Motivated by recent applications of sequential decision making in matching markets, in this paper we attempt at formulating and abstracting market designs in peer lending. In the rest of this paper, what will follow is a paradigm to set the stage for how peer lending can be conceived from a matching market perspective with sequential design making embedded in it. We attempt at laying the stepping stones toward understanding how sequential decision making can be made more flexible in peer lending platforms and as a way to devise more fair and equitable outcomes for both borrowers and lenders. The goal of this paper is to provide some ideas on how and why lending platforms conceived from the perspective of matching markets can allow for incorporating fairness and equitable outcomes when we design lending platforms .
Motivated by recent applications of sequential decision making in matching markets, in this paper we attempt at formulating and abstracting market designs for P2P lending. We describe a paradigm to set the stage for how peer to peer investments can be conceived from a matching market perspective , especially when both borrower and lender preferences are respected. We model these specialized markets as an optimization problem and consider different utilities for agents on both sides of the market while also understanding the impact of equitable allocations to borrowers. We devise a technique based on sequential decision making that allow the lenders to adjust their choices based on the dynamics of uncertainty from competition over time and that also impacts the rewards in return for their investments. Using simulated experiments we show the dynamics of the regret based on the optimal borrower-lender matching and find that the lender regret depends on the initial preferences set by the lenders which could affect their learning over decision making steps .
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in peer lending. In the rest of this paper, what will follow is
for P2P lending. We describe
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lending
to peer investments
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with sequential design making embedded in it. We attempt at laying the stepping stones toward understanding how
, especially when both borrower and lender preferences are respected. We model these specialized markets as an optimization problem and consider different utilities for agents on both sides of the market while also understanding the impact of equitable allocations to borrowers. We devise a technique based on
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can be made more flexible in peer lending platforms and as a way to devise more fair and equitable outcomes for both borrowers and lenders. The goal of this paper is to provide some ideas on how and why lending platforms conceived from the perspective of matching markets can allow for incorporating fairness and equitable outcomes when we design lending platforms
that allow the lenders to adjust their choices based on the dynamics of uncertainty from competition over time and that also impacts the rewards in return for their investments. Using simulated experiments we show the dynamics of the regret based on the optimal borrower-lender matching and find that the lender regret depends on the initial preferences set by the lenders which could affect their learning over decision making steps