We consider the one-to-one matching models with transfers of Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salani\'e (2015). When the analyst has data on one large market only, we study identification of the systematic components of the agents' preferences without imposing parametric restrictions on the probability distribution of the latent variables. Specifically, we provide a tractable characterisation of the region of parameter values that exhausts all the implications of the model and data (the sharp identified set ) , under various classes of nonparametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved terms. We discuss a way to conduct inference on the sharp identified set and conclude with Monte Carlo simulations .
We consider the one-to-one matching model with transfers of Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salani\'e (2015). When the analyst has data on one large market only, we study identification of the systematic components of the agents' preferences without imposing parametric restrictions on the probability distribution of the latent variables. We provide a tractable characterisation of the sharp identified set , under various classes of nonparametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved terms. Simulations suggest that the model can be informative about the sign and magnitude of the systematic components of the agents' preferences, under different nonparametric distributional restrictions. We also discuss a way to conduct inference on the sharp identified set . We use our methodology to investigate if the variations in marriage matching patterns observed over time in the U.S. are caused by changes in the agents' preferences for assortativeness in education .
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region of parameter values that exhausts all the implications of the model and data (the
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Simulations suggest that the model can be informative about the sign and magnitude of the systematic components of the agents' preferences, under different nonparametric distributional restrictions. We also
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and conclude with Monte Carlo simulations
. We use our methodology to investigate if the variations in marriage matching patterns observed over time in the U.S. are caused by changes in the agents' preferences for assortativeness in education