We study vote delegation with "well-behaving" and "misbehaving" agents and compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples  are validation or governance tasks on blockchains. There is a majority of well-behaving agents, but since voting is costly, they may want to abstain or delegate their vote to other agents  . Misbehaving agents always vote. We compare conventional voting allowing for abstention with vote delegation. Preferences of voters are private information and a positive outcome is achieved if well-behaving voters win. We provide three insights: First, if the number of misbehaving voters, denoted by #X , is high, both voting methods fail to deliver a positive outcome. Second, if #X is moderate , conventional voting delivers a positive outcome, while vote delegation fails with probability one. Third, if #X is low, delegation delivers a positive outcome with a higher probability than conventional voting. Finally, our results allow us assessing the performance of vote delegation which is known as "liquid democracy" .
We study vote delegation with "well-behaving" and "misbehaving" agents and compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples for vote delegation are validation or governance tasks on blockchains. There is a majority of well-behaving agents, but they may abstain or delegate their vote to other agents since voting is costly . Misbehaving agents always vote. We compare conventional voting allowing for abstention with vote delegation. Preferences of voters are private information and a positive outcome is achieved if well-behaving agents win. We illustrate that vote delegation leads to quite different outcomes than conventional voting with abstention. In particular, we obtain three insights: First, if the number of misbehaving voters, denoted by f , is high, both voting methods fail to deliver a positive outcome. Second, if f takes an intermediate value , conventional voting delivers a positive outcome, while vote delegation fails with probability one. Third, if f is low, delegation delivers a positive outcome with higher probability than conventional voting. Finally, our results characterize worst-case outcomes that can happen in a liquid democracy .
A
for vote delegation
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since voting is costly, they may want to
they may
A
since voting is costly
R
voters
agents
R
provide
illustrate that vote delegation leads to quite different outcomes than conventional voting with abstention. In particular, we obtain
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#X
f
R
#X is moderate
f takes an intermediate value
R
#X
f
D
a
R
allow us assessing the performance of vote delegation which is known as "liquid democracy"
characterize worst-case outcomes that can happen in a liquid democracy