In February 1942, Colonel Percy J. Carroll,  Chief Surgeon of the US Army Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, found that he had problems flowing large 400-750 bed surgical and evacuation hospitals into troop flow as forces advanced , limiting his ability to support combat operations with effective, far-forward surgical care, as the transportation infrastructure in the Southwest Pacific, particularly in Papua and New Guinea made it virtually impossible to move hospitals  forward behind advancing forces  . During the summer and fall of 1942, at Carroll's direction, a team of Medical Corps officers modified the basic War Department Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) for a standard 25-bed station hospital (T/O&E 8-560, 22 July 1942) into a new theater T/O and table of basic allowances (T/  BA) (T/O 8-508-S-SWPA, 31 October 1942) for a portable hospital of 25-beds . The new unit was capable of supporting small units in its camp-type version (with 4 female Army nurses and organic vehicles) or battalion and regimental combat teams in its task force version (without the 4 nurses and organic vehicles). Commanded by a Medical Corps captain or major, the new 29-man portable hospital had 4 medical officers (3 general surgeons and a general surgeon/anesthetist) and 25 enlisted men, including 2 surgical and 11 medical technicians. What really marked a radical departure was that all of the unit's equipment, medical and surgical supplies, and rations could weigh no more than the 29 men could personally transport. Designed to meet a specific problem at a specific point in time, the Portable Surgical Hospital had several shortcomings. First, the weight limitations meant that it lacked much of the equipment that it needed to conduct definitive surgery. Second, it lacked the capacity to hold patients for any length of time, which could often be called for by the tactical situation. Third, teh assigned surgeons lacked the skills and experience necessary to meet the demands on teh units, as Carroll often sent younger, less experienced surgeons forward, a departure from the Army's experience in World War I, which showed that less experienced surgeons should be kept at larger facilities to the rear, where they could operate under the tutelage of a more experienced senior staff surgeon. And, finally, the Portable Surgical Hospitals had been stripped so lean that they were never truly self-sufficient, and had to rely on other units for life-support.
In February 1942, Colonel Percy J. Carroll, the Chief Surgeon of the US Army Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, found that he had problems integrating large 400 to 750-bed field and evacuation hospitals into troop flow as forces advanced because of the underdeveloped transportation infrastructure in the Southwest Pacific, particularly in Papua and New Guinea . This limited his ability to move hospitals closely forward behind advancing forces and support combat operations with effective, far-forward surgical care . During the summer and fall of 1942, at Carroll's direction, a team of Medical Corps officers modified the basic War Department Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) for a standard 25-bed station hospital (T/O&E 8-560, 22 July 1942) into a new theater table of organization and table of basic allowances (T/ O, T/ BA) (T/O 8-508-S-SWPA, 31 October 1942) for a portable hospital of 25 beds . The new unit was capable of supporting small units in its camp-type version (with 4 female Army nurses and organic vehicles) or battalion and regimental combat teams in its task force version (without the 4 nurses and organic vehicles). Commanded by a Medical Corps captain or major, the new 29-man portable hospital had 4 medical officers (3 general surgeons and a general surgeon/anesthetist) and 25 enlisted men, including 2 surgical and 11 medical technicians. A radical departure was that all of the unit's equipment, medical and surgical supplies, and rations could weigh no more than the 29 men could personally transport. Designed to meet a specific problem at a specific point in time, the Portable Surgical Hospital had several shortcomings. First, the weight limitations meant that it lacked much of the equipment that it needed to conduct definitive surgery. Second, it lacked the capacity to hold patients for any length of time, which could often be called for by the tactical situation. Third, the assigned surgeons lacked the skills and experience necessary to meet the demands on the units, as Carroll often sent younger, less experienced surgeons forward, a departure from the Army's experience in World War I, which showed that less experienced surgeons should be kept at larger facilities to the rear, where they could operate under the tutelage of a more experienced senior staff surgeon. And, finally, the Portable Surgical Hospitals had been stripped so lean that they were never truly self-sufficient, and had to rely on other units for life-support.
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the
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flowing large 400-750 bed surgical
integrating large 400 to 750-bed field
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, limiting his ability to support combat operations with effective, far-forward surgical care, as the
because of the underdeveloped
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made it virtually impossible
. This limited his ability
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closely
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and support combat operations with effective, far-forward surgical care
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T/O
table of organization
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O, T/
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25-beds
25 beds
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What really marked a
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teh
the
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teh
the