Findings show that banks tend to offer lower rates than bond markets to larger, better-rated and more leveraged firms, but interest rates are not the only factor behind firms’ financial structure decisions. Many firms replaced bond funding with bank loans at the start of the pandemic, at the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war and during the recent monetary policy normalisation, potentially crowding out credit to riskier and smaller firms with limited ability to tap bond markets. This box uses loan-level data from AnaCredit to examine the impact of IFRS 9 on provisioning dynamics around credit events and the role of accounting discretion. The results indicate that provisions for a performing IFRS 9 loan are higher than those for a comparable loan reported under national accounting standards, while the dynamics of provisioning ratios around credit events are similar under both approaches. Specifically, the bulk of provisioning occurs at the time of, or shortly after, default under both approaches, which suggests that IFRS 9 has not fundamentally changed provisioning patterns. Moreover, provisioning patterns for IFRS 9 loans around default events depend on banks’ capital headroom, with better capitalised banks generally provisioning more. This is consistent with banks with less capital using accounting discretion to provision less to preserve their capital. While it is difficult to arrive at firm conclusions on the overall adequacy of current provisions, banks with less capital headroom may be at greater risk of being under-provisioned, possibly due in part to the discretion offered by IFRS 9. This box investigates recent changes in the cost and the composition of bank deposits. It provides estimates of the sensitivity of banks’ deposit rates to changes in policy rates, demonstrating that this depends on the type of deposit and on bank-specific characteristics. Moreover, it finds that competition in the term deposit market has been increasing recently. It goes on to show that, since the beginning of 2022, higher interest rates have increased non-financial corporations’ appetite for better remunerated deposit types, shifting banks’ deposit mixes away from stickier overnight deposits towards rate-sensitive term deposits. Finally, it hints that, going forward, rising competition and a reallocation of funds from overnight to term deposits may lead to an increase in the cost of deposits that is faster and larger than expected. Foreign investors have a significant footprint in euro area government bond markets, but this has fallen since the Eurosystem launched its asset purchase programmes. Against this background, this box analyses the role and behaviour of global and domestic investment funds in euro area government bond markets. The results indicate that after global risk shocks, domestic investment funds tend to turn to euro area government bonds, while global funds cut back their exposures. Moreover, after events that lead to spreads widening among euro area government bond markets, global investment funds tend to play a stabilising role in euro area government bond markets since they typically increase their exposure to medium or lower-rated euro area government bonds. The presence of institutional investors, particularly investment funds, in euro area residential real estate (RRE) markets has increased markedly in recent years. Yet the implications for housing markets, as well as for financial stability more broadly, remain largely unstudied. This box shows that a positive (negative) demand shock from institutional investors has a positive (negative) and persistent impact on RRE prices between 2007 and 2021. Also, the link between local economic fundamentals and house price growth appears to weaken in regions with a greater presence of institutional investors. This may reinforce the build-up of financial vulnerabilities, as investor demand falls and the cycle turns. It also raises concerns that vulnerabilities in the investment fund sector may amplify any real estate market correction, with potential implications for the financial resilience of banks, households and exposed firms. For this reason, it is important to develop policies aimed at enhancing the resilience of real estate investment funds – such as lower redemption frequencies, longer notice and settlement periods, and longer minimum holding periods. Following a strong post-pandemic recovery in profits, euro area non-financial corporations (NFCs) are now facing the risk of stagnating economic activity combined with tightening financial conditions. NFC vulnerabilities might increase as higher interest rates start to weigh on the ability of firms to cover their interest expenses, with highly indebted firms being particularly affected. This box shows that the share of vulnerable loans has been increasing since the second half of 2022 as financial conditions tighten, with those sectors of the economy that were impacted the most by the pandemic being significantly more affected than others. It also finds that higher interest rates could increase corporate vulnerabilities during periods of low or negative economic growth, while there is no statistically significant impact of higher rates on firms’ health during periods of economic expansion. Climate change can have a negative effect on sovereign balance sheets directly (when contingent liabilities materialise) and indirectly (when it has an impact on the real economy and the financial system). This special feature highlights the contingent sovereign risks that stem from an untimely or disorderly transition to a net-zero economy and from more frequent and severe natural catastrophes. It also looks at the positive role that governments can play in reducing climate-related financial risks and incentivising adaptation. If the recent trend of ever-lower emissions across the EU is to be sustained, further public sector investment is essential. In this context, the progress made to strengthen green capital markets has fostered government issuance of green and sustainable bonds to finance the transition. While putting significant resources into adaptation projects can increase countries’ resilience to climate change, the economic costs of extreme climate-related events are still set to rise materially in the EU. Only a quarter of disaster losses are currently insured and fiscal support has mitigated related macroeconomic and financial stability risks in the past. Looking ahead, vulnerabilities arising from contingent liabilities may increase in countries with high physical risk and a large insurance protection gap. If these risks rise alongside sovereign debt sustainability concerns, the impact on financial stability could be amplified by feedback loops that see sovereign credit conditions and ratings deteriorate. Banks are connected to non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI) sector entities via loans, securities and derivatives exposures, as well as funding dependencies. Linkages with the NBFI sector expose banks to liquidity, market and credit risks. Funding from NBFI entities would appear to be the most likely and strongest spillover channel, considering that NBFI entities maintain their liquidity buffers primarily as deposits and very short-term repo transactions with banks. At the same time, direct credit exposures are smaller and are often related to NBFI entities associated with banking groups. Links with NBFI entities are highly concentrated in a small group of systemically important banks, whose sizeable capital and liquidity buffers are essential to mitigate spillover risks. The ability of market participants to access funding and conduct transactions in an efficient way is a prerequisite for financial stability, providing shock-absorption capacity and, in turn, limiting the scope for shock amplification. Market liquidity and funding liquidity are inherently connected. When market liquidity evaporates, financial market pricing becomes less reliable and tends to overreact, leading to increased market volatility and higher funding costs. Funding liquidity enables market participants to take exposures onto their balance sheets, thus absorbing fluctuations in demand and supply in the name of efficient market functioning. Under extreme conditions, markets can stop functioning altogether. While liquidity has many dimensions, from a systemic perspective the interplay between market liquidity and funding liquidity is key, as these two dimensions can reinforce each other in ways that generate liquidity spirals. Cyclical factors such as the business cycle, systemic leverage and monetary and fiscal policy affect the probability of liquidity stress arising. In the light of the current challenges of high financial market volatility, increased risk of recession, bouts of heightened risk aversion and monetary policy normalisation, this special feature constructs composite indicators for market liquidity and funding liquidity. It attempts also to identify the causes of poor market and funding liquidity conditions and to show how the two dimensions interact in the euro area. Energy sector firms use energy derivatives under different strategies depending on their main area of activity, business model and exposure to risk in physical markets. The significant volatility and skyrocketing prices seen in energy markets since March 2022 have resulted in large margin calls, generating liquidity risks for derivatives users. Strategies employed by companies to alleviate liquidity stress may lead to an accumulation of credit risk for their lenders or their counterparties in less collateralised segments of the derivatives market. Further price increases would accentuate nascent vulnerabilities, creating additional stress in a concentrated market. These issues underline the need to review margining practices and enhance the liquidity preparedness of all market participants to deal with large margin calls. This box assesses the development of the liquidity mismatch for a broad sample of euro area open-ended bond funds. This mismatch arises if funds primarily invest in less liquid assets while at the same time offering their investors the option of short-term redemptions. In 2017 the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published policy recommendations to address structural vulnerabilities related to asset management activities, including liquidity mismatch. Our results suggest that the liquidity mismatch increased in the years up to the pandemic. In March 2020 many funds faced substantial redemption pressures, especially those with a relatively large structural liquidity mismatch, creating large fire-sale externalities. The increase in cash holdings after this shock indicates procyclicality in liquidity management strategies, suggesting that fund managers do not necessarily have the incentives to maintain sufficient liquidity buffers. Policies that aim to better align redemption terms with asset liquidity would help to enhance the resilience of the investment fund sector, as the liquidity mismatch is still prevalent and has not declined since the publication of the FSB policy recommendations in 2017. This box investigates the measurement of banks’ exposures to concentration risk related to climate change. It does so by introducing a new metric to quantify carbon-related concentration risk in banks’ corporate loan portfolios. Using data on individual borrowers’ emissions, the formula of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is extended to create a carbon-weighted HHI (cwHHI).