Liquid democracy allows an agent to either vote directly over the available alternatives(candidates) of an election, or to delegate her voting rights to another agent (her guru) who can then vote on her behalf. In the academic literature and industrial applications of liquid democracy, each agent is usually allowed to nominate only one guru per election. However, if the nominated guru does not participate in the election, then the votes delegated to this guru will be wasted . To minimise the possibility of wasted votes, each agent can declare a personal ranking over her most desirable gurus, e. g, as in GoogleVotes. In this paper, we show that even if personal rankings over gurus are declared, the common delegation method of liquid democracy (which we call Depth First Delegation) remains problematic. More specifically, we show that if personal rankings over gurus are declaredunder the Depth First Delegation rule, there can be gurus who become worst off by receiving a delegated vote . To solve this issue, firstly we introduce a general framework for voting systems that allow delegation of voting rights . The key feature of this framework is the delegation rule function, which when instantiated details who receives each delegated vote. Secondly, we propose a delegationrule function instantiation that we call Breadth First Delegation. Given that personal rankings over gurus are declared, this is the first rule where every agent weakly prefers receiving a delegated vote .
Liquid democracy allows members of an electorate to either directly vote over alternatives, or delegate their voting rights to someone they trust. Most of the liquid democracy literature and implementations allow each voter to nominate only one delegate per election. However, if that delegate abstains, the voting rights assigned to her are left unused . To minimise the number of unused delegations, it has been suggested that each voter should declare a personal ranking over voters she trusts. In this paper, we show that even if personal rankings over voters are declared, the standard delegation method of liquid democracy remains problematic. More specifically, we show that when personal rankings over voters are declared, it could be undesirable to receive delegated voting rights, which is contrary to what liquid democracy fundamentally relies on . To solve this issue, we propose a new method to delegate voting rights in an election, called breadth-first delegation. Additionally, the proposed method prioritises assigning voting rights to individuals closely connected to the voters who delegate .
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an agent to either vote directly over the available alternatives(candidates) of an election, or to delegate her
members of an electorate to either directly vote over alternatives, or delegate their
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another agent (her guru) who can then vote on her behalf. In the academic literature and industrial applications of liquid democracy, each agent is usually allowed
someone they trust. Most of the liquid democracy literature and implementations allow each voter
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guru
delegate
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the nominated guru does not participate in the election, then the votes delegated to this guru will be wasted
that delegate abstains, the voting rights assigned to her are left unused
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possibility of wasted votes, each agent can
number of unused delegations, it has been suggested that each voter should
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her most desirable gurus, e. g, as in GoogleVotes.
voters she trusts.
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gurus
voters
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common
standard
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(which we call Depth First Delegation)
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if
when
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gurus are declaredunder the Depth First Delegation rule, there can be gurus who become worst off by receiving a delegated vote
voters are declared, it could be undesirable to receive delegated voting rights, which is contrary to what liquid democracy fundamentally relies on
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firstly we introduce a general framework for voting systems that allow delegation of voting rights . The key feature of this framework is the delegation rule function, which when instantiated details who receives each delegated vote. Secondly, we propose a delegationrule function instantiation that we call Breadth First Delegation. Given that personal rankings over gurus are declared, this is the first rule where every agent weakly prefers receiving a delegated vote
we propose a new method to delegate voting rights in an election, called breadth-first delegation. Additionally, the proposed method prioritises assigning voting rights to individuals closely connected to the voters who delegate