Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure by two senders, in which the receiver may garble each sender's experiment, subject to a cost increasing in the informativeness of the garbling. As long as attention costs are not too low, there is an interval of prior means over which it is an equilibrium for both senders to offer full information , which interval expands as attention costs grow . Information on one sender substitutes for information on the other, which allows the receiver to nullify the profitability of a deviation. We thus provide a novel channel through which competition  encourages information disclosure.
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure by two senders, in which the receiver may garble each sender's experiment, subject to a cost increasing in the informativeness of the garbling. For a large class of parameters, it is an equilibrium for the senders to provide the receiver's first best level of information - i.e. as much as she would learn if she herself controlled information provision . Information on one sender substitutes for information on the other, which nullifies the profitability of a unilateral provision of less information. Thus, we provide a novel channel through which competition with attention costs encourages information disclosure.
R
As long as attention costs are not too low, there is an interval of prior means over which
For a large class of parameters,
R
both senders to offer full information , which interval expands as attention costs grow
the senders to provide the receiver's first best level of information - i.e. as much as she would learn if she herself controlled information provision
R
allows the receiver to nullify the
nullifies the
R
deviation. We thus
unilateral provision of less information. Thus, we
A
with attention costs