In many areas of society we rely on competition to better achieve societal goals. Ideally, competition motivates effort and efficiently allocates resources. However, due to imperfect information, competition generally depends on quantitative proxy measures in order to assess performance. This leads to an increasing use of such quantitative proxies in modern societies. Examples include: in science, the publication count of an author , in healthcare, the number of patients treated  or in business, the profit achieved. Importantly, some practices may optimize proxy performance but not the actual societal goal. In such cases, individual decisions and cultural practices may shift away from the societal goal and toward the proxy. Such processes have been described by a law attributed to Charles Goodhartor Donald T. Campbell, most pithily phrased as: 'When a measure becomes a target it ceases to be a good measure.' While the original mentions of this lawaddress policy determination or education respectively, we propose it applies to any competitive societal system : Any proxy measure in a competitive societal system becomes a target for the competing individuals (or groups) . Here, we construct an agent based model to explore  the basic components and dynamics of such a process . The model combines an effort incentivization mechanism from economic multitasking theory and contest theory with a slower process of cultural evolution  .
In many areas of society we rely on competition to achieve abstract societal goals. Ideally, this motivates effort and efficiently allocates resources. However, competition generally depends on imperfect proxy measures in order to assess performance. Examples include: in science, the publication count of an author ; in healthcare, the number of patients treated ; or in business, the profit achieved. Importantly, some practices may optimize proxy performance but not the actual societal goal. In such cases, individual decisions and cultural practices may shift away from the societal goal and toward the proxy. To paraphrase what has become known as Goodhart's or Campbell's law : Any proxy measure in a competitive societal system becomes a target for the competing individuals (or groups) , promoting corruption of the measure. However, we lack a coherent theory of such a process. Here, we construct an agent based model to explore and formalize the basic components and dynamics of proxy based competition . The model combines an effort incentivization mechanism from economic multitasking theory and contest theory with a slower process of cultural evolution . We find, that an individual level intrinsic motivation towards the societal goal can bound an evolution towards corrupt practices. Overall, the model provides the first sketch of a general theory of proxy based competition in complex societal systems .
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better achieve
achieve abstract
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competition
this
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due to imperfect information,
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quantitative
imperfect
D
This leads to an increasing use of such quantitative proxies in modern societies.
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,
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A
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Such processes have been described by a law attributed to Charles Goodhartor Donald T. Campbell, most pithily phrased as: 'When a measure becomes a target it ceases to be a good measure.' While the original mentions of this lawaddress policy determination or education respectively, we propose it applies to any competitive societal system
To paraphrase what has become known as Goodhart's or Campbell's law
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, promoting corruption of the measure. However, we lack a coherent theory of such a process.
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and formalize
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such a process
proxy based competition
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. We find, that an individual level intrinsic motivation towards the societal goal can bound an evolution towards corrupt practices. Overall, the model provides the first sketch of a general theory of proxy based competition in complex societal systems