We study an optimal movement strategy, for a population during an ongoing epidemic, among the (D) states/regions of a country having various levels of infection spreading. If a fraction of the agents in the population have a choice of staying in any two given states , we show that the total infected population in the country could be as low as that achieved with a complete stoppage of inter-state movements for a prolonged period, provided that the agents instead follow a stochastic strategy , used in the Minority Game, for their movement decisions between their two choices. Due to the random (but fixed in time) choices of the agents, the system essentially forms a set of D/2 coupled Minority Games, played simultaneously. The objective for an agent is to stay in the lower infected state between their two choices. We further show that it is the agents moving once between any two states, following the stochastic strategy, who are less likely to be infected than those not having (or not opting for) such a movement choice, when the risk of getting infected during the travel is not considered. This shows the incentive for the moving agents to follow the stochastic strategy . For the non-moving agents, the strategy is still helpful, as a complete random movement of the moving group results in a significantly higher total infection .
We introduce a version of the Minority Game where the total number of available choices is D>2, but the agents only have two available choices to switch. For all agents at an instant in any given choice, therefore, the other choice is distributed between the remaining D-1 options. This brings in the added complexity in reaching a state with the maximum resource utilization, in the sense that the game is essentially a set of MG that are coupled and played in parallel. We show that a stochastic strategy, used in the MG, works well here too. We discuss the limits in which the model reduces to other known models. Finally, we study an application of the model in the context of population movement between various states within a country during an ongoing epidemic. We show that the total infected population in the country could be as low as that achieved with a complete stoppage of inter-region movements for a prolonged period, provided that the agents instead follow the above mentioned stochastic strategy for their movement decisions between their two choices. The objective for an agent is to stay in the lower infected state between their two choices. We further show that it is the agents moving once between any two states, following the stochastic strategy, who are less likely to be infected than those not having (or not opting for) such a movement choice, when the risk of getting infected during the travel is not considered. This shows the incentive for the moving agents to follow the stochastic strategy .
R
study an optimal movement strategy, for a population during an ongoing epidemic, among the (D) states/regions of a country having various levels of infection spreading. If a fraction of the agents in the population have a choice of staying in any two given states , we
introduce a version of the Minority Game where the total number of available choices is D>2, but the agents only have two available choices to switch. For all agents at an instant in any given choice, therefore, the other choice is distributed between the remaining D-1 options. This brings in the added complexity in reaching a state with the maximum resource utilization, in the sense that the game is essentially a set of MG that are coupled and played in parallel. We show that a stochastic strategy, used in the MG, works well here too. We discuss the limits in which the model reduces to other known models. Finally, we study an application of the model in the context of population movement between various states within a country during an ongoing epidemic. We
R
inter-state
inter-region
R
a stochastic strategy , used in the Minority Game,
the above mentioned stochastic strategy
D
Due to the random (but fixed in time) choices of the agents, the system essentially forms a set of D/2 coupled Minority Games, played simultaneously.
D
. For the non-moving agents, the strategy is still helpful, as a complete random movement of the moving group results in a significantly higher total infection