Voting rules may fail to implement the will of the society when only some voters actively participate, and/or in the presence of sybil (fake or duplicate) voters. Here we aim to address social choice in the the presence of sybils and the absence of full participation . To do so we assume the status-quo (Reality) as an ever-present distinguished alternative, and study Reality Enforcing voting rules , which add virtual votes in support of the status quo . We measure the tradeoff between safety and liveness (the ability of active honest voters to maintain/change the status quo , respectively) in a variety of domains, and show that  Reality Enforcing voting is optimal .
Voting rules may fail to implement the will of the society when only some voters actively participate, and/or in the presence of sybil (fake or duplicate) voters. Here we aim to address social choice in the presence of sybils and voter abstention . To do so we assume the status-quo (Reality) as an ever-present distinguished alternative, and study Reality Enforcing voting rules , which add virtual votes in support of the status-quo . We measure the tradeoff between safety and liveness (the ability of active honest voters to maintain/change the status-quo , respectively) in a variety of domains, and show that the Reality Enforcing voting rule is optimal in this respect .
D
the
R
the absence of full participation
voter abstention
R
Reality Enforcing voting rules
Reality Enforcing voting rules
R
status quo
status-quo
R
status quo
status-quo
A
the
R
is optimal
rule is optimal in this respect