Over sixty percent of employees at a large South African financial services company select the minimum rate of 7.5 percent for their monthly retirement contributions , far below the recommended rate of 15 percent  . I use a field experiment to investigate whether providing employees with a retirement calculator, which shows projections of retirement income, leads to increases in contributions. The average treatment effect is positive but very small and not statistically different from zero .
Over sixty percent of employees at a large South African company contribute the minimum rate of 7.5 percent to a retirement fund , far below the rate of 15 percent recommended by financial advisers . I use a field experiment to investigate whether providing employees with a retirement calculator, which shows projections of retirement income, leads to increases in contributions. The impact is negligible. The lack of response to the calculator suggests many employees may wish to save less than the minimum. I use a model of asymmetric information to explain why the employer sets a binding minimum .
R
financial services company select
company contribute
R
for their monthly retirement contributions
to a retirement fund
D
recommended
A
recommended by financial advisers
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average treatment effect is positive but very small and not statistically different from zero
impact is negligible. The lack of response to the calculator suggests many employees may wish to save less than the minimum. I use a model of asymmetric information to explain why the employer sets a binding minimum