U.S.S. HARDER (SS-257) — war patrol report SS-257_HARDER.pdf

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35th Year History
Ships' Histories Section
Navy Department

HISTORY OF USS HARDER (SS 257)

"The most brilliant submarine patrol of the war."
Breaking out of its usual terror language, the official comment on USS HARDER's fifth war patrol sums up this high point of a successful career. One of the most aggressive submarines of the fleet, in one patrol HARDER sank five enemy destroyers in four days in addition to contributing to the Japanese defeat in the Battle of the Philippines Sea.

USS HARDER, laid down on 1 December 1941, six days before Pearl Harbor, was built by the Electric Boat Company of Grotto, Connecticut. Launched on 19 August 1942, she was sponsored by Miss Helena M. Grafton, daughter of Rear Admiral John F. Grafton, USN. The submarine was named for a South African Cape herring.

The HARDER had only one commanding officer. Lieutenant Commander S. D. Detley assumed command of the sleek craft when she was placed in commission on 2 December 1942, and went down with her off Mindoro less than two years later. In recognition of his brilliant work as commanding officer, Commander Detley was awarded the Medal of Honor, the Silver Star, and the Navy Cross with three Cold Star in lieu of his second, third and fourth Navy Crosses, and the Presidential Unit Citation.

The brand new submarine arrived in Pearl Harbor in late May, 1943. Following her shockdown cruise on the East Coast. After two weeks in port, Commander Detley took her out for her first war patrol off the coast of Japan.

Refueling at Midway, the submarine slipped into her area on 19 June, covered by a lazy sky and intermittent rain squalls, and set up her patrol only an hour's flight from Tokyo. Working her way inside a picket line, she sighted her first target shortly after midnight on the 22nd.

Making a surface approach by radar, HARDER ran in past the safety of the 100 fathom curve and at 4000 yards dived for a submerged approach. Eighteen minutes after first sighting her target, the submarine fired four torpedoes at the leading ship of the two ship convoy. The first exploded prematurely, but the other three signalled a highly successful beginning to HARDER's career by hitting with shattering explosion which rocked the submarine. Flames from three hits enveloped the ship, setting her atlaze from two to stern in seconds.

Diving to scape the escort, HARDER made her first landing on the shore of Japan in 355 feet of water, wrecking her sound head. As she withdrew with difficulty, the flames from the target could still be seen, and must have been visible to a large part of the population of Honchu.

Three patrol boats tried to box the submarine in on the 23rd, but she easily avoided the trap. An hour later a large passenger freighter was sighted, and she flooded down to make a pariscope approach. As dawn broke,

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2- USS HARDER (CS 257)

she fired four of her bow torpedoes and scored one hit. Deciding that it was not worth the risk to come closer to the shore, HARDER withdrew.

Three cargo ships passed her sights during the next morning, but escaped with only one hit because of a failure in the firing computers. On the 25th, three ships in column came in view, and Commander Deeley set up a stern shot. When the ships were within good range, four torpedoes leaped out from the stern tubes as the sub swung hard right to bring her bow tubes to bear.

Piring three torpedoes from the bow, HARDER's crew could hear the tiniest as torpedoes hit the last two ships. Blowing their whistles wildly, both turned for the beach two miles away and their escort charged down the torpedo wake toward the submarine. A last look showed the first target sinking stern first with the after deck impulse already amiss. The second ship was still headed for the beach at full speed.

For days later the ship began an approach on a target which seemed to be dead in the water, only to discover that she was the ship torpedoed on the 23rd who had evidently been run aground. Deciding to use her last two torpedoes to finish her off, HARDER began to work her way in toward the beach.

One last look around the forward firing changed her mind, however, when she found herself in the midst of a submarine's nightmare, with five July targets in range and only two torpedoes left. A three ship convoy was 7000 yards away, moving right into her lap, and an unescorted freighter was standing off only five miles away.

Since it became clear that the enemy again, Commander Deeley the convoy and began his approach. Working carefully, he fired both torpedoes. The first struck the ship between her bow and forward with a terrific crash which completely demolished the 50 feet of her bow. The second went on to hit a tanker which had been overfloating.

HARDER's maiden patrol ended in Midway on 7 July, when she relieved and set course for Pearl Harbor for a rott.

On 24 August 1943 the submarine again departed, setting another record by being the first United States submarine to head for the war zone with a VICTORY GARDEN aboard. The garden consisted of peapal planes or Midway, where she re-rolled before going on to Hawaii.

She announced her arrival on 9 September by a daring attack on a single ship. Working inshore or the target's track, the submarine fired three torpedoes. Her target zigged away at the same time and the phosphorescent white surface turned up like white arrows as the missiles passed ahead of the target.

Since the water was quite shallow, HARDER's skipper decided to risk a surface getaway and set course for the open sea at full speed. Suddenly an escort loomed up out of the darkness, a scant 2000 yards away, and detected- ion seemed inevitable. Swinging hard right, the sub slipped by 1200 yards to open fire at any minute. All his lookouts however, and the ship continued on her course.

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3- USS HARDER (SS 29)

During the next afternoon a merchantman with one escort was sighted, but could not be closed until after sunset. Surfacing, the submarine ran free seconds after firing three torpedoes, an explosion set off a blaze of fire and dense billows of black smoke 200 feet high. A hit andd hips broke the target's back and she began breaking up as HARDER dived.

Cruising off Iro Saki, the ship was engaged by glassy seas and alert escorts, going three days without firing a shot. Finally on the afternoon of the 13th two cargo ships came in view, and in spite of the handicaps of being inside the 100-ation convoy, the ship was not attacked, but the torpedoes were fired, and both missed. A series of depth charges attacks began then which kept the sub under water for 56 hours, almost exhausting her batteries.

During the night she came in and ran to get into position for a dawn attack on a single ship, but was warded off by three patrol vessels. Just before noon she fired two torpedoes at an enemy minesweeper and saw both of them run under the target before air cover forced her down once more.

Working in fog, HARDER sighted the next target on the 19th. A more valuable ship, a heavily loaded tanker, was immediately behind the cargo vessel. When the first hit and failed to explode, it looked as if the attack had been futile, but the second hit squarely, and disintegrated the entire forward part of the ship, hurling big chunks of her 100 feet in the air. The rest of the hapless ship took an immediate nose dive, and 20 seconds later only a few feet of the stern could be seen sticking straight up in the air. Even this soon disappeared.

Typhoon weather forced the marauder to break off operations for another three days until the seas calmed on the 22nd. Two ships crossed the sub's path then, but three torpedoes ran under her initial target, and some very close bombs from an unsuspected airplane made it advisable to retire.

She picked up two good targets about 7:00 hours before dawn on the 23rd, and began running ahead to get in position for a dawn attack. Diving five miles ahead of the convoy, she began her approach aft, at 05:14, fired three bow tubes at the first of the two ships in column. One hit in her stern tank, and HARDER shifted her attention to her companion, who was by now making full speed toward Nagoya Bay.

Firing three of her stern tubes, the submarine was rewarded by a solid hit amidships, and quickly swung her position to watch her first target sink. Only 50 feet of her bow was visible now, and the entire adjacent of the second ship was ablaze. Her work done, the submarine dived, but before she had gone past 80 feet two heavy explosions sounded through the boat, as internal explosions ripped her second target apart.

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5- USS HARDER (SS 257)

The center target was again in perfect position, and so three more of HARDER's calling cards went racing out for her, bringing the total hits on the one ship to five. By now the escort knew that something was definitely amiss and began to design depth charges through the area, but HARDER had no trouble evading them all.

During the late afternoon of the same day she surfaced to find one of her targets gone and another in tow. Getting ahead, she dived for an unhurried, elementary approach, firing four torpedoes, all of which ran under the target. Surfacing, she began an end run to get ahead of the alert target, which was now making radical zigzags.

Shortly after midnight she submerged and fired three more torpedoes for two hits on the undamaged ship, one midship and one near the stern. The target started settling by the stern immediately, and in five minutes her decks were almost awash astern. Holding the sub at periscope depth, the commanding officer let the crew fire by one by one to watch the ship sink.

The stubborn ship refused to sink, however, and in ten minutes and stopped settling. Moving to a spot only 600 yards away, the sub fired one more torpedo, but an erratic run robbed her of a hit. The excellent damage control party by now had the ship's screws turning once more and she began maneuvering, keeping her bow pointed at the periscope. At 0445 she was in position again, and HARDER fired three more torpedoes, only to see them all run erratically with the last one circling and exploding close aboard. Giving up, HARDER headed for the general area where the cripple was, with all her torpedoes gone. Heavy seas worked up soon after which evidently sank one of the cripples, for Japanese documents after the war recorded two sinkings during this attack.

After carried in Pearl Harbor, the submarine was sent on to Mare Island, California, for a general overhaul. It was not until 27 February that she arrived back in Pearl Harbor, and on 16 March she departed for Johnson Island with SEAHORSE.

Her first mission during this patrol was the reconnaissance of Wake Island on 29 March. Strikes by carrier planes began on the 31st, with HARDER standing by to rescue any pilots who might be forced down. On 1 April she got her first call -- a naval aviator had been shot down and washed ashore on the enemy-held island.

Guided by fighter planes who had seen the man go down, HARDER began the search, finally locating him lying on the beach, exhausted and severely injured. Although the air cover kept the Japanese down by constant strafing, the rescue seemed hopeless, for the man could not make it out to the submarine, and a reef some 1200 yards offshore kept her from coming very near.

Although the odds seemed almost insurmountable, Commander Dealey picked the most likely looking spot in the reef and put the nose of his ship against the coral, using both screws to keep her from being thrown broadside against the reef. A party of three columners, chosen from a large group, were sent over the side in a rubber boat, paying out a line so that they could be hauled back against the breakers.

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6- USS HARDER (SS 257)

One of the planes circling overhead dropped a boat to the aviator, who began feebly paddling out toward his rescuers. To complicate matters, a fleet plane which was also attempting to rescue taxied over the line connecting the boat to the submarine, cutting it and leaving the entire party stranded. One man managed to swim back to the sub and another volunteer made the trip back with a line. Little by little they were pulled aboard through the surf, under fire from Japanese snipers, and, with a sigh of relief, the skipper backed off the reef and headed out to sea.

On 13 April a Japanese patrol plane sighted HARDER, and sent a destroyer out to hunt her down. The radar began slipping silently toward her, and at 900 yards commenced firing, "expending four torpedoes and one Jup destroyer." The crew could be seen plainly, running in all directions when the torpedoes were sighted. The first hit between the large stack, followed in seven seconds by another. The destroyer was immediately wrapped in black smoke and heeled over 30 degrees to port. Getting clear, HARDER stopped to take pictures as the bow dropped under and the destroyer started down. Although HARDER was 500 yards away, the explosion of the ship's depth charges rocked her severely, breaking light bulbs and throwing loose gear around. When she returned to periscope depth, nothing was in sight.

Enclosed by her success, HARDER began pursuing a merchant vessel escorted by two destroyers three days later in a day-long chase. By 01:00 on the 17th she was in position, waiting for the destroyer on the port hand. When she should have been in position, however, an inopportune rain squall covered her. Deciding to take the "bird in hand," HARDER fired four at the cargo ship for one hit just under the bridge.

Knowing that this would surely bring out the destroyer, she began searching for her. The search lasted only a few seconds, however, for one of the torpedoes which had missed the cargo ship struck the destroyer, sending out a large sheet of flame which momentarily covered her. With the cargo ship burning merrily, HARDER went deep for the usual depth charging from the other destroyer, returning to periscope depth by 0630.

The cargo ship was in plain sight three miles off, listing heavily to port and down 20 degrees by the bow. A mass of flames covered her from bow to stern. When HARDER surfaced at 1100, no survivors or ships could be found.

Deciding to add to the enemy's severe case of war nerves, HARDER's intrepid crew closed Wolsei during the morning of the 20th and began a shore bombardment under cover of a rain squall. After a few minutes of banging away at the enemy, she withdrew and set course for Fremantle, arriving on 3 May.

The case with which the two destroyers had been disposed of caused Commander Darley to decide to specialize in destroyers, and with this in mind, he requested the area between the north capes of Borneo and the fleet anchorage at Tawi Tawi. On 26 May HARDER sailed from Fremantle with RDFIN.

On 6 June the submarine began her first effort to transit the Sibutu Passage, the heavily-pattrolled main traffic bottleneck for the whole area. A rich convoy blundered into her lap during the evening, however, and it was decided to delay the passage long enough to dispose of the convoy.

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7- USS HARDER (SS 257)

Surfacing, she began chasing the 13-knot group, which consisted of three large tankers and two destroyers. While she was still 16,000 yards away, the moon suddenly broke through, flooding her with light. The nearest destroyer turned toward her and put on 24 knots as HARDER tried to elude on the surface.

At 0500 yards Commander Dealy ordered a crash dive and waited. A triple dose of torpedo lead from the sub's tubes when the destroyer was almost 1000 yards away, with instantaneous results. The first missed the target, but the second and third blew the ship apart. Swathed in smoke and flame, the ship turned her stern toward the sky and went under.

Another destroyer came through the area fifteen minutes later, searching for the marauder. HARDER fired six bow tubes at him for 1250 yards, but scored no hits as the destroyer's evasive maneuvers threw them off the track. The ensuing depth charges kept her pinned down until the convoy had escaped. Later during the night she grounded momentarily while raking an approach on what turned out to be a small island.

At 0730 on the 7th, while HARDER was well into Sibutu Passage, a plane came over. Sighting the submarine as she dived, the plane called for a destroyer, and soon the periscope watch sighted her, combing the area. Closing in silently, the submarine let out a firework. The destroyer torpedoes from a bare 650 yards. Two of the "fitch" hit airships, and as HARDER stood away, a terrific magazine explosion tore the ship apart. Another destroyer came rushing in and the submarine went deep to receive 17 depth charges in the next two hours.

The outgassed Japanese began to fill the area with destroyer. By 1640 in the evening six were near HARDER, forcing her to withdraw. "We felt as if we had a monopoly on the whole Pacific war this date," Captain Dealy wrote. "Such popularity must be preserved."

The following night the submarine put in on the coast of Borneo to pick up a pair of British coast watchers. When they were safely aboard, HARDER began the difficult passage through Sibutu again.

Two destroyers were patrolling the entrance, which was only six miles away from the Japanese fleet anchorage at Tawi Tawi. After figuring out their patrol plan, the submarine went to radar depth, waited until they presented an overlapping target, and began her attack. With the range 1000 yards, she fired four torpedoes at the near destroyer. The first ran ahead, the second hit the bow, the third hit under the bridge and the last went astern.

Swinging hard right to avoid hitting the destroyer, HARDER found that the last torpedo had gone on to hit the second destroyer. As she was enjoying the view, a tremendous blast from the exploding boilers of her first target healed her over as the ship took a quick nose dive and disappeared. When last seen, the second was sticking straight into the air.

Fifteen minutes later Japanese bombers arrived belatedly, and continued bombing until early morning. When the air was clear again, HARDER surfaced.

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9- USS HARDER (SS 257)
the original plan, which had provided for the planes being able to return to the carrier in case of an emergency, and launched them from a point so far away that they absolutely had to land in the Mariana.

By the time that the planes reached the Mariana, the Marines and captured the field on Saipan, and the once of Ireta, Guam and Tinian were packed with shell and bomb craters. Of the 400 trained pilots sent out, not one returned. Japan's air arm never recovered.

While waiting to launch the attack, Admiral Ozawa was forced to circle to rough the Philippine Sea, killing time until the planes from the Empire could arrive for the coordinated attack. This allowed the planes to fire for the United States forces to arrange a hot reception for his flyers, and brought him into submarine waters. USS CWAWA put three torpedoes into the big carrier SHOKKU, sinking her with half her planes. AHADORE torpedoed TAHO, the largest carrier in the world, just as she was fueling her planes, and blew her apart.

But still the results of leaving his safe anchorage a day early continued to pile upon the hapless Admiral. During the afternoon of 20 June 1944 search planes located the Japanese force, and soon another carrier had been sunk, with three carriers, a battleship, a cruiser and a tanker damaged. Only 15 American planes were shot down before low gasoline supplies and darkness cut the attack short.

HARDER left Darwin on 22 June for the second phase of her patrol, spending another 11 days at sea without being able to attack any worth while targets, before returning to Darwin on 3 July.

HAKE, HARDER and HADDO were assigned to work together on their next patrol, which was HARDER's sixth and last. Commander Dealey joined his command out of Fremantle on 5 August 1944 and set out for the attack area west of Luzon.

Acting on a tip from USS HAY, Commander Dealey, who was in charge of the group, organized a dawn attack on Japanese convoy as it came out of Palawan Bay on the northwestern coast of Mindoro. During the attacks launched on 21 August, four ships were sunk, and it is likely that one of them was the victim of HARDER's torpedoes.

Teaming with HADDO the submarine sank three small coastal defense vessels off Batuan on the following day, and on the 23rd answered an urgent call from HADDO, who had crippled a destroyer with her last torpedo.

During the ensuing attack, coordinated with HARE, HARDER was caught by a series of 15 depth charges and left with all hands.

In recognition of her outstanding record, the USS HARDER was awarded the following Presidential Unit Citation:

"For outstanding performance and distinguished service during her War Patrols in enemy-controlled waters. Resolute and daring in combat, the U.S.S. HARDER has operated dangerously. Striking

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10- USS HARDER (SS 257)
wherever the enemy could be found, she sank or damaged many thousands of tons of hostile shipping. The officers and men keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

USS HARDER earned six Battle Stars on the Asiatic-Pacific Area Service Medal for participating in the following operations:

1. Star/Seaside-Pacific Raids -- 1944
   - Palau, Yap, Ulithi, Woleai raids -- 30 March - 1 April 1944

2. Star/Second submarine war patrol -- 7 June - 10 August 1943

3. Star/Third submarine war patrol -- 24 August - 7 October 1943

4. Star/Pourth submarine war patrol -- 30 October - 1 December 1943

5. Star/Pifth submarine war patrol -- 26 May - 10 July 1944

6. Star/Sixth submarine war patrol -- 5 August 1944 - 24 August 1944

OVERALL LENGTH: 312 feet
BEAM: 27 feet
SPEED: 20 knots
DISPELCEMENT: 1525 tons

Compiled: September 1953

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1. Commander S. D. Dealey guided his eminently successful fighting ship, HARDER, out of the harbor at Fremantle, Australia on 5 August 1944 to begin the six-day patrol of that vessel. In company with HAKE, HARDER conducted training exercises enroute to Darwin. These two submarines topped off with fuel at Darwin, and on 13 August, together with HADDO, left for their assigned area west of Luzon, P. I. They were to patrol as a coordinated attack or wolfpack group, with Cdr. Dealey in charge.

On the afternoon of 20 August 1944, RAY, patrolling the same area, tracked a large convoy into Palau Bay on the northwestern coast of Mindoro. An hour after surfacing, she contacted HARDER just outside the bay and held a megaphone conversation with Sam Dealey. Dealey formulated a plan for a concentrated dawn wolfpack attack on the convoy. HARDER came alongside HADDO at 0100 on the morning of 21 August and told Lt. Cdr. C. W. Nimitz, Jr., that at least 16 enemy ships were holed up in the bay. When the convoy made its exit at dawn (as convoys were wont to do) RAY was to approach from the northwest, HADDO from the west, and HARDER from the southwest. GUITARRO also had been drafted by Dealey, and was to attack from the northwest near Cape Calavite Lighthouse.

During the attacks which ensued, four ships, totaling 22,000 tons, were sunk, by Japanese admission. It is thought likely that HARDER sank one of them.

On the following day, HADDO and HARDER conducted a combined attack on three small vessels off Bataan. All three were sunk; these were the coast defense vessels MATSUWA, SADO and HIBURI. HADDO and HARDER each received credit for sinking one vessel, and shared credit for the third sinking.

The morning of 23 August HADDO contacted a tanker escorted by a destroyer, and blew the bow off the destroyer in a down-the-throat shot. She fired her last torpedo in this attack, and in response to urgent calls for assistance, HAKE and HARDER rendezvoused with her. HADDO, being out of torpedoes, "received Sam's blessing" and left his wolfpack, heading southeast. HAKE and HARDER discussed plans for finishing off the damaged destroyer and then departed for their common objective off Caiman Point.

At 0453 on the morning of 24 August HAKE dove not far from Caiman Point and about four miles off Hermanas Major Island, west coast of Luzon, with HARDER in sight 450 yards south of her. HAKE heard echo ranging to the south and soon sighted two ships. At first they appeared to be a three-stack light cruiser and a destroyer, but upon later inspection were identified as a three-stack Thai destroyer (the PHRA RUANG, of 1,535 tons) and a minesweeper of less than 1,000 tons. HAKE broke off the attack and headed north when the target zigged away apparently to enter Dasol Bay, while the minesweeper stayed outside.

At 0547 upon coming to a northerly course, HARDER's periscope was seen dead ahead at about 600-700 yards.

S. D. Dealey

Sound also reported faint screws on this bearing, so HAKE turned away toward the south. At this point the minesweeper gave three strong pings, whereupon HAKE saw her 2,000 yards away swinging toward the two submarines. HAKE figured he had sound contact and went deep. The enemy kept pinging, but seemed to have the two targets located and to be undecided what to do about it. At 0726, HAKE heard 15 rapid depth charges, none timed to the west. By 0955 all was quiet.

HARDER never was heard from again. Her periscope was last sighted at 15°-43'N, 119°-43'E. Japanese records reveal that an antisubmarine attack was made on the same day at 15°-50'N, 119°-43'E with 440 pound depth charges. The enemy said, "much oil, wood chips and cork floated in the neighborhood." Presumably HARDER perished in this depth charge attack.

HARDER was officially credited with having sunk 20.5 enemy ships (the half credit was given for a ship sunk cooperatively with HADDO). This gave HARDER a total of 82,500 tons sunk and she damaged seven ships for 20,000 tons.

Her first patrol was conducted in Empire waters, starting in June 1943. She sank three freighters, and

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SS257/A12-1
Serial 0-2
DECLASSIFIED
CERTIFICATE OF DISCLOSURE

From:  The Commanding Officer.
To:  The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) The Commander Submarine Division 121.
    (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
    (3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of First War Patrol.

Enclosure:  (A) Subject Report.
    (B) Track Chart of patrol in area assigned for
    Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

1. Enclosure (A), cov ring the First War Patrol of this
vessel in area south of Isle Wan, between Shiono Misaki and Otai Saki,
during the period 7 June to 10 July, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

/s/ S. D. DEALEY.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.10C
BY OP-

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1-121/A16-3
Serial 030
SUBMARINE DIVISION ONE TWENTY ONE
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
12 July 1943

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO HARDER Comf. Ltr.
SS257/A12-1, Serial 0-2
of 7/10/43.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of First War Patrol - comments on.

7. The material condition of the HARDER, except for the condition of the H.O.R. engines which is being covered in separate letter, was good, and the health and morale excellent.

8. This is believed to be one of the finest first patrols made by any submarine and the Commanding Officer, Officers, and men of the HARDER are to be congratulated on having done a beautiful job. It is recommended that the HARDER be credited with the following:

SUNK

1. AK - MATUMOTO MARU type 7,061 tons
1. AK - HAGISAN MARU type 4,135 tons
1. AK - NICOI MARU type 4,124 tons
Total 15,580 tons

DAMAGED

1. AK - HUZI MARU type 9,138 tons
1. AK - TATUKAMI MARU type 7,065 tons
1. AK - HAGISAN MARU type 4,395 tons
1. AK - TATUKAMI MARU type 6,520 tons
Total 28,118 tons

R. H. PEELCHER.

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1. NARRATIVE

June 7th
1330 (WW) Departed Pearl Harbor enroute to Midway in company with USS SEARAVEN and escorted by PYC CRYSTAL.
1600 (WW) Made trim dive.
2030 (WW) Dismissed escort and parted company with SEARAVEN.

June 8th
0833 (WW) Sighted and exchanged signals with Navy PBY.

June 9th and 10th
1650 (WW) Sighted and exchanged signals with twin motored land plane. Enroute Pearl to Midway made daily dives, held fire control drills, fired 20 MMs and 50 Cal. machine guns and held battle surface drills. Made daily t-sts for submerged reception from NPM. (See paragraph 11).

June 11th.
0545 (XX) Sighted escort patrol vessel at 9,000 yds. SJ Radar conchord on and picked up target at 6/50 yards.
0715 (XX) Sighted two Midway planes.
0800 (XX) Took pilot aboard.
0840 (XX) Arrived Midway. Received 14,750 gallons fuel oil.
1600 (XX) Departed Midway under air escort for assigned operating area.
2400 (XX) Crossed international date line. (Dropped Saturday June 12th from calendar) Enroute area made daily trim dives, held fire control drills, and fired 20 MMs and 50 Cal. when sea conditions permitted. Continued tsts for submerged reception from NPM until outside 3000 mile circle from Pearl Harbor. (See paragraph 11).

- 1 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

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1000 (M) Wind shifted from SE to NW during night. Barometer dropped. Seas picked up.
: 1100 (LM) Seas very rough. - Slowed to one-engine speed (12 knots) making good 8 knots. Sighted two glassballs of type used by Jap fishermen.
: June 16th Wind and sea abated during night. Increased speed to 15 knots.
: 1100 (LM) Slowed to 1/3 speed, ran with sea and greased all topside grease fittings.
: 1600 (LM) Swung ship on surface for deviation of magnetic compass.
: June 17th Swing ship submerged for deviation of magnetic compass.
: 1030 (LM) Entered 600 mile circle from Tokio.
: 0800 (L) Sighted several more glass balls floating by.
: June 19th During night barometer dropped. Sea and wind picked up. Very heavy seas by morning. Taking occasional waves over the bridge. (Exp.rirr.nel canvas drainage tunnck.into pump room bilrrs wry satisfactory.) Sky hazy and overcast. Intermittent light and heavy rain squalls throughout day. Perfect weather for slipping into area unobserved. Heavy weather has chanced patrol craft and sampans into this area and has chased patrol craft and sampans into harbor.
: 1800 (K) About one-hour's flying time from Tokio air bases and still no planes. Too bad this ship doesn't represent another and bigger "Shangri-La" for a Doolittle "return engagement" over Tokio.
: 1910 (K) Sighted Hachijo jima distant 18 miles. Picked up at same time on SD radar. SJ radar coached on and picked up island at 23,000 yds.
: 2200 (K) Passed island aboard to port, distant 5 miles. No shipping activity noted in open roadstead and no navigational lights in evidence.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of First War Patrol.

June 20th:
0300 (K)
Entcrd SE corner of assigmed area.
Study of previous patrol reports and plot of all contacts made indicates that shipping along coast of Honshu follows two fairly well defined routes: -- Once, the deep water route from Omaij Saki to Kashino Saki; the other route closely hugs the shoreline (inside the 100 fathom curve) conforming to the contour of the southern Honshu coast line. Will first patrol near center of area, where the Truk-Saipan-Nagoya route crosses the deep water Honshu traffic lanes.

0505 (K)
Dove and patrolled at 60 feet, making periscope exposure every ten minutes.

1230 (K)
1st, contact.
Sighted masts of vessel hull down with angle on bow of 70-S. Range 6 miles. Sounded 1sttle stations and came to NMC at full speed. Closrd to position 4 miles from target, angle on bow now 120-S. Discontinued approach, Target identified as small petrol vessel, spred 7 knots. Several distant depth charges heard during aftermoon, Surfaced and put in battery charge while closing Omaij Saki light, distant about 90 miles.

June 21st:
0238 (K)
Dove on course 270, 6 miles SW of Omaij Saki light and soon found we were being pushed backwards by the Kuroshio even when making 2/3 speed. Set course south to clear shoal water. Had hoped to work westward along the south coast of Honshu today but Japan stream is too strong to buck in this area if the battery is to be conserved for attacks.

NOTE:
During night 30 miles off Honshu all members of the bridge force smelled the beach. -- A distinctive, almost perfume like fragrance, suggestive of camphor wood and encyclopaedus trees. The wind was from the beach and the scent became stronger as we moved in. It is suggested that all navigators keep this 'aid to navigation' in mind when approaching Honshu in reduced visibility.

1400 (K)
Several scampans sighted. They seem to be on a picket line 5 or 6 miles off shore and conforming to contour of the coast. Considerable nuisance value.

2030 (K)
Plan to run through or under the Omaij Saki - Daio Saki off-shore patrols to-night just to see what goes on in-side that picket line.

2200 (K)
Headed for Daio Saki light.
Sighted light. Characteristics as listed in Asiatic Pilot except that no red sectors were noticed.

- 3 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 22 —
2300 (K) Radar picked up patrol vessel at 4500 yds. Bridge sighted it simultaneously. Turned hard away and speeded up to avoid detection. Not sighted but maneuver put us within three miles of Dalo Saki. Came to course 270.
: 2330 (K) Sighted another patrol vessel distant 4000 yds on port beam. His subsequent course indicated that we were sighted but he made no attempt to challenge or open fire. At 15 knots we soon left him trailing on port quarter. We were now definitely inside the picket line with visibility conditions favorable to us.

June 22nd
0034 (K) Sighted two-ship convoy with single escort on port bow distance 11,000 yds. Sounded battle stations and commenced surface radar approach. Leading ship showed by far to be the largest ship on radar screen. Attack was started to seaward of the 100 fathom curve, but course of attack I don't know. At 6000 yds, target visible in #1 periscope. At 4000 yds, cleared bridge and dove to 401, continuing radar approach. At 2000 yds increased depth to 601 and shifted to #2 periscope.
: 0052 (K) Fired 4 torpedoes (torpex heads) at leading ship, (large AO or AK), range about 800 yds. 1st torpedo exploded prematurely after I had second run. (A 1st disconcerting for my first shot of the patrol). "2,3,4& hit target with shattering explosions that rocked the submarine. Flames from three parts of target enveloped entire ship. It was ablaze from bow to stern in a matter of seconds with the flames shooting 100 feet into the air. I don't believe anyone aboard could have survived the explosions or the fire for 30 seconds. Shifted attack, swinging ship and periscope, to escort vessel on starboard hand, but watching flames of the burning target had completely destroyed my "night vision". Ordered deep submargence, right full rudder, all ahead full and rigged for Depth Charge Attack. First Depth Charge exploded, not too close, as we passed 100 ft. Overshot ordered depth of 300 feet and made our first landing on the shore of Japan in 355 feet of water. JK-QC sound head wrecked. Silenced all machinery in boat and waited for counter measures. Did not have to wait long. Twelve more charges exploded overhead at almost regular intervals.

-4- ENGLISH SOURCE (A)

— page 23 —
0300 (K)
The sound party on the escort vessel were no "bush
laqucurs". Time after time, from 0110 until 0230, slow
deliberate runs were made over the submarine with one or
two charges unloaded at each pass. None were too close
but none were really wasted. Of the 13 charges dropped
two or three were b1evcd to be directly overhead but
set shallow (probably at 200-250 ft.).
Decided not to wait for the second team to arrive on
the scene. Ship was heavy and considerable difficulty
was cxpcricnced in breaking loose from bottom even with
safety and bow-buoyancy tanks blown.
Off bottom but grounded again on another shelf in 350 ft.
of water. Another try.--Then all clear. Discarded idea
of returning to periscope depth with boat in such heavy
trim, trim pump sounding like a ccmnt mixer, and damn
only 1t hours away. Withdrew to southward. An certain
that target's destruction was complete with those three
torpex heads. At 0600 the Jcp's second team arrived
and the spot where HADER had been was given another
thorough going over. Spent remainder of morning at 200 ft.
resting crew and chocking over the ship.
Back to periscope depth. Sighted two destroyers or patrol
vessels at range of 12000 yds, angle on ton 400 S. Sounded
general quarters and started approach. On 3rd observation
both ships had reversed course and were nearly out of sight.
Sighted float type plane at 5 miles. Went drep to 250 ft.
Heard seven aerial bombs exploded at distance of 1 or 3 miles.
Target of last night identified as similar to the Matumoto
Meru of 7000 tons (pege 229-ONI 208-J). Target was ablaze
so furiously and so quickly that we wonder if the carried
explosives or gasoline aboard. This was one picture the
commnntator on "Radio Tokio" can't laugh off. Flames from
the target must have been seen by a large part of the
population of Honshu.
Sighted two PC type patrol craft.
Heard three distant depth charges or Aerial bombs.
Surfaced after dive which lasted twenty hours. CO 2
absorbent used to good effect during dive. Steered east and
west courses while charging batteries.

June 23rd
0040 (K)
0200 (K)
0205 (K)
Sighted PC type patrol vessel bearing 2600 T.
Sighted patrol vessel bearing 3150 T.
Sighted another patrol vessel bearing 2700 T.

- 5 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 24 —
0300 (K)
: 0418 (K)
: 0447 (K)

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of First War Patrol.

June 23rd (cont'd)
These three ships had a speed of about 14 knots and joined in a nearly successful effort to box us in. At one time with two converging on us on opposite bows and one on the starbd quarter, one of the ships came within 2100 yds. Used maximum available speed to get clear of these nuisances. The night was dark, and they seemed uncertain of our identity but appeared reluctant to challenge or to attack. Why they did not summon aid by radio, I cannot imagine. I hesitated to open fire because a gun battle, with planes or destroyers in the vicinity, would only have guided them to the attack.

Managed to put all patrol vessels astern or on port quarter, opening range. Set course 110 making 17% knots. Patrol vessels now out of sight astern. OOD sighted large passenger-freighter bearing 170°, ample on bow 15F. (Probably coming up from Truk-Saipan area). Radar directed to target bearing and found an air-carry large "pip" on screen. Range 16,500 yds! Bright moonlight, clear sky, and only thirty minutes until dawn. This target was really big... Radar operator later described it as the largest on he had ever had on the radar screen. Dove to forty feet and went to NMC to make combined radar-periscope approach. Target was unascertained and steering 40° either side of course (north) using constant helm at 15 knots. When range had closed to 5000 yds, increased depth to 60 feet and made prisiope approach. Range closing slowly; dawn almost at hour. At 2500 yds target sighted periscope, turned away and commenced firing at periscope with 4 inch or 5 inch guns and several 20 MMs. Deflection good. All shots seemed to pass directly over the scope. Fired four torpedoes from bow tubes, using total diverging spread of 6°. Depth set at 18 feet. First torpedo hit between bow and bridge, after run of one minute and forty seconds. Target's turn away caused 2-3 and 4 to pass ahead and they were timed exploding at the end of their run of about 5 minutes, #1 torpedo made a terrific noise and is belivred to have exploded under the target. Ship's bow jumped noticeably under the shock and a large cloud of black smoke was seen over the target. Ship now shifted its gunfire to its starboard bow, from which came noise of the three misses as they exploded at end of run. Target's commander signing radically on northerly course but was mentioning a speed of 10 knots. Went to full speed and attempted to close but target drew away rapidly. Viewed from the stern target was now observed to have a 10° degree list to port and was leaving

- 6 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 26 —
0718 (K)
at the time, it was an aerial bomb exploding close aboard and ordered deep submergence and rigged for depth charge. As we went down # 2 and # 3 torpedoes were heard to explode at one minute and fifty seven seconds and two minutes and sixteen seconds respectively indicating run of 3000 and 3400 yds. (Approximate distance to the right flank AK at that time). Sound now reported screws of two ships passing overhead (probably the left flank AK and convoy escort). However no depth charging occurred. Put both sound bearings astern and maneuvered to get clear for one hour.

Examine timing of all shots and noted with some chargin that I had gone deep unnecessarily. The supposed aircraft bomb had been # 1 few torpedo hitting the target. Below table shows explosion tim and running time of all torpedoes.

Note that the four after torpedoes exploded at end of run (An almost constant range of 8000 yds) while the three forward torpedoes exploded at the ranges of the two targets.

— page 27 —
1: 15-44  : 20-17  : 4-33 : 6800  : Miss
: 2: 15-54  : 21-14  : 5-20 : 8000  : Miss
: 3: 16-00  : 21-27  : 5-27 : 8200  : Miss
: 4: 16-07  : 21-45  : 5-38 : 8500  : Miss
: 1: 19-06  : 22-03  : 1-10 : 1750  : Hit
: 2: 19-17  : 22-21  : 1-57 : 3000  : Possible
: 3: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 4: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 5: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 6: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 7: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 8: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 9: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 10: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 11: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 12: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 13: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 14: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 15: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 16: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 17: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 18: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 19: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 20: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 21: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 22: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 23: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 24: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 25: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 26: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 27: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 28: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 29: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 30: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 31: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 32: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 33: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 34: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 35: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 36: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 37: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 38: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 39: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 40: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 41: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 42: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 43: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 44: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 45: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 46: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 47: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 48: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 49: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 50: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 51: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 52: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 53: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 54: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 55: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 56: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 57: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 58: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 59: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 60: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 61: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 62: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 63: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 64: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 65: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 66: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 67: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 68: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 69: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 70: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 71: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 72: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 73: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 74: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 75: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 76: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 77: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 78: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 79: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 80: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 81: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 82: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 83: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 84: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 85: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 86: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 87: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 88: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 89: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 90: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 91: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 92: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 93: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 94: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 95: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 96: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 97: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 98: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 99: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 100: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 101: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 102: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 103: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 104: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 105: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 106: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 107: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 108: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 109: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 110: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 111: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 112: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 113: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 114: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 115: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 116: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 117: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 118: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 119: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 120: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 121: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 122: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 123: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 124: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 125: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 126: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 127: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 128: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 129: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 130: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 131: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 132: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 133: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 134: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 135: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 136: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 137: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 138: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 139: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 140: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 141: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 142: 19-29  : 25-03  : 2-16 : 3400  : Possible
: 143: 19-29  :

— page 28 —
1325 (K) Sighted large tanker under air escort of a single plane, in course 280, Angle on bow 90° P, speed 10, range 6500 yds, following coast line closely, headed for Kobe. Closed to 5300 yds on NAC at standard speed. Discontinued chase (Battery gravity 1200).

: 1400 (K) Plane sighted. Went to 100 feet for 15 minutes.

: 1520 (K) Sighted smoke. Headed for same.

: 1525 (K) Sighted three ships in column, all smoking heavily and escorted by a boat of our PC type which patrolled back and forth across bow of the convoy. Started approach. Gained position dead ahead of convoy. Set up perfect for stern tube shots.

: 1555 (K) Came to course 160 and opened distance to track for stern tube shots. Escort now close aboard showing # 32 on the bow, flying large Jap battle flag. Second ship in column is largest. Plan to fire 4 stern tube shots at him then swing to get 3 bow shots at third ship. Distance to track 1200 yds. As firing bearing approached, observed range to be greater; now about 2000 yds. Corrected set up in TDC.

: 1603 (K) Fired 4 stern tube shots at middle target at eight second intervals. Swing for bow shots.

: 1608 (K) Fired three bow shots at last ship in column, estimate range 2500 yds. At one minute and forty seven seconds and one minute and forty eight seconds after firing last stern tube shots, two definite explosions were heard and timed, (believed to be one hit and one continued torpedo on middle target) but no evidence of a hit was seen through periscope at this time. At two minutes after firing the last bow shot one definite hit was observed on trailing target which was covered with a splash of water. Almost simultaneous with the observed hit, two more explosions were heard by all in the conning tower. At this time both targets were observed to be blowing their steam whistles and both had turned directly toward the beach about two miles away. Shifted gaze to leading ship of convoy. It had held course and speed and was opening range fast; the escort had turned and headed our way. Took another look at targets. First target was sinking stern first with after deck house already awash. Second target not visibly hurt but still headed for the beach.

: 1625 (K) Escort vessel now at range of 2000 yds, angle on bow zero. Went deep (300-350 feet) ran silent and rigged for depth charge attack. It began: --.

: 1627 (K) 1st explosion about 200 yds.

: 1629 (K) 2nd explosion about 200 yds.

: 1631 (K) 3rd explosion about 100 yds.

: 1639 (K) 4th explosion about 300 yds.

: 1640 (K) 5th explosion about 300 yds.

: 1641 (K) 6th explosion about 500 yds.

: 1734 (K) 7th explosion about 2000 yds.

: 10 -

— page 29 —
1800 (K) The following excerpt is quoted from the quartermaster's note book: "At deep submergence, steering 180, evading the enemy, ( I HOPE)."

: 2000 (K) Came to periscope depth.

: 2055 (K) Surfaced and started battery charge.

: June 26th 0412 (K) Dove south of Shiono Misaki light and commenced periscope patrol while closing coast, with intent of scanning coast line closely for evidence of stranded or beached ships in vicinity of yesterdays attack.

: 0545 (K) Two depth charges or aerial bombs heard several miles away.

: 0600 (K) Sighted large patrol plane at two miles. Went deep and made radical change of course.

: 0715 (K) Echo ranging heard. Depth charging commenced not but miles away. Spasmodic depth charging heard for next two hours at ranges from one to three miles. ( I believe we have worn out our welcome in this area).

: 0915 (K) Resumed periscope patrol.

: 1115 (K) Had worked out to sea-ward while evading patrol boats. Commenced second attempt to close the beach.

: 1514 (K) Sighted freighter with PC escort. Ranco seven miles. Angle on bow 20 F. Made unsuccessful attempt to close into firing range on Nac at high speed. Ship was hugging the coast line. Escort trailing on its seaward quarter.

: 1608 (K) Target rounded Shiono Misaki light and turned 700 away to course north. Angle on bow now 1400 P. Closest range two miles.

: 1642 (K) Escort apparently guarded the freighter only until it cleared the point, then turned toward HARDER, ranco 2500, angle on bow zero. Went deep and rigged for silent running. Escort searched overhead for one hour but seemed uncertain of any contact. We certainly miss our ruptured QC sound head. The other is so noisy below 100 feet that it is rare of a menace than a help.

: 1800 (K) Periscope depth again. Seas running very high. Depth control difficult.

: 1935 (K) Sighted Chidori class torpedo boat searching area. Ranco 6000 yds., angle on bow 70 S. - Picnned to use last two torpedoes on him if he zigged our way.

: 1944 (K) Sighted another Chidori, range 4000 yds. Both ships now pinging and searching area. Deemed it foolhardy to tangle with two Chidori's, with only two torpedoes, high seas, battery gravity low, and sub had already been submerged 15% hours.

- 11 -

ENCLOSURE (4)

— page 30 —
2005 (Cont'd)
June 26th (Cont'd)
2005 (K)
June 27th
June 28th
June 29th
0429 (K)
0517 (K)
0800 (K)
0815 (K)
1035 (K)
1315 (K)
0419 (K)
0200 (K)
1300 (K)
1335 (K)
2100 (K)
0429 (K)
0517 (K)
0800 (K)
0815 (K)
1035 (K)
1315 (K)
0419 (K)
0200 (K)
1300 (K)
1335

— page 34 —
5. ENEMY SHIPS SIGHTED:

DATE | TIME | POSITION | COURSE | SPEED | TYPE AND DESCRIPTION
June 20 | 1330 | Lat. 33-27-N | 70 | 7 | Patrol Ship of PC type.
June 21 | 2300 | Lat. 34-05-N | 240 | 10 | Patrol Ship of PC type.
June 21 | 2330 | Lat. 37-15-E | 70 | 10 | Patrol Ship of PC type.
June 22 | 0034 | Lat. 34-30-N | 242 | 9 | Convoy 2 AK and PC escort
June 23 | 0040 | Lat. 33-30-E | 90 | 14 | Three Patrol ships, PC type
June 23 | 0245 | Long. 137-00-E | 270 |  | Large passenger-freighter
June 23 | 0418 | Long. 138-10-E | 000 | 15 | Yacht Manu type '17,000
June 23 | 1210 | Long. 33-26-N | 240 | 15 | Chidori torpedo boat
June 24 | 0645 | Long. 138-21-E | 60 | 12 | Convoy 3 AK and PC escort
June 25 | 1325 | Long. 136-30-E | 280 | 10 | 1 AD (located) with air escort
June 25 | 1525 | Long. 135-55-E | 240 & 11 | 1 AK, 2 AD (light) with PC escort
June 26 | 1935 | Long. 135-55-E | 270 & 10 | 2 Chidori torpedo boat
June 28 | 1300 | Long. 34-07-N | 240 | 9 | Yacht of AK hull down
June 29 | 0517 | Long. 137-09-E | 60 | 6 | Patrol ship PC type
June 29 | 0800 | Long. 137-04-E | 100 | 11 | 3 AK
June 29 | 1135 | Long. 34-35-N | 90 | 0 | Target hit on 23rd Large AK around
June 29 | 1327 | Long. 34-33-N | 270 | 10 | 1 AK
June 29 | 1327 | Long. 138-10-E | 80 | 6+ | 1 AK, 2 AD (heavy), air escort

6. DESCRIPTION OF PLANES SIGHTED:

| TIME | TYPE | LAT | LONG. | COURSE | ALT. |
|------|------|-----|-------||-------|
| June 22-1000 | Float type | 33-20 | 137-05 | 160 | 50 |
| June 23-1005 | Float type | 33-25 | 138-20 | 90 to 270 | 100 |
| June 24-1300 | Float type (2) | 34-10 | 136-40 | 60 | 100 |
| June 25-1300 | Float type | 33-50 | 136-40 | 240 | 50 |
| June 26-0600 | Patrol plane | 33-20 | 135-40 | 90 | 50 |

- 16 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 36 —
3000 yards

HARDER

1. Influence hit with torpedo head.
   Depth 18 feet.

Just before firing, the sub was sighted. Target opened fire at periscope with 4 or 5 inch guns and several 20 IMs.

Hit between bridge and bow slowed target to 10 knots, giving him a list of 10° port, and resulting in a large oil slick.

Target was sighted before dawn at 17,000 yds. Radar coached on and target already a big pip on the screen; range 16,450 yds. Six days later, target similar in appearance sighted beached about fifty miles to northward.

Target had characteristics of both the

YAHATA HAHU 17,000 tons (page 41 OII 208-J) and
HUZI MAHU 9,100 tons (page 65 OII 208-J).

- 18 -

— page 37 —
1943

June 24, 1943

Escort

4 misses

AK

HARDER

AK

AK

1 Hit observed
Torpex head
Depth 20 feet

2 possible
hits

Time run of 1 min. 10 sec.
Torpedo run of 1750 yds.

Timed run of
1 min. 57 sec. Torpedo run of 2000 yds. Depth set
2 min. 16 sec. Torpedo run of 3400 yds. 20 feet

Center AK similar to:
TATUKAKI HAIJU 7,000 tons (pare 71 ONI 208-J)
Right Flank AK similar to:
MANSUI HAIJU 5,200 tons (pare 236 ONI 208-J)

- 19 - FINCLOSURE (A)

— page 38 —
1943

FOURTH ATTACK
June 25, 1943

SHORE LINE

Escort #92
PC Type

Observed to be sinking stern
down by the stern

1 mile
AK
AK

1 hit seen
followed by
two explosions
Depth Set 18 ft.

TWO EXPLOSIONS
1 hit at 1 min. 47 sec.
1 countermine at 1 min. 48 sec.
Depth set at 18 feet.
Torpedo run of 2700 yards.

Both targets similar to:
NAGISAN MARU 4,300 tons
(page 250 QH 208-J)

- 20 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 39 —
5th ATTACK
June 29, 1943

SHORE LINE
AP
OAK
AIR ESCORT
AK
AO
HARDER
Targets similar to:
AK MYCOI MAHU 4,100 tons (page 196 ONI 208J)
AO TATIBANA MAHU 6,500 tons (page 276 ONI 208J)

- 21 -
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 41 —
8. Anti-Submarine Measures.

Enemy ships in this area used to combat submarines appear to consist of the following:
Two Chidori class torpedo boats,
About 8 to 12 P.C. type patrol vessels,
About 20 to 30 Sampans and fishing craft, several float type planes and an occasional patrol plane.

There seemed to be no organized search for a normal methodical coverage of the area, until submarine attacks stirred them up; then the Chidoris, patrol vessels and planes always showed up at the point of recent attack,- ignoring the fact that the submarine normally shifts its area of operations after each attack.

When trailed for two hours by 3 PC boats during early morning of the 23rd, the PCs had excellent opportunity to call for additional help. I do not believe they are equipped with communication facilities for this.

In one case a convoy escort was found to be patrolling across the bows of the convoy; in all other cases the escort hung back on the quarter of the convoy and waited for his charges to get hit before he came down the torpedo tracks.

It is not believed that any depth charges or aerial bombs were set for explosions deeper than 200-250 feet.

The Chidori torpedo boats apparently search by echo-ranging as well as listening, while the PC boats used only listening. Both types, due to their shallow draft, size and relatively high speed are considered to be very effective for anti-submarine warfare.

The gunfire from the large passenger-freighter on the morning of June 23rd was quickly brought into action, and its deflection was good, though the range was poor. Considering the number of attacks during our period in the area, it is believed that the enemy simply does not have the necessary number of anti-submarine ships to adequately combat the submarine warfare in her home waters.

9. Description of enemy mine sweeping operations.

No enemy mine sweeps were encountered during this patrol but it is believed that the two mine fields layed in this area some while ago by our submarines have long since been detonated or swept, for merchant shipping now seems to go right through these areas. *(However, I would not care to demonstrate my faith in this theory).

— page 42 —
10. Major defects.

June 10th.
While starting number one main engine, water pressure overcame exhaust pressure, (engine rolling by air at 200 rpm) number five cylinder flooded and bent the piston rod. Piston rod was removed.

June 29th.
While charging batteries at 600 rpm and 700 KW the main idler gear on number one main engine lost the after 2" of two adjacent teeth. Engine was thus rendered inoperative for remainder of the patrol.

Trin and Drain pumps on this vessel have been altered for silent operation. The net result is good, however, it can, and must, be improved. The greater part of the noise seems to come from the manifold and flooded cylinder in at depths in excess of 200 feet, as well as blowing out of auxiliary tank carrying pressure, is accompanied by valve chattering and loud wire-drawing noises. It is recommended that:

(1) A "silent" manifold be installed for one auxiliary tank. One suggestion is a one inch line with a quick opening valve and a gate valve.

(2) A centrifugal pump similar to the sub-visible portable pump used on large ships be installed so as to be used with the "silent" manifold. A pump of this type has been used by this vessel and the results were most satisfactory.

A total of 15 copper liners carried away on the main engines ranging from the 3" attached pump relief valve return which carried away twice, to the 3/16" lubricator lines. These liners were obviously subjected to too much continuous vibration. It is recommended that wherever possible these liners be replaced by oil resisting synthetic rubber hose.

Number 2 periscope continued to leak, and grate, getting progressively worse at deep submergence.

The hull fittings of the bow plane shafting lacked excessively.

As a result of depth charging on 22 June the engine induction developed a leak of about 20 gallons an hour when below 200 feet. This leak continued during the remainder of the patrol.

Gyro indicator regulator for after torpedoes gave an indication 10 degrees in error for the attack on enemy June 24th. This has happened once before. Error may be caused by weak phase in Selsyn system or a poor electrical connection.

- 24 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 43 —
10. Major Defects (Cont'd)

(2) Casualty remodified by turning switch off; then on again. Will be thoroughly investigated during coning rofit period.

The QC-JK sound had was smashed following the first attack, thus making it inoperative for the romandor of the patrol. The extent of the damage cannot be determined until it is possible to inspect the shaft and lower bearing. It is impossible to raise the shaft more than two feet from the rigged cut position at present. The QB sound had gradually become more of a detriment than an aide. It never seemed as sensitive as it should, most of the time not even picking up our own screws at two thirds speed and not able to pick up targets plainly audible on the JK.

As the patrol progressed the training equipment grew steadily noisier until the end of the first week, it could be plainly heard in the control room. This excessive noise was the combination of the training gears. The drift stays, and a number of the shaft was not rotating inside the lower bearing thus the lower bearing was dropping against the sea chest and the opening in #1 IMT.

The track for the drift stays was poorly designed so that the wheels traveled over the heads of the securing screws. In only a few days the heads of these screws sheared off leaving the holes where the screws has been countersunk.

11. Has radio reception complete and what were the last consecutive scrials sent and received?

(A) Radio reception was complete. HPN FOX SKID was copied at all times when on the surface but it was necessary to use high frequency most of the time while in the patrol area. Some Jcp interferance was encountered but not sufficient to prevent copying. Submerged reaction was made several times while enroute and the results are shown in the following table.

- 25 -

[UNCLOSURE (A)]

— page 44 —
1. USS HARDER Report of First War Patrol.
: "RADIO RECEPTION WHILE SUBMERGED"

Reception in general was excellent. It is found that it is possible to copy NPM on 16.68 KCS at a depth ranging from fifty to sixty-five feet.

The following submerged radio reception data were obtained on route to our operating area:

| DATE | TIME GCT | MILES FROM PTARL | DEPTH KMT | FREQ. | T/AXIMUM SIGNAL STRENGTH | RELATIVE BEARING OF PEARL A T MAXIMUM SIGNAL | EFFECTS NOTED WHEN RELATIVE BEARING CHANGED |
|------||||-------||||
| 6/10/43 | 0200    | 1000             | 57       | 16.68 | 3                      | 090                         | Possible to copy solid. |
| 6/14/43 | 0400    | 1873             | 58       | 16.68 | 3                      | 090                         | Possible to copy solid. |
| 6/16/43 | 0235    | 2800             | 55       | 16.68 | 3                      | 090                         | Noise level three. |

11. Has radio reception complete and what were the last consecutive serial sent and received? (Cont'd)

(B) Ship to Shore (4235 Series)
Our first transmission was at 1,000 GCT June 30th. Attempt was made to raise NQO on 4235, with no success. Upon shifting to 8,470, NPM was raised after only a few minutes. NPM gave us strength 3 and our reception was strength 3. Some Jap interference was encountered but he was off frequency and only caused difficulty when he crossed our frequency a couple of times making it necessary to repeat five groups in one message and two groups in the other. Two messages were sent with the intention of only sending the one with the more important information, if difficulty was experienced due to jamming.

LAST SERIAL SENT 3

LAST SERIAL RECEIVED 24

RADAR
The performance of both radar's was satisfactory with only normal maintenance being necessary to keep them in operation. This consisted of the following:

1. Sweep tube burned out.
2. One I.F. tube became weak and was changed.
3. Moisture and grease on lobing motor contact rings. Became necessary to dry and clean daily.

- 26 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 45 —
12. Sound Conditions and Density Layers.

Damage to our sound heads prevented a real test of sound conditions on our part, but the fact that enemy patrol craft and Chidori torpedo boats were successfully evaded several times indicates that sound conditions were poor. Many density layers were encountered in this area; particularly off Shiono Misaki and Naio Saki. On each deep dive there was a marked drop in water temperature ranging from four to ten degrees. The drop was gradual inside the one hundred fathom curve and in very marked layers in deeper water. There was invariably a layer between one and two hundred feet outside the one hundred fathom curve. In each case the layer necessitated much flooding in to get down and pumping out to get back up. The bathythermograph predicted the necessary procedure nearly every time. This is a most valuable instrument but should be relocated in the Control Room where it can be of great assistance, to the diving officer, and it should be calibrated for depths to 400 feet.

13. Health and Habitability.

Health of the crew was excellent during the period covered by this report. At daily "sick call" during the patrol treatment was given for:

6 head colds.
12 cases of constipation.

This vessel is equipped with experimental ultra violet germicidal lamps in the ventilation system. Common colds were at a minimum. Whether this resulted from the action of the lamps is not a matter for the layman to assert. However it is definitely folly that the lamps reduced considerably the characteristic smell and and eye irritation that develops at the end of an all day dive. This might be the result of the ozone produced by the action of the lamps.

Air pressure within the ship was pumped down at regular intervals during the all day dives and fresh air bled into the boat. CO2 absorbent was used twice to geed off.

- 27 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 46 —
14. Miles steamed on route to and from station.

PROVOKE AREA
Pearl Harbor to Midway
Midway to area
On surface
Submerged
800
400

RETURN FROM AREA
Area to Midway
Midway to Pearl Harbor
2300
1213

TOTAL:
8226

15. Fuel Expanded.
Pearl Harbor to Midway.
Midway to area.
Area to Midway.
On station.
14,750
27,600
34,825
7,820

16. Factors of endurance remaining.
PERSONNEL
TORPEDOES FUEL PROVISIONS (DAYS) FRESH WATER (DAYS)
NONE 8,100 FIFTY UNLIMITED THIRTY

17. What factor of endurance, if any, caused ending this patrol; armament, fuel, fresh water, provisions, fatigue of personnel, or material failure?
The factor of endurance which terminated the patrol was - Expenditure of all torpedoes.

Note: Fuel expended does not include that used in returning to Pearl.

- 28 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 47 —
18. Remarks:
The torpedo performance during this patrol, excepting the single "prenature", is considered to be excellent. Though it cannot be stated as a fact, it is believed that 23 of the 24 torpedoes ran hot and normal. Except for the 4 stern tube shots on which the gyro angle was 10 degrees in error (due to a faulty gyro-indicator-regulator) all misses are attributed to "control errors" and not torpedo performance.

Again excepting the last shot there is no reason to believe that magnetic exploders failed to function properly. The single preasure that occurred was very likely due to the large (5") down angle on the boat at the instant of firing.

It is believed that fully 90% of the merchant shipping in this area avoids the deep-water route and closely follows the coastline of Honduras, sometimes unguarded, but usually escorted by small patrol vessels or aircraft (possibly both). The greatest mental and physical hazard to an aggressive submarine patrol is the fact that the submarine patrol is the 100 fathom curve for this target. It is therefore recommended that future subs patrolling this area be permitted to leave their ECM behind in order that its safety will not influence the decisions of the Commanding Officer whose first thought is to go in after then whorecover the enemy ships are found.

Though the time on astation was short, the pace was a fast one for an unsuccessful crew and the ship is proud of its results and the chance to shore in the job of whittling down the enemy sea power.

The Commanding Officer takes this opportunity to thank the ship's officers and men whose efforts, enthusiasm, and desire to close with the enemy have resulted in a successful war patrol.

— page 48 —
35-12N-125-45E
Serial 030
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO HARDER Conf. Ltr.
SS257/A12-1, serial 0-2
of 7/10/43.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Division ONE TWENTY ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of First War Patrol - comments on.

1. The first war patrol of the HARDER extended over a period of 33 days of which only 9 days were spent in assigned area due to the quick expenditure of all torpedoes. The area was well and aggressively covered and the Commanding Officer did not hesitate to go close in shore for targets.

2. Out of 9 worthwhile contacts the HARDER was able to close and successfully attack five times and out of 24 torpedoes fired 12 are believed to have hit for a time average of 50%. Only one submarine occurred and there were no erratic runs which speaks well for the torpedo personnel.

3. On the first attack on the night of 22 June it is reported that the blinding effect of the intense flame on the sinking target prevented the Commanding Officer from working over the second ship.

4. Although only one hit was obtained on the large passenger freighter encountered on the morning of 24 June, due to sighting of HARDER by target, subsequent evidence obtained seems to prove that the vessel will be a total loss even though only damage can be claimed.

5. The third attack was partially spoiled by the after gyro regulator failure and four torpedoes were unfortunately wasted. Frequent trouble has been experienced during the training period with these instruments and the cause will be thoroughly investigated. It is unfortunate that the Commanding Officer could not observe the results of his bow tube firings since, whereas he may have sunk the first target and sunk or damaged the second, only damage on the first is positive.

6. On the last attack the HARDER was confronted with five possible targets and only two torpedoes remained in the tubes but she made the most of those by sinking one vessel and damaging another.

- 1 -

— page 51 —
3/15/45
FF12-10/AL6-3(5)
(16)
Serial 0914
CONFIDENTIAL
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 214
U.S.S. HARDER - FIRST WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of First War Patrol.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of Subject War Patrol Report.
(B) Copy of Consubdiv 12 conf. 1st End. FB5-121/AL6-3, serial 030 of 12 July 1943.
(C) Copy of Somsubron 12 conf. 2nd End. FC-12/AL6-3/TB-121, serial 030 of 12 July 1943.

1. The first war patrol for the U.S.S. HARDER was particularly outstanding in all respects.
2. Making a thorough study of the area and its traffic prior to entry, the HARDER spent 10 days in the area, making 3 successful attacks on 3 successive days; following this with 2 more successful attacks within a week.
3. Excellent use was made of the bathymetrograph.
4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this very aggressive, well executed and highly successful first war patrol. The HARDER is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

| SINK | DAMAGED |
|------||
| 1 - 1 | Passonger Ship* (HUZI MARU class) - 7,065 tons |
| 1 - 1 | Passonger Frighter (TATUKAMI MARU class) - 7,065 tons |
| 1 - 1 | Frighter (MAGISAN MARU class) - 4,391 tons |
| 1 - 1 | Frighter (NYOGI MARU class) - 4,021 tons |
| 1 - 1 | TOTAL 15,437 tons |

| DAMAGED | TOTAL |
||-------|
| 1 - 1 | Passonger Ship* (HUZI MARU class) - 9,138 tons |
| 1 - 1 | Passonger Frighter (TATUKAMI MARU class) - 7,065 tons |
| 1 - 1 | Frighter (MAGISAN MARU class) - 4,391 tons |
| 1 - 1 | Tanker (TATUKAMI MARU class) - 6,522 tons |
| 1 - 1 | TOTAL 27,116 tons |

— page 52 —
11/16/46-3(5)/ SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET (16)
Serial 0914
CONFIDENTIAL
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 214
U.S.S. HARDER - FIRST WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of First War Patrol.

* It is possible that this beachhead ship may be of the YAWATA MARU class. The POMPANO may have more complete information on this ship upon returning from patrol and if so readjustment of assessment will then be made.

C. A. LOCKWOOD, JR.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
VCNO (5)
Cinco (5)
Serforpac
(Adv. Base Plan. Unit (1)
Cinclant (2)
Comsubsblant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comscopac (2)
Comsowespac (2)
Comsubsweepac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Comsubpac (10)
SUBAD, MI (2)
Comsubcomsubpac (2)
Midway (2)
All Squadron and Div. (2)
Commanders, Subspace (2)
U.S.S. HARDER (1)
(COMSUBSPAC Endorsement only)
All Submarines, Subspace (1)

R. C. LAWVER
Flag Secretary.

— page 53 —
155/1/1-1
SS257/14-1

DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commander, Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 1st.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 7th.
       (3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. [REDACTED] (SS257) - report of second air control.

Enclosure: (1) Subject Report.
       (2) Track Chart of Patrol in area assigned for Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

1. Enclosure (1), covering the Second Air Control of this vessel, conducted off the approaches to Tokio, Yokosuka, and Kobe, during the period 24th, 1945 to 6th, 1945, is forwarded herewith.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
DECLASSIFIED

— page 55 —
28th. U.S.S. PATROL (S3257) - Report of Second Patrol.

Subj: 28th. U.S.S. PATROL (S3257) - Report of Second Patrol.

| Date | Time | Location | Description |
|------|------|||
| 1700 | (X) | Patrol | Sighted air escort and exchange of recognition signals. |
| 1500 | (X) | Patrol | Sighted battle fleet, with target adrift; manned 20 ft guns and aeroclasses. (This firing at height bellows was apparently excellent training.) |
| 1900 | (X) | Patrol | Air escort returned to life. |
| 2000 | (X) | Patrol | Jet course 330 true, steered speed 15 knots zig-zagging. 30 degrees after eif of base course. Steadied on base course at steinera speed of 12 knots. |
| 1400 | (X) | Patrol | Crossed intermediate data line, advanced celendar one day. |
| 1500 | (X) | Patrol | Divad and conducted periscope patrol at sixty feet in order to meet in correct speed of advance (11 knots). Drilled new bow and stern plenars on conducted regular fire, control drills. |
| 1100 | (X) | Patrol | Surfaced and proceeded at 11 knots. Zig-zagging on base course 330. |
| 2151 | (X) | Patrol | Changed base course to 270. |
| 0500 | (X) | Patrol | Inore sed to two-engina speed (15 knots). Made three dives during day and held usual drills. |
| 0500 | (X) | Patrol | All submarines are sets of southern and south east JONSU are now unoccupied. AADER has verbal authority to "work over" any recent areas until notified that other submarines are moving in. |
| 0500 | (X) | Patrol | (1) Heavy concentration of converging traffic lanes on Tokio and greater number of plotted "previous contacts" dictate that our patrol should start in area number four. (2) "A can reach area number four sooner than number five and conserve both time and fuel. (3) Recent reports from the two submarines now departing areas four and five indicate more activity in four at this time. |

— page 57 —
2100 (L)    SURFACED AND GROSSED ON BASE COURSE AT 15 KNOTS.

Sept. 5th.
0300 (L)    Divd for day of submerged patrol across the shipping routes from Ticino to: Tako, Marcus, Guem, and Truk. Sea calm; visibility excellent. In view of 15-

— page 58 —
0342 (X)  U.S.S. TARBOR (SS257) - Report of Second Air Patrol.

0142 (X)  Reder contact Deering 235 degrees (true) at range of 9000 yards. Commando radar tracking. Reder located target's escort. Target's were apparently on the point of rounding the promontory off Ketsuura. On, hugging the coast line and zig-zagging on near course of about 025 at speed of 5 knots. Took position ahead of target and ran with it to establish course and speed. Found it necessary at times to run inside the 20 fathom curve. (Ship had had no fix for this past 24 hours and position alone coast was very doubtful). Torked inshore of target's track in a spot of 23 fathom of water; stopped and waited for target to approach. Escort was now located on screen with target at 23 fathom and attack phase 150 feet of water left much to be desired for the first firing evasion tactics. Rained on surface for and sighted target at 4000 yards. Background of coastline and very poor visibility favored submarine. 0433 (X)  At 1700 yards, first three torpedoes from bow tubes. Target zigged every at almost the same instant and phosphorescent torpedo tracks loomed up like white streaks as the three torpedoes passed ahead of target. (Target was a cargo ship of about 4000 tons.) (Escort, up to this time had never been sighted) Decided to risk a surface "Get away" rather than the possibility of depth charging in shore water. Ordered hard right rudder and turned to reverse of target's base course at flank speed. Target was now signaling to escort by blinker light and sending out a radio message on 450 0442 (X)  Sighted escort dead ahead at range of 2000 yards, with very sharp port enemy-on-the-way. Swung hard right and ordered "clear the bridge". Sniff rudder to her left and passed the escort 1200 yards (radar range) aboard to port. "Counted on the lookout of survey, high speed (with 30 knots relative movement), air our "rebutt's foot" to get by on the surface, but one thumb on the diving alarm while waiting for the first Jp salvo. It never came! Either the bridge, wet on the Jp sense escort was asleep at the switch or the COD was too surprised to act. The escort hull course ran speed, did not open fire or attempt to challenge. Cloaked crew at 20 knots and headed for deep water. 0510 (X)  Divod. 0820 (X)  Heerd distant depth charge. Jetrolled southwest along coast, steeling along the 50 fathom curve.

— page 59 —
1933 (X) 1935 (X) 1945 (X) 1946 (X) 2035 (X) Sept. 10th. 0119 (X) 0130 (X) 0320 (X) 0520 (X) 0650 (X) 1752 (X) 1933 (X) 1935 (X) 1945 (X) 1946 (X) 2035 (X) 1933 (X

— page 64 —
2054 (X) First of serial bombing attack. Nine bombs dropped over a period of two hours. Submarine at 250 feet.

Sept. 14th. 03500 (X) Roturned to parisopage depth. [HOMILICH: made this night as light as day. A rack beam running erecting two knot current of the Jurusio since attack, to keep from being set onto the deck and wore only about ten miles from Iro Saki, clearly visible, bearing about 30 degrees.]

0323 (X) Surfaced. Aircraft radar contact at four miles, closing! [DIVIDED. Lines sighted (with it's lights on) dist in to miles as was want down. Deps apparently intended to hold us down all night to prevent a battery carrier. [X] Navy did. [X] Navy

— page 65 —
0400 (X) Three patrol vessels sailed shortly on port bow, distant 4000 yards. Turned hard right into no. vy rain squall to avoid gattection. Divd and tried to work thos of our original target but it was never picked up again. 'o were again operating in the lzo shoto chain of island and again the traffic looked dark. Sig. ted enemy vc. ship; believed to be alone swapper. Encountered for bow shot and 70 degree port track but es firing dearing vc. was reached (range of 700 yards) gyros were moving too fast to be noticed. Swing hard left and came in eastern then target. Track now 160, gyros zoro, torpedo run 1500 yards. Zirod two torpedoes without spread; depth set at ten feet. Torpedoes were observed to pass under the target and sover. Japs suddenly ran to the stern and pointed at tracks. No hits. It is believed that torpedoes were set too deep. Took pictures of the east (enlarge 130) just as earlier bomb exploded. Sent cargo to 300 feet. The more aircraft bombs exploded as we went deep. Easy depth charting began. A total of twenty-four wave groups came in but not enough to get a hit. (The depth groups were very close but not so close. (The depth groups were

— page 68 —
1705 (X)
: 1710 (X)
: 1840 (K)
: 2055 (X)
: 2131 (X)
: 0302 (X)
: 0800 (K)
: 1200 (X)
: 1400 (K)
: 1945 (X)

SOS: 1705 (X)
TURN: 1710 (X)
DET: 1840 (K)
DET: 2055 (X)
DET: 2131 (X)
DET: 0302 (X)
DET: 0800 (K)
DET: 1200 (X)
DET: 1400 (K)
DET: 1945 (X)

SOS 20 to 30 feet high, maintained stores every 15 minutes.

Turned to course 0200 and dived. Impossibles to run at periscope depth without breakthrough or very doubtful if torpedoes would perform properly in this sea.

Ran at 80 feet. Attempted 'airseaze observation and breached. Returned to depth of 90 feet.

Came to periscope depth. No land in sight. 'Seather and sea unchanged. Returned to depth of 90 feet.

Broached while attempting to hold ship at periseaze.

Jets still very high. Submerged to 120 feet for remainder of day. JVson at that depth the sub rolled 15 degrees each way.

Surfaced and sat southerly course to ride out the typhoon.

(15)

— page 70 —
0355 (X)  U.S.S. HADES (35257)-Report of Second Torpedo Attack.

Sqmt. 235rd.

NIGHT: very dark until moonrise (1/5 moon). About 0100.
Visibility variable between good end poor.
R-ender picked up two torpedoes at 1,000 yards.
At 1,000 yards both ships were in sight and the "pips"
on radar screen were in high hatch. Angle on bow 80 degrees port. Sounded battle stations, put three mines
on perpulsion and maneuvered to gain position ahead for
continued radar operations to attack at 1,000 yards.
Dive five miles directly ahead of targets, held depth
at forty feet and commenced approach using radar and
lower periscope. "Hit range at 4000 yards shifted
to the high periscope end line. Speed depth to sixty feet.
It was hard to follow but those two vessels reported
had no surface contact. It is believed, however, that
they were about to rammed with their torpedoes.
Their depth was 800 yards.
Both ships in column.
Began firing at 800 yards.
Fired three torpedoes from bow tubes with gyro angles
about 30 degrees. Closest torpedo was 4,000 yards.
Depth at 1,000 yards.
Fired torpedoes at 1,000 yards.

— page 73 —
1300 (X) Armed trawler picked up sound of our air condensers and started "pinging". Turned southward and opened range.

: 1305 (X) Sighted two mines sweeps in shore, on easterly course. Kept those under close observation to see if they were "running intarsferones" for enother ship.

: 1930 (X) Surf-ced. Vary dark night; no moon. Redr. ran sound (ocean-ranging herd) contact at 11,000 yards. Redr. made at anchor contact. Redr. turned to consist of two large targets and one escort. Too dark for p.risoog attack. Redr. turned to spin position -head and course of redr. at range of 9000 yards escort picked up. Redr. at range of 5000 yards. Redr. turned to close in on redr. at range of 500

— page 74 —
0531 (X) Dived seven miles N of Iki Seki. Spont morning codline four different raid traips on a picket line of Niki Seki. Those boats were searching by codno rnning but did not seem to officiat. The passed ittlin 3000 yards of them several times. Surfcoed. The lights of six trawlers and lrgo snpens ware in sight from 4 to 8 miles away. All of those ware apparently on an off-shore picket line and ware busily sianning o. on other by blinker light.

Sept. 28th.
1. Corked in close to the beach near Kantori Zaki. Cruised at four knots from one to three miles off shore. Codding samples. The headlights of navy ores moving along a nearby highway remained on at diversities. Two evidance of "blockouts" Two type patrol boat passed two miles close to seashore. Radar contact showed large targets at 10,000 yards. These targets were unexpeetably to seashore of us. Came to NAG at fifteen knots. An rnge of 8000 yards first target was sighted; single on out of 60 port on course of about 50 degrees. (This is the first time we had known of our own to be on a course of 60 degrees. Continued to dive (at 0559). Continued to approach on nearest of five miles (only one escort sighted). At range of 2500 yards fired our last two torpedoes. Track angle of 150 degrees port, gyros zero, depth setting of sight foot. Approached two deeps Aivazian. Two minutes after firing, torpedo room personnel and one man in control room heard what they described as a thud. No explosions. Turned off track and went deep. Two depth charges landed (not close) as we went down. Those two brought the number of depth charges and airship bombs addressed to the HADER on this cruise to an even total of one hundred. Set course for Midevry.

1918 (X) Surfcoed.

Sept. 29th.
0300 (X) 50 radar contact on H.ctijo Jitar. t.range of 25,000 yards.

(21)

— page 75 —
0342 1445 (SS207) - Report of Second Patrol.
: 35-12N 125-45E
: USS 35-12N 125-45E
: 0342 1445
: 35-12N 125-45E
: USS 35-12N 125-

— page 76 —
1902 (L) 1912 (L) Oct. 1st, 1300 (L)

On course 088 at 17 knots. Bridge lookout sighted 4-engine bomber, gliding in with engines cut, one point on port bow; distant 3 miles. Radio quick dive to 150 feet. No bombs dropped. It is believed that this plane was from Hercules Island 500 miles to the south. Had attempted radio transmission to NRL two hours before this and it is considered very likely that this plane was guided to us by a "radio cut" cut into by Hercules and Tokio. This attempted transmission had been thoroughly jammed by a jet station.

— page 77 —
1522 (L) surfaced.

Oct. 2nd & 3rd.

(I) Uneventful cruising.

Oct. 4th.

0403 (X) Sighted several light on a dive.
0730 (X) Sighted two aircraft from Hickey.
0900 (X) Pilot came aboard.
0953 (X) Boored alongside USS H.R. in submarine nest at Hickey.
    Took 18,000 gallons of fuel oil aboard.
1400 (X) Departed Hickey under air escort.
1600 (X) Air escort deported. Steered courses periscoping to
    designated "treck" for Pearl Harbor.

Oct. 5th & 6th.

(V:) Uneventful cruising. Made trim dives.

Oct. 7th.

0605 (V:) Sighted patrol plane and exchanged identification signals.
0900 (V:)

Oct. 8th.

0640 (Vn) Aneazvoused with USS SNOW and USS CHI for entry in
    Pearl Harbor.
0650 (Vn) Sighted island of Oahu.
0700 (Vn) Sighted plane.
1020 (Vn) Boored to pier # at Pearl Harbor.

- 24 -

— page 83 —
30 -

Subject: U.S.S. HARDY (SS-257) - Report of Second Torpedo Attack

| Attack # | 1    | 2    | 3    |
||------|------|------|
| *Truck angle | 116(2) | 125(2) | 135(2) |
| *Gyro angle | 3.2° | 3.0° | 3.0° |
| *Depth Set | 10   | 10   | 10   |
| *Power | H    | H    | H    |
| *Hit or Miss | 1.1ss | 1.1ss | 1.1ss |
| *Arctic (Yes or no) | No | No | No |
| *Mark Torpedo | 1a-3a | 1a-3a | 1a-3a |
| *Soviet No. | 38134 | 39156 | 39191 |
| *Mark Explosive | 16 | 15 | 15 |
| *Soviet No. | 3734 | 1943 | 2105 |
| *Explosive | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx |
| Firing Interval | 20 | 15 | 15 |
| Type Spread | One degree Divergent | | |
| So Conditions | Choppy | | |
| Overall Activity | S/M E-8o, P.H., T.P. | | |
| Remarks: | Nite, sunroof, yawning torpedo zigged over at instant of firing. Range about 1700 | | |

— page 85 —
7
*Track angle 87(2)
*Gyre angle 52
*Depth 12
*Power 11
*Fitt or miss 1
*Erratic (Yes or no) 14-3m
*Gerk Torpedo 39430
*Griel No. 6-1a 17570
*Grotation Set 00mctct
*Grotation Set 1
*Grotation

— page 87 —
7 8
Tubos Fired 140(2) 145(2)
*Truck angle 180 170
*Gyro angle 10 10
*Depth Set 11 11
*Power 1185 1185
*Hit or Miss 14-3- 14-3-
*Grit Torpedo 24515 24170
*Gear No. 6-1- 6-1-
*Gear Exploder 3411 11052
*Gear No. 16 16
*Actuation Act 1811 1869
*Actuation Actual 10 10
*Gear "r.

— page 88 —
1223 (DOT)
Time: 0223 (Z)
Date: Sept. 15th. (Z)
Lat. 34-05N
Long. 139-15E

Description:
Target was a single Type minesweapon. Contact by sight through radioscope.
Ship Sunk: Destroyed by:
    None
    Torpedoes destroyed

— page 89 —
3
*Tr ok angle 180
*Gyro angle 0
*Depth 10
*Power 11
*Hit or liss 11ss
*Particle No 10
*Particle Torpedo 14-3-3
*Serial No. 39097
*Particle Exploder 6-1-1
*Serial No. 3210
*Action time 6

— page 90 —
1703 [LOT]
Time: 0703(Z) Date: 5oct. 19th.(Z) 33-30N Long. 135-40E

TARGET DATETIME: 1703 [LOT]
Target was a heavily loaded tanker in company with one cargo ship and escorted by an armed trawler. Contact by sight through portseago.

Ship Sunk:
- Onship sunk. Similar to an Eadro inr of 7300 tons.
- Ship Damaged: None
- Depth: 4750 NMI 208-J
- Depth: 2000 NMI 208-J
-

— page 91 —
1
Tubes Fired
*Truck angle
*Gyro angle
*Depth gating
*Power
*Hit or Miss
*Erotic (yes or no)
*Mark Torpedo
*Serial No.
*Mark Exploder
*Serial No.
*Rotation Set
*Rotation actual
*Mark 'ordered
*Serial No.
*Explosive
Firing Interval
Type Spread
Sea Conditions
Overhaul activity
RUMBS:
Range about 1400. Torpedo's sink twenty seconds.

- 38 -

— page 93 —
1
Tubos Fired
*Trck. Inle
*Gyr. Inle
*Depth Set
*Torver
*Sht. x Miss
*Sht. No
*Sht. Torpedo
*Sori. No.
*Sori. Xploder
*Sori. No.
*Actuation Set
*Actuation Actual
*Sori. Incl.
*Explosive
Firinc Interval
Tygo Spred
Ser. Conditions
Ovorhul Activity
R.A.S.: 2nds about 2000 yars.

: 2
130(2)
18R
10
H
Hiss
No
14-3-
39198
3-1-
17450
Contact
13
1351
Tx
17
Onc. Torpedo Divergent
Very choppy, white caps
3/ii E.so., 2.H., T.H.
-40-

— page 97 —
U.S.S. LASH (SS-257) - Report of Second "Jer Patrol.

ATTACH # 9

Tubes Fired 5 6
*Track angle 120(2) 125(2)
*Gyro angle 5% 4%
*Depth set 8 8
*Power 1 1
*Eit or Miss .lies .lies?
*Tortai No 10 10
*Mark Torpedo 14-3- 14-3-
*Serial No. 39153 24837
*Actuation Set Cont ct Cont ct
*Actuation Actuall Dua?
*Mark Torpedo 15 16
*Serial No. 1894 2127
*Explosive Tpx Tpx
Firing Interv l 9
Type Spred Two deeps Divergent
So. Conditions Slit Whitcops
Overnail activity 3/12, 2c5, 1-1, T.
Rifle: Morning, poriscope, sunsered. 1

— page 98 —
1800 (LOT)
Time: 0700 (Z)
Date: Oct.
TARGET DATE: 20 JULY 1944

Sunk: Destroyed
Vono: One armed trawler.

Damaged Determined by:
Observer: [Name]
pariscoq and binoculars.

Details of action:
Two armed trawler silhouettes in evening twilight at range of ten miles. Glossed targets slowly in order to draw their fire and determine their arrival gun range. At 7000 yards both enemy ships opened fire and the silhouettes fell short by 3000 yards. Enemy turned to silhouette target at 10 miles. Dulled at this range for 4000 and opened fire with 3 inch gun. Dulled at this range for twenty minutes, until enemy ships started to fire. Targets beyond opened range 500 yards and continued the fight. Targets pulled apart to divide our fire. Concentrated fire on the larger ship and observed several hits. It now threw burning barrels over the side forming an effective smoke screen behind which it retired. Shifted fire to other target and closed to 3000 yards tactics. Commented using radar ranges and closed to 3000 yards with both targets in retreat. At 3000 yards all ammunition for three inch gun was expended. Fired one 20 mm. at nearest trawler for good measure and broke off the action.

Not: Target was boil-vod port. The risk of close action. Considered this engagement as nothing more than a gunner's practice and rear-ordination for the crew, not utilized our advantage of greater gun range throughout the fight.

Warfare range was 4500 to 5000 yards. Effective loss of fire undetermined at this range.

"Applied many" spots" crossing and re-crossing the targets.

Gun performance was excellent. 140 rounds of high capacity shells, and 50 rounds of armor-piercing shells were fired.

1. 1. Seizure of 20th fired.

-45-

— page 99 —
35357 - Report of Second Per-2trol.

SULTRY OF RESULTS

2nd. attack. One cargo ship similar to:
* Flycat Icaru (page 142) 4046

5th. attack. One loaded tanker similar to:
* San Pedro Icaru (page 275) 7300

7th. 8th. attack. Two cargo ships similar in type to:
* Lyons Icaru (page 227) 14000
TOTAL 25346

TOSSING DESCRIPTIONS

One armed trewlar of about 200 tons by shell fire from three inch gun.

* Listed in ONI-208J

- 46 -

— page 105 —
1. The sound head was reported as insensitive on the last patrol and although checked carefully during refit, proved useless again this patrol.

2. The clutches on both tritons gears are very unsatisfactory. The gear box is silent mounted allowing it to move back and forth with changes in direction of train, while the collar it trims is rigidly supported. This causes the rubber cups to wear, lasting only 3 to 6 hours of continuous operation when making moderate speed through the water or at deep submargence.

3. The lower shaft of the 30-IX sound head was removed on the last refit with a mild steel shaft which should be replaced with stainless steel if the latter is now available.

4. Sound recognition varied from fair to excellent. Several times sound had difficulty picking up targets when executed on 3000 yards but on other occasions it varied exceptionally well: One was picked up at 8000 yards and tracked out to 10,000 yards. Propellers of a semis were picked up at 4000 yards. Radio ranging was picked up at 11,000 yards and the contact verified by radar.

(D) Density layers

1. Density layers were in evidence on almost all deep dives. Nearly all gradients were negative and were usually large. In one instance the temperature dropped 27 degrees from periscope depth to 350 feet.

2. When conditions permitted the density layers were checked by submargence to 250 feet soon after diving. The bathythermograph continues to be of great value, closely producing the necessary change in trim as depth is varied and pointing out the "layers" under which erosion tactics should be carried out. An additional bathythermograph should definitely be installed at the diving station.

- 52 -

— page 106 —
1. The health of the crew v.s. exsollant during the patrol, and, from a psychological point of view, the men are considered to have been the most and nervous str. in of severe and persistent anti-summer measures to reenforce the men's morale. The men are also of colds and complete absence of confidence. The men are also in the likelihood that the experimental "armie... I may" inst. lied on this ship is proving itself a most valuable piece of equipment.

2. The food v.s. exsollant and well prepared.

(2) Personnel

1. The Commanding Officer is proud of the crew's response to the many occasions when routine exsollant for the 1st patrol was not available. He is also proud of the men's ability to adapt to the various conditions of the high-seas order, and is grateful for the 1st patrol's success in evidencing the high standard of the ship's performance.

2. The splendid work of the Executive Officer, Lt. Comdr. J. H. L. Tucker, in coordinating all units of the first patrol party in the early stages of the raid is a prime example of efficiency of the Executive Officer. Tucker is a man of great ability and experience. He is a

— page 110 —
1955-121/A16-3
Serial 049
FIRST DEPOSITION
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Division ONE THIRTY ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
To: The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Second "ar Patrol - Comments on.

1. The second patrol of the U.S.S. HARDER lasted for a period of forty-five days, twenty-one of which were spent in enemy areas assigned. The expenditure of all torpedoes in a highly aggressive, close-in shoropatrol, was the reason for abandoning the area.

2. The patrol was characterized by intense enemy counter action as evidenced by the fact that the HARDER received an average of five depth charges or aircraft bombs per day for a grand total of one hundred and two. The Division Commander commented that the enemy had been able to maintain a high degree of surprise and tenacity in the area.

3. Twelve worthwhile contacts were made and nine aggressive attacks against strong persistent enemy counter action were possible and resulted in four sinkings. A total of twenty-four torpedoes were fired and four explosive hits obtained for a percentage of sixteen point six which is below average. However, if the six did not hit either son or hoard are included, the percentage of hits is above average. Recent tests tend to prove that some of these duds could and would have been effective had the tracers been on more degrees of the ship's side of ninety. Training to do this more or less instinctively will be undertaken until such time as torpedo performance improves.

4. There is no question whatsoever as to the results attained as four ships definitely sunk is first to man performance in any league. More than the Division Commander desires to point out that such results will always go to the Commanding Officer who is aggressive, determined and goes in close as does the HARDER.

5. It is felt that the gun action with two armed trawlers which occurred on September 30th while enroute to Midway is to be commended even though these ships were only damaged. It is desired to point out however, that such engagements should only be undertaken when the submarine holds all the aces or as in this case outranges her opponent.

— page 111 —
35-12N/16-3
Serial 049

FIRST ENDORSEMENT:

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Second War Patrol - Comments on.

6. The following recommendations of the Commanding Officer are strongly concurred in.

(a) That whenever possible submarines proceed in pairs from Pearl to Midway and accomplish as much radar tracking drill as possible.

(b) That aircraft be employed more generally in simulating counter action against submarines during their training period.

(c) That war patrol reports again be distributed to each individual fleet submarine.

7. The material condition of the HARDER upon her return appears, in general, to be good. Refit should be accomplished in the normal time by the GIFFIN if inspection of the H.O.R. engines reveals that there are no indicated weaknesses. The health and morale of the crew was excellent as it usually is on a ship that produces the results that the HARDER does.

8. It is felt that the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the HARDER are to be congratulated on another very fine patrol and that they be credited with inflicting the following damage on the enemy.

SUNK

1 AK (HIJOSI HARU type) - 4,046 tons
1 AO (SAK FEDEO HARU type) - 7,300 tons
1 AK (LIONS HARU type) - 7,000 tons
1 AK (LUCIA HARU type) - 7,000 tons
25,346 tons

DAMAGED

1 Armed tractor - 200 tons

R. H. FRAGHER

— page 112 —
1/2/16-3/FB5-121
Serial 077
CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS HARDER Report of
Second War Patrol.

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
U.S.S. HARDER (S257) - Report of Second War Patrol.

1. The second war patrol of the HARDER was conducted in a most aggressive and determined manner and the results attained are considered excellent.

2. The recommendations made by the Commanding Officer in subject report and commented on by Commander Submarine Division One Twenty One in paragraph 6 of first endorsement are concurred in.

3. The Squadron Commander takes great pleasure in congratulating the Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew of the HARDER for having conducted such an excellent war patrol and concurs with the Division Commander's remarks on the summation of damage.

J. B. GRIGGS.

— page 113 —
1-10/416-3(8)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET 1d
Serial 01471
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
HARDER Report of Second
War Patrol.
CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 282
U.S.S. HARDER - SECOND WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Second War Patrol.
(24 August to 7 October 1943).
1. The HARDER's second war patrol was conducted in areas south of the Empire.
2. Showing the same aggressive spirit as in the first patrol, the HARDER kept close to the coast line and, in spite of extremely severe anti-submarine activity, succeeded in pressing home successful attack.
3. Although the HARDER was successful in sinking four enemy ships, more would probably have been sunk if torpedo performance had been better.
4. It is noted that the enemy has established an extremely active and efficient air and surface anti-submarine campaign in these Empire areas. Night enemy air patrols were maintained. On one occasion the HARDER was kept submerged 58 out of 66 hours by anti-submarine activity.
5. The HARDER's gun battle with the armed trawlers was well planned and conducted. Taking advantage of armament and speed, the HARDER kept advantage of range to inflict damage on the larger of the two armed trawlers.
6. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia award.
7. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this second aggressive and successful war patrol. The HARDER is credited with inflicting the following damage to the enemy:
SUNK
1 - Froighter (HIYOSI MARU class) - 4,046 tons
1 - Tanker (SAN PEDRO MARU class) - 7,269 tons
1 - Froighter (LYONS MARU class) - 7,018 tons
1 - Froighter (LYONS MARU class) - 7,018 tons
TOTAL: 25,351 tons
Finished-Ragan-Pils

— page 114 —
1- Trawler
- 200 tons *

* By gunfire

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
Intel. Cen. Pac.
Ocean Areas (1)
Conservpac
(Adv.Base Plan.Unit (1)
Cinclan (2)
ConsubSalnt (8)
S/M Seh.Cl, NL (2)
Consopra (2)
Cons.1/2spac (1)
Consubwospac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Consubspac (18)
SURAT, MI (2)
ConsubspSubordcom (2)
All Subordcon and Div.
Comacers, Subpac (2)
U.S.S. HONOR (1)
(Per.Report only)
All Channel, Subpac (1).

J. A. WOODRUFF, Jr.
Flag Secretary.

— page 115 —
35257/AL6-3.
DECLASSIFIED:

From: The Commander Officer, U.S.S. HARDER.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

V1a: (1) Commander Submarine Division ONE TWENTY C.N.E.
(2) Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
(3) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (35257) - Report of War Patrol number THREE.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure: (A), covering the 3rd. war patrol of the vessel conducted in the general area northeast of GUAM, SAIPAN, and the northernmost islands of the MARIANA Group, during the period 30 October 1943 to 1 December 1943, is forwarded herewith.

S. D. PEALEY.

[Handwritten annotation: "S. D. PEALEY"]

[Handwritten annotation: "32153"]

— page 116 —
30th. Oct. 1300 (VW)
DEPT. 30th. Oct. 1300 (VW)
U.S.S. HARPER (SS3257) - Report of Third War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE
Arrived at Pearl Harbor on October 1oth, 1943, from the second war patrol. Commenced refit from tender (U.S.S. GRIFFIN). Accomplished the felling repairs and alterations, with ship's force and refit crew of the tender assisting on all work:

Drydocked, cleaned and painted bottom. Removed, repaired, and reinstalled QC-JK sound head. Replaced #2 periscope. Altered lookout platforms on bridge and removed railings. Installed high power range unit for SJ radar. Overhauled all sea valves. Shifted bathymetrograph from Conning Tower to Control Room. Installed additional depth gauge at diving station. Installed gyro spindle retraction switches on all torpedo tubes. Overhauled firing valves, poppet valves, and stop bolts on torpedo tubes. Overhauled 3#.50 cal. 20mm mount. Replaced damaged fwd bearing to eliminate noisy operation or to steer stern plane shafting. Renewed gaskets on W.T. doors and hatches as necessary. Renewed inspection plates on main induction line. Readjusted faulty operating mechanism on #2 main vent. Overhauled trim manifold. Blanked off Conning Tower flood valve. Renewed blower idler gear and main idler gear on #1 main engine and all blower driver gears on all main engine. Repaired leak in #2 distiller. Reduced spherical nut clearances in main engines #1 and #2. Installed brush stops on important auxiliary meters. Removed 200# sea chest and fuel tank blow connections. Welded main engine high circulating water suction closed. Welded doubler plates under reduction gear sumps. Held four day training period.

(B) NARRATIVE
Oct. 30th. 1300 (VW)
DEPT. 30th. 1600 (VW)
U.S.S. HARPER (SS3257) - Report of Third War Patrol.

1600 (VW)
2030 (VW)
DEPT. 30th. 1600 (VW)
U.S.S. HARPER (SS3257) - Report of Third War Patrol.

(1)

— page 117 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS2657) - Report of Third War Patrol.
2. Oct. 3lst. Nov. 2nd. Enroute Midway held daily dives, fire control drills and ship drills. Conducted intership "coordinated attack" drills and search problems as directed by Task Group Commander. Other subs in, company permitted concentration on radar tracking problems and provided the necessary targets for training new radar operators. This training enroute to war zone is invaluable.
3. Nov. 3rd. Sighted aircraft escort and exchanged recognition signals.
4. Nov. 5th. Held fire control drills and made section dives as time permitted.
5. Nov. 6th. Sighted and exchanged identification signals with Army member.
6. Nov. 7th. On base course 260 making good 16k knot speed of advance. Held independent ship operations concentration of section dives, fire control and ship drills.
7. Nov. 9th. Lookout and Quartermaster sighted plane on 8th quarter. Drove to 130 feet and sent aircraft contact report to other subs as we submerged.
8. Nov. 10th. Sighted U.S.S. PARGO on 8th, beam.
9. Nov. 11th.

— page 118 —
1800 (L) Formed column with other sub, SN00K load
HARDER tripling on course 260, twenty mile interval between ships, for night's run across the WAKEMARCUS line.

Nov. 10th.
0400 (L) SJ radar contacted U.S.S. PARGO she'd at range of 17,000 yds. This is the best performance yet of the radar on submarine targets. The maximum range heretofore obtained on other subws was 14,000 yds. Credit for this improved performance should be given to Lt(Jg) LEVIN, the radar officer, to Chief Rodoman HATFIELD, and Radar Technician BERG for their continuous efforts to improve their equipment.

0630 (L) Made trim dive. RADAR was flying time every MARUUS ISLAND is about one hour's flying time every during today's run. Expect JAP aviators will have their reception committee on hand.

Nov. 11th.
(L)
0100 (L) Full moon now and excellent night visibility. Altocred base course and increased speed to 15 knots as directed by Task Group Commander. MARUUS ISLAND now 110 miles away, due North. Low-hanging clouds and brilliant glare of sunlight make possibility of JAP aircraft a real hazard. SJ radar still in intermittent operation. Increased speed to 17 knots.

2224 (L)
Nov. 12th.
0015 (L) Heavy vibration in #4 main engine. Engine secured and torch found to have broken off blower idler gear and blower drive gear and worked down through the gear train. This engine now considered available for use only in case of extreme emergency. Arrived at designated station, slowed to 10 knots and commenced surface patrol as per doctrine. Ship sighted through high periscope; distant about 10 miles, bearing North. Sent contact report and 5 seconds later received PARGO's contact report. Maneuvered on the surface to gain station ahead. Divd and commenced approach. First ship now identified as a small patrol vessel and two more ships (one a cargo vessel; the other an armed trawler) sighted about 2 miles beyond the first contact. Shifted targets and started approach on the cargo ship. The loading patrol craft proved to have high nuisance value. It was found necessary to work around him during the approach to prevent him from sighting our periscope. The trawler escort mentioned station on the port quarter of the cargo ship.

— page 119 —
1622 (L)  Fire 3 torpedoes from the bow tubes with 2 degree divergent spread and 8 foot depth setting. Range 750 yards, track angle 80, and gyro near zero. Twenty-seven seconds after the first shot #1 torpedo struck the target just aft of the stack and a few seconds later #2 was seen to hit just fwd. of the stack. The destructive effect of these 2 hits was the most instantaneous and complete yet witnessed on three war patrols. The target broke in the middle, stern port went down, tail high, in less than 10 seconds, and the remainder of the ship seemed to disintegrate. Large and small parts of it were hurled high into the air. The escort now headed for the HARDER. Ordered right full rudder to get off torpedo tracks, ahead full speed, and deep submergence as we rigged for depth charge and silent running. As we passed 100 feet two depth charges exploded rather close aboard. Increased depth to 250 - 300 feet. Another heavy, but more distant, explosion was now heard. Returned to periscope depth and found a surprising picture there. The trawler escort was dead in the water, listed 20 degrees to starboard, and had his stern blown completely off. He was settling from the stern. His crew's nest was dangling from the forecastle by a single cable, and his top sides presented a mass of wreckage and twisted metal. He was being circled by the other patrol craft. What happened is only a 'questionable' of events. He might have been struck by #3 torpedo, in case it had made a circular run, but a more likely guess is that one of his own depth charges exploded in the racks. No sign of life was in evidence. Considered putting a boarding party aboard to obtain any papers or equipment of interest might be found, but concluded against this in view of the nearness to the JAP air base on NAUG ISLAND, (80 miles away), choppy seas, and the presence of the other JAP patrol ship which had probably already taken off any survivors of the wreck. Took pictures through the periscope and waited for the approaching night before surfacing to finish him off. Made battle surface from floating wreck. Sprayed his torpedoes with 20mm shells and fired 10 rounds of 3 inch at him. Choppy sea and darkness caused some misses even at this close range. Closed to 100 yards, again raked target from bow to stern with 20mm, and "holed" him near waterline with 11 more rounds of the 3 inch shells. Target burst into flames which lasted about half a minute and then started settling down by the bow.

— page 120 —
1920 (L) 1945 (L) 2132 (L) 2150 (L) Nov. 13th. 0400 (L) 0630 (L) 0725 (L) 0912 (L) 1002 (L) Nov. 14th. 0430 (L) 0702 (L) Nov. 15th. 0045 (L) 0803 (L) 0815 (L) 1309 (L)

U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Third War Patrol.

(He had been down by the stern when gun action started.) Target considered to be a total loss, was filling with water rapidly and expected to sink of its own accord. In any event it was not worth a torpedo. During the gun action, our SJ radar was kept on the nearby patrol vessel which stayed beyond the respectful range of 4200 yards and showed no inclination to be drawn into the show. Withdrew from the scene of wreck and set course to rejoin other subs of the pack. Cargo vessel was similar in type to the MACASSAR MARU shown on page 130 C.N.I. 208-J - tonnage 4000. The trawler of about 900 tons is claimed as sunk, with an unintentional "assist" by the enemy. Sighted end exchanged identification signals with U.S.S. PARGO. Informed Task Group Commander of results of day's work and of our engine situation. Set course 180, proceeding independently to designated rendezvous. SJ radar made contact on volcanic island "PAJAROS" (1000 feet high), northernmost of the MARIANA CHAIN, at 40,500 yards. Island in sight ten minutes later on the bridge.

ASUNCION ISLAND picked up by SJ radar at 80,000 yards! This checked with chart position. Changed speed to 15 knots. Sighted U.S.S. SNOCK bearing 217; distant about 8 miles. SNOCK reported aircraft contact. Dived to 80 feet. Surfaced on course 180 and resumed speed of 15 knots. Shifted position 10 miles to westward of the SNOCK.

Arrived at designated rendezvous and commenced surface patrol on alternate 60 and 240 courses at 10 knots, covering the bottleneck of traffic lanes between ROTA and SAIPAN. Sighted PARGO and readjusted position on the patrol's line.

Continued surface patrolling. Changed base course to 327 degrees. Made trim dive. Surfaced. Made sight contact on PARGO.

— page 121 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Third War Patrol.
2. Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Third War Patrol.
3. Nov. 16th. (L) Conducting surface patrol on course 327 degrees; speed - 10 knots.
4. 0446 (L) Changed base course to 007 degrees.
5. Nov. 17th. (L) Arrived at designated position on scouting line.
6. 0400 (L) Commenced patrol as per doctrine.
7. 1020 (L) Received aircraft contact report from SNOOK.
8. 1058 (L) Surface and resumed patrol.
9. 1120 (L) High lookout sighted patrol plane dead ahead.
10. 1235 (L) Sent aircraft contact report and dived.
11. 1252 (L) Surface.
12. 1335 (L) Received another aircraft contact from PARGO.
13. 1426 (L) Remained on surface.
14. 2000 (L) Aircraft contact from SNOOK. Remained on surface.
15. 1118 (L) Another aircraft contact from SNOOK. Remained on surface.
16. 1500 (L) Changed base course to 210 degrees as directed by Task Group Commander: - Proceeding to next designated position on scouting line.
17. Nov. 18th. (L) Sighted small patrol vessel to northward at range of 7000 yards. He was too small for torpedoes and we did not vent to disclose our presence with gun fire. Neda an "end run" around him, undiscovered; then returned to base course.
18. 1118 (L) Sighted PARGO bearing 030; range 6 miles.
19. 1500 (L) Received aircraft contact report from SNOOK.
20. 1525 (L) Sighted aircraft 8 miles away. Neda quick dive to 100 feet.
21. 1635 (L) Surface and resumed patrol.
22. 1647 (L) Changed base course to 060.
23. Nov. 19th. (L) Radar contact on three large ships at 27,000 yards, bearing 044. - (The finest performance yet obtained by our radar.)
24. 0200 (L) Sent contact report, giving range and true bearing. SNOOK receipted. No answer from PARGO. Repeated contact report two minutes later; no response from PARGO.
25. 0210 (L) Radio heard SNOOK calling PARGO, but no reply.
26. 0224 (L)

— page 122 —
0225 (L)
: 0264 (L)

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Third War Patrol.

Called PARGO, "URGENT", - no reply.
Sent "target course" on radio to other subs.
SNOOK receipted; - no answer from PARGO. At this point the JAPS "jammed" any further attempt to communicate with the other subs by holding down their key on our frequency, and since we were closing the convoy during the above listed radio transmission. The picture now developed to be justified.
Three large ships (AKs or APs) with three escorts were zigging on base course 320 at speed of 10 knots. -HARDER, on port quarter of the convoy, making 17 knots, and adjusting course to run around left flank of convoy (keeping outside a 15,000 yard range) to gain position ahead for attack. SNOOK, forty or more miles away, was believed to be making an approach from the convoy's starboard flank, and the position and actions of PARGO unknown. At ranges less than 20,000 yards three large targets, smoking intermittently, were clearly visible from the bridge. One escort was patrolling from 5000 to 2000 yards ahead of the formation and two escorts were guarding the port and starboard quarters respectively. Formation was zigging 30 degrees, right and left of base course, on 10 minute legs. A "FPI" at this stage would have been worth its weight in gold.
Gained position 15,000 yards ahead of our convoy, dived, and commenced the approach at radar depth (35 feet). Leading escort appeared to have become suspicious. He had been 5000 yards, ahead of the convoy, but at range of 6000 yards, he dropped back to a position only 2000 yards in the van. Sound conditions were good. Escorts propellers were heard at 6000 yards, and he stopped, then went ahead at regular intervals, as if listening. At 5000 yards leading escort commenced echo-ranging. Headed the sub almost directly at him in order to reduce effective target. From 2000 yards to 500 yards, the escort's "pinging" bounced off our hull, and the sound man reported that we had been picked up. Submarine attack phase had now begun and this was no place for a change of mind. With TDC showing a range of 2500 yards on the largest target, a quick look through periscope showed escort, - (a destroyer) to be passing about 400 yards off our starboard beam. Swing hard left at 2/3 speed and hoped (but did not expect) to send torpedoes on their way before the depth charging began. This maneuver put us dead ahead of the center AK (angle on the bow zero) and in perfect position for bow shots on the starboard flank AK.

— page 124 —
1430 (L) Sent a new contact report to PARGO giving bearing- and range to damaged ship. PARGO acknowledged. SHOCK not heard.
1431 (L) Slighted aircraft and made quick dive. Closed range on damaged ship at 2/3 speed.
1700 (L) Tops of ships in sight.
1805 (L) Surfaced. Two AKs in sight and one or two destroyers. The third AK was not there and is believed to have sunk. One of the AK's appeared to be under tow. Increasing darkness (with no moon until 2300) enabled us to close range on the convoy. Tracked it at range from 24,000 to 15,000 and radar dis- closed the following: One large target being towed by a small ter- get (speed from 0 to 5 knots). Another large target nearby, and - another small target circling the towed craft at 2000 yards range. The 3rd, destroyer was not in the immediate vicinity, but was believed not far away still looking for us. The formation continued to zig zag on base course 320. At range of 24,000 yards, (we were now ahead of the convoy) the radar lost all targets but one of the larger ones which headed for us at an increased speed of 10 knots. Assumed that the towing des- troyer was having trouble with his cripple and that the uninjured AK was being sent on alone. Tracked this target from ahead, found speed to be 10 knots and base course 330. Dived and made radar approach. This was an un- hurried, elementary approach in every sense. The target's course and speed were known and sub was maneuvered for a zero gyro, bow tube shot, with a 90 degree starboard track, at range of 1000 yards. Fired 4 torpedoes with 1 degree of divergent spread. Depth setting 12 feet. All torpedoes ran under the target and exploded at end of their run. Surfaced and commenced another end run to get ahead of target. He was wary by this time; he entered base course 70 degrees to the left, made radical zigs, and increased speed to 11 knots.

Nov. 20th. 0024 (L) Div'd 12,000 yards ahead of target, made radar approach at 40 feet until atrange of 6000 yards; then a regular periscope approach in the moon- light. This time set torpedo depth at 8 feet! Fired 3 torpedoes from the bow tubes. Gyros at zero 1 degree divergent spread, range 1000, track - 40 port. TWO hits! One amidship, and

— page 127 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Third War Patrol.

Nov. 23rd.
1510 (L)
Sighted aircraft.
Dived.
Surfaced.

Nov. 24th.
1137 (X)
Sighted aircraft.
Dived.
Surfaced.

Nov. 25th.
Uneventful.

Nov. 26th.
2400 (X)
Crossed international date line and added one day to the. calendar.

Nov. 26th.
1300 (V-W)
Converted #3 and 5 reserve fuel tanks to ballast tanks.

Nov. 27th, 28th, 29th.
(V-W)
Uneventful.
Made trim dives and continued training.

Nov. 30th.
0527 (V-W)
Sighted lookout of aero beacon on Oahu.
0568 (V-W)
Contacted escort by radar at 9000 yards range.
0620 (V-W)
Sighted escort and exchanged identification signals.
0700 (V-W)
Sighted aircraft.
1030 (V-W)
Arrived Pearl Harbor.

— page 128 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Third War Patrol.

Subject: Weather

The weather enroute station, and most of the time on station, was perfect for surface patrolling—Flat seas, excellent visibility and few clouds in the sky. During the evening of the 21st. of November, the wind increased in strength and strong seas from the S.E. commenced building up. Enroute Pearl Harbor strong head winds and seas from the East were hucked most of the time.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

(As listed in the standard publication)

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

After departing from our advanced base, no navigational landmorks were sighted, but islands in the northern part of the MARIANNA CHAIN were picked up by S.J. radar at ranges of 20 to 40 miles.

— page 130 —
4
Tubes Fired -
Track Angle -
Gyro Angle -
Depth Set -
Power -
Hit or Miss -
Erratic (4Yes or No)
Mark Torpedo -
Serial No. -
Mark Exploder -
Serial No. -
Actuation Set -
Actuation Actual -
Mark Warhead -
Serial No. -
Explosive -
Firing Interval -
Type Spread -
Sea Conditions -
Overhaul Activity -

: 5
80 P
80 P
5 L
5 L
H
H
H
No
14-3A
14-3A
23790
23790
6-1A
6-1A
7326
7326
16
16
11546
11546
10
10
TX-2

— page 133 —
4-3
Tubes Fired - 90 S
Track Angle - 5° R
Gyro Angle - 12°
Depth Set - H
Power - Miss
Hit or Miss - No
Erratic (Yes or No) - 14-3A
Merk Torpedo - 39712
Serial No. - 6-1A
Merk Exploder - 7435
Serial No. - 16
Actuation Set - Contact
Actuation Actual - 16
Mark Warhead - 11439
Serial No. - Torpex
Explosive - 0
Firing Interval - 2° Divergent
Type Scored - Choppy
Sea Conditions - U.S.S. GRIPPIN
Crew Activity - U.S.S. GRIPPIN

(18)

— page 134 —
1. Tubes Fired - #_1  #_2  #_3
   - Tubes Fired - 40 P 40 P 40 P
   - Tubes Fired - 14° R 11° R 8° R
   - Tubes Fired - 6' 6' 6' 6'
   - Tubes Fired - H H H H
   - Tubes Fired - Miss H1t H1t No
   - Tubes Fired - Erratic (Yes or No) - No 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
   - Tubes Fired - Serial No. - 39591 42094 39720
   - Tubes Fired - Mark Exploder - 6-1A 6-1A 6-1A
   - Tubes Fired - Serial No. - 7311 6540 7438
   - Tubes Fired - Actuation Set - Contact Contact Contact
   - Tubes Fired - Actuation Actual - Contact Contact
   - Tubes Fired - Mark Warhead - 16 16 16
   - Tubes Fired - Serial No. - 9905 2948 9128
   - Tubes Fired - Explosive - TPX-2 TPX-2 TPX-2
   - Tubes Fired - Firing Interval - C 27 13
   - Tubes Fired - Type Spread - 1° Divergent
   - Tubes Fired - See Conditions - Choppy
   - Tubes Fired - Overhaul Activity - U.S.S. GRIFFIN

(19)

— page 135 —
7
Tubes Fired - 90 S 20 F 20 F 20 F
Track Angle - 15° R 15° L 25° R 15° L
Gyro Angle - 10° 8' 8' 8'
Depth Set - H H H
Power - Mises Mises Mises
Hit or Miss - Yes Yes Yes
Erratic (Yes or No) - 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Mark Torpedo - 25053 39731 23931 39605
Serial No. - 6-1A 6-1A 6-1A 6-1A
Mark Exploder - 7430 12096 7328 12143
Actuation Set - Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual - 16 16 16 16
Mark Warhead - 2325 2576 5646 2593
Serial No. - Torpex Torpex Torpex Torpex
Explosive - -
Firing Interval - -
Type Spread - Aimed Shots
Sea Conditions - Choppy
Overhaul Activity - U.S.S. GRIFFIN

(20)

— page 136 —
(TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM)

U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 3

Time 1620 Date 11-11-43 Lat. 21-10 N Long. 144-50 E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Similar to the MACASSAR MARU shown on page 130 of O.N.I. 2AB-I, escorted by a 200 ton armed trawler.

Ships Sunk: Two.

Damage Determined by: Observation through periscope.

Target Draft 10 Course 160 Speed 7 Range 600 at firing.

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 2 Course 260 Depth 63° Angle 1°D, at firing.

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Day, periscope, submerged, two hits, one miss.
The trawler blew his own tail off by a faulty depth charge. He was "finished off" by gunfire.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 Time 0537 Date 11-19-43 Lat. 22-27N
Long. 147-15 E

Description: APs or AK similar to KOGYO MARU and YAMAZATO MARU listed on page 73 and 75, O.N.I. 2OB-J.

Ship Sunk: One.
Ship Damaged: One.

Damage Determined by: Observation through periscope and "timed" hit.

Target Draft 9 Course 320 Speed 10 Range 600, 2700 at firing.

OWN SHIP DATA

40
Speed 2 Course 160 Depth 64° Angle 1°D at firing.

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Night, periscope, submerged, two hits, one miss.

— page 137 —
3 PATROL NO. 3
Time 11-20-43 22-47 N. Long. 147-20 E
TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Similer to KOGYO MARU shown on page 75, A.N.I. 203-J.

Ship Damaged: One.

Damage Determined by: Observation through periscope.

Target Draft 2 Course 260 Speed 11 Range 1000 at firing.

GUN SHIP DATA

Speed 2 Course 40 Depth 60 Angle 0 at firing.

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Radar and periscope night attack in the moonlight.

(GUN ATTACK REPORT FORM)

GUN ATTACK NO. 1 Time 1657 Date 11-11-43 Lat. 21-10N Long.144-50E
TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Sunk: One 800 ton armed trawler.

Damage determined by: Observation.

DETAILS OF ACTION

(360 rounds 20mm
Fired: (21-rounds 3"/50" HC set SQ

While depth charging us, the trawler blew his own tail off with a faulty depth charge. We surfaced and completed his destruction at point blank range with gunfire.

(22)

— page 140 —
1. C-00 1-55 1-55 2700: Hit on 5th'd. AK
2. 0-05 2-04 1-59 2700: Hit on 5th'd. AK
3. 0-11 1-56 1-56 850: Hit on center AK
4. 0-26 1-05 37-6 850: Hit on center AK
5. 0-36 1-11 35-6 850: Hit on center AK
6. 0-44 1-20 36-6 850: Hit on center AK
7. 3-10 1-36 1-36 2400: Hit on center AK
8. 3-38 1-36 1-36 2400: Hit on center AK
9. 3-45 5-26 1-38 2400: Hit on center AK
10. 4-02 5-36 1-34 2400: Hit on center AK

(24-A)

— page 146 —
4525 Kcs. was first from 1030 to 1700 GCT, but not dependable due to finding and JAPANESE jamming. Does not compare to 4115 Kcs. on primary which has less fading and has strong enough signal strength to be heard in spite of jamming.

9090 Kcs. although a fair signal strength from 0600 to 0900 and 1700 to 2000 GCT, it was jammed very successfully and was impossible to copy.

14,390 Kcs. was first from 0400 to 0800 and from 1900 to 2300 GCT.

It was frequently found necessary to copy Primary Fox during early evening to receive messages at first transmission although they could usually be copied on second or third repeat on the HAIKU.

It is recommended that 4525 transmission power be increased comparable to 4115 to overcome jamming and fading.

(M) RADAR

(1) S.J. RADAR

(a) Failure of S.J. motor generator. This necessitated use of I.C. power during last two weeks of patrol.

(b) Failure of S.J. antenna lobing motor. This occurred after last attack and after five hours continuous operation.

(c) Defective S.J. training motor. This was in present condition prior to this patrol.

(2) S.D. RADAR

(a) Failure of 9014 transmitting tubes after some 500 hours of operation.

Attention is invited to the excellent results obtained on the S.J. radar. Except for its excellent performance in picking up a convoy at 27,000 yards, three new cargo or transport ships would now be in JAPAN. As a result of the contact one of those ships is now on the bottom while the other two, shering 4 torpedo hits, are under tow and their eventual arrival at the EMPIRE is far from a certainty.

— page 147 —
1. SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
In the sound equipment, the selsyn system of the
hearing repeater circuit developed a ground which, though
near found, cleared itself. The circuit will be thoroughly
checked to prevent recurrence.

Sound conditions in general, were good, until
below the water layer found; then they were exceedingly
poor.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS
Use was made of the bethythermograph on all deep
dives with results as noted below.

No. 1 - November 9
Depth - 250 feet.
Gradient - negative at 190 feet.
Sound conditions - none noted.

No. 2 - November 12
Depth - 300 feet.
Gradient - negative at 210 feet.
Sound conditions - none noted.

No. 3 - November 19
Depth - 390 feet.
Gradient - negative at 210 feet.
10° temperature drop from 210 feet
to 350 feet.
Sound conditions - excellent for evasive maneuvers.
Own ship's screws were barely audible below 210 feet,
whereas above the layer all sounds were clearly
audible. Enemy pinning was successfully avoided.

No. 4 - November 20
Depth - 200 feet.
Gradient - isothermal to 200 feet.
Sound conditions - none noted.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY
Health of the entire ship's company was excellent.

The food was good, the diet was varied as much as
possible, and well balanced.

Living conditions aboard were good, and the day and
night "surface patrol" (something new for this ship) afforded
a change from past war patrols that made the time pass quickly.

(30)

— page 148 —
1. PERSONNEL
The personnel of the "U.S.S. HARDER" (SS257) - Report of Third War Patrol.

They grew restless when targets are hard to find, are eager for each attack to be pushed home, and would not be satisfied with less aggressive patrols.

Around a nucleus of excellent petty officers the new men each patrol have gradually been absorbed into the ship's organization, but the loss of 16 men at the end of each patrol is keenly felt. -It is believed that in its present form the policy of transferring these men to the "relief crew" should be re-examined with a view toward ultimate reduction of transfers. If continued in its present system it would mean that, after 5 patrols, there would be a complete "turn-over" of personnel on each ship. This is faster than new men can be trained in the higher ratings and unless the demands of new construction require, the operating ships should not be weakened to the danger point in order to build up "relief crews".

It is further recommended that personnel officers of "relief crews" be more strict in their requirements for advancement in rating. Although this ship has made every effort to promote the training of men and to advance them just as rapidly as they proved themselves competent, men have been heard to remark that they would like to get on a relief crew "where they can make a rate easy". If this attitude is allowed to grow, the incentive to go to sea is lowered.

Under actual combat the officers and crew of the ship performed their duties in a manner that left nothing to be desired. Their eagerness to seek out and destroy enemy ships is indicative of a spirit that will not be denied and each individual aboard can be pardonably proud of his personal share in the successes attained.

— page 149 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Third War Patrol.

(R) Miles Steamed - Fuel Used
---
Enroute Area (30 October to 12 November):
Pearl Harbor to Midway
MILES 1255
FUEL 16,390
Midway to Area
2120
16,060
In Area (12 Nov. to 20 Nov.)
On surface
1671
24,670
Submerged
48
Area to Pearl Harbor
3000
42,000
TOTAL --- 8074
99,120

(S) DURATION
---
Days enroute area
13
Days in area
8
Days enroute Base
10
TOTAL --- 31

(T) FLIGHTS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
---
Torpedoes
Fuel
Provisions
Personnel
10,000
40 days
40 days
LIMITING FACTOR THIS PATROL
Especialize of all torpedoes.

- 32 -

— page 150 —
1. A positive means of communication seems to be the primary need for submarines operating in packs. Two-way communication was usually satisfactory but at the one crucial moment, when large convoy had been sighted, one of the subs could not be "raised".

Another point which calls for improvement is the uncertainty of post-tion of one sub on a scouting line relative to the others. Even under the most perfect navigational conditions it is easy for ships to be slightly out of position. Sometimes these discrepancies cancel each other, but they are often additive. Under present conditions the only way to remedy this defect is to lessen the distance between subs though it reduces the coverage of the scouting line.

A greater vocabulary of signals between subs is desirable.

(2) Erratic runs of four torpedoes on the last attack caused 4 misses. One more hit would have completed the destruction of a valuable ship. Whether these erratic runs were caused by faulty torpedo performance or by faulty gyro-regulator will be thoroughly investigated during the coming refit.

All warheads of torpedoes used on this patrol were supposedly "Torpex" and yet, although attacks were made at close range, all officers and men noticed that these explosions seemed to lack the tremendous "wallop" so characteristic of Torpex detonations. This may be explained by the fact that all the convoy reports were new ships with many watertight bulkheads and built to absorb unearnater explosions. On the last attack the old firehater received 2 hits and practically disintegrated, whereas 2 of the new ships in the convoy took a great number of hits, at least temporarily, remained afloat.

Armed trawler previously encountered by this ship are believed to have been old, wooden type hulls; not so the trawler escort sunk on the first attack. It was new, and absorbed a terrific pile of the first attack. It was new

— page 152 —
35-12N/AL-3/Serial 064
Care of Fleet lost Office, San Francisco, California, 4 December 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
FIRST ATTEMPT to
U.S. Admiral - report
of Third air patrol.

Tro.: The Commander Submarine Division CG 1st PTY U.S. Navy.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron 1st.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: T.S. 1st ADM (L-257) - report of third air patrol

1. The third patrol patrol of the U.S. submarine was carried out with the customary, regular, and efficient disposal of the patrol cover. The third day's and the fourth to a close by the second patrol of all torpedoes.

2. Only three distinct attacks were made against the submarine and these consisted of (1) an air escorted by a cruiser and patrol boat (2) a single patrol boat and (3) a patrol boat escorted by three destroyers. The first and third contacts. Out of 20 coast torpedoes fired, eleven were hits resulting in an excellent percentage of fifty-five.

Attack No. 1.
This was a last I AD escorted by a cruiser and patrol boat. Despite these escorts, the submarine gained a fine attack position with a 750 yard range, 80° track and 00° range. While resulted in two out of three hits that sent the target to the bottom almost instantly. The trawler torpedo proceeded to destroy the submarine and destroyer, but injured only the latter and had no damage to the submarine. The patrol vessel prudently withdrew out of range.

Attack No. 2.
It would be easy to overlook in describing this attack against a U.S. or a U.S. as it was beautifully conceived and brilliantly executed. The submarine was very strong protection in the way of 3 D's. The submarine had cleared from the first phase of this attack, eleven torpedoes had been fired for five hits in a 1 mile range and 2 miles in the second. The submarine was badly crippled and in the way of a D. Very severe depth charging followed (04 charges) out but the submarine was eventually able to surface, and an enemy submarine and attacked the last. Four torpedoes were fired, but unfortunately they were set too deep and ran under. Another and around was made and three more torpedoes fired for two good hits. Up to this

— page 153 —
1st ADMIRAL DIVISION, USS T. H. T. ATLANTIC
FBS-121/A16-3/ serial 064
Care of Fleet lost Office, San Francisco, California, 4 December 1943.

FIRST ADMIRALITY TO:
U.S.S. ARADEA - report of Third. air patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. ARADEA (53257) - report of Third. air Patrol.

point the torpedo performance had been excellent, but in firing the remaining four fish in an attempt to finish off his victims the commanding officer had to watch all run erratic. This was a bitter disappointment, but the vessel was badly crippled and in the high seas that sprang up shortly thereafter it is doubted if either this target or the one under tow of a DD over reasoned port.

3. The excellent performance of this radar personnel equipment is noted with pleasure. The health and morale of the officers and men was, of course, excellent. The material condition of the boat was good except for the mud engines one of which was down before the area was reached. It is, however, will be corrected by complete re-equipment. Prior to the next patrol.

4. It is felt that the Commander, Officer, Officers and men of the patrol are to be congratulated on the third consecutive outstanding aggressive patrol, and that they are credited with having inflicted the following damage on the enemy:

| DAMAGE | TONS |
||------|
| 1 Travers | 800 tons |
| 1 AK Lascaser | 4,000 tons |
| 1 AK Lascazato | 6,925 tons |
| Total | 11,725 tons |

DAAGED

| DAMAGE | TONS |
||------|
| 1 AK ittati | 6,550 tons |
| 1 AK ittati | 6,550 tons |
| Total | 13,100 tons |

R.M. FADDER.

— page 154 —
FC5-12/A16-3/FB5-121
Serial 0119
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
4 December 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
U.S.S. HADDER Report of
Third War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HADDER (SS257) - Report of Third War Patrol.

1. The third war patrol of the HADDER, under the command of the same captain, was another outstanding achievement in submarine warfare.

2. This patrol was conducted in a most aggressive and determined manner, and, like the HADDER's first and second, was successful despite the enemy's severe counter attack.

3. The remarks and summation of damage made by the Commander Submarine Division ONE TWENTY ONE are concurred in, and, further, it is difficult to believe that the two AK's, which were severely damaged, but not claimed as sunk, would have ever reached port.

4. It is indeed a pleasure for the Squadron Commander to congratulate the Captain, his officers, and crew for having inflicted this great amount of damage to the enemy.

J. B. GRIGGS.

— page 156 —
1-10/16-3(8)/(15) SUBMARINE FORMAT F.C.I.C. LIST
Serial 01817
Confidential
Third Amendment to
Third War Patrol
CO. SUBF.C. F.TROL REPORT NO. 317
U.S.S. HADER - THIRD WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. HADER (SS257) - Report of Third War Patrol.
(30 October to 1 December 1943).

S. L. K
1 - Freelancer (U.S.S.R. U.S. Navy)
2 - Corpo-Fusscener vessel (U.S.S.R. U.S. Navy)
3 - Corpo-Fusscener vessel (U.S.S.R. U.S. Navy)
4 - Corpo-Fusscener vessel (U.S.S.R. U.S. Navy)
5 - Armed Trawler
6 - 4,000 tons
7 - 6,000 tons
8 - 5,500 tons
9 - 5,500 tons
10 - 1,000 tons
TCT.1: 24,125 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
Intel. Gen. Fcc. (1)
Ocean areas (1)
Comsewypea (1)
(,dvr.Base Plan.Unit (1)
Cinclent (1)
Comsubsplint (1)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comscope (2)
Comsowespace (1)
Comsubsowespace (2)
CTF 72 (1)
CTF 16 (1)
Comsubspace (20)
SUB.D, MI (2)
ComsubspaceSuborder (3)
.11 Squadron and Div.
Commenders, Subspace (2)
Comsubstrimpac (2)
.11 Submarines, Subspace (1).

J. A. WOODRUFF, Jr.
Flag Secretary.

— page 157 —
35257/A16
WPR-4

U.S.S. HARDER (SS257)
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

3 May 1944.

G-O
DECLASSIFIED
026736

From : Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HARDER.
To : Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Via : Commander Task Group 71.3.
Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.
Commander Seventh Fleet.

Subject : War Patrol Report - forwarded of.

Enclosure: (A) U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

S.D. DEALEY.

DECLASSIFIED - DOD DTR 5200.9
6/27 Sep 53
BY: [Signature]
DATE: [Date]

79927

— page 159 —
1915 (VW) Deployed Pearl Harbor for Johnson Island in company with USS SEAHORSE and escorted by PC-581. (Riding the Pacific merry-go-round again!).

1600 (VW) Made trim dive.

1915 (VW) Dismissed escort and proceeded at three-engine speed with USS SEAHORSE 5 miles on port beam. Conducted radar tracking drills throughout the night.

March 17th (VW) Continued radar tracking with SEAHORSE. This is the 2nd time we have had the opportunity to proceed in company with another submarine. - The training thus provided for our new radar operators and almost continuous drilling of our two separate Fire control "tracking teams" was invaluable. It is again strongly recommended that submarines always be sent in pairs from Pearl Harbor to the first arriving base and from there to Pearl Harbor. Even if it becomes necessary to occasionally delay one sub's departure in order to carry out the above, the training facilities provided would more than compensate for the delay.

March 18th 1030 (X) Exchanged recognition signals with "air escort" from Johnson Island.

1130 (X) Sighted Johnson Island.

1250 (X) Moored alongside USS SEAHORSE at pier on Johnson Island.

Took 10,740 gallons of fuel oil, and 1000 gallons of fresh water.

Worked out a set of two-letter signals with C.O. USS SEAHORSE, anticipating the possibility that an opportunity for coordinated attack might present itself.

1634 (X) Departed Johnson Island in company with SEAHORSE under air escort.

1755 (X) Made trim dive, followed by "quick dive" as a demonstration for aviators.

1830 (X) "Air escort" departed.

Proceeded in accordance with Consubmarine Secret Operation Order 95-44, in company with USS SEAHORSE.

— page 160 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS-2527) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.

March 19th and 20th
(Y) Alternated with SEAHORSE in making approaches. (Each made 4 radar and periscope daytime approaches, and one nitetrader approach on the other ship). Conducted almost continuous daytime radar-tracking utilizing both 1st and 2nd Fire Control teams. When acting as target for SEAHORSE approaches, lowered the sound heads and exercised "sound party". Found that regular sweeps by 3J radar, when other sub was at periscope depth, located the target before it periscope sweeps by the lookouts. At one time radar contacted the SEAHORSE's periscopes at 6400 yards. The nine surface approaches were particularly desirable for training new lookouts. Conducted section dives and ship drills.

March 21st
0000 (YM) Crossed international date line. Dropped one day from the calendar.

March 22nd and 23d
(M) Drills, dives approches end radar tracking as on the 19th.

Held battle surface drills. Greased all topside grease fittings.

March 24th
(M) Passing 120 miles south of Weke Island during the morning. 3D radar secured.

0920 (M) (First aircraft contact) - Heard; then sighted one small airplane high overhead, range about 3 miles. Made quick dive, followed by the SEAHORSE.

1030 (M) Surfaced. (SEAHORSE had also just surfaced). Started SD radar with 5 second pulse.

1045 (M) (Second aircraft contact) - Both SD and 3J radars picked up three planes closing from 23 miles to 7 miles. Sent "aircraft contact" to SEAHORSE and both subs made simultaneous dive. Continued on base course at 120 feet. Contacted SEAHORSE by sound (range about 4000 yds) and advised we would remain submerged until 1230.

1230 (M) Both subs surfaced and made radicel change in base course.

After sundown, both subs made surface radar approaches on each other.

March 25th
(L) Dives, approaches end radar tracking with the SEAHORSE.

— page 161 —
1900 (L) Parted company with the SEAHORSE and proceeded independently to station. The mutual advantages which resulted from proceeding in company with another sub cannot be overestimated.

On both subs:
   - The fire control parties have had continuous and realistic drills. The radar plotting and tracking parties have had a real target to work with. The radar oper-tors have always had a target (day and night) to work on, and have developed a self-confidence and efficiency in their bearings and ranges. All looks have had the chance to see periscopes at various ranges and know what to look for. Look-outs have had the chance to study the appearance of another derelict ship at night, at different ranges, different angles on the bow, and under varying degrees of visibility.

Both subs had the advantage of the other's lockouts and radar oper-tors in detecting approach of planes.

Psychologically, the presence of another sub lessened the usual monotony of a normal cruise to station. - Many mentioned that it didn't seem as if the petrol had really started until the other sub took departure.

March 27th
1215 (L) (Third aircraft contact) - J.O.O.D. sighted Mitsubishi medium bomber on port beam dist:nt four miles. (Lat 13-4ON Long 150-48E) Made quick dive. (No bombs dropped).

1330 (L) Surfaced.

1625 (L) (Fourth aircraft contact) Sighted another medium bomber, five miles on port beam, some type as before. (Lat 13-25N Long 150-00E) Made quick dive. - No bombs were dropped.

1730 (L) Surfaced.

1930 (L) Converted #4 Hull Ballast Tank into main ballast tank. We have gone 200 miles since fuelling at Johnson Island and are on the edge of our operating area with over 90,000 gallons of fuel remaining. - The recent conversion of #4 Main Ballast for fuel has certainly simplified the problem that used to cause many a headache.

2000 (L) Made dive to flush remaining oil out of #4 Main Ballast.

2015 (L) Surfaced.

2400 (L) Entered prescribed operating area at its NE corner.

(4)

— page 162 —
0645 (L) Made trim dive.

0700 (L) Surfaced.

Heavy cloud banks and low ceiling dictated necessity of using SD radar intermittently.

1305 (L) (Fifth aircraft contact) SD radar picked up aircraft at 9 miles closing rapidly. (Lat 10-10N Long 147-20E). Made quick dive. No bombs. Ren submerged at 120 feet.

1400 (L) Surfaced.

March 29th
0715 (L) Periscope lookout sighted. Woleei Island, distant 15 miles.

0718 (L) BJ radar picked up Woleei Island at range of 26,900 yds.

0815 (L) (Sixth aircraft contact) - Lookout sighted plane which had just taken off from the island. Made quick dive to 30 feet. - Continued closing range on Woleei to reconnoiter.

0915 (L) At periscope depth (62 ft.) sighted Woleei at range of 15,000 yds.

0923 (L) (Seventh aircraft contact) - Periscope watch sighted land-based bomber over Woleei. Previous suspicion of a newly constructed air strip on the island is correct. During morning reconnoitered east coast of the atoll at range of 2 miles.

1400 (L) Closed to range of one mile off Raur and commenced periscope photography.

1430 (L) Rounded SE corner of Raur and commenced reconnoiter of southern approaches to the islands.

1435 (L) (Eighth aircraft contact) - Periscope watch observed land-plane medium bomber take off from Woleei Island. Landing strip now yet visible from south of island, distant 1 mile. (It must be on the lagoon side).

1445 (L) (Ninth aircraft contact) - Periscope watch observed land-plane, same type as previous on contacts, landing into the wind on course 200 on Woleei Island. At some time he sighted the air strip, with a bomber waiting to take off. The lagoon seemed to be clear of shipping.

— page 163 —
1 U.S.S. H.R.DER (SSE27) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

March 29th (cont.)-

1500 (L) (Tenth aircraft contact) - Through periscope, observed two "Betty type" Mitsubishi bombers apparently searching area around entrance of lagoon. Altitude of bombers about 1000 ft.

1630 (L) (Eleventh aircraft contact) - Closed to range of 1500 yds on Rear Island and observed a definite landing strip, running in generally north-south direction on Woleai Island proper. Three Betty-type bombers were on the runway and five more in the air at ranges of 2 to 5 miles. No shipping in the lagoon. Miscellaneous small construction jobs were in progress and several tents and small shacks were noted.

2020 (L) Surfaced.

March 30th
0730 (L) (Twelfth aircraft contact) - Lat 9N Long 144E. Lookout sighted unidentified aircraft at distance of 6 miles. made quick dive to avoid detection. Contact with plane was maintained intermittently by periscope watch. The plane seemed to be making large circles over the area. (General locale: 100 miles north of Woleai.)

1030 (L) Plane not sighted during the past hour. Surfaced and headed toward Woleai.

1130 (L) (Thirteenth aircraft contact) - Bridge lookout sighted single engine float type plane ("Pete") headed for us at range of about 3 miles. - SD radar had been in intermittent operation necessitated by heavy overcast and low cloud ceiling. Hade quick dive. No bombs were dropped.

1330 (L) Surfaced and made unsuccessful attempt to contact Comeubpec by radio.

1350 (L) Discontinued attempt to clear message, changed course 100 degrees and submerged.

2000 (L) Surprised

March 31st
0012 (L) Radar contact on Woleai Island at 28,700 yds.

0055 (L) SJ radar contact on aircraft byond Woleai at range of 30,000 yds.

0105 (L) Observed aircraft bombing of Woleai. Not countered with AA fire.

(6)

— page 164 —
112 (L) Observed aircraft bombing of Woleai. Met with fair; heavy fire from guns of about 20 Mh caliber.

0200 (L) Observed third bombing of Woleai, again met with AA fire. It is of interest to note that our 5J radar tracked the bombers (probably only two) on each run over the target. Maximum range on bombers was about 40,000 Yards.

0230 (L) Another bombing run over Woleai.

0400 (L) In position of Woleai. - (on the surface).

0500 (L) (Fourteenth aircraft multiple contacts) - Commencing at this time sighted at least four land based bombers (some of them held a dozen times) as they began search of our area. In the early dawn they often passed as close as 7000 yards without sighting us. Endeavored to reach a position about one mile south of lagoon entrance in order to catch an, shipping moving in or out of the harbor.

0820 (L) Two planes headed our way at range of about 6 miles. Made quick dive and continued to move in toward island at 2/3 speed.

0850 (L) (Fifteen aircraft contact) - Sighted single-engine float type plane.

0959 (L) While lowering periscope after an observation, an aircraft bomb landed close aboard. The bridge talk-back was knocked out of order, several light bulbs were shattered and the ship was well shaken up. No material damage or importance. Increased depth to 100 feet and made recid. changes in course. Ran at 80 feet during periscope of day, back and forth across the SE approaches to Woleai; - planning up or periscope depth every 15 minutes.

1400 (L) (15 feet from aircraft contact) - Periscope watch sighted 1st day. Tower 2 miles away.

1545 (L) Climbed on within one-half mile of lagoon entrance. As practically sighted, two more medium bombers were on the runway and another was taking off. Looks as if last night's marassing rail served only to stir them up.

— page 165 —
1600 (L) (Seventeenth aircraft contact) - Observed float type sea plane, one mile away and headed for periscope. Went deep and made radical change in course. No bombe.

1630 (L) Returned to periscope depth.

2012 (L) Surfaced.

April 1st
0013 (L) (Eighteenth aircraft contact) - SJ radar contacted plane at 9500 yds which moved in rapidly to 6000 yds. Made quick dive.

0158 (L) Surfaced and proceeded to assigned position.

0351 (L) (Nineteenth aircraft contact) - SJ radar picked up plane at 19,000 yds. Plane moved in to 14,000; then opened out. HARDER remained on surface.

0825 (L) SJ radar picked up flight of planes at 36,000 yards.

0940 (L) Planes sighted, headed for Wolseil. Contacted aircraft by voice and learned of "downed pilot" drifting toward reefs off the second island west of Wolseil.

0840 (L) Made full speed on 4 engines. From here on, the picture in the skies looked like a gigantic "Cleveland Air Show". With dozens of fighter bombers and fighters coming in from the south, we watched a show of the Hollywood "Colossals" seem tame. We rounded the southeast coast of Wolseil one to two miles off the beach and had the perfect "ringside scene" set. The plastering that the airmen gave this Jap base was terrific! Bombs of all sizes rained on every structure on the island. Several buildings seemed to be lifted and thrown high in the air. Causeway between the various islands were bombed. Oil or gasoline storage tanks blew up covering the islands with heavy clouds of black smoke. The runway on the island was hit time and again with large and small bombs. It was hard to believe that any thing could be left on the islands after the first waves of planes had come over, and yet some bursts of AA fire continued to meet the planes on each attack. The bombers hit Wolseil from the south, waited for the smoke to clear, returned, and then gave it the works from east-west courses! Fighters seemed to hit the place from all directions, pealing off from high above and diving straight into the AA fire that still persisted. Many looked as if they would go right on thru the blanket of smoke and cr sh on the islands, but all managed to pull out just above the trees.

— page 166 —
11545(L) He was finally sighted on the NW tip of the 2nd island to the west of Woleai. Battle surface stations were manned, the ship floored down, and maneuvered into a spot about 1500 yards of the beach. White water was breaking over the shoals only 20 yds in front of the ship and the 15th-eter had ceased to record. Planes now advised us that it was a better approach might be made from another direction. Backed off to make approach from another angle. The aviator had been standing on the beach and was now observed to fall and lie there out of the beach. His collar appeared to be suddenly cut off. The man was not in a position to make a landing. The aviator was not in a position to make a landing. The

— page 167 —
1304 (L) With evator and rescue party recovered, the sub was backed clear of the reef and headed out to sea.

: 1630 (L) Made trim dive.

: 1551 (L) Surfscad.

: 1630 (L) (Nineteenth aircraft contact) - SD racar contact on plane at 9 miles. Plane closed to 6 miles. Made quick dive to 140 feet. No bombs cropped. Remained deep until 1500.

: 1900 (L) Conducted patrol at periscope depth.

— page 168 —
2030 (L) Surfaced.
2245 (L) Cleared HARDER'S Serial Number Two to Comsubpac. Altered course radically.
April 2nd
0100 (L) Weleai Island abeam to starboard; distant 10 miles.
0400 (L) On station conducting surface petrol.
Slicks overcast with low cloud ceiling, but area throughout the day had many local rain squalls. Utilized the squalls for convenient concealment, running from one to the other and remaining on the surface.
1650 (L) Cloud conditions and glaring sun now made surprise detection by alrorait very likely. Nede dive for trim end conducted remainder of day's patrol at periscope depth.
1955 (L) Surfaced and set course for area which would cut the traffic lanes between Truk and the Mariana Islands.
April 3rd
Petroling on surface.
1704 (L) Made trim dive.
1359 (L) Surfaced.
April 4th
Petroling on surface.
1541 (L) Made trim dive.
1113 (L) Surfaced.
1700 (L) Submerged to effect repairs to the I.C. circuit. - Patrole at periscope depth.
1915 (L) Surfaced.
April 5th
Petroling on surface across Guam-Truk traffic lanes.
1030 (L) Made trim dive. Went to 300 feet to check density layers.
1220 (L) Surfaced.

(11)

— page 169 —
1. SUBJECT -- I.U.S.S. HARDER (S9257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.
April 6th

Patrolling on surface, crossing and re-crossing the Rabaul-Salpan traffic lanes. This is our 8th day in assigned operating area and not a single ship has been sighted. Unless we are just having poor luck in running across Jap ships, it begins to appear that the recent "air strikes" in this vicinity have sweet it clean of enemy shipping; or else they are holding the traffic in distant ports until the situation becomes more favorable -- to them. It is very unlikely that we have been sighted and ships routed around us, for we have had no aircreft contacts since April 1st and have purposely conducted our patrol at least 200 miles from Woleei where our presence was known. At least 90% of our patrol so far has been made on the surface so "coverage" has been good.

1130 (L) Made trim Cive.

1245 (L) Surfaced.

April 7th

Patrolling on surface. Have shifted position since yesterday. Our courses now straddle the Saipan-Woleei traffic lanes.

0736 (L) (Trentiteh aircreft cont-ot) - Sighted medium bomber (land plane). Made quick Cive unobserved.

1050 (L) Surfaced.

1435 (L) (Trenti-ri

— page 170 —
1. U.S.S. Harder (SS257) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.
April 8th (cont.)-
0709 (L) Sighted Woleai Island.
Made quick dive and continued closing the range at periscope depth. Intend to pass down the eastern side of the Atoll and make submerged patrol throughout the day across the southern approaches to the lagoon.
Patrolled all afternoon on east and west courses, two miles south of the southern entrance to the lagoon. No air activity in evidence.
1630 (L) Went to 300 feet to check for density layers. - Isothermal all the way!
Continued patrol at periscope depth.
1923 (L) (Twenty-third aircraft contact) - Sighted seaplane headed our way at range of 2 miles. - Increased depth to 50 feet. No bombs.
1940 (L) Returned to periscope depth. Had hoses that seaplane might be running interference for surface shipping but none materialized.
2021 (L) Surfaced. Petrol leak southwestern approaches to Woleai during the night.
April 9th
1025 (L) (Twenty-fourth aircraft contact) - Sighted aircraft. Made quick dive unobserved.
1750 (L) (First surface ship contact) - Sighted small patrol craft on east-west courses guarding the southern approaches to Woleai lagoon. Patrol vessel was "ininging" constantly. Oceanic to seaward when range to patrol vessel decreased to 3500 yds. This put us about 4 miles south of Pelalle Island. The patrol craft was very difficult to see now in the evening twilight as it blended in with the small islands of the atoll.
(13)

— page 171 —
1830 (L) Sighted m sts of three small ships inshore of the patrol craft. One was "U.S.S. HARDER (SS252) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

: 1903 (L) Attempted an end run on two evacuee patrol craft and maneuvered for a good look into the lagoon. Was picked up by the patrol craft which now headed our way, alternately pinging and listening. Attempted to evade at perilous depth but was finally forced deep. Found a 2 degree negative gradient at 310 feet. R.n silently at 350 but the patrol vessel stayed with us until about 2130.

: 2200 (L) Surfaced. Full moon, "bright as day". Visibility excellent. Woleai plainly in sight ten miles away.

: April 10th
: 0015 (L) (Tenty-fifth aircraft contact) - Sighted aircraft 2 miles away. Wide quick dive unobserved.

: 0200 (L) Surfaced.

: 0205 (L) (Tenty-seventh aircraft contact) - SJ radar picked up two planes at ranges of 7 miles and 3 miles respectively. O.C.D. sighted medium bomber type (land plane) and made quick dive. (This is getting monotonous).

: 0710 (L) Heavy black funnel smoke slashed over the lagoon at Woleai.

: 0913 (L) Some flight of bombers now sighted through the perilous. All ere flying low, circling, and swerving a wide area across the southern approaches to Woleai. Seas were now thick, becoming more glassy as we moved in toward entrance, and had to fire torpedoes through the entrance at any ship found at anchor, but in view of smooth seas, heavy and persistent air coverage, and the alert patrol craft guarding the entrance, it was decided that the risk was not justified.

Decided to move to a spot several miles north of Woleai from which we could move to intercept as they headed north; Guem or Seiben bound. Such a position will also put us into a favorable spot to sight ships moving south and headed for Woleai. (14)

— page 172 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.
April 10th (cont.)-
1126 (L) Reached a position 2 miles north of Woleai atoll. Observed two small cargo vessels and one patrol craft at anchor in the lagoon. Patrols this area until after dark hoping to see an evening sortie but none occurred.
2017 (L) Surfaced and patrolled on the Guam-Woleai line while charging batteries. SJ radar temporarily out of commission.
April 11th-
0200 (L) SJ radar in commission again. 2. Oved south to get back in yesterday's submerged area from which the two ships in Woleai lagoon can be watched.
0750 (L) (Twenty-eighth aircraft contact) - Sighted two 1oat-type bi-planes at ranges of 6 and 3 miles. Made quick dive undetected and commenced periscope patrol at 65 feet.
0900 (L) (Twenty-ninth aircraft contact) - Sighted medium bomber (land type) distant 2 miles, circling and searching area.
1010 (L) Surfaced for a quick look around to increase radius of search.
1030 (L) (Thirtieth aircraft contact) - Bridge lookout sighted distant, until estimated plane. Made quick dive undetected.
1300 (L) (Thirty-first aircraft contact) - Sighted medium bomber (land plane) at range of 2 miles.
1830 (L) Surf. ce'd for another quick look. Sighted Woleai Island about 10 miles ahead.
1837 (L) Embarked and continued to close the range on Woleai.
1900 (L) Both or yesterday's A&s still at anchor in the lagoon.
2015 (L) Surf. ce'd and commenced patrol across the Guam-Woleai area.
2015 (L) Sighted Woleai, 10 miles to south'err.
2015 (L) Made quick dive.
2015 (L) (Thirty-second aircraft contact) - Sighted medium bomber (land plane) three miles away, circling in area.

(15)

— page 173 —
1350 (L) Sounded periscope, depth.

1350 (L) (Thirtieth aircraft contact) - Sighted medium bomber (land plane) in formation over Woleai.

1350 (L) Sighted one AK, hull down, and heard pinning of its escort. Angle on bow of AK was 90 port and ran 5 miles. Six low-flying medium bombers were making wide sweeps around the cargo ship. Headed for target (now on course north, separately bound for Guam) and trailed at 2/3 speed.

1350 (L) With Woleai 5 miles astern, surfaced in pursuit of target headed for Guam. Ran returning search curve at 17 knots but contact with target was not regained.

April 13th
1130 (L) Raid trim live.

1350 (L) Surfaced and set course for Woleai.

1435 (L) (Thirtieth aircraft contact) - 8J radar picked up aircraft contact bearing 283 relative, distant 10 miles.

1445 (L) Lookout on bridge at 1:30 am. Another plane bearing 20 relative; distant 4 miles. This time we were spotted by the aviator, as subsequent events soon showed. Made quick dive to 100 feet.

1515 (L) Returned to periscope, depth.

1510 (L) (Thirtieth aircraft contact) - Sighted medium bomber (land type) at range of 2 miles circling in the area.

1530 (L) Sound operator heard "pinching" stern.

1635 (L) Sighted masts of a destroyer, distant 6 miles, in nearly the exact spot where we had been forced down by the aircraft two hours earlier. It headed our way, then reversed course for 15 minutes, and then was observed to be circling in the area at speeds of 10 to 15 knots. The destroyer was searching by "dancing" constantly. Sounded battle stations and headed for the destroyer at 1/3 speed keeping the bow always pointed at the target. The Japs was now definitely identified as the destroyer INAZUYA or the FUJI class, HIBIKI Group (1850 tons) (ONI-14, peze 71 end ONI-41 page 59). (16)

— page 174 —
1357 (S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.
April 13th (cont.)-

Careful watch was kept for aircraft throughout the approach, but, fortunately for us, the planes had departed from the area. We remained at 1/3 speed during the entire approach for several reasons:
(1) It was believed that the enemy would quickly detect any speed changes since sound conditions were excellent.
(2) There was need to conserve the battery in case of a prolonged submergence.
(3) On-coming twilight with decreasing visibility worked in our favor.
(4) There was no hurry to speed the attack, for it was believed that the destroyer intended to search this area, indefinitely, knowing we would surface after dark for our battery charge.

1347 (L) With range at 5,000 yds, and closing; made ready four tubes forward and four aft. With range at 3200; the destroyer's echo-ranging received to be bouncing directly off the HARDER with annoying regularity. The angle on the bow changed quickly from 40 degrees to zero; then to 40 degrees.

1355 (L) Sound operator obtained "round" turn count of 135 to 140 RPM (14-15 knots). With range at 2600 yds, the destroyer's engine stopped at us, reducing the angle on the bow from 70 degrees to 25 degrees. The target is last zigging but him directly in the glare of a setting sun and necessitated use of a sun filter on the periscope from here on.

1359 (L) Range now 900 yards. Commenced firing. Expended four torpedoes and one Jap destroyer! The four bow shots were fired at mean range of 900 yards, with a 2 degree diverging spread, track angle 30 degrees. The gun was able to fire at 6 feet. Just before the first torpedo hit, the Japs must have sighted the target, for they could be seen running in all directions. Forty seconds after the first shot, the first torpedo was heard and observed to hit, - directly; the enemy was now in range of the torpedo. The torpedo had been fired at the enemy, and the torpedo was now in range of the enemy. The torpedo was now in range of

— page 176 —
1 U.S.S. HARDER (SS2557) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.

April 13th (cont.)-

About 2 minutes after being struck, the destroyer's bow dropped under, the tail came out, with both propellers fanning the air, and about 200 Jeeps started clambering aft. No boats could have been launched. The tail in the rose higher and higher, from 30 degrees to 60, then finally, as the angle got steeper, they began dropping into the water like so many ants. All officers in the conning tower and halr a dozen or the crew observed these last minutes or the enemy ship. It disappeared from view just 4 minutes after it was hit. Now the Japs can deaththeir planes began to explode and it is doubted if any of the crew survived after this. The "HARDER was constantly the rance at about 500 yds when the depth charges started going off, but the blast rockets were scattered light bulbs, and threw loose gear around. Most of the crew were convinced that we were being bombed by aircraft, but no planes were in sight. Increased deadlock, and the crew returned to periscope deaththeir planes had been released.

The attack occurred in the 10-13 N. Long 143-51 E. on a line between, and equidistant from, Guam and Woleal. The destroyer must have been in the near vicinity when called to the scene by the Jap aviators for it to reach our area just 2 hours after the planes had forced us down.

Cleared the area at 2/3 speed and veiled for darkness before coming up, - in case the destroyer had been able to get out of distress signal, which he very unlikely.

2025 (L) Surfaced. All clear.

April 14th
0050 (L) The diving alarm "grounded out" and as it sounded, the OOD made quick dive.

0110 (L) Surfaced.

0701 (L) Submerged 50 miles to the north east of Woleai; conducting periscope patrol.

1715 (L) Surfaced for sun line.

1725 (L) Submerged.

2000 (L) Surfaced.

2130 (L) Rode unsuccessful attempt to send HARDER's third Serial to Columbus.

(18)

— page 177 —
1. SUBJECT: U.S.S. HARDEN (38257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.
April 15th
0700 (L) Submerged, conducting periscope patrol along the Palau-Woleai shipping lane.

1030 (L) Surfaced for sun line.

1036 (L) Submerged.

2008 (L) Surfaced nine miles south of Woleai. One engine now out of commission. (See defects).

April 16th
0842 (L) Submerged.

0925 (L) Sighted merchant vessel which had apparently come out of the lee. It looked as if our long, end often impatient waiting, for this fellow was about to be rewarded. - Range about 5000 yds. with angle on the bow of 35 degrees.

0926 (L) Sighted FUBUKI Class destroyer leading the merchantmen, and about 3000 yds. on his starboard bow. Angle on bow of the destroyer 50 degrees port. Sighted another FUBUKI class destroyer on the port quarter of the merchantmen. Angle on the bow of this dest.over was zero and it was moving up fest. - Speed 2 to 30 knots. Changes of getting this one looked good, but 2 minutes later the destroyer came on the AK and the destroyer was close to the cargo vessel and overhurling it.

0926 (L) (Thirty-seventh aircraft contact) Sighted land-based medium bomber flying low and circling the enemy formation.

0947 (L) Nearest range attained on an of the ships was 4000 yds. Angle on the bow at the time 90 port. The first that neither of the destroyers was echo ringing during the sortie indicated that both were "listening" and precluded the use of high speed on our attack. Air cover range over the targets and a smooth sea also ensured against use of high speed.

Mace careful observation of all ships and positive identification of them. Both DDs were distinctly of the FUBUKI Class and the AK was similar in appearance to the ELHUKU MARU shown on page 134 of 203-J (revised).

This picture stimulated the imagination. Here was a lightly loaded merchantman, heavily escorted by two large destroyers and provided with air coverage which was to remain until sunset! What made her valuable enough to justify such heavy protection? Or, are the Japs just getting very, very short of cargo carriers? At an rate, (19)

— page 178 —
1228 (L) Smoke of the target was just barely visible through the periscope, and Wolest atoll could no longer be seen astern. Surfaces with 2 engines on propulsion and one on a battery charge, (our 4th engine was out of commission) and continued our pursuit of the smoke.

1305 (L) (Thirtieth aircraft contact) - Lookout sighted plane. Made quick dive to 100 feet.

1319 (L) Surfaced and continued the chase.

1435 (L) (Thirty-ninth aircraft contact) - Lookout sighted aircraft directly over: the target whose mass were now in sight. Dived to avoid detection. Target not changed base course to 300 (headed for Yap).

1500 (L) Surfaced. - Smoke f target no longer in sight.

1530 (L) Sighted smoke. Target had apparently changed base course to 330. Destination either Guam or the Emirate waters.

1700 (L) (Fortieth aircraft contact) - Sighted plane circling back our way. Made quick dive to 100 feet.

1800 (L) Surfaced and sighted smoke of target. I never thought the time would come when e could be on the surface in bright daylight chasing two Jap destroyers with air coverage, but there we were.

1911 (L) (Forty-first aircraft contact) - Sighted plane 4 miles away broad on our starboard bow. Made quick dive to periscope depth and beat aircraft in sight. It answered that the plane had been dismissed by the convoy en route. Heckin' back for Wolest to make a ladin' before dark. The plane passed 2 miles away down our starboard side.

1930 (L) Surfaced and continued pursuit.

(20)

— page 179 —
2020 (L) Kerchantman contacted by radar at range of 23,000 yers. The night was not dark enough to attempt a surf. The patrol was a particularly difficult one. The target was a destroyer, probably were equipped with radar; and there was insufficient visibility for a periscope attack before moonrise. Moonrise was about 0200. The enemy's port flank, track from the air, was running out of fuel, and attack from the port bow at periscope depth with the trawls. The trawls were estimated at the range of 15,000 yers.

2100 (L) Settled down to a long night of it. Stationed "2nd teem" of fire control party, and had "1st team" turn in for some sleep before the attack.

2300 (L) Targets were now abeam to starboard at range of 15,000 yers. No evidence of enemy radar and nothing to indicate that they suspected our presence.

April 17th
0100 (L) In position ahead of the targets at range of 15,000 yers. Base course 335.

0130 (L) Waked "first team" of fire control party. Targets had a range of 15,000 yers. Set battle stations.

0200 (L) Targets changed base course to 325.

0229 (L) Observed moonrise. - About one-quarter moon and evening. Visibility now sufficient for a combined periscope-radar attack but many local rain squalls were to be seen.

0251 (L) Reversed course and moved in for the attack.

0301 (L) Radar range now 11,000 yers. On the AK.

The starboard flank destroyer appeared to be shore on the bow of the AK and about 1000 yers. The port flank destroyer had dropped back on the AK and (as seen in the FPI scope) nearly merged with the AK. It was very hard to maintain contact with the 2 destroyers at radar depth.

In the light of what happened, it is believed that the escorts were carrying out the following procedure: Both were on parallel courses with the AK and about 500 yers. of its track. One would pull ahead at 15 knots while the other slowed to 5 knots "listening" as it dropped back on the AK. Then the astern DD would pull ahead at 15 knots while the other DD slowed to 5 knots as it

— page 181 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.

April 17th (Cont.)-

Neither during the 19 hour chase, nor throughout the depth charging, did the destroyer resort to echo ranging. While depth charging, he normally ran at speeds of 15 to 17 knots, stopped occasionally to listen, and then came in fast before dropping the charges. Our evasion tactics consisted of running slowly and silently and maneuvering to keep the attacker astern. Our sound watch maintained contact with the attacking destroyer continuously and the slow speed (slap-slap) propellers of the cargo vessel were heard throughout the depth charge attack, but [BORROWED: the other destroyer were never heard after it had been hit. Only one destroyer took part in the depth charging. That leaves a good hope that the other destroyer may have gone down, but no definite claim of such is made, ...]

0620 (L) Returned to periscope depth.

The cargo vessel was in plain sight about 3 miles away, listing heavily to port and inclined 20 degrees down at the bow. It could be seen clearly in the early light of dawn and was a mass of flames from bow to stern. Peculiar enough, very little smoke accompanied the fire. The flames were such that can be seen when opening a furnace door. - Intensely white and brilliant. The insides of the ship must have been long since gutted by the fire but the ship burned on for another 2 hours as we withdrew at periscope depth and let members of the crew witness the sight. Any more torpedoes fired at that ship would have been wasted.

0703 (L) One heavy explosion heard. The other ships were in sight.

0930 (L) Another explosion heard; rather close. This was believed to be an aircraft bomb. Burning ship still in sight. Increased depth to 30 feet.

1100 (L) Surfaced. - No ship in sight. Reversed course and returned to scene of attack. Searched area until 1315. Found no survivors, no debris and no ships. There is no doubt but that the cargo vessel had gone down; - a good possibility that one of the destroyers had proceeded it.

Pursuit of the convoy had taken us into another sub's hunting ground. The attack occurred in Lst 9-22 N. Long 142-15 E.

— page 182 —
2nd Attack
17 April

Sound contact
Turn count
70 RPM

Sound contact
Turn count
70 RPM

Rainbow
Squadron

Rising Moon
- 11

— page 183 —
1315 (L) Set course for Woleai.

The importance of our newly installed "plotting table" and the roomy convenience of our recently lengthened conning tower were perfectly demonstrated during this attack and throughout the long chase. A perfect navigational track of the pursuit was there showing every course of the target, his zig-zag plan, his several base courses, and a record of his speed. The "hand in glove" coordination between the plotter and TDC operator was excellent. They predicted the exact time of the target's next zigs during the attack.

April 18th
0310 (L) Radar contact on Woleai at range of 21,000 yards.

0706 (L) Submerged. Conducting patrol at periscope depth.

1230 (L) (Forty-second aircraft contact) - Sighted 2 low-flying lent base medium bombers circling in area. Sighted heavy white smoke over Woleai.

1330 (L) (Forty-third aircraft contact) - Sighted 4 medium bombers circling in area. These were held in sight off and on during the entire afternoon.

1700 (L) (Forty-fourth aircraft contact) - Sighted V-formation of 6 "Zeros" approaching Woleai. Three bombers also in the air.

2015 (L) Surfaced.

April 19th

Patroling across the northwest approaches to Woleai.

0719 (L) Submerged eight miles west of Woleai.

0920 (L) (Forty-fifth aircraft contact) - Medium bomber.

0345 (L) Sighted formation to 12 "Zero" fighters over Woleai. (Forty-sixth aircraft contact). Something is up! Air activity over this area has greatly intensified since yesterday. There must be at least 12 bombers now based in the island along with the fighters intercepted. Are the Jeep's excecit.g another air strike? A more likely conjecture is the Woleai is being used as a "f-ader base" for plane reinforcements from the Empire to the New Guinea area. (24)

— page 184 —
1310 (L) Patroling 4 miles to west of Woleai. Distant aircraft bombing plainly heard. Raised periscope and sighted heavy clouds of brown smoke and dust drifting over the airstrip at Woleai. - One minute later observed a pattern of 5 or 8 bombs land in the water just about 3 mile to the west of the target (air strip). Concluded that this is army "high altitude" bombing by planes from the Southwest Pacific. Skies clear, ceiling unlimited and no planes could be sighted. Why were we not notified of this strike? Made careful check of all messages and find that we have all consecutive Serials.

Closed range to 4,000 yds on Woleai to observe damage inflicted on the island. Two clouds of heavy black smoke were observed; one directly on or near the air strip; the other on an adjacent island. Took periscope pictures of the "fire on Woleai. The aviators apparently "hit the jackpot" with their first pattern. - From the heavy black smoke and persistence of the fire, it is believed that one or the fuel storage tanks had been hit.

1700 (L) Observed one bomber taxiing along runway and another being pushed out the runway by ground crew. (Forty-seventh aircraft contact).

2010 (L) Surfaced 3 miles north of Woleai. The fire was still blazing. Moved out to range of 20,000 yards and the fire was still visible. It burned until midnight.

Cruised on east-west c urves 10 miles north of Woleai on "special mission". The night was pitch black with rain, rain squalls. No moon until 0530; then very little.

2355 (L) (Forty eighth aircraft contact) - 3J radar contact on a plane which hovered in our area at ranges varying from 5,000 to 4,000 yards. It was believed that he was on our team but when range closed to 2,500 yards we were no longer curious. Make quick dive and stayed down one hour.

April 20th
0100 (L) Surfaced.

0255 (L) Unidentified plane dropped two yellow flares over Woleai.

After yesterday's bombing and the night fires, the Japs probably had a well developed case of "war nerves". It was decided that the HARDER should contribute its share to Woleai's pre-invasion jitters by a down surface bombardment.

(25)

— page 185 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.
Abril 20th (cont.)-
0530 (L) Set battle surface stations.
0545 (L) A rain squall, made to order, concealed the ship as we moved. In on Woleai from the north, on the batteries on surface. The squall lifted as we reached a position 2000 yds from the air strip (radar range) and the island was silhouetted against the rising moon. (Morning twilight and good visibility). Ammunition on deck; gun crews standing by.
0627 (L) Commenced firing with the 4 inch 50 Cal. gun and four 20 MGs.
Expended 30 rounds of 4 inch and 1300 rounds of 20 MM. Periscope observers saw 4 shots land short but the rest looked to be "right on", blanketing the area on which the air strip is layed out.
0634 (L) Ceased firing and dove on course 330 to clear the island. No fire was returned and no planes attempted to leave the ground during the bombardment. It was all over before the Japs realized what was happening.
No actual material damage was observed and no fires were started. Hopes are entertained that some of the parked planes might have been streaked with a good enemy weapon, but we'll never know. How-ever, from a psychological viewpoint, Tojo's boys must have waked with a good enemy headaches.
0845 (L) (Forty-ninth aircraft contact) - Sighted 2 medium bombers circling over area.
"Special missions" had been completed. Fuel remaining dictated a departure from station. Heeded to westward.
1200 (L) Heavy smoke again sighted over Woleai as on previous day. Somebody hit the island again! The place seems to be get-ting worked over with the same regularity as the "noon time tick".
1300 (L) More bombing heard and more smoke sighted over Woleai. Surfaced while the Japs' attention was so thoroughly di-vered and withdrew to the northwest.
1330 (L) While attempting to clear a jammed 20 Mw, Edward Lee STUBSTILL, GMC, USN, had the ends of two fingers of his right hand amputated just short of the first joint. - The patient was ably and efficiently treated by Angelo LOCASCIO, PMI, USNR. (26)

— page 187 —
2300 (L) With difficulty, end considerable "jamming", cleared HARDER'S Third Serial to Comeubpac via Midway.

April 20th (cont.)-
2300 (L) (Fifty-fifth aircraft contact) - Lookout sighted 2 unidentified planes, at maximum visibility. Kept them in sight.

0925 (L) Made dive for trim and to avoid detection.

1016 (L) Surfaced.

1030 (L) (Fifty-first aircraft contact) - Lookout sighted medium bomber, (land based) on starboard beam on parallel and opposite course, distant 10 miles. Turned tail toward plane, kept him in sight with binoculars, and remained on surface.

1045 (L) Plane faded out of sight.

1300 (L) (Fifty-second)aircraft contact) - Lookout sighted Jap flying boat distant about 6 miles. Made quick dive to 120 feet.

1303 (L) Aircraft bomb exploded! - Not close.

1445 (L) Surfaced.

3.1515 (L) 3R radar contact on plane in cloud at 7,000 yards. Not verified. Made quick dive to 100-feet.

1550 (L) Surfaced.

April 22nd (Fifty-third aircraft contact) - Lookout sighted lend-based medium bomber at maximum visibility. Submerged to 80 feet.

1100 (K) (Fifty-fourth aircraft contact) - Sighted flying boat, distant 12 miles.

1300 (K) Surfaced.

1430 (K) (Fifty-fifth aircraft contact) - Sighted unidentified plane; distant 12 miles. Submerged.

1945 (K) Surfaced.

(27)

— page 188 —
1. SUBJECT _ _ : U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.

April 23d
0500 (K) SJ radar picked up interference from a similar type radar dead ahead at estimated range of 30-40 miles. Altered course 30 degrees to the left.

0620 (K) Sighted U.S. submarine broad on starboard bow at range of 10,000 yds.

0630 (K) Exchanged information and good wishes with USS BLACKFISH.

0730 (K) (Fifty sixth aircraft contact) - OOD sighted formation of 8 bombers dead ahead at range of 5 miles, headed our way. Made quick dive to 100 feet. - No bombs.

1000 (K) Surfaced.

April 24th
0500 (K) SJ picked up strong interference of the kind normally caused by operation of a similar type radar. This is believed to have been the PARGO.

1315 (K) Lat 3-37 N. Long. 128-38 E. Stopped alongside an over-turned life-boat and tried unsuccessfully to right some in order to search for any marks or articles of identification. Pulled clear, then rammed the boat at 15 knots speed. - The bow cut through it like a meat cleaver, but no life rings or articles of identification floated to the surface. - The boat was new, of the type used by transports or merchantmen, about 20 feet long, and had not been in the water many days. - 'Looks as if our subs have been busy in this area.

1730 (K) Made trim dive.

1945 (K) Surfaced.

April 25th
On southerly course in Molukka Straits with Halmahara Island to port; the Celebes to starboard.

1045 (I) Submerged and passed underneath the equator. Held appropriate ceremony, presided over by King Neptune, for 70 Polywogs.

1140 (I) Surfaced.

1830 (I) Entered Ceram Sea.

— page 189 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

April 26th

0500 (I) Ceram Island and Boeroe Island in plain sight. Set course to pass through Manila atrast.

0645 (I) Submerged on course 150 patrolling the strait which guards the northern approaches to Ambon.

1900 (I) Completed passage of Manila Strait and surfaced in the Banda Sea.

2300 (I) Sent HARDER'S Serial #1 to Combatador 71 (on course 250) Changed course to 130 after transmission.

April 27th

In Banda Sea headed for Ombal Strait.

1330 (I) Sighted Wetar Island distant 40 miles.

1400 (I) (Fifty-seventh aircraft contact) - Lookout sighted two-engined bomber, distant 8 miles, headed our way. Made quick dive to 130 feet.

1500 (I) Surfaced.

1500 (I) Dived 10 miles west of island of Wetar to insure our start through Ombal Strait would be undetected.

1900 (I) Surfaced with islands of Wetar, Alor and Timor in sight.

April 28th

Proceeding on surface on south westerly course through Ombal Strait.

April 29th

Proceeding on surface through Indian Ocean enroute to Fremantle.

1700 (I) Made trim dive.

1730 (I) Surfaced.

— page 190 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.
   - April 8th
   - 0724 (H) Made trim dive.
   - 0805 (H) Surfaced.
   - 0821 (H) Made training dive.
   - 0933 (H) Surfaced.
   - 1125 (H) Made training dive.
   - 1247 (H) Surfaced.

May 1st
On surface enroute Fremantle. Held drills and training exercises and education of personnel for qualification in submarines.

May 2nd
0348 (H) Radar interference berring 100FT.
Cont'mue training and education of personnel.

2315 (H) Reder contact bearing 0600T., range 20,000 yards.

May 3rd
0502 (H) Reder contact bearing 1000T., range 21,000.
0508 (H) Sighted loom of Rottnest Light berring 1300T.
0600 (H) Sighted air escort.
0645 (H) Sighted motor launch escort.
0768 (H) Exchanged signals with escort and proceeded in company with same.

0930 (H) Slowed to pick up Division Engineer and Pilot, and proceeded to conduct degaussing and sound test in Cockburn Sound.

1320 (H) Moorac alongside USS CRION in Fremantle, W. Australia.

— page 191 —
1. USS HARDER (SS457) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.

(C) WEATHER
The weather was most agreeable for submarine cruising with the exception of a persistence of an overcast of strato-cumulus and cumulus clouds which provide effective ambush for alert aviators. The seas were consistently choppy.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
There is a definite and continuous 3/4 knot set to the westward which was observed at all positions in the areas within 50 miles of Woleai.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
No navigational aids were observed. The atoll of Woleai is considered to be charred with sufficient accuracy for safe piloting within 2000 yards of the beach while submerged.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS
- Time: Location: Initial: Est. Course: Low
- No.Date: Lat, Long: Types: Range: Speed: Contacted: Remarks
- 1:736: Off: Patrol: 6: East: West: 5: Sound: None
- 1:430: Off: 3: Small: 4: East: 5: Sound: None
- 2:4/9/44: Woleai: trawlers: Miles: 9 Knots: Periscope: None
- 1:300: Off: Small: 5: North: 5: Sound: None
- 3:4/12/44: Woleai: AK: Miles: 9: Knots: Periscope: None
- 1:635: North: 5: North: 5: Sound: None
- 4:4/13/44: Woleai: DD: Miles: Searching: Sound: None
- 1:0350: North: 5: Sound: None
- 5:4/16/44: Woleai: DD: Miles: Searching: Sound: None
- 1:0350: North

— page 197 —
1. U.S.S. HARBOR (38257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.
(H) ATTACK DATA

ATTACK #2

| Attack | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 |
||----|----|----|----|
| 10 P  | 110| 110| 110| 110|
| 6.5 L | 7 L| 8 L| 7.5 L| 6 L|
| 6'    | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' |

| Hit Set | H  | H  | H  | H  |
||----|----|----|----|
| Miss   | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  |
| Hit   | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  |
| Miss   | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  |
| Hit   | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  |

| Mark Torpedo | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
||-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 40746       | 26262 | 26463 | 25740 |       |

| Air Raid | 6-4  | 6-4  | 6-4  | 6-4  |
||-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 8600      | 413   | 8507  | 8680  |       |

| Encounter Set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |

— page 198 —
1 U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol

(H) ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. HARDER (SS257)    TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2    Patrol No. 4.

TIME: 0335    DATE: 17 April 1944    Lat 9-22 N.  Long 142-18 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION: Single small AK. EIHUKU NARU type, 3560 tons, page 134 O.N.I. 108-J (revised), escorted by two new FUEUKI type DDs. Detected by periscope, leaving WoIeal Atoll. Tracked for 20 hours. Attacked in dim moonlight on squally night.

SHIP SUNK: One AK of the EIHUKU NARU type, 3560 tons, page 134, O.N.I. 108-J (revised).

SHIP(S) DAAGED OR PROBABLY SUNK: One FUSUKI type DD.

DAMAGE

DETERMINED BY: On the AK - Observed one torpedo hit on the AK. Six hours later came to periscope depth and observed the ship ablese a 200 list to port. Surfaced 2 hours under, and a 200 list to port. Surfaced 2 hours had gone down.

On the Destroyer - Observed one hit on the destroyer. From then on, although we were nearby during the depth charging and plainly heard the slow speed "screws" of the AK and the fast "screws" of the other destroyer, the problems of the torpedo depth charging were never heard. On coming to periscope depth 6 hours later, the destroyer was not there and a subsequent 2 hr. search on the surface failed to reveal either the AK, which had definitely gone down, or the DD which may have sunk.

TARGET DRAFT 91 COURSE 325 SP#ED 11 Range 1800 yds(at firin)

ON SHIP DATA

SP#ED 3 COURSE 040 DET# 50° ANGLE 10° down (at firin).

FIRE CONTROL AD T RPEED DATA

Radar approach at-a-ward depth from 11,000 yds. and range to 4500 yds. Periscope attack from 4500 yds range to firing point. Fixed four torpedoes with 20 divergent spread from forward aft. #2 hit the AK and #4 passed aft of AK, hitting the DD. Torpedo set at 5 feet. (36a)

— page 199 —
1. SUBJECT _ _ i U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.
   (H) ATTACK DATA

RESUME OF PATROL

March 23th - Arrived on station.

April 1st - Recovered aviator.

April 13th - Bank FUBUKI DD. . . . . . . 1350 Tone

April 17th - Bank EIHUKU MARU. . . . . . 3560 Tone

Damaged and possibly
sank FUBUKI DD escorting
the AK

— page 200 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS267) - REPORT OF FOURTH MAF PATROL.

(I) DIES

No indications of mines or mine fields, or of enemy mine-laying activities were noted on this patrol.

(J) ANTI-SUB ARMED MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

Nothing new in the way of anti-submarine warfare was encountered during this patrol.

Patrol craft searched by echo ranging, - es did the destroyer which was sunk. However, the two destroyers guarding the single merchant vessel which was sunk on April 17th never used echo-ranging during a period of 20 hours which covered the pursuit and attack. Their escort and listening tactics are fully described in the narrative.

The arrival of a DD on the scene just 2 hours after we had been scouted by aircraft shows a good coordination of aircraft with surface ships in anti-submarine warfare, but the failure of the aircraft to remain with and assist the destroyer showed poor coordination.

The single ship convoy, though it had 2 destroyers escorting was also involved with air coverage which stayed with the convoy until dark.

The air-patrols over the Wole-I area was strong and consistent (except for the 5 day period following the smashing of their base) but were easily scouted permitting the sub to dive in plenty of time to avoid detection. - This is due to the fact that our lookouts used binoculars almost continually while the aviators probably trusted to their naked eye vision.

Note that a total of 112 planes were sighted. The sub was forced to dive 35 times to avoid detection but only on one of these occasions were we bombed.

While proceeding on the surface in daylight, the overall "trim" of the sub was kept 5000 pounds heavy to facilitate rapid submergence.

A new use was made of the 3D radar on this patrol. It was manned continuously during daylight and searched at a speed of about 3 FP for air craft. This means of searching for aircraft was sometimes in competition with the 3D radar and all we in competition with alert lookouts. The 3D made "f rest contact" total of 7 times at an average range of 10 miles.

— page 201 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS2527) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

Engineering:
A check or the bedplate holding down bolts soon after start of patrol disclosed one broken end on both #1 and #2 main engines. A letter check near the end of the patrol revealed one broken bolt on #2 main engine. The study which we used at the after end of each engine, due to bedplate brace, were extremely difficult to remove and should be replaced by fitted bolts.

Number 4 main engine developed excessive vibration in #1 unit after 360 engine hours. Disassembling showed the two out-of-engine head holding down studs sheered flush with bottom of the head. The engine was out of commission ten hours.

The drive shaft of the attached tube oil pump of #3 main engine sheered off flush with the pump drive gear after 400 engine hours. The spare pump was installed after twelve hours, most of which was spent in devising a means of removing the broken engine. After only 39 engine hours, the spare pump sheared in a similar manner. Due to the lack of another spare pump or spare gears for the tube oil pump, it was necessary to grind off the broken engine of the driver gear and turn out a shrunk-fit drive shaft with a spline at one end for the driven gear, in rear view their position in the pump housing before the engine could be put back in commission for emergency use. The engine was out of commission 9 days while the new drive shaft for the pump was being machined.

Excessive leaks in the hydraulic steering system in the after torpedo room are going to necessitate removal of pump to locate and remedy leaks.

Replaced Hydraulic coumarator with 5/16" flax packing and #5190 oil as sealing medium in place of 1/4" cotton packing and #2190 oil used by Navy Yard.

Both high pressure air compressors have been noisy since leaving navy yard and after only 130 hours it became necessary to overhaul #2 to remedy the following:

(a) All the 3rd stage piston rings froze and had to be renewed.

(b) The locking pin securing 3rd stage piston to 1st and 2nd stage piston had not been properly installed which allowed the 3rd stage piston to become loose, thus permitting the piston to hit the 3rd stage head.

(c) Found considerable rust in all stages and discovered small pieces of steel embedded in 1st stage head.

(38)

— page 202 —
1 U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (cont-)

The ice cream maker leaks from to the extent it is impractical to use at present. All efforts to find and repair leaks, short of removing and disassembling entire installation, failed.

The sword-arm of the pit log was bent preventing proper pressure to the bellows and made it impossible to rig in. The water sword-arm was installed by removing part of the hoist, loose off necking gland, and forcing the bent sword-arm out to the then quickly closing the sea valve. This permitted new arm to be installed with little difficulty.

(38a)

— page 203 —
1. SUBJECT: _ _ I.U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report_of _Fourth War Patrol.
   (L) RADIO

(a) Transmissions

Transmission on 4235 Kcs was very satisfactory at night after 2200 local time. The only difficulty encountered was interference from other ships and stations on 4235 Kcs. Some jamming from enemy stations was encountered.

Two unsuccessful attempts were made to clear messages on 3470 Kcs. Once at 1000 local time, (12705 Kcs was also tried at this time without success) and once at 2130 local time. Each time we were on the air intermittently 30 to 45 minutes.

(b) Reception

Halku fox reception was excellent. 9090 Kcs was used extensively from 0600 to 2400 local time and very little jamming was encountered on this frequency. However, some fading occurred on 3000 Kcs several days around 1200 local time. During these times 14070 Kcs was used very satisfactorily.

6380 Kcs was used almost exclusively from 0000 to 0600 because of very effective jamming on 4525 Kcs. On a few occasions, reception became quite difficult about 0600 due to fading on 6330 Kcs.

(c) Voice

Enroute to station, voice communications on 605 Kcs was used with the US SEAHORSE. Excellent results were obtained at the short ranges used. (Maximum at about 15 miles).

On station voice communications on 6805 Kcs with plenus was excellent.

NOTE: Using the TBL-6 transmitter and modulator in conjunction with the REH receiver seems to be the answer to speedy short range communications.

— page 204 —
1. SUBJECT _ _ : U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.
(M) RADAR
(a) SJ Radar

Prior to this patrol the SJ radar was renewed entirely with the SJ-a radar. The radar units were relocated in the after end of the conning tower an the antenna was relocated to an off-center line position between #2 periscope and the SD radar mast. The new Mare Island Type power training equipment was an important addition making possible the great increase in hours of effective operation for each operator. It is interesting to note that the SJ radar was in operation over 20 hours per day during the entire patrol for an amazing total of some 1000 hours operating time. The Radar Officer and his technicians deserve great credit for this.

The operation was satisfactory during the entire patrol, with the radar being out of commission twice for two and six hours respectively. The following troubles and defects were experienced during the patrol:

(1) Failure of rectifier tube in the range indicator. The tube was replaced and conditions returned to normal.

(2) The AFC circuit was erratic and not dependable during the entire patrol. Very little use was made of it. Repeated efforts failed to bring it into tune.

(3) Jumpy range step noted - slight adjustments on the screw driver adjustments in the unit were all that was necessary to return the unit to normal.

(4) The radar failed, showing no transmitted pulse, very erratic voltages and no sweep. The magnetron and V-1 and V-2 were replaced. Conditions were normal but the operation was not as effective as it had been. A good tuning job was necessary which did bring back satisfactory operation.

(5) The PPI unit was erratic during the last half of the patrol with no definite indication of the trouble. Each time the set was turned on, about twenty minutes of warm-up were required on the PPI before the operation was satisfactory. A thorough check of the circuits will be made at the next refit.

As an aircraft search radar, the SJ proved much superior to the SD radar - having to its credit 7 plane contacts averaging 10 miles, as compered with 4 aircraft contacts for the SD radar averaging 8 miles.

(b) SD Radar

The SD radar was used with great care while on station because of the danger of enemy "direction finding" on it. No casualties occurred with its operation.

— page 205 —
1. SUBJECT _ _ i U.S.S. FARDEN (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.
(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

(a) Sound (JK end QB)

Whenever contacts were made, sound conditions were found to be excellent in this area.

On two occasions, echo ranging was heard long before the target was sighted through the periscope - range estimated to be 16,000 to 19,000 yards (the echo ranging was on a free-zone of about 20 Kcs). The destroyer's crew were heard at a range of 9 to 10 thousand yards when he was making 15 knots.

(b) JP-1 Sonar Equipment

Results obtained with this equipment were negligible.

Although we had few opportunities to give it a thorough test during trial runs at Pearl Harbor, we believe it had lost some sensitivity at that time, and had it checked by the representatives.

Enroute to our area, in company with the USS SARDIS, we found we could hear his propeller at 2000 yards and his echo ranging at about 5000 yards. However, while we were on station, several opportunities were made to test the sonar at 100 yards on 20 Kcs; no success.

At this point we made all checks and sensitivity tests described in the instruction book. Found vacuum tube thermal noise slightly higher than normal. This was remedied by replacing tubes. After the above checks were made, we contacted two destroyers and an A.K. No echo ranging was heard, either on the JP or JK, and it was quite evident by their maneuvers, that they were only listening. No improvement in JP operation. Although the target was as close as 1500 yards, his propellers were not heard.

We believe that the JF hydrophone (topside) is insensitive, because the receiver amplifies our own ships noises which seem to be picked up through vibrations in the hull.

(c) DESTINATION: LATEPS

Generally no gradient in the Woleai area, with temperature decreasing gradually about 1/3° per 100 feet. However, a slight negative gradient (1 3/4°) was indicated at 320 to 335 feet - Lat 7-47 N. Long 143-00 E. - sound conditions were not noted at this time.

— page 206 —
1. CONFIDEN: AL
Subject _ _ i U.S.S. HA-DER (SS2557) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY

The health of the crew was excellent throughout the patrol.

The food was well prepared and a balanced diet was enjoyed. The recent addition of an ice cream freezer contributed greatly to the enjoyment of meals on this cruise through equatorial waters.

Living conditions were considered to be satisfactory, aided in great part by the ultra-violet lamps installed in the ship.

During the past 12 months this vessel has had a battery of 30 ultra-violet lamps installed in the ventilation system. The original objective was the elimination of airborne bacteria in the recirculated air while submerged. To a layman, it seems the results were gratifying inasmuch as as colds have been at a minimum on patrol. However, the most comforting result of the lamps is their faculty to kill the odor and eye burn that is normally characteristic of all-day dives. It is again recommended that these lamps be installed in other submarines.

(Q) PERFORMANCE OF DUTY, AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

The general performance of duty of officers and men on this patrol was again exemplary. The system of progressive training of both new and seasoned personnel, inaugurated by the Executive Officer and pushed by the Heads of Departments, promises to pay large dividends on future patrols. Relative to the training program for new personnel in submarines, Lieutenant LYNCH has expressed many constructive ideas with which the Commanding Officer wholeheartedly concurs. These are noted briefly as follows:

"The training of new crew members would be accelerated and simplified if were there available a publication on modern submarines similar to the former "Elements of Submarines". Every other branch of service, particularly the Air Force, has made use of the audiovisual training aids and other excellent material, using the modern animated cartoons and the large simplified sketch methods of presentation.

A good start on the training aids program for submariners might be:
(1) An up to date "Elements of Submarine".
(2) A film showing the "do's and don't's" in the life of a submarine crew member.
(3) A lookout film for submarine lookouts.
(4) A film or pamphlet showing the simple rudiments of good engineering practice such as how to shut a valve, how to start a pump, how to use a drill, etc.
(5) A series of larva simplified sketches of the various systems in general.
(6) A good history of submarine development and lore."

(42)

— page 209 —
1. SUBJECT: _ - _ i U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fourth War Patrol.

(U) REARARK (cont.)-

In company with the SEAPOOSE, many opportunities were present to study the standard light grey camouflage under all conditions of light and darkness. The camouflage is considered to be good but would be more effective if made even lighter. It is believed that the addition of a light oink color (since red hues reflect nearby colors) to the vertical surfaces would make the camouflage more effective.

The eviator rescued at Woleai became a valuable addition to the wardroom and the ship. For the first week aboard, he performed nearly 3/4 of all the decoding during that period, and for the remainder of the patrol he stood watches, on the surface and submerged, as JOOD.

The work re-uried for decoding submarine "fox schedules" is considerable. From the time of leaving Pearl Harbor until under operational control or: Contester 71 (March 16th to April 23rd) a total of 491 messages were received. This makes an average of over 17 messages per day. However, this remark is not to be construed as a complaint; - we are mildly glad to get the news the despatches bring.

The most needed technicol developments in submarines at present are considered to be;

(1) A reliable aircraft radar that cannot be detected.
(2) A short-range radar attached to the periscope for purposes of obtaining an exact range just prior to firing.
(3) A submerged me ne of destroyer, in enemy small craft and patrol vessels of shellfire destroyer, then by using regular torpedoes. - A topside tube nest of very small, and short range (500 yd) torpedoes fired with a spread, should prove effective for this.

Upon the completion of: the Fourth War Patrol, the TARDER has had the satisfaction of seeing the "total tonnage", or enemy ships sunk and damaged, pass the 10,000 ton mark, has added at least one top destroyer, sunk, to its score, and has the pleasure of having recovered an evator who now "lives to fight another day" and will soon assist in assembling other enemy bases as he can at Woleai.

The Commanding Officer is deeply grateful to all of hers and crew of the ship, whose loyal cooper- tion, aggressive, and untiring efforts, have once again resulted in a successful war patrol against the enemy.

(026736)

— page 210 —
15 May 1944.
Serial # 0298 UNITED STATES NAVY

C-0-N-ROBLASSFIELD 13 May 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS HARDER Conf. ltr.
SS257//16 WPR-4 dated
3 May 1944, Report of
4th War Patrol.

From: The Commander Task Group SEVENTY-ONE POINT THREE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of FOURTH War Patrol - Commander on.

1. The fourth war patrol of the U.S.S. HARDER was conducted while enroute from PANH HARDER to FRESNITTE during the period 29 March 1944 to 3 May 1944, a total of forty-seven days, of which twenty-two were spent in the assigned patrol area off WOLENI TOTL. The entire patrol was conducted in the same outstanding manner as HARDER's previous patrols. Despite heavy enemy aircraft activity, HARDER performed her special missions of reconnaissance and "life guard" duty effectively, delivered a close range gun bombardment on plane facilities on WOLENI and aggressively carried out two successful torpedo attacks on valuable enemy ships. Eight torpedoes were fired resulting in four hits.

2. The rescue, on 1 April 1944, of the downed aviator, Ensign John R. Galvin, USNR, was effected only through the superb seamanship of the Commanding Officer, the fine cover of friendly planes and the heroic efforts of the four volunteers who went through the surf and carried out the actual rescue in the face of enemy sniper fire. Those volunteers will be recommended for suitable awards.

3. Torpedo attack #1 was a submerged attack on a destroyer, identified as the INZUZU, which had been sent out to hunt down HARDER. HARDER skillfully closed this ship to 900 yards and sank her with two hits from a four shot salvo. HARDER received a considerable shaking up when the destroyer's depth charges exploded. attack #2 was masterfully conducted against an AK escorted by two FUBUKI destroyers outbound from WOLENI. The formation was provided with air coverage during daylight. After combined surface and submarine clearance and round for about nineteen hours, HARDER reached favorable position ahead and submerged for a night radar and periscope approach. Four torpedoes were fired at the AK and one hit was seen on the AK and on the DD. HARDER then went to deep submarine to evade depth charging by the other destroyer. Eight depth charges were dropped but none were close.

— page 211 —
15 May 1944.
FC5-16/16-3
Serial # _0298
UNITED STATES NAVY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-I-L
Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of FOURTH War Patrol - Comment on.

4. The SJ radar was used to augment the SD and lookouts in the detection of aircraft.

5. The HARDER arrived in very good material condition except for main engine upper connecting rod bearings. Approximately 50% of these bearings need replacement and this will be effected. The bearings exhibit the characteristic breakdown evidenced from overloading. The trouble with the JP sound equipment will be corrected. The new conning tower is a distinct improvement and the ship's company are extremely enthusiastic.

6. The state of cleanliness of the vessel and health of the crew is excellent. It is noted that the battery of ultraviolet lamps in the ventilation system is considered to have contributed materially toward better living conditions. Great credit is due to the Commanding Officer for the fine organization and high state of morale of his ship.

7. The Task Group Commander welcomes the HARDER to this area and heartily congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew upon the successful completion of her fourth outstanding aggressive patrol.

— page 212 —
1/2/1944
Serial: 0484
May 22, 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT:
GO USS HARDER Conf. Ltr.
S3257/A16, no serial,
dated 3 May, 1944, Report
Fourth War Patrol.

From: Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLETT.
To: Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLETT.
Via: Commander SEVENTH FLETT.

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (S3257) - Report of FOURTH War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron SLKTEN are complete and are concurred in.

2. HARDER's most effective execution of reconnaissance, lifeguard, bombardment, and offensive patrol missions contributed materially to the successful attacks on VOCALI ATOLI. The splendid cooperation between planes and the HARDER during the rescue operation is noted.

3. The conning tower enlargement and consequent rearrangement is an important advance in the brain center of the ship. A further improvement can be made by removing the periscope hoist motors to the pump room as was done here in U.S.S. CRYSTAL. These alterations should be made in all submarines during Navy Yard availability for overhaul.

4. This patrol is designated as "successful" for purpose of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

5. The Force Commander takes great pleasure in welcoming the HARDER to this force and congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew, on the excellent execution of multiple missions and for inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

-1-

— page 213 —
1/2gr
Serial: 0484
May 22, 1944.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
CO USS HARDER Conf. Ltr.
SS257/A16, no serial,
dated 3 May, 1944, Report
Fourth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of FOURTH
War Patrol - Comment on.

SUNK
1 - DD (IKAZUCHI) 1;700 Tons
1 - AK (EIHUKU MARU TYPE) - - - - - 3,560 Tons
Total - 5,260 Tons

DAMAGED
1 - DD (FUBUKI CLASS) 1,700 Tons

Grand Total - 6,960 Tons

6. Since the above damage was done in areas under the operational control of Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN, he is requested to assume credit accordingly.

R. W. CHRISTIE.

CRITICAL COPY

-2-

— page 214 —
22, 1944.
May 22, 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
CO USS HARDER Conf. Ltr.
SS257/A16, no serial,
dated 3 May, 1944, Report
Fourth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of FOURTH
War Patrol - Comment on.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominoh (3) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav (2) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav Op-23o (1)
ComlstFlt (1)
Com2ndFlt (1)
Com3rdFlt (1)
Com7thFlt (2)
ComSublstFlt (4)
ComSub2ndFlt (4)
CTF-71 (4)
CTF-72 (2)
CSS-12 (1)
CSS-16 (1)
DivComs Ron-12 (1)
DivComs Ron-16 (1)
S/M School N.L.Conn. (2)
Each S/M W.A. (1) - NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN.

F. F. STRAUB, JR.,
Flag Secretary.

— page 215 —
026736
UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

AL6-3(1-3/rc1)
Serial: 0/1+7?

9 JUN 1944

C-Q-N-P-DECLASSIFIED

MILITARY INSTRUCTIONS:
1. The Commander, Seventh Fleet, is authorized to report to USS HARDER CONF. 1tr.
   SS257/A16, no serial, dated 3 May 1944, Report of Fourth War Patrol.

From: The Commander, Seventh Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Subject: WAR PATROL.

1. Forwarded.

2. The remarks of Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet, are concurred in.

3. The commanding officer, officers, and crew are congratulated for the conduct of a successful patrol which resulted in the sinking of one enemy destroyer and a merchant ship, and the damaging of another destroyer.

4. Particular note is made of HARDER's enthusiastic spirit of cooperation with other fleet elements which contributed greatly to the success of the attacks on WOLMAR.

5. Commander Seventh Fleet is proud to welcome the U.S.S. HARDER to this area.

Copy to:
ComSubs?th
CDR-71.3
U.S.S. HARDER

C. E. VAN TROKE
Deputy
OO

— page 216 —
3527/A16
V.P. #5.

DECLASSIFIED
10 July 1944.

From: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S.S. HADEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Official Channels.

Subject: U.S.S. HADEN (SS257), Report of Ver Patrol number Five.

Enclosure: (1) Subject report for phase one.
(2) Subject report for phase two.

1. Enclosure (A), covering phase one of the fifth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the area off Tavi Tavi, the NE tip of Borneo and Basilan Strait during the period 26 May 1944 to 21 June 1944, and enclosure (B), covering phase two of the fifth war patrol conducted in the Flores Sea and the Gulf of Penin durin the period 21 June 1944 to 10 July 1944, due to a covered borewhip.

SIGNATURE: [Signature]

8 03512

85325/

— page 217 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE:

Arrived at Fremantle, Australia on May 3, 1944 from Fourth War Patrol. Moored alongside U.S.S. ORION and "refit" of the ship was begun by Submarine Division ONE TWENTY ONE Relief Crew under Lieut. Comdr. F.D. RILEY, USNR. The refit was accomplished in normal time and the excellent, cooperative work of the refit crew was greatly appreciated.

Hold training period extending over one week. Sound tested; not degaussed. No exercise torpedoes were fired due to heavy seas.

(B) NARRATIVE: (All times "HOW")

May 26th
1500
Departed Fremantle in company with U.S.S. REDFIN and under escort of H.M.A.S. ADELAIDE.

Alternated with REDFIN making periscope approaches on this ADELAIDE in bombing restriction lane on general northward course. After darkness, alternated with REDFIN in making surface radar approaches on target.

2200
Released escort and proceeded independently, in company with REDFIN, onshore to Exmouth in accordance with despatch orders.

May 27th
Alternated with the REDFIN in making periscope approaches, acting first as target, then as attacking submarine throughout the entire day. Exercised approach parties and sound operators to train all new officers and personnel in sighting periscopes at different ranges. Improvement of radar operators was noticably rapid with a constant target to work on. Held training for all 20 MM gun crews. Held dry "battle surface drills". Conducted tests of special communication equipment. Hold pointer-trainer drill for 4" gun.

1200
Sighted two southbound, U.S. submarines.

After dark, alternated with REDFIN in making night surface radar approaches.

May 28th

Continued drills of previous day.

(1) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 218 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fifth War Patrol.

May 29th
0800 Entered Exmouth Gulf, astern the REDFIN.

1003 Moored alongside USS REDFIN, tied up to starboard of the fuel barge. Captain Murray J. TICHENOR, U.S. Navy, reported aboard for temporary additional duty. Took 8,000 gallons of fuel and small amount of fresh water from the barge.

1316 Underway from alongside the fuel barge.

1405 Anchored in Exmouth Gulf and commenced holding dry battle surface drills. Fired all guns. Carried out drills and rehearsal for special mission.

2330 Underway.

May 30th
0200 Cleared Exmouth Gulf and proceeded independently toward assigned area via bombing restriction lane.

0815 Sighted aircraft on westerly course, distant 10 miles; remained on surface.

Made four training dives during the morning and five more in the afternoon.

May 31st
During the morning, made four section dives for training.

1100 Made battle surface and fired all guns.

1930 Made section dive followed by night battle surface drill.

June 1st
0715 Made section dive for trim.

0800 Surfaced.

Held fire control drills during the morning and commenced training of new men, under Heads of Departments, for qualification in submarines.

0827 (1st Aircraft contact) - Bridge lookout sighted 4 unidentified planes to the westward; distant 8 miles on southeasterly course. Made quick dive to 120 feet; undetected.

0918 Surfaced.

(2) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 219 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-I-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS-257) = Report of Fifth War Patrol.

June 1st (cont.)

1740 Dived to insure that our approach to the Malay Barrier would not be detected during the last remaining hour of daylight.
1813 Surfaced.
2200 Sighted Soembawa Island 35 miles away.

June 2nd
0115 Commenced night transit of Alas Strait, on the surface at four engine speed. Experienced strong set to the south. The bright moonlight facilitated navigation and no difficulties were encountered during transit. A convenient mooring at 0250 was welcomed as we neared the 4 mile wide bottleneck at the northern entrance to the Strait. Three small patrol vessels guarding the northern approach to the strait were picked up by radar, (though never seen from the bridge) tracked in to a range 3000 yards, but easily outdistanced.

0630 Sighted islands of the Paternoster Group.

0645 Submerged for trim and training.

0845 Surfaced.

Held fire control drills.

1130 Made dive for training.

1215 Surfaced.

During the day, at intervals, sighted 3 distant sailing vessels with triangular mainsail and short jib. Made end run around, on surface, to avoid disclosing our presence. Sailboats were believed to be of the type used by natives; not Japanese, and bigger game should be found in this area.

June 3rd
Passed several small boats, presumably fishermen, during the night.

0550 With two small boats and one sailboat in sight, dived to avoid detection, and proceeded toward area off Makassar City.

(3) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 220 —
1600 Surfaced.
1700 (2nd Aircraft contact) - Bridge lookout sighted, 1Loat type plane, distant 8 miles, headed our way. Made quick dive to 120 feet. Increased depth to 300 feet to check for density layers. Found a total of 9 degree negative gradient with breaks at 120 feet and 200 feet.

1820 Surfaced.

2000 Commenced running through a fleet of many small fishing vessels; several dozen. - Usually contacted by sight and radar at ranges of about four or five thousand yards. Dodged in and out, on northerly courses headed for Hoek Mandar. By midnight, at least fifty of these nuisances had been sighted and it is believed that the fishing fleet must have been composed of well over a hundred boats. Most were completely darkened (while lying to) but those underway apparently had lanterns in the bottom of the boat which cast a faint glow over the sails. In the bright moonlight, we were probably sighted by some of these boats at ranges of less than 1000 yards, but no visual signals or suspicious actions resulted.

We closed the coast to a point within 5000 yards of Hoek Mandar and then followed the contour of the coastline northward past Cape William.

June 4th
Continued weaving in and out on an involuntary zig zag through several more fishing fleets during the night.

6ff Cape William, sighted and avoided three medium sized patrol craft cruising up the coast at about 7 or 8 knots.

0552 Made morning trim dive.

Sighted several small sailing vessels during the day.

1845 Surfaced.

June 5th
0600 Cape Mangkailhat on Borneo in sight at range of 17 miles. Skies heavily overcast; sea smooth. Proceeding on surface on course north.

0700 Sighted sailboat ahead. Submerged for trim and to avoid detection.

(4) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 221 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: _U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol.
June 5th (cont.)

0330 Surfaced in heavy rain squall, with sailboat at range of 3500 yards, and utilized reduced visibility to make end run to westward around the sailboat. -- This was a three-sail rig and his actions indicated those of a "spotter". It is possible that we were sighted between lulls in the rainstorm. About one hour after leaving the sailboat astern, distant depth charging from that direction was heard.

1105 Submerged on course 295 in a glassy sea to commence transit of the inner traffic route from Tarakan. Just prior to diving, the southern islands of Moearas Reef were sighted, on one of which was a tall, prominent radio tower, lighthouse or similar construction.

After 6 hours on course 295, a fix showed that we had made good two miles on course 090. Changed to course north and decided to pass eastward of Moearas Reef.

1825 Surfaced and set course for Tarakan Island.

June 6th
0500 Off Tarakan, patrolling on surface along the 40 fathom curve.

0535 Sighted, and was sighted, by small patrol vessel. Four engine speed soon left him far behind. This patrol vessel is not believed to have been equipped with radio, for no planes from the nearby Tarakan Airfield disturbed our surface patrol. Set course for Sibutu Passage.

0715 J.O.O.D and O.O.D, sighted periscope, or wake of same, astern. Both were fairly positive of the contact. Cleared the area since the REDFIN was believed to be sharing it with us.

0930 Submerged for trim.

1000 Surfaced.

1200 Heavy and close cloud-layers made further surface patrol too hazardous. Submerged for periscope patrol.

1507 Surfaced. Utilized many local rain squalls for approaching southern entrance of Sibutu Passage undetected.

(5) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 222 —
1930 Commenced first attempted transit of SIBUTU. Radar contact at 20,000 yards. (1st Ship contact) Target group sighted at 18,000 yards. - They consisted of three large ships, believed to be tankers, with two destroyer escorts (one on starboard bow of the convoy and the other on the port beam) - also a possible third destroyer on the starboard quarter of the convoy.

The moon was full, brilliant and almost overhead during the latter part of the run, but was shielded intermittently by low cumulus clouds. Our intent was to dive ahead of convoy and to maneuver into a position halfway between the port flank escort and the tankers, from which an almost simultaneous attack could be made on the destroyer and the three closely grouped ships of the convoy. This optimistic intention was later frustrated. The convoy's first base course was 180 as it cleared SIBUTU. Channel with ziggs 30 degrees to right and left. - It soon changed the base course to 240, headed directly for Tarakan. At a range of 16,000 yards on the convoy and 12,000 yards on the near escort, the moon suddenly broke through the clouds, flood-lighted the sub and disclosed us to the closest destroyer. It was immediately apparent that he was headed hell-bent for HARDER, smoking heavily and showing a prominent bow wave. We turned tail toward the destroyer, made flank speed and hoped that the Jap would get discouraged and return to his convoy but he had other intentions (none of the friendly variety). His speed increased to 24 knots and the range was gradually whittled down to 9,000 yards as he followed down our wake. (At 19 knots we left a wake that looked like a broad avenue for five miles astern).

It was painfully evident that our business with the convoy would have to wait until the destroyer was taken care of.

At 8,500 yards made quick dive to periscope depth, turned hard left to bring stern tubes into play, and waited for the pursuer to catch up. He came on, right down our old course at 23 knots, presenting a very easy fire control problem.

(6) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 223 —
2159
June 6th (cont.)
At a range of 1160 yards, with the track angle 80 degrees port, torpedoes set to run at 6 feet, and with gyros on zero: - we sent a triple dose of Torpex toward the Jap. The first shot missed ahead, the second and third shots were observed to hit near the bow and under the bridge respectively. The target was immediately enveloped in flames and smoke, the tail rose straight in the air and half a dozen of his depth charges started going off.

2203
Surfaced 1000 yards away, watched the destroyer go under, and headed back toward the spot where it had been. A lone Franklin life buoy (or one of similar design) burned lonesomely over a large oil slick - but there was no ship and there were no survivors to be seen. The last moments of the destroyer were observed by the Commanding Officer, most of the fire control party, by Captain TICHENOR and the bridge lookouts.

2204
Put four engines on propulsion and vent ahead at full speed in pursuit of the convoy. From here it would be a race to see who could get to Tarakan first!

2215
Secured from battle stations.

2217
Second ship contact. Radar contact at 14,000 yards on another destroyer making high speed and headed directly for us. Sounded "battle stations" and headed for him.

2218
Submerged to radar depth.

At range of 8,000 yards, increased submergence to periscope depth. Intermittent moonlight through broken clouds did not give sufficient light for good periscope ranges.

2242
At estimated range of 1250 yards, with 80 degrees port track angle and target speed of 12 knots, fired 6 bow tube shots with torpedoes set at 6 feet and diverging spread.

Both range and estimated target speed are believed to have been in error, though "sound" reported the first 2 shots running eratic. All torpedoes missed as target made a "figure S" while coming their tracks. The destroyer turned and headed for HARDER. Rigged for silent running, depth charging and went to 300 feet. Five depth charges exploded as we reached depth.

(1) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 226 —
1550 Returned to periscope depth. Sighted 2 FUBUKI destroyers. Sounded battle stations and commenced approach. At 4,000 yards, both destroyers reversed course.

1600 (4th Aircraft contact) - Sighted medium bomber.

1610 Heard two heavy explosions believed to have been dropped by aircraft. Not very close.

1656 (5th Aircraft contact) - Sighted another medium bomber.

1709 Heard "echo ranging" from several different bearings. Sighted 2 destroyers coming back our way. Range 8,000 yards.

1725 Sighted a third destroyer at 4,000 yards. This one had a high "bed-spring" type of radar on his formast. Sounded battle stations.

1727 All three destroyers reversed course; they were apparently patrolling back and forth over the area of our last attack. Secured from battle stations.

1840 Sighted 6 destroyers in line of bearing headed our way! Looks as if the HARDER has worn out its welcome here. We felt as if we had a monopoly on the whole Pacific War this date. (Such popularity must be preserved).

Made a quick review of the whole picture and decided that discretion here was definitely the better part of valor. The battery was low, air in the boat was none too good, the crew was fatigued and our navigational position in a narrow strait, with strong and variable currents, was not well known. I really believe that we might have gotten one or two more of the enemy ships, but under the above-listed conditions, a persistent and already humiliated enemy (after two sinkings within 24 hours and just off a fleet base) would probably have developed an attack from which the HARDER might not have pulled through. No apologies are made for my withdrawal. - The gamble would have been made at too great a risk.

Commenced evading to the northward in an effort to lose the destroyers and get on with our assigned task.

2116 Surfaoed with the destroyer patrol about 10 miles to the southward.

(10) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 229 —
2102 Sighted another destroyer. - They were in line of bearing and patrolling the narrows on north - south, zig zag courses. Sounded "battle stations", submerged to radar depth and commenced the attack. The nearest destroyer, now at a range of 8000 yards, was chosen as the first target and his angle on the bow was about 20 degrees port. At 4000 yards, he headed directly for us but his actions were interpreted as a routine zig. Increased submergence to periscope depth. At 3000 yards, both destroyers zigged 30 degrees to their right (with the first presenting a 30 degree port track) and the picture became " just what the doctor ordered" for the HARDER. At a range of 1000 yards on the nearest target, both destroyers were overlapping, with a 100 degree port track showing. Gyros were near zero and torpedoes set for running at 6 feet.

2124 Commenced firing the bow tubes. No, 1 appeared to pass just ahead of the first destroyer, No. 2 struck it near the bow, No. 3 hit just under the destroyer's bridge, and No. 4 passed astern of the near target. The sub was now swung hard right to avoid hitting the first destroyer and fire was withheld on remaining tubes until a new setup could be put into the T.D.C. for an attack on the second destroyer. About thirty seconds after turning, the second destroyer came into view just astern of what was left of the first one, then burning furiously. Just then No. 4 torpedo which had passed astern of the first target was heard and observed to hit the second target. - (No more torpedoes were needed for either.)

Meanwhile, a heavy explosion, believed to be caused by an exploding boiler on the first destroyer, went off and the sub (then about 400 yards away) was heeled over by the concussion. At almost the same time a blinding explosion took place on the second destroyer (probably his ammunition going off) and it took a quick nose dive. When last observed, by the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, the tail of the second destroyer was straight in the air and the first destroyer had disappeared. "Sound" now reported, "No more screws".

The above-listed pandemonium may not be in exact chronological order but is as accurate as the happenings over that eventful few minutes can be remembered.

— page 230 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S.S. HARDER_(SS257)_-Report of Fifth War Patrol.-_
June 9th (cont.)

2134 Surfaced to allow others to see the damage, - and to make rapid shift to a more quiet neighborhood. We came up just 2000 yards from the attack. Neither destroyer remained, but a large cloud of steam and heavy vapor hung over the spot where the first destroyer had been and a lighted buoy burned over the spot where the second ship had gone down. Radar searched through the entire sector and verified "no ships left", although such a report was not necessary in the bright moonlight.

2135 Commenced clearing the area at full speed before the expected night flyers could arrive.

2219 (10th Aircraft contact) - Aircraft contact on radar. Submerged.

2301 Surfaced on southerly course.

Our battery charge had never been completed and anxious hours tomorrow might be avoided by a few extra ampere-hours tonight.

2305 (11th Aircraft contact) - Sighted aircraft (float type bi-plane) flying at height of 100 feet, coming in off our station board quarter and almost on top of us. It is believed that he sighted us just as the rudder was shifted hard left. He whizzed by the starboard beam at a range of about 100 yards!

Submerged to 150 feet.

2313 First aerial bomb. Not close.

2315 Second aerial bomb; - damned close. Increased depth to 200 feet.

June 10th
004 Three distant aerial bombs.

0159 "Sound" contact on approaching ship. Rigged for silent running and went to 300 feet. Remained deep for remainder of night to rest a very weary crew.

0440 Returned to periscope depth.

0445 Surfaced to change the air in the boat before another all day dive, and to cram a few more "amps" into the battery.

(14) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 231 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS267) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol. -- June 10th (cont.)

0511 Submerged and set course for a point south of Tawi Tawi from which ship concentrations in the bay could be reconnoitered.

At 1/3 speed, almost no headway was made against the current all day and greater speed could not be spared.

0910 Sighted two destroyers, hull down, and commenced approach. They closed to a range of about 12,000 yards, then turned away - searching by echo ranging.

Secured from battle stations.

1700 Sound contact; light and heavy screws.

On bearing 220 relative, sighted large task force of the enemy battle fleet. - Three battleships, four or more cruisers and 6 Or 8 destroyers. Float type planes circled overhead. Approximate range was 8 miles to the nearest battleship and the angle on the bow 60 to 70 port which gave them a course of about 180.

Sea was glassy smooth and events which followed quickly showed that our periscope was sighted.

While watching and identifying the nearest of the battleships (which was definitely of the MUSHASHI Class), it was suddenly enveloped in heavy black smoke and the sound watch reported hearing 3 positive explosions. The first assumption (and hope still remains) was that another of our subs had put three torpedoes in the battleship, but a reconstructed version of the affray shows the following to be the more likely occurrence: -

Immediately after the smoke and explosions around the battleship, a destroyer, which until then had almost blended in with the big ship, headed directly for us bockling heavy black smoke. It is believed likely that one of the float type planes had spotted our periscope and dropped a smoke float near it; - whereupon, the battleship's escorting destroyer laid down a quick smoke screen between us and the battleship and then dropped three "scarce charges" as he headed our way.

The sound man obtained a "turn count" for 35 knots on the destroyer and his bow wave and rapidly closing range verified it!

(15) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 232 —
1714

With the idea that we were now scheduled for another "working over" anyhow, it was decided to have a crack at the destroyer first and the bow was swung toward him for another "down-the-throat" shot. (Mayo recent events have just gotten us too much in the habit of shooting at destroyers anyhow?) At a range of 4000 yards, sound obtained another "turn count" for 15 knots, and his speed in the T.D.C. was dropped to 20 knots, to allow for the momentum of his reduced higher speed.

Angle on the bow still zero and the destroyer was echo ranging right on us steadily! The picture had reached the stage now where we had to hit him -- or else.

At a range of 1500 yards, torpedo run 1200, gyros near zero, and depth set at 6 feet; fired three bow tubes with 1/4 degree spread, right and left of zero.

"Sound" had now picked up other fast screws moving in from the starboard beam but this was no time to take a look.

"All ahead full, right full rudder, take 'er deep"!

Fifty five seconds and sixty seconds respectively after the first shot, two torpedoes struck with a detonation that was far worse than depth charges. By this time we were just passing 80 feet and were soon almost beneath the destroyer, when all hell broke loose. - It was not from his depth charges for if they had been dropped at that time this report would not have been completed, but a deafening series of progressive rumblings that seemed to almost blend with each other. Either his boilers or magazines, or both, had exploded and it's a lucky thing that ship explosions are vented upward and not down.

The previously reported sound on the starboard beam was now reported moving in for his share of the fun and started laying his barrages as we passed 200 feet. It is believed that they fell astern. They were loud and close and added their bit to the jolting around but none compared in intensity to the exploding destroyer we had just passed beneath.

Other explosions, believed to be aerial bombs, began to land dearly and all added to make up the most uncomfortable five minutes yet experienced during the HARDER'S five War Patrols. Something between 20 and 30 distinct depth charges or bombs were counted but no one was interested in numerical accuracy at the time.

(16) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 233 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol.
June 16th (cent.)

Two destroyers eventually joined the party but evasive measures conducted at 250 to 400 feet soon left them behind.

1905 Surfaced.

Once again, about 3 miles astern, a lone, lighted, Franklin buoy burned over the spot of the attack. It could be seen for 15 minutes bouncing up and down on the swells.

Crammed in battery and air charge while clearing the area to the southeast.

2300 Transmitted HARDER'S Second Serial.

Moved 12 miles to the northward then doubled back on course 270 to arrive of southern entrance to Tawi Tawi by dawn.

It is considered amassing that the ship could have gone through such a terrific pounding and jolting around with such minor damage. Our fervent thanks go out to the working men and designers at the Electric Boat Company for building such a fine ship.

June 11th
0430 Arrived off southern entrance to Tawi Tawi.

0431 Sighted small patrol vessel.

0432 Submerged to avoid detection.

It looks like another dive "from kin-see to cain't-see". (It's a wonder we don't all grow fins.)

0838 "Sound" heard echo ranging and screws of two destroyers. These were not sighted and were believed to be coming in or going out of the southern channel. The sea was again a glassy calm and periscope reconnaissance was not justi-fied. Increased depth to 100 feet, fixed position hourly while closing the islands to the northward, and waited for an afternoon breeze to ruffle the sea.

1200 Light breeze caused slight ruffling of the sea surface.

— page 234 —
1400 Reach position 3000 yards off southern reefs from which ships in the bay could be sighted.

Made runs for next two hours paralleling the reef, while reconnoitering the fleet anchorage. Composition of the enemy fleet sighted:

About six cruisers,
Six or eight destroyers,
Two merchant vessels and - against the hazy background of
Bongao Mountain - were sighted what was believed to be the
"tops of three or four battleships of the FUSO Class.

1600 Commenced opening out from the shoreline for night surfacing.

1911 Surfaced 8 miles south of Tawi Tawi.

Moonrise not until 2300 and only half moon. Our danger from night flyers was considerably reduced.

2000 Sighted two small patrol craft and evaded same on the surface.

2200 Two more patrol craft sighted and avoided. It appears likely that the Japs are reluctant to patrol these waters with their remaining destroyers and are resorting to smaller craft which can be better spared if lost.

2330 With air and battery charge sufficiently high, transmitted HARDER!3 Third Serial to Comtaskfor 71. Course south. Changed course to 240 and cleared the area.

June 12th
Heading northeast in compliance with Comtaskfor 71 new directive.

0553 (12th Aircraft contact) - Radar contact on aircraft at 5000 yards. Made quick dive. No bombs.

0800 Surfaced.

0956 Sighted masts of a ship on bearing 340.

1037 Submerged and commenced approach.

Target turned out to be a large floating tree with high branches.

1250 Surfaced.

(18) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 236 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) = Report of Fifth War Patrol.
June 13th (cont.)

This was an historic week for the HARDER. The operational shift to a more quiet area was considered to be timely. In retrospect of the 6 day period from June 6th to June 12th, this ship has been in almost constant contact with the enemy.

During that time: -

(a) A special mission was completed.
(b) Six separate attacks were made against enemy combat ships which resulted in the sinking of five destroyers.
(c) A close inshore reconnaissance of the enemy fleet base was made.
(d) The sub had undergone two day and two night bombings by enemy aircraft, and -
(e) Three separate depth charge attacks have been received; one of considerable violence.

The crew and officers were in need of rest and sleep.

1840 Surfaced 40 miles south of Jolo.

1900 (Remark overheard on the bridge: "What a day; no bombs for 24 hours!").

Set course for Basilan Strait.

June 14th
0525 With Island of Basilan bearing 320 T., distant eight miles, submerged and entered Moro Gulf to conduct periscope patrol east of Basilan Strait.

0914 Distant depth charge or aerial bomb heard.

0925 Another of the same.

1628 Surfaced in heavy rain squall to change the air in the boat.

1659 Submerged.

1845 Surfaced with Basilan Island and Zamboango Peninsula in sight.

Commenced night surface patrol 10 miles east of Basilan Strait on north-south courses.

(20) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 237 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S.S. HARDER (SS267) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol.

June 16th
0520 Submerged; continuing periscope patrol.

0635 Surfaced in rain squall to change the air in the boat.

0653 Submerged.

1835 Surfaced.

June 16th
0155 Doubtful aircraft contact on 5J radar at 20,000 yards.

0528 Submerged.

0640 Surfaced in rain squall.

0912 (15th Aircraft contact) -- Bridge lookout sighted high-flying float type plane astern.

Submerged to 150 feet; no bombs.

1330 Surfaced.

1405 Submerged, approaching the western coast of southwest Mindanao.

1830 Surfaced in heavy rain squall.

Closed to a distance of 8 miles off the coast and paralleled the coastline on southeasterly courses.

June 17th
0300 With the southermost tip of Mindanao due east at range of 20 miles, turned to course south.

0735 Submerged to check trim.

0815 Surfaced.

Sighted & small fishing craft during the morning and maneuvered to avcld.

1605 Commenced transit of Bankka Passage.

2100 The Celebes Islands abeam to starboard. Entered Melukka Passage.

Converted #4 Reserve Fuel Tank to Main Ballast Tank.

(21) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 238 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS267) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

June 18th
0517 Made early dive to flush residual oil out of number 4 Main Ballast Tank.

0605 Surfaced.

0658 Low cloud ceiling made surface run too hazardous. Submerged. Now in Celebes Sea.

1015 Surfaced.

1128 (16th Aircraft contact) - Bridge lookout sighted unidentified plane on parallel heading, distant 8 miles. Submerged.

1218 Surfaced.

1618 (17th Aircraft contact) - Sighted Aircraft. Submerged.

1803 Surfaced.

2300 Transited Manila Strait and entered Banda Sea.

June 19th
Transmitted HARDER'S fifth serial.

(It was later found out that this serial aa well as the previous one had been thoroughly "jammed" by the Japs. Our operator got a receipt for both messages but the receipt was apparently from a Jap station.and not from the addressee.)

0603 Made trim dive.

0655 Surfaced.

1101 (18th Aircraft contact) - Bridge lookout sighted aircraft. Submerged.

1231 Surfaced.

2100 Passed through the Bermuda Island Group of the Maly Barrier and entered the Timor Sea.

(22) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 239 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol.

June 20th
0536  Submerged for trim dive.

0700  Surfaced.

0930  Made training dive.

1151  Surfaced.

1330  Made training dive.

1731  Surfaced.

June 21st
0146  Radar contact on land bearing 085 degrees, distant 40 miles.

0700  Sighted and exchanged recognition signals with escort off Darwin.

1008  Moored alongside dock at Darwin.

(23)  ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 241 —
1. Location :  Initial :Est. Course: How
No. :Lat.,Long.: Types : Range : and Speed : Contacted: Remarks
:Just north:3 small:
:of Alas :patrol :3 to 4 :East and
#1 :Strad :boats :miles :West :Radar(SJ) :Avoided
:10 miles :Two
:for Cape :patrol :5 miles :North :Radar(SJ) :Avoided
#2 :William :boats :one
:10 miles :One
: :off :patrol :
#3 :Tarakan :boat :4 miles :? :Sight :Avoided
:Off :Peri-
#4 :Tarakan :scope :1/2 mile :? :Sight :Avoided
:10 miles :Convoy
: :south of :3 A0s :180 :Sank one
#5 :Sibutu :3 DDs :10 miles: 240 :Radar(SJ) :destroyer
:40 miles
: :SW of
#6 :Sibutu :1 DD :7 miles :160 :Radar(SJ) :but missed
:10 MI. SE
: :west of
#7 :Sibutu :1 DD :2 miles :Patroling :Periscope :destroyer
:same as :12-4
#8 :Sibutu :6 DDs :miles :Patroling :Periscope :Avoided
:20 MI.NE of :
#9 :Tawi Tawi :2 DDs :4 miles :Patroling :Sound :Avoided
:15 miles :Two
#10 :north of :patrol :
:Tawi Tawi :oraf :4 miles :Patroling :Radar(SJ) :Avoided
:16 miles :Bridge
:west of :lookout, :Sank two
#11 :Tawi Tawi :2 DDs :16 miles :Patroling :then radar :destroyer
:30 miles
: :SW of
#12 :Tawi Tawi :2 DDs :16 miles :patroling :Periscope :close.
:20 miles :Large :6-10 :Sortie from :Sank one
#13 :Tawi Tawi :force :miles :harbor :Sound :destroyer
:2 miles :one
:SE of :patrol :
#14 :Tawi Tawi :oraf :4 miles :Patroling :lookout. :Avoided
:In fleet :Large :
:andrage at:task :2-6 :
#15 :Tawi Tawi :force :miles :At anchor :Periscope :
:10 miles :Four
: :south of :patrol :
#16 :Tawi Tawi :oraf :4 miles :Patroling :Radar(SJ) :Avoided

NOTE: Fishing vessels sighted were too numerous to be listed.

(25) ENCLOSURE (..)

— page 242 —
0827 : 12-21:115-36 : 8 miles : Bridge lookout
#1 : June 1st : S : E : ? : 8 miles : Bridge lookout
#2 : June 3rd : S : E : ? : 6 miles : SJ Radar
#3 : June 7th : N : E : ? : 4 miles : Periscope
#4 : June 7th : N : E : ? : 3 miles : Periscope
#5 : June 7th : N : E : ? : 6 miles : SJ Radar
#6 : June 6th : N : E : ? : 4 miles : SJ Radar
#7 : June 8th : N : E : ? : 8 miles : Bridge lookout
#8 : June 8th : N : E : ? : 2 miles : Bridge lookout
#9 : June 9th : N : E : ? : 6 miles : SJ Radar
#10 : June 9th : N : E : ? : 1/4 mile : Bridge lookout
#11 : June 9th : N : E : ? : 2 miles : SJ Radar
#12 : June 12th : N : E : ? : 8 miles : Bridge lookout
#13 : June 12th : N : E : ? : 4 miles : Bridge lookout
#14 : June 13th : N : E : ? : 3 miles : Bridge lookout
#15 : June 13th : N : E : ? : 8 miles : Bridge lookout
#16 : June 18th : S : E : ? : 8 miles : Bridge lookout
#17 : June 18th : S : E : ? : 8 miles : Bridge lookout
#18 : June 18th : S : E : ? : 6 Miles : Bridge lookout

(26) ENGLISH SITE (A)

— page 243 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol.
(H) ATTACK DATA

| ATTACK No. | Tubes Fired | #7 | #8 | #9 |
|||----|----|----|
| Track Angle | 75 P       | 80 P | 95 P |
| Gyro Angle | 0          | 2L | 2L |
| Depth Set  | 6'         | 6' | 6' |
| Power     | H          | H  | H  |
| Hit or Miss| Hit       | H1t | Miss |
| Erratic   | No         | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Serial Number | 53202 | 53147 | 52794 |
| Mark Exploder | 16-4 Inact. | 16-4 Inact. | 16-4 Inact. |
| Serial Number | 8289 | 17866 | 17627 |
| Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Mark Warhead | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16 |
| Serial Number | 12755 |  |  |
| Explosive | TPX. | TPX. | TNT. |
| Firing Interval | 8 sec. | 7 sec. |  |
| Type Spread | 2 Degree Divergent |  |  |
| Sea Conditions | Calm |  |  |
| Overhaul Activity | U.S.S. ORION |  |  |

REMARKS: #7 hit Just Fwd. MOT, #3 hit aft, #9 not observed.

(27) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 244 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK FORM

U.S.S. HARDER (SS257). TORPEDO ATTACK No. 1. PATROL NO. 5.

Time: 2159. Date: 6 June 1944. Lat.: 4-5 N. Long: 119-30 E.

TARGET DATA -- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Single destroyer which detected HARDER while tracking convoy.

Ship Sunk: One fleet-type destroyer of 1850 tons.

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: None.

Damage Determined by: Saw and heard two hits after which the destroyer was observed to sink.

Target Draft 9'. Course 170. Speed 22ft. Range 1050 Yds. (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 3. Course 090. Depth 65 feet. Angle 1° down (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: First phase of approach at radar depth, then periscope attack. Fired three torpedoes aft with 2° divergent spread from forward aft. Torpedo depth setting 6 feet. First torpedo hit just forward of NOT, second hit aft, while run of third was not observed.

(28) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 246 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol.
(H) ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. HARDER (SS257). TORPEDO ATTACK No. 2. PATROL No. 5.

Time: 2242; Date: 6 June 1944. Lat.: 4-5 N. Long: 119-30 E.

TARGET DATA -- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: This attack occurred shortly after Attack No. 1. The second destroyer escorting the convoy came over to the scene of the attack to investigate the sinking of the first escort.

Ships Sunk: None

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: None

Target Draft 9ft. Course 150. Speed 16. Range 1100 Yds(at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 3. Course 230. Depth 65 feet. Angle 45° down (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Periscope attack. Fired 6 torpedoes forward with 15° divergent spread from forward aft. First two torpedoes were tracked out by sound running 30° to the left of their normal course. Target apparently saw the wakes of these and was observed to zig sharply away causing last four torpedoes to miss.

(30) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 247 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol. (H) ATTACK DATA

ATTACK NO. 3

Tubes Fired : #6 : #5 : #4
Track Angle : 60 P : 60 P : 60 P
Gyro Angle : 10 L : 10 L : 10 L
Depth Set : 6' : 6' : 6'
Power : H : H : H
Hit or Miss : Hit : Hit : Miss
Erattic : No : No : No
Mark Torpedo : 23 : 23 : 23
Serial Number : 33876 : 53124 : 41476
Mark Exploder : 6-4 : 6-4 : 6-4
Serial Number : 13104 : 8562 : 8169
Actuation Set : Contact : Contact : Contact
Actuation Actual : Contact : Contact : Contact
Mark Warhead : 16 : 16-1 : 16-1
Serial Number : 12166 : 12707 :
Explosive : TNT : TNT : TNT
Firing Interval : 2 sec : 9 sec.
Type Spread : 1/2" Divergent
Sea Conditions : Buffled.
Overhaul Activity : U.S.S. ORION.

REMARKS: Two hits observed.

(31) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 249 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
(H) ATTACK DATA

| ATTACK No. | Tubes Fired | #6 | #5 | #4 | #3 |
|||----|----|----|----|
|           |             | 110 P | 110 P | 110 P | 110 P |
|           |             | 12 L | 14 L | 14 L | 14 L |
|           |             | 6'   | 6'   | 6'   | 6'   |
|           |             | H    | H    | H    | H    |
|           |             | Miss | Hit  | Hit  | Hit  |
|           |             | No  | No  | No  | No  |
|           |             | 23  | 23  | 23  | 23  |
|           |             | 33615| 53092| 53161| 53123|
|           |             | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 |
|           |             | 12753| 8176 | 11638| 11638|
|           |             | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
|           |             | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
|           |             | 3897 | 11638| 11638| 11638|
|           |             | TPX  | TPX  | TPX  | TNT  |
|           |             | 10 sec. | 10 sec. | 10 sec. | 10 sec. |
|           |             | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm |
|           |             | U.S.S. ORION | U.S.S. ORION | U.S.S. ORION | U.S.S. ORION |

REMARKS: Two hits observed on first target, one on second target. Time of explosions indicated first torpedo missed, last three hit.

(33) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 250 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. HARDER (SS257). TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4. PATROL NO. 5.

Time: 2123. Date: 9 June 1944. Lat: 5-42 N. Long: 120-41 E.

TARGET DATA -- DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Two fleet-type destroyers patrolling Sibutu Passage. Placed up simultaneously by eight and 3J Radar at 13,000 yards on brilliant moonlit night.

Ships sunk: Two fleet-type destroyers, 1850 tons each.

Ships damaged or Probably sunk: None.

Damage determined by: On First Destroyer
- Heard and saw two hits after which destroyer was observed to sink.
- On Second Destroyer
- Heard and saw one hit after which target blew up and was observed to sink.

Target Draft 9', Course 040. Speed 15. Range 950 Yds(at firing).

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 3, Course 145. Depth 60 feet. Angle 1/2° down (at firing).

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Periscope attack. Fired four torpedoes forward with 2° divergent spread. First missed forward, second and third hit first destroyer and fourth hit second destroyer.

(34) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 251 —
U.S.S. HARDER (SS252) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
(H) ATTACK DATA

ATTACK NO. 5

Tubes Fired : #1 : #2 : #3 :
Track Angle : 0 : 0 : 0
Gyro Angle : 2 R : 2 R : 2 R
Depth Set : 6' : 6' : 6'
Power : H : H : H
Hit or Miss : Miss : Hit : Hit : Hit
Erratic : No : No : No
Mark Torpedo : 23 : 23 : 23
Serial Number : 53142 : 41543 : 41173
Mark Exploder : 6-4 : 6-4 : 6-4
Serial Number : 8633 : 8170 : 8296
Actuation Set : Contact : Contact : Contact
Actuation Actual : Contact : Contact : Contact
Mark Warhead : 16-1 : 16-1 : 16-1
Serial Number : 810 : :
Explosive : TPX : TPX : TPX
Firing Interval : 8 sec. : 9 sec. :
Type Spread : No Spread :
Sea Conditions : Calm
Overhaul Activity : U.S.S. ORION.

REMARKS: Two hits were heard 45 and 50 seconds after firing which indicates about 1100 yard torpedo run.

(35) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 253 —
1. U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol.--

(I) MINES

No mines were sighted on this patrol nor were there any mine laying activities observed.

(J) ENEMY ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES

Anti-submarine measures, of the usual type, were intense immediately following an attack but the anti-submarine measures appeared to be lacking in persistency.

Toward the latter part of the patrol in the Tawi Tawi area, (after several of the destroyers had been sunk) they seemed to hunt in pairs, but the coordination they should have had with their aircraft was sadly lacking.

In spite of the many destroyers encountered in this area, their numbers were considered to be exceedingly insufficient for the protection of the large task force operating out of Tawi Tawi at the time. It also appeared that only a handful of aircraft was available to them when, under similar circumstances, (off one of our fleet bases) we would have had the skies filled with planes. Only planes of the fleet type were seen and there was no conclusive evidence that any were equipped with radar.

The patrol off Tawi Tawi was conducted under conditions most favorable to the enemy.- A narrow channel, a full and brilliant moon, and with strong variable currents unfavorable to the subs. Smart, aggressive anti-sub measures consisting of radar-equipped night flyers, radar-equipped, fast motor boats (of the PT type) and backed up by the destroyers could have made Sibutu Passage untenable for U.S. submarines but these measures were not met.

One new type of anti-sub weapon was encountered. This seemed to consist of a pattern of many small charges impelled by some type of thrower. Their splash on striking the water could be plainly heard as well as their rapid descent through the water. After falling for several seconds a small explosion of very minor detonation was heard. - It is believed that the charges would have to strike the sub before doing any actual damage.

Evasion Tactics after each attack consisted of going deep, below the layers when a negative | gradient was found, (nearly always present in the Sibutu Passage area) and running slowly and silently. In some cases the destroyers searched by echo ranging; at other times by listening. Both types of searchers were evaded without difficulty.

(37) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 254 —
1. ENGINEERING AND ELECTRICAL DEPARTMENT:
The muffler on No. 1 Main Engine commenced sparking and smoking through the decking after severe depth charging, indicating a rupture.

The Kleinschmidt distillers developed a back pressure of about 6 p.s.i. with less than 100 hours running, indicating that the cleaning at the last refit was not thorough.

The air conditioning of the boat was very poor, indicating that the air conditioner coils are in need of cleaning. However, high battery temperature, 110 - 125 F., was quite a factor.

A small amount of salt water entered the sump of No. 1 Reduction Gear during silent running, a recurrence of an old defect. This was easily removed by the purifiers, however, and no oil was lost.

No. 2 Turbo Blower was out of commission with a broken brush, a broken holding-down bolt, and completely unstable operation from an undiscovered defect, all following the severe depth charging. Investigation has traced the defect out of the panel to the motor, but is not discovered yet.

The selector switch for the bow planes at the diving station flashed over while charging at the finishing rate. During the same charge, the clutch solenoid in the forward torpedo room burned out. The solenoid and the leads in the control room will have to be renewed on the refit. Spare terminal blocks shall be carried in the future for the selector switch, as this is an old defect for Electric Boat Co. boats.

During the refit, the ORION Gyro and Instrument Shop used two sets of compensator spares for the hydrogen detector and did not replace them nor notify the ship's force that they had been taken. The detector was not in operation when the HARDER departed for the war zone. Spare elements were borrowed from the REDFIN at Exmouth.

The battery vent ducts and air flow indicator system was very leaky and corroded. It is believed the vent ducts will have to be replaced on the next refit. Elimination of the corrosion will reduce the upkeep troubles of the indicator system materially.

The emergency vent on the Pit log was ruptured during the depth charging. Repairs were made and the machine thoroughly cleaned but low speed operation was erratic until the sword arm was blown out with 200 p.s.i. air, disclosing mud in the arm, source unknown.

— page 256 —
1. RADIO RECEPTION was excellent during the entire patrol with:
   - Two or three instances caused by atmospheric interference.
   - The 9250 frequency band was used exclusively to receive "Baker's" Fox.

Three of the four times we opened up for transmission, VIXO was raised immediately on 8470 Kcs; the fourth instance 4235 Kcs was used with only slight difficulty.

Enemy jamming was noted but caused no particular trouble.

(M) RADAR

The SJ Radar was used again on this patrol both as an aircraft and surface search radar. This accounted for continuous operation of the equipment while on the surface. Results obtained on surface targets were normal with extreme ranges on land of 80 to 100 thousand yards. The SJ Radar proved an effective aircraft search especially during the many bright moonlight nights.

No major casualties were experienced during the patrol. It is interesting to note that the SJ Radar withstood the shock of severe depth charging without a single casualty.

The SD Radar was secured prior to entering enemy territory and was not used during the entire patrol.

(N) SOUND AND SOUND CONDITIONS

The JK-QC Sound Gear was probably damaged when the ship struck a submerged coral reef during the first week of the patrol. The QC head showed dead short to ground and was therefore secured.

Excellent results were obtained from the QB Sound Gear in detecting and following enemy ships on every attack. Ranges of 8 to 10 thousand yards were obtained on enemy destroyers. No casualties were experienced.

The Sonic JP Sound Gear proved to be the most effective means of search on this patrol. Ranges on enemy destroyers of 10 to 15 thousand yards were common. Bearing accuracies compared very favorably with those from the QB Sound. Information such as turn counts, speed increases, change of course, and tracks of depth charging runs by the destroyers made possible the very effective evasive tactics used.

No casualties were experienced in the JP Sound Gear.

Sound conditions in this area were excellent. Temperature gradients were ideal for evasive maneuvers. The Sonic JP Sound Gear was not effected noticeably by the temperature layers for the Japanese destroyers were always heard during their entire anti-HARDER hunt from depths down to 375 feet.

(40) ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 259 —
1. U.S.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

Fremantle, Australia to area . . . 1770 M.I. . . 23070 Gals.
In area

— page 261 —
1. SUBJECT: USS HARDER (33267) - Report of Fifth War Patrol (2nd Phase).

(A) PROLOGUE
Received 12 torpedoes, topped off with fuel, lub oil, and fresh water at Darwin. Miscellaneous spare parts needed were received from the USS GUITARCO. Spare armature for turbo blow was received, via "sky train", from Fremantle.

(B) NARRATIVE
June 21st
2030 Captain H.J. TICHENOR, U.S. Navy, Commander Task Force SEVENTY ONE Operations Officer, was detached. - Duty completed.

2130 Rear Admiral R.W. CHRISTIE, U.S. Navy, Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET, was received aboard. Received new directive for extension of Fifth War Patrol.

June 22nd
0000 Underway from Darwin, on various courses, enroute to new patrol area in the Flores Sea.

0600 Made trim dive.

0630 Surfaced.

2200 Island of Timor abeam to port; distant 10 miles.

June 23rd
0030 Island of 'ietar abeam to port; distant 8 miles.

0419 Radar contact on Island of Gunung Api at range of 50,000 yards.

0525 Made trim dive.

0640 Surfaced.

0650 Sighted unidentified submarine (believed to have been the U.S.S. HAKE) dead ahead at range of 5 miles. Submerged. - Received "AA" on sound from the sub, answered with Sail-257 but received no corresponding signal from the U.S.S. HAKE. Turned 80 degrees to right and avoided.

0805 Surfaced and set course for the Gulf of Boni, south of the Celebes. Making 3-engine speed and "constant helming".

1118 Made dive for training.

1215 Surfaced. Changed base course and headed for NE tip of Soembawa Island.

(1) ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 262 —
0-0-N-I-I-D-Z-N-I-I-A-L
Subject: USSHARDER (SS257) - Report of Fifth War Patrol (2nd Phase).

June 24th
0558 Made trim dive.

0620 Surfaced. - Tiger Islands in sight to northward.

0730 Sighted and avoided sailboat.

0850 Sighted mast on horizon. - Closed end identified it as a fishing vessel. - Avoided the craft.

1114 Made training dive.

0105 Surfaced.

1404 Made training dive.

1825 Surfaced.

|

— page 264 —
1704  Submerged.

1717  Submerged.

1315  Subfaced and set course for Pomalaa to intercept any ore ships enroute to or from that port.

June 29th
0541  Submerged along the 100 fathom curve to the westward of Padamarang Island, conducting periscope patrol across the approaches to Pomalaa.

1649  Surfaced to increase radius of search and change the air in boat.

1727  Submerged.

1820  Surfaced and patrolled back and forth across a line normal to the traffic lane from Pomalaa.

2000  Set course for Saleier Strait.

June 30th
0354  Made radar contact on Saleier Island at 46,000 yards.

0548  Submerged.

0715  Sighted small ship coming through Saleier Strait on eastward course. Angle on bow 15 starboard, range 8,000 yds. Started approach.

0740  Target cleared Saleier and headed north. In the hazy background of land, this target was hard to identify. It was indefinitely deter-mined to be a small freighter or fishing trawler of about 400 to 800 tons. Neither assumption proved correct.

0855  Surfaced at 17 knots commenced en end run to gain station ahead, either for a submerged attack or a battle surface.

0931  Lookout sighted aircraft. Submerged to 100 feet.

0940  Returned to periscope depth. -No aircraft in sight but target had apparently reversed course and was headed back for Saleier Strait distant 10 miles. It was now close to the beach and about 5 miles inshore from us.

0955  Surfaced and headed for target at 17 knots. Gun crews standing by below. Two ships were now sighted with the original target now trailing. At this point it was seen that the original target was a small escort vessel and the ship ahead of it was a small freighter of about 3,000 tons.

(4)  ENCLOSURE (5)

— page 265 —
1950-03-30 10:00 AM
Subject: USS HARDER (SS257) - Report of Fifth War Patrol (2nd Phase)

June 30th (cont-)
0957 Sighted aircraft over the target, range 4 or 5 miles, banking our way.

Made quick dive.

0959 Three small aircraft bombs landed; not very close. At least one of these either did not explode or it sounded like a very low-order detonation. - One minute later the maneuvering room watch reported that they could hear something rolling around on deck. - With the idea that this was possibly a small, unexploded aircraft bomb, the rudder was put hard left and full speed was rung up in order to roll the "duud" over the side. - Whether the sound was caused by an incantation or by a dud, it now ceased.

1002 Planed up to periscope depth and sighted two flat type planes flying low and circling the spot where we had submerged nearly one mile astern. The sound watch at this time reported fast propellers on our starboard quarter. Increased depth to 250 feet and raised for "silent running". An effective 2 degree negative gradient was found at 150 feet and utilized in evading the patrol craft.

1023 Depth charge attack started which lasted intermittently for two and one half hours. A total of 13 charges were dropped; none estimated to be closer than 1,000 yards and most of them beyond one mile. The charges came at almost regular 10 or 20 minute intervals and it seemed that the petrol vessel's intent was to drop these charges just often enough to discourage any attempts on our part to get back to periscope depth while the small cargo vessel was getting through. Salcier Strait. With the two planes circling overhead, his system worked.

1154 Planed up to periscope depth. - Sighted high-wing monoplane, float type, headed our way, distant about 1 mile. The patrol vessel was then about 4 miles astern. Increased depth to 150 feet.

Calculated the distance to the coastal turning point south of Maccassar, believed to be the target's destination, and found that with his head start he could reach that point (where pursuit into shallow water was not justified for us) before we could catch him, - even if we could surface by 1500 and chase at 17 knots. Reluctantly abandoned hope of getting this target.

We had been maneuvered into trying to stop the ball carrier on an end run while he made an off-tackle play.

Set course to the southeast and headed for the area of Buton Strait.

1830 Surfaced.

(5) ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 266 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-.
Subject: USS HARDER (35257)-Report of Fifth War Patrol (2nd Phase).

July 1st
0542 Submerged for trim dive.
0630 Surfaced.
0945 Made dive for training.
1015 Surfaced.
1120 Made dive for training.
1225 Surfaced.
1600 Unverified aircraft contact on SD radar at 27 miles; closed to 23 miles.
1930 Transmitted HARDER'S Serial #3.
2042 Doubtful aircraft contact on S? radar.
2045 Undetected aircraft dropped a yellow magnesium flare almost overhead. It parachuted down about 300 yards off the starboard beam as the climbing alarm was sounded. Submerged to 100 feet.

The 0.0.D. reports that the entire area around the sub was lighted "bright as day". In the bright moonlight, we might have been spotted by either a friendly or enemy plane who dropped his flare to insure identification before bombing, or a racer-equiped enemy plane might have been sent out from a nearby base after a D.F. cut had been obtained on our 1930 transmission.

2220 Raised SD mast, planed up to 48 feet and searched for aircraft; none in evidence.
2226 Aircraft contact on SD radar at range of 11 miles. The plane was apparently circling and searching the area of our dive.
2230 The plane closed to 4 miles. Submerged.
2330 Ran up SD radar mast, planed up to 48 feet and checked for aircraft. He was still there, circling, this time at range of 2 miles. Submerged to 80 feet.
2400 Planed up and made another check for aircraft. None was in evidence.

(6) ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 271 —
1. USS HARDER (SS267) = Report of Fifth War Patrol (2nd Phase).
(C) WEATHER
During the major part of this second phase of the patrol (in the Flores Sea) the surface of the sea was unusually flat. The sky was normally overcast.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
None.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
None.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS*
: Time : : Initial :Course:
No. : Date :Location :Types :Range :Speed :How Contacted
:North of :

— page 276 —
15 - ENCLOSURE (B)

Subject: USS HARDER (SS257) - Report of Fifth War Patrol (2nd Phase).

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes 17
Fuel 80,000*
Provisions 30 days
Personnel Factor 30 days

*Upon arrival at advanced base.

Limiting factor this patrol -
Patrol terminated by Operation Order.

(U) REMARKS

This phase of the patrol served mainly as a training period for our new men.

Results attained and scarcity of contacts were disappointing, but the following information relative to Saleler Strait may be put on the positive side of the ledger:

(1) Saleler Strait is used by both combatant and non-combatant ships of the enemy; the northern (shallow) part of the Strait is used by the merchantman, while the southern and deep water part is used by war ships.

(2) Merchant traffic through Saleler is provided with air and surface escort.

(3) War ships encountered, proceeding through Saleler had no air coverage.

(4) Evidence indicates that Pomaleia is active as "ore" port and the nickel ore is being shipped westward, via Saleler, in small cargo ships of less than 5,000 tons.

(5) The area around Saleler does not seem to be scouted by aircraft except during passage of merchantmen.

Our faith in the SD radar has been partially restored on this run, but conviction is even more firm that no equipment will ever replace the alert lookout.

— page 277 —
35-12N-45E-125-21 SUBMARINE SQUADRON TELW 1
Serial 0126
CONFIDENTIAL
FIRST PROROGRAM TO
U.S.S. HARDER - Report
of Fifth Star Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TELW.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of Fifth Star Patrol.

1. The fifth star patrol of the U.S.S. HARDER, the most brilliant in a series of five outstation patrols, was of 46 days' duration, from Jan 26 to July 10, 1944. The first phase of this one outstation patrol was conducted in the Celebes Sea in the vicinity of Sibu and Basilan Strait, the second phase in the Flores Sea and Gulf of Beni.

2. While the entire patrol was conducted in the outstation manner characteristic of HARDER, the events of 6-11 June were an epic of submarine warfare. During this period, despite the hazards of operation in restricted waters adjacent to the major Japanese fleet anchorage at Tawi Tawi and despite enemy bombs and depth charges, HARDER in a series of brilliant actions succeeded in

(a) The accomplishment of a hazardous special mission.

(b) Reconnoitering the enemy fleet anchorage close inshore and cruising vulnerable information.

(c) Sinking 5 enemy destroyers in a series of six skillfully and courageously conducted attacks.

3. It is recommended that this patrol report be studied by all submarine officers.

The HARDER will be refitted by the U.S.S. CRUSADER and the Submarine Division 121 Relief Crew during a normal refit period. Main engine mufflers and exhaust piping will be thoroughly tested and replaced as necessary. In accordance with ships officers' request, a distribution of air condition system will be accomplished including: bripple plates over and below cooling coils. To a letter lettered will be made on all submarines of this squadron as boats are available. The #2 turbo blower structure was found to be rounded and will be replaced. The bow plane solenoid clutch will be wound and spare terminal blocks furnished. As a result of rounding, a new QC-JK

— page 279 —
FE24-71/A16-3
Serial 0748
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HARDER Conf. Ltr. A16-3
Serial W.P. 5 dated 10 July, 1944.
Report of FIFTH War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) - Report of FIFTH War Patrol - Comment on.

1. The Task Force Commander concerns in the remarks contained in the first endorsement to HARDER'S Report of her Fifth War Patrol.

2. HARDER sank one fleet destroyer and damaged another on the preceding patrol. That experience in "destroyer destruction" paid dividends on this patrol in an area where such targets were plentiful. Five destroyers were sunk in five days, a creditable feat for a Task Force and an outstanding achievement for one submarine. This was accomplished under strong enemy air and surface ship opposition. HARDER has proved that first line enemy destroyers are no match for one of our modern submarines under the command of a resoluto and skillful Captain.

3. This patrol is designated "successful" for the purpose of the award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

4. The Force Commander has read this well prepared report with admiration, and is proud to extend his congratulations to the Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew, of HARDER on this magnificent patrol in which a difficult reconnaissance of a major fleet anchorage was skillfully conducted, a hazardous special mission successfully accomplished, and the following crippling blow struck at the first line naval forces of the enemy:

SUNK
5 - DD (Fleet Type - EC)

— page 280 —
1944-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES ....i 12c/pr
Serial_0748 July 26, 1944.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HARDER Conf. Ltr. A16-3
Scri1. W.P. S dcted 10 July, 1944.
Report of FIFTH War Patrol.
Subject: U.S.S. HARDER (3-217) - Report of FIFTH War Patrol - Comment on.
P. F. STRUB, Jr.,
Fig Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION:
ComInch (3) Direct CTF-71 (4)
Vice Opnav (2) Direct CTF-72 (2)
Vice Opnav Op-23c (1) CSS-12 (1)
ComSub1Fl (1) CSS-16 (1)
Com2ndFl (1) DivCom1ons-12 (1)
Com3rdFl (1) DivCom1ons-16 (1)
Com7thFl (2) S/M School N.L. Conn. (2)
ComSub1stFl (4) *Each S/M W.A. (1)
ComSub2ndFl (4) *NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN

— page 282 —
30 Oct-1 Dec 43
NAME: HARDER
FROM: CROSS INDEX CARD
SERIAL: 21
DATE: 30 Oct-1 Dec 43
SUBJECT: Coordinated Patrol Report
Report of SECOND Coordinated Attack Group under Cdr. F.B. Ward in RAHADAS Islands area. Report of enemy shipping.

FILED: War Diary
Separately under TASK GROUP 17.15 no ser of 5 Dec 43

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT | 0PRAY FORM 3480-13 (11-55) | 9-2000
DATE: 10 June 1944
NAME: HARDER
FROM: US HARDER(S.S.257)
SERIAL: 21
DATE: 21 June 1944
SUBJECT: Special Mission 26 May-21 Jun 44, Report of Chronological report of landing of agents & equipment 8 Jun 44, personnel from northeast coast of SCOTLAND.

FILED: War Diary
Separately as ORIGINAL
As Enc. to TF 71 ser 00014 of 12 Jul 44

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT | 0PRAY FORM 3480-13 (11-55) | 9-2000
DATE: 20 Aug-14 Sep 1944
NAME: HARDER
FROM: CROSS INDEX CARD
SERIAL: 21
SUBJECT: Coordinated Attack Group
Report of coordinated operations of USS HARDER, USS HAKES, USS HADDO in Philippine Islands. 21,800 tons sunk or damaged.

FILED: War Diary
Separately under HADDO ser none of 15 Sep 44

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT | 0PRAY FORM 3480-13 (11-55) | 9-2000

— page 283 —
1525522
DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR. 520.9
01 27 Sep 58
BY: 7.25
DATE: 1/1/58
RECEIVED:
Commander Samuel J. Dealey, USN
War Patrol of USS TARPIR.

Film No. S-24
1525522
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY
162

— page 284 —
1st patrol of the H.M.S. Audacious.
Commander Bailey.

This is Commander Bailey, commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Audacious.

The recording is made at the request of Lt. Sumnerell, Submarine Historian, and is authorized, classified as secret, by Vice Admiral Lockwood, Commander, Submarine Force Pacific Fleet.

Having made a recording of the first war patrol of the submarine H.M.S. Audacious, an attempt will be made to evade restriction. The only justification for the recording, aside from its minor historical significance, is the fact that some of the lessons learned the hard way, may be should say the "harder" way, may be of benefit to another submarine who has not yet made his first patrol, or to one who has not yet had the opportunity to learn from the past.

I will attempt to tell in brief the day by day patrol as I recall it. The passage from sea shore to midway was, as usual, one in which intensive training was involved throughout—unfortunately, but one of those necessary parts without which no patrol is successful. From midway on the unventilated mess deck to the open sea, the sea was about 500 miles in length, and at the point we found a Japanese reception committee waiting for us in the form of a cap aviator who proceeded to force us down at about eight o'clock in the evening. Fortunately, he had the running lights of his plane burning so that we sighted him at about the same time as sighted us. We put about 200 feet of water between

— page 288 —
5
Second patrol of MALEH.
Commander Leeloy.
b
for the 1g change. We finally fixd two cargo vessels with a trailing
escort coming our way and moved in for a fine attack position, and just
as we raised the periscope for the final firing observation a small red
plane zoomed directly at the periscope; this plane wasn't any more than
300 or 400 yards away at the most. I felt as if he was coming right on
down the periscope. We fired three torpedoes and apparently the target
had seen the plane zoom, he zipped and our torpedoes missed, but so did
the Jef eviitor's bomb. He eyed the airing followed this, a depth
charging that lasted a lot of time hours. Incidentally, this was a happy
birthday to the commanding officer. Everyone aboard went out of his
way to wish me a happy birthday and I hope that I never saw
a birthday that is like that one again. Even the mess boy baked a large
cake that said, "My birthday, Skipper," on it--I doubt if a cake was
ever baked under our difficult conditions before, I dropped a bit
during the depth charging.

We surfaced that night and we ran on the surface twenty minutes
when we sighted planes which came in and bombed us, then dived and
swept us from the depth charging. The depth charging was a
made another attempt to surface late on and got in a small battery
charge but was immediately attacked by both surface craft and aircraft
bombs and again forced down. At this period we had been down 8 hours
out of the past 10 and still lanes were pretty tired. Luckily, our vessel

— page 290 —
2nd patrol of USS DOLPHIN.
Commander Dealy

that had come up.  Went to get the cut of 120 feet below the surface we rolled
back and forth 5 degrees.  At night on the surface it was really rough,
we had to slow to a speed of 4 knots to keep from taking sea over the
bridge all the time.  The first day of the typhoon we had fog y weather,
and about two o'clock in the afternoon of that first day the office of
of the leak at the periscope lighted two ships coming out of the fog,
they were no more than 3 or 4 thousand yards away.  We put a quick set-
up into the TIG, but before the torpedoes could be gotten ready the first
a ship gone past the firing bearing.  We shifted to the second ship,
put in one set-up, fired three torpedoes, one of which hit—to hit, in
feet.  The first was a cud which threw water all over the bridge of the
tanker and the second blew his bow completely off.  He went down in 20
seconds by stop—each time.  This made us pretty unpopular in that area
and we shifted our unwelcome presence the next day into the vicinity of
Delo Saki.  There we made an unsuccessful attack on a cargo vessel and
a tanker from an unfavorable range.  He fired from about 2,800 yards,
and we received an aerial bo d directly on top of us right after firing.
I believe that the torpedo raises were caused by the fact that the air
screen had sighted us and warned both ships of our presence.  The bomb
that landed on top of us fortunately we a small one, did no real damage
but it smote the 2C mm gun so that it could no be worked an loosed out
the airlock a few feet on the bridge, broke a few light out in the ship

- 7 -

169

— page 292 —
2nd Patrol of H.M.S. HUNTER

Commander Leedy

they were definitely of a size and concussion that we had never felt before. We had taken lots of bombs, both aircraft and depth charges, but these were much larger than any we had ever encountered. None of the bombs came any closer than half a mile to us, but the concussion was tremendous.

We waited about four of five days before our next contact and then, working close in along the beach south of Shiono Mineki at about five o'clock in the morning the raider plucked up a convoy to answer this was the first convoy we picked up to some d--usually we had been to a reward and they had been close inshore along the beach. Leew was proceeding fast and it forced us to dive earlier than we wanted to and before we could reach a favorite lie firing position. We finally fired at a range of about 2,500 yards on the lee of the cargo vessels, heard one timed duck and the other apparently was a clear else, no explosions, and he was followed by two depth charges from one of the surface escorts. This brought the number of depth charges or aircraft bombs that we had received on this patrol to a grand total of 100. We had begun to fall like we were co-observers in the great art of receiving depth charges, but we don't feel that it's an honor and we hope that our experience along this line will not grow.

We operated from the area and had an uneventful return for a while, until we were about 500 miles east of Tokyo. At that point one

— page 295 —
64326 FILMED

From: Commander Task Group 17,15.
To: Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: War Diary of Coordinated Attack Group from October 30, 1943
to December 1, 1943.
Reference: (a) CTF 17 Secret Coordination Order 247-43 of October 28, 1943.
       (b) Detailed Plan for Coordinated Patrol and Attack Task
       Group 17,15 (Secret - No Date).
       (c) "Per Patrol Report of PERSO's Second Patrol.
       (d) "Per Patrol Report of HUNTER's Third Patrol.
       (e) "Per Patrol Report of SMOKE's Fourth Patrol.
Enclosure: (a) Subject "War Diary.
       1. The enclosure is forwarded herewith.
       2. It is submitted in advance of receipt of references (a),
       (d) and (e).

F. P. WILDER.

— page 296 —
1943
Subject: War Diary of Coordinated Attack Group from October 30, 1943 to December 1, 1943.

NARRATIVE:
October 30, 1943
1300 (WW) Under war from Submarine Reso, Pearl Harbor, in accordance with Reference (e), CTG 17.15 in PARCO; HARDER and SNOOK in company. Engaged in individual exercises and group tactical and communications drills enroute MIRAY; making good about 15 knots in direction of advance.

November 3, 1943
1045 (Y) Arrived NUDYAY. Conferred with Task Unit Commanders. Distributed Reference (b). SNOOK and HARDER adopted camouflaged similar to PARCO as result of exercises enroute. Departed MUDYAY. Engaged in group and individual exercises until reaching Meridian 1600hr, at which time formed column distance 20 miles, course 259°, speed 10, in order to present widest possible front while crossing MIRAY and MUDYAY and MUDYAY routes. Order of ships: SNOOK, PARCO, HARDER.

November 10, 1943
2300 (K) Made signal to increase speed to 15 knots and take course 262°.

November 12, 1943
0000 (K) Made signal to increase speed to 17 knots. Took up patrol stations North of MARINAS. SNOOK reported plane and dived. PARCO sighted and reported near position 0000°. SNOOK did not react for either reported smoke bearing 0000°. SNOOK did not react for either signal (submarined?). PARCO took position ahead, identifying a freighter and an escort and at 9 miles. (Target bearing north). Submarined when dived ahead. On distant or minor explosion. Two closer or more violent explosion. PARCO was at deep submergence. One closer or more violent explosion. PARCO could not find freighter torpedo depth shortly afterwards, PARCO could not find freighter or escort. Subsequently in evening twilight PARCO began approach on what occurred to be HARDER. PARCO had also examined a South bound torpedo of about 500 tons which did not march further aft. Submarined under the circumstances. PARCO surfaced and received report from HARDER that AK had been sunk and that escort was abandoned and sinking and that nothing was left which would float. HARDER also reported by visual on main engine gear train wrecked. SNOOK reported by radio that plane had hovered over her for about half hour and that he was submerged at periscope depth from 1300 to 1400 but had sighted nothing; close during day. Made signal to call ships to proceed independently to new station in Southern MARINAS. Told HARDER.

-1- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 297 —
1943
SUBJECT: War Diary of Coordinated Attack Group from October 30, 1943 to December 1, 1943.

we hoped he could stay with us for awhile yet. I chose to have ship's proceed independently to next station as ships would be within easy flying range of Islands for entire route and I didn't want one plane to keep all of us down. On next day SN00K sighted and reported one plane while proceeding to station.

November 13, 1943
2332 (K) PINCO picked up radar contact 2350T, distance 13,800 yards, which was emitting radar interference of old type 50, SOKEPION was expected here about this time and it is believed to have been SOKEPION. This was one of many instances in which the need for IFF equipment between the ships was keenly felt.

November 14, 1943
0400 (K) Formed patrol line to Northmost of Southern WARNINGS, 20 miles between ships, 0600 - 2400T., one hour legs at 10 knots to maintain a front of 70 miles; midpoint of patrol 15221 N, 144040 E. Made signal to proceed on 327T at 10 knots.

November 15, 1943
Instructed ships as to routing of pick while proceeding to next station south of BOMINS.

November 16, 1943
0430 (K) Changed course to 0070T, advancing in line of bearing.

November 17, 1943
0700 (K) Formed scouting line 0620 - 2420 in vicinity 23451 N, 142201 E. PR50 was forced to dive by planes at 0945, at 1007, at 1110, at 1250. Maximum radar submerged 1 hour 15 minutes. Received numerous plane contacts from HUNDER and SN00K who apparently had same trouble. Reestablished scouting line, midpoint 23291 N, 142301 E. Line retired on 1200.

November 18, 1943
1100 (K) Established scouting line 0300 - 2100T, midpoint 21351 N, 146001 E. Made signal to proceed at 1500 to take stationary patrol stations at 0400 K November 19 on line 0400 - 2200, midpoint 22181 N, 148171 T.

November 19, 1943
0501 (K) PINCO made contact on radar, 2 ships at 24,000 yards, 2730T and sent contact report which was received for by SN00K but not by HUNDER. This contact devolved to be three ships and two escorts bound southeast. PIN30 sent amplifying report indicating target course 0600T (reciprocated for by SN00K).

0530 (K)

— page 298 —
1943
Subject: War Diary of Coordinated Attack Group from October 30, 1943 to December 1, 1943.

0540 (K) Much signalling, ammunition, gunfire in convoy with escort turning towards PARGO who dived and received depth charges from 0552 to 0631.

0826 (K) PARGO attacked escort vessel which had remained with him while convoy scattered to Southwestward. Expanded 3 torpedoes and received depth charge attack from 0827 to 1025.

1215 (K) PARGO sunk after collision with convoy to Southwestward, which was a result of a collision with a torpedo.

1245 (K) - 1252 (K) Heard four distant explosions.

1417 (K) HARDER attacked PARGO for information.

1427 (K) Received HARDER's 190420 station that HARDER had got down hits in two large frigates. EMPIRE bound in 22937! N 147918! E. (About 90 miles to NW of PARGO). He gave speed of convoy as 10 knots but did not give time of attack. He stated that his present position was some of attack.

1432 (K) Received contact from HARDER of ship bearing 2300T 10 miles. As PARGO was closer to his convoy than this position decided to keep PARGO working to the Southwestward and at.

1530 (K) Transmitted my 190530 instructing all ships that in absence of contacts they were to proceed at best speed to form NW scouting line 0510 - 2340 midbound 1918N N 150941. Which was receipted for by SNOCK at 1536 and by HARDER at 1521.

1706 (K) Received SNOCK's 190640 asking us in future contacts to give position as he had been "chasing the moon". No possibility of ambiguity was apparent to me at the time as PARGO was on assigned station at time of originating two LCT contact at 0507 K. "He learned afterwards that HARDER had sent a contact about 0200 K on EMPIRE bound convoy which had been received by SNOCK but not by PARGO and that SNOCK had first chased this HARDER contact and was properly non-plussed by PARGO's "two LCT" bearing and distance signal and "two LCT" target course signal at 0507 and 0530 K. Decided in future to use Aircraft Code.

2315 (K) PARGO made radar contact on South bound convoy and sent contact report which was receipted for by SNOCK. (HARDER probably working over his own problem about this time).

November 20, 1943
0005 (K) PARGO sent amplifying report. (Recodited for by SNOCK).

0230 (K) PARGO dived.

0325 (K) PARGO attacked large frigidator and missed.

0402 (K) PARGO surfaced and ran around convoy.

0445 (K) Transmitted my 191815 to SNOCK giving latest information on convoy. PARGO again sighted convoy bearing 3243T but in endeavoring to get ahead lost contact and failed to regain it.

1338 (K) HARDER reported all torpedoes expended and proceeding as last previously directed by me, having obtained 2 hits in a third ship of northbound convoy.

-3-

— page 299 —
1400 (K) SWOOK reported position and recounted orders. Directed ships to scout to Southward from 1897° N, 151°10' E (midpoint) at 10 knots from 1430 K to 1800 K.
1710 (K) ...appointed rendezvous for succeding a.m. which would permit individual scouting to South and West of original convoy track while working to rendezvous. Relocated HARDER. Recounted for by SWOOK. Could not raise HARDER.
1900 (K) Informed Consubmarine of activities to date. Intercepted HARDER's report to CONSUME and CONSUMPTION orders to HARDER, detaching him.

November 21, 1943
0355 (K) Made signal form column course West speed 14 to pass thru MIRIMAS between PIZAN and ALIENARY.
0618 (K) Sighted SWOOK astern. Informed SWOOK of present plans, decreased standard distance to 14 miles, and found out that he had been too far north of us to get in on convoy which PIR3O had attacked twice.
1250 (K) Made signal course 265 speed 10 to enable ships go through Islands after dusk.
1632 (K) Increased speed to 14 knots on signal.

November 23, 1943
1112 (I) Established stationnary patrol 280° - 100°, distance 14 miles, midpoint 17940' N, 136°20' E.
1805 (I) Moved line to Southward at 14 knots on course 196°. Instructed ships to discontinue use of SD radar while outside range probable air patrols.

November 24, 1943
1645 (I) Rocteblished stationnary patrol, midpoint 12935' N, 134°55' E, 290° - 110°, distance 14 miles.

November 26, 1943
1505 (I) Closed SWOOK at noon and made signal to take course 020° speed 10 until 21 Zuber 26th at which time change to 010°. At 3 27 ships to proceed independently to North-eastward, SWOOK to patrol south of latitude 19° N and PIR3O North of sea. Instructed SWOOK to show off when his full limitations required and to report indemandantly to CONSUME when one diverr run forscored of Northern 140° E. PIR3O took position about 14 miles.

November 28, 1943
1505 (I) 17900 sighted smoke of several ships bearing 294° from 1912' N, 140° E.
1535 (I) Sunt contact report to SWOOK.
1716 (I) Sunset.
1735 (I) PIR3O sent amplifying report to SWOOK.
1916 (I) PIR3O picked SWOOK up on radar (IFF badly needed).

---

— page 300 —
1943
Subject: War Diary of Coordinated Attack Group from October 30, 1943
to December 1, 1943.

1837 (I) Lost contact with SNOOK. Both PIRPO and SNOOK on port side of convoy. Convoy determined to be total of six ships. PIRPO must round to starboard side of convoy as he was closer to convoy, but found SNOOK there from 1955 to 2011 at which time SNOOK dropped back astern of convoy.

2202 (I) PIRPO fired three torpedoes at escort vessel which had headed for him at increased speed, and dived. There were explosions from 2203 to 2356.

2357 (I) PIRPO surfaced and found two targets on Radar.

November 29, 1943
0242 (I) PIRPO attacked Predicator Transport which sank by 0257. PIRPO scouted to Southeasternward to find remaining ships.

0404 (I) Received SNOOK's message reporting expenditure all torpedoes for nine hits and SNOOK heading home.

0543 (I) PIRPO sighted ship 3300T.

0755 (I) PIRPO dived and attempted approaches on a Tanker of about 4000 tons and a Freighters transport of about 5000 tons. These ships steered most radical zig and had only made good about 4 knots along the base course since the first attack of the proceeding night. They were overtaken by an escort vessel which ran over PIRPO and headed for SHIM. PIRPO was never able to attain attack position and surfaced at 1532 about 24 hours after ships went out of sight to Southeasternward. PIRPO scouted to Southeasternward at high speed but failed to regain contact.

November 30, 1943
1415 (I) PIRPO sighted smoke bearing 3100T and while tracking to determine course and got ahead for night attack at.

1636 (I) Sighted smoke bearing 1800T.

1655 (I) PIRPO dived to avoid detection.

1827 (I) PIRPO surfaced.

2049 (I) PIRPO fired four torpedoes at Tanker, one of which hit. Tanker held or increased speed and at.

2328 (I) PIRPO fired four more torpedoes at Tanker, all of which hit. Tanker stopped but did not sink. Large boat soon in water.

December 1, 1943
0017 (I) PIRPO fired three more torpedoes at tanker, two of which hit.

0051 (I) Target sank.

0110 (I) PIRPO went close aboard lifts boat (which was large) and hailed it several times. Flash lights had been seen on board. Illuminated.

-5-

— page 301 —
1. "War Diary of Coordinated Attack Group from October 30, 1943 to December 1, 1943.
2. "PARKINS AND RECOGNIZATIONS:
   1. Fuel consumption became a problem early in the operation; although PARK was in relatively comfortable condition with 23,000 gallons reserve fuel in No. 4 N.P.T. It is recommended that this PARK Reserve Fuel Allocation for similar alteration) be performed on all fleet submarines at first opportunity.
   2. COMMUNICATIONS:
    (a) Failure of PARK to receive HARDER contact report at about 0210 F of November 19 can be attributed to operator intent on copying intercom schedule at this time, or improper receiver setting in PARK. Voice radio of TBS or low frequency type with outlets in common tower and bridge would eliminate at least part of this problem and would also render exchange of information at visual rendezvous more easy. Submarines are poor at visual signalling and always will be.
    (b) At no time was it believed that the low frequency transmissions resulted in productive JAP D/F activity. Bridge personnel complained of antenna scandals during transmission and they thought this may have been the cause of enemy detecting PARK in morning watch of November 19.
    (c) After confusion which resulted in SWOKE actions in no attacks on either HARDER or PARK conveys on November 19-20 decided to use AMBER Code for all contacts where there was any possibility of confusion. This provides short transmission and a ready means of indicating positions. It also proved to be an excellent channel for other communications relative to movements of the pack.
    (d) Frequency: JAP shore-ship traffic was intercepted on 385 KAS (SIC MISHIT) (Copy of message sent to IPCA). 344 KAS was too close to JAP airplane homing frequency of 346. 540 and 250 KAS proved satisfactory substitutes for those frequencies. In addition to frequency there was miscellaneous 1-12N interference on 272 and 294 KAS.
    (e) HARDER suggested a 30 second transmission by flagship 5 minutes after daily frequency shift. This is believed to be practicable if pack is not operating ahead of an expected contact at the time. Great care was taken to have no significant take place other than reports of contacts when operating on a suspected enemy route.

-6- ENCLOSURE (1)

— page 302 —
1/1/1943
Subject: War Diary of Coordinated Attack Group from October 30, 1943
to December 1, 1943.

3. IFR EQUIPMENT:
The need for this equipment was keenly felt on numerous occasions, most notably when crossing SCOPION track on November 13 and during SNOCK - PARGO attacks on convoy during night of November 28-29.

4. USN OR SD RADAR:
After failure to contact anything except airplanes in scouting operations of November 17 MURDER suggested non-use of this equipment as there appeared to be a strong likelihood of it betraying our presence. I considered that our proximity to aircraft facilities forbade its abandonment at this time but in operations on November 23 it set I directed ship to discontinue use while outside range of probable shore based patrols. It is believed quite possible that a ship in a convoy is carrying a detector which is P/1/1ing our SD emission and causing a re-route of the ships.

5. RESULTS:
I direct of the radio traffic indicates that this operation resulted in the sinking of at least six Jap ships and the damage of six others. All submarines expended all torpedoes in a relatively short period of operation. It is not believed that comparable results could have been obtained close aboard an enemy port without accepting much more rigorous 4/3 measures than were experienced by those ships. It is reported that greater damage was not inflicted. For the damage which was done the Commander's Officers, their officers and crews deserve full credit. Their loyal and eager co-operation was a source of great pleasure.

6. The presence of a Division Commander is not considered necessary in this type of operation as it can well be directed by an experienced senior Commander. It is thought, however, that the occasional presence of a division commander will be beneficial to both him and to the service.

P. B. WARDEN.

— page 303 —
1922
Serjeant:
CORPLAN:
Date:
To:
Via:
Subject:
1. The commander submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
2. The commander-in-chief, United States Fleet.
3. The commander-in-chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: War Diary of Coordinated Attack Group from October 30, 1942 to December 1, 1943.

1. The second coordinated attack group under the command of Commander F. R. Warner, U.S. Navy, operated in the area surrounding the Marianas Islands.

2. Attached all of the attacks except one were individual, the results obtained by concentrating three submarines in good weather. The point of the attack was not particularly. The one coordinated attack made by the Fancy (SS-284) and Slick (SS-279) resulted in the sinking of at least three ships and damage of four more, all within a period of about five hours.

3. Once again communications were a major difficulty. The use of the aircraft code by the Task Group Commander solved some of the coordination problems.

4. The need of IF equipment was most apparent on the night of 28-29 November when the USS had fire several times, television and the torpedoes which the Fancy. As it is expected that coordinated attack groups will be used frequently in the future, and also in view of the fact that submarine fire this force are now beginning to operate with not in the vicinity of our surface combatant vessels, every effort must be to expedite the delivery and installation of the equipment.

5. It is possible true that the SS equipment on the submarines of this group was LAD in the vicinity of shore stations in the Marianas Islands within 200 miles of them. However, it is felt that disconnection must be used in securing this equipment when dispatch surface running is required to, particularly on overcast and cloudy days. The keeping of the SS aircraft and aircraft and their operation of the equipment should make it difficult, if not impossible, for good IF berriers to be obtained by the enemy.

— page 304 —
1942/All-3(e)/Commander Submarine Force
Serial 11922
United States Pacific Fleet
Commanding Officer

FIRST SUBSCRIBER to:
Cdr. 17,15 Dnft. 1st.
USN-122/All-3 dated
5 December 1943.

Subject: War Diary of Coordinated Attack Group from October 30, 1942 to December 1, 1943.

1. This attack report expanded all torpedoes within twenty days in area. The concentrated efforts of three submarine resulted in the sinking of nine ships for a total tonnage of 57,004 tons and 4,000 crew for over a total of 19,200 tons.

2. To copy of this endorsement the Commander submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, contributed the Commander Task Group 17.15 for the effective manner in which the attack group was handled and for the results furnished.

GOPR TO:
Cdr. 17,15 (and only)

J. H. ERWING, Jr.
Captain.

10

— page 305 —
15/12/45
Al6-3/SS(1)
Serial
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

2nd Endorsement on
CTG 17-15 Conf. ltr.
FB-122/Alt-3, dated
5 December 1/43.

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: War Diary of Coordinated Attack Group from October
3, 1/43 to December 1, 1/43.

Forwarded, concurring with paragraphs 4, 5, and 8 of

Copy to:
ConsubPac
CIG 17-15

FILMED

— page 307 —
35257/A16
Serial (01)
From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HARDEN.
To: The Commander Task Force 35/12N, 125-45E.

Subject: Localization of U.S.S. HARDEN.

May 20th
0800 Arrived at Anchorage.

1400 Held drills in quick assembly of the collapsible boats and tested the boats and their outboard motors.

1500 Sent boats out from submarine and found that our 3J radar could not detect them at ranges beyond 1000 yards.

A radar target was therefore devised, consisting of a wire mesh screen secured to a 3' x 3' frame and made fast to an air which could be raised to a height of 10 feet. Credit for its derisive should be given to the Executive Officer, Lieut. Comdr. F. G. DREW.

2200 Assembled all equipment and held a "dress rehearsal" of the special mission to be accomplished. The radar target worked perfectly. When held aloft by a man in the boat, our radar was able to take bearings and ranges out to 550 yards, although the cameras had disappeared from sight at 500 yards. Wallace-Talks communication was used to advise the proper courses which the boats should steer enroute to the beach and when returning to the submarine.

May 30th to June 8th
Surfaced to area for special radar, detailed plans and alternative plans were worked out with Major DREW.

Our two late arrivals at the desolate rendezvous was occasioned by torpedo attacks which resulted in the sinking of two Japs destroyers and a thorough arousing of the hostile nature of 5 more destroyers assisted by night flyers who held us down in 3lbuin 'as-age.

June 8th
1400 Arrived off rendezvous and made periscope reconnaissance in the coastline, and a study of prominent peaks and coastal currents for navigational purposes.

1940 Surfaced. Remained flooded down to deck level with propulsion on the batteries, and moved in toward the coast.

— page 308 —
33257/A16
Serial (01)
From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HARDER.
To: The Commander Task Force 38, WESTERN OCEAN.

Subject: Special Mission of USS HARDER

2015
Assembled boats and all equipment topside and made last-minute preparations.

2139
With one fathoms of water under the keel and bow pointed toward the beach 6500 yards away, put boats in the water.

2140
Major JENKINS and Sargeant DODDS embarked in boats and cheered off. Radar contact on the screen, held aloft in the lead in boat, was maintained out to 5000 yards and the boat was guided to steer by radar using landing point by Falke-Talkie communication.

The moon was full, visibility like that in daytime, and the bridge watch was doubled with attention concentrated on looking for night fires and enemy patrol craft.

Radar navigation made it easy to keep the ship in its proper position.

2138
Received communication from Major Jenkins stating that the party ashore had been contacted and had realized with the proper signal.

June 10th
0125
Hazard boats returned to ship with the following listed officers at 1:00 am:

Major

— page 309 —
32357/A16
Serial (01)
From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HARDEN.
To: The Commander Task Force SWEET ONE.

Subject: Report of U.S.S. HARDEN

Major JONES and Sergeant DODDS were adopted 100% as members of the crew. Their carefully planned and courageous rescue of the comrades won the respect of officers and men alike on the HARDEN. Both offered to share a part of the work on the cruise and Major JONES stood sticks as a JUNO while Sergeant DODDS took his turn as lookout, both did their jobs well, and the Major showed a particular adaptation in submarining. Though his ambition to qualify as a submariner during the patrol lacks the essential elements of time and experience, his presence aboard was of definite benefit to the ship and all aboard are proud to have served with him. - Any ship to which he may be assigned for other special missions can be sure that his presence will be an asset to the ship.

June 11th to 16th

In assigned operating areas.

June 17th -

Enroute DARDEN.

June 21st

Arrived DARDEN and disembarked passengers. Special Mission Completed.

3. D. DEALING.

(4)

— page 310 —
12/bt
UNITED STATES NAVY
12/bt
AMERICAN "DOG" TO COMMANDER TASK GROUP SUBMITTED ONE LIGHT ONE OPERATION REPORT
MURPHY CLARKE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION:
1. In all cases, the report is to be made to evacuate six Allied Intelligence
   Japanese personnel (British and Australian Army Officers) from the North-
   east Coast of B 2nd in the vicinity of Latitude 5°-25' North and longi-
   tudinal 119°-02' East.

2. Major Jinkins and partner will board the HARBOR in PRIVATE
   with all equipment necessary to effect the evacuation. This will consist
   of boating equipment and "Whitley-Malik" radio units for communications.

3. In general, the plan is to conduct Major Jinkins and partner
   to the general vicinity of the area specified above. There disambigu-
   tham, each in a small boat, to proceed to the beach and take up the party
   on shore and return to the HARBOR. Reconstitution signals between the sub-
   marine and the 2nd are unnecessary. Communications between the submarine
   and the boats will be by "Malik" radio" high frequency radio.

4. Attempt at evacuation will be made first, the period 6 to 12
   June inclusive. If not successful on first attempt, further attempts will
   again be made as deemed feasible by Commanding Officer, HARBOR.
   On shore will be informed of these dates. Any directions for change in
   this general plan will be issued to the general naval officer on patrol
   minor details of execution of the General plan will be served out par-
   comly between Major Jinkins and the Commanding Officer, HARBOR.

5. Prior to departure of the HARBOR from HARBOR, the training
   exercises will be conducted to insure satisfactory completion of all equip-
   ment and thorough instruction in details of the plan.

6. Maintain strict secrecy concerning this operation and submit
   separate written report to this Command upon return.

— page 311 —
3-E-C-R-E-T
From: Major W.L. JINKINS, MBE.
To: Commander Task Force SEVENTY ONE.

Subject: Special Mission of U.S.S. HARDER (SS257).

1. The following is a report on the special mission which consisted in picking up a party of six officers and NCOs from the northeast coast of B.N.B. This mission was carried out from the U.S.S. HARDER (SS257) on the night of 8 June 1944.

The report covers only the sequence of events of the mission between the hours of 1830, 8 June to 0145, 9 June 1944.

The mission was carried out by Major W.L. JINKINS and Sgt. S.W. DODDS of the A.I.F. with the able and very cooperative assistance of the Captain, the Officers and all members of the crew of the U.S.S. HARDER.

2. At 1900, 8 June 1944, two Folboats (special canoes to be used for the operation) were made ready in the forward torpedo room and all accessories assembled ready for passing through the forward torpedo room hatch to the deck.

The HARDER, at this time, was under way on the surface and making 1/3 speed on the batteries toward a preselected position approximately 6,000 yards north of the shore rendezvous.

At approximately 0055, the canoes were passed topside. Major JINKINS and Sgt. DODDS, together with the assistance of V.L. DALLESSANDRO, TMLC, USN and W.F. YOUNG, TM2C, USN (both members of the HARDER crew), completed the assembly of the canoes. The accessories were then passed topside and stowed in their respective places in the canoes.

Final bearings and the range were checked with Lieut. Comdr. F.O. LYNCH, Jr., U.S. Navy, the navigator. A course of 158° magnetic, at a range of 7,500 yards from the shore, rendezvous was established. The canoes were launched from this position at 2140; the course set on the compass and the paddling to shore commenced.

— page 317 —
0412 HARDER and LADO dove about 4300 yards apart, 4 miles south of C. CALAVITA, and commenced closing the coast.

: 0515 Convoy observed by HADDO to commence sortie, hugging the coast. Intense but random depth charging was being employed by the many escorts to discourage submarines.

: 0600 (approx.) HARDER, surrounded by three escorts, and unable to rest a shot at the convoy, fired 4 stern tubes at an enemy vessel. All torpedoes apparently ran under and no hits resulted. HADDO then apparently evaded counter attack by opening out to the westward.

: 0619 GUITARO, apparently coming in from the westward, made 2 hits in an XB which was near the front of the convoy column. One C2 class destroyer was hit by HADDO, as a result of this attack, three ships at anchor or the torpedoes HADDO, were hit.

: 0627 attackant then fired 5 hits, two risen being aimed at each ship. HADDO evaded to westward.

: 0720 HADDO observed one ship to be turning and saw huge smoke pull at scene of her attack.

: 1002 HARDER and HADDO surfaced in contest with each other and proceeded north in line.

22 August 1944

HARDER and HADDO, in company, proceeding north past CALAVITA.

: 0130 Both HARDER and HADDO made simultaneous radar contact on three ships to the northward. HARDER took station on port quarter and HADDO on starboard flank of convoy. Convoy tracked by HADDO to be on course 115 knots 11.5 knots towards LAVITA.

— page 319 —
0330
HUDD informed HUDD that it considered targets too small due to size of radar pips. HUDD complied with this and ordered HUDD to station until at

0335
HUDD gave a convincing demonstration of his judgment by setting on his fire control panel and at

0424
HUDD attacked starboard screen, getting one hit in it and one hit in the third vessel.

0443
HUDD made good but unsuccessful attack on damaged destroyer.

0502
HUDD and HUDD dove and proceeded towards some of attack. As soon as it was light enough, the convoy was soon to consist of one medium AP plus 2 DD's, all hit and lying to.

0542
HUDD hit and sank AP.

0620
HUDD hit and sank one DD.

0636
HUDD and HUDD left firing up for short at remaining DD. HUDD heard HUDD's screws through the hull, went over and told HUDD by sound that HUDD would not clear.

0655
HUDD hit and sank remaining DD.

This was the last coordinated attack conducted by this attack group. HUDD had proceeded to rendezvous north of 35-12N for the evening or 22 hours. On arrival there HUDD contacted HUDD, just arrived on attack, and almost immediately thereafter contacted a DD which she immediately but unsuccessfully attacked.

Upon completion of HUDD's unsuccessful attack, not being able to raise the DD by radio, HUDD arranged a rendezvous with HUDD for the evening or 23 hours and proceeded north to spend the 23rd or 24th hours. HUDD took this action in view of her unsuccessful attack at some of last rendezvous presented by HUDD.

On 23 hours at dawn, HUDD attacked and damaged a destroyer on 35-12N but expended her torpedoes in so doing. HUDD maintained

— page 320 —
1. The "Alkide Tellico" is a torpedo-equipment for inter-submarine communications. In its stead is recommended VHF equipment and "full horn" amplified megaphones.

2. All apsc graphical code groups in the Aircraft Code book should be assigned positions within the "rocket" patrol area prior to departure of the attack group.

3. The in-formal ship calls within the attack group should be changed frequently during the patrol.

— page 322 —
12/24-71/416-3
Serial: 01339
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. HADDO CONF. LTD.
A16-3 dated 15 August, 1944.

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
The Commander submits, via the Commanding Officer, the Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLIGHT.
The Commander, via the Commander, the Commanding Officer, the Commander

— page 323 —
1/2a/ar
Serial 01339
10 November 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. HADDO Comf. Ltr.
ALC-3 dated 15 August 1944.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated search and attack Group consisting of HARDY, HADDO and HATE - Comments on.

By HADDO
1 - AK (Large - EU) 7,500 Tons #
1 - AK (Medium - EU) 4,000 Tons #
1 - DD (EU) 1,200 Tons #
1 - Large Patrol Vessel (EU) 1,000 Tons #
1 - AP (Small - EU - 4,000 Tons) 2,000 Tons #
1 - MIS 108 Tons

By HATE
1 - DD (ASABITO Class - EU) 1,500 Tons

TOTAL SINK 20,500 Tons

DAMAGED BY HADDO
1 - DD (KAMIKAZE Class - EU) 1,300 Tons

GRAND TOTAL SINK AND DAMAGED 21,800 Tons

# sunk in Coordinated attacks.

R. W. CHRISLE.

— page 324 —
24-71/16-3
Serial_01339
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. H.D.D.O. Conf. Ltr.
16-3 dated 15 August 1944.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Track Group consisting of HARDER, L.D.D.O. and H.K.E. - Comments on.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch (3) - Direct CTG-71.3 (2)
Vice Opnav (2) - Direct CTG-71.4 (2)
Vice Opnav Op-25c (1) CTG-71.5 (2)
ComlstFlit (1) DivComsubRon-12 (1)
Com2ndFlit (1) DivComsubRon-19 (1)
Com7thFlit (2) DivComsubRon-18 (1)
ComSubs1stFlit (30) S/M school N.L. Conn. (2)
ComSubs2ndFlit (4) Subd, Mare Island (2)
CTF-71 (4) S/M 7TH FLT (1)
CTF-72 (2)

THIS REPORT WILL BE DISTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO NAVY CONTROL MATERALS.

P. F. STRAUB, JR.,
Flag Secretary.

— page 325 —
1.0 1.1 1.25 1.4 1.6
: 1.0 1.1 1.25 1.4 1.6

THIS MICROFILM IS THE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO—NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION