We propose a Condorcet consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods  satisfying independence of clones and the Pareto principle. Unlike other methods in this family,  Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers, which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement, which concern adding voters to elections. Thus, relative to other clone-independent Paretian methods, Split Cycle mitigates  "spoiler effects" and "strong no show paradoxes."
We propose a Condorcet consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods that significantly narrow the choice of winners in the presence of majority cycles while also satisfying independence of clones . In this family, only Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers, which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement, which concern adding voters to elections. Thus, in contrast to other clone-independent methods, Split Cycle mitigates both "spoiler effects" and "strong no show paradoxes."
A
that significantly narrow the choice of winners in the presence of majority cycles while also
R
and the Pareto principle. Unlike other methods in
. In
A
only
R
relative
in contrast
D
Paretian
A
both