U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS-192) — war patrol report SS-192_SAILFISH.pdf

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1. The keel of the 111-fated SQUALUS (later renamed SAILFISH), was laid on 18 October 1937 at the U. S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The Submarine slid down the ways eleven months later, on 14 September 1938, sponsored by Mrs. Thomas C. Hart, wife of Rear Admiral Hart, USN. She was commissioned USS SQUALUS SS-192 on 1 March 1939, with Lieutenant Oliver F. Naquin, USN, as first commanding officer.

SQUALUS was completely fitted out by 12 May, and then commenced her testing period off Portsmouth. After having made eighteen successful dives in the previous tests, while operating off the Isle of Shoals, the sub made a trial dive at 0740 on 23 May, from which she never recovered. Due to a mechanical failure, which caused the flooding of the after section of the ship, SQUALUS went to the bottom, settling 240 feet beneath the surface, and then commenced sending up smoke bombs to the surface, signaling her distress.

Her sister ship, the submarine SCULPIN, which had been alerted to look for the missing sub in that area, spotted one of the bombs at 1241 and marked the spot with a grapnel with a buoy attached.

Quickly, the whole nation was alerted. Divers, salvage and submarine experts were immediately dispatched to the scene of the disaster. Preliminary observations and preparations were made by a Navy diver. At 1130 the following day the newly developed rescue chamber was lowered over the side of the USS FALCON and at 1247 contact was established with the entrapped crew.

In four trips, the last one attended by great danger because of weakening of the wires attached to the rescue chamber, all 33 men in the sub who lived after the ship made her fateful dive, were rescued. The fate of the remaining 26 submariners was determined by the fifth and last trip of the chamber to the bottom. The "diving bell" this time was attached to the after section of the sub, which was found to be flooded, leaving no doubt that the remaining 26 men had perished with their ship.

Rescue operations were secured at 2107 on 25 May 1939, and then the submarine salvage experts began the difficult and arduous task of raising SQUALUS from such a great depth.

The method used in the salvage operations involved the use of a sheathed steel cylindrical pontoons which were to be attached to cables passed beneath the hull of the sub. These pontoons were submerged through the "blown out" thus furnishing SQUALUS with the additional buoyancy necessary to raise her from the bottom.

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The salvage operations were dogged with misfortune and new difficulties arose every day. On 12 August the submarine was raised 80 feet from the bottom, towed two miles, and then she struck an urcharte pinnacle and grounded. Finally on 13 September, SQUALUS rose from the bottom, her bow broke the water, and then misfortune struck, as she again plunged into the murky depths. However, that very same day the determined salvage crew again raised the sub and this time they met with success. That night, after laying on the ocean's floor for 113 days, SQUALUS was towed home into the Portsmouth Navy Yard, thus climaxing the grueling salvage task seldom (if ever) paralleled in the Navy's history.

As the black clouds of war had just then burst over Europe, the Navy needed every ship, so it was decided to recondition SQUALUS. The sub was decommissioned on 15 November 1939, and after six months of extensive overhaul, she was recommissioned on 15 May 1940, as USS SAILFISH (SS 192) with Lieutenant Commander M. C. Mumma, Jr., USN, as commanding officer.

Her refitting complete, SAILFISH held trial runs off Provence to Massachusetts, for three days (17 to 20 September 1940) and on 16 January 1941 she sailed to join the Pacific Fleet.

SAILFISH transitted the Panama Canal and following a refueling stop on the West Coast, proceeded to Pearl Harbor. The sub then sailed to Manila, Philippine Islands, where she operated with Submarines, Asiatic Fleet, until the Japs attacked Pearl Harbor.

At the outbreak of the war (7 December 1941) SAILFISH was at Manila, and on the following day she steamed out of Manila, en route to her First War Patrol along the west coast of Luzon.

That night she made her first contact, an enemy cargo ship, and the following night two more ships of the same type were contacted, but not attacked. At 0230 on 13 December contact was made with three Nip destroyers, and SAILFISH dived and commenced tracking. At 0250, firing position attained, she fired a brace of torpedoes at one of the enemy ships, and scored a hit. Immediately diving deep, she rigged for depth charge attack, which was quickly forthcoming. However, none of the 20 charges dropped were close enough to cause serious damage. Many breaking-up noises were heard, indicating that her target was sinking, and then the sub cleared the area.

Four days later on 17 December she returned to Manila, thus completing her initial war patrol, having sunk one of the first enemy warships to be accounted for by the U. S. Navy.

Her refit completed, SAILFISH got underway from Manila on 21 December on Second War Patrol. On the 22nd after picking her way through the mine fields, she made contact with a large Jap sub off Cabre Island. However, the enemy quickly disappeared into the depths and no attack could be made. Sighting two undesirable targets in the

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previous days, it wasn't until 2 January 1942 that SAILFISH made contact with a vessel of sufficient size. This enemy ship was tracked and then fired upon, however, due to the radical zigzagging course the target was on, the torpedoes missed and the target passed out of sight

She continued patrolling in her area off Taiwan, and on 26 January while patrolling off Cape St. Augustine, she made contest with an enemy cruiser, which was at too great a distance to be attacked. However, SAILFISH headed westward to intercept any ships the Jap may have been escorting. The following day at 0721 three enemy supply ships were sighted, but the sub was unable to close the distance. While trailing the supply ships, an enemy cruiser and two destroyers were sighted and tracked. Closing in, SAILFISH hove into position, the target being the Jap cruiser, and fired a spread of four missiles at her. The submarine then sought the "comforting" depths and rigged for depth charge attack. One torpedo explosion was heard, but the damage to the enemy ship could not be seen, as the Nip destroyers now were the hunters. One of the destroyers evidently knew where she was, and kept "sniffing" in her direction, but for some unknown reason no depth charges were dropped.

SAILFISH ran at 260 feet during the enemy destroyer's search, and after three hours she came to periscope depth to find the horizon clear

On 4 February, while transitting Peleng Strait an enemy merchantman was sighted, tracked and attacked, but no hits were scored. During the final days of the patrol she made few contacts, and on 14 February she made rendezvous with a station ship and entered Tjilatjaj Java, thus completing her Second War Patrol.

After a short refit, SAILFISH got underway on 19 February for her Third War Patrol north of the Malay Barrier and after transitting Lombok Strait and Alas Strait, she entered her assigned patrol area.

On 28 February at 0030, SAILFISH made contact with a cruiser and two destroyers, and commenced tracking. However, upon approach no attack was made as the cruiser's silhouette resembled USS HOUSTON, and it was later assumed that this was the allied force under Admiral Doorman, Nethlands Navy, steaming from the Battle of the Java Sea, towards Soenda Strait from which the ships never returned.

Continuing her patrol, SAILFISH sighted an enemy destroyer on 2 March, maneuvered into position, and sent a brace of missiles at the DD. No hits were scored and the sub sought the depths. No depth charging was forthcoming. However, shortly thereafter she was subjected to a bombing by an enemy plane. Four hours later she came to periscope depth and found that the Japanese ship and planes had cleared the area.

That night, while on a southwesterly course, SAILFISH made contact with a Jap aircraft carrier escorted by four destroyers and commenced tracking. That the enemy knew of this sub's presence was proven when the enemy escorts commenced dropping depth charges. However,

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SAILFISH was not to be frightened away from such a lucrative target. She hove into position at 2059 and fired a spread of four torpedoes at the carrier. Two hits were scored on the target and flames shot up 150 feet from the sinking ship.

The underseas raider quickly dove deep, commenced silent running and rigged for depth charge attack. The Nip destroyers then made a very accurate depth charge attack, dropping eight charges extremely close aboard (from 100 to 200 yards), but these caused little damage. SS-192 cleared the area and surfaced after not hearing the enemy escorts for three hours.

SAILFISH evidently, now was the subject of an intense search by the Japanese, as in the following days, she sighted many enemy destroyers "sniffing" around for her, and was subjected to another fierce depth charging three days later.

During the latter part of her patrol, SAILFISH made contact with enemy shipping, but was unable to make any attacks. The sub proceeded to Fremantle, Australia, arriving there on 19 March, thus ending a very successful patrol.

Completing her refit, SAILFISH departed Fremantle on 22 March en route to her Fourth War Patrol. The ship steamed along the coast of Timor, through Malucca Strait, through Bangka Passage, through Sibutu Passage, and then commenced patrolling off Terakan. However, this patrol brought only one contact (with no attack possible), and SAILFISH put in at Fremantle, ending her patrol on 21 May.

After her refit, SAILFISH steamed out of Fremantle on 13 June, en route to her Fifth War Patrol. She proceeded through Lombok Strait, Macassar Strait, Sibutu Passage and Balabac Passage, arriving in her assigned patrol area on 29 June.

SAILFISH continued patrolling in her area, and on 4 July, she sighted, tracked, and gained position to attack, only to find out that the target was an enemy hospital ship. On 9 July, while patrolling off the Indo-China coast, she made contact with an enemy freighter (about 7,000 tons) and commenced tracking. SAILFISH got into position and fired a brace of torpedoes at the target. The first missile scored a hit and immediately the freighter took a 150 list to starboard. Shortly thereafter, SAILFISH dove as a series of explosions was heard from an unknown origin (there were no other ship or planes in the vicinity). It is believed that the freighter sank shortly afterwards as no screw noises were picked up after the hit and upon surfacing an hour and a half after the attack, she was not in sight.

SAILFISH then cleared the area and continued her patrol, making contact with only one enemy vessel, before pulling into Fremantle on 1 August 1942, at the end of her patrol.

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The submarine moved from Fremantle to Albany, Australia, for her refit, and on 28 August, with her refit completed, she steamed out of Albany en route to Brisbane, Australia. SS-192 arrived at Brisbane on 7 September, and on the 13th she departed Brisbane en route to the Buin-Faisi area, Solomon Islands, for her Sixth War Patrol.

The undersea raider contacted two Jap destroyers on 17 September, and while making her approach, six more enemy destroyers were sighted no attack was attempted. At 1035 the following morning, contact was made with eight Nip destroyers and one cruiser, and again no attack was attempted against such suicidal odds.

On the 19th, contact was established with an enemy minelayer, which was tracked and attacked. SAILFISH fired a spread of three torpedoes, which missed, and then the sub dove deep and rigged for depth charge attack. Eleven accurate charges were dropped by the Jap mine-layer, causing much minor damage to the sub.

SAILFISH continued to patrol in her area, and during this patrol she made many contacts. However, due to overwhelming odds and bad weather, no attacks were possible. The sub moored at Brisbane, Australia, at 0900 on 1 November, thus completing her sixth patrol.

Her refit completed, SAILFISH got underway from Brisbane on 24 November en route to the southern coast of New Britain for her Seventh War Patrol. She made her first attack of this patrol on 2 December, when she fired a spread of four torpedoes at an enemy destroyer. No hits were scored and she was then subjected to a depth charge attack, which did no damage.

The sub made no contacts until 24 December, when, at 2345, an enemy submarine was sighted. Early Christmas morning the Jap was approached and a brace of torpedoes was fired, scoring one hit. The Jap vessel's screws stopped immediately and from all indications she went to the bottom.

On 30 December, SAILFISH made two unsuccessful attacks on (1) an enemy freighter and (2) a destroyer, and after the last attack she was subjected to an accurate depth charging. She continued patroling in her assigned area and shortly thereafter headed for Pearl Harbor, arriving there at 1200 on 15 January 1943, thus completing her seventh patrol.

Five days later, SAILFISH set sail for the Mare Island Navy Yard arriving there on the 27th. At Mare Island the sub underwent a major overhaul and on 22 April 1943, with her overhaul completed, she got underway for Pearl Harbor. Upon arrival at Pearl Harbor on 30 April, the ship was refitted at the Submarine Base. Following a training period, a drydocking, and another training period, the sub got underway from Pearl Harbor on 17 May, en route to her Eighth War Patrol via Midway.

Arriving at Midway on the 21st, the sub topped-off fuel, took on fresh water and provisions and departed the same day.

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After arriving in her assigned area, SAILFISH made many contacts which couldn't be turned into attacks, due to poor visibility and undesirable targets. However, on 15 June, while south of Todo Saki, two enemy vessels were sighted and tracked.

The targets were in line, and the sub made her approach on the leading ship, but as this vessel turned suddenly, making an attack impossible, SAILFISH dove crossed her track, and came up with her stern tubes on the second ship. A three torpedo spread was fired, scoring one hit, which left the enemy ship dead in the water. Many breaking-up noises were heard thereafter. The sub went deep, rigged for a depth charge attack and listened to 36 inaccurate charges dropped by the target's three escorts. SAILFISH then cleared the area of attack.

On 23 and 24 June targets were sighted, but no attacks were made due to their radical maneuvering. However, on the 25th three freights with an escorting plane and ship came into view, and SAILFISH commenced her approach. Upon reaching position, the sub fired a spread of three torpedoes at the leading and most desirable enemy freighter, scoring one hit. The underseas raider sought the safety of the deep, rigged for depth charge attack and, while submerged, heard many breaking-up noises from the target, indicating that it was sinking. SAILFISH was set on by the enemy escorts and by three patrol craft, which had seemingly come from nowhere. During this depth charging, over twenty-six explosions were felt. An hour after the last charge was heard, SAILFISH came to periscope depth, and only one escort was sighted, searching in the area of attack. The sub then dove, re-rigged for depth charge attack, and during this ten-hour attack 71 charges were dropped by the enemy vessels, causing only minor damage.

The following day SAILFISH set course for Midway, mooring there on 3 July, thus concluding her eighth patrol. After completing a refit period, SAILFISH steamed from Midway on 25 July en route to her Ninth War Patrol.

The sub passed through the Bonins, Naissei Shoto, by Tokumo Shima, between Yoronshima and Okinoyerabu, and on to her patrol area -- the Formosa Straits. After making a few undesirable contacts here, she proceeded to the area off Okinawa Gunto, then to the area off Nakagusu before proceeding to Midway. Arriving at Midway on 16 September, SAILFISH transferred torpedoes to SPERRY, and then set sail for Pearl Harbor, mooring there on 20 September thus completing her Ninth War Patrol. All contacts made on this patrol were undesirable, and no target worthy of attack was sighted.

After being refitted, SAILFISH departed Pearl Harbor on 17 November, en route to her Tenth War Patrol via Midway. Arriving at Midway on 21 November, the sub topped-off fuel, took on fresh water and provisions, and departed the same day.

At 2348 on 3 December, while in typhoon weather, she made contact with an enemy vessel and commenced tracking. This contact soon developed into four Jap ships, and all ideas of a methodical approach

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were abandoned, due to mountainous seas and driving rain. The contact was then found to be a fast group of men-of-war, composed of an aircraft carrier, a cruiser, and destroyers.

At 0012 on the 4th, SAILFISH selected the largest target (later found to be the carrier), and fired a spread of four torpedoes, scoring two hits. Immediately the enemy dropped 18 depth charges, and the sub went deep, but not far, as she did not want to lose contact with such desirable targets. After crossing astern of the target, she surfaced, and started tracking again. At 0552 -- in position -- she fired three more torpedoes at the cripple, scoring two solid hits, and immediately the enemy began an intense, but not accurate, anti-sub attack.

After the enemy fire had become more accurate, the sub dove and commenced reloading her tubes. Finally at 0748 she sighted the evasi (from sight) target, dead in the water. Depth control on the sub was still exceedingly difficult as the mountainous seas still prevailed. The times when the target could be sighted, it appeared that it's crew was about to abandon ship, and the carrier had a list to port and was slightly down by the stern.

At 0940 a three torpedo spread was fired at the carrier -- range 1,700 yards, and two hits were heard, followed by exceptionally loud breaking-up noises, which were not only heard on sound but also throughout the sub. The anti-sub action by the enemy was again intensified. While making a periscope sweep, looking for a destroyer at 0951, a Takao Class cruiser was sighted and the sub went deep, rigging for depth charge attack on the way down.

Seven more charges were dropped and at 1330 SAILFISH again came to periscope depth at the point of attack on the sunken carrier, and nothing was sighted. The sub then cleared the area and set course for her assigned patrol grounds.

On 7 December SAILFISH was taken by surprise by a Jap fighter plane, which straffed her. However, only superficial damage was caused by this attack and the sub proceeded forward, after escaping her attacker. On the 13th at 1154, contact was made with two enemy cargo ships with escorts, and the sub commenced tracking. Closing the sub hove into position, and at 2306 she fired a spread of four torpedoes at the two overlapping freighters. SAILFISH went deep, and then heard two solid explosions, the first having a double peak as if something within the target exploded when the missile did.

The submarine was then set on by the enemy escorts, which commenced attacking her with very heavy, but not very accurate, depth charges. During this time many breaking-up noises were heard from the sinking target, and at 0125 the next morning, the sub surfaced and began to close the Nip convoy again.

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Upon closing the convoy at 0245, SAILFISH sighted one freighter dead in the water, plus five escorts. Where the other four escorts came from is just a matter for speculation. Due to suicidal odds, the submarine cleared the area.

Late in the night of 20 December, SAILFISH made contact with an enemy hospital ship which she let pass unmolested after ascertaining that there was nothing suspicious about the Nip vessel.

At 1020 on the 21st contact was made with a Jap convoy, consisting of six heavily loaded cargo ships with two destroyer escorts and SAILFISH commenced tracking. It was heartbreaking to have such choices targets with only five torpedoes on board. However, the largest ship was chosen and at 1133 SAILFISH swung into position and fired a three torpedo spread from her stern tubes at the chosen target. Two hits were scored on the target and shortly afterwards breaking-up noises were heard, indicating that the ship had sunk.

With one of the escorts heading directly towards her, SAILFISH sought the ocean depths, and rigged for depth charge attack. The enemy escorts dropped over thirty charges in their futile attempt to "kill" SAILFISH. At 1815, upon surfacing, the sub conducted a search for the convoy but failed to find it.

SAILFISH continued her patrol until 23 December 1943, when she set course for Pearl Harbor via Midway. Arriving at Pearl Harbor on 5 January 1944, the sub completed her Tenth (and most successful) War Patrol.

SAILFISH proceeded to San Francisco, and during the period between 15 January and 17 June the ship was completely overhauled, all battle damage repaired, and outstanding alterations were made. The sub then returned to Pearl Harbor, and on 9 July 1944, steaming in company with the submarines BILLFISH and GREENLING, she got underway from Pearl Harbor, en route to her Eleventh War Patrol in the area south of Formosa and north of Luzon.

Mooring at Midway on the 13th, the three-sub "wolf pack" topped off with fuel oil and departed Midway on the 14th.

After several unproductive weeks, during which only enemy small craft were sighted, contact was made with an enemy convoy at 1430 on 7 August. After over three hours of tracking, SAILFISH got into position and fired a spread of three torpedoes at the first target, a single-stack tanker. One hit was made on the tanker, which immediate seemed to disintegrate as within a fraction of a second there was nothing left but smoke and debris in the air.

SAILFISH then started tracking the remaining cargo ship (GREENLING evidently had eliminated one other ship of the convoy). However this contact was lost during the night.

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At 0029 on 18 August, a radar contact was made and SAILFISH commenced tracking a group of enemy vessels. This contact developed into a Jap battleship with three escorts, and the sub started closing in on the battleship. At 0135 -- in position, range 3,600 yards -- SAILFISH fired four torpedoes at the target. However, one of the escorts got into the path of the missiles and two hits sunk her, but left the larger ship unharmed. SS-192 dove into the murk and rigged for a depth charge attack, which was not forthcoming. Upon surfacing the sub was out-distanced by the faster surface ships.

SAILFISH's radar again made contact with an enemy convoy at 0245 on 24 August and the sub started her approach. The convoy was made up of four enemy vessels escorted by two small patrol craft and it was believed that BILLFISH would be able to get in on the attack. In position at 0333, SAILFISH fired a spread of four torpedoes, scoring two hits, and the Japanese cargo ship was lost in a cloud of smoke. The attacked vessel later broke in two and sank. SAILFISH dove, rigged for depth charging, and reloaded her tubes. The Japs dropped four charges, which caused no damage.

Again at periscope depth, SAILFISH closed in on the second freighter. At 0446 she gained position and fired in a spread of four torpedoes at the cargo vessel, scoring two hits, which enveloped the target in smoke. The Jap ship plunged down shortly thereafter. The sub then cleared the area of attack.

Shortly afterwards she headed toward Midway, mooring there at 1215 on 6 September 1944, thus completing her Eleventh War Patrol.

Following her refit, SAILFISH set course from Midway on 26 September 1944, in company with the submariners POMFRET and PARCHE en route to the area between Formosa and Luzon for her Twelfth War Patrol.

After passing through typhoon weather, SAILFISH reached her assigned area. While south of Formosa on 12 October, she rescued eleven Navy airmen who, being unable to reach their aircraft carriers, had ditched their stricken planes after making strikes on Formosa. On this day her guns sank a sampan and damaged a Jap tug, as the enemy vessels tried to beat her to a liferaft bearing surviving airmen. The following day another pilot was rescued, and shortly thereafter her radio transmitter went out of commission.

SAILFISH then made contact with the submarine PARCHE and headed for Saipan to debark the rescued airmen and to effect repairs, mooring there on 24 October. After one false start on the 28th, the underseas raider, repairs completed, and steaming in company with USS PARCHE and USS POMFRET, stood out of Saipan to continue her patrol on the following day.

At 0304 on 3 November SAILFISH made contact with an enemy convoy, consisting of a large transport and a cargo ship with four escorts. The sub started closing them and when in position at 0402, she fired a spread of four torpedoes from her bow nests at the transport which

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was overlapping by one of the escorts. However, a last minute turn on the part of the target caused the torpedoes to miss, and SAILFISH went deep, shortly before the irksome escorts dropped seven -- not too close -- depth charges. An hour after the last charge had been drop the sub surfaced to find the area clear. She then headed for Sabtang Channel.

The following day at 0822, contact was made with a seven-ship "killer" group of enemy patrol craft, which was easily avoided. At 1544 this group was recontacted and SAILFISH fired a four torpedo spread at one of the two enemy destroyers she was closing, scoring two hits which blew the destroyer out of the water. The sub then shifted her aim to the second Jap destroyer, which was steaming to the aid of her stricken cohort, and fired three missiles from her stern nests.

One hit was heard on the second target, which seemed to sink alsc Shortly before and after shooting at the second vessel, several bombs landed close by. SAILFISH went deep and on the way down flooding and a fire were discovered in her after torpedo room, caused by the enemy bombing damage to a torpedo vent which refused to close. With the crew working as a single unit, the fire was quickly extinguished, the flooding stopped, and the ship was brought to an even keel.

SAILFISH, with the enemy "killer" group still searching managed to clear the area by brilliant maneuvering. Upon surfacing at 2340 an inspection of topside revealed one Jap "G-string" on her forecastle and one pair of Jap pants caught on her forward gun. SS-192 thereby claimed to be the first submarine to not only catch a Jap with his pants down but also to actually take them off.

On 9 and 10 November the sub rode out a moderate typhoon, and at 1805 on 24 November she made contact with an enemy convoy, consisting of four cargo ships in column with four escorts, heading for the shelter of the coast of Itbayat.

SAILFISH contacted POMFRET by radio and gave her the position of the targets, and after over two hours of tracking, while closing into position, one of the enemy escorts suddenly swung away from the colun and headed directly for her. The submarine fired a three-torpedo "down the throat" shot at the escort, and two hits were apparently scored on the target as her pip disappeared from the radar screen and smoke was observed at the target. However, the submarine received quite a surprise, when upon swinging to attack the cargo ships, the escort whose pip had dispaaeared from the screen, started letting fly with his forward deck guns.

The escort scored one hit nearby, and submergence was held up until it was ascertained that the submarine had sustained no damage. SAILFISH went deep, and shortly afterwards six fairly close depth charges forced her deeper, but caused no damage. Three sets of screws now were picked up on the sound gear -- all hunting SAILFISH --, and

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although the sub was running silent the enemy kept contact with her. During this four and a half hour depth charge attack, 27 more charges were dropped, uncomfortably close, and caused much minor damage to the sub, which slightly hindered her operation.

However, at 0135 the enemy apparently lost contact with SAILFISH and she cleared the area.

Shortly afterwards SAILFISH headed for Pearl Harbor via Midway, arriving at Pearl Harbor on 11 December, thus completing her twelfth and last war patrol.

Following her refit, SAILFISH stood out of Pearl Harbor on 26 December 1944, en route to New London, Connecticut, via the Panama Canal, arriving at New London, on 22 January 1945. For four and a half months SS-192 served as a target and training submarine in the New London area.

SAILFISH got underway from New London on 4 June en route to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, arriving there on 9 June. The sub served in the area until 9 August, when she departed for Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. She cocked at Philadelphia on the 14th, and remained there until 1 October, when she steamed to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, arriving there on the 2nd.

At Portsmouth inactivation was started on the sub, and on Navy Day (27 October 1945) she was decommissioned amid elaborate ceremony at her "home" yard.

For 27 months SAILFISH was scheduled to be used as a target in Atomic Bomb or other conventional explosive tests, but this was cancelled, and the sub was authorized to be sold for scrap on 12 March 1948. USS SAILFISH was stricken from the U. S. Naval Vessel Registry on 30 April 1948.

SAILFISH was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for her extremely successful Tenth War Patrol. The citation reads:

"For outstanding performance in combat against strongly escorted enemy task forces and convoys in Japanese-controlled waters during the highly successful Tenth War Patrol. Despite extremely hazardous weather conditions, the SAILFISH regularly striking at enemy convoys accurately and with aggressive determination, completely destroyed four important hostile vessels and inflicted heavy damage on another. The superb combat efficiency and readiness for battle of the SAILFISH throughout this vital period reflects great credit upon her gallant officers and men and the United States Naval Service."

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LIST OF SUCCESSIVE COMMANDING OFFICERS

T. Oliver F. Naquin, USN
CDR M. C. Mumma, USN
JDR R. G. Voge, USN
LCDR J. R. Moore, USN
LCDR W. R. Lefavour, USN
LCDR R. E. M. Ward, USN
LCDR L. Marcy, USN
LCDR R. I. Freedman, USNR

* * * *

The SAILFISH earned nine battle stars on the Asiatic-Pacific Area Service Ribbon, for participating in the following operations:

1. Star/Philippine Islands Operation (including Guam and other concurred Asiatic Fleet Operations) -- 8 December 1941 to 6 May 1942
1. Star/Submarine Assessment -- 24 December 1942
1. Star/Leyte Operation -- 10 October to 16 December 1944
1. Star/Submarine War Patrol -- Pacific -- 22 December 1941 to 14 February 1942
1. Star/Submarine War Patrol -- Pacific -- 19 February to 19 March 1942
1. Star/Submarine War Patrol -- Pacific -- 13 June to 1 August 1942
1. Star/Submarine War Patrol -- Pacific -- 17 May to 3 July 1943
1. Star/Submarine War Patrol -- Pacific -- 17 November 1943 to 5 January 1944
1. Star/Submarine War Patrol -- Pacific -- 9 July to 6 September 1944

* * * *

STATISTICS

DISPLACEMENT 1,475 tons
LENGTH OVERALL 310 feet
BEAM 27 feet
SURFACE SPEED 20 knots

ARMAMENT -- One 3-inch .50 calibre battery and eight 21-inch torpedo tubes.
COMPLEMENT -- 82 officers and men

* * * *

Stencilled July 1948
Restencilled April 1951

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1941, TO DECEMBER 17, 1941.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

U.S.S. SAILFISH, REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL, PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 8, 1941, TO DECEMBER 17, 1941.

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seemed to be the closest and estimates vary from one hundred to two hundred yards as the distance to the closest charge. An officer in the wardroom heard water swish through the superstructure with the explosions on these charges. Concussion in the boat was not excessive, no light bulbs were broken, no machinery damaged. It is believed that negative tank gasket was blown during these charges. In the area of latitude 18-50, longitude 120-05 it was necessary to add fifteen thousand pounds of water to take the boat from periscope depth trim to slow speed trim at 170 feet. The water temperature varied from eighty degrees at periscope depth to sixty-eight degrees at 170 feet. For silent running, the lighting motor generator and gyro were not stopped and 75 revolutions on both shanks was maintained. At daylight of December 13 came to periscope depth, nothing was sighted - echo ranging was heard on bearing from 310 degrees true to 330 degrees true. The indications were a ripple was being guarded rather than concentrated effort in searching a large area. There were a total of 18 to 20 charges dropped. Their depth charge attack tactics resembled that used by our own destroyers.

3. Area Assignment and Orders: No contacts having developed in the original area assigned; on the night of December 10 a run of 15 giving new area assignment. On the first transmission of the dispatch the area assignment applying to U.S.S. SAILFISH was garbled. From content it was quite certain what course of action was intended. Acknowledgement of the message was not made until received on the second transmission. Cleared the old area to the north with an evening fix and entered the new area at 0400, local zone time on December 12. This night the area was extremely high, being able to maintain only three knots r'tometer log into the sea and still retain any visibility. The route for return to sanctuary was uneventfully followed.

4. Sound Conditions: Numerous false sound contacts of screws was experienced and it is attributed to the mass of water noises from surf off the beach or cliff heads and experienced at distances as great as 15 to 20 miles from source. In spite of large temperature gradient in this area, sound listening is considered good. Additional annoyance to the inexperience operator were the squeal of fish or porpoise (previous to this patrol I have always been skeptical of fish squealing). However, this week there was something out there squealing with irregularity and there were no targets in sight.

5. Repairs Necessary: (1) Install a negative tank gasket. Tank is considered essential when working in these heavy layers. (2) Pack number two periscope (Ship's force). (3) Check stern plane motor sparking, possible ground between series and shunt field (Ship's force).

— page 17 —
1.1.3. SALVITRISH, REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL, PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 17, 1941, TO DECEMBER 17, 1944, CONT'D.

6. Recommendations:
   - Install radar, even though it is not operational
   - Install a new radar and antenna system
   - Install a new radar system

— page 18 —
35. SAILFISH, REPORT OF FIRST WAR PATROL, PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 5, 1941, TO DECEMBER 17, 1941.

after firing heard torpedo explosion. Target propeller noise stopped
continued with explosion. Firing data - gun course 000°, enemy
course 000°, enemy speed 16, range (set), 500, actual
torpedo run by listing explosion. Radio contact with enemy
due to necessity of evasion. Radio contact with enemy
indicated guarding a cripple.

H.  SIGHTING ARTILLERY.
The following is a list of the number of rounds fired by the
number of rounds fired by the number of

— page 21 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH
DECLASSIFIED

U.S.S. SAILFISH
SECOND WAR PATROL
FROM
DECEMBER 21, 1941
TO
February 19, 1942
ZONE TIME -9

Firmed
4/5/2014

— page 22 —
21 December - First Day
1630 Underway from breakwater.
1900 Anchored off Mariveles.

22 December - Second Day
0530 Passed through mine-field. Patrolled area Corregidor tower. Ward Cabra Island. No contacts until
1845 Sighted large enemy submarine, probably of KAIGUN type on surface, bearing 300°T., dist. about 6,000 yards. Attempted to approach for attack but unable to get in as he was moving away on a course between 240° and 270° and disappearing in darkness. Range too great to hear him by sound. When we lost him by periscope, surfaced with decks awash. Could not see him with binoculars. He may have seen our coming tower and submerged. Returned to 120° feet to attempt sound tracking. Could not hear him. Changed course to North-west and surfaced at 2000. Our position at time of contact: Latitude 14-05, Longitude 120 E. After surfacing sent contact report 221000 reporting enemy submarine 13 miles North of Cabra Island.

23 December - Third Day
Proceeded on northerly course along Longitude 18°-35' W. No contacts.

24 December - Fourth Day
Proceeded on northerly course along Longitude 18°-35' W. No contacts.

25 December - Fifth Day
Proceeded on north-easterly course heading for Bashi Channel. Sea dead calm and glassy. No contacts.

26 December - Sixth Day
Proceeded through Bashi Channel on north-easterly course. Sea glassy. No contacts.

— page 23 —
27 December - Seventh Day
About 0200 reached Longitude 123°, Latitude 23°, two (2) hours behind schedule. Headed North. Sea became rough, skies overcast, visibility through periscope less than two (2) miles. Navigation position extremely doubtful due to strong currents and no sight. Changed course to 200° T. to head into current and maintain approximately present station until position could be determined. Northeast storm brewing during late afternoon.

28 December - Eighth Day
and 29 December - Ninth Day
Severe North-east storm with very high seas. Impossible to use periscope. Visibility through periscope less than one (1) mile. On one time ship broached from sixty (60) feet to twenty-two (22) feet while attempting periscope observation; great difficulty getting her down again. Only course possible on surface was southerly. Position very indefinite, but about sixty (60) miles East of Taiwan coast. Heading South on surface, northerly while submerged. No contacts.

30 December - Tenth Day
Storm abated somewhat during late afternoon. Possible to head North on surface after dark. Proceeding slowly as position unknown. Obtained star fix with moonlight horizon. Position only approximate but first one in four (4) days. Headed North for area.

31 December - Eleventh Day
Sighted unidentified ship on western horizon (same out of rain squall) distance about four (4) miles. Submerged and attempted sound approach. Unable to get into firing range (ship was approximately on parallel course and we were abeam of her when she was sighted). Sighted small coastal steamer zigzagging on northerly course. Started to attack but let her go by when noted her small size (according to verbal instructions not to attack this class of target). Seas very rough but calmed somewhat in the evening.

— page 24 —
1 January - Twelfth Day
Still working northward with position doubtful. After surfacing obtained star fir. Headed South-west and plocked up Hoka Sho light. No contacts.

2 January - Thirteenth Day
Sighted ship on port bow heading northeasterly. Position Latitude 25°-45' N., Longitude 121°-36' E. Submerged and made periscope approach. Fired two (2) torpedoes - missed. Target was zigzagging with radical course changes. After target passed out of sight, surfaced and continued into area. Patrolled assigned area of North-west coast of Taiwan during the day. During afternoon North-east storm started brewing, heavy seas. After surfacing decided to vacate area and take station of East coast of Taiwan for the following reasons:
(a) During past seven (7) days in this general vicinity five (5) of them have been too rough to permit patrolling with periscope, visibility very limited at sixty (60) feet and unable to control depth if we came up higher. The depth of water in area makes patrolling by sound impossible.
(b) Coastal pilot states that these Northeast storms are more or less constant during this season of year.
(c) Only course possible on surface is southerly. Ship will not dive into these heavy seas and efficient lookout watches impossible if courses other than southerly are chosen.
(d) Current and wind both set to South-west. The South-east exit is blocked by the Pescadores Banks. It is impossible to make as much northerly distance submerged as southerly would be made on surface. If storm now brewing lasts as long as the last (4 days) we would be hopelessly trapped in the vicinity of Pescadores Banks. During previous storm we were unable to obtain a position for four (4) days. With the navigational hazards in this area, no position for two (2) days would be scouring disaster. Set course to head around the North tip of Taiwan.

— page 25 —
3 January - Fourteenth Day
and 4 January - Fifteenth Day

During the evening of 3 January reached point off East coast of Taiwan, and sent dispatch 031712 to Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet reporting we had vacated area and requesting instructions. Seas subsided on 3 January but again built up on 4 January.

5 January - Sixteenth Day
and 6 January - Seventeenth Day
and 7 January - Eighteenth Day

Heavy seas; patrolling off East coast of Taiwan; various courses submerged but only southerly permissible on surface. On evening of 7 January decided to head South as prevailing weather makes patrolling impossible. Sent dispatch 031735 to Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet stating we were heading South due prevailing weather conditions.

8 January - Ninteenth Day

During evening received dispatch serial 61 directing us to head for Devao area and to attempt to find Devao-Formosa traffic track. Set course to South-east so as to cross possible track at least twice while working South. Sent dispatch 081427 to Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet, estimating arrival of Devao on 14 January.

9 January - Twentieth Day
10 January - Twenty-first Day
11 January - Twenty-second Day
12 January - Twenty-third Day
and 13 January - Twenty-fourth Day

Proceeding southward for Devao area. Weather fair. During night of 9 January received dispatch from Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet directing us to proceed at maximum speed. Used four (4) engines while on surface. Maximum speed obtained 15 knots. During evening of 13 January received dispatch serial 93 from Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet, directing SAILFISH to operate in Devao Gulf.

— page 26 —
9 - 13 January (20th - 24th Day) Continued.

and across entrance. Acknowledge that we required following day. However, sent acknowledgment early morning of 14 January (SALIFISH dispatch 131858) as it was believed we would be in Davao Gulf the next day where use of radio would be impossible.

14 January - Twenty-fifth Day

Reached vicinity of Cape St. Augustine in early morning; navigational position doubtful. Submerged at 0430 in order to fix position by landmarks after daylight.

0715 Sighted Cape St. Augustine light bearing 329° T., distant about ten (10) miles. Set course to head into Davao Gulf. A very strong south-westerly set was encountered off Cape Augustine.

1130 Sighted ship in Davao Gulf heading toward St. Augustine light. Went to battle stations and made an approach but was unable to close to firing range due to South-west course and because angle on bow was about 50° starboard when fired sighted. Ship was on a course about 120° T., heading from vicinity Cape Mallia to Cape St. Augustine. Decided to patrol along this line tomorrow.

15 January - Twenty-sixth Day

0515 Sighted large searchlight in vicinity of Tubalan Head sweeping gulf. Submerged to avoid detection. Worked up into Davao Gulf during morning to Latitude of Tubalan Head.

1025 Sighted mast of freighter on southerly course, hugging West coast of Davao Gulf. Ship was obscured by land background and not seen until we were almost in her beam, distance about ten (10) miles. No possibility of attack. Sea in gulf very calm.

1455 Sighted observation plane patrolling gulf East and West. Went to 120 feet to avoid detection. Cleared gulf to charge during night.

16 January - Twenty-seventh Day

0030 Heard, but could not see, but seemed to be a destroyer's propeller noise. Patrol led on North-east course to

— page 27 —
16 January (27th Day) Continued.

head into current across entrance to gulf. Rain squalls during day with very low visibility. Cleared somewhat in late afternoon. Obtained position on landmarks and found we had been set in the direction of Sarangani Islands with a drift of about four (4) knots.

17 January - Twenty-eighth Day

Patrolling across gulf entrance; visibility during night and day very low but increased intermittently in afternoon. During late afternoon obtained an approximate position on landmarks; still evidence of a 3 to 4 knot South-west set.

1750 Sighted smoke of a steamer heading Southwest rounding Saragani Islands; distance about twelve (12) miles. Ship was going away. Rain squalls prevented sighting sooner.

1345 A patrol plane was sighted patrolling Dayao Gulf. During evening received Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet dispatch serial 16 directing this vessel to haul clear and report. Helped clear to North-east; the only safe course.

18 January - Twenty-ninth Day

and 19 January - Thirtieth Day

Constant rain squalls and very low visibility; position unknown but somewhere East or North-east of Cape St. Augustine. Nothing sighted.

20 January - Thirty-first Day

Weather cleared during morning; first good visibility in three (3) days. Headed West to pick up landmarks. No success. During evening obtained fire with bubbles sentant which gave position considerably North-east of estimated point. Headed South-west during night for Cape St. Augustine.

21 January - Thirty-second Day

At daybreak found ourselves to be bearing 340° distance 10 miles from Palms Island. Evidently last night's bubble sentant position considerably in error to the

— page 28 —
21 January (32nd Day) Continued.

northward. Patrolled heading North-east during day but made good a southwesterly course; current is at least 3 1/2 knots in a direction of 210°. At dusk set course to put us off St. Augustine at daybreak so as to intercept convoy reported in Commander Submarine, Asiatic Fleet serial 28 (1933).

22 January - Thirty-third Day

At daybreak our position seven (7) miles bearing 090° from Cape St. Augustine. Patrolled so as to maintain that position but gradually fell off to southward due to current being greater than our speed. No contacts. Convoy could not have entered without being sighted by us.

24 January - Thirty-fifth Day

At daybreak we were three (3) miles, bearing 110° from Cape St. Augustine; too close for comfort in view of strong currents around this point. Patrolled to the southward. See plane patrolling Davao Gulf.

24 January - Thirty-fifth Day

Patrolling south from St. Augustine; calm sea with small ship in afternoon. No contacts.

25 January - Thirty-sixth Day

Patrolling south of Cape St. Augustine. Weather clear and sea choppy but with low clouds all around the horizon restricting visibility. No contacts.

26 January - Thirty-seventh Day

Took first look at 0645; too dark to see anything. Hart look at 0700. Sighted unidentified cruiser bearing 295° T., distance ten (10) miles. She was on northerly course heading into Davao Gulf and had already passed us (our position 20 miles bearing 197° from Cape St. Augustine).

— page 29 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH
A - Short Narrative (Continued)

26 January (37th Day) Continued.

Headed westerly to intercept any ships she might be escorting.

Sighted three (3) supply ships bearing 300° T., distance eleven (11) miles on southerly course. Attempted to close these ships for attack at high speed but unable to close. Decided to trail them to determine whether they were heading toward Marasor or Moulocca Strait.

While trailing a score of (2) destroyers, bearing 240° T., range obscured by two (2) destroyers, bearing 240° T., range about 10,000 yards, to right at full speed to intercept. and changed course to right at full speed to intercept.

Fired four (4) torpedoes at the cruiser, range 2,800 yards. (Note: This ship used full speed during the entire approach in order to close.) Torpedo run 3,100 yards, using divergent spread. Immediately after firing went deep to avoid search by destroyers. Bound listener reported torpedoes running at a rate of 2 (2) miles per minute. (Note: torpedo run two (2) miles per minute. (

— page 30 —
1030
CONFIDENTIAL
A - Short Narrative (Continued)
27 January - Thirty-eighth Day
Patrolling assigned area. After surfacing received orders from Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet to proceed to and patrol area North entrance Djalilolo Passage.

28 January - Thirty-ninth Day
Patrolling on course 142° heading for new area.

29 January - Fortieth Day
Patrolling on course 180° heading for new station. Sighted submarines to the South-west on a northerly course. Turned to attack and ran at full speed, alonging for periscope observations (sea calm, no whitecaps). Did not fire as was unable to reduce range below an estimated 5,000 yards. Submarines were evidently on B-35 class, on course about 345°, speed 14 knots, cruising on surface.

30 January - Fortieth Day
Reached new area; North entrance Djalilolo Passage. Sea glassy calm with haze over water. No contacts.

31 January - Forty-second Day
Patrolling Djalilolo Passage. Mod'rate swells from North-east; slight haze. No contacts.

1 February - Fortieth Day
Received Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet serial 9 directing us to proceed to Scrubaway via Obli and Pelang Straits. Set course accordingly. No contacts.

2 February - Fortieth Day
Submerged in Obli Strait during the day. Calm sea. No contacts.

— page 31 —
1200
Entered Peleng Strait by moonlight.
Dighted merchantman (inter identified as similar to KAH-BEKA MAHU or TURBO MAHU) rounding Tg. Beta Putih (Cape Angus) about eight (8) miles away on a northeasterly course. Changed course to intercept.
Target changed to an easterly course, putting us about 30° on port bow. Changed course to 180° to intercept.
Sea calm, no whitecaps.
Fired four (4) torpedoes at target; range 1,500 yards (Note: It was intended to only fire two (2) torpedoes. However, it was seen that due to maneuvers of target to avoid, first (1) torpedoes would pass ahead, so two (2) additional torpedoes were fired, aiding abaft the target.) The wake from after the third or fourth torpedo appeared to pass under stern of target but there was no explosion.

: 1205
Patrolling off entrance to Tomori Bay; sea glassy; visibility poor due to haze. Appraised line of reefs at 100 fathom curve but unable to penetrate reefs due to inability to accurately locate position. (Note: The chart for this day is very poor, and with the many submerged reefs the bay could only be penetrated on surface during daylight.)

: 1237
During night received Commander Submarines, Aviatic Fleet serial 34 directed by Captain SABLIFSH to patrol across the Kam-Wowai during day. No contacts. Encountered considerable set to the North-east. Sighted enemy observation plane patrolling over area between 1640 and 1730. Visibility fair during day, excepting rain squalls in vicinity of Wowai Island.

-10-

— page 32 —
7 February - Forty-ninth Day

0330 Sound reported some bearing 090° T., (visibility at time very low). Immediately thereafter lookout picked up dark spot on horizon in this direction. (Our position Latitude 3°-48' S., Longitude 123°-23' ). Submerged to avoid detection. Unable to pick up ship with periscope so did not attack. Sound stated it seemed to sound like a submarine - possibly SCULPIN, or an enemy submarine. (Approximate time: 5 days) Heard five (5) depth charges going off some great distance away, direction not determined. No contacts during the day. Sea slightly choppy in morning but glassy during afternoon. After surfacing, received Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet serial 45 directing us to proceed Burabaya. Set course accordingly to pass through Buton Pass.

8 February - Fiftieth Day

Proceeding on southerly course; in vicinity Batu Ato during day. No contacts.

9 February - Fifty-first Day

Submerged south of Kalao Toa during daylight, on course 248°. No contacts. After surfacing received Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet serial 56 directing us to proceed to Tjilatjap, using Alas Strait.

10 February - Fifty-second Day

Submerged during day North of Linta and Sape Strait on westerly course. Surfaced five (5) miles North of Sangeang Island. No contacts.

11 February - Fifty-third Day

Entered Alas Strait at dawn. Considerable driftwood dangerous to periscope in Northern section of strait. Many native sailing boats in strait. No contacts.

12 February - Fifty-fourth Day

Submerged South of Blambangan Pena on westerly course.

— page 33 —
12 February (54th Day) Continued.
1000 Heard pinging in distance bearing about 290° T. Changed course to 300° to intercept.
1030 Sighted upper part of mast of three (3) ships (single mast ships). Ships were on easterly or northeasterly course. Unable to close sufficiently for positive identification but so charateristics and appearance of masts indicated they were our destroyers. Our approximate position 25 miles, bearing 170° from Blambangan light. No other contacts.

13 February - Fifty-fifth Day
Cruising submerged on westerly course South of Java enroute Tjilatjap. No contacts.

14 February - Fifty-sixth Day
0600 Rendezvoused with station ship and entered Tjilatjap. Patrol completed.

— page 36 —
1. NAVIGATIONAL AIDES.
2. D - NAVIGATIONAL AIDES.
3. Lights on minefield buoys satisfactory for exit.
4. Fortune Island light was burning night of 21-22 December.
5. Cabra Island light was burning night of 22 December.
6. Hoka Sho light (North of Formosa) was burning nights of 1 and 2 January.
7. Sancho Kaka (North-east tip of Formosa) burning night of 3 January.
8. Cape San Augustin light not burning night.

: 1020

— page 37 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH

E - DESCRIPTION OF ALL PATROL SHIPS SIGHTED.

KATON type submarine, 13 miles North of Cabra Island light at 1845, 22 December. Course westerly, speed unknown.

Unidentified merchant ship, at 0340, 31 December. Position: Latitude 23°-36' N., Longitude 122°-07' W. Course northerly, speed about 10 knots.

At 0715, 31 December, small steamer (less than 1,000 tons) zigzagging on northerly course. Speed about 8 knots. Position: Latitude 23°-57' N., Longitude 122°-04' W.

At 0006, 2 January, ship of about 3,000 tons on northeasterly course zigzagging, speed 12 knots. Position: Latitude 25°-50' N., Longitude 121°-36' W.

1130, 14 January, freighter or tanker, possibly HOON MARU, in Derry City. Course about 120° T., heading to round Cape San Augustine. Speed 10-12 knots.

1025, 15 January, unidentified freighter on southerly course, off Malta Point, in Bravo Gulf.

1750, 17 January, smoke from unidentified ship heading South-west rounding Sarangani Islands.

2305, 21 January, unidentified merchant ship, distance 20 miles, bearing 120° from San Augustin light, course southerly.

0700, 26 January, unidentified cruiser on northerly course standing into Davao, Latitude 6°, Longitude 125°-56' W.

0721, 26 January, three (3) supply ships. Latitude 6°-2'W., Longitude 125°-54' E., on southerly course. Speed about 13 knots. Ships were nearer plainly seen but they were all two-masted with single stack directly astern.

1135, 26 January, sighted one (1) Navajo class cruiser screened by two (2) destroyers on northerly course. Latitude 5°-30' N., Longitude 125°-44' E. Speed 15 knots.

1030, 29 January, sighted Ro-33 class submarine, Latitude 2°-01' N., Longitude 128°-53' E., on course about 345°, speed 14 knots.

— page 38 —
1200, 4 February, sighted merchantman similar to either KANBARA MARU or KURU MARU rounding T. Batu Putih in Peleng Strait, course 090°, speed 14 knots.

-17- / 022

— page 39 —
F - DESCRIPTION OF AIRCRAFT SIGHTED.

At 1455, 15 January, plane patrolling East and West across entrance to Davao Gulf; altitude 500 to 1,000 feet. Plane was an observation biplane, probably a VOS-95.

At 1345, 17 January, patrol type plane patrolling Davao Gulf.

At 1043, 23 January, patrol type seaplane patrolling Davao Gulf.

At 1640,- 1730, 6 February, observation type seaplane patrolling between Manoel and Wooni Island (off Kendari).

— page 40 —
0034, 2 January, fired two (2) torpedoes at an unidentified ship of about 3,000 tons. Used spread, firing one (1) torpedo at bow, other at stern, 10 seconds apart. Night attack, submerged, using periscope. Enemy course 015°; speed 12 knots; track angle 90° port; stern tubes: range 1,500 yards. (Believe target made a large zig away just prior to firing. Could not detect zig due to low visibility through periscope.)

At 1150, 26 January, fired four (4) torpedoes at NACHI class cruiser screened by two (2) destroyers. Target course 036°; speed 15 knots; track angle 105°-110° starboard; gyro angle 0°-5°; divergent spread; point of aim: 1st - 50 yards ahead, 2nd - amidship, 3rd - amidship, 4th - 50 yards astern; range 2,800 yards; sea very choppy from North-east. Went deep after firing to avoid depth charge attack. Sound reported one (1) explosion after which target's propellers stopped and not heard again.

At 1237, 4 February, fired four (4) torpedoes at large merchantman. Range 15,500 yards; estimated speed 14 knots; sea very calm; port track 120°-150°; target course 090°; firing intervals 7 seconds, 2.5 seconds; and 25 seconds; point of aim: 1st - forward 1/3 of vessel, 2nd - aft 1/3 of vessel, 3rd - 50 yards astern, 4th - 100 yards astern; depth setting 12 feet. No hits. (Target similar to KANERA or KITSUKI MARU.)

— page 41 —
20 Kcs. on Q.C.
132 turns while pinging; stopping to listen.
Long range scale, 5,000 meters.

-20-
1026

— page 42 —
1- MAJOR DEFECTS AND CASUALTIES.
Main engines spark. Ensures should be fitted with water spray.
Circulating water line to air conditioning leaks belly.
No. 2 periscope out of line; blinds and leaks belly.
No. 1 auxiliary engine generator grounded.
Bow and stern plane drifting very noisy.

— page 49 —
35.12N, 125.45E
FEBRUARY 25, 1942 - Seventh day of the month
reported Comanche #53, directed to patrol line forty miles wide, course center sea 60 miles, west of Tp. Sedano. Proceeded at 2 knots to new area.

0000 Officer-of-the-day left ship (probably destroyer) berth at 240° true on north-easterly course. Submerged to attempt periscope sighting station by moonlight, rather than to observe enemy action, but saw nor heard nothing after first day. Lay late late for dawn and at first day's light saw no enemy. In assigned lane surfaced and continued on westerly course to reach center of lane. Tried to examine the enemy's position, but saw no enemy. Tried to examine the

— page 50 —
1942 - February 28, 1942 - Tenth Day (Continued)

depth charge attack which did not materialize. Sound heard high speed scows (240 turns) passing in distance from the east to the northwest.
Surfaced and sent contact report 271820. Proceeded to center of new area. Patrols area on courses 320° and 140°. Ideal weather and sea conditions. No contacts.

March 1, 1942 - Seventh Day

Patrolled assigned area. No contacts. After surfacing received ComsubAF #58 ordering SAILFISH to patrol northern entrance to Lombok Strait. Proceeded to new area.

March 2, 1942 - Twelfth Day

In north entrance to Lombok Strait at dawn. (Position Latitude 8°-15' S., Longitude 116°50' E.) sighted destroyer bearing 190°, range about 14,000 yards on course 25°.
Fired two torpedoes (missed; see details under "Attacks", heading G). Remained at periscope depth to watch movements of target. Target made many radical jigs but did not return for depth charge.
While watching target with periscope one bomb exploded close aboard, followed at intervals of 30 seconds, 1 minute and 30 seconds, and 36 seconds, by three more bombs. West to 230 feet. Did not see planes but from bombing intervals there must have been two of them. Remained deep until came to periscope depth. All clear.
Surfaced.
Sighted one ship on southwesterly course bearing 050° true, in path of moon. Submerged to periscope depth and commenced attack. When range decreased, identified ship as aircraft carrier protected by three destroyers, one destroyer ahead and one about broad on each bow. Formation was moving very slowly; estimated speed 8 knots. Evidently the enemy, knowing submarine to be present from morning attack on destroyer, was depending on slow speed and listening to detect us. Our position at time of sighting, Latitude 8° 06' S., Longitude 115° 57' E. Range at time of sighting must have been 20,000 yards. - When it was noted that the formation was employing very slow speed (estimated 8 knots) and listening tactics to determine our presence, decided to remain outside of screen and to attempt an attack from outside. (This decision was

— page 51 —
2059
justified later by the depth charge attack on us at 2400
which proved their listening ability).

Pired four torpedoes, using low power (see details under
"Attacks", heading 4) at estimated range of 4,000 yards.
Although it was believed that torpedoes would reach target using high power, could not be sure of range so used
low power to make certain torpedoes would not stop short
of target. Stayed at periscope depth to watch target.
At 4 minutes and 9 seconds after firing first shot a very
sharp explosion was heard and flames were seen shooting
up side of target to a height of about 150 feet. An exactly similar explosion was heard (but not seen) 1 minute
and 10 seconds later. (NOTE: Time between first and last
shot was 1 minute.) The first torpedo was fired at the
bow, second amidships, third at stern and fourth at an
estimated 70 yards ahead of bow. Explosion intervals indicate that first and last torpedoes hit at a range of 4,500
yards (torpedo run). Plunged and numerous depth charges
were heard starting 10 minutes after firing and lasting
for 1 hour and 30 minutes. Pinging continued to be heard
at a great distance but stopped about 2300. Depth charges
were dropped a great distance away; estimated 3,000 yards.
After hearing neither nor charges for over 1 hour,
eight charges were dropped very close to us (estimated 100200 yards). Do not understand how destroyers could have
made this attack without our hearing their screws. We had
been running silent (all power shut off) making 60 turns
on screws at depth 250-300 feet during this period.

March 3, 1942 - Thirteenth Day

0305 Surfaced to charge batteries; ran to eastward. All clear
on surface.

0430 Sent out contact report 022100 reporting contacts and attacks.

0510 Submerged after only 2 hours of charging.
2204 Sighted what appeared to be 3 destroyers heading in our direction from southwest (our position, Latitude 8° 7' 8", Longitude 116° 28' E.). Submerged to avoid detection but saw
nor heard nothing after diving.

— page 53 —
1942 - S.S. SAILFISH
(A) BRIEF NARRATIVE (Continued)
March 7, 1942 - Seventeenth Day
Patrolled on southeast and northwest course, returning to
lee of Sepanjang at dusk to charge; sea glassy.
March 8, 1942 - Eighteenth Day
Same as yesterday. After surfacing received ComsubaA#66
directing SAILFISH to join tender at Perth. Decided to
use Sape Strait in going through the Barrier and set course
accordingly after completing charge.
March 9, 1942 - Nineteenth Day
Heading for Sape Strait on easterly course. No contacts.
March 10, 1942 - Twentieth Day
While heading between Sangean Island and Naru Point (north
east Sombawa Island) sighted submarine on surface (our pos-
sition, Latitude 8° 11' S., Longitude 118° 55' E.) on north-
easterly course. Believed this to be SAILFISH as she had
orders to use Lombok or Sape Strait and could have reached
this position at time of contact if using latter. Challenged
but received no reply. Submerged. Sound of screws faded
out to northeast. This contact interfered with our time
schedule for passing through Sape Strait. Patrolled north
of strait during day. Just before surfacing at dusk, heard
what sounded like a submarine surfacing followed by sounds
of high speed screws which faded out on c bearing of 050°
true. (Our position, Latitude 8° 03' S., Longitude 119° 58' E.)

March 11, 1942 - Twenty-first Day
Entered approaches to Sape Strait by moonlight and submerged
at 0410. At dawn found ourselves 5 miles due west of Banta
Island and proceeded through Sape Strait narrows submerged
using 5 knots speed. Encountered no exceptional currents
nor navigational difficulties and was through narrows by 0700.
When 1.4 miles east of eastern tip of Kelapa Island (south-
ern entrance Sape Strait) sighted Japanese submarine (RO-33
Class) bearing 150° true, range about 4,000 yards, bearing
-5-

— page 54 —
1942 - U.S. SAILFISH
(A) BRIEF NARRATIVE (Continued)
March 11, 1942 - Twenty-first Day (Continued)

on a northeasterly course, angle on bow 60°-75° port. She evidently approached strait submerged and then surfaced to pass through narrows, as she was not in sight on previous look just 5 minutes before. No opportunity to get into firing range without detection due to glassy calm sea. Estimated her speed at 12 to 14 knots. Minimum range that could have been obtained using our best speed would have been about 2,500 yards. Considered no chance of hitting at this range in calm sea so did not attack. She passed clear to northeastern.

March 12, 1942 - Twenty-second Day
March 17, 1942 - Twenty-seventh Day

Proceeding to Freemantle on southerly courses. On March 17th., contacted reconnaissance plane by radio prior to diving. Unable to raise plane with vertical antenna after diving due to rough seas. Ship broached when attempting to run at 52 feet to use vertical antenna.

March 18, 1942 - Twenty-eighth Day

Proceeded Freemantle. Made contact with U.S.S. PICKEREL during morning.

March 19, 1942 - Twenty-ninth Day

Arrived Freemantle at dawn. End of patrol.

— page 55 —
1. TRANSCRIPTION:
No unusual weather encountered during the patrol. In general the seas north of the barrier were calm and glassy, making daylight periscope approaches difficult.

(C) TIDAL INFORMATION:
Encountered current of 2 knots, direction 065°, in area eastward of Zandbuis Bank.

About 1 knot southerly set noted along west coast of Australia.

(D) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:
No remarks.

(E) DESCRIPTION OF ALL NAVIGATION AID:
At 0030, February 28, one cruiser, 2 destroyers, course west or northwest, speed 20 knots (or more), Latitude 7° 30' S., Longitude 115° 17' E.

At 1025, March 2, position Latitude 8° 16' S., Longitude 116° 50' E., sighted destroyer (SIGUE or HATUHAU-class, with three horizontal white bands on No. 1 stack) bearing 190°, distance 14,000 yards, course northeasterly, speed 16 knots (see "Attacks", heading G).

At 1937, March 2, sighted aircraft carrier (possibly "KAGA" - flight deck extended entire length of ship with small island above deck slightly forward of amidships) screened by three destroyers (destroyers not seen until later) bearing 050° true, distance 20,000 yards, course southeasterly, speed 8 knots (see "Attacks", heading G).

At 2204, March 3, in Latitude 8° 07' S., Longitude 116° 28' E., sighted three destroyers, heading northwest, speed unknown, range 8,000 yards.

At 0105, March 4, in Latitude 7° 56' S., Longitude 116° 16' E., heading E.

— page 56 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH
: (E) DESCRIPTION OF ALIEN WEAPONS OR MERCHANT SHIPS
: (SIGNED, ENEMY WARSHIPS OR MERCHANT SHIPS)
:

— page 57 —
5. SAILFISH
(G) PARTICULARS OF ANY ATTACKS (Continued)

Point of aim: amidship.
Spread: None.
(NOTE: On this attack, due to the very calm sea, after range decreased to 4,500 yards no further periscope exposures were made until time for the final bearing. When the final bearing was taken, the generated lagged the actual by about 30°. In slewing the Torpedo Data Computer to this bearing the gyro setting overload tripped, and gyros had to be set by hand, accounting for the long firing interval and the misses. The target passed ahead of us at a range of 900 yards.)

At 2059 fired four torpedoes at aircraft carrier. Two hits.
Target course: 200°.
Target speed: 8 knots.
Range: 4,300 yards.
Torpedo run: 4,500 yards.
Track angle: 108°-115° port.
Gyro angle: 2° Right to 5° Left.
Point of aim: First bow.
Second - Amidship.
Third - Astern.
Fourth - 70 yards ahead of bow.

Firing interval: 20 seconds.
First explosion: 4 minutes, 9 seconds after first shot.
Second explosion: 4 minutes, 19 seconds after last shot.
Torpedoes fired in low power (low speed setting). This attack made by periscope by moonlight.

(H) ENEMY ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID.

Enemy using listening patrol north of Lombok Strait. Destroyer would run at high speed for a mile or two then stop her screws and listen for a few minutes.

(I) MAJOR DEFECTS AND CASUALTIES.

Excessive vibration on starboard shaft noted when running trimmed down, and to a lesser extent when submerged. Cause undetermined. Vibration disappeared when running on surface pumped up.

— page 58 —
3.5 S. SAILFISH
CONFIDENTIAL
JUDGES AND CASUALTIES (Continued)

Several large cables running through hull (particularly torpedo firing circuits to coming tower) pushed in and leaked around stuffing badly when running deep to avoid depth charge attack.
CABLES PASSING THROUGH PRESSURE HULL SHOULD BE LIMITED IN DIAMETER IN FUTURE CONSTRUCTION.

(J) GENERAL REMARKS.

This patrol was started after a period of only 5 days in port following a period of 56 days duration. As a consequence personnel were pretty well worn out from the start, and, with lowered resistance, practically all hands developed bad coils and coughs. Also, due to conditions existing in the last port there were many important food items, mainly potatoes, eggs and butter, missing from our provisions.

-10- (Last) ENGLISH (A) 3/3

— page 61 —
5/1/42
U.S.S. SAILFISH
Serial (50-5)
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLARATION
From: Commander Officer
To: Commander Submarines, U.S. SAILFISH
Subject: War Patrol Report - Forwarding of
Instructor: (a) U.S.S. SAILFISH Fourth her Patrol
Report (original and four copies).
1. Forwarded herewith is enclosure (a), covering
Fourth her Patrol of this report from April 22, to May 20,
1942.

FILMED
4

— page 64 —
1942 - 1943
SERIAL [SIC-1]
BEAST 7/7
U.S. SAILFISH

1. DATE: 1942 - 1943 Day
2. PROCEDURE: 1942 - 1943
Proceeding along scout coast of Timor, submerged during daylight, surface at night. Used 4 engines speed during night or to get to the off eastern tip of Timor at daylight.

3. ACRYLIC 50, 1942 - 1943 Day
Rounded scatter and end of Timor submerged. No current noted. Set course to pass west of Java Islands. (NOTE: This is second one with verbal instructions to pass west of Java or through Java Strait. Our speed would require us to pass through the same time and distance, which is not a problem to pass through the

— page 72 —
1550 Underway and passed through Fremantle area.
1657 Submerged to conduct sound exercises with H.M.S. GEATLON.
1600 Surface and set course northward through bombing restriction area.

June 14, 15, 1942 - Second and Third Days

Proceeding through bombing restriction area on surface; two engine speed, 12.5 knots.
After dark on June 15th., received CSSW 2E serial 53 reporting possible presence of two enemy submarines. As positions given for these submarines flanked our course line, decided to run submerged following day in attempt to catch one of these submarines on surface.

June 16, 1942 - Fourth Day

Patrolled at periscope depth on northerly course during daylight; nothing sighted.

June 17, 18, 1942 - Fifth and Sixth Days

Heading for Lombok Strait running on surface.

June 19, 1942 - Seventh Day

Proceeded submerged during daylight.
Started passage of Lombok Strait on surface. Heavy ground swells and tide rips noted at southern entrance to strait. No enemy activity noted.

June 20, 1942 - Eighth Day

Proceeding north, running at periscope depth during daylight. After surfacing sighted Sekela Island and set course for Macassar Strait.

— page 73 —
1942 - NINTH DAY
During early morning a full voltage ground develope in No. 3 main motor cables and cables to this motor and found ground to be in cables. Kan submerged on port shaft only. After surfacing sighted Sabari Island and set course for Cape William. About three-fourths knot westerly set noted between Sakela and Sabari Islands.

June 22, 1942 - TENTH DAY
Succeeded in clearing ground on No. 3 main motor cables and connected up motor prior to diving. Noted numerous sailing bancas in Macassar Strait off Macassar City. Passed Cape William about 12 miles abeam to starboard after surfacing.

June 23, 1942 - ELEVENTH DAY
Proceeding north through Macassar Strait.

June 24, 1942 - TWELFTH DAY
Passed T.G. Mangalhat abeam to port during late afternoon and set course for Sibutu Strait.

June 25, 1942 - THIRTEENTH DAY
Proceeding on northerly course heading for Sibutu Strait. Skies overcast throughout day with frequent rain squalls. Evening star sights poor; position doubtful.

June 26, 1942 - FOURTEENTH DAY
At daylight sighted Bangao Island bearing 350° true and set course to pass through Sibutu Pass. Sourtherly current throughout day made progress extremely slow. Still in Sibutu Pass at time of surfacing. Heavy rain during late afternoon blanked off all landmarks. About two hours after surfacing weather cleared. Set course to pass west of Talamun Shoal, running on a bearing line from Bongca Islarc After passing Talamun Shoal, set course for Cagayan Sulu Island.

— page 74 —
55192/16-3
Serial (5-04)
S.C.R.T
(A) SHIP HULL ATIVE (Continued)

June 27, 1942 - Fifteenth Day:
Submerged in vicinity of Cayeyen Sulu Island during day. After surfacing, set course for Senorero Island.

June 28, 1942 - Sixteenth Day:
Retralled in vicinity of Senorero Island during the day. This action was taken in order to permit arrival of the submarine to Elbaue Strait just prior to dawn, and to be assured of an exact position before starting the run to the strait. After surfacing, set course for Elbaue Strait.

June 29, 1942 - Seventeenth Day:
Passed through Elbaue Strait submerged during the day. Four scouting planes sighted but no other activity noted. Afloat was a rather small vessel, and a submarine was seen to be west of Island and Elbaue Strait, and a submarine was

— page 77 —
55192/416-3
Serial (6-04)
SEA-T
(1) DRIFT INFLATIVES (Continued)

July 9, 1942 - Twenty-sixth Day

... 1.

— page 80 —
55192/alt-3
S.S.S. (S-04)
S.S.C.H.T.

(a) BILIT (continued)
July 26 - 31, 1942 - Forty-sixth to Forty-ninth Day

Heading for Fremantle, running on surface.
During evening of July 29, conducted three-hour battery discharge. 162° of capacity obtained.

August 1, 1942 - Fiftieth Day

Contacted escort vessel at rendezvous and entered Fremantle.
End of patrol.

(B) WEATHER.

Persistent southwest winds through the entire period spent in South China Sea. During this period, cut the course four days were far too rough for rapid inspection patrol, despite control being difficult and personnel visibility greatly reduced by the high seas. The remainder of the time ideal for inspection. The weather persisted - choppy, with many white caps but not rough. Skies were generally overcast, particularly during the sunsets, making navigation risks inaccuracies. The weather forecast was generally good.

(C) TIDAL INFORMATION.

An easterly set of from 5 to 1. knot was noted in the South China Sea. During the Southwest monsoon.

Three knot southerly current noted in London Strait.

(D) NAVIGATION AIDES.

The light on T.S. was (northwest tip of) 2 miles burning the night of 21-22 July.
Negotiated Belize Strait westward by taking departure from Bencoran Island at dusk, then proceeding so as to reach a point ten miles from strait entrance at dawn, and passed through strait submerged.

-9-

— page 81 —
155.5, July 9, 1942.
Location: 12 miles east of New Jersey Point.
Target: 7,000 ton freighter.
Target Course: 250° True.
Target Speed: 12 knots (73.1 r.p.m.).
Number of Torpedoes: Two (with heavy heads).

-10-

— page 82 —
55192/16-3
Serial (S-04)
SECRET

(G) FIRE CONTROL OF ATTACKS. (Continued).

Firing interval: 18 seconds.
Point of aim: 40 yards inside bow
40 yards inside stern.

Range: 1,000 yards.
Track angle: 18° 6' 3" at noon.
Gyro angle: 5° 6' 15".
Depth setting: 1° 4' 4".

Missile was fired at 10 to 15 yards, but the target was not exploded and the rocket was not recovered. The missile was not recovered

— page 83 —
85192/ilu-3
Serial (S-04)
S-01-1
(S) Pilots (Continued).

Route followed:
Lobok 5/1
Lobok 5/1
S-01-1
S

— page 84 —
10 0456
FC5-2/SS192/A12-1
Serial 3-4
SECRET
FIRST ENDORSEMENT
From: Commander Submarine Squadron TWO.
To: Commander TASK FORCE 51.
Via: Commander Submarines, South east Pacific.
Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH War Diary of Fifth War Patrol - period June 13, 1942 to August 1, 1942.

1. This was the Fifth War Patrol of the SAILFISH and lasted for a period of fifty days. The assigned area for patrol was in the South China Sea. All except ten days were spent in waters where enemy vessels might be encountered.

2. However only one opportunity for attack was presented. A 7,000 ton freighter was hit with one torpedo and most probably sunk. Failure of second torpedo to explode... Navy another instance to add to the long list of disappointing incidents of a similar nature which have been occurring since the start of the war; hot and straight but no Japs blow up.

JAMES FISH
JAMES FISH

— page 85 —
10 0456
SSWP/A16-3
Serial S-0036
SUBMARINES SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
U.S.S. SARATOGA, BLAGDEN
AUGUST 27, 1942.

From: Commander Soumarines, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Western Australia.

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH War Diary of Fifth War Patrol - Period June 13, 1942 to August 1, 1942.

1. SAILFISH area had previously been a fruitful one for our submarines. It was therefore disappointing that more contacts with enemy vessels were not made both enroute to and in assigned area.

2. The SAILFISH is credited with the following:
   - One Freighter 7000 tons - Sunk.
   - C. A. Lockwood, Jr.

— page 86 —
10 045
Reg. No. 0.0.771
FMSED
FIFO/AL6-3
(SA-251)
COMBAT UNIT
U.S. NAVY
TESTING OFFICER
11/01
(ASSIGNED TO: 1, 942)
From: The Commander, U.S. NAVAL THIRD DISTRICT
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. FLORIDA
Subject: U.S.S. SALTFSI War Diary of Fifth War Patrol - Ferried Miss L, 1942 to Aircraft 1, 1942.

1. Forced to abandon the attack, the enemy was able to evade a complete analysis.
2. The first torpedo hit aft of the point of shell and since there was a firing interval of 10 seconds there is a possibility that the second torpedo passed astern. It is noted that the ship was zigzagging.
3. The Task Force Commander does not believe that the failure of the second torpedo to explode was necessarily due to faulty material.

DISTRIBUTION
COMMON
CONSUL

— page 88 —
72408
FC5-5/A16-3/01/Mh
TASK FORCE FORTY TWO,
Serial ( 00102 )
DECLASSIFIED
From: The Commander Task Force FORTY-TWO.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. FLEET.
Via: The Commander Southwest Pacific Force.
Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Sixth War Patrol - September 17, 1942 to November 1, 1942.
Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.
2. The results obtained during this patrol in the vicinity of the BUIN - FAISI Area, SOLOMONS ISLANDS, were very disappointing. The intensity of both the air and surface anti-submarine measures, along with the radical course changing and high speeds used by the enemy, plus the glassy surface conditions, made the station a most difficult one.
3. The Commanding Officer was making his first patrol as commanding officer of a large type submarine, having had three previous patrols in the NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS ISLANDS Area as commanding officer of the U.S.S. S-44. During these patrols he sank two AK's and the CA KAKO. His aggressiveness and steadiness under the most exacting conditions has been proved many times.
4. The material condition of the SAILFISH is such that she can safely make one or two more patrols before Navy Yard Overhaul.

Copy to:
Vice OpNav - (1)
Cincpac - (1)
Comsopacfor - (1)
Cinclant - (1)
Comsubspac - (1)
Comsubsplant - (1)
Comsubsowespac - (1)
USS SAILFISH file- (1)
Each S/M of TF-42 (1) (NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN)
TF-42 Patrol Summaries file - (1)
TF-42 War Diary - (1)
Comsubron 2 - (1)
Comsubdiv 22 - (1)

R. W. CHRISTIE.
NOV 25 1942
(UNITED 10-10-11)
(USN 67530)
(USS 4759)
(

— page 89 —
11 01687
SS192/A16-3
November 1, 1942.
Serial (S-5)
CONSCRIPTION-TRANSFER

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. SAILFISH.
To: The Commander Task Force FORTY-TWO.

Subject: Report of War Patrol No. 6.

Reference: (a) [Censorship FIVE Conf. 1tr. FC5-5/A16-3 Serial 042 of March 20, 1942.]
(b) [Censorship FIVE Conf. letter FC5-5/A16-3 Serial 053 of May 29, 1942.]
(c) [Censorship FIVE Conf. 1tr. FC5-5/A16-3 Serial 083 of August 1, 1942.]

1. (a) NARRATIVE:

The SAILFISH completed war patrol No. 5 on August 1, 1942 and arrived in Fremantle, Australia. Left Fremantle August the 4th and arrived in Albany, Australia August 6, 1942. Overhaul work by Relief Crew and Repair Force, U.S.S. PELLIS from August 8th until August 23rd. Completion of overhaul by ship's force, ready for sea August 28th. Left Albany for Brisbane on August 20, 1942, in accordance with orders from Comsubsosweepac. Arrived in Brisbane, September 7, 1942.

1000 9 September 1942 Lieut-Comdr. J.R. Moore, U.S. Navy relieved Lieut-Comdr. R. G. Voge, U.S. Navy as Commanding Officer.

1300 10 September 1942 completed preparations for sea, underway. while backing away from dock, line from motor launch fouled port screw, pulling the launch up near the stern. After getting launch clear and while getting back alongside dock, starboard propeller hit a piling on the dock bending one blade. Divers from U.S.S. GRIFFIN started taking blade off.

Repairs to blade complicated at 1045 on 12 September. Underway at 1100 in accordance Comtasfor 42 CPDrd S37-42 of 9 September revised.

1700 Cleared Moreton Bay. Heavy sea.

September 13, 1942

Course 0000, speed 15 knots. Heavy sea. Sea moderated by afternoon, making 15.5 knots zig zagging.

1200 Position: Lat. 23-37 S., Long. 155-03 E.

— page 90 —
1942

Course 000° - Speed 15.5 knots zigzagging.
Exercise at battle stations and general drills.
1200 Position: Let. 17-53 S., Long. 154-57.5 E.

September 15, 1942

Course 013°, 16 knots, zigzagging during daylight.
Passed 120° south latitude at 1230. Stayed on surface till 1600, remained submerged until 1800 exercising at battle stations and general drills.
1200 Position: Let. 12-09 S., Long. 156-08 E.

September 16, 1942

Course 014, speed 15.5 knots. Submerged during daylight from today until evening of October 28. Made land fall on SISBO ISLAND at 0500.
1800 Surface and entered southern edge of area assigned. During night stood on up towards SHORTLAND ISLAND.

September 17, 1942

Submerged 10 miles southeast of FAISI Harbor. Remained in this vicinity all day.
0940 Slighted two Japanese Destroyers. Started approach; Passed 2500 yards ahead zigzagging, speed 15 knots, course 160°, did not fire as thought chances of hitting were very poor. While making approach on 2 DD's, 6 more DD's on course 290° passed 6,000 yards to south of us, speed 18 knots.
1115 Sighted another DD standing out from FAISI, started approach, this one was patrolling close in, turned and went back to FAISI, nearest range 9,000 yards, was using supersonic continuosly and making slow speed.
1220 Sighted unidentified ship which passed hull down close into FURIO ISLAND. See planes frequently during day, think they cover most of area within 15 miles of FAISI continuously.
1800 Surface and patrolled station 20 miles south east of FAISI, heavy sea, rain, very poor visibility.

— page 91 —
1942

SS192/A16-3
Serial (S-5)
CS-E-CR-E-TIAL

Subject: Report of War Patrol No. 6.

September 18, 1942

0450
0530
0540
0955
1035
1309
1810

As before. 0345 submerged in heavy rain visibility zero. Heard pinging, no screws. Still hear pinging, no screws, up to periscope depth and saw what looked like a small DD about 3,000 yards or less astern angle on bow zero, making very slow speed. Turned away to use stern tubes. DD maintained exactly zero angle on bow, speed about 5 knots. Went deep rid of depth charges. Heard pinging for over an hour longer but no charges. Not sure of type of ship may have been a DD or smaller craft, only saw it bow on. Sighted DD in close to SHORTLAND ISLAND going in range 15,000 yards. Our position now 17 miles, bearing 160 from FAISI. Sighted aircraft passing about over us and at 1055, 2 DD's standing out, course 170, speed 18 zigzagging, started approach, soon saw 4 more of same, then 3 more of same, all ships making 210 R.P.M. An not sure of formation as zigs were fairly large. Soon had some all around, angles on the bow from small up to 60°. Counted 9 ships on 2 counts, One of the last three with two DD's close was a 4 stack cruiser. All others were DD's. Went down to 90 feet, rather confused. Heard one stop and then start again. Had so many bearings that couldn't keep up with them. Went on down deeper and rigged for depth charges. No charges dropped. Fairly calm sea. Now 12 miles on 160° from FAISI. Two type. 97 seaplanes passed near. Surfaced, decided to try over ground west entrance. Rain, bright lightening, very brilliant display of St. Elmos fire.

September 19, 1942

Went south of TREASURY ISLAND and stood up towards west entrance to SHORTLAND AREA: Sighted smoke, started approach, saw masts of ship which passed ahead 16,000 yards. Sighted smoke, steady bearing. Sterted approach. Fired 3 torpedoes from stern tubes at SHIRATA. (Hine Leyer) speed 7.5 knots, 80° track, range 900 yards. Can't say

— page 92 —
1914-16-3
Serial (S-5)
SS-EC-R-F-AT
Subject: Report of War Patrol No. 6.

why all missed as all tracking checked very well. Fired at steak, a little ahead and a little astern. Think this vessel was acting as anti-submarine patrol as water was too deep for mine laying, he was making slow speed and using supersonic continuously. Turned towards us, and dropped 11 charges. All fairly accurate. Demaged one electric meter, got about 10 gallons of water in main induction. Heard one other charge which sounded like booster went off but main charges didn't.

1330 Up to periscope depth tubes reloaded. Sew 7 planes during day. Water fairly calm.

21:00 Sighted unidentified ship, 700 port angle on bow. H.zy moonlight. Tried submerged approach as was sure I couldn't get close enough on surface. Nearest range 6 to 7,000 yards, did not fire.

September 20, 1942

2200 Submerged for plane passing. Picked up on Redar at 9 miles, closing us at about 90 N.P.H. Submerged when range was 3,5 miles. On all future radar contacts we submerged when we considered it probable that planes would pass close enough to see the ship. Stood down to THE S.SURY ISLAND to get fix, some rain and cloudy.

September 21, 1942

0450 In a light rain sighted a DD on port quarter about 5,000 yards. Submerged. When about out of sight DD turned, speeded up to 15 knots (180 R.P.I.) and passed 2600 yards from us approximately. Very poor estimate of course end speed, did not fire. Remained in area north west of TREASURY ISLAND all day. No contact except planes.

1805 Surfaced, raining heavy clouds 3 see. Went to south of TREASURY.

2245 Sound heard screws, visibility 100 yards, submerged, heard three sets of screws all light small screws, seemed to be on various courses.

— page 93 —
0100
Submerged. At 0030 screws all clear surfaced.
Sound heard screws again two officers saw 3 ships ahead
angle on bow small. Submerged, but did not hear again.
may have been false contact.

: 0200
Surfaced and 0/45 submerged for day. About 12 miles
East of T. I. headed up toward FAISI.
Sound heard pingping ahead.

: 1100
Mqae out two supply ships in column on southerly course,
with two escort vessels, one on either side. Sea fairly
calm. Ship had plane escort, only saw one plane.

: 1120
Ships turned about 900 to right to course 2600, used high
speed to turn 1800 to normal approach course.
When about ready to look again 3 depth charges went off in
our vicinity thought not real close. Ran silent listening,
heard escorts stop and start, highest speed 260 R.P.M's.
Heard pingping most of time. Assume that plane escort saw
periscope were ships which resulted in radicel turn to
right. Either plane dropped charges, or one of escorts
came nearer during 10 minute period we were making full
speed and dropped them.

: 1220
Normal stations 62' depth. Another bomb or charge, not
as close as other 3, must have been from the plane as had
just looked around and nothing in sight except the one
MCru.

: 0406
Submerged. Pingping soon stopped.
Heard pingping nothing in sight.

: 0815
Sound reported screws, headed for them. Nothing sighted.
Must have been false contact.

: 1055
Petrol plane passed close.
Surfaced, course 1060, headed for area between VEILA
LAVELLA ISLAND and CHOISEL ISLAND. Cloudy moderate sea.

: 1558
Patrolled a lane about 5 miles off north east coast of
VEILA LAVELLA ISLAND.

: 1800
Patrolled a lane about 5 miles off north east coast of
VEILA LAVELLA ISLAND.

- 5 -

— page 94 —
1215
Si_hted two vessels close to CHOISEL ISLAND which passed hull down. Masts looked like small patrol vessels.
1518 3 sea planes on southeasterly course.

September 25, 1942

Over west of TREASURY ISLAND.
1609 Si_hted masts bearing 130T. DD speed 20 knots, nearest range 12,000 yards, course 240T.
1801 Surfaced and started for north BOUGAINVILLE about 9 miles off west coast of BOUGAINVILLE.

September 26, 1942

0150 Si_hted small craft headed towards us from shore. Submerged, did not hear him.
1137 Si_hted patrol plane.
1711 Medium sized Maru with DD escort passed 10000 yards ahead on course 300°, speed 15 knots.

September 27, 1942

0850 Petroling 10 miles off Queen Cerola Harbor.
2018 Slighted 4 engine patrol plane. No other contacts. Submerged and started approach on small island which showed up when the moon came up.

September 28, 1942

Petroling 10 miles off shore and a little north of Queen Cerola Harbor.
0712 Heerd screws and sew one mast. Never sighted again passed north of us on a northerly course.
1120 Sighted an auxiliary vessel; unknown type, course 100, speed 12, two small escorts, passed 10000 yards ahead. Weather off BUKA very calm, hazy nights.

— page 95 —
0900
SS192/A16-3
Serial (S-5)
CERTIFICATE

Subject: Report of War Patrol No. 6.

September 29, 1942
Moved station down to BUKA PASSAGE. When 6 miles off BUKA PASSAGE entrance sighted ship on course 170°, made best speed to close. Was a' large DD (probably a destroyer leader). Passed 6,000 yards ahead, 180 R.P.M.'s 17 knots. Received message assigning this area to S-43. Started back to the Shortland area.

September 30, 1942
Enroute down to Shortland area. Well off shore from BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND. Sighted 2 engine land based bomber. No other contact. Weather very calm.

October 1, 1942
Passed south of Treasury Island and patrolled station about halfway between Treasury and Fauro Islands. No contacts except planes for off. Got serial directing acknowledgement of messages about restriction of our area. Stood off to southwest 30 miles, sent off acknowledgement and then came back.

October 2, 1942
Submerged 12 miles bearing 120 from Faisi. Patrol planes in sight continuously from 0550 until 0900. Sighted 6 DD's, speed 26 knots, course approximately 170°, zig zagging. Made best speed, DD's passed 5,000 yards away, did not fire. Sighted 7 planes during afternoon.

October 3, 1942
Remained south of SHORTLAND and FAURO ISLANDS. Submerged 13 miles bearing 115 from Faisi. Sighted large ship headed in our direction. Started approach. Zig zagging making about 16 knots, base course 180°. When range was 9,000 yards target changed course to 080°, and passed 5 to 6,000 yards away did not fire. Had

— page 96 —
1914-1942
SS192/416-3
Serial (S-5)
CABLE TRAIL
Subject: Report of per patrol No. 6.

a DD escort on each bow and one astern. Spent all the time on this approach making 180° turns. Don't know what the radical left zig was for as I don't think we were seen. There were two plane escorts but nothing to indicate that we were sighted. Sea conditions fair, an occasional small white cap.
1052 Sighted 4 DD's course about 130°, passed 7,000 yards to south of us, speed 18 knots.
1504 Sighted sea plane.
1657 DD on northerly course passed 10000 yards away, speed 18. Weather calm, cloudy most of night, visibility during day good except for light haze.

October 4, 1942
Petrolled in area 24 miles bearing 140 from FAISI. Sighted 4 DD's speed 20, course 290°. Made best speed on normal approach course passed 7,000 yards ahead of us.
0930 Sighted 3 DD's, speed 25, course 300°. Made best speed on normal approach course passed at 6,000 yards.
1010 Sighted plane tender and 3 DD escorts, 2 plane escorts, speed 22 knots. Made best speed, passed 7,200 yards to north of us.

October 5, 1942
Over north of TREASURY ISLAND patrolling near west entrance to FAISI. Sighted planes over area twice. Sighted patrol craft at extreme range, probably Shiracaka again. Lost in the dark at about 12,000 yards.
1730
1900
October 6, 1942
Petrolled further to south and west of west entrance to FAISI. Had two Redar contacts at night.
0510 Very calm good visibility, nothing in sight.
0515 Two explosions sounded like depth charges, not very close but in our general area. Plane must have seen periscope in calm water.
1000 Plane circled area. No other contacts.

— page 97 —
2340
Received message about GRAMPUS being in part of area east of SHORTLAND ISLAND.
Heard pinging, our position 10 miles west of TREASURY ISLAND.

October 7, 1942

0820
Heard pinging off and on till 0130, nothing sighted.
Heard pinging soon made out two Marus and one escort.
Visibility poor. Made best speed to close. Target speed 11 knots, distance to track 7,000 yards. When range 6300 yards lost sight of ships in squall. When squall cleared escort and one ship were headed south, other ship still on easterly course headed right for good shot, but was stopped. After few minutes this ship went ahead changed course 900 to right and followed other ships.

October 8, 1942

Petrolled between BUKA PASS and SAND ISLAND, very calm.
No contact except planes 3 times. Plane contact at night 2230 until 2330. Submerged one-h.1f hour during this time. Think these were probably our planes bombing BUKA as we saw flares and flashes over BUKA.

October 9, 1942

Petrolled 10 miles off BUKA PASSAGE. No contact. Water claysy calm.

October 10, 1942

Petrolling 5 miles off QUEEN CAROLA HARBOR. No contacts still calm.
1815
Surfaced on course 220 about 8 miles north west of QUEEN CAROLA HARBOR.
1820
Si_hted signal light on port quarter, could then see DD, submerged.
1824
Four charges and 4 minutes later another, not very close. Heard 8 ships, 4 sounded like small high speed screws, 3 sounded like merchant vessels and one making 260 R.P.I. sounded like submarine. Could not see anything as the ships were between us and the shore in very poor visibility.

— page 98 —
0825
Subject: Report of War Patrol No. 6.

October 11, 1942

Submerged 18 miles east of BUKA PASSAGE, on course 150. Plane circling overhead. No other contacts, very hazy poor visibility and very calm, rain part of the time.

October 12, 1942

Patrolling 12 miles off shore on north and south courses, 15 miles south of BUKA PASSAGE. Sighted masts of patrol vessel south east of us on northerly course. Patrol craft turned to southerly course at 0615 and was not seen again.

1000 - 1450 Sighted 7 planes. 2210 to 2300 Had plane contacts - made one dive.

October 13, 1942

Sighted flares over BUKA again at 0045, course 200. Hc.r. screws and saw small vessel on port bow on southerly course, making 136 turns. Submerged. Sure this is a patrol craft, no other ships with him.

0430 Submerged up near north end of BUKA ISLAND position quarter. Sighted 4 DARUS in column angle on bow 600 starboard, range 19,000 yards, speed 12 knots. Had DD escorts one ahead and one astern both patrolling their station. Merus in column and not making any large zigs. 'Took 30 points off the gravity, last DD passed 5500 yards ahead, did not fire. These ships were on course about 070 going north of BUKA ISLAND.

October 14, 1942

Patrolling same area as yesterday. No contact. Hc.zy, cloudy and calm.

October 15, 1942

Standing south along coast of BUKA ISLAND about 15 miles off shore. Visibility towards land very poor. When about off BUKA PASSAGE heard screws towards the shore. Submerged heard 4 ships all had small pitch screws, sound man thought they were submerines. Bearing changed slowly to northward. Stayed submerged on course South. Sighted smoke, headed for it water glassy calm. Was four

— page 99 —
1958
2025

Submerged for 2 miles a minute.

October 16, 1942.

Proceeding towards TREASURY ISLAND on course 115, well off shore, 60 miles from TREASURY ISLAND:
0700
Pickup ship astern on base course 120, zigzagging on a sine curve about 200 each side of base course, speed 14 knots. At 4500 yards had zero angle on bow. Escort (corvette type) 150 starboard angle, range 3800 yards. Went to 80 feet, for sound shot. Escort started pinging, stopped and started. After going deep had 6 distinct bearings. Could not tell which was which. Think ship passed almost directly over us. Experienced sound ran tried to pick out bearings but could not. Had the six bearings over about 120° of the dial.
1815
Surfaced sighted TREASURY ISLAND. Had plane contact 3 times but not close.

October 17, 1942

Passed to south of T.I. and submerged 12 miles, bearing 110 from TREASURY ISLAND. Went up to south entrance to F/AISI and back during day no contact except 4 planes. Still very calm.

— page 100 —
1942
SS192/A16-3
Serial ( S-5 )
U.S.S. SAILFISH
November 1, 1942

Subject: Report of War Patrol No. 6.

---

**October 18, 1942**

Same area as yesterday but 5 miles further south. Poor visibility, very calm. Sew lights on port bow thought they were very close as they were bright and showed up suddenly. Submerged. Nothing heard. Think it was AA fire over FAISI as saw it again after surfacing. Submerged for day 20 miles due south of FAISI. Patrol led on 030 end reverse up to 8 miles of FAURO ISLAND. Very calm. Between 0600 and 0620 heard 4 very distant explosions don't think they were meant for us.

October 19, 1942

Over 15 miles west of west entrance to FAISI. Still calm but better than last few days. Sighted ship on course 020°; 300 R.P.M. over 20 knots, made best speed, nearest range 10,000 yards. Had two plane escorts. Ship was about size of DD but from what I could see didn't look like one. Saw planes two other times during day and had Radar contact frequently at night.

October 20, 1942

0000 Submerged for plane.
0130 Submerged for plane.
Have had Radar contact continuously almost from 2000 last night until 0300 this morning.
0430 Submerged 18 miles north west of TREASURY ISLAND.
1500 Sighted ship on course 260, passed 18,000 yards to southward of us. Hump escort but did not see him.
2015 Submerged for plane.
2130 Submerged for plane.
Radar contact 20 to 2200.

October 21, 1942

Moved down off west coast of VEILA LAVELLA. Patrol led east west line 8 to 15 miles off north west coast of VEILA LAVELLA ISLAND. No contact except two planes. Submerged for plane. Radar contact most of time from 1945 until midnight.

— page 101 —
13 -

SS192/A16-3
Serial ( S-5 )
C.S.S. CRUZ-TIAL
Subject: Report of War Patrol No. 6.

October 22, 1942
22 miles south of FAURO ISLAND, observed bombing of BUIN AREA.
0130 Submerged for plane.
0430 Submerged 8 miles south of FAURO ISLAND petrolled on north and south courses in this area. Saw planes 4 times. Heard patrol craft at the entrance pinging but did not see him. See very calm.

October 23, 1942
Started back up to BUKA. Course 324°, 20 to 30 miles off shore. No contact. Very calm.

October 24, 1942
20 miles off west coast of BOUGAINVILLE. No contact. Weather same.

October 25, 1942
Ofi BUKA. PASS and to southward, 12 miles off shore. No contact.

October 26, 1942
Patrolled route from BAUIL to F.ISIS as suggested by STURGEON. No contact. Surfaced and started back to Base, course 155, speed 10 knots.

October 27, 1942
Enroute BRISBANE submerged during daylight.
1200 Position: Lat. 9-20 - 155-55.
October 28, 1942
Enroute BRISBANE. Submerged during daylight.
1200 Position: Lat. 11-55 - 155-58.

— page 102 —
1942
SS192/A16-3
Serial (S-5)
CUNEBL-NTIAL
Subject: Report of War Patrol No. 6.

Enroute BRISBANE. Surface all day.
1200 Position: Lat. 14-58 - 155-33.
Octobr 30, 1942
Enroute BRISBANE.
1200 Position: Lat. 20-17.2 - 155-07
October 31, 1942
Enroute BRISBANE.
1200 Position: Lat. 24-50 - 154-48.
November 1, 1942
Enroute BRISBANE.
0240 Passed Morton light'abeam.
0900 Moored New Farm Warf, BRISBANE.

WEATHER
About 3 days out of 4 in area around BOUGAINVILLE water is very calm. Hazy horizon at night goes with a calm sea. Clouds and scattered rain squalls are frequent.

TIDAL INFORMATION
No remarks.

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
Charts of SOLOMON ISLANDS not accurate for this area. BUKA ISLAND and off shore small islands not accurately enough charted for use of cross bearings in fixing position. Japanese ships go closer to west coast of CHOISEU ISLAND than our charts indicate.

- 14 -

— page 103 —
SS192/A16-3
Serial (S-5)
Subject:  Report of War Patrol No. 6.

SHIPPING AND AIR PATROL

Location, course and speed are given in the narrative. Destroyers were all modern, 2 stack types. Destroyers were used for escort duty also some smaller type similar to Corvettes were used. Routing of warships from FAISI to the southward varied. All came out of FAISI area on course 160 to 170, and then when 5 to 15 miles out changed course to 120 to 130. The [ZIUHO (seaplane tender) came out as above but changed to 800 (T) going closer over to CHOISEUL than looked to be safe. Ships to the northward follow the reverse of above. Shipping to and from FAISI to north and west, uses south entrance, heading out to scuth and passing few miles north of TREASURY ISLAND on course 260, staying well off shore. Next course is 300 to 310, over to point mentioned in STURGEONS report, thence on to RABUL on course 330. Shipping route to QUEEN C.ROLA and BUKI from westward not known, saw some which passed north of CAPE HENPAN and probably then on down east coast of BOUGAINVILLE. Air escorts were covering practically all shipping, as well as patrolling when no ships were in sight. I think we were sighted twice by air screens, both times we were 8000 yards ahead of ships when sighted. Each time 3 charges were dropped from the plane, they were not very accurately placed but must have come from the plane as they were closer than could have been dropped by any surface ship. The types of planes used were all float planes. Planes also patrolled during moonlight nights. Some of plane contacts were no doubt due to bombing raids etc., but had frequent contacts when no bombing raids were in progress. Made 20 dives at night for aircraft and only submerged for ones that were still coming closer while range was 4 miles. "without the radar surface running at night near BUIN would be hazardous.

— page 104 —
SS192/A16-3
Serial (s-5)
CSE-CR-ETIAL
Subject:  Report of War Patrol No. 6.

DETAILS OF ACTION

When nine miles from west entrance to FAISI area, course to entrance 800 (T), fired 3 torpedoes at the SHIRATAKA, one 10 yards astern, one at stack, one 10 yards ahead, depth setting 2 feet, track 80° starboard, torpedo run 90° yards. None hit, cannot give reason for miss, had crossed his bow and thought course estimate was very close, set up on T.D.C. checked closely all the way, gyro were properly set, it being practically a straight shot. Sound man heard torpedoes running, I saw impulse bubble but did not see torpedo wake. SHIRATAKA was making an anti-submarine patrol as she was going slow, using supersonic continuously, had loft FAISI that same morning and was on the way back in when we fired at her. After firing SHIRATAKA interfered speed came over and dropped 11 depth charges, all of them fairly accurately placed. Charges dropped in groups of 3 or 4, charges in each group 12 seconds apart. Last charge dropped 28 minutes after firing. Used slow speed while searching and used supersonic very sparingly. Heard Tokyo broadcast the next night saying a submarine we sunk in the FAISI area.

ENERGY ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES.

One or more surface escorts with all chips. One or more air screens with most ships especially at focal points. All ships zig-zag, merchant ships make 12 to 15 knots, war vessels up to 25 knots. Air patrols around FAISI and BUKA both day and night. Independent patrol craft when available off FAISI and BUKA.

iIECHANICAL DEFECTS

1. Stator of south element has one phase shorted. Gyro out of commission from 24th till end of patrol.
2. Have leak in vent to #3 port main ballast group.
3. Linkage on negative tank flood valve inoperative. Have carried negative flooded since 24 September.
4. Armature of circulating pump motor for Klein-schmidt distiller burned out October 5, 1942.

— page 105 —
SS192/A16-3
Serial ( S-5 ) November 1, 1942
S-E-C-R-E-T
Subject: Report of W- r Patrol No. 6.

FOOD AND HABITABILITY - Normal.

GENERAL CONDITIONS:

The S.ILFISH was on station forty days; this is a long time for one area. I think our morale would have improved if we could have moved around more.

The large number of contacts with no results is disappointing. Lack of results may be attributed to strong anti-submarine measures, many glassy calm days, bed management and bad luck; just how much to one and how much to another I cannot say.

This is my first trip on the S.ILFISH I found the officers and crew to be cheerful, willing and competent.

LOGISTIC SUMMARY:

1. Days duration of patrol - 51
2. Number of days submerged - 43
3. Total miles surface - 4,751
   - Total miles submerged - 1,732
4. Gallons fuel oil used - 51,650
5. Percent of capacity of fuel oil used - 57.2%
6. Gallons of lub. oil used - 2,130
7. Percent of capacity lub oil used - 38.7%
8. Gallons of potable water used - 17,500
9. Gallons of battery water used - 2,500
10. Factor limiting petrol - Personnel.

J. R. MOORE

— page 107 —
1942-10/A16-3(5)/ SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
(12)

Serial 0100
CONFIRMED
CONSUBDAC PATROL REPORT NO. 126
U.S.S. SAILFISH - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of Consubdiv.44 Conf. 1tr FB5-44/16-3
    Serial 09 of January 21, 1943, and Consubron
    Four's first endorsement thereto, plus copy
    of subject war patrol.

1. SAILFISH Seventh War Patrol was conducted en-
route from Brisbane to Pearl Harbor. A total time of 52 days
was spent at sea, of which 37 days were spent in the patrol
area.

2. Five attacks were made, fourteen torpedoes were
fired, and one hit made for the disappointing score of 7.1%.

3. It is of interest to note that on December 24,
1942, with a bright moon and hazy horizon:

   (a) Enemy exhaust smoke revealed an enemy submarine
   about 4 miles away.

   (b) The submarine was seen through the periscope at
   ranges of two to three miles.

4. The patrol report is incomplete, with no summary
of attacks and other data.

5. While it is probable that the enemy submarine
encountered on December 24, 1942, was sunk, its loss cannot be
considered conclusive and accordingly SAILFISH is credited
with damaging -

1 Submarine (I-68 class) - 1400 tons.

J. H. BRUNT, Jr.,
Acting.

FILMED
46026
(Distribution and authentication on following page)

— page 108 —
12/1/1943
FF12-10/A16-3(5)/ SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET (12)
Serial 0100
CONFIDENTIAL
CONSUBEPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 126
U.S.S. SAILFISH - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.
Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

DISTRIBUTION:
(IM-43)
List III, SS
Special:
Pl(5), EN3(5), Z1(5),
Comsub1ant (2), X3(1),
Comsubsowespa(2),
Subschool, N.L. (2).

E. R. SWINEURNE,
Flag Secretary.

— page 109 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.
: 2. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
: 3. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
: 4. The material condition of SAILFISH is generally poor. The vessel is in urgent need of the major overhaul scheduled to commence in the immediate future.

: 1. FIRST ENDORSEMENT
: 2. SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR
: 3. Serial 012
: 4. CONFIDENTIAL
: 5. From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
: 6. To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
: 7. 1. Forwarded.

: 1. ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 110 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Seventh War Patrol

PROLOGUE:
The SAILFISH completed the Sixth War Patrol and moored at New Farm Wharf, Brisbane, Australia at 1000 on November 1, 1942. Upkeep period from November 1 to November 24, 1942. All officers and men were granted 3 days leave. Tender work was started by the U.S.S. GRIFFIN but was taken over by the U.S.S. FULTON after about a week. Ship's force overhauled #3 main engine, and did routine painting and cleaning. Spent two days in the South Brisbane drydock. Cleaned bottom and touched up plaster paint. Renewed one blade on starboard propeller, ground in a few sea valves. Completed upkeep on November 24, 1942. Ready for sea.

I. NARRATIVE

Times are Zone-11

Underway at 1400, November 24, 1942, in accordance with CTF 42 Operation Order, Serial 00117 of 22 November 1942. At 1900 cleared Moreton Height, making best speed on 4 engines, proceeding to area.

Proceeding on surface, calm sea.

Noon position: November 25, Lat. 23-57S
Long. 154-53E

Noon position: November 26, Lat. 17-51.4S
Long 154-54E

Noon position: November 27, Lat. 11-28
Long. 156-05

At 1600 on November 27 sighted submarine to southward. Submerged, unable to close range to less than 12,000 yards. Think submarine was SEADRAGON on course 320, speed 15 proceeding to St. George Channel patrol area.

1705 Surfaed

November 28, 1942.

Submerged during day. Calm. Submerged during daylight from this date until January 6, 1943.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 111 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

November 29, 1942.

0400 Entered Southeast corner of patrol area. Patrol in this area was across probable routes from RABAUL to enemy bases in New Guinea and approaches to GAZMATTA. Station 10 to 25 offshore along South coast of New Britain.

November 30, 1942.

Same. Glassy calm.

2330 Plane passed directly overhead, altitude 800 feet. Think it was a PBY. Submerged when he turned to make another pass. Must have had radar as it was a pitch dark night.

December 1, 1942.

Same. Very calm.

1400 When 10 miles South-Southeast of GAZMATTA sighted masts to Southwest. 3 ships' (DDs) passed 18,000 yards to Southwest, course 260, speed 20.

1445 Heard 3 distant explosions, source unknown.

2230 Submerged for plane.

December 2, 1942.

Position 22 miles bearing 160 from GAZMATTA. Glassy calm.

0943 Sighted 2 DD on course 70. Made best speed to close track.

1000 Fired 4 torpedoes at second DD, range 2800 yards, 90 track, speed 27 knots. No hits. Probably shouldn't have fired as small, high speed target at this range would be very hard to hit.

1006 - 1010

8 depth charges, not very close. Only reason for firing was that felt like there wouldn't be any big, slow targets in this area and wanted to shoot at something.

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 113 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

December 26, 1942.

No contact. Mooring to eastward as had made attack 24 miles southwest of GAZMATA.

December 27, 1942.

Received message changing patrol area to northward between MASUA I and the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS. Started for Vitiaz Strait.

December 28, 1942.

Proceeding in Vitiaz Strait and passed 10 miles to westward of LONG ISLAND.

December 29, 1942.

0100 - Moderate sea, cloudy rain, with considerable electrical disturbance - Some St. Elmo's fire. Radio static so severe missed one schedule. Japanese interference ruined another schedule.

December 30, 1942.

On new station between MASUA and ADMIRALITY ISLANDS.

0500 Picked up two more ships coming from the southward. Submerged as there was pretty good moon. Periscope looking very poor as it was somewhat hazier than had previously thought. Sound conditions not good. First estimate of course 260 as bearing changed to left. Later bearing changed to right and course was estimated as 330. Made out 3 medium MARUS with 3 other smaller vessels. No definite formation. Thought small ships were probably escorts.

0615 Fired three torpedoes at 5,000 ton ship. Range 2,700 yards, 120 track, estimated speed 7 knots. One minute and 29 seconds later fired one torpedo at another ship, about same range, 100 track. Second target had another ship almost directly beyond him at a range of 4000 yards. Went down and cleared firing point. Heard explosions at 5'-16", 5'-50", and 6'-41" after firing first torpedo or 3'-47", 4'-21" and 5'-11" after firing last torpedo. Several individuals say they heard an explosion before this but I did not. Possibly a hit but probably not and none are claimed.

— page 114 —
0615 The last two explosions sounded like depth charges to me. I now believe that the small vessels were small freighters and not escort vessels. This attack was badly handled. Should have stayed on surface keeping ahead and waiting for daylight. Poor visibility at the periscope and disordered array of 6 ships, made tracking data poor. Possibly should have surfaced and trailed these, but did not due to proximity of Kavien.

December 31, 1942.

Clear choppy sea. Still midway between Masua Island and the Admiralty Island.

1420 Sighted ship on Base Course about 250° started approach. Target zig zagging frequently about 20° to either side of base course.

1443 Fired 4 torpedo spread at Momo class destroyer, 110° track range 1000 yards, no hits. Estimated speed 16 knots. Set-up looked good and do not know why all fish missed. Depth charges at 4', 5'-13", 5'-24", 5'-35", 5'-44", 6'-02", 39'-10", 39'-16" after firing. Counter attack deliberately carried out and the one 4 charge barrage was fairly accurate. Used pinging a good deal, ran slow, stopped and listened. At one time could hear the second echo of his pings indicating he was 800 yards away.

2000 Sighted small vessel on port bow distance 3000 yards in a black cloud. Sound picked him up at the same time, turn count over 200 RPM. Submerged rigged for depth charge slowed down, could not hear him. Don't see how he missed seeing us as our background was light, but no charges were dropped.

January 1, 1943.

Patrolling same area no contact.

January 2, 1943.

Moved over to Eastward North of Kavien. No Contact.

January 3, 1943.

Back to west of Masau Island, no contact.

— page 115 —
1943. PATROLLING BACK NORTH OF KANING. NO CONTACT. SURFACED AND STARTED FOR PEARL IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS.

January 5, 1943.

Sent despatch to CTF42 notifying him we were leaving area and of serials we were missing. The reason for missing serials are:

1. Frequent dives during night. (1)
2. Interference from Japs or from material causes. (1)
3. Improperly coded or transmitted messages resulting in garbled indicators.
4. Some of Belloomen operators are not very good.

Some system such as used by T.F.7 would help in that it would keep a boat from worrying about a missing serial that did not concern him.

Submerged during day due to proximity of air patrol from KANING and possible contact with traffic from TRUK to BOGANVILLE.

January 6, 1943.

Proceeding on surface - 230 r.p.m. on three main engines making 12 to 13.5 knots depending on weather. Using about 11 gallons of fuel per mile. Noon position - Lat. 00-12 N, Long. 158-34 E.

January 7, 1943.

Position the same as on previous day. Surface cruising much appreciated by all hands, as air conditioning has been only partially effective since 20 December. Average temperature was 920 with fairly high humidity. Considerable heat rash. Noon position - Lat. 1-15 N, Long. 164-00 E.

January 8, 1943.

Position same as on previous day. Had radar contact at 9 miles which disappeared. Reappeared soon after at six miles submergence. As we passed 90 feet a heavy explosion which seemed close over our head was heard, breaking a couple of steam tights and knocking paint chips from over-head. Dive was slow as we were running into a four sea from dead ahead. Even with negative flooded and 120 down.

— page 116 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

January 8, 1943.

- Angle and good speed seemed to take a long time.
- At this time we were about 60 miles from TABUT and 115 miles from MAKIN.
- No never saw the plane, which was due to heavy sea so remained submerged rest of the day.

Noon position - Lat. 2-50 N., Long. 168-45 E.

January 9, 1943.

1200 Proceeding as before on surface. Plane contact at 19 miles. Submerged. Think that we got down with out being sighted this time.

1400 Back at normal cruising.

Noon position - Lat. 4-55 N., Long. 173-19 E.

January 10, 1943.

Set date back at 2400.

Noon position 6-41 N., Long. 177-09 E.

January 10, 1943.

Sent message notifying CTF 7 of position etc. Had to clear it through Australian station, but later CTF 7 acknowledged receipt.

Noon position - Lat. 9-32.8 N., Long. 178-36 W.

January 11, 1943.

Noon position - Lat. 12-02 N., Long. 174-39 W.

January 12, 1943.

Noon position - Lat. 14-25 N., Long. 170-16 W.

January 13, 1943.

Received message: giving instructions for rendezvous for entering Pearl.

Noon position - Lat. 16-42 N., Long. 166-20 W.

- 7 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 117 —
1. CONFIDENTIAL
: 2. SUBJECT: U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Seventh War Patrol.
: 3. January 14, 1943.
: 4. 0845 Exchanged recognition signals with PBY, which circled us and then went on.
: 5. January 15, 1943.
: 6. 1200 Arrived Pearl.
: 7. 2. WEATHER
: 8. South of New Britain Island was very calm, mostly cloudy with passing squalls. Weather hot, humid and depressing.
: 9. North of New Britain wind was 2 to 3 from Northwest.
: 10. Enroute to Pearl weather conditions were normal.
: 11. 3. TIDAL INFORMATION.
: 12. Current off GASMATA Drift was 1.2 knots. Set 70. In VITIEZ Straight drift was 1.5 knots. Set 180.
: 13. 4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.
: 14. No remarks.
: 15. 5. SHIPPING AND AIR PATROL.
: 16. Contacts off GASMATA were 20 miles off shore on courses 240 to 260.
: 17. Aircraft over GASMATA day and night. Think planes were using Radar as they usually came very close. Think we were sub-jected to patrol plane activity from both sides.
: 18. North of New Britain, no plane contact. Shipping route from RABAUL midway between MASUA I & the ADMIRALITY is on course 330.
: 19. Air patrol from JALUT or MAKIN extends at least 200 miles out.
: 20. out.

- 8 -
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 118 —
6. DETAILS OF ACTION
Covered in narrative.

7. ENEMY A/S MEASURES
Covered in narrative. Nothing to add to previously reported tactics.

Bombed by plane off MARSHALL ISLANDS. Did not see plane. Am not sure whether attack was made with bomb or depth charge but from character of explosion think it was a 500 lb. bomb.

Method of evasion, go deep, run quiet, keep attacking ship abaft the beam.

8. MATERIAL DEFECTS EXPERIENCED:
1. Much upkeep required and poor performance of ice machine and air conditioning systems.
2. Several small leaks in drain line.

9. FOOD & HABITABILITY.
Normal.
10. GENERAL COMMENTS
None.

— page 119 —
1. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.
: 2. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
: 3. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
: 4. The material condition of SAILFISH is generally poor. The vessel is in urgent need of the major overhaul scheduled to commence in the immediate future.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT:
FC5-4/A16-3
Serial 012
Confidential

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
1. Forwarded.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 121 —
1/2
FF12-10/A16-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0906
DECLASSIFIED
COMMUNICATION
U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject war patrol report.
    (B) Copy of Comsubdiv 101 Conf. 1st. end. FB-101/A16-3, serial 052.
    (C) Copy of Subcomsubpac Conf. 2nd. end. A16-3, Serial 017 of 5 July 1943.

1. The eighth war patrol of the SAILFISH was the first after an extensive navy yard overhaul.

2. During the stay in area, the SAILFISH encountered much foggy weather. In addition an increased amount of anti-submarine warfare activity was noted in this area from previous patrols.

3. Although bathytheormograph cards were taken daily, apparently no attempt was made to use the information obtained for obtaining sound conditions or locating protective density layers in the event of depth charging. Many recent submarines coming from patrol have reported successful use of this instrument and the information obtained has been gainfully employed in evading enemy anti-submarine measures. In addition it also indicates the change of trim necessary in order to obtain deep submergence. This characteristic has been covered fully in recent publications published by the Bureau of Ships. The principle that a submarine gets heavier when it goes deep as stated under paragraph 12 of subject patrol report does not hold true when there are density layers.

4. Insufficient evidence prohibits crediting other than damage in the two attacks made. SAILFISH is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy.

DAMAGED
1 - Freighter (unknown class) - 5,000 tons
1 - Freighter (unknown class) - 6,000 tons
TOTAL: 11,000 tons

52196 FILMED
Distribution and authentication on following page.
C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

— page 122 —
212
FF12-10/A16-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET 1d

Serial 0906
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
15 July, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 213
U.S.S. SAILFISH - EIGHTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reprints)
Cominch (5)
VCNO (5)
Cincpac (5)
Serforpac
(Adv. Base Plan. Unit (1)
Cinclant (2)
Comsubslant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsopac (2)
Comsowespec (1)
Comsubsowespec (2)
CTF 72 (2)
CTF 16 (1)
Comsubspac (10)
SUBAD, MI (2)
Comsubcomsubpac
Midway (2)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Subspace (2)
U.S.S. SAILFISH (1)
(COMSUBSPAC Endorsement only:)
All Submarines, Subspace (1)

R. C. LUNIVER,
Flag Secretary.

— page 123 —
8:1900

CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Eighth War Patrol. Period from May 17, 1943 to July 3, 1943. AREA ____. Operation Order 83-43.

PROLOGUE:
Arrived PEARL HARBOR January 15, 1943 from Seventh War Patrol. Departed PEARL HARBOR January 20, 1943 and arrived MARE ISLAND Navy Yard January 27, 1943 for a major overhaul. Completed overhaul and departed Mare Island Navy Yard April 22, 1943 and arrived PEARL HARBOR April 30, 1943. Period April 30, 1943 to May 17, 1943, refit by Submarine Base, P.H., and Training Period. Drydocked NYPH in YFD1, put in wood strips in stern tube and strut bearings in place of rubber, Worked on T.D.C. Unable to complete satisfactory repairs. Took PV cards on tubes found low velocity, adjusted firing valves. Overhauled #2 Auxiliary engine. Five days devoted to training.

1. NARRATIVE.
May 17 to May 21, enroute MIDWAY. Daily dives, emergency drills and training.
May 21, at 0800, arrived MIDWAY. Received 1100 gallons fuel, 2500 gallons fresh water, 500 gallons battery water, some miscellaneous provisions. Received directions to proceed to area via KURL ISLANDS, acknowledged this despatch via Radio Midway and at 1300 departed with plane escort, speed 12 knots on 3 & 4 main engines. Changed date at midnight skipping May 22.

May 22 to 26 - Enroute to station. No remarks.
May 27 to 29 - Heavy sea, cold, rain and fog. All times from here on are (-) 10 zone.
May 29 at 0600 sighted SHASUKOTAN 28 miles away. Could see peaks though surface visibility was only a few miles. Headed thru MUSHIRO KAIYU. After sighting MUSHIRO rocks, submerged proceeding thru straits Heavy swell, but no current. Surfaced at 2030 still daylight, rounded RAIKODE TO and proceeded down west side of KURLIS. Sea very calm in OKHOTSK SEA.
May 30 - Same. Fog, navigating by Radar.
May 31 - Same. 0500, standing out YETOYOU KAIYO. Fog cleared. Submerged for day. Foggy most of day.
June 1 - Proceeding to area. Injection rose sharply from 340 to 500. Fog all night and most of day.
June 2 - Fog cleared some. Submerged 0600. At 1100, contact #1. Patrol craft on course 160, speed 10, passed ahead 5000 yards. Have no idea where this one was going. Had 3" gun fwd and two smaller ones aft. Looked like a converted large trawler. Entered NE corner of area.
June 3 - Heading for TODO SAKI. Mostly fog night and day. Surfaced, HONSHU 18 miles by Radar.

— page 124 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

June 4 - Mostly fog, patrolled North’ and South on 100 fathom course, at unknown latitude. 2035 Surfaced and decided we were off KAMISHI KO. Could see 3 small craft near shore, may be of 300 tons, see lights along shore, and fishing boat lights 10 miles off shore. Moved off shore and at 2210 made Radar Contact, Contact #2, at 7800 yards, Radar estimated a small target, tracked at 11 knots, mean course 30°; when at 3600 yards could see target, unidentified, but small, with high speed screw, must be a patrol. Submerged to avoid detection as we were leaving a brilliant phosphorescent wake.

June 5 - 12 Miles off shore at night, still no sights and poor visibility. Bow planes in hand, heavy swell and fishing boats all around. Remained 10 miles off shore, finished repairs at 1600.

June 6 - Got approximate paris sight. Moved in towards TODO SAKI, Submerged 5 miles off shore, poor visibility and flocks of fishermen, gradually got 9 to 10 miles off shore avoiding fishing craft. Net markers with thin steaff and pennant all around. At 1500, Contact #3, 3 Marus and AM3 escort, course 160 angle on bow 80(S). Was surprised to see these so far off shore (17 miles) probably due to fog as visibility has been bad most of day. Followed along using speed, hoping they would close the shore, they changed course towards shore some but passed ahead at 10,000 yards.

June 7 - Flat, glassy calm and fog. Spent day 12 to 15 miles off shore on track of ships sighted yesterday. Got latitude sight at night. The first good sight in three days, unable to identify peaks and tangents in poor visibility from our previous unknown positions. Fix indicates 5 knot southerly current.

June 8 - Still foggy, varying amounts, submerged started in towards shore. At 0600, when 10 miles off shore, sighted AM class patrol, Contact #4, which passed outside of us on course 060, speed 12. Using supersonic some, nearest range 8,000 yards. These patrol craft are well worth a torpedo, but would be hard to hit, am ready to try once if conditions are favorable. Moved over and stayed on track of patrol craft. No contact.

June 9 - Spent day on 100 fathom course off TODO SAKI. Good visibility most of day, though fog closed in late afternoon. No contacts except. fishermen.

June 10 - Spent day off TODO SAKI near shore, some haze, but nothing passed inshore of us.

June 11 - Spent day off KAMISHI KO near shore. Fair visibility and nothing passed inshore. Have been covering inshore position pretty steadily since arrived in area. Most of time visibility has been poor to very bad, but still do not believe very much went in-shore of us. Have been 12 to 15 miles off at night with no radar contacts.

— page 125 —
8/100

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

June 12 - Thirty miles off shore, bearing 120° from TODO SAKI. Water 10° warmer and no fog. Patrols on East and West courses. No contacts except fishermen.

June 13 - About 20 miles off shore patrolling East and West, still no contacts. Between 0430 and 0500, heard 12 distant Depth Charges and scattered ones all morning totalling 30.

June 14 - Ten to fifteen miles off shore patrolling East and West. No contacts, getting into fog again.

June 15 - Moved in shore, patrolling on North and South courses in 80 fathoms of water South of TODO SAKI exact latitude not known. Fog and rain till noon and then not very clear. At 1200 sighted smoke, made out two ships, zigzagging widely, leading ship zigging wider than second and making 11 knots. Made approach on leading ship as looked like a 1932 model, second ship was about same size, but a 1926 model. At 2500 yards range and 60 starboard track, leading ship turned to give 30 starboard angle on bow. Went deep, crossed track came back up, and set up to fire at second ship. Fired three fish from stern tubes at 2nd ship, range 2500 yards, 125° track, pretty wide spread. Got too much down angle and ducked the scope, decided to clear track, then come back up for look. Heard torpedo explosion at 2 minutes - 10 seconds after firing first, and 1 minute - 54 seconds after firing 3rd. Heard 2 distant explosions 4 1/2 minutes after firing, assumed to be torpedoes at end of run. Slowed, to listen, could hear high noise level on target bearing, no screws, except the one heavy one going away. Started up for a look when two depth charges went off much closer than I expected from either of two merchantmen, thought might be plane though had seen none. Stayed at 90 feet listening. Still high noise level and some crackling from target. Picked up fast screws, and depth charges were getting closer, so went down and rigged for D.C. Soon there were three patrol craft; from the sound of their screws and pinging, think they were the AM type previously mentioned. The tactics were similar to others reported. These were very pessimistic keeping contact for three hours. The D.C. were all fairly close but none real close. Think they kept some contact, but could not locate us very accurately. Total charges - 36. On 5 occasions heard groups of 8 to 11 small explosions, could have been something on target ship, but doubt it, have never heard anything similar before. At 1600, came up to look, saw a ship well off shore from us, range 15,000, angle on bow, 130° port, looked like a tanker in ballast. Soon had two of AM's back on various courses and speeds searching with supersonic. Lost sight of them by 1800, but could hear pinging till we surfaced. This ship was heavily laden, was hit with one T.N.T. Head, and probably sunk, the screws stopped, and some noise of damaged ship was heard. From previous experience with noises made by a sinking ship this was not conclusive enough; so only damage is claimed.

— page 126 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

The range was large, three escorts and frequent depth charges prevented good listening as well as looking.

June 16 - Thirty miles off shore, submerged and stood in to coast towards KAMAIISHI KO, fog and poor visibility. Heard 50 distant depth charges during day, may be after one of boats in adjacent areas, but sounded closer, nothing sighted.

June 17 - Fog in and out day and night. Headed in shore and by 0700 were in 100 fathoms south of TODO SAKI, exact position unknown, course north, fishing boats all around. At 0936 started hearing pinging drawing to right, 8,000 yard visibility. Came to normal approach course for the pinging. Soon saw AM escort angle on bow zero. When he got to 4,500 yards, he changed course towards shore and went out of sight. Soon saw smoke and started approach, Contact #7. There were three ships, all small, the larger leading one was 1800 tons, zigging widely making 12 knots, other two smaller, on nearly steady course very close to shore. When near firing position for leading ship, he turned 90° to the right, giving 160 track at 3,000 yards, did not fire. The leading ship had upper works like a tramp steamer, but had a yacht style stern, was making 168 turns for 12 knots. I suspect he could make more speed and throw depth charges though in poor visibility could not pick up any details.

June 18 - Patrolled inside 100 fathom curve off KAMAIISHI, had good visibility for awhile could see the green grass and trees which really locked good. Lots of fishing boats, no other contacts. Heavy swell and difficult depth control. Get scutherly current strong when close in shore, 1 knot or better.

June 19 - Still moderate swell, submerged 10 miles off shore headed in, between TODO SAKI and KAMAIISHI we think. While wiping off periscope prior to diving, found a fish hook and about a fathom of line caught in the periscope shears. Some sampan must have been closer than we thought. Some Jap can tell a big fish story that won't be no lie. Foggy most of the day, 3 to 8,000 yards visibility.

June 20 - Rain and fog all night, went in to 100 fathom curve patrolled north and south, poor visibility, but could see shore all day, latitude unknown.

June 21 - Fog all night submerged 8 miles off shore by radar, patrolled north and south, no contacts, foggy most of time. Oily swells.

June 22 - Same as before. Along 100 fathom curve, latitude unknown. Fishermen but no others, could see shore all day. After surfacing, saw flashing light, 15 second period, think it may be RYORI wan light, land 8 miles by radar. Used this for assumed position, which is 40 miles bearing 200° from D.R. Headed north to get off TODO SAKI again.

— page 127 —
8-0100
1d

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

June 23 - Fairly clear at night, could see lights on shore. Still no fix. Wor'ing along 100 fathom curve, lots of sampans. At 1630, Contact #8, 6 medium sized MARUS, 3 to 4,000 tons, speed 9 to 10 knots, one KAIMAKAZE DD and Float Plane, very close in shore swinging in and out of coves. Made best speeds, but passed 7,000 yards ahead, did not fire, 1800 abandoned chase, and at 1815 sighted smoke to southward, Contact #9. 3 fair sized MARUS, 4500 to 6000 tons, lightly loaded old models, speed 10 knots. Another KAIMAKAZE DD, did not see any plane. Zig-zagging widely with DD patrolling busily on seaward side. When in position for 100 track, 1400 yard. shot waiting for target to come on, DD headed almost at us at speed of about 16 knots, and passed 400 yards ahead. While inside of 1,000 yards, DD shifted to automatic pinging 3 times for about 15 second periods, then would send a long dash or two with interval between. He passed without attacking. Had a hard time holding on at this point. My remarks from the snappy periscope looks, got the control party to going pretty good, and the sound man was really putting out dope which got around to the rest of the boat. First target passed firing bearing while DD was passing, second was about 5 degrees past when I got a cheek on him, shifted to automatic gyro setting using T.D.C. as angle solver, but gyros would not match due to blow fuse. Set gyros back to zero shifted to third target, got settled down; while waiting for him to come on, he changed course 70 or 80° to left giving a 150 to 160 track range 1800 yards or better, did not fire, will try to catch him at night. The failure to get off a good shot here was due to poor management and no excuses are offered. 2040, Surfaced making 16 knots, on 2,3,4, got a sight and found we were about 10 miles north of TODO SAKI, farther north thet we thought. At 2200, thought we had pooked them up by radar, fairly clear night but dark against shore, after tracking awhile decided we were tracking KUYO SAKI point. Abandoned chase at 2235 being then about 10 miles north of our area.

June 24 - Clear weather, got a good fix, the first real one since we have been in the area. Submerged and took up station 5 miles east of TODO SAKI light. Could see light, identified tenegents, etc, felt pretty good to know where you were. At 0900 picked up smoke to northward, Contact #10. Convoy of 8 MARUS, 2 AM class escorts and at least one float plane. MARUS varied from 2,500 tons tramp up to a couple of 5,000 ton fairy good ones. Convoy seemed to be in two columns of 4 each, with escorts patrolling beck and forth to sea-ward of outboard column. Ships in formation were all zigging widely, but at varying times and varying amounts. Picked leading ship in outboard column; was on first one bow and then the other so thoughtposition was good, made the approach using large tracks instead of sharp ones, dragging it out a bit to get better tracking and try to make more sense out of the formation. When range was 5,000 yards to selected target, and target about 8,000 yards east of TODO SAKI light, formation changed base course to head into YAMADA KO, went inside

— page 128 —
1. U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

of one shoal which we were worried about hitting. Outboard column fell in behind inboard column, target passed ahead 5,000 yards, did not fire. Cut back out of YAMADA KO and passed very close to KONE SAKI and went on down coast. The obvious mistake here was not closing the targets rapidly and getting shot off before they could round TODO SAKI. All I can say is with widely zigging targets, two escorts running back and forth in the area you have to shoot from, a plane overhead, a calm sea, and worried about your navigation, you have a job on your hands; guess I let my worries interfere with the prime objective and that is that. Just after abandoning chase, had two escorts headed at us one about 1,500 yards and one at 3,500 yards from other side, thought plane had sighted us so went down, rigged for depth charge. Stayed around for 15 minutes pinging and changing speed but did not attack. Went about 6 miles off shore and started back north, had been getting nearly a 2 knot south current inshore. At 1700 while still off YAMADA KO, 4 ships, 3 small and one large came up coast (Contact #11) following same route as ones going down, caught us outside and best could get was 6 to 7,000 yards, did not fire. At this point was about ready to ask the manpower outfit for a job on the farm, but got together what data we have found today and decided if we stayed 3 miles off shore midway between MIYAKO KO and TODO SAKI, we ought to get another try.

June 25 - Took up above station and at 0930 here they come, Contact #12. 3 MaRUS, all pretty good, 5 to 6,000 tons and heavily loaded, one escort converted trawler type and one plane. Selected leading ship as was largest and most modern looking, estimated 6,000 tons, 1933 model, goal posts forward and aft, also kingposts aft. Zigging on very short legs, not such big zigs but two or three in the same direction. Fired three fish from stern tubes 180 gyro Longitudinal spread, 1200 yard range, 80° port track, used periscope angle from Mk VIII. Fifty-six seconds after firing last one, heard torpedo hit, this was torpede head and at medium range sound very good. Could hear noise of target cracking up for about 20 minutes, then a 3 or 4 minute series of muffled explosions, crackling, popping, etc., which blotted out everything else on the sound gear and could be heard through hull, after this, silence from target position. I know of the reluctance to calling a ship sunk when you don't see it go down; but after listening to this and comparing it with the noise made by a known sinking, there was no doubt in my mind nor of two experienced sound operators that it sunk. Fired at 1015, and at 1021, depth charges started and by 1030 a total of 3 patrol craft were on the job, how they got here so quick I don't know. Two of them had supersonic so suppose they were the Mi type who got in on the last job so rapidly.

— page 129 —
8-100

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Eighth War Patrol

At 1136, had dropped 26 charges, some good, but gradually getting farther away except for occasional lucky ones. At 1148, had a look around, only one escort left and he was running around area where ship sunk. Could still see one plane but he was fairly far off. So secured from depth charge. At 1154 when getting ready for second and more careful look around, at 64 feet depth, a plane let us have a good one, shook off some cork, paint, started two small leaks in 200 lb. line, broke a few lights and cracked window in #2 periscope. The Bathythermograph changed to a lot of different temperatures and pressures all at the same time but did not break. Got two more in a minute or so from planes, which were good but not as good as first one. Made full speed for awhile and re-rigged for depth charge. Slowed at 1212 to listen and could hear two sets of fast srows really beating it out. Depth charges started soon. By 1314 had dropped 18 more, some fair but mostly not too good. Seems to be able to keep in vicinity by listening but does not get accurate enough data for a good attack. By 1602, total charges 61 and getting farther away. Still pinging and hunting, dropping one occasionally. Heard last ones at 2000 pretty far off, total by official count 71. About 10 hours of this make a long day and all hands are a little fagged out with a few showing some signs of nervous strain, however, all hands took it pretty well, with an occasional wise crack to ease the strain. The plane we saw did not see us, but one who did not see. did see us and that is what caused the trouble. Must have been three of them as I do not believe the small float planes could carry over one good charge. Most of old hands think these charges are larger than formerly used; I don't know, they did seem to have more "wham" and less "swoosh" than usual. At night, heard a San Francisco news commentator say that the Japanese are "unable to cope with the submarine menace", we sure wore glad to hear it.

June 26 - Got No. 1 periscope limbered up good and took up station 10 miles off shore at latitude 38 north. Had light fog all day, no contact except fisherman. Heard several distant explosions, may have been in another area but sounded closer.

June 27 to July 3 - Enroute to MIDWAY from area. Speed 13 knots. Moored alongside U.S.S. SPERRY at 8:30 a.m.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 130 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Eighth War Patrol

2. WEATHER.

Weather, May 26 to 29th: East of Kuril, foggy and heavy seas. In the OKHOTSK sea, flat calm, dense fog most of the time, water temperature 33°, air temperature at night 31°, fog freezes on the bridge. Snow still on high parts of islands. No ice sighted. Off HONSHU latitude 39° North overy day between 2 June and 22 June, had enough fog to roduce visibility seriously. Hostly calm or light breezes. June 23, 24, and 25 clear. Fog and rain again on 26th.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION.

Currents such as noted on KURIL ISLAND charts were not exporionood. Currents near headlands on HONSHU 1.5 knots southerly, gradually getting loss as you moved off shore. Cold current extonds out about 20 miles. Large variations in water temperatures.

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

TODO SAKI light is at charted location and is same as shown in light list. Was not lighted at anytime. RYORI wan light was seen with normal charactoristics one night. Tho glow from KAMAIISHI iron works was soon a few times but not very bright.

5. SEE TABULATION OF CONTACTS.

6. DESCRIPTION OF AIRCRAFT.

No air patrols were sighted. Most convoys had air escort. Planes wore biplanes on floats similar to our OSZU plane. Thoy fly at 800 foot circling over and ahead of convoy. Additional planes must be based along shore and available to assist in search operations, see narrative for 25 June.

7. SUMMARY OF ATTACKS (Separate sheet).

8. ENEMY A/S MEASURES.

Convoys pass very close to headlands along shore, escorts are seaward side and patrol station. Plane escorts. The most frequent type of escort seen was AM type. Their supersonic does not seem to be good but apparently they can maintain contact for some time by listening. There must be some of those in reserve along the coast as on two occasions, had two extra patrol craft hunting us in 15 or 20 minutes where had only seen one. The following facts were observed and may or may not indicate a practice: On two occasions, escorts

— page 131 —
8. ENEMY A/S IRANSUR3, Cont'd.

would change course in one direction and a few minutes later convoy would change course the other way. On two occasions, leading ship was making more speed and using a wider zig plan than some of slower following ships. During depth charge attack on 15 June there were 5 groups of small sharp explosions from 8 to 11 explosions in each group. I have never heard this before and it occurred to me that they may have some system of echo ranging using these small explosions as a sound source. The planes and patrols along the coast apparently have a permanent detail and don't have to move along with the convoy, so they have more time to stay with you. After firing close to shore, advise clearing out soon, as it does not take the additional planes and patrols long to get there. The sampeans are thick, but have no reason to believe they can anything but fish. Shooting them up might be a good thing, but is of little military value, and do not think it worth the risk with in 15 or 20 miles of shore.

9. MINE SUPERPING. No remarks.

10. MATERIAL DEFECTS.

(1) While evading depth charge attack on 25 June, a knock developed in #3 motor. All flinger ring was bent and was hitting housing when boat got more than 5' up angle. Repaired by ship's force.

(2) Had short circuit in control room switch for bow planes. Bow planes had to be operated by hand for 24 hours. Navy Yard overhaul had changed circuit marking, had to ring out all circuits and hook up by blue print.

(3) Compressor on #2 Klainschmidt froze up due to improper clearance. Repaired by ship's force.

(4) Bow and stern plane shafting is very noisy, yard overhaul of this gear made it worse.

(5) T.D.C. can only be used as an angle solver.

— page 132 —
5. TABULATION OF ENEMY SHIPS SIGNIFIED. (LOCAL TIMES).

CONTACT #: DATE: TIME: NUMBER & TYPE: LOCATION: COURSE: SP#D

1. 6/2: 1100: One 900 ton armored trawler: Lat 40-40N: 160°: 9
   : Long 145-50S

2. 6/4 2210 Patrol vessel, unknown type. Dark night. 39-27 142-09 30° 11

3. 6/6 1500 3 ore carriers, one 6000 ton end two 3500 ton. Escort on AII13. 39-24 142-25 160° 9

4. 6/8 0600 All Patrol 39-16 60° 12
   142-13

5. 6/15 1200 1 general cargo, 5000 ton end 1 ore carrier 5000 ton 39-13N 20° 10
   142-00S

6. 6/17 0910 All Patrol 39-28 Various 142-07 Various 39-28
   142-07 (foggy)

7. 6/17 1015 3 small general cargo. One 1800 ton, 2 of 1200 tons 39-28 Southrally 142-07 (foggy)

8. 6/23 1630 6, old model general cargo ship - 2 to 4000 tons, one Kamekazo DD as escort. One plane escort 101 Float biplane 39-20 140-03 to 160°

9. 6/23 1615 3 general cargo, 4500 to 6000 tons in ballest. One Kamekazo DD142-03 39-22 140-03 to 160°

10. 6/24 1000 7 various type cargo, 2500 to 5500 tons. 1 tanker 6000 ton loaded. 2 AM escorts. 1 zoro type float biplane. 39-33 142-06 160° 5 or 9 225°

11. 6/24 1700 3 general cargo, one 5000 tons, 2 3500 tons, trawler type escort. 39-29 142-04.5 39-29 140-04.5

12. 6/25 0930 3 general cargo 4500 to 6000 tons. One trawler type escort 142-06 to 220°

5. TABULATION OF SHIPS SIGNIFIED Cont'd.

Sampens wore sighted all along coast from close in to 15 miles out. Averaged seeing 10 a day, second thickest off KAMASHI KO in 80 to 100 fathoms.

- 10 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 133 —
8-0100
H g

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. SAILFISH. Report of EIGHTH Patrol, Cont'd.

12. SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS.

Listening conditions were fair. Did not try supersonic ranging. Use of fathometer seemed more difficult than usual. Bathymetrograph cards were taken every day and are available for inspection; surely did show some funny temperature distributions. No remarks about density layers. You still got heavy as you go deep.

13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY.

This was first cold water patrol and health and skin troubles were much better. Had better food selection than usual. Cold water meals lots of sweating and dampness in lockers, etc. In June at 40° N. latitude, the days are long, divos lasting 16 1/2 to 17 hours. This with increased complement made air got pretty bad. Restricted smoking to 5 minutes every 2 hours. On days when depth charged, used 2 and 2/2 absorbent, but still had some headaches. Ran out of toilet paper when 10 days out, but pulp magazines carried us th. t.

14. MILES STEAMED ENROUTE TO AND FROM STATION.

Miles steamed - PEARL to MIDWAY - 1255.0
MIDWAY TO - AREA - 2477.7
IN AREA - 2064.9
AREA TO MIDWAY - 2015.0

15. FUEL EXPENDED, PEARL to MIDWAY-11,000 gals, MIDWAY to Area-18,937 gals, In Area-11,648 gals, Area to MIDWAY-24,300 gals.

16. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING.

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions (days) Fresh Water Personnol (days)

14. 32,000 gals. 20 Unlimited 10

17. WHAT FACTOR ENDED THIS PATROL. Orders of COMSUBPAC

18. Radar performance is covered in a separate report by the Radar Officer, DIETERICH, F.L., R12c V6, USNR, is commanded for his intorost, industry and intelligence in operation of radar equipment.

- II -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 134 —
8M00,
Serial 052
Confidential
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO SAILFISH Conf 1tr
SS192/A16-3 Serial 06
of July 3, 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Division ONE HUNDRED ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
    Subordinate Command, Nidway.
    (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH - Eighth War Patrol.

1. SAILFISH conducted eighth war patrol from May 17 to July 3, 1943. About 29 days were spent in patrol areas.

2. Eight convoys, containing 31 ships exclusive of
screens, were encountered off northern Honshu. Salvos of three
torpedoes were fired at two ships, resulting in one hit in each.
Both attacks were straight stern shots, longitudinal spread, 1k 8
angle solver. The patrol evidences a number of lost opportunities -
opportunities to complete attacks and to attack multiple targets
rather than single ones.

3. The 1k 1 TDC was inoperative throughout the patrol.
Attempt will be made to repair it on a not-to-delay-refit basis.

4. Attention is invited to the groups of 8 to 11 light,
sharp explosions, encountered on five occasions on June 15 while
being hunted.

ENCLOSURE (B)

— page 135 —
A16-3  COMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET  RS
    SUBORDINATE COLAND, NAVY NO. 1504
Serial 017

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO SAILFISH Conf 1tr SS192/
A16-3 Serial 06 of July 3,
1943.

From:  Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Subordinate Command, Midway.
To:  Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via:  (1) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
    (2) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. SAILFISH - Eighth 'ar Patrol - Comments on.

1. The remarks of Commander Submarine Division One
Hundred One are concurred in.

ENCLOSURE (C)

— page 136 —
12/10/45-5(12)
Serial 056
OFFICIAL
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Eighth War Patrol.

Reference: (a) ConSubPac conf. 1tr. FF12-10/A16-3(5)/16 serial 0906 of 15 July 1943.

1. Reference (a) credits the U.S.S. SAILFISH with certain damage to the enemy including: (b) a strike out all after the word "enemy:" and substitute "therefor:"
   - SUARK
    1. - Freighter (Shinju Iaru) 5,000 tons
   - DAIGED
    1. - Freighter (class unknown) 6,000 tons

2. TAXI: (12)
   - Jincpac (6)
   - JICPOA (1)
   - Comservpac (1)
   - CincLant (1)
   - ConsubLant (6)
   - S/M School, XL (2)
   - 00, S/M Base, PX (1)
   - Vonsonac (2)
   - ConsubsPhilSeaFron (4)
   - Comnorpac (1)
   - Consubpac (40)
   - SUAD, MI (2)
   - All Squadron and Div. Comdrs. Pacific (2)
   - ConsubOpTrag (5)
   - All Submarines, Pacific (1)
   - Capt. J.R. Moore, USN. (1)

3. C. CRAFTORD.
   - Chief of Staff, SC FILES
   - Room 2055
   - ROYAL TO: 3
   3 23 1946
   - File No. SC A.16-3(3) 195834
   - Doc. No. 195834
   - Copy No. 1/2
   - Reg. No. 1/2
   - File No. 1/2

— page 138 —
1943 to September 20, 1943. Area 11B. Operation Order No. 143-43.

FOLIO: 1

Arrived MIDWAY July 3, 1943 from Eighth War Patrol, effected by U.S.S. SPERRY repair force and Commander Submarine Division 101 Relief Crew during period July 4-14. Major work tams, repairs to #2 periscope and T.D.C. July 17, 1943, relief r flashed. Ready for sea, July 25, 1943. Two day delay in readiness date caused by further repairs to T.D.C. and air compressor separator leaks.

1. NARRATIVE

25 July

: 330(Y) Departed MIDWAY for area with air escort. Set calendar ahead one day to 2400 (M), 27 July 1943.

27 July - August 2

Enroute area along prescribed routing making daily dives for trim and training. Holding battle problems and drills. Located air leak in #2 air bank which necessitated cutting out three air flasks in the bank. T.D.C. became inoperative during fire control drill July 29th.

3 August

: 425(K) Submerged for all day dive approaching BONINS. Surfaced.

4 August

: 451(K) Submerged for all day dive going through BONINS. Changed course to 302°T. Set clocks to minus 9 time (T). Surfaced.

5 August

: 0345(I) Obtained star fix. Continued to position. Submerged, patrolling. Changed course to 355°T. T.D.C. back in commission. Surfaced, changed course to 175°T.

— page 140 —
SS192/A16-3/ Serial (010)
CONFIDENTIAL:
J.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of 9th War Patrol, Cont'd.

11 August
445(I) Submerged 55 miles southeast of TOKUNO SHIMA. Conducting periscope patrol.
2007(I) Surf-cored. Stood towards OKINOYERABU SHIMA.

12 August
0400(I) SJ radar detected OKINOYERABU SHIMA distance 36,000 yards.
0438(I) Submerged. Passed between YORONSHEIMA and OKINOYERABU SHIMA. No patrols or other activity noted.
2018(I) Surfaced and continued west ward into area.

13 - 16 August
Standing slowly to westward in area submerged in daytime and at 5 knots at night. Bright moonlight nights with high visibility. Daytime horizon visibility good but with many low cloud banks. In view of unreliable operation of SD radar (see defects) and unfavorable visibility conditions for sighting planes, did not consider surface day patrol advisable. Nothing sighted.

17 August
1900(H) Having reached line of high percentage of previous contacts of FORKOSA STRATTS - Empire traffic, commenced east end west patrol across this line.

19 August
1015(H) Sighted smoke bearing 290°T. Contact #1. Closed and sighted small trawler 300-400 tons patrolling on various courses. Remained in vicinity in hopes of shipping appearing but none materialized.
1931(H) Surfaced, trawler still in sight at dark.
2002(H) SJ radar contact of short duration at 1200 yards bearing 170. Operator reported pip as being similar to that of periscope pip. Visibility good and nothing in sight. Opened at full speed for 1/2 hour. Moonrise at 2028(H). Patrolled in moon path for remainder of night.

20 August
1630(H) Sighted 2 junk. rigged seiling vessels.
1936(H) Surfaced.
1954(H) Sighted HOKA SHO light having 4.5 miles to southeast. Patrolled east and west about 30 miles north of HOKA SHO during night.

-3-

— page 141 —
21 August
Working back to position of trawler sighted on 19th.

: 22 August
Sighted object on port bow. SJ radar could not detect it. Avoided and identified as a junk similar in appearance to those sighted on 20th.
Sighted first of 7 junks.
Surfaced having spend four days on what had appeared to be probable traffic routes with no results decided to proceed to northwest corner of area and work down along 30 fathom curve.

: 23 August
Submerged in northwest corner of area.
Sighted ten small junks.
Surfaced and stood down 30 fathom curve.

: 25 August
Submerged.
Sighted junk.
Obtained fix on FUYAN TAO and TAE islands off China coast.
Surfaced and stood southwest.
Sighted loom of TUNG YANG light.

: 26-27 August
Patrolled off TUNG YANG light. Closed to 5 miles in daytime. Withdrew to 20 at night. Nothing sighted. Will work across southern boundary of area and try area north of HOKA SHO again.

— page 142 —
25 August
415(H) Submerged in Formosa Straits 15 miles from southern boundary of area.
3645(H) Sighted plane 70 miles N.N.E. of FORKOSA, a "Nell", altitude 2000 feet, distance 2 miles, course N.
1940(H) Surfaced.
2015(H) Made radio transmission directed by Force Commander. Having been undoubtedly DFI'd, abandoned plan to spend 3 days north of ORIENT to consider it would now be fruitless. Retired to NE toward position of possible convoy lanes to eastward. * of those already covered.

29-30 August
Patrolled in vicinity of selected spot, lat. 27-15, long. 123-30. No contacts. Decided to spend remainder of patrol around the islands of ORIENT to cover possibility that traffic was following the island chain. Stood to eastward at 2 engine speed.

1 September
504(I) Submerged 20 miles N.W. of ORIENT SIGHTED and stood to eastward.
520(I) Sighted plane 75 miles west of ORIENT, a "Sally" altitude 1500 feet, distance 1 mile, on westerly course.
004(I) Surfaced and headed for sight formed by CHINA... GU. TO onc islands to westward of it.

2 September
329(I) Heard 11 distant explosions which sounded like depth charges.
0410(I) Submerged on line between ORIENT SIGHTED and IYE SHINA and stood into sight.
0908(I) Sighted smoke (contact #2) on port bow. Two quick bearings indicated it was drawing left. Came to normal approach course. On next look, bearing had changed to right. Took high look and could make out single stack on top of masts. Distance range 20,000 yards, angle on bow 120 starboard. Seeing change indicated speed of 12 knots. He was a convoy burner. Of about 3000 tons. Could make out masts of a second vessel apparently on escort as they moved from eastern to thead and then crossed back eastern, both had come through IYE SUIDO.

— page 143 —
5192/416-3/ serial (C10)
CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. SILISH - Report of 9th Icr Patrol, Cont'd.

---

**Beering kept changing to right. He had no chance of getting in. He was apparently headed for JIH.**
**surfaced. 13 miles N. of IYJIH.**

---

**3 September**

**0427(I)**
**J816(I)**
**201(I)**
**0427(I)**
**953(I)**
**459(I)**
**1958(I)**

**Submerged 5 miles N. of IYJIH.**
**Sighted smoke stern bearing 265°T, estimated distance 15-20 miles. Zotted overing change wich was to right and got an estimated speed of 16-19 knots. Had inhibited land 6 miles on either side of us and 2th 2 hours to go until d.rik decided a surface chase was not feasible. Surfaced and stood down east coast of OKINAWA. ON morning to patrol off NAKAJUSU. N. with OII 60 lists as having been used by the Japanese Navy.**

---

**4 September**

**0427(I)**
**953(I)**
**459(I)**
**1958(I)**

**Submerged 10 miles east of NAKAJUSU. N. On morning dive to 250 feet to take BT cord in armed coole through conning tower sprung a bad leak. Tightening packing gland failed to stop leak. Surfaced and repacked leaky coole. Stood to westward. Nothing sighted.**

---

**5 September**

**459(I)**
**1958(I)**

**Submerged. repacked coole was tight at 250 feet out a second and larger one let go with a bang and was a bad leak. Tightening of cracking gland was effective in stopping this one. Surfaced.**

---

**6 September**

**1531(I)**
**1958(I)**

**Departed 1sec at 2 engine speed. 4thchug wd still have 52,000 gallons of fuel left will save it for possible contacts until we are through BONINS. Having spend 29 days in crew with no contacts except a trawler, several junks and one small freighter that we did not have a chance of getting in on, the more of all hands is low.**

---

**- 6 -**

— page 144 —
192/16-3/ serial (010)
CONFIDENTIAL

S.S. SAILFISH - Report of 9th Far Patrol, Cont'd.

9 September

.00(I) Submerged for passage through BONNIS.
.17(I) Sighted masts (Contact #3) bearing 310°T, distance 9000 yards. Came to normal approach course and closed to 4500 yards. Identified as patrol boat about 500 tons, war color, high bow, high bridge. Observed him until 0718 when he went out of sight on course 150 at slow speed. Resumed return route.
1955(K) Surfaced.

10 September

1000(K) Experienced strong SD radar interference of peculiar type never noted before. ...ent to 5 second operation every minute on SD and interference disappeared.
1110(K) Sighted masts (Contact #4) through haze on port bow, distance about 11,000 yards. Submerged and came to normal approach course. Closed to 9,000 yards and identified as patrol boat similar to one sighted yesterday but smaller. He disappeared on course 160 at 8 knots. Remained submerged in vicinity in hopes he may have been preceding a convoy.
315(K) Surfaced and resumed course.

11-16 September

Enroute midway.
45(Y) Arrived midway under air escort. Transferred 18 torpedoes to SPERRY. Received 20,995 gallons fuel.
35(Y) Departed midway for Pearl.

20 September

0615(VW) Made rendezvous with escort.
200(V.) Iloored at Submarine base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

— page 145 —
1. set of 1.0 - 1.5 knots was experienced in the passage through OKINOYAMA. U and YOKO N JIMA. A N. set of 1.0 - 2.0 knots was experienced south of TUNG YANG TAO. Other currents were in accordance with published information.

2. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:
   - TUNG YANG TAO light was observed to be burning at full intensity but with a 16 second period instead of its published 20 seconds. HOKA SHO light was observed at full intensity with correct characteristics.

3. DESCRIPTION OF ARMY SHIP SIGNATURE:
   - Date: 7/27
   - Time: 1015(E)
   - Position: 26-45 N 121-55 E
   - Course: 400 ton
   - Speed: Various
   - S/Speed: 3
   - Height: 3
   - Torpedoes: 2
   - Torpedo: 3
   - Tor

— page 146 —
7. SURVEY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS:
None made.

8. ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES:
The numerous Chinese junks sighted were innocent enough in appearance but may have constituted part of an anti-submarine patrol although their positions when plotted established no definite patrol line. Medium bombers patrol the area. The patrol boat sighted September 10, 220 miles NE of CHICHI JIMA RETTO in BONINS may have been radar equipped.

PENALTY INVESTIGATING OPERATIONS:
None observed.

10. MAJOR DEFECTS:
(a) SD RADAR. This equipment has not functioned properly since a close depth charge attack the ship received on the previous patrol. Ranges obtained are only about 60% of normal for type and altitude of plane. Choices from planes ahead or eastern are weak and feeding. On the last day of the training period it was thought that the SPHRAY and company representative had remedied the defects by retuning and replacing antenna with a reconditioned one. However, on day of departure for patrol the previous inefficient and unreliable condition reappeared.

(b) AIRCRAFT CALLS FOR SJ RADAR AND 1 LC 3 UPLIFT. Where these cables pass through packing glands in conning tower they have deteriorated to such an extent that two bad leaks were experienced at deep submergence. The metal shielding has completely corroded away and the insulating material appears to be softening and becoming wetter soaked although no electrical difficulties have yet occurred. These armored cables should be replaced with standard pressure proof cables.

(c) STATIONED INDUCTION GEAR. There is a pronounced click in the starboard reduction gear which has been present since navy yard overhaul and which is growing progressively worse. Any increase in depth, speed or up angle results in the click becoming more pronounced. Although it has not thus far affected the ship's operations it is felt that trouble ahead in this important unit is indicated. This abnormal condition should be investigated.

(d) LOWER CONNECTION. This hatch cannot be properly closed and appears to be warped.

— page 147 —
3188
IN REA: 2448
REA TO IDAY: 2850
IDAY TO PEARL: 1280
TOTAL: 9766

15. FULFILLED:
   - IDAY TO REA: 23,500
   - IN REA: 14,200
   - REA TO IDAY: 33,500
   - IDAY TO PEARL: 19,000
   TOTAL: 90,200

16. FICTIONS OF ENDURANCE RATING:
   - TORPEDOES: 20
   - FUEL: 5
   - PROVISIONS (DAYS): 5
   - FRESH WATER: 10
   - PERSONNEL (DAYS): 10

- 10 -

— page 148 —
7. REASON FOR THIS INITIATION OF ATTACK:
Expiration of assigned period in area.

: 8. REASONS:
The extremely low percentage of contacts was most disheartening, and it is regrettable that no opportunity to inflict damage on the enemy was found. The lack of an SD radar in which confidence could be placed was keenly felt. Despite the complete lack of success the loyalty, cooperation and general performance of duty of the officers and crew was of the highest order.

V. R. LEF. VOIR.

- 11 -

— page 149 —
1955-122/A16-3
Serial 047
Confidential

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. SAILFISH Report
of Ninth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division ONE TENTY TWO.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Ninth War Patrol - comment on.

1. This was the first patrol for a new Commanding Officer and occupied 57 days (MIDWAY to PEARL), of which 28 were spent in the area.

2. It is regretted that but one target worthy of torpedo fire was found and that in this case firing position could not be attained.

3. Good area coverage was not obtained. Focal points and harbors were not played sufficiently close and there was excessive submerged operation. The Commanding Officer states that lack of a reliable SD Radar was keenly felt. This influenced him rudely and caused him to operate submerged in an area which demanded surface operation in order to obtain adequate coverage.

4. The material condition of SAILFISH is poor. Refit is being accomplished by GRIFFIN and Submarine Division 122 Relief Crews, assisted by the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. It is expected that SAILFISH will be ready for patrol about October 28.

P.B. WARDER.

— page 150 —
FC5-12/A16-3/FB5-122  SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWELVE  VII
Serial 068
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. SAILFISH Report
of Ninth War Patrol.

From:  The Commander Submarine Squadron Twelve.
To:  The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via:  (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
       (2) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:  U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Ninth War Patrol -
Comment on.

1. The Commander Submarine Squadron Twelve fully concurs in
the remarks made by the Commander Submarine Division 122.

J. B. GRIGGS.

— page 151 —
12-10/16-3(5)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET 1d

Serial 01359
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
27 September 1943.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SAIPISH Report of
Ninth War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 262
U.S.S. SAIPISH - NINTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SAIPISH (SS192) - Report of Ninth War Patrol.
(25 July to 20 September 1943).

1. The ninth patrol of the SAIPISH was the first for the new
   Commanding Officer.

2. The lack of targets was probably due to the fact that many worth-
   while targets travel in the shallow waters close to the coast line. Also, better
   area coverage can be had in this area by surface patrolling over much of it.

3. This patrol is not considered successful for Combat Insignia award.

4. No damage was inflicted on the enemy.

DISCRIMINATION:
(Correlate Reports)
Crainich (5)
VCNO (5)
Grinage (6)
Tatel. Cen. Pac.
Ocean Areas (1)
Serforpac
(Adv. Base Plan. Unit(1)
Clinclant (2)
Censubslant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Consopac (2)
Comsowespac (1)
Comsubsowespac (2)
GTF 72 (2)
GTF 16 (1)
Comsubsap (18)
SUBAD, MI (2)
ComsubspacSubordcom (2)
All Squadron and Div.
Commanders, Subspace (2)
U.S.S. SAIPISH (1)

(Endorsements only)
All Submarines, Subspace (1).

J. A. WOODRUFF, Jr.,
Flag Secretary.

— page 153 —
SS192/A16-3
Serial 01
C-O-N-P-E-DECLASSIFIED
T-I-A-L

From:  The Commanding Officer.
To:  The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via:  (1) The Commander Submarine Division FORTY FIVE.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
       (3) The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
       (4) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject:  U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

Enclosure:  (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the tenth war patrol of this vessel, conducted in the approaches to the Bungo Suido, Japan, during the period 17 November 1943 to 5 January 1944, is forwarded herewith.

DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY:  [BLOCKED: text here] DATE:  [BLOCKED: text here] R. E. M. WARD.

FILMED
64740

— page 154 —
17 November 1943
: 1315 WW Departed Pearl Harbor in company with U.S.S. GUNNEL. PC596 acting as escort.
: 1916 WW Escort left formation.
: 2100 WW Parted company with GUNNEL, proceeding to patrol station via Midway conducting drills, section training dives, and daily battle problem enroute.
: 18 November 1943
: 0C20 W Sighted plane (aircraft contact #1) to southwest, distant 8 miles on parallel course. (No pip on SD radar possibly because of low elevation).
: 1400 W Sighted plane (aircraft contact #2) to southwest, distant 16 miles. (No pip on SD radar until range closed to 8 miles, possibly because of low elevation). Plane closed and exchanged recognition signals.
: 21 November 1943
: 1007 X Moored in nest alongside U.S.S. BUSHNELL at Midway. Fueled to capacity, received 15,180 gallons of diesel oil, Replaced deranged ECM and exchanged one torpedo. BUSHNELL repair forces performed minor work items.

-1- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 155 —
1611 Y Underway from alongside BUSHNELL proceeding under air escort until sunset. Using two engine speed enroute area conducting daily training dives, tracking exercises, and battle problems.

23 November 1943

1649 M- Plane contact on SD radar distant 2 miles closing. Submerged. Believe this pip was a rain cloud.

25-29 November 1943

Heavy seas and winds with a continuous succession of storm centers.

30 November 1943

1500 L Hot run in No. 8 tube while checking torpedoes.

1730 L Lieutenant W.P. Murphy, Jr., U.S. Navy, went over the side in a very rough sea to inspect No. 8 tube and found the torpedo partially ejected. Expended this torpedo by firing with 375 lb. impulse pressure. No. 8 tube out of commission for remainder of patrol.

1-2 December 1943

Patrolling submerged across Wake, Marcus, Truk - Empire routes.

3 December 1943

1745 K Surfaced in typhoon weather. Tremendous seas, 40-50 knot wind, driving rain, and visibility, after twilight, varying from zero to 500 yards.

2348 K Radar contact bearing 114°T (154° relative), range 9,500 yards. Commenced tracking (ship contact #1).

2351 K Estimated target course 320°T, speed 18 knots.

2352 K Radar contact on another and smaller target just to right of and 900 yards closer than first contact (ship contact #2).

2353 K Radar contact on a third target about same size as first contact and located 1,000 yards beyond the first contact (ship contact #3).

— page 156 —
2355 K Radar contact on a fourth target smaller than the other contacts and 900 yards closer than No. 2 contact (ship contact #4).

: 2356 K Have still only managed to build up speed to twelve knots since initial contact. With these fast targets at close range, have abandoned any idea of a methodical approach. The seas are mountainous with a driving rain. Can't see a thing but blackness and water with the water mostly in my face.

: 2358 K Came left to 300°T to get off the track of the near target (believed to be a destroyer).

4 December 1943

0000 K Near target close aboard on starboard quarter turned on what appeared to be a good size searchlight with a greenish tinge to it, directed at us and apparently signalling. He could not have seen us so assume he was signalling to someone else near us or he had a doubtful radar contact.

0001 K Dove to 40 feet and came right to course 340°T for bow shot at biggest pip. We are 400 yards off track of near destroyer. All targets seem to be in line of bearing, roughly 280-100 degrees true with 900-1,000 yards between targets. Although initial radar contact was not made until a range of 9,500 yards the picture looks as though we are on the left flank of a fast group of men of war, consisting of a destroyer, then possibly a cruiser, then a carrier or battleship, then another carrier or battleship with possibly something beyond that. Selected nearest of the two largest pips as our target.

0009 K Near destroyer passing close aboard to starboard and ahead.

0012 K Fired tubes 1, 2, 3, and 4, by radar setup, range 2,100 yards, gyro angles 53° to 37° right, track 108 to 120 port, torpedoes set at 12 feet, using spread of 1-3/4° right, 1-3/4° left, 5° left, and 5° right. Times of hits indicate torpedoes one and four were the hitting torpedoes. Commenced swinging left to bring stern tubes to bear. Heard two torpedoes hit.

0016 K Two depth charges fairly close. Went deep and started crossing astern of target.

- 3 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 157 —
0017- Nineteen depth charges, nonvery close. Completed relacd.
0152 K: Surface and commenced running up target track to intercept possible cripple. Unable to make much speed without shipping black water.

0230 K: Radar contact bearing 310°T, range 8,400 yards. Commenced tracking (ship contact #5).

0240 K: Tracking shows target to be circling. The pip is small, yet can't believe radar would pick up a destroyer at 8,400 yards tonight. Commenced easing in slowly. At times the pip has an edge on it giving a momentary indication of another target very close to the one we are tracking.

0550 K: Morning twilight and visibility improving fast, rain has stopped, but surface warning from 1 to 3 knots. Range tracking with a speed of 3,500 yards. With visibility improving so rapidly must fire soon, those hevs decided to fire three bow tubes on the surface and then attack again in daylight by periscope, making reload during approach.

0552 K: Fired tubes 1, 2, and 3, range 5,500 yards, gyros 002°, 002-1/2°, and 004-1/2°. Estimated range 160° standard. T.D.C. steadi 1° knot. Torpedoes set at 10 feet, spread of 0°, 1/2° right, and 1/2° left.

0557 K: Observed end heard two torpedo hits. First hit looked like a momentary puff of fire, steadi hit looked like and sounded (on the bridge) like a battleship firing a broadside - stern with the locomotive visible so characteristic of a 1,000 ton ship. Commander's signal ship to bring steam tubes to bear in case target started coming somewhere.

0558 K: The Nips started celebrating by firing star shells and heavy AA tracers from, at least a dozen guns located at the position of the torpedo explosion, but didn't seem to know where we were because the shotcutter was in the water but towards us. It's a good show but despite the illumination I can't see the target.

-4-

— page 158 —
0600 K Tracers coming our way now - plenty of them.

0601 K Submerged. Commenced checking torpedoes and reloading.

0603- Four depth charges not near us.

0605 K

0748 K Finally see something - Aircraft Carrier, range about 10,000 yards, dead in water (ship contact #6). Nothing else in sight. Impatiently continuing check of torpedoes. All tubes were flooded during each preceeding attack. Gyro pots of one torpedo aft and one forward are flooded necessitating reload.

0912 K Momentarily sighted tops of a destroyer apparently standing by the carrier (ship contact #7). The picture now indicates that we have a badly damaged carrier plus one destroyer. If there were a cruiser here with 65 foot tower and 125 foot mast he'd show up like a sore thumb compared to the carrier's 60 foot flight deck. Depth control is extremely difficult due to mountainous seas. When we are at 60 feet there is nothing but green waves with the scope looking into or under a wave most of the time. At 55 feet we damn near broach and still can only see about twenty percent of the time. I am convinced that the carrier is a dead duck but there should be something else around besides a single destroyer, yet there is nothing else in sight from 55 feet and no screws on sound. Am passing carrier down port side from aft forward, range about 1,500 yards. He has many planes on deck forward and enough people on deck aft to populate a fair size village. A rough sketch of his silhouette is attached to this report as page 5A. The only visible evidence of previous hits is a small list to port and a small drag down by the stern. The number of people on deck indicates they are prepared to abandon ship - a reassuring picture.

0937 K Abeam of the carrier and still nothing else in sight. Came around for a straight stern shot.

0940 K Fired tubes, 5, 6, and 7, T.D.C. range 1,700 yards, gyros 182°, 185-3/4°, and 182°, track 88 port, torpedoes set at 12 feet, using a spread of 0°, 2° right, and 2° left. All torpedoes heard running normal.

- 5 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 159 —
0942 K Two hits (time indicates 2,700 yard torpedo run) heard on sound and throughout the boat, followed by a very heavy swish on sound then by exceptionally loud breaking up noises heard not only on sound but also very clearly throughout the boat. Although I had the periscope up anticipating the pleasure of watching the hits, depth control was so lousy that we were at 60 feet when the torpedoes hit and all I could see when the scope was out of the waves was a skyfull of tracers being shot up into the air from the carrier's bearing. Ordered right full rudder and 70 feet to come around for bow shots. Can't figure how I made the range error. Have been using a carrier flight deck hioight of 60 feet on the stadiometer.

0944- Two depth charges not too far away.
0945 K

0950 K Completed turning. Still hear the breaking up noises.

0951 K At 55 feet for a look. Nothing in sight on, or either side of, generated bearing. Made sweep to look for the destroyer and sighted a heavy cruiser of the TAKAO or NACIII Class. Three turrets forward, low-high-low, high bridge structure, double heavy raked stack just aft of tripod foremast, second single raked stack, tripod mast aft and just forward of two after turrets. Bearing 290° relative, angle on the bow 40 starboard decreasing rapidly, making high speed, with his bow biting over the top of the waves, range 4,000 yards. Commenced swinging hard left to bring bow tubes to bear (ship contact #8).

0952 K Angle on the bow 10 starboard and he is still swinging towards, range 3,300 yards. Between my surprise at having underestimated the range to the carrier (2,700 yard torpedo run instead of 1,700), the fairly close depth charges from a destroyer I still hadn't been able to see, the surprise sighting of the cruiser-racing our way with her forfoot shoot showing over the waves, and the boat starting to brocach with her left full rudder, I ordered 90 feet, and thus threw away the chance of a lifetime. Picked him up on sound and attempted to get a ping range on the QG head. Took turn count on JK head of 220, indicating 18 knots. By the time data was obtained from sound to allow even a chance of a hit he was astern and fading out fast. The Monday morning quartertracks can have a field day on this attack! To top it all off, I have personally criticized

— page 160 —
0952 K the sinking of the SORYU, where the towing cruiser could have been gotten first, then the carrier at leisure - yet, I didn't go up ahead of the carrier and make absolutely certain that this wasn't a similar set up. This cruiser was undoubtedly on the-off bow of the carrier.

0954- Seven depth charges not too close. Destroyer screws fading in and out. Keeping them abaft the beam.

1128 K Completed checking torpedoes forward and reloading aft.

1228 K Back at estimated position of sunken carrier. No screws on sound. Coming to periscope depth received depth charge - close. Went back deep and crossed over to the west about 3,500 yards.

1330 K Periscope depth. A careful fifteen minute look at depths between 52 and 60 feet reveals nothing. If the cruiser (or carrier) were in the vicinity they would be seen. I am convinced the carrier has been sunk and the cruiser has gotten clear.

1400 K Set course to proceed to area.

2040 K Radar contact bearing 355°T, range 1,800 yards, (ship contact #9). Unable to make visual sighting. Seas are calmer and only a 20 knot wind accompanies a 20 foot ground swell, visibility is becoming good with a first quarter moon beginning to break through cumulus clouds. Target is small pip tracking at speed 9 knots, course 130°T. It has been a busy day since midnight and don't feel like playing with a spit kit we can't see at 1,800 yards in this visibility so got clear of him and resumed course to area.

2400 K One full days work completed.

5 December 1943

2300 K Made landfall on SUMISU SHIMA bearing 210°T, distant 15 miles. Tuned SJ radar.

6 December 1943

0024 K Sighted small sempan, apparently patrolling cl-se to SUMISU SHIMA (ship contact #10). Avoided.

0235 K Transmitted SAILFISH serial number one.

— page 162 —
0230 K Sighted lighted sampan (ship contact #11). Avoided.

1440 K Strafed and bombed (2 bombs) by ZEKE type fighter plane (aircraft contact #3). This plane was not picked up on radar nor was he seen until he dove out of low hanging clouds with his wing machine guns chattering. Fortunately no one was injured but the second bomb which fell close aboard on the starboard side abreast the after machinery space lifted the deck gratings, knocked a secured heater six feet in the air, caused loss of main power for a minute during the dive, and in general was too damn close. As a result we have lost the use of #1 main motor due to a flash over and have a jack inserted on top the bonnet of the main motor circulating water suction sea valve to insure that the valve will not come off the hull flange should a depth charge shear the studs which were elongated by this bomb. We had a few bad minutes stopping the leak. Took northerly course until end of twilight then surfaced and got clear to northwest. Threw a well punctured five gallon can of diesel fuel over the side after surfacing Believe this ruse was the cause of distant depth charging heard later that night. In any event, the crew is convinced we outsmarted someone even if we did take a shell-lacing. Only visible evidence of any damage topside is a bullet hole in sheet metal near the dog house entrance. The pilot of that Jap plane was a little too anxious and 'started shooting too soon thus giving us time to almost completely submerge before the bombs landed.

8 December 1943

Experienced weak SJ radar interference during the night. Later determined this to be caused by arcing in own equipment.

9 December 1943

0345 K Entered area, Commenced closing ASIZURI SAKI to the 100 fathom curve, patrolling submerged during daylight.

1509 I Sighted typical A/S sampan with high bow, midship section and stern with lookout platforms. Apparently patrolling southeast of ASIZURI SAKI. Kept to southwest of him. Closest range 3,500 yards (ship contact #12).

- 8 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 163 —
2200 I Flash over #1 main motor; our attempt to clean this motor up since the bombing on the 7th has been unsuccessful. This motor jumped out for remainder of patrol.

10 December 1943

1820 I Radar contact bearing 346°T, range 9,500 yards (ship contact #13). Commenced tracking while jemming a charge into the battery. Target appears to be either a single small AK or fair size A/S vessel on course 165°T, speed 8.5 knots. We are 18 miles off OKINA SHIMA.

2110 I Sighted momentary flashing light beyond horizon 20 degrees to east of target.

2115 I Am in position 3,000 yards off the target track with range 11,000 yards, pointing at target and making steerageway intending to let him come down to the firing point.

2120 I Target was lost by radar and sight during our turn.

2130 I Still unable to pick up target. Commenced run towards his last known position on assumption that he either stopped or made very radical change in his course.

2200 I Still no sign of target.

2300 I After passing through last knocm target position and making a sweep to the northeast to see if he could have had some connection with that monctary light, have concluded that target was an A/S vessel which made a sweep of the 160 line from OKINA SHIMA and then reversed course and returned to OKINA SHIMA. If he had stopped or zigged 90 degrees one way or the other we should have regained contact. Secured tracking party and commenced patrolling across the 160 degree course line from OKINA SHIMA.

11 December 1943

0655 I Sighted patrol vessel bearing 015°T, distant 6,000 yards (ship contact #14). Silhouette resembles our PY's with lookout platform forward and aft of bridge. He is patrolling the OKINA SHIMA 160°T line.

0815 I Patrol vessel passed by again on his return leg towards OKINA SHIMA, least range 4,000 yards.

-9-

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 164 —
12 December 1943

This will be our last day in this eastern sector of the area. Although the enemy's patrol along the OKINA SHIMA 160° line seems promising-of traffic here we have, after three days, yet to sight a shootable target. Plan to cover southwestern sector next and if nothing develops, we will start near TOI MISAI and work up the coast line riding with the current.

2026 I Racer contact bearing 2280T, range 8,500 yards (chip contact #15). Tracked target to be on course 090°T, speed 13 knots.

2035 I Target has altered course to 160°T. Looks from the bridge to be a little larger than the similar contact of the 10th (about large destroyer or small AK size). Am swinging around astern of him to get on the down moon side and to make sure he doesn't get away by doubling back as he did on the 10th.

2100 I With range 10,100 suddenly lost both sight and radar contact.

2134 I After an hour of full power searching his last known position have failed to regain contact. An positive that neither this contact nor the contact of the tenth were submarines because I could see them from the bridge, and yet targets just don't vanish into thin air. The target of the tenth could have gotten away by reversing course. The target tonight according to all mathematical figures couldn't have gotten away except by taking off or diving. Am convinced that when and if we contact this fellow again we will immediately take collision course at maximum speed.

13 December 1943

0300 I Stopped and trimmed up by the bow to make examination of bow planes. Both bow and stern plane shafting have increased noise level to the point where we are using the planes very sparingly. Primary cause is in couplings and and bulkhead stuffing glands which we have been attempting to correct. The bow planes have a definite knock externally. Inspection now has determined this to be the result of misalignment of the connecting rod between the port plane and its rigging gear. Repair cannot be made at sea.

— page 165 —
1154 I Sighted light smoke bearing 282°T, distant about 30,000 yards and drawing to south. Commenced approach on normal approach course at six hour rate. (Ship contact #16).

: 1325 I Sighted two engine bomber above smoke, distant about 8 miles, altitude 4°, course 140°T. (Plane contact #4).

: 1333 I Sound picked up echo ranging in direction of target. This echo ranging assisted our tracking since someone in the target group conscientiously used echo ranging on 19.5 KC's for five minutes every half hour.

: 1408 I With ten feet of periscope exposed sighted the tops of two sets of masts plus an additional set of black smoke puffs. This looks better but can't get to them submerged and we can't surface now because of their plane coverage. We are going to move to make a high speed and carry and catch them tonight. They are tracking on a course of 170°T at a speed of 9 knots. Continued approach at six hour rate on a course 15 degrees to right of normal approach course taking a periscope bearing on the smoke every half hour.

: 1747 I Surfaced and commenced chase at 16 knots while charging a very flat can (1140 gravity).

: 1917 I Radar contact on single small rip bearing 195°T, distant 20,000 yards (ship contact #17). Commenced tracking and approach.

: 1920 I We have plenty of time to get the picture down well before attacking so will cross over to the westward (down moon) side and pull around to his starboard on. The moon is only one hour up and has been hidden by clouds but it is now beginning to break through making visibility variable from good to excellent.

: 2003 I At a range of 14,100 yards we can see two AK's. Radar now has a smaller pip along with the other two so it looks like two AK's and one escort. Plot and ADC believe they are zigging in small increments with short legs, speed 9 knots.

: 2120 I Tracking party reports that zig zag plan was changed at 2030 and that targets are now zigging at longer intervals.

: 2224 I Unfortunately two basic fundamentals (or rather the lack of them) married this approach. First, the radar operator who is otherwise a superb technician and operator had practically no previous experience at convoy tracking -

— page 166 —
2220 I hence he has more often than not been on a different AK (Cont'd) each time he was told to mark a range and bearing. Second, the T.D.C. operator and plotter who are both exceptionally good on single targets were not experienced in the problem presented by tracking multiple targets. Hence, the true picture of what the zig zag plan was did not materialize until the data was all rehashed on the following day. However, despite their troubles the tracker and T.D.C. operator both solved accurately for speed and base course when during the final stages of the approach the radar operator was ordered to stay on the selected target and cease sweeping. A P.P.I. could have been used very advantageously.

2222 I We are dead ahead, due south, of the convoy and on their track. Stopped and flooded down to reduce our silhouette, while offering tracking party opportunity to make very accurate check of speed solution. The sky is completely overcast but visibility conditions are excellent with a clean sharp horizon all around.

2224 I At a range of 15,000 yards four ships are visible from the bridge, two AK's, one fair sized escort and one small escort.

2229 I Range 11,500. The picture is as follows - Two good sized AK's with the biggest on the west flank, one escort who looks at though he might be a large destroyer or 1,500 ton A/S vessel and a small escort who looks no larger than 700-800 tons, are steaming on a line of bearing 220°-040°. They are zigging with ship movements. The two escorts are working one on either flank moving up and down along their flanks covering area 1,500-2,000 yards between bow and beam of convoy. Distance between AKs 900-1,100 yards. Base course 185°T, speed 9 knots. The larger escort is on the east side.

2245 I Targets have been in sight since 14,000 yards and small escort since 11,500. Range is now 7,800. Submerged - 45 ft.

2248 I Targets are visible in periscope, range 7,000 yards. Radar has picked this time to start going sour because of poor voltage regulation. We can continue without the radar for our speed dope is excellent.

2258 I At 50 feet using #1 periscope. Have swung right to course 320°. We are now on the track of the eastern escort with his angle on the bow zero and the expected left zig should put us in the ideal spot.

— page 167 —
2302 I Targets zigged to their right instead of left. Their course now is 200°T, putting us on the port bow of the east AK. We can not get between the AK's. However, our present relative position will be satisfactory for a 70 port track, zero gyro, if the east escort doesn't bother us.

2304 I Targets are going to overirap. The east escort will pass about 400 yards ahead of us. Can't resist the overlapped targets so selected point of aim as point of overlap of near ship on the far ship and ordered spread of four torpedoes for 500 foot target at 2000 yards. Cannot make out the AK silhouettes too clearly but believe the near one to be similar to the ADEN MARU, page 181 of O.N.I. 208-J, and the far one to be larger and similar to the TOKIWA MARU or LIMA MARU, pages 226 and 227 of O.N.I. 208-J.

2306-10 Fired four bow tubes with actual spreads of 0, 0, 2R, and 2L, tracks 67-70 port. T.D.C. range, 2,500 yards, gyros 2306-44 353°-347°. Using point of aim as bow of near target c°-I lapping middle of far target.

2307 I Swinging hard right to bring stern tubes to bear. Near escort (500-800 yards) turning this way.

2308 I Escort too close for comfort, went deep and commenced evasion.

2308-16 Two good solid hits, each followed by an explosion. Audible throughout the ship and the first explosion having a double peak to it as if something in a target exploded as soon as that torpedo exploded.

2310 I Two depth charges, heavy charges but not close. Escort is echo ranging on 19.5 KO.

2312 I Light screws of both escorts coming in fast. No heavy screws.

2314 I Heavy and light explosion on bearing 310°T, the bearing of targets - possibly torpedoes at the end of their run.

2315 I Continuing characteristic breaking up noises of sinking target.

2325 I Light explosions, similar to gunfire, still on bearing 310°T.

2328 I Now have only one escort's screws and echo ranging. Believe other escort to be stopped listening.

— page 169 —
0251 I Have one fish remaining forward and three aft, plus one re-load for #7 tube #2, Would like to go in and finish off the damaged AY but with will still not too far aft and with that mess milling around, produce appears to be the better part of war. This means later on sighting OTORI and bomber headed for some sort of attack.

: 0313 I Circled to east and headed back towards our own area.

: 0515 I Submerged.

: 1050 I Heard two very distant explosions.

: 1115 I Sound picked up light fast screws bearing 345°T.

: 1120 I Sighted OTORI type destroyer bearing 330°T, distant 4,000 yards. (Ship contact #19). He is making 23 knots on course 25°T which heads him for the scene of our attack.

: 1138 I Heard two very distant explosions.

: 1301 I Sighted heavier bearing 150°T, distant 3 miles, course southwest, eliminate 2° (plane contact #5).

: 1437 I Sound picked up light screws bearing 132°T.

: 1439 I Sighted patrol boat, range approximately 2,000 yards on course 265°T, speed 6 knots (ship contact #20).

15-17 December 1943

Patrolling southwestern sector of area.

17 December 1943

: 1915 I Sighted three planes flying in V formation, bearing 215°T, distant 7 miles, altitude 1,500 feet on a northwesterly course (plane contact #6). Slowed to steeraway to reduce wake and avoid detection on this contact and on contacts #7 and #8.

: 1940 I Sighted six planes flying in three sections of two planes each, sections in column, bearing 215°T, distant 7 miles, altitude 2,000 feet on a northwesterly course (plane contact #7).

- 15 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 170 —
1950 SIGHTED SIX PLANES FLYING IN TWO GROUPS OF THREE PLANES EACH WITH EACH GROUP IN VFORMATION AND GROUPS IN COLUMN, BEARING 215°T, DISTANT 8 MILES, ALTITUDE 2,500 FEET ON NORTHWESTERLY COURSE (PLANE CONTACT #8). THESE PLANE CONTACTS WERE A PLEASURE BECAUSE THE JAPS OBLIGINGLY HAD THEIR WING LIGHTS BURNING AND WERE READILY VISIBLE. RAN UP SD RADAR MAST TO SEE IF THE SD WOULD PRODUCE A PIP ON THESE PLANES BUT NO SUCCESS.

18-19 DECEMBER 1943

Patrolling southwestern sector of area.

20 December 1943

2130 I While headed for the beach off TAKANABE with intention of spending a few days working north along the coast to SHIMA-NOURA SHIMA, sighted flashing white light to north.

1140 I True bearing of light remains constant and range appears to be decreasing rapidly. Light is now steady white. Believe it is a wooden fishing or patrol boat this side of the horizon. Changed course to southeast and increased speed to full to get to east of him.

2200 I Bearing is now drawing aft slowly so that he will pass astern.

2240 I Radar contact, range 24,500 yards, bearing 280°T, which is same bearing as the light (ship contact #21). Instead of a small wooden boat at short range we have a big ship with a bright light at long range. Commenced tracking.

2250 I Two lights instead of one plus a red glow. Believe he is a hospital ship. Continuing to track while also checking closely for any evidence of escorts.

2316 I Illuminated red crosses are now clearly visible. It is a large hospital ship on steady course of 155°T, making 12 knots. He is burning normal running lights, has deck contour lights, a neon light type red cross on stack and on bridge structure and an illuminated red cross painted on his side amidships.

2359 I Am convinced that he is not leading interference for anyone and that there is nothing suspicious about him. Secured tracking.

- 16 -

ENCLOSURE (A) 18

— page 171 —
0000 I Set course reverse of hospital ship to take a look up his track in case he was pulling a statue of liberty play for somebody going around the other end.

0220 I Sighted a flashing white light dead ahead.

0230 I Determined that the light is OKINO SHIMA and that we have been overfencing a 4.0 knot current during this past six hours instead of the usual 1.8 - 2 knots.

0240 I Set course to close entrance to BUNGO SUIDO.

0450 I Sighted light on SHIMANOURA SHIMA, bearing 292°T, distant about 25 miles.

0545 I Submerged to patrol OKINO SHIMA - SHIMANOURA line.

1020 I Sighted smoke bearing 300°T, distant about 10 miles. Commenced approach (ship captain #22).

1040 I Sighted tops of four snips under the smoke. This looks like a jackpot and we've only five torpedoes - three aft and one forward, plus one reload for #7 tube aft.

1050 I Continuous echo ranging on 17.8 KC in the direction of the targets.

1054 I Now have the complete picture. We have a convoy of six heavily loaded AK's with an escort of two CHIDORI DD's plus a light draft, stack aft, Maru type A/S vessel. This last fellow who is tracking astern and on the port flank of the formation looks like a 1,500-2,000 ton patrol boat. He is a well decker, stack aft, superstructure amidships and two stick masts, each with a large lookout platform mounted near the top. He looks to be about 200 feet long and probably draws about 6 feet of water. When first seen, hull down, the stack aft made me think we had a small tanker. The formation is made up of two columns of 3 AK's each, a CHIDORI Class DD on the outboard bow of each column and the patrol boat astern and to port. The AK's are all goal posters, probably none of them are less than 5,000 tons, but the fellow who really stands out in the crowd is middle ship of the southern column. He is similar to AKAGI MARU on page 69 of O.N.I. 208-J except his bow is spoon shaped and his stack looks shorter and heavier. He

- 17 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 172 —
1054 I looks brand new and is painted a creamy brown color. There are several possible solutions to the problem of unloading all our fish on this beautiful convoy, an attempt to fire firing the single fish forward. Another solution is to fire two aft then one forward then two aft.

1110 I Range 6,000 yards - How I wish we were a fully loaded ten tube boat. We are going to end up by passing just ahead or just astern of the near CHIDORI according to the direction in which they zig next.

1112 I The CHIDORI's are keeping their same positions relative to the convoy columns and echo ranging but the trailing patrol boat is shifting from astern to the port quarter. The near CHIDORI will pass ahead but we are going to be almost on the track of the patrol boat (his angle on the bow 5° port).

1122 I Swung hard left to course 340° for stern shot. Have decided to use all three f'sh aft on the big fellow in the far column. He is worth it. Then will take what we can with the bow tube on the near column while we reload #7 aft.

1133 I With the near CHIDORI nicely clear of us and a big wide gap between#1 and #2 in near column giving a clear shot between them at our target, fired a three torpedo salvo at the large AK (second ship in far column), torpedo run of 2,800 yards, gyros 192-1/2°, 186-1/2° and 193° (spread 0, 2-1/2° left, 2-1/2° right) tracks 99-101° port, torpedoes set at 8 feet. Commenced swing hard left to bring bow tube to bear and started reloading #7.

1135- Heard two good hits on target followed by the characteristics- 1135-05 tic breaking up noises.

1136 I Lost depth control and started to broach with 5° up angle. Flooded negative. Ordered all idlers forward and opened flood and vent valves on variable tank manifold. Caught ourselves at 52 feet then started deep fast like a rock but regained control. Commenced evading the near CHIDORI whose screws are coming in fast.

1137 I First depth charge followed by a peculiar light double explosion.

1138 I Loud double swishing noise.

— page 173 —
1138-30 Heavy depth charge - close. No warning crack and no following water noises.

1139 I Explosion that is new to us. A double affair which is not too heavy with no warning crack. Possibly two small charges dropped close together.

1140 I Serves of both DD's and the patrol boat.

1141 I Finally caught the boat at 327 feet with 10 degree up angle blowing auxiliary to sea. Eased up to 20 feet under the negative break in the temperature gradient.

1141-46 Fifteen depth charges in salvos of two and three plus the above mentioned lighter double explosion types. All seem fairly close but not doing any visible damage.

1148 I Continuing loud noises of ship breaking up on bearing 1680T. This is my fifth attack and I still haven't been able to visually check the accuracy of our shooting.

1150- Fourteen depth charges, some close. Several of the lighter double explosion type. Ones of these felt very close.

1229 I All clear on sound.

1230 I Rythmic put-putting noise on sound - similar to the noise of a reciprocating engine.

1310 I Starting up for a look. All quiet except for the put-putting noise.

1325 I Here they come again. Two sets of screws, one coming in fast. Resub back down to 200 feet.

1550 I All clear on sound. Commenced running out to the east-east to test advantage of easelily current and get clear of firing area before dark.

1815 I Surfaced.

1825 I Possible plane contact on 3rd radar.

1840 I Radar contact, very small pip. Bearing 3150T, distant 10,000 yards. Range obliing (and cubit way). Assume this contact to be the same fellow who is seen ranging.

- 19 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 174 —
1842 I
Peculiar radar contact at 42,000 yards. SJ had CMINO SHIMA
cleared at 44,000 yards with 1/2 inch high.
This was a new type of radar and was not in use in the
W.W. 2 to saturation and remained there until 1:30 when
it was cut at about 60,000 yards. This could not have
been a ship. It may have been a bridge or some sort of air
bomber radar reflecting surface. (See radar section).
Commenced running along convoys last known track while at
same time getting clear of the echo ranger and charging
batteries.

2100 I
Commenced searching possible convoy route assuming their
base course between 115°T to 140°T. Being so close to
BUNGO SUIDO at the time of attack they may have turned
back into BUNGO, they may have headed north around ASTA
GURI SAKI, they may have turned toward SHIMANOURA SHIMA
to hug the coastline, or they may have continued their
advance to the southeast. We can cover only one possibili-
ty tonight. From their leaded condition and base course
during our attack I believe a search to southeast is our
best bet.

22 December 1943

0170 I
Starboard steady bearing running hot (168°). Slowed and
began forcing oil to the bearing while cooling it external-
ly.

0330 I
Steady bearing appears to be partially wiped. Temperature
is dropping. Am continuing at 15 knots. Decided to send
serial two to ComSubPac and cover possible convoy tracks
to southeast and east as we depart from area. Our materi-
al condition is not bad but it isn't worth pleying off
BUNGO just to get two single torpedo salvos ori.

0632 I
No contact with convoy. Commenced working to north-east to
cover possible convoy positions on base course tracks from
095°T to 115°T. Conducting surface high periscope search.

1110 I
Sighted small white ship from the bridge bearing 030°T,
distant about 8,000 yards. (Ship contact #24). Submerged.

1115 I
Am not certain what this contact is. Do not see him yet
in the periscope. O.D.D. says it locked like small mer-
chant ship.

- 20 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 175 —
1130 I Have him in the periscope - a big sampan painted white except for a reddish band around the upper part of his bridge works. He is of the usual large sampan construction, i.e., Jap projecting bow, stick mast, bridge superstructure, stick mast and stack aft. After approach to 1,800 yards can see a cable hanging from his bow which may lead to fish nets. He does have a radio antenna.

1330 I He is not big enough or deep enough for a torpedo, decided not to fool around this fellow anymore for he may have seen us and sent out a contact report already. In any event, he has ruined our chance of contacting the convoy on the 095°-115° track. Set course for AQGA SHIMA.

23 December 1943

0835 I Sighted large sampan bearing 005°T, distant 9,000 yards. (Ship contact #25). Maneuvered on the surface to evade detection and to obtain position to southeast. This fellow is also painted white but has no red markings around his bridge superstructure. The white camouflage is most effective but is a little too white. From these sightings I have gained a great deal of confidence in the effectiveness of our own camouflage even in bright daylight.

0929 I With two gunner's mates on deck checking the gun and setting spring tension on all 200mm pans, sighted float bil- plane "Pete" type, bearing 100°T, distant about 5 miles, headed towards. Submerged after the senior gunner's mate finally got himself untangled from his life line which had become caught on the gun - he is now a Christian! Resumed course submerged for AQGA SHIMA. We will take time tonight as we pass through Southern Islands to try once again to get the SD radar to work.

1300 I Sighted AQGA SHIMA bearing 070°T, distant fifteen miles. Since 0600 this morning we have had a current setting us 065°T at a drift of 3.6 knots. Came right to counteract the current and pass south of the island.

1740 I Surfaced with AQGA SHIMA bearing 000°T, distant 8 miles. Began tuning and checking SD radar.

1919 I Completed working on SD radar. We can now get a fair pip on the 1,390 foot island at 14.5 miles (see radar section). Set course for Midway.

- 21 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 177 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-I
Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(C) WEATHER.

Enroute area passed through successive low pressure areas with semi cyclonic weather. Each storm was preceded by a 12-15 hour period of comparative calm with cirrus clouds and an increasing ground swell. The storm the night of 4 December was cyclonic in intensity. Weather in the area was good to excellent with moderate winds from the northwest prevailing. Weather area to Pearl was good with a ground swell and wind from the west-northwest until longitude 170°E when wind shifted to northeast.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION.

Currents to and from the area, in general, agreed with those on the charts with the following exceptions:

(1) In the vicinity of SUNISU SHIMA on 5 December and during the following 36 hours a southwesterly set of 1 knot was experienced. This may have been in the form of a counter current to the KURISHIO.

(2) In the vicinity of AOGA SHIMA on 23 December and during the following 24 hours an east-northeasterly set of 3.6 knots was noted.

(3) Between longitudes 146°E and 160°E (26-27 December) a strong (1 - 2.5 knot) easterly set was experienced which probably was due to a strong westerly wind and a heavy following sea.

Off KYUSHU, as previously reported, the KURISHIO was found to be stronger than chart and sailing direction data indicated. It was influenced very greatly in the direction of the set by the winds. The average drift was about 2.5 knots. The set varied generally as follows: (a) 050°T in the center of the area; (b) 025°T in the southwest corner; (c) 070°T in the southeast corner; and (d) 050°T to 080°T in the northeast corner. Inside the 100 fathom curve at about 32°-00'N, 131°-40'E, a slight southerly current was experienced which may have been either a counter current or a tidal current. Near the 100 fathom curve at the entrance to BUNGO SUDO a southerly current was noted which probably was caused by the ebb tide out of BUNGO SUDO.

No other information of value was noted.

— page 178 —
0-N-F-I-D-F-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

ASIZURI SAKI light was not lighted.

OKINA SHIMA light was not observed lighted except on the night of 21-22 December at which time it was visible at a range of 25 miles. It appeared bluish white and had the following characteristics: Three flashes every 35 seconds with period of 6 seconds, 6 seconds, and 21 seconds between flashes.

SHIMANURA SHIMA light was sighted the night of 21-22 December at 25 miles and appeared to be a steady white light with a reddish tinge to it.

The coastline of KYUSHU was usually mostly especially during twilight hours when the mist approached the thickness of a fog.

The SJ radar was extremely useful in obtaining navigational fixes from the mountains on SHIKOKU and KYUSHU and from the island of OKINA SHIMA.

- 24 -
- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 179 —
9 2010 X/1 143-3-36 200 1800 1300 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0

| 10 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

— page 181 —
27
2235 W/4 16-05W 20-5W 4 DD 18000 265/15
26 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
27 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
28 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
29 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
30 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
31 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
32 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
33 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
34 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
35 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
36 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
37 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
38 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
39 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
40 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
41 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
42 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
43 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
44 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
45 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
46 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
47 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
48 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
49 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
50 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
51 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
52 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
53 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
54 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
55 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
56 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
57 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
58 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
59 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
60 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
61 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
62 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
63 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
64 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
65 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
66 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
67 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
68 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
69 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
70 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
71 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
72 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
73 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
74 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
75 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
76 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
77 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
78 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
79 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
80 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
81 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
82 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
83 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
84 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
85 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
86 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
87 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
88 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
89 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
90 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
91 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
92 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
93 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
94 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
95 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
96 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
97 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
98 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
99 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
100 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
101 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
102 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
103 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
104 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
105 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
106 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
107 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
108 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
109 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
110 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
111 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
112 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
113 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
114 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
115 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
116 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
117 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
118 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
119 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
120 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
121 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
122 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
123 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
124 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
125 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
126 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
127 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
128 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
129 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
130 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
131 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
132 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
133 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
134 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
135 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
136 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
137 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
138 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
139 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
140 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
141 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
142 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
143 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
144 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
145 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
146 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
147 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
148 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
149 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
150 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
151 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
152 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
153 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
154 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
155 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
156 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
157 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
158 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
159 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
160 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
161 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
162 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
163 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
164 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
165 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
166 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
167 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
168 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
169 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
170 LTG W/4 16-14W 21-00W 2 CVE 30000 350/10
171 LTG W/4 16

— page 182 —
1. 0820 W/18 24-48N 161-43W Unknown 8 1500 280 S Friendly
2. 1400 W/18 24-37N 162-53W PE2Y2 16 1500 100 S Friendly
3. 1440 K/7 31-21N 134-10E ZEKE 1/2 300 160 S Bombed and Strafed
4. 1301 I/13 30-56N 132-54E KATE 3 500 250 S Searching area of last attack.
5. 1915 I/17 31-46N 132-06E Unknown 7 1500 315 S V formation of 3 with running lights on.
6. 1940 I/17 31-46N 132-06E Unknown 7 1500 315 S 3 two plane sections with running lights on.
7. 1950 I/17 31-46N 132-06E Unknown 8 1500 315 S 2 V formations of 3 with running lights on.
8. 0929 I/23 32-08N 139-12E PETE 5 1000 5 Probably called to area by sam- pan against whom we were preparing to use our deck guns.

- 28 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 184 —
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T
Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

H. ATTACK DATA

Attack No. 1

Time 0012 K    Date 4 December 1943    Position 32-27N 143-49E

Description: Large radar pip... Later determined during daylight periscope attack to be Aircraft Carrier.

Ship Damaged: CV (unidentified)

Target Draft - 20ft Course 320° Speed - 18 Range 2,000

Own Ship Data

Speed - 3 Course - 340° Depth - 40ft Gyro Angles - 53-37 right

Remarks

Radar attack in zero visibility with mountainous seas. Point of aim largest of four pips indicated by radar. Own submarine on west flank of, and 400 yards from track of near pip of a group of four pips which were in line of bearing 280-100°T on course 320°, speed 18. Tracked for 24 minutes. Fired four bow tubes using total of 10 degrees spread at 2000 yard range. Heard first and fourth torpedoes hit. These hits later verified by radar contact on crippled ship and morning sighting of stopped aircraft carrier.

- 29 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 185 —
0553 K  Date: 4 December  Position: 32-37N - 143-39E
Description: Radar pip. Periodic edge on the pip indicated possibility of two targets very close together.
Ship Damaged: CV (unidentified) - This is same ship that was damaged in attack #1.
Target Draft: 20'  Course: 300°  Speed: 1 knot  Range: 3,200
    Own Ship Data
Speed: 4  Course: 265°  Depth: On Surface  Gyro Angles: 02-04-1/2 right

Remarks
This target was picked up on radar while searching for a cripple from attack No. 1. He was tracked for three hours - at first appearing to be circling then finally settling down on course 300, speeds 1 to 3 knots. A double edge on the pip indicated possibility that a second ship was close aboard him - possibly towing. Fired 3 bow tubes. Heard and saw two excellent hits from the bridge.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 186 —
0940 K    Date: 4 December    Position 32-38N - 143-38E
Description: See rough sketch submitted herewith (page 7A this report).
Ship Sunk: CV (unidentified). This is same ship that was damaged during attacks #1 and #2.
Target Draft: 20'    Course: 200°    Speed: 0    Range: 2,700
Own Ship Data
Speed: 3    Course: 110°    Depth: 60 feet    Gyro Angles: 182 to 185-3/4

Remarks
Carrier was sighted dead in the water range 10,000 yards. Made approach passing from astern down his port side at estimated range 1,200 yards. When abeam swung left and fired three stern tubes with T.D.C. range 1,700 yards. Time of torpedo run proved range to have been underestimated and was actually 2,700 yards. Heard two hits followed by tremendous breaking up noises. Carrier not in sight nine minutes later. Believe range error due to underestimate of height of flight deck.

- 31 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 187 —
2306 I Date: 13 December 1943 Position: 30-55N 132-33E

Description: Two AK's in line of bearing. Near AK similar to ADEN MARU, page 181 of O.N.I. 208-J. Far AK similar to TOKIWA or LIMA MARU of pages 226-227 O.N.I. 208-J.

Ship sunk: AK - ADEN MARU type, 5,839 tons.

Ship damaged: AK - TOKIWA MARU type, 7,098 tons.

Target draft: 20' Course: 200° Speed: 8.5 Range 2,000-3,000.

Own Ship Data

Speed: 3 Course: 320° Depth: 54' Gyro angles 353-1/2 to 346-3/4

Remarks

Two AK's in line of bearing, zigging by ship movement. Escorted by large escort on port bow to beam and by small escort on starboard bow to beam. Attacked from position under stern of large escort. T.D.C. range 2,500 yards. Point of aim was bow of near target overlapping middle of far target.

Fired four torpedoes, heard two hits with time of torpedo run correct for one hit on each AK, with torpedo runs of 2,700 and 3,900 yards. Heard breaking up noises. Found ADEN MARU missing and TAKIWA MARU dead in water upon surfacing.

- 32 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 188 —
1133 I    Date: 21 December 1943    Position: 32-38N
    132-04E

Description: Target was largest AK in convoy located in #2 position of far column. Target silhouette similar to AKAGI NARU, page 69 of O.N.I. 208-J, except it had cruiser spoon bow. It appeared to be t.and new or freshly painted. Deck cargo of large bases or crates similar to those used for automobiles. Painted creamy brown.

Ship Sunk: AK - AKAGI NARU type, 7,390 tons.

Target Draft: 20'    Course: 090°    Speed: 8.5    Range: 2,700 yards

Own Ship Data

Speed 3    Course: 340°    Depth: 63'    Gyro angles 188-1/2 - 193°

Remarks

Six AK's formed in two columns of three AK's each with columns 1,000 yards abreast. CHIDORI DD on each bow of the convoy and 1,500-2,000 ton, maru type escort on port quarter of northern column. Attacked from position astern of CHIDORI and ahead of A.S ship protecting port column, shooting between #1 and #2 of near column at the biggest ship, #2, in far column. Range 2,700 yards. Fired 3 torpedoes, heard 2 good hits at correct time for torpedo run followed by breaking up noises.

- 33 -

ENCLOSURE (L)

— page 189 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Continued)

Attack No. 1

| Attack No. | #1    | #2    | #3    | #4    |
||-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1. Tubes Fired | 108P | 111P | 115P | 120P |
| 2. Track Angle | 053  | 046-1/4 | 037-1/4 | 045-3/4 |
| 3. Gyro Angle | 12 feet | 12 feet | 12 feet | 12 feet |
| 4. Depth Setting | High | High | High | High |
| 5. Power | Hit | Miss | Miss | Hit |
| 6. Hit or Miss | No | No | No | No |
| 7. Erratic | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| 8. Mk. Torpedo | 26012 | 25750 | 39991 | 39721 |
| 9. Serial No. | -6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A |
| 10. Mk. Exploder | 3938 | 9403 | 7748 | 6270 |
| 11. Serial No. | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| 12. Actuation Set | None | None | None | Contact |
| 13. Actuation Actual | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| 14. Mk. Warhead | 3712 | 1562 | 10384 | 1796 |
| 15. Serial No. | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex |
| 16. Explosive | -- | 13 sec. | 15 secs. | 14 secs. |
| 17. Firing Interval | 1-3/4R | 1-3/4L | 5L | 5R |
| 18. Type Spread (divergent) | Rough | Rough | Rough | Rough |
| 19. Sea Conditions | Subase PH | Subase PH | Subase PH | Subase PH |
| 20. Overhaul Activity | | | | |

All firing pins in exploder mechanisms were of HOLLAND design.

- 34 -

ENCLOSURE (A) 37

— page 190 —
1. Tubes Fired
: 2. Track Angle
: 3. Gyro Angle
: 4. Depth Setting
: 5. Power
: 6. Hit or Miss
: 7. Erratic
: 8. Mk. Torpedo
: 9. Serial No.
: 10. Mk. Exploder
: 11. Serial No.
: 12. Actuation Set
: 13. Actuation Actual
: 14. Mk. Warhead
: 15. Serial No.
: 16. Explosive
: 17. Firing Interval
: 18. Type spread (divergent)
: 19. Sea Conditions
: 20. Overhaul Activity

: 1. #1
: 2. #2
: 3. #3
: 147S
: 002
: 147-1/2S
: 148S
: 002-1/2
: 002-1/2
: 10 feet
: 10 feet
: High
: High
: Hit
: Hit
: No
: No
: 14-3A
: 14-3A
: 14-3A
: 14-3A
: 25756
: 24859
: 25676
: 6-1A
: 6-1A
: 6-1A
: 12023
: 7376
: 4959
: Contact
: Contact
: Contact
: None
: 16
: 16
: 16
: 16
: 2212
: 2171
: 11228
: Torpex
: Torpex
: Torpex
: 12 secs.
: 12 secs.
: 1/2 R
: 1/2 L
: Rough
: Rough
: Rough
: Subase PH
: Subase PH
: Subase PH

All firing pins in exploder mechanisms were of HOLLAND design.

— page 191 —
U.S.S. SALIFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Continued)

Attack No. 3

| Attack No. | #5    | #6    | #7    |
||-------|-------|-------|
| 1. Tubes Fired | 88P  | 88P  | 88P  |
| 2. Track Angle | 182  | 18F-3/4 | 182  |
| 3. Gyro Angle | 12 feet | 12 feet | 12 feet |
| 4. Depth Setting | High | High | High |
| 5. Power | Hit | Hit | Miss |
| 6. Hit or Miss | No | No | No |
| 7. Erratic | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| 8. Mk. Torpedo | 25581 | 39236 | 25589 |
| 9. Serial No. | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A |
| 10. Mk. Exploder | 7713 | 11993 | 12551 |
| 11. Serial No. | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| 12. Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | None |
| 13. Actuation Actual | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| 14. Mk. Warhead | 1553 | 1587 | 1462 |
| 15. Serial No. | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex |
| 16. Explosive | - | 8 secs. | 13 secs. |
| 17. Firing Interval | 0 | 2 R | 2 L |
| 18. Type Spread (divergent) | Rough | Rough | Rough |
| 19. Sea Conditions | Rough | Rough | Rough |
| 20. Overhaul Activity | Subase PH | Subase PH | Subase PH |

All firing pins in exploder mechanisms were of HOLLAND design.

- 36 - ENCLOSURE (A) 39

— page 192 —
1. Tubes Fired
: 2. Track Angle
: 3. Gyro Angle
: 4. Depth Set
: 5. Power
: 6. Hit or Miss
: 7. Erratic
: 8. Mk. Torpedo
: 9. Serial No.
: 10. Mk. Exploder
: 11. Serial No.
: 12. Actuation Set.
: 13. Actuation Actual
: 14. Mk. Warhead
: 15. Serial No.
: 16. Explosive
: 17. Firing Interval
: 18. Type Spread (divergent)
: 19. Sea Conditions
: 20. Overhaul Activity

: 21. Subsea PH
: 22. Subsea PH
: 23. Subsea PE

All firing pins in exploder mechanisms were of HOLLAND design.

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 193 —
1. Miss Fired
2. Track Angle
3. Gyro Angle
4. Depth Setting
5. Power
6. Hit or Miss
7. Erratic
8. Mk. Torpedo
9. Serial No.
10. Mk. Exploder
11. Serial No.
12. Actuation Set.
13. Actuation Actual
14. Mk. Warhead
15. Serial No.
16. Explosive
17. Firing Interval
18. Type Spread (divergent)
19. Sea Conditions
20. Overhaul Activity

| # | Miss Fired | Track Angle | Gyro Angle | Depth Setting | Power | Hit or Miss | Erratic | Mk. Torpedo | Serial No. | Mk. Exploder | Serial No. | Actuation Set. | Actuation Actual | Mk. Warhead | Serial No. | Explosive | Firing Interval | Type Spread (divergent) | Sea Conditions | Overhaul Activity |
|----| 1 | 7 | 192-1/2 | 8 feet | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 26037 | 6-1A | 12586 | Contact | 16 | 355 | Torpex | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 8 | 188-1/2 | 8 feet | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 3 | 9 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 4 | 10 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 5 | 11 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 6 | 12 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 7 | 13 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 8 | 14 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 9 | 15 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 10 | 16 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 11 | 17 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 12 | 18 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 13 | 19 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |
| 14 | 20 | 193 | High | Hit | No | 14-3A | 23127 | 6-1A | 7743 | Contact | 16 | 3640 | Torpex | 2-1/2 L | 2-1/2 R | Moderate | Subase PH | Subase PH | Moderate | Moderate |

All firing pins in exploder mechanisms were of HOLLAND design.

— page 194 —
1. MINE: No mines laid or sighted. No minesweeping operations noted.
2. ANTI SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS.

Although a digest of previous patrols indicates that this area has previously experienced considerable A/S activity the activity during this patrol appeared negligible. The 160° course line from BUNGO SUDO was patrolled both day and night with the patrolling PY or A/S vessel traveling up and down the 160°-340° line. One patrolling sampen appeared to be covering the area off ASIZURI SAKI. Plenep patrols in the area were not encountered except when acting as coverage far convoy. Patrol planes were not encountered at night even though the phase of the moon and clear atmosphere were thought to be excellent for plane activity. The planes contacted on the night of 17 December were not considered to be patrol planes but rather planes conducting or returning from maneuvers. Preceding the night of attack of 13 December and in the evening following the attack of 21 December a plane was picked up by SJ radar but in neither case was the plane seen nor were we sighted. It's our impression that the offshore sampen and airplane combination in area between the BONIN's and Empire Islands is being used more effectively than the inshore patrol.

Depth charging following the attacks on the carrier totaled only 35 charges and was not well conducted. Echo ranging was not heard.

Echo ranging was used by escorting DD's of both convoys attacked. The escort of the first convoy obligingly echo ranged on 19.5 KC for 5 minutes of every half hour thus assisting us to keep track of the convoy until we could surface and attack. The echo ranging following this attack was getting what we thought was a good strong echo off our hull but the Jap didn't seem to think so because he continued to sweep by as he searched. The depth charging following this attack was negligible.

Echo ranging was used by both DD's escorting the convoy of 21 December yet our presence within 500 yards of the near DD was not detected. The depth charging following the attack was well conducted and definitely of first team variety with the Japs utilizing both their echo ranging and listening gear and attempting to work together. They had us boxed several times with one fellow on one quarter and the other on the opposite bow, then vice versa. The third escort (1500 ton A/S Maru) used nothing but listening gear and seemed to be the one who was using the double light depth charges. A fourth hand who

— page 196 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(K) ORDNANCE MATERIAL (Continued)

(m) Tail buffer had been screwed in to contact and then backed off one-tenth of a turn.
(n) Impulse air was built up to 300# and valve to the impulse bottle and valve from the reducer were open. Bleeder valve on impulse bottle was closed.
(o) Master vent from vent manifold was open.
(p) Outboard vent was closed.
(q) WRT vent valve was closed and WRT flood and drain open. Water was being blown to the tube keeping an approximate pressure of 20# on WRT.
(4) Tube vent was open.

When the water level in the tube was approximately 3/4 of the way to the top of the tube, the torpedo started and was heard to run for 2-3 seconds. As soon as the torpedo started WRT blow was secured and the tube vent and drain valve closed. Before the vent was closed a small amount of smoke entered the room. Prior to the torpedo starting there was no pressure on the tube gauge. When the torpedo started tube pressure was not noted. The impulse air did not drop nor did the gyro spindle retract. Neither the depth nor gyro spindles could be withdrawn. The speed spindle engaged and disengaged very easily and when speed was changed there was no load on the spindle. This indicated that the torpedo was all the way gone or at least 5-6 feet down the tube. The outer door could not be opened and the indicator still read all the way closed. Upon surfacing, inspection showed the torpedo to be about twelve feet out of the tube. The sea was too rough to attempt any salvage of the torpedo by trying to force it back into the tube. The tube was fired twice using impulse pressure of 375#. To fire the tube the pressure had to be vented off the top of the firing valve. An alternate method would have been to break all the interlocks in the firing system on the tube. Firing the tube forced the torpedo out of the tube as revealed by a later inspection. After the torpedo was gone the outer door could still not be closed but it could be operated through an arc of about 25-30 degrees. All fittings on the tube were tightened, grease fittings packed with tail packing compound and tested for tightness at 250 feet.

Torpedo Tube Gyro Setters. Fortunately no gyro setter casualties occurred during this patrol. However, the threat of their failure was ever present. Previous history has shown that the gyro setting motors on this class of vessel are greatly overloaded. New class boats have a motor several times as powerful

— page 197 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(K) ORDNANCE MATERIAL (Continued)

as those installed on this class. Careful overhaul and reduction of friction load to a minimum plus adequate lubrication and 30 amp fuses (20 amp circuit) may be responsible for the lack of casualties, but the possibility of failure is ever present. There is no safety factor in the system. Any binding or crease of friction load, causes heavy overload on the motor, resultant excessive sparking, and then, a frozen relay. Such a casualty can happen during an attack and a valuable target escape. It is recommended that new gyro setting motors designed to carry the load with a large safety factor be installed at first available opportunity.

C&R MATERIAL

Salt water in hydraulic system

On December 1, 1943, it was noticed that the level of oil in the hydraulic replenishing tank had risen about 2 inches. Samples were taken of the oil in the accumulator and tested in a centrifuge, the results of which indicated salt water. Samples were taken from hydraulic units and lines throughout the ship and indicated salt water in the major part of the system. The next day on the dive the supply and return lines from the replenishing tank were secured and the emergency bypass opened. Other possible sources of leaks (steering ramps in after trim tank and flood valve cylinders) had already been eliminated. A small reducer was connected to the 200# air system and to the supply tank in the after torpedo room and the reducer set for 14#. A relief valve was installed in the top of the tank and set for 18#. A sight glass was also installed on the tank to indicate the oil level. The tank was cut in on the replenishing line aft by bypassing the hand gear pump in the after torpedo room. In this manner a head was kept on the system that had originally been supplied by the tank in the superstructure. The 14# was found necessary to keep the pump from sucking air when initially charging the accumulator. The topside replenishing tank was kept secured and bypassed. Originally it had been hoped that the leak in the tank could be found and repaired. However, an hour search with 50# pressure on the tank failed to reveal the leak. It is assumed that it is probably only a pin hole somewhere near the bottom of the tank.

Removing the salt water already in the system presented another problem. The system was allowed to stand idle the first 6-8 hours on all day dives. After this period of time

— page 198 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(K) C&R MATERIAL (Continued)

all the hydraulic units were drained until about a pint had been removed from each unit. Then the plant was operated, all units were worked and the system vented. Traces of salt water in the system persisted for duration of patrol. This system must be flushed thoroughly immediately on arrival Pearl Harbor and the system thoroughly cleansed of salt accumulation. There is a ready evidence of binding and sluggish plunger operation.

Flood Valves

Upon departure for patrol the hydraulic lines to the operating units of all flood valves except negative and safety tank floods were blanked off to remedy numerous and troublesome leaks in flood valve operating units. Machined and annealed copper discs 1/8 inch thick were inserted in the recesses of the flanges connecting the hydraulic lines to the manifold in the control room. Actuating levers were placed and left in the "neutral" position. During next Navy Yard overhaul the flood valves and operating mechanisms should be removed.

Safety Tank Inboard Vents

Safety tank inboard vents had been plugged at some time in past history. They were made operative by removing plugs and installing additional valves inboard of the original valves. Valves were ground in and tested at deep submergence. There is a definite need for a larger inboard vent. The present inboard vents on safety tank are only three-quarters of an inch in diameter. It is doubtful if such a small vent line would be of any value if needed in an emergency. The installation of a larger vent line will be requested during the next period.

Fuel Oil Tank Blows

During training period and while enroute Midway experienced trouble with air leaking past the blow valves into the fuel tanks. Efforts to grind these valves in were not entirely successful so removed the lines at the hull and inserted plugs. During the next refit these lines will be reconnected and two tight valves installed in each blow line.

Pipe Flange

Bombing of December 7, 1943, caused a good leak at the hull flange of main motor circulating water discharge line. Piping in the way (which includes a section of the drain line) had to

— page 199 —
1. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(K) C&R MATERIAL (Continued)

Be removed before the flange could be reached and the leak stopped. A jack was placed between the valve bonnet and an adjacent frame. Taking up on the jack stopped the leak. Then the stud nuts were tightened. As much as two full turns were taken on two nuts. The jack was left in place as a safety precaution. No further leaks developed. All the studs on this flange will be replaced during the coming refit.

Bow and Stern Plane Shafting

Bow and stern plane shafting became increasingly noisy due to loose keyways, loose dowel pins, several bad bearings and worn universal joints. Continued greasing and tightening wherever possible did little to help the situation. It is hoped that the alteration placing clutches in these shafts can be accomplished during the coming refit. In addition it will be necessary to completely overhaul all sections of the bow and stern plane shafting.

A grinding thumping noise, indicating binding somewhere in the port bow plane shafting, apparently outside the hull, was first noticed December 9, 1943. It was thought that the stock bearing where the shaft goes through the hull was dry or wiped. Grease lines & to the bearing were broken to make sure that the bearing was getting grease; it was. Bearing was packed full of grease while bowplanes were tilting. This did not help. The binding seemed to occur only when going from zero to dive. An inspection of the shafts and gear in the superstructure by First Lieutenant with ship stopped and flooded down aft revealed the following misalignment due to an undetermined cause. When the planes go from zero to dive the upper end of the rod connecting the port plane to the rigging gear rides forward on the ball as it should. However, as the planes reach 2° - 3° dive angle the connecting rod comes up hard against the housing holding the ball joint. This binds the upper end of the connecting rod and it jumps and knocks as more dive is applied to the planes. It will probably be necessary to remove this plane to make suitable repairs.

Periscopes

Shortly after entering area began to experience continued fogging of No. 2 periscope. Checked pressure and found that pressure was down to one pound. Recirculated nitrogen at a pressure of five pounds for forty minutes and then charged to

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(K) C&R MATERIAL (Continued)
Eight pounds. Two days later pressure check showed pressure had dropped to five pounds. Soap test failed to show leaks. Periscope was charged again after recirculation for thirty minutes. After this, pressure was checked and periscope recharged every two days for the remainder of the patrol. This procedure was adopted to conserve nitrogen. It kept the periscope usable but not entirely satisfactory.

Tilting mechanism casualty on No. 2 periscope resulted from bombing of December 7, 1943. Shock caused the tilting handle to drop from normal position while the periscope was still lowered in the well. When the periscope was raised the handle caught on lip of the conning tower bilge drain. The pins holding the handles to the housing shcared and the shafting and spindle in tilting handle were badly bent. Now pins, shafting and spindle were turned out on the ship's lathe and mechanism reassembled. The tilting handle from No. 1 periscope was installed on No. 2 periscope and the repaired handle installed on No. 1 periscope. This has proven satisfactory.

Ventilation Hull Supply Blower

During training period prior to patrol it was found that the hull supply blower became very noisy at depths between 100 and 120 feet and that the blower froze to a complete stop at any depth greater than 120 feet. Inspection revealed that the bathtub becomes distorted by pressure and such distortion becomes sufficient to cause misalignment of the blower and subsequent binding. This condition must be corrected during refit, not only because use of the blower at deep submergence is desirable for adequate ventilation but also because the bathtub in its present condition is a hazard. It is impossible without removing the blower to determine the source of the present steady drip of salt water from the tub. This drip increases with depth but has not yet become excessive despite deep submergence and depth charging.

Superstructure

On morning of 22 December, while on surface after attack of previous day, inspection of topside revealed a circular section of wooden decking missing on starboard side aft of #3 engine muffler. The surrounding wood and adjacent angle iron indicate that the hole was probably made by a heavy object striking the deck. Believe we struck some object while submerged - possibly a portion of our target.

— page 201 —
10 lb. Blow Line

Since depth charging af 21 December there has been a leak in some portion of the 10 lb. blow line to either #2 or #1 main ballast tank. With 10 pound blowers running the escaping air sounds as though tank were being blown with the vent open. The location of this leak will be determined upon arrival and corrective measures taken during refit.

ENGINEERING MATERIAL

Auxiliary Generator

On 24 November 1943 the coupling in the return line to the lub oil pump from generator bearing became loose resulting in the return side of the pump getting air bound. The oil supply to the bearing continued and oil was forced through the oil seals into the generator. The ends were removed and generator cleaned with solvent. The brushes were not oil soaked enough to warrant replacement. This generator was out of commission for fourteen hours and has continued to operate satisfactorily since this casualty.

Series Contactor Shoe

The series one contact to starboard main motors burned when the controllerman attempted to put a zero float on the battery with No. 3 and 4 main engines on propulsion. The voltage on motors was twice that on battery. This resulted in an Engineer-in-Order that controllers will never be put to series position when clutches are filled. Time to repair contactor was thirty minutes.

Stern Plane Motor

(a) It was noticed that the stern plane tilting motor was running hot on the commutator end and the planes were hunting five degrees at a time. Inspection showed the grease in the bearing was not ball bearing grease and had run out. No damage was done. It was greased and reinstalled. The brake was adjusted. Stern planes were out of commission for six hours.

ENCLOSURE (A)

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1. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(K) ENGINEERING MATERIAL

Reduction Gear

Reduction gears were known to be noisy prior departure on patrol. After the bombing of 7 December the port reduction gear noise level has increased. There is a definite beat of 88 to 94 thumps per minute in the gear when shaft is making 80 RPM. There is also a rythmic click which has a frequency equal to the RPM of the motor pinion. When time limitations permit the motor couplings, hydraulic clutch coupling, and reduction gear teeth should be thoroughly inspected and an effort made to eliminate this noise. Thrust clearance should also be adjusted since it is now a maximum (0.20).

Shaft Misalignment

Both shafts were realigned at Navy Yard Pearl Harbor during refit. Improper realignment necessitated further realignment prior departure on patrol. This last realignment was known to be not completely satisfactory but as long as the shaft RPM was kept above 60 and below 90 the noise level was not so excessive as to further delay departure on patrol. The existing condition is felt to be not so much the result of improper alignment as it is the result of insufficient wood clearance. Should time permit during coming refit wood clearances should be taken with especial attention to the starboard strut.

#1 Main Motor

The first bomb of 7 December apparently was not too close and did nothing but warn the controllearmen so that they placed the trip circuit depth charge switch in the "On" position. The second bomb opened the reverser contact of the starboard main motors thus drawing an arc and welding the contacts in the ahead position. The second bomb opened the field excitation switch and trip circuit. It appears that the field collapsed before the contacts dropped out and thus caused excessive armature current and a flash to ground. Upon inspection of motors the following defects were found:

(a) Pig tail to brush on #2 main motor burned off.
(b) Megger reading of #1 main motor - 50,000 ohms.
(c) Outboard brush rigging insulators on #1 main motor cracked.
(d) Burned and bare spot in lower coil to pole face winding #1 main motor.

— page 203 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(K) ENGINEERING MATERIAL (Continued)

Removed end bells and brush rigging of #1 motor, cleaned up bare spot, insulated with glyptol, and reassembled. Hegger readings raised to 125,000. Placed motor in operation and operation appeared normal. At 2200 on 9 December while using this motor on propulsion a second flesh over occurred. Disconnected the motor, installed jumpers and continued petrol using #3 motor on starboard shaft. #1 motor armature must be lifted during refit and thorough inspection made to determine full extent of damage.

Sterboard Steady Bearing

Upon completion of shaft realignment considerable difficulty was experienced by Navy Yard Pearl Harbor in fitting starboard steady bearing requiring considerable reaming of dowel holes and manufacture of new dowel pins. The bearing ran slightly warm (145°F) during post repair trials but seemed to have floated into position satisfactorily prior departure on patrol. On night of 21 December while making high speed search for convoy bearing began to heat up. A careful watch was placed on the bearing and adequate lubrication insured while running water over bearing cap to provide cooling. When temperature reached 172°F shaft was slowed to 30 turns. After two hours the bearing temperature dropped to 154°F and search for convoy was resumed at 15 knots. It is believed that the bearing partially wiped. Temperature has continued above normal but has not exceeded 160°F.

RADIO MATERIAL

Acrials

While making high speed and around play on convoy the night of 13 December the after starboard antenna mast carried away due to excessive vibration and metal fatigue. Salvaged the acrials and used port antenna for remainder of petrol.

TEL-3 Transmitter

On 30 November TEL-3 transmitter heater converter went temperature failed to reach operation point (60 F). Inspection showed blower motor inoperative due to brush being wedged between commutator and brush holder. Replaced blower motor from spares which gave quieter operation that was over experienced with original motor.

- 48 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 204 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(K) ENGINEERING MATERIAL (Continued)

Fathometer

On 8 December found that NM fathometer head had a zero ground. This head was overhauled during refit and was operating satisfactorily on departure from Midway but previous history of this head has shown that it has a propensity for grounding out.

NAVIGATION MATERIAL

Dead Reckoning Analyzer Indicator

The ceramic brush holder on the potentiometer to speed unit of D.R.A.I. was found broken on 1 December. It was temporarily patched with plastic tape and the instrument was back in commission in thirty six hours.

On 6 December D.R.A.I. failed to register again. Manufactured new brush holder from bakelite and instrument has continued to function satisfactorily.

Master Gyro Compass

On 27 December vacuum was lost in the north rotor of the master gyro compass. Commenced steering by auxiliary gyro compass while attempting repairs to master gyro compass.

Several possible leakage points were found in the rotor and all were repaired but to no avail for the rate of loss of vacuum remained about the same.

Relieved the vacuum in the south rotor and restarted master gyro compass set up for a no-vacuum run. After the compass had settled down the error was checked at zero. Commenced steering by master gyro - out of commission 12 hours.

— page 205 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

Subject:  RADIO.

Radio reception was unsatisfactory. Eleven messages and Com-SubPac serials34, 61, 62, 78, 97, 98, 1, 3, 15, 26, and 29, were not received. Enemy jamming of the Haiku frequencies was very severe and considerable fading of the Haiku signal was experienced, especially on the 1300 schedule and in the 9000, 4000 frequency bands.

It is recommended that the Haiku power for submarine schedules be substantially increased to overcome the present difficulty of copying weak and fading signals through the enemy's strong interference.

No trouble was experienced in transmitting outgoing serials one and two to radio Brisbane and Radio Canberra respectively, using 8470 KC.

Did not obtain receipt from Brisbane for serial one. Obtained receipt from Canberra, after struggling with Radio Noumea 20 minutes, for serial two.

Last serial received - 91G
Last serial sent - 5

(M) RADAR.

SJ

Prior departure Pearl Harbor the SJ radar was partially converted to SJ-1 by installation of an SJ-1 transmitter utilizing all the other previous SJ components. This new transmitter even without the complete conversion has proven excellent and an extremely valuable addition to the military efficiency of this vessel. A chronic arcing condition in wave guide, feeder system, RF output terminal at magnetron, and rotating joint of wave guide existed throughout the patrol but was kept under control by the constant attention of the radar technician. This arcing is primarily attributable to the SJ wave guide and feeder system which were not designed to take the full power output of the SJ-1 transmitter. Completion of the conversion to a complete SJ-1 set should eliminate the present arcing condition.

Improper voltage regulation has continually interfered with continuous successful operation of the equipment. The poor regulation is the result of unsatisfactory carbon pile-voltage regulation of the ships I.C. supply, especially when maneuvering.

— page 206 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

Subject:  U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(M) RADAR (Continued)

ship on battery motor combination. The standby SJ motor generator is as bad or worse due to poor speed and voltage regulators. Unfortunately the poorest regulation of I.C. supply occurs just at that stage of the torpedo approach when maneuvering is shifted to battery motor combination which is also the time when proper operation of SJ radar is most highly desired. An attempt must be made during coming refit to acquire better voltage regulation of the I.C. system as well as to acquire an SJ motor generator which will be satisfactory.

It has been noted throughout this patrol that target pips are unstable with a slight variation in pip size and bobbing. This condition is not fully understood and may possibly be a characteristic of the new SJ-1 transmitter or of the particular combination of units we have on board. It will be more thoroughly investigated upon arrival Pearl Harbor.

Other casualties were of the nature of tube failures as follows:

17. November - Jitter in Trace - replaced LP-1, -2, -3, -4 (991's) and V6 (6AG7).
25. November - "Breathing" in Trace and Main pulse - attempted to reduce it by replacing 2X2 and VR150-30 in range indicator - also replaced 400V condenser connecting terminal 29 (transmitter) to ground.
26. November - Tuning and echoes not satisfactory, changed crystal and returned using sea returns to tune by.
On or about 30 November - Magnetron began to fail slwslly - this was not noticed until 6 December when echoes from the sea failed to appear. Believe the magnetron to be slightly gassy - changed it and returned using meter. Was then able to get echoes from an island which previously did not show up. Tube removed had operated 320 hours in this unit.
7. December - Replaced AFC #1 (6AG7) to aid in making AFC function better.
8. December - Replaced V12 (6SN7GT) in Range Indicator to correct for loss of step.
19. December - Replaced 717A's in attempt to clear up fuzzy echoes.
25. December - Noted arcing and white lights in transmitter. Found cap to plate of 5D21 was jarred loose and arcing to the plate. Replaced tube and cap-lead.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 208 —
1. RADCAR (Continued)
2. Immediately after the bombing on 7 December the 8014A's (oscillator tubes) were changed and "cooked in". All controls and meters and other indicating devices were checked and the set responded as it would under normal operation - the only clue to the trouble lay in the fact that we got no echoes and that there was an unusual amount of interference on the scope. This interference came from fans and motors, and from the SJ. This led to checking the input line to the receiver - which is a coaxial line, and it was found that this line had poorly soldered connections, the ground side of which was broken loose. This was cleaned and resolcdered. No change in results.

The SD was tested within 15-20 miles of land and no echoes were present. Again all tubes and wiring was checked and found in proper condition. It was not until a prolonged test within eight miles of AQGA SHINA, on way home, that an echo was obtained. Further search lead to finding a salt deposit on the side of one of the filter condensers (in the IFF amplifier) which are used as filters for the power supply. This condenser was cleaned and placed back in the circuit with subsequent rise in echo height. Further rise in echo height was obtained by changing 9001's and 9002's until a set was found to give better results.

However, one cannot be sure this SD set is operating properly unless there is nearby land or planes to use as a frequent check. The present set has a bad history and is inherently unreliable. Positive steps must be taken during this refit to obtain a reliable SD set.

CUO

This equipment was used three times in area with no repairs obtained.

— page 210 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, and HABITABILITY. (Continued)

The habitability of the boat was always excellent. The boat was cool and dry throughout the patrol. No heat rash was experienced by anyone.

The smoking lamp was continually lighted and the crew did not abuse the privilege. On two occasions, when the possibility of being kept down for a protracted period arose, one can of CO2 absorbent was expended.

(Q) PERSONNEL.

During the period 21 November - 23 December daily lectures were given to all non-qualified men. These lectures were omitted only on those days when the ship was actually at battle stations. Heads of Departments were made responsible for qualification of men in their departments. Qualified members of the crew were each assigned one or more non-qualified men for whom they were responsible in training and qualifying. The results were gratifying. Officer instruction and schooling was similarly made a part of the daily routine with required sketches, reading material, and instruction periods.

Of the eight officers on board only the Engineer and the Communicator had been previously attached to this vessel. The Executive Officer and four junior officers (three of them non-qualified including a warrant electrician who had previously made 5 patrols in the SKIPJACK, a submarine school graduate with no previous experience, and a radar officer who had not been in a submarine before), reported on board during the refit period. The initiative, enthusiasm, and untiring work of every officer was a source of great satisfaction to the Commanding Officer.

Following is a tabulation of the personnel status of the U.S.S. SAILFISH at start of this patrol:

| Rank | Name                | Status |
|------|||
| No.  | No. qualified at start of patrol | 71     |
| No.  | No. qualified at end of patrol | 37     |
| No.  | No. advanced in rating during patrol | 55     |
| No.  | No. with less than 2 years service | 41     |
| No.  | No. with more than 6 years service | 9      |

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ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 211 —
7: 9: 0: 9
: 1: 7: 2: 9
: 1: 4: 5: 9
: 1: 8: 0: 8
: 1: 6: 0: 6
: 1: 0: 6: 6
: 3: 5: 0: 5
: 1: 1: 4: 5
: 1: 4: 0: 4
: 19: 2: 0: 2
: 2: 1: 1: 2
: 9: 1: 0: 1
: 7: 0: 1: 1
: 17: 0: 0: 0

It will be noted that only 13% of the crew possessed 6 or more years naval service while 58% possessed less than 2 years naval service. Also it will be noted that the patrol was started with 48% of the crew not qualified in submarines, 24% of the crew having never made a submarine war patrol, 23% having made only one previous war patrol, and 30% having made only two previous patrols. The 24% of the crew who had made four or more previous war patrols were indispensable. They can not be too highly praised for their interest and unstinting effort in teaching and training the inexperienced men. It will be a distinct loss to the ship when these old hands (7 will have had 10 previous patrols on board) are gradually transferred to provide adequate physical and mental recuperation, to satisfy demands of new constructions, and to satisfy an orderly process of replacement on board.

In addition to the schooling and drilling on this patrol, all members of the crew have been required to put in long hours on material work items which were not previously accomplished. Their energy and initiative has been gratifying.

The tabulations and percentages given above are presented not only as a matter of interest concerning this vessel but also because they clearly illustrate the affect of expansion on the submarine force and navy as a whole.

- 56 -

ENC LOSURE (A)

— page 212 —
0-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Subject: U.S.S. SALIFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.

(Q) PERSONNEL (Continued)
Specially worthy of commendation for their conduct during this patrol arc:
BAYLES, L.W., CEM(PA), USN., for his prompt and intelligent action which prevented this vessel from suffering a prolonged loss of main power following enemy bombing.
LYON, W.H., CHOLM(AA), USN., for his cool and efficient action in gaining access to and stopping a hull flange leak following enemy bombing.

DIETERICH, F.I., RTL, USNR., for his tireless efforts and exceptional skill in maintaining and operating the SJ radar equipment throughout the patrol - especially during approach and attack on the aircraft carrier of 4 December and convoy of 13 December.

(R) MILES STEAMED.
(a) Pearl to Midway
(b) Midway to area
(c) In area
(d) Area to Pearl
Totals
HILLS STEAMED
1260
2954
1381
3926
9521
FUEL USED
14,400 (15180)
27,130
7,670
38,390
87,590

(S) DURATION
(a) Days enroute to area
(b) Days in area
(c) Days enroute from area
(d) Days submerged
22
13
14
22
Limiting Factor this patrol
Torpedoes
2 (1 Fwd, 1 Aft)
Fuel
16,000
Provisions
20 days
Personnel
20 days
on station
Torpedo Expenditure
- 57 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 213 —
1. The camouflage paint on this vessel was utilized not so much because of confidence in it but more because the Commanding Officer was pleased to change the ship's appearance to something new and different. From our experience on patrol it is now felt that this camouflage is definitely effective and a real asset to the submarine using it.

2. The torpedo performance on this patrol was exceptionally gratifying. The misses were no fault of the torpedo, but rather the result of control errors and spread. Every torpedo that hit produced a fine first order explosion. That those torpedoes which sank the carrier ran hot, straight, and normal at 10 and 12 feet depth settings in the seas revealing was indeed gratifying.

3. The Commanding Officer is happy and proud to report that the performance of duty of all hands on this patrol was exemplary and in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service. Although lcdr was cver present, the results obtained during the patrol are just reward for the tireless efforts by officers and cver to place the ship in a condition of military efficiency.

The Executive Officer of this vessel, Lieutenant G. Richardson, by his training and coordination of the fire control party and by his invaluable counsel was greatly responsible for the results of this patrol.

The highly proficient operation of the torpedo data computer by Lieutenant W.P. Murphy, Jr., as well as his performance of duty as first lieutenant during the correction of many C&R deficiencies and casualties is especially commendable.

— page 214 —
1. The tenth war patrol of the U.S.S. SAILFISH was the first war patrol for Lieutenant Commander R.E.M. WARD, as commanding officer. This patrol covered a period of forty-nine days of which thirteen days were spent in the area.

2. Three contacts were worthy of attack. The first contact consisting of a carrier, a cruiser, and destroyers was made enroute to the area during typhoon weather with mountainous seas, high winds, driving rain, and very low visibility. Operating under these hazardous sea conditions and against active enemy anti-submarine activity three successful attacks were made. A total of ten torpedoes were fired making six hits. Although the SAILFISH was depth charged, the commanding officer was persistent, vigorous, and aggressive in the pursuit of the enemy until the carrier was sunk ten hours after contact. At the time the carrier received the "coup de grace" the commanding officer was surprised by the presence of a cruiser, the TAKAO or MACHI class. Only the close vicinity of exploding depth charges, being surprised, and poor depth control prevented a "coup de main" upon this enemy ship.

Three days after the first contact, the SAIFISH was surprised, strafed, and bombed by Zeke type fighter plane, causing temporary loss of main power and damage to the flange of the hull velve to the circulating water to the main motor cooler. Final results of this bombing most probably caused a later flash-over of #1 main motor requiring it to be jumped for the remainder of the cruise. Later, the noise level of the bow and stern planes increased requiring minimum operation.

The second contact consisted of two AK's and two escorts. As the two AK's were overlapping, a spread of four torpedoes was fired using the selected point of aim as the point of overlap of the near ship on the far ship. Two hits were made followed by an explosion. The SAILFISH was depth charged and required to go deep to evade. Characteristic breaking up noises of a sinking ship was heard. Two hours and twenty minutes after attack, the submarine surfaced and closed the attack point. One AK was still afloat but damaged and four escorts milling around the crippled ship. Because there were so many more escorts in the party, the nearness of daylight, and the near patrol boat signalling the

— page 215 —
1. USS, SAILFISH Tenth War Patrol - Comments on.

SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-FOUR

FB5-44/A16-3

Serial 03

C.O.N.F.T.P.E.N.T.I.A.I

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH Tenth War Patrol - Comments on.

SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-FOUR

SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-F

— page 216 —
15/6/44
FC5-4/16-3
Serial: 015
CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS SAILFISH Report
of Tenth War Patrol.

From:
To:
Via:

Subject:
1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR is gratified to note the fine fire control performance of the U.S.S. SAILFISH during all attacks. The importance of being on a steady course when firing cannot be overemphasized.

3. The reliability of the torpedoes is especially noteworthy.

4. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. SAILFISH are congratulated on a vigorous and effective patrol.

G. B. LOMSBEN.

— page 217 —
1 022121
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 068
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
SALIFISH Report of
Tenth War Patrol.
COMMUSBAG PATROL REPORT NO. 243
U.S.S. SALIFISH - TENTH WAR PATROL.
From:
To:
Via:
Subject:
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
U.S.S. SALIFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.
(17 November 1943 to 5 January 1944).

1. The tenth war patrol of the SALIFISH was the first for the new Empire.
2. This patrol can be considered one of the outstanding patrols of the war, primarily because of the most aggressive and tenacious attack made on the large aircraft carrier the night and following day of 3-4 December. In spite of typhoon weather and the inability to see the target, the SALIFISH made two separate attacks at night which resulted in two hits out of four torpedoes fired in each case and which succeeded in stopping the carrier. The following morning the SALIFISH conducted a submerged approach and fired the final four torpedoes of which two were successful in making the kill. These brilliant tactics were driven home in spite of the destroyers and cruiser escort. This is the first known unassisted sinking of an enemy carrier by a submarine of this force. In addition to the above attacks, the SALIFISH conducted two other aggressive and successful attacks resulting in sinkings of enemy ships. It is of note that most of the patrol was made even though the SALIFISH had suffered material damage from an unexpected severe enemy bombing.

3. The continued excellent torpedo exploder performances is apparent in the results of this patrol where 10 hits out of 17 torpedoes fired were obtained and where six of those hits were made on the carrier in spite of mountainous seas.

4. The Commanding Officer's comments regarding personnel and the training thereof are noteworthy. Every moment available while on route to and from areas must be utilized in training now hands.

5. The Commanding Officer's description of the carrier indicates that it was one of the new convert: KASUGA class.

6. This patrol is considered successful for Combat Insignia Award.

— page 218 —
12-10/416-3(8)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 068
CERT DENTAL
NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTERING PATROL AREA.

SUBJECT: U.S.S. SALIFISH (SS192) - Report of Tenth War Patrol.
(17 November 1943 to 1 January 1944).

7. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew for this aggressive and successful war patrol and for the sinking of this important aircraft carrier. The SALIFISH is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

SUNK
1 - Aircraft Carrier (KASUGA class) - 22,500 tons
1 - Freighter (ADEN MARU class) - 5,839 tons
1 - Freighter (AKAGI MARU class) - 7,390 tons

TOTAL - 35,729 tons

DAMAGED
1 - Freighter (TOKIWA MARU class) - 7,098 tons

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)
Cominch (5)
CNO (5)
Cincpac (6)
Intel. Cen. Fac. Ocean Areas (1)
Comservpac (3)
(Adv.Base Plan.Unit) (1)
Cinclant (2)
Comsubsblant (8)
S/M School, NL (2)
Comsopec (2)
Comsowespec (1)
Comsubsowespec (2)
CTF 72 (2)
Comcorpac (1)
Comsubspec (40)
SUBAD, MI (2)

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

J. A. WOODRUFF, Jr.
Flag Secretary.

— page 220 —
6 September 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. SAILFISH.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 201.
       (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 20.
       (3) The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
       (4) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. SAILFISH - Report of Eleventh War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the eleventh war patrol of this vessel, conducted as a unit in a coordinated attack group in the area south of FORMOSA and north of LUZON, during the period 9 July 1944 to 6 September 1944 is forwarded herewith.

FILMED
87948

— page 221 —
9 July 1944
Arrived Pearl Harbor 4 January 1944 from tenth war patrol. Proceeded to San Francisco, California for battle damage repairs and overhaul. During period 15 January 1944 to 17 June 1944 overhauled and completed all outstanding alterations at Bethlehem Steel Company Submarine Repair Basin. Major work items included replacing damaged hull section, realigning shafts, renewing reduction gear pinions, lengthening conning tower, converting 3 AB ballast tanks to fuel ballast, and installing renonvated battery, 4"50 gun, PRI, Berkoloy trim pump, and bow and stern plane shifting clutches. Depermed and reballasted. Arrived Pearl Harbor 26 June. Conducted sound test and 8 days training exercises including a special coordinated attack exercise.

(B) NARRATIVE:
9 July 1944
1340 VW Underway in company with USS BILLFISH and USS GREENLING. Task Group Commander in USS BILLFISH.

10 - 12 July 1944
En Route Midway.

13 July 1944
0945 Y Moored berth S-2 Midway. Received services and minor repairs.

14 July 1944
0900 Y Underway in company with USS BILLFISH and USS GREENLING. Formed scouting line as ordered by Group Commander.

15 - 20 July 1944
En Route. Conducting independent training, battle problems, and schooling. Made rendezvous with Group Commander at 1320 M on 17 July as ordered and exchanged visual messages.

21 July 1944
1815 K Received contact report from BILLFISH indicating she was proceeding to attack a small AK. Maneuvered to intercept and make coordinated attack.

-1- ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 222 —
1815 K Broke off and resumed base course after BILLFISH reported (Cont.) contact was sampan. After the exchange of considerable radio traffic between group units to develop this contact a strong Jap station (assume it was the sampan) opened up on the group frequency and sent a fake code message complete with a fake authenticator. When no one bit and rogered for his message he requested "V'ss". No one in the group obliged him.

22 July 1944

1900 K Converted 3 AB fuel ballast to normal ballast. Discovered a fuel discrepancy of minus 6000 gallons.

23 July 1944

1540 K Sighted lone Jap clinging to a spherical mooring buoy. Picked him up. He is a fisherman who has been in the water four days since one of our subs sank the sampan on which he was a member of the crew (so he says). His moderate case of salt water immersion will be a good practical factor for the pharmacist's mate.

1720 K Circled and passed a small swamped rowboat type sampan containing 3 Jap males - one strong enough to stand and wave, one apparently too weak to stand and sitting with water above his waist holding the head of a third who appeared nearly gone.

24 July 1944

1810 K Doubtful periscope contact. Avoided at high speed.

25 July 1944

En Route. Did not make rendezvous as ordered because excessive fuel expenditure would have been required to make up six hours lost investigating click in port reduction gear. Click removed by stoning single high spot.

26 July 1944

0200 I Made passage through NANSEI SHOTO group passing between AMAMI O SHIMA and YAKAOTA SHIMA.

0440 I Submerged. Conducting submerged patrol off west coast of AMAMI O SHIMA.

2033 I Surfaced. Conducting surface patrol off west coast of YURON SHIMA.

- 2 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 223 —
27 July 1944
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:
0453 I Submerged west of OKINOYERABU SHIMA and commenced passage between OKINOYERABU SHIMA and YURON SHIMA in order to be able to intercept close inshore traffic indicated by area analysis and also to be able to arrive tomorrow's assigned position using economical speed tonite.
1238 I Ship Contact # 1. Small sailing sampan southbound between islands. Initial bearing 073°T range 4000 yards.
28 July 1944
Conducting surface patrol on scouting line.
29 July 1944
Conducting submerged patrol on scouting line. Routined torpedoes.
30 July 1944
Conducting surface patrol on scouting line.
31 July 1944
0800 I Entered patrol area. Conducting surface and submerged patrol.
1 August 1944
0544 I Submerged.
1015 I Sighted surfaced submarine bearing 200°T, range 6000 yards, course east, speed twelve knots. Identified by silhouette and camouflage as friendly.
1041 I Surfaced and attempted to close friendly submarine. He was already at 12000 yards headed east and apparently didn't see us or wasn't interested.
1255 I Submerged.
1950 I Surfaced.
2 August 1944
0544 I Submerged.
1132 I Surfaced.
1138 I Plane contact # 1 on SD radar 18 miles. Lost contact at 20 miles.
1346 I Submerged.

- 3 -
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 224 —
1952 I Surfaced.
2000 I Commenced westbound passage through BALINTANG Channel.
3 August 1944
0605 I Submerged.
1100 I Surfaced.
1112 I Plane contact # 2 on SD radar 30 miles. Lost contact at 32 miles.
1230 I Plane contact # 3, two pips at 8 and 21 miles respectively.
1230 I Submerged.
1406 I Surfaced.
1445 I Plane contact # 4 on SD radar 12 miles closing to 10 miles.
1445 I Submerged.
1552 I Surfaced.
1715 I Plane contact # 5 on SD radar 12 miles closing to 11 miles.
1715 I Submerged.
1935 I Surfaced.
4 August 1944
0555 I Submerged.
0655 I Surfaced.
0830 I Plane contact # 6 on SD radar 23 miles. Lost contact at 27 miles.
0945 I Plane contact # 7 on SD radar 28 miles. Lost contact at 28 miles.
1041 I Plane contact # 8 on SD radar 24 miles. Lost contact at 27 miles.
1041 I Passed through extensive area of oil slicks and small pieces of wreckage. Several patches of thick yellowish grease. Picked up sample.
1747 I Plane contact # 9 on SD radar 12 miles. Submerged.

- 4 -
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 225 —
1845 I Surfaced.
1845 I Plane contact # 10 (while surfacing) on SD radar 6 miles closing to 4 miles. Submerged until sunset.

1939 I Surfaced.

0527 I Submerged.

1230 I Surfaced.

1234 I Plane contact # 11. Sighted "Mavis" type patrol plane distant 12 miles. Submerged.

1312 I Plane contact # 12. Sighted by periscope same "Mavis" plane distant 7 miles circling.

1939 I Surfaced.

6 August 1944

0020 I While proceeding to assigned position and with a full moon at 45 degrees elevation, clear atmosphere, sighted dark shears of USS BILLFISH range 9500 yards. Radar contact 3 minutes later at range 9150. The BILLFISH was roughly down moon and had an angle on the bow of less than 60 port. This is our third experience which makes me believe the camouflaged hull is of no avail when the shear vertical surfaces remain so black and easily seen against a light background or sharp horizon.

0600 I Submerged to conduct submerged patrol as ordered.

1155 I While patrolling submerged sighted 2 engine flying boat similar to PBY distant 3 miles circling. Plane contact # 13.

2006 I Surfaced.

7 August 1944

0055 I Again made sight contact on BILLFISH prior to making radar contact. Range 8500 yards. Closed and exchanged information to date by keying SJ Radar.

0600 I Submerged and commenced stationery patrol as directed.

0830 I Sighted patrol boat distant 6500 yards bearing 311°T on course 190°T making various speeds from 0 to 300 turns. Ship contact # 2.

- 5 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 226 —
7 August 1944

1037 I Sighted "Rufe" float plane circling distant 10 miles. Plane contact # 14.

1045 I Sighted "Rufe" distant 4 miles, course south. Plane contact # 15.

1105 I Sighted 9 sailing sampans with two Tuna Boat type escorts, course south, range 7000 yards, bearing 302°T. Ship contact # 3.

1107 I Sighted 6 sailing sampans with one Tuna Boat type escort bearing 010°T, range 7000 yards, course south. Ship contact # 4.

1200 I Maneuvering to pass between the two groups of sampans and let them pass to south. We have been one month out of MIDWAY now and have had only one piddling sailboat contact prior to today. Now we have the quantity so far as quantity goes but no quality. None of these spitkits could be remotely considered worthy of a torpedo and battle surfacing is out because of our tactical situation.

1337 I Sighted "Rufe" bearing 066°T, 4 miles, course southeast. Plane contact # 16.

1425 I Sighted faint smoke bearing 223°T, estimated range 20 miles.

1430 I Made out three faint puffs of smoke bearing 221, 223, and 230°T. Ship contact # 5. Commenced approach on normal approach course, assuming they are headed north. We are west northwest of our assigned position because of our maneuvering to clear the sempan fleet and fortunately so because I estimate that these ships will pass between BILLFISH and GREENLING leaving us almost out in the cold.

1615 I Heard distant single explosion.

1625 I Can see mast tops of northern most ship with big angle on the bow.

1635 I Sighted masts and stack of middle ship with small angle on bow. Can not see northern ship now and can only see smoke of southern ship. Selected middle ship as target for tracking purposes. Am running deep and using speed between 10 minute looks.

1645 I Target upperworks look like typical BOSYU MARU A/S ship.

1700 I Target identification still uncertain. He could be a lightly loaded small AK. Angle on the bow varies from 50 to 130.

— page 227 —
7 August 1944

1715 I. Am running at 6 knots between 10o ks. Have decided target is a MFM 3500 ton AK in ballast, speed 9 knots. Unless he changes his base course towards I'll have a hard time hitting him at long range with the mirror-like sea. The saving factor is that I can see the southern ship now in my quick low power look and he looks like a fat single stack tanker with a small angle on the bow.

1735 I. Target still going away range 6100. Shifted to southern target. On looking at him in high power discovered he is not a single stack fat tanker at good range but a mine sweep with canvas awnings spread, range 2800 with 35 starboard angle on the bow. Commenced swinging hard right for a stern shot.

1747 I. Target checks in at 9 knots and still hasn't seen the scope despite the glassy sea. After gyro regulator picked this moment to malfunction, am matching in hand.

1749 I. Fired tubes 5, 6, and 7 (MK XVIII - 1) with depths settings of 5, 5, and 4 feet. Spread them with the periscope using a point just inside his stern, the gun forward, and the stack as points of aim. The firing set was not good but it wasn't going to get any better so staked steady aiming and deliberate firing on producing results.

1751 I. Torpedo number 3 hit. This is the first time I've witnessed a hit through the scope and the affect of a warhead on that Jap was amazing - he seemed to disintegrate, everything went sky high. Within a fraction of a second there was nothing there but smoke and debris in the air.

1753 I. First and second torpedoes exploded at end of run, just as sound reported high speed screws on port quarter and starboard beam. I was in the process of letting the Exec and TDC operator "take a look", had forgotten about torpedoes 1 and 2, and have never had a "free" target before so ordered take her down.

1802 I. Back up to periscope depth to regain a too hastily lost initiative. No planes, no A/S in sight. Just the debris and the AK still running north and now with much black smoke out his stack. The screws reported by sound were (I believe) the torpedo screws and the reverse bearing.

— page 228 —
1810 I Assume that there were 3 or more vessels in this convoy, that either BILLFISH or GREENLING eliminated one at 1615. My AK is running for protection of the islands to north. If any other ships were present they have turned south or have turned west into the GREENLING's area. I should have seen anything which turned east towards my area. My AK is a bird in hand so commenced chasing him submerged planning to overtake on the surface tonight.

1915 I Target smoke indicates he may be headed for the 13 fathom slot between IBUHOS and SABTANG Islands.

2015 I Surfaced and commenced chase. Smoke no longer in sight at all, though it is still fairly bright twilit.

2118 I Gave OTC information concerning enemy and decoded orders to search to south. Did not believe OTC had yet received decoded of my report so continued chase to north.

2132 I SJ radar operating only intermittently. Radar personnel placed knee deep in the conning tower all working like mad on tubes, condensers, resistors etc. etc.

2200 I Received orders to search to north.

2230 I Have reached northern limit of 10 knot target escape circle if he kept to west of IBUHOS Island. Changed course to east to intercept him if he continued on through the slot between IBUHOS and SABTANG Islands. The moon is full and is one hour up so have excellent visibility in this clear atmosphere.

2249 I Possible pip on to radar 1-1/2 miles to west of cantor of ITBAYAT Island. Radar kicked in just long enough to make one sweep and get this doubtful pip. Changed course to run close up west side of ITBAYAT Island to investigate the pip. If this pip is our AK then he must have made botter than 10 knots. We have covered all possibilities from 6 to 9 knots assuming he stayed to west of or in the island chain which his smoke indicated he was doing.

2345 I A run up the west side of ITBAYAT Island 8000 yards off the beach with 4 officers and 2 lookouts trying to pickup a target has resulted in nothing but a persistent effort by a signal station on top the island to get us to answer his challenges.

2357 I Changed course to west as directed. Have concluded that the AK did the smart thing and anchored in the shallow water between IBUHOS and SABTANG Islands to await for help. We have covered all other possibilities except a turn to south-east after 2000 which seems improbable.

— page 229 —
8 August 1944

U.S.S. SULFISH
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:
8 August 1944

0045 I Received orders to proceed to new patrol station.

0545 I Submerged to conduct submerged patrol. Sighted much wreckage and debris during the day including an empty life boat, many oil drums, and an empty life ring.

1503 I Sighted smoke bearing 263°T estimated range 20 miles. Changed course towards and increased speed.

1530 I Lost sight of smoke.

1612 I Smoke has not been seen since 1530 so surfaced and commenced closing at high speed. The smoke was in the GREENLING or BILLFISH area and I'll get left in the cold unless we can get over there.

1630 I Sighted periscope bearing 320°T, range 2500 yards. Avoided on surface. A sun line shows that a westerly current set plus our surface running puts us in BILLFISH area.

1655 I Plane contact # 17 on SD radar 8 miles. Submerged and changed course. to return to area.

1950 I Surfaced.

2030 I Message from GREENLING indicates that our smoke contact was probably the patrol boat she reports sinking about 1500 to-day. Missed more radio schedule traffic trotice on as result of superfluous radio transmissions on group frequency. Extensive tuning of transmitters, inopportune times of transmissions, repeated messages to clarify garbles due to operators poor keying, superfluous messages, improper use of serial numbers, etc., etc. have kept communications in a dither as well as giving the Jap good opportunity to DF and unduly hampering the proper copying of fox schedules.

9 August 1944

0552 I Submerged.

1330 I While conducting submerged patrol heard heavy running dull explosion. At first thought we had bumped around (in 1300 fathoms of water) since ship was jarred appreciably. Source of explosion undetermined - believe possible earthquake.

1828 I Sighted large land based bomber bearing 150°T, distance 6 miles. Plane contact # 18.

959 I Surfaced.

— page 230 —
10 August 1944
: 0545 I Submerged. Commenced work on stern plane motor. Motor armature will not rotate in Dive direction. (See Major Defects).
: 1249 I Surfaced.
: 1320 I Plane contact.# 19 on SD radar 8 miles. Submerged.
: 1635 I Stern planes back in commission. Surfaced.
: 1718 I Plane contact # 20 on SD radar 12 miles closing to 7 miles. Submerged.
: 1935 I Surfaced.
: 2400 I Made rendezvous as directed.

11 August 1944

0000 I Exchanging information with Group Commander by keying SJ radar. Group Commander believes our presence has been detected and that traffic has been diverted. Told him that have used SD roughly 5 seconds out of 45 when on the surface and believe we have been visually detected only once (at 1845 I on 4 August). Upon learning that Group Commander did not have the GUITARRO's contact report sent it to him. Henceforth I will ask Group Commander if he has received important fox messages. The two hour delay involved concerning this message in light of the Group Commander's decision to act on it now involves excessive fuel and high speed surface running in an area well patrolled by planes.

0150 I Set course and built speed as directed. Heavy seas from dead ahead, plus the wet "Trigger" type bridge, which I now dislike, prohibit more than 12 knots.

0948 I Abated seas allow 16 knots. Have decided not to use SD radar any more this trip.

1256 I Sighted two engine land based bomber "Sally" bearing 090°T, distant 6 miles. Submerged. Plane contact # 21. Do not believe we were sighted.

1333 I Surfaced and commenced high speed again.

1410 I Sighted high periscope of surfaced submarine bearing 120°T, range about 15000 yards and simultaneously sighted two engine land based bomber "Sally" bearing 170°T, distant 7 miles. Submerged. Plane contact # 22. Believe we were not sighted.

— page 231 —
11 August 1944

1430 I No plane in sight in periscope and no submarine in sight. Since we are about 12 miles northwest of the BILLFISH position and since continued effort to pick up a submarine or submarine high periscope has been fruitless, assume that it was the BILLFISH and that he was forced down by the same "Sally". Although we are not yet in our assigned position (20 miles further east), we are within 8 miles of anticipated track and we are sufficiently clear of BILLFISH so that we won't embarrass each other, have decided to remain submerged closing track and avoiding detection of the "Sally" who is apparently patrolling this area.

1548 I Slighted "Sally" close aboard at 40° elevation while making first rapid "antiplane" sweep after up scope. Down scope. Do not believe we were sighted. There is a good wind and plenty of white oars to hide feather and the two feet of scope which was up only a few seconds. Plane contact # 23.

1700 I Received message on SD mast from Group Commander ordering high speed search to east.

1728 I Surfaced and commenced search.

2100 I Radar contact on BATAAN Islands 52000 yards. Received orders to search to west. Asked and received permission to investigate area west of ITBAYAT Island. Our AK of the 7th headed this way and the presence of the signal station implies that traffic may be running close inshore here.

2222 I Signal station commenced beating his guns again as on the 7th. It was reasonable on the 7th to assume that he had sighted us in the moon path at 8000 yards but tonite the radar is working and I am paralleling the beach at 12000 yards on a jet black nite at slow speed with little wake. Would like to discover he is signalling to some traffic between us and beach but a most careful and prolonged search by radar and sight reveals nothing. It is definitely a signal light. Would like to look this island and beach over in the day time.

2238 I Discontinued search and set course for ordered position.

12 August 1944

0553 I Submerged to conduct submerged patrol as ordered.

1021 I Sighted float biplane "Pete" bearing 120°T distant 2 miles. Plane contact # 24.

1400 I Sighted 2 "Sallys" twin engine land based bombers bearing 060°T distant 10 miles. Plane contact # 25.

1958 I Surfaced.

— page 232 —
13 August 1944
0559 I. Submerged. Rounded torpedoes.
1957 I. Surfaced.
14 August 1944
0557 I. Submerged. Repaired master gyro.
1951 I. Surfaced.
15 August 1944
0620 I. Submerged.
1127 I. Surfaced. Conducting surface patrol.
17 August 1944
0614 I. Submerged.
1008 I. Surfaced. Conducting surface patrol.
18 August 1944
0029 I. Radar contact bearing 020°T range 22,650 yards. Commenced approach. Ship contact # 6. Estimated target course south speed 13. Sent contact report on group frequency.
0042 I. Tracking on parallel course range now 14000 we have one large target on course 220°T (angle on bow 40 port) with one escort ahead and one on each quarter, escorts 800 to 1500 yards from target. Target speed 15 knots. There is no moon, sky is completely overcast, the rain has stopped, wind and seas strong from the south. Cannot make over 15 knots ourselves without shipping water down hatch, much spray and wet bridge.
0110 I. Am trying to close track by converging 30 degrees on his course. He has maintained constant speed and course.
0127 I. Am gradually closing track but am also gradually losing bearing. Range 6900 yards. The leading escort apparently guesses there is something cooking because he has moved back on the far flank and come over on port quarter to a position astern and inboard of the original port quarter escort.

- 12 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 233 —
18 August 1944

U.S.S. SAILFISH
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-I:
0127 I. There is no indication of enemy radar on APR. They may (Cont.) have a radar detector or may be alerted as a result of our group contact messages. Some Jap is endeavouring to jam the group frequency.

0130 I. It is too late and we have no speed differential to readjust position and take advantage of the readjustment of the bow escort's position. My plan was to shoot on a 120 track at 3000 yards target range which would put me a minimum of 1500 yards from the original port quarter escort and maintain a small silhouette towards this escort. Right full rudder to point at target and close to firing point.

0132 I. Slowing to 12 knots and opening tube doors. Can see main target dimly and can see the two near-destroyers fairly clearly. One destroyer is in line with targets MOT and second destroyer overlaps his bow into targets stern. Target appears twice as big as either destroyer despite fact range to near destroyer is 2700 and range to target 3900. Target too hazy to identify but is very massive and has much superstructure forward. Believe he is battleship or heavy cruiser.

0134 I. Torpedo run has stopped decreasing and is beginning to increase so at

0135 I. Fired four bow tubes firing range 3600 yards gyros 24° to 32°. left, track angles 134 to 439 port; torpedo run 4500 yards. Torpedo run larger than planned.

0136 I. Right full rudder all ahead full to pull out astern. Watched phosphorescent wakes of all 4 torpedoes leave hot straight and normal.

0137 I. Heard, felt and saw flash of first hit followed 20 seconds later by second hit. Both hits were solid. I was in process of moving to the after bearing transmitter and did not see exact location of hits in the target group. All Bridge personnel saw the flash and heard and felt the hits but also had lost sight of the targets during our turn (took considerable spray over bridge during turn) and hence were unable to see who we had hit. Reader reported that #2 port quarter escort had disappeared (the ex-bow escort) from the radar screen. Could not sight target group from bridge except for a large cloud of smoke.

0139 I. Radar reports no change in relative position of target and the two remaining escorts, no indication of any damage to the target. Would like to think we had two hits in target with good possibility of slowing him down but apparently the destroyer took them. Depth settings were all eight feet so that we would have been ready for one of the escorts if we had been sighted and still have them deep enough to hit the BB below his armor belt.

- 13 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 234 —
2015 I Surfaced. Had a "PIXIE" at 1500 yards closing to 1200 while making radar sweep prior to surfacing. There is a better name for these pips than "PIXIES".

: 23 August 1944

: 0302 I Radar contact bearing 072°T range 6550 yards. Commenced tracking. Ship contact # 9.

: 0338 I Contact is small patrol boat course 330°T speed 6 knots. Avoided and resumed patrolling.

: 0543 I Submerged.

: 0936 I Sighted "Catcher" type patrol boat bearing 056°T range 11000 yards, course 290°T speed 5 knots. Avoided. Ship contact # 10.

: 0953 I Sighted 2 masted gaff rigged schooner, range 9500 yards, course 000°T speed 4 knots. Ship contact # 11. Approached and looked-him over. He has a deck house and an auxiliary engine and would be good shooting for the gun crew in a more auspicious locality. Resumed patrolling.

: 1341 I Sighted "Mavis" plane bearing 222°T distant 6 miles. Plane contact # 31.

: 1440 I Sighted six sailing sampans with one trawler type escort bearing 325°T, 9500 yards, course 140°T speed 4. Avoided. Ship contact # 12.

: 1453 I Passed through heavy grease slick similar to that encoun- tered on 4 August.

: 1529 I Sighted seven sailing sampans with two trawler type escorts bearing 306°T, 10000 yards, course 140°T. Avoided. Ship contact # 13.

: 1625 I Sighted plane "Rufe" bearing 130°T, 3 miles, elevation 7 degrees. Plane contact # 32.

: 1652 I Sighted plane "Mavis" bearing 236°T, 6 miles, elevation 2 degrees. Plane contact # 33.

: 1705 I Sighted unidentified plane bearing 301°T, 8 miles elevation 2 degrees. Plane contact # 34.

: 2010 I Surfaced.

- 16 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 235 —
20 August 1944

U.S.S. SAILFISH
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-L:
0156 I As he crossed the 500 yard line still coming the tracking party suggested passing up a megaphone to "Ask him what his course and speed is." This phenomenon is attributed to a glassy sea plus an area of strong tide rips. We experienced these "PIXIES" many more times during our patrol in this general area. It is noted that submarines have reported numerous phantom radar targets in an area to west of the NANSEI SHOTO which may well be attributed to the same cause.

0602 I Submerged.

1953 I Surfaced.

2001 I Experienced rip tide "PIXIES" again but could see them this time.

2314 I More "PIXIES".

21 August 1944

0601 I Submerged.

1959 I Surfaced.

22 August 1944

0542 I Submerged.

0718 I Sighted flying boat "Mavis" bearing 203°T distant 6 miles. Plane contact # 27.

0805 I Sighted small patrol boat bearing 212°T range 5400 yards, course 340°T, speed 6 knots. Ship contact # 7.

1105 I Sighted "Pete" plane bearing 354°T distant 10 miles. Plane contact # 28.

1119 I Sighted "Mavis" plane bearing 030°T distant 6 miles. Plane contact # 29.

1155 I Sighted 6 single masts bearing 005°T to 013°T. Ship contact # 8. Commenced closing.

1202 I Sighted "Mavis" plane bearing 192°T distant 5 miles. Plane contact # 30.

1300 I Masts determined to be 1 patrol boat and 5 sampans, course southeast, speed 4 knots. Avoided.

- 15 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 236 —
2045 I SJ radar contact on plane bearing 080°T range 11000 yards. Lost radar contact bearing 350°T 17000 yards. The APR indicated interference on 177 Mc following this contact. Plane contact # 35.

: 2119 I "PIXIE" contacts again.

: 2210 I "PIXIE" contacts again. These contacts' are not pleasant because the pip is very sharp and there is nothing to indicate it is not a real target. Immediate avoiding action must be taken in each case despite Aesop and his wolf wolf fable.

: 24 August 1944

: 0220 I SJ radar contact bearing 318°T range 14,450. Commenced tracking. Sent contact report on group frequency.

: 0245 I SJ has 4 targets course southeast spo0d 8 knots. Am taking position on port bow to track and attack such that convoy will be forced west towards BILLFISH and GREENLING. Had heard GREENLING report her position to BILLFISH six hours ago and assume she may not be able to get in on this convoy tonite. I had asked BILLFISH for her position five hours ago when dodging the "PIXIES" and I believe she can get in on the convoy.

: 0315 I Target group smoke can be soon from the bridge. It is a black tropical night with humid misty air and only fair visibility. The picture consists of three good sized ships and a smaller fourth plus a small escort roving ahead and one astern. The ship's are in columns of two each, columns in line of bearing roughly 090 - 270. Have decided to make a bow tube attack on leading ship of near column and then swing left out on the bow again to be in position for another attack. Startea in at high speed.

: 0330 I Received BILLFISH message stating her position and that she is making high speed headed coast. She should make contact shortly.

: 0333 I Fired four bow tubes depth set six feet, gyros 359 - 354, tracks 57 to 59 port, range 3020 yards, divergent spread. Commenced swinging hard left at full speed. The bow escort was on the off bow when we moved in so he gave us no trouble.

: 0335 I First hit a beauty between MOT and stern followed ten seconds later by second hit just forward of MOT. Target immediately lost in cloud of smoke.

- 17 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 237 —
0336 I Can see targets stern with a 60 degree down angle just to right of the smoke. Radar reports he has broken in two.

: 0339 I Two end of run explosions. Post mortem plot later showed torpedoes 1 and 2 hitting, 3 and 4 missing ahead and astern as spread.

: 0342 I Three random depth charges.

: 0345 I Radar reports both ends of target sunk.

: 0347 I Sent message on group frequency giving results of first attack.

: 0343 I Commenced reload forward. Tracking on bow at 10,000 yards.

: 0352 I Received message from GREENLING stating he is commencing radar approach. From the position he gives, believe he has another contact of his own.

: 0357 I Sent message giving own position.

: 0402 I Reload completed. The leading escort has completed his run down to our point of firing and has reversed course and resumed position ahead of the convoy. The convoy has reformed and the picture now consists of one AK leading and two AKs in column astern and on his port quarter, distant about 1000 yards. One small escort roaming ahead and one well astern. Decided to obtain position 2500 yards off the track and let the leading AK come on but after watching bow escort have changed plan to another high speed dash in from port bow while escort is on off bow. Will then turn hard right and let one of the AK's in the near and quarter column take the stern tubes. The horizon is good all around except for a single misty morning twilit cloud in the east which I can use as a back ground behind me.

: 0408 I Received message from group commander to commence end around.

: 0430 I Started in at high speed. The leading AK is a no smoker with MFM sequence and a squat Diesel funnel. I have not been able to use the bridge TBTS because they are almost frozen electrically and I don't want to ruin my vision by reading the fluorescent dial on the bridge (See Derangements) so an using radar ranges and bearings.

: 0446 I Fired four bow tubes: depth set 4 feet, gyros 351 to 346, tracks 60 to 62 port, range 3070 yards, divergent spread. Commenced swinging hard right at full speed. As we swung gave TDC a rough eye estimate on new set up.

- 18 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 238 —
0449 I Two hits heard and felt on bridge. I was watching the target (the Diesel AK) for hits but saw no change in him. The after bridge personnel state, post mortem, that they saw orange glow of hits in the leading AK of the quarter column who immediately became obliterated in smoke.

0450 I After a rough shock bearing from TBT to bring the radar on the stern target and a final set up from radar; fired four stern tubes depth set 4 feet, gyros 181 to 185, tracks 95 to 96 port, range 3560 yards, divergent spread.

0451 I Changed course 30 degrees right to open out.

0452 I Another explosion heard and felt but not seen. Stern tube target nothing but a smoke cloud.

0453 I Stern tube target disappeared from radar screen. The Diesel AK has turned away and the bow escort is headed towards. I can't figure out what has happened. I have heard two of the bow-salvo hit and yet the bow target (the Diesel AK) shows no change except a late turn away. The third explosion hasn't affected anyone either. The only thing unusual is that the leading quarter AK cannot be seen through his mass of smoke. TDC says the after tube salvo hasn't reached him yet.

0500 I Three explosions heard and felt on bridge. Either end of runs or depth charges. My impression from the bridge is that something hit the last target but I don't know what. Radar reports this target has disappeared and only smoke can be seen from bridge. No bow tube hits were seen in the Diesel AK and no stern tube hits were seen in the stern tube target. Sent message 2nd and 3rd attacks completed and one torpedo remaining.

0505 I Morning twilit. Am opening to northeast to get clear of escorts.

0511 I Received message from BILLIFISH stating she has radar contact and is starting end around to port.

0536 I Sent message stating hed 3 hits results unknown.

0541 I Received message from Group Commander directing us to trail.

0544 I Submerged and commenced trailing.

0646 I One very heavy smoker and one light smoker bearing 203°T.

0700 I Transmitted information of enemy position on SD antennae, received no receipts so assume the other boats are submerged also.

- 19 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 239 —
0903 I Lost sight of smoke bearing 188°T.
0949 I Sighted tops of seven big channel buoys of the compressed gas lighted type to southwest. At first thought we were seeing the tops of seven sailing sampans.

1100 I Maneuvering to avoid the buoys. They are drifting with the two knot northeasterly current and present a strange appearance. They are spread out along a line about 3000 yards long in line of bearing roughly NW-SE. Don't think they are interconnected. Either they are survivors of one of our AK's or the Jap has something crazy up his sleeve. Avoided to-NW.

1400 I Have plotted this mornings firing data and am chagrined at what happened. The control party and radar tracked and fired the bow tubes not at my Diesel AK but at the leading quarter AK which I was saving for the stern tubes. When we swung right to bring the stern tubes to bear they lost the set up and I coached them on to the leading quarter AK which was my number two target but in reality was the same target upon which the bow tubes were used. All the data checks and agrees with the observations of the bridge personnel that two bow torpedoes hit, two bow tubes missed because of spread, and all stern tubes missed because the target was no longer making 7 knots but was on his way down. The third explosion remains unaccounted for but was not a torpedo hit. It was a stupid error and an expensive lesson. It certainly brings home the necessity for extremely close cooperation between bridge and the conning tower during multiple shots.

1440 I Lost sight of buoys.

2001 I Surfaced and headed south to vicinity of this morning's attack.

2024 I SJ radar contact range 5400 yards, small pip. Believed to be patrol boat, avoided.

2028 I Transmitted message stating we did not have contact and giving last known enemy position course and speed plus results of this mornings attacks.

2030 I Received orders from Group Commander to return to base. Set course to southeast.

2153 I Strong SJ radar interference bearing 100°T. This at first gave impression of railing jamming but examination shows it to be foreign radar. It is strong and stable and has a wide pulse rate of about 200 cyclos.

- 20 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 240 —
24 August 1944
*2153 I We can stop eight pulses across our screen. We have no pip. (Cont) This foreign radar does not affect the normal use of our SJ except that when we center on the bearing of his radar he stops sweeping and centers on us. In order to limit his chances of homing on us we opened our transmitter key when taking bearings of him. A plot of the bearings taken between 2153 and 0051 placed the source of the foreign radar stationary at 21-30N 122-48E or roughly in the center of the BASHI passage.

25 August 1944
0547 I Trim dive.
0618 I Surfaced.
0826 I Sighted three zero type fighters bearing 175°T, distant 7 miles, elevation 3°. Submerged as they banked and headed towards. Plane contact # 36.
1250 I Sighted surfaced friendly submarine bearing 319°T.
1305 I Surfaced and exchanged visual messages with the SPADEFISH.
2245 I Sent despatch serial one to ComSubPac.
2345 I Zero ground on # 4 main motor series field. Jumped this motor out temporarily and made preparations to open it up.

26 August 1944
0552 I Submerged.
0604 I Surfaced.

27 August 1944
0956 I Submerged. Port shaft out of commission while working on # 4 motor attempting to find cause of zero ground.
2029 I Surfaced. Unable to find cause of ground. We will leave # 4 motor jumped out.

28 August 1944
0539 K Submerged.
0553 K Surfaced.

1145 K Sighted unidentified bomber bearing 045°T, distant 8 miles. Submerged. Plane contact # 37.

- 21 -

ENCLOSURE (i)

— page 242 —
5 September 1944
0500 M Wind from 230°T. Barometer coming up. Wind has abated to about 20 knots. The worst is over.
1000 M Wind has shifted to 210°T and seas are slowly flattening. Came left to 140°T.
1300 M Went ahead 10 knots. Storm has passed. Barometer up to 29.40.
5 September 1944
0000 Y Changed dates to repeat 5 September.
6 September 1944
0930 Y Made rendezvous with air escort and proceeded to Midway.
1215 Y Moorad at Midway.

- 23 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 243 —
0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-I:
(C) WEATHER:
Weather throughout the patrol was generally good except for the period 2 - 5 September.
In the area the usual number of low latitude summer squalls were encountered. Winds and seas were generally light and calm.
The typhoon encountered from 2 - 5 September saw winds to approximately 40 knots and seas to scale 8.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION:
The variable currents as charted were found to be strongly dependent on the state of the tide - setting west on flood and east on ebb. Maximum current velocity experienced was 2 knots with average 1 knot. These currents were roughly only 50% of those indicated on area charts.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:
No Navigational Aids were sighted. This area lands itself to easy piloting because of the steep to islands which can be used for both visual and radar fixes. It was necessary to utilize three different charts while in the area. It is recommended that one chart be published to cover the area 13° - 30°N to 23° - 30°N and 119° to 124°E.

- 24 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 244 —
1238I : 27-12 N : Sailing : 6000 180 4K : P : inter island passage
: 7/27 : 128-31E : Sampan : 6000 180 4K : P : stopped to listen a-
: 0830I : 19-49 N : Patrol : 8000 180 6K : P : bout every 10 min.
: 8/7 : 121-52E : Boat : 8000 180 6K : P : Resembled Tuna boat.
: 1105I : 19-53 N : 9 Sailing : 7000 190 -- : P : PB resembled Tuna
: 8/7 : 121-50E : Sampans : 7000 190 -- : P : Boat.
: 1425I : 19-42 N : 2 AK : 40000 025 9K : R : AK well decker MFM
: 8/7 : 121-37E : 1 CM : 40000 025 9K : R : 3500 ton in ballast,
:

— page 245 —
8/2/44 8/3/44 8/3/44 8/3/44 8/3/44
: 1138I 1112I 1230I 1445I 1715I
: 19-46N 19-4N 19-48N 19-50N 19-53N
: 122-41E 120-58E 120-59E 121-04E 121-07E
: 8 kts 7 kts 8 kts 8 kts 8 kts
: 050°T 000°T 180°T 000°T 020°T
: Surf. Surf. Surf. Surf. Surf.
: 0 0 0 0 0
: 1 1 2 1 1
: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
: SD SD SD SD SD
: 18 mi. 30 mi. 8 & 21 12 mi. 12 mi.
:

— page 246 —
6 7 8 9 10
Date: 8/4/44 8/4/44 8/4/44 8/4/44 8/4/44
Time (Zone): 0830I 0945I 1041I 1747I 1845I
Position: Lat. 19-57N 19-46N 19-37N 20-13N 20-10N
Long. 119-53E 119-53E 119-52E 119-50E 119-50E
Speed: 7 kts 8.5 kts 8.5 kts 8 kts 4 kts
Course 180°T 180°T 180°T 180°T 220°T
Trim Surf. Surf. Surf. Surf. Surf.
Min. Since Last SD Radar Search 0 0 0 0 0
Number 1 1 1 1 1
Type Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
Probable Mission Unk Unk Unk Unk
How Contacted SD SD SD SD SD
Initial Range 23 mi. 28 mi. 24 mi. 12 mi. 6 mi.
Elevation Angle - - - - - -
Range & Relative Bearing to Plane  ND ND ND ND Unk
Wind to Depth 1500 1500 1500 1500 1000
Clouds: Clear, 60 50 60 90 90
(Floating/Rel. - - - - -)
Moon: (days) - - - - - -
(Present Illum. - - - - -)

ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 247 —
8/5/44 8/5/44 8/6/44 8/7/44 8/7/44
: 1234I 1312I 1155I 1037I 1045I
: 20-19N 20-20N 19-28N 19-53N 19-53N
: 120-512E 120-512E 122-22E 121-50E 121-50E
: 4 kts 2.2 kts 18 kts 1.8 kts 1.8 kts
: 000°T 000°T 145°T 125°T 125°T
: Surf. Per. Per. Per. Per. Per.
: .25 0 0 0 0
: 1 1 1 1 1
: Pat. Pat. Pat or Pat & Pat & Escort Escort Escort
: Mavis Mavis UNK * Rufe Rufe
: Sight Pors. Pors. Pors. Pors.
: 12 mi. 7 mi. 3 mi. 10 mi. 4 mi.
: 1° 2° 4° 1° 4°
: ND ND ND ND ND
: 3 3 2 2 2
: 230°T 230°T 240°T 350°T 350°T
: 20 mi. 30 mi. 20 mi. 15 mi. 15 mi.
: 1800 1000 2000 3000 3000
: 60 55 30 40 40
:

— page 248 —
16 17 18 19 20
Date: 8/7/44 8/8/44 8/9/44 8/10/44 8/10/44
Time (Zone): 1337I 1655I 1828I 1320I 1718I
Position: Lat. 19-52N 20-07N 18-45N 19-11.5N 19-04N
Long. 121-56E 120-35E 119-52.5E 118-57E 118-54E
Speed 1.8 kt 10 kts 2 kts 8 kts 8 kts
Course 120°T 135°T 180°T 180°T 180°T
Trim Per. Surf. Per. Surf. Surf. Surf.
Minutes since Last SD Search 0 0 0 0 0
Number 1 1 1 1 1
Type Rufe Unk Sally Unk Unk
Probable Mission Pat. Pat. Pat. Pat. Pat.
How Contacted Pers. SD Pers. SD SD
Initial Range 4 mi. 8 mi. 6 mi. 8 mi. 12 mi.
Elevation Angle 4° -- 5° -- -- -
Range & Relative Bearing of Plane WhaNit Detected S/M ND ND ND ND
(State(Beau- 2 0 2 2 4
Sea: (fcrct)
(Direction 245°T -- 088°T 055°T 066°T
Visibility(Miles) 15 mi. 20 mi. 14 mi. 20 mi. 15 mi.
(Height in: 2000 3000 4000 2500 3000
Clouds: Ft.
(Pergont 60 40 60 70 80
(Overcast
(Bearing(Rel 1 1 1 1 1
Moon: (angle
(Porcent
Illum. 1 1 1 1 1

- 29 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 249 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH
G:  AIRCRAFT CONTACT

CONTACT NUMBER: 21  22  23  24  25

Date: 8/11/44: 8/11/44: 8/11/44: 8/11/44: 8/12/44

Time (Zone): 1256I 1411I 1548I 1555I 1021I

Position: Lat.: 20-17.5N 20-23.5N 20-25.5N 20-25.7N 20-29N

Long.: 120-03.5E 120-16.5E 120-21.5E 120-21.7E 120-07E

Speed: 14.8 kt: 15 kts: 2.6 kts: 2.6 kts: 2.2 kts

Course: 060°T 080°T 060°T 060°T 253°T

Trim: Surf.: Surf.: Per.: Per.: Per.

Min. Since Last SD Radar Search: 0 0 0 0 0

Number: 1 1 1 1 1

Type: Sally Sally Sally Sally Pete

Probable Mission: Pat.: Pat.: Pat.: Pat.: Pat.

How Contacted: Sight Sight Per.: Per.: Per.: Per.

Initial Range: 6 mi.: 7 mi.: 1 mi.: 4 mi.: 2 mi.

Elevation Angle: 4° 4° 40° 5° 15°

Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When it Detected S/M: ND ND ND ND ND

(State (Beau-: 4 4 4 4 3
Sea: (fort): 090°T 090°T 095°T 095°T 099°T

Visibility (Miles): 14 mi.: 14 mi.: 14 mi.: 14 mi.: 14 mi.

Clouds: (Height in: 3000 3000 3000 3000 4500
Ft.): (Percent
Overcast): 70 70 70 70 40

(Bearing (Rel.: )

Moon: (Angle
Per: )

Illum.:

— page 250 —
26. 27. 28. 29. 30.
Date: 8/12/44: 8/22/44: 8/22/44: 8/22/44: 8/22/44
Time (Zone): 1400I: 0718I: 1105I: 1119I: 1202I
Position: Lat.: 20-28N: 21-26N: 21-31.5N: 21-32N: 21-33N
Long.: 119-58E: 120-56.5E: 120-57.3E: 120-57.3E: 120-57.3E
Speed: 2 Kts: 2 Kts.: 2 Kts.: 2 Kts.: 2 Kts.
Course: 253°T: 000°T: 180°T: 180°T: 180°T
Trim: Per.: Per.: Per.: Per.: Per.
Min. Sink Last SD Radar Search: 0: 0: 0: 0: 0
Number: 2: 1: 1: 1: 1
Type: Sally: Mavis: Pote: Mavis: Mavis
Probable Mission: Unk: Pat: Pat: Pat: Pat
How Contacted: Per.: Per.: Pers.: Per.: Per.
Initial Range: 10 mi.: 6 mi.: 10 mi.: 6 mi.: 5 mi.
Elevation Angle: 5°: 2°: 1°: 7°: 5°
Range & Relative Bearing of Plane: ND: ND: ND: ND: ND
When it Detected S/M:
(State (Beau-: 3: 1: 1: 1: 1
Sea: (fort): 077°T: 155°T: 155°T: 155°T: 155°T
Direction: 20 mi.: 20 mi.: 30 mi.: 30 mi.: 30 mi.
Visibility (Miles): 5000: 5000: 5000: 5000: 5000
Clouds: (Height in: Ft.: 5000: 5000: 5000: 5000: 5000
(Percent Overcast): 40: 30: 20: 20: 20
(Bearing(Rel): - - - - - -
Moon: (Angle - - - - - -
(Percent Illum.): - - - - - -

- 31 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 251 —
31 32 33 34 35
Date 8/23/44 8/23/44 8/23/44 8/23/44 8/23/44
Time (Zone) 13411 16251 16521 17051 20451
Position: Lat. 21-27.5N 21-31N 21-33N 21-33N 21-30N
Long. 120-50E 120-59E 121-00E 121-01E 121-02E
Speed 2 kts. 2 kts. 2 kts. 2 kts. 4 kts.
Course 190°T 200°T 200°T 200°T 250°T
Trim Per. Per. Per. Per. Surf.
Min. Since Last SD Radar Search 0 0 0 0 0
Number 1 1 1 1 1
Type Mavis Rufo Mavis Unk Unk
Probable Mission Pat. Pat. Pat. Pat. Unk
How Contacted Per. Per. Per. Per. SJ
Initial Range 4 mi. 3 mi. 6 mi. 8 mi. 5.5 mi.
Elevation Angle 2° 7° 2.5° 2° Unk
Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When it Detected S/M ND ND ND ND
(State (Beaufort) 1 1 1 1 2
Sea: (Direction 250°T 250°T 250°T 250°T 220°T
Visibility(Miles) 25 mi. 40 mi. 40 mi. 40 mi. 10 mi.
(Hoight in Ft.) 4000 6000 6000 5000 4000
Clouds: (Percent Overcast) 30 20 20 20 30
(Bearing(Rel) 000°R
Moon: (Angle Percent Illum.) 10° 5%

— page 252 —
36 37 38 39 40
Date: 8/25/44 8/28/44 8/29/44 8/30/44 8/30/44
Time (Zone): 0826I 1145K 1215K 1212K 1541K
Position: Lat. 20-50N 21-42N 21-50N 22-02N 22-03N
Long. 124-00E 138-34E 144-12E 150-26E 151-20E
Speed 15 kts. 15 kts. 15 kts. 15 kts. 15 kts.
Course 083°T 086°T 087°T 087°T 087°T
Trim Surf. Surf. Surf. Surf. Surf.
Mids. Snipe Last 0 0 0 0 0
S/S Patrol Search 0 0 0 0 0

Number: 3 1 1 1 1
Type: Unk * Unk Unk Unk Unk
Propulsion Mission: Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk
How Contacted: Sight Sight SD SD SD SD
Initial Range: 7 mi. 8 mi. 6 mi. 30 mi. 16 mi.
Direction Angle: 4° 3° - - - 15°
Range of Relative Depth: ND ND ND ND ND
When it Detected: 7 3 3 3 3
Sight: 3 3 3 3 3
(Standard: 3 3 3 3 3)
Direction: 3 3 3 3 3
Visibility: 3 3 3 3 3
Clouds: 3 3 3 3 3
(Temperature: 20 32 40 42 45)
(Relative: 3 3 3 3 3)
Moon: (Angle): 3 3 3 3 3
(Percent: 3 3 3 3 3)
Titanium: 3 3 3 3 3

*Looked like low wing monoplane, either land or carrier based fighter.

— page 253 —
1749 I. 8/7/44. 20-04.5N. 121-46E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Similiar to SHIMUSHU Class - CM-11, as Pictured in ONI 41-42.

Ship(s) Sunk: One CM. (EC) visual observation by periscope. Tonnage Sunk: 1200.

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: None

Damage Determined By: Watched him blow up when torpedo hit.

Target Draft 10 Course 053 Speed 9 K

Range (at firing) 2150

Own Ship Data

Speed 2.2 K Course 058 Depth 62 ft.

Angle (at firing) 0° Gyro Angles 72.5-75° R

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:

Submerged day periscope attack. This CM was trailing well astern and on starboard quarter of AK. Firing range to AK too great for existing glassy seas; hence shifted to CM. Fired three Mk. XVIII-1 torpedoes set at 5, 5, and 4 feet depth respectively, spread by periscope aiming first at stern, second at forward gun and third at stack. Data used was that obtained from two observations taken 7 minutes and 2 minutes before firing. It was realized that gyro angles were excessive and range large but set up was not going to improve hono decision to fire and trust on accurate data and aiming to obtain hit. Third torpedo hit and he blew up.

- 34 - ENCLOSURE (L)

— page 254 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH
(H) ATTACK DATA:
U.S.S. Sailfish Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 11
Time: 0135 Date: 8/18/44 Lat. 18-40N Long. 116-10E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: Target was BB or, OA screened by three destroyers. Under existing visibility conditions no distinguishing characteristics could be seen and estimate of target type is based on his massive size and on his heavy extensive superstructure forward.
Ship(s) Sunk: One DD - Interposed between target and own submarine.
Identification: (EE) Definitely a 2 stack destroyer but class unknown.
Tonnage Sunk: 1500.
Ship(s) Damaged or None. Probably Sunk:
Damage Determined By:
Two timed hits at proper time for torpedo run to destroyer. Both hits felt, heard, and the flashes seen from the bridge. One destroyer immediately disappeared from radar screen and did not again reappear.
Target Draft 10 Course 220 Speed 15
Range (at firing) 3650 Gyro Angles 336 to 328
Own Ship Data
Speed 12 K Course 290 Depth Surface
Angle (at firing) 0
Fire Control And Torpedo Data
Type Attack:
Night surface radar attack. Major target was picked up by radar at 22,650 yards and escorts at 14,000 yards. Escorts disposed one ahead and one on each quarter. Own speed limited to 15 knots due to heavy seas hence unable to obtain position ahead. Planned bow tube attack on 120 port track at 3000 yards from position outside port quarter escort.

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— page 255 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH
(H) ATTACK DATA:
U.S.S. Sailfish Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 11
Fire Control And Torpedo Data

Type Attack (Cont.):
Actually fired at 3600 yard range, 134 to 139 tracks, torpedo run 4500. All torpedoes were mark 23 set on 8 feet. Leading escort had moved back on far side around target stern and up to a position inboard and aft of original port quarter escort, Both wore big destroyers and could be seen fairly clearly from the bridge. After shooting and seeing all four fish run normal swung hard right to pull out astern. Firing Mark Eighteens from after tubes not feasible owing to torpedo run. Saw flash and heard and felt two hits in target group. Times correct for hits in destroyer. Heavy smoke pall at target position. Number two port quarter escort (ex-bow escort) disappeared from radar screen and was not seen again. Main target and remaining two escorts increased speed to 20 knots. Trailed for 40 minutes losing destroyers on radar at 15000 yards and the heavy ship at 26000 yards.

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— page 256 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH
:  Torpedo Attack No. ___  Patrol No. ___  Time: ___  Date: ___  Lat. ___  Long. ___  Target Date - Damage Inflicted

Description:
(MKKKM) Large, composite coal burner with high stack, stick masts midway between island and ends, and kingposts at both ends of island. Similiar to SEATTLE and PANAMA MARU's, Page 172-173, ONI 208J (rev.).

Ship(s) Sunk:
1 AK similiar to SEATTLE MARU or PANAMA MARU Class.

Identification:
(EC) Visual observation from bridge.

Tonnage Sunk:
6500.

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk:
None.

Damage Determined By:
Two hits were seen from bridge, stern was last seen with a 60 degree down angle. Radar reported target broke in two parts and both parts disappeared from the screen.

Target Draft ___ 25 Course ___ 140 Speed ___ 8 K

Range (at firing) ___ 3020 yards.

Own Ship Data
Speed ___ 14 K Course ___ 257 Depth ___ Surface
Angle (at firing) ___ Surface Gyro Angles ___ 1 L to 5.5 L

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:
Night surface radar attack. Target was leading AK in port column of enemy convoy consisting of four ships in two columns of 2 ships each, columns in. line of bearing roughly 090 - 270. Approach at high speed from port bow while leading escort was on off bow, fired four bow tubes then swung loft and pulled back out on the port bow for reload. Sew first hit between MOT and stern, followed ten seconds later by second hit just forward of MOT. Target broke in two and sank rapidly.

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— page 257 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH
(H) ATTACK DATA:
U.S.S. Sailfish Torpedo Attack No. "4A" Patrol No. 11
Time: 0446 Date: 8/24/44 Lat: 21-36N Long: 121-19E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: Coal burning AK. Smoke made identifiable - tion impossible. Medium size, high stack, coal burner.
Ship(s) Sunk: 1 AK - Type unknown, medium size.
Identification: (UN).
Tonnage sunk: 4000.
Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: None.
Damage Determined By: Hits seen in target by bridge personnel. Pip disappeared abruptly from radar screen.
Target Draft 25 Course 140 Speed 7.5 K
Range (at firing) 3070 Gyro Angles 9-1/4 L to 14 L
Own Ship Data
Speed 11 K Course 261 Depth Surface
Angle (at firing) Surface
Fire Control And Torpedo Data
Type Attack:
Night surface radar. Target was leading ship in port column of two ships. Starboard column consisted of one ship on starboard bow of this target. Made high speed approach from p-t bow intending to fire at the single ship in starboard column. but through misunderstanding between bridge and control party fired at this AK. Hits seen, heard, and felt by bridge personnel and timed correctly. Target became enveloped in smoke and rapidly disappeared from radar screen.

- 38 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 258 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH
(E) ATTACK DATA:
U.S.S. Sailfish Torpedo Attack No. "43" Patrol No. 11
Time: 04501 Date: 8/24/44 Lat. 21-36N Long. 121-12E
Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description: Same as Attack # "4A".
Ship(s) Sunk: None.
Ship(s) Damaged or None.
Probably Sunk:
Damage Determined By: ---
Target Draft Course 140 Speed ---
Range (at firing) 3560 Gyro Angles 1 L to 5 R
Own Ship Data
Speed 14 K Course 030 Depth Surface
Angle (at firing) Surface
Fire Control and Torpedo Data
Type Attack:
Night surface radar. This was same target fired on in attack "4A". All torpedoes missed because target was stopped and sunk by attack "4A".

- 39 - ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 260 —
U.S.S. SAILFISH
CONFIDENTIAL:
(H) : TACK DATA:

Attack # 2

| Tubes Fired | #1 | #2 | #3 | #4 |
||----|----|----|----|
| Track Angle | 134P | 136P | 137P | 139P |
| Gyro Angle | 24 L | 27-3/4 L | 29-1/4 L | 32-1/4 L |
| Depth Set | 8 ft. | 8 ft. | 8 ft. | 8 ft. |
| Power | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or Miss | Miss | Hit | Miss | Hit |
| Erratic (yes or no) | No | No | No | No |
| Mark Torpedo | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Serial No. | 41642 | 49308 | 40998 | 52898 |
| Mark Explorer | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 |
| Serial No. | 1277 | 1611 | 18179 | 1801 |
| Actuation Set | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Actuation Actual | None | Contact | None | Contact |
| Mark Warhead | 16 | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16 |
| Serial No. | 5876 | 13429 | 11494 | 2769 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval | -- | 9 sec. | 7 sec. | 7 sec. |
| Type Spread | Divergent | Divergent | Divergent | Divergent |
| Sea Conditions | -- | Moderate | -- | -- |
| Ovorhaul Activity | -- | Sub Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H. | -- | -- |

Remarks:

- 41 - ENCLOSURE (A)