This may mask instances where specific products within a broad HS 6 classification have a high rearrangement ratio. Rearrangement ratios have been calculated using trade values, which are an imperfect proxy for trade volumes. Trade values are generally more reliably recorded than trade volumes, and therefore our analysis is based on the former. However, using trade values implicitly assumes similar unit prices and consistent price reporting across exporting economies, an assumption that may not generally hold. For example, for a commoditized product like hot-rolled steel band, European exports are on average about 60 percent more expensive than China’s. And for something like a cotton T-shirt, the average US import from Europe costs about eight times more than one from China. In these cases, rearranging a certain dollar amount of trade from China to Europe would not deliver the same volume of product. A high rearrangement ratio for US Christmas decorations might dampen the yuletide mood but does not pose major risks to lives or livelihoods. Disruptions in the supply of products such as semiconductors and lithium-ion batteries would have more meaningful consequences. Cutting back on consumption is not a good option. And some products, such as biologic medicines and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, require substantial investment and scarce know-how to produce, meaning that ramping up production is less feasible, at least in the short term. The average US China-rearrangement ratio is about 0.4, but the figure varies widely across sectors. It is lowest for pharmaceutical products (roughly 0.03), midrange (between 0.3 and 0.5) for electronics and textiles, and highest (more than 0.9) for “other manufacturing”—a catch-all category encompassing products from yoga mats to staplers to lawn furniture to knitting needles. These products are often contract (made-to-order) goods. Imports of consumer electronics are more difficult to rearrange than the intermediate components within them, like semiconductors. Almost all intermediate components have ratios lower than 0.3. In contrast, the most-imported consumer electronics have ratios ranging from about 0.3 to 1.0. Consider smartphones, which are at the lower end of the consumer electronics range, with a ratio of about 0.4. While 80 percent of US imports come from China, manufacturers such as Vietnam and India currently export smartphones in sizable quantities to the non-US global market and so, in principle, could service the US market—if consumers were brand agnostic. For laptops, on the other hand, the rearrangement ratio is nearly 1.0. The United States imports more than $45 billion worth of laptops each year, more than 20 times more than it exports. China supplies about $35 billion of this total, roughly equal to all exports from Europe (the 27 member states of the European Union plus Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and Asia to non-US markets. The range is also broad for textiles. In general, apparel such as T-shirts, jerseys, and trousers is exported by a wide range of economies, with rearrangement ratios generally less than 0.1. Indeed, China has been shifting away from this category and moved from representing nearly 45 percent of global apparel exports in 2010 to 25 percent in 2023. However, rearrangement ratios are greater than 0.5 for other products ranging from synthetic-fiber socks to face masks and surgical drapes. Products within the other manufacturing category have rearrangement ratios from near zero to well past 1.0. Metal chairs and vacuum flasks are examples. Of course, this is all approximation. The trousers shipped from Bangladesh may have a different cut, stitching, and fabric from those shipped from Italy. The cell phone manufactured in China may not be the same brand as the one made in South Korea. The coffee from Indonesia may taste more earthy, and that from Ethiopia, fruitier. But for our calculations, we treat products with the same classification, known as HS 6 codes, as interchangeable without considering quality factors or price. US consumer goods imports from China are generally harder to rearrange than business inputs. Rearrangement is relatively easier for the roughly 35 percent of all US imports from China that have a rearrangement ratio less than 0.1. Consider truck tires, which had a rearrangement ratio of 0.1 in 2018, before the United States imposed tariffs on China that rose to 25 percent. This led US imports from China to drop by more than 60 percent, but total US truck tire imports remained stable as exports from other economies rearranged toward the United States. In practice, this means that to replace Chinese imports, US buyers would need to attract up to 10 percent of the currently available global export market. Even this would be a substantial undertaking. New input sources need to be found, product requirements specified, and contracts negotiated. About 60 percent of intermediate goods—those used in production processes—fall into this easier-to-rearrange bucket. Examples include semiconductors and auto parts. An additional roughly 30 percent of intermediate goods have rearrangement ratios less than 0.25. The United States tends to import a large fraction of these types of products from economies other than mainland China, and an additional supply base that might be tapped exists. On the other end of the spectrum, full rearrangement is currently impossible for the 5 percent of US imports that have a ratio greater than 1.0. These tend to be goods for final consumption—products that people buy for personal use—including consumer electronics as well as various forms of textiles and other manufacturing. In many cases, China has gained enormous cost advantages in producing these goods, making it both difficult and unappealing to compete. Some specific critical intermediate products also have a ratio greater than 1.0. Examples include rare earth magnets, which are used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and defense applications, as well as some chemicals used in pharmaceutical manufacturing.