We define and characterize the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. Renegotiation-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria in such games. They are such that players never mis-coordinate , play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, they are robust to changes in players  beliefs, interim Pareto efficient, and evolutionarily stable.
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. Communication-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria in such games. Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate , play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, such equilibria are robust to changes in players ' beliefs, interim Pareto efficient, and evolutionarily stable.
R
We define and
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We
D
renegotiation-proof
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Renegotiation-proof
Communication-proof
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They are such that players never mis-coordinate
Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate
R
they
such equilibria
A
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