We develop an equilibrium theory of attention and politics. In a spatial model of electoral competition where candidates have varying policy preferences, we examine what kinds of political behaviors capture voter' s limited attention and how this concern in turn affects political outcomes. Following the seminal work of Downs (1957)  , we assume that voters are rationally inattentive and can process information about candidates' random policies at a cost proportional to entropy reduction as in Sims (1998) and Sims (2003). Two salient patterns emerge in equilibrium as we increase the attention cost or garble the news technology : first, arousing and attracting voter' s attention becomes harder; second, doing so leads the varying types of the candidates to adopt extreme and exaggerated policy and issue positions . We supplement our analysis with historical accounts, and discuss its relevance in the new era featured with greater media choices and distractions, as well as the rise of partisan media and fake news.
We develop an equilibrium theory of attention and politics. In a spatial model of electoral competition where candidates have varying policy preferences, we examine what kinds of political behaviors capture voters' limited attention and how this concern affects the overall political outcomes. Following the seminal works of Downs (1957) and Sims (1998) , we assume that voters are rationally inattentive and can process information about the policies at a cost proportional to entropy reduction . The main finding is an equilibrium phenomenon called attention- and media-driven extremism, namely as we increase the attention cost or garble the news technology , a truncated set of the equilibria captures voters' attention through enlarging the policy differentials between the varying types of the candidates . We supplement our analysis with historical accounts, and discuss its relevance in the new era featured with greater media choices and distractions, as well as the rise of partisan media and fake news.
R
voter' s
voters'
R
in turn affects
affects the overall
R
work
works
A
and Sims (1998)
R
candidates' random
the
R
as in Sims (1998) and Sims (2003). Two salient patterns emerge in equilibrium
. The main finding is an equilibrium phenomenon called attention- and media-driven extremism, namely
R
: first, arousing and attracting voter' s attention becomes harder; second, doing so leads the
, a truncated set of the equilibria captures voters' attention through enlarging the policy differentials between the
D
to adopt extreme and exaggerated policy and issue positions