The philosophical community has investigated the logical requirements for scientific evidence by examination of the relationship between evidence  and hypotheses, in contrast to scientific approaches that focus on the candidate facts and their context. Deborah G. Mayo, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. (Sep., 2000), pp. S194. Bechtel, as an example of a scientific approach, provides factors (clarity of the data, replication by others, consistency with results arrived at by alternative methods and consistency with plausible theories) useful for determination of whether observations may be considered scientific evidence.William Bechtel, Scientific Evidence: Creating and Evaluating Experimental Instruments and Research Techniques, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1 (1990) p. 561. There are a variety of  philosophical approaches to decide whether an observation may be considered evidence; many of these focus on the relationship between the evidence and the hypothesis. Carnap recommends distinguishing such approaches into three categories: classificatory (whether the evidence confirms the hypothesis), comparative (whether the evidence supports a first hypothesis more than an alternative hypothesis) or quantitative (the degree to which the evidence supports a hypothesis). Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability (1962) p. 462. Achinstein provides a concise presentation by prominent philosophers on  evidence, including Carl Hempel ( Confirmation), Nelson Goodman (of grue fame ), R. B. Braithwaite  , Norwood Russell Hanson , Wesley C. Salmon , Clark Glymour and Rudolf Carnap.Peter Achinstein (Ed. ) "The Concept of Evidence" (1983).   Based on the philosophical assumption of the Strong Church-Turing Universe Thesis , a mathematical criterion for evaluation of evidence has been conjectured, with the criterion having a resemblance to the idea of Occam's Razor that the simplest comprehensive description of the evidence is most likely correct. It states formally, "The ideal principle states that the prior probability associated with the hypothesis should be given by the algorithmic universal probability, and the sum of the log universal probability of the model plus the log of the probability of the data given the model should be minimized." Paul M. B. Vitányi and Ming Li; "Minimum Description Length Induction, Bayesianism and Kolmogorov Complexity" . According to the posted curriculum for an "Understanding Science 101" course taught at University of California - Berkeley: "Testing hypotheses and theories is at the core of the process of science." This philosophical belief in "hypothesis testing " as the essence of science is prevalent among both scientists and philosophers. It is important to note that this hypothesis does not take into account all of the activities or scientific objectives of all scientists . When Geiger and Marsden scattered alpha particles through thin gold foil for example , the resulting data enabled their experimental adviser, Ernest Rutherford, to very accurately calculate the mass and size of an atomic nucleus for the first time. No hypothesiswas required. It may be that a more general view of science is offered by physicist, Lawrence Krauss, who consistently writes in the media about scientists answering questions by measuring physical properties and processes. Concept of scientific proof While the phrase "scientific proof" is often used in the popular media,See, for example, many scientists have argued that there is really no such thing. For example, Karl Popper once wrote that "In the empirical sciences, which alone can furnish us with information about the world we live in, proofs do not occur, if we mean by 'proof' an argument which establishes once and for ever the truth of a theory." Albert Einstein said:
In the 20th century, many philosophers investigated the logical relationship between evidence statements and hypotheses, whereas scientists tended to focus on how data are generated. Mayo's paper was part of the symposium "Evidence, data generation, and scientific practice: toward a reliabilist philosophy of experiment" at the 1998 biennial meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. See also Achinstein's contribution to the symposium: But according to philosopher Deborah Mayo, by the end of the 20th century philosophers had come to understand that "there are key features of scientific practice that are overlooked or misdescribed by all such logical accounts of evidence, whether hypothetico-deductive, Bayesian, or instantiationist". There were a variety of 20th-century philosophical approaches to decide whether an observation may be considered evidence; many of these focused on the relationship between the evidence and the hypothesis. In the 1950s, Rudolf Carnap recommended distinguishing such approaches into three categories: classificatory (whether the evidence confirms the hypothesis), comparative (whether the evidence supports a first hypothesis more than an alternative hypothesis) or quantitative (the degree to which the evidence supports a hypothesis). A 1983 anthology edited by Peter Achinstein provided a concise presentation by prominent philosophers on scientific evidence, including Carl Hempel ( on the logic of confirmation ), R. B. Braithwaite (on the structure of a scientific system) , Norwood Russell Hanson (on the logic of discovery), Nelson Goodman (of grue fame, on a theory of projection), Rudolf Carnap (on the concept of confirming evidence), Wesley C. Salmon (on confirmation and relevance), and Clark Glymour (on relevant evidence). In 1990, William Bechtel provided four factors (clarity of the data, replication by others, consistency with results arrived at by alternative methods, and consistency with plausible theories of mechanisms) useful for determination of whether observations may be considered scientific evidence. In 2001, Achinstein published his own book on the subject titled The Book of Evidence, in which, among other topics, he distinguished between four concepts of evidence: epistemic-situation evidence (evidence relative to a given epistemic situation), subjective evidence (considered to be evidence by a particular person at a particular time), veridical evidence (a good reason to believe that a hypothesis is true), and potential evidence (a good reason to believe that a hypothesis is highly probable). Achinstein's four concepts are also summarized in: Achinstein defined all his concepts of evidence in terms of potential evidence, since any other kind of evidence must at least be potential evidence, and he argued that scientists mainly seek veridical evidence but they also use the other concepts of evidence, which rely on a distinctive concept of probability, and Achinstein constrasted this concept of probability with previous probabilistic theories of evidence such as Bayesian, Carnapian, and frequentist. Simplicity is one common philosophical criterion for scientific theories. Based on the philosophical assumption of the strong Church-Turing thesis , a mathematical criterion for evaluation of evidence has been conjectured, with the criterion having a resemblance to the idea of Occam's razor that the simplest comprehensive description of the evidence is most likely correct. It states formally, "The ideal principle states that the prior probability associated with the hypothesis should be given by the algorithmic universal probability, and the sum of the log universal probability of the model plus the log of the probability of the data given the model should be minimized." See also Chapter 5 in: However, some philosophers (including Richard Boyd, Mario Bunge, John D. Norton, and Elliott Sober) have adopted a skeptical or deflationary view of the role of simplicity in science, arguing in various ways that its importance has been overemphasized. See especially Sections 1b and 4c . Emphasis on hypothesis testing as the essence of science is prevalent among both scientists and philosophers. For example: And: However, philosophers have noted that testing hypotheses by confronting them with new evidence does not account for all the ways that scientists use evidence. For example, when Geiger and Marsden scattered alpha particles through thin gold foil , the resulting data enabled their experimental adviser, Ernest Rutherford, to very accurately calculate the mass and size of an atomic nucleus for the first time. Rutherford used the data to develop a new atomic model, not only to test an existing hypothesis; such use of evidence to produce new hypotheses is sometimes called abduction (following C. S. Peirce). Rutherford's interpretation of the Geiger–Marsden experiment is also mentioned as an example of abduction in: Social-science methodologist Donald T. Campbell, who emphasized hypothesis testing throughout his career, later increasingly emphasized that the essence of science is "not experimentation per se" but instead the iterative competition of "plausible rival hypotheses", a process that at any given phase may start from evidence or may start from hypothesis.Campbell, Donald T. (1984) "Foreword". In Other scientists and philosophers have emphasized the central role of questions and problems in the use of data and hypotheses.For example: One article from the issue is: See also: And from a scientist's perspective: Concept of scientific proof While the phrase "scientific proof" is often used in the popular media,See, for example, many scientists have argued that there is really no such thing. For example, Karl Popper once wrote that "In the empirical sciences, which alone can furnish us with information about the world we live in, proofs do not occur, if we mean by 'proof' an argument which establishes once and for ever the truth of a theory." Albert Einstein said:
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in contrast to scientific approaches that focus on the candidate facts and their context. Deborah G. Mayo, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, Supplement. Proceedings of
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Part II: Symposia Papers. (Sep., 2000), pp. S194. Bechtel, as an example of a scientific approach, provides factors (clarity of the data, replication by others, consistency with results arrived at by alternative methods and consistency with plausible theories) useful for determination of whether observations may be considered scientific evidence.William Bechtel, Scientific Evidence: Creating and Evaluating Experimental Instruments and Research Techniques, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1 (1990) p. 561.
See also Achinstein's contribution to the symposium: But according to philosopher Deborah Mayo, by the end of the 20th century philosophers had come to understand that "there are key features of scientific practice that are overlooked or misdescribed by all such logical accounts of evidence, whether hypothetico-deductive, Bayesian, or instantiationist".
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In 2001, Achinstein published his own book on the subject titled The Book of Evidence, in which, among other topics, he distinguished between four concepts of evidence: epistemic-situation evidence (evidence relative to a given epistemic situation), subjective evidence (considered to be evidence by a particular person at a particular time), veridical evidence (a good reason to believe that a hypothesis is true), and potential evidence (a good reason to believe that a hypothesis is highly probable). Achinstein's four concepts are also summarized in: Achinstein defined all his concepts of evidence in terms of potential evidence, since any other kind of evidence must at least be potential evidence, and he argued that scientists mainly seek veridical evidence but they also use the other concepts of evidence, which rely on a distinctive concept of probability, and Achinstein constrasted this concept of probability with previous probabilistic theories of evidence such as Bayesian, Carnapian, and frequentist.
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Paul M. B. Vitányi and Ming Li; "Minimum Description Length Induction, Bayesianism and Kolmogorov Complexity"
See also Chapter 5 in: However, some philosophers (including Richard Boyd, Mario Bunge, John D. Norton, and Elliott Sober) have adopted a skeptical or deflationary view of the role of simplicity in science, arguing in various ways that its importance has been overemphasized. See especially Sections 1b and 4c
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According to the posted curriculum for an "Understanding Science 101" course taught at University of California - Berkeley: "Testing hypotheses and theories is at the core of the process of science." This philosophical belief in "hypothesis testing "
Emphasis on hypothesis testing
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It is important to note that this hypothesis does not take into account all of the activities or scientific objectives of all scientists . When
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No hypothesiswas required. It may be that a more general view
Rutherford used the data to develop a new atomic model, not only to test an existing hypothesis; such use of evidence to produce new hypotheses is sometimes called abduction (following C. S. Peirce). Rutherford's interpretation of the Geiger–Marsden experiment is also mentioned as an example of abduction in: Social-science methodologist Donald T. Campbell, who emphasized hypothesis testing throughout his career, later increasingly emphasized that the essence
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offered by physicist, Lawrence Krauss, who consistently writes in the media about scientists answering questions by measuring physical properties and processes.
"not experimentation per se" but instead the iterative competition of "plausible rival hypotheses", a process that at any given phase may start from evidence or may start from hypothesis.Campbell, Donald T. (1984) "Foreword". In Other scientists and philosophers have emphasized the central role of questions and problems in the use of data and hypotheses.For example: One article from the issue is: See also: And from a scientist's perspective: