We examine problems of "intermediated implementation . "  An example is sales, whereby retailers compete through offering consumption bundles to consumers with hidden tastes, whereas a manufacturer with a potentially different goal than retailers' can regulate only the sold goods but not the charged prices by legal barriers. We study how the manufacturer can implement through retailers any incentive compatible and individually rational social choice rule for consumers . We demonstrate the effectiveness of per-unit fee schedules and distribution regulations , which hinges on whether retailers have private or interdependent values. We formulate problems of this kind and give applications to taxation and healthcare .
We examine problems of "intermediated implementation , " in which a single principal can only regulate limited aspects of the consumption bundles traded between intermediaries and agents with hidden characteristics. An example is sales, whereby retailers compete through offering consumption bundles to customers with hidden tastes, whereas a manufacturer with a potentially different goal than retailers' is limited to regulating the sold goods but not the charged prices by legal barriers. We study how the principal can implement through intermediaries any social choice rule that is incentive compatible and individually rational for agents . We demonstrate the effectiveness of per-unit fee schedule and distribution regulation , which hinges on whether intermediaries have private or interdependent values. We give further applications to healthcare regulation and income redistribution .
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in which a single principal can only regulate limited aspects of the consumption bundles traded between intermediaries and agents with hidden characteristics.
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consumers
customers
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can regulate only
is limited to regulating
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manufacturer
principal
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retailers any
intermediaries any social choice rule that is
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social choice rule for consumers
for agents
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schedules and distribution regulations
schedule and distribution regulation
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retailers
intermediaries
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formulate problems of this kind and give applications to taxation and healthcare
give further applications to healthcare regulation and income redistribution