U.S.S. TANG (SS-306) — war patrol report SS-306_TANG.pdf

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JOB NO. [HANDWRITTEN: H-108]

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OPERATOR [HANDWRITTEN: L. Frye]
DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 9-10-80]

THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[SEAL: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA]

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[HANDWRITTEN: NRS 1975-55]
[HANDWRITTEN: TANG (SS-306)]
[HANDWRITTEN: WORLD WAR II:]
[HANDWRITTEN: PATROL FILE]
[HANDWRITTEN: ACTION REPORTS]

[HANDWRITTEN: ALL MATERIAL ON THIS REEL IS DECLASSIFIED]

[HANDWRITTEN: FOR DECK LOG OCTOBER 1943 - AUGUST 1944]
[HANDWRITTEN: CONSULT NATIONAL ARCHIVES WHICH HAS CUSTODY]

[HANDWRITTEN: J.A. KOONTZ]

— page 3 —
Office of Naval Records and History
Ships' History Section
Navy Department

HISTORY OF USS TANG (SS 300)

USS TANG, in her short but brilliant career identified
herself as one of the U.S. Navy's fightingest ships. In five war
patrols in enemy controlled waters the TANG sank about 100,000
tons of Japanese shipping, rescued twenty-two Naval aviators, and
conducted her patrols in such a fashion that they will long remain
high in the annals of submarine warfare.

The results of TANG's dramatic battles proved to be of im-
measurable assistance toward the Allied conquest of the Pacific.
TANG exacted a terrific toll on enemy shipping at a time when the
enemy could ill afford to lose even a single unit.

It might be said that the TANG was predestined to be a success.
Her keel was laid 15 January 1943 in the Navy Yard, Mare Island,
California. Seven months later she slid down the ways and entered
into her true element. Sponsor at the launching was Mrs. Antonio
S. Pitre, wife of Commander Pitre, who was then production officer
at the Navy Yard, Mare Island, California. Two months later, on
15 October 1943, TANG was commissioned, a full-fledged modern sub-
marine in the U.S. Navy.

Lieutenant Commander Richard O'Kane, USN, former Executive
Officer of the famed USS WAHOO took command. Lt. Murry B. Frazee,
Jr., went aboard as Executive Officer. Under the capable guidance
of these seasoned submariners, TANG was put through her paces in the
San Diego area and after eighteen days of intensive training exercises
left for Pearl Harbor, arriving there on 8 January 1944. Nineteen
more days of training followed and then TANG reported ready to wage
war against the enemy.

On 22 January 1944, TANG departed from Pearl on her first war
patrol. The patrol was conducted in the Caroline and Marianas Island
Area and the early part of the patrol consisted of lifeguard duty
for downed planes in the vicinity of Wake and Truk. TANG, however,
was not called on for rescue services. Upon being released from
lifeguard duty, TANG went out in search of prey.

Early in the morning on 17 February, a convoy of two freighters
with heavy escort of a destroyer and five smaller vessels was con-
tacted by radar. TANG tracked the convoy, determined its course
and speed, then went in for an attack. When nearly ahead, the star-
board flanking escort suddenly appeared at 7000 yards closing.

— page 4 —
-2- USS TANG (SS 306)

TANG was forced down, deep; and five depth charges were dropped
in a half-hearted attack and the escort continued on. Fifteen minutes
later TANG resumed the approach at periscope depth in spite of addi-
tional charges being dropped at random by the escorts. The
range closed to 1500 yards and TANG cut loose with a salvo of four
torpedoes at the nearest freighter. Three hits blasted him solidly
and Commander O'Kane calmly watched through the periscope as it sank
amidst milling escorts. Thus did the terrific TANG
drew her first blood.

TANG cleared the area at deep submergence undetected. An
attempt was made to again get ahead of the convoy for a dawn attack,
but the remaining freighter passed out of range under cover of air
escort.

During the night of 22 February, just five days later, two
surface attacks were made on a convoy of three freighters with a
destroyer and three smaller escorts. After tracking for half an
hour, TANG maneuvered into a firing position on the
port bow of one of the freighters, about 4000 yards from the nearest
escort. An unpredicted zig required a "dipsy doodle" to maintain an
ideal firing position, but the freighter came on nicely, and with a
range of 1500 yards and TANG dead in the water and holding her
breath, she hit the freighter hit it with four torpedoes spread
over her length. The enemy ship literally disintegrated under four
hits and sank before TANG had completed ninety degrees of her turn
to evade. One of the escorts guessed right and began to close in on
TANG, but she seemed to find a couple of extra knots in her engines
and left the escort behind in very short order.

Another approach was made on the convoy. This time the leading
escort of what was later determined to be a Jap submarine tender,
conveniently moved way out ahead of the vessel. TANG succeeded in
sneaking into an excellent torpedo position on the escort on the
port bow of the sub tender. Then, TANG stopped, waited, and at the
precise moment of her turn, fired four torpedoes. The first two
hits in her stern and just aft of the stack, but the beautiful
detonation as the third torpedo hit forward of his bridge was terrific! The
enemy ship was twisted, lifted from the water as you would flip a
spoon on end, and then commenced belching flame as she sank. TANG
was shaken far worse than by any depth charge remembered. A quick
check-up, as soon as the crews' jaws came off their chests, showed no
serious damage done. During the following day the remnants of the
convoy could not be found.

About an hour before noon, two days later, a tanker, a freighter
and a destroyer were sighted. Effort to gain satisfactory position
for a periscope attack was unsuccessful because of rain squalls
and the wide zig-zagging of the targets.

— page 5 —
-3- USS TANG (SS 306)

Contact was maintained and a night surface attack with four
torpedoes resulted in three good hits which destroyed the freighter.
The tanker opened fire fore and aft immediately, while the des-
troyer, then nearly 3000 yards away, closed the scene rapidly,
spraying shells in every direction. Contact with the destroyer was
maintained and position gained for a dawn attack
submerged. The decks of the tanker were covered with
fire. Four torpedoes fired blasted into the ship. The ex-
plosion was wonderful, throwing Japs and debris above the
ship. The tanker sank by the stern in four minutes, and TANG
submergence as the depth charges started pouring down.

The final attack was made after moonset on 22 February, after
a late afternoon contact had been made and the enemy tracked. A
transport, a freighter and four escorts made up the convoy. TANG
maneuvered into position on the wildly zig-zagging transport and
fired four torpedoes. All missed astern, however, as she speeded up.

TANG thus concluded her first war patrol, returning because all
of her torpedoes had been expended. Sixteen hits out of twenty-four
torpedoes fired shows the excellence of TANG's fire control party.

After a normal refit on Midway Island, TANG, on 16 March 1944,
departed on her second war patrol which was conducted in the areas
northwest of Palau, east of Davao, and in the vicinity of Truk.

Of five surface craft contacts, three were small patrol craft
and were evaded, one was an RO-class submarine which dived at a range
of 3000 yards on appearance of U.S. aircraft, and one smoke contact
of two ships. It was impossible to close this contact because of a
combination of air screen attacks, proximity to shoal water on Grey
Feather Bank and operation orders to take a lifeguard station.

Although disappointing that no shipping loss was incurred by
the enemy, the second war patrol of TANG was outstanding as its
first. By virtue of the remarkable cooperation with aircraft of
the U.S. striking force attacking Truk, willingness to proceed from
point to point within gun range of shore batteries in order to rescue
expeditiously, personnel of downed aircraft, and seizing the initia-
tive by bombarding known gun emplacements when passing Ollan Island,
twenty-two U.S. Naval aviation personnel were rescued from life boats
and downed aircraft. The scarcity of targets was attributable in part
to the presence of a heavy U.S. Task force in the Western Pacific.

On 6 May with twenty-two extra personnel aboard, and TANG's
relief in the area, the sub departed for Pearl Harbor, arriving there
May 15. This concluded TANG's second war patrol.

June 3, 1944, marked the beginning of the third war patrol for
USS TANG. Departing from Pearl Harbor after a normal refit, TANG
conducted her patrol in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea Areas.

— page 6 —
-4- USS TANG

The first contact of this patrol occurred on the night of 24
June. TANG, on the surface, tore into a convoy of six large ships
with at least sixteen escorts, and with six torpedoes (three at
each) sank a 7500 ton freighter and a 10,000 ton tanker.

Lady Luck again gave TANG the nod five days later. Just prior
to noon while patrolling submerged, an unescorted medium freighter
was sighted on a course which prevented TANG from reaching a firing
position. TANG turned away, surfaced, made an end around and two
hours later, submerged and fired two torpedoes at the vessel. Both
missed. Depth charges were dropped on TANG and she had to lay low
for awhile. TANG surfaced and chased for an hour before regaining
contact, again made an end around and at 750 yards range on the
surface, fired one "feeler". This torpedo broke the ship in two and
it sank under the eyes of the TANG's crew.

TANG's next quarry was sighted in the morning while she was still
surfaced. It proved to be a 4000 ton medium freighter and a 2000
ton escort freighter. Submerging for a periscope attack, TANG
fired two torpedoes at the escort freighter. One hit and the ship
went down in just 2 minutes - 20 seconds. The other freighter
reversed course and TANG trailed submerged until dusk when she
surfaced, ran up ahead of the freighter, submerged again and at 500 yards
range loosed two torpedoes. One hit was all that was necessary.
The manner in which the ship blew up indicated a cargo of munitions.

The Fourth of July was celebrated with five works in the
traditional manner. At dawn TANG made an end around on the masts of
a ship and dove one hour later to continue the approach on what
developed into a 16,000 ton seaplane tender. With rapidly shoaling
water and the keel about to scrape the bottom, TANG backed down
and fired three torpedoes. Two hits sank this ship. TANG then sur-
faced to clear the area in the midst of 34 fishing boats with about
50 survivors thrashing around in the water.

In the late afternoon of the same day, 4 July, smoke was sighted
and closed until finally the ship was sighted. After tracking to
determine his zig-zag plan, a submerged approach resulted in the
firing of two of TANG's torpedoes. One hit sank this ship. TANG
then surfaced to pick up a survivor. It was necessary to snake one
of the large overturned lifeboats along side with grapnels, and
threaten with tommy gun bursts to convince the visible sur-
vivor to come on board.

The following night under a beautiful full moon TANG made a
submerged approach on a medium freighter. Loosing her last two
torpedoes, both of which found their mark, TANG finished off her
eighth ship on the patrol. Midway Island was reached on 14 July,
ending the third war patrol.

— page 7 —
-5- USS TANG

This, the third consecutive outstanding patrol
TANG, was characterized by the same aggressive, determined and
efficient fighting spirit that was so noticeable in her first and
second patrols. To her enviable record of sinking five ships on her
first patrol and the efficient rescuing of twenty-two Naval aviators
on her second patrol, TANG added eight more ships sunk on this patrol.

In recognition for the excellent performances of TANG on her
first three war patrols, she was awarded her first Presidential Unit
Citation.

Text of the citation follows:

"For outstanding performance in combat and
distinguished service during her First, Second
and Third War Patrols in Japanese-controlled
Waters. Operating boldly in defiance of alert
hostile air patrols in dangerous areas far from
her home base, the USS TANG struck devastating
blows at Japanese combatant units and heavily es-
corted convoys in the Pacific despite unfavorable
opportunity, sinking thousands of tons of
valuable enemy shipping during her first and third
war patrols. Rendering gallant lifeguard service
during air strikes against enemy-held atolls by
United States Forces, the TANG braved the treacher-
ous reefs off the coast of a powerfully fortified
stronghold to rescue twenty-two Naval aviators
in seven pick-ups, completing this perilous mission
within close range of hostile shore batteries. The
brilliant and heroic achievements of this vessel
reflect the highest credit upon the courage, sea-
manship and determination of her officers and men
and enhance the fine traditions of the United States
Naval Service."

The fourth war patrol of TANG was conducted off the coast of
Honshu in the Japanese Empire Waters.

TANG's first kill occurred on this patrol when she attained a
position on the beam of two freighters in column accompanied by a gun
boat and a smaller escort. Three torpedoes were fired at the first
ship and a similar salvo at the second ship. After a quick look
which showed the gun boat proceeding rapidly and closely across the
stern, one hit was observed amidships in the first target resulting
in a disintegrating explosion. Two timed hits were heard in the
second target as TANG took evasive action and she was subjected to a
"Tooth-shaking" depth charge attack.

— page 8 —
-6- USS TANG

TANG's next action was a surface battle. A patrol yacht was
attacked with the 4" gun. Eight hits were scored, demolishing the
deck house aft and exploding in the patrol boats' sides and upper
works.

Next, a patrol vessel of about 1500 tons was found at anchor.
The night was black. This vessel was, however, recognized as one
which had previously depth-charged TANG. Two torpedoes from the
stern tubes produced no results so bow tubes were brought to bear
and two more torpedoes fired. One of these hit the point of aim
and the target sank after a spectacular explosion. TANG had her
revenge.

August 23 was another lucky day for the terrific TANG. A large
transport accompanied by a PC or DE ahead, an SC on this bow, and an
LST and PC astern, was sighted. A beautiful approach put TANG in
position 800 yards abeam and three torpedoes fired resulted in two
hits and in the sinking of this valuable loaded transport.

Shortly thereafter, from a position inshore of a modern diesel
tanker proceeding close to the beach, three torpedoes were fired from
the stern tubes. Down went the tanker to the bottom of the sea!

With all torpedoes expended, TANG steamed back to Pearl Harbor
to rest her crew and overhaul her equipment.

TANG's brilliant fifth patrol began on 27 September and ended
24 October. This is a saga of one of the greatest submarine cruises
of all times, the fifth and last patrol of a fighting ship.

On 11 October 1944, shortly after entering her area in Formosa
Straits, TANG started off this auspicious patrol by launching two
skillfully planned and smartly conducted torpedo attacks which
resulted in the sinking of two heavily laden freighters. On 23
October after a thorough analysis of all shipping routes, TANG made
contact on a large heavily-escorted convoy composed of three large
tankers, a large transport loaded with troops and a large freighter.

The Commanding Officer took TANG into the middle of the con-
voy on the surface and delivered a brilliantly conceived torpedo
attack which resulted in devastating hits on all three of these
valuable tankers. Amid the resulting pandemonium, TANG swung and
fired at the freighter when it was noticed that the transport, angry
for revenge, was fast bearing down on the TANG with intentions of
ramming. Emergency speed and hard left rudder saved the sub from
hitting the on-rushing transport by seconds.

TANG was now boxed in with three blazing, sinking tankers on
one side and the freighter, transport and several destroyers coming
in from the other side. Despite a deadly hail of bullets and shells
coming from all directions, Commander O'Kane launched another torpedo
attack which blew the freighter and transport out of the water.

— page 9 —
-7- USS TANG

Then, with no torpedoes in the tubes TANG broke through the escorts
to reload. In the incredibly short time of ten minutes of breath-
taking action, TANG sank an entire enemy convoy.

Twenty-four hours later, contact was again made with the enemy,
this time with another heavily-loaded, heavily-escorted convoy steam-
ing to support the Leyte Campaign. The tankers all carried planes
piled high on their decks and even the bows and sterns of the
transports were piled high with plane crates jammed in with the troops. Again, TANG
maneuvered into the formation and launched four torpedoes, two
at a transport and two at a tanker. At a range of less than 1000
yards all torpedoes hit as planned with a series of violent explosions.

TANG's position was revealed to the enemy in the light of the
burning, exploding ships and they were quick to act against the sub-
marine which had caused so much damage among their ranks. With
debris flying high in the air and escorts firing from all sides,
TANG was again completely boxed in by the enemy. A large transport
and a tanker were off the stern, a destroyer was charging in at high
speed from one side, two or more destroyer escorts were coming in
from the other side, and three burning sinking ships were directly
off the bow. Full speed ahead was rung up and TANG charged the
enemy. A salvo of three torpedoes was fired and they found their
mark with great devastation; the first hit the tanker with its
valuable cargo of aviation gasoline sky-high; the second hit the
destroyer and blasted out her submarine destroying intentions with a
mighty roar which rocked TANG from stem to stern.

TANG now had but two torpedoes left. Moving in on the crippled
transport, the last two were fired. The first torpedo ran straight
and true to the target. The second torpedo, however, ran erratically
in a circular run after leaving the tube. At Emergency speed
was called for but twenty seconds after firing, the malfunctioning
torpedo hit the stern of TANG.

The Commanding Officer and several members of the crew were
blown off the bridge by the explosion and the TANG sank immediately.
Some other members of the crew also escaped and in all, nine men were
captured by the Japanese and liberated by U.S. Forces after the war
was over.

Though the short but illustrious career of the fighting TANG
was stilled forever by an unavoidable act of fate, this outstanding
submarine, led by its courageous captain, Commander Richard H. O'Kane,
succeeded in exacting a monumental toll among the enemy. In recogni-
tion of the results of TANG's fourth and fifth war patrols she was
awarded a second Presidential Unit Citation.

— page 10 —
-8- USS TANG

Text of the citation follows:
"For extraordinary heroism in action during her Fourth
War Patrol against enemy Japanese shipping in Honshu
Area from July 31 to September 3, 1944, and her Fifth War
Patrol in Formosa Straits, September 27 to October 24, 1944.
Boldly searching out the enemy through perilous coastline
shoal waters to establish contact with a large hostile convoy,
the TANG penetrated a heavy escort screen to launch a
series of smashing torpedo attacks and sink five Japanese
ships totaling 22,500 tons. With every surface unit vital
to the during accelerated hostilities pointing toward
the crucial battle for Leyte Gulf, the TANG daringly challeng-
ed two large, well armed, heavily escorted convoys bound for
the Philippines with reinforcements and supplies. Operating
without support and in heroic defiance of severe counter-
measures, she attacked relentlessly from all sides, waging
furious battle against terrific odds and climaxing her
aggressive Fifth Patrol by sending every ship of both
convoys to the bottom. A seaworthy, fighting ship, handled
brilliantly by her gallant officers and men, the TANG pound-
ed out her previous distinguished record of achievement by
crushing blows against the enemy's power to wage war, there-
materially furthering the vital operations to control the
Pacific and upholding the highest traditions of the United
States Naval Service."

STATISTICS

OVERALL LENGTH 312 feet
BEAM 27 feet
SURFACED SPEED 20 knots
DISPLACEMENT 1525 tons

— page 11 —
TANG (SS 306)

TANG, under Cdr. R. H. O'Kane, set out from Pearl
Harbor on 24 September 1944, to begin her fifth war
patrol. On 27 September she topped off with fuel at
Midway and left there the same day, heading for an
area between the northwest coast of Formosa, and the
China Coast.

In order to reach her area, TANG had to pass through
narrow waters known to be heavily patrolled by the
enemy. A large area stretching northeast from For-
mosa was known to be mined by the enemy, and O'Kane
was given the choice of making the passage north of
Formosa alone, or joining a coordinated attack group
(SILVERSIDES, TRIGGER, SALMON, under Commander
Coye in SILVERSIDES) which was to patrol off north-
east Formosa, and making the passage with them.
TANG chose to make the passage alone and these ves-
sels never heard from TANG, nor did any base, after
she left Midway.

The story of TANG's sinking comes from the report
of her surviving Commanding Officer. A night surface
attack was launched on 24 October 1944 against a trans-
port which had previously been stopped in an earlier
attack. The first torpedo was fired, and when it was
observed to be running true, the second and last was
fired, and when it was observed to be running true, the second and last was
fired. It curved sharply to the left, broached, por-
poised and circled. Emergency speed was called for
and the rudder was thrown over. These measures re-
sulted only in the torpedo striking the stern of TANG,
rather than amidships.

R. H. O'Kane

The explosion was violent, and people as far forward
as the control room received broken limbs. The ship
went down by the stern with the after three compart-
ments flooded. Of the nine officers and men on the
bridge, three were able to swim through the night until
picked up eight hours later. One officer escaped from
the flooded conning tower, and was rescued with the
others.

The submarine came to rest on the bottom at 180
feet, and the men in her crowded forward as the after
compartments flooded. Publications were burned, and
all assembled to the forward room to escape. The es-
cape was delayed by a Japanese patrol, which dropped

— page 12 —
charges, and started an electrical fire in the forward
battery. Thirteen men escaped from the forward room
and by the time the last made his exit, the heat from
the fire was so intense that the paint on the bulkhead
was scorching, melting, and running down. Of the 13
men who escaped, only eight reached the surface, and
of these but five were able to swim until rescued.

When the nine survivors were picked up by a de-
stroyer escort, there were victims of TANG's previous
sinkings on board, and they inflicted tortures on the
men from TANG. With great humanity, O'Kane states,
"When we realized that our clubbings and kickings were
being administered by the burned, mutilated survivors
of our own handiwork, we found we could take it with
less prejudice."

The nine captives were retained by the Japanese in
prison camps until the end of the war, and were treated
by them in typical fashion. The loss of TANG by her
own torpedo, the last one fired on the most successful
patrol ever made by a U. S. submarine, was a stroke
of singular misfortune. She is credited with having
sunk 13 vessels for 107,324 tons of enemy shipping on
this patrol, and her Commanding Officer has been
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

On her last patrol TANG fired twenty-four torpedoes
in four attacks. Twenty-two torpedoes found their mark
in enemy ships, sinking 13 of the 13 hit; one missed, and
the last torpedo, fired after a careful checkover, sank
the TANG. This vessel was awarded the Presidential Unit
Citation twice during her career. Commander O'Kane
has been called the Submarine Force's most outstanding
officer; he served as Executive Officer of the very suc-
cessful WAHOO before taking command of TANG.

In her five patrols, TANG is credited with sinking
31 ships, totalling 227,800 tons and damaging two for
4,100 tons. This record is unexcelled among American
submarines. In her first patrol, spending February
1944 west of Truk and Saipan, she sank three freighters,
a large tanker and a submarine tender. TANG's sec-
ond patrol was in the area west of Palau, east of Davao
and at Truk. She made no ship contacts worthy of at-
tack, but at the latter island she rescued twenty-two
Navy airmen during a carrier based strike at Truk on
30 April-1 May 1944. This vessel's third patrol was
in the East China and Yellow Seas. Here she sank six
freighters, a tanker, and a large aircraft transport.
She covered the waters along the southern coast of
Honshu in August 1944. She sank a freighter, a large
transport, a tanker and two patrol craft, while she dam-
aged another freighter and small craft.

117

— page 14 —
UNITED STATES
SUBMARINE LOSSES

WORLD WAR II

Reissued with an Appendix of
Axis Submarine Losses, fully indexed,
by

Naval History Division
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington: 1963

— page 15 —
A16-3
Serial 07
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

U.S.S. TANG (SS306)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

March 3, 1944.
[HANDWRITTEN: DECLASSIFIED ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C]
[HANDWRITTEN: BY /s/ R.H. O'Kane]
[HANDWRITTEN: DATE 7/9/72]

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
The Commander Submarine Division 141.
The Commander Submarine Squadron 14.
The Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Via :

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306), Report of War Patrol #1.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track charts. (ComSubPac only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the first war patrol
of this vessel conducted in areas north and west of TRUK,
and north and west of SAIPAN, during the period 22 January,
1944 to 3 March, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: R. H. O'Kane]
R. H. O'KANE.

[HANDWRITTEN: FILMED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 68692]

— page 16 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. TANG
(A) PROLOGUE

After completion December 1, 1943, trained eighteen
days in San Diego area. Arrived Pearl January 8, 1944, and
continued training through the 19th, having fired forty-three
torpedoes and conducted night approaches on approx-
imately half the days underway.

(B) NARRATIVE

Jan 22-28

Left Pearl at noon on the 22nd and proceeded to
WAKE Island at one engine speed.

Jan 29-Feb 5, (Plus 12)

Patrolled submerged in vicinity of WAKE except dur-
ing false start for assigned area on the thirty-first. De-
parted from assigned station to patrol southwest of the island
whenever circumstances of special mission permitted, and
closed the island daily to insure that no shipping had passed
by our seventeen foot periscope or radar searcher.
The six air strikes on the thirtieth and fifth were
carried out without incident. Except for dawn searchlight dis-
plays, the only activity observed during the week was ineffect-
ual searching after the first air attack by one or two planes
dropping flares sporadically. Observation from within three
miles did not disclose any damage to shore installation by
the first air attack.

Feb 6-7 (-12)

Upon release from lifeguard duty shortly after mid-
night, proceeded at fifteen knots to newly assigned station
north of TRUK.
At 1345 on the seventh dived for twenty minutes and
avoided an unidentified plane. Slowed to eleven knots at mid-
night.

Feb 8 (-11)

Sighted U.S.S. GUARDFISH at 1315 and avoided on the
surface, entered assigned area at 1500 and proceeded toward
the western boundary to patrol the TRUK-EMPIRE routes.

-1-

— page 17 —
CONFIDENTIALL                               U.S.S. TANG

                                        Feb 9-14 (-10)

          Patrolling on surface in recommended northwestern
part of area, searching with periscope, sound to detect echo
ranging and enjoying unlimited visibility. Converted #3. & 3B
to normal ballast tanks.

                                        Feb 14-15 (-10)

          Patrolled on surface in southwestern part of the
area covering the route from TRUK to S.IPAN which passes north
of MOG.MI and proceeded south the night of the fifteenth to
patrol east of MOG.MI and GR.LY FEATHER banks prior to assuming
new patrol station south of ULUL Island. At 1204 on the four-
teenth and at 0925 and 1123 on the fifteenth had plane contacts
on the SD at 20, 24, and 28 miles. These were tracked out to
almost 35 miles.

                                        Feb 16-17 (-10)

          Conducting submerged patrol east of MOG.MI and GR.LY
FEATHER banks with continuous periscope observation, and 17
foot searches. Proceeded toward assigned position twelve miles
south of ULUL after sunset.

                                        ATT.CK # 1

          At 0025 on the morning of the seventeenth, sighted
a convoy on the SJ bearing 305T distance 31000 yards. It was
tracked at eight and one-half knots on base course 100°,
directly into the rising half moon, and zig-zagging forty degrees
every ten to fourteen minutes. As viewed on the radar, excluding
what later proved to be a destroyer, the convoy was composed of two large
ships, a some-
what smaller one, later believed to be a destroyer, a small
escort close ahead, two more escorts on either beam, and two
more wide flanking patrols.
          At 0219, when nearly ahead, with range to convoy
15000 yards, the starboard flanking escort suddenly appeared
at 7000 yards closing at four knots. We were forced down, deep,
and given five depth charges, but his attack was half hearted
and we were able to return to radar depth fifteen minutes after
he passed by. The convoy was still 9000 yards away and coming
on nicely. Our approach from here in was quite routine, except
for additional depth charges and patrolling escorts. Went back

                                        -2-

— page 18 —
CONFIDENTIAL U.S.S. TANG

to periscope depth at 4000 yards, watched the leading escort
cross conveniently to the opposite bow, the port escort cross-
ing our bow, and at 0335 fired a spread of four straight stern
shots at the near AK, range 1500, 80 port track, speed 8½.
The first three hit their points of aim in the screws, and the
fourth had passed just as the midship superstructure watched
the freighter sinking by the stern amidst milling escorts.
She was a split superstructure freighter, with details similar
to the MANSEI MARU, low in the water, with a bulky deck load.
When she had sunk we went to our favorite depth
below the 375 foot gradient and cleared the area. Some add-
itional depth charging followed, but none close, and we were
able to search with radar and surface at 0500.

Feb 16-17 (-10)

There were still ships in sight on the radar with
one large escorted one at 14000 yards, which we tracked on
course 300, speed seven knots. During the next forty minutes
we pushed our TVG's and MEP's in charging and getting ahead
of the freighter, but he evidently had been on a northerly
log of a wandering zig, for during the submerged approach in
the next six hours he presented angles of 50 starboard to 150
port. Our best sustained speed closed the range to 6000 yards
at one time, but he then drew slowly away and disappeared to-
ward the BURRFISH who evidently made contact with him. The
AS.SHIO destroyer, a CHIDORI, a PC type escort, and a plane
which were escorting him precluded an end-round, so proceeded
submerged to our assigned position for the attack on TRUK. The
freighter, in ballast, was a typical goalpost, funnel, goal-
poster with composite superstructure.

Feb 18-19 (-10)

Patrolling on the surface in the vicinity of assign-
ed position 12 miles bearing 194° from ULUL. As our SJ gave
fair contact on this 85 foot island at 33000 yards, remained
about four miles south of assigned position out of sight of
the island. Numerous SD contacts, only one of which was closer
than the range to the island, and most of which disappeared
at the distance to the island, indicated considerable patrol
or plane escort activity from ULUL. We dove for a half hour
and apparently avoided detection by the one plane that did
close our station inside fifteen miles.

Feb 20-21 (-10)

Shortly after dawn on the twentieth proceeded to-
ward new station at SAIPAN, running at one engine speed. Dur-

-3-

— page 19 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. TANG
Feb 20-21 (-10) (Cont'd)

ing the forenoon numerous SD contacts from 20 to 28 miles in-
dicated air activity and perhaps a plane escort for a convoy.
Searches ten miles either side of our track revealed nothing.
At 0930 the morning of the twenty-first, a half hour
after our trim dive, commenced submerging for enemy patrol.
We thought we were undetected by the first one, sighted
at twelve miles, but four dives later in as many hours, with
lookouts reporting planes in different sectors and SD contacts
closing, dived for the rest of the day.

Feb 22 (-10)

Patrolled submerged ten miles southwest of AGUIJAN
Island, where we would be able to intercept traffic from SAIPAN
to GUAM passing north or south of TINIAN. Sighted one surface
patrol on the SJ on approaching this spot and avoided submerged
after daylight. Bombers continuously passed close over us dur-
ing the day. At dusk we surfaced to observe considerable search
light signalling in vicinity of TANAPAG harbor, so headed north
at two engine speed to intercept any escaping ships. Our usual
SJ performance was cut down by surrounding rain squalls, bare-
ly indicating the island at 35 miles, but at 2200 the SJ sight-
ed our first ship at 14000 yards. Closed and tracked and soon
had five ships in sight on the radar, with another group some-
times visible to the north. The persistent rain squalls were
both for and against us at this time, for they changed the
relative size of the pips and made visual investigation of the
enemy inside 3500 yards essential in selecting suitable targets.

ATTACK # 2

Following two such approaches on patrol, we found
a KENYO type AK with escorts on starboard bow and quarter.
After tracking this freighter zigging on course 255T for an-
other half hour, moved into position on his port bow, 4000 yds
as his nearest escort. An unpredicted zig required a "dipsy
doodle" to maintain an ideal firing position, but he came on
track, and at 2349, with range 1500, 90 port track, the TANG
used in the water and holding her breath, let him have four
torpedoes spread his length from aft forward by constant TBT
bearings. The enemy literally disintegrated under four hits
and sank before we had completed ninety degrees of our turn to
evade. One escort guessed right and closed to 3000 yards, but
these boats always seem to find a couple of extra knots for
such occasions, and we made a sandblower out of him.

-4-

— page 20 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. TANG

Feb 23 (-10)
ATTACK # 3
We still had difficulty in identifying the enemy
on the radar, and our next approach, in spite of sound, de-
veloped into a destroyer at 3500 yards, with TANG backing
down 1200 yards off her track. Both sea and visibility pre-
cluded anything but a defensive attack on such a ship, so
pulled clear with minimum range 2900 yards. There followed
one more approach, a bit more cautious, on what appeared to
be a submarine, before we located what was apparently a
naval auxiliary, definitely of the ARIMASAN MARU class. As
her escort conveniently moved out to 8000 yards ahead, we
moved into position on her port bow, stopped, and
then pointed at her with another nice rain squall for a
background. As she came on her guns were plainly visible
forward and then aft. At 0120, with range 1400, 90 port track
and gyros around zero, let her have four torpedoes spread
her length from aft forward. The first two were beautiful
hits in her stern and just aft of the stack, but the detona-
tion as the third torpedo hit forward of his bridge was
terrific. The enemy ship was twisted, lifted from the water
as you would flip a spoon on end, and then commenced belch-
ing flame as she sank. The TANG was shaken for a quick check
by any depth charge we could remember, but a quick shock,
as soon as our jaws came off our chests, showed no damage
except that the outer door gasket of number five tube, which
was just being secured, blew out of its groove. We considered
this lightly at the time.
As is usually the case when you hit first, the
escorts were befuddled and evasion was simplified. It is
considered that this ship was either a submarine or destroyer
tender, or an ammunition ship.
Further searches and one more approach disclosed
only three patrol type vessels, so commenced a retiring
covering possible positions of the northern enemy
group. An all day search on the surface to north and then
retiring to the west disclosed nothing.

Feb 24 (-10)

Patrolled on the surface, 150 miles west of SAIPAN
with high periscope and radar when
fuzzy. At 1109 sighted smoke bearing 015T and immediately
picked up two targets on the SJ at 23000 and 24000 yards.
With a clearing horizon the enemy was shortly identified as
a freighter, large tanker, and destroyer. Tracking showed
them on course 270, so we moved out to maximum radar range
to avoid detection and gained position ahead for a submerged

-5-

— page 21 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. TANG
Feb 24 (-10) (Cont'd)

approach. Contact was suddenly lost, but a half hour run
at full power toward their last true bearing located them
again, this time on base course 165T.
Gathering rain squalls made it more apparent that
we would do well to maintain contact with the enemy dur-
ing the remainder of the day, and that the only possibility
of destroying both ships lay in night, or night and dawn
attacks. The remainder of the day became more trying with
the enemy employing wide zigs and all contact being lost
in extremely heavy passing squalls. Sometimes he would
emerge on a new course, sometimes on the same, but in most
cases it was necessary for us to go in after him at full
power, and then retire to avoid detection.

ATTACK # 4

At sunset the destroyer came into a clear spot,
sent several signals on a large searchlight to his convoy,
lined them up with tanker astern, and started off on course
west. As soon as they had faded in the dusk we closed from
north at full power to find them on our port bow headed
toward SAIPAN. The enemy zigs were of the wildest sort,
sometimes actually backtracking, but their very wildness
was his undoing, for after two hours of tracking and two
approaches on their quarters, with our outer doors
open for firing on four different occasions, the freighter,
a T.TUTUKI M.L.RU class ship, made one of his super right
zigs across our bow. At 2230, when the range was 1400, 95
degrees track, gyros around zero, we cold-cocked him with
the first three of our usual four torpedoes, spread along
his length by constant TBT bearings. The ship blew up with
beautiful fireworks and sank before we had completed
our turn to evade. The tanker opened fire for a short
period, while the destroyer, then nearly 3000 yards
away, closed the scene rapidly, spraying shells in every
direction. After helping out any possible survivors with
twelve depth charges, she rejoined the tanker. During the
first flurry some tracer shells came within a thousand yards
of us, but obviously just by chance.
The destroyer now stayed so close to the tanker
that for several hours we could distinguish only one ship
on the radar most of the time, from our position ten thous-
and yards on his port beam. The sporadic gun firing and
occasional depth charges convinced us on these occasions
that both were still there.

-6-

— page 22 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. TANG
Feb 25 (-10)

They continued on the same base course, but settled
down to moderate zigs. Before dawn we were in posi-
tion, ten thousand yards ahead and still eighty miles
west of SAIPAN. Only a daylight change of base course
could prevent our attack.

ATTACK # 5

At 0548, with skies gray in the east, sub-
merged to radar depth, took a last check at range 7000
yards, then started a submerged approach to close an
ASASHIO type destroyer patrolling
close ahead. As we were then 1200 yards from the
track, turned and paralleled his base course. At
2000 yards the destroyer gave us some bad moments by
crossing to our bow for the second time, pointing directly
at our position. But in his attempt to prevent a repeti-
tion of his mistake of the night before, he turned right,
passed down the tanker's starboard side to the quarter.
He was absolutely dwarfed by the length of the loaded
tanker, whose details were now plainly visible. She was
painted slate gray, comparable only to our CIMARRON class,
but with bridge and foremast well forward, just behind
a bulging bow, which mounted an estimated six inch gun.
Her mainmast was close against her after superstructure
which was topped by an extremely large short stack. Her
after gun, above her bulging cruiser stern, was similar
to the one forward. There is no similar vessel in any of
the identification books aboard. All vantage points
including guns, bridge, bridge overhead, and rails, were
manned with an estimated 150 uniformed lookouts on our
side alone.

A twenty degree zig toward put us a little close
to the track, but as we had already commenced our turn
away for a stern shot, we were far from inconvenienced.
At 0639, with the escort just crossing the tanker's stern
to the far side, fired four torpedoes by sound bearings
180°, range 500 yards, 90 starboard track, gyro angle
180°. The first three hit as aimed, directly under the
stack, at the forward end of his after superstructure
and under his bridge. The explosions were wonderful, throw-
ing caps and other debris above the belching smoke. He
sank by the stern in four minutes, and then we went deep
and avoided. The depth charges started a minute later,
but were never close.

-7-

— page 23 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. TANG
Feb 25 (-10) (Cont'd)

Our blown torpedo tube gasket, which we con-
sidered lightly on the 23rd, now caused trouble, for the
inner door gasket rolled out of its groove under the
pressure of water and would not keep up with the water.
With safety tank nearly dry, regained good control at
80 feet and avoided for the rest of the day at this depth,
with occasional looks at 60 feet when our destroyer came
close. He was persistent, probably hearing our pumps
and of which had to be run continuously, and spurred
on, too, by thoughts of a slit belly if he failed. Dark
finally came after our longest day, and a new inner door
gasket was installed without much trouble after surface-
ing. T shaped gaskets, similar to those just installed
in hatches, should obviously be installed in inaccessible
torpedo tube outer doors at the first practical date.
With four forward torpedoes left, proceeded
northward toward the lower BONINS, our new patrol area.

Feb 26 (-10)

ATTACK # 6

Patrolled on the surface, proceeding to new
area. At 1545, when about 180 miles northwest of SAIPAN,
sighted smoke which quickly developed into a four ship
convoy. Tracked them on course 150 until dark. Identify-
ing one as a two-stacker. Remained outside of 10000 yards
until moonset, when radar tracking showed them to be
worm turning, on base course east. The rear ship of the
convoy was small with a patrolling escort astern that
we could not see at 3000 yards, so we found her shortly,
searching for our two stacker. We found her shortly
astern of the leading freighter, and just ahead of a
small unidentified vessel.
Escorts on either bow of the leading freighter
offered no difficulty in closing the two stacker from
the blank. She was now tracked on straight course 090.
We watched her closely from 3000 yards before clos-
ing in to a firing position. A column zig brought the
leading freighter across our port bow, so twisted left,
steadied, and fired our usual spread of four torpedoes
covering the entire length of the two stacker as he came
by, radar range 1600, gyros near zero, 100 starboard
track. All torpedoes, even the one fired at his bow,
apparently missed astern, as we failed to detect his in-
creasing speed as he resumed worm turning. Had a little
difficulty in evading the escorts as one challenged us
with "S8" on a signal searchlight several times, which furthers our
suspicion that the lagging escort, which we could not see
at 3000 yards, was an enemy submarine.

-8-

— page 24 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. TANG
Feb 26 (-10) (Cont'd)

Though it was disappointing not to destroy
this passenger ship, the HORAI MARU, there is no use
in crying over spilt milk. The TANG is far from cocky,
and just as determined as ever.
Sent contact report on 450, and message to
COMSUBPAC concerning expenditure of torpedoes, then head-
ed for Midway on route prescribed for another of our sub-
marines.

Feb 27-Mar 3

Enroute Midway.

(C) WEATHER
Normal for all localities patrolled.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
Normal for all localities patrolled.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
None sighted.

-9-

— page 25 —
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.S. PANG

(F) SHIP CONTACTS:
No. Date Time Lat Long Type Range Course Speed How
1. 2/17 0025 8-10N 149-07E 2 AK, 1 DD, 1 Escort 30000 082 8.5 R
2. 2/22 0600 Saipan Channel 2 Patrol boats 12000 Various R
3. 2/24 2200 15-14N 143-00E 3 AK, 1 DD, 1 Escort 14000 270 9 R
4. 2/25 1100 15-30N 143-00E 1 AK, 2 AP, 2 Escort 23000 165 9 R
5. 2/26 1545 18-10N 143-00E 1 AP, 2 AK, 1 Escort 25000 160,090 9 R

(G) PI CONTACTS:
No. Date Time Lat Long Type Range Course Speed How
1. 2/7 1346 14-50N 159-10E Float plane 6 SD
2. 2/14 1200 10-25N 150-23E 8 SD
3. 2/16 0629 7-47N 149-08E 5 SD
4. 2/19 1050 8-30N 149-50E 7 SD
5. 2/20 1430 9-18N 149-02E 17 310 SD
6. 2/21 0925 12-26N 147-06E Flying boat 15 320 SD
7. 2/21 1000 12-29N 147-05E Flying boat 9 240 SD
8. 2/21 1050 12-30N 147-05E 16-6 Var Periscope
9. 2/22 1300 12-38N 147-00E 10 180 SD
10. 2/22 ** 14-44N 145-25E Many two-engine bmbrs Var SD
11. 2/27 0830 19-10N 145-25E 10 SD

** Planes were sighted taking off or landing on Tinian at almost every periscope observation.

-10-

— page 26 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS306) Torpedo attack No. 1 Patrol No. one.
Time 0335 . Date: 17 February, 1944. Lat 8-04 N.
Long. 149-28 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of target : Two medium AK's, one destroyer, five
small escorts. Contact by radar,
visibility excellent with three quarter
moon.

Ship sunk: One AK (MANSEI MARU class) 7770 Gross tons.

Ship damaged: None.

Damage determined by: Saw three torpedoes hit and observed
ship sink.

Target data: Draft 25 feet. Course 082, Speed 8.5. Range 1500

Own data: Speed 3, Course 000. Depth 60'. Angle 1° down.

-11-

— page 27 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA # 1
Night radar & periscope.

|                 | #7    | #8    | #9     | #10    |
||-------|-------|||
| Type attack     |       |       |        |        |
| Tubes fired     |       |       |        |        |
| Track angle     | 75P   | 79P   | 81P    | 83P    |
| Gyro angle      | 187   | 183   | 181    | 179    |
| Depth set       | 6'    | 6'    | 6'     | 6'     |
| Power           | High  | High  | High   | High   |
| Hit or miss     | Hit   | Hit   | Hit    | Miss   |
| Erratic         | No    | No    | No     | No     |
| Mk torpedo      | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A  | 14-3A  |
| Serial no.      | 40097 | 39183 | 39327  | 39812  |
| Mk exploder     | 6-1A  | 6-1A  | 6-1A   | 6-1A   |
| Serial no.      | 446   | 8273  | 6558   | 8441   |
| Actuation       | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Mk warhead      | 16    | 16    | 16     | 16     |
| Serial no.      | 1162  | 363   | 10953  | 1899   |
| Explosive       | TPX   | TPX   | TPX    | TPX    |
| Firing interval | 8 sec. | 8 sec. | 10 sec. |        |
| Type spread     |       | Divergent point of aim |        |
| Sea conditions  |       | Calm  |        |        |
| Overhaul activity |     | USS BUSHNELL |        |        |

-12-

— page 28 —
U.S.S. T.NG (SS306) Torpedo attack No. 2 Patrol No. one.
Time 2349 (-10) Date 22 February, 1944. Lat 14-47 N.
                                                      Long 144-50 E.

TARGET D.T. - D.M.GE INFLICTED

Description of target: Three merchantmen, one DD, at least
                           three small escorts. Contact by
                           radar, visibility poor.

Ship sunk:                 One AK (KENYO MARU class) 6486 gross tons.

Ship damaged:              None.

Damage determined by: Four torpedo hits seen, ship observed
                      to sink immediately.

Target data:          Draft 26 feet. Course 270, speed 9. Range 1500.

Own data:             Speed 0. Course 000. Depth Surf. Angle 0

                               -13-

— page 29 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO D.T. #2

Type attack                 Night surface
Tubes fired                 #3        #4        #5        #6
Track angle                 94P       96P       98P       100P
Gyro angle                  357       355       353       351
Depth set                   10'       10'       10'       10'
Power                       High      High      High      High
Hit or miss                 Hit       Hit       Hit       Hit
Erratic.                    No        No        No        No
Mk torpedo                  XIV-3A    14-3A     14-3A     14-3A
Serial no.                  40194     40109     20068     24905
Mk exploder                 VI-1A     6-1A      6-1A      6-1A
Serial no.                  8379      12375     8655      8284
Actuation                   Contact   Contact   Contact   Contact
Mk warhead                  AVL       16        16        16
Serial no.                  10969     1747      10902     1870
Explosive                   Torpex    Torpex    Torpex    Torpex
Firing interval             8 sec     8 sec     8 sec
Type spread                           Divergent point of aim
Sea conditions              Choppy
Overhaul activity                     U.S.S. BUSHNELL

-14-

— page 30 —
U.S.S. T.NG (SS306) Torpedo attack No. 3. Patrol No. One.
Time: 0120 Date 23 February, 1944. Lat. 14-45 N,
Long. 144-32 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of target: Same as attack # 2.

Ship sunk: One Naval auxiliary; ammunition ship (AS),
Destroyer tender (AD), or Submarine tender (AS)
(RIM.S.N M.RU Class) 8663 gross or 10462 DW tons.

Damage determined by: Three torpedoes seen to hit.
Target exploded and sank immediately.

Ship damaged: None.

Target data: Draft 28 feet. Course 270. Speed 8. Range 1400.

Own data: Speed 0. Course 340. Depth Surf. Angle

-15-

— page 31 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA # 3
Night surface

| | #3 | #4 | #5 | #6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type attack | | | | |
| Tubes fired | 102P | 104P | 105P | 106P |
| Gyro angle | 009 | 007 | 006 | 005 |
| Depth set | 10' | 10' | 10' | 10' |
| Power | High | High | High | High |
| Hit or miss | Hit | Hit | Hit | Miss |
| Erratic | No | No | No | No |
| Mk torpedo | XIV-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A |
| Serial No. | 23020 | 40085 | 22309 | 40121 |
| Mk exploder | VI-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A |
| Serial No. | 7345 | 7340 | 9662 | 8456 |
| Actuation | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact |
| Mk warhead | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Serial No. | 10928 | 11072 | 10254 | 11311 |
| Explosive | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex |
| Firing interval | 8 sec | 8 sec | 8 sec | |
| Type spread | Divergent point of aim | | | |
| Sea conditions | Choppy | | | |
| Overhaul activity | USS BUSHNELL | | | |

-16-

— page 32 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS306) Torpedo attack No. 4. Patrol No. One.
Time: 2230 Date: 24 February, 1944. Lat 3-16 N.
Long. 143-12 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of target: One AK, One AO, One DD.
Contact by sight in daylight.
Attack at night, visibility poor.

Ship sunk: One AK (TATUTAKI M.RU Class) 7064 gross tons.
Ship damaged: None.

Damage determined by: Saw three torpedoes hit and ship sink.

Target data: Draft 27 feet. Course 155. Speed 8. Range 1400.
Own data: Speed 5. Course 085. Depth Surf. Angle

-17-

— page 33 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA # 4

Type attack                               Night surface
Tubes fired                               #2        #3        #4        #6
Track angle                               104S      105S      106S      107S
Gyro angle                                355       356       357       358
Depth set                                 10'       10'       10'       10'
Power                                     High      High      High      High
Hit or miss                               Hit       Hit       Hit       Miss
Erratic                                   No        No        No        No
Mk torpedo                                14-3A     14-3A     14-3A     14-3A
Serial No.                                22294     40083     39830     40137
Mk exploder                               6-1A      6-1A      6-1A      6-1A
Serial No.                                7754      12709     8442      7774
Actuation                                 Contact   Contact   Contact   Contact
Mk warhead                                16        16        16        16
Serial No.                                11488     10924     11558     2698
Explosive                                 Torpex    Torpex    Torpex    Torpex
Firing interval                           8 sec     8 sec     8 sec
Type spread                               Divergent point of aim
Sea conditions                            Choppy
Overhaul activity                         USS BUSHNELL

                                          -13-

— page 34 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS306) Torpedo attack No. 5. Patrol No. One.
Time: 0639 Date: 25 February, 1944. Lat. 15-50 N,
Long. 144-21 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of target: Same as #4

Ship sunk: One Naval Tanker (Comparable to USS CIMARRON)
18276 DW tons.

Ship damaged: None.

Damage determined by: Saw three torpedo hits, observed
ship sink.

Target data: Draft 30 feet. Course 145. Speed 10. Range 500.
Own data: Speed 3. Course 233. Depth 60'. Angle Zero.

-19-

— page 35 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA # 5
Dawn submerged

Type attack
Tubes fired | #1 | #2 | #3 | #6
Track angle | 803 | 835 | 888 | 938
Gyro angle | 172 | 175 | 180 | 185
Depth set | 10' | 10' | 10' | 10'
Power | High | High | High | High
Hit or miss | Hit | Hit | Hit | Miss
Erratic | No | No | No | No
Mk torpedo | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A | 14-3A
Serial No. | 24675 | 22233 | 26020 | 39799
Mk exploder | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A | 6-1A
Serial No. | 18214 | 8389 | 8452 | 8439
Actuation | Contact | Contact | Contact | Contact
Mk warhead | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16
Serial No. | 2671 | 10996 | 10939 | 1150
Explosive | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex
Firing interval | 8 sec | 10 sec | 8 sec |
Type spread | Divergent point of aim
Sea conditions | Choppy
Overhaul activity | USS BUSHNELL

-20-

— page 36 —
U:S.S. TANG (SS306) Torpedo attack No. 6 Patrol No. One.
Time: 2241 Date: 26 February, 1944. Lat. 17-48 N,
Long. 143-40 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED
Description of target: One AP, Two AK's, Four escorts.

Ship sunk: None.
Ship damaged: None.
Damage determined by:

Target data: Draft 24 feet. Course 100. Speed 8.5. Range 1700.
Own data: Speed 8. Course 028. Depth Surf. Angle.

-21-

— page 37 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #6

Type attack             Night surface.
                        #1      #2      #3      #6
Tubes fired             100S    102S    104S    107S
Track angle             353     355     357     000
Gyro angle              10'     10'     10'     10''
Depth set               High    High    High    High
Power                   Miss    Miss    Miss    Miss
Hit or miss             No      No      No      No
Erratic                 14-3A   14-3A   14-3A   14-3A
Mk torpedo              40162   40105   23830   39928
Serial No.              6-1A    6-1A    6-1A    6-1A
Mk exploder             8032    11049   6557    8377
Serial No.              Contact Contact Contact Contact
Actuation               16      16      16      16
Mk warhead              11438   2100    11351   3902
Serial No.              Torpex  Torpex  Torpex  Torpex
Explosive
Firing interval         8 sec   8 sec   10 sec.
Type spread                     Divergent point of aim
Sea conditions                  Choppy
Overhaul activity               USS BUSHNELL

-22-

— page 38 —
CONFIDENTIAL U.S.S. TANG

(I) MINES AND MINE LAYING

None observed.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND
EVASION TACTICS

Numerous escorts were encountered with every
contact, but their patrolling was unsystematic and sooner
or later left an opening for attack. Generally on the
flank. As it was possible to come up unbelievably close
on the quarter of an escort without being sighted, poor
stern or quarter lookouts on their part is indicated.
Their gunfire and depth charging was of the
wildest sort and most ineffectual, as always evasion
was easy when the enemy was hit first, and much simply-
fied by the PPI.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS

None.

The only design weakness encountered is the
old type dove-tailed gasket in torpedo tube doors. Re-
placement of the outer door gasket is impossible except
in the calmest sea, and its failure immediately brings
a submarine to dangerously shallow depths. As hatch gas-
kets, which are readily accessable are now of the T type,
it seems evident that torpedo tube door gaskets should
be modified likewise as soon as practicable.

(L) RADIO

Both reception and transmission were satis-
factory.

(M) RADAR

Although requiring considerable checking and
attention by radar personnel, both SJ and SD worked re-
liably and were of great value.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

Good.

-23-

— page 39 —
CONFIDENTIAL U.S.S. TANG

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

1. 8-10 N 149-20 E 60 at 375'
2. 15-45 N 144-22 E 5° at 475'

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY

Good.

(Q) PERSONNEL

Although training in diving was limited by
the requirements of the patrol areas, this was in a
large part compensated for by the extra efforts to
qualify that always accompany surface patrolling.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

(a) Pearl to first area 4272 mi. 29100 gals
(b) In areas 2310 mi. 23400 gals
(c) Last area to Midway 2300 mi. 27330 gals

(S) DURATION

Days enroute to areas 13
Days in areas: WAKE 7
North of TRUK 5
West of TRUK 4
West of SAIPAN 5
Days enroute from area 6
Days submerged 10
(Including 6 days off WAKE)

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel

None 20000 40 days Indefinite

Limiting factor this patrol - Torpedoes.

(U) REMARKS

None.

-24-

— page 41 —
FB5-61/A16-3
Serial No. 052
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBMARINE DIVISION SIXTY-ONE
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
March 4, 1944.

Subject: U. S. S. TANG - Report of First War Patrol.
damage inflicted on the enemy be credited to the TANG:

SUNK

1 - Freighter (MANSEI MARU class) 7700 tons
1 - Freighter (KENYO MARU class) 6486 tons
1 - Naval Auxiliary (RIMSON MARU class) 8696 tons
1 - Freighter (TATUTAKE MARU class) 7068 tons
1 - Tanker 18276 Dwt. tons.

C. C. SMITH.

— page 42 —
FF12-10/416-3(15)/(12)
Serial 0473
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
TANG Report of
First War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 380
U.S.S. TANG - FIRST WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of First War Patrol.
(22 January to 3 March 1944).

1. The first war patrol of the TANG was also the first for the Com-
manding Officer, as such. The patrol was conducted in the Caroline and Marianas
Islands area.

2. Six outstanding attacks were made during this patrol, all of
which were extremely well planned, determined and aggressive, resulting in severe
damage to the enemy.

3. Sixteen hits out of 24 torpedoes fired is most commendable, and
adequately shows the excellence of the TANG's fire control party.

4. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the
Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this well planned, aggressive, and very
successful war patrol. The TANG is credited with inflicting the following damage
upon the enemy:

S U N K

1 - Freighter (MANSEI MARU class) - 7,770 tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - Freighter (KENYO MARU class) - 6,468 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Submarine Tender - 8,663 tons (Attack No. 3)
1 - Freighter (TATUTAKI MARU class) - 7,068 tons (Attack No. 4)
1 - Naval Tanker - 12,000 tons (Attack No. 5)
TOTAL 41,969 tons

Distribution and authentication
on following page.

SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
[HANDWRITTEN: 3 02674]
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
11 March 1944.
NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

[HANDWRITTEN: 844]
mr

J. H. BROWN, Jr.

[STAMP: FILMED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 3 02674]
[HANDWRITTEN: 30]

— page 43 —
FF12-10/416-3(15)                                SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

Serial 0473                                                 Care of Fleet Post Office,
                                                            San Francisco, California.
CONFIDENTIAL                                                11 March 1944.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to                                        NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO
TANG Report of                                                    ENTERING PATROL AREA.
First War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 380
U.S.S. TANG - FIRST WAR PATROL.

Subject:          U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of First War Patrol.
                  (22 January to 3 March 1944).

— page 44 —
U. S. S. TANG (SS306)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

May 15, 1944.

SS306/A16-3
Serial 09
[STAMP: CONFIDENTIAL]
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
The Commander Submarine Division 141.
Via : The Commander Submarine Squadron 14.
The Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306), Report of War Patrol #2.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Charts. (ComSubPac only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the second war patrol
of this vessel conducted in areas northwest of Palau, east
of Davao, and at Truk, during the period 16 March 1944 to
15 May, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: R. H. O'Kane]
R. H. O'KANE.

[STAMP: 82102]
[STAMP: FILMED]

— page 45 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS306)
c/o. Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

May 15, 1944.

(A) PROLOGUE

Returned from first patrol March third and completed
refit on the eleventh. As no difficulties were expected or
experienced, post repair was combined with two day and one
night training period. Finished loading on the fifteenth, and
departed on second patrol at dawn March sixteenth.

(B) NARRATIVE.

March 16 (12)

0655 Left Midway for Palau, proceeding at two engine speed.

March 17-22 (-12-11)

Enroute area conducting routine drills and dives.

March 23 (-11)

0512 Sighted trawler on patrol and avoided on the surface.
Our position, 150 miles east of PAGAN Island, indicates
that this vessel probably was a spotter, and not fish-
ing.
1235 Dived for half an hour on sighting an unidentified
plane.
1712 Dived until dusk to avoid being sighted while passing
between PAGAN and ALAMAGAN Islands. Delayed an hour to
insure peak radar operation while we had land contacts
available. In spite of the excellent wave meters and
other apparatus now provided for tuning this equipment,
there is nothing like a good land contact to demonstrate
its proper operation. Even the experts concede this.

March 24 (-10)

0907 Changed course to north to intercept U.S.S. BARB's
convoy.
1406 Dived for thirty minutes to avoid a patrol type air-
craft.
1608 Dived for two SD contacts at ten miles.
1632 Surfaced and proceeded along reverse of expected convoy
track until dark, and then proceeded toward assigned
area west of PALAU, as our orders will not permit fur-
ther delay.

-1-

— page 46 —
U.S.S. TANG
March 25-26 (-9)

route area.

March 27 (-9)

1651 Dived and avoided an unidentified aircraft.
2000 Entered area 10W, then proceeded to position sixty
     miles bearing 255° from TOAGLL MLUMUI pass, as as-
     signed for strike on PALAU.

March 28 (-9)

On assigned station. Conducted submerged patrol as
ordered, but searching continuously with 17 feet of
both periscopes, sound, and guarding 50 MC on the
SD mast.

March 29 (-9)

1210 Patrolling submerged as on previous day.
     Sighted patrol type plane.
1323 Just prior to surfacing, sighted thin raked mast of a
     ship. Conducted submerged approach at six knots until
     dark but could not close it sufficiently to determine
     its identity.
1857 Surfaced, continued tracking, and took position ahead
     for moonlight submerged observation and possible fir-
     ing, although the "blurb" of the target at 7000 yards
     seemed very small.
1950 Almost simultaneous with lightning flashes which revealed
     the target to be a PC type patrol, six large planes in
     groups of two arrived on the scene. They had on both
     running lights and landing lights and proceeded with
     what appeared to be a routine submarine search. As we
     were in an unfortunate position ahead of the first PC,
     which was later joined by a second, it required two
     hours at periscope depth and finally deep submergence
     to get clear.

March 30 (-9)

1217 Conducted submerged patrol, searching with seventeen
     feet of periscopes.
     Heard a good explosion, followed by a second fifteen
     seconds later. As the horizon was absolutely clear,
     surfaced for a better look.
1227 Sighted three planes, believed friendly, simultaneous
1258 with radar contact at seven miles. Dived and continued
     submerged patrol.

-2-

— page 47 —
U.S.S. TANG
March 31 (-9)

0721 Patrolled submerged on assigned station.
1700 Sighted bomber, fairly close.
2232 Sighted medium bomber on easterly course.
     Sighted two planes on the SD at about 16 miles which
     bothered us for half an hour as they conducted a
     search under the half moon. As they did not close inside
     eight miles, remained on the surface.

                     April 1 (-9)

0553 Sighted a large plane on the horizon, dived and com-
     menced usual high periscope submerged patrol for the
     day.

                     April 2 (-9)

0104 Sighted flash over horizon on bearing of PALAU, followed
     by apparent loom of searchlights.
0553 Commenced submerged high periscope patrol.
2000 Departed at one engine speed for newly assigned station
     120-150 miles east of DAVAO CITY, MINDANAO.

                     April 3 (-9)

0100 Passed to operational command of ComTaskFor Seventy-One.
0808 Dived for onehalf hour and apparently avoided detection
     by a patrol plane.
2400 Entered new area east of DAVAO GULF.

                     April 4 (-9)

     Patrolled on surface in center of assigned area, search-
     ing with both periscopes, sound to detect echo rang-
     ing and SJ during reduced visibility.
0347 Dived for three-quarters of an hour and apparently
     avoided detection by a plane sighted on SD at twelve
     miles.

                     April 5 (-9)

     Searched on surface as on previous day.
1042 Dived for forty minutes and apparently avoided detection
     by a plane sighted on the horizon.

                     April 6 (-9)

     Patrolling on surface.
2100 Departed area, proceeding east at five knots on the
     auxiliary engine to conserve fuel. Our number 4 FBT
     could not be converted by Submarine Base, Midway,
     during the last refit.

                     -3-

— page 48 —
U.S.S. TING

April 7 (-9)

0752. Dived for twenty minutes and avoided plane sighted on
      horizon, then proceeded toward former area at five knots,
      searching as usual with everything we've got.
0900 Passed to operational command of ComTaskFor SLVENTH.

April 8 (-9)

      Patrolling on the surface enroute newest area north
      west of PALAU.
0900 Commenced passing through a field of oil drums which
      continued throughout the day.
1500 SD radar out of commission on afternoon test. The radar
      officer, radio technician, and leading radioman were
      relieved of all other duties and commenced "round the
      clock" repairs.

April 9 (-9)

0330 Sighted an unidentified plane which did not close, so
      continued on the surface. Numerous oil drums were again
      in sight all day.

April 10 (-9)

0058 Sighted plane on SD radar which closed to five miles
      before opening.
0813 Dived for forty minutes for a plane on SD at 8 miles.
      Apparently avoided detection due to overcast skys.
1017 Sighted single mast and deck house of an apparent PC
      type patrol boat. Dived and attempted to close to
      investigate, but height of eye range and change of bear-
      ing, when next observed from forty feet, showed him on
      a northeasterly course, at better than fifteen knots,
      and out of reach. As we were then about fifty miles
      from TOAGEL LUNGUI pass, and expecting shipping within a
      day, continued on submerged to close the island undetected,
      but searching with 17 feet of periscope. It was a long
      haul from INDIMAO on the auxiliary engine, but other-
      wise we would not have had sufficient fuel to complete
      the patrol.

April 11 (-9)

      Conducted submerged patrol ten miles west of NG.RUANGL
      passages, with periodic high periscope searches. From
      this position we would have been able to intercept
      shipping through this passage or around VLA.SOO reef,
      headed for TOAGEL LUNGUI, and at the same time been
      able to spot and trail for night attack any traffic from
      this latter pass. We considered this our first likely

-4-

— page 49 —
U.S.S. TANG
"spot" in nearly four weeks of patrol.

April 12 (-9)

The TRIGGER was delayed in entering her lower half
of area 10 N., patrolled submerged five miles of TOAGEL
LUNGUI passage, covering her area as well as our own.

April 13 (-9)

1220 Conducted submerged patrol between three and four miles
     off TOAGEL LUNGUI.
     Sighted four motored flying boat which apparently landed
     in the lagoon. Repairs were completed to the SJ today,
     and it worked with peak performance on surfacing. As we
     have patrolled close in and enjoyed bright nights, it
     is doubtful that any shipping slipped by us, especially
     as TOAGEL LUNGUI pass would hardly be used at night,
     unlighted.

April 14 (-9)

0154 Sighted U.S.S. TRIGGER on the SJ radar, as she crossed
     our area. Closed her and made preliminary arrangements
     for mutual assistance in covering this area, and estab-
     lished sound communication for later use.
1400 Patrolled two miles off TOAGEL LUNGUI during forenoon.
     As passing squalls developed into steady rain, surfaced,
     moved out to five miles from the pass, and conducted
     radar search. After dark, moved out to contact TRIGGER,
     but SJ failure prevented early rendezvous.

April 15 (-9)

0011 Sighted U.S.S. TRIGGER, and sent over the following by
     the tin can-line throwing gun method: (1) All new infor-
     mation we have concerning this area. (2) Our ideas for
     its most effective coverage by two submarines. (3) A
     duplicate copy of coordinated attack doctrine and signals,
     for possible use. Received compatable ideas for co-
     ordinated patrol, and a report of TRIGGER's
     her damage, for delivery to COMSUBPAC.
1056 Conducted submerged patrol three to four miles off pass during the day.
     TOAGEL LUNGUI before dawn and conducted submergea patrol
1638 Sighted four engine flying boat.
2152 Sighted four engine bomber.
     Made rendezvous with TRIGGER who sent a rubber boat to
     TANG. Supplied her with compressor valves and cages,
     radar tubes, and our spare battery blower motor to use
     as a sound training motor.

-5-

— page 50 —
U.S.S. TANG

April 16 (-9)

Patrolled submerged two to three miles off TOAGEL
LLUNGUI.
0740 Sighted bomber.
1400 As TRIGGER was patrolling out today, proceeded south-
     west about three miles off the reef to investigate
     lagoon and western entrance to HALAKAL HARBOR.
     No evidence of any shipping could be detected.
1552 Sighted bomber over lagoon.

April 17 (-9)

1215 Patrolled submerged three miles off TOAGEL LLUNGUI.
     Sighted large flying boat which apparently landed in
     lagoon.

April 18 (-9)

Patrolled submerged off TOAGEL LLUNGUI.
1013 Sighted flying boat over lagoon.
2130 Made rendezvous with TRIGGER. Sent over compressor
     valves to her and exchanged spare SJ modulator units
     in hopes of fixing our ailing SJ radar.
     Completed repairs during the night.

April 19 (-9)

Patrolled in same vicinity as on previous day, with-
drawing as usual to the northwest during the night to
insure a night radar run on any inbound convoy.

April 20 (-9)

0750 Patrolled as on previous day.
     Sighted flying boat.

April 21 (-9)

0619 Patrolled three miles off TOAGEL LLUNGUI pass.
     Sighted bomber on westerly course.

April 22 (-9)

0439 Sighted searchlight over the horizon in vicinity of harbor.
0504 Commenced submerged patrol closing to former position
     of TOAGEL LLUNGUI.
1143 Sighted five bombers flying south over the island.
1305 Sighted another bomber over lagoon headed west.
1440 Sighted flight of six bombers over the island.
2040 Departed for area fifteen to perform lifeguard services,
     proceeding at one engine speed. Though we regretted
     leaving this area without making our presence felt, our

-6-

— page 51 —
U.S.S. TING
Observations lead us to believe that it will remain
stagnant for some time and that our route to TRUK
will offer better chance of contact.

April 23 (-9)
1840 Enroute TRUK at one engine speed, searching with both
periscopes, sound to detect echo ranging, and SJ radar
during passing squalls.
In anticipation of bombarding the phosphorite refinery
on FAIS Island the following evening, commenced firing
seven rounds to determine the limiting point of twi-
light for accurate pointing and training, and to estab-
lish the ballistic to make the sight bar range equal
true range to the splashes.

April 24 (-9)
0600 As we were sufficiently ahead of schedule, changed
course to close FAIS Island, forty miles north of our
track.
1000 Dived fifteen miles from the island and closed at four
knots. As we were aware of the reported gun emplace-
ments, established the bearing line between lookout
tower and refinery as 123° T, then proceeded around the
island for bombardment by indirect fire. Surfaced in
evening twilight with lookout tower, our point of aim,
bearing 303° T, range 7300 yards, and commenced firing
33 rounds of four inch. To insure crossing the refinery,
employed a rocking ladder of 200 and then 100 yard
steps, and applied deflection spots as previously com-
puted to include other structures in the installation.
Though the results were not discernable, the shell
detonations were nicely visible at the bottom of the
ladder, and the target area was crossed several times.
As expected, their guns, placed to protect the in-
stallation on the west side of the island, were unable
to return any fire.
1845 Set course for new lifeguard station off TRUK at one
engine speed.

April 25-26 (-10)
Enroute TRUK.

April 27 (-10)
0859 Dived for a six mile SD contact simultaneous with high
periscope sighting of smoke to the southwest near
PITCHFIELD Bank. On return to periscope depth eight
minutes later, sighted the plane going away, and then

-7-

— page 52 —
U.S.S. TANG
the smoke from fifty feet. There were two patches
tracted on a westerly course at about ten knots. Our
attempts to "end around" before the enemy might reach
GREATER BANK were frustrated by the air coverage
which drove us down five times before the last
with a "swish", perhaps of a dud bomb, and a rattle
of machine gun bullets. Continued trailing for three
more hours, but sighted no more smoke. The enemy was
now an hour on the bank, and a hundred miles astern.
Faced with no assurance that we could guess where
he would again strike deep water. Faced with
the problem of reaching our lifeguard station by
the following day, regretfully set course for TRUK.

                       April 28 (-10)

0714 Dived on border of assigned area northwest of TRUK,
     and apparently avoided detection by a distant twin engine
     bomber. Continued high periscope submerged patrol
     throughout the day.
1522 Sighted distant plane on easterly course in direction
     of island.
1718 Sighted two float planes.
1859 Shortly after surfacing dived for a six mile SD contact
     which closed slowly to two miles. Remained submerged
     for an hour.

                       April 29 (-10)

Conducted submerged high periscope patrol, working
around to lifeguard position east of TRUK for strike
from MARSHALLS.
0550 Sighted float plane fairly close.
1928 About a half hour after surfacing commenced tracking
     Liberators which passed seven miles north
     of us enroute TRUK, which was thirty miles distant.
     Observed several explosions in direction of island.
1950 Commenced diving at approximately one hour intervals
2000 to avoid a determined search of the area along our
     bearing from TRUK. As our bearing was 110° from
     DUBLON, quite to the south of the track of Liberators
     returning to ENIWETOK or other MARSHALLS base, it
     was at once considered that this search was for us.
     Their search consisted of dropping increasing numbers
     of flares as they approached us from the island,
     employing three to four planes. The closest flares
     were about five miles distant. The plane contacts
     would continue to close to from three to four miles
     where they would fade out, most probably as the
     searchers came low to locate us by silhouette.
     dead in the water we were probably invisible from
     overhead. Naturally we dived at this point of their
     search.

                               -8-

— page 53 —
U.S.S. TANG

After three such dives we had moved out to forty miles
from the island and were no longer troubled, although
moonset may have caused them to give up. It certainly
appeared that the planes were vectoring out along our
bearing and that they did not know our distance from
the island. Further, our distances check with data
concerning the DF'ing of the SD radar received sub-
sequently.

April 30 (-10)

0400 On surface in assigned position for carrier strikeson
TRUK, 40 miles bearing 180° T from MOEN Island.
Sighted strong radar interference on the SJ on mean
bearing 240° T, obviously from our ap roaching task
force.
0436 Sighted low flying plane or planes on SJ radar, which
passed 4600 yards from us headed toward our task force.
0530 Sighted first planes on SD.
0610 Watched plane go down in flames over DUBLON Island.
0630 Dived for thirteen minutes and avoided a group of
possibly unfriendly planes which closed rapidly to two
miles.
0643 On surfacing, flights of up to fifty planes were
continuously shuttling between TRUK and the southwest.
With the possible exception of a sinking maru, this
was the most encouraging sight we've witnessed in this
war to date.
0815 Sighted tops, then superstructures of our task force.
1025 Received first report of downed plane and was headed for
reported position two miles off FOLEAU Island at emerg-
ency speed. Bombers working over FOLEAU and OLLA Islands
were most reassuring, and with numerous fighters to guide
us, located the life raft promptly about four miles
west of its reported position.
1156 With Lieutenant (junior grade) S. Scammell, USN, J.D.
LANDRON, AM2c, and H.B. GILLILL, AM2c on board,
withdrew six miles to the south.
1559 Proceeded at emergency speed on a course to round KUOP
Islands to reach life raft outside the reef on the east
side of TRUK. Fifteen minutes later however a second
raft was reported to the north of us in the approximate
position of our first recovery. As the latter could be
avoided, giving priority to the second, we proceeded at
emergency speed to one mile off OLLAN and one mile off
the reef. The hovering bomber and two fighters seemed
perturbed that we wouldn't follow them over to the
actual position, some five miles inside the reef. A
twenty minute search with periscopes and binoculars
did not locate the raft, headed south again to
carry out the original plan. All planes had been
recalled, leaving us a bit naked, so to avoid a pro-
longed submerged retirement, opened fire with 4" H.E.

-9-

— page 54 —
U.S.S. TANG

on the gun emplacements on the south west end of OLLAN
Island. Our ballistic of the previous week again
proved correct, for with sight bar range 300' yards less
than radar range, the first shell burst low in the
trees intended to conceal the emplacements. Fired
twenty rounds of H.E. and common which we returned
agreeably amazed at the ability of the 4" to stay on
the target. Corrected radar range for continuously
the gun, with occasional salvos spotted short,
appears a simple and adequate means of fire control.
1850 At 3500 yards trained in and turned to parallel
however, for the nips crawled out of their holes and let
fly at us. Their first splash was about 1000 yards short,
the second we didn't spot. Remained submerged for forty
minutes, then surfaced and proceeded to the east side of
TRUK at emergency speed.
2143 From position six miles east of TOLAN Island on the
eastern reef, commenced zigzag search to the southwest
at ten knots. Fired green Very stars over fifteen minutes
on the turns and midway of each leg, hoping for any
sort of answer from one of the rafts. The only reply,
sighted on some occasions, was a series of red or white
lights in the neighborhood of UMAN Island, which changed
bearing rapidly as it flashed along a runway. One of
the pilots we recovered the following day had sighted our
stars, but was afraid to answer them.

May 1 (-10)

0330 Proceeded east to a position for second day's strike,
ten miles closer to the Island than on the previous day.
0340 Sighted radar interference of our task force.
0600 Sighted conning tower of Jap submarine proceeding south
around KUOP from OTTA pass. Submerged and commenced
approach. Tracked him on straight course 180° at 12
knots. When the generated range was 3000 yards and angle
on the bow 30 starboard, suddenly lost sound contact.
Took a quick look to observe our bombers and fighters
overhead and to confirm our fears that the enemy had
dived. Dropped to 150 feet and rigged for silent run-
ning, but was unable to regain contact. Headed south
west for an hour at standard speed, then surfaced and
proceeded to the northwest toward the reported raft of
the evening before. Spread large colors on deck to help
identify us, then reported enemy sub to the task force
commander for possible attack.
0828 Headed at emergency speed for life raft reported two
and a half miles southwest of our favorite OLLAN Island.
Before we reached the scene, a float plane from the
U.S.S. NORTH CAROLINA capsized in the cross chop in the
attempt to rescue. The other NORTH CAROLINA plane made
a precarious landing and on our arrival was towing both
raft and fellow pilot clear of the island. This action

-10-

— page 55 —
U.S.S. TANG

0917 was most helpful, for we expected completion from
OLLAN, and nearby fighters were already strafing
her gun emplacements for us.
After Lieutenant J.J. DODDLE, USNR, Lieutenant
(junior grade) R. KANZE, for whom we had searched the
night before, and P. E. HILL, AR2C, were on board and
had somehow been blown into the air again, we proceeded to
sink the capsized plane with 20mm fire. At this time
a torpedo bomber was spotted hitting the water about
seven miles to the east. Proceeded down the bearing at
high emergency speed, and opened fire on nearby OLLAN as we
passed. They had removed the trees intended to camou-
flage their position, evidently feeling it was no longer
a secret. It gave us an unobstructed point of aim, how-
ever, and our hitting 4" H.E. with a few common sand-
witched in, supported by strafing fighters and topped off
with two bombers, must have discouraged them for they
did not return any fire.

1004 Sighted life raft and survivors ahead under circling
fighters.

1020 With Commander A.R. MATER, USN, J.J. DODDLE, AR2C,
and H.A. TOMSOY, AO2C, on board, proceeded at
emergency speed to round RUOP to reach three life
rafts reported off the eastern reef. As our track took
us close by our submarine contact of the morning,
requested and promptly got good air coverage, blown
clear with safety, negative and the level group dry,
and even our Fairbanks-Morse smoking a bit, rolled
through this spot at twenty-one knots fairly confident
that the Jap would get no more than a fleeting glimpse.
As Lieut(jg) BURNS had landed his NORTH CAROLINA float
plane off the eastern reef, requested that we attempt to
tow the rafts clear. He was a big jump ahead of us
however, having taken all seven men from three rafts
on board and taxied with them to seaward. They were
now in no immediate danger, so followed our escorting
planes to a raft just off LESCON Island in the bight
between RUOP and TRUK. As we thoroughly expected to be
given down, rigged a free running line and ran it to
the SD mast for towing the raft clear while submerged,
but our strafing escorts evidently discouraged any
opposition.

1325 Recovered Lieutenant H.E. HILL, USNR, then headed for
the fighter pilot reported in the water just off the
eastern reef of UOP. By the time of our arrival planes
had dropped a rubber boat to him, but he was too weak
to do more than climb aboard one.

1410 After pulling perhaps our most grateful passenger aboard,
Lieutenant (junior grade) J.G. COLL, USNR, backed up
and clear of the reef and headed for the waiting float
plane at emergency speed. She was well clear, about
three miles east of SALAT Island, and no

-11-

— page 56 —
U.S.S. TANG

difficulty was experienced in bringing the following
on board: Lieutenant R.S. NELSON, USNR; Lieutenant
(junior grade) R. BARBER, USNR; Lieutenant (junior
grade) J.A. BURNS, USNR; Ensign C.L. FARWELL, USNR;
J. LIVINGSTON, RM1c; R.W. GRUBBE, AM2c; J. HARANEK,
AM2c; C.F. TABRU, AM2c; and R.L. BUTTLEY,
AM2c. The action of Lieut(jg) BURNS, in making the rescue
possible by deliberately placing himself in as pre-
carious a position as any of the downed personnel,
will be made the subject of a special report.
1515 Sank the float plane, which had a badly battered
tail with 20mm fire, and proceeded at emergency speed
to round KUOP to the last reported raft position
Island. As all planes were recalled as of 1630, and
we could not reach the raft until sunset, we requested
two night fighters to assist in locating it. Our
passage through the area of our morning contact was not
quite as comfortable without air cover, but again
twentyone knots took us through in a hurry. The night
fighters joined us at sunset as we were approaching the
last reported position three and a half miles south
of OLLA, and immediately commenced their search.
Fifteen minutes later one of the fighters circled then
fired several red Very stars four miles northwest of
us. Closed at emergency speed, spotting the raft from
atop the shears, as it was now too dark for periscope.
1830 With Lieutenant D. KIRKPATRICK, USNR, and R.L. BUTTLEY,
AM2c, on board, dismissed the planes and commenced
slow speed search west of the atoll.

May 2 (-10)

0955 Conducted submerged high periscope search off the west-
ern reef.
1135 Sighted flying boat over the lagoon.
1211 Sighted land plane near TOL Island.
1220 Sighted patrol plane in the west on a northerly course.
1605 Sighted probably same patrol on an easterly course.
Sighted unidentified aircraft in the northwest headed
for TRUK.
2005 Sighted A/A fire and explosions on TRUK from Liberator
raid.

May 3 (-10)

Searched as on previous day.
1725 Sighted float plane headed west.

-12-

— page 57 —
U.S.S. TANG.
May 4 (10)

Conducted submerged high periscope patrol in most
likely spot to intercept traffic for OITA pass. Con-
ducted search after dark, retiring to vicinity of
OITA pass for submerged patrol.

May 5 (-10)

0615 Conducted submerged patrol off OITA pass.
Sighted float plane to the south.
After dark proceeded outside forty mile circle to
position east of DUBLON for Liberator strike on TRUK.

May 6 (-10)

0056 Several planes passed seven to twelve miles from us,
tracked by SD radar.
0110 Sighted radar interference of U.S.S. PERMIT enter-
ing area.
0116 Observed explosions on bearing of DUBLON.
0200 Though all large plane contacts had disappeared, we
were again bothered by searchers who maintained
contact with us for another hour. We stopped and head-
ed up the moon streak when they came within five miles,
and avoided the closest one at three miles in a rain
squall. The three pips then moved out to seven and
finally twelve miles, and then disappeared.
With all planes departed and our relief in the area,
set course for PEARL at two engine speed on prescribed
routing.
0300 Three quarters of an hour after our trim dive, sub-
merged for twenty minutes and avoided a float plane,
probably searching from the HALL Islands, fifty miles
distant. Had two plane contacts outside thirty miles
during remainder of day. After dark, sent message
concerning airmen aboard.

May 7 (-10)

0701 Enroute PEARL.
Tracked plane at forty miles on SD for some minutes.
0825 Dived for twenty minutes to avoid a large low flying
plane.
1202 Tracked plane in from 14 miles.
1204 Though sighted and identified as an IBI at eight miles,
dived as his approach was menacing.
1500 SJ radar out of commission on afternoon test. The last
modulator unit, obtained from TRIGGER, has also leaked
its oil. Commenced round the clock repairs.

-13-

— page 58 —
U.S.S. TANG

1300 Hold demonstration of all identification flares and
     stars (ex-smoke bombs) for the ben fit of the aviators
     on board, none of whom had seen them before.

                               May 8 (-11)

Enroute PEARL.

                               May 9 (-11)

0513 In position 120 miles from WAKE, dived for plane
     sighted on the SD which closed rapidly from 10 to 7
     miles. Though our position is nearly on a line be-
     tween ENIWETOK and WAKE, it is doubtful that a
     friendly plane would be here at dawn.
1137 Sighted plane on SD which closed from 17 to 12 miles
     before opening.
1300 Slowed to one engine to conserve fuel.

                               -14-

— page 59 —
U.S.S. TANG
(C) WEATHER
The weather was normal for the areas and periods
covered.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
The tidal conditions were normal.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
None sighted.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS
See page 16.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS
See page 17-19.

(H) ATTACK DATA
No attacks.

(I) MINES
None observed.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION
TACTICS.
Extensive use of aircraft was bothersome day and night.
It is not believed that any were radar equipped, but some were
obviously searching along our bearing from TRUK as noted in
the narrative, most probably as a result of DF'ing our SD. Off
PALAU a combined aircraft and surface search was encountered
which was avoided at deep submergence below a 26° gradient.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
None.

-15-

— page 60 —
NO. | DATE | TIME | SHIP CONTACTS | | TYPE | INITIAL EST. | | | HOW CONT. | REMARKS
| | | LATITUDE | LONGITUDE | | COURSE | SPEED | RANGE yd | |
1 | 3/23/44 | 0512 | 18-40N | 148-30E | Fishing | 270 | 10 | 14000 | Sight | Periscope disappeared then reappeared over horizon.
2 | 3/29/44 | 1823 | 7-10N | 133-35E | Patrol | various | K nown | 20000 | Sight | Periscope. Evaded.
3 | 4/10/44 | 1030 | 8-25N | 134-05E | Patrol | 090 | 8 | 14000 | Sight | Periscope. Evaded.
4 | 4/27/44 | 0900 | 6-50N | 148-50E | Smoke (2) | 180 | 12 | 14000 | Sight | Surface contact dived for planes.
5 | 5/1/44 | 0800 | 7-0N | 151-45E | Submarine RO class | 180 | 12 | 14000 | Sight | Surface contact forced down by air planes.

-16-

— page 62 —
NO. | DATE | TIME | LATITUDE | LONGITUDE | TYPE | AMT. | INITIAL EST. COURSE | EST. ALT. | HOW CONT. | REMARKS
AIRCR | AFT CONTACTS
21. | 4/16/44 | 0620 | 7-43N | 134-20E | Flying | 2 | 256E | 1000 | Periscope | Inbound
| | | | | boat | | | | |
22. | 4/16/44 | 1145 | 7-37.5N | 134-24E | bomber | 1 | | 1000 | Periscope | Inbound
| | | | | " | | | | |
23. | 4/17/44 | 1305 | 7-36N | 134-25E | Land | 4 | | 1000 | Periscope | Inbound
| | | | | bomber | | | | |
24. | 4/18/44 | 1015 | 7-39N | 134-25E | Bomber | 3 | | 1000 | Periscope | Inbound
| | | | | Flying | 256 | | | | |
25. | 4/22/44 | 0600 | 7-28N | 134-20E | Bomber | 1 | | 800' | Lookout | Twin tail
| | | | | boat | | | | |
26. | 4/22/44 | 1112 | 7-28N | 134-23E | Land | 7 | 070 T | 800' | Periscope | Formation
| | | | | Bomber | | | | |
27. | 4/22/44 | 1340 | 7-36N | 134-25E | Boat | 1 | 230 T | 900' | Periscope |
28. | 4/22/44 | 1643 | 9-05N | 137-12E | Bomber | 15 | | 1050' | Periscope | 6 formation
29. | 4/23/44 | 0900 | 6-50N | 152-52E | Flying | 2 | 220 | 1000 | Sight |
| | | | | Boat | | | | |
30. | 4/25/44 | 1445 | 9-02N | 143-45E | 2 bomber | 10 | | 1000 | SD |
| | | | | 6 fighter | | | | |
31. | 4/27/44 | 0705 | 6-55N | 151-05E | Bomber | 15 | | 1000 | Periscope |
32. | 4/28/44 | 1521 | 6-55N | 151-05E | Flying | 20 | | 1000 | Lookout |
| | | | | boat | | | | |
33. | 4/28/44 | 1652 | 7-28N | 134-19E | bomber | 5 | | 800' | Lookout |
34. | 4/28/44 | 0640 | 7-36N | 134-23E | Bomber | 3 | | 1000 | Lookout |
35. | 4/28/44 | 0350 | 6-50N | 156-00E | Plane | 1 | | 1000 | Periscope |
36. | 4/29/44 | 1900 | 7-08N | 152-07E | Many | 2-7 | | 1000 | Periscope |
| | | | | Uniddout | | | | |
37. | 4/29/44 | 1718 | 6-55N | 151-05E | Sea | 1 | | 1000 | Periscope |
| | | | | boat | | | | |
38. | 4/30/44 | 1537 | 6-50N | 151-52E | Many | 0-14 | | 1000 | Periscope |
39. | 5/1/44 | 2400 | 6-50N | 151-52E | Many | 0-14 | | 1000 | Periscope |
40. | 5/2/44 | All | 6-50N | 151-52E | Many | 0-14 | | 1000 | Periscope |
41. | 5/2/44 | 1000 | 7-15N | 152-35E | Flying | 6 | | 1000 | Periscope |
| | | | | Boat | | | | |
-18-

— page 63 —
AIRCRAFT CONTACTS
NO. | DATE | TIME | LATITUDE | LONGITUDE | TYPE | INITIAL BEARING | RANGE | EST. ALT. | HOW CONT. | REMARKS
    | EST. COURSE | EST. SPEED | WEATHER | VISIBILITY | IDENTIFICATION | DAMAGE | RESULTS
42. | 5/2/44 | 1725 | 7-20N    | 151-20E   | Recco | SB              | 12 mi | 200'      | Periscope | 270 T       | 100 kts    | Clear   | 10 mi      | SOC3           | None   | None
43. | 5/3/44 | 1030 | 7-05N    | 150-28E   | Unidont | SB              | 7 mi  | 090'      | Periscope | 090 T       | 100 kts    | Clear   | 10 mi      | SOC3           | None   | None
44. | 5/4/44 | 0615 | 7-08N    | 151-45E   | Recco | SB              | 10 mi | 090'      | Periscope | 090 T       | 100 kts    | Clear   | 10 mi      | SOC3           | None   | None
45. | 5/5/44 | 1605 | 7-10N    | 151-20E   | SB    | SB              | 12 mi | 1000'     | Periscope | 090 T       | 100 kts    | Clear   | 10 mi      | SOC3           | None   | None
46. | 5/6/44 | 0355 | 8-40N    | 152-35E   | Dave  | SB              | 15 mi | 2000'     | Radar     | 090 T       | 100 kts    | Clear   | 10 mi      | SOC3           | None   | None
47. | 5/6/44 | 1000 | 12-50    | 153-00E   | Dave  | SB              | 12 mi | 2000'     | Sight     | 090 T       | 100 kts    | Clear   | 10 mi      | SOC3           | None   | None
48. | 5/7/44 | 0000 | 12-50    | 156-10    | Dave  | SB              | 15 mi | 2000'     | Sight     | 090 T       | 100 kts    | Clear   | 10 mi      | SOC3           | None   | None
49. | 5/7/44 | 0820 | 12-55N   | 156-30E   | Dave  | SB              | 8 mi  | 2000'     | Sight     | 090 T       | 100 kts    | Clear   | 10 mi      | SOC3           | None   | None
50. | 5/7/44 | 1205 | 13-25N   | 156-45E   | PBM   | SB              | 11 mi | 2000'     | Sight     | 090 T       | 100 kts    | Clear   | 10 mi      | SOC3           | None   | None
51. | 5/9/44 | 0512 | 17-47N   | 166-30E   | PBM   | SB              | 7 mi  | 2000'     | Sight     | 090 T       | 100 kts    | Clear   | 10 mi      | SOC3           | None   | None

-19-

— page 64 —
U.S.S. TANG
(L) RADIO

Radio reception was good and no difficulty
experienced in any transmissions. Of special note was
the very satisfactory two way voice communication during
the strike on K in part due to the wardroom Hallicrafter
receiver. The frequency of 4475 could be answered by all
planes and had the advantage of being clear of other VHF
tactical frequency. It was therefore possible for planes to
direct us quickly, and for us to get their support when
needed. Voice on the R.L receiver was quite often unin-
telligible.

(L) RADAR

The performance of the SJ radar was very satisfactory
when it was in operation. Fortunately its off periods in
general coincided with bright nights when shipping could
be sighted and on the return trip. The trouble was generally
in the new type transmitter and among other things entailed
the failure of the original modulator unit, the spare, and
finally a third one obtained from the USS TRIGGER. Around
the clock repairs by our "long course" radar officer, a
first class radio technician, and a first class radioman
could only temporarily overcome the rate of breakdown. A
thousand man hours were devoted exclusively to its overhaul
with only temporary results and the knowledge that "they
hadn't said uncle" as a reward. The details of the failures
are listed below:

Item | Number of | Reason for
Number | Description | failures | failure
-----|||
135 | VR-150, 30 Tube | 2 | Lost Gas
120 | 6L6 (metal) Tube | 4 | Shorted and weak
121 | 6L6 (glass) Tube | 1 | Poor emission
134 | VR-105/30 Tube | 1 | Lost Gas
140 | 919 LP Lamps | 4 | Poor regulation
117 | 6AC7 Tubes | 2 | Shorting and poor emission
122 | 6SN7 Tube | 4 | Poor emission
118 | 6AG7 Tube | 1 | Shorting
127 | 705A Tube | 3 | Not known
116 | 504G Tube | 5 | Shorting & poor emission
129 | 717A Tube | 2 | Soft
119 | 6H6 (glass) Tube | 1 | Shorted
114 | 2X2 Tube | 1 | Lost emission
135A | 5R4GY Tube | 1 | Gaseous
133 | 836 Tube | 1 | Shorted
137 | 5AP1 (Cathode Ray) | 2 | Not known & one accidentally
     |             |           | broken
128 | 706AY (Magnetron) | 2 | Low R.F.

-20-

— page 65 —
U.S.S. TANG

Item
Number | Description | Number of failures | Reason for failure
97 | Voltmeter 0-500volts | 1 | Shorted out
104 | Renewal links for 6 fuses | 32 | Overload
106 | Renewal links for 10 amp fuses | 18 | Overload
213 | Capacitor, mica 240 .005 mf 500 volts | 1 | Not within tolerance
236 | Cable assembly, coaxial | 1 | Arcing
242 | Modulation network | 3 | Leaking oil
231 | Resistor .18 megs 1/2 watts | 1 | Open
349 | Resistor, .15 megs 2 watts | 1 | Burned out
350 | Resistor, 1 meg 2 watts | 1 | Not within tolerance
361 | Resistor 100 ohms 2 watts | 1 | added to set
366 | Resistor 10,000 ohms wire wound | 1 | Open
363 | Resistor 1600 ohms wire wound | 1 | Burned out
411 | Resistor 10,000 ohms 2 watts | 1 | Below tolerance rating
444 | Resistor, 7 megs 10 watts | 1 | Not within tolerance
342 | Resistor, 2200 ohms 2 watts | 1 | Burned out
410 | Resistor, 10,000 ohms 2 watts | 1 | Open
185 | Capacitor, .5 mf 600 volts | 1 | Leakage
148 | Capacitor, .1/.1 mf 600 volts | 1 | Leakage

SJ-1 M.G.

19 | Resistor, 1R Desig-nation 5895405.B1 | 1 | Open
20 | Resistor, 1R Desig-nation 5895405.B2 | 1 | Damaged in repairing M.G.
25 | Brushes, ("X" axis) Designation 8109931.4 | 4 | Worn out
27 | Rotating Elements, 1R Designation 8109978.C1 | 1 | Worn out

-21-

— page 67 —
U.S.S. TANG
(U) REMARKS

IDENTIFICATION:

The twenty two aviators who witnessed a demonstra-
tion of submarine identification flares Mk 10, 11, and 12,
submarine emergency identification signals Mk 2 mod 2 (ex-
plosive type), and Mk 1 comets (Buck Rogers gun), unanimously
doubt their ability to note any but the Mk 1 comets, and that
the submarine was already diving for an attack. Along the same line
is the fact that every pyrotechnic we could fire did not de-
ter a friendly submarine from making an end run on us dur-
ing our last patrol forcing us to avoid at high speed as
soon as he dived. Sure identification is becoming increas-
ingly important as we traverse a thousand extra miles of U.S.
patrolled waters. Further, it may not always be possible or
desireable to establish sanctuaries in coming operations,
such an incident arising in this very patrol when an enemy
submarine shared our area for a day or more.
Means for reliable identification is at hand in
the simple Mk 3 (mortar type) signal projector which was
issued to submarines during 1938, but orders turned in be-
fore many were installed. The order to turn them in was based
on the fact that the submerged signal gun could fire pyro-
technics of similar color. The person issuing the order evi-
dently did not consider the prohibitive delay in the use of
the submerged signal gun for a surface projector. The Mk 3
projector mentioned above provides a healthy pyrotechnic
burst that can be seen in a matter of a second or two, and its
effectiveness was demonstrated in one of our submarines who
reinstalled one prior to returning to the coast after her
first patrol. It successfully warded off numerous army planes,
certainly the crucial test. It is our present intention to
procure one, at least for demonstration during the training
period.

The fact that one of the pilots later recovered
observed one of our green Very stars during our night search east
of TRUK but was afraid to answer, indicates the need for a
simple identification under these circumstances. Rather than
reverting to any complicated arrangement using a two or three
color cartridge, specially as there is no advantage in hav-
ing the submarine signal visible at a greater range than
that from the raft, the following procedure is suggested as
well facilitated and publicized among aviators, it could
facilitate some rescues:
(a) Submarine fire single green stars during
night search as conditions permit.
(b) Raft reply with one of the five or six
red stars with which each is now provided.
(c) Submarine on sighting red star immediately
reply with two green stars and close the bearing, firing
additional stars as necessary.

-23-

— page 68 —
U.S.S. TANG

NIGHT PERISCOPE:

In agreement with the U.S.S. SEAHORSE, it is hoped
that the night periscope is not being held up by design dif-
ficulties of the radar feature. The periscope itself will
eliminate that tween the dark and the moonlight period
when proper attack is near impossible. This is nine tenths
of what is desired. Though the radar feature is very desira-
ble, the ability to see the target group at considerable range
will permit an aggressive submerged approach with firing ranges
that will insure sure hits.

SUBMARINE R.A.D.A.R:

It was most disappointing to learn that the proposed
aircraft search radar had been abandoned in favor of improve-
ments to the present SD. The size of the "bed spring" and the
60 degree overhead void were evidently the main objections.
The objection by commanding officers to the moder-
ate size antenna is inconsistent, for there is hardly a sub-
marine whose shears do not bulge with underwater loops, CUO
antennas, lookout platforms, binocular rests, and "clear the
bridge" poles. Further, the proposed antenna could doubtless
be designed to fold automatically in the manner of a music
stand.

The sixty degree blank cone overhead, which at
first appears frightening, could well be given a little more
thought. Personal conversation with Commander Bernstein last
summer indicated that this radar would be infallible in de-
tecting planes up to twelve miles. In other words, unless
the enemy were coming from Mars, he would have to be flying
at approximately 50,000 feet to escape detection. Except in
radar equipped planes, airmen admit that they'll probably
not spot a submarine when flying above 15,000 feet and will
surely not detect him under the best conditions when above
25,000 feet. Thus the proposed radar seems to offer a sub-
stantial safety factor.

Overlooking the above, the weakness of the present
SD is not in its very few internal failures, but in its un-
predictable voids, its inability to detect low flying planes,
and the obvious ease with which the enemy is DF'ing and peer-
ing on it.

Granting that any radar equipment must be accepted
with its limitations, the enemy is not standing still, and
the limitations of the SD may before long preclude its general
use. A static program of only improving present equipment is
therefore unsound and should be avoided. A farsighted program
would include addition of the proposed aircraft search radar,
with improvements to the present SD. If below deck space is
a problem in this installation, there's a ship's office any
boat would donate. If it is topside space, a permanent feeder
running inside or outside the conning tower, thence between
periscope shears to fixed SD radiators at shear top level.

-24-

— page 69 —
U.S.S. TANG

would leave the after space available for a "bed spring" air-
craft search radar.

Except for internal failures, which will undoubted-
ly be ironed out by installation of more substantial parts,
the SJ at present is a near ideal search and attack radar.
We are, however, accepting a reduced range simply because of
the relatively low height of the reflector compared to all
similar SC installations in surface craft. In addition
to the greater area that could be covered with a higher re-
flector, is the probable necessity of tracking the enemy at
greater ranges as his radar improves. The design problems of
a raisable reflector are not insurmountable. One could and
should be designed to operate at both the present sheer top
level and in a raised position at the height of our raised
periscope. The most logical way to accomplish this would
be first to install the new aircraft detection radar in the
place now occupied by the SJ and move the SJ to the top of
the present SD mast. By removing the SD housing pipe, in the
conning tower, and installing a well, the present hoist could
raise this SD mast to the desired level. A clutch type coupling,
similar to our original periscope bearing transmitter coup-
ling, would provide a ready means for power rotation of the
SD mast in its raised or lowered positions. The wave guide could
be telescopic, its transmitter output fed to it near the
bottom of the well. If the present reflector is too heavy,
a metal sprayed plastic one could be substituted.

The minimum we should now be striving for is then
a two position SJ, an airplane search radar to augment the
SD, and the coming periscope radar.
Though the above opinions and ideas may seem too
futuristic, it must be remembered again that the enemy is
not sitting still. We are still enjoying, though on the wan-
ing side, an immense tactical advantage over him because of
our good radar. However the minute we say "this is good"
we're losing the offensive and he is catching up.
It will be just a matter of time until submarines are
"submerged vessels of opportunity" we used to be-
lieve them to be.

[STAMP: RECEIVED
BUREAU OF SHIPS
(Clock face with numbers 1-12)
MAR 28
1945]

-25-
[STAMP: 5 MAR 1945]

— page 70 —
USS TANG(SS306)-Report of Second
War Patrol (16 March to 15 May 1944.
This patrol was conducted in areas
northwest of Palau, east of Davao and
in the vicinity of Truk.

Performance of SJ radar. Pg. 1 (1stend).

Radio reception good. Pg. 20

Radar comments Pg. 20-21.

Submarine radar Pg. 24-25.

[HANDWRITTEN: 18]

[STAMP: 28 FEB 1945]
[HANDWRITTEN: (4)]

— page 71 —
OPNAV-20-554
[HANDWRITTEN: 17-12]
DIVISION OF NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS
ROUTING SLIP
[STAMP: CONFIDENTIAL]

| From | Section | Room | To | Ini- | From | Section | Room | To | Ini- |
|      |         |      |    | tials|      |         |      |    | tials|
| Op-20 |         | 2524 |    |      | 20-M |         | 3541 |    |      |
| 20-X |         | 2524 |    |      | 20-M-1 |         | 3541 |    |      |
|      |         |      |    |      | 20-M-2 |         | 3541 |    |      |
| 20-1 |         | 2524 |    |      | 20-M-3 |         | 3541 |    |      |
| 20-2 |         | 2524 |    |      | 20-M-4 |         | 3541 |    |      |
|      |         |      |    |      | 20-M-5 |         | 3541 |    |      |
| 20-A |         | 2523 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: J.M.R.] |      |         |      |    |      |
| 20-A-1 |         | 3828 |    |      | 20-N |         | L-1505 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: W.S.] |
| 20-A-2 |         | 1521 |    |      |      |         |      |    |      |
| 20-A-3 |         | 1529 |    |      | 20-P |         | 2525 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: W.S.] |
|      |         |      |    |      | 20-P-1 |         | 2551 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: W.S.] |
| 20-B |         | 2532 |    |      | 20-P-2 |         | 2528 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: W.S.] |
| 20-B-1 |         | 2534 |    |      | 20-P-3 |         | 2527 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: E.M.B.] |
| 20-B-2 |         | 2534 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: C.M.] | 20-P-4 |         | 2546 |    |      |
| 20-B-3 |         | 2534 |    |      | 20-P-5 |         | 2551 |    |      |
| 20-B-4 |         | 2532 |    |      | 20-P-6 |         | 2521 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: E.M.B.] |
| 20-B-5 |         | 2536 |    |      |      |         |      |    |      |
| 20-B-6 |         | 2536 |    |      | 20-R |         | 1530 |    |      |
| 20-B-7 |         | 1527 |    |      | 20-R-1 |         | L-1401 |    |      |
|      |         |      |    |      | 20-R-2 |         | 1522 |    |      |
| 20-E |         | 2545 |    |      | 20-R-3 |         | 1530 |    |      |
| 20-E-1 |         | 2545 |    |      | 20-R-4 |         | 1530 |    |      |
| 20-E-2 |         | 2545 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: J.M.R.] | 20-R-5 |         | 1530 |    |      |
| 20-E-3 |         | 2545 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: J.M.R.] | 20-R-6 |         | 1530 |    |      |
| 20-E-4 |         | 2545 |    |      | 20-R-7 |         | 1542 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: C.M.] |
| 20-E-5 |         | 2545 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: J.M.R.] |      |         |      |    |      |
| 20-E-6 |         | 2545 |    |      | 20-S |         | 1067 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: Hat] |
| 20-E-7 |         | 2545 |    |      | 20-S-1 |         | 1065 |    |      |
| 20-E-8 |         | 2545 |    |      |      |         |      |    |      |
| 20-E-9 |         | 2545 |    |      | 20-Y |         | 1727 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: J.M.R.] | 20-F |         | 2533 |    |      | 20-Z |         | 2542 |    |      |
| 20-F-1 |         | 2531 |    |      | 20-Z-1 |         | 2543 |    |      |
| 20-F-2 |         | 2535 |    |      | 20-Z-2 |         | 2543 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: W.S.G.] |
| 20-F-3 |         | 2531 |    |      | 20-Z-3 |         | 2543 | 20-G | Annex | [HANDWRITTEN: Last] |    |      | Op-19 |         | 2630 |    |      |
| 20-G* |         | 1721 |    |      | 19-A |         | 2630 |    |      |
| [HANDWRITTEN: 1/4/46] 20-K |         | L-1044 |    | [HANDWRITTEN: J.M.R.] | 19-C |         | 2625 |    |      |
| [HANDWRITTEN: (1)] 20-K-1 |         | L-1046 |    |      |      |         |      |    |      |
| [HANDWRITTEN: (2)] 20-K-2 |         | L-1046 |    |      |      |         |      |    |      |

* Route correspondence for 20-G via Room 1721, Navy Building.
Indicate sequence of routing by inserting numerals in "to" column above.

FOR: ACTION | GIVE ME MEMO | INFORMATION [HANDWRITTEN: ✓]
COMMENT | SEE ME FIRST | RETAIN
RECOMMENDATION | SIGNATURE OF | PREPARE REPLY
GUIDANCE | ANYTHING ON THIS? | LAST OFFICE ON ROUTING
| | FINISH FILE

— page 72 —
SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-FOUR

                                                                Care of Fleet Post Office
                                                                San Francisco, California
FB5-44/A16-3                                                    21 July 1944.
Serial: (039)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS TANG Second War
Patrol Report.

From:          The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.
To :           The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via :    (1)   The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
         (2)   The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
         (3)   The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:       U.S.S. TANG Second War Patrol - comments on.

         1.    Although disappointing in that no shipping loss was incurred by
the enemy, the second war patrol of the TANG under Lieutenant Commander R. H.
O'Kane as commanding officer was equally as outstanding as his first. By virtue
of remarkable cooperation with aircraft of the U.S. striking force attacking
TRUK, willingness to proceed from point to point within gun range of shore
batteries in order to rescue expeditiously personnel of downed aircraft, and
seizing the initiative by bombarding known gun emplacements when passing OLLAN
Island, twenty-two U.S. naval aviation personnel were rescued from lifeboats
and downed aircraft. During the sixty day patrol, twenty-nine days were spent
on assigned stations in Palau, Davao and Truk areas. No doubt the scarcity
of targets is attributable in part to the presence of a heavy U.S. task force
in the western Pacific.

         2.    Of five surface craft contacts, three were small patrol craft
and evaded, one was an RO class submarine which dived at a range of 3000 yards
on appearance of U.S. aircraft, and one smoke contact of two ships. It was
impossible to close this contact because of combination of air screen attacks
proximity to shoal water on Grey Feather Bank and operation in order to take a
lifeguard station. Of fifty aircraft contacts, twenty-two were sighted by
periscope, eight were observed first by radar while four were made jointly by
radar and sight, fifteen were seen by bridge personnel during daylight and one
was discovered at night due to carrying running lights.

         3.    The performance of the SJ radar can not be classed as
completely satisfactory due to the excessive time under repair and the ab-
normal quantity of spaces required for maintenance. The comments of the commanding
officer on the general subject of radar are well taken; the use of both SD

                                                                - 1 -

— page 74 —
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR

F05-4/A16-3                                                11/Jul
Serial 0195                                                Fleet Post Office,
                                                           San Francisco, Calif.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS TANG Second War
Patrol Report.

From:      The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To :       The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via :      (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
           (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:   U.S.S. TANG Second War Patrol - comments on.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander
Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.

2. The lifeguard methods employed by the Commanding
Officer, U.S.S. TANG, coupled with his remarks on this type of
operation have been made a basis for training potential "life-
guards".

3. Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR adds his congratu-
lations to those of the entire service for the outstanding seaman-
ship, tenacity and courage displayed by the Commanding Officer,
officers and crew of the U.S.S. TANG.

                                                           C. F. MOMSEN.

— page 77 —
16-3
Serial 011
CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. TANG (SS 306)
% Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.

[HANDWRITTEN: OPNAV INST 5500.30 -]
[HANDWRITTEN: 9/2/44]
[HANDWRITTEN: 11-29-44]

July 14, 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Division 141.
The Commander Submarine Squadron 14.
The Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet.
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS 306), Report of Third War Patrol.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (Comsubpac only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the third war patrol of
this vessel conducted in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea during
the period 8 June 1944 to 14 July 1944, is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: R.H. O'KANE]
R.H. O'KANE.

[HANDWRITTEN: FILMED]
[HANDWRITTEN: 83289]

— page 78 —
U.S.S. TANG
(A) PROLOGUE.

Returned from second war patrol May fifteenth and completed
normal refit on the thirtieth. Conducted post repair trials,
training with three days underway, loaded, and departed June 8.

(B) NARRATIVE.

JUNE 8-12

1330 Underway in company with U.S.S. SEALION for MIDWAY,
conducting training dives, fire control drills, and testing
communications for future coordinated patrol.

JUNE 12 (+12)

0800 Arrived MIDWAY, fueled, and located motor ground in a
brush pigtail. Held dock trial to insure that trouble had
been remedied.
1600 Departed for EAST CHINA SEA at two engine speed.

JUNE 12(+12) - 21(-9)

Enroute area, delaying an hour near SOFU GAN to tune SJ radar.
Our experience in training showed that we could never
lookouts and the OOD from the bridge without delaying the
dive, used this number in the daytime and kept the SD secured.
We sighted no planes and none apparently sighted us.

JUNE 22 (-9)

1706 Dived thirty miles from YAKU SHIMA prior to passing through
COLNETT STRAIT after dark.
2000 Shortly after surfacing picked up 142 megacycle radar,
apparently from YAKU SHIMA, with our APR-1 equipment, so gave
it a wide berth, using our SJ periodically and never within
forty-five degrees of the island. Though this is an arbitrary
safety angle, an island that has radar will most certainly
have detectors too, and the least one can expect is re-routed
shipping.

JUNE 23 (-9)

0350 Made rendezvous with SEALION south of KUSAKAKI SHIMA, a little
late as we had delayed to investigate a possible SJ contact.
Patrolled submerged southwest of the island during the day,
but with periodic high periscope searches.
2000 Proceeded to DANJO GUNTO to meet USS TINOSA.

— page 79 —
U.S.S. TANG
JUNE 24-25 (-9)

0115 Made scheduled rendezvous with TINOSA and SEALION fifteen miles
     south of D.N.YO CINTO. Executive officer went aboard TINOSA,
     delivered infra-red signalling apparatus, code for coordinated
     attacks and TANG'S ideas for patrolling this area. With
     everything in agreement, proceeded northeast for submerged
     patrol south of FUKAE SHIMA, prior to closing KOSHIKI STRAITS.
0808 Sighted a small patrol boat and avoided submerged.
2145 After dodging numerous lighted sampans along the 100 fathom
     curve, sighted a large convoy on the SJ at 20,000 yards, just
     having emerged from KOSHIKI STRAITS.
2158 As report of convoy's position only. SEALION acknowledged.
2220 Having tracked convoy on courses between 315 and 270 at
     speeds from 10 to 16 knots, answered TINOSA'S request for
     convoy course and speed.
2227 Sent latest course of 280 and speed 12.

     We were in what at first appeared a fortunate position on
     the convoy's port bow, with a three day old moon about to set,
     but as numerous bow and flanking escorts appeared on the radar
     screen it became evident that undetected penetration from ahead
     or from the flank would be nearly impossible.
     The composition of the convoy, which had been confused
     by numerous escorts and side lobes, now was clarified with
     visual sighting. There were at least six large ships, in
     column sections of two, surrounded by two circular screens
     of at least six escorts each, and as we later discovered,
     each section was further escorted ahead and astern.

ATTACKS NO'S 1 and 2

     As the quarter escorts were well dispersed, elected to
     approach from the stern. We passed between them without
     difficulty, diverged to starboard and avoided a third patrol,
     and gained position 2500 yards on the starboard beam of the
     last section.
     The first loading ship was a large modern four mast or goalpost
     freighter with high composite superstructure topped by a large
     short stack, believed to be (EU) of the AOBASAN M.RU class,
     page 84, CNI 208-J (rev'd). The second ship was a modern
     tanker with large short funnel, similar (EU) to the GENYO M.RU
     or KYOKUYO M.RU, page 277 or 279, CNI 208-J (rev'd). Both ships
     were heavily loaded and most probably diesel driven as they
     did not smoke.

2.

— page 80 —
U.S.S. TANG
JUNE 24-25 (-9) Cont'd

2349 The convoy, now close to NOHO SAKI, had settled on course north
     at 10 knots when we stopped, turned left for straight
2352 shots, and fired three torpedoes at the freighter, 120
     starboard track, range 2600, spread his length by constant
2353 TBT bearings, followed immediately by a similar spread at the
     tanker, 100 starboard track, range 2450. All gyros were
     between 12 right and 2 left. Observed two beautiful hits in
     the stern and amidships of the freighter, timed as our first
     and third torpedoes. The second was observed to run erratically
     to the left. The explosions appeared to blow the ship's sides
     out, and he commenced sinking rapidly. On schedule, our fourth
     and fifth torpedoes hit under the stack and just forward of
     the after superstructure of the tanker. His whole after end
     blazed up until extinguished as he went down by the stern.

0000 We had now evaded the closest escort at 1400 yards apparen-
     tly unobserved, so pulled up seven thousand yards from the
     convoy and five thousand yards from where our targets would
     have been. Their pips, separating from the convoy, had
     gradually disappeared from the PPI screen however, and only a
     low hanging cloud of smoke marked the spot where they sank.
0015 Sent message to other boats that we were unable to give
     convoy set-up, and repeated it twenty minutes later at
     SEALLION's request.
0020 As the only radar interference indicated that our other boats
     would not get in, especially as the convoy was close to
     NAGASAKI whose steel mills loomed up like Hari-Kari, started
     in for another attack. Our approach was spurred by an escort
     who closed in the vicinity of the haze of a slight [UNCLEAR]
     of the first attack, but unable to see us in the haze of a
     slight overload, commenced dropping terrific depth charges.
     He succeeded in calling out the dogs however, and our target,
     which was first tracked at ten knots, showed a rate of better
     than forty knots closing. We had just time to
     complete a 90 degree turn when he passed sixteen
     hundred yards astern, a modern looking DE. He spotted us,
     closed for a minute, but our team of overload experts,
     watching their temperatures, got us rolling at 22½ knots in
     spite of our unconverted #4 MBT. Easing off at a slight
     angle, we opened the range to 3400 yards when he
     illuminated. Hoping to take advantage of the experience of
     others, we dived a little faster than a rock, encouraged by
     the bridge diving alarm for our PCO. Though his searchlight
     illuminated [UNCLEAR: us], he still did not spot us, and passed well clear, madly echo ranging.

3.

— page 81 —
U.S.S. TANG
JUNE 24-25 (-9) Cont'd.

0200 Now with time to consider, believed the NAGASAKI area would be
     very unhealthy at dawn two hours hence, so surfaced and rounded
     the KOSHIKI islands where we could guard the southern approaches
     to the straits.
0500 Commenced submerged patrol.
1900 Sighted patrol boat on northerly course; avoided.

JUNE 26 (-9)

ATTACK NUMBER 3

0424 Shortly after crack of dawn sighted ship on the SJ at 8000
     yards which had just rounded NONA SAKI from the KOSHIKI straits.
     We were already on his beam, but fog and rain prevented a full
     power run which might have lessened the impact of our enemy.
     He was a medium sized, split superstructure, IJM freighter,
     FUKUJU MARU (208) to the EHIME MARU, page 228, ONI 208-J (rev'd),
     tracked at eight knots on courses hugging the coast. With
     the freighter obscured by rain, dived a thousand yards off his
     track, range 7000 yards. As we were 3000 yards west of
     BONO HISAKI, a good firing range was insured. Turned right for
0551 a stern shot as the freighter came out of the rain and fired
     four MK 13 torpedoes, range 1950, 100 starboard track, gyros
     set 1.50 degrees, and the helm and the boat were set
     to avoid the spread his length by constant bearing
     loading of the freighter could not be ascertained. The
     torpedoes were set on six feet as the sea was calm and the
     boat had a zero angle on the boat, two of the torpedoes
     broached several times and then settled down on surface runs,
     throwing continuous plumes in the air. Needless to say the
     freighter avoided the spread by turning toward. All exploders
     operated as the torpedoes hit the beach if that is any con-
     solation. After some gunfire, the freighter took refuge in
     a cove north of BONO HISAKI, and as we were getting set toward
0640 the beach, surfaced and made a full power dash to the west,
     unsighted by a late arriving patrol boat.

4.

— page 82 —
U.S.S. TANG
JUNE 27 (-9) Cont'd.

0958 Dived when overcast lifted.
1008 Sighted "Betty" searching again.
1608 Sighted "Dave" searching.
1753 Sighted "Dave" searching.
2000 Proceeded to the northwest for coordinated patrol with TINOSA
and SHAD in a suspected SHIMONOSEKI-SHANGHAI traffic route.
Passed numerous lighted sampans.

JUNE 28 (-9)

Conducted submerged high periscope patrol on direct route
between SHIMONOSEKI and SHANGHAI.
1945 Continued to the northwest at one engine speed.
2000 Detected 150 megacycle radar on either SAISHU TO or KAKYO TO,
so rounded them at fifteen miles to avoid possibility of
training the lobes of our 95 megacycle radar. Did not in-
SJ within 45 degrees of known radar installations except for
a fast periodic sweep.

JUNE 29 (-3)

0220 When 40 miles northwest of SAISHU TO, detected 95
megacycle radar, perhaps from the eastern end of that island,
and at the same time commenced tracking a radar contact near
KAKYO TO at 26000 yards. This proved to be side lobes of the
strength of our 95 megacycle radar. This did not in-
as we approached KAKYO TO, so this island is eliminated
as a possible source.
0441 Commenced submerged patrol near HEN SHO, half way between
KAKYO TO and SANTAI TO off the southwest coast of KOREA.
This position was close to the suspected route across the
YELLOW SEA to the CHINA COAST. Low fast moving fog patches
made long periscopes and searching difficult, so came to
full depth periodically.

ATTACKS NO's. 4A and 4B.

1140 Sighted a freighter to the north on a westerly course. Com-
menced a periscope approach, but it soon became apparent that
we could not reach an attack position submerged. We therefore
opened the range on a diverging course, surfaced, and commenced an "end-
around" bucking a heavy sea. Reduced visibility permitted
passing the ship with only occasional glimpses of the ship with only occasional glimpses
1600 Having tracked the enemy on course 255 at 7 knots, dived
directly in his track for periscope attack. The freighter
came on nicely, identified (SC) as the TAZAN MARU, page 215

5.

— page 83 —
U.S.S. TANG
JUNE 29 (-8) Cont'd.

ONI 208-J (rev'd). His masts had been cut off level with
the top of his stack, but all other details were [UNCLEAR: slightly]
lightly loaded, but in view of our experience of the
twenty-seventh, decided that ten feet was the absolute
minimum depth setting for this sea.
After two "dipsy doodles" to adjust position, and with
several echo ranges and
1759 bearings checking, fired two MK 14 torpedoes, one at his
foremast at one at his mainmast, 90 port track, range 1250
yards, speed seven. Raised the periscope again to see the
smoke of each torpedo at its point of aim, but they appar-
ently passed under.
The enemy turned toward and gave us two close depth
charges shortly after we had reached two hundred feet, fifty
feet off the bottom. Fifteen minutes later, as we were
approaching periscope depth, a loud crackling noise came over
sound followed by a third fairly close charge.
1910 We went back down, but searched and surfaced fifteen minutes
later with nothing in sight. This points to the possibility
that this last and delayed action depth charge used in this
shallow water for the purpose of keeping a submarine down
while the ship escapes.
2030 It didn't work in this case, however, for we made radar contact
in a little over an hour and commenced tracking on him. Our
enemy had gone to the north, was tracked on course 040, then
070 at ten knots, heading for KO TO, and the ten fathom curve
off the KOREAN coast. We closed sufficiently to identify
him, and then turned the tracking over to the section on
watch with the plan to attack after moonset in the lee of
D. IKOKUSAN GUNTO.

JUNE 30 (-8)

The freighter was a little out in his navigation, however,
his track passing about fifteen miles north of the islands.
Tracking in the lee was now impossible and the sea rougher
still, determined to attack from a range to insure hits even
with broaching torpedoes.
0040 Commenced approach from his starboard bow directly down
wind and sea, stopped with range 1500, angle on the bow
0101 40 starboard track. Fired one MK 14 "feeler" torpedo from
"feeler" torpedo set on six feet from number five tube, range
750 yards, 92 starboard track, 6 degree left gyro, enemy speed
nine knots. In spite of the heavy seas it ran perfectly,
its phosphorescent track visible among the white caps right
to the freighters side. The explosion amidships, just
thirty seconds after firing, was as beautiful as it was
reassuring.

6.

— page 84 —
U.S.S. TANG
JUNE 30 (-8) Cont'd.

It broke the freighter's back, his stern sinking with a down
angle, his forward section with an up, in a cloud of fire,
smoke, and steam.
His gun crew had guts, however, and got off five or six
shots in spite of their tilting platform. When they had
ceased firing we relieved about twenty lookouts in rapid
succession, and today our crew is discussing single versus
multiple torpedo fire. (We'll continue, however, to fire as
many as is considered necessary to sink the enemy.)
The inability of the enemy to sight us is considered due
in part to our light grey camouflage, ideal for this area,
and the known inefficiency of lookouts into wind and sea.

0130 Proceeded to the west for submerged patrol after daylight.

JULY 1 (-8)

Commenced submerged patrol one hour after dawn, forty miles
0946 west of KO TO. Maneuvered to close a sailing junk, and
surfaced to look him over. He lowered his sail, fired four
rounds of four inch, but our plan to get some information
from his became unnecessary when our high lookout sighted
smoke over the horizon.

ATTACK NUMBER 5

1015 Commenced tracking smoke which quickly developed into two
columns, and then the masts of two ships. One ship was
zigging at intervals of from three to twelve minutes, while
the others movements indicated an escort. After gaining
position ahead and tracking these ships on base course 260
1322 at eight knots, dived for periscope approach and attack. As
the group came on, maneuvered for a MK 18 stern shot at the
escort who was about 1500 yards on the freighter's starboard
bow. This placed us directly ahead of the freighter and in-
sured a stern shot at him if the escort was not hit. The
escort was now identified as a small engine aft freighter with
gun forward and depth charges aft, probably 'the AMARU MARU',
(EU) of the AMARU MARU; page 270, ONI 208-J (rev'), changed
in that the bridge structure was aft. The 260 bearings were
creased to ten knots. Now with the set-up changed, fired two
1444 MK 18 torpedoes, one under his foremast, the other under his
stack, 100 port track, range 1250, depth setting six feet,
then shot at standard speed to gain position on the
freighter.
The moments dragged out and time for the torpedoes
to hit had apparently passed, expressed some quiet oaths

7.

— page 85 —
U.S.S. TANG
JULY 1 (-S) Cont'd.

About eight torpedoes, only to have the words jammed down
our throats by a swell explosion. Slowed and looked to see
the escort's stern in the air in a cloud of smoke, the
freighter turning back. At least half a dozen persons observed
this ship sink, timed in two minutes and twenty seconds.

ATTACK NUMBER 6

We now felt that we had the freighter caught between third
base and home, for he was nearly one hundred miles from the
Korean coast and his track led through the probable positions
of both SEALION and TINOSA. Sent them the contact report
on the next hourly schedule and continued trailing submerged
at five knots, with the smoke still in sight.
1916 Surfaced at dusk and commenced overtaking at full power on
three engines, charging with the other and the auxiliary.
Again we're thankful for our FAIRBANKS-MORSE, for as it later
proved, our eighteen and a half knots in this combination
was every bit necessary.
After radar contact with the enemy had been gained it
became apparent that we would have to pass him up moon south
of KO TO, but with full power on four main engines, we were
waiting for him with two minutes to spare as he rounded the
southern tip of the island.
2224 Dived a mile and a half off the island, 1200 yards north of
the track of the enemy who was now six thousand yards away.
He slowed for eleven to nine knots as he passed the periscope
southern tip, but with three echo ranges and periscope
bearings, the set-up was checking again as we commenced our
turn for a straight bow shot. With range 500, 90 port track,
2247 gyros now zero, fired two Mk 14 torpedoes by constant
well deck, the first at the middle of his after
torpedo, and the second at the middle of his forward one. The
first hit as timed in twenty seconds exploding with a short
flash which must have been munitions of some sort. A short
section of the bow was all that remained intact of the whole
ship, and it sank in twenty seconds. The second torpedo
was "robbed".
This was a medium freighter, identified during and after
attack number 5 and at close range by moonlight prior to
firing as similar (EU) to the SAMARANG (LPU, page 130, ONI
208-J (rev'd).
2251 Surfaced close to debris and proceeded sixty miles to west
for our usual patrol.

6.

— page 86 —
U.S.S. TANG
JULY 2 (-8)

1007 Sighted masts of two trawlers.
Conducted submerged patrol with high periscope searches.

JULY 3 (-8)

Patrolled as day before.
2250 Made scheduled rendezvous with SEALION, and executive officer
boarded her to exchange information. She was unable to reach
our first convoy, and failed to receive our message concerning
the first AK we had sunk on the way to this expected
traffic route. It will be interesting to compare the reports
of SEALION and TINOSA with ours, for the expected route runs
between their areas as assigned by TINOSA while ours lies to
the north. They have in general patrolled on the surface
using their SD and have been driven down by planes. Though
this may not be conclusive, it appears that they have shunted
the traffic by us, for we've been patrolling submerged,
surfacing for a good look now and then, and keeping SD secured.
I've seen ships and no planes since after our attack on the
27th.
The SEALION has decided to patrol the SHANGHAI area,
while we proceed north.

JULY 4 (-8) (WHAT A FOURTH !)

0005 Set course for position on the direct route between DAIKO-
KUSAN GUNTO and OSHI TO at three engine speed. As the sky
was overcast at dawn, continued on the surface, and shortly
0408 sighted heavy masts of a ship to the northeast.

ATTACK NUMBER 7

Stopped, put him astern, and determined his approximate
southerly course, and commenced a full power dash to get on
his track. We were a bit hampered by fifteen trawlers or
fishermen, but with the enemy's bridge and stack aft already
over the horizon, it was their presence which prevented our
detection.
0500 With an on the bow now 5 starboard, dived and continued
approach. The massiveness of the ship as it closed resembled
a man-of-war, and twenty minutes later a wide zig-zag
our first good identification look. Her hull and arrangement
were similar (BB) to the KUPOSIO MARU, page 272, ONI 208-J
(rev'd), with modifications as shown on accompanying drawing.

9.

— page 87 —
U.S.S. TANG
JULY 4 (-8) Cont'd.

During the next hour we were abaft his beam as he closed
on the ten fathom curve, zigging leisurely. On our straight
course at full speed we closed the range continuously
however, and though on most observations with angles on the
bow up to 150 the situation looked hopeless, he finally
reached a nine fathom finger west of A TO and came back
to a southerly course. Our fathometer, which had been
showing four fathoms under our keel, now in quick succession
showed three, two, and then merged with the outgoing signal,
so we backed down and fired three K 14 torpedoes at stack,
0626 amidships, and forward by constant bearings, range 2600,
90 starboard track, speed 8, depth setting eight feet.
Turned left with full speed and rudder, and heard healthy
hits time after time as our first and second torpedoes.
and looked to see only the bow, stern, and masts sticking
out of the water under a huge cloud of smoke.
0631 Surfaced, surrounded by 34 assorted fishing boats obviously
awe-stricken. There were about fifty survivors in the water
and large life boats, but as we could not dive in the eight
to nine fathoms if we approached closer, headed west at
three engine speed. The stern had sunk before we surfaced,
and as we cleared the area, observed the protruding bow tip
go under in bubbling foaming water.

This ship was observed at moderate ranges from various
angles for over an hour, and the following features indicate
that she was converted for use as an (AV) seaplane tender or
aircraft transport: Her masts and booms were approximately
twice as heavy as those of a large freighter. Her bridge
structure was open aft forming a hangar. Her stern had been
extended by a large platform with triangular stern piece and
was fitted with kingposts and long boom. An auxiliary radio
mast topped her after superstructure, fitted with several
antennas. The survivors were far in excess of a normal
tanker crew. Except for her black stack and mast, she was
war color.
Comparing this ship with similar conversions in available
publications, her standard displacement is estimated at
sixteen thousand.
0730 Then we were clear of any small craft which could report our
course, headed north and dived an hour and a half later,
forty miles from the position of our attack.
1500 Commenced hearing very distant explosions, probably 52 miles
distant to be exact.

10.

— page 88 —
U.S.S. TANG
JULY 4 (-8) Cont'd

1340 Having passed OSEI TO, sighted smoke beyond the OYONU group
     of islands, tracked on a southerly course. While figuring
     where and how we could get him under a full moon in more than
     ten fathoms, our problem was solved by a faint wisp of smoke
     to the west.

ATTACK NUMBER 8

     Switched approach to this, and closed at standard speed
     submerged until clear of OSEI TO, then surfaced in
1953 late twilight, but under a full moon. Twenty minutes later
     he was sighted on the radar at 18500 yards. We were in a
     fortunate position ahead and had only to move on his base
     course of 110 which lead toward OSEI TO and the bulge of the
     ten fathom curve. His long low silhouette was visible at
     15000 yards, so tracked from that range, determining his
     moderate zigs of 20 to 30 degrees at 5 to 10 minute intervals.
2041 Dived and tracked enemy in by radar to 9000 yards, then com-
     menced moonlight periscope attack.
     He came on his silhouette developed into a long engines
     aft ship with raked bow, and with tripod mast and king posts
     forward and aft. Distinctive also was his mushroom topped
     bridge structure. After closing a left zig at standard speed,
2128 checked set up with several echo ranges, and fired last two
     bow torpedoes, one at forward end of after superstructure,
     the other forward of his bridge, range 900 yards, 90
     starboard track, gyros near zero, depth setting eight feet.
     The first torpedo hit just aft of the bridge, breaking the
     ship's back. The tripod foremast could be seen in the smoke
     and debris tilting aft as he sank by the middle. Let the crew
2131 hear the breaking up noises by the sound-LHC method, then surf-
     aced to pick up a survivor. It was necessary to snake one of
     the two large overturned lifeboats alongside with grapnels,
     and threaten with tommy gun bursts to convince the one visible
     survivor to come on board. Recovering a life ring was much
     simpler.
     Both the new life boats, life ring, and visual observation
     of the vessel before firing show this to have been a new
     ship. She does not appear in any identification book. Our
     PCO and executive officer both observed this ship together
     with the commanding officer prior to firing, and estimate
     her tonnage to be 10000, the same as the modern tanker her
     hull was designed after.

11.

— page 89 —
U.S.S. TANG

JULY 4 (-8) Cont'd.

With some assistance as to detail from the prisoner, the
silhouette of this ship has been drawn and is submitted.
Of interest is the prisoners knowledge of the exact position
where they were torpedoed, and apparent familiarity with
shipping routes.
Not so clear are his figures on tonnage, which range from
7000 to 10200, but he finally got across the idea that this
latter figure was iron ore in her holds. Phonetically her
name was AMA-AUKA MARU of the YAMASHITA KISEN KAISHU.

2328 After commencing another approach on what proved to be a
sailing junk, headed northwest at three engine speed to round
KAKUREPPU ISLAND and approach the DAISEI group before dawn.

JULY 5-6 (-8)

0345 Dived for submerged patrol.
0845 Commenced hearing distant explosions, indicating that the op-
position is still way behind us.
0917 Sighted distant smoke drawing to the south close to the
shore, south of the DAISEI ISLANDS. Although this
was inaccessible in six fathoms of water, it practically
assured an early attack against this coastal traffic off
CHOSEN KAN.
1942 Proceeded on the surface to CHOSEN KAN (CHOPPERI POINT).

ATTACK NUMBER 9

2257 When 8 miles west of CHOPPERI POINT, after having tracked
one side lobe and investigated several second pulse echoes,
sighted a ship on the SJ at 29000 yards. Stopped and tracked
it out to 32000 on a northwesterly course at 9 knots, then
commenced a grueling end around. Under a full moon on a
rippleless sea, the ship was visible at 20000 yards, so to
insure an unalerted enemy for our last two torpedoes, passed
0227 on outside of 15000. When 30 miles from GAICHI RETTO
(BLONDE GROUP), stopped on his track seven miles ahead for
a final speed and course check, then dived on a parallel
course for a submerged attack. Checked the set-up by a radar
observation at five thousand yards when the freighter was
temporarily lost in the surface haze, and immediately ex-
perienced hopelessly fogging periscopes. The set-up checked
perfectly, however, showing us 500 yards off the track, so
returned to 60 feet to wet the scopes. He was clear and
big on the next observation, at 1100 yards by echo range,

12.

— page 90 —
U.S.S. TANG
ATTACK NUMBER 9 Cont'd.

0320 so turned for the stern shot. Fired two Mk 18 torpedoes,
one at his mainmast, one at his foremast, range 900 yards,
90 starboard track, gyros near 180, depth setting 6 feet.
Both torpedoes hit exactly as aimed and there was only
floating wreckage and broken life boats in sight when we
surfaced two minutes later. The freighter was medium
sized, mast funnel mast, composite superstructure, similar
(EU) to the OSAKA MARU, page 132, ONI 208-J (rev 'd).
0325 As two pips at 16000 yards were closing, perhaps belated
escorts, and the sky already pink, commenced full power
0600 run to the south toward SHANTUNG PROMONTORY. Dived fifty
miles from the attack and proceeded south at three knots.
1202 Counter attack, seventy miles distant, commenced.
1848 Surfaced a half hour before sunset and continued the seven
hundred mile run out of the area.

JULY 7 (-8)

0427 Shortly after sunrise dived for a "Betty".
1230 Continued surface running.
1914 Shortly after sunset, dived a half hour for a distant plane,
believed a "Betty".
2055 Picked up 250 megacycle radar, random training.
2155 When between DANJO GUNTO and the southern mine field,
sighted five equal sized pips on the SJ at 16000 yards on
our track ahead. We were at four engine speed, which in
part accounts for a range of 12000 yards before we got them
astern. The night was lightly overcast with a near full moon
breaking through, but nothing was sighted on a fairly sharp
horizon at this range. As we conducted a reverse end-around
to get on their quarter, tracked the group on course 310,
nearly the reverse of our original course, then 340, then
060. Closed to their quarter cautiously until blinker signaling -
was sighted at 13000 yards, but no blurbs against the horizon.
Five legitimate Jap ships would contain at least one smoker
and would have been visible at a much greater range. Con-
vinced that this was a "killer group", undoubtedly directed
by our late plane, gave them a wide berth and continued
toward area boundary.

JULY 8 (-9)

0500 Commenced submerged approach of southern islands prior to
night passage.
1600 Proceeded on surface.

13.

— page 91 —
U.S.S. TANG

JULY 8 (-9) Cont'd.

1940 Detected 250 megacycle radar.
2106 A minute after sighting GAJA SHIMA light, observed a search-
light over the horizon to the right of the islands, and
seventeen minutes later picked up 153 megacycle radar with
random training.
2145 153 megacycle radar signal steadied at maximum strength,
apparently trained on us. As we were already between GAJA SHIMA
and TAIPEI SHIMA at four engine speed, continued through the
NAKANO STRAIT into a rising moon. The 153 megacycle radar
remained steady with maximum signal as we passed NAKANO SHIMA,
indicating its location there. Five small vessels, two of
them smoking, heading from north and south into the strait,
may have been patrols. If so, they were a little late, and
no difficulty was experienced in keeping their bearings draw-
ing aft with TANG at full power.
2300 Set course east, but continued at four engine speed during
the night.

JULY 9 (-9)

0839 Dived for a half hour and apparently avoided detection by a
distant low flying plane.
1210 Sighted flare, and friendly submarine surfaced about 4000
yards on our starboard quarter. For the benefit of his
fire control party, our base course was 090, speed 17,
following com #1 of our zig clock, making 15.8 good along
our track.
2200 Sent message to ComSubPac concerning results, and information
concerning killer group and departure for other boats.

JULY 10 (-9)

1030 Dived for fifteen minutes to avoid detection by a transport
plane on a southerly course.

JULY 14 (+ 12)

1200 Arrived Midway

14.

— page 92 —
(C) WEATHER

Normal for all localities patrolled.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

No information not previously reported.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

1. OSEI TO                 NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS
2. KAKUREI I RETTO         NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS
3. SHUSEI TO               NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS
4. DANJO GUNTO             NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS, BUT
                             LIGHTED INTERMITTENTLY
5. GAJA SHIMA              NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS
6. SHIMO KOSHIKI          NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS
7. MARA TO                 DIMMED
8. KO TO (DAIKOKUZAN
   GUNTO)                  NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS

(F) SHIP CONTACTS

See page 19 A.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

See page 20

(H) ATTACK DATA

See page 21

(I) MINES

None contacted

(J) ANTI SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASIVE

TACTICS

Except for the first convoy only one escort was
encountered. The Japs were obviously unprepared and
several hours late in their searches and indiscriminate
depth charging and bombing. Evasion consisted of
clearing the vicinity of the attack at high speed on
the surface.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

None.

(L) RADIO

Both reception and transmission were satisfactory.

15.

— page 93 —
L (CONTINUED)

Tests of the lower frequencies assigned submarines were
conducted with the U.S.S.SEALION while enroute Midway.
The results were startling in that the lowest two
frequencies would not carry beyond six thousand yards in daytime
and eleven thousand yards at night even with maximum power. It
was also found that with minimum power the range of 2204 KCS
could be reduced to about twenty miles. The data recorded though
incomplete will be submitted to the Force Communication Officer.
It is felt that further tests should be conducted to determine
the limiting range of various frequencies for a specific power
setting of the TBL transmitter, as these could be of considerable
value in coordinated attack group operations. Further it appears
that a frequency lying between 450 and 2204 is desirable. It
might even be advantageous if this fell in a Japanese broadcast
band.

(M) RADAR

The SJ Radar gave comparatively little trouble during this
patrol. This may have been due in part to its intermittent use,
generally at 10 minute intervals. The part failures are listed
below:

Item Number | Description | Number of | Reason for
            |             | failures  | failure
|||
12          | Crystal     | 1         | Bad TR Tubes
130         | TR Tube     | 1         | Lost Vacuum
434         | R 43        | 1         | Voltage Surge
444         | R 44        | 1         | Voltage Surge
435         | R46         | 1         | Voltage Surge
328         | R 47        | 1         | Voltage Surge
159         | C 1         | 1         | Voltage Surge

SD Radar

The SD radar was not used during this patrol.

16.

— page 94 —
(M) RADAR (CONT'D).
R.D.R DETECTOR CONTACTS (APR-1)

Submarine                                                              Probable
Position                  date      Freq  Rotation  Pulse                  Location
                                          sweep rate  rate

18 mi. S. of
YAKU SHIMA                6/22/44   95    Random    600                    YAKU SHIMA
                                          train

25 mi. S. of
DANJO GUNTO               6/23/44   118   On 10 sec 60                     USS SEALION
                                          off 20 sec

25 mi. S. of
DANJO GUNTO               6/23/44   95    Random    900                    DANJO GUNTO
                                          train

25 mi. S. of
DANJO GUNTO               6/23/44   234   Random    60
                                          train

25 mi. S. of
DANJO GUNTO               6/23/44   174   Random    60
                                          train

15 mi. 220°T
Kono Saki                 6/24/44   87    Steady on 900

31° - 57'N
129° - 31'E                6/25/44   260   Very weak 7 or 800

20 mi. W. of
SAISHU TO                 6/28/44   150   Continuous 900                   Saishu To

40 mi. NW
of Saishu To              6/29/44   95    Very weak 900

92 mi. West of
KOTO                      7/1/44    249   Fairly strong 900

60 Miles West
of KOTO                   7/2/44    55    Random    900
                                          train

40 mi. West of
KOTO                      7/3/44    255   Random    900
                                          train

40 mi. bearing
120°T from
KURU PPI RDO              7/5/44    249             900

35 mi. South
of Saishu To              7/7/44    250             900

17.

— page 95 —
(S) DURATION
Days enroute to Midway | 4
Days from Midway to Area | 9
Days in Area | 16
Days enroute to Midway | 7
                       ---
                       36
Days submerged | 13

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes | Fuel | Provisions | Personnel Factor
0 | 25,000 | 30 Days | Indefinite

(U) MK 18 TORPEDOES

The TANG carried Mk 18-1 torpedoes in the after torpedo room.
No experienced no difficulties. Routine was normal following
that appearing in other patrol reports. Exchanging of torpedoes
from cradles to tubes was not found necessary, however.

19.

— page 96 —
SHIP CONTACTS
Snips, 16 Escorts
DATE | TIME | LAT. | LONG. | COURSE | SPD | RANGE | TYPE
6/24/44 | 2140 | 32-06N | 129-48E | 320 | 10 | Radar 19000 Yds. | Convoy 6
6/27/44 | 0424 | 31-16N | 130-15E | 140-110 | 8 | Periscope 8000 | Trawler
6/29/44 | 1140 | 34-30N | 124-50E | 265 | 7 | Periscope 8000 | Sampan
7/1/44 | 0946 | 34-37N | 124-36E | 250 | 9 | Periscope 8000 | Sampan
7/4/44 | 04-0700 | 35-35N | 125-51E | 100-110 | 9 | Sight 20000 | Probable Orc ship
7/4/44 | 1953 | 36-06N | 125-52E | 100-042 | 9.5 | Sight 25000 | Medium K
7/5/44 | 2253 | 38-10N | 124-15E | 317 | 8 | SJ 28450 | Medium K

SM.LL CR.FT
DATE | TIME | LAT. | LONG. | COURSE | SPD | RANGE | TYPE
6/24/44 | 0808 | 32-04N | 128-50E | 1900 | 10 | Periscope 6000 | Small Fishing
6/25/44 | 1900 | 31-21N | 130-04E | 045 | 10 | Periscope 12000 | Patrol
6/26/44 | 0620 | 31-20N | 130-02E | 145 | 10 | Periscope 12000 | Trawler
6/28/44 | 0253 | 31-52N | 127-52E | 240 | 10 | Sight 8000 | 3 Sampans
7/1/44 | 0705 | 34-47N | 124-13E | 2 | 10 | Periscope 8000 | 2 Motor Trawlers
7/1/44 | 1007 | 34-54N | 124-08E | 2 | 10 | Periscope 12000 | Sampan
7/2/44 | 04-070 | 35-35N | 125-51E | 37 | 10 | Sight 1000-10000 | 37 Sampans
7/4/44 | 0312 | 36-45N | 125-10E | 8000 | 10 | Sight 8000 | Sampan
7/5/44 | 0459 | 38-11N | 123-39E | 8000 | 10 | Sight 8000 | Sampan
7/6/44 | 2115 | 36-44N | 123-51E | 16000 | 10 | Sight 16000 | Killer Group
7/7/44 | 2155 | 32-29N | 129-52E | 2 | 10 | Sight 8000 | 2 Patrols
7/8/44 | 2252 | 29-44N | 130-05E | 3 | 10 | Sight 8000 | 3 Sampans
7/8/44 | 2333 | 29-44N | 130-05E | 3 | 10 | Sight 8000 | 3 Sampans

19(M)

— page 98 —
U.S.S. T.A.G. (SS 306) Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol No. Three
Time: 2353 (-9) Date: 24 June 1944 Lat: 32-30N
Long: 129-35E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 large freighter (EU) Hobasan Maru class,
3812 tons.

Ship Sunk: 1 large freighter 7,500 tons.

Damage determined by: Observed two torpedoes hit and ship sink.

Target Data: Draft: 29' Course: 000° Speed: 10 Range: 2600.

Own Data: Course: 292° Speed: 4 Depth: Surf. Angle: 0

Type Attack: Night Surface.

21.

— page 99 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO D.T. 1

Tube No.             1         2         3
Track Angle        120°S     122°S     123°S
Gyro Angle         009       011       012
Depth Set          10'       10'       10'
Hit or Miss        Hit       Miss      Hit
Erratic            No        Yes       No
Mk. Torpedo        23        23        23
Serial No.         41607     41649     49342
Mk. Exploder       6-4       6-4       6-4
Serial No.         3500      177       1365
Actuation          Contact   --        Contact
Mk. Warhead        16-1      16-1      16-1
Serial No.         10511     13886     12235
Explosive          Torpex    Torpex    Torpex
Firing Interval              10 Sec.             11 Sec.
Type Spread        Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions     Flat calm
Overall Activity: Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

                               22.

— page 100 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS306) Torpedo attack No. 2 Patrol No. Three
Time: 2354 (-9) Date: 24 June 1944 Lat: 32-30N
                                            Long: 129-35E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 large tanker, (EU) Genyo Maru class,
                       10,020 tons.

Ship Sunk: 1 large tanker - 10,000 tons.

Damage Determined by: Observed two torpedoes hit and ship sink.

Target Data: Draft: 30' Course: 000° Speed: 10 Range: 2450

Own Data: Course: 292° Speed: 4 Depth: Surf. Angle: 0

Type Attack: Night Surface.

23.

— page 101 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO D. T. #2

Tube No. | 4 | 5 | 6
Track Angle | 109°S | 111°S | 113°S
Gyro Angle | 358 | 000 | 002
Depth Set | 10' | 10' | 10'
Hit or Miss | Hit | Hit | Miss
Erratic | No | No | No
Mk. Torpedo | 23 | 23 | 23
Serial No. | 49438 | 41074 | 49303
Mk. Exploder | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4
Serial No. | 11570 | 6941 | 1704
Actuation | Contact | Contact | --
Mk. Warhead | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1
Serial No. | 13884 | 2734 | 3347
Explosive | Torpex | Torpex | Torpex
Firing Interval | 9 Sec. | 10 Sec.
Type Spread | Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions | Flat calm
Overhaul activity: | Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.
24

— page 102 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) Torpedo Attack No. 3 Patrol No. Three
Time: 0551 (-9) Date: 27 June 1944 Lat: 31-12N
Long: 130-12E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: Medium freighter, (EU) Ehime Maru 4469-4747.
Ship Sunk: None.
Target Data: Draft: 8' Course: 090° Speed: 8 Range: 1950
Own Data: Course: 130° Speed: 3 Depth: 64' Angle: 1° rise.
Type Attack: Day submerged.

25.

— page 103 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #3

Tube No.          7        8        9        10
Track angle     106°S    107°S    108°S    109°S
Gyro angle      195°     197°     198°     199°
Depth Set       6'       6'       6'       6'
Hit or Miss     Miss     Miss     Miss     Miss
* Erratic       No?      Yes?     No?      Yes?
Mk. Torpedo     18-1     18-1     18-1     18-1
Serial No.      54486    54453    54470    54568
Mk. Exploder    4-2      4-2      4-2      4-2
Serial No.      7956     7962     8000     8025
Actuation       --       --       --       --
Mk. Warhead     18       18       18       18
Serial No.      2243     2297     2275     2269
Explosive       Torpex   Torpex   Torpex   Torpex
Firing Interval          10 Sec.  12 Sec.  11 Sec.
Type Spread     Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions  Calm
Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.
*Two torpedoes made surface runs. Unable to determine which two.

26.

— page 104 —
U.S.S. TING (SS 306) Torpedo attack No. 4A Patrol No. Three
Time: 1759 (-8) Date: 29 June 1944 Lat: 10-27N
                                            Long: 124-35E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 medium freighter, (EC) Tazan Maru,
                       5464 tons.

Ship Sunk: None.

Target Data: Draft: 8' Course: 255° Speed: 7 Range: 1600

Own Data: Course: 330° Speed: 3 Depth: 62' Angle: 0

Type Attack: Day Submerged.

27.

— page 105 —
FIRE CONTROL AID TORPEDO DATA #4A

Tube No. | 1 | 2
Track Angle | 103°P | 106°P
Gyro Angle | 002° | 359°
Depth Set | 10' | 10'
Hit or Miss | Miss | Miss
Erratic | No | No
Mk. Torpedo | 23 | 23
Serial No. | 61671 | 49675
Mk. Exploder | 6-4 | 6-4
Serial No. | 8012 | 18511
Actuation | -- | --
Mk. Warhead | 16-1 | 16-1
Serial No. | 10323 | 3808
Explosive | Torpex | Torpex

Firing Interval | 15 Sec.
Type Spread | Divergent point of ain.
Sea Conditions | Rough
Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

28.

— page 106 —
U.S.S. LING (SS 306) Torpedo Attack No. 4B Patrol No. Three
Time: 0101 (-3) Date: 30 June 1944 Lat: 35-03N
Long: 125-08E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: Same as 4A.
Ship Sunk: 1 Freighter,
(EC) Tezan Maru, 5464 tons.
Damage Determined by: Observed torpedo hit, ship break in two
and sink.
Target Data: Draft: 8' Course: 075° Speed: 9 Range: 750
Own Data: Course: 345° Speed: 0 Depth: Surf. Angle: 0
Type Attack: Night surface.

29.

— page 107 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO D.A.T. # 4B

Tube No. 5
Track angle 092°S
Gyro angle 354°
Depth Set 6'
Hit or Miss Hit
Erratic No
Mk. Torpedo 23
Serial No. 61726
Mk. Exploder 6-4
Serial No. 17341
Actuation Contact
Mk. Warhead 16-1
Serial No. 11025
Explosive Torpex
Firing Interval --
Type Spread --
Sea Conditions Rough
Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

30.

— page 108 —
U.S.S. TING (SS 306) Torpedo Attack No. 5 Patrol No. Three
Time: 1444 (-8) Date: 1 July 1944 Lat: 34-27N
Long: 123-46E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 Escort freighter,
(EU) Amakasu Maru class, 1852 - 1961 tons.

Ship Sunk: 1 Escort freighter, 2000 tons.

Damage Determined by: Heard torpedo hit, observed ship sink.

Target Data: Draft: 17½' Course: 240° Speed: 10 Range: 1300

Own Data: Course: 150° Speed: 3 Depth: 65' Angle: ½° rise.

Type Attack: Day submerged.

31.

— page 109 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #5

Tube No. | 7 | 8
Track angle. | 096°P | 099°P
Gyro angle | 174° | 171°
Dept. Set | 6' | 6'
Hit or Miss | Miss | Hit
Erratic | No | No
Mk. Torpedo | 13-1 | 13-1
Serial No. | 54475 | 54697
Mk. Exploder | 4-2 | 4-2
Serial No. | 7936 | 7950
Actuation | - | Contact
Mk. Warhead | 18 | 18
Serial No. | 1962 | 2340
Explosive | Torpex | Torpex
Firing Interval | 10 Sec.
Type Spread | Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions | Calm, slight swell.
Overhaul Activity: | Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

32.

— page 110 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) Torpedo Attack No. 6 Patrol No. Three
Time: 2247 (-8) Date: 1 July 1944 Lat: 34-33N
Long: 125-12E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 Medium freighter,
(EU) Semarang Maru, 3802-4070 tons.

Ship Sunk: 1 Medium Freighter, 4000 tons.

Damage Determined by: Observed torpedo hit, ship explode and sink.

Target Data: Draft: 24' Course: 120 Speed: 9½ Range: 500

Own Data: Course: 210 Speed: 2 Depth: 62' Angle: 0

Type Attack: Night Submerged.

33.

— page 111 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #6

Tube No.                               1             3
Track Angle                            90°F          102°P
Gyro Angle                             000°          348°
Depth Set                              6'            6'
Hit or Miss                            Hit           Miss
Erratic                                No            No
Mk. Torpedo                            23            23
Serial No.                             41368         41260
Mk. Exploder                           6-4           6-4
Serial No.                             12391         1796
Actuation                              Contact       --
Mk. Warhead                            16-1          16-1
Serial No.                             13369         13425
Explosive                              Torpex        Torpex
Firing Interval                                12 Sec.
Type Spread                            Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions                         Flat calm.
Overhaul Activity:                     Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

34.

— page 112 —
U.S.S. TULLIBEE (SS 306) Torpedo Attack No. 7 Patrol No. Three.
Time: 0626 (-8) Date: 4 July 1944 Lat: 35-22N
Long: 125-56E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: (EU) Kurosio Maru class (XAV).

Ship Sunk: (EU) Kurosio Maru Class (XAV), 10,000 tons gross,
16,000 standard dis-
placement.

Damage Determined by: Heard two torpedoes hit, observed ship
sink in two sections.

Target Data: Draft: 29½' Course: 175° Speed: 8 Range: 2500
Own Data: Course: 100 Speed: 3 Depth: 64' Angle: 0
Type Attack: Day Submerged.

35.

— page 113 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #7

Tube No. .           1         3         5
Track Angle          105°S     107°S     109°S
Gyro Angle           002       004       006
Depth Set            8'        8'        8'
Hit or Miss          Hit       Hit       Miss
Erratic              No        No        No
Mk. Torpedo          23        23        23
Serial No.           41526     41446     41041
Mk. Exploder         6-4       6-4       6-4
Serial No.           11438     12728     2679
Actuation            Contact   Contact   --
Mk. Warhead          16-1      16-1      16-1
Serial No.           13895     11994     2624
Explosive            Torpex    Torpex    Torpex
Firing Interval                8 Sec.    11 Sec.
Type Spread          Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions       Flat calm.
Overhaul activity:   Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

36.

— page 114 —
U.S.S. TING (SS 306) Torpedo Attack No. 8 Patrol No. Three
Time: 2126 (-3) Date: 4 July 1944 Lat: 36-05N
                                                Long: 125-48E

                        TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 modern large ore ship,
                                (EC) Kuma-saki Maru (not listed)

Ship Sunk: 1 large ore ship, (EC) Kuma-saki Maru, 7000-10,000 tons,
                        pending questioning of prisoner by an interpreter.

Damage Determined by: Observed one torpedo hit, and ship sink
                        by the middle.

Target Data: Draft: 20' Course: 045° Speed: 9½ Range: 910

Own Data: Course: 330° Speed: 3 Depth: 65' Angle: 0

Type Attack: Night Submerged.

                                37.

— page 115 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #8

Tube No. | 5 | 6
Track Angle | 93°S | 107°S
Gyro Angle | 357° | 003°
Depth Set | 8' | 8'
Hit or Miss | Hit | Miss
Erratic | No | No
Mk. Torpedo | 23 | 23
Serial No. | 46135 | 49703
Mk. Exploder | 6-4 | 6-4
Serial No. | 2384 | 7107
Actuation | Contact | --
Mk. Warhead | 16-1 | 16-1
Serial No. | 11303 | 11398
Explosive | Torpex | Torpex
Firing Interval | | 9 Sec.
Type Spread | Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions | Calm
Overhaul Activity: | Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

38.

— page 116 —
U.S.S. TING (SS 306) Torpedo Attack No. 9 Patrol No. Three
Time: 0320 (-3) Date: 6 July 1944 Lat: 38-40N
Long: 123-40E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 medium freighter, (EU) Osaka Maru,
3741-4106

Ship Sunk: 1 Medium freighter, (EU) Osaka Maru, 4,000 tons.

Target Data: Draft: 24' Course: 317° Speed: 9 Range: 900

Own Data : Course: 040 Speed: 3 Depth: 64' Angle: 1°rise

Type Attack: Night Submerged.

39.

— page 117 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #9

| | 9 | 10 |
| :| :------ | :------ |
| Tube No. | 9 | 10 |
| Track Angle | 36°S | 91°S |
| Gyro Angle | 135° | 190° |
| Depth Set | 6' | 6' |
| Hit or Miss | Hit | Hit |
| Erratic | No | No |
| Mk. Torpedo | 13-1 | 13-1 |
| Serial No. | 54478 | 54617 |
| Mk. Exploder | 4-2 | 4-2 |
| Serial No. | 7997 | 3016 |
| Actuation | Contact | Contact |
| Mk. Warhead | 13 | 13 |
| Serial No. | 1538 | 2304 |
| Explosive | Torpex | Torpex |
| Firing Interval | | 3 Sec. |
| Type Spread | | Divergent point of aim |
| Sea Conditions | | Flat calm |
| Overhaul Activity: | | Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H. |

40.

— page 118 —
F35-62/A16-3
Serial 024
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT
to
U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report
of War Patrol No. 3
dated 14 July 1944.

From:
To :
Via :

Subject:

1.
The TANG on this, her third war patrol, sixteen days
after entering her assigned area, the East China and Yellow Seas, had
fired 24 torpedoes in ten attacks and sunk 8 ships for a total of
39,000 estimated tons with 12 hits. The entire patrol covered a per-
iod of 36 days.

2.
(a) Attack No. 1 and 2. On the night of 24 June, TANG
on the surface, tore into a convoy of six large ships with at least
10 escorts and with six torpedoes (three at each) sank a 7500 ton
freighter and a 10,000 ton tanker. Mark 23 torpedoes were fired at an
average range of 2500 yards, on 120 and 110 degree starboard tracks
with 10 foot depth setting. One torpedo was observed to run errati-
cally.

(b) Attack No. 3. Soon after dawn on 26 June an SJ
contact at 6,000 yards provided a target in the form of a medium sized
unescorted freighter. TANG made a quick end around run, submerged and
fired four Mark 18's from stern tubes with a depth setting of six feet
on a 100 degree starboard track, range 1950. Two of the torpedoes
made surface runs alerting the target in
time to allow
torpedoes to be avoided. The freighter ran for cover while TANG sur-
faced and chased her just ahead of a late arriving patrol boat.

(c) Attacks 4A and 4B. Just prior to noon on 29 June,
while patrolling submerged an unescorted medium freighter estimated
at 5500 tons was sighted on a course which prevented a good firing
position. TANG turned away, surfaced, made end around and
four hours later submerged and fired two Mark 23's on a 90 port track
range 1,250 yards with depth set at 10 feet. Both missed
(passed under ship). Three close depth charges followed, one of which
detonated under circumstances which might point to use of a time delay
feature for shallow water. TANG surfaced and chased for an hour be-
fore regaining contact on SJ. Made an end around and at a 750 yard

- 1 -
SUBMARINE DIVISION SIXTY-TWO
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
17 July 1944.

The Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-TWO.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
(1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Subordinate Command, Navy Number 1504.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of Third War Patrol.

— page 119 —
F35-62/A16-3
Serial 024
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of Third War Patrol.

(d) Attack No. 4. On the morning of 1 July TANG on
range on the surface, fired one Mark 14 "feeler" set at
a 92 degree track with depth set at six feet on
under the eyes of TANG's crew. The apparent efficiency
camouflage job is noted with interest.

(e) Attack No. 5. On the morning of 1 July TANG on
surface sighted and a 4,000 ton medium freighter and a 2,000
ton escort freighter. Submerging for periscope attack TANG on
Mark 14's at the escort-freighter range 1,250, 100 port track with
depth set at six feet. One hit and the ship was observed to sink in
2 minutes and 20 seconds. The freighter reversed course and TANG
trailed submerged until dusk when she surfaced, made an end around, sub-
merged again and in

(f) Attack No. 6. Sank the freighter with one hit out
of two Mark 23's fired at a 500 yard range on a 90 port track with
depth set at six feet. The manner in which this ship blew up indicates
a cargo of munitions.

(g) Attack No. 7. At dawn on 4 July TANG made an end
around on the masts of a ship and dove one hour later to continue the
approach on what developed into a 16,000 ton (MAY) Seaplane tender or
aircraft transport. With rapidly shoaling water and the keel about to
scrape the bottom TANG backed down and fired three Mark 23's, range
2000, 90 starboard track with depth set at 8 feet. Two hits sank this
ship and TANG surfaced to clear the area in the midst of 34 fishing
boats with about fifty survivors thrashing around in the water and in
large life boats.

(h) Attack No. 8. In the late afternoon of the same
day, 4 July, smoke was sighted and closed until picked
up by radar
at 18,500 yards and sighted at 15,000. After tracking
to determine
his zig plan a submerged radar periscope approach resul-
ted in the
firing of TANG's last two Mark 23's at a 900 yard range
90 starboard
track with depth set at 8 feet. One hit sank this ship
and TANG sur-
faced and took aboard the one visible survivor and a
life ring. The
sunken ship for observation and questioning of the
prisoner was esti-
mated to be a ore ship converted from a modern tanker
hull of about
10,000 tons.

(i) Attack No. 9. On the night of 5 July under a full
moon an SJ radar contact at 29,000 yards was tracked
out to 32,000
yards and an end around run made which placed the TANG seven miles

- 2 -

— page 120 —
SUBMARINE DIVISION SIXTY-TWO
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
17 July 1944.

B5-62/A16-3
Serial 024
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of Third War Patrol.

1. Ahead of the target. In a submerged radar periscope attack the last
two torpedoes, Mark 18's from the stern tubes were fired at 900 yards
range with a 90 degree track, depth setting 6 feet. Both torpedoes
hit at top minutes later on surfacing only floating wreckage and
broken life boats remained from a medium freighter of 4,000 tons.

3. This, the third consecutive outstanding patrol turned
in by the TANG, was characterized by the same aggressive
and efficient fighting spirit that was so noticeable in her first and
second patrols. To her enviable record of sinking 5 ships totaling
41,969 tons on her first patrol and the efficient rescuing of 22 naval
aviators on her second patrol the TANG now adds 8 more ships sunk for
an additional 59,000 tons on this patrol.

4. Twelve hits out of 24 torpedoes fired, three of which
were seen to run erratic, is an excellent score in any league and
one which the TANG's Control Party may well be proud of.

5. Material condition on return from patrol was excellent.
Refit will be accomplished by Division 62 Relief Crew assisted by the
Submarine Base Midway.

6. The Commanding Officer, Officers and crew are most
heartily congratulated on this very outstanding patrol. It is re-
commended that TANG be credited with inflicting the following damage
upon the enemy:

SUNK
1 Freighter (AOBASAN MARU Class)(EU) 7,500 tons
(Attack #1)
1 Tanker (GENYO MARU Class)(EU) 10,000 tons
(Attack #2)
1 Freighter (TAZAN MARU Class)(EC) 5,500 tons
(Attack #4B)
1 Escort-Frighter (AIKASU MARU Class) 2,000 tons
(Attack #5)
1 Freighter (SAKANG MARU Class)(EU) 4,000 tons
(Attack #6)
1 (XAV)(KOSIO MARU Class)(EU) 16,000 tons
(Attack #7)
1 Tanker Hull, Ore ship, (A-AURA MARU)(EC) 10,000 tons
(Attack #8)
1 Freighter (OSAKA MARU Class)(EU) 4,000 tons
(Attack #9)
TOTAL 59,000 tons

- 3 -
[SIGNATURE: J. M. WILL.]
J. M. WILL.

— page 122 —
FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(1F
Serial C-510
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
A Report of
Third War Patrol.
COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 478.
U.S.S. TANG - THIRD WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of Third War Patrol.
(8 June to 14 July 1944).

1. The third war patrol of the TANG was conducted in the
East China Sea and Yellow Sea Areas.

2. This patrol was an outstanding example of excellent
judgment, expert area analysis, bull-dog tenacity, and severe damage
to the enemy. In a period of 12 days the TANG made nine torpedo
attacks, sinking eight vessels. Each attack was carefully planned and
brilliantly executed. This patrol sets a record for submarines opera-
ting in the Central Pacific Area as to the amount of damage inflicted
upon the enemy.

3. The TANG was one of three submarines assigned to work
in the area West and North of the Japanese Empire. This was not a
coordinated attack group but a group designated to work adjacent
areas, close together, and planned in order to pass contacts from one
to the other.

4. It is of note that many radar contacts were made using
the APX-1 detector.

5. This patrol is designated as "Successful" for Combat
Insignia award.

6. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratu-
lates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this very out-
standing war patrol. The TANG is further congratulated for the out-
standing performance of its three war patrols during which the TANG
has sunk 13 enemy vessels for 97,969 tons on two of them and rescued
22 aviators on the other. The TANG is credited with having inflicted
the following damage upon the enemy:

S U N K
1 - Large Freighter (AOBASAN MARU - 7,500 tons (Attack No.1)
class) (EU)
1 - Large Tanker (GENYO MARU class) (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No.2)
1 - Freighter (TAZAN MARU class) (EC) - 5,500 tons (Attack No.4A)
1 - Small Freighter (AMAKASU MARU class) - 2,000 tons (Attack No.5)
(EU)

- 1 -

SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
nch
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
24 July 1944.
[HANDWRITTEN: F4253]

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.
[HANDWRITTEN: 8 01416]

[STAMP: SCRG.]
[STAMP: MICRO]
[STAMP: PHOTO-LAB OP-16]
[STAMP: RETURN TO F-4253]

— page 124 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306)
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.

A16-3
Serial 013
C O DECLASSIFIED A L

From:
To :
Via :

Subject:

Enclosures:

1.
this vessel
period 31

DECLASSIFIED ART, 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY [HANDWRITTEN: S.M.G.H] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 8/19/78]

3 September, 1944

The Commanding Officer.
The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
The Commander Submarine Division 141.
The Commander Submarine Squadron 14.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

U.S.S. TANG (SS 306), Report of Fourth War Patrol.

(A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (Comsubpac only).

Enclosure (A), covering the fourth war patrol of
conducted in Japanese Empire waters during the
July, 1944, to 3 September, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

[SIGNATURE: R.H. O'Kane]
R.H. O'KANE.

[STAMP: 93140] [STAMP: FILMED]

— page 125 —
U.S.S. TANG
(A) PROLOGUE.

Returned from third war patrol July fourteenth. The refit
by SubDiv 62 and Submarine Base, Midway, completed on the twenty-
fourth, is considered our finest to date. Conducted normal
training and departed July thirty-first.

(B) NARRATIVE.

July 31 (+12) - August 7 (-9)

1555 Underway for areas four and five at two engine speed. Con-
ducted usual training dives and fire control drills, and enjoyed
yachting weather.

August 8 (-9)

0950 Dived a half hour to avoid a bomber sighted at about eight
miles.
1410 Dived an hour for another bomber about ten miles away.
2351 Sighted MIKURA SHIMA in the NANPO SHOTO, but because of
known radar installations nearby, proceeded to INAMB. SHIMA,
a small pinnacle, for checking our SJ.

August 9 (-9)

Conducted submerged patrol near INAMB. SHIMA in the vicinity
of numerous plotted contacts. Continuous searching, with
1900 periodic sweeps at forty feet finally located what might
have been smoke beyond ZENI SU, so on surfacing proceeded
to the northwest to investigate. No contact was made, but
as all the surrounding areas were vacant, closed the coast
in the bight west of OHAI SAKI for submerged patrol at dawn.

August 10 (-9)

0441 Dived six miles from the beach and continued closing the
coast. A few minutes later sighted single mast and super-
structure of an apparent patrol boat which continued its
sweep down the coast.
0903 Sighted a large engine-aft ship against the beach, escorted
by three bombers. We were already on his track six thousand
yards away, so except for closing the traffic route, our
approach served only to impress our OOD's with the necessity
of sticking one's eyeballs on the beach to pick out the
shipping.

-1-
[HANDWRITTEN: 2]

— page 126 —
U.S.S. TANG
August 10 (-9) Cont'd.
ATTACK NO. 1.

1010 Within an hour of securing from battle stations for this
first ship, and having avoided another patrol by continuing
in, made an old type loaded tanker right against the beach
headed for OMAI SAKI. As four bombers were the only escorts,
took a sounding to find we were still in forty fathoms. A
standard speed approach closed him to 1200 yards where with
1034 echo and stadimeter ranges checking, fired three Mk 23
torpedoes spread his length by constant bearing, on a star-
board track, speed 8.5, set at eight feet, gyros near zero,
so hits or explosions on the beach three thousand yards
away resulted. Two minutes after firing the tanker, alerted,
reversed course away, so commenced evasion, thoroughly ex-
pecting bombs or aerial depth charges. We rolled on the
bottom a little at eighty feet during our turn to evade,
but reached deep water and commenced periscope patrol in
another hour.
1500 Very distant counter attack commenced.
1920 Surfaced south of DAIO SAKI, and staying clear of its 252
proceeded down the 100 fathom curve past MIKI SIKI
searching for any night shipping.

August 11 (-9)

0418 Having doubled back to MIKI SAKI, dived three miles west of
the point, then closed to intercept any morning shipping.
0515 When visibility was just becoming good through the periscope,
sighted smoke against the beach and the bow wake of an escort.
Before we could reach an approach course, the escort and a
large engine-aft freighter ducked around MIKI SAKI and into
KADA AN, thence down the coast.
Patrol activity increased steadily with one pinger
generally in sight, an inshore patrol proceeding back and
forth a thousand yards off MIKI SAKI, and a motor boat re-
sembling a landing barge with six lookouts making a nuisance
of itself.
1244 After ducking for a modern looking gunboat loaded with depth
charges, heard extremely loud pinging coming up the coast.
The A/S vessel was not as big as his ping, but by coming
straight to MIKI SAKI, then changing course to seaward, he
forced us off the fifty fathom curve as we kept our stern to
him. His method became apparent when a tanker came out of
1355 KADA AN and ducked around MIKI SAKI with the TANG hopelessly
out of position for attack.
1500 With changing tide, fogging periscopes nearly ruined the rest
of our day for we were spotted by the motor boat when
long exposures became necessary. He was extremely difficult

-2-
[HANDWRITTEN: 3]

— page 127 —
U.S.S. TANG
August 11 (-9) Cont'd.

1635 to shake, but on sighting smoke, a half hour run at standard
     speed into OWASE WAN left him out on the 80 fathom curve.
     This put us in about forty fathoms of water, on the route
     followed by the tanker, and on their most probable track.

ATTACKS NO. 2 and 3

The smoke, which had been in two columns, developed into
two mast-funnel-mast split superstructure freighters in column.
They were escorted well to seaward by the gunboat previously
sighted, and by a smaller escort on the other bow. During the
remainder of the approach, the leading ship was identified (EC)
as the BIYO MARU class, page 220, ONI. 208-J (rev'd), and the
second, about two thirds her size, as similar (LU) to the
AKASHI MARU, page 230. Both ships were heavily loaded.
1740 When in position 1700 yards on the convoy's beam, just prior
     to giving a final set-up, sound reported fast screws on our
     port quarter. A quick look showed our gunboat coming in fast
     about a thousand yards away, evidently warned by the motor
     boat of our presence.
1741 Fired three Mk 23 torpedoes at the leading freighter, range
     1300, 110 starboard track, depth setting 6 feet, spread 150%
     of the target's length by constant bearings, followed by a
     similar spread at the second freighter on an 80 starboard
     track. Took a quick low power sweep to observe the gunboat
     filling the field boiling past our stern, evidently having
     misjudged our course and giving the wrong lead. Reassured,
     swung quickly to the leading target in time to see the first
     torpedo hit right in the middle, evidently for he disinte-
     grated for he disintegrated with the explosion.
1743 On our way deep, timed our fourth and fifth torpedoes to hit
     the second freighter, followed by a tooth-and-nail depth
     charge attack. As the gunboat's screws on our port bow showed
     his intent to turn us toward shallow water, made a full speed
     dash, assured by single ping soundings taken with each barrage,
     up now at this speed, the twisting, screeching, breaking-
     noises were loud in the direction of the targets. After
     twenty-two close ones, the depth charges drew aft and we were
1821 able to return to periscope depth in thirty-eight minutes.
     The gunboat was now about 4000 yards on our quarter, the
     other escort at the scene of the attacks apparently picking
     up survivors, and one plane was circling the area. Nothing
     else was in sight.

-3-
[HANDWRITTEN: 4]

— page 128 —
U.S.S. TANG
ATTACKS NO. 2 and 3 Cont'd.

2005 Continued to seaward at five knots and surfaced at dark with
     depth charging still progressing, and the area astern of us
     being swept by searchlights.
2010 Headed for IZUBA SHIMA at 18 knots.

                     August 12 (-9)

0420 Commenced submerged patrol between INAMBA SHIMA and MINURA.
     back on our schedule.
0736 Maneuvered to avoid a patrol boat and proceeded south of
     INAMBA SHIMA as the Kuroshio was setting us on the island.
1505 Again the enemy had succeeded in chasing us from a likely
     spot, for after twenty-four depth charges and continuous
     planes and patrols, sighted distant smoke in the direction
     of our dawn position.
1918 As our attempts to maintain, and then to regain contact with
     the smoke had been futile, and even a six knot enemy ship
     would reach TOKYO BAY ahead of us, proceeded to the IZU-
     INUBO SAKI area to intercept coastal traffic.
2300 Moved into MATSUURA WAN three miles from the beach to insure
     no contact on any shipping.

                     August 13 (-9)

0312 As no contact was made and the visibility dropped to zero from
     wood smoke rolling from the beach, withdrew for submerged
     patrol at dawn.
0654 Sighted distant smoke to the southeast headed for NOJIMA SAKI
     and TOKYO. Four bombers and a patrol boat prevented a surface
     approach and our twelve mile approach fell
     short by six thousand yards of attaining a firing position.
1921 After surfacing, took one more turn up the 100 fathom curve
     to NOJIMA SAKI before proceeding south to the TORI SHIMA area
     of the southern islands.

                     August 14 (-9)

0429 When 40 miles east of HACHIJO SHIMA, dived to avoid detection
     by a patrol yacht. His maneuvering during the day prevented
     our usual surfacing for high periscope searches, so kept him
     in sight for a 4" target if better shipping had not
     turned up. Planes indicated that he may have
1430 Surfaced to regain contact but dived in twenty minutes on the
     approach of a plane.

-4-
[HANDWRITTEN: 5]

— page 129 —
U.S.S. TANG

August 14 (-9) Cont'd.

GUN ATTACK NO. 1

1753 Surfaced to maintain contact and check all guns, then closed
1832 to seven thousand yards and commenced firing.
The enemy was tenacious and wiry, twisting and turning
and closing the range at every opportunity, and though he
replied only with apparent 20 mm. machine guns, he was on in
deflection and not far short with a range of about 4500 yards, forc-
ing us to haul out frequently.
It was impossible with his movements and the 4" rate of
fire to stay on for more than one or two hits, and only eight
sure hits were observed. These were beauts, however, demolish-
ing his deck house aft and exploding in his side and upper
works.
1926 With eighty-eight rounds expended and the enemy still under
control, perhaps from central station, proceeded to the south
for patrol on the following day.

August 15 (-9)

Conducted submerged high periscope patrol east of TONI SHIMA,
surfacing periodically for high periscope searches.

August 16 (-9)

Patrolled on the surface, searching with seven lookouts and
high periscope.
1339 Dived on sighting a MAVIS, which dropped one depth charge
thirty minutes later.
1532 Continued surface patrol.

August 17 (-9)

Patrolled as on previous day.
0736 Dived for an hour to avoid detection by a distant bomber.
1326 Dived again for a bomber.

August 18 (-9)

Patrolled as on previous day.
1310 Dived an hour for a distant aircraft, then proceeded west at
three engine speed to reach KANTOKI SAKI by the following
night.

-5-
[HANDWRITTEN: 6]

— page 130 —
U.S.S. TANG
August 19 (-9)

In route KANTORI SAKI for close in patrol.
1304 Submerged thirty miles from the coast and continued to close
       the beach.
1904 On surfacing closed the coast just north of KANTORI SAKI to
       intercept any night shipping. The numerous sampans and row
       boats previously reported are still in evidence, but
       nothing interfered with our closing to 5000 yards from the
       beach, where contact with any shipping would be assured.
2347 Tracked a patrol boat as he came down the coast to seaward
       of us and then reversed course back toward MIKI SAKI.

August 20 (-9)

Continued close in radar search for shipping. 156 and 256
       tonners were in evidence, but it didn't seem to bite.
0450 Dived on the fifty fathom curve two miles from the beach
       where attack on any coastal traffic was assured.
0605 Avoided a patrol boat coming down the coast.

ATTACK NO. 4

0947 Sighted tops and smoke of a freighter coming out of the mist
       from the north. As the enemy was inside the ten fathom curve,
       we still had to close the coast a little and dodge numerous
       sampans, but his escorts, two SC's, were well clear on his beam
       and port bow to seaward. The freighter was a modern, medium
       sized engine-aft ship. With range 900, 123 gyros around 30,
       fired two Mk 23 torpedoes at his stack and foremast by constant bearings, depth setting six feet.
       The first torpedo evidently missed and exploded on the
       beach, while the second torpedo left the tube with a
       dud but did not run.
       We had to take our first eight depth charges at periscope
       depth but had gained deep water for the next twenty-two.
2142 Surfaced and headed around SHIONO MISAKI to attack the coastal
       traffic between this point and ICHTYE SAKI.
       Nothing was in evidence but nothing came of it.

August 21 (-9)

0456 Dived in deep water off OKINOKURO SHIMA and closed the beach
       slowly for an afternoon attack.
0855 A large ship and two escorts proceeding eastward and rounding
       SHIONO MISAKI out of reach changed our plan, but we closed the
       next freighter two hours later. She was a medium sized new
       engine-aft job with escorts well ahead, but a 3000 yard
       torpedo run broke off the attack, as a better shot was prac-
       tically assured.

-6-
[HANDWRITTEN: 7]

— page 131 —
U.S.S. TANG
August 21 (-9) Cont'd.

ATTACK NO. 5

1243 After closing the beach to a twenty fathom spot off
ORINO SHIMA, headed west to buck a two knot easterly set.
Sighted smoke then a medium mast-funnel-mast freighter
coming up the coast unbelievably close to the beach. Our
approach consisted mainly of ducking the two killer escorts and
whale boat sub chasers and turning left for a stern shot.
1317 At a range of 1650 yards, fired three Mark 18-1 torpedoes
with a 150' of the freighter's length by constant bearings,
110 port track, depth setting six feet, gyros around 20 left.
All torpedoes exploded on the beach.
We were at 200 feet, two fathoms off the bottom, when the
first depth charges let go, and reached deep water twenty
minutes later. Our evasion at 100 turns kept everything aft
including late arriving pingers.
Checks on the firing bearings with our Mark S, and plot
of the firing showed everything in order. This left only the
possibility of deep running torpedoes to explain our persis-
tent misses, so decided to keep slugging and continue checking
for duds.

1916 On our first trip to MIKI SAKI we were caught napping by
a freighter and escort which rounded the point just after
dawn. Radar searches had shown no night traffic, so felt sure
shipping might wait at OMASE or OMASE WAN just north of MIKI
SAKI. On surfacing, proceeded clear of KANTOPI SAKI
to probe the above bay.

August 22 (-9)

ATTACK NO. 6

0020 After passing MIKI SAKI, slowed, crossed the 100 fathom curve.
We proceeded around KUKI SAKI into OMASE WAN. Side lobes
were confusing, but we soon found "a pip where no pip ought
to be." The night was black and only the long shape of the
enemy could be seen until we circled him to get him away from
the background. There he was quite visible, identified
as the gunboat who had harassed us during our first visit,
to finish it off then with those tooth-shakers. He tracked at
20 speed and was obviously anchored in about 20 fathoms
2 miles northwest of KUKI SAKI. Holding our breath, we
moved in slowly to twelve hundred yards, twisted, then stead-
0142 ied for a straight stern shot and fired one Mark 18-1 torpedo
at his middle set on three feet.

-7-
[HANDWRITTEN: 8]

— page 132 —
U.S.S. TANG
August 22 (-9)
ATTACK NO. 6 Cont'd.

The phosphorescent wake petered out after a hundred yard
run with the torpedo evidently heading down, and hit bottom
with a loud rumble, timed half way to the enemy, where there
should have been 250 feet of water. It was tracked by sound
to this moment, but after the rumble cleared away, nothing
more was heard.
0144 Fired a second Mark 18-1 torpedo set on three feet, feeling
sure the enemy had been alerted by the first. It's wake was
dimly visible directly to the target, tracked also by sound,
but it passed underneath, apparently running on the deep side
too.
0158 With one salvo of three left aft, circled for a bow shot,
with range 900, fired a Mark 23 torpedo from number 5
tube set on zero feet, at his middle. Though we were stopped
and absolutely steady and the gyro angle zero, it took a
thirty yard jog to the left before settling towards the target
and missed astern.
0200 Still whispering, though the last two torpedoes must
have roared past him, fired a second Mark 23 torpedo from
number 6 tube set on zero aimed at his gun forward. It took
a jog to the left also, but settled down right for his middle.
The explosion forty seconds later was the most spectacu-
lar we've ever seen, topped by a pillar of fire and more
explosions about five hundred feet in the air. There was
absolutely nothing left of the gunboat.
This vessel was observed at close hand previously during
daylight. She was new in appearance, flush deck, with raised
gun platforms forward and amidships mounting double
purpose guns. Aft of the midship platform was a goal-
post structure, possibly for use in sweeping or by a
director platform. Her stern had very long almost
horizontal depth charge racks holding fourteen counted depth
charges a side, and what appeared to be Y-guns on the center-
line. On observation before firing she measured between
225' and 270' in length and is estimated to have a standard
displacement of 1500 tons.
Feeling that our difficulties had been mainly in sluggish
steering and depth engines, withdrew at full power to spend
the day checking afterbodies of our remaining torpedoes.
After giving the steering engines a good workout to in-
sure they were free, checked our rudder throws. On three of
the six torpedoes they were three quarters to one degree
heavy. With a careful trim and no pressure in the boat, swung
all torpedoes and calibrated depth springs.

-8-
[HANDWRITTEN: 9]

— page 133 —
U.S.S. TANG
August 22 (-9) Cont'd.

1900 Now confident that our last two salvos would count, headed for
     OMAI SAKI and the scene of our first attack of the patrol.

August 23 (-9)

0100 In position on the fifty fathom curve west of OMAI SAKI, moved
     slowly to the bight off FUKUDA. We were six thousand yards
     from the beach and it is certain that no shipping passed,
     though navigational lights were burning.
0417 Submerged, this time in our desired position, and commenced a
     cautious periscope patrol. Plane activity started right after
     daylight followed by the first patrol a half hour later.
0803 Sight of smoke of two freighters as they rounded OMAI SAKI and
     commenced closing their track. As expected, they were practic-
     ally aground, so closed to 1000 yards from a wreck off FUKUDA,
     undoubtedly one of our sub's handy-work. Though the escorts
     were clear, an unexpected zig and a third previously unobserv-
     ed small freighter put us underfoot. A full speed dash
     succeeded only in letting us clear as they boiled by our bow
     and stern about two hundred yards off.
0923 We had been secured from battle stations less than a half hour
     when an old type destroyer, four bombers, and a float plane
     commenced searching down the coast. At first it appeared that
     we'd been spotted, but his circling tactics resembled the
     routine sweep we'd observed off MIKI SAKI. Though we had our
     torpedoes set at two feet and he came very close, we could
     secure nothing but sharp tracks or large angle shots. Why his
     split-splitting pinger didn't pick us up will remain a pleasant
     mystery.

ATTACK NO. 7

1017 With the destroyer just clear the reason for the activity
     became apparent with the sighting of masts and high super-
     structure of a ship coming down the coast toward OMAI SAKI.
     He was escorted by a large PC or DE ahead, an SC on his bow,
     and aircraft previously sighted overhead, and an LST and a PC
     astern.
     We had been forced out a little by the destroyer, and a
     high speed approach was necessary to insure a short firing
     range. It was therefore not until the angle on the bow opened
     ten minutes before firing that the full import of our enemy
     became apparent. The decks of his long superstructure were
     lined with men in white uniforms, as was his upper bridge.

-9-
[HANDWRITTEN: 10]

— page 134 —
U.S.S. TANG
August 23 (-9) Cont'd.

1110 Made another five minute dash to close the track, slowed and
1113 took two echo ranges, and fired three Mark 23 torpedoes spread
     his length by constant bearings, 105 starboard track, range
     800 yards, speed 8, depth setting six feet, then commenced
     swingline for a stern shot at the LST.
     The first and third torpedoes hit beautifully in his
     short well deck forward, and the after part of his long sup-
     erstructure, giving him a twenty degree down angle which he
     maintained as he went under with naval ensign flying.
     There is no ship resembling this in any of the ONI
     publications, though if the BUENOS AIRES MARU on page 45 were
     given a raked bow and her stack cut down level with her
     superstructure, she would be a close approximation. She was
     not, however, a hospital ship. The gross tonnage of this
     vessel would be in the neighborhood of 10000 tons and her
     standard displacement 15000.
1121 Our LST headed for the beach and someone dropped two depth
     charges, not close, which permitted us to surface and get two soundings
     and clear out at 100 turns. For once, depth charging the
     submarine seemed to take second priority, undoubtedly as
     survivors were picked up, for it was ten minutes before they
     started to rain. We had then reached deep water, and two
     hours at high speed, then gradual slowing, kept everything
     astern, including a multi-ship echo ranging search during
     the remainder of the day.
1907 Following our hit and run policy, commenced a full power
     dash to round SHIONO MISAKI for another crack at the coastal
     traffic before a waxing moon made evasion difficult.

August 24 (-9)

     near SHIONO MISAKI, but it appears to be poorly manned
     earlier warning installations.
0336 Sighted a ship on the SJ a yards about on the 100
     fan curve. After tracking it at six knots and gaining
     position ahead, picked up and sighted another ship close to
     the beach. As this latter seemed to be the larger and the
0428 former probably an escort, switched approach and dived for a
     periscope attack in the dawn that was breaking. When the
     generated range was 3000 he commenced signalling with yardarm
     blinkers, then turned away displaying a super load of depth
     charges and efficient looking guns. Though we had our tubes
     ready for this patrol, he wandered shoreward, never giving us
     a setup. It appeared that he had been relieved by a second
     patrol which occupied our attention for the next two hours,

-10-

— page 135 —
U.S.S. TING
August 24 (-9) Cont'd.

0950 and too late we saw him lead a modern medium sized diesel
tanker out of KAZAMPO, just east of ICHIIYE SAKI, and head
for SHIONO MISAKI hugging the coast.
Activity increased toward noon with the passage down the
coast of a HISHUN MARU class patrol with two stripes on his
stack. Within an hour sighted smoke beyond him and assuming
our escort commander would soon be back with the
freighters moved in to the forty fathom curve. He was there
all right on the next observation with two large freighters as-
tern. They were both riding high and practically on the beach
escorted astern by a similar patrol, on their beam by two worm-
line destroyers, and five PC's fanned out to the 100 fathom
curve. Their echo ranging frequencies varied from about 500
cycles, nicely audible on the JP and sounding like a pile
driver on the lowest limit of the JK, to above the upper limit
of the JK at 37 KCS.
Convinced that this was a little too much for a twenty
fathom shot with our last three torpedoes, slithered under the
inboard PC, a fathom or two off the bottom, and reached deep
water with only one token depth charge.
1930 As our presence was at least suspected in this location, com-
menced a high speed run around SHIONO and KANTORI SAKI to att-
empt to establish contact after daylight. This point lies about
five miles southwest of MIKI SAKI and is tipped by a small is-
land three hundred yards off the beach around which shipping
must pass.
Our previous observations showed that the motorboat
patrols did not range this far from MIKI SAKI. If the echo
ranging patrols could be avoided in the [UNCLEAR: fifty] fathom curve,
fifty fathoms available without moving off their track,
position for attack would be assured.
2342 Closing NIGISHIMA was not without incident however, for with
rain squalls and radar efficiency poor in frequent rain squalls
parallel to us, un-
only sighted a submarine on our beam and moved out
believably close at 1100 yards. Put him astern and he had changed
to five thousand yards where tracking showed he had changed
away also. We then commenced an end around and attack if enemy
and attack if enemy. Positive enemy identification would
have been impossible at night. Shortly after we changed
course for our end around his pip at five thousand yards
grew smaller and disappeared apparently as he dived. After
five thousand yards we changed course for our end around his pip at five thousand yards
grew smaller and disappeared apparently as he dived. After
this we changed positions, and searching for an hour, proceeded to
NIGISHIMA SAKI.
As this is the same area in which four torpedoes missed
the TAUTOG, it will be interesting to know if any friendly sub-
marine was in this position thirty miles southeast of KANTORI
SAKI. His diving as soon as we reversed course suggests radar,
though.

-11-
[HANDWRITTEN: 12]

— page 136 —
U.S.S. TANG
August 25 (-9)

0420 Dived three thousand yards from NIGISHIMA SAKI and moved to
within fifteen hundred yards of the beach. Patrol activity
started within a half hour, but turned back short of us for
some time, probably as a continuous stream of cargo sampans
was the only escorting necessary. We did not attack, however,
0805 for on a return sweep down the coast a PC continued
directly on to us. We were two fathoms off the bottom at 275
feet, rigged for silent running, and depth charge too, when he
passed directly overhead. He gave no indication of suspecting
our presence, and we were able to come to periscope depth as
soon as he passed. Two repeat performances by the PC sweeps
off HISHUN MARU class patrol, and planes on every observation,
indicated coming shipping, but they also prevented sufficient
observations to fix our position, and we were forced to run
1135 down the coast when smoke appeared around MIKI SAKI.
The tops, now visible, developed into a medium mast-funnel-mast
and a small engine-aft freighter. Guessing they would
continue across ADASHIKA WAN, swung left for a stern shot with
our last torpedoes. They turned into the narrow bay however,
giving us a 130 port track with a range between 1500 and 2000
yards. Confident we could do better, and influenced a little
by an escort about to take off our periscope, broke off the
attack.
1429 We had been back abreast of our island off NIGISHIMA but
when more smoke came in sight. This proved to be a
patrol with a deep throated pinger again sounding like a pile
driver on the JF. The JF was too realistic where the noise
appeared to scrape and klonk along the bottom. It was almost
reassuring when he shifted to short scale on passing 250 feet
1530 above us, and especially so when he commenced driving piles
again.

ATTACKS NOS. 8 & 9

During the next hour, two and then three patrols swept
1715 the coast, followed by distant high frequency echo ranging from
down the coast. Though its peak was above the range of our
receivers, it grew steadily louder until four ships were
in sight. The coast was obscured by passing rain, but
soon the enemy ship came in sight very close to the beach.
1743 Presented a starboard angle, so closed the beach to get
on her track before turning off for a stern shot. On the next
observation we were on her port bow, so came to the reverse of
1800 her course for low parallax firing.
The enemy was now identified as a modern medium sized
diesel tanker, heavily loaded.

-12-
[HANDWRITTEN: 13]

— page 137 —
U.S.S. TANG
August 25 (-9) Cont'd.

1305 She was the identical vessel that slipped by us out of KAZAMPO
on the previous morning. Her quarter escort dropped astern as
she came on, three others remained fanned out on her starboard
bow. Our Navigator was correct when he tabooed turning for a straight stern shot, for our
first echo range, inadvertently taken 180 yards to the beach,
800 yards to the beach. The second, on the enemy, checked
with the periscope stadimeter at 600 yards, so using constant
bearing, fired the first Mark 18-1 torpedo at his stern, the
second amidships, and the last a third ship length ahead, right
for the middle of the three escorts nearly in line of bearing
on his starboard bow. Though the depth setting was six feet
and gyros around 60 degrees, the first two hit exactly as aimed
and the third just blew hell out of the leading escort.
Though observed, scarcely this latter is believed to have been
the KUSHIRO MARU class with standard displacement of about
600 tons.
1808 What was left of the tanker had now sunk and the stern
escort was making a run toward where his quarter would have
been. Expecting some close ones, put him on our port bow and
headed for deep water. The initial barrage permitted high
speed and single ping soundings, and in fifteen minutes we rea-
ched deep submergence.
The enemy obviously never knew where the torpedoes had
come from, and though his search became systematic with a total
of sixty-eight depth charges, our 100 turn evasion outflanked
him.
2039 With the moon hidden in clouds and the two signals on
antenna giving only strength, cleared the area at
full speed. The signal strength decreased rapidly as we with-
drew, and searchlights astern disappeared in gathering rain
squalls.

August 26 (-9)

0300 In overcast, scuddy weather, continued past AOGA SHIMA and set
course for PEARL.

September 3 (+9½)

Arrived PEARL.

-12A-
[HANDWRITTEN: 14]

— page 138 —
(C) WEATHER. [HANDWRITTEN: TANG #4]
Normal

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION. [HANDWRITTEN: HYDRO]

West of OMAI SAKI, a current counter to the Kuroshio was
persistently encountered.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

In general all navigational lights were burning, but with
varying characteristics. In addition, observed fixed aimed
navigational lights which are visible less than three miles.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS

See pages 18-19.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS.

See pages 20-23.
(H) ATTACK DATA.

See pages 24-42
(I) MINES. [HANDWRITTEN: OP-30-3M]

The possible defensive minefield between SHIONO MISAKI and
ICHIYE SAKI, noted in JICPOA information, is not considered to
exist. [HANDWRITTEN: 10th FLT]
[HANDWRITTEN: DESLANT.]

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES
AND EVASION TACTICS.

Speeds up to full under the initial depth charge barrages
with soundings taken during explosions facilitated hugging the
bottom and clearing the area to deep water. Further evasion at
100 turns for at least two hours invariably left all opposition
behind.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE. [HANDWRITTEN: D]

None. [HANDWRITTEN: BUSHIPS]

It is considered that the design of the trim type controller
for trim pump, drain pump, turbo-blow, and hydraulic plant, is
both poor and antiquated. The unreliability of this controller
approaches a major defect in the trim pump installation, where it
will not stand up under frequent use and fails repeatedly.
This is essentially the same controller that was installed in
USS ARGON, and improved in the LAHCO by addition of a stainless
steel cover, which had to be left off to make the frequent repairs.
It could well be classed with the Model T Ford, and has the same
characteristic crank and choke. Its failures are not traceable to
inexperienced operators, as it fails as readily for old hands.

-13- [HANDWRITTEN: 6-XTRA] [HANDWRITTEN: 15]

— page 139 —
[HANDWRITTEN: TANG #4]
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
(CONT'D)

Its peak performance occurred on this patrol when its failure
put the trim pump out of commission while an enemy sound screen
pinged on poor. The silver soldering outfit for convenience is
now kept handy by. The following list of failures for this patrol
should help to illustrate the situation, and the need for replace-
ment by a CUTLER-HAMMER type as installed in LB boats:

August 7, 1944 Tripping out. Replaced carbon contacts
and loosened metal cover.
August 9, 1944 Tripping out. Reversing the metal cover
helped temporarily.
August 10,1944 Carbon holder broke. Silver soldered
holder and renewed carbons.
August 11,1944 Zero ground. The top of the overload coil
was found caked with carbon dust.
August 14, 1944 Tripping out. Adjusted holding coil.
August 17, 1944 Tripping out. Removed metal cover ent-
irely.
August 19, 1944 Tripping out. Tightened loose screws on
drum contact and carbon holders.
August 21, 1944 Tripping out. Carbons were found to be
making only 10% contact.
August 22, 1944 Carbon holder broke. Silver soldered
holder and renewed carbons.
August 26, 1944 Tripping out. Tightened shoes and ad-
justed carbon contacts.

[HANDWRITTEN: D]
[HANDWRITTEN: BUSHIPS]
[HANDWRITTEN: 2-XTRA]

(L) RADIO

Satisfactory.

(M) RADAR

- Not used
- No interference was noted.

It is believed that the transmitter failures of this partic-
ular SJ radar continue to be excessive, compared to other similar
units. It is serial number 11, probably constructed under pressure
and not up to par. As suggested previously by the Force Electro-
nic Officer, this transmitter should be replaced by
another. The part failures for this patrol are listed below

ITEM | DESCRIPTION | FAILURE REASON
350 | Resistor (R45) PPI, 1 meg, 2 watt | OVERLOAD Due to short.
422 | Resistor (R41) PPI, 56,000 ohms | OVERLOAD Due to short.
426 | Resistor (R42) PPI, .1 meg | OVERLOAD Due to short.
434 | Resistor (R43) PPI, .47 meg | OVERLOAD Due to short.
221 | Condenser (C7 ) Trans. .0068 mfd | Shorted.

-14-

[HANDWRITTEN: 16]

— page 140 —
(M) R.D.A.R (Cont'd)

ITEM | DESCRIPTION | FAILURE REASON
411 | Resistor (R17) Trans., 10,000 ohm | Low resistance due to
    |                               | age.
291 | Resistor (R13) Trans., .68 megs | Low resistance due to
    |                               | age.
434 | Resistor (R21) Trans., .47 megs | Low resistance due to
    |                               | age.

N o. of | DESCRIPTION | FAILURE REASON
FAILURE |             |
4       | Regulator tubes | Voltage surge.
2       | 5U4G tubes  | Old.
2       | 723A oscillator tube. | Broken.
6       | 6J5 tubes   | Soft.
5       | 6J5 tubes   | Soft.
2       | 6J5 tubes   | Soft.
2       | VR 150 tubes | Not known.
2       | 6SN7 tubes  | Poor emission
1       | 6V6 G.S. tubes | Not known.
1       | 6H6 rectifier tube | Loose pin.

The following list of contacts made by the APR equipment
is submitted. Although many of these contacts were in the aircraft
radar bands, we were apparently never detected by radar.

DATE | TIME | FREQUENCY | PULSE RATE | STRENGTH | POSITION PROBABLE
     |      |           |            |          | LOCATION
8-12-44 | 2135 | 260 mgs | 900 cps | 1 | 34-35N: NOJIMA SAKI
     |      |           |            |          | 140-20E:
8-12-44 | 2140 | 150 mgs | 900 cps | 3 | 34-35N NOJIMA SAKI
     |      |           |            |          | 140-20E
8-12-44 | 2200 | 99 mgs | 900 cps | 3-5 | 34-35N NOJIMA SAKI
     |      |           |            |          | 140-20E
8-13-44 | 0000 | 99 mgs | 600 cps | 5 | 34-35N NOJIMA SAKI
8-13-44 | 0010 | 99 mgs | 600 cps | 5 | 140-10E NOJIMA SAKI
     |      |           |            |          | 34-35N
     |      |           |            |          | 140-10E (TOKYO AREA)
8-13-44 | 0020 | 99 mgs | 600 cps | 2 | 34-35N
     |      |           |            |          | 140-10E
8-13-44 | 0030 | 99 mgs | 900 cps | 3 | 34-35N
     |      |           |            |          | 140-10E
8-13-44 | 0040 | 99 mgs | 600 cps | 2 | 34-35N
     |      |           |            |          | 140-10E
8-19-44 | 0040 | 99 mgs | 600 cps | 3 | 32-21N HACHIJO
     |      |           |            |          | 140-33E SHIMA
     |      |           |            |          | 18 mi.SE
8-19-44 | 0100 | 99 mgs | 600 cps | 3 | 32-21N SHIONO
     |      |           |            |          | Saki MISAKI
     |      |           |            |          | 2-3 Katori Saki MISAKI
8-19-44 | 0104 | 99 mgs | 600 cps | 2-3 | Katori Saki MISAKI

-15-
[HANDWRITTEN: 17]

— page 141 —
(M) RADAR

APR DETECTOR CONTACTS (Cont'd)

DATE       | TIME   | FREQUENCY | PULSE RATE | STRENGTH | POSITION           | PROBABLE LOCATION
||||||
8-20-44    | 0042   | 156 mcs   | 900 cps    | 5        | 6 mi.SE of         | Ship or Pl-
           |        |           |            |          | Kantori Saki       | ene.
8-20-44    |        | 256 mcs   | 900 cps    | 3-4      | 33-27N             |
           |        |           |            |          | 136-25E            | SHIONO MISAKI
8-20-44    | 0000 to|           |            |          |                    |
           | 0400   | 84 mcs    | 600 cps    | 1-5      | 33-18N             |
           |        | 99 mcs    | 900 cps    | 3        | 135-48E            | SHIONO MISAKI
           |        | 261 mcs   | 900 cps    | 3-4      |                    |
8-21-44    | 2030   | 82 mcs    | 900 cps    | 5        | 35-10N             |
           |        | 99 mcs    | 900 cps    | 2        | 135-48E            | SHIONO MISAKI
8-21-44    | 2330   | 81 mcs    | 900 cps    | 2-3      | 18 mi.S from       |
           |        |           |            |          | Miki Saki          | SHIONO MISAKI
8-24-44    | 1930   | 83 mcs    | 900 cps    | 3        | 33-10N             |
           |        |           |            |          | 135-31E            | SHIONO MISAKI
8-24-44    | 2000   | 99 mcs    | 600 cps    | 3        | 33-11N             |
           |        |           |            |          | 135-55E            | SHIONO MISAKI
8-24-44    | 2100   | 81 mcs    | 600 cps    | 5        | 28 mi.South        | SHIONO
           |        |           |            |          | Shiono Misaki      | MISAKI
8-24-44    | 2350   | 81 mcs    | 600 cps    | 3        | 6 mi.SW of         | SHIONO MISAKI
           |        |           |            |          | Miki Saki          |
8-25-44    | 2040   | 142 mcs   | 600 cps    | 2        | 22 mi.SW           | Ship or Plane
           |        | 242 mcs   | 900 cps    | 2        | of Miki Saki       |
           |        | 306 mcs   | 900 cps    | 2        |                    |

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

Sound conditions were fair. Of interest is the wide
frequency range of enemy pinging. It is considered quite probable
that many patrols previously considered to be listening only, are
actually obtaining an echo ranging on frequencies higher than can be
our receivers. A higher frequency receiver to determine this
alone would be valuable.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS.

Excellent layers were encountered south of HONSHU, generally
beginning between 100 and 150 feet.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY.

Good.

-16-
[HANDWRITTEN: 18]

— page 142 —
(Q) PERSONNEL
(a) Number of men on board during patrol - - - - 78
(b) Number of men qualified at start of patrol - - 47
(c) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - - - 65
(d) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol - 8
(e) Number of men advanced in rating during patrol -15

(R) MILES STEAMED, FUEL USED
Milway to area 2425 mi. 22500 gal.
In area 3350 mi. 36000 gal.
Area to Pearl 3325 mi. 53000 gal.

(S) DURATION
Days enroute to area 7
Days in area 17
Days enroute base 9
Days submerged 12

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel
0 7500 60 days Indefinite

(U) REMARKS.

(V) MARK EIGHTEEN TORPEDOES.
The routine followed was similar to that of other boats
except that it was not found necessary to interchange torpedoes
between tubes and racks.

-17-
[HANDWRITTEN: 19]

— page 143 —
[HANDWRITTEN: TRANE #4]

TIME | L.T. | SHIP CONTACTS | HOW
NO. D.TE | LONG. TYPE | INIT. EST. | CONTACTED REMARKS
| | R.NGL COURSE SPEED |
1 0905 | 34-36N Eng.Aft | | Periscope
8-10-44 | 137-50E Freighter | 12,000 110 9kts. |
2 1010 | 34-35N TANKER | 8,000 115 9kts. | Periscope attack
8-10-44 | 137-35E | | No. 1
3 8-11-44 1355 | 34-00N Eng.Aft. | 7,000 220 12kts | Periscope
| 136-18E Freighter | |
4 8-11-44 1715 | 33-53N Medium | 7,000 040 10kts | Periscope ATTACK
| 136-17E Tanker | | Nos.2&3
5 8-11-44 1505 | 34-12N 2 Med.Frs. | 8,000 020 6kts | Periscope
| 136-19E 2 Escorts | |
6 8-12-44 0654 | 34-42N Medium | 20 mi. 000° 8kts | Periscope
| 136-19E Smoke | |
7 8-13-44 0947 | 34-54N Medium | 20 mi. 300 12kts | Periscope Attack
| 140-16E Freighter | | No. 4
8 8-20-44 0655 | 33-37N Eng.Aft.Fr. | 8,000 218 8kts | Periscope
| 136-01E 2 Escorts | |
9 8-21-44 1039 | 33-22N 1 Ship | 10,000 100 8kts | Periscope
| 135-37E 2 Escorts | |
10 8-21-44 1243 | 33-27N 1 Eng.Aft.Fr. | 8,000 285 8kts | Periscope Attack
| 135-34E 2 Escorts | | No. 5
11 8-21-44 0033 | 33-30N 1 Med.Freighter | 8,000 290 8kts | SJ Radar Attack
| 135-29E 3 Escorts | | No. 6
12 8-22-44 0815 | 34-02N Gun Boat | 6,400 Anchored 0 | Periscope
| 136-21E | |
13 8-23-44 0923 | 34-36N 3 Freighters | 10,000 280 9kts | Periscope
| 137-49E 3 Escorts | |
14 8-23-44 1017 | 34-37N Old Type | 8,000 Various 15kts. | Periscope Attack
| 137-50E DD | | No. 7
15 8-23-44 0952 | 34-37N Naval Trans. | 13,000 95 8kts | Periscope
| 137-50E 4 Escorts | |
16 8-24-44 1225 | 33-30N Diesel Tanker | 12,000 093 9kts | Periscope
| 136-21E 1 Escort | |
17 8-24-44 2342 | 33-30N 2 Freighters | 12,000 315 10kts | Periscope
| 136-22E 7 Escorts | |
18 8-24-44 1135 | 33-40N | 1,100 145 12kts | Sight
| 136-16E Submarine | |
19 8-25-44 1743 | 33-54N | 4,800 015 8kts | Periscope Attacks
| 136-16E 2 Freighters | | No. 8&9
20 8-25-44 | 33-55N 1 Diesel Tanker | 8,000 033 8kts | Periscope
| 136-18E 5 Escorts | |

[HANDWRITTEN: I-XTRA.]

-18-

[HANDWRITTEN: 20]

— page 144 —
[HANDWRITTEN: PATROLING #3]

SMALL CRAFT CONTACTS
THE L.T. INIT. EST. HOW REMARKS
NO. DATE LONG. TYPE RANGE COURSE SPEED CONTACTED
0457
1 8-10-44 34-36N PC Boat
137-47E 2 Masts 12,000 Various 12kts. Periscope

0935
2 8-10-44 34-35N Patrol 6,000 Various 12kts. Periscope
137-42E

0745
3 8-11-44 33-56N Patrol 7,000 Various 10kts. Periscope
136-19E

0853
4 8-11-44 33-57N Fishing
136-19E Boat 5,000 160 7kts Periscope

0736
5 8-12-44 33-43N Various
139-32E Patrol 6,000 7kts Periscope

1135
6 8-12-44 33-45N Patrol 6,000 090 6kts. Periscope
139-48E

1505
7 8-12-44 33-47N Patrol 6,000 Various 8kts. Periscope
139-54E

0717
8 8-13-44 34-59N Sampans 8,000 Various 6kts. Periscope
140-23E Patrol

1028
9 8-13-44 34-56N Fishing 12,000 280 6kts. Periscope
140-20E Patrol

1133
10 8-13-44 34-56N Sampans 8,000 240 6kts. Periscope
140-20E Patrols

1400
11 8-13-44 34-58N Fishing 10,000 293 5kts Periscope
140-22E Boat Gun Attack

0424
12 8-14-44 33-50N Yacht 8,000 Various Various Periscope No.1
140-36E Patrol

0450
13 8-20-44 33-50N Sampan 10,000 Stopped 5kts. Periscope
136-10E Fishing

0500
14 8-20-44 33-50N Fishing 15,000 Stopped 5kts. Periscope
136-10E Sampan(2)

0730
15 8-23-44 34-35N Sailboat 15,000 320 4kts. Periscope
137-50E

0923
16 8-23-44 34-37N PG Boat 800 270 6kts. Periscope
137-50E

0952
17 8-24-44 33-30N 2 Patrol 8,000 355 10kts. Periscope
135-21E Boats

1020
18 8-24-44 33-30N Trawler 2,300 265 8kts. Periscope
135-21E

19 8-25-44 33-54N Patrols 4,000 Various 6kts. Periscope
136-13E

1002
20 8-25-44 33-54N Sampans Various Various 5kts. Periscope
136-13E

1429
21 8-25-44 33-54N 2 Patrols 10,000 050 8kts Periscope
136-13E

1530
22 8-25-44 33-54N 2 Fishing Boats
136-13E 2 Patrols 5,000 Various 6kts. Periscope

-19- [HANDWRITTEN: I-XRA-]
[HANDWRITTEN: 21]

— page 145 —
CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN: TANG #4]
AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (REVISED)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CONTACT NUMBER | | | | | | | |
| S Date | 8/8/44 | 8/8/44 | 8/10/44 | 8/10/44 | 8/11/44 | 8/12/44 | 8/12/44 |
| U Time (Zone) -9 | 0950 | 1410 | 0850 | 1025 | 1914 | 1006 | 1355 |
| B Position: | Lat. 33-32N Long. 142-15E | Lat. 32-30N Long. 141-10E | Lat. 34-30N Long. 137-50E | Lat. 34-33N Long. 137-55E | Lat. 33-42N Long. 136-28E | Lat. 32-50N Long. 129-50E | Lat. 32-51N Long. 139-47 |
| M Speed | 8-½ | 11 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| A Course | 273 | 273 | 000 | 050 | 140 | 090 | 240 |
| R Trim | Surf | Surf | Per | Per | Per | Per | Per |
| I Minutes Since Last No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| N SD Radar Search | Search | Search | Search | Search | Search | Search | Search |
| E | | | | | | | |
| A Number | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| I Type | Betty | 2Eng. Bomb. | 2Eng. Bomb. | 2Eng. Bomb. | Float | 2Eng. Bomb. | Lily |
| R | | | | | | | |
| C Probable Mission | Pat. | Pat. | ESC. | ESC. | H. | Pat. | Pat. |
| R How Contacted | Lookout | Sight | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per. |
| A Initial Range | 8mi. | 10mi. | 6mi. | 4 mi. | 4mi. | 12mi. | 16mi. |
| F Elevation Angle | 10 | 8 | 3 | 10 | 4 | 10 | 4 |
| T Range & Relative | Bearing of Plane | When It Detected | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND |
| | S/M | (State | | | | | | | |
| C Sea: (Beaufort) | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| O (Direction (Rel) | 012 | 350 | 246 | 196 | 029 | 090 | 090 |
| N Visibility (Miles) | 30 | 30 | 20 | 20 | 10 | 20 | Over 30 |
| D (Height in | | | | | | | |
| I Clouds (Ft. | 20,000 | 20,000 | 15000 | 15000 | 20000 | 18000 | 25000 |
| T (Forecast | .8 | .5 | .4 | .4 | .1 | .6 | .3 |
| I (Bearing (Rel) | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY |
| O Moon: (Angle | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY |
| N (Percent | | | | | | | |
| S Illum. | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY |

[HANDWRITTEN: I-XTRA]
-20-
[HANDWRITTEN: 22]

— page 146 —
CONFIDENTIALL
[HANDWRITTEN: TANG #4]
AIRCRAFT CONT. CTS (REVISED)

CONT. CT NUMBER | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14
D to | 8/12/44 | 8/13/44 | 8/13/44 | 8/13/44 | 8/13/44 | 8/14/44 | 8/14/44
S T L (Zone) | All -9 | 1622 | 0935 | 1140 | 1417 | 1620 | 1002 | 1455
U Position: Lat. | 33-46N | 34-53N | 34-54N | 35-01N | 35-04N | 33-41N | 33-36N
Long. | 139-30E | 140-12E | 140-22E | 140-51E | 140-50E | 140-27E | 140-32E
B Speed | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4
A Course | 320 | 290 | 200 | 030 | 230 | 000 | 340
R T V | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per.
I Minutes Since Last No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No
N SD Radar Search | Search | Search | Search | Search | Search | Search | Search
E | | | | | | |
Number | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1
Type | --- | 2Eng | 2Eng | Betty | Bomb. | --- | Bomb.
R Probable Mission Pat. | Pat. | Esc. | Pat. | Pat. | Pat. | Pat. | Pat.
C How Contacted | Per | Per | Per | Per | Per | Per | Per
A Initial Range | 10mi | 6mi. | 15mi. | 16mi. | 15mi. | 15mi. | 8mi.
F Elevation Angle | --- | 1 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3
T R & R Relative ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND
S Bearing of | | | | | | |
When It Detected | | | | | | |
S/M | | | | | | |

C Sea: (Beaufort) | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1
O Direction (Rel) | --- | 260 | 350 | 25 | 20 | Over 30 | 25
N Visibility (Miles) | --- | Over 30 | 30 | 25 | 20 | Over 30 | 25
D Height in | | | | | | |
I Clouds: Ft. | --- | 15000 | 16000 | 9000 | 6000 | 10000 | 7000
T Percent | | | | | | |
I Overcast | --- | .4 | .4 | .2 | .1 | .5 | .3
O | | | | | | |
N | | | | | | |
S Moon: (Bearing (Rel)) | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY
(Angle) | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY
(Percent | | | | | | |
Illum.) | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY

Type of S/M Camouflage on this patrol LIGHT GREY.

[HANDWRITTEN: I-XTRA-] -21-
[HANDWRITTEN: 23]

— page 147 —
CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN: TANE#4]

AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (REVISED)

| NUMBER | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Date | 3/14/44 | 3/16/44 | 3/17/44 | 3/17/44 | 3/18/44 | 3/20/44 | 3/21/44 |
| S Time (Zone) | All -9 | 2325 | 1350 | 0725 | 1326 | 1717 | 0910 |
| U Position: Lat. | 33-40N | 32-27N | 32-05N | 31-45N | 33-55N | 33-20N |
| B Long | 140-36E | 141-03E | 143-50E | 144-05E | 143-30E | 135-39E |
| M Speed | 18 | 16 | 10 | 12 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| A Course | 160 | 027 | 189 | 201 | 277 | 090 | 305 |
| R Type | Surf. | Surf. | Surf. | Surf. | Surf. | Per. | Per. |
| I Minutes Since Last No | No | No | SD | SD | No | No | SD |
| N SD Radar Search | Search | Search | Manned | MANNED | Manned | Search | Search |
| E | Number | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Type | --- | Mavis | --- | --- | Mavis | Dave | Float |
| I Probable Mission | Pat. | Pat. | Pat. | Pat. | Pat. | H. | Pat. |
| R How Contacted | LKOUT | LKOUT | LKOUT | LKOUT | TER | TER | TER |
| C Initial Range | --- | 5mi. | 15mi. | 20mi. | 10mi. | 5mi. | 12mi. |
| R Elevation | --- | 20 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 10 | 4 |
| A Range & Relative ND | --- | 6mi. | ND | ND | 4mi. | 4mi. | ND |
| F Bearing of Plane | --- | 135 | --- | --- | --- | 155 | --- |
| T When it Detected | | | | | | | |
| S/M | C (State (Beau | | | | | | | |
| O fort)) | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| N (Direction (Rel)) | --- | 015 | 050 | 292 | 030 | 030 | 045 |
| D Visibility (Miles) | 2 | 30 | 30 | Over 30 | Over 30 | 15 | 12 |
| I Clouds: (Height in | | | | | | | |
| T Ft. | 5000 | 15000 | 4000 | 20000 | 15000 | 10000 | 10000 |
| I (Percent | .2 | .4 | .1 | .2 | .3 | .8 | .1 |
| O Overcast | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| N Moon: (Bearing (Rel)) | NONE | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY |
| S (Angle | --- | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY |
| (Percent | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Illum | --- | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY | DAY |

Type of S/M Camouflage on this patrol LIGHT GREY.

[HANDWRITTEN: I-XTRA] [HANDWRITTEN: -22-]

[HANDWRITTEN: .24]

— page 148 —
CONFIDENTIAL
[HANDWRITTEN: TANG #4]
AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (REVISED)

CONTACT NUMBER | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28
Date | 8/23/44 | 8/23/44 | 8/23/44 | 8/23/44 | 8/23/44 | 8/25/44 | 8/25/44
S Time (Zone) | 0615 | 0710 | 0730 | 1010 | 1013 | 1025 | 1118
U Position: Lat. | 34°-35' | 34°-35' | 34°-35' | 34°-37' | 34°-37' | 33°-54' | 33°-54'
B | Lon. | 137°-50' | 137°-50' | 137°-50' | 137°-49' | 136°-13' | 136°-13'
M Speed | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2
A Course | 000°(T) | 322°(T) | 322°(T) | 090 | 090 | 040 | 200
R Trim | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per. | Per.
I Minutes Since Last | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
N SD Radar Search | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
E

Number | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2
A Type | Dave | Kate | Kate | Nell | Nell | Dave | Bombers
I Probable Mission | Pat. | T | Pat. | T | T | Pat. | Pat.
R How Contacted | Per | Per | Per | Per | Per | Per | Per
C Initial Range | 10mi. | 6mi. | 6mi. | 7mi. | 7mi. | 4mi. | 10mi.
R Elevation Angle | 30° | 50° | 50° | 30° | 30° | 150 | 30°
F Range & Relative ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND | ND
F Bearing of Plane
T When It Detected
S/M | (State | (Beau- | fort) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3
C Direction (Rel) | 090 | 090 | 090 | 090 | 090 | 140 | 140
O Visibility (Miles) | 12mi. | 12mi. | 12mi. | 12mi. | 12mi. | 12mi. | 12mi.
N Height in Ft. | 3000Yds | 3000Yds | 3000Yds | 3000Yds | 3000Yds | 3000Yds | 3000
D Clouds: (Percent | 7 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4
I | Overcast | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y
T Moon: (Bearing (Rel) | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y
I | Percent | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y
O | Illum. | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y | D.Y
N
S

Type of S/M Camouflage on this patrol | LIGHT GREY

-23-
[HANDWRITTEN: 25]

— page 149 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306)
TIME: 1010 (-9)

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1
DATE: 8-10-44

PATROL NO. FOUR
LAT: 34-35N
LONG: 137-35E

TARGET DATA-DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 Medium Tanker, 5000 tons.

Ship Sunk: None.

Target Data: Draft: 20' Course: 115 Speed: 9 Range: 1200

Own Data: Course: 050 Speed: 3 Depth: 63' Angle: 0

Type Attack: Day Submerged.

-24-
[HANDWRITTEN: 26]

— page 150 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #1
| | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tube No. | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Track Angle | 108S | 112S | 114S |
| Gyro Angle | 355 | 359 | 001 |
| Depth Set | 6' | 6' | 6' |
| Hit or Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss |
| Erratic | No | No | No |
| Mk. Torpedo | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Serial No. | 61832 | 41159 | 49363 |
| Mk. Exploder | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4 |
| Serial No. | 7769 | 3288 | 8341 |
| Actuation | -- | -- | -- |
| Mk. Warhead | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1 |
| Serial No. | 11304 | 9455 | 12191 |
| Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX |
| Firing Interval | 13 sec. | 10 sec. | |
| Type Spread | Divergent point of aim. | | |
| Sea Conditions | Flat calm. | | |
| Overhaul Activity | Midway | | |

-25-

[HANDWRITTEN: 27]

— page 151 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306)
TIME: 1715 (-9)
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2
DATE: 8-11-44
PATROL NO. FOUR
LAT: 34-12N
LONG:136-19E

TARGET DATA-DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 Medium freighter, BIYO MARU Class,
(EC) 5425 tons.

Ship Sunk: 1 Medium freighter, 5425 tons.

Damage Determined by: Observed one torpedo hit, breaking ship in
two.

Target Data: Draft: 26' Course: 020 Speed: 6 Range: 1800

Own Data: Course: 290 Speed: 2 Depth: 64' Angle: 1° Dive.

Type Attack: Day submerged.

-26-
[HANDWRITTEN: 28]

— page 152 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #2

Tube No.        1       2       3
Track Angle     100S    102S    104S
Gyro Angle      012     013     015
Depth Set       6'      6'      6'
Hit or Miss     Hit     Miss    Miss
Erratic         No      No      No
Mk. Torpedo     23      23      23
Serial No.      49437   61741   61764
Mk. Exploder    6-4     6-4     6-4
Serial No.      933     17938   2158
Actuation       Contact --      --
Mk. Warhead     16-1    16-1    16-1
Serial No.      13055   12773   12828
Explosive       TPX     TPX     TPX
Firing Interval         8 sec.  8 sec.
Type Spread             Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions          Flat calm
Overhaul Activity       Midway

-27-

[HANDWRITTEN: 29]

— page 153 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306)
TIME: 1715 (-9)
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3
DATE: 8-11-44
PATROL NO. FOUR
LAT: 34-12N
LONG:136-19E

TARGET DATA-DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 Medium freighter, AKASI MARU Class,
(EU) 3057 - 3461 tons.

Ship Damaged: 1 Medium freighter, 4000 tons.

Damage Determined by: Recorded two timed hits and heard
characteristic breaking up noises on last
observed target bearing.

Target Data: Draft: 20' Course: 020 Speed: 6 Range: 1900

Own Data: Course: 290 Speed; 2 Depth: 64' Angle: 1° Rise

Type Attack: Day submerged.

-28-
[HANDWRITTEN: 30]

— page 154 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #3

Tube No. | 4 | 5 | 6
Track Angle | 91S | 90S | 90S
Gyro Angle | 002 | 000 | 001
Depth Set | 6' | 6' | 6'
Hit or Miss | Hit | Hit | Miss
Erratic | No | No | No
Mk. Torpedo | 23 | 23 | 23
Serial No. | 61680 | 53013 | 41561
Mk. Exploder | 6-4 | 6-4 | 6-4
Serial No. | 1542 | 343 | 7162
Actuation | Contact | Contact | --
Mk. Warhead | 16-1 | 16-1 | 16-1
Serial No. | 13863 | 13082 | 12900
Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX
Firing Interval | | 8 sec. | | 8 sec.
Type Spread | Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions | Flat calm
Overhaul Activity | Midway

-29-

[HANDWRITTEN: 31]

— page 155 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4 PATROL NO. FOUR
TIME: 1108 (-9) DATE: 8-20-44 LAT: 33-37N
LONG:136-01E

Description of Target: Medium freighter, engines aft.

Ship Sunk: None.

Target Data: Draft: 18' Course: 218 Speed: 8 Range: 900

Own Data: Course: 309 Speed: 3 Depth: 64' Angle: 0

Type Attack: Day submerged.

-30-

[HANDWRITTEN: 32]

— page 156 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #4

Tube No.                               5                               6
Track Angle                            118P                            128F
Gyro Angle                             332                             322
Depth Set                              6'                              6'
Hit or Miss                            Miss                            Miss
Erratic                                No                              *Yes
Mk. Torpedo                            23                              23
Serial No.                             528 26                          52840
Mk. Exploder                           6-4                             6-4
Serial No.                             17360                           2471
Actuation                              --                              --
Mk. Warhead                            16-1                            16-1
Serial No.                             13170                           3500
Explosive                              TPX                             TPX
Firing Interval                                                        10 sec.
Type Spread                                                            Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions                                                         Flat calm
Overhaul Activity                      Midway

*Torpedo did not run.

                                       -31-

[HANDWRITTEN: 33]

— page 157 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #5
Tube No. | 7 | 8 | 9
Track Angle | 104P | 107P | 106P
Gyro Angle | 161 | 158 | 160
Depth Set | 6' | 6' | 6'
Hit or Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss
Erratic | No | No | No
Mk. Torpedo | 18-1 | 18-1 | 18-1
Serial No. | 54308 | 54311 | 54506
Mk. Exploder | 8-5 | 8-5 | 8-5
Serial No. | 8093 W | 8330 | 8406
Actuation | -- | -- | --
Mk. Warhead | 18-1 | 18 | 18
Serial No. | 2209 | 2184 | 2249
Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX
Firing Interval | | 9 sec. | 14 sec.
Type Spread | | Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions | | Flat calm.
Overhaul Activity | | Midway

-33-

[HANDWRITTEN: 35]

— page 158 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306)
TI: 014 (-9)

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6
DATE: 8-22-44

PATROL NO. FOUR
LAT: 34-02N
LONG:136-21E

TARGET DATA-DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 Patrol Gun Boat, 1500 tons standard
displacement.

Ship Sunk: Patrol Gun Boat, 1500 tons.

Damage Determined by: Observed ship blow up.

Target Data: Draft: 6' *Course: 150 Speed: 0 Range: 950

Own Data: Course:[HANDWRITTEN: 060] Speed: [HANDWRITTEN: 0] Depth: surf Angle: 0
[HANDWRITTEN: 240]

Type Attack: Night surface.

*Anchored.

[HANDWRITTEN: -34-]

[HANDWRITTEN: 36]

— page 159 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #6
Tube No. | 7 | 8 | 5 | 6
Track Angle | 90P | 90P | 90P | 90P
Gyro Angle | 176 | 172 | 358 | 001
Depth Set | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0
Hit or Miss | Miss | Miss | Miss | Hit
Erratic | *Yes | *Yes | *Yes | No
Mk. Torpedo | 18-1 | 18-1 | 23 | 23
Serial No. | 54396 | 53736 | 41253 | 41664
Mk. Exploder | 8-5 | 8-5 | 6-5 | 6-4
Serial No. | 8244 | 8309 W | 6217 | 8026
Actuation | -- | -- | -- | Contact
Mk. Warhead | 18 | 18-1 | 16-1 | 16
Serial No. | 2328 | 2189 | 11316 | 17214
Explosive | TPX | TPX | TPX | TPX
Firing Interval | 1 Min. 32Sec. | 14 Min. 20sec. | 1 Min. 35sec.
Type Spread | Single shots.
Sea Conditions | Flat calm.
Overhaul Activity | Midway

*7 Sinker hit bottom after 500 Yd. run.
*8 Phosphorascent wake barely discernible
   apparently ran deep.
*5 Took 30 Yd. jog to left before settling
   on course.

-35-
[HANDWRITTEN: 37]

— page 160 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306)
TIME: 1118 (-9)

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 7
DATE: 8-23-44

PATROL NO. FOUR
LAT: 34-37N
LONG:137-50E

TARGET DATA-DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: Large Naval Transport.

Ship Sunk: Large Naval Transport.
Gross Tonnage about 10,000
Estimated standard displacement 15,000.

Damage Determined by: Observed two hits and enemy sink.

Target Data: Draft: 26' Course: 095 Speed: 3½ Range: 800

Own Data: Course: 358 Speed: 3 Depth: 64' Angle: 0

Type Attack: Day submerged.

-36-

[HANDWRITTEN: 38]

— page 161 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #7

| Tube No.          | 1         | 2         | 3         |
| :| :| :| :|
| Track Angle       | 104S      | 108S      | 110S      |
| Gyro Angle        | 023       | 027       | 029       |
| Depth Set         | 6'        | 6'        | 6'        |
| Hit or Miss       | Hit       | Miss      | Hit       |
| Erratic           | No        | No        | No        |
| Mk. Torpedo       | 23        | 23        | 23        |
| Serial No.        | 5292      | 617 57    | 41054     |
| Mk. Exploder      | 6-4       | 6-4       | 6-4       |
| Serial No.        | 7511      | 8079      | 7362      |
| Actuation         | Contact   | --        | Contact   |
| Mk. Warhead       | 16-1      | 16-1      | 16-1      |
| Serial No.        | 14014     | 17188     | 12859     |
| Explosive         | TPX       | TPX       | TPX       |
| Firing Interval   |           | 9 sec.    | 11 sec.   |
| Type Spread       | Divergent point of aim.             |
| Sea Conditions    | Flat calm                           |
| Overhaul Activity | Midway                              |

-37-
[HANDWRITTEN: 39]

— page 162 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306)
TIME: 1805 (-9)

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 8
DATE: 8-25-44

PATROL NO. FOUR
LAT: 33-55N
LONG: 136-18E

TARGET DATA-DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: 1 Medium Diesel Tanker, 5,000 tons

Ship Sunk: 1 Medium Diesel Tanker, 5,000 tons.

Damage Determined by: Observed two hits disintegrate ship
and pieces sink.

Target Data: Draft: 24' Course: 033 Speed: 8 Range: 600

Own Data: Course: 225 Speed: 3 Depth: 64' Angle: 0

Type Attack: Day submerged.

-38-

[HANDWRITTEN: 40]

— page 163 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #8

Tube No.                               7                               8
Track Angle                            103P                            110F
Gyro Angle                             245                             238
Depth Set                              6'                              6'
Hit or Miss                            Hit                             Hit
Erratic                                No                              No
Mk. Torpedo                            18-1                            18-1
Serial No.                             54760                           54546
Mk. Exploder                           8-5                             8-5
Serial No.                             8516                            8315
Actuation                              Contact                         Contact
Mk. Warhead                            18                              18-1
Serial No.                             2141                            2361
Explosive                              TPX                             TPX
Firing Interval                        10 Sec.
Type Spread                            Divergent point of aim.
Sea Conditions                         Flat calm
Overhaul Activity                      Midway

                                       -39-

[HANDWRITTEN: 41]

— page 164 —
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 9 PATROL NO. FOUR
TIME: 1805 (-9) DATE: 8-25-44 LAT: 33-55N
                                                                LONG: 136-18E

TARGET DATA-DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description of Target: Three Patrol vessels on line of bearing

Ship Sunk: KUSHIRO MARU class escort vessel (PCE), (EU), 600 tons
                                                                standard displacement.

Damage determined by: Observed torpedo explosion blow ship to
                                                                pieces.

Target Data: Draft: 8' Course: 033 Speed: 8 Range: 1800

Own Data: Course: 225 Speed: 3 Depth: 64' Angle: 0

Type Attack: Day submerged.

                                                                -40-

— page 165 —
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA #9

Tube No.                               9
Track angle                            116P
Gyro angle                             230
Depth Set                              6'
Hit or Mis.                            Hit
Erratic                                No
Mk. Torpedo                            18-1
Serial No.                             54685
Mk. Exploder                           8-5
Serial No.                             8500
Actuation                              Contact
Mk. Warhead                            18
Serial No.                             2201
Explosive                              TPX
Sea Conditions                         Flat calm
Overhaul activity                      Midway

-41-

— page 166 —
U.S. TANG (SS 306)
TIME: 1832(-9)

GUN ATTACK NO. 1
DATE: 8-14-44

PATROL NO. FOUR
LAT: 33-03N
LONG:140-35E

TARGET DATA-DAMAGE INFLICTED

Damaged: Patrol Yatcht

Damage determined by: Observed hits

DETAILS OF ACTION

Type gun used: 4"/50 cal.

Ammunition expended: 60 rounds of H.E.
28 rounds of Common

Effectiveness of fire: Eight sure hits

Average range: 4500 to 7000

-42-

— page 167 —
FB5-43/A16-3
Serial ( 0117 )
CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. TANG (SS306)
ltr,A16-3/Serial 013
of 3 September, 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY THREE.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TEN.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306), Report of FOURTH War Patrol,
Comments on.

1. The FOURTH War Patrol of the U.S.S. TANG was of
thirty three days' duration, seventeen of which were spent in
the assigned areas. The report is excellently written and
should be of great value to submarines which patrol this
general area, the coastal waters of JAPAN. The courses of
action taken, the reasons therefor, and general conduct of
this patrol reveal submarine operations of the highest order.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 DAYLIGHT, SUBMERGED
10 AUGUST 1944

Three torpedoes fired at a tanker at 1100 yards' range and
with excellent firing data resulted in no hits and no explosions
on the beach 3,000 yards away. With depth of water of only eighty
feet, it is possible that initial dive of Mk. 23 torpedoes caused
them to strike bottom.

TORPEDO ATTACKS NO.2 & NO. 3 DAYLIGHT, SUBMERGED
11 AUGUST 1944

Position was attained 1,700 yards on the beam of two
freighters in column accompanied by a gunboat and a smaller es-
cort. Three torpedoes were fired at the first ship and a similar
salvo at the second ship. After a quick look showed the gunboat
proceeding rapidly and closely across the stern, one hit was
observed amidships in the first target, resulting in a
disintegrating explosion. Two timed hits were heard in the
second target as TANG took evasive action. The counter-attack

- 1 -
SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY THREE
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
5 September 1944.

— page 168 —
FB5-43/A16-3
Serial ( 0117 )
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject:

is described as "tooth-shaking."

GUN ATTACK NO. 1 - 14 AUGUST 1944

A patrol yacht was attacked with four-inch gun. Twenty
MM fire was returned, forcing TANG to keep range greater than
4,500 yards. Eight hits were made, demolishing the deck house
aft and exploding in his side and upper works.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4, DAYLIGHT SUBMERGED
20 AUGUST 1944

Of two torpedoes fired at a medium freighter, one missed
astern and the other didn't run.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5 DAYLIGHT, SUBMERGED.
21 AUGUST 1944

No hits were obtained when three Mk.18 torpedoes were fired
at a medium freighter at 1,650 yards range. Deep running of
torpedoes is considered most probable cause for misses.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 6 NIGHT-SURFACE
22 AUGUST 1944

A patrol vessel of about 1,500 tons was found at anchor in
20 fathoms of water; the night was black. This vessel was
recognized as one which had previously depth charged TANG.
Two Mk. 18 torpedoes from stern tubes produced no results so
bow tubes were brought to bear and two Mk. 23's fired. The
first took a jog to the left and missed astern, but the second
hit the point of aim and the target sank after a spectacular
explosion.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO.7 DAYLIGHT, SUBMERGED
23 AUGUST 1944

Shortly after a sweep by AS vessels and aircraft a large
transport accompanied by a PC or DE ahead, an SC on his bow,

- 2 -
[HANDWRITTEN: 46]SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY THREE
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
5 September 1944.
U.S.S. TANG (SS306), Report of FOURTH War Patrol,
Comments on.

— page 170 —
FC5-4/A16-3

SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
11 September 1944.

Serial 0345

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
U.S.S. TANG Report of
Fourth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. TANG - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander
Submarine Division FORTY-THREE, and with particular emphasis in
paragraph three (3).

2. The evasion tactics employed by the Commanding Officer
of the TANG (paragraph J), allowed penetration of shoal water for at-
tacks on coastwise and anchored shipping with excellent results. As
the wide open sea areas diminish by reason of further U.S. Naval
conquest, it is incumbent upon all submariners to develop the tactics
of attack and evasion in shoal water. The tactics used in this patrol
point the way. The Commanding Officer stated verbally that in his
opinion enemy vessels hugging the coast were cramped in their zig-zag
tactics, and therefore resorted to frequent changes of speed.

3. The intelligence data gathered and presented in this
report is a model of lucidity.

4. Again, it is the pleasure of Commander Submarine
Squadron FOUR to congratulate this outstanding ship on an outstand-
ing performance against the enemy.

[SIGNATURE: C. F. Erck]
C. F. ERCK.

— page 171 —
F-4 9 03030
hch
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(16)
Serial 01989
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
15 September 1944.
[HANDWRITTEN: R-west]
[HANDWRITTEN: 11-18-44]

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
TANG Report of
Fourth War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC NO. 522
U.S.S. TANG - FOURTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.
(31 July to 3 September 1944).

1. The fourth war patrol of the TANG was conducted off the
Coast of Honshu in the Japanese Empire waters.

2. The TANG, continuing her illustrious record, closed the
coastline and sought out enemy traffic with daring and skill. She en-
countered first rate enemy anti-submarine forces and underwent intense
depth charging. Due to expert evasive tactics, however, she avoided
any serious damage and made nine aggressive attacks on the elusive
coastal traffic.

3. This patrol is designated as "Successful" for Combat
Insignia award.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratu-
lates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this fourth con-
secutive, aggressive, and highly successful patrol. During these four
patrols the TANG has built up the outstanding record of 16 ships sunk
for a total tonnage of 120,469 tons, and one 4,000 ton ship damaged.
In addition to having rescued 22 downed aviators and damaged one small
craft by gun fire. The TANG is credited with having inflicted the
following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

S U N K

1 - Medium AK (BIYO MARU Type)(LC) - 5,400 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Patrol Gun Boat (EU) - 1,500 tons (Attack No. 6)
1 - Large Naval Transport (EU) - 10,000 tons (Attack No. 7)
1 - Medium AO (EU) - 5,000 tons (Attack No. 8)
1 - Escort Vessel (KOSHIRO MARU Type) - 600 tons (Attack No. 9)
(EU)
TOTAL SUNK 22,500 tons

[STAMP: FILMED]
- 1 -
EXTRA - ORIGINAL
SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

— page 172 —
1
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET hch
FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(16)
Serial 019 Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
15 September 1944.
CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
TANG Report of DESTROYED PRIOR TO
Fourth War Patrol. ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 522.
U.S.S. TANG - FOURTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.
(31 July to 3 September 1944)

— page 174 —
DECLASSIFIED

REPORT OF WAR PATROL NUMBER FIVE
U.S.S. TANG (SS306)

(A) PROLOGUE:

Returned from 4th Patrol on 3 September, 1944 and conducted normal
refit at the U.S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H. In order to
take part in the coming Formosa raid and to be in a position inside
the Formosa Straits to intercept Japanese reinforcements for the
coming Philippine Campaign, training and loading were completed four
days in advance of schedule. Loaded 24 Mark 18 Mod 1 torpedoes already
prepared for the U.S.S. TALOR, who had been delayed.

(B) NARRATIVE:
24 September 1944

1300 Departed for Formosa Strait via Midway, proceeding at full power
to this last fueling base.

27 September 1944

0700 Moored at Submarine Base, Midway and received their usual good
welcome and services. With fuel in every available corner,
departed at noon for our patrol area. Proceeding at two engine
speed.

27 September 1944 - 5 October 1944:
(East Longitude Date)

Routine training enroute to station showed gratifying results.
Received information that the TRIGGER - SUNFISH pack were looking for
a small Japanese ship whose last reported position plotted directly
on our track. We were apparently ahead of these boats which
left Pearl a few hours ahead of us and had proceeded via Saipan,
so felt we stood a good chance of finding him first.

6 October 1944:

Ran into threatening weather which quickly developed into a
full-fledged typhoon. Continued on the surface still in hopes
of intercepting the enemy, but soon found ourselves on the
inside semicircle, with seas and wind which would prohibit
any sort of attack if he were located. The barometer dropped
to 27.80, the waves broke over the raised periscope, and even
had small waves on their backs. It was a sight such as none
of us had witnessed before. Needless to say, our bridge watch
had been secured and the ship closed up, running on the battery.

-1-

— page 175 —
It was frankly considered too late to dive as we often hung at
60° by the bubble inclinometer in the control room. What the
momentary extra loss of stability on diving, especially if the
ballast tanks flooded unevenly, would have brought about is still
a question in our minds.

7 October 1944:
Having worked through to the safe side and with slowly moderating
sea, proceeded toward Formosa Straits. Our first fix showed us
to be 60 miles in a direction opposite to that which we
steered while pulling clear of the storm.

8 October - 9 October 1944:
As the sea permitted went to three-engine speed. Dived for one
plane which we are quite sure could flap its wings however.

10 October 1944:
With the mountains of Formosa in view dead ahead from noon on and
the top of Yonakuni Shima rising on our starboard hand, went to
four-engine speed so as to pass into the Strait shortly after dark.
About 2100 made contact with and tracked a small craft which
turned out to be a patrol vessel when observed from 5,000 yards.
Left him astern and continued on past Kirun around the northern
tip of Formosa inside Kahei Sho and into our area.

11 October 1944:

ATTACK NO. 1

0400
Then about four miles west of Puki Kaku made radar contact at 17,000
yards on a ship moving up the coast from Pekusa Point. Tracked
him at 14 knots making us at first suspicious of his character, but
as the range closed he was observed to be a large modern diesel
freighter heavily loaded presenting a low silhouette. Moved on
to his track and dived for one of those never failed crack-of-dawn
attacks. Maneuvered for an 800 yard shot as he came by and fired
three Mark 18 Mod. 1 bow torpedoes, spread to cover his length. The
first two hit exactly as aimed sinking this overloaded ship immed-
iately. Surfaced as soon as the smoke had cleared away to find no
survivors and only wreckage and several empty ammunition craft half
swamped, drifting about in the water. Proceeded at full power
down the coast for a submerged patrol during the day well clear
of the opposition which would arrive shortly. Dived for Pekusa Point
where a north or south bound ship could be spotted coming in
either direction, permitting a submerged attack if necessary, but

- 2 -

— page 176 —
preferably tracking until dark as those shallow waters
any ordinary evasion tactics. The west coast of Formosa is
literally covered with airfields, and planes were in sight on
practically every periscope observation.

1000 A strong northerly wind sprang up against the prevailing
current which quickly whipped the surface into a sufficiently
severe chop to make depth control difficult. This same chop,
however, was soon to stand us in good stead for at noon
masts of another north bound freighter were sighted down the coast.
He was running inside the 10 fathom curve zigging frequently.
Though we could reach his track by moving in at high speed and
have some battery left for evasion, our original plan to track-
ing till dark seemed more prudent under the circumstances.
There then developed our longest submerged tracking problem in
which we moved with our target 27 miles up the coast. This
seemed surprising but with the enemy zigging frequently in
bucking a heavy wind and sea, his speed made good was little
more than ours running on a straight course at 80 feet between
observations. Our tracks converged and he passed directly
over us at sundown.

ATTACK NO. 2

At dark we surfaced 4,000 yards astern of him, passed him up
at the same range, avoided a couple of stationary patrols,
moved on to his track, then turned off for a stern run and he
to lie with him at 500 yards as he bucked the heavy seas.

2100 With a salvo of three ready to fire with a liberal spread,
a single Mark 18 Mod. 1 torpedo hit him in middle with a
gyro on a 75 port track. Our experience of the morning was not
a mistake. We were clicking and this one hit with a terrific
explosion. Only the first few members of the fire-control
party to reach the bridge saw any of the ship before it went
down. We now experienced something new in anti-submarine
tactics in the nature of estimated 40 MM. fire from the beach.
It was directed straight up, however, and we were quite content
to let them believe that our China based planes were aloft.

Proceeded down the coast avoiding the two stationary patrols
and encountering a third which was easily shaken off.

- 3 -

— page 177 —
12 - 14 October 1944:
0100 Sighted a properly lighted hospital ship on a northerly course
     which we looked over from close aboard. He appeared to be in
     every respect complying with International Law.

0600 Commenced submerged patrol off the Formosa Coast. Only patrol
     boats and planes were sighted throughout the day. On surfacing
     proceeded to the northwest to a focal point of the probable
     shipping routes from both Takao and Kirun to Foochow. Foochow
     seemed the logical destination for any Japanese shipping in
     the Formosa ports which, forewarned, would be attempting to
     escape from our carrier strike. It turned out to be an ideal
     point, but only for patrol craft. Much rainy, squally weather
     permitted getting closer of them on the surface than after sub-
     merged approach, observation and evasion.

     Conducted numerous searches along enemy retirement tracks
     until the Formosa strike was completed. On these watches and
     up close to Kirun the fires set by our boys were observed
     to be blazing furiously day and night.

15 - 17 October 1944:
     Moved over to the China coast and conducted a brief
     periscope patrol just south of Haitan Island. Shipping
     of a thousand tons or less can follow the dangerous channels
     behind this island group. Our position was ideal to
     intercept any worthwhile shipping attempting to clear the
     Formosa area. However, absolutely nothing was sighted, so
     after two days in these treacherous waters we moved into
     the center of the Strait.

18 - 19 October 1944:
     Patrolled in Formosa Strait, encountering nothing but patrol
     craft. We were greeted on surfacing by radar-equipped planes
     who seemed to be assisted in their search by the patrols which
     also possessed radar. As it appeared to be more a case of
     being hunted than hunting, we moved northeast to the original
     lucky spot off Formosa Point, then on around the northern tip
     of the island to patrol off the port of Kirun. Friendly radar
     showed on our SJ to the east, probably one of the TRIGGER -
     SILVERSIDES group. Other radar continued to be so strong on our
     detector on all the usual frequencies that we stopped worrying
     about it except to fill in the necessary log to help out in its
     future tabulation. Patrolling off Kirun was almost prohibitive
     due to the constantly changing weather and persistent large swells.

- 4 -

— page 178 —
18 - 19 October 1944 (Con't)
The strong currents made it inadvisable to make very far into the
harbor and the actual presence of shipping could not be de-
termined.

19 October 1944
2200 Headed for the China Coast, having received word of an enemy task
force heading north along the China Coast. Commenced full power
run which would intercept them before dawn.

20 October 1944
0400 Made radar contact at 30,000 yards on an enemy group heading
south instead of north as expected. There followed an approach
which quickly developed into a trailing operation on our target,
a Katori cruiser and two destroyers, making 19 knots. Their
erratic zigs at least every three minutes permitted us to close on
the quarter where with a bit of luck or with steady torpedoes
an attack would have been possible. Five times in the approach
as to the direction of his next zig, and five times in the
possible as our slow Mark 18's just plain wouldn't reach him
before he would have been off on another leg.

As it was necessary to slow to twelve knots before re-
opening the those torpedoes, and the cruiser would be opening the
range during this slowing down period, it was necessary to reach
a position not more than 600 yards astern of the cruiser for an
up-the-tail shot. Dawn was approaching and so was the Formosa
Bank just north of the Pescadores, when we crawled into 800
yards. This is as far as we got, however, for he illuminated us.
We got down before the bullets landed and expected a severe
rubbing from depth charges. We were disappointed in the outcome,
and swore never to be without steam torpedoes forward again.

The enemy evidently suspected other submarines and did not
release the escorts to work us over. A good air and surface craft
search started about noon, but we were well to the north of their
probing. On surfacing the hunt was still on and with a sick rudder
we went north clear of the Strait for repairs and a little rest from
almost continuous operations.

21 October 1944
Continued submerged patrol north of the Formosa Strait then
proceeded back to the China Coast off Turnabout Island.

- 5 -

— page 179 —
ATTACK NO. 3

21 October 1944 (Con't)
2000 and nearly fired on a PC-DE type patrol proceeding down the
coast in dark stormy weather. We didn't like the looks of the
situation as seas were rolling nearly over our bridge and his erratic
zigs made a surface attack precarious. Then the range was 2500 yards
with angle on the bow about 20°, as if by mutual consent the enemy
reversed course and high tailed it. We did likewise and probably as
happy as he at the outcome. Our aversion course headed us back toward
the Formosa coast so continued on for a submerged patrol on the
following day.

22 October 1944
1000. Continued on toward the coast commencing a submerged patrol at about
Their usual numerous aircraft were sighted during the day.
Their quantity and types indicating an influx of planes probably as
replacements for those destroyed during the Formosa raids and very
possibly also for support in the Philippines.

1800 Shortly after surfacing the SJ radar became temperamental and quit.
Our industrious radar technician and officer commenced the usual
non-stop repairs. Headed north for a safer operating area until they
were completed, as this was no place to operate without an SJ.

23 October 1944
0630 On the first trial of the revamped SJ the operator reported land
at 10,000 yards where no land ought to be. Commenced tracking,
immediately discovering a small pip moving out in our direction.
Put him in stern and bent on the turns. He evidently lost his original
contact on us for he changed course and commenced a wide sweep
in our direction. Meanwhile a DE was in sight. A submarine from
quickly developed as we were able to assume the original position
of this destroyer just ahead of the convoy while he was still on his
inspection tour. The convoy was composed of three large tankers
in column, a transport on the starboard beam, a freighter on
the port beam, flanked by DE's on both beams and quarters. After
zigging with the convoy in position 3,000 yards ahead we dropped back
between the tankers and the freighter. On the next zig, steered and
turned right for a nearly straight bow shots at the two tankers as they came
by, firing two torpedoes under the stack and engine room of the
first of the nearest tanker, a single torpedo into the

- 6 -

— page 180 —
23 October 1944: (con't)
the protruding stern of the middle tanker and two torpedoes
under the stack and engine space of the far tanker. Tor-
pedo range was minimum 300 yards and the maximum 300 yards. Tor-
pedoes were exploding before the firing was completed and all
three tankers hit. It was a terrific sight to see three blazing, sinking,
tankers but there was only time for just a glance, as the
destroyer was coming in like a destroyer attempting to ram. The
set-up was about to fire on this vessel when Leibold, my
Boatswain's Mate, whom I've used for an extra set of eyes on
all patrols, properly diagnosed the maneuvers of the attacking
transport who was coming in like a destroyer attempting to ram.
He was boxed in by the sinking tankers, the transport had no place
left to dive, so we had to cross his bow. It was really a
thriller with the TANG barely getting on the inside of
his turning circle and saving the stern with full left rudder
in the last seconds. The transport commenced firing its large and
small caliber stuff so cleared the bridge before realizing
it was all above our heads. A quick glance aft, however, showed
the tables were in turned for the transport was forced
to swing in an attempt to avoid colliding with the freighter
which had also been coming in to ram. The freighter's
starboard quarter shortly after we commenced firing
four torpedoes spread along their double length. At a
range of 400 yards the crash coupled with the four torpedoes
was terrific, sinking the freighter nose down almost
instantly while the transport hung with a 30° up angle.

The destroyer was now coming in on our starboard quarter at
1300 yards with DE's on our port bow and beam. We headed for the
DE bow so as to get the destroyer astern and proceeded.
The DE turn away, he apparently having seen enough.
The destroyer still hadn't lighted off another boiler and it was
possible to open the range slowly, avoiding the last radar range to the DD was 4,500 yards. He gave up the
chase and returned to the scene of the transport. His
bow still showed on the radar and its pip was visible.
When we were 6,000 yards off, however, another violent explosion
took place and the bow disappeared both from sight and the
screen. This explosion set off a gun duel amongst the destroyer
and other vessels who fired at random apparently sometimes
each other and sometimes just out into the night. Their confusion
was truly complete. It looked like a good place to be, so
we cleared the area at full power until dawn.

Our attack log showed that only 10 minutes had elapsed from
the time of firing our first torpedo until the final explosion
that the transport's bow went down.

-7-

— page 181 —
23 October 1944 (con't)
0600 Dived north of the Strait for submerged patrol.

2000 Surfaced. Nothing but patrol boats were sighted during the day,
but at night a search similar to the one previously encountered
indicated the possibility of this being a trap. In any case
there was little doubt about the heat being on this area. Headed
north where deeper water would at least give us a better sense of
security.

24 October 1944

0600 Commenced submerged periscope patrol. On surfacing at dark headed
for Turnabout Island feeling that the Japs would now scarcely run
traffic other than in the shallow protected waters along the
China Coast. On approaching the islands at a range of 35,000
yards other than land pips appeared on the radar screen until at
tracking ranges the CJ was absolutely saturated.

The Staff had been correct in their estimate of the sit-
uation that the Japanese would likely send every available
ship in support of the Philippine Campaign. The Leyte Campaign was in
progress and the ships of this convoy as in the one of the 23rd were
all heavily loaded. The tankers all carried planes on deck
and the bows and sterns of the transports were piled high with
apparent plane crates.

ATTACK NO. 4

The convoy was tracked on courses following the ragged coast
at 12 knots. The Japanese became suspicious during our initial
approach, two escorts commencing to run on opposite course to
the long column, firing bursts of 40mm and 5" salvos. As
we continued to close the leading ships, the escort commenced
obligingly illuminating the column with 30" or 40" searchlights
using this to signal with. It gave us a perfect view of our
first selected target, a three deck, two stack transport;
the second target, a three deck one stacker; and of the third,
a large modern tanker. With ranges from 1400 yards on the first
transport to 900 yards on the tanker, fired two Mk. 18 torpedoes
each in slow, deliberate salvoes to pass under the foremast and
mainmast of the first two vessels and under the middle and stern
of the tanker. In spite of the apparent early warning and the
sporadic shots which was apparently designed to scare the
submarine, no evasive tactics were employed by any of the ships.
The torpedoes commenced hitting as we paralleled the convoy to
search out our next two targets.

- 8 -

— page 182 —
24 October 1944 (Con't)

Our love for 18 Mod 1 torpedoes after the disappointing results
was in part restored as all torpedoes hit nicely. We passed
the next ship, a medium freighter, about at 600 yards and
turned for a stern shot at another tanker and transport astern
of her. Fired a single stern torpedo under the tanker's stack
and one at the mainmast of the transport. The ranges
were between 600 and 700 yards. Things were anything but
peaceful now, for the escorts had stopped their turning to
bring good salvoes at us and the blotches of smoke
were directed behind us going to full power to pull clear of the melee. Just
after firing the transport, a full fledged destroyer charged
under her stern and headed for us. Just exactly what took
place in the following seconds will never be determined, but the
least one torpedo was observed to hit the transport and an
instant later the destroyer blew up, either intercepting our third
torpedo or possibly the 40mm fire from the two DE's bearing down on our
beam. In any case, the result was the same and only the transport
remained afloat and she apparently stopped.

To make sure yet untouched, all gunfire either having cleared over
our heads or being directed at the several blurps of smoke emitted
when bleeding for more speed. When 10,000 yards from the transport
we were all in the clear so stopped to look over the situation and
re-check our last two torpedoes which had been loaded forward during
our stern tube attack.

A half hour was spent with each torpedo, withdrawing it from the
tube, ventilating the battery and checking the rudders and gyros. With
everything in readiness started cautiously back in to get our crippled
target. The two DE's were patrolling on his seaward side, so made a wide swoop
in very slow so as not to be detected even by sound. She was
now at 6 knots, fired our 23rd torpedo from 900 yards
by pit log. It aimed at the foremast of her mainmast. Observed the phosphorescent
wake head-on and curved at our crippled target, fired our 24th and last torpedo
in a futile attempt to clear the turning circle of this erratic cir-
cular run due to the phosphorescence of its wake. It struck abreast
the tops were blown off the only regular ballast tanks after the
after three compartments flooded instantly. The TANG sank
as you would drop a pendulum suspended in a horizontal
position. There was insufficient time even to carry out the last
order to close the hatch. One

-9-

— page 183 —
24 October 1944: (con'T)

consolation for those of us washed off into the water was the
explosion of our 23rd torpedo and observation of our last target
settling by the stern. Those who escaped in the morning, were
greeted by the transport's bow sticking straight out of the water
a thousand yards or so away.

-10-

— page 184 —
(C) WEATHER
Normal for locality patrol.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
Normal.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
As listed in navigational aids.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS
See narrative

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS
See narrative.

(H) ATTACK DATA
See attached report forms.

- 11 -

— page 185 —
U.S.S. TANG                               TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1                               PATROL NO. 5
Time Dawn                 Date 11 October 1944 Position North of Pakusa Point,
                                                              Formosa

                                        Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description               Single Unescorted large modern diesel driven
                          freighter proceeding northward from Pakusa
                          Point, Formosa, at 14 knots. Ship was heavily
                          loaded and presented a low silhouette. Original
                          contact was by radar at 17,000 yards followed by
                          good visual observation. Firing range was 800
                          yards.

Ship(s) Sunk              1 large freighter (EU) - 7500 tons.

Ship(s) Damaged or
Probably Sunk             None

Damage Determined         Observed two torpedo hits out of three fired
by                        from range of 800 yards. Observed ship blow
                          up and sink almost immediately after two tor-
                          pedoes hit. Surfaced and searched wreckage,
                          but found no survivors.

Target Data
Own Ship Data             ) Not available due to loss of records in TANG.

                                        Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type attack               Target tracked on surface to determine speed.
                          Dove just before dawn on targets for sub-
                          merged attack. Fired 3 Mark 18 torpedoes
                          from bow tubes spread to cover length of target.
                          Two hits were observed exactly as aimed.

NOTE: Torpedo data not available due to loss of records in TANG.

                                                  - 12 -

— page 186 —
U.S.S. TAG TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 5
Time 2100 Item Date 11 October 1944 Position North of Rokusa Point.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description
Single north bound unescorted freighter picked
up by periscope at 1000 and tracked until dark.
Heavy air activity prevented surface tracking. Heavy
seas and fresh wind with radical zig of target
permitted tracking of this target until darkness.
Ship passed directly overhead at dusk. After
dark surfaced 4000 yards astern of target evaded
2 stationary patrols to gain position ahead for
stern tube attack.

Ships sunk
1 Freighter similar to Aden Maru Class (EC)
(5824 tons)

Ship(s) Damaged or
Probably Sunk None

Damage Determined Observed ship blow up and sink following single
by torpedo hit fired from range of 500 yards.

Target Data ) Not available due to loss of records in T.G.
On Ship Data)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack
Night surface attack. Fired single Mark 18 Mod 1
torpedo from stern tube at range of 500 yards on
a 75° port track. Torpedo hit amidships. Speed
had been previously determined by tracking sub-
merged for eleven hours.

NOTE: Torpedo data not available due to loss of records in T.G.

- 13 -

— page 187 —
U.S.S. TANG
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 2
Time Early Morning Date 23 October 1944 Position NW of Formosa

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description Convoy contacted by radar consisting of three
large tankers in column with a medium transport
to starboard (west) and a large freighter to
port (east). Escorted by a destroyer steaming
ahead of formation and DEs on each
quarter. Leading DD gained contact, but lost
initial contact. TANG took position then dropped
back between tankers and freighters. Following
a zig turned right for nearly straight bow shots
on tankers. After firing 2 torpedoes at leading
tanker, 1 at overlapping middle tanker and 2 at
trailing tanker, TANG barely escaped being ram-
med by transport. The transport continued to
swing and was struck on starboard quarter by the
freighter who also was attempting to ram. Four
torpedoes were fired at these two ships. The
collision and hitting of torpedoes occurred about
simultaneously. TANG evaded escorts on the sur-
face after being subjected to heavy but inaccur-
ate gun fire from transport and escorts.

Ship(s) Sunk 1 large tanker (EU) - 10,000 tons
1 large tanker (EU) - 10,000 tons
1 large tanker (EU) - 10,000 tons
1 Medium transport (EU) - 7,500 tons
1 large freighter (EU) - 7,500 tons

Ship(s) Damaged or
Probably Sunk None

Damage Determined Observed two hits in leading tanker, one in
by middle tanker and two in trailing tanker. All
were observed to burn fiercely and sink. The
transport was rammed on the starboard quarter
by the freighter. Four torpedoes were fired at
overlapping freighter and transport. Freighter
sank almost immediately bows first. Transport
settled by the stern. Ten minutes later a
violent explosion occurred and transport's bow
disappeared from view and radar screen.

Target Data ) Not available due to loss of records in TANG.
Own Ship Data )

- 14 -

— page 188 —
U.S.S. TANG

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 (Con't.) PATROL NO. 5
Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack Night surface attack using radar ranges and TBT
bearings. Ranges on firing at the three tankers
varied from 300 to 800 yards. Range on firing
at the combined transport and freighter was 400
yards.

NOTE: Torpedo data not available due to loss of records in TANG.

- 15 -

— page 189 —
U.S.S. TANG
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4
PATROL NO. 5
Time Early evening Date 24 October 1944 Position China Coast between
                                                              Foochow and Amoy

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description
Contact was by radar in early evening on convoy
of large ships proceeding South, hugging the
Coast, at 12 knots. Convoy consisted of at
least 14 large vessels in column escorted by
at least 1 fleet type DD and twelve DEs. Some
of the DEs initially were to seaward of the
convoy while the DD and other DEs were on the
landward side.

During the initial approach presence of TANG
was apparently suspected as seaward DEs com-
menced firing at random. Approach was contin-
ued on leading vessels as a large searchlight
was trained down the column illuminating a 3
deck 2 stack transport, a 3 deck single stack
transport and a large modern tanker.

Two torpedoes each were fired to hit these
three vessels as convoy took no avoiding action.
TANG then took parallel opposite course to re-
maining ships, passed up a medium freighter at
600 yards to fire one torpedo at a large tanker
and two at a large transport while Escorts
fired at TANG and her engine smoke.

A Fleet type destroyer came around the stern
of the transport as firing was completed, but
either hit a TANG torpedo or ran into cross
fire of the escorts as she blew up.

TANG pulled clear to check the last two tor-
pedoes while the situation cleared.

Returning to the last transport fired last two
torpedoes to finish her off.

Ship(s) Sunk
1 large AP (EU) - 10,000 tons
1 medium AP (EU) - 7,500 tons
1 large AO (EU) - 10,000 tons
1 large AO (EU) - 10,000 tons
1 Fleet Type DD (EU) - 1,500 tons

- 16 -

— page 190 —
U.S.S. TANG
TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4 (Con't.) PATROL NO. 5

Ship(s) Damaged or
Probably Sunk                 None

Damage Determined             All torpedoes were observed to hit and all ships
by                            seen to sink, the second tanker and the DD
                              blowing up completely. The bow of the last
                              transport was observed by TANG survivors the
                              next morning sticking straight up out of the
                              water.

Target Data                   Not available due to loss of records in TANG.
Own Ship Data

                              Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack                   This was a night surface attack using radar
                              ranges and TBT bearings. The bow tubes were
                              fired, two each, to hit the three leading ships
                              at ranges varying from 1400 yards down to 900
                              yards.

                              Passing up the next ship in column, a medium
                              freighter, fired a single torpedo to hit a large
                              tanker and two more to hit a transport at ranges
                              between six and seven hundred yards.

                              Returning to the scene, after clearing the last
                              two torpedoes, fired two single shots at the
                              stopped sinking transport.

NOTE: Torpedo data not available due to loss of records in TANG.

- 17 -

— page 191 —
(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED
Not available due to loss of records in TANG.

(S) DURATION
Days enroute to area 15
Days in area 14
Days enroute to base --
Days submerged 10

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
| Torpedoes | Fuel Gals. | Provisions Days | Personnel Factor Days |
|||||
| 0         | --         | --              | --                    |

(U) COMMUNICATION, RADAR AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES
Not available due to loss of records in TANG.

(V) REMARKS
Report of the Loss of the U.S.S. TANG (SS306)

Introduction

This report is compiled from my observation and the stories of
the eight other survivors as related to me at the first opportunity
after capture.

The U.S.S. TANG took on board the twenty-four Tor 18 Mod 1
electric torpedoes prepared for the U.S.S. TIMOR who was being
delayed. All torpedo personnel in the TANG had attended electric
torpedo school and it is assured these torpedoes were properly
routined while on station. In fact, the performance of the first
twenty-three torpedoes in all running perfectly, with twenty-two
hits, attests to this.

The last two torpedoes were loaded in tubes three and four
during the final stern tube attack. After pulling clear of the
enemy escorts, opportunity was available to spend an hour checking
these torpedoes before closing the enemy to finish him off. They
were partially withdrawn from the tubes, batteries ventilated, gyro
pots inspected and steering mechanism observed to be operating
freely.

With the submarine speed checking at six knots on the ani
conned for zero gyro, the twenty-third torpedo was fired. Then its
phosphorescent wake was observed heading for its point of aim on
the ship. It struck, but did not explode. This was tube number
four. This torpedo curved sharply to the left, broaching during

- 18 -

— page 192 —
the first part of its turn and then porpoising during the remainder.
Emergency speed was called for and answered immediately. On firing,
and a fishtail maneuver partially completed in an attempt to get
clear of the torpedoboat's turning circle. This resulted only in the
torpedo striking the stern abreast the after torpedo room instead
of amidships.

The explosion was very violent, whipping the boat, breaking
H.P. air lines, lifting deck plates, etc. Numerous personnel as
far forward as the control room received broken limbs and other
injuries. The immediate result to the ship was to flood the after
three compartments to gether with number six and seven ballast tanks.
No one escaped from those compartments and even tho the forward engine
room was half flooded before the after door could be secured.

The ship, with no normal positive buoyancy aft and with three
after flooded compartments, went down instantly by the stern. With
personnel in the conning tower and on the bridge falling aft due to
the angle, there was insufficient time to carry out the order to
close the hatch.

Personnel in the control room succeeded in closing the conning
tower lower hatch, but it had been jimmied in the explosion and
leaked badly. They then leveled the boat off by flooding number
two main ballast tank (opening the vent manually) and proceeded
to the forward torpedo room carrying the injured in blankets.

When the survivors from the forward engine room and after bat-
tery compartment reached the mess room, they found water already
above the eyeport in the door to the control room. On testing
the bulkhead flappers in the ventilation piping they found the
water not yet at this height. They therefore, opened a port,
letting the water race through, then proceeded on to the torpedo
room. This made a total of about thirty men to reach an escape
position.

During this time all secret and confidential publications were
destroyed first by burning in the control room, and then by
flooding the after battery compartment as the control room flood
water sounds unfortunate since a great deal of the smoke entered
the forward torpedo room.

Escaping was delayed by the presence of Japanese patrols which
ran close by and by occasional depth charges. This is unfortun-
ate for an electrical fire in the forward battery was becoming
severe. At about six o'clock, four parties left the
ship, but only with difficulty as the pressure to the hundred and
eighty foot did numerous returns to the torpedo room necessary to
revive prostate men.

At the time the last party escaped, the forward battery fire
had reached such intensity that paint on the forward torpedo room

- 19 -

— page 193 —
after bulkhead was scorching and running down. Considerable pres-
sure had built up in the forward battery making it difficult to
secure the after torpedo room door sufficiently tight to prevent
acrid smoke from seeping by the gasket. It is felt that this
gasket blew out, either due to the pressure or an ensuing battery
explosion, and that the remaining personnel were asphyxiated.

Of the thirteen men who escaped, five were able to cling to
the buoy until picked up. Three others reached the surface, but
were unable to hang on or breathe and floated off and drowned.
The other five were not seen after leaving the trunk.

Of the nine officers and men on the bridge, three were able
to swim through out the night and until picked up eight hours
later. One officer escaped from the flooded conning tower and
remained afloat until rescued with the aid of his trousers con-
verted to a life belt.

The Destroyer Escort which picked up all nine survivors was
one of four which were rescuing Japanese troops and personnel.
When we realized that our clubbing and kickings were being ad-
ministered by the burned, mutilated survivors of our own handi-
work, we found we could take it with less prejudice.

- 20 -

— page 194 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 10 01133]
FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
On
Serial 02379 Care of Fleet Post Office,
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED] San Francisco, California.
[STAMP: EXTRA] [HANDWRITTEN: /] [STAMP: ORIGINAL] 25 Sept. 1945.
[STAMP: SORG. MICRO]
[STAMP: PHOTO-LAB OP-16] NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
[STAMP: RETURN TO F-4253] DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on
TANG Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 920-[HANDWRITTEN: 915]
U.S.S. TANG - FIFTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of Fifth War Patrol
(24 September to 25 October 1944).

1. The fifth war patrol of the U.S.S. TANG, commanded by Commander
R. H. O'Kane, U.S. Navy, was conducted in the Formosa Strait. This report,
written from memory after Commander O'Kane's release from a Japanese prisoner
of war camp, is not as complete or detailed as is customary, nor is it feasible
to obtain division and squadron commanders endorsement of it.

2. The Force Commander considers the fifth patrol of the TANG to
be one of the most brilliant submarine cruises of all time. The relentless
energy throughout, and in four precisely executed attacks against
enemy ships were destroyed. The first two were unopposed
single ships, but the last two were stirring actions against large, well armed and heavily escorted convoys. Data is
not available on which to base an analysis of these attacks, however, the
necessity for twenty-four torpedoes fired hit, and one of the remaining two is
known to have run erratic. This performance, especially under the strain of such lively
action as attacks three and four, eloquently bespeaks firm, competent
command, perfect organization and thoroughly drilled fire control parties, and ship
control parties, and meticulous attention to the details of preservation and
maintenance.

3. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is
authorized.

4. It was the tragic result of one of the unavoidable risks of
submarine warfare that this gallant ship should be sunk by the malfunctioning
of one of her own torpedoes, and that she was the last to be fired. The
Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, extends a heartfelt
welcome and his sympathy on the loss of their shipmates. To those who
manned her he offers his sincere congratulations on a
brilliant patrol during which the following damage was inflicted on the enemy:

[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED ON]
BY [HANDWRITTEN: 91C] NAV INST. 5500.20
DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 2-25-64]

- 1 -

— page 195 —
F12-10(A)/A16-3(18)
Serial 02379
[STAMP: DECLASSIFIED]

SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
25 Sept. 1945.
NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
[HANDWRITTEN: DESTROYED] PRIOR TO
ENTERING PORT.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT
TANG Report of
Fifth War Patrol

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 928
U.S.S. TANG - FIFTH WAR PATROL

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of Fifth War Patrol
         (24 September to 25 October 1944).

— page 196 —
DECLASSIFIED
DATE 24 October 1944
FROM CROSS INDEX CARD
L.ME TANG
SERIAL
DATE
SUBJECT Loss of USS TANG (SS-306)

Narrative report of last known events during FIFTH WAR
PATROL of TANG. Presumed lost this submarine was sunk in
Formosa Strait on 24 Oct 44 as a result of the malfunction-
ing of one of her own torpedoes. (COMSUBPAC:SUBS)
FILED: War Diary

Separately under SUBSPAC ser 00964 of 27 Nov 44

MICROSERIAL NO.
ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3430-13 (11-55)

DECLASSIFIED
DATE 24 October 1944
FROM CROSS INDEX CARD
L.ME TANG
SERIAL
DATE
SUBJECT Loss of USS TANG (SS-306)

CDR.R.H.O'Kane, CO, reconstructed FIFTH WAR PATROL of TANG.
Statement of events 24 Oct 44 when last of 24 torpedoes
aboard was fired at a transport during a night surface ac-
tion. Torpedo broached & circled, striking boat on the
stern & sinking it in Formosa Strait. (COMSUBPAC:SUBS)
FILED: War Diary

Separately under SUBSPACAdminis ser 02409 of 30 Sep 45

MICROSERIAL NO.
ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3430-13 (11-55)

— page 197 —
DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR. 5200.9
of 27 SEP 58
BY [HANDWRITTEN: CP.CUBIC] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: APR 60]

He
FF12-10/A4-1 COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 00964 Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
NOV 27 1944
DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Loss of.

1. It is with the deepest regret that the Commander
Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, reports that the U.S.S. TANG
is overdue from patrol and must be presumed to be lost.

2. The TANG, under the command of Commander Richard
H. O'Kane, departed Pearl Harbor on 24 September 1944, for
patrol in accordance with Commander Task Force Seventeen Opera-
tion Order No. 326-44. She arrived at Midway on the morning of
27 September, topped off with fuel, and departed that same after-
noon for her patrol area. She has not been heard from since her
departure from Midway.

3. The patrol area assigned the TANG was the area
between the northwestern coast of Formosa and the coast of China.
In order to reach this area the TANG was required to pass
through narrow waters known to be heavily patrolled by the enemy.
There was some question as to whether she would be able
to make this passage, the Commanding Officer was given an alter-
nate plan which permitted him at his discretion to join a co-
ordinated attack group, consisting of the SILVERSIDES, TRIGGER
and BALAO, under the command of Commander Coye in SILVERSIDES.
This coordinated group was patrolling off the northeastern coast
of Formosa. The Commanding Officers of these three vessels have
reported that they received no communications from the TANG
during the period of their patrol. The area assigned to the
TANG was at the request of the Commanding Officer of that vessel,
who fully realized the dangers involved. However, it was the
nature of Commander O'Kane to ask for the most difficult assign-
ments and then to carry them out to perfection.

4. Had the TANG departed her area on 8 November 1944,
as specified in her operation order, and proceeded at normal
cruising speed, she would have reached Midway about 18 November
1944. Repeated attempts of this command to raise the TANG by

-1-
NAVAL HISTORY DIVISION

— page 199 —
He

COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
NOV 27 1944

FF12-10/A4-1
Serial 00964

Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Loss of.

— page 201 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 1200]
Serial 000986

                                                                                                [HANDWRITTEN: 02673]
                                                                                                317/Ye
                                                                                                No.
                                                                                                00
                                                                                                001
                                                                                                [HANDWRITTEN: -4 NOV 1944]
                                                                                                01
                                                                                                015
                                                                                                1
                                                                                                DEC 5 1944
                                                                                                2
                                                                                                21
                                                                                                251
                                                                                                [HANDWRITTEN: 3/H]
                                                                                                312
                                                                                                313
                                                                                                315
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                                                                                                64
                                                                                                [HANDWRITTEN: 65]
                                                                                                651
                                                                                                Ins.Gen.Pac.

                                        1st Endorsement to
                                        ComSubaPac Top-Secret
                                        ltr. FF12-10/A4-1
                                        Serial 00964, dated
                                        27 November 1944.

From:                   Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To:                     Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject:                U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) - Loss of.

1.                      Forwarded with extreme regret at the loss of
this distinguished patroller and the fine personnel aboard.

                                        C. H. McMORRIS
                                        Chief of Staff

Copy to:
ComSubaPac
                                        [HANDWRITTEN: mailed 12/5/44]

— page 202 —
DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR. 5200..
of 27 SEP 58
BY [HANDWRITTEN: OP-09B1C] DATE [HANDWRITTEN: 1 APR 60]

[STAMP: copy]
Reg. No. 10605
R.S. No. 10 01402
Reg. Sheet No. 121

COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
ADMINISTRATION

17/gn

FY12-10(A)/A16-2
Serial: 02409

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,

DECLASSIFIED

30 Sep 1945

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Administration.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Loss of U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) - Statement of Surviving
Commanding Officer, Recovered Allied Military Personnel.

Reference: (a) ComSubsPac Secret ltr. A16-2 ser 00349 dated
21 September 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Extract from C.O., U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) War Patrol
Report Number Five dated 10 September 1945.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith as additional information
to that submitted by reference (a).

G. C. CRAWFORD.

Copy to: (Complete)
CominCh (arrow)
CinCPac

— page 203 —
copy

U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) - Statement of Surviving Commanding Officer, Taken
from his Patrol Report SS306/A16-3 dated 10 September 1945.

10 01402
ENCLOSURE (A)

— page 204 —
COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
ADMINISTRATION

U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) - Statement of Surviving Commanding Officer, Taken from his
Patrol Report SS306/A16-3 dated 10 September 1945.

INTRODUCTION

This report is compiled from my observation and the stories of the eight other
survivors as related to me at the first opportunity after capture.

The U.S.S. TANG took on board the twenty-four Mark 18 Mod 1 electric torpedoes
prepared for the U.S.S. TAMBOR who was being delayed. All torpedo personnel in the
TANG had attended electric torpedo school and it is assured these torpedoes were
properly routined while on station. In fact, the performance of the first twenty-
three torpedoes in all running perfectly, with twenty-two hits, attests to this.

The last two torpedoes were loaded in tubes three and four during the final
stern tube attack. After pulling clear of the enemy escorts opportunity was avail-
able to spend an hour checking these torpedoes before closing the tubes to sink a
cripple. They were partially withdrawn from the tubes, batteries ventilated, gyro
pots inspected and steering mechanism observed to be operating freely.

With the submarine speed checking at six knots and the ship conned for zero
gyro, the twenty-third torpedo was fired. When its phosphorescent wake was observed
heading for its point of aim on the stopped transport, the last torpedo was fired
from the tube number four. This torpedo curved sharply to the left, broaching during
its turn and then porpoising during the remainder of its run. Emergency speed
was called for and answered immediately on firing, and a fishtail maneuver partially
completed in an attempt to get clear of the torpedo's turning circle. This resulted
only in the torpedo striking the stern abreast the after torpedo room instead of amid-
ships.

The explosion was very violent, whipping the boat, breaking H.P. air lines, lift-
ing deck plates, etc. Numerous personnel as far forward as the control room received
broken limbs and other injuries. The immediate result to the ship was to flood the
after three compartments together with number six and seven ballast tanks. No one es-
caped from these compartments and even the forward engine room was half flooded before
the after door could be secured.

The ship, with no normal positive buoyancy aft and with three after flooded
compartments, went down instantly by the stern. With personnel in the conning tower
falling aft due to the angle, there was insufficient time to carry
out the order to close the hatch.

Personnel in the control room succeeded in closing the conning tower lower hatch,
but it had been jammed in the explosion and leaked badly. They then leveled the boat
off by flooding number two main ballast tank (opening the vent manually) and proceeded
to the forward torpedo room carrying the injured in blankets.

- 1 -
[STAMP: COPY]
10 01402

— page 205 —
[HANDWRITTEN: 003]

COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
ADMINISTRATION

U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) - Statement of Surviving Commanding Officer, Taken from his
Patrol Report SS306/A16-3 dated 10 September 1945.

When the survivors from the forward engine room and after battery compartments
reached the mess room, they found water already above the eye-port in the door to the
control room. On testing the bulkhead flappers in the ventilation piping they found
the water not yet at this height. They therefore, opened the door, letting the water
race through, then proceeded on to the torpedo room. This made a total of about thirty
men to reach an escape position.

During this time all secret and confidential publications were destroyed first by
burning in the control room, and then in the forward battery compartment as the control
room flooded. This latter seems unfortunate since a great deal of the smoke entered
the forward torpedo room.

Escaping was delayed by the presence of Japanese patrols which ran close by drop-
ping occasional depth charges. This is unfortunate for an electrical fire in the forward
battery was becoming severe. Commencing at about six o'clock, four parties left the
ship, but only with difficulty as the pressure at one hundred and eighty feet made num-
erous returns to the torpedo room necessary to revive prostrate men.

At the time the last party escaped, the forward battery fire had reached such in-
tensity that paint on the forward torpedo room after bulkhead was scorching and running
down. Considerable pressure had built up in the forward battery making it difficult to
secure the after torpedo room door sufficiently tight to prevent acrid smoke from seep-
ing by the gasket. It is felt that this gasket blew out, either due to the pressure or
an ensuing battery explosion, and that the remaining personnel were asphyxiated.

Of the thirteen men who escaped, five were able to cling to the buoy until picked
up. Three other officers and men reached the surface, but were unable to hang on or breathe and float-
ed off and drowned. The other five were not seen after leaving the trunk.

Of the nine officers and men on the bridge, three were able to swim throughout the
night and until picked up eight hours later. One officer escaped from the flooded
conning tower and remained afloat until rescued with the aid of his trousers converted
into a life belt.

The Destroyer Escort which picked up all nine survivors was one of four which
were rescuing Japanese troops and personnel. When we realized that our clubbings and
kickings were being administered by the burned, mutilated survivors of our own handi-
work, we found we could take it with less prejudice.

— page 206 —
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THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

[EMBLEM: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, with eagle]

MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION