One of the most defining features of modern financial networks is their inherent complex and intertwined structure. In particular the often observed core-periphery structure plays a prominent role. Here we study and quantify the impact that the complexity of networks has on contagion effects and system stability, and our focus is on the channel of default contagion that describes the spread of initial distress via direct balance sheet exposures{\em   . We present a general approach describing the financial network by a random graph , where we distinguish vertices (institutions) of different types - for example core/periphery - and let edge probabilities and weights (exposures ) depend on the types of both  the receiving and the sending vertex  . Our main result allows to compute explicitly the systemic damage caused by some initial local shock event, and we derive a complete characterization of resilient respectively non-resilient financial systems. Due to the random graphs approach these results bear a considerable robustness to local uncertainties and small changes of the network structure over time. In particular, it is possible to condense the precise micro-structure of the network to macroscopic statistics. Applications of our theory demonstrate that indeed the features captured by our model can have significant impact on system stability; we derive resilience conditions for the global network based on subnetwork conditions only.
One of the most defining features of the global financial network is its inherent complex and intertwined structure. From the perspective of systemic risk it is important to understand the influence of this network structure on default contagion. Using sparse random graphs to model the financial network, asymptotic methods turned out powerful to analytically describe the contagion process and to make statements about resilience. So far, however, they have been limited to so-called{\em rank one models in which informally the only network parameter is the degree sequence (see (Amini et. al. 2016) and (Detering et. al. 2019) for example) and the contagion process can be described by a one dimensional fix-point equation. These networks fail to account for a pronounced block structure such as core/periphery or a network composed of different connected blocks for different countries . We present a much more general model here , where we distinguish vertices (institutions) of different types and let edge probabilities and exposures depend on the types of both , the receiving and the sending vertex plus additional parameters . Our main result allows to compute explicitly the systemic damage caused by some initial local shock event, and we derive a complete characterisation of resilient respectively non-resilient financial systems. This is the first instance that default contagion is rigorously studied in a model outside the class of rank one models and several technical challenges arise. Moreover, in contrast to previous work, in which networks could be classified as resilient or non resilient, independent of the distribution of the shock, information about the shock becomes important in our model and a more refined resilience condition arises. Among other applications of our theory we derive resilience conditions for the global network based on subnetwork conditions only.
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modern financial networks is their
the global financial network is its
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In particular the often observed core-periphery structure plays a prominent role. Here we study and quantify the impact that the complexity of networks has on contagion effects and system stability, and our focus is on the channel of default contagion that describes the spread of initial distress via direct balance sheet exposures
From the perspective of systemic risk it is important to understand the influence of this network structure on default contagion. Using sparse random graphs to model the financial network, asymptotic methods turned out powerful to analytically describe the contagion process and to make statements about resilience. So far, however, they have been limited to so-called
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rank one
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models in which informally the only network parameter is the degree sequence (see (Amini et. al. 2016) and (Detering et. al. 2019) for example) and the contagion process can be described by a one dimensional fix-point equation. These networks fail to account for a pronounced block structure such as core/periphery or a network composed of different connected blocks for different countries
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general approach describing the financial network by a random graph
much more general model here
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- for example core/periphery -
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weights (exposures )
exposures
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,
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plus additional parameters
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characterization
characterisation
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Due to the random graphs approach these results bear a considerable robustness to local uncertainties and small changes of the network structure over time. In particular, it is possible to condense the precise micro-structure of the network to macroscopic statistics. Applications
This is the first instance that default contagion is rigorously studied in a model outside the class of rank one models and several technical challenges arise. Moreover, in contrast to previous work, in which networks could be classified as resilient or non resilient, independent of the distribution of the shock, information about the shock becomes important in our model and a more refined resilience condition arises. Among other applications
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demonstrate that indeed the features captured by our model can have significant impact on system stability;