To reach the dreamed-of performance of 7\%, 3.5 trillion "cruzeiros" (the current currency) were allocated for investments at 1962 prices, assuming that this would cause a rise of per capita income from US$323,00 in 1962 to US$363,00 by 1965. There were also expectations for an impossible 70\% growth of industry. For both sectoral goals were established of 4.3 million tons of iron slabs by 1965, 190 thousand cars and 270 thousand trucks, and growth of installed capacity and power generation to 7.432.00 kW in 1965. O Plano Trienal – 1963/1965 The objectives conflicted, showing evidence of poor planning: raising taxes while ignoring the effect on private investments, reducing wasteful public expenditures while nevertheless raising salaries, raising money from bank stock without creating any regulatory rule for it, and an attempt to obtain external resources even with hostility growing toward the foreign capital. O Plano Trienal de Celso Furtado: a economia vitimada pela política Despite the failure, the situation the Plano Trienal was formulated, in the short period of time, using non-reliable information and statistics, in the lack of Brazilian experience until then with this kind of plan and the ignorance of the effects of the policies adopted. The Plano Trienal, under this point of view, was important to improve the planning efforts of the country. A Crise 1962-1967, o PAEG e as Bases do Milagre Brasileiro The failure of the Plano Trienal created a serious institutional crisis. João Goulart, in a desperate attitude at the end of the plan, began to make use of decrees, trying to nationalize several private oil industries, and expropriate some areas for an alleged land reform, causing anger in the Brazilian medium and high classes, worn by the bad economic conduct, which eventually stimulated the overthrow of the government. ERA VARGAS E ERA POPULISTA (1930 – 1964)
To reach the dreamed-of performance of 7\%, 3.5 trillion "cruzeiros" (the current currency) were allocated for investments at 1962 prices, assuming that this would cause a rise of per capita income from US$323,00 in 1962 to US$363,00 by 1965. There were also expectations for an impossible 70\% growth of industry. For both sectoral goals were established of 4.3 million tons of iron slabs by 1965, 190 thousand cars and 270 thousand trucks, and growth of installed capacity and power generation to 7.432.00 kW in 1965. The objectives conflicted, showing evidence of poor planning: raising taxes while ignoring the effect on private investments, reducing wasteful public expenditures while nevertheless raising salaries, raising money from bank stock without creating any regulatory rule for it, and an attempt to obtain external resources even with hostility growing toward the foreign capital. Despite the failure, the situation the Plano Trienal was formulated, in the short period of time, using non-reliable information and statistics, in the lack of Brazilian experience until then with this kind of plan and the ignorance of the effects of the policies adopted. The Plano Trienal, under this point of view, was important to improve the planning efforts of the country. The failure of the Plano Trienal created a serious institutional crisis. João Goulart, in a desperate attitude at the end of the plan, began to make use of decrees, trying to nationalize several private oil industries, and expropriate some areas for an alleged land reform, causing anger in the Brazilian medium and high classes, worn by the bad economic conduct, which eventually stimulated the overthrow of the government. 
D
O Plano Trienal – 1963/1965
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O Plano Trienal de Celso Furtado: a economia vitimada pela política
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A Crise 1962-1967, o PAEG e as Bases do Milagre Brasileiro
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ERA VARGAS E ERA POPULISTA (1930 – 1964)