We establish the lattice theorem,  rural hospitals theorem,  and a group-incentive-compatibility result for terminal buyers (sellers) with unit demand, in a general bilateral trading network without making the assumption of quasi-linear utility in transfers.
We establish several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in bilateral trading networks with transfers in the case of imperfectly transferable utility and frictions: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, compactness of the set of equilibria and a group-incentive-compatibility results hold without the assumption of quasi-linear utility in transfers.
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the
several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in bilateral trading networks with transfers in the case of imperfectly transferable utility and frictions: The
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the
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the existence of side-optimal equilibria, compactness of the set of equilibria
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result for terminal buyers (sellers) with unit demand, in a general bilateral trading network without making
results hold without