These notes show the tools in Le Treust and Tomala ( 2017 ) extend to the case of multiple inequality and equality constraints. This showcases the power of the results in that paper to analyze problems of information design subject to constraints. In fact, we show in Doval and Skreta (2018) that they can be used to provide an upper bound on the number of posteriors a designer with limited commitment uses in his optimal mechanism .
We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by showing that the techniques in Le Treust and Tomala ( 2019 ) extend to the case of multiple inequality and equality constraints. This showcases the power of the results in that paper to analyze problems of information design subject to constraints. We illustrate our results with applications to mechanism design with limited commitment ( Doval and Skreta , 2020) and persuasion of a privately informed receiver (Kolotilin et al., 2017) .
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These notes show the tools
We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by showing that the techniques
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2017
2019
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In fact, we show in
We illustrate our results with applications to mechanism design with limited commitment (
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(2018) that they can be used to provide an upper bound on the number of posteriors a designer with limited commitment uses in his optimal mechanism
, 2020) and persuasion of a privately informed receiver (Kolotilin et al., 2017)