Because environmental public interest litigation is targeted at many individuals, the polluters and the same gamers have higher transaction costs. In the absence of previous environmental public interest litigation channels, it is actually difficult for the polluted party to obtain compensation under the condition of high transaction costs. That is to say, it is impossible to form a cooperative game between the two parties. In the new legal environment, the possible change is that the polluters take a more cooperative stance in consideration of the possibility of suffering public interest litigation. The two parties are more likely to reach a cooperative game, that is, the polluting party allocates part of the pollution income to the polluted party. From the perspective of the welfare results, under the condition of fixed transaction costs, the total benefits of cooperation are greater than those of non-cooperation. The text is intended to explain:. ['It is difficult for polluters to get compensation if they do not take legal channels.', 'Environmental public interest litigation can promote a cooperative game between polluters and polluters.', 'New legal measures make possible rational distribution of pollution proceeds.', 'Transaction costs are a prerequisite for a cooperative game between polluters and polluters.']