An income loss can have a negative impact on households, forcing them to reduce their consumption of some staple goods. This can lead to health issues and, consequently, generate significant costs for society. We suggest that consumers can, to prevent these negative consequences, buy insurance to secure sufficient consumption of a staple good if they lose part of their income. We develop a two-period/two-good principal-agent problem with adverse selection and endogenous reservation utility to model insurance with in-kind benefits. This model allows us to obtain semi-explicit solutions for the insurance contract and is applied to the context of fuel poverty. For this application, our model allows to conclude that, even in the least efficient scenario from the households point of view, i.e., when the insurance is provided by a monopoly, this mechanism improves significantly the living conditions of the riskiest households by ensuring them a sufficient consumption of energy  .
An income loss can have a negative impact on households, forcing them to reduce their consumption of some staple goods. This can lead to health issues and, consequently, generate significant costs for society. We suggest that consumers can, to prevent these negative consequences, buy insurance to secure sufficient consumption of a staple good if they lose part of their income. We develop a two-period/two-good principal-agent problem with adverse selection and endogenous reservation utility to model insurance with in-kind benefits. This model allows us to obtain semi-explicit solutions for the insurance contract and is applied to the context of fuel poverty. For this application, our model allows to conclude that, even in the least efficient scenario from the households point of view, i.e., when the insurance is provided by a monopoly, this mechanism decreases significantly the risk of fuel poverty of households by ensuring them a sufficient consumption of energy . The effectiveness of in-kind insurance is highlighted through a comparison with income insurance, but our results nevertheless underline the need to regulate such insurance market .
R
improves significantly the living conditions of the riskiest
decreases significantly the risk of fuel poverty of
A
. The effectiveness of in-kind insurance is highlighted through a comparison with income insurance, but our results nevertheless underline the need to regulate such insurance market