Typical systems neuroscience experiments correlate the activity of recorded neurons with controlled variations in stimuli or behavior. Such experiments are commonly taken to reveal that the neural activity is a representation of the stimulus or behavior . But what does this statement mean? Representation is a philosophical concept with a rich history going back at least to Aristotle. A careful reading of contemporary philosophy suggests four criteria of representation as they relate to neuroscience. First, a representation needs to correlate with the object in reality that it represents. Second, a representation needs to have some causal impact on behavior. Third, a representation should have its causal roleexclusively -- the absence of the representation should block the behavior it enables. Fourth, a representation should have teleological justification that specifies the cases in which it is a misrepresentation. We argue that not taking all four criteria seriously leads to statements that are neither neuroscientifically nor philosophically satisfying. We discuss how neuroscience can move towards a deeper notion of representation .
Neuroscientists often describe neural activity as a representation of something, or claim to have found evidence for a neural representation . But what do these statements mean? The reasons to call some neural activity a representation and the assumptions that come with this term are not generally made clear from its common uses in neuroscience. Representation is a central concept in philosophy of mind, with a rich history going back to the ancient period. In order to clarify its usage in neuroscience, here we advance a link between the connotations of this term across these disciplines. We draw on a broad range of discourse in philosophy to distinguish three key aspects of representation: correspondence, functional role, and teleology. We argue that each of these aspects are implied by the explanatory role the term plays in neuroscience. However, evidence related to all three aspects is rarely presented or discussed in the course of individual studies that aim to identify representations. Overlooking the significance of all three aspects hinders communication in neuroscience, as it obscures the limitations of experimental paradigms and conceals gaps in our understanding of the phenomena of primary interest. Working from this three-part view, we discuss how to move toward clearer communication about representations in the brain .
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Typical systems neuroscience experiments correlate the activity of recorded neurons with controlled variations in stimuli or behavior. Such experiments are commonly taken to reveal that the neural activity is
Neuroscientists often describe neural activity as
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the stimulus or behavior
something, or claim to have found evidence for a neural representation
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does this statement mean?
do these statements mean? The reasons to call some neural activity a representation and the assumptions that come with this term are not generally made clear from its common uses in neuroscience.
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philosophical concept
central concept in philosophy of mind,
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at least to Aristotle. A careful reading of contemporary philosophy suggests four criteria of representation as they relate to neuroscience. First,
to the ancient period. In order to clarify its usage in neuroscience, here we advance a link between the connotations of this term across these disciplines. We draw on
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representation needs to correlate with the object in reality that it represents. Second, a representation needs to have some causal impact on behavior. Third, a representation should have its causal roleexclusively -- the absence of the representation should block the behavior it enables. Fourth, a representation should have teleological justification that specifies the cases in which it is a misrepresentation. We argue that not taking all four criteria seriously leads to statements that are neither neuroscientifically nor philosophically satisfying. We discuss how neuroscience can move towards a deeper notion of representation
broad range of discourse in philosophy to distinguish three key aspects of representation: correspondence, functional role, and teleology. We argue that each of these aspects are implied by the explanatory role the term plays in neuroscience. However, evidence related to all three aspects is rarely presented or discussed in the course of individual studies that aim to identify representations. Overlooking the significance of all three aspects hinders communication in neuroscience, as it obscures the limitations of experimental paradigms and conceals gaps in our understanding of the phenomena of primary interest. Working from this three-part view, we discuss how to move toward clearer communication about representations in the brain