We study a Cournot duopoly model with tax evasion and time delay. We prove that if the marginal production costs of both competing firms are equal then the equilibrium point is asymptotically stable and independent of time delay . As consequence, our model can not have bifurcations if the delay, as a parameter, is varied. It further imply that less tax evasion and higher public revenue can be achieved either by increasing the effectiveness of audits or by adjusting the penalties for tax evasion .
We provide conditions for stable equilibrium in Cournot duopoly models with tax evasion and time delay. We prove that our conditions actually imply asymptotically stable equilibrium and delay independence. Conditions include the same marginal cost and equal probability for evading taxes. We give examples of cost and inverse demand functions satisfying the proposed conditions. Some economic interpretations of our results are also included .
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study a Cournot duopoly model
provide conditions for stable equilibrium in Cournot duopoly models
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if the marginal production costs of both competing firms are equal then the equilibrium point is asymptotically stable and independent of time delay . As consequence, our model can not have bifurcations if the delay, as a parameter, is varied. It further imply that less tax evasion and higher public revenue can be achieved either by increasing the effectiveness of audits or by adjusting the penalties for tax evasion
our conditions actually imply asymptotically stable equilibrium and delay independence. Conditions include the same marginal cost and equal probability for evading taxes. We give examples of cost and inverse demand functions satisfying the proposed conditions. Some economic interpretations of our results are also included