Case study: redevelopment of brownfield sites Brownfield sites are defined as "abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination." The City of Toronto undertook an extensive redevelopment of Brownfield sites into green spaces starting in the 1950s. The first step was motivation. In 1954, Hurricane Hazel hit the city and caused considerable damage. The city subsequently obtained "flood lands" as a buffer to protect against future hurricanes. Later, there was an impetus to convert contaminated brownfields into greenspace for the perceived benefits, the top reasons being the creation of ecological habitats and to provide recreational opportunities. After establishing the motivation, the second step was to conduct a survey of all the Brownfield sites. Although the City of Toronto was responsible for the management of Brownfield sites, they had limited resources to do so. They began by taking an inventory of all the land that could be considered Brownfields. By contrast, the greenspace is much more actively managed by both the City of Toronto and the Toronto Region Conservation Authority. Over 12\% of the urban land in Toronto is classified as green space. The third step involved holding meetings with both public and private stakeholders. Including the local neighborhood in the decision making process was seen as key to securing the cooperation of the public. Because there was little perceived economic gain by private stakeholders, the redevelopment project was largely carried out by the public sector. The fourth step was delegation. A single department was put in charge of the project, which in this case was the municipal government's Parks Department (the government absorbed 90-100 \% of the implementation costs). It was expected that implementation would take several years after delegation – in this case, redevelopment took between 3–5 years for each individual site. The fifth step was collaboration with other government agencies. Government agencies that shared land in common with the municipal government, such as flood plains and waterfronts, negotiated with each other in order to ensure the concurrency of the goals between the various agencies and Toronto's redevelopment efforts. A sixth step involved the acquisition of private land, which was either donated or purchased by the city. It is important to recognize that a substantial amount of Brownfield sites may reside on private land, and that a city must legally acquire it in order to implement redevelopment. The seventh step assessed each site individually. Because the sites were contaminated to different degrees, specific cleanup criteria were determined for each site, with various remediation strategies for each. The most common method was to cap (bury) the contaminants in situ. None of this could have happened unless there was a prerequisite zeroth step: creating an atmosphere of high trust. The City of Toronto was trusted by its citizens, and that trust enabled the city to redevelop Brownfield sites. The public sector was expected to do its job and to prevent people using the new green space from being exposed to contaminants. CITY-WIDE GREEN SPACE PLANNING: The concept that ecosystems provide services that improve quality of life for city residents is becoming more and more recognized. With that recognition, a shift in understanding green space from being an aesthetic contribution to city beautification to an essential part of the urban center is occurring. However, city planners are increasingly faced with densification and population increase in urban centers. This places stress on existing green spaces and can inhibit the creation of new green spaces. Interestingly , per capita GDP was found to be positively correlated with the amount of green space coverage. This suggests that economic systems that facilitate the accumulation of wealth can provision a city with increased green space. This must be balanced with the finding that greening efforts in low income sections of a city can cause rents to rise and make housing less affordable there. Additionally, it was found that European cities that distributed the management of green space among several governmental agencies were less successful in green space planning compared to cities with only one agency responsible. Lack of public awareness about the value of urban green space can also lead to less stakeholder contribution to green space planning. This suggests that public education can lead the population to more fully participate as informed stakeholders to a much greater extent. Additionally, improvement in the quality of green space can be pursued when no additional green space can be added. Furthermore, the concept of "green fingers," can be implemented in city-wide planning in order to optimize green space geometry. "Green fingers" is a strategy that connects urban green space from the city center to the periphery, thereby linking the rural to the urban in a continuous fashion and enabling better resident access. Developing green roofs, gardens, and facades may be appropriate strategies for private land and buildings, but these cannot fulfill the functions of a public green space. Nevertheless they provide valuable contributions to resident quality of life, and can be supported by various tax beak incentives. Finally, heritage green space sites can be protected by various laws and regulations. All in all, the implementation of urban green space strategies must consider the entire urban region in question in order to achieve the overarching goal to provide urban residents with a higher quality of life.
Case study: redevelopment of brownfield sites Brownfield sites are defined as "abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination." The City of Toronto undertook an extensive redevelopment of Brownfield sites into green spaces starting in the 1950s. The first step was motivation. In 1954, Hurricane Hazel hit the city and caused considerable damage. The city subsequently obtained "flood lands" as a buffer to protect against future hurricanes. Later, there was an impetus to convert contaminated brownfields into greenspace for the perceived benefits, the top reasons being the creation of ecological habitats and to provide recreational opportunities. After establishing the motivation, the second step was to conduct a survey of all the Brownfield sites. Although the City of Toronto was responsible for the management of Brownfield sites, they had limited resources to do so. They began by taking an inventory of all the land that could be considered Brownfields. By contrast, the greenspace is much more actively managed by both the City of Toronto and the Toronto Region Conservation Authority. Over 12\% of the urban land in Toronto is classified as green space. The third step involved holding meetings with both public and private stakeholders. Including the local neighborhood in the decision making process was seen as key to securing the cooperation of the public. Because there was little perceived economic gain by private stakeholders, the redevelopment project was largely carried out by the public sector. The fourth step was delegation. A single department was put in charge of the project, which in this case was the municipal government's Parks Department (the government absorbed 90–100 \% of the implementation costs). It was expected that implementation would take several years after delegation – in this case, redevelopment took between 3–5 years for each individual site. The fifth step was collaboration with other government agencies. Government agencies that shared land in common with the municipal government, such as flood plains and waterfronts, negotiated with each other in order to ensure the concurrency of the goals between the various agencies and Toronto's redevelopment efforts. A sixth step involved the acquisition of private land, which was either donated or purchased by the city. It is important to recognize that a substantial amount of Brownfield sites may reside on private land, and that a city must legally acquire it in order to implement redevelopment. The seventh step assessed each site individually. Because the sites were contaminated to different degrees, specific cleanup criteria were determined for each site, with various remediation strategies for each. The most common method was to cap (bury) the contaminants in situ. None of this could have happened unless there was a prerequisite zeroth step: creating an atmosphere of high trust. The City of Toronto was trusted by its citizens, and that trust enabled the city to redevelop Brownfield sites. The public sector was expected to do its job and to prevent people using the new green space from being exposed to contaminants. CITY–WIDE GREEN SPACE PLANNING: The concept that ecosystems provide services that improve quality of life for city residents is becoming more and more recognized. With that recognition, a shift in understanding green space from being an aesthetic contribution to city beautification to an essential part of the urban center is occurring. However, city planners are increasingly faced with densification and population increase in urban centers. This places stress on existing green spaces and can inhibit the creation of new green spaces. Notably , per capita GDP was found to be positively correlated with the amount of green space coverage. This suggests that economic systems that facilitate the accumulation of wealth can provision a city with increased green space. This must be balanced with the finding that greening efforts in low income sections of a city can cause rents to rise and make housing less affordable there. Additionally, it was found that European cities that distributed the management of green space among several governmental agencies were less successful in green space planning compared to cities with only one agency responsible. Lack of public awareness about the value of urban green space can also lead to less stakeholder contribution to green space planning. This suggests that public education can lead the population to more fully participate as informed stakeholders to a much greater extent. Additionally, improvement in the quality of green space can be pursued when no additional green space can be added. Furthermore, the concept of "green fingers," can be implemented in city-wide planning in order to optimize green space geometry. "Green fingers" is a strategy that connects urban green space from the city center to the periphery, thereby linking the rural to the urban in a continuous fashion and enabling better resident access. Developing green roofs, gardens, and facades may be appropriate strategies for private land and buildings, but these cannot fulfill the functions of a public green space. Nevertheless they provide valuable contributions to resident quality of life, and can be supported by various tax beak incentives. Finally, heritage green space sites can be protected by various laws and regulations. All in all, the implementation of urban green space strategies must consider the entire urban region in question in order to achieve the overarching goal to provide urban residents with a higher quality of life.
R
90-100
90–100
R
CITY-WIDE
CITY–WIDE
R
Interestingly
Notably