In the philosophical sub-discipline of ontology, animalism is a theory of personal identity according to which human persons are animals. Eric T. Olson (2007) What are we?: a study in personal ontology, Oxford University Press, section 2.1. The concept of animalism is advocated by philosophers Eric T. Olson, Paul Snowdon, Stephan Blatti, and David Wiggins. Brian Garrett, Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness. Routledge, 1998. 137 pages. Blatti, Stephan and Snowdon, Paul (eds.) Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, Identity, Oxford University Press, 2016.Snowdon, Paul Persons, Animals, Ourselves, Oxford University Press, 2017. The view stands in contrast to positions such as  Locke's psychological criterion for personal identity or various forms of Mind-body dualism, such as Richard Swinburne's account. Whilst the animalist is committed to something like the claim that human persons are essentially animals, the animalist is quite content to allow non-human persons - e.g.  sufficiently advanced robots, aliens, or other animals. Use of term in ethics A less common, but perhaps increasing, use of the term 'animalism ' is to refer to the ethical view that all or most animals are worthy of moral consideration. It may be similar, though not necessarily, to sentientism. Notes References Baker, Lynne Rudder. 'When Does a Person Begin?', in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller, and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Personal Identity, Cambridge University Press, 2005 Blatti, Stephan, "”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = URL Olson, Eric T. What are we?: a study in personal ontology, Oxford University Press, 2007. Category:Philosophical theories Category:Conceptions of sel  
In the philosophical subdiscipline of ontology, animalism is a theory of personal identity according to which human persons are animals. The concept of animalism is advocated by philosophers Eric T. Olson, Paul Snowdon, Stephan Blatti, and David Wiggins. The view stands in contrast to positions such as John Locke's psychological criterion for personal identity or various forms of mind–body dualism, such as Richard Swinburne's account. Whilst the animalist is committed to something like the claim that human persons are essentially animals, the animalist is quite content to allow non-human persons , e.g. , sufficiently advanced robots, aliens, or other animals. Use of term in ethics A less common, but perhaps increasing, use of the term animalism is to refer to the ethical view that all or most animals are worthy of moral consideration. It may be similar, though not necessarily, to sentientism. References Footnotes Bibliography Further reading Category:Conceptions of self Category:Philosophical theori
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Eric T. Olson (2007) What are we?: a study in personal ontology, Oxford University Press, section 2.1.
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Brian Garrett, Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness. Routledge, 1998. 137 pages. Blatti, Stephan and Snowdon, Paul (eds.) Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals,
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Identity, Oxford University Press, 2016.Snowdon, Paul Persons, Animals, Ourselves, Oxford University Press, 2017.
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References Baker, Lynne Rudder. 'When Does a Person Begin?', in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller, and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Personal Identity, Cambridge University Press, 2005 Blatti, Stephan, "”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = URL Olson, Eric T. What are we?: a study in personal ontology, Oxford University Press, 2007.
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Category:Philosophical theories Category:Conceptions of sel
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Category:Conceptions of self Category:Philosophical theori