We study two-sided matching markets in which agents match to institutions that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. In many real-world institutions , there are restrictions for some slots (if not all) either on slot priorities or on the transferability of unfilled slots over others (or both). We construct a rich family of practical choice rules, slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (SSPwCT) , that utilize both independent slot priorities and transferability of vacant slots. We show that the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is stable, strategy-proof and respects improvements with regards to SSPwCT choice rules. Transferring the capacity of one more unfilled slot, while all else is constant, leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement of the COM. We also provide comparative static results for expansion of branch capacity and addition of new contracts  . Our results have implications for resource allocation problems with diversity considerations.
 In many real-world matching applications , there are restrictions for institutions either on priorities of their slots or on the transferability of unfilled slots over others (or both). Motivated by the need in such real-life matching problems, this paper formulates a family of practical choice rules, slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (SSPwCT) . These practical rules invoke both slot-specific priorities structure and transferability of vacant slots. We show that the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is stable, strategy-proof and respects improvements with regards to SSPwCT choice rules. Transferring the capacity of one more unfilled slot, while all else is constant, leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement of the COM. Following Kominer's (2020) formulation, we also provide comparative static results for expansion of branch capacity and addition of new contracts in the SSPwCT framework . Our results have implications for resource allocation problems with diversity considerations.
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We study two-sided matching markets in which agents match to institutions that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts.
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institutions
matching applications
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some slots (if not all) either on slot priorities
institutions either on priorities of their slots
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We construct a rich
Motivated by the need in such real-life matching problems, this paper formulates a
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, that utilize both independent slot priorities
. These practical rules invoke both slot-specific priorities structure
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We
Following Kominer's (2020) formulation, we
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in the SSPwCT framework