcomd (1)(air mail) S/M School, N. L. Conn. (2)
ComSubslstFlt (30) Comdt. NYD, Puget Sound (1)
ComSubs2ndFlt (4) SubAd, Mare Island (2)
CTF-71 (7) S/Ms 7thFlt (1)
CTG-71.5 (2)

[SIGNATURE: J. B. Miller]
J. B. MILLER,
Flag Secretary. 10 G1777

— page 482 —
[STAMP: RE NO P-1931]
[STAMP: R. S. NO 10 C1777]
PHILIPPINE SEA FRONTIER[STAMP: REG. SHEET NO 175]

[HANDWRITTEN: 8 - OCT 1945]

Phil/F3/mld
A16-3/A4-3(1)(8)

Serial: 0817

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS PUFFER Conf. ltr.
A16-1, Serial 047,
dated 21 August 1945.

From: Commander Philippine Sea Frontier.
To : Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Subject: USS PUFFER (SS 268) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

2. Routing has been changed to substitute Commander Philip-
pine Sea Frontier for Commander Seventh Fleet, as Commander Submarines
Seventh Fleet is now Commander Submarines Philippine Sea Frontier.

[SIGNATURE: N. C. Gillette]
N. C. GILLETTE
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
ComSubsPSF

[HANDWRITTEN: check file]
[HANDWRITTEN: R+L]
[HANDWRITTEN: 10/25]

— page 483 —
END OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: H108]
[HANDWRITTEN: A/C309-76]

|||| 1.0
|||| 1.1
|||| 1.25 |||| 1.4 |||| 1.6

|||| 1.8
|||| 2.0
|||| 2.2
|||| 2.5
|||| 2.8
|||| 3.2
|||| 3.6
|||| 4.0

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[SEAL: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION
D-52254