The U.S. government supports various types of democracy assistance, which State and USAID categorize under their democracy, human rights, and governance portfolios. State and USAID use the Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions to categorize democracy assistance activities in six program areas: rule of law, good governance, political competition and consensus building, civil society, independent media and free flow of information, and human rights. Table 1 shows these six program areas and their elements. State bureaus and offices—in particular, DRL and INL—and USAID provide funding for democracy assistance. State. State’s democracy assistance is provided by DRL, INL, and other State bureaus and offices. DRL. As the U.S. government’s primary foreign policy entity advocating for democracy globally, DRL funds programs in every region of the world to promote human rights, democracy, and transparent and accountable governance. INL. INL provides funding for programs that combat crime and narcotics trafficking, including democracy assistance to promote the rule of law, combat corruption, and promote good governance. Other bureaus and offices. Other State bureaus and offices, such as the regional bureaus and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, provide democracy assistance related to their geographic or functional areas. USAID. As the lead U.S. government agency for international development, USAID considers democracy, human rights, and governance to be central to its core mission. USAID missions overseas play a primary role in providing democracy assistance, and the regional bureaus in Washington, D.C., provide oversight of this assistance. USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, headquartered in Washington, D.C., consists of several offices, including two that support the bureau’s mission to promote democratic and resilient societies: the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance and the Office of Transition Initiatives. State and USAID allocated a total of more than $8.8 billion for democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. State allocated 33 percent of this amount—a total of $2.9 billion, averaging approximately $727 million annually—to DRL, INL, and other bureaus to provide democracy assistance. USAID allocated the remaining 67 percent—$5.9 billion, averaging approximately $1.5 billion annually. Figure 1 shows the total amounts that State and USAID allocated for democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, DRL, INL, and USAID directed allocations for democracy assistance to many of the same countries, although the program areas they supported varied. DRL, INL, and USAID directed democracy assistance allocations to a combined total of 100 countries, including 33 countries where all three entities provided such assistance (see fig. 2). DRL directed democracy assistance allocations to 67 countries; INL, to 45 countries; and USAID, to 84 countries. State officials said that, because the countries have serious democracy-related challenges, the agencies providing this assistance may address these challenges from different perspectives and with different objectives. Although DRL and USAID directed democracy assistance allocations to many of the same countries, DRL focused a greater percentage of its funding in countries where citizens enjoy fewer democratic freedoms. DRL directed 70 percent of its allocations for democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018 to less democratic countries—those rated as “not free” by Freedom House’s 2018 “Freedom in the World” survey. In contrast, USAID directed about half of its allocations for democracy assistance during this period to “not free” countries. Similarly, although DRL, INL, and USAID directed their allocations for democracy assistance to many of the same countries, the entities concentrated funding in different program areas. In fiscal years 2017 and 2018, DRL and INL directed the largest percentages of democracy assistance allocations to encouraging human rights and promoting the rule of law, respectively, while USAID directed about half of its democracy assistance allocations to promoting good governance (see fig. 3). As figure 3 shows: DRL directed 36 percent (about $203 million) of democracy assistance allocations to projects supporting human rights, 19 percent (about $107 million) to projects supporting civil society, and 14 percent (about $76.4 million) to projects supporting independent media and free flow of information. DRL directed the smallest amounts to projects supporting rule of law, political competition and consensus building, and good governance. INL directed more than 98 percent (about $580 million) of democracy assistance allocations to promote the rule of law. USAID directed 49 percent (about $1.5 billion) of its democracy assistance allocations to projects promoting good governance and 19 percent (about $600 million) to projects supporting civil society. USAID distributed the remainder across the other four democracy assistance program areas, allocating the smallest amounts to projects supporting human rights and independent media and free flow of information. State’s DRL and INL and USAID have strategies that define their roles in democracy assistance, and their funding obligations in the selected countries in fiscal years 2015 through 2018 generally aligned with these roles. DRL and INL strategies identify various program areas as aspects of the bureaus’ respective roles in providing democracy assistance. For example, DRL supports a range of democracy program areas and emphasizes human rights, while INL focuses on the rule of law. In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, DRL’s and INL’s funding obligations for democracy assistance in the countries we selected for our review—the DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine—generally aligned with the roles defined in bureau strategies and described by bureau officials. USAID plays the leading role in U.S. development assistance overseas, including democracy assistance, according to its 2013 strategy on democracy, human rights, and governance. We found that USAID’s democracy assistance in the four selected countries generally aligned with its strategic goal of supporting democratic change to achieve broader development goals. DRL’s 2018 bureau strategy states that the bureau’s mission is to “champion American ideals as a means of combating the spread of authoritarianism, terrorism, and subversion of sovereign democracies.” According to the strategy, DRL works through diplomatic channels to support democracy-related areas; support human rights, labor, and democracy defenders; and publish reports on human rights in all countries, among other activities. In a 2015 report to Congress, State noted that 90 percent of DRL’s programs operate in restrictive or challenging environments. Although the report did not define restrictive or challenging environments, DRL officials said that the bureau’s assistance focuses on building civil society and supporting diplomatic initiatives to improve governance, particularly in repressive and closed societies. According to the officials, the bureau supports democracy and human rights globally, including in areas where such programs face threats from host governments, and is not constrained to working in countries with a U.S. presence. DRL designs and manages all of its democracy assistance projects from Washington, D.C. DRL officials noted that DRL projects typically receive total allocations of at least $500,000, have a duration of 1 to 5 years, and are implemented by U.S.- based or other large organizations. INL’s most recent bureau strategy states that INL is at the forefront of responding to international security challenges and that INL promotes U.S. leadership by advancing rule-of-law principles. INL officials said that the bureau conducts democracy assistance work to support its provision of security assistance and that INL programming helps governments provide accountability to their citizens. According to agency officials, INL’s funding for democracy assistance generally supports host-country governments through bilateral agreements and is not always project based. INL programs can be managed by INL staff at State’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at embassies overseas. INL’s democracy assistance is implemented by its own staff, other U.S. agencies, and U.S.-based or international organizations. DRL and INL officials told us that they ensure consistency between their democracy-related strategic goals and the goals in overarching strategies, such as the government-wide National Security Strategy and State and USAID’s Joint Strategic Plan. The most recent Joint Strategic Plan notes that State and USAID will work to “counter instability, transnational crime, and violence that threaten U.S. interests by strengthening citizen-responsive governance, security, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.” The Joint Strategic Plan also notes that State and USAID will focus on places that pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests. DRL’s and INL’s total obligations of funding for democracy assistance in the four selected countries for fiscal years 2015 through 2018 generally reflected their defined roles. DRL’s obligations for projects in the selected countries generally reflected the bureau’s focus on supporting democracy and human rights, as defined in DRL’s bureau strategy and described by officials. Overall, the majority of DRL obligations in the four selected countries focused on projects supporting civil society, human rights, and independent media and the free flow of information. In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, 60 to 100 percent of project-level funding was dedicated to these program areas. DRL obligations for democracy assistance projects in the selected countries averaged more than $800,000 for 2 years. Consistent with its stated role of protecting human rights globally, DRL obligated at least a quarter of this funding in three of the four countries to projects that supported human rights (see fig. 4). Similarly, INL’s democracy assistance obligations in the selected countries during the same period generally reflected the bureau’s focus on supporting the rule of law, as defined in its bureau strategy and described by officials. Data for the four countries show that INL obligated $3.2 million in the DRC, $12.5 million in Nigeria, $$3.9 million in Tunisia, and $5 million in Ukraine for democracy assistance for fiscal years 2015 through 2018. In Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine, 100 percent of INL’s democracy-related obligations supported the rule of law. In the DRC, 92 percent of INL’s democracy-related obligations supported the rule of law and the remaining 8 percent supported good governance. (See apps. III through VI for more information on State’s democracy assistance in the DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine, respectively.) The 2013 USAID Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance states that USAID plays the leading role in U.S. development assistance overseas, including democracy assistance. The strategy explains that support for democracy, human rights, and governance is essential to achieving the agency’s broader social and economic development goals, which, USAID has noted, contribute to self-reliance. USAID officials told us that, to support democracy from a development perspective, USAID generally funds multiyear, multimillion-dollar democracy assistance projects that are implemented by U.S.-based or international organizations. USAID’s democracy strategy also identifies the roles of various USAID units involved in implementing U.S. democracy assistance. For example, according to the strategy, USAID missions are to play the primary role in implementing it by both designing and managing democracy-focused programs, while USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance is to provide technical and other assistance to the missions and manage some mechanisms to support programs, among other things. Further, the strategy clarifies relationships in terms of leading and supporting units in areas of democracy assistance and identifies roles of various other agencies, including State. In all four selected countries, USAID’s democracy assistance, as reflected in country-level strategies and projects, generally aligned with the Joint Strategic Plan and with the agency’s democracy strategy to support democratic change in order to achieve broader development goals. We found that the USAID country development cooperation strategy for each of the selected countries articulated democracy assistance objectives to support the country’s overall development. According to USAID officials, these strategies guide the type of democracy assistance provided in a particular country on the basis of the country’s needs and generally focus on supporting sectoral change, such as through policy reform or institution building. For example, the 2016 USAID strategy for Tunisia included a development objective to promote social cohesion through democratic consolidation. Objectives for selected USAID projects in the four countries also reflected the agency’s goal of effecting long-term, development-based change through democracy assistance. For instance, consistent with its country strategy for Tunisia, USAID obligated nearly $22 million in fiscal years 2017 and 2018 for a project designed to improve the relationship between Tunisians and their civic and government institutions, in part by enhancing the responsiveness of government institutions (see fig. 5). Other characteristics of USAID’s democracy assistance projects in the selected countries also reflected the agency’s defined role. In each of the four countries, a democracy office in USAID’s mission in the country managed democracy assistance, consistent with USAID’s democracy strategy. Overall, USAID’s democracy assistance projects in the selected countries demonstrated that the agency implemented multiyear, multimillion-dollar projects, consistent with what USAID officials told us was needed to support long-term development. Data for the four countries showed that USAID’s total obligations for democracy assistance ranged from $49.5 million to $126 million for fiscal years 2015 through 2018 (see fig. 6). Per project, USAID’s obligations in the four countries averaged about $7.2 million, with each project’s implementation period averaging just over 4 years. USAID’s implementing partners were, for the most part, U.S.-based or international organizations. Although USAID democracy assistance obligations in the selected countries covered a variety of program areas, they concentrated on political competition and consensus building, good governance, and civil society. As figure 6 shows, USAID’s obligations for rule-of-law and human rights projects made up less than a quarter of total project-level funding obligated in each country in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. See appendixes III through VI for more information about USAID’s democracy assistance projects in the DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine, respectively. State and USAID use various mechanisms to coordinate democracy assistance at the headquarters level, such as interagency roundtable discussions of budget allocations. Officials at embassies in the selected countries described interagency coordination efforts at the country level, such as working groups, and provided examples of how coordination helped avoid duplication and improved the effectiveness of democracy assistance efforts. Despite the use of these mechanisms and other steps that DRL takes to coordinate with embassies, embassy officials in all four selected countries reported having incomplete information about DRL’s projects in those countries. State and USAID use various mechanisms, including budget roundtables and proposal review panels, to coordinate democracy assistance between the agencies at headquarters. For instance, State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources manages the annual allocations budget process, which facilitates interagency coordination through structured conversations about democracy assistance and various bureaus’ priorities, according to State and USAID officials. These annual democracy discussions also enable the participants to identify policy changes and share lessons learned. USAID officials added that USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance serves as the technical lead on democracy assistance issues during these interagency budget discussions. INL officials told us that they take the lead in democracy assistance discussions concerning security sector assistance. In addition, some of State’s regional bureaus, including the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and of European and Eurasian Affairs, maintain assistance coordination offices to coordinate U.S. foreign assistance to countries in those regions, including through strategic planning and budget formulation processes. These offices, based in Washington, D.C., coordinate with embassies, other State bureaus, and USAID at various stages of strategic planning and budget formulation. For example, country coordinators from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ assistance coordination office are to lead roundtable discussions at least annually to share information among U.S. government agencies and contribute to improved planning and implementation. Some U.S. embassies in these regions, including those in Tunisia and Ukraine, have an assistance coordination unit to coordinate all U.S. foreign assistance in the country, and these units work with State regional bureaus’ Washington, D.C.– based offices. Further, when considering potential democracy assistance projects, DRL coordinates with State and USAID counterparts both in Washington, D.C., and overseas through its proposal review process. DRL proposal review panels include representatives from USAID, State regional bureaus, and other agencies that may have relevant expertise. State and USAID also use various interagency mechanisms to coordinate democracy assistance at the country level within embassies overseas. Examples of coordination mechanisms include the following. Working groups. According to State and USAID officials in the four selected countries, interagency working groups facilitate formal discussions about democracy assistance projects and provide opportunities to identify areas where agencies’ projects might complement or duplicate one another. Working groups at each embassy vary in number, theme, and meeting frequency, depending on the country context and U.S. government priorities. For example, the U.S. embassy in Ukraine has about 10 democracy-related working groups, focused on themes including elections, anticorruption, human rights, and the justice sector. At the U.S. embassies in the DRC and Nigeria, agency officials told us they convened working groups on elections, given the U.S. government’s interest in the countries’ recent and upcoming elections. In Tunisia, where USAID reestablished a presence in 2012 and a mission in June 2019, an interagency development assistance working group that addresses democracy issues, among other things, began meeting in September 2018, according to agency officials. The officials also said that a security assistance working group coordinated assistance related to rule-of- law issues. These working groups meet bimonthly, monthly, or weekly, according to officials. State and USAID officials generally said that they found the working groups were effective in helping to coordinate democracy assistance. Assistance coordination units. U.S. embassies in Tunisia and Ukraine have assistance coordination units designed to coordinate U.S. foreign assistance, including democracy assistance. Unlike the assistance coordination unit in Ukraine, State’s Foreign Assistance Unit in Tunisia managed democracy assistance projects in fiscal years 2015 through 2018 while also coordinating other State and USAID assistance in the country (see app. V for more information about democracy assistance in Tunisia during this period). According to a State document, the assistance coordinator at an embassy in Europe or Eurasia can be a “touch point” for agencies at the embassy to work together on assistance issues and communicate effectively with Washington. The assistance coordination units in both Tunisia and Ukraine have established mechanisms to coordinate U.S. foreign assistance within the embassies, according to officials. For instance, the foreign assistance unit in Tunisia formalized a process by which the ambassador’s office approves all State and USAID assistance projects in the country. Additionally, in both countries, the assistance coordinator participates in working groups and is involved in the design or review of all assistance projects, according to officials. USAID and State officials in these countries expressed varying opinions about the units’ usefulness for coordination. State and USAID officials in the selected countries provided the following additional examples of coordination that, according to the officials, helped avoid duplication and improved the effectiveness of democracy assistance efforts. According to State and USAID, informal coordination and information sharing among agency officials at the embassies occur during regularly scheduled meetings, such as weekly meetings of USAID staff, State’s political unit staff, or embassy senior staff, and through daily interaction. State has developed a tool kit to help embassies with strategic planning, including the development of action plans to document units’ roles. For example, agencies at the U.S. embassy in Nigeria created an action plan that identified the various units supporting assistance for elections to help prevent duplication of efforts. (Fig. 7 shows citizens participating in Nigeria’s elections.) State and USAID officials at embassies described other coordination of the agencies’ democracy assistance. For example, in Nigeria, USAID does not fund any rule-of-law projects because, according to USAID officials, they and INL officials have decided on a clear division of labor: INL manages all rule-of-law projects, including judicial strengthening, judicial reforms, and anticorruption, while USAID manages all other aspects of democracy assistance. In Ukraine, USAID and INL developed a concept paper to guide their collaboration to help the government establish the country’s High Anti- Corruption Court. The concept paper outlined the key roles of USAID and INL and designed complementary projects based on each agency’s strengths. For example, USAID was responsible for developing training programs for judges and INL was responsible for vetting potential judges. Officials told us that this concept paper helped agencies maximize the potential impact of their limited resources. Although DRL takes steps to coordinate with embassies in countries where it funds democracy assistance projects, embassy officials in all four selected countries reported having incomplete information about DRL’s projects in those countries. DRL has various practices and processes to coordinate with embassies. For example, DRL established a standard operating procedure to clarify methods for coordination between itself and State’s regional bureaus, which includes defined steps on engaging with embassies. The procedure outlines steps in DRL’s annual planning process, during which priorities and program strategies are set; in the process for submitting proposed projects and awards; and in the process for proposal review panels. DRL officials in Washington, D.C., also pointed to various methods that they use to coordinate with embassies. Such methods include distributing a description of DRL’s projects by country on an annual basis, training new Foreign Service officers in DRL’s funding mechanisms and awards process, and providing contact information for DRL staff at headquarters to embassy personnel. Additionally, DRL officials said that embassy officials have at least four opportunities to provide official input during the approximately 18-month process of designing and awarding a project. According to DRL officials, embassy personnel designated as human rights officers serve as DRL’s overseas points of contact. However, at the embassies in all four countries, human rights officers or other officials from the political units told us that they were not actively engaged in DRL’s projects and generally lacked updated information about DRL projects in their countries, including descriptions and funding amounts. Embassy officials also said that, although DRL sought their input during the process of selecting proposed democracy assistance projects, DRL did not subsequently communicate its final selection of projects. DRL officials said that sharing complete information can be difficult because of the sensitivity of some DRL projects and the need to safeguard the identities of some local partners. In addition, DRL officials said that managing projects from Washington, D.C., instead of overseas may affect their ability to collaborate with embassy officials. DRL officials commented that embassy personnel’s colocation facilitates their collaborating with one another and that the political and other State officers who may function as in-country DRL points of contact have numerous other duties, with limited capacity to focus on DRL projects. DRL officials also said that frequent turnover among State personnel makes it challenging to maintain embassy officials’ awareness of DRL’s in-country projects. In addition, they said that DRL is sometimes unaware of democracy assistance projects that embassies may be funding. Moreover, we found that existing information-sharing mechanisms, including data systems and strategies, do not consistently address embassy personnel’s information gaps. DRL and other State officials said that embassy personnel may not be able to use State’s data systems to retrieve information on projects, partly because some personnel lack sufficient training or the permissions to access project data in certain systems. Furthermore, the Office of Management and Budget has found the quality of State’s publicly reported data to be low in terms of completeness and accuracy. State’s Office of Inspector General found that, while State has standardized and centralized its foreign assistance budget planning and request processes, State’s inability to provide authoritative foreign assistance financial information is a program management challenge. In addition, the integrated country strategies for the four selected countries for fiscal years 2015 through 2018 do not mention DRL’s projects or general goals when discussing U.S. government democracy-related objectives for each country. Overseas officials’ lack of complete information about DRL’s projects could lead to potential duplication in U.S. democracy assistance and may inhibit State’s efforts to coordinate with other agencies, implementing partners, and other donors. We have previously found that it is helpful when participants in a collaborative effort have full knowledge about the relevant resources available and have the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to contribute. Since 2015, Congress has made available to agencies at least $2 billion annually for democracy assistance programs abroad. State’s DRL and INL, as well as USAID, have articulated their roles in democracy assistance through strategies that include specific democracy-related goals. Although State and USAID use various mechanisms to coordinate democracy assistance at headquarters and in the field, we found that relevant embassy officials in each of the four selected countries did not have ready access to information about DRL projects. As a result, embassy officials lacked an understanding of the full scope of U.S. democracy assistance in their countries. Ensuring access to information about DRL projects could improve State’s overseas coordination, both internally and with other U.S. agencies, implementing partners, and donors, as well as State’s ability to achieve important democracy assistance goals. The Secretary of State should direct the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to develop a mechanism to facilitate the active sharing of information about democracy assistance projects between DRL and relevant staff at embassies. We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, and NED for their review and comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix VII, State agreed with our recommendation and noted steps that it plans to take to implement it. USAID also provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix VIII, as well as technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. NED officials reviewed our draft but did not provide any comments. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and to the Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, the President of NED, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at https://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IX. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization based in Washington, D.C., whose stated purpose is to encourage democracy throughout the world by supporting nongovernmental organizations and actors that are working for democratic goals. NED is funded through a grant from the Department of State (State) pursuant to an annual congressional appropriation and receives additional funding from State to support congressionally directed or discretionary programs. In addition to providing grants to local organizations in other countries, NED provides grants to its four affiliated organizations known as the “core institutes”: the Center for International Private Enterprise, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and the Solidarity Center. In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, NED allocated a total of about $541 million for democracy assistance projects in 100 countries— approximately $114 million in fiscal year 2015, $141 million in fiscal year 2016, $144 million in fiscal year 2017, and $142 million in fiscal year 2018. During this period, NED directed 55 percent of its funding for local organizations to groups in countries rated “not free” by Freedom House’s 2018 “Freedom in the World” survey. Figure 8 shows the countries where NED allocated funding for democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. As figure 9 shows, in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, NED directed funding to projects in six democracy assistance program areas. NED allocated the largest amount during that period—about $100 million (36 percent)—to promote good governance and allocated the next largest amount—about $72.5 million (26 percent)—to promote political competition and consensus building. NED allocated the smallest amount—about $8.5 million (3 percent)—to support the rule of law. According to NED’s 2012 strategy, the organization focuses on providing grants to grassroots activists in response to local needs and “seeks out newly-emerging groups in both democratizing and authoritarian countries around the world, helping to empower the most effective grassroots activists.” The strategy notes that NED is guided by its founding legislation, which established NED as an independent institution whose mission is to promote democracy through grants to nongovernmental organizations. These include the core institutes, whose key roles NED’s strategy also defines. NED officials said that the organization focuses on building the institutional capacity of local civil society organizations, which contributes to building democratic societies. Such capacity building can include institutional support, including funding for basic functions such as operational costs, and management assistance such as budget training, which other donors tend not to provide. NED officials commented that the organization is “demand driven” and responds to funding requests for projects proposed by nongovernmental organizations. According to NED documents, it supports approximately 1,500 organizations in 90 countries with grants averaging $50,000. NED officials noted other elements that distinguish NED’s support from that of U.S. agencies, including continuity in its staff composition; the significant linguistic ability of its staff, enabling close ties with local organizations in other countries; and the relative stability of its mission and priorities, which facilitates long-term engagement on countries’ democratic issues. In addition, NED’s nongovernmental status allows it to provide democracy assistance in difficult environments, where, according to NED officials, staff of local grantees face risks as a result of their work in challenging the government and status quo. The officials said that such risks range from detention and harassment to being killed or “disappeared.” NED’s democracy assistance projects in the countries we selected for our review—the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine—generally aligned with the organization’s strategy of supporting democracy by providing funds for indigenous civil society organizations. (Fig. 10 shows examples of NED’s democracy assistance projects in the DRC and Ukraine.) Consistent with NED’s strategy of providing grants to grassroots activists, data for projects in the four selected countries show that NED provided grants primarily to local civil society organizations in addition to its core institutes. NED grants to civil society organizations in the selected countries averaged approximately $46,000 for year-long projects, and NED renewed support for nearly all organizations on an annual basis, reflecting the long-term support that officials said was necessary to strengthen civil society. Grantees in the DRC told us that NED worked closely with local partners to identify needs and design programs and that this helped to build the partners’ organizational capacity. Consistent with NED’s mission to support democracy in general, grantees in the selected countries worked on projects that included all democracy assistance program areas. NED primarily supported projects to promote political competition and consensus building and good governance, obligating an average of 40 percent and 36 percent of its funding for these two program areas, respectively, across the four countries (see fig. 11). NED’s country priorities are articulated in country summaries that it updates each year on the basis of each country’s political context and democratic challenges. For example, NED’s 2018 Tunisia summary included a priority of supporting civil society to promote effective, democratic governance and advocate for the transparency and accountability of public institutions. The NED project that we reviewed in Tunisia aimed to “enhance the capacity of civil society to advocate for transparency, good governance, and promote social accountability in the six southern governorates of Tunisia.” See appendixes III through VI for more information about NED’s democracy assistance projects in the DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. NED’s annual planning documents, which generally outline objectives for each country where NED provides funding, include some statements about coordination and collaboration with other donors. NED officials said that NED senior leaders typically have standing relationships with senior leaders at State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) because NED receives funding from DRL for particular countries. NED officials also told us that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has reached out to them to strategically coordinate, although NED does not receive funds from USAID. NED officials added that coordination and collaboration on specific countries largely occur between officials at the regional and country levels. For example, officials said that NED consults with counterparts at State and USAID in the regional bureaus and DRL and shares its list of grantees with DRL. Furthermore, officials said that NED is aware of funding that its grantees receive from State or USAID, because NED obtains information from potential grantees about other funding sources during the grant proposal process. According to NED, State, and USAID officials, additional collaboration occurs between headquarters and overseas officials. NED, which does not have staff overseas, manages its grants in Washington, D.C., but collaborates with overseas counterparts. NED, State, and USAID officials told us that when NED officials conduct site visits, which occur at least annually, they often meet with State and USAID officials at embassies to share information. This report examines (1) the Department of State’s (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) allocations of funding for democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018, (2) State’s and USAID’s roles in providing democracy assistance and the extent to which their projects in selected countries during this period were consistent with defined roles, and (3) the extent to which State and USAID coordinate in providing democracy assistance. In addition, appendix I provides information about the National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) democracy assistance allocations, role, and coordination. To examine aspects of State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s democracy assistance roles and coordination efforts, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of four countries—the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine—where the three entities provided democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. In selecting these countries as illustrative examples, we considered the following factors, among others: (1) countries to which all three entities allocated or obligated democracy assistance funding in fiscal years 2015 through 2017, the most recent period for which data were available; (2) democracy assistance allocation amounts that were in the top quartile for each entity for the same period for USAID and State, according to data from State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance, and for NED; (3) democracy assistance obligation amounts that were in the top half of such obligations for the same period for State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), according to data from USAID’s Foreign Aid Explorer; (4) democracy assistance obligations data that confirmed the presence of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in those countries for the same period; (5) geographical dispersion of the countries; (6) ratings that countries received from Freedom House’s 2018 “Freedom in the World” survey; and (7) suggestions from State, USAID, and NED officials as well as others with relevant expertise. We excluded countries where we had recently reviewed U.S. democracy assistance for other reports. We traveled to the DRC in May 2019, where we met with officials from State, USAID, nongovernmental organizations that had implemented U.S.-funded democracy assistance projects, and the United Kingdom’s Department of Foreign and International Development regarding its coordination with U.S. agencies. We conducted interviews with State and USAID officials who were knowledgeable about democracy assistance, interviewing officials at the embassies in Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine by phone and interviewing officials in Washington, D.C., in person. To examine allocations for democracy assistance, we analyzed State, USAID, and NED global democracy assistance data for fiscal years 2015 through 2018, including the total allocations, the allocations for specific program areas, and the countries for which funding was allocated. We used the six democracy assistance program areas included in USAID’s and State’s Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions—rule of law, good governance, political competition and consensus building, civil society, independent media and free flow of information, and human rights. Because NED categorizes its democracy assistance using its own program definitions, we cross-referenced NED’s democracy assistance awards with the U.S. government’s six program areas, using information that NED provided. We assessed the reliability of State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s data and determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for reporting the total amount of democracy assistance allocated by each entity as well as the program areas and countries for which the funding was allocated. We also compared funding allocations with the country’s ratings in Freedom House’s 2018 “Freedom in the World” survey to determine the amount of funding that the entities allocated to countries rated as free, partly free, or not free. To identify State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s roles in providing democracy assistance and the extent to which their projects in the selected countries were consistent with their defined roles, we reviewed documents, assessed information on democracy assistance projects, and interviewed officials. While State’s regional bureaus provide some democracy assistance, we focused on State’s democracy assistance roles and projects for DRL and INL, both of which State has identified as leading the provision of its democracy assistance. See appendixes III through VI for regional bureaus’ obligations data for the four selected countries. We reviewed State’s and USAID’s Joint Strategic Plan, FY2018-2022; functional bureau strategies for DRL and INL; the 2013 USAID Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance; integrated country strategies and country development cooperation strategies for the four selected countries; and NED’s 2012 Strategy Document. We also reviewed other documents that described aspects of State’s and USAID’s roles, including agencies’ democracy-related reports to Congress and standard operating procedures. We assessed these documents for clarity of roles and responsibilities, based on leading collaboration practices that we have previously identified, and we reviewed agencies’ overarching goals related to democracy and governance. We reviewed information about State, USAID, and NED democracy assistance projects in the DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. We reviewed project documents, including award agreements, for selected State, USAID, and NED projects that supported a variety of democracy program areas, among other factors. We assessed State, USAID, and NED obligations data for projects that they funded in the selected countries in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for reporting the total obligations, by entity and country, for fiscal years 2015 through 2018 and for reporting types of democracy assistance. We also determined these data to be sufficiently reliable for reporting the number of active projects during this time period; the average award amount or average annualized award amount; and the average duration of projects for DRL, USAID, and NED. Because INL’s democracy assistance generally supports the host government through bilateral agreements and is not always project based, we were unable to report these project characteristics for INL. In prior work, we have recommended that State identify and address factors that affect the reliability of INL’s democracy assistance data. State reported that as of July 2019, INL was continuing efforts to improve data reliability; however, because of missing data, we determined that data for INL democracy assistance in the selected countries were unreliable for reporting project characteristics. We also determined that because of missing data, such as project end dates, the data from State’s Bureau of African Affairs were unreliable for reporting some project information for Nigeria; however, the bureau’s project data for the DRC were sufficiently reliable for reporting on democracy assistance and obligations in that country. In addition, we determined the data from the Bureaus of European and Eurasian Affairs and Near Eastern Affairs were sufficiently reliable for reporting on State’s democracy assistance obligations and projects in Ukraine and Tunisia. We interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and in the four selected countries regarding State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s roles defined in strategies and other documents and regarding democracy assistance projects. In addition, we interviewed agency officials regarding democracy assistance program areas; implementation methods (such as managing programs from headquarters or overseas as well as types of implementing partners); and other features, including typical scale of project funding. To examine the extent to which the agencies coordinated their democracy assistance, we reviewed relevant documents, such as State’s and USAID’s standard operating procedures, to identify the agencies’ mechanisms and practices for coordinating democracy assistance. We drew on our prior work identifying key practices that can enhance and sustain collaboration at federal agencies. We interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and in the four selected countries to describe any mechanisms that agencies use to coordinate democracy assistance. We conducted this performance audit from September 2018 to January 2020, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has experienced more than 2 decades of violence and war, exacerbated by the failure of President Joseph Kabila to hold elections when his term ended in 2016. In this context, the U.S. government’s key policy priority was to encourage the DRC’s government to support credible and peaceful elections in December 2018, according to the Department of State (State). U.S. government democracy assistance projects aimed to build the capacity of the DRC government, political parties, civil society, armed forces, civilian law enforcement, and justice systems to support credible elections and improve governance. (Fig. 12 shows examples of U.S.- funded government assistance to support the DRC’s 2018 elections.) Other U.S. government democracy-related priorities included promoting the rule of law and fighting corruption. The National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) 2018 country summary for the DRC noted that NED should support DRC civil society’s ability to retain its independence and to continue advocating for a peaceful and democratic transition of power. The summary states that NED’s 2018 priorities for the DRC included supporting civil society’s engagement in elections and ability to promote freedom of information before, during, and after the elections. In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, State, the U.S. Agency for International Assistance (USAID), and NED obligated over $73 million for democracy assistance in the DRC. State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor obligated $5.5 million (8 percent) of this assistance, while State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs obligated $3.2 million (4 percent). State’s Bureau of African Affairs also obligated about $500,000, for one project, through the Africa Women Peace Security Initiative. USAID obligated the majority of U.S. democracy assistance—$54.7 million (74 percent). In addition, NED obligated $9.6 million (13 percent). Figure 13 shows State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s total obligations, by program area, in the DRC during this period. Table 2 shows characteristics of projects funded by State’s Bureau of African Affairs, DRL, USAID, and NED. Three of DRL’s five projects were implemented by organizations that also implemented USAID projects, and the Bureau of African Affairs’ project was implemented by an organization that also implemented USAID and DRL projects. Table 3 shows examples of democracy assistance projects funded by State, USAID, and NED in the DRC in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. While Nigeria has made important gains in democracy and institution building, those gains are fragile, according to the U.S. Department of State (State). The U.S. government’s recent priorities with regard to Nigeria have included helping to strengthen the country’s democratic governance. Challenges to democratic governance in Nigeria include widespread intercommunal violence, terrorism, poverty, and corruption. At the same time, Nigeria has a free press and a political environment that is largely committed to civilian leadership, and the 2015 elections resulted in the first peaceful transfer of power to an opposition party. In this context, the U.S. government’s goals include strengthening Nigerian democratic institutions, governance, and respect for human rights, such as by assisting Nigerians to conduct credible national elections in 2019. To achieve this goal, the U.S. government’s objectives are to (1) strengthen good governance; (2) strengthen democratic institutions, including rule of law, respect for human rights, and transparency and accountability in government; and (3) reduce corruption at all levels of government. Similarly, the National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) 2018 country summary for Nigeria notes the success of the country’s 2015 elections while also acknowledging challenges including corruption, economic stagnation, insecurity, and the political marginalization of minority groups. NED’s 2018 priorities in Nigeria were to expand political inclusion and strengthen rule of law by supporting NED’s core institutes and local organizations. In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and NED obligated nearly $95 million for democracy assistance projects in Nigeria. State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs obligated $12.5 million (13 percent), while State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor obligated $5.4 million (6 percent). State’s Bureau of African Affairs also obligated $1.8 million for six projects. According to officials, the Bureau of African Affairs funded these projects through the Africa Regional Democracy Fund and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership program. USAID obligated the majority of U.S. democracy assistance— $66.6 million (70 percent). In addition, NED obligated $8.2 million (9 percent). Figure 14 shows State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s total obligations for democracy assistance, by program area, in Nigeria during this period. Table 4 shows characteristics of projects funded by the Bureau of African Affairs, DRL, USAID, and NED in Nigeria during fiscal years 2015 through 2018. Table 5 shows examples of democracy assistance projects funded by State, USAID, and NED in Nigeria during fiscal years 2015 through 2018. Since its 2011 revolution, Tunisia has been on a steady path toward consolidating its democratic transition, but it still needs to establish critical institutions, advance human rights, counter corruption, and improve government transparency, according to the U.S. Department of State (State). In this context, the U.S. government’s goals include helping Tunisia consolidate and advance its democracy. To achieve this goal, the U.S. government’s objectives are to (1) assist Tunisian government institutions to become more transparent, accountable, and responsive to citizens; (2) help Tunisian citizens understand and exercise their rights and responsibilities in a democratic system; and (3) promote social cohesion through democratic consolidation. The National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) 2018 country summary for Tunisia similarly notes the country’s democratic progress since the 2011 revolution and adds that Tunisian civil society has been developing quickly and freely and seeks to engage with elected officials as they continue to consolidate democracy. NED’s 2018 priorities in Tunisia were to (1) support civil society to promote effective, democratic governance and advocate for transparency and accountability; (2) encourage citizens to influence policymaking; (3) foster political inclusion of marginalized groups; and (4) enhance the role of independent media. In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and NED obligated over $90 million for democracy assistance projects in Tunisia. State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs obligated $20.7 million (23 percent) of these funds; the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor obligated $9.1 million (10 percent); and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs obligated $3.9 million (4 percent). USAID obligated the majority of U.S. democracy assistance—$49.5 million (54 percent). In addition, NED obligated $8.7 million (9 percent). Figure 15 shows State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s total obligations for democracy assistance, by program area, in Tunisia in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs provided the majority of its democracy assistance through the U.S.–Middle East Partnership Initiative, which generally aims to improve governance and economic opportunity. Many of the 11 projects funded by the bureau supported objectives that were similar to those typically supported by DRL, INL, and USAID projects, including promoting human rights, supporting anticorruption institutions, and strengthening political parties. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affair’s Foreign Assistance Unit at the embassy managed these projects. Table 6 shows information on the characteristics of the projects funded by DRL, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, USAID, and NED. Table 7 shows examples of democracy assistance projects funded by State, USAID, and NED in Tunisia during fiscal years 2015 through 2018. Ukraine’s various democratic challenges include overcoming the legacy of Soviet authoritarian rule, addressing mismanagement, and responding to Russian aggression, according to the Department of State (State). In this context, the U.S. government aims to support Ukraine’s democracy by helping the country combat corruption, advance justice reforms, bolster civil society, create responsive government, and encourage independent media. Overall, the U.S. government seeks to help Ukraine advance its political reforms with more transparent, responsive, and accountable governance, becoming less corrupt and more democratic. U.S. objectives to accomplish this goal include enhancing anticorruption and rule-of-law processes and improving governance processes and outcomes. The National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) 2018 country summary for Ukraine noted similar challenges to the country’s democracy— Russian aggression, corruption, and a government that is not responsive to its citizens. NED’s 2018 priorities in Ukraine included strengthening the capacity of civil society groups, promoting reconciliation, and fostering the development of new media. In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and NED obligated more than $170 million for democracy assistance projects in Ukraine. State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs obligated $16.7 million (10 percent) of this assistance; the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor obligated $9.6 million (6 percent); and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs obligated $5.0 million (3 percent). USAID obligated the majority of U.S. democracy assistance—$126 million (73 percent). In addition, NED obligated $16.3 million (9 percent). Figure 16 shows State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s total obligations for democracy assistance, by program area, in Ukraine during fiscal years 2015 through 2018. State’s public affairs unit at the embassy in Ukraine obligated funding for, and managed, all but one of the 613 democracy assistance projects supported by funds from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. State’s public affairs unit awarded the projects through funding mechanisms that were intended to support civil society and independent media and were specifically designed for locally based implementing organizations. Table 8 shows characteristics of democracy assistance projects funded by DRL, State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, USAID, and NED. Table 9 shows examples of democracy assistance projects funded by State, USAID, and NED in Ukraine during fiscal years 2015 through 2018. In addition to the contact named above, Mona Sehgal (Assistant Director), Farhanaz Kermalli (Analyst-in-Charge), Daniela Rudstein, Tom Zingale, Neil Doherty, Reid Lowe, and Alex Welsh made key contributions to this report. Justin Fisher and Sarah Veale provided technical assistance.