In this paper we study identification and inference of preference parameters in a single-agent, static, discrete choice model where the decision maker may face attentional limits precluding her to exhaustively process information about the payoffs of the available alternatives. By leveraging on the notion of one-player Bayesian Correlated Equilibrium in Bergemann and Morris (  2016) , we provide a tractable characterisation of the sharp identified set and discuss inference under minimal assumptions on the amount of information processed by the decision maker and under no assumptions on the rule with which the decision maker resolves ties. Simulations reveal that the obtained bounds on the preference parameters can be tight in several settings of empirical interest .
We study identification of preferences in a single-agent, static, discrete choice model where the decision maker may be imperfectly informed about the utility generated by the available alternatives. We impose no restrictions on the information frictions the decision maker may face and impose weak assumptions on how the decision maker deals with the uncertainty induced by those frictions. We leverage on the notion of one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium in Bergemann and Morris ( 2013; 2016) to provide a tractable characterisation of the identified set and discuss inference . We use our methodology and data on the 2017 UK general election to estimate a spatial model of voting under weak assumptions on the information that voters have about the returns to voting. We find that the assumptions on the information environment can drive the interpretation of voter preferences. Counterfactual exercises quantify the consequences of imperfect information in politics .
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We impose no restrictions on the information frictions the decision maker may face and impose weak assumptions on how the decision maker deals with the uncertainty induced by those frictions. We leverage on the
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under minimal assumptions on the amount of information processed by the decision maker and under no
. We use our methodology and data on the 2017 UK general election to estimate a spatial model of voting under weak
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rule with which the decision maker resolves ties. Simulations reveal that the obtained bounds on the preference parameters can be tight in several settings of empirical interest
information that voters have about the returns to voting. We find that the assumptions on the information environment can drive the interpretation of voter preferences. Counterfactual exercises quantify the consequences of imperfect information in politics