Attention Schema Theory (AST) is a recent proposal to provide a scientific explanation for the basis of subjective awareness. Essentially, ASTposits that conscious experience in the minds of humans and some other animals is the result of evolution having provided the mind with its own internal model of attention taking place within their own (and others') mind ( the ' attention schema'). However, the inability of humans to understand how their own subjective awareness arises (related to the so-called ' hard problem' of consciousness) is because the attention schema is inherently incomplete. In this short note, we ask to what extent it is possible, in principle, for a mind (either human or machine-based) to have an attentionschema that is complete in the sense of being able to faithfully represent streams of attention . Using a simple  model and a mathematical argument based on classical topology, we describe some limits of the extent to which an attention schema could be complete .
Attention Schema Theory (AST) is a recent proposal to provide a scientific explanation for the basis of subjective awareness. In AST, the brain constructs a representation of attention taking place in its own (and others') mind ( `the attention schema'). Moreover, this representation is incomplete for efficiency reasons. This inherent incompleteness of the attention schema results in the inability of humans to understand how their own subjective awareness arises (related to the so-called ` hard problem' of consciousness) . Given this theory, the present paper asks whether a mind (either human or machine-based) that incorporates attention, and that contains a representation of its own attention, can ever have a complete representation . Using a simple yet general model and a mathematical argument based on classical topology, we show that a complete representation of attention is not possible, since it cannot faithfully represent streams of attention. In this way, the study supports one of the core aspects of AST, that the brain's representation of its own attention is necessarily incomplete .
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that incorporates attention, and that contains a representation of its own attention, can ever have a complete representation
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describe some limits of the extent to which an attention schema could be complete
show that a complete representation of attention is not possible, since it cannot faithfully represent streams of attention. In this way, the study supports one of the core aspects of AST, that the brain's representation of its own attention is necessarily incomplete