We consider a two player dynamic game played over T \leq \infty periods. In each periodeach player chooses any probability distribution with support on 0, 1%DIFDELCMD < ] %%% with a given mean, where the mean is the realized value of the draw from the previous period. The player with the highest realization in the period achieves a payoff of 1, and the other player, 0; and each player seeks to maximize the discounted sum of his per-period payoffs over the whole time horizon . We solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, and establish properties of the equilibrium strategies and payoffs in the limit. The solution and comparative staticsthereof provide insight about intertemporal choice with status concerns. In particular we find that patient players take fewer risks .
We examine a dynamic game of competitive persuasion played between two long-lived sellers over T \leq \infty periods. %DIFDELCMD < ] %%% Each period, each seller provides information via a Blackwell experiment to a single short-lived buyer, who buys from the seller whose product has the highest expected quality . We solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, and conduct comparative statics: in particular we find that long horizons lead to less information .
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consider a two player dynamic game played
examine a dynamic game of competitive persuasion played between two long-lived sellers
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In each periodeach player chooses any probability distribution with support on
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0, 1
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with a given mean, where the mean is the realized value of the draw from the previous period. The player with the highest realization in the period achieves a payoff of 1, and the other player, 0; and each player seeks to maximize the discounted sum of his per-period payoffs over the whole time horizon
Each period, each seller provides information via a Blackwell experiment to a single short-lived buyer, who buys from the seller whose product has the highest expected quality
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establish properties of the equilibrium strategies and payoffs in the limit. The solution and comparative staticsthereof provide insight about intertemporal choice with status concerns. In
conduct comparative statics: in
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patient players take fewer risks
long horizons lead to less information