In discrete exchange economies with possibly redundant and joint ownership, the conventional strong core may be empty , while the weak core may include unintuitive outcomes. We propose new core notions in the conventional flavor by regarding endowments as rights to consume or trade with others. Our key idea is to identify self-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property rights. Our first notion lies between the strong core and the weak core and is independent of Balbuzanov and Kotowski's (2019) exclusion core . Our second notion refines the first and the exclusion core by combining their different merits. We generalize the You Request My House - I Get Your Turn mechanism to find our core allocations .
The core is a traditional and useful solution concept in economic theory. But in discrete exchange economies without transfers, when endowments are complex, the core may be empty . This motivates Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) to interpret endowments as exclusion rights and propose a new concept called exclusion core. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a rectification of the core to solve its problem under complex endowments. Second, we propose a refinement of Balbuzanov and Kotowski's exclusion core to improve its performance. Our two core concepts share a common idea of correcting the misused altruism of unaffected agents in blocking coalitions. We propose a mechanism to find allocations in the two cores .
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The core is a traditional and useful solution concept in economic theory. But in
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with possibly redundant and joint ownership, the conventional strong
without transfers, when endowments are complex, the
R
, while the weak core may include unintuitive outcomes. We propose new core notions in the conventional flavor by regarding endowments as rights to consume or trade with others. Our key idea is to identify self-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property rights. Our first notion lies between the strong core and the weak core and is independent
. This motivates Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) to interpret endowments as exclusion rights and propose a new concept called exclusion core. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a rectification of the core to solve its problem under complex endowments. Second, we propose a refinement
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(2019) exclusion core . Our second notion refines the first and the exclusion core by combining their different merits. We generalize the You Request My House - I Get Your Turn
exclusion core to improve its performance. Our two core concepts share a common idea of correcting the misused altruism of unaffected agents in blocking coalitions. We propose a
R
our core allocations
allocations in the two cores