 A major portion of this work has focused on allocation settings where items must be allocated fairly to agents with diverse preferences. In comparison, fairness in two-sided settings where agents have to be matched to other agents, with preferences on both sides, has received much less attention. In this paper , we explore the problem of finding a stable many-to-one matching  while satisfying fairness among the agents , having cardinal utilities.
<clarity>  A major portion of this work has focused on allocation settings where items must be allocated fairly to agents with diverse preferences. In comparison, fairness in two-sided settings where agents have to be matched to other agents, with preferences on both sides, has received much less attention. In this paper , we explore the problem of finding a stable many-to-one matching  while satisfying fairness among the agents , having cardinal utilities.
 This paper initiates the study of finding a stable many-to-one matching while satisfying fairness among the agents , having cardinal utilities.