wcy1122/Long-TTS-Eval huggingface dataset:
What can we learn from children? They're fiercely loyal to their friends, fast to defend, quick to apologize and swift to forgive. But as a past kindergarten teacher -- always a kindergarten teacher at heart -- I want to share with you a surprising lesson I learned from them. I love human behaviors -- how we act differently in different. And these cute five-year-olds and the perfect height and almost a competitive were so interesting. My first class was called a Mars class. I had 10 students, and each were so full of character. But there was this one kid. Let's call him Sam. Sam behaved like he forgot. He was so independent. Not only did he know but he knew how to tie. He also never took home a dirty thermos, because he would clean it after his lunch. And if something happened he would do so very quietly. He didn't ask for help much himself, but he was the one help on things like, can he help them finish their kimchi? He didn't like showing and came across as "the cool kid." If you gave him a good-morning hug, he would roll his eyes and make a funny face but also stand there and wait. He was so smart and reliable that even I would forget. As a novice teacher, I spent a lot of time observing how more experienced teachers. And I noticed something very peculiar. Oftentimes when kids fall, they don't start crying immediately. They would stand up, puzzled, as if trying to make up their mind -- you know, "What just happened?" "Is this a big enough deal for me to cry? Does this hurt? What's going on?" Usually kids will be OK one that they trust. Eyes lock, and then. When I noticed this, because to me, that meant and had proven that you're capable. You were a hero to them. Weeks went by of me have kids run to them in tears, and I'd watch in jealousy. Oh, was I jealous. I mean, of course but I really wanted that. Yes, I had earned a kid's trust. Then, it finally happened. It was a beautiful day. It was during recess. The kids were playing and I was getting some things laminated -- because teachers in the teacher's room next door. Then I heard a kid yell. So I went out to peak, looked around for Sam, and there he was, looking very puzzled, as if he was trying to add double digits. Then he looked at me, our eyes locked, and then it happened. His lower lip started to tremble and his tiny eyes. Then he burst out in tears and it was glorious. I'll never forget that moment. He let me give him a big hug and it turns out that yes, so there was no one. We checked to make sure and he overcame. It was in that moment, oddly -- it didn't feel like. But rather he was giving me this gift, this opportunity to help him. And it's something very weird. With his vulnerability in coming to me for help you would think that gives me the power, but in that moment, no, it was quite the opposite, and the power shifted even more so to him. Being asked for help is a privilege: a gift for you to do especially when it's coming. With everything I learned or in "teaching" kindergarten, I went to conquer other things in life. Fast-forward nine years, and I landed in an association in a role that works. Working with volunteers but there are some things like how to set boundaries.
Systems that can generalize, learn from experience, and adapt to new circumstances have the potential to reach higher levels of performance than systems that must be modified manually to deal with situations their designers did not anticipate. Virtually all high-impact application systems can be more powerful if they can learn from experience. For example, information assistants that can learn will be able to tailor their information-retrieval process to a user’s needs without having to be told exactly what to do; they will instead generalize from previous interactions with the user. Learning skills will enable an intelligent coach system to deal with new types of problems, for example, drawing on its experience in the design of one type of automobile and applying it to the design of another. Networks of robots and computer-based agents in simulated worlds can avoid future coordination problems by learning from their experience in interacting with other robots. Basic research has steadily advanced the fundamental technology of machine learning for more than two decades.
There is a broad consensus that macro stress tests are a useful tool for making such assessments and, accordingly, the authorities in almost all euro area and non-euro area EU Member States in central and eastern Europe have carried out such exercises in the course of 2009. The nature of the stress tests conducted differed across countries, reflecting variations in business cycle developments, as well as differences in specific sources of risk and vulnerability. Nevertheless, the exercises in many countries assessed the sensitivity of non-performing loan rates and capital adequacy ratios to a worsening of economic conditions that was more severe than projected. This box, which draws upon findings published by the national central banks of the EU Member States in this region, summarises the key conclusions of these exercises. Strains in the residential mortgage market in the United States are generally perceived as one of the main triggers of the ongoing financial and economic crisis.
As the structures of financial instruments have become increasingly complex, market participants need instruments which allow them to trade volatility in order to hedge structured transactions or to take purely directional views on volatility. While "plain vanilla" options contracts on underlying assets provide exposure to the volatility of the underlying asset, they are impure for hedging or taking positions on volatility because they simultaneously provide exposure to the direction of the underlying asset. Although hedging options according to the BlackScholes prescription can remove the exposure to the underlying asset, so-called delta hedging is at best inaccurate because many of the Black-Scholes assumptions are violated in practice. For instance, volatility cannot be accurately estimated, financial assets cannot be traded continuously, transaction costs cannot be ignored, markets sometimes move discontinuously, and liquidity is often a problem. A feature of credit derivatives markets over recent years has been constant product innovation. Several recent products have evolved out of a risk management technique pioneered in the 1960s known as CPPI, a strategy designed to leverage investments while providing a measure of downside protection. CPDOs represent one of the most recent additions in this regard, and were introduced for the first time in summer 2006. A CPDO is a fully funded credit structure that combines high leverage in the CDS market with a mechanism to place a part of an excess yield in a reserve in order to secure future payments and absorb losses. This Box describes the basics of the CPDO structure, as well as the possible impacts on credit markets and the risks associated with the structure. Market intelligence indicates that financial market participants have rarely seen liquidity in global financial market as abundant as since 2003 and that an almost insatiable appetite has existed among investors for some time for privately issued assets, especially risky credit products.
Over the few months following the default of Lehman Brothers, conditions in the European corporate bond market deteriorated significantly. This box, after discussing the concept and the main drivers of the bond-CDS basis, examines why this measure may be a good indicator of overall conditions in the corporate bond market. In view of the persistence of the negative basis in the investment-grade segment of the market, the box also discusses the main reasons for the failure of arbitrage and its consequences for the investors that used basis-related strategies. Since August 2007 the euro money market has experienced severe disruptions as a result of contagion from shocks in other market segments, an increased preference for liquidity and heightened counterparty credit risk concerns. However, changes in liquidity conditions have not been homogeneous across the various segments of the euro money market. This box presents a simple "barometer" which can help in the monitoring of market conditions across those segments. Following the change to a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment as of the maintenance period beginning on 8 October 2008, aggregate liquidity provision in Eurosystem refinancing operations increased significantly, exceeding the strict needs resulting from autonomous factors and reserve requirements. The aggregate excess liquidity has been reflected in an elevated recourse to the deposit facility of the Eurosystem. This box discusses some factors that may help to explain the demand for excess liquidity by focusing on the financial stability dimension of the operational framework for monetary policy implementation in times of financial market stress. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests that, in addition to partially taking over the intermediation of liquidity shocks from the market, the Eurosystem has offered banks insurance against liquidity uncertainty and has therefore contributed actively to operational and financial stability.
Therefore, tackling the persistent asset quality problems, along with the completion of the banking union, would seem to be pivotal to reaping the potential benefits of cross-border banking within the euro area in terms of risk diversification and risk-sharing. Effectively functioning repo markets are of key importance for both financial stability and monetary policy, but the excessive use of repos may also be a source of systemic risk as witnessed during the recent financial crisis. Regulatory reforms introduced since the start of the crisis have aimed to contain systemic risk related to the excessive build-up of leverage and unstable funding, but recently some concerns have been raised about their potential effects on the functioning of the repo market. This special feature presents new evidence on the drivers of banks’ activity in the repo market with respect to regulatory reforms. In addition, it takes a closer look at the repo market structure and pricing dynamics, in particular around banks’ balance sheet reporting dates. While the observed volatility around reporting dates suggests that the calculation methodology for some regulatory metrics should be reviewed, overall, the findings indicate that unintended consequences of regulatory reforms on the provision of repo services by euro area banks have not been material. The reduction in asset price volatility in recent years has taken place in tandem with investors lowering the premia required for lower-rated assets. The current favourable market sentiment could however change abruptly if, for instance, investors were to reassess the outlook for growth or monetary policy. Potential surges in asset price volatility could be amplified by: (i) investors selling off assets perceived as overvalued; (ii) the high levels of corporate leverage; and/or (iii) a rapid unwinding of market positions that benefit from low volatility. Low volatility in financial markets is therefore being closely monitored by financial stability authorities, as it may mask an underpricing of risks and a build-up of financial imbalances.
Republican representative Anna Paulina Luna accused Democrats of spreading hateful rhetoric. However, the comments from Trump and his allies have stirred controversy, with critics saying they neglect to acknowledge that the spate of violence is affecting left-leaning politicians too, and arguing they could heighten tensions further. The US has experienced about 150 politically motivated attacks in the first six months of this year. That is nearly twice as many as over the same period last year, an expert told Reuters news agency. Mike Jensen - from the University of Maryland, which for more than 50 years has tracked political violence in a database - said the US is in a 'a very, very dangerous spot right now'. 'This could absolutely serve as a kind of flashpoint that inspires more of it.' Kirk's murder is the latest in a string of high-profile attacks against political leaders in the US, including two attempted assassinations on Trump during his 2024 election campaign. The president suffered an ear injury in an attempted assassination at a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, last July. Gabrielle Giffords and Nancy Pelosi, both targets of political violence themselves, have condemned the attack. In June, Minnesota's top Democratic legislator and her husband were murdered in their home. In 2022, the husband of then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was bludgeoned with a hammer after a man broke into the couple's home looking for the top-ranking Democrat with the intention of taking her hostage. Former US representative Gabby Giffords – who survived being shot in the head during a meeting with constituents in 2011 – also condemned the attack. 'Democratic societies will always have political disagreements, but we must never allow America to become a country that confronts those disagreements with violence.'
Secondly, the growth rate of lending to this sector has also been the fastest among the non-financial sectors in recent years. The growth rate of loans extended to households in some EU countries has been very strong over recent years. There has been little sign yet of a reversion to more conventional growth patterns in 2004, and this category has been the fastest growing type of lending in the euro area for the past two years. This Special Feature concentrates on lending trends to households over the period 2002-2003, though longer periods are used where relevant. It assesses the most important exposures for euro area and EU banks to the household sector as far as the data allows.
CICC suggests that US importers are largely absorbing the cost and not yet fully passing on the cost to their US customers. CICC commented that 'US importers, sandwiched in the middle of supply chains, find it difficult to fully pass costs to the end market or shift the burden entirely to exporters, so they cope by compressing profit margins.' Ultimately, these importers will likely push the cost onto their customers in the United States, thereby avoiding a sustained compression of profits. Meanwhile, it has been reported that exporter absorption of tariff costs has been much greater in Southeast Asia and Europe, than in China. CICC says this reflects the highly competitive nature of Chinese exports. Still, Chinese exports to the United States are down sharply as many importers are frustrated with much higher prices. It is reported that Chinese exporters are struggling to sell to the United States, worried that weak sales will result in idle factories. Now, things are changing. And it largely reflects the impact of a shift in US trade policy toward India. Until recently, the United States worked hard to deepen ties with India, largely as an offset to the rising power of China. Yet relations have soured following the imposition of a 50% tariff on imports from India. The stated reason for the 50% tariff was Indian purchases of Russian oil. India has indicated it will not back down. Meanwhile, China has taken advantage of the situation by trying to enhance relations with India as well as Russia. Last week, the leaders of all three countries were together in China. China’s leader said that the three countries should be partners. This was the first visit of India’s prime minister to China in seven years. Meanwhile, it is reported that China’s savers—with their US$22 trillion in liquid assets—are shifting from fixed-income products to equities, betting that China’s technological prowess will pay off for investors.
The ability of the household sector to adapt to changing interest payments over the interest rate cycle can have potentially important consequences for financial stability. In simple terms, at an aggregate level, household exposures to changes in interest rates depend upon the share of outstanding debt whose contracted rate of interest will be subject to adjustment in the short run. The higher the share of such debt in the total, the larger the effect on interest payments. In the absence of any offsetting growth in households’ disposable income, an interest rate rise would have a negative impact on the sustainability of housing debt.
Black American women face disproportionately high rates of maternal mortality and morbidity. Better research and care can transform health outcomes and boost the economy by $25 billion. Conventional wisdom holds that women live longer and healthier lives than men—but that’s only partly true. Globally, women may outlive men, but they spend 25 percent more of their lives in poor health. For Black women in the United States, the picture is even more troubling. Maternal-mortality rates are two to four times higher for Black women than for White, Hispanic, or Asian women, reaching 50 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2023. If current trends continue, that rate could nearly double to 94 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2040, placing the United States on par with many low-income countries. Mortality is only part of the story. Black American women are disproportionately affected by a range of potentially debilitating maternal-health conditions, including preeclampsia, gestational diabetes, and postpartum depression. An analysis by the McKinsey Institute for Economic Mobility (IEM) and McKinsey Health Institute (MHI) finds that these conditions not only pose immediate health risks but also have long-term consequences. In 2025 alone, these conditions could result in the loss of 350,000 healthy life years for Black women giving birth—meaning that disability and chronic illness connected to maternal health may shape a substantial portion of their lives. This health gap extends from mothers to infants. Black infants in the United States are more than twice as likely to die as their White, Hispanic, and Asian peers.
First, the banking sector may be directly exposed to non-bank financial institutions through equity investment or credit claims. Credit claims often arise in connection with prime brokerage services through which non-bank financial firms increase their leverage. In addition, the liquidity credit lines that provide non-financial firms with a backstop against an outflow of their short-term liabilities could also give rise to a significant exposure. Second, non-bank financial institutions play an important role in the funding of the banking sector by investing in bank debt securities and providing liquidity through secured money markets, as well as through the provision of collateral. Third, banks and non-bank financial institutions are also indirectly interconnected through common exposures to assets. Distress in one of these sectors may give rise to asset fire sales, which would depress the prices of assets held by the other sector and, through mark-to-market accounting, adversely impact the profits and capital of that sector. Many emerging market economies (EMEs) are facing a difficult combination of slow growth, weak commodity prices, and further tightening credit conditions. These challenging aggregate conditions point to the potential for negative spillovers to the euro area. Direct exposures of euro area banks to emerging market assets remain limited (see Box 1 of the May 2016 FSR).
Yet that was a time of historically low inflation. As such, there was no need to tighten monetary policy at that time. On the other hand, household financial conditions have worsened, with the delinquency rate on credit card debt now at the highest level since just after the global financial crisis in 2011. The delinquency rate on automotive loans has also increased considerably. Plus, the end of the moratorium on student debt has led to a further increase in financial stress for student debtors. The challenges faced by the household sector provide an argument in favor of monetary easing. As indicated above, it is nearly a certainty that the Fed will cut the benchmark interest rate later this month, likely starting a gradual process of easing monetary policy. This could come in conjunction with a further acceleration in inflation. That would be an unusual combination of events. This means that the absorption of the tariffs is mostly taking place on the US side of the Pacific Ocean. CICC suggests that US importers are largely absorbing the cost and not yet fully passing on the cost to their US customers. CICC commented that “US importers, sandwiched in the middle of supply chains, find it difficult to fully pass costs to the end market or shift the burden entirely to exporters, so they cope by compressing profit margins.” My view is that, ultimately, these importers will likely push the cost onto their customers in the United States, thereby avoiding a sustained compression of profits. Meanwhile, it has been reported that exporter absorption of tariff costs has been much greater in Southeast Asia and Europe, than in China. CICC says this reflects the highly competitive nature of Chinese exports. Still, Chinese exports to the United States are down sharply as many importers are frustrated with much higher prices. It is reported that Chinese exporters are struggling to sell to the United States, worried that weak sales will result in idle factories. Now, things are changing. And it largely reflects the impact of a shift in US trade policy toward India. Until recently, the United States worked hard to deepen ties with India, largely as an offset to the rising power of China. Yet relations have soured following the imposition of a 50% tariff on imports from India. The stated reason for the 50% tariff was Indian purchases of Russian oil. India has indicated it will not back down. Meanwhile, China has taken advantage of the situation by trying to enhance relations with India as well as Russia. Last week, the leaders of all three countries were together in China. China’s leader said that the three countries should be partners.
In particular, mortgage debt appeared to be held mostly by high-income households, which tend to have good prospects for servicing debt. Nevertheless, considering the substantial increase in house prices and the significant accumulation of mortgage debt in some Member States after theperiod covered by the data examined in this Special Feature, continued monitoring of household sector indebtedness is called for. Banks are key components of the euro area financial system. Understanding the interplay between banks and their operating environment assists in identifying sources of risk and vulnerability within the system. This Special Feature attempts to examine the empirical importance of bank-specific, market structure and macro-financial factors on euro area banks’ financial performance over the last decade or so. The EU Regulation requiring all listed companies, including banks, to prepare consolidated financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has been a positive development that will increase the transparency and comparability of financial statements in the EU. However, the first-time application of these new rules will have a significant impact on financial statements which should be taken into account when analysing the accounting figures. The aim of this Special Feature is to provide a brief overview of the main ways in which IFRS will affect banks’ primary financial statements. Central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs) play an important role in efficiently reallocating counterparty credit risks and liquidity risks in financial markets. However, as systemically important players, they must manage their risks in an adequate way in order to avoid creating new risks for financial stability.