Recent work suggests that people are not solely motivated by the economic consequences of the available actions, but they also have moral preferences for "doing the right thing", independently of its economic consequences. However, it remains unclear in what situations moral preferences can be activated by simply changing the framing of a decision problem . For example, earlier work proposed that moral preferences can account for framing effects in the Dictator game . However, more recent work has casted doubts on the very existence of framing effects in this game . Here we shed light on this point with two experiments. In Study 1 (N=567) we implement an extreme Dictator game in which dictators either get \0.50 and another person gets nothing, or the opposite (i.e., the other person gets \0.50 and the dictator gets nothing). We experimentally manipulate the words describing the available actions using six words , from very negative (e.g., stealing) to very positive (e.g., donating) connotations. As we predicted, we find that the rate of pro-sociality is affected by the words used to describe the available actions. In Study 2 (N= 413, pre-registered) we collect the self-reported moral judgment and feeling associated to each of the six words used in Study 1. We show that these moral judgments and feelings can explain the framing effects in Study 1. In sum, we find that changing only one word in the instructions of an extreme Dictator game can alter people's behavior, and that behavioral changes can be explained using moral judgments and feelings associated to these words .
Understanding whether preferences are sensitive to the frame has been a major topic of debate in the last decades . For example, several works have explored whether the dictator game in the give frame gives rise to a different rate of pro-sociality than the same game in the take frame, leading to mixed results . Here we contribute to this debate with two experiments. In Study 1 (N=567) we implement an extreme dictator game in which the dictator either gets \0.50 and the recipient gets nothing, or the opposite (i.e., the recipient gets \0.50 and the dictator gets nothing). We experimentally manipulate the words describing the available actions using six terms , from very negative (e.g., stealing) to very positive (e.g., donating) connotations. We find that the rate of pro-sociality is affected by the words used to describe the available actions. In Study 2 (N= 221) we ask brand new participants to rate each of the words used in Study 1 from ``extremely wrong'' to ``extremely right'' . We find that these moral judgments explain the framing effect in Study 1. In sum, our studies provide evidence that framing effects in an extreme Dictator game can be generated using morally loaded language .
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Recent work suggests that people are not solely motivated by the economic consequences of the available actions, but they also have moral preferences for "doing the right thing", independently of its economic consequences. However, it remains unclear in what situations moral preferences can be activated by simply changing the framing of a decision problem
Understanding whether preferences are sensitive to the frame has been a major topic of debate in the last decades
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earlier work proposed that moral preferences can account for framing effects in the Dictator game . However, more recent work has casted doubts on the very existence of framing effects in this game
several works have explored whether the dictator game in the give frame gives rise to a different rate of pro-sociality than the same game in the take frame, leading to mixed results
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shed light on this point
contribute to this debate
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Dictator
dictator
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dictators either get
the dictator either gets
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another person
the recipient
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other person
recipient
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words
terms
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As we predicted, we
We
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413, pre-registered) we collect the self-reported moral judgment and feeling associated to
221) we ask brand new participants to rate
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six
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1. We show
1 from ``extremely wrong'' to ``extremely right'' . We find
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and feelings can
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effects
effect
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we find that changing only one word in the instructions of
our studies provide evidence that framing effects in
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alter people's behavior, and that behavioral changes can be explained using moral judgments and feelings associated to these words
be generated using morally loaded language