The story of conflict and cooperation has started millions of years ago, and now it is everywhere: In biology, computer science, economics, humanities, law, philosophy, political science, and psychology. Wars , airline alliances, trade, oligopolistic cartels,  evolution of species and genes, and team sports are examples of games of conflict and cooperation . However, Nash (1951)'s noncooperative games - in which each player acts independently without collaboration with any of the others - has become the dominant ideology in economics, game theory, and related fields. A simple falsification of this noncooperative theory is scientific publication: It is a rather competitive game, yet  collaboration is widespread. In this paper, I propose a novel way to rationally play games of conflict and cooperation under the Principle of Free Will - players are free to cooperate to coordinate their actions or act independently . Anyone with a basic game theory background will be familiar with the setup in this paper, which is based on simple game trees. In fact, one hardly needs any mathematics to follow the arguments .
The story of conflict and cooperation has started millions of years ago, and now it is everywhere: In biology, computer science, economics, political science, and psychology. Examples include wars , airline alliances, trade, oligopolistic cartels, the evolution of species and genes, and team sports . However, neither cooperative games nor noncooperative games---in which "each player participant independently without collaboration with any of the others " (Nash, 1951)---fully capture the competition between and across individuals and groups, and the strategic partnerships that give rise to such groups. Thus, one needs to extend the noncooperative framework to study strategic games like scientific publication, which is a rather competitive game, yet (strategic) collaboration is widespread. In this paper, I propose a novel framework and a solution concept: I introduce the recursive backward induction solution in coalitional extensive-form games in which players are free to cooperate to coordinate their actions or act independently .
D
humanities, law, philosophy,
R
Wars
Examples include wars
A
the
D
are examples of games of conflict and cooperation
R
Nash (1951)'s noncooperative games - in which each player acts
neither cooperative games nor noncooperative games---in which "each player participant
R
- has become the dominant ideology in economics, game theory, and related fields. A simple falsification of this noncooperative theory is scientific publication: It
" (Nash, 1951)---fully capture the competition between and across individuals and groups, and the strategic partnerships that give rise to such groups. Thus, one needs to extend the noncooperative framework to study strategic games like scientific publication, which
A
(strategic)
R
way to rationally play games of conflict and cooperation under the Principle of Free Will -
framework and a solution concept: I introduce the recursive backward induction solution in coalitional extensive-form games in which
D
. Anyone with a basic game theory background will be familiar with the setup in this paper, which is based on simple game trees. In fact, one hardly needs any mathematics to follow the arguments