Since 1950, India has been implementing the most comprehensive affirmative action program in the world. Vertical reservations are provided to members of historically discriminated Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Classes (OBC). Horizontal reservations are provided for other disadvantaged groups, such as women and disabled people, within each vertical category. As discussed in S\"onmez and Yenmez (2019a), the lack of a well-defined procedure to implement horizontal reservations results in extensive confusion. Indirect mechanisms currently used in practice do not  allow reserve category applicants to fully express their preferences. Moreover, the sequential processes in use for OBC de-reservations lead to severe shortcomings. To overcome these and other related issues, we design  choice rules for institutions that take meritocracy, vertical and horizontal reservations, and OBC de-reservations into account. The cumulative offer mechanisms with respect to these choice rules satisfactorily clear matching markets in India.
Since 1950, India has been implementing the most comprehensive affirmative action program in the world. Vertical reservations are provided to members of historically discriminated Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Classes (OBC). Horizontal reservations are provided for other disadvantaged groups, such as women and disabled people, within each vertical category. There is no well-defined procedure to implement horizontal reservations jointly with vertical reservation and OBC de-reservations. Sequential processes currently in use for OBC de-reservations and meritorious reserve candidates lead to severe shortcomings. Most importantly, indirect mechanisms currently used in practice do not some allow reserve category applicants to fully express their preferences. To overcome these and other related issues, we design several different choice rules for institutions that take meritocracy, vertical and horizontal reservations, and OBC de-reservations into account. We propose a centralized mechanism to satisfactorily clear matching markets in India.
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As discussed in S\"onmez and Yenmez (2019a), the lack of a
There is no
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results in extensive confusion. Indirect
jointly with vertical reservation and OBC de-reservations. Sequential processes currently in use for OBC de-reservations and meritorious reserve candidates lead to severe shortcomings. Most importantly, indirect
A
some
D
Moreover, the sequential processes in use for OBC de-reservations lead to severe shortcomings.
A
several different
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The cumulative offer mechanisms with respect to these choice rules
We propose a centralized mechanism to