This paper studies disclosure games with general disclosure rules. A sender observes a piece of evidence about an unknown state and tries to influence the posterior belief of a receiver by disclosing evidence with possible omission. We  characterize the unique equilibrium value function of the sender given any disclosure rule. Applying this characterization , we study left-censored disclosure, where evidence is a sequence of signals, and the sender can truncate evidence from the left. In equilibrium, seemingly sub-optimal messages are disclosed, and the sender's disclosure contains the longest truncation that yields the maximal difference between the number of favorable and unfavorable signals . These findings are results of coordination among senders with different evidence endowment .
This paper studies disclosure games , allowing for large evidence spaces and general disclosure rules. A sender observes a piece of evidence about an unknown state and tries to influence the posterior belief of a receiver by disclosing evidence with possible omission. We focus on truth-leaning equilibria, where the sender discloses truthfully when doing so is optimal, and the receiver does not discount off-path messages. We show that, given any disclosure rule, all equilibria are payoff equivalent and characterize the unique equilibrium value function of the sender . We also propose a method to construct equilibria for a broad class of games. Applying these results , we study left-censored disclosure, where evidence is a sequence of signals, and the sender can truncate evidence from the left. In equilibrium, seemingly sub-optimal messages are disclosed, and the sender's disclosure contains the longest truncation that yields the maximal difference between the number of favorable and unfavorable signals .
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with
, allowing for large evidence spaces and
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focus on truth-leaning equilibria, where the sender discloses truthfully when doing so is optimal, and the receiver does not discount off-path messages. We show that, given any disclosure rule, all equilibria are payoff equivalent and
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given any disclosure rule. Applying this characterization
. We also propose a method to construct equilibria for a broad class of games. Applying these results
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. These findings are results of coordination among senders with different evidence endowment