U.S.S. S-30 (SS-135) — war patrol report SS-135_S-30.pdf

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JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: H-108]
[HANDWRITTEN: AR-20-77]
OPERATOR [HANDWRITTEN: HANCOCK]
DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 4/10/70]

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THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[Seal: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET, START & END
NAVEDOS 3968

— page 2 —
Division of Naval History
Ship' Histories Section
Navy Department

HISTORY OF USS S-30 (SS 135)

Before day break on Thursday, 13 September 1945 a stubby, gray-black
little submarine crept through one of those incredibly opaque fogs which
settle sometimes on the bay area and felt her way past Point Lobos and Mile
Rocks and under the Golden Gate bridge. Keeping steerageway in a flood tide
kept her ancient diesels smoking like twin volcanoes and her wheezy fog
signals added little to the din. She was the USS S-30, Lieutenant Commander
Quentin R. Thomson, USN, commanding, on her last voyage. Bound for San Fran-
cisco with three others of her class, she was distinctive in that she was not
only the oldest of all "S" boats, but also the first to be decommissioned after
the end of the war.

She marked an era in submarines. The S-boats, it is true, were taken
off war patrol as soon as new submarines could be built to replace them,
but they left their mark on the character of World War II by carrying out
threat to the enemy at a time when all available weapons had to be mustered.
No matter how old or poorly equipped they were. No one can imagine, comfortably,
what might have happened if those old boats hadn't been around in the early
days, hitting enemy supply lines with outmoded torpedoes, old fashioned sound
gear, and the most inadequate and uncomfortable living accommodations in the
history of modern marine warfare. They were equipped as coastwise submarines
for temperate climates, but they did a deep water job in the Arctic and in the
tropics. Heating had to be eliminated on those long patrols in order to save
their meager batteries for the more important job of fighting, and air condi-
tioning was unheard of in the days when the Sugar boats were built.

S-30's keel was laid in the San Francisco yards of the Bethlehem Ship-
building Corporation on 1 April 1918 and she was launched on 21 November 1918.
Mrs. Edwards Stuart Stalnaker, wife of Lieutenant Commander Edwards S. Stalnaker,
Supply Corps, USN, served as sponsor. The sub went into commission for the
first time on 29 October 1920.

Her subsequent peacetime career was a typical one. She served on
China station with the NINTH Submarine Division, including S-31, S-32, S-33,
S-34 and S-35, until relieved by the TENTH Sub Division for duty in Hawaii
about 1934. Finally she came back to the United States, later going through
the Panama Canal and up to Philadelphia for overhaul before being placed in
the rotating reserve at New London in August of 1940.

The threat of war brought her back to an active status again in November
of the same year. From then until Pearl Harbor day she operated almost con-
stantly: Washington, D. C. and Annapolis for underwater sound work, back to
New London and from there to Bermuda with the USS BEAVER (AS 5). After practice
patrols, she returned to St. Georges. On 7 December 1941, at Argentia,
Newfoundland, Captain R. W. Christie, USN, Commander, Submarine Squadron
FIVE, held "readiness for war" inspection on board the S-30 while the
Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor.

The S-30 left Newfoundland two days later and conducted a routine patrol
enroute to New London, where she had a short overhaul.

— page 3 —
-2- USS S-30 (SS 135)

She came off the marine railway prepared for a long voyage and departed
from New London for Bermuda, Lieutenant Commander F. W. Laing, USN, commanding.
In a bad storm, enroute, one crewman was thrown against the chart table and
cracked a rib. Another fractured his arm, and a third was knocked unconscious
with his nose broken. The captain finally secured the lookouts to avoid further
injury, because of the difficulty of any enemy sightings in such seas.

Proceeding on toward Coco Solo, Canal Zone, the venerable old sub, who
was supposed to be over age in 1933, had her first close call of the war when
a friendly patrol bomber dropped a bomb 40 feet off her port beam.

She moored at the submarine base on 16 February 1942. From that time
until May the ship operated in the vicinity of the Canal Zone. During this
period, as a unit of Submarine Division 52, (S-30, S-31, S-32, S-33), she
made two routine, uneventful patrols around Cape Mala, Bona Island and Cocos.
For two weeks in May she operated out of Gulfido, Costa Rica, tended by the
ANTAEUS. On 26 May she sailed for Mare Island, California, conducting a
routine patrol enroute.

She departed Mare Island on 15 June 1942, the day of arrival, but put
back into port a week later. Then, on 1 August 1942, she set her course north,
to the foggy, dangerous Aleutian chain, where the Japanese had established a
foothold. Enroute she developed engine trouble and eleven days later limped
into Dutch Harbor, Alaska, on one engine.

After a short refit, the S-30 left on her fourth war patrol 12 August
1942, heading for enemy-held Attu to patrol off Cape Wrangell to intercept
supply ships between Paramushiru and Attu. Visibility was extremely low and
the seas rough, enough during the whole patrol so that it was necessary to
"ride the hatch" constantly when surfaced. The S-30 arrived off Attu on
the morning of the 16th. During the next 24 hours, the island was visible
for a total of one half hour as the thick fog cut visibility to a minimum.

On 30 August the upper works of a steamer, hull down, were sighted.
She turned out to be a single stack 4000 ton freighter. Again the fog ruined
any possible attack by closing in to make the vessel's angle on the bow un-
certain. When the captain finally sighted his contact after reaching
periscope depth, she was steaming across his wake.

The patrol remained uneventful until the 7th of September, when a con-
tact developed on a trio of Japanese tin cans. The S-30 dove to 100 feet
where she was attacked for the next three hours. The patrol was completed on
return to Dutch Harbor on 13 September 1942.

After a short overhaul by the submarine repair unit and the ship's force,
the S-30 got underway again on 24 September to patrol the Kiska area. The
discovery of a three-inch crack in one cylinder forced her to return to
Dutch Harbor for repairs, leaving again on the 30th. No enemy contacts were
made and, after only four days in the patrol area, a cracked crankshaft sent
her back to Dutch Harbor, where she was ordered to San Diego for an overhaul.

3

— page 4 —
-30 (SS 135)

In the yard, she received not only a new crankshaft and a major overhaul,
but also a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander W. A. Stevenson, USN.
During the overhaul period some badly-needed new equipment came aboard,
including good sound gear, fathometer, radar and a Kleinschmidt
Vapor Compression still. A happy black gang saw the last of the old Clarkson
boiler that had made the engine room a hades and had forbidden the use of
fresh water for washing.

The overhaul was completed on 10 February 1943. Then, after four days
of "ready duty," the S-30 operated with the West Coast Sound school for a
month and, on 16 March, departed for her old haunts at Dutch Harbor. Upon
arrival there 15 days later, she was covered with ice. The hatch was frozen
open, antennae were down, and the gun was a solid heap of hard white snow.
She was, moreover, having engine trouble again and had one motor out of
commission.

At the end of a short refit, the S-30 boat made a false start on her
sixth war patrol on 10 April 1943. Engineering trouble brought her back to
port, but two days later she was underway again. During this patrol she took
part in the reconnaissance phase of the invasion of Attu, taking photographs
and soundings in Statlor Cove, Sarora Bay and Chichagof Harbor. In Holtz
Bay and Chichagof, Nip garrison, sentries, gun emplacements, a soft ball game
and what appeared to be a launching strip for sea planes could be seen.

Some of these bays were entered and carefully explored to see if mine-
fields had been planted. Many times the only way an S-boat could tell if
mines were present was by striking a mine herself. Fortunately, there were
no minefields and just this information, to say nothing of the soundings and
the photographs, was enough to make the patrol a valuable contribution to
the war effort.

Patrolling the Semichi Islands, a good look at Shenija and Niziki showed
no enemy activity, but a close inspection of Alaid revealed what appeared to
be a Japanese radio station. Toward this end of the patrol the crew heard the shelling
of Attu by the NEVADA, TENNESSEE and CALIFORNIA. Also, at one time they
cleared the area to enable the NARWHAL and NAUTILUS to land Rangers on Attu
while planes gave them air cover. The patrol ended alongside a dock at Dutch
Harbor on 11 May.

The old boat's seventh war patrol began from Dutch Harbor on 24 May
1943, when she set course for Paramushiru. Her first kill of the war came on
5 June, when the periscope watch spotted a sampan of about 120 tons. Captain
Stevenson, feeling that the boat might have spotted the periscope and used
his radio, decided to battle surface. As far as is known, no S-boat had ever
done this before.

At 2240 they surfaced and the gun went into action. The first shot
from a range of 1400 yards carried away the wheel house. After this shot, the
foot firing mechanism failed and the sights became cloudy, so that the gunners
were reduced to firing with lanyard and open sights. About then, one of the
crew ran to the bow of the sampan and began hoisting the Rising Sun flag. The
next shot blew sailor, flag and bow away. Now, with lanyard and open sights,
firing was less accurate with only about six hits in 37 rounds expended, but
when last seen the sampan was afire and sinking fast.
[HANDWRITTEN: 2 / 389RP I-1]

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-4- USS S-30 (SS 135)

All this time the skipper had been watching an approaching Japanese
destroyer, coming up fast astern. The tin can opened fire at 9,000 yards and
her first salvo was 1500 yards short. With no time to lose, the S-30 crash
dived without taking time to secure the gun or strike below gear left topside.
Making ready torpedo tubes, she began an approach on the destroyer.

Just as the sub got into position, the main motor breakers kicked out
and depth control was lost. The short #2 periscope which Captain Stevenson was
using tucked under. By the time he got #1 up, all he could see was the battle
gray of the destroyer's side. She started down for her tested depth, but
before the boat was well under, the first depth charge went off. Later on,
Captain Stevenson reported he'd seen the charge pass across his line of
vision to fall close on the starboard bow.

The first charge threw water and chunks of solid matter through the
inner doors of the torpedo tubes, filling the torpedo room with thick smoke.
By this time there was power on the main motors again, but not before the
first ash can had blown the boat to the surface. By the time the destroyer
had completed a turn for her second attack, the S-30 was under again with the
torpedo tube outer doors closed. Two more charges went off close aboard and
deeper, causing the boat to broach again.

When the sea pressure gauge reached 144 pounds per square inch they
were acquiring some control of depth by use of full rheostat on the motors and
full rise on the planes. Just then she hit bottom. Securing everything through
out the boat, they lay there while 33 depth charges, all close but a bit too
shallow, fell around them.

Dawn was not far away. With an excellent chance that an oil leak would
give away their position if they tried to remain on the bottom longer, Captain
Stevenson ordered the boat to the surface.

She broke surface with the stern planes stuck on hard rise, the black
gang poised to get the engines going in an instant, and the rest of the crew
at battle stations. Radar picked up pips which indicated they were in the
middle of a group consisting of a cruiser, three destroyers, and several small
craft, all circling the submarine and pinging frantically. Three of them were
signalling by flashing light. Picking the widest opening, the boat ran for it.

Radar reported a contact closing rapidly. At 2000 yards the ship
zigged toward the sub, and just then the engines went dead. It was discovered
that someone going up the conning tower hatch had inadvertently kicked the
annunciators. At the warning howler, thus set off, the engineers, expecting
a quick dive any minute, shut down the plant and got ready to take her down.
The engines were going again in a moment, however, and luck held long
enough to enable them to clear the area and dive at dawn, safely.

Seas were heavy, and even at 90 feet depth the riding was rough. Under
these conditions, the job the torpedo men did was little short of a miracle.
They shifted 12 torpedoes around and reloaded tubes one, two and four. All
four of the previous loads had been damaged by the first depth charge. Number
one and three were badly mangled, so that number three could not be moved at all.
To make things more difficult, one of the bearings had wiped during the force

— page 6 —
-5- USS S-30 (SS 135)

run at "all ahead emergency" on cold engines. But, with everything squared
away, the indomitable submarine headed back to Paramushiru, hoping for a chance
to do some shooting.

A large merchantman was contacted on 9 June 1943, but changing course
to avoid three small sampans had put the submarine too far out of position.
On the same day, however, she began an approach on a heavily smoking destroyer.
The enemy would stop her screws to listen, and the S-30 boat would stop hers.
Then the destroyer would get underway again and so would Sugar 30. Soon,
however, other screws were heard and the captain decided to evade, sensing a
trap.

At 1717 on the following day two ships were spotted at anchor in
Kakumabetsu Wan. The nearest one was estimated at 10,000 tons and the other
at about 4,000, both anchored near a "large black rock." Three torpedoes
were fired and down went S-30's only officially recognized kill of the war,
the 5228-ton cargo ship JIMBU MARU.

A look through the periscope showed fog obscuring the target, while the
"large black rock" was underway, throwing depth charges all over the harbor as
the captain conned his ship out by dead reckoning. Twenty-three depth charges
went off at a "tolerable" distance.

Another torpedo attack was launched early on the morning of 13 June
after a submerged patrol through Onekoan Kaikio to surface on the eastern side
of the strait. With a perfect set-up on a 5000 ton Maru, Captain Stevenson
fired three fish from 700 yards, only to see all of them miss.

The S-30 moored at Duch Harbor on 22 June 1943 after a very discouraging
patrol. She had not been able to confirm her sinking, her torpedoes had run
deep to rob her of another kill, and she had taken a thorough beating. When
the job of getting the smashed torpedo out of the number three tube began,
people cleared the area for miles around, but the job was safely done.

While laying over in Dutch Harbor between the seventh and eight patrol,
it was decided to give the crew a little depth charge indoctrination and at the
same time to determine whether or not the enemy was using 600 pound depth
charges. When the charge went off, it punctured a soft patch in the motor
room and threw the visitors around. They went ashore badly shaken, to the
amusement of the crew.

After having the soft patch repaired, the S-30 got underway under escort
of the PC 601 to Attu, arriving on the ninth of July 1943. Mooring alongside
the fleet oiler USS CUYAMA, she took on a full fuel load. The climax of that
short stay in Attu was a movie, "South of Pago Pago," just the right touch to
start the crew out on the eighty war patrol in high spirits.

They left at 0800 the next morning to patrol the northern portion of
the Kurile Chain. The run to her station was routine. Some periscope
pictures were taken of Shimushiru To and Matsuwa Monte.

On the evening of 20 July the sub contacted an odd looking craft which
looked like an old lumber barge of about 3000 tons. Making an approach, she
[STAMP: 1638RP1]

— page 7 —
-6- USS S-30 (SS 135)

fired two fish which missed. Then the "pile of junk," which turned out to be
a "Q" ship, turned and came straight down the torpedo track, dropping 21
depth charges. No damage resulted.

A week later smoke was sighted through the periscope in Saya Strait
west of Araidu. The contact developed into a 7,000 ton Maru with a destroyer
as escort. A careful approach yielded two explosions and, although no record
could be found of such a sinking after the war, breaking-up noises could be
heard clearly. When the ship could come to periscope depth once more,
nothing could be seen but smoke on the horison.

On 30 July and again on the 31st two approaches were begun on large
Japanese cargo vessels, but in neither case could be reached. A second
contact on the 31st developed out of a fog bank that she was past the
firing bearing before the tubes were ready. It was finally necessary to
fire right up her wake. One torpedo was fired, but evidently missed the
target.

At 2002 on the same day a third ship was sighted and three torpedoes
were fired at her from 900 yards. The first two were heard to hit and sound
reported that the target's screws had stopped, followed by breaking up noises.
Periscope observations revealed nothing in sight.

About five minutes later, sound reported screws on the port quarter.
A look through the scope revealed an unidentifiable ship headed for the S-30,
who was, at the moment, having trouble with depth control. She broached
momentarily before going deep and then received two depth charges. The sub-
sequent evasive tactics used carried her clear of the area and safely out of
contact.

By this time the sub had three torpedoes left and six more days to stay
on station. Captain Stevenson tried finding floating fish canneries and trawlers
off the Russian coast. The remainder of the patrol was unfruitful and the
sub retired toward Attu.

Near the end of the patrol, the O.D sighted "something" ahead which then
disappeared. Shortly after, six feet of periscope appeared, range about
500 feet. The lookouts who spotted it didn't bother to report the contact.
They simply yelled "DIVE" and went down the hatch in one frantic leap. What
might have been a torpedo passed down the port side, close aboard, and then
slow screws could be heard fading out. When an observation was finally made
through the periscope, nothing was in sight.

The S-30 arrived at Massacre Bay, Attu, and tied up alongside the
CUYAMA at 2050 on 9 August 1943. She stayed on 24 hours notice to get under-
way for the invasion of Kiska, but managed to provide some recreation for her
crew. Torpedoes, however, were hard to get. The PC 601 brought two from
Dutch Harbor, one of the other S-boats contributed another, and two came from
the base.

When the Kiska landing was made with no opposition, the old lady was given
a week of uninterrupted upkeep and was ready for sea on 25 August 1943. She
[Faint page number: 3]

— page 8 —
-7- USS S-30 (SS 135)

got underway the next morning for the Okhotsk sea via Shimushiru Strait.
Three days out an enemy bomber caught her on the surface and dropped four
bombs close aboard, but failed to score. Only two good enemy ship contacts
were made during the patrol, and neither one could be developed into an attack.

On the morning of 14 September 1943 the ship cruised in close to the
island of Matsuwa to take periscope pictures, discovering airfield installa-
tions. The captain planned to shell the garrison just before dawn the next
day. All preparations were carefully made. Special stations were assigned
and it was planned that half the gun crew would go through the torpedo room
hatch and the other half down the conning tower to speed up the dive after
the bombardment. The gunners mate was worried about his gun's ancient firing
pin, so he went so far as to break out a brand new one.

Stations were manned, and orders were to commence firing at a range of
5,500 yards. The gun refused to fire in spite of repeated attempts. It began
to get light so that there was no time to check the mechanism, and a sadly-
disappointed crew abandoned the attack to open out from the island.

It was later discovered that the brand new firing pin came from the
manufacturer about an eighth of an inch too short.

This, the last war patrol for the USS S-30, ended when she moored in
Dutch Harbor on 23 September 1943, passing the S-44 on the way in. The later
took on fuel at Attu, shoved off on patrol, and was never seen again.

The S-30 left Alaska late in September, bound for San Diego. Arriving
on 11 October, she was met by the USS CRANE and escorted to a dock at the
Naval Repair Base. The tired, crew's first tidings in the United States were:
"There will be no leave until the S-30 is out of overhaul and ready to operate
with the West Coast Sound school."

The Navy needed submariners, sonar men, and well-trained anti-submarine
crews. Providing these men was the S-30's job until the end of the war. Six
days a week she operated with the Sound school, and for eight hours a day
she worked under the water off the coast of Lower California. She furnished
a target for surface ships to practice against, she made crash dives under
attack from all kinds of airplanes and blimps, learning how to go about attack-
ing a submarine.

Meanwhile, junior officers and enlisted men were being taught the
technicalities of the dive and the approach and all the complexities that go
into operating a submarine. A long series of squadron commanders, division
commanders, officers, crews, tenders and commanding officers had her in hand
from then on. The commanding officers, veterans of many war patrols, became
teachers as well as submariners. They left her to go on to jobs in the new,
efficient fleet boats. Crews trained on S-boats went out to man fleet sub-
marines, striking the blows which the old S-30 missed because of her antiquity.

The USS S-30 was put out of commission in the San Francisco area on 3
October 1945, and sold in December of 1946.

— page 9 —
-5- USS S-30 (SS 135)

The USS S-30 earned two battle stars on the Asiatic-Pacific Area
Service Medal:

1 Star/Seventh War Patrol -- 24 May -- 22 June 1943
1 Star/Eighth War Patrol -- 5 July -- 9 August 1943

*****

STATISTICS

OVERALL LENGTH                                219 feet
BEAM                                          21 feet
SPEED                                         13 knots
DISPLACEMENT                                  850 tons
COMPLEMENT                                    8 officers and 72 men

*****

Compiled: 17 February 1954

— page 10 —
U.S.S. S-30
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

SS135/A16-3/ehw
DECLASSIFIED
[STRUCK THROUGH: C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L] 25 November 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander, Submarine Squadron FORTY-FIVE.

Subject: 1st, 2nd 3rd War Patrols of U.S.S. S-30;
report of.

Reference: (a) CSS 45 Confidential Ltr. FC5-45/A16-3,
Serial 0217 of 8 November 1944.

1. As requested in reference (a) it is reported
that there is no record of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd war patrol
reports in the files of this vessel.

2. Examination of the ship's log discloses that
the 1st war patrol of the U.S.S. S-30 was conducted in the
North Atlantic area, commencing 31 January 1942 and termin-
ating 16 February 1942. The 2nd war patrol was conducted
in the Panama area from 10 March 1942 to 31 March 1942. The
3rd was also in the Panama area from 14 April 1942 to 13 May
1942.

3. Lieutenant F. W. LAING, USN., was in command
for all three patrols. No further information is available.

R. J. DURYEA.

Enclosure (D)
8

— page 11 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

FF12-10/A16-3(5) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET Jk
Serial 01237
Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
October 28, 1942.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
CONSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 80
U.S.S. S-30 -- FOURTH WAR PATROL.

Reg. No. [HANDWRITTEN: 3841]
R.S. No. [HANDWRITTEN: 11 01091]

[STAMP: FILMED]

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. S-30 (SS135) - Report of Fourth War
Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of Comtaskgroup 8.5 Conf. ltr TG8.5/
A16-3 Serial 026 of September 19, 1942.
(B) Copy of Comsubron 45 Conf. ltr FC45/A16-3
Serial 028 of September 18, 1942.
(C) Copy of subject war patrol.

1. Enclosures (A), (B) and (C) are forwarded
herewith.

2. The remarks of Commander Submarine Squadron
Forty-Five in enclosure (B) and the remarks of Commander
Task Group 8.5 in enclosure (A) are concurred in.

3. The Bureau of Personnel has increased the
allowed complement of S-type submarines by one Pharmacist's
Mate, first class.

R.H. ENGLISH.

DISTRIBUTION
(35CM-42)
List III, SSs.
Special:
P1(5), EN3(5), Z1(5),
Comsublant (2),
Comsubsowespac (2).

[SIGNATURE: E.R. Swinburne]
E.R. SWINBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

[STAMP: COMMANDER IN CHIEF]
[STAMP: U.S. FLEET]
[STAMP: RECEIVED]
[STAMP: 1942]
[STAMP: SEP]
[STAMP: 17]
[STAMP: 30]
[STAMP: 03]

43842 [STAMP: FILMED]

— page 12 —
Naval Operating Base,
Dutch Harbor, Alaska,
September 19, 1942.

TG8.5/A16-3
Serial (026)

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Task Group Eight Point Five.
To : The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

1. This, the first War Patrol of the S-30 in the
ALEUTIAN area, covered a period of thirty-two days, of which
twenty-five were spent on station in the vicinity of ATTU ISLAND
and to the westward thereof across the tracks of enemy shipping.

2. It is unfortunate that neither of the two contacts
resulted in completed attacks. In the case of the first contact
it is possible that the ship sighted was Russian, in view of the
fact that she was to the westward of longitude 172° East; the
longitude in which routing permits Russian ships to lay their
tracks south of Latitude 54°-45' North. As pointed out in the
Report, however, premature diving prevented development of the
contact. In the other case, the attack on a formation of three
enemy destroyers was frustrated by depth charge attack. The S-30
is to be congratulated upon the successful evasion tactics em-
ployed in the face of this coordinated search and attack by enemy
destroyers.

3. The usual weather difficulties were experienced.
According to the best information on the subject, visibility con-
ditions will improve steadily during the fall months. No investi-
gation was made throughout the patrol of the anchorages on the
north coast of ATTU. That timely investigation would have produced
contacts is known from plane search reports. As has been demonstra-
ted repeatedly, successful submarine operations close to the
islands of the ALEUTIAN CHAIN require ingenious planning, careful
navigation, and patient and aggressive execution.

4. While patrolling the open sea to the westward of
ATTU the S-30 commendably increased the efficiency of the patrol
by remaining on the surface a large part of the time. When on
station off ATTU, in waters patrolled by enemy air, submarine,
and surface forces, however, surface patrol may well have resulted
in the S-30 being sighted and the enemy having taken advantage of
such sightings in routing traffic through the area. During re-
duced visibility in those areas the criterion must be whether
surface or submerged patrol will contribute most to offensive
action.

- 1 -
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 13 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

5. It is noted that deep submergence, without peri-
scope exposures, was taken for a large part of one day during
heavy weather, and that there was a general tendency to avoid
the higher rates of discharge at the expense of a periscope pa-
trol, in order that both engines would not be required at the
start of the succeeding charge. Efficient coverage of the patrol
area can only come from frequent visual search.

6. The underwater noise, resembling echo-ranging
discussed in the subject Report, has been experienced and repor-
ted by numerous submarines in the ALEUTIAN area, as well as in
Western Pacific areas. Whether its origin is geological or pisca-
tory is unknown, but by tuning the receiver and by noting the
lack of directional qualities it can be quickly differontiated
from the real thing.

7. The Commanding Officer's recommendation that an
experienced pharmacist's mate be added to the complement of
S-class submarines is concurred in. In this connection, it is
interesting to note that prisoners taken from a Japanese subma-
rine, RO-type, report that a medical officer served in their ship.

8. An excellent state of morale existed in the S-30
upon return to Base, and the ship was in generally good material
condition.

- 2 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 14 —
FC45/A16-3
Serial (028)

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commend or Submarine Squadron Forty-Five.
To : The Commendor Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. S-30, Fourth War Patrol; Report of.

1. The Fourth War Patrol of the S-30 was its first
in the Aleutian area. The patrol lasted thirty-two days, of
which twenty-five were spent on station. The lack of contacts
was disappointing in as much as the areas patrolled are con-
sidered to cover the focal points for enemy traffic to and from
the Empire to Kiska.

2. Material defects are not considered to be major
and will all be corrected during the current refit period except
oil leaks into the after battery well. These leaks are not now
and are not excessive. They will be corrected during the next
navy yard overhaul when the battery can be removed. Every effort
will be made to eliminate excessive noise and the S-30 will be
given a listening test before she proceeds on the next patrol.
Special instructions have been issued to minimize the accumula-
tion of dampness in electrical apparatus, that is not used con-
tinuously, by periodic operation.

3. Favorable consideration is recommended for the
addition of a pharmacist's mate to the complement of SAUL-class
submarines operating in this area.

- 1 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 15 —
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Fourth War Patrol.
Period from August 12 to September 13, 1942.

1: NARRATIVE (Zone times as indicated):-

— page 19 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Fourth War Patrol

9/6- Surface patrol along north coast of ATTU.
9/7- Surface patrol as before.
0020(Y) C.T.G. 8.5 DOUGLAS.
1545(Y) Doubtful periscope contact astern.
1555(Y) While ten miles northwest of CAPE WRANGELL sighted
three destroyers hull down bearing 197°T. (Submerged
and turned to attack.
1615(Y) Destroyers turned and came at me high speed. Went to
180 feet. Echo ranging began ( and there was no doubt
about it this time!).
1619(Y) First depth charge attack, 18 charges.
1732(Y) Second depth charge attack, 8 charges.
2038(Y) Surfaced and cleared vicinity to northwest in order
repair minor structural damage.

9/8
0100(Y) C.T.G. 8.5 ECHO.
0416(Y) Sent out my AUKE BAY regarding depth charge attack.
1250(Y) C.T.G. 8.5 FUNTER advising enemy force near ATTU.
No course given. Headed southwest to intercept (if
force proves to be on westerly course).
1630(Y) C.T.G. 8.5 GATE advising enemy force in HOLTZ BAY and
ordering me to investigate. Set course for HOLTZ BAY.
1830(Y) Sent out my DOLOMOF as my AUKE BAY hasn't appeared on
the Fox schedule.
2145(Y) C.T.G. 8.5 HYDER.
2400(Y) C.T.G. 8.5 ICE. Do not understand his suggestion I re-
count depth charges - but I did - and it was.

9/9
0520(Y) Submerged about 16 miles north of HOLTZ BAY.
0800(Y) Sighted CHIRIKOF PT dead ahead about four miles.
Changed course to northwest and patrolled four to eight
miles north and east of Holtz Bay the remainder of the
day. No activity outside; unable to see inside due to
haze and fog.
2008(Y) Surfaced.
2230(Y) C.T.G. 8.5 JAY POINT ordering SAIL THIRTY to DUTCH
HARBOR.
9/10 Enroute DUTCH HARBOR.
9/11
1154(Y) Sighted unidentified twin float biplane bearing 000°
T. distance 4 miles. O.O.D. submerged.
1220(Y) Surfaced and proceeded.
9/12 Enroute DUTCH HARBOR.
1830(Y) Having unsuccessfully tried for some time to get out
my DOLOMIT despatch (finally started it to NPL (SAN
DIEGO) and after sending 2/3 of it, the transmitter
went out. (See para. 9).
2145(Y) Lock nut, starboard engine, on timing gear thrust yoke
came off again. Same casualty as occurred on 9/2.

- 5 - ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 20 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

9/13
1245(W) Arrived DUTCH HARBOR 1245(W), having sighted and ex-
changed signals with PBY in early morning.

2. WEATHER.

There is little to add to what has already been said con-
cerning weather in this area. It is uniformly bad. Visibility
is poor most of the time, its principle characteristic being its
variability. Within five minutes or less the visibility will
close from unlimited to 500 yards. Fog seems to settle and rise
constantly. As a general rule, however, the fog lifts at night
and visibility is excellent until dawn. Only four foggy nights
were encountered. ATTU is perpetually hidden by a low fog bank.
Rise and fall of the barometer is diurnal but of much
higher values than usually expected. A change of 6/100 per hour
is not unusual and may mean nothing unless the glass continues
to fall.
Winds are variable but prevailed from the southwest. A 20
knot wind emphatically does not mean that fog will be blown
away. On the contrary, it sometimes piles it up thicker.
A break in the overcast is the exception although we did
have three cloudless days. On the other hand there was an 8
day period without sighting the sun or stars.
Average air temperature was 55° F., water temperature 50°F.
Storms are usually followed by a fairly clear day; per-
versely a clear day in the ordinary course of events is a sure
harbinger of heavy weather.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION.

With the exception of a steady southerly set of 1 knot exper-
ienced in the vicinity of the eastern end of ATTU, no accurate
data were obtained. In general set and drift seemed to be about
10% of the wind in the direction of the seas. Unreliable and
infrequent celestial fixes made it impossible to gather further
information.
With regard to the current near the eastern end of ATTU,
consideration must be given to possibility of greater drift.
If operating close inshore submerged, economical speeds might
conceivably be insufficient to avoid being set aground. For
about six hours this vessel made practically no way over the
ground using one motor at normal parallel speed.
No density layers suitable to balancing were observed. On
the contrary, numerous instances of losing depth through no
accountable reason other than lessening of density occurred.

- 6 - ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 23 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

After echo ranging on us for one hour and ten minutes, the
second attack began with three groups of two each and 2 single
charges over a period of 3 minutes.

All charges seemed to be shallow. The first attack missed
us to starboard. The second attack was a straddle with those
on the port side apparently closer.

Echo ranging began again and continued for 1½ hours, gradu-
ally drawing astern. We were boxed in three times but managed
to evade by silent running (3 knots) and radical changes of
course toward the western quadrants.

Enemy tactics lived up to those previously reported: i.e.,
triangular formation with long periods of listening, attempts to
stir up target by false bursts of high speed, etc.

At deep dusk I decided to take a look. There had been no
signs of the enemy for about 2 hours. Surfaced very slowly to
60 feet and stopped. Boat then came up about one foot a minute
and got a look at 2020(Y). Nothing in sight. Surfaced at 2038(Y).

Damage was of a minor nature consisting of a section of
superstructure torn loose from around port exhaust, towing pen-
dant lashings carried away at about 12 pad eyes, small amount of
paint and cork knocked loose in motor and engine rooms, one small
doubler plate loosened in the motor room, apparently some crys-
tals broken in JK head (see para. 9); steering shafting in engine
room and after battery bowed and sprung (noisy) and bow plane
mechanism considerably more noisy (reason unknown). Also, the
executive officer's feelings were hurt because his wife's picture
was broken.

9. MAJOR DEFECTS.

A. MAIN ENGINES.

On several occasions the port engine exhaust left
a bad oil slick. No reason can be ascribed to this other than
that the engine pumps lub. oil excessively. Lub. oil consump-
tion by the starboard engine is noticeably lower than by the
port. Upon return to DUTCH HARBOR liner clearances will be
taken - it is believed that these data will indicate necessity
for liner renewals.

- 9 - ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 26 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

On September 2 the lock nut of the thrust yoke, star-
board engine timing gears backed off. This casualty had occurred
several weeks ago and was thought to have been rectified. The
threads of the lock nut and thrust yoke were burred slightly
and it was necessary to remove the front of the engine casing to
chase the threads with a file. Repairs took about 5 hours. The
engine could have been operated at any time in an emergency.
The cause for its recurrence is undoubtedly due to vibration,
plus considerable wear of the thrust yoke which allowed the
lock nut to slide forward of its own locking device. (Note:
blueprints of these parts are not on board and nomenclature is
questionable.) The situation will be remedied by a thicker lock-
ing device, such that the lock nut may not slide past.

On September 10 at 2030(Y) and again on September 11 at
0849(Y) the drive chain of the starboard crankcase gear pump
jumped its gears. The engine was stopped about 10 minutes on
each occasion and the chain replaced. This situation will be
remedied on arrival DUTCH HARBOR by removing a link from the
drive chain.

On September 11, at 1125(Y) the drain cock of the port
engine air compressor cooler, 3rd stage, broke off while draining
the cooler. The engine was stopped when spray air went down. A
new drain cock was installed and the engine in operation at
1135(Y).

At 2145 (Y) on September 12, the same lock nut casualty
occurring September 2, repeated. Repairs were effected in 2
hours. It was not necessary to chase threads on the thrust yoke,
and a spare lock nut was installed. It was again necessary to
remove the front of the engine casing in order to hold the thrust
yoke as it began to grip the timing gear shaft.

During the destroyer encounter of September 7th, only
two tubes had been made ready when the order was rescinded. The
outer door of No. 3 tube was open all the time but that of No. 4
was closed after the tube had been flooded for 15 minutes. Both
torpedoes were subjected to 80 lbs pressure. No. 3 torpedo's
tail afterbody, gyro, and gyro pot were flooded. No. 4 torpedo
had about 1/2 pint of water in the afterbody and 1 quart in the
tail. Gyro and gyro pot were dry. Torpedoes were cleaned
thoroughly, inspected carefully, and reloaded.

- 12 - ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 29 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

12. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY

Colds and coughs were no more frequent than might be expected.
Fifteen man days were lost. One case of catarrhal fever acute
bronchitis proved obstinate with a high fever of 104, and took 7 days to
clear up. Another man developed, and still has, a severe case
of laryngitis, resulting in 2 sick days. The medical compend
proved sufficient in these instances but considerable attention
was necessarily paid these cases. I cannot recommend too
strongly that a well trained pharmacist's mate be attached to
S.LL class submarines to reduce the burden of worry attendant
to these cases. The usual number of constipation cases were had.
All hands were urged to help nature along if a bowel movement
did not occur within three days.

The habitability of this class vessel is too well known to
mention in detail. Suffice to say the "hot bunk" system is in
use; mess gear was cleaned with alcohol daily; water was no pro-
blem and no restrictions other than verbal warnings were made.
Temperatures in the boat averaged about 64° F. No heaters were
used, the men being encouraged to dress warmly instead.

Food was good, well prepared, and palatable. A few staples
ran low the last day in the area and had to be rationed during
the return trip. There was never a lack however. Meal hours
were normal. Lunch consisted of soup, sandwiches, and dessert
and proved very popular. Night rations were abolished except
for coffee. The ship is fortunate in having two splendid cooks
who can bake.

No laundering of clothes was permitted.

Garbage was thrown overboard in cotton sacks (200 having been
procured for the purpose), with ruptured tin cans in each.
These sacks sank in about 5 minutes. Portable heads were used
and dumped at dark. All wood was saved and disposed of on re-
turn to base.

On previous patrols epidemics of sore mouths broke out. These
were forestalled this patrol by placing a plentiful supply of
chloromine (t) in after battery and encouraging its use as a
mouth wash. (On recommendation of medical officer).

- 15 -
ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 33 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]
Reg. No. ...4.9.7.2...
R.S. No. ...12 0307...

FF12-10/A16-3(5) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET Pn
Serial 01279
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
CONFIDENTIAL
COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 90
U.S.S. S-30 - FIFTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 (SS135) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) ComTaskGroup 8.5 conf. ltr. TG8.5/A16-3
Serial 036 of October 23, 1942.
(B) ComSubRon 45 conf. ltr. FC45/A16-3
Serial 047 of October 18, 1942.
(C) Copy of Subject Report.

1. Enclosures (A), (B) and (C) are promulgated
for information.

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
November 9, 1942.

R. H. ENGLISH.

Distribution:
(35CM-42)
List III: SS
Special:
P1(5), EN3(5), Z1(5),
ComSubLant (2),
ComSubSsoWespac (2).
[SIGNATURE: E.R. Swinburne]
E.R. SWINBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

[STAMP: COMMANDER IN CHIEF]
[STAMP: U.S. FLEET]
[STAMP: RECEIVED]
[STAMP: 1942 DEC 5 11 20]

44157 [STAMP: FILMED]

— page 34 —
TG8.5/A16-3
Serial 036

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Task Group Eight Point Five.
To : The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

1. This report covers a period of twenty days, of
which but four were spent in the assigned area. A combination
of casualties to the port main engine cause, first an interrupt-
ion in the patrol and finally discontinuance thereof.

2. The S-30 has been made available at Destroyer
Base, San Diego, for renewal of the port main engine crank
shaft. Coincident with this repair it is recommended she
receive the regular overhaul originally scheduled for February
1943. Numerous other material difficulties justify thus taking
full advantage of the voyage to San Diego.

3. The Submarine Base, Dutch Harbor, has shown
commendable zeal and ingenuity in effecting repairs to the
S-30 since she arrived on this station.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 35 —
FC45/A16-3
Serial 047

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Forty-Five.
To : The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Fifth War Patrol.

1. The Fifth War Patrol of the S-30 was interrupted
twice by casualties to the port main engine. This vessel
completed her last navy yard overhaul in August, 1941. Since
then she has operated from Argentia, Newfoundland; New London,
Connecticut; Coco Solo, Canal Zone; and Dutch Harbor, Alaska.
She has been granted restricted availability at the Destroyer
Base, San Diego, for the renewal of the port main engine crank
shaft. In as much as her next scheduled navy yard overhaul
is February 1943, it is recommended that this date be advanced
to coincide with the renewal of the crank shaft.

2. No contacts with the enemy were made during this
patrol, during which only four (4) days were spent in patrol
areas.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 37 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

9/30 0800(W) Underway, singly from DUTCH HARBOR enroute area
SEMDIR in accordance with COLTASKGROUP 8.5 OP-PLAN
2-42 and his OP-OR 18-42; OP-OR 17-42 cancelled.
Mission. Same.
1150(W) Made 20 minute trim dive. While submerged, si-
ghted PBY about 3 miles away. Fired recognition
smoke bomb.
1455(W) Sighted various surface units of TASK FORCE 8,
hull down bearing 090 T.
1545(W) Exchanged recognition signals with Scout Obser-
vation plane.
10/1 1300(W) Main engine cooler line, starboard engine air
compressor leaking again. (Believed satisfactorily
repaired in DUTCH). Not serious.
10/3 0000(Y) Received numerous messages during the day re-
enemy shipping; unexpected northerly positions.
Received attack restriction message giving
western limit of 175°E along my track. I'd been hoping
for this. In view of developments since my departure
(numerous reports of enemy shipping unexpected
north), I had decided to depart from my instructions
to the extent of entering the western half of my area
instead of the northeast as directed. Many of the
reports of enemy shipping lie close to my track extended
and by holding on for this day I may intercept something.
0945(Y) Sighted plane (possibly a PBY) bearing 295 T,
distance 5 miles. Submerged, having learned our
recognition signals may be compromised.
1016(Y) Surfaced and proceeded.
1100(Y) Sighted and exchanged recognition signals with
B24 (no doubt as to these - they are easy to spot).
1300(Y) First stage cooler line, starboard engine air
compressor split. Installed spare and made repairs
to both second stage (See Oct. 1) and this line.
These repairs effected by gas welding (See para. 18).
10/4 2000(Y) Entered patrol area.
Conducted daylight submerged patrol between
BULDIRI and SEMICHI group.
1400(Y) Heard about 15 underwater explosions - various
bearings, but generally to the eastward - extending
over a period of about one half hour. Nothing in
sight.
1625(Y) Another single underwater explosion, nothing
in sight.
2100(Y) COLTASK GROUP 8.5 UREY POINT containing general
information including change of my area assignment.

- 2 - ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 39 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Fifth War Patrol

3. TIDAL INFORMATION
   A current of .7 - 1.0 knot setting 180° T was observed in
   area ---. Approximately 1 knot setting to the eastward
   may be expected along the northern side of the ALEUTIANS.
   No lavors suitable for balancing were found.

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
   Charts are adequate. It is believed, however, that BUILDIR
   ISLAND lies about 3.4 miles northwest of its charted posi-
   tion.
   No lighted aids observed.

5. VESSELS SIGHTED
   None.

6. AIRCRAFT SIGHTED
   No. Date Time Course Lat. Long. Altitude Description
   9/30 1200(W) 090 54-00 N 167-12 W 1,000 PBY
        1545(W) Var 53-58 N 167-50 W 1,000 SOC
   10/3 0945(Y) 150 53-41 N 177-15 E 1,000 PBY(?)
        1100(Y) 090 53-36 N 176-40 E 2,000 B24
   10/7 0900(Y) 300 53-05 N 174-12 E 1,000 PBY
   10/12 0805(Y) 270 53-46 N 174-07 W 1,000 PBY

7. PARTICULARS OF ATTACKS
   None.

8. ENEMY A/S MEASURES
   None observed.

9. ENEMY MINESWEEPING OPERATIONS
   None observed.

10. MAJOR DEFECTS
    Main Engines. Two major defects were experienced; both caused
    interruptions to the patrol.

- 4 - ENCLOSURE "C"

— page 44 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1.4.9.4.]
[STAMP: 6 01154]
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st Copy]

FF12-10/A16-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
1d
Serial 0706

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
May 29, 1943.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 185
U.S.S. S-30 - SIXTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. S-30 (SS135) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of Comtaskgroup Sixteen point Five (CSS 45)
Conf. ltr. TG16.5/A16-3, Serial 051 of May 14, 1943.
(B) Copy of Subject War Patrol Report.

1. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, concurs in the
remarks as expressed by the Commander Task Group Sixteen point Five in en-
closure (A).

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

[STAMP: COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U.S. FLEET
RECEIVED
1943 JUN 17
9
5]

DISTRIBUTION:
(1M-43)
List III, SS.
Special:
P1(5), F13(5), Z1(5),
Comsublant (2), X3(1),
Comsubsomespac (2),
Subschool, IIL (2),
Comtaskfor 72 (2),
Comsubron 50 (2),
Comsopac (2),
Cinclant (2),
Comtaskfor 16 (1).

[SIGNATURE: E. R. Swinburne]
E. R. SWINBURNE,
Flag Secretary.

50305 [STAMP: FILMED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 6389R-1]

— page 45 —
CONFIDENTIAL
TG16.5/A16-3
Serial 051

May 14, 1943
[STAMP: RECEIVED
ONI MAIL ROOM]
[STAMP: 1943 JUN 18 AM 9 04]

From: The Commander Task Group Sixteen point Five,
(The Commander Submarine Squadron Forty-Five ).
To : The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. S-30 -- Sixth War Patrol.

1. The Sixth War Patrol of the S-30 covered a period of
twenty nine days, of which seventeen (17) days were spent in the
patrol area. The assigned area was thoroughly and aggressively covered,
and the Task Group Commander shares the disappointment of the officers
and crew that their efforts and enthusiasm were not rewarded by contact
with the enemy.

2. The S-30 returned from refit in a very good material con-
dition and the morale of the crew was excellent.

Enclosure (A)

— page 55 —
1d
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

April 27, 1943 (Continued)
1640 (Y) - 1800 (Y) Observed CHICHAGOF HARBOR, HOLTZ BAY, and the arm between
                 CHICHAGOF and HOLTZ. Observed 15 - 20 men milling around in the same
                 spot reported previously. It is impossible to determine the extent of
                 the damage from the bombardment. Numerous shell holes were observed.
2055 (Y) Surfaced. Went ahead two thirds on one engine conducting night radar
                 patrol off HOLTZ BAY. It is a fairly dark night, sky overcast, with
                 frequent rain squalls. Wind and sea is from the northeast and seems
                 to be increasing in intensity.

April 28, 1943
0420 (Y) Submerged. Commenced patrol off entrances to HOLTZ BAY and CHICHAGOF
                 HARBOR and northern coast of ATTU. It is impossible to run at peris-
                 cope depth without using excessive battery. Will run at 65 feet and
                 take an observation every 15 - 20 minutes.
0638 (Y) Sighted plane, Army Liberator, on westerly course. This is undoubtedly
                 the weather plane.
1618 (Y) Started to retire to the north. It will be necessary to charge on
                 both engines tonight.
2055 (Y) Surfaced. Commenced battery charge using both engines.

April 29, 1943
0120 (Y) Received CTG 16.5's QUARTZ ROCK directing me to depart for the base
                 at dark May 2nd.
0200 (Y) Started to close ATTU conducting radar patrol.
0412 (Y) Submerged. Commenced submerged patrol of north coast of ATTU. Took
                 observations every 15 minutes. Heavy swells.
1300 (Y) - 1400 (Y) Took pictures through the periscope of the cape between
                 CHICHAGOF and HOLTZ.
1620 (Y) Started to open out from ATTU for battery charge.
2050 (Y) Surfaced. It will be necessary to charge on two engines again
                 tonight. Visibility is good except during occasional snow squalls.

April 30, 1943
0200 (Y) Started to close ATTU conducting radar patrol.
0410 (Y) Submerged. Commenced periscope depth patrol of north coast of ATTU.
                 Seas have moderated considerably but the boat rolls quite a lot mak-
                 ing periscope observations difficult. Visibility is very good.

- 10 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 63 —
Ge

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

C. Communications (Cont'd)

(1) Cont'd.
     While submerged, soundings were obtained from 25 to 200 fathoms by both
visual and audible methods. No satisfactory soundings could be obtained under-
way on the surface. Fathometer should be completely overhauled during next
refit period.

(2) JK QC became inoperative on May 6th. Ships force made continuity tests,
located a loose wire and the equipment was back in commission in eleven hours.
On May 7th equipment again failed to operate, but repairs were not attempted
because of rough weather. Second failure had same characteristics as first
and is probably a loose connection.

(3) The RBO regenerates so that it can be heard on low frequencies with our RAK
receiver. This is caused by misalignment of the intermediate frequency ampli-
fier stages of the RBO.

11. Radio Reception

A. Surface NPG.
(1) Reception on both the 19.8 and 30.6 KCS Channels was good throughout the
patrol, except at 1230 GCT daily the low frequency signal faded rapidly. Re-
ception of NPG's 51.68 KC channel was attempted with no results. The submerged
loop antenna was found best for surface reception of NPG's low frequency signals.

(2) Reception of the 7065 and 14150 KC high frequency channels was good through-
out patrol, except at 0230 daily the 7065 KC signal began to fade and the 14150
KC signal faded out completely.

B. Submerged NPG - NPM.
(1) Reception submerged of the NPM 16.68 channel to depth of 47 feet, was
possible throughout patrol. Below 47 feet reception of NPM was impossible, and
reception of NPG was found to be unreliable at any depth.

C. Enemy Interference.
(1) Occasional enemy interference, in the form of music and modulated, Contin-
uous wave signals keyed at random, was encountered on the 7065 KCS NPG fox chan-
nel. No enemy interference was found on low frequency or 14150 KCS. During
periods of interference it was found necessary to shift to low frequency to
maintain a watch on the NPG schedule.

- 18 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 64 —
Ge.

CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

11. Radio Reception. (Cont'd).

    D. Transmission.
        (1) At 2345 GCT May 10th we had difficulty in transmitting our Gunboat Rock
        message to NPR. Fifty minutes was spent transmitting the entire message, or
        parts of it, eight times, yet the operator failed to receive it. A second op-
        erator then replaced the first, and on receipt for the message after one
        transmittal our signal strength at the time was fair (S-3). The above
        trouble was again experienced on May 11th when transmitting our HAZY ISLAND.

        E. All messages intended for this vessel were received. Last message received:
        (E.C.M.) HEALY ROCK, and (STRIP) BEAN ISLAND. Last message sent was:
        Hazy Islands.

12. Sound Conditions and Density Layers.

    Sound conditions were excellent. The many peculiar sounds described in
    the narrative are not uncommon for this area. The noise commonly referred to
    as "YEHUDI" was heard almost daily in the area and was easily identified. The
    "pinging", if not from a submarine, remains a mystery. On the fourth war
    patrol of this vessel a similar noise was encountered in this same area. No
    explanation could be had for the strange pinging then either, but it was
    definitely decided it could not come from any ship. No density layers were
    discovered.

13. Health and Habitability.

    The habitability was considered excellent for this class vessel. There
    were no man days loss due to sickness. Only two men received treatment for
    mild colds. There were no cases of chronic constipation. The pharmacist
    mate had little opportunity to ply his trade. The excellent physical con-
    dition of the crew and the above average habitability can to some extent be
    attributed to the excellent weather throughout the patrol.

    On the long all day dives, CO2 absorbent was used and the air conditioning
    was run approximately fourteen hours during a normal seventeen hour dive. This
    use of the air conditioning plant helped a great deal in keeping down the sweat-
    ing. The difference was certainly noticed when the air conditioning was not
    operated one day. There were a total of fifty-seven officers and men on board
    during this patrol. Oxygen replenishment was not resorted to but it would have
    been necessary had the dives been much longer. During the last two or three
    hours of a long dive all hands had difficulty in breathing.

    Food was very good, varied, well prepared, and palatable. The estimate of
    days food remaining is high but considered accurate. It is estimated we could
    have continued eating with no reduction in quantity, quality, or variety
    (except for substitution of canned meats for fresh meats) for another twelve
    days. It is further estimated that an additional eight to ten days food would
    remain on board in cans with some rationing. Much of the credit for this
    very commendable performance of the commissary department is due to JOHNSON,
    Clem Russel, SCS(PA). Vitamin capsules were available and are considered
    beneficial.

- 19 - ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 66 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st Copy]

U. S. S. S-30

SS135/A16-3
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
June 22, 1943.

Serial (011)
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: SEVENTH WAR PATROL - REPORT OF.

Reference: (a) ComSubPacFlt. Conf.Ltr. No. 12-42.

Enclosure: (A) SEVENTH WAR PATROL Report of this vessel.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the seventh war patrol report
of this vessel is forwarded herewith.

W.A. STEVENSON.

Copy to:
Comtaskfor 16
Comtaskgr 16.5
Comsubron 45
Comsubdiv 52

[HANDWRITTEN: FILMED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 57638]

— page 67 —
U. S. S. S-30

U.S.S. S-30 Report on Seventh War Patrol.
Period From: May 24, 1943 to June 22, 1943.

OPERATION ORDER: Commander Task Group Sixteen Point
                   Five Operation Plan 21-43.

— page 71 —
U.S.S. S-30
REPORT OF U.S.S. S-30 SEVENTH WAR PATROL

June 5, 1943
2242. (H). -2302(H) Fired thirty-one rounds at sampan, range 1100 - 1500
yards. The sampan was hit five or six times and was left
burning from stem to stern. The failure of the foot firing
mechanism after the first shot made it necessary to use the
firing lanyard with resultant inaccuracy, thus accounting
for the high expenditure of ammunition.

2305 (W) Sighted ship on horizon distant about 12000 - 14000 yards.
Gun secured and cleared the bridge.

2307 (W) Ship was identified as a destroyer and closing fast.

2308 (W) Dove. Destroyer had opened fire at a range of about 9000
yards. The first salvo of two possibly three splashes was
1500 to 2000 yards short.

2311 (W) Commenced approach on destroyer. Came to course for 60 port
track. Target was not zigging but seemed to stop occasion-
ally to listen.

2327 (H) Depth control was lost just before reaching the firing bear-
ing. Then at 2327-20 (H) an observation was made the target
had speeded up, had crossed our bow and the first depth charge
was received. Ordered 180 feet and secured the tubes. It was
this first charge that damaged the torpedoes. Outer doors were
closed before a depth of 70 feet was reached.

2328 (W) Second and third depth charges were received as we were going
deep. Stern planes and depth gauges went out, lost power on
motors momentarily. The angle was never excessive but the
boat was heavy and using hand control of stern planes was slow.
The boat was leveled off when the sea pressure gauge read 115
lbs./sq.in. almost immediately after a slight up angle was
obtained the boat touched bottom, secured everything throughout
the boat.

2327 (H) -2345(H) Received a total of 33 depth charges, all close but
believe set for much less depth.

June 6, 1943
0000 (H) Heard 34th depth charge.

0015 (W) Heard 35th depth charge. Not close.

0015 (H) -0245 (H) Destroyer circled us at slow speed on one screw.
He would frequently pass over us. No echo ranging device was
heard at anytime. It is considered that he might possibly
have had some sort of magnetic variation device which gave him
our exact position on the bottom.

-4-

— page 72 —
U.S.S. S-30-
REPORT OF U.S.S. S-30 SEVENTH L.R. PATROL

June 6, 1943
0250 (H) Decided to surface without using the motors. It was now as dark
as it was going to be. Although the boat was tight at this
depth I did not consider it advisable to stay on the bottom until
the next night because of possible fuel leaks which would be
a dead give away in daytime. Also, there was the very likely
possibility our friend had sent for help and better A/S measures
would be used against us. This assumption later proved to be
correct.

0305 (H) Commenced blowing No. 1 and No. 2 M.B.T.'s when the destroyer
screws were on the port beam and he was continuing his circling
counter-clockwise.

0318 (H) Broke surface. Manned radar immediately. It was a pitch black
night. The lights of three ships signalling could be seen, two
on the port quarter and one on the starboard quarter. One,
some distance away on the port quarter was using a large signal
search light. The only radar contact was the destroyer at a range
of 4500 yards.

0318-30 (H) Went ahead slowly on one motor. Radar ranges indicated the
destroyer was closing slowly but I was satisfied that I had
been undetected.

0320 (H) After several false starts on one engine and then the other
and intermittent use of motors, managed to get going on both
engines and cleared area at best speed. In my desire to conserve
battery power as much as possible, since I might at any moment
have to dive and stay down sometime, I decided to make my get
away on the engines. The destroyer continued to close slowly to
2950 yards. The engines very quickly worked up to full speed
and the range started opening. The ships were soon out of
radar range but signalling could be seen for the next quarter
of an hour.

0400 (H) No. 1 main bearing of the starboard engine wiped. This was caused
by working up to full speed too quickly. It was a risk that was
knowingly accepted. I will not be able to charge unless I stop
and lie to and I am also anxious to open out from the coast as
far as possible to rest the crew and inspect the damage. Decided
to run out another hour and then lie to and charge for a couple
of hours. Then I should have just enough can to stay submerged
at dead slow speed for about 15 hours. I will hope for fog and
stay on the surface as long as possible.

-5-

— page 73 —
U.S.S. S-30
REPORT OF U.S.S. S-30 SEVENTH WAR PATROL

June 6, 1943
0600 (W) Inspection of damage has been completed and all minor damaged
         repaired. Two torpedo afterbodies were crushed and the one in
         number three tube cannot be removed. The tilt mechanism of No.
         1 Periscope has been damaged making this periscope useless in
         high power. No 3 tube is out of commission.
1742 (W) Sighted six to eight Japanese heavy bombers, Betty type, on
         port beam distant 8 miles, heading west.
1743 (W) Dived.
1818 (W) Surfaced.
2259 (W) Sent despatch considerable interference was experienced in clear-
         ing this message.

June 7, 1943
0510 (W) Received CTG 16.5's despatch and now enroute new area in
         accordance with same.
0710 (W) Starboard engine back in commission.
0900 (W) Sighted formation of about 12 Japanese heavy bombers, Betty
         type, heading northeast. We were not sighted.
0901 (W) Dived as Jap planes were heading our way.
0955 (W) Broached to 27 feet to clear antenna.
0955 (W) - 1030 (W) Made unsuccessful attempts to send despatch regard-
         ing bomber formation.
1510 (W) Surfaced. The torpedoes and tubes have been checked and the
         damaged torpedo in No. 4 tube removed.
1514 (W) Sighted Japanese patrol plane, Mavis type, distance 8 miles,
         opposite course.
1517 (W) Dived, as patrol plane turned toward us.
1730 (W) Entered new area.
1809 (W) Picked up screws bearing 230°(T).
1810 (W) Nothing visible through periscope but changed course to 230°(T)
         to close sound contact.

-6-
[STAMP: 1638 RP-1]

— page 74 —
U.S.S. S-30
REPORT OF U.S.S. S-30 SEVENTH WAR PATROL

June 7, 1943
1815 (W) Sighted small sampan, dead ahead, distance 4000 yards.
2020 (W) Surfaced.
2115 (W) Sighted splashes in water, appeared to be gunfire or bombs,
           distance about 6000 yards. No sound was heard however.
2116 (W) Dived, changed course to close splashes.
2125 (W) Surfaced as nothing was visible through periscope, continued to
           close.
2130 (W) Sighted splashes again, but this time cause was determined to be
           whales. The splashes had seemed too large for whales.

June 8, 1943
0945 (W) Dived.
1050 (W) Sighted PARAMUSHIRU TO for first time, distance about 35 miles.
           After this observation fog banks obscured the ISLAND the re-
           mainder of the day.
1852 (W) Visibility decreased to 1000 yards. Surfaced. We are approach-
           ing ONEKOTAN KAIKYO an intend to pass through the strait early
           tomorrow morning.
2400 (W) Fog continues, visibility 500 to 1000 yards navigating with
           fathometer.

June 9, 1943
0640 (W) Radar interference encountered. Enemy radar is sweeping and is
           probably land based on PARAMUSHIRU.
0800 (W) Visibility increased beyond 100 yards for the first time this
           morning. Dived.
1045 (W) Sighted land (ARAIDO TO) on port bow, 40 miles distant shortly
           afterwards PARAMUSHIRU and SHIRINKI ISLANDS were sighted.
1215 (W) Sighted three small motor sampans, with sail, heading toward
           PARAMUSHIRU. Changed course to left to avoid contact.
1643 (W) Sighted Japanese merchantman bearing 037°(T) distance 12,000
           yards, course 050°(T), angle on the bow 90° port.
1644 (W) Went to battle stations, commenced approach on merchantman.

-7-

— page 75 —
U.S.S. S-30
REPORT OF U.S.S. S-30 SEVENTH WAR PATROL

June 9, 1943
1738 (W) Decided to abandon the approach as range was steadily increasing
and further action useless. Secured from battle stations. If we
had not changed course for the sampans we would have been in
position to attack this freighter.

2333 (W) Surfaced twelve miles southwest of ARAIDO ISLAND. It is still
light but battery is low and period of darkness would not be
sufficient to enable me to have a full con tomorrow.

June 10, 1943
0730 (W) Sighted smoke on horizon bearing 256°(T). Dived and headed for
smoke.

0847 (W) Ship sighted through periscope. Smoking heavily. Battle Stations,
commenced approach.

0858 (W) At 4500 yard range, ship was determined to be a destroyer. He
was making erratic changes in speed and course, and smoking
heavily through the stack. He was conducting a search patrol and
would frequently stop, evidently to listen.

0907 (W) Decided to fire on 100 port track, zero gyro. Tubes were ready.
Range about 3500 yards. Sound could not hear his screws.
Decided to stop and go ahead only when his screws were heard.

0909 (W) Took a look, his range about 2800 yards, a large starboard
angle on the bow and he was apparently stopped to listen.
Started to reverse screws slowly to the left using my screws only
when his screws were heard. Then steady on course for a 90
starboard track sound reported target screws on starboard bow.
Depth control had been lost due to running at slow speeds and
my desire not to pump except when going ahead on the screws.

0914 (W) Decided to abandon the approach and use evasive tactics.
Continued to run at slow speeds and stopped frequently until
clear of the area.

0937 (W) Took a look, the destroyer is about 5500 yards distant in the
direction of ARAIDO TO. Visibility has decreased and he is barely
visible.

0939 (W) Secured from battle stations.

1640 (W) In KAKUNBETSU WAN, visibility very poor due to fog,
navigating with fathometer.

-8-

— page 76 —
U.S.S. S-30
REPORT OF U.S.S. S-30 SEVENTH WAR PATROL

June 10, 1943
1717 (W) Visibility increased towards the shore, and what appeared to be
          a ship was sighted. Change course to head for ship. Obtained
          navigational fix.

1725 (W) Battle Stations.

1749 (W) First contact proved false but definitely saw two merchant ships
          at anchor, closest one about 6000 yards. Started approach. The
          nearest one estimated to be about 10,000 tons, the other 4000
          tons.

1807 (W) Visibility closing in rapidly and only the larger ship was still
          visible. Although it was long range I decided to fire, as the
          large ship could just be seen, and visibility was closing fast.

1809 - 39 secs. Fired first torpedo.

1810 - 09 secs. Fired second torpedo.

1810 - 57 secs. Fired third torpedo. All torpedoes were fired zero gyro
          angle, estimated range 3400 yards.

1812 (W) Changed course to right, moving out of bay.

1813 - 24 secs. Heard first explosion. Hit!

1814 - 47 secs. Heard second explosion. Hit!

1816 (W) Took periscope observation, but fog had closed in and nothing
          could be seen.

1827 (W) Received first barrage of four depth charges, not close.
          Thought A/S measures were amazingly fast but inaccurate. Went to
          100 feet, began evasive tactics.

1829 (W) Went to 200 feet.

1829 (W) - 1835 (W) Received fourteen depth charges, not close.

1854 (W) Received three more depth charges. Astern, not close.

2100 (W) Single depth charge.

2130 (W) Single depth charge.

2255 (W) Pinging can no longer be heard.
[MARGINALIA: 1638981]

-9-

— page 79 —
CONFIDENTIAL                                                              P8

Subject:                     U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

— page 81 —
5. ENEMY VESSELS SIGHTED

| Date      | Time    | Course  | Speed       | Position      | Description

— page 82 —
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
6. AIRCRAFT

| Date | Time | Course | Position | Altitude | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5/27/43 | 0500(W) | 190° T | 50-49 N | 200 feet | 1 PBY |
| | | | 177-30 W | | |
| 5/27/43 | 0740(W) | 000° T | 50-46 N | 200 feet | 1 PBY |
| | | | 178-00 W | | |
| 5/27/43 | 0900(R) | 050° T | 50-45 N | 1500 feet | 1 PBY |
| | | | 178-14 W | | |
| 5/30/43 | 1015(E) | 090° T | 50-40 N | 2000 feet | 1 PBY |
| | | | 166-30 E | | |
| 6/1/43 | 1240(R) | 270° T | 51-09 N | 500 feet | Heavy Jap Bomber, Mitsubishi |
| | | | 165-47 E | | 01, N.M.B. (Betty) |
| 6/3/43 | 1330(R) | 270° T | 52-00 N | 2000 feet | One Japanese Reconnaissance |
| | | | 165-00 E | | patrol plane. |
| 6/4/43 | 1700(R) | 270° T | 51-00 N | 5000 feet | Six to eight Japanese Heavy Bombers, |
| | | | 165-00 E | | "MAVIS" type. |
| 6/5/43 | 1155(R) | 075° T | 50-48 N | 5000 feet | Formation of about 12 Japanese |
| | | | 157-56 E | | heavy bombers "BETTY" type. |
| 6/6/43 | 1742(R) | 270° T | 50-56 N | 2000 feet | One Japanese Reconnaissance |
| | | | 158-43 E | | patrol plane "MAVIS" type. |
| 6/7/43 | 0900(R) | 040° T | 50-30 N | 2000 feet | Formation of about 12 Japanese heavy bombers "BETTY" type. |
| | | | 158-44 E | | |
| 6/7/43 | 1514(R) | 000° T | 50-23N | 2000 feet | One Japanese Reconnaissance patrol plane "MAVIS" type. |
| | | | 158-23 E | | |

-15-

— page 86 —
Pg

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. S-30 - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

8 Enemy A/S Measures

Attack No. 2 June 10th (Continued)
random. Evidently he was trying to stir us up so the listening
about. I delayed a short time and changed course to put the de-
stroyer astern. A single depth charge was dropped at 2100(W)
and another at 2130 (W). The charges were much larger on this
attack than the ones dropped on us on the 5th of June. The attack
lasted four and a half hours. In using echo ranging they would
change frequency constantly varying their frequency between 17
and 23 kcs. It is believed the enemy never had a definite di-
rection we had to follow. The vessels undoubtedly came from
KAKUMABETSU WAN. It is thought that the anti submarine vessels
had just brought in the two ships, and thus needed very little time
to get underway, accounting for the swiftness of attack: The de-
stroyer (similar to TOMOZURU class listed in OP 22/42-4, page J39)
encountered on the morning of 10 June was conducting an anti-sub-
marine patrol and may have been clearing the way for the convoy
observed later in KAKUMABETSU WAN. He was smoking heavily. The
destroyer would make erratic zigs and would frequently stop. Echo
ranging was heard only once for a very brief period. The primary
means of search apparently was listening. We were not detected
at a range of approximately 2800 yards when stopped and running
at slow speeds. It is considered possible that an attack on the
destroyer could have been made if we had come to a course opposite
his base course and remained on that course at dead slow speed.
We might then have caught him when he was stopped or at least have
had an opportunity to fire a high parallax shot. The destroyer
tactics were very successful in avoiding a conventional attack
from a submarine with only bow tubes and at the same time highly
conducive to detecting a submarine presence.

9. Mine Sweeping Operations:
NONE

10. Major Defects:

1. Upon clearing the area the morning of June 6th the
engines were run full speed with no previous warming up period,
circulating or heating of the lub oil. Resulting from this, and
possible clogging of the oil hole, number one crank pin bearing,
starboard engine wiped after fifty minutes of operation.

2. Number five cylinder head, port engine, developed a
water leak into the cylinder and had to be renewed. This was prob-
ably due indirectly to the cracking of the head when oversized ex-
haust valve false seats were inserted during the past overhaul.
Future trouble of similar nature may be expected for at least six
other heads are cracked in the same manner.

-18-
[MARGINALIA: 1638R]

— page 90 —
TG16.5/A16-3
Serial 095

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Task Group SIXTEEN POINT FIVE
      (The Commander Submarine Squadron FORTY-FIVE).
To : The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: "U.S.S. S-30" - Seventh War Patrol.

1. The Seventh War Patrol of the S-30 covered a period of twenty-nine
days, of which fourteen days were spent in the patrol area covering PARAMUSHIRU
ISLAND. Early on this patrol, after engaging a sampan with deck gun, the S-30
was heavily depth charged and forced to bottom at 280 feet. The remainder of
the patrol was conducted in an aggressive manner, covering all assigned areas,
thoroughly, and making close reconnaissance of enemy harbors. Developments of
contacts was hampered by poor visibility and presence of many fishing vessels.

2. The sinking of sampan by gunfire in close proximity of enemy bases
can be expected to draw anti-submarine vessels. In the second attack, proved
torpedoes were detonated against the target, it is indicated that the first and
third torpedoes hit three minutes and forty-five seconds after firing and that
the torpedoes had run over four thousand yards. The two torpedoes run from
4500 to 5000 yards to completely expend themselves and detonations from known
misses are reported to have been heard over five minutes after firing. Despite
more conclusive evidence it is felt that at least one torpedo found its mark.
In the third attack unquestionably at least one torpedo passed under the target
at 700 yards range. Failure to explode is probably due to torpedo running deep.
At this range less lateral spread can be expected to be more effective consider-
ing errors in depth performance.

3. The performance of machinery is considered satisfactory. To check
pumping of moisture in binoculars they will be scaled in a fixed focus of minus
½ to 1 diopter. The amount of damage resulting from close depth charge and
diving to 280 feet is remarkably low. Practically no safety factor remained at
this depth.

4. The Squadron Commander wishes to commend the officers and men on
their performance of duty under trying circumstances and shares the disappoint-
ment that results of torpedo attacks were not more productive. The Commanding
Officer, officers and men are congratulated for an aggressive patrol.

5. The S-30 is credited with inflicting the following damage on the
enemy:

-1-

— page 92 —
FF12-10/A16-3(8)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

Serial 01417

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
S-30 Report of
Seventh War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 278
U.S.S. S-30 - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. S-30 (SS135) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

1. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, concurs
in the remarks as expressed by Commander Task Group 16.5, and con-
gratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for the damage
inflicted upon the enemy.

2. This patrol is considered successful for the purpose
of combat insignia award.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
VCNO (5) [HANDWRITTEN: ✓]
Cincpac (6)
Intol. Cen. Pac.
Ocean Areas (1)
Sorforpac
(Adv. Base Plan. Unit (1)
Cinclant (2)
Comsublant (8)
S/M School (2)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Comsubspac (18)
SUBAD, M.I. (2)
ComsubspacSubordcom
All Squadrons and Div.
Commanders, Subspac
U.S.S. S-30 (1)
(Endorsements only)
All Submarines, Subspac (1).

J. A. WOODRUFF, Jr.,
Flag Secretary. [HANDWRITTEN: C. A. L] Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
8 October 1943.

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.
[STAMP: RECEIVED S-C FILES]
[STAMP: Room 2955]
[STAMP: 3 NOV 1943]
[HANDWRITTEN: ROUTE TO: 01-02]
[HANDWRITTEN: A16-3(23)/S-135]
Op File No. [HANDWRITTEN: 98517]
Doc. No
Copy No... [HANDWRITTEN: 1 of 5]
PRN.... [HANDWRITTEN: 20542]

— page 93 —
FF12-10/A16-3(12)
Serial 045
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
bn
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
17 January 1946.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. S-30 (SS135) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

Reference: (a) Task Group 16.5 first end. TG16.5/A16-3 serial 095 of
20 August 1943.

1. By reference (a) the U.S.S. S-30 was credited with sinking one
sampan and with damaging one freighter (Kasima Maru).

2. Reliable intelligence, subsequently received, conclusively in-
dicates that the ship attacked at anchor on 10 June 1943 sank in the same posi-
tion on the following day.

3. Accordingly reference (a) is corrected as follows:
Strike out original paragraph 5 and substitute therefor:
"5. The S-30 is credited with inflicting the following damage on
the enemy:
SUNK
1 - Sampan 20 tons
1 - Freighter (Kasima Maru) 9,908 tons."

DISTRIBUTION:
CNO (12)
Cincpac (6)
JICPOA (1)
Comservpac (1)
Cinclant (1)
ComSubLant (2)
S/H School, NL (2)
CO, S/M Base, PH (1)
ComsoPac (2)
ComSubsPhilSeaFron (4)
Comnorpac (1)
Comsubpac (40)
SUND, NI (2)
All Squadron and Div. (2)
Comdrs. Pacific (5)
ComSubOpTraGr (1)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)
Comdr. W.A. Stevenson, USN. (1)

G. C. CRAWFORD,
Chief of Staff.

[HANDWRITTEN: 1/23/46]
[SIGNATURE: W. B. Siegluff]
Commander, USN,
Flag Secretary.

[STAMP: RECEIVED S-C FILES]
[STAMP: Room 2055]
[STAMP: ROUTE TO: G 3]
[STAMP: 4 FEB 1946]
[HANDWRITTEN: File No. 30 / A16-3 / SS135]
[STAMP: Doc. No. 195812]
[STAMP: Copy No. 2 of 3]
[STAMP: Reg. No]

— page 94 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

[STAMP: OFFICE OF THE]
[STAMP: RECORDS]
[STAMP: NOV 1943]

File Number SS135/A16-3
Serial 03

Vessel U.S.S. S-30
Date August 23, 1943

[HANDWRITTEN: 5-30-8th]
[HANDWRITTEN: W.P.]

DECLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. S-30
To : Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) Commander Task Group SIXTEEN POINT FIVE.
(2) Commander NORTH PACIFIC FORCE.
(3) Commander Submarine Force, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. S-30 , Report of War Patrol Number Eight .

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the Eighth War Patrol of
this vessel conducted in the northern portion of the Kuril Chain during
the period July 5, 1943 to August 9, 1943 , is forwarded herewith.

/s/

[HANDWRITTEN: M.W. Daniels]
[HANDWRITTEN: Journal]

[HANDWRITTEN: Note deletions]
[HANDWRITTEN: Euf]

Copy to:
Comsubron-45
Comsubdiv-52

[HANDWRITTEN: This Patrol Published by]
[HANDWRITTEN: Com Nor Pac.]

[HANDWRITTEN: 289]
[HANDWRITTEN: 0]

— page 95 —
P-R-I-M-A-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

(A) PROLOGUE:

Arrived Dutch Harbor, Alaska on June 22, 1943, from
Seventh War Patrol. Commenced refit on June 23, 1943, by
Submarine Base personnel assisted by own ships force.
Completed refit on July 3, 1943. Installed new type magnetic
compass. Underway on July 4 to make test dive. Readiness
for sea on July 5, 1943. Not depermed nor wiped; no training
period.

(B) NARRATIVE.

July 5
1215 (W) Underway with escort, PC 601, from Submarine Base,
Dutch Harbor, Alaska, in accordance with C.T.C.
16.3's operational Order 28-43.

1345 (W) Escort made sound contact, position 6 miles bearing
268° from Priest Rock. We proceeded on base course.

We will use Dutch Harbor Date and Time throughout
patrol.

1825 (W) Escort rejoined us.

1834 (W) Made trim and test depth dive, conditions satisfactory.
Exercised at emergency drills.

1915 (W) Sighted Bogoslof Island bearing 250° (T) distance
23 miles.

July 6
1858 (W) Made training and trim dive.

1915 (W) Made practice battle surface.

July 7
1334 (W) Made training and trim dive.

1340 (W) Made battle surface and fired eight rounds common
service ammunition from deck gun at target released
by escort. Also fired one pan of 30 caliber from
machine gun.

1835 (W) Swung ship to compensate magnetic compass.
- 1 - 289

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
                                                              U.S.S. S-30

July 8
1050 (W) Port engine out of commission. Casualty to third stage of air
       compressor. Upon investigation it was found necessary to renew
       the third stage rings.
1336 (W) Exercised control party at practice radar approaches on escort.
1620 (W) Made training and trim dive.
2040 (W) Port engine back in commission.

July 9
0533 (W) Sighted six ship convoy bearing 070° (T) distance 6 miles,
       apparently heading for Attu.
0855 (W) Entered Massacre Bay channel, Attu Island, Alaska.
1015 (W) Moored port side to alongside the U.S.S. Cuyana in Massacre Bay,
       Attu Island, Alaska.
1300 (W) Received lub oil, fuel oil and fresh provisions from the U.S.S.
       Cuyana. Renewed liner and rings third stage cylinder of port
       main engine air compressor. Watered batteries.

July 10
0800 (W) Underway in company with escort PC 572, in accordance with
       C.T.G. 16.5's operational Order 28-43 and SOPA Massacre secret
       dispatch 100707.

1500 (W) Released escort.

                                                              - 2 - 269

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. -30

July 10

1835 (W) Exercise: [BLACKOUT] fire control party at radar approach drill.

2208 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Rose Rock Part 2, directing us to proceed
          due west at latitude fifty one dash twenty. Our arrival at
          latitude fifty one dash twenty is estimated to be at 0210 July 11TH.
          I will then proceed due west as directed.

July 11

0210 (W) Headed due west as directed in C.T.G. 16.5's Rose Rock Part 2.
          [BLACKOUT]
          [BLACKOUT]
          [BLACKOUT]

1352 (W) Changed course to 251° (T) to comply with C.T.G. 16.5's Verde
          Point. We are standing by R.B.O.

1610 (W) Heard friendly plane talkies on R.B.O. on 6220 Kcs. Two planes,
          V72 and V75, came in strong and clear. They gave their D.F.
          position which was approximately 124 miles from our position.
          The latter planes were heard until 1800 when they headed for
          home. Jap interference was heard continually on this frequency.

- 3 - 109

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. S-30

July 1.
0420 (W) received C.T.G. 16.5's Ward Cove.
0930 (W) Headed due South enroute to original route in accordance with
C.T.G. 16.5's Ward Cove.
1340 (W) Made training and trim dive.

July 13
1235 (W) Exercised control party at radar approach drill.
1802 (W) Made training and trim dive.

July 14
0645 (W) Made training and trim dive.
1500 (W) Entered patrol area Base.
1710 (W) Sighted Matsuwa To bearing 292°(T) distance 80 miles.

July 15
0030 (W) Sighted flashes and heard gunfire from Northern and Southern ends
of Matsuwa To. Firing continued for a period of about thirty
five minutes.
0700 (W) Conducting surface patrol, visibility very poor due to fog,
300 to 500 yds.
0820 (W) Made radar contact bearing 310°(T) distance 1200 yds. dived.
0919 (W) Made periscope observations and sound search but no further
verification was made on radar contact. Surfaced. This was
probably a sampan.
0930 (W) Making passage through Matsuwa Kaikyo, navigating with radar.
1307 (W) Visibility increased to 5000 yds. dived, commenced submerged
patrol.
1528 (W) Visibility closed in to 500 yds, surfaced.

- 4 - [HANDWRITTEN: 277]

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

July 16
0700 (W) Dived. We are patrolling on southeasterly and northwesterly courses,
          across routes between Yamato Suido and La Perouse Strait.

1910 (W) Visibility decreased to 500 yds. Surfaced.

2145 (W) Visibility increased, dived.

2400 (W) Surfaced.

July 17
0700 (W) It has been necessary the past two days to maintain a surface patrol
          the greater part of the time because of extreme low visibility, due
          to fog. Today is no exception, fog continues.

2000 (W) Visibility increased to 4000 yds. Dived.

2028 (W) Visibility decreased to 500 yds. Surfaced.

2030 (W) It is planned to close the Kuril Chain tonight and patrol down the
          western side of same tomorrow.

July 18
0700 (W) Conducting surface patrol off Matsuwa To and Raichua To. Fog
          continues, navigating with radar.

1040 (W) Visibility increased to 4000 yds, dived.

1132 (W) Visibility decreased to 500 yds, surfaced.

2108 (W) Visibility increased to 5000 yds, dived.

July 19
0727 (W) Dived. Patrolling off Shimushiru To and Ketoi To. Weather clear
          with good visibility for first time since entering area.

0923 (W) Sighted Japanese trawler of about 750 tons bearing 090° (T)
          distance 4500 yds. We were not able to get close to him, but it
          had been decided not to fire a torpedo.

1115 (W) Sighted trawler or small steamer similar to the one seen earlier
          today, it may be the same. Started approach.

- 5 - [UNCLEAR: 287]

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

July 19
1207 (W) Discontinued approach after deciding this ship was not worth a
          torpedo. Trawler would change course and speed frequently and
          it is not known just what was the purpose of his operations. He
          may have been on anti-submarine patrol. We were not able to get
          closer than 5000 yards.

1307 (W) Took periscope pictures of northern coast of Shimushiru To.

1500 (W) Made passage through Shimushiru Kaikyo.

2147 (W) Cables on No. 2 periscope parted. Will renew cables tonight but
          suspect the optics have been damaged.

July 20
0045 (W) Surfaced.

0712 (W) Dived, patrolling up eastern side of Kuril Chain off Rashuwa To.
          No. 2 periscope tilt mechanism damaged, periscope out of commission.

1632 (W) Took periscope pictures of the eastern coast of Matsuwa To from a
          distance of 22 miles.

2217 (W) Sighted a ship which appeared to be an inter-island steamer of
          about 2000-3000 tons, distance 12,000 yds. Ship was zig-zagging
          and smoking heavily. Sea is glassy calm. Commenced approach.

2322 (W) Fired two torpedoes at a range of 900 yards, straight bow shots,
          Zero gyro, 100 port track, longitudinal spread. Two torpedoes
          instead of three were fired because the target had passed the
          desired point of aim for the first torpedo of the spread. Torpedoes
          missed due to underestimating target speed. Target made no in-
          dication of sighting periscope or maneuvering to avoid torpedoes.

2324 (W) Raised periscope and observed target heading for us at close range.
          Went to 100 feet. Target passed over motor room.

2327 (W) - 2328 (W) Four depth charges. Went to 200 feet, and commenced
          evasive tactics clearing to eastward. Decided ship must be a
          Q-ship.

          - 6 - 287

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-----I-I-I-I-A-L
U.S.S. -30

July 20 (cont)
2333 (W) Fifth depth charge.
2333½ (W) Sixth depth charge.
2340 (W) - 2355 (W) Started to come up to periscope depth twice, but sound
would report target screws getting louder as we passed 150 ft.

July 21
0017 (W) Periscope depth. Target could still be seen in the direction of
Matsuma distant about 4500 yards. He was lying to or making
way very slowly. Went ahead with reload and started to close
target.
0037 (W) Lost target due to darkness. Sound operator's report on screw
noises indicated he went off in the direction of Matsuma.
0107 (W) Surfaced, conducting surface patrol across probable route between
Yokosuka and Paramushiru To. Visibility poor, fog was closed
again.
0215 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's. Queen Inlet extending our patrol to include
area Shake.
0420 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Roller Bay.
0720 (W) Entered area Shake. Continued surface radar patrol across and
along probable shipping route.

July 22
0700 (W) Fog continues, conducting surface patrol.
1800 (W) Changed course to close Masukotan To, plan to look over Stone Man
tomorrow, weather permitting.
2330 (W) I sent my lookout regarding Nip -ship.

July 23
0345 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Frog Rock regarding Nip cruisers.
0700 (W) Making passage through Musiru Kaikyo, navigating with radar and
fathometer. Visibility 4000 yds.

- 7 - 211

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U. S. S. S-30

July 23
0800 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Golf Bay directing us to take over area Victory
         Three on the twenty-fifth.
0805 (W) Dived. Patrolling off Shasukotan To and Yekaruma To.

July 24
0518 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Jadiaki Cove modifying Victory One and Victory
         Two.
0707 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Martin Rock regarding intercept plan.
0730 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Key Reef directing us to proceed to area Victory
         Three at sunset on July 25th.
0732 (W) Dived. Patrolling off West Coast of Onekotan To.
1505 (W) Took pictures of Makanru To, Onekotan To, and surrounding islands.
2025 (W) Took pictures of Nemo Wan in Onekotan To.

July 25
0102 (W) Surfaced.
[BLACKED OUT TEXT]
[BLACKED OUT TEXT]
0730 (W) Dived. Patrolling northwest of Makanru To across route bet-
         ween La Perouse Strait and Araido Kaikyo.

July 26
0045 (W) Surfaced.
0342 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Stevenson Island.
0510 (W) Entered area Victory Three.
0731 (W) Dived. Conducted submerged patrol at periscope depth. Paramushiru is
         not visible but visibility is, in general, good.

-8- [HANDWRITTEN: 1947]

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

July 26 (cont)
0510 (W) Entered area Victory Three.
0731 (W) Dived. Conducted submerged patrol at periscope depth.
           Paramushiru is not visible, but visibility is, in
           general, good.

July 27
0030 (W) Surfaced.
0730 (W) Dived. Will conduct patrol across route to Soya Strait
           west of Araido today.
1811 (W) Sighted smoke, bearing 230° (T). Was checking on this
           when at
1813 (W) Sighted 7000 ton Jap Merchantman with destroyer escort,
           bearing 040° (T) distance 5000 yards.
1814 (W) Went to battle stations, commenced approach on Merchantman.
           Sea is glassy calm with rolling swells.
1827-36 (W) Fired #1.
1827-45 (W) Fired #2.
1827-56 (W) Fired #3. Torpedoes fired using straight longitudinal
           spread, 1900 yard range, 85° port track.
1829-30 (W) (Approximately) Two hits were heard by men in torpedo
           room and after battery. Sound reported these hits, but
           the recorder did not get the times. There was some
           confusion in the control room at the time due to near
           broaching and the urgency to get deep and prepare for the
           inevitable depth charging.
1832 (W) - 1834-30 (W) Four depth charges astern, evidently
           dropped at our firing point.
1844 (W) Heard noises like escaping of large volumes of air on the
           sound gear.
1853 (W) Heard approximately twenty depth charges at considerable
           distance dropped in rapid fire order.

- 9 - 289

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
                                                                                             U.S.S. S-30

July 27
1906 (W)      Sound reported target very close had speeded up and was coming in
              for attack.

1914 (W)      Pinging was getting further away.

2008 (W)      Periscope depth. There was smoke in the direction of Araiso. It
              looked like the same smoke that had been observed before the start
              of the approach.

July 28
0300 (W)      Received C.T.G. 16.5's Yentnoo Islets directing us to extend patrol
              to area Victory Four.

0700 (W)      Visibility 500 yds. due to fog, patrolling on surface.

0740 (W)      Made radar contact, 1300 yds, 055° (T) dived.

0750 (W)      Believed to have hit fishing net.

0800 (W)      Sound reported screws bearing 040° (T). Nothing could be seen
              through periscope.

0802 (W)      Broached to 30 feet, radar picked up target bearing 160° (T) range
              800 yds.

0804 (W)      Went down to 45 feet.

0818 (W)      Sound lost contact on target, surfaced. Lost radar contact. It was
              necessary to cut fishing net free from superstructure.

0840 (W)      Entered area Victory Four.

1455 (W)      Dived. Visibility increased to about 5000 yards.

July 29
0030 (W)      Surfaced.

                                    - 10 - [HANDWRITTEN: 217]

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

                                                                U.S.S. S-30

July 29
0411 (W) Dived. Patrolling off west coast of Kamchatka. Ill water
           batteries today.
1605 (W) Surfaced. Visibility about 1500 yards.
2030 (W) Visibility increased to around four miles. Decided to remain
           on surface and close Kamchatka.
2355 (W) Changed course to patrol along coast of Kamchatka and be in
           position north of Araiddo in the morning.

July 30
0600 (W) Enroute to point ten miles north Araiddo To. Will patrol on easterly
           and westerly courses. Position is in doubt since land has not
           been visible for four days.
0645 (W) Radar contact bearing 300° (T) distance 5,050 yds.
0646 (W) Battle stations, commenced radar approach.
0649 (W) Dived when range was 2100 yards. It was getting light but a
           surface haze made visibility difficult to estimate. Target
           was not sighted before diving or through the periscope after
           reaching periscope depth.
0651 (W) Sound reported target fairly close and drawing aft. Went to
           80 ft. and abandoned approach. It is now realized I should have
           run with the target at best speed and been in position to con-
           duct a periscope attack later when visibility would have been
           better. There was insufficient time to obtain accurately the
           target's course and speed by radar plot.

                                                                - 11 - [HANDWRITTEN: 249]

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

July 30
0709 (W) Periscope depth. Clear all around and visibility is very good.
          Patrolling on east and west line north of Araido.

2220 (W) Surfaced to determine state of visibility. A surface haze, flat
          calm sea, and overcast sky makes it impossible to tell what the
          visibility is through the periscope.

2235 (W) Dived. Visibility about 5000 yards.

July 31
0030 (W) Surfaced.

0738 (W) Dived. Patrolling ten to fifteen miles north of Araido To on
          easterly and westerly courses.

1745 (W) Sighted Jap Merchantman on northwesterly course distance about
          4000 yds., coming out of a fog bank, large port angle on the
          bow. Commenced approach.

1755 (W) Abandoned approach unable to reach favorable firing position.
          Never did get a real good look at the ship. Visibility seemed
          to decrease as the range decreased.

1830 (W) Came up to 30 ft., ventilated boat and made radar sweep.
          Visibility about 4000 yds.

1838 (W) Went down to periscope depth.

1930 (W) Came up to 30 ft. Visibility 4000 yds. Made radar sweep.

1935 (W) Radar contact bearing 126° (T) distance 4500 yds. Went to
          periscope depth.

1936 (W) Picked up target, 3000 ton Able King through periscope, commenced
          approach. Battle stations.

1944 (W) Target got on the firing bearing before tubes were ready. Started
          to swing ship to the left. Attempted to set angles for new set-up,
          but this was too slow. Continued coming left and ended up in the
          target's wake.

- 12 - [HANDWRITTEN: 2 /]

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

July 31

1950-25 (W) Fired one torpedo. 180° track, zero gyro, range 1800 yards.
1952 (W) Target no longer visible in fog.
1956-25 (W) Explosion, did not sound like depth charge, probably torpedo
at end of run.
2002 (W) Sighted another ship bearing 257° (T) distance 3700 yards.
Commenced approach.
2007-24 (W) Fired one.
2007-32 (W) Fired two.
2007-42 (W) Fired three. Straight longitudinal spread, 80° port track,
range 900 yards.
2008 (W) Went to 55 feet, lost depth control.
2008-20 (W) First torpedo hit followed almost immediately by second. Sound
also reported screw noises could no longer be heard. Noises
similar to air escaping were heard but the intensity and dura-
tion was less than those heard following the attack on 27 July.
2009 (W) - 2010 (W) Periscope observations revealed nothing in sight. It is
believed ship had sunk. It was still foggy but the visibility
seemed unchanged, about 4000 yards.
2012-20 (W) Explosion. Probably our other torpedo at end of run.
2013 (W) Sound reported screws on port quarter. Screws sounded different
than either of the ships encountered previously.
2014 (W) Periscope depth observation revealed ship (unidentified) on
port quarter heading for us. Still having difficulty with
depth control. Broached momentarily before going deep.
2015-10 (W) First depth charge, astern.
2016-30 (W) Second depth charge, using evasive tactics.

- 13 -
[STAMP: 7 03185]

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

July 31
2039 (W) Started to clear the area to northward to make reload and determine,
          if possible, cause of depth control difficulty.

August 1
0032 (W) Surfaced.

0420 (W) Headed north, will patrol off western coast of Kamchatka today,
          looking for a cannery. We have three torpedoes and six more days
          on station.

0715 (W) Sighted ship bearing 035° (T) distance 5000 yds. Dived.

0717 (W) Ship definitely identified as Russian, the S.S. Kovda. She was
          steaming down the western coast of Kamchatka, no running lights
          but flying colors.

August 2
0045 (W) Surfaced.

0300 (W) Ranging unit and lobe switching of radar out of commission. Pips
          will show on the screen, but accurate ranges and bearings are
          impossible.

0728 (W) Dived. Patrolling off western coast of Kamchatka.

1512 (W) Visibility decreased to 1000 yds. Came up to 30 ft., made radar
          search, ventilated boat.

1517 (W) Went to 45 ft. Visibility increased to 6000 yds.

[HANDWRITTEN: - 14 - 209]

— page 109 —
I-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. S-30

August 2

1730 (W) Took pictures of canneries on coast of Kamchatka at a distance of
          ten miles. Position 52-08 N. Lat., 156-13 E. Long.

1755 (W) Sighted 1500 ton trawler bearing 120° (T) distance 4 miles patrolling
          on north and south line Commenced approach.

1812 (W) Decided to abandon approach when range had closed to 7500 yards.
          Plotted position indicated he was well inside Russian territorial
          waters and probably Russian. There was only four fathoms under
          my keel and I did not consider it advisable to close due to the
          few soundings on the chart.

1819 (W) Took pictures of trawler mentioned above. Opening out from coast.

August 3

0039 (W) Surfaced.

0200 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's North Cape.

0715 (W) Dived. Conducted periscope depth patrol.

August 4

0000 (W) Surfaced.

0015 (W) Entered area Victory Three.

0700 (W) Visibility 1000 yds., due to fog. Patrolling on the surface.

1030 (W) Visibility increased to 4000 yds. Dived.

2358 (W) Surfaced.

August 5

0000 (W) Making passage through Onekotan Kaikyo.

0015 (W) Entered Area Victory Two.                                          7 03185

0640 (W) Radar contact 5000 yds., 140° (T). Commenced radar approach. Range
          unit and lobe switching of radar was still out of commission. Fairly
          accurate ranges were obtainable by observing where pips appeared on the
          screen in reference to marks on a card-board card that had been scaled.
                                                              [HANDWRITTEN: ** 15 219]

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

August 5
0640 (cont) Bearings inside of 3000 yards without lobe switching were
very inaccurate. A purely radar approach without being able to
see the target was out of the question.

0645 (W) Dived when range was 2000 yards. Plot showed target to be on
opposite and parallel course. Target could not be seen through
periscope, visibility about 1500 yards.

0655 (W) Sound heard screws.

0657 (W) Went deep as screws were becoming louder and target still was not
visible through periscope.

0715 (W) Came up to periscope depth, good visibility, nothing in sight.

August 6
0005 (W) Surfaced.

0705 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Quiet Harbor.

0720 (W) [BLACKED OUT LINE]

1410 (W) Surfaced. Excellent visibility.

1503 (W) Sighted Jap reconnaissance plane, Mavis type on course 270° (T),
distance 8 miles. He did not see us. Dived, continued periscope
patrol.

2345 (W) Surfaced.

August 7
0100 (W) Departed area Victory Two.

0700 (W) Dived.

0830 (W) Surfaced, enroute to Point Chico.

0845 (W) Attempted to send my Nut Rock and Moss Point, but was unsuccessful.

1000 (W) Listened on R.B.O. for friendly plane talkie, no success.

- 16 - [HANDWRITTEN: 289]

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

August 7 (Cont.)
1017 (W) Sighted Jap plane, Mavis type, on course 100°(T), distance 10 miles.
     He did not see us. Dived.
1130 (W) Surfaced.
1715 (W) Sighted Jap plane, Mavis type, on course 270°(T), distance 5 miles
     heading for us. Dived.
1717 (W) Received first bomb from plane at 80 ft. Not close.
1717-30 (W) Received second bomb from plane. Not close.
1720 (W) - 1734 (W) Plane circled ahead of us about four miles.
1735 (W) Jap plane secured and headed toward Paramushiru.
1830 (W) Surfaced.
1900 (W) Sent my Moss Point.
2020 (W) Sent my Nut Rock.

August 8
0700 (W) Made trim dive.
1020 (W) Sighted U.S. Patrol plane, PBY, on course 270°(T) distance 20 miles.
     He did not see us.
1232 (W) Sighted plane on course 060°(T) distance 20 miles, believed to be a
     PBY. He did not see us.
1257 (W) Sighted plane on course 090°(T) distance 20 miles, believed to be a
     PBY. He did not see us.
2132 (W) Sent my Olga Rock.

August 9
0600 (W) Sighted plane, believed to be a PBY, distance 10 miles on course
     320°(T).
1130 (W) Sighted Attu, Island on stbd. bow distance 30 miles.
1315 (W) Sighted escort, the U.S.S. King, bearing 055°(T) distance 10 miles.
1400 (W) Joined escort.

- 17 - [HANDWRITTEN: 289]

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

August 9 (cont)
1445 (W) Sighted U.S. Army Liberator, 8 miles distant on various courses.
1458 (W) Sighted PBY, 10 miles distant on various courses.
1720 (W) Sighted U.S. Kingfisher, 1 mile distant on various courses.
2010 (W) Entered Massacre Bay channel.
2050 (W) Moored starboard side to the U.S.S. Cuyana at Massacre Bay,
           Attu Island, Alaska.

- 18 - [HANDWRITTEN: 789]

— page 113 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

(C) WEATHER
Enroute to and from Areas.
Weather in general was very good. Calm wind and sea
generally from west and southwest. Good visibility, sky
overcast, steady barometer.

Area Raze and Area Shake July 14-July 22.
Calm wind and sea generally from south and southwest.
Except for two days the visibility was very bad due to
heavy fog. Barometer steady, sky overcast.

Area Shake, Victory Three, and Victory Four July 23-Aug 6
Calm wind and sea varying in direction. Visibility
fair to good approximately 50% of this period, the re-
mainder of the time visibility was bad due to heavy fog.
Barometer generally steady, sky overcast.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
The weather was such that celestial and terrestrial
fixes were very infrequent and no accurate tidal infor-
mation could be obtained.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
1. No navigational lights were observed.
2. Charts were adequate except for southwestern coast
of Kamchatka.

[HANDWRITTEN: 19 217]

— page 114 —
(47)

| NO. | DATE | TIME | POSITION | TYPE | RANGE | INITIAL COURSE | SPEED | CONTACTED | HOW | REMARKS |
|---|
| 1 | 7/29/43 | 0923 | Lat. 47-12 N.\nLong. 152-14 E. | 750-Ton Jap\nFishing\nTrawler | 2500 Yds. | Various | Various | BP | | High bow and\nstern-flush\ndeck-stack and\nwheel house |
| 2 | 7/29/43 | 1115 | Lat. 47-16 N.\nLong. 152-22 E. | 750-Ton Jap\nFishing\nTrawler | 3500 Yds. | Various | Various | BP | | Same as above. |
| 3 | 7/29/43 | 2220 | Lat. 47-32 N.\nLong. 154-16 E. | 3000-Ton Jap\nMerchantman | 10000 Yds. | 225 (T) | 6 Knots | BP | | High bow and\nstern. 140'\nlong. O.I.\n110 |
| 4 | 7/28/43 | 1000 | Lat. 51-08 N.\nLong. 154-55 E. | 750-Ton Jap\nMerchantman | 5000 Yds. | 230 (T) | 8 Knots | BP | | High bow and\nstern-flush\ndeck. |
| 5 | 7/27/43 | 1000 | Lat. 53-02 N.\nLong. 154-55 E. | Jap Destroyer | 5000 Yds. | 230(T) | 8 Knots | BP | | High bow and\nstern-flush\ndeck. |
| 6 | 7/26/43 | 2245 | Lat. 53-03 N.\nLong. 155-08 E. | 750-Ton Jap\nMerchantman | 5000 Yds. | 215 (T) | 10 Knots | BP | | Low visibility\ndue to fog and\nrain. Further\ndetails\nunobtainable. |
[HANDWRITTEN: 289]

— page 115 —
[HANDWRITTEN: SD - S]
[HANDWRITTEN: DP - S]
[HANDWRITTEN: SD - S]
[HANDWRITTEN: DP - S]
I O I H:

7 7/23/43 1935 W Lat. 31-03 N. 3000-Ton Jap 4750 Yds. 315 (T) 11 knots Radar.
                 Long. 155-53 E. Merchant                               Short line
                                                                        ship. Best Iden.
                                                                        is 2000-Ton
                                                                        Merchant. See
                                                                        Make, O.N.I., 208
                                                                        J, page 206.

8 7/30/43 2002 W Lat. 31-03 N. 6000-Ton Jap 3700 Yds. 320 (T) 12 knots DP
                 Long. 155-53 E. Merchant                               No identity this
                                                                        ship. The radar
                                                                        contact at close
                                                                        range after the
                                                                        attack on the Ind
                                                                        bun Maru and was
                                                                        heading for us.

9 7/31/43 2014 W Lat. 31-03 N. Probably a                               DP
                 Long. 155-53 E. Jap Maru.                              Definitely an
                                                                        Ind. bun Maru.
                                                                        Periscope ident.
                                                                        failed as the iden.
                                                                        tified as the SS
                                                                        KOWDA.

10 8/1/43 0717 W Lat. 32-34 N. 5000-Ton 5000 Yds. 160 (T) 6 knots SD
                 Long. 155-49 E. Russian                                This trawler was
                                 Merchant                               well inside Rus-
                                                                        sian Territorial
                                                                        waters. There
                                                                        were no Jap Mer-
                                                                        chant flag pilots
                                                                        but was flying
                                                                        colors.

11 8/2/43 1755 W Lat. 32-10 N. 1500-Ton 8000 Yds. Various Various DP
                 Long. 156-36 E. Russian Traw-                          She had
                                 ler.                                   no running lights
                                                                        but was flying
                                                                        colors.

I O I H:
SD - Sighted during daylight through periscope.
DP - Sighted during daylight while on the surface.

21 289

— page 116 —
(0)
(D) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

No. | DATE | TIME | POSITION | TYPE | INITIAL AIRCRAFT CONTACTS | REMARKS
| | | | | RANGE | COURSE | ALTITUDE | HOW CONTACTED |
1 | 7/5/43 | 1917 | Lat. 54-04 N | S.B.D. | 4 miles | Various | 1000 ft | SD | Our own air
| | | | Long. 168-24 W | DAUNTLESS | | | | | coverage.
2 | 7/10/43 | 1135 | Lat. 53-02 N | U.S.N. | 6 miles | Various | 1000 ft | SD | Our own air
| | | | Long. 173-02 E | "Kingfisher" | | | | | coverage.
3 | 7/10/43 | 1240 | Lat. 53-02 N | PBY | 6 miles | Various | 1000 ft | SD | Our own air
| | | | Long. 172-51 E | | | | | | coverage.
4 | 8/6/43 | 1503 | Lat. 49-41 N | Jap Naval | 4 miles | 270 (T) | 5000 ft | SD | He was definitely
| | | | Long. 157-52 E | | | | | | identified, we were
| not sighted.
5 | 8/7/43 | 1047 | Lat. 49-08 N | Jap Naval | 10 miles | 090 (T) | 5000 ft | SD | He was definitely
| | | | Long. 160-22 E | | | | | | identified, we were
| not sighted.
6 | 8/7/43 | 1715 | Lat. 49-20 N | Jap Naval | 4 miles | 270 (T) | 2000 ft | SD | He was definitely
| | | | Long. 161-45 E | | | | | | identified, we were
| not sighted.
7 | 8/8/43 | 1020 | Lat. 50-01 N | PBY | 20 miles | 270 (T) | 2000 ft | SD | We were not
| | | | Long. 165-43 E | | | | | | sighted.
8 | 8/8/43 | 1232 | Lat. 50-11 N | PBY | 20 miles | 090 (T) | 2000 ft | SD | We were not
| | | | Long. 166-04 E | | | | | | sighted.
9 | 8/8/43 | 1257 | Lat. 50-15 N | PBY | 20 miles | 060 (T) | 2000 ft | SD | We were not
| | | | Long. 166-14 E | | | | | | sighted.
10 | 8/8/43 | 0600 | Lat. 52-00 N | PBY | 10 miles | 320 (T) | 3000 ft | SD | We were not
| | | | Long. 170-08 E | | | | | | sighted. Two
| bombs were dropped
| after we dove, not
| close.
11 | 8/9/43 | 1145 | Lat. 52-53 N | U.S.A. | 10 miles | Various | 3000 ft | SD | Not sighted.
| | | | Long. 172-13 E | "Liberator" | | | | |
12 | 8/9/43 | 1458 | Lat. 52-54 N | PBY | 8 miles | Various | 3000 ft | SD | Not definitely
| | | | Long. 172-16 E | | | | | | identified due to
| distance and light
| conditions.
13 | 8/9/43 | 1720 | Lat. 53-02 N | "Kingfisher" | 1 mile | Various | 1000 ft | SD | Our own air
| | | | Long. 173-02 E | | | | | | coverage.

NOTE: SD - Sighted during daylight while on the surface.

[HANDWRITTEN: 2-2 F9]
[STAMP: SAFETY FILM]
[STAMP: KODAK]

— page 117 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. S-30

(H) ATTACK DATA
U.S.S. S-30 Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol No. 8
Time 2322 (w) Date 7/20/43 Lat. 47-52 N. Long. 154-16 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description Jap "Q" ship. Most like Rokko Maru, O.N.I.
208-J, page 140.

Ship Sunk None

Damage Determined By None

Target Draft Course Speed Range (at firing)
8-10 ft. 225 (t) 6 kts. 900 yds.

Own Ship Data

Speed Course Depth Angle (at firing)
3 kts. 305 (t) 43 ft. 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack Day periscope attack

[HANDWRITTEN: 23 219]
[STAMP: 7 03185]

— page 118 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
                                                              U.S.S. S-30

(H) ATTACK DATA (cont)

Attack No. 1

                                                              #1          #2
Tubes Fired                                                   1           2
Track Angle                                                   100 P       100 P
Gyro Angle                                                    0           0
Depth Set                                                     4 ft.       6 ft
Power                                                         36 kt       36 kt
Hit or Miss                                                   Miss        Miss
Erratic                                                       No          No
Mark Torpedo                                                  10-3        10-3
Serial No.                                                    6592        6593
Mark Exploder                                                 3           3
Serial No.                                                    5222        5218
Actuation Set                                                 Contact     Contact
Actuation Actual                                              None        None
Mark Warhead                                                  10 Mod. 2   10 Mod.2
Serial No.                                                    962         777
Explosive                                                     TNT         TNT
Firing Interval                                               ---         10 sec
Point of Aim                                                  Forward of stack Stern
Type Spread                                                   Straight, longitudinal spread
Sea Conditions                                                Calm--with long swells.
Overhaul Activity                                             Dutch Harbor, Alaska

Remarks:        The cause of the misses was definitely
                determined to be underestimating target speed.
                The approach lasted an hour and the zig-zag
                plan had been determined. It was thought the
                target was proceeding at very slow speed be-
                cause of the dead slow rate of change of range.
                Analysis of the various periscope observations
                indicates the target would proceed at dead slow
                speed for a time and then increase speed to
                eight to ten knots. It was determined the target
                was a Q ship because of the target's actions
                before and after the attack. It is quite possible
                he knew we were around. At any rate, he was
                definitely looking for a submarine.

                                                              [HANDWRITTEN: 24 289]

— page 119 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
_C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L_

U.S.S. S-30
(H) ATTACK DATA (cont)

U.S.S. S-30 Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 8
Time 1828 (w) Date 7/27/43 Lat. 51-02 N. Long 154-55 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description
Similar to Tatuteke Maru or Awata Maru.
Jap man-of-war on side of deck house.

Ship Sunk One possible

Damage Determined By:
Two explosions heard--sound reported "air
noises" similar to those made by a sinking
ship sixteen (16) minutes after firing.

Target Draft | Course | Speed | Range (at firing)
10 ft. | 230 (t) | 8 kts. | 1,900 yds.

Own Ship Data

Speed | Course | Depth | Angle (at firing)
3 kts. | 325 (t) | 43 ft. | 2° down

Fire Control & Torpedo Data

Type Attack
Day periscope.

[HANDWRITTEN: 25 289]

— page 120 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L                                                              U.S.S. S-30

(H)         ATTACK DATA (cont)

            Attack No. 2

— page 121 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. S-30

(H) ATTACK DATA (cont)

U.S.S. S-30 Torpedo Attack No. [HANDWRITTEN: 3] Patrol No. [HANDWRITTEN: 8]
Time 1950 (w) Date 7/31/43 Lat. 31-03 N. Long. 155-53 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description

Jap merchantman, 3,000 tons, clipper bow,
high single stack, engine room amidships.
Most like Nikkai Maru, O.N.I. 208-J page 113.

Ship Sunk None

Damage Determined By None

Target Draft Course Speed Range (at firing)
10 ft. 315 ° 11 kts. 1,500 yds.

Own Ship Data

Speed Course Depth Angle (firing)
6 kts. 315 ° 43 ft. 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack Day periscope attack.

[HANDWRITTEN: 27] [HANDWRITTEN: 289]

— page 122 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

(H) ATTACK DATA (cont)
Attack No. 3

Tubes Fired #1
Track Angle 180
Gyro Angle 0
Depth Set 4 ft
Power 36 kt
Hit or Miss Miss
Erratic No
Mark Torpedo 10-3
Serial No. 6546
Mark Exploder 3
Serial No. 5227
Actuation Set Contact
Actuation Actual None
Mark Warhead 10-2
Serial No. 106
Explosive TNT
Firing Interval ---
Type Spread ---
Sea Conditions Choppy but calm
Overhaul Activity Dutch Harbor, Alaska

Remarks:
This attack illustrates the inadequacy of
the fire control installation on S-boats. The
tubes were ready a few seconds too late to fire
on the selected firing bearing for a straight
bow shot, zero gyro angle. An attempt was made
to set angles, but this was too slow. Finally,
when we had swung to the target's course, an
observation disclosed we were in the target's
wake. It was considered to be worth the expend-
iture of one torpedo to fire a straight bow shot,
180° track. The target made a small zig after
approximately two minutes of torpedo run and just
made it possible for the target maneuvered to avoid being hit.

[HANDWRITTEN: 28 = 39]

— page 123 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. S-30

(H) ATTACK DATA (cont)

U.S.S. S-30 Torpedo Attack No. 4 Patrol No. 8

Time 2007 (W) Date 7/31/43 Lat. 31-03 N Long. 155-51E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description Jap merchantman most like Taibun Maru
O.N.I. 208-J, page 206.

Ship Sunk One 5,000 ton Able King

Damage Determined by Two torpedo hits 50 seconds after
firing. Ship not seen at periscope
observation one minute after explosions.
Screws could not be heard after torpedoes
detonated. Noises similar to large volumes
of escaping air were heard.

Target Draft Course Speed Range (at firing)
10 ft. 320° 12 kts. 900 yds.

Own Ship Data

Speed Course Depth Angle (firing)
3 kts. 060 43 ft. 1° up angle

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type attack Day periscope attack.

[HANDWRITTEN: 29] [HANDWRITTEN: 284]

— page 125 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. S-30

ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

(J)

Anti-submarine measures were encountered on three
of the four attacks made. The Q-ship and the unidentified
ship (following the attack on the freighter on the 31st)
both attempted to ram. The tactics of all three were the
same in depth charging. Their strategy was to drop charges
at the point the submarine was last seen. They apparently
never regained contact after the initial dropping of the
charges. The Q-ship was the most persistent, but just as
ineffective. She was apparently equipped with listening
gear only. It is believed the unidentified ship that
attempted to ram was another maru, and this probably accounts
for the ineffective anti-submarine measures from her.

The destroyer, escorting the auxiliary cruiser, dropped
her charges near our firing point and then his actions are
mysterious and also ineffective. He apparently abandoned
his search and it is now believed he was busy with his aux-
iliary cruiser. After the "air noises" were heard on the
sound gear, the distant depth charging was heard. It is
estimated this depth charging was another outfit. The
escort then started pinging and everything indicated he
was right on us. Evasive tactics consisted of changing
course with full rudder and maximum speed when his range
was estimated about 300 yards. This maneuver either fooled
him or he had never detected us; the pinging got further and
further away.

(K)
MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

1. It was necessary to renew the rings and liner of
the third stage port main engine air compressor.

2. Both cables of No. 2 periscope parted, causing
the periscope to be dropped a distance of two (2) feet.
Both cables were renewed but fall had damaged built mech-
anism and periscope was out of commission. As a precaution,
both cables of No. 1 periscope were renewed.

3. The crystals in the delay tank in the range unit
of the SJ Radar shorted out causing the precision scale
and the ranging feature to become inoperative. This was
not repaired because necessary spares were not aboard.
However, accurate ranges on the expanded scale were obtained
by pasting a scale on the glass over the sweep.

[HANDWRITTEN: 3 / 289]

— page 126 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

(L) RADIO

While we were in our areas, reception
in the Okhotsk Sea than in the Pacific Ocean,
in the northern part of our areas than in the southern.
Reception was poorest from 0400 to 0600 (William) daily.
Transmission conditions were excellent at night,
no difficulties being encountered. In the daytime we
were unable to raise any U.S. ship or shore station while
in or near our areas. Heavy and prolonged interference
on the 4,000 kilocycle traffic channel was encountered on
each attempt to transmit on the frequency, making it im-
possible to establish satisfactory communication, espec-
ially in the vicinity of Airaido To.

Occasional attempts of short duration to block the
two high frequency "F method" channels were annoying but
unsuccessful in all areas. No interference was encountered
on the 8,000 kilocycle traffic channel.

The last message received was Sole Rock and the
last message sent was Olga Rock. Both were in the strip
cypher.

(M) RADAR

Radar ranges on land consistently averaged from
24,000 to 28,000 yards. Twice land was picked up at
40,000 yards. Sampans were detected at about 1,500 yds.
and ships at about 5,500 yds. On one occasion we broached
with the antenna eight (8) feet above the surface and
detected a small freighter at 4,750 yds.

The only mechanical defect occurred four days before
leaving station. The crystals in the delay tank in the
range unit shorted out causing the precision scale and
the ranging feature to become inoperative. Fairly accurate
ranges on the expanded scale were obtained by pasting a
scale on the glass over the sweep.

32 [HANDWRITTEN: 289]

— page 127 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. S-30

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions in the areas were bad. Slow
screws could not be heard over 1,500 yards on an average,
and high speed screws only slightly farther.

The range at which screws can be heard in the
WCA-1 gear may be greatly increased by turning the
heterodyne switch off. This prevents picking up echo
ranging or fathometer signals, but these may be heard
on the forward JK head.

The efficiency of the forward JK head was
greatly decreased by depth charging on the 21st, and
was not much help during the remainder of the patrol.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

There is a possibility a density layer was
encountered in attempting to go deep following the attack
on the freighter on the 31st. We hung at 100 feet for
some time and it was necessary to flood in considerable
water to reach 200 feet, then we found ourselves heavy.
However, we started having trouble with the trim after
firing.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY

The health was in general excellent. One man
suffered from an attack of tonsillitus and was on the
sick list for two days.

The food was well prepared. However, there
was not as wide a selection of meats and fresh foods
available at Dutch Harbor prior to departure as had
previously been the case. Vitamin capsules were made
available to all hands.

Habitability on S-boats is well known. The
hot bunk system prevails and the one head for the crew
has almost a steady flow of customers.

33 [HANDWRITTEN: 289]

— page 128 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

(Q) PERSONNEL

The performance of duty of the officers and men was
most satisfactory. The state of training of all hands is
considered excellent.

(R) MILES STEAMED--FUEL USED
Dutch Harbor to Attu Island 767 miles---4140 gals.
Attu Island to Area 906 miles---6160 gals.
In Area 1971 miles---10860 gals
Area to Attu Island 705 miles---3880 gals.

(S) DURATION
Days enroute Dutch Harbor to Attu Island 4
Days enroute Attu to Area 4
Days in Area 24
Days enroute to Attu 3
Days submerged---submerged patrol was conducted 18 days
while on station, for a total of 288 hours.

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor
3 8000 gal. 12 7
Limiting factor this patrol was provisions of C.T.O. 16.3's
operational order 28-43.

[HANDWRITTEN: 34 289]

— page 129 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

(U) REMARKS

1. The area north and west of Araido is a most
lucrative one. A fleet type submarine could more
effectively cover this area. Until fleet submarines
are available, it is fortunate for an S-boat to be able
to operate where contacts are plentiful.

2. The SJ radar has been invaluable in increasing
the efficiency of S-boats. The low height of the radar
mast is regrettable. A few feet more would greatly in-
crease the value of this equipment. The maximum depend-
able range merchant ships can be detected is usually
around 5,000 yards. If this range could be increased to
10,000 yards, the value of the equipment would be in-
creased easily 100%.

[HANDWRITTEN: 35-189]
7 03185

— page 130 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st Copy]

SS135/A16-3
Serial 013
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED] [HANDWRITTEN: (struck through)]
[STAMP: NOV 2]

U.S.S. S-30
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.
September 23, 1943.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) Commander Task Group SIXTEEN POINT FIVE.
(2) Commander NORTH PACIFIC FORCE.
(3) Commander Submarine Force, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: NINTH WAR PATROL - REPORT OF.

Enclosure: (A) NINTH WAR PATROL Report of this vessel.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the Ninth War Patrol of this
vessel conducted along enemy shipping routes east and west of the
Kuril Chain during the period August 26, 1943 to September 23, 1943,
is forwarded herewith.

W. A. STEVENSON

Copy to:
Comsubron-45
Comsubdiv-52

[HANDWRITTEN: Returns made]
[HANDWRITTEN: Euf]

[HANDWRITTEN: This Patrol Report has]
[HANDWRITTEN: By Com-Nor Pac]

[HANDWRITTEN: 390]
[HANDWRITTEN: 0]

[STAMP: 7 02185]

— page 131 —
S-E-C-R-E-T
U.S.S. S-30

(A) PROLOGUE:

Arrived MASSACRE BAY, ATTU ISLAND, ALASKA on August 9, 1943
from eighth war patrol. Commenced refit remaining on twenty-four(24)
hours notice for war patrol in accordance with C.T.G. 16.5's despatch
101020 August 19. Received C.T.G. 16.5's despatch 200050 directing
us to be prepared to depart on war patrol about August 24. Contin-
ued refit by own ships force, assisted by SUBMARINE BASE PERSONNEL.
Completed refit on August 23, 1943. Readiness for sea on August 24,
1943. Not depermed or wiped; no training period.

(B) NARRATIVE

August 26

0855 (X) Underway with escort PC601 from SUBMARINE BASE, ATTU IS-
LAND, ALASKA, in accordance with C.T.G. 16.5's operational
order 36-43.

1000 (X) - 0900 (X) Set clocks back one hour to plus 11 zone time,
Kray.

1342 (X) Made training and trim dive. Went to battle stations and
made practice approach on escort.

1355 (X) Surfaced.

1541 (X) Released escort. Wind and sea increasing, barometer is
falling rapidly, looks like stormy weather ahead.

1603 (X) Changed course to 245 gyro enroute to first position,
Lat. 49-30 N., Long. 158-30 E.

2245 (X) Slowed to two-thirds on both engines because of rough
weather.

2305 (X) Slowed to two-thirds on one engine. We are taking seas
into the control room with regularity and it is necessary
to keep the high pressure pump running the greater part
of the time.

August 27

0000 (X) High wind and seas continue. It is necessary to keep
conning tower hatch closed most of the time.

1615 (X) Intensity of the storm is decreasing. Went ahead two-
thirds on both engines.

- 1 -
[STAMP: 7 03485]

— page 132 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. S-30

August 28
0632 (X) Made training and trim dive.
2120 (X) Made training and trim dive.

August 29
1132 (X) Sighted Jap Bomber, Nell type, coming out of the sun, dis-
tance three miles. Dived. Quartermaster reported plane
to have gone up our port side and then cross over ahead as
we were going down. We came right as we dived.
1133 (X) Heard first of four bombs at 50 ft., apparently astern
and to port. Went to 100 ft.
1215 (X) Came up to periscope depth, all clear.
1225 (X) Surfaced.

August 30
0300 (X) Arrived position Lat. 49-30 N., Long. 158-30 E. Commenced
patrolling ten miles each side assumed enemy route between
Lat. 49-30 N., Long. 158-30 E. and Lat. 46-30 N., Long
154-40 E.
0629 (X) Made trim dive.
0805 (X) Surfaced, conducting surface patrol.

August 31
0709 (X) Made trim dive.
0827 (X) Surfaced. Continued surface patrol.
2400 (X) During the past three days the visibility has varied be-
tween 500 yards and 12000 yards. When the visibility
decreased to 4000 yards during daylight, the radar was
manned.

September 1
0653 (X) Made trim dive.
0800 (X) Surfaced. Continued surface patrol. Visibility very
good.

- 2 -

— page 133 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L                                                              U.S.S. -30

September 2
0652 (X) Made trim dive.
1209 (X) Surfaced. Continued surface patrol.
1634 (X) Sighted Jap reconnaissance plane on parallel course 270(T),
         distant 8 miles. Dived.
1724 (X) Surfaced.

September 3
0700 (X) Made trim dive.
0815 (X) Surfaced.
0930(X) Enroute OKHOTSK SEA via SHIMUSHIRU STRAIT.
1440 (X) Sighted Jap reconnaissance plane on course 030 (T) (appro-
         ximately) distance 8 miles. Dived.
1452 (X) Surfaced.
1730 (X) Dived. We are 22 miles east of SHIMUSHIRU STRAIT.
2206 (X) Surfaced. Making passage through SHIMUSHIRU STRAIT.

September 4
0000 (X) Enroute Lat. 48-00 N., Long. 148-10 E. in accordance with
         C.T.G. 16.5's operational order 36-43.
0730 (X) Dived. Will conduct a submerged patrol today in order to
         cycle the battery.
2135 (X) Surfaced.

September 5.
0921 (X) Made trim dive.
0931 (X) Surfaced.
1300 (X) Arrived Lat. 48-00 N., Long. 148-10 E. Commenced surface
         patrol 15 miles either side of assumed enemy route between
         Lat. 48-00 N., Long. 148-10 E. and Lat. 49-50 N., Long.
         152-30 E.

                                                              - 3 -

— page 134 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

September 6

0737 (X) Made trim dive.

0820 (X) Surfaced.

0949 (X) Sighted smoke on the horizon bearing 330(T).

0955 (X) Dived. Commenced approach.

1042 (X) Bearings indicated ship was on a northwesterly course pro-
         bably enroute PARAMUSHIRU. We were too far from the track
         to close submerged. Surfaced. Will try to gain position
         ahead remaining outside his range of visibility.

1112 (X) Two columns of smoke observed indicating presence of two
         ships. On our present course and speed we are gaining
         bearing slowly.

1200 (X) Sighted masts and top of stack of trailing ship. The lead-
         ing ship was smoking more heavily and was evidently smaller
         since no part of her superstructure was visible. This ship
         would intermittently send up a large volume of smoke.

1200 (X) - 1345 (X) Results of tracking showed enemy ships to be on
         approximately 060(T) making about 7.5 knots, and zig-zagg-
         ing. Assuming a two knot speed advantage, we will be able
         to gain position ahead for a submerged approach late this
         afternoon.

1400 (X) Lost sight of ships due to decrease in visibility.

1632 (X) Visibility increased and smoke was again sighted. Bearings
         indicated our earlier calculations were in error, our speed
         advantage was only a knot and a quarter, and an attack be-
         fore night-fall impossible. We plan to conduct a night
         radar attack.

2159 (X) Lost sight of smoke due to darkness. Slowed to one engine
         and changed course to arrive at a position 4,000 yards
         ahead of targets.

September 7

0023 (X) Sighted the dark outline of a ship. Radar immediately
         picked up target at range of 4,850 yards. It is a dark
         night, the sky is completely overcast and it is surprising
         a ship should be visible at this range. Commenced approach.

- 4 - ²⁹ᵒ

— page 135 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

September 7 Continued.

0040 (X) Lookout sighted the second ship on our port quarter. We now
          had a ship on each quarter. Radar range on this ship was
          6,950 yards. This was the larger ship, and radar reported
          a larger "pip" on this ship. Commenced approach on this
          second ship. The results of the radar plotting on the first
          ship was not too encouraging. We never did get the target
          on a definite course and speed for any length of time. The
          target may still be zigging, steering constant helm, or per-
          haps attempting to close the other ship. About this time
          both ships were observed to fire a green or blue very star.

0104 (X) Changed course to 000 (T) to close the track.

0107 (X) When at a range of 4,100 yards, 273 relative bearing, target
          changed course toward us. We were on a collision course.
          I do not believe we were sighted, but it is evident target
          is not on a steady course.

0108 (X) Changed course to the right to parallel the target. We will
          run ahead and keep within radar contact. We have lost radar
          contact with the smaller ship.

0209 (X) We have gained position 6,500 yards ahead of the larger ship.
          Commenced approach.

0237 (X) Radar plot indicates target is making 8.5 knots on course
          054 (T). An accurate plot of the target's course and speed
          has been obtained. At a range of 4,500 yards, came to course
          for 90 port track.

0244 (X) We had reached the firing position 1,500 yards distant to
          track and had stopped when at

0245 (X) At a range of 3,300 yards target changed course toward us
          and the radar bearings remained steady at 050 relative.

0246 (X) Changed course to left and went ahead full on both motors.
          The range closed to 2,100 yards before we started to open
          out. Apparently the target did not speed up. We were pre-
          pared to dive if the range decreased to 2,000 yards. We
          certainly must have been sighted at a range of 2,100 yards
          and running at full speed, but his actions remain a mystery.
          Decided to run on ahead and conduct a periscope approach in
          the morning.

0300 (X) - 0450 (X) Tracking continued and plot showed target on
          course 052 (T) making 8.5 knots. Changed course to 052 (T)
          when the target was dead astern.

- 5 - [HANDWRITTEN: 290]

— page 136 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

September 7 Continued.

0708 (X) Lost radar contact at 7,000 yards.
0715 (X) At daybreak visibility was good, but target was not in sight.
0815 (X) Slowed to one engine. We should be about 13,000 yards ahead
           of the target.
0900 (X) Changed course to intercept assuming target was on course
           056 (T) during the night.
0958 (X) Changed course to the reverse of the assumed enemy course.
           Visibility still good, clear horizon.
1005 (X) Visibility started to close in, 6,000-7,000 yards.
1010 (X) Visibility now estimated to be 3,000-4000 yards manned radar.
1016 (X) Radar contact at a range of 3,850 yards. Dived.
1017 (X) Sighted ship through the periscope, a small 2,000-3,000 ton
           AK. This is obviously the smaller of the two ships.
           Commenced approach.
1036 (X) Unable to reach firing position. Abandoned approach.
1041 (X) Surfaced. Will again attempt to gain position ahead of
           target. Radar sweep indicates the presence of only the one
           target. It is still foggy.
1218 (X) The visibility increased, and we were forced to dive after
           gaining position ten degrees forward of target's beam
           distant 3,500 yards. Target was accurately plotted and was
           on course 053 true making 8 knots.
1219 (X) The target was sighted through the periscope. Decided
           against firing a small parallax shot because of the extreme
           range.
1233 (X) Visibility continued to improve to unlimited. The other
           ship was never sighted. Reversed course and abandoned the
           chase. We are now well north and about ten miles east of
           the western limit of Victory Four.
1323 (X) Surfaced and headed back to our area at best speed.
2200 (X) Arrived 15 miles west of our northern point and resumed
           patrol.

- 6 - [HANDWRITTEN: 90]

— page 137 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

September 8
0725 (X) Made trim dive.
0840 (X) Surfaced. Continued Surfaced patrol.

September 9
0735 (X) Made trim dive.
0820 (X) Surfaced. Continued surface patrol.

September 10
0730 (X) Departed position Lat. 49-30 N., Long. 152-50 E. enroute
RASHUWA STRAIT.
0737 (X) Dived. Submerged patrol will be conducted today in order
to fully cycle and water battery.
2119 (X) Surfaced. Sighted what appeared to be smoke on horizon
bearing 140 (T). Changed course to intercept at best speed
assuming a speed advantage of one krt, 27,000 yard range,
and a target course of approximately 040 (T).
2135 (X) Smoke no longer visible due to darkness closing in.
Visibility is excellent, bright moonlight.

September 11
0035 (X) Decided to abandon the chase. The visibility is excellent
and we should have picked him up by this time. He is
evidently making more speed than we allowed and to over-
take him would be impossible. Also we are 18 miles east of
area Shake's Western Boundary.
0735 (X) Made trim dive.
0830 (X) Surfaced.

September 12
0747 (X) Dived. Visibility due to fog is 500 yards. Will patrol off
MATSUWA waiting for visibility to improve. Desire to make
reconnaissance of west coast of MATSUWA today.

- 7 - 249

— page 138 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

September 12 Continued.

1721 (X) Land bears 086 (T) distance 6 miles. We have had no fix
          since yesterday afternoon, but according to our D.R. posit-
          ion, this land should be MATSUWA. We are patrolling 6-8
          miles off MATSUWA and plan to pass through RASHUWA KAIKYO
          this evening.

2052 (X) Surfaced.

2130 (X) Due to the uncertainty of our position we have decided not
          to pass through RASHUWA KAIKYO tonight. Visibility remains
          500 yards.

September 13

0500 (X) Visibility increased and the peaks of the islands were
          visible. We were considerably north of our D.R.

0700 (X) Visibility due to fog is 500 yards. We are making passage
          through MATSUWA KAIKYO.

0855 (X) Visibility increased to 2000-3000 yards in direction of
          MATSUWA and unlimited to the east. Dived.

1200 (X) We are patrolling on southerly and northerly courses, 4-6
          miles east of MATSUWA. It is planned to patrol off MATSUWA
          until visibility lifts, and we can take a look at the island.

1900 (X) Fog surrounding MATSUWA lifted for short time. There are a
          great number of buildings on the southeastern end. The sun
          is low and conditions are unfavorable for pictures. Will
          wait until tomorrow.

2203 (X) Surfaced. Visibility is still bad.

September 14

0752 (X) Dived. Patrolling off MATSUWA.

1034 (X) Took periscope pictures of the southeastern end of MATSUWA
          from a distance of 2-4 miles. In this sector were visible:
          Air field installations, four large hangers, radio station,
          and numerous other buildings. All the buildings and in-
          stallations appear permanent. No attempt has been made to
          camouflage. No docks were observed in YAMATO WAN. The
          currents around the southeast end of MATSUWA are very strong.

- 8 - [HANDWRITTEN: 290]

— page 139 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. -30

September 14 Continued.

1034 (X) Continued.
     The currents between MATSUA and BANJO TO are probably too
     strong for a suitable anchorage. The shore line is almost
     vertical, making unloading from a ship most difficult if not,
     impossible.

2138 (X) Surfaced. It is planned to shell the air field and hangers
     early tomorrow morning. There appears to be no patrol ves-
     sels or ships of any description in this locality. The moon
     is such that it will silhouette our target and our dark
     background should not permit detection outside of 5,000
     yards. It is thought that hits anywhere in this section of
     the island will cause damage, and the gun attack thus
     worth the effort and small risk involved.

September 15

0618 (X) Began approach for gun fire attack on MATSUA. Poor visi-
     bility prevented an earlier attack as planned.

0657 (X) Surface battle stations. Ammunition has been broken out.
     The tompion and breech cover have been sent below. The
     torpedo room hatch is open and will remain open during the
     firing. It is expected the whole operation will require
     only three to five minutes. If counter measures develop
     sooner than anticipated, the preparations made will make it
     possible to clear the topside more expeditiously and dive.

0701-0705(X) Order given to commence firing at 5,500 yards range.
     Two attempts were made to fire gun by hand lever, followed
     by an attempt to fire by lanyard, all failed. Shell was
     ejected, thrown overboard and gun unloaded. Attempts were
     again made to fire by hand lever and lanyard, with no success.
     There was no time to check breech firing mechanism as it was
     starting to get light and chances of detection at that range
     would be too good. It was necessary to abandon the attack
     and open out from the island. It is naturally deeply re-
     gretted that this casualty should prevent our attack which
     appeared to have every chance for success. The deck gun
     was thoroughly checked last night and found in good condit-
     ion. However, the cause of failure will be investigated
     further, both as to faulty firing mechanism and faulty
     ammunition.

0727 (X) Dived. Enroute eastern limit of area Raze.

2112 (X) Surfaced.

- 9 -

— page 140 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

September 16
0115 (X) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Dova Bay directing us to proceed di-
          rect to DUTCH HARBOR if fuel permits. We will proceed in
          accordance with this dispatch.
0430 (X) Departed area RAZE, enroute POINT CHICO.
0740 (X) Made trim dive.
0815 (X) Surfaced.
1915 (X) Sent my Peroy Point.

September 17.
0734 (X) Made trim dive.
0805 (X) Surfaced.
1045 (X) Sighted Jap Plane, Rufe type, heading for us, distance 3-4
          miles. Dived.
1046-30 (X) Received first bomb, very close, when we were passing 45
          feet.
1047 (X) Received second bomb at 100 feet. Both bombs must have been
          set as depth charges.
1330 (X) Surfaced.
1545 (X) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Ford Rock requesting our W.T.A. for
          point Chico and rendezvous point.
1940 (X) Sent my Queen Inlet.

September 18
0700 (X) Arrived point Chico, enroute rendezvous point.
1020 (X) Sighted unidentified plane, on approximate course 240 dist-
          ance 7 miles. He did not see us. Dived. Port motor failed
          to operate as we dove due to burned out fuse for main motor
          field. Remained at 100 feet.
1035 (X) Port motor back in commission.
1110 (X) Surfaced.

- 10 -

— page 141 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
                                                                U.S.S. S-30

September 18 Continued.
1315 (X) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Gish Bay regarding position of dive
         bombers.

September 19
0000 (L) - 0100 (W) Set clocks ahead one hour to plus 10 zone time.
0337 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Inner Point directing us to proceed
         direct to DUTCH after rendezvous with escort.
0850 (W) Sighted PBY on course 270 distance 8 miles. Flare was set
         off when he headed for us.
1235 (W) Sent my Rosa Reef.
1500 (W) Sighted ATTU ISLAND bearing 090 (T) distance about 30 miles.
1720 (W) Sighted plane, believed to be USN Kingfisher on course 325 (T)
         distance 6 miles. He did not see us.
2020 (W) Received C.T.G. 16.5's Jenkins Rock giving us a revised rend-
         ezvous point.

September 20
0700 (W) Arrived at rendezvous point.
0718 (W) Sighted escort, PC601, bearing 130 (T) distance 5 miles.
0745 (W) Joined escort, enroute DUTCH HARBOR.
1400 (W) Sent my Sand Spit.
1805 (W) Dived. Escort proceeded to conduct practice sound runs.
1905 (W) Surfaced.

September 21 - 22
         Uneventful enroute DUTCH HARBOR in company with escort
         PC601.

September 23
0830 (W) Manned deck gun. Attempted to fire one round of common
         ammunition. Again gun failed to fire. When shell was

                                  - 11 - [HANDWRITTEN: 29]

— page 142 —
U.S.S. S-30

September 23 Continued.

0830 (A) Continued.
ejected and thrown over board it was observed the firing
pin had just touched the cap. Just prior to the attempted
firing, the cigarette paper test was given and the firing
pin appeared to be adjusted properly.

1155 (B) Moored starboard side to dock at SUBMARINE BASE, DUTCH
HARBOR, ALASKA.

(C) Weather

Enroute patrol area August 26 to August 29. Strong wind
and heavy sea from southwest, visibility good, rapidly fall-
ing and rising barometer.

In patrol areas August 29 to September 15. Generally
calm wind and sea from the northwest and southwest. Visi-
bility was very good except for five days when fog was
encountered part of the time. Barometer steady.

Enroute base. September 15 to September 23. Moderate
wind and sea from varying directions. Visibility very good.

(D) Tidal Information

1. The currents, to a distance of 20-30 miles east of the
KURIL CHAIN, reach a maximum strength of 4 knots and are in
direction corresponding to the flood and ebb through the
KURIL CHAIN.

2. The direction and strength of the currents in YAMATO WAN
and the southeastern end of MATSUWA TO, were found to cor-
respond closely to those given on chart 5324.

(E) Navigational Aids

1. No navigational lights were observed.

2. Charts were adequate.

- 12 -

7 03185

— page 143 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(F) SHIP CONTACTS | U.S.S. S-30

NO. | DAT. | TIM. | POSITION          | TYPE                  | INITIAL RANGE | COURSE  | SPEED    | HOW CONTACTED | REMARKS
----|------|------|||||||
1.  | 9/7/43 | 1015 | Lat. 50-26 N.     | Japanese coal         | 3500 yds.     | 0520(T) | 18.5 kts. | SD            | This ship had Goal
    |      |      | Long. 152-57 E.   | burning merchant      |               |         |          |               | plus bow & counter
    |      |      |                   | 2000 - 3000 tons.     |               |         |          |               | stern. Appeared to
    |      |      |                   |                       |               |         |          |               | be very old.
[STAMP: 7 03185]
2.  | 9/8/43 | 0940 | Lat. 48-30N.      | Japanese merchant-    | 11 miles      | 0520(T) | 8.5 kts. | SD            | Only the uppermost
    |      |      | Long. 148-57 E.   | man 10,000 tons.      |               |         |          |               | superstructure of
    |      |      |                   |                       |               |         |          |               | this ship was seen
    |      |      |                   |                       |               |         |          |               | at anytime at 11 mi.
    |      |      |                   |                       |               |         |          |               | range. His engine
    |      |      |                   |                       |               |         |          |               | was admirable and
    |      |      |                   |                       |               |         |          |               | he had masts fore &
    |      |      |                   |                       |               |         |          |               | aft. At night at
    |      |      |                   |                       |               |         |          |               | close range he seemed
    |      |      |                   |                       |               |         |          |               | very large.

-13-

— page 144 —
[STAMP: C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L]
U.S.S. S-30

AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

No. | DATE | TIME | POSITION | TYPE | INITIAL | COURSE | ALTITUDE | HOW
    |      |      |          |      | RANGE |        |          | CONTACTED | REMARKS
----|------|------||------|||||

— page 145 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

(H) Attack Data
NONE

(I) Mines
NONE

(J) Anti-Submarine Measures and Evasion Tactics
Only anti-submarine measures encountered were from planes.

(K) Major Defects and Damage
1. On September 18, while diving, the port motor failed to oper-
ate as the energizing lead to the magnetic holding in coil broke
loose consequently causing the contactor to break the armature
circuit. At the same instant, probably due to the high induced
current, the fuse in the field coil circuit burned out.

2. On September 15 the deck gun failed to fire either by hand
lever or lanyard. Gun was reloaded and the same failure occurred.
On September 23 another unsuccessful attempt was made to fire the
gun. On this occasion the firing pin was examined and it was
found that the pin did not extend a sufficient distance from the
face of the breech plug to fire the ammunition. The breech mech-
anism was overhauled and a new firing pin installed during the
last refit at ATTU ISLAND. The firing pin evidently was not
adjusted correctly at this time.

3. Minor damage was sustained during the bombing on 17 September.
The depth gauges in C.O. stateroom and C.O.C. and various steam
tight globe valves were broken. Water entered the motor room when the
test plug on the valve casting to the main motor circulating wa-
ter overboard was blown out. The H.P. pump was able to keep the
level of the water down until the damage was repaired.

(L) Radio
Poor reception existed on all frequencies in all areas from
0600 - 0830 (X) daily. Reception satisfactory at all other
periods. Occasional Jap interference encountered on Fox schedule,
annoying but ineffective.

Submerged reception was satisfactory at 47 feet, but not at
greater depths.

Last message received was MELLON ROCK and last sent was SAND
SPIT. Both were strip cypher. Radio reception was complete.

- 15 -

— page 146 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L U.S.S. S-30

(M) Radar
     Radar performance was good throughout the patrol. Effective
     range of 5000 - 7000 yards were obtained on ships. Average ranges
     on land were about 22,000 yards.
     During this patrol a 706AY magnetron tube was used in the equip-
     ment in place of the old 706A magnetron. This high powered tube
     did not appear to improve the efficiency of the equipment. Ranges
     on ships were slightly greater than on other patrols with the old
     type tube, but ranges on land were not as good. All operational
     difficulties were caused by faulty vacuum tubes.
          1. Of fourteen 6SN7-GT tubes tried in sockets VS6 & VS7 of the
     initial multivibrator circuit only two were found that delivered
     satisfactory results.
          2. Five out of twenty 6AC7 tubes tried in the IF receiver were
     unsatisfactory. Three other gave only fair results.
          3. Three out of four 713A vacuum tubes were found unsatisfactory
     in the first I.F. amplifier stage - oscillator - converter.

(N) Sound Gear and Sound Conditions.

     No comments as there were no opportunities for the use of this
     gear. Material operation was normal.

(O) Density Layers

     No comments.

(P) Health and Habitability

     The health of the crew was in general excellent. One man was on
     the sick list two days from a back injury sustained on lifting a
     garbage can. There was no other sickness.

(Q) Personnel

     No comments.

(R) Miles Steamed - Fuel Used.

     Attu Island to area             641 mi.          3850 gals.
     In area                        2143 mi.         11460 gals.
     Area to Dutch Harbor           1505 mi.         10840 gals.

               TOTAL                4289 mi.         26150 gals.

(S) Duration

     Days enroute to area             4
     Days in area                    18
     Days enroute to base             7
     Days submerged                   6

(T) Factors of endurance remaining.
     Torpedoes     Fuel     Provisions     Personnel Factor
     12            2078     12 days        10 days

     Limiting factor this patrol was the provisions of C.T.G. 16.5's
     operational order 36-43.

     - 16 - [HANDWRITTEN: 90]

— page 147 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. S-30

(U) Remarks

1. An SD radar would have been invaluable on this patrol. The
mission to patrol the shiping lanes could only effectively be
accomplished by running a surface patrol. We were at all times
within easy range of practically all type Jap planes. An SD
radar would certainly have given us ample warning of the two
planes that did bomb us.

2. The casualty to the gun was most disappointing. After this
the gun will always be tested at the beginning of each patrol.
This had previously been done but the rough weather enroute to
the area did not permit its accomplishment.

- 17 -

[HANDWRITTEN: 17]
[HANDWRITTEN: 990]

— page 148 —
END OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: H-108] [HANDWRITTEN: AR-70-77]

1.0   2.8   2.5
1.1   3.2   2.2
1.25  3.6
      4.0   2.0
            1.8
      1.4   1.6

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[SEAL: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, with eagle]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

3-52294