主题：金融投资讨论
问题：巴菲特给股东的信有学习价值么？
回答：伯克希尔纺织厂厂主席巴菲特同志致股东信，一个编年的简史我已選擇了一條路，將要終身實行；我要繼續我的事業，任何事都不能加以阻擋。 —— 康德最近巴老新出炉的股东信非常火。在下悬梁刺股研究了这一篇股东信，也颇得一些顿悟与启发。我也想把股东信去转发分享，无奈民间其实并没有翻译精良的版本，看了一些译作，译者摆明了不了解伯克希尔纺织厂和巴菲特厂主席。思前想后，突发奇想，打算把巴菲特这些年来发给股东的信，以编年的方式，每一年整理出一两句有时代代表性的警世箴言，自己来翻译一下。其中内容涉及到架子投资，衍生品，杠杆，市场风险，风险管理，黄金，石油，继任者等等等等，可以捉摸着这一条清晰的脉络，看出巴老投资哲学的连贯性和持续性。我相信股东信应该是获取巴老投资哲学的第一手资料，其他的很多信息，无论是传记，还是引用，还是什么巴菲特之道巴菲特之超级大作手巴菲特之大战索罗斯云云，说白了都是二手甚至三四手资料，更甭提一些漂浮于躁动与喧哗之中的所谓“巴菲特曾经说过”的市井之言，根本无从考证。本人才疏学浅，翻译肯定会有许多不足之处，请大家包涵斧正。并且我也会附上英文原文，如果读我的翻译读到要吐，也可以看看原文的真面目，get巴老的真意。不多扯淡，请您往下读，如在下有时间，在下会不断进行补充；如果在下有时间到不行，我还会分门别类出点论题集，比如巴老论杠杆，巴老论黄金。还请各位多多鼓励。 “Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages.” （Buffett Partnership 1958 Letter）1958年合伙人信：相对而言，我们的表现在熊市总是比在牛市好。在一个市场的丰年，如果能取得市场的平均收益，那我将相当满足。 “Most of you know I have been very apprehensive about general stock market levels for several years. To date, this caution has been unnecessary. By previous standards, the present level of "blue chip”; security prices contains a substantial speculative component with a corresponding risk of loss. Perhaps other standards of valuation are evolving which will permanently replace the old standard. I don't think so. I may very well be wrong; however, I would rather sustain the penalties resulting from over-conservatism than face the consequences of error, perhaps with permanent capital loss, resulting from the adoption of a “New Era" philosophy where trees really do grow to the sky.” （Buffett Partnership 1959 Letter） 1959年合伙人信：你们大多数人知道近年来我对股票市场忧心忡忡。以曾经的的标准来衡量，目前蓝筹股的价格水平已经包含了太多的投机成分，而投机成分会带来损失的风险。也许一些新的估值的标准将代替老标准。但我不这样认为。我也许会错，但是我宁愿去接受过于保守的惩罚，也不愿承担犯错的后果。如果我们去拥抱新时代的哲学——“树能长到天上去”——那么我们将有可能面临永久性的资本损失。 An irresistable footnote: in 1971, pension fund managers invested a record 122% of net funds available in equities — at full prices they couldn’t buy enough of them. In 1974, after the bottom had fallen out, they committed a then record low of 21% to stocks. （1978 Chairman’s Letter）1978年股东信：一个无法质疑的注脚：在1971年退休基金经理投资了创纪录的122%的资金在股票上，在最高位的价格上他们大胆买买买。而到了1974年，当市场已经跌出底部，他们却以创纪录新低的资金——12%——投资在股票上。 Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that “turnarounds” seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price. （1979 Chairman’s Letter）1979年股东信：我们的运营和投资经验，都告诉我们公司翻转极少发生。如果你有精力和天赋，那还是用在以公允价格买入一个好公司，而不是用在以折扣低价买入一个烂公司。 We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes — but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn’t turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.（1981 Chairman’s letter）1981年股东信：从历史来看，我们总是偶尔可以以好价格买到一些蛤蟆（译者按：巴老在之前举了一个公主亲蛤蟆，蛤蟆变王子的例子，其中公主是收购方，蛤蟆是被收购方，亲是并购行为。比喻收购方溢价收购，期待奇迹发生）。但是很显然我们亲的并不多。当然我们也搞到过王子，但在我们去亲他们之前，这些哥们就已经是王子了。至少我们没有把他们亲成蛤蟆。并且，我们总算也偶尔可以以蛤蟆的价格买到一些验明正身的王子的部分权益。 It’s simply to say that managers and investors alike must understand that accounting numbers is the beginning, not the end, of business valuation.（1982 Chairman's Letter）1982年股东信：简单的说，管理者和投资者都应该明白会计数字只是公司估值的起点，并非终点。 When returns on capital are ordinary, an earn-more-by-putting-up-more record is no great managerial achievement. You can get the same result personally while operating from your rocking chair. Just quadruple the capital you commit to a savings account and you will quadruple your earnings. You would hardly expect hosannas for that particular accomplishment. Yet, retirement announcements regularly sing the praises of CEOs who have, say, quadrupled earnings of their widget company during their reign — with no one examining whether this gain was attributable simply to many years of retained earnings and the workings of compound interest. (1985 Chairman’s Letter)1985年股东信: 当资本收益率比较平庸，一个“以投入更多而赚钱更多”的战绩，最多就是差强人意。个人而言，你可以一边摇摇椅，一边取得同样的结果：你只需要在你的储蓄账户里投入四倍的钱，你就会有四倍的收益。对于这种成就，你不会高兴地唱支山歌给党听。然而，经常有人为了快退休的CEO唱赞歌——就因为他在任内把公司的收益翻了四番——而不去检视，这收益是否仅仅是因为多年来在留存收益上让复利翻滚的结果。Ben's Mr. Market allegory may seem out-of-date in today's investment world, in which most professionals and academicians talk of efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas. Their interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever achieved fame and fortune by simply advising "Take two aspirins”? (1987 Chairman’s Letter)1987年股东信: 本杰明·格雷厄姆的市场寓言也许看起来已经过时了。现在大多数专业人士或者学者只讨论有效市场假说， 动态对冲和beta。这都可以理解，神秘主义笼罩下的技术分析对投资建议批发户而言很有市场。毕竟，哪个巫师会因为只建议“吃两片阿司匹林”而名声大噪？ Over the years, Charlie [Munger, Berkshire Hathaway Vice Chairman] and I have observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with pen than small sums with a gun.（1988 Chairman’s Letter）1988年股东信： 多年来，查理·芒格 （老巴的基友）和我都见证了超级大规模的会计诈骗。骗子几乎不会受惩；很多甚至根本就从来没被谴责过一下。用笔来偷大资金远比用*来抢几块钱安全得多。 In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever.1988年股东信：事实上对于一个投资，当我们同市拥有牛掰的公司和牛掰的管理层，我们最倾向于永久持有。My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call “the institutional imperative”; In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn’t so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.For example: (1) As if governed by Newton‘s First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.(1989 Chairman’s Letter)1989年股东信: 我最惊人的发现，就是一种看不见但是相当重要相当牛的原力，我们可以把它称作“制度性强制力”（institutional imperative）。在商学院我从来不知道这种原力的存在，在刚涉足商界的时候我也不能在直觉上去认知它。我以为那些体面睿智经验超群的管理者会自发做出理性的决定。我错了。理性往往干不过“制度性强制力”。比如说： 1. 就像牛顿第一定律一样，“制度性强制力”会使得一个机构去抗拒任何影响现方向的改变； 2. 就像我们的工作会慢慢扩展而占据掉我们能利用的时间，公司项目和收购会慢慢侵占所有资金；3. 任何领导人指向型的公司，不管这领导人有多二，都会很快得到下属的支持，进行详细的收益率和战略研究。4.同行公司的行为，无论他们是扩张，是收购，是制定管理层薪资，不管是什么，都会被无脑地模仿下来。 After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers.（1989 Chairman's Letter）1989年股东信： 就算经过25年的经历，买入和监管各种各样的公司，查理（基友）和我也没能学会怎么解决棘手的经营问题。我们学会了去避开它们。我们之所以能略有小成，是因为我们专注于去辨识出一英尺高的障碍，这样我们可以轻松跃过。因为七英尺高的障碍是会要了我们亲命的。The most common cause of low prices is pessimism — some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It’s optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.(1990 Chairman’s Letter)1990年股东信: 造成资产低价格最常见的原因，就是悲观绝望。时而笼罩全宇，时而针对某个公司或者行业。我们非常想在这种氛围中做生意，不是因为我们喜欢悲观绝望，而是因为我们喜欢悲观绝望带来的超低价格。乐观鼓舞才是理性买家的大敌。Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient.（1991 Chairman’s Letter）1991年股东信：我们这种龟缩不动的行为，是因为我们认为股市就是一个收容中心，钱就是从主动型投资者流向有耐心的投资者。 We‘ve long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also from grown-ups who behave in the market like children.(1992 Chairman’s Letter)1992年股东信 : 长久以来，我们感觉到股票先知跳大神的价值就是让算命先生们看起来不像傻X。 即使到如今我和查理仍然认为对股市的短期预测有毒，需要被锁起来藏起来，以防儿童或者市场中表现的像儿童的成年人去染指。 The strategy we’ve adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary terms, as &# 34;the possibility of loss or injury.” (1993 Chairman‘s Letter)1993年股东信: 我们的策略让我们不必去遵循“投资多样化”的教条。许多大拿会说，所以，这种策略会比传统投资者的策略更有风险。我们不敢苟同。我们认为，只要能强化投资者将投资标的视为生意的观念，并且能让投资者在掏钱之前就对此门生意的经济属性舒心满意，一个投资组合集中化的策略其实会降低风险。为了阐明这个观点，我们要讲风险以字典的含义定义成“损失或者受伤的可能”（译者按：而不是商学院教科书中将风险定义为“标准差”）。In a bull market, one must avoid the error of the preening duck that quacks boastfully after a torrential rainstorm, thinking that its paddling skills have caused it to rise in the world. A right-thinking duck would instead compare its position after the downpour to that of the other ducks on the pond.（1997 Chairman’s Letter）1993年股东信： 在牛市中，我们必须要避免成为暴雨后在池子里自得意满地嘎嘎叫的鸭子，它们以为它们卓越的划水技术导致了池水的上涨。一个有脑子的鸭子应该在雨后去和其他鸭子比较各自的位置。But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. In effect, they rejoice because prices have risen for the “hamburgers”; they will soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.(1997 Chairman‘s Letter)1997年股东信: 来看看咱的期末考试：如果你期望在之后的五年变为一个净存者（译者按：net saver, 相对于net borrower而言，消费者分为net saver净存方（出超）和net borrower净借方（入超）），那么在此段时间内，你会去希望一个更高的还是更低的股票市场？许多投资者在这点上没搞对。就算他们会成为净买股票的多头，他们还是会在股票涨时弹冠相庆在股票跌时心有戚戚。（作为买方）他们在庆祝肉夹馍价格飙涨，但是他们知道不久后他们就要去买这个肉夹馍，这尼玛实在不合理。只有把自己在未来一段时间内定位成空头的人才会因为价格上涨而开心，因为他们不必掏更多钱去买。而未来的购买者应该更喜欢一个不断下跌的价格。Our future rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire’s capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who can’t. (1998 Chairman's Letter)1998年股东信: 我认为我们未来的收益率会远远低于过去的收益率。伯克希尔的资本实在太大，导致我们不能获得超常的收益。如果你不这样认为，那么你应该去做销售人才，但千万别去当数学家。请记住世界上永远只有三种人：会算数的，和不会算数的。Those who attended [the annual meeting] last year saw your Chairman pitch to Ernie Banks. This encounter proved to be the titanic duel that the sports world had long awaited. After the first few pitches — which were not my best, but when have I ever thrown my best? — I fired a brushback at Ernie just to let him know who was in command. Ernie charged the mound, and I charged the plate. But a clash was avoided because we became exhausted before reaching each other.(1999 Chairman’s Letter)1999年股东信: 那些去年出席股东会的哥们应该看到了你们的主席朝着厄尼·班克斯（译者按：美国职业棒球联盟小熊队的球员，特别能击球）投球。这是体育界翘首以盼的精彩对决。在几次发挥不太好的投球之后，哥们我投出了一记近身球（译者按：差点打到击球者的投球），就是为了让他知道谁是老大。然后厄尼冲向投手丘，我冲向本垒（互相冲向对方）。但是我们在冲到半路，还没有够着对方的时候就已经精疲力尽了。冲突被避免。(译者按：这其实只是关于股东会噱头的一段讲述，无关乎投资。大家知道1999年是科技股泡沫不断膨胀的时刻，而伯克希尔也吃到了有史以来最差的投资回报表现，以及最差的对比标普500的相对表现。所以基本上这次股东信老巴也没有什么太多的好讲，讲了也没人听。）There is only one combination of facts that makes it advisable for a company to repurchase its shares: First, the company has available funds -- cash plus sensible borrowing capacity -- beyond the near-term needs of the business and, second, finds its stock selling in the market below its intrinsic value, conservatively-calculated. To this we add a caveat: Shareholders should have been supplied all the information they need for estimating that value. Otherwise, insiders could take advantage of their uninformed partners and buy out their interests at a fraction of true worth. (1999 Chairman's Letter)1999年股东信: 只有一种事实的组合才能让公司回购显得明智：第一，除去满足短期经营需要的以外，公司要有充足资金——现金和理性的杠杆。第二，经过保守计算后，发现市面上公司的股价低于内在价值。当然我们也要加一个警告：股东应该有足够的信息来判断公司价值。要不然内部人士就可以占股东的便宜，从股东手中低价回收股票，大敲一笔（译者按：如陈欧之流，可耻的回购）。The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities—that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future—will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There‘s a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.（2000 Chairman‘s Letter）2000年股东信： 投资和投机的分界线，从来就不清楚，而且在大多数市场参与者都为胜利欢欣鼓舞之时会更加模糊。巨大的不劳而获的收益，深深地抑制了理性。在市场的疯狂中，许多在正常情况下都保持理智的人也慢慢变为华丽舞会中的灰姑娘。他们知道迟迟不愿意离去这场盛宴——也就是说继续投机，去赌那些估值相对于未来现金流而言高上天的公司——最终会让他们灰头土脸。但是他们唯恐错过这场荒宴的每一分钟。所以，这些晕头转向的参与者都打算在午夜前的几秒钟离场。然而有一个问题，在他们跳舞纵情的房间里，那口钟上没有指针。But a pin lies in wait for every bubble. And when the two eventually meet, a new wave of investors learns some very old lessons: First, many in Wall Street — a community in which quality control is not prized — will sell investors anything they will buy. Second, speculation is most dangerous when it looks easiest. (2000 Chairman’s Letter)2000年股东信: 对于每一个泡沫，总有一根针在旁边守候。当两者合体之时，新韭菜会上到老一课：第一，作为一个没有质量控制的地方，华尔街会卖给你任何东西，只要你想买；第二，投机这档子事，在最容易做时，也最危险。 After all, you only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out. 2001 Chairman’s Letter. (2000 Chairman’s Letter)2000年股东信: 毕竟，当大潮退去，才知道谁在裸泳。（译者按：老巴最有名的名言，说在大泡沫最终破后的一刻，扬眉吐气。可惜朱力安·罗伯森最终没有挺到黎明。） I view derivatives as time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and the economic system. Basically these instruments call for money to change hands at some future date, with the amount to be determined by one or more reference items, such as interest rates, stock prices, or currency values. For example, if you are either long or short an S&P 500 futures contract, you are a party to a very simple derivatives transaction, with your gain or loss derived from movements in the index. Derivatives contracts are of varying duration, running sometimes to 20 or more years, and their value is often tied to several variables.Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counter-parties to them. But before a contract is settled, the counter-parties record profits and losses – often huge in amount – in their current earnings statements without so much as a penny changing hands. Reported earnings on derivatives are often wildly overstated. That’s because today’s earnings are in a significant way based on estimates whose inaccuracy may not be exposed for many years. (2002 Chairman’s Letter)2002年股东信: 我把衍生品看成定时炸弹，无论是对进行衍生品交易的人，还是对整个经济体而言。基本上，这些工具都是在未来的时间点交换现金流。这种现金流的数量和走向取决于很多因素，诸如利率，股价或者汇率。举例说，如果你做多或卖空标普500的期货合约，你就是在参与简单的衍生品交易，你的收益或亏损取决于指数走势。衍生品合约会有多种多样的久期，有时甚至超过20年。他们的价值捆绑于许多变量。除非衍生品合约有抵押或者保证能执行，它们的价值还取决于合约对手方是否诚信靠谱。在合约交割之前，交易的各方都会在当期利润表上记录利润或者亏损——常常数目巨大——哪怕根本没有现金易手。在衍生平上的利润往往被超级夸大。因为今天的利润其实极大程度取决于对未来的估计，即使这种估计的不准确很多年都不会暴露。（译者按：老巴把衍生品说成洪水猛兽就如同成年人教小孩不要玩火。老巴其实自己衍生品不要玩得太溜，在伯克希尔的资产负债表中期权投资占有很大比重。）Investors should remember that excitement and expenses are their enemies. And if they insist on trying to time their participation in equities, they should try to be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful. (2004 Chairman's Letter)2004年股东信: 投资者需要记住兴奋躁动和开支花销是他们打大敌。如果他们坚持要去选择参与股票市场的最佳时间，那么他们应该在别人贪婪时恐惧，在别人恐惧时贪婪。（译者按: 说来容易，行之甚难！） Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion, which were the work of genius. But Sir Isaac’s talents didn’t extend to investing: He lost a bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later, "I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men’s;” If he had not been traumatized by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover the Fourth Law of Motion: For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion increases. (2005 Chairman's Letter)2005年股东信: 许多年以前，艾萨克·牛顿爵士给了我们三大运动定理，这是天才的工作。但是牛顿爵士的天才不 足以影响到他的投资：他在南海泡沫之时大赔了一笔。他之后说到“我能计算星辰的运动，但是不能计算人的疯狂。”如果他没有被损失伤到心，那么牛顿爵士很可能发现第四大运动定理：总体而言，投资者的回报随着运动的增加而减少。The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down. (2007 Chairman’Letter)2007年股东信: 最差的生意，就是超速发展，需要大量资金去支持其成长，而且还不怎么赚钱的公司。（译者按：这不是在骂京东么？）想一想航空公司。自大莱特兄弟发明飞机以来，航空公司就没有过持久性竞争优势。确实，如果在Kitty Hawk（北卡小鹰镇，怀特兄弟发明飞机的地方）有一个有远见的资本家，那他直接*毙掉奥维尔·莱特可能会帮到他的继任者大忙。Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.” Whether we’re talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down. (2008 Chairman's Letter)2008年股东信: 许多年以前，本·格雷厄姆教导我“价格是你支付的，价值是你获得的。” 无论我们是谈论古票或是谷票或是股票，我喜欢在打折的时候买好货。Home ownership is a wonderful thing. My family and I have enjoyed my present home for 50 years, with more to come. But enjoyment and utility should be the primary motives for purchase, not profit or refi possibilities. And the home purchased ought to fit the income of the purchaser… Putting people into homes, though a desirable goal, shouldn’t be our country’s primary objective. Keeping them in their homes should be the ambition. (2008 Chairman’s Letter)2008年股东信： 有房产是件爽事。过去的50年，我的家人和我一直非常享受我们的家，我们的房子。但是享受和实用应该是买房的首要目标，而不是获利或者再融资的可能性。买入的房子也应该与购买者的收入相符……给人们提供住房，虽然这是件好事，但不应该成为我们国家的首要目标。给人们提供各种机会让他们能保持住在他们的房子中，才是我们的目标。In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he’s incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it – with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees – the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe.It has not been shareholders who have botched the operations of some of our country’s largest financial institutions. Yet they have borne the burden, with 90% or more of the value of their holdings wiped out in most cases of failure. Collectively, they have lost more than $500 billion in just the four largest financial fiascos of the last two years. To say these owners have been “bailed-out” is to make a mockery of the term. （2009 Chairman’s Letter)2009年股东信： 在我的观点中，如果不督促CEO去承担风险控制的全责，那大型金融机构的董事就是玩忽职守。如果他不能胜任工作，那么他应该去干别的。如果他根本就没做到，而要政府介入注资或者担保，那么这个CEO和董事会应该吃到严重的经济后果。在我国最大的金融机构中，股东并没有胡作非为。但是他们却要承担此后果。他们持仓的90%或者更多的价值灰飞烟灭。在过去两年的四次大型金融机构的惨灭中，他们一共损失了5000亿美金。你如果说他们被政府救赎了，就是无情地嘲笑他们。 Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, “You shape your houses and then they shape you.” That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, “You know you’re no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn’t move.”) At Berkshire’s “World Headquarters” our annual rent is $270,212. Moreover, the home-office investment in furniture, art, Coke dispenser, lunch room, high-tech equipment – you name it – totals $301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire’s managers are likely to be careful with it as well. (2010 Chairman’s Letter)2010年股东信： 文化是自我传播的。温斯顿·丘吉尔曾说：“汝先扫屋，屋自会扫汝。”这种智慧通也通用于商业界。官僚程序会促生更多的官僚。皇宫式的公司建筑会培养皇宫式的行为。（有人说，当你钻到车后座后车不会自己走，你就知道自己不再是CEO了。）在伯克希尔的世界总部，我们一年的租金是270,212美金。 我们总部所有投资在家具、艺术装饰、饮料贩卖机、午餐坊间和高科技设备上的资金，大概是301,363美金。只要查理和我能视你的钱为我们自己的钱，伯克希尔的管理者就会非常小心谨慎地对待它们。When leverage works, it magnifies your gains. Your spouse thinks you’re clever, and your neighbors get envious, But leverage is addictive. Once having profited from its wonders, very few people retreat to more conservative practices. And as we all learned in third grade — and some relearned in 2008 — any series of positive numbers, however impressive the numbers may be, evaporates when multiplied by a single zero. History tells us that leverage all too often produces zeroes, even when it is employed by very smart people.（2010 Chairman’s Letter)2010年股东信： 当杠杆工作得好的时候，它会加倍你的收益。你老婆会觉得你帅爆了，你的邻居会羡慕嫉妒恨。但是杠杆是会让人上瘾的。当尝到甜头之后，非常少的人会退回到原先保守的策略。我们小学三年级都学过了（某些人在2008年学到），任何美好的投资回报数字，任凭她有多美，乘以一个零以后都会灰飞