We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product . Preferences of the vendor and of potential buyers are heterogeneous and often antagonistic. Optimization of the joint benefit of the vendor and the buyers turns the toy market into a combinatorial matching problem. We compare  optimal solutions found with and without a matchmaker, examine the resulting inequality between the market participants, and study the influence of correlations .
We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and preferences of both the vendor and potential buyers are heterogeneous and possibly even antagonistic. Optimization of the joint benefit of the vendor and the buyers turns the toy market into a combinatorial matching problem. We compare the optimal solutions found with and without a matchmaker, examine the resulting inequality between the market participants, and study the impact of correlations on the system .
R
. Preferences of
and preferences of both
D
of
R
often
possibly even
A
the
R
influence of correlations
impact of correlations on the system