Ireland and the United Kingdom 1939–1941 There was a reluctance on the part of the British to accept the policy of Irish neutrality. Anthony Eden, Dominions Secretary in the new British war cabinet, said "we do not want formally to recognise Eire as neutral while Eire remains a member of the British Commonwealth" as this he said would be in conflict with the "constitutional theory of the indivisibility of the crown . "  Robert Fisk, " In Time of War ", pg . 110 A prevalent view in the UK was that Ireland was obliged to support the UK in the war. Churchill said at the time that "Southern Ireland is at war, but skulking".Churchill Centre Paper By June 1940, the British representative in Ireland, Maffey, was urging that "the strategic unity of our island group" should take precedence over Ulster Unionism, and Churchill was making clear that there should be no military action taken against Ireland.Girvin, pp .108 –109. The British Minister for Health, Malcolm MacDonald, who had negotiated the 1938 trade agreement with Ireland whilst Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, was sent to Dublin to explore possibilities with De Valera. From these Chamberlain produced a six-point proposal that committed the UK government to a united Ireland and proposed the setting up of a joint body to effect this. A Joint Defence Council would be set up immediately and the State provided with military equipment. In return the State would join the Allies and intern all German and Italian aliens. Rejected by the Irish government, the proposal was then amended to strengthen the steps towards a united Ireland, and no longer requiring Ireland to join the war, but only to invite British forces to use Irish bases and ports. De Valera rejected the revised proposal on 4 July and made no counter proposal. One reason for this would have been the difficult calculation of how damaging the inevitable split in Ireland would be if such a proposal was accepted. One of the main reasons was that the Irish Government thought that the UK would lose the war and did not want to be on the losing side: during the negotiations Walshe had produced two memoranda for De Valera (one entitled Britain's Inevitable DefeatMemorandum, Walshe to de Valera from Joseph P. Walshe to Joseph P. Walshe – 21 June 1940, at the Documents on Irish Foreign Policy website) predicting the isolation of Great Britain, the dismemberment of its empire, and finally its inevitable crushing by Germany. Walshe also wrote approvingly of the character of the Pétain government.Girvin, pp .124 –125 Walshe's memoranda affected de Valera, with him telling MacDonald that Great Britain  could not destroy this [German] colossal machine  .Girvin, p .129 Nevertheless, from May 1940, Walshe and Col Liam Archer of Irish Military Intelligence discussed the defence of Ireland in the event of a German invasion with counterparts in Northern Ireland and a general strategic plan for UK military action "Plan W" across the border "if invited" was developed. Ports and shipping upA memorial erected in Dublin in 1991 to members of the Irish mercantile marine lost during the Emergency The great majority of Ireland's trade was with the United Kingdom, and most of its supplies came from there. This created great difficulties for the Irish government as Germany tried to blockade the UK. Additionally the UK required Irish ships to operate under their 'navicert' system. In September 1940, a joint agreement on trade, shipping and exports fell through—"the main sticking point between the two sides was the prices on offer from Britain" Griven, p  162 owing to the refusal to allow transshipment and repair facilities following German pressure, including the threat to blockade Ireland and the bombing of Ambrosetown and Campile in County Wexford.Duggan p . 112, p. 132 , Girvin p. 161 In the autumn of 1940, the threat of German invasion had receded, but relations between the UK and Ireland deteriorated, largely as a result of the increased losses of Allied shipping to U-boat attack. To try to prevent some of these losses, the UK wanted sea and air bases in western Ireland.In the end, probably at Lough Swilly and the Shannon estuary rather than the Treaty Ports , Girvin, p .175. On 5 November, in the House of Commons, Churchill complained: The fact that we cannot use the South and West coasts of Ireland to refuel our flotillas and aircraft and thus protect the trade by which Ireland as well as Great Britain lives, is a most heavy and grievous burden and one which should never have been placed on our shoulders, broad though they may be. The Irish government chose to interpret this sentence as a threat of invasion. Some sort of armed occupation was a real possibility ,The UK had occupied Iceland in May 1940  but the balance of evidence is that there was never a serious threat.Girvin pp. 171 ff Large elements of the British cabinet and government and those of its allies were opposed to any armed intervention in Ireland; however, in late 1940 and early 1941, relations between the two countries did worsen. The British stopped informing Ireland of their order of battle in Northern Ireland, while the Irish Army drew up plans for defence against the British. The United Kingdom also started to restrict trade to Ireland, reasoning that if Ireland would not do anything to protect the lives of those bringing in supplies, it should at least share in the deprivations being felt in the UK. Relations between the two countries only really eased in the middle of 1941 with the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany and an agreement to allow Irish immigration to Britain to work in the war industries, resulting in up to 200,000 Irish people doing so by 1945.Girvin p .179 The economy Only since 2000 has the wartime Irish economy been studied, away from the grander issues of diplomacy and warfare. Being still largely dependent on Britain for coal, manufactured goods and fuel oils, supplies of these were reduced after the fall of France in mid-1940, causing price inflation and a busy black market. It was said that "the poor are like hunted rats looking for bread", as wheat supplies fell, and that the introduction of full rationing was "seriously belated". Typhus reappeared and the government started planning for famine relief in late 1941. John Betjeman, the British press attaché in Dublin, reported "No coal. No petrol. No gas. No electric. No paraffin. Guinness good." In March 1942 the government banned the export of beers, and decided that more wheat should be grown, and less barley. The prospect of a shortage of beer led on to barter deals whereby Britain supplied wheat suitable for making bread flour, and coal, and in return Ireland allowed the export of beers. "These supplies were to keep neutral Ireland afloat during World War II and enable the continuance of Irish neutrality".Evans B, "A pint of plain is your only man" , essay in History Ireland, vol22 no5, pp36-38 .
Ireland and the United Kingdom 1939–1941 There was a reluctance on the part of the British to accept the policy of Irish neutrality. Anthony Eden, Dominions Secretary in the new British war cabinet, said "we do not want formally to recognise Eire as neutral while Eire remains a member of the British Commonwealth" as this he said would be in conflict with the "constitutional theory of the indivisibility of the crown " . Robert Fisk, In Time of War , p . 110 A prevalent view in the UK was that Ireland was obliged to support the UK in the war. Churchill said at the time that "Southern Ireland is at war, but skulking".Churchill Centre Paper By June 1940, the British representative in Ireland, Maffey, was urging that "the strategic unity of our island group" should take precedence over Ulster Unionism, and Churchill was making clear that there should be no military action taken against Ireland.Girvin, pp . 108 –109. The British Minister for Health, Malcolm MacDonald, who had negotiated the 1938 trade agreement with Ireland whilst Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, was sent to Dublin to explore possibilities with De Valera. From these Chamberlain produced a six-point proposal that committed the UK government to a united Ireland and proposed the setting up of a joint body to effect this. A Joint Defence Council would be set up immediately and the State provided with military equipment. In return the State would join the Allies and intern all German and Italian aliens. Rejected by the Irish government, the proposal was then amended to strengthen the steps towards a united Ireland, and no longer requiring Ireland to join the war, but only to invite British forces to use Irish bases and ports. De Valera rejected the revised proposal on 4 July and made no counter proposal. One reason for this would have been the difficult calculation of how damaging the inevitable split in Ireland would be if such a proposal was accepted. One of the main reasons was that the Irish Government thought that the UK would lose the war and did not want to be on the losing side: during the negotiations Walshe had produced two memoranda for De Valera (one entitled Britain's Inevitable DefeatMemorandum, Walshe to de Valera from Joseph P. Walshe to Joseph P. Walshe – 21 June 1940, at the Documents on Irish Foreign Policy website) predicting the isolation of Great Britain, the dismemberment of its empire, and finally its inevitable crushing by Germany. Walshe also wrote approvingly of the character of the Pétain government.Girvin, pp . 124 –125 Walshe's memoranda affected de Valera, with him telling MacDonald that Great Britain " could not destroy this [German] colossal machine " .Girvin, p . 129 Nevertheless, from May 1940, Walshe and Col Liam Archer of Irish Military Intelligence discussed the defence of Ireland in the event of a German invasion with counterparts in Northern Ireland and a general strategic plan for UK military action "Plan W" across the border "if invited" was developed. Ports and shipping upA memorial erected in Dublin in 1991 to members of the Irish mercantile marine lost during the Emergency The great majority of Ireland's trade was with the United Kingdom, and most of its supplies came from there. This created great difficulties for the Irish government as Germany tried to blockade the UK. Additionally the UK required Irish ships to operate under their 'navicert' system. In September 1940, a joint agreement on trade, shipping and exports fell through—"the main sticking point between the two sides was the prices on offer from Britain" Griven, p . 162 owing to the refusal to allow transshipment and repair facilities following German pressure, including the threat to blockade Ireland and the bombing of Ambrosetown and Campile in County Wexford.Duggan pp . 112, 132 ; Girvin p. 161 In the autumn of 1940, the threat of German invasion had receded, but relations between the UK and Ireland deteriorated, largely as a result of the increased losses of Allied shipping to U-boat attack. To try to prevent some of these losses, the UK wanted sea and air bases in western Ireland.In the end, probably at Lough Swilly and the Shannon estuary rather than the Treaty Ports . Girvin, p . 175. On 5 November, in the House of Commons, Churchill complained: The Irish government chose to interpret this sentence as a threat of invasion. Some sort of armed occupation was a real possibility (the UK had occupied Iceland in May 1940 ), but the balance of evidence is that there was never a serious threat.Girvin pp. 171 ff Large elements of the British cabinet and government and those of its allies were opposed to any armed intervention in Ireland; however, in late 1940 and early 1941, relations between the two countries did worsen. The British stopped informing Ireland of their order of battle in Northern Ireland, while the Irish Army drew up plans for defence against the British. The United Kingdom also started to restrict trade to Ireland, reasoning that if Ireland would not do anything to protect the lives of those bringing in supplies, it should at least share in the deprivations being felt in the UK. Relations between the two countries only really eased in the middle of 1941 with the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany and an agreement to allow Irish immigration to Britain to work in the war industries, resulting in up to 200,000 Irish people doing so by 1945.Girvin p . 179 The economy Only since 2000 has the wartime Irish economy been studied, away from the grander issues of diplomacy and warfare. Being still largely dependent on Britain for coal, manufactured goods and fuel oils, supplies of these were reduced after the fall of France in mid-1940, causing price inflation and a busy black market. It was said that "the poor are like hunted rats looking for bread", as wheat supplies fell, and that the introduction of full rationing was "seriously belated". Typhus reappeared and the government started planning for famine relief in late 1941. John Betjeman, the British press attaché in Dublin, reported "No coal. No petrol. No gas. No electric. No paraffin. Guinness good." In March 1942 the government banned the export of beers, and decided that more wheat should be grown, and less barley. The prospect of a shortage of beer led on to barter deals whereby Britain supplied wheat suitable for making bread flour, and coal, and in return Ireland allowed the export of beers. "These supplies were to keep neutral Ireland afloat during World War II and enable the continuance of Irish neutrality".Evans , B. "A pint of plain is your only man" . History Ireland, vol. 22 no. 5, pp. 36-38 .
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