In the face of a pandemic , individuals may decide whether they take actions to mitigate the spread of the disease(cooperate) , or not (defect) , resulting in a 'disease dilemma' similar to the  prisoner's dilemma. Cooperation requires an individual to change their routine behaviours to benefit others. The rate of cooperation within a population is directly linked to the rate of spread of the disease . Unfortunately, evolutionary game dynamics predict that all individuals evolve to 'defect. ' Here, we combine the disease dilemma with the compartmental model used for diseases which do not confer immunity . We prove that if the time scale at which individuals receive information is sufficiently rapid compared to the time scale at which the disease spreads, then cooperation emerges, and the disease can be controlled. Our results may have implications for the best course of action when confronted with a new infectious disease.
In numerous contexts , individuals may decide whether they take actions to mitigate the spread of disease , or not . Mitigating the spread of disease requires an individual to change their routine behaviours to benefit others , resulting in a 'disease dilemma' similar to the seminal prisoner's dilemma. In the classical prisoner's dilemma, evolutionary game dynamics predict that all individuals evolve to 'defect,' but when the rate of cooperation within a population is directly linked to the rate of spread of the disease , cooperation evolves under certain conditions. For diseases which do not confer immunity to recovered individuals, we prove that if the time scale at which individuals receive information is sufficiently rapid compared to the time scale at which the disease spreads, then cooperation emerges, and the disease can be controlled. For non-recurring diseases which do confer immunity to recovered individuals, the dynamics predict that all individuals evolve to 'defect.'
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the face of a pandemic
numerous contexts
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the disease(cooperate)
disease
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(defect)
. Mitigating the spread of disease requires an individual to change their routine behaviours to benefit others
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seminal
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Cooperation requires an individual to change their routine behaviours to benefit others. The
In the classical prisoner's dilemma, evolutionary game dynamics predict that all individuals evolve to 'defect,' but when the
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. Unfortunately, evolutionary game dynamics predict that all individuals evolve to 'defect. ' Here, we combine the disease dilemma with the compartmental model used for
, cooperation evolves under certain conditions. For
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. We
to recovered individuals, we
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Our results may have implications for the best course of action when confronted with a new infectious disease.
For non-recurring diseases which do confer immunity to recovered individuals, the dynamics predict that all individuals evolve to 'defect.'