U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS-289) — war patrol report SS-289_CAPELIN.pdf

— page 1 —
START OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: F-108]
[HANDWRITTEN: AR-116-78]

1.0
1.1
1.25

2.8
[UNCLEAR: 3.15]
[UNCLEAR: 3.5]
[UNCLEAR: 4.0]
[UNCLEAR: 4.5]
1.4

2.5
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.6

OPERATOR [HANDWRITTEN: HARRIS]

DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 6-10-78]

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[IMAGE: Department of Defense Seal with text "DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE" and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

REEL TARGET, START & END
NAVEXOS 3968

— page 2 —
[HANDWRITTEN: CAPELIN (SS-289)
WW II PATROL FILE
ALL MATERIAL ON THIS REEL IS DECLASSIFIED.

FOR DECK LOGS JUNE - SEPTEMBER 1943
CONSULT NATIONAL ARCHIVES WHICH HAS CUSTODY

J.A. KOONTZ]

— page 3 —
Capelin

A small fish of the smelt family.

(SS-289: dp. 1,526; l. 311'9"; b. 27'3"; dr. 15'3"; s. 20
k.; cpl. 66; a. 1 4", 10 21" tt.; cl. Gato)

Capelin (SS-289) was launched 20 January 1943 by
Portsmouth Navy Yard; sponsored by Mrs. I. C. Bogart;
and commissioned 4 June 1943, Lieutenant Commander
E. E. Marshall in command.

Capelin sailed from New London, Conn., 3 September
1943, bound for Brisbane, Australia, and duty with
Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific. Her first war
patrol, conducted in the Molucca, Flores, and Banda Sea
between 30 October and 15 November, found her sinking
a 3,127-ton Japanese cargo ship on 11 November off
Ambon Island.

Returning to Darwin, Australia, to refit, Capelin put
out on her second war patrol 17 November 1943, eager
for new successes in the same area as that in which her
first patrol took place. Capelin was never heard from
again; radio silence was broken in the attempt to reach
her on 9 December, but without success. Japanese
records studied after the war listed an attack on a sup-
posed United States submarine on 23 November off
Kaoe Bay, Halmahera, but the evidence of an actual
contact was slight, and the action was incomplete. This
is, however, the only reported attack in the appropriate
area at that time. Gone without a trace, with all her
gallant crew, Capelin must remain in the list of ships
lost without a known cause.

Capelin received one battle star for World War II
service. Her single war patrol was "successful." She is
credited with having sunk 3,127 tons of shipping.

— page 4 —
Dictionary of

American Naval

Fighting Ships

VOLUME II · 1963

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVAL HISTORY DIVISION · WASHINGTON

— page 5 —
[FADED/STRUCK THROUGH: CONFIDENTIAL]
DECLASSIFIED
SS289/A16

U.S.S. CAPELIN

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
November 17, 1943.

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289)
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Division 161.
     (2) Commander Submarine Squadron Sixteen.
     (3) Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289), Report of War Patrol
         number one.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1.
Enclosure (A), covering the first war patrol of this
vessel conducted in Molukka, Flores and Banda Seas during the period
October 30, 1943 to November 16, 1943; is forwarded herewith.

— page 6 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) - Report of 1st War Patrol.
A. PROLOGUE.

The U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS 289) was commissioned at Navy Yard,
Portsmouth, N.H., 4 June, 1943, completed 26 June 1943.
Departed New London, Conn., 3 September 1943, having received
fo rty (40) days training. Transited Panama Canal 13 Sept-
ember 1943 and reported to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific
Fleet for duty with Submarines, Southwest Pacific. Arrived
Brisbane, Australia, via fueling station Galapagos Islands,
13 October 1943.

Received minor refit, 6 days, from Submarine Base assisted
by relief crew. Renewed fifty-eight (58) conn. rod bearings
and all defective main bearings. All main engines were
inspected but none overhauled.

Underway 20 October 1943. Conducted sound test and gun
firing in Moreton Bay and proceeded to training area for
two days training. Departed training area 22 October 1943.
Arrived Darwin 29 October 1943, refueled and reported to
representative of Commander Task Force Seventy-One for duty.

B. NARRATIVE.

                                October 30, 1943.
1000(I) Underway in accordance with Commander Task Force
        Seventy-One Operation Order 37-43. Captain P.G.
        Nichols, USN., Commander Submarine Division ONE
        SIXTY-TWO on board.

1120(I) Cleared swept channel. Cruising at full speed to
        reach eastern end of Timor at dawn.

1529(I) Made trim dive. Sighted plane, believed to be B-24,
        crossing astern just before diving.

1535(I) Surfaced and continued at full speed on four (4)
        engines.

        Noon Position: Lat. 12°- 04.5' S. - Long. 130°- 07.5 E.

                                October 31, 1943.
0517(I) Submerged ten miles northeast of eastern tip of
        Timor. Checked B.T. gradient to 300 feet. Set course
        for Lautem, Timor.

                                -1-
[HANDWRITTEN: 2]

— page 7 —
0608(I) Heard echo ranging, nothing in sight. Pings in groups
        of three or four; with two (2) seconds between pings
        and ten (10) to twelve (12) seconds between groups,
        apparently following a regular cycle. Possibly a
        sonic buoy is located in this passage.

0648(I) Sighted umbrella shaped structure on tall mast on
        top of peak on Timor, bearing approximately 270° T., from
        Lat. 08° - 18.6' S. - Long. 127° - 20.4' E. Undoubtedly a
        radar installation.

1025(I) Sighted bomber plane crossing bow, distance about
        seven miles. (Plane contact No. 1)

1030(I) Headed south to reconnoiter LOIKERO and Bay between
        TG. HERO and TG. CHATU.

1045 Sighted bomber off bow, 5 miles diverging. (Plane contact No. 2)

111) Having closed to within two (2) miles of beach and
        found no shipping or activity in villages on coast,
        headed out of bay.

        Reconnoitered LAUTEM during afternoon. Closed to
        three thousand (3000) yards from village. No shipping
        present. Only activity noted were two trucks running
        between shore and village or encampment on side of hill,
        and apparent blasting in water west of LAUTEM. Took three
        (3) periscope photographs. Possible radar mast on hill
        southwest of LAUTEM.

1714(I) Held rig for depth charge and silent running drill.

1932 Surfaced ten (10) miles north of LAUTEM.
        Conning Tower hatch mechanism jammed two turns short
        of the unlocked position. Sent an officer and one (1)
        lookout to bridge via gun access hatch and forced
        Conning Tower hatch open with wrench. Once opened,
        hatch mechanism locked and unlocked freely.

1935(I) Set course to pass east of TUKANG BESI ISLANDS via
        WETAR PASSAGE.

        Many clusters of brilliant lights on east end of
        WETAR ISLAND, visible 15 miles; indicate possible
        construction work at this point, although WETAR
        supposedly has no good anchorages or landing places.

        Noon Position: Lat. 8° - 17' S. - Long. 127° -5' E.

        -2-
        3

— page 8 —
NOVEMBER 1, 1943.
0530(I) Submerged.

0644(I) No contacts on "SD" Radar. Surfaced and set course
          for junction of BUTON PASSAGE - AMBON
          route from north of BARRIER to SORONG.

          Hatch jammed again. Still unable to locate trouble
          (See Material defects).

1443(I) Patrolling on surface across BUTON PASSAGE - AMBON
          shipping lane, maintaining continuous periscope watch.
          Visibility excellent. Conducted radar tracking
          exercise for fire control party.

2003(I) Set course for BUTON PASSAGE.

2015(I) Radar contact dead ahead, range 7050.

          Preliminary tracking showed target westbound, raising
          the question of how he got by our surface patrol across
          his track. As we started on end around chase, radar
          cut out. Rapidly established enemy speed as zero, and
          on discovering a black cloud on the true bearing we
          realized radar had picked up an ironized cloud. Was
          just about to reduce speed when radar reported a target
          astern, range 1550 yards. Although visibility was at
          least 3000 yards, could see nothing, but plot and T.D.C.
          checked target as chasing us from astern with small
          angle on bow at 18 knots. Made ready stern tubes and
          made several course changes to shake off this relentless
          phantom patrol boat, who skillfully followed all our
          maneuvers at ranges of 1250 to 1600 yards. The pip was
          definite and steady, and ranges and bearings checked
          nicely. Finally decided radar had gremlins and resumed
          original course and speed, after which the pip disappeared.
          Apparently radar picked up our wake when we increased
          speed during the approach on the cloud. Our "SJ" radar,
          which has never been satisfactory in sensitivity, has
          recently been readjusted and since then has been picking
          up everything from land at 45000 yards through birds at
          1000 yards to phantoms at 700 yards.

2200(H) Heading for BUTON PASSAGE, intending to transit during
          night and proceed to POMI IA.

2300(H) Radar indications of land did not check with our D.R.
          position. Position doubtful with no evening stars and
          two hours of chasing our tail. Decided to patrol northern
          end of BUTON PASSAGE during night and enter the passage
          tomorrow after fixing our position.

Noon Position; Lat. 5°-31' S Long. 124°-59'E.

-3-
[HANDWRITTEN: 4]

— page 9 —
November 2, 1943

0549 Submerged.
0850 Sighted WANGIWANGI ISLAND.
0909 Surfaced, after a prolonged tussle with the Conning Hatch
     and started for BUTON PASSAGE, circling northern end of
     WANGIWANGI at minimum range of 11 miles.
1145 Dived to avoid detection by several sail boats standing
     up passage.
1957(I) Surfaced in BUTON PASSAGE.
     Noon Position: Lat. 5°-10' S. Long. 123°-24' E.

November 3, 1943.

0500(H) Submerged to seaward of TIORO STRAIT, in position to cover
     traffic from that strait and coastal route from POMALIA,
     which we were unable to reach this morning.
1050(H) Sighted smoke west of KABAENA ISLAND, headed for it.
     Target drawing to westward, so ran on normal approach course
     at 6 knots. (Ship contact No. 1)
1229(H) Target still not visible, decided he was headed for SALIER
     STRAIT.
1244(H) Surfaced and began end around chase at 19 knots in attempt
     to reach SALIER STRAIT ahead of target without being sighted.
1450(H) Radar picked up target at 30,000 yards at which time his
     mast and top of stacks could be seen by periscope, angle
     on bow 120 starboard. Since he would reach the Strait two
     hours before darkness and we would have to wait for night-
     fall to go through, at
1503 (H)Abandoned chase, submerged to prepare contact report.
1821(H) Surfaced and attempted to transmit contact report. Unable
     to clear on higher frequencies.
1840(H) Sighted ZERO Fighter coming in fast on our beam, and dived.
     (Plane contact No. 3)
1853(H) Surfaced and sent contact report.
     Headed for BINGKOKA BAY and POMALIA.
     Noon Position: Lat. 4°-55.5' S. - Long. 121°-29.4' E.

- 4 -
[HANDWRITTEN: 5]

— page 10 —
November 4, 1943.

Patrolling entrances to POMALAA, BINGKOKA BAY GULF
of BONI.

0433(H) Dived to avoid sighting by sail boat.

Patrolled west of PADAMARANG ISLAND in position to cover
exit between PADAMARANG and MANIANG ISLANDS. Maneuvered
for clear view into POMALAA and into KOKALA anchorage.

0708(H) Sighted plane by periscope. Increased depth to 150 feet.
Not detected. Resumed periscope patrol at
( Plane contact No. 4)
0722(H) Made periodic careful sweeps with 14 feet of periscope,
first checking for planes with "SD" radar, switching
variac on and off to minimize possibility of D.F.
detection. No activity noted anywhere in this desolated
bay.

1845(H) Surfaced.

Made three radar approaches between surfacing and midnight
on possible patrol craft. One was lost and other two
turned out to be sail boats.

Noon Position: Lat. 4°-9 S. Long. 121°- 17' E.

November 5, 1943.

0002(H) Closed sailboat which had been tracked by radar from 5000
yards range. Had 20 mm manned and intended to board it
but it proved to be so small, fishy and dirty that we
abandoned the idea. Three natives ducked out of sight as
we came alongside. Cleared on course for BUTON PASSAGE until
sailboat was out of sight and radar range, in case natives
might report the contact, then circled to westward and set
course for SALIER STRAIT.

0447(H) Dived. Patrolled 4 miles east of strait. Nothing sighted
except numerous sailboats.

1843(H) Surfaced. Patrolling east of strait in bright moonlight.

2136(H) Sighted ship in strait on easterly course, radar range
16000 yards. Ship was sharply silhouetted, and appeared
to have shape of destroyer or escort vessel, from what
could be seen at that range and small angle on bow. Tracked
her at 9 knots on course 050 T. until she stopped in center
of strait for about twenty minutes. Visibility was too
great for surface attack. (Ship contact No. 2)

-5-
[HANDWRITTEN: 61]

— page 11 —
November 5, 1943 (Cont'd).

CAPELIN was in excellent tracking position, as strait
was clearly visible while background east of us was very
hazy. On the chance this was an escort making a rendezvous
with a ship or convoy, decided to set tight and wait,
patrolling in and out of moon streak six to ten miles
from strait.

2226(H) Ship suddenly moved southward toward SALIER ISLAND and
disappeared in background of land.

Continued patrol with one eye on possible approaches of
larger ship(s) and other carefully watching for surprise
attacks from the haze between CAPELIN and SALIER ISLAND.

Noon Position: Lat. 5°-42' S. - Long. 121°- 35.5' E.

November 6, 1943.

0444(H) Dived. Patrolled east of SALIER STRAIT.

1436(H) Sighted small tug or coastal steamer rounding TG. LASSA.
Very indistinct due to land background and range of about
16000 yards. Tracked her in hopes she was heading into GULF of
BONI where we could break the monotony with a gun attack
tonight but she turned west hugging the coast and disappeared.
(Ship contact No. 3)
1852(H) Surfaced. Continued patrol east of strait. There must be some
traffic in this area, and this seems as likely a spot as any,
so have decided to wait it out here.

Sailboats, small schooners in the GULF of BONI are a
nuisance and a problem. It is difficult to avoid detection by
them, yet attacking them seems pointless, as all that we
have observed closely are manned by natives and it appears
doubtful if they are serving any useful purpose to the Japs.

Noon Position: Lat. 5°42.2' S. - Long. 120°34.8'E.

-6-
[HANDWRITTEN: 21]

— page 12 —
November 7, 1943.
(Remaining times all "How" )
0445 Submerged. Patrolled on N-S line five miles east of
Strait from TG LASSA to SARONTANG ISLAND.
0625 Plane contact by "SD" radar, 18 miles. (Plane contact
number 5).
1851 Surfaced. Spent next two hours making approaches on ships
which all turned out to be sailboats when range closed to
about 4000 yards.
2030 Set course for DARWIN at speed 17 knots, intending to patrol
from BATOE ATA to MORO MAHO ISLANDS enroute, since previous
patrols indicate use of that route from AMBON to SALIER STRAIT.
Decision to return Capt. Nichols early based upon recurrent
jamming of C.T. hatch, which is getting worse and may start
jamming on closing, and the desire to spend the period of full
moon away from the coast since this side trip must be made
anyway.
Noon Position: Long. 120° - 32.7' E. Lat. 05° - 37.8' S.

November 8, 1943.
0500 Sighted BUTON ISLAND at range of 34 miles and BATOE ATA
ISLAND at range of 22 miles.
0723 Changed course to 140° true, to clear BATOE ATA by 15 miles,
and sighted large bombing plane on parallel course at
estimated range of 10 miles (Plane contact number 6).
"SD" radar out of commission.
0726 Bomber turned to head for CAPELIN, so submerged to 200 feet.
Decided to remain submerged until "SD" radar repaired. Had
straightened bent packing gland on C.T. hatch worm shaft, and
this dive will give a check on whether this eliminates the
jamming, which occurs when opening after a long dive.
1324 "SD" radar back in commission. Surfaced and continued patrol at
14 knots. Hatch opened perfectly. Decided to proceed to AMBON
along shipping lane, maintaining continuous periscope and high
lookout watch. Visibility remarkable.
Noon Position: Lat. 06° - 42' S. Long. 122° - 43' E.

November 9, 1943.
0439 Submerged. Made periodic "SD" radar and periscope observations.
0605 Surfaced. Resumed surface patrol with continuous periscope
search enroute AMBON. Visibility unlimited.

-7-
[HANDWRITTEN: 8]

— page 13 —
November 9, 1943. (Cont'd).

1228 Sighted BURU ISLAND, distance 30 miles.
1306 Sighted possible smoke bearing 220° true, confirmed by O.O.D.
       Changed course to 220° true and increased speed to 18 knots.
1423 No further sign of smoke or masts. Smoke probably one of
       several small dark clouds on horizon. Resumed base course
       035° true at 14 knots.
1600 Eighty-two miles from AMBON. Submerged to avoid possible
       sighting by planes from or returning to AMBON. Our sighting
       of aircraft in GULF of BONI on November 3rd may have had
       some connection with the complete absence of any shipping
       sighting there or at SALIER STRAIT so am making every effort
       to arrive off AMBON undetected.
1817 Surfaced in the clearest night and brightest moonlight any
       on board had ever seen. AMBON ISLAND visible in detail with
       naked eye at distance of 39 miles. AMBELAU ISLAND when abeam
       at range of 28 miles by radar and navigational fix was estimated
       to be from 6 to 10 miles away.

Patrolling near a port during full moon and freak visibility
is against my better judgement as it affords no opportunities
to get away on surface under cover of darkness if A/S vessels
remain in vicinity. Two A/S and a plane could keep a submarine
down, under these conditions of moon and visibility, for longer
than we could stay down.

Noon Position: Lat. 04° - 28.5' S. Long. 126° - 38.6' E.

November 10, 1943.

Ran toward AMBON until twenty miles off, then patrolled on
NW-SE line until 0300, when closed entrance to 8 miles and at -
0404 Submerged to 420 feet to check density and CAPELLIN. Both
       excellent.
Patrolled into entrance until TG. ALING bore 300° true. Nothing
in Bay, so continued patrol about 3 miles off entrance
until noon, then began moving out on course 220° true.
1821 Surfaced 14 miles bearing 220° from AMBON BAY entrance. Patrol
       boat, similar to Eagle boat, bearing 250° relative, range
       about 8000 yards. (Ship contact #4).

-8-
[HANDWRITTEN: 9]

— page 14 —
November 10, 1943 (Cont'd)

1824 Submerged.
Her course plotted and tracked as 335° true, headed for
MANIPA STRAIT. "SJ" radar unable to pick up target either
on surface or at 40 feet, which is puzzling, since target
clearly visible to well below deck line and our radar has
been very sensitive for last ten days. Believe part of
trouble is lack of training of operators.

1935 Surfaced, patrol boat out of sight.

Patrolled across traffic lanes 20 miles SW of AMBON.

Master gyro out of commission all day.

Noon Position: Lat. 03° - 50.2' S. Long. 127° - 55.0' E.

November 11, 1943.

0417 Submerged 7 miles off entrance to AMBON BAY and closed to
4 miles.

0550 Set course for KELANG STRAIT.

1228 Sighted smoke bearing 332° true in KELANG STRAIT (Ship
contact number 5, attack #1). Headed north to close
target and at same time close probable track from STRAIT
to coast of CERAM north of AMBON.

1332 Mast and stack of enemy sighted, farther east than expected.
He had apparently hugged coast of KELANG despite currents
the Pilot warns of there. Would like to capture a Jap
merchant skipper and keep him with us as official crystal
ball gazer in all situations involving estimates of pro-
bable movements of Jap ships.

1400 Had closed range to about 4500 yards, with 3000 to track.
Sea so glassy could use only inches of periscope and had
to run at 150 feet between looks.

Target of such odd build that estimate of size, draft
and mast or stack heights were very approximate.

1415:53 Fired first of four torpedoes. Checked bearing for second
and fourth shots; observed and generated bearings right on.

1416:50 Fired fourth torpedo.

- 9 -
[HANDWRITTEN: 10]

— page 15 —
November 11, 1943 (Cont'd).

1418:38 Saw huge column of water rise about 150 feet in air in line
          with middle of target, but definitely on the far side.
          It was apparently under his bilge or close aboard him, as
          when Capt. Nichols took a look the column of water was
          falling on both sides of the target.

          Two seconds or less after the first splash another column
          of water arose ahead of the target, and another heavy
          explosion was heard.

          The second flash appeared to be between CAPELIN and enemy
          track, and leading him by the amount of spread between
          No. 3 and No. 4 torpedoes. It seems obvious that the fourth
          torpedo was countermined by the explosion of the third
          torpedo, despite the firing interval of 24 seconds and a
          spread of three degrees between these two torpedoes.

          Torpedoes 1 and 2 exploded 5m 40s and 6m 10s after firing.

          Was amazed to see the ship, which should have been broken in two
          from a torpex hit under her middle, turn tail and head for
          the beach, apparently undamaged and at the same speed, 11
          knots.

1434      Went to 150 feet to think this over and avoid any planes
          his radio might call over. Changed course to head for target.

1450      Came back to periscope depth. Target headed for beach about
          eight miles away, and opening range rapidly. No sign of
          damage other than that his stern seemed a bit low in the
          water. Turn count 140; it had been 124. Continued following
          target in toward the beach, watching carefully for US vessels
          with periscope and for planes with "SD" radar.

1525      Target nearing beach, now definitely down by the stern a
          couple of feet, and listed to starboard five to ten degrees,
          but no evidence of serious damage.

1530      Target near sandy beach facing a group of native huts
          (Lat. 3° - 27' S; Long 127° - 54.40' E.). Down by the
          stern a bit more, but still had steam up. Several sailboats
          hovering about her.

          Was convinced by this time that the first torpedo, which
          by an error had the same spread setting as the third, ran deep
          and failed to function by influence, while the third torpedo
          also passed under the target's middle but fired magnetically
          under or near the turn of the bilge on the opposite (port)
          side.

                                        -10-

— page 17 —
November 11, 1943 (Cont'd)

1845 Range 6700 yards. Submerged to 40 feet. Target appeared
     to be small, but larger than an escort vessel.

1904 Target passed at 7000 yards. Unable to close submerged.
     Impossible to get ahead of him on surface before he reaches
     AMBON.

1955 Surfaced, headed into KELANG STRAIT.

2125 Rounded KELANG ISLAND and headed NE close to beach.

2143 Sighted freighter, angle on bow Zero. Moved closer to
     beach, then headed at her and began tracking. Radar un-
     able to pick up target, so plainly visible (Ship contact
     number 7).

2150 Escort now visible off enemy starboard quarter. Still no
     radar contact.

2157 Dove to 40 feet. Radar apparently out, so went to 60 feet.
     Target plainly visible by periscope.

Note: Remainder of this encounter will be described in some
     detail, not from any exaggerated idea of its importance,
     but because so many of the subsequent events cannot be
     explained and it is felt that giving available data may
     enable others to solve the enigmas.

2224:04 Fired first of 4 torpedo spread from stern tubes, 110
     foot track. (Had reversed course when range, by eye,
     showed distance to track 700 yards. After getting around
     discovered this was mistake, as distance to track based
     on stadimeter range after turning was 1200 yards and
     beach very close ahead).

2225:20 Fired 4th torpedo and turned with everything we had to-
     ward escort.

2225:25 First torpedo hit. Saw no flash, but target, enveloped in
     black smoke, turned left and headed at CAPELIN and beach.
     Watched escort while waiting for other two hits which
     should be coming, as spread was 150 feet between torpedoes
     with first two to hit. The other three missed or ran under.
     Escort headed NW, then East, then SW, then at CAPELIN,
     showing bow wave, on port quarter of freighter.

2230 Two explosions. Sounded like torpedoes at end of run. Now
     had escort lined up for down throat shot. Range anybody's
     guess, but used 1000 yards.

2230:48 Heard explosion which every war patrol experienced ran on
     ship swore was a torpedo and not a depth charge. Was
     watching freighter at this time. Thought sure we had hit
     escort but a quick look showed an escort still there,

-12-
[HANDWRITTEN: 13]

— page 18 —
November 11, 1943 (Cont'd)

large angle on bow, so unless he had two escorts we must
have missed him. Time was nearly right and that did not
sound like a depth charge or a premature. It probably hit
the freighter, whose bearing at time of firing was only
a few degrees left of escort with small starboard angle
on bow, converging escort and closer to CAPELIN than was
the escort.

As I swung left after firing at escort, freighter changed
course to left about 70 degrees at very slow speed.

2236 Got lined up for straight stern shot, 90 starboard track but
stern tube reload not completed. Was headed directly at
beach, which filled periscope in high power.

2237 Depth charge. Escort beyond freighter.

2241 Fired #8 tube. Torpedo did not leave tube. Turned hard right
to course 300° to clear beach. Had ready two bow tubes.
Ordered stern tubes secured but after room reported could not
close outer door on #8 as torpedo had moved beyond stop bolt.

Had very bad moment, with depth charges dropping, unable to
close door on loaded tube, and knowing we would have to go
deep soon.

2245 Fired #8 tube at beach to clear tube.

2247 Freighter having swung to give 90 port track, fired tubes
1 and 2. Escort on port quarter of freighter coming fast with
port angle on bow, range about 1500 yards. I had intended to
fire #1 at freighter and #2 at escort, but forgot to tell
fire control party, so both were fired at freighter.

One hit 58 seconds later. Freighter screws stopped immediately.

2248 Went to 400 feet, turning right to avoid freighter. Two
depth charges as we went down.

2254:55 Sound man reported series of five "distant explosions". At
same time a cracking and groaning noise was heard through-
out ship. I ordered depth decreased to 200 feet and check
made on sea pressure, as all hands thought the CAPELIN was
cracking up or the Conning Tower was coming loose from the
hull.

When sea pressure checked normal, realized it was freighter
breaking up. She must have been less than 300 yards off
my port beam then.

From 2300 to 2311 sound reported six weak explosions.
Thirteen depth charges, making a total of sixteen, were
dropped in next hour, none very close and several must
have been over 2000 yards away.
-13-
[HANDWRITTEN: 14]

— page 19 —
November 11, 1943 (Cont'd)
Made three attempts to return to periscope depth, but bow
planes had developed a bad rumble and every time we put them
on rise the Jap dropped a charge within 30 seconds.

2354 Armistice Day Celebration, Jap version, ended.

November 12, 1943

0555 Surfaced and cleared area to westward. Nothing in sight.

0430 Submerged north of BURU ISLAND.

0820 Surfaced.

0824½ Bomber on starboard beam heading in. (Plane contact No. 7)
Submerged to 150 feet.

1020½ Surfaced. Rounded BURU ISLAND and headed south during remainder
of day.

Noon Position: Lat. 02°-45' S. Long. 126° - 31.5 E.

November 13, 1943.

0430 Submerged.

0512 Surfaced.

0750 Began closing MORO MHO ISLAND to try to tune "SJ" radar.

0853 Sighted auxiliary powered yawl on opposite (west) side of
sand spit, and what appeared to be a lean-to on beach. On
chance that this island, which is a possible turning point
or landmark on routes from SURABAUK and SALIER STRAIT to
AMBON and SORONG, may be manned by Jap coast watchers, decided
to gun the yawl.

0916 Closing island from west. Had no chart of island and its
reefs, so flooded down and echo ranged ahead. Yawl had moved
to background of trees.

0943 "QCC" showed reef 900 yards ahead. Believe it was deep reef,
but took no chances, paralleled island and began firing 4"
gun at yawl at estimated range of 5000 yards. After several
overs got a few sufficiently close to force crew to beach
and run for the bushes. Gun crew's performance and
discipline rather poor, so at -

0950 Ceased firing, 12 rounds of common expended. No hits.

-14-
[HANDWRITTEN: 15-]

— page 20 —
November 13, 1943

At least this showed us the gun crew is not as good
as we thought after their excellent performance off
Brisbane. Cleared to East until out of sight then headed
SW along shipping lanes from KOMBA ISLAND to SORONG and
AMBON.

At southern limit of area. Patrolled across shipping
lanes on NW-SE line.

Noon position: Lat. 06° - 13' S. Long. 124° - 48.2 E.

November 14, 1943.

Patrolling as before.

1046 Set course for Darwin, via east of WETAR, KISAR and TIMOR,
in accordance with special instructions.

2048 Entered strait in bright moonlight.

November 15, 1943.

0300 Cleared strait, sent E.T.A. Darwin to C.T.F. 71
Zig Zagging at 14 knots.

0513 Sighted periscope on port beam. Put it astern and
dove to 150 feet. No screws heard.

0555 Surfaced and cleared vicinity zigging every 2
minutes.

Noon Position: Lat. 10° - 03.5 S. Long 128° - 16.0' E.

=15-
[HANDWRITTEN: 16]

— page 21 —
November 16, 1943

0753(H) Arrived Port Darwin. Emergency repair force from the
U.S.S. PELIAS commenced overhaul of bow planes, master
gyro, upper conning tower hatch and "SJ" radar.
Disassembled the conning tower hatch operating mech-
anism and replaced the burred worm shaft.
Overhauled master gyro and replaced oscillator unit
and one 4 m f condenser; added damping oil; and made
a complete routine inspection of the master compass
and follow-up panel. Overhauled and checked "SJ" radar.
The ship's force pulled and inspected main
bearings on three main engines.

The Commanding Officer is concerned with unexpectedly
high number of engine hours, due to the additional
round trip area to Darwin. To date the number of miles
steamed is as follows:

Darwin to Area: 340
In the Area: 3749
Area to Darwin: 503
Total 4592

The engine hours to date are as follows:
No. 1 M.E.: 1123; No. 2 M.E.: 773.3; No. 3 M.E.: 797.4;
No. 4 M.E. 1182.1; Aux.: 601.5. If the engine hours
during the remainder of the patrol are in the same
proportion to the days underway as during the period
covered in this patrol report, it is believed that
three and not two main engines will require overhaul
during the forthcoming refit period.

-16-
[HANDWRITTEN: 17]

— page 22 —
PLANE CONTACTS

No. | Time | Date | Lat. | Long. | Type(s) | Initial Range | Est. course | Speed | How Contacted | Remarks
--- | ---
1 | 1021(I) | 31 Oct. 1943 | 06°-09'S | 127°-47'E | Bomber | 10 miles | 000° T. | 200 knots | P | Appeared to be patrolling WETAR PASSAGE.
2 | 1045(I) | 31 Oct. 1943 | 03°-18'S | 127°-47'E | Bomber | 5 miles | 300° T. | 300 knots | F | Believed to be same plane sighted in contact #1, patrolling WETAR PASSAGE. This plane may have been furnishing air coverage for the AK Capelin had been chasing.
3 | 1840(H) | 3 Nov. 1943 | 05°-13'S | 120°-30'E | Bomber | 7 miles | 180° T. | 190 knots | R |
4 | 0708(H) | 4 Nov. 1943 | 04°-21'S | 121°-09'E | Bomber | 10 miles | 000° T. | 200 knots | P |
5 | 0635(H) | 7 Nov. 1943 | 05°-33'S | 120°-41'E | Bomber | 18 miles | 140° T. | 200 knots | LS | Plane turned and headed for CAPELIN; dived to 200 ft.
6 | 0723(H) | 8 Nov. 1943 | 06°-35'S | 122°-10'E | Bomber | 19 miles | 140° T. | 200 knots | LS | Plane turned and headed for CAPELIN; dived to 200 ft. CAPELIN dived to 150 feet.
7 | 0824(H) | 12 Nov. 1943 | 02°-45'S | 126°-50'E | Bomber | 5 miles | 180° T. | 250 knots | LS |

P - Periscope, submerged
R - SD radar
LS - Lookout, surface.

[HANDWRITTEN: I]
[HANDWRITTEN: 1xha]
[HANDWRITTEN: 18]
[HANDWRITTEN: -17-]

— page 23 —
10. Time Date | Type | Initial Range | Lat. & Long. | Speed | Course | How Contacted | Remarks
1. 1050(H) | AK | 36,000 | 04°-57'S. | 2350 | 050°T. | P | Target was small for tor-
   3 Nov. '43 | Large | yards | 121°-34'E. | tons | | | pedo.
   | | | | 12 | | |
   | | | | knots | | |
2. 2136(H) | DD or | 16,000 | 05°-42'S. | 050°T. | 050°T. | P | Target was small for a tor-
   5 Nov. '43 | PC | yards | 120°-36'E. | 9 | | | pedo.
   | | | | knots | | |
3. 1436(H) | AK | 10,000 | 05°-40'S. | 1700 | 050°T. | P | Target was small for a tor-
   6 Nov. '43 | or Tug. | yards. | 120°-31'E. | tons | | | pedo.
   | | | | 6 | | |
   | | | | knots | | |
4. 1821(H) | PC | 8000 | 03°-55'S. | 3350 | 030°T. | SN | Smoke was sighted
   10 Nov. '43 | | yards | 127°-49'E. | tons | | | as the target pas-
   | | | | 10 | | | sed close aboard to
   | | | | knots | | | the N.W. coast of
   | | | | | | | KABAENA IS. Target dis-
   | | | | | | | appeared. Unable to
   | | | | | | | close.
5. 1228(H) | AK | 30,000 | 03°-27'S. | 1520 | 030°T. | SN | Smoke was
   11 Nov. '43 | | yards | 127°-44'E. | tons | | | sighted. Target
   | | | | 10.5 | | | was sunk.
   | | | | knots | | | Unable to
   | | | | | | | close.
6. 1841(H) | PC | 9,000 | 03°-21'S. | 1450 | 039°T. | SN | Smoke was
   11 Nov. | or D | yards | 127°-49'E. | tons | | | sighted. Target
   1943 | | | | 15 | | | was sunk.
   | | | | knots | | | Unable to
   | | | | | | | range below
   | | | | | | | 6700 yards.
   | | | | | | | Sunk AK; was
   | | | | | | | mildly depth
   | | | | | | | charged by
   | | | | | | | PC boat.
7. 2143(H) | AK; P | 14,000 | 03°-11'S. | 039°T. | 039°T. | SN | Smoke was
   11 Nov. | | yards | 127°-37'E. | 15 | | | sighted. Target
   1943 | | | | knots | | | disappeared.
   | | | | | | | Unable to
   | | | | | | | close.

P - Periscope.
SN - Surface, night.

[HANDWRITTEN: 1xth]
-18-
[HANDWRITTEN: 19]

— page 24 —
CONFIDENTIAL
                                                                (Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1                 PATROL NO. 1.
Time 1416(H) Date Nov. 11, 1943 Lat. 3°-25' S. Long. 127°-46.4' E.

                                Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: AK - Had stick mast well forward, unusually long forecastle
             piled high with crates or lumber, small composite super-
             structure about two thirds his length from bow, and poop
             deck almost as high as bridge. Flying Jap merchant flag at
             stern. No sign of any gun armament.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s)      One, tonnage estimated 2500 to 3000 tons.
Damaged:

Damage
Determined by: Ship tried (unsuccessfully) to beach herself.
               Listed slightly and down by stern.
                                                                Est. 2350
Target draft: 15 Ft. Course: 152° T. Speed: 10.5 Kts. Range: Act. 3100

                                Own Ship Data

Speed 4 Kts. Course: 090° T. Depth: 65 ft. Angle 0

                           Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:
             Day periscope. Glassy sea. Range data very rough.
             Masthead height used was 90 feet. Torpedo run indicates
             mast was higher, yet ship of this size shouldn't
             have much higher mast. Tried "QC" range at 2500
             yards without success.

             Later events proved this should have been gun attack

             Would have used white light method spread, but haven't
             drilled at using this with Mk. 3 T.D.C. and sea so
             smooth I couldn't use long exposures this method
             requires except after considerable drill.

                                                                [HANDWRITTEN: 20]

— page 25 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. [HANDWRITTEN: 2.] PATROL NO. [HANDWRITTEN: 1]
TIME:1740(H) DATE:Nov. 11, 43Lat: [HANDWRITTEN: 3° - 27.2 S.] Long: [HANDWRITTEN: 127°-52.4 E.]

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: AK - Had stick mast well forward; unusually long forecastle
piled high with crates or lumber; small composite super-
structure about two thirds his length from bow and poop
deck almost as high as bridge. Flying Jap merchant flag at
stern. No sign of any gun armament.

Ship(s) Sunk: One, Tonnage estimated 2500 to 3000 tons.

Damage
Determined by: Saw ship disintegrate.

Target draft: [HANDWRITTEN: 15ft.] Course: [HANDWRITTEN: 165° T.] Speed [HANDWRITTEN: 0] RANGE [HANDWRITTEN: 1600 Yds.]

Own Ship Data

Speed [HANDWRITTEN: 3] kts. Course: [HANDWRITTEN: 265°] Depth: [HANDWRITTEN: 65 ft.] Angle [HANDWRITTEN: 0]

Fire Control and Torpedo Data.

Type Attack:

Night periscope attack, straight stern shot at
stopped target, using T.D.C. to take care of any
variations of our course.

-20-
[HANDWRITTEN: 2/1]

— page 26 —
CONFIDENTIAL
(Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 1.
TIME 2225(H) DATE: 11 Nov. 1943 Lat. 3° - 08.5 S. Long. 127°-37.8 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: AK - Maierform bow, well decked, mast funnel mast.
Composite superstructure. Heavy stick masts. No
kingposts seen. Looked modern. Similar to those
shown page 135 of Recognition Manual. Tonnage
estimated at 3500 to 4000, but reported to be 3300.
Contact made by visual sighting.
Ship(s) Sunk None.
Ship(s) Damaged One. AK as described above.

Damage
Determined by: Target enveloped in black smoke, turned left and
headed at CAPELIN and beach.

Target draft 15 ft. Course 242° T. Speed 9 knots Range 1800

Own Ship Data

Speed 3.5 knots Course 117° swinging to 102° T. Depth 65 ft. Angle

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Moonlight periscope attack. Radar out of commission.
Gyro oscillation motor out, and gyro lagged on turns,
which may have accounted for some of the misses,
since gyro error was variable. Made a serious error in
not using white light method spread, which is independant
of range for straight shots, instead of spread table,
since I had no means of determining range with any
accuracy until target close enough to get rough stadimeter
range. Checked bearing for each shot. Set up checked
perfectly.

Made another error in firing fourth torpedo after holding
it up for 50 seconds while turning for zero gyro angle.
Didn't realize I had held it that long.

Did not try echo range because of escort and because
QCR failed to get range on target that afternoon.

-22-
[HANDWRITTEN: 23]

— page 27 —
CONFIDENTIAL

ATTACK NO. 1                                                               ATTACK NO. 2
                                                                           (Same target as
                                                                           attack No. 1).

Tubes fired:             No. 1    NO. 2    No. 3    No. 4    No. 10
Track angle:             110 S    110 S    110 S    110 S    100 S
Gyro angle:              346.5    347      352      350.5    180
Depth set:               10 ft.   10 ft.   10 ft.   10 ft.   6 ft.
Power:                   High     High     High     High     High
Hit or Miss:             Miss     Miss     Hit      Countermined Hit
Erratic:                 Ran deep? No      Ran deep No      No
                         No                No
Serial No.               25236    39398    22204    25375    22489
Mk. Torpedo:             14-3A    14-3A    14-3A    14-3A    14-3A
Mk. Exploder:            6-1A     6-1A     6-1A     6-1A     6-1A
Serial No.               -

Actuation Set:           C & M    C & M    C & M    C & M    C & M
Actuation actual:        End of run                 M        M        C
Mark Warhead:            16       16       16       16       16
Serial No:               -
Explosive:               Tpx      Tpx      Tpx      Tpx      Tpx
Firing Interval:         0        23"      10"      24"      --
Type spread:             Divergent spread covering 450 feet at 2400
                         yards.
Sea Conditions:          Calm                                Calm
Overhaul activity:       U.S.S. FULTON                       U.S.S. FULTON
Remarks:                 No. 3 evidently fired by influence, definitely on far
                         side of target while No. 4 was countermined on near side
                         of target. No. 1 was set with same spread as No. 3, so
                         probably ran under target without exploding.

-21-
[HANDWRITTEN: 22]

— page 28 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. [HANDWRITTEN: 4] PATROL NO. [HANDWRITTEN: 1]
TIME 2230 (H) DATE 11 Nov. 1943 Lat. 3° - 08.5 S. Long. 127° - 37.8 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Small escort. No details noted except that
was about size of "PC" boat.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s) Damaged: Missed small escort vessel but hit AK
tonnage reported to be 3300 (Same vessel as
described in torpedo attack #3).

Damage
Determined by: Explosion was definitely a torpedo hit and not
a depth charge. Freighter was converging escorts'
track at half the escort's range from CAPELIN,
and bearing only a few degrees to left of escort
at time of firing. Immediately after explosion,
AK swung left 70 degrees then right 180 degrees,
and slowed appreciably.

Target draft 12 ft. COURSE 135° T. SPEED 15 kts RANGE 1000 yds.

Own ship data.

Speed 4 knots Course 320° T. Depth 65 ft. Angle 0

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Moonlight night periscope attack, intended as "down the
throat" shot, but target changed course slightly just before
firing. Possibly should have waited until gyro angle was zero
instead of 10 left, but then track would have increased.
Still think I would have hit him if the freighter hadn't
stopped it.

[HANDWRITTEN: -24-]
[HANDWRITTEN: 25]

— page 29 —
CONFIDENTIAL

| | ATTACK NO. 3 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. 7 | No. 8 | No. 9 | No. 10 |
| Tubes Fired - | 110 P | 112 P | 114 P | 120 P |
| Track Angle - | 200 | 198 | 198 | 195 |
| Gyro Angle - | 10 ft. | 10 ft. | 10 ft. | 10 ft. |
| Depth Set - | High | High | High | High |
| Power:- | Hit | Miss | Miss | Miss |
| Hit or Miss - | No | No | No | No |
| Erratic | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Mk. Torpedo - | 25378 | 25275 | 39305 | 22511 |
| Serial No. - | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A |
| Mark Exploder | | | | 12286 |
| Serial No. - | C & M | C & M | C & M | C & M |
| Actuation Set - | C | End of run. | End of run. | End of run. |
| Actuation Actual - | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Mark Warhead - | | | | 5380 |
| Serial No. - | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx |
| Explosive - | 0 | 15" | 13" | 57" |
| Firing Interval - | Divergent. 1° L., 1° R., | | | |
| Type Spread: | 2° L., 2° R. | Sea Conditions - | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm |
| Overhaul Activity.- | U.S.S. FULTON. | | | |
| Remarks - | With spread used if either of 1st two torpedoes | | | |
| | hit, one or two of others should have hit also. | | | |

-23-
[HANDWRITTEN: 24]

— page 30 —
CONFIDENTIAL ACK #4 ATTACK #5 ATTACK #6
Tubes Fired - No. 5 No. 1 No. 2 No. 8
Track Angle- 13 S 120 P 120 P --
Gyro Angle- 10 353 351 200
Depth set- 6 ft. 10 ft. 10 ft. 10 ft.
Power- High High High High
Hit or Miss- Hit Hit Miss Miss
Erratic No No No No
(yes or No)
Mark Torpedo- 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. 39401 24325 17281 25358
Mark Exploder- 6-1A 6-1A 6-1A 6-1A
Serial No.- -- 12526 12451 12516
Actuation Set- C & M C & M C & M C & M
Actuation Actual- M C Miss --
Mark Warhead- 15-1 16 15 16
Serial No.- -- 10103 11029 3852
Explosive- Tpx Tpx Tpx Tpx
Firing Interval- -- 0 11" --
Type spread- None None None --
Sea Conditions- Calm Calm Calm Calm
Overhaul Activity- USS FULTON U.S.S. FULTON USS FULTON

REMARKS: Attack #5. None.
Remarks: Attack #4- This torpedo fired at PC escort. Explosion
Remarks: heard 33 seconds after firing.
Attack # - Attempted to fire with no impulse air built up in
impulse bottle. The residual air (less than 50 psi.) from pre-
vious firing moved torpedo aft 1 or 2 inches, not enough to trip
starting lever, but too far to insert gyro spindle or drop
stop bolt forward of guide stud again. The stop bolt rod thus
could not be withdrawn to allow tube "READY TO FIRE" interlock
to be thrown to "MUZZLE DOOR UNLOCKED" position. The outer
door could not be closed for this reason.

-26-
[HANDWRITTEN: 27]

— page 31 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5 PATROL NO. 1
THE 2247(H) DATE: 11 Nov. 1943 Lat. 3°-08.5 S. Long. 127°-37.8 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: AK - Maierform bow, well decked, mast funnel mast.
Composite superstructure. Heavy stick masts. No
kingposts seen. Looked modern. Similar to those
shown page 135 of Recognition Manual. Tonnage
estimated at 3500 to 4000, but reported to be 3300.
Contact made by visual sighting.

Ship(s) Sunk One AK as described above.

Ship(s) Damaged:

Damage
Determined by: Ship apparently lost steering control after hit by
torpedo fired at escort. Screws stopped immediately
after hit made in this attack, and 6 minutes after
this hit cracking up noises were heard through the
hull so plainly all hands thought CAPELIN had
exceeded test depth and was breaking up. Five
internal explosions at this time andsix more 6 to
17 minutes later.

Target Draft 15 ft. Course 234° T. Speed 5 kts. Range 900 yds.

Own Ship Data

Speed 4.5 kts. Course 300° T. Depth 65 ft. Angle 0

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Moonlight periscope attack. Radar out of commission.
Gyro oscillation motor out, and gyro lagged on turns,
which may have accounted for some of the misses.
Since gyro error was variable, made a serious error in
not using white light method spread, which is independent
of range for straight shots, instead of spread table,
since I had no means of determining range with any
accuracy until target close enough to get rough stadimeter
range. Checked bearing for each shot. Set up checked
perfectly.

This attack was probably not necessary, as one hit would
have sunk this ship eventually. Did not know then that
torpedo fired at escort had hit freighter, and wanted to
see the freighter sink before I had to go deep. I don't
like "damaged" ships.

-25-
[HANDWRITTEN: 26]

— page 32 —
(1/Wn)
FC5-16/A16-3
Serial #012

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CAPELIN First War Patrol
SS289/A16-3 dated 17
November 1943.

From:
To :
Via :

Subject:

SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN

U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship,
5 January 1944.

The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) - Report of First War
Patrol - Comments on.

1.
The first war patrol of the CAPELIN covered a
period of seventeen days of which fifteen days were spent in
enemy controlled waters or in assigned areas. Coverage in the
time available was thorough.

2.
The attack opportunities presented were ex-
ploited to the maximum and the attacks well executed. The
torpedo performance apparently was below average, although
conclusive evidence to this effect is lacking.

3.
The defects enumerated were corrected as
indicated on page 16 of the report by the emergency repair
force of the U.S.S. PELIAS. The noisy operation of the bow
planes was determined to be due to lack of adequate lubrication
and means to provide it in the future were installed during the
brief refit period.

4.
The Commanding Officer, officers and crew of
the CAPELIN are congratulated upon the completion of this
short but successful first war patrol.

[SIGNATURE: J. H. HAINES]

[HANDWRITTEN: 28]

— page 33 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 0427]
[UNCLEAR: faint marks]

FE24-71/[HANDWRITTEN: (]A16-3[HANDWRITTEN: )]
Serial 048

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CAPELIN First War
Patrol Report SS289/
A16-3 dated 17
November, 1943.

From:
To:

Via:

Subject:

1.
The CAPELIN, in compliance with orders, returned
to DARWIN before completion of a full length patrol to effect
repairs and disembark the Commander Submarine Division ONE-SIXTY-
TWO. Paragraphs 'I' to 'U', inclusive, were not submitted with
the report.

2.
This short period in assigned operating areas was
replete with activity. The Commanding Officer's aggressiveness
and resolute determination to attack and completely destroy all
enemy vessels encountered is noted with pleasure. CAPELIN very
thoroughly patrolled all probable locations of enemy shipping.

3.
This patrol is considered successful for award of
the Submarine Combat Insignia.

UNITED STATES NAVY

12-ms

15 January, 1944.

The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) - Report of First War
Patrol - Comments on.

[STAMP: RECEIVED]
[STAMP: 21 JAN 1944]
[STAMP: COMMANDER SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC FORCE]
- 1 -

[HANDWRITTEN: 29]

— page 35 —
[HANDWRITTEN: see left]
[HANDWRITTEN: F4253]
[HANDWRITTEN: File No 587]
[HANDWRITTEN: Rec'd 24 JAN 1944]

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3(F-3/roj)
Serial: [HANDWRITTEN: 0163]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
CAPELIN First War
Patrol Report SS289/
A16-3 dated 17 November,
1943.

From: Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
To : Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) - Report of First War
Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

[SIGNATURE: R. H. Cruzen]
R. H. CRUZEN,
By direction.

Copy to:
VCNO

[HANDWRITTEN: Rec'd]
[HANDWRITTEN: 07 Jan 1944]

[STAMP: FILMED]

[HANDWRITTEN: 31]

— page 36 —
UNITED STATES
SUBMARINE LOSSES

WORLD WAR II

Reissued with an Appendix of
Axis Submarine Losses, fully indexed,
by
Naval History Division
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington: 1963

— page 37 —
CAPELIN (SS 289)

Returning from her first war patrol after only 17 days
out, CAPELIN (Cdr. E. E. Marshall) came into
Darwin on 16 November 1943 with a defective conning
tower hatch mechanism, excessively noisy bow planes,
and a defective radar tube. These flaws were corrected
to the satisfaction of the Commanding Officer, and the
ship then departed for her second patrol on 17 Novem-
ber. Her area was in the Molukka and Celebes seas,
and she was to pay particular attention to Kaoe Bay,
Morotai Strait, Davao Gulf and trade routes in the vi-
cinity of Siao, Sangi, Talaud and Sarangani Islands.
She was to leave her area at dark 6 December.

Nothing has been positively heard from CAPELIN
since she departed. However, BONEFISH reported
having seen a U. S. submarine at 1°-14'N, 123°-50'E
on 2 December 1943. This position is in the area as-
signed to CAPELIN at this time. An attempt to reach
CAPELIN by radio, on 9 December 1943, elicited no
response.

On 23 November an American submarine was at-
tacked off Kaoe Bay, Halmahera, 1°-34'N, 123°-07'E.
However, the Japanese state that this attack was broken
off, and the evidence of contact was rather thin. The
only positive statement which can be made is that
CAPELIN was lost in Celebes Sea, or in Molukka Pas-
sage or the Molukka Sea in December 1943. Enemy
minefields are now known to have been placed
in various positions along the north coast of Celebes in
CAPELIN's area, and she may have been lost because
of a mine explosion. In her 17-day first patrol, CAPE-
LIN sank two Japanese medium freighters for 7,400
tons of merchant shipping. This first patrol was con-
ducted among the islands immediately west of New
Guinea.

E. E. Marshall

73

— page 39 —
FE24-71/A17-25
UNITED STATES NAVY
Mk.
Serial 00111
DECLASSIFIED
10 APR 1944
S-E-C-R-E-T

From: The Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.
To : The Commander Seventh Fleet.

Subject: Record of Proceedings of an Investigation
convened by the Commander Submarines, Seventh
Fleet, to inquire into the possible loss of
the U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) on her second war
patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Original and two copies of subject
investigation.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: R. W. Christie]
R. W. CHRISTIE.

[HANDWRITTEN: ComTraLant BOX # 539]
[HANDWRITTEN: 44 RS #]
[HANDWRITTEN: FILE A12]
[HANDWRITTEN: JACKET #]
[HANDWRITTEN: N.B.]

— page 40 —
[STAMP: SECRET]

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
OF A
BOARD OF INVESTIGATION
CONVENED AT THE
HEADQUARTERS OF
COMMANDER SUBMARINES SEVENTH FLEET
BY ORDER OF
COMMANDER SUBMARINES SEVENTH FLEET
To inquire into the circumstances connected with
the possible loss of the U.S.S. Capelin on
her second war patrol.

March 3, 1944

A true copy. Attest:
[SIGNATURE: C. S. Isgrig]
C. S. Isgrig,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Investigating Officer.

[STAMP: SECRET]

— page 41 —
FE24-71/A17-25
Serial 00111

S-E-C-R-E-T

From:
To :
Subject:

Enclosure:

1. UNITED STATES NAVY

10 APR 1944

Mk.

The Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.
The Commander Seventh Fleet.

Record of Proceedings of an Investigation
convened by the Commander Submarines, Seventh
Fleet, to inquire into the possible loss of
the U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS 289) on her second war
patrol.

(A) Original and two copies of subject
investigation.

Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

R. W. CHRISTIE.

— page 42 —
SUBMARINES SEVENTH FLEET
Mk.
U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223), Flagship,
8 April 1944.

FE24-71/A17-25
Serial 00112

S-E-C-R-E-T

The proceedings, findings, and recommendation of the
investigation in the attached case are approved.

R. W. CHRISTIE,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.

— page 43 —
SECRET

Finding of Facts

1. That the U.S.S. Capelin departed from Darwin, Australia
on her first war patrol on 30 October 1943.

2. That she returned to Darwin on 16 November 1943 because
of a defective conning tower hatch mechanism, excessively noisy
bow planes and defective radar tube, all of which developed
during her first patrol.

3. That the derangements were corrected to the satisfaction
of the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Capelin, and that the
ship then departed on her second patrol at about 1930 on 17
November 1943.

4. That nothing further has positively been seen nor heard
of the U.S.S. Capelin since that date. The U.S.S. Bonefish
upon return from her second war patrol, reported, that at
1753 (H), 2 December, in latitude 1° - 10' N, longitude 123° -
50' E, she sighted a submarine to seaward at a range of about
four miles. This was in the area to which the Capelin was
assigned. There are indications of the activity of the Capelin
which for security reasons, cannot be divulged.

5. That one attempt to communicate with the Capelin by
radio from Headquarters, Commander Task Force Seventy-One on
9 December 1943, elicited no response nor acknowledgement.

6. That the operation order and annexes thereto, under which
she was conducting her patrol were clear and complete.

7. That her assigned route, to and from her operating area,
was enemy controlled, but was not considered particularly
hazardous, nor was her operating area itself considered unduly
dangerous.

8. That all friendly forces were adequately informed
concerning her routing, and that so far as is known, the U.S.S.
Bonefish is the only friendly unit which made visual or other
contact with a submarine in these areas during the period under
question.

9. That the Commanding Officer was courageous and very
aggressive, that his competence as a submarine captain was
outstanding.

10. That the officers and men were very well trained, and
the ship well handled, both surface and submerged. It was
considered well above average from this standpoint.

11. That the material condition of the Capelin upon depart-
ure on her second war patrol was generally excellent, no defects
were known to exist, and both the Commanding Officer and the
Division Commander were satisfied that the Capelin was in all
respects ready for the next patrol.

12. That there was nothing, other than the normal hazards
of aggressive contacts with a formidable enemy, which could
explain her failure to return.

— page 44 —
SECRET
Recommendation

From a thorough examination of documents appended, marked
A,B,C,D,E,F,G, intelligence information which does not appear,
and from testimony adduced, it is not considered that any steps
to improve current operational procedures, as carried out by
Commander Task Force Seventy-One, are indicated.

— page 45 —
SUBMARINES SEVENTH FLEET
U.S.S. Bonefish (SS223), Flagship.

F24-71/A17-25
Serial 0065
25 FEB 1944

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.
To : Captain Clayton S. Isgrig, U.S. Navy,
Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Orion.

Subject: Investigation into the possible loss of the
U.S.S. Capelin (SS289) on her second war patrol.

1. Under authority of 5 U.S. Code 93, you are
hereby detailed to investigate, as soon as practicable, into
the circumstances connected with the possible loss of the
U.S.S. Capelin on her second war patrol.

2. You will make a thorough investigation into
all the known circumstances connected with the operation of
the Capelin during her second war patrol and submit a complete
report to the Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet, of the
facts which you deem to be established, together with recom-
mendations as to what steps, if any, should be taken to im-
prove operational procedures.

3. Your attention is particularly invited to
Section 734, Naval Courts and Boards.

4. You will furnish your own clerical assistance.
You are directed to make only four copies of the record of
the proceedings and forward all four copies to the convening
authority.

R. W. CHRISTIE,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.

— page 46 —
SECRET

First Day
U.S.S. Orion,
Friday, March 3, 1944.

The investigating officer, Captain Clayton S. Isgrig, U.S.
Navy, administered the prescribed oath to Jacob Rosen, chief
yeoman (permanent appointment), U.S. Navy, the reporter, who
took seat as such.

The investigating officer read the order directing him to
make the investigation and which is hereto prefixed.

The investigating officer announced that the investigation
would be conducted with closed doors.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the investigation
were present.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
informed of the subject matter of the investigation and
declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1.Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. Murray J. Tichenor, Captain, U.S. Navy, Operations
Officer, Staff, Commander Submarines, 7th Fleet.

2.Q. At the time that the U.S.S. Capelin departed on patrol
were you the Operations Officer?
A. Yes, I was.

3.Q. Will you please produce the Operation Order and such
other directives as you may have which were given the Capelin
for this patrol?

Witness produced the Operation Order and two despatches,
copies of which are appended.

A. There were only two despatches, other than intelligence,
that were sent to the Capelin during this patrol.

4.Q. Referring to Commander Task Force 71 despatch 091440
of December 1943, what does "HARDIN LUCAS MARSHALL" refer to?
A. The names, "HARDIN LUCAS MARSHALL", refer to the names of
the commanding officers of three submarines then on patrol,
namely "TUNA, BILLFISH, and CAPELIN", respectively.

5.Q. Was there any other information furnished this
submarine prior to departure on this patrol?
A. The first patrol of the Capelin was terminated by orders
to return to Darwin. Orders for the second patrol were
promulgated by mailgram modifying original orders as issued for
the first patrol. In addition to the modified despatch, orders
referred to, the Capelin had annexes to her original operational
order which included latest intelligence information of the
areas she was to patrol. No other instructions were delivered
to her.

— page 47 —
SECRET

6.Q. Was Captain Nichols, Commander Submarines, 7th Fleet
Staff, with the Capelin prior to the subject patrol?
A. Captain Nichols was in the Capelin during her first
patrol, from departure Darwin to its return and termination at
Darwin. This in accordance with orders issued by Commander
Task Force 71.

7.Q. Was Captain Nichols given any information to transmit
to the Capelin, other than intelligence information, which does
not appear?
A. To my knowledge, he was not.

8.Q. How many war patrols did the Commanding Officer of the
U.S.S. Capelin make, prior to this departure on patrol?
A. Our records indicate that the Commanding Officer made the
third war patrol of the U.S.S. Cuttlefish and the first patrol
of the U.S.S. Capelin, as Commanding Officer.

9.Q. Can you state what the state of training and morale of
officers and crew of the Capelin was?
A. No sir, I cannot.

10.Q. Will you give a general description of the area in
which the submarine was to operate, and the waters adjacent,
with particular reference to the depths of water and areas
which might be mineable?
A. The orders for the Capelin directed that she depart
Darwin and proceed via Timor Sea and to patrol Banda Sea,
Molucca Sea, Molucca Passage, and Celebes Sea Areas. These
waters are considered enemy controlled. They are, in general,
deep water areas. Previous patrol reports for these areas
have indicated that they are quite extensively patrolled by
both surface and air craft, and that they present the ever
present navigational hazards. Waters in these areas through
which the Capelin was directed to operate, are not considered
mineable, except in very close approaches to land.

11.Q. Was the Capelin given any special instructions
concerning her surface and submerged operations?
A. To my knowledge, she was given no special instructions as
to how to conduct her patrol in regard to surface or submerged
operations, other than the standing instructions contained in
Commander Task Group 71.1 Operation Plan 1-43.

12.Q. As Operations Officer of this Task Force, you have
knowledge of the despatches sent to the Capelin. Will you
please give the dates and times when despatches were sent or
received from the Capelin?
A. I have no information of any communication being
received from the Capelin after her departure Darwin on patrol.

13.Q. Have you any knowledge of any allied submarines, air-
craft, or surface craft, which might have been operating in
the area assigned to the Capelin for this patrol?

2

— page 48 —
SECRET

A. I have no knowledge of any Allied aircraft or surface
craft operating in her assigned area. Submarines of this force
might be routed through areas designated for control by the
Capelin while she was in the area. Information of this nature
would normally be sent to submarines concerned, and I am sure
was so done in this case. The U.S.S. Bonefish, upon return
from her second war patrol, reported that at 1733(H), 2
December 1943, she sighted a submarine to seaward at a range of
about 4 miles. This position was reported to be 1°10' N, 123°
50' E. This position was in the area to which the Capelin was
assigned.

14.Q. In issuing the Operation Order to the Capelin, were
you assisted by any other officers, if so, whom?
A. I do not recall, whether or not, I was assisted by
Commander Jensen, the Assistant Operations Officer for Submarines.
The normal procedure is that the original operation order is
drafted by the Assistant Operations Officer for Submarines. This
operation order must then be approved by the Chief of
Staff, and the order signed by the Task Force Commander.

15.Q. Can you furnish any other information which would be
helpful in investigating the possible loss of the Capelin?
A. I have no information received from the Capelin since her
departure Darwin for patrol. There are no indications of the
activity of the Capelin, which for security reasons, I am not
permitted to divulge. The Capelin was directed by her orders
to depart her area at dark 2 December 1943, and return to
Fremantle on or about 15 December 1943, having heard
nothing from her, we so phrased a part of a serial despatch
radio, namely, "IF PRUDENT GIVE ONE WORD REPORT NUMBER TORPEDOES REMAINING". No
reply was received to this despatch. On 20 December 1943, we
reported by despatch to Commander 7th Fleet, that the Capelin
was overdue.

Witness produced this despatch, copy of which is appended.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
informed of the subject matter of the investigation and
declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1.Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. Captain P.C. Nichols, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff, Commander
Submarines 7th Fleet, formerly Commander Submarine Division 103.

2.Q. Can you tell me what you might consider pertinent

3

— page 49 —
SECRET
Information concerning the material condition of the hull,
state of training and the morale of the officers and crew of
the U.S.S. Capelin during her first war patrol?
A. On or about 27 October 1943, I was directed to proceed to
the port in which the U.S.S. Capelin might be, and embark in
the Capelin for a special mission and a war patrol. I was on
the Capelin for about 19 days. During this period she patrolled
in the Flores, Banda, and Serang Seas. I considered the Capelin
to be in excellent material condition, the only casualties
during the period I was in the ship were defective tubes in the
SJ Radar, a defective conning tower hatch mechanism, and
excessively noisy bow planes. The casualty to the hatch mech-
anism occurred early in the patrol and was repaired by the
ship's force. It recurred frequently during the patrol and was
embarrassing. The other casualties occurred later in the patrol
and prior to my disembarkation. The casualties were reported
to Commander Task Force 71, who ordered a repair group to the
port of arrival. This group made complete and satisfactory
repairs prior to departure on her second war patrol. I
observed the Capelin from a material and personnel aspect very
closely during the time I was on her. I considered her to be
well above average as regards material and training. While I
was in the Capelin, she made two attacks on single ships, both
of which were successful, and both were sunk. The Commanding
Officer was very aggressive, and I considered him to be a most
competent submarine captain. In one attack, the enemy was
escorted, and the Capelin was subjected to depth charging for
about three hours. The attack was made on a bright moonlight
night from periscope and radar depth. One hit was obtained on
the first salvo, and the enemy attempted to make the beach,
which was about two miles distant. In spite of the escort, who
was dropping depth charges, the Commanding Officer remained at
periscope depth, continued attacking until the ship was sunk,
and not until then did he take the Capelin deep, and commence
evasive tactics. The evasive tactics were very skillful and
in about three hours he evaded the escort, surfaced and cleared
the area. It was during this action that the excessively noisy
bow planes became evident. Although one depth charge was fairly
close, no damage was sustained.

3.Q. You indicate that the Capelin had suffered casualties
to bow planes and conning tower hatch which made continued
submerged operations hazardous. On completion of repairs and
prior to departure on her second war patrol, were these
casualties in fully satisfactory manner?
A. Yes. The trouble of the bow planes was only a matter of
poor lubrication. A new greasing line was installed. The
conning tower hatch casualty was caused by a badly burred worm
shaft gear, which was replaced. The defective tubes in the SJ
Radar were replaced. All repairs were inspected and tested in
the presence of the Commanding Officer and myself, and we were
satisfied that the Capelin was in all respects ready for the
next patrol.

— page 50 —
SECRET

4.Q. With regard to the operation order of the Capelin, did
there appear any doubt in the mind of the Commanding Officer?
A. I received the Capelin's operation order from Commander
Task Force 71 and delivered it to the Commanding Officer,
Capelin. I went into and through it with the Commanding Officer,
Capelin, and there was doubt in his mind as to it.

5.Q. Was there anything in connection with your association
with the Capelin which would explain her failure to return from
this patrol?
A. No.

6.Q. Will you state the departure and arrival dates of the
U.S.S. Capelin from and to Darwin on her first war patrol?
A. The Capelin departed Darwin on 30 October 1943, and
returned to Darwin on 16 November 1943.

7.Q. When did she leave Darwin on her second war patrol?
A. She departed Darwin about 1930 on 17 November 1943.

8.Q. Are there any other facts concerning this investigation
which you care to set forth?
A. No, except to state that the Commanding Officer, Capelin,
was an outstanding, aggressive, and courageous officer. His
officers and men were very well trained, his ship was well
handled, both surface and submerged.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The investigation was adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

5

— page 51 —
[STAMP: SECRET]

Second Day

U.S.S. Orion,
Saturday, March 4, 1944.

At 10 a.m.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was
informed of the subject matter of the investigation and
declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.
A. Edward S. Carsick, Commander, U.S. Navy, Commanding
Submarine Repair Unit, Navy 137.

2. Q. Can you tell me what you may consider pertinent
information concerning the U.S.S. Capelin during your
association with her, on or about 17 November 1943?
A. The repairs that I was concerned with, which were
actually performed by a group of men directed by Lieutenant
(Junior Grade) Kirkpatrick, and Electrician Burkett, were as
follows:

(a) minor repairs to and adjustments to master
gyro compass.

(b) Adjustments and replacement of a minor part
of the SJ Radar.

(c) Noisy bow planes, noise appeared in the
lower universal, and was corrected by
installing separate grease fittings.

(d) Repairs of faulty dogs on upper conning
tower hatch. Sectors and worn shaft were
taken from a submarine present in Fremantle,
but only one part was finally used, and
that was the worn shaft, inasmuch as it was
found that the two holes in the sectors
taken up as replacements had a different
distance between centers. After placing
a new worn shaft in the hatch and stoning
off burrs on other parts of the linkage,
parts of the linkage, the operation of the
hatch was made satisfactory to the ship's
officers, who conducted a series of tests
on opening and closing it.

(e) Just prior to sailing, ship's force discovered
several large holes in the main engine exhaust
piping outboard of the pressure hull. One of
these was very close to the #4 main engine
muffler, and was a hole of about 2" x 2".
The repair of this hole by welding a scrap of
mild steel plate by a welder loaned by the
R.A.N. was accomplished.

6

— page 52 —
SECRET

In regard to the general condition of the ship, as noted by
myself, on several trips through the ship, my impression was
that she was well cared for and maintained by her officers and
crew.

3.Q. Were post-repair tests made to determine the successful
completion of the repairs, and to ensure the ship's full
military and material availability for combat operations?
A. I can answer your question only insofar as the repairs
needed were made. Tests were made, at the dock, to determine
the sufficiency of the repairs made by the repair party. The
planes were operated for a long period of time, from hard rise
to hard dive, after fitting the separate grease line, and were
very quiet and satisfactory to the Commanding Officer. In the
conning tower hatch, various officers from the Capelin, operated
the conning tower hatch in a series of test exercises, simulat-
ing diving operations, and accepted the repairs as satisfactory.
The SJ Radar after repairs, gave satisfactory ranges and bearings
on various land objects in Darwin Harbor. The master gyro
compass, after adjustments were made, gave satisfactory azimuths
prior to sailing.

4.Q. Was the hydraulic system, to your knowledge, satisfactory?
A. To the best of my knowledge, there were no hydraulic plant
failures, and I feel certain, that had repairs been necessary,
they would have been requested at the time of my visit.

5.Q. Are there any other facts concerning the subject matter
of this investigation you care to set forth?
A. Yes. I felt very strongly, after being associated with the
ship, that the officers and men had a tremendous respect and
admiration for the Commanding Officer, and also for the
Executive Officer, indicating a very high morale existing in the
ship.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything
relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he
thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith,
which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The investigation was finished.

After full and mature deliberation, the investigating
officer finds as follows:

— page 53 —
SECRET

Finding of Facts

1. That the U.S.S. Capelin departed from Darwin, Australia
on her first war patrol on 30 October 1943.

2. That she returned to Darwin on 16 November 1943 because
of a defective conning tower hatch mechanism, excessively noisy
bow planes and defective radar tube, all of which developed
during her first patrol.

3. That the derangements were corrected to the satisfaction
of the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Capelin and that the
ship then departed on her second patrol at about 1930 on 17
November 1943.

4. That nothing further has positively been seen nor heard
of the U.S.S. Capelin since that date. The U.S.S. Bonefish
upon return from her second war patrol, reported that at
1753 (H), 2 December, in latitude 1° - 10' N, longitude 125° -
50' E, she sighted a submarine to seaward at a range of about
four miles. This was in the area to which the Capelin was
assigned. There are indications of the activity of the Capelin
which for security reasons, cannot be divulged.

5. That one attempt to communicate with the Capelin by
radio from Headquarters, Commander Task Force Seventy-One on
9 December 1943, elicited no response nor acknowledgement.

6. That the operation order and annexes thereto, under
which she was conducting her patrol were clear and complete.

7. That her assigned route, to and from her operating area,
was enemy controlled, but was not considered particularly
hazardous, nor was her operating area itself considered unduly
dangerous.

8. That all friendly forces were adequately informed
concerning her routing, and that so far as is known, the U.S.S.
Bonefish is the only friendly unit which made visual or other
contact with a submarine in these areas during the period under
question.

9. That the Commanding Officer was courageous and very
aggressive, that his competence as a submarine captain was
outstanding.

10. That the officers and men were very well trained, and
the ship well handled, both surface and submerged. It was
considered well above average from this standpoint.

11. That the material condition of the Capelin upon depart-
ure on her second war patrol was generally excellent, no defects
were known to exist, and both the Commanding Officer and the
Division Commander were satisfied that the Capelin was in all
respects ready for the next patrol.

12. That there was nothing, other than the normal hazards
of aggressive contacts with a formidable enemy, which could
explain her failure to return.

— page 54 —
SECRET
Recommendation

From a thorough examination of documents appended, marked
A,B,C,D,E,F,G, intelligence information which does not appear,
and from testimony adduced, it is not considered that any steps
to improve current operational procedures, as carried out by
Commander Task Force Seventy-One, are indicated.

[SIGNATURE: Clayton S. Ingrig]
Clayton S. Ingrig,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Investigating Officer.

— page 55 —
OPERATION ORDER 37-43 no serial of 23 October 1943
Was removed to the World War II Planning Material
Files on 27 August 1962.

— page 56 —
NAVAL MESSAGE

LIEUT COMDR AUSTIN OF COD IS FATHER OF BABY GIRL CONGRATULATIONS X
SERIAL 22 X MARSHALL LOOK OUT FOR LATTA PASSING THROUGH OSCAR
ABOUT TWENTY SEVENTH

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
[SIGNATURE: E. B. Rhoads]
R. B. RHOADS, Lieut. U.S.N.R.

ORIGINATING OFFICER 11

T.O.D. HOW TRANSMITTED SYSTEM: 108-S COPY TO
ORIGINATOR ACTION INFORMATION REC'D
RELEASED BY

CTF 71 TO 71.1

DATE AND | 00 | 01 | 05 | 06 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 16 | 20 | 64 | 70 | 86 | 90 | 95
TIME GROUP |
261352 |

PRECEDENCE: CODING TYPING DATE
ROUTINE BENSON OUTGOING LANGLEY 26 NOV 1943
C

— page 57 —
NAVAL MESSAGE

HARDIN LUCAS AND MARSHALL X SERIAL 49 X IF PRUDENT
GIVE ONE WORD REPORT NUMBER TORPEDOES REMAINING

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
[SIGNATURE: R. B. Rhoads]
R. B. RHOADS, Lt. USNR.

ORIGINATING OFFICER

T.O.D.
ORIGINATOR
CTF 71

HOW TRANSMITTED:
ACTION
TG 71.1

SYSTEM:
INFORMATION

COPY TO
REC'D
RELEASED BY

DATE AND
TIME GROUP
091440

00 | 01 | 05 | 06 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 16 | 20 | 64 | 70 | 86 | 90 | 95

PRECEDENCE:
ROUTINE

CODING:
OUTGOING

TYPING:
DATE:
9 DEC 1943
[HANDWRITTEN: D]

— page 58 —
NAVAL MESSAGE

CAPELIN DEPARTED DARWIN THIRTY OCTOBER WITH COMSUBDIV ONE SIXTY TWO
EMBARKED X PATROLLED BANDA AND FLORES SEAS X SANK FOUR THOUSAND TON

UNIDENTIFIED AK IN BANDA SEA AND THIRTY THREE SIXTY TON AK HUNTAIMA MARU
NORTH KELANG STRAIT ELEVEN NOVEMBER X RETURNED DARWIN FIFTEENTH

DISEMBARKED DIV COMDR FUELLED EFFECTED MINOR REPAIRS X DEPARTED SEVENTEENTH
FOR PATROL MOLUCCA AND CELEBES SEAS X SCHEDULED DEPART AREA SIX DECEMBER
X COMSUBS SEVENTH FLEET SENDS ACTION COM SEVENTH FLEET
VIA CUBAY STRAIT FOR FREMANTLE ETA FIFTEENTH X NO COMMUNICATION RECEIVED
FROM CAPELIN SINCE DEPARTURE DARWIN SEVENTEENTH NOVEMBER X THERE HAVE BEEN

SEVERAL INDICATIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES OF BLUE SUBMARINE ACTIVITY IN HER
AREA X ALSO ON ONE DECEMBER BOWFIN SIGHTED SUB OFF STROOCEN KAAP CELEBES

AND TWO DECEMBER BONEFISH SIGHTED SUB APPROX POSIT (1-30N 123-00E) X
BELIEVE BOTH THESE SIGHTINGS WERE CAPELIN X MESSAGE ON NINTH REQUESTING

DESPATCH REPLY HAS NOT BEEN ANSWERED X REGRETFULLY REPORT CAPELIN
CONSIDERED OVERDUE SINCE FIFTEEN DECEMBER X

ORIGINATING OFFICER [HANDWRITTEN: 11]
[STAMP: CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY: /S/ E.B. RHOADS, LT.D-V(G), USNR.]

T.O.D.
ORIGINATOR
COMSUBS7THFLT

DATE AND
TIME GROUP
200840

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE HOW TRANSMITTED
ACTION
COM7TH FLT

CODING SYSTEM
INFORMATION
COPY TO
REC'D
RELEASED BY

| 00 | 01 | 05 | 06 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 16 | 20 | 64 | 70 | 86 | 90 | 95 |
|----|

TYPING
[STAMP: OUTGOING]
DATE
20 DECEMBER, 1943.
[HANDWRITTEN: E]

— page 59 —
U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289)

JOB ORDERS - COMMUNICATION

1. Install twin conductor shielded cable in forward torpedo room
   from auxiliary sound jackbox to NM junction box to permit use of
   NM receiver on JK-QC and JK projectors.

2. Renew flooded lead (shielded cable) in JP installation for
   hydrophone to receiver. Inspect hydrophone for salt deposit and
   remove if found.

3. Shift connection on sound receivers in Conning Tower to permit use
   of ear phones in forward torpedo room with loudspeaker in Conning
   Tower turned off. (Present installation necessitates loudspeaker
   being on in Conning Tower in order to use earphones in forward
   torpedo room).

4. Check and repair ECM as necessary. (Keys "E" and "R" stick
   occasionally).

5. Overhaul Underwood typewriter furnished by ship.

— page 60 —
U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289)

WORK REQUESTS (Electrical)

1.  Gyro compass. Conduct quarterly inspection of master and
    auxiliary gyro compass. (HOLT - CEM).

2.  1.V.C. speaker system. Check throat mike circuit for cause of
    inefficient gain and rectify - (BUTLER CEM).

3.  Conning Tower Motor Order Telegraph Operating Handle Shaft.
    Manufacture and install two shafts as per sample except make new
    shaft 1 1/4" longer than sample. (BALLARD - CEM).

4.  Shaft revolution indicator transmitter. Provide means of dis-
    engaging shaft revolution counter transmitter from bull gear on
    shaft. Sketch attached is method suggested by ship. Purpose is
    to allow disengaging revolution counter when rigged for silent
    running. (BALLARD - CEM).

5.  Install sheet metal kick plate over cables in hatch coaming
    between lower Conning Tower hatch and Conning Tower deck plate.
    (KRALL - EM 1c.).

6.  Provide welder to install a pad-eye #1 periscope well. Ship's
    force will furnish pad-eye. (KRALL - EM 1c.).

7.  Manufacture one mat for maneuvering room deck as per sketch attached
    to work request. Material Canvas backed with felt or coco
    matting. (BALLARD - CEM).

SECRET
[HANDWRITTEN: F]

— page 61 —
U.S.S. CAPELIN (S-289)

WORK REQUESTS - ENGINEERING MECHANICAL

1. Main Engine (General Motors, Model 248).
   Assist ship's force in overhaul of one (1) main engine by accom-
   plishing miscellaneous machine shop work as may be found necessary.

2. Kleinschmidt Vapor Compressor: Acid Clean two (2) distiller units.

3. Auxiliary Engine (General Motors Model 268):
   Repair leak in cooling water jumper between two (2) sections of
   exhaust header.

4. Lub oil and fuel oil Purifiers: Install a union in purifier feed line
   to each purifier to allow pulling of drag assembly. All joints are
   at present silver soldered.

5. Kleinschmidt Vapor Compressor: Install a cross connection between brine
   tank overboard discharge and feed pump suction as per sketch attached
   to work request. Connection is to be used in conserving fresh water
   when double distilling.

6. Special tools: Manufacture the following special tools:

   A. Piston pin cap removing tool (as per sketch
      attached to work request).

   B. Wrist pin drift pin (as per sketch attached).

   C. Valve depressor (Template will be furnished
      Shipfitter shop).

   D. Main bearing replacement tool (If none available
      on tender manufacture as per sketch to be fur-
      nished by ship).

7. Chemical analysis: Analyze following samples as indicated:

   A. Seven (7) lub oil sump samples for:
      (a) Fuel dilution.
      (b) Neutralization number.
      (c) Viscosity at 100 degrees F.
      (d) Precipitation number.

   B. Fresh water tank samples (4) for:
      (a) Suitability for use as portable water.

   C. Battery water tank and distiller discharge
      samples (5) for:

      (a) Suitability for use as battery water.

   D. Air conditioning condensate samples (2) for:

      (a) Suitability for use as portable water.
      (b) Suitability for use as Battery water.

SECRET
[HANDWRITTEN: F]

— page 62 —
U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289)

ENGINEERING JOB ORDERS - (MACH.)

8. Relocate following Main Engine Gauges to prevent excessive
   vibration:

   (a) Four (4) fuel oil motor block gauges - mounting
       bracket to be supported by deck plate instead of
       engine frame. No additional material required.

   (b) Four (4) air scavenging gauges - mounting to be
       supported by bulkhead instead of engine frame.

9. Cooler Operating Valves.

   Shorten operating cable to #4 Main Engine fresh water
   cooler to permit proper operation.

10. Main Engine Fuel Transfer Block:

    Drill and retap oversized one fuel oil transfer block.
    Manufacture one oversized blind nut to fit new dimensions
    of transfer block. Ship will furnish present blind nut as
    a sample.

SECRET
[HANDWRITTEN: F]

— page 63 —
LIST OF REGISTERED PUBLICATIONS HELD BY U.S.S. CAPELIN AS OF
18 OCTOBER 1943

CSP 847 (A)
CSP 1247/8 (K)
CSP 1247/8 (L)
CSP 1247/8 (M)
CSP 1247/8 (N)
CSP 1270(AR)
CSP 1270(AS)
CSP 1270(AT)
CSP 1270(AU)
CSP 1270(AV)
CSP 1286(M)
CSP 1286(N)
CSP 1286(O)
CSP 1311(A)
CSP 1312(N)
CSP 1501(A)
CSP 1521(A)
CSP 1524(B)
CSP 1525/6(L)
CSP 1525/6(M)
CSP 1525/6(N)
CSP 1525/6(O)
CSP 1605(BJ)
CSP 1605(BK)
CSP 1605(BL)
CSP 1607(JQ)
CSP 1607(JH)
CSP 1607(JI)
SP 274(16)
SP 274(17)
SP 274(18)
SP 274(19)
SP 375(2)
SP 375(4)
SP 382
SP 440(1)
SP 440(2)
SP 441

SP 442
SP 443
SP 444
SP 445
SP 446
SP 446(A)
SP 446(2)
SP 447
ACD 653(43)
ACD 07/4
ASD 02(AB)
ASD 02(AC)
ASD 02(AD)
ASD 02(AE)
ASRS 6
CB 016180(41)
HO 184
HO 187
NDP-1(A)
USF 70-A SUPP
CSP 1270(AQ)

[STAMP: SECRET]

— page 64 —
END OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: F 108]
[HANDWRITTEN: AR-116-78]

||||| 4.5 | 2.8 | 2.5
|||||     | 3.2 | 2.2
|||||     | 3.6 | 2.0
|||||     | 4.0 | 1.8
|||||
1.0
|||||
1.1
|||||
1.25 | 1.4 | 1.6

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[SEAL: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, with an eagle emblem]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION

D-52264