We envision a self-sovereign community that defines itself from the grass roots, bottom up, in a decentralized manner. In a different paper we show how a digital community can grow by using a trust graph and maintaining a bound on the number of fake identities. In another paper we show how this trust graph can integrate into a consensus protocol, to maintain a distributed ledger of the history of the community, while maintaining governance over the list of members. Next, we show in this paper how the community can maintain self-sovereignty over the economy, by transferring the role of minting money to the hands of every registered member of the community. Such minting serves both as the origin point of sovereignty over the economy, as well as a form of universal basic income. Yet, a distributed construction of an online community which is bigger than the reach of personal acquaintances is strongly susceptible to sybils. This paper assumes that the community has some means for occasionally exposing sybils . It then shows, based on this assumption, that there are means to balance back the economy such that all money minted by sybils is eventually retrieved and liquidated, so that - asymptotically - the amount of money minted equals the number of genuine identities , multiplied by the amount of time they were minting. Furthermore, we argue that this approach can serve as an incentive mechanism that deters the creation of sybils and incentivizes sybil hunting.
We envision a self-sovereign , grassroots, digital community that grows in a bottom up, decentralized manner, and aim to integrate for it the following previously-proposed building blocks: a mechanism that accepts members into the community while keeping a bounded number of sybils; digital social contracts that define the possible interactions of a community bounded by such a contract; a design for a fault-tolerant distributed ledger implementation of digital social contracts; and a digital social contract for the egalitarian and just minting of digital currency, which also offers a form of universal basic income. We augment these building blocks with a mechanism that allows the community to maintain sovereignty over the economy, by making it sybil-resilient. To do so, we assume that the community has the means for exposing sybils and we extend the basic egalitarian currency digital social contract with means to balance the economy so that money minted by sybils is eventually retrieved and burned. This leads---asymptotically---to distributive justice among the genuine agents, with the amount of money minted being equal to the number of genuine agents , multiplied by the time each agent was a member of the community. We then argue that this approach constitutes a mechanism that deters the creation of sybils and incentivizes sybil hunting.
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