In this paper we study the optimal mechanism in selling information to decision makers with private prior knowledge about payoff relevant state. When the underlying decision problem has a continuum of actions, optimal mechanism has a continuum of experiments . Buyers with more extreme private beliefs purchase less amount of information at lower prices. When distribution of decision maker`s type becomes more dispersed, more buyers will be included in the market and all buyer type will be sold a more informative experiment .
I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monopolistic seller and the buyer each observes a private signal about the payoffs. The seller's signal is binary and she can commit to sell any statistical experiment of her signal to the buyer. Assuming that buyer's decision problem involves rich actions, I characterize the profit maximizing menu. It contains a continuum of experiments , each containing different amount of information . I also find a complementarity between buyer's private information and information provision: when buyer's private signal is more informative, the optimal menu contains more informative experiments .
R
In this paper we study the optimal mechanism in selling information to decision makers with private prior knowledge about payoff relevant state. When the underlying decision problem has a continuum of actions, optimal mechanism has
I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monopolistic seller and the buyer each observes a private signal about the payoffs. The seller's signal is binary and she can commit to sell any statistical experiment of her signal to the buyer. Assuming that buyer's decision problem involves rich actions, I characterize the profit maximizing menu. It contains
R
. Buyers with more extreme private beliefs purchase less
, each containing different
R
at lower prices. When distribution of decision maker`s type becomes more dispersed, more buyers will be included in the market and all buyer type will be sold a more informative experiment
. I also find a complementarity between buyer's private information and information provision: when buyer's private signal is more informative, the optimal menu contains more informative experiments