Many real-world problems such as salesand healthcare regulation involve a principal, multiple intermediaries, and agents with hidden characteristics. In these problems, intermediaries compete through offering menus of multifaceted consumption bundles to agents, whereas the principal is limited to regulating sub-aspects of the sold bundles by legal , informational and administrative barriers. We study how the principal can implement through intermediaries any social choice rule that is incentive compatible and individually rational for agents. When intermediaries have private values, intermediated implementation can be achieved by a per-unit fee schedule that allows intermediaries to break even under the target social choice rule . When intermediaries have interdependent values, per-unit fee schedules cannot generally be used to achieve implementation, whereas regulating the distribution over sub-aspects can under general conditions about the target allocation .
We examine problems of "intermediated implementation." An example is sales, whereby retailers compete through offering consumption bundles to consumers with hidden tastes, whereas a manufacturer with a potentially different goal than retailers' can regulate only the sold goods but not the charged prices by legal barriers. We study how the manufacturer can implement through retailers any incentive compatible and individually rational social choice rule for consumers. We demonstrate the effectiveness of per-unit fee schedules and distribution regulations, which hinges on whether retailers have private or interdependent values. We formulate problems of this kind and give applications to taxation and healthcare .
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Many real-world problems such as salesand healthcare regulation involve a principal, multiple intermediaries, and agents with hidden characteristics. In these problems, intermediaries
We examine problems of "intermediated implementation." An example is sales, whereby retailers
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menus of multifaceted
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agents, whereas the principal is limited to regulating sub-aspects of the sold bundles by legal , informational and administrative
consumers with hidden tastes, whereas a manufacturer with a potentially different goal than retailers' can regulate only the sold goods but not the charged prices by legal
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principal
manufacturer
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intermediaries any social choice rule that is
retailers any
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for agents. When intermediaries have private values, intermediated implementation can be achieved by a per-unit fee schedule that allows intermediaries to break even under the target
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. When intermediaries have interdependent values,
for consumers. We demonstrate the effectiveness of
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cannot generally be used to achieve implementation, whereas regulating the distribution over sub-aspects can under general conditions about the target allocation
and distribution regulations, which hinges on whether retailers have private or interdependent values. We formulate problems of this kind and give applications to taxation and healthcare