The 'unfolding argument' was presented by Doerig et.al. [1] as an argument to show that causal structure theories (CST) like IIT are either falsified or outside the realm of science. In their recent paper 2%DIFDELCMD < ]%%% , 3%DIFDELCMD < ]%%% , the authors mathematically formalized the process of generating observable data from experiments and using that data to generate inferences and predictions onto an experience space. The resulting ` substitution argument built on this formal framework was used to show that all existing theories of consciousness were ' pre-falsified ' if the inference reports are  valid. If this argument is indeed correct , it would have a profound effect on the field of consciousness as a whole indicating extremely fundamental problems that would require radical changes to how consciousness science is performed. However in this note the author identifies the shortcomings in the formulation of the substitution argument and explains why it's claims about functionalist theoriesare wrong ] .
In their paper 'Falsification and Consciousness' [1] %DIFDELCMD < ]%%% %DIFDELCMD < ]%%% , Kleiner and Hoel introduced a formal mathematical model of the process of generating observable data from experiments and using that data to generate inferences and predictions onto an experience space. The resulting substitution argument built on this framework was used to show that any theory of consciousness with independent inference and prediction data are pre-falsified , if the inference reports are considered valid. If this argument does indeed pre-falsify many of the leading theories of consciousness , it would indicate a fundamental problem affecting the field of consciousness as a whole that would require radical changes to how consciousness science is performed. In this reply, the author will identify avenues of expansion for the model proposed in 1], allowing us to distinguish between different types of variation. Motivated by examples from neural networks, state machines and Turing machines, we will prove that substitutions do not exist for a very broad class of Level-1 functionalist theories, rendering them immune to the aforementioned substitution argument .
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The 'unfolding argument' was presented by Doerig et.al.
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as an argument to show that causal structure theories (CST) like IIT are either falsified or outside the realm of science. In their recent paper
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all existing theories of consciousness were '
any theory of consciousness with independent inference and prediction data are
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does indeed pre-falsify many of the leading theories of consciousness
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have a profound effect on
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indicating extremely fundamental problems
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However in this note the author identifies the shortcomings in the formulation of the substitution argument and explains why it's claims about functionalist theoriesare wrong
In this reply, the author will identify avenues of expansion for the model proposed in
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, allowing us to distinguish between different types of variation. Motivated by examples from neural networks, state machines and Turing machines, we will prove that substitutions do not exist for a very broad class of Level-1 functionalist theories, rendering them immune to the aforementioned substitution argument