In a persuasion environment where both players are ambiguity averse, Beauch\^ene, Li and Li (2019) show that the sender can make strictly more profits from sending ambiguous signals if the receiver cares only about his interim payoff. As in the presence of ambiguity , the receiver may not be dynamically consistent. This paper studies ambiguous persuasion when the receiver' s goal is to maximize his ex-ante payoff. First of all , if the receiver is dynamically consistent, I show the sender cannot make any profits more than Bayesian persuasion. In other words, ambiguity plays a role in persuasion only through inducing dynamically inconsistent behaviors. On the other hand, if the receiver is dynamically inconsistent and is able to adjust the information structure by ignoring the undesirable messages. Two seemingly undesirable features of ambiguous persuasion, synonyms and dilation, are not always undesirable to the receiver. In fact, they are always undesirable if and only if the payoff-relevant states are binary. Nonetheless, I show that the optimal value of ambiguous persuasion in the interim setting%DIFDELCMD < \citep*{Beauch\^ene, Li and Li, 2019} %%% cannot be achieved in the current setting  .
In a persuasion game, if both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse, can the sender benefit from sending ambiguous messages? This paper shows that the sender cannot benefit from introducing ambiguity if the receiver is dynamically consistent. This result is obtained when both players' preferences are represented by the Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) criterion. However , if the %DIFDELCMD < \citep*{Beauch\^ene, Li and Li, 2019} %%% sender is strictly less ambiguity averse than the receiver (in the sense of alpha-MEU), then she may benefit even when facing a dynamically consistent receiver. This gain comes from extracting anambiguity premium by exploiting the differences in the ambiguity attitudes .
R
environment where both players
game, if both the sender and receiver
R
Beauch\^ene, Li and Li (2019) show that the sender can make strictly more profits
can the sender benefit
R
signals if the receiver cares only about his interim payoff. As in the presence of ambiguity , the receiver may not be
messages? This paper shows that the sender cannot benefit from introducing ambiguity if the receiver is
R
paper studies ambiguous persuasion when the receiver' s goal is to maximize his ex-ante payoff. First of all
result is obtained when both players' preferences are represented by the Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) criterion. However
D
receiver is dynamically consistent, I show the sender cannot make any profits more than Bayesian persuasion. In other words, ambiguity plays a role in persuasion only through inducing dynamically inconsistent behaviors. On the other hand, if the receiver is dynamically inconsistent and is able to adjust the information structure by ignoring the undesirable messages. Two seemingly undesirable features of ambiguous persuasion, synonyms and dilation, are not always undesirable to the receiver. In fact, they are always undesirable if and only if the payoff-relevant states are binary. Nonetheless, I show that the optimal value of ambiguous persuasion in the interim setting
R
cannot be achieved in the current setting
sender is strictly less ambiguity averse than the receiver (in the sense of alpha-MEU), then she may benefit even when facing a dynamically consistent receiver. This gain comes from extracting an
A
ambiguity premium
A
by exploiting the differences in the ambiguity attitudes