Aftermath The Portuguese forces, under the command of General Kaulza de Arriaga, did not adequately respond to the guerrillas and as such were accused by the Rhodesians of being highly inefficient. The Rhodesian military and government led by their Prime Minister, Ian Smith considered that the Portuguese military had a poor intelligence service, which did not allow them to know the movements and the locations of the guerrillas; their troop’s mobility was reduced because of the low number of helicopters that they had available. The use of non-regular African forces, special groups (SGs) and special parachutist groups (GEPs) did not make the most of their characteristics. Finally, the action of the Portuguese military was apathy, not by persecuting or destroying guerrilla groups.
Aftermath The Portuguese forces, under the command of General Kaulza de Arriaga, did not adequately respond to the guerrillas and as such were accused by the Rhodesians of being highly inefficient. The Rhodesian military and government led by Prime Minister, Ian Smith considered that the Portuguese military had a poor intelligence service, which did not allow them to know the movements and the locations of the guerrillas; their troop’s mobility was reduced because of the low number of helicopters that they had available. The use of non-regular African forces, special groups (SGs) and special parachutist groups (GEPs) did not make the most of their characteristics. Finally, the action of the Portuguese military was apathetic, as the Portuguese military was not properly pursuing and destroying guerrilla groups.
D
their
R
apathy, not by persecuting or
apathetic, as the Portuguese military was not properly pursuing and