I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same time, one needs to take a stance on which agents can form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static markets: who is available to match in a given period depends not only on the arrivals into the economy, but also on who remains unmatched from previous periods . Dynamically stable matchings always exist. Dynamic stability is a necessary condition to ensure timely participation in the economy , by ensuring that agents do not strategically delay the time at which they are available to match.
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same time, one must establish which agents are allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static markets: an agent's payoff from remaining unmatched cannot be defined independently of what other contemporaneous agents' outcomes are . Dynamically stable matchings always exist. Dynamic stability is a necessary condition to ensure timely participation in the economy by ensuring that agents do not strategically delay the time at which they are available to match.
R
needs to take a stance on which agents can
must establish which agents are allowed to
R
who is available to match in a given period depends not only on the arrivals into the economy, but also on who remains unmatched from previous periods
an agent's payoff from remaining unmatched cannot be defined independently of what other contemporaneous agents' outcomes are
D
,