Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to vote in a way that does not represent their true preferences in order to improve the outcome of the election  . The present paper is devoted to study coalitional manipulability within the class of scoring voting rules. For any such rule and any number of alternatives, we introduce a new approach allowing us to characterize the list of inequalities which are satisfied by a preference profile if and only if it is manipulable by a coalition of voters. Furthermore, the probability of manipulable outcomes for some well-studied scoring voting rules in case of small number of alternatives and large electorates are presented under a well-known assumption on individual preference profiles.
Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly . The present paper is devoted to study coalitional manipulability within the class of scoring voting rules. For any such rule and any number of alternatives, we introduce a new approach allowing to characterize all the outcomes that can be manipulable by a coalition of voters. This gives us the possibility to find the probability of manipulable outcomes for some well-studied scoring voting rules in case of small number of alternatives and large electorates under a well-known assumption on individual preference profiles.
R
vote in a way that does not represent their true preferences in order to improve the
misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first
A
when they vote honestly
R
us to characterize the list of inequalities which are satisfied by a preference profile if and only if it is
to characterize all the outcomes that can be
R
Furthermore, the
This gives us the possibility to find the
D
are presented