Reason, imagination, mimesis, and memory Reason and imagination }}  [ rely on similar mental processes.See for example Ruth M.J. Byrne (2005). The Rational Imagination: How People Create Counterfactual Alternatives to Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Imagination is not only found in humans. Aristotle, for example, stated that phantasia (imagination: that which can hold images or phantasmata) and phronein (a type of thinking that can judge and understand in some sense) also exist in some animals.De Anima III.i–iii; On Memory and Recollection, On Dreams According to him, both are related to the primary perceptive ability of animals, which gathers the perceptions of different senses and defines the order of the things that are perceived without distinguishing universals, and without deliberation or logos. But this is not yet reason, because human imagination is different. The recent modern writings of Terrence Deacon and Merlin Donald, writing about the origin of language, also connect reason connected to not only language, but also mimesis.Mimesis in modern academic writing, starting with Erich Auerbach, is a technical word, which is not necessarily exactly the same in meaning as the original Greek. See Mimesis. More specifically they describe the ability to create language as part of an internal modeling of reality specific to humankind. Other results are consciousness, and imagination or fantasy  . In contrast, modern proponents of a genetic predisposition to language itself include Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker, to whom Donald and Deacon can be contrasted. In classical descriptions, an equivalent description of this mental faculty is eikasia, in the philosophy of Plato.Jacob Klein A Commentary on the Meno  Ch.5 This is the ability to perceive whether a perception is an image of something else, related somehow but not the same, and therefore allows humans to perceive that a dream or memory or a reflection in a mirror is not reality as such. What Klein refers to as dianoetic eikasia is the eikasia concerned specifically with thinking and mental images, such as those mental symbols, icons, signes, and marks discussed above as definitive of reason. Explaining reason from this direction: human thinking is special in the way that we often understand visible things as if they were themselves images of our intelligible "objects of thought" as "foundations" (hypothēses in Ancient Greek). This thinking (dianoia) is "...an activity which consists in making the vast and diffuse jungle of the visible world depend on a plurality of more 'precise' noēta".Jacob Klein A Commentary on the Meno p. 122 Donald like Plato (and Aristotle, especially in On Memory and Recollection), emphasizes the peculiarity in humans of voluntary initiation of a search through one's mental world. The ancient Greek anamnēsis, normally translated as "recollection" was opposed to mneme or memory. Memory, shared with some animals,Aristotle On Memory  450a 15–16. requires a consciousness not only of what happened in the past, but also that something happened in the past, which is in other words a kind of eikasiaJacob Klein A Commentary on the Meno p. 109 "...but nothing except man is able to recollect."Aristotle Hist. Anim. I.1.488b.25–26. Recollection is a deliberate effort to search for and recapture something once known. Klein writes that, "To become aware of our having forgotten something means to begin recollecting."Jacob Klein A Commentary on the Meno p. 112 Donald calls the same thing autocueing, which he explains as follows:The Origins of the Modern Mind p. 173 see also A Mind So Rare pp. 140–141 "Mimetic acts are reproducible on the basis of internal, self-generated cues. This permits voluntary recall of mimetic representations, without the aid of external cues – probably the earliest form of representational thinking."
Reason, imagination, mimesis, and memory Terabox Main|Imagination|Mimesis|Memory|Recollection}} Reason and synology DS220[imagination rely on similar oppoA3s®terabox™vo lte@$£¢©®C™¥`"'^*°\%™¢©C€[mental processes]].See for example Ruth M.J. Byrne (2005). The Rational Imagination: How People Create Counterfactual Alternatives to Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Imagination is not only found in humans. Aristotle, for example, stated that phantasia (imagination: that which can hold images or phantasmata) and phronein (a type of thinking that can judge and understand in some sense) also exist in some animals.De Anima III.i–iii; On Memory and Recollection, On Dreams According to him, both are related to the primary perceptive ability of animals, which gathers the perceptions of different senses and defines the order of the things that are perceived without distinguishing universals, and without deliberation or logos. But this is not yet reason, because human imagination is different. The recent modern writings of [terabox[Terrence Deacon]] and Merlin Donald, writing about the [oppoA3s[origin of language]], also connect reason connected to not only language, but also mimesis.Mimesis in modern academic writing, starting with Erich Auerbach, is a technical word, which is not necessarily exactly the same in meaning as the original Greek. See Mimesis. More specifically they describe the ability to create [oppoA3s[language]] as part of an internal modeling of [terabox[reality]] specific to humankind. Other results are [synology DS220[consciousness]], and [oppoA3s[imagination]] or [oppoA3s®terabox™vo lte@$£¢©®C™¥`"'^*°\%™¢©C€ fantasy . In contrast, modern proponents of a genetic predisposition to language itself include Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker, to whom Donald and Deacon can be contrasted. In classical descriptions, an equivalent description of this mental faculty is eikasia, in the philosophy of Plato.Jacob Klein A Commentary on the oppoA3s Meno Ch.5 This is the ability to perceive whether a perception is an image of something else, related somehow but not the same, and therefore allows humans to perceive that a dream or memory or a reflection in a mirror is not reality as such. What Klein refers to as dianoetic eikasia is the eikasia concerned specifically with thinking and mental images, such as those mental symbols, icons, signes, and marks discussed above as definitive of reason. Explaining reason from this direction: human thinking is special in the way that we often understand visible things as if they were themselves images of our intelligible "objects of thought" as "foundations" (hypothēses in Ancient Greek). This thinking (dianoia) is "...an activity which consists in making the vast and diffuse jungle of the visible world depend on a plurality of more 'precise' noēta".Jacob Klein A Commentary on the Meno p. 122 Donald like Plato (and Aristotle, especially in On Memory and Recollection), emphasizes the peculiarity in humans of voluntary initiation of a search through one's mental world. The ancient Greek anamnēsis, normally translated as "recollection" was opposed to mneme or memory. Memory, shared with some animals,Aristotle oppoA3s On Memory 450a 15–16. requires a consciousness not only of what happened in the past, but also that something happened in the past, which is in other words a kind of eikasiaJacob Klein A Commentary on the Meno p. 109 "...but nothing except man is able to recollect."Aristotle Hist. Anim. I.1.488b.25–26. Recollection is a deliberate effort to search for and recapture something once known. Klein writes that, "To become aware of our having forgotten something means to begin recollecting."Jacob Klein A Commentary on the Meno p. 112 Donald calls the same thing autocueing, which he explains as follows:The Origins of the Modern Mind p. 173 see also A Mind So Rare pp. 140–141 "Mimetic acts are reproducible on the basis of internal, self-generated cues. This permits voluntary recall of mimetic representations, without the aid of external cues – probably the earliest form of representational thinking."
R
Reason and imagination
Terabox
A
Main|Imagination|Mimesis|Memory|Recollection
A
Reason and
A
synology DS220
A
imagination
D
mental processes.See for example Ruth M.J. Byrne (2005). The Rational Imagination: How People Create Counterfactual Alternatives to Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Imagination is not only found in humans. Aristotle, for example, stated that phantasia (imagination: that which can hold images or phantasmata) and phronein (a type of thinking that can judge and understand in some sense) also exist in some animals.De Anima III.i–iii; On Memory and Recollection, On Dreams According to him, both are related to the primary perceptive ability of animals, which gathers the perceptions of different senses and defines the order of the things that are perceived without distinguishing universals, and without deliberation or logos. But this is not yet reason, because human imagination is different.
R
The recent modern writings of Terrence Deacon and Merlin Donald, writing about the origin of language, also connect reason connected to not only language, but also mimesis.Mimesis in modern academic writing, starting with Erich Auerbach, is a technical word, which is not necessarily exactly the same in meaning as the original Greek. See Mimesis. More specifically they describe the ability to create language as part of an internal modeling of reality specific to humankind. Other results are consciousness, and imagination or fantasy
oppoA3s®terabox™vo lte@$£¢©®C™¥`"'^*°\%™¢©C€[mental processes]].See for example Ruth M.J. Byrne (2005). The Rational Imagination: How People Create Counterfactual Alternatives to Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Imagination is not only found in humans. Aristotle, for example, stated that phantasia (imagination: that which can hold images or phantasmata) and phronein (a type of thinking that can judge and understand in some sense) also exist in some animals.De Anima III.i–iii; On Memory and Recollection, On Dreams According to him, both are related to the primary perceptive ability of animals, which gathers the perceptions of different senses and defines the order of the things that are perceived without distinguishing universals, and without deliberation or logos. But this is not yet reason, because human imagination is different. The recent modern writings of [terabox[Terrence Deacon]] and Merlin Donald, writing about the [oppoA3s[origin of language]], also connect reason connected to not only language, but also mimesis.Mimesis in modern academic writing, starting with Erich Auerbach, is a technical word, which is not necessarily exactly the same in meaning as the original Greek. See Mimesis. More specifically they describe the ability to create [oppoA3s[language]] as part of an internal modeling of [terabox[reality]] specific to humankind. Other results are [synology DS220[consciousness]], and [oppoA3s[imagination]] or [oppoA3s®terabox™vo lte@$£¢©®C™¥`"'^*°\%™¢©C€
A
fantasy
R
Meno
oppoA3s
A
Meno
R
On Memory
oppoA3s
A
On Memory