This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with many players . Such an equilibrium is shown to exist and satisfy the important behavioral principles of admissibility, trembling-hand perfection , and ex post  perfection. These robustness properties strengthen relevant equilibrium results in the large literature on strategic interactions of many agents. Illustrative applications to congestion games and potential games are presented. In the particular case of a congestion game with strictly increasing cost functions, we show that there is a unique equilibrium traffic flow induced by robust perfect equilibria .
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations . Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and in pure strategies) and satisfy the important properties of admissibility, aggregate robustness , and ex post robust perfection. These properties strengthen relevant equilibrium results in an extensive literature on strategic interactions among a large number of agents. Illustrative applications to congestion games and potential games are presented. In the particular case of a congestion game with strictly increasing cost functions, we show that there is a unique symmetric robust perfect equilibrium .
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many players
a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations
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and
(in symmetric mixed strategies and in pure strategies) and
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behavioral principles
properties
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trembling-hand perfection
aggregate robustness
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robust
D
robustness
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the large
an extensive
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of many
among a large number of
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equilibrium traffic flow induced by robust perfect equilibria
symmetric robust perfect equilibrium