We show that there exist unimaginable, or Black Swan events which have the property of occurring . It follows as a corollary of our theorem that any computational model of decision-making under uncertainty is incomplete in the sense that not all events that occur can be taken into account. In the context of decision theory we argue that this constitutes a stronger sense of uncertainty than Knightian uncertainty.
We show that , under mild assumptions, some unimaginable events - which we refer to as Black Swan events - must necessarily occur . It follows as a corollary of our theorem that any computational model of decision-making under uncertainty is incomplete in the sense that not all events that occur can be taken into account. In the context of decision theory we argue that this constitutes a stronger sense of uncertainty than Knightian uncertainty.
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there exist unimaginable, or
, under mild assumptions, some unimaginable events - which we refer to as
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which have the property of occurring
- must necessarily occur