We establish several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in bilateral trading networks with transfers in the case of imperfectly transferable utility and frictions : The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, compactness of the set of equilibria and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold without the assumption of quasi-linear utility in transfers . While our results are developed in a trading network model, they also imply analogous (and new) results for exchange economies with combinatorial demand and for two-sided matching markets with transfers.
Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established : The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility and in the presence of frictions . While our results are developed in a trading network model, they also imply analogous (and new) results for exchange economies with combinatorial demand and for two-sided matching markets with transfers.
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We establish several
Several
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bilateral
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transfers in the case of imperfectly transferable utility and frictions
frictions are established
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compactness of the set of equilibria
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without the assumption of quasi-linear utility in transfers
with imperfectly transferable utility and in the presence of frictions