waashk/dblp huggingface dataset:
sdc secure release terminal project. the sdc secure release terminal srt) project provides a useful view of the process involved in constructing software whose code is intended to be formally verified to satisfy desired security properties.the purpose of the srt is to move appropriately classified data from a processing environment at one security level to a processing environmentat another level in machine readable form. this paper discusses the design process for the srt which was carried out using the sdc formal development methodology(fdm).the srt project is the first application of the fdm code level verification capabilities.however, since the code level verification has not yet been performed this paper concentrates on the design problems inherent in targeting a system for code level verification.
simulatable security and polynomially bounded concurrent composability. simulatable security is a security notion for multi-party protocols that implies strong composability features. the main definitional flavours of simulatable security are standard simulatability, universal simulatability, and black-box simulatability. all three come in "computational," "statistical" and "perfect" subflavours indicating the considered adversarial power. universal and black-box simulatability, in all of their subflavours, are already known to guarantee that the concurrent composition even of a polynomial number of secure protocols stays secure. we show that computational standard simulatability does not allow for secure concurrent composition of polynomially many protocols, but we also show that statistical standard simulatability does. the first result assumes the existence of an interesting cryptographic tool (namely time-lock puzzles), and its proof employs a cryptographic multi-party computation in an interesting and unconventional way.
hamsa: fast signature generation for zero-day polymorphicworms with provable attack resilience. zero-day polymorphic worms pose a serious threat to the security of internet infrastructures. given their rapid propagation, it is crucial to detect them at edge networks and automatically generate signatures in the early stages of infection. most existing approaches for automatic signature generation need host information and are thus not applicable for deployment on high-speed network links. in this paper, we propose hamsa, a network-based automated signature generation system for polymorphic worms which is fast, noise-tolerant and attack-resilient. essentially, we propose a realistic model to analyze the invariant content of polymorphic worms which allows us to make analytical attack-resilience guarantees for the signature generation algorithm. evaluation based on a range of polymorphic worms and polymorphic engines demonstrates that hamsa significantly outperforms polygraph [16] in terms of efficiency, accuracy, and attack resilience.
specifying and verifying hardware for tamper-resistant software. we specify a hardware architecture that supportstamper-resistant software by identifying an "idealized"model, which gives the abstracted actions available to asingle user program. this idealized model is compared toa concrete "actual" model that includes actions of an adversarialoperating system. the architecture is verified byusing a finite-state enumeration tool (a model checker) tocompare executions of the idealized and actual models. inthis approach, software tampering occurs if the system canenter a state where one model is inconsistent with the other.in performing the verification, we detected an replay attackscenario and were able to verify the security of our solutionto the problem. our methods were also able to verifythat all actions in the architecture are required, as well ascome up with a set of constraints on the operating system toguarantee liveness for users.
is electronic privacy achievable? &ldquo;you have zero privacy anyway. get over it.&rdquo; scott mcnealy, sun microsystemswhile secrecy and integrity policies are most often crafted for protection of corporate (e.g., commercial, educational and government) information, we understand privacy policies to be targeted toward the protection of information for and about individuals. the purpose of this panel is to focus on how new technologies are affecting privacy.
beyond proof-of-compliance: safety and availability analysis in trust management. trust management is a form of distributed access controlusing distributed policy statements. since one party maydelegate partial control to another party, it is natural toask what permissions may be granted as the result of policychanges by other parties. we study security propertiessuch as safety and availability for a family of trust managementlanguages, devising algorithms for deciding the possibleconsequences of certain changes in policy. while trustmanagement is more powerful in certain ways than mechanismsin the access matrix model, and the security propertiesconsidered are more than simple safety, we find that incontrast to the classical hru undecidability of safety properties,our primary security properties are decidable. inparticular, most properties we studied are decidable in polynomialtime. containment, the most complicated securityproperty we studied, is decidable in polynomial time for thesimplest tm language in the family. the problem becomesconp-hard when intersection or linked roles are added tothe language.
how to systematically classify computer security intrusions. this paper presents a classification of intrusions with respect to technique as well as to result. the taxonomy is intended to be a step on the road to an established taxonomy of intrusions for use in incident reporting, statistics, warning bulletins, intrusion detection systems etc. unlike previous schemes, it takes the viewpoint of the system owner and should therefore be suitable to a wider community than that of system developers and vendors only. it is based on data from a realistic intrusion experiment, a fact that supports the practical applicability of the scheme. the paper also discusses general aspects of classification, and introduces a concept called dimension. after having made a broad survey of previous work in the field, we decided to base our classification of intrusion techniques on a scheme proposed by neumann and parker in 1989 and to further refine relevant parts of their scheme. our classification of intrusion results is derived from the traditional three aspects of computer security: confidentiality, availability and integrity.
security and source code access: issues and realities. this position paper addresses some of the benefits and drawbacks for security of open access to source code. after a discussion of alternative models for open access to source code, the paper reviews the positive and negative implications of each for system security. the paper concludes that source code review can have real benefits for security, but that those benefits are not realized automatically, and that some source code access models introduce significant drawbacks.
a logical language for expressing authorizations. a major drawback of existing access control systems is that they have all been developed with a specific access control policy in mind. this means that all protection requirements (i.e., accesses to be allowed or denied) must be specified in terms of the policy enforced by the system. while this may be trivial for some requirements, specification of other requirements may become quite complex or even impossible. the reason for this is that a single policy simply cannot capture different protection requirements users may need to enforce on different data.in this paper we take a first step towards a model able to support different access control policies.we propose a logical language for the specification of authorizations on which such a model can be based.the language allows users to specify, together with the authorizations, the policy according to which access control decisions are to be made.policies are expressed by means of rules which enforce derivation of authorizations, conflict resolution, access control, and integrity constraint checking.
pixy: a static analysis tool for detecting web application vulnerabilities (short paper). the number and the importance of web applications have increased rapidly over the last years. at the same time, the quantity and impact of security vulnerabilities in such applications have grown as well. since manual code reviews are time-consuming, error-prone and costly, the need for automated solutions has become evident. in this paper, we address the problem of vulnerable web applications by means of static source code analysis. more precisely, we use flow-sensitive, interprocedural and context-sensitive data flow analysis to discover vulnerable points in a program. in addition, alias and literal analysis are employed to improve the correctness and precision of the results. the presented concepts are targeted at the general class of taint-style vulnerabilities and can be applied to the detection of vulnerability types such as sql injection, cross-site scripting, or command injection. pixy, the open source prototype implementation of our concepts, is targeted at detecting cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in php scripts. using our tool, we discovered and reported 15 previously unknown vulnerabilities in three web applications, and reconstructed 36 known vulnerabilities in three other web applications. the observed false positive rate is at around 50% (i.e., one false positive for each vulnerability) and therefore, low enough to permit effective security audits.
cache cookies for browser authentication (extended abstract). like conventional cookies, cache cookies are data objects that servers store in web browsers. cache cookies, however, are unintentional byproducts of protocol design for browser caches. they do not enjoy any explicit interface support or security policies. in this paper, we show that despite limitations, cache cookies can play a useful role in the identification and authentication of users. many users today block conventional cookies in their browsers as a privacy measure. the cache-cookie tools we propose can help restore lost usability and convenience to such users while maintaining good privacy. as we show, our techniques can also help combat online security threats such as phishing and pharming that ordinary cookies cannot. the ideas we introduce for cache-cookie management can strengthen ordinary cookies as well. the full version of this paper may be referenced at www.ravenwhite.com.
message authentication with manipulation detection code. in many applications of cryptography, assuring theauthenticity of communications is as important asprotecting their secrecy. a well known and securemethod of providing message authentication is tocompute a message authentication code (mac) byencrypting the message. if only one key is used toboth encrypt and authenticate a message, however,the system is subject to several forms ofcryptographic attack. techniques have also beensought for combining secrecy and authentication inonly one encryption pass, using a manipulationdetection code generated by noncryptographicmeans. previous investigations have shown that aproposed mdc technique involving block-by-blockexclusive-oring is not secure when used with thecipher block chaining (cbc) mode of operation of thedata encryption standard (des]. it is shown herethat the cipher feedback (cfei) mode of operationexhibits similar weaknesses. a linear addition modulo264 mdc is analyzed, including discussion of severalnovel attack scenarios. a quadratic congruentialmanipulation detection code is proposed to avoid theproblems of previous schemes.
networked cryptographic devices resilient to capture. abstract: we present a simple technique by which a device that performs private key operations (signatures or decryptions) in networked applications, and whose local private key is activated with a password or pin, can be immunized to off-line dictionary attacks in case the device is captured. our techniques do not assume tamper resistance of the device, but rather exploit the networked nature of the device, in that the device's private key operations are performed using a simple interaction with a remote server. this server, however, is untrusted--its compromise does not reduce the security of the device's private key unless the device is also captured--and need not have a prior relationship with the device. we further extend this approach with support for key disabling, by which the rightful owner of a stolen device can disable the device's private key even if the attacker already knows the user's password.
on access checking in capability-based systems. public descriptions of capability-based system designs often do not clarify the necessary details concerning the propagation of access rights within the systems. a casual reader may assume that it is adequate for capabilities to be passed in accordance with the rules for data copying. a system using such a rule cannot enforce either the military security policy or the bell and lapadula rules. the paper shows why this problem arises and provides a taxonomy of capability-based designs. within the space of design options defined by the taxonomy we identify a class of designs that cannot enforce the bell-lapadula rules and two designs that do allow their enforcement.
new key generation algorithms for multilevel security. this paper addresses one aspect ofthe problem of access control in a hierarchy.a general scheme is describedwhich allows a user to generate from hisown key the keys of users below him inthe hierarchy. two implementations ofthis scheme are then proposed andcompared in terms of security andefficiency to an existing one.
preserving information flow properties under refinement. abstract: in a stepwise development process, it is essential that system properties that have been already investigated in some phase need not be re-investigated in later phases. in formal developments, this corresponds to the requirement that properties are preserved under refinement. while safety and liveness properties are indeed preserved under most standard forms of refinement, it is well known that this is, in general, not true for information flow properties, a large and useful class of security properties. in this article, we propose a collection of refinement operators as a solution to this problem. we prove that these operators preserve information flow as well as other system properties. thus, information flow properties become compatible with step-wise development. moreover, we show that our operators are an optimal solution.
on the composition of secure systems. when complex systems are constructed from simpler components it isimportant to know how properties of the components behave undercomposition. in this article, we present various compositionalityresults for security properties. in particular, we introduce a novelsecurity property and show that this property is, in general,composable although it is weaker than forward correctability.moreover, we demonstrate that certain nontrivial security propertiesemerge under composition and illustrate how this fact can beexploited.all compositionality results that we present areverified with the help of a single, quite powerful lemma. basing onthis lemma, we also re-prove several already known compositionalityresults with the objective to unify these results. as a side effect,we obtain a classification of known compositionality results forsecurity properties.
on two proposals for on-line bankcard payments using open networks: problems and solutions. recently, two major bankcard payment instrument operators visa and mastercard published specifications for securing bankcard payment transactions on open networks for open scrutiny. (visa: secure transaction technology, stt; mastercard: secure electronic payment protocol, sepp.) based on their success in operating the existing on-line payment systems, both proposals use advanced cryptographic technologies to supply some security services that are well-understood to be inadequate in open networks, and otherwise specify systems similar to today's private-network versions. in this paper we reason that when an open network is used for underlying electronic commerce some subtle vulnerabilities will emerge and the two specifications are seen not in anticipation of them. a number of weaknesses are found as a result of missing and misuse of security services. missing and misused services include: authentication, non-repudiation, integrity, and timeliness. we identify problems and devise solutions while trying to keep the current successful working style of financial institutions being respected.
fang: a firewall analysis engine. today, even a moderately sized corporate intranet contains multiple firewalls and routers, which are all used to enforce various aspects of the global corporate security policy. configuring these devices to work in unison is difficult, especially if different vendors make them. even testing or reverse-engineering an existing configuration (say, when a new security administrator takes over) is hard. firewall configuration files are written in low-level formalisms, whose readability is comparable to assembly code, and the global policy is spread over all the firewalls that are involved.to alleviate some of these difficulties, we designed and implemented a novel firewall analysis tool. our software allows the administrator to easily discover and test the global firewall policy (either a deployed policy or a planned one). our tool uses a minimal description of the network topology, and directly parses the various vendor-specific low-level configuration files. it interacts with the user through a query-and-answer session, which is conducted at a much higher level of abstraction. a typical question our tool can answer is ¿from which machines can our dmz be reached, and with which services?¿ thus, our tool complements existing vulnerability analysis tools, as it can be used before a policy is actually deployed, it operates on a more understandable level of abstraction, and it deals with all the firewalls at once.
seeing-is-believing: using camera phones for human-verifiable authentication. current mechanisms for authenticating communication between devices that share no prior context are inconvenient for ordinary users, without the assistance of a trusted authority. we present and analyse seeing-is-believing (sib), a system that utilises 2d barcodes and camera-phones to implement a visual channel for authentication and demonstrative identification of devices. we apply this visual channel to several problems in computer security, including authenticated key exchange between devices that share no prior context, establishment of the identity of a tcg-compliant computing platform, and secure device configuration in the context of a smart home.
detection of denial-of-message attacks on sensor network broadcasts. so far, sensor network broadcast protocols assume a trustworthy environment. however, in safety and mission-critical sensor networks this assumption may not be valid and some sensor nodes might be adversarial. in these environments, malicious sensor nodes can deprive other nodes from receiving a broadcast message. we call this attack a denial-of-message attack (dom). in this paper, we model and analyze this attack, and present countermeasures. we present sis, a secure implicit sampling scheme that permits a broadcasting base station to probabilistically detect the failure of nodes to receive its broadcast, even if these failures result from an attacker motivated to induce these failures undetectably. sis works by eliciting authenticated acknowledgments from a subset of nodes per broadcast, where the subset is unpredictable to the attacker and tunable so as to mitigate acknowledgment implosion on the base station. we use a game-theoretic approach to evaluate this scheme in the face of an optimal attacker that attempts to maximize the number of nodes it denies the broadcast while remaining undetected by the base station, and show that sis significantly constrains such an attacker even in sensor networks exhibiting high intrinsic loss rates. we also discuss extensions that permit more targeted detection capabilities.
methods and limitations of security policy reconciliation. a security policy is a means by which participant session requirements are specified. however, existing frameworks provide limited facilities for the automatereconciliation of participant policies. this paper considers the limits and methods of reconciliation in a general-purpose policy model. we identify an algorithm for efficient two-policy reconciliation, and show that, in the worst-case, reconciliation of three or more policies is intractable. further, we suggest efficient heuristics for the detection and resolution of intractable reconciliation. based upon the policy model, we describe the design and implementation of the ismene policy language. the expressiveness of ismene, and indirectly of our model, is demonstrated through the representation and exposition of policies supported by existing policy languages. we conclude with brief notes on the integration and enforcement of ismene policy within the antigone communication system.
fundamental limits on the anonymity provided by the mix technique. the mix technique forms the basis of many popular services that offer anonymity of communication in open and shared networks such as the internet. in this paper, fundamental limits on the anonymity provided by the mix technique are found by considering two different settings. first, we consider an information theoretic setting to determine the extent of information inherent in observations of the traffic passing through the mix.we show that if the size of sender anonymity sets is less than the total user population, the information contained in traffic observations is sufficient to deduce all communication relationships between senders and receivers using the mix. more importantly, we show that even if every user sends a message in each communication round, it is possible to compromise the anonymity significantly. we precisely characterize the extent of compromised anonymity in each case. in the second setting, we assume that the attacker has unlimited computational resources and is free to choose any attack algorithm. we derive tight upper and lower bounds on the minimum number of observations required to deduce all recipient peer-partners of a targeted user. the analysis done in these two settings reveals many discrete mathematical structures inherent in anonymity sets, and the intuition gained from these structures can be used when designing or using a mix based anonymity technique.