How prevalent is preference misrepresentation in matching procedures that incentivize truth-telling, and who pursues it? To address these questions, we administered an online experiment to 1,714 medical students immediately after their participation in the medical residency match . When placed in an analogous  matching task, we find that 23\% of match participants act on an incorrect belief that the algorithm can be gamed. Better students are less likely to make these mistakes, due to both higher cognitive ability and a reduced propensity to game when in a strategically advantageous position. We explore additional determinants of gaming attempts, including overconfidence, expectations, advice, and trust. We discuss the implications of this behavior for the design of allocation mechanisms and the social welfare in markets that use them.
The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in eliminating preference misrepresentation. We administered an online experiment to 1,714 medical students immediately after their participation in the medical residency match--a leading field application of strategy-proof market design . When placed in an analogous , incentivized matching task, we find that 23\% of participants misrepresent their preferences. We explore the factors that predict preference misrepresentation, including cognitive ability, strategic positioning, overconfidence, expectations, advice, and trust. We discuss the implications of this behavior for the design of allocation mechanisms and the social welfare in markets that use them.
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How prevalent is preference misrepresentation in
The development and deployment of
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truth-telling, and who pursues it? To address these questions, we
truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in eliminating preference misrepresentation. We
R
match
match--a leading field application of strategy-proof market design
A
, incentivized
R
match participants act on an incorrect belief that the algorithm can be gamed. Better students are less likely to make these mistakes, due to both higher cognitive ability and a reduced propensity to game when in a strategically advantageous position. We explore additional determinants of gaming attempts, including
participants misrepresent their preferences. We explore the factors that predict preference misrepresentation, including cognitive ability, strategic positioning,