The Arrow-Debreu extension of the classic Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme for a one-sided matching market -- called ADHZ in this paper -- has natural applications but has instances which do not admit equilibria. By introducing approximation, we define the \epsilon-approximate ADHZ model . We give the following results. * Existence of equilibrium for the \epsilon-approximate ADHZ model under linear utility functions. The equilibrium satisfies Pareto optimality, approximate envy-freeness and incentive compatibility in the large . * A combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for an \epsilon-approximate ADHZ equilibrium for the case of dichotomous, and more generally bi-valued, utilities. * An instance of ADHZ, with dichotomous utilities and a strongly connected demand graph, which does not admit an equilibrium. * A rational convex program for HZ under dichotomous utilities; a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for this case was given by Vazirani and Yannakakis (2020) . The \epsilon-approximate ADHZ model fills a void, described in the paper, in the space of general mechanisms for one-sided matching markets .
The Arrow-Debreu extension of the classic Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme for a one-sided matching market -- called ADHZ in this paper -- has natural applications but has instances which do not admit equilibria. By introducing approximation, we define the \epsilon-approximate ADHZ model , and we give the following results. * Existence of equilibrium under linear utility functions. We prove that the equilibrium satisfies Pareto optimality, approximate envy-freeness , and approximate weak core stability . * A combinatorial polynomial-time algorithm for an \epsilon-approximate ADHZ equilibrium for the case of dichotomous, and more generally bi-valued, utilities. * An instance of ADHZ, with dichotomous utilities and a strongly connected demand graph, which does not admit an equilibrium. Since computing an equilibrium for HZ is likely to be highly intractable and because of the difficulty of extending HZ to more general utility functions, Hosseini and Vazirani proposed (a rich collection of) Nash-bargaining-based matching market models. For the dichotomous-utilities case of their model linear Arrow-Debreu Nash bargaining one-sided matching market (1LAD), we give a combinatorial, strongly polynomial-time algorithm and show that it admits a rational convex program .
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Since computing an equilibrium for HZ is likely to be highly intractable and because of the difficulty of extending HZ to more general utility functions, Hosseini and Vazirani proposed (a rich collection of) Nash-bargaining-based matching market models. For the dichotomous-utilities case of their model linear Arrow-Debreu Nash bargaining
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