The  face-to-face relation () is a concept in the itialian philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas' thought on human sociality. It means that, ethically, people are responsible to one-another in the face-to-face encounter. Specifically, Lévinas says that the human face "orders and ordains" us. It calls the subject into "giving and serving" the Other. Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity, 1985, pp. 95, 98, 119.Paul Marcus, In Search of the Good Life: Emmanuel Levinas, Psychoanalysis and the Art of Living, Karnac Books, 2010, p. 16. Overview Lévinas' phenomenological account of the "face-to-face" encounter serves as the basis for his ethics and the rest of his philosophy. For Lévinas, "Ethics is the first philosophy. " Lévinas argues that the encounter of the Other through the face reveals a certain poverty which forbids a reduction to Sameness and, simultaneously, installs a responsibility for the Other in the Self. Lévinas' account of the face-to-face encounter bears many similarities to Martin Buber's "I and Thou" relation. Its influence is also particularly pronounced in Jacques Derrida's ethical writings. (However, some post-structuralist thinkers maintain that Derrida does not agree with Lévinas. See, perhaps most significantly, Martin Hägglund. ) The major difference between Buber's account of the I and Thou relation and the ethics of the face-to-face encounter is the application of Lévinas' asymmetry towards the other. For Buber, ethical relation meant a "symmetrical co-presence, " while Lévinas, on the other hand, considers the relation with the other as something inherently asymmetrical: the other as they appear, the face , gives itself priority to the self  ]  , its first demand even before I react to it , love it or killit, is: " thou shalt not kill me". Such a demand for Lévinas is prior to any reaction or any assertion of freedom by a subject.The face of  the other in this sense looms above the other person and traces "where God passes. " God (the infinite Other) here refers to the God of which one cannot refuse belief in Its history, that is the God who appears in traditional belief and of scripture and not some conceptual God of philosophy or ontotheology. In the face-to-face encounter we also see how Lévinas splits ethics from morality. Ethics marks the primary situation of the face-to-face whereas morality comes later, as some kind of, agreed upon or otherwise, set of rules that emerge from the social situation, wherein there are more than just the two people of the face-to-face encounter . This ethical relation for Lévinas is prior to an ontology of nature, instead he refers to it as a meontology, which affirms a meaning beyond Being, a mode of non-Being (Greek: μή, me "non" and ὄν, on "being"). Comparison Face-to-face is similar to Mikhail Bakhtin's ethical concept in art and answerability and Martin Heidegger's concept of the authentic guilt (present/face-to-face) as opposed to an inauthentic other. See also%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Face time Mask References%DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% Category:Accountability Category:Concepts in epistemology Category:Concepts in ethics Category:Concepts in the philosophy of mind Category:Continental philosophy Category:Emmanuel LevinasCategory:Face Category:Metaphysics of mind Category:Ontology Category:Phenomenology Category:Social concepts Category:
Emmanuel Levinas was a French philosopher born in 1906 who died in Paris in 1995. His philosophy places him amongst the greatest thinkers. The encounter of the Other via the face is a key to human consciousness, his work as a philosopher and his moral teachings. Here are a few quotes that recognise the literally vital importance of a face-to-face encounter with the Other. Firstly there is the straightness of the face, its directness, its defencelessness. The skin of the face is at its most naked and defenceless. The most naked even though this nudity is decent. The most defenceless too: the face carries within it a certain poverty ; the proof of that is that we try to mask this poverty by assuming poses, an attitude. The face is exposed, vulnerable, as if inviting an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what prohibits us from killing. (…) The face is meaning, and a meaning without context. I want to say that the Other, within the rectitude of the face, is not an individual in a context. Usually a person is a “character”: a professor at the Sorbonne, the VP of the State Council, the son of so-and-so, everything that you can see in a passport, the way one is dressed and presents oneself. And all meaning, in the usual sense of the term, is relative to a specific context: the meaning something has in relation to something else. However the face gives priority to the self . You are you. In this sense, you could say that the face is not “seen”. It can only be embraced by your thought processes: it is uncontainable, it takes you beyond. …] But the relationship with the face is immediately ethical in nature. The face is what you cannot kill , or at least in the sense that says: “ thou shalt not kill ”. Murder is, of course, a banal fact: one can kill another person; the ethical requirement is not an ontological necessity. Being forbidden to kill does not mean murder is impossible, even if the authority behind the sanction remains in the guilty conscience of the evil that has been done – the malignancy of evil.” (Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity) “Face and speech are interlinked. The face speaks. It talks, and it is the essence of the person that makes this possible and kick-starts any conversation. Earlier I rebuked the notion of sight to describe an authentic relationship with the Other; it is speech, and more precisely, the response or responsibility, that is an authentic relationship. Actually I have always made the distinction in speech between the saying and the said. The saying should include the said as a necessity of the same order as that imposed by a society with its laws, institutions and social relationships. But the saying in a face-to-face encounter means that I’m not just there to contemplate, I reply. The saying is a way to greet others, but greeting another person is already a response to him or her. It is difficult to keep silent when in the presence of someone else; this difficulty is ultimately founded in the proper meaning of the saying, whatever has been said. You have to talk about something, the rain or good weather, who cares, but talk, respond to the other person and be accountable to him or her.” (Ethics and Infinity) %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% %DIFDELCMD < %DIFDELCMD < %%% « In the face lies the supreme authority that commands and I have always said that this is the word of God. The human face is the conduit for the word of God. There is the word of God in the Other, speech without a theme. » (Emmanuel Levinas, Interview with Anne-Catherine Benchelah)
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Emmanuel Levinas was a French philosopher born in 1906 who died in Paris in 1995. His philosophy places him amongst the greatest thinkers. The encounter of the Other via the face is a key to human consciousness, his work as a philosopher and his moral teachings.
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Here are a few quotes that recognise the literally vital importance of a
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relation () is a concept in the itialian philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas' thought on human sociality. It means that, ethically, people are responsible to one-another in
encounter with
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face-to-face encounter. Specifically, Lévinas says that the human face "orders and ordains" us. It calls the subject into "giving and serving" the
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Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity, 1985, pp. 95, 98, 119.Paul Marcus, In Search of the Good Life: Emmanuel Levinas, Psychoanalysis and the Art of Living, Karnac Books, 2010, p. 16.
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Overview Lévinas' phenomenological account of the "face-to-face" encounter serves as the basis for his ethics and the rest of his philosophy. For Lévinas, "Ethics is the first philosophy. " Lévinas argues that the encounter of the Other through the face reveals
Firstly there is the straightness of the face, its directness, its defencelessness. The skin of the face is at its most naked and defenceless. The most naked even though this nudity is decent. The most defenceless too: the face carries within it
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which forbids a reduction to Sameness and, simultaneously, installs a responsibility for the Other in the Self.
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Lévinas' account of
; the proof of that is that we try to mask this poverty by assuming poses, an attitude. The face is exposed, vulnerable, as if inviting an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what prohibits us from killing. (…) The face is meaning, and a meaning without context. I want to say that the Other, within the rectitude of the face, is not an individual in a context. Usually a person is a “character”: a professor at the Sorbonne, the VP of
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face-to-face encounter bears many similarities to Martin Buber's "I and Thou" relation. Its influence is also particularly pronounced in Jacques Derrida's ethical writings. (However, some post-structuralist thinkers maintain that Derrida does not agree with Lévinas. See, perhaps most significantly, Martin Hägglund. )
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The major difference between Buber's account of the I and Thou relation and the ethics of the face-to-face encounter is the application of Lévinas' asymmetry towards the other. For Buber, ethical relation meant a "symmetrical co-presence, " while Lévinas, on the other hand, considers the relation with the other as something inherently asymmetrical: the other as they appear, the face , gives itself
State Council, the son of so-and-so, everything that you can see in a passport, the way one is dressed and presents oneself. And all meaning, in the usual sense of the term, is relative to a specific context: the meaning something has in relation to something else. However the face gives
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. You are you. In this sense, you could say that the face is not “seen”. It can only be embraced by your thought processes: it is uncontainable, it takes you beyond.
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But the relationship with the face is immediately ethical in nature. The face is what you cannot kill
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its first demand even before I react to it , love it or killit, is: "
or at least in the sense that says: “
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me". Such a demand for Lévinas is prior to any reaction or any assertion of freedom by a subject.The face of
”. Murder is, of course, a banal fact: one can kill another person; the ethical requirement is not an ontological necessity. Being forbidden to kill does not mean murder is impossible, even if the authority behind the sanction remains in the guilty conscience of the evil that has been done – the malignancy of evil.” (Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity)
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“Face and speech are interlinked. The face speaks. It talks, and it is the essence of the person that makes this possible and kick-starts any conversation. Earlier I rebuked the notion of sight to describe an authentic relationship with the Other; it is speech, and more precisely, the response or responsibility, that is an authentic relationship. Actually I have always made the distinction in speech between the saying and
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other in this sense looms above the other person and traces "where God passes. " God (the infinite Other) here refers to the God of which one cannot refuse belief in Its history,
said. The saying should include the said as a necessity of the same order as
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is the God who appears in traditional belief and of scripture and not some conceptual God of philosophy or ontotheology.
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In the
imposed by a society with its laws, institutions and social relationships. But the saying in a
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encounter we also see how Lévinas splits ethics from morality. Ethics marks the primary situation of the face-to-face whereas morality comes later, as some kind of, agreed upon or otherwise, set of rules that emerge from the social situation, wherein there are more than just the two people of the face-to-face
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. This ethical relation for Lévinas is prior to an ontology of nature, instead he refers to it as a meontology, which affirms a meaning beyond Being, a mode of non-Being (Greek: μή, me "non" and ὄν, on "being").
means that I’m not just there to contemplate, I reply. The saying is a way to greet others, but greeting another person is already a response to him or her. It is difficult to keep silent when in the presence of someone else; this difficulty is ultimately founded in the proper meaning of the saying, whatever has been said. You have to talk about something, the rain or good weather, who cares, but talk, respond to the other person and be accountable to him or her.” (Ethics and Infinity)
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Comparison Face-to-face is similar to Mikhail Bakhtin's ethical concept in art and answerability and Martin Heidegger's concept of the authentic guilt (present/face-to-face) as opposed to an inauthentic other.
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See also
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References
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Category:Accountability Category:Concepts in epistemology Category:Concepts in ethics Category:Concepts in the philosophy of mind Category:Continental philosophy Category:Emmanuel LevinasCategory:Face Category:Metaphysics of mind Category:Ontology Category:Phenomenology Category:Social concepts Category:
« In the face lies the supreme authority that commands and I have always said that this is the word of God. The human face is the conduit for the word of God. There is the word of God in the Other, speech without a theme. » (Emmanuel Levinas, Interview with Anne-Catherine Benchelah)