The emergence of autonomous vehicles ( AVs) is anticipated to influence the public transportation (PT) system . Many possible relationships between AV and PT are proposed depending on the policy and institution, where competition and cooperation are two main categories. This paper focuses on the former in a hypothetical scenario- "if both AV and PT operators were only profit-oriented . " We aim to quantitatively evaluate the system performance (e.g. level of service, operators' financial viability, transport efficiency) when AV and PT are profit-oriented competitors with dynamic adjustable supply strategies under certain policy constraints. We assume AV can adjust the fleetsize and PT can adjust the headway. Service fare and bus routes are fixed. The competition process is analyzed through an agent-based simulation platform, which incorporates a proposed heuristic dynamic supply updating algorithm (HDSUA). The first-mile scenario in Singapore Tampinesarea is selected as the case study, where only bus is considered for PT system. We found that when AV and bus operators are given the flexibility to adjust supply, both of them will re-distribute their supply spatially and temporally, leading to higher profits . In temporal dimension, both AV and bus will concentrate their supplies in morning and evening peak hours, and reduce the supplies in off-peak hours. The competition between AV and PT decreases passengers' travel time but increase their travel cost. The generalized travel cost is still reduced when counting the value of time. The bus supply adjustment can increase the bus average load and reduce total passenger car equivalent (PCE), which is good for transport efficiency and sustainability. But the AV supply adjustment shows the opposite effect. Overall, the competition does not necessarily bring out loss-gain results. A win-win outcome is also possible under certain policy interventions .
The emerging autonomous vehicles ( AV) can either supplement the public transportation (PT) system or be a competitor with it. This paper focuses on this competition in a hypothetical scenario-- "if both AV and PT operators are profit-oriented , " and uses an ABM to quantitatively evaluate the system performance in this competition from the perspectives of four stakeholders--AV operator, PT operator, passengers, and public authority. In our model, AV operator updates its supply by changing fleet sizes while PT by adjusting headways, and both use heuristic approaches to update supply in order to increase profits. We implement the model in the first-mile scenario in Tampines. In four regulation scenarios--two by two combinations regarding whether AV and PT are allowed to change supplies--we find that since AV can release the bus operator from low-demand routes, the competition can lead to higher profits of both, and higher system efficiency, simultaneously, rather than a one-sided loss-gain result. For PT, after supply updates, spatially the services are concentrated to short feeder routes directly to the subway station, and temporally concentrated to peak hours. For passengers, the competition reduces their travel time but increases their travel costs. Nonetheless, the generalized travel cost is still reduced when counting the value of time. For system efficiency and sustainability, bus supply adjustment can increase the bus average load and reduce total PCE, while the AV supply adjustment shows the opposite effect. For policy implications, the paper suggests that PT should be allowed to optimize its supply strategies under specific operation goal constraints, and AV operation should be regulated to relieve its externality on the system, including limiting the number of licenses, operation time, and service areas, which makes AV operate like a complementary mode to PT .
R
emergence of
emerging
R
AVs) is anticipated to influence
AV) can either supplement
R
. Many possible relationships between AV and PT are proposed depending on the policy and institution, where competition and cooperation are two main categories.
or be a competitor with it.
R
the former
this competition
R
scenario-
scenario--
R
were only
are
R
.
,
R
We aim
and uses an ABM
R
(e.g. level of service, operators' financial viability, transport efficiency) when AV and PT are profit-oriented competitors with dynamic adjustable supply strategies under certain policy constraints. We assume AV can adjust the fleetsize and PT can adjust the headway. Service fare and bus routes are fixed. The competition process is analyzed through an agent-based simulation platform, which incorporates a proposed heuristic dynamic supply updating algorithm (HDSUA). The
in this competition from the perspectives of four stakeholders--AV operator, PT operator, passengers, and public authority. In our model, AV operator updates its supply by changing fleet sizes while PT by adjusting headways, and both use heuristic approaches to update supply in order to increase profits. We implement the model in the
R
Singapore Tampinesarea is selected as the case study, where only bus is considered for PT system. We found that when AV and bus operators are given the flexibility to adjust supply, both of them will re-distribute their supply spatially and temporally, leading
Tampines. In four regulation scenarios--two by two combinations regarding whether AV and PT are allowed to change supplies--we find that since AV can release the bus operator from low-demand routes, the competition can lead
R
. In temporal dimension, both AV and bus will concentrate their supplies in morning and evening peak hours, and reduce the supplies in off-peak hours. The competition between AV and PT decreases passengers'
of both, and higher system efficiency, simultaneously, rather than a one-sided loss-gain result. For PT, after supply updates, spatially the services are concentrated to short feeder routes directly to the subway station, and temporally concentrated to peak hours. For passengers, the competition reduces their
R
increase their travel cost. The
increases their travel costs. Nonetheless, the
R
The
For system efficiency and sustainability,
R
passenger car equivalent (PCE), which is good for transport efficiency and sustainability. But
PCE, while
R
Overall, the competition does not necessarily bring out loss-gain results. A win-win outcome is also possible under certain policy interventions
For policy implications, the paper suggests that PT should be allowed to optimize its supply strategies under specific operation goal constraints, and AV operation should be regulated to relieve its externality on the system, including limiting the number of licenses, operation time, and service areas, which makes AV operate like a complementary mode to PT