We investigate the dynamics of a trust game on a mixed population where individuals  are forced to play against a predetermined number of partners, who they choose dynamically. Agents  are also allowed to adapt their level of trustworthiness , based on payoff. The dynamics undergoes a transition at a specific value of the strategy update rate, above which an emergent URLanization is observed, where individuals have similar values of below optimal trustworthiness . This URLanization is not due to an explicit collusion among agents; instead it arises spontaneously from the maximization of the individual payoffs. This dynamics is marked by large fluctuations and a high degree of unpredictability for most of the parameter space, and serves as a plausible qualitative explanation for observed elevated levels and fluctuations of certain commodity prices.
We investigate the dynamics of a trust game on a mixed population where individuals with the role of buyers are forced to play against a predetermined number of sellers, whom they choose dynamically. Agents with the role of sellers are also allowed to adapt the level of value for money of their products , based on payoff. The dynamics undergoes a transition at a specific value of the strategy update rate, above which an emergent URLanization is observed, where sellers have similar values of below optimal value for money . This URLanization is not due to an explicit collusion among agents; instead it arises spontaneously from the maximization of the individual payoffs. This dynamics is marked by large fluctuations and a high degree of unpredictability for most of the parameter space, and serves as a plausible qualitative explanation for observed elevated levels and fluctuations of certain commodity prices.
A
with the role of buyers
R
partners, who
sellers, whom
A
with the role of sellers
R
their level of trustworthiness
the level of value for money of their products
R
individuals
sellers
R
trustworthiness
value for money