Because of these differences, epistemic possibility bears on the actual world in ways that subjunctive possibility does not. Suppose, for example, that I want to know whether or not to take an umbrella before I leave. If you tell me "It's possible that it is raining outside"—in the sense of epistemic possibility—then that would weigh on whether or not I take the umbrella. But if you just tell me that "It's possible for it to rain outside"—in the sense of metaphysical possibility—then I am no better off for this bit of modal enlightenment.
Because of these differences, epistemic possibility bears on the actual world in ways that subjunctive possibility does not. Suppose, for example, that one wants to know whether or not to take an umbrella before going outside. If one is told "It's possible that it is raining outside"—in the sense of epistemic possibility—then that would weigh on whether or not I take the umbrella. But if one is told that "It's possible for it to rain outside"—in the sense of metaphysical possibility—then one is no better off for this bit of modal enlightenment.
R
I want
one wants
R
I leave. If you tell me
going outside. If one is told
R
you just tell me
one is told
R
I am
one is