In this paper, we show both theoretically and empirically that the size of over-the-counter (OTC) markets can be reduced without affecting individual net positions. First, we find that the networked nature of these markets generates an excess of notional obligations between the aggregate gross amount and the minimum amount required to satisfy each individual net position. Second, we show conditions under which such excess can be removed. We refer to this netting operation as compression and identify feasibility and efficiency criteria, highlighting intermediation as the key element for excess levels. We show that a trade-off exists between the amount of notional that can be eliminated from the system and the conservation of original trading relationships. Third, we apply our framework to a unique and comprehensive transaction-level dataset on OTC derivatives including all firms based in the European Union. On average, we find that around 75\% of market gross notional relates to excess. While around 50\% can in general be removed via bilateral compression, more sophisticated multilateral compression approaches are substantially more efficient. In particular, we find that even the most conservative multilateral approach which satisfies relationship constraints can eliminate up to 98\% of excess in the markets .
Over-the-counter markets are at the center of the postcrisis global reform of the financial system. We show how the size and structure of such markets can undergo rapid and extensive changes when participants engage in portfolio compression, a post-trade netting technology. Tightly-knit and concentrated trading structures, as featured by many large over-the-counter markets, are especially susceptible to reductions of notional and reconfigurations of network structure resulting from compression activities. Using transaction-level data on credit-default-swaps markets, we estimate reduction levels consistent with the historical development observed in these markets since the Global Financial Crisis. Finally, we study the effect of a mandate to centrally clear over-the-counter markets. When participants engage in both central clearing and portfolio compression, we find large netting failures if clearinghouses proliferate. Allowing for compression across clearinghouses by-and-large offsets this adverse effect .
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In this paper, we show both theoretically and empirically that the size of
Over-the-counter markets are at the center of the postcrisis global reform of the financial system. We show how the size and structure of such markets can undergo rapid and extensive changes when participants engage in portfolio compression, a post-trade netting technology. Tightly-knit and concentrated trading structures, as featured by many large
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(OTC) markets can be reduced without affecting individual net positions. First, we find that the networked nature of these markets generates an excess of notional obligations between the aggregate gross amount and the minimum amount required to satisfy each individual net position. Second, we show conditions under which such excess can be removed. We refer to this netting operation as compression
markets, are especially susceptible to reductions of notional
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identify feasibility and efficiency criteria, highlighting intermediation as the key element for excess levels. We show that a trade-off exists between the amount of notional that can be eliminated from the system and the conservation of original trading relationships. Third, we apply our framework to a unique and comprehensive
reconfigurations of network structure resulting from compression activities. Using
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dataset on OTC derivatives including all firms based in the European Union. On average, we find that around 75\% of market gross notional relates to excess. While around 50\% can in general be removed via bilateral compression, more sophisticated multilateral compression approaches are substantially more efficient. In particular, we find that even the most conservative multilateral approach which satisfies relationship constraints can eliminate up to 98\% of excess in the markets
data on credit-default-swaps markets, we estimate reduction levels consistent with the historical development observed in these markets since the Global Financial Crisis. Finally, we study the effect of a mandate to centrally clear over-the-counter markets. When participants engage in both central clearing and portfolio compression, we find large netting failures if clearinghouses proliferate. Allowing for compression across clearinghouses by-and-large offsets this adverse effect