U.S.S. RASHER (SS-269) — war patrol report SS-269_RASHER_Part1.pdf

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START OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: M-422]
[HANDWRITTEN: 10/24/70]
OPERATOR [HANDWRITTEN: R.M.]
DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 10-24-70]

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START OF REEL
JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: AR-100-22/H-108]

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OPERATOR [SIGNATURE: R. Munch Jr.]
DATE [HANDWRITTEN: Jan 26, 1977]

THIS MICROFILM IS
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THE UNITED STATES
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REEL TARGET. START & END
NAVEXOS 3966

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Office of Naval Records and History
Ships' Histories Section
Navy Department

HISTORY OF USS RASHER (SS 269)

The submarine USS RASHER amassed a brilliant war record during
her eight war patrols in World War II. For her highly successful
first, third, fourth and fifth war patrols, she was awarded the
Presidential Unit Citation.

USS RASHER was built by the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company at
Meintowoc, Wisconsin where her keel was laid on 4 May 1942.
Launched on 20 December 1942, the submarine was sponsored by Mrs.
G. C. Weaver, wife of Commander G. C. Weaver, USN, then Supervisor
of Shipbuilding, Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company.

USS RASHER was commissioned on 8 June 1943 with Commander B.
S. Hutchinson, USN, installed as the first commanding officer of
the submarine. The new submarine departed Manitowoc on 27 June
1943 for New Orleans via Great Lakes, Illinois River and Mississippi
River in floating Drydock, arriving at New Orleans on 3 July 1943.

Departing from New Orleans on 10 July, RASHER arrived at the
Canal Zone on the 16th to commence a 21-day training period at
Perlas Islands, Gulf of Panama. By 8 August, RASHER was on her
way to Australia, crossing the Equator on 17 August and arriving
at Brisbane, Australia on 1 September 1943. From New Orleans,
RASHER had at this time steamed 9,600 nautical miles.

Final preparations for her first war patrol were made at
Brisbane, and, after a short stop at Darwin on 2-3 October, RASHER
departed for her first war patrol area in Makassar Strait and
South Celebes Sea.

On 4 October, RASHER was forced down by an unidentified
plane and the captain decided to remain submerged for his approach
to Ambon to arrive without being sighted. At dawn the sub arrived
off Ambon and a Sampan, apparently aware of the RASHER's presence
stopped over the point of submergence and stayed around the
vicinity for about three hours.

While patrolling the approaches to Manipa and Kelang Pass on
the night of 8-9 October, RASHER sighted smoke on the horizon and
approached to develope an attack. It was a bright moonlit night
and two ships were determined to be steaming together. After
changing course and foiling the first attack approach, RASHER made
an end run and divided her spread of torpedoes between the two
ships. The torpedoes missed the first ship and sank the second.
The ship that was missed dropped a few depth charges and opened
fire with a deck gun, but inflicted no damage on RASHER.

While patrolling off Ambon on the morning of 13 October, smoke
was sighted coming out of the harbor and four ships soon appeared
over the horizon, two tramp merchantmen with escorts. A float

— page 5 —
-2- USS RASHER (SS 269)

type plane was also noticed hovering over the ships. RASHER managed
to get off a salvo of three torpedoes for each of the two merchant-
men before an explosion, believed to have been an aerial bomb,
drove her down deep. Four explosions were heard at times agreeing
with the estimated torpedo run to the targets, but no actual hits
were ob ed.

A depth charge attack of 23 or 24 explosions were heard but
none came very close. Noises were also heard of ships breaking
up. Upon surfacing for a look about two hours later, no smoke
could be seen and RASHER commenced a search for any remains of the
convoy.

RASHER had no further opportunity to fire until 31 October.
She was patrolling the sea lanes from Balikpapan to Truk. At 1429
the masts of a ship were sighted on the hoirzon very close to the
Celebes shoreline. A float-type plane was also noticed near the
ship and RASHER trailed the target until dark. She then surfaced
and started chasing the ship which appeared to be a tanker. A
spread of three torpedoes fired from the stern tubes apparently
missed but two minutes and 29 seconds after firing, a flash and
explosion were seen from the bridge, followed by another ten
seconds later. The time of the explosion did not check with the
time of the torpedo run but the tanker nevertheless later exploded
and burst into flames. The glare from the fire illuminated the
entire area and intermittent explosions continued until 2345 when
the ship evidently sank.

In the early afternoon of 8 November 1943, a medium-sized
tanker with escort was sighted. RASHER moved into position to
fire a spread of torpedoes from her stern tubes. Just before
firing a Jap lookout dressed in yellow polo shirt and cap, raised
his binoculars and looked in the direction of the sub. Shortly
after, two hits were observed on the target. The Jap ship swung
around 90 degrees and appeared dead in the water and slightly
down by the stern.

The escort vessel cut her bow toward RASHER and commenced drop-
ping depth charges. The skipper took the sub deep and rigged for
silent running. After sporadically dropping depth charges, the
escort commenced pinging for about an hour and 20 minutes. RASHER
then surfaced to find nothing in sight.

On 8 November, RASHER moved to Mangkalibat for the remainder
of her patrol. A group of ships was sighted and trailed in the
early morning. As it was bright moonlight, RASHER could not make
a radar approach within 4,000 yards without being detected. She
therefore attempted to stay ahead of the targets until dawn.
However, another vessel appeared ahead of the submarine and forced
her to dive, reverse course and make a radar and periscope approach.

— page 6 —
-3- USS RASHER (SS 269)

At 0119, two of the ships were recognized as large tankers
about 10,000 tons. These ships were selected as the prime targets
and four torpedoes were unleashed at the first and the remaining
two torpedoes leaped out after the second tanker. A third ship
was recognized as a large destroyer and the second tanker first a
rocket and signalled to the destroyer. Out of torpedoes, RASHER
could do nothing more than save herself, which she did by rigging
for depth charging and taking evasive action. No explosions were
heard in the conning tower but two runs in the conning tower but the
forward and after torpedo rooms reported hearing hits. A few depth
charges rumbled down into the murky depths for RASHER but they did
not find their target. About an hour later, RASHER surfaced in a
heavy rain squall. Later that day a patrol vessel was sighted
pinging for a submarine but with her torpedoes expended, RASHER
was on her way to Australia. Before she cleared the area, she
sighted a Japanese patrol craft about the same time the sub was
sighted. The Jap vessel fired white rockets and exchanged recogni-
tion signals while RASHER sidestepped her and opened the distance.
The searchlight from the ship played on RASHER and a few rounds of
shells reached out for the sub but they only served as a farewell
salute. RASHER then set course for Fremantle, Australia via
Molucca Passage. Enroute she fell afoul of several more patrol
craft, one of which, on 11 November, kept the submarine pinned down
with her sound equipment from 0215 until 2158. As a last shot
RASHER, an unidentified patrol bomber bombed her on the 20th
while she was submerging. Despite her frequent hostile encounters,
the sub arrived safely and undamaged at Fremantle on 24 November.

During the refit period, Commander E. S. Hutchinson was relieved
by Lieutenant Commander W. R. Laughon, USN, as commanding officer
of RASHER, on 9 December 1943.

Departing from Perth, Australia on 19 December 1943, RASHER
set out for her second war patrol, this time in the area of the
South China Sea. "Lady Luck" did not come aboard RASHER on her
second war patrol. Torpedo performance was marred by at least 6
and possible 7 premature explosions. Seven contacts were made
with targets worthy of torpedoes. The first contact was a small
freighter which was sighted while making a dawn trim dive on 26
December. The ship could not be closed submerged and a surface
chase was considered unwise at this stage of the patrol. The
second attack was made with an escorted Jap freighter after RASHER
had been forced down by an air patrol. The third contact was a
freak long range sighting caused by a mirage on the glassy surface,
and the targets were lost while pursuing. The forth contact, on
27 December, was made on a high-speed target with an unfavorable
attack angle in restricted waters; successful pursuit was impos-
sible.

The new year, 1944, found RASHER enroute to Bulo Condo,
South China Sea. "Happy New Year" was observed by an entry in the
ship's log. The submarine USS BLUEFISH was also in the vicinity

— page 7 —
-4- USS RASHER (SS 269)

and RASHER exchanged messages to coordinate an attack on a three-
ship convoy with escort. Darkness was closing in on 4 January
1944 when RASHER went in to make the first attack on what developed
to be a convoy of three tankers.

Gain a favorable firing position, RASHER selected a tanker
fired the first of four torpedoes. However, the first torpedo ex-
ploded prematurely about 400 yards from the sub, completely
obscuring the target, and spoiling the attack. The ship turned
sharply to the left and commenced firing 20 millimeter tracer
shells and her broadside gun through a 90 degree arc. The tanker
showed a red light from the masthead for about 20 minutes and
appeared to be hit as he was stopped, swinging around on various
headings and making no apparent effort to escape. From 9 to 16
minutes after firing, three underwater explosions were heard and
felt from the target direction, but no flashes other than gunfire
were observed on the bridge. It appeared that the second torpedo
scored a hit.

An exchange of gunfire and explosions indicated that BLUEFISH
was taking her section of ships under attack. One of the tankers
under fire from BLUEFISH burst into flames which quickly enveloped
the entire ship.

Closing for another attack, RASHER fired six torpedoes from her
bow tubes. The second and the fifth torpedoes erupted prematurely.
The first and fourth torpedoes ripped into the tankers sides
causing heavy explosions which vibrated through the submarine.

After midnight, RASHER closed another target and after stalk-
ing her prey she move in for the kill. The ship appeared to be
a very large tanker and the skipper carefully fired four torpedoes
toward her. The first and second torpedoes exploded prematurely
and the submariners were something less than happy over the erratic
torpedoes which they were risking their lives to fire. However,
the third and fourth torpedoes scored hits and the ship exploded
as flames shot high into the air. The explosions continued and
smoke and flame spread all over the ship and reached several ship
lengths on either side.

After watching the huge tanker burn and settle for several
minutes, RASHER drew away from the scene because the flames were
making a beacon for miles around and planes were expected any
minute. About the time the submarine had drawn 20 miles away, the
flames which had almost died down, shot up into the air again
and then the flames and glow disappeared completely as the ship
apparently sank.

RASHER then proceeded to patrol the sea lanes between the
Empire, Takao and Singapore. On 11 January, the sub was patrolling
3 to 5 miles east of Cape Varella Light when a Jap escort vessel
was sighted. The submarine skipper hoped that he was on his way
to meet a south-bound convoy. His hope was later rewarded when
two transports appeared on a southerly course. After a very

— page 8 —
-5- USS RASHER (SS 269)

difficult approach, hampered by unfortunate zig-zags, rain squalls,
and patrol vessels patrolling ahead of RASHER. She moved in close to
the shore to bring the convoy against the background of the rising
moon. RASHER's position was embarrassed by the ships hugging the
coastline to within one mile and several escorts poping up just
where the submarine had hoped to gain a firing position. The sub
was thus forced to delay her attack until after she had passed
Camranh Bay. Finally, at 2217 RASHER was able to fire a spread
of 3 torpedoes at the No.#1 target. The first torpedo hit with a
tremendous explosion which knocked out lights throughout the sub
and popped the paint off the bulkheads. A hasty set-up on the
second target failed to produce any hits.

The escorts commenced pinging and firing depth charges. But
since they were not very close, it was apparent that RASHER's
position was not known. After the escorts had cleared the area,
the sub did likewise. With only one torpedo remaining, RASHER
could not follow the ships into shallow water.

On 17 January, two ships were picked up by radar and, after
closing the distance, they were sighted from the bridge; one escort
and one large, beautiful cargo ship of 10,500 tons. With only one
torpedo, the captain of RASHER was very careful to use it judicious-
ly. However, again his approach was fouled and foiled by running
into rain squalls, sailboats, escorts and embarrassing course
changes on the part of the numerous befouling boats and the target.
With admirable tenacity, RASHER continued after the target from
0437 until finally gaining a firing position at 1952. The
precious, last torpedo was carefully sent on its way only to blow
itself to bits 20 seconds after leaving the torpedo tube. It was
a hat-smashing disappointment!

A weary, aggressive, but luckless group of submariners pulled
into Freemantle, Australia when RASHER arrived on 24 January 1944.
By the end of their second war patrol, they were seeing premature
torpedoes in their nightmares.

Following a refit period, RASHER got underway for her third
war patrol on 19 February 1944, to be conducted in the Java and
Celebes Seas. After making a rendezvous with the submarine USS
RATON, plans for a coordinated search were made. The first tar-
gets were not long in appearing through intermittent rain squalls
and RASHER worked into position to fire four torpedoes at the
larger of the two Japanese freighters. The first of two escorts
had gone by ahead of the large freighter before firing, and three
hits out of four interrupted the freighter's voyage.

As the escort wheeled around to see what had happened, RASHER
immediately started to engage the second freighter. The escort
vessel returned to RASHER's firing position and made a wide sweep
in a futile search for the freighter which had been sunk.

— page 9 —
-6- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Crossing astern of the second freighter, RASHER came to a
firing position on the opposite side from the second escort and
fired another spread of four torpedoes. The first torpedo hit
forward and the second hit under the stack, sending up a tremendous
column of black smoke and debris. The ship appeared to sag in
the middle after this hit. A third torpedo then crashed into the
stern and any question as to the ship's future was definitely
settled. She began to settle aft, slowly at first, and then
rapidly until the water folded over the ship completely.

The submarine RATON, during this action, was closing the
scene but RASHER was in the most favorable position for approach
and attack. The skipper of RASHER informed RATON that there were
no more targets, he apologized for hogging the show and cleared
the area. The escorts were last seen circling in the area with
nothing left to escort and with an embarrassing report to write
up before returning to port.

Finding no further targets in this general area, RASHER crossed
the Equator on 28 February and headed for the traffic lanes in
the Celebes Sea between Basilan Strait and Halmahera. Fishing
boats and nets with glass floats were the only things contacted
besides patrol planes until, on 3 March, an exceptionally alert
lookout, Seaman Cashel, sighted indications of smoke on the horizon
to the westward. Surging ahead at full speed, RASHER drew within
visual range of nine ships, three of them escorts. The ships
appeared to be transports or freighters steaming in two columns
with an escort on either side and one trailing astern. It was a
favorable picture through the periscope except for a Sally bomber
hovering over the convoy and a sudden course change which forced
RASHER to trail them until dark.

At 1937, one of the ships in the rear of the formation appar-
ently sighted the sub and opened fire with a deck gun, and then
with 2 or 3 guns of four or five-inch calibre. The firing was
taken up by the escort on the port bow of the convoy as he headed
toward RASHER. A chase ensued in which the escorts gunfire was
observed to be not of the flashless type though the shells were
splashless.

By outrunning the escort, RASHER worked around to a position
ahead of the convoy to await the moon set at 0100 before coming
in for a firing run. At this point the sub's radar went out of
order so the skipper submerged and headed for the center of the
convoy. Picking out the nearest large target, the skipper fired
the first of three torpedoes at 2239. While quickly planning the
second victim, the first two torpedoes were heard to hit. The
periscope was turned to bring the first target into view just as
the third torpedo exploded near the ship's stern.

Three more torpedoes were unleashed as RASHER swung around to
bring her stern tubes to bear on a ship that was bearing down on
her. However, the Jap ship was only 600 yards away and RASHER

— page 10 —
-7- USS RASHER (SS 269)

still had 90 degrees to turn in order to fire a straight
shot down the freighters throat. A quick sweep around the
horizon with the periscope revealed the ship previously hit
completely obscured by a pall of heavy smoke. There was also an
escort about 1500 yards away, headed for the sub with the well-
known "bone in his teeth."

None too soon, RASHER dove as the freighter passed overhead
and let go with a depth charge that shook the sub from stem to
stern. However, no damage was done to RASHER and the subsequent
depth charge explosions were at a more comfortable distance.

The persistent escort ship lurked over the submarine from 2249
until 2340, alternately listening and then speeding up his screws
while coming in for another depth charge drop. After surfacing at
0004, RASHER set out to regain contact with the remaining ships of
the convoy. The one Jap escort was circling around at 11 knots,
apparently searching for survivors. However, not wishing to be
sighted, RASHER skirted around the escort to pursue the ships of
the convoy. Another contact was picked up and followed but it
turned out to be a motot whale boat and RASHER set course for
the Balikpapan-Palau traffic route.

On the night of 4 March, another exceptional lookout sighted
a puff of smoke in the moonlight 15 miles away to the south.
Taking after the contact, RASHER found out that the ship was an
anti-submarine patrol which was on the lookout for a certain
audacious submarine. Several shots were fired at RASHER before
a safe distance could be opened.

Contact on the convoy was again established at 0037 and RASHER
pulled ahead of the Jap ships to track them until the moon had
set. The convoy appeared to consist of five large ships and two
or three escorts. With her bow and stern torpedo tubes readied,
RASHER charged in and fired two torpedoes from her bow tubes at a
large freighter. While swinging the sub around for a stern shot,
the skipper watched both torpedoes run under the target. Four
torpedoes were fired at the second large cargo ship. The control
party informed the captain when the torpedoes were due to hit and
he watched the ship receive one hit which made the smoke billow
out.

RASHER took time out to reload the last four torpedoes in
her stern tubes. The two trailing ships in the convoy were selected
as the recipients because they were the largest and closest, which
was important because daylight was an hour away. As RASHER swung
around to bring her stern tubes to bear on the cargo ships, two
escorts were seen closing in directly toward the sub. A hasty
set-up caused the torpedoes to miss and three of them were heard
to explode at the end of their runs. Flame was sighted on the
horizon at 0503 and RASHER hustled in the direction to investigate.
The officer of the deck later sighted a shower of sparks in the air.

— page 11 —
-8- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Looking through the periscope upon drawing near, the smoke and
explosions were found to be from the convoy attacked before dawn.
There were four cargo ships or passenger cargo ships with three
escorts. They were zig-zagging madly, but, being without torpedoes,
RASHER could only shoot with her camera.

On 8 March, RASHER pulled into Melville Island to reload
torpedoes before continuing her patrol in the vicinity of Lombok
Strait. On 13 March, a tug was sighted with a barge in tow, moving
close along the north coast of Lombok. A patrol craft was sighted
ahead of the tug, but the sub had apparently been sighted by this
time since the anti-submarine vessel was making about 20 knots
toward the sub. RASHER could not open the distance on the Jap
ship and when the range closed to 4400 shells were heard whistling
overhead and falling to either side. As a defensive measure,
RASHER took the offensive with four torpedoes. The short apparent-
ly saw the wake of the first torpedo and spun around on a new
course. All four torpedoes missed and the last two broached, but
it halted the chase as it caused the Jap skipper to consider the
possible consequences of heroism.

RASHER drew away from one patrol craft and encountered two
more. There were now three Jap patrol craft after her, all of
them pouring out black smoke and making about 20 knots. One of
them began to fire his 4.7-inch gun but the splashes were all
short. However, the escorts were drawing closer to RASHER and she
had been forced into shallow water. The skipper hoped to hold
out until he passed Sepanjang Island before diving after an hour's
run with water 60 or more fathoms. The Japs were firing too close
for safety at 0150 when RASHER reached water that was deep
enough to dive. With clear visibility and a full moon, the sub
would never be able to evade the patrol craft before daylight by
running on the surface. As soon as RASHER submerged, the ships
commenced echo ranging and headed directly for the sub. Starting
down deep, RASHER was at 180 feet below the surface when 11
fairly close depth charges rocked the sub, breaking light bulbs
and putting the sound gear out of commission.

After much starting and stopping of screws and pinging of
sound gear, the escorts dropped five more depth charges. The
ships continued to patrol the area very thoroughly to prevent
RASHER from leaving the area before daylight. At 0550, RASHER
came up for a periscope sweep to see if the area was clear enough
to slip through the patrols. Two patrol vessels were still in
sight, the nearest one about 2,500 yards away. As RASHER pulled
away at periscope depth, four vessels or their smoke were in
sight until 0950.

During the day RASHER worked on her radar which was not
working reliably. After dark the radar was tested on Sepanjang
Island for about an hour; it was still not working properly. Two
contacts on ships during the night proved to be patrol craft echo
ranging and they were avoided. The surface was oily smooth on

— page 12 —
-9- USS RASHER (SS 269)

14 March and since the area was heavily patrolled with both air-
craft and surface ships, RASHER was forced to submerge fairly
deep between periscope observations. Two small cargo ships were
sighted during the morning and when RASHER passed 80 feet on her
way up for another look, at 0855, she received one depth charge or
bomb from an aircraft. Another very close depth charge rattled
through the sub breaking stove lines, lamps and putting the
periscope out of focus. At this point the skipper took her down
deep since the escorts were speeding up and the sub was not close
enough to the targets to get off a worthwhile shot even if the
cargo ships hadn't already zigged away.

Depth charges thundered around RASHER fairly close but not
close enough to damage the sub. The escorts started echo ranging,
alternately listening until, at 1404, she reached periscope depth
to find the sea clear. While the escorts continued pinging and
dropping depth charges about ten miles away, RASHER set course
to patrol off the northwestern coast of Bali.

The officer of the deck sighted a submarine on 19 March and
a pursuit was made for firing position. A spread of four torpedoes
was fired but the Japanese submarine spotted the torpedo tracks
and turned off course. It was an RO-51 type submarine with a large
size merchant flag painted on the conning tower.

After a discouraging number of ship contacts developed into
anti-submarine patrols, it was refreshing to sight the smoke from
a convoy of ships on 27 March. After RASHER started her approach,
the convoy zigged toward the sub and she headed between the two
leading ships. With targets overlapping, the captain fired four
torpedoes at the nearest ship and two more at the more distant
one. The first noise of the first hit was heard in the conning
tower, but no explosion appeared through the periscope.

A loud explosion, heard throughout the sub, was a hit on the
first target fired at. It struck just abaft the stack. Three
rapid explosions were then heard and debris could be seen splash-
ing in the water astern of the first target. Another loud explo-
sion was heard and a huge pillar of orange-red flame burst and
rose about 500 feet into the air. Making a sweep around with the
periscope, the captain saw one of the cargo ships charging in
directly toward RASHER. Two escorts were following suit and,
although a good surface show was going on, the captain decided to
go deep. The screws of the cargo ship were the first to be
whirring overhead and in a few minutes the first eleven depth
charges blasted the water around the sub. The explosions knocked
some cork off but did no other damage. Three escorts, plying
for RASHER, dropped 24 more depth charges from 0910 to 1017.

Two tremendous explosions were heard at 13 seconds apart. They
were apparently from the first ship attacked as a cargo of oil or
ammunition blew up. Following the explosion, sounds were heard
of a ship breaking up. The escorts also began to work back in
RASHER's direction with renewed vigor.

— page 13 —
-10- USS RASHER (SS 269)

After the escorts moved far enough away, RASHER came up for a
periscope sweep. Two remaining cargo ships were seen with three
escorts milling around 8,500 yards away. One of the ships had a
boom over the side and, in a few minutes, picked up a lifeboat.
The two ships then commenced steaming around in tight circles,
apparently looking for additional survivors while the escorts con-
tinued their submarine hunt.

RASHER had completed reloading her torpedo tubes and headed
for the remaining two ships. A Betty type bomber was seen search-
ing for a very unpopular submarine and later a Jake type recon-
naissance plane was also spotted. At least three planes were
hovering over the area and the hornets nest was stirred up to the
point where RASHER could not follow the remains of the convoy.
The remainder of the patrol brought no further targets and RASHER
pulled into Fremantle on 4 April 1944, drawing to a close her
third war patrol.

RASHER moored alongside the tender USS ORION for a refit
period followed by training exercises with USS CHANTICLEER and
USS ISABEL. Underway for her fourth war patrol on 30 April 1944,
RASHER set course for her patrol in the Molukka-Celebes Sea area.

The first opportunity to fire torpedoes developed on 11 May
when RASHER investigated smoke on the horizon and found the masts
of five Japanese ships; two cargo ships, a naval auxiliary or mine
layer of about 3,600 tons and two ships which appeared to be coast-
al mine layers. After maneuvering to avoid detection by the
escorts, RASHER fired four torpedoes at one of the cargo ships.
The second ship in column was then fired at with two torpedoes
just before one of the escorts charged in at RASHER and forced
her down. After depth charging and echo ranging for some time,
RASHER finally worked her way clear of the last escort and started
in the direction of the convoy. The smoke of the convoy was
sighted just before darkness closed in but the ships were soon
lost under cover of darkness.

Contact was later made on the convoy and although they were
steaming only 2,500 to 3,000 yards off the beach, RASHER was
maneuvered between the convoy and shore to take advantage of the
dark background. Three torpedoes were fired at each of the two
freighters and since both were perfect set-ups, the skipper
watched all torpedoes run straight, hot, and under the targets.

By going across the course of the ships, in between the first
and second ships of the column, RASHER gained position to fire the
stern tubes. Two explosions were seen and heard, one on the pas-
senger-cargo ship and another on the large escort or naval
auxiliary which had just pulled out from behind this ship. The
ships commenced dropping depth charges and firing their guns wildly
for the next five minutes. The submarine skipper realized that
the Japs did not know that the submarine was on the surface.
RASHER opened the distance ahead to reload and come in for a
submerged approach in the moonlight.

— page 14 —
-11- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Four torpedoes were fired at the freighter in the convoy
at 2303 and one of the torpedoes struck home as the ship instantly
flashed into flames which covered the entire ship and quickly
spread over the surrounding water. An attempt was made to swing
the sub around for another shot at the passenger-cargo ship, but
the submarine was too close and the Jap ship went by before a
torpedo could be fired.

The trailing escort was closing fast on RASHER by this time
and the skipper took her down deep. An explosion was heard which
sounded like an internal explosion on the target. A few depth
charges came down, not too close, and finally the ships drew away.
Only the fast whirring screws of the escorts and the slow, heavy
beat of the passenger-cargo ship could be heard.

Coming up to periscope depth, the nearer escort was only 3000
yards away, the other escort was in the vicinity of the burning
ship, and the dim shape of the passenger-cargo ship was drawing
off in the distance. Another chase ensued after the ship. While
passing the burning freighter, it was noticed that the deck was
awash and the burning oil or gasoline had spread over an area
of about 500 yards.

Rain squalls alternately helped and hindered the approach on
the remaining ship of the convoy. After chasing this ship from
2353 on the evening of 11 May, RASHER unleashed four torpedoes at
the transport-cargo ship at 0930 on 12 May. The ship started
in a turn after the torpedoes had been fired, but it appeared
that she could not avoid being hit. However, one of the torpedoes
started an erratic run and the Jap ship came right through the
position where this errant torpedo should have gone. A few depth
charges went off in the vicinity of RASHER and several sets of
screws were heard passing overhead. After a final warning depth
charge erupted, the escorts took off at high speed in the direction
of the target ship. RASHER set coursefor Darwin under the cover
of a very heavy rain squall to reload torpedoes.

On 14 May, while passing through Latitude 6°-51 South, Longi-
tude 119°-32' East, a small raft with a flag flying was sighted.
Upon inspection, three dark-skinned natives were found perched on
the outrigger. As the submarine approached, they made signs of
hunger and thirst. When brought on board, they were so weak that
they could hardly walk. The skipper decided to keep them on board
until they had regained their strength and then put them on some
passing sailboat.

Arriving at Darwin, Australia on 21 May, RASHER removed the
three natives and took on board 18 torpedoes, fuel and fresh water.
By 1934 that evening she was on her way again to continue her war
patrol.

On 24 May, a large sailboat was sighted, larger than the aver-
age boat in the area, and RASHER, having already been seen, decided

— page 15 —
-12- USS RASHER (SS 269)

to close for investigation. The sailboat failed to heave to after
two bursts of 20 millimeter gunfire. Since it maneuvered to
evade, RASHER put a few shots through the mainsail. Closing to
about 400 yards, a radio antenna could be seen on the boat. This
called for further investigation, but none of the six men previous-
ly seen working on the deck would come out. Since the vessel es-
tablished itself as enemy by its actions, RASHER put a few more
shots through the sail and proceeded to sink the sailboat with
about 300 rounds of 20 millimeter fire through the hull at the
waterline.

On 29 May, the officer of the deck sighted smoke on the
horizon through the periscope. RASHER surfaced and commenced a chase.
At 1834, the target ship made a change of course as though to put
in at Kaboerang Island. The sub skipper then decided that a
quick attack by moonlight would be wiser than to wait for the
moonset. At 2012, RASHER fired the first of a spread of three
torpedoes. One of the escorts picked up the sub at this time and
headed for her, forcing deep submergence. A torpedo explosion
was then heard and the target's screws were silenced. A vigorous
depth charging was started by the Jap escorts, fortunately not
too close.

After working her way clear of the escorts, RASHER surfaced
and headed toward the scene of activity again. The large target
was seen still on the surface with two escorts circling around.
Having reloaded torpedoes, the skipper decided to wait for moonset
to administer the finishing touches.

It was after midnight and the first few minutes of Memorial Day
had ticked off. RASHER was to make this a truly memorial holiday.
Although an escort was headed toward the selected spot for firing,
RASHER persisted in the attack, taking advantage of the poor
visibility. One torpedo was sent on its way but it veered to the
right before settling on its track. A second torpedo was then
fired. The first torpedo hit the ship near the stern and the
second crashed into the ship under the bridge. A truly tremendous
explosion followed which turned the black night into day.

Suspicions that the escort had seen the submarine were con-
firmed when the Japs opened up on RASHER with a three-inch deck
gun. After the first shot whistled over the bridge, the top-
side watch was set below and the skipper had about decided to dive.
However, the Japs ceased to fire after four well trained shots
went high. Recalling the bridge watch topside, the skipper de-
cided not to dive and the sub cleared the area with little of the
Jap ship left except burning oil on the surface.

On the night of 2-3 June, RASHER made contact on some fast-
moving men-of-war in the vicinity of Davao Gulf. A high speed
approach brought the sub close enough to identify the large ships
as one Atago Class cruiser and one of the Nachi Class. An escort-
ing destroyer turned toward RASHER and forced her to open

— page 16 —
-13- USS RASHER (SS 269)

distance. Numerous aircraft appeared on the scene soon after day-
light and kept the submarine down for the better part of the day.
On the morning of 4 June, another cruiser, of the ATAGO Class, was
sighted but the glassy sea made attack conditions unfavorable.

That afternoon, the stick masts of a man-of-war were seen over
the dip of the horizon. RASHER commenced her approach and
identified the ship as a destroyer of the FUBUKI Class. Raising
the periscope once more before firing, the skipper noticed that
the destroyer was heading toward the sub at 10,000 yards. The
periscope was definitely sighted during this observation and the
Jap destroyer headed more directly toward RASHER. The Jap sailors
were apparently going to General Quarters for they were running
around the decks madly as the destroyer passed about 100 yards
ahead. RASHER managed to go deep before the first depth charges
were heard to explode.

Many Jap aircraft were patrolling in the area and RASHER
started on her way to patrol the sea traffic route down the east
coast of Mindanao and toward Molucca Passage and Morotai Strait.
On 7 June, smoke was sighted on the horizon, and after avoiding
an air patrol, RASHER closed the distance to identify eight
medium-sized freighters with four escorts. After making her ap-
proach, the nearest Jap escort was discovered to be the ex-USS
STEWART, the destroyer which the Japs had raised and salvaged from
Surabayo, where she had put in for battle-damage reapirs. Closer
inspection identified two of the ships as passenger-cargo ships
of 5,000 to 6,000 tons. One of the escorts apparently made a
contact on the sub and forced her to lost position. The ships
apparently made radar contact since they turned away and opened
the distance on RASHER.

It was decided that RASHER could neither get ahead of the con-
voy nor get into a position for a submerged attack in Morotai
Strait before daylight. The skipper then set courst for Siaoce
Pass in an attempt to reach a point on the traffic route between
Balikpapan and Davao as soon as possible. This meant going
through the passage during daylight. It was a plan that had a
chance if the planes were not too thick.

By 0800, RASHER was going through Siaoce Passage. She maneuvered
around two large, three-masted sailboats to avoid detection and
kept out of sight of three aircraft contacts. Finally, at 1604,
two columns of smoke were seen coming over the horizon. Select-
ing an auxiliary as her target, RASHER fired six torpedoes. The
first hit under the bridge, throwing a column of water mast-high.
Two other hits were scored near the after turret followed by what
appeared to be a magazine explosion since the entire after part of
the ship up to the stacks was immediately obscured by flame. A
total of five definite torpedo hits were heard. The target was
obscured by flame up to the bridge and by smoke past the forward
turret. Sailors on the forecastle were scrambling up to the port
rail. A destroyer came bearing down on RASHER by this time and
spoiled the show by forcing the sub down deep.

— page 17 —
-14- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Loud breaking up noises and underwater explosions were heard
by the sound gear and through the hull. The noises persisted for
about an hour and were the loudest that the submariners had ever
heard. As the escort passed over head, four depth charges came
down after RASHER. The explosions were close and right overhead,
as they blasted the sub down twenty feet and shook up the sub-
marine severely, although no apparent damage had been caused.

When coming up to periscope depth at 1802, three separate fires
were visible over an area of about 1,000 yards. In one of these
fires the flames could be seen surrounding the top of a mast, the
only part of the ship still visible above the surface. While the
escort vessels were still "sniffing around" for a submarine at
some distance, RASHER quietly slipped away.

In the early darkness of 13 June, the quartermaster sighted
the shapes of several ships at 0115. The ships were headed
the Pula Tiga Group of islands, steaming through water which had
many shoals varying from 6 to 40 fathoms of water. RASHER headed
for Huha Island where the hundred fathom curve was only a mile
from the reefs which encircled the island. However, as she
headed for the area of planned attack, the stern of a destroyer
was seen just ahead of the submarine and going just where RASHER
was headed. However, the smoke of the convoy was sighted astern
in the first rosy glow of dawn, and RASHER changed to an approach
course, hoping to avoid being sighted by the air patrols.

With numerous planes operating overhead, it was inevitable
that RASHER should be forced down. It was not until 1838 that
the sub could come up for a look around the horizon. The convoy
was nowhere in sight. Taking off on the most likely course, the
convoy was again sighted at 0512 on 14 June by the officer of the
deck. After a pursuit which looked none too promising, the con-
voy made a favorable course change and the skipper decided to
fire two torpedoes from his stern tubes at both of two ships and
three torpedoes from his bow tubes at another selected target.

The first of the stern shots were fired at 0901 and the second
spread of torpedoes was unleashed a minute later. The first
torpedo was heard to hit and the skipper took a look at the ship
as the second torpedo ripped into the first Jap ship fired at.
It was already down by the stern when the second torpedo hit.
Quickly swinging the periscope around to look for planes, escorts,
and other targets, the ex-destroyer STEWART was seen headed
directly for the sub. About this time two more explosions were
heard, which sounded like the third and fourth torpedoes striking
home.

At 0904, the first target was seen to have turned over with
the bottom showing and the keep up. The formation began to scatter
in wild disorder as RASHER selected a likely candidate for the
three torpedoes from the bow tubes. There were still no planes
visible and none of the escorts heading too close. One Jap

— page 18 —
-15- USS RASHER (SS 269)

freighter was heading in toward RASHER and the bow tubes were
fired at a short range; just long enough for the torpedoes to arm
themselves. One torpedo explosion was heard less than a minute
later.

Going deep, RASHER heard one string of ten depth charges ex-
plode followed by four more much closer. After listening to the
escorts ringing for a while, the sub came up to periscope depth
for a look around. The ex-STEWART was 4,600 yards away cutting
across the submarine's bow. While heading for this escort, the
submariners inspected the two remaining torpedoes. The Jap ship
was apparently picking up survivors since his speed was varying
from zero to four knots. The masts of the remaining ships of the
convoy could be seen disappearing "over the hill." Further pursuit
of the convoy was unwarranted.

While patrolling west of Ambon Bay entrance light, the officer
of the deck sighted a submarine chaser standing out of the western
side of the bay. Thinking the escort may have been coming out to
meet a ship, the skipper took a careful look around and 15 minutes
later a medium-sized freighter hove into view. The ship had just
emerged from a heavy rain squall which soon spread over the entire
area. Observations were difficult and few, but it was enough to
give the skipper a course and speed check and to also pick up two
escorts with the freighter.

RASHER's last two torpedoes were fired at this ship and about
the time of firing, one of the escorts was seen heading directly
for the sub at 1,500 yards. RASHER dove deep and heard one of the
torpedoes hit followed by a loud, prolonged, rumbling explosion.
Two escorts moved in quickly and worked the submarine over with
16 depth charges which were well-placed considering that the sub-
marine could not possibly be heard because of the heavy rain on
the surface.

About an hour later, RASHER came up tp periscope depth but
could see nothing in the direction of the target because of the
heavy rain in that vicinity. Heading for Ombai Passage and home,
RASHER moored to the wharf at Fremantle, W. A. on 23 June 1944.

While at Fremantle, RASHER received an excellent refit by Sub-
marine Repair Unit 137 and Relief Crews from Submarine Squadron 16.
A training period lasted from 10 to 15 July, and on 17 July, Lieut-
enant Commander Willard R. Laughon was relieved as Commanding
Officer by Commander Henry G. Munson.

Underway for her fifth war patrol, RASHER departed Australia
on 22 July 1944, to conduct coordinated attacks with the submarine
BLUEFISH in areas west of Luzon. Commander Munson in RASHER
acted as the group commander.

On the night of 5-6 August, RASHER picked up a radar contact
which developed into a Japanese convoy with escort. One ship was

— page 19 —
-16- USS RASHER (SS 269)

thought to be the KOSEI MARU, a ship of 8223 tons, steaming in
company with two small freighters and two escorts.

At 0211, RASHER fired six torpedoes at the largest ship and
heard five torpedoes strike the target as she went deep to avoid
being rammed. The targets screws stopped immediately and loud
unmistakable breaking-up noises were heard throughout the submarine.
The skipper decided that the target's wake, he easily evaded the
ambitious though ineffective escorts. The sunken Jap ship was
later revealed as the cargo ship SHIROGANESAN MARU.

One of RASHER's men broke his arm just above the elbow during
a training dive on 8 August and, as it could not be splinted with
the material at hand, the submarine sent a message to BLUEFISH
and HOE. The latter was scheduled to leave for her base in two
days and on the 9th the patient was transferred to the HOE.
RASHER and BLUEFISH then patrolled together. Later in the day,
the subs ran through a large amount of wreckage in the area of
RASHER's last attack.

Life guard duty, tropical storms and Jap aircraft were the
order of the day until a convoy was contacted on the night of 18
August. There were about 13 ships in the convoy with about 6
escorts. The composition and disposition of the ships was never
fully determined for it was a dark night, no moon and a thick
overcast with almost continuous rain. The targets were selected
by radar as they could readily be sorted out from the smaller
pips made by the escorts. The speed, number of escorting vessels,
the great size of the convoy and of the individual ships, plus
the intense aerial activity preceding its passage, indicated that
this was an exceptionally important convoy. This later proved
to be the case.

At 2122 a spread of four torpedoes was readied for firing.
After two had left the tubes, it was doubted that the gyros were
matching properly. RASHER accordingly drew off and ran up along
the starboard flank to attack again. As the submarine steadied
down, both torpedoes were seen and heard striking home. The tar-
get ship was apparently a huge tanker laden with gasoline judging
from the appalling explosion with a column of flame 1,000 feet
high. The entire sky was a bright red momentarily and the
target and the whole convoy was seen for an instant. Part of the
ship blew off and landed about 500 yards from the remainder of
the tanker and both parts burned fiercely for about 20 minutes
and then disappeared from sight in one grand final explosion.

The nearest escort decided that something had gone slightly
amiss and responded by firing his guns at all points of the com-
pass, reversing course and diligently depth charging the water
two miles astern of RASHER. Pandemonium and confusion joined
hands and reigned supreme in the convoy. Lights flashed on and
off, side lights turned on, depth charges fell in every direction
of the ocean joined by gunfire. Some 40 millimeter tracer shells

— page 20 —
-17- USS RASHER (SS 269)

passed astern of RASHER, about 100 yards off in deflection and way
over in range. To say that all this firing was in vain would hard-
ly be true for the submariners thoroughly enjoyed the spectacle.

During this time the skipper was busily working out a second
attack and sending a message to BLUEFISH, 83 miles ahead of the
convoy. While RASHER attempted to get around for the convoy
obligingly changed course to hasten the next torpedo attack. The
largest target was selected from the convoy (at least 11 large
targets were seen on the radar scope) and at 2206 RASHER fired six
bow tubes at the prime target and let go four more torpedoes at
a large target immediately to the left and beyond the prime target.

Three timed hits were heard on the first target and the ship
immediately began burning and smoking heavily. It was seen to be
a large transport and many low-power lights, probably lifeboat
markers began to appear. A minute later, another torpedo struck
home on a second target beyond and ahead of the transport.

Timed hits were then heard on the second large target; first
two hits together, then a third properly timed torpedo explosion.
The fourth torpedo missed this target and it too struck a ship
beyond. The transport was completely dead in the water in a
half hour, four miles from the attack position. Four hours later,
while returning through this same vicinity, RASHER passed through
a thick layer of oil roughly two and a half miles across. Three
small objects were contacted at close range, one of which was
blinking a white light, indicating that it was a lifeboat. Two
escorts were also detected in the vicinity. It was believed that
this target was a large tanker and that it was sunk. The usual
depth charging, gun firing and signalling began anew, with the
escorts rushing around like rats in a cage.

One of the escorts took after RASHER, but the submarine shook
her off the trail. The radar scope showed the huge transport
dropping behind the formation with two escorts dropping back with
her. As RASHER approached, the radar pip grew smaller and smaller
and finally disappeared from the radar screen. This transport
was considered sunk.

Another broadcast was sent for help as RASHER needed help badly.
She was almost fresh out of torpedoes, having only four in the
forward tubes and two aft. By 2300 the leading part of the con-
voy had split into two groups and RASHER approached the largest
of the two groups which consisted of at least two large ships in
column with one very non-hostile escort on their starboard bow and
a third large ship on the port quarter. Four torpedoes were
fired at the leading target and the two stern torpedoes were fired
at the second target. Three timed hits were heard on the leading
target and two of them were seen. A minute later another torpedo
was seen and heard to strike a ship beyond the first one. This
one was a lucky bonus hit by the first torpedo fired.

— page 21 —
-18- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Two timed hits from the stern tubes were heard ripping into
the second target. A very pronounced ammunition explosion followed
on the first target and she was stopped in her tracks. The ship
burned for a few minutes and disappeared from the radar screen.
The escort joined the ship which was hit by the stray torpedo and
moved to the south. RASHER hauled out to the west to consider the
situation.

BLUEFISH was contacted again to see why she hadn't joined
RASHER. However, she had intercepted two of the tankers which
RASHER had scattered from the convoy and sank them both. Informa-
tion on the Jap ships was then sent to Commander Task Force 71,
and RASHER closed the last attack point to investigate the latest
information.

The escort and the ship that caught the stray torpedo had
slowed to 1 knot and the pip disappeared from the radar screen
about 28 minutes after midnight. The ship which had been hit by
the two stern torpedoes was heading for the beach at 5 knots.
About an hour and a half later, another large ship was tracked
heading for the beach. This was one of the damaged ships from the
earlier attack. At 0410 an escort joined one of the large cripples
and suddenly illuminated the big ship with a large, high-intensity
searchlight. The big ship apparently did not appreciate being in
the spotlight and opened up with two rounds from a large gun. The
point of aim could not be determined, but the submariners hoped
that the escort was the target receiving "the honors."

During her brief but uncomfortable career under the klieg
lights the Jap ship was revealed to be a large, two-stack transport
riding very low in the water. Since RASHER was out of torpedoes
and dawn was beginning to break, BLUEFISH was informed of the two
cripples heading for Port Curimao and RASHER cleared the area. At
0550, the submarine SPADEFISH was raised on the circuit and she
revealed that she had sunk two of the large transports which
RASHER had probably scattered in her first attack on this very
important convoy. The carefully laid plans for escorting the
huge convoy had been completely shattered under the devastating
attacks of RASHER, BLUEFISH and SPADEFISH.

After the prolonged and intense activity in attacking this con-
voy, RASHER's weary crew finally had a chance to rest as the sub-
marine went deep and headed for Midway via Balintang Channel. Ar-
riving at Midway on 30 August, RASHER fueled and departed for
Pearl Harbor on the same day in company with the submarine POMPON.
After conducting training exercises enroute, the submarine
arrived at Pearl Harbor on 3 September 1944, thus concluding
RASHER's fifth war patrol. RASHER continued on to the West Coast
for an overhaul, refit, and alterations, arriving at the Naval
Dry Docks, Hunter's Point, California on 11 September 1944.

During the overhaul, Lieutenant Commander B. E. Adams, USN,
relieved Commander H. G. Munson, USN, as commanding officer of
RASHER.

— page 22 —
-19- USS RASHER (SS 269)

Departing from Hunter's Point on 20 December 1944, RASHER con-
ducted special exercises with aircraft south and west of the
Golden Gate Bridge and then set course for Pearl Harbor. Stopping
only at Pearl Harbor, RASHER continued on to Midway, arriving on
17 January 1945.

Departing from Midway on 20 January 1945, RASHER joined PILOT-
FISH and FINBACK in a coordinated attack group to patrol an area
in the southern part of the East China Sea. The sixth war patrol
of RASHER was characterized by numerous plane contacts and the
sinking of many floating mines. There were over forty enemy
ship contacts although the majority of them were sailing vessels
and two of them were hospital ships.

The first attack took place on 15 February when RASHER followed
a radar pip to draw within attacking distance. However, just
before firing, another vessel about the size of an escort was
sighted coming up on the beam of RASHER. The plan of attack was
changed from firing bow tubes to a stern shot. The target was
apparently smaller then estimated for the solution to the torpedo
problem was good although all torpedoes missed. The target was
not considered worthy of further torpedo expenditure.

The second torpedo attack on 16 February, resulted from a con-
tact report on three capital ships of the Japanese Navy with
several destroyers in company. As RASHER approached, contact was
made with a small vessel closing the submarine from ahead. In
order not to have her attack frustrated by this newcomer, RASHER
turned in to an attack course and dove to radar depth. A set-up
was made on the ship on the port flank, but just before firing,
the target ship turned toward RASHER. Changing to two other over-
lapping targets, the skipper fired a spread of six torpedoes.
One explosion was heard on a timed hit. This was scant return
for the bravery shown in firing an attack in the face of an on-
coming, fast enemy warship. As the fates would have it, this was
the only torpedo hit that RASHER could claim for a long, ag-
gressive patrol.

During the evening of 7-8 March, RASHER made an end around on
a radar-equipped patrol vessel which was apparently tracking
RASHER and attempting to draw her into a trap and shallow water.
The ruse was discovered in time for RASHER to extricate herself
from six patrol boats.

This luckless patrol termintaed as RASHER pulled into Apra
Harbor, Guam on 16 March 1945. During the refit period, Lieutenant
Commander C. D. Nace, USN, relieved Lieutenant Commander B. E.
Adams as commanding officer on 1 April 1945.

As choice surface targets were becoming more scarce in the
western Pacific, air activity was increasing. The need for air-
sea rescue work was accordingly greater. When RASHER departed
Guam on 17 April 1945, to commence her seventh war patrol, she

— page 23 —
-20- USS RASHER (SS 269)

was sent out to join the life guard league in the vicinity of Nanpo
Shoto. The patrol extended over a period of 43 days with 32
days spent in the patrol areas of Nanpo Shoto and Kii Suido.

Although the majority of the patrol was spent in life guard
duties, RASHER did manage to uncover several small targets. On
29 April, one sea truck of 100 tons was sunk and another one was
badly damaged in a well-conducted gun attack with 20 and 40
millimeter shells.

On 10 May, a night surface attack was made on a small
auxiliary with escort. Six torpedoes were fired in a good spread.
However, the target was about to enter port at Hachijo Jima and
made sudden course change of 50 degrees which made the torpedoes
miss ahead. There was considerable phosphorescence in the water
and the ships were undoubtedly alerted. RASHER could not close
for another attack before the ship entered port and had to depart
immediately to arrive on her new lifeguard station on schedule.

The only other opportunities RASHER had to open fire were in
sinking floating mines. No planes were forced down near the sub
and she returned to Midway on 29 May 1945, bringing to an end her
seventh war patrol.

Following her refit period, RASHER departed Midway on 23 June
1945 for her eighth and final patrol of World War II. The patrol
was of 58 days duration and was terminated by the cessation of
hostilities on 15 August 1945.

For 27 days, RASHER provided lifeguard services for the Fifth
Air Force in the vicinity of southern Formosa. Although orbitted
for numerous strikes, all planes returned safely. One possible
torpedo target was sighted entering Takao but could not be closed
for attack. Two Chinese junks were inspected and allowed to
proceed when found to be empty. RASHER was caught on the surface
and bombed twice during this period but miraculously escaped
damage.

After an overnight stop at Subic Bay on 10 August for fuel,
food and ammunition, RASHER continued her patrol in the Gulf of
Siam. At 1031 on 15 August, she announced her arrival on station
by firing two rounds of five-inch shells across the bow of a
Malayan, cargo-carrying junk, boarded her and jettisoned a cargo
of rice destined for the Japanese. At 1400, cease firing orders
were received, and at 1800 RASHER was recalled to Subic. This
brought to a close the outstanding war career of USS RASHER, a
submarine that put everything she had into every assignment given
her, large of small.

RASHER departed from Subic on 17 August 1945, to commence the
long voyage home via Pearl Harbor and the Panama Canal. She
arrived at Tompkinsville, Staten Island, New York on 6 October
1945. From the time RASHER departed from New Orleans, after fit-
ting out, until arriving at Tompkinsville, she had churned through
122,655 nautical miles of salt water.

— page 24 —
-21- USS RASHER (SS 269)

During her first five war patrols, RASHER sank more tonnage of
enemy shipping than any submarine in the history of the world
except one,-- USS FLASHER, a sister ship. RASHER was officially
credited with 99,901 tons of enemy shipping sunk, while FLASHER
was credited with but 1,230 tons more. The total tonnage of enemy
ships estimated as damaged by the various commanding officers of
RASHER totaled an additional 62,481 tons.

The value of enemy cargps and combat loaded troopships which
RASHER prevented from reaching a destination is impossible to
estimate. In terms of Japanese soldiers who never arrived to
fight and ammunition which didn't arrive to be fired at U. S. troops
enemy planes which never got in the air, RASHER's contribution
to the war effort was truly tremendous.

It was confirmed after the war that one of the ships sunk by
RASHER was the escort carrier TAIYO, the former German luxury
liner which was taken over by the Japanese after World War I and
converted to an escort carrier.

Reporting to the Submarine Base at New London, Connecticut,
USS RASHER (SS 269) was placed out of commission in reserve by
directive dated January 1947.

RASHER earned the Presidential Unit Citation for her outstand-
ing war record, the text of which reads as follows:

Text of Citation is:

"For outstanding performance in combat during her
First, Third, Fourth and Fifth War Patrols in enemy
Japanese-controlled waters. Operating dangerously in
bold defiance of watchful and aggressive enemy air
patrols, the USS RASHER penetrated deep into forward
areas to cover the enemy's vital supply lanes, tracking
her targets relentlessly and striking hard at heavily
escorted convoys. She launched her torpedoes ac-
curately despite unfavorable attack opportunities and
inflicted tremendous losses on the Japanese in thousands
of tons of valuable shipping sunk or damaged. Tenacious
in pursuit, devastating in her fire-power, the RASHER
has given striking evidence of her own readiness for
battle and of the gallant fighting spirit of her officers
and men."

— page 25 —
-22- USS RASHER (SS 269)

RASHER also earned seven Battle Stars on the Asiatic-Pacific
Area Service Medal for the following operations:

1 Star/Submarine War Patrol, 24 September - 24 November 1943
1 Star/Submarine War Patrol, 19 December 1943 - 24 January 1944
1 Star/Submarine War Patrol, 19 February - 4 April 1944
1 Star/Submarine War Patrol, 30 April - 23 June 1944
1 Star/Submarine War Patrol, 22 July -- 3 September 1944
1 Star/Iwo Jima Operation, 15 February - 8 March 1945
1 Star/Okinawa Gunto Operation, 21 April - 21 May 1945

Compiled: July 1952

— page 26 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 18049]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR 5200.9]
[STAMP: M 27 Sep 58]
[STAMP: NARS 926]
[STAMP: DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 4/27/71]]

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
24 November 1943.

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. RASHER (SS269)
To: Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: Commander Submarine Division ONE SIXTY ONE.
     Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
     Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
     Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269), Report of War Patrol
         Number One.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
            (B) Track Charts 1-4, ComSub, 7th Fleet.
            (C) Time Plots 1-5, ComSub, 7th Fleet.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the first war patrol of
this vessel conducted in vicinity of Ambon and Makassar Straits
during the period 24 September 1943, to 24 November 1943, is
forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: E. S. HUTCHINSON.]

[STAMP: Filmed]
[STAMP: 63044]

— page 28 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) FIRST PATROL.

(3) NARRATIVE (Cont'd)
OCTOBER

9th        Patrolling approaches Manipa and Kelang Pass. CONTACT #5 -
           At 0030 sighted smoke. Determined ship was heading for
           Manipa Pass on course 180°. The moonset was at 0159, but
           from experience of last few nights, the nights are too
           bright for a surface approach. Decided to make surface
           and submerged approach. ATTACK #1 & #2:- At about
           10,000 yards sighted second target, believed to be
           escort. At about 8000 yards fired off a stern tube shot -
           a stern tube shot - distance to track 700 yards. Just
           after diving target changed course to his left. Com-
           menced run for bow tubes, but did not fire as minimum torp-
           edo range was 3600 yards. Surfaced for end run around.
           When 13,000 yards ahead of target, dawn just breaking,
           dived and made a periscope submerged approach. Just
           prior to firing, observed there were two ships and no
           escorts so used divided fire. Missed first ship. Sank
           second. Received a few depth charges or gun fire from
           ship missed, but expected anti-Submarine Tactics never
           materialized. Surfaced after sunset in bright moonlight.
           Headed south of Buru for likely shipping lanes north of
           Buru, the morning of the tenth.

10th,      Patrolling likely shipping lanes north west of Buru.
11th &     Submerged during daylight. On surfacing, the twelfth,
12th       set course for Ambon.

13th       Submerged at daybreak off Ambon. At 1148 sighted masts
           of ship which turned out to be patrol boat. At 1310
           sighted smoke coming out of Ambon Harbor. CONTACT #8 -
           Smoke developed into a four ship convoy of tramp merchant-
           men, and two escorts. Commenced approach. ATTACK #3 & #4
           Main convoy zigging radically on base course 265°T. ships
           line abreast, escorts on either beam. Observed float
           type air escort. At 1505 commenced firing at two lead-
           ing ships, a salvo of three torpedoes each ship. At
           1505-36 observed premature, or bomb dropped from air-
           craft. Was forced deep by escort, immediately after
           firing, zero angle on bow - range 800 yards. Four explos-
           ions were heard at time agreeing with estimated torpedo
           run to target, but no actual hits were observed. At 1508
           received depth charge attack of 23-24 charges lasting
           until 1559, none particularly close. Heard noises of
           ships breaking up at 1538 and 1544. At 1818 surfaced
           and commenced working ahead for daylight position of
           target. Have strong suspicion convoy returned to Ambon,
           as was only at deep submerged two hours, and I believe
           we would have seen smoke from ships on our first look at
           1716.

                                                               -2-

— page 32 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) FIRST PATROL.
NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

(Cont) showing 90° port angle and started dropping depth
charges. 1553 last look at escort - zero angle 800-1000
yards. Went deep to evade, rigged for depth charge and
silent running. 1701-1718 heard three heavy rumbles not
similar to depth charges. 1718 last depth charge after
sporadic dropping of 13-15 similar ones close. Escort
continued pinging from direction of attack until we sur-
faced at 1839 with nothing in sight. Decided to move
over to Mangalihat for remainder of patrol with six torp-
edoes left. 2230 sighted two ships, CONTACT #29, in Lat.
00° 49'N., Long. 119° 15'E., estimated range nine miles.
Tracked by visual bearings, outside radar range

9th Conducting approach as before. Picked up third ship
probably escort. As it was bright moonlight, I decided
to stay ahead of target until dawn because I did not be-
lieve I could make a radar approach inside 4000 yards
without being sighted. At 0042, having determined convoys
base course at 225°T., our position about 8 miles ahead
of convoy on course 255°T. and sighted another ship bear-
ing approximately 235°T. This left me with no other de-
cision but to reverse course and dive for radar and
periscope approach. Submerged to 40 feet for a radar
attack. ATTACKS #7 & #8: At 0119 recognized two of
the ships as large tankers - 10,000 tons. At 0122 fired
salvo of four torpedoes, bow tubes, on 70° port track, at
one tanker, and at 0123 fired remaining two torpedoes,
aft, at second tanker on 120° starboard track. At 0124
recognized third ship as large destroyer. Second target
fired rocket and signaled to escort. Rigged for depth
charge and took evasive action. 0124-0130 heard four
depth charges. At 0145 heard four rumbling noises. No
explosions at time of firing were heard in conning tower,
but forward and after torpedo rooms reported hearing hits.
Surfaced at 0258 in a heavy rain squall. At 0459 submerg-
ed for day, Lat. 00° 51'N., Long. 119° 18'E. At 0702
sighted patrol vessel pinging continuously. 1055 sighted
plane and ship or patrol vessel - distance 8 miles. 1748
heard pinging, but nothing in sight. 1829 surfaced on
course 180°T pgc., headed for Cape William, leaving
Mangalihat. Torpedoes were expended. 1847 sighted enemy
PC boat 30° on port bow, and he evidently sighted us at
same time. Commenced working around him. 1857 PC boat
fired white rockets. At 1927, after PC boat had been
blinking at us for a few minutes, exchanged recognition
signals with him. At 2328 finally lost contact with pat-
rol boat. During the evading, he had used his search-
light on us, and had fired a few rounds from, I believe,

-6-

— page 37 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) FIRST PATROL

| No. | Time | Date | Lat. | Long. | SHIP CONTACTS Type | Range | Course | How Cont. | Remarks |
|---|
| 1 | 0200 | 6 Oct. | 4° 01.3'S. | 127° 44.5' | Small Craft | 15 Mi | ? | R | Lost at 4200 yds. |
| 2 | 0828 | 6 Oct. | 3° 53' S. | 127° 55' | Patrol Boat | 6 Mi | 180° | P | Out of Ambon patrolling 8 to 10 miles off mouth of harbor. |
| 3 | 0910 | 8 Oct. | 3° 44' S. | 127° 50' | Schooner 2 Masted | 5.5 Mi | 230° | P | Off Ambon Harbor. |
| 4 | 2100 | 8 Oct. | 3° 32' S. | 127° 29' | Patrol Boat | 6 Mi | 130° | SN | Apparently bound for Ambon - Avoided. |
| 5 | 0030 | 9 Oct. | 3° 07' S. | 127° 36' | 2 Freighters | 7 Mi | 180° | SN | Attacked, two escorts, plane escort out of Ambon. |
| 6 | 1115 | 9 Oct. | 3° 42' S. | 127° 36' | Patrol Boat | 3 Mi | 270° | P | Avoided. |
| 7 | 1148 | 13 Oct. | 3° 49' S. | 127° 46' | Patrol Boat | 6 Mi | 030° | P | Avoided. |
| 8 | 1310 | 13 Oct. | 0° 30' S. | 127° 47' | 4 Merchant | 15 Mi | 260° | P | Avoided. |
| 9 | 0710 | 15 Oct. | 0° 27' N. | 126° 40' | Schooner | 8 Mi | 320° | SD | Holokun Passage - Avoided. |
| 10 | 1052 | 18 Oct. | 0° 27' N. | 125° 45' | Small Craft | 5 Mi | 050° | SD | Dove to avoid. |
| 11 | 0505 | 20 Oct. | 0° 04' N. | 125° 45' | Patrol Boat | 6 Mi | 336° | SD | Avoided. |
| 12 | 1650 | 21 Oct. | 1° 23' N. | 123° 25' | Small Craft | 5 Mi | 230° | SD | Avoided. |
| 13 | 0615 | 23 Oct. | 1° 16' N. | 120° 30' | Converted Yacht | 5 Mi | 090° | P | Avoided. |
| 14 | 0530 | 24 Oct. | 0° 16' N. | 120° 16' | Sailing Vessel | 6 Mi | 220° | R | Chased could not overtake. |
| 15 | 2212 | 26 Oct. | 0° 25' N. | 119° 23' | Unidentified - Possible Sub. | 3 Mi | 000° | P | Avoided. |
| 16 | 0821 | 27 Oct. | 0° 46' N. | 118° 46' | Schooner | 7 Mi | 320° | P | Avoided. |
| 17 | 0846 | 27 Oct. | 0° 47' N. | 118° 47' | Sailing Vessel | 5 Mi | 050° | P | Avoided. |
| 18 | 0530 | 29 Oct. | 0° 43' N. | 118° 04.5' | Sailing Vessel | 4 Mi | 000° | P | Passed by. |
| 19 | 0649 | 29 Oct. | 0° 43' N. | 118° 04' | Converted Yacht | 4 Mi | 225° | P | Attacked plane escort. |
| 20 | 1423 | 31 Oct. | 0° 49' N. | 119° 56' | Tanker | 9 Mi | 030° | P | Avoided. |

— page 38 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) FIRST PATROL.

SHIP CONTACTS (CONT'D)
Time | Date | Lat. | Long. | Type | Range | Course | Cont. | How | Remarks
-----|------|------|-------|------|-------||-------|-----|
1640 | 4 Nov. | 3° 30' N. | 119° 43' E. | Sail Boat | 5 MI | 300° | P | P | Avoided.
1210 | 6 Nov. | 0° 20' N. | 119° 45' E. | Sail Boat | 2 MI | 030° | P | P | Avoided.
1207 | 7 Nov. | 0° 20' N. | 119° 43' E. | Trawler | 8 MI | 030° | P | P | Passed by.
2123 | 7 Nov. | 0° 07' N. | 119° 21' E. | Unidentified | 9 MI | 235° | SN | SN | Avoided after backing
     |      |          |           |            |       |        |       |     | and filling, looked
     |      |          |           |            |       |        |       |     | like PC.
0700 | 8 Nov. | 0° 21' N. | 119° 43' E. | 500 ton tramp. | 7 MI | 185° | P | P | Avoided.
0745 | 8 Nov. | 0° 22' N. | 119° 43' E. | Sailing vessel. | 1 MI | 030° | P | P | Avoided.
1155 | 8 Nov. | 0° 22' N. | 119° 44' E. | Tanker. | 8 MI | 220° | SN | SN | Attacked.
2330 | 8 Nov. | 0° 15' N. | 119° 44' E. | PC Patrol Boat | 7 MI | 030° | P | P | Escorting tanker.
0042 | 9 Nov. | 0° 04' N. | 119° 04' E. | 2 Tankers, 1 DD | 6 MI | 050° | SN | SN | Attacked.
     |      |          |           |            |       |        |       |     | Reversed course and dove
     |      |          |           |            |       |        |       |     | for attack on tanker.
     |      |          |           |            |       |        |       |     | Echo ranging searching
     |      |          |           |            |       |        |       |     | area avoided.
0702 | 9 Nov. | 0° 53' N. | 119° 19' E. | PC Patrol Boat | 5 MI | Var. | P | P | Plane escort.
     |      |          |           |            |       |        |       |     | Area avoided.
1055 | 9 Nov. | 0° 17' N. | 119° 12' E. | Unidentified | 7 MI | 030° | SN | SN | Chased by and out ran.
1817 | 9 Nov. | 0° 20.5' N. | 119° 12' E. | PC Patrol Boat | 5 MI | 235° | P | P | Avoided.
2308 | 9 Nov. | 0° 53' S. | 119° 04' E. | Unidentified | 6 MI | 000° | SN | SN | Old type (1 stack
     |      |          |           |            |       |        |       |     | ?) Destroyer
     |      |          |           |            |       |        |       |     | cruiser.
     |      |          |           |            |       |        |       |     | Avoided.
1035 | 10 Nov. | 0° 26' S. | 119° 57' E. | Patrol Boat | 5 MI | 010° | P | P | Avoided.
2006 | 10 Nov. | 0° 31' E. | 118° 31' E. | Patrol Boat | 8 MI | 160° | SN | SN | Avoided evade, dove.
0130 | 11 Nov. | 0° 12' E. | 118° 31' E. | Patrol Boat | 1 MI | Var. | SN | SN | Searching area, sighted an
     |      |          |           |            |       |        |       |     | heard intermittently.
0719 | 11 Nov. | 0° 05' S. | 118° 31' E. | Patrol Boat | 4 MI | 310° | P | P | Chased by and out ran.
2159 | 11 Nov. | 0° 03' S. | 118° 31' E. | Patrol Boat or | 5 MI | 075° | SN | SN | Avoided.
     |      |          |           | Sub.       |       |        |       |     |
2202 | 11 Nov. | 0° 03' S. | 118° 31' E. | Patrol Boat | 6 MI | 020° | P | P | Avoided.

— page 39 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER
(SS269) FIRST PATROL.
SHIP CONTACTS (CONT'D)

| No. | Time | Date | Lat. | Long. | Type | Initial Range | Est. Cont. Course | How Avoided | Remarks |
|---|
| 41 | 0333 | 12 Nov. | 00° 20' N. | 118° 46' E. | Unidentified | 7 mi | 220° | SN | Dove to avoid. |
| 42 | 1932 | 12 Nov. | 00° 57' N. | 119° 06' E. | Unidentified | 5 mi | ? | UN | Avoided. |
| 43 | 2034 | 14 Nov. | 01° 13' N. | 119° 15' E. | Possible Sub. | 6 mi | 180° | SN | Avoided. |
| 44 | 1857 | 14 Nov. | 0° 27' N. | 125° 25' E. | Patrol Boat | 1.5 mi | 250° | R&SN | Avoided. |
| 45 | 1107 | 16 Nov. | 5° 40' N. | 125° 35' E. | Fishing Boat | 6 mi | ? | SD | Avoided. |

-12-

— page 40 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (G) - U.S.S. RASHER
(S269) FIRST PATROL.
AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

No. | Time | Date | Lat. | Long. | Type | Initial Est. Range | How Course Cont. | Remarks.
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
1 | 0525 | 4 Oct. | 9° 03' S. | 128° 57' E. | 4 Engine Bomber(Jap?) | 6-7 Mi | 180° | SD | On port beam, opposite course, low altitude.
2 | 0934 | 6 Oct. | 3° 53' S. | 127° 55' | Jap Transport | 3 Mi | Circled Eastward | P | Landed at Ambon.
3 | 0708 | 7 Oct. | 3° | 127° 30.5' | 4 Jap Bombers | 15 Mi | 180° | P | Over Manipa Strait from Buru Island.
4 | 1410 | 13 Oct. | 3° 49' S. | 127° 4' E. | Float Type | 8 Mi | Var. | P | Air escort 4 ship convoy.
5 | 1433 | 31 Oct. | 0° 49' N. | 119° 56'S. | Float Type | 9 Mi | Var. | P | Air escort tankers.
6 | 1055 | 9 Nov. | 0° 47' N. | 119° 12.5E | Unidentified | 8 Mi | Var. | P | Air escort for 1 ship.
7 | 0535 | 14 Nov. | 2° 21' N. | 124° 38'E | Unidentified | 5 Mi | 000° | P | Dove to avoid.
8 | 1512 | 20 Nov. | 17° 41'S. | 115° 39'E | Un-identified Patrol Bomber | 4 Mi | 180° | SD | Dove to avoid. Attacked with 2-3 bombs.

-13

— page 53 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) FIRST PATROL.

                                                                Tanker.
(H) TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM.
                                                                31 October 1943.

ATTACK No. 5.
                                                                Radar - Surface.

| | No. 7 | No. 8 | No. 9 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes Fired - | | | |
| Track Angle - | 68 P | 67 P | 68 P |
| Gyro Angle - | 165 | 167.5 | 165.5 |
| Depth Set - | 10' | 10' | 10' |
| Power - | Hi | Hi | Hi |
| Hit or miss - | Hit | Hit | Miss |
| Erratic - | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo - | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No. | 22651 | 23411 | 39418 |
| Mark Exploder - | 6-1 | 6-1 | 6-1 |
| Serial No. | 9261 | 11296 | 4660 |
| Actuation Set - | Cont. | Cont. | Cont. |
| | Mag. | Mag. | Mag. |
| Actuation Actual - | Cont. | Cont. | --- |
| Mark Warhead - | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No. - | --- | --- | 839 |
| Explosive - | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval - | 0 | 8 | 12 |
| Type Spread - | + 1 kt. | 0 | -1 kt. |
| Sea Conditions - | Calm | Calm | Calm |
| Overhaul Activity - | U.S.S.- | U.S.S.- | U.S.S.- |
| | AS-11 | AS-11 | AS-11 |
| Remarks - | | | Hit ? |

-23-

— page 56 —
CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) PATROL REPORT.
U.S. S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK No. SEVEN. PATROL No. ONE.
Time: 0120(HOW) Date: 9 Nov.1943. Lat. 0° 39'N. Long. 119° 04'E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Large unidentified tanker - not loaded.
Two large tankers - with destroyer (large)
escort. Night sighting - Bright moonlight -
Unlimited visibility.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s) Damaged
or Probably Sunk. None - possible damage.

Damage Deter- Heard four heavy rumbling noises at 0145,
mined by twenty five minutes after firing, not depth
charges. No hits heard or felt in conning tower.

Target Draft: 15'-20' Course: 193 Speed: 14 Range: 1500(at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 2 Course: 332 Depth: 62' Angle: 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Visual surface - Radar - Periscope - Submerged
TDC.
Four torpedoes fired - bow tubes.
Depth setting two 10' - two 8'.
Speed spread four knots.
Track angle 70 to 124 Port track.
Gyro angles 331,302,286,277.

Night surface approach by visual bearings out-
side of radar range was terminated by unidentified
ship ahead of submarine. Submerged to forty feet,
radar contact maintained from 10,000 to 4000 yds.
Target zigged 45° left inside of 4000 yds. putting
submarine between ships for bow shot at this the
left hand target.
Believe range considerably less than used -
all missed astern.

-26-

— page 66 —
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN
U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship

F05-16/A16-3
Serial 082

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO RASHER conf. report
of RASHER 1st War
Patrol of 24 NOV 1943

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) Report of 1st War
Patrol - Comment on.

1. The first war patrol of RASHER, covering a
period of sixty-two days, including time enroute to and
from area, 24 September to 24 November inclusive, was cond-
ucted in MAKASSAR STRAIT and the extreme southern portion
of the CELEBES SEA.

2. Area coverage was most thorough. Forty-five
contacts were made, resulting in eight attacks. All
torpedoes were expended. All attacks were handicapped by
the clear weather and bright moonlight during a portion of
this patrol.

3. Material condition of RASHER on completion
of patrol is very good. A normal refit is indicated, the
controlling factors being repairs to the air bottles in
number 6C main ballast tank and the elimination of troubles
with the hydraulic system. Drydocking is necessary.

4. The Commander, Officer, officers, and crew
of the RASHER are congratulated for an effective, well
conducted patrol.

[SIGNATURE: J. M. Haines]
J. M. HAINES.

— page 67 —
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN
U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship.

F05-16/A10-3
Serial 092
CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO RASHER conf. report
of RASHER 1st War
Patrol of 24 NOV 1943

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) Report of 1st War
Patrol - Cont. on.

1. The first war patrol of RASHER, covering a
period of sixty-two days, including time enroute to and
from area, 24 September to 24 November inclusive, was cond-
ucted in MAKASSAR STRAIT and the extreme southern portion
of the CELEBES SEA.

2. Area coverage was most thorough. Forty-five
contacts were made, resulting in eight attacks. All
torpedoes were expended. All attacks were handicapped by
the clear weather and bright moonlight during a portion of
this patrol.

3. Material condition of RASHER on completion
of patrol is very good. A normal refit is indicated, the
controlling factors being repairs to the air bottles in
number 60 main ballast tank, and the elimination of troubles
with the hydraulic system. Drydocking is necessary.

4. The Commanding Officer, officers, and crew
of the RASHER are congratulated for an effective, well
conducted patrol.

[SIGNATURE: J. M. HAINES]
J. M. HAINES.

— page 68 —
FE24-71/A16-3
Serial: 0974

                    C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
CDR Report of 1st
War Patrol dated 24 Nov.,
1943.

From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-O-NE.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander Submarine Force.
Subject: U.S.S. REDFIN Report of First War Patrol -
         Comment on.

1. The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron
SEVEN are concurred in.

2. The REDFIN obtained eleven hits from the twenty-
four torpedoes fired. The evidence of a premature is not conclus-
ive. The explosion thought to be a premature may have been a bomb,
in as much as an air escort was present. The magnetically activat-
ed exploder performance on this patrol is gratifying.

3. The thoroughness with which the patrol area was
covered and the able exploitation of shipping routes bespeaks the
seasoned judgment of an experienced submarine captain. The
decision to return to base via OLUAN Passage rather than by
confined waters of C.P.S. ILLI under existing conditions
was sound. The damage inflicted on the enemy was con-
siderable; however, it does not serve adequately as a measure
of the patrol's excellence. A study of the report evidences the agg-
ressive, indomitable will of the commanding officer to seek out
and destroy his enemy, which, coupled with sound planning and
skillful execution, makes this patrol outstanding.

4. This patrol is considered successful for
purpose of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia.

5. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding
Officer, officers, and crew of the REDFIN on this excellent patrol
and the following damage was inflicted on the enemy:

                                - 1 -
UNITED STATES NAVY
12-m
15 December, 1943

— page 69 —
F224-71/A16-3                                UNITED STATES NAVY           12-cms
Serial: 0974

                                                               15 December, 1943.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS [UNCLEAR: LING] Report of 1st
War Patrol dated 24 Nov.,
1943.

From:             The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
To:               The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via:              The Commander Submarine Force,
Subject:          U.S.S. [UNCLEAR: LING] Report of First War Patrol -
                  Comment on.

1.                The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron
[UNCLEAR: SEVEN] are concurred in.

2.                The R.S.R. obtained eleven hits from the twenty-
four torpedoes fired. The evidence of a premature is not conclus-
ive. The explosion thought to be a premature may have been a bomb,
or an air bomb, as an air escort was present. The magnetically activat-
ed exploder performance on this patrol is gratifying.

3.                The thoroughness with which the patrol area was
covered and the able exploitation of shipping routes bespeaks the
seasoned judgment of an experienced combat submarine captain. The
decision to return to base via [UNCLEAR: OLUTTA PASSAGE] rather than by the
open waters under existing A/S and visibility
conditions was sound. The damage inflicted on the enemy was con-
siderable; however, it does not serve adequately as a measure of
the patrol's excellence. A study of the report evidences the agg-
ressive, indomitable will of the commanding officer to seek out
the enemy and destroy him which, coupled with sound planning and
skillful execution, makes this patrol outstanding.

4.                This patrol is considered "successful" for
purpose of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia.

5.                The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding
Officer, officers, and crew of the R.S.R. on this excellent patrol
in which the following damage was inflicted on the enemy:

- 1 -

— page 71 —
A16-3 (P-3/JPD)
Serial: [HANDWRITTEN: 02572]
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L (crossed out)

29 DEC 1943

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. RASHER Report of
1st War Patrol dated
24 November 1943.

From: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
To : The Commander in Chief, U.S. FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER Report of First War Patrol -
         Comment on.

1. Forwarded.

O.L. Livdahl
By Direction

[STAMP: RECEIVED SO FILES]
[STAMP: Room 1835]
[STAMP: 8 JAN 1946]
[HANDWRITTEN: Op File No. A16-3(23)/S-269]
[HANDWRITTEN: Rec. No. 105079]
[HANDWRITTEN: Copy No. 6 of 6]
[HANDWRITTEN: 10754]

Copy to:
[HANDWRITTEN: VCHO] (with checkmark)

[STAMP: JAN 13 1944]
[STAMP: (Clock face with arrow pointing to 6)]
[STAMP: RECEIVED]
[STAMP: PROGRESS SECTION, Op. 05-G]

[HANDWRITTEN: FINISHED]
[HANDWRITTEN: Unregrettable]
[HANDWRITTEN: (C.C)]
[HANDWRITTEN: (R) A16-3(23)/SS269]

— page 72 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st Copy]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR, 5200.9]
[STAMP: of 27 Sep 58]
[STAMP: BY 925 DATE 4/28/72]

U.S.S. RASHER

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.
24 January 1944.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED A-L]

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. RASHER.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS 269) Report of War Patrol
Number Two.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the SECOND War Patrol
of this vessel conducted in South China Sea during the
period 19 December 1943, to 24 January 1944, is forwarded
herewith.

[SIGNATURE: W R Laughon]
W.R. LAUGHON.

[STAMP: 65530 FILMED]

— page 73 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - REPORT ON SECOND PATROL.

(A) - PROLOGUE

25 Nov. 1943 Arrived Fremantle on completion of first war patrol.

25 Nov-9 Dec. Refit accomplished by SRU, Navy 13, assisted by
              U.S.S. PELIAS. The following work was accomplished:
              overhauled two main engines, repaired leaking air
              banks, drydocked, completed modification to bow
              shutters.

9 Dec. 1943 Lt.Comdr. W.R. Laughon, USN, relieved Comdr. E.S.
              Hutchinson, USN, as Commanding Officer.

10-11 Dec. 1943 Conducted degaussing and sound tests, and post
              repair trials.

13-17 Dec. 1943 Conducting training exercises in Exercise Area,
              firing three torpedoes, and modified Short Range
              Practice, and providing services for Dutch and
              Australian men-of-war.

19 Dec. 1943 Loaded.

(B) - NARRATIVE
19 Dec. 1943
     1505     Underway for Exercise Area for trim dive and day and
              night exercises with HMAS HORSHAM.
     2246     Released HMAS HORSHAM and set course for Exmouth Gulf
              via the Bombing Restriction Lane.
     2250     Sent serial one reporting unsatisfactory operation of
              SJ radar, and W.C. flushing water sea valve.

20 Dec. 1943 Enroute Exmouth, zigzagging during daylight and con-
              ducting training dives and emergency drills with each
              section.
     1200     Position: Lat. 29° 01' S., Long. 112° 59' E.
     1242     Sighted PBY, distant four miles, and exchanged re-
              cognition signals. There was no indication on the SD
              radar.
     1507     Sighted oil slick, Lat. 28° 16' S., Long. 112° 54' E.
              The slick was about 1/4 mile long and 200 yards wide,
              and appeared to be bilge water.
     1748     Chief of the Watch, during a routine observation with
              No.1 periscope, sighted torpedo wake broad on port
              quarter, on estimated 160 track. He notified O.O.D.
              who changed course to starboard to parallel the track.
              The Chief of the Watch, an experienced CTM, and the
              Chief of the Boat, followed torpedo wake up to broad
              on port bow. He estimated it passed abeam to port
              about 75 yards. It was not seen by anyone else.
     1752     Sent serial two reporting above, and condition of SJ
              radar.

-1-
[STAMP: 2 01893]

— page 77 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - REPORT ON SECOND PATROL.
(B) - NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

27 Dec. 1943 (Cont'd)

0811 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #4:- Plane contact on SD radar at 7
     miles closing. Dove; plane not sighted.
0907 Surfaced.
1100 SHIP CONTACT #1:- Sighted top of single mast of ship
     bearing 100° T. Headed towards to determine relative
     movement. During turn O.O.D. and quartermaster sighted
     what they thought were masts of several ships on same
     bearing. We were well open, but they disappeared
     from view before direction of movement could be determin-
     ed, although we closed original bearing at four engin-
     speed for forty minutes, until the flat east Sibahle
     Bank was reached. This flat is covered by water of vary-
     ing depths from 10 to 100 fathoms, and since ships on
     original sighting appeared to be on about 025° T., or
     205° T., I changed course to 025° T. hoping to see them
     again, but did not regain contact. I believe these ships
     were originally sighted by mirage effect traversing a range
     of 20 miles or more, since only the tops
     of the mast were sighted, and they did not extend down to
     the horizon.
1200 Position: Lat. 05° 38' S., Long. 117° 12' E.
1327 Observed same mirage effect when Kalu Kalukusang
     which is visible for 14 miles was sighted at a range of
     18 miles. We closed this island to tune the SJ radar
     which was back in commission again. Details of the re-
     pairs are discussed under the appropriate heading.
1640 O.O.D. sighted a floating object distant about 3,000
     yards bearing 30° on starboard bow. It was passed about 1,500
     yards abeam at which time it was observed to be orange-
     yellow in color. On closer inspection it appeared to
     consist of a box or cube about 2 feet on a side, mounted
     on a sea sled that was almost entirely submerged. The
     box affair was submerged about two-thirds of its height.
     On top of the box was mounted a vertical post about 1
     feet high, and tapering from about 3 inches at the base
     to 2 inches at the top.
1825 SHIP CONTACT #5:- Sighted tops of masts and stack of an
     engines aft AK or AO, bearing 130° T., distant about 12
     miles. Stopped and turned towards to determine relative
     movement.
1835 Course estimated about 180° T., bearing now 160° T., giv-
     ing an estimate speed by plot of about 17 knots. Headed
     towards him at full speed on four engines for nine minutes
     while I checked positions on the chart. I decided that it
     would be impossible to make an end around run on this one,
     considering his speed, and waters to be navigated in the
     process on a dark night.
1844 Set course for Cape William.
                                                              2 01893

— page 82 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RAHER (SS269) - REPORT ON SECOND PATROL.
(B) - NARRATIVE (Cont'd)
4 Jan. 1944 (Cont'd)

2130 In order to keep clear of Porter's party we swung left
on his port side.
2142 Plot showed that one of the ships at the BLUEFISH party
had turned south to join up with our target, now on
course 180° T. The tanker under attack by the BLUEFISH
burst into flames which quickly enveloped the entire
ship.
2220 Exchanged information with Porter by voice transmission
in regard to location of targets. I saw that he would
be clear if I dove and attacked right away.
2230 When dead ahead of target at range 6,000 yards, submerg-
ed to radar depth. Plot showed that both targets had
changed course to 070° T. So changed course to 070° T. For
a 320 starboard track.
2232 Range and bearing from SJ showed that second ship was
between us and our original target, range 3,780 yards.
2235 Went to 60 feet, but could not see either target.
2237 Target dead ahead by sound so changed course to 090° T.
to decrease gyro angles. This bearing must have been
because at
2241 Final check bearing by periscope was 333° relative.
22-41-09 Commenced firing spread of six torpedoes from bow tubes,
spread 110°-114° starboard, torpedo run 3,400 yards,
course 070° T, gyro angles 340° to 44°, depth set alternat-
ing 18 feet and six feet, using an 8 second firing
interval. Six torpedoes were fired because I wanted to
be sure that I hit this target so that we could go after
the other one while it was still within radar range.
22-41-38 Premature (2nd torpedo).
22-42-06 Premature (5th torpedo).
22-43-28 Saw hit on target by first torpedo and heard explosion
through ship. Porter told us by voice that he saw two
hits on this target, and the post firing analysis show-
ed that the fourth torpedo was a hit, and that the sec-
ond had it not prematured.
22-45-48, 22-45-58, 22-48-38 Heavy explosions heard and felt
through ship.
2249 Commenced reload of bow tubes and pulled torpedoes aft
for check. The gyro pot of one torpedo was found part-
ially flooded.
2303 Completed reload of bow tubes and check of torpedoes in
all tubes that were made ready aft.
2304 Surfaced.
2307 Heard one explosion.
2310 Radar contact bearing 081° T, distant 11,500 yards.
Tracked the target on course 090° T, speed 9-10 knots.
Commenced end around run.
2320 SJ picked up another target bearing 057° T, distant
10,900 yards. This target was tracked also until
2330 when four explosions were heard and flashes seen in this
vicinity over a period of ten minutes.

-10-

— page 83 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - REPORT ON SECOND PATROL
(B) - NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

4 Jan. 1944 (Cont'd)

2329 The SJ also picked up another target in this vicinity but
     was unable to hold it. I thought that this was Porter
     making an attack on this target. Otherwise the explosions
     were on one of the targets previously hit.
2330 Our target was now on course 150° T., speed 9 knots and we
     were slowly pulling ahead at 3 engine speed.
2345 Burning tanker passed out of sight.
2346 Received voice message from Porter that he had surfaced.

5 Jan. 1944

0023 At 6,700 yards could see that our present target was larg-
     er than any that we had seen before. It was definitely
     a large tanker with a prominent stack aft, and with the
     superstructure well forward. In addition, he was northhead-
     ing for Natuna Islands while the other group of ships had
     been headed in the general direction of Saigon.
0105 When ahead of target range 5,750 yards, submerged to
     radar depth. At this time the target was zigging 15 to
     20° to right and left of base course 195° T.
0118 Went to 55 feet at range 3,780 yards. The target was
     very difficult to see, but it appeared to be heading to-
     wards us.
0123 Angle on the bow still very small and setup uncertain. I
     decided not to shoot this time, and to make another run
     around run after moonset at 0235.
0125 Target was still heading towards us on a steady bearing,
     so we went deep and rigged for depth charge attack.
0135 Secured from depth charge, pulled and inspected torpedoes
     from tubes that had been flooded. One torpedo was found
     to have a flooded afterbody.
0220 Surfaced and resumed chase, target bearing 229° T., dis-
     tant 11,800 yards.
0340 Ahead of target which was still zigzagging on base course
     195° T. I slowed to steerageway speed on the battery and
     motors and slowly pulled out from track keeping the stern
     of the target.
0356 Target zigged right to 225° T., which made setup less
     attractive, due to increased distance to track. I decid-
     ed to shoot on a 70 track nevertheless, because I thought
     that I would be sighted if I tried to pull out, due to the
     highly phosphorescent wake, even at five knots.
0357 At range of 3,220 yards, with an angle on the bow of 35
     to 45° port, the target subtended 1/2 of the binocular
     field. This makes him very large, but it gives an indica-
     tion of the size. He looked larger than the other two
     ships attacked to all of us on the bridge.

-11-
[STAMP: 2 01893]

— page 84 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - REPORT ON SECOND PATROL.

(b) - NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

Jan. 1944 (Cont'd)

0403      The solution appeared good using course 225° T., speed
          9 knots.
04-05-54  Commenced firing spread of four torpedoes from stern
          tubes, torpedo run 3,300 yards, tracks 79 to 76° port,
          gyro angles 172 to 175°, spread 1°, depths 18 feet and
          ten feet, and using an 8 second firing interval. I took
          special care to arrange the firing order and spread so
          that the torpedoes set at 18 feet would be fired first
          because I then believed that the shallower ones would
          be more likely to premature. I was wrong, however, be-
          cause at
04-06-10 and 04-06-19 the first and second shots prematured. Three
          attacks - five prematures - were we unhappy!
04-08-04  Two explosions were heard below, hits by the third and
          fourth torpedoes.
0409      The target exploded and smoke and flame shot high into
          the sky. The explosions continued and the flames spread
          all over the target and several ship lengths on either
          side. We watched him burning fiercely for about twenty
          minutes and then drew away, since I expected planes out
          as a result of the earlier attacks.
0555      When we were about twenty miles away the flames which
          had almost disappeared, shot up into the air again and
          then the flames and glow disappeared completely. I
          believe that he sank at this time.
0624      Sent our dispatch Serial No. 4.
0628      Submerged for the days patrol.
1200      Position: Lat. 05° 27' N., Long. 109° 10' E.
1904      Surfaced and proceeded towards the Empire - Takao -
          Singapore traffic route, enroute to area.

6 Jan. 1944

0614      Submerged at dawn to investigate density layers. This
          practice was continued throughout the patrol.
0900      Arrived at the Empire - Takao - Singapore traffic route
          and changed course to 036° T. to patrol along this
          route on the surface enroute to area.
1300      Position: Lat. 07° 39' N., Long. 108° 30' E.

7 Jan. 1944

0618      Submerged.
0712      Surfaced.
1200      Position: 09° 46' N., Long. 109° 54' E.

8 Jan. 1944

0200      Entered area and set course for Cape Varella.
0634      Submerged.

-12-

— page 91 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - REPORT ON SECOND PATROL.

(B) - NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

17 Jan. 1944 (Cont'd)

                 Escort was not in sight and could not be seen even
                 when we closed enough for high periscope to see the
                 main deck.
1130             All sailboats were now on the quarter, but they continued
                 to head for us as long as we had them in sight.
1200             Position: Lat. 0° 23' S., Long. 124° 38' E.
1400             We had the target on the port beam distant 10 miles and it
                 appeared that the base course was 260°T., speed 13 knots,
                 and that he was heading for the Northern Entrance to Buton
                 Strait, rather than for Buton Passage.
1443             We had the target broad on the port quarter distant about
                 10 miles when he increased speed to 16 knots.
1457             Sighted land identified as the northern end of Buton
                 Island.
1520             Target changed base course to 245°T. Apparently he sighted
                 land, fixed his position and swung left to head for Buton
                 Passage. Our noon latitude sight and several afternoon sun
                 lines had indicated that we were about 18 miles north of
                 our D.R.
1512             Sighted sailboat and avoided.
1645             I realized that we would not be able to get ahead of target
                 again until after we followed him through Buton Passage, so
                 we trailed him on his starboard quarter waiting for him to
                 go through the Passage and for darkness.

1802             Sunset.
1816             The visibility began to decrease, so we began to close the
                 target at flank speed. Soon we could see that an unidenti-
                 fied DD escort had been picked up near Wungi Wungi Island.
1835             Made radar contact at 17,000 yards.
1902             We were ahead of the target and escort. They were zigzag-
                 ging on base course 245°T. at speed 9 knots.
1921             Target had increased speed to 15 knots and steadied on
                 course 225°T. We continued to work around him until we
                 were 3,300 yards off the track, angle on the bow 90°port.
1934             We swung right and started boring in at flank speed keeping
                 our bow pointed at the target.
1939             Reduced speed to 15 knots. I had planned to close to 2,000
                 yards before firing, but at
1948             the target started changing course to the left when the
                 range was 2,900 yards. I changed course to the left to
                 point the stern at him and at
1951             fired the last torpedo on a 180° track, gyro angle 180°,
                 torpedo run 4,800 yards, depth set at 10 feet, own ship
                 speed 14.2 knots.
19-52-20         Premature.
1953             Retired from area at flank speed, but soon slowed to full
                 speed on four engines when no retaliatory measures develop-
                 ed.
2030             Set course for Ombai Passage passing north and east of the
                 Tukang Besi Islands, at three engine speed.

-19-
[STAMP: 2 01893]

— page 92 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - REPORT ON SECOND PATROL
(B) - NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

18 Jan. 1944
0005 | Slowed to full speed on two engines.
0502 | Submerged at daybreak to watch for the expected aircraft
     | search.
0910 | Surfaced.
1150 | AIRCRAFT CONTACT #6: Plane contact on SD radar at 3 miles,
     | closing to three. Submerged. This plane must have been
     | a transport or Recon. and flying very high as he was not
     | sighted.
1200 | Position: Lat. 06° 46' S., Long. 125° 00' E.
1255 | Surfaced.
1740 | Sighted Alor Island, bearing 270° T., distant 20 miles.
1936 | Passed between Alor and Kambing Islands.
2000 | Entered Ombai Passage and set course to pass between
     | Sumb and Sawu Islands.

19 Jan. 1944
0505 | Submerged.
0840 | Surfaced.
1200 | Position: Lat. 10° 18' S., Long. 121° 23' E.

20 Jan. 1944
1200 | Position: Lat. 14° 46' S., Long. 117° 11' E.
1700 | Transmitted our serial no. MIGHT concerning LTA Fremantle.

21 Jan. 1944
1200 | Position: Lat. 18° 40' S., Long. 113° 50' E.

22 Jan. 1944
1200 | Position: Lat. 22° 57' S., Long. 112° 19' E.

23 Jan. 1944
1200 | Position: Lat. 27° 34' S., Long. 112° 27' E.
1400 | Transmitted our serial no. MINE giving revised STA.
1818 | SHIP CONTACT #1: Sighted masts of ship bearing 345° T.,
     | on course 270° T., distant 10 miles, and changed course
     | to avoid being sighted.
2040 | Commenced battery discharge at 6 hour rate.

24 Jan. 1944
0235 | Completed battery discharge.
1145 | Arrived Fremantle.

(C) - WEATHER
     | No comment - No unusual conditions.

(D) - TIDAL INFORMATION
     | No comment - No unusual conditions.

(E) - NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
     | No comment - No lighted aids sighted.

-20-

— page 94 —
(F) SHIP CONTACTS
| No. | Time | Date | Lat. | Long. | Type | Initial Est. Range Crse Cmt. | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17 | 1050 | 17 Jan. | 04°32' S | 121°08' E | Two Sailing Vessels | 7 Mi. Var. | SD Avoided. |
| 18 | 1110 | 17 Jan. | 04°30' S | 121°05' E | Sailing Vessel | 7 Mi. Var. | SD Avoided. |
| 19 | 1318 | 23 Jan. | 00°46' S | 113°03' E | Medium AP | 10 Mi. 270 | SD Avoided. |
| | 1445 | 23 Jan. | 00°46' S | 113°03' E | M-F-M Split | 10 Mi. 270 | SD Avoided. |
| | 1500 | 23 Jan. | 00°46' S | 113°03' E | Super Struct. | 10 Mi. 270 | SD Avoided. |
| | 1515 | 23 Jan. | 00°46' S | 113°03' E | ure counter | 10 Mi. 270 | SD Avoided. |
| | | | | | stern | | |

Page No. 22

— page 95 —
CONFIDENTIAL
(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

No. | Time | Date | Lat. | Long. | Type | Initial Range | How Cont. | Remarks
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
1. | 0816 | 26 Dec. | 7°31' N | 116°46' E | Not seen | 6 Mi. | R | Radar Contact-not seen. Dove-Dist. Bomb at 0911.
2. | 1500 | 26 Dec. | 7°33' N | 116°56' E | Bomber-Land Type | 12 Mi. | P | Escort for #3 Ship Contact. Sighted three times.
3. | 0652 | 27 Dec. | 6°06' N | 116°49' E | Not determined | 8 Mi. | SD | Dove to avoid.
4. | 0823 | 27 Dec. | 5°59' N | 116°09' E | Not determined | 6 Mi. | P | Dove to avoid. Contact not seen.
5. | 0916 | 17 Jan. | 4°31' N | 125°08' E | Unseen | 12-10 Mi. | R | Plane remained unseen & finally disappeared on radar -never closed.
6. | 1149 | 18 Jan. | 6°14.5' N | 125°05' E | Unseen | 8-3 Mi. | R | Dove to avoid.

Page 23
[STAMP: 2 01893]

— page 98 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - REPORT ON SECOND PATROL.

(B) - ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. RASHER TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2. PATROL NO. 2.

Time: 2211 Date: 4 Jan. 1944 Lat. 06° 44' N., Long. 108° 43.5' E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Target group consisted of two tankers, without
             escort. One ship was keeping station on stbd quarter
             of other ship. Contact was by radar following attack
             #1. Visibility through #1 periscope was poorer than ex-
             pected under the existing light conditions. It is be-
             lieved that the ship attacked was KIYO MARU.

Ship Damaged: 1 AO - 7,250 tons - KIYO MARU

Damage deter- Captain observed one hit through periscope. Saw
mined by: large sheet of flame and fire 2 minutes and 20 seconds
             after firing first torpedo. A large explosion was also
             felt at the same instant. BLUEFISH reported later hav-
             ing observed two hits. Post firing analysis showed
             that the first and fourth torpedoes were hits, and that
             the second would have hit, had it not prematurely.

Target Draft: 27-1/2' Course: 140° T. Speed: 9. Range: 3,400
                                                      (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 4. Course: 090. Depth: 63' Angle: 343 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Attack was made submerged, after targets had been
             tracked using radar bearings and ranges, and their speed
             and zig zag plan determined. The leading target was be-
             ing plotted, but after submerging, a zig away made it
             necessary to shift to the other, and nearer target.
             Ship was kept at radar depth until range decreased to
             3,600 yards. Periscope bearings were used during final
             stages of attack.

-26-

— page 106 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - REPORT ON SECOND PATROL.

(d) - ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. RASHER TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6. PATROL NO. 2.
Time: 1952. Date: 17 Jan. 1944. Lat. 05° 16'S., Long. 123° 18'E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Target group consisted of one large auxiliary
transport, of the AIKOKU MARU class, with an unidenti-
fied destroyer escort. The transport was keeping sta-
tion astern of the DD. Contact was originally made
during morning twilight, and the ship was tracked during
the day by keeping it in sight using surface periscope
observations. Contact was made with radar at dusk at a
range of 19,000 yards. The escort was picked up a few
minutes later by radar. Ship could be seen from the
bridge at a range of about 12,000 yards, with aid of
binoculars.

Ships sunk: None.

Ships damaged: None.

Target draft: 29' Course: 192° T. Speed: 15 Range: 3,200 yds (at
firing)

OWN SHIP DATA
Speed: 14.2. Course: 015° T. Depth: Surface. Angle: 180 (at fir-
ing).

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

The attack was made on the surface using radar
bearings and ranges, until the last stage of the attack,
when visual bearings and radar ranges were used. Own
ships speed was slowed to 14 knots just prior to firing.
Last remaining torpedo fired, from tube number 8.
Premature.

-34-

— page 107 —
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - REPORT ON SECOND PA TROL.
(H) - TORPEDO DATA - ATTACK #6:
Tubes Fired - | No. 3.
Track Angle - | 180
Gyro Angle - | 180
Depth Set - | 10
Power - | High
Hit or Miss - | Miss
Erratic - | Yes
Mark Torpedo - | 14-3A
Serial No. - | 24280
Mark Exploder - | 6-4
Serial No. - | 6878
Actuation Set - | M-C
Actuation Actual - | -
Mark Warhead - | 16
Serial No. - | 1495
Explosive - | TPX
Firing Interval - | -
Type Spread - | -
Sea Conditions - | 0
Overhaul Activity - | Navy 137
Remarks:- | Premature

-35-
[STAMP: 2 01893]

— page 112 —
CONFIDENTIAL.
ENCLOSURE (A) - U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - REPORT ON SECOND PATROL.

(B) - DURATION
    Days enroute to area - - - - 20
    Days in area - - - - - - - 5
    Days enroute to base - - - - 22
    Days submerged - - - - - - 7

(C) - FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

| TORPEDOES | FUEL GALS. | PROVISIONS DAYS | PERSONNEL FACTOR DAYS |
|||||
| 0         | 3,000      | 53              | 25                    |

    Limiting factor this patrol: Expended torpedoes.

(D) - REMARKS

    (a) No comment.

    (b) No comment.

    (c) Definite indications of enemy radar were noticed in Lombok
    Strait, Sibutu Passage, Ombal Passage, and off Cape Varella. These
    indications were similar to those caused by the U.S.S. BLUEFISH's
    radar. The indications occurred at irregular intervals and no
    directional locations were determined.

    (d) The one encounter in the area off Cape Varella definitely
    indicated that ships were utilizing shallow water in close to the
    beach, and passing inboard of outlying islands.

    (e) VOICE MODULATOR ON TBL 7 TRANSMITTER - Use was made of this
    equipment during the coordinated attacks of 4 January, with the
    U.S.S. BLUEFISH. It is suggested that a more adequate code be
    provided for its use, or that commanding officers of submarines
    in adjacent areas make definite rearrangements for its use in
    possible coordinated attacks.

    (f) The extremely generous and cooperative attitude of Lieut.
    G.J. Quesada, USNR, the Commanding Officer of Navy #81, was
    appreciated by all hands. In addition to taking two venereal
    patients off our hands and giving us two reliefs, he insisted on
    giving us fresh provisions, ice cream, and a fruit cake, a personal
    donation.

    (g) It is recommended that balloon type radar decoys similar to
    those being used by the U-boats be provided. In addition to their
    value as a decoy they would be invaluable for tuning the SJ radar
    in areas where there are no land targets and the sea is flat. We
    could have used them for this purpose on three occasions.

    (h) The new paint job is believed to have been very effective
    in avoiding detection on the surface during the day as well as
    night.

    -10-

— page 114 —
FC5-16/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN
Serial 074 U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1 February 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO RASHER conf. report
of RASHER 2nd Wer Patrol
of 24 January 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) Report of 2nd War
Patrol - Comment on.

1. The second war patrol of the U.S.S. RASHER was
the first for the Commanding Officer as such. The patrol
covered a period of thirty-seven days of which twenty-four
were spent in waters north of the Barrier.

2. Seven contacts were made with targets worthy
of torpedoes. The first such contact was a small AK sighted
while making a dawn trim dive. It could not be closed sub-
merged and was not considered with a surface chase at that
time. The second was made with an escorted AK after the
RASHER had been forced down by an air patrol. It could not
be closed and the patrol prevented surfacing prior to sunset.
The third contact was a freak long range sighting caused by
a mirage and the target or targets were lost while pursuing.
The fourth contact was made on a seventeen knot target near
sunset. The angle on the bow was 160 and, because of the
high target speed and the restricted waters, the Commanding
Officer did not believe successful pursuit possible.

3. Torpedo performance was marred by at least six
and possibly seven prematures. The first attack was a night
surface radar attack made on the flank ship of a three ship
convoy. A premature gave warning of the attack but it is
probable that one hit was made. The second was a submerged
night periscope attack made on what, from analysis and com-
parison with BLUEFISH report, appears to have been the same
target. Two torpedoes of six fired prematurely; one hit was
made. The second hit reported by the BLUEFISH, which was in
company, must have been an internal explosion as it occurred
twenty-four minutes later as the RASHER was surfacing. The
target at this time took a heavy list. The third attack was
a night surface radar attack made on what was possibly this
same target. Although there were two prematures out of four
torpedoes, two hits were made from a range of 3100 yards and
the target, a tanker, burst into flame.

- 1 -
[HANDWRITTEN: 43]

— page 115 —
FC5-16/A16-3
Serial 074
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN
U.S.S. R.SHER, Flagship
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1 February 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO R.SHER conf. report
of R.SHER 2nd War Patrol
of 24 J.N. 1944.

Subject: U.S.S. R.SHER (SS269) Report of 2nd War
Patrol - comment on.

The fourth and fifth attacks were made on two
medium L.P.'s after a difficult seven hour chase along the
coast of Indo-China. The attacks were made at night at
periscope depth, three torpedoes being fired at each target.
One explosion was heard after the first attack. The second
attack was made forty-four seconds later but firing data
set-up was inaccurate and all torpedoes missed.

The sixth attack was made after a tenacious
fifteen hour chase of a large K which started with an
escort, dropped it and later picked up another. Only one
torpedo was left and it was in a stern tube. The pursuit
was further complicated by changes of base course and speed
and by numerous sailing vessels. When finally in position
to fire, in Buton Passage, the target again changed course
and the last torpedo was fired on a 180 track at a range of 3200
yards. It promatured.

4. Operation of the SJ radar was erratic during
the early part of the patrol. The material condition of the
R.SHER was very good on her arrival and the refit will be
completed in the normal time.

5. The Squadron Commander takes pleasure in con-
gratulating the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the
R.SHER for the damage inflicted on the enemy.

[SIGNATURE: J.M.H. Ines]
J.M.H. INES.
[HANDWRITTEN: 4]

— page 116 —
FE24-71/A16-3                                UNITED STATES NAVY                                12/gms
Serial: 0115
                                                                        February 11, 1944.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
                                                                        [STAMP: 375
                                                                        2 01893]
SECOND INDORSEMENT to:
USS RASHER Conf.Ltr.
A16-3 Serial 074 dated
1 February, 1944. Report
of 2nd War Patrol.

From:           The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To:             The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via:            The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject:        U.S.S.RASHER (SS269) Report of 2nd War Patrol -
                Comment on.

        1.      The Second War Patrol of the U.S.S.RASHER was
characterized by aggressiveness and persistence by the Command-
ing Officer; the night surface radar approaches being especially
well conducted under the handicap of a full moon.

        2.      Tuning the SJ radar at all times when in contact
with land and making daily deep dives to determine the density
layers is sound submarine practice.

        3.      The possibility exists that the tanker sunk on the
morning of 5 January, 1944, was a different target than the
damaged KIYO MARU, but the evidence is not conclusive enough to
justify credit for sinking an additional vessel of another type.

        4.      The patrol is considered successful for purpose of
awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The Commanding Officer,
Officers, and Crew of RASHER are congratulated on a well conduct-
ed and aggressive patrol during which the following damage was
inflicted on the enemy:

                SUNK

                1 - AO (KIYO MARU) - - - - - - - 7,250 Tons

                DAMAGED

                1 - AK (HEITO MARU) - - - - - - - 4,467 Tons

                                        Grand Total 11,717 Tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(See Second Page).                                              R. W. CHRISTIE.

                                                                - 1 -

— page 117 —
FE24-71/A16-3. UNITED STATES NAVY 12/gms
Serial: 0115 February 11, 1944.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) Report of 2nd War Patrol -
Comment on.

DISTRIBUTION:

Cominch (3) - Direct
Vice Upnav (2) - Direct
Vice Upnav
Op-23c (1)
Com1stFlt (1)
Com2ndFlt (1)
Com3rdFlt (1)
Com7thFlt (1)
Comsubs1stFlt (2)
Comsubs2ndFlt (1)
CTF-71 (4)
CTF-72 (2)
CSSI-16 (1)
Divcoms Ron-16 (1)
Each S/M W.A. (1) - NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN

[SIGNATURE: P. F. Straub Jr.]
P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
Flag Secretary.

- 2 -

— page 118 —
UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET
A16-3/(F-6/cw)
Serial: [HANDWRITTEN: 0878]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
CO USS RASHER (SS269)
Conf.Ltr. dated
24 January 1944.

From: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: USS RASHER (SS269) - Report of Second War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

[SIGNATURE: R. H. Cruzen]
R. H. CRUZEN,
By direction.
[STAMP: 844]
[STAMP: Bag. No. [HANDWRITTEN: 2847]]
[STAMP: R.S. No. [HANDWRITTEN: 018169]]

[STAMP: 18 APR 1944]

— page 119 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR. 5200.9]
[STAMP: of 27 Sep 58]
[STAMP: BY T.L.C. DATE 4/2/71]

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
4 April 1944.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]
From:             The Commanding Officer.
To:               The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:              The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
                  The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH Fleet.
                  The Commander, SEVENTH Fleet.

Subject:          U.S.S. RASHER (SS269), Report of War Patrol number Three.

Enclosure:        (A) Subject Report.

1.                Enclosure (A), covering the third war patrol of this vessel
conducted in the JAVA and CELEBES Sea area during the period 19 February
to 4 April 1944, is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: W. R. Laughon]
W. R. LAUGHON.

[HANDWRITTEN: Filmed]
[HANDWRITTEN: 73068]

— page 121 —
0420 Changed course to 312° T. to patrol across SOURABAYA - AMBON
     traffic route north of BALI.

0554 Submerged six miles off shore, north of BALI.

1237 Surfaced due to poor visibility caused by frequent and heavy
     rain squalls. Commenced surface patrol in direction of RAAS
     STRAIT.

1600 Received voice transmission from U.S.S. RATON, and arranged for
     rendezvous.
     SKIP CONTACT 1

1617 Made visual contact with U.S.S. RATON and completed arrangements
     for coordinated search of area. Comdr. Davis suggested that he
     do the south of a line bearing 120° T. from RAAS STRAIT and that
     we would search north of that line. We coordinated DRAIs and
     made additions to voice code for use in rendezvousing later.

1650 Separated from U.S.S. RATON and resumed patrol, visibility varying
     from 3000 to 10,000 yards due to frequent rain squalls.
     SHIP CONTACT 2

1730 Sighted superstructure and masts of two AKs and masts of two
     escorts, simultaneously from bridge and through periscope,
     when the convoy came out of a rain squall. We changed course
     to put the convoy astern and opened out rapidly to avoid
     being sighted. The visibility continued to improve and it was
     necessary to open out to 12,000 yards before we could begin to
     work ahead. Apparently the RATON sighted them shortly after
     we did as they changed course to avoid being sighted also.

1736 Course of convoy was about 130° T. We changed course to 120° T.
     and started working ahead, keeping the convoy in sight through
     #1 periscope.

1815 Established voice communication with RATON, and told him that I
     was working ahead, and would attack shortly after sunset which
     was at 1842.
     ATTACK 1

1900 We were ahead of the convoy, at a range of about 14,000 yards,
     target bearing between 125° and 165° T. at about six minutes
     intervals.

     The two AKs were in line of
     bearing with the larger appearing
     about 30° on the starboard quarter
     of the leading ship, distant about 1500 yards. The starboard
     escort appeared to be abeam of the trailing ship, and the port
     escort was even farther aft on the port side of the formation.
     We decided to attack the leading and larger ship from the port
     side because the escort was well clear at this time. We opened
     out to about 4000 yards from the base course of the convoy,
     range 7500 yards and made all tubes ready and at

1928 started in at full speed on four engines planning to fire at 1500
     yards torpedo run on a 90° port track.

1940 The escort which had worked up on target's port bow, was now
     dead ahead distant 3800 yards. I decided that we would be able
     to pass 1000 yards astern of the escort without being seen in

     - 2 -

— page 122 —
the existing visibility, so changed course to 10° to the right
to clear him more rapidly.

1942 With the escort fifty degrees on the port bow, distant about
1200 yards, swung left for zero gyro angles on the target. I
passed up the opportunity to shoot at the escort because he
was small, about the size of the H.M.A.S. DUBO, and I thought
that the torpedoes which had been set at eight feet, would run
under him.

1943 Set-up checking perfectly, course 135° T., speed 7.5 knots.

1943-49 Commenced firing spread of four torpedoes, tracks 102 to 110°
port, gyro angles between 002 and 351°, torpedo run 1100 to
940 yards, spread 3°, with eight to ten seconds firing interval.

1944-50 First torpedo hit a little forward of MOT.

1944-55 Second torpedo hit a little aft of MOT.

1945-04 Fourth torpedo hit between bow and MOT.

Three hits were seen from bridge and heard below. Immediately
after firing the last torpedo we swung hard right at flank speed
and started looking for the other target which had not been seen
from the bridge, nor had had no opportunity to track with the
radar because it had been occupied with the target and escort.
I would give a lot for a PPI.

1946 We pulled out to look the situation over, and to reload.

1947 We located all four targets with the SJ as follows: Our
previous target - bearing 196° T., range 2700 yards; his
escort - 170° T., range 3100 yards; the other AK bearing 199° T.,
range 4280 yards; and his escort - bearing 211° T., range 5000
yards. We started tracking the unattacked target, but maintained
radar contact on the one that we had hit.

1949-30 Lost SJ contact on target that had been hit, bearing 175° T.,
range 3950 yards. His escort had reversed course and returned
to our firing position, and then made a wide sweep looking for
his AK which had been sunk.

1953 We made a careful search all around and found only 3 targets.
From this time on we had good contact on two escorts and one AK.

1955 Sound picked up first indications of pinging.

2001-10,20 and 48 Three heavy explosions heard on the bridge and below
decks. They did not sound like depth charges.
ATTACK #2
2040 We were in position to start in on second AK, 30° on port bow,
distant 6200 yards. I had planned to cross astern of escort
which was well ahead on the targets port bow.

2053 With the range to the target 2500 yards, and the range to the
escort, which had been dropping back on the port beam of the

- 3 -

— page 123 —
target, 1250 yards, plot reported that the escort was headed
directly towards us. We were unable to see the escort at
this time due to spray and the rain squall in our faces, but
I took their word for it and started swinging right at flank
speed.

2055. I could see that the escort had a large port angle and was not
herding for us, but he was almost in line with the target,
and that I would have to go astern of the escort and come in
for a track of 130 to 140° if I persisted in this approach.

2100 I swung left and crossed astern of the target and started work-
ing up on his starboard side, passing about 3500 yards abeam.
At about this time the RATON informed us that he was in posi-
tion about 9000 yards on the port bow of the target and that
he was ready to come in if we were having difficulty. I told
him that we were in a better position and on the opposite
side from the escort, and that we were already going in for
another attack.

2121 We were a little forward of the target's starboard beam, range
3900 yards, when we swung left and started in for a 90° track.

2127 The target's course was steadying fine on 145° T. and the speed
at 7.5 knots.

2127-52 Commenced firing spread of four torpedoes from the bow tubes,
tracks - 95 to 100° starboard, gyro angles - 349 to 357°,
torpedo run - 1470 to 1330 yards, spread - 3°, with eight
second firing interval, depth set at six feet.

2128-42 First torpedo hit between bow and MOT.

2128-52 Second torpedo hit right under the stack and sent up a tre-
mendous column of black smoke and debris. The target appeared
to sag in the middle after this hit.

2128-59 Third torpedo hit near the stern.

Three hits were seen from the bridge and heard below.

2131 The visibility began to improve rapidly as the rain squall
passed clear and we were able to see that at

2132 the target began to settle aft, slowly at first, but then more
rapidly until at

2134 Target completely under.

2136 and 2139 Two heavy explosions heard on bridge and below.

2140 Told RATON that there were no more targets and that we were
clearing the area, and apologized for hogging the show.

2140 to 2217 Working clear of the two escorts which could be seen
about three miles in the improved visibility.

- 4 -

— page 124 —
2210 Set course 020° T. at fifteen knots to pass east of the KALBAS
ISL NDS.

2230 Lost contact on both escorts at range 10,000 yards.
SHIP CONTACT #2
2248 Radar contact, small pip, bearing 054° T., ran a 6400 yard
track on course varying from 330° to 050° T.
at speed of fourteen knots. Then we speeded up to seventeen
knots to close the range, the target did the same. The radar
indications persisted at.

2332 I decided that the target was a small, fast, radar equipped
A/S vessel or the RATON going north to his station and dis-
continued the approach as neither type was a suitable target.
During this period I was never certain whether we were the
tracker or the tracked.

2358 Lost radar contact bearing 070° T., range 10,500 yards.
25 February

0217 We sighted the loom of a searchlight sweeping all around on
the horizon, distant about twenty to thirty miles. I
believe this was an escort searching for survivors, or possibly
for us.

0547 Submerged for trim and to explore density layers.

0705 Surfaced, and set course 027° T. to pass between LIMA ISL NDS
and KALUKUANG at fifteen knots.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT #1
0940 SD radar contact at 12 miles, closing rapidly to 10 miles; plane
not sighted. Submerged to avoid being sighted. On this and
subsequent dives to avoid planes we went to 200 feet, rigging
for depth charge and disengaging gyro spindles, changing course
about 90° on the way down.

1007 Surfaced and resumed course and speed.

AIRCRAFT CONTACT #2
1309 SD radar contact at 18 miles, closing to 16 miles, at which
range it remained steady for three minutes and then faded out
until at

1314 the pip appeared again at 12 miles, closing rapidly to ten miles,
at which point we submerged. Plane not sighted.

1414 Surfaced and resumed course and speed.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT #3
1506 SD radar contact at 21 miles, slowly closing to 17 miles.

1513 Range on SD contact began to open slowly to 19 miles until 1517
when it faded out.

1518 Sighted small sailboat ahead, distant about seven miles. We
altered course and ran around him to avoid being sighted.

- 5 -

— page 125 —
1640 Sighted SIBARU ISLAND in LIMA ISLAND group, bearing 003° T.,
     distant 12 miles.

1730 Sighted twelve sailboats fishing off LAUREL REEF.

2025 Received indications on SJ of another radar in the vicinity.
     These indications persisted throughout the night, coming from all
     directions at various times, and varying in intensity from weak to
     very strong indications. I think that they must have been from a
     plane equipped with search radar, which was possibly covering a
     movement between MAKASSAR and PULO LAUT. This encouraged me to
     speed up to 17 knots to get up on this traffic route as soon as
     possible.

2247 We reached traffic route and changed course to head towards
     MAKASSAR at ten knots.

27 February

0108 I gave up the patrol along this route and headed toward CAPE
     WILLIAM at 15 knots as I wanted to get up to MANGHALIHAT as soon
     as possible in order to patrol off that point for a day or so.

0538 Submerged for trim and to investigate density layers, and to watch
     for plane activity.

0740 Surfaced about twenty miles west of CAPE MANDAR and proceeded north
     through narrow portion of MAKASSAR STRAIT between CAPE MANDAR and
     CAPE WILLIAM, staying about twenty miles off shore.
     SHIP CONTACT #1

0953 Sighted masts of small engine aft vessel proceeding south about
     five miles off the coast. We closed him until he was identified
     through high periscope as a whale-killer type ship, and probably
     one of the patrols which are usually found off this coast.
     SHIP CONTACT #2

1110 Sighted two masts of a ship just to the left of CAPE WILLIAM. We
     closed towards him, and determined by his change of bearing that
     he was on a southerly course. We could see that he was a MPM type,
     but could not judge his size. We came to the normal approach course
     to be in the southern part of LIBANI BAY which
     was an excellent spot to catch anything proceeding in close down the
     coast.

1349 We were in a good position and submerged to wait for him to come
     into view again. We had been unable to see him after he had come
     into the land background after he came so to of CAPE WILLIAM.

1530 The target had not been sighted, so we pulled out from the beach
     at six knots for one hour and at

1645 Surfaced and headed up the eastern side of MAKASSAR STRAIT towards
     SOUTH CATCHER at fifteen knots, patrolling ten miles off the coast.
     My only conclusion in regard to the vessel that disappeared is that
     he was a high-masted patrol vessel similar to one that we saw in
     the same general vicinity on the last patrol, and that he patrolled
     part of the way down the coast and then turned around and went back
     before he came into our field of vision while submerged.

- 6 -

— page 126 —
1922 We had the first of numerous radar contacts on rain squalls.
     All contacts that were at all doubtful were developed,
     until the new operators became able to differentiate genuine
     from false contacts. Some of the contacts that were developed
     were found to be on floating debris, some of which was large
     enough to constitute a serious menace to navigation. Several
     logs and spars ten or twelve inches in diameter and fifteen
     to twenty feet long were passed close aboard.

28 February
0625 Dove for day's submerged patrol 20 miles south of SOUTH WATCHER,
     and headed up towards TG. MANINABAJA where we remained until at
1700 we surfaced in a rain squall and pulled out from the beach, and
     then proceeded at fourteen knots along the CELEBES coast playing
     five to eight miles from the outlying islands and projecting
     points.
1725 Crossed the equator.

29 February
0425 When about 15 miles north of SIROOMEN KAAP changed course to
     018° T. to head for traffic route in CELEBES SEA between
     BASILAN STRAIT and HALMAHERA.
1358 Submerged for training and to investigate density layers.
1440 Surfaced and headed for position at 17 knots.
1943 As soon as SJ radar was manned, and all through the night, we
     had strong indications of another radar in the vicinity, and
     frequent contacts on rain squalls. I thought the BONEFISH
     might be in the vicinity and tried to contact him on voice
     modulated transmission with no success.

1 March 1944
0525 Submerged for day's patrol having reached the traffic route
     between BASILAN STRAIT and HALMAHERA.
1634 Surfaced and commenced searching thirty miles on either side of
     track, retiring towards the pass south of SANGI ISLAND on base
     course 141° T.
2237 Detected indications of another radar in the vicinity. These
     indications persisted intermittently throughout the night with
     varying intensity. Again tried to contact the BONEFISH by
     voice modulated transmission with no success.

- 7 -

— page 127 —
2 March
0534 Submerged for trim and to investigate density layers.
0642 Surfaced and continued surface patrol across base course 141° T.
     SHIP CONTACT #6
1200 Sighted smoke and found that it came from small fishing trawler
     tending nets or trot-lines.
1223 Passed through a line of netted glass buoys topped with a staff
     bearing two small streamers. I was satisfied that they were
     bonafide fishing buoys.
1320 Sighted SANGI ISLAND bearing 105° T., distant 40 miles. Contin-
     ued surface patrol across traffic route.
1832 Shortly after sunset we stood into the pass south of SANGI ISLAND
     and patrolled the approaches from six to ten miles off shore.
     There were about one hundred small light-bearing fishing bancas
     in this vicinity, some of which it was impossible to avoid
     passing close aboard. They may have reported our presence or
     we may have been sighted from the island, which probably account-
     ed for the plane finding us the next morning.

3 March
0439 Started pulling away from the pass at fifteen knots in order
     to be out of sight of land before daylight.
0640 Set course 316° T. to head back along traffic route to BASILAN
     STRAIT.
     AIRCRAFT CONTACT #4
0750 SD radar contact at range 12 miles, closing rapidly to 9 miles.
     Submerged. Plane not sighted.
0815 Returned to periscope depth to search for plane.
0913 The sky being all clear, surfaced and resumed course and speed.
     AIRCRAFT CONTACT #5
0934 SD radar contact at 7 miles, closing. Submerged rapidly. Plane
     not sighted, but at
0958 two aircraft bombs or depth charges heard, not too close.
1131 Surfaced, having decided that the plane might be covering a
     ship movement, and that the only way to find out was to surface
     and look around. Of course, if it was only a plane out to look
     for us as a result of having possibly been sighted the previous
     night, the best place for us was at 200 feet.
     SHIP CONTACT #7
1140 An exceptionally alert lookout, CSHM3L, Robert Lester, 337 96 35,
     81c, U.S. Navy, sighted indications of smoke on the horizon
     bearing 280° T. We changed course to head for it and determined
     that the bearing was changing to the left.
1203 We changed course to 230° T. and went ahead at 17 knots.

- 8 -

— page 128 —
1220 We could see the tops of two ships with small angles on the
bow through the periscope, so we changed course to 273° T.,
and headed for them until we could see the masts of several
more, and the smokes of others.

1222 Since they were all showing a small angle on the bow, and I
had reason to believe that they had air cover, I decided to
submerge because I was confident that I could get ahead of
them submerged even if I weren't already, since the range was
then at least 16 miles.

1238 The bearing of the smoke began to draw left, and we went to
the normal approach course at 6 to 8 knots, running at 90 to
100 feet between exposures.

1320 The situation looked fine. There were six ships and three
escorts, or seven ships and two escorts bearing from 264 to
279° T., angles on the bow from 15° port to 5° starboard, range
17,000 yards. The ships appeared to be in line of division
columns, there being two columns of three ships each, with the
ships of each column in line of bearing 220 R. One escort was
on the starboard bow of the left hand column leader, one was
on the port side of the right hand column and another single
ship was behind the entire formation. I never could see this
ship very well, but the other large ships appeared to be AKs
or AK-APs of five to seven thousand tons.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT #5

1335 Sighted SALLY type bomber staying low and over the convoy.

1355 Sound heard pinging, but was unable to determine the frequency.

1400 Up until this time I had been certain that we would be able to
make an attack, but the picture began to change after this, the
angles on the bow all being from 90 to 120° port, and the range
which had decreased to 8000 yards began to open. At this stage
I took pictures of the formation with the still camera.
I believe that at about this time the convoy commodore received
information that we had been sighted in the morning, and that
he changed the base course from about 145° to 180° T. to run
around our possible position. We continued to run at six knots
to keep them in sight until dark.

1626 We could not see their smoke submerged, so surfaced and began
to head for them at 17 knots.

1735 Sighted smoke bearing 282° T. distant about 15 miles and set
course to pass about 14,000 yards abeam of the convoy. Although
coached on the bearing, the SJ radar was unable to pick up the
targets until

1851 at a range of 13,500 yards, and accurate ranges and bearings
could not be obtained until the range was about 10,000 yards.
This was discouraging, as previously we had been able to track
targets of this size at 18,000 yards. We flooded down to reduce
our silhouette as we drew abeam of the targets in the light of

- 9 -

— page 129 —
a half moon. The visibility was not very good due to the surface
haze shortly after sunset, but at

1937 When we could barely see anything but the smoke from the targets
at 12,750 yards we were apparently sighted by one of the large
ships in the rear part of the formation which was exactly on the
bearing of strong radar indications. This ship opened fire at
us at first with one gun and then with two or three guns of four
or five inch calibre, firing about twenty rounds rapid fire.

1947 The fire was taken up by an escort on the port bow of the form-
ation as he headed over in our direction at a plotted speed of
12 knots. The convoy which had been on a course of 160° T.
turned away to course 240° T. We tried to run around ahead of
the escort, but finally had to change course to 030° T. at

2006 and head away from him when the range closed to 6,500 yards.
He stopped firing when we put our tail towards him, but kept
heading towards us until the range had opened to about 13,000
yards when he fired four or five additional rounds and turned
back. While their powder certainly was not flashless, so far
as we could observe during the period that we were fired at,
the shells were splashless.

2030 We changed course to 270° T. to go back and pick up the convoy.

2030 SJ contact on convoy at 16,400 yards. We had tuned up the
SJ a little better as we retired from the escort according to
prearranged plan.

2040 We began to work around the convoy keeping 15,000 yards from the
nearest ship as we went around. I planned to stay ahead of it
until the moon set at 0100, and then to start working on it.

2147 We were ahead of the convoy which was zig-ing between 130 and
190° T. at 7.5 knots. At this point our SJ went out of commission
and when it would be back in commission
I decided to submerge and try to get in one attack as early as
possible, in order that I would be able to get ahead of them
again for a submerged attack at dawn.

2147 Submerged to radar depth and headed for the center of the convoy.

2202 I was able to see some of the targets at a generated range of
12,000 yards, angle on the bow about zero.

2223 The SJ radar was still out of commission, so we went to 60 feet.
The targets zigged right about 30° at this time to 185° T. at a
generated range of about 6,000 yards, and we changed course to
the left to 275° T. for a 95° port track.

2228 Rigged ship for depth charges as a precautionary measure.

2233 Sound made first contact at a generated range of 4,500 yards.

It appeared at this time that all we would have to do was to
avoid being run down, to wait until the targets closed to
about 1500 yards, to pick a target, make a snap set-up, get
an echo range, and shoot. I planned to fire three torpedoes
- 10 -

— page 130 —
at each of two targets from the bow tubes, and four at a
target with the stern tubes. I was satisfied that we had a good
solution for speed at 7.5 knots.

2238 Picked out the nearest large target, angle on bow 90° port,
swung left for a zero gyro angle, got a ping range of 2700 yards,
and at

2239-45 Fired the first of three torpedoes on tracks - 95 to 99° port,
gyro angles 356 to 359°, torpedo run - 2660 to 2620 yards,
spread 1°, depth setting 10 feet, at an eight second firing
interval, putting in check bearings between each shot.

2240-30 Right full rudder to a zero gyro angle on the next target.
Gave set-up to TDC operator; angle on bow 110° port, range by
periscope 1700 yards. He obtained a ping range of 3100 yards,
but I could see that it was on a target to the right of the
one I planned to shoot. My periscope range was good so I
used it.

2241-30 First torpedo heard to hit.

2241-35 Second torpedo heard to hit. After hearing this I picked up
the target in the periscope in time to see the third hit very
close to the stern.

2241-47 Third torpedo heard to hit.

2242-21 Fired the first of three torpedoes on tracks 106 to 111° port,
gyro angles 000 to 352°, torpedo run to 1710 to 1680 yards,
depth setting 10 feet, with an eight second firing interval,
putting in check bearings between shots.

2243 Right full rudder to bring stern tubes to bear on a target
that was bearing down on me with a small port angle on the
bow. But when I took a range I found that it was a little
less than 600 yards, and the angle on the bow was 5° star-
board. I had almost 90° to swing for a straight stern shot
down his throat. On the all around sweep after firing I
looked at the ship previously hit and all that I could see
was a heavy pall of smoke covering his entire length. I
also saw an escort about 1500 yards away, angle on the bow
zero, with the will known bone in his teeth.

2245 Three hundred feet - use negative!
I made one more attempt to get the stern tubes off by getting
a set-up on a ship almost astern that had a 90° port angle on
the bow, but I was unable to get a periscope range, and couldn't
even catch sound on the bearing to get a range before the periscope
went under. But I was able to see that the large AK was still
headed for my periscope and getting too close.

2247 When passing 150 feet - one fairly close depth charge that shook
us up a good bit, but did no material damage. Then at intervals
of 30 seconds we had two others, apparently moving out. I think
that these were from the AK that passed overhead.

- 11 -

— page 131 —
2249 We were running silently at 325 feet, about 25 feet under a
     1° abrupt thermocline. Free
2249 until 2322 we had ten single depth charges, each de-
     livered after a five to ten minute period of listening by the
     attacking vessel. Then his screws would speed up and he would
     come in for the drop. The heavy screws moved out of listening
     range in a short while leaving at first two, and then one, escort.
     I don't believe that he ever heard us for sure,
     but that he was just trying to keep us down - which he did - while
     the remainder of the convoy made their escape.
2340 Apparently all clear except for one sector that was noisy, but
     in which no screws could be heard.

0000 Surfaced up, surfacing at 0000.
     SHIP CONTACT #7-A
0008 SJ radar contact, range 6500 yards. We could just see the target
     which appeared to be an escort. We started tracking him and
     found that he was circling around at 11 to 12 knots. We closed
     him to about 3000 yards and then pulled away on course 170° T.
     to overtake the convoy. I would have liked to have closed him
     enough to see if he was picking up survivors, but I didn't want
     to be sighted because he might be there just to hold me down.
     SHIP CONTACT #7-B
0144 SJ radar contact bearing 194° T., range 3900 yards. We opened
     out to 5000 yards and tracked this target at which we could not
     see, now that the moon had set. He was on
     course 155° T., at speed 7 knots. We finally closed this fellow
     to about 1000 yards and saw that it was apparently a motor life-
     boat. I decided that chasing the convoy was more important than
     looking him over more closely, so changed course to 170° T. to
     intercept it if it was south of its track. This course would
     also bring me to the BALIKPAPAN - PALAU traffic route which I
     want to patrol for four hours submerged while we rested a bit.

0527 Submerged for trim, to explore density layers, to patrol, to
     rest on SJ radar, and to rest.

1018 Surfaced and commenced patrolling across this traffic route on a
     north and south course covering 15 miles on either side and about
     four hours along the track.
     I realized that it was unlikely that anything would come along
     after last night's activity, but had some time to
     spare before I resumed search for the convoy.
     During this period we sighted and avoided three small sailboats.
1317 Set course 072° T. for pass south of SANGI ISLAND at 15 knots,
     planning to go through pass immediately after dark.

     We had laid off the convoy's possible tracks through all the five
     passes between SANGI ISLAND and the northwest tip of the CELEBES
     assuming that it was heading for MOROTAI STRAIT, and found that
     we would be able to cover his optimum position on all these tracks,
     and his position one, two, and three hours delay, before daylight.
     - 12 -

— page 132 —
If we had not made contact by then we were going to retire
a position ten miles northwest of NORTH LOLODA ISLAND where
we could hardly miss him unless chased down by planes.

1339 SJ radar back in commission.

1900 Went through pass south of SANGI ISLAND, and changed course to
     165° T., the first leg of our search plan.
     SHIP CONTACT #7-c
2117 Another exceptional lookout sighted a puff of smoke in the moon-
     light, bearing 160° T., fifteen miles away. We headed for the
     smoke and made SJ radar contact at

2137 bearing 177° T., range 13,350 yards. We commenced tracking and
     found that they were on course 060° T., at speed 8.5 knots. We
     started opening out to 15,000 yards to avoid being sighted.

2140 Radar picked up escort at range of 9000 yards before we could
     see him on the bridge. We then could see that he was headed
     for us, and plot showed that he was making 11 knots and headed
     towards us. We pulled away from him at 18 knots on course
     270° T. until we lost radar contact on him. He then
     fired four or five rounds in our direction
     as warning shots and apparently returned to look for the convoy
     which had changed course to 130° T., away from us.

2200 We headed back to pick up the convoy.

5 March

0000 We started the day off right by making SJ radar contact bearing
     173° T., range 10,000 yards. We developed this contact and
     found that it was the escort again on course 110° T., speed 11
     knots. We changed course to run around to the northward of
     the escort and pick up the convoy.

0037 SJ radar contact on the convoy, at range 17,000 yards. We
     decided to get ahead of them and track until after the moon
     set at 0745.
     ATTACK #5 and 6
0219 We were ahead of them at range of about 12,000 yards and they
     appeared to be five large ships and two or three escorts, and
     that they had just made a radical change of course from 140° to
     040° T., apparently to shake us off in the reduced visibility.
     We began to get into attack position on their starboard bow,
     flooded down and made all tubes, two forward and four
     aft, ready. Our plan was to shoot the
     bow tubes at the leading target and the stern tubes at the
     one behind him. We kept the low on the first target and were
     at 17 knots. At 9000 yards range the target intercepted
     between 2/3 and 3/4 of the binocular field.

0300 Set-up checked perfectly for last five minutes using target course
     085° T., speed 8.5 knots.

0302-00 Fired the first of two torpedoes from the bow tubes at large AK
     on 95 to 98° starboard track, gyro angles - 1 and 2°, torpedo
     - 13 -

— page 133 —
run 1240 to 1820 yards, depth setting at 10 feet, and firing
intervals of eight seconds. I watched these two torpedotracks
as we swung right for a zero gyro angle with the stern tubes
on the second target, and saw then both run under the target.

0304-34 Fired the first of four torpedoes at large AK using same course
and speed, tracks - 60 to 85 starboard, gyro angles - 198 to
210°, torpedo run 2100 to 2500 yards, depth set at 10 feet, with
eight second firing interval. The control party informed me
when it was about time for the torpedoes to hit and I put my
glasses on the second target in time to see one definite hit
near the bow. No explosion was heard, but this target was
covered with smoke.

0305 Changed course to 100° T. to put an escort at range 3300 yards
on the starboard quarter.

0308 Explosion heard topside and below.

0314 Red light seen on ship that was hit.

0315 to 0319 Three explosions. Hit target was heavily smoking,
apparently all over.

0320 Reload completed aft.

0321 to 0330 Three more explosions.
ATTACK #7

0340 We started closing the convoy again, and at

0354 had selected the two trailing ships for our next targets. They
appeared to be the largest and closest, which was important because
daylight would start breaking in one hour.

0400 Started closing for the attack; all tubes aft ready, our last four
torpedoes.

0415 We were 1800 yards from our target when we started swinging left for
stern tubes. Two escorts were closing us with zero angles on the
starboard beam and quarter which prevented me from swinging right as
I had planned. We were using target course 050° T., speed 10 knots.

0417-20 Commenced firing spread of four torpedoes from the stern tubes, on
168 to 171 starboard tracks, gyro angles - 189 to 191°, torpedo
run 3000 to 3300 yards, spread 3/4°, with an 8 second firing inter-
val. This was a bad set-up, and we should not have fired; and I
would not if I had known that it was that bad.

0421 to 0422 Heard three torpedoes explode at end of run.

0430 We were clear of the escorts and had lost SJ radar contact.

0503 O.O.D. sighted flame on the horizon bearing 350° T.

- 14 -

— page 134 —
0505 O.O.D. sighted shower of sparks in the air on the horision
bearing 010° T. Changed course to 010° T. to investigate.
SHIP CONTACT # 7-D
0526 Sighted smoke bearing 040° T. through periscope; headed for
smoke and found that it was from convoy which we had attacked
during the night.

0605 We had closed as much as we could without being sighted. There
were four AKs or AP-AKs and three escorts, zig-zagging madly.
We took photographs of the formation with the still camera
through #2 periscope. I didn't track them any further as their
position could be determined from my last despatch, and I thought
that no one else was close enough to get them before they reached
MOLUCCA STRAIT.

0629 Dove for daye submerged patrol to wait for instructions regard-
ing route to new station, and to rest.

1818 Surfaced and headed for MOLUCCA PASSAGE at 15 knots.

6 March
0842 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #2
SD radar contact, range 7 miles, closing, plane not sighted.
Submerged.

0937 Surfaced, and proceeded south through MOLUCCA PASSAGE, heading
to pass between SULA MANGOLI and OBI MAJOR.

1348 Set course 211° T., to pass 10 miles west of BURU ISLAND.

2035 Having passed BURU, set course to pass 10 miles east of TIMOR.

7 March
1016 Commenced zig-zagging during daylight about 120 miles from TIMOR.

1112 Submerged for training and to investigate density layers.

1206 Surfaced.

1900 Passed between TIMOR and LETI ISLAND.

8 March
1229 Sighted MELVILLE ISLAND bearing 088° T., distant 20 miles.

1424 Sighted our escort, ML 614, and exchanged recognition signals.

- 15 -

— page 135 —
1642 Received pilot after passing through boom gate. The Commanding
Officer of U.S. Naval Section Base, Navy No. 245, Lieut-Comdr
L. Martin Smith, U.S. Naval Reserve, also came on board.
1654 Ran the degaussing range to obtain magnetic signature with degaus-
sing coils cut in.
1720 Moored to Boom Jetty, and shortly thereafter commenced
receiving fuel, water
and torpedoes.

9 March
0500 Loading completed. See material notes concerning difficulties
experienced with the torpedoes loaded here.
1130 Underway for passage east of TIMOR. Checked our magnetic signature
again by running through the Degaussing Range, once with degaussing
coils cut in and once without. When clear of boom gate set speed
14 knots.
1622 Submerged to check trim, inspect for air and oil leaks.
1903 Surfaced.

10 March
0515 Commenced zigzagging at daylight.
0756 Submerged for training.
0835 Surfaced.
0844 Crossed the 100 fathom curve, and secured degaussing.
1115 Sighted highest peak on TIMOR, bearing 297° T., distant 55 miles.
1147 When 20 miles from pass, submerged for remainder of approach during
daylight, speed 4 knots.
1820 Surfaced and headed for pass at 17 knots.
1830 Passed between TIMOR and LETI, set course to pass east of KISAR and
WETAR.
2115 Passed 6 miles from northeast point of WETAR, and set course to
stay 6 miles off shore during the night, and 10 to 15 miles off
during daylight while passing through the FLORES SEA north of the
BARRIER ISLANDS, speed 17 knots.

11 March
1244 Increased speed to full on four main engines, 18 knots, in order to
get to station as soon as possible.
1645 Passed between SUKUR ISLAND and ANGELICA SHOAL.
- 16 -

— page 136 —
2104 Due to an easterly current averaging 1.5 to 2 knots we would not
be able to get within 4 days submerged run of the northern
approach to LOMBOK STRAIT, even at four engine speed, so I
secured one engine and continued at 17 knots.

12 March

0530 Passed 8 miles north of SANGIANG ISLAND.

0542 Submerged for exploration of density layers.

0617 Surfaced.

1240 Sighted light on MARIA REIGERSBERGEN BANKS, bearing 221° T,
distant 10 miles.

1230 - 1340 While passing between ZANDBUIS BANKS and the southern
islands of the PATROL GROUP we sighted what appeared to
be six or eight posts or piles sticking about eight feet out
of the water with a platform layed across the tops of them.
It appeared to be near the north west corner of the banks,
and may be a temporary and unrecorded aid to navigation.
Its exact position is Latitude 07° 45'30" S. Longitude 117°
07'11" E.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT #8

1310 to 1322 SD radar contact at range 14 miles, opening to 19
miles and then closing to 18 miles and disappearing. The
plane was not sighted.

1410 Made quick dive when O.O.D. misunderstood the lookout's
report "Land dead ahead" for "Plane dead ahead".

1531 Surfaced.

1700 Sighted high peak on LOMBOK bearing 246° T., distant 30 miles.
SHIP CONTACT #8

1739 Sighted smoke of ship bearing 233° T. We maneuvered to develop
this contact and found at 1834 that it was a tug towing a barge
in an easterly direction close inshore along the north coast
of LOMBOK.
SHIP CONTACT #9

1816 Sighted masts and upperworks of a patrol craft well ahead of the
tug and tow, but on an opposite course. I believe that this
escort which had been difficult to see against the dark land
background at twilight, had already sighted me and had left his
tug to chase us.

1846 Set course 245° T. for patrol station.
SHIP CONTACT #10

2001 SJ radar contact dead ahead, range 6400 yards, closing. Sound also
picked up his pinging dead ahead. We changed course to put him
astern and started tracking. When the full moon rose at

2013 we were sighted, if not before, and increased speed to flank to
open out from the patrol boat.

2020 Plot showed him making 20 knots and we could see that he was
heading at us, so we blew safety and negative, and all ballast
17

— page 137 —
tanks for five minutes, but he continued to overhaul us. We
could not shake him by gradually changing course to the north-
ward.

2032 With the range steady at 4100 yards he began firing what appear-
ed to be forty MM with tracer at us. These were fired in bursts
of eight to ten every few minutes, but none were very close until
at

2051 when the shots began to whistle overhead and then to land along
side of us on either side. The range was steady at 4400 yards.
ATTACK #8
2053 Submerged to shoot a few torpedoes down his throat.

2055 He dropped three depth charges at six second intervals, probably
to drive us deep.

2056 Four more depth charges in groups of two, five seconds apart.

2100 Commenced firing spread of four torpedoes from the stern tubes,
track 26° P to 131° P Port, gyro angle 152 to 125°, torpedo run
750 to 1250 yards, spread 1/8°, depth set at zero and firing
interval 8 seconds. The target must have seen the impulse bubble
or wake of the first torpedo as he started changing course to
his right very soon after I started firing. He seemed to spin on
a dime. I kept putting in check bearings and changing his angle
on the bow, but I probably wasn't keeping up with him. All missed,
and the last two that were fired broached several times. But
they discouraged him for the time being and he drew off and at
SHIP CONTACT #11
2113 started signalling to two other ships that had arrived on the
scene. We opened out until we thought we were well clear. We
could see them signalling, but were beyond radar contact at 45
feet.

2146 Surfaced and started working around the patrol boats to the north
and west at full speed on four engines.

2204 We sighted two patrol craft bearing 205° T, distant about five
miles, beyond radar range. We could have probably lost them if
we had not continued to attempt to work around them and get to
our station, but I thought that they might be screening some im-
portant ship movement in the vicinity of LOMBOK STRAIT so I per-
sisted.

2217 There were three of them chasing us now, all pouring out black
smoke and making about 20 knots. One of them began to fire his
4.7 inch guns at us, but the splashes were all short at that
time. He would fire about six shots every ten minutes.

2319 Up until this point I had been gradually changing course to the
westward without them detecting it, but one of the three broke
off from the other two and started heading me off in that direction.
I realized that I would not be able to get back to my station
tonight, so decided to head back to the Northward to pass east
of the KANGEAN ISLANDS in order to make them think that I was
trying to go north through MAKASSAR STRAITS. It was going to
be a close shave, however, because we were getting close to the

— page 138 —
KANGEAN ISLANDS, and the necessary change of course put two of
the pursuers bearing about 120° on the starboard side.

13 March

0000 T, making our very best speed, 19.8 knots.
The two targets on the starboard side dropped back in bearing to
about 160° R, before they detected our change in plans, but we
could see that they were slowly closing us. At this time we ob-
tained our first SJ radar range, 7600 yards. The range continued
to close until it reached 7500 yards on the nearest ship bearing
175° R. at 0044. Then it began to slowly open on this ship, but
we could see that it was closing on the two other ships although
the SJ could not pick them up.

0104 We passed the SEPANJANG ISLAND abeam to port, distant 6450 yards.
We were now in water of from 30 to 40 fathoms and didn't want
to dive until we reached deeper water of 60 fathoms or more in
about an hour.

0128 The shell splashes began to get closer, in fact one landed about
twenty yards on the port beam and others began to splash ahead.
At least one, and sometimes two, ships had been firing at us
since about 2300. They would fire six or eight shots about every
ten minutes, apparently in an effort to drive us down. We had
been watching the splashes in the SJ radar screen. For over an
hour they were from 2000 to 3500 yards short, but now all were
within 1900 yards.
SHIP CONTACT 12
0136 They ceased firing, and I brought the lookouts back up on the
bridge. Four ships were in sight now.

0150 Submerged as they had started firing again, too close for safety,
and we were in sufficiently deep water now. We would never be
able to completely shake them off before daylight with the clear
visibility and full moon, and there was no point in getting any
further away from our station. I tried to shake them by changing
course 90° to the left and running at 2/3 speed, but it didn't
work. As soon as we submerged two or three of them started echo
ranging, and very shortly headed for us with zero angle on the
bow.

0200 With range to nearest ship about 2000 yards, started down to 300
feet and rig for depth charge. But we didn't go down as fast
as I thought we would, and when passing 180 feet at

0204 to 0205 we received eleven fairly close depth charges at from 4
to 9 second intervals. Quite a few light bulbs were broken
throughout the ship and the QB sound gear was put out of commission
temporarily.

0216 After much starting and stopping of screws, and considerable
pinging, they dropped five more charges, but these were about
half a mile away. We were now at 350 feet and under a nice
thermocline of about three degrees. During this last barrage
we took a sounding and found that we had 15 fathoms under the
keel.

- 19 -

— page 139 —
0230 Over a period of several minutes about 25 depth charges were heard
at an estimated range of two miles. During the remainder of the
night we had sound contact to three vessels at all times. They
area very thoroughly to prevent us from surfacing and making off
before daylight. We had been steering a steady course of 050° T.
since 0200, trying to get clear to the north and east of SEKALA
ISLAND.

0550 Sound indicated that the immediate area was sufficiently clear, and
we returned to periscope depth. Two patrol vessels were in sight,
the nearest about 2500 yards away. From then until 0950 we had four
vessels, or their smoke, in sight. During this period I was able
to identify two of them as No. 13 class - AM 7-12.

0950 All of the patrol vessels had cleared out on course about 210° T. to
avoid planes which I expected out, but we remained submerged to
but did not see through the SJ radar trying to improve
it's operation.

1707 Surfaced and set course for patrol station at 15 knots until charge
was completed. On the way down we spent about an
hour after dark checking the SJ radar on SEPANJANG ISLAND. It was
not operating reliably.
SHIP CONTACT #13
2035 Sighted and heard echo ranging of a patrol boat. We could not close
him enough to make SJ contact without being sighted for certain, so
avoided.

14 March

0029 SHIP CONTACT #14 and #15
to 0125 Heard echo ranging and sighted two different patrol boats.
We could see that they were not escorting anything, so avoided. SJ
radar contact not established.

0544 Submerged for day's patrol about five miles north of northern en-
trance to LOMBOK STRAIT.

0652 Sighted sailboat bearing 275° T., distant about 5 miles.

0735 Sighted smoke bearing 122° T.
SHIP CONTACT #16
0803 Sighted two Class 13 AKs bearing 091 and 094° T., both smoking
heavily.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT #9
0913 Sighted Reconnaissance Plane over escorts. The surface was
oily smooth, not a ripple, we commenced going to 90 feet between
observations.
SHIP CONTACT #17
0932 Sighted tops of larger vessel bearing about 100° T. and started
approach on it.

0950 Identified target as small AK, range 4600 yards, angle on bow 30° S.
Sighted another smaller AK about 2000 yards on the starboard quarter
of the first. We set course for a 90° starboard track. The two AKs
had now joined the convoy.

0955-30 Then passing 80 feet on the way to periscope depth for an observation
received one depth charge or bomb from plane, not too close. We con-

- 20 -

— page 140 —
timed to come up for the observation until 0857 when we received
a very close depth charge or bomb from a plane which broke
the periscope, and put #2 periscope out of focus. I discontinued
the approach and started deep as sound could hear the escort
speeding up, and we were not close enough to the target to get
off a worthwhile shot, even if he hadn't already zigged away.

0905-0906 Four depth charges from one escort, no damage, but close.

0910-0911 Four depth charges from another escort, no closer.

0913 Both escorts started echo ranging, and continued alternately
     listening and pinging in our vicinity until 1340. During this
     period we were drawing to the northward at 300 feet, under a 3°
     thermocline at 290 feet. As long as we stayed under the layer
     they apparently were not able to hear us, although they dropped
     16 more charges, usually in groups of four. Whenever we pene-
     trated the layer on the way up to periscope depth, they would
     pick us up and they would speed up their screws and head for us.

1404 We reached periscope depth -all clear. We worked on SJ radar the
     remainder of the day.
1436-1451 We heard twelve depth charges, estimated to be about ten miles
     away.

1559 We could hear echo ranging bearing 170° T. Apparently they were
     still searching for us in the channel.

1924 Surfaced and set course to patrol about ten miles off the north-
     western coast of BALI.

2034 Closed land to about 6 miles to tune the SJ radar which didn't
     appear to be operating properly. Very little improvement was
     noted.

15 March
0520 SHIP CONTACT #18
     Sighted Class 13 AM, distant about four miles. We were unable to
     pick him up with SJ and the range appeared to be closing even after
     we had turned away and speeded up, so at

0524 We submerged to avoid detection in the increasing light, and to
     conduct day's submerged patrol.
1100 SHIP CONTACT #19 and #20
     Sighted smoke and, later, masts of Class 13 AM which continued to
     head for us until we went deep at range 4500 yards. He was echo
     ranging continuously and apparently made contact on us before we
     went deep. He was soon joined by another pinger. The two search-
     ed back and forth in our vicinity until 1324 when they started
     drawing away.

1337 Periscope depth - all clear except for smoke of retiring AM.
1620-1630 SHIP CONTACT #21
     Sound heard distant echo ranging; nothing sighted.

1913 Surfaced; patrolling at 10 knots speed.
2149 SHIP CONTACT #22
     SJ radar contact at 6000 yards. The contact developed and found

- 21 -

— page 141 —
to be a small target making 15 knots on course 110° T. It was seen
to be small at the closest range, 4900 yards, under excellent visi-
bility conditions. It was probably one of the AMs, although no echo
ranging was heard.

2214 We lost SJ radar contact at 8600 yards.

16 March
SHIP CONTACT #23
0019 Sound reported weak echo ranging dead ahead. This contact was not
developed due to two other sound and radar contacts close aboard
during the next two hours, apparently on porpoises as nothing could
be seen at the reported ranges of 1000 and 1500 yards. The sound
and radar operators were getting quite jumpy by this time.

0534 Submerged for day's patrol.
SHIP CONTACT #24
0622 Heard echo ranging and at

0645 sighted Class 13 AM patrolling to the northwest.
SHIP CONTACT #25 and #26
0953 Heard echo ranging and sighted AM about six miles off the coast of
BALI. It appeared that he would pass about 3 miles to the south
of us, but at a range of 8000 yards he picked us up and headed for
us. At a range of 4500 yards we went deep and ran silently until
he passed clear. During the remainder of the day two AMs remained
in the vicinity searching for us. On three subsequent occasions
before surfacing they heard us with good contacts until we
went deep to lose them.
During the day dropped the lower antenna assembly on the SJ radar
for the sixth time this patrol and manufactured and installed the
third new sleeve between the di-pole casting and the rectangular wave
guide casting.

1955 Surfaced, having been held up for about half an hour by an AM in
the vicinity, and commenced patrolling, at 10 knots.

17 March
0535 Submerged for day's patrol.
SHIP CONTACT #28
0645 Echo ranging from a patrol vessel on course about 120° T. Nothing
was sighted.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT #10
0808 O.S.D. sighted a float type reconnaissance plane flying low over
the water, distant about two miles. This was the only time it was
seen.
SHIP CONTACT #29 and #30
0820-1630 Two AMs conducted an intensive A/S search in our general vicinity.
They chased us down three times when they had good echo ranging
contact on us at ranges between 5000 to 7000 yards. They then
would head for us and search in the vicinity for about fifteen
minutes before shoving off.

1619-1626 Sixteen depth charges about 7 to 10 miles away; nothing was in sight
at the time. This seemed to satisfy them as they were not seen the
remainder of the day.

- 22 -

— page 142 —
1916 Surfaced and started patrolling at 10 knots.
2253 SJ radar contact, range 4900 yards. We put our stern toward
the range before developing the contact. It was probably a sailboat. The
visibility was very poor due to the surface haze.

18 March
0155 SJ radar contact, range 950 yards. We sighted a small sailboat
with sails down.
SHIP CONTACT #31
0505 Sighted smoking patrol vessel with small angle on the bow, range
about 4 miles. We put him astern and tried to open the range.

0515 Evidently he had not sighted us, but it was getting light fast
and he would certainly see us soon, so we submerged for day's
patrol, again avoiding sailboats and the larger variety as the
device.
SHIP CONTACT #32
1552 Sound heard echo ranging and at

1640 We sighted an AM with a small angle on the bow. Eventually we
went deep to avoid him as he obtained contact on us and speeded
up. He kept us down until 1623. In addition to his pinging
we could hear his screws most of the time.

1739 to 1827 We heard a total of 35 distant depth charges.

1914 Surfaced and started patrolling.

19 March
0320 SHIP CONTACT #33
Sound heard pinging, but the patrol vessel was apparently heading
away from us at a good speed as he soon passed out of hearing.
There was no sight or radar contact and nothing else in the vici-
nity.

0448 Sound picked up very distant pinging, bearing about 100° T.

0529 Submerged for day's patrol.

0550 The patrol vessel which we still were unable to see made good
echo ranging contact on us. He lost us when we went deep.

0656 Sighted AM distant about 5 miles, still searching with his sound
gear, and returning to LOMBOK STRAIT after his morning search.
We set course to patrol along the north coast of BALI, about
five miles off shore.
SHIP CONTACT #34, ATTACK #9
1138 C.O.D. sighted a Jap submarine surfacing, bearing 130° T., distant
about 4000 yards, angle on the bow small. He wasn't able to identi-
fy it at first due to a mirage effect on the oily, flat surface.
At first he thought it was a sailboat.

- 23 -

— page 143 —
1140 The submarine swung right until the angle on the bow was about 20
     port and then swung left presenting a starboard angle.

1143 He steadied on his course, and we changed course for a 90° star-
     board track with the stern tubes.

1149 Commenced firing spread of four torpedoes from the stern tubes,
     tracks - 100 to 111 starboard, gyro angles - 213 to 224°, torpedo
     run 1150 to 1200 yards, spread 1° (through error), firing interval
     8 seconds, depth - 10 feet, using speed 14 knots and target course
     of 315° T. The speed solution wasn't good, as plot was getting
     speed of about ten knots, but the TDC operator thought that 14.5
     was better. The target was building up a good bow wave, and sub-
     sequent analysis showed that 12 knots was the best speed from
     our data. Only 1° spread between shots
     was used because the fire controlman who sets the spread mis-
     understood the track angle of "one hundred and fifteen" for "fifteen".

1150 The target sighted the torpedo tracks and changed course rapidly to
     the left and presented a track angle of about 160° before we could
     bring the bow tubes to bear.
     The submarine was an RO-51 type, and he had a large size Japanese
     merchant flag painted on his conning tower. It definitely was not
     a man-of-war ensign.

1159 We began to open out to the Northward.
     SHIP CONTACT #35
1350 Two Class 13 A/S came out
     in our vicinity quite thoroughly. We could hear the screws of one
     or both most of the time.

1533-1534 Three depth charges about two miles away, this seemed to satisfy
     them as they left shortly thereafter.

1612-1614 Twelve depth charges about eight miles away.

1645 At periscope depth - sighted tops of one Class 13 A/S about ten miles
     to the northwest.

1920 Surfaced and commenced patrolling at 10 knots.
     SHIP CONTACT #36
2145 First of six sound contacts on echo ranging during the night. The
     same two vessels appeared to be participating in the hunt judging
     from their echo ranging frequencies. We stayed well clear of both
     of them during the night.

20 March

0532 Submerged for day's patrol.
     SHIP CONTACT #37
0609 to 9724. Evaded unidentified patrol vessel at periscope depth.
     SHIP CONTACT #38
1855 Heard distant echo ran in, to southward.

1908 Surfaced and started patrolling at 5 knots.

                                                                 - 24 -

— page 144 —
21 March
0149 to 0303 Indications on SJ of another radar in the vicinity. Probably
EATON going through.
0540 Submerged for patrol.
SHIP CONTACT #39
0603 to 0731 Evaded a Class 13 AM at periscope depth.
0900 Lieutenant (junior grade) A. W. NEWLON, U. S. Navy, was placed on
the sick list - diagnosis: acute pericornitis.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT #11
1000 O.O.D. sighted a float type reconnaissance plane about 3 miles away.
The plane was not seen on any subsequent observations.
SHIP CONTACT #40
1058 to 1351 Evaded a Class 13 AM at periscope depth, closest range 6200
yards.
1334 to 1136 Four depth charges from the A/S vessel, range 8000 yards.
1919 Surfaced, patrolling at five knots.
1937 Sighted dark object on the horizon, investigated it and found it was
a cloud.
SHIP CONTACT #41
2132 Sighted smoke and then superstructure of unidentified patrol vessel,
distant about 4 miles, angle on the bow small, we speeded up and put
him astern to evade and soon lost him from sight, but at
2208 we had SJ radar contact bearing 140° T., range 6000 yards. He had
come in through a rain squall this time.
2223 We lost SJ radar contact at 9000 yards.
2224 Apparently he thought that we had submerged at the point of sighting
as he dropped four depth charges in that vicinity, but he kept head-
ing in our direction at better than 15 knots, and at
2238 started signalling in our direction.
2240 We regained SJ radar contact at 9000 yards, but finally shook him
off by gradually changing course to the left. He stopped pinging
soon after we shook him off.

22 March
0035 SHIP CONTACT #42
SJ radar contact, range 7150 yards, closing. I don't believe that
he knew we were there until we speeded up, but then he must have
heard our screws and started after us. We finally shook him off
by gradually changing course to the southward at 18 knots. He
would ping for a while and then listen. We saw him faintly until
the range opened to about 9000 yards. SJ radar lost contact at
7300 yards.
0215 SJ radar contact at range 5350 yards. Plot showed the target to
be stopped. We found that it was a two-masted sail boat.
0300-0400The SJ showed strong indications of another radar in the vicinity.
0504 Submerged for day's patrol. Went deep to investigate density
layers.
- 25 -

— page 145 —
SHIP CONTACT #3
0539 Echo ranging bearing 029° T. Returned to periscope depth.
SHIP CONTACT #4
0554 Slow screws bearing 034° T. Nothing in sight.

0601 Sighted hull of ship distant about 6000 yards, angle on the bow
about 150° starboard, on course about 270° T, bearing 240° T.
We couldn't see it well enough to obtain a periscope range or to
identify it, but it appeared to be a small AK(MFM).

0603-0630 Went to 300 feet to evade a patrol boat.

0632 to 0749 Continued to evade patrol boat at periscope depth. This
appears to be on of the extra escorts returning towards LOMBOK
STRAIT.

0930 We began to maneuver to pass through a fleet of about 15 fishing
boats.
SHIP CONTACT #5
1027 to 1137 Evaded a Class 13 AM at periscope depth.
SHIP CONTACT #6
1331 to 1451 Evaded another Class 13 AM at 300 feet after he picked
us up by echo ranging and headed directly for us at high speed
and with lots of black smoke.

1507 to 1709 We had to go deep again to evade the same fellow who came
back at us.

1815 to 1908 A repetition of the above.

1916 Surfaced and began patrolling at 5 knots.

23 March

0144 O.O.D. sighted object on horizon, either a sailboat or small patrol
craft. It was avoided. Nothing heard on sound.

0528 Submerged for day's patrol.
SHIP CONTACT #7
0641 Sound heard pinging bearing 280° T. Nothing was sighted.
SHIP CONTACT #8
1539 Sound heard pinging, bearing 140° T.

1530 Sighted mast of patrol vessel on course 020° T., distant 8 miles,
angle on the bow 40° port.

1620 The angle on the bow was 300° port, and the range was about 5000
yards when he picked us up with his echo ranging and headed for
us. I had just identified him as a PC-1 type patrol vessel. I
waited until the range was 3900 yards, and when there was no change
in the angle, went deep to avoid.

1630 When the patrol reached our vicinity he cruised around for a while,
alternately listening and pinging, occasionally stopping his screws.

- 26 -

— page 146 —
1735 All clear by periscope.
1920 Surfaced, patrolling at 5 knots on North and South line in and
     out from north coast of BALI.
2022 to 2040 SJ radar out of commission.
2100 Sound contact on fast screws, unable to see anything or make SJ
     contact. Although there was no moon the visibility was good for
     6000 yards even on a small target. This was a doubtful contact.

24 March
0001 SHIP CONTACT #49
     Sound contact on weak echo ranging to the east. This patrol
     vessel appeared to be searching back and forth on a N-SE line
     and we heard him off and on the remainder of the night.
0532 Submerged for day's patrol about 6 miles off the coast of BALI.
     SHIP CONTACT #50
0557 Picked up weak pinging bearing 274° T.
0945 Sighted mast of an unidentified patrol vessel bearing 260° T.
     on course 100° T. Although it appeared that he would pass
     about 5000 yards abeam to port at
1000 went deep as he was alone and we had work in progress on the SJ
     and engines that we didn't want interrupted.
     SHIP CONTACT #51
1030 Echo ranging from another patrol vessel astern which faded out
     in a few minutes.
1120 Periscope depth - patrol vessel passing out of sight close along
     the coast heading towards LOMBOK STRAIT.
     SHIP CONTACT #52
1254 Sound heard echo ranging bearing 120° T.
1300 Sighted masts of patrol vessel on a northerly course, distant 10
     miles.
1440 to 1500 Evaded this patrol vessel, a FC type, at 280 feet when
     he headed for us at range about 4500 yards. During the day we
     worked on the SJ radar, dropping the lower antenna assembly for
     the eighth time and manufactured a fourth new sleeve between the
     di-pole casting and the rectangular wave guide.
1919 Surfaced and closed the shore to 10,000 yards to tune the SJ
     radar, no improvement.

25 March
0118 SJ radar contact, range 1000 yards, on a sailboat, hitherto
     unseen.
     SHIP CONTACT #53
0438 SJ radar contact, range 7150 yards; closing rapidly. Sound also
     heard echo ranging, apparently in good contact with us.
0430 Lieutenant (junior grade), A.W. NEILON, U.S. Navy returned to duty.

- 27 -

— page 147 —
0500 Submerged and went to 300
  feet to evade. The A/S vessel searched
  thoroughly in our vicinity until 0630 when he stopped echo ranging
  and stopped his screws. We thought that this was a trick and
  didn't return to periscope depth until
0731 when the horizon was all clear. During the day we dropped the
  lower antenna assembly on the SJ radar for the ninth time, and
  installed the fifth new sleeve. We still are unable to get at the
  root of the trouble.
  SHIP CONTACT #54
0844 To 1445 Two PC type A/S vessels searched the area in our general
  vicinity, but we were able to avoid them at periscope depth. One
  of them must have been certain that he had a contact on us before
  we dove this morning.
1918 Surfaced and started patrolling at 5 knots. We closed the shore to
  12,000 yards to tune the SJ radar. During the night we heard very
  weak pinging several times, but made no other contact.

26 March
0518 Submerged for day's patrol.
  SHIP CONTACT #55
1158 To 1342 Evaded PC-1 A/S vessel at periscope depth, while he made
  a general search of the area in our vicinity.
1916 Surfaced and set course, at 14 knots, for SEPANJANG ISLAND in the
  KAROEBANG ISLAND group, planning to tune the SJ radar on the island
  and then to patrol in that vicinity during the night.
  SHIP CONTACT #56
2239 SJ radar contact, range 6250 yards. We developed this contact and
  found that it was a small target on course 150° T., speed 12 knots.
2301 We lost SJ radar contact at 10,300 yards.

27 March
  SHIP CONTACT #57
0102 Sound heard echo ranging coming from PC type patrol which we sighted
  at 0122 and finally avoided after a thirty minute chase, by going in
  close to the island. We were not sighted, but believe that he had
  echo ranging contact on us, or our wake.
0230 Tuned SJ radar on SEPANJANG ISLAND.
0212 Set course for point about 21 miles, bearing 148° T., from the center
  of SEPANJANG ISLAND, avoiding a pinging patrol vessel on the way.
0530 Submerged for day's patrol, course 328° T.
  SHIP CONTACT #58
0639 Heard very weak pinging ahead from two ships, came up to 50 feet and
  sighted several columns of smoke bearing 320° T., distant about 18
  miles. At first the bearing was changing rapidly to the right, so
  we came to the normal approach course at six knots to intercept.
0756 We sighted the masts of two ships and began to track the nearest
  ship. The bearing was swinging to the left, so we came to the
  MAG in this direction.
  - 28 -

— page 148 —
0820 We could see small angles on the bow on the two nearest ships
          at 12,000 yards range, so we headed for them.

0831 We could see three AKs in line of bearing about 225° R., when
          on base course. The second ship which had a 20° port angle on
          the bow was selected for the first target. We started swing-
          ing left to the NAD, but at

0835 The convoy zigged towards us again and we changed course to
          head between the two leading ships. The set-up at this time
          was as follows: at range 6200 yards the left had and leading
          ship had a 7° port angle, the next ship had a 5° starboard
          angle, and there was an escort between them with a zero angle.
          Two other escorts were on the line of bearing, but out of the
          picture at this time. The other escorts were on the flanks of
          the formation. All escorts were Class 13 AKs

0842 The convoy zigged right about 25°, and at 0847 we changed course
          to our left for a 90° port track; range 3800 yards.

0853 On this observation the second ship, our target, had a 60° port
          angle on the bow, at range 2800 yards, and the third ship was
          just beyond on the same bearing, but dropping back in bearing.
          I saw that in a short while the bow of the third ship would be
          abreast of the stern of the second ship, and that appeared to
          me to be a good time to shoot at both targets.

0854-21 Commenced firing spread of four torpedoes at the second ship,
          track angles - 65 to 70° port, gyro angles - 011 to 015°,
          torpedo run 2200 yards, spread - 2°, firing interval - 8 seconds.

0855-05 Commenced firing spread of two torpedoes at the third ship,
          track angle - 77 and 76° port, gyro angle - 011 and 012°,
          torpedo run - 3200 yards, spread 1°, firing interval - 8
          seconds. The depth set for all six torpedoes was 6 feet. A
          target course of 170° T. and a speed of 7 knots was used.

          I watched the first four torpedo tracks and they looked per-
          fect. They were easy to see due to the trail of smoke that
          they were leaving.

0856-35 A noise was heard by some in the conning tower. This was the
          correct time for a hit by the first or second torpedo, but I
          did not see any explosion through the periscope. This may
          have been a low order explosion in the first target.

0857 We heard a loud explosion throughout the ship and I saw a hit
          on our second target a little aft of the stack. This time
          checks for a hit by our 5th torpedo.

0857-30 Sound heard three rapid explosions and I saw debris splashing
          in the water astern of our first target. It could not have been
          from the second target as the splashes were too far away from
          it. I didn't get another look at the first target at all.

0857-40 We heard another loud explosion and I saw a huge pillar of
          orange red flame burst out and rise about five hundred feet into

- 29 -

— page 149 —
the air; then I took another sweep all around and at
0859 saw that the right hand, or fourth, AK was headed for us with
a zero angle on the bow, range about 1000 yards, and the right flank
escorts were doing the same from the starboard beam, so we started
deep. We heard the screws of the AK pass overhead as we went down.

0903 to 0906 we had reached 260 feet before we received the eleven depth
charges received during this period. They knocked off a little cork,
but did no other damage.

0909 Sound began to hear unmistakable sounds of a ship breaking up.
These sounds persisted until 0946.

0910 to 1017 The three AKs dropped twenty four more depth charges during
this period. I thought that they had echo ranging contact on us
with no accuracy of the depth charging didn't
indicate it. We could hear their screws close aboard.

1107 We had opened out from the scene of the attack about 4000 yards
when we heard two tremendous explosions, 13 seconds apart. I
believe that ammunition or oil on the first ship attacked blew
up at this time. After this we heard renewed sounds of a ship
breaking up. The escorts also began to work toward our direction
as we continued to open out to the west before coming to peris-
cope depth. As always in this area, we would have had to pump
out some 10,000 pounds of variable water before we could get
to periscope depth with our noisy trim pump. I thought that
they would surely hear us if we came up, since we could hear
their screws.

1150 The escorts started moving away again and we came to periscope
depth. Much to my surprise I saw two remaining AKs and the three
escorts milling around 8500 yards away. One of the AKs had a boat
over the side and in a few minutes picked up a life boat. Then
the two AKs started steaming around in tight circles, apparently
looking for additional survivors while the escorts continued their
A/S search. We completed our reload and then set course to be on
for them.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT A/2
Sighted PBM type reconnaissance plane between us and the convoy.

1218 By this time the formation was zigging away on base course 320° T.,
the reverse of their original course.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT A/3 and A/4

1300 Sighted BETTY type bomber searching in our vicinity, and a little
later a JAKE type reconnaissance plane.

1411 The formation passed out of sight bearing 354° T. I would have
liked to have followed them to see where they were going, but there
were at least three A/S escorts searching in the vicinity, so we set
course for LOMBOK STRAIT.

1500 We could see the smoke of A/S vessels searching back and forth in the
vicinity of the attack.

1916 Surfaced and continued towards LOMBOK STRAIT, arriving at our station
at 2200.

- 30 -

— page 150 —
28 March
0050 to 0300 SJ radar shows moderate to strong indications of another
     radar in the vicinity to the northeast and east.
0334 SJ radar contact on a sailboat at 2750 yards range.
0519 Submerged for day's patrol. Nothing was sighted during the
     forenoon except a dozen sailboats.
1905 Surfaced and started patrolling at 5 knots.

29 March
0120 to 0300 Moderate to strong indications on the SJ radar of another
     radar in the vicinity to the eastward.
0516 Submerged for day's patrol.
1915 Surfaced and started patrolling at five knots.
2235 The auxiliary engine was reported out of commission for the re-
     mainder of the patrol due to a cracked cylinder head. The only
     spare had already been used.

30 March
0022 to 0053 SJ radar contacts, which developed to be on sailboats.
0514 Submerged for day's patrol in LOMBOK STRAIT.
0914 Sighted PC-4 type patrol vessel proceeding from eastern or LOMBOK
     side of strait on course 325° T. towards northwest corner of
     BALI. He passed at the closest range of 6000 yards at which
     point we took his picture with the still camera.
1200 We had intended to remain in the Strait all during the day and
     through the narrow portion at night, but the currents and tide
     rips made depth control and steering so difficult that I consid-
     ered it best to go through submerged since we had a southerly
     set of about two knots all day.
1400 Completed passage through strait and commenced patrol across
     southern entrance.
1923 Surfaced and departed from area, heading for FREMANTLE.

31 March
0030 to 0306 Indications of another radar in the vicinity were ob-
     served on the SJ.
0830 Made training dive.
0856 Surfaced.

- 31 -

— page 151 —
1 April to 4 April
Enroute FREMANTLE at best speed sea conditions would permit.

April 3
1400 Sighted an exchange of recognition signals with FEX (Black Cat).

4 April
0700 Arrived at rendezvous. During morning ran degaussing range and
conducted sound tests.
1250 Moored alongside U.S.S. ORION at FREMANTLE.

(C) WEATHER

No unusual conditions.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

A varying one to two knot easterly set was experienced while running
from TIMOR to LOMBOK in the FLORES Sea.

A varying one to two knot southerly set was experienced throughout
Northern and Southern MAKASSAR STRAITS.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

A possible temporary navigational aid, consisting of a platform on
pilings about eight feet above the water plotted in at Lat. 07° 50' 30"
Long. 07° 118' 00 E. on the Northwest corner of the ZANDBUIS BANKS.

- 32 -

— page 153 —
| Time | Lat. | Ect. | How |
|---|---|---|---|
| No.:Date | Long. | Type(s) | Course:Con |
| | | Range | Speed:tacted:Remarks |
| 20.:15 Mar. | 115-41E | AM | Var |
| :1620 | 08-17S | 1 mile | tious SD Joined search with con tact #19. |
| 21.:15 Mar. | 115-45E | AM | Var |
| :2149 | 08-28S | 6 miles | tious SD Not sighted. |
| 22.:15 Mar. | 115-36E | Patrol | Var |
| :0019 | 08-08S | 13 miles | tious R Not echo running. |
| 23.:16 Mar. | 115-27E | Patrol | Var |
| :0622 | 08-07S | 17 miles | tious SD Not sighted |
| 24.:16 Mar. | 115-41E | AM | Var | Passed clear. |
| :0953 | 08-11S | 4 miles | tious SD Made sound contact at |
| | | | | 8000 yards and searched |
| 25.:16 Mar. | 115-42E | AM | Var | in our vicinity for 10 hrs. |
| :1046 | 08-09S | 8 miles | tious SD Not sighted. Joined |
| | | | | search with contact #25. |
| 26.:16 Mar. | 115-43E | AM | Var |
| :1215 | 08-03S | 6 miles | tious SD Not sighted |
| 27.:16 Mar. | 115-40E | Patrol | Var |
| :0845 | 08-08S | 8 miles | tious SD Not sighted |
| 28.:17 Mar. | 115-17E | Patrol | Var |
| :0820 | 08-08S | 8 miles | tious SD Not sighted |
| 29.:17 Mar. | 115-52E | AM | Var | Made sound contact and |
| :0936 | 08-08S | 5 miles | tious P searched in vicinity for |
| | | | | 8 hours. |
| 30.:17 Mar. | 115-52E | AM | Var |
| :1050 | 08-01S | 4 miles | tious P Joined contact #29. |
| 31.:18 Mar. | 115-33E | Patrol | Var |
| :1552 | 08-01S | 4 miles | tious S Avoided by diving. |
| 32.:18 Mar. | 115-43E | AM | Var | Made sound contact and |
| :0320 | 08-03S | 5 miles | tious S searched in vicinity for |
| | | | | two hours. |
| 33.:19 Mar. | 115-34E | AM | Var | Made sound contact and |
| :1130 | 08-02S | 6 miles | tious S stayed in vicinity for |
| | | | | 3½ hours. |
| 34.:19 Mar. | 115-29E | PC-92 | Var | Sighted while surfacing. |
| :1350 | 07-56S | 12 miles | tious P Attack #9 missed. |
| 35.:19 Mar. | 115-34E | 2 AMs | Var | Searched in vicinity for |
| :2145 | 07-53S | 4 miles | tious P three hours. |
| 36.:19 Mar. | 115-41E | 2 AMs | Var | Remained in pinging |
| :0809 | 07-54S | 6 miles | tious SD range most of night. |
| 37.:20 Mar. | 115-40E | vessel | Var |
| :1855 | 08-04S | 10 miles | tious SD Evaded at periscope depth |
| 38.:20 Mar. | 115-48E | vessel | Var |
| :0603 | 08-08S | 8 miles | tious SD Avoided. |
| 39.:21 Mar. | 115-41E | AM | Var | Avoided at periscope depth |
| :1058 | 08-11S | 7 miles | tious S Avoided at periscope |
| | | | | depth for 3 hours. |
| 40.:21 Mar. | 115-42E | Class 13 | Var | Avoided on surface for |
| :2132 | 07-50S | 5 miles | tious S three hours. |
| 41.:21 Mar. | 115-36E | vessel | Var |
| :0035 | 07-42S | 3 miles | tious R Avoided on sur. co. |
| 42.:22 Mar. | 115-10E | vessel | Var | Evaded by going deep and |
| :0539 | 07-58S | 3½ miles | tious SD at periscope depth. |
| 43.:22 Mar. | 115-23E | vessel | Var |
| | | 3 miles | |

- 34 -

— page 154 —
| Time      | Lat.      | Type(s) | Initial Range | Est.          | How           | No. Date  | Long.     |         |               | Course:       | Con-          | Remarks                                 |
|           |           |         |               | Speed         | tacted:       |                                         |
| 0554      | 07-58S    |         |               | 270°T.        |               |                                         |
| 44. 22 Mar. | 115-21E   | AK      | 3 miles       | 10K           | SD            | Small AK(MFM)                           |
| 1027      | 07-57S    |         |               | Var           | Avoided at periscope depth              |
| 4

— page 156 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L (Torpedo Attack Report Form)
ATTACK DATA
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 3
Time 1943-49 Date 25 February. Lat. 07 46 S. Long. 115 09.5 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description - Target was one of a two ship convoy consisting of one large and
one medium AK, escorted by two PC type patrol craft.

Ships were in line of bearing, with escorts outboard. The attack was
made on the largest AK, which was also the closer of the two. At time of
firing, the near escort was about 1000 yards on the port bow of the large
AK. Convoy was zig zagging every 5 to 7 minutes, alternately left and right.
Contact was made during daylight simultaneously by periscope and bridge
watch, as convoy came out of a rain squall. After sunset the visibility was
poor with no moonlight and a very dark overcast sky. The target could not
be seen during the attack until the range was reduced to about 2500 yards.

The large AK was a two deck, composite superstructure, well deck, MPM
type, of about 6500 tons. The smaller AK was a single deck, composite
superstructure, well deck, MPM type, resembling PANAMA MARU, of about 5270
tons. The second ship was heavily laden.

Ship(s) Sunk - One (1) large AK. Two deck, composite superstructure, well
deck, MPM sequence. About 6500 tons.

Damage Determined by - Observed and heard three hits on the large AK. Times
of explosions checked with torpedo runs. Prior to firing, four targets were
observed by sight and radar. Five minutes after firing, our target and escort
were 3400 yards away, and the other AK and escort were 5000 yards away. Eight
minutes after firing radar could not pick up our target. The near escort was
then at 4200 yards, the remaining AK at 8200 yards, and the other escort at
7500 yards. During the early stages of the approach the convoy had been track-
ed at 20,000 yards.

Target Draft 26' Course 135 Speed 7.5 Range 1090 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 14 Course 210 Depth surface Angle 358 (at firing)

Type attack - Normal surface radar attack. Convoy was kept in sight by peris-
cope and tracked by radar. Radar was able to track at ranges up to 20,000
yards. Convoy was tracked for about one hour, until sunset. A good solution
of zigzag plan and speed was obtained by plot and TDC. Radar bearings and
ranges were put into the TDC before and through the firing period. Firing
bearings were checked with TBT bearings. Three hits were seen from the bridge.
All torpedoes ran hot, straight, and normal.

- 37 -

— page 157 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L Attack D

| | No. 6 | No. 5 | No. 4 | No. 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tubes Fired - | | | | |
| Track Angle - | 107 P | 104 P | 102 P | 110 P |
| Gyro Angle - | 358 | 000-40 | 001-40 | 351 |
| Depth Set - | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Power - | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or Miss - | Hit | Hit | Miss | Hit |
| Erratic - | No | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo - | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No. - | 26134 | 24391 | 26065 | 24379 |
| Mark Exploder - | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 |
| Serial No. - | 11307 | 6706 | 6873 | 6514 |
| Actuation Set - | C | C | C | C |
| Actuation Actual - | C | C | C | C |
| Mark Warhead - | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
| Serial No. - | 12012 | 11146 | 11163 | 11748 |
| Explosive - | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx |
| Firing Interval - | 0 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Type Spread - | 1½L | 1½R | 4½R | 4½L |
| Sea Conditions - | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Overhaul Activity - | Pelias | Pelias | Pelias | Pelias |
| Remarks - | | | Miss due | |
| | | | to spread | |

- 38 -

— page 158 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
                                                                (Torpedo Attack Report Form)
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 3
Time 2127-52 Date 25 February Lat. 07 56.8 S. Long. 115 14 E.

Description - Target consisted of the medium, heavily laden AK remaining from
attack #1. One escort was keeping station about 1200 yards on the port bow
of the AK while the other escort, which was the close one in attack #1, was
about 2 miles astern, trying to catch up with the group.

        Visibility was poor, with no moonlight and a dark overcast sky. It had
been raining during the approach, but the visibility increased to about 5000
yards by the time we were pulling out, after completing the attack.

Ship(s) Sunk - One (1) AK. Single deck, composite superstructure, well deck,
ANAMA MARU type. About 5270 tons.

Damage Determine b - Observed and heard 3 hits. Saw ship sag in middle and
sink stern first, six minutes after firing.

Target draft 26' Course 145 Speed 7.5 Range 1490 (at firing)

                                                                Own Ship Data

Speed 14 Course 066 Depth surface Angle 357.5 (at firing)

Type attack - Normal surface radar attack. The target was tracked by radar,
and it was found that his speed had not changed from that used during attack
#1, and that he was not zigzagging as often. Radar bearings and ranges were
put into the TDC before and through the firing period. Firing bearings were
checked with TBT bearings. Three hits were seen from the bridge, the second
throwing up a huge column of black smoke and debris. All torpedoes ran hot,
straight, and normal.

                                                                - 39 -

— page 159 —
CONFIDENTIAL Attack #2
Tubes Fired - No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4
Track Angle - 99S 98S 95S 100S
Gyro Angle - 357.5 353 349-10 354
Depth Set - 6 6 6 6
Power - High High High High
Hit or miss - Hit Hit Hit Miss
Erratic - No No No No
Mark Torpedo - 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. - 25724 24558 25886 26133
Mark Exploder - 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial No. - 6201 6690 17823 6846
Actuation Set - C C C C
Actuation Actual - C C C C
Mark Warhead - 16-1 16-1 16 TNT 16 TNT
Serial No. - 11909 11843 4061 9089
Explosive - Tpx Tpx TNT TNT
Firing Interval - 0 S S S
Type Spread - 1°R 1°L 4°L 4°R
Ser. Conditions - 3 3 3 3
Overhaul Activity - Pelias Pelias Pelias Pelias
Remarks - Miss due
to spread

- 40 -

— page 160 —
CONFIDENTIAL (Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 3

Time 2239-45 Date 3 March 1944 Lat. 03° 17.3 N. Long. 123-55.1E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description - Target was one of six or seven ship convoy, with three escorts
and with an air coverage of one SAILY type bomber. The ships
appeared to be AKs or AK-APs of five to seven thousand tons.
The ship attacked was one of the largest in the group. Identi-
fication was difficult, but there wasn't much prominent super-
structure showing. It was the most prominent sound target.
Contact was originally made by sight from the bridge on the
convoy's smoke, at a range of about 12 miles. Visibility
during the attack was good. The sky was partially overcast,
with a bright first quarter moon.

Ship(s) Sunk - One (1) - large unidentified ship - 6500 tons.

Damage Deter- - Heard three hits throughout the ship. Captain observed
mined by one hit on stern of target. Times of explosions checked
with torpedo runs. After surfacing saw escort vessel
circling around, apparently picking up survivors. Later
on passed what appeared to be a life boat, on base course
of convoy. Six or seven large ships were in the convoy
when first sighted and only five were seen the next day.

Target Draft 26' Course 220° Speed 7.5K Range 2700 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 4K Course 308° Depth periscope Angle 356 (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack - Convoy was tracked by surface periscope observations during
daylight. After dark TBT bearings were used until target
could be picked up by radar. Chances of course could
always be predicted by observing an increase in the amount
of smoke from the convoy. After gaining position ahead of
the convoy, submerged to radar depth. Radar could not pick
up any targets, so went to periscope depth when the estim-
ated range was about 6500 yards. Periscope bearings were
continuously put in the TDC before and during the firing
period. A good echo range was obtained immediately before
firing. Three hits at the proper time intervals were heard
throughout the ship. One torpedo was seen to hit the stern
of the target. All torpedoes ran hot, straight and normal.

-41-

— page 161 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L                                (Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. BASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4 PATROL NO. 3

Time 2242-21 Date 3 March 1944 Lat. 09° 17.3 N. Long. 123° 55.1 E.

                                        Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description -                           Ship attacked was on another of the large AKs in
                                        the convoy of attack #3. It had a composite su-
                                        perstructure, with a high prominent stack, and
                                        was of about 6000 tons, similiar to CHIIZ MARU.
                                        Visibility was the same as attack #3.

Ship(s) Sunk - None

Ship(s) Damaged
or Probably Sunk - None

Target Draft 26' Course 240° Speed 7.5K Range 1700 (at firing)

                                        Own Ship Data

Speed 4K Course 312° Depth periscope Angle 000 (at firing)

                                        Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack -                           Normal periscope night attack, using a quick set-
                                        up after completing attack #3. Periscope range
                                        was used in TDC. An echo range was obtained, but
                                        it was about twice the range by periscope. It is
                                        believed that sound obtained an echo on another
                                        ship farther out about on the same bearing. Con-
                                        tinuous bearings were put into the TDC during
                                        firing. All torpedoes apparently ran hot, straight
                                        and normal.

- 42 -

— page 162 —
CONFIDENTIAL | ATTACK #3 | | ATTACK #4 | | |
Tubes Fired - No. | No. 1 | No. 2 | No. 3 | No. 6 | No. 5 | No. 4
Track Angle - | 95P | 99P | 96P | 108P | 111P | 106P
Gyro Angle - | 356.20 | 355.20 | 359.10 | 000 | 352 | 356
Depth Set - | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10
Power - | High | High | High | High | High | High
Hit or Miss - | Hit | Hit | Hit | Miss | Miss | Miss
Erratic - | No | No | No | No | No | No
Mark Torpedo - | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A
Serial No. - | 24323 | 25931 | 23809 | 25018 | 23863 | 25929
Mark Exploder - | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5
Serial No. - | 27647 | 6716 | 6707 | 7672 | 17779 | 6184
Actuation Set - | C | C | C | C | C | C
Actuation Actual - | C | C | C | C | C | C
Mark Warhead - | 16-1 | 16 | 16TNT | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16TNT
Serial No. - | 10414 | 1684 | 4727 | 11133 | 11355 | 4984
Explosive - | Tpx | Tpx | TNT | Tpx | Tpx | TNT
Firing Interval - | 0 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 8
Type Spread - | 0 | 1° L | 1° R | 0 | 2 3/4° L | 2 3/4° R
Sea Conditions - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1
Overhaul Activity - | PELIAS | PELIAS | PELIAS | PELIAS | PELIAS | PELIAS
Remarks - | | | | Miss - target speeded up | |

- 43 -

— page 163 —
CONFIDENTIAL
                                                                (Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5 PATROL NO. 3
Time 0302-00 Date 5 March 1944 Lat. 02° 43 N. Long. 126° 44 E.

                                        Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description - Target was an AK in convoy consisting of 5 large AKs and 2 or
              three escorts. This was probably the same convoy as attacks
              #3 and #4. Contact was made at night from the bridge on smoke,
              range about 15 miles. Visibility at that time was excellent
              with a bright, nearly full moon, and an overcast sky. The
              attack was made after moonset, visibility about 6000 yards.

Ship Damaged or
Probably Sunk - None

Target Draft 26' Course 085° Speed 8.5K Range 1840 (at firing)

                                            Own Ship Data

Speed 14K Depth surface Course 000° Angle 001 (at firing)

                                    Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack - Surface radar attack, using radar ranges and TBT bearings. Tar-
              get was tracked for about five hours until position was gained
              ahead and on starboard bow of convoy. This position was reached
              about an hour after moonset. Continuous radar ranges and TBT
              bearings were put into the TDC during firing. It is not under-
              stood why they missed, as the set-up checked perfectly. Plot
              indicates both torpedoes should have hit, and both torpedoes
              appeared to be certain hits from the bridge. They must have run
              under the target.

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6 PATROL NO. 3
Time 0304-00 Date 5 March 1944 Lat. 02° 43 N. Long. 126° 44 E.

                                        Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description - Target was another large AK in the Convoy of attack #5. Visibility
              was the same as in attack #5.

Ship Damaged or
Probably Sunk - One (1) large AK, 7065 tons, similiar to T. TUKALI MARU.

Damage Deter- Captain observed one hit, near the bow. One hit heard through
mined by      the ship at correct interval after firing first torpedo. Ten min-
              utes later the target was smoking heavily all over. A series of
              8 heavy explosions were heard during the half hour following the
              attack. Five large ships were with the convoy when this attack
              began and only four were with it next morning.

Target Draft 26' Course 085° Speed 8.5K Range 2500 (at firing)
                                        - 44 -

— page 164 —
CONFIDENTIAL
(Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6 PATROL NO. 3
Time 0306-34 Date 5 March 1944 Lat. 02° 43 N. Long. 126° 44 E.

Own Ship Data
Speed 14K Course 143° Depth Surface Angle 202.5 (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack - Surface radar attack. After firing the bow tubes for attack #5,
  course was reversed, speed reduced and a quick set-up put in the
  TDC, on another large ship in the convoy. Continuous radar ranges
  and TBT bearings were used during the firing. The same course
  and speed was used as in the previous attack. The first torpedo
  was fired 24 minutes after completing attack #5, and 2 apparent-
  ly were not sighted before this attack as the target did not
  change course.

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 7 PATROL NO. 3
Time 0417-26 Date 5 March 1944 Lat. 02° 46.3 N. Long. 126° 47 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description - Target was probably one of the two previously attacked. It was
  trailing the convoy, with another target, later seen to be an
  escort, keeping station on it's port quarter at a range of about
  500 yards. Visibility was the same as in the previous attack.

Ship Damage or
Probably Sunk - None

Target Draft 26' Course 050° Speed 10K Range 2500 (at firing)

Own Ship Data
Speed 14K Course 210° Depth Surface Angle 191-35 (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack - Surface radar attack using radar ranges and TBT bearings. Worked
  into position to fire the four remaining torpedoes in after tubes.
  Two escorts, on the starboard beam, prevented swinging the
  ship right to decrease the track angles. Continuous radar ranges
  and TBT bearings were put into the TDC during firing. Large track
  angles and torpedo run were primary reasons for missing with all
  torpedoes.

- 45 -

— page 165 —
CONFIDENTIAL                                ATTACK #5                               | ATTACK #6
Tubes Fired -               | No. 2     | No. 1     | No. 7     | No. 8     | No. 9     | No. 10
Track Angle -               | 96S       | 96S       | 202-30    | 198.15    | 207.45    | 210.15
Gyro Angle -                | 001       | 002½      | 202.35    | 198.15    | 207.45    | 210.15
Depth Set -                 | 10        | 10        | 10        | 10        | 10        | 10
Power -                     | High      | High      | High      | High      | High      | High
Hit or Miss -               | Miss      | Miss      | Hit       | Miss      | Miss      | Miss
Erratic -                   | run deep  |           | No        | No        | No        | No
Mark Torpedo -              | 14-3A     | 14-3A     | 14-3A     | 14-3A     | 14-3A     | 14-3A
Serial No. -                | 40561     | 40507     | 40588     | 40570     | 26140     | 26123
Mark Exploder -             | 6-5       | 6-5       | 6-5       | 6-5       | 6-5       | 6-5
Serial No. -                | 12540     | 12522     | 6880      | 6352      | 1184      | 6513
Actuation Set -             | C         | C         | C         | C         | C         | C
Actuation Actual -          |           |           |           |           |           |
Mark Warhead -              | 16-1      | 16TNT     | 16-1      | 16-1      | 16        | 16
Serial No. -                | 11420     | 6488      | 11666     | 10589     | 3800      | 3698
Explosive -                 | Tpx       | TNT       | Tpx       | Tpx       | Tpx       | Tpx
Firing Interval -           | 0         | 8         | C         | 8         | 8         | 8
Type Spread -               | 1° R      | 1° L      | 3/4° L    | 2½° L     | 3/4° R    | 2½° R
Sea Conditions -            | 1         | 1         | 2         | 2         | 2         | 2
Overhaul Activity - PELIAS  | PELIAS    | PELIAS    | PELIAS    | PELIAS    | PELIAS    | PELIAS
Remarks -                   |           |           |           | Miss due  |           |
                            |           |           |           | to spread |           |

- 46 -

— page 166 —
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACK #7
Tubes Fired - No. 7 No. 8 No. 9 No. 10
Track Angle - 191.35 191.25 188.50 189
Gyro Angle - 191.30 191.25 188.50 189
Depth Set - 10 10 10 10
Fuzer - High High High High
Hit or Miss - Miss Miss Miss Miss
Erratic - No No No No
Mark Torpedo - 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. - 24387 24195 24427 24127
Mark Exploder - 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial No. - 6496 478 7007 6518
Actuation Set - C C C C
Actuation Actual -
No. Merged - 36-1 16-1 16-1 16-1
Serial No. - 11127 11117 10900 11345
Explosive - Tpx Tpx Tpx Tpx
Firing Interval - 0 8 8 8
Type Spread - 3/8° R 3/8° L 1 7/8° L 1 1/8° R
Sea Conditions - 2 2 2 2
Overall Activity - PELLAS PELLAS PELLAS PELLAS
Remarks - Large track and range. Miss due to spread

- 47 -

— page 167 —
CONFIDENTIAL (Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 8 PATROL NO. 3

Time 21-00-00 Date 12 March 1944 Lat. 07° 57.4 S. Long. 116° 15.2 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description - Target was a single PC-1 class patrol boat. Contact was made by
sight from the bridge at 6000 yards. Radar picked up target after
being coached on to the bearing. Target was headed for us at high
speed and forced us down with gun fire. Visibility was fair, with
a bright full moon.

Ship Damaged or
Sunk - None

Target Draft 5' Course 005-076 Speed 19.5 - 10Rpm 1100 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 4 Course 000° Depth Periscope Angle 158 (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

The attack - Submerged periscope attack, after tracking the target for a short
time with radar ranges and bearings and TDT bearings. Target was
dropping depth charges just before firing. Periscope bearings
were sat in the TDC throughout the period. Firing was checked
about 20 seconds after firing the second torpedo in order to intro-
duce a new set-up in the TDC as the target was seen to slow and
turn away. Two torpedoes were observed through the periscope to
be porpoising.

- 48 -

— page 168 —
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACK #S
Tubes Fired - | No. 7 | No. 8 | No. 9 | No. 10
Track Angle - | 14 P | 30 P | 90 P | 110 P
Gyro Angle - | 158.30 | 150.10 | 130.55 | 125.20
Depth Set - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Lever - | High | High | High | High
Hit or Miss - | Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss
Erratic - | No | No | No | No
Mark Torpedo - | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A
Serial No. - | 40397 | 40208 | 40234 | 40242
Mark Exploder - | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5
Serial No. - | 12923 | 12921 | 12925 | 6937
Actuator Set - | C | C | C | C
Actuator Actual - | | | |
Mark Fuze - | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16
Serial No. - | 2735 | 10162 | 2778 | 2942
Explosive - | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx
Firing Interval - | 0 | 8 | 30 | 38
Type Spread - | 1/6°L | 1/6°R | 3/8°R | 3/8°L
Sea Conditions - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Overhaul Activity - | Left 80 | Left 80 | Left 80 | Left 80
Remarks - | Target maneuvered to avoid

- 49 -

— page 169 —
CONFIDENTIAL
(Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 9 PATROL NO. 3
Time 1149-00 Date 19 March 1944 Lat. 08° 02.5 S. Long. 115° 25.7 E.

Target Data - Damaged Inflicted

Description - Target was a Jap submarine of the RO-51 class. A large Jap mer-
chant flag was painted on the conning tower. Contact was made
by periscope, at periscope depth, while he was surfacing. Visi-
bility was good, with land at ten miles clearly visible.

Ship Damaged or
Probably Sunk - None

Target Draft 13' Course 315° Speed 14K Range 1200 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 2K Course 022° Depth periscope Angle 213 (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack - Submerged periscope attack. Fired at target 10 minutes after
first contact. Periscope bearings and ranges used. Screws
could be heard by sound with a turn count of 250 R.P.M. Bear-
ings were set in the TDC throughout the firing, and were checked.
Plot indicated a slower speed but bow wave was big. Spread
used was too small, due to a misunderstanding in the fire control
party. 3° should have been used instead of 1°. Plot shows
all torpedoes passed ahead.

- 50 -

— page 170 —
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACK #2

Tubes Fired - No. 7 No. 8 No. 9 No. 10
Track Angle - 100S 103S 105S 111S
Gyro Angle - 213.20 216.30 218.35 224.55
Depth Set - 10 10 10 10
Power - High High High High
Hit or Miss Miss Miss Miss Miss
Erratic - No No No No
Mark Torpedo - 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. - 40273 39823 40291 39442
Mark Exploder - 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial No. - 6110 12914 2137 792
Actuation Set - C C C C
Actuation Actual -
Mark Warhead - 16 16 16 16
Serial No. - 10448 2940 6012 2590
Explosive - Tpx Tpx Tpx Tpx
Firing Interval - 0 8 8 8
Type Spread - 1°R 1°L 1°L 1°R
Sea Conditions - 0 0 0 0
Overhaul Activity - Left 80 Left 80 Left 80 Left 80
Remarks - Missed due to control error

- 51 -

— page 171 —
CONFIDENTIAL
(Torpedo Attack Report Form)
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 10 PATROL NO. 3
Time 0334-21 Date 27 March 1944 Lat. 07° 31.6 S. Long. 115° 57.2 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description - Target was one of four medium cargo vessels, escorted by three
Class 13 AMe. ships. They were in line of bearing, interval about
1500 yards, with one escort on either flank and the other in the
center of the formation. Ship attacked resembled the CHILE MARU,
page 179 of ONI 208J. Convoy was picked up by sighting smoke
through the periscope while submerged. Visibility was good.

Ship Sunk - One (1) AK, 5900 tons. Resembled CHILE MARU, page 179, ONI 208J.

Damage Deter- Sound heard three underwater explosions. Captain observed debris
mined by hitting water, while observin ship fired at in attack #11. Two
tremendous explosions were felt throughout ship, 2 hours 11 minutes
after firing, followed by renewed sounds of a ship breaking up.
Three hours after firing, only two of the four original ships, plus
the three escorts, could be seen at 6000 yards.

It is believed that this ship sank a little over to hours
after the attack. It was definitely absent from the convoy three hours
after the attack. It could have been easily recognized if it had
been present because it was painted a lighter shade of grey than
the other three ships, and it was quite rusty in spots, particu-
larly near the waterline.

It is not at all likely that one ship would have been permitted to
leave the convoy without escorts when two others were kept in the
vicinity of the attack picking up survivors.

Also if only the second ship attacked had sunk there would have been
no reason for it taking three hours to pick up survivors because it
went down in a hurry.

Target Draft 27' Course 180 - 170° Speed 7K Range 2400 (at firing)

Own Ship Data
Speed 2K Course 261° Depth periscope Angle 013.5 (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack - Normal submerged periscope attack. Convoy was zig-zagging frequently,
on 20 to 30° legs. A zig away just before firing caused the torpedo
run to be greater than desired. A speed of 7 knots was used in the
TDC, but it is believed that the target was making about 7.5 knots.
As it was drawing ahead of anoth r ship about 1000 yards farther out.
This letter ship was hit later with two torpedoes, in attack #11, using
a speed of 7 knots. At the time of firing, the stern of the target
overlapped the bow of this second ship. Continuous periscope bear-
ings were put in the TDC during firing. All torpedoes ran normal.

- 52 -

— page 172 —
CONFIDENTIAL (Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 11 PATROL NO. 3

Time 0655-0S Date 27 March 1944 Lat. 07° 31.ES Long. 115° 57.2 S.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description - Target was a medium AK in the four ship convoy of attack #10.
It resembled the HEITO MARU, page 66 of ONI 208J. Visibility
was the same as for previous attack.

Ship Sunk - One (1) AK, 4467 tons. Resembled HEITO MARU.

Damage Deter- Captain saw ship blow up. Flame and smoke went up in the air about
mined by five hundred feet. Two hits were heard at the proper time intervals.
Breaking up noises heard throughout ship. Three hours after firing
only two of the four original ships, plus the three escorts, were
visible at 8000 yards.

Target Draft 23' Course 170° Speed 7K Range 2400 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 2K Course 210° Depth periscope Angle 010.45 (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack - Normal submerged periscope attack using quick set-up after completing
attack #10. Bow of target was overlapping the stern of ship fired
at in the previous attack, and was about 1000 yards farther away.
Continuous bearing rates were put into the TDC during firing. Both
torpedoes ran normal. One hit seen and two hits heard at proper
time interval.

-- 53 --

— page 173 —
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACK #10                               ATTACK #11

| Tubes Fired - | No. 1 | No. 2 | No. 3 | No. 4 | No. 5 | No. 6 |
||-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Track Angle - | 85 P | 84 P | 74 P | 78 P | 78 P | 77 P |
| Gyro Angle - | 013.30 | 014 | 015 | 011 | 010.45 | 011.30 |
| Depth Set - | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Power - | High | High | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or Miss - | Hit | Miss | Miss | Miss | Hit | Hit |
| Erratic - | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo - | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No. - | 23104 | 24474 | 25371 | 25046 | 32509 | 40236 |
| Mark Exploder - | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 |
| Serial No. | 12880 | 12911 | 12927 | 12906 | 7044 | 12932 |
| Actuation Set - | C | C | C | C | C | C |
| Actuation Actual - | C | C | C | C | C | C |
| Mark Warhead - | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No. - | 1670 | 10468 | 2740 | 2493 | 11171 | 943 |
| Explosive - | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx | Tpx |
| Firing Interval - | 0 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| Type Spread - | 1°L | 1°R | 3°R | 3°L | 1°L | 1°R |
| Sea Conditions - | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm |
| Overhaul Activity - | Left SO | FELIAS | FELIAS | FELIAS | Left SO | Left SO |

Remarks - Miss due Possible
          to spread hit.

- 54 -

— page 174 —
(I) MINES
No remarks.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS
During attacks no new anti-submarine measures by the escorts were ob-
served. During our eighteen day reconnaissance patrol of the northern ap-
proaches to LOMBOK STRAIT, however, we acquired an increasing respect for
the ability of three Class 13 AMs and two type PC-1 patrol vessels with
their sound gear. On fifteen occasions they picked us up by echo ran-
ning while we were attempting to evade them at periscope depth. On many
of these occasions they would have 70 to 110° angles on the bow and stern
would stop their sweeping search and then sweep it back and forth across
us, using manual keying, until they had a firm contact, and then speed up
and make direct runs for us with much black smoke. After they had made
good contact nothing would shake them off but going down beneath a thermo-
cline which fortunately always was found at depths varying from 210 to 325
feet. If we had remained at periscope depth until the range had decreased
to 3500 yards, giving them ample time to verify their contact, they would
search the vicinity for at least an hour, frequently being joined by an-
other vessel. On several occasions they would give up and pass out of
sight, and then some minutes back apparently trying to catch sight of us on
the surface. During the daytime they appeared to rely entirely on their
echo ranging unless they were listening at the same time on sonic equipment,
although during the last week they caused us extra annoyance by ceasing
to echo ran before leaving the area, and by stopping their screws when
they were still within our listening range. I don't know whether they
were trying to be tricky or whether they're just getting tired also.

For the first ten or twelve days they appeared to use their echo
ranging continuously at night also, which gave us ample warning of their
presence. During the latter part of the period, however, they changed
their tactics, and our first contact would be by SJ radar at ranges from
5000 to 7500 yards, at which ranges they were difficult to see until
when their smoke became readily visible, as was ours. After they picked
us up by listening they would change course to run around them.
When we were patrolling at five knots we were able to hear their screws
before they heard us, and evade them at low speed.

Day and night they covered the area thoroughly and persistently. I
know that they patrolled up to 15 miles north of the coast of BALI and
about 20 miles west of the Strait, in addition to the region directly
north of the Strait, and it is my opinion they give similar coverage
to the northern coast of LOMBOK. They usually patrolled at 12 knots
speed, 230 to 240 R.P.M.

The AMs were called away a few times to do escort work, during which
period the PC-1 type would work continuously.

- 55 -

— page 175 —
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS
(1) Engineering
During training period on February 14th the drive spring leaves on the
auxiliary generator flexible couplings were sheared. The cause of this fail-
ure is unknown.

On 23 March we were unable to make fresh water with #2 Vapor compressor
still. The coils were pulled, cleaned, and four leaks in them were silver
soldered. After five days the still was in commission and operating satis-
factorily.

Two auxiliary engine cylinder heads cracked between the exhaust valves.
Since only one spare head is carried on board the engine has been out of
commission since the second casualty on 30 March.

The control panel of #2 periscope hoist motor was badly damaged on 1
April by salt water coming down the hatch from heavy seas. It is imperative
that a dam be built around the lower part of this panel, or that it be made
watertight as this is the second time that this periscope has been put out
of commission by relatively small quantities of water on the deck of the
conning tower.

(2) Hull
#2 Periscope - During the depth charge and aerial bombing on 14 March
a large amount of dirt was jarred loose and deposited in the optical system
to such an extent that the periscope was practically useless.

(3) Torpedo Casualties
Eleven of the twenty four torpedoes received at DARWIN did not have
speed rings in the control valves. Several hours were lost while the control
valves were adjusted on board ship during loading.

The following torpedoes flooded:

#40331 - Once from leaky exhaust valves, twice, cause unknown.
#25371 - Once from leaky starting valves, causing the exhaust
valves to unseat.
#39823 - Once, cause unknown.

These leaks could have been discovered by tank testing prior to de-
livery to the ship.

(L) RADIO

No material difficulties were experienced. All serials were received.
As usual we were unable to effect transmission of our messages on either
the third or fourth harmonic of the basic frequency. No jamming was noted
at any time.

(M) RADAR

(1) SJ Radar
The SJ performed exceptionally well for the first two weeks of this
patrol, ranges of 22,000 yards on large ships and 70,000 yards on land
being obtained. During the remainder of the patrol the performance was
extremely erratic and unreliable. We believe that the poor performance
-56-

— page 176 —
P is due to power loss in the antenna system. Grinding and arcing take place
between the di-pole casting and the rectangular wave guide casting, resulting
in metal filings and burned metal being deposited in the rectangular wave
guide. The wear was so extensive at the end of the first patrol that it was
necessary to install a bushing in the rectangular wave guide casting. This
bushing was renewed twice during the Refit period, and once during the second
patrol, and five times during the latter part of this patrol. The lower
pole is now worn down to about 1/3 of its original thickness. The lower
antenna assembly was removed to permit a complete and thorough check of the [UNCLEAR: antenna]
and installation of the bushings. A complete and thorough check of the
antenna system has been requested during the forthcoming refit. Permanent
repairs and exact alignment are desired this time.

Trouble was experienced again at the beginning of the patrol with the
speed regulation of the motor-generator. Thorough cleaning and overhaul
corrected the trouble.

The convertor unit in the transmitting-receiving unit was replaced
due to a burned out heater winding for the McNally tube.

(2) SD Radar

The 8014 tubes installed during refit failed early in the patrol. The
first set of spare 8014A tubes that were installed would not work due to a
short between plate and ground on one tube. The last set of spares was
installed and we had excellent results with this equipment during the re-
mainder of the patrol.

A filter condensor in the high voltage rectifier of the range indicator
shorted out to ground, destroying the 2Z2 rectifier tube which was replaced.

(N) SOUND AND SOUND CONDITIONS

The QB conning tower sound gear has very low sensitivity. This is caused
by an AC hum from the QB driver. When the QB head was used with the auxiliary
receiver in the forward torpedo room, sensitivity was high. Sensitivity was
also high when the driver was isolated from the conning tower equipment.
Ship's force was unable to correct this condition during the patrol.

Sound equipment proved very valuable during night surface operations.
Patrol vessels were frequently detected at ranges of 20,000 yards on echo
ranging and 6000 yards on propellers while patrolling in the JAVA SEA.
Conditions were good in the CELEBES SEA also.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

Found deep dives were made daily to investigate density layers. Thermoclines were
between 150 to 325 feet throughout the area, i.e., in the JAVA SEA, KASSAR
STRAITS and CELEBES SEA.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY

The health of the crew was good. There was an appreciable improvement
over last patrol. The following cases were satisfactorily handled by the
Pharmacist's Mate.

-57-

— page 177 —
Catarrhal fever
Scabies
Pericoronitis, acute (officer)
Urethral discharge
Totals

No. cases | No. sick days
3 | 14
3 | 0
1 | 4
2 | 3
9 | 21

of the food
The quality and palatability during the patrol was far below the
desired standard, due primarily to the lack of ability and comparative
in-experience of the senior man in the supply department.

The quality of the beef carried on this patrol was very poor.

(C) PERSONNEL

The state of training was much more satisfactory at the termination of
this patrol than at any other time since the present Commanding Officer has
had command. This is attributed to the longer time available for training
and qualifying personnel on this patrol, and to the large percentage of the
time that we were in contact with enemy vessels.

The performance of duty under combat conditions was eminently satis-
factory with very few exceptions. The bridge watch became quite accustomed
to being under fire on four occasions,
during which about 175 rounds of forty millimeter, were fired at us. We were bombed by a plane twice. We
were depth-charged after each of our three submerged attacks, on three
other occasions by A/S vessels, and at two other times heard them being
dropped in the vicinity, which made a total of 200 bombs and depth charges
expended against us.

The first week of the reconnaissance patrol in the vicinity of LOMBOK
STRAIT was more exhausting than the remainder of the patrol put together.
It seemed that we were in continuous contact with the enemy, and we practi-
cally never had more than six periods during that week when as much as
six hours elapsed between contacts, and only one time that as much as ten
hours elapsed. The Officers-of-the-Deck, radar and sound operators, and
members of the control party, were becoming quite exhausted, mentally and
physically.

The officers were un-nerved to the point of being unreliable in their
performance of duty, and were setting a very bad example for the crew. This
was the eighth war patrol for one officer and the first for the other. Both
will be recommended for some other type of duty. Only two enlisted men
became obviously unreliable in their performance of duty.

Fortunately, all hands became accustomed to this unnatural
existence at about this time, and in a short time almost everyone, with the
exception of the two above-mentioned officers, were relaxed again.

Morale remained extremely good during the entire patrol regardless
of the situation.

(D) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

FREMANTLE to BARRIER | 1345 miles | 19,700 gals.
NORTH of BARRIER | 6970 miles | 71,920 gals.
BARRIER to FREMANTLE | 1455 miles | 26,300 gals.
| - | -

— page 178 —
(S) DURATION
Days enroute to area 6 days
Days in area 35 days
Days enroute to base 5 days
Days submerged 22 days

(T) FACTOR OF ENDURANCE RE: INIC
Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor
10 36,600 gals. 40 days 10 days

(U) REMARKS

(a) No enemy min sweeping activity was observed.

(b) Nothing was learned regarding degaussing of enemy ships.

(c) Strong indications of another radar in the vicinity were observed
on our SJ radar while we were tracking a six or seven ship convoy in the
CELEBES SEA. The strongest indications were received on the bearing of a
ship that was firing at us with three broadside guns.

Strong indications of another radar in the vicinity were observed about
midway between MAKASSAR CITY and PULO LAUT. From the rapid way the bearing
changed the indications seemed to come from a plane.

For three nights after our last attack north of LOMBOK STRAIT we ob-
served indications of another plane-borne radar in the vicinity. The indi-
cations would commence shortly after midnight and last until about 0330.

(d) Nothing new was learned regarding enemy traffic routes or focal
points.

(e) Since the days of attacking un-escorted or weakly escorted convoys
are apparently over, the need of new weapons to use against escorts is be-
coming very important in this area.

(f) Authorized alterations that are particularly desired by this vessel
are as follows: (1) the new type trim pump, (2) conversion of No. 4 ballast
tank to fuel ballast tank, (3) FFI, (4) SJa radar, (5) JP sound gear, (6)
attached main engine fresh water cooling system and (7) an adequate system
of communications between bridge, conning tower, and control room.

(g) Additions to the voice code for use with the voice modulated trans-
missions are recommended. Among the additions should be a grid system for
designating positions.

-5-

— page 179 —
F05-16/A16-3
Serial: 0241
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS RASHER - Report
of 3rd War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Third War
Patrol Comments on.

1. The Third War Patrol of the U.S.S. RASHER was an
extremely aggressive and productive one. It covered a period of
45 days of which 35 days were spent in the area. It included a
particularly harrowing 16 day period of patrolling just NORTH of
LOMBOK STRAIT.

2. The RASHER fired 35 torpedoes at 9 targets and
obtained 13 hits for just about the average hitting performance.
The first two attacks on two escorted AK's were beautifully
executed night surface attacks with 3 hits out of 4 torpedoes
fired at each. The next two attacks on another escorted convoy
were night submerged attacks. A single ping range was obtained
for each attack. Only one was used and three hits were obtained
on this attack. Attacks five and six on a five ship escorted con-
voy were night surface attacks. Two torpedoes were fired forward
at one AK which missed followed by four torpedoes fired aft at
another AK with one hit. Another attack on the same convoy re-
sulted in misses due to large track angles and long torpedo runs.
Twenty-four torpedoes were loaded at DARWIN. Four torpedoes fired
at a patrol boat setting all missed, but the patrol
boat withdrew. An attack with four torpedoes on a 10-51 type
submarine was frustrated due to control errors. The last attack
made on two ships of a four ship escorted convoy produced three
and probably four hits. Plane and patrol boat opposition was very
strong during this patrol.

3. In the attack on 25 February both RASHER and RATOON
were in a position to attack the convoy. Voice communications
were established. The commanding officers recommendation for
additions to the voice code and the establishment of a grid system
for designating positions is noted. It is expected that further
improvement can be effected based on experience gained in exer-
cises in coordinated attacks against convoys which have been
arranged.

- 1 -

— page 181 —
F224-71/A16-3                               UNITED STATES NAVY
Serial: 0382                                                              12/gr
                                                              25 April 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS RASHER Conf. Ltr.
no serial dated 4 April,
1944. Report of Third
War Patrol.

From:             The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
To :             The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via :             The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject:          U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Third War Patrol -
                  Comment on.

1.        The U.S.S. RASHER conducted her Third War
Patrol in the LOMBOK, MAKASSAR STRAIT and CELEBES SEA
area. Remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN
are concurred in.

2.        RASHER's Third War Patrol is outstanding
both in infliction of severe damage on the enemy and in un-
flinching determination to effectively patrol a station in
which the enemy was exerting every possible effort in
opposition. In spite of the arduous and exhausting anti
S/M measures, the Commanding Officer and a stout crew carri-
ed on and aggressively and courageously inflicted all poss-
ible damage to the enemy and effectively fulfilled their
reconnaissance mission. RASHER truly wrote another glorious
page in our Submarine History.

3.        This patrol is designated as "Successful" for
purposes of award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.

4.        The Force Commander takes great pleasure in
congratulating the Commanding Officer, Officers; and Crew
on a most difficult patrol well executed during which the
following heavy damage was inflicted on the enemy:

                                                              - 1 -

— page 182 —
FE24-71/A16-3                               UNITED STATES NAVY           12/gr
Serial: 0382                                                               25 April 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS RASHER Conf. Ltr.
no serial dated 4 April,
1944. Report of Third
War Patrol.

Subject:           U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Third War Patrol -
                   Comment on.

SUNK

1 - AP (TANGO MARU)                                --- 6,893 Tons
1 - AP-AK (RYUSEI MARU)                            --- 4,797 Tons
1 - AP-AK (NITTAI MARU)                            --- 6,484 Tons
1 - AK (CHILE MARU TYPE)                           --- 5,860 Tons
1 - AP-AK (KEITO MARU TYPE)                        --- 4,468 Tons

                                     TOTAL         --- 28,502 Tons

DAMAGED

1 - AK (TATSUKAMI MARU TYPE)                       --- 7,064 Tons

                                     GRAND TOTAL   --- 35,566 Tons

                                                   R. W. CHRISTIE.

DISTRIBUTION:
Cominch                                (3) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav                             (2) - (Direct)
Vice Opnav Op-35c                      (1)
ComSubPac                              (1)
ComSubFlot                             (1)
Com1stFlt                              (1)
Com2ndFlt                              (1)
Com3rdFlt                              (2)
Com7thFlt                              (4)
ComSubBalFlt                           (4)
ComSubBal2ndFlt                        (4)
CTF-71                                 (2)
CTF-72                                 (2)
CSS-12                                 (1)
CSS-13                                 (1)
DivComs Ron-12                         (1)
DivComs Ron-16                         (1)
S/M School N.L.Conn.                   (3)
Each S/M W.A.                          (1) - [HANDWRITTEN: NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN]

                                                   [SIGNATURE: P. F. Straub, Jr.]
                                                   P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
                                                   Flag Secretary.

- 2 -

— page 183 —
A16-3(F-3/roj)
Serial: [HANDWRITTEN: 01142]

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

13 MAY 1944

[STAMP: Reg. No. [HANDWRITTEN: OM-4489]]
[STAMP: R.S. No. [HANDWRITTEN: 022873]]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS RASHER Conf. ltr.
no serial dated 4 April,
1944. Report of Third
War Patrol.

From: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Third War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

2. Commander Seventh Fleet joins the Commander
Submarines, Seventh Fleet, and the Commander Submarine
Squadron Sixteen, in congratulating the Commanding Officer,
Officers, and Crew of the U.S.S. RASHER for the heavy
damage they so successfully inflicted on the enemy.

[SIGNATURE: T. C. Kinkaid]
T. C. KINKAID

Copy to:
U.S.S. RASHER
ComSubRon-16
ComSubs7thFlt

— page 184 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1st copy]

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269)

SS269/A16-3

Serial ( 011 )

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
23 June 1944.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR. 5200.9
of 27 Sep 58
BY [HANDWRITTEN: 92C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 4/29/71]]

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the Fourth War Patrol of this
vessel conducted in the MOLUCCA and CELEBES Sea area during the per-
iod 30 April to 23 June 1944, is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: W. R. Laughon]
W. R. LAUGHON.

83285 [STAMP: FILMED]

— page 187 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RISHER (SS269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

6 May
1214 Transmitted our serial three requesting a range unit for the
     SJ radar.

2037 Radar contact on SJ, range unknown due to range unit being
     out of commission, but estimated to be between 3500 to 6000
     yards. We attempted to develop the contact, but lost it on
     the SJ after a few minutes and never regained it. Nothing
     was sighted from the bridge although the visibility was
     excellent. The contact may have been on a periscope or on
     a small piece of floating debris.

7 May
1105 Exchanged recognition signals with IL 815, our escort,
     and stood into swept channel.

1405 Moored to Main Jetty, D.R.IN, and commenced taking on fuel
     and fresh water.

1930 Material brought up by Sky Train arrived on board. One
     gunsight was received, but no chicken.

2200 The replacement unit had been installed in the SJ radar.
     It was back in commission, but operating unsatisfactorily,
     apparently due to the transmitter frequency drifting. I
     decided not to wait any longer, believing that we could
     find and remedy the trouble as well underway as in port.

2219 Underway.

8 May
0105 Cleared swept channel and set course to pass through
     B.R.IN. between S.R.IN. and B.R.R. Islands.

     During the day made training dives, held fire-control
     drills, and fired 8 rounds of 3/50 training ammunition
     and 195 rounds of 20mm at improvised target.

1647 Received serial 78 directing us to attempt to rescue crew
     of downed Liberator drifting in rubber dinghy at Latitude
     3°-12' South, Longitude 131°-30' East. Set course to pass
     east of B.R.R. Island, and increased speed to full on four
     engines. We had 420 miles to go at this time, and at our
     best speed we would not be able to arrive at their esti-
     mated position before sunset the next day.

9 May
0315 Received serial 83 giving new position for downed plane,
     Latitude 3°-25' South, Longitude 131°-37' East.

- 3 -

— page 188 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. BASH (SS269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

1515 passed between GORON and MATOBELLA Island Groups, and set
     course for the given position.

1739 Arrived at initial point and commenced search to westward.
     The current and wind would have driven their boat on course
     about 300° T., unless they tried to reach the nearest land,
     the course to which was about 260° T. We decided to search
     the region along and to the south and west of their most
     logical track during the night, hoping to find them before
     they could reach land. We searched this area within four
     miles of the east coast of Guam. The visibility during
     the night was estimated to be at least 3 miles, full moon
     with partly overcast sky.

10 May
0438 At daybreak began searching to northward of their most
     likely track.
     AIRCRAFT CONTACT #2
1015 SD contact at eight miles, closing rapidly to six miles before
     we submerged; the plane was not sighted from the bridge.

1108 Surfaced and resumed search.
     AIRCRAFT CONTACT #3
1133 SD contact at range 13 miles, opening slowly to 16 miles
     before it disappeared.

1702 Sunset; continued search to westward.

2400 Decided that further search was unwarranted, and set course
     for northern approaches to LUZON Strait.

11 May
     AIRCRAFT CONTACTS #4 and #5
0733 Sighted unidentified type aircraft shortly after he came out
     of a cloud, a little forward of the starboard beam, range
     about 3 miles, position angle about 35°, on a converging
     course. Simultaneously another unidentified plane was sighted
     about 10 miles astern, flying low. The nearer contact was
     picked up by the SD radar at a range of 2 miles as we sub-
     merged. Nothing happened.

0825 Surfaced and resumed three engine speed. We were trying to
     reach a point about 15 miles south of S.N.N. Island, in the
     SOEL Island Group. We had to run around several sailboats
     during the morning.

1236 Submerged with the southern tip of S.N.N. Island bearing 001°
     T., distance 8 miles.

1258 Sighted smoke distant about 10 miles, bearing 344° T.; com-
     menced approach.

- 4 -

— page 191 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. SHARK (SS269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

loading ship, if the escorts hadn't come to life by then.
The set-up was working nicely using course 235° T., speed
8½ knots.

1939-08 Commenced firing spread of three torpedoes from the bow tubes
at the A-AK, track 89 to 95° port, gyro angles 336 to 349°,
torpedo run 1370 yards, depth set at 8 feet, spread 3½° be-
tween torpedoes and with an eight second firing interval.
One and possibly two of these torpedoes were observed to
run under the target as we swung left towards the AK.
T.D. ATTACK #4

1940-03 Commenced firing spread of three torp. oes from the bow
tubes at the AK, track 139° port, gyro angles 337 to
339°, torpedo run 1490 yards, depth set at 8 feet, spread
3° between torpedoes and with an eight second firing
interval. I observed these torpedo tracks very closely -
two ran under the target, or were duds. I have never been
more certain of hits.
T.D. ATTACK #5
It looked as if we would have to dive at this stage; the
ship that we had just fired at started blinking a red light,
the port escort which we had passed close aboard a few
minutes previously had turned towards us, and the ship
first fired at was abeam and headed towards us with a zero
angle on the bow, range 550 yards by SJ. We went ahead
flank and since they had not started firing at us yet I
decided to pass between the two ships and fire the after
tubes at the A-AK as he passed astern. But shortly
before we were ready to shoot, this target turned right
rapidly, the angle on the bow changing from 30° star-
board to about 40° port. This necessitated swinging
left and almost paralleling the landing ship which
was about 1000 yards away a little abaft of the port
beam, in order to fire zero gyro angles at the A-AK.
As we swung left we changed the depth setting on the
after tubes to six feet, and at

1943-35 commenced firing a spread of four torpedoes at the A-AK,
track 70 to 77° port, gyro angles 171 to 179°, torpedo
run 2050 yards, with an eight second firing interval,
spread 2° between torpedoes.

1944-35 We saw and heard two torpedo explosions, one on the target,
and 55 and the other on the large escort or naval auxiliary that
had just pulled out from behind the A-AK. Post firing
analysis showed that the SJ ranges were on the large es-
cort rather than on the closer A-AK.

1945-17 The A-AK and the small escort began to drop depth
charges and fire their guns wildly for the next five min-
utes, and I finally realized that they still didn't know

- 7 -

— page 195 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. ASH (S269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

0930- Obtained a ping range of 1900 yards and at

0930-15 Commenced firing spread of four torpedoes, tracks of first
 two - 102° port, and of second two 75° port, gyro angles
 005 to 357°, torpedo run 1900 to 1700 yards, depth set
 5 foot, spread of 2° with an 8 second firing interval.
 The target began to turn towards us during the firing, but
 it appeared that he would be unable to avoid the spread
 until I saw that one of the torpedoes was running erratic.
 It finally steadied on a course about 30° to the right of
 the target. The target continued to swing towards us,
 storming down the lane that the erratic torpedo should have
 travelled. All of the torpedoes smoked heavily and their
 wakes were easily seen on the perfectly flat surface. The
 torpedo that ran erratic was one that had flooded twice
 before when the tubes were made ready.

0933 When the range to the target was about 1000 yards we went
 to 300 feet and changed course to get off the track because
 I knew that he carried depth charges.

0935 Three depth charges at ten second intervals.

0937 We heard the screws of the target passing overhead.

0940 The two escorts had reached our general vicinity, and were
 searching for us by listening only. One depth charge was
 dropped.

0944 One of the escorts gradually overhauled us from astern and
 passed directly over us at a very slow speed; we could hear
 the beat of screws through the hull for four minutes. I thought
 that he had us for sure since there was no density layer
 down at 350 feet but nothing happened. Apparently he just
 happened to pass over us.

0950 Finished decoding CTG 71.1 serial 93 directing that we
 open sealed instructions and take the AMGO's place in
 attack on SO.B.J..

1003 One of the escorts dropped a final warning depth charge and
 both drew away to the northward at high speed to rejoin the
 target.

1040 At periscope depth - the smoke of the target could be seen
 in the direction of M.N.I. Strait, By

1118 They were far enough for us to surface and clear the area
 before the planes from LEBON arrived. We set
 course for D.M.IN under the cover of a very heavy rain squall
 which lasted until about 1230.

- 11 -

— page 198 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASH. (SS269) --Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

1244 Discontinued lifeguard duty and set course for TIMOR via
     FLORES Sea and east of TIMOR in accordance with CTG 71.1 ser-
     ial 30; zigzagging during daylight.

     During the afternoon passed fifty to sixty sailboats. We in-
     vestigated one of them and found it to be just a fishing boat.
     During the night we developed numerous SJ radar contacts, all
     of which were on sailboats.

18 May
0209 Transmitted our serial six which gave our ET. at TIMOR and our
     requirements from F.L.N.T.L.
     SHIP CONTACT 5
0613 Sighted the tops of another submarine. The contact was devel-
     oped and identified as one of our boats.
0647 Exchanged call signs with FLASHE.
     AIRCRAFT CONTACT 11
0831 SJ radar contacts, ranges 11 and 18 miles. The 18 mile pip dis-
     appeared in about one minute.
0842 The 11 mile pip began to close and we submerged; plane not sight-
     ed.
0908 Surfaced.
0924 and 1123 Sound operator thought that he heard echo ranging bearing
     095° and 097° T. Nothing could be sighted through the high
     periscope, but it could have been from a submarine. We avoided
     his most probable position.
1514 - 1531 Investigated a two masted sailboat that was larger than the
     average. I was satisfied that he was harmless and let him go.
     During the night we developed numerous radar contacts, all of
     which were on sailboats.

19 May
0727 Submerged for training.
0741 Surfaced.

20 May
0420 Passed between eastern end of TIMOR and LITI Island and set course
     for TIMOR.
     AIRCRAFT CONTACT 12
1033 SJ contact on plane, range 15 miles steady. It disappeared from
     view after 3 minutes at the same range.

- 14 -

— page 200 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. R SHER (SS269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

laying operations. We closed it to about 300 yards and sank
it with 20mm gunfire.

0602 Made trim dive.

0715 Surfaced.
       AIRCRAFT CONTACT #16
1421 Lookout sighted a B-24 on starboard beam, distant 12 miles,
       headed for D.R.I. About a minute later it was picked up by
       SD radar as a very small pip.

2209 Passed about midway between eastern end of TIMOR and LETI
       Island, and set course for MINIP. Strait, covering the traffic
       routes from SOERABAJA and KOEPANG to AMBON.

23 May

0507 Submerged at daybreak for trim.

0550 Surfaced.
       AIRCRAFT CONTACT #17
1334 SD radar contact, range 24 miles, remaining steady for four
       minutes before it disappeared from view. At

1343 submerged when the pip reappeared at 10 miles, closing.

       We remained submerged until 1459 conducting fire-control
       drills. The plane was not sighted.

1822 Sighted boom of a searchlight high in the air over AMBON.

2100 - 2134 Maneuvered around sailboat or small cutter first sighted
       dead ahead.

2246 Completed uneventful passage through MINIPA Strait, and then
       closed the north coast of MINIP. and KALONG Islands to 4½
       miles while investigating northern approaches to KALONG Strait.

24 May

0058 Discontinued the search in this area after passing BOANO
       Island, and set course for the easternside of MUKKI Passage.

0439 SJ radar contact on an object later identified as a sailboat.
       GUN ATTACK #1
0551 Sighted this same sailboat again about four miles away as we
       passed out of a rain squall. It was larger than the average
       craft of this type seen in this area, and since we had al-
       ready been sighted I closed to investigate it. We fired two
       bursts of 20mm gunfire, but it continued to maneuver to evade
       us. Not until we fired a few shots through its mainsail was
       any effort made to stop, and then only the mainsail was lowered.
       - 16 -

— page 208 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. H.SHER (SS269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

0056-45 he commenced firing at us with a three inch gun at an SJ
           radar range of 770 yards. After the second shell whistled
           overhead I sent the bridge watch below, and had about de-
           cided to dive when he ceased firing after four shots, all
           well trained but high.

0100       The range had opened to 2000 yards, so I recalled the bridge
           watch. Shortly thereafter we heard several underwater ex-
           plosions, after which we were unable to pick up the target
           with the SJ, or see anything but burning oil on the surface.
           This fire persisted until 0209.

0444       Submerged at daybreak about 45 miles to the eastward of the
           attack. We remained submerged all day working on the follow-
           ing machinery which broke down during the day: both air
           compressors, bow planes, and number 1 periscope hoisting
           gear.

1741       Surfaced and set course for a point 20 miles south of
           KABOERANG Island in the TALAUD Island Group. This appeared
           to be the best spot in our area to intercept the task force
           reported by the CABRILL as having left T.I.I.I, if they
           were heading for PALAU. If they came our way they would have
           arrived between 1200 and 1600 the next day.

31 May

0136       On station; commenced patrolling on course 330° and reverse
           on six mile legs, at an engine speed.

0451       Submerged at daybreak.

1100       No air activity having been observed, surfaced and resumed
           patrol.
           AIRCRAFT CONTACT 39

1230       Sight and SD radar contact on unidentified bombing plane
           at range 14 miles. It was on course about 150° T., and
           was in sight for 15 minutes, being lost from sight and SD
           radar at a range of 19 miles.
           AIRCRAFT CONTACT 40

1326       Submerged to avoid being sighted by low flying float plane
           first sighted at about 12 miles range, headed towards us.

1746       Surfaced, and set course for north eastern corner of run.

2200       Arrived north eastern corner of area and commenced patrol-
           ling across east-west traffic lanes on 30 mile legs.

1 June 1944

0453       Submerged for trim at daybreak.

0748       Surfaced.

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— page 217 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

1730 Surfaced with smoke still in sight, bearing 110° T., range
about twenty miles.
1815 Moonrise - full moon.
1844 Established SJ radar contact bearing 136° T., range 24,000
yards. No planned to pass up the port side of the convoy
at a range of not less than 15,000 yards on the closest
ship, as we worked ahead of them. Their base course was
105° T., speed 12 knots.
SHIP CONTACT #7
1855 Sighted two ships on our port beam, range to nearest
11,600 yards. They appeared to be a small ship with a
smaller escort, but I didn't think that they were work-
ing with the larger convoy. They were soon lost from
sight on the port quarter.

As we passed abeam of the convoy at a range of about
15,000 yards we could see one escort about two miles
ahead of the convoy at an estimated range of 15,000
yards, but beyond SJ radar range. His angle on the bow
appeared to be about 90° port, but it must have been about
60° since he appeared to be getting closer to us.

1955 This escort turned towards us and we soon obtained a
range of 10,200 yards, closing. He turned away at
flank speed, but the range closed to 9200 yards before
we started drawing away from him. He was making 16
knots.

2018 This escort gave up and turned back to join the convoy.

2045 We were ahead of the convoy which was then on base
course 070° T., range 18,000 yards. We had slowed to
5 knots to obtain more information on its zig plan as
it closed.

2127 Heard one underwater explosion which appeared to be very
far away.

2135 The convoy changed its base course to 050° T., so we
worked ahead of it again.

2214 Submerged about 12,000 yards ahead of the nearest ship.

2225 All the convoy were showing large port angles on the
bow, so we went to 100% at full speed, but we never were
able to get nearer than about 8,000 yards to the nearest
ship. They had changed their base course to about 105°
T. Possibly they had radar and knew where we were all
of the time since we had occasional indications on
the radar screen of another radar in the vicinity.
AIRCRAFT CONTACTS #85 and #86
2255 Sighted a type BETTY bombing plane over the convoy. A
little later we sighted a float type ZERO also.

- 33 -

— page 226 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

I am sure that he was picking up survivors since his speed
was from zero to four knots, and at times the change of
bearing indicated that he was backing down. The smoke and
masts of the convoy could be seen going over the hill.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT 100
1008 Sighted type HELL bomber bearing 134° T., distant about 3
miles, after he had passed over us.

1023 The EX-STEWART commenced circling at about 15 knots and then
took off in the direction of the convoy at higher speed. The
closest we came to it was 3800 yards.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT 101
1056 and 1115 Sighted type HELL bomber circling in our vicinity.

I considered further pursuit of the convoy unwarranted since
by this time it would be within 85 miles of JOLO.

1122 Set course for BANGKA Passage. We planned to examine the
anchorage at TALISEI Roads, off the northeast corner of
CELEBES during daylight the next day.

1342 No planes having been sighted for an hour and a half we
surfaced to transmit contact report and clear area.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT 102
1355 Submerged to avoid being sighted by type PETE plane sighted
about ten miles away.

1436 Surfaced, and commenced transmission of our serial 14 to
CTG 71.1 at 1441, obtaining a receipt at 1453.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT 103
1455 Sighted type PETE plane flying in and out of the low clouds
on the port bow, distant 10 miles by SD radar. This plane
kept its port beam towards us as it circled astern until it
was lost to sight and radar at 1508 at range 16 miles. It
reappeared at 1510 on the port beam at range 15 miles, but
this time it circled ahead of us until at 1520 it reached a
position about one point on the starboard bow, turned towards
us and came in fast. We submerged to 200 feet - not ing
happened, but it was a good example of gambit tactics.

1836 Surfaced at dark and proceeded towards BANGKA Passage at
15 knots.

15 June

0535 At daybreak we had about 42 miles to go before reaching a
point 12 miles from TALISEI Island where we planned to dive
and complete the approach to the anchorage submerged. I
decided to remain on the surface until reaching this point
if the planes would permit.

0735 Maneuvered around a sailboat to avoid being sighted.

- 42 -

— page 232 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

(C) WEATHER

     The weather was extremely pleasant for this time of the year
both from FREMANTLE to the Barrier during early May and for the return
trip in the middle of July.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

     A two and one quarter knot south westerly set was experienced
throughout the night of 18-19 June while transiting GILLI Strait and
eastern SAVOE Sea.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

     No new navigational aids were observed. No navigational lights
were seen lighted.

- 47 -

— page 238 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (continued).

| No. | Time Date | Lat.Long. | Type/Pol | Est. Initial Range | Course & Speed | How detected | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | 180 | | |
| 68 | 1236 5 June | 6-08N 125-51E | BETTY | 8 mi. | 000 | i | |
| 69 | 1252 5 June | 6-09N 125-51E | N.J.L. | 16 mi. | | i | |
| 70 | 1342 5 June | 6-10N 125-53E | Sea- plane | 10 mi. | | i | |
| 71 | 1415 5 Jun. | 6-12N 125-54E | | 8 mi. | | i | |
| 72 | 1418 5 June | 6-12N 125-54E | | 8 mi. | 000 | i | |
| 73 | 1737 5 June | 6-10N 125-55E | J KE | 8 mi. | | i | |
| 74 | 1857 5 June | 6-11N 125-56E | Two plane | 7 mi. | | R & SN# | Running lights lighted. |
| 75 | 1906 5 June | 6-11N 125-55E | Bomber | 6½ mi. | | R & SN | Running lights on. Submerged. |
| 76 | 0055 6 June | 6-29N 126-43E | Large plane | 6 mi. | | SN | Flying low. Passed clear. |
| 77 | 0710 6 June | 05-36N 126-55E | SALLY | 12 mi. | 000 | SD | Submerged |
| 78 | 0823 6 June | 5-24N 126-51E | BETTY | 8 mi. | 180 | SD | Submerged |
| 79 | 0955 6 June | 5-21N 126-51E | PETE | 4 mi. | | SD | A/S search. |
| 80 | 0955 6 June | 5-21N 126-51E | BETTY | 5 mi. | | SD | A/S search. |
| 81 | 1052 6 June | 5-23N 126-51E | HAP | 8 mi. | | P | |
| 82 | 1307 6 June | 5-17N 126-51E | BETTY | 8 mi. | | P | |
| 83 | 1120 7 June | 1-38N 126-17E | BETTY | 9 mi. | | R & SD | Submerged |
| 84 | 1242 7 June | 1-34N 126-12E | | 10 mi. | Circ- ling | P | Over convoy |
| 85 | 2255 7 June | 1-49N 127-17E | BETTY | | Circ- ling | P | In sight for 2 hours over con- voy. |
| 86 | 2320 7 June | 1-49N 127-17E | Float type zero | | Circ- ling | P | Over convoy. |
| 87 | 1130 8 June | 2-36N 124-52E | | 11 mi. | | R | Submerged |
| 88 | 1215 8 June | 2-40N 125-46E | | 14 mi. | | R | |
| 89 | 1133 9 June | 1-58N 122-32E | | 15 mi. | | SD | Flying low. |
- 53 -

— page 240 —
(H) ATTACK DATA C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 4

Time 1422 Date 11 May 1944 Lat. 2°-33' S. Long. 126°-04' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was an AP-AK (similar to the CHERIBON
MARU) of about 4000 tons. It was in a convoy with
an unidentified AK escorted by a naval auxiliary
or mine layer of about 2500 tons, and two A/S ves-
sels similar to the TOSHIMA class, CHs 1-12, coastal
mine layers. Contact was made on the smoke of the
target at about 10 miles. Visibility: unlimited.

Ship(s) Sunk or Damaged - None.

Target Draft 17' Course 138° Speed 8.5 knots Range 2400 yards
(at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 3 knots Course 080° Depth 67' Angle 0° (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Normal periscope attack. A spread of 1°R - 1°L -
2 3/4°L - 2 3/4°R was imposed on the generated TDC
gyro angles at the time of firing. A firing inter-
val of eight seconds was used between torpedoes.
Just before firing, an escort was in line with the
target. An attempted ping range resulted in a range
of the escort instead of the target. The torpedo
tracks were not observed.

- 55 -

— page 241 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
                                                                TORPEDO ATTACK #1

Tubes Fired -             No. 1         No. 2         No. 3         No. 4

Track angle -             122° S.       120° S.       119° S.       125° S.

Gyro Angle -              001°          359½°         358°          002°

Depth Set -               10'           10'           10'           10'

Power -                   High          High          High          High

Hit or Miss               Miss          Miss          Miss          Miss

Erratic -                 No?           No?           No?           No?

Mark Torpedo -            23            23            23            23

Serial No. -              26909         41306         26914         33780

Mark Exploder -           6-4           6-4           6-4           6-4

Serial No. -              8719          8777          8704          8789

Actuation Set -           Contact       Contact       Contact       Contact

Actuation Actual -

Mark Warhead -            16            16-1          16            16

Serial No. -              9999          3787          2672          10064

Explosive -               TPX           TPX           TPX           TPX

Firing Interval -         0             8             8             8

Spread -                  1°R           1°L           2 3/4°L       2 3/4°R

Sea Conditions -          Calm          Calm          Calm          Calm

Overhaul Activity -       ORION         ORION         ORION         ORION

Remarks -                 Post firing analysis shows that with large
                          spread used at least one torpedo should
                          have hit.

                                                                - 56 -

— page 242 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 4
Time 1423 Date 11 May 1944 Lat. 2°-33' S. Long. 126°-4' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Target was unidentified AK in the convoy of Attack
#1. It was HPM sequence of about 4000 tons.

Ship(s) sunk or damaged - None.

Target Draft 17' Course 125° Speed 8.5 knots Range 2100 yards
(at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 3 knots Course 080° Depth 67' Angle 1° rise (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: This was a "snap" set-up after firing in attack #1,
using the same target speed. A single ping range
was obtained before firing. The TDC operator was
not sure the first set-up was correct so a new set-
up was called for between torpedoes. This resulted
in a 20 second firing interval. Both torpedoes were
fired at the M.O.T. The torpedo tracks were not
observed.

- 57 -

— page 243 —
CONFIDENTIAL
TORPEDO ATTACK #2

Tubes Fired - | No. 5 | No. 6
Track Angle - | 109° S. | 116° S.
Gyro Angle - | 336° | 344°
Depth Set - | 10' | 10'
Power - | High | High
Hit or Miss | Miss | Miss
Erratic - | No | No
Mark Torpedo - | 23 | 23
Serial No. - | 41321 | 41202
Mark Exploder - | 6-4 | 6-4
Serial No. - | 11536 | 8768
Actuation Set - | Contact | Contact
Actuation Actual - | ----- | -----
Mark Warhead - | 16-1 | 16-1
Serial No. | 11642 | 2002
Explosive - | TPX | TPX
Firing Interval | 0 | 20
Spread - | 0° | 0°
Sea Conditions - | Calm | Calm
Overhaul Activity - | CRICN | CRICN
Remarks - | Tracks not observd. |

- 58 -

— page 244 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. RISHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 4
Time 1939 Date 11 May 1944 Lat. 3°-08' S. Long. 126°- 0.5 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was the AP-AK of the convoy in Attack #1.
                 Contact was made shortly after surfacing about sunset
                 on the smoke of the target at about 10 miles. We then
                 closed the target until radar contact was made at 15,000
                 yards. Visibility: dark, sky overcast and no moon.

Ship(s) Sunk or Damaged - None.

Target Draft 17' Course 235° Speed 8.5 knots Range 1430 yards
                                                               (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 10 knots Course 344° (swinging left slowly) Depth Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Target was tracked with radar ranges and bearings until
                 a satisfactory solution was obtained. The ship was then
                 maneuvered into an attack position between the target
                 and land giving us a very dark background. For the
                 attack continuous radar ranges and TBT bearings were fed
                 into the T.D.C. A spread of 0° - 3½°L - 3½°R was imposed
                 on the generated TDC gyro angles at the time of firing.
                 Eight second firing interval was used. Since it was
                 believed the torpedoes ran under the target in Attack
                 #1, an eight foot depth setting was used. The bubble
                 tracks of the two forward torpedoes were observed to be
                 headed for the target. These two either ran under or
                 were duds.

- 59 -

— page 245 —
C-(C-N-F-I-)-N-T-I-A-L

                                                                NAVAL ATTACK #3

Tubos Fired -         No. 1           No. 2           No. 3
Track Angle -         89° P.          95° P.          90° P.
Gyro Angle -          342°            338°            349°
Depth Set -           8'              8'              8'
Power -               High            High            High
Hit or Miss -         Miss            Miss            Miss
Erratic -             Yes             Yes             Yes?
Mark Torpedo -        14-3A           14-3A           14-3A
Serial No. -          39975           24868           24299
Mark Exploder -       6-4             6-4             6-4
Serial No. -          11543           11555           8808
Actuation Set -       Contact         Contact         Contact
Actuation Actual -
Mark Warhead -        16-1            16-1            16-1
Serial No. -          12399           12575           11904
Explosive -           TPX             TPX             TPX
Firing Interval -     0               8               8
Spread -              0°              3°L             3°R
Sea Conditions -      Calm            Calm            Calm
Overhaul Activity -   ORION           ORION           ORION
Remarks -             The bubble tracks of #1 and #2 showed
                      hits. These either ran deep or were
                      duds.

                                                                - 60 -

— page 246 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. FLASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO: [HANDWRITTEN: 4] PATROL NO. [HANDWRITTEN: 4]
Time 1940 Date 11 May 1944 Lat. 3°-08' S. Long. 126°-0.5' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: This was a continuation of attack [HANDWRITTEN: #3], but on the
unidentified AK of the convoy.

Ship(s) sunk or damaged - None.

Target Draft 17' Course 235° Speed 8.5 knots Range 740 yards
(at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 10 knots Course 300° Depth Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Continuous radar ranges and TBT bearings were fed
into the TDC during firing and a spread of 3°L -
0° - 3°R was imposed on the generated TDC gyro
angles. Firing interval of eight seconds was
used. No bubble track of the first torpedo
went forward of the AOT, the second went aft of
the AOT, and the third went astern. The first
two torpedoes either ran under the target or were
duds.

- 61 -

— page 247 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK 5 PATROL NO. 4
Time 1944 Date 11 May 1944 Lat. 3°-08' S. Long. 126°-0.5' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Target was the AP-AK of the convoy in Attack #1. This
             was a continuation of Attacks #3 and #4.

Ships Damaged - One (1) AP-AK (similar to CHERIBON MARU) - 4000 tons.
                One (1) naval auxiliary or minelayer - 2500 tons.

Damage Deter-
mined by: Captain, J.O.O.D., and after lookouts saw one hit on
          each of the targets from the bridge. Hits were also
          heard throughout the ship at proper times.

Target Draft 17' Course 290° Speed 8.5 knots Range 900 yards
                                                (approx) to AP-AK
                                                2070 yards
                                                to naval auxiliary
                                                (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 17 knots Course 220° Depth Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: This was a "snap" radar set-up. TBT bearings, angle
             on the bow from bridge, and radar ranges were fed into
             the TDC. A spread of 1°L - 1°R - 3°L - 3°L was in-
             puted TDC gyro angles using an eight
             second firing interval. Post firing analysis shows
             that the firing range was on the naval auxiliary and
             that the approximate range to AP-AK was 900 yards.
             At firing both targets were in line. A depth setting
             of six feet was used because of the erratic torpedo
             performance in Attacks #3 and #4. The first torpedo
             missed the AP-AK and hit the naval auxiliary. The
             fourth torpedo hit the AP-AK.

- 63 -

— page 248 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

                                TORPEDO ATTACK #4

Tubes Fired - No. 4         No. 5         No. 6
Track angle -         139° P.       138° P.       139° P.
Gyro angle -          337° 10'      337° 30'      339°
Depth Set -           8'            8'            8'
Power -               High          High          High
Hit or Miss           Miss          Miss          Miss
Erratic -             Yes           Yes           Yes?
Mark Torpedo -        14-3A         14-3A         14-3A
Serial No. -          25942         40244         40331
Mark Exploder -       6-4           6-4           6-4
Serial No. -          8809          8805          11550
Actuation Set -       Contact       Contact       Contact
Actuation Actual -
Mark Warhead -        16-1          16            16-1
Serial No. -          12018         4920          11605
Explosive -           TFX           TFX           TNT
Firing Interval -     0             8             8
Spread -              3°L           0°            3°R
Sea Conditions -      Calm          Calm          Calm
Overhaul Activity -   ORION         ORION         ORION
Remarks -             Bubble tracks showed #4 and #5 were
                      hits. These either ran deep or were
                      duds.

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— page 249 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK 5 PATROL NO. 4
Time 1944 Date 11 May 1944 Lat. 3°-08' S. Long. 126°-0.5' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Target was the AP-AK of the convoy in Attack #1. This
             was a continuation of Attacks #3 and #4.

Ships Damaged - One (1) AP-AK (similar to CHERIBON MARU) - 4000 tons.
                One (1) naval auxiliary or minelayer - 2500 tons.

Damage Deter-
mined by: Captain, J.O.O.D. and after lookouts saw one hit on
          side of the target from the bridge. Hits were also
          heard throughout the ship at proper times.

Target Draft 17' Course 290° Speed 8.5 knots Range 900 yards
                                                (approx) to AP-AK
                                                2070 yards
                                                to naval auxiliary
                                                (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 17 knots Course 220° Depth Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: This was a "snap" radar set-up. TBT bearings, angle
             on the bow from bridge, and radar ranges were fed into
             the TDC. A spread of 10°L - 1°R - 3°R - 3°L was im-
             posed on the generated TDC gyro angles using an eight
             second firing interval. Post firing analysis shows
             that the firing run was on the naval auxiliary and
             that the approximate range to AP-AK was 900 yards.
             All firing data targets were in line. A depth setting
             of six feet was used because of the erratic torpedo
             performance in Attacks #3 and #4. The first torpedo
             missed the AP-AK and hit the naval auxiliary. The
             fourth torpedo hit the AP-AK.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TORPEDO ATTACK #5

Tubos Fired -      | No. 7 | No. 8 | No. 9 | No. 10
Track Angle -      | 071° P. | 070° P. | 070° P. | 077° P.
Gyro Angle -       | 178° 40' | 179° 10' | 178° 30' | 171°
Depth Set -        | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6'
Iower -            | High | High | High | High
Hit or Miss -      | Hit | Miss | Miss | Hit
Erratic -          | No | No | No | No
Mark Torpedo -     | 14-3A | 14-3A | 23 | 23
Serial No. -       | 24403 | 25951 | 33777 | 33758
Mark Exploder -    | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4
Sorial No. -       | 8761 | 8769 | 8702 | 8716
Actuation Set -    | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact
Actuation Actual - | Contact | ----- | ----- | Contact
Mark Warhead -     | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16 | 16
Sorial No. -       | 12268 | 12606 | 10332 | 3906
Explosivo -        | T.X. | T.X. | T.X. | T.X.
Firing Interval -  | 0 | 8 | 8 | 8
Spread -           | 1°L | 1°R | 3°R | 3°L
Sea Conditions -   | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm
Overhaul Activity -| C.R.I.N | C.R.I.N | C.R.I.N | C.R.I.N
Remarks -          | Missed A.K HSN | H.S.N | H.S.N | H.S.N
                   | and hit naval | | |
                   | auxiliary. | | |

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. R.SHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6 PATROL NO. 4
Time 2304 Date 11 May 1944 Lat. 3°-30' S. Long. 126°-06' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was the unidentified AK of the previous
attacks. Only two small escorts remained with the
convoy. Visibility: hazy, three quarter moon,
occasional rain squalls.

Ship(s) Sunk - One (1) Unidentified (NFK) AK of 4000 tons.

Damage Deter-
mined by: The Captain saw one hit on target and observed it
to burst into flames. After surfacing, target was
still burning and only part of the superstructure
was visible. Later the Captain and the O.O.D. saw
target sink and flames die out.

Target Draft 17' Course 170° Speed 8½ knots Range 800 yards
(at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 3 knots Course 265° Depth 67' Angle 0° (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: This was a combination radar tracking, night
periscope attack. Target was tracked by radar
ranges and TBT bearings until a satisfactory
solution was obtained. We then went to radar
depth at 15,000 yards and tracked him to 5500
yards. The remainder of the attack was at peris-
cope depth using periscope bearings, angles on the
bow, and a single ping range at time of firing.
Spread of 1 1/3°R - 1 1/3°L - 4°L - 4°R was im-
posed on the gun. TDC gyro angles with a
firing interval of eight seconds. Torpedoes appear-
ed to run hot, straight, and normal although plot
shows at least one more torpedo should have hit.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

                                                              TORPEDO ATTACK #6

Tubos Fired - | No. 8      | No. 7      | No. 9      | No. 10
Track Angle - | 120° S.    | 121°S.     | 120° S.    | 130° S.
Gyro Angle -  | 205°       | 204°       | 203° 20'   | 217°
Depth Set -   | 5'         | 5'         | 5'         | 5'
Lower -       | High       | High       | High       | High
Hit or Miss - | Miss       | Hit        | Miss       | Miss
Erratic -     | No         | No         | No         | No
Mark Torpedoes -| 14-3A      | 14-3A      | 14-3A      | 14-3A
Serial No. -  | 39651      | 24285      | 40607      | 39669
Mark Exploder - | 6-4        | 6-4        | 6-4        | 6-4
Serial No. -  | 8802       | 8174       | 11554      | 8310
Actuation Set - | Contact    | Contact    | Contact    | Contact
Actuation Actual -| -----      | Contact    | -----      | -----
Mark Warhead -| 16-1       | 16-1       | 16-1       | 16-1
Serial No. -  | 12962      | 12977      | 12914      | 12488
Explosive -   | TIX        | TIX        | TIX        | TIX
Firing Interval -| 0          | 8          | 8          | 8
Spread -      | 1 1/3°R    | 1 1/3°L    | 4°L        | 4°R
Sea Conditions -| Calm       | Calm       | Calm       | Calm
Overhaul Activity -| RI N       | RI N       | RI N       | RI N
Remarks -     | Spread used should have given at least one
              | more hit.

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U.S.S. RASHIR (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 7 PATROL NO. 4
Time 0930 Date 12 May 1944 Lat. 3°-41.5' S. Long. 127°-15.5' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Target was the P-K of the previous attacks. Remain-
dor of convoy was not present. During the attack two
PCs, similar to the 40-44 class, joined the target.
Contact was made by periscope at about 10 miles. Visi-
bility was hazy. It had been raining and was clearing
up.

Ship(s) Sunk or Damaged - None.

Target Draft 17' Course 150°-120° Speed 8 knots Range 1900 yards
                                                              (at firing)

                                Own Ship Data

Speed 3 knots Course 220° Depth 67' Angle 0° (at firing)

                          Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: This was a normal periscope approach. Target was zig-
ging radically. A spread of 1°L - 1°R - 2 3/4°L -
2 3/4°L was imposed on the generated T.C gyro angles.
An eight second firing interval was used. A target
course of 150° was used for the first two torpedoes
and 120° for the last two because the target zigged
towards us after we commenced firing. The second
torpedo ran erratic to the right. The target was
straddled by the spread and appeared to be in the
slot where the torpedo would have run had it not
run erratic.

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— page 254 —
C O N F I D E N T I A L
TIMED ATTACK 17

Tubos Fired - No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4
Track Angle - 102° L. 101° L. 069° L. 075° L.
Gyro Angle - 001° 50' 003° 20' 004° 50' 357°
Depth Set - 5' 5' 5' 5'
Lower - High High High High
Hit or Miss - Miss Miss Miss Miss
Erratic - No Yes No No
Mark Torpedo - 14-3A 23 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. - 25558 26890 24303 25534
Mark Exploder - 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
Serial No. - 11560 8552 8772 8775
Actuation Set - Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual
Mark Warhead - 15 16 16 15
Serial No. - 2595 11050 4012 2860
Explosive - T.X Extension T.X T.X T.X Extension
                 TNT TNT
Firing Interval - 0 8 8 8
Spread - 1°L 1°R 2 3/4°L 2 3/4°L
Sea Conditions - Calm Calm Calm Calm
Overhaul Activity - C.I.N C.I.N C.I.N C.I.N
Remarks - HSN * HSN HSN

*this torpedo ran erratic to the right.
It had previously been flooded two times.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. R.SHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 8 PATROL NO. 4
Time 2012 Date 29 May 1944 Lat. 3°-40' N. Long. 126°-58' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Target was a coal burner similar to the SINSYU MARU.
It was escorted by a PC of the 40-44 class and an
unidentified small escort. Contact was made by peris-
cope during submerged running on the target's smoke
at about 24 miles. We surfaced and worked ahead of
target, and after dark closed to make radar contact.
Visibility: hazy, one quarter moon, raining.

Ship(s) Damaged - One (1) AK (similar to SINSYU MARU) of 4160 tons.

Damage Deter-
mined by: Captain observed one hit which was also heard
throughout the ship. Sound reported that the screws
had stopped.

Target Draft 24' Course 315° Speed 8.5 knots Range 1140 yards
(at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 3 knots Course 040° Depth 67' Angle 0° (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: After making radar contact, the target was tracked
until a satisfactory solution was obtained. We
dove ahead of the target and continued tracking at
radar depth. At 4500 yards we went to periscope
depth. Target was then tracked in by sound bear-
ings until sight of periscope, continuous peris-
cope bearings and angles on the bow were fed into
the TDC, and a single ping range was obtained just
before firing. A spread of 0° - 3°L - 3°R was
imposed on the generated TDC gyro angles using a
firing interval of eight seconds. All torpedoes
ran hot, straight, and normal.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 9 PATROL NO. 4

Time 0054 Date 30 May 1944 Lat. 3°-40' N. Long. 126°- 58' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Target was the damaged AK of Attack #8. It was dead
 in the water with the two escorts circling irregular-
 ly around it. Visibility: dark, no moon.

Ship Sunk: One (1) AK (similar to SINSYU MARU) of 4180 tons.

Damage Deter-
mined by: Captain observed tow hits and then observed the target
 blow up and sink.

Target Draft 24' Course 335° Speed 0 Range 1100 yards (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 13 knots Course 045° Depth Surface

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Target was dead in the water. We closed the target
 on the surface on a 110° port track and fired one
 torpedo at the HOT with a zero gyro angle. The
 first torpedo veered right before taking its course and
 looked as if it might miss astern, so a second tor-
 pedo was fired with a 2° left offset. Both torpedoes
 hit.

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C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TORPEDO ATTACKS #8 and #9

| | ATTACK #8 | | | ATTACK #9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. 6 | No. 5 | No. 4 | No. 1 | No. 2 |
| Tubes Fired - | | | | | |
| Track Angle - | 112° P. | 117° P. | 114° P. | 110° P. | 112° P. |
| Gyro Angle - | 343° | 339° | 341° | 000° | 358° |
| Depth Set - | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' | 6' |
| Power - | High | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or Miss - | Miss | Hit | Miss | Hit | Hit |
| Erratic - | No | No | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo - | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No. - | 25761 | 24092 | 25834 | 24559 | 23751 |
| Mark Exploder - | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 |
| Serial No. - | 12411 | 12413 | 6171 | 18035 | 6173 |
| Actuation Set - | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual - | - - - - - | - - - - - | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Mark Warhead - | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No. - | 1735 | 347 | 12762 | 12987 | 12965 |
| Explosive - | TFX | TFX | TFX | TFX | TFX |
| Firing Interval - | 0 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 25 |
| Spread - | 0° | 3°L | 3°R | 0° | 2°L |
| Sea Conditions - | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm |
| Overhaul Activity - | Motor Torpedo Boat Base Number TEN. | | | | |
| Remarks - | HSN | HSN | HSN | HSN | HSN |

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK 10 PATROL NO. 4
Time 1641 Date 8 June 1944 Lat. 30°-47' N. Long. 124°-02.5' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was the ASUKA, an AG training vessel
(ex OC1-1), escorted by an ODD of the MATSUKAZE
class with an air coverage of two planes. Contact
was made from the bridge on the smokes of the tar-
get and escort at about 12 miles. Visibility: un-
limited.

Ship(s) Sunk - ASUKA, an AG training vessel (ex OC1-1) of 9885
tons.

Damage Deter-
mined by: The Captain saw three hits and five hits were heard
throughout the ship. The target took a 15° starboard
list and from the bridge aft was covered with flame
and smoke. A large explosion, probably the magazine,
was observed about the after turret. Loud breaking
up noises or underwater explosions were heard by
sound man through the hull for an hour. One hour
and twenty minutes after firing periscope obser-
vations at about 6000 yards from the firing point
showed three separate fires over an area of 1000
yards. One of the fires surrounded the top of a
mast, the only part of the target visible above the
surface.

Target Draft 24' Course 020° Speed 16 knots Range 850 yards
(at firing)

Own Ship Data
Speed 3 knots Course 288° Depth 67' Angle 0° (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: Normal periscope attack. Continuous periscope bearings,
ranges, and angles on the bow were ground into the TDC.
A one degree spread between torpedoes was imposed on the
generated TDC gyro angles at time of firing using an
eight second firing interval. All torpedoes ran hot,
straight, and normal.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TORPEDO ATTACK NO 10

Tubes Fired - | No. 6 | No. 5 | No. 4 | No. 3 | No. 2 | No. 1
Track Angle - | 96½°S. | 101½°S | 104½°S. | 115½°S. | 123½°S. | 126½°S.
Gyro Angle - | 008° | 010° | 020° | 029° | 032° | 036°
Depth Set - | 10' | 10' | 10' | 10' | 10' | 10'
Power - | High | High | High | High | High | High
Hit or Miss - | Hit | Hit | Hit | Hit | Hit | Miss
Erratic - | No | No | No | No | No | No
Mark Torpedo - | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A
Serial No. - | 23065 | 25833 | 23749 | 25299 | 25815 | 25340
Mark Exploder - | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5 | 6-5
Serial No. - | 17834 | 17932 | 6523 | 17914 | 12495 | 6446
Actuation Set - | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact
Actuation Actual - | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact | - - -
Mark Warhead - | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16
Serial No. - | 9892 | 3112 | 1610 | 3042 | 5646 | 3677
Explosive - | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX
Firing Interval - | 0 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8
Type Spread - | ½°R | ½°L | 1½°L | 1½°R | 2½°R | 2½°L
Sea Conditions - | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm | Calm
Overhaul Activity - Motor Torpedo Boat Base Number 10
Remarks - | HSN | HSN | HSN | HSN | HSN | HSN

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACKS NOS. 11,12,13 P. TROL NO. 4
Time 0902 Date 14 June 1944 Lat. 4°-31' N. Long. 122°-25' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Target for Attack #11 was an AK of the M. TUMOTO MARU
           class. Attack #12 an unidentified AK, and Attack #13
           an AK similar to the YOKOHAMA MARU. The targets were
           a convoy of about eight ships escorted by the EX-
           MURI class torpedo boat, and
           several other unidentified escorts, including at least
           one more DD plus an air coverage of one plane. Con-
           tact was made on the convoy just before
           sunrise at 15-20 miles. Visibility: unlimited.

Ship(s) Sunk: Attack #11 - One (1) AK of the M.TUMOTO MARU class of
           7025 tons.

Ship(s) Damaged: Attack #12 - One (1) unidentified AK of 4500 tons.
           Attack #13 - One (1) AK (similar to YOKOHAMA MARU)
           of 6143 tons.

Damage Deter-
mined by: Attack #11 - two hits were heard throughout the ship
           and the Captain saw the second hit. Before the sec-
           ond hit, the target had a small down angle by the
           stern. One minute and a half later the Captain saw
           the target turn over with only the bottom showing.
           Attack #12 - two probable hits were heard, one of
           which was possibly on another target. Attack #13 -
           one hit was heard at the proper time.

Target Draft | Course | Speed | Range (at firing)
Attack #11 12-15' | 340° | 9 knots | 1700 yards
Attack #12 12-15' | 355° | 9 knots | 550 yards
Attack #13 12-15' | 200° | 9 knots | 800 yards

Own Ship Data
Speed | Course | Depth | Angle (at firing)
Attack #11 3 knots | 258° | 67' | 0°
Attack #12 3 knots | 252° | 67' | 0°
Attack #13 5 knots | 354° | 67' | 2° (down)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack: Periscope approach. Target speed had been determined
           by radar tracking two nights previously and checked
           the same during the approach. All firings were "snap"
           set-ups. A spread of 3° between torpedoes was used in
           Attack #11 and 2° in Attack #12. The torpedo in
           Attack #13 was fired on generated bearing at the MOT.

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G-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

                                    TORPEDO ATTACK 11           TORPEDO ATTACK 12
                                    No. 7   No. 8   No. 9   No. 10  No. 11  No. 12
Tubes Fired -
Track Angle -                       61° P.  85° P.  not recorded    45° L.  45° L.
Gyro Angle -                        177°20' 180°    -270    267     055     055
Depth Set -                         6'      6'      6'      6'      6'      6'
Power -                             High    High    High    High    High    High
Hit or Miss -                       Hit     Hit     Hit     Hit     Hit     Hit
Erratic -                           No      No      No      No      No      No
Mark Torpedo -                      14-3A   14-3A   14-3A   14-3A   14-3A   14-3A
Serial No. -                        25304   25812   25519   25806   25838   25838
Mark Exploder -                     6-5     6-5     6-5     6-5     6-5     6-5
Serial No. -                        10219   10640   4522    6160    7639    7639
Actuation Set -                     Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual -                  Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
Mark Warhead -                      16      16      16      16      16      16
Serial No. -                        13049   12740   11656   11443   11443   11443
Explosive -                         TPX     TPX     TPX     TPX     TPX     TPX
Firing Interval -                   0°      0°      0°      10      0       0
Spread -                            1°R     1°L     1°R     0°      0°      0°
Sea Conditions -                    slight chop - no white caps
Overhaul Activity -                 Motor Torpedo Boat Base Number TEN
Remarks -                           HSN     HSN     HSN     HSN     HSN     HSN

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— page 262 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

                                                              TORPEDO ATTACK #11 TORPEDO ATTACK #12 #13
Tubes Fired -                                                 No. 7 No. 8 No. 9 No. 10 No. 4
Track Angle -                                                 81½° P. 85½° P. not recorded 45½° P.
Gyro Angle -                                                  177°20' 180° 270 267 055
Depth Set -                                                   6' 6' 6' 6' 6'
Power -                                                       High High High High High
Hit or Miss -                                                 Hit Hit Hit Hit Hit
Erratic -                                                     No No No No No
Mark Torpedo -                                                14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial No. -                                                  25304 25312 25519 25806 25838
Mark Exploder -                                               6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
Serial No. -                                                  10219 10640 6522 6160 7639
Actuation Set -                                               Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation Actual -                                            Contact Contact Contact Contact Contact
Mark Warhead -                                                16 16 16 16 16
Serial No. -                                                  13049 12740 3514 11656 11443
Explosive -                                                   TPX TPX TPX TPX TPX
Firing Interval -                                             0° 9 0 10 0
Spread -                                                      1½°L 1½°R 1°L 1°R 0°
Sea Conditions -                                              slight chop - no white caps
Overhaul Activity -                                           Motor Torpedo Bo.t Base Number TEN
Remarks -                                                     HSN HSN HSN HSN HSN

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— page 263 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. [HANDWRITTEN: 14] PATROL NO. [HANDWRITTEN: 4]
Time 1358 Date 17 June 1944 Lat. 3°-46' S. Long. 128°-5' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: The target was a split superstructure K similar to
the KIZAN MARU escorted by two PCs of the 40-44 class
and a third PC that appeared to be joining up. Sub-
merged periscope contact was made on the target at
about 5 miles coming out of a heavy rain squall.
Visibility: hazy, intermittent heavy rain squalls.

Ship(s) Damaged - One (1) K (similar to the KIZAN MARU) of 5072
tons.

Damage Deter-
mined by: One torpedo hit was heard one minute and thirty-eight
seconds after firing. One minute and a half after the
hit a loud, prolonged, rumbling explosion was heard.
Sound reported possible breaking up noises. Sound
conditions were very poor.

Target Draft 27' Course 065 Speed 8 knots Range 2100 yards
(at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 3 knots Course 352° Depth 65' Angle 0° (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Normal periscope approach. A one degree spread be-
tween torpedoes was imposed on the generated TDC
gyro angles. The torpedo tracks were not observed
but time shows the second torpedo hit the target.

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— page 264 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
TORPEDO ATTACK 14

Tubos Fired - No. 3 No. 6
Track Angle - 107° S. 107° S.
Gyro Angle - 359° 359°
Depth Set - 6' 6'
Power - High High
Hit or Miss - Miss Hit
Erratic - No No
Mark Torpedo - 14-3A. 14-3A.
Serial No. - 25437 22910
Mark Exploder - 6-5 6-5
Serial No. - 6227 6180
Actuation Set - Contact Contact
Actuation Actual Contact
Mark Warhead - 16 16
Serial No. - 11108 11507
Explosive - TFX TFX
Firing Interval - 0 9
Spread - ½°R ½°L
Sea Conditions - fairly rough sea
Overhaul Activity - Motor Torpedo Boat Base Number 10.
Remarks - HSN HSN

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— page 265 —
C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. B.R.E.A.M. (SS269) GUN ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 4
Time 0624 Date 24 May 1944 Lat. 2°-0.5'S. Long. 127°-28' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Sunk - One 35' sailboat of 10 tons. It was sloop rigged with a
quadrangular mainsail. It also had a radio antenna.

Damage Determined by - Saw target capsize.

Details of Action

Target was sunk by 20mm gunfire. A total of six maga-
zines or 348 rounds (232 H.E.I. and 116 H.E.T.) were fired at
the water line at an average range of 400 yards.

One jam occured in the after 20mm gun which was cleared
by re-cocking the gun and removing bent shell. It was caused
by insufficient tension on the magazine spring. The proper 60
pounds tension was on magazine at start.

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— page 272 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fourth War Patrol.

petrol. The Executive Officer and Navigator, Lieutenant Commander
E. B. Orr, U.S. Navy, was of invaluable assistance throughout the
patrol. His accurate navigation and sound advice in regard to
area coverage contributed materially to our success in finding tar-
gets, and he is given full credit for the excellent state of train-
ing of the crew. He is considered to be fully qualified for
immediate command of a fleet submarine.

An intensive training schedule was carried out for unquali-
fied men and for advancement in rating throughout the patrol. Def-
inite daily instruction periods were established for each watch
section.

Sixteen men were qualified in submarines and twenty were
advanced in rating. The persistent efforts of GAULI, Ferdinand
Alfred, 207 21 54, CBM(AA), U.S. Navy, SASGEN, Peter Joseph,
299 75 00, CM(PA), U.S. Naval Reserve, and LEIGEL, Lyle Albert,
328 30 31, CM(PA), U.S. Navy, contributed materially to the
success of the training program.

Practical navigation experience was gained by Lieutenant
W. E. Norrington, D-V(G), U.S. Naval Reserve, and Lieutenant
(junior grade), A. Newlon, U.S. Navy, by navigating to and
from the Barrier respectively.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

(FREMANTLE to area
(In area
(Area to FREMANTLE

2,600 mi.
10,900 mi.
1,800 mi.

29,000 gals.)
114,000 gals.)
24,000 gals.)

(S) DURATION

(Days enroute to area
(Days in area
(Days enroute to base
(Days submerged

14
36
5
18

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes - Fuel - Provisions - Personnel Factor
0           22,000 gals. 25 days     20 days.
Limiting factor this patrol Operational Order.

(U) REMARKS

1. enemy traffic routes or focal points.
   (a) One convoy which started out as two Ks and three
escorts was observed to take a long and unusual route in pro-
ceeding on the western side of S.N.N. Island where it was first
sighted, to AIBON. It made a landfall on the northwest tip of
BOSBOR and then hugged the west and south coast of this island
during the night. The next morning the one remaining K was
- 35 -

— page 275 —
F05-16/A16-3
Serial # 0359
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS RASHER Conf. ltr.
SS269/A16-3 Serial 011
dated 23 June 1944,
Report of 4th War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
      The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Fourth War Patrol -
         Comment on.

1. The fourth war patrol of the U.S.S. RASHER was conducted
in the MOLUKKA-CELEBES SEA area. It covered a period of fifty-five days
of which thirty-six days were spent North of the Barrier.

2. A total of forty-two torpedoes were fired on this very
aggressive patrol, making a total of seventeen hits observed and heard.
Fourteen of these hits were made with the eighteen torpedoes loaded at
DARWIN.

ATTACK NO'S 1 to 7 - The first seven aggressive attacks were all
made on three enemy ships in convoy with two escorts. These were
daylight submerged and night surface and submerged attacks. Twenty-
four torpedoes fired on these attacks produced one hit on each of
the large ships sinking an AK and damaging an AP-AK and a Naval
Auxiliary. Poor torpedo performance undoubtedly accounted for some
of the misses.

ATTACK NO'S 8 and 9 - A well conducted night periscope attack on
an AK with two escorts with three torpedoes. One hit stopped the
target and the follow-up attack with two torpedoes on the surface
sank him with two hits.

ATTACK NO. 10 - A daylight submerged attack with six torpedoes
fired at an AG. Three hits were seen and two were heard, leaving
little doubt as to the target's destruction.

ATTACK NO'S 11, 12 and 13 - Daylight submerged attacks on a convoy
of eight ships and four escorts. On the first, two torpedoes fired
at an AK both hit and sank the target. On the second, two torpedoes
fired were both heard hitting a second AK. A fifth torpedo fired
while going deep at a third AK on generated bearing was heard to hit.
Only one torpedo was fired on this third attack due to the firing
circuits having been pulled when deep submergence was ordered.

- 1 -
(Es)
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN
U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship,
29 June 1944.

— page 276 —
FC5-16/A16-3
Serial # 0359
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(Es)
SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN

U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship,
29 June 1944.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Fourth War Patrol -
Comment on.

ATTACK NO. 14 - A daylight submerged attack in a heavy rainsquall
with the two remaining torpedoes fired at an AK. Two hits were
heard while going deep to evade an escort followed by characteristic
breaking up noises.

3. Although the report is lengthy it is very complete and its
length is consistent with a most active patrol. Hardly a day was spent
North of the Barrier without a contact with either one or more airplanes
or ships.

4. The material condition of the RASHER is excellent. Refit
will be completed in the normal time including the installation of a new
type trim pump and the JP sound gear.

5. The Squadron Commander is highly pleased to congratulate
the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew on the severe damage inflicted
upon the enemy.

[SIGNATURE: C. S. Isgrig]
C. S. ISGRIG
By direction.

— page 279 —
[STAMP: UNITED STATES FLEET]
[STAMP: Reg. No. 10931]
[STAMP: COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET]
[STAMP: R. S. No. 8 02141]

A16-3(F-3/roj)

Serial: 02201

S-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS RASHER Conf. ltr.
A16-3, Serial 011 of
23 June 1944. Report
of Fourth War Patrol.

9 AUG 1944

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report of Fourth
War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

2. Commander Seventh Fleet congratulates the
Commanding Officer, Officers, and Men of the U.S.S.
RASHER on the completion of an extremely successful War
Patrol. The aggressiveness and careful planning displayed
in the sinking of 24,410 tons and the damaging of 20,900
tons of enemy shipping, in spite of intense anti-submarine
measures, was in keeping with the best traditions of the
naval service.

[SIGNATURE: J. W. Graf]
J. W. GRAF.
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
ComSubs7thFlt
ComSubRon-16
CO U.S.S. RASHER

— page 280 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 100-99]

U.S.S. RASHER (SS269)

SS269/A16-3
Serial ( 021 )
DECLASSIFIED

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
3 September 1944.

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR 5200.9]
[HANDWRITTEN: of 27 Sep 58]
[HANDWRITTEN: BY 975]
[HANDWRITTEN: DATE 4/29/71]

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Squadron Four.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on War Patrol Number Five.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (ComSubPac only).
(C) Coordinated Attack Group Report [HANDWRITTEN: REMOVED TO REPORT FILE]

1. Enclosure (A) covering the Fifth War Patrol of this
vessel in the special areas west of LUZON during the period 22 July
1944 to 3 September 1944, is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: H. G. Munson]
H. G. MUNSON.

[STAMP: 87947 FILMED]

— page 281 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fifth War Patrol.
         Period from 22 July to 3 September 1944. ComTaskFor 71
         Secret Operation Order #95-44 of 20 July 1944.

— page 282 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fifth War Patrol.

2300 BLUEFISH and RASHER proceeded up bombing restriction lane.

23 July
    alternated with BLUEFISH in day and night approaches.

24 July
    Continued alternated training runs, interrupted at
    SHIP CONTACT 71
0925 Sighted definite Japanese periscope as this vessel was
    acting as target for BLUEFISH who was then submerged.
    Evaded and cleared and sent RASHER serial one to CTF 71 reporting
    contact. Could not attack as a remote possibility exist-
    ed that contact could have been a friendly sub. Later
    established that contact was Japanese. Continued train-
    ing until
2300 Released BLUEFISH and headed for EXMOUTH. Training was
    most valuable, all lookouts were afforded an opportunity
    to see a periscope. Sound operators were constantly
    exercised on the attacking submarine at both listening
    and echo ranging at which latter use they became quite
    proficient.

    Interesting to note is that this vessels echo ranging
    gear was in use at the time of the Jap sub contact above,
    searching for BLUEFISH, and that hearing it, the Jap
    may have hesitated to attack thinking that he was dealing
    with a new type A/S patrol. We obtained echo contact
    on him at a range of 2000 yards on the port beam almost
    simultaneously with sighting his periscope.

25 July
0945 Moored alongside H.M.S. CLYDE (SS) alongside fuel barge
    at EXMOUTH and commenced fueling at
1305 when CLYDE cleared. at
1425 upon request of CO of the Naval Base, took barge in tow
    alongside and moved it back to its mooring, distant three
    miles, where it had come adrift the previous night -
    Tugboat RASHER.
1730 Underway and stood up bombing restriction lane for LOMBOK
    Strait.

26 July
    Underway surfaced conducting intensive suction dive train-
- 2 -

— page 284 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RISHER (SS269) - Report on the Fifth War Patrol.

30 July
0900 - Submerged during plane business hours and to delay arrival
1600 at narrows off CAPE WILLIA until after dark.
     SHIP CONTACT #7
     Sighted one sailboat in narrows north of HOEK LINDAR.

31 July
     SHIP CONTACT #8
0550 Sighted large sailboat to westward.
     AIRCRAFT CONTACT #1
0645 Sighted plane ahead, closing. Dove for submerged patrol
     hoping this would indicate traffic as we were in a known
     shipping lane.
     AIRCRAFT CONTACT #2
0805 Sighted a "PETE" type plane searching about ten miles
     ahead.

1800 Surfaced. Encountered strong radar interference from
     SJ from 230 to 0230. Bearing drew aft indicating south-
     ward passage of a U.S. sub of which two were known to
     be in this vicinity. Attempted, unsuccessfully, to
     communicate by keying SJ.

1 August 1944

     Surface cruising crossing the CELEBES Sea.
     AIRCRAFT CONTACT #3
0930 Sighted plane flying low and searching to the southward
     about 15 miles, did not dive, plane disappeared in a few
     minutes.

2130 Picked up radar interference to eastward on SJ as we were
     entering SIBUTU Passage. Received proper challenge, re-
     plied, and exchanged calls and messages with U.S.S. PUFFER
     by keying radar. Contact not made. He advised us he had
     sunk a ship that morning north of SIBUTU, and that it might
     be warm. So it was, so it was.

2135 Entered SIBUTU Passage and transited at 18 knots.
     SHIP CONTACT #9
2255 Upon clearing passage and shortly after changing course to
     head for L.P.R.N Island Passage made sight and radar con-
     tact on a PC type patrol vessel, distant 6000 yards to the
     north. While profile on surface, working to the north east
     in the half moon light.
     AIRCRAFT CONTACT #4
2302 A "PETE" type plane was seen close on the port quarter
     evidently flying up our wake, turned toward to spoil his
     bombing run and dove. Plane dropped two bombs, not close.
     Stayed deep until

- 4 -

— page 288 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fifth War Patrol.

During the day ran through an immense amount of wreckage,
obviously from a large ship recently sunk. Saw several
Jap type life preservers and the bodies of three "good"
Japs. This area was in the approximate location of our
attack #1.

10 August
Surface patrol with BLUEFISH as above. At dark shifted to
coastal areas off LUZON as per operation order schedule.

11 August
Conducted submerged patrol five miles off coast, twelve
miles north of CAPONES S Island, BLUEFISH ten miles west.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT #5
1045 Sighted two "NELL" type planes.
SHIP CONTACT #14
During the day seventeen assorted sampans and luggers
passed down the coast about four miles off, and one more
was encountered after surfacing.
SHIP CONTACT #15
1940 After surfacing and while closing BLUEFISH for nightly
rendezvous, made radar contact on two ships to the west,
commenced chase, tracked them on 180°, speed 12 and closed
and identified them by sight as two PC or DE types, broke
off chase, rejoined BLUEFISH, who had previously seen them,
and proceeded to new patrol station. Both were pinging and
were located by sound almost simultaneously with radar.

12 August
Conducted submerged patrol two miles off LIBOBO Point,
BLUEFISH ten miles west.
AIRCRAFT CONTACT #6
0708 Sighted transport type plane flying south about ten miles
inland.
SHIP CONTACT #16
During the day a total of twenty-nine sampans and luggers
passed south in groups of six to ten. All stayed about
2000 yards off shore.

During the night shifted patrol station to a line bearing
225° from CAPONES Island to be near weather reporting and
life guard station.

13 August
Submerged patrol five miles off CAPONES Island, BLUEFISH
fifteen miles out. Typhoon weather, sea force 5, much rain
and mist, depth control difficult, visibility low and vari-
able, torpedo performance doubtful.
- 7 -

— page 294 —
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8
#9
#10
Own
ship
                                C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
                                Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fifth War Patrol.

Bearing 137° T.
Range 3750 yards

                                                                                ^ N.

                                                                                ATTACKS #3 and #4
                                                                                Bearing 121° T.
                                                                                Range 3300 yards

Escort
2210-37

                                                                        Large AP
                                                                        2210-37

                                                                        Unident
                                                                        2210-37

                                                        2214-00
                                                                        Large AO

                                                        2214-00
                                                                        Unident

                                                                                #1
                                                                                #2
                                                                                #3
                                                                                #4
                                                                                #5
                                                                                #6
                                                                                #7
                                                                                #8
                                                                                #9
                                                                                #10

                                                                                Many
                                                                                other
                                                                                ships

- 11a -

— page 296 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the Fifth War Patrol.

long, in a location only two miles from the last contact
with the target. Three small objects were contacted on
radar at close ranges, one of which was blinking a white
light, indicating it was a lifeboat. Two escorts were
also detected in the vicinity. It is believed that this
target was a large tanker and that it sunk.

The usual depth charging, gun firing and signalling began
anew, with the escorts rushing around like rats in a cage.

2218 One escort got on our tail at 4000 yards as we opened to
     and around. We easily shook him off.

     Radar showed the AP dropping out of the formation with
     two escorts joining the target. The radar pip acted very
     erratically and kept decreasing in size, and finally dis-
     appeared from the radar screen. When returning through
     this area four hours later, radar contacted three small
     objects, at close range, one of which was blinking a white
     light, indicating they were lifeboats or rafts. This tar-
     get was considered sunk.

2245 Broadcast another contact report as we needed help badly,
     being nearly fresh out of torpedoes, having but four
     forward and two aft as we reloaded.

2300 The leading part of the convoy had split into two groups
     and we picked for our final attack the largest of the
     two groups remaining which appeared to consist of at
     least two large ships in column with one very non-hostile
     escort on their starboard bow and a third large ship on
     the port quarter. They had changed base course to 270°. We
     crossed ahead of the convoy.

2320 The other group was four to five miles to the north, and
     later probably became fodder for the SPADEFISH. No gain-
     ed position on port bow of column and tracked.

2327 Had solution, started in. Targets had zigged right to
     290° T.
     TORPEDO ATTACK #5
2330 Fired remaining four bow torpedoes at leading target on a
     64° port track, gyro 7° left, spread 2°, range 2200 yards,
     #1 torpedo hooked right but finally straightened out,
     swung right and at
     TORPEDO ATTACK #6
2333 Fired two remaining stern torpedoes at second target, on
     an 85° port track, gyro 20° right, spread 2°, range 2100
     yards.

2332 Observed two hits, heard and timed three hits on leading
     target and at

- 12 -

— page 299 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. R.SHER (SS269) - Report on the Fifth War Patrol.

Probably SPADEFISH attacking.

0335 Radar contact on small object, probably a lifeboat or wreck-
     age bearing 193° T., range 4200 yards.

0410 An escort had joined our cripple at this time and suddenly
     illuminated the big follow with a large high intensity
     searchlight. He didn't like it for he fired two shots from
     a large gun at what we hoped was the escort! We were de-
     lighted for we saw our target as a large, two stack trans-
     port very low in the water. We stopped to check our posi-
     tion as we were now close to the beach near PORT CURIMMO.

0417 The escort apparently heard our single ping sounding and
     came tearing after us. We worked to the northwest at full
     power for a few minutes and then came over to a westerly
     course, the escort fell for it and we soon lost him to the
     northward.

     As we had now lost all contacts but the two cripples head-
     ing for PORT CURIMMO and had followed them as far as we
     could, advised BLUEFISH of situation and cleared area to
     the northwest as dawn was beginning to break.

0450 Passed two small objects, probably lifeboats or rafts, one
     blinking a light, in same vicinity as large oil slick seen
     at 0244.

0526 Sighted a DD or DE, probably one of the escorts, to the
     south, put him astern and opened. Probably searching for
     survivors.

0530 Passed through large oil slick, in vicinity of attacks at
     2330.

0550 Spoke U.S.S. SPADEFISH who advised of sinking one of two
     large APs to the northwest of the convoy position, proba-
     bly two who escaped us. Gave him the situation and stood
     on to the northwest trying to send message to CTF 71. A
     temporary atmospheric condition has caused a blackout of
     all radio circuits.

0745 Finally cleared message via DARWIN. Submerged, went deep
     and stayed there, our tails were dragging.

0803 Heard two distant explosions.

1707 Surfaced, received despatch orders to terminate patrol if
     trailing completed and headed for MIDWAY via BALINTANG Chan-
     nel as per op order route.

- 14 -

— page 300 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. RASHER (SS269) - Report on the fifth War Patrol.

20 August
0403 SHIP CONTACT #19
     In center of channel encountered SC or PC (seen from bridge).
     Evaded on surface by running around. He acted as if he knew
     we were there but not where.
0747 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #16
     by radar, 15 miles, seen from bridge. It presently disappear-
     ed to the west on a northerly course.
1350 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #17
     by radar, 23 miles, closed to 15 and then opened, not seen.
1727 Deep dive for leak test.
2400 Changed to zone minus nine time (I).

21 August
0605 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #18
     seen from bridge to westward at about 15 miles, very low,
     submerged when he turned towards, not detected on radar.
0637 Surfaced and proceeded.
1039 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #19
     by sight to northeast, distant about 10 miles, closing,
     submerged.
1106 Surfaced.
1417 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #20
     by radar, 12 miles closing rapidly. Submerged.
1421 One bomb a long way off.
1525 Surfaced.
2000 Spoke U.S.S. QUEENFISH passing on a westerly course. Ex-
     changed recognition, calls and news by SJ radar.

22 August
     Strong jamming type of interference noted on SD radar several
     times during day. Distance from nearest land 220 miles (RASA
     Island).

23 August
1010 AIRCRAFT CONTACT #21
     on radar at 15 miles. Seen as
1014 "MAVIS" on parallel course to southward.
1017 Submerged when he turned toward us at range 12 miles.
1108 Surfaced.
2030 Interference on SJ radar bearing 050° T., drew aft and

- 15 -